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EMORY UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
A TREATISE,
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL,
ON
THE HUMAN WILL.
BY ARCHIBALD J. BATTLE, D.D.,
President of Mercer University, Macon, Ga.
ATLANTA, GA. :
James P. Harrison & Co., Printers and Binders.
1876.
ERRATA.
The present publication not being stereotyped, it was impossible to give it a
final revision before binding. This will explain the appearance of a number of
typographical errors which mar the appearance of this edition. Some of the
more important errata are here added :
Page 15, line 7, for " exists," read exist.
" 27, line 10. for "by," read be.
" 28, line 13, for " councils," read counsels.
" 35, tenth line from bottom, for " beleiving," read believing.
" 45, line 5, for "pursuaded," read persuaded.
" 53, ninth line from bottom, for " those," read one.
" 53, third line from bottom, for "meeting," read sometimes.
" 55, line 19, for " psychical," read physical.
" 55, next to last line, for " spychcal," read psychical.
" 62, line 17, the asterisk (*) refers to Dr. A. T. Bledsoe.
" 62, line 5, for " intrinsic," read extrinsic.
" 88, line 4, for " have," read has.
" 67, line 31, for "labarynth," read labyrinth.
" 72, line 26, for "gorgous," read gorgons.
" 56, line 2, for " undeterminate," read indeterminate.
Considering the difficulties in the way of revision by the author, the work is
remarkably free from misprints.
Errata
105
CONTENTS.
Section I.—Preliminary Outline 9
Section II.—The Nature of the Will 11
Section III.—Relations of the Mental Powers 14
Section IV.—The Law of the Will 17
Section V.—Historical Illustrations of the Doctrine of the Will 2
Section VI.—The Intellect not a Determining Force to the Will 24
Section VII.—Analytical View of Conscience 27
Section VIII.—Scriptural Examples—Analysis of Faith 31
Section IX.—Regeneration and Evangelical Faith • 36
Section X.—The Will in Reference to Mechanical, Indifferent, and Reluctant
Actions 39
Section XI.—The Doctrine of Motives 42
Section XII.—The Theory of the Autonomy of the Will *47
Section XIII.—The Scheme of Necessity 52
Section XIV.—Free Agency 56
Section XV.—Autonomy a Scheme of Licentiousness 59
Section XVI.—Moral Agency and Accountability 61
Section XVII.—Autonomy Denies Moral Responsibility 65
Section XVHI.—Divine and Human Agency 66
Section XIX.—Autonomy Sets at Naught the Divine Influence in Regenera¬
tion 70
Section XX.—Theodicy 75
Section XXI.—Autonomy Asperses the Divine Perfection 79
Section XXII.—Resume of the Argument 82
Section XXni.—The Importance of the Sensibility 86
Section XXIV.—Cultiu-e of the Sensibility 94
Section XXV.—The Energy of the Will 100
Appendix 103
Errata 105
r) ICDI CAT IO KT.
TO MY VENERABLE FATHER, DR. CULLEN BATTLE,
Of Eufaula, Ala.,
The faithful guardian of my youth, the judicious guide of my earlier thoughts, and the
prudent counsellor of my maturer years, who, after a long life of usefulness,
now in his ninety-second year, awaits with calm faith and pa¬
tience,1 the summons to a higher sphere, this little
volume is affectionately inscribed.
THE AUTHOR.
PREFACE.
This Treatise is an expansion of a series of communica¬
tions written for "The Christian Index," in compliance
with the request of an earnest inquirer. At the sugges¬
tion of many friends, they are submitted, in this more per¬
manent form, to the general reader. The author makes
no apology for infusing so strong a theological ingredient
into a work essentially metaphysical. He is convinced
that no theory of the Will is tenable that ignores man's
relation to God, as revealed in the Christian Scriptures.
The law of the Will, as here enunciated, embodies a truth
that has repeatedly been admitted by many philosophers.
But not to the author's knowledge, has that truth ever
been formulated as the law governing this part of our
constitution. Yet it seems to be verified by conscious¬
ness, by history and by revelation. It makes our psychol¬
ogy more simple, and seems to accord more perfectly
with the New Testament doctrine of regeneration than
any view hitherto proposed.
The analyses of Conscience and Faith are submitted to
the judgment of ethical and theological thinkers, as im¬
portant corollaries from the author's doctrine of the Will.
It will 'be seen, that the term, "autonomy" has been
employed as a designation for the theory of the self-deter¬
mining power of the Will. It is recommended by several
considerations. It is a single word, and, therefore, prefer¬
able to the usual circumlocution. It is expressive: im¬
plying sovereignty, or power of self-government; it quite
accurately describes the scheme in question. It is a word
not in very common use, so that it may stand without any
adjunct, as a technical name for the theory. It involves
8
Preface.
nothing of opprobium, such as that attaching to "fatal¬
ism," or "the scheme of necessity," applied to the oppo¬
site doctrine. It covers both the philosophical and theo¬
logical ground, and, hence, may be used instead of Armin-
ianism—a theological designation. Its derivatives, auton¬
omous, autonomic and autonomists, are brief descriptives, con¬
venient for reference to the doctrine and its advocates.
A. J. B.
Mercer University, March 20, 1876.
THE HUMAN WILL
SECTION 1.
PRELIMINARY OUTLINE.
The Will is a subject which concerns both the psychol¬
ogist and the theologian. To comprehend its nature and
powers, we must study the philosophy of the soul; to as¬
certain its relations to our duty and destiny, we must ex¬
amine it in the light of Divine revelation.
This section will be devoted to a brief survey of the fac¬
ulties of the human soul, preliminary to the main discus¬
sion.
The soul, or mind, is that part of our nature which thinks
and feels and wills. As matter cannot perform these acts,
the soul is spiritual and not material. The acts just men¬
tioned indicate a natural division of the faculties of the
mind. There are three great cardinal powers, viz: the
Intellect, or the power of thinking and knowing; the Sen¬
sibility, or the power of feeling; and the Will, or the power
of decision. This is the ultimate analysis of the soul, upon
which most philosophers are now agreed. They will be
considered separately.
I. THE INTELLECT.
The Intellect, sometimes called the Understanding, is that
part of our spiritual constitution which knows and thinks.
It includes, among its functions, the perception of the ex¬
ternal world, remembering, imagining, judging, reasoning^
and, in short, all those mental acts which belong to man's
rational nature. When we know anything, whether it be an
object in nature, a mathematical principle, or a moral truth,
that knowledge is an exercise of the Intellect. When we
remember a past event, or impression or acquisition; when
10
The Human Will.
we imagine—frame ideal conceptions and mental pictures;
when we compare and reason—form judgments, convictions
or beliefs; when we rise to abstract principles and original
intuitions; in each and all of these forms of soul-activity,
we exercise the Intellect. It is seen, then, that this is a
vast, important and noble power of the mind. Without it,
there could be no thought, nor knowledge, nor belief, nor
conviction. The Intellect is a cardinal element of the Soul.
II. THE SENSIBILITY.
The second cardinal power of our spiritual nature is the
Sensibility, or the power of feeling or emotion. We are all
familiar with that state of the mind which we call feeling,
as distinguished from thought and knowledge. It is an ex
perience so peculiar and marked, that we are in no difficulty
to recognize it. When we love or hate, rejoice or grieve,
hope or fear, we are conscious of indulging feeling, and
hence, these are exercises of the Sensibility. The forms or
phases of Sensibility are almost innumerable, but they are
susceptible of classification.
They may be divided into two general classes, viz:
I. Sensations—Physical or animal feelings, such as the
sensations of hunger, thirst, bodily pleasure or pain.
II. Emotions—Purely spiritual feelings, having no direct
connection with the body.
As our discussion does not concern the Sensations, we
will classify only the Emotions.
On one principle, they may be reduced to two kinds, as
follows:
1. The sympathetic emotions, characterized by uneasi¬
ness, restlessness, obtrusiveness or demonstrativeness; as
love, joy, hope, sorrow.
2. The rational emotions, characterized by calmness,
strength, nobility; as virtuous ambition, satisfaction in suc¬
cessful achievement, pride in discovery, joy in the triumph
of truth, sentiment of duty, approval of virtue, admiration
of the beautiful.
The Human Will.
11
On another principle we may classify the Emotions un¬
der different names, as follows :
1. The Simple Emotions—Transient feelings of the soul.
2. The Affections—More permanent and steady feelings.
3. The Passions—Violent or tumultuous feelings.
4. The Desires—Feelings seeking gratification.
in.—THE WILL.
The third cardinal element of the soul is the Will, or the
power of resolution or decision. This is a state of mind
distinguishable from both Intellect and Sensibility. The
Will does not think or know, neither does it feel, but it re- •
solves upon action, it wills to do. In one sense, it may be
called the executive power of the soul. The Intellect may
show the end to be attained, and the way; the Sensibility
may aspire to the end; but the Will is the executive au¬
thority, which decrees that it shall be accomplished.
With this preliminary survey, we proceed to consider
more fully the Will as a distinct power of the mind.
SECTION II.
THE NATURE OF THE WILL.
The three-fold division of the mental faculties into Intel¬
lect, Sensibility and Will, has received the a^ost unani¬
mous assent of philosophers The former two-fold classi¬
fication, of Understanding and Will, has been entirely
abandoned, and the emotions, affections, and desires, which,
for a long time, were regarded as modifications, or phe¬
nomena of the Will, are now grouped into a distinct class ;
while the Willis considered an individual power, altogether
different in its nature and functions, from both Understand¬
ing and Emotion.
A distinction was, long ago, carefully drawn between
Will and Desire, by the celebrated philosopher, John
Locke; though he does not seem to have discovered the
the triple natuie of the soul. Reid also limited the Will
to the capacity of decision, excluding from it the emotions
The Human Will,
and desires. Sir William Hamilton divided the powers of
the soul into faculties of cognition, capacities of feeling and
powers of conation—including, under the last head, desire
and will. But the present beautiful analysis of the soul,
into Intellect; Sensibility and Will, brought out in clear
and distinct evolution by M. Cousin, has superseded all
other methods, and has been adopted by the great body of
modern philosophers. Indeed, until the trichotomy of
Cousin was proposed, psychology did not seem to be
established on a true scientific basis.
The Will has been defined the power of decision or res¬
olution to act. It has also been described as the executive
faculty of the soul. Perhaps that which most distinctly
marks the true nature of the Will is its imperative char¬
acter—its office of commanding. Action takes place only
when the Will issues its mandate, and inevitably follows
the order, unless prevented by physical force—what the
earlier theologians called co-action. The proper exercise
of the Will is called volition. When, therefore, the mind
puts forth a volition, it utters an authoritative decree, en¬
joining obedience or action upon whatever powers, physi¬
cal or mental, it may make the instruments of execution.
I. THE WILL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE INTELLECT.
A comparison of this power with the Intellect will dis¬
close a palpable difference. When we perceive an object—
that is, know it, by means of the senses or consciousness—
we exercise the Intellect, but not the Will. When we recall
anything in memory; when we portray unreal scenes by
imagination; when we analyze, abstract and reason; when
we evolve by reflection general principles and intuitive
truths: in none of these intellectual processes is there any¬
thing akin to the act of resolving to do, of commanding
to action. The imperative feature is wanting in every intel¬
lection or exercise of the Intellect.
£A.n intellection is a quiet, calm, comtemplative process;
a volition is a quick and instantaneous energy. The In-
The Human Will. C^j
tellect deliberates and legislates; the Will orders the exe¬
cution.
II. THE WILL DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SENSIBILITY.
The former view of the soul which regarded the Will as
a modification of desire, and the affections as phenomena
of the Will, confounds powers and acts, which are essen¬
tially and radically different. For the sake of convenience,
we shall designate any state or exercise of the Sensibility
as an emotion. Now, the emotions may be sharply distin¬
guished from the volitions. Emotion is any kind of feel¬
ing ; volition is the resolve or command of the soul to act.
A sensation of pain or pleasure, an emotion of pity or
contempt, an affection of love or grief, a passion of anger
or revenge or jealousy—these are states of the sensibility,
feelings of the soul; and are in no respect similar to voli¬
tions—resolutions to act. The emotions may be indulged
to any extent, and yet no action follow. Even desire, a
positive impulse, into which most emotions culminate be¬
fore resolution is born, may exist without a resulting voli¬
tion.
Thus, I may think, know, reflect, imagine, remember,
judge and reason; yet if this be all, there is no exercise
of the Will, no resolution to act. There is only intellection
put forth.
I may suffer pain, experience joy or grief, indulge love or
hate, cherish ambition, malice or revenge, become the sub¬
ject of raging passion; and yet in none of these emotions
is there any determination or command to act. I may
ardently desire to do a given thing, and yet, while it is only
feeling, there is no volition. Nor, until emotion passes into
resolution, or rather invokes the imperative injunction to
act, does the Will exert itself. As soon, however, as voli¬
tion is put forth, action follows. It is the decree of author¬
ity, which nothing but physical necessity can successfully
resist. Our constitution is such that what we will to do,
we always do, unless prevented by an external power over
which we have no control.
14
The Human Will.
It follows, then, that the Will possesses an inherent en-
ergy—an activity of its own—and its efforts are not the move¬
ments of an inert substance, like dead matter. This is
evinced in the vehemence, tenacity and activity character¬
istic of the purposes of many men. Though the Will is
aroused to activity by the influence of causes, yet it is not
comparable to the movements of a machine, or the me¬
chanical motion of masses of matter excited by anterior
causes, but .is analogous, rather, to the great dynamical
agents, fire and steam, which, though produced by ante¬
cedent causes, are yet endowed with energies of their own,
that defy computation.
We have likened the Intellect and Will, respectively, to
the Legislative and Executive departments of civil govern¬
ment. There is also an intermediate power of the soul
as of the State. And though the functions of the Judiciary
are more like the Intellect in its power of judging, yet the
Sensibility resembles that section of the body politic, in
that it determines the direction in which the Executive
power of the soul shall display its energy.
SECTION III.
RELATIONS OF THE MENTAL POWERS.
We are now to investigate the relations of the three cardi¬
nal elements of the soul, viz: the Intellect, the Sensibility
and the Will.
It is reasonable to suspect that a close connection sub¬
sists between these, which, though unlike in their phenom¬
ena, are yet powers of one indivisible soul. To suppose
that each, or any one of them, is an independent, self-de¬
termining or self-moving force, is to suppose an anomaly
in the system of the universe. For, outside of man's soul,
there abides, throughout the creation of God, the unceas¬
ing relation of dependence, of antecedence and sequence,
of cause and effect. Through the entire framework of
material things, the filaments of influence are so interlaced,
that nothing exists insulated and independent. In the
planetary world law reigns supreme, and one force binds
The Human Will.
15
systems, suns, planets, satellites, comets, meteors together,
in harmonious union. The soul and body are united in
the closest bonds. The various organs and members of
the body are so intimately connected, that all share in the
influence that affects a single one. In the social economy,
the same interdependence and interpenetration of influence
exists, so that the character and conduct of one individual
affect, in some way, all the rest. It is difficult, often im¬
possible, so to understand this network of causes, as to
"untwist the mystic chain," to trace a given effect to its
cause, or to explain the bond of connection between them.
From the prevalence of this principle of dependence in the
outer world, we may reasonably infer the existence of
some law of relationship governing the powers of the soul.
What relation can be discovered between the first and
second, the Intellect and the Sensibility? This much, at
least, that without some form of intellectual activity,there can
be no exercise of sensibility. The principle may be stated
in the form of a law: Intellection is the ?iecessary antecedent
to emotion.
Let us illustrate the law. I cannot desire an orange,
unless I know or think something about the orange. I
cannot love an individual, unless I have some knowledge
of the individual—cognizance of his existence and judg¬
ment of his traits of character. The desire and the love
are emotions; the knowledge and judgment are intellec¬
tions. The latter are the conditions precedent to the
former. Whether the intellection be the efficient cause,
producing the emotion, or only the occasion of awakening
the sensibility, the influence is not a very determinate one.
Do we know in every case what particular emotion is ap¬
propriate to a given intellection ? Can we predict the de
gree of sensibility that will be aroused when any particular
idea is presented? We answer, that we know of no law,
infallibly determining either the kind or degree of emotion
which a given intellection will awaken. There are, how¬
ever, certain feelings appropriate to certain cognitions. The
16
The Human Will.
perception of beauty is calculated to excite admiration, and
the contemplation of vice is naturally adapted to kindle a
feeling of disapprobation. But these results are not inva¬
riable in actual experience. The sensibility is the most vol¬
atile part of our nature, and its action is notably unsteady
and incalculable. We cannot anticipate its movement with
any more certainty, than we can calculate the precise di¬
rection and energy of gun-powder or nitroglycerine. What
excites love or admiration in one may awaken aversion or
disgust in another. And while, in the same individual,
the contemplation of an object may, to-day, carry the feel¬
ing to ecstacy or passion, it may, to-morrow, fail to stir the
most vapid emotion.
" Beauty soon grows familiar to the lover,
Fades in the eye and palls upon the sense."
Thus, while we discern the tendency—seeming constitu¬
tional—of certain forms of knowledge or thought, to pro¬
duce certain kinds and degrees of emotion, yet, in our ex¬
perience, a given intellection does not always excite its ap¬
propriate emotion, nor that emotion in its proper measure.
The question suggests itself, was man originally—before
his fall—thus constituted ? Or is this inconsequential rela¬
tion a symptom of derangement, an effect of the fall ?
May not this loosening of the nexus between these two
great powers of the soul be eminently the effect of the fall?
May it not be true, that, in normal souls, in which no dis¬
order has entered and broken the original perfect harmony
of the spirit, there exists a link of connection between
these faculties so firm that every form of knowledge, by
an invariable law, develops its appropriate sentiment and
in its due intensity? Christ possessed a human soul per¬
fect in its nature. A clear, sound, vigorous and penetrat¬
ing intellect He surely had. A well regulated sensibility
doubtless responded to the convictions of His judgment,
and to the various ideas of imagination and reason. In Him
no wrong emotion, no malevolent affection, no tumultuous
passion arose, to darken or disturb the bright serenity of His
The Human Will.
17
sensitive nature. Doubtless, this was the constitution of
man as he first came from the Creator's hand. Doubtless
thus, also, will redeemed humanity appear in the perfection
of the future state.
Before concluding this subject, we call attention to the
reflex influence of the Sensibility upon the Intellect. Our
emotions often set trains of thought into action, give direc¬
tion to these currents, and stimulate them to quickened ac¬
tivity. Ambition suggests plans for compassing its aims.
Avarice urges the thoughts into channels entirely new. Cu¬
riosity quickens the energy of intellect, and develops
powers previously unsuspected.
Injurious is often the reflex influence of the Sensibility on
the Intellect. A wrong feeling, an absorbing affection, or
a violent passion, casts a mist over the Intellect, obscuring
its perceptions, distorting its imaginations, and beclouding
its judgments. Through the false medium of passionate
love, jealousy, or prejudice, our judgments are inaccurate
and unjust. Love transforms deformity into beauty; jeal¬
ousy gives the color of guilt to the most innocent act; prej¬
udice perverts truth into error, or transmutes error into
truth.
SECTION IV.
THE LAW OF THE WILL.
We proceed now to inquire what is the true relation of
the Will in the spiritual organism; or what is the law of
the Will? A close connection has been established be¬
tween the first and second of the mental elements, Intel¬
lect and Sensibility. The inference, is irresistible that the
Will bears some relation to one or both of these powers.
If we attend carefully to the mental process which pre¬
cedes any act we perform, we shall find that the three
great powers already described, have their part in contrib¬
uting to the result. The process is as follows: I know :
I feel: I will. That is, knowledge precedes and awakens
emotion ; emotion precedes and induces volition; and voli-
18
The Human Will.
tion commands action. Thus the chain is complete, be¬
ginning with intelligence and ending in voluntary action.
We enunciate, then, the law of the Will as follows: The
Will bears a direct relation to the Sensibility, and is subject to
its immediate sway, the Volition being always determined by
the dominant Emotion. This emotion usually takes the form
of desire, before it is resolved into volition, although other
impelling or restraining sentiments may sometimes govern.
By " dominant emotion " is meant that feeling, or combi¬
nation of feelings, which is most powerful in the breast at
the time of action. The emotion maybe a single, indivis¬
ible passion, overpowering all conflicting impulses, or a
desire compounded of two or more different and even con¬
trary emotions, yet all combining to create an irresistible
incentive.
Now, to exemplify the law &s above stated, let us take,
first, a very simple action—namely: the eating of an orange.
The acts, or states, of the soul, in their order, are:
1. Intellection—I perceive the orange, and know its de¬
licious and refreshing flavor.
2. Emotion—Upon this knowledge, appetite—the desire
to eat it—is awakened.
3. Volition—If this be the dominant impulse, my Will
yields: I resolve to eat the orange.
But other desires or impulses of the sensibility may con¬
tend for the mastery. Suppose I am an invalid, and
know or believe that by thus indulging my appetite, I
would seriously endanger my health. Dread of increased
suffering and desire for recovery, combine now to constitute
a powerful impulse. The mental process would be thus:
1. Intellection—I know or believe that the eating of the
fruit would cause increased sickness and suffering.
2. Emotion—This conviction awakens dread of suffer¬
ing and desire for health—a combined emotion.
3. Volition—I resolve to reject the orange, being im¬
pelled by a feeling stronger, at the time, than appetite.
Or a different kind of affection may come into play. Just
The Human Will.
19
as I am about to indulge my propensity to eat the fruit, a
hungry little orphan approaches and begs for the orange.
Pity is awakened, kindling into benevolence, and pleads for
the child.
1. Intellection—I perceive and understand the famished
condition of the orphan.
2. Emotion—Benevolence creates a desire to relieve her
evident want.
3. Volition—I resolve to surrender the orange to the
child.
Now, it is palpable that the volition, in each case, has fol
lowed the dominant emotion, and the Will has submitted
as readily as the most loyal vassal obeys the command of
his sovereign.
Observe, in the examples above, three grades of emotion,
namely: appetite, self-love, and benevolence. Now, as has
been before shown, no known law of our present condition
enables us to determine, infallibly, which of these emotions
will predominate in every case. In regard to some indi¬
viduals whose characters are well known t* us, we might
anticipate, with confidence, the kind of emotion which
would prevail, and might predict their actions with moral
certainty. Here is A, who seems incapable of impulses
higher than appetite. He will sacrifice health, fortune,
happiness, honor, to gratify this animal instinct. B knows
no sentiment superior to self-love. He will submit to no
inconvenience for the advantage of his neighbor, and will
even invade the rights of others to promote his own inter¬
est. C possesses a nature so exalted, that he subordinates
all lower propensities to benevolence. It is unquestionably
true, that the nearer we approach perfection in our spiritual
culture, the more will prevail the higher and nobler sus¬
ceptibilities, and, consequently, the more regularly will the
Will prompt to better and worthier endeavors.
Take another illustration, in which the Will would seem
the prominent factor. Let us suppose the country in a
state of war. The question before my mind is that of vol¬
untary enlistment in the service. Shall I volunteer or not?
Now, although the very word employed to denote the action
20
The Human Will.
implies will-energy, yet it will be seen that there is "a
power behind the throne"—a motor which impels the will
forward. The Intellect has surveyed the question on every
side, and passed various judgments. On these intellectibns
various sensibilities have sprung into being.
1. I know, or believe, that in the army, I can effectively
promote my country's honor and weal. Upon this,patriotism
is awakened, and a desire to serve my country.
2. I know that in battle I am in constant peril of being
wounded or killed. Cowardice, the feat of pain and death,
supervenes.
3. I believe, or imagine, that in the army I can acquire
military glory. Ambition, desire for fame, is born of this
reflection.
4. I conceive of the probability that in my absence from
home, my family will suffer want and starvation. Upon this
conception arises anxiety for my family's welfare and safety.
Here we have four different judgments of the! intellect,
followed by as many different forms of sensibility. Of
these four emotions, two, namely, patriotism and ambition,
urge to enlistment; and two, cowardice and domestic affec¬
tion, prompt to stay at home. Let any single one be
stronger than the rest, and the volition will take the direc¬
tion of that impulse. If patriotism predominate, I will en¬
list, not from love of military glory so much as from love
of country, and no fear of danger, nor dread,of ruin to my
family will hinder me. If cowardice be the dominant im-;
pulse, I will refuse to serve from this ignoble motive alone,
and patriotism and ambition will lift their voices in vain.
Or cowardice and domestic solicitude may unite their pleas,
and becoming a stronger impetus than the other two com¬
bined, will carry the volition before the dominant emotion.
In this example, as in the first, the Will is found obeying
the dictates of the Sensibility, and thus the principle enun¬
ciated receives further confirmation.
The Human Will.
21
SECTION V.
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE WILL.
The doctrine, propounded and illustrated in our last
section, that the volition is always determined by the dominant
emotion, will now be enforced by a few historical examples.
Sir Philip Sidney, an accomplished courtier and soldier
under Queen Elizabeth, was mortally wounded in an action
between the English and Spaniards, near the fortress of
Zutphen, in Holland. As he lay on the field, mangled
with wounds and faint from the loss of blood, an attend
ant brought him a flask of water to relieve his intense
thirst. The nobleman observed a private soldier lying
near him, whose piteous moans strongly aroused his sym¬
pathy, and saying " Thy necessities are greater than mine,"
he resigned the flask to his dying comrade. Now, in this
act of rare self-denial, it is unquestionable that the Will
was governed by an influence extraneous to itself, and that
this influence proceeded from the Sensibility. It is evident
that humanity or benevolence was the determining emotion
prevailing, at the time, over self-love. which must have
pleaded strongly for his own relief.
The memorab'e pause of Julius Caesar on the brink of
the Rubicon, was a case in which the Will was held in
abeyance by a momentary conflict of emotions. Patriot¬
ism bade him turn back ; ambition urged him onward.
The volition, held in suspense for a time, at last yielded to
the sway of the more powerful impulse, and the passage
of that stream opened the way for the destruction of Ro¬
man liberty.
When Caesar had risen to the very summit of power in
the republic, he was suspected of cherishing ambition for
the imperial crown. Brutus, a prominent patriot, was
Caesar's personal friend. And to the claims of friendship
he remained loyal, so long as these claims did not conflict
with duty to his country. He loved Caesar well, but he
loved Rome more. And when convinced that, while Cae-
2
22
The Human Will.
sar lived, there was no hope for the liberties of his country*
he headed a conspiracy to take the life of his ambitious
friend. Patriotism triumphed over friendship, and became
the ruling passion of his soul. The volition obeyed, and
the loving Brutus became an assassin.
Charles V., the illustrious Emperor of Germany, abdi¬
cated his throne, in the year 1555, at the age of fifty-six.
As he had displayed great ambition and enterprise, his
resignation, at an age when objects of ambition operate
with full force on the mind, excited universal attention,
and many were the conjectures as to his motives. In his
address at Brussels, on the occasion of his devolving the
imperial authority upon his son Philip, he assigned as his
reason for retiring from the cares of an extensive empire,
the growing infirmities and exhausted vigor of his frame,
in consequence of an incurable distemper. There is no
doubt that the failure of some of his grandest projects,
added to the weight of the cares of state, and aggravated
by a mortal disease, had produced disappointment, mortifi¬
cation and disgust; and these feelings, together with his
hopes centered upon his son, combined to create a great
master emotion, which, prevailing over ambition, induced
him to resign the crown and place it upon tne brow of his
beloved Philip. The volition was swayed by the dominat
ing complex emotion.
It was fanaticism—a feeling composed of religious fer¬
vor and malignant passion—which prompted Charles IX.
of France, and his wicked queen-mother, to plot the mas¬
sacre of sixty thousand Protestants, on St. Bartholomew's
eve—a crime which has rendered the names of Charles
and Catharine execrable forever, and made that day the
blackest in Time's calendar.
Macbeth—a historical personage, though best known
through Shakspeare's drama—assassinated Duncan, his
kinsman, his guest and his king. Ambition goaded him to
the bloody deed. But other emotions protested against
the treachery and wickedness of that unparalleled crime.
The Human Will.
23
Gratitude for multiplied favors, love for his amiable kins¬
man, loyalty to the noble monarch, a sense of duty to his
trusting guest, and dread of detection, united their eloquent
pleadings for the life of the gentle Duncan. Above all,
conscience rose up in stern rebuke of the meditated guilt.
But lust of power drowned in its tumultuous torrent the voices
of these safe monitors, and swept the unhappy Macbeth
into the gulf of crime. Here the strongest emotion con¬
trolled the volition.
Archbishop Cranmer, primate of England under Henry
VIII and Edward VI, was a prominent champion of Pro¬
testantism against the doctrines of the Church of Rome.
When Mary, the bloody Catholic queen, acceded to the
throne, the religion of the realm was changed, and the
Protestant leaders were arrested and compelled to recant,
on peril of being burned alive. Scores had already perished
at the stake. Cranmer, in sight of the fires of Smithfield,
where Latimer, Ridley and Hooper had endured their ter¬
rible martyrdom, was overcome by his fears, and signed the
recantation. Afterwards, stung by remorse and shame,
and sustained perhaps by faith, he publicly recalled his re¬
cantation, an3 bravely confronted the fiery doom. Here,
the emotion of fear impelled to the subscription of that
odious document, against which his moral sense rebelled.
Subsequently cotiscience re-established its authority, and
triumphed over the baser impulses of nature.
The fiendish crime of the wretch, Thomas or Thomas-
sen, developed at Bremerhaven, on the 11th of December,
1875, has rung its peal of horror throughout the civilized
world. It is confidently stated, that this demon in human
form, to secure the insurance on the steamer Mosel, delib¬
erately contrived a scheme for blowing up the ship, by
placing a case of dynamite in the hold, with clock-work
attachment, so arranged that it would probably explode,
when the vessel should be on mid-ocean. But, by an ap¬
parent accident, the material exploded on the quay, before it
could be smuggled on board of the steamer. The result was
24
The Human Will.
the loss of more than sixty lives, and the mutilation of two
hundred persons. The successful execution of his plot would
have effected the destruction of the ship with all on board,
and none would have escaped to tell the tale, and no trace
of the awful tragedy would have been left upon the track¬
less waters. It was cupidity—the greed of gain—the love
of money—in the heart of that debased monster, which
determined the volition to the execution of a crime so
atrocious as to call forth the unanimous execration of man"
kind.
SECTION VI.
THE INTELLECT NOT A DETERMINING FORCE TO THE WILL.
In each of the examples thus far adduced, it is clear that
the resolution to act was not produced by judgment, or rea¬
son, or any form of intellectual activity, but by the impulse
of feeling. Does reason, or judgment, ever impel to action?
We reply that there is nothing, in mere intellect, of the na¬
ture of force, or incentive to action. Between it and the
volition, feeling must intervene. The genial opinion of
philosophers is in accord with this view.
Sir William Hamilton, in his lectures on Metaphysics,
asserts that "the mere cognition—i. e. intellection—leaves
us cold and unexcited ; the awakened feeling infuses warmth
and life into our action ; it supplies action with an interest;
and without an interest, there is for us no voluntary action
possible. Without the intervention of feeling, the cogni¬
tion stands divorced from the conation—i. e. effort—and,
apart from feeling, all conscious endeavor after anything
would be altogether incomprehensible."
The testimony of Locke is to the same effect. He says:
" Good and evil, present and absent, it is true, work upon
the mind, but that which immediately determines the Will,
from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the uneasi¬
ness of desire, fixed on some absent good, either negative,
as indolence to one in pain, or positive, as enjoyment of
The Human Will.
25
pleasure." Elsewhere he says: "For good, though ap¬
pearing and allowed ever so great, yet till it hath raised de¬
sires in our minds, and thereby made us uneasy in its want,
it reaches not our wills ; we are not within the sphere of its
activity."
Sir James Mackintosh is more to the point. He says:
"We can easily imagine a percipient and thinking being,
without a capacity of receiving pleasure or pain. Such a
being might perceive what we do; if we could conceive
him to reason, he might reason justly; and if he were to
judge at all, there seems no reason why he should not judge
truly. But what could induce such a being to will or to
act I It seem:- evident that his existence could only be a
state of passive contemplation. Reason, as reason, can
never be a motive to action'. It is only when we superadd
to such a being sensibility, or the capacity of emotion, or
sentiment of desire and aversion, that we introduce him
into the world of action."
Haven admits that the majority of philosophers concur
in these opinions. He says: "The intellect they regard
as acting upon the will, not directly, but through the me¬
dium of the sensibilities, the various emotions and desires
which are awakened by the perceptions of the intellect.
That this is the correct view, admits of little doubt."
But there are cases, in which it does, at first, seem, that
men are impelled to action more by judgment or reason
than by feeling; in which the volition is determined by the
intelligence, rather than by the emotions. In exigencies of
danger and doubt, we are embarrassed by the question,
which of several courses must we take ? We must decide
the question by the reason first. That must inform us,
which of the possible courses is wisest, safest, or best. And
yet a scrutiny of the mental process will discover, that a
feeling or desire supervenes upon the decision of the intel¬
lect, and before the volition takes place. A general is in
doubt, which of two or more methods of strategy to adopt;
whether to advance or retreat, to attack boldly in front, or
26
The Human Will.
surprise on the flank or rear, to employ infantry or artil¬
lery. His object is to defeat the enemy and gain a victory-
It is his desire to accomplish this, which nerves him to the
endeavor. His judgment must decide the method, but his
interest—his desire for success—spurs him on to the achieve¬
ment. A mere decision between two courses has in it
nothing of impulse, or inducement to action.
It is said that when Caesar was at the height of his pop¬
ularity and power, a kingly crown " was thrice offered
him, which he thrice refused. It would seem that his
action, in this instance, was dictated by policy—i. e., judg¬
ment of prudence or expediency. Moreover, supposing
him to be ambitious of the imperial dignity, it would ap¬
pear that he willed in opposition to his desires. He desired
the royal power, yet would not take the crown. Why?
He knew or feared that the acceptance of the symbol then
was premature, and would precipitate a revolution which
might deprive him of the reality of which that diadem was
only a sign. His desire or ambition was for the power,
and not the symbol; therefore, he refused the symbol that
he might more certainly enjoy the power. 'Twas ambition
that caused him to reject the proffered emblem.
But do we not sometimes act from judgment, and at other
times from feeling. We say one man acts from prejudice,
a second from passion, a third from reason or judgment.
It is said to be characteristic of wise men to be controlled
by principle, and foolish men by impulse. So we speak.
But it would be more correct and more philosophical to
say, that wise men act from the impulses of the rational sensi¬
bilities, and foolish men fr6m those of the lower propensities.
Two men may have the same judgment as to the impro¬
priety of a given act. The one, impelled by passion,
rushes headlong into its commission. The other, re¬
strained by conscientious obligation, or sense of duty or
honor, avoids it. One has obeyed the impulse of passion,
the other the impulse of a nobler feeling.
In the early days of the Roman republic, the sons of the
The Human Wilt.
21
consul, Lucius Junius Brutus, were arraigned before their
father on an allegation of crime. He found them guilty
and gave sentence accordingly. Parental love pleaded
strongly for his children, but duty argued more powerfully
for justice and the good of the commonwealth. His will
obeyed the dictate of duty.
Now what is duty ? It is simply obligation to do what is
right, or just, or wise, or prudent, or safe, or honorable,
or courteous, or anything which may be called praisewor¬
thy. " If there by any virtue, any praise," duty bids us
"think on these things." Now, of course, the judgment
must decide what is praiseworthy—that is, it must inform
us which, of several courses, it is our duty to pursue. But
if that decision be all, nothing will be done. Unless we
feel the obligation, unless the sense or sentiment of duty be
awakened, as an impulse in the heart, there will be no vo¬
lition, and hence no action. Duty, therefore, presupposes
judgment; but its essential nature is impulse—which is
feeling.
In our historical illustrations, we had occasion to speak of
conscience, both as a restraining and impelling influence to
the volition. Its voice warned Macbeth of the crime he
meditated, and urged Cranmer to revoke his treason to his
faith. The question arises, how is Conscience an influence
to the Will? Is it to be classed among the emotions?
Conscience is a subject of much difficulty, and of sacred
importance. It will be discussed in the next section, in
which its nature and relation to the Will may be seen.
SECTION VII.
ANALYTICAL VIEW OF CONSCIENCE.
Among the impulses to volition residing in the human
breast, one of the most powerful is that of conscience, or
the moral faculty. As an incentive to voluntary action, it
is of the nature of obligation, allied to duty, though not
identical with it. Duty is an obligation more general than
28
The Human Will.
that of conscience, having reference to a wider range of
qualities. Duty concerns all estimable and praiseworthy
actions; conscience has regard to one feature of conduct
only, the moral quality—the right and wrong. Conscience
enjoins obligation to God, as our Creator and moral Gov¬
ernor, and to men as the creatures of God. It commands
reverence and obedience to our Maker, and enjoins charity,
justice, truth, honesty, chastity to our fellow creatures, on
account of our common relations to God. Duty involves
not only all these, but other excellent qualities and actions
not properly classed as moral. It includes expedient, poli¬
tic, wise, appropriate, prudential and aesthetic relations, as
well as those that are moral. It not only councils to pious,
just and charitable conduct, but to the observance of what
is becoming, dignified, graceful and politic. Conscience
regards morals alone; duty whatever is commendable or
excellent. Duty includes conscientious obligation, but has
a wider sphere of action.
Duty is essentially an emotion—a feeling of obligation to
do what is right, or wise, or appropriate, or expedient, or
courteous. It presupposes reason and judgment, but its
real nature is emotional. In this also it differs from con¬
science, which is a complex power, made up of both intel¬
lectual and emotional elements.
Conscience may be defined that faculty, or department,
of our spiritual nature which is concerned with moral quali¬
ties and duties—the right and the wrong in human affairs.
Right is that which is pleasing to God; wrong is what is
displeasing to God. Conscience involves the recognition
of the existence and moral perfections the Supreme Being,
and enjoins those obligations which arise out of man's rela¬
tions to Him. It approves every act done in accordance
with these obligations, and censures every violation of the
same. It is thus seen that conscience involves several
functions. Some of these are' intellectual and some emo¬
tional.
An analytical view of the moral faculty is here presented.
The Human Will.
29
Conscience may be resolved into four different factors, or
states, each of which is a compound of intellection and
emotion.
1. In the first state, the intellectual element is the idea
of a God. This idea is intuitive and universal, being found
or developed in every human breast. Upon this idea there
springs up a responsive emotion—namely, awe of a God
a feeling of subdued terror, in view of the existence and
perfections of this exalted Being. Both the idea and its
emotional correlate are fundamental and universal—lying at
the basis of the moral faculty and existing among all men.
2. Following upon the acknowledgment and awe of a
Deity, arises the second state of the conscience. This con¬
sists of the conception of right and wrong—the intuitive
notion of a possible something pleasing or displeasing to
God; and the correlative feeling of approval of the right and
disapproval of the wrong. This compound state is also
universal, all men having it in a greater or less degree.
3. The third state of the development of conscience is
reached, when an act involving moral quality is proposed.
The intellectual element is now, not an intuition, but a
judgment. It decides whether the act is right or wrong.
And as all judgments are fallible, the ethical judgment is
liable to be erroneous. Hence, some things which one
man believes to be right, another regards as wrong, and
vice versa. This is the feature of conscience in respect to
which there is such a wide difference among men. While
all men have some notion of right and wrong, based on
their recognition of a Supreme Being, they differ in their
judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. Much
depends on education for the correctness of our moral
judgments. The defects of the ethical judgment need to
be supplied by the truths of revelation.
Following close upon this intellection, comes the feeling of
obligation to do the right or refrain from doing the wrong.
Whether our judgments are correct or erroneous, the
3
30
The Human Will.
emotion responds to the intellection, and we feel impelled
to do what we believe to be right, and to abstain from
what we think to be wrong. This is a natural emotion,
and, when encouraged, will urge us to duty. But like all
other emotions, it may be blunted by neglect and repeated
disregard of its monitions.
This part of conscience requires the most careful atten¬
tion and nurture. The intellectual element should be dil¬
igently cultivated by thoughtful attention to the character
and bearings of every act, aided by the teachings of Holy
Writ. Only thus can the discriminations of conscience be
trusted. And no less should the emotional element—the
feeling of obligation—be scrupulously fostered and obeyed.
Otherwise, habitual disregard will benumb the moral sen¬
sibility, and render us a prey to the power of corrupt affec¬
tions and malign passions.
4. The fourth and last state ef conscience supervenes
after the performance of the act, or after a proposed in¬
dulgence has been successfully resisted. The conscience
then surveying the act, experiences pleasure if it was
right, and pain if it was wrong.
RECAPITULATION.
First Stale.
Intellection—Idea of a God.
Emotion—Awe of a God.
Second State.
Intellection—Idea of right and wrong.
Emotion—Approval of right, disapproval of wrong.
Third State.
Intellection—Judgment as to the right or wrong of a
given act.
Emotion—Obligation to do the right and refrain from
doing the wrong.
Fou? th State.
Intellection—Subsequent contemplation of the act.
Emotion—Pleasure on having done right, pain on hav¬
ing done wrong.
The Human Will.
31
These four intellections, with their corresponding emo¬
tions, make up the whole of that mysterious department
of our nature called conscience. It is that part of the
soul which binds us to the throne of God, and is, in one
sense, the vicegerent of God in the soul.
An analysis of a moral action will discover to us the rela¬
tion of the conscience to the Will. Suppose the question
to be as to the commission of a theft.
Intellection—I discern in this act a moral quality—
namely wrong; that is I judge the theft to be wrong.
Emotion—Upon this judgment I feel impelled to abstain
from the act; that is, a feeling of obligation restrains me.
Volition—If no stronger emotion prevails, I will refrain,
in obedience to the dictate of conscience.
The impulse of conscience, or the feeling of moral obli¬
gation, is the most sacred and authoritative impulse of the
soul. In well regulated sensibilities, it holds the highest
rank of all the natural emotions, subordinating self-love and
all the lower propensities to its authority. In such natures,
the Will ever commands right actions, because it is under
the sway of moral obligation—the dominant emotion.
SECTION VIII.
SCRIPTURAL EXAMPLES—ANALYSIS OF FAITH.
The Bible will now furnish some instances illustrative o
the theory of the Will, heretofore propounded.
It is undeniable that the first transgression—the fall—was
the result of the tempter's assault upon the heart—the sen¬
sibility—of the mother of the human race. Desire was
kindled in the breast of Eve. This desire, whether sensual
or rational, whether appetite, lust or ambition, gained the
ascendency over the holy affections of her original nature,
and, in a moment of supreme mastery, prompted.the de¬
termination to eat the forbidden fruit. Then discord began
in the soul, the elemental forces of the sensibility lost their
32
The Human Will.
due subordination, and depravity became the leprous inheri¬
tance of the race.
The first murder was instigated by hatred, begotten of
jealousy in the heart of Cain. David's double crime was
the offspring of sensual lust. Peter's denial of his Master
was prompted by cowardice, and the treachery of Judas by
avarice. Thus it is plain that the sensibility was the seat of
the evil in every instance. The master passion swayed the
Will, determining the volitions to those acts necessary for
its gratification.
We now turn to more pleasing illustrations of the doc¬
trine, in which we shall see exhibited the triumph of the
nobler affections.
Abraham was divinely commanded to offer up his only
son as a burnt sacrifice on Mt. Moriah. Pity, humanity,
sympathy, parental love, stimulated to intensity by the un¬
paralleled circumstances of the case, cried out with vehe¬
ment protest against the execution of the dreadful order.
An act so unnatural and horrible was never before required
of a father. But against these eloquent appeals of nature
stood the direct, positive, and inflexible command of Al¬
mighty God.
Abraham resolved to obey the divine mandate. What
impelled to this obedience? Most persons would say that
he did it in spite of his inclinations, and that he stifled all
the feelings of his heart. Not so; else it would never have
been done. He yielded to the dominant emotion, the af¬
fection that held supreme sway in his soul.
But let us contemplate Abraham as he makes up his
mind to execute the stern decree. We exhibit the mental
process in the manner before adopted.
Intellection—Abraham understood the order, and appre¬
ciated all the revolting features of the case.
Emotion—Parental love—the unspeakable yearning of
the father's heart over Isaac, his only son, the son of his
old age, the son of promise—urged him to disobey.
The Human Will.
33
Volition—Had no stronger impulse dominated in his sen¬
sibility, he had refused to obey God and spared his son.
But he obeyed, and from what impulse ? The apostle
Paul attributes it to faith. " By faith, Abraham, when
he was tried, offered up Isaac." Now, what was the prin¬
ciple which, triumphing over every natural feeling of the
breast, prompted that good man, that loving father, to lay
his darling upon the altar for a burnt offering?
As was shown in a previous section, there is no im¬
pulsive force in mere intellect; to constitute a motive to
action, the energy must come from the emotional part of
our nature. This has been variously exhibited in the exam¬
ples already adduced. We found emotional elements in the
moral faculty, and showed that wherever conscience urged
to action, the volition was determined by the feeling of ob¬
ligation. The opinions of eminent philosophers were also
produced, corroborating this principle.
At this stage of our investigation, it is proper to inquire
whether the Scriptures throw any light upon this subject.
Solomon exhorts : " Keep thy heart with all diligence, for
out of it are the issues of life." The heart is the seat of the
sensibility, and we are here taught that from it spring the
actions that make up the history of our lives. Our Saviour
teaches that " out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, mur¬
ders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphe¬
mies; these are the things which defile a man." The apos¬
tle John sums up everything in the world opposed to the
Father in three emotions, '' the lust of the flesh, the lust of
the eyes, and the pride of life"—all affections of the sensi¬
bility. Good actions, also, are the issues of the heart.
^ Love is the fulfilling of the law." The divine summary
of duty is love to God and to our neighbor.
Since, therefore, actions, both good and bad, are
prompted by the heart, if faith be a motive to conduct, F
must have a heart element, an emotional power. The
apostle distinctly ascribes Abraham's obedience to faith.
Let us analyze his faith.
34
The Human Will.
1. Intellection—Abraham believed in the existence and
glorious perfections of God.
2. Emotion—Upon his belief, supreme love to God was
awakened.
Hence, faith is a complex act or state of the soul, involv¬
ing both intellect and sensibility. Abraham's faith was a
compound of intellectual conviction and holy affection; in
short, of belief in God and love to God. It was trust or
confidence in God, and was more or less a permanent condi¬
tion of his soul. Let us now analyze his act of faith—his
obedience.
1. Intellection—Abraham was convinced that the com¬
mand really came from God, and that obedience would be
pleasing to God.
2. Emotion—Upon this, was awakened desire to please
God—based on love to God.
3. Volition—This desire prevailing over parental affec¬
tion, determined the Will to compliance. Thus we find
again action commanded by the Will, in obedience to the
dictate of the dominant emotion. It seems that the Scrip¬
tures ascribe the efficiency of faith, as a motive, to emotional
power, when it teaches us that "faith works by love," and
"with the heart man believeth unto righteousness."
The choice of Moses affords another striking illustration
of the doctrine in question.
Moses, though a Hebrew, was the adopted child of the
daughter of Pharaoh, and enjoyed all the pleasures, riches
and honors of a prince of the house of Egypt. His coun¬
trymen, the Hebrews, were abject slaves, doomed to pov¬
erty, shame and wretchedness. At the age of maturity
and discretion, he resolved to identify himself with his
afflicted people, sharing their degradation and hardships,
renouncing the affluence, dignity and luxury of the Egyp¬
tian court. What impelled him to this choice? All the
natural feelings were against it.
Voluptuousness—love of pleasure—prompted him to
The Human Will.
35
remain amid the enjoyments of the most sensual and lux¬
urious court of ancient times.
Avarice—love of riches—urged him to continue in the
possession of the treasures of Egypt, that surpassed the
wealth of all other nations of that period.
Ambition—love of fame and power—impelled him to
abide in a position where present honors clustered thickly
around his person, and where, perhaps, royal dignity
awaited him. All these feelings combined to create a
powerful desire to stay where he was, associated with the
wicked and idolatrous natives of the land. But a contrary
impulse predominated. " By faith Moses, when he was
come to years, refused to be called the son of Pharaoh's
daughter; choosing rather to suffer affliction with the peo¬
ple of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season ;
esteeming the reproach of Christ greater riches than all the
treasures in Egypt; for he had respect unto the recom¬
pense of the reward."
Here the choice of Moses is clearly attributed to a mo¬
tive, faith. The Will is determined by faith. We have
seen that its impulsive power is in the sensibility. It is love
to God. It is this faith which, "working by love," urges
the pious missionary to forsake home, friends and comfort
for ;he hardships and perils of a life among savages. It is
this same faith which, " beleiving with the heart," induces
the sinner to seek pardon and salvation at the Cross of the
Divine Redeemer, and to consecrate his life to the service
of his Master.
It triumphs, as we have seen, over natural inclination.
It must, therefore, be a supernatural principle. It is an
inspiration. "It is the gift of God."
We are prepared now to consider the Will in its rela¬
tion to regeneration and Christian obedience. This will be
discussed in our next section.
36
The Human Will.
SECTION IX.
REGENERATION AND EVANGELICAL FAITH.
We have now discovered a striking coincidence between
our philosophy of the. Will and the teachings of revelation.
Both unite their testimony to the truth that the impulse to
volition and action is derived from the scat of the affec¬
tions—the sensibility, as psychologists term it; the heart,
as it is denominated in the Scriptures.
It was suggested in the third section of this treatise,
that there was a symptom of disorder in the loose nexus
binding the Intellect and Sensibility. This symptom is
betrayed not so much in the variety of emotions awakened
by a given intellection, as in the false, base and malevolent
affections aroused by ideas which ought, legitimately, to
produce the contrary feelings. The human soul is a
grand instrument, whose chords are capable of a great va¬
riety of musical sounds. But it is sadly out of tune.
The keys, though struck by a master hand, awaken uncer¬
tain, false and dissonant tones, so that what should be
sweet and thrilling harmony is jarring and jangling discord.
The Sensibility, then, is the chief seat of evil in man's
soul. No longer under the sway of right reason and a
pure conscience, it often flames like raging fire, and de
stroys in its malignant fury.
The Bible, also, teaches that the heart is the seat of cor¬
ruption in man. "The heart is deceitful above all things,
and desperately wicked." Christ, as we have seen, de¬
clared that '' out of the heart proceed all evil thoughts,
murders," etc. As all goodness consists in love to God and
our neighbor, so all wickedness results from the absence of
th ese holy affections. But man, in his natural state, does
not love God. "The carnal mind is enmity to God, for it is
not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be."
From enmity nothing pleasing to God can flow. There¬
fore, man's Will, prompted by natural feeling, never com-
The Human Will.
37
mands righteous and holy actions. Thus man is, by nature*
entirety a sinner, because his heart is opposed to God.
We have shown in the cases of Abraham and Moses,
that, in matters of duty to God, righteous men are impelled
by a principle superior to the natural dispositions of the
soul. This principle, therefore, is supernatural in its origin.
It is awakened by Deity. We have said that faith is an
inspiration. By this we do not mean to say that it is an
exotic transplanted into the soul—that is, a foreign sub¬
stance added to the furniture of the soul; but a capacity
developed by Divine power to do what, of its own un¬
aided nature, it could not do. We have found faith to be
a compound of intellection and 'emotion—namely, con¬
viction of certain truth and responding affections. One
who possesses this faith js regefierated, "born again," or
"born of God." The scriptures emphatically assert the
necessity of this regeneration, which it as emphatically
ascribes to Divine Power, the power of the Holy Spirit;
Now, in order to regeneration there must be new intel¬
lections—convictions of truth of which the soul was be¬
fore incapable. There must be also new sensibilities
awakened—affections hitherto inexperienced and impossi¬
ble. The gospel furnishes the truth or knowledge, which
the Holy Spirit fastens in clear conviction on the intellect,
and then awakens those emotions which follow appropri¬
ately and legitimately. The reception of this truth, and
the consequent affections, make up evangelical faith.
Thus evangelical faith is both intellectual and emotional.
We exhibit its elements as follows :
Intellection.—Belief of the Gospel. This includes the
conviction of the following prominent truths : Man's de¬
pravity and ruin—God's hatred of sin, yet love to the race
—Christ's Divine satisfaction for sin—pardon and salvation
to the penitent.
Emotion—Love to Christ. This involves the following
prominent feelings : Sorrow for sin—trust in the Saviour
—desire to glorify Him.
38
The Human Will.
Now, it is easy to see that if this faith is once created in
the soul by Divine Power, these higher impulses will pre¬
vail over the lower propensities of the carnal nature, and
the Will, obeying the dictate of the dominant emotion,
will command actions pleasing to God, and the subject of
this faith will do what'is right.
Thus it is the effect of regeneration, as it is its design*
to bring the soul of man into harmony with the mind o
God, and the human will into co-operation with the Divine
Will. Thus it produces in him loyalty and obedience to
his Maker and righteous Lord. Thus "God worketh in us
both to will and to do of His good pleasure." He does
not arbitrarily or violently bend the Will to His behests'
compelling it to act against the disposition of the heart,
but He creates in us right affections and holy desires, and
thus so works in us that we will and we do of His good
pleasure. The question is sometimes asked, which is first
in order, regeneration or faith ? Our theory of faith set¬
tles the question. Regeneration is the process ; faith is
the product. The Spirit is the agent, regeneration the
method by which He operates, and faith the result. But
while regeneration psychologically precedes faith, chronolo¬
gically they are one and instantaneous. As "God speaks
and it is done" so when he decrees the moment of the new
birth, instantly faith is awakened, and the new-born soul
breathes the air of liberty. The regenerated man is at
once a new man, because his heart is changed at once.
Saul of Tarsus was at one moment breathing threatening
and slaughter against Christ and His people, and in the next,
was lying on the ground in an agony of remorse, crying
"Lord, what wilt thou have me to do ?" His mind was
then no longer enmity against Jesus, whom he had perse¬
cuted, but eager to know what he could do to serve Him.
He was a regenerated man, the subject of evangelical faith.
One of the admirable effects of regeneration is the grad¬
ual and complete restoration of conscience to its normal
supremacy, and the other natural sensibilities to their
The Human Will.
39
proper subordination to its authoritative impulses. Thus,
in harmonizing the human soul with the will and law of
the Creator, it re-establishes harmony within the soul itself.
The ultimate result of the process is to bring man back to
the perfection of his original state, when he bore the clear
and complete image of his Maker; or rather to elevate
him to that state of perfection and security, from which it
will be impossible for him to fall. The full realization of
this perfection will be in the future life.
SECTION X.
THE WILL IN REFERENCE TO MECHANICAL, INDIFFERENT, AND
RELUCTANT ACTIONS.
From a study of consciousness, the reports of experi¬
ence, and a wide range of historical inquiry, both sacred
and profane, we have, by generalization and induction,
drawn the conclusion, that the Will is subject to the control
of the sensibility, its acts being put forth in obedience to
the prevailing emotions. This induction is corroborated
by the declarations of Scripture and the opinions of phil¬
osophers.
If, therefore, any actions come under our observation,
for which we can discover either no motives at all, or mo¬
tives that appear to be other than impulses of the sensi¬
bility, it is reasonable to infer that these are only seeming
exceptions to the law, and that a perfect analysis, were it
always possible, would disclose the secret cause in the
emotional part of our nature. Some of these apparently
exceptional instances will now be considered.
There are many actions of a minor character, in regard
to which it is very difficult to discern any prior impulse,
incentive or motive. The utterly insignificant and trivial
character of these actions naturally suggest that their
causes are of a feeble, vague and shadowy kind. Among
these may be included all merely automatic or mechanical
40
The Human Will.
actions—those that we do unconsciously from long habit
or practice ; whimsical actions; actions performed without
any apparent interest; and actions prompted by a choice
between two or more proposed courses to which we are
seemingly indifferent.
An example of the mechanical action is seen, when one,
on setting out to walk, unconsciously takes up his umbrella
for which he has no need ; or when one, while studying,
twists his hair, or thumps his cheek, It is evident, that in
such cases, the action is involuntary—neither head, heart
nor will has anything to do with it. The mind is abstracted,
and action results from habit alone. It is the facility which
the mind acquires of working in channels from which long
use has worn off the friction, and its movements are auto¬
matic, like those of a machine. There is no volition, and
hence no impulse to action, other than the predisposition
of habit.
An example of the second kind is, when one, with a per-
lect consciousness of what he is doing, intentionally strikes
the table at which he is sitting with all the muscular force
of his arm ; or, rising from his seat, kicks over a chair
from pure caprice. These acts seem to be done without
any motive whatever, and though there is physical or
muscular energy put forth in the action, no interest, or
feeling, or purpose is discernible. These appear to be cases
of volition, independent of prior motives or causes. Are
they really so ? The incentive may be unwise and unrea¬
sonable ; it may be a whimsicality bordering on idiocy or
insanity; but there is an impulse nevertheless, and that is
the impulse of desire. For some reason or other, he is
pleased to do it. And his pleasure, or whim, or wish, or
desire was a feeling.
A case of the third kind is that of one who is persuaded
by another to take a walk, though he feels no interest in
the act—does not " care " whether he walks or not. But
however little may be the interest in the walk, the desire
to gratify his friend may not be lacking.
The Human Will.
41
The fourth kind is that of action in view of equiponder¬
ant motives—that is, where the interest or motives for two
or more courses appear to be equally balanced. As long
as the equilibrium of motives is preserved, it is certain that
there will be no action. The Will is held in suspense, and
the man will hesitate or vacillate. As soon as action takes
place it is proof that one of the incentives has prepon¬
derated, and carried the volition before it. Here, for ex¬
ample, are two different places I wish to visit. I cannot
go to both—yet strong but different motives impel to both.
For some time these motives are equiponderant. Finally,
I barely incline to one of the proposed courses. It is the
preponderance of one impulse of desire over the other.
Or suppose two apples be offered me, equally ripe,
sound and inviting. I have no choice between them at
first—that is, I do not care which I take. Finally I do
choose one of them, but the act of selection has been done
without any interest. This is almost wholly automatic—it is
as if I had shut my eyes, and left the choice to accident.
In propotion to its recession from the automatic, the vol¬
untary feature [is more evident, and the interested feeling
more discernible. There may have been little force of vo¬
lition, and so behind it there was little force of desire. As
the desire on the instant of action inclines, in that direc¬
tion is the bent of the Will. I have done as 1 pleased, and
this demonstrates feeling.
Another class of actions, apparent exceptions to the law,
may be denominated reluctant actions. It frequently hap¬
pens that we do that to which certain feelings offer power¬
ful opposition. It is common to say, that, in such cases,
we acted against our wishes, or did what we did not wish
to do. It would be more correct to say that the act was
reluctant—done in spite of strong opposition on the part
of certain sympathetic and demonstrative feelings. The
sympathetic emotions—such as love, hatred, grief—are
more restless, boisterous and turbulent in their manifesta¬
tions than the rational sensibilities—such as duty, moral
42
The Human Will.
sentiment, and other like dictates of high and virtuous
feeling. The indulgence of the former makes us uneasy to
a certain degree, and their cries are heard above " the still
small voice " of rational impulse; yet,' as in nature, the
most powerful agents are the most noiseless and impercept¬
ible, so in the mind, the calm, deep sensibilities are the
most effective impulses of the breast.
Take this example. A young lady is strongly attached
to a young man whom her father forbids her to marry. Or,
to put a stronger case, the father commands her to marry
a man whom she does not love—nay, positively dislikes^
Finally, after a struggle, she yields to her father's injunction^
and gives her hand to the man whom she despises. In the
most extreme case of this kind, where one yields to the
imperious will of another, there is very little volition, if;any
at all. And behind the volition, where it exists, there is
some feeling of dread, or reverence, or duty, which, after
a struggle with the more sympathetic emotion, prevails—
the reluctating affection becoming more feeble in its oppo¬
sition as the contest goes on. Finally, when the time of
action arrives, the more quiet, yet authoritative, feeling
gains the mastery of the more turbulent affection, and car¬
ries the volition before it.
SECTION XI.
THE DOCTRINE OF MOTIVES.
The motive theory of the Will was propounded by Jon¬
athan Edwards, the most distinguished of American meta¬
physicians, and one of the ablest thinkers of modern times.
His view has been accepted by a large class of philosophers,
and by the great majority of Calvinistic theologians. The
doctrine is this: '' The motive which, as viewed by the mind,
is strongest, is that which detennines the Will." By motive
is meant whatever moves, or excites to action. With re¬
spect to the Will, motive is simply the .cause of volition
To say that the Will is determined by the strongest motive,
The Human Will.
43
is the same as to say that it is determined by the strongest
cause, which sounds very much like a truism.
But it is the motive which is strongest, "as viewed by the
mind." This expression "strongest, as viewed by the
mind," is explained to mean "most agreeable and inviting
to the understanding." If this conveys any idea at all, it
is that the Will is determined by some influence which
awakens agreeable feeling or desire in the mind; and that,
unless it does arouse feeling, it causes no volition, and,
therefore, is not a motive at all. To be a motive it must
kindle emotion, and to be the strongest motive, it must ex¬
cite the strongest emotion. Thus President Edwards main¬
tains that the motive operative upon the Will is a force out¬
side of the soul, and is operative only as it arouses feeling.
Our theory is much simpler, and, we think,' more intelli¬
gible also. It places the motive in the sensibility—it makes
feeling the motive, rather than that which awakens feeling.
Edwards seems to place the motive a degree or two behind
the impulse to volition, which he virtually admits to be
feeling. The doctrine of Edwards was based upon a de¬
fective psychology; and imperfect analysis of the soul. He
recognized only two great cardinal powers of the soul—
Understanding and Will. As he regarded the understand¬
ing as capable of feeling pleasure, it is evident that he as¬
cribed some emotional character to that intellectual faculty,
and Will he manifestly considered as a form of desire. Thus,
with a confused psychology, he naturally fell into confusion
of thought. It should be remembered that the present
three-fold classification of the powers of the soul—Intellect,
Sensibility and Will—is a comparatively recent triumph of
science, and when Edwards wrote, more than one hundred
years ago, was entirely unknown.
Another objection to the motive hypothesis is, that it
does not clearly characterize the motives, nor define their
proper sphere, and, hence, does not satisfactorily explain
the phenomena of volition. The spirit of inquiry demands,
"Where do these motives reside, and what is their na-
44
The Human Will.
ture? Is their sphere objective or subjective? Do they
proceed from sources external to the mind, or do they orig¬
inate within the soul itself? If external, are they the
powers of intelligent agents, the emanations of matter, or
the blind influences of circumstances and events?"
Let us inquire whether exterior influences do ever be¬
come motives to volition—do ever affect the Will without
the intervention of intellectual or emotional activities. The
most important influences from without the soul, capable of
impressing the mind, are those from the Divine Will or
agency, from human actions, and from surrounding circum¬
stances.
1. How does the Divine agency operate to control the
actions of men ? Is it by a power exerted directly upon
the Will ? Calvin maintains that, in the regeneration of
the soul, God "produces the Will." In another place he
says, "He moves the Will." Paul declares that "it is God
that worketh in you, to will zxi&to dooi His good pleasure."
Here, both the willing and the doing are said to be wrought
jn us. He does not produce the willing any more than the
doing by a direct omnipotent energy on the Will, but in¬
spires in us the desire, from which it follows that we will and
do of his good pleasure. He touches the heart, awakens
the right affection towards Him, and thus the Will; follow,
ing the law of the mind, executes the pleasure of the soul.
In conversion God draws the sinner to Christ and His
service. Says our Saviour, "No man can come unto me,
except the Father which hath sent me draw him." But
this drawing is not a violent dragging or constraint
of the Will, but a sweet attractive influence upon the
heart; and the affections thus graciously drawn become
impulses to holy action. The motive to volition, in this
case, is not an immediate Divine energy upon the Will
but the Divinely awakened affection of the heart.
2. How do the actions of our fellow-men operate to pro¬
duce action in us ? We are, undoubtedly, subject to in¬
fluences from those by whom we are surrounded. The
The H:,man Will.
45
voice of maternal entreaty turned Coriolanus from the gates
of Rome. The wail of distress prompted Sidney to an
act of noble self denial. The example of Leonidas
aroused his three hundred Spartans to face destruction at
Thermopylae. The eloquence of Patrick Henry pursuaded
the colonies to arm in defence of their liberties. But, in
every case, the influence did not operate directly upon the
Will, but through the medium of the sensibility. Filial
love in the heart of the stern Roman ; pity in the soul of
the noble soldier ; enthusiastic courage in the hearts of the
Spartans, and patriotic ardor in the bosoms of the Ameri¬
can colonists, were the respective impulses to action.
Thus die immediate motive to volition is not human in¬
fluence, but emotion, an affection of the sensibility.
3. Do external events and surrounding circumstances
constitute motives to action ? They are sources of feel¬
ing, but they exert no immediate influence on the Will.
A house on fire may cause a man to leap from a third
story window, but it would be a remote cause, and not a
motive to volition. If no fear or feeling of any kind were
awakened, he would make no effort to save himself. The
motive to action is the feeling. The discovery of a gold
mine attracts thousands to the scene; but the moving
cause is the love of gold excited in the breast. Without
this avaricious feeling no volition would be produced.
The diabolical act of the "dynamite fiend," which caused
the frightful disaster at Bremerhaven, has been already
alluded to. Now, on the motive theory of President Ed¬
wards, it was the insurance on the Mosel, that prompted
the crime. On the theory maintained in this discussion,
the immediate impulse or motive to volition was the feeling
of cupidity, the greed of gain in the heart of that debased
monster, and the insurance was only a remote influence to
the Will. It was not money, but the love of money in the
bad heart, which determined the volition towards the exe¬
cution of the monstrous crime. Not one man in a million
4
46
The Human Will.
would have been influenced to do such an act by mere
money. Only one whose heart is fearfully corrupted by
avarice would be capable of it.
And so every event or circumstance influences action
only indirectly, by first addressing the understanding and
then awakening the sensibility. It is the dominant emo¬
tion determining the volition.
Thus external influences of whatever kind, whether from
God, from man, or from circumstances, operate to produce
action through the medium of the sensibility, which thus, in
every case, is the seat of the motive.
Thus it is not enough to say, that the Will is determined
by the strongest motive. We must localize and character¬
ize the motive. We must know its nature, and where it is
be found. Thus we have found that the controlling force of
volition is not the direct agency of God, nor the actions of
men, nor the influence of circumstances, nor anything exter¬
nal to the soul. We have found, also, heretofore, that there
is no motive to volition in mere intellect. But it is a sub¬
jective force that determines the Will, and that is the power
of emotion—a power residing in the sensibility.
Here is a motive specified and localized, and thus is phi¬
losophy simplified. Here is, we think, the true psychol¬
ogy ascertained.
And, if our theory enables us to furnish the true expo¬
sition of conscience and faith, to harmonize psychology
with revelation, and, above all, to show that the ultimate
appeal of philosophy must be to the inspired Word of God,
then, in the law of the Will enunciated, we have not stated
simply an abstract principle, nor proposed merely a juster
philosophy of the soul, but we have established a great
truth, fraught with the profoundest practical momen
every thoughtful mind.
The Human Will.
47
SECTION XII.
THE THEORY OF THE AUTONOMY OF THE WILL.
Philosophers, who deny that the Will is governed by
motives, or causes, extraneous to itself, maintain that it
possesses a self-determing energy, or the uucontrolled
power to originate its own volitions. This position is held
by some able metaphysicians, and by the great body of
Arminian Theologians. Among the distinguished advo¬
cates of this theory are Cousin, in France, Tappan, of New
England, and Bledsoe, a Southern writer of high reputa¬
tion and superior ability.
Cousin ascribes to the Will an absolute and undeter¬
mined power to act as cause. "This cause, in order to
produce its effect, has need of no other theater and no other
nstrument than itself. It produces it directly, without
anything intermediate, and without condition: * * * being
always able to do what it does not do, and able not to do
what it does." Mr.Tappan contends that all cause lies ul¬
timately in the Will, a power which is self-moved. Mr.
Bledsoe denies that volition is the effect, of anything;
whether motive or mind, it is the action of an independent
agent, the Will: "The mind puts forth its volitions with¬
out being efficiently caused to do so—without being im¬
pelled by its own prior action, or by the prior action of
anything else. The conditions or occasions of volition
being supplied, the mind itself acts in view thereof, with¬
out being subject to the power or action of any cause
whatever."
These views agree in making the Will exempt from the
operation of any impelling cause—an autonomy, or inde¬
pendent power, with inherent capacity to do or refrain, at
its own uncontrolled option.
This theory is objectionable for the following reasons :
First, it contradicts one of the acknowledged intuitions of
the mind—a universally recognized first principle of
thought: namely, the principle of causation. The law of
48
The Human Will.
causation is, every event has a cause, or every begun ex¬
istence, or every occurring phenomenon, is the effect of
some preceding energy, called a cause. An event or
phenomenon without a cause, is inconceivable by the
mind. And, therefore, philosophers have ever placed
causality among the categories of thought, the intuitive
truths of the mind—truths that are selfievident, necessary
and universal. To say that volition, an act of the Will,
can take place without a cause, is to state what the con¬
scious mind pronounces impossible. When an act has
been performed, it is legitimate to ask why it was done ?
The answer is, according to this theory, the mind so willed
it. Why did the mind so will ? To this there is no an¬
swer, and can be none, for there is no law governing the
Will—it wills thus, or the opposite, without motive. But
this does not meet the demand of the inquiring soul,
which is ever curiously prying into the springs of actions,
and the causees of unexplained phenomena. This demand
of universal reason is seen in the child whose faculties are
just unfolding, and in the untutored savage, as truly as in
the mature philosopher. A little child sees a watch, ob¬
serves the motion of the wheels, hears the ticking of the
little machine, and'instantly exclaims, '• What makes it do
so?" In this curiosity to know the cause, he is on a level
with the philosopher. Indeed, he is a philosopher, bent
upon the discovery of causes, and you leave him unsatis¬
fied and thirsting, until you have assigned a cause.
It is this yearning of the soul after a cause, which
gives so ready an entrance to the idea of a God into the
mind, and which, in the breast of the ignorant, ascribes all
strange and unexplained occurrences to the direct agency
of God. The mind must rest in something, and hence it
seeks the simplest solution of the mystery, in the Great
First Cause. Now, the operation of the Will is no excep¬
tion to the rule, that the mind demands a cause of every
phenomenon. If I see a man do anything whatever, the
motive for which is not apparent, I cannot avoid the men-
The Human Will.
49
tal inquiry, why did he so ? A man commits suicide.
On every hand, from the youngest to the oldest, the ques¬
tion springs up spontaneously, why did he take his life?
To recur again to the Bremerhaven horror: the German
press pronounced Thomassen's crime the natural outgrowth
of American civilization; and while Americans residing
in Germany were indignant at this aspersion, and while
thoughtful minds are asking for "a psychological cause,"
the autonomists say, there is nocause ; he willed it, that
is all. They ignore the avarice in his "heart"—which the
Bible declares to be "desperately wicked"—and would
have us believe that he contrived that infernal scheme
without a motive. But the question of universal reason,
why ? will not down at the bidding of autonomists. Now,
it does not avail against this inexorable fact of our con¬
sciousness and experience, to draw a distinction between
the relation of cause at.d effect, and that of agent and ac¬
tion. If by this equivocal word, action, is meant the op¬
eration, or putting forth of power, then there must be a
cause for that operation. A machine may have power to
act, but its action is never self-produced. The powers of
nature act, but their action is always the effect of some
antecedent energy. If action signifies the product or re¬
sult of the operation of the power, it is palpably caused by
that operation. And in all such cases, the question is
ever coming up: Why? Why? Why?
We repeat, then, that the hypothesis of the self-deter¬
mining power of the Will contradicts one of the universally
acknowledged maxims of reason, that every event must
have a cause.
Secondly, the theory under review is contravened by all
analogy. Everything in the material universe is admitted
to be subject to this relation of cause and effect. All ac¬
tion, motion, existences and phenomena, occurring in the
physical creation, are produced by anterior power or force.
And not only in nature, but in mechanics, in civil society,
in mind, and in morals, we witness the operation of
50
The Human Will.
causes, and can find no event without its cause, either
known or sought for. Even the advocates of the view
under consideration, admit that the tinder standing and the
sensibility, with the states and acts of each, are deter¬
mined—even necessitated. The Will alone is exempt
from the dominion of causality, and its acts alone are self-
caused. It is, then, an anomaly in a double sense, being
the solitary exception to a sweeping law, and exempt
from the control of all law. Is a theory unsupported by
a single analogy—nay, with which all analogy is at vari¬
ance—likely to be true ?
Thirdly, it is contrary to observed facts. In the course
of this discussion, we have adduced a great variety of ex¬
amples, demonstrative of the principle that men act in
obedience to incentives lying in the sphere of the sensibil¬
ity. In every case, it was clearly established, that the vo¬
lition was prompted by feeling—such as appetite, self-love,
pity, benovolence, ambition, patriotism, fear, love, av¬
arice, feeling of obligation, desire to please God, etc.
We have investigated simple and common-place actions, as
well as rare and important deeds, and, in each instance,
we have traced the volition to a determining emotion.
We have searched the range of conscious experience,
the sphere of observation, the record of current events,
the pages of history, the volume of revelation, and have
found the Will ever acting in obedience to extraneous in¬
centive. There are cases which, at the first glance, seem
to point to the intellect—the judgment—as the source of
power over the volition; but the impelling cause or in¬
ducement to action is an intervening emotion, which the
test of scrutiny always discovers. Indifferent or trivial
actions may often appear almost entirely motiveless; but
in proportion to the feebleness or absence of induce¬
ments, are also the feebleness and absence of the voluntary
element. We maintain that the observed facts and phe¬
nomena of the Will form a broad basis of inductive de¬
monstration,- establishing the truth of our theory, while
The Human Will.
51
not one action has ever clearly appeared to be inspired by
the undetermined Will.
Strange autonomy this, which in all history has not per¬
formed a solitary independent exploit, but has forever sub¬
mitted to the dictation of alien powers; which never
exercises its vaunted prerogative of sovereignty, but pays
unvarying tribute to foreign authority! It is vain to say
that the Will can do otherwise than it does. It is vain to
arrogate powers that are never exercised. Nothing can be
more ridiculous than the claim of an individual to kingly
authority, who is, and ever has been, a private citizen.
Advocates of the autonomous Will cannot establish
their hypothesis by induction. That hypothesis asserts
that the Will has power to do otherwise than it does. In
the very nature of things, it is impossible to prove this
from " the facts of nature," because the doctrine asserts
what is contrary to facts. To affirm that the Will can do
what it does not do, is to affirm what can never be known
to be true—a purely conjectural and ideal conception.
Thus, we can never, by "dissecting," "anatomizing" or
questioning nature, arrive at the autonomy of the Will.
And, according to Dr. Bledsoe, any other method is un¬
scientific; " it anticipates, but does not interpret nature."
And according to Bacon, "it is the [parent of error, and
the calamity of every science."
Induction, therefore, the argument from observed facts, is
against the hypothesis of the self-determining power of the
Will. We have, in every volition, one condition uniformly
present—an impulse of the sensibility—and this, by the
rule of inductive science, must be the cause.
52
The Human Will.
SECTION XIII.
"the scheme of necessity."
The system of philosophy which maintains that the
volitions, like all other phenomena, mental and physical,
are due to causes, has been characterized as "the scheme
of necessity," and its advocates as "necessitarians."
The relation of cause and effect, it is argued, is the re¬
lation of necessity, the two being conjoined not simply by
the bond of succession, as antecedent and consequent, but
by the strong bond of irresistible power. It is essential
to a cause that it produce an effect, and nothing is a cause
from which an effect does not inevitably result. If, there¬
fore, the human volitions are caused, they are necessitated
and the resulting actions are likewise necessitated. There¬
fore, man is under the rigorous pressure of a constraint
from which he cannot escape, being held fast by the ada¬
mantine chain of necessity.
In order to avoid this humiliating disability—this help¬
less bondage to despotic necessity—the alleged logical
consequence of the doctrine of caused volition—a theory is
proposed, by which the Will is regarded as loosed from the
dominion of causes, the volitions being produced solely by
the inherent energy of that power. This is the hypothesis
which, as a convenient designation, not involving oppro¬
brium, we have denominated the scheme of autonomy.
This scheme has already been impugned, as violative of
the intuitive principle of causality, as at variance with all
analogy in nature, as unsupported by facts, and as inca¬
pable of inductive demonstration. Its merits will be fur¬
ther discussed as this investigation proceeds. For the
present, let us glance at " the scheme of necessity."
Are the volitions necessitated ? If so, what then ?
The answer of the autonomist is, that human liberty is a
myth, accountability an illusion, and virtue and vice
empty names.
It is not our purpose to deny the philosophic necessity
The Hitman Will.
53
involved in the causal relation. We may be, in some sense,
creatures of necessity. The autonomist assures us that
our feelings and thoughts are all necessitated. But to
attempt to follow out the " implexed series and concate¬
nation of causes " is to wander in hopeless perplexity in the
mazes of metaphysical speculation. Yet while our reason
admits causation, our consciousness proclaims freedom.
And we affirm that the causation of volition, or of any
mental phenomenon, is not followed by the revolting con¬
sequences alleged by the autonomist. We shall show
that it does not impair freedom, subvert moral agency, nor
contravene accountability. How responsibility is compat¬
ible with the causation of the mental acts, is a metaphysical
problem—one of those mysteries pertaining to the human
soul, especially in its relations to the incomprehensible
Deity, which reason cannot solve. But autonomy offers
no escape from the difficulty; for, as will hereafter appear,
the same dread sphynx lurks, an unwelcome intruder, in
that vaunted refuge for harassed minds.
The truth is, we must be content to leave some mys¬
teries unexplained. "Now we know in part: hereafter
we shall know even as we are known."
To reject a proposition as false, because it is incompre¬
hensible to our minds, or appears contradictory to our
limited understanding, is the height of folly and arrogance.
Who can comprehend the eternity of God? Who can
reconcile that awful attribute with our necessary notions of
finite duration ?
To those not versed in science, what principle appears
more impossible and self-contradictory than the paradox
of the " interference of light"—namely, that two rays of
light meeting each other, under certain conditions, should
produce darkness ? What mental contradiction is there
greater to him than that well known fact in physics, that
two encountering waves of sound meeting produce silence?
There are thousands of mysteries and paradoxes in mate¬
rial nature; ^nd shall we be surprised to meet them in
54
The Human Will.
that confessedly most occult and inaccessible of sublunary
realms, the human soul? Especially in its relations to
the unsearchable Deity, We may expect to find difficulties
that defy the utmost efforts of reason to resolve. The one
now before us—the reconciliation of necessity with ac¬
countability—is the Gordian Knot of philosophy, to un¬
tie which seems beyond the capacity of the human intel¬
lect. But, however this may be, we find the very same
difficulty in the scheme of autonomy.
While, therefore, we shall not deny that we are creat¬
ures of necessity, in a sense, nor attempt to solve the
problem referred to, we shall suggest the sphere in the
mental constitution, where the vexed question might, were
our powers equal to the task, find its complete answer;
where, perhaps, in the future, a full and satisfactory ex¬
plication of the intricate mystery will be possible. And
subsequently, it will be our part to show that, however
necessity may oppress the human mind, it does not in¬
fringe man's birthright of freedom, nor subvert his distinct
moral agency and thorough accountability. And, fur¬
thermore, it will be our purpose to demonstrate that the
self-same evils imputed to "the scheme of necessity"—nay,
far greater and more insurmountable evils—are chargeable
to the scheme of autonomy.
We maintain that causation everywhere prevails in the
universe of God—in the material creation, and in the
world of mind. Not only are external phenomena sub¬
ject to causes, but our spiritual acts and states—our voli¬
tions, our emotions and our thoughts. But an important
distinction is to be drawn between physical phenomena
and psychical phenomena—between the operation of
causes in matter and in mind. This distinction grows out
of the difference in the nature of matter and of mind.
Matter is essentially inert, insensate, impotent. Mind is
essentially active, conscious, potential. The one submits
passively, blindly, helplessly, to whatever forces may act
upon it. The other is aroused by causes, but possesses
The Human Will.
55
an inherent energy, a dynamic force of its own. There
is, consequently, a vast difference between physical neces¬
sity, and psychical or mental necessity.
Let us illustrate: A rope-walker attempts to cross
Niagara river on a rope stretched over the great falls.
Midway the passage he loses his balance, is precipitated
to the bottom of the chasm, and is dashed to pieces on
the rocks. He is found dead. Now, here is a series of
physical events produced by causes, and bearing all the
features of rigid, blind necessity. Beginning with the
physical act of walking, we go through the several se¬
quences of losing his balance, descending to the bottom of
the gorge, the force of the impact, the mangling of the
body, the destruction of life. We have not mentioned
all, if any, of the causes in this series. But, if we could
search them out, we should find that each sequence fol¬
lowed its cause with an obedience which was, in the
highest degree, compulsory. The cause, in every case,
was psychical force acting upon inert, stolid matter.
But behind the first step in this series of physical events,
was a chain of mental phenomena. There was, first, the
resolution to walk the rope—a volition of the mind. This,
upon our theory, was caused by some impulse of the sen¬
sibility—say mercenary feeling. Here the relation is di¬
rect, the ruling emotion—desire of gain—prompting the
volition, and the volition following with unvarying cer¬
tainty. Yet there is an obvious difference between the
relation of two active psychical principles, and the " hooks
of steel" with which physical forces lay hold of dead
matter. The necessity which impelled the funambulist to
obey the mercenary motive, although just as certain in its
influence, was entirely dissimilar to that necessity which
caused his unsupported body to descend from the rope,
and death to ensue upon the frightful contusion of his
frame. The relation is that of certainty; the necessity is
spychcal and not physical.
But while the relation of the Will to the Sensibility is
56
The Human Will.
thus direct and determinate, that of the latter to the Intel¬
lect, or to any known cause, is undeterminate and incon¬
sequent. Of all the mental factulties, the Sensibility is
incomparably the most spontaneous, active and free. Our
emotions come and go without any apparent cause; they
flit hither and thither, as if they knew neither law nor
limit; now, like the trade-winds, they flow in a steady,
helpful current; now, like the tornado, they rage with
lawless and destructive violence. They are the very
source of freedom in action; for the actions obeying the
volitions execute, in every instance, the supreme pleasure
of the soul. Surely a power like this is not subject to the
same adamantine necessity as insensate and inanimate mat¬
ter. Matter cannot feel; the Sensibility is quick with a
spontaneous vivacity and susceptibility, pleasurable or
painful, happy or miserable. Our emotions are neces¬
sitated, yet not like the fall of a stone, or the movements
of a machine.
This phenomenal character of the Sensibility justifies us
in making a broad distinction between physical necessity
or compulsion, and psychical necessity or certainty; and in
pointing to this department of our spiritual nature as the
realm , where all the vexed problems of necessity, liberty
and responsibility may find their possible resolution.
SECTION XIV.
FREE AGENCY.
It has been charged that the subjection of the Will to .
extraneous influence subverts the free agency of man. If
the Will be bondman to an external power, how is man
free ? If this external power be an agency outside of the
human soul, bearing directly upon the Will, there is force
in the imputation. There is plausibility in it, as directed
against the views of Calvin; and even respecting the
motive theory of Edwards, it suggests some difficulty. If
God bends or produces the Will by the immediate exertion
The Human Will.
57
of omnipotence, it is hard to escape the conclusion that
man is a vassal. If external circumstances, or motives
lying without the soul, usurp direct control of the voli¬
tions, it would seem that he is held fast by the bond of
necessity. He is not free to do otherwise than as these
external forces impel him.
It must not be forgotten that, besides the Will, man
possesses two other great spiritual faculties, each of which
is endowed with various and potent energies. The sensi¬
bility is awakened upon the exercise of the intellect, but
so great is the variety and mobility of the emotional power,
that many of its impulses can neither be traced nor ac¬
counted for, but are like the wind, which "bloweth where
it listeth," yet is ever subject to law. In this almost in¬
finite diversity, volatility and elasticity of the emotions,
there is ample verge and scope for the largest liberty
imaginable. And we hold, that it is not in the Will that
human freedom is to find its range, but in the sensibility,
which, though not exempt from the influence of causes, is
so constituted that the feelings, affections and desires are
as free as the roving winds. The currents of the atmos¬
phere are set in motion by causes which, in general, are
well understood, and yet what science will enable us to
calculate the rise, the direction, the velocity and the force
of every wind, from the gentle breeze to the devastating
cyclone? The winds are the very emblems of wild and
riotous freedom, and yet the feelings and desires are more
free than they.
The essence of freedom is not in willing anything what¬
ever; but in willing in accordance with one's own pleasure or
desire. Hence, a free agent is one who does as he pleases.
When a being has the power to do as he pleases, he pos¬
sesses, not absolute liberty indeed, but the utmost liberty
of which a creature, suhject to law, is capable. The angels
enjoy no higher or more enlarged freedom. Indeed, it is
almost inconceivable that God Himself should have the
58
The Human Will.
power to do otherwise than is conformable to His high
and holy pleasure.
Our theory is, that human volition is always in obedience
to the dominant feeling or desire. Thus it is plain that,
in the absence of coaction—physical coercion or restraint—
man always does as he pleases. When the noble Sidney
resigned the flask of water to his fellow-sufferer on the
battle-field, he did as he pleased. When Macbeth assas¬
sinated Duncan, he did as he pleased—executing the im¬
pulse of ambition, the dominant desire of his breast. Abra¬
ham did as he pleased when he made ready to sacrifice his
son—that is to say, it pleased him to obey God rather
than to carry out the natural desires of his heart. And
Moses acted in accordance with the prevailing desire of his
breast when he renounced the glittering attractions of the
Egyptian court, and identified himself with the despised
slaves of the quarry.
Here is a man who has contracted the fearful vice of
intemperance. Appetite commands unceasing indulgence.
But he suddenly awakes to a realization of his peril. A
new set of desires spring up and contend for the mastery,
until the despot passion is crushed. Love of family,
dread of ruin, self-love, and perhaps the love of God, in¬
spired by Divine grace, all rise up and throttle the mon¬
ster appetite, and he resolves—he wills—to stop, now and
forever, the fatal indulgence. He has acted freely ; aye,
he is conscious of a higher freedom than he knew before;
and yet his liberty does not consist in absolutely willing
thus or otherwise, without incentive, but in the execution,
by the Will, of the prevailing desires of the heart.
When the penitent turns to God, he does as he pleases.
But a change has come over his spirit. He now pleases
to do that which before he found pleasure in opposing. A
nobler pleasure has overmastered and replaced his former
selfish inclinations.
In all these cases, and in every case, the man is con¬
scious that he acts freely, because he does that which he
The Human Will.
59
pleases to do. And no reasoning from causes, or "neces¬
sity," or the "implexed series of events," can persuade
him that he has been coerced to do otherwise than his own
pleasure dictated. He may have acted hastily, impru¬
dently, or basely, or he may have performed wise, hu¬
mane and holy actions, but he has done what, at the time,
he most desired to do. Man does sometimes seem to be
diivcn 011 by passion or appetite, but, after all, it is his
pleasure 01 desire, rising to tumult or to violence, which
urges him, and he does as he pleases.
Now, he has acted from causes, and, therefore, is not
absolutely free ; but a more ample liberty he does not
want—nay, he cannot clearly conceive of a wider range
of freedom.
It will be seen that this view of the Will places man
within the pale of the Divine control. His heart—the seat
of the emotions—is open to Divine influence, and, there¬
fore, his actions are controllable by the Deity, though in
such a way as not to infringe his essential liberty. Man
always does as he pleases, but he very often does the
pleasure of God in doing his own.- It is God working in
him, through his affections, so that he wills and does of
God's own pleasure. Thus is brought about the harmony
of man's will with that of God. It is only thus that the
Divine agency and the human endeavor are made recon¬
cilable. It is only thus that God retains power over man,
without imDairing his essential liberty.
SECTION XV.
AUTONOMY A SCHEME OF LICENTIOUSNESS.
The contrary hypothesis—that of the autonomy of the
Will—is as destructive of true, rational liberty as the most
inexorable scheme of necessity, and more disastrous in its
results. Ic is noc liberty, but licentiousness, and natufally
tends to anarchy.
By this theory, the Will, as has been said, is an anom-
60
The Human Will.
alyin creation. It stands alone in all the universe of God,
without' a peer. Moreover, it occupies a solitary position
of independence by the throne of the Creator Himself.
God is independent; the human Will is independent.
The Will cannot control God, and, just as logically, God
cannot control the Will. And this is the autonomist's
avowed position. It is a conclusion irresistibly following
from his premises. And shocking though it is, he does
not hesitate to declare that God did not prevent man from
sinning, because He could not! Man by his constitution
was made absolutely free and independent of all exterior
control, and was, therefore, placed beyond the reach of
the Divine omnipotence. As a moral Governor of the
world, then, God is helpless, is impotent to control the
world He has made, and cannot prevent the moral anarchy
of the race which He has brought into being. And with
the tremendous moral gravitation downwards, already be¬
gun, what ray of hope is there for man, that he will escape
remediless ruin, utter and irretrievable moral chaos?
The licentiousness of the scheme of autonomy, and its
certain tendency to anarchy, are objections more fatal to
it than the charge of destroying human liberty is to the
scheme of necessity itself. The most extreme necessitarian
view—even if it make man an automaton—does not give
a prospect half so gloomy and forbidding as this licentious
scheme. For if every human action be produced by an im¬
mediate irresistible energy from without, we know that
God holds the end of the chain, and whatever evils may
present themselves to our short-sighted vision, all will
most surely come out right in the end. But if human vo¬
lition be independent of God, then man is loosed from his
safe anchorage, and not only is there no certainty of a prosi
perous issue, but, with his inherent proclivity to evil, his
destruction is morally inevitable. And carried to its ulti¬
mate conclusion, this principle would work not only moral
and social chaos, but havoc and ruin in the physical crea¬
tion itself.
The Human Will.
61
It has been shown that our theory of the Will neither
makes man a machine, nor cuts him loose from God's control;
but leaves him the highest freedom conceivable in a creat¬
ure, and yet keeps him a subject of the moral government
of the Creator.
Autonomy, however, places him at the mercy of a ca¬
pricious and unbridled Will, and severs him from the in¬
fluence of that all-wise and merciful Sovereign, in whom,
as we fondly hope, ' 'we live and move and have our being."
It is, therefore, a scheme of licentiousness more to be
dreaded than the most unmitigated bondage conceivable,
under the rule of the divine Maker and Governor of the
universe.
SECTION XVI.
MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
Is a man a moral and accountable agent ? Do his actions
possess a moral character—that is, are human actions com¬
monly called good, really virtuous, and those called bad,
really vicious ? And, hence, do men, when they commit
evil deeds, incur guilt and responsibility ?
The conscience is the ground and proof of human ac¬
countability. Without this faculty, we could neither
know the right, nor feel moral.obligation. It decides on
the moral character of an action, and pronounces man in¬
nocent or guilty. Its tribunal is erected in every bosom,
and its reproaches for the violation of its sacred impulses
are felt by every human being. Its judgments—its voice
of approval or condemnation—are evidences of a future
reckoning. As we judge ourselves, so we judge others,
and are judged by them. We blame our fellow-beings
when they do evil, and incur guilt in their estimation
when we go astray. It is, therefore, the unanimons ver¬
dict of mankind, that we are moral and responsible agents.
What our own consciences proclaim, the Bible emphat¬
ically affirms. It declares that God will bring every work
5
62
The Human Will.
into judgment, and that He hath appointed a day wherein
He will judge the world in righteousness.
But autonomists contend that moral agency and ac¬
countability are impossible, unless the Will be loosed from
the influences of intrinsic causes. They argue that, if the
Will be not absolutely independent, the volitions are
necessitated, and, hence, human actions have no moral
quality—are neither virtuous nor vicious. It follows,
therefore, that there is no guilt nor responsibility attaching
to the agent. But this conclusion is absurd, and, hence,
the Will is independent, and sovereign in its determina¬
tions.
The fundamental postulate on which this argument rests
is, that moral agency and accountability are incompatible
with necessity. Is this assumption true? A representa¬
tive autonomist, and one of the ablest and most candid
of the class, * repeatedly asserts that the states of both
the intellect and sensibility are necessitated. He says:
"The understanding, or intelligence, is necessarily deter¬
mined ; all its states are necessitated as completely as the
movements of a machine." Again he says: "Every state
of the sensibility is a passive impression, a necessitated
phenomenon of the human mind." But do not these i 'tel-
lectual and sentient states possess a moral character ?
What says the Scripture ? Concerning the wickedness of
man before the flood, it states that God saw that "every
imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil
continually." As here imagination and thoughts, which
are intellectual exercises, are connected with the heart, the
seat of the sensibility, the idea is conveyed that both in¬
tellectual and emotional states were corrupt. Christ de¬
clares that evil affections are the very essence of crime ;
lust is adultery, and anger is murder. And the apostle
says, "Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer." The
autonomist says that imagination and thoughts—states of
the intellect—and lust and anger and hate—states of the
sensibility—are necessitated. Upon his reasoning, there-
The Human Will.
63
fore, they are not wrong—that is blameworthy or vicious.
Yet the Bible says they are evil, and some of them are
crimes, the darkest in the catalogue of iniquities.
Are men responsible for the acts and states of these pow¬
ers, which the autonomist says are necessitated ? Christ
says, " Whosoever is angry with his brother without a
cause shall be in danger of the judgment"—thus clearly
indicating accountability. The Bible teaches that every¬
thing shall be brought into judgment, even our secret
thoughts.
Not only Scripture, but our own consciences condemn
the indulgence of impure lusts and imaginations, ot malig¬
nant thoughts and passions, and there is the idea which we
cannot repress, that we are accountable for them.
Now, what becomes of the assumption, that necessitated
acts and states have no moral character, and that the con¬
trary teaching abolishes the distinction between virtue
and vice ? What becomes of the alleged incompatibility,
the irreconcilable contradiction, between necessity and
accountability? If to teach that the volitions are caused,
or necessitated indeed, destroys accountability for men's
actions, does not the doctrine that the thoughts and affec¬
tions are necessitated destroy accountability for impure
imaginations and unholy passions ? Thus the hypothesis,
on which the argument of the autonomist is built, proves
to be contradictory to Scripture and conscience, or else to
himself.
Since, then, this difficulty meets us in any view we may
take of the Will, it seems to be a reasonable conclusion
that there is no incompatibility between causation, on the
one hand, and moral and accountable agency on the other.
To unravel the tangled web of causes, and reconcile
these apparently conflicting principles, may be above- the
power of the limited human faculties ; but as, in the almost
boundless range of the sensibilities, there is ample room
for an immeasurable liberty, so in the variableness, buoy-
64
The Human Will.
ancy and spontaneity of the emotions, there may be scope
for the full play of accountability.
According to the autonomist, our emotions are necessi¬
tated. We admit them to be subject to causes. But the
Scriptures affirm that we are responsible for them. And
if we trace the responsibility of our acts, both mental and
overt, to their original impulses in the soul, we shall find
its springs in the emotional part of our nature. Here are
the great moral Nile sources, which explorers have vainly
endeavored to discover in the Will. Human guilt or inno¬
cence is truly tested by the feeling of the heart, and not by
the physical action. Even in human law, murder is the
taking of life from malicious or corrupt intent. The heart-
motive is the criterion of criminality in the moral judg¬
ments of men. The Bible is emphatic in its teachings as
to the real test of character and conduct.
An action apparently good may be done from an evil
feeling—a bad motive. The alms-giving of the Pharisees
had no virtue, because it was prompted by selfish desire of
human applause. The feeling being wrong imparted its
moral hue to the outward action. The responsibility,
therefore, did not attach to the act nor the volition, but to
the emotion from which the volition sprang. This is the
more evident where conduct proceeds from a mixed mo¬
tive—a combined emotion—that is, where the emotion
prompting it is made up of good and evil elements. An
act by which a fellow-being is benefited, for example,
giving bread to the hungry, or money to a charitable insti¬
tution—is, in one sense, a good act, even when it proceeds
from selfishness, for it accomplishes good. It is no less a
good act, when it proceeds partly from a good, and partly
from a bad feeling. But its moral character, its innocence
or guilt, does *ot depend on the effect, but the cause—not
on the good it accomplishes, but on the motive which
prompts it. And the evil motive will condemn us, while
the good motive will justify us. We are responsible for
the emotion, whether good or bad.
The Human Will.
65
Even wrong thoughts and imaginations derive their
moral character from the feelings which prompt them ; for
all bad thoughts are the suggestion and offspring of cor¬
rupt emotions.' The imagination riots in scenes and pleas¬
ures that are forbidden, but its revels are the fruits of
unholy desires in the heart.
Thus the sensibility seems to be the very "head and
front" of all man's moral offending* and, hence, is the
seat of moral accountability.
SECTION XVII.
AUTONOMY DENIES MORAL RESPONSIBILITY.
The charge of subverting moral and accountable agency,
brought against the "scheme of necessity," may be re¬
torted upon the system of autonomy with redoubled force.
It has just been seen that, by the same argument employed
by the autonomist to prove that the doctrine of caused
volition destroys accountability for human actions, his own
theory is proved to destroy accountability for impure fas-
sions and unholy desires. Between overt acts and emotions
of the heart, responsibility attaches more especially, in¬
deed, exclusively to the latter. Therefore, his argument
bears more heavily against his own scheme, for it allows
the emotions to be all necessitated.
But there is a special vulnerability of the scheme of au¬
tonomy to the charge of denying moral responsibility.
If by the mental constitution neither God nor conscience
have any control of human actions, it is hard to see how
these actions can acquire any moral character. The Will
commands right or wrong actions,not because it obeys or dis¬
obeys God, or the vicegerent of God in the soul; for by its
very nature, it is placed aloof from conscience and from its
Maker. An agent entirely beyond the power of God, and
independent of the obligations and restraints of the moral
faculty, cannot be said to be a moral agent. Still less is
he a responsible agent. By his creation, he is insulated
66
The Human Will.
from all moral forces; therefore he cannot be amenable to
moral law. Just as reasonably may the acts and policy of
•an independent State be subject to the control, authority
and dictation of a foreign power, as for the autonomous
Will to be held responsible to laws of which it was created
independent.
And between the two alternatives—an agency subject t<3
the control of God and of conscience, and an agency inde¬
pendent of both—the two conditions being supposed
equally irresponsible—surely no rational being could hesi¬
tate to choose. The one is the irresponsibility of subjec¬
tion to causes that would infallibly bring forth good results;
the other, the irresponsibility of subjection to a whimsical
and capricious power, a condition which offers a dreary
prospect to the race—for every man a "fearful looking for of
judgment and fiery indignation."
But such is not the alternative to which we are held.
In the place of an independent and irresponsible Will, we
have this power acting in obedience to the dictates of sen¬
sibilities that are under the control of an all-wise and mer¬
ciful Creator.
SECTION XVIII.
DIVINE AND HUMAN AGENCY.
In the discussion of the "scheme of necessity," our at¬
tention was confined to the realm of second causes. Events
and their causes—phenomena and causation—were con¬
sidered philosophically. But reason, as well as revelation,
affirms an Intelligent First Cause—a personal Creator—
from whom not only every chain of causes and effects pro¬
ceeds, but who holds it in His firm grasp, vigilantly super¬
vises its endless succession, and suffers not a link to be
formed which is not subject to the control of His infinite
wisdom and almighty power. Every existence in the
universe, mental and physical, animate and inanimate,
angelic and human, rational and brutal, is under the sleep-
The Human Will.
67
less care and perpetual sway of that Mind of transcendent
wisdom, and subject to the guidance of that Hand of sur¬
passing skill. Through the chain of second causes, He
works out His eternal purposes an I plans, the forces of
nature being His workingmen, and the intelligence of
created minds the agents of His power.
It is impossible to conceive of the Supreme Being,
without regarding Him as the Governor, as well as the Crea¬
tor of all things. And this governance must extend to all
and every part of the universe. No being, or power, or
agent of any description, can possibly exist independent
of Him. Body, soul and spirit; angel, demon and man ;
animal, vegetable and mineral; air, ocean and land ; sun,
planet and meteor; deluge, lightning and tempest; atom,
monad and cell; nay, all things, all forces in the bound¬
less creation, are held in the hands of the eternal, almighty
and supreme Ruler of the universe. ' While, therefore,
second causes are forever working, God is forever working
through them. Revelation everywhere procla ms and as¬
sumes this absolute and universal dominion of the Deity,
a fact which answers to the demand of our highest reason.
Men, then, are agents and instruments of God in carry¬
ing out His purposes. Butfherethe question again meets us,
"If this be so, what becomes of human claim to liberty?"
If, in everything we do, we are executing the Divine plans,
how are we either free or responsible? We answer, as be¬
fore, that in the secret and mystic operation of the emo¬
tional power, there seems to be hints of a solution of the
problem. If we could fathom its vasty depths, and pry
fully into all its subtle working, we might pick up the clew
that would lead the way out of this intricate labarynth.
Here it would seem that freedom has an unrestricted play,
and responsibility the most ample range. It is here that
God's working and man's doing come together. The Sen¬
sibility receives the Divine touch, immediately the spring
of human action responds, and the Will issues its com¬
mands. Where the Divine agency terminates, and human
68
The Human Will.
agency begins, or, to speak more accurately, where the
two meet for co-operation, and how the conjunction is ef¬
fected, we cannot tell. It is a hidden mystery, like that
of the junction and co-operation of sense and spirit in the
process of perception. How do we see ? is a question of¬
ten asked. Not with the eye alone, for without the soul
the eye, though perfect in its structure, would be useless.
Not with the mind alone, for a material organ is necessary
as an instrument of vision. We see with both the mind
and the eye—the one being as essential as the other. But
how can spirit and nerves act together, where is the point
of junction, what is the link of connection, and how do
mind and matter, so essentially different, combine to pro¬
duce the effect of vision ? These, and a thousand other
questions connected with our spiritual and material com¬
position, have ever baffled the skill of the acutest philoso¬
phers, and they will ever remain a mystery to us in our
present state. As the mind acts, and the body acts in har¬
mony with it, so God acts within us, and we act in har¬
mony with Him. As the soul sees through the eye, its
instrument of vision, so God effects His purposes in
human affairs through the necessary instrumentality of
men, As the sensorium—the assemblage of material organs
and nerves—is the sensitive medium through which the
soul perceives external objects, so the Sensibility is the
sensitive, spiritual medium through which God excites
men to action. The bond of connection in each case is
inscrutable, the process mysterious, but the facts are un¬
deniable.
There seem to be two spheres of Divine operation in
the concerns of mankind. One is the ordinary domain of
every-day human affairs—the domain of history; the other,
the extraordinary sphere of special intervention — the
sphere of religion. In the one, second causes hold their
regular sway, subject to such interruptions and dislocations
as may seem good to the all-wise Mind. In the other, the
Divine Spirit interposes and brings man into immediate
The Human Will.
69
relations with his Maker. The operation of the former
has been considered under Necessity; that of the latter,
under Regeneration. All men are subject to the one;
only those whom God chooses are brought under the su¬
pernatural influence of the other. Every creature is an
agent of God, through second causes: only the elect are
His agents, through Hi.? Spirit.
In both spheres—nature and religion—there is liberty,
and in both accountability. Man does as he pleases in
his every-day life and relations ; the regenerate man does
as he pleases in the service he renders to God and His
Son. And when a man does wrong in the ordinary moral
relations of society, he is conscious of a feeling of guilt;
so, when he violates the duties of religion, he is sensible
of moral guilt and responsibility.
Pharaoh was an instrument of Jehovah in the accomplish¬
ment of His purpose, the deliverance of the Israelites.
" Even for this purpose have I raised thee up, that I might
show my power in thee." Yet that hard-hearted tyrant
conceived that he was acting out only his own pleasure,
and thwarting the will of the God of the Hebrews, in re¬
fusing to release the people of Israel. Nevertheless, he
was accomplishing the Divine purposes in his very disobe¬
dience. Doubtless the hardening of Pharaoh's heart was
the influence of second causes operating on his sensibilities
by natural laws.
Saul of Tarsus was an agent of God, to manifest His
saving power, and to bear the gospel to the Gentiles. But
God, through the direct power of the Holy Spirit, touched
his heart, changed the current of his thoughts and affec¬
tions, and brought him to the feet of that Jesus whom he
was persecuting. Though conscious that he had suddenly
become the subject of some mysterious transformation, he
gladly acknowledged the grace that subdued him, and
joyfully gave himself to the service of his new Master, and
to the preaching of that faith he had endeavored to destroy.
Pharaoh did as he pleased; Paul did as he pleased ; yet
70
The Human Will.
both executed the will of God, and were instruments of
His purposes.
Human effort is not the less necessary because Divine
agency is exerted through man. There is a mysterious
co-operatiion between the infinite power of the Deity and
the limited but active power of the human soul. The
husbandman must plough, and sow, and nurse, and tend,
and reap, or the harvest will never come. Yet in all his
work he is absolutely dependent upon the Divine agency
in nature. So the soul must "work out (its) salvation
with fear and trembling," conscious that "it is God that
worketh in (it) both to will and to do of His good pleasure."
This co-operation of Divine and human agency is the
law of our history. It is necessary to recognize it; it is
not essential to comprehend it. God works ; we must work.
If he did not work, we could not; or, if we could, our
work would be useless. If we do not work, neither tem¬
poral weal nor eternal salvation is possible, because we are
His instruments for both. It is the height of folly and
impiety to plead the Divine agency as an excuse for inac¬
tion on our part.
SECTION XIX.
AUTONOMY SETS AT NAUGHT THE DIVINE INFLUENCE IN
REGENERATION.
The Scriptures declare the necessity of a special Divine
influence in the moral reformation of man. Regeneration,
or the new birth, is effected by the Holy Spirit operating
on the individual heart. This truth is incorporated into
the systems of most Christian theologians, and taught in
the creeds of most Christian organizations.
But autonomy denies, or practically nullifies, this Divine
influence. If the Will be absolutely sovereign over its
volitions, originating them without determination by any
extraneous influence, then Divine grace does not renovate
the soul at all, or is defective in operation and practically
The Human Will.
71
unavailing. Many merely philosophic autonomists, recog¬
nizing the incompatibility of the Christian doctrine of re¬
generation with absolute freedom of the Will, totally dis¬
card that doctrine of the Scriptures.
The Arminian theologians, however, admit the necessity
and reality of the Holy Spirit's work in regeneration, but,
at the same time, maintain the entire sovereignty of the
Will.
Let us, 'first, advert to the remarkable position of Dr.
Bledsoe.
This writer holds that the intellectual and emotional
natures are the exclusive spheres of the divine operation,
admits the supernatural illumination of the intelligence
and the creation of the new heart, but contends that, with
this, the effect of Divine grace ceases, and that man's
agency begins with volition. While the Intellect and Sen¬
sibility are the regions of the Spirit's gracious action, the
Will is the free and uninvadible realm of human agency.
The Intellect and Sensibility are regarded as subject to
causes, all their states necessitated, and, therefore, they
present an open field for the operation of the Divine in¬
fluence. But the Will, constitutionally independent,
maintaining a complete autonomy, is not subject to the
control of foreign influence from any quarter.
Let us consider the possible practical consequences of
this hypothesis. Dr. Bledsoe admits the "absolute de¬
pendence of the soul upon the agency of God. The first
effect of grace is to "flash the light of truth" into the un¬
derstanding ; "the second effect of the Divine power in the
new creation is ' a new heart.' " He goes on to say, that
God, having done this, "may well call on us to 'workout
our salvation with fear and trembling, for God worketh in
us to will and to do of his own good pleasure.' We have
seen that the state of the Will, that a volition is not neces¬
sitated by the intelligence or by the sensibility; and, hence,
it may 'obey the heavenly vision,' or it may resist and 'do
despite to the Spirit of grace.' If it obey, then the vivi-
72
The Human Will.
fying light and genial shower have not fallen upon the soul
in vain."
We pause for a moment, to call attention to the admis¬
sion, that the Divine influence may, on this view, be in
vain. God has wrought on the soul, renewing both intel¬
lect and heart, yet the influence may be nugatory, since the
disobedient Will may completely neutralize it.
But this is not the worst view of this most remarkable
theory of regeneration. Let us suppose a caSe—for, on
the doctrine, it is supposable, and probable in many in¬
stances of an individual, on whose understanding the spirit
has shed its illuminating flood, and whose heart has been
renovated by the same Divine power, but whose Will, self-
determined and independent, decides to "disobey the
heavenly vision," and to "do despite to the Spirit of grace."
What a spectacle would a man, thus affected, present?
The unnatural conjunction of holiness of heart with wick¬
edness of life—the inconsistent and grotesque union of a
pure spirit with debauched conduct—a regenerate soul with
a career of vice and crime. While his heart is aflame with
love to God, his lips blaspheme that holy name which an¬
gels utter with adoring awe. While his bosom is overflow¬
ing with sweet and heaven-born charity, his life is a, pitiless
record of wanton cruelty and murder. His heart white,
his hands black, he stands a moral monster, more revolt¬
ing than the "gorgous and chimeras dire" of fable.
Is there any escape from this dilemma on the foregoing
premises ? There is nothing to hinder the thorough reno¬
vation of the heart and understanding; the state of these
are necessitated, and the Divine power may carry on its
work of regeneration, in harmony with the laws of the
mind. But the Will is absolutely free ; the Spirit cannot
touch that; there is, therefore, nothing to prevent this in¬
dependent power from antagonizing perpetually with the
impulses of the renewed heart. Let the capricious Will
so decide, and the moral monstrosity already described is
the result. The man is only partially reformed, the work
The Human Will.
73
is useless—nay, a wretched failure, a miserable abortion.
No such marplot is that glorious Spirit of perfect wisdom,
holiness, goodness and power, whose office is to "con¬
vince the world of sin, of righteousness and of judgment."
The Christian autonomist, we know, will shrink from
such a conclusion with horror. He will agree that such a
product is not only unnatural, but impossible. But if
unnatural, it is because it is contrary to some natural law,
that the volitions should be so directly antagonistic to the
dictates of the renewed heart. And that law is the one
already enunciated, that the volitions are determined by
the predominating emotions. If the conclusion is impos¬
sible, it is not because it does not logically follow from the
premises, but because those premises are unsound and
fallacious. If impossible, it is because the Will cannot
successfully resist the holy impulses of regenerated affec¬
tions. It is its nature, it is its law, that it obeys the dom¬
inant sensibilities of the soul.
But another view of the autonomous Will, as related to
regeneration, is that adopted by perhaps the majority of
Arminians. It is something like this: The influence of
the H^ly Spirit is necessary to regeneration, and is offered
to all men, but it may be accepted or rejected at the option
of the individual. The power is present, the grace is
offered, but it rests with the Will whether it shall effect
its work.
According to this view, the Will stands at the threshold
of the soul, a sort of janitor or sentinel, with discretion to
admit or reject the heavenly Messenger. If the gracious
offer be rejected, and the door kept barred, the soul re¬
mains uncleansed and unsaved. That man is beyond God's
power. But what if He be admitted ? The work of re¬
generation goes on, but, as in the case before considered,
its effect is confined to the head and the heart—the Will,
by its constitution, remaining intact. Although it kindly
permits the regeneration of the intellect and sensibility, it
reserves to itself the privilege of refusing, if it see proper,
74
The Human Will.
to co-operate in the work; and thus we are brought to the
possibility just described—the unnatural coalition of a pure
heart and an unholy life. It is evident that, if the heart
be regenerated, and yet the Will have power to antagonize
the holy emotion wrought by Divine grace, regeneration
is in that case a failure. A man may be at ihe same instant
regenerated and unconverted, a saint and a sinner—at once
white in heart and black in life—a moral monster. The
very thought is shocking to our sense of fitness and of
truth. It is contrary to nature, and violates a law of
nature. What law ? The law that the volitions are de¬
termined by the ruling emotions of the heart. If the heart
be corrupt, the life will, naturally, and by a moral neces¬
sity, be corrupt. If the heart be pure and loving, the life
will abound in deeds of purity, and overflow with streams
of benevolence.
Thus it appears that autonomy restricts the efficacy of
the Divne influence, and thus practically nullifies it. Upon
this view the grace of God may effectually purify the heart,
but at the same time fail to reform the life. There is,
indeed, no certainty that it will ever be more than a partial
and defective means of renovation.
And whatever fetters the most dire "scheme of neces¬
sity " may impose upon the spirit, it is far preferable to a
scheme that leaves man at the mercy of a capricious Will,
renders nugatory the most thorough work of the Spirit,
and exhibits to the universe the spectacle of a product
which is nothing less than a moral monstrosity.
On the autonomic premises, prayer for Divine preserva¬
tion, and deliverance from actual disobedience and practical
transgression, is utterly unavailing. I may cry ever so
earnestly to God, "Lead me not into temptation," " Keep
back thy servant from presumptuous sins," yet I entreat
a Being who has no power to answer my prayers. He
could not prevent the rebellion of Lucifer, He could not
restrain our first parents from disobedience, He cannot
keep me from sinning. To such an impotent Deity it is
The Human Will.
75
useless to address my prayers, for at last it depends alto¬
gether upon my own free and undetermined Will. If any
prayer can avail, it must be addressed to this god within
my own breast. This "kingly will," this deified nature
within me, is the sole arbiter of my destiny ; and, if it so
decide, can forever thwart the united prayers of the church,
frustrate the loving purpose of the High and Holy One,
and render practically useless the patient, renewing work
of the Holy Ghost.
The^e conclusions, so absurd in themselves, only serve
to show the egregious sophism of autonomy—the falseness
of the premise from which they inevitably result.
SECTION XX.
THEODICY.
The charge is often brought against "the scheme of neces¬
sity," that it impeaches the Divine holiness, by making God
the author of sin. The argument is as follows: If God
necessitates human actions by controlling the Will, either
directly by His immediate omnipotent energy, or indirectly
through the medium of causes, men are absolved from
guilt, and the blame of every wicked act rests upon Him.
Thus "the scheme of necessity" makes God the author
of sin.
Before proceeding to vindicate our theory from this im¬
putation, we shall show that the argument applies with
equal force, at least, to the scheme of autonomy, as to any
scheme of necessity. And we shall hereafter prove that
autonomy is far more vulnerable to the charge of dishon^
oring the Divine perfections, than any of the systems which
it opposes.
Let us now try autonomy by the foregoing argument,
and see whether it relieves the Divine Being of the blasphe¬
mous imputation. The autonomist admits, yea insists,
that the sensibilities are all necessitated. Not only are
they subject to cause, but are controlled by an irresistible
76
The Human Will.
necessity. And as all causes originate with God, He ne¬
cessitates the emotions. Thus, when anger, hatred, avarice,
lust, pride are cherished in the soul, they are necessitated
by the Divine Being. But each and all of the above affec¬
tions are vicious, unholy, sinful. Therefore, men are ab¬
solved from guilt, and the blame of every wicked passion
and unholy desire rests upon Him. Thus the scheme of
autonomy does not escape the odium sought to be fastened
by its advocates upon the doctrine of caused volitions, but
if their argument be valid, it, equally with that doctrine,
makes God the author of sin.
Is it possible to construct a Theodicy—a theory which
shall so explaiu the order of things as completely to ex¬
onerate the Divine Being from any complicity in the sins
of men? Several attemps have been made, notably by
Leibnitz, by Bledsoe, and by Edwards—the first a rigid
necessitarian, the second an autonomist, the third maintain¬
ing the determination of the Will by objective motives or
influences. We have shown above, that the autonomic
scheme does not vindicate the Divine glory, being itself
exposed to the very objections it brings against the neces¬
sitarian scheme. The methods of Leibnitz and Edwards
both assume that moral evil is essential to the perfection
of the universe and the glory of God. Leibnitz contends
for the "privative" or negative character of evil, only
holiness and goodness having positive character. While,
therefore, God directly produces what is good, there are
certain necessary negatives of good, which are evil. Ed¬
wards compares good to the direct effect of the sun's rays,
and evil to the effect of the deprivation or absence of his
beams. Thus,~as warmth and light are produced by the
sun, so holiness is the positive production of the Creator;
and as cold and darkness are merely negative conditions,
arising from the absence of the sun's rays, so sin, or moral
evil, is a negative condition, due to the absence of the
Divine influence. Thus, he arrives at the conclusion that
God does not directly cause sin to exist, but permits it for
The Human Will.
77
wise purposes, by withdrawing, at His sovereign pleasure,
the Divine influence from men.
There can be no doubt that, if God permits sin, or
chooses that it shall be, the existence of sin must be es¬
sential to His glory and the perfection of the universe.
The Bible clearly teaches that deeds, in themselves wicked,
are permitted, or decreed, in order that great ultimate
good may be brought to pass. The deliverance of the
people of Israel was accomplished through the obduracy
of Pharaoh, of whom it is said that God "hardened his
heart." "For this cause have I raised thee (Pharaoh) up,
that I might show my power in thee." The greatest good
to the human race that can possibly be conceived—namely,
their salvation—Was made possible by the greatest crime
ever committed, namely, the crucifixion of the Son of
God. "Him being delivered by the determinate counsel and
foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and with wicked
hands have crucified and slain." As Edwards says, "It
is certain that God thus, for excellent, holy, gracious and
glorious ends, ordered the fact which they committed who
were concerned in Christ's death; and that therein they
did but fulfill God's designs." It appears, then, that God
did purposely, and knowing what would come to pass—by His
"determinate counsel and foreknowledge"—withdraw His
holy influence from these men, and thus leave them to
their own lusts "to do what His hand and His counsel
determined before to be done."
Now, if the existence of moral evil is necessary to the
greatest good of the universe and the glory of God, it is
obvious that the ordering and determination and control
of this evil should be in the hands of the all-wise and
all-merciful Sovereign, rather than left to the unreasoning
caprice and unbridled whim of human volitions. If the
Will be independent of God, then He cannot prevent, or
control, or obstruct, or eradicate sin. It must take its
course, obedient only to the caprice of the short-sighted
6
78
The Human Will.
Will of frail mortals. Such is not the constitution of the'
world.
Still, however plausible and correct this explanation
may be, it does not give us any clue to the solution of the
problem that lies behind all theories of optimism, namely,
if our sinful actions and mental states be necessitated, how
can the Divine Being be exonerated from complicity in
them ? This brings us back to the connection between
Divine and human agency, the compatibility of causation,
and free moral and responsible agency. Let it be borne
in mind that whatever may be the truth as regards " ne¬
cessity," man is endowed with essential liberty, capacity
of guilt and accountability. These find their source and
range in the sensibility, which, although subject to causes,
possesses a marked character of spontaneity, activity, va¬
riety and buoyancy. We have indicated this sphere of
the soul as the possible key by which these difficult and
apparently contradictory problems of our nature may find
their explication.
If man is free to do as he pleases, then whatever he does
is his own act; whatever he wills is his own volition ;
whatever he feels is his own emotion ; whatever he thinks
is his own thought. But his feelings seem eminently his
own, and we express that ownership, or liberty, when we
call it his pleasure—when we say he acts or does as he
pleases. The fact that an emotion is caused, does not
make it any less his pleasure, or the disposition of his
soul. His emotions, then, are his own, and not God's
emotions. When he hates, it is man that hates, not God;
so when he loves God, it is man loving God and not God
loving himself. So volition and action, following emotion,
is his action and not the action of God. The sin, there¬
fore, is man's sin and not God's. Man is the sinner, and
God is the high and holy One that inhabiteth eternity.
" Let God be true, and every man a liar."
The Human WilL
79
SECTION XXL
autonomy asperses the divine perfection.
In the last section, the argument of the autonomist, by
which he reasons that "the scheme of necessity " makes
God the author of sin, was turned against his own system.
It was shown that, if the necessitation of sinful acts im¬
pugns the holiness of God, by making Him blameable for
the sins of men, the necessitation of unholy thoughts and
desires involves Him in equal censure. But autonomy
maintains that these are necessitated ; therefore, by parity
of reasoning, it charges the Almighty with sin.
We shall now prove that this theory dishonors God, by
disparaging the'Divine wisdom and purity, limiting the Di¬
vine omnipotence, and impeaching the Divine righteous¬
ness.
First, autonomy disparages the Divine wisdom and
goodness. It is only necessary to revert to the last
section but one, to see that this scheme makes it possi¬
ble for the Will to render null and void the thorough
regeneration of the heart by the Spirit of God. It also
presents, as a possible product of regeneration, a moral
amalgamation of the most inconsistent, revolting and mon¬
strous character. The bare contemplation of that possi¬
bility, for a moment, is in the highest degree offensive to
our moral sensibilities, especially because a scheme bear¬
ing such fruits reflects upon the wisdom and goodness of
the Author of regeneration. Such a product is not the
design of "the wise and only Potentate," nor the Jwork
of the Spirit of wisdom and truth.
Secondly, the scheme of autonomy places a limit to the
omnipotence of God. It makes the bold and shocking
avowal that God does not prevent sin, because He can¬
not! ! If this is not to "limit the Holy One of Israel,"
in respect to an essential attribute, we do not see how it is
possible to cast any aspersion at all upon that Divine per¬
fection. It plainly excludes the almighty agency from the
80
The Human Will.
moral world, and so restricts it in the human soul that it
is practically useless. The only sphere in which it allows
the Divine power full play is the world of matter* Thus
it seems to reduce the omnipotence God to brute force.
The Creator is made to appear a physical Ruler, govern¬
ing through the laws of matter, but is denied the greater
glory of a moral Sovereign. Such is not the sacred Maj¬
esty of heaven.
And what is the assumption on which it is deemed nec¬
essary to divest the Supreme Monarch of so large and im¬
portant a part of this glorious attribute ? It is held, that
for God to control the volition is to deprive man of f.ee
and moral agency; it is to necessitate virtue or holiness,
and vice or sin, and thus to abolish the distinction between
moral good and moral evil. It is assumed that a good
action, if necessitated, has no moral quality at all, and that
a bad action necessitated possesses no vicious character.
Let us try the scheme of autonomy by this assumption.
The affections of the Sensibility, according to the autono¬
mist, are necessitated. Anger, hatred, lust and pride are
all affections of the Sensibility. Therefore, it follows,
upon the postulate of autonomy, that anger, hatred, lust
and pride are not sinful. But this contradicts Scripture
and reason. The Bible denounces hatred as murder, and
lust as adultery. Conscience also condemns them as wrong,
and reproaches us as guilty if we indulge them. The au¬
tonomist, then, must yield his principle that the sensibiii
ties are necessitated, or abandon the assumption that neces-
sitation deprives an act of its moral character. The
dilemma is an iron-clad one. He must surrender one, or
the other. He dares not give up the causation of the sen¬
sibilities—the logic of that, if not atheism, is treason to
both philosophy and Christianity. He must, therefore,
yield the assumption that acts caused, or necessitated, are
destitute of moral quality.
Because the autonomist cannot explain how necessitated
acts can be sinful or holy, he rushes to the conclusion that
The Human Will.
81
God is excluded from the moral government of the uni¬
verse. To control the volitions, in his view, implies a
contradiction; therefore, the question lies without the
sphere of omnipotence. As omnipotence cannot make
two and two five, or anything but four, because it is a
contradiction; so omnipotence cannot make necessitated
acts holy or sinful, because the autonomist cannot see or
explain how necessity and moral agency are compatible.
Now we ask, which is the greater contradiction to suppose
our moral acts to be caused, or necessitated; or to sup¬
pose that God cannot govern the creatures His own hand
has formed, and that His dreadful attribute of omnipotence
is practically restricted to the narrow domain of the mate¬
rial world ? We may find the former alternative hard to
explain—a knot for the intellect—one of a thousand
mysterious paradoxes ; but the latter is so shocking to our
moral sense as to paralyze credulity itself. The scheme of
autonomy, therefore, asperses the Divine perfection, by
limiting the omnipotence of God.
Thirdly, the autonomist seems to cast a reproach upon
the Divine justice and goodness, in that he charges the
omniscient and omnipotent Creator with so constituting the
world that the practice of moral evil should be forever
impreventible and uncontrollable by Him. We have
shown that the theory maintained in this treatise does not
make God the author of sin. Man sins freely and con¬
sciously; and his conscience condemns him, while it
points to a solemn reckoning in the future. It pleased
God to create man with a capacity to sin. This proves
that He, in His unerring wisdom, deemed the existence of
moral evil essential to the highest well-being of the world,
and to the proper illustration of His own glory. There¬
fore, in bringing into existence a race that would violate
His moral law, He did what was supremely right, what
was absolutely best.
But it is one thing to permit moral evil to exist, nay to
declare that it shall come to pass, and aifother thing to so
82
The Human Will.
order all things that it shall forever be without the pale of
the Divine control. A man is justified in purchasing and
using a horse known to be mettlesome, if he takes effect¬
ual means to keep him under his control, and thus make
his dashing, fiery spirit serve important ends. But he
would be highly culpable to attach that horse to a vehicle
which bears his wife and children, and leave him, without
curb, rein, or bit, to dash madly withersoever his wild
impulses might carry him. Sin, under the control of the in¬
finitely wise, powerful and benevolent Sovereign, may and
will work out happy and glorious results. But this mis¬
chievous force, unless controlled by a power greater than
the human soul, will run to every excess of riot and mad¬
ness, involving the universe in hideous chaos and ruin*
Does not a scheme which implies consequences like this
reproach the almighty Creator with cruelty and injustice ?
SECTION XXII.
RESUME OF THE ARGUMENT.
It may be well, at this place, to review and sum up the
points of our discussion.
I. The human soul is endowed with three grand charac¬
teristic powers: the Intellect, or the power of knowing
and thinking ; the Sensibility, or the power of feeling; and
the Will, or the power of resolution or decision.
II. The Will is a cardinal power, distinct from both
thinking and feeling ; its special characteristic being that of
commanding to action.
III. The Sensibility bears a directrelation to the Intellect,
no emotion being possible without an antecedent intellec¬
tion. But the relation is so indeterminate that we are un¬
able to pronounce the intellection to be the cause of the
emotion; and so great is the variety, activity, elasticity
and mobility of the sensibilities, that they seem to arise
spontaneously, as if not subject to causes. Nevertheless,
they are not exempt from the dominion of causation.
The Human Will.
83
TV. The Will is directly related to the Sensibility, being
subject to its immediate sway; the volition, in every case,
"being determined by the dominant volition. This is the law
of the Will.
V. This law was abundantly illustrated by a large num¬
ber of well attested facts from history, in which it was
-evident that the dominant emotion governed the volitions,
and hence the actions.
VI. As, at first view, some actions seem to be dictated
by the intellect, or judgment, inquiry was made into them,
and it appeared that the true incentives lay in the Sensi¬
bility. Duty is a feeling of obligation.
VII. As many actions are prompted by conscience, this
important faculty was subjected to analysis, and it was
found that it contained an emotional element—the feeling
of moral obligation being the true impulse to volition.
VIII. The Scriptures were then consulted, and their
testimony, both doctrinal and historical, sustained the the¬
ory that actions are prompted by the prevailing emo¬
tion of the heart. As the righteous deeds of Scripture
■characters were ascribed to faith, this grace was consid¬
ered and found, like conscience, to be complex in its nature,
containing an intellectual and emotional element, of which
the latter, love to God, was the impnlse to action.
IX. An inquiry was then instituted into Regeneration,
as taught in the Scriptures, from which it appeared that it
is the mysterious and miraculous process by which the
Holy Spirit produces those convictions of the Intellect and
emotions of the heart which infallibly lead to obedience or
practical righteousness. The product of regeneration is
evangelical faith, a compound of intellectual belief and holy
affection, the latter impelling the volitions to holy conduct.
The effect of regeneration is to bring the will of man into
harmony with the will of God, and to restore conscience
■to its normal supremacy in the soul.
X. Some actions of a doubtful sort, such as are of a
.mechanical, indifferent and reluctant nature, were then
84
The Human WiU.
brought under consideration, from which it appeared that,
though the emotional impulse might be unobtrusive or
obscure, it nevertheless was the only incentive to the effort.
XI. Having thus, by a general induction from the ob¬
served facts of history and consciousness, corroborated by
the testimony of Scripture and the opinions of eminent phi¬
losophers, arrived at the law above enunciated, other the¬
ories of the Will came under review. First, the position
of Edwards, that "the volitions are determined by the
strongest motive as viewed by the mind," was examined.
It was suggested that this, view, propounded by the great
metaphysician at a remote period in the history of psy¬
chology, was founded upon an imperfect analysis of the
soul, and did not assign a sufficiently clear and definite
cause of volition. It did not characterize or localize the
motive, which, upon our theory, is the predominant emo¬
tion—a motive characterized and localized as an affection
of the Sensibility.
XII. The theory of the self-determination of the Will—
or the scheme of autonomy—was then discussed and con¬
demned, on the following general grounds: first, that it
contradicts one of the acknowledged intuitions of reason,
that every event or phenomenon must have a cause; sec¬
ondly, it is opposed to all analogy ;x thirdly, it is contrary
to observed facts in history and experience; fourthly, it is
incapable of inductive demonstration—the only true method
of establishing any principle or law of matter or mind.
XIII. As autonomists object to the doctrine of caused
volitions, on the ground that it makes us creatures of ne¬
cessity, and deprives us of liberty, moral agency and ac¬
countability, "the scheme of necessity" was next consid¬
ered, and a broad distinction made between physical
necessity and psychical or mental necessity. While neces¬
sity is characteristic of physical causation, mental causation
is marked rather by certainty. Of all the human powers,
the Sensibility is the most spontaneous, active and free;
and hence, it is reasonable to suppose that here, if any-
The Human Will.
85
where in the soul, the vexed problems of necessity may-
find their solution.
XIV. It was then demonstrated that, notwithstanding
this subjection <o causes, man possesses the highest free¬
dom conceivable in a creature—the liberty to do as he
pleases ; and that in the Sensibility are verge and scope for
the most ample freedom, these powers, by their activity,
variety and mobility, being comparable to the wind,
which, though subject to causes, " bloweth where it
Ksteth."
XV. The charge of destroying human liberty, imputed
by autonomists to the scheme of necessity, was retorted
upon their own theory—it being shown that autonomy
is not true, rational liberty, but a scheme of licentious¬
ness, with a certain tendency to anarchy.
XVI. The imputation that the "scheme of necessity"
subverts moral agency and accountability was then repelled,
and it was demonstrated that, on the autonomist's own
premises, his scheme was no less obnoxious to the charge
than the most rigid necessitarian view, and that moral
agency and accountability had their sphere not in the Will,
but in the Sensibility. This power being the incentive to
volition, it also imparted its moral quality and accounta¬
bility to the outward act.
XVII. It was next shown that autonomy, besides being
liable to the charge of destroying accountability, on the
same ground as alleged against the scheme of necessty,
was especially vulnerable to the accusation, inasmuch as it
pronounces the Will independent of God and moral obli¬
gation, and thus exempts it from His moral government
and the restraints of conscience. Being thus a constitu¬
tional autonomy, it is not amenable to the judgment of
alien powers.
XVIII. The doctrine of the supremacy and universal
rule of the Deity over, and in, all terrestrial events, was
then maintained. At the same time, the free co-operation
of the human agency with the Divine was established.
The Human Will.
XIX. Autonomy was impugned as rendering unavailing
the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, and making
prayer an ineffectual service.
XX. The theory of this treatise was vindicated against
the charge of making God the author of sin, while it was
shown that the scheme of autonomy was exposed to the
same charge by parity of reasoning. An attempt was
made to show that only upon the views here maintained
can anything like a satisfactory theodicy bee onstructed.
XXI. The bill of impeachment against the scheme of
autonomy was concluded with the charge that it asperses
the Divine perfections, by disparaging the Divine purity
and wisdom, limiting the Divine Omnipotence, and censur¬
ing the Divine justice and goodness.
SECTION XXIII.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SENSIBILITY.
From the foregoing discussion, it appears that the Sen¬
sibility is invested with a profound, peculiar and sacred
importance. There is no department of our nature on
which depend interests of such vast moment for time and
eternity. The great practical questions of life—duty, suc¬
cess, happiness, influence and character—and above all, the
high and holy concerns of religion, are directly and inti¬
mately related to the emotional part of man's constitution.
The following considerations prove the transcendent im¬
portance of the Sensibility.
1. The emotions are the immediate springs of human
actions, Everything man does, whether great or small,
important or trivial, public or secret, good or bad, wise or
foolish, is done under the influence, and by the prompting,
of some transient emotion,* some overmastering passion, or
some ruling desire. All human transactions find their true
explanation here. The history of the world is the history of
the human heart. In a latent corner of some individual heart
was born the feeling, which, ripening into desire, aroused
the energy of a Will, by whose command the entire face
The Human Will.
87
of history has been changed. In the throbbing heart of
Caesar was born that restless ambition, which laid the
foundation of the mightiest empire the world ever saw.
No greater events have marked the annals of modern
times than those created by the ambitious spirit of Napo¬
leon. All startling revolutions have had their birth in
restless bosoms, where lust of power, or indignation
against wrong, or love of liberty, has burst into flame,
firing other hearts, until a people have risen up in their
might to overturn the established throne, or to
" Crush the tyrant while they rend the chain."
And the minor events that make up the calm, steady stream
of history, are the outcome of the passions and desires that
are ever rolling and surging in the unseen depths of the
human heart. The bad passions of men—lust, avarice,
ambition, hatred, revenge and every form of selfishness—
have been the poisonous dragon's teeth, from which have
sprung up a baleful crop of woes, in the shape of tyranny,
rapine, cruelty, murder and war, with the attendant horrors
of famine, pestilence, poverty, and a horde 'of individual
and social v'ces. All the black and revolting crimes that
have stained the page of history and disgraced humanity,
are the outgrowth of the emotions of the human heart.
On the contrary, pure and virtuous feelings have been
the good seed, whence golden harvests have grown, to
bless the world, dignify man, and promote the peace, hap¬
piness and progress of the human race.
Love of conquest and power gave to history the names
of Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon, who marked the earth
with the blood of slaughtered millions. Inhumanity pro¬
duced a Nero, a Caligula and an Alva; fanaticism a Cathe¬
rine de Medici, a Philip II., and the bloody Mary; love of
money a Judas, a Bacon and a Belknap. While, on the
other hand, the path of history is radiant with the illustri¬
ous names and pure deeds of great and good men, whose
virtues have redeemed humanity and illustrated the glory
of Christianity. That holy affection, inspired by Divine
88
The Human Will.
grace in the heart of the Christian, has renovated individ¬
ual character, reformed society, purified the stream of his¬
tory, and turning it from its former corrupt channels in the
dark hollows and noisome fens of crime and cruelty, have
sent it leaping and sparkling along the sunny plains and
smiling vales of purity and peace.
If, then, virtue and vice are the offspring of the Sensi •
bility; if the state of the heart—the prevalence of good or
bad affections, of holy emotions or corrupt passions—is the
true source of human action, and the fountain-head of all
history, what a sacred and awful importance belongs to the
emotional department of our nature!
2. But, secondly, the Sensibility is the seat of human
freedom. Man is essentially free, but not because of a
free Intelligence or a free Will. Without emotion, his
God-like reason would render him a passive and uninter¬
ested spectator of the changing events and scenes of life.
It is only by the Sensibility that he is moved to roam
abroad, an active, free and eager participant in the grand
drama of history. Without emotion, the Will would for¬
ever lie dormant, in helpless apathy, or blindly follow the
momentum of external forces, or, if endowed with inde¬
pendent energy, would make man a thing of blind caprice,
of motiveless whim, or of defiant and reckless mischief.
Liberty consists in doing as one pleases—this pleasure of
the soul originating and disporting itself in the sphere of
the Sensibility. Yet, as liberty, to be genuine, must be
subject to law, so the Sensibility, where freedom resides, is
subject to the dominion of causes, under the ceaseless care
and control of the infinitely wise, benevolent and powerful
Deity.
If, then, without emotion, man would be a cipher, a
slave, or a mere agent of mischief, how important is that
power which prompts him to be ever active, to do ever
the behests of his own pleasure, and which is so consti¬
tuted that, with the most generous freedom, he is ever
The Human Will.
89
under the efficient government of supreme Wisdom, Love
and Power!
3. Again, the Sensibilityis the chief realm and source of
man's moral agency and accountability. This has already
been amply demonstrated. Good emotions, rational de¬
sires, pure affections, as they incite to good, virtuous and
holy actions, lend their moral complexion to the conduct,
and pronounce man innocent and just. But corrupt affec¬
tions, base desires and malignant passions, as they impel
to vicious conduct, impart their dark hue to the behaviour,
and render man guilty and responsible.
It may be said that certain actions posses a vicious qual¬
ity irrespective of the spirit that actuates them, while many
deeds are in themselves good, which do not proceed from
worthy motives in the heart. True, theft is an injury to
the person defrauded, if committed by an idiot, mad¬
man, or brute. But evidently it is, in such cases, no
vice. To take life wrongs the victim, as well when done
by accident, as when done from malice, or a cold-blooded
cruel, disposition. But there is no guilt where there is no
corrupt motive or inclination to do wrong, and hence no
responsibility. So some actions are, in themselves, good
—that is, accomplish good results Alms giving is always
helpful, always promotes the welfare of the beneficiary.
But if it be done from selfishness, it carries no virtue with
it.
The essence of virtue and guilt is the disposition which
prompts the action, and the possession of that spirit ren¬
ders a man virtuous or guilty, though no overt deed be the
result. The Sensibility, therefore, derives additional im¬
portance from the fact that it is the sphere and source of
moral agency and responsibility.
4. The Sensibility is also the chief basis of character.
The heart is the true index of the man; and he who is most
deeply read in the human heart, has the most thorough
knowledge and is the best judge of human nature. A
good man is one who has a good heart; a bad man is one
90
The Human Will.
who has a bad heart. A righteous man is one who loves
God and takes pleasure in conforming to the Divine will
and law. A wicked man is one destitute of this holy af¬
fection, and who hates the person and service of God.
Different phases of character arise from the habitual pre¬
dominance of different phases of the Sensibility. A miser¬
ly or avaricious man is one whose soul is dominated by
one absorbing passion—the love of money. An ambitious
man is one whose heart is imbued with desire of power or
fame. A proud man is one who cherishes pride—a feeling
of the heart.
A vain man is one whose predominant passion is love of
display or admiration. A selfish man is ruled by self love,
to which all other feelings yield subservience. An impul¬
sive man is one whose emotions are quick, strong and gener¬
ally unstable. Even the man usually characterized as self-
willed, derives his peculiar trait as much from the vigor of
his Sensibilities as from the tenacity of his Will. Indeed,
constancy of Will is, for the most part, associated with
strength and depth of feeling. It is not a turbulent or de¬
monstrative feeling that distinguishes the obstinate or self-
willed man from the impulsive man, but rather a deep,
strong, hidden undercurrent of emotion, which in its
steadiness and force imparts energy to the Will. A posi¬
tive character is one of marked power of emotion, while
one destitute of this, is a negative character. Some men
are distinguished by what is called an intellectual character,
from persons of mere Sensibility. And yet, without emo¬
tion, there can be no action, and hence no criterion of char¬
acter. The impulse to action, in such men, is an elevated,
rational Sensibility, appropriate to, and corresponding with,
the judgments and conceptions of an acute, vigorous and
enlightened understanding.
5. The Sensibility is the foundation of success or failure.
A man of sluggish or torpid Sensibility will be slow and
feeble in action; while quick and lively emotions prompt
to activity and energy in business. A due regulation of
The Human Will.
91
these emotions is a necessary condition of success. While
dull Sensibilities engender indolence, excessive impulsive¬
ness endangers success.
As prosperity is intimately connected with a virtuous
life, and adversity with vicious indulgence, it is evident
that a man who would gain permanent success, must culti¬
vate the purer affections, and restrain the corrupt propen¬
sities of his nature.
6. The Sensibility is the source of power and influence.
An individual with a feeble emotional nature, will be a fee¬
ble man among men. The nearer his Sensibility ap¬
proaches zero, the nearer he will approach the status of a
social cipher. His power will be nothing, his whole char¬
acter negative. In every position and office, the man of
power is the man of powerful- emotion.
The statesman or soldier, who would achieve triumph,
and leave his impress upon the world, must possess strong,
active, steady courage, and an ambition that rises with
the occasion. Napoleon possessed both, and hence the
mighty influence and power he had. Cromwell was a man
that to courage and ambiticn added religious zeal—the
three forms of emotion combining to create an irresistible
influence, which enabled the great Commoner to mould
men and "events at his will.
The power of the orator is due more to the energy of
the feelings than to the extent and .vigor of the intellect.
"In the most eloquent passages of the great orators of an¬
cient or modern times, it is not so much the irresistible
cogency and unrelenting grasp of the terrible logic, that
holds our attention, and casts its spell over us, as it is the
burning indignation that exposes the sophistries, and tears
to shreds the fallacies of an opponent, and sweeps all
argument and all opposition before it, like a devouring
fire."* Such emotional power was the very soul of the
eloquence of Demosthenes, of Burke, of Henry and of
Clay.
*Dr. Joseph Haven.
9.2
The Human WilL
The power of poetry is derived more from the fire of
aroused emotion, the frenzy of lofty passion, the sublime
elevation of feeling, than to the beauty of imagery or the
charm of diction or the melodious, rythmical flow of the
verse. True these are important elements of poetry, but
the spirit which animates the thought, the ideality, the
expression, the form, is the ecstacy and exalted fervor
of the poet's soul, the " fine frenzy" in which alone lies
the magic of his power.* Take from Milton and Shakes¬
peare and Byron the feeling that exalts their verse, and
their master-pieces would be but the cold marble statue, as
compared with the breathing, glowing form of a living
man. Yea, there is feeling in the best forms of sculpture,
and a statue, which is a true work of art, speaks in every
feature of the face the sentient soul of the artist.
The power of woman, so universally felt and acknowl¬
edged, is the power of Sensibility—the influence of the
heart—in which she so far surpasses the sterner sex. The
power of the mother, in moulding and directing the infant
mind, committed to those gentle hands by a wise Creator;
the power of the wife in softening the asperities of the
rougher companion, and reforming the evil tendencies of a
husband grown, wayward by long indulgence, and the
absence of restraint; the power of the sex in social life,
commanding homage and devotion, is the irresistible
power of the heart, by which woman is forever a queen.
And may we not say, with reverence, that the power of
the Gospel is heart-power, coming, as it does, from the
great heart of the Father, rendered availing by the blood
that flowed from the great heart of the Son, and made
effectual by the loving offices'of the Holy Spirit ? Yea,
God, in His character of Supreme Monarch of worlds,
governs the universe by love; "for He maketh His sun
to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on
the just and the unjust."
7. The Sensibility is the fountain of human happiness
•According to Milton, poetry is " simple, sensuous and passionate."
The Human Will.
93
or misery. Under this head, we cannot refrain from quot¬
ing the following impressive language of Dr. Thomas
Brown:
"We might, perhaps, have been so constituted, with
respect to our intellectual states of mind, as to have had
all the varieties of these, our remembrances, judgments
and creations of fancy, without our emotions. But without
the emotions that accompany them, of how little value
would the mere intellectual functions have been ! It is to
our vivid feelings of this class we must look for those ten¬
der regards which make our remembrances sacred, for
that love of truth and glory and mankind, without which
to animate and reward us in our discovery and diffusion of
knowledge, the continued exercise of judgment would be
a fatigue rather than a satisfaction ; and for all that delight¬
ful wonder which we feel when we contemplate the admir¬
able creations of fancy, or the still more admirable beauties
of the unfading model, that model which is ever before us,
and the imitation of which, as has been truly said, is the
only imitation that is itself originality. By our other mental
functions we are mere spectators of the machinery of the
universe, living and animate ; by our emotions, we are ad¬
mirers of nature, lovers of man, adorers of God. * * *
" In this picture of our emotions, however, I h^ve pre¬
sented them in their fairest aspects; there are aspects
which they assume, as terrible as these are attractive ; but
even terrible as they are, they are not the less interesting
objects of our contemplation. * .* * In the list of our
emotions of this formidable class, is to be found every pas¬
sion which can render life guilty and miserable; a single
hour of which, if that hour be an hour of uncontrolled do¬
minion, may destroy happiness forever, and leave; little
more of virtue than is necessary for giving all its horror
to remorse. There are feelings as blasting to every desire
of good that may still linger in the heart of the frail vic¬
tim, who is not yet wholly corrupted, as those poisonous
7
94
The Human Will.
gales of the desert, which not merely lift in whirlwinds
the sands that have often been tossed before, but wither
even the few fresh leaves, which, on some spot of scanty
verdure, have still been flourishing amid the general ster¬
ility."
In the approval of a good conscience, there is a sweet
satisfaction, a solid happiness, which can arise from no
•other source. It is a well-spring of joy,
"A perpetual feast of nectared sweets
Where no crude surfeit reigns."
While, on the other hand, the voice of accusing con¬
science is a source of mental anguish, for which the pleas¬
ures of sense have no antidote. "It is a fire in the bones,
burning when no man suspects, but him only who is
doomed to its endurance ; a girdle of thorns worn next
the heart, concealed, it may be, from the eye of but
giving the wearer no rest, day nor night." Remorse is
the worm that dies not, tne fire that is never quenched.
If its torments are so terrible in this life, how unspeakably
fearful must they be in the world of woe !
But the approval of conscience and the remorse that
follows upon disregard of its warnings, are feelings—the
one of pleasure, the other of pain. They have their seat
in the Sensibility. How important the power which en¬
folds in its bosom our happiness or misery, for time and
eternity !
SECTION XXIV.
CULTURE OF THE SENSIBILITY.
If upon the Sensibility hang such high and holy interests
—our-history, our responsility, our character, our success,
our influence, our destiny—no duty is more solemn or im_
perative than that which binds us to the proper culture and
regulation of this power. And yet, how do we overlook
its importance in even our well-meant efforts at self-discip¬
line ! How little weight is attached to the cultivation
The Human Will.
05
ot the emotions in the nursery and by the fire-side; how
much too little in the training of the schools ! In compari¬
son with the Intellect, the heart, the source of such wonder¬
ful power, is regarded as a matter of small moment in our
systems of education.
But the question meets us, ale the Sensibilities suscepti¬
ble of regulation and culture ? If produced by causes, if
subject to the law of necessity, can they, in any way, be
brought under our control ? Do they not arise in obedi¬
ence to forces so far beyond our reach, as not to come
wfthin the scope of any voluntary methods of education ?
We maintain that the emotional powers, as well as those
of the Intellect, are susceptible of high cultivation and im¬
provement. By proper appliances, they maybe educated,
trained, improved and regulated. As perception, memory,
imagination, reason—intellectual faculties—are confessedly
subjects of culture, so the powers of the Sensibility may
be cultivated for the great purposes of their creation.
The fact that both reason and Scripture pronounce man
responsible for the state of his affections, is a proof that, to
some extent at least, they are subject, to voluntary regula¬
tion.
But does not this imply the power of the Will over the
Sensibility, and does it not refute the doctrine that the vo-
itions are determined by the emotions? That the Will
does have an influence 011 the emotions is not denied.
The very idea of the cultivation of these powers involves
voluntary action of the mind. I cannot take a single step
in the education of my feelings, without first putting forth
the resolution to do so—an exercise of the Will. I must
not only will to cultivate them, but I must resolve upon
the requisite act,'at each stage of the process. Moreover,
through the entire proceedure, the attention must be held
to it, by a strong and persistent exertion of the Will. But
none of these resolves or volitions are self-produced—none
are arbitrary and causeless operations of the Will. Be¬
hind each volition there lurks a feeling—some desire or
96
The Human Will.
obligation—which spurs the Will to the resolution; other¬
wise, no such resolution could exist. To resolve to con¬
trol or cultivate the Sensibility, without a motive, is incon¬
ceivable.
But does the Will act directly upon the emotions, at its
own option arousing the feelings to activity, and stimulat-
ing/them to violence, or commanding the temper and re¬
straining the passions by its own immediate energy ? In
other words, are phases of emotion, or activities of the
Sensibility, ever produced by the direct force of the Will ?
To this, we think, a negative answer must be given. We
cannot, by sheer Will-effort, create any given emotion, or
even produce any given phase of feeling. I cannot awaken
love by simply willing it. I cannot indulge hate, revenge,
fear, joy or hope, by a mere effort of Will. '
But cannot we check or suppress our feelings, command
our temper and restrain our passions by the Will ? Let
us see. I am conscious that the feeling of anger is rising
in my breast. If it gain supreme sway, dominating all
other feelings, it will prompt the Will to some overt action.
It will find expression in some abusive or threatning word,
or menacing gesture, or injurious blow. It will seek an
outlet in the contemptuous '' Raca! " the passionate " Thou
fool!" or the murderous shot or thrust. But before it
thus gains the ascendency and openly exhibits itself, a
thought occurs to me which awakens a different feeling. I
remember that this passion has previously gotten me into
trouble—has either brought me into disgrace or danger.
Or I have observed these bad effects in the case of another
person. The feeling of ptlde or fear is born, and imme¬
diately a conflict with the rising passion ensues. The strong¬
er feeling overbears the weaker. If pride of character,
scorning to be brought into a disgraceful position, be
stronger than anger, the passion will yield. If fear of
danger gain the mastery, the angry feeling will succumb.
Or suppose, as the passion swells in my heart, the thought
that anger is wrong comes to my mind, then the emotional
The Human Will.
77
conscience—the feeling of moral obligation—arises to dis¬
pute the field with the original possessor. If the new foe
prove the stronger in the grapple, the other will yield,
and all expressions of passion will be restrained. It is ev¬
ident, that these new emotions are the conquerors, and not
the Will. And these emotions are born of certain thoughts—
intellections—that have arisen in' the mind. These intek
lections have entered through some principle of sugges¬
tion or association, independent of the Will.
This leads us to inquire what the Will does in the culti¬
vation of the Sensibility. Its office is indirect—namely,
to employ the necessary means for accomplishing the
object.
What then are the means and methods for the due edu¬
cation and regulation of the emotional nature ? In re¬
ference to this, the following considerations are offered:
1. In the first place, the Sensibility may be cultivated by
the proper improvement of the intellectual faculties. It
is emphatically true, that to educate the heart we must first
educate the head. Our Sensibilities are awakened by our
intellections—our feelings arise out of our thoughts. This
has been iterated from time to time in this discussion.
And though a given thought does not always awaken to a
given feeling—our emotions, desires and affections being
uncertain, inconstant and variable—yet the relation is such,
that the habitual exercise of a certain character of thought
will secure the prevalence of a certain character of feeling.
The office of the Will, then, is to adopt such methods of
educating the Intellect as will give right and safe directions
to the thoughts, as habits of the mind. Let us apply this
principle to some of the faculties of the Intellect.
'1 he imagination is one of the most active and powerful
of these faculties, and, in its influence on the Sensibilities,
one of the most important. By its proper training—that
is, by exercising it on certain subjects—it calls into play
the purest and noblest emotions of the soul. It may be
educated to frame lofty ideals of things earthly, and holy
98
The Human Will.
ideals of things heavenly; to range amid sublunary
scenes of unpolluted, innocent and rational enjoyment, or
rising on bolder wing, to sweep in lawful excursions, amid
the ideal glories of the upper world. The habitual crea¬
tion and contemplation of noble images like these, tend to
exalt the spirit, and to foster habitual emotions, pure, re¬
fined and elevated.
On the other hand, to accustom the imagination to revel
in scenes of impurity and debauchery, is to develop and
stimulate the base and corrupt propensities of the heart.
The higher powers of judgment and reason are noble
capacities of the Intellect, and may, by proper cultivation,
prove valuable means of training the Sensibility to noble
tendencies. The habitual employment of the mind in
seeking truth, in rational investigation, in lofty contem¬
plation, tends to the production of habitual states of pure
and elevated feeling.
Above all, the correct education of the ethical judgment—
the intellectual element of conscience—is one of the most
effective means of promoting correct habits of emotion.
Let the conscientious judgment be habitually right, and the
moral impulses will be habitually right. Let one take pains
to educate his conscience so as to secure nice and accurate
discriminations between right and wrong, and the emo¬
tional power of this faculty will maintain its rightful as¬
cendency, and it will rarely happen that appetite and pas¬
sion can prevail over the moral instincts of the soul.
Thus the proper culture of the intellectual powers is a
necessary and valuable instrumentality in the right regu¬
lation of the emotional nature.
2. In the second place, the Sensibility may be duly cul¬
tivated by keeping proper objects before the attention, and
by excluding hurtful objects and images from the thoughts.
One who habitually contemplates pure and right things—
whether they be objects of sense, discerned by the bodily
organs, or ideas of imagination, or subjects of reason—
will be likely to have habitually right feelings; and the
The Human Will.
99
prevalence of these proper emotions will be in propor¬
tion to the frequency or constancy of these pure con¬
templations. Let no corrupt spectacle come before the eye,
no harmful sound or speech be uttered to the ear, no fan¬
cied scene of pollution be presented to the imagination,
and the emotions will not stray after such unfamiliar im¬
proprieties. In the education of children, the greatest
care is necessary to guard them, in their tender years,
from the contamination of objects, pictures, spectacles,
associations and literature, that naturally tend to kindle
corrupt passions in the heart. Lascivious pictures, licen¬
tious theatrical and spectacular exhibitions, and dissolute
companions, suggest base thoughts, by which the Sensibil¬
ities are polluted and the moral nature degraded.
And so with respect to self-reformation ; if one has con¬
tracted debasing habits of mind, it should be his task to
divert his thoughts from their accustomed pernicious chan¬
nels, and to dwell in contemplation upon subjects pure
and noble and rational. Habits of right thought thus es¬
tablished, will naturally be followed by habitual states of
right emotion.
3. The Sensibility is most properly and effectually reg¬
ulated by religious culture. Religion is pre-eminently the
renovation of the heart—the inspiration of new and holy
affections and desires. This is the work of the Holy Spirit^
and His power and grace must be sought with faith and
prayer, under the teaching of Divine truth. Aside from
the direct, supernatural influence of the Spirit, the occu¬
pation of the mind with the sacred themes of revelation,
the frequent reflection upon the Divine character, the con¬
templation of the scenes and employments of heaven,
and the elevation of the mind in the holy atmosphere of
prayer, (if we could suppose them possible without Divine
influence,) would naturally tend to sustain the emotions
in a state of heavenly exaltation. Yet the grace of the
Holy Spirit is necessary, and in seeking this grace, the
Will is employed. We are to put forth volitions, by
100
The Human Will.
asking, seeking and knocking at the door of Divine Mercy.
Thus the Will, not by the exertion of its power directly
upon the feelings, but by its resolution to adopt the means
necessary for the purpose, is employed in the task of cul¬
tivating the Sensibility. To this it is impelled by some
antecedent desire, and thus we are kept, in accordance
with the laws of our constitution, within the sphere of
Divine control. We are not abandoned to a capricious, arbi¬
trary Will for the determination of our destinies. And
yet that Will is endued with a native energy, potential for
the purposes for which it was created. To this subject we
direct attention in our final section.
SECTION XXV.
TIIE ENERGY O? THE WILL.
Before concluding this treatise, an inquiry of interest
and pertinence merits some consideration. Is the Will,
which we have found to be subject to the law of causation,
endowed with any intrinsic energy ? Does it possess any
power of its own, independent of the motive which de¬
termines its action ? Or is it driven onward in blind and pas¬
sive submission, inert and impotent, like insensate matter,
unless impelled or sustained by the moving force ?
The Will isNa psychical agent, a power of the soul, and
hence, unlike a stolid, material substance, it has an essen¬
tial activity. We know the intellectual faculties to be
caused ; yet we call them powers, implying that they
possess some potential energy. Thus memory, imagina¬
tion and reason are powers of the understanding, having
in themselves an underived forceful activity. We speak
likewise, of the emotional powers, which, as we have seen,
are characterized by a quick and lively energy. It'would
seem to be a fair inference from analogy, that the third
great department of the soul—the Will—is invested with
the attribute of power.
It is often convenient to compare the powers and acts
The Human Will.
101
of the mental faculties to material forces and operations
But there is no physical analogy which will perfectly ex¬
plain psychical powers and phenomena. We have already
likened the Will to certain agents in external nature, which
possess an inherent dynamic energy, not apparent in the
causes which produce them. Fire is the effect or result of
chemical action—ol heat acting upon certain constituent
elements of matter. But has not fire a potential energy
not to be discovered in the cause which produces it ? Its
power to consume everything combustible and to fuse the
most obdurate metals ; the terrific fury and sweeping
havoc of the great conflagration : all give evidence of an
energy peculiar to this agent ? Steam is the effect of heat
applied to water—in other words, it is water in the form
of vapor, the change being effected by heat. But has steam
no intrinsic energy ? The force with which it drives the
most massive machinery, propels the colossal man of war
and draws the most ponderous train with a swiftness
which the fleetest horse cannot rival ; the terrible force
with which it bursts the most heavily-plated boilers, scat¬
tering destruction on every side—these give token of an
inherent potency, which we do not discern in the produc¬
ing causes.
But even these may be explained by the physicist so as
to give*to these dynamical agents the character of bor¬
rowers of force. In the caloric, which kindles the fire and
raises the steam, which burns in the one and lies enveloped
in the other, we have the source of their terrific power.
But to the Will itself there seems to belong a measure
of energy, giving it tenacity, elasticity and strength. And
yet we hold, that the greater portion of constancy and
steadfastness it exhibits is due to the bracing it receives
from the Sensibility. As has been before said, even self-
willed and obstinate men are distinguished by strength
and energy of feeling.
Inflexibility of character, as contrasted with pliant, plas¬
tic and vacillating natures, is frequently superinduced by
the prevalence of some species of Sensibility, which sus-
102
The Human Will.
tains the resolution, and gives to the purpose its pro¬
verbial stability. The various feelings of courage, pride,
duty and religious faith have sustained men against dan¬
gers, difficulties and discouragements, which have broken
the spirit of those whose purposes were not hacked by
these stout and vigorous emotions. It was courage, or
military ardor, that upheld the immortal six hundred at
Balaklava, who, fearless,
" Rode into the valley of death,"
while
" Cannon to right of them,
Cannon to left of them,
Cannon in front of them,
Volleyed and thundered."
It was pride that prompted and sustained the heroic act
of Mutius Scaevola, who, in the presence of the overbear¬
ing Porsena, thrust his right hand into the fire upon the
altar, and held it steadily in the flame until it was con¬
sumed.
It was patriotic duty that supported the firm purpose
of Regulus to submit to degradation, torture and death,
rather than counsel dishonor to Rome.
It was the fervor of religious faith that prompted Cran-
mer to place his offending hand first into the fierce flame,
and calmly to hold it there while suffering other tortures,
until the devoted member dropped from his shoulder.
And yet, in all these instances, there are indications of
a tenacity inhering in the Will itself. This power, after being
determined to action, seems to brace or nerve itself to a
firm and inflexible consistency, which withstands every as¬
sault made npon it. It holds out with a steadfast and
stubborn strength of resistance, which defies opposition,
scorns danger and suffering, and justifies the encomium of
the Roman Poet:
" Justum et tenacem propositi virum,
Non civium ardor prava jubentium,
Non vultus instantis tyranni,
Mente quatit solida. * * *
Si fractus illabatur orbis
Impavidum ferient ruinae."
APPENDIX.
In the second section of this work credit was given to
M. Cousin for the present three-fold classification of the
mental powers, Intellect, Sensibility and Will. This, how¬
ever, seems to be a matter of doubt. Cousin distinctly main¬
tains that '' voluntary activity, sensibility and intelligence,
or reason," constitute the powers of the soul; and adds
that this classification *' is now generally adopted, and
makes the foundation of the psychology of our times."
Hamilton ascribes the trichotomy to the German philos¬
opher, Kant. The author has just received the following
from Dr. Noah Porter, President of Yale College, author of
a profound and valuable work on the Human Intellect.
Says President Porter: It is not easy to answer the ques¬
tion asked in your letter. Hamilton misstates—or rather
incorrectly states—Kant's merit in respect to the three-fold
classification. Kant's division of the powers, or faculties,
is this : Denk (Thinking); Gefuhls (Feeling) ; and Best-
rebungs Vermogen (Endeavor Faculties)—this last answer¬
ing to Desire, rather than to the Will, or Free-Will. And
yet Kant in his Ethics, as does Hamilton, incidentally re¬
cognizes Will as something distinguished from Desire. But
Locke made the same distinction between Desire and Will.
Reid followed him. The old division into Understanding
and Will seems to have very tenaciously made itself felt,
long after it was abandoned in the application. Psycholo¬
gists have been few and far between in English Literature;
but T. C. Upham formally adopted the three-fold classifi¬
cation, taking it in effect from Dugald Stewart."
President Porter adopts the three-fold division, precisely
as employed in this treatise.