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THREE TREATISES 
 
 THE FIRST 
 CONCERNING ART 
 
 THE SECOND 
 CONCERNING MVSIC 
 PAINTING AND POETRY 
 
 THE THIRD 
 
 CONCERNING HAPPINESS 
 
 BY I AMES HARRIS ESC^ 
 
 9 
 
 THE THIRD EDITION 
 REVISED AND CORRECTED 
 
 LONDON 
 
 PRINTED FOR IOHN NOVRSE 
 AND PAVL VAILLANT 
 
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Advertifement to the Reader. 
 
 TN the Treatifes here publijhed , there 
 is the following Connexion. ‘The firjl 
 treats of Art in its mojl comprehenfve 
 Idea , when confidered as a Genus to many 
 fahordinate Species . The fecond confiders 
 three of thefe fubordinate Species, whofe 
 Beauty and Elegance are well known to 
 all The lafi treats of that Art , which 
 refpeBs the ConduB of Human Life y and 
 which jnay juftly be valued , as of all Arts 
 the mojl important , if it can truly lead 
 Its to the End propofed , 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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TREATISE THE FIRST 
 
 A D1ALOGVE 
 
 CONCERNING ART 
 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE 
 THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY 
 
 B 
 

 
 •* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 v - : •: t i : T 
 
 
 
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 ■ : ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCERNING ART 
 
 A DIALOGVE 
 
 TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE 
 THE EARL OF SHAFTESBVRY 
 
 My Lord, 
 
 "^HE following is a Converfation 
 in its kind fomewhat uncom¬ 
 mon, and for this reafon I have 
 remembered it more minutely than I could 
 imagine. Should the fame Peculiarity prove 
 a Reafon to amufe your Lordfhip, I fhall 
 think myfelf well rewarded in the Labour 
 of reciting. If not, you are candid enough 
 to accept of the Intention, and to think 
 there is fome Merit even in the Sincerity 
 of my Endeavours. To make no longer 
 Preface, the Fadt was as follows, 
 
 B 2 A 
 
4 
 
 Concerning A R T, 
 
 A Friend from a difiant Country hav¬ 
 ing by chance made me a Vifit, we were 
 tempted by the Serenity of a chearful Morn¬ 
 ing in the Spring, to walk from Salifoury 
 to fee Lord Pembroke § at Wilton . The 
 Beauties of Gardening, xMchitedure, Paint¬ 
 ing, and Sculpture belonging to that Seat, 
 were the Subject of great Entertainment to 
 my Friend: Nor was I, for my own part, 
 lefs delighted than he was, to find that our 
 Walk had fo well anfwered his Expedi¬ 
 tions. We had given a large Scope to oqr 
 Curiofity, when we left the Seat, and lei- 
 furely began our return towards home. 
 
 And here, my Lord, in pafiing over a 
 few pleafant Fields, commenced the Con- 
 verfation which I am to tell you, and which 
 fell at firfl:, as was natural, on the many 
 curious Works, which had afforded us both 
 fo elegant an Amufement. This led us in- 
 fenfibly to difcourfing upon ART, for we 
 both agreed, that whatever we had been 
 admiring of Fair and Beautiful, could all be 
 2 referred 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 referred to no other Caufe. And here, I 
 well remember, I called upon my Friend 
 to give me his Opinion upon the meaning 
 of the Word ART : A Word it was (I 
 told him) in the Mouth of every one; but 
 that neverthelefs, as to its precife and defi¬ 
 nite Idea, this might frill be a Secret; that 
 fo it was in fadt with a thoufand Words 
 befide, all no lefs common, and equally fa¬ 
 miliar, and yet all of them equally vagueand 
 undetermined. To this he anfwered,That 
 as to the precife and definite Idea of Art, it 
 was a Queftion of fome Difficulty, and not 
 fo foon to be refolved; that, however, he 
 could not conceive a more likely Method of 
 coming to know it, than by confidering 
 thofe feveral Particulars, to each of which 
 we gave the Name. It is hardly probable, 
 faid he, that Mufic, Painting, Medicine, 
 Poetry, Agriculture, and fo many more 
 fhould be all called by one common Name, if 
 there was not fomething in each , which was 
 common to all. It ifiould feem fo, replied I» 
 What then, faid he, fhall we pronounce 
 this to be ? At this, I remember, I was 
 
 B 3 under 
 
6 Concerning ART, 
 
 under fome fort of Hefitation. Have Cou¬ 
 rage, cried my Friend, perhaps the Cafe is 
 not fo defperate. Let me afk you—Is Me¬ 
 dicine the Caufe of any thing? Yes fure- 
 ly, faid I, of Health. And Agriculture, 
 of what ? Of the plentiful Growth of 
 Grain. And Poetry, of what ? Of 
 Plays and Satires, and Odes, and the like. 
 
 And is not the fame true, faid he, of 
 Mufic, of Statuary, of Architecture, and, in 
 iliort, of every Art whatever ? I confefs, 
 faid I, it feems fo. Suppofe then, faid 
 he, we fhould fay. It was common to every 
 Art to be a Caufe —Should we err ? I 
 replied, I thought not. Let this then, 
 faidhe, be remembered, that all Art is Caufe , 
 
 I promifed him it fhould. 
 
 But how then, continued he, if all Art 
 be Caufe , is it alfo true, that all Caufe is 
 Art ? At this again I could not help 
 helitating. You have heard, faid he, 
 without doubt, of that Painter famed in 
 Story, who being to paint the Foam of 
 a Horfe, and not fucceeaing to his Mind, 
 
 threw 
 
threw at the Pidlure in Refentment a 
 Sponge bedaubed, with Colours, and pro¬ 
 duced aFoam the moft natural imaginable. 
 Now, what fay you to this Fadt ? Shall 
 we pronounce Art to have been the Caufe ? 
 
 By no means, faid I. What, faid 
 he, if inftead of Chance, his Hand had been 
 guided by mere Compuljion , himfelf diffent- 
 ing and averfe to the Violence ? Even 
 here, replied I, nothing could have been 
 referred to his Art. But what, con¬ 
 tinued he, if inftead of a cafual 'Throw , or 
 involuntary Compuljion, he had willingly and 
 defignedly directed his Pencil, and fo pro¬ 
 duced that Foam, which Story fays he 
 failed in ?—Would not Art here have been 
 the Caufe ? I replied, in this cafe, I 
 thought it would. It (hould feem then, 
 faid he, that Art implies not only Caufe , 
 but the additional Requifite of Intention, 
 Reafon, Volition , and Confcioufnefs; fo that 
 not every Caufe is Art , but only voluntary 
 or intentional Caufe . So, laid I, it 
 
 appears. 
 
 B 4 
 
 And 
 
8 
 
 Concerning A R 
 
 And ffiall we then, added he, pronounce 
 every intentional Caufe to be Art ? I fee 
 no reafon, faid I, why not. Confider, 
 faid he; Hunger this Morning prompted 
 you to eat. You were then the Caufe , 
 and that too the intentional Caufe , of con- 
 fuming certain Food : And yet will you 
 refer this Confumption to Art ? Did you 
 chew by Art ? Did you fwallow by Art ? 
 
 No certainly, faid I. So by 
 
 opening your Eyes, faid he, you are the 
 intentional Caufe of Seeing, and by ftretch- 
 ing your Hand, the intentional Caufe of 
 Feeling ; and yet will you affirm, that 
 thefe things ■proceedfrom Art P I ffiould 
 
 be wrong, faid I, if I did: For what Art 
 can there be in doing , what every one is able 
 to do by mere Will, and a fort oj uninflrucled 
 Injlincl ? You fay right, replied he, and 
 the reafon is manifeft : Were it otherwife, 
 we ffiould make all Mankind univerfal Ar- 
 tilts in every lingle Adtion of their Lives. 
 And what can be a greater Abfurdity than 
 this ? I confelfed that the Abfurdity ap- 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 9 
 
 peared to be evident. But if nothing 
 then, continued he, which we do by Com - 
 puljion , or without intending it, be Art; and 
 not even what we do intentionally , if it pro¬ 
 ceed from mere Will and uninfruffied In- 
 ftindt ; what is it we have left remaining, 
 where Art may be found converfant ? Or 
 can it indeed poffibly be in any thing elfe, 
 than in that which we do by Ufe , Practice* 
 Experience and the like, all which are born 
 with no one, but are all acquired after¬ 
 ward by advances unperceived. I can 
 think, faid I, of nothing elfe. Let there¬ 
 fore the Words Habit and Habitua /, faid 
 he, reprefent this Requifite, and let us fay, 
 that Art is not only a Caufe, but an in¬ 
 tentional Caufe; and not only an intentio¬ 
 nal Caufe , but an intentional Caufe found¬ 
 ed in Habit , or, in other Words, an habi¬ 
 tual Caufe. You appear, faid I, to argue 
 rightly. 
 
 But if Art, faid he, be what we 
 have now afferted. fomething learnt and 
 acquired j if it be alfo a thing intentional 
 
 or 
 
io Concerning ART, 
 
 or voluntary , and not governed either bf 
 Chance or blind Necejjity *—If this, I fay, 
 be the Cafe, then mark the Confequences. 
 
 And what, faid I, are they ? The 
 firlT, faid he, is, that no Events, in what we 
 call the natural World, muff be referred to 
 Art; fuch as Tides, Winds, Vegetation, 
 Gravitation, Attraction, and the like. For 
 thefe all happen by Hated Laws; by a curi¬ 
 ous Necejfity , which is not to be withftood, 
 and where the nearer and immediate Canfes 
 appear to he wholly unconfcious. I con- 
 fefs, faid I, it feems fo. In the next 
 place, continued he, we muft exclude all 
 thofe admired Works of the Animal Worlds 
 which, for their Beauty and Order, we me¬ 
 taphorically call artificial. The Spider's 
 Web, the Bee’s Comb, the Beaver’s Houfe, 
 and the Swallow’s Neff, muft allbejreferred 
 to another Source—For who can fay, thefe 
 ever learnt to be thus ingenious ? or, that 
 they were ignorant by Nature, and knowing 
 only by Education? None, furely, re¬ 
 plied I. But we have Hill, faid he, a 
 higherConfideration. And what, faid I, 
 
 is 
 
A Dialogue. it 
 
 is that ? It is, anfwered he, this —. 
 
 Not even that Divine Power , which gave 
 Form to all things, then aBedby Art, when 
 it gave that Form. For how, continued 
 he, can that Intelligence, which has all 
 PerfeBion ever in Energy , be fuppofed to 
 have any Power, not original to its Nature? 
 How can it ever have any thing to learn, 
 when it knows allfrom the Beginning ; or, 
 being perfeB and complete , admit of what 
 is additional andfecondary ? I fliould 
 
 think, faid I, it were impoffible. If fo, 
 faid he, then Art can never be numbered 
 among its Attributes: For all Art is fome- 
 thing learnt , tomzihingfecondary and ac¬ 
 quired, and never original to any Hein?, 
 which pcfleffes it. So the Fadl, faid I, 
 has been eflablilhed. 
 
 If this therefore, continued he, be true; 
 if Art belong not either to the Divine 
 Nature, the Brute Nature, or the Inanimate 
 
 Nature,-—to what Nature (hall we fay it 
 
 does belong ? I know not, faid I, unlefs 
 it be to the hlnman. You are right, faid 
 
 7 he; 
 
S& Concerning ART, 
 
 he ; for every Nature elfe you perceive is 
 either too excellent to want it, or toobafe to be 
 capable of it. Befide, except the Human, 
 what other Nature is there left ? Or where 
 elfe can we find any of the Arts already 
 inftanced, or indeed whatever others we 
 may now fancy to enumerate ? Who are 
 Statuaries, but Men ? Who Pilots, who 
 Muficians ? This feems, replied I, to 
 be the Fadt. 
 
 Let us then, continued he, fay, net 
 only that Art is a Caufe , but that it is 
 Man becoming a Caufe; and not only Man, 
 but Man intending to do what is going to 
 be done , and doing it alfo by Habit; fo 
 that its whole Idea, as far as we have 
 
 hitherto conceived it, is- Man becoming 
 
 a Caufe , Intentional and Habitual. I con- 
 
 fefs, faid I, it has appeared fo. 
 
 And thus, faid he, have you had exhi¬ 
 bited to you a Sketch of Art. You mull re¬ 
 member however, it is but a Sketch : there 
 is ftill fomething wanting to make it a 
 
 fini Ihed 
 
A Dialogue. 13 
 
 finished Piece. I begged to know what 
 this was. In order to that, replied he, 
 I cannot do better, than remind you of a 
 Paffage in your admired Horace. It is con¬ 
 cerning Alfenus; who (if you remember) 
 he tells us, though his Tools were laid 
 afide, and his Shop {hut up, was ffcill an 
 Artift as much as ever.—— 
 
 -- Alfenus vafer omni 
 
 Abjecio injlrumento Artis claupiq, taberna , 
 Sutor erat ——■— I remember, 
 
 faid I, the Paliage, but to what purpofe is 
 it quoted ? Only, replied he, to {hew 
 you, that I {hould not be without Prece¬ 
 dent, were I to affirm it not abfolutely ne- 
 ceffary to the being of Art, that it {hould 
 be Man actually becoming a Caufe; but that 
 it was enough, if he had th e Power or Capa¬ 
 city of fo becoming. Why then, faid I, 
 did you not fettle it fo at fird ? Becaufe, 
 replied he, Faculties , Powers , Capacities 
 (call them as you will) are in themfelves, 
 abftradt from Action, but obfcure and 
 hidden things. On the contrary Energies 
 
 and Operations lie open to the Sen/es, and 
 
 cannot 
 
2 4 Concerning ART, 
 
 cannot but be obferved, even whether wc 
 will or no. And hence therefore, when 
 ftrfc we treated of Art, we chofe to treat of 
 it, as of a thing only in Energy. Now we 
 better comprehend it, we have ventured 
 fomewhat farther. Repeat then, faid I, 
 if you pleafe, the Alteration, which you 
 have made. At firft, anfwered he, we 
 reafoned upon Art, as if it was only Man 
 aBually becoming a Caufe intentional and 
 habitual. Now we fay it is a Power in 
 Man of becoming fuch Caufe ; and that, 
 though he be not actually in the Exercife of 
 fuch a Power . I told him, his Amend¬ 
 
 ment appeared to be juft. 
 
 There is too another Alteration, added 
 he, which, for the fake of Accuracy, is 
 equally wanting; and that is with refpe<ftto 
 the Epithet, Intentional or Voluntary , And 
 what, faid I, is that ? We have agreed 
 it, replied he, to be neceftary, that all Art 
 ftiould be under the Guidance of Intention 
 or Vo lit ion t fo that no Man afting by Com- 
 pulfon, or by Chance, ftiould be called 
 
 an 
 
A Dialogue. 15 
 
 an Artiji. We have. Now tho’ 
 this, raid he, be true, yet it is not fufficient. 
 We mud limit this Intention or Volition to 
 a peculiar Kind . For were every little 
 Fancy, which we may work up into Habit^ 
 a fufficient Foundation to conditute an Art, 
 we ffiould make Art one of the lowed and 
 mod: defpicable of things. The meaned: 
 Trick of a common juggler might, in fuch 
 cafe, entitle a Man to the Character of an 
 Artid. I confeded, that without fome 
 Limitation, this might betheConfequence. 
 But how limit Intentions to a Kind or 
 Species ? What think you, replied he, 
 if we were to do it, by the Number and 
 Dignity of the Precepts , which go to the 
 directing of our Intentions ? You mud: 
 
 explain, faid 1 5 for your Meaning is ob- 
 fcure. Are there not Precepts, replied he, 
 in Agriculture, about Ploughing and Sow¬ 
 ing ? Are there not Precepts in Archi¬ 
 tecture, about Orders and Proportions ? 
 Are there not the fame in Medicine, in 
 Navigation, and the red ? There are. 
 
 And what is your Opinion of thefe 
 
 feveral 
 
16 Concerning ART, 
 
 feveral Precepts ? Are they arbitrary and 
 capricious •, or rational and fteady ? Are 
 they the Inventions of a Day ; or well- 
 approved by long Experience ? I told him, 
 
 I fhould confider them for the mod part as 
 rational, fteady, and well-approved by long 
 Experience. And what, continued he, 
 fhall we fay to their Number ? Are they 
 few ? Or are they not rather fo numerous, 
 that in every particular Art, fcarce any 
 comprehend them all, but the feveral A i'¬ 
 ll (Is themfelves , and they only by length 
 of time, with due Attendance and Appli¬ 
 cation ? I replied, it feemed fo. 
 Suppofe then We were to pronounce, that 
 to every Art there was a Syflem of fuch 
 various and well-approved Precepts: Should 
 we err? No certainly. And fuppofe 
 we Ihculd fay, that the Intention of every 
 Art if, in his feveral Art, %vas directed by 
 fuch a Syflem: Would you allow this? 
 Surely. And will not this limiting of 
 Intentions to fuch only, as are fo directed, 
 fuilieiently diftinguifti Art from any thing 
 elfe which may refemble it ?——In other 
 
 words, 
 
A Dialogue. 17 
 
 words. Is it likely, under this Diflindlion, 
 to be confounded with other Habits of a 
 trifling, capricious and inferior Kind ? 
 
 I replied, I thought not. 
 
 Let us then fee, laid he, and collect 
 all that we have faid, together. We have 
 already agreed, that the Power of abting 
 after a certain manner is fufficient to con- 
 ftitute Art, without the actually operating 
 agreeably to that Power. And We have 
 now farther held the Intentions of every 
 Artifl: to be directed by a Syftem of ’various 
 and well-approved Precepts. Befides all this, 
 we fettled it before, that all Art was^founded 
 in Habit : and was peculiar to Man ; and 
 was feen by becoming theCaufe offomeEf- 
 feffi. It fliould feem then, that the whole 
 Idea of Art was this— An habitual 
 Power in Man of becoming the 
 Cause of some Effect, accord- 
 ing to a System of various 
 
 AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS. 
 
 I replied, That his Account appeared 
 to be probable and juft„ 
 
 C § 
 
Concerning A R T, 
 
 § 2. And now then, continued he, as we 
 have gone thus far, and havefettled between 
 us what we believe Art to be; fhall we goa 
 little farther, or is your Patience at an end ? 
 
 Oh! no, replied I, not if any thing be 
 left. We have walked foleifurely, that much 
 remains of our w r ay; and I can think of no 
 Method, ho w we maybetter amufe ourfelves* 
 
 My Friend upon this proceded with fay¬ 
 ing, that if Art were a Caufe , (as we had 
 agreed it was) it mufl be the Caufe offome- 
 thing. Allow it, faid I. And if it be 
 the Caufe offomething, it mufl have a Sub¬ 
 ject to operate on. For every Agent has need 
 of fome Patient; the Smith of his Iron, the 
 Carpenter of his Wood, the Statuary of his 
 Marble, and the Pilot of his Ship. 
 
 I anfwered, it was true. If then, 
 
 faid he, the Subjects of particular Arts be 
 thus evident: What Idea fhall we form of 
 that unvuerfalSubjecl, which is common to all 
 Art? At this Queflion, it mufl be con- 
 feffed, I was a little embarafied. 
 
 This 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 19 
 
 This induced him to afkme, Howmany 
 forts of Subjects I allowed of? Here I 
 could not help helitating again. There 
 is nothing, continued he, fo difficult in the 
 Queftion. You muft needs perceive, that 
 all Natures whatever can be but either con¬ 
 tingent or necejj'ary . This may be, re- 
 
 plied I j but even yet I do not comprehend 
 you. Not comprehend me ! faid he ; 
 then anfwer me a Queftion : Can you con¬ 
 ceive any Medium between Motion and No- 
 Motion, between Change and No-Change? 
 
 I replied', I could not. If not, 
 can you conceive any thing in the whole 
 Order of Being, which muft not be either 
 liable to thefe, or not liable ? Nothing. 
 
 Call thofe things therefore, faid he, 
 which are liable to Change and Motion, con - 
 tingent Natures’, and thofe, which are not 
 liable , necejj'ary Natures: And thus you 
 have a Divijion, in which all things are in¬ 
 cluded. We have fo, laid I. 
 
 ' C 2 In 
 
20 
 
 Concerning ART, 
 
 In which therefore, faid he, of thefeNa¬ 
 tures fhall we feek for this common Subject of 
 Art ? To this, I told him, I was unable 
 to anfwer. Reflect, faid he, a little. 
 We have found Art to be a Caufe . 
 
 We have. And is it not effential to 
 every Caufe to operate? or can it be a Caufe, 
 and be the Caufe of nothing ? Impoffible. 
 
 Wherever therefore there is Caufe , 
 there is neceflarily implied fome Operation . 
 
 There is. And can there poffibly 
 be Operation, without Motion and Change? 
 
 There cannot. But Change and 
 Motion baud: needs be incompatible with 
 what is necejfary and immutable . They 
 mud. So therefore is Caufe. It mud. 
 
 And fo therefore Art. It mud. 
 
 Truth therefore, faid he, and Know¬ 
 ledge ; Principles and Demondrations; the 
 general and intellectual Efences of Things; 
 in fhort, the whole immutable and necefary 
 Nature is no part of it reducible to a Subjedl 
 of Art. It feems fo, faid I. 
 
 If 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 21 
 
 If therefore Art, faid he, have nothing 
 to do with the Jieady , abflradl , and ne- 
 cefary Nature , it can have only to do 
 with the tranfienty the particular , and 
 contingent one. It is true, faid I ; for 
 there is no other left. And fhall we 
 
 then fay, replied he, it has to do with all 
 contingent Natures exiftingin theUniverfe? 
 
 For aught, replied I, which to me ap¬ 
 pears contrary. What think you, faid 
 he, of thofe Contingents of higher Order ? 
 fuch as the grant Planetary Syftem ; the 
 Succeffion of the Seafonsthe regular and 
 uniform Courfe of all fuperior Natures in 
 the Univerfe ? Has Art any Ability to 
 intermeddle here ? No certainly, faid I. 
 
 Thefe fuperior Contingents then, 
 which move without interruption , are, it 
 feems, above it. They are. 
 
 And Ihall we fay the fame of thofe of lower 
 fort y thofe, whofe Courfe wefee often inter¬ 
 rupted j thofe, which the Strength and Cun¬ 
 ning of Man are able to influence and con- 
 iroul? Give Inftances, faid I, of what 
 
 C 3 you 
 
22 
 
 Concerning ART, 
 
 you mean. I mean, faid he, Earth, 
 
 Water, Air, Fire ; Stones, Trees ; Ani¬ 
 mals ; Men themfelves. Are thefe Con¬ 
 tingents within the reach of Art, or has 
 Art here no Influence ? I fhould think, 
 faid I, a very great one. 
 
 If this, continued he, be true, it fhould 
 feem that the common or universal 
 Subject of Art was —-all those con- 
 
 TINGENtNaTURES, WHICH LIE WITHIN 
 THE REACH OF THE HUMAN POWERS 
 to influence. I acknowledge, faid I, 
 it appears fo. 
 
 Thus far then, faid he, we have ad¬ 
 vanced with tolerable Succefs. We have 
 p-ained fome Idea of Art % and fome Idea of 
 
 O 
 
 its Subject. Our Inquiry, on the whole, 
 has informed us, that Art is--an habi¬ 
 
 tual Power in Man of becoming a certain 
 Caufe* —and that its Subject is— every 
 fuch contingent Nature , which lies within the 
 reach of the human Powers to influence. 
 
A Dialogue, 
 
 O 
 
 § 3. It is true,(aid I, this appears tohave 
 been the Refult of our Inquiry, and a full 
 and ample one it feems to have been. 
 
 A long one, replied he, if you pleafe, but 
 not a full and ample one. Can any 
 
 thing, faid I, be wanting, after what you 
 have faid already ? Certainly, replied 
 he, a great deal. We have talked much 
 indeed of Art, confidered as a Caufe ; and 
 much of the SubjeB , on which it operates ; 
 but what moves thefe Operations to com¬ 
 mence, and where it is they end , thefe are 
 Topics, which we have as yet little 
 thought of. I begged him then, that 
 
 we might now coniider them. 
 
 He was willing, he faid, for his part, 
 and immediately went on by afking, What 
 I thought was the Beginning of Art? 
 I mean, faid he, by Beginning , that Caufe 
 for the fake of which it operates, and which 
 being fuppofed away , Men would be never 
 moved to follow it. To this, I told him, 
 I was unable to anfwer. You will no £ 
 
 C 4 think 
 
%<l Concerning A R T, 
 
 think it, faid he, fo difficult, when you 
 have a little more confidered. Relied: 
 
 with yourfelf--Was it not the Abfence 
 
 of Health, which excited Men to cultivate 
 the Art of Medicine ? I replied, it was. 
 What then, faid he, if the Human 
 Body had been fo far perfect and felf- 
 fufficient , as never to have felt the Vicijji- 
 tudes of Well and III: Would not then this ; 
 Art have been wholly unknown ? 
 
 I replied, I thought it would. And 
 
 what, faid he, if we extend this Perfe&iofi 
 a degree farther, and fuppofe the Body not 
 only thus healthful , but withal fo robujl , as 
 to have felt no Uneafinefs from all Incle¬ 
 mencies of Weather: Would not then the 
 Arts of Building alfo and Clothing have 
 been as ufelefs, as that of Medicine ? 
 
 I replied, it feemed they would. But 
 W'hat, faid he, if we bound not this Per¬ 
 fection of ours even here ? What if we 
 fuppole, that not only Things merely necef- 
 firy , but that thofe alfo conducive to Ele¬ 
 gance and Enjoyment were of courfe all 
 implied in the Conffitution of Human Na¬ 
 ture ; 
 
A DlALOGUEi 4$ 
 
 tui*e \ that they were all Jieady , conjiant j 
 aud independant from without , and as in- 
 feparable from our Being, as Perfpiring, or 
 Circulation : In fuch cafe, would not the 
 Arts of Mufic* Painting, and Poetry, with 
 every other Art palling under the Denomi¬ 
 nation of Elegant , have been as ufelefs, as 
 we have held thofe others of Medicine, 
 Clothing, and Architecture ? I replied, 
 It feemed they would. It was then the 
 Abfence of Joys, Elegancies, and Amufe- 
 ments from our Conjlitution, as left by 
 Nature , which induced us to feek them in 
 thefe Arts of Elegance and Entertainment . 
 
 It was. And what, faid he, are 
 Joys, Elegancies, Amufements, Health, 
 Robuftnefs, with thofe feveral other Objedls 
 of Dejire, whofe abfence leads to Art> but fo 
 many different Names of that complex Being 
 called Good, under its various , and multi- 
 form , and popular Appearances ? I re¬ 
 plied, it feemed fo. 
 
 If' this then, faid he, be granted, it 
 fhould feem that the Beginning or Prin¬ 
 ciple 
 
26 Concerning ART, 
 
 ciple of Art was the Abfence of fome thing 
 thought Good ; becaufe it has appeared that 
 it is for the fake of fome fuch abfent Good 
 that every Art operates ; and becaufe, if 
 we fuppofe no fuch Abfence to have been , 
 we jhould never have known any Art. 
 
 I confefs, faid I, it feems fo. 
 
 But how then, continued he? If it be 
 true that all Art implies fuch Principle , 
 it is reciprocally true, that every fuch 
 Principle Ihould imply Art ? I fee no 
 reafon, faid I, why not. Confider, 
 
 faid he. It might be thought a Good by 
 fome perhaps, to be as ftrong as thofe 
 Horfes, which are ploughing yonder Field; 
 to be as tall as thofe Elms, and of a Nature 
 
 as durable.-Yet would the Abfence of 
 
 Goods, like thefe , lead to Art ? Or is it not 
 abfurd to fuppofe, there fhould be an Art 
 of Impoffibilities ? Abfurd, faid I, cer¬ 
 tainly. If fo, faid he, when we define 
 the Beginning or Principle of Art, it is not 
 enough to call it the Abfence of fomething 
 thought Goody unlefs we add, that the Good 
 
 be 
 
A Dialogue. 27 
 
 be a Good Pojjible ; a "Thing attainable by 
 Man ; <2 Thing relative to Human Life , rzW 
 conjijlent with Human Nature: Ordoesnot 
 this alfo appear a Requifite ? I replied., 
 I thought it did. 
 
 But hill, continued he-Is it a fuf- 
 
 hcient Motive to Art, that the Good dejired 
 ihould be attainable ? In other Words, 
 does every Abfence of Good attainable lead 
 to Art , or is our Account hill too loofe , and 
 in need of hrider Determination ? 
 
 Of none, laid I, which appears to me. 
 Refled:, faid he; there are fome the pof- 
 fible Goods fo obvious and eafy, that every 
 Man, in an ordinary State of common na¬ 
 tural Perfedlion , is able to acquire therm 
 without Labour or Application. You will 
 hardly deny but that a fair Apple, tempting 
 to eat, may be gathered ; or a clear Spring, 
 tempting to drink, may he drank ar, by 
 the mere Suggehions of Will and unin - 
 ftrudied Inf in 51 . I granted, they might. 
 
 It would be therefore impertinent, 
 faid he, to fuppofe that Goods, like thefe t 
 
 Ihould 
 
2$ Concerning ART* 
 
 fhould lead to Art, becaufe Art would be 
 Juperfluous, and in no refpeft neceffary. 
 
 Indeed, faid I, it Teems To. 
 
 If therefore, faid he, neither Impojjibles 
 lead to Arty becaufe offuch there can be no 
 Art y nor Things eafily pojfible, becaufe in 
 fuck Nature can do without Art: what is it 
 we have left, to which we may refer it ? 
 Or can it indeed be to any other than to that 
 middle Clafs of Things, which, however pof- 
 fible, are flill not fo eafy, but to be beyond 
 the Powers of Will, and Infh'nct unin- 
 ftru&ed ? I replied, it Teemed fo. 
 
 That there are many fuch things, faid he, 
 is evident pad: doubt. For what Man 
 •would pay Artifts fo largely for their Arts, 
 were he enabled by Nature to obtain what¬ 
 ever he def red ? Or who would ftudy to 
 be flailed in Arts, were Nature’s original 
 Powers to be of themfelves alonefufficient ? 
 
 I told him, it was not likely. 
 
 It fhould Teem then, faid he, according 
 to this Reafoning,that the B z c i n n i n g , Mo¬ 
 tive, 
 
A Dialogue. 29 
 
 tive, or Principle of Art ; that Caufe, which 
 firft moves it to Aft ion, and ,for the fake of 
 ’which its feveral Operations are exerted, 
 is— the Want or Absence of some¬ 
 thing appearing Good; relativeto 
 H uman Life, and attainable by 
 Man, but superior to his natural 
 
 AND UNINSTRUCTED FACULTIES. 
 
 I replied, I could not deny, but that the 
 Account appeared probable. 
 
 § 4. Let this then, faid he, fuffice, as to 
 the Beginning of Art. But how (hall we 
 defcribe its End ? What is it we fhall pro¬ 
 nounce this ? My Anfwer, I replied, 
 muff be the fame as often already; which 
 was indeed, that I could not refolve the 
 Queftion. It fhould feem, faid he, 
 
 not fo difficult, now we have difcovered 
 what Beginning is. For if Beginning and 
 End are Contraries and oppofed, it is but 
 to invert, as it were, the Notion of Begin¬ 
 ning, and we gain of courfe the Notion of 
 End. I afked him, in what manner ? 
 
 Thus, faid he, the Beginning of Art has 
 <5 been 
 
30 Concerning ART, 
 
 been held to b efomething, which , ffuppofed 
 away , Men would be never moved to apply to 
 Art. By Inverfion therefore the End of Art 
 mu ft be fame thing, which , while fuppofed 
 away , Men will never ceafe applying to Art j 
 becaufe, were they to ceafe, while the End 
 was wanting, they would ceafe with Im¬ 
 perfection, and their Performance would be 
 incomplete. To this I anfwered. That 
 the Account, however true, was by far too 
 general, to give me much Intelligence. 
 
 He replied, If it was, he would endea¬ 
 vour to be more particular. And what, 
 continued he, fhould we fay, that every 
 Art, according to its Genius, will of courfe 
 be accomplijhed either in fome Energy , or in 
 fome Work $ that, befides thefe two, it can 
 be accomplifned in nothing elfe; and con- 
 fequently that one of thefe muji of neeejjity be 
 its End? I conld not here but anfwer 
 him with a Smile, That the Matter was 
 now much obfcurer than ever. I find 
 then, faid he, it is proper we fhould be more 
 explicit in our Inquiries, and deduce our 
 
 Reafon- 
 
A Dialogue. 31 
 
 Reafonings from fome clearer Point of 
 View. I told him, It was quite necef- 
 fary, if he intended to be intelligible. 
 
 Thus then, Paid he. You will grant, that 
 every Art, being a Caufe, mujl be productive 
 of fome Ejfeft ; for indance, Mufic, of a 
 Tune; Dancing, of a Dance; Architecture, 
 of a Palace ; and Sculpture, of a Statue 
 It is allowed, faid I. You will 
 
 grant alfo, faid he, that in thefe Productions 
 they are all accomplifed and ended: Or, in 
 other words, thatas Mufic produces a Tune, 
 fo it is ended and accomplished in a Tune; 
 and as Sculpture produces a Statue, fo is it 
 ended and accomplished in a Statue. 
 
 It is admitted, faid I. Now thefe Pro¬ 
 ductions, continued he, if you will examine, 
 are not like Units or Mathematical Points ; 
 but, on the contrary, all confjl of a certain 
 Number of Parts, from whofe accurate Or- 
 der is derived their Beauty and Perfection . 
 For example; Notes, ranged after fuch a 
 manner, make a Tune in Mufic; and 
 Limbs, ranged after fuch a manner, make a 
 
 Statue 
 
 7 
 
/ 
 
 32 Concerning A R T, 
 
 Statue or a Picture. I replied, They did. 
 
 If then the Productions , continued he, 
 of every Art thus confift of certain Parts , 
 it will follow, that thefe Parts will be either 
 co-exijlent , or not; and if not co-exijlent, 
 then of courfe [uccejjive. Affift me, 
 
 faid I, by another Inllance, for you are 
 growing again obfcure. Co-exijlent, re*- 
 plied he, as in a Statue, where Arms, Legs, 
 Body, and Head allfubfijl together at one in¬ 
 dividual In ft ant : Succeffive, as in a Tune or 
 Dance, where thereis nofuch Co-exiftence, 
 but where fom t Parts are everpuffing away, 
 and others are ever fucceeding them. 
 
 Can any thing be faid to exijl, faid I, 
 whole Parts are ever pajjing away ? 
 
 Surely, replied he, or how elfe exifl Years 
 and Sealons, Months and Days, with their 
 common Parent , Time itfelf ??—Or indeed 
 what is Human Life , but a Compound of 
 Parts thus jleeting ; a Compound of various 
 and multiform Actions , which fucceed each 
 other in a certain Order? The Fadt, 
 faid I, appears fo. 
 
 This 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 33 
 
 This then, continued he, being the cafe, 
 and there being this Difference in Produc¬ 
 tions, call every Production, the Parts of 
 which exijt fuccejfively, and whofe Nature 
 hath its Being or E[fence in a Pranfition, call 
 it, what it really Motion os an Energy— 
 Thus a Tune and a Dance are Energies; 
 thus Riding and Sailing are Energies; and 
 fo is Elocution, and fo is Life itfelf. On 
 the contrary, call every Production , whofe 
 Parts exijt ail at once, and whofe Nature de¬ 
 pends not on a Pranftion for its Efence, call 
 it a Work, or Thing done, not an Energy 
 or Operation.—*■—Thus a Houfe is a Work, 
 a Statue is a Work, and fo is a Ship, and 
 fo a Picture. I feem, faid I, to compre¬ 
 hend you. 
 
 If then there be no Productions, faid he, 
 but muft be of Parts, either co-exiflent or 
 Juccefive and the one of thefe be, as you 
 perceive, a Work, and the other be an 
 Energy ; it will follow, there will be no 
 Production, but will be either a Work or an 
 
 D Energy. 
 
34 Concerning A R T, 
 
 Energy. There will not, faid l. But 
 every Art, faid he, you have granted, is 
 accomplijhed and ended in what it produces ? 
 
 I replied, I had. And there are 
 no Productions , but Works or Energies ? 
 None. 
 
 It will follow then, faid he, that every 
 Art will be accomplished and end¬ 
 ed in a Work or Energy. 
 
 To this I anfwered, That his Reafoning 
 I could not impeach; but that ftill the Di- 
 HinCtion of Work and Energy was what I 
 did not well comprehend. There are 
 feveral Circuinftances, faid he, which will 
 ferve fufficiently to make it clear. 
 
 I begged he would mention fome. 
 
 Thus then, faid he-When the Pro¬ 
 
 duction of any Art is an Energy , then the 
 PerfeCiwn op the Art can be only perceived 
 during that Energy. For inftance, the Per¬ 
 fection of a Mulician is only known, while 
 he continues playing. But when the Pro¬ 
 duction 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 35 
 
 du<ftion of any Art is a Work , then is not the 
 Perfection vifible during the Energy , but only 
 after it. Thus the Perfection of the Sta¬ 
 tuary is not feen during his Energies as a 
 Statuary, but when his Energies are over j 
 when no Stroke of the Chizzel is wanting, 
 but the Statue is left as the Refillt of all. 
 
 It is true, faid I. 
 
 Again, continued he,-——in confe- 
 quenceof this, w'here the Production is an 
 Energy , there the Production is of Necefjity 
 
 r 
 
 co-eval with the Artifl . For how fhould 
 the Energy furvive the Man ; the Playing 
 remain, when the Muftcian is dead ? But 
 where the Production is a Work , then is 
 there no fuch Necejjity. The Work may well 
 remain, when the Artift is forgotten; there 
 being no more reafon, that the Statue and 
 the Artift fhould be co-eval, than the Man 
 and the rude Marble, before it received a 
 regular Figure. You feem now, faid I, 
 to have explained yourfelf. 
 
 D 2 If 
 
 
3 6 
 
 Concerning ART, 
 
 If then, laid he, Work and Energy 
 be made intelligible "Terms, you cannot but 
 perceive the Truth of what we before af- 
 ferted—■—— that every Art , according to its 
 Genius , muft needs be accomplijhed in one of 
 tliefe ; that , except in thefe two , // can be ac- 
 complifhed in nothing elfe ; and confequently 
 that ONE OF THESE MUST OF NECESSITY 
 be its End. 1 anfwered, That the 
 
 Reafoning appeared juflly deduced. So 
 much then, replied he, for the Ending or 
 Accomplijhment of Art ; and fo much alfo 
 for a long, and, I fear, an intricate Difqui* 
 fition. 
 
 § 5. He had no fooner faid this, than I 
 was beginning to applaud him ; efpecially 
 on his having treated a Subject fo copioufly, 
 flarted, as it were, by Chance, and without 
 any apparent Preparation. But I had not 
 gone far, before he interrupted me, by fay¬ 
 ing, That as to my Praifes they were more 
 than he deferved ; that he could pretend to 
 no great Merit for having been, as I called 
 
 it. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 37 
 
 it, fo copious, when he had fo often before 
 thought, on what at prefent we had beeu 
 talking. In fhort, fays he, to tell you a 
 Secret, I have been a long time amufing 
 myfelf, in forming an Elfay upon this Sub- 
 jed. I could not here forbear reproach¬ 
 ing him, for having hitherto concealed his 
 Intentions, My Reproaches produced a fort 
 of amicable Controverfy, which at length 
 ended in his offering, That, to make me 
 fome amends, he would now recite me (if 
 I pleafed) a fmall fragment of the Piece; 
 a Fragment, which he had happened acci¬ 
 dentally to have about him. The Propofal, 
 on my part, was willingly accepted, and 
 without farther Delay, the Papers were 
 produced. 
 
 As to the Performance itfelf, it muff be 
 confeffed, in point of Stile, it was fomewhat 
 high and florid, perhaps even bordering 
 upon an Excefs. At the time however of 
 recital, this gave me lefs Offence, becaufe 
 it feemed, as it were, to palliate the Drynefs 
 of what had paffed before, and in fome fort 
 
 D 3 to 
 
3 8 Concerning ART, 
 
 to fupply the Place of an Epilogue to our 
 Conference. Not however to anticipate, 
 he began reading as follows : 
 
 t( O Art ! Thou dijiinguifing Attribute 
 “ and Honour of Human Kind ! who art 
 “ not only able to imitate Nature in her 
 “ Graces, but (what is more) even to adorn 
 “ her with Graces of thy own. Pofleffed of 
 
 Thee, the meaneflGenius grows deferv- 
 * e ing, and has a juft Demand for a Portion 
 “ of our Efteem. Devoid of Thee, the 
 “ Brighteft of our Kind lie loft and ufelefs, 
 <c and are but poorly diftinguifhed from 
 “ the mod Defpicable and Bafe. When 
 “ we inhabited Forefts in common with 
 “ Brutes, nor otherwife known from them 
 “ than by the Figure of our Species , Thou 
 “ taughtell us toaflert the Sovereignty ofour 
 “ Nature , and to aflume that Empire, for 
 “ which Providence intended us. Thou- 
 “ fands of Utilities owe their Birth toThee; 
 <c thoufands of Elegancies, Pleafures, and 
 e< Joys, without which Life itfelf would be 
 <c but an infipid PolTeffion. 
 
 <{ Wide 
 
A Dialogue, 
 
 39 
 
 “ Wide and extenfive is the Reach 
 <f of thy Dominion. No Element is 
 S( there either fo violent or fo fubtle, (oyield- 
 <c ing or fo 'Jluggijh , as by the Powers of its 
 “ Nature to be fuperior to thy Direction. 
 “ Thou dreaded not the fierce Xmpetuodty 
 “ of Fire, but compelled its Violence to 
 11 be both obedient and ufeful. By it Thou 
 ec foftened the dubborn Tribe of Minerals, 
 “ fo as to be formed and moulded into 
 “ Shapes innumerable. Hence Weapons, 
 <c Armour, Coin ; and previous to thefe, 
 “ and other Thy Works and Energies , 
 “ hence all thofe various Tools and Xndru- 
 <( ments, which empower Thee to proceed 
 “ to farther Ends more excellent. Nor is 
 " the fubtle Air lefs obedient to Thy 
 Power, whether Thou willed it to be a 
 “ Minider to our Pleafure, or Utility. At 
 «* Thy Command it giveth Birth toSounds, 
 “ whichcharmtheSoul withall ihePowers 
 “ of Harmony. Under thy Xndrudfion it 
 <c moves the Ship o’er Seas, while that 
 “ yielding Element, where otherwife we 
 
 D 4 <f fink, 
 
 * 
 
40 Concerning ART, 
 
 £c fink, even Water itfelf is by Thee 
 
 taught to bear us ; the vail Ocean to pro- 
 “ mote that Intercourfe of Nations, which 
 <£ Ignorance would imagine it was deftined 
 <c to intercept. To fay how thy Influence is 
 <c feen on Earth, would be to teach 
 <c the meanefl-, what he knows already. 
 “ Suffice it but to mention Fields of Arable 
 “ and Failure ; Lawns and Groves, and 
 “ Gardens, and Plantations ; Cottages, Vil- 
 “ lages,Cafi:les, Towns; Palaces,Temples, 
 “ and fpacious Cities. 
 
 “ Nor does thy Empire end in a Subjects 
 “ thus in-animate . Its Power alfo extends 
 “ thro’ the various Race of Animals, 
 “ who either patiently fubmit to become 
 <c thy Slaves, or are fure to find Thee an ir- 
 “ refiflible Foe. The faithful Dog, the 
 “ patient Ox, the generous Plorfe, and the 
 <c mighty Elephant, are content all to re- 
 “ ceive their Inflrudtions from Thee, and 
 fC readily to lend their natural InJlinBs or 
 c( Strength , to perform thofeOffices, which 
 f< thy Occaflons call for. If there be found 
 
 “ any 
 
A Dialogue. 41 
 
 “ any Species, which are ferviceable when 
 “ dead, Thou fuggeftefi: the Means to in- 
 ct veftigate and take them. If any be fo 
 “ fivage, as to refufe being tamed ; or of 
 “ Natures fierce enongh, to venture an At- 
 “ tack ; Thou teachefi: us to fcorn their 
 “ brutal Rage ; to meet, repel, purfue, and 
 “ conquer. 
 
 <f And fuch, O Art ! is thy amazing 
 “ Influence, when Thou artemployedonlv 
 ** on thefe inferior Subjects ; on Natures/w- 
 “ animate , or at hzfolrratmial. But when- 
 
 e’er Thou choofefl: a Subjedl more noble, 
 “ and fettefi: to the cultivating of Mind 
 “ itfelf, thenitisThou becomefi truly ami- 
 “ able and divine ; the ever-flowing Source 
 “ of thofe fublimer Beauties, of which no 
 “ Subjefl but Mind alone is capable. Then 
 “ it is Thou art enabled to exhibit to Alan- 
 ** kind the admired Tribe of Poets and of 
 te Orators; the facred Train ol Patriots and 
 il of Pleroes; the godlike Lift of Philofo- 
 “ phers and Legiflators; the Forms of vir- 
 “ tuous and equal Polities, where private 
 
 “ Wei- 
 
42 
 
 Concerning A R T, 
 
 “ Welfare is made the fame with public; 
 “ where Crowds themfelves prove dif- 
 “ interefled and brave, and Virtue is made 
 “ a national and popular Charadteridic. 
 
 “ Hail ! facred Source of all thefe 
 “ Wonders ! Fhyfelf inftrudt me to praife 
 <c Thee worthily, thro’ whom whate’er we 
 “ do, is done with Elegance and Beauty ; 
 “ without whom, what we do, is ever grace- 
 (t lefs and deformed. —Venerable Power ! 
 “ By what Name {hall I addrefs Thee? 
 “ Shall I call thee Ornament of Mind ; 
 t( or art Thou more truly Mind itfelf l — 
 “ It is Mind Thou art, mod: perfedt 
 “ Mind ; not rude, untaught, but fair and 
 “ poliflied ; in fuch Thou dwelled, of fuch 
 “ Thou art the Form ; nor is it a Thing 
 “ more podible to feparateThee from fuch, 
 “ than it would be to feparate Thee from 
 “ thy own Exidence.-- 
 
 My good Friend was now arrived to a 
 very exalted Pitch, and was purfuing his 
 Panegyric with great Warmth and Fluency; 
 
 when 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 43 
 
 when we entered the Suburbs, our Walk 
 being near finifhed. The People, as we 
 went along, began to look at us with Sur¬ 
 prize ; which I, who was lefs engaged, 
 having leifure to obferve, thought it was 
 proper to admonifh my Friend, that he 
 fhould give over. He immediately ceafed 
 reading ; put his Papers up ; and thanked 
 me for flopping him at fo feafonabJe a 
 Time. 
 
 § 6 . What remained of our Difcourfe 
 paffed off with lefs Rapture, and was in¬ 
 deed no more, than a kind of fhort Re¬ 
 capitulation. 
 
 He obferved to me, that our Inquiries 
 had furnffhed out an Anfwer to four diffe¬ 
 rent Queflions. For thus, faid he, if it be 
 alked us. What Art is? We have to 
 Anfwer, it is—>—-an habitual Power in 
 Man y of becoming the Caufe of fame Effedl, 
 according to a Syjiem of 'various and well- 
 approved Precepts. If it be afked us, On 
 what Subjedl Art operates? We can answer, 
 
 8 On 
 
44 Concerning ART, 
 
 On a contingent, which is within the reach 
 of the Human Powers to influence . If it be 
 afked us. For what Peafon, for the fake of 
 what , Art operates ? We may reply. For 
 thefake of fome abfent Good , relative to Hu¬ 
 man Life, and attainable by Man , but fupe- 
 rior to his natural and uninflrubded Facul¬ 
 ties. Laftly, if it be afked. Where it is the 
 Op erations of Art end? We may fay. 
 Fit her in fome Energy, or in fome Work. 
 
 He added. That if be were not afraid of 
 the Imputation of Pedantry, he could be 
 almofl tempted to fay. That we had been 
 confidering Art, with refpedt to thofe four 
 Caufes, fo celebrated once among ProfefTors 
 in the Schools. By thefe, upon Inquiry, I 
 found that he meant certain Caufes, called 
 the* Efficient, the -f Material, the^Final, 
 and the || Formal. 
 
 But 
 
 * P. 17. 
 i P. 34) 3 6 * 
 
 f P. 22. 
 
 t P. 28, 29. 
 
yl Dialogue. 45 
 
 But here, without farther explaining, 
 he begged for the prefect that we might 
 conclude, being fufficiently, as he faid, 
 fatigued with the Length of what had 
 palled already. The Requed was reafon- 
 able I could not but own, and thus ended 
 our Converfation, and foon after it our 
 Walk. 
 
 J/ig E N D. 
 

 ' 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 . 'ij 
 
 *. 
 
 .... ij 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TREATISE THE SECOND 
 
 A DISCOURSE 
 
 On MUSIC, PAINTING, 
 and P O E T R Y. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 49 ) 
 
 CONTENT Si 
 
 CHAPTER the First. 
 
 * 
 
 1 “ NTRODUCTION —— Defgn and 
 
 Diftribution of the Whole—Preparation 
 for the following Chapters. 
 
 CHAPTER the Second. 
 
 On the Subjects which Painting imitates —- 
 On the Subjects which Mufc imitates —* 
 Comparifon of Mufc with Painting. 
 
 CHAPTER the Third. 
 
 On the Subjects which Poetry imitates , but 
 imitates only thro natural Media , Gr mere 
 Sounds— —Comparifon of Poetry in this 
 Capacity , firfi with Painting , then with 
 Mufc. 
 
 E 
 
 CHAP- 
 
5° 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER the Fourth. 
 
 On the SubjeBs which Poetry imitates,-not 
 by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by 
 Words Significant; the Subjects being fuck 
 to which the Genius of each of the other two 
 Arts is mod; perfectly adapted .— ItsCom- 
 parifon in thefe Subjects, firft with Paint - 
 ing, then with Mufic . 
 
 CHAPTER the Fifth. 
 
 On the Subjects which Poetry imitates by 
 Words Significant, being at the fame time 
 Subjects not adapted to the Genius of either 
 
 of the other Arts - The Nature of thefe 
 
 Subjects. *--'- The Abilities of Poetry to 
 imitate them.—Comparifon of Poetry in 
 refpedi of thefe Subjects, frfl with Paint¬ 
 ing, then with Mufic . 
 
 CHAP- 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 5 1 
 
 CHAPTER the Sixth. 
 
 On Mufic confiderednot as an Imitation, but 
 as deriving its 'Efficacy from another 
 
 Source .- On its joint Operation by this 
 
 means with Poetry•—An Objection to 
 Mujic folved.—Phe Advantage arifing to 
 it, as well as to Poetry, from their being 
 united*—*—Conchffion* 
 
 E 
 
 z 
 
 A 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 53 ) 
 
 A DISCOURSE 
 
 On MUSIC, PAINTING, 
 and POETRY. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Introduction. — T>ejign and JDiJlribution of 
 the Whole.—Preparationfor the following 
 Chapters. 
 
 A LL Arts have this in common, Ch. I. 
 that they refpeCl Human Life. v --v—■ 
 Some contribute to its Necefji- 
 ties , as Medicine and Agriculture ; others 
 to its Elegance , as Muftc, Painting, and 
 Poetry. 
 
 Now, with refpedt to thefe two diffe- 
 rent Species , the necejfary Arts feem to have 
 been prior in time ; if it be probable, that 
 
 E 3 Men 
 
A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 I. Men confulted how to live and to fupport 
 mmmJ themfelves* before they began to deliberate 
 how to render Life agreeable. Nor is this 
 indeed unconfirmed by Fadt, there being 
 no Nation known fobarbarous and ignorant, 
 as where the Rudiments of thefe necejfary 
 Arts are not in fome degree cultivated. 
 , And hence poffibly they may appear to be 
 the more excellent and worthy* as having 
 claim to a Preference , derived from their 
 Seniority . 
 
 The Arts however of Elegance cannot 
 be laid to want Pretenfions, if it be true, 
 that Nature framed us for fome thing more 
 than mere Exijlence . N ay, farther *, if Well- 
 being be clearly preferable to Mere-being , 
 and this without itbebut a thing contempt¬ 
 ible, they may have reafon perhaps to 
 afpire even to a Superiority. But enough 
 of this, to come to our Purpofe. 
 
 § 2 . 
 
 * ’o V TO £>11/ TTTfpl TS’XtlfiS zrowltov, 
 
 *AAA« to iv tfy. Plat, in Critone. 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 55 
 
 §2. The Defign of this Difcourfe is toCh. I. 
 treatofMusic, Painting, and Poetry^ 
 to confider in what they agree, and In 
 what they differ , and which upon the 
 
 WHOLE, IS MORE EXCELLENT THAN THE 
 OTHER TWO. 
 
 In entering upon this Inquiry, it is firfl 
 to be obferved, that the Mind is made 
 confcious of the natural World and its Af¬ 
 fections, and of other Minds and their 
 Affections, by the feveral Organs of the 
 Settfes ( a ). By the fame Organs , thefe Arts 
 exhibit to the Mind Imitations, and imitate 
 either Parts or AffeCtions of this natural 
 
 E 4 World, 
 
 (a) To explain fome future Obfervations, it will 
 be proper here to remark, that the Mind from thefe 
 Materials thus brought together , and from its own Ope¬ 
 rations on them , and in conference of them , becomes 
 
 fraught with Ideas -and that many Minds fo 
 
 fraught, by a fort of Compact aligning to each Idea 
 fome Sound to be its Mark or Symbol, were thefirjl 
 Inventors and Founders of Language. See 
 Vol. II. ox Hermes, Lib. iii, cap. 3. 4. 
 
56 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Cho I. World ? or e]fe the Paffions, Energies, and 
 —i Affejfiions of Minds. There is this 
 
 Difference however between th zkArts and 
 Nature ; thatNaturepaflesto the Percipient 
 thro 5 all the Senfes$ whereas thefe Arts ufe 
 only two of them, that of Seeing and that 
 of Hearing, And hence it is that the fen - 
 file Objedls or Media , thro’ which (b) they 
 imitate, can be fuck only, as thefe two Senfes 
 are framed capable of perceiving; and thefe 
 Media are Motion , Sound , Colour , and 
 Figure. 
 
 Paint- 
 
 (b) To prevent Confufion it rmift be obferved, 
 that in all thefe Arts there is a Difference between 
 the fenfible Media , thro ’ which they imitate , and the 
 Subjects imitated. The fenfible Media, thro’ which 
 they imitate, muft he always relative to that Senfe , 
 by which the particular Art applies to the Mind ; but 
 the Subject imitated may be foreign to that Senfe, and 
 beyond the Power of its Perception. Painting, for in- 
 Itance, (as is fhewn in this Chapter) has no fenfible 
 Media , thro’ which it operates, except Colour and 
 Figure: But as to Subjects, it may have Motions, 
 Sounds, moral Affections and Actions ; none of which 
 are either Colours or Figures, hut which however are 
 all capable of being imitated thro ’ them. See Chapter 
 the fecond. Notes (£), (c), [d). 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 57 
 
 Painting, having the Eye for its Or ~ Ch. I. 
 gan , cannot be conceived to imitate, but‘“’^ ,r ’““ 
 thro’ the Media of v'fble Objects. And 
 farther, its Modeofimitating being always 
 motionlefs , there mud be fubtradted from 
 thefe the Medium of Motion. It remains 
 then, that Colour and Figure are the only 
 Media, thro’ which Painting imitates. 
 
 Music, palling to the Mind thro’ the 
 Organ of the Ear , can imitate only by 
 
 Sounds and Motions . 
 
 Poetry, having the Ear alfo for its 
 Organ , as far as Words are confidered to be 
 no more than mere Sounds , can go no far¬ 
 ther in Imitating, than may be performed 
 by Sound and Motion. But then, as thefe 
 its Sounds fand by * Compact for the various 
 Ideas , with which the Mind is fraught , it is 
 enabled by this means to imitate, asfar as 
 
 Lan - 
 
 * See Note (a) Page 55 . 
 
c8 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. I, Language can exprefs jandthatit is evident 
 will, in a manner, include all things. 
 
 Now from hence may he feen, how 
 thefe Arts agree , and how they differ. 
 
 They agree, by being ^//Mimetic, 
 or Imitative. 
 
 They differ , as they imitate by different 
 Media ; Painting by Figure and Colour; 
 Music, by Sound and Motion', Painting 
 and Music, by Media Much are Natural ; 
 Poetry, for the greateftPart, by a Medium^ 
 which is Artificial (c). 
 
 § 3 - 
 
 (c) A Figure painted, or a compofition of Mu- 
 fical Sounds have always a natural Relation to that, 
 of which they are intended to be the Refemllance. But 
 a Defcription in W ords has rarely any fuch natural 
 Relation to the feveral Ideas, of which thefe Words are 
 the Symbols. None therefore underftand the Defcrip¬ 
 tion, but thofe who Jpeak the Language. On the con¬ 
 trary, Mufical and Picture-Imitations arc intelligible 
 to all Aden. 
 
 6 
 
 Why 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 59 
 
 § 3. As to that Art, which upon theCh. I. 
 whole is moji excellent of the three; it muft be 
 obferved, that among thefe various Media 
 of imitating, fome will naturally beac¬ 
 curate, feme lefs fome will befl imitate one 
 Subjed fome, another. Again, among 
 the Number of Subjedls there will be natu¬ 
 rally alfo a Difference, as to Merit and De¬ 
 merit. There will be fome fublime , and 
 fome low } fome copious, and fome fort •> 
 fome pathetic, and others void of Pajjion; 
 fome formed to injlrudt, and others not ca¬ 
 pable of it. 
 
 Now, from thefe two Circumftances; 
 that is to fay, from the Accuracy of the 
 Imitation , and the Merit of the Subjell 
 imitated, the Queftion concerning which 
 Art is mofk excellent, muft be tried and de¬ 
 termined. 
 
 This 
 
 W hy it is faid that Poetry is not univerfally , but 
 only for the greater part artificial, fee below, Chapter 
 the Third, where what Natural Force it has, is ex¬ 
 amined and eftimated. 
 
Co 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. I. This however cannot be done, without 
 a Detail of Particulars , that fo there may 
 be formed, on every part, juft and accurate 
 
 Comparifons. 
 
 To begin therefore with Painting, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 61 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 On the Subjects which Painting imitates .—• 
 On the Subjects which Mujic imitates .— 
 Comparifon of Mufc with Painting. 
 
 T HE fittest Subjects FORCh. II, 
 Painting, are all fuch Things 
 and Incidents, as are*peculiarly cha- 
 radlerifed by Figure and Colour. 
 
 Of this kind are the whole Mafs (a) of 
 Pilings inanimate and vegetable j fuch as 
 Flowers, Fruits, Buildings, Landfkips— 
 The various T ribes of Animal Figures; fuch 
 as Birds, Beafts, Herds, Flocks——The 
 Motions and Sounds peculiar to each Animal 
 Species, when accompanied with Configura¬ 
 tions , which are obvious and remarkablefi)-- 
 
 The 
 
 * P. 57 - 
 
 ( a ) The Reafon is, that ihefe things are almoft 
 wholly known to us by theirs Colour and Figure. Be¬ 
 tides, they are as motionlefs> for the moft part, in 
 Nature , as in the Imitation. 
 
 ( b ) Instances of this kind are the Flying of 
 Birds, the Galloping of Horfes, the Roaring of Lions, 
 the Crowing of Cocks. And the Reafon is, that 
 
 4 though 
 
62 A D iscourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. II. The Human Body in all its Appearances (as 
 Male, Female; Young, Old; Handfome, 
 Ugly;) and in all its Attitudes , (as Laying, 
 Sitting, Standing, &c .~——-The Natural 
 Sounds peculiar to the Human Species, (fuch 
 asCrying, Laughing, Hollowing, &c.) (c) — 
 All Energies , PoJJions , and Affections of the 
 Soul, being in any degree more intenje or 
 
 'violent 
 
 though to paint Motion or Sound be impoffible , yet the 
 Motions and Sounds here mentioned having an im¬ 
 mediate and natural Connexion with a certain vifible 
 Configuration of the Paris , the Mind, from a 
 Prcfpect of this Configuration , conceives infenfbly that 
 which is concomitant ; and hence it is that, by a fort of 
 Fallacy , the Sounds and Motions appear to be 
 painted aifo. On the contrary, not fo in fuch Mo¬ 
 tions, as the Swimming of many kinds of Fifli ; or in 
 fuch Sounds, as the Purring of a Cat; becaufe here is no 
 fuch fpecial Configuration to be perceived. —Horner in his 
 Shield deferibing the Picture of a Bull feized by two 
 Lions, fays of theBull— o S\ [a .otvtoa yap.vyi ui ,, EXxtIo — 
 He, bellow nig loudly , was drap’d along. "Where Eufiathius , 
 in commenting on this Bellowing, fays, IJ'jiAa rw 
 xfiuocli, as he (the Bull) made manifejl (in the Picture) 
 by his Figure or Attitude. Huff, in J. 2- p. 1224. 
 
 (r) The Reafon is of the fame kind, as that 
 given in the Note immediately preceding ; and by 
 the fame Rule, the Obfervation muff be confined to 
 natural Sounds only. In Language , few of the Speakers 
 know the Configurations , which attend it. 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 6 
 
 violent than ordinary (d )—~—All Allions Ch. II. 
 and Events, whofe Integrity or Wholenefs 
 depends upon a Jloort andfelf-evident Suc- 
 
 ceffion of Incidents (<?)-Or if the Suc- 
 
 ceflion be extended, then fuch AAions at 
 leaft, whofe Incidents are all along , during 
 
 that Succejjion,Jimilar ff) -Ail Actions, 
 
 which being qualified as above , open thern- 
 felves into a large Variety of Ci ream fiances, 
 
 con- 
 
 ( d ) The Reafon is Bill of the fame kind, viz. 
 from their Vifible Effects on the Body. They natu¬ 
 rally produce either to the Countenance a particular 
 Rednefs or Palenef ; or a particular Modification of its 
 Mufcles ; or elfe to the Limbs , a particular Attitude. 
 Now all thefe Effects are folcly referable to Colour. 
 and Figure, the two grand fenfible Media, peculiar 
 to Painting. See Raphael ’’s Cartoons of St. Paul at 
 Athens , and of his ftriking the Sorcerer Elymas blind : 
 See alfo the Crucifixion of Polycratcs , and the Suffer¬ 
 ings of the Conful Regains, both by Salvator Rcfa. 
 
 (e) For of neceffty every Picture is a Pun Rum 
 Temporis or Instant. 
 
 (f) Such, for inftance, as a Storm at Sea-, whofe 
 Incidents of Vfion may be nearly all included in foam¬ 
 ing Waves, a dark Sky, Ships out of their erect 
 
 Poflure, and Men hanging upon the ropes.-- 
 
 Or as a Battle; which from Beginning to End pre- 
 fents nothing elfe, than Blood, Fire, Smoak, and 
 Diforder. Now fuch Events may be well imitated 
 
 all 
 
 Oj 
 
64 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. II. concurring all in the fame Point of Time (g)* 
 
 - All ABions which are known , and 
 
 known univerfally, rather than Actions 
 newly invented or known but to few ( li ). 
 
 And 
 
 all at once ; for how long foever they lad, they are but 
 Repetitions of the fame - Nicias , the Painter, recom¬ 
 
 mended much the fame Subjects, viz. a Sea-fight or a 
 Land-battle of Cavalry- His reafons too are much the 
 fame with thofe mentioned in Note (g). He concludes 
 with a Maxim, (little regarded by his SuccefTors, how- 1 
 ever important,) that the Subject itfelf is as much a Part 
 of the Painter’s Art, as the Poet’s Fable is a Part of 
 Poetry. See Demetrius Phal. p. 53. Edit. Ox. 
 
 (g) For Painting is not bounded in Exten* 
 sion, as it is in Duration. Befides, it feems 
 true in every Species of Coonpofition , that, as far as 
 Perplexity and Confufion may be avoided, and the 
 Wholenefs of the Piece may be preferved clear and in¬ 
 telligible ; the more ample the Magnitude , and the 
 greater the Variety , the greater alfo, in proportion, 
 the Beauty and Perfection. Noble inftances of this 
 are the Pittures above-mentioned in Note (d). 
 See Arifot. Poet. cap. 7. 'O J £ v.op uulvv Cpvcrsv ra 
 wgtxyfAoc!®* cell Uiu, Sec. See alfo Character's - 
 
 flicks, V. I. p. 143. and Bojfu, B. 1. cap. 16. UAchille 
 dtHomere ef ft grand , & c. 
 
 (!)) The Pieafon is, that a Picture being (as has 
 been faid) but a Point or Infant , in a Story well 
 known the Spectator’s Memory will fupply the pre¬ 
 vious and the fubfequent. But this cannot be done, 
 
 where 
 
PAINf ING, and POET RY. 65 
 
 And thus much as to the Subjects ofch. II. 
 
 P 
 
 ainting. 
 
 § 2. In Music* the Fittest Sub¬ 
 jects of Imitation are all fuch T hingS 
 
 and 
 
 where fuch Knowledge is wanting. And therefore it 
 may be jiiftly queftioned, whether the moft cele¬ 
 brated Subjects, borrowed by Painting from Hiftory, 
 would have been any of them intelligible thro' the 
 Medium of Painting only , fuppofing Pliftory to have 
 been blent, and to have given no additional Information. 
 
 It may be here added, that Horace , comformably 
 to this Reafoning, recommends even to Poetic Imita¬ 
 tion a known Story* before an unknown. 
 
 •- Tuque 
 
 Reflius Iliacum carmen deducis in edius. 
 
 Kfuam ft proferres ignota, indidtaque primus. 
 
 Art. Poet . v. 128. 
 
 A N 3 indeed as the being tinder flood to others , either 
 Hearers or Spectators', feems to be a common Requi - 
 fue to ail Mimetic Arts whatever ; (for to t'hofe, who 
 underhand them not, they are in fact no Mjmetie 
 Arts) it follows, that Perjpicuity mud: be Efrit ml to 
 them ail; and that no prudent Art;ft would negledd, 
 if it were poffible, any juft Advantage to obtain this 
 End. Now there can be no Advantage greater, than 
 the Notoriety of the SubjcSt imitated. 
 
 F 
 
A D iscourse on MUSIC, 
 
 II. and Incidents, as are moji eminently* cha~ 
 ratter fed by Motion and Sound. 
 
 X 
 
 Motion may be either flow or fuoift, 
 even or uneven , broken or continuous ——< 
 Sound may be either foft or loud, high or 
 low . Wherever therefore any of thefe Spe¬ 
 cies of Motion or Sound may be found in 
 an eminent (not a moderate os mean) degree , 
 there will be room for Musical Imita¬ 
 tion. 
 
 Thus, in the Natural or Inanimate 
 World , Music may imitate the Glidings, 
 Murmurings,Toffings, Roarings, and other 
 Accidents of Water, as perceived in Foun¬ 
 tains, Catara&s, Rivers, Seas, &c. —The 
 fame of Thunder—the fame of Winds, as 
 
 well the dor my as the gentle.-In the 
 
 Animal World, it may imitate the Voice of 
 fome Animals, but chiefly that of finging 
 Birds——It may alfo faintly copy fome of 
 their Motions —In the Human Kind, it can 
 
 alfo 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 67 
 
 alfo imitate fomzMotions(i) and Sounds[k)-, Ch. II. 
 and of Sounds thofe moft perfectly, which 
 are expreffive of Grief and Anguijh flj. 
 
 And thus much as to the Subjects, 
 which Mufie imitates. 
 
 § 3. It remains then, that we compare 
 the/e two Arts together. And here in¬ 
 deed, as to Mujical Imitation in general, it 
 muft be confefled that—as it can, from its 
 Genius, imitate only Sounds and Motions—■ 
 as there are not many Motions either in the 
 
 Animal 
 
 (i) As the Walk of the Giant Polypheme , in the 
 
 Paftoral of Ads and Galatea. - See what ample Strides 
 
 he takes , See. 
 
 (k ) As the Shouts of a Multitude, in the Corona¬ 
 tion Anthem of, God fave the King, &c. 
 
 (/J The Reafon is, that this Spedes of Mufical 
 Imitation mojl nearly approaches Nature. For Grief , 
 in moft Animals, declares itfelf by Sounds , which are 
 not unlike to long Notes in the Chro?natic Syjlem. 
 Of this kind is the Chorus of Baal’s Priefts in 
 the Oratorio of Deborah, Doleful Bi dings, hovo ye 
 wound, &c. 
 
68 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Cb. \\. Animal or in the Inanimate World, which 
 are exclusively peculiar even to any Species 
 
 and fcarcely any to an Individual -ns 
 
 there are no Natural Sounds, which cha¬ 
 racter ife at leaf! lower than a Species (for 
 the Natural Sounds of Individuals are in 
 every Species the fame )———farther, as 
 Mufic does but imperfedlly imitate even 
 
 thefe Sounds and Motions (///)--On the 
 
 contrary, as Figures, Poftures of Figures, 
 and Colours charaCterife not only every fen - 
 fible Speciesy but even every Individual ; and 
 for the mod part alfo the various * Energies 
 
 and PaJJions of every Individual-and 
 
 farther, as Painting is able, with the higheft 
 Accuracy andExaBnefs , to imitate all thefe 
 Colours and Figures ; and while Mufical 
 
 Xmita- 
 
 (w) The Reafon is from the Dipfimilitude be¬ 
 tween the Sounds and Motions of Nature, and thole 
 of Mufic. Mufical Sounds are all produced from Even 
 Vibration, moll Natural from Uneven ; Mufical Mo¬ 
 tions are chiefly Definite in their Meaiure, me ft 
 Natural are Indefinite. 
 
 * See Note (d) of this Chapter . 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 69 
 
 Imitation pretends atmofi to no more,than On. II. 
 the raifing of Ideas fimilar, itfelf afpires £ 0 
 
 raife Ideas the very fame -In a word, as 
 
 Painting, in relpedt of its Subjects, is equal 
 to the nobleft Part of Imitation, the imi¬ 
 tating regular Actions confifling of a Whole 
 and Parts 3 and of fuch Imitation, Mufic is 
 
 utterly incapable - from all this it 
 
 muft be confeiTed, that Musical Imita¬ 
 tion IS GREATLY BELOW THAT OF 
 Painting, and that at bejl it is but an 
 imperfect thing. 
 
 As to the Efficacy therefore of Music, 
 it muff be derived from another Source, 
 which mufl be left for the prefent, to be 
 confidered of hereafter *. 
 
 There remains to be mentioned Imi¬ 
 tation by Poetry. 
 
 * Ch. VI. 
 
 F 3 
 
 CHAP. 
 
7 ° 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.IIX. 
 
 v— 
 
 C H A P. III. 
 
 On the Subjects 'which Poetry imitates , but 
 imitates only thro ’ natural Media , or mere 
 
 Sounds-- Comparifon of Poetry in this 
 
 Capacity , frfi 'with Painting , then with 
 Mujic . 
 
 P OETIC Imitation includes every 
 thing in it , which is performed either by 
 Picture-Imitation or Musical ; for 
 its Materials are Words , and Words are 
 * Symbols by Compact of all Ideas . 
 
 Farther as Words , befide their being 
 Symbols by Compadl, are alfo Sounds vari - 
 oufy diftinguifed by their Aptnefs to be 
 rapidly or flowly pronounced, and by the 
 refpe&ive Prevalence of Mutes y Liquids , or 
 Vowels in their Compohtion; it will follow 
 that, befide their Compadl-Relation , they 
 
 will 
 
 * &<? (<?) 1 , 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 will have likewife a Natural Relation to all Ch 
 fuch Things, between which and them- 
 felves there is any Natural Refemblance r 
 Thus, for inftance, there is Natural Re- 
 femblance between all forts of harjh and 
 grating Sounds. There is therefore (ex- 
 clufive of its Signification) a Natural Rela¬ 
 tion between the Sound of a vile Hautboy a 
 and of that Verfe in *' Virgil t 
 
 Stridenti miferumfiipuld difperdere Carmen, 
 
 or of that other in -f* Milton . 
 
 Grate on their Scrannel Pipes of wretched 
 Straw. 
 
 So alfo between the fmoothfwift Gliding of 
 a River, and of that Verfe in j| Horace , 
 
 -- ——at ille 
 
 Lahitur , & labetur in omne volubilk <zvum 9 
 
 And thus in part even Poetic Imitation 
 has its Foundation in Nature. But then 
 
 F 4 this 
 
 * Eel. 3. ver. 27. f I n bis Lyudas. 
 |j Epift. 2. 1. 1. ver. 42, 43. 
 
72 A Di scourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.III. this Imitation goes not far - 3 and taken 
 f without the Meaning derived to the Sounds 
 from Campadl, is but little intelligible, how¬ 
 ever perfect and elaborate. 
 
 § 2. If therefore Poetry be compared 
 with Painting, in refpedt of this its 
 merely Natural and Inartificial Refem- 
 
 blance, it may be juftly laid that-In as 
 
 much as of this fort of Refemblance, 
 Poetry (like Mufic) has no other Sources, 
 than thoje two of Sound and Motion —— 
 in as much as it often wants thefe Sources 
 themfielves (for Numbers of Words neither 
 fiave , nor can have any Refemblance to 
 thofe Ideas , of which they are the Sym¬ 
 bols') -in as much as Natural Sounds 
 
 and Motions, which Poetry thus imitates, 
 are themfelves but * loofe and indefinite Ar- 
 cidents of thofe Subjects , to which they 
 belong, and confequently do but loqfely and 
 indefinitely charadlerife them——laftly, in 
 as much as Poetic Sounds and Motions do 
 
 but 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 73 
 
 bat faintly referable thofe of Nature, which Ch.III. 
 are them]elves con felled to be fo imperfect 
 
 and vague -- From all this it will 
 
 follow (as it has already followed of Mufic) 
 that-— —Poetic Imitation founded 
 in mere Natural Resemblance is 
 
 MUCH INFERIOR TO THAT OF PAINT¬ 
 ING, and at bef but very imperfect. 
 
 § 3. As to the Preference, which fuch 
 Poetic Imitation may claim before 
 Musical, or Musical Imitation be¬ 
 fore that ; the Merits on each Side may 
 appear perhaps equal . They both fetch 
 their Imitations from *j- Sound and Motion . 
 
 Now Music feems to imitate Nature bet¬ 
 ter as to Motion , and Poetry as to Sound,. 
 
 The Reafon is, that in Motions [a) Mufic 
 
 has 
 
 t R 5 7- 
 
 (a) Music has no lefs than five different Lengths 
 cf Notes in ordinary ufe, reckoning from the Semi- 
 brief to the Semi-quaver ; all which may be infi¬ 
 nitely 
 
74 Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.III. ^as a greater Variety\ and in Sounds, thofe 
 Poetry approach nearer to Nature (b). 
 
 * 
 
 If therefore in Sound the one have the 
 Preference, in Motion the other, and the 
 Merit of Sound and Motion be fuppofed 
 nearly equal j it will follow, that the 
 Merit of the two Imitations 
 
 WILL BE NEARLY EQUAL ALSO. 
 
 nit sly compounded, even in any one 1 ime, or Mea- 
 
 fure-- Poetry, on the other hand, has but two 
 
 Lengths or Quantities, a long Syllable and a Jhort, 
 (which is its Half) and all the Variety of Verfe arifes 
 from fuch Feet and Metres, as thefe two Species of 
 Syllables, by being compounded, can be made produce. 
 
 ( b ) Musical Sounds are produced by even 
 
 Vibrations, which fcarcely any Natural Sounds are-- 
 
 on the contrary, Words are the Product of uneven 
 
 Vibration, and fo are mojl Natural Sounds- 
 
 Add to this, that Words are far more numerous, than 
 Mufical Sounds. So that Poetry, as to imitation by 
 Sound, feems to exceed Mufic, not only mnearnefs of 
 Rsfemblance, but even in Variety alfo. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
FAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 75 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 On the Subjects which Poetry imitates , not 
 by mere Sounds or natural Media, but by 
 Words fignificant .; the Subject sat thefame 
 time being fucby to which the Genius of each 
 of the other two Arts is moft perfectly 
 adapted-—Its Comp ar if on in thefe Subjects, 
 frfl with Painting, then with Mufc. 
 
 Mimetic Art of Poetry hasCh.IV< 
 & been hitherto confidered, as fetch- 
 ing its Imitation from mere Natural Re- 
 femblance. In this it has been !hewn 
 much inferior to Painting, and nearly 
 equal to Music. 
 
 It remains to be confidered, what its 
 Merits are, when it imitates not by mere 
 Natural Sound, but by Sound fgnificant 
 by Words, the compadl Symbols of all kinds 
 of Ideas. From hence depends its genuine 
 
 Force, 
 
yS A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 ChJV*Force. And here, as it is able to find 
 ^ "Sounds expreffive of every Idea, fo is there 
 no Subject either of Pidture-Imitation, or 
 Mufical, to which it does not afpire ; all 
 Things and Incidents whatever being, in a 
 manner, to be defcribed by Words. 
 
 Whether therefore Poetry, in this 
 its proper Sphere , he equal to the Imitation of 
 the other two Arts, is the Queftion at pre- 
 fent, which comes in order to be difcufied, 
 
 Now as Subjects are infinite , and the 
 other two Arts are not equally adapted to 
 imitate all ; it is propofed, firfb to compare 
 Poetry with them in fuch Subjects, to 
 which they are mofi perfectly adapted. 
 
 § 2. To begin therefore with Paint- 
 ing. A Subject, in which the Power 
 of this Art may be mofi fully exerted, 
 (whether it be taken from the Inanimate , 
 or the Animal , or the Moral World) mu ft 
 be a Subject, which is principally and 
 eminently charadlerifed by certain Colours , 
 
 Figures, 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 Figures, and Pojhires of Figures ■- —whofe Ch 
 
 Comprehenfion depends not on a SucceJJion of 
 Events ; or at leaf , if on a Succefion, on a 
 
 fort andfelf-evident one - which admits a 
 
 large Variety of fuch Circumfances , as all 
 concur in the fame individual Point of'Time 
 and relate all to one principal Aclion. 
 
 As to fuch a Subject therefore-——In as 
 much as Poetry is forced to pafs thro’ 
 the Medium of Compact , while Painting 
 applies immediately thro’ the Medium of 
 Nature; the one being underftood to all, 
 the other to the Speakers of a certain Lan¬ 
 guage * only-in as much as Natural 
 
 Operations mud: needs be more affedling, 
 
 than Artificial -in as much as Painting 
 
 helps our own rude Ideas by its own, which 
 are confummate and wrought up to the Per- 
 fedlion of Art; while Poetry can raife no 
 other [a) than what every Mind isfurnilhed 
 
 with 
 
 * Note (c) p. 58. 
 
 (a) When we read in Milton of Eve, that 
 Grace was in all her Steps, Heav’n in her Eye, 
 In ev’ry GeJIure Dignity and Love ; 
 
78 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. 1 V. with before — in as much as Painting (hews 
 a ] j t j-jg minute and various concurrent Cir- 
 cumfiances of the Event in the fame indivi¬ 
 dual Point of Time* as they appear in 
 Nature •> while Poetry is forced to want 
 this Circumftance of Intelligibility, by 
 being ever obliged to enter into fome de¬ 
 gree of Detail ——in as much as this Detail 
 creates often the Dilemma of either be¬ 
 coming tedious , to be clear; or if not 
 
 tedious , then obfcure -laftly, in as much 
 
 as all Imitations more fmilar> more imme¬ 
 diatei 
 
 we have an Image not of that Eve, which Milton* 
 conceived, but of fucb an Eve only , as every one, 
 by bis own proper Genius , is able to reprefent, from 
 reflecting on thofe Ideas , which he has annexed to 
 thefe feveral Sounds. The greater Part, in the mean 
 time, have never perhaps bellowed one accurate 
 Thought upon what Grace, Heaven , Love^ and Dignity 
 mean ; or ever enriched the Mind with Ideas of 
 Beauty, or afked whence they are to be acquired, 
 and by what Proportions they are conjlituted. On 
 the contrary, when we view Eve as painted by an 
 able Painter , we labour under no fuch Difficulty ; 
 becaufe we have exhibited before us the better Con¬ 
 ceptions of an Artist, the genuine Ideas of perhaps a 
 Titian or a Raphael. 
 
 4 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 79 
 
 » * 
 
 diate, and more intelligible , are preferableCh.IV. 
 to thofe which are lefs fo ; and for 
 Reafons above, the Imitations cf Poetry 
 are lefs fmiliar , lefs immediate , and lefs in¬ 
 telligible than thofe of Painting —-—From 
 ALL THIS it will follow, that- IN ALL 
 
 Subjects, where Painting can 
 
 FULLY EXERT ITSELF, THE IMITA¬ 
 TIONS of Painting are superior 
 TO THOSE OF POETRY, AND CQNSE- 
 QUENTLY IN ALL SUCH SUBJECTS. 
 
 that Painting has the Prefe¬ 
 rence. 
 
 § 3. And now to compare Poetry 
 with Music, allowing to Mujic the fame 
 Advantageof a e well-adapted§ub]z&. f which 
 has already been allowed to Painting in the 
 Comparifon juft preceding. 
 
 What fuch a Subject is, has already 
 been * defciibed. And as to Preference , it 
 
 muft 
 
 * See Chap. II. % 2. 
 
So A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.IV. mufl he confefied, that—•—In as much a3 
 Musical Imitations, tho’ Natural, 
 afpire hot to raife the fame Ideas, but only 
 Ideas ||fimilar and analogous; while Poetic 
 Imitation, tho’ Artificial , raifes Ideas 
 the very fame —in as much as the Definite 
 and Certain is ever preferable to the Indefi¬ 
 nite and Uncertain ; and that more efpeci- 
 ally in Imitations, where the principal 
 if) Delight is in recognizing the Thing 
 
 imitating 
 
 f| P. 68, 69. 
 
 tf) That there is an eminent Delight in this 
 very Recognition itfelf, abflraft from any thing 
 pleafmg in the Subject recognized, is evident from 
 
 hence-that, in all the Mimetic Arts, we can be 
 
 highly charmed with Imitations , at whofe Originals in 
 Nature we are /hocked and terrified. Such, for in- 
 fiance, as Dead Bodies, Wild. Beafls, and the like. 
 
 The Caufe, afligned for this, feems to be of 
 the following kind. We have a Joy, not only in 
 the Sanity and Perfection , but alfo in the juji and na¬ 
 tural Energies of our feveral Limbs and Faculties . 
 And hence, among others, the Joy in Reasoning ; 
 as being the Energy of that principal Faculty , our In j 
 tellect or Understanding. This Joy ex¬ 
 tends, not only to the Wife, but to the Multitude. 
 Tor ail Men have an Aver fan to Ignorance and Error . 
 
 and 
 
 7 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 8i 
 
 imitated ■—it will follow from hence that—.Ch.IV. 
 even in Subjects thebestadapted'”^^ 
 to Musical Imitation, the Imita¬ 
 tion of Poetry will be still more 
 excellent. 
 
 and in fome degree, however moderate, are glad to 
 learn and to inform themfelves. 
 
 Hence therefore the Delight , arifmg from thefe 
 Imitations ; as we are enabled, in each of them, to 
 exercije the Reasoning Faculty ; and, by com¬ 
 paring the Copy with the Architype in our Minds, to 
 infer that this is such a thing ; and, that, 
 another ; a Fadt remarkable among Children, 
 even in their find and earlieft Days. 
 
 To, rf ycto pUf/,u<rQxi } <Tupt,(pJlov t oiq oig Ik 
 
 ’csxiocov £rn >p} Taro 0 TxCf>spn(ri tcov uaAcov gcoojv, ert 
 
 [juy.rJiKtijTtxIov f’fi, xetl rx; zronTrui hd 
 
 / \ / \ \ / ^ / 
 mp.Y\(rtw$ roeg zr^Crjrag y^ to %xigEiv rotg (xi^txoctri 
 
 7Tolv\x ?. SUjUJiOV <Je TBTS TO (TUjwSctiVoV fc7Ti TCOV (pyUV, 
 
 "A yf ccvlx Awrrr^uq oeuuev, rarcoi/ tWovxq rdq 
 
 jU«A»foc yxotbccy.ivzg, yrooigopizv S’sco^dlsq" ojok 3'nplxv 
 
 7s yoclpxq tui/ xygtcolaTwt', fj veKowv. ’'Aihov Is 
 
 Tara, on {tavQxvtiv a” y.ovou T0?q (piAo<ro(poiq Rebrov, 
 
 ». . \ \ ~ >/,. * / v , > > \ n \ ~ 
 
 uAAx Xy Toiq a aaoi? ofxoixq aAA z~n ppot%y hoihouz** 
 criii au Id. Aid yxp> thto y^xfpuci Ttdq siKoixxq opcadleq, 
 oti o’vu.&ai'vsi S’eupbvlctg /xoaiQocuuv K) (rvAAoylfcrQdtiy 
 t; stizroV olov, oti irQ 3 IktTv^. Arid. Poet. c. 4 . 
 
 G 
 
 C H 4 P. 
 
$2 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 On the Subjects 'which Poetry imitates by 
 V/ords JigniJicant, being at the fame time 
 Subjects not adapted to the Genius of 
 either of the other Arts—The Nature of 
 thofe Subjects—The Abilities of Poetry 
 
 to imitate them - Comparifon of Poetry 
 
 in thefe Subjeds, firft with Painting > 
 then with Mufc. 
 
 Ch. V . r 1 'HE Mimetic Art of Poetry 
 JL has now been confidered in two 
 Views—FirPc, as imitating by mere natural 
 Media ; and in this it has been placed on a 
 level with Music, but much inferior to 
 Painting—I t has been fince con- 
 
 lidered as imitating thro’ Sounds fignificant 
 by Compact , and that in fuch Subjeds re- 
 fpedively, where Painting and Music 
 have the fullef Power to exert themfelves. 
 
 7 Here 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 f ' • 
 
 Mere to Painting it has been held inferior , Ch 
 but to Mufic it has been preferred. 
 
 It remains to be confiderecl—-—what 
 i other Subjects Poetry has left, to which the 
 Genius of the other two Arts is lefs per¬ 
 fectly adapted —How far Poetry is able to 
 
 imitate them-and whether from the 
 
 Perfection of its Imitation, and the Nature 
 of the Subjects themfelves, it ought to be 
 called no more than equal to its Sifter Arts; 
 or whether, on the whole, it fhould not 
 rather be called fuperior . 
 
 § 2. To begin, in the fir ft place, by 
 comparing it with Painting. 
 
 The Subjects of Poetry , to which the 
 Genius of Painting is not adapted\ are-— 
 all Actions, whofe (a) Whole is of fo 
 
 G 2 lengthened 
 
 (a) For a juft; and accurate Defcription of Whole- 
 tiefs and Unity> fee An ft Poet. Ch. 7 & 8. and BoJfu y 
 his beft Interpreter, in his Treadle on the Epic Poem. 
 
 B. II. ch. 9, io, 11. 
 
A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 V. lengthened a Duration, that no Point of 
 Time, in any part of that Whole, can be 
 given fit for Painting ; neither in its Be¬ 
 ginning, which will teach what is Sulfe- 
 quent nor in its End, which will teach 
 what is Previous ; nor in its Middle, which 
 will declare both th & Previous and the Sub- 
 
 fequent. -Alfo ajl Subjects fo framed, as 
 
 to lay open the inter nalConfiitution of Man, 
 and give us an Infight into (fi) Characters, 
 Manners, Pajjions, and Sentiments. 
 
 The 
 
 (/>) For a Defcription of Character, fee be¬ 
 low, Note ff) of this Chapter, 
 
 As for Manners, it may be laid in general, 
 that a certain Syjiem of them makes a Character ; and 
 that as thefe Syltems, by being differently compounded, 
 make each a different Character, fo is it tiiat one Man 
 truly differs from another. 
 
 Passions are obvious - r Pity, Fear , Anger , &c. 
 
 Sentiments are difcoverable in all thofe 
 Things, which are the proper Bufmefs and End of 
 Speech or Discourse. The chief Branches of 
 this End are to Affert and Prove ; to Solve and Re¬ 
 fute ; to exprefs or excite Papons ; to amplify In¬ 
 cidents* 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 85 
 
 The Merit of thefe Subjects is obvious. Ch. V. 
 They mud neceffarily of all be the moft ^— J 
 affedi ing ; the mod improving ; and fuch 
 of which the Mind has the jirongeji Com - 
 prehenjion « 
 
 For as to the affecting Part—it it be 
 true, that all Events more orlefs affect us, 
 as the Subjects, which they refpedl, are 
 more or lefs nearly related to us > then 
 furely thofe Events mud needs be moji af¬ 
 fecting, to whofe Subjects we are of all the 
 moji intimately related. Now fuch is the 
 Relation, which we bear to Mankind; and 
 Men and Human Actions are the Subjects, 
 here propofed for Imitation. 
 
 G 3 As 
 
 cidents, and to diminijb them. It is in thefe 
 things therefore, that we muft look for Sentiment. 
 
 See Arift. Poet. c. 19.- sft xc&ltx ryv Aixvoixv 
 
 toc'jtoc , o<rx vvq tx Xcyx zrxgu<rxevxcrQ?ivai. Msgv 
 ll txtuiv, to, t£ xttoSsixvvvou, d, to Xvuv, to zrscQw 
 
 ZTXgCHTXS U#£fiV,———x) £Tl miysQof, dj <Tf*IXgOTtil<X. 
 
S6 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 ✓ ... » 
 
 Ch. V. As to Improvement ■—-there can be none 
 
 1 furely (to Aftf/z at leaft) fo great, as that 
 
 > 
 
 which is derived from a juft and decent 
 Reprefentation of Human Manners , and 
 Sentiments. For what can more contribute 
 to give us that Majier-Knowledge (r), with¬ 
 out 
 
 (O r N n © I 2 AT TON. But farther, 
 befides obtaining this moral Science from the Con¬ 
 templation of Human Life ; an End common both to 
 Epic, Tragic, and Comic Poetry ; there is a pecu¬ 
 liar End to Tragedy , that of eradicating the Paffions 
 of Pity and Fear. 'Efiv rPOcyM/z f/ap;crif zrga£tco; 
 (nns$cztois xj TtXtioa;- —ch* xj £ pa€x zrcgaii/xira tt,v 
 
 ruv TowTcov zruQvp-ccTwv xeZQxg<riv. Arift. Poet. c. 6 . 
 Tragedy is the Imitation of an Action important and 
 perfefi, thro ’ Pity and Fear vaorking the Purga¬ 
 tion OF SUCH-LIKE PASSIONS. 
 
 There are none, it is evident, fo devoid of thefe 
 two Paffions , as thofe perpetually converfant , where 
 the Occafmis of them are moffc frequent ; fuch, for 
 inftance, as the Military Men, the Profeffors of 
 Medicine , Chirurgcry , and the like. Their Minds, 
 by this Intercourfe, become as it were callous ; gain¬ 
 ing an Apathy by Experience , which no Theory can 
 ever teach them. 
 
 t V 
 
 Nov/ 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 87 
 
 out which, all other Knowledge will prove Ch. V. 
 of little or no Utility ? 
 
 G 4 
 
 Now that, which is wrought in thefe Men by 
 the real D infers of Life , may be fuppofed wrought 
 in others by the Fidlions of Tragedy ; yet with this 
 happy Circumftance in favour of Tragedy, that, 
 without the Difafters being real> it can obtain the 
 fame End. 
 
 It muff however, for ail this, be confeffed, that 
 an Effect of this kind cannot reafonably be expended, 
 except among Nations, like the Athenians of old, 
 who lived in a perpetual Attendance upon thefe 
 Theatrical Reprefentations. For it is not a fingle or 
 occafional Application to thefe Paffions, but a conflani 
 and uninterrupted , by which alone they may be leffened 
 or removed. 
 
 It would be improper to conclude this Note, 
 without obferving, that the Philofopher in this 
 place by Pity means not Philanthropy, Na¬ 
 tural Affediion , a Readinefs to relieve others in their 
 Calamities and Dijlrcf ; but, by Pity , he means that 
 Senseless Effeminate Consternation, 
 
 1 which feizes weak Minds , on the fudden Profpedi of any 
 thing difajlrous ; which, in its more violent Effects, 
 is feen in Shriekings , Swoonings 3 &c. a Paffion, fo far 
 from laudable, or from operating to the Good of 
 others, that it is certain to deprive the Party, who 
 labours under its Influence, of all Capacity to do the 
 leaji good Office. 
 
83 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. V. As to our Comprehsnjion- -there is no- 
 
 thing certainly, of which we have fo ftrong 
 Ideas, as of that which happens in the 
 Moral or Human World. For as to the 
 Internal Part , or Active Principle of the 
 Vegetable , we know it bu iobfcurely, becaufe 
 there we can difcover neither Pajjion , nor 
 Senfation. In the Animal World indeed 
 this Principle is more feen, and that from 
 the PaJJions and Senfations which there de¬ 
 clare themfelves. Yet all hill refts upon the 
 mere Evidence of Sen/e ; upon the Force 
 only of external and unajjifted Experience • 
 But in the Moral or Human World, as we 
 have a Medium of Knowledge far more 
 accurate than this; fo from hence it is, 
 that we can comprehend accordingly. 
 
 With regard therefore to the various 
 Events which happen here , and the various 
 
 Caufesy by which they are produced- 
 
 in other Words, of all Characters, Manners, - 
 Human Paffions, and Sentiments; befides 
 the Evidence of Senfe 3 we have the highejl 
 
 Evidence 
 
 
$9 
 
 PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 Evidence additional , in having an exprefs Ch. V. 
 Confcioifnefs of fomet 1 i i ng familiar within 
 of fomething homogeneous in the Recedes of 
 our own Minds; in that, which conftitutes 
 to each of us his true and real Self. 
 
 These therefore being the Subjects, not 
 adapted to the Genius of Tainting, it comes 
 next to be coniidered, how far Poetry can 
 imitate them. 
 
 And here, that it has Abilities clearly 
 equal , cannot be doubted 5 as it has that 
 for the Medium of its Imitation, through 
 which Nature declares herfelf in the fame 
 Subjects. For the Sentiments in real Life 
 are only known by Men’s * Difcourfe. 
 
 And the Char afters. Manners , and Paffons 
 of Men being the Prompters to what they 
 fay ; if mu ft needs follow, that their Dif¬ 
 courfe will be a conflant Specimen of thole 
 Char afters, Manners , and Pqfjions. 
 
 Format 
 
 * P. 84, Note (b). 
 
A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. V.* Format enim Natura prius nos intus ad 
 % ~~~ v ' omnem 
 
 Fortunarum habitum; juvat, aut impellit ad 
 iram : 
 
 F>oft effert Animi Motus, Interprete 
 Lingua. 
 
 Not only therefore Language Is an ade¬ 
 quate Medium of Imitation, but in Senti¬ 
 ments it is the only Medium ; and in Man¬ 
 ners and PaJJions there is no other, which 
 can exhibit them to us after that clear , 
 precife , and definite Way , as they in Nature 
 Hand allotted to the various forts of Men, 
 and are found to conftitute the federal Cha¬ 
 racters of each (d). 
 
 * Hor. de Arte Poet. verf. 108. 
 
 (d) It is true indeed that (befides what is done 
 by Poetry) there is fome Idea of Character, which 
 even Painting can communicate. Thus there is no 
 doubt, but that fuch a Countenance may be found by 
 Painters for /Eneas, as would convey upon view a 
 
 mild , 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY, 
 
 91 
 
 § 3. To compare therefore Poetry , in y 
 phefe SubjeBs, with Painting— In as much 
 as no Subjects of Painting are* wholly pa¬ 
 per ior 
 
 % 
 
 p - 57 > 5 8 - 75 > 7 6 * 
 
 mild, humane, and yet a brave Difpofition. But 
 then this Idea would be vague and general. It would 
 be concluded, only in the grofs, that the Hero was 
 Good. As to that Sydem of Qualities peculiar to 
 Adneas only, and which alone properly confitutes his 
 true and real Character, this would dill remain a 
 Secret, and be no way difcoverable. For bow de¬ 
 duce it from the mere Lineaments o f a Countenance? 
 Or, if it w‘ere deducible, how few Speculators would 
 there be found fo fagacious ? It is here therefore, 
 that Recourfe mud be had, not to Painting, but to 
 Poetry. So accurate a Conception of Character can 
 be gathered only from a Succejfion of various, and yet 
 confident Actions ; a Succedion, enabling us to conjec¬ 
 ture, what the Perfon of the Drama will do in the 
 future, from what already he has done in the pafl. 
 Now to fuch an Imitation, Poetry only is equal ; 
 becaufe it is not bounded, like Painting, to fort, and, 
 as it were, infant Events, but may imitate Subjedls 
 of any Duration whatever. See Arif. Poet. cap. 6. 
 !l Eft Pe r, 0 oc fxh to toixtov, 0 or^oi rrjv zxpoociourii) 
 CiTToHJi TIS lf)v, iv oi? ihc Ifl OYiXOV, il ZegOCilgilTXl 7} 
 Opivysi b xiyvv. See alfo the ingenious and learned 
 Bfju, Book 4. ch. 4. 
 
cj>2 A D iscourse on MUSIC, 
 
 ■r&ifr- 
 
 Cli. V fenor to Poetry ; while the Subjects, here 
 defcribed, fat' exceed the Power of Paint¬ 
 ing-in as much as they are of all Sub¬ 
 
 jects the molt ~j~ af 'tiding, and improving , 
 and fuch of which we have the firongejl 
 
 Comprehenfon --further, in as much as 
 
 Poetry can mo ft J accurately imitate them— 
 in as much as, befides all Imitation, there 
 is a Charm in Poetry, arifing from its very 
 Numbers (<?); whereas Painting has Pre¬ 
 tence 
 
 + P. 85, &£. 
 
 X P. 89, &c. 
 
 ( e ) That there is a Charm in Poetry , arifing 
 from its Numbers only, may be made evident from 
 the five or fix fir ft Lines of the Paradife Loft ; where, 
 ■without any Pomp of Phrafe, Sublimity of Senti¬ 
 ment, or the leapt Degree of Imitation , every Pleader 
 mu ft find himfelf to be fenfibly delighted ; and that, 
 only from the graceful and fimple Cadence of the 
 Numbers , and that artful Variation of the Cafura or 
 Paufe , fo eflential to the Harmony of every good 
 Poem. 
 
 An Englijh Heroic Verfe confifls of ten Semipeds , 
 or Half-feet. Now in the Lines above-mentioned 
 
 the 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 93 
 
 tence to no Charm, except that oflmita-Ch. V. 
 
 tion only-laftly, (which will Toon be* - ' - ' 
 
 ^ fliewn) in as much as Poetry is able to 
 ajfociate Mufic , as a mofi: powerful Ally; 
 of which Affifiance, Painting is utterly in¬ 
 capable- From all this it may be 
 
 fairly concluded, that- Poetry is not 
 
 only Equal y but that it is in faff far Su¬ 
 perior to its Sister Art of Paint¬ 
 ing. 
 
 § 4. But if it exceed Fainting in Sub- 
 jebls, to which Painting is not adapted; no 
 doubt will it exceed Music in Subjects to 
 
 Mufic 
 
 * Chap. VI. 
 
 the Paufes are varied upon different Semipeds in the 
 Order, which follows ; as may be feen by any, who 
 will be at the Pains to examine 
 
 Paradise Lost, B. I. 
 
 Verfe 1 ^ 
 —— 2 
 
 - 3 
 
 -- 4 
 
 -- 6 
 
 Semiped 
 
 has its Paufe 
 fall upon 
 
 7 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
94 ^ D i s c o r s e on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch. V. Mufic not adapted . For here it has been 
 u v ' * preferred, even in thofe Subjects, which 
 have been held adapted the bejl of all. 
 
 § 5. Poetry is therefore, on the 
 
 WHOLE MUCH SUPERIOR TO EITHER OF 
 
 the other Mimetic Arts; it having 
 been Jhewn to be equally excellent in the 
 •j- Accuracy of its Imitation ; and to 
 imitate Subjects, which far surpass, 
 as well in J Utility,'as. in || Dig¬ 
 nity* 
 
 * Ch. IV. § 3. t P. 89. t P- 86. 
 
 jj See p. 83, 84. and p. 64, Note (gj. See alfs 
 
 P- 59 * 
 
 C H A P. 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 9S 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 On Mujic confidered not as an Imitation, but 
 as deriving its 'Efficacy from another 
 Source.——-On its joint Operation by this 
 
 means with Poetry - An Objection to 
 
 Mujic folved.—I he Advantage arijing to 
 it, as well as to Poetry, from their being 
 united .- Conclufion . 
 
 I N the above Difcourfe, Music hasCh.Vf. 
 
 been mentioned as an * Ally to Poetry.' 
 
 It has alfo been Paid to derive its f Efficacy 
 from another Source, than Imitation. It 
 remains therefore, that thefe things be ex¬ 
 plained. 
 
 Now, in order to this, it is firfl to be 
 obferved, that there are various Affections, 
 which may be raifed by the Power of 
 
 Mujic . 
 
 * P- 93- 
 
 f P. 69. 
 
A Discourse*MUSIC, 
 
 VI. Mujic. There are Sounds to make us 
 <m * mJ chearful, or fad; martial, or tender ; and 
 fo of almoh: every other Affection, which 
 we feel. 
 
 It is alfo further obfervable, that there 
 is a reciprocal Operation between our Aff 
 fe Si ions , and our Ideas ; fa that, by a fort 
 of natural Sympathy, certain Ideas necefla- 
 rily tend to raife in us certain AffeSiions; 
 and thofe AffeSiions, by a fort of Counter- 
 Operation, to raife the fame Ideas. Thus 
 Ideas derived from Funerals, Tortures, 
 Murders, and the like, naturally generate 
 the Affection of Melancholy. And when, 
 by any Phyfical Caufes , that AffeSiion hap¬ 
 pens to prevail, it as naturally generates the 
 fame doleful Ideas . 
 
 And hence it is, that Ideas, derived 
 from external Caufes, have at different 
 times, upon the fame Perfon, fo different 
 an Effed. If they happen to fuit the 
 Affections, which prevail within, then is 
 their Impreffionwto/? fenfble, and their Effed 
 
 moji 
 
PAINTING, ana POETRY. 97 
 
 moji lafting. If the contrary be true, then Ch.VI. 
 is the Effed contrary. Thus, for inflance, 
 a Funeral will much more affed the fame 1 
 Man, if he fee it when melancholy, than 
 if he fee it when chearfuh 
 
 Now this being premifed, it will fol- 
 low, that whatever happens to be the 
 AffeElion or Difpoftion of Mind, which 
 ought naturally to refult from the Genius 
 of any Poem, the fame probably it will be 
 in the Power of fome Species of Mufic to 
 excite. But whenever th z proper AffeElion 
 prevails, it has been allowed that then all 
 kindred Ideas, derived from external Caufes, 
 make the moji fenfible Imprejjion . The 
 
 Ideas therefore of Poetry muft needs make 
 the moft fenfible Impreflion, when the 
 [a] Affedions, peculiar to them, are al¬ 
 ready 
 
 (a) Quintilian elegantly, and exadly appofite 
 
 to this Reafoning, fays of Muftc - Namque & 
 
 voce tsf modulatione grandla elate , jucunda dulciter, 
 
 moderate 
 
 H 
 
I 
 
 gS A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.VL ready excited by the Muiic. For here a 
 double Force is made co-operate to one EndL 
 A Poet, thus ajfijied , finds not an Audience 
 in a Temper, averfe to the Genius of his 
 Poem, or perhaps at heft under a cool In¬ 
 difference hut by the Preludes, the Sym¬ 
 phonies, and concurrent Operation of the 
 Muiic in all its Parts, rouzed into thofa 
 very Affections, which he would mold 
 defire. 
 
 1; < * ’ » i 
 
 An Audience, fo difpofed, not only em¬ 
 brace with Pleafure the Ideas of the Poet s 
 when exhibited; but, in a manner, even 
 anticipate them in their feveral Imagina¬ 
 tions, The Superfbitious have not a more 
 previous Tendency to be frightened at the 
 fight of Spedtres, or a Lover to fall into 
 Raptures at the fight of his Miftrefs ; than 
 a Mind, thus tempered by the Power of 
 
 Mufic, 
 
 moderata leniter canity totdque arte confentit cum eo- 
 runi, quae dicuntur, Affectibus. Injl . Orator. 1. 3. 
 cap. 10 . 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 99 
 
 Mufic, to enjoy all Ideas, which are fuitable Ch.VL 
 to that Temper. 
 
 And hence the genuine Charm of 
 Mufic, and the Wonders which it works, 
 thro J its great Profefibrs (b), A Power, 
 which confifls not in Imitations, and the 
 railing Ideas; but in the railing AffeBions , 
 to which Ideas may correfpond. There 
 are few to be found fo infenfible, I may 
 even fay fo inhumane, as when good 
 Poetry is justly set to Music, 
 not in fome degree to feel the Force of 
 fo aimable an Union. But to the Mufes 
 Friends it is a Force irrejijlibk , and penc¬ 
 il 2 trates 
 
 ( b) Such, above all, is George Frederick Handel ; 
 whole Genius, having been cultivated by continued 
 Exercife, and being itfelf far the fublimeffc and moll 
 univerfal now known, has juftly placed him with¬ 
 out an Equal, or a Second. This tranlient Telli- 
 mony could not be denied fo excellent an Artiffc, 
 from whom this Treatife has borrowed fuch eminent 
 Examples, to juftify its Aflertions in what it has of- 
 ferred concerning Mufic. 
 
ICO 
 
 A Discourse cn MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.VI. trates into the deepeft RecefTes of the 
 Soul. 
 
 -* Pectus inaniter angit , 
 
 Irritat, muled, faljis terroribus implet. 
 
 § 2. Now this is that Source, from 
 whence Mafic was *f* faid formerly to de-, 
 rive its great eft Efficacy . And here indeed, 
 not in (r) Imitation, ought it to be chiefly 
 cultivated. On this account alfo it has 
 been called a J powerful Ally to Poetry. 
 And farther, it is by the help of this Rea¬ 
 soning, that the Objection is folved, which 
 is railed againfl the Singing of Poetry (as 
 in Opera’s, Oratorio’s, &c.) from the want 
 
 of, 
 
 * Hof at. Epijl. i. 1 . 2. verf. 2ir. 
 t P- 69. t P. 93- 
 
 (r) For the narrow Extent and little Efficacy of 
 Music, confidered as a Mimetic or Imitative 
 Art, fee Ch. II. § 3. 
 
I6J 
 
 PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 of Probability and Refemblance to Nature. Ch.VL 
 To one indeed, who has no mufical Ear, 
 this Objection may have Weight. It may 
 even perplex a Lover of Mufic, if it hap^ 
 pen to furprife him in his Hours of In* 
 difference. But when he is feeling the 
 Charm of Poetry fo accompanied\ let him 
 be angry (if he can) with that* which 
 ferves only to intereft him more feelingly 
 in the Subject, and fupport him in a 
 flronger and more earnefl Attention; which 
 enforces, by its Aid, the feveral Ideas of 
 the Poem, and gives them to his Imagi¬ 
 nation with unufual Strength and Gran¬ 
 deur. He cannot furely but confefs, that 
 he is a Gainer in the Exchange , when 
 he barters the want of a fmgle Proba¬ 
 bility, that of Pronunciation (a thing 
 merely arbitrary and every where different) 
 for a noble Heightening of Nffebhons which 
 are fuitable to the Occafion,and enable hitn 
 to enter into the Subject with double Energy 
 and Enjoyment . 
 
102 
 
 A Discourse on MUSIC, 
 
 Ch.VI. § 3. From what has been faid it is 
 N” evident, that thefe two Arts can never be 
 fo powerful frngly , as when they ar z pro* 
 perly united. For Poetry , when alone, 
 mud be neceffarily forced to wafe many 
 of its richeft Ideas , in the mere railing of 
 Affections, when, to have been properly 
 relilhed, it fhould have found thofe Af¬ 
 fections in their highelt Energy. And 
 Mufc , when alone, can only raife Affec~ 
 tions, which foon languifo and decay , if 
 not maintained and fed by the nutritive 
 Images of Poetry. Yet mud; it be re¬ 
 membered, in this Union, that Poetry ever 
 have the Precedence ; its * Utility , as well 
 as Dignity , being by far the more con- 
 fiderable. 
 
 § 4. And thus much, for the prefent, 
 as to Music, Painting, and Poetry, 
 
 the 
 
 * Ch. V. § 2. p. 83. 
 t P. 55- 
 
PAINTING, and POETRY. 
 
 the Circumftances, in which they agree,Chyli 
 and in which they differ; and the Pre- w ‘ v ~^ 
 
 FERENCE, DUE TO ONE OF THEM. ABOVE 
 TtlE OTHER TWO. 
 
 the END. 
 
TREATISE THE THIRD: 
 
 / 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 A DIALOGUE. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 rf 
 
 ✓ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' : ’ j • 
 
 
 * 
 
 - 
 
 ' 
 
 * •• . 
 
 \ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 '■ - :>• 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 , 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( I0 7 ) 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 A DIALOGUE. 
 
 PART the First. 
 
 J. H. to f. s. 
 
 N ATURE feems to treat Man,Parti, 
 as a painter would his difciple, i “~ %- — J 
 to whom he commits the out¬ 
 lines of a Figure lightly lketched* which 
 the Scholar for himfelf is to colour and 
 complete. Thus from Nature we derive 
 Senfes, and Paffions, and an Intellect, 
 which each of us for himfelf has to model 
 into a Charader. And hence (the reverfe 
 
 ef 
 
 4 
 
10S Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. of every Species befide) Human Characters 
 * v—' alone are infinitely various; as various in¬ 
 deed, as there are Individuals to form 
 them. Hence too, the great Diverfity of 
 Syflems, and of DoCtrmes, refpeCting the 
 Laws and Rules, and Conduct of Human 
 Life. 
 
 It is in the Hiflory of thefe, my Friend, 
 you have fo fuccefsfully employed yourfelf. 
 You have been fludious to know, not fo 
 much what Greeks , Romans , or Barbarians 
 have done-, as what they have reafoned, and 
 what they have taught . Not an Epicure 
 has more Joy in the Memory of a d II- 
 cious Banquet, than I feel in recollecting, 
 what we have difcourfed on thefe Sub¬ 
 jects. 
 
 And here you cannot forget (for we 
 were both unanimous) the Contempt, in 
 which we held thofe fuperficial Cenfurers, 
 who profefs to refute, what they want 
 even Capacities to comprehend. Upon the 
 Faith of their own Boafling (could that be 
 
 credited) 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 109 
 
 credited) Sentiments are expofed,Opinions Part I. 
 demolifhed, and the whole Wifdom of J 
 Antiquity lies vanquidied at their Feet. 
 
 Like Opera Heroes, upon their own Stage, 
 they can with eafe difpateh a Lion, or dif- 
 comfit a whole Legion. But alas! were 
 they to encounter, not the Shadow, but 
 the Subdance, what think you would be 
 the Event then ?—Little better, I fear, than 
 was the Fortune of poor Priam, when the 
 feeble Old Man durd attack the Youthful 
 Pyrrhus . 
 
 •—'— * Pelum imbelle Jine idlu 
 Conjecit: rauco quodprotenus cere repulfum, 
 EtfummoClypei nequicquam umbone pependiu 
 
 Among the many long exploded and 
 obfolete Sydems, there was one, you may 
 remember, for which I profeffed a great 
 Edeem. Not in the lead degree con¬ 
 vinced by all I had heard againd if, I 
 
 durd 
 
 * JEneid. 1. 2. verf. 544. 
 
 I 
 
I IO 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. durft venture to affirm, that no Syftem 
 u "‘ nr ' was more plaufible j that grant but its 
 Principles , and the reji followed of courfe; 
 that none approached nearer to the Per¬ 
 fection cf our own Religion, as I could 
 prove, were there occafion, by Authority 
 not to be controverted. Asyou, I knew, 
 were the Favourer of an Hypothecs feme- 
 what ‘f* different ; fo 1 attempted to fup- 
 port my own, by reciting you a certain 
 Dialogue. Not fucceeding however fo 
 happily in the Recolle&ion, as I could 
 wiffi, I have fince endeavoured to tran- 
 feribe, what at that time I would have re- 
 hearfed. The Refult of my Labour is the 
 following Narrative, which I commit, with 
 Confidence to your Friendfhip and Can-* 
 dour. 
 
 § 2. It was at a time, when a certain 
 Friend, whom I highly value, was my 
 Gueft. We had been lifting together, 
 
 enter- 
 
 t Viz. the Platonic. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 i i x 
 
 entertaining ourfetves with Shakejpear. Parti. 
 Among many of his Characters, we had u ^* yTOW 
 looked into that of JVoo/fey . How foon, 
 fays my Friend, does the Cardinal in Dif- 
 grace abjure that Happinefs, which he was 
 lately fo fond of? Scarcely out of Office, 
 but he begins to exclaim 
 
 *Vain Pomp and Glory of the WorldUhateye. 
 
 So true is it, that our Sentiments ever vary 
 with the Seafon 3 and that in Adverflty we 
 are of one Mind, in Profperity, of another. 
 
 As for his mean Opinion, faid I, of 
 Human Happinefs, it is a Truth, which 
 fmall Reflection might have taugh t him long 
 before. There feems little need of Diftrefs 
 to inform us of this. I rather commend 
 the feeming Wifdom of that'f-Eaftern Mo¬ 
 narch, who in the Affluence ofProfperity, 
 when he was proving every Pleafure, was 
 yet fo fenfible of their Emptinefs, their In¬ 
 sufficiency to make him happy, that he 
 
 pro- 
 
 * Shakespeare Henry the Eighth* 
 f Tu/c. Difp. v. 7. 
 
112 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. proclaimed a Reward to the Man, who 
 v—^ fhould invent a new Delight. The Re¬ 
 ward indeed was proclaimed, but the De¬ 
 light was not to be found. If by 
 
 Delight, Paid he, you mean fome Good ; 
 fomething conducive to real Happinefs it 
 might have been found perhaps, and yet 
 not hit the Monarch’s Fancy. 
 
 Is that, faid I, poflible? It is poflible, 
 replied he, tho’ it had been the Sovereign 
 Gooditfelf-' ——And indeed what wonder? 
 Is it probable that fuch a Mortal, as an 
 Eaftern Monarch fuch a pampered, flat¬ 
 tered, idle Mortal; fhould have Attention, 
 or Capacity to a Subject fo delicate ? A 
 Subjed, enough to exercife the Subtleft 
 and mod Acute ? 
 
 What then is it you efleem, faid I, the 
 Sovereign Good to be ? It fhould feem, by 
 your Reprefentation, to be fomething very 
 uncommon. Afk me nottheQueftion, 
 faid he, you know not where it will carry 
 us. Its general Idea indeed is eafy and 
 plain j but the Detail of Particulars is 
 
 perplexed 
 
A Dialogue. 113 
 
 perplexed and long--Paffions, and Opi- Part I. 
 
 nions for ever thwart us-a Paradox 
 
 appears in almoft every Advance. Befides, 
 did our Inquiries fucceed ever fo happily, 
 the very Subjedi itfelf is always enough to 
 give me Pain. That, replied I, feems 
 a Paradox indeed. It is not, faid he, 
 
 from any Prejudice, which I have con¬ 
 ceived again!! it ; for to Man I efteem it 
 the noblef! in the World. Nor is it for 
 being a Subject, to which my Genius does 
 not lead me ; for no Subject at all times 
 has more employed my Attention. But 
 the Truth is, I can fcarce ever think on it 
 but an unlucky Story ftill occurs to my 
 Mind. “ A certain Star-gazer, with his 
 “ Telelcope was once viewing the Moons 
 “ and defcribing her Seas, her Mountains, 
 t( and her Territories. Says a Clown to 
 “ his Companion, Let him fpy what he 
 pleafes ; we are as near to the Moon , as 
 “ he and all his Brethren .” So fares it 
 alas ! with thefe, our moral Speculations. 
 Practice too often creeps , where Theory 
 can four . The Philcfopher proves as weak, 
 
 I as 
 
114 Co?icerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. as thofe, whomhemojl contemns. A morti- 
 ' fying Thought to fuch as well attend it» 
 Too mortifying, replied I, to be 
 long dwelt on. Give us rather your ge¬ 
 neral Idea of the Sovereign Good. This is 
 eafy from your own Account, however in¬ 
 tricate the Detail. 
 
 G 
 
 Thus then, faid he, fince you are fo 
 urgent, it is thus that I conceive it. The 
 Sovereign Good is that, the Pos¬ 
 session of which renders us Happy. 
 
 And how, faid I, do we pofTefs it? 
 Is it Senfual , or Intellectual? There 
 you are entering, faid he, upon the Detail . 
 This is beyond your Queffcion. Not 
 
 a fmall Advance, faid I, to indulge poor 
 Curiofity ? Will you raife me a Third, and 
 be fo cruel not to allay it ? It is not, 
 replied he, of my raifing, but your own. 
 Belides I am not certain, fhould I attempt 
 to proceed, whether you will admit fuch 
 Authorities , as it is poffible I may vouch. 
 
 That, faid I, mud be determined 
 by their Weight, and Character. Sup- 
 
 pofe, 
 
 « 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 11 5 
 
 pofe, faid he, it fhould be Mankind 5 Part.I 
 the whole Human Race. Would you not 
 think it fomething ftrange, to feek of thofe 
 concerning Good, who purfue it a thou - 
 fund Ways , and many of them contra¬ 
 dictory I confefs, faid I, it feems fo. 
 
 And yet, continued he, were there 
 a Point, in which fuch Dffentients ever 
 agreed , this Agree?nent would be no mean 
 Argument in favour of its Truth and JuJl~ 
 nefs. But where, replied I, is this 
 
 Agreement to be found ? 
 
 He anfwered me by afking, What if 
 it fhould appear, that there were certain 
 Original Characteristics and Pre¬ 
 conceptions of Good, which were Na¬ 
 tural, Uniform and Common to all 
 Men; which all recognized in their various 
 Purfuits; and that the Difference lay only 
 in the applying them to Particu¬ 
 lars ? This requires, faid I, to be 
 
 illuftrated. As if, continued he, a 
 
 Company of Travellers, in fome wide 
 Forefl, were all intending for one City? 
 
 I 2 but 
 
116 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. but each by a Route peculiar to himfelf. 
 
 *“-" Y The Roads indeed would be various, and 
 many perhaps falfe ; but all who travelled, 
 would have one End in view. It is 
 
 evident, faid J, they would. So fares 
 it then, added he, with Mankind in pur- 
 fuit of Good. The Ways indeed are Ma?iy 9 
 but what they feek is One. 
 
 For indance : Did you ever hear of 
 any, who in purfuit of their Good, were 
 for li ving the Life of a Bird, an Infedt, or 
 a Fifh ? None. And why not ? 
 
 It would be in confident, anfwered I, 
 with their Nature. You fee then,, 
 
 faid he, they all agree in this-that what 
 
 they purfue, ought to be conjifient , and 
 agreeable to their proper Nature. So 
 
 ought it, faid I, undoubtedly. If fo, 
 continued he, one Pre-conception is dis¬ 
 covered, which is common to Good in gene¬ 
 ral ——It is, that all Good is fuppofed Jome- 
 thing agreeable to Nature. This in¬ 
 
 deed, replied I, feems to be agreed on all 
 hands. 
 
 But 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 But again, faid he, - —Is there a Man Part I. 
 
 ficarcely to be found of a Temper fo truly 
 mortified, as to acquiefce in th olowefi, and 
 fhorteft Neceffaries of Life ? Who aims not, 
 if he be able, at fomething farther , fome- 
 thing better ? I replied. Scarcely one. 
 
 Do not Muhitudes purfue, faid he, 
 infinite Objedts of Defire, acknowledged, 
 every one of them, to he in no refpedt 
 Neceffaries? -Exquifite Viands, deli¬ 
 
 cious Wines,fplendid Apparel, curious Gar¬ 
 dens; magnificent Apartmentsadorned with 
 Pidfures and Sculpture ; Mufic and Poetry, 
 and the whole Tribe of Elegant Arts ? 
 
 It is evident, faid I. If it be, 
 
 continued he, it fhould feem that they all 
 con fide red the Chief ox Sovereign Good , not 
 to be that, which conduces to bare Exifience 
 or mere Being ; for to this the Neceffaries 
 alone are adequate. I replied they were. 
 
 But if not this, it mult be fomewhat 
 conducive to that , which is fuperior to mere 
 Being. It mull. And what, con¬ 
 tinued he, can this be, but Well-Being ? 
 
 I 3 Well- 
 
118 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. Well-Being, under the various Shapes, in 
 which differing Opinions paint it ? Or can 
 you fugged any thing elfe ? I replied, 
 I could not. Mark here, then, con¬ 
 
 tinued he,another Pre-cvnceptiondm which 
 
 they all agree-—the Sovereign Good is 
 
 fomewhat conducive , not to mere Being, but 
 to Well-Being. I replied, it had fo ap¬ 
 peared. 
 
 Again, continued he. What labour, 
 what expence, t© procure thofe rarities, 
 which our own poor country is unable to 
 afford us ? How is the world ranfacked to 
 its mmoft verges, and luxury and arts 
 
 imported from every quarter ?-Nay 
 
 more---How do we baffle Nature her- 
 
 felf; invert her Order j feek the Vegetables 
 of Spring in the rigours of Winter, and 
 Winter’s Ice, during the heats of Sum¬ 
 mer? I replied. We did. And 
 
 what difappointment, what remorfe,when 
 endeavours fail ? It is true. If this 
 
 then be evident, faid he, it fhould feem, 
 that whatever we defire as our Chief and 
 
 Sove - 
 
A Dialogue. 119 
 
 Sovereign Good , is fomething which, nsfarPart I. 
 aspoffible, we would accommodate to all Places } 
 and Times. I anfwered, fo it appeared. 
 
 See then, faid he, another of its Cha- 
 raSteriftics , another Pre-conception . 
 
 But farther fli 11 -What contefts for 
 
 Wealth? What fcrambling for Property? 
 
 What perils in the purfuit ; what follicitude 
 in the maintenance ?—And why all this ? 
 
 To what Pnrpofe , what End? —Or is not 
 the reafon plain ? Is it not that Wealth 
 may continually procure us, whatever we 
 fancy Good; and make that perpetual , 
 which would otherwife be tranjient ? 
 
 I replied, it feemed fo. Is it not far¬ 
 
 ther defired, as fupplying us from ourfelves; 
 when, witliout it, we muft be beholden to 
 the benevolence of others , and depend on 
 their caprice for all that we enjoy ? 
 
 Xt is true, faid I, this feems a reafon. 
 
 Ag ain —--—Is not Powerof every degree 
 as much contefted for, as Wealth? Are not 
 magiftracies, honours, principalities, and 
 
 I 4 empire. 
 
120 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Fart I. empire, the fubjedts of drife, and ever- 
 v lading contention ? I replied. They 
 
 were. And why, laid he, this P To 
 
 obtain what End?--Is it not to help us, 
 
 like wealth, to the PoJJ'eJJion of what we 
 dejire? Is it not farther to afcertain, to 
 fecure our enjoyments ; that when others 
 would deprive us, we may be ftrong enough 
 to refft them? I replied, it was. 
 
 Or to invert the whole--Why are 
 
 there, who feek recedes the mod didant 
 and retired ? dy courts and power, and 
 fubmit to Parcimony and Qbfcurity ? Why 
 all this, but from the fame intention ? 
 From an Opinion that frnall pod'effions, 
 
 ufed moderately, are permanent -that 
 
 larger poffedions raife envy, and are more 
 frequently invaded -——that the Safety of 
 Power and Dignity is more precarious, than 
 that of Retreat; and that therefore they 
 have chofen, what is mofl eligible upon the 
 whole? It is not, laid I, improbable, 
 that they adl by forne luch motive. 
 
 Do 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 I 21 
 
 Do you not fee then, continued he, two Part I. 
 or three more Pre-conceptions of the Sove- ’—— 
 reign Goody which are fought for by all, as 
 elTential to conftitute it ? And what, 
 
 laid I, are thefe ? That it fhould 
 
 not be tranfient , nor derived from the 
 Will of otherSy nor in their Power to take 
 away ; but be durable , felf-derivedy and (if 
 I may ufe the Expreffion) indeprivable . 
 
 I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 
 
 But we have already found it to be con¬ 
 fide red, as fomething agreeable to our Nature ; 
 conducive , not to mere Being, but to Well- 
 Being ; and what we aim to have accommo¬ 
 date to all Places and Times f We have. 
 
 There may be other Chara^eriftics, 
 faid he, but thefe I think fufficient. See 
 then its Idea; behold it, as collected from 
 the Original , Natural and UniverJ'al Pre¬ 
 conceptions of all Mankind. The Sove¬ 
 reign Good, they have taught us, ought 
 
 to be fomething- Agreeable to our 
 
 JMature; Conducive to Well-Being; 
 
 Accom- 
 
122 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Parti. Accommodate to all Places and 
 Times; Durable, Self-derived, and 
 Indeprivable. Your account, faid 
 
 I, appears juft. 
 
 It matters, continued he, little, how 
 
 they err in the Application -if they covet 
 
 that as agreeable to Nature , which is in it- 
 
 felf moft Contrary -if they would have 
 
 that as Durable , which is in itfelf moft 
 
 Dranfient -that as Independent, and their 
 
 own, which is moft precarious and Servile. 
 It is enough for us, if we know their 
 
 Am --enough, if we can difcover, what 
 
 it is they propofe- the Means and Method 
 
 may be abfurd, as it happens. I an- 
 
 fwered. Their Aim was fufftcient to prove 
 what he had afterted. 
 
 It is true, replied he, it is abundantly 
 fufficient. And yet perhaps, even iho’ this 
 were ever fo certain, it w 7 ould not be al¬ 
 together foreign, were we to examine, 
 how they adt; how they fucceed in ap¬ 
 plying thefe Univerjals to Particular Sub¬ 
 jects. 
 
A Dialogue, 323 
 
 jedls. Should they be found juft in the Part I. 
 
 Application, we need look no farther-v—v«-» 
 
 The true Sovereign Good would of courfe 
 be Plain and Obvious and we fhould have 
 po more to do, than to follow the beaten 
 road. It is granted, replied I. But 
 
 what if they err ? Time enough for 
 that, laid he, when we are fatisfied that 
 they do. We ought firfl to inform our- 
 felves, whether they may not poffibly be 
 in the right. I fubmitted, and begged 
 him to proceed his own way. 
 
 § 3. Will you then, faid he, in this 
 difquiftion into Human Conduct, allow 
 me this——That fuch, as is the Species 
 of Life, which every one choofes ; fuch is 
 his Idea of HappineJ's, fuch his Conception 
 of the Sovereign Good? I feem, faid I, 
 to comprehend You, but fhould be glad 
 You would illuftrate. His Meaning, 
 
 he anfwered, was no more than this-- 
 
 If a Man prefer a Life of Induftry , it is be- 
 caufe he has an Ideaoi Happinefsin Wealthy 
 |f he prefers a Life of Gaiety , it is from a 
 2 like 
 
124 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. like Idea concerning Pleafure . And the 
 <u ~“ v 1 'fame , we fay, holds true in every other 
 
 Inftance. I told him, it mull cer¬ 
 
 tainly. 
 
 And can you recollect, Paid he, any 
 Life, but what is a Life of Bufmefs , or of 
 Leifure? I anfwered. None. And 
 is not the great End of BufmeJ's either 
 Power , o r Wealth ? 11 i s. M u ft 
 
 not every Life therefore of Bufnefs be 
 either Political ox Lucrative? It mu ft. 
 
 Again-—Are not Intelledl and Senfe, 
 the Soul’s leading Powersl They are. 
 
 And in Leifure are we not ever 
 feeking, to gratify one. or the other ? 
 
 We are. Muft not every Life there¬ 
 
 fore of Leifure be either Pleafurahle , or 
 Contemplative? If you confine Plea fure, 
 faid I, to Senfe, I think it neceftarily muft. 
 
 If it be not fo confined , faid he, we 
 confound all Inquiry . Allow it, 
 
 Mark then, faid he', the two grand 
 Genera , the Lives of Business and of 
 
 Leisure 
 
i Dialogue. 125 
 
 Leisure- -mark alfo the fubordlnate Parti. 
 
 Species; the Political and Lucra- u "“ v "—' 
 tive, the Contemplative and 
 
 Pleasurable -Can you think of any 
 
 other, which thefe will not include ? 
 
 I replied, I knew of none. It is pof- 
 
 fible indeed, faid he, that there may be 
 other Lives framed, by the blending of 
 thefe, two or more of them together. 
 
 But if we feparate with accuracy, we 
 fhall find that here they all terminate. 
 
 I replied, fo it feemed probable. 
 
 If then, continued he, we would be 
 exaft in our Inquiry, we muft examine 
 thefe four Lives, and mark their Confe- 
 quences . It is thus only we fhall learn, 
 how far thofe, who embrace them, find 
 that Good and Happinefs, which we know 
 they all purfue. I made anfwer, it 
 
 feemed necelfary, and I fhould willingly 
 attend him. 
 
 § 4. To begin then, faid he, with the 
 Political Life. Let us fee the Good* 
 
 ufually 
 
126 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. ufually fought after here. To ^ private 
 Man , it is the favour of fome Prince, or 
 Commonwealth ; the honours and emo¬ 
 luments derived from this favour ; the 
 court and homage of mankind •, the 
 
 power of commanding others-—To a 
 
 Prince , it is the fame thing nearly, only 
 greater in Degree ; a larger command ; a 
 ilrider and more fervile homage ; glory* 
 
 conquefl, and extended empire--Am I 
 
 right in my defcription ? I replied* 
 
 I thought he was. Whether then, faid 
 he, all this deferves the Name of Good or 
 not, I do not controvert. Be it one, or 
 the other, it affedls not our Inquiry. All 
 that I would afkconcerning it, is this-—-— 
 Do you not think it a Good (if it really 
 be one) derived from Foreign and External 
 Canfes? Undoubtedly, replied I. 
 
 It cannot come then from ourfelves , or be 
 felf-derived. It cannot. And what 
 
 Brail we fay as to its Duration and Stabi¬ 
 lity l Is it fo firm and lajiing , that we can¬ 
 not be deprived of it ? I thould imagine, 
 faid I, quite otherwife. You infill not 
 
 then, 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 127 
 
 then, faid he, on my appealing to Hiftory. Part I. 
 You acknowledge the Fate of Favourites, * , J 
 
 of Empires, and their Owners. I re¬ 
 plied, I did. 
 
 If fo, faid he, it fhould feem that this 
 Political Good, which they feek, ccrrefponds 
 not to th ePre-conceptions of being Durable, 
 and Indeprivable. Far from it. But 
 ft appeared juft before, not to be felf- 
 derived. It did. You fee then, 
 
 faid he, that in three of our Pre-conceptions 
 it intirely fails. So indeed, faid I, it 
 appears. 
 
 I 
 
 But farther, faid he—We are told of 
 this Good , that in the Pojfefjlon it is attended 
 with Anxiety ■, and that when loft, it is 
 ufually loft with Ignominy and D if grace ; 
 nay, often with profecutions and the bit- 
 tereft refentments; with mul&s, with 
 exile, and death itfelf. It is frequently, 
 faid I, the cafe. How then, faid he, 
 can it anfwer that other Pre-conception , of 
 contributing to our Well-Being ? Can that 
 
 contribute 
 
 
128 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Parti, contribute to Well-Being, whofe Confe- 
 L r quences lead to Calamity, and whofe Pre- 
 fence implies Anxiety ? This, it muft be 
 confefted, faid I, appears not probable. 
 
 But once more, faid he---There 
 
 are certain Habits or Difpoftions of Mind* 
 called Sincerity, Generofity, Candour, 
 Plain-dealing, Juftice, Honour, Honefty, 
 and the like. There are. And it has 
 been generally believed, that thefe are 
 agreeable to Nature . Affuredly. 
 
 But it has been as generally believed, that 
 the Political Good, we fpeak of, is often not 
 to be acquired but by Habits, contraiy to 
 thefe’, and which, if thefe are Natural, 
 muft of neceffity be unnatural. What 
 Habits, faid I, do you mean ? Flattery, 
 anfwered he, Diffimulation, Intrigue : upon 
 occafion, perhaps Iniquity, FaHhood, and 
 Fraud. It is poffible indeed, faid I, 
 that thefe may fometimcs be thought necef- 
 fary. How then, faid he, can that 
 
 Good be agreeable to Nature, which cannot 
 be acquired, but by Habits contrary to 
 
 Nature ? 
 
i Dialogue. tag 
 
 Mature? Your Argument, faid I, Part L 
 
 feemsjufL 
 
 If then> faid he, we have reafoned 
 rightly, and our Conclufions may be de¬ 
 pended on ; it fhould feem that the sup¬ 
 posed Good, which the Political Life 
 purfues , correfponds not , in any Injia?ice , to 
 our Pre-conceptions £/ 7 /;<?SovereignGood» 
 
 I anfwered. So it appeared,, 
 
 § 5. Let us quit then, faid he, the Poli¬ 
 tical Life, and pafs to the Lucrative. The 
 Objed of this is Wealth. Admit it* 
 
 And is it not too often, faid he, the 
 Gafe, that to acquire this , we are tempted 
 to employ fome of thofe Habits , which we 
 have juft condemned as Unnatural? Such, 
 
 I mean, as Fraud, Falfhood, Injuftice, and 
 the like? It muft be owned, faid I, 
 
 too often. 
 
 Besides^ continued he-—-—What fhall 
 we fay to the EJleenii the Friendjhip , and 
 Love of Mankind? Are they worth having? 
 
 K Is 
 
130 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. Is it agreeable , think you, to Nature , ta 
 ^ ' endeavour to defefve them ? Agreeable, 
 faid I, to Nature, beyond difpute. If 
 fo, then to merit Hatred and Conteinpt 9 
 faid he, mud needs be contrary to Nature . 
 
 Undoubtedly. And is there any 
 thing which fo certainly merits Hatfedznd 
 Contempt , as a mere Lucrative Life , fpenfi 
 in the uniform Purfuit of Wealth? 
 
 I replied, I believed there was nothing. 
 
 If fo, faid he, then as to correspond-* 
 ing with our Pre-conceptions, the Lucrative 
 Good, in this relped:, fares no better than 
 the Political. It appears not. 
 
 And what fhall we fay as to Anxiety ? 
 Is not both the Pofefion and Purfuit of 
 Wealth, to thofe who really love it, ever 
 anxious? It feems fo. And why 
 anxious , but from a Certainty of its Injla* 
 bilityi from an Experience, how obnoxious 
 it is to every crofs Event; how eafy to be 
 loft and transferred to others, by the fame 
 Fraud and Rapine, which acquired it to 
 ourfelves ?——This is indeed the triteft of 
 
 all 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 131 
 
 all Topics. The Poets and Orators have Part .1 
 long ago exhaufied it. It is true, Paid I, 
 they have. May we not venture then, 
 faid he, upon the whole, to pafs the fame 
 Sentence on the Lucrative Life, as we 
 
 have already on the Political - that it 
 
 propofes not A Good, correfpondent to thofe 
 Pre-conceptions, by which we would all be 
 governed in the Good, which we are 
 allfeekingf I anfwered, we might 
 
 juflly. 
 
 § 6 . If then neither the Lucrative 
 Life , nor the Political , faid he, procure 
 that Good which we defire : (hall we feek 
 it from the Pleasurable ? Shall we 
 make Pleasure our Goddefs ? 
 
 * - -Pie afure. 
 
 Whom Love attends, andfoft Define , and 
 Words 
 
 Alluring, apt the fie add eft Heart to bend . 
 
 So fays the Poet, and plaufible his Doc¬ 
 trine. Plaufible, faid I, indeed. 
 
 K 2 Let 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Let it then, continued he, be a plea- 
 fur able World 3 a Race of harmlefs , loving 
 Animals ; an Elyfian ‘Temperature of Sun- 
 fhine and Shade. Let the Earth , in every 
 Quarter, refemble our own dear Country 3 
 where never was a Froft, never a Fog, 
 never a Day, but was delicious and ferene. 
 
 I was a little embarraffed at this un¬ 
 expected Flight, ’till recollecting myfelf, 
 I told him, (but ftill with fome Surprize) 
 that, in no degree to difparage either my 
 Country or my Countrymen, I had never 
 found Either fo exquifite, as he now 
 fuppofed them. There are then, it 
 
 feems, faid he, in the Natural World , 
 and even in our own beloved Country, 
 fuch things as Storms and Tempefs 3 as 
 pinching Colds, and fcorching Heats. 
 
 I replied, there were. And confe - 
 
 quent to thefe , Difeafe , and Famine , and 
 infinite Calamities . There are. 
 
 And in the Civil or Human World, we 
 ha Difcord and Contention 3 or (as the 
 
 Poet 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *33 
 
 Poet better * defcribes it) Parti. 
 
 Cruel Revenge , and rancorous Defpite , 
 
 Di/loyal Treafon,and heart-burning Hate • 
 
 We have. Alas ! then, poor 
 
 Pleafure ! Where is that Good, accommo¬ 
 date to every Time; fuited to every Place ; 
 feIf-derived, not dependent on Foreign Ex¬ 
 ternal Caufes? Can it be Pleasure, on 
 fuch a changeable , fuch a turbulent Spot , as 
 this ? I replied, I thought not. 
 
 And what indeed, were the World, 
 faid he, modelled to a Temperature the mofl 
 exaff ? Were the Rigours of the Seafons 
 never more to be known ; nor Wars, De¬ 
 valuations, Famines, or Difeafes ? Admit¬ 
 ting all this, (which we know to be im - 
 pofible) can we find ftill in Pleafure that 
 lengthened Duration, which weconfider as 
 an Ejfential , to conflitute the Sovereign 
 Good?— —Aik the Glutton, the Drinker, 
 
 K 3 the 
 
 * Spencer’s Fairy ghieen, B. 2. Cant. 7, Stanz. 22. 
 
134 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. the Man of Gaiety and Intrigue, whether 
 'they know any Enjoyment , not to be can¬ 
 celled by Satiety ? Which does not haftily 
 pafs away into the tedious Intervals of In¬ 
 difference ?—-—Or yielding all this too, 
 (which we know cannot be yielded) where 
 are we to find our Good , how pofiefs it in 
 Agel In that Eve of Life, declining Age, 
 when the Power of Senfe , on which all de¬ 
 pends, like the fctting Sun, is gradually for- 
 faking us ? 
 
 I should imagine, faid I, that Pleafure 
 was no mean Adverfary, fince you em¬ 
 ploy, in attacking her, fo much of your 
 Rhetoric. Without heeding what I faid, 
 
 he purfued his Subject-Btfidc, if this 
 
 be our Good , our Flappinefs , and our End; 
 to what purpofe Powers , which bear no 
 Relation to it ?—-—Why Memory ? Why 
 Reafon ? Mere Senfation might have been 
 as exquifte , had we been Flies or Earth¬ 
 worms -—Or can it be proved otherwife ? 
 
 I replied, I could not fay. No Ani¬ 
 mal , continued he, pofefes its Faculties in 
 4 
 
 vain. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *35 
 
 yarn. And (hall Man derive no Good Part I. 
 from his hefty his mod eminent From w -v—■ 
 That, which of all is peculiar to himfelf? 
 
 For as to Growth and Nutrition, they are 
 not wanting to the meaneft Vegetable; and 
 for Senfes, there are Animals, which per¬ 
 haps exceed us in them all. 
 
 § 7. This feems, faid I, no mean Ar¬ 
 gument in favour of Contemplation. 
 
 The Contemplative Life gives Reafon 
 all the Scope, which it can defire. And 
 of all Lives, anfwered he, would it furely 
 be the beft, did we dwell, like Milton s 
 Uriel, in the Sun's bright Circle. Then 
 might we plan indeed the moft Romantic 
 Kind of Happinefs. Stretched at Eafe, 
 without Trouble or Moleftation, we might 
 pafs our Days, contemplating the Uni- 
 verfe •, tracing its Beauty ; loft in Wonder ; 
 ravilhed with Ecftacy, and I know not 
 
 w hat-But here alas! on this fublunary, 
 
 this turbulent Spot, (as w'e called it not 
 long fince) how little is this, or any thing 
 like it, practicable? -Fogs arife, which 
 
 K 4 dim 
 
CO 
 
 6 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. dim our Profpedfts—the Cares of Life per- 
 Wv J petually moleft us—Is ContemplationJuited 
 to a Place, like this l It muft be owned, 
 Paid I, not extremely. How then is it 
 the Sovereign Good, which fhould be Ac- 
 commodate to every Place? I replied, 
 
 jt feemed not probable. 
 
 But farther, faid he-Can we enjoy 
 
 the Sovereign Good, and be at the fame 
 time vexed, and agitated by PaJJion ? Does 
 not this feem a Paradox ? I anfwered, 
 it did, Suppofe then an Event were to 
 happen-—not an Inundation, or Majfacre < 
 but an Acquaintance only drop a difrefpeff- 
 ful Word j a Servant chance to break a 
 favourite Piece of Furniture— What would 
 ihftrudl us to endure this?—•— Contempla¬ 
 tion, Theory, Abftradlions? Why not, 
 faid I ? No, replied he with Warmth, 
 (quoting the Poet) not 
 
 -* Pho all the Stars 
 
 fhou knovSf by Name ; and all the Etherial 
 Powers. For 
 
 * Par. Loft, R. 12. ver. 576. 
 
A Dialogue. 137 
 
 For does not Experience teach us, abun-Part I. 
 dantly teach us, that our deepeft Philofo-' 
 phers, as to Temper and Behaviour , are as 
 very Children for the mod; part, as the 
 meaneft and moft illiterate ? A little more 
 Arrogance perhaps, from Preemption of 
 what they know, but not a grain more of 
 Magnanimity , of Candour and calm Indu~ 
 ranee . 
 
 You are fomewhat too fevere, faid I, 
 in cenfuring of all. There are better and 
 worfe among Them, as among Others. 
 
 The Difference is no way prop or- 
 tioned , faid he, to the Quantity of their 
 Knowledge; fo that whatever be its Caufe, 
 it can’t be imputed to their Speculations 
 Belides, can you really imagine, we came 
 here only to Think? Is Adding a Circum- 
 flance, which is foreign to Our Character ? 
 
 —-Why then fo many Social AffedhonSt 
 
 which all of us feel, even in fpite of our- 
 felves ? Are we to fupprefs them All, as 
 ufelefs and unnatural ? The Attempt, 
 replied I, muff needs be found impracti¬ 
 cable. 
 
13 8 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Fart I. cable. Were they once fupprejfed , faid 
 *—' he, the Confequences would be fomewhat 
 ftrange. We fhould hear no more of Fa¬ 
 ther, Brother, Hufband, Son, Citizen, Ma- 
 giftrate, and Society itfelf. And were this 
 ever the Cafe, ill (I fear) would it fare 
 with even Contemplation itfelf. It would 
 certainly be but bad Speculating, among 
 lawlefs Barbarians-Unaffociated Ani¬ 
 
 mals——-wher t Strength alone of Body was 
 to conftitute Dominion , and the Contefl 
 came to be (as* Horace defcribes it) 
 
 g landem atque cubilia propter , 
 JJnguibus & pugnis , dein fujlibus >.—• 
 
 Bad enough, replied I, of all con- 
 fcience. 
 
 It fhould feem then, faid he, that not 
 even the best Contemplative Life, 
 however noble its Objedl, e was agreeable 
 to our present Nature, or confifient 
 
 'with 
 
 * Sat. 3. 1. 1. ver. 99. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *39 
 
 with our prefcnt Situation . I confefs, Part I. 
 faid I, you appear to have proved fa. 
 
 But if this be allowed true of the Befl, 
 the moil; Excellent \ what (hall we fay to 
 the Mockery of Monkery; the Farce of 
 Friars; the ridiculous Mummery of being 
 fequeftred in a Cloyjler ?■ This furely is too 
 low a Thing, even to merit an Examina¬ 
 tion. I have no Scruples here, faid I, 
 you need not wade your Time. 
 
 ♦ 
 
 § §. If that, faid he, be your Opinion, 
 let us look a little backward. For our 
 memory’s fake it may be proper to reca¬ 
 pitulate. I replied, it would be highly 
 acceptable. Thus then, faid he—— 
 \V e have examined the four grand Lives, 
 which we find the Generality of Men em¬ 
 brace ; the Lucrative , and the Political; 
 the Pleafurable , and the Contemplative. 
 
 And we have aimed at proving that- 
 
 to fuch a Being as Man, withfuch a Body y 
 fuch Affections, fuch Senfes, andfuch an In¬ 
 tellect - placed in fuch a World, fubjeCt 
 
 to fuch Incidents—mot one of thefe Lives is 
 
 pro - 
 
140 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. productive of that Good, which we find ail 
 ' Men to recognize thro the fame un form 
 Pr e-con ceptions; and which thro one or 
 other of thefe Lives they all of them pwfue . 
 
 § 9. You have juftly, Aid I, collected 
 the Sum of your Inquiries. And 
 
 happy, faid he, fhould I think it, were 
 they to terminate here. I ailced him. 
 Why ? Becaufe, replied he, to in- 
 
 finuate fird, that all Mankind are in the 
 wrong; and then to attempt afterwards, 
 to fliew one's felf only to be right; is a 
 Degree of Arrogance, which I would not 
 willingly be guilty of. I ventured here 
 to fay, That I thought he need not be fo 
 
 diffident-that a Subjedt, where one's 
 
 own Interefi appeared concerned fo nearly y 
 would well juftify every Scruple , and even 
 the fevered; Inquiry. There, faid he, 
 you fay fomething—there you encourage 
 
 me indeed. For what-Are' we not 
 
 cautioned againft Counterfeits , even in Mat¬ 
 ters of meaned Value ? If a Piece of Metal 
 be tendered us, which feems doubtful, do 
 
 we 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 141 
 
 we not hefitate ? Do we not try it by the Part T. 
 Tefi, before we take it for Current —-And 
 is not this deemed Prudence? Are we not 
 
 cenfured, if we adt otherwife ?-How 
 
 much more then does it behove us not to 
 be impofed on here? To be diffident and 
 fcrupuloufly exact, wher tlmpofiure, if once 
 admitted, may tempt us to far worfe Bar¬ 
 gain, than ever Glaucus made with Diomed? 
 
 What Bargain, faid I, do you mean ? 
 
 The Exchange, replied he, not of 
 Gold for Brafs, but of Good for Evil, and 
 
 of Happinefs for Mifery -But enough of 
 
 this, fince you have encouraged me to 
 proceed—We are feekingthat Good, which 
 we think others have not found. Permit 
 me thus to purfue my SubjedE 
 
 § 10. Every Being on this our Ter - 
 refirial Dwelling, exifls encompafied with 
 infinite Objedls \ exifls among Animals tame, 
 and Animals wild ; among Plants and Ve¬ 
 getables of a thoufand difi'erent Qualities, 
 among Heats and Colds, Tempefls and 
 Calms, the Friendfhips and Difcords of 
 
 hetero - 
 
142 Concerning HAPPINESS* 
 
 Part I. heterogeneous Elements- -What fay you? 
 
 Are all thefe Things exactly the fame to it; 
 or do they differ, think you in their Ef¬ 
 fects and Confequences They differ, 
 faid I, widely. Some perhaps then, 
 
 faid he, are Apt, Congruous , and Agreeable 
 to its Natural State. I replied, they 
 
 were. Others are In-apt, Incongruous * 
 and Eifagreeable. They are. 
 
 And others again are Indifferent . They 
 
 are* 
 
 It Should feem then, faid he, if this be 
 allowed, that to every individual Beings 
 without the leafl Exception, the whole Mafs 
 of things External, from the great eft to the 
 meanef, food in the Relations of either 
 Agreeable, Eifagreeable, or Indifferent . 
 
 I replied, fo it appeared; 
 
 But tho’ this, continued he, be true 
 in the general, it is yet as certain when we 
 defcend to Particulars, that what is Agree¬ 
 able to one Species is Difagreeable to another; 
 and not only fo, but perhaps Indifferent to 
 
 a 
 
A Dialog us. 
 
 Hi 
 
 a third . Inftances of this kind, he faid 5 Part L 
 were too obvious to be mentioned. v-« 
 
 I replied, it was evident. Whence 
 
 ♦hen, faid he, this Diverfty ? -It cannot 
 
 arife from the Externals- --for Water is 
 
 equally PVater, whether to a Man , or to a 
 Fijh j whether, operating on the one, it 
 fuffocate , or on the other, it give Life and 
 Vigour. I replied, it was. So is 
 
 Fire, faid he, the fame Fire , however 
 various in its Confequences j whether it 
 harden or f 'often , give Pleafure or Pain . 
 
 I replied, it was. But if this D/~ 
 verfty , continued he, be not derived from 
 
 the Externals , whence can it be elfe?«-* 
 
 Or can it poffibly be derived otherwife than 
 from the peculiar Confutation , from the 
 Natural State of every Species itfelf ? 
 
 I replied, it appeared probable. 
 
 Thus then, faid he, is it that Every 
 particular Species is, itfelf to itfelf, the 
 Meafure of all things in the Univerfe—that 
 <as Things vary their Relations to it, they 
 
144 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. vary too in-their Value —— and that if theif 
 w ~' r_w ~' 1 '* Value be ever doubtful > it can no f Lvay be ad- 
 jufled , but by recurring with Accuracy to 
 the Natural State of the Species , and to 
 thofe feveral Relations y which fuch a State 
 of courfe creates . I anfwered, he ar¬ 
 
 gued juftly. 
 
 § ii. To proceed then, Paid he—Tho’ 
 it be true, that every Species has a Natural 
 State , as we have aflerted ; it is not true, 
 that every Species has a Senfe or Feeling of 
 it* This Feeling or Senfe is a Natural 
 Eminence or Prerogative y denied the Vege¬ 
 table and Inanimate , and imparted only to 
 the Animal I anfwered, it was* 
 
 And think you, continued he, that as 
 many as have this Senfe or Peeling of a 
 Natural State, are alienated from it, or in¬ 
 different to it ? Or is it not more probable, 
 that they are well-affedted to it ? 
 Experience, faid I, teaches us, how well 
 they are all afteded. You are right, 
 
 replied he. For what would be more 
 
 abfurd? 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 M 5 
 
 abfurd, than to be indifferent to their own Part .1 
 Welfare; or to be alienated from it, as tho’ 
 it was Foreign and Unnatural f I replied. 
 Nothing could be more. But, con¬ 
 
 tinued he, if they are well-affedled to this 
 their proper Natural State> it fhould feem 
 too they muft be well-affecled to all thofe 
 Externals , which appear^/, congruous , and 
 agreeable to it. I anfwered, They 
 
 muft. And if fo, then ill-affeSled or 
 
 averfe to fuch, as appear the contrary. 
 
 They mufti And to fuch as appear 
 
 indifferent , indifferent . They muft* 
 
 But if this, faid he, be allowed, it 
 will follow, that in confequence of thefe 
 Appearances , they will think fome Exter¬ 
 nals worthy of Purfuit fome worthy of 
 Avoidance and fome worthy of neither . 
 
 It was probable, faid I, they fhould. 
 
 Hence then, faid he, another DiviJio?i 
 of Things external-, that is, into Purfuable , 
 Avoidable, and Indifferent —-a Divifion only 
 belonging to Beings Senjitive and Animate , 
 becaufe all, below thefe , can neither avoid 
 
 L cor 
 
Concerning H A P P IN E S S, 
 
 I. nor purfue, I replied. They could 
 
 ’ 'not. 
 
 If, then, faid he, Man be allowed in 
 the Number of thefe Senftive Beings, this 
 
 Divifion will affedt Man- -or to explain 
 
 more fully, the whole Mafs of Things exter¬ 
 nal will, according to this Divifion, exifi 
 to the Human Species in the Relations of Fur- 
 fuakle, Avoidable, and Indifferent. I re¬ 
 plied, They would. 
 
 Should we therefore defire, faid he, 
 to know what thefe things truly are, we 
 inufi: firfi; be informed, what is Man’s 
 truly Natural Constitution. For 
 thus, you may remember, it was fettled not 
 long fi-nce-—that every Species was its own 
 Standard, and that when the Value of 
 Things was doubtful, the Species was to be 
 fudied ; the Relations to be deduced, which 
 were confequent to it ; and in this manner 
 the Value of Things to be adjufied and afcer- 
 taimed. I replied. We had fo agreed 
 
 it. I fear then, faid he, we are en- 
 
 gaged 
 
4 . » . . « . . 
 
 A Dialogue. 147 
 
 gaged in a more arduous Undertaking, aPart I. 
 Tafk of more difficulty, than we were 
 firft aware of—But Fortuna Fortes —we 
 mutt endeavour to acquit ourfelves as well 
 as we are able. 
 
 § 12. That Man therefore has a 
 Body, of a Figure and internal Strublure 
 peculiar to itfelf; capable of certain De¬ 
 grees of Strength, Agility, Beauty, and the 
 like ; this I believe is evident, and hardly 
 wants a Proof. I anfwered, I was 
 
 willing to own it. That he is capable 
 too of Fleafure and Fain ; is po/Telled of 
 Senfes , Affedlions , Appetites , and Averfions; 
 this alfo feems evident* and can fcarcely be 
 denied. I replied, it was admitted. 
 
 We may venture then to range Him 
 in the Tribe of Animal Beings. 
 
 I replied. We might. 
 
 And think you, faid he, without Society, 
 you^or any Man could have been born ? 
 
 Mod: certainly not. Without 
 
 Society , when born, could you have been 
 
 L 2 brought 
 
148 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. brought to Maturity ? Mod certainly 
 w "“ v J not. Had your Parents then had no 
 
 Social Affections towards you in that peri- 
 vid - lous State, that tedious Infancy, (fo much 
 
 J 1 r Tibl ' 7 ^ 
 
 Protrept. longer than the longejl of other Animals) 
 you muft have inevitably perifhed thro' 
 Want and Inability. I mufb. You 
 perceive then that to Society you, and 
 every Man are indebted, not only for the 
 Beginning of Being , but for the Continu¬ 
 ance . We are. 
 
 Suppose then we pafs from this Birth 
 and Infancy of Man, to his Maturity and 
 Perfection—Is there any Age, think you, 
 fo felf-fufficient , as that in it he feels no 
 Wants ? What Wants, anfwered I, 
 
 do you mean ? In the firfl: and prin¬ 
 cipal place, faid he, that of Food-, then 
 perhaps that of Raiment; and after this, 
 a Dwelling , or Defence again!! the Wea¬ 
 ther. Thefe Wants, replied I, are 
 
 furely Natural at all Ages. And is it 
 
 not agreeable to Nature, faid he, that they 
 fhould at all Ages be fupplied? Af- 
 
 furedly. 
 
A D I A L O G U E. T49 
 
 furedly. And is it not more agreeable Part I. 
 to have them well fupplied, than ill ? — 
 
 It is. And mojl agreeable, to have 
 
 them bejl fupplied ? Certainly. 
 
 If there be then any one State, better than 
 all others , for the fupplying thefe Wants; 
 this State, of all others , muf needs be mojl 
 Natural. It mud. 
 
 And what Supply, faid he, of thefe 
 Wants, (hall we efteem the meanefl , which 
 we can concive ?—Would it not be fome- 
 thing like this ? Had we nothing beyond 
 Acorns for Food $ beyond a rude Skin, for 
 Raiment ; or beyond a Cavern, or hollow 
 Tree, to provide us with a Dwelling ? 
 
 Indeed, faid I, this would be bad enough. 
 
 And do you not imagine, as far as 
 this , we might each fupply our [elves , tho’ 
 we lived in Woods, mere folitary Savages? 
 
 I replied, I thought we might. 
 
 Suppose then, continued he, that our 
 Supplies were to be mended —for inllance, 
 that we were to exchange Acorns for 
 
 L 2 Bread-— 
 
* 5 ° 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 part I. Bread—-Would our Savage Character be 
 fufficient here $ Mud we not be a little 
 better difciplined ; Would not fome Art 
 be requifite ?—The Baker s, for example. 
 
 It would. And previoujly to 
 
 the Baker’s, that of the Miller ? It 
 
 would. And previoujly to the Miller’s 
 that of the Hufbandman ? It would. 
 
 Three Arts then appear neceffary* 
 even upon the lowejl Edimation. It is 
 admitted. 
 
 But a Quedion farther, faid he—Can 
 the Hufbandman work, think you, with¬ 
 out his Tools? Mud he not have his 
 Plough, his Harrow; his Reap-hook, and 
 the like ? He mud. And mud not 
 thofe other Artids too be furnifhed in the 
 fame manner ? They mud. And 
 whence mud they be furnifhed ? From 
 their oven Arts ?-—Or are not the making 
 Tools, and the ufmg them, two different 
 Occupations ? I believe, faid I, they 
 
 are. You may be convinced, continued 
 he, by fmall Recollection. Does Agricul¬ 
 ture 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 ture make its own Plough, its own Harrow ? p ar t J o 
 Or does it not apply to other Arts , for all ^—v*""- 4 
 NecefTaries of this kind ? It does. 
 
 Again-Does the Baker build his own 
 
 Oven ; or the Miller frame his own Mill? 
 
 It appears, laid I, no part of their 
 Bufinefs. 
 
 What a Uribe of Mechanics then, faid 
 he, are advancing upon us?—Smiths,Car¬ 
 penters, Mafons, Mill-wrights--and all 
 
 thefe to provide the Jingle Necejfary of 
 Bread. Not lefs than feven or eight Arts, 
 we find, are wanting at the fewefl. It 
 
 appears fo. And what if to the pro¬ 
 viding a comfortable Cottage , and Raiment 
 fuitable to an indujlrious Hind, we allow a 
 dozen Arts more? It would he eafy, by 
 the fame Reafoning, to prove the Number 
 double. I admit the Number, faid I, 
 mentioned. 
 
 If fo, continued he, it fhould feem, that 
 
 towards a tolerable Supply of the three Pri¬ 
 mary and Common NeceJJ'aries, Food, Raiment, 
 
 L 4 and 
 
* 5 2 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. and a Dwelling , lefs than twenty Arts 
 
 were, on the lowejl Account, requifite . 
 
 It appears To. 
 
 And is one Man equal, think you, to 
 the Exercife of thefe twenty Arts F If he 
 had even Genius , which we can fcarce ima¬ 
 gine, it is peffible he fhould find Lefure ? 
 
 I replied, I thought not. If fo, 
 then ai folk ary ,unfocial State can neverfupply 
 tolerably the common Necejfaries of Life, 
 
 It cannot. 
 
 But what if we pafs from the Necejfa¬ 
 ries of Life, to the Elegancies ? To Mufic, 
 Sculpture, Painting, and Ppetry?—What 
 if we pafs from all Arts whether Necefary 
 or Elegant , to the large and various Tribe 
 of Sciences? To Logic, Mathematics, Agro¬ 
 nomy, Phyfics ?-—Can one Man, imagine 
 you, mailer all this ? Abfurd, faid I, im- 
 poffible. And yet in this Cycle of Sciences 
 and Arts , feem included all the Comforts , 
 as well as Ornaments of Life ; included all 
 conducive, either to Being, or to Well-Being . 
 
 It 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 M3 
 
 It mu ft be confefted, faid I, it has Part I. 
 the Appearance. v 
 
 Wh at then, faid he, muft be done ? 
 
 In what manner muft we be fupplied ? 
 
 I anfwered, I knew not, unlefs we 
 made a Dijlrihution —Let one exercife om 
 
 Art ? and another a different -Let this 
 
 Man ftudy fuch a Science; and that Man, 
 another—'-A Thus the whole Cycle (as you 
 call it) may be carried eafily into Perfec¬ 
 tion. It is true, faid he, it may; and 
 
 every Individual, as far as his own Art or 
 Science , might be fupplied completely , and as 
 well as he could wifti. But what avails a 
 Supply in a Jingle Inftance? What in this 
 cafe are to become of all his numerous other 
 Wants ? You conceive, replied I, what 
 I would have faid, but partially. My 
 Meaning was, that Artifl trade with Ar- 
 tijl ; each fupply where he is deficient, by 
 exchanging where he abounds ; fo that a 
 .Portion of every thing may be difperfed 
 throughout all . You intend then a State, 
 
 faid 
 
154 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. faid he, of Commutation and 'Traffic. 
 replied, I did. 
 
 If To, continued he, I fee a new Face 
 of things. The Savages, with their Skins 
 and their Caverns, difappear. In their place 
 I behold a fair Community riling. No longer 
 Woods, no longer Solitude, but all is Social, 
 Civil, and Cultivated —And can we doubt 
 any farther, whether Society be Natural? Is 
 not this evidently the State, which can befi 
 fupply the Primary Wants? It has ap¬ 
 peared fo. And did we not agree 
 
 fome time lince, that this State , whatever 
 we found it, would be certainly of all others 
 the moft agreeable to our Nature ? We 
 did. And have we not added, lince 
 
 this, to the Weight of our Argument, by 
 pafling from the Neceffiary Arts to the Ele¬ 
 gant ; from the Elegant to the Sciences ? 
 
 We have. The more, faid he, 
 
 we conlider, the more fhall we be con^ 
 vinced, that All thefe , the noblell Honours 
 and Ornaments of the Human Mind, with¬ 
 out that Leifure, that Experience, that Emu - 
 4 la t ion. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 I5S 
 
 lation, that Reward, which the Social State Part I. 
 alone we know is able to provide them, v “~ v ~"^ 
 could never have found Exigence, or been 
 in the lead: recognized. Indeed, faid I, 
 
 I believe not. 
 
 Let it not be forgot then, faid he, in 
 favour of Society , that to it we owe, not 
 only the Beginning and Continuation , but 
 the Well-Being , and (if I may ufe the Ex- 
 predion) the very Elegance and Rationality 
 of our Exiflence . I anfwered, It ap¬ 
 
 peared evident. 
 
 And what then, continued he?--If 
 
 Society be thus agreeable to our Nature , is 
 there nothing, think you, within us, to ex~ 
 cite and lead us to it ? No Impulfe , no Pre¬ 
 paration of Faculties l It would be 
 
 llrange, anfwered I, if there fhould not. 
 
 It would be a lingular Exceptions 
 faid he, with refpedt to all other herding 
 Species—-Let us however examine—Pity, 
 Benevolence, Friendlhip, Love; the general 
 Diflike of Solitude, and Delire of Com- 
 
 pany; 
 
156 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. pany ; are they Natural AJfeSlions, which 
 come of themfehes; or are they taught us by 
 Art , like Mufic and Arithmetic ? 
 
 I fhould think, replied I, they were Na¬ 
 tural, becaufe in every Degree of Men fome 
 Traces of them may be difcovered. 
 
 And are not the Powers and Capacities of 
 Speech , faid he, the fame ? Are not all 
 Men naturally formed, to exprefs their Sen¬ 
 timents by fome kind of Language ? I 
 
 replied. They were. 
 
 If then, faid he, thefe feveral Powers, 
 and Lfpofitions are Natural , fo fhould feem 
 too their Exercife. Admit it. And 
 if their Exercife , then fo too that State , 
 where alone they can be exercifed . Ad¬ 
 mit it. And what is this State , but the 
 Social? Or where elfe is it poflible to con- 
 verfe, or ufe our Speech ; to exhibit Actions 
 of Pity, Benevolence, priendfbip or Love; 
 to relieve our Averjion to Solitude , or gratify 
 our Defire of being with others ? I re¬ 
 
 plied, It could be no where elfe. 
 
 You 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 157 
 
 You fee then, continued he a Prepa - p ar t j e 
 ration of Faculties is not wanting. We are "v— 
 fitted with Powers and Difpofitions, which 
 have only Relation to Society ; and which, 
 out of Society, can no where efe be exercifed '. 
 
 I replied, it was evident. You have 
 feen too the fuperior Advantages of the So- 
 cial State , above all others. I have. 
 
 Let this then be remembered, faid he, 
 throughout all our future Reafonings, re¬ 
 membered as a firft Principle in our Ideas 
 of Humanity , that Man by Nature is truly 
 a Social Animal. I promifed it 
 
 fhould. 
 
 § 13. Let us now, faid he, examine, 
 what farther we can learn concerningHim. 
 
 As Social indeed. He is diftinguifhed from 
 the Solitary and Savage Species ; but in no 
 degree from the reft, of a milder and more 
 friendly Nature. It is true, replied I, He is 
 not. Does He then differ no more from 
 
 thefe 
 
158 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. thefe feveral Social Species, than they, eacri 
 of them, differ from one another ? Mu ft we 
 
 range them all , and Man among the rejh 
 
 * 
 
 under the fame common and general Genus? 
 
 I fee no Foundation, faid I* fo£ 
 making a Diftindtion. 
 
 Perhaps, faid he, there may be none % 
 and it is poflible too there may. Conlider 
 a little-—Do you not obferve in all other 
 Species, a Similarity among Individuals f 
 a furprizing Likenefs y which runs thro each 
 Particular ? In one Species they are alj 
 Bold; in another, all Timorous j in one all 
 Ravenous ; in another, all Gentle. In the 
 Bird-kind only, what a Uniformity of Voice, 
 in each Species, as to their notes; of Ar - 
 chite&ure, as to building their Nefts j of 
 Food, both for themfelves, and for fup- 
 porting their Young ? It is true, faid I. 
 
 And do you obferve, continued he, 
 the fame Similarity among Men? Are thefe 
 all as Unforniy as to their Sentiments and 
 Actions ? I replied, by no means. 
 
 One 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *50 
 
 One Question more, laid he, as to the Part I. 
 Character of Brutes, if I may be allowed 
 theExpreffion—Ar ethefe, think you, what 
 we behold them , by Nature or otherwife 
 Explain, faid I, your Queffion, for 
 I do not well conceive you. I mean, 
 replied he, is it by Nature that the Swallow 
 builds her Neff, and performs all the Offices 
 of her Kind : Or is fhe taught by Art, by 
 Difcipline , or Cujlom She a£ts, re¬ 
 
 plied I, by pure Nature undoubtedly. 
 
 And is not the fame true, faid he, of every 
 other Bird and Beall; in the Univerfe? 
 
 It is. No wonder then, continued he, 
 as they have fo wife a Governefs, that a 
 uniform Rule of Action is provided for each 
 Species. For what can be more worthy the 
 Wifdom of Nature , than ever to the fame 
 Subfances to give the fame Law ? It ap¬ 
 pears, faid I, reafonable. 
 
 But what, continued he, fhall we fay 
 as to Man ? Is He too actuated by Nature 
 purely I anfwered. Why not ? 
 
 If 
 
16t> Concerning H A P P I N E S S, 
 
 Part I. If Pie be, replied he, it is ftrange in Nature 
 t | iat w j t ]-j re fped: to Man alone , fhe fliould 
 follow io different a Condudt. The Particu¬ 
 lars in other Species, we agree, fhe renders 
 Uniform ; b u t i n Our s, every Particular fee m s 
 a fort of Model by himfetf. If Nature 
 Paid I, do not actuate us, what can we fup- 
 pofe elfe ? MtLocalCufloms, Paid he Na¬ 
 ture ? Are the Polities and Religions of par¬ 
 ticular Nations, Nature? Are the Examples 
 which are fet before us; the Preceptors 
 who inflnidt us ; the Company and Friends, 
 with whom we converfe, all Nature ? 
 
 No furely. Paid I. And yet, faid he, 
 
 it is evident that by thefe, and a thoufand 
 incidental Circumftances, equally foreign to 
 Nature, our Actions, and Manners, and 
 Characters are adjufled. Who then can 
 imagine, we are actuated by Nature ofily? 
 
 I confefs, faid I, it appears con¬ 
 trary. 
 
 You fee then, faid he, one remarkable 
 Dfindlion between Man and Brutes in ge¬ 
 neral—In the Brute, Nature does all; in 
 
 Man, 
 
A Dialogue. 161 
 
 Man , but Part only . It is evident, Part I. 
 
 faid I. 
 
 But farther, continued he——Let us 
 confider the Powers or Faculties, poffeffed 
 by each—Suppofe I was willing to give a 
 Brute the fame Infraction^ which we give 
 a Man. A Parrot perhaps, or Ape, might 
 arrive to fome fmall Degree of Mimicry ; 
 but do you think, upon the whole, they 
 would be much profited or altered ? 
 
 I replied, I thought not. And do you 
 perceive the fame % faid he, with refpedt to 
 Man ? Or does not Experience fhew us the 
 very reverfe ? Is not Education capable of 
 
 moulding us into any thing-of making 
 
 us greatly Goody or greatly Bad ; greatly 
 Wife , or greatly Abfurd? The Fadt, 
 faid I, is indifputable. 
 
 Mark then, faid he, the Difference 
 between Human Powers and Brutal— -The 
 Leading Principle of Brutes appears to 
 tend in each Species to onefugle Purpofe— 
 to this, in general, it uniformly arrives, and 
 
 M here. 
 
162 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. here, in general, it as uniformly flops — it 
 needs no Precepts or Difcipline to inftrud: 
 it; nor will it eafily be changed , or admit a 
 different Direction. On the contrary, the 
 Leading Principle of Man is capable of in¬ 
 finite Directions —is convertible to all forts 
 of Purpofes —equal to allforts of Subjeffs — 
 neglected, remains ignorant, and void of 
 
 every Perfedion-cultivated, becomes 
 
 adorned with Sciences and Arts —can raife 
 us to excel, not only Brutes y but our own 
 Kind —with refpedto om other Powers and 
 Faculties, can inftrud us how to ufe them, 
 as well as thofe of the various Natures, 
 which we fee exifting around us. In a 
 word, to oppofe the two Principles to each 
 other—The Leading Principle of Man, is 
 Multiform, Originally UninflruBed, Pliant 
 and Docil —the Leading Principle of Brutes 
 is Uniform, Originally Inftrucled; but, in 
 mod Inftances afterward, Inflexible and 
 
 Indocil -Or does not Experience plainly 
 
 fiaew, and confirm the Truth of what we 
 afTert? I made anfwer, it did. 
 
 You 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 163 
 
 You allow then, faid he, the Human Part I. 
 Principle, and the Brutal, to be things of 
 different Idea, Undoubtedly. Do 
 they not each then deferve a different Ap¬ 
 pellation ? I fhould think fo. Sup- 
 pofe therefore we call the Human Principle 
 Reason; and the Brutal, Instinct: 
 would you objedt to the Terms ? I re¬ 
 plied, I fhould not. If not, continued 
 he, then Reafon being peculiar to Man , of 
 all the Animals inhabiting this Earth, may 
 we not affirm of Him, by way of Diftinc- 
 tion, that He is a Rational Animal? 
 
 I replied. We might juftly. 
 
 Let this too then be remembered, faid 
 he, in the Courfe of our Inquiry, that Man 
 is by Nature a Rational Animal. 
 
 I promifed it fhould. 
 
 § 14. In confequence of this, faid he, as 
 often as there is Occafton, I fhall appeal as 
 well to Reafon , as to Nature , for a Standard. 
 What, faid I,doyoumean by Nature? 
 
 M 2 Its 
 
164 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 p art j Its Meanings, replied he, are many 
 
 -v -—t anc 3 various. As it dands at prefect op- 
 pofed, it may be enough perhaps to fay, 
 that Nature is that, which is the Caufe of 
 every thingy except thofe 'Things alone, which 
 are the immediate Effects of Reafon. In 
 other words, whatever is not Reafon, or 
 the EffeSi of Reafon, we would condder as 
 Nature , or the Effedi of Nature. I an- 
 
 fwered, as he fo diftinguifhed them, I 
 thought he might juftly appeal to either. 
 
 And yet, continued he, there is a re¬ 
 markable Difference between the Standard 
 of Reafon , and that of Nature ; a Diffe¬ 
 rence, which at no time we ought to for¬ 
 get. What Difference, faid I, do you 
 
 mean ? It is this, anfwered he 1 -In 
 
 Nature , the Standard is fought from among 
 the Many, in Reafon, the Standard is fought 
 from among the Few. You mud ex¬ 
 plain, faid I, your Meaning, for I mud: 
 confefs you feem obfcure. 
 
 Thus 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 Th us then, faid he-Suppofe, as an Part I. 
 
 Anatomift, you were feeking the Structure 
 of fome internal Part——To difcover this, 
 would you not infpeCt a Number of Indi¬ 
 viduals ? 1 fhould. And would you 
 
 not inform yourfelf, what had been dis¬ 
 covered by others ? I fhould. And 
 fuppofe, after all, you fhould find a Multi¬ 
 tude of Inftances for one Structure, and a 
 few fngular for a different : By which 
 would you be governed ? By the Mul¬ 
 titude, faid I, undoubtedly. Thus then 
 continued he, in Nature the Standard, you 
 fee, exifls among the many. I replied, 
 
 it had fo appeared. 
 
 And what, faid he, were we to feek 
 the Perfection of Sculpture, or ofPaint- 
 ing ?—Where fhould we inquire then ?—• 
 Among the numerous common Artifls, or 
 among the few and celebrated? Among 
 the Few, faid I. What if we were to 
 feek the Perfection of Poetry, or Oratory— 
 Where then ? Among the Few ftill. 
 
 M 3 What 
 
166 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. What if we were to feek the Per- 
 
 ^ y 'fe&ion of true Argument, or a found 
 
 Logic--Where then ? Still among 
 
 the Few. And is not true Argument, 
 or a found Logic, one of Reafon s greated 
 Perfections? It is. You fee then, 
 continued he, whence the Standard of 
 Reafon is to be fought——It is from among 
 the Few , as we faid before, in contradi- 
 dindtion to the Standard of Nature. 
 
 I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 
 
 And happy, faid he, for us, that Provi¬ 
 dence has fo ordered it—-happy for us, that 
 what is Rational, depends not on the Multi¬ 
 tude ; or is to be tried by fo pitiful a Ted, as 
 the bare counting of Nofes. It is happy. 
 Lid I, indeed—But whence pray the Dif¬ 
 ference? Why are the Many to determine 
 in Nature , and the Few only, in Reafon ? 
 
 To difcufs this at large, faid he, 
 would require fome time. It might in- 
 fenfibly perhaps draw us from our prefent 
 Inquiry. 1 will endeavour to give you the 
 Reafon, in as few words as poOible which 
 fhould they chance to be obfcure, be not 
 
 too 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 too folicitous for an Explanation. 
 
 I begged him to proceed his own way. 
 
 The Cafe, faid he, appears to be this— 
 In Naturalist osksandNatural Operations, 
 we hold but one Efficient Caufe , and that 
 confummately wife. This Caufe in every 
 Species recognizing what is beft, and work¬ 
 ing ever uniformly according to this Idea of 
 Perfection, the Productions and Energies , in 
 every Species where it aCU, are for the 
 mofl; part fimiliar and exactly correfpondent . 
 If an Exception ever happen, it is from 
 fome hidden higher Motive , which tran- 
 fcends our Comprehenfion, and which is 
 feen Jo rarely , as not to injure the general 
 Pule , or render it doubtful and precarious. 
 On the contrary, in the Productions and 
 Energies of Reafon, there is not one Caufe 
 but infinite —-as many indeed, as there are 
 Agents of the Human Kind. Hence Truth 
 being but one, and Error being infinite , and 
 Agents infinite alio : what wonder they 
 fhould oftener mifs, than hit the Mark ?—~ 
 that Multitudes fhould fail, where one alone 
 
 M 4 fuc- 
 
168 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. fucceeds, and Truth be only the Poffieffion 
 0 f th e chofen , fortunate Few ? You 
 
 feem to have explained the Difficulty, 
 laid I, with fufficient Perfpicuity. 
 
 Let us then go back, faid he, and re¬ 
 coiled; ourfelves; that we may not forget^ 
 what it is we are feeking. I replied. 
 
 Mod; willingly. We have been feek¬ 
 ing, continued he, the Sovereign Good. In 
 confequence of this inquiry, wehavedif- 
 covered—that all Filings whatever exifl to 
 the Human Species in the Relations of either 
 Purfiable , Avoidable , or Indifferent . To 
 determine thefe Relations with Accuracy 
 we have been fcrutinizing the Human 
 Nature ; and that, upon this known 
 Maxim, that every Species was its own 
 proper Standard ; and that where the Value 
 of Filings was dubious , there the Species was 
 to be fludied , and the Relations to be deduced , 
 which naturally flow from it. The Refult 
 of this Scrutiny has been—that we have 
 fir ft agreed Man to be a Social Animal; 
 and fince, to be a Rational. So that if we 
 
 can 
 
 tf 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 can be content with a defcriptive, concife p a rt J, 
 Sketch of Human Nature, it will amount— 
 to this—that Man is a Social Ra¬ 
 tional Animal. I anfwered, it 
 
 had appeared fo, 
 
 § 15. If then, faid he, we purfue our 
 Difquifitions, agreeably to this Idea of Hu¬ 
 man Nature, it will follow that all Things 
 will be Purfuable, Avoidable, and Indiffe¬ 
 rent to Man , as they refpedt the Being 
 and Welfare of fuch a Social, Rational 
 Animal . I replied. They mufl. 
 
 Nothing therefore in the fird: place, 
 faid he, can be Purfuable, which is de- 
 Jlrudfive of Society. It cannot. 
 
 Adts therefore of Fraud and Rapine, and 
 all acquired by them, whether Wealth, 
 Power, Pleafure, or any thing, are evi¬ 
 dently from their very Character not fit 
 to be purfued. They are not. 
 
 But it is impoffible not to purfue many 
 fuch things, unlefs we are furnifhed with 
 fome Habit or Hifpoftion of Mind, by 
 
 which 
 
170 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. which we are induced to render to all Men 
 "v—-* their own , and to regard the Welfare, and 
 Intereft of Society. It is impofilble. 
 
 But the Habit or Difpojition of ren¬ 
 dering to all their own , and of regarding 
 the Welfare and Intereft of Society, is 
 Justice. It is. We may there¬ 
 fore fairly conclude, that Nothing is natu¬ 
 rally Purjuable, but what is either correfpon- 
 dent tojujlice , or at leaf not contrary . 
 
 I confefs, faid I, fo it appears. 
 
 But farther, faid he-—It is poflible we 
 may have the beft Difpofition to Society $ 
 the moft upright Intentions; and yet thro* 
 Want of Ability to difcern , and know the 
 Nature of Particulars, we may purfue 
 many things inconfiftent, as well with our 
 Private Intereft, as the Public. We may 
 even purfue what is Right, and yet purfue 
 it in fuch a manner, as to find our Endea¬ 
 vours fruitlefs , and our Purpofes to fail. 
 
 I anfwered, it was poffible. 
 
 But this would ill befit the Character of a 
 Rational Animal. It would. It is 
 
 6 . necef- 
 
A Dialogue. 171 
 
 neceflary therefore, we fhould be furnifhed p art j 
 with feme Habit or Faculty , inftrudling us 1—y——» 
 how to difeern the real Difference of all 
 Particulars , and fuggefting the proper 
 Means, by which we may either avoid or 
 obtain them. It is. And what is 
 this, think you, but Prudence ? 
 
 I believe, faid I, it can be no other. 
 
 If it be, laid he, then it is evident from 
 this Reafoning, that Nothing can be purfu- 
 able which is not correfpondent to Prudence . 
 
 I replied, He had fhewn it could not. 
 
 But farther ftill, faid he—It is poflible 
 we may neither want Prudence , nor JuJlice 
 to diredt us ; and yet the Impulfes of Appe¬ 
 tite, the lmpetuofties of Refentment , the 
 Charms and Allurements of a thoufand flat¬ 
 tering Objects, may tempt us, in fpite of 
 ourfelves, to purfue what is both Impru¬ 
 dent, and JJnjufl. They may. But 
 if fo, it is neceflary, would we purfue as 
 becomes our Character, that we fhould be 
 furnifhed with fome Habit, which may 
 moderate our Exceffes which may temper 
 
 our 
 
172 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. our Addons to the Standard of a Social 
 State, and to the Intereft and Welfare, not 
 of a Part, but of the Whole Man. 
 Nothing, faid I, more neceffary. And 
 what, faid he, can we call this Habit , but 
 the Habit of Temperance ? You 
 
 name it, faid I, rightly. If you think 
 fo, replied he, then Nothing can be Pur - 
 fuable, which is not cither correfpondent to 
 Temperance, or at Jeajl not contrary . 
 
 I replied, fo it feemed. 
 
 Once more, continued he, and we have 
 done— 1 1 i s poffi ble that not only Refentment 
 and Appetite, not only the Charms and Al¬ 
 lurements of external Objeds, but the Ter¬ 
 rors too, and Dread of them may marr the 
 Reciitude of our Purpofes. It is poffi ble. 
 
 Tyranny and Superftition may af- 
 fail us on one hand; the Apprehenhons of 
 Ridicule, and a Falfe Shame on the other—• 
 Inexpedient,to withfland thefe, wefhould 
 be armed with fome Habit, or our wifeft, 
 bed Purfuits may elfe at all times be de¬ 
 feated. They may. And what is 
 
 that 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *73 
 
 that generous, manlike and noble Habit, Part I. 
 which fets us at all times above Fear and 
 Danger; what is it but Fortitude ; 
 
 I replied, it was no other. If fo 
 then, continued he, befides our former 
 Conclulions, Nothing farther can be pur- 
 fuable , as our Inquiries now have fhewn. 
 us, which is not either correfpondent to For. 
 titude , or at leaf not contrary. I admit, 
 
 faid I, it can not. 
 
 Observe then, faid he, the Sum, the 
 Amount of our whole Reafoning—— No- 
 thing is truly Furfuable to fuch an Animal as 
 Man, except what is correfpondent, or at 
 leaf not contrary , to Justice, Prudence, 
 Temperance and Fortitude. I al¬ 
 low, faid I, it appears fo. But if no¬ 
 
 thing Furfuable, then nothing Avoidable or 
 Indifferent, but what is tried and eflimated 
 after the fame manner. For Contraries are 
 ever recognized thro the fame Habit , one 
 with another. The fame Logic judges of 
 Truth and FaUhood ; the fame Mulical 
 Art, of Concord and Difcord. So the fame 
 4 Mental 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Mental Habitudes, of Things Avoidable and 
 Purfuable . I replied, it appeared pro- 
 
 hable. 
 
 To how unexpeded a Conclufion then, 
 faid he, have our Inquiries infenfibly led 
 
 vs ?-In tracing the Source of Human 
 
 Action, we have eftablifhed it to be thofe 
 Four Grand Virtues, which are 
 efteemed, for their Importance, the very 
 Hinges of all Morality. 
 
 We have. 
 
 But if fo, it fhould follow, that a Life^ 
 whofe Purfuings and Avoidings are go¬ 
 verned by thefe Virtues, is that True and 
 Rational Life , which we have fo long 
 been leeking; that Life, where the Value 
 of all things is jujlly meafured by thofe Rela¬ 
 tions, ‘which they bear to the Natural Frame 
 and real Confitution of Mankind —in fewer 
 Words, a Life of Virtue appears to 
 be the Life according to Na¬ 
 ture. It appears fo. 
 
 174 
 Part I. 
 
 But 
 
A Dialogue* 
 
 But in fiich a Life every Purfuit, every Part I. 
 Avoiding , (to include all) every Aciion will 
 of courle admit of being rationally jujlijied . 
 
 It will. But That, which being 
 Done, admits of a Rational fufiifcation, is 
 the Effence or genuine Character of an 
 Office , or Moral Duty. For thus long 
 ago it has been defined by the beft * Au¬ 
 thorities. Admit it. If fo, then 
 a Life according to Virtue, is 
 a Life according to Moral Of¬ 
 fices or Duties. It appears fo. 
 
 But we have already agreed it, to 
 be a Lije according to Nature. We 
 
 have. Obferve then: A Life ac¬ 
 
 cording to Virtue, according to 
 Moral Offices, and according to 
 Nature, mean all the same Thing, 
 tho’ varied in the Expreffion. Your 
 
 Remark, Laid I, feems juft. 
 
 § 16 . We need never therefore, re¬ 
 plied he, be at a lofs how to chufe, tho" 
 
 the 
 
 * By Tally in his Offices, and by other Authors 
 of Antiquity. 
 
176 Concerning .HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. the Objects of Choice be ever fo infinite 
 and diverfified. As far as nothing is in - 
 confident with fuch a Life and fuch a Cha- 
 racier, we may juftly fet Existence before 
 Death ; prefer Health to Sicknefs ; Inte¬ 
 grity of the Limbs, to being maimed and 
 debilitated ; Pleafure to Pain ; Wealth to 
 Poverty j Fame to Dishonour; Free Go¬ 
 vernment to Slavery ; Power and Magi¬ 
 stracy, to Subjection and a private State— 
 Univerfally, whatevertends eitherto Being, 
 or to Well-Being, we may be justified, when 
 we prefer to whatever appears the con¬ 
 trary. And when our Several Energies, 
 exerted according to the Virtues juft men¬ 
 tioned, have put us in PofTeffion of all that 
 we require : when we enjoy ,fubjoined to a 
 right and honeft Mind, both Health of Body, 
 and Competence of Externals : what can 
 there be wanting to complete our Happinefs; 
 to render our State perfectly confonant to 
 Nature ; or to give us a more Sovereign 
 Good, than that which we now enjoy ? 
 Nothing, replied I, that I can at prefent 
 think of. 
 
 There 
 
A D 1 A L O G It E< IJJ 
 
 4 
 
 There would be nothing indeed, faidPart I. 
 be, were our Energies never to fail ; were 
 all our Endeavours to be ever crowned with 
 due Sacce/s. But fuppofe the contrary— 
 Suppole the worjl Succefs to the mojl up¬ 
 right ConduB ; to the wiled Reditude of 
 Energies and Addons. It is pollible, nay 
 Experience teaches us it is too often fad, 
 that not only the Purfuers of what is con¬ 
 trary to Nature , but that thofe who purfue 
 nothing but what is fir icily congruous to it* 
 may mifs of their Aims , and be frujtrated 
 in their Endeavours. Inquihtors and Monks 
 may deleft them for their Virtue, and 
 purfue them with all the Engines of 
 Malice and Inhumanity. Without thefe. 
 
 Pelts may afflid their Bodies ; Inunda¬ 
 tions o’erwhelm their Property; or what 
 is wofie than Inundations, either Ty¬ 
 rants, Pirates, Heroes* or Banditti. They 
 may fee their Country fall, and with 
 it their braved: Countrymen j themfelves 
 pillaged, and reduced to Extremities, or 
 
 N perilhing 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 I. perishing with the reft in the general 
 ^ MaiTacre. 
 
 ~— * cadit & Ripheus , juflijjimus unus 
 Quifuit in Teucris, & JervantiJJimus reqni. 
 
 It mu ft be owned, laid I, this has too often 
 been the Cafe. 
 
 Or grant, continued he, that thefe 
 greater Events never happen—— —that the 
 Part allotted us, be not in the Tragedy of 
 Life, but in the Comedy. Even the Comic 
 
 Dijlrejfes are abundantly irkfome-- 
 
 Domeftic Jars, the ill Offices of Neigh¬ 
 bours——Sufpicions, Jealouftes, Schemes 
 defeated——-The Folly of Fools ; the 
 Knavery of Knaves; from which, as Mem¬ 
 bers of Society, it is impoffible to detach 
 ourfelves. 
 
 Where 
 
 * JEneid. 1 . 2. ver. 426. 
 
. .. .. 
 
 i Dialogue, 179 
 
 Where then fhall we turn, or what p ar t y. 
 have we to imagine? We have at length 
 placed Happiness, after much Inquiry, in 
 attain! n a the primary and juft Rcquifites 
 of our Nature, by a Conductfait able to Virtue 
 and Moral Office, But as to correfponding 
 with our Pre-conceptions (which we have 
 made the Tell) does this Syftem correfpond 
 better, than thofe others, which we have 
 rejeded ? Has it not appeared from various 
 Fads, too obvious to be difputed, 'that in 
 many Times and Places it may be abfolutely 
 unattainable ? That in many, where it 
 ex ids, it may in a moment be cancelled, and 
 put irretrievably out of our Power , by 
 Events not to be rejifted? If this be certain, 
 and I fear it cannot be queftioned, our 
 fpecious long Inquiry, however accurate 
 we may believe it, has not been able to 
 Blew us a Good, of that Character which 
 we require 3 a Good Durable , Indepriv - 
 able, and Accommodate to every Circum- 
 
 ftance - Far from it—Our Speculations 
 
 N 2 * (I 
 
180 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part I. (I think) rather lead us to that low Opinion 
 ‘■■"—v"—■* of Happinefs, which you may remember 
 you * expreffed, when we fir ft began the 
 fubjedt. They rather help to prove to us, 
 that inftead of a Sovereign Good, it is the 
 more probable fentiment, there is no fuch 
 Good at all. I fhould indeed, faid I, 
 
 fear fo. For where, continued he, 
 
 lies the difference, whether we purfue 
 what is congruous to Nature, or not con¬ 
 gruous ; if the Acquifition of one be as dif¬ 
 ficult , as of the other , and the Pofefiion of 
 both equally doubtful and precarious ? If 
 Ceefar fall, in attempting his Country’s 
 Ruin; and Brutus fare no better, who only 
 fought in its Defence ? It muft be 
 
 owned, faid I, thefe are melancholy Truths, 
 and the Inflances, which you alledge, too 
 w r ell confirm them. 
 
 We were in the midft of thefe ferious 
 Thoughts, defcanting upon the Hardships 
 
 and 
 
 * See p- in. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 18 i 
 
 and Miferies of Life, when by an Inci-PartI, 
 dent, not worth relating, our Speculations 
 were interrupted. Nothing at the time, 
 
 I thought, could have happened more un¬ 
 luckily--our Quettion perplexed-its 
 
 IxTue uncertain—-and myfelf impatient to 
 know the Event. Neceffity however was 
 not to be refitted, and thus for the prefent 
 our Inquiries were pottponed. 
 
 
 N 3 
 
 C O N- 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 . 
 
 
 " 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 A DIALOGUE. 
 
 PART the Second. 
 
 B RUTUS perijhed untimely , and p ar t II. 
 Casfar did no more —Thefe Words 
 I was repeating the next Day to 
 myfelf, when my Friend appeared, and 
 chearfully bade me Good-Morrow. I could 
 not return his Compliment with an equal 
 Gaiety, being intent, fomewhat more than 
 ufual, on what had paffed the day before. 
 
 Seeing this, he propofed a Walk into the 
 Fields. The Face of Nature, Paid he, 
 will perhaps difpel thefe Glooms. No 
 AfMance, on my part, fhail be wanting, 
 
 N 4 you 
 
Concerning FI A P P I N E S S, 
 
 . you may be allured. I accepted his Pro- 
 pofal ; the Walk began ; and our former 
 Cpnverfation infenfibly renewed. 
 
 Bruttjs, faid be, perifhed untimely , and 
 Cas far did no more .——It was thus, as I re¬ 
 member, not long fince you were expref- 
 fmg yourfelf. And yet fuppofe their For¬ 
 tunes to have been exactly parallel - - 
 
 Which would you have preferred? Would 
 you have been Cas far or Brutus l 
 Brutus , replied I, beyond all Contro.verfy. 
 He afkcd me. Why? Where \yas the Dif¬ 
 ference, when their Fortunes, as we now 7 
 fcppofed them, wereconfidered as th rfame? 
 
 There fepms, faid I, abftradt from 
 their Fortunes fomethmg,! know' not what, 
 jntrinfcally preferable in the Life and Cha¬ 
 racter or Brutus. If that, faid he, be 
 true, then mull we derive it, not from the 
 uccejs ot h:s Endeavours, but from their 
 Truth and Reel if tide. He had the Comfort 
 to be cpnfcious, that his Caufe was a juft 
 one. It was impcffible the other IhouJd 
 
 have 
 
i Dialogue. 185 
 
 have any fuch Feeling. I believe, Part II, 
 
 {aid I, you have explained it. 6 
 
 \ — 
 
 Suppose then, continued he, (it is but 
 merely an Hypothecs) fuppofe, I fay, we 
 were to place the Sovereign Good in fuck 
 a Redhtude of Conduct—in the Conduct 
 merely , and 72 ot in the Event. Suppofe 
 we were to fix our Happiness, not in the 
 actual Attainment of thatHealth, that Per¬ 
 fection of a Social State, that fortunate 
 Concurrence of Externals, which is con¬ 
 gruous to our Nature, and which we have 
 a Right all to purfuej but folely fix it in 
 the mere Doing whatever is correfpondent 
 to fuch an End, even tho* we never attain, 
 or are near attaining it. In fewer words— 
 
 What if we make our Natural State the 
 Standard only to determine our Conduct; and 
 place our Happinefs in the Re&itude of this 
 Conduct alone? —-On fuch an Hypothefis 
 (and we confider it as nothing farther) we 
 fhould not want a Good perhaps, to cor - 
 refpond to our Pre-conceptions; for this, it is 
 evident, would be correfpondent to them 
 
 all . 
 
186 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part IT.#//• Your Dodtrine, replied I, is To 
 
 *-—v—new and ftrange, that tho’ you have been 
 copious in explaining, I can hardly yet 
 comprehend you. 
 
 It amounts all, Paid he, but to this- 
 
 Place your Happinefs , where your Praife 
 is. I afked. Where he fuppofed 
 
 that ? Not, replied he, in the Plea- 
 fures which you feel, more than your 
 
 Difgrace lies in the Pain-not in the 
 
 cafual Profperity of Fortune, more than 
 
 your Difgrace in the cafual Adverfity-- 
 
 but in jujl complete Aclion throughout every 
 Part of Life , what ever be the Face of 
 Filings y whether favourable or the con¬ 
 trary . 
 
 But why then, faid J, fuch Accuracy 
 about Externals ? So much Pains to be in¬ 
 formed, what are Purfuable , what Avoid¬ 
 able 1 It behoves the Pilot, replied he, 
 to know the Seas and the Winds; the 
 Nature of Tempefts, Calms, and Tides. 
 They are the Subjects , about which his Art 
 
 is 
 
i Dialogue. iSp 
 
 is converfant. Without a juft Experience p art jj 
 of them, he can never prove himfelf an u, rv— 
 Artiji. Yet we look not for his Reputa¬ 
 tion either in fair Gales, or in adverfe ; 
 but in the Skilfulnefs of hisConduB , bethefe 
 Events as they happen. In like manner 
 fares it with this the Moral Artift. He, for 
 a Subject! has the Whole oj Human Life —— 
 
 Health and Sicknefs ; Pleafure and Pain ; 
 with every other pofiible Incident, which 
 can befal him during his Exiftence. If his 
 Knowledge of all thefe be accurate and 
 exact, fo too mu ft his ConduB , in which 
 we place his Happinefs . But if this Know¬ 
 ledge be defective, muft not his ConduB be 
 defective alfo ? I replied, fo it fhould 
 feem. And if his Conduct, then his 
 Happinefs ? It is true. 
 
 You fee then, continued he, even tho" 
 Externals were as nothing \ tho’ it was true, 
 
 }n their own Nature, they were neither 
 Good nor Evil j yet an accurate Knowledge 
 of them is, from our Hypothecs, abfolutely 
 
 necejjary. 
 
i8 '$ Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part W.neceJJary. Indeed, faid I, you have 
 
 'proved it. 
 
 He continued-inferior Artifts may be 
 at a Hand, becaufe they want Materials. 
 From their Stubbornefs and Intractability, 
 they may often be difappointed. But as 
 long as Life is palling, and Nature con¬ 
 tinues to operate, the Moral Artiji of Life 
 has at all times, all he defires. He can 
 never want a Subjedl fit to exercife him in 
 his proper Calling j and that, with this 
 happy Motive to the Conftancy of his 
 Endeavours, that, the croller, the harlher, 
 the more untoward the Events, the greater 
 his Prafe , the more illullrious his Repu¬ 
 tation. 
 
 All this, faid I, is true, and cannot be 
 denied. But one Circumftance there ap¬ 
 pears, where your Similes feem to fail. 
 The Prafe indeed of the Pilot we allow 
 to be in his Conduit; but it is in the Succefs 
 of that Conduct, where we look for his 
 Happinefs . If a Storm arife, and the Ship 
 
 be 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 189 
 
 be loft, we call him not happy , how well Part II* 
 foever he may have conducted. It is then 
 only we congratulate him, when he has 
 reached the befired Haven. Your 
 
 Diftindion, faid he, is juft. And it is here 
 lies the noble Prerogative of Moral Artijls, 
 above all others—But yet I know not how 
 to explain rhyfelf, I fear my Dodrine will 
 appear fo ftrange. You may proceed, 
 faid I, fafely, fmce you advance it but as an 
 Hypothecs. 
 
 Thus then, continued he-The End 
 
 in other Arts is ever diftant and removed. 
 
 It confifts not in the mere Condudl , much 
 lefs in a Jingle Energy ; but is the juft Re - 
 fult of many Energies , each of which are 
 eftential to it. Hence, by Obftacles un¬ 
 avoidable, it may often be retarded: Nav 
 more, may be fo embarrafted, as neverpof- 
 Jibly to be attained . But in the Moral Art 
 of Life, the very Conduct is the End ; 
 the very ConduSl , I fay, itfelf, throughout 
 every its minutejl Energy; becaufe each of 
 thefe, however minute , partake as truly of 
 
 Reftitude t 
 
igo Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. ReBitude , as th zlargeft Combination of them * 
 when confidered collectively. Hence of 
 all Arts is this the only one perpetually 
 complete in every Infant , becaufe it needs 
 not, like other Arts, Rime to arrive at that 
 Perfection, at which in every Infant it i3 
 arrived already. Hence by Duration it is 
 not rendered either more or lefs perfeCt ; 
 CompletioUi like Truth, admitting of no 
 Degrees, and being in no fenfe capable of 
 either Intenfon or Rethifion. And hence 
 too by neceffary Connection (which is a 
 greater Paradox than all) even that Happi - 
 nefs or Sovereign Good , the End of this 
 Moral Art, is itfelf too, in every Infant , 
 Confumniate and Complete; is neither heigh¬ 
 tened or dimini fed by the Quantity of its 
 Duration , but is the fame to its Enjoyers, 
 for a Moment or a Century. 
 
 Upon this I fmiled. Pie afked me 
 the Reafon- It is only to obferve, faid I, 
 the Courfe of our Inquiries-A new Hy¬ 
 pothecs has been advanced--Appearing 
 
 fomewhat ftrange, it is defired to be ex¬ 
 plained— 
 
A Dialogue. igi 
 
 plained-You comply with the Requeft, Part IL 
 
 and in purfuit of the Explanation, make 
 it ten times more obfcure and unintelligible, 
 than before. It is but too often the 
 
 Fate, faid he, of us Commentators. But 
 you know in fuch cafes what is ufually 
 done. When the Comment will not ex¬ 
 plain the Text, we try whether the Text 
 will not explain itfelf. This Method, it is 
 poffible, may affift us here. The Hypo- 
 thefis, which we would have illuftrated, 
 was no more than this-That the Sove¬ 
 
 reign Good lay in Re Hit nde of ConduB, and 
 that this Good cor ref ponded to all our Pre¬ 
 conceptions. Let us examine then, whether, 
 upon trial, this Correfpondence will appear 
 to hold; and, for all that wehaveadvanced 
 iince, luffer it to pafs, and not perplex us. 
 
 Agreed, faid I, willingly, for now 
 I hope to comprehend you. 
 
 § 2 . Recollect then, faid he. Do you 
 not remember that one Pre-conception of the 
 Sovereign Good was, to be accommodate to 
 all Times and Places ? I remember it. 
 
 And 
 
 4 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS,* 
 
 And is there any Time, or any Place, 
 whence Reftitude of Conduct may be ex¬ 
 cluded ? Is there not a right Addon in 
 Profperity, a right Adion in Adverfity?—- 
 May there not be a decent, generous, and 
 laudable Behaviour, not only in Peace, in 
 Power, and in Health , but in War, in 
 Oppreffion, in Sicknefs and in Death ? 
 
 There may. 
 
 And what fhall we fay to thofe other 
 
 Pre-conceptions -to being Durable , Self- 
 
 derived, and Indeprivable ? Can there be 
 anv Good fo Durable , as the Power of al- 
 
 j 
 
 ways doing right ? Is there any Good con¬ 
 ceivable, fo intirely beyond the Power of 
 ethers Or, if you hefitate, and are doubt¬ 
 ful, I would willingly be informed, into 
 what Circumftances may Fortune throw a 
 brave and honeft Man, where it fhall not 
 be in his Power to aft bravely andhonefily? 
 If there are no fuch, then Reftitude of Con- 
 dufty if a Good, is a Good Indeprivable. 
 
 I confefs, faid I, it appears fo. 
 
 But 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 *93 
 
 But farther, faid he——Another Pre- Part IL 
 conception of the Sovereign Good was, to be 
 Agreeable to Nature. It was. And 
 can any thing be more agreeable to a 
 Rational and Social Animal, than Rational 
 and SocialConduCt? Nothing. But 
 Rectitude of ConduCt is with us Rational and 
 Social Conduct. It is. 
 
 Once more, continued he—Another 
 Pre-conception of this Good was, to be Con¬ 
 ducive, not to Mere-being, but to Well¬ 
 being. Admit it. And can any < 
 
 thing, believe you, conduce fo probably to 
 the Well-being of a Rational Social Animal* 
 as the right Exercife of that Reafon, and of 
 thofe Social Affections t Nothing. 
 
 And what is this fame Exercife, but the 
 highejl Rectitude of Conduct ? Certainly. 
 
 § 3. You fee then, faid he, how well 
 our Hypothecs, being once admitted, tal¬ 
 lies with our Original Pre-conceptions of 
 the Sovereign Good. I replied, it in- 
 
 O deed 
 
194 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS,- 
 
 Part II. deed appeared fo, and could not be denied. 
 ’But who, think you, ever dreamt of a 
 Happinefs like this? A Happinefs depen¬ 
 dent, not on the Succefs , but on the Aim ? 
 
 Even common and ordinary Life, 
 replied he, can furnifh us with Examples^ 
 Aik of the Sportfman where lies his En¬ 
 joyment? Afk whether it be in the Pof- 
 fejjion of a flaughtered Hare, or Fox ? He 
 would reject, with Contempt, the very 
 Suppofition——He would tell you, as well 
 as he was able, that the Joy was in the 
 Purftidt —in the Difficulties which are ob¬ 
 viated ; in the Faults, which are retrieved ; 
 in the Conduct and Direction of the Chace 
 thro’ all its Parts—that the Completion of 
 their Endeavours was fo far from giving 
 them Joy, that inftantly at that Period all 
 their joy was at an End. For Sportf- 
 men, replied I, this may be no bad Rea- 
 foning. It is not the Sentiment, faid he, 
 of Sportimen alone. The Man of Gal¬ 
 lantry not unoften has been found to think 
 after the fame manner. 
 
 — Meus eft amor hide Jimilis ; nam 
 
 Pranj- 
 
 \ 
 
 i 
 
A Dialogue, 195 
 
 Tranfvolat in medio pofita, & fugientia Part lL 
 cap tat *. 
 
 To thefe we may add the Tribe of Buil¬ 
 ders and Projectors. Or has not your own 
 Experience informed you of Numbers, 
 who, in the Building and Laying-out , have 
 expreifed the highest Delight but (hewn 
 the utmoft Indifference to the Re/ieltof their 
 Labours, to the Manfion or Gardens, when 
 once finifhed and complete ? 
 
 a 
 
 The Truth, faid I, of thefe Examples 
 is not to be difputed. But I could wifh 
 your Hypothecs had better than thefe to 
 fupport it. In the ferious View of Happi - 
 nefs , do you ever imagine there were any* 
 who could fix it (as we faid before) not 
 on the Succefs , but on the Aim ? 
 
 More, even in this light* faid he, than 
 perhaps at firft you may imagine. There 
 are Inflances innumerable of Men, bad as 
 well as goody who having fixed, as their 
 Aim, a certain ConduB of their own, have 
 
 O 2 fo 
 
 * Hor. Sat. II. L, i. v. 107. 
 
 / 
 
196 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part IT. fo far attached their Welfare and Happinefs 
 V ’ w '~ w to it, as to deem all Events in its Prosecu¬ 
 tion, whether fortunate or unfortunate, to 
 be mean, contemptible, and not worthy their 
 Regard . 1 called on him for Examples. 
 
 What think you, Paid he, of the Af- 
 faftin, who flew the fir ft Prince ot Orange ; 
 and who, tho’ brought by his Condud to 
 the moft excpiifite Tortures, yet confcious 
 of what he had done, could bear them all 
 unmoved ? Or (if you will have a better 
 Man) what think you of that fturdy Roman , 
 who would have difpatched Porfenna ; and 
 who, full of his Defign, and fuperior to 
 all Events, could thruft a Hand into the 
 Flames with thefteadieft Intrepidity? 
 
 I replied, That thefe indeed were very un¬ 
 common Inftances. 
 
 Attend too, continued he, to Epi¬ 
 curus dying, the Founder of a Philofophy, 
 
 little favouring of Enthufiafm -“ Phis 1 
 
 f( write you (fays he, in one of hisEpiftles) 
 g{ while the laft Day of Life is puffing, and 
 
 that 
 
A Dialogue. 197 
 
 “ that a Happy One. The Pains indeed of Part 
 “ my Body are not capable of being heigh - 
 “ tened. Yet to thefe we oppofe that Joy of 
 “ the Soul, which arifesfrom the Memory 
 “ of our paf Speculations —■—Hear him, 
 confonant to this, in another Place avert¬ 
 ing, that a Rational Adverfity was better 
 than an Irrational Profperity. 
 
 And what think you ? - Had he not 
 
 placed his Good and Happinefs in the fup- 
 pofed Rectitude of his Opinions , would he 
 not have preferred Profperity , at all rates, 
 to Adverfity ? Would not the Pains, of 
 which he died, have made his Happinefs 
 
 perfect Mifery ?-And yet, you fee, he 
 
 difowns any fuch thing. The Memory of 
 his paft Life, and of his Philofophical In¬ 
 ventions were, even in the Hour of Death 
 it leems, a Counterpoife to fupport him. 
 
 It muft be owned, faid I, that you 
 appear to reafon juftly. 
 
 Pass from Epicurusy continued he, to 
 Socrates. What are the Sentiments of that 
 
 O 3 divine 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 II. divine Man, fpeaking of his own unjuit 
 Condemnation ? “ O Crito, fays he, if it 
 “ be pieajing to the Cods this way, then be 
 “ it this way And again-—-—“ Anytus 
 ■ { and Melitus, 1 grant, can hill me-, but 
 “to hurt or injure me, is beyond their 
 <e Power.” It would not have been be¬ 
 yond it, had he thought his Welfare de¬ 
 pendent on any thing they could do; for 
 they were then doing their word-——- 
 Whence then was it beyond them ?——— 
 Becaufe his Happinefs w r as derived not 
 from without, but from within ; not from 
 the Snccefs, which perhaps was due to the 
 Redlitudeof his Life, but from that Rebli- 
 tude alone, every other thing difregarded. 
 He had not, it feems, fo far renounced his 
 own Do&rine, as not to remember his 
 former Words; that—Ti? whom ever 
 et all things, conducive to Happinefs, are de~ 
 “ rived folely, or at leaf nearly from him - 
 f* f e lf, an d depend not Gn the Welfare or 
 “ Adverfty of others , from the Variety of 
 u whofe Condition his own muf vary alfo ; 
 “ He it is , who has prepared to himfelf the 
 
 mail 
 
 *y. - 
 
A Dialogue. jgg 
 
 c * mofi excellent of all Lives—He it is, who p ar t JJ, 
 c< is the Temperate , the Prudent, and the'~~~r mm * 
 “ Brave—He it is, who, when Wealth or 
 c< Children either come or are taken away> 
 
 “ will beft obey the Wife Man s Precept —— 
 
 “For neither will he be feen to grieve, nor 
 “ to rejoice in excefs, from the Trufi and 
 <£ Confidence which he has repofed in himfelfP 
 ■—You have a Sketch at leaf!: of his Mean¬ 
 ing, tho’ far below his own Attic and truly 
 elegant Expreffion. I grant, faid I, 
 
 your Example; but this and the reft are 
 but ftngle Inftances. What are three or 
 four in Number, to the whole of Human 
 Kind ? 
 
 If you are for Numbers, replied he, 
 what think you of the numerous Race of 
 Patriots, in all Ages and Nations, who have 
 joyfully met Death, rather than defert their 
 Country, when in danger ? They muft 
 have thought furely on another Happinefs 
 than Succefs , when they could gladly go, 
 where they faw Death often inevitable. 
 
 Or what think you of the many Martyrs 
 
 O 4 for 
 
200 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. for Syftems wrong as well as right, who 
 ^ r—'have dared defy the worft, rather than 
 fwerve from their Belief ? You have 
 
 brought indeed, faid I, more Examples 
 than could have been imagined. 
 
 Besides, continued he, what is that 
 Comfort of a Good Conscience, cele¬ 
 brated to fuch a height in the Religion 
 which we profels, but the Joy arifingfrom 
 a Confcience of right Energies ; a Con¬ 
 fcience of having done nothing, but what 
 js confonant to our Duty? I replied, 
 Jt indeed appeared fo. 
 
 Even the Vulgar, continued he, re¬ 
 cognize a Good of this very Chara&er, 
 when they fay of an Undertaking, tho’ it 
 fucceed not, that they are contented; that 
 they have done their beft, and can accufe 
 themfelves of nothing. For what is this 
 but placing their Content, their Good } their 
 Happinefs , notin the Succefs of Endeavours, 
 but in the Rediitude? If it be not the 
 Jledlitude which contents them, you muff 
 
 tell 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 20 I 
 
 tell me what it is elfe. It appears, Part IT. 
 
 replied I, to be that alone. V ’”“ Y 
 
 I hope then, continued he, that 
 tho’ you accede not to this Notion of 
 Happinefs, which I advance; you will at 
 lead: allow it not to be fuch a Paradox, as 
 at firfl you feemed to imagine. That 
 indeed, replied I, cannot be denied you. 
 
 § 4. Granting me this, faid he, you 
 encourage me to explain myfelf—We have 
 fuppofed the Sovereign Good to lie in RedlT 
 tude of Coiiducl. We have. And 
 think you there can be Re&itude of Con¬ 
 duct, if we do not live confijlently ? 
 
 In what Senfe, faid I, would you be un¬ 
 derflood ? To live confidently , faid he, 
 is the fame with me, as To live agreeably to 
 Jome one Jingle and confonant Scheme , or Pur - 
 pofe. Undoubtedly, faid I, without this, 
 there can be no Redlitude of Conduct. 
 
 All Redlitude of Conduct then, you fay, 
 implies fuch Confidence. It does. 
 
 And does all Confifience } think you, imply 
 
 fuch 
 
202 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II fuch Re Bit ude f I allied him. Why 
 
 '“’"-v-—' not ? It is poflible, indeed it may, 
 
 faid he, for aught we have difcovered yet 
 to the contrary. But what if it fhould 
 be found that there may be numberlefs 
 Schemes, each in particular confifient with 
 itfelf] but yet all of them different , and 
 fome perhaps contrary? There may, you 
 know, be a confifient Life of Knavery, as 
 well as a confifient Life of Honefty; there 
 may be a uniform Practice of Luxury, as 
 well as of Temperance, and Abftemiouf- 
 nefs. Will the Confidence, common to all 
 of thefie Lives , render the Con duel in each, 
 right ? It appears, faid I, an Abfur- 
 dily, that there fhould be the fame Recti¬ 
 tude in two Contraries. If fo, faid he, 
 
 we mud look for fomething more than 
 mere Confidence, when we fearch for that 
 Lie Bit ude, which we at prefent talk of. 
 A confifient Life indeed is requifite, but 
 that alone is not enough. We mud de¬ 
 termine its peculiar Species , if we would 
 be accurate and exadt. It indeed ap¬ 
 
 pears, faid I, neceflary. 
 
 Nor 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 Nor is any thing, continued he, more p ar t U c 
 eafy to be difcuffed. For what can that 
 peculiar Confidence of Life be elfe, than a 
 Life, whofe feveral Parts are not only con- 
 fonant to each other, but to the Nature 
 alfo of the Being, by whom that Life has 
 been adopted ? Does not this lajl Degree 
 of Confidence appear as requifite as the 
 former? I anfwered. It could not be 
 otnerwife. 
 
 You fee then, laid he, the true Idea 
 of right Conduit. It is not, merely To 
 
 live confiflently \ but it is To live confftently 
 with Nature . Allow it. 
 
 But what, continued he. Can we live 
 confifently ivith Nature , and be at a lofs 
 how to behave ourfelves ? We cannot. 
 
 And can we know how to behave 
 purfelves, if we know nothing of what 
 hefals us y nothing of thofe Things and 
 Events , which perpetually furround, and 
 affeit us ? We cannot. You fee 
 
 then. 
 
204 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. then, continued he, how we are again 
 ^ ' fallen infenfibly into that Doctrine, which 
 
 proves the Neceflity of ferutinizing, and 
 knowing the Value oj Externals, I re¬ 
 plied, it was true. If you affent, Paid he, 
 
 to this, it will of courfe follow, that, To 
 live conjzfiently with Nature , is, To live 
 agreeably to ajujl Experience of thoje Things, 
 which happen around us. It appears lo. 
 
 But farther Hill, faid he.—Think you 
 any one can be deemed to live agreeably 
 to fuch Experience, if he feledt not, as 
 far as poffible, the things moll congruous 
 to his Nature? He cannot. And by 
 the fame Pvule, as far as poffible, muft he 
 not rejeSl fuch as are contrary? He 
 
 muft. And that not occafionally, as 
 
 Fancy happens to prompt j but feadily, 
 conjlantly, and without Remiffion. 
 
 I fhould imagine fo. You judge, faid 
 
 he, truly. Were he to act otherwife in 
 the leaf! inflance, he would falfify his 
 Profefiions ; he would not live according 
 to that Experience, which we now fup- 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 205 
 
 pofe him to polk fs. 
 would not. 
 
 I replied. He Part IE 
 
 It fhould faem then, laid he, from 
 hence, as a natural Confeauence of what 
 we have admitted, that the EJJence of 
 right ConduB lay in Selection and 
 Rejection. So, faid I, it has ap¬ 
 peared. And that fuch SeleBion and 
 
 Rejection fhould be confonant with our pro¬ 
 per Nature. It is true. And be 
 
 jieady and perpetual, not occalional and in¬ 
 terrupted. It is true. But if this be 
 the Effence of Right Conduct, then too it 
 is the ElTence of our Sovereign Good; for 
 in fuch Conduct we have fuppofed this 
 Good to confill. Wc have. 
 
 See then, faid he, the Refult of our 
 
 Inquiry.-The Sovereign Good, as 
 
 conftituted by ReBitudeof ConduB , has, on 
 our ftridred: Scrutiny, appeared to be this— 
 To live perpetually selecting, as 
 
 FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS CONGRUOUS 
 
 to Nature, and rejecting what is 
 
 CON- 
 
2 o6 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. CONTRARY, MAKING OUR End THAT 
 Selecting and that Rejecting 
 only. It is true, Paid I, fo it appears. 
 
 § 5. Before we haflen then farther, 
 faid he, let us flop to recoiled, and fee 
 whether our prefent Conclufions accord 
 with our former.—We have now fuppofed 
 the Sovereign Good to be Rectitude of Con¬ 
 duct t and this Conduct we have made con- 
 lift in a certain Selecting and Rejecting. 
 
 We have. And do you not imagine 
 
 that the Selecting and Rejecting) which we 
 propofe, as they are purely governed by 
 the Standard of Nature, are capable in 
 every inftance of being rationally juftified? 
 
 I replied, I thought they were 
 But if they admit a rational J unification, 
 then are they Moral Offices or Duties 5 
 for thus * you remember yefterday a Moral 
 Office was defined. It was. But 
 if fo, To live in the Practice of them, will 
 
 be 
 
 ---—■—■—■—*———-——.... 
 
 * Su P- P- 175- 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 \ ■» 
 
 2 °? 
 
 be To live In the D if charge of Moral Offices. Part II. 
 
 It will. But To live in the Diffi 
 charge of thefe , is the fame as Living ac¬ 
 cording to Virtue , and Living according to 
 Nature. It is. So therefore is 
 
 Living in that Selection, and in that Rejec¬ 
 tion, which we propofe. It is. 
 
 We need never therefore be at a lofs, 
 faid he, for a Defcription of the Sove¬ 
 reign Good. -We may call it. Rec¬ 
 titude of Conduct.— -If that be too 
 
 contracted, we may enlarge and fay, it is—- 
 To live perpetually Selecting and 
 Rejecting according to the Stan¬ 
 dard of our Being.—— If we are for 
 
 ftill different Views, we may fay it is-- 
 
 To live in the Discharge of Mo¬ 
 ral Offices— To live according to 
 
 Nature -To live according to 
 
 Virtue- To live according to 
 
 just Experience of those Things, 
 which happen around us. ——Like 
 fome finished Statue, we may behold it 
 every way it is the fame Objed, tho’ 
 
 varioufly 
 
2o8 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. varioufly viewed; nor is there a View'/ 
 u ^ vW bi]t is natural* truly graceful* and en¬ 
 gaging- 
 
 §9-1 cannot deny, faid I, but 
 that as you now have explained it, your 
 Hypothefis feems far more plaufible, than 
 when firft it was propofed. You will 
 believe it, faid he, more fo ft ill, by con- 
 fidering it with more Attention.—In the 
 firft place, tho’ perhaps it efteem nothing 
 really Good but Virtue, nothing really 
 Evil, but Vice, yet it in no manner 
 takes away the Difference , and DiJlinClion 
 of other ‘Things. So far otherwife, it is 
 for eftablifhing their Diftindtion to the 
 greateft Accuracy. For were this neglect¬ 
 ed, what would become of Selection and 
 Rejection, thofe important Energies, which 
 are its very Soul and ElTence ? Were there 
 noDiFFERENCE, there could be no Choice. 
 
 It is true, faid I, there could not. 
 
 Again, faid he. It is no meagre, mor¬ 
 tifying Syflem of Self-denial— It fuppre/Tes 
 
 no 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 209 
 
 no Social and Natural Affections,nor takes Part II* 
 away any Social and Natural Relations—-"V"" J 
 It prefcribes no Abflainings, no Forbear¬ 
 ances out of Nature ; no gloomy, fad; and 
 lonely Rules of Life, without which it is 
 evident Men may be as honed; as with> 
 and be infinitely more ufeful and worthy 
 Members of Society.—It refufes no Plea- 
 fure, not inconfiftent with Temperance—* 
 
 It rejeCts no Gain, not inconfiftent with 
 
 fuftice -Univerfally, as far as Virtue 
 
 neither forbids nor dijfuades, it endeavours 
 to render Life, even in the moft vulgar 
 Acceptation, as chearful, joyous, and eafy 
 as poflible. Nay, could it mend the Condi¬ 
 tion of Exigence in any the moft trivialCw- 
 cumftance, even by adding to the ampleft 
 Poffeffions the pooreft meaneft Utenfi!, it 
 would in no degree contemn an Addition 
 even fo mean. Far otherwife—It would 
 confider, that to negleCt the lead Acqui- 
 lition, when fairly in its power, would 
 be to fall fhort of that perfedl and accurate 
 Conduct which it ever has in view, and 
 on which alone all depends. 
 
 P 
 
 And 
 
210 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. And yet, tho’ thus exaCt In every the 
 minuted Circurndance, it gives us no Soli¬ 
 citude as to what Rank we maintain in 
 Life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy 
 or poor; whether merged in Bufinefs, or 
 confined to Inactivity, it is equally conjijient 
 with every Condition , and equally capable 
 of adorning them all. Could it indeed 
 choofe its own Life, it would be always 
 that, where mod focial Affections might 
 extenfively be exerted, and mod done to 
 contribute to the Welfare of Society. But 
 if Fate order otherwife, and this be de¬ 
 nied; its Intentions are the fame, its En¬ 
 deavours are not wanting ; nor are the 
 Social , Rational Powers forgotten, even in 
 Times and Circumdances, where they can 
 lead; become confpicuous. 
 
 It teaches us to confider Life, as one 
 great important Drama, where we have 
 each our Part allotted us to aCt. It tells 
 us that our Happinefs , as Affiors in this 
 Dra?na , confiffs not in the Length of our 
 4 Part, 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 21 i 
 
 Part, nor in the State and Dignity , but in Part IL 
 the juft , the decent > and the natural Per- y 
 formance. 
 
 If its Aims are fuccefsful, it is thankful 
 to Providence. It accepts all the Joys, de¬ 
 rived from their Succefs , and feels them as 
 fully, as thofe who know no other Happi- 
 nels. The only Difference is, that having 
 a more excellent Good in view, it fixes not, 
 like the Many, its Happinefs on Succefs 
 alone, well knowing that in fuch cafe, if 
 Endeavours fail , there can be nothing left 
 behind but Murmurings and Mifery. On 
 the contrary, when this happens, it is then 
 it retires into itfelf, and reflecting on what 
 is Fair , what is Laudable and Honefl (the 
 truly beatific Vfion , not of mad Enthujiajls , 
 but of the Calm, the Temperate, the Wife 
 and the Good) it becomes fuperiour to all 
 Events ; it acquiefces in the Confcioufnefs of 
 its own Rediitude j and, like that Manflon 
 founded, not on the Sands, but on the 
 Rock, it defies all the Terrors of Temped 
 and Inundation. j 
 
 P 2 § 7. 
 
I 
 
 212 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II § 7 * ETere he patlfed, and I took the 
 w—*v“—- Opportunity to obferve, how his Subjedl 
 had warmed him into a degree of Rap¬ 
 ture how greatly it had railed both his 
 Sentiments and his Stile. No wonder, 
 faid he. Beauty of every kind excites our 
 Love and Admiration ; the Beauties or 
 Art, whether Energies or Works', the 
 Beauties of Nature, whether Animal or 
 Inanimate. And fhall we expe<ft lefs from 
 this Supreme Beauty \ this moral , mental , 
 and original Beauty of which all the reft 
 are but as Types or Copies ? -Not how¬ 
 
 ever by high Flights to lofe Sight of our 
 Subje< 5 t, the whole of what we have ar¬ 
 gued, may be reduced to this-- 
 
 \ 
 
 All Men pursue Good, and would 
 be happy , if they knew how ; not happy 
 for Minutes, and miferabie for Flouts, but 
 happy , if pofhble, thro' every Bart of their 
 Exigence. Either therefore there is a 
 Good of this feady durable Kind , or there 
 is none. If none, then all Good mud: be 
 
 tranfent 
 
A Dialogue, 
 
 2I 3 
 
 tranjient and uncertain and if fo, an Ob- Part II. 
 jeil of lowefi Value, which can little 
 ferve either our Attention, or Inquiry. But 
 if there be a better Good , fuch a Good as 
 we are feeking; like every other thing, it 
 muft be derivedfrom fome Caufe ; and that 
 Caufe muft be either external , internal or 
 mixt, in as much as except thefe three, 
 there is no other poflible. Now afleady , 
 
 durable Goody cannot be derived from an 
 external Caufe, by reafon all derived from 
 Externals muft fluid uatey as they fluctuate. 
 
 By the fame Rule, not from a Mixture of 
 the Two} becaufe the Part which is external 
 will proportionally deflroy its Efence. What 
 then remains but the Caufe internal ; the 
 very Caufe which we have fuppofed, when 
 we place the Sovereign Good in Mind; in 
 Peclitude of Conduit; in juft Selecting and 
 RejeBing ? There feems indeed no 
 
 other Caufe, faid I, to which we can pof- 
 ftbly afiign it. 
 
 Forgive me then, continued he, 
 fhould I appear to boaft——We have 
 
 P 3 proved. 
 
214 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. proved, or at lead; there is an Appearance 
 we have proved, that either there is no 
 Good except this of our own, or that, if 
 there be any other , it is not ’worthy our Re¬ 
 gard. It mufl be confeiled, faid I, 
 
 you have faid as much, as theSubjedt feems 
 to admit. 
 
 § 8. By means then, faid he, of our 
 Hypothecs, behold one of the faireft, and 
 moft amiable of Objects, behold the 
 true and perfect Man : that Or¬ 
 nament of Humanity; that GodlikeBeing; 
 who, without regard either to Pleafure or 
 Pain , uninfluenced equally by either Profpe- 
 rity or Adverflty, fuperiour to the World and 
 its befl and worfl Events , can fairly refl his 
 All upon the Rectitude of his own Conduct ; 
 can conflantly , and uniformly , and manfully 
 maintain it; thinking that , and that alone, 
 wholly fvflflcient to snake him happy. 
 
 And do you ferioufly believe, faid I # 
 there ever was fuch a Charadler ? And 
 what, replied he, if I fhould admit, there 
 
 never 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 215 
 
 never 'was, is, or willbefnch a Character? — Part II. 
 that we have been talking the whole time 
 
 of a Being, not to be found; 
 
 \ 
 
 Afaultlefs Monjier, which the V/orld ne er 
 Jaw ? 
 
 Supposing, I fay, we admit this, what then ? 
 
 Would not your Syflem in fuch a cafe, 
 faid I, a little border upon the chimerical ? 
 
 I only afk the Qneftion. You need 
 
 not be fo tender, he replied, in expreffing 
 yourfelf. If it be falfe, if it will not in- 
 dure the Teft, I am as ready to give it up, 
 as I have been to defend it. lie muff be a 
 poor Philofopher indeed, who, when he fees 
 1 Truth and a Syjle?n at variance, can ever 
 be folicitous for the Fate of a Syftem. 
 
 But tell me, I pray——Do you objedt 
 to mine, from its Perfection, or from its 
 Imperfection ? From its being too excel¬ 
 lent for Human Nature, and above it; or 
 from its being too bafe, and below it ? 
 
 It feems to require, faid I, a Perfection, 
 to which no Individual ever arrived. 
 
 That very Tranfcendence, faid he, is an 
 
 P 4 Argu- 
 
 
216 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part JL Argument on its behalf. Were it of a 
 Rank inferior, it would not be that Per¬ 
 fection, which we feek. Would you 
 have it, faid I, beyond Nature? If you 
 mean, replied he, beyond any particular or 
 individual Nature , mo ft undoubtedly I 
 would.—--As you are a Lover of Painting, 
 you (hall hear a Story on the SubjeCL 
 
 In ancient days, while Greece was 
 flourifhing in Liberty and Arts, a cele- 
 <c brated Painter, having drawn many ex- 
 tc cellent Pictures for a certain free State, 
 e ‘ and been generoufly and honourably re- 
 f* warded for his Labours, at lad made 
 4< an Offer to paint them a Helen, as a 
 e( Model and Exemplar of the mod ex- 
 4J quifite Beauty. The Propofal was rea- 
 U dily accepted, when the Artift informed 
 “ them, that in order to draw one- Fair, 
 *'•' it was neceffary he (hould contemplate 
 4 ‘ many. He demanded therefore a Sight 
 * of all their fined Women. The State, 
 cc to affift the Work, affented to his Re- 
 l e queft. They were exhibited before 
 
 him$ 
 
 a 
 
1 
 
 A Dialogue. 217 
 
 him ; he feleded the raoft beautiful - Part II. 
 “ and from thefe formed his Helen , more 
 
 beautiful than them all.”— 
 
 You have heard the Fad, and what 
 are we to infer ?—Or can there be any 
 other Inference than this—that ihz Stan¬ 
 dard of Perfection , with refpeCi to the 
 Beauty of Bodies , was not (as this Artift 
 thought) to be difcoveredin any Individual; 
 but being difperfed by Nature in Portions 
 thro the many , wasfrom thence , and thence 
 only , to be collected and recognized? 
 
 It appears, faid I, he thought fo. The 
 Pidure, continued he, is loft, but we have 
 Statues ftill remaining. If there be Truth 
 in the Teflimony of the bed: and faired 
 Judges, no Woman ever equalled the De¬ 
 licacy of the Medicean Venus , nor Man the 
 Strength and Dignity of the Farnhefan 
 Hercules. It is generally, faid I, fo 
 
 believed. * 
 
 And will you, faid he, from this unpa- 
 ralelled and tranfcendent Excellence, deny 
 
 thefe 
 
218 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part IT. thefe Works of Art to be truly and dridly 
 Natural? Their Excellence, replied I, 
 
 mud be confelled by All; but how they 
 can be called fo ftridly Natural , I mud 
 own a little dartles me. That the 
 
 Limbs and their Proportions , faid he, are 
 feleded from Nature , you will hardly I 
 believe doubt, after the Story jud related. 
 
 I replied, it was admitted. The 
 Parts therefore of thefe Works are Na¬ 
 tural. They are. And may not 
 
 the fame be averted, as to the Arrange¬ 
 ment of thefe Parts ? Mud not this too 
 be natural, as it is analogous we know to 
 Nature? It mud. If fo, then is 
 
 the Whole , Natural. So indeed, faid 
 I, it fhould feem. It cannot, replied 
 
 he, be otherwife, if it be a Fad beyond 
 difpute, that the Whole is nothing more, 
 than the Parts under Juch Arrangement. 
 
 Enough, faid I, you have fatisfied me. 
 
 If I have, faid he, it is but to transfer 
 what we have afferted of this fubordinate 
 Beauty, to Beauty of a higher Order; it is 
 
 but 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 219 
 
 but to pafs from the "External, to the Part IT. 
 Moral and Internal. For here we fay, by 
 parity of Reafon, that no where in any 
 particular Nature is the perfeli Character 
 to be feen intire. Yet one is brave an¬ 
 other is temperate; a third is liberal ; and 
 a fourth is prudent. So that in the Multi¬ 
 tude of mixed imperfect Characters, as be¬ 
 fore in the Multitude of imperfect Bodies , is 
 exprefled that Idea, that Moral Stan¬ 
 dard of Perfection, by which all are 
 tried and compared to one another, and at 
 laft upon the whole are either justified or 
 condemned—that Standard of Perfection, 
 which cannot be but rnoft Natural , as it is 
 purely collected from Individuals of Na¬ 
 ture , and is the Tefl of all the Merit to 
 which they afpire. I acknowledge* 
 
 faid I, your Argument. 
 
 I might add, faid he, if there were 
 Occafion, other Arguments which would 
 furprize you. I might inform you of the 
 natural Pre-eminence, and high Rank of 
 Specific Ideas, — that every Individual was 
 
 but 
 
220 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS,, 
 
 Part II. but their Type, or Shadow ; -that the 
 
 L —* 1 Mind or In telle SI was the Region of Pof- 
 
 fibles \—that what ever is Pofible, to the 
 Mind adtually Is; nor any thing a Non¬ 
 entity, except what implies a Contradic¬ 
 tion s-—that the genuine Sphere and ge¬ 
 
 nuine Cylinder, tho’ Forms perhaps too 
 perfeSl, ever to ex if conjoined to Matter, 
 were yet as true and real Beings, as the 
 grofeft ObjeEls of Senfe ; were the Source of 
 Infinite Truths, which wholly depend on 
 them, and which, as Truths, have a Being 
 moft unalterable and eternal . But thefe are 
 Reafonings, which rather belong to another 
 Philofophy; and if you are fatisfied with¬ 
 out them, they are at bed; but fuperduous. 
 
 He waited not for my Anfwer, but 
 proceeded as follows. It is thus, faid 
 he, have J endeavoured, as far as in my 
 power, to give you an Idea of th q perfect 
 CharaBer: a Character, which I am neither 
 fo abfurd, as to impute to myfelf; nor fo 
 rigorous and unfair, as to require of others. 
 We have propofed it only, as an Exem¬ 
 plar 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 221 
 
 plar of Imitation, which tho’ None Part II* 
 we think can equal , yet All at leaft may 
 follow ■—-an Exemplar of Imitation, which 
 in proportion as we approach, fo we ad¬ 
 vance proportionably in Merit and in 
 
 Worth --an Exemplar, which, were we 
 
 more felfifh, we Ihould be Fools to rejedlj if 
 it be true, that to be Happy , is the ultimate 
 TV if) of us all and that Happinefs and Moral 
 Worth fo reciprocally correfpond, that there 
 can be no Degree of the one, without an 
 equal Degree of the other . If there be 
 
 Truth, faid I, in your Reafonings, it can¬ 
 not certainly be otherwife. 
 
 He continued, by faying——The Pro - 
 fciency of Socrates , and indeed of every 
 honeft Man, was fufficient to convince us, 
 could we be fleadfad; to our Purpofe, that 
 fome Progrefs at leaf might be made toward 
 this Perfection —How far, we knew not— 
 
 The Field was open—The Race was free 
 and common to All—Nor was the Prize, 
 as ufual, referved only to the Firil ; but 
 AD, who run, might depend on a Reward, 
 
 having 
 
222 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. having the Voice of Nature, would they 
 'k-r-.r-nij' b ut pften, to allure them, 
 
 * Nemo ex hoc numero mihi non donatus 
 abibit . 
 
 9 
 
 § 9. Here he paufed, and left me to 
 meditate on what he had fpoken. For 
 fome time we palled on in mutual Silence, 
 till obferving me on my part little inclined 
 to break it, What, faid he, engages you 
 with an Attention fo earneft ? I was 
 wondering, faid I, whence it fhould hap¬ 
 pen, that in a Difcourfe of fuch a nature, 
 you fhould fay fo little of Religion , of 
 Providence , and a Deity, I have not, 
 replied he, omitted them, becaufe not in¬ 
 timately united to Morals; but becaufe what 
 ever w'e treat accurately, fhould be treated 
 feparately and apart. Multiplicity of Mat¬ 
 ter naturally tends to Confulion. They are 
 weak Minds indeed, which dread a ra¬ 
 tional Sufpence ; and much more fo, when 
 in the Event, it only leads to a furer Know¬ 
 ledge, 
 
 * JEueid,].v. N. 305. 
 
A D r A L O G U E. 
 
 223 
 
 ledge, and often flrengthens the very Sub- Part II. 
 jed, on which we fufpend. Could I how- ‘— 
 ever repeat you the Words of a venerable 
 Sage, (^°r I can call him no other) whom 
 once I heard diverting on the Topic of 
 Religion, and whom Hill I hear, when 
 ever I think on him ; you might accept 
 perhaps my Religious Theories as candidly, 
 as you have my Moral. I preded him 
 to repeat them, with which he willingly 
 complied. 
 
 The Speaker, faid he, whofe Words I 
 am attempting to relate, and whom for 
 the prefent I name Theophilus , was of a 
 Charader truly amiable in every part. 
 
 When young, he had been fortunate in a 
 liberal Education •, had been a Friend to 
 the Mules, and approved himfelf fuch to 
 the Public. As Life declined, he wifely 
 retired, and dedicated his Time almofl 
 wholly to Contemplation. Yet could he 
 never forget the Mufes, whom once he 
 loved. He retained in his Difcourfe (and 
 fo in the Sequel you will foon find) a large 
 
 Portion 
 
224 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. Portion of that rapturous, anti-profaic Stile, 
 w in which thofe Ladies ufually choofe to 
 exprefs themfelves. 
 
 We were walking, not (as.now) in the 
 chearful Face of Day, but late in the Even¬ 
 ing, when the Sun had long been fet. Cir- 
 cumdances of Solemnity were not wanting 
 to affeCt us; the Poets could not have 
 
 feigned any more happy-a running 
 
 Stream, an ancient Wood, a dill Night, 
 and a bright Moondiine.—I, for my own 
 part, induced by the Occafion, fell infenfibly 
 into a Reverie about Inhabitants in the 
 Moon. From thence I wandered to other 
 heavenly Bodies, and talked of States there, 
 and Empires, and I know not what. 
 
 Who lives in the Moon, faid he, is 
 perhaps more than we can well learn. It is 
 enough, if we can be fatisfied, by the help 
 of our bed Faculties, that Intelligence is not 
 confined to this little Earth, which we in¬ 
 habit; that tho’ Men were not, the World 
 would not want Spectators, to contemplate 
 
 its 
 
I 
 
 A Dialogue, 225 
 
 flg Beauty, and adore the Wifdom of its Part IL 
 Author* 
 
 ee This whole Universe itfelf is but 
 
 “ one City or Commonwealth-* 
 
 tl a Syflem of Subfances varioufly for me d^ 
 
 “ and varioufly affiliated agreeably to thofd 
 
 forms -a Syflem of Subftances both 
 
 t£ immenfely great and flnall. Rational\ 
 tc Animal , Vegetable, and Inanimate • 
 
 ** As many Families make one Village, 
 t( many Villages one Province, many Pro« 
 
 “ vinces one Empire; fo many Empires, 
 
 ** Oceans, Wafles, and Wild9, combined, 
 
 “ compofe that Earth on which we live. 
 
 <f Other Combinations make a Planet or a 
 “ Moon; and thefe again, united, make 
 f< one Planetary Syflem* What higher 
 tc Combinations fubfift, we know not. 
 
 “ their Gradation and Afcent it is impof* 
 
 “ Able we fhould difeover. Yet the ge-* 
 
 < c nerous Mind, not deterred by this Im- 
 t( menfity, intrepidly pafles on, thro’ Re-* 
 
 “ gions unknown, from greater Syflem 
 
 Q*_ “ to 
 
226 
 
 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II “• to g reater > till it arrive at that greatefl , 
 u—v—v 44 where Imagination Hops, and can ad- 
 44 vance no farther. In this lad, this 
 4C mighty, this (lupendous Idea, it beholds 
 44 the Universe itfelf, of which every 
 44 Thing is a Part, and with refpedl to 
 44 which not the fmallefl Atom is either 
 “ foreign or detached. 
 
 44 Wide as its Extent, is the Wifdom 
 44 of its Workmanship, not bounded and 
 44 narrow, like the humbler Works of Art. 
 44 Thefe are all of Origin no higher than 
 44 Human. We can readily trace them to 
 4£ their etmoft Limit, and with accuracy 
 44 difcern both their Beginning and their 
 44 End. But where the Microfcope that 
 44 can (hew us, from what Point Wifdom 
 44 begins in Nature ? Where the Telefcope 
 44 that can defcry, to what Infinitude it 
 44 extends? The more diligent our Search, 
 
 44 the more accurate our Scrutiny, the 
 “ more only are we convinced, that our 
 
 45 Labours can never finifii; that Subjects 
 
 44 inex- 
 
A Dialogue. 227 
 
 6< inexhauftible remain behind, flill un-Part II, 
 “ explored. f 
 
 “ Hence the Mind truly wife, qult- 
 ting the Study of Particulars , as know- 
 <( ing their Multitude to be infinite and in- 
 ** comprehenjible , turns its intellectual Eye 
 <c to what is general and comprehenfive, 
 
 “ and thro’ Generals learns to lee, and re- 
 A< cognize what ever exilts. 
 
 <c It perceives in this view, that every 
 “ Subltance, of every degree, has its Na - 
 “ ture, its proper Make, Conflitution or 
 < ( Form, by which it aids, and by which 
 “ it fuffers. It perceives it fo to fare with 
 t( every natural Form around us, as with 
 “ thofe Tools and Inftruments by which 
 “ Art worketh its Wonders. The Saw is 
 “ deftined to one ACt; the Mallet, to an- 
 “ other j the Wheel anfwers this Purpofe ; 
 
 “ and the Lever anfwers a different. So 
 {< Nature ufes the Vegetable , the Brute , 
 l( and the Rational, agreeably to the proper 
 “ Form andConfiitution of every Kind. The 
 
 0,^2 “ Vegetable 
 
22$ Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. “ Vegetable proceeds with perfect hifenfi- 
 * V ' a ' , - J ‘ £ bility. The Brute poiTeffes a Senfe of 
 
 “ what is pleafurahle and painful, but ftops 
 “ at mere Senfatmi,2,c\&\$ unable to go far- 
 ££ ther. The Rational, like the Brute, has 
 “ all the Powers of mere Senfation , but en- 
 “ joys fuperadded a farther tranfeendentf 7 ^- 
 ££ culty , by which it is made confcious, not 
 “ only of •what it feels, but of the Powers 
 * £ themfehes, which are the Sources of 
 ££ thofe very Feelings ; a Faculty , which 
 ££ recognizing both itfelf and all Things 
 <( clfe, becomes a Canon, a Corrector , and 
 it a Standard Univerfal. 
 
 ££ Hence to the Rational alone is im- 
 “ parted that Master-Science, of what 
 ££ they are, where they are, and the Pnd 
 * £ to which they are deftined. 
 
 ££ Happy, too happy, did they know 
 £< their own Felicity ; did they reverence 
 ££ the Dignity of their own fuperior Cha- 
 “ raster, and never wretchedly degrade 
 “ themfelves into Natures to them fubor- 
 
 £< dinate. 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 229 
 
 ft dinate. And yet alas! it is a Truth too Part II. 
 
 “ certain, that as the Rational only are 
 “ fufceptible of a Happinefs truly excel- 
 “ lent, fo thefe only merge themfelves 
 (( into Miferies paft Indurance. 
 
 “ Assist us then. Thou Power 
 “ Divine, with the Light of that Rea- 
 “ son, by which Thou lightened: the 
 < c World ; by which Grace and Beauty is 
 “ diffufed thro’ every Part, and the Wel- 
 
 fare of the Whole is ever uniformly up- 
 “ held; that Reafon, of which our own is 
 f< but a Particle or Spark , like fome Pro - 
 “ methean Fire, caught from Heaven above. 
 u So teach us to know ourfelves , that we 
 te may attain that Knowledge, which 
 (( alone is worth attaining. Check our 
 “ vain, our idle Refearches into the Laws, 
 “ and Natures, and Motions of other Be- 
 “ ings, till we have learnt and can prac- 
 “ tife thofe, which peculiarly refpedt our- 
 “ felves. Teach us to be fit A&ors in 
 <e that general Drama, where Thou haft 
 il allotted every Being, great and fmall, its 
 
 0.3 
 
23 o Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. <e proper Part, the due Performance of which 
 w=v ^ Ea *' “ is the only End of its Exigence. 
 
 “ Enable us to curb Desire within 
 (l the Bounds of what is Natural. Enable 
 “ us even to ftfpehd it, till we can employ 
 <£ it to our Emolument. Be our frfl 
 “ Work, to have efcaped from wrong Opi - 
 “ nion y and bad Habit; that the Mind, 
 “ thus rendered fincere and incorrupt, may 
 “ with Safety proceed to feek its genuine 
 ** Good and Happinefs. 
 
 “ When we are thus previoufly ex- 
 “ ercifed, thus duly prepared, let not our 
 i£ Love there flop, where it firft begins; 
 c< but infenfibly conduct it, by thy invi- 
 6( fiblc Influence, from lower Objects to 
 “ higher, till it arrive at that Supreme, 
 <c where only it can find what is adequate 
 “ and full. Teach us to love Thee, and 
 
 “ Thy Divine Administration- 
 
 £t to regard the Univerfe itfelf as our true 
 c< and genuine Country, not that little ca- 
 ct fual Spot, where we fir ft drew vital 
 
 “ Air. 
 
i Dialogue. 231 
 
 “ Air. Teach us each to regard Himfelf, Part II. 
 “ but as a Part of this great Wh ole ; 
 
 “ a Part which for its Welfare we are as 
 “ patiently to relign, as we refign a fingle 
 “ Limb for the Welfare of our whole 
 “ Body. Let our Life be a continued 
 “ Scene of Acquiescence and of Gr ati- 
 (< tude; of Gratitude, for what we enjoy, 
 
 <( of Acquiefcence, in w r hat we fuffer ; as 
 “ both can only be referable to that con- 
 “ catenated Order of Events, which can~ 
 e ‘ not but be bejl , as being by Thee 'ap- 
 “ proved and chofen. 
 
 % 
 
 “ In as much as Futurity is hidden 
 < f from our Sight, we can have no other 
 Rule of Choice, by which to govern our 
 “ Condudl, than what feems confonant to 
 “ the Welfare of our own particular Na- 
 <c tures. If it appear not contrary to Duty 
 “ add moral Office, (and how Ihould we 
 “ judge, but from what appears ?) Thou 
 “ canfl: not but forgive us, if we prefer 
 “ Health to Sicknefs; the Safety of Life 
 Ci and Limb, to Maiming or to Death. 
 
 Q 4 <e But 
 
232 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. <c But did we know that thefe Incidents, 
 or any other were appointed us ; were 
 fe fated in that Order of incontroulable 
 f( Events, by which Thou prefervefl: and 
 fC adorneft the Whole: it then becomes 
 our Duty, to meet them with Magna- 
 (( nimity ; to co-operate with Chearfulnefs 
 in what ever Thou ordained:; that fo 
 ft we may know no other Will, than thine 
 €t alone, and that the Harmony of our 
 particular Minds with thy TJniverfal , 
 * e may be fteady and uninterrupted thro* 
 the Period cf our Exigence* 
 
 Yet, fince to attain this Height, this 
 tranfcendent Height, is but barely pof- 
 {e fable, if poffible, to the mod perfedt 
 * c Humanity : regard what within us is 
 Congenial io ‘Thee; raife us above our- 
 ft felves, and warm us into Enthujiafm . 
 u But let our Enthufiafm be fuch, as befits 
 the Citizens of Thy Polity ; liberal, 
 *•' gentle, rational, and humane-—not fuch 
 as to debafe us into poor and wretched 
 ff Slaves, as if Thou vvert our Tyrant, 
 
 .1 t( no£ 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 2 33 
 
 ^ not our kind and common Father ;Part JJ 
 “ much lefs fuch as to transform us into * 
 tc favage Beafls of Prey , fullen, gloomy, 
 
 “ dark and fierce prone to perfecute, to 
 “ ravage, and deffroy, as if the Lull of 
 “ Maffacre could be grateful to thy Good- 
 “ nefs. Permit us rather madly to avow 
 “ Villainy in thy Defiance, than impioufly 
 f l to affert it under colour of thy Seryice. 
 
 * c Turn our Mind’s Eye from every Idea 
 * ( of this Character; from the Servile, Ab- 
 “ jedt, Horrid and Ghaftly, to the Gene- 
 rous. Lovely, Fair and Godlike. 
 
 / 
 
 “ Here let us dwell;—*—be here our 
 “ Study and Delight. So fhall we be en- 
 “ abled, in the filent Mirrour of Contem - 
 tc plation, to behold thofe Forms , which 
 “ are hidden to Human Eyes—that ani- 
 mating Wisdom, which pervades and 
 “ rules the Whole—that Law irrefiftible, 
 fc immutable, fupreme, which leads the 
 Willing, and compels the Averfe, to co- 
 “ operate in their Station to the general 
 *f Welfare—that Magic Divine, which 
 
 “ by 
 
234 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. “ by an Efficacy pad; Comprehendon, can 
 1 "* mmJ ft transform every Appearance, the moll 
 “ hideous, into Beauty, and exhibit all 
 “ things Fair and Good to Thee, 
 “ Essence Increate, who art of purer 
 if Eyes , than ever to behold Iniquity. 
 
 *• Be thefe our Morning, thefe our 
 “ Evening Meditations—with thefe may 
 
 “ our Minds be unchangeably tinged- 
 
 t c that loving Thee with a Love mod: dif- 
 interefted and dncere ; enamoured of 
 “ thy Polity, and thy Divine Admi- 
 *' nistration ; welcoming every Event 
 “ with Chearfulnefs and Magnanimity, as 
 <c being bejl upon the Whole, becaufe or- 
 “ dained of Thee; propofing nothing of 
 et ourfelves, but with a Referve that Thou 
 <c permitted; acquiefcing in every Obftruc- 
 e< tion, as ultimately referable to thy Pro- 
 vidence—in a word, that working this 
 “ Condudt, by due exercife, into perfect 
 “ Habit; we may never murmur, never 
 <s repine ; never mifs what we would ob- 
 c< tain, or fall into that which we would 
 
 “ avoid > 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 €t avoid ; bat being happy with that tran- p art jp 
 “ fcendent Happinefs, of which no one'—“V s *--* 
 <e can deprive us$ and blefb with that Di- 
 <c vine Liberty , which no Tyrant can an- 
 “ noy; we may dare addrefs Thee with 
 “ pious Confidence, as the PhilofophkBard 
 <e of old, 
 
 ie Conauci me, Thou, of Beings Caufe Divine, 
 
 “ Where-e'er I'm deftiri din thy great Defgiu 
 e< A dive Ifollow on : for fhould my Will 
 “ Reftft, Tm impious ; but mu ft followftilL ’* 
 
 In this manner did Theophilus, faid he, 
 purfue the Subject, to which I had led 
 him. He adorned his Sentiments with 
 Expreffions eyen more fplendid, than I 
 have now employed. The Speaker, the 
 Speech, the happy Circumftances which 
 concurred, the Night’s Beauty and Still- 
 nefs, with the Romantic Scene where we 
 were walking, all together gave the Whole 
 fuch an Energy and Solemnity, as it is im- 
 poilible you fhould feel from the Coldnefs 
 of a bare Recital. I, continued he, for 
 
 my 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 II. my own part, returned home fenlibly 
 touched, and retained the ftrongeft Feel¬ 
 ings of what I had heard, till the follow-’ 
 ing Morning. Then the Bufinefs of the 
 Day gently obliterated all, and left me by 
 Night as little of a Philofopher, as I had 
 ever been before. 
 
 § io. And is it poffible, faid I, fofoon 
 to have forgotten, what feems fo finking 
 and fublime, as the Subject you have been 
 now treating ? It is Habit, replied 
 he, is all in all. It is Practice and Exer- 
 a/e, which can only make us truly any thing . 
 Is it not evidently fo, in the moft com¬ 
 mon vulgar Arts ? Did mere Theory alone 
 ever make the meaneff Mechanic ? And 
 is the Supreme Artifi of Life and Manners 
 to be formed more eafily, than fuch a 
 one ? Happy for us, could we prove it near 
 fo eafy. But believe me, my Friend, good 
 Things are not fo cheap. Nothing is to 
 he had gratis, much lefs that which is mod 
 valuable, 
 
A Dialogue, 
 
 *37 
 
 Yet however for our Comfort, we have p ar t 
 this to encourage us, that, tho’ the Diffi- v — 
 culty of acquiring Habits be great and 
 painful, yet nothing fo eafy, fo pleafant, 
 as their Energies , when once wrought by 
 Exercife to a due Standard of Perfection. 
 
 I know you have made fome Progrefs in 
 Mujic . Mark well what you can do, as a 
 Proficient this way—You can do that,which 
 without Habit, as much exceeds the wifefi 
 Man, as to walk upon the Waves, or to 
 afcend a Cliff perpendicular. You can 
 even do it with Facility; and (left you 
 fhould think I flatter) not you yourfelf 
 alone, but a thoufand others befide, whofe 
 low Rank and Genius no way raife them 
 above the Multitude. If then you are fo 
 well allured of this Force of Habit in one 
 Infiance, judge not in other Infiances by 
 your own prefent Infufiiciency. Be not 
 fhocked at the apparent Greatnefs of the 
 perfect Moral Character , when you com¬ 
 pare it to the Weaknefs and Imperfection of 
 your own. On the contrary, when thefe 
 
 dark, 
 
238 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. dark, thefe melancholy Thoughts aflail 
 v> y OU> immediately turn your Mind to the 
 Confideration of Habit. Remember how 
 eafy its Energies to thofe, wh o pofefs it; 
 and yet how impracticable to fuch, as pof- 
 fefs it not . 
 
 It mud; be owned, faid I, that this is 
 a Satisfadtion, and may be fome kind of 
 Affiftance in a melancholy Hour. And 
 yet this very Doctrine naturally leads to 
 another Objection.—Does not the Difficulty 
 of at taming Habit too well fupport a certain 
 After t ion, that, defend Virtue as we will, 
 it is but a Scheme of Self-denial? 
 
 By Self-denial, faid he, you mean, I 
 
 fuppofe, fomething like what follows- 
 
 Appetite bids me eat; Reafon bids me for¬ 
 bear—-—-If I obey Reafon, I deny Appetite . 
 and Appetite being a Fart of myfelf, to 
 deny it, is a Self-denial What is true thus 
 in Luxury , is truealfoin other Subjects; is 
 evident in Matters of Lucre, of Power, of 
 Refentment, or whatever clfe we purfue 
 
 by 
 
/i Dialogue, 239 
 
 by the Dictate of any Paflion. You Part IL 
 
 appear, faid I, to have dated the Obje&ion 
 juftly. 
 
 To return then to our Indance, faid he, 
 of Luxury. Appetite bids me eat; Reafon 
 bids me forbear—If I obey Reafon , I deny 
 Appetite —and if I obey Appetite , do I not 
 deny Reafon ? Can I act either way , with¬ 
 out rejecting one of them ? And is not 
 R.eafon a Part of myfelf y as notorioufly as 
 Appetite ? 
 
 Or to take another Example— I have 
 a Depofite in my Hands. Avarice bids 
 me retain— Corfcience bids me redore. Is 
 there not a reciprocal Denial , let me obey 
 which I well ? And is not ConJ'cience a Part 
 of me , as truly as Avarice? 
 
 Poor Self indeed mud be denied, 
 take which Party we will. But why 
 fhould Virtue be arraigned of thwarting it, 
 more than Vice her contrary?—Make the 
 mod of the Argument, it can come but to 
 
 1 this—- 
 
240 Concerning HAPPINESS, 
 
 Part II. this-If Self-denial be an Objedtion'to 
 
 v "^ u ~ Virtue , fo is it to Vice —If Self-denial be 
 no Objection to Vice, no more can it be to 
 Virtue . A wonderful and important Con- 
 clufion indeed ! 
 
 He continued by faying, that the Soul 
 of Man appeared not as a fingle Faculty , but 
 as compounded of many—‘-that as thefe Fa¬ 
 culties were not always in perfedt Peace 
 one with another, fo there were few Ac-*- 
 tions which we could perform, where they 
 would be all found to concur . What then 
 are we to do ? Sufpend till they agree ?— 
 That were indeed impoffible.—Nothing 
 thereforecanremain,butto weigh well their 
 feveral Pretenfions; to hear all, that each 
 has to offer in its behalf; and finally to pur- 
 fue the Dictates of the Wifefl and the Bef* 
 This done, as for the Self-denial , which 
 we force upon the reft5 with regard to our 
 own Character , it is a Matter of Honour 
 and Praife—with regard to the Faculties 
 denied , it is a Matter of as fmall Weight, as 
 to contemn the Noife and Clamours of a 
 
 mad 
 
A Dialogue. 241 
 
 mad afid fenfelefs Mob, in deference to the Part II. 
 fober Voice of the worthier, better Citi- 
 zens. And what Man could be juftified, 
 fhould he reject thefe, and prefer a Rabble? 
 
 § 10. In this place he paufed again, 
 and I took occafion to acknowledge, that 
 nay Objedion appeared obviated. As the 
 Day advanced apace, he advifed that we 
 might return home; and walking along 
 leifurely, thus refumed to himfelf the Dif* 
 courfe. 
 
 I dare fay, continued he, you have feen 
 many a wife Head (hake, in pronouncing 
 that fad Truth, how we are governed all by 
 Interest.— —And what do they think 
 fhould govern us elfe ? Our Lofs, our 
 Damage, our Difinterejl ?——Ridiculous 
 indeed ! We fhould be Ideots in fuch cafe, 
 more than rational Animals. The only 
 Queflion is, where Interejl truly lies ? For if 
 this once be well adjufted, no Maxim can 
 be more harmlefs. 
 
 “ I 
 
 R 
 
2^2 
 
 Concerning HAPPINES, 
 
 Part II. ec I find myfelf exiding upon a little 
 V-—^Spot, furrounded every way by an im- 
 " menfe unknown Expansion.—-Where 
 “ am I ? What Sort of a Place do I 
 te inhabit ? Is it exabtly accommodated, 
 “ in every Indance, to my Convenience? 
 « 4 Is there no Excefs of Cold, none of 
 Heat, to offend me ? Am I never an** 
 44 noyed by Animals, either of my own 
 44 kind, or a different? Is every thing 
 “ fubfervient to me, as tho’ I had ordered 
 
 44 all myfelf ?—-No-nothing like it-— 
 
 the faribed from it poflible—.-—The 
 44 World appears not then originally made 
 <( for the private Convenience of me alone?— 
 44 It does not.—But is it not poffible fo to 
 <c accommodate it, by my own particular 
 
 44 Indudry?—-Ir to accommodate Alan 
 
 44 and Bead, Heaven and Earth • if this be 
 
 44 beyond me, it is not poffible-What 
 
 44 Confequence then follows ? Or can 
 44 there be any other than this— if 1 feek 
 tL an Interef of my own, detachedfrom that 
 
 4 “ °f 
 
A Dialogue. 
 
 243 
 
 
 u 
 
 of others ; Ifeek an Inter eft which is chi- Part II. 
 meric al, and can never have Exiftence ? 
 
 “ How then mud I determine ? Have 
 f I no Intereft at all ?—If I have not, I 
 c am a Fool for flaying here. It is a 
 f fmoaky Houfe, and the fooner out of 
 £ it, the better.-—But why no Interefl?—• 
 ‘ Can I be contented w'ith none, but one 
 f feparate and detached?—Is a Social 
 
 * Interest joined with others fuch an 
 c Abfurdity, as not to be admitted ? The 
 ‘ Bee, the Beaver, and the Tribes of herd- 
 £ ing Animals, are enough to convince 
 ‘ me, that the thing is, fomewhere at 
 ‘ leaftt poffible. How then am I affured, 
 
 ‘ that it is not equally true of Man? -- 
 
 ‘ Admit it; and what follows ?-—If fo, 
 
 f then Honour and Justice are my 
 
 * Interest —then the whole Train 
 c of Moral Virtues are my Inte- 
 f rest s without fame Portion of which , 
 
 {< not even Thieves can maintain Society . 
 
 R 2 
 
 “ But 
 
244 
 
 Concerning H A P PIN E S S, 
 
 Part II. 
 
 “ But farther ft ill—I flop not here— » 
 “ I purfue this Social Inter eft, as far as I 
 f‘ can trace my feveral Relations, I pafs 
 fro pi my own Stock, rpy own Neigh- 
 f f bourhood. my own Nation, to the whole 
 lt Race of Mankind, as difperfed th rough- 
 “ out the Earth. —Am 1 not related to them 
 * c all, by the mutual Aids of Commerce ; 
 i( by the general Intercourfe of Arts and 
 “ Letters •, by that common Nature, of 
 
 st which we all participate?——Again- 
 
 f* I mufl have Food and Clothing.-- 
 
 “ "Without a proper genial Warmth, 
 i( I inibantly perifh.——-Am J not rela- 
 “ ted, in this view, to the verv Earth 
 itfelf ? To the diftant Sun, from 
 whofe Beams I derive Vigour ? To that 
 f c flupendous Courfe and Order of the hfi- 
 nit e Hof of Heaven, by which the Times 
 and Seafons ever uniformly pafs on ?— 
 f £ Were this Order once confounded, I 
 could not probably furvive a Moment; 
 ■ c fo ahfolutely do I depend on this common 
 f‘ general Welfare . 
 
 “ WH AJ 
 
A Dialogue:. ' ^45 
 
 ‘ 5 What then have I to do, but to Part It* 
 enlarge Virtue into Piety ? Not 
 s: only Honour and Jttftice, and what I 
 “ owe to Man, is my Intereji but Grati- 
 a tude alib, Acquiefcence , Rejignation , Ado * 
 
 “ ration , and all I owe to this great Polity 9 
 tc and its greater Governor, our com- 
 “ mon Parent. 
 
 “ But if all thefe Moral and Di- 
 il vine Habits be my Interest, I 
 * c need net furely feek for a better. I 
 “ have an Intereft compatible with the 
 “ Spot on which I live- — —I have an In* 
 
 “ tereft which may exift, without altering 
 “ the Plan of Providence; without mend- 
 st ing or marring the general Order of 
 tc Events.—I can bear whatever happens 
 with manlike Magnanimity; can be 
 contented, and fully happy in the Good 
 “ which I poffefs; and can pafs thro’ this 
 “ turbid, this fickle, fleeting Period, with- 
 “ out Bewailings, or Envyings, or Mur- 
 “ murings, or Complaints.” 
 
 R 3 
 
 And 
 
Concerning HAPPINESS* 
 
 II. A nd thus, my Friend, have you my 
 Sentiments, as ii were abridged ; my Sen¬ 
 timents on that Subject, which engages 
 every one of us. For who would be un¬ 
 happy ? Who would not, if he knew 
 how, enjoy one perpetual Felicity l Who 
 are there exifling, who do not at every 
 Inftant feek it? It is the Wifh, the Em¬ 
 ploy, not of the Rational Man only, but 
 of the Sot, the Glutton, the very lowed 
 of our kind. For my own Syftem, whe¬ 
 ther a jud one, you may now examine^ 
 if you think proper. I can only fay on 
 its behalf, if it happen to be erroneous, 
 it is a grateful Error, which I cheridi and 
 am fond of. And yet if really fuch, I 
 fhall never deem it fo facred, as not wil¬ 
 lingly, upon Convidtion, to refign it up to 
 Truth. 
 
 Little palled after this worth relat¬ 
 ing. We had not far to walk, and we 
 fell into common Topics. Yet one Obfer- 
 vation of his I muff; not omit. It was 
 
 what 
 
A Dialogue. 247 
 
 what follows.--When we are once } p art jx a 
 
 faid he, well habituated to this chief,'— v — 1 
 this moral Science, then Logic 
 and Physics become two profitable 
 Adjuncts: Logic , to fecure to us the 
 Poflefiion of our Opinions,- that, if an 
 Adverfary attack, we may not bafely give 
 them up : Phyjics , to explain the Reafon 
 and Oeconomy of Natural Events, that 
 we may know fomething or that Univerfe, 
 where our Dwelling has been appointed 
 us. But let me add a Saying (and may 
 its Remembrance never efcape you) while 
 you find this great, this Majler-Sc>ie?ice 
 wanting , value Logic but as Sophijiry , and 
 Phyjics but as Raree-Jhew 5 for both, afiure 
 yourfelf, will be found nothing better. 
 
 It was foon after this that our Walk 
 ended. With it ended a Converfation, 
 which had long engaged us j and which, 
 according to my Promife, I have here en¬ 
 deavoured to tranfcribe. 
 
 THE END, 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' .. 
 
 
 
 , * 
 
 
 ' 
 
 
 , . . 
 
 ' 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! e 
 
 
Advertilement to the Reader- 
 
 T HE Author has chofen 'to feparate all 
 Notes from his firfl and third Trea - 
 tifes , and thus fubjoin them to the End, 
 becaufe thofe \Treatifes, being written in 
 Dialogue , from their Nature and Genius 
 admit not of Interruption . One of his 
 
 Reafons for adding Notes was, to give 
 Weight to his AJfertions from the Autho¬ 
 rity of antient Writers. But his chief 
 and principal Reafon was, to excite (if 
 pofibleJ the Curiofity of Readers, to exa¬ 
 mine with fritter Attention thofe valuable 
 Remains of antient Literature. Should 
 he obtain this End, he fall think his La¬ 
 bours (fuch as they are) abundantly re¬ 
 warded. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ; 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 
 ' 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E S 
 
 NOT 
 
 O N 
 
 TREATISE the Firftj 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 A R T. 
 
 y OTE I. p. 6. All Art is Cause.] Artis 
 maxime proprium, create & gignere. Cic» 
 de Nat. Deor. I. 2. c. 22. *Efi b\ rsyyn 
 zsoarct zric) yivvriv. All Art is employed in Produc¬ 
 tion, that is, in making fomething to be. Arijlot . 
 
 Ethic. Nicom. 1 . 6. c. 4. 
 
 The active efficient Caufss have been ranged, 
 and enumerated after different manners. In the 
 fame Ethics, they are enumerated thus— oUtioc yap 
 boxztrtv eijxi Cpfcnj, dvxyxr,, tv % v ‘ it 1 ds ^ 
 z.rocv to bd ai/0p£u?r5f. The feveral Caufes appear to he • 
 Nature, Necejfty, and Chance ; and beftdes thefe. Mind 
 or Intellect, and whatever operates by or thrd Man. 
 
 1. 3. c. 3. The Paraphraft Andronicus, in explaining 
 this laft Pafiage, Tlav to bd cE^octth, adds olov Ttyjjy\y 
 x ocWn Tiq zj-adriq, as for inflance, Art, or any other 
 husnan Action. 
 
 Alex- 
 
52 NOTES on Treatise the FirjL 
 
 Alexander Aphrodisiensis fpeaks of effiU 
 cient Caufes as follows : AAAa pnv tx xvglu; olntx 
 TZrOlTlTlXX, (pCtTLS Tt, Xy Tt^VYi, Jt) ZSpoxlptlTi;. The 
 Caufes , which me JtriElly and properly efficient, are 
 Nature, Art, and each Man s particular Choice of Action. 
 STEjOt T'Jp^T]?. p. 160. B. AViV. 
 
 In what manner Art is diftinguiffied from the reft 
 of thefe efficient Caufes, the fubfequent Notes will 
 attempt to explain. 
 
 Note II. p. 6 . Of that Painter famed 
 in Story, Cfr.] See Valer. Max. 1 8 . c. ii. See 
 alfo Dion. Chryfofiom. Orat. 63. p. 590. 
 
 Note III.] p. 12. Art is Man becoming a 
 Cause, Intentional and Habitual,] Ari- 
 ftotle , in his Rhetoric , thus accurately enumerates 
 all the poffible manners, either direct or indi¬ 
 rect, in which Mankind may be faid to att or do 
 any thing. Uccvti; Sri ■arpxTietri zsocvtx, too p\v, 
 « aulas' too Je, Si* aulas' tuv p\v Zv pen Si* x'vlS;, 
 rx p.tv Six tv ye nn zrpxT%<ri, tx SI ijr avxyxr,;' tuv 
 f xvxyxriS, tx ptv (Six, tx SI (pvcrti" togs zjxvJx, 
 crx pen 01 aulas zs’pxThsa-i, tx ptv xtto Tvy^r,;' tx dt 
 (pi fti’ tx SI (Six. *0 crx St Si av IS;, x] ccv xvloi 
 cciho 1, t& ptv 01 tvo;, tx at 01 ogtfciv xxi tx ptv oix 
 Ao^ir» >£T l 1; to. c,£ 4)4 aAoyifov. tfi at n ptv 
 
 { 3 aAJix»s, pilx Xoyu ogfj'i; ayxQu—xhoyoi S’ opl'^ti;, 
 
 » \ v > a e t! / ft < 1 / o ■> / 
 
 xai t 7 ri\lvpix uft oTxvlx oerx 'arpxThsmv, avxy- 
 v.n zjpxrltiv Si' a fix; toSix' Six Tvyrriv, Six (Slav, Six 
 
 (p'JITlV, 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl . 253 
 
 (P'jtriv, St s 9 of, Six Xcyitr^bv, Six B’vpcov, St £7r*0y- 
 
 / 
 
 sill Men do all Things , either of themfelves, or not of 
 themfelves. The Things , which they do not of themfelves , 
 they do either by Chance, or from Necefjity ; and the 
 Things done from Neeeffity, they do either by Compulflon, 
 which is External Neeeffity , or Nature , which is 
 Internal. So that all Things whatfoever, which Alen 
 do not of themfelves , they do either by Chance, or ^rotf* 
 Compulfon , or by Nature. 
 
 Again, the Things which they do of themfelves, and 
 pf which they are themfelves properly the Caufes , yWo 
 they do thro ’ Cuflom and acquired Habit, others thro* 
 original and natural Defire. Farther, Things done 
 thro' natural Defire they do, either thro' fuch Defire 
 ajffed by Reafon , or thro' fuch Defere devoid of Reafeon. 
 Jfe it be afefifed by Reafeon, //;<?« ajfeumes the Denomi¬ 
 nation of (Till , —-o« the contrary, the irrational Deferes 
 are Unger and Appetite. 
 
 Hence it appears that all Things whatever ? which 
 Men do, they necejfearily do thro' one ofe thefee feeveti 
 Caufes o/Mcr thro' Chance, Compulfon, Nature, 
 Cuflom, Will , Anger, Appetite. Arif. Rhet. 1. I. 
 c. 10. 
 
 It remains, agreeably to this Enumeration, to 
 .confider with which of thefe Caufes we ought to 
 arrange Art. 
 
 As to Chance, it may be obferved in general 
 of all Cafeual Events, that they always exclude Inten¬ 
 tion or Dejign: But Intention and Defeign, are from 
 
 Art 
 
254 NOTES on Treatise the Firft* 
 
 Art infeparable. Thus is the Difference between Art 
 and Chance manifeft. 
 
 As to External Compulsion, we have it 
 
 thus defcribed- Blaiov d\ b r, ccgyfi e£w 0 £v. That is t 
 
 an Act of Compuljion , the efficient Principle of which is 
 from without , independent of the Doer. Ethic. Nic. 
 1 . 3. c. 1. Again, in the fame Treatife, 1 . 6. c. 4. 
 ■vve are told of the Works of Art , that they are fuen, 
 wu n doyf \v ru zoocdhh, the efficient Principle of which 
 is in the Doer or Agent. Thus therefore is Art diftin- 
 guifhed from Compulfian. 
 
 These two Caufes, Chance and CompuJfon , arc 
 mentioned and confidered in the Dialogue, Pages 6 
 and 7. 
 
 Nature, or rather Natural Necessity, is 
 that Caufe, thro’ which we breathe, perfpire, digeft, 
 circulate our Blood, &c. Willy Anger , and Appetite , 
 are (as already obferved) but fo many Species of 
 Natural Desire, confidered either as afiifled by 
 Ileafon, or elfe as devoid of it. Now tho’ Natural 
 Dcfire and Natural Neceffity differ, becaufe in the 
 one we a£t J'pontaneoufy , in the other not fpontane- 
 oufy , yet both of them meet in the common Genus 
 of Natural Power. Moreover this is true of all Na¬ 
 tural Power , that the Power itfelf is prior to any 
 Energies or Acts of that Power. ’Ou yolp in tb zsroA- 
 A uhh l£s7v y ’usoXAosxis dmuroa tus aicrOwini? ixd£o- 
 
 [aiv, aAA* dvocTTOiXiv^ iyovle; iy^y<rocp.£^ix, i ygyeoc.- 
 ’iyoyvj. For [to inftance in the natural Powers 
 of Senfation] it was not from often feeing , and often 
 
 1 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl . 
 
 2 5J 
 
 hearing , that we acquired thofe Senfies ; but on the con~ 
 trary , being firjl pojfiejfed of them , then ufed them 9 
 
 not through any UJ'e or Exercife did we come to pojfefs 
 them. Arijl. Ethic. 1 . 2. c. x. 
 
 Now the contrary to this is true in the cafe of 
 any Powers or Faculties not natural , but acquired by 
 Cujlom and Ufiage. For here there are many Ener¬ 
 gies and which muft necelTarily precede the 
 
 Exigence of fuch Power or Habit , it being evident 
 (as is faid in the fame Chapter) that ex ruv opoiuv 
 ivepyucui/ ai Y£us ylyvovlxi, firotn fimilar and homoge¬ 
 neous Energies it is that Habits are obtained. So 
 again, in the fame Place, x ydp hA pcxQbvlois woxeiv, 
 toc vice zroHsti Iff pcxv 9 xvop.su' oiov oncob'ofjceileg oixdSopcot 
 
 yivovlxi, A) xx 9 xfi^ 0 'ilsg xi 9 xgwcu'. The Things which 
 we are to do by having learnt , we learn by doing. Thus 
 by building Men become Builders , and by prac fifing Mu* 
 file they become Muficians. 
 
 Thus therefore is Art diftinguilhed from all 
 Natural Power of Man, whether Natural 
 Necefiity, Will , Anger, or Appetite. But Art has 
 been already diftinguifhed from Chance and Com¬ 
 pulsion. So that being clearly not the fame with 
 fix of thofe feven Caufes, by which all Men do all 
 Things, it muft needs be referred to the feventh , 
 that is, to Custom or Habit. 
 
 It muft be obferved, the natural Caufes or Powers 
 in Man, cohfidered as diftindt from Art, are treated 
 in the Dialogue, Pages 8 and 9. 
 
 And 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firji. 
 
 And now, as we have (hewn Art to be a certain 
 Cauje working in Man , it remains to fhevv how it is 
 diflinguifhed from tbofe other Caufes befide Man , which 
 we fuppofe to operate in the Univerfe. Thefe are 
 either fuch Caujes as are below him, like the Vegeta¬ 
 tive Power, which operates in Vegetabes, the Sen- 
 fitive in Animals ; or elfe fuch Caujcs as are above 
 him, like God, and whatever is elfe of Intelligence 
 more than human. 
 
 The Causes eeloW us may be all included in 
 the common Genus of Nature ; and of Nature we 
 may fay univerfally, as well of Nature without us 
 as within us, that its feveral Operations , contrary to 
 fhofe of Art, are not in the leaf degree derived from 
 Cufom or Ufage. Thus the Author above cited-- 
 
 Cudfy yap run CpuVa ’otioov cc AAwj 
 (p-JiTci xoct w (pcoofrso; , ax av iOtcQeiy a.vu> 
 ecu [A, vgiocxic a-uldi* tij ocvu pnrlwv, 
 
 * oiov o 
 (pf fa-Qai, 
 
 ’ 1S\ \ ^ 
 
 ZOi TO wvp 
 
 xorui. None of thofe Things , which are what they are by 
 Nature , can be altered by being accu/hmed. Thus a Stone, 
 which by Nature is carried downward , can never be 
 accufomtd to mount upward , no, not tho ’ any one 
 Jhould ten thaufind times attempt it , by throwing the 
 Stone upward. The fanie may be faid of accuf owing 
 Fire to move downward. Ethic. Nicom. 1 . 2. c. i. 
 .Again, in the JVorks of Nature , fuch as Trees, 
 Animals, and the like, the efficient Principle is vi¬ 
 tally united to the Subjects , wherein it operates.-- 
 
 h at vlcis t’/puri rdvlot tjou df-yfv. Ethic. Nicom. 1 . 6. 
 p. 4. But in the JVorks of Art, fuch as Statues or 
 Houfes, the efficient Principle is difunited from J:e 
 Snbjedls, and exifls not in the Things dene or made, 
 
 bu£ 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjt. 
 
 but in the Doer or Artijl —«u v * v T£ ? wotisvli 
 
 ccXXa y.n iv tu zromptvu. Ethic. Nic. 1. 6. c. 4 . It 
 is indeed pofiible that, even in Works of Art , the 
 Subject and efficient Caufe may be united , as in the 
 Cafe of a Phyfician becoming his own Patient, and 
 curing himfelf. But then it muft be remembered 
 that this Union is xccld <rv{/.£t£?ixf, merely acciden¬ 
 tal , and no way efjential to the conftituting of Art, 
 confidered as Art. By this therefore is Art clearly 
 diftinguifhed from Nature, whofe Definition in¬ 
 forms us that it is — otpy^ri t»V ailhx. rS xtvturQca x} 
 
 fygtftsiv tv £J VITCt^tl ZS-pWTWf, X&G’ Oililo X^ fJ.V\ XCclot 
 
 <rvy.£t£woc. A certain Principle or Caufe of moving and 
 ceafing to move , in fame Subject wherein fuch Principle 
 exi/ls immediately , effentially , and not by way of Accident . 
 Ariit. Natuf. Aufc* 1. 2 . c. i< 
 
 The Causes, which are of Rank superioUR 
 to Man , fuch as the Deity, can have nothing 
 to do with Art , becaufe being (as is faid in the 
 Dialogue, p. ii*) perfect and complete , and knowing 
 all from the Beginning , they can never admit of what 
 is additional and fecondary. Art therefore can only 
 belong to Beings , like Men, who being imperfect, 
 know their Wants, and endeavour to remove them 
 by Helps fecondary and fubfequent. It was from a 
 like Confideration that Pythagoras called himfelf a 
 Philosopher, that is to fay (according to his own 
 Explication of the Name) a Lover and Seeker of 
 what was wife and good , but not a PoiTefiorj 
 ivhich he deemed a character above him. Con- 
 
 fonant to this we fetod in Plato s Banquet, Sstuv 
 
 S 
 
258 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Firjh 
 
 aJ'flf <Pl\oiTo(pl~, «T hnQvpe'i cotpoS yivitrQoa’ £ft 
 
 yctp, See. No God philojophizes , or defires to become 
 wife , for He is so already, Nor , if there 
 be any other Being wife , doth he philofophize for the 
 fame Reafon. On the other hand , neither do the Indocil 
 philofophize 5 for this is the Misfortune of Indocility t 
 without being virtuous , good or prudent , to appear to 
 ones felf fufficient in all thefe RefpeSls. In general there¬ 
 fore, he who thinketh himfelf in no want, defireth 
 not that , which he thinks himfelf not to need. Who 
 then, faid Socrates to Diotima , (the Speaker of this 
 Narration) Who are those who philoso¬ 
 phize, if they are neither the Wife nor the Indocil? 
 
 \That (replied (he) may be now confpicuous even to a 
 Child. They are those of middle Rank, 
 BETWEEN THESE EXTREMES. Plat. p. 203. tom. 
 3. Edit. Serrani. 
 
 Here we fee (agreeably to what is faid in the 
 Dialogue, pages 11. and 12.) that as to acquired 
 or fecondary Habits , fome Beings are too excellent 
 for them, and others too bafe ; and that the Deity 
 above all is in the Number of thofe tranfeendent , 
 and is thus, as a Caufe , diftinguiflned from Art. Vid. 
 Amm. ’Epp.iv. p. 26. b. et omnino tk xulwy. p. 
 127, 128. 
 
 There are, befides the Deity and Nature now 
 fpoken of, certain other external Caufes, which are 
 mentioned in the firft Note as diftin£t from Art ; 
 namely Chance and Neceffity. But of thefe hereafter, 
 when we confider the Subject of Art. 
 
 Note 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firfi. 
 
 Note IV. p. 13. Faculties, Powers, &c. 
 
 ARE OBSCURE AND HIDDEN THINGS-ENER¬ 
 
 GIES and Operations lie open to the 
 Senses.] *E» A iytiv ti txotrov t«tws/, oiov 
 
 T» to vodlinov, 11 t; to durOrli xov, zrp orcgov itchy- 
 XiTrVopf t( to m~t/, yfj t» to aur0ai'£<r0ai‘ tst^o— 
 Ttgoa yap Xy Yodpifcqoa zrgcc rijJ-ocg toov ovvocfAtuy 
 i«r* a.1 ivt^yttoa. zrgotvlvy%di/o[A£v yap do! aiY, Vy 
 “fug Juvajuft; cctco tztocv i 7 rivox(/.ev. Jf we are to ex¬ 
 plain what each of thefe things are , as for infance , what 
 the intelligent Principle , what the fenfitive , u><? mujl 
 frjl inquire what it is to think , what to fee^ hear , 
 z*A the Senfes. For with refpeft to us Men , the Ener¬ 
 gies tf/r prior and more evident than the Pow¬ 
 ers, becaufe it is in the Energies we are frjl conver - 
 fant , and comprehend the Powers from them. Themifl;. 
 in lib. 2. de Anima, p. 76. E dit. Aid. Fol. Ariftot. de 
 An. II. 4. 
 
 Note V. p. 15. Are there not Pre¬ 
 cepts, t 5 V.] Vid. Plat, in Min. tom. 2. p. 316, 
 17. Edit. Serran. et in Gorgia, tom. 1. p. 465. A. 
 iyd cJe t t%vriv z x«Ao), 0 ocu r, aXoyov 'urqocyux. 
 
 As to thofe low Habits here mentioned, from 
 which we diftinguifh Art by the Number and Dignity 
 of its Precepts, they fall in general under the Deno¬ 
 mination of ModoaoTiygpixy oi which Quintilian gives 
 the following Account. MoUxiony^piot quoque ejl 
 quadam , id eft, fupervacua Artis Imitatio , qua nihil 
 fane nec boni nec mali habeat , fed vanum laborem - 
 quads illius fuit, qui grana ciceris , ex fpatio difante 
 miffa, in acum conlinuo iff fine frujlratione infer chat ; 
 quern , cum fpeflaffet Alexander , donajje dicitur ejufdem 
 
 S 2 
 
260 NOTES on Treatise the Firjt* 
 
 leguminis modio. Quod quidem pramium fuit illo opsrS 
 dignijjimum. Inft. Orat. 1 .2. c. 20. 
 
 Note VI. p. 17. An Habitual Power in 
 Man of becoming the Cause of some Ef¬ 
 fect, ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF VARIOUS 
 AND WELL-APPROVED PRECEPTS-] 
 
 The Peripatetic Definition of Art is ^E^if (*tlx 
 
 Aof» aArjOSf zsoirihxn - an efficient Habit, joined with 
 
 Jound and true Reaffon. Ariftot. Ethic. Nic. 1 . 6. c. 4. 
 
 The Stoic Definition, as we find it in Sext. 
 Empir. adverfus Logicos , p. 39-2. is, tx 
 
 xocla,\r'i\'Suv ifytyvy.voKrp.ivuv ri tsA^ tv^rifov 
 
 TUV iv TW 0,'w. Thus tranflated by Cicero in Dio- 
 demes de Grammat. 1 . 2. Arc ejl Perceptionum exerci- 
 iatarum colled!io, ad unum exitum vitae utilem perti• 
 nentium. And again by Quintilian, Inft. Orat. 1 . 2, 
 e. 18. Artem conffare ex perceptionibus conffentientibus 
 (A coexercitatis ad ffnem utilem vitae. The fame De¬ 
 finition is alfo alluded to in the Academics of Cicero y 
 
 1. 2. c. 7. where it is faid- Ars vero qiue pot eft effffe, 
 
 niff quae non ex una , aut duabus , ffed ex multis animi per¬ 
 ceptionibus conffat ? 
 
 There 13 a third Definition of Art cited by 
 Quintilian in the fame place, and aferibed by him to' 
 
 Cleanthes - Ars eff poteffas via (id eff, or dine) efficient. 
 
 The Greek, from which this Latin Definition is taken,, 
 is fuller and more philofophical. The Words are— 
 
 c/ ££i? ocL ( 3 x$l£\s<rot p.floc (poci/Tocmoc; -which may be 
 
 rendered, an Habit , which proceeds in a Road or Me¬ 
 thod , having a Senffe withal off what it is about. The 
 
 laft 
 
26 i 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Firft . 
 
 laft Character diftinguifhes Art from the naturalEner. 
 gies of all things infenfitive , which, tho’ they proceed 
 methodically , yet want a Senfe of what they are doing. 
 Vid. Niceph. Blemmid. Epit. Logic, p. 20. 
 
 Now if we compare fhefe Definitions with that 
 in the Dialogue, we ihall find them all to correfpond. 
 The Habitual Power in Man of becoming the Caufe of 
 fome Effort, is the fame as vrotrlhxv in the Peri¬ 
 
 patetic Definition. According to a Syfem of various and 
 well-approved Precepts, is the fame as f*tloc A of a aAntafc 
 For found and true Reafon mud needs be the Bafis of 
 allJuch Precepts. 
 
 Again, as to the fecond Definition—The Words 
 Sfrirj.% xuIocXyi^soov \_a Syfem of Comipr ehenfons, or of 
 certain and evident Truths'] correfpond to the latter 
 
 Part of the Definition in the Dialogue- According 
 
 to a Syfem of various and well-approved Precepts. The 
 Word Ayeyjy.voc<r^ivuv [that is to fay, worked in by 
 Habit and Exercife ] correfponds to the firft Part, 
 that Art is a Caufe founded in Elabit. And the reft 
 r; Wa©’, Cfc. that is to fay, a Syfem which 
 has refpert to fome ufeful and ferviceable End or Purpoje 
 in Human Lfe~\ {hews the Syftem here mentioned to 
 regard Prartice and Artion , not Theory and Speculation. 
 And thus does it correfpond with the Definition of the 
 Dialogue, where it is faid that Art is an Habitual 
 Power not of merely contemplating and knowing , but of 
 becoming the Cauje of fo?ne Ejfert. It is not indeed ex- 
 prefled in the Dialogue, that this Effett has refpeft to 
 the Utility of Human Life , becaufe this latter Circum- 
 fance is referved to the Definition of the final Caufe 
 oi Art, given page 29. 
 
 s 3 
 
 As 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl . 
 
 As to the third Definition of Art, potefias via efjfi- 
 ciens, a Power of operating methodically , it may be ob- 
 ferved, that by being called an operating Power, it is 
 diftinguifhed from Powers purely fpeculative : and as it 
 is faid to operate methodically, or in a Road and regu¬ 
 lar Procefs , it is diftinguifhed from Chance as well as 
 blind NeceJJity. And thus far it correfponds with what 
 is offered in the Dialogue But it does not appear from 
 this Definition, whether the Power therein mentioned 
 be Original and Natural , or Secondary and Habitual > 
 becaufe Powers of either fort may operate methodically. 
 And perhaps Cleanthes intended not to diftinguifh fo 
 far, but took Art in that larger and more general 
 Senfe, adopted fometimes by the Stoics; as when they 
 defcribe Nature herfelf to be a Ilup r t%yixov oJ'oj ( 3 a- 
 tiifiov rape? ylvimv, an artificial Fire , proceeding me¬ 
 thodically to Production or Creation. For it is not to 
 be imagined, they intended by this to infinuate that 
 Nature was a Fire, which had learnt by Habit fo to 
 operate. On the contrary, by artificial it is probable 
 they intended no more than fome active efficient Prin¬ 
 ciple^ wot king with Reef on, Order , and Method; of 
 which Principle they confidered Fire to be th tproperefi 
 vehicle, as being of all bodies the moft Jubtle , and 
 that into which the reft are all ultimately refolvable. 
 Vide Dtog. Laert. 1 . 7. SeCt. J 56. Cic. de Nat. Dear , 
 1 . %. c. 22. 
 
 Note VII. page 22. It should seem that 
 
 THE COMMON OR UNIVERSAL SUBJECT OF Art 
 
 was-All those contingent Natures, 
 
 WHICH LIE WITHIN THE B.EACH of H’JMAN POW¬ 
 ERS TO INFLUENCE.] 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 
 
 The Cause here treated is the Material, the 
 *TAn, or ‘Tt Toml^tvovy or to « yivHdi rt £W7rap- 
 
 Of a Contingent we have the following Defini¬ 
 tion- Aiyoo (T to tvAs^cpevov, » pri 
 
 <f!(& dvocfudie, t£0 £v7(§P vnotp^eiv, aJ'fv tfoti diet 
 
 tut’ aJ'vvoilov. I call that a Contingent, which 
 not being necejfary y but being fuppofed to be , there will 
 follow nothing impofftble from fuch Suppofition. Arift. 
 Anal, prior. 1. i. c. 13. Diog. Laert. 1 , 3. § 10. 
 
 That this is true in Works of Art , is evident. 
 It is not necefiary, that a given Fragment of fuch a Rock 
 fhould affume the Figure of Hercules: but there fol¬ 
 lows nothing impojfible , if we fuppofe it fo figured. 
 It is for this reafon, that the Subject of Art is in the 
 Dialogue called a Contingent , 
 
 But however, to explain the whole of what is 
 faid in this Place, it is neceifary to go backward, and 
 deduce what we would fay from fome remoter Confi- 
 derations. 
 
 The Peripatetics held the End or Aim of their 
 Philofophy to be the difeovering and knowing the 
 the primary and creative Principle of all Things . 
 They purfued this Inquiry, when they reasoned analyti- 
 cally , that is to fay upwards , by beginning their Con¬ 
 templation from thofe things, which are to us firjl iit 
 the Order of our Comprehenfion, and fo afeending 
 gradually to that which is truly firjl in the real Order 
 of Beings. Ammon, fif E. (puv: p. 36. 
 
 S 4 Th£ 
 
 263 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firfi . 
 
 The firfi and original Objects of our Comprehen* 
 fion are thofe nearer and more immediate, viz. the 
 Objects of Senfe, with which we are furrounded orj 
 every Side. Thefe Objects we perceive to be all in 
 motion ; and the Motions are multiform , various , and 
 often oppofte to each other. The Confequences of 
 this we perpetually behold. By fuch Motions we fee 
 that not only the mere local Site of thefe Beings is 
 changed, but their very Bulk , and Figure, and po¬ 
 litics ; nay more than this, even the Beings themfelver, 
 are made to feparate and perifn , while neiu Beings 
 firife from the Re-affemblage of the fcattered Parts, 
 which Parts different Motions can as well bring to¬ 
 gether, as difunite. The Beings or Objects of the Cha-. 
 rafter here defcribed, the Peripatetics denoted under 
 the common Appellation of the r« wxp.tvx fj CpSa^la, 
 the Beings moving and corruptible. 
 
 From thefe moving and peri fable Objects , they paffed 
 to thofe fublimer and more tranfcendent Objects of Senfe, 
 which they faw adorn the Heavens . Here like wife 
 they difcovered Motion ; but then this Motion was 
 uniform and confant; offering not the Beings moved , 
 fave in the relation of local Site. As therefore they 
 beheld no Change in the Form and Ef 'ence of thefe 
 Beings, they deemed them (upon their Hypothefs) in¬ 
 corruptible and out of them eftablifhed another Clafs 
 of Beings, that is to fay, the ra j uyteptytn k! 
 the Beings moving and incorruptible. 
 
 From thefe fublimer Objects of Senfe , they paffed 
 to Objects of pure Intellect ; to Bodies devoid of all 
 Motion, and of all polity , fave that infeparable one 
 
 of 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firfi. 265 
 
 of Figure ; fuch Bodies for inftance as the Cube, the 
 Sphere, and the reft of Bodies mathematical. From 
 mathematical Bodies, and the 7 ruths refulting from 
 them , they pafled to the Contemplation of Truth in 
 general ; to the Soul , and its Powers both of Intuition 
 and Syllogization ; to Being un'tverjal , and above both 
 Time and Place ; and thus at laft to that fupreme Caufe, 
 the great Principle of the whole, which is ever the 
 fame immutable and eternal. The feveral Objects of 
 this bitellefinal Comprehenfon they ftiled not merely 
 a(p 9 ag 1 tx. but a<pQocf>lx f ocxlvrUoi, Beings incorrupti¬ 
 ble and immoveable. V. inf. Note xvii. 
 
 In this manner didThe Peripatetics fpeculate. And 
 hence was it they eftabliihed to themfelves three Species 
 of Philofophical Employment—one about Beings mo - 
 tionlefs and eternal ; another, about Beings moveable 
 and eternal; and a third, about Beings moveable and 
 perijhable. 1 he firft they held the proper Employ¬ 
 ment of the Metaphyfician $ the two laft of the JJlro- 
 nomer and the Naturalijl. 
 
 Ai o al zrgocffJkQileTea’ v [x\v zrig} ockIvyHqv' 
 
 < 5 t, xivxptvov utyQxflov Sl m ri SI, zrsfi rot 
 
 (pQabhz. Idcirco tres funt tradl all ones ; una, de immo- 
 bill : altera de eo, quod movetur quidem , Jed ell interi- 
 tus expers ; tertia de rebus , interitui obnoxiis. Ariftot. 
 JSIatural. Aufc. 1 . 2. c. 7. Aio >£ rgng ui zrgaff/.dlii'ou' 
 
 Yl [xlv, X>V8 {/.£V0i £ P9xjlcc' V\ SI ZTlJl XlMfJlllnX,^ 
 
 a(p 9 ajlx. Si' n Si, Ts-tfi ccxivvlcc Xj u<p 6 xghz» The - 
 trdjlii Paraphrafis in loc. 
 
 This threefold Subjeft of Philofophic Inquiry 
 $s elegantly explained in the following PalTage. T l Je 
 
 TO 
 
266 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Firjt. 
 
 to teA©-* lf\ Trig ’AgifOTehixn; (piXoqotyixg ; §>oty \ tf 
 ort youoxi tvv zrduloev d^nv, ryv ruv udolwv fnpiwgyov 
 dfli'xv, rt}v ail wrduloog e%K<ro6V’ ct7roJeinvu<ri yap TuctVm 
 two dp 5 £>ji», xj dtxuifixloo' txuimg r« zsdvlx uagd- 
 yscQxi, Ti'vcf, A r« dyoola. rifxxg i7g thto to t(X<& ; 
 (pxfio art r S^xaxxXlx two It/ %P 0 va x) (xtlxQoXy inrxp- 
 yodlwv' toixutk <Je tfi tiz ev yeoitrst x^ $)0o^a* a-To' j/ap 
 <ha p etojv y.a&rifA.dhxwv, dvdfofiiv saving eVj ra 
 ah Kj oorxvlu); iyov\x toixvtx oe en rx xgxvix* xxi 
 
 iSTIW) field TXg d<TW[AXTXg Xtriocq, £7Tt r>1U zrgurrtv tsxCIw* 
 
 d^ywo. Tld<rng yap xn/ycrewg >j xxP aV/a v xcryg, y xodd 
 ztoioo, rl xxld tcVov, t d [Av to yevetre i x^ (£>0opa xald 
 zrdirxo xloymo xivxolai' tcc. St y.gxvix xxld /xo'oyv Tyu 
 xxld To7rov. Aio xgri Ivldxlug SStvtiv xtto two stoA u- 
 
 , / > ' \ <7 \ / ' / / 
 
 rgcnrwg xioufuowo tree Ta xaja ^uav, x, fxoorio xtvriirtv 
 xmfxsvx, Xj srw; £7rt THN AKINHTON KAI AEI 
 ilXATTflS EXOTXAN APXI-IN. Apa^oolu elg rdf 
 xxlnyoglag, p. 12. Edit. Venet. 8vo. 1545. 
 
 The Author of the Dialogue has had Reference to 
 this threefold Divifion of SubjeSls, as may be feen in that 
 Part of his Dialogue, which gives occafion to the 
 prefent Comment. He has chofen however to ftile 
 the tx *0 vgdvix, or Heavenly Bodies , rather Contin¬ 
 gents of Inghtr Order, than Beings neceffary , as ima¬ 
 gining the former to be their truer Character. 
 
 It may be here added, that the Peripatetics con¬ 
 fined <I>u<ng, or Nature , for the moll part, to this 
 Earth of ours, where they confidered her as the a Stive 
 Principle of Life in Plants and Animals. Hence 
 therefore they diftinguifhed not her EffeSls from thofo 
 
 of 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 
 
 of Arty by their Neceffity (for the Ejfefts of both they 
 treated as contingent) but from the Caufe in Natural 
 Subje&s operating within y in Artificial without , as has 
 been already obferved, p . 256, 257. See Diog . LaerU 
 
 p. 459. 
 
 It may be farther added, that they "placed thefe 
 Effefis of Art and Nature , and indeed all other Con - 
 tingents whatever, in a middle Rank between 1 hings 
 Necejfiaryy and Things Impojfible. The Reafon was 
 evident. Things Neceffary could not but be* ! hings 
 Impojfible could not be ; but Contingents were rot ivfo- 
 ^bfxevot Yj hvoct x) pri Imai, that is, were equally fufcep • 
 tible both of Being and Non-being. 
 
 But ftill tho’ all Contingents admitted on their 
 Hypothefis both of Being and Non-being, yet they 
 fuppofed fome to have a greater Tendency to Exift- 
 ence, and others to have a lefs. The firft Species of 
 thefe they ftiled rx us in) to zsoXf the Things which 
 happen for the mofl part ; the laft, rot in* sXoctIov, the 
 Things which happen lefs frequently. 
 
 Now as it is evident that both Nature and Art 
 tftener obtain their Endy than mifs it (for complete 
 Animals are more frequently born than Monftcrs, and 
 the Mufician, if an Artift, ftrikes oftener the right 
 String than the wrong) hence it was, that they ranged 
 the Effcfls of Nature and Art among thofe Contingents 
 which were tx us in) to uoXv 9 Contingents of greater 
 Frequency. But yet as thefe EfFedls were not from the 
 Hypothefis neceffary , and contrary to thefe upon occafion 
 happened, hence is was, that whenever either Nature 
 pr Art became Caufei of the rot in* iXotrlov, thofe rarer 
 
 Events 9 
 
NOTE S on Treatise the Firft. 
 
 Events^ in fuch cafe they (Nature and Art) were con¬ 
 sidered by thefe Philofophers as anion xcelcc <rvfA.Gt£woS 
 Caufes by may of Accident , and not according to their 
 own Ejfence and diftinguifhing Character. In fuch 
 Inftancesit was, that they affumed the Names of Tup^n 
 and ’Auroralov, Fortune Chance, Tv%yi hav¬ 
 ing rnoftly Reference to Works of Men, ’Aut opcclov to 
 Works of Nature. The Inftances given by Themifius , 
 in cafes of Chance and Fortum , are as follow. A 
 Tile falls from a Houfe. The End of its falling is to 
 arrive at that lower Fiace, whither Nature would carry 
 it by the common Law of Gravity. In falling it 
 flxikes and wounds a Paffenger. This lajl Event is 
 from Chance. Again, a Man digs in his Garden, to 
 plant. In digging, he difcovers a hidden Treafure. 
 This laft Event is from Fortune. And thus, adds The- 
 raifiius , i? divan zjgxfcig x) jtxfa, aAAs ftv xu 9 ’ a. utvv 
 dnloc, aAA» Je xxtcc cvjuSiGrixo?. The fame indivit 
 dual Action is the Caufe of one Thing from its own pe¬ 
 culiar Character , and of another Thing , by way of 
 Accident. And again, sft fAtv Zu x) twk ztw ? avuCxi- 
 vovlwu » rnv (puciu n mi/ zrgouigeiriv ocmxv arwj narfiv, 
 aAA a xao auTflv a tbtwi/ bt£ zvpo»]Ao£V 
 
 o »t£ n xotTW£%Qri y aAA* et ccgoc y 
 
 X.U.Ta rupGiGw's. - Of thefe Events we may call Na¬ 
 
 ture or Human Will in a manner the Caufe , but yet not 
 Jo from themfelves , and according to their own peculiar 
 Ejfence *, for it was not for the fake of what happened 
 that either the Paffenger WENT FORTH, or the Tile FI LL 
 DOWNWARD, but if any thing it was ly Accident. 
 Themift. in lib. 2. Natur. Aufcult. p. 26. Edit. Aid. 
 See alfo Arifot. Natur. Aufcult. 1. 2. c. 4, 5, 6. Am¬ 
 mon in Pradicam. p. 113, b. This Do&rine came 
 
 originally 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl . 
 
 ©riginally from Plato , whofe Definition of Fortune was— 
 'Zvp.Tnup.oc (pv<rsu ? n zrgoMgirtus, a Sy?nptom, or thing 
 co-incident either with Nature or Human Will* V'ld , 
 Suidam in Foe. ’Ej^a^u 
 
 It muft be here obferved, that xar« <rvy.€e€n>tof 
 [by accident] means in no Part of thefe Quotations 
 accidental , as (landing for cajual; for this would be 
 mere Tautology, as to what is here faid concerning 
 Chance. It means rather fomething by way of Ap¬ 
 pendage ; fomething Adventitious ; in other Words, it 
 means Accident , as adhering to Subjlance, without 
 which it can have no Being , tho’ fuppofe it abfent or 
 taken away, the Nature of Subjlance is no way ajfefted. 
 It was in this Senfe the Peripatetics fuppofed Chance 
 and Fortune to be Accidents or Appendages to Nature , 
 and Mind. According therefore to them, the Suppo- 
 fition of Chance and Fortune was fo far from excluding 
 Nature and Mind from the Univerfe, that they de- 
 monftrably proved their Exiftenee in it. For admitting 
 their Account of Chance and Fortune to be juft ; if we 
 grant the Accidents toexift, much more muft we grant 
 the Subjects, and this too with that Juperior Dignity 
 and Priority of Exifence , which is evidently due to 
 all Subjects above their Accidents. Well therefore did 
 the Philofopher conclude vrtgov aga to *Aut opoflov, wj 
 ti Tup^vj tk Ns, xj T« OuVfw?. Subfequent in Exijl- 
 ence , are Chance and Fortune to Mind Na¬ 
 ture. Arijlot . Natur. Aufc. 1. 2. c. 6. 
 
 From what has been fard, we fee the Pteafon of 
 that Enumeration of Caufes mentioned in the Be¬ 
 ginning of the firft Note, where they are deferibed to 
 be Necessity, Nature, Man, and Fortune. 
 
 To 
 
2J0 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 
 
 To Necessity they referred all thofe Things and 
 Events, which they fuppofed of necejfary Exijlence ; fuch 
 as the Univerfe, the Heavenly Bodies, together with 
 their uniformly regular Motions. 
 
 To Nature, Man, and Chance, they re¬ 
 ferred all Contingents ; to Nature , and Mdn y obtaining 
 their End y all Contingents of greater Frequency to 
 the fame Caufes, either falling Jhort of their End y 
 or going beyond it , and thus becoming Chance or 
 Fortune , thofe oppofite Contingents of Exijlence lefs 
 vfual. 
 
 And hence, as Art and Fortune were both con- 
 Yerfant about the fame Subje£ts (viz. fuch Contin¬ 
 gents as refpedted Human Life) we find the Mean¬ 
 ing of that Verfe of Agatho’s , cited by AriJlotle y in 
 his Ethics , 1 . 6. c. 5. 
 
 ’Ttyvri Tuyr\v k? Tvyv Tiyynv t 
 
 Art loveth Fortune 3 Fortune loveth Art . 
 
 The whole Chapter indeed is well worth perufal, 
 But we thall not venture to lengthen this Note, which 
 may be probably deemed too long already, and which 
 can be only excufed, as giving fome Sample of a Phi- 
 lofophy, which, from its Rarity perhaps, may poffibly 
 furnifh fome Amufement. 
 
 Note 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjt . 
 
 Note VIII. p. 23 . I mean, said he, by 
 Beginning, that Cause for the Sake of 
 Which, &c. 
 
 As the Cause here fpoken of, is that Caufe ufually 
 called Final, it may be alked, how it comes in this 
 Place to be confidered as a Beginning. The Anfwer 
 is, that what comes lajl in Brattice, Hands in Theory 
 firjl; or in other Words, the Order of Ideas in the In- 
 tellett of the Artift is exactly inverted , with rcfpecl to 
 the Order of his Energies. 
 
 Thus Ammonias - KaGoAa yup ryg fiv Siuplug 
 
 TO yiyvi TUI TVS ZCpU^CCVg’ £fA7T0t\tV 
 
 ryg zrpdgccog to teA©- 5 , dgxy Stoogiug. oTou 6 
 ’OixoJ'ojU©- 5 , t7rHuye)g oinov, xiyti xaG 5 iuvrov, iTrtrdi- 
 yyv oinov TZowtrui' tmp Ifi <rnt7roc<rpi.oi, xwAut ixoit 
 c/j.£guv Ay nuvy.uruv. raro tie In uv yivoilo, f ,ty yivo - 
 ivyg ogo(pn(. ’EvteuGev av Tyg Sswglug. zrpo- 
 
 Qulvuv <Je (py<rlv‘ *AAAa tuto In uv yivollo, fxy yt- 
 vopAmv toi'xuV aro» <Je In uv yivoivlo, fuy VTroQXyQiv- 
 t uv StucXiuV 0 » <Je SepiXioi In ccv (3a r$e7iv, y.y opvx~ 
 Qelryg rig yyg. IvtuvOu nuTiXy^iv y Seufu. EvltiQiv 
 
 T V « / \ > / n ^ 
 
 OC^ETCCl V\ ZT^OC^t;. ZTgOTSgQ'J yXp C^UT/fl TYIV yY\V * 
 
 tiG’ etw (3«AAei tov S’E j w£ / A»ov‘ lira iytl^u To/p^aj* *y 
 v?egov i 7 mif)ricri ryv 6 oo(pyv, yrig in teA© j Trif 
 zrgufrug. y T ccgxy Tyg u^u^eug, te'A^ ryg Jeu^tug. 
 Afuu. e *'g nuryy. p. 15. Edit.Venet. 8vo. 
 
 For z« general the End of Theory is the Beginning 
 of Prattice ; and fo reciprocally , the End of Brattice , 
 the Beghmmg of Theory. Thus for infance : An Ar¬ 
 chitect, 
 
 27I 
 
 6 
 
272 NOTES on Treatise the Firjt. 
 
 chitedi , being ordered to build a Houfe, fays to himfelf 
 1 am ordered to build a Houfe ; that is to fay , a certain 
 Defence , to protect againji the Rains and the Heats* 
 But this cannot be without a Roof or Covering. From 
 this Point therefore be begins his Theory. He proceeds 
 
 and fays - But there can be no Roof if there be no 
 
 Walls ; and there can be no Walls , without fame Foun* 
 dations ; nor can there be laid Foundations , without open¬ 
 ing the Earth. At this Pointy the Theory is at an End. 
 Hence therefore commences the Practice or Action. For 
 firfl he opens the Earth $ then lays the Foundation ; then 
 raifes the Walls ; and laftly puts on the Roof which is 
 the End of the Adiion or Pradiice , \but Beginning of the 
 Theory ] as the Beginning of the Pradiice was the End of 
 the Theory. Sec alfo Arifl. Ethic. Nicom. 1. 3. c. 3, 
 et de Anima , 1 . 3. c. 3. 
 
 Note IX. p. 24. Was it not the Abfence of 
 Health, £?o] Vide Platon, de Rep. J. 1. tom. 2. p. 
 341. Edit. Serrani. ‘'Clcnrip (t(pv\v iyd) tl [ot egow 
 d (TG^acrn, ttvxi (ToogcuTi, ?i zs^oct^Ttxs 
 
 iproijtA* xj, cti zvavTCtoroiSH fiv hv zsfocSArxt. Side 
 TXVTX A, V T£%VTI £f}v IdlgSKr) VVV tVOSpivYI, GTS <SG)[XOt 
 
 ifi zsovrgov, A) kk i£ocgxt 7 autw tcibtw Avxt. ^uem* 
 admodum, inquam , fi a me queer eres, an fatis ft Corpora, 
 at ft Corpus , an alia quapiam re indigeat: refponderemi 
 omnino indigere. Atque hac quidem de Caufa medicines 
 ars nunc ef inventa , quoniam Corpus per fe profigatum 
 ef, neque ipf fatis ef, ut ft hujufmodi. So likewife the 
 
 acute Scaliger - Motionis enim Appctentia Caufa ef v 
 
 Apprentice, Privatio. De Cauf. L. Lat. 1 . 15. e. 114. 
 P- 235 - 
 
 Note X. p. 26. Or is it not absurd 
 
 TO SUPPOSE THERE SHOULD BE AN ART OF 
 
 2 Impqs- 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjt . 
 
 Impossibilities What is here faid concerning 
 the Difference between thofe things for which we 
 may poffibly wijh , and thofe which we actually pur-> 
 fue , is expreffed in the Ethics of Arijiotle , 1 . 3 . c. 2 . 
 rfpoa/^£CTif jU£v yap an if* tuio ccJvvxtu?, >ij t’l ti£ 
 tpoc'n ] 7zrpo«j^?ra0a:<, J'okoA at/ JiAiOi©^ thou. jSaAntri? 
 J 1 ’ £fi tuv ocJvvbtTuv, oiov a 0 al/a<naj. There is indeed 
 no determined Choice of A Hi on with refpeH to Things 
 impojfible ; and if any one Jhould fay he had j'o determined\ 
 he would appear to be a Foot But there may be a Wil¬ 
 ling or Longing after Things impojfible 9 as for injlance } 
 never to die » 
 
 Note XI. p. 27 * TIie Suggestions of Will, 
 
 AND UnINSTRUCTED INSTINCT.] Will, (3aA7l(fl?j 
 Or ’'Ogcfys XcyiriKri •, uninjlrufied Injlindt , opf^Jj «Ae* 
 See before, AW III. 
 
 Note XII. p. 29. The Want or AbsencS 
 
 OF SOMETHING APPEARING GOOD ; RELATIVE 
 
 To Human Life, and attainable by Man, 
 
 BUT SUPERIOR TO HIS NATURAL AND UNIN * 5 
 
 iTRUCTED Faculties.^ 
 
 The Cause here defcribed is tire to a mxa, 
 
 or final.- Arijiotle in his Pbyfcs , 1 . 2 . c. 3 . in 
 
 enumerating the various Sorts of Caufes, reckons 
 
 among the reft- to F ut to t^A©- 5 , ^ t’ ayaOoV 
 
 ruv aAAcoi/. to yap a Ivtxot (Hihhrov, x] tiA ® 3 tuv 
 aKhuv ( 9 s,\ei Huai. To thefe may be added that Caufe 9 
 which is confidered as the End , and Good of ad the 
 rejl. For that , for whoj'e fake all the ethers are 
 
 T deemed 
 
 *73 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firft. 
 
 deemed neceffary, has juft pretenfms to be befty and to be 
 the End of tbetn all. To this he fubjoins, confonant 
 
 make no Difference whether we call this End , real 
 Goody or only apparent Good. So in the Beginning 
 
 tion, fo likewife every ACiion.y and determined Choice of 
 Purfuity appear all of thetn to tend toward fome Good. 
 IVell therefore have they pronounced Good to be thaty to¬ 
 ward which all things tend. See alfo Plat, in Gorg. 
 p. 499. E. tom. i. Edit. Serrani. 
 
 In the Definition here treated, the Words [rela* 
 the to Human Life ] exprefs that Part of the Stoic 
 Definition of Art [z^o? ti tc\(&> iv^ncov r uv iv 
 r w p*w.] They were omitted in the Definition p. 17, 
 as more properly belonging to the prefent Definition, 
 which refpedts Art in its final Caufe. See page 261. 
 
 That what is perfect and felf-fefficient is above 
 the fecondary Helps of Art ; that our own Weaknefs 
 and Infujjiciencyy and the Profpedt of procuring that <7^- 
 Jent Good, by which we all hope to fupply ourfelves, 
 where deficient ; that this is the Source not only of 
 all Artsy but (joined to foeial AfFeftion) is the Origin 
 and Cement of Human Society ; fee (befides the 
 Place here treated) pages 11, 12 ; and of the third 
 Treatifey p. 147 to p. 157. 
 
 2 
 
 Thus 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Virjl. 
 
 Thus the Poet in Stobcsus, p. 51^. 
 
 Xgdoc wocvV t/ V a xzv dvsugoi ; 
 
 Need #// things taught : JVhat cannot Need invent ? 
 
 Agreeably alfo to this, Virgil , in his fir ft Georgic, 
 having told us of the various Changes to the worfe, 
 ivhich happened in the natural World immediately 
 fubfequent to the Golden Age, goes on to enumerate 
 the feveral Inventions of Men, which were the natural 
 Refult of this their newly indigent State . He at laft 
 fums up the whole by faying-* 
 
 *Turn varies venere antes : labor omnia vicit. 
 
 Improbus , id duris urgens in rebus egestas. 
 
 Where (according to the Dodtrine in the'Dia¬ 
 logue) Want is made the Beginning or Origin of 
 Arts. The Poet even refers this Difpenfation ) this 
 Introduction of Indigence , Care, and Solicitude , to the 
 immediate Will of Providence, adtingfor the Good 
 of Mankind ; left Plenty fhoula lull them into flothful 
 Lethargy , fo as to forget their noolejl and mojl a Stive 
 Faculties. 
 
 ——Pater ipfe colendi 
 
 Haudfacilem ejfe viam voluit , primufque per artem 
 
 Movit agros , curis acuens mortalia corda , 
 
 Nec torpere gravi pajfus fua regna veterno. 
 
 Note XIII. p. 32. Co-existent, replied 
 He, as in a Statue, idc. Successive, as in 
 
 T 2 A 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Vtrfi. 
 
 a Tune or Dance, &c,~] This Divifion of 
 Beings or Productions we find mentioned by Ari - 
 Jlotle in his Phyfics , ( 1 . 3. c. 8.) where explaining 
 his DoCtrine concerning Infinite , he fays- aAA* 
 
 >\ _ . / \ T cl it, « 
 
 tmi WOAAXXH to emxi, w<r7rfp v vfxsox eft, x, 0 
 
 * ' - » v ’/. . ' X. . / A d ' x 
 
 ayuv, to) octi aAAo Xj «AA 0 jjtcj x, to 
 
 ami gov. In as much as Being is manifold, fuch as is 
 
 the Being of a Day or public Fejlival, (which exijl by 
 
 continually becoming fomething farther') fuel) alfo is the 
 
 Being and Nature of Infinite. The fame Sentiment 
 
 foon after is more fully explained and opened* 
 
 I2r£ to xmigov u on A xy-^xviiv, ug Tode ti , 010 v 
 
 D l\ ■*.</, t. - » < * / , / <1 \ * 
 
 ocvvgotmov, v onuxv x AA w? r[xtgx Aiyelxi, x, 0 
 
 otydv 01 g to tTvxt, she dg xcrloc r\g J-'Ej/oyfy, aAA’ oU\ 
 lv yevicrn x) (pQcgx. IVe are not to conceive of Infit 
 nite , as of a pofitive particular Subjlance , like a Man 
 or a Houfe but rather as we pronounce Exijlence of a 
 Day or public Fejlival , which have their Effence , not 
 as fenfille , individual Sub/lances , but by a continued 
 Procedure of Being and ceafing to be. Vid. Scalig. de 
 Cauf. Ling. Lat. 3. C. 72. p. 124. Ariffcot. Categ. 
 Cap. 6. Ammon Com. teg Kxl. p 82. b. Seal. Poetic. 
 
 L. 3’ t. p. 82. 
 
 Note XIV. p. 32. What is Human Life, 
 but a Compound of Parts thus fleet¬ 
 ing, &c.] It is not inelegantly faid in the E - 
 
 thics fo often referred to-H <?u7j ivtgymx tU 
 
 xj ixxg-^ wig] txvtoc f) T&Tosg IvegyiT co 
 x) puAigcc dyxnx' o\ov 0 y.\v y.vcrixog 9 tv xxoy wig} 
 t x jouAtf, 0 Je (plXo/xxOvg, tv Stxvolx wig] rx 3’iu'gv- 
 fx.xlx‘ KTCO C£ x) T«y X017TUV EXCCf^. Life is a 
 certain Energy, and each Man energizes about thofe 
 
 SubjeflSj. 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firji. 
 
 Subjects, and with thofe Faculties, for which he hath 
 the greatejl AjfeCtion ; the Mufician, with his Hearing, 
 about Sounds harmonious; the Studious, with his Intel¬ 
 lect, about Matters of Speculation ; and in like manner 
 each Alan elfe of the various forts befde. Ethic. Ni- 
 com. 1. io. c. 4. 
 
 Note XV. p. 34. Every Art will be 
 
 ACCOMPLISHED AND ENDED IN A WORK OR 
 
 Energy.] The Cause here treated is the For¬ 
 mal, called by various Names ; the tlf® 3 , the A o'yQy, 
 the t» ifi, the to' tI rv tivoct. Vid. Seal, de Cauf. 
 Jang. Lat. L. v. c. 113. p. 232. lmperfedum autem 
 Grad, Sc c. 
 
 In the Beginning of the above cited Ethics , after 
 the Author has told us that every Art, and Human 
 Action tend to foroe Good or End, he adds A i<z(pogcc 
 tic (fotlvi Tat ruv tsAwv* toc fiv yzp iurtv tvs^yelxt’ 
 
 tx zvctp* ocvtocc, tgyat Ttvoc - But there appears a 
 
 Difference in Ends : For fame are Energies ; fame, 
 ever and above thefe Energies, are certain Works. 
 In Quintilian’s Jnjlitutes the fame DiJlinCiion, with 
 refpett to the End of Arts, is mentioned, /. 2. c. 18. 
 Vid. Plat, in Dio. Laert. L. 3. C. 84. p. 216. C. 100. 
 p. 225. 
 
 But here perhaps it may be afked, if all Arts are 
 ended and accomplifhed in fome Energy or IVork, and 
 this Energy or Work be almoft univerfally that abfent 
 Good, toward which they all tend, and for the fake 
 of which they are all exerted ? (for a Dance, which 
 is an Energy, and a Houfe, which is a Work, arc 
 pertain abfent Goods or Pleafures, for the fake of which 
 
 T 3 cer- 
 
 277 
 
03 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Fir ft. 
 
 certain Arts operate) if this be allowed, it may be 
 afked, whence then the Difference between the Formal 
 Caufe and the Final ; the Finely as in Note XII. it 
 has been already treated ? 
 
 The Anfwer to this is, that they concur and are 
 the fame. To [mv yap tI iffy to a mKa, iv !$-»• 
 The Formal Caufe and the Final are one. Arijl. 
 Nat. Aufc. 1 . 2. c. 7. If they differ , it is (as 'Joannes 
 Grammaticus obferves in commenting on this Place) a 
 Difference rather in the Time and Manner of our view¬ 
 ing them, than in their own EJJence and Nature. It 
 may not perhaps be improper to tranferibe his own 
 Words. Tavlov toj ocgi 9 fj.u) to t£A@ j f, to tv 
 
 fftcrei now Focipipov, ug h^rj-rai, x) too qtolv 
 
 fj.lv yocp ug yiMofj.il/0Vy x) fj.rnru ov SsjognTou, t£A(^ j 
 jY»V orav <J| oog ydy yivopievov, The End and 
 
 the Form are numerically the fame, differing (as has 
 been faid) in the Relation only , and Tim's.. Fqr thus 
 $he fame Thing , vjhile confidered as in its Progrefs to 
 Completion, but as not yet complete , is fo long an End; 
 when confidered as actually completey is no longer an End, 
 but a FoRP/f. And thus is this Queftion one way 
 anfwered, by acknowledging that thefe two Caufes 
 co-incide, and differ not in their Effence or real Cha- 
 rafter, but rather in the Time and Manner of our con¬ 
 templating them. 
 
 But there is another Anfwer, and that is derived 
 from the twofold Nature of f.nal Caufes. According 
 to this Duftrine, Arts have not only a nearer and 
 more immediate End, (as a Ship is the End of Ship¬ 
 building, or Navigation the End of Pilotry) but 
 they have a Hill remoter and higher End, a t£A@p t £*> 
 
 AiXCOToIoK, 
 
 \ 
 
i 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Firfl. 
 
 Xixurxlov, that is to fay, Man, Human-kind , or 
 (in other Words) the Utility or Elegance of Human 
 Life. Thus the Stagirite. *E<t[asv yxp zrwg ?£ 
 tsA^* yap to a I'l/exx. For WE OUR¬ 
 
 SELVES alfo are in fame fort an End ; for the final 
 Caufie is tzuofold. Natur. Aufcult. 1 . 2. c. 2. If 
 therefore we have refpedt to this ultimate End, 
 thefe two Caufes will be found to differ, and be really 
 diftindt from each ether. 
 
 , , 
 
 And thus it is that in fome refpedls they agree 9 
 and in others they differ , according to the above 
 Diftindlions eftablilhed by this Philofophy. 
 
 Note XVI. p. 38. O Art! Thou distin¬ 
 guishing Attribute, fcfr.] This alludes to a ca¬ 
 pital Difiindhon of Art, taken from a View of her 
 different Ends. Art may in fome refpedls be faid to 
 finish Nature, in others to imitate her. She 
 finifloes her, where Nature, having given the Powers , is 
 of herfelf unable to give them Perfeftion. It is thus 
 the Gymnajlic Arts , Dancing, Riding, &c. finifh the 
 Corporeal Powers; while the fublimer Arts, Logic, 
 Rhetoric, Moral Virtue, &c. finifh the Mental. Where 
 {he does not finifh Nature, {he imitates her, as in 
 Sculpture, Painting Dramatic Poetry, Gfc. 
 
 Aristotle exprefles the above fentiment, as fol¬ 
 lows. ''OXu; t£ n Tiyyn ra ftv IrriTiXAf xv ti (pvm; 
 (x’Juvabr x7regyxQ<r()xi, rx hi fxi[tuTxi, Phyfic. L. 2. 
 
 j C. 8. 
 
 T 4 Note 
 
 
 2 79 
 
NOTES oil Treatise the Firjf, 
 
 Note XVII. p. 44. The Efficient, the 
 Material, the Final, and the Formal.] 
 That is to lay, to xi r to £ e ' wtx , to 
 
 Eft©-*, 
 
 Th us Seneca in his 65th Epiflle. Caufam ArU 
 Jloteles putat tribus modis did■ Prima , inquit, caufia 
 cjl ipfa Materia , fine qua nihil pot ft efifici. Secunda^ 
 Opifiex. Tenia , Forma quce unkuique operi imponitur y 
 tanquam fiatucs \ nam hanc Arifioteles ldos (aVo?) vacate 
 fiuarta quoque , inquit , accedity Propofitum to tins 
 
 Quid fit hoc , aperiam. Ms prima Jlatua caufia 
 pfi : nunquam enirn fadla efifiet , nifi fiuififet id, ex quo ea 
 fiunderetur , ducereturve. Secunda caufia y Artifiex eft t 
 non poiuijfiet enim ess illud in habitum Jlatues figurari s 
 tiifi accefifiififent periies inarms. Tcrtia caufia ejl Forma : 
 neque enim Jlatua ifila Doryphoros out Diadumenos voca- 
 retvj\ nifi hesc illi efifiet irnprefifia facies. fifiuarta caufia 
 efiy faciendi Propofitum : nam nifi hoc fiuififiet , faff a non 
 efifiet. ffiuid eft Propofitum ? fihtod invitavit arti- 
 ficew.y quod {lie fecuius fecit. Vel pecunia efil hoc, fi 
 vendituru r fabricavit 5 vel gloria , ft laboravit in no-? 
 men ; vel religio, fi donum tcmplo par avit. Ergo & 
 here Caufia efi , propter quam fit. An non putas inter 
 &a fas fiadli operis unmet andumy quo reraoto fiacium non, 
 efifiet^ -r 
 
 Aristotle’s own 
 
 > T / rt 
 
 fXtl/ XV T£07TCV (XITIOV 
 
 ’tl-X.^OVT'pp 3 ' OiOVy 0 
 
 Words are as follow. <; Evx 
 
 . / v jv r / * » 
 
 Myeroti to gg * yivsrou n erj- 
 
 p^aAXc'? th avdjcuaiiT©’, o 
 
 Ji) Ti X 7VTUV }dvt]. V AA Xov d«, 
 
 TQ 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Tirft . 
 
 ro ml© J , A, to Tsrcifioifoiy’px* thto P i?)v o A o<yi§* 
 o th t'i vim zlvxs, 7 ^ tx tztx yevr)' oiov tk Poo zxxiroov 
 Tot ovo zrgog ev, ^ oAco? o x^inyoog, k, to tx iv 
 
 t:j) Xcy>w, 'Eti, oQev « a^ij rJjf /xslxSoAns y zt^utvi, 
 t'i vi Trig rgsfxva-ewg' olov o (3xAev<rag, ctiriov' o 
 “sroir-'p, t« rotva’ oAcof to ztoivv th zroixfxzvv, x} to 
 fxelxbaAAov th fjtflxGxAAofAWX. v £t i, cJf to teA^* 
 tkto J 5 If] to' a zvvnx' oTqv ra zSf^TXTt7v v\ vyltix' 
 thoc t l yap ZTigiTTXTH , (pxfxiv tvx vyixlvv, tnrovTig 
 tSTUig, 0} O/XcQx XWQpdlCXZ'JXl TO uiti$v. 
 
 In cne manner that may be called a Caufe, out of 
 which, exifiing as a Part of it , any thing is made or 
 compounded. Thus is Brafs the Caufe of a Statue, 
 Silver of a Cup , aud fo alfo the higher Genera, in 
 which thefe are included [as Metal, the Genus in¬ 
 cluding lirafs and Silver; Body, the Genus including 
 Metal, tdc, &c.] In another Way, the Form and Ex¬ 
 emplar of any thing is its Caufe ; that is to fay, in other 
 JVords, the Defnition3 the Detail or Narrative of its 
 EJfence [that which, characterizing it to he fuch a par¬ 
 ticular thing, diftinguifhes it from all things elfe] and of 
 this Definition the feveral higher Genera, Thus the Caufe 
 of the Diapafon or OCtave is the Proportion of two to 
 cne ; and more generally than that, is Number j and is 
 moreover the fever al Paris, out of which this Definition 
 js formed. Add to this Caufe3 that other, frotn whence 
 the original Principle of Change , or of Ceafing to 
 fhange ; as far infiance, the Perfon who deliberates k 
 the Caufe of that, which refults from fuch Delibera¬ 
 tion ; the Father is the Caufe of the Son ; and in gene¬ 
 ral, the Efficient, of the Thing effected ; the Power 
 ^hanging, of the thing (hanged. Befides thefe Caufes , 
 
 thtr$ 
 
 2$I 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 
 
 there is that alfo, which is confidered as the End ; that 
 is to fay , the Caufe , for the fake of which the thing is 
 done. Thus the Caufe of Exercifeng is Health. For if 
 it be afked , Why does he ufe Exercife ? We fay , To pre¬ 
 fer ve his Health ; and having faid thus much , we think 
 we have given the proper Caufe. Ariftot. Natur. 
 AufcuJt. 1 . 2. c. 3. 
 
 Addition to NOTE HI. 
 
 The Peripatetic Definition of Nature , given p. 
 257, tho’ in fome degree illuftrated p. 266, yet be¬ 
 ing Hill from its Brevity perhaps obfcure, the follow¬ 
 ing Explication of it is fubjoined. 
 
 In the firft place, by Nature the Peripatetics 
 meant that Vital Principle in Plants, Brutes, and 
 Men, by which they are faid to live , and to be di- 
 ftinguilhed from Things inanimate. Nature therefore 
 being another Name for Life or a vital Principle, 
 the firjl Act of this Principle, throughout all Sub¬ 
 jects, is univerfally found to be of the following 
 kind ; namely, to advance the Subjefi, which it en¬ 
 livens, from a Seed or Embryo to fomething better and 
 more perfect. This Progreffion , as well in Plants as 
 in Animals, is called Growth. And thus is it that 
 
 NATURE is a Principle of Motion. -But then 
 
 this Progreffion or Growth is not infinite. When 
 the SubjeCt is mature , that is, hath obtained its Com¬ 
 pletion and perfect Form , then the Progreffion ceafes. 
 Here therefore the Bufinefs of the vital Principle 
 becomes different. It is from henceforward no 
 longer employed to acquire a Form , but to preferve 
 to its Subject a Form already acquired. And thus is 
 it that Nature is a Principle of Rejl, Stability , or 
 
 Ceafing 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjl. 
 
 Ceafng to move. And fuch indeed fhe continues to 
 be, maintaining, as long as pofible, the Form com¬ 
 mitted to her Care, till Time and external Caufes in the 
 firft Place impair it, and induce at length its DiJJolution) 
 which is Death. 
 
 And thus it has been {hewn how Nature may 
 be called a Principle eoth of Motion and 
 Ceasing to move. 
 
 As to the reft of the Definition, namely, that 
 Nature is a Principle , which inheres in its Sub¬ 
 ject immediately , ejjentially , and not by way of Acci¬ 
 dent ; no more is meant by this, than that the Na¬ 
 ture or Life in every Being, which hath fuch 
 Principle, is really and truly a Part of that 
 Being, and not detached and feparate from it, like 
 the Pilot from the Ship, the Mufician from the In- 
 ftrument- For to thefe Subjects tho’ thofe Artijls are 
 Principles of Motion and Ref , yet do they in no fenfe 
 participate with them in vital Sympathy and Union, 
 
 END of the NOTES on Treatise the Firf. 
 
- — —-— -—- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ' 
 
 ' 
 
 
 
 
 • ' ■ ' ■ , • ' »i ’* i”:***•■ 
 
 , , /. • . . ..L . , 
 
 '• i ‘ • 
 
 
 
 • - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 s 'i 
 
 
 
 • ;: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 O N 
 
 TREATISE the Third* 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 HAPPINESS. 
 
 OTE To p. 107. Nature seems to 
 treat Man, £sV] Ut Phidias pottfl a 
 primo hjiituere fignurn , idque perficere po* 
 tejl ab alio inchoatum accipere & abfohere : huic ejl 
 fapientia fmilis. Nan enim ipfa genuit hominem , fed 
 accept t a natura inchoatum : banc ergo intuens , debet 
 injlitutum illud y quafi figvum abfolvere. Cic. do Fin, 
 IV. 13. p* 334. Edit. Tavih 
 
 Note II. p. 113. Practice Too often 
 CREEPS, &c.'] See p. 136. and Note X. 
 
 Note III. p. 14. The Sovereign Good 
 is that, the Possession of which renders- 
 
 Us HAPPY,] Kt ritrci polp ccyxOui/f bi VjSocifjcove^ 9 
 iuSaip-ovc?. By the Poffeffion of Things good, are 
 
 the 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 the Happy made happy. Platon. Conviv. p. 204: 
 tom. 2. Edit. Serrani. Phileb. Plat. p. 60. B. Sec Ar¬ 
 rian Epifl. 1. 3. C. 22. p. 453. 
 
 The Reader will be pleafed to obferve, that, in 
 all Quotations from the Differtations of Epifietus col¬ 
 lected by Arrian , the Author refers to the late Edi¬ 
 tion in two Volumes Quarto, publilhed by his learned 
 and ingenious Friend, Mr. Upton. 
 
 Note IV. p. 115. Certain original 
 Characteristics and Pre-concep¬ 
 tions, &c.] The Pre-conceptions here fpoken 
 of, are called by the Latins Pranotiones, or Antici¬ 
 pations ; by the Greeks , or v Evvoixi , with 
 
 the occafional Epithets of either non a), £ptpvloi } or 
 (pvirwoci. 
 
 It is evident that all Men, without the leaf! Help 
 of Art, exert a kind of Natural Logic ; can in fome 
 degree refute , and profte, and render a Reafon. 
 
 Now this cannot be (as the meaneft Proficient 
 in Logic well knows) without general Ideas , and 
 general Propofitions , becaufe a Syllogifm of Particu¬ 
 lars is an Impoffibility. There mud be therefore 
 fome natural Faculty to provide us thefe Generals. 
 This Faculty cannot be any of the Senfes , for they 
 all refpedl Particulars only. Nor can it be the rea- 
 J'oning or Jyllogizing Faculty , for this does not form fuch 
 Generals, but ufe them when formed. There only 
 therefore remains the Faculty called N»?, that is to 
 fay, the Inductive Faculty ; the Faculty, which, by 
 Induction of ftmilar Individuals , forms out of the 
 
 particular 
 
t 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the'Third. 
 
 particular and the many what is general and one. This 
 Species of Aptrehenfion is evidently our firjl and 
 earliejl Knowledge, becaufe all Knowledge by Reafon - 
 ing dates its Origin from it, and becaufe, except thefe 
 two , no other knowledge is poftible. 
 
 As therefore every Ear, not abfolutely depraved, 
 is able to make fome general Dijlinflions of Sound; 
 and in like manner every Eye, with refpe£t to Objects 
 of Vifion ; and as this general Ufe of thefe Faculties, 
 by being diffufed through all Individuals, may be 
 called common Hearing, and common Villon, as op- 
 pofed .to thofe more accurate Energies , peculiar only 
 to Artijh : So fares it with refpedl to the Intellect. 
 There are Truths, or Univerfals of fo obvious a 
 kind, that every Mind , or Intellect, not abfolutely de¬ 
 praved, without the leaft Help of Art, can hardly 
 fail to recognize them. The Recognition of thefe, 
 or at leaft the Ability to recognize them, is called 
 Koive'f N*?, Common Sense, as being a Senfe com¬ 
 mon to all , except Lunatics and Ideots. 
 
 Farther, as this Power is called Korns N 
 fo the feveral Proportions, which are its proper Ob- 
 jetts, are called zs^oXv^ns, or Preconceptions , as be¬ 
 ing previous to all other Conceptions. It is eafy 
 
 to gather from what has been faid, that thefe zs^o- 
 XyiJ'iis, muft be general , as being formed by InduSion ; 
 as alfo natural , by being common to all Aden, and 
 previous to all Inftruclion Hence therefore their 
 Definition. ’Efi S* n ZTgcXrfii, Ei/OlOC (pVCTl KV TUV 
 xocGdxn. “ A Pre-conception is the natural Ap- 
 prehenfion of what is general , or univerfal Diog. 
 
 Laert. 
 
 87 * 
 
s88 NOTES on Treatise the Thirl 
 
 Laeit. /. 7. f. 54* See alfo Arrian. Epift. 1. 1, c. 22. 
 
 1 . 3. c. 6. Cic. de Natura Deor. 1 . 1. e. 16, 17* 
 Plut. de Placit. Philofoph. 910. C. Ariftot. de Anim* 
 HI. 11. 
 
 Note V. p. 115. - And that fHE Dif<< 
 
 FERENCE LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING THEM 
 
 to Particulars.] This was called ’Ecpagpoyn 
 ?uv zir^eX)i / i|'£wv t a~? £ 7 r» jatr/ajs—- t«? (pvtrixxs 
 
 i(pxgy.o£uv tx 7 ; hr) 
 
 Epi£t. 1 . 1. c. 22. p. 114, I16. A^i/. Vpt. See an 
 eminent Inftance, illuftrating the Truth of this Rea- 
 foning, in the fame Author, /. 4. c. 1. p. 545° 
 ’Evvo^ev otj, &c. ifor. de Conf. L. 3. Profa « 
 
 2. p. ic6. 
 
 Note VI. p. 120. Why are there, who 
 seek Recesses, is'c.} Multi autem & funt , 
 fuerunt , jkj earn, quam dico y tranquilhtatem expetentes f 
 a negotiis publicis fe remover int y ad otiumque perfu - 
 
 gerint. -//?r /Vfwz propofitum fuit y quod regibus j ut 
 
 ne qua re egerent y ne cut parerent y libertate uterentur % 
 tujus proprium ejl fic vivere y ut veils. Epuare cum 
 hoc commune fit potently cupidorum cum its , quos dixi^ 
 otiofis : alteri fe adipijci id poffe arbitrantur, fi opes 
 magnas habeant \ alteri ft contenti Jint & fuo y & parvo . 
 Cic. cle Offic. 1 . 1. c. 20, 21. 
 
 Note VII. p. 121.- The Sovereign Good, 
 
 THEY HAVE TAUGHT US, OUGHT TO BE, tiff.] 
 
 The original Pre-conceptions of the Sove¬ 
 reign Good here recited, may be juftified by the 
 following Authorities, from among many which are 
 omitted. 
 
 Acres- 
 
NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. 
 
 Agreeable to Nature, - Neque ulla alia in 
 
 re, nifi in Natura, queer endum ejfe illud Sum MUM 
 bonum, quo omnia referrentur. Cic. Acad, 1 . i. c. 5. 
 p. 27. Edit. Davif. 
 
 Conducive to well-being.- Epifietus calls 
 
 that Truth or Knowledge, which refpefts our real Hap- 
 pintfs [ti^ aXrhaocv ty\h zreet t ris tv$otiy.o wa?] the Truth 
 or Knowledge, which regards not mere Living, but 
 which ccnduces to Living well [a r n'» vrsfi t« 
 ZH N, uaXqc tvij ■nrpaf to ET ZHN.] Arrian . 
 Epift. 1. i. c. 4 . p. 28 . Edit. Upt. ‘At Koivai zecfi 
 
 lv$ouy.oi/iots Hvvoixi -TO ZHN KATA 3>T2IN, 
 
 xj to\ xcctoc (pv<riv ( 3 fov, ETAAIMONIAN Aiywri* 
 uTpot oi rarotf, TO ET ZHN, x) TO £u [3mu, yj 
 rriv iv^cdxv, ’ETAAIMONIAN (pxcr\v rivoa. Our 
 common Pre-conceptions concerning Happiness call it 
 the Living according to Nature ; farther 
 than this, they fay it is Living or ExiJUng well; the 
 Life of well-being. Alex. Aphrod, usfi 
 p. 157. Edit. Aid. 
 
 Accommodate to all Places and Times— 
 Antoninus, fpeaking of that Happinefs, which he 
 deemed our Sovereign Good, calls it fomething which 
 was in our Power IIANTAXOT x) AIHNE- 
 KX2 2, every where and perpetually. 1. 7, 
 
 S' 54* 
 
 Durable -and Indeprivablf.. —Nft sta- 
 
 BILI & FIXO y PERMANENTE BONO, BEATU 3 
 
 tjje nemo potejl. Tufc. Difp. 1 . 5. c. 14. p. 372. Edit. 
 
 V Davif. 
 
 289 
 
290 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Davif. So immediately after, in the fame page— 
 An dubium <?/?, quin nihil fit habendum in eo genere , 
 quo vita beata completur , fi id poflit amitti ? nihil 
 enim interarefcere , nihil exf ingulf Sec. K oil rk 
 avvn r, tvgoix, %v 0 rv%uu iy. 7 rodl<rxi JuWrai, x At <yu 
 Kuiacip Ka/cra^o? (piA© J , aAA« xo^a^, dvArirrif, zsv 
 f£ro\, «AAa T^iir^upta ; 11 <P ETPOIA aVlv urug 
 ? X h wf TO AIHNEKE2 ANEMIIOAI- 
 2TON. And what fort of Happinefs is this , which 
 any thing intervening may embarraf ; / not Caefar, 
 or Ccefar’r Friend , but a Crow , <2 Piper , 22 Fever , a 
 ihoufand things befde? Happiness furely implies 
 nothing fo much , Perpetuity and being su¬ 
 perior to Hindrance or Impediment, ^r- 
 rx'rfff. £/>/#. 1,4. c. 4. p. 585. Edit. Upt. See alfo 
 l. 2. r. 11. p. 227. 
 
 Self-derived.- - hoc dabitis , cpinor fi 
 
 modo fit all quid effe beatum, id oportere TOTUM 
 poni in potestate Sapientis : nam , fi amitti 
 vita beata potefi , beata effe non potcfl. Cic. de Fin. 1. 2. 
 
 C. 27. p. 163. - y? to~? [xlv kxt ccXrfleiai/ xaxoi? fvce 
 
 vs err Inin 0 uv9pco7r(^ > , isF aulw [ot $£oi] to 
 £ Qevlo. That Man might not fall into real Evils, the 
 Gods have put the whole in his own Power. M. 
 Ant. 1. 2- f. II. T l yxp Ifiv, 0 fylei zrxg ccv9gU7r(&‘; 
 EvraQwvoa, ev $oa[AovYi<rou, IT ANT A X2£ ©EAEI 
 nOlEIN, y.v\ kwAuecOa;!, jM.jjd'’ ccvoi'yx.xPecrQoci. For 
 what is it , that every Man fecks ? To be fecurely 
 fixed , to be happy , to do all things accord¬ 
 ing to his own Will, not to be hindered, not 
 to be compelled. Arr. Epict. 1 . 4. c. 1. p. 539, 540. 
 Arifiotle joins fef-derivtd and indeprivable in his idea 
 
 6 of 
 
NOTES on Treatise the ‘Third . 
 
 of Good. T dyodlov dt ojxhou t» x) dWatpai^sIsv ifvcct 
 pxvlivopiQoc. Etb. Nic. 1 . i. c. 5. 
 
 Note VIII. p. 125. The Political and 
 
 LUCRATIVE) THE CONTEMPLATIVE AND PLEA¬ 
 SURABLE.] This fourfold Diftin£tion of Lives is 
 mentioned in Arifotle's Ethics, 1 . 1. c. 5. 
 
 Note IX. p. 131. - Pleasure 
 
 Whom love attends, &c. 
 alluding to Homer , Iliad. £. V. 214. 
 
 Note X. p. 136. Suppose an Event Were 
 
 to happen-not an Inundation, &c.] See 
 
 Arrian. Epifl. 1 . 4. c. 4. which Chapter is peculiarly 
 addreffed to the Seekers of Leifure Retirement , and 
 Study. Part of it has been already quoted, p. 290* 
 ry t U olvrr) r\ svgotx, &c. See alfo the fame Author, 
 I.4. c. 1. p. 567. &c. and of the Dia¬ 
 
 logue here commented, p. 113. 
 
 Note XL p. 137. -Is Acting a Circum¬ 
 
 stance, £sV.] Etenim eognitio contemplatioque na¬ 
 tures manca quodammodo atque inchoata fit , ft nulla 
 attio rerum confequatur. Ea autem actio in hominum 
 commodis tuendis maxime cernitur. Cic. de Offic. 1 . 1. 
 c. 43. The whole Chapter, as well as the Subfequent, 
 is well worthy of Perufal. 
 
 Note XII. p. 140.— If a Piece of Metal be 
 tendered us, feV.] See Arr. Epift. 1 . 1. c. 10. 
 p. 1IO. ’Opart x, \tx\ t» &C. 
 
 Note XIII. p. 144. — Are alienated from 
 it, or are indifferent to it ?] Placet his, in- 
 quity quorum ratio mibi probatur , fimul atque natum fit 
 
 U 2 animal 
 
 4gl 
 
at; 2 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 animal (bine enim eft drdiendwn) ipfum fibi conciliari , id 
 commendari ad fe confervandum , id fuum Jlatuin , id ad 
 ea, qua confervantia flint ejus flatus , diligenda ; alienarl 
 autem ab interitu , iifque rebus , 7^ interitum vide ant ur 
 afferre. Cic. de Fin. 1 . 3. c. 5. p. 211. Edit. Dav „ 
 See alfo /. 5. c. 9. O^rc. 1 . 1. c. 4. ’OiXfiapcfOos 
 srpo? au’m E’jSuf yivoptvos. Plut. Mor. p. 1038. b. 
 
 Note XIV. p. 155 .—Let if Not be forgoT 
 
 THEN, SAID HE, IN FAVOUR OF SOCIETY, idc .] 
 The whole Argument to prove Society natural t& 
 Man , from p. 147 to the page here cited, is taken 
 from the fecond Book of Plato’s Republic. See Plat. 
 tom. 2. p. 369. idc. Edit. Serrani. See alfo the 
 fame argument hinted at in the Protagoras of Plato, 
 p. 322. C. Edit. Serr. Tom. 1. 
 
 N6te XV. p. 156. -Are not the Powers 
 
 and Capacities of Speech, idc.2 The Argu¬ 
 ment in favour of Society , from our being polfefled 
 of Ao or the /peaking Faculty , feems to have 
 
 been much infilled on by the bell Authors of An¬ 
 tiquity. 
 
 Aioti oi zvoXiTistov 0 ' At £o*ov, zrutrr,; pt~ 
 /.i'ttvs xu\ zsu\n(§p uytXuix £cai puXXou, brtXoo. 
 ’OuOed ya'p, ds (pup.£V, potrrtv y (pverts woisr A byov Pi 
 povov ’AvSpau e%ti ruv 1/. Tl p\-j L (pun j r? 
 
 ybtQp x, XinrygH ift cypibov’ bio xj toT, aAAotj ibr- 
 a ?yj l & 0i $' T * Tii n (pvens olvluv l AjiAu- 
 
 6 ft', use atcrSai/fcOat th Authors x} ybiQy, xj tuvtx 
 esypumio ccAA^Aoij* O bl Xoyos f?n to bnAuv ift 
 TO (SVpP^OV, Xj TO fjXubC^OO' bi Iff >9 TO blxuiov, 
 
 to a Jim. T«ro yap srpo'j rat aAAfit rotV 
 
 et» 9 »u* 
 
2 93 
 
 NOTES 0# Treatise the ‘Third. 
 
 a l/0pCO7 TOli iSlOV, TO [XOVQV ayxQx Kj Y.XXZ, 7^ SlXXtH 
 dSly.e ocKrQr.nv ’ivtiv' f\ S\ tvtcov x,o)vxv lx tvoih oikIxv 
 dj ■sroX.tv. The Reafon why Man is a Social Ani¬ 
 mal, more than any Bee , or any herding Species whatever , 
 is evident from hence. Nature, we fay, 7 nak.es nothing 
 in vain ; and Man, of all Animals, is only pojfejfed of 
 Speech. Bare Sound indeed may be the Sign of ivbat 
 is pleafurable or painful; and for that reafon is it com¬ 
 mon even to other Annuals alfo. For Jo far we perceive 
 even their Nature can go, that they have a Senfe of 
 thofe Feelings, and fignify them to each other. But 
 Speech is made to indicate what is expedient, and what 
 hurtful , and in conference of this, what is juft and 
 unjuft. It is therefore given to Men, becaufe this , with 
 refpelt to other Animals , is to Men alone peculiar , that 
 of Good and Evil, JuJl and VnjuJJ, they only pojfefs a 
 Senfe or Feeling. Now it is the Participation or Com¬ 
 munity of thefe, which makes and conjlitutes both a 
 ^Family, and a Polity. Arijlot. Polit. 1 . i. c. 2. 
 
 ’Edcovez ydp litriv Iv tyi 4 ^%;? Tuv ^otljxtxTUi/ 
 Vor:[j>ZTOc~\' di SI tpcevoc) tuv vov[xxtuv ’uPm i^xyFs Art- 
 
 X0Ct‘ >tj Sid TiSTO SiSoSJxi dfiV U7TO TY}q (pSlTCUS, TV po'f 
 
 to ' Si dvrxv <T’ci[xxlviiv ypxg xXXriXoig rrif $/V)(yig TC ^ 
 
 vofipocTx - i'vx rl) Svvu[xe 9 x xoivuvuv dxXyXoig yj 
 
 vv[A7ro?\iTevi(rQxi' xoivuvixov yxp £uov 0 ,l Av9gui r©-\ 
 Ideas are Images of Things in the Soul ; and Sounds 
 are declarative of thefe Ideas. And for this reafon 
 were thefe Sounds imparted to us by Nature, not only 
 that we might indicate to each other thefe Ideas, but 
 that we might be enabled to communicate and 
 live in Associations. For Man is by Nature a 
 Social Animal. Ammon, in l. de Inttrpr. p . 16. b. 
 
 U 3 Thu^ 
 
NOTES cn Treatise the Third . 
 
 Thus Cicero, fpeaking of Human Nature—Omit to 
 cpportunitates habilitatefque reliqui corporis , moderac¬ 
 tionem vocis , orationis vim, qua conciliatrix ejl 
 humana maxume focietatis. De Legg. 1 . I. c. 9. p. 
 35. Edit. Davif. 
 
 Again in his Offices - Sed qua natura principia 
 
 Jint communitatis & focietatis humana , repetendum 
 altius videtur, Ejl enhn primum , quod cernitur in 
 univerfi generis humani focietate. Ejus enim vinculum 
 ejl Ratio, & Oratio ; qua docendo , difcendo , com- 
 municando , difceptando , dijudicando , conciliat inter fe 
 homines , conjungitque naturali quadam focietate. De 
 Offic. 1. i. c. 16. 
 
 Thus too in his Treatife De Nat. Dear. - J'am 
 
 vero domina rerum [ut vos foletis dicere) EloquendI 
 vis quam eft pvaclara, quamque divina ? Ehia primum 
 effcit ut ea, qua ignoramus , difcere , £ 3 * ea, qua fcitnus , 
 alios docere poffmus. Deinde hac cohortamur , hac per- 
 fuademus , hac confolamur ffiffos, hac deducimus per- 
 territos a timer c, hac gefientes comprimimus , hac cupi- 
 ditates iracundiafque rejlinguimus: hac nss juris, le- 
 gum, urbium focietate devinxit : hac a vita unmani 
 Id ferd fegregravit. De Nat. Deor. 1 . 2. c. 59. p. 
 
 243. Edit. Davif --See alfo £hiint. Jnjl. 1. 2. c. 16. 
 
 and Alex. Aphrod. rztf p. 155. b. Edit. Aid. 
 
 Sanftii Min. 1 . 1. c. 2. p. 15. Plat, in Sophifla , p. 260* 
 A. Edit. Scrr. 
 
 Note XVI. p. 166. It is from among the 
 fe w, & r.] In omni enim arte, vel fludio, vel quavis 
 fasntia , vel in ipfa virtuie , optumum quoclque rariffl 
 : ' " ws 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third . 
 
 mum ejl. Cic. de Fin. 1 . 2. c. 25. p. 158. Edit, Dav. 
 Thus too Arijlotle joins the rare and the excellent.— 
 to fu, xj <T 7 rdvi 0 V) xj sTraiWoi/, xj xaAo'v. Eth. Nic. I. 
 2. c. 9. to' yag mrocviov, u EuOuJViju-Sj t/^jov. Plat, in 
 Euthyd. p. 304. b. £^V. Serr. 
 
 Note XVII. p. 167.- Working ever uni¬ 
 
 formly ACCORDING TO THIS IDEA OF PER¬ 
 FECTION, &V.J 
 
 Thus Boethius , addrefling the Deity, 
 
 O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernasy 
 < Terrarum ccelique Sator , qui tempus ab <zvo 
 Ire jubes, Jlabilifque manens das cundta moveri j 
 Jpuem non extemce pepulcrunt fingere caufirs 
 Materia fiuitantis opus ; vertttn insit a Summi 
 Forma boni, livore carens: Tu cuncia superno 
 Duels ab exemplo, pulchrum pulcherrimus ipfe 
 Mundum mente gerens , fimilique in imaginefiormans. 
 
 Confol. Philof. 1. 3. Metr. 9. 
 
 Note XVIII. p. 167.- From some hidden 
 
 higher Motive, WV.J Mnoroie Je [xrde txvtx 
 
 [fc. TOC TtqXTX~\ TjStZgU (pV<TiU hell/, OcAAtX TV jW ,lv fJLE~ 
 (P'OTti a Cpucrfi, aAAa zsocqoc r« <Jf jiaOo'At*, 
 
 x^ (pucEt Kf xoctoc <P‘j<riV 'H y.\v ydg (pv<n; 
 
 £»&? roy^oc^tTou, u.oc\ fjdocv rsgr,<riv Cplvyii’ Aid 
 tht 0 tvj juli/ Ta ai/0^w7ra (£>u<m to' Te^aj arf (pvcrrg 
 rr»V) sT£ xxtoc (pu<m tvj <3 oAw (p'Jtrti torn [swotv rw 
 ztocvt) zroegoi (pvtriv (oudh yocq kockov iv t» zcr^im) olx 
 tft -tssoc^oc (pver iv, txXXx (pu<rti xocl xaroc (pvcriv, 
 Joannes Gram, in Ariftot. lib. 2. Natural Aufcult, 
 Nihil *»//» fieri Jine caufa pot ejl; nec quicquam fit , 
 
 U 4 
 
 295 
 
,296 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 quod fieri non potefil: nec , Ji id fiaftum ejl quod potuit 
 fieri, portenturn debet videri. Cic. de Divin. 1 . 2. C« 
 28. p. 189. Edit. Davifi. 
 
 Note XIX. p. 169.— Man is a social Ratio¬ 
 nal Animal .3 Zuov Xoyixov, k} zroXinxbv, X&yi- 
 uov *) xoivuvixov, Xoyixbv i}y.^ov, thcfe are Defcrip- 
 tions of Humanity, which we meet in every Page of 
 Epictetus and Antoninus . 
 
 It feems indeed to have been a received Opinion 
 of old, that fo intimate was the Relation between 
 thefe two Attributes, that wherever there was Ra¬ 
 tionality, Sociality followed of caurfe. Thus Anto¬ 
 ninus -if* to A oyiv.lv, £’jO'Jf x) zroXmxov. 1 . 10. 
 
 f. 2* And again, more fully-x} toivvv zrav to 
 
 tvs vczooiS (poareug jucsro^ov, -aryo; to <rvyfiv\; ffolceg 
 (T7 rsv&i, a ;t) fjLoiXXov’ c'cry ydg £fi xffirlov zvuyoc to? 
 uXXol, toctjjtw yd, zrpog to vvyxgwacrQoci Tty ohitby td, 
 <rvyxt 7 <jQou troipcoTtPOV. 1. 9. f. 9. 
 
 It is not perhaps foreign to the prefent Subject to 
 obferve, that were the Eyes of any two Men what- 
 ever to view the fame Objefl, they would each, from 
 their different Place, and their different Organization, 
 behold it differently, and have a different Image. But 
 were all the Minds in the Univerfe to recognize the 
 fame Truth, they would all recognize it as one , their 
 Recognition would be uniform, and themfelves in a 
 manner would be one alfo. The Reafon is, Per~ 
 ception by the Senfes admits of more and lefs , better 
 and worfe *, but Perception by the Intellect, like Truth 
 its Objeft, admits of no degrees , and is either no¬ 
 thing at all, or elfe total, uniform , complete , and one. 
 
 2 Hence 
 
NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. 
 
 Hence therefore one Source of the Society , and as it 
 were Communion of all Minds , confidered as Minds, 
 namely, the Unity of Truth , their common Object. 
 
 Again, every juft and perfect Society ftands on 
 the Bafis cf certain Laws . But Law is nothing 
 more, than right and perfect Reason, feen in bidding 
 aud forbidding , according to the Nature and EfTence 
 of thofe Beings, to which it is a Law. If therefore 
 this Universe be one whole, or general Society s 
 there muft be fame common, general Law t for 
 its Conduct and iVefare ; and this Law muft, of con- 
 fequence, be fome right and perfect Reason, which 
 paffes thro’ all things, and extends to every Part. 
 Well therefore might Antoninus fay in the Beginning 
 of this Note, that every thing rational , was of courfe 
 focial , fince Reason and Law appear to be the 
 Jame> and Lavj to be the Support and Bafis of all 
 
 Society. Thus too Cicero - fequitur , ut eademfit 
 
 in his [fc. Dus'] quee loumano geveri Ratio ; eadem 
 Veritas utrobique fit\ eademque Lex, qu<s eft reSli 
 praceptioy preguique dtpufo. De Nat. JDeor. 1 . 2. 
 c. 31. p. 180. See alfo the fame Author, De Legg . 
 1 . 1. c. 8, 12, 15. p. 29, 41, 51. Edit. Davif. De 
 Fin. 1 . 2. c. 14. p. 123. See alfo Diog. Laert. 1 . 7. 
 f. 88. M. Anton. 1 . 5. c. 16. 1 . 6. c. 23. Arif Polit. 
 as quoted in Note XV. 
 
 Note XX. p. 169. Nothing can be pur- 
 
 SUABLE, which is DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY.]] 
 Si enim fc erimus ajfedli, ut propter fuum quifque emo - 
 lumentum fpoliet , aut violet alierum , difrumpi necejfe 
 ef earn , qua; maxime ef fecundum naiuram , humani ge¬ 
 neris Societatem. Cic. de Qfhc. 1 . 3. c. 5. 
 
 297 
 
 Nte 
 
98 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Note XXL p. 173.— —For Contraries are 
 
 EVER RECOGNIZED THROUGH THE SAME Ha- 
 EIT, tdc<] A onu Ji x^ n dirdiy, x^ y i 7 rifruy tocv 
 hxultuv, y duTy eTvxi. There feems to he one and the 
 fame error , and one and the fame Science, with rcfpett 
 to things contrary. Arid, de Anim. 1 . 3. c. 3. This 
 by Themijlius , in his Parapbrafe , is thus illuftrated. 
 Tov ivocvTiuv |w .icc trL £7nrw/*>l> /Aa olyvoix' 6 
 
 yxg to dyuOov wj u(pi\i[A0V yivoovKiov, x^ to xaxoii 
 oti |3X(! iGipov <rvvt 7 riroiTou’ fj 0 wifi SocTSgoy ifcocrrot,~ 
 Tu/AwOr, i^onrfi xtoci f) -Greg) Sxtcoov. Of Things 
 contrary there is one Science, and one Ignorance. For 
 thus he, who knows Good to be fomething beneficial, 
 knows Evil at the fame time to be fomething pernicious ; 
 and he, who is deceived with refpedl to one of thefe , is 
 deceived alfo with refpeft to the other. See the lo of 
 Plato , p. 531. T. 1. Edit. Serr. 
 
 Note XXII. p. 174.-- Those four Grand 
 
 Virtues, bV.] Stobaeus having told us, that of 
 the Virtues fome were primary, fome fubordinate , adds 
 •—urpeoraf Je tst\ xfoaq eivxi, (pgovymv, (roctpgotruvyv, av- 
 fyilxv, faxotio<rvvnv x} ryv plv (pfovycriv, zrefi too 
 xxGyjioilx ylvttrQxi' ryv Js <rv(pgo<nvtiv zrsfi r«? ogpois 
 th x\>G Rooms’ tvv ds dvfytlzv, 7C££» ra? V 7 rofAovdg’ rr'u 
 A chxa ioisii'jr,v, zeic) rxg ocnovetxiWei?. The primary Vir¬ 
 tues aie four ; Prudence, Temperance, Forti¬ 
 tude, and Justice: Prudence is employed in moral 
 Offices -, Temperance, in Elens natural Appetites and 
 Purfuits ; Fortitude, in Endurings ; and Juflicc, in 
 Dijlributions. Eel. Ethic, p. 167. 
 
 That 
 
NOTES on Treatise the ' Third , 
 
 That the Life according to Virtue, was deemed 
 the Life according to Nature, appears from what is 
 faid by the fame Author, in the Page following— 
 YLouruv Je tstuv tuv agsluu to tsA©-’ tii/ai, to ccxo* 
 A&0cos tyi tyva-ii fyv' txaryv < 5 e txtuv dice twv ’dluv 
 ’zrxf'xjvQoa r vf^dvovjx rov olv^onrov. The End of all 
 thefe Virtues is , to live agreeably to Nature ; and each 
 of them, by thofe Means , which are peculiar to itfclf is 
 found to put a Man in pojfejfion of this End. 
 
 So likewife Cicero - Etenim quod fummum lonurn 
 
 a Stoicis dicitur , convenienter naturae vivere, id habet 
 banc , ut opinor , fententiam , cum virtute congruere 
 Temper. De Offc . 1 . 3. c. 3. 
 
 Note XXIII. p. 174. That Life, where 
 the Value of all Things is justly mea¬ 
 sured, fcfc.] See pages 143, 146, 168, 203, 
 204. 
 
 Note XXIV. p. 175.— That, which being 
 
 DONE, ADMITS OF A RATIONAL JUSTIFICA¬ 
 TION.] In the Original it is- 0 vsgocyffh tvXoyov 
 
 'Icyju aVoAo^icr^dv. Diog. Lacrt. 1 . 7. f. 107. on two 
 T x^ctyfiv ivXoyov ’lyzs thd UTeoXoylocv. Sext. Emp. Adv. 
 Mathem. 1 . 7. Thus rendered by Cicero—Offcium id 
 effe dicunt , quod cur fatluin fit , ratio probabilis reddi 
 pofft. De Offic. 1 . 1. c. 3. The Reafon of its 
 Greek Name, xaOijxov, is given by Simplicius. IC ot- 
 Qrxovhx, ifi roc >yivoy.EVOi xcctcc toc rlxovloc Kj lir&xX- 
 
 Xoiilx —— Moral Offices are thofe things which are done 
 
 agreeably 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 agreeably to what is fitting, aud expedient. Simplic. it* 
 Ench. c. 37. 
 
 Note XXV. p. 176 .——And when our se¬ 
 veral Energies, exerted according to 
 the Virtues above, have put us in pos¬ 
 session of, &V/] This was the Idea of Happiness, 
 adopted by the old Academy , or Platonics. Secun¬ 
 dum natura?n vivere, fic affiedtum, ut optime cffici 
 poffit , ad naturamque accommodatijfime . Cic. de Fin. 
 1. 5. c. 9. p. 370. The Peripatetics, who werq 
 originally of the fiatne School, held the fame. ’JEi 
 
 htw , to div^dinvov ocyxQov ivifoycux ylyvtlon 
 
 xoc V dpelnv —tvv d.fiS’Viv x, TsXcidlxTfiv — tv (3tfi teAeiw» 
 Jf this be admitted, it follows that Human Good or 
 Happiness is, the energizing of the Soul according to 
 the bef and mof corfummate Virtue , in a perfiedl a?id 
 complete Life . Ethic. Nic, 1 . 1. c. 7. A per fed and 
 complete Life, they explained to be fuch a Life as 
 was no ivay deficient either as to its Duration, its bodily 
 Health , and its being attended with a proper Competence 
 of external Goods, and Profiperity. By the bejl and 
 mofi confummate Virtue, they not only meant that 
 Virtue, which was in its kind molt perfect, but which 
 was the Virtue alfo of that Part , which is in each 
 of us mof excellent. For there are Virtues of the 
 Body, fuch as Strength and Agility ; and there are 
 Virtues of the Senfes, fuch as accurate Seeing, accu¬ 
 rate Tailing; and the fame of every Faculty, fron; 
 the loweft to that which is fupreme. 
 
 The fovereign Good or Happinefis here fpoken of, 
 is again repeated, in other Words, p. 179. where it 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 is called, the Attaining the primary and jujl Re¬ 
 quires of our Nature , by a Conduct fuitable to Virtue 
 end moral Office. 
 
 The primary and just Requisites here 
 mentioned, are all Things reauifite to the Ufe and 
 Enjoyment of our Primary and Natural 
 Perfections. Thefe Primary and Natural 
 Perfections mean the Natural Accomplish¬ 
 ments of both our Mind and Body. They 
 were called by the Latins , Prima Nature;, Prime 
 fecundum Naturam'’, by the Greeks , rx ztoc-jtx xxt & 
 (pvtnv, rx zTguToc rr,s (pursue. In them were in¬ 
 cluded Health, Strength, Agility, Beauty, perfect Sen- 
 fations. Memory, Docility, Invention, &c. See Stab. 
 Eel. Eth. p. 163. Lie. de Fin. 1 . 5. c. 7. p. 364. A 
 Gell. 1. 12. c. 5. 
 
 A like Sentiment of Happinefs, to this here fpoken 
 
 of, is that mentioned by Cicero - Virtute adhibita , 
 
 frui primis a naturci datis. De Fin. 1 . 2. c. 11. 
 p. 113. It is there called the Opinion of the old 
 Academics , and Peripatetics. It is again repeated by 
 the fame Author. Honejle vivere , frumtem rebus iis , 
 quas prim as homini natura conciliet. Acad. 1 . 2. c. 
 42 p. 240. 
 
 It is to be obferved that Cicero , fpeaking of this 
 Hypothecs, fays that it propofed an Idea of Happi¬ 
 nefs , which ivas not properly in our own Power. Hoc 
 non ejl pofitum in nojlra aCiione : completur enim & 
 ex eo genere vitce, quod virtute finitur y id ex iis rebus 
 qua fecundum naturam funt, neque funt in nojlra po- 
 tejlate. De Fin. 1 . 4. c, 6. p. 287, 
 
 He ncr 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third . 
 
 7G2 
 
 Hence therefore the Deficiency of this Doc¬ 
 trine. However juftifiable, however laudable its End , 
 
 It could not infure a due Succefs to its Endeavours. 
 And hence too the Force of what is obje&ed to it in 
 the Dialogue , from p. 177, to the End of the firft 
 Part. 
 
 Note XXVI. p.185. — To place the Sove¬ 
 reign Good in Rectitude of Conduct, OV.] 
 As the Conduct here mentioned implies a Conduct 
 under the Direction of a befitting Rule or Law , 
 and that, as oppofed to wrong Condu£t, which has 
 either no Rule at all, or at leaft one erroneous; it 
 may not be an improper Place to enquire, what was 
 the antient Opinion concerning Law universal, 
 that great and general Law , which Rood oppofed t6 
 the municipal Laws of particular Cities, and Com¬ 
 munities. 
 
 Est quidem vera Lex, reft a ratio , natures con - 
 gruens , dijfufa in omnes, conjlans, fempiterna, ques vocet 
 
 ad ojfcium jubendo , vetando a fraude deterreat - nee 
 
 erit alia lex Roma, alia Athenis, alia nu7ic , alia pofl- 
 hac ; fed id omnes gentes, id ornni tempore una lex, 13 
 fempiterna, id immortalis continebit; unufque erit com¬ 
 munis quafi magifer , id imperator omnium Deus. Ilk 
 hujus legis inventor, difeeptator , lator. Cui qui non 
 parebit, ipfe fe fugiet, ac naturam hominis afpernabitur ; 
 hoc ipfo luet maximas pcenas, etiamfi catena fupplicia, 
 qua putantur, ejfugerit. Fragm. Cic, de Rep. 1 . 3. 
 
 Lex 
 
NOTES o?2 Treatise the "Third. 303 
 
 Lex eft ratio fumma , infita in natura, qua jubet 
 ta qua facienda funt, prokibetque contraria. What 
 follows is worth remarking. * Eadem ratio , cum eft 
 In hominis mente confirmata let confedta , lex eft, Cic. 
 de Legg. 1 . i. c. 6. p. 22. 
 
 Again. Lex vera - ratio eft rella fummi Jovis. 
 
 To which he fubjoins. as above, Ergo ut ilia divina 
 mens fumma lex eft ; it a cum in bomine eft, perfect a eft 
 in mentefapientis. De Legg. 1 . 2. c. 4, 5. p* 88. 
 
 It is in this Senfe the rfpoftle tells us of the Gen - 
 tiles, or Mankind in general, that they Jhew the Work 
 of the Law written in their Hearts , their Confcience 
 alfo bearing witnefs, and their Thoughts the mean while 
 aecuftng, or elfe excufmg one another. Rom. i. 11. 
 
 As Cicero, in his Book of Laws above cited, follows 
 the Stoic Difcipline, fo is it agreeable to their Rea- 
 loning, that he makes the original natural Law, of 
 which we here treat, to be the Sovereign Rea¬ 
 son of the Deity himfelf. Thus Chryftppus -~ 
 
 Jdem ffcil. Chryftppus ] leg is perpetua & aterna vim , 
 qua quafi dux vita & magiftra ojpeiorum fit, Jovem 
 dicit ejje. Nat. Deor. 1 . 1. c. 15. p. 41. 
 
 So by the fame Philofophers in Laertius , we are 
 ordered to live according to Nature, bblu ivipyxi/lzs uv 
 unxyooiviiv c vcy.© 1 0 koivos, oenrsp ifiv b of os 
 Xoy(^> bid zrabluv 0 d-Jlbs uv rw An', aa- 
 
 ^nyipoovi Tarw ty,s t uu ovluv (tOT oXcov) OiOtKr'crsccs obit, 
 doing nothing , forbidden by the Universal Law, 
 
 that 
 
NOTES cn Treatise the Third. 
 
 that is to fay, hy that right Reafon , which pafieth thro* 
 all Things, and which is the same with Jove him- 
 felf., the Governor and Conductor of this univerfal Ad~ 
 minijlration . Laert. 1 . 7. f. 88. Edit. Aldobrand. 
 
 Agreeably to this Reafoning, Plutarch corre&s' 
 ihofe, who made A001, a Goddefs, and the Affeffor 
 of Jove ; for, fays he, 0 Zivt oust 'iyit flv rw Atxnu 
 usolgttyov, aAA* olulof Aim xj if i, h) vo/auv 0 
 
 orgsaGurobl©* yh, TiXcioTzl^y, Jove has not A Sit] or 
 Right for his Affejfor , hut is hinfelf Right, and 
 Justice, and of all Laws the moji antient and 
 perfect. Moral . p. 781. B. 
 
 Thus Antoninus -tsA© 0 o\ Xoytxuv to 
 
 s7T£crQxt tu rvj $ ztoXeuq zfoXthixq m zr^eo-^vIxTtjf 
 A oyu xcci Sicpu. The End of Rational Animals is to 
 follow the Reason and sacred Law of that City 
 and rnojl antient Polity , [in which all rational Beings 
 are included.] 1 . 2. f. 16. 
 
 The mod fimple Account of this Law, which the 
 Stoics gave, feems to be that recorded by St oh ecus * 
 according to which they called It A byov, ogQov ovlcx, 
 fxxlty.su fxiu 71 -oco zrolvlsccv, dnxyoctvUxou Js tuv f 
 
 zroroliuv. Right Reason, Ordaining what is to he 
 done , and forbidding what is not to be done. Eel. 
 Ethic. 178. See alfo the Notes of Turnebus and 
 Davis upon Cic. de Legg, 1 . 1. c. 6. 
 
 Having premifed thus much concerning Law 
 univerfal, it remains to fay fomething of that Rec¬ 
 titude of CoND-ucTj which is in this Part of the 
 
 Dialogue 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third * 
 
 Dialogue propofed as our Happinefs. Rectitude 
 oE Conduct is intended to exprefs the Term 
 i Cctlof which Cicero tranflates refia EffeSlio . 
 
 KalogOu/Aot he tranilates Refium Radium. See De 
 tin. 1. 3. c. 14. p. 242. Now the Definition of a 
 K <xlofxy.oc, was Nof*» zo frapp. oc, a Thing com - 
 mantled by Law \ to which was oppofed dpafirpa, 
 a Sin or Offence, which was defined No'u* d-rca- 
 pc/civux, a Thing forbidden by Law. Plut. Mor. 
 1037. C. What Law is here meant, which thus 
 commands or forbids, has been fhewn above. 
 
 Hence therefore may be feen the Reafon, why we 
 have faid thus much on the Nature and Idea of Lava 
 itniverfal\ fo intimate being the Union between this 
 and right Condudl , that we find the latter is nothing 
 more than a perfedl Obedience to the former. 
 
 Hence too we fee the Reafon, why in one view 
 it was deemed Happiness, to be void of Error 0? 
 Offence , awpiotglrUov livxi, as we find it in Arrian. 
 Epift. 1 . 4. c. 8. p. 633. For to be thus inculpable 
 was the neceffary Refult of Redlitude of Condutl , or 
 .ather in a manner the fame thing with it. 
 
 I cannot conclude this Note , without remarking 
 on an elegant Aliufion of Antonir.us to the primary 
 Signification of the Word Ka 1 o^ 0 w<n?, that is to 
 fay, aa-ra of of, right onwards , fraight and diredlly 
 forwards. Speaking of the Reafoning Faculty , how, 
 without locking farther , it refs contented in its own 
 Energies , he adds-KaO d xoblofutreis di ronocxilat, 
 
 zrpdj'S 1? ovopd^ovlat, r r'v c forhlx tvs qJk cnpatvacoci. 
 
 «.- For which reafon Athens of this fort 
 
 X an 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 are called Rectitudes, as denoting the Direftnefs 
 of their ProgreJJion right onwards. 1 . 5. f. 14* 
 So again in the fame Senfe, tvGAxv tzi^xIvuv, to keep 
 on, theJlraight Road . 1 . 5. f. 3. 1. 10. f. 11. 
 
 One would imagine that our Countryman Milton 
 had this Reafoning in view, when in his 19th Son¬ 
 net, fpeaking of his own Blindnefs, he fays with a 
 becoming Magnanimity, 
 
 -- ‘—Yet 1 argue not 
 
 Againf Heav'd*s Hand or THill ; nor bate one jot 
 Of Heart or Hope ; but Jlill bear up, and feer 
 Right onwards——— 
 
 The whole Sonnet is not unworthy of Perufal, be¬ 
 ing both fublime and fimple. 
 
 Note XXVII. p. 185.-- The mere doing 
 
 WHATEVER IS CORRESPONDENT TO SUCH AN 
 
 End, even tho’ we never attain it- 3 
 
 Thus Epifleius in Arrian, fpeaking of Addrefs to 
 Men in Power, and admitting fuch Addrefs, when 
 juftified by certain Motives, adds, that fuch Addrefs 
 ought to be made, without Admiration, or Flattery. 
 Upon this an Objedior demands of him, zrws «y 
 tuvo, s d top.xi ; But how then am I to obtain that, 
 
 which 1 want ? -The Philofopher anfwers, ’EpcJ 
 
 as trot A iyc:, qti TEYHOMENOB 
 
 31 fxovov, tvx urcdfq to c rocvha nrforov ; Did 1 ever 
 fay to thee , that thou Jhouldf go and addrefs , as tho r 
 thou inert to succeed ; and not rather with this only 
 view , that thou mightef DO THAT, WHICH IS BE¬ 
 COMING thy Character ? — -And foon after, 
 4. when 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 when an Objection is urged from Appearance, and 
 the Opinion of Mankind, he anfwers,-23c otVQ’ 
 
 n » v . s ^ * A x * ta ^ */ 
 
 on xvwp 3 ixXoi; x, ayavo; eoev tcroiei t» oofcxi ive >cjj, 
 dxxd tk riEITPAX 0 AI KAAXiXj Know eft 
 thou net , that a fair and good Man does nothing for the 
 fake of appearance, but for the fake only of having 
 DONE WELL AND FAIRLY ? Arr. Epifi. 1. 3, C. 24. 
 p. 497, 498. This Doffrine indeed feems to have 
 been the Bafts of the Stoic Morals ; the Principle? 
 which included, according to thefe Philofophers, as 
 well Honour and Honejiy , as Good and Happinefs. 
 ThuS Cicero—Facere omnia , ut adipifcamur qucs fecun- 
 dum naturam fint , etfi ea non adfequamur, id effe & 
 hoKeflum , cd Jolum per fe expetendum & fummum bonutn 
 Stoici dicunt. De Fin. 1. 5. c. 7. p. 365, 6. To this 
 
 is confonant that Sentiment of theirs in Plutarch -. 
 
 Trjv ju.li/ (putrm ajTyv ddixtyo^ov ehxt' to Je tv Cpvcrsi 
 cpeoXoyGv, dyxQov —And again —to fr.v kxtx Cpucrjv, 
 teA© 0 ivjxi—tx kxtx (pvcriv, x$ixl(po(>x shoa. Plut. 
 Mor. 1060. D. E. Sqe below, Note XXX. Socrates 
 was of the fame Opinion, as appears from all parts of 
 the Platonic and Xenophontean Dialogues. Take one 
 Example out of many.— too Je dyx 9 o'v lull ft, y.xXuS 
 
 r n «/ >/ ' 1 . ' U T /an / n 
 
 zt^xtUiv x xv zrqxrloi tov di su zepxTlovix , [xxxxgiovle 
 ft iuSxipcovx iivxl. Gorg. Plat, p . 507. Edit. Serr. 
 
 Note XXVIII. p. 185 .—What if we make 
 our natueal State the Standard only 
 TO DETERMINE OUR CONDUCT, &C .J It is in 
 this fenfe we find it elegantly faid in Plutarch by the 
 laft mentioned Philofophers— m%ux i\i$xiy.ovlxg 
 
 tvv (pu <riv, ft to x.utx (pvcnv - that our NATURAL 
 
 State arid what is confonant to it , are the Elements 
 
 X 2 of 
 
 Oi 
 
30S NOT ES on Treatise the FirjL 
 
 of Happinef ,—and juft before, the fame natural State 
 is called k) u\j] t»j? the 
 
 Source of Moral Office ; and the Sueject Mat¬ 
 ter of Virtue. Pint. Mor. 1069. E. F. Atque 
 etiam illud perfpicuum ejl , conflitui necejfe effie initium y 
 quod fapientia , cum quid ogere incipiat, fequatur ; id- 
 que initium effie natures accommodatum : nam a/iter ap- 
 petitio , &c. Cic. Acad. 1 . 2. c B. p. 85, 86. Initiapro- 
 poni neceffie efje apta V accommodate natures, quorum ex 
 feletlione Virtus poffit cxijlere. De Fin. 1 . 4. c. 17. 
 p. 316. Cum vero ilia , ques officia effie dixi , profieij- 
 cantur ah initiis natures ; ea ad hese referri neceffie eft : 
 ut retie did poffiit , omnia officia eo referri , ut adipifea- 
 mur principia natures ; nec tamen ut hoc ft bqnorum 
 ultimum -- De Fin. 1 . 3 c. 6. p 217. 
 
 Note XXIX. p. 185. - We should not 
 
 want a Good to correspond, &c.] Plutarch 
 quotes the following Sentiment of Chryfppus , who 
 
 patronized this Idea of Good - Tod ziifi d'yxQwv 
 
 xcc] xocxvv A oyov, ov oculo; eurdyei xx\ 
 a-vutyuvoToclov Avod (pritrt ro> (3iw, xxi [xxXifx tuV 
 ‘{x'pvucv oIttUo-Qou 5rpoX«vJ/£ojv. Plut. Mor. 104 I. E. 
 
 Note XXX. p. 587. - Yet we look not 
 
 FOR HIS reputation, &c.] What Quintilian 
 fays of Rhetoric , may with great propriety be tranf- 
 ferred to Morality. Nofer orator , Arfque a nobis 
 fnita y non funt poiita in EVENTU. Tendit quidem 
 ad vitloriam, qui elicit : fed , cum bene dixit , etiamfi 
 non vincaty id , quod arte continetur y effiecit. Flam (ff 
 guhernator vult falvd nave in portum pervenire : ft 
 tamen temprflate fuerit ahreptus, non ideo minus erif 
 guhernator , dicetque notum illud; dum clavum re<£tum 
 teneam. Et medicus fanitatem agri petit : ft tamen 
 
 aut 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Firjf. 
 
 out valetudinis vi, aut intemperantid agri , aliove quo 
 caju fumma non coniingit ; dum ipfe omnia fecundum 
 rationem fecerit , mediants fine non excidit. Ita oratori 
 
 bene dixifft, finis ejl. Nam eji ars ea - in actu 
 
 pofita, non in eventu. Inft. Orat. 1. 2. c. 17. 
 
 Note XXXI. p. 187.- He for a Subject 
 
 HAS THE WHOLE OF HUMAN LlFE, &C.~\ ’oU<T£« 
 ra ocyoc Oa, zrpodigHri; zsoioc.’ t» uxnis mpoulgtrit; ztohz. 
 Ti av ra ixlo; ; TAat tw ■Bspootigarsi, zrtgt ocg uvoc- 
 rgt<Po[*tvri T£V%ehxi rS i’Jjk aj/a6a 1} jcaxa. ‘T'Ztf Effence 
 e/ - G ood, is a peculiar Direction of Mind ; and the 
 Effince of Evil, is a peculiar Direction alfio. What 
 then are Externals? They fierue as Subjects to 
 the Mind's Direction , from converfing with which it 
 obtains its proper Good or Evil. Arr. Epi£t. 1 . 1. c. 29. 
 
 Again-'A< uAa*, v <Js ocJlN a* 
 
 The Subjects are indifferent , but 
 yi the U se of them. Arr. Epi£t. J. %. c 5, 
 
 Thus Horace: 
 
 Non psfifidentem multa vocaveris 
 Retie beatum ; rettius occupat 
 Nomen beati , qui Deorum 
 Muneribus sapienter uti, 
 
 Duramque callet pauperiem pati, 
 
 Pejufque leto flagitium timet: 
 
 Non ille , &c. 
 
 Od. 1 . iv. 9. 
 
 Even the Comic Poet feems not to have been un¬ 
 acquainted with this Do&rine: 
 
 X 3 
 
 3°9 
 
 Ch. 
 
3 10 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third . 
 
 Ch. Quid narrat ? Cl. Quid ille ? miferum fe efje. 
 
 Ch. Miferum ? quem minus, credere eft f 
 
 Quid relliqui eft, quin hcibeat qua quidem in homine 
 dicurttur bona f 
 
 Parentis , patriam inc'olumcm, amicos, genus, cognat os, 
 diviti is: 
 
 Atque bate perinde funt ut illius animus, qui ea pbf- 
 fidet: 
 
 Qui UTI fit, ci BONA ; illi, qui non utitur redie, 
 mala. 
 
 Heauton. Aft. I. S. 2. V. 18. 
 
 Vid. Platon, in Euthydemo, p 281. Edit. Serr. h jm- 
 (pocXoci'u <F, idpnv, co KA tmoc, xiv^uvivst. 
 
 Note XXXII. p. 189.- The End in other 
 
 Arts is ever distant, ftV.] Sed in cateris 
 artibus cum dicitur Artificiose, poferum quodam modo 
 Cf confcquens putandum ef, qued illi hnywipoclixiu 
 appellant quod autem in quo Sapienter dicitur , id ad- 
 primo reSlijfme dicitur : quicquid enim a fapiente pro- 
 ficifcitur, id continuo debet expletum effe omnibus Juis 
 partibus ; in eo enim p of turn ef id, quod dicimus effe 
 expetendum. Nam ut peccaium ef patriam prodere , 
 parentes violarc, fana depeculari , qua funt in ejfediu - 
 fic timere, fic briar ere, fie in lilidine effe, peccatum ef^ 
 eiiam fine effediu. Verum ut hac, non in poferis iff in 
 confequentibus, fed in primis continuo pcccata funt : fic 
 ea qua proficifcuntur a virtute, suscEPTloNE prima 
 non perfectione, redia funt judicanda. Cic. de 
 Fin. 1 . 3. c.9. p. 228. Ta IJ'/a -riAaj r vf^ccvsi [rl Ao- 
 
 ' 1 ' 1 w ">' v ~ A / / > ** 1 
 
 y 07rH ^ 70 T * t7nrf ap£, 
 
 « I >\»/ \C / , ~ * f 
 
 uarirep im U 7 roxpi<r£«j y^ tuv toustuv 
 
 UTfXnc 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third . 
 
 uriXriq ylvilxi r> oAn zrpxjriSi Icev r i tyyio^n 9 aAA 
 iTc\ zs’atHo s [xlgxs, >9 07ns civ xat}x?vti(p 6 ri t ■srXn^ig x? 
 airports 1 ? Ifiewlij to zrpohQh zronP ulft inrslv, lyu 
 ditiyu tx ijxot. M. Ant. 1. II. f. I. Et qucmad - 
 modum opportunitas (Jlc enim adpellcmus ivxxipicev) non 
 fit major produdione temporis (halent enim fuum mo- 
 dutn quacunque opportuna dicuntur) fc veld a effedio 
 (xoclcpQunv enim ita adpelio , quoniam redmn fadum 
 xdlopQu/x<zj reda igitur ejfedio , item convenientia , </<?- 
 ipsum BONUM, quod in eo pofitum eft ut natures 
 confentiat , crefcendi accejfonem nullam babet. Ut enim 
 opportunitas ilia , fic here de quibus dix'u non fiunt tem¬ 
 poris produdione major a ; ob eamque caufam Stoicis non 
 videtur op tab Hi or nee magis expetenda vita beat a , fi fit 
 longa , quam fi brevis: utunturque ftmili , fi cothurni 
 
 laus ilia ejl ad peeietn apte convenire , neque multi cothurni 
 paucis anteponerentur , majores minoribus: fic quo - 
 
 raw bonum convenientia atque opportunitate finitur , 
 nec plura paucioribus , longinquiora brevioribus ante- 
 poneniur. Cic. de Fin. 1 . 3. c. 14. p. 242. See alfo 
 Dio. Laert. 1 . 7. f. 101. M. Ant. 1 . 6. f. 23. 1 . 3. f. 
 7. Senec. Epiit. 66. 
 
 Note XXXIII. p. 191.- Recollect then, 
 
 SAID HE, Do YOU NOT REMEMBER THAT ONE 
 
 Pre-conception, &c.~\ In this, and the fubfequent 
 Pages, the general Pre-conceptions of Good are applied 
 to the particular Hypothefs of Good , advanced in this 
 Treatife. See before, p. 115, 121, 122. 
 
 Note XXXIV. p. 192.- And is there 
 
 any Time or Place, whence Rectitude 
 op Conduct may be excluded?] EIAN- 
 T A X O T f, A I H N E K a 2 im <rol tV», 
 tv -Srocrf&wj i'jxstfGv, x? rolls zrx- 
 
 X 4 £80'<y 
 
NOTES on Treatise the- Third. 
 
 g'xarw ccvOpcoTTot; xctlx Jnixiwvvriv zrpotripigsa 0a»—- 
 M. Ant. 1 . 7. f. 54. 
 
 Note XXXV. p. 192.- Where it shall 
 
 not be in his Power to act bravely and 
 honestly.] Mws 7 » av yoi xlye, nxug ywrUxi » 
 oncog yccp dv yivy]oa> <ru a’Jlo Shoti? xaAcoj, x> srat 
 crot to aTToQx'j iul'j^v/xa. Arrian. EpidE i. 4. c. 10* 
 
 р. 650. 
 
 Note XXXVI. p. 195.- There are In¬ 
 
 stances innumerable of Men bad, as well 
 AS good, Cfc.] See a long Catalogue of thefe in Ci¬ 
 cero’s Eufculan Deputations ; Spartan Boys ; Barbarian 
 Sages *, Indian Wives ; Egyptian Devotees, &e. idc. 
 The whole Pafiage is worth reading, Tufc, Difp. 1 . 5. 
 
 с. 27. p, 40o ? 401, idc. 
 
 Note XXXVII. p. 196 .—This I write you 
 (says he in one of his EprsTLEs) WHILE, 
 Cfr.] [xoiXQcpixv ayoiihg xj dyx TiXixilodxv r, { ui- 
 
 £>av r? (3tv, cypx(pcpt.ev vy.7i/ txvtx' rpxfyxgiale ux- 
 gnxoX xQIksi tcj JvtrvilegiKX zrxQy, vrrepQoXvv a’x ohro- 
 XiirroJlx yd iu txvIoC ysytQx;' di/lnragilccrlelo df 
 
 ~ / v "1 N t N ^ 5, > ~ ~ 
 
 zrari txt01$ to kocIoc %otL()Q]/ £ 7 n TYj tco'j •ysyo- 
 
 VOTUV vy.~v JixXoyurfAuv juvy/xv —Dio. Laer. 1 . 10 . f. 22 . 
 Cum agcremus vita: beatum id eundem Jupremum diem y 
 ftribebamus hac. Eanti auiem morbi aderant vcfica id 
 vifcerum, ut nihil ad eorwn magnitudinem pojjit acce- 
 dere. Cempenfabatur tamen curn his omnibus animi les- 
 titia , quam capiebam memorid rationum inventorumqye 
 yiofirorum- -Cic. de Fin. }. 2. c. 30. p. 173. 
 
 Soon after we have another Sentiment of Epicu - 
 futj that a rational Adverjity was better than an irra¬ 
 tional 
 
3*3 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 tlcnal Profperity. The original Words are- xp 
 
 jov tZjoct iuAoyifuig ocrv^fTv, r\ ccAo'ylfcog evluyseTv. 
 Dio. Laert. 1 . 10. f. 135. 
 
 Note XXXVIII. p. 198. O Crito, if it be 
 pleasing to the Gods, &c.J The three Quota¬ 
 tions in this Page are taken from Plato ; the firft 
 from the Crito , quoted by Epittetus at the End of 
 the Enchiridion , and in many other Places; the fe- 
 cond from the apology, quoted as frequently by the 
 fame Author; the third, from the Menexenus or Epi¬ 
 taph. Plat. Opera, tom. 2. p 248. Edit. Sen an. 
 fee alfo Cic. Tufcul. 1 . 5. c. 12. 
 
 Note XXXIX. p. 199. If you are for 
 Numbers, replied he, what think you of 
 the numerous Race of Patriots, &c.] Sed 
 quid duces & principes nominem ; cum legiones foribat 
 Cato Jape alacris in eum locum profeflas , unde redituraS 
 fe non arbitrarentur ? Pari ammo Lacedamonii in 
 Tbermopylis occiderunt: in quos Simonides, 
 
 Die hofpes Sparta, nos te hie vidijje jacentes, 
 
 Dum fan it is patria legibus obfequimur. 
 
 Tufcul. Difp. 1 . 1. 42. p. ioio 
 
 Note XL. Ibid. - Martyrs for Sys¬ 
 
 tems wrong, £s 7-3 That there may be a bigotted 
 Objlinacy in favour of what is abfurd , as well as a 
 rational Conjlancy in adhering to what is right, thofe 
 Egyptians above mentioned may ferve as Examples. 
 Mgyptiorum morem quis ignoret ? quorum imbuta mon¬ 
 ies pravitatis erroribus quamvis camifcinam prius fubi- 
 grint, quam ibim aut afpidetn aut felem aut canem aut 
 
 croco - 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 crotodilum violent: quorum etiam ft imprudentes quid * 
 piam jecerint, pcenam nullatn recufent. Tufcuh Difp. 
 1 . 5. c. 27. p. 402. See before, Note XXXVI. 
 
 Note XLI. p, 200.- Celebrated to such 
 
 a Height, in t the Religion, which we 
 profess, &c. It is probable, that fome Analogies 
 of this fort induced a Father of the Church (and no 
 lefs a one than St. ferom) to fay of the Stoics , who 
 made moral Reffitude the only Good, - no¬ 
 
 stro DOGMATI IN PLERISqUE CONCORDANT. 
 Vid. Menag . in D. Laert. 1. 7. f. 101. p. 300. and 
 Gatak. Prafat. in Ad. Anton. See alfo of this Trea~ 
 tife page 110. and below, Note XLIV. 
 
 Note XLII. p. 201. To LIVE CONSISTENT? 
 ly, bV.] To LIVE consistently is here ex¬ 
 plained tO be LIVING ACCORDING TO SOME ONE 
 SINGL.E CONSONANT SCHEME OR PURPOSE ; and 
 
 our Good or Happiness is placed in fuch Con¬ 
 sistence, upon a fuppofition that thole, who live 
 incoujijlentlyi and without any fuch uniform Scheme , 
 are of confcquence inferable , and unhappy. To rt- 
 A(^ 0 fw Zyi/uv stojs aVed'oRf, to 0/j.oXoyny.Euq ^u* 
 tzto f ffl xoc(i’ ivot Xoyov (rvplpuiQv uq ruv 
 
 [uoty^opivuq ^uvluv xockx$xi[agvN 1 uv. Stob. Eel. Ethic, 
 p. 17 I. 
 
 This Consistence was called in Greek opoXo- 
 y\oc, in Latin Convenientia , and was fometimes by 
 itfelf alone confidered as the End. Ttiv Itj.oXoyiocv 
 Xiyvori TiXdjy tivou. Stob. Eel. Ethic, p. 175. See 
 alfo Cic . de Fin. 1. 3. ,c. 6. p. 216. So alfo in the fame 
 laft named Treatife, c. 7. p. 220- Ut enim hijlri- 
 
NOTES on Treatise the \Third • 
 
 (mi afiio, faltatori inotus , non quivis, fed certus quidam 
 eft dot us: fic vita agenda eji certo genere quodam, non 
 quolibet ; quod genus CONVENIENS CONSENTANE- 
 UMQUE dicimus. Nec enim gubernationi cut medicines 
 fimilem fap'uniiam ejje arbitramur , fed atflioni Uli potius > 
 quarn modo dixi, & faltationi ; ut in ipfa arte inftty 
 non foris petatur extremum, id ejf artis ejfedits. 
 
 It is upon this Principle we find it a Precept 
 
 jn Cicero’s Offices - In pi i mis autem conjiituen- 
 
 dum eji , quos nos & quales effie velitnus , Of in quo 
 genere vitae- 1 . i. c. 32. So likewife in the En¬ 
 chiridion of EpiCtetis , c. 33.-T«£ov rivet fftn y^x- 
 
 goiyjrigx <rxvlu> stj tvttov 9 0v (pv\ct£*is iirl re <rexvlu ui/ t 
 xvSpu 7 roig iirtlwyfcxvm. Ordain to tbyfelffome Cha¬ 
 racter and Model of Life , which thou rnayji maintain both 
 by thyfef , and when thou art converfant with Mankind. 
 
 So much indeed was relied upon this Prin¬ 
 ciple of Conffence 9 that even to be any thing con- 
 ffently , was held better than the contrary. Thus 
 
 Epidietus. - “Evcc <re $e~ £v9guirov tivoa, n ctyxQov v 
 
 pxxov' ?! to wye/xovixo'v (re SeT e£igyiz£e<r()aci to (radix, 
 clo? - It behoves thee to be one uniform 
 
 N 5 , 
 y TOC txlo<; 
 
 Man, either good or bad ; either to cultivate thy own 
 
 Mind , or to cultivate things external -Arr. Epicl. 
 
 1 . 3. c. 15. p. 421. And more fully than this does 
 he exprefs himfelf in a place fubfequent; where 
 having firft counfelled againft that falfe Complai- 
 fance, which makes us, to pleafe Mankind, forget 
 our proper Character , and having recommended as 
 
 our Duty a Behaviour contrary, he adds- <51 
 
 [xyj dfcrei raula, oA© J ccttoxXivov err) r avail la‘ yzvs 
 $Tf reel ifnsudW, ei; ruv y-oi^fev - Aviftptrca <P »toj 
 
NOTES on Treatise the ‘Third. 
 
 'sr^otrwrrx & ylyvv I««* « Suvxcxi yj ©yoiriTyv vttqv.^- 
 voc 7 $oa \\yayty.vovx —Arr. Epi£t. 1 . 4. c. 2. p. 580. 
 But if what 1 recotnmend to thee do not pleafe , then turn 
 thee totally to all that is contrary ; become a profligate of 
 
 the moji prcflitute hind - Characters fo different are 
 
 not to be blended ; thou canfe not ad at once Therfites 
 and Agamemnon. 
 
 So too Horace : 
 
 - Quanto constantior idem 
 
 In vitiis , tanto levins mifer , ac prior ille 
 Qui jam contento, jam laxo fune labor at. 
 
 Sat. 7. 1 . 2. y. 18. 
 
 See alfo CharaCieriflics , V. 1. p. 131. 
 
 Note XLIII. p. 203-It is not merely 
 
 TO LIVE CONSISTENTLY; BUT TO LIVE CON¬ 
 SISTENTLY with Nature.] 'Oy.0X0yiiy.im1; tv! 
 (fivcrti tjov. Cleanthes in Stob. Eel, Eth p. 171.—— 
 Congruenter natura convenienterque vivere. Cic. de 
 Fin. 1 . 3. c. 7. p. 221. The firft Defcription of 
 our End \_to live confidently J was deemed defective , 
 and therefore was this Addition made. See Stob ecus 
 in the Place cited. Arr. EpiS. 1 . 3. c. 1. p. 352. 
 
 Note XLIV. p. 204.-To live consis¬ 
 
 tently with Nature is to live accord¬ 
 ing to just Experience of those things, 
 
 WHICH HAPPEN AROUND US.] TeX(&> tfi to' 
 cy.0X0yvy.tvu; tm oVrp 0 Xpviwrir@ J <ra- 
 
 (piregov (HvXoy.tvo; sromcrjei, rev rgoirov t»tov, 
 
 Zvju xxV tyrruolcev tuv (puirei <ruy.Gxtvov 1 uv. Stob. Eel. 
 Ethic. 171. Diog. Laert. b 7. c. 87. His verbis 
 
3 ! 7 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 [foil, vivere fecundum naturam'] tria fignifcari Stoici 
 dicunt. Unttm ejufmodi , vivere adhibentem Jcientiam 
 tarum rerum , qua natura evenirent ——De Fin. 1 . 4. 
 c.'6. p. 286. See alfo the fame Treatife, /. 3. c. 9. 
 
 p. 227. /. 2. c. ix. p. 113. where it is exprelfeci-- 
 
 Vivere enm intelligentid earum rerum qua natura eve- 
 nirent. 
 
 Note XLV. p. 205.—To live perpetually 
 
 SELECTING, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, WHAT IS 
 CONGRUOUS TO NATURE, AND REJECTING 
 WHAT IS CONTRARY, MAKING OUR End THAT 
 
 Selecting, and that Rejecting only.] 
 'O t e ’Av!nra 7 o(gp,- - to T£\(& KfhrOoa, *£i» TM 
 
 JWfHVf k) UTrX^txQxT Cdff EKA^£<t6^J ftV Tfti HOOT 00 
 (pvtriVf d 7 rexA£ i ye<r 9 txi bz too zroegei (pvmv, V 7 roXa.y.Qccvti, 
 Clem. Alex. Strom. 1 . 2. p. 497* Edit. Potter. This 
 Sentiment was fometimes contrasted , and exprefled 
 
 as follows- to ivXoyirtTv iv r£K.Aog/cuf -- 
 
 fometimes, more concifely ftill, by the fingle Term 
 To £ua oyireiv. See Plutarch 1071, 1072. C/V*r<? 
 
 joins this , and the foregoing Defcriptions of Happi~ 
 nefs , together. Circumfcriptis igitur his fententiisy 
 quas pofui , tff ft qua ftmilis earum fmt ; relinquitur , 
 Jurnmum bonum fit , vivere feientiam adhibentem 
 earum rerum , 71/^ natura eveniant , feligsntem qua fc~ 
 cundum naturam , ts? contra naturam funt rejicien - 
 tem^ id efl , convenienter congruenterque natura vivere , 
 X)e Fin. 1 . 3. c. 9. p. 227. See alfo De FA. h 2. 
 
 c. 11. p. 113. See alfo Eaert. 1 . 7. c, 88..-— 
 
 S/oE Eel. Eth. 171. 
 
 Note XLVI. p. 207. To live in the dis¬ 
 charge of moral Offices.] b\ 
 
 [T£A(§*> 
 
CO 
 
 iS N OPES on Treatise the Third, 
 
 [t/A(§P CP'/;(ri] TO ZTCZvlx TOO KxS/jKOvlx STTlTlAXvlOC zw 
 
 Laert. I. 7. c. 88.-Stob. Eel Eth. 171.-- Officia 
 
 omnia - fervantem vivere. Cic. de Fin. 1 . 4. c. 6. 
 
 p. 286. 
 
 Soon after we meet the Phrafes-To live ac¬ 
 
 cording to Nature ; To live according 
 to Virtue. O Zvvuv- — teX©* wVs, to o/xoXoyv- 
 uivoog t 7 spocret £yv, orrep if kuV ocperliv ^r,v. Laert. 
 
 1. 7. c. 87.- Confentire natural ; quod effe volunte 
 
 virtute , id eft , honejlate vivere - DeFin. 1 . 2. c. 1 r. 
 
 p. 113. Where, as has been already obferVed page 
 174, and in the Note likewife on the Place, we find 
 the Lives according to Nature and Virtue are con- 
 fidered as the fame. 
 
 However, to make this Afiertion plainer, (if k 
 be not perhaps fufficiently plain already) it may not 
 be improper to confider what Idea thefe Philofophers 
 had of Virtue. 
 
 In Laertius (where he delivers the Sentiments of 
 Zeno and his followers) Virtue is called At<zQi<ri$ 
 tpjoAoyvfASvy, a confident Difpofition ; and foon after, 
 zJiirowfAtm zpgog tv o^oXoylxv zjxvlog ra ( 3 /a. 
 A Mind for fried to Confidence thro* every Part of Life - 
 Laert. 7. c. 89. 
 
 In Stobaus (according to the Sentiments of the 
 fame School) it is called At »0 tcrig <rv/x(puv@ J 
 
 covin zrift oXov tov ( 3 /ov. A Difpofition of Mind , con- 
 J'onani to itfelf throughout the whole of Life. Eel. Eth. 
 p. 167. 
 
 So 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 319 
 
 So Cicero in his Laws - Confans & perpetua ratio 
 
 •vita, qua eji Virtus. -1. I. c. 17. p. 55. 
 
 So Seneca in his 74 th Epijlle- - Virtus enim con¬ 
 
 venient 1 a con fiat: omnia opera ejus cum ipja concor ■* 
 dani, Uf congruunt. 
 
 Thus therefore Confidence being the Eflence of 
 Virtue, and upon the Hypothefs here advanced , the 
 Efience alfo of Happinefs ; it follows firft that a Vir¬ 
 tuous Life will be a Happy Life. But if a Happy one, 
 then of courfe a Life according to Nature ; fince no¬ 
 thing can be Good, which is contrary to Nature, nor 
 indeed which is not confonant, in the ftricteft manner, 
 to it. 
 
 And here (as a proper Opportunity feems to offer) 
 vve cannot but take notice of the great Similitude of 
 Sentiments, it may be even faid the Unanimity of » 1 - 
 moft all Philofophers, on this important Subject con¬ 
 cerning Ends, and Happiness. 
 
 Those, whofe Hypothefs we have followed in 
 this Dialogue, fuppofed it to be Virtue and con¬ 
 sistent Action, and that without regard to For¬ 
 tune or Succefs. But even they, who from their Hy¬ 
 pothecs made fome Degree of Succefs requifte; who 
 refled it not merely on right Aftion, but on a propor¬ 
 tion of bodily Welfare, and good Fortune concomitant, 
 even thefe made right Action and Virtue to be 
 PRINCIPAL. 
 
 Thus 
 
320 NOTES on Treatise the Third, 
 
 Thus Archytas , according to the Doctrine of the 
 Pythagorean School. EuSaifiosCvoL ygdcri; d^(\di tv 
 tvlvyips". Hapfinefs is the UJe or Exercife of Virtue , 
 attended with external good Fortune. Opufc. Mytho- 
 log. £>. 678. Coiifonant to this Sentiment, he Dy's 
 in the beginning of the fame Treadle, 0 fi.lv dyoi- 
 6 o\ dvyp ouk tu&fT? ivSdsfj.uv 1 % dvdyxoa; iiiv’ $ Si 
 luSdifAUVy Xj dyzQoq dvvp tfi. The good Man is not 
 of necejfiiy Happy ; [Tecaufe upon this Hypothecs, 
 external Fortune may be wanting ;(] hut the happy Man 
 is of neceffty Good , [becaufe, upon the fame Hypo¬ 
 thefis, without Virtue was no Happinefs.J Ibid. 
 
 p. 673* Again— -’Aid yltv yd p xaxotliJ isfxovtv dvdWoo 
 
 rev xaxdv, die tyoi uAotv (xaxwf re ydp dol'd yptilon) 
 
 uie tTTroLv'fai. - The had Man (fays he) mu ft needs 
 
 at all times be miferabley whether he nave , or whether he 
 wanty the Materials of external Fortune ; for if he have 
 them , he will employ them ill. Ibid. p. 696. Thus 
 we fee this Philofopher, tho’ he make Externals a 
 Requiftc to Happinefy yet hill without Virtue he 
 treats them as of no importance. Again—Ado T cSds 
 TifxvovLxt tv rw ( 3 iV a [dlv a’xvSpioTrol^a, an 0 rAdiAvv 
 IQdSftv ’OJu(ronuV a ot IvSmvolsoXy t dv iirogsvelo 
 
 Tav dv dgsldv (pxjxi JV;An<r9at (lege <hrA£!r9a», 
 Dorice pro •S'eAtm) ixlv radian, Su vatrOat Se x) Ttivav. 
 There are tivo Roads in Life dljiincl from each other y 
 one the rougher , which the Juffering Ulyfles went ; the 
 other more fnooihy which was travelled by Neftor. 
 Now of thefe Roads (fays he) Virtue defires indeed the 
 latter \ and yet is fie not unable to travel the former. 
 Ibid, p 696. From which laid Sentiment it appears, 
 that he thought Virtue, even in any Fortunty was 
 capable of producing at leaf fame degree of Happiness. 
 T ” ■ As 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third * 325 
 
 f 
 
 As for the Socratic Doctrine on this Subject, it 
 may be fufficiently feen by what is quoted from it, 
 in the Dialogue pag. 1.98, 199. And as the Senti¬ 
 ments, there exhibited, are recorded by Plato , they 
 may be called not only Socratic , but Platonic alfo. 
 However, left this Ihould be liable to difpute, the 
 following Sentiment is taken from Nenocrates, one 
 of Plato's immediate Succeflors in the old Academy 
 by him founded. Ba/oxpxry; (pyr'iv, 'Evdcti[xovx eivca 
 to v t r}y ty^ovlx cmsoxluv' rxulyv yx p eKxfu) 
 
 tTvxi A xfovx. Xenocrates held that he was Eudtemon, 
 or Happy, who had a virtuous Mind ; for that the 
 Mind was every one's Daemon or Genius. Arijl. Top. 
 
 1. 2 . c. 6. 
 
 Here we fee Virtue made the Principle of 
 Happiness, according to the Hypothecs of the 
 Dialogue. There is an elegant Allufion in the Paf- 
 fage to the Etymology of the Word ’Evfxi/xuvy which 
 fignifies both [ Happy~\ and \_poffeffed of a good Genius 
 or Damon;] an Allufion which in tranfiating it was 
 not poflible to preferve. See below, Note LVIII. 
 
 As for the Peripatetic School , we find their Idea 
 of Happiness, as recorded by Laertius , to be in a 
 manner the fame with that of the Pythagoreans. It 
 was apt,lyg to (3 lu> TtXtlu — The TJfe or Exer- 
 
 ctfe of Virtue in a complete and perfeS Life. Laerr. 
 
 1. 5. c. 30. We have already, in Note XXV, cited 
 the fame Do&rine (tho 5 fomewhat varied in Ex- 
 prelfion) from the Founder of the Peripatetics , in 
 his firft Book of Ethics. So again we learn from 
 him ■ — ■ qts zrpxfcuf rm? yi, Wtpyuxi X^yovTx^ 
 
 Y *• 
 
32 
 
 22 
 
 N O T E S on Treatise thi 
 
 'Third. 
 
 rc TfA0 J , that it is certain Actions and Energies * 
 which are to be deemed THE End. Ethic. Nic. ]. i. 
 
 c. 8.-‘And again —yap olvln v iwfsxfcloe. t t- 
 
 X^Pf. For it is the very ReElitudc of Action^ which is 
 itfef the End. Ibid. 1 . 6. c. 5. And again, H i u-* 
 
 dxifovlx ivioynx rig igt - Happinefs is a certain 
 
 , Energizing. I. g. c. g. And more explicitly than 
 all thefe Paflages in that elegant Simile, L 1. c. 8.— 
 ' blrn fp il oXypcnixcriv ey 01 xxXXifoi i%OgoTtxlo‘ 
 refiavaiilcx!, cc AA’ 01 ayuvi^c fxcvoi (thtoov ydp nvii 
 inxufrlv'') «tw >t) ruv Iv to: ( 3 tu xxXwv f) cc.yn.Quv Ol 
 I 1 PATTONTES OP 012 2 ewi'CoXoi yiywlxt. 
 For as in the Olympic Games , not thofe are crowned , 
 who are handfomejl and Jlrongcji, but thofe ivho combat 
 and contend , (for it is from among thefe come the Vigors ;) 
 fo, with refpeci to things laudable and good in human 
 Life , it is the right ASlors only that attain the PojTeffton 
 of them. Nay, fo much did this Philofopher make 
 Flappinefs depend on right ASiion , that tho’ he re¬ 
 quired fome Portion of Externals to that Felicity * 
 which he held fupreme ; yet flill it was Honour and Vir¬ 
 tue which were its principal Ingredients. Thus fpeak- 
 2 ng of the Calamities and external Cafualties of Life* 
 which he confcfTes to be Impediments to a Happinefs 
 
 perfectly complete , he adds-*• opus's Ji iv riroig bix- 
 
 Xxpcrrii to xxX o'v, Ittu^xv (pegn rig ivxbXug vsoXXxg 
 f. ftyxXag x-r vyjxg, p.rj oZ dvxXynHxv, xXXx ysv- 
 vdZag uv -f fx(yxXo-]>vy > og. <T iitnv xi iApyiiai 
 
 xvgixt rr,g <^ung, xaQccnep tnroj* fv, JiJei? oiv yivoila ru y 
 y.xHxfuv dQxi® 3 ’ ZZi\7r0is yap zspxfcei rx uicrfa nf 
 (pxvXx. Tcv yap ug aXnQo.g xyxQov tp.fppovx fid- 
 crag bibp.tQx rug rZyjxg iveryoyovug (pcgav t sc, in tuv 
 frx^ycZuv dt\ rd xaXXtfX Tzpxfmv' xxQxirtp si. 
 
 rpa- 
 
NOTES on Treatise the i'hird . 323 
 
 Fgxlriyov a.<ya$QV tw zrapovli r^oiTOTrASy %py<r9txi uToAe- 
 puKjjrctlx, yOj mojTc]o[y.ov lx rwy Milluv <rxvhov x«A- 
 Ajfov U7 to^71[xoc Tssoiilvy tov ccvlbv Js tpsvoii f t2j aA- 
 
 As? Tf^y/ra? air avion;- ’£i <T arwf, csSAi^ a’Je- 
 7 rols ysvotV uv 0 iv^xijxuv. And yet, even in fucb Inci¬ 
 dents ^ the fair Principle of Honour and Virtue /bines 
 forth, when a Man with becoming Calmlefs endures 
 many and great Misfortunes , and that not thro ’ Infenfi - 
 biltty , but being brave and magnanimous. Nay morey 
 f it be true, as we have already affirmed, that it is 
 Actions , which are predominant in conjiituting a happy 
 Life , then can no one be completely inferable , who is 
 happy in his right Conduct, becaufe he will never be the 
 Alter of what is detejlable and bale. For it is our Opi¬ 
 nion that the Man , truly wife and good, endures all 
 Fortunes with beaming Decency , and from whatever 
 happens to arife, fill frames the fairejl Actions ; like as 
 the good Commander ufes the Army , which he happens to 
 finely after the manner mojl agreeable to the Rules of 
 JVar ; and the Shoemaker , from fuch Skins as others 
 provide him , makes a Shoe , the befi that can be made 
 from fuch Materials, and Jo in the fame manner all 
 other Artfis beficte. But if this be true, then he, who 
 is happy in this Rectitude of Genius, can in no Jnfance 
 be truly and ftrilily miferable. Eth. Nic. 1 . i. c. io. 
 
 As for EpicuruSy tho’ he was an Advocate for 
 Pleafurey yet fo high was his Opinion of a voife 
 and right Conduit , that he thought rational Adver- 
 ftty better than irrational Profperity. See Dial, 
 p. 197. Hence too he reprefented that Pleafurey 
 which he efteemed our Sovereign Flappinefs, to be 
 as infeparable from Virtue, as Virtue was from that. 
 
 O'jk tfiv vjlx; uvsv vs (pooifw;, f xaAw?, xj 
 
 Y 2 fsxxlug* 
 
3 2 4 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Jjjca/to;* sdl (Pgovtputy x) xochu; x) hxoctuff oLvtv ts» 
 r'Jfwf. /f /J impojjible to live pleafurably, without 
 living prudently, and honourably, and jujlly ; ar to live 
 prudently and honourably and jujlly, without living 
 pleafurably. Epic, in Laert. 1 . io. f. 132. 
 
 To conclude the whole, our Countryman Yfo- 
 ;?.w Hobbes, though he profeflhdly explodes all this 
 Do&rine concerning Ends, yet feems infenfibly to 
 have eftabiifhed ail EWhimfelf, and to have founded 
 it (like others) in a certain Energy or Action. 
 For thus it is he informs us, in his Treatile called 
 Human Nature , that there can be no Content¬ 
 ment, but in Proceeding ; and that Felicity 
 
 confijleth, not in Having - but in Prospering. 
 
 And again, fome time after, having admitted the 
 Comparifon of Human Life to a Race, he imme¬ 
 diately fubjoins- But this Race we muft fuppofe to 
 
 have no other Goal, nor other Garland, but being 
 foremost and in it. 
 
 And thus much as to the concurring Sentiments of 
 PhiloJ'ophers on the Subject of Ends , here treated. 
 
 Note XLVJI. p. 208. — Yet it in no man¬ 
 ner takes away, the Difference and Di¬ 
 stinction of other things.] Cum enim vir~ 
 tutis hoc proprium fit , earum rerum qua fecundum 
 naturam frit, habere deleft urn ; qui omnia fic ex aqua - 
 ve runt, ut in utrarnque partem it a pari a redderent, uti 
 nulla fcleft tone uterentur , virtutem ipfam fflulerunt, 
 Cic. de Fin. 1 . 3. c. 4. p. 207. 
 
 Quid autem apertius , quam, ft feleftio nulla fit ab 
 iis rebus, qua contra naturam fint, earum ret urn qua 
 fmt fecundum naturam, tollatur omnis ea, qua quara- 
 
 tur 
 
3 2 5 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 tur laudeturque prudential Cic. tie Fin. 1 . 3. c, 9. 
 p. 227. 
 
 Dei NCEPS exphcatur differentia rerum: quam fi non 
 tillam ejje dicer emus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab 
 Arijlone ; nec ullum Japientia munus out opus invenire • 
 tur, cum inter eas res , qua ad vitam degendam pertine - 
 rent, nihil emnino inter ejfet ; neque ullum dele Stum haberi 
 oporteret. Jtaque cum ejjet fatis conjlitutum, idJelum ejje 
 bonum quod ejfet honejhtm, id id malum folum quodturpe ♦ 
 turn inter h<ec id ilia , qua nihil valerent ad beate mife- 
 reve vivendum, aliquid tamen , quo differrent , ejje volue - 
 runty ut ejjent eorum alia ajlimabilia, alia contra, alia 
 neutrum. Ibid. 1 . 3. c. 15. p. 246. 
 
 Cetera autemy etfi nec bona nec mala ejjent , ta 
 men alia fecundurn naturam dicebat, alia natures ejje 
 contrana: iis ipfts alia inter jedia id media numerabat. 
 Acad. 1 . 1. 9. 11. p. 46. SeeDi'A- p. 187. 
 
 Note XLVIII. p. 208. It suppresses no 
 
 SOCIAL AND NATURAL AFFECTIONS, £dc.] As 
 much has been faid concerning the Stoic Apathy, 
 or Infenftbility with refpeSl to Pajjiony it may not 
 be improper to inquire, what were their real Senti¬ 
 ments on this Subject. 
 
 which we ufually render a Pajjiony is al¬ 
 ways rendered by Cicero, when fpeaking as a Stoic, 
 Periurbatio, a Perturbation. As fuch therefore in the 
 firft place w T e fay it ought always to be treated. 
 
 The Definition of the Term vsd 90 >, as given 
 Vy thefe Philofophers, was oppv ■srteovugx<roc, tranf- 
 Jated by Cicero , Appetitus vchementior. Tufc. 1 . 4. 
 C- 9. p. 273. Now this Definition may be more 
 
 Y 3 eafily 
 

 26 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 pafily explained, if we fir ft inquire, what they meatft 
 by opuri. 'Op;j.Yi they defined to be <pogi 4 /-J X r,? l7ri 
 n, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul toward Something. 
 Stob. Eel. Ethic. p. 175. A therefore, or 
 
 Perturbation, mu ft have been, according to their De¬ 
 finition, a Tendency or Motion of the Soul, which was 
 exceffive and beyond Bounds- Stobaus, from whom 
 this Definition, is taken, in commenting upon it ob- 
 ferves, « Xsyii zsi(pvy.v 7 x zeAeovd^iiy, TaP i]Sn eu 
 ■urXtovderate htrec' « yap Svvxy.11, jU,aAAcu P Ivipytlz — 
 that Tleno (its Author) does not call a IlA)^ fome- 
 thing capable by Nature to pafs into Excefs , but forne- 
 thing actually in Exccfs already, as having its Efjence y 
 not itt mere Capacitybut in Actuality. Eel. Eth. p. 159. 
 
 There is another Definition of the fame Term, 
 which makes it to be W «A oy(& x) nrxox (pvcrsv 'Ivyjiq 
 XiWt?, a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to 
 Nature. D. Laert. b 7. f. iiq. Andronicus Rhodiu s 
 adds, to this latter Definition, the Words, Si uwo* 
 Xrfiv r.xv-'e. ri cr/ctCe, from the Opinion cf fomething 
 Good or Evil. Ilf^i TIxQ. p. 523. So that its whole 
 Idea is as follows. A Perturbation, or Stoic Paffion , 
 is a Motion of the Soul, irrational and contrary to 
 Nature, art from the Opinion of fomething Good 
 cr Evil. Thcfe laft Words, founding the 
 or Perturbation on Opinion , correfpond to what Cicero 
 fays, where he gives it as the Sentiment of the 
 Stoic Philofophers , omnes perturbationes judicio fieri bp 
 cpinione, Tufc. 1 . 4. c. 7. p. 276. Laertius informs 
 us, that they even made the Perturbations thernfelves to 
 be 'Judgments. A oxTi S\ dvloT t x zsxGn xgi ant? civzt. 
 Laert. 1 . 7. f. hi. He fubjoins an Inftance to illuf- 
 trate. Hn yip (piXxpyvglz ts to ccg- 
 
 yueiov 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third., 
 
 •y'jgioy xxXov ilva i. For thus (fays he) the Love of 
 Money is the 'Judgment or Opinion , that Money is a 
 thing good and excellent. Plutarch records the farne 
 Sentiment of theirs, in a fuller and more ample 
 manner. IlaO©- 1 —>-a bytig? ncovrgog x) ax&Aar®-*, £>£ 
 (pd'jXn; x) b'ir lj uap 1 r, l uivr l g xfhriag crtpefycriflx x, pebpemv 
 ‘ssporXocGdv. A Perturbation is a villous and intem¬ 
 perate Reafoning, which ajjumes Vehemence and Strength 
 from bad and erroneous Judgment. Mor. p. 441. IX 
 To thefe Telfimonies may be added that of Fhemijhus . 
 — x) o’u xooixs 01 onto Zwuvos, rot vruQrt rr,g dvitponrl- 
 vris ra Xoyu £1 xffotpoeg iii/oa T^ip-ivot, >9 
 
 A byv kphriig bfxocpTr/xrlvxg. Themift. Paraph, in Ari- 
 Rot. de anima, L. 3. p. 90. b. Edit. Aldince. 
 
 The Subftance of what is faid above, feems to 
 amount to this ; that Tlxhtfg?, in a Stoic Senfe, implied 
 a Perturbation , and not a Pafjion , and that fuch Per¬ 
 turbation meant an irrational and violent Motian of 
 the Soul, founded on Opinion or Judgment , which was 
 erroneous andfaulty. 
 
 Now from hence it follows, that the Man of 
 perfect Character (according to their Hypo - 
 thefis) mull of neceflity be aVaS^if, Apathetic, 
 or void of Pertureation. For fuch a Cha¬ 
 racter, as has been {hewn, implies perfect Rectitude 
 of Conduct. But perfeft Rectitude of Conduct im¬ 
 plies perfect Rectitude of Judgment ; and fuch Recti¬ 
 tude of Judgment excludes all Error and wrong Judg¬ 
 ment : But if Error and wrong Judgment, then Pertur¬ 
 bation of confequence, which they fuppofe to be de¬ 
 rived from thence alone. 
 
 That this was the Senfe, in which they under-, 
 $ood Apathy, we have their own Authority, as 
 
 Y 4 given 
 
 CO 
 
323 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third: 
 
 given us by Laertius. 3 >a<n x? ocvaOw thus tg'v 
 
 ( rotyev , dia'TG dvipnrtdlov titoa. La'ert. 1. 7. p. 117* 
 T/.uy fay the wife Man is apathetic , by being fuferior. 
 
 to Error - by beingfupcrior to ERROR, if they may 
 
 be credited themfelves ; Rot, as fpr the molt part 
 we abfurdly imagine, by being Juperioy to all Serfe , 
 and Feeling, and Ajfefiion. The Sentence imme¬ 
 diately following the foregoing, looks as if thefe 
 Philofephers had forefeen, how likely they were 
 to be mifunderftood. ETvou x, cLkXov aVaOrj rev 
 
 (padkov, tv 1 try kcyby.evou rw <rxkvgv >9 carpI ttI y --• 
 
 Fhere is alfo another fort of Apathetic Man x .who is 
 bad who is the fame in Character , as the hard and 
 inflexible. To the fame Purpofe Epictetus. ’Ou StT 
 
 yap jus itvoa aVaSn, w; dvfeixvjx, d,kX<x rag %iauq 
 r,ripH-ilx (pvcrixa; ^ hn 9 ireq x ug lurfSn, uiq vioi/ f wc 
 
 ccJektpbv, ci{ zj.ocVgx, ug ssoXiTW. For I AM NOT 
 to be Apathetic, like a Statue, but I am 
 withal to obferve Relations , both the natural and 
 adventitious ; as the Man of Religion , as the Son , as 
 the Brother , as the Father , aj the Citizen. Arr. Epict- 
 L 3. p. 2. p. 359, 
 
 Immediately before this, he tells us in the 
 fame Chapter, Ida9^ yap ocXXug * yivfiat x it uf 
 cP^ttog arrolvy^avisri jf, r innktcscog •nrE£i7ri7rbV»;r, 
 feat a Perturbation in no other way ever artfes , but 
 ' either when a Defire is frujlrated, or an Averfton 
 fails into that which it would avoid. Where it is ob- 
 fervable, that he does not make, either Deftre or 
 Averfeon, nddv, or Perturbations y but only the Caufr 
 of PeriurbationSy when erroneouflv conducted. 
 
 Agreeably to this, in the fecond Chapter of 
 the Enchiridion, we meet with Precepts a^out the 
 
 ' Con- 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Conduct and Management of thefe two Af'eStions - . . 
 
 Not a word is faid about lopping off either 5 on the 
 contrary, Averfwn we are dire£ted how tp employ 
 immediately, and Dcfre we ape only ordered to fuf- 
 pend for the prefent, becaufe we want a proper Sub¬ 
 ject of lit Excellence to excite it. 
 
 To this may be added, what the fame Philofo- 
 pher fpcaks, in his own Pei fop, concerning himfelf. 
 Arr. Epifl. 1 . 1. c. 2i. y.tv av ogt- 
 
 yu/xxi Af IxjfAfvw xxla (pitny--- ■ /, for my part , am 
 Jatisfed and contented , if 1 can desire and avoid 
 agreea&ly to Nature. 3 H[e $4 not remain it feems 
 diflatisfied, till |re had eradicated thefe Ajfctticns ; 
 but he was fatisfied in reducing them to their natural 
 Vfc. 
 
 In Laertius we read recorded for a Stoic Senti¬ 
 ment, that as the vitious Man had his WGrj, or Per¬ 
 turbations ; fo oppofed to thefe, had the Virtuous his 
 *£u7raG£(ai, his Eupathies or Well-feelings , tranflated 
 by Cicero Canfipvtice. The three chief of thefe were 
 BbA^k, Will, defined o£>e£ij evAcj^, rational 
 Dcfire; ’EuAaTna, Caption, defined ^ExxAunc 
 iuAo}/^, rational Averfon; and Xocgx y Joy, defined 
 iirxptn; fuAo^©^, rational Exultation. To thefe three 
 principal Eupathies belonged many fubordinate Species; 
 fuch as svvoix, otyxTrrxTi^ a idwc, rfpj/if, iv(ppotrvvK i 
 iL 9 jjw.la, &c. See Laert. 1 . 7. f. 115, 116. Andron a 
 Rhcd. X7«0wv. Cic. Tufc. 1 . 4. c. 6. 
 
 Cicero makes Cato, under the Chara&q - of a Stoic y 
 pnd in explaining their Syftem, ufe the following 
 exprefiions. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur , in- 
 telligi yatura feri , lit liberi a parentibus amentur ; a 
 
 qm 
 
 3 2 9 
 
33 ° 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 quo initio profebdam eommunem humani generis facie * 
 tatem perfequuntur. De Fin. 1 . 3. c. 19, The fame 
 Sentiment of the Stoics is recorded by Laertius , 
 Js (cj Stwucoi) fj t r'v zra 0? ra rtxva (psXo^opyixv 
 
 (putruivv eTvxi cculoTi - They fay parental Ajfebtion is 
 
 natural to them, 7. f- 120. 
 
 Again, foon after, in the fame Treatife de Fini- 
 bus. phiodque nemo in furnma folitudine vitam agere 
 velity ne cum infnita quidem voluptatum abundantia * 
 facile intelligitur , nos ad conjunchonem congregationem- 
 que hominum , cf ad naturalem communitatgm ejfe natos. 
 So Laertius. " AKkdi flv sT iv ior\[xlx ((px cri) ( 3 id<rihzs 
 0 cTre^xioi’ Jtotiwwno? (pu<ra, >t) zrpxxhxog. 
 
 'The virtuous Alan (fay they, the Stoics) will never 
 be for living in Solitude ; /ir by Nature facial, and 
 formed for Action, 1 . 7. f. 123. 
 
 Again, Cicero , in the above-cited Treatife. Cum 
 autem ad tuendos confervandofque homines hominem 
 natum ejfe videamus \ confentaneum ejl huic natures , 
 at fapiens ve/it gerere, & adminiflrare rempublicam ; 
 atque ut e natura vivat , uxor eon adjungere , vsjle ex 
 ed liberos. Ne amoves quidem fanflos a Japiente alienos 
 
 ejfe arbitrantur .-£// wra confervetur omnis homini 
 
 erga hominem focietas , conjundtio, caritas ; tsf emolumenta 
 
 & detriment a- - -communia ejfe voluerunt . De Fin. 1. 
 
 3 . C. 20, 21. 
 
 In Epidletus the leading Duties , or Offices 
 
 of Man , are enumerated as follows. noAtr^£<r0a<, 
 yotfxdv, w<xiJo 7 roi( 7 <r()xi, 3 ~iov <ri€stv, yoveccv ini[xtX( 7 ir^xi, 
 xccQoXu ofyiAlxi, ixxXsvtiv, opjaav, dtpoppexv, wj ixarov 
 
 tstwu 
 
33 * 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 fsruv fu vsoiuv, wf zntpvxoi/xsv. Arr. Epidl. 1 . 3. c. 7. 
 p. 386. The fame Sentiments maybe found repeated 
 both in Stobceus and Laertius. 
 
 I shall only add one more Sentiment of thefe 
 Philojophers, and that is concerning Friendjhip. At- 
 Je x) rnv (piXiocV in [xdvoig rof? rnns^xioif t7vxt-—t 
 They fay that Friendjhip exijis among the Virtuous only. 
 Lacrt. i. 7. f. j 24. 
 
 The Sum of thefe Quotations appears to be this 5, 
 that the Stoics, in the Character of their virtuous 
 Man, included rational Defire, Averfion, and Exul¬ 
 tation ; included Love and. parental Ajfcdlion ; Friend- 
 Jhip , and <3 general Charity or Benevolence to all Man¬ 
 kind ; that they confidered it as a Duty, arifing from 
 our very Nature , not to neglect the Welfare of pub¬ 
 lic Society , but to be ever ready, according to our 
 Rank, to act either the Magifrate or the private 
 Citizen ; that their Apathy was no more than a 
 Freedom from Perturbation , from irrational and ex- 
 cejfwe Agitations of the Soul ; and confequently that 
 the Jl range Apathy, commonly laid to their Charge, 
 and in the demolifhing of which there have been fo 
 many Triumphs, was an imaginary Apathy, for which 
 they were no way accountable. 
 
 Note XLIX. p. 209. It rejects no Gain, 
 not inconsistent with Justice.] The Stoics 
 were fo far from rejecting Wealth, when acquired 
 fairly, that they allowed their perfedl Man, for the 
 fake of enriching himfelf, to frequent the Courts of 
 Kings, and teach Philofophy for a Stipend. Thus 
 
 Plutarch from a Treat ife of Chryftppus - -T 0v yXu 
 
 tro(po v 
 
332 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 troCpov Hj @et<ri\tv(n trvviceis^txt tpritrrj ei/cxot y^p'opj.dclis-p.ts^ 
 ¥j co^if£-J(T£iv W afyufcc—Morj p. 1047. F. 
 
 So likewife the Stoic Hecato, in his Treatife of 
 Offices, as quoted by' Cicero , Sapientis effe, nihil con¬ 
 tra mores., leges , ivfituta facientem, habere rationem rei 
 familiaris. Pleque erdm folum nobis clivites effe volumus, 
 fed liber is, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipullica. 
 Singularum enim facultates & copies, divitia funt civi- 
 tatis , De Offic. 1 . 3. c. 15. 
 
 Note L. p. 206 ——Universally as far as 
 
 Vir TUE NEITHER FORBIDS NOR DISSUADES, IT 
 ENDEAVOURS TO RENDER LlFE, EVEN IN THE 
 MOST VULGAR ACCEPTATION, AS CHEARFUL, 
 JOYOUS, AND EASY AS POSSIBLE.} Etenim quod 
 fummum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter natures 
 viverc, id habet hanc (ut cpinor) fententiam, Cum vir- 
 tute congruere femper: csetera autem, quae fecundum 
 naturam effent, ita legere, fi ea virtuti non repugna- 
 yept, Cic, de Ojjic. 1 . 3. c. 3. 
 
 ; Alexander ApHRQDjsiEysis, fpealyng of th$ 
 
 Stoic Doctrine concerning the external Conveniences , 
 and common Utilities of Life, delivers their Senti¬ 
 ment in the following Words- otXXot iltl ° 
 
 pj.ii/u.yj ctpelvi t£ juu tutoh f, ctffn fx-ovni, fAriStirol ocv 
 vov (rotpov zrv x£^w^kt^£v^iv £Atcr 9 ai, u hit otylsa JuvocIqp 
 tyiV ueloc tusv ocWusv Aa^wv. Supposing there lay Vir¬ 
 tue on the one fide, attended with thefe Externals, and 
 Virtue on the other fide, alone by her f If, the wife 
 A/ian would never choofe that Virtue , which was defitute 
 if it was' in his Power to obtain that other , 
 
 which 
 
* 
 
 NOTES on Treaties the Third. 
 
 which was accompanied with thefe Advantages . XTe^i 4 /u X“ 
 p. 157. 
 
 Note LI. p. 209.- Nay, could it mend 
 
 the Condition of Existence-by adding 
 
 TO THE AMPLEST POSSESSIONS THE POOREST) 
 
 meanest Utensil, it would in no degree 
 
 contemn, idc.] - Si ad illam vitam, qua cum vir » 
 
 tute degatut ', ampulla aut Jirigilis accedat, fumpturum 
 
 fapientem earn vita?n potius , cui hac adjefta fmi, -Dc 
 
 Fin. 1 . 4. c. 12. p. 300. 
 
 Note LIL p. 210 .—Could it indeed choose 
 its own Life, it would be always that, 
 
 WHERE MOST SOCIAL AFFECTIONS MIGHT BE 
 Exerted, idc.] hemque magis eft fecundum naturam 
 pro omnibus gentibus (ft fieri pof it) confervandis aut ju~ 
 vandis maximos labores molefiafque fufcipere , imitan- 
 tem Herculm ilium , quern hominum fama , heneficiorum 
 memory in concilia carlefium conlocavit , quam vivere in 
 folitudiney non modo fne ullis molefiis , fed etiam in 
 maximis voluptatibus , abundantem omnibus copies ; ut 
 excellas etiam pulchritudine id viribus. bficocirca optima 
 quifque id fplendidijjimo ingenio longe illam vitam huk 
 anteponity Cic. tie OfTic. 1 . 3 * c> 5 * 
 
 : • . - ..•• t l , . r . • • ■’ * & CIS 
 
 Note LIII. p. ibid.— ——It teaches us 
 
 TO CONSIDER LlFE, AS ONE GREAT IM¬ 
 PORTANT Drama, where, idc.] Thus 
 
 Arifio the Chian- - Eivoa yocp cpoiov too ocyadH 
 
 u7roxpi1n Tiv orofpov’ cf chile Oeprirts adit 'Ayoc[xe[ji,u9- 
 v©* zspbfimrov ocvocAa'fy, ixxzegov vnonpAslots zrpoirri- 
 
 xovluq. The wife Man is like the good Actor ; wht 
 whether he aJTume the Character of Therfites or Aga- 
 
 crwnnoDf 
 
 333 
 
NOTES on Treatise the thirl 
 
 memnon, alts either of the two Parts with a LemnirA 
 Propriety. D. Laert. 1 . 7. f. 160. 
 
 This Companion of Life to a Drama or Stage « 
 flay.) feems to have been a Gomparifon much ap¬ 
 proved by Authors of Antiquity. See Epifi. Enchi- 
 rid. c. 17. and the Notes of the Late learned Editor 
 Mr. TJpton. See alfo M. Anton. 1 . 12. f. 36. and the 
 Notes of Gataker. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. T. 1. Ed. Serr. 
 
 Note LIV. p. 211. - It accepts all the 
 
 Joys derived from their Success, &c. It 
 
 FIXES NOT, LIKE THE MANY, ITS HAPPINESS 
 
 on Success alone, &c.] One of the wifeft Rules 
 that ever was, with refpedl to the Enjoyment of External 
 good Fortune , is that delivered by Epifletus ; to enjoy 
 it) u; JuJolao, rj p* caov bicoloa, in fuch manner as 
 it is given , and for fuch "Time as it is given , remem' 
 bring that neither of thefe Conditions we have the 
 Power to command. See Arr. Epitt. 1 . 4. c. 1. p. 556. 
 See alfo p. 573. of the fame. 
 
 Note LV. Ibid. On the contrary, when 
 
 THIS HAPPENS, IT IS THEN IT RETIRES INTO 
 ITSELF, AND REFLECTING ON WHAT IS FAIR, 
 
 What is laudable, &V.J See before, p. 322. 
 d! jv rarois <Ji«A«/x 7 rf», See. 
 
 Note LVI. p.212. All Men pursue Good, 
 OV.] This is a Principle adopted by all the Stoics, 
 and inculcated thro’ every part of the Diflertations 
 of Epiftetus. Take an example or two out of many. 
 
 <J>uViS <T a urn sraflof, to to ocyoc^ov, (pivyciu to 
 
 ■rt&xov -t» yd p ecyJcQd crufycnfigov nbev, It is the 
 
 Nature 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Aliir L p 
 
 Nature of every one to furfue Good, and fly Evil - —— 
 for nothing is more intimately allied to us than Good. 
 Arr. Epifr. 1 . 4. c. 5. p. 606. Again, /. 2. c. 22 . 
 3 I 3* Zwov adm cocuulcci) eg re idiu 
 
 a-v [xtpipovn. To nothing is every Animal fo intimately 
 allied , as to its own peculiar Welfare, and In¬ 
 terest. 
 
 So Cicero. Omnes enim expetimus UTiLlTATEMj 
 ad eamque rapimur , nec facere aliter ullo modo poffumus. 
 De Oilic. 1. 3. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. T. 1. 
 Edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E. 
 
 Note LVII. p. 213.- -All derived from 
 
 Externals must fluctuate, as they fluc¬ 
 tuate.] See before, p. 126, 130, 133* 
 
 Note LVIII. Ibid. - When we place the 
 
 Sovereign Good in Mind —— ] Daemon or 
 Genius means every Man’s particular Mind, and 
 
 Reasoning Faculty. -sxo? !f»> « 
 
 £xaV» V 8 $ >9 A oy^r*. M. Anton. 1 . 5. p. 27. Ge » 
 fiiiim effe uniufcujufque animurn rationalem j & ideo ejje 
 fingulos fingulorum —Varro in Fragm. It is from this 
 Interpretation of Genius , that the Word, which in 
 Greek exprefles Happiness, is elegantly etymolo¬ 
 gized to mean a Goodness of Genius or Mind. 
 ’Evdcapovlx, if 1 bodpcov dycdjo;. Al. Anton. 1. 7- f. 17. 
 See Gataker on the Place. The Sentiment came 
 originally from the old Academics. See before, page 
 
 3 21 * 
 
 Note LIX. p. 214.- Behold the true 
 
 and perfect Man: that Ornament, GV.] 
 ffuam gravis vero , quam magnifea , quam confans con- 
 
 feitur 
 
 33s 
 
 4 
 
33 6 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 ficitur perfona fapientis ? Epui, cum ratio docuerit, quod 
 honejlum ejftt, id ejfte folurn bonvm, ftmper fit necejfe 
 ejl beatuSf vereque omnia ijfta nomina poftideat , qua? 
 inrideri ab imperitis folent. Re dll us enim appellabitur 
 rex, quam Tarquinius, qu'i nec ft nec fuos regtre po - 
 tuit: redlius mcgifter piipuli., &c. Clc. de Fill. I. 3* 
 C. 22 p. 269. Ergo hie, quifquis eft, qiii moderation 
 id conftanila quietus animo eft, ftbique iffte placatus ; 
 ut nec tabeftat moleftiis, nec frangatur timore , nec fi¬ 
 ll enter quid expetens ardent deftderic, nec alaaitate futili 
 geftienS deliquftat ; is eft fapiens, quern quecrimus, is eft 
 beatus : tui nihil human at urn rerum aut intolerable ad de- 
 mittendum animum, aut nimis latabile ad eeferendum vi~< 
 deri pot eft. Fpuid enim videatur ei magnum, iffc. Tufc. 
 
 Difp. 1 * 4- c - J 7 - P* 298. 
 
 Note LX. p. 215. -Would not your Sys¬ 
 
 tem in such a Case a little border upon 
 the Chimerical ? &c.] Chryfippus feems to 
 have been fenfible of this, if we may judge from a 
 Pafiage of his, preferved in Plutarch. Aid diet 
 rdv tuts j utyiQv; x) ra xctXXv;, zrkoc<r(xoca-i 
 
 doxiefxsv ofxoict kiysiv, x) a x«r« to* «a/ 0 p« 7 rev xj 
 tJv elv 9 puTri vyv (pdfiv. For this rcaftn, thro' the exceft- 
 five Greatneft and Beauty of what we aftert, we ap¬ 
 pear to fay things which look like Fictions, and not fuch 
 as are fuitable to Man and human Nature. Mor. 
 1041. F. 
 
 % 
 
 Note LXI. p.216,— —~In antient Days, 
 when Greece, See Cic. de Invent. 1 . 2 - c. 1. 
 
 See alfo Maximus Tyrius, Dift. 23. />. 277. of the 
 late Quarto Edition j and Xcntph. Memor. 1 . 3. c. 10. 
 
 \ 
 
 Note 
 
NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. 
 
 337 
 
 Note LXII. p. 219.-No where in any 
 
 PARTICULAR NATURE IS THE. PERFECT Cha-' 
 RACTER TO BE SEEN INTIRE.] The Stoics them- 
 felves acknowledged, as we learn from Clemens of Alex¬ 
 andria^ that their 0 trotyog, or perfect Man, was 
 difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree ; bvcrsv- 
 £>sr(S) J ztccvv' atpbbpx. Strom, p. 438. Sextus Empi- 
 ricus gives it as their Opinion, that they had never as 
 yet found him , TivfiT* ovl®* kocV olujtg 
 
 <ro(pS. Adv. Phyf. p, 582. Edit. Lipfienf. 
 
 % 
 
 What Sextus fays, feems to be confirmed by 
 Cicero, who fpeaking in his Offices the Language cif 
 a Stoic, has the following Expreflions. Nec vero, 
 cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones , fortes viri commemo- 
 rantur, aut cum Fabricius ArijlideJ've ju/li nominantur , 
 aut ab iliis fartitudinis, aut ab his jujlitiee, tanquam a 
 Sapientibus, petitur exe?nplum. Nemo enim horum 
 sic Sapiens ejl, ut Sapientem volumus intelligi. 
 Nec ii, qui fapientes habiti fuht, O’ noryiinati, M. Cato 
 & C. Lalius, fapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem feptem,: 
 fed ex mediorum officiorum pequenfia fmilitudinem. 
 quondam gerebant, fpeciemque fapientum. De Qffic. 
 1. 3. c. 4. Again, in his Lalius , fpeaking of the 
 fame confummaie Wifddm, he calls it, Sapientia quam 
 adhuc mortalis nemo ejl confecutus. 
 
 . . So too Quintilian. Qtiod fi defuit his viris fummd 
 virtue, fic qucerentibus, cm or at ores faerint, refpondepo, 
 .quo modo Stoici , fi interrogentur , an Sapiens Zeno , 
 an Cleanthes, an Chryfippus , refpondeant ; magnos qui¬ 
 dem illos ac venerabiles ■, non tamen id, quod natura ho- 
 
 Z minis 
 
333 NOTES m Treatise the Third. 
 
 mints fummam habet, confecutos. Inft. Orat. 1 . 12. c. n 
 p. 721, 722. Edit. Caper. 
 
 So likewife Seneca : Scis , quern nunc bonum virurri 
 dicdm f Hujus fecuntke notes. Nam ille alter for- 
 tajfe, tanquam phoenix, jemel anno quingentefimo nafci- 
 tur. Epift. 42.- 
 
 Note LXIII. p. 219. - 1 might inform you 
 
 OF THE NATURAL PRE-EMINENCE, AND HIGH 
 
 Rank of specific Ideas.3 See Cicero in hi$ 
 Orator , near the Beginning. Sed ego fic ftatuo , nihil 
 ejfe in ullo genere fam pulchrum , quo non , iff c. &c. See 
 alfo the V erfes of Boethius before cited, Note XVII. 
 p. 295. 
 
 Note LXIV. p. 220, 221 .—An Exemplar of 
 Imitation, which tho’ none we think 
 
 CAN EQUAL ; YET ALL AT LEAST MAY FOL-~ 
 
 low - an Exemplar, Cfc.] Seneca gives it as a 
 
 general Confeflion of the grer.tejl Philofopfiers, that 
 the Do&rine they taught, was not quemadmodum ipfi 
 viverent , fed quemadmodum vivendum eflet. De vita 
 beatd , c. 18. 
 
 There appears indeed to be one common 
 Reasoning with refpect to all Models, Exem¬ 
 plars, Standards, Correctors, whatever we 
 call them, and whatever the Subjects, which they 
 are deftined to adjuft. According to this Reafoning, 
 if a Standard be lefs perfetfl than the Subject to be 
 adjufted, fuch Adjufling (if it may be fo called) be¬ 
 comes a Detriment. If it be but equally perfect, then 
 
 is 
 
NOTES oft Treatise the Third. 
 
 3 s the Adjufting fuperfluous. It remains therefore 
 that it muft be more perfect, and that to any Tran- 
 fcendence , any Accuracy conceivable. For ftippoie a 
 Standard as highly accurate , as can be imagined. If 
 the Subjects to be adjufted have a Nature juitable$ 
 then will they arrive, by luch Standard, to a degree of ' 
 Perfection , which thro’ a Standard lefs accurate they 
 could never pofiibly attain. On the contrary, if the 
 SubjeHs be not fo far capable, the Accuracy of the 
 Standard will never be a hindrance, why they fnould 
 hot become as perfect , as their Nature will admit. 
 
 It feems to have been from fome Sentiments of 
 this kind, that the Stoics adorned their o' irotpos, or 
 Perfect Character , with Attributes fo far fuperior to 
 ordinary Humanity . ’Exem/© oA'oi©, skew© aV^ocr- 
 Sm, exeu© avidly iff, j waxa^i©, te'Aej ©—’Twas 
 he was fortunate; ’twas he was above want 'twas he 
 zvas felf-fufficient , and happy , and perfect. Plutarch. 
 Mor. 1068. B. See Note LXII. 
 
 Some Philofophers have gone fo far, as not to reft; 
 fatisfied with the moji per fit Idea of Humanity , but 
 to fubftitute, for our Exemplar , even the fupreme 
 Being , God Himself. Thus Plato,m his Thcatetus, 
 make the great Object of our endeavours, to be 
 GjUgAck tw S’ew v.oclx to dupfov, the becoming like to 
 God, as far as in our pozver. He immediately ex¬ 
 plains, what this refemblance is. 'OjUoiWij Pi, P- 
 xouov A) o<r*ou (Asia (pgopricriu; 'yivAQjci, It is the be¬ 
 coming juf and holy , along with Wifdom or Prudence. 
 Plat. tom. 1. p. 176. Edit. Serrani. See this Sentiment 
 explained by Ammonius , in V. Foies Porph. p. 5. See 
 alio Arifotle’ s Ethics , L. 10. C. 8. p. 465. 
 
 Z 2 
 
 33 9 
 
 Th e 
 
NOTES on Treatise the 'Third. 
 
 The Gofpcl appears to favour the fame Hypothecs, 
 Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which 
 is in Heaven is perfeft. .Matt. v. 48. 
 
 % 
 
 What has been above faid, will be, it is hoped, 
 a fufficient Apology for the Tranfccndence of the Cha¬ 
 racter defcribed in the Dialogue . 
 
 Note LXV, p. 221. The Proficiency of 
 Socrates—was sufficient to convince us— 
 that some Progress, Cfr.] See Diog. Laert. 
 1. 7. c. 91. p. 420. Ttxpwgiov Je to CirotpKTvv sTwi 
 tvv dgilriv —to ysviohtxs iv tsspoxoirn Taj -Greg] ZuxpdT7,y, 
 AtoyevqVf &c. 
 
 Note LXVI. p. Ibid .— Nor was the Prize, 
 
 as USUAL, RESERVED ONLY TO the FIRST; 
 BUT ALL, WHO RUN, MIGHT DEPEND UPON A 
 Reward, having, & c .] Verum ut tranfeundi fpes 
 von fit , magna tamen ef dignitas fubfequendi. Quindt. 
 Inft. 1 . 12. c. 11. p. 760. Exigo itaque a me , non ut 
 optimis par fm , fed ut malls melior. Senec. de Vita 
 beata, c. 17. ’ouJe yap MsXuv ta-opcu, oy.u; Jx 
 dpeiXui Tts <rcoy.dl(§y’ ade Kpo~o-(§P, opcu; ix dy.sXu 
 tyi$ xlnnus' «T do rAwj aAAs tivo; tyis tTrspaXii Iocs, 
 
 TJi'y d 7 rdyvuav tuv dxpceu, alpifdfxiGoi. For neither 
 fall I be Milo, and yet I neglefl not my Body ; nor 
 Crcefus, and yet I negledl not my Efate ; nor in general 
 do we deffl from the proper Care of any things thro ’ 
 Defpair of arriving 'at that which is Jupreme. Arr. 
 EpiCt. 1 . 1. c. 2. See alfo Horat. Epif . 1. 1. 1. 
 v. 28. &c. 
 
 Note 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 34 1 
 
 Note LXVII. p. 225.-— -This whole Uni¬ 
 verse -is one City or Commonwealth—} 
 
 O zoirfj.^ 3 [aioc zroA»? sr'i- -Arr. EpiSf .. 1. 3 * 
 
 c. 24. p. 486. This was a <SWc Do&rine, of which 
 Epiffetus and the Emperor Marcus make perpetual 
 mention. See of the laft, /. 12 . f 36. 
 
 So Cicero , Univerfus hie mundus una civitas com¬ 
 munis Dcorum atque hominutn exijlumandus. De Legg. 
 1 . 1. c. 7. p. 29. See De Fin. 1 . 3. c. 19. De Nat. 
 Dear. 1 . 2. c. 62. 
 
 Note LXVIII. p. 227. - -Hence the Mind 
 
 TRULY WISE, QUITTING THE STUDY OF PAR¬ 
 TICULARS, The Platonics , considering Sci¬ 
 
 ence as fomething afeertained ’, definite , and Jieady j 
 would admit nothing to be its Ohjedt , which was 
 vague , infinite , and pajfng. For this reafon they 
 excluded all Individuals, or Objects of Sense, 
 and (as Ammonias exprefies it,) raifed themfelves, in 
 their Contemplations, from Beings particular to Be¬ 
 ings univerfal , and which as fuch, from their own 
 Nature, were eternal and definite. The whole Paf- 
 fage is worth tranferibing. Eigylai cn w (psXocroCplx, 
 'Groii/lui/ tcov ov/wv ^ oW& ifiv. ti^wmeroev gjr 04 
 (ptA oco'poi, rlvx uv Tporrov yivuvlxi tcov ovjoov tons~fi pa¬ 
 ves' -fi S7TiAd eugw rol acclcc ptoos ysvnrx x) (pQxplx 
 
 if n if t\ \ */ f r\ ’ / 1 \ 
 
 0*1 Cl) £Tl 01 Vy OC7T£ipOCi 7J C£ £ 7 OUOlMVIS Xj ZJi7T£ ma 
 
 pot.crpt.ivm ef» yvueng (to yxp yvccrov (3xAe1xt thro rvs 
 yvdereus zFSgtXxpGxvetrQxr to Pe dree fiAwl ov) 
 
 oumyxyov Ix'Sleg aVo' twk pegrxuv H7rt ra xxOoAxt 
 cudix o(lx vj a TnrzgxcTfxiVx. 'i2? yap (pyicrm e IlAarwv, 
 
 Z 3 
 
342 
 
 I 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 ’‘&7nfr{AY! zrxgd to tig *E? rifoitriv Yi(JL&g sc, cgott 
 
 rival zspodynv rZu ■sjpocyfj.druv* tuto $1 zrogi^oy.iijx 
 Pot Trig tig t« JtaOoAa otvocfyoung. Ammonius in his 
 Preface to Porphyry's Ifagcge , p. 14. Edit. 8vo. 
 
 Consonant to this, we learn it was the Advice 
 of Plato , with refpedt to the Progrefs of our Spent* 
 lotions and Inquiries, when we proceed Synthetically t 
 that is to fay, from firjl Principles downwards, that 
 we fhould defend from thofe higher Genera , which in¬ 
 clude many fubordinate Species , down to the lowef Rank 
 of Species , thofe which include only Individuals. But 
 here it was his Opinion , that our Inquiries Jhouldfop } 
 and , as to Individuals , let them wholly alone ; becaufe 
 of thefe there could not poffibly he any Science. t\io 
 T<f3V hJWwlcdTWV doro Toon •ymxdhxTUV nxllovixg 
 
 zroc^iiccXivilo 0 T1\<xtcov srotvscr^ui -r a Pt ansigu 
 
 (finriv lav, [j.n ds yelp civ zsolc ytvicQoti TisTuv 
 Porphyr. Ifagog. p. 2. 
 
 Such was the Method of antient Philofophy, The 
 Falhion at prefent appears to be fomewhat altered* 
 and the Bufinefs of Philophers to be little elfe, than 
 the collecting from every (Quarter, into voluminous 
 Records, an infinite Number of fenfible , particular , 
 and uncannedled Facts , the chief Effect of which is to 
 excite our Admiration. So that if that well-known 
 Saying of Antiquity be true, it was Wonder which in¬ 
 duced Aten frf to philofophize , we may fay that Phi¬ 
 lofophy now ends , whence originally it began. 
 
 Note LXIX p. 228.-A Faculty, which 
 
 RECOGNIZING BOTH ITSELF, AND ALL THINGS 
 ELSE, BECOMES A CANON, A CORRECTOR, AND 
 
 4 Standard universal.] See before, p. 162. 
 
 2 In 
 
NOTES on Treatise the ‘Third. 
 
 In Epifletus, 1 . i. c. i. p. 6. the Avfocpcn A oytxn 
 or reafoning Power , is called the Power n f, avlvv 
 S’fco^cra, df t aAAo. zsrtxvhx. So Marcus — Toe ’[choc Tr,g 
 Xoyixn; 4 /u X r,? * tzvlw c^a, cctulriv J'tx^pAy &c. The 
 Properties of the reajoning Soul are , it beholdeth itfelf ; 
 it formeth itfelf &c. 1 . I j . c. I. So again Epittetus^ 
 
 t \ \ ** < ~ \ y / \ s , / < \ 
 
 r— V7Ttp (J.iV T8 Xj UXXSIV, X^ VI] V7rtp &VI3 
 
 tx &v y dj t uv crvi/spycov zrpog otulo, V 7 rep xoeporuv 
 
 £vpCOV, V7T£p 01VX, V7f}p iXOiiii iV'^Otff! I TM Sr*) ’ jU£- 
 
 pxviicro J'’ oTi aAAo ri cot dtdwxs xpsiTlov uttoGIuv tztocv, 
 TO 2Cp?,(r0f*tV0V IXVToTif TO £oXl[J.u£o\), TO Triv ufiocv 
 
 cKZfx Xoyixpcivov, For feeing , for hearing , and indeed 
 for Life itfelf and the various Aleans which co-operate 
 to its Support; for the Fruits of the Earth , /i>r IVine 
 and Oil , for all thefe things be thankful to God : yet be 
 mindful that he hath given thee fomething elfe , which 
 IS BETTER THAN ALL THESE ; fofnething which is 
 to ufe them, to prove them , to compute the Value of 
 each. Arr. Epidl. 1 . 2 c. 23. p. 321. 
 
 Note LXX. p. 228.- That Master- 
 
 Science, OF WHAT THEY ARE, WHERE THEY 
 are, and the End TO WHICH, &c.~\ See Arr. 
 Epift. 1 . 2. c. 24. p. 337—See alfo 1 . 1. c. 6. p. 36. 
 and Perf Satyr. 3- v. 66. 
 
 Note LXXI. Ibid. -And never wretch¬ 
 
 edly degrade themselves into Natures 
 to them subordinate.] See Arr. Epifl. 1 . 1. 
 
 C. 3. p. 21. Aid Tocvryv tG crvyyivuocv, 01 p.\v ocno- 
 xA»Vai>T£?, Aukok opcoioi yivop.t$x y clnrifoi Xy £7nSaAo» 
 
 x] ( 3 a a£f£<n* ci ds Afscjv, uyptoi >£> 
 
 (Hwpigoi' oi zrXthss d’ rpcui/ aAcoVotij, &c. 77 ;r«’ /Z>/j 
 
 Z 4 Affinity 
 
 343 
 
NOTES on Treatise the'Third. 
 
 Affinity (he means our Affinity to the Body, or bafer 
 Part) fome of us , degenerating , become like Wolves , 
 faliblefs , and treacherous , and mifebievous ; others , //i* 
 Lions, fierce, and favage , wild ; but the greater Part 
 
 turn Foxes , little, fraudulent , wretched Animals. Cum 
 autem duobus mod'ts , id efl , aut vi out fraude fiat in¬ 
 juria ; f ans, quafi vulpecula, vis, leonis videtur. Cic. 
 de Offic. 1 . i c. 19. See alfo Arr. Epidi. 1 . 2. 9* 
 p. 210, In our own Language we feem to allude 
 to this Degeneracy of Human Nature, when we call 
 Men, by way of reproach, Sbeepijb , Bear if a. Hog - 
 gifi). Ravenous, See. 
 
 Note LXXII. p. 229. - 1 hat Reason, of 
 
 WHICH OUR OWN IS BUT A PARTICLE, OR 
 
 Spark, &c.] - ai vj/tr^ai p/H xtwj herb lv$t$£[Xivot) 
 
 x) <rvvx(pi7g to) Sts w, «t£ yogix beroa, Vy gctcot- 
 
 TTixoryxTX .— Arr. Epidi, 1 . 1. c. 14. p. 81. - 0 ^oci- 
 
 yeev, ov rxarw 'Srporar’/iU 39 wysyovco 0 AfU? £oa>K£v J 
 aTotSTcaayx soojtx «t©-’ os £fiv 0 txafa Vis? 
 
 Alar. Ant. 1. 5. f. 27. Hu/nanus autem animus , de- 
 cerptus ex mente divind , cum nullo alio nifi cum ipfo Deo 
 (ft hoc fas efl didlu) comparari potejl. Tufc. Difp. 1 . 5. 
 c- 13 -P-371- 
 
 Note LXXIIL Ibid. - Fit Actors in that 
 
 GENERAL DRAMA, WHERE THOU HAST AL¬ 
 LOTTED every Being, great and small, 
 its proper Part, &c.~] See before, p. 210. and 
 Note LI 1 I. See alfo Arr. Epidb. 1 . 3. c. 22. p. 444— 
 
 Zu nAt©- 5 ii‘ <Jl ivoktxi, C5 c. The Paffagc is fublime 1 
 and great, but too long to be here inferted. 
 
 Note 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Note LXXIV. p. 230 .—Enable us to curb 
 Desire, &c. Enable us even to suspend 
 it, &c. Be cur first Work to have 
 
 ESCAPED, &V.] ’A 7 TO%H TSTOTi uT Ot vlot, 7 rct<riv 
 
 1 'vcc ztot) A, £uA oyco; ogiyjfjs. Abflaln for a tune from 
 Dcfire altogether , that in tune thou nmyjl he able to 
 clefire rationally. Arr. Epidt. 1 . 3. c. 13. p. 414. 
 Again the fame Author— Zypsgov — oftfcti ova l%pri- 
 ca,(jt.rjy boi\l<ru zxpsg /xoi/x tx zrgootigehxx——To day 
 my Faculty of Defire I have not ufed at all ; my Aver- 
 fion I have employed zuith refpeft only to things , which 
 are in my power. 1. 4. c. 4. p. 588. See alfo Enchir. 
 c. 2. and Charaft. V. Ilf. p. 202. Flat. Gorg. p. 505. 
 B. Tom. 1. Edit. Serr. zregl Fe -- 
 
 Horace feems alfo to have alluded to this Dodtrine: 
 
 Virtus ejl 3 vitium fugere ; IF fapientia prima , 
 Siultitia caruijfe -Epift. 1. 1 . 1. v. 41. 
 
 Note LXXV. Ibid -- Let not our Love 
 
 THERE STOP, WHERE IT FIRST BEGINS, BUT 
 INSENSIBLY CONDUCT it, &cf See Plat. Sy?np. 
 
 p. 210. tom. 3. Edit. Serrani. Ah yap, z(pn 3 tov 
 
 CflGw? IQVTOt T &T 0 Zupx[jJ.X 3 ap^£(T 0 £a, &C. 
 
 Note LXXVI. Ibid. - Not that little 
 
 casual Spot, where, tsA] See Arrian. Epift. 
 1 . 1. c. 9. p. 51. Socrates quidcm 3 cum rogaretur , cu - 
 jatem fe effe diceret 3 Mundanum, inquit : totius enim 
 mundi fe incolam IF civem arbitrahatur. Tufc. Difp. 
 1. 5. c. 37. p. 427. 
 
 Note LXXVII. p. 231. - Teach us each 
 
 to Regard himself, but as a Part of 
 
 THIS 
 
 34S 
 
14 & 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 N ¥ 
 
 THIS GREAT WHOLE ; A PART, Ilo)? 
 
 PaysToa tuv euros rtvoc xdld (pvcriii, See. In wbat 
 Senfe then (fays the Philofopher, fince all is referable 
 to one univerfal Providence) are fame things tailed 
 agreeable to our Nature, and others the contrary ? The 
 jin fiver is, They are fo called, by confidering ourfelves as 
 detached, and feparate from the Whole. For thus may 
 1 fay of the Foot, when conftdercd fo apart, that it is 
 agreeable to its Nature, to be clean and free from Filth. 
 But if we confider it as a Foot, that is, as fomething not 
 detached, but the Member of a Body, it will behoove it 
 both to paf into the Dirt, and to trample upon Thorns, 
 and even upon occafton to be lopped of, for the P refer - 
 vation of the Whole. Were not this the cafe, it would 
 be no longer a Foot. Something therefore of this kind 
 
 foould we conceive with refpedt to ourfelves. - What 
 
 art thou ? A Man. If thou confider thy Being as 
 fomething feparate and detached, it is agreeable to 
 thy Nature, in this View of Independence , to live 
 to extreme Age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if 
 thou confider thyfelf as a Man, and as the Member of a 
 certain Whole ; for the fake of that Whole, it will 
 cccafonally behoove thee, at one while to be fick, at 
 another while to fail and rifque the Perils of Naviga¬ 
 tion, at another while to be in want, and at lajl to die 
 perhaps before thy time. Why therefore doji thou bear 
 thofe Events impatiently ? Knowef thou not, that afier 
 the fame manner as the Foot ceafeth to be a Foot, fo dof 
 thou too ceafe to be longer a Man ? Arr. Epict. 1 . 2. 
 c. 5. p. 1 91. 
 
 Note LXXVIII. p. 231. - In as much as 
 
 Futurity, &c.~] av dbnXoc [xoi v rd efcws, 
 
 del tuv ivtpvtfeguv e%op.ca, nrpos to tvF^ocvuv tuv xocik 
 
 (pvariv. 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 (Pvitiu’ dvToi yap yi o S'cog t oixtcov exAd itmov 
 35 <Tfv* it di yt rfeiv, on vovAv yoi xu^Ayapras vvv y 
 
 \ tt -A > * y /. \ v « v » 
 
 Kj Wp/XWV KV £ 7 T &UTO te, 0 ' 5 T 8 $* ) Ei 
 
 Ti^v, oippocs oiv £7rl to “smAsicrOGU. Arr. Epift. 1. 2. 
 c. 6. p. j 95. It appears that the above Sentiment 
 was of Chryfppus. In the tenth Chapter of the fa?nt 
 Book we have it repeated, tho in Words fomevvhat 
 different. Aixthto xocXus xiyviriv oi (piAotrofio], oti, 
 
 &c. So Seneca - Lpuicquid accident , fic ferre, quafi 
 
 tibi volueris accidere. DebuiJJes enim velle, ft fifes 
 omnia ex decreto Dei fieri. Nat. Qineft. iii. in Praefat. 
 
 (p pivots 
 
 Note LXXIX. p. 232.- That we may 
 
 KNOW NO OTHER WlLL, THAN THINE ALONE, 
 AND THAT THE HARMONY OF OUR PARTICU¬ 
 LAR Minds with thy universal, Cf fed] - 
 
 Eti/an <P «uro t»to riv ts £U fiotlyov® 3 eeqeliv fj ’ivqoiotv 
 jQis, orav uydvlx ufpxrlr'lca xocloi rrv <rvy(puvlotv rs 
 ■arct p’ £xarw b'xiyov®’ zepo; tvv tv oAs bionivlv (3sAr,- 
 
 <r»v. The Virtue of a happy Alan, and the Feliaty 
 of Life is this, when all things are tranfaEled in 
 Harmony of a Alan's Genius, with the Will of Him , 
 who adminijiers the Whole. Diog. Laert. 1 . 7. c. 88. 
 
 р. 418. This is what Epifletus calls tm aura p»A n- 
 fiv. (ruvapjuocrcu toi? ynoyivoic, to attune or harmonize 
 one's Mind to the things , which hoppen. Diff. 1 , 2. 
 
 с. 14. p. 242. 
 
 Note LXXX. Ibid. Yet since to attain 
 this Height— is but barely possible, &V.3 
 See before, page 215, &c. See alfo Notes LX. and 
 
 LX 1 I. 
 
 Note LXXXI. p. 233.— Such as to trans¬ 
 form us into Savage Beasts of Prey, sul¬ 
 len, ^r -3 See before, Note LXXI. Not£ 
 
 347 
 
Ca> 
 
 48 NOTES on Treatise the ’Third 1 . 
 
 Note LXXX 1 T. p 233. That animating 
 Wisdom, which pervades, and rules the 
 Whole, This Power is called by the Emperor 
 
 Marcus -——to'v Six rr,g itriag SiwoSlx Ac yov, Xy - 
 
 QlKQVOfAXVlOt TO ZJXV* L 5 . 1. 32 . 
 
 Note LXXXIII. Ibid. -That Magic Dr- 
 
 VINE, WHICH, - >'? to yj.<ry.x av ra Xe'ov- 
 
 T^, Xy TO (hjAlJT ViglOV, TZOXTX KXKXpyiX, Wf XXXvQX, 
 
 tog jSo'pSo^Qr, sxELVccv tTriymvpcSlx tuv <ri[xvav xa- 
 A con’ pan ii\) dvlx aXXorpix runs, a <ri&ng, (paflix.^x’ 
 d,XXx TYiv zrxvloov icr nyr,v t 7 riXoyi^>s. M. Ant. 1 . 6. 
 
 f. 36.-See alfo 1 . 4. f. 44. 1 . 3. f. 2. "Clcnrcp yap 
 
 ai xwpuTiai (CpntrE) zmypx/x/xtxlx ycXoix (pioxcriv, a 
 xaQ’ t a ’Six fxiv Ifi (pavXa, rw Je oAm zroiriy.xii %dgiv 
 nvd zxpofi&vmv' uTug ipifcuxg uv avlrjv Ip saving riiv 
 xxxtxv, t o7g S' aXXoig zk a^p Vfog Eft. Chryfip. and 
 Plutarch, p. 1065. D. 
 
 OuJ'e ti ylyvSxi ipyov Ivr) yJloSi era Siypa y &xi t uuv 3 
 Ovte Xixl* diQigiov B’Cov woXov, zt \tc\ zs’oSl w, 
 
 IlArX Q7rotT<x pE^atri x&xoi crpiUpiiTiv xvolxig. 
 
 ’AAA<5i CTU Xj TOC, ZTl^KTITX £7 rifOKTOU a pi IX STiWl, 
 
 Kai koit[xi 7 v tx xxocrpax' x) a (piXx <ro) piXx sfiv. 
 
 ‘PlSs yap hg tv arcaSx crwrippaoxag icrQxa xaxo~<riv y 
 ‘'CLv G’ Eva yiywEO-Ofiei zrxvluv Xoyov xi\v iovjuv. forf. EoiiJa. 
 
 Cleanthis Hymn. apud Steph. in P oefiPhilof. p. 49, 50, 
 
 [The Pleader will obferve that the fourth of the 
 above Verfes is fupplied by the Mifcell. Obfervationes 
 
 Critical 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third . 
 
 Critic #, Vol. VII. from a Manufcript of Voffius at 
 Leyden .] 
 
 Note LXXXIV. p. 234 .—With these may 
 our Minds be unchangeably tinged, S2V.] 
 — ( 3 x 7 r\eTUi yap uVo ruv (pailartcov w 4 /U PC r '—M. Ant. 
 1. 5. f. 16. 
 
 Note LXXXV. Ibid. --With a reserve, 
 
 &fc.] v-m^sugUius. See Epic!. Enchirid, c. 2. 
 JZ. 1 . 4. f. 1. 1 . 5. f. 20. Seneca tranflates it, raw 
 exceptione. See Ab Beneficiis , 1 .4. f. 34. 
 
 Note LXXXVI. Ibid .-Never miss what 
 
 WE WOULD OBTAIN, OR FALL INTO THAT WHICH 
 WE WOULD AVOID, tsV.J jUMJTS OgiyoyHOV CCTTOTvf- 
 
 yoc'i fiv, iKxXivovla WfpmVIsJi/. Arr. EpiZt. 1 . 3. 
 
 c. 12. p. 404. 
 
 Note LXXXVII. p. 235.*— —Conduct me, 
 Thou, &c.] 
 
 Aj/« ot [a , w Zru, x, Hu )i zj£7rguy,ivn, 
 
 '’Qttoi 'stoS’ u>b £t ( Wt SlXTiTayp-iv^ 3 . 
 
 \Q? Jccxv©- 1 * m Si ye y.i SZAw, 
 
 K»>tCf J/£t'0jlA£V® J , Alb Jflov 
 
 Cleanthes in Epifl. Encb. c. 52. 
 
 Thus tranflated by Seneca: 
 
 Due me> parens , celfique dominator pcli, 
 
 Epuocunque placuit: nulla parendi mora eft : 
 
 Adfum 
 
 1 
 
I 
 
 ;© NOTES tf/z Treatise the 'Third \ 
 
 Adfum impiger , fac nolle : comitabor gemens y 
 Malufque patiar, quod bono licuit pati. 
 
 Epift. 107. 
 
 Note LXXXVIII. p.236. It is EIabit, re¬ 
 plied HE, IS ALL IN ALL. It IS PRACTICE 
 and Exercise, which can only, lAt. iAc- 
 to the End of the Paragraph.'] ——\\XXoi zroXXtis lyji 
 Xpeiocv zvaqoarKiuy; ^ zrova zsoXXe x) (xotfyyi[ aoctuv, 
 T t vv ; IXtti^si;, oti tjjv p.eyls"W t fairriv utto oXiyuv 
 
 tr»y doroXocSeTv *,- But (fays one, with refpeft to 
 
 the virtuous Chara&er) there is need of much Pre¬ 
 paration , of much Labour and Learning. And what? 
 Doji thou expert it fnould be pojfble (anfwers the 
 Philofopher) to obtain , by little Pains , the chiefejl 
 greatest Art? Arr. Epifi. 1 . 1. c. 20. p. 111. 
 
 rf A (pvu Pi Totvg®* J •yivsloii) Jit ymotii©* «^@pw7r© J • 
 dxXot Pa yttp.ourx.woUy zsot,^ouTHWoc<TOCC-$OHy ■*] ph iix.n 
 zrpo<T7rri$dv iz) r« y.r,Ptv zspozrxotTX. No robujl and 
 mighty Animal is complete at once; nor more is the brave 
 and generous Man. It is neceffary to undergo the fe¬ 
 ver ef Exercife and Preparation, and not rafAy plunge 
 into things , which are no zvay fwtable. Ejufd. 
 Differt. 1 . 1. c. 2. p. 18. See alfo the fame Author , 
 1 . 1. c. 15. p. 86. 1 . 2. c. 14. p. 243. Sed ut nec 
 mediciy nec imperatores , nec oratores , quamvis artis 
 pracepta perceperint , quidquam magna laude dignum 
 Jine ufu & exercitatione confequi poffunt : ftc oJfci' t 
 confervandi precept a traduntur ilia quidcm (ut facimu s 
 ipfi;) fed rei magnitudo ufum quoque exercitationcmque 
 defderat. Cic. de Offic. 1 . 1. c. 18. I’ ’H0IKH 
 ’^©OTS zvegiyivslou’ oQtv r xvopoc i<r%we—*> 
 
 Ethic. Nicom. 1 . 2. c. 1. 
 
 Note 
 
1ST O T E S on Treatise the Third. 
 
 Note LXXXIX. p. 236. Nothing is to be 
 
 HAD GRATIS, bV.] IIpODca x$iv ylvsloa. Arr. Epift. 
 1 . 4. c. 10. p. 653. The fame Sentiment is often re¬ 
 peated by the fame Author. 
 
 Note XC. p. 241.—-We are all go¬ 
 
 verned by Interest, (Ac.) See of the Dialogue , 
 
 р. 212, 246. See alfo Notes LVI. and XCII. 
 
 Note XCI. p. 243. -It is a smoaky 
 
 House-K xirvog i?r u 7 ripy ^ oy . txi . M . Ant . 1. 5, 
 
 с. 29. See Arr. Epift. 1 . 1. e. 25. p. 129. 
 
 Note XCII. ibid. Is a social Interest, bV.ij 
 As the Stoics, above all Philofophers, oppofed a 
 lazy inactive Life, fo they were perpetually recom¬ 
 mending a proper regard to the Public , and encou¬ 
 raging the Pradlice of every facial Duty. And tho* 
 they made the original Spring of every particular 
 Man’s Addion, to be Self-love, and the profpedt of 
 private Interejl $ yet fo intimately united did they 
 efteem this private Interelt with the public , that they 
 held it impojjible to promote the former, and not at 
 the fame time promote the latter. T oixv 1 r t v (pvcriv 
 tb Xoyoos fins xalfcn<u;a<rn), Ivtx y,w$tvog toov Ibiuv dyx- 
 Quiii buvvlca TuJp^avfiv, it y.y r 1 \tg to xoipov d(piXiy.ov 
 TZrpotrtpigihx 1° ovlceg ovxIti txxotvNilov yivflxi 9 to 
 T krccvloc dvlz ivtxoi vsoiuv. God hath fo framed the Na¬ 
 ture of the rational Animal , that it Jhouid not be able to 
 obtain any private Goods , if it contribute net withal fame 
 thing profitable to the Community. Thus is there no longer 
 any thins: unsocial, in doing all things for 
 THE SAKE OF SELF. Arr. EpiCl. 1 . I. C. 19. p. I06. 
 
 The 
 
 35* 
 
NOTES on Treatise the \Third* 
 
 The Peripatetic Doctrine was much the fame. 
 Uxifluv Hi d[M\Xu[/.£i/uv zcpog to kocXov, yty J 'iccthvq- 
 y.ivu>\> toc Kx/Jjfd zrpocrleiv, xoir/i t* ccv tsociH'i hn 
 too Siovloc., to, l Hi a iKocfo) toc yifcc tuv ayu9uv 9 
 
 V t> ' '■*/>.«/ \ \ fl ' $• ? 
 
 £»7Tfp 71 CCg£T7) TOliSTOV tfl UfS TOD [MV OS/OCX 70V, OH 
 (plXOCVTQV SlVXl * yj yxp OCVTOq oritSTCCl toc kocXoc 
 
 upocrlccv, yj Txq uKKnq dCOiXmn. Were all to aim 
 jointly at the fair Principle of Honour , and ever flrive 
 to att what is fairefi and mofi laudable , there would 
 be to every one in common vjhatever was zuanting, and to 
 each Man in particular of all Goods the greatefi 9 if Vir¬ 
 tue defer ve jufily to be fo ejleemed. So that the good. Man 
 is neceffarily a Friend to self: For by doing what 
 is laudable , he will always himfelf be profited , as well 
 as at the fame tune be beneficial to others. Ethic. Ni- 
 com. 1. 9. c. 8. 
 
 Note XCIII. p. 243. - If so, then Honour 
 
 and Justice are my Interests, iffc.J Thus 
 Cicero , after having fuppofed a fiocial common Interejl 
 to be the natural In ter eft of Man, fubjoins imrne- * 
 
 diately- Jfiuod ft ita efi 9 urn continemur omnes iff ea~ 
 
 dem lege natures. Idque ipfum ft ita eft> certe violare 
 alter urn lege natures prohibemur. De Gflic. 1. 3. c. 6. 
 
 Note XCIV. Ibid. - Without some Por¬ 
 tion of which not even Thieves, &X] -- 
 
 Cujus (fic. Jufitiee) tanta vis efi 9 ut ne illi quidem , 
 qui maleficio iff feelere pafeuntur , poffint fine ulla par - 
 1 1 cilia jufiities vivere. Nam qui eorum cuipiam , qui 
 una latrocinantnr , furatur aiiquid ant eripit, is fibi ne 
 in latrocinio quidem relinquit locum. Ille autem qui 
 8 archi- 
 
NOTES ^Treatise the Hhird* 
 
 archipirata dicitur , nift aquabiliter pradam , &c. De 
 Offic. 1 . 2. c. ii. 
 
 — —’AAA* sriv ctvotfxri, (pvrntrig vtryg t>i£ xoivuuocg 
 mat (pu(7£* t« Slxot ja, Ji 7 aw Iru* a xoivuvfx. **Oti yap 
 
 TO JtXXIOV 0 -UV£p^£» TW XOIVCCVIUV, £yi?\OV ifiv £ 7 T 4 TWi/ 
 
 aftxulotTUV thou J'oxisi/'luv' »rot o£ I«r»i/ o* AjjjW* off 
 « zjrpof «AA?iAsf xoivoovtx vtto Jmoao<rvvris <ru£tlaci rug 
 zrpog xXXvAxg. A»a te to p*?!' vrXzowiltTv aA- 
 
 ArjAs?, <?»« to ^vju&adtai, xj di;? to' riju,av to 
 xpcTrlov Johuv, rd, to' t» TufxapiEva (pvAocrluv, J'kz 
 to' PojiOeTu to»V aV 9 fi/£f££Oi?, 3 ix txZtx n cepog aAA«- 
 A«j xuloig xoivuuix (rvpcfXEOst aw zj«» Txvou/ltov ug ag 
 d£iKzcri zjom<ri:/. It is ncceffary , Society ta/«g- n<3/w- 
 raJ) that Justice Jbould be natural alfo , which 
 
 Society exijls. For that "juftice holds Society together , 
 zi evident in thoj'e , who appear of all the majl unjujl 9 
 jitch 1 mean as Robbers or Banditti , whofe Society 
 ■with each other is preferved by their JuJlice to each 
 ether. For by not afpiring to any unequal Shares , 
 ffiwr falftfying , and by fubmitting to what appears 
 expedient , guarding the Booty amajfed to¬ 
 
 gether , and by ajjifing their weaker Companions , 
 ■thefe things it is, that their Society fubfifls ; the contrary 
 to all which they do by thofe , whom they injure. Alex. 
 Aphrod. Zuc^i \pu%. p. 156. Edit. Aid. See alfo 
 Plat, de Repub. 1 . 1. p. 351. tom. 11. iu/;V. Serrani. 
 
 Note XCV. p. 245. What then have I 
 to do, but to enlarge Virtue into Piety? 
 Not only Honour, bV.J 
 
 A si All 
 
 3 S 3 
 
 l 
 
354 NOTES on The atise the Third* 
 
 All manner of Events, which any way affect a 
 Man, arife either from within himfelf\ or from 
 Caufes independent. In the former cafe, he main¬ 
 tains an a Stive Part ; in the latter, a paffive. The 
 aftive Part of his Character feems chiefly to be the 
 Care of Virtue, for it is Virtue which teaches us 
 what we are to aft or do ; the pajjive Part feems to 
 belong more immediately to Piety, becaufe by this 
 we are enabled to refign and acquiefce , and bear with 
 a manly Calmnefs whatever befals us. As there¬ 
 fore we are framed by Nature both to aSt and to 
 fuffer , and are placed iti a Univerfe, where we are 
 perpetually compelled to both •, neither Virtue nor 
 Piety is of itfelf fufficient, but to pafs becomingly 
 jhro’ Life, we fhould participate of each. 
 
 Such appears to have been the Sentiment of the 
 
 wife and good Emperor - —dvbxiv oA ov sxvlov, JWa jo- 
 
 svvri [Atv ten v(p zxvla ivipyayvivoe, ev ot r otf «A- 
 Aok <ruy.£ix*vx<ri J rn tuv wAcou (pvcrti. Tf V igi 7 ti?, 
 •ji xnroXrityilou iTtfi aula, j? xsfl’ aVJZ, a? 
 
 vilv (3fieAAf1«tj duo raVoif d^nty.iv^r, ctulbg J'txxto- 
 vrpocyt'iv to vuv nrpoccrcrby.tvov, k) (ptXeTv to urron- 
 fj.by.tvov tavlu) - He (the perfect Man) commits him¬ 
 
 felf wholly ' to Justice, the universal Na¬ 
 ture; to Justice, to thofe things which are 
 done by himfelf ; in all other Events , to Na¬ 
 ture of the Whole. What any one will fay 0 
 or think about him , or aft againfe him> he doth not fo 
 much as take into confederation j contented and abun¬ 
 dantly fatisfied with theje two things , himfelf to do 
 justly what is at this infant doing , and to ap¬ 
 prove 
 
355 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third, 
 
 prove and LOVE, what is at this infant allotted him. 
 M. Anton. 1. io. f. n. Ildfix ixeTvx, l(p’ d Sid 
 zrtgioSa IaSAi/, r,Sn t^tTv Svvxtxi, Idv ft trxvlu 
 
 (pOovyg' t»to Js ifiv, Idv tssuv to vruc'XQov xdlxXi7rvig, 
 X? to' [XSXXoV tTTtTpSlJp? TiJ zxpovo IXi 7 £> TO ZTCtgOV [JCOVOi I 
 
 etvevOwt ZSTpo'f 'CIIOTHTA AIKAIOZTNHN* 
 OTiordlx y.\v, luos (ptXtjs to x7rov£y,ofxsvov‘ crol yelp dvlo v 
 
 (pvfig i(ptPZ 7 7^ CT£ TXT'f SlXZlOO’UVWV (^£, \vX iX £U0E£Wf 
 
 xcr££>!7rAo}tiK Ae^ijs ?e t’ «A>i0ji, tc, wpxT<rvg tx 
 
 xdhz vouo'j f xaf dfclocv - —All thofe things , at which 
 
 thou wifhef to arrive by a road round about , thou 
 mayji injlantly pojjefs, if thou doji not grudge them to 
 thyfelf ; that is to fay , in other words , if every thing 
 pajl thou intirely quit , the future thou trujl to Pro- 
 vidence , and the prcfent alone thou adjufl according to 
 Piety and Justice ; according to Piety , that fo thou 
 tnayjl approve , love what is allotted , [/or whatever 
 
 it be, it was Nature brought it to thee , and thee io it;) ac¬ 
 cording to f if ice , fo thou mayji generoufly and with¬ 
 
 out difguife both jpeak the Truth, and a£i what is confo- 
 nant io [the general] Law , and the real Value of things, 
 M. Ant. 1. 1 2i c. i. See afo 1. 7. c. 54. andVXss.td’s 
 Gorgias, p. 507. Tom. 1 . Edit. Serr. k) /aw 
 trco(ppwv. k. t. A. 
 
 Note XCVI. p. 245.- 1 have an Inte¬ 
 
 rest WHICH MAY EXIST, WITHOUT ALTER* 
 ing the Plan of Providence; without 
 
 MENDING, Tlcci$iVi<rdou " • • Ti Ihfl TO [xxvQx- 
 
 Vftv zKccfo i «tw S’c'AeU', w?, &c. To be inftrudled - 
 
 that is to fay , to learn fo to will all things , as ?’« fa d 
 they happen. And how do they happen ? As He, tv bo 
 ordains them , hath ordained. Now he hath ordained 
 that there Jhould be Summer and J Vinter , and Plenty 
 
 A a 2 and 
 
356 
 
 NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 and Famine, and Virtue and Vice, and all manner cf 
 Contrarieties, for the Harmony of the Whole ; and to 
 each of us hath He given a Body , and its Members , 
 and a Fortune , and certain Affociates. Mindful there - 
 fore of this Order , to come for Injlruftion , 
 
 indeed how we may alter what is already efablifried, 
 (for that neither is permitted us, nor would it be better 
 fo to bei) but how , while things continue around us, 
 j'ujl as they are, <75 /V their Nature, ur may f ill 
 
 preferve our 'Judgment in harmony with all that happens. 
 Arr. Epidt. 1 . 1. c. 12. p. 74. 
 
 Note XCVII. p. 246. Who would be unv 
 happy? Who would not, if he knew 
 HOW, ENJOY ONE PERPETUAL FELICITY, 
 
 —t«u7*i$ (fc. IvSotsy.ovioig') yd p ydgiv tu Kenned znohr- 
 ng zjdvhz zrpdfloMiv. It is for the fake of Happinefs 9 
 we all of us do all other things whatever. Ethic.' Ni- 
 com. 1 . 1. c. 12. fub. fin. -See before, of the Dia¬ 
 
 logue pages 212,241. and Notes LVI andXCII. Plat • 
 Protag. p. 358. T. 1. Ed. Serr. 
 
 Note XCVIII. Ibid .—— —If it happen to 
 be erroneous, it is a grateful Error, 
 WHICH I CHERISH, &c.] *Ei dc i%X 7 rodr$iv]oi t ivd 
 ’fd jua&flv, on ruv tarog anpoxi^iTUV JJtv eVi zopog 
 7[xa,g, tyu> 7 ) 0 £Aoy ryv unuTViv tuvts jv, e-g t,g 
 r\uaKAoii l\)(>oug dra^dy^wg fltutfetrdoii. Were a 
 Man to be deceived , in having learnt concerning Ex¬ 
 ternals, that all beyond our Power was to us as nothing ; 
 1 , for my own part, would clef re a Deceit, which would 
 triable me for the future to live tranquil and ur.di- 
 Jlurbcd. Arr. Epidt 1 . 1. c. 4. p. 27. 
 
 Nqte 
 
NOTES on Treatise the Third. 
 
 357 
 
 Note XCIX. p. 247. -When we are 
 
 ONCE, SAID HE, WELL HABITUATED TO THIS 
 
 •-moral Science, then Logic and Phy¬ 
 
 sics BECOME TWO PROFITABLE ADJUNCTS, fsV.] 
 Ad eafque virtutes , de am bus difputatum ejl, Dialecli- 
 cam etiam adjungunt & pbyfcam , eafque ambas vir- 
 tutum nomine adpellant: alteram , quod habeat ratio - 
 nem ne cui falfo adfentiamur , neve, Cic. de Fin. 
 
 1. 3. c. 21. p. 265. 
 
 The threefold Division of Philosophy 
 into Ethics , Phyfics, and Logic , was commonly re¬ 
 ceived by moil Sedls of Philofophers. See Laert. 1 . 7. 
 c. 39. See alfo Cicero in his Treatife de Legibus , 1 . 1. 
 c. 23. and in his Academics, 1. 1. c. 5. Fuit ergo jam 
 accept a a Plat one philofophandi ratio triplex , &c. Plu¬ 
 tarch de Placit. Philof. p. S74. 
 
 A a 3 
 
 A D V E R- 
 

 
 . 
 
 . ' 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 y HE following Notes , chiefly taken 
 from Greek Manufcripts, are added 
 partly to explain , partly to give the Reader 
 a Specimen of certain Works , valuable for 
 their Rarity , jj - i zev// < 7 / for their Merit . 
 
 A a 4 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
 
 . 
 
 
 
 . : ? &t, ' 
 
 ' * \ . ' 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . .1 
 
 : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
( 3 61 ) ' 
 
 ADDITIONAL 
 
 NOTE 
 
 O N 
 
 TREATISE the Second. 
 
 P AGE 54. - The necessf.ry Arts seem 
 
 TO HAVE BEEN PRIOR, &C.,] 
 
 The following Extract from a Manufcript of Phi - 
 loponus may help to fhew the comparative Priority of 
 Arts and Sciences, by fhewing (according to this Au¬ 
 thor) the order of their Revival in a new formed So¬ 
 ciety. Such Society he fuppofes to have arifsn from 
 fcattered Individuals again affemblingthemfelves, after 
 former Societies had by various incidents of War, Fa¬ 
 mine, Inundation, and the like, been diflipated and 
 deftroyed. 
 
 % 
 
 Having fpoken of the Effefls of Deucalion's Flood, 
 he proceeds as follows——Ourot Zv 01 ■arsgiXti(pQiVTfs 9 
 t%ov 7 ei odeu av Tpoo^eTev, hrevoxv V 7 r* ccvctyxyg too 
 zrpoi %puotv 9 oiov to ccXriQuv fxvXocig err ov 9 v to <ti rtl- 
 
 f £,V > n T\ TOIHTOV OoXXo' 7^ iKCoXSCTOOV TY]V TOICCVTVV \ttI~ 
 voiav (TofpliXV) TVV £<5 TOO <X.V0iyX.0UX Til |3iS TO XytUTSXiZ 
 {vgitrxvcav, <ro(pov tov t7ri\)ioor t KOTx. 
 
 JJoc X\v 
 
Additional Note on Treatife the Second. 
 
 TlxXiv lirtvoycroiv rlyvoig, cog (pytr'tv o zeoiflyg, 
 - V7ro6y/^o(rvv/i(riv ’A Qrivrg, 
 
 a [aovov rug T vs T5 ' v P‘ ov ocvoiyxyg irxjoctvag, 
 
 aXXoi >tj f^^XP 1 Ti5 ^-OcXis h} aVcttf zspoiccrxg' ;tj txto 
 nzxXiv irotplav xixXyxxtnv, ro'v ivgovlx aopbv’ ug to, 
 
 —- -- <7Cl(pog YgXOl TidluV, 
 
 ’Ey uSug <ro(pirig 
 
 — U7ro@n//,oirJ^>;(ri T ’A Qyvyg si7nv, *7T£* Six tyv 
 Im^oXyv twu tvgy/xxTUV hg v£e\> T«y tv'tuv ’artv'jixv 
 ccvipipov. 
 
 IJxXiV, a7r£j3Af\|/'au zcpog tx woXitixz zc pxy[xoclx, 
 df ifccvgov vo'ftovg, x} vtxvtx tx crvvirouvJa rag zroXiig' 
 ytj tzvtyv zex Atv tjiv Inluoixv aopixv ixxXtcnxv' rotaroj 
 •yap ygxv oi \ir\x aopo), zsroA vnxctg nvxg xoirag £u~ 
 go'vrig. 
 
 Elrx Xonrov, odu zrpoictihg, x) if ocvtx tx ircb[/.xJx, 
 5^ tjjv Jyy.iispyo\ xutcov zrpoy/^ov (p uVjv, jo) txvttiv iidi- 
 xut igov pvcrixyu ixdXcrxv S'cue lav, cotps'f raj tjjo 
 Toixulyv {XiTlOvLxf (TX£\J/t». 
 
 TfAfUTaiov <T ctt’ ccuto? Xonrov £pQx<rxv ru SttTx, 
 u 7 T£pHoVjou«, xj ziastxQXytx zsxvTsXug, rvjy tutuv 
 Tyworj xvgiuTXTriv Toplxv wvoy.x<rxv. 
 
 These therefore, that were thus left, not having 
 whence they could fupport themfelves , began thro ’ »*- 
 to contrive things relative to immediate IVant, 
 fuch as the grinding of Corn by Mills , or the fowivg 
 it, orfomething elfe of like kind ; and fuch Contrivance, 
 
 dlf- 
 
Additional Note on 'Treatije the Second . 
 
 difcovering what was conducive to the Necefiaries of 
 Life, they called Wifdom , and him a wife Alan , who 
 had been the Contriver. 
 
 Again, they contrived Arts (as Homer fays) 
 
 By Precepts of Alinerva --- 
 
 that is , not only thofe Arts , that Jhp at the Neceffty 
 of Life , but thofe alfo that advance as far as the Fair 
 and Elegant ; and this too they called Wifdom , and the 
 Inventor a wife Alan. Thus the Poet : 
 
 - The Work 
 
 *Twas a ivife Artifl fram'd , his Wifdom taught 
 By Precepts of Alinerva -- 
 
 The lafl Words are added , becaufe, from the Tranfen * 
 dence of the Inventions, they referred their contrivance to 
 a Divinity. 
 
 Again, they turned their Eyes to Matters Political, 
 and found out Laws, and the feveral things that con - 
 flitute Cities , or civil Communities; and this Con¬ 
 trivance in its turn they called Wifdom , and of this fort 
 were thofe celebrated Seven Wife Men, the Inventors of 
 certain Virtues Political. 
 
 After this, fill advancing in a road , they pro¬ 
 ceeded to corporeal Subflances , and to Nature, their effi¬ 
 cient Caufe ; and this Speculation , by a more fpecifc Name, 
 they called Natural Speculation, and thofe Perfons wife, 
 who purfued fuch Inquiries. 
 
 Last of all , they attained even to Beings divine , 
 fupramundane , and wholly unchangeable ; and the 
 
 Know- 
 
 3 6 3 
 
3 6 4 
 
 Additional Note on Treatife the Second. 
 
 Knowledge of thefe they named the most excellent 
 Wisdom. 
 
 A few Obfervations on this important PafTage may 
 not perhaps be improper. 
 
 Our firfl; Obfervation is, thattho’ we give it from 
 Fhiloponus , yet is it by him (as he informs us) taken 
 from a Work of Arijlocles , an antient Peripatetic, 
 intitled, flscl ( pi\c<ro(plx $, Concerning Pbilofophy . Some 
 indeed have conjectured that for Arijlocles we ought to 
 read Ar'Jlcteles , becaufe the laft puhlifhed a Work un¬ 
 der this Title, which he quotes himfelf in his Treatife, 
 Ke Anima. Be this as it may, the Extract itfelf is 
 valuable, not only for its Matter, but for being thg 
 fragment of a Treatife now no longer extant. 
 
 Our next Obfervation is, that by Matters Poli¬ 
 tical in their third Paragraph, the Author means not the 
 frjl Affociations of Mankind, for thefe were prior to 
 aimoft every thing elfe, and were not referable to 
 Art, but to the innate Impulfe of the focial Principle : 
 He means on the contrary thofe more exquifite and ar¬ 
 tificial Forms , given to Societies already eftablifhed, in 
 order to render them happy, and refeue and preferve 
 them from tyrannic Power. Such was the Polity given 
 by Lycurgus to the Lacedemonians , by Solon to the 
 Athenians , by Numa to the Romans , &c. Thofe great 
 and good Men, in meditating their Inllitutions, had 
 the fame Sentiment with Akiclamas , according to that 
 noble Fragment of his preferved in the Scholiaft upon 
 
 Arijlotle’s Rhetoric - <x<prpa zedvlx.; St ids' 
 
 voivee JaAov i (pu<nj ZTirrorcKiv. God hath fent forth all 
 Men free ; Nature made no Man a Slave . 
 
 Oust 
 
/ 
 
 Additional Note on Treatife the Second. 365 
 
 Our third Obfervation is, that by the mojl excellent 
 Science, in the laft Paragraph, is meant the Science of 
 Caufes, and, above all others, of Caufes efficient and 
 final, as thefe neceflarily imply pervading Reafon, and 
 fuperintending Wifdom. This Science, as Men were 
 naturally led to it from the Contemplation of EffieCls, 
 
 ■which Effects were the Tribe of Beings natural or phy- 
 fical, was, from being thus fubfequent to thefe phyftcal 
 Inquiries, called Methaphyfical ; but with a View toitfelf, 
 and the tranfcendent Eminence of its ObjeCl, was more 
 properly called i srpwrr? ( piXotrotploi , the First Phi¬ 
 losophy. 
 
 Our fourth Obfervation is on the Order of thefe 
 Inventions, namely, Arts neceffiary, Arts elegant ; Arts 
 political ; Science phyfical-, Science Metaphyfical; in all, 
 five Habits, or Modes of Wifdom. The neceffiary Arts 
 it is evident mull on all Accounts have come firft When 
 thefe were once eftablifhed, the Tranfition to the Elegant 
 was eafy and obvious. Inventions of Neceffity, by the 
 Super-additions of Difpatch, Facility, and the like, foon 
 ripened into Inventions of Convenience ; and again 
 thefe, having in their very nature a certain Beauty 
 and Grace, eafily fuggefted Inventions of pure and 
 fimple Elegance. 
 
 That the Legiflators, tho’ in Pvank and Genius far 
 fuperior to all natural Philofophers, fhould come before 
 them in point of time, is owing to the Nature of their 
 Subject, which had a more immediate Connection 
 with Man , and Human Happinefs. It was not indeed 
 till Societies were thoroughly eftablifhed, and Peace 
 had been well fecured both internally and externally, 
 that Men had Leifure, or even Inclination, to reflect 
 
 on 
 
 \ 
 
3 66 Additional Note on Treatife the Second 
 
 on the Objects round them, or to recognize that vaft 
 Manfion, in which they found themfelves exifting. 
 
 Lastly, as the tremendous Part of phyftcal Events 
 led weak Minds, who could not explain them, into 
 the Abyfs of dark and dreary Superflition ; fo thofe 
 phyftcal Events, which had Beauty and Order, being 
 in their turn equally ftriking, and equally Obje£ts of 
 Admiration, led ftrong and generous Minds into Prin¬ 
 ciples the very reverfe*. They conceived it probable, 
 as their own Views were limited, that, even where 
 Beauty and Order were not to them apparent, they 
 might {till in other views have a moft real Exiftence, 
 Farther, as thefe Obfervers could perceive nothing 
 doneeither by themfelves,or thofe of their own Species^ 
 ■'Svhich, if it in the lead afpired to Utility, or Beauty, 
 was not neceffarily the Effect of a confcicus and inteU 
 ligent Caufe, they were, from the fuperior Utility and 
 Beauty of phyftcal Effects, induced to infer a confcicus 
 and intelligent Caufe of thefe, far fuperior to thein- 
 felves ; a Caufe, which from the Univerfality of thefe 
 Events, as well as from their Union and Sympathy , was 
 not, as are the Sons of Men, a Multitude of limittea 
 Caufes , but a fmple Caufe , univerfal and one ; a Caufe 
 too, which, from the never-ceafing of its Events, was 
 not, like the fame human Beings, an intermittent Caufe, 
 but a Caufe , ever operating, ever in Energy. 
 
 We fee therefore the Reafon why this First Phi¬ 
 losophy was fuhfequent in point of Time to phyftcal 
 Speculation, and why of courfe to the other Habits or 
 Modes of Wifdom here enumerated, tho’ in its own 
 Dignity and Importance far fuperior to them all. 
 
 OuR 
 
Additional Note on Treatife the Second . 
 
 Our fifth Obfervation is, that as a Nation may be 
 faid to be in a State of Perfection, which is in the full 
 Poffeflion of all thefe Habits, or Modes ofWifdom ; 
 fo thofe Nations are neareft to Perfection, that poffefs 
 them in the greateft Number, or in a ftate of the great- 
 eft Maturity . 
 
 A Man of Ingenuity, might find rational Amufe- 
 ment from this Speculation, by comparing the fame 
 Nation as to thefe Matters, cither with itfelf in different 
 Periods, or with its Neighbours in the fame Periods, 
 either paft or prefent. He might for example compare 
 aniieni Britain with antient Greece ; prefent Britain 
 with prefent Greece ; Britain in the Age of Crufades , 
 with Britain in the Age of Elizabeth ; prefent Britain , 
 with her Colonies; with Italy, France , Holland , and 
 the enlightened Countries ; with Spain , Portugal , Bar¬ 
 bary, &c. But this we leave, as foreign to our Work, 
 and drawing us into a Theory, which merits a better 
 place than an occafional Note. 
 
 A IT 
 
 367 
 
 
( 368 ) 
 
 additional 
 
 NOTES 
 
 O N 
 
 TREATISE the Third. 
 
 |AGE 115 . 
 
 “And that the Dif¬ 
 
 ference LAY ONLY IN THE APPLYING 
 them to Particulars.] So Proclus in 
 his Manufcript Comment on the prji Alcibiadts of 
 Plato > p. 139. H Ken?} ^ aSixg-popQr 3 hvotx t r,v eu- 
 Sxifxo'jixv tw duTxpKnx yagxxTyglfi" uxp’ uv yxp to 
 To, zrx^x t«tku Aj tp dvTapxeg. ?tj boxg cy zruhiu 
 07rug ivrxvGx fj b ’AAxi'Sixbwg xxTopGoT fv xxtx 
 xro piii^ovK) <r(pot\\iTui <Te xxtu tu'v eA qi'tIgvx zrpora- 
 «TiV. SuAA oyipTai yxp arwj* tyu Six crx'y.x^ Aj yevt&i 
 yb) (piXvg 9 rb) txXvt ov tvSxifxuv' 0 IvSxdfxuv avivSeyg* 
 lyu (jp^inv) u’jivSwg' vxuv on [xlv 0 hiSxifxwv uvev- 
 $$r,g, x7\r$k' oTt ^ xorbg ASx'uxv^ to 
 
 cyZi/ <TV[M rtgx<r[AX \.]y£uJ£? Six Tr,v eA xtIovx. ySj trxg 
 
 IvjOTGiig yb, TG’J (pt'ATiS&VCV, Xj T OV (pl\OXpV[XCtTOV, Sid 
 
 txvTtiv 4‘£u Sofxlvxg' 0 fj.lv yap nSovilv, b Je y_pv\fxa~ 
 r» tiGst «» to aya.Gov* on SI ttxv to ItytTov ayx Gov* 
 
 X91V0P 
 
Additional Notes on Treat ife the Third. 
 
 xmvov if)v aurolf. cvveXovn (p»mi 9 ra? /iaev [xil - 
 tuv zj-poTttcrEwv ixocfoi rlOcocriv, urro tuv hoi- 
 kc*jw svvciwv Ta Aoj/8 raura? wpoSaAAovbf, rdf 
 iXoNJug octto (pxiloccioify uiro atcrOvjVfwj, «Vo twv 
 ccXoyoov zrpotpegovlxi zroc9oou’ JW -K) tmjtsuS y.h $iot(pl- 
 jD«VTat wpo? aAA^Aa?, uaiWi? <Je 0|Uc£ppoi/<i<n. res 
 ^-a'p mtOn ^f^jer^a iiocfoc<redg Efii/ ama, tocT; tj/u- 
 ^aTf* TiTOtviHtx <yocp tf<, ^ §cx<nrocy cttoc^iztIei tou tv 
 r ; y-~ v mv' ° <^£ AoTl^p koivos ifi tiratn, ^ ij ra AoTa zepo- 
 €oXr\ ^ tSto K0IN02 O EPMH2, \'vx Jjj 
 yhxtoc aura zvon/itru/xtQx riv sfcyywrtv. 
 
 The universal and unperverted Idea of Alan cha - 
 raflerifes Happiness by Self-sufficiency, 
 with whomever Well-being exjfisy with them the Self- 
 fujficient exijls alfo. Tou fee therefore , how here again 
 Alcibades is right as to his Major Proposition, 
 but m'f.aken as to the Minor. For thus it is he Jyl- 
 
 logizes -“ /, on account of my Perfon and Family 
 
 “ and Friends and Wealthy am HAPPY. — The Perfon 
 “ happy is superior To Want— therefore am l 
 li superior to Want.” Now that , the Per¬ 
 son happy is superior to Want, is true ; but 
 that He was happy, was falfe. The Conclu¬ 
 sion therefore is false thro ’ the Minor Proposi¬ 
 tion. 
 
 It is thus alfo Ton xvill find the Lover of Pleafure , 
 and the Lover of Money , erring in their ReafoningSy 
 thro' the fame Propofition. For one of them lays doivrt 
 the Good of Man to be Pleafure , the other to be 
 Riches'y but that every thing desirable is Good, 
 
 B b this 
 
 3 6 9 
 
Additional Notes on Treatife the Niird, 
 
 this they pofffs in common , and ajfent to on both 
 fides. 
 
 It may be faid indeed univerfally , that all Indivi¬ 
 duals produce the general Propositions, which 
 they lay down , from their common or Universal 
 Ideas, and from the Faculty of Reason : but that 
 their minor Propositions are produced from Ima¬ 
 gination, from Sense, and from irrational Pas¬ 
 sions. And hence it is , that about thefe LAST they 
 dif'er one with another , while in the FORMER they all 
 agree. The Passtons indeed may be confdered within 
 the Souls of Men as the Cafes of Divifon and Dijlance 
 for they are Titanic, and diftraCt and tear oar 
 Intellect to pieces. But R.EASON is the fame and 
 common to all , as is alfo the Faculty of Speech , the 
 Medium of its Promulgation. And hence it is> that 
 Hermes (the Type of rational Difcourfe) is called 
 common and universal, if we may be allowed to 
 give of him an Ethical Explanation. 
 
 P. 185 -Fix our Happiness in the mers 
 
 doing . 3 So Proclus - Tluaut yap cel ra 
 
 zs-pdfciii zspoi cevrov » rr'y uvedpogeev' ivzeyyrag Zv 
 
 SUfpi/£T»K«.? S’£ 07 rpE 7 r£«)f, Iv T HI iVCpFciCC TO TEAlg^ Ep£f», 
 
 yUl the Actions of the virtuous Man have reference to 
 himfef. When therefore he has energized beneficently 
 and divinely , it is In the very Energy itself 
 that he obtains his End.— This from the fame 
 MS. Comment as the Note preceding. 
 
 P. 220.— The genuine Sphere and genuine 
 
 Cylinder, tsV.] - dxf rye ZpcTtgoc stoa- 
 
 Aw 
 
 i 
 
Additional Notes on Trsatife the Third. 071 
 
 Aw yi) axpiQlge^x yd) xa 0 *^«ur£^a tcov (pocivcfAivuv bn- 
 vosiv ciuvtZTUi, Hp <yivvav1 rev <y hv (paivo gcevofj xvxA ov 
 tirrfitpQitTCCtj yhp A tyti, xa(yo<rov krog dnoXt'nriTCu t3 
 axp/bKf, >tj tS’nAow, w? cpuxtx r< t 3 t» xaAAjoi/ aAAo kJ 
 rfAftorf^ou etJof a wa [xrjcvog £(px7r1oy.bri, jur^s 
 tig t i ytocQxgwTtgov ( 3 xb racct, tkto ^£d a (pvtnu ovhogiTvctt 
 xxAcu } tut o Js s -sTiXvhi itrov' oivluy yscp Tip Xtyuv rdvhxt 
 
 Jeixvviriv ug cgx TO riANTHI KAAON I1AN- 
 THI HON. Our Soul is able both to perceive 
 and to produce ObjeCls much more accurate and pure , 
 than thofe which are vifibly apparent. It corrects there¬ 
 fore the apparent Circle , and fays , how much that 
 Circle wants of the Perjed one ; and this it evidently 
 does , by beholding fome Form, which is fairer than 
 the vifible one , and more perfect. It is not indeed 
 pofftble , that , without connection with any thing elfe, 
 or without looking upon fomething more pure , /V Jhould 
 fay that this is not really Fair, this is not in every re - 
 Equal: For by thefe very djfcrtion^ it proves that 
 it beholds that which is in every respect 
 Fair, and in every respect Equal. From 
 the MS. Comment of Proclus on the Parmenides , Book 
 the Third. 
 
 Ibid.- The Source of infinite Truths , &c.] The 
 
 Antients held four Methods or ProceJJes in their Dia¬ 
 lectic for the Inveftigation of Truth : Firft the Divi - 
 five ( r, dtaipiiixd) by which we divide and feparnte the 
 real Attributes of Being; next the Definitive, (3 oei- 
 nxri) by which we bring them again together, and by 
 a juft arrangement form them into Definitions ; thirdly 
 the Demonjirative , (3 uto^hkIixyI) in which we em¬ 
 ploy tbofe Definitions, and by fyllogizing defeend thro’ 
 
 B b 2 them 
 
Additional Note r on Treatife the Third. 
 
 them from Caufes to Effects j and laflly the Analytic 
 (i xvx\vtiky\) in which, by an inverfe Procefs we un¬ 
 ravel Demonftrations, and fo afcend from Effects to 
 Caufes. 
 
 Now to all thefe Methods they held EIAH, that 
 is, Specific Forms or Ideas to be indifpenfably 
 requifite, from their two important Chara&ers of Per - 
 mansnce , and Comprehenfion. 
 
 Hence it is that Proclus , in the fifth Book of hi's 
 Comment on the Partnenides , having gone thro’ the 
 fcveral Methods above mentioned, concludes with the 
 following remark. 
 
 El agx iuy ifi roc EIAH, xx tcrovTXi al fxXcxhxol 
 [. jUOoJoi, aa0 s a.; tx ov tx yJvu<rxc{xiv, if otto i r pi^ofxsv 
 rrjv fxvoixv i%oy.sV a urn yd p n Svvx[m; rng 
 Aira zsoQxcru rriv ainV.v, S7rl tgs EIAH xxrx(p£uyci. 
 If therefore there are no Specific Ideas or Forms, 
 there can be none of thofe Dialectic Methods , by which 
 we come to the Knowledge of things , nor fall we know 
 whither to direct our Difcurfive Faculty ; for this i* 
 that Power of the Soul , which , defiring above all others 
 the Caufe or Reafon of things , files for that Purpofe to 
 Forms or Specific Ideas. 
 
 P. 226.—Not the smallest Atom is either 
 foreign OR DETACHED .]—ifiv iv ifIV xroog ocTifxov 
 yy (pauAov, 0 A t« dyx9e, xaxuQsv sfsi rfi 
 
 yivctriv’ ettu xav tvv oXyv bVoij, ivfi<reig x} tocvtyiv dfx- 
 GoV xxv xulb to xxxcv , evfcreig fy r«ro [/.ct'c^ov olfx9x 
 Tivbg, yd, if xX?\xg x/rrornvxi dovd/xcuov, n tco xfx9u %puv- 
 vvj xtvoVy ry [MTtxXx[x@xvov ocy x9x t mg. «Aa’ al fiiv 
 
 6 
 
 T UV 
 
Additional Notes on Treat ife the Third. 
 
 tccv av0pw7rwv Sofcoti <rp.ixpx dj lureAr) tjh • 9 'hW xnlxq e£- 
 octtUiv ifcxKryfivovlxi, wpog rriv thtwu «7rc£A£7racraj (pucriVj 
 * urpoV rtfw ixclvys $vvxy. iv, x] on tuv pti£ovon hvx 
 •ycvvvTixri •sroAAu •srAtov j’rt rwy tXxavovoov’ ol i\ ovTiog 
 ( piXorotpoi , -srauT# o<r« zs’t^ l?iv ev to xc<rp.(i) x] ^e- 
 ^JtAa x^ (TfxrAox zTgoioiocg adsu «t</aov, 
 
 adt <Z7?oG?^riTov iv rw otxw Ta Aid? cgocmv, aAAa u txvtx 
 dyxQx, x x9o<rov lx zrpcvolxg utpirvxs , x] xaAa, uar’ 
 ulnxv yiyovorx tav S'fsxv. There is therefore nothing 
 ignoble and bafe , which doth not participate of THE 
 Good Principle, z?«z/ hath not from thence its Origin. 
 Should you even inflame Matter, you will find even 
 that to be Good ; fhould you infance Evil 
 yea wzV/ y5W that afo participating of fome Goody 
 and no other wife able to fub fifty than as coloured by 
 Good, and partaking of it. The Opinions indeed of 
 ordinary men are ajhamed to refer little and contemptible 
 Things to the [primary and] divine Caufe , looking fin 
 their reafonings] to the Nature of the Subjects, not to 
 the Power of the Caufe, and [to this neceffary con- 
 fequence] that if it be productive of the greater Ef¬ 
 fect s y much more fo is it of the inferior. But thofe 
 on the contrary , who are truly Philofophers , referring 
 all Things both great and finally that exifl in the Uni - 
 verfe , to a Providence, behold nothing fit to be re¬ 
 jected in this Mansion of Jove, but all Things Good, 
 as having been efiablijhed by a Providence, and 
 Fair, as having been produced by a Cause, which 
 is divine. Proclus in his manufeript Comment on 
 the Parmenides of Plato. 
 
 p. 234 ..——Who art of purer Eyes, than 
 ever to behold Iniquity.] An Ear, that was to 
 hear a mufical Difcord alone y would have Ideas of 
 
 B b 3 Dif- 
 
 373 
 
374 
 
 Additional Notes on Treatife the Third, 
 
 DifTonance, unknown to that Ear, which, along with 
 the Difcord, was to hear its Preparation and Jlefolution. 
 An Eye, that was to fee only the Words —venis iff caco 
 carpitur —would have Ideas of Abfurdity, unknown to 
 that Eye, which was to behold the Verfe intire: 
 
 Vulnus alii venis , et caco carpitur igni. 
 
 Numerous are the Ideas of Defedf, Errour, Abfur* 
 dity, Falfehood, &c. all referable to this Oafs; Ideas, 
 which arife purely from partial and incomplete Com- 
 prehenfion, and which have no Exiftence, where the 
 Comprehension is univerfal and complete. It feems to 
 be from this reafoning, that Themjlius affcrts— tijuu- 
 uligoi yap Nh;, o roc zoX(lu) vouv, o.Xa o t a dptlvu. 
 The more respectable Mind is not that, which 
 perceivcth the greater Number of Objefls, but 
 the better and more excellent ones. Them, 
 in Arijlot. de A aim, p, 92 . Edit. Aid. 
 
 TOST- 
 
( 375 ) 
 
 n 
 
 POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 W E muft not conclude, without faying a few 
 words on the elegant Frontifpiece, with 
 which this Volume is adorned. 
 
 The Figure in the middle reprefents Nature ; 
 that, which is crowning her, Virtue ; both after the 
 antique. The feveral Genii, or Youths, reprefent the 
 tribe of Arts, all of which are feen in various man¬ 
 ners attending upon Nature, as having a necejjary 
 * Reference to her in all their Operations. 
 
 Of Arts (as has been f faid already) fome imitate 
 Nature, others cultivate and fnifo her. 
 
 The Genii or Youths in the foreground reprefent 
 the Imitative Arts ; He with the Lyre, Mufic ; He 
 with the Scroll, Poetry ; He with the Tablet, Paint¬ 
 ing. A Bufto (lands near them, to denote Sculpture ; 
 and they are grouped together from their known Affi¬ 
 nity. 
 
 If we proceed, we may imagine the different Parts 
 of the Column to denote Architecture j the Youth , plow¬ 
 ing with Oxen , to denote Agriculture ; two Arts s 
 which have this in common, that they exert their 
 Powers on the X infenfitive Parts of Nature. Not fo 
 the Youth , who is managing the Horfe : In Him we fee 
 the Force of Art, where Nature is living and || fenfitivc , 
 
 B b 4 All 
 
 * P. zz. 
 
 f p * 3 3 * 2 7S- t p * 39* II p - 4°» 
 
376 POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 All thefe latter Arts are diftinguifhed from the imi¬ 
 tative, as being Powers, by which Nature is adorned 
 and cultivated. 
 
 To the fame Clafs we may refer thofe Arts, cha- 
 radlerifed by the three Youths , placed immediately over 
 Nature , of whom one holds a Bafket of Flowers, which 
 the others are throwing upon her; as alfo the tivo be- 
 lowy who are decorating her with a Feftoon. 
 
 As thefe laft Youths by their feveral Employs ap¬ 
 pear to co-operate with the Figure reprefenting Vir¬ 
 tue, they may be fuppofed to exhibit thofe higher 
 Arts of Cultivation , which peculiarly refpect the * ra- 
 tional Nature ; thofe Arts> that Virtue prefides over, by 
 prefcribing their Mode and Limits, and while thefe in 
 an inferior Degree render Nature more accomplifhed. 
 Virtue with a fuperior dignity places the Crown 
 upon her Head. 
 
 Mr. Stuart, the ingenious Defigner of this Piece, 
 has not only diflinguifhed himfelf as a Painter in the 
 Difpofition of his Figures, and in their graceful Atti¬ 
 tudes ; but has contrived withal, that each of them 
 fhould have a meaning ; each apply with Propriety to 
 fome one of the feveral Treatifes. 
 
 The whole Defign taken together , by exhibiting Na¬ 
 ture as a paffive Subject, on which Art in all its 
 Species is feen to operate as an efficient Caufe , has an 
 immediate reference to the first Treatise, where 
 Art is confdered in a view the mojl general and compre- 
 henfive. 
 
 d P» 
 
 The 
 
POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 377 
 
 The three Youths , that bear the Symbols of a Lyre, 
 a Scroll, and Tablet, by denoting the mimetic or 
 imitative Arts, have reference to the Second 
 Treatise, where thofe Arts in particular are exa¬ 
 mined and compared* 
 
 The two principal Figures in the Defign, one of 
 which is feen crowning the other, as they fhew the Ho¬ 
 nours and Pre-eminence that Nature derives from 
 Virtue, charadlerife very aptly the Subject of the 
 third Treatise, which profefles to prove, that 
 the Perfection and Happinefs of Human Nature are only 
 to be attained th>ro' the Medium of a moral and a vir¬ 
 tuous Life . 
 
 I N- 
 
1 . 
 
 D E 
 
 4 
 
 ACQUIESCENCE and Gratitude , their Force, 
 
 2 3 r > 356 
 
 Jjfeftions, reciprocate with our Ideas, 96. their Force, 
 
 when raifed by Mufic, -- - 97 
 
 Agatho, - -- - 270 
 
 Alexander Aphrodisiensis, his account of adlive 
 efficient Caufes, 252. of Speech, 294. of the Stoic 
 eftimate of Externals, 332. of the neceffity of Ju - 
 
 jlice to the worji Societies, - - 353 
 
 Ammonius, 258, 263, 266, 268, 271, 276, 292, 
 
 339 > 34 1 * 34 2 
 
 Andronicus Rhodius, -• 251,326,329 
 
 Antipater, his notion of the End of Man, 317 
 Antoninus, unites Social and Rational, 296, 297. 
 defcribes Law univerfal, 304. his notion of Kotroc- 
 Sccm;, or Redlitude of Conduct, 305, 306. quoted, 
 311, 334, 351. his notiort of Ad.iy.ccv, or Genius , 
 335. of the Univerfe, 341. of Reafon, or Intel- 
 led!:, 343, 344. of God, the animating Wifdom, 
 348. of Evil, 348. of tinging our minds, 349. of 
 Philofophical Exception , or Pteferve, 349. joins Ju- 
 Rice and Piety, -- - 354 ? 355 
 
 Archidemus, his notion of Happinefs, 
 Alcidamas, noble Sentiment of, — 
 
 Archytas, —— - 
 
 Aristocles, -- -- 
 
 3 1 7 
 364 
 
 320 
 
 364 
 
 of 
 
 .Aristotle, his notion of Art, 251, 254, 25 
 asSlive efficient Caufes, ibid, of the various Modes 
 of Human Adtion, 252. of Compulfion, 254. of 
 l Man’s 
 
I 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Man’s natural Power, 254. of his acquiredVovttx, 
 or Habits, 255. of Operations, purely natural, 256, 
 of Nature, 257. of a Contingent, 263. of the Sub¬ 
 jects of Philofophy , 265. of Chance and Fortune, 268. 
 proves from their exigence that of Mind, and Na¬ 
 ture, 269. quoted, 64, 272, 339. his notion of 
 human Choice or Determination, 273. of final 
 Caufes, 273, 277. of Energies, 276. makes Life 
 itfelf an Energy , 276. Final caufes two-fold, 279. 
 his Divifion of Arts, 279. enumeration of Caufes, 
 280, 281. quoted, 288. his Idea of Good, 291. 
 proves Man facial from Speech , 292. quoted, 83, 
 255, 297. holds the fame Science of Contraries, 
 298. his Account of Happinefs, 300, 322. gives 
 that of Xenocrates , 321. accounts for the pleafure 
 arifiug fromImitations,8i. hisaccountofSentiments^ 
 85. of the end of Tragedy, 86. of Characters or 
 Manners, 91, erymologifes the word Ethics , 350. 
 makes fef and facial one, 352. makes Happinefs 
 the univerfal objedt, 356. his Treatife concerning 
 Philofophy, quoted from a Manufcript, — 364 
 
 Arrian, See Epictetus. 
 
 Art, confidered as an efficient Caufe, from p, 6, to p. 
 17. its Material Caufe, from p. 18, to p. 22. its 
 Final , from p. 23, to p. 29. its Formal , from p. 
 29, to p. 36. loves Fortune, why, 270. what, 
 6, 12, 17, 251, 252. how diftinguifhed from 
 Chance, 7, 253, 267. how from Compulfion, 7, 
 254. how from Volition, 8, 254. how from na¬ 
 tural power and Inftindt, 8, 10, 254, 255, 256. 
 how from power divine, 11, 257. its influence on 
 the Elements, 39, 40. cn Animals irrational, 4c, 
 41. on Man, 41, 42. the fame as Mind, 41. 
 
 inane 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Inane and falfe Art, 259. Peripatetic description of 
 Art, 260. Stoic, ibid. that of Quintilian , ibid. 
 of Cicero , ibid, of Cleanthes , ibid, of Nicepborus 
 Blermnides , *'£/*/. Art confidered in /iwr views, 43. 
 Arts, their Comparative Priority, 361, &c. either 
 neceffary or elegant, 53, 362, 363. the Pretenfions 
 of each, 54. imitative Arts imitate thro’ fenfible Me¬ 
 dia, 56. what a number of them wanted to eftablifh 
 
 human Society, - 149, to 152 
 
 Artists, moral and inferiour, how they differ, 188, 
 
 189, 310 
 
 B. 
 
 Beauty , its Effect, - - — 212 
 
 Being , every fpecies of, conciliated to itfelf, 144, 145, 
 
 291 
 
 Being , and Well-Being , - - 54 
 
 Blemmides, - - 261 
 
 Bossu, - - — 64, 83, 91 
 
 Brutal, Degradation of Rational into it, how, 343,344 
 
 C. 
 
 Cafura in verfe, - - — 92, 93 
 
 Capacity , - - -- 13, 14, 
 
 Cause, 7, 8. Efficient, 6 to 17. Material, 18 to 
 22. Final, 23 to 29, 277. Formal, 30 to 36. 
 Final often concurs with Formal, 278. Final, two¬ 
 fold, 278. the four fpecies in one view, 280, 281 
 
 Chance , -- - 7, 253, 267, 268 
 
 Character, or Manners , - - 84, 90 
 
 Chrysippus, his notion of Law univerfal, 333. of 
 
 Good, 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Good, 308. of the Rational Purfuit even of Exter¬ 
 nals, 331, of the Perfett Man, 336. of Futurity, 
 
 346. of Evil, -- - 348 
 
 Cicero, his notion of Art, 251. quoted, 260, 262, 
 288, 289, 290. for an aftive Life, 291. quoted, 
 291,294. his Notion of Portents, 295, 296. fup- 
 pofes one Pieafon, one Truth, and one Law to Gods 
 and Men, 297. his argument againft Injuftice, 297. 
 holds Virtue agreeable to Nature, 299. his Defini¬ 
 tion of a Moral Office, or Duty, ibid, his account 
 of the Peripatetic Idea of Happinefs, 300, 301. of 
 the Stoic objection to it, ibid, of Law univerfal, 302, 
 303. tranflates Kalcg 9 u<ri{, 305. his account of 
 the Stoic Happinefs, 307, 308, 310. quoted, 312, 
 
 3 i 3 > 3 J 4 > 3 * 5 > 3 i6 > 3 j 7 > 3 i8 > 3 * 9 > 3 * 4 > 3 * 5 » 
 336, 338, 34.4. his account of the Stoic IT ol 9 og, 
 325. of their regard to the focial Syftem, 329, 330, 
 to Externals, 332, 333. Good or Intereft, his ac¬ 
 count of it, 335. of the Perfect Man, 335, 337. 
 of the Univerfe, as one City, 341. joins felf and 
 focial , 352. his high notion of Jultice, 352. whence 
 he derives human Reafon or Mind, 344. his notion 
 of Habit, as to Morals, 350. quoted, 345, 357 
 Cleanthes, his notion of Happinefs, 316. of Evil, 
 
 348. his verfes, - -- 235 
 
 Clemens Alexandrinus, - — 337 
 
 Compulfion , - - — 7, 254 
 
 Contingents, what, 263. differ in Character, — 267 
 Contraries , known thro’ the fame Habit or Faculty, 173, 
 
 298 
 
 D. 
 
INDEX, 
 
 D. 
 
 Axipuv ox Genius, what, 321, 335, 344, 347. af¬ 
 fords an Elegant Etymology to ’Ev$oay.uvtct, Hap- 
 
 pinefs, -- - - 335 
 
 Demetrius Phalereus, - — 64 
 
 Define, how to be treated, - 230, 343 
 
 Dialectic , what, - - - 371 
 
 Dio Chrysostom, - - 252 
 
 Diogenes Laertius, 262, 263, 277, 287, 
 
 297. defines a Moral Office, or Duty, 299. Laiv 
 univerfal, 303. quoted, 311, 312, 313, 314,316, 
 317, 318, 323, 357. his account of Paffion, ac¬ 
 cording to the Stoics, 326. their Apathy, what, 
 327, 328. their Eupatbies , or Well-feelings, 329. 
 quoted, 330, 331, 340. Virtue and Felicity, one, 
 
 347 
 
 Duty, See Moral Offices. 
 
 E, 
 
 End of Alan, and human Afiion, examined in the Life 
 Political, 125. Lucrative, 129. Pleafurable, 131. 
 Contemplative, 135. in the Life of Virtue joined 
 to Health and Competence , 176. of pure Virtue alone, 
 185. End , not in the Succefs, but in Redlitude 
 of Conduct, 185, 308, 314. in the mere doing , 
 ibid, and 306, 307. confirmed by Examples, 94, to 
 201, 312. Aloral End differs from other Ends, how, 
 
 189, 310 
 
 Energies , 13. how they differ from Works , 32, 33, 
 34. in them and Works all Arts end, p. 30, 34. 
 eafy, when habitual, - — 257 
 
 Enthufafn, the rational, and the favagc, 232, 233 
 
 Epic- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Epictetus, his Idea of Good, 286, 288, 28 9, 290, 
 306. quoted 291, 305, 343. makes £//£ the Sub~ 
 3 e£l to the Moral Artift, 309. quoted 312, 315. 
 recommends Confidence, 316. his Account of Stoic 
 Apathy, 328. difiinguifhes Paffons from naturaldf- 
 fediions, ibid. 329. maintains the facial Syftem, 
 330. Life a Drama, 334. wife Advice of his, 
 ibid, makes Good the common Objedt of Purfuit, 
 334, 335. his notion of Proficiency, 340. of the 
 World , as one City, 341. of Reafon and Intellect, 
 343. Reafon degraded, how, 343, 344- our own , 
 whence, 229, 344. his advice about Defire , 345. 
 treats Man as a Part of the Whole , 345, 346. his 
 Dodtrine as to Futurity , 346, 347. his Notion of 
 Flabit in Morals , 350. quoted, 345, 349, 351. 
 makes felf and facial one , 351. reds all in pious and 
 rational Acquiefcence, 356. what Error he would 
 
 adopt, - - -- 356 
 
 Epicurus, his Fpidle, when dying, 196. his account 
 of Happinefs connected with Virtue , — 323 
 
 EuoAjuwiaa, vid. Aai puv. 
 
 EuJA/W, etymologifcd morally, — 321, 335 
 
 Evil, — 233, 295. N. xviii, 348. N. Ixxiii. 353. 
 
 N. xcv. 373 
 
 Eustathius, - - - 62 
 
 Externals , not neceflarily conducive to Happinefs, 179. 
 accurate knowledge of them requifite, why, 187, 
 
 203, 204 
 
 F. 
 
 Final , vid. Caufe. 
 
 Fortitude , natural, why, —■— —— 172 
 
 Fortune , 267, 268. loves Art, why, — 270 
 
 Friendfjip , 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Friendfhip , real, exifts only among the Virtuous, 33* 
 
 Froniifpiece , explained, 
 
 Futurity , its Force, either as unknown, or known, 
 
 23G 2 2 2 > 346, 347 
 
 G. 
 
 Gale’s Opufcula , 
 
 320 
 
 Generals^ or Univerfals , their CharaCter, 227, 371, 372 
 Genius , vid. A<xiy,uv. 
 
 God, fuperior to all Art, how, 257. to Philofophi- 
 zing, why, 258. works uniformly, according to 
 Idea of Perfection, 167, 295. the fame with right 
 Reafon, and univerfal Law, 303, 304. the Standard 
 of Perfection, according to Plato and Scripture , 339, 
 340. the univerfal Reafon , 229, or Mindy 232* 
 pervades and rules the whole, 233, 348, 365. made 
 all men free, 364. himfelf univerfal, one, and ever 
 
 in Energy, - - - 366 
 
 Good, abfenty leads to Art, 24, 25. this abfent 
 Good deferibed, and it3 Characters given, 26 to 29. 
 Sovereign, 114, 285. always complete, 190. va¬ 
 rious defcriptions of it, 267. its original Precon¬ 
 ceptions or CharaCteriftics, 115. agreeable to Na¬ 
 ture, 116, 289. conducive to Well-Being, 117. 
 accommodated to all Places and Times, 122, 289. 
 durable, 119, 289. felf-derived, 119, 290. its 
 Chara£terifticsapplied,to determine zuhatisHappitt^t, 
 179, 191 to 193, 213. Good not in Externally but 
 in their proper Ufey 309. purfued by all, 212, 246, 
 334j 35 6 - See Happinefs. 
 
 Gofpely quoted, - - - 340 
 
 Gratisy nothing to be had, - 236, 351 
 
 Gratitude and Acquiefcenuy their force, — 231, 245 
 
 H. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 H. 
 
 ilabit, — — 9> 2 34> 235, 236, 35s 
 
 Handel, — — — — 67, 99 
 
 Happiness,, in Virtue joined to Health and Compe¬ 
 tence, 176, how far adequate and perfeCt, 177 to 
 180. in Virtue qlone, or ReCUtude of Conduct, in 
 the mere doing, without regard to Succefs, 184 to 
 186. in Confiftence, in Lxperience, in Selection 
 and RejeClion, 203 to 206, 314 to 319. in per¬ 
 formance of moral Offices, 206, 317. concurring 
 Sentiments of different Sects of Philofophers on the 
 Subject of Happinefs, 3*9 to 324. Virtue and 
 Happinefs, One, 347. real Self-Intereft and Hap- 
 pihei's, One, 351. purfued by all, — 246, 356 
 Hecato, the Stoic, — — 332 
 
 Hermes, called KOINOE, or Common, why, 369 
 Hobbs, his account of Happinefs, — 324 
 
 HOMERS — — — 291, 363 
 
 Horace, *3, 64, 71, 90, 98, 138, 195, 309, 316, 
 
 34 °> 343 
 
 I; 
 
 Urns, in Poetry we form our own, in Painting we take 
 them from the Artifls, 77, 78. reciprocate with 
 Affections, 96. Ideas, Specific, their high Rank, 
 
 219, 220, 338, 370, 371 
 
 Jerom, his Notion of the Stoics , - 314 
 
 III, vid. Evil. 
 
 Imitation, Objects of, different from the Media 
 of Imitation, how, 56. extend farther than the Me~ 
 did . ibid . and 61, 62, 63. Imitation , Media of 
 
 C c What 
 
INDEX. 
 
 What to Painting , 57, 61. What to Muftc 3 57, 
 66, 67, 73. What to Poetry , 57, 72. Whence 
 Imitation by different Arts derive their Preeminence, 
 5 9. Imitation 3 natural to Man, and pleafing, why, 
 
 80, 81 
 
 Imitative Arts, — — —- 55, 375 
 
 Individuals. See Particulars. 
 
 JnjuJlice , unnatural, why, —-■■■ - 297, 352 
 
 lnjlindl , 10. different from Reafon, how, — 158 
 Interejl y all governed by, 241. and jujlly y ibid, a de¬ 
 tached one, impoffible, 242. a focial one, Happi- 
 nefs, 243. Private and Public, infeparable , 331 
 
 Joannes Grammaticus. See Philoponus. 
 
 5 V rVc, natural, why, 170, 243, 352. joined by the 
 Stoics to Piety, — 
 
 K. 
 
 Kowoi N»?, Common Senfe y 
 K<zt o£0a<rjf and 
 
 L. 
 
 Language , its Rife, 55. founded in Compact, ibid, 
 
 & 7. See Speech. 
 
 Law, univerfal, deferibed, 302, 303, 304. the fame as 
 j&gfo Reafon , 297. and as God himfelf, 233, 304 
 Legijlators , their high Character, — 41, 364, 365 
 
 Liberty , the Gift of God, 364. Philofophic, what, 235 
 Life, 137, 138, 291. Life according to Virtue and 
 to Moral Offices, the fame , 175, 299. /,//*?, and 
 
 its Events, the Subject-Matter to the moral Artift, 
 
 3 ° 9 * 
 
 *286, 287 
 
 — 305 
 
INDEX. 
 
 . 309. Life human, a Drama, 210, 229, 333, 334, 
 
 344 
 
 Lives four forts of, 123, 124, 291. the Political. 125, 
 229. theLucrative, 129 to 131. thePleafurable, 131 
 to 135. the Contemplative, 135 to 138. all inad¬ 
 equate, 193. Active and Social. 137, 138, 291 
 Love, Philofopbic, its Progrefs and End, 230, 234, 345 
 Logic , when ufeful, when not, — — 247 
 
 M. 
 
 Man, his Nature and Conftitution, examined, 147 to 
 169. by Nature, Social, 147 to 157. Rational, 
 15710169. the Perfect Man, 214., 237,335. Man, 
 a Part only of the Whole, 231, 245. made by God 
 and Nature, not a Slave, but Free, — 364 
 
 Mankind, their Modes of Action, — 252 
 
 Manners , or Characters, — — 84, 90 
 
 Manufcript, of Philoponus, 361. of Proclus, 368, 
 
 37 °> 372 
 
 Ma/ler-Knowledgezn&Scitnce,$6,22$,24.J,34.3,363,35$ 
 
 Moclaiort^vim, what, — — — 259 
 
 Matter, — — — — 373 
 
 Maximus Tyrius, — 336 
 
 Metaphyftcs, called fo, why, -— — 365 
 
 Milton, — 71, 77, 92, 135, 136, 306 
 
 Mimetic, vid. Imitative. 
 
 Mind, recognizes the Natural World thro’ the Senfes, 
 55. Particular Minds, Harmony of, with the Uni- 
 verfal, 232, 234, 347. the more refpeCtable, how 
 characterized, — — — 374 
 
 Moral Office, defined, 175, 299. Happinefs, to live 
 performing them, — — 2 C J, 318 
 
 Morals united with Religion, 222. why treated apart, 222 
 Motion , its fpecies, with a view to the Mimetic Arts, 
 
 C c 2 66. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 66. Natural differs from Mufical, how, 68. lift!-* 
 tated by Painting, how, 61. more Motions in Mu-' 
 fic, than in Poetry, — — 73, 74* 
 
 Alitfic , Art of; its Media of Imitation , 57. its Sub¬ 
 jects, 65. imitates Joy and Grief, how, 67. its 
 Imitation far inferior to that of Painting, why-, 68, 
 69. Its Efficacy derived elfewhere, 95. by help 1 
 of Natural Media, imitates nearly, as well as Poetry, 
 tho’ inferior, 73, 80. an Ally to Poetry, how, 93, 
 95. raifes Ajfettions, rather than Ideas, 97. its 
 force in confequence of this, 98, 99, 100. Ob¬ 
 jections to tinging of Dramas, folved, — 100, 10 r 
 Mujical D fcords , different to different hearers, whence, 
 
 373 ’ 374 
 
 N. 
 
 Nations, comparative Eftimate of, how to be formed, 
 
 3 ^/ 
 
 Nature , Divine, Human, Brutal, Vegetable, 11. de¬ 
 fined, 257, 267, 282, 283. her treatment of Man, 
 107, 285. how diftinguifhed from, and oppofed to 
 Reajon , 163 to 167. governed by one efficient 
 Caufe, 167. when and why She Deviates, Note 
 18, p. 295. the Primaries of Nature , rx zrgurx 
 Tr,g (pvtTiuq, what, — — 3or 
 
 Natural Philojopby , its Order in the Kahk of Sciences , 
 
 ' 363* 365 
 
 Neceffary , and ImpcJJible , ■— — — 267 
 
 Necrtftty , natural, how diftinguifhed from natural De¬ 
 fire, — — 254, 269 
 
 Nicias, the Painter, his judicious remarks on the 
 Subjects ot his Art, -— — ■— 64 
 
 O. 
 
 Ob},:A, of universal Purfuit, what, 246, 356. ObjeSti 
 
 of 
 
INDEX. 
 
 of Perception, to be valued, not by their Number, 
 but their Worthy — — — 374 
 
 P. 
 
 Painting, Art of, its Media of Imitation, 57. its Sub. 
 jedis, 61. imitates Sounds, Motions, Paffions, Af- 
 fe&icyns, Characters, how, 61, 62, 90, 91. its 
 belt Subjects, hew circumflnnced, 63, 76. confined 
 to an Infant , as to Tune, 63. not fo, as to Space, 
 
 6 4 - 
 
 P articular $ , their Characters, — 227, 341 
 
 Paul, quoted, — — — — 303 
 
 Perceptions , Senfitive differ from IntelleCtual.how, 296 
 Perfection, usher e, and how it exifts, 215 to 221. vid. 
 Standard. 
 
 Peripatetics , unite Self and Social , r—- 352 
 
 Persius, — — — 343 
 
 Perfpicuity , efiential to Arts, — -—65 
 
 Philoponus, 278, 295. MS. 36;. See Joannes 
 Grammaticus. 
 
 Philosophers, the concurring Sentiments of various 
 SeCts of, concerning Happinef, and moral Ends, illu- 
 ftrated from the Pythagoreans, 320. the Socratics, 321. 
 the Peripatetics, 321, 322. the Epicureans, 323. 
 Thomas Hobbs, 324. the Stoics, pajfm. 
 Philosophy, its Progrefs and End or Aim , according 
 to the Peripatetics, 2.63. according tp the Platonics , 
 341. philofophy antient , different ip its Method 
 from modern, how, 342. its three-fold Divifion ac¬ 
 cording to the Ancients, 357. tips Firjl Philofophy a 
 what, and why fo called, — — 363, 365 
 
 Phyfics, when ufeful, when not, 247. prior to Meta - 
 phyfes, why, — — 363, 365, 366 
 
 Phy- 
 
 C c 3 
 
I N D E X. 
 
 Phyfical Events , their different Effedt on weak, and oil 
 generous Minds, —— ■ - — 366 
 
 Piety , connected with Virtue , 245. their different 
 
 employs, - -- - 354 
 
 Plato, his Idea of Goinotphilofophizing, and why, 
 257. of the Invention of Arts, 272. of the Sove¬ 
 reign Good , 286. his Argument for Society, 292, 
 294. quoted, 198, 199, 259, 274, 295, 298, 310, 
 
 3 1 3 > 334 . 333 * 345 . 353 . 35 ^. makes God the 
 Standard, 339. his philofophical Synthefis, 342* 
 
 his progrefs of Love , - - 345 
 
 Plutarch, defcribes Lavj univerfal, 304. quoted, 
 288, 292, 305, 308, 327, 331, 336, 339, 348, 
 
 357 
 
 Poetry, Art of \ its Media of Imitation, 57. Me- 
 dia partly natural, partly artificial, 57,58, 70,71. 
 its force by help of natural Media, 71. in this 
 view, limited, 72. and inferior to Painting, 72, 77, 
 78. but nearly equal to Mufic, 73, 74. Poetry, its 
 force by help of an artificial Medium, Language, 
 75. inferior to Painting, where the fubjedt is mcjl 
 ■perfectly adapted to Painting, 77, 78. the reafon, 
 note, p. 77, 78. fuperior to Mufic, 80. Poetry, 
 the objects moft perfectly adapted to it, defcribed, 83 
 to 89. its force in thefie lajl Subjects, 89, 90. 
 compared to Painting, 91. to Mufic , 93, greatly 
 fuperior to both, and why, 93, 94. affociates with 
 Mufic, how, 93. derives power merely from its 
 Numbers, -- - _ 92, 93 
 
 342 
 295 
 how 
 255 
 
 ir 3 
 
 Pre- 
 
 PORPHYRY, --- - 
 
 Portents , and Monfilers, what and whence, — 
 Povjer, 13. natural, prior to Energy, 254. 
 
 different from Habit, or Cuftorn, -- 
 
 Prafiice and Theory, —— _ __ 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Preconceptions, IJ^oXy^/e^, 115, 286. defined, 287 
 Proclus, Manufcript of. Quotations from, 368, 370 
 
 37 1 > 37 2 
 
 Proficiency , - -- - 221,340 
 
 Prudence, natural, and our Intereft, —■ 170 
 
 Quintilian, his Account of MocTooiohxylx, or inane 
 and falfe Art, 259. of Energies and Works, 277. 
 of Speech, 294. of the Event, in Rhetoric, 308. 
 of the force of Mufic, 97. of the perfect Orator, 
 
 337 ? 340 
 
 R. 
 
 Raphael Urbin, - -- 63, 78 
 
 Reason, natural to Man, rf> 2 . different from In- 
 JtinEl, how, 159, 160. rational implies facial, 296, 
 297. Reafon and Law, the fame, 297. its Cha¬ 
 racter, 228, 229, 342, 343. univerfal, fee God. 
 
 Reafon , degraded, how, - — 228, 343 
 
 Reflttude of Endeavours, or Conduct, 18, 185, 304, 
 propofed, as the Sovereign Good, 185. examined by 
 our Preconceptions of Good, 191 to 193. ex¬ 
 plained, —- -- 3°5’3 o6 >37° 
 
 Religion connected with Morals , 222, 245. See 
 Piety. 
 
 Referve , Philofophical, what, —-— 234, 349 
 
 s. 
 
 Salvator Rosa, 
 Sanctius, — 
 
 6 
 
 - 63 
 
 294 
 SCA- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 £cALICES.} - - 2/2, 276, 277 
 
 Science , its objects, what, — 341, 370, 371, 372 
 
 370. vid. Interejl , Happinefs , Virtue. 
 
 Self-denial , dilcufl, - -- 238 to 240 
 
 Seneca, his account of the Caufes, 280. quoted, 
 311, 319. his notion of the Perfeit Man , 338, 
 340. of Futurity, 347, of Philofophic Pieferve, 
 
 349. tranflates Cleantbes , - — ibid. 
 
 Scnf, objects of, their Character, 341, 371. common ,, 
 
 >vhat, - - - 286, 287 
 
 Sentiments , their Defcription and End, — 84 
 
 Sextus Empiricus, - -- 337 
 
 Shaftesbury, Earl of, quoted, — 64, 316, 345 
 
 Shakespeare, - - — iij 
 
 Simplicius, explains the Stoic Definition of Moral 
 
 Duty, -- - - 299,300 
 
 Social Jjf'edlions , natural, 155, 156, 328, 330. fo- 
 cial Principle implied in rational , 296, 297. contri¬ 
 butes to Happinefs, - - 193 
 
 Society , natural to Man, 156, 157, 329, 330. pro- 
 grefs of a rifing one, from its commencement to its 
 completion, 361, 362, 363, 364. need]ary to 
 
 ;the production of Science, why, - 365, 366 
 
 Socrates, his notion of Happinefs., 198, 199, 307. 
 
 his Proficiency, - - 22 j, 340 
 
 Soul of Alan , has various faculties, - 240 
 
 Sounds , imitated by Painting , how, 61, 62.— AiufcaU 
 different from Natural , how, 68. inferior to thof e 
 of Poetry, in the view of Imitation , why, 74 
 Speech , its powers natural, 156. our facial Nature 
 proved from it, 292, £93, 294. its Origin, 55. 
 See Hermes. 
 
 Spenser, 
 
 4 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Sf>EfrSER, —-— -- - 13^ 
 
 Sportfmen , refemble Philofophers, how, — 194 
 
 Standard\ when found among the many, when among 
 theyko, 164, 294, 295. Natural State, a Stan¬ 
 dard of what, 185, 307. of Perfection, natural § 
 and moral, 218, 219. found in no one Individual, 
 219, 337 ' general reafoning on the Idea of Stan¬ 
 dard, 338, 339. God, the moral Standard, 339, 
 
 340. Reafon, a Standard, - 228 
 
 Stod-jeus, hie account of the Virtues, 298. makes 
 Virtue agreeable to Nature, 299. defines a moral 
 Duty, 299. quoted, 275, 314, 316, 317, 318, 326 
 Stoic Philosophy, its Idea of the Jovereign Good, 
 113 to 122. objects to the Peripatetic Idea, and why^ 
 299. its Notion of Law universal, 303, 304. holds 
 its Idea of Good molt confonant to our Preconcep¬ 
 tions, 308 refembles the Chriftian Religion, x 10, 
 200, 314. takes not away the difference in things, 
 but eftablifhes it, 208, 324, 325. fuppreffes no na¬ 
 tural Affections, 208, 325. its Apathy, what, 325 
 to 331. what not, 328. its Idea of the perfedl 
 moral Character, 331. its Attachment to the fo- 
 cial Scheme, 329, 330, 331. Stoic Syftem, what 
 it is not, 209. what it is, 21c, 211. did not re¬ 
 ject Externals, 332, 373. its perfedl Man, 337# 
 339. made real Jelf and focial the fame — 351 
 Subjiances, their fpecies, - 41, 225, 227, 363 
 
 T. 
 
 Temperance , natural, why —- -- 171 
 
 Terence, places Good not in Externals, but in their 
 
 proper U/e. »—- - —~— 309 
 
 The- 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Themistius, 2.65, 268. holds the fame Science of 
 Contraries, 295. gives the Stole account of the Paf- 
 fions, 327. characterizes the moft excellent Mind 
 
 by its objects, how, - - 374. 
 
 Theory , compared to Practice, - 113,236 
 
 Things, not indifferent, 141. their value adjufted by 
 the peculiar nature of each fpecies, 145. Divifion 
 of them with refpedt to Beings fenfitive, 143. Phi- 
 lofophy takes not away their Diftindtion, 208, 324 
 Tragedy , End of, explained, - - 86 
 
 U. 
 
 Valerius Maximus, ^ • 
 Varro, his notion of Genius, 
 Verfe, Englifh Heroic, 
 
 - 252 
 
 - 335 
 
 -- 93 
 
 Vice, as much Self-denial in, as in Virtue , — 239 
 
 Virgil, his account of the Caufe, which gave birth 
 to Arts, 275. quoted, p. 71. 109, 178, 222, 
 
 374 
 
 Virtue, cardinal Virtues, 173, 174. 298. Virtue 
 connected with Religion , 222. infeparable from 
 J‘ l f> - - ~ 243, 251, 370 
 
 Universe, one City or Commonwealth, 225, 230, 232, 
 234, 341, 345* how we rife to its Idea, 225, 226. 
 the Manfion of Jove, where all is fair and good, 
 
 373 
 
 W. 
 
 Well-Being, compared to Mere-Being, 
 Whole , Man, a part of, —— 
 
 — 54 
 
 —231, 345 
 
 Wife 
 
INDEX. 
 
 Wifi Men , the Seven) their Character and Employ, 
 
 363 
 
 X. 
 
 Xenocrates, his notion of Happinefi , 321. of 
 Aa»/*cov, or GeniuSy - - - ibid, and 335 
 Xenophon, -- —— — 336 
 
 Z. 
 
 Zeno, 214. his account of the End of Many 314, 
 318. of a Paflion, or Perturbation, IlaOof, 326. 
 makes the Paffioos to be erroneous Judgments , 327 
 
 FINIS, 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 P. *7, I. 13, r. Tome of the. 
 
 J 49* 1 1, concive r. conceive. 
 
 152, 7, it is ? 1 . is it ? 
 
 275, 11. ad fin : dele periodum . 
 
 304> 22 j wwv /.<Taw. 
 
 306, 23, a /. a. 
 
 ' 3°7. J 9> afoaufogtt l. a$id<poga, 
 
 308, 9, accommodate l. accommodata. 
 
 ,w , 
 
 309, 7, ’Ot/3-ia /, ’Ovrta. 
 
 3*3, 25, favour / favour. 
 
 314, 23, criifiKpc-HOV /. (Tu^am. 
 
 318, 2i, ri) /. W. 
 
 339 . 2 4> make /. makes. 
 
 349, 18, “Aya /. ”Aj,g. 
 
 3 5 5 » 3 > i ** l- 
 

 

 
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