BRITISH ROUTES 
 TO INDIA 
 
LONGMANS. GREEN AND CO. 
 
 5 5 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 
 221 EAST 20TH STREET, CHICAGO 
 TREMONT TEMPLE, BOSTON 
 210 VICTORIA STREET, TORONTO 
 
 LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. Ltd. 
 
 39 PATERNOSTER ROW, E C 4, LONDON 
 5 3 NICOL ROAD, BOMBAY 
 6 OLD COURT HOUSE STREET, CALCXTTTA 
 167 MOUNT ROAD, MADRA3 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2017 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/britishroutestoi01hosk 
 
Scenes Illustrating the Overland Route about 1855 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 IN HISTORY 
 
 PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE 
 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
 OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
 OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 HALFORD LANCASTER HOSKINS 
 
 PHILADELPHIA 
 
 1928 
 
 -f 
 
 i- 
 
 27115 
 
PRINTED IN 
 
 THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 CO PYRIGHT, I 928 
 BY LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 
 
D 
 
 ^ -I ^ 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 T he solicitude of the great nations of Europe for the 
 countries lying at the eastern end of the Mediterranean 
 has been a conspicuous feature of European interna- 
 tional relations ever since the rise of the chronic Eastern Question. 
 While the motives of the Powers concerned with this problem 
 have been various, the Question was fundamentally due to the 
 existence of certain broad natural highways leading from the 
 Mediterranean toward the jealously guarded confines of India. 
 It was the decadence of the Mohammedan states lying athwart 
 these highways, coincident with the phenomenal development of 
 western Europe, which made the Near and Middle East the scene 
 of such fierce European rivalry during the nineteenth century. 
 The political difficulties arising in these areas have been studied 
 from sundry points of view, but scant attention has been devoted 
 to the simultaneous development of lines of communication along 
 these natural routes. The early instances of the use of the shorter 
 routes for purposes of communication were as unimpressive as the 
 casual trading voyages of the late eighteenth century with which 
 they began. But European imperialism presently added vast sig- 
 nificance to these routes and definite lines of access were projected 
 and developed, which, in addition to economic and social uses in 
 times of peace, would serve military purposes in times of war and 
 political objects on all occasions. 
 
 The recounting of these developments has supplied a theme 
 large for the space limits assigned to it. Much pertinent material 
 has necessarily been omitted, and matters with which the reader is 
 likely to be more or less familiar have been greatly abridged. For 
 the same reason, only the most requisite or suggestive of the 
 sources consulted have been cited. If the account thus lacks some 
 of the elements of completeness, it may still suffice to throw new 
 and interesting light on the international bearings of the routes 
 described, and on the foreign policy of Great Britain in particular. 
 
 In the course of this work, I have frequently been placed under 
 obligation for courtesies rendered. I desire to acknowledge my 
 indebtedness to those in charge of the British Museum and the 
 
 V 
 
 127115 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE 
 
 Public Record Office in London, and in particular to Sir William 
 Foster, late Historiographer of the India Office, for valuable 
 assistance. Several English commercial houses with Eastern in- 
 terests have kindly furnished information which could not other- 
 wise have been obtained. In this regard, Mr. Francis W. Parry, 
 Secretary of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Com- 
 pany, has been most considerate in supplying both information and 
 photographs of scenes of the Company’s activities. To my much- 
 tried friend and former teacher. Professor William E. Lingelbach, 
 of the University of Pennsylvania, I am especially grateful for 
 practical counsel and hearty encouragement since this work was 
 first undertaken. I have been fortunate in having the benefit of 
 some very timely suggestions from Professor Charles K. Webster, 
 of the University of Wales. Professor Wilbur C. Abbott, of 
 Harvard University, made some valuable comments on the book 
 in one of its early stages, as did the late Professor Archibald Cary 
 Coolidge, of Harvard. Also I wish to thank President John A. 
 Cousens, of Tufts College, for appreciative and generous co- 
 operation. These kindnesses and others unrecorded have been as 
 oases in the deserts of doubt and difficulty through which one must 
 travel who seeks to explore the past. 
 
 Halford Lancaster Hoskins 
 
 West Somerville, Massachusetts 
 August , 1928 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 1. Beginnings of English Interest in Egypt. . 
 The trend toward the East — English penetration 
 into the Mediterranean — Monopoly of the Cape 
 Route — The political situation in Egypt — James 
 Bruce and plans for a route through Egypt — The 
 Treaty of 1775 — George Baldwin and the Egyptian 
 trade — Turkish attacks on the navigation of the Red 
 Sea — Obstacles to the transit through Egypt — 
 French designs on Egypt — Baldwin’s desire for pre- 
 ferment — Egyptian treachery in 1779 — Decline of 
 the Overland Route. 
 
 II. International Competition for the Overland 
 
 Route 
 
 Austrian interest in Egypt — French activities — 
 Truguet’s Treaty with the Beys, 1775 — English dis- 
 covery of the document — Changes in English Levan- 
 tine policy — Appointment of Baldwin as Consul in 
 Egypt — Revival of the English Overland Route — 
 Turkish chastisement of the Beys — Turkish refusal 
 to regularize the navigation of the Red Sea — Decline 
 of English interest in the Overland Passage — Bald- 
 win’s Treaty of 1794 — Russian projects in Turkey 
 and Egypt — French plans for the occupation of 
 Egypt. 
 
 III. Blows at Britain’s “Feet of Clay” .... 
 The French Revolution and eastern policy — Bona- 
 parte’s preparations for an Egyptian Expedition — 
 Early accomplishments of the Expedition — The 
 Battle of the Nile — French invasion of Syria — - Tem- 
 porary English occupation of Egypt — The rise of 
 Mehemet Ali — English attempts to dominate the 
 eastern Mediterranean — British diplomatic estab- 
 lishments in western Asia — The route through Meso- 
 potamia — The first Persian mission — Napoleon’s 
 designs on Persia: Gardane — Rival missions of 
 Jones and Malcolm — Recovery of British influence. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 IV. Steam and the All-Sea Route to India . . 8o 
 
 The Cape Route — Voyages of the old East Indiamen 
 — Inadequacies of the route — Increasing value of 
 the Indian trade — The early steam vessel — Early 
 plans for steam communication with India — The 
 Calcutta Steam Committee — Projects of Capt. James 
 Henry Johnston — Voyage of the Enterprize — Par- 
 tial failure of the promoters — Effects of the voyage 
 — Schemes of James W. Taylor and Thomas Wag- 
 horn — Practical work of the Bombay Government. 
 
 V. Tentative Trials of the Suez Passage . . . 103 
 Steam plans of the Bombay Government — Obstacles 
 to the development of the Overland Route — Efforts 
 of Governor Malcolm — Early voyages of the Hugh 
 Lindsay — Attitude of the Home Authorities — First 
 English steam lines in the Mediterranean — The 
 project of J. W. Taylor — His untimely death — 
 Further activities of Thomas Waghorn — Plans of 
 the Calcutta Steam Committee — The Forbes — 
 Growth of steam interest in England. 
 
 VI. The Shaping of a British Eastern Policy 128 
 Rise of the Eastern Question — The Greek Revolu- 
 tion — Navarino — Influence of the Russo-Turkish 
 War — ^ Changes in British foreign policy — French 
 motives for an Algerian expedition — Anglo-French 
 diplomatic relations — Effects of the July Revolu- 
 tion — Mehemet Ali — Invasion of Syria — Russian 
 intervention — Capt. F. R. Chesney — Personal sur- 
 vey of the Euphrates River — Reports on its naviga- 
 bility. 
 
 VII. Attempts to Open the Euphrates Route . . 154 
 
 Chesney’s timely reports — The Select Parliamentary 
 Committee of 1834 — Plans for a steam survey of the 
 Euphrates — Money appropriations — Formation of 
 the Euphrates Expedition — Turkish approval — 
 
 Early difficulties of the Expedition — Beginning of 
 the survey — Loss of the Tigris — Failure to ascend 
 the Euphrates — The opening of the Tigris and 
 Karun — Termination of the Expedition — The Par- 
 liamentary Committee of 1 837 — Rise of new political 
 emergencies — Further Mesopotamian surveys under 
 Indian auspices. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 IX 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 VIII. Paving the Way to India 183 
 
 Origin of the Bombay Marine — Early marine sur- 
 veys — The Indian Navy — Later surveys — Socotra 
 — Evolution of a Steam Service — Search for a 
 steam supply base — Case of the Doria Dowlut — ■ 
 Negotiations for the purchase of Aden — Arab du- 
 plicity — The capture of Aden — Its justification. 
 
 IX. Establishment of the Overland Route . . . 208 
 
 Conversion of the Court of Directors — Beginning of 
 regular overland mails, 1835 — Independent efforts 
 of the Calcutta Steam Committee — The East India 
 Steam Navigation Company — Additions to the 
 steam branch of the Indian Navy — Recommenda- 
 tions of the Select Committee of 1837 — 
 plan of Indian communications — Continental mail 
 and passenger routes — New Indian steam units — 
 
 The transit through Egypt — A transit war — Plans 
 for an Egyptian railway — Formal opening of the 
 Overland Route — The beginning of an era. 
 
 X. The Comprehensive Plan of Communication 236 
 Improvements in the overland passage — Revival of 
 the railway idea — The Egyptian Transit Company 
 — The Transit Administration — Rise of the Penin- 
 sular and Oriental Company ■ — Absorption of rival 
 concerns — Early mail contracts — Rise of a “com- 
 prehensive” system — Agitation of the Australian 
 colonies — The Select Committee of 1851 — New 
 routes to the Far East — Improved steam equipment 
 in eastern waters — Reduction of time distances. 
 
 XL Disputed Guardianship of the Routes to 
 
 India 266 
 
 Russia and the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi — Advance 
 of Mehemet Ali in Arabia — French activities in 
 Egypt — Critical state of the Eastern Question — 
 
 British problems in the Middle and Far East — Re- 
 newal of Turco-Egyptian hostilities — European 
 diplomacy — The Convention of July 15, 1840 — 
 
 French threats of war — Attitude of Mehemet Ali 
 — The Turkish firman of deposition — Wisdom of 
 Louis Philippe — Concessions to Mehemet Ali — 
 Renewal of the Concert, June i, 1841 — Criticisms of 
 Palmerston’s policy — The Overland Route during 
 the Syrian crisis. 
 
X 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER page 
 
 XII, Beginnings of the Suez Canal 291 
 
 Ancient canals through Egypt — Bonaparte’s canal 
 survey — Plans of Mehemet Ali — Reasons for Eng- 
 lish official opposition — The Egyptian Railway — 
 
 The survey of 1847 — Robert Stephenson — Acces- 
 sion of Abbas Pasha — Lapse of the canal idea 
 — Building of the Railway — Said Pasha and the 
 appearance of De Lesseps — Opening of the diploma- 
 tic struggle — “Sultan” Stratford — Rival influences 
 at the Porte — Attitude of the French Government 
 — De Lesseps in England — The International 
 Scientific Commission — The first Canal Concession 
 — Imminent defeat of the Canal. 
 
 XIII. The Euphrates Valley Railway 321 
 
 New troubles in the Near East — Alignment of 
 European Powers — Opening of the Crimean War — 
 Defensive preparations of Great Britain — The war 
 with Persia — The idea of a “World’s Highway” 
 railway — R. M. Stephenson — W. P. Andrew — 
 Prospectus of the Euphrates Valley Railway Com- 
 pany — The European and Indian Junction Tele- 
 graph — Attitude of the Foreign Office — French 
 Competition — The Turkish firman — Palmerston’s 
 desertion of the project — Probable cause — Lapse 
 of the Euphrates project. 
 
 XIV. The Building of the Suez Canal 343 
 
 De Lesseps in England — The barrier of political 
 hostility — The impasse at Constantinople — Retire- 
 ment of Lord Stratford — Lack of change at the 
 Porte — Expressions in the House of Commons — 
 Formation of the Suez Canal Company — Com- 
 mencement of work on the Canal — Diplomatic 
 obstacles — The corvee — Ismail Pasha — Suspen- 
 sion of Canal activities — Napoleon III as arbiter — 
 
 The firman — Physical problem of the Canal — 
 Progress of the Work — Completion of the Canal 
 — Elaborate opening ceremonies. 
 
 XV. Telegraphic Routes to the East 373 
 
 Potentialities of the electric telegraph — The first 
 Mediterranean cables — The project for a Mesopo- 
 tamian line — Failures of the Red Sea and India Co. 
 
 - — Obstacles to submarine cable efficiency — The 
 Malta-Alexandria line — A land line to the Persian 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 XI 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 Gulf — The Persian Gulf cable — Opening of the 
 first line to India — The Persian auxiliary line — 
 European telegraphic routes — Land lines in India 
 — Abuses in the overland service — The Select 
 Committee of 1866 — New Mediterranean cables — 
 Completion of an all-British line to India • — The 
 Eastern Group — The comprehensive plan of tele- 
 graphic communication — Improvement of land lines. 
 
 XVL Improvements in Eastern Communications. . 398 
 
 Shortcomings of the Overland Route — Its use during 
 the Crimean War — The Indian Mutiny — Delay in 
 sending reenforcements through Egypt — “Political 
 and other considerations” — Turkish and Egyptian 
 cooperation — The Select Committee of 1858 — The 
 Overland Route as a military highway — Considera- 
 tion of new European routes for eastern mails — The 
 German route — Retention of the Marseilles line — 
 Expansion of the P. & O. Co. — Effects of the Suez 
 Canal — Abandonment of the Overland Route — Im- 
 proved eastern communications — Evolution of the 
 steamship — New competitors of the P. & O. — Ex- 
 tent of Improvements. 
 
 XVII. Revival of Projects for an Alternative 
 
 Route 423 
 
 The commercial opening of Mesopotamia — The 
 Lynch Company — Relations with Ottoman authori- 
 ties — Competition on the Tigris — British interest 
 in Lynch enterprises — New plans for a Euphrates 
 Valley Railway — Influence of the Suez Canal — - The 
 Select Committee of 1870-72 — Weak points in its 
 Report — Decline of Government interest — Russia 
 and the frontiers of India — The Russo-Turkish War 
 — The Congress of Berlin — The Cyprus Convention 
 — Government explanations — Cyprus as a point de 
 depart and place d' armes — Private projects for a 
 Euphrates Valley line — Construction of short lines 
 in Asiatic Turkey — Beginnings of the Bagdadbahn 
 — Tardy changes in British policy. 
 
 XVIII. The Canal and the Control of Egypt . . . 453 
 
 Financial problems and policies of the Canal Com- 
 pany — The tolls issue — The International Commis- 
 sion — Proposed sale of the Khedive’s Canal shares 
 — English diplomacy — Consummation of the pur- 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 xii 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 chase — European attitude — Disraeli’s justification 
 of the act — The Canal as a commercial highway — 
 
 Effect on shipping — Necessity for frequent enlarge- 
 ment — The Royal Titles Act — Financial predicament 
 of the Khedive — Dual Control — British conquest 
 of Egypt — The Sudan — Internationalizing of the 
 Canal — English responsibilities in Egypt. 
 
 Index 481 
 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
 
 Scenes Illustrating the Overland Route about 1855 
 
 [[From Bradshaw' s Indian Guide~\ Frontispiece 
 
 The S. S. Enterprize, Which Reached India From 
 England in 1826 [After a rare drawing, supplied 
 from the collection of Mr. Francis B. C. Bradlee, of 
 Marblehead, Massachusetts]] Facing page 96 
 
 The Firebrand, First Admiralty Packet Steamer in 
 THE Mediterranean [From an old print in the pos- 
 session of the author] 96 
 
 Steamers Euphrates and Tigris on the Euphrates 
 River in May, 1836 [From Chesney’s Narrative of the 
 Euphrates Expedition~\ 168 
 
 The Roadstead of Suez about 1840 [After an old print] 168 
 
 Map of Lower Egypt, Showing Overland, Railway, 
 
 AND Canal Routes 234 
 
 General Francis R, Chesney [From The Life of the Late 
 
 General F. R. Chesney, by his Wife and Daughter] . . 336 
 
 Bust of Thomas Waghorn at Suez [From a recent 
 photograph, by courtesy of Mr. Maynard Owen 
 
 Williams] 336 
 
 Map Showing Routes of Communication to India about 
 
 1875 396 
 
 The Bentinck at Aden in January, 1844 [From an old 
 print, by courtesy of Messrs. Thos. H. Parker, 28 
 Berkeley Square, London] 426 
 
 The Blosse Lynch at Bagdad about 1877 [From a 
 photograph in the collection of the Euphrates and 
 Tigris Steam Navigation Company] 426 
 
 xiii 
 
BRITISH ROUTES 
 TO INDIA 
 

 i 
 
 i 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 O NE OF the most striking characteristics of early modern 
 times was the rapid and extensive development of Euro- 
 pean overseas trade. This revolution in commerce, mark- 
 ing the emergence of the modern nation-state from the confusion 
 of mediseval times, has had a profound influence on the whole of 
 the modern era. The world of the twentieth century has learned 
 to trace from the commercial movement of the sixteenth the 
 colonizing activities of the seventeenth, the overseas wars of con- 
 quest of the eighteenth, and the industrial revolution and eco- 
 nomic imperialism of the nineteenth century. 
 
 The appetites created by early commercial growth found great- 
 est satisfaction in the wares of the Orient, and thence the trading 
 fleets of the West quickly found their way. From the voyages of 
 circumnavigation of Drake and Cavendish until the beginning 
 of the second quarter of the nineteenth century, the British were 
 accustomed to approach their commercial domain in India by way 
 of the Cape of Good Hope.^ First contacts with India, however, 
 had been established by way of the Mediterranean j and since 
 these early ventures exerted a certain influence on the reestablish- 
 ment of contacts between India and England much later by this 
 channel, it will be worth while briefly to review early activities 
 in the eastern Mediterranean area. 
 
 English traders had made no especial attempt to secure a share 
 of European trade prior to 1 500. The beginning of the sixteenth 
 century found England for the first time in a position to cast her 
 
 ^ H. G. Rawlinson, British Beginnings in Western India, 1579—1657 (Oxford, 
 1920), p. 22, -passim; J. Charles-Roux, L’Isthme et le Canal de Suez (2 vols., Paris, 
 1901), I, 32-46. 
 
2 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 bread upon the waters. The Hundred Years’ War with France 
 had resulted in the loss of English continental possessions where 
 strength and fortune might be dissipated, and the end of the Wars 
 of the Roses had given the country a centralized government 
 under a dynasty which was not averse from innovations. The sea, 
 therefore, began to offer an outlet for surplus wealth and energy, 
 and as the century advanced small and clumsy craft ventured 
 down the coast of Europe and into the Mediterranean, where they 
 caused no little worry to the Spanish, French and Venetians who 
 were already on the scene. 
 
 This Mediterranean trade is interesting, both because of its 
 nature ^ and because it led to the first English diplomatic establish- 
 ments in the Levant. To the eastern shores of the Mediterranean 
 various kinds of oriental goods still found their laborious way 
 by the routes which had been employed to some extent since 
 mediaeval and perhaps since ancient times.* The all-sea route to 
 the sources of these oriental products was known but it was not 
 attempted by English mariners until near the end of the sixteenth 
 century because of the numerous hazards from natural forces and 
 from hostile Hispanic fleets. The appetite created by these tastes 
 of eastern wares led to the beginning of English diplomatic re- 
 lations with the Turkish Empire. In the sixteenth century the 
 favor of the Grand Seignior was courted by the representatives of 
 several nations, not only because the Turkish Empire had not 
 then entered upon a serious decline, but also because it controlled 
 the existing overland trade routes to the Orient. At the outset, 
 French agents, stoutly supported by their government and abetted 
 by the Venetians, succeeded in greatly embarrassing the English 
 Levant Company and in limiting its trading privileges. But the 
 recognition of William Harborne as English Ambassador by the 
 Sultan in 1583 ^ marks the beginning of an important epoch in 
 English relations with the East. Harborne and his immediate suc- 
 cessors, Edward Barton and Henry Lello, had hard shift to up- 
 hold the interests of their countrymen 5 but they succeeded at last 
 in firmly establishing English influence at Constantinople,* and 
 
 ^ The character of the Mediterranean trade is well shown by entries in the 
 Calendar of State Papers, Domestic Series, CLV, and Venetian Series, 1592—1603. 
 See Mordecai Epstein, Early History of the Levant Company (London, 190S), 
 pp. 6, 52. 
 
 ® H. G. Rawlinson, Intercourse betvoeen India and the Western World to the Fall 
 of Rome (2d ed., London, 1926). 
 
 * Harborne was sent out and maintained by the Levant Company, although he 
 was accredited by the Queen’s government. — Epstein, op. cit., pp. 12—13. 
 
 ® Cal. of St. Pap., Venetian, 1592—1603, pp. vii, xliv, and Nos. 131, 191, 501, 
 641, 662; Acts of the Privy Council, 1599-1603, p. 339; Historical Manuscripts 
 Commission Publications, XXXVII, 202. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 3 
 
 except for a few brief estrangements, it was not seriously disturbed 
 until late in the nineteenth century. 
 
 As the sixteenth century drew toward a close, the Mediterra- 
 nean trade no longer sufficed as a source of eastern goods for 
 English markets. Having discovered their ability to compete on 
 even terms with their European contemporaries, the English 
 began to experience an urge to trace eastern products to their 
 sources. Then ensued one series after another of attempts to reach 
 the eastern shores of Asia by routes other than the preempted one 
 around the Cape of Good Hope. One after another of these, the 
 northeast, northwest, and southeast, passages were tried and aban- 
 doned, either because of physical obstructions or over-great dis- 
 tance.® Journeys overland to India from the eastern Mediterra- 
 nean resulted in the gaining of much useful information, but 
 failed to disclose practicable trade routes in the then political state 
 of the countries of western Asia and the means of transportation 
 available.^ The first tentative ventures to the East around the tip 
 of Africa, however, disclosed so much of the decline of Hispanic 
 power and opened up such an amazing source of wealth, that at 
 the close of the century the English largely abandoned the lucra- 
 tive Mediterranean trade for the more dangerous but much more 
 lucrative trade by the all-sea route. The success of this shift in 
 interest was assured by the chartering of the East India Company 
 on December 31, 1600. Thenceforward the Cape route was the 
 English route to the East far excellence, and it remained so until 
 the many changes due to the Industrial Revolution effected a re- 
 turn of lines of communication and trade to the Mediterranean in 
 the nineteenth century. 
 
 English absorption in the all-sea route to India militated against 
 the vigorous maintenance of interests in the Levant, and for the 
 greater part of two centuries Englishmen were content to trade 
 under the Capitulations issued in 1604, which conceded to the 
 English most of the privileges which had been granted to the 
 French in 1 535, that is, the right of trading in all Ottoman ports 
 under their own flag.® During most of this time England did not 
 
 ® The accounts of the pathfinding- voyages of such discoverers as Willoughby 
 and Chancellor, Gilbert, Frobisher and Davis, Hawkins, Drake and Cavendish, are 
 detailed in Samuel Purchas’ Pilgrimes. 
 
 ’’ It would seem, however, that the information gained as a result of the New- 
 bery-Fitch expedition and the journeys of Mildenhall, William Hawkins, Finch, the 
 Shirley brothers, and others was responsible to a large degree for the first voyages 
 made to India around the Cape of Good Hope. See Rawlinson, British Beginnings, 
 pp. 21—51; (Sir) William Foster, Early Travels in India, 1583—1619 (Oxford, 
 1921), Parliamentary Paper, 1834, No. 478, Appendix 8, p. 17; Sir Austen Henry 
 Layard in the Quarterly Review, CII, 363-364. 
 
 ® William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801—1922 (Cam- 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 4 
 
 regularly maintain consular officials in Egypt and in Syria, and 
 such small commercial interests as remained in the ports of the 
 Ottoman Empire were usually left in the hands of Italians.® 
 Meanwhile, the factors of the East India Company at Bombay 
 had found profit in approaching the western shores of Asia from 
 the East. Toward the close of the seventeenth century, English 
 vessels crossed the Arabian Sea, entered the Red Sea, and at Mocha 
 purchased quantities of Arabian coffee on very favorable terms. 
 It was this advance toward Europe from the Orient which first 
 suggested the expediency of establishing connections between 
 England and the southern coasts of Asia by a passage through 
 Egypt. 
 
 In 1698 one Henry Tistew, who had formerly been English 
 Consul at Tripoli in Syria, passed through Egypt and made his way 
 down the Red Sea and thence to Surat with the idea of developing 
 a trade route through Egypt and the Red Sea.^” He was foiled in 
 this principally by the Ottoman ban oir'the navigation of the Red 
 Sea north of the port of Jeddah by all Christian vessels because 
 of the proximity of the Holy Cities of Medina and Mecca. But 
 the trade in coffee between Jeddah, Mocha, and Bombay in Eng- 
 lish and in native vessels flourished, and during at least a part of 
 the eighteenth century it was sufficient to warrant the maintenance 
 by the East India Company of an English resident at Mocha.^“ 
 
 After having become masters of the ocean passage to India, the 
 English had little desire to return to the Mediterranean. The 
 route by way of the Cape of Good Hope served sufficiently well 
 both for the exchanging of messages and the transportation of 
 goods. Moreover, it had the considerable additional advantage 
 after the early years of the seventeenth century of being closed to 
 other Europeans or even to English interlopers.^® What matter, 
 then, if the French held sway in the eastern Mediterranean, as 
 
 bridge, Eng., 1923), p. 2; E. Driault, La Question d'Orient defuis ses Origines jusqu'd 
 la Paix de Sevres (1920) (Sth ed., Paris, 1921) ; E. A. Freeman, The Ottoman Power 
 in Europe (London, 1877) ; A. de la Jonquiere, Histoire de PEmpire Ottotnan 
 (Rev. ed., 2 vols., Paris, 1914), I. 
 
 ® Paul Masson, Histoire du Co 7 nmerce Frangais dans le Levant au Dixseptieme 
 Siecle (Paris, 1896); Frangois Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, PIst/wte de Suez, et 
 PEgypte au XVIII® Siecle (Paris, 1922), pp. 2 ff. 
 
 Despatch from Benoist de Maillet, French consul at Cairo, to the Chamber of 
 Commerce of Marseilles, 10 Mar., 1698; quoted in Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 7. 
 
 Strictly speaking, Christians were forbidden to enter the Red Sea further than 
 the port of Mocha, but the trade to Jeddah was tolerated by the local chiefs. See 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 42, passim. 
 
 F. Charles-Roux, Les Origines de PExpedition d’Egypte (Paris, 1910), p. 29; 
 L'Angleterre, PIsth 7 ne de Suez, et PEgypte, pp. 8 ff. Charles-Roux in this latter 
 work has made an excellent study of the beginnings of French and English relations 
 in the Near East up to the interruption caused by the French expedition in 1798. 
 
 Except, of course, those licensed by the Crown, of which there were altogether 
 too many for the best interests of the old East India Companj^. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 5 
 
 long as the Red Sea remained closed to Christian trade? Prior to \ 
 1770, the only occasions on which English representatives in the 
 Levant displayed noticeable interest in a route to India by way 
 of Suez was at such times as other nations, the Austrians or the 
 French, were suspected of planning to make use of this lined^ ) 
 The old Levant Company meanwhile had so far declined that, as^ 
 far as Egypt was concerned, English trade was practically at a 
 standstill. French interests were increasing in the Near East, 
 those of the English in the countries beyond. 
 
 Shortly after the middle of the eighteenth century began a re- 
 markable series of events which quickly combined to alter per- 
 manently the political and commercial complexion of the region 
 of the eastern Mediterranean. In 1766, Ali Bey, one of the 
 twenty-four Mameluke Beys of Egypt, asserted his supremacy 
 over his fellows, and by dint of assassination and exile established 
 it. He sent the Pasha of Cairo back to Constantinople, refused to 
 pay tribute to the Ottoman Government, established his own coin- 
 age, and assumed the title of Sultan of Egypt. Almost at one 
 stroke, Egypt became, to all intents and purposes, independent. 
 Ali Bey was destined to enjoy his supremacy but a brief time, but 
 his example found imitators. For the next quarter of a cen- 
 tury Egypt remained in successful rebellion, and gave every ap- 
 pearance of having entirely escaped from the suzerainty of the 
 Sultan.^® 
 
 This internal situation in Egypt coincided with a succession of 
 wars between Turkey on the one hand and Russia and Austria on 
 the other, in which the former was seriously worsted. The Euro- 
 pean wars of Turkey, together with the situation in Egypt and in 
 India, gave rise to new and far-reaching ideas in France and Eng- 
 land. The French Government, believing the partition of the 
 Ottoman Empire to be at hand, conceived the idea of securing a 
 share of the spoils and acquiring compensation for the recent loss 
 of territories in India by seizing Egypt at some moment of internal 
 confusion.^® England also was attracted, but differently, by the 
 situation. Having been unable to open a communication through 
 the Red Sea at an earlier date because of the Turkish prohibition, it 
 now appeared a feasible matter to accomplish this purpose by nego- 
 tiation with the Egyptian Beys.^^ 
 
 Two methods were available for undertaking to establish re- 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., pp. 13—15. 
 
 Ibid.y pp. 20—21. 
 
 Charles-Roux traces the expedition of Bonaparte to this persistent idea. 
 
 See his Orlgtnes de V Expedition d'Ugypte, pp. 28 ff. 
 
 State Papers, Turkey, Letters from John Murray, 13 Nov., 1768 to 3 July, 
 1770; cited in Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., pp. 22, 25. 
 
6 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 lations between Europe and India by way of Egypt. One was to 
 approach the Porte, as the sovereign power, for the necessary au- 
 thorization j the other was to take up the matter with the local 
 authorities. The French had generally favored the former policy 
 from the days of Louis XIV. The English, after 1770, pre- 
 ferred the latter, and during the troublous times that followed 
 the coup d'etat of Ali Bey in 1766, they had, for the time being, 
 an open field for diplomacy in Egypt.^® 
 
 Definite projects for the utilization of Egypt for purposes of 
 trade and communication began with the arrival at Alexandria in 
 June, 1768, of James Bruce, lately English Consul at Algiers. 
 On his way to Asia via the Red Sea, he examined Egypt with a 
 critical eye. He was astonished to find that none of his country- 
 men was established in Egypt at the time. To pave the way for 
 English enterprise, Bruce conferred with Ali Bey, talked with the 
 merchants of various European countries, visited upper Egypt and 
 Egyptian Red Sea ports, and finally, in May, 1769, proceeded to 
 Jeddah. Here he found two English merchant vessels from In- 
 dia, the IVLerchant of Bengal^ commanded by Capt. Cuthbert 
 Thornhill, and the Lion, in charge of Captain Thomas Price, of 
 Bombay. Both men were deeply interested in the possibilities of 
 opening up trade with Egypt, because they considered themselves 
 imposed on by the excessive customs duties levied on them at 
 Arabian ports. A plan was therefore concerted between Bruce 
 and Thornhill, whereby the former, returning to Cairo by way of 
 upper Egypt, should attempt to conclude a commercial treaty with 
 the Bey, while the latter, on his next voyage from Bengal, would 
 sail to Suez.^^ 
 
 Before Bruce again reached Cairo, Ali Bey, guided partly by 
 his own commercial instinct and partly by the arguments of a 
 Venetian merchant, Carlo Rosetti, had already opened the port 
 of Suez and had embarked on a career of conquest in Arabia. In 
 this undertaking he was prompted less, perhaps, by a desire to con- 
 trol the Holy Places and the important markets of Mocha and 
 Jeddah than to effect a return of the European trade around the 
 
 See G. Poignant, in Questions Diplo7nattques et Coloniales, 'KXXV, 26^ S.-, 
 British and Foreign State Papers, IV, No. 732; Quart, Rev., XXVI, 444—44.5. 
 
 Charles-Roux insists that the idea of developing a route through Egj-pt was 
 originally and essentially French, because of the character of their activities in Turkey 
 and in Egypt in the sixteenth century. 
 
 This is borne out by the correspondence exchanged between the Government 
 of Bengal and the Pasha of Jeddah in 1773-1774. — Imperial Record Department, 
 Calendar of Persian Correspondence, (Calcutta, 1925), IV, 21, 107, 122, passim. 
 
 James Bruce, Travels . . . to Discover the Source of the Nile, in the Years 
 1768—1773 (5 vols., Edinburgh, 1790), I, 70 ff.; Alexander Murray, Account of 
 the Life attd Writings of James Bruce, of Kinnaird. . . (Edinburgh and London, 
 1808), pp. 61—67, III) 112. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 7 
 
 Cape of Good Hope to its former direct channels. At the same 
 time he despatched a “ very sensible letter ” to the Governor of 
 Bengal, pointing out the manifold advantages of opening a trade 
 to Egypt. This was sufficient encouragement to bring about the 
 formation at Calcutta by Capt. Thornhill and some of his asso- 
 ciates of a small joint stock company for the trade to Egypt, the 
 first dividends to be paid upon the return of the first vessel from 
 Suez.^® While this group were preparing for a voyage to Suez, 
 Warren Hastings, who had just come out to Bengal as Governor- 
 General, despatched a note, with suitable presents, to Ali Bey, 
 expressing appreciation for the invitation to trade, and assuring 
 him that a vessel would be sent to Egypt the next year.^^ 
 
 About the same time it occurred to the Governor-General that 
 the route through the Red Sea and across Egypt might prove con- 
 venient for the transmission of despatches.^® Finding that the 
 Bengal merchants, Capt. Thornhill, and some of his former asso- 
 ciates in the trade to Mocha and Jeddah, Robert Halford and 
 David Killican, were projecting a trading voyage to Suez, Has- 
 tings gave them all encouragement. On November i8, 1773, he 
 wrote the Court of Directors of the East India Company in 
 London, that — 
 
 The President [?'.<?., of the Bengal Presidency] informs 
 the Board that Messrs. Thornhill, Halford, and Killikan, 
 having sometime ago communicated to him the plan of a 
 voyage to Suez, he was induced by the Prospects which the 
 introduction of this new and hitherto untried Channel of 
 Trade afforded him both of improving the General Com- 
 merce of these Provinces and of establishing a new and con- 
 tinual communication of Letters with the Honble. Court in 
 England, to take a concern in it.^® 
 
 British Museum, Additional Manuscripts, 29210, Folios 428, 429, “ Proposals 
 for a commerce to Suez”; cited by Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., p. 33. 
 
 Brit. Mus., Add. Mss., 29210, Fos., 426, /^z6d; cited in Charles-Roux, of. cit., 
 
 P- 34 - 
 
 Cal. of Per. Corres., IV, 21; George Baldwin, “The Communication with 
 India by the Isthmus of Suez, vindicated from the prejudices which have prevailed 
 against it” (1784), in India Office, Factory Records, Egypt and Red Sea, vol. 5. 
 
 George Baldwin, later an official agent in Egypt, claimed credit for being the 
 first to suggest the use of the route through Egypt for despatches. See his Political 
 Recollections relative to Egypt; Containing Observations on Its Government under 
 the Mamelukes, Its Geographical Position; — Its Intrinsic and Extrinsic Resources ; — 
 Its Relative Importance to England and France; and Its Dangers to England in the 
 Possession of France (London, 1801), p. 65, and Col. James Capper, Observations 
 on the Passage to India through Egypt and across the Great Desert (London, 1784), 
 Introduction. 
 
 1 . O., Factory Records, ut supra, Vol. 5; Extract of a Bengal Public Consulta- 
 tion, 18 Nov., 1773. 
 
8 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 This action was approved by the Court, who suggested that the 
 Governor-General place a schooner at the service of the merchants 
 to accompany their trading vessel and to make a survey of the Red 
 Sea, “ that navigation being hitherto unknown.” 
 
 The approval and suggestions of the London authorities was 
 anticipated by the Governor-General, who placed a small vessel, 
 the Culladorey at the service of the merchants, and wished their 
 venture bon voyage before hearing from London. But Fate did 
 not smile on this pioneering expedition. Shortly after the de- 
 parture of the two vessels from Calcutta early in 1774, Hastings 
 was compelled to record in another letter to the home authorities 
 that “ soon after the departure of these vessels, they were over- 
 taken by a Violent Gale of Wind in the Bay, in which the [trading] 
 ship received great damage . . . and the Schooner has not since 
 been heard of.” 
 
 Under a less vigorous Indian administration than that of War- 
 ren Hastings, this might well have ended the whole plan for offi- 
 cially utilizing the Red Sea and the overland passage through 
 Egypt. But while the incident was discouraging, it merely gave 
 him time for maturing his arrangements for subsequent voyages 
 through Egypt. He wrote almost at once to Ali Bey, informing 
 him of the disaster and promising another vessel in another year."® 
 The opening up of the Egyptian route, Hastings wrote to the 
 home authorities, he considered a matter of “ great public utility.” 
 After some vessels had successfully made the voyage to the Red 
 Sea, in 1775 he despatched agents to Cairo to arrange, if possible, 
 for privileges of trade from India and for a regular system of 
 communication through Egypt. The proposed treaty provided 
 for “ a reciprocal and entirely perfect liberty of navigation and 
 commerce between the subjects on each part, through all and every 
 the Dominions and Provinces under their Government in India 
 and Egypt, concerning all and singular kinds of goods. . .” 
 English merchant vessels were to pay anchorage charges in Egyp- 
 tian ports, and goods brought in for sale were to pay customs 
 duties of 6^% to 8%, but only after such goods were sold. Cairo 
 was appointed as the Egyptian market."® This treaty, providing 
 
 I. O. Records, ttt supra; Extract of a General Letter from Bengal, 15 March, 
 1774. Cal. of Per. Corres., IV, 155. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, “ Treaty of Navigation and Commerce be- 
 tween the Most Serene and Mahometan Bey of Upper and Lower Egy^pt, and the 
 Honble. Warren Hastings, Esqr., President and Governor for Affairs of the British 
 Nation in Bengal . . . concluded at Cairo the 7th day of March, 1775.” See Le 
 Baron 1 . de Testa, Recueil des Trahes de la Porte Ottomane, assec les Puissances 
 etrangeres depuis le premier traite conclu en 1536 . . . jusqtPd nos jours (6 vols., 
 Paris, 1864), I, 482; J. Charles-Roux, Ulsthme et le Canal de Suez (2 vols., Paris, 
 1901), I, Annexe 4. 
 
9 
 
 ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 greater sureties than previous irregular concessions, laid the basis 
 for an extensive English trade in the months to come, regardless 
 of the fact that without ratification by the Porte on the one hand 
 and the British Government on the other the treaty could not be 
 considered as binding. 
 
 Meanwhile, political conditions in Egypt and the Hedjaz had 
 changed. The Arabs had driven the Egyptian garrisons out of 
 Mecca and Jeddah, and had restored Ottoman authority. In 
 Egypt itself Ali Bey had been overthrown by one of his lieutenants 
 and had fled to Syria. The accession of the new Bey, Mohammed 
 Abou Dahab, had disrupted the trade which was beginning to reach 
 Egypt by way of the Red Sea. At this point, in January, i 773 j 
 J ames Bruce again reached Cairo, having experienced difficulties 
 and dangers of all kinds during his return from Jeddah.^” He 
 was able, however, to ingratiate himself with the new despot, and 
 to take up with him the matter of a definite arrangement under 
 which English trade might continue, and to effect an agreement 
 under which English goods should pay 8 % customs duties instead 
 of the 14% usually levied at Jeddah. The substance of this ac- 
 cord Bruce immediately communicated to Captains Thornhill and 
 Price, whom he had met at Jeddah in 1769, and enclosed a copy 
 of a firman issued by Mohammed Abou Dahab guaranteeing pro- 
 tection to English merchants. Other copies were sent to the Gov- 
 ernors of Bengal and Bombay. Having thus succeeded, to all ap- 
 , pearances, in his favorite project, Bruce left the further conduct 
 of affairs in the hands of the Venetian Consul, and proceeded 
 homeward to enlist the interest of the English Government in the 
 new trade. 
 
 Bruce was less successful in England than he had been in Egypt. 
 There he found Lord North’s Government not only altogether 
 unappreciative of his patriotic endeavors, but openly hostile. The 
 commerce with Egypt by way of Suez, it was maintained, would 
 result in positive disadvantage to the East India Company by 
 carrying the trade of India out of the bounds of the Company’s 
 monopoly. But in addition to this, the trade would be dangerous, 
 it was contended, because of the hostility of the Ottoman Porte to 
 it.®’ Deeply wounded at the lack of appreciation in England for 
 his unselfish and hazardous endeavors, Bruce retired from the 
 scene, unaware of the real influence of his work. 
 
 The response in India to the privileges he had been instru- 
 
 Bruce, of. cit., IV, 718; J. Charles-Roux, of. dt., I, 94-95; Murray, of. dt., 
 pp. 229-230. 
 
 Bruce, of. dt., IV, 730-731. 
 
10 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 mental in securing was immediate. Merchant vessels laden in 
 Indian ports, as if confident of the favorable result of the treaty 
 drawn up by the Governor-General, made their appearance in the 
 Red Sea almost as soon as the agreement was completed, and were 
 soon unloading at Suez. Packets and despatches, brought on 
 nearly every vessel, were promptly transported from Suez to 
 Cairo and thence to Alexandria by special messengers. They 
 reached Europe in some of the many vessels annually attracted to 
 Alexandria, and reached England by a route leading from Trieste 
 to the Channel ports. At first the new plan of communication, 
 based on a coordination of trade and messenger service, gave great 
 promise. During each of the three or four years following the 
 Treaty of 1775, sailing vessels frequently arrived at Alexandria 
 from England and at Suez from India at the same time.^^ The 
 only difficulties in the way of these activities appeared to be the 
 seasonable adverse winds of the Indian Ocean, the dangerous, un- 
 charted shores of the Red Sea, and the great desert between Suez 
 and Cairo. The political sky was serene. The strict injunction 
 issued by the Porte in 1775 in contravention of this Christian in- 
 vasion of the Red Sea, if known in India, was ignored while rela- 
 tions with the Beys remained good, and there is good reason to 
 believe that the British Ambassador at the Porte, John Murray, 
 had even neglected to apprise his Government of such Turkish 
 protests.®^ 
 
 It remained for George Baldwin, merchant and adventurer, to 
 reap where his fellow countryman, Bruce, had sown.®® This en- 
 terprising individual had been engaged in mercantile operations 
 in the Levant since 1760 and had become acquainted with the re- 
 markable resources of Egypt and with the peculiar advantages to 
 be derived from a well-conducted line of communications through 
 that country. Finding that there was not in Egypt at this period 
 either an official or unofficial agent to care for English interests, 
 Baldwin determined to assume charge of such matters himself, and 
 during a brief visit to England he was able to secure official sanc- 
 tion of his plans.®® He first secured recognition from the Levant 
 Company, whose monopoly in the Near East still survived under 
 the paternal care of the British Government. Learning of this, 
 the Directors of the East India Company authorized him to act 
 as their agent for communications as well, agreeing to pay ex- 
 
 Archives Affaires Etrang-eres, correspondence consulaire, cited in F. Charles- 
 Roux, L'Angleterre, etc., p. 52. 
 
 Baldwin, of. cit., p. 6; J. Charles-Roux, of. ck., I, 100— loi, 418. 
 
 F. Charles-Roux, of. ck., pp. 51-52. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 52-54. 
 
 Baldwin, of. ck.. Preface. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 II 
 
 penses, a small salary, and a bonus on each packet of correspond- 
 ence safely expedited through Egypt. This commission Baldwin 
 gladly accepted, and entered upon his new duties late in the sum- 
 mer of 1775.^^ 
 
 The next two years were devoted quite largely to the problem 
 of coordinating the sending of despatches from London and from 
 the three Indian presidencies. A voyage from India to Suez was 
 an exceedingly expensive, not to say hazardous, undertaking, and 
 to realize the greatest degree of efficiency, a vessel bringing out 
 despatches from India also had to carry papers of importance on 
 the return journey. The working out of the scheme was greatly 
 complicated by the fact that a safe and speedy voyage could be 
 projected in either direction during only a few weeks of the year. 
 Baldwin devoted much attention to matters of navigation in Ind- 
 ian seas and in the Mediterranean, and presently drew up a plan 
 which seemed to offer most practical results. Allowing about 
 twenty-five days for the sending of packets from Cairo to Eng- 
 land, it was found that a speedy vessel arriving from India at the 
 beginning of the open season might safely await replies from Lon- 
 don before leaving Suez on the return j ourney. This arrangement 
 proved to be so effective that by the year 1777 the India authorities 
 both in England and in India were relying on this route for their 
 most important communications, and a packet marked “ received 
 overland ” was a signal for instant attention.®* 
 
 The new scheme was no sooner inaugurated than it was seriously 
 threatened. Although the treaty between the Government of 
 India and the Beys of Egypt was, strictly speaking, no violation 
 of the Turkish Capitulations under which Englishmen had traded 
 to the Levant for many generations, the Ottoman Porte looked 
 with undisguised hostility on the trade to Suez, the benefits of 
 which would redound to the semi-independent Beys rather than 
 to the Porte and would tend to increase the Turkish administra- 
 tive problems in Egypt.®® Baldwin, assuming himself the credit 
 for the opening of the traffic with Egypt, explained it thus: 
 
 The Turk, who had hitherto been silent, began to com- 
 plain j the Daganier, or custom-master, wanted a participation 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, Vol. 5, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, East India Correspondence. The “ overland ” 
 route had not at this time any particular reference to the use of any line from England 
 across the continent to the Mediterranean as it had during part of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, although communications were frequently carried from Channel ports to Trieste 
 or Marseilles, and vice versa. 
 
 Ibid,., “ Translation of a Representation from the Ottoman Porte to His 
 Britannick Majesty’s Ambassador. Received May 5, 1777 and Correspondence of 
 the East India House. 
 
12 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 in the customs 5 the sheriff of Mecca began to complain that 
 the port of Gedda would be abandoned, and the cause of re- 
 ligion sustain an injury in its effects 5 the Directors of the East 
 India Company complained that their trade would suffer j the 
 Turkey Company cried out that they would be ruinedd® 
 
 The Court of Directors of the East India Company had been 
 pleased at first at the prospect of a new line of communication, 
 but they soon discovered that this would prove to be a very ex- 
 pensive matter unless developed in connection with the commer- 
 cial opening of the Red Sea. Merchant vessels could carry mes- 
 sengers and packets to or from India as well as the Company’s 
 cruisers, and at no additional expense, while every voyage of an 
 armed vessel with despatches alone cost the Company several 
 thousand pounds sterling. But just as Hastings’ treaty of 1775 
 succeeded in opening the way to Suez, the Company’s Directors 
 came to the conclusion that the Indo-Egyptian trade, far from be- 
 ing desirable, might easily become an unmixed evil. It occurred 
 to the Directors that eastern goods ostensibly destined for con- 
 sumption in Egypt might readily follow the new line of com- 
 munications and find their way, possibly in the ships of the Levant 
 Company, to European markets, and thus seriously compete with 
 cargoes brought’ around by way of the Cape of Good Hope. So 
 it was reluctantly decided that in the long run it would be better to 
 forego the advantages of a regular line of communications via the 
 Red Sea, if necessary, for the purpose of ending the Egyptian 
 trade. They were, in consequence, quite willing to see the point 
 of the Turkish Government when presently it was brought forci- 
 bly to their attention.'*^ 
 
 At the close of 1775, Ambassador John Murray, a strong pro- 
 tagonist of the Egyptian trade and the route through Egypt, left 
 Constantinople to return to London. He did not live to com- 
 plete his journey 5 and his death at Venice prevented his making 
 known to the English Government the antipathy with which the 
 trade to Egypt was viewed by the Turks.*" Before the arrival of 
 
 Baldwin, of cit., p. 7. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
 Inasmuch as Murray had never despatched to London the prohibitory injunc- 
 tion issued by the Ottoman authorities some months earlier, and since the original of 
 that document was not found in the British Embassy at Constantinople, it is supposed 
 that he was bearing the document with him and that it was lost at the time of his 
 death. — State Papers, Turkey, Vol. 53, reports from Sir Robert Ainslie, 14 March, 
 5 May, and 17 June, 1777; cited in Charles-Roux, of. ch., p. 52. I have relied on 
 Charles-Roux’s thorough study of the State Papers and their continuation in the For- 
 eign Office Turkey Papers. My own original investigations of these activities have 
 been made largely in the Factory Records of the India Office, most of which were 
 unnumbered when I had access to them. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 13 
 
 his successor at Constantinople, the English charge d^ajfaires^ 
 Hayes, was compelled to report to his Government, while uphold- 
 ing English rights under the Capitulations, that the Turks were in- 
 sistent on the ending of the Suez trade. This report was the first 
 intimation received by the London authorities of the feeling at 
 Constantinople on the Indo-Egyptian trade. The Turkish re- 
 quest was immediately acceded to, and positive orders were sent 
 to India to restrain vessels bound for Suez. These instructions did 
 not arrive in time to prevent various sailings during 1776, but 
 these were in no way molested, in spite of the fact that the Porte 
 had repeatedly enjoined the Pasha of Cairo from permitting more 
 cargoes and passengers from landing.*® 
 
 Baldwin meanwhile had done all in his power to promote both 
 the trade and the communications. He had addressed notes on 
 the manifold advantages of Egypt to the Indian Government,** 
 and he had begun to contemplate the improvement in his own posi- 
 tion which would result from his being appointed British Consul 
 in Egypt. But his protests and arguments against Turkish attitude 
 and the East India Company’s commercial policy were of little 
 avail as compared with a series of incidents occurring in the Red 
 Sea area at the height of the trade. Contrary to the impression 
 Baldwin had been careful to give in all of his communications, 
 political conditions in Egypt were never long stable. The year 
 1776 produced new proofs of this. During the course of the 
 year, Mohammed Abou Dahab died while on a campaign in Syria. 
 In the ensuing struggle among the Beys for supremacy, the power 
 of government was seized by three rival chiefs. In effect, the 
 security which had marked the two previous regimes vanished and 
 confusion everywhere prevailed.*® 
 
 Upon the arrival of a new British Ambassador, Sir Robert 
 Ainslie, at the Porte, he was immediately confronted with serious 
 issues. He was particularly tried by the arrival at Suez almost 
 simultaneously of five English merchant vessels, four from Ben- 
 gal and one from Bombay. Being reproached by these arrivals, 
 Ainslie tried dissimulation and feigned to believe that these 
 could not be English vessels, but that they were perhaps inter- 
 • lopers — doubtless Turkish subjects. His evasions were with- 
 out effect. He was presently confronted with definite evidence 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 52, Hayes to the Foreign Office, 3 Jan., and 3 June, 1776. 
 The Porte was never long unaware of English activities in Egy^pt, as the French were 
 diligent in reporting every detail. 
 
 “ View of the advantages and the possibility of pursuing, by the navigation of 
 the Red Sea to Suez, a commerce between India and Egypt” (22 March, 1776). — 
 Rrit. Mus., Add. Mss., 29210, Fos. 422—424. Cited by Charles-Roux, p. 56. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 57. 
 
H 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES. TO INDIA 
 
 concerning the ownership of the vessels, and at the same time 
 was given a new and categorical note to be transmitted to his 
 Government, demanding the cessation of all Christian navigation 
 of the Red Sea above Jeddah. The note repeated that the Red 
 Sea adjacent to the holy cities of Mecca and Medina was held 
 sacred and might not be profaned by commercial activities, that 
 the trade was contrary to usage, and, in a word, that all this was 
 likely to endanger the good relations which had long existed be- 
 tween the English and Ottoman Governments.^® 
 
 The situation was complicated by the fact that the Beys of 
 Egypt, making the most of what might prove to be a short period 
 of power, levied duties of 20% on the goods landed, and the 
 Turkish Government took peculiar delight in placing an addi- 
 tional heavy duty on such of the goods as w^ere forwarded from 
 Egypt. At this, Baldwin and the injured merchants loudly 
 affirmed the right of trade under the treaty arrangement of 1775, 
 and demanded compensation from the Porte for the recent out- 
 rages. In such a dilemma, Ainslie took a sympathetic attitude 
 toward the Turks on the principle involved, partly because of per- 
 sonal dislike to Baldwin, whom he suspected of advancing his own 
 interests at the expense of the Crown and the East India Com- 
 pany, and partly because of his belief that he understood the senti- 
 ment both of the Home Government and the two trading com- 
 panies concerned. His reports to the Foreign Office w^ere so 
 alarming that the East India Company was easily prevailed upon 
 to supplement the orders already sent out to India by more drastic 
 i ones still. On July 4, 1777, the Court of Directors issued a posi- 
 j tive prohibition to any British or Company’s vessel to trade to any 
 / Red Sea ports except Jeddah and Mocha. Copies of this order 
 I were at once sent to the Governor-General in Bengal and to Bald- 
 win at Cairo, with instructions to publish them immediately.'*® 
 
 Only on July 1 1 did Ainslie receive the instructions from home 
 he had awaited for several months. These informed him of the 
 steps which had been taken to terminate the Red Sea navigation, 
 but requested him to arrange, if possible, for the safety of such 
 vessels as might arrive at Suez before the publication of the notices 
 in the Indian Presidencies. A further and much more significant 
 request was also included. Ainslie was authorized to ask that the 
 East India Company be permitted to send despatches by way of 
 Suez on condition that the packet boats carry no merchandise. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, East India Correspondence. 
 
 Ainslie was very fearful lest the Turks retaliate by limiting' the trading 
 privileges of the Levant Company. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 15 
 
 Before the Turkish Government returned a formal reply to 
 these requests, a partial answer had been given by the outcome of 
 what served as a test case. In January, 1777, a sloop-of-war, the 
 Swallow, Capt. Panton, arrived at Suez, having been sent on spe- 
 cial mission by the Governor-General, Warren Hastings, with 
 despatches of unusual gravity. At the request of Baldwin, the 
 de facto Pasha of Cairo, Ibrahim Bey, consented to permit the 
 landing of three special messengers with their effects. Upon 
 their arrival at Cairo, the Pasha, wishing to curry favor with 
 the Porte, violated the safe conduct he had given and had the 
 baggage of the messengers searched. After much difficulty the 
 three men managed to secure their release and to proceed to 
 Alexandria, where they were a second time arrested and 
 their baggage was rifled. Finally the three were allowed to 
 depart for Europe, but without some of their more important 
 despatches.^® 
 
 Baldwin complained bitterly to Ainslie concerning this incident 
 and begged him to secure from the Porte a commandement which 
 would prevent the repetition of such an outrage. And at the same 
 time he sought to convince the Ambassador, and through him the 
 Porte, that the Suez route was essential to Turkish welfare, if not 
 to that of the East India Company.^® Although Ainslie was much 
 less favorably disposed toward the Suez route of trade and com- 
 munications than his predecessor Murray, he felt it his duty to 
 maintain English prestige, even in Egypt. He therefore made 
 representations to the Ottoman Government as to the treatment 
 accorded the three official messengers brought out on the Swallow, 
 and craved the indulgence of the Porte for such vessels as might 
 arrive at Suez before the notice of the termination of Red Sea 
 navigation had been published in India, but he was unable to secure 
 any satisfaction in return. In replying to Baldwin, therefore, he 
 could only reiterate the prohibition of the Ottoman Government 
 of the navigation of the Red Sea above Jeddah.®’' 
 
 Late in the summer of 1777, Baldwin received a packet of de- 
 spatches from the Directors of the East India Company with in- 
 structions to have them carried to India by the sloop Swallow. 
 This vessel, however, having remained in the Suez roadstead for 
 a considerable time, had already sailed on her return voyage. As 
 the London despatches were described as being of the greatest im- 
 portance, Baldwin, anxious to prove the utility of the Suez route, 
 considered himself justified in hiring a native vessel to carry them 
 
 Eyles Irwin, A Series of A ^ventures in the Course of a Voyage uf the Red Sea 
 (Dublin, 1780), pp. 554 ff. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 53, Baldwin to Sir R. Ainslie, 22 Jan., 1777. 
 
 Ibid. 
 
i6 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 to India before the commencement of the southwest monsoon.®^ 
 It is true that his zeal for the Red Sea route may have been 
 stimulated on this occasion by commissions he had received from 
 England to forward private messages. But when it came to the 
 ears of the Directors that a despatch vessel had been chartered at 
 their expense, and had carried private mails as well, their indigna- 
 tion knew no bounds. Baldwin was accused of having violated 
 the confidence of his employers. They would not pay the “ ex- 
 travagant sum ” of £4500 for the chartered vessel, and insisted 
 that all expenses of the voyage must be paid by those who had sent 
 the private despatches. For some time it appeared probable that 
 Baldwin’s position as agent would be vacated. It was at last con- 
 firmed, but with plenty of admonition as to his future con- 
 duct.®^ This incident, coming at a time when the Red Sea passage 
 was acquiring a certain notoriety, conspired to discredit it further 
 in the eyes of the British Cabinet. 
 
 The Turkish Government had more reason for attempting to 
 stop the use of the Red Sea by “ Frank ” vessels than religious 
 prejudice or the wish to deprive the rebellious Beys of Egypt of a 
 source of income. It was feared that the commercial opening of 
 the Red Sea might wean away from the old trade route, which 
 utilized the Persian Gulf and Mesopotamia, such commerce as 
 still reached Levantine ports. It was chiefly by this route that 
 Constantinople itself was supplied with eastern goods. But more 
 than that, Turkish suspicions of English motives in developing a 
 route through Egypt caused no little anxiety. The sight of Eng- 
 lish and Indian official messengers hastening through Egypt with 
 secret despatches, the frequent arrival at Suez of vessels of war, 
 the indiscreet remarks of George Baldwin, the curiosity of English 
 explorers in Egypt (who knew that they were not spies? ), all con- 
 spired to breed a feeling of alarm. This was augmented not a 
 little by the similar suspicions of the French, who easily persuaded 
 themselves that British designs included the actual conquest of 
 Egypt at the first favorable moment.®® The fact that these sus- 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5 ; Letter from the East India House to Georg-e 
 Baldwin, 1 Apr., 1777. Baldwin had been instructed to send the despatches back to 
 Malta if the Swalloiv had sailed. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut su-pra, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
 From the time of Bruce, Englishmen whose purposes were not evident fre- 
 quently crossed Egypt. Many of them, instead of crossing the desert from Cairo to 
 Suez, chose to follow the Nile into Upper Egypt and to take ship from Cosseir or Tor. 
 In this way they avoided a very unpleasant desert trip and at the same time, if they 
 were not in haste, they gained a view of the monuments of ancient Egypt. Both 
 the Turks and the Egyptians completely failed to understand these tourists and sus- 
 pected them of having overt intentions. 
 
 Arch. Aff. Etrang., De Trouy (French Vice-Consul at Cairo) to his Govern- 
 
1 ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 17 
 
 picions were without foundation did not lessen the attempts made 
 to exclude the English from Egypt altogether.®® 
 
 French and English objectives in the eastern Mediterranean 
 were far from being the same, although each suspected the other 
 of having identical designs. The official correspondence of the 
 time does not indicate that either the British Government, the 
 Levant Company, or the East India Company had the slightest 
 thought of undertaking the conquest of Egypt, however simple 
 an undertaking that might prove to be. At the same time, 
 both Ainslie and Baldwin believed that they had good evidence 
 of French plans for securing for themselves the right of navi- 
 gating the Red Sea and unloading cargoes in Egypt, which was 
 in fact equally unfounded. What these diplomatic agents failed 
 to uncover were the real designs of France, which looked toward 
 the French conquest of Egypt as a means of competing with Brit- 
 ain on more nearly equal terms in India and elsewhere in the East. 
 Thus, Ainslie reported to his home government in September, 
 1777, that a certain Baron de Tott, Inspector General of the 
 French commercial ports in the Levant, was visiting Cairo in the 
 hope of signing a commercial treaty with the Beys.®^ De Tott’s 
 mission, however, was much more sinister : it was nothing less than 
 to study and report on the means of effecting a French conquest 
 of Egypt, of opening a French route to India through Egypt, and 
 even of reopening the ancient canal between the Nile and the Red 
 Sea for that purpose.®® It was only incidental that the French 
 did infrequently make use of the Suez route for much the same 
 purpose as the English East India Company, in transmitting im- 
 portant despatches or in sending out reinforcements of officers 
 to India.®® 
 
 In pursuance of instructions from England and at the insistence 
 of Baldwin, Ainslie presented to the Porte in August, 1777, a note 
 asking that English vessels coming to Suez in ignorance of in- 
 structions forbidding the traffic be permitted to land their cargoes, 
 and that the use of the Suez route for the transmission of de- 
 spatches be authorized. No reply was received to this communica- 
 tion. Conferences with Turkish Ministers also were without 
 avail. Finally, in November, he received a very unsatisfactory 
 
 ment, 8 June, 1777; and Mure (French Consul General at Alexandria), 17 June, 
 1777; cited by Charles-Roux, of. cit., pp. 87—89. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 53, Ainslie, 17 Sept., 1777. 
 
 Baron de Tott, Memoires sur les Turcs et les Tartares (Paris, 1784), IV, 72; 
 cited by Charles-Roux, p. 94. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., pp. 94-95. 
 
i8 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 reply. On the question of English vessels coming h Suez on 
 any errand whatsoever, the Turks were adamant: Jeddah was to 
 be the limit of navigation. Messages might be forwarded in 
 native boats from Jeddah to Cairo, whence English agents could 
 take charge of them. It was only later still, after Ainslie had 
 spoken of the possibility of English vessels bombarding Suez, 
 that he was able to secure an extension of the Egyptian trade to 
 the end of the summer of 1778.®“ 
 
 The English trade with Egypt meanwhile showed no signs of 
 diminution. In the spring of 1778 thirteen vessels arrived at 
 Suez flying the British flag. Being angrily confronted with this 
 by the Reis Effendi, Ainslie felt it wise to disavow a part of the 
 report: he insisted therefore that only eight vessels had arrived 
 flying the English flag, and that these were operated by an inter- 
 national group of Irresponsible adventurers.®^ 
 
 This scarcely lessened the wrath of the Turks, and as hostilities 
 were on the point of breaking out between England and France, 
 Ainslie was hard put to it to save the right of the transmission of 
 British despatches through Egypt in such an emergency. He 
 promised that such an event would never occur again, but relations 
 with the Porte remained bad, and no support was offered by Lord 
 Weymouth at the Foreign Office.®^ 
 
 In the meantime, the Suez or “ overland ” route had been put 
 to very practical use. In April, 1778, Ainslie apprised Baldwin 
 of the alliance of France with the revolted American colonies, 
 and asked that the news be sent to India as quickly as possible. 
 Baldwin welcomed the opportunity to prove one of his conten- 
 tions, and sent word to all of the presidencies with such effect 
 that the capture of Pondicherry was effected at an early date and 
 French activities in India paralyzed. One of these despatches 
 had consumed but 68 days from London to Aladras.®® The 
 Turkish Government, however, showed as much aversion from 
 the arrival at Suez of naval vessels in the capacity of packets as 
 from English mercantile sailings. Ainslie was thus reduced to the 
 necessity of feigning to believe that the reports of English sailings 
 were all wrong: he would investigate. But a new difficulty was 
 
 I. O. Records, la sufra, Vol. 5, No. 221, “ Translation of the Ottoman Porte’s 
 Answer to His Excellency’s Memorial, dated the 26th August, 1777 ”5 S. P., Turkey, 
 vol. 53, Ainslie, 18 Nov., 3 and 17 Dec., 1777. 
 
 Ibid., Vol. 54, Report by Ainslie, 3 Aug., 1778. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5, No. 243. 
 
 Baldwin, of. cit., pp. 7, 22. “I had the satisfaction,” Baldwdn states, “ to con- 
 vey the first advices of the war in 1778 to the East Indies; by means of which they 
 were enabled, to the astonishment of all England, when the news arrived, to expel the 
 French from India before succours could reach them, and add their possessions to our 
 own.” 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 19 
 
 suddenly added to the others: George Baldwin arrived at Con- 
 stantinople. 
 
 For a considerable time Baldwin had been obsessed with the 
 idea that since he was performing all the functions of a consul, 
 that title should be conferred upon him. The consular office once 
 maintained in Egypt by the English Government had terminated 
 when the English trade had deserted that country for other 
 regions. Since that time, under the authorization of the British 
 Embassy at Constantinople, English mercantile interests in Egypt 
 were in the hands of the chief custom house officer at Cairo, a 
 native. Since it was the function of the Levant Company to set 
 up consular establishments in the region covered by its monopoly, 
 Baldwin had applied to it first in 1776 for the reestablishment 
 of the office at Cairo. The Company refused to take such action 
 in view of the political situation in that country.®^ Baldwin there- 
 upon approached Ainslie, asking that the functions exercised by 
 the customs officer be conferred upon him. This Ainslie professed 
 not to have within his power. Baldwin still did not despair. At 
 the end of 1777, he reopened the issue, maintaining that he could 
 not discharge his functions as English agent under the circum- 
 stances. On this occasion, as before, he made little headway. 
 The Levant Company was little interested in Egypt, and Ainslie 
 would not act without instructions from the Levant Company. 
 Baldwin was, however, granted the right of acting as consul with- 
 out possessing the title.®® It was to secure documentary confirma- 
 tion of his title and the right of English vessels to trade with 
 Egypt through the Red Sea that he went to Constantinople at 
 the end of 1778. 
 
 Baldwin’s visit bore little fruit. His attempts to bribe Ainslie 
 into acquiescence with his plans added to the suspicion with which 
 he was already regarded by the incorruptible Ambassador. He 
 was able to secure some documentary confirmation of the power 
 and position he claimed in Egypt — a commandement making him 
 protector of all English interests in Egypt, a letter naming him 
 vakeel^ or lieutenant, of the Ambassador with all the rights and 
 emoluments of consul, and another letter practically deposing the 
 chief customer at Cairo from his pretended position.®® Baldwin 
 made much less headway in attempting to convert Ainslie to the 
 right and need of the Red Sea traffic. The Ambassador, whose 
 understanding of the situation existing in various parts of the 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Correspondence of the East India House. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., pp. 103-111. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 54, Ainslie, 17 Dec., 1778; Vol. 55, 4 and 24 Jan., 25 and 
 26 Feb., 1779. 
 
 1 
 
 5 
 
20 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Ottoman Empire was by no means profound, refused to alter his 
 attitude of agreement with Turkish prohibitions of the Suez trade, 
 and Baldwin was warned that such injunctions must be enforced. 
 
 The Porte again took occasion, before Baldwin’s departure for 
 Egypt, to issue to Ainslie another interdict in the form of a 
 hatticherif bearing on the navigation of the Red Sea by Christian 
 vessels.®^ In return, Ainslie presented an additional memoir to 
 the Porte, asking for the admission to the waters of Suez of any 
 Government or East India Company’s vessel bearing despatches 
 but no merchantable wares. This was returned to him with the 
 statement that the prohibition which had frequently been issued 
 was final and was not a subject to be argued} the transit of de- 
 spatches through Egypt was inadmissible except under the con- 
 ditions already proposed. Ainslie felt obliged to indicate his 
 acceptance of this fiat, first because he was orally given to under- 
 stand that the transit of despatches in the usual manner would 
 be tolerated until the end of the following summer, and in the 
 second place, he was doubtful of receiving support from Baldwin 
 on the basis of such concessions as he might obtain by further 
 insistence. With renewed instructions as to the necessity of 
 observing these arrangements, and with power to appoint agents 
 in Egypt to assist in enforcing the regulations, Baldwin returned 
 to Egypt, outwardly obedient, but secretly unrepentant. He still 
 believed in the Suez trade. 
 
 Even during the return voyage to Egypt from Constantinople, 
 Baldwin evolved a scheme for carrying out his favorite idea. It 
 occurred to him that some Indian merchandise might safely be 
 unloaded at Suez along with Indian despatches, in case the agent 
 at Cairo, that is, himself, assumed responsibility for the payment 
 of a Turkish duty on such goods, and strictly prevented the em- 
 barkation at Suez of any goods bound for India. This, he be- 
 lieved, would be to the advantage of every one. He was inclined 
 to attach little weight to Ainslie’s instructions to carry out the 
 recent injunctions carefully in order to give the Turks no ground 
 for making concessions to the French.®* 
 
 The Ottoman authorities, however, soon put themselves at 
 fault. In August, 1779, two English packets arrived at Suez, and 
 two official messengers. Captain Scott and Lieutenant Mills, with 
 their despatches, were landed. These were suffered to pass 
 through Egypt to Alexandria, but there they were arrested and 
 held. Baldwin instantly sent to Constantinople to obtain redress. 
 
 Translations of this document are to be found in De Testa, of. at., J. Charles- 
 Roux, of. cit., and Baldwin, Political Recollections. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 55, Letter from the Foreign OfBce, 10 March, 1779. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 21 
 
 which in time was forthcoming, although he was severely censured 
 for having permitted articles of trade to be landed under cover of 
 the transit of despatches. On his part, Ainslie proposed to the 
 Turkish Government that only armed vessels of the East India 
 Company be permitted to bring despatches to Suez, and that these 
 be empowered to seize vessels trading in those parts. The 
 Turkish reply was a repetition of former refusals to tolerate 
 either trade or communication in Christian vessels. At that point 
 the matter rested, Ainslie consoling himself with the belief that 
 if English vessels might no longer reach Suez safely, at any rate 
 French plans for developing a route through Egypt had been 
 forestalled.®® 
 
 As a kind of substitute for the Red Sea route, Ainslie sug- 
 gested to the Foreign Office the use of another short cut to India 
 for the sending of despatches — one which was destined to be 
 highly celebrated in the next century as the “ alternative route.” 
 To prove the merits of this line, he was able to secure Turkish 
 consent for the despatch of two English officers and some official 
 papers from Aleppo through Mesopotamia to Basrah and thence 
 to Bombay. This route, he suggested, might be found preferable 
 in many respects to that through Egypt.'® It did not develop, 
 however. In subsequent years it was employed on occasions, not- 
 ably during the French occupation of Egypt from 1798 to 1801. 
 But the natural difficulties of this route, coupled with the dangers 
 from nomadic Arabs, who had little regard for a Turkish safe 
 conduct, prevented it from being much employed or even con- 
 sidered as a regular route of communication during these years. 
 
 By the opening of the year 1779, it was becoming apparent that 
 the Suez route would soon, to all intents and purposes, be closed. 
 To the failure to secure compensation for the injuries inflicted 
 upon the passengers of the Swallow in 1777' and the repeated 
 injunctions of the Porte in 1778 was added the arbitrary arrest 
 of two English officers on mission in 1779.^^ This was sufficient 
 evidence that the Porte was in earnest in terminating the Suez 
 traffic and that, even in the confused state of Egypt, it could still 
 exact a measure of obedience. The risks, both of trade and of 
 communication, were mounting rapidly. 
 
 Charles-Roux (pp. 127-128) points out that the idea of French plans for a 
 route of communications was an illusion. French vessels did come to Suez on occa- 
 sion at this period, but whether primarily to engage in trade or to maintain a partial 
 communication between France and French ports in India is not altogether clear. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, No. 256, Ainslie to Viscount Weymouth, 17 
 Sept., 1779; J. Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 104 ff. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol., 55, Baldwin, 30 April, 1779; Firman de la Sublime Porte, 
 in J. Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, Annexe No. 5, 419-420. 
 
22 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The climax of the contest was reached in a series of unhappy 
 events which occurred during 1779. In April, two English ves- 
 sels arrived at Suez bearing despatches and merchandise. The 
 despatches passed without difficulty, and the captains of the trad- 
 ing vessels, warned by Baldwin of the prohibition against trade, 
 were not molested in disposing of their goods discreetly and 
 “ privately.” In this Baldwin gave material assistance. On 
 May 24 two vessels showing the Danish flag, but under the 
 direction of an Englishman, George Moore, arrived at Suez. 
 Moore, who brought a letter of recommendation from the Gov- 
 ernor-General of Bengal, addressed himself to the Bey of Cairo. 
 His supercargo, a German named Van der Velden, also bearing 
 a letter from the Governor-General, approached Baldwin for 
 assistance. Baldwin took no active part at first. Having received 
 from the Bey permission to discharge their merchandise, the ships 
 were unloaded, and Moore, taking the portion which belonged 
 to him, went first to Cairo, where he had no difficulty in disposing 
 of his goods at considerable profit. 
 
 The other traders, the German, two Frenchmen, Saint-Germain 
 and his brother, four Englishmen, O’Donnell, Jenkins, Barring- 
 ton and Waugh, formed a caravan for conveying their goods to 
 Cairo a few weeks later. They anticipated no danger, for not 
 only did they have a safe conduct, but even the camels had been 
 supplied by the Bey. In consequence, they travelled unprepared 
 and unarmed. At a little distance from Suez they were suddenly 
 set upon by a party of Bedouins, who made short work of pillaging 
 the entire caravan, which was valued at £37,500, taking even the 
 clothing of the merchants and leaving them stranded in the 
 desert. O’Donnell returned to Suez. The others, believing they 
 could reach Cairo, proceeded. They soon lost their way, however, 
 and through hunger, thirst, fatigue and sun stroke, all except one 
 of the party died. He, Saint-Germain, after unbelievable tor- 
 tures, was succored by a fellah y and presently rescued by a French 
 merchant of Cairo. 
 
 O’Donnell meanwhile had reached Cairo from Suez, and with 
 the assistance of Baldwin, who, it later appeared, had invested 
 heavily in this particular enterprise, obtained from the Bey an 
 offer of assistance in recovering the stolen goods. By a clever 
 stroke, the Bey, who supplied an expeditionary force of 200 
 soldiers, seized the two ships in the Suez roadstead and seques- 
 tered them. With all the merchandise in his possession, he threw' 
 off his mask, imprisoned Moore, and held Baldwin and O’Donnell 
 as prisoners on parole. At this moment five Englishmen bearing 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 55, Baldwin to Ainslie, 30 July, 1779. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 23 
 
 despatches arrived at Alexandria from England en route to India 
 — those who had come out on the vessels which had reached 
 Suez in April. These men were temporarily held, but were 
 presently released on the promise that they would take no action. 
 
 The Bey promptly reported the affair to the Porte, as did 
 Baldwin and O’Donnell to Sir Robert Ainslie.^* The episode 
 made quite a stir, not only at Constantinople, but at the courts of 
 western Europe. Various attitudes were taken. The prevalent 
 opinion was that in violating a well-known prohibition, the mer- 
 chants would be unable to recover their losses. The Porte did 
 not conceal its joy at the action of the Bey, and confirmed him 
 in his position forthwith. Ainslie, although wholly out of 
 sympathy with the enterprise, still appealed to the Porte to secure 
 the release of those held by the Bey, and this was accorded. 
 Before instructions to this effect reached Egypt, the Bey, antici- 
 pating the attitude which would be taken by the Porte and the 
 various European powers, had released all except Baldwin and 
 another Englishman, Skiddy, one of the agents of the commercial 
 expedition, who were held as security against any reprisals which 
 might be taken. 
 
 Before action could be taken for the release of Baldwin and 
 his companion, the former “ jumped ” his parole, and escaped 
 from Alexandria on a French vessel, deserting all of his property 
 in Egypt and leaving Skiddy to follow suit as he might.^® Land- 
 ing first at Smyrna, Baldwin made his way to Constantinople, 
 where he spent the next several months in assessing blame for all 
 those whom he considered in any way connected with the late 
 tragedy. He first vented his wrath on the prominent Venetian 
 merchant in Egypt, Carlo Rosetti, whom he thought responsible 
 for the whole plan of plundering the caravan, in collusion, per- 
 haps, with the chief customs officer, Antoun Cassis, whose func- 
 tions as official agent for England Baldwin had recently been able 
 to terminate. 
 
 At Constantinople Baldwin devoted his time chiefly to attempts 
 to justify his conduct in Egypt and to bringing charges against 
 Ainslie, whom he considered an unpatriotic Turcophile. Al- 
 though Baldwin was able to rally to his cause some influential 
 persons both in Turkey and in England, he was unable to make 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, No. 253, Letter from John O’Donnell to Sir 
 Robert Ainslie, Cairo, 5 Aug., 1779. 
 
 S. P., Turkey, Vol. 55, Ainslie, 18 Oct., 1779. 
 
 Ibid,., Baldwin, 31 Aug., 1779. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Nos. 253 et seq. 
 
 ’’’’ S. P., Turkey, Vol. 55, Baldwin, 7 Dec., 1779. F. Charles-Roux considers the 
 case against Rosetti largely or entirely unfounded. 
 
24 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 serious headway in accomplishing his dearest wish, which was to 
 secure Ainslie’s recall. In the spring of 1780, almost a year 
 after the attack on the caravan near Suez, Baldwin decided to 
 carry his case to England in person, where he hoped still to enlist 
 influence in favor of opening the Suez route and to clear himself 
 of all charges of disobedience. Within the following twelve- 
 month the British Foreign Office was able to survey all of the 
 evidence bearing on the events of 1779, and Ainslie was found 
 guiltless of any lapse of duty. 
 
 The incidents of 1779 could not take effect instantly. Before 
 the news had reached England and India by the slow means of 
 transit then in use, still other vessels came to Egypt. The pas- 
 sengers on some of these, by employing the good offices of Carlo 
 Rosetti escaped trouble. But in the summer of 1 780, two English 
 vessels, a packet and a frigate, arrived at Cosseir, one of the doors 
 to Egypt. Five Englishmen were landed. By satisfying the 
 greed of a local chief with a payment of about £35, they were 
 permitted to proceed to Cairo. There four of them were tem- 
 porarily imprisoned, then released on the promise to return to 
 their vessels. The fifth, named Wooley, was suffered to take 
 ship for Constantinople with his despatches, perhaps as a means 
 of shifting part of the responsibility to the Turkish authorities. 
 At Constantinople he was detained and some of his despatches 
 were opened, in which it appeared that the English authorities in 
 India still hoped to carry on trade relations with the Beys of 
 Egypt under the treaty of 1775. It was with considerable diffi- 
 culty that Ainslie succeeded in liberating his countryman and in 
 sending him on to England.®® 
 
 Ainslie was much perturbed over this incident, but hard on its 
 heels followed more trouble in Egypt to complete the breach 
 opened by the plunder of the caravan in the preceding year. 
 While waiting at Cosseir, the sailors of the English frigate above 
 
 While participation in the trade from India was not open to Baldwin after his 
 appointment as consul de facto in Egypt, first because of the Turkish prohibition on 
 Christian trade and second because of the nature of his duties, Baldwin’s situation 
 deserves a bit of sympathy. In 1777, as related, he was held responsible by the East 
 India Company for the payment of £4500 which he was unable to raise. At the end 
 of 1778 the same Company’s Directors voted him a “bonus” of £500 “for faithful 
 services ” during that year, but at the same time they neglected to pay him his regular 
 stipend. Baldwin may have been grasping, but there is every reason to believe that 
 he was largely dependent on his own commercial enterprise for support. I cannot 
 consider him quite the rogue that he appears to M. Frangois Charles-Roux. 
 
 Late in 1779 Ainslie had been given orally to understand that, for purposes 
 of communication only, Englishmen proceeding through Egypt would not be molested 
 during the year 1780. — I. O., Factory Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Nos. 263-265, 
 Letters from Ainslie. 
 
 F. O., Turkey, Vol. i, Ainslie, 17 and 21 Aug., 1780. 
 
ENGLISH INTEREST IN EGYPT 
 
 25 
 
 mentioned during shore leave were drawn into an open clash with 
 the Bedouins and five of the former were killed. The captain of 
 the vessel, throwing caution to the wind, determined on a reprisal 
 and began a bombardment of the town which lasted until nu- 
 merous casualties had atoned for injuries received earlier. 
 
 Ainslie made a strong representation to the Foreign Office on 
 this head, begging that the repeated violations of the Turkish 
 prohibition of the navigation to Egypt be ended.®^ Again orders 
 were sent to the Governors of the Indian Presidencies reaffirming 
 previous instructions. This, however, was unnecessary. The 
 news of the attack on the caravan in 1779 and of the further 
 trouble in 1780, added to the many evidences of the uncom- 
 promising attitude of the Ottoman authorities, spread much more 
 rapidly in India than did all of the injunctions of the Porte as 
 advertised by the East India Company. Since the trade to Egypt 
 had become more dangerous than profitable, and since communi- 
 cations through Egypt had to rely on native boats and messengers 
 between Jeddah and Suez, that route was largely given up. Even 
 the action of the Beys in deposing the reigning Pasha Ismail, that 
 they might again profit by the illegitimate trade with India, had 
 no immediate effect. By the end of 1780 it was said that “ Eng- 
 lish vessels no longer come to Suez.” 
 
 Ibid,., 20 March and i6 Sept., 1780. In spite of his vigorous protests at the 
 violation of the Turkish injunctions by Englishmen, Ainslie commissioned one Richard 
 Hughes to occupy a post in Cairo as agent of the East India Company with practically 
 the powers enjoyed by Baldwin, If there was to be no trade with Egypt and no 
 communication through that country, this office was superfluous. 
 
 I. O. Records, ui sufra, Vol. 5, No. 273. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 
 
 F ollowing the withdrawal of the English from active 
 participation in the Indo-Egyptian trade and the con- 
 temporaneous exit of George Baldwin as English agent 
 in Egypt, such English travellers and messengers as still had 
 courage to use the overland route found a friend and advocate 
 in Carlo Rosetti, Baldwin’s bate noire. Rosetti, a “ true political 
 chameleon,” appears at one time or another to have served all 
 those Christian nations which had interests in Egypt, as well as 
 various Mohammedan regimes.’ This circumstance still enabled 
 Englishmen to pass to or from India through Egypt, and so it 
 tended to keep alive, through the publication of accounts by these 
 travellers, some conception of the advantages to be gained by the 
 development of a route through Eygpt for communications, if 
 not for trade." 
 
 In the meantime, others were appearing on the scene. Austria 
 had long taken a healthy interest in the affairs of the Ottoman 
 Empire. At this time, the Imperial Internuncio at Constanti- 
 nople, who had made a fortune by privately engaging in the Indo- 
 Egyptian trade, persuaded his government to establish an official 
 post in Egypt. Through Austrian influence at the Porte, the 
 chief of the customs at Alexandria, Antoun Cassis, was formally 
 recognized as agent and representative of Austria and was loaded 
 with honors and titles. The Venetian free lance, Rosetti, was 
 drawn into the scheme as an Austrian agent. Likewise, the chief 
 of customs at Cairo was placed under the protection of the Holy 
 Roman Empire for the same purpose. These men were but the 
 first of a considerable number of representatives it was planned 
 to establish in Egypt for the development of trade. ^ 
 
 ^ F. Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, Vlsthme de Suez, et I’Egypte au AT 7 //® Steele, 
 pp. 153-154- 
 
 2 See the accounts by Capper (1785), Savary (1786), Volney (1787), and 
 Rooke (1788). 
 
 ® F. O., Turkey, Vol. 3, 3 and 9 Aug-., 1782. These Foreign Office papers, as 
 in the previous chapter, are cited in Charles-Roux. 
 
 26 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 27 
 
 These arrangements were carried out with the knowledge and 
 consent of the Porte. Ainslie was considerably upset and alarmed, 
 not only at the apparent inconsistency of Turkish attitude, but 
 also at the probable effect on the English East India trade. His 
 complaints on the subject had little effect, however, now that 
 the English Government had ceased to interest itself in the navi- 
 gation of the Red Sea. Ainslie’s anxiety on account of Austrian 
 schemes did not last long. Early in 1784 Antoun Cassis suddenly 
 and mysteriously quitted Alexandria, ostensibly to go on a pil- 
 grimage, and with his departure, Austrian preparations dwindled 
 away.^ 
 
 Although many Englishmen had already come to regret their 
 withdrawal from Egypt in consequence of the events of 1779, it 
 was not they who returned now that the field had been vacated 
 by the Austrians. Since 1 763 the French had been £asting longing 
 eyes _at E^ypt, less with J;h.e- idea of de'^bping trade and com- 
 munications with the consent of the Porte or in collusion with 
 the Beys, than with a view to the military occupation of the 
 country and its use as a base of operations against the English in 
 India.® No move of the English in Egypt long remained unno- 
 ticed by the French Embassy at Constantinople or at the Foreign 
 Office at Versailles. French agents in an almost constant stream 
 passed to and fro through Egypt surveying its strength and re- 
 sources and estimating its value as a French colony.® After 1778, 
 when the French formed an alliance with the American colonies 
 against Great Britain, their attempts to undermine British in- 
 fluence all through the East were redoubled.^ Some proposals 
 were made for an alliance between France and Persia for the 
 purpose of approaching India. Others’ looked toward a European 
 coalition for seizing Egypt and Arabia and for cutting a canal 
 through the Isthmus of Suez in order to take the English in the 
 flank, a project actually attempted some twenty years later. 
 The economic possibilities of Egypt were not overlooked.® The 
 French Consul-General at Alexandria, Mure, considered it “ be- 
 yond doubt that the commerce of India can be made to pass by 
 way of Egypt as formerly, with a marked advantage over those 
 
 ^ F. O., Turkey, Vol. 5, Ainslie, 10 Feb., 1784; Charles-Roux, of. cit., pp. 
 158-159. 
 
 ® F. Charles-Roux, “ La politique frangaise en Egypte a la fin du dix-huitieme 
 siecle,” in La Revue Historique, LXII (1906), and Les Origines de PExf edition 
 d’Egyfte, pp. 31-34. 
 
 ® Charles-Roux, L'Angleterre, PIsthme de Suez, et I'Egyfte, pp. 161— 162. 
 
 See above, p. 18. 
 
 ® Masson, Histoire du Commerce frangais dans le Levant, p. 574, fassitn; 
 Charles-Roux, Les Origines de PExf edition d’Egyfte, pp. 103— 123. 
 
28 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 nations who continue to employ the way by the Cape of Good 
 Hope.” ® 
 
 The signing of the peace at Versailles, September 3, I7'83, 
 although scarcely altering the feeling of hostility between the 
 two powers, tended to exert some influence on French projects in 
 the eastern Mediterranean.^® The French Ministry gave up plans 
 for occupying Egypt in force in favor of developing a communi- 
 cation with India by way of Suez, employing much the same 
 means as the English had used in the early seventies — agreement 
 with the Beys of Cairo. In 1783 and 1784 various French officers 
 were commissioned to study the possibilities of executing this plan, 
 and the French Ambassador at the Porte was even instructed to 
 prepare a table comparing the advantages of the two natural 
 routes to India, that by way of Basrah and that by way of Egypt 
 and the Red Sea.^^ Nothing tangible was accomplished, however, 
 until the arrival in Egypt late in 1784 of a French marine officer, 
 the Chevalier de Truguet. 
 
 His arrival at Alexandria marked the opening of a new phase 
 of French diplomacy — one in which the principal endeavor was 
 transferred from Constantinople, where it had been only partially 
 successful, to Egypt, where the coast appeared to be clear for a 
 monopoly of influence. Truguet was destined to succeed where 
 some of his countrymen had failed because of several favorable 
 circumstances. In the first place, he was the bearer of a note of 
 friendship to the Beys of Egypt from a high functionary of 
 Turkey, the Capitan Pasha, Grand Admiral of the Ottoman 
 fleet. In the second place, he had an invaluable ally in the 
 French merchant, Charles Magallon, who had long been estab- 
 lished in Egypt. Being on the point of retiring from active work, 
 Magallon was requested by the French Ambassador at Constan- 
 tinople to remain in Egypt in the capacity of consul for this par- 
 ticular mission. However, all the twenty-two years of Magal- 
 lon’s experience in Egypt might have availed little in negotiating 
 a treaty with the Beys but for the fact that Mme. Magallon had 
 once been of service to these chiefs in Upper Egypt and she had 
 remained on intimate terms with the inmates of the harems of 
 the chiefs at Cairo. 
 
 Materially assisted by the merchant and his wife, Truguet was 
 
 ® Charles-Roux, Les Origines, etc., p. 129, Archives Ministeres de la Guerre, 
 1783. This memoir of Mure was one of those consulted by Bonaparte before his 
 expedition to Egypt in 1798. 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., p. 166. 
 
 Masson, op. cit., p. 576. 
 
 Charles-Roux, Les Origines, etc., pp. 148 ff. 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., p. 171. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 29 
 
 not long in negotiating a phenomenal treaty in which the French 
 were accorded exclusive and exceedingly extensive privileges in 
 Egypt and the Red Sea. Little was taken for granted in this 
 document, which was signed at Cairo on February 7 , 178?, by 
 Murat (or Murad) Bey for the chiefs of Egypt and the Chevalier 
 de Truguet for France.^* It guaranteed freedom of all kinds to 
 French merchants, gave them exemption from all dues and taxes 
 except the usual customs, which were greatly reduced, and stipu- 
 lated the right of transmitting sealed messages through Egypt. 
 One clause, especially, threatened the English East India Com- 
 pany: the permission to ship goods in bond from India to France 
 through Egypt.^® In order to give the document more of the 
 appearance of regularity, it was provided that the treaty should 
 continue in force pending the arrival of the hatticherif , or sign 
 manual, from the Porte to legalize it. This, of course, was hardly 
 to be anticipated as long as the English maintained a large 
 measure of influence at Constantinople. But inasmuch as the 
 treaty was concluded “ with the utmost secrecy,” it is evident that 
 the absence of the sign manual was to be considered no obstacle 
 as long as the Egyptian authorities wished the treaty to remain 
 in force. Two subsidiary treaties were also signed at the same 
 time, one between Truguet and the Chief of Customs at Cairo, 
 Youssouf Cassab, pertaining to the duties to be levied on French 
 goods arriving at Suez, and the other between Truguet and an 
 Arab sheik arranging for a fixed charge for caravan camels.^® 
 The French appeared to have obtained more than the English had 
 formerly sought. 
 
 There was no Englishman in Egypt at this time either to ob- 
 struct the consummation of the treaty or to discover its secret 
 provisions. Nevertheless, there were exceedingly efficient in- 
 formers in Egypt in English employ, and the treaty had not long 
 been completed before a copy of it was surreptitiously obtained 
 and despatched with all haste to Ainslie at Constantinople. Sir 
 Robert had already become deeply suspicious of French designs 
 because of their unusual activity throughout the Levant during 
 
 India Office, Factory Records, Egypt and Red Sea, Vol. 5, “ Convention be- 
 tween the Court of France and the Government of Egypt, concluded with the latter 
 on the Port of France by the Chevalier de Truguet ” (also spelled Truquet, Fruquet, 
 and Chetruguet) . The first text obtained of this treaty was in Italian, prepared, 
 apparently, by Ainslie’s private correspondent in Egypt, M. Brandi. See Baldwin, 
 Political Recollections, pp. 23—24; J. Charles-Roux, Ulsthme et le Canal de Suez, 
 I, no— III. The text of the document is given in the latter, pp. 421—422. 
 
 There is little evidence that the French had carried any Asiatic goods across 
 Egypt to Europe before this time. 
 
 Baron de Testa, Recueil des Traites de la Porte Ottomane, II, 80-83; J- 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, Annexe No. 7, p. 423. 
 
30 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 the preceding months/^ Confiding his suspicions to the Foreign 
 Office, he was cautioned, in 1784, to secure for England such 
 special privileges as might be granted to any other European 
 power. French interest in the Black Sea and in the islands of the 
 Archipelago threw him off the correct scent, however, and he 
 failed to anticipate any French attempt to effect a liaison with the 
 Beys.^® It was only in the opening days of March, 1785, that he 
 received an inkling of the real situation, upon receiving word 
 from his private correspondent in Alexandria that the Porte had 
 given the French the right to trade with the port of Suez. 
 Charged with this act of discrimination, members of the Turkish 
 Ministry denied all knowledge of any such arrangement. Such 
 disquieting news put Ainslie on his guard, however, and con- 
 tributed largely to the undoing of the French plans in the end.^® 
 The reports of these activities caused considerable uneasiness 
 in London, both to Government and to East India Company, and 
 pointed out the need for an English consul in Egypt. The 
 Foreign Minister, the Marquis of Carmarthen, gave Ainslie 
 special caution. 
 
 Whatever part France may be inclined to take in the affairs 
 of Turkey, it becomes an object of great importance to us to 
 prevent, if possible, the attainment of her views in Egypt. 
 The consequences they must invariably produce . . . upon 
 our East India trade and establishments are too obvious to 
 require the smallest explanations. You, Sir, have heard of 
 her wish to induce the Porte to allow France the two ports 
 of Suez and Gedda on the Red Seaj these two objects are of 
 themselves sufficient to create alarm on our part, and I trust 
 that the Ottoman Government may be induced to abstain 
 from such a demand, when the pernicious effects to England 
 are represented by you in their real and just points of 
 view. . 
 
 Ainslie, however, while piqued and seriously concerned about 
 the rumored French plans, was still inclined to underestimate 
 the danger. He was repeatedly and categorically assured by the 
 
 F. O., Turkey, vol. 5, Ainslie, 24 Jan. and 20 Feb., 1784. 
 
 Charles-Roux, V Angleterre, etc., pp. 1 74-1 75. 
 
 Ainslie evolved various theories to explain the mt’sterious schemes of the 
 French. At this time he concluded that the most plausible solution would be an 
 attempt of the French to open commerce to Suez under an Indian flag — doubtless 
 that of Tipoo, who had sent an embassy to Constantinople in 1784. 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Extract of a Letter from the Marquis 
 of Carmarthen to Sir Robert Ainslie, 19 May, 1785. See Charles-Roux, L'Au- 
 gleterre, etc., p. 180. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 31 
 
 Turkish Ministers that their attitude toward the opening of the 
 Red Sea to Christian commerce had not altered in the least since 
 1777, and that they had no knowledge of any plans to establish 
 new lines of trade with Suez. These assurances quieted Ainslie’s 
 worst fears, for he did not discover at any time that at the very 
 moment he was being thus advised the French Ambassador at 
 the Porte, Choiseul-Gouffier, was requesting Turkish sanction of 
 the treaties negotiated by Truguet.^^ Even the reported arrival 
 of a French corvette, the Auguste ^ from Pondicherry at Suez on 
 April 24 bearing special messengers en route to Versailles,^^ 
 and the contemporaneous appearance of two French frigates at 
 Basrah loaded with arms and ammunition,^^ created no great 
 alarm. 
 
 Late in the summer Ainslie received from his Alexandria cor- 
 respondent, Brandi, copies of the documents negotiated with the 
 Beys by Truguet several weeks before. Although with these the 
 secret of the French was out, there seemed to be no new cause for 
 anxiety. Brandi had suggested, in transmitting the papers, that 
 probably any other country could secure such concessions just as 
 easily, and it was with this same comment that Ainslie in leisurely 
 fashion forwarded copies to the Foreign Office.^* Upon reflection, 
 however, he considered it wise to take up the matter with the 
 Porte. The effect of this immediately excited his apprehensions. 
 The Reis Effendi displayed great alarm and passion upon being 
 confronted with the documentary evidence of French conspiracies, 
 disavowed the treaties in their entirety, and promised immediate 
 steps to nullify the pact, though a close observer might have noted 
 that his spleen was directed more against the irresponsible Beys 
 than against the contents of the treaties.^® 
 
 However, for other reasons the French treaty was destined to 
 have no practical consequences. Before the Ottoman Government 
 had devised any effective way of chastising their rebellious feuda- 
 tories in Egypt, French plans for exploiting the Red Sea route 
 for trade and communications had largely fallen to the ground. 
 French merchants in India remembered too vividly the treachery 
 of the Egyptians on various occasions to venture themselves or 
 their goods in the Egyptian trade. Attempts made by merchants 
 in France to form a trading company for the Egyptian trade were 
 
 Charles-Roux, Les Origines, etc., pp. 151-153. 
 
 Ibid., p. 153. 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5, Correspondence of the East India 
 
 House. 
 
 Ibid., “Extracts from Sir Robert Ainslie relative to the Establishment of the 
 French in Egypt.” 
 
 Ibid., Ainslie to Lord Carmarthen, 10 and 25 Nov., 1785. 
 
32 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 frustrated by the French East India Company which was just 
 renewing its former chartered monopoly. In 1786 it began prep- 
 arations for sending cargoes from Indian posts to Suez, but so 
 slowly did these plans mature, that the first cargo arrived at Suez 
 only in March, 1789 — full three years later. Meanwhile the 
 situation in Egypt had undergone a change so complete that the 
 treaties of 1785 had lost such efficacy as they might have pos- 
 sessed at the outset.^® 
 
 The English Foreign Office did not regard the news of the 
 French treaty with the Beys with a great degree of equanimity. 
 Recent conflicts in India had been too severely contested and 
 French objectives in establishing themselves in Egypt were too 
 potent to escape critical review in London. Already for some 
 years the attitude of the Government and of the East India Com- 
 pany toward the use of the route through Egypt had been under- 
 going a great change. In 1773 Lord North had seen nothing in 
 the recommendations of James Bruce worthy of the least con- 
 sideration. No English official raised a protesting voice when the 
 Ottoman Government issued the firman of 1777 placing an 
 interdict on the navigation of the Red Sea. But since the stoppage 
 of trade and communication in 1779 the conviction had been 
 growing that the withdrawal from Egypt had been a mistake. 
 The practical convenience of sending and receiving important 
 Indian despatches in one-half or one-third the usual time had 
 left its impress during those few years when the transit through 
 Egypt had been uninterrupted. In 1785 the Red Sea was no 
 longer the wholly unknown body of water it had been fifteen 
 years before. Not only had various travellers published de- 
 scriptions of it in connection with their travels through Egypt, 
 but such surveys as had been made had also found their way into 
 print. 
 
 The book of Col. James Capper, Observations on the Passage 
 to India through Egyft and across the Great Desert, published in 
 1784, contained strong arguments for the use of a route which 
 had been responsible for English victories over the French in 
 India, and which, had it still been in use when the Peace of Ver- 
 sailles was concluded, would have saved the lives of eighty English 
 officers and more than two thousand men who were killed in use- 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., pp. 187—192. 
 
 G. Trotter, The Harbour and- Road of Suez in the Red Sea (London, 1779) ; 
 Lieut. Mascall, Plan of the Harbour and Road of Suez from a Survey of Mascall, 
 1777, with some additions by Lieut. Harvey (London, 1782); W. Robinson, Sttez 
 Harbour Surveyed by Captain VV. Robinson (London, 1784); L. S. de la Rochette, 
 The North West Branch of the Red Sea (London, 1785). 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 33 
 
 less battles long after the war had been formally ended/® Col. 
 Capper believed in the simultaneous employment of the two 
 other routes to India which had been found practicable, that by 
 way of Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf and that around the 
 Cape of Good Hope, but, except during the prevalence of the 
 southwest monsoon, he considered that by way of Egypt essential. 
 Moreover, he gave one telling argument against the Turkish pro- 
 hibition of the use of the Red Sea: if the Turks could grant to 
 their natural enemies, the Russians, control of the Black Sea and 
 the Dardanelles, how readily might they consent to grant to their 
 friends the right of sending packet vessels to Suez! 
 
 More powerful still were the arguments, supported by the 
 strongest evidence, brought forward by George Baldwin. Since 
 his return from Egypt by way of Constantinople in 1781 he had 
 spent his time in vain endeavors to recover the property he had 
 lost in Egypt and in writing memorials to the Directors of the 
 East India Company, in which he attempted to explain and justify 
 his past conduct. In 1783 his case was taken up by the Court and 
 he was olEcially exonerated from the charges held against him, 
 the most serious of which were connected with his private trading 
 ventures and his unauthorized chartering of a vessel in 1777 at an 
 exhorbitant price to carry despatches to India.®® 
 
 With his past mistakes thus forgiven, Baldwin devoted himself 
 to the securing of recognition for the route to which he was wholly 
 committed. In 1784 he published a pamphlet entitled, The Com- 
 munication with India by the Isthmus of Suez^ vindicated from 
 the Prejudices which have f revailed against it. . In this he 
 showed that “ the feats of the East India Company respecting the 
 influx of Indian manufactures by that route to Europe to their 
 prejudice were not well founded j and that the alarm of the Grand 
 Signior for the safety of his empire need not have been aroused 
 by the arrival of six or eight loaded ships per year at the port of 
 Suez.” In a memoir to be presented to the India Board the 
 following year, Baldwin showed the dangers which might arise 
 from the establishment of France in Egypt. 
 
 France, in possession of Egypt [he wrote], would possess 
 the master-key to all the trading nations of the earth. En- 
 
 2d ed. (London, 1784). 
 
 James Capper, Observations on the Passage to India, Preface, pp. x-xvii. 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5. Baldwin’s creditors apparently were 
 never reimbursed for their losses. 
 
 Contained in I. O. Factory Records, Vol. 5. 
 
 In 1783 Baldwin estimated that the total volume of the goods exported by 
 the English from India to Egypt between 1768 and 1782 amounted to £318,600. 
 
34 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 lightened as the times are, in the general arts of navigation 
 and commerce, she might make it the awe of the eastern 
 world, by the facility she would command of transporting 
 her forces thither, by surprise, in any number, and at any 
 time 5 and England would hold her possessions in India at the 
 mercy of France. 
 
 These and many similar observations all tending to show that 
 France would naturally aspire to control Egypt and that this 
 would be a vital matter for Great Britain, exerted a deep influence 
 on the India authorities. Baldwin was asked to prepare other 
 statements showing how British interests might most efficaciously 
 be revived in Egypt. In reply, he sketched his idea of a prac- 
 ticable consular establishment, providing for a consul general at 
 Cairo having power to name deputies or vice-consuls at Alexandria 
 and Suez as the first step. He thought this might be financed in 
 any one of three ways: by reviving the trade from India to Suez 
 and levying a small duty on such goods to be applied to this pur- 
 pose; by removing the Levant Company’s monopoly and applying 
 its annual Parliamentary grant toward the upkeep of the diplo- 
 matic establishment; or by requiring the Levant Company to 
 appropriate the necessary funds from its own income. Also he 
 prepared at some length a brochure entitled Observations on the 
 Practicability and Utility of Establishing a Correspondence Over- 
 Land to India by Way of Suezf^ in which he pointed out that 
 “ Almost the only difficulty in establishing a correspondence over- 
 land to India, by way of Suez, is in the navigation of the Red 
 Sea. The regularity of the winds, which make a voyage safe and 
 expeditious at one particular time of year, renders it dangerous, 
 tedious, and almost impracticable at any other.” 
 
 The decision of the British Government and the East India 
 Company to reestablish a consular office in Egypt took shape, 
 early in 1786, in the formal appointment to the new post of the 
 only person sufficiently capable in every way of fulfilling the 
 needs of the situation. Baldwin’s own memoirs were taken as 
 the basis of the instructions issued to him.®® As Consul, Baldwin- 
 was enjoined — 
 
 Baldwin, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, p. 79. 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, ut supra, Vol. 5, Baldwin, on openings the Red Sea 
 Route, 27 Jan., 1785. 
 
 I. O. Records, tU supra. No. 279. 
 
 Ibid., Vol. 5, Dundas mss. Henry Dundas, Chairman of the Court of Directors, 
 estimated the total cost of a monthly communication between England and India 
 at £3850, on the basis of information supplied by Baldwin. He thought messages 
 could be transmitted in either direction within the space of 60 days. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 35 
 
 To protect His Majesty’s subjects in their Trade and 
 lawful avocations ... to endeavor to obtain from the Gov- 
 ernment of Egypt by proper and discreet means, a secure 
 and regular passage through their country for His Majesty’s 
 subjects and dispatches — going and coming between Eng- 
 land and the East Indies by the Red Sea ... to watch the 
 motions of the French, and their particular designs . . . 
 [and to] transmit to His Majesty’s ministers your discoveries 
 and observations upon their proceedings, which may have 
 a tendency to affect in any shape the interests of Great 
 Britain ... to prevent as much as in your power lies, the 
 transit of all British Subjects to and from India by the 
 Isthmus of Suez, except only such as bear an authority from 
 Government or East India Company for so doing, it being 
 subject to create disturbances, and to embarrass the free com- 
 munication intended to be obtained for the Public Services.®’ 
 
 The Court of Directors on their part made out a voluminous 
 set of instructions, governing Baldwin’s conduct in every con- 
 tingency, and including much solid advice. Recalling his former 
 shortcomings it was specifically provided that on no account was 
 he to engage in trade. And to this the Court signed themselves, 
 “Tour loving friends.”®® “The great end of Mr. Baldwin’s 
 residence at Cairo,” ran a separate despatch to Sir Robert Ainslie, 
 “ is the opening of a communication to India through Egypt.” ®® 
 In all of these instructions, it is to be noted, a clear distinction was 
 made between purposes of communication and those of trans- 
 portation. This continued until after the trading monopoly of 
 the Company had been entirely removed and the eastern trade 
 thrown open to the world in the early years of the next century. 
 
 There was some question at first whether Baldwin should 
 proceed to Egypt primarily in the capacity of British Consul Gen- 
 eral or as Agent of the East India Company. If the latter, his 
 salary and expenses would naturally be defrayed by the Company 
 and his despatches would be directed to the Court of Directors 
 rather than to the Foreign Office. After some delay, a joint 
 arrangement was agreed upon whereby Baldwin’s activities were 
 to conform to two sets of instructions, but his salary was to be 
 paid by the Company.^® He was to be sent out to Egypt accredited 
 
 IhiJ.., “ Instructions to George Baldwin as Consul to Egypt.” 
 
 Ibid., No. 1359. 
 
 Ibid., “Heads of Instructions for Mr. Baldwin,” 19 May, 1786. 
 
 Ibid., Dundas mss. The Levant Company had become practically a dead 
 concern, subsisting largely on a Parliamentary grant. Baldwin apparently had no 
 commission from this Company during his second official residence at Cairo. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 36 
 
 to a Turkish possession, but it was made clear to him that the 
 immediate aim of his work in Egypt was to be a new and separate 
 treaty with the Beys, “ which will put His Majesty’s Government 
 at least on an equal footing with . . . the French.” “ In fact 
 Baldwin’s salary of £500 per year with expenses was to continue 
 only on condition that he negotiate this favorable treaty within 
 a year after his arrival in Egypt. This, then, was the efFect of the 
 French treaty of February, 1785; the British were at last prepared 
 to compromise their Turkish policy. The difficult feat was to be 
 tried of riding two eastern horses at once — and animals very 
 much averse from running in the same direction. 
 
 Additional preparations were made at Constantinople for the 
 success of his mission before Baldwin’s departure for Egypt. The 
 purposes of the new establishment were pointed out to Ainslie, 
 who had already strongly but ineffectually opposed the appoint- 
 ment of Baldwin. There stood in the way of the enterprise the 
 Turkish firman^ which commanded the entire cessation of Chris- 
 tian navigation in the Red Sea.^^ The instructions sent to Ainslie 
 requested him to make representations to the Porte on the basis 
 of the privileges granted the English in the Capitulation of 1675, 
 which provided, in part. 
 
 That the said nations, and the English merchants, and all 
 other nations and merchants that do, or shall arrive under 
 the colors and protection of England with their ships . . . 
 merchandize, effects [etc.], shall at all times sail securely in 
 our seas, and go and come with all manner of safety and 
 freedom to all parts within the limits of our Imperial 
 Domain. . . That the said nation shall likewise freely go 
 and come by land, within the limits of our Imperial Do- 
 minions. . . All English ships, great and small, may at all 
 times come and enter any port or harbor whatsoever of our 
 Dominions, and set out from thence when they please. . 
 
 Such preparations for the return of the English to the eastern 
 Mediterranean were well under way when Baldwin, armed with 
 copious instructions, cautions, and advice, sailed on the Weymouth 
 from Portsmouth, August 14, 1786, for Egypt. He arrived in 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sup-a, “ Heads of Instructions for Mr. Baldwin,” 19 May, 
 
 1785. 
 
 Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, etc., pp. 207-225. 
 
 The instructions issued by the Foreign Office to Baldwin on May 19 suggested 
 that, in view of the Capitulations and the French treaty of 1785, he might well 
 ignore the prohibitory firman. 
 
 Quoted in I. O. Records, ut sufra, Vol. 5, in a paper entitled “ The Com- 
 munication with India by way of Suez” (1784). 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 37 
 
 Cairo in December, and discovered immediately that the greater 
 part of his preparations had been to no avail, for a Turkish army 
 was then in Egypt in process of chastising the rebellious Beys, 
 and the entire country was in the utmost confusion. It will be 
 worth while to approach this circumstance from another point 
 of view. 
 
 It was little consolation to the Porte that the Beys of Egypt, 
 who had scant regard for the authority of the Sultan, deposed 
 each other in rapid succession. Each de facto regime quickly set 
 about exploiting all possible sources of wealth while its authority 
 lasted. Only the inertia characteristic of a government already 
 entering upon a decline and the constant dread of Russian attacks 
 prevented the Turks from taking summary vengeance upon their 
 lawless Egyptian vassals. However, even Turkish patience was 
 exhausted at last. Early in 1786 Murat Bey demanded of the 
 European consuls in Egypt a large sum of money. In case of 
 failure to comply with the demand, the two Franciscan Churches 
 at Alexandria were to be plundered, an expedient suggested by 
 the Russian Consul at Alexandria, Baron de Thonus.'*® In the 
 face of this danger, the diplomatic corps of the western powers 
 instantly appealed to their superiors at Constantinople to avert 
 the danger. A joint representation was quickly made to the 
 Porte by all the ambassadors of European powers at Constanti- 
 nople except those representing Sweden and England. Finding 
 the request for intervention coinciding with its own interests at 
 this favorable moment, the Turkish Government determined to 
 take summary and drastic action. The representatives of 
 the powers were reassured this time less by specious promises 
 than by preparations for a campaign of first magnitude. A 
 large fleet was out in readiness to proceed to Egypt, and no less a 
 personage than the Captain Pasha, Hassan, was placed in charge 
 of it.^® 
 
 Ainslie, although taking no part in the request for intervention 
 in Egypt, rejoiced, nevertheless, at the growing prospect of de- 
 stroying the effects of the French treaty of 1785 with the Beys.^^ 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, Vol. 6, Ainslie, 24. Sept., 1787. Russian activities in 
 Egypt had begun in 1783, when a Russian agent arrived in Egypt bringing power 
 to negotiate a treaty with the Beys whereby Egypt was to be made independent of 
 the Porte and the Russians were to have the right of placing garrisons at Alexandria, 
 Rosetta and Damietta. Negotiations along this line were continued until Baron de 
 Thonus, who had been established as Consul at Alexandria in 1785, provoked the 
 attack on the churches which led to the expedition of the Capitan Pasha in 1786. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 195. 
 
 Ainslie to the Foreign Office, 11 and 27 March, 1786, cited in Charles-Roux, 
 of. cit., p. 196. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 38 
 
 A cardinal feature of English eastern policy — the restoration of 
 Turkish power in Egypt with the consequent widening of English 
 influence — was about to be accomplished. The event too well 
 justified the expectation. Alexandria surrendered to the Turkish 
 forces in July without opposition. Rosetta and Cairo likewise were 
 taken. The forces of Murat and Ibrahim were easily defeated 
 and scattered and they themselves driven to Upper Egypt.'*® 
 Their rival, Ismail, was installed in power by the Capitan Pasha. 
 After some further resistance and temporary successes early in 
 1787, Murat and Ibrahim were again defeated, but as the price 
 of submission were allowed to retain two of the provinces of 
 Upper Egypt.*® But the news of such an outcome, which would 
 have caused rejoicing in English circles at almost any other time, 
 was received in London with gloom and apprehension. English 
 policy in Egypt had been reversed at the worst possible moment, 
 for Baldwin arrived just at the time when the Turks were over- 
 whelming the Beys with whom he was instructed to negotiate an 
 independent treaty. 
 
 Baldwin had no difficulty in securing his recognition by virtue 
 of the consular barat which he bore, and after his reception at 
 Alexandria he proceeded presently to Cairo. Here he appointed 
 agents for the ports at Alexandria and Suez, secured an Arab 
 writer and interpreter, and was soon ready to take advantage of 
 that fortunate clause in his instructions which enabled him to 
 negotiate with whatever authorities there might be in Egypt. 
 There seemed to be but one course to pursue, now that the Turks 
 were actually in possession of the country. This plan was to 
 demand boldly the privileges which had once been granted the 
 English in the Capitulations to trade in all Turkish ports.®® On 
 March 6, 1787, Baldwin was received in audience by the Capitan 
 Pasha, and the case was stated frankly. 
 
 The reputation of your armes and the promises of order 
 which your government bring to the country have deter- 
 mined the King of England ... to name me his consul 
 general in Egypt, in order to restore with vigor the rights 
 belonging to his subjects, conformably to his binding Capit- 
 ulations with the Sublime Porte, particularly the right of 
 navigating the Red Sea and of frequenting all the ports situ- 
 ated on the shores of that sea. In consequence, I beg of Your 
 Excellence to proclaim the wish of the Sublime Porte that 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6, Ainslie, 25 Aug., 1786; Baldwin, Jan. 1787. 
 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., pp. 231—233, passim. 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Baldwin to Lord Carmarthen, 12 Jan., 1787. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 39 
 
 all functionaries of government and all subjects living under 
 its law second and assist the British nation in the free exercise 
 of the rights pertaining to itd^ 
 
 To this Hassan replied ingeniously that such a matter would 
 remain for the Porte to decide. However, not to cause delay, he 
 would see that the English were not molested in the exercise of 
 their rights while his authority remained in Egypt. 
 
 A problem soon arose. A Christian (“ Frank ”) vessel was 
 sighted in the Red Sea. Supposing that this would be an English 
 vessel, Baldwin besought the Capitan Pasha to permit its recep- 
 tion at Suez. This was not to Hassan’s taste, for he had been 
 given copies of the prohibitory firman of 1779 before leaving 
 Constantinople. Nevertheless, being a shrewd man, he ruled 
 that whatever vessel arrived, it should receive no harm during 
 his sway in Egypt. The vessel proved to be the French frigate 
 Venus bearing despatches from India. After some hesitation, 
 Hassan authorized the landing of despatches and messengers, but 
 insisted that the vessel sail shortly from Suez — an injunction 
 carefully acted upon. Baldwin raised no objection to this ar- 
 rangement, believing that such a precedent might be an advantage 
 to his own countrymen. Indeed, he even took occasion to send 
 despatches of his own to India by the return voyage of the vessel. 
 
 The Capitan Pasha had indicated that only some evidence of 
 consent on the part of the Porte was necessary to the free use of 
 the route through Egypt.®® The real responsibility for the re- 
 opening of the route through Egypt, now that Egypt was largely 
 under Turkish authority once more, devolved upon Ainslie. He 
 was slow and unwilling to act, feeling the inconsistency of the 
 new position he was expected to take with that he had so long 
 maintained. News of the landing of the Venus and the passage 
 through Egypt of her despatches and passengers, however, gave 
 him ground for broaching the matter. Approaching the Reis 
 Effendi with the statement that Great Britain would expect the 
 same rights in the Red Sea as the French, he was curtly informed 
 that no rights had been accorded the French, and that an in- 
 vestigation would be made of the Venus affair.®* Ainslee there- 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Baldwin, ii April, 1787. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Vol. 6, Baldwin, 20 April, 1787. 
 
 He seems to have been perfectly well aware, however, that the Porte was 
 unlikely to grant this, but as his own stay in Egypt was likely to be brief, it shifted 
 the responsibility to Constantinople and made it possible for him to accept sundry 
 valuable presents from Baldwin with good grace. 
 
 F. O., Turkey, Vol. 8, Ainslie, g, 25 June, 10 July, 1787; Charles-Roux, 
 of. cit., pp. 244—246. 
 
40 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 upon weakly refrained from following his instructions and 
 demanding the right as based on the Capitulations. Time, he 
 believed, would play into his hands, and he waited the issue of 
 events in Egypt. 
 
 Under the circumstances, it was natural that two men, never 
 friendly, both kept completely in the dark by the intricacies of 
 Turkish statesmen who were well aware of the purpose of Bald- 
 win’s mission to Egypt,®® should find the cause of failure in the 
 other. Baldwin complained repeatedly that none of his letters 
 to the Ambassador at the Porte was answered, and that Sir Robert 
 had apparently done nothing toward securing that slight evidence 
 of assent on the part of the Porte which would suffice for a 
 guarantee of safety of navigation from the Capitan Pasha. 
 Ainslie accused Baldwin of lack of caution in his negotiations and 
 again suspected him of private mercantile operations. Both gave 
 presents lavishly and remained optimistic as to the eventual suc- 
 cess of the plan, particularly since the threatening moves of 
 Russia would make the Turks desirous of English support.®® 
 
 In London, meanwhile, preparations were being made for 
 making use of the overland route with little regard to the pos- 
 sibility of the failure of negotiations with Ottoman authorities. 
 In spite of the Turkish expedition to Egypt, the tone of the 
 despatches of both Ainslie and Baldwin, to cover up their inability 
 to make real headway, had remained hopeful, and this doubtless 
 influenced the home authorities to believe that no serious obstacles 
 existed to the reopening of communication through Egypt. Their 
 industry in making all arrangements for the official use of the 
 line was stimulated, not only by the unsettled state of Europe, 
 but by news from various quarters of the East. Lord William 
 Murray, who had come back from India through Egypt early 
 in 1787, brought word of the willingness of the native rulers of 
 Mecca and Jeddah to assist in a regular navigation of the Red 
 Sea by English ships. ®^ Word also came that Basrah had been 
 taken by an Arab sheik, who had arrested and imprisoned the 
 Turkish authorities and so made himself master of all lower 
 Mesopotamia.®® This was looked upon as closing the route 
 through Mesopotamia to emergency messages, making the route 
 through Egypt more essential still. In addition, reports from 
 
 Even the English Consul at Smyrna, Hayes, was able to keep in touch with 
 developments in Egypt through the rumors reaching him from Turkish sources. 
 F. O., Vol. 8, Ainslie, 24 July, 1787. 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., pp. 251—252. 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Baldwin, 2 July, 1787. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 264. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 41 
 
 Egypt spoke of the arrival of another French vessel at Suez, a 
 merchantman, which only awaited an opportunity to discharge 
 a cargo for the Cairo market.®® 
 
 The Foreign Office, in consequence, took up with the Post 
 Office the matter of utilizing the Red Sea route for despatches, 
 and through this department negotiated with the Board of 
 Control and the East India Company. Plans prepared in May 
 and June, 1787, looked toward one annual voyage in each direc- 
 tion, beginning in 1788. Despatches bound for India would be 
 sent from London in June, and those destined for England would 
 leave India in December to take advantage of the most favorable 
 conditions. Livorna was selected as the Mediterranean port for 
 the communication with Egypt, the roads connecting that town 
 with the Channel being suitable for the purpose. Rates of postage 
 were agreed upon, and necessary Parliamentary legislation was 
 outlined for the ensuing session.®® 
 
 It required the exigencies of war to make these plans of par- 
 ticular significance. In the autumn of the year 1787 was com- 
 menced the war between Turkey and Russia which had been 
 brewing for some years. Early in October the Capitan Pasha, 
 who had been expecting the summons, was hastily recalled to 
 Constantinople. There ensued at the Porte a strange, but quite 
 characteristic, illustration of Ottoman diplomacy. The Capitan 
 Pasha, feigning great enthusiasm for the English, promised 
 Ainslie the satisfaction of his wishes with respect to the naviga- 
 tion of the Red Sea. Definite action was delayed, however, by 
 the alleged discovery of a British engagement to supply Russia 
 with ships and marine forces in the opening war against Turkey.®’' 
 No sooner had this excuse lost its efficacy than the Turks justified 
 further delay on the ground that the French (far less worthy 
 than the English ! ) were demanding the same privilege. Finally 
 the whole matter was referred to a Divan, an extraordinary meet- 
 ing of Turkish Ministers, where the opening of the Red Sea 
 was adjudged inopportune at that time. Thus the assumption of 
 collective responsibility made the tortuous path of individual 
 ministers easier. 
 
 Ainslie was slow to discern in all these manoeuvres a definite and 
 concerted plan to retain the friendship of the English Govern- 
 ment, to promote the further giving of largesses, and otherwise to 
 play one European government off against another without giving 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6, Baldwin, i6 Oct., 1787. 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Lord Carmarthen, 17 May, Lord Cartaret, 6 June, 1787; I. O. 
 Records, ut supra, Vol. 6, Ainslie, 25 Oct., 1787; Charles-Roux, op. cit., pp. 259, 260. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6, Baldwin, 16 Oct., 1787. 
 
42 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 real satisfaction to any. But when, after nearly a year of futile 
 but always promising negotiations the real goal of British policy 
 was apparently as far from being reached as ever, Ainslie con- 
 cluded that he had been unwittingly led on, and to save the 
 remainder of his prestige, decided to cease making presents and 
 to suspend his activities. Although reports reached him in Octo- 
 ber and November, 1788, that the Government of India proposed 
 to send vessels to Suez early in the following year on the chance 
 that arrangements with Turkish authorities would be completed 
 in the meantime, he took no steps toward soliciting permission 
 for their reception at Suez.®^ 
 
 The burning question of the right of employing the route 
 through Egypt for despatches, if not for merchandise, was finally 
 solved in a manner characteristically Turkish. While no formal 
 permission would be granted by the Porte, it gradually became 
 apparent, after the return of the Capitan Pasha to Constantinople, 
 that infringements of the prohibitory firman of 1779 would be 
 overlooked. Naturally, the Turkish administration in Cairo be- 
 came aware of this attitude, and in April, 1788, Baldwin was able 
 to report to his Government — 
 
 I have succeeded in obtaining from the government at 
 Cairo the authorization, for all passengers and despatches 
 arriving at Suez by the packet boats of the Company, to dis- 
 embark freely and to pass through the country without being 
 molested. I have sent official orders to Suez to that effect. 
 And if this government comes to be replaced by another, I 
 have no doubt that I shall obtain the same permission.®® 
 
 This Baldwin believed to be essentially what he had been sent 
 to Egypt to obtain and he had little doubt that it would lead to 
 an immediate resumption of activity at Suez. He also assumed 
 that there would be as little objection to the revival of the trade 
 to Egypt as to the passage of passengers and mails. Indeed, he 
 reported in February, 1789, that loaded French vessels had been 
 allowed to discharge their cargoes at Suez and that he was ar- 
 ranging for the reception of two English trading vessels reported 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., pp. 273—274. Ainslie himself was to a 
 considerable degree responsible for this determination on the part of the Government 
 of India, since such action was inspired by the reflected optimism of his reports to 
 the Foreign Office. Still, Baldwin deserves a fair share of credit or blame, as the 
 case may be, for having spoken in his despatches to India of the “ solemn assurance ” 
 given him by the Capitan Pasha that the right to navigate the Red Sea would soon 
 be forthcoming. 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Baldwin 2 or 8 April, 1788, quoted in Charles-Roux, UAn~ 
 gleterre, etc., pp. 287-288. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 43 
 
 coming from India. “ The passage through Egypt,” he said, 
 “ is free whenever the Company want to make use of it.” 
 
 At the moment when Baldwin flattered himself he had attained 
 the long coveted goal, when he was able to report that the Red 
 Sea was open to English vessels, and when he was effectively 
 obstructing the activities of the French,®® events were making 
 which tended to nullify his efforts. The plan concerted in 1787 
 by the Foreign Office with the Post Office and Board of Control 
 was, for some reason, never put into execution.®® In 1790, an 
 intensive survey was made by a committee of the Privy Council 
 of English trade with Turkish territories, with particular atten- 
 tion to Egypt. In the report of the Committee on October 19,®^ 
 Egypt was described as a country of great potentialities, “ the 
 entrepot and the only channel ” by which commercial relations 
 had long been maintained between Europe and Asia. But the 
 existing trade of the country was described as of little importance, 
 particularly to Great Britain. The fear was expressed also that 
 goods from India imported through Egypt and sold in Europe 
 might dangerously undersell goods brought by way of the Cape 
 of Good Hope.®® The opinion was stated that profitable trade 
 with Egypt alone could never be revived until a better political 
 order had been established there, and as the Turkish administra- 
 tion of Ismail was giving way before the growing strength of the 
 rebellious Beys, Murat and Ibrahim, this time appeared to be 
 distant. But in view of Russian and French designs on Egypt at 
 that moment, designs at which George Baldwin had correctly 
 guessed and had widely advertised, the report concluded with 
 the astonishing statement that even if the Turks were unable to 
 reassert their authority in Egypt, Great Britain would need to 
 take steps for safeguarding her interests by means of a treaty only 
 when some other power had become master. 
 
 This report attached no importance whatever to the matter of 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, Alexandria, 23 Feb., 1789. 
 
 Ibid,., Alexandria, 21 June, 1790. This has reference to the detention in 
 Egypt for a considerable time of two French agents, St. Leger and Colier, whom 
 Baldwin suspected of bearing despatches which boded ill for the Company’s 
 possessions in India. 
 
 See Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., p. 300. 
 
 Contained in F. O., Turkey, 11, Report of the Lords of the Committee of the 
 Privy Council Relative to the Trade with Turkey, 19 October, 1790; cited in 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 301. 
 
 This, apparently, represented the opinion of the Levant Company, which 
 furnished most of the data on which the report was based. The East India Company 
 had already reached the conclusion that no dangerous competition was to be an- 
 ticipated by this route. 
 
44 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 transmitting despatches through Egypt, its only concern touching 
 the profits which might be derived from trade with that country. 
 Its influence on the whole policy of the British Government with 
 respect to Egypt was, nevertheless, profound 5 and when, in 1792, 
 the new-born French Republic found it essential, in the face of a 
 hostile European coalition, to determine to maintain both postal 
 and commercial contact with India by way of the Red Sea, the 
 English authorities were preparing to withdraw from Egypt 
 their only establishment — that of the Consulate. 
 
 The first suggestions of Lord Grenville, Foreign Secretary, to 
 Henry Dundas, Secretary of War and President of the Board of 
 Control, that since the consular office in Egypt was useless and 
 expensive it should be suppressed, met with counter suggestions.®® 
 The attack was repeated in 1793. On this occasion. Lord Gren- 
 ville remarked that if the services of Baldwin were sufficiendy 
 valuable to the East India Company to warrant its assumption 
 of the cost of the establishment, the consular post might be con- 
 tinued, otherwise not. This argument was conclusive. Neither 
 the Company nor the India Board cared to add to their budgets 
 the sum of £2000 annually. On February 8, 1793, therefore, a 
 despatch was issued from the Foreign Office terminating Bald- 
 win’s appointment as British Consul and suspending his functions. 
 
 This action was taken at an awkward time. On January 31, 
 1 7'93, war was declared between Great Britain and France, making 
 a liaison between London and the Indian Presidencies far more 
 essential than at any time since the establishment of Baldwin’s 
 post. Lord Grenville had scarcely ceased denouncing the con- 
 sular office as useless when Baldwin demonstrated its value in 
 striking fashion. Upon receipt of the news that hostilities would 
 soon commence, he instantly despatched it to India before the 
 French garrison were aware of the state of affairs in Europe, 
 enabling the English to capture Pondicherry, and “ to expel the 
 French from India, and to decide the fate of the war in that 
 country a second time, and to the great honour and incalculable 
 advantage of England.” '® The news of this action caused Dun- 
 das to reopen with the Foreign Office the matter of maintaining 
 the consular post in Egypt. He suggested in this correspondence 
 that the India Board might find means of continuing the establish- 
 ment and of supporting Baldwin who had showm himself so 
 zealous in imperial matters. This plan, however, appears to have 
 been but a generous hope: Lord Grenville did not revert again 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 315, based on papers contained in the Fortescue 
 Manuscripts preserved at Dropmore — the “ Drof 7 nore Papers^' — vol. II. 
 
 George Baldwin, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, p. 28. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 45 
 
 to the matter and the burden was not assumed by India Board or 
 East India Company/^ 
 
 Fortunately for the British cause, Baldwin did not abandon his 
 post, because, for some unknown reason, he failed to receive 
 the edict of deposition of February 8, 1793. It was only sev- 
 eral months later when the Foreign Office refused to honor an 
 expense account that he became aware that some unfavorable 
 action had been taken. He had been ill for some time previously j 
 and this turn of affairs caused him to make preparations to return 
 to England. But at this juncture, his personal representative in 
 England was orally requested to the Foreign Office to ask 
 Baldwin to remain at his post during the war with France, his 
 expenses being paid as before. This Baldwin interpreted as 
 meaning that his consular position had been confirmed, and he 
 continued to act as though no interruption had occurred.^^ 
 
 Under such an arrangement, which savored strongly of oriental 
 equivocation, Baldwin could hardly have rested easily. Although 
 he could protest that he had faithfully served the interests of his 
 country and had obstructed the purposes of its enemies, the fact 
 remained that he had never been able to execute the principal 
 injunction in the instructions issued to him when he became consul. 
 This was to negotiate a treaty wfith such authorities as might be in 
 control in Egypt. Such a reflection must have been at the bottom 
 of a treaty drawn up between himself and the restored Beys, 
 Murat and Ibrahim, in May, 1794, the text of which was trans- 
 mitted to London with but few explanatory remarks.^* The treaty 
 had been so long delayed, it was pointed out, because of the lack of 
 stability in Egyptian politics and because of the obstinacy of Sir 
 Robert Ainslie, who had refused to cooperate with Baldwin when 
 a treaty might have been obtained earlier. 
 
 As for the document itself, it followed closely the lines of the 
 treaty obtained from the Beys in 1785 by Truguet. In providing 
 for freedom of navigation of the Red Sea and the landing of 
 articles of trade at Suez, it represented the same objective on the 
 part of the Beys as the treaty of 1785, namely, their hope of 
 making capital of the revival of trade through customs duties. 
 Freedom of transit through Egypt for mails and passengers was 
 readily conceded, but in this the Beys were not at all interested, 
 as it produced no revenue. In fact, it was made to appear that 
 
 Dropmore Papers, II, 621, cited as above. 
 
 1 . O., Factory Records, Baldwin, 10 Oct., 1794. 
 
 F. O., 24/1, Willis, 20 (29?) May, 1794, cited in Charies-Roux, op. cit., 
 p. 318. Baldwin was suffering from the prevalent disease of ophthalmia at this 
 time, hence his correspondence was entirely in the hands of his secretary, Richard 
 Willis. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 46 
 
 the transit through Egypt should be only a means to an end — 
 the end being a revival of English trade, which had been practi- 
 cally nil in Egypt since 1779. For the encouragement of trade, 
 the English were to enjoy the position of most-favored nation. 
 Other features were the usual ones: anchorage fees, collection of 
 customs, exemptions. 
 
 As to the duties themselves, those of 3 % specified in the Cap- 
 itulations were to be levied for the Ottoman Government, and 
 additional duties of 6% for the Beys. Half of the 6% tax was 
 to be paid by English merchants, half by the native purchasers at 
 the Cairo mart.^^ In submitting the treaty to the Foreign Office, 
 Baldwin’s secretary pointed out that the communication through 
 Egypt, which had been the source of British interest in Egypt for 
 a number of years, would be safe only if it had the accompaniment 
 of trade. Obviously the Beys had made strong representations on 
 that point. 
 
 Almost at the moment the treaty was concluded, the British 
 cruiser Panther arrived at Suez with Bombay despatches for the 
 Court of Directors in London. This happy incident served sev- 
 eral purposes.^® It enabled Baldwin to send a copy of the new 
 treaty to London by a courier from Bombay, Major Macdonald, 
 it gave an opportunity for the Beys to demonstrate their coopera- 
 tion, as it seemed to them to presage the arrival of merchant ships 
 in the near future, and it permitted Baldwin to advertise in the 
 presidencies the new commercial engagement. Upon the return 
 of the Panther to India at the end of August, Baldwin despatched 
 his secretary, Willis, to the Council of Bombay, bearing a memo- 
 rial on the opportunity which now offered for the reopening of 
 the trade with Egypt. In this, taking for granted the approval 
 of the home authorities, Baldwin assured the Governor and 
 Council of Bombay of the likelihood that his treaty with the Beys 
 would be ratified at the Porte, now that Sir Robert Ainslie had 
 been replaced by Robert Lisbon as Ambassador. The trade with 
 Egypt, he pointed out, was safe, in any case. Finally, he appealed 
 for a show of the revival of trade in order to safeguard the route 
 through Egypt, if for no other purpose.'® 
 
 The substance of the treaty is contained in Charles-Roux, V Anghterre, etc., 
 pp. 320—323. 
 
 I. O., Factory Records, Vol. 6, Despatch from Alexandria, lo April, 1793. 
 Maj. Macdonald was the bearer of only a portion of the despatches destined for 
 London. The others were intrusted to Baldwin to forward as best he might. The 
 originals he sent on to London by way of Constantinople, expecting to send duplicates 
 by another route. The originals apparently did not reach their destination. Baldwin 
 was too ill to exert himself with regard to the duplicates, and he had no authority 
 to hire a vessel, in any event. It was only in November, 1797, that these were 
 sent on to London by a chance traveller. 
 
 Charles-Roux, L' Angleterre, etc., pp. 324—325. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 47 
 
 Next Baldwin turned his attention to securing the formal assent 
 of the Porte to the proposed resumption of trading operations. 
 Baldwin’s reflection on this point had counselled tact. “ I pre- 
 sume, my Lord,” he wrote to Lord Grenville on October 10, 1794, 
 “ that it will be sufficient to demand the privilege of coming to 
 Suez, as well as any other port belonging to the Grand Seignior, 
 as an article already included in the Capitulations, without 
 requesting the sanction of our treaty with the beys.” ” With all 
 this he thought fully to justify the establishment of the consular 
 office in Egypt and to secure the continuation of the post, which 
 would, he said, with the development of the projected trade, 
 produce a revenue which would cover the cost of the establish- 
 ment. 
 
 All these efforts, however, were to no avail. Baldwin did not 
 receive even a note of acknowledgment from the Foreign Office 
 after the treaty had been forwarded from Egypt. The records 
 of the Foreign Office and of the East India Company give no 
 indication that the existence of the treaty was ever mentioned 
 in any of the despatches to the British Ambassador at Constan- 
 tinople. Eight years earlier the hope of accomplishing such a 
 treaty had been the principal factor in the establishment of the 
 English consulate in Egypt. Now the consummation of this hope 
 was ignored utterly. The reasons for this neglect in 1794 are not 
 definitely known, but they may be conjectured with some de- 
 gree of confidence. In the first place. Sir Robert Ainslie was in 
 London, in the good graces of the Foreign Office, and he would 
 naturally have used all of his influence to discredit Baldwin. In 
 the second place, with the exception of the message sent to India 
 in 1792 leading to the capture of Pondicherry, few messages of 
 importance had passed through Egypt in Tate years, and those 
 were in many instances long in reaching their destination. Since 
 merchant vessels no longer sailed to Egypt at frequent intervals, 
 messages had to be despatched, on the oriental side of Egypt, 
 either in British or Company’s vessels of war or in native boats. 
 The former method was far too expensive for frequent communi- 
 cation, while the latter was altogether unreliable. At best, the 
 communication between India and Egypt had to be seasonal, due 
 to the fury of the southwest monsoon. 
 
 Doubtless there were other contributing factors. The frequent 
 changes of control in Egypt during the last quarter of the century 
 were not calculated to inspire great faith in the permanence or 
 stability of any particular regime or in faithful adherence to its 
 treaty engagements. Moreover, having taken the step of sup- 
 pressing the consular office at a time when no treaty was in sight, 
 
 ’’’’ F. O., 24/1, Baldwin, lo Oct., 1794; cited in Charles-Roux, of. cit., p. 327. 
 
48 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 the Foreign Office could scarcely restore the post merely because 
 of the sudden appearance of a document of questionable intrinsic 
 value. Even the commercial possibilities seemed slight. The 
 English had no commercial establishments in any part of Egypt, 
 and those established there long before by the French were lan- 
 guishing. Nor did the prospect of a revival of trade appeal to 
 English interests in India as it had in the days of Warren Hastings. 
 Baldwin’s appeal to Bombay for merchant vessels fell on ears 
 nearly as deaf as those at the Foreign Office in London. It has 
 already been indicated that the prospect of French or Russian pre- 
 ponderance in the eastern Mediterranean caused no such emotions 
 of fear and anxiety as recurred again and again during the course 
 of the nineteenth century.^® Thus, the various considerations 
 which had led to the abolition of the consular establishment were 
 sufficiently numerous and weighty to prevent any serious recon- 
 sideration of the action.^® 
 
 Although the British Government after 1786 steadily lost in- 
 terest in Egypt, discovering there neither attractive commercial 
 opportunities nor a reliable and essential high road to India, other 
 European powers were less short-sighted. It was very generally 
 believed on the continent that the Ottoman Empire would not 
 survive another major war without breaking up, and already 
 estimates were being made of the division of spoil. In this 
 Russia was particularly forehanded. Having already acquired 
 considerable portions both of Polish and Turkish territory, her 
 appetite was thereby made the keener for further acquisitions 
 which might lead to the much-coveted seaport on the Mediter- 
 ranean.®” France, having had no taste of Turkish blood, was 
 anxious for one.®^ 
 
 As early as 1785, when another Russo-Turkish war was in 
 prospect, suggestions were made for a partition of Turkish terri- 
 tories. The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg was approached 
 with the proposal that France take over certain Mediterranean 
 portions of Turkey in the event of war. The French Govern- 
 
 See above, pp. 9, 12, 17. 
 
 Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, etc., p. 330, calls attention to the additional 
 fact that Baldwin, during his term as consul, had not literally obeyed his instruc- 
 tions. Whereas he had been directed to reside at the native capital, Cairo, he had, as a 
 matter of fact, lived at Alexandria. Moreover, as I have pointed out above, the 
 continuation of his office was to depend upon his success in negotiating a treaty at 
 once. The fact that this was altogether impracticable did not place on the British 
 Government any obligation to continue the establishment. 
 
 See William Miller, The Ottoman Emftre and Its Successors, 1801—1922, 
 pp. 7-16, et fasshn. 
 
 Charles-Roux, Les Ortgines de VExpedition d’Egypte, pp. 137— 145. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 49 
 
 ment, although visibly interested, did not follow up the proposal.®^ 
 When war actually broke out between Russia and Turkey in 1787, 
 however, the successor of the great Vergennes, Montmorin, was 
 besieged with plans for French annexation of Cyprus, Candia, 
 Crete, and even Egypt. Some of these owed their details to the 
 fear that England, which power obviously had great interests 
 at stake in Egypt, would take over that country, and the rees- 
 tablishment of the consulate and the contemporaneous publication 
 in England of various books and pamphlets on the value of Egypt 
 to England gave color to the suspicion.®® 
 
 Whatever impulse the French Government may have had to 
 embark on a career of conquest in the eastern Mediterranean was 
 held in abeyance by the financial condition of France, which made 
 aggression on a large scale quite beyond the bounds of possibility. 
 Even the matter of establishing a route through Egypt for de- 
 spatches had to be discarded for the same general reason: packet 
 boats which did not pay their own way by the cargoes they carried 
 proved to be expensive luxuries. So it was with France as with 
 Great Britain 5 “the project of conquering or occupying Egypt 
 remained only a pro j ect, seductive without doubt, but adventurous 
 and above all prohibited.” 
 
 The Russian Government, under Catherine the Great, was 
 unlike that of France in being embarrassed neither by scruple nor 
 by dearth of funds. Being particularly anxious to secure a hold 
 on the Mediterranean, every prospect of obtaining such a prize 
 was carefully canvassed. Unexpectedly Egypt became a land of 
 promise. In 1785' a group of Beys, led by the irrepressible 
 Ibrahim, determined to secure independence, if possible, by means 
 of foreign alliance. For that reason they entered into secret 
 negotiations with Russia, confiding their plans meanwhile to 
 Baldwin. The Russian Consul, the Baron de Thonus, handled 
 the situation awkwardly enough, and suggested appealing to 
 Austria for assistance. The Porte, meanwhile, aware of these 
 schemes, sent reenforcements to Egypt to support their tottering 
 regime and to await the anticipated Russian attack. It did not at 
 once materialize. During the course of the subsequent Russo- 
 Turkish War, however, when Egypt was practically defenceless, 
 a significant gesture was made. In August, 1788, a Russian frig- 
 ate of forty guns, accompanied by two transports bearing arms, 
 munitions and gifts appeared before the town of Damietta, di- 
 
 Ibid., pp. 176—177. 
 
 83 Works by the well-known travellers, Volney and Savary, for instance. Even 
 the practicability of an isthmian or a Nile canal to open an all-water route was 
 considered in the former. 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Angleterre, etc., p. 279. 
 
50 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 rected by the former consul, Baron de Thonus. The French agent 
 at Damietta immediately placed himself at the service of the 
 Russians, “ whether through a national interest in the Russian 
 design or through imbecility, I do not know,” said Baldwin.*® 
 The purpose of the Russians apparently was to encourage the 
 Beys to undertake a general revolt against Turkey. But the proj- 
 ect met an early death. The subtility of the Turkish creature, 
 Ismail, was more than a match for the bluster of the Russian 
 agents, and the affair ended with the temporary incarceration of 
 both Baron de Thonus and the French agent. The main Russian 
 fleet, which had been advertised by the Russian Consul, did not 
 appear in Egyptian waters, and Ismail remained for the time 
 being master of the situation.*® The first Russian overture to the 
 Beys had a sequel, however, which smacked of opera houjfe. In 
 January, 1790, Ainslie was instructed from the British Foreign 
 Office to inform the Porte of an astounding plan of the Russians 
 for the conquest of Egypt. It was no less than a plan to despatch 
 from Kronstadt a high seas fleet of eight vessels of war around 
 the Cape of Good Hope to the Red Sea under the Dutch flag. 
 Jeddah and Yambo were to be destroyed, Mecca and Medina 
 pillaged, the tomb of Mohammed violated, and Egypt threat- 
 ened.®^ There indeed appeared no likelihood that adequate 
 measures could be taken for averting such a powerful blow, and 
 while the Turks displayed great excitement, practically nothing 
 was done. On this as on many other occasions Turkish apathy 
 remained unpunished. No Russian fleet appeared in the Red 
 Sea, and the enterprise of the Baron de Thonus remained the only 
 naval exploit in Egyptian waters. Baldwin, who had taken the 
 whole Russian episode philosophically enough, returned to his 
 denunciation of French machinations. 
 
 For the time being, French designs were hardly to be feared. 
 In 1789 occurred the deluge anticipated for years, which com- 
 pletely swept away the ancien regime. But the National Assembly 
 proved to be an apt student of international affairs, and readily 
 gave ear to a memorial submitted by the French merchants in the 
 Levant in 1790. 
 
 If the French abandon Cairo [they said], the communica- 
 tion with the East Indies is interrupted^ our vessels will no 
 longer bring to Suez the cloths of Bengal. This commerce, 
 
 Charles-Roux, L’Ayigleterre, etc., p. 292. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 292-294. 
 
 F. O., Turkey, ii. The Duke of Leeds to Ainslie, 8 Jan., 1790; cited in 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 297. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 51 
 
 which has caused so much anxiety to the English Company, 
 which, better directed, could give them a mortal blow, is lost 
 for France.*® 
 
 To avoid this loss, the merchants asked that a new treaty be 
 signed with Turkey, based on the Capitulations, enjoining the 
 Egyptian authorities from placing obstacles in the way of com- 
 mercial operations. It was even suggested that a small French 
 fleet, blockading the Mediterranean ports of Egypt, or the seizure 
 of the annual supply fleet from Jeddah to Suez, could quickly 
 bring the Beys to terms. By such means would the French be 
 entrenched in Egypt. “ Cairo offers an easy communication with 
 the East Indies, and the port of Suez would be fatal to the Eng- 
 lish. . . The colossus which the English have raised in Bengal 
 would be thrown down.” 
 
 However, the following years were dark for the French in the 
 Levant. The French East India Company lost its chartered 
 privileges. French trade fell off. French merchants, deprived 
 of the protection of a firm government, were mistreated in eastern 
 markets where formerly they had been courted. The vigor of 
 the National Convention gave hope that such wrongs would be 
 redressed, and a new memorial was sent to the Marine Depart- 
 ment in 1793 reiterating the necessity of keeping hold of strategic 
 points in Egypt, by armed force, if necessary.®® This appeal, 
 being more timely, was more effective than the preceding. Its 
 immediate effect was to bring about the reestablishment of the 
 French Consulate at Cairo, which had been suppressed since i77'7- 
 The choice for this position was the merchant Magallon, who was 
 gazetted consul on the thirtieth of January, 1793, nine days prior 
 to the date of the letter from the British Foreign Office which 
 relieved Baldwin of his position as Consul General in Egypt. 
 It was these developments which produced new despairing pro- 
 tests to the English Government against the abandonment of 
 Egypt. In January, 1795, Sir William Sidney Smith, brother of 
 Spencer Smith, secretary of the British Embassy at the Porte, 
 memorialized the Foreign Office on the plans of the French and 
 the likelihood that they would be able to revive the old trade 
 route through Egypt to the great detriment of the English. This 
 the Foreign Minister was slow to believe. It did not appear 
 
 Archives of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, quoted in Charles- 
 Roux, Les Origines de ^Expedition d’Egypte, p. 225. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 227—228. 
 
 Archives, Affaires Etrangeres, Cairo, i Feb., 1793; quoted in ibid., pp. 
 248—250. 
 
 Charles-Roux, Les Origines, etc., p. 252. 
 
52 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 probable that the French Republic would be able to execute such 
 a project, or that it would jeopardize its influence at Constan- 
 tinople by military action in Egypt. In London the matter was 
 allowed to rest. 
 
 The reestablishment of a French consulate at Cairo did not 
 lead to better relations with the Beys. Indeed, it resulted in no 
 immediate advantages to French merchants in Egypt, who found 
 it necessary to remain in Alexandria for their safety. The re- 
 juvenated French Government, however, proved to be more 
 persistent than the Bourbon monarchy had been. In October, 
 1795, a special agent, Dubois-Thainville arrived at Alexandria 
 for the purpose of treating directly with the Beys for the opening 
 of a regular trade and communication between Suez and India. 
 These negotiations, coming to the ears of Baldwin, led him to see a 
 plan for attacking India through Egypt — a plan which he com- 
 municated at once to the British Foreign Office, suggesting that 
 a consular office might still be of service. Although this produced 
 only a terse statement from London reiterating the suppression 
 of Baldwin's former office, he still loyally used his influence with 
 the Beys to defeat Dubois-Thainville’s project. In 1801 Baldwin 
 noted in his Political Recollections that “ In 1796 a certain Tin- 
 ville arrived in Cairo to inveigle the Beys of Egypt into the 
 designs of the French, and particularly to obtain consent to their 
 project of passing an army through Egypt, to the East Indies, by 
 the Red Sea, in order to strengthen Tipoo (the Sultan of Mysore), 
 and finally to annihilate the British Dominion in the East In- 
 dies.” However true that may have been, it anticipated such 
 an attempt only by a matter of two years. 
 
 The lack of success in treating with the Beys of Egypt at last 
 led the French to make a serious study of the purpose Baldwin 
 had so long attributed to them. Magallon had already pointed 
 the way. In 1795 he wrote — 
 
 Masters of the Red Sea, we should not be long in giving 
 the law to the English and in ousting them from India. . . 
 By way of Suez, during the favorable monsoon, a quantity of 
 troops could be transported to India with few vessels. Our 
 soldiers would not need to be on the sea more than sixty days, 
 instead of, by way of the Cape of Good Hope, a matter of 
 six months. By way of Suez we should not lose one man in 
 a hundred} by the other way, we should be very fortunate 
 not to lose ten per cent.®* 
 
 George Baldwin, Political Recollections Relative to Egypt, p. 28. 
 
 17 June, 1795, quoted in Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, etc., pp. 342—34.3. 
 
COMPETITION FOR THE OVERLAND ROUTE 53 
 And later he stated to the Commissioner of Foreign Relations — 
 
 Departing from Toulon on the 20th of June, French 
 troops could be at Alexandria on the lOth of July, at Cairo 
 about the 20th, at Suez about the 2 5th, forty-five days later in ♦ 
 India, before the English would have had time to take any 
 defensive measure. Ten thousand French newly arrived 
 from Europe, in a single campaign, would chase them out 
 entirely from Bengal, where they have their principal mili- 
 tary establishment.®* 
 
 It was these letters of Magallon’s which led to a detailed in- 
 vestigation by the French Directory of the practicability of acting 
 on such recommendations. The idea of a military and naval 
 expedition to Egypt began to emerge from the realm of specula- 
 tion and to assume a garb of definiteness. The continued arrival 
 of English vesels at Suez at irregular intervals, bearing despatches 
 and, in some instances, articles of trade, spurred on the plan.®® 
 Magallon was recalled from Egypt to contribute his counsels to 
 the scheme. By the end of 1797 the idea of an expedition direct 
 to Egypt and on to India was far advanced toward completion. 
 Only George Baldwin remained as an English bulwark between 
 France and India, and his services were nearing an end.®® He was 
 old, feeble, and nearly blind, and now that he was long out of 
 profitable employment his resources were very meagre. But 
 before the impending stroke was delivered by his enemies the 
 French, to whose undoing he had devoted the better portion of 
 his life, even he had left Egypt to spend his last days in his own 
 country, which had rewarded his services so poorly. 
 
 I Oct., 1795. 
 
 Baldwin, of. cit., p. 30; Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, etc., p. 341. 
 
 Baldwin’s last patriotic service, according to his own account, was the despatch 
 of information concerning the departure from Europe of a fleet of Dutch trans- 
 ports, bound for the Cape of Good Hope, to Admiral Elphinstone, then in command 
 of an English fleet in Indian waters. This enabled the English to capture the 
 Dutch off the Cape and so to save Cape Colony for the English. — Baldwin, of. 
 cit., p. 29. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 BLOWS AT Britain’s “ feet of clay ” 
 
 I N THE decade between 1788 and 1798 there were few de- 
 velopments of note in Egypt. Trading vessels continued to 
 arrive at Red Sea ports at distant intervals, and packets of 
 despatches crossed Egypt back and forth en route to India or 
 England. George Baldwin’s treaty with the Beys in 1794, al- 
 though ignored in England, still exerted some slight influence on 
 the use of the overland route. ^ After the French declaration of 
 war in 1793 unusual care had to be exercised in sending English 
 vessels to Egyptian waters, but few interruptions of the route were 
 due to French interference during this interval. 
 
 The French Revolution made no appreciable change in French 
 policy or practice in the East. Those Frenchmen who had served 
 under the old regime of Louis XVT became the loyal servants 
 of the Revolution and were spurred on to increased activity. The 
 new wave of proselytism inaugurated by revolutionary France 
 coincided very nearly with the policy of non-intervention in 
 Asiatic states long planned by the East India Company and now 
 seriously undertaken by the Governor-General of India, Sir John 
 Shore. Such a policy of retrenchment created the inevitable 
 impression of British decadence among the native potentates in 
 India and western Asia and thus played into the hands of the 
 French. In several instances alliances w'ere formed between 
 France and oriental states for the purpose of driving out the 
 English. The spring of 1798 saw the defection of several of the 
 most powerful of the Indian states. Among these was Mysore, 
 whose Sultan, Tipoo Sahib, gladly employed the services of 
 French officers in the training of his troops in modern warfare 
 against the day when the cooperation of French forces would 
 make possible the complete expulsion of the English from India.^ 
 
 ^ I. O. Factory Records, Egypt and Red Sea, Vol. 6, despatch of 5 Apr., 1798; 
 J. S. Buckingham, Travels in Palestine. . . (London, 1821), pp. viii, ix. 
 
 - F. Charles-Roux, UAngleterre, Plsthfne de Suez, et I’Egypte, p. 367. 
 
 ® Ibid., pp. 348, 360, 364. 
 
 54 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “FEET OF CLAY” 55 
 
 By the time French plans were ripe for invading Egypt, the 
 outlook for British interests in Asia was decidedly dark. 
 
 The Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in May, 179^? which so 
 astonished the world and left such a train of important con- 
 sequences, did not spring solely from the ambition and genius of 
 the Corsican, as many contemporaries believed. Rather, it was 
 the logical outgrowth of a generation of French policy in the 
 Levant translated into action by peculiarly favorable circumstances 
 both in Europe and in the East. Earlier French traders and 
 strategists had advocated the seizure of Egypt for the commercial 
 advantages which would be sure to follow, or to forestall a similar 
 move on the part of the English to control the trade of the Red 
 Sea or to keep open a route of communications. But after 1792 
 the project was considered by the French Directory as a means of 
 striking a vital blow at Great Britain. “Egypt,” argued the 
 Marquis de Talleyrand, “ offers us, besides, the means of ousting 
 the English from India by sending a body of 1 5,000 troops from 
 Cairo by way of Suez.” * By the beginning of the year 1798 the 
 idea of attacking the English in India by way of Egypt had sprung 
 up spontaneously in several quarters, since the despatch of ' a 
 French fleet by way of the Cape of Good Hope was obviously 
 impracticable.® 
 
 Such a plan could not but appeal to the master strategist Na- 
 poleon Bonaparte, in whose fertile mind the details of such an 
 operation were maturing while he was still unaware of the study 
 devoted to the project for years by various officials of government. 
 In the belief that he was broaching a novel plan, Bonaparte wrote 
 to the Directors in August, 1797, his conviction that “ The times 
 are not distant when we feel that, in order really to destroy Eng- 
 land, it will be necessary to seize Egypt.” ® But already the 
 Directors had before them a great deal of information bearing on 
 the value of Egypt and the means of acquiring that country, and 
 were more than half convinced of the practicability of attempting 
 such a daring stroke in that direction. It required only the dis- 
 covery of the obstacles in the way of a direct invasion of England 
 to bring Bonaparte and the Directory into full accord upon the ad- 
 visability of a quick, powerful and secret blow at Egypt.^ 
 
 ^ Quoted in Hid., p. 369. 
 
 ® Ii>id., p. 34.7. 
 
 ® Le Baron I. de Testa, Recueil des Traites de la Porte Ottomane . . . I, 516. 
 
 ^ F. Charles-Roux, Les Origines de P Expedition d’Egypte, p. 341. This author, 
 who has made a careful and accurate study of the factors involved, believes that 
 the expedition to Egypt, in spite of long continued plans, would not have been 
 undertaken in 1798 if France had not been at war with England and had not found 
 it impracticable to make a direct attack on that country. 
 
56 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Such a course was determined upon on April 12, 1798, and 
 preparations were immediately begun. Armaments were pre- 
 pared at Toulon, Corsica, various Italian ports, and Corfu. Many 
 of the troops of the “ army of England ” were reorganized into 
 the “ army of the Orient.” Diplomatic plans kept pace with 
 military and naval preparations. Despatches couched in glowing 
 terms were sent express to restive rulers of the East to inform 
 them that the day of deliverance from the British yoke was near.® 
 Statements were prepared to legitimize an unprovoked attack on 
 an Ottoman territory. For this purpose, it was made to appear 
 that “ the Beys of Egypt, who have themselves seized the gov- 
 ernment of Egypt, have formed the closest associations with the 
 English and have placed themselves under their control.” In 
 consequence of the many injuries heaped upon the French because 
 of this alliance, “ it is the duty of the Republic to pursue its 
 enemies wherever they are to be found and in whatever place 
 they carry on their hostile operations.” ® By this means the 
 Directory hoped to justify its actions and preserve the neutrality, 
 if not the friendship, of the Porte, which was looked upon as 
 essential to the success of the enterprise and for which French 
 representatives at Constantinople had long been laboring.^® 
 
 It had not occurred to the English, meanwhile, that their 
 Gallic rivals might be harboring designs on the possession of 
 Egypt. George Baldwin had often raised the cry of “ wolf! ” in 
 vain. Secure in the feeling that the Ottoman Government would 
 be able to care for its own, they took no thought of Egypt for 
 themselves and could not impute such thoughts to others. There 
 was now no English consul in Egypt j not even an English mer- 
 chant was established there. The Levant Company had long since 
 lost all interest in the country, and the East India Company was 
 not sufficiently interested in its overland communications to take 
 active steps to safeguard them. It required a war with France 
 and a major attack by the French on Egypt to change the attitude 
 of the British Government from one of neglect to one of active 
 interest in the condition of Egypt. 
 
 The stroke authorized by the Directory was quickly executed. 
 On May 19 a large French fleet sailed from Toulon convoying 
 a vast array of transports bearing a veteran army of nearly 40,000 
 men. A corps of able young officers accompanied the expedition 
 
 ® See De Testa, op. cit., I, 520 ff., 573. 
 
 ® De Testa, op. cit., I, 536; Clement, Marquis de la Jonquiere, UE.xpedition 
 d'Egypte, 1798-1801 (4 vols., Paris, n. d.), I, 343-344. Cf. Charles-Roux, L\ 4 n- 
 gleterre, etc., p. 362. 
 
 De Testa, op. cit., I, 538. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 57 
 
 and a large group of civil experts was taken along to survey the 
 country to be occupied, to study its character, and to report on its 
 value. The work was to be done thoroughly. The English, 
 meanwhile, were at a loss to comprehend these proceedings. In 
 spite of numerous significant signs and warnings from observers,’^ 
 there was no thought among Government heads that the expedi- 
 tion was aimed at Egypt. Lord Nelson, who was sent into the 
 Mediterranean to counteract French purposes, could scarcely 
 hazard a guess as to the meaning of French plans. This enabled 
 Napoleon to execute his first projects. Barely evading the Eng- 
 lish fleet, he seized and garrisoned Malta on the excuse that the 
 act was to prevent the island’s falling prey to Austria. 
 
 Having sequestered the treasure of the Knights of St. John, 
 the French fleet departed for Egypt and arrived without warning 
 at Alexandria, only twenty-four hours after Nelson had quitted 
 the place, assured that the French were bound elsewhere. Na- 
 poleon’s arrival was so sudden and unexpected that the English 
 transient in Egypt had no opportunity of escaping with their 
 property. Baldwin was no longer there to give counsel to the 
 distracted Egyptians. Leaving his affairs in the hands of the 
 Venetian, Rosetti, he had departed for his native country on 
 March 14.^® English goods still littered the markets in Cairo and 
 ships from India were unloading at Suez. The French seized a 
 large portion of an Indian mail containing some valuable secret 
 papers which had just arrived at Alexandria, and an English ves- 
 sel in the harbor barely escaped with the remainder as the French 
 transports sailed in. 
 
 The landing of troops from the French vessels and the taking 
 of Alexandria were quickly accomplished. Attention was then 
 directed to the immediate purpose of the expedition, which was 
 the building of a series of forts for the control of the passageway 
 from Alexandria through Cairo to the head of the Red Sea. At 
 Suez a French fleet was to be collected which might presently sail 
 to inflict the long-meditated mortal blow on Britain in India. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut stifra, “ Memoir Concerning Egypt and the Red Sea,” by 
 A. Dalrymple. 
 
 De Testa, o^. cit., I, 517; J. J. E. Roy, Les Frangais en Egy-pte, ou Souvenirs 
 des Camf agues d^Egyfte et la Syrie, far un Officier de PExf edition , . . (Tours, 
 1855). PP- 19-21- 
 
 2® 1 . O. Records, ut sufra, despatch of 3 Mar., 1798; Charles-Roux, UAit~ 
 gleterre, etc., p. 368; D. A. Cameron, Egyft in the Nineteenth Century (London, 
 1898), pp. 217—218; William James, The Naval History of Great Britain, from the 
 Declaration of War by France in 1792, to the Accession of George IV (New ed., 
 6 vols., London, 1886), II, 169-175. 
 
 J. F. Miot, Memoires four servir a I’Histoire des Exf editions en Egyfte et en 
 Syrie {Paris, 1804). The account of the invasion is given at length by La Jonquiere, 
 in L’Exf edition d’Egyfte. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 58 
 
 While Egypt was being subdued and fortifications were being 
 constructed, French engineers ran a line of levels between the 
 Mediterranean and Red Seas in order to ascertain whether it were 
 possible to construct a sea-level ship canal. The results of this 
 survey were not at all encouraging, not so much because of the 
 impediments found as because of an apparent difference of thirty- 
 two and a half feet in the levels of the two seas.^® The report of 
 this survey effectually ended for the time all projects for a ship 
 canal between the two seas. 
 
 Meanwhile, French designs on India had been checked in more 
 serious ways. In April, 1798 — three months before Bonaparte’s 
 landing in Egypt — Sir John Shore had been succeeded as Gov- 
 ernor-General in India by Richard Wellesley, Earl of Morning- 
 ton. Wellesley was already aware of the critical nature of affairs 
 in India and he acted promptly and vigorously to create a margin 
 of safety. His apprehension of French agents and his summary 
 demands of Indian princes that they discharge French officers and 
 disband their armies ended the immediate danger of a general 
 uprising in India and went far toward restoring fallen prestige. 
 To these decisive measures was added the influence of a great 
 naval victory in Egyptian waters. 
 
 Bonaparte had found both the outer and inner harbors at 
 Alexandria too shallow and intricate to accommodate his powerful 
 navy in safety. While his transports discharged their living 
 freight at Alexandria, therefore, the high seas fleet was sent off 
 to anchor in a protected position at Aboukir Bay, proximate to 
 one of the mouths of the Nile. Here the French fleet was at last 
 discovered by Lord Nelson, after a long and heart-breaking search, 
 on August I, and battle was Immediately joined, with the French 
 fleet still at anchor. By the morning of August 2, the French 
 fleet, although potentially stronger, perhaps, than that of the 
 English, was almost entirely destroyed or captured. It was a 
 timely and peculiarly decisive action.^® The French army, al- 
 though undefeated, was marooned. 
 
 Description de PEgypte, ou Recueil des Ohservations et des Rec/ierches qui orit 
 ete fakes en Egypte, pendant P Expedition de P Annie frangaise, publii par les 
 Ordres de Napoleon le Grand (lo vols., Paris, 1809-1822), I, 57—58; De Testa, of. 
 cit., II, 82—85. The difference in levels reported by the French surveyors had a ven,' 
 considerable effect on the later development of routes to India. The reputation of 
 these engineers for accuracy was such that their findings were everywhere accepted as 
 authoritative until definitely disproved by surveyors in the emplo)' of Ferdinand de 
 Lesseps much later. De Lesseps himself seems to have been inspired by surveys of the 
 Isthmus made about 1830 which were not highly credited at the time. See F. R. 
 Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, p. 1 1 ; ParUa?nentary Paper, 1S3+, 
 No. 478, Min. of Ev., p. 2. 
 
 James, op. cit., II, 215; Hansard, The Parliamentary History of England 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 59 
 
 Although deprived of the possibility of receiving supplies and 
 reenforcements from France, Bonaparte continued his military 
 operations in Egypt, giving rise to the thought that he still hoped 
 to reach India by way of the Red Sea. Nelson therefore took 
 measures to apprise the Indian Presidencies of French designs as 
 quickly as possible that they might be on guard.’^ On August lO 
 he commissioned Lieut. Thomas Duval to proceed to India with 
 despatches by what was frequently termed at that period the 
 overland route. Lieut. Duval sailed in a native boat from Egypt 
 to Alexandretta where he was welcomed by the Turkish author- 
 ities. Procuring an Arab costume, he continued by way of Aleppo 
 to Bagdad. The Pasha of Bagdad, pleased by the news of the 
 victory of the Nile, heaped honors on him, and furnished him 
 with a boat which conveyed him to Basrah. Here, after a brief 
 delay, he was able to take passage on an English packet vessel, 
 and on October 2i he arrived at Bombay, having completed the 
 journey, including stops, in about seventy days.’® From this time 
 forward for a number of years despatches were sent to and from 
 India by way of a line through Syria and Mesopotamia or through 
 Arabia to the Persian Gulf. The other overland route through 
 Egypt was not extensively used again until the advent of steam 
 navigation.’® 
 
 Even the route through Syria was placed in jeopardy by the 
 French as soon as the conquest of Egypt had been completed. 
 Although his friendly sentiments toward Mohammedans in 
 general and the Ottoman Porte in particular had been reiterated, 
 Bonaparte had been unable to preserve the neutrality of the Turks 
 and he was compelled to face their open hostility. Under these 
 circumstances a plan presented itself which apparently had not 
 been thought of when the expeditionary force departed from 
 France.®® This was no less than to use Egypt as a base of opera- 
 tions for invading Syria and seizing the ports garrisoned by the 
 Turks, and to march thence overland to India, relying on the 
 friendship of the restive Arabs and Persians for assistance against 
 
 (London, 1819), XXXIII, 1527; Charles Norry, An Account of the French Ex- 
 f edition to Egy ft . . . (Trans, from the French: London, 1800), pp. 10-12. Norry 
 was an eye-witness of the battle. Lord Nelson received, among other rewards for 
 this victory, a gift of £10,000 from the East India Company, “ with a proper sense of 
 the benefit they derived from the Nile victory.” 
 
 1 . O. Records, ut sufra, “ Extract of Letter from the Governor in Council at 
 Bombay to the Governor-General in Council,” 16 Nov., 1798. 
 
 James, of. cit., II, 206, 465—466. 
 
 E. B. B. Barker, Syria and Egyft under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey (2 
 vols., London, 1876), I, 55. 
 
 De Testa, of. cit., I, 546-548, 564, 567, 572—575; Chares-Roux, UAngle- 
 terre, etc., p. 363. 
 
6o 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 the English. The move was rash, but it was undertaken. The 
 Syrian campaign was in many respects brilliant, but it ended in 
 complete failure. An English fleet prevented the occupation of 
 important Syrian ports, Turkish armies loomed up on the north 
 and threatened an invasion of Egypt in the rear, while the French 
 were not equipped for long marches through the unknown semi- 
 arid regions eastward. Defeat was written in the retreat to Egypt, 
 as the hasty return of Bonaparte to France bore witness. 
 
 Even with its commander in France and without a supporting 
 fleet, an undefeated French army in Egypt was a potential danger. 
 So thought Sir Sidney Smith, when he arranged the Convention 
 of El Arish between the Ottoman Government and General 
 Kleber, in charge of the French army, providing for the peaceful 
 evacuation of Egypt by the French, arms and all. This arrange- 
 ment, however, was disavowed by the British Ministry, and as 
 Egypt had by this time come to be considered vital to the safety 
 of India, “ the corner-stone of the Empire,” an Egyptian cam- 
 paign became necessary.^^ 
 
 Already the Bombay Government had sent an armed force to 
 establish military bases at the mouth of the Red Sea to obstruct 
 any possible move of the French toward India by that route. A 
 base was first prepared on the island of Perim, but because of the 
 unhealthy environment this proved to be a death trap for the 
 East India Company’s troops. Within a few months the survivors 
 were transferred to Aden on the Arabian coast, though the Gov- 
 ernment of India considered it unwise to make more than tem- 
 porary use of the position.^® In i8oi a combined military and 
 naval force came out from India to cooperate with English forces 
 which approached from the Mediterranean. Indian troops, land- 
 ing at various points along the coast of Upper Egypt, moved 
 down the Nile Valley with Cairo as their objective. But before 
 these forces under Gen. Sir David Baird could efllectively employ 
 their strength, English contingents under Gen. Sir Ralph Aber- 
 cromby had taken Cairo in June and Alexandria in September.''* 
 
 General Henri G., Comte Bertrand, Catnpagnes d'Egyfte et de Syrie (2 vols., 
 Paris, 1847), II; Hansard, Pari. Hist., XXXIV, 1159; Miot, op. cit., pp. 111—136; 
 The French Expedition into Syria, Comprising General Buonaparte’s Letters, etc., 
 (2d ed., London, 1799). 
 
 Hansard, Pari. Hist., XXXV, 214-216, 587-598, 1436-1444; De Testa, 
 op. cit., H, 7—15. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6. This position was destined to come under the 
 British flag a generation later, and to remain one of the principal stations on the 
 route between England and India traversing the Red Sea. 
 
 James, op. cit., HI, 81-95; C. R. Low, History of the Indian Na^'y, I, 218, 
 219; Sir Robert T. Wilson, History of the British Expedition to Egypt (London, 
 1803), pp. 166 ff.; “Journal of the English Expedition from India to Egt'pt,” in 
 The Oriental Herald, XV, 235—248; De Testa, op. cit., II, 31—42. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 6i 
 
 These events and the Peace of Amiens brought to ruin the first 
 French attempt to reach India in force by one of the shorter 
 routes. 
 
 The sequel is not so dramatic, but is of some significance. After 
 the disappearance of the French from Egypt, the relations be- 
 tween the British forces on the one hand and the Egyptians on the 
 other soon became strained. The English ideal of a semi- 
 independent Egypt ruled by the Beys was hotly opposed at Con- 
 stantinople, where it was hoped that Turkish control of Egypt 
 might be greatly increased as a result of the late troubles. The 
 upshot of these bickerings was the rise of a new Turkish champion 
 in the form of a young Albanian adventurer, Mehemet Ali. His 
 allegiance fluctuated as interest dictated. Thus he advanced from 
 post to post until in July, 1805, he was strong enough to obtain 
 his appointment as Pasha of Egypt. The English had already 
 evacuated Egypt in 1803, leaving their afltairs in the hands of a 
 new “ British Proconsul,” Samuel Briggs.^® Being thus dis- 
 engaged, Mehemet Ali proceeded to indulge in an orgy of 
 slaughter in which he crushed the power of the Mamelukes, and 
 was then free to disclose his friendly sentiments for the French, 
 whom he warmly admired.^® 
 
 These events appeared to open Egypt to French influence 
 anew. Even in defeat, Bonaparte had not given up his plans for 
 making at least a feint at India by employing the route through 
 Egypt. In 1802, he had sent Colonel Sebastiani on a tour of in- 
 spection to Egypt, and upon his return to France, prepared a 
 memoir in which he stated his belief that a force of 6000 French 
 might take Egypt, even against the English. This, published in 
 the Moniteur in 1803, considerably revived French hopes of a 
 successful stroke in India, and prompted the sending out of Gen- 
 eral Decaen to maintain the hopes of Indian rulers in the coming 
 of a French army of relief.^^ 
 
 The opening of a new Anglo-French conflict in the East oc- 
 curred not in Egypt but at Constantinople. As the Napoleonic 
 wars progressed and the Continental System was instituted, Russia 
 was inevitably drawn into the European struggle. The approach 
 of a Russian campaign opened for the French the diplomatic 
 road to Constantinople, where the Turks were thirsting for re- 
 
 I. O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6. Rosetti reported from Cairo, July 25, 1801, 
 that, although he had suffered severely from the French, who knew him to be an 
 English agent, he had not heard from London for three years. 
 
 Edouard Driault, Mohamed Aly et Napoleon (1807—1814) (Cairo, 1925), 
 pp. iii, iv. 
 
 Ibid., pp. vi, vii; Charles-Roux, op. cit., p. 370; De Testa, op. cit., I, 504-5 ii. 
 
62 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 venge for the various inroads on Black Sea territories. In 1806, 
 the astute Sebastiani was sent as French Ambassador to the Porte, 
 taking with him a corps of French officers and diplomats. The 
 English attack which this invited occurred in February, 1807, 
 when a fleet under Admiral Duckworth undertook to penetrate 
 the Dardanelles. This was successfully accomplished, and the 
 way was opened to the Golden Horn. However, Sebastiani was 
 equal to the situation. Working in feverish haste, he and his 
 assistants were able to put the city in such a state of defence and 
 to instil such spirit into the Turks, that the English had to retire 
 discomfited.^® 
 
 Yet a worse experience awaited in Egypt. Hoping to regain 
 the loss of prestige suffered before Constantinople, it was deter- 
 mined to make an immediate attack on Egypt, where the French 
 were suspected of intending to land another army intent on the 
 invasion of India. The cordial relations existing between the 
 Egyptian dictator, Mehemet Ali, and the French Empire added 
 a probability of French success altogether lacking in the expedition 
 of 1798. But on this occasion, the English paid a dear price for 
 having failed to keep closely in touch with the situation in Egypt. 
 Instead of finding Egypt torn with the feuds of rival chieftains, 
 they found it a strong centralized monarchy, with the Mamelukes 
 cowed and almost powerless. The English forces under Generals 
 Wauchope and Meade landed, were outmanoeuvred at Rosetta, 
 ignominiously defeated, and either captured or driven to their 
 ships. The route through Egypt was decisively closed to the 
 British for the time being."^® 
 
 In spite of these disasters to English arms, there was still room 
 for consolation. If they were denied the control of Egypt and 
 the use of the Red Sea route to India, the French, since the Battle 
 of the Nile and particularly since Trafalgar, were denied the use 
 of the Mediterranean. The island of Malta, retained by the 
 British in defiance of the Peace of Amiens, was not yet a way 
 station on routes of eastern communication, but it served ad- 
 mirably as a naval base, while Gibraltar gave assurance of access 
 to the Mediterranean at all times. Thus, in the contest for mas- 
 tery of the East, it was check and counter-check. It was a question 
 of the primacy of land or of water domination. The monarch of 
 the land — sovereign of France, master of Spain and Italy, ally 
 
 Edouard Driault, La Politique Orientale de Napoleon, Sebastiani et Gardane 
 (Paris, 1904), pp. 89-1 10; Driault, La Question d'Orient, depuis ses Origines jusqu'd 
 Nos Jours (Paris, 1909), p. 85. 
 
 Driault, Mohamed Aly, pp. viii, i ; La Politique Orientale, pp. 1 1 1— 1 22 ; Felix 
 Mengin, Histoire de PEgypte sous le Gouvernement de Mohammed- Aly (2 vols., 
 Paris, 1823), I, 282-300. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 63 
 
 of Turkey and sponsor of Egypt, controller of nearly the whole 
 shore of the Mediterranean — was unable to place a large force 
 in Asia because of land distance and lack of control of intervening 
 water routes, while the mistress of the seas was unable adequately 
 to protect the approaches to India because of diplomatic and 
 political barriers. 
 
 Obviously, the more practicable route for an army of conquest 
 in the East was that by way of Egypt, and during his day in power 
 Napoleon never abandoned the idea of making use of it. Time 
 after time he projected attempts to place a French army in Egypt, 
 only to be balked by English watchfulness or crises in Europe. 
 In July, 1 8 10, he went so far as to issue a decree for the construc- 
 tion of a fleet of transports on the Mediterranean. During the 
 next two years he worked actively on the idea, collecting detailed 
 information and making naval preparations. “If in 1812 the 
 circumstances are favorable,” he said, “ I count on making an 
 expedition to Sicily or to Egypt in the Mediterranean. . . It is 
 necessary to have at Toulon all that is necessary for an expedition 
 to Egypt.” And Corfu was made into a French arsenal to rival 
 Malta.®® Another Battle of the Nile was not unthinkable. 
 
 But all these careful plans miscarried. First, Mehemet Ali 
 displayed signs of waning enthusiasm for the French cause as 
 their armaments increased and his own territorial ambitions 
 waxed. It was by no means certain that his extensive work on 
 the fortifications at Alexandria were intended to guard the rear 
 of a French movement from Egypt toward India. This the 
 French were never to learn. The Russian campaign of 1812 
 proved to be a boomerang, and the disintegration of his elaborate 
 European political structure in 1813 and 1814 brought an end to 
 Napoleon’s hopes of conquest in the Orient. Mehemet Ali, 
 having completed his rise to power in Egypt by the extermination 
 of the remaining Mamelukes in 18 1 1, was left to pursue his own 
 plans of conquest in Asia by which he became master of Arabia 
 and, years later, Syria.®® 
 
 Not all of French plans during these years for an invasion of 
 India were devoted to the route through Egypt. Careful con- 
 sideration from the time of the Convention was given to the 
 possible ways in which a land power might penetrate the East 
 
 Driault, Mehemet Aly, p. xxv; Waldemar Ekedahl, “The Principal Causes 
 of the Renewal of the War between England and France in 1803,” in Transactions 
 of the Royal Historical Society ^ New Ser., VIII, 181—202. 
 
 Driault, Mehemet Aly, pp. xxviii, 120— 12 1, fassim. St. Marcel, special 
 French agent in Egypt and Syria, reported in May, 18 ii, that he was convinced 
 that Mehemet Ali desired an alliance with the English. 
 
 Ibid., pp. XXX— xxxix, 122—216, fassim; D. G. Hogarth, The Penetration of 
 Arabia (N. Y., 1904), pp. 84—89, too- 106, fassim. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 64 
 
 without being dependent on a vulnerable line of sea communica- 
 tions. Much preparatory work, especially of a diplomatic char- 
 acter, was found to be a prerequisite to any scheme for aggran- 
 dizement in Asia. The Turks, if they refused to become allies, 
 must in any event be kept neutral. Cooperation was necessary 
 from the semi-independent chieftains of western Asia. Hence, 
 French agents under the Republic circulated freely in Syria, 
 Mesopotamia, and even in Arabia. From the establishment of 
 the Consulate in 1801 until near the end of the Empire, Napoleon 
 kept his emissaries busy in the East collecting data and attempting 
 to undermine British prestige in these countries.*^ He did not 
 propose to fight his way toward India another time. 
 
 These moves were met by the insertion of diplomatic wedges 
 by the British. As early as 1 756 it had been proposed to appoint a 
 permanent British agent at Bagdad, in view of French interest in 
 the Levant. The idea was disapproved by the Court of Directors 
 at that time, but a native agent was appointed in 1783. In 1798, 
 a year ever memorable because of the French expedition to Egypt, 
 an English delegation under Mr. Harford Jones (later Sir Har- 
 ford Jones Brydges) was sent to Bagdad with the double object 
 of arranging with the Pasha for the regular transmission of official 
 despatches through his province and to observe and counteract 
 the work of French agents who were active in the region at that 
 time. Although Jones was not recognized by the Turkish au- 
 thorities as having any particular powers, he was permitted to 
 remain at Bagdad in the capacity of Political Agent of the East 
 India Company pending his investment with more definite func- 
 tions.®* In 1802 Lord Elgin, then British Ambassador at the 
 Porte, was able to secure a consular barat for the Resident at 
 Bagdad to avoid possible misunderstandings in future.®® 
 
 On the rupture between England and Turkey in 1807, the 
 Pasha of Bagdad took the Residents at Bagdad and Basrah under 
 his protection, and they retained their positions. In 1810 the 
 Residency at Basrah, which had been established as a consulate in 
 1764,®® was amalgamated with that at Bagdad. The Resident 
 thereafter bore the title of “ Political Agent in Turkish Arabia,” 
 and because of his proximity to the Persian frontier he was 
 ej^pected to keep an eye on developments in that countrj' as well. 
 
 Quarterly Revie^j:, XXVI, 445. 
 
 1 . O. Records, ut supra, Vol. 6, Loose Papers, Packet ii. Bundle i. Nos. 7, 8. 
 
 Ibid., No. 16; C. U. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties, Engagements, and 
 Sunnuds relating to India and Neighbouring Countries (S vols., Calcutta, 1876- 
 1878), III, 1-4; VII, Pt. I, 8, 9. 
 
 An English factory had been established at Basrah before 1640. Various 
 political privileges had been accorded the agents here before the establishment of 
 the consulate. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “FEET OF CLAY” 65 
 
 This office was considered a very important one, partly because of 
 its relationship to any line of communication to India through 
 Mesopotamia, and partly because the Pasha of Bagdad was, to all 
 intents and purposes, an independent chieftain. Many of the 
 Arabs under his jurisdiction wandered at will across the Turco- 
 Persian boundary, recognizing the authority neither of the Sultan 
 nor of the Shah. The Resident at Bagdad was, therefore, usually 
 a man of wisdom, courage and experience, and many illustrious 
 names are connected with that position. Until 1835 these agents 
 were responsible to the Bombay Government j but in that year 
 their supervision was transferred to the Supreme Government at 
 Calcutta. 
 
 In the south of Arabia the beginnings of diplomatic contacts 
 had been made in connection with the sending of a naval force 
 from India to Egypt in 1799. The expedition which found the 
 island of Perim untenable, moved for a time to Aden on the 
 Arabian mainland, where they were well received. The Sultan 
 of Lahej, who controlled Aden, even proposed a treaty of alliance, 
 but this was refused by the Admiral, Sir Home Popham, who did, 
 however, promise aid to the Arabs in case of any attack from the 
 French. On this basis a Treaty of Friendship was drawn up in 
 1802.®^ This was merely a precautionary measure at the time, 
 for the permanent connection of the English with Aden dates 
 from the establishment of a line of steam navigation between 
 Suez and Bombay a generation later. 
 
 At other places along the Arabian coast diplomatic penetration 
 began, to be consolidated at later intervals during the century. 
 The native agent of the Company at Bushire negotiated the first 
 treaty with the Imam of the Muscat Arabs in 1798, providing for 
 the expulsion of French agents. Another and supplementary 
 treaty was signed in 1800 at the instance of John Malcolm. 
 This influence was interrupted by French agents in 1 807, but was 
 reestablished in 1810.®® Other series of engagements were 
 formed about the same time with the semi-nomadic Arabs on 
 both sides of the Persian Gulf, most of which were of short 
 duration.®® 
 
 After the creation of the French Empire, Napoleon had capable 
 agents at work everywhere in Turkey bribing provincial gov- 
 ernors, subsidizing ministers, and approaching the Sultan with 
 alluring promises or subtle threats. Great Britain, on the other 
 
 I. O. Records, ut su-pra, Political Letter from Bombay, 22 Dec., 1801 ; 
 Aitchison, op. cit., VII, 1 21-134. 
 
 Aitchison, op. cit., VII, Pt. II, passim. 
 
 Low, op. cit., I, Ch. 10. 
 
66 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 hand, had little to offer except promises of assistance in case of 
 attack j but French insinuations frequently caused the Turks to 
 wonder whether a French alliance would not be preferable to 
 English domination. At the time of the formidable Gardane 
 mission to Persia, the French Ambassador at the Porte, Sebastiani, 
 as has been mentioned, succeeded in effecting a temporary breach 
 between Turkey and Britain, the former being induced to enter the 
 “ Continental System.” With the addition of Turkey to his list of 
 allies, Napoleon had a clear road from the shores of Syria to the 
 Punjab for his contemplated Indian enterprise. But this situation 
 did not endure. Even before Sir Harford Jones had completed 
 the negotiation of the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance with 
 Persia (March i2, 1809), articles of peace between Great Britain 
 and the Ottoman Empire were signed at the Dardanelles on Janu- 
 ary 5, 1809.^'“ By this agreement, the old Capitulations were re- 
 affirmed and England was granted most-favored-nation treat- 
 ment. Following this, largely because of the danger from Russia, 
 British diplomacy resumed its sway at the Porte and was not 
 seriously endangered for a considerable span of years. This went 
 far toward closing the gate, left open for a space of two years, by 
 which a European power might have entered Asia intent on 
 reaching India. 
 
 Out of these precautions taken against France grew a line of 
 regular communication between England and India, now that 
 the route through Egypt could no longer be relied on. In 1 802 
 Lord Elgin was sent to Constantinople as Ambassador to the 
 Porte with special instructions to make definite provision for the 
 frequent and safe transmission of despatches through Turkish 
 dominions, in Europe as well as in Asia. His efforts were 
 crowned with success. “ Nothing can exceed the regularity and 
 zeal which your agents at Bagdad, Bussorah, and Aleppo uni- 
 formly exhibit,” he wrote the Court of Directors of the East 
 India Company. “ They have left me nothing to do eastward 
 further than showing occasional attentions and sending trifling 
 presents to the Governor of their residencies. . . ” From 
 Constantinople the new route continued overland through the 
 Turkish Balkan provinces by estafette or relays of Turkish 
 couriers via Bucharest to Vienna. From there other couriers 
 carried the packets through Germany to the North Sea, whence 
 they were conveyed to England. “ During my Embassy,” wrote 
 
 Aitchison, of. cit., VII, App. I, iii-xxiv; Driault, La Politique Orlentale, pp. 
 364—370, fassim. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut sufra, iz Feb., 1802. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 67 
 
 Elgin in 1806, “ a Tatar was expedited eastward once a fortnight 
 as regularly as the Post came in from Vienna. For the most part 
 this Tatar took nothing except the European newspapers and my 
 letters to the Government in India. . .” By this route, which 
 closely approximated the line which made the Bagdad Railway 
 famous — and dangerous — a century later, communications 
 were carried on until after the close of the Napoleonic Wars. 
 Strangely enough, the European overland section of this line 
 proved to be much more difficult than that in Asia. This was due 
 to the frequent uprisings of the Balkan subjects of the Sultan, the 
 hordes of brigands, and the constant tampering with the mails by 
 officials of the various countries through which the line passed. 
 Despatches sent by this line were generally of the utmost im- 
 portance and secrecy, and the English public never became aware 
 of the extent to which the line was used. 
 
 Motives similar to those which led to the beginnings of dip- 
 lomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire also suggested bring- 
 ing other states into line. In 1808 Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, 
 later Governor of the Bombay Presidency, concluded a treaty of 
 alliance with Shah Shujah of the Dooranee (Afghan) Empire 
 with the object of preventing the threatened invasion of Af- 
 ghanistan and India from the west. This treaty, which was rati- 
 fied by Lord Minto on June, 17, 1809, guaranteed assistance to 
 Shah Shujah only in case of a joint attack by French and 
 Persians.** 
 
 Diplomatic overtures were likewise made to Persia. This 
 country offered a good field for diplomatic operations early in the 
 nineteenth century, not only because it laid claim to lower Meso- 
 potamia and lay athwart some of the lines of access to India, but 
 also because of its receptive attitude toward western advances. 
 Ordinarily averse from European influences, the Persian Court 
 was then desperately eager to establish cordial relations with any 
 state which might assist in checking dismemberment by Russia. 
 
 The English, suspicious of the designs of both France and 
 Russia, were the first to appear on the scene in diplomatic force. 
 In December, 1799, while excitement still ran high throughout 
 the British world over the invasion of Egypt, a formidable em- 
 bassy headed by Captain John Malcolm left Bombay for the 
 Persian Gulf, en route to Teheran. The mission had several 
 objects connected with the safety and the trade of India, but the 
 
 Ibid., Elgin to the East India Company, ii Aug., 1806. 
 
 I. O. Records, ut su-pra. Nos. 2, 10; Barker, op. cit., I, 55, g6. 
 
 Aitchison, op. cit., II, 424. 
 
68 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 chief one was the desire “ to counteract the possible attempts of 
 those villanous but active democrats, the French.” “ Persia at 
 that time was virgin soil in the diplomatic sense, and there was 
 considerable doubt in the minds of the envoys what attitude and 
 what course to pursue to avoid wounding oriental susceptibilities 
 on the one hand while maintaining British prestige on the other. 
 After some preliminary sparring with Persian officials at Bushire, 
 Malcolm concluded that the two great essentials in dealing with 
 the Persians lay in the munificent distribution of presents and in 
 stickling for forms. Both of these points contributed to vexatious 
 delays, the Persian officials bargaining for all the tips which the 
 situation would bear while they grudgingly gave the required 
 formal and somewhat ostentatious reception. 
 
 Nevertheless, Malcolm was well received at Teheran, partly 
 because of the very prodigality of his gifts, which were in pro- 
 portion to the estimated gravity of the situation. At the same 
 time, he found that the effect of French successes in Europe and 
 of Bonaparte’s daring plunge into Egypt was working its magic in 
 Persia. He wrote to a friend, “ . . . the nature of my situation 
 requires me to be very cautious. . . Those rascals, the French, 
 will persuade the Turks that they are their best friends before 
 they have done 5 and if they succeed in establishing themselves in 
 Egypt on any terms, we must look to every quarter, and to none 
 with more care than to the Persian Gulf.” 
 
 Although Malcolm was received by the Shah with marks of 
 consideration, his work moved slowly forward because he under- 
 took to bribe every one into acquiescence. At last, however, po- 
 litical and commercial treaties were drawn up and agreed to which 
 appeared to be all that Britain could ask. The Persians were to 
 assist in protecting the northwest frontier of India in return for 
 British assistance in case of attack on Persia; there were strong 
 provisions for the expulsion and “ extirpation ” of French subjects 
 in Persia, and British merchants were granted extensive trading 
 privileges.*' These treaties were never formally ratified on either 
 side, but firmans were issued by the Shah and like orders by the 
 Governor-General of India declaring them to be in force. 
 
 Having thus apparently succeeded in its main objects, the 
 British Embassy prepared to return to India. Malcolm carefully 
 avoided giving any explicit guarantees that British aid would be 
 forthcoming in the struggle against Russia. Vague assurances 
 
 Malcolm’s instructions are given in J. W. Kaye, T/ie Life and Correspondence 
 of Major-General Sir John Malcolm. . . (2 vols., London, 1S56), I, 30, 89. 
 
 “s Ibid., I, 128. 
 
 Ibid., I, 515-525; Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, VIII, 659-662. Cf. 
 Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (2 vols., London, 1921), II, 398-399. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 69 
 
 were given, however, that Great Britain would naturally not per- 
 mit her Persian ally to be despoiled, and with these veiled 
 promises, on which any Persian support and cooperation depended, 
 the British delegation withdrew to India. 
 
 For more than two years thereafter, the Russians steadily con- 
 tinued their attacks, while the Persian Government appealed to 
 Britain for help in vain. The French meanwhile kept in touch 
 with the Persian situation through their efficient network of con- 
 suls, merchants, and spies, and waited for an opportune moment to 
 serve their cause. In 1805 a formal Persian mission reached 
 Calcutta hoping to arrange for active assistance on the basis of 
 earlier promises. Although the Indian Government maintained 
 rather frequent communications with Great Britain by the then 
 overland route, considerable procrastination ensued. So as weeks 
 passed with no sign of favorable action either in India or in Eng- 
 land, Feth Ali Shah, “ considering the effect on the Orient of 
 Napoleon’s conquest of Egypt,” felt obliged to seek French aid.^® 
 
 War had already broken out between France and Russia, placing 
 Persia in a very strategic position, and greatly increasing the 
 significance attached by Persia to French promises. Immediately 
 upon receiving word concerning the Persian change of heart, 
 Napoleon despatched two agents to make hasty preliminary in- 
 vestigations, before committing himself wholly to any line of 
 conduct. One of these, M. Amedee Jaubert, was sent out pri- 
 marily with a view to opening negotiations for an alliance with 
 the Sultan. This came to an end so summarily — due to British 
 dominance at the Porte — that it nearly involved France and 
 Turkey in hostilities. Quitting Constantinople, Jaubert made his 
 way under an assumed name toward Persia. He had been pre- 
 ceded, however, by another diplomatic agent, M. Romieu, who, 
 with his secretary, managed to reach Persia, having with difficulty 
 passed through Asiatic Turkey in disguise. Their disguise had 
 not been so perfect as to deceive the English consul at Aleppo, 
 John Barker,®” who immediately reported his discovery to Har- 
 ford Jones, British consular agent at Bagdad. The latter’s watch- 
 fulness and his influence in Mesopotamia nearly brought an un- 
 timely end to the French mission. 
 
 Le Cte. Alfred de Gardane, Mission du General Gardane en Perse, sous le 
 Premier Emfire. Documents historiques. . . (Paris, 1865), pp. 9, 10; Driault, 
 Mohamed Aly et Nafoleon, pp. 91-92, 119; Kaye, of. cit., I, 396. 
 
 Gardane, op. cit., p. 13; Sykes, of. cit., II, 40, 399—401. 
 
 Gardane, of. cit., p. 18. Barker was a stern enemy of all French activities. 
 As English consul in Syria and in Egypt for the next third of a century he had many 
 opportunities to check French enterprise and to promote speedy communications 
 between India and the mother country for political reasons. 
 
70 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Romieu was well received at the Persian capital, and he, like 
 Jaubert, who arrived in i8o6, reported very favorably on the 
 opportunity for the extension of French interests since Feth Ali 
 desired an alliance with France. This attitude of the Persian 
 Court was carefully fostered by French agents during 1806 and 
 the early months of 1807, until Napoleon, having mastered cen- 
 tral Europe, could devote more attention to his oriental plans. 
 In February, 1807, the Russian Government offered favorable 
 terms of peace to Persia, which, in view of French promises of 
 assistance, were refused. A Persian envoy was thereupon sent 
 with all haste to conclude a formal alliance with Napoleon before 
 a short truce with Russia should expire. The Persian envoy found 
 Napoleon in camp at Finkenstein, where he was courteously 
 received and asked to await the drawing up of a treaty.®^ 
 
 Before this draft was ready, Napoleon had responded to the 
 invitation to open diplomatic relations with Persia. He deter- 
 mined at the outset to impress the oriental mind with a suggestion 
 of illimitable power, and to this end he selected a formidable 
 delegation of seventy picked men to undertake a kind of pioneer- 
 ing mission. The ground was to be prepared for a possible 
 Franco-Persian invasion of India, hence various treaties were to 
 be drafted and surveys of many kinds carried out. Napoleon’s 
 instructions to General Gardane, the head of the mission, go far 
 toward explaining why British attitude toward the states of 
 western Asia suddenly underwent a change. These ran, in part: 
 
 Persia is today squeezed in between Russia and the Eng- 
 lish possessions. The nearer these possessions approach the 
 Persian frontier, the more she [Persia] must fear the even- 
 tual aggrandizement of them: she will be in danger of 
 becoming some day, as northern India, an English province, 
 if from now on she does not anticipate the danger, to injure 
 England, and to aid against her all the operations of the 
 French. . . 
 
 Persia is considered by France from two points of view: 
 as the natural enemy of Russia and as a means of passage for . 
 an expedition to India. . . 
 
 Let us suppose . . . that the French expedition, with the 
 consent of the Porte, should land at Alexandretta, or that it 
 should round the Cape of Good Hope and land at the en- 
 trance to the Persian Gulf. . . It must be known in both 
 cases what would be the route from the landing place to 
 India. . . 
 
 Gardane, pp. 19-25; Driault, La Politique Orientate, pp. 172— 177. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 7'i 
 
 In fine, General Gardane must not lose sight of the fact 
 that our important task is to establish a triple alliance between 
 France, the Porte, and Persia, to open for us a road to India 
 and to procure for us help against Russia. . 
 
 Gardane and his party having been despatched for the East 
 with important duties and extensive powers, Napoleon proceeded 
 to complete the treaty of alliance with Persia. This, the Treaty 
 of Finkenstein, was concluded on May 30, 1807, and is a monu- 
 ment to the self-interest of the Emperor of the French. Accord- 
 ing to this document, Persia was to declare war on England im- 
 mediately, to expel all the English from the country and allow 
 none to enter again, to unite with the Afghans, Mahrattas, and 
 other Indian peoples for a march on English Indian holdings, 
 and in every way to assist a French army to march through the 
 country in case of a French expedition against the English in 
 India. The obligations of Persia were stated precisely, inclu- 
 sively, and in considerable detail. The obligations of France, on 
 the other hand, were vaguely worded and stated only in brief, 
 general terms. In substance, France recognized the validity of 
 Persia’s claim to Georgia, which had been annexed by Russia in 
 1 800, and undertook to supply as many cannon, rifles, officers, and 
 workmen as Persia should need in maintaining her territorial 
 integrity. 
 
 The Treaty of Finkenstein had hardly been completed and a 
 copy despatched for the approval of the Shah when events in 
 Europe altered its whole bearing. In June, 1807, occurred the 
 decisive battle of Friedland, in which the Russians were routed. 
 Tsar Alexander thereupon sued for peace, and negotiations were 
 cpnducted by the two Emperors in person at Tilsit. According 
 to the arrangements adopted at this important conference, Na- 
 poleon was to have a free hand, so to speak, in Europe, and 
 Alexander like privileges in Asia. Both were to consider Britain 
 their chief enemy. This was a natural and almost inevitable 
 arrangement, based on the natural spheres of interest of the two 
 powers. Thus, Napoleon sacrificed Asiatic connections for Euro- 
 pean policy, undermined his connections with Persia since he could 
 
 Driault, La Politique Orientale, pp. 183, 184; Gardane, of. cit., pp. 16-25, 
 82—94. Gardane was chosen to head the mission because he was well known in the 
 commercial ports of the Levant and in Persia, where members of his family had 
 long held consular positions. 
 
 The Treaty is given in Gardane, of. cit., pp. 71—81. See kdouard Driault, 
 La Politique Orientale, pp. 170—173; Sykes, of. cit., II, 402—405. 
 
 A. Vandal, Nafoleon et Alexandre 7 ®’' (3 vols., Paris, 1891—1896), I, 
 Appendix; Driault, La Politique Orientale, pp. 197—214. 
 
72 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 no longer assist against Russia, and thereafter used Persia as a 
 pawn to keep Britain at bay as long as possible. These events, 
 however, were not known and understood in Persia for many 
 months.®® 
 
 Gardane proceeded to act on his instructions at first in ignorance 
 of and later without regard to the Treaty of Tilsit. He was kept 
 very poorly informed of developments in Europe^ probably for 
 good reason. He negotiated a favorable commercial treaty, pre- 
 pared maps, supervised surveys, survived many delicate diplo- 
 matic difficulties, and invented most ingenious excuses to explain 
 the non-arrival of arms, munitions, and training officers from 
 France at a time when he was as ignorant as the Persians them- 
 selves as to the causes of the non-execution of French engage- 
 ments.®® Thus the year 1807 passed and 1808 dragged along 
 with Persia and Russia still at odds. The instructions which 
 reached Gardane at long intervals indicated a changed attitude 
 on the part of the Emperor — one which encouraged the conclu- 
 sion of a Russo-Persian peace on the basis of Persian concessions. 
 However, England was still pictured to the Persian Court as the 
 universal enemy and Napoleonic France as the champion of 
 justice.®^ 
 
 Gardane, meanwhile, retained faith in the genuineness of the 
 Franco-Persian alliance. He supported the Persian Government 
 in refusing to make terms with Russia on the basis of the cession to 
 the latter of the provinces of Georgia, Erivan, and the Trois 
 Eglises. He even believed that the demands made on several oc- 
 casions by the Russian field commander. General Goudowitsch, 
 that the Persian Government treat with him directly, w^ere unau- 
 thorized by the Russian Government and contrary to the wishes of 
 the Emperor Napoleon. On October 12, Gardane wrote General 
 Goudowitsch that if certain confidential representations he had 
 previously made, to the effect that the Russo-Persian boundary 
 difficulty would undoubtedly be settled in Paris, were flouted by 
 the Russian high command, “ it is my duty officially to announce to 
 you that Persia, being allied with the Emperor [Napoleon], and 
 the integrity of the territory your troops are occupying having been 
 guaranteed by the Emperor, I shall regard all attacks against this 
 territory as a provocation against my august court.” ®® This 
 
 Napoleon undoubtedly considered this arrangement, by which Russia entered 
 his “ Continental System ” against Britain, as a convenient substitute for his pro- 
 jected invasion of India. Gardane stated positively to the Shah in February, 1808, 
 that nothing had been stipulated at Tilsit relative to Persia because the treaty of 
 alliance (Finkenstein) had not then been ratified by Persia. 
 
 Gardane, of. cit., pp. 107—138. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 146-147; Driault, La Politique Orientate, pp. 310—322. 
 
 Gardane, of. cit., pp. 205-206. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 73 
 
 threat Goudowitsch considered of such small importance that he 
 ignored it altogether, aware, no doubt, that Gardane was being 
 used as a dupe and that he himself was much better informed on 
 conditions in Europe than was the chief of the French mission. 
 
 Hence, but a few months after Napoleon had regaled his ally, 
 the Shah, with a glowing account of how the world was arming to 
 avenge themselves on the English, Goudowitsch was brutally 
 demanding “ for the last time ” the cession of choice Persian 
 territories, with the simple justification that “ the power which 
 the Russian Government has acquired by force of arms gives it the 
 right to those boundaries which it pleases to have.” And he must 
 needs taunt the Persians with their own helpless isolation and the 
 fact that a hostile British force had arrived in the Persian Gulf 
 to begin an offensive in which the Pasha of Bagdad threatened to 
 take part.®® 
 
 These developments shocked and frightened the credulous 
 Persians. Gardane was summoned before the Shah to explain 
 Napoleon’s strange neglect and to state whether the French 
 could be relied upon for assistance. To this Gardane could only 
 reply that in a situation so desperate for the Persians, he could 
 not advise them to undertake a war on the two extremities of 
 their Empire, but that if the English were admitted to Persia as 
 friends he must needs sever French relations.®” This he was 
 presently compelled to do as the English made headway. By 
 November, 1808, Gardane found his popularity and prestige gone. 
 Without any reply from France in response to frantic appeals for 
 instructions, he and his suite had no choice but to withdraw from 
 Persia as an English embassy under Harford Jones approached 
 Teheran from the Persian Gulf.®’ 
 
 With the withdrawal of Gardane vanished the last serious 
 threat France was to make of invading India by land. There is, 
 of course, no proof that Napoleon seriously contemplated making 
 use of the road through Persia at any time, although his actions 
 prior to the Treaty of Tilsit would seem to show such an intent.®® 
 But after the British rupture with Turkey in 1807 and the con- 
 fidential reports of French agents on conditions in Egypt, he 
 inclined in favor of his original plan of attack, which was to 
 
 Ibid., pp. 199—204; Driault, La Politique Orientale, pp. 325—334. 
 
 Gardane, o-p. cit., pp. 235-244, passim-, Driault, La Politique Orientale, p. 323. 
 
 Gardane, op. cit., pp. 252—253; Driault, La Politique Orientale, pp. 336-339. 
 Although beginning to fear that he might have been betrayed, Gardane retained a 
 high regard of the importance of his mission to the last, and in his final communica- 
 tion to the Emperor from Persian soil he urged a quick invasion of India by the 
 route he had surveyed. 
 
 Gardane, op. cit., pp. 33—34, 108; Driault, La Question d'Orient, pp. 94-95; 
 La Politique Orientale, pp. 341—342. 
 
74 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 proceed through Egypt. The cloak dropped in Persia by France 
 was taken up by Russia, which Power, with much less pomp 
 and fanfare but with infinitely more subtle scheming, patience, 
 and purposefulness, more nearly succeeded in placing its armies on 
 the southern slopes of the Himalayas than Napoleon probably 
 could have, had all of his preparations been acted upon. 
 
 Although the Government of India had expressed alarm, 
 the British Cabinet had been slow to comprehend the full mean- 
 ing of the French mission in Persia where Malcolm had been so 
 successful not long before. The complete breakdown of the 
 French Egyptian enterprise had conduced to a temporary feeling 
 of security as far as eastern matters were concerned. By the end 
 of the year 1806, however, some anxiety was being manifested in 
 London at the rapid growth of French influence at various points 
 in Asia. This was considerably stimulated by a report made by 
 Malcolm in November to the Governor-General of India, the 
 substance of which was transmitted to the Home Government. 
 
 If the war between Russia and France [he said] has ter- 
 minated in a manner favorable to the interests of the latter, 
 
 . . . Turkey can only be considered hereafter as a province 
 of the French Government, and under such circumstances, 
 British India will be exposed to a danger which will require 
 every measure of preventative policy to avert. . . 
 
 I have learnt from respectable authority that almost all 
 the provinces of Turkey are already inundated with French 
 officers, and when the war with Russia is over, it is evident 
 that Bonaparte can spare any number of troops to aid in the 
 support, or rather, restoration of the tottering power of the ' 
 Ottomans. The probable first employment of such a force 
 would be the reduction ... of the most rebellious prov- 
 inces of the [Turkish] Empire, among which may be num- 
 bered Egypt, Syria, and Bagdad; and if that service is ever 
 effected by the aid of a French force, we must anticipate the 
 actual establishment of the influence and power of that nation - 
 over countries subdued, which would give it an advanced and 
 advantageous position from whence it could carry on 
 intrigues and operations against the British power in 
 India. . 
 
 Similar reports from other quarters increased the disquietude. 
 In consequence, upon the successful completion of the French 
 
 Kaye, of. cit., I, 395—398. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 75 
 
 campaign against Russia in 1807, steps were immediately taken 
 by the British to send a delegation to Persia, backed by a show of 
 naval strength, to oust the French and renew English engage- 
 ments.®* The initiative in this was taken by the Government of 
 India, which recommended to the Home Government and to the 
 Court of Directors of the Company that Captain John Malcolm 
 again be sent to Persia as special ambassador. The Home authori- 
 ties did not countenance this suggestion, being mindful of 
 Malcolm’s unnecessary extravagance on his first mission. Instead, 
 the choice fell on Harford Jones as one whose long experience in 
 the East and whose natural caution would give him peculiar 
 fitness for counteracting French influence and negotiating a new 
 treaty with the Shah. Early in 1808, therefore, Jones and his 
 staff, armed with suitable presents and rather general instructions 
 set out from England for the Persian Gulf by way of the Cape 
 of Good Hope and Bombay.®® 
 
 The renewal of British contacts with Persia was complicated 
 by the fact that the Government of India, on behalf of the East 
 India Company, though often acting on its own responsibility in 
 the absence of definite inspmctions, assumed a considerable degree 
 of responsibility for the political situation in those states lying 
 near India. For both political and commercial reasons, the Indian 
 Government was unwilling to have the British Government nego- 
 tiate directly with these states, which would naturally have a 
 tendency to dim the prestige which had grown up about the name 
 of the Company as an autocratic, imperial authority in itself. In 
 the Persian question, therefore, the Governor-General, Lord 
 Minto, took the responsibility upon his own office to regain at the 
 Persian Court the hegemony which had been usurped by the 
 French. Finding the Home Government not disposed to act 
 through the Company’s agency on this occasion. Lord Minto con- 
 ceived the idea of anticipating the Home authorities, who were 
 notoriously slow in such matters, and thus increasing the Com- 
 pany’s influence both in Asia and in England.®® 
 
 For this purpose, Malcolm was appointed a commissioner of 
 the Government of India early in 1 808, with powers of a general 
 and not well defined character, and was instructed to hold him- 
 self in readiness to depart from India for Persian shores at any 
 moment. He presently proceeded from Calcutta to the Persian 
 Gulf by way of Bombay, which, because of its favorable bearing, 
 was used as a base for all of the operations in Persia during this 
 
 ®‘‘ Hon. George N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, I, StS — siT , Kaye, 
 of. cit., I, 397, 398, 413-426. 
 
 Kaye, of. cit., I, 401—402. Ibid., I, 410, 41 1. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 76 
 
 period. Malcolm’s ship Psyche, supported by a strong squadron, 
 arrived at Bushire on May 10, and a Captain Pasley, who had 
 previously spent several years in Persia as an informer, was de- 
 puted to proceed toward Teheran and arrange for Malcolm’s 
 reception at Court, 
 
 The French were still too strong at this time, however^ and 
 Malcolm was refused permission to come to the capital. At the 
 same time the Shah and most of his ministers made no secret of 
 their desire to learn what the English had to offer, and Malcolm 
 was invited to treat with the Prince Regent of the province of 
 Ears before any official reception was given him by the Persian 
 Government. To this proposal Malcolm replied hotly that while 
 a French Ambassador was given constant recognition at the Per- 
 sian Court, a representative of the British Nation could never 
 condescend to treat with a provincial chief 5 that further, unless 
 he were permitted to state his mission at Teheran in the presence 
 of the Shah, he would at once terminate his visit, embark for 
 India, and never return to Persian soil unless accorded all the 
 dignity and honor which had been given him on the occasion of his 
 first mission.®^ 
 
 For assuming this tone of hauteur, which he described as one 
 of “ temperate remonstrance and offended friendship,” Malcolm 
 has been severely criticised on several occasions.®® His biographer, 
 Kaye, even ascribes the failure of the mission to this attitude. It 
 is possible, however, that it served the purpose intended. Mal- 
 colm could hardly have been admitted to Court as long as the 
 Persian Government retained hope of receiving the promised aid 
 from France, in any case. By his uncompromising demands and 
 proud demeanor Malcolm believed that he had contributed much 
 to the Persian distrust of French power of which signs w'ere 
 already appearing. 
 
 After having spent several weeks in fruitless negotiation and 
 intrigue, Malcolm, “ to the utter consternation of the populace,” 
 made good his threat to return to India.®® The causes of his 
 failure were reviewed at Calcutta and new plans put on foot to 
 maintain the honor of Britain and the glory of the East India 
 Company. One of these was a plan to seize and garrison the 
 island of Karrack, lying close to the Persian shore. This island 
 
 Kaye, of. cit., 416-418. 
 
 Indeed, Lord Minto himself was displeased at the arrogant speech used by 
 Malcolm on this occasion. 
 
 The mercantile class living along the shores of the Persian Gulf were gen- 
 erally strongly pro-British, chiefly because of the protection given by the Bombay 
 Marine to their trading vessels. Besides, they were so far removed from Teheran 
 as to have little sympathy with the policies and intrigues of the Court. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 77 
 
 had been promised to France by the Treaty of Finkensteinj and 
 as it had been considered as a suitable base for a Franco-Persian 
 invasion of India, now it was proposed to employ it to offset the 
 intrigues of French agents among the chiefs of lower Arabia and 
 Persia and to thwart any attempts at the invasion of India. The 
 commercial value of the island was not overlooked, nor the fact 
 that it was so situated as to facilitate actual military operations in 
 Persia should the French menace continue. Arrangements for an 
 expedition to Karrack were well under way, when at the end of 
 September, 1808, word arrived that Sir Harford Jones had ac- 
 tually arrived in the Persian Gulf preparatory to opening nego- 
 tiations with the Shah. 
 
 In this dilemma. Lord Minto was compelled to proceed with 
 caution. The expedition to Karrack was necessarily suspended, 
 for, as he said, “ We cannot commit hostilities on Persia while 
 the King of England is negotiating with the King of Persia.” 
 To save his amour frofrcy the Governor-General took the “ sour- 
 grapes ” view that the island would not be particularly desirable, 
 and that the French could hardly have used it, in any event. 
 Malcolm was instructed to observe the progress of the imperial 
 mission from the vantage point of Bombay and to bide his time. 
 As soon as Sir Harford had accomplished the principal objects of 
 his mission, including the formation of a preliminary treaty be- 
 tween Great Britain and Persia, Malcolm was despatched to 
 Teheran at the head of a new mission to raise the fallen crest of 
 the Government of India.^^ At Bushire he received a cordial wel- 
 come, both from residents and from Persian officials who extended 
 a polite and formal invitation for him to visit the capital. The 
 English-Indian party made very leisurely progress toward the 
 Persian capital, allowing ample time for the Court to prepare a 
 suitable reception. The situation was full of unpleasant possibil- 
 ities, however, for Malcolm insisted that he must be received by 
 Sir Harford Jones as an equal and as the representative of a 
 government whose interests in Persian welfare were second to 
 none. At first this concession was refused by Sir Harford, who 
 had received a number of “ stinging ” letters from the Governor- 
 General since his arrival in Persia. Malcolm, thereupon, pre- 
 pared to withdraw without approaching Teheran j but Sir Har- 
 ford, rather than compromise his own position by an open break 
 with Malcolm, who was personally very popular with the Persian 
 Court, relented, and Malcolm and his entourage arrived in the 
 presence of the Shah on June 21.^^ 
 
 Kaye, op. cit., I, 437, 438. 
 
 ^2 Ibid., II, 1-22. 
 
 Ibid., I, 507— 5 1 1, passim. 
 
78 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Thus, Britain was represented on Persian soil by two distinct 
 and obviously rival missions, one coming from England intent 
 on the undoing of France 5 and the other hailing from India to 
 make provision for checking the further advance of Russia. Both 
 had power to negotiate treaties. The Persian Court, already dis- 
 tracted by French promises and Russian threats, now found itself 
 truly between the horns of a dilemma. Any offending of the 
 British Ambassador would likely deprive Persia of military and 
 diplomatic assistance in Europe, while the seizure of strategic 
 positions along the Persian coast was probable if the Indian mis- 
 sion were not accorded due honor. The Persians temporized by 
 officially acknowledging both delegations, and instead of playing 
 the prejudices of one diplomatic envoy against the other, the way 
 was made easy for a ra'p'prochement between the two. After 
 considerable sparring, Jones and Malcolm were able to arrange a 
 modus Vivendi much to their own credit and the relief of the 
 Persians. 
 
 Although the prestige of the Indian Government undoubtedly 
 was increased by Malcolm’s third mission, his efforts otherwise 
 were largely barren of results. In July, 1809, despatches from 
 England announced the intention of the British Government to 
 assume charge of all relations with Persia thereafter, thus greatly 
 limiting the political sphere of the Company’s operations and 
 making of Malcolm’s embassy an expensive gesture.'^ Sir Har- 
 ford Jones retired in 18 ii, but until the close of the Napoleonic 
 Wars the relations between Britain and Persia were direct and 
 close. Meanwhile, Persia was content to remain practically a 
 ward of Great Britain. Some of the officers of the Indian political 
 mission remained to train Persian troops and give technical advice 
 and even to take active part in the struggle which still continued' 
 with Russia. 
 
 The preliminary treaty of peace and friendship negotiated by 
 Sir Harford Jones in 1809 sufficed to define the relations between 
 Britain and Persia meanwhile, and supplied the foundation for 
 most of the subsequent engagements of the two states. Its con- 
 cern for the protection of routes of access to India appeared in 
 every article of the document. In fine, Persia was to make no 
 engagements hostile to British interests and was expressly to 
 prevent any European force from passing through Persia toward 
 
 Malcolm wao censured by the Bengal Government for his lavish expenditures, 
 but he insisted that his mission could not have been carried out ivithout them. Kaye 
 writes, “ I have always thought that this mission was unnecessary' ... it may be 
 questioned whether the re-elevation of the fallen majesty of the Indian Government 
 was worth the expenditure bestowed upon it.” — Ibid., II, 50. 
 
 Sykes, of. cit., II, 407. 
 
BLOWS AT BRITAIN’S “ FEET OF CLAY ” 
 
 79 
 
 India. In return, Great Britain gave pledges similar to those 
 offered earlier by the French. Persia was to be protected against 
 invasion from any quarter, was to be supplied with arms and 
 military forces for defensive purposes, and was to be subsidized 
 materially. 
 
 This agreement was made into a formal, definitive treaty, 
 signed on November 25, 1814.^® The provisions were largely 
 the same as in the previous document, the main feature being the 
 precaution against armies hostile to Great Britain which might 
 march across Persia toward India. The Persian subsidy was here 
 fixed at £150,000, and was to continue until Persia engaged in 
 an aggressive war.^^ By these measures, a substantial part of the 
 land passage between eastern Europe and the frontiers of India 
 was made safe for Great Britain until changing conditions and 
 shifting alliances in Europe placed Anglo-Persian interests, and 
 hence their policies, on a different basis. 
 
 Although political activity in the Near and Middle East de- 
 clined considerably after the exile of Napoleon to St. Helena, the 
 late events in Egypt, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Persia had done 
 much to destroy British confidence in the adequacy of the Cape 
 route to India. Englishmen had been loath to believe such reports 
 as they heard during the latter part of the eighteenth century that 
 the French were actually contemplating the conquest and occupa- 
 tion of Egypt largely because of the strategic value of that posi- 
 tion, but the well planned expedition of 1798 and later persistent 
 efforts on the part of both France and Russia to acquire control 
 of one or another of the shorter routes by which the feet of clay 
 of the British colossus might be shattered taught thorough lessons. 
 These events ushered in a century in which the protection, de- 
 velopment, and control of the approaches to India and other pos- 
 sessions in the East were to rank among the leading enterprises 
 of the British people. 
 
 British and. Foreign State Papers, I, 2';8-26i. Cf. Curzon, op. cit., I, 576-7. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., I, 261—266; Victor Fontanier, Voyage dans PInde, 
 II, 199, 200, 419. The actual work of drawing up both treaties is ascribed by 
 Fontanier to James Morier, one of Sir Harford Jones’ suite and “ a more clever man 
 than his colleagues.” See Sykes, op. cit., II, 407—409. 
 
 By a subsequent arrangement this subsidy was paid to Russia in lieu of an 
 indemnity imposed on Persia in 1813. Britain began to consider it quite as much 
 to her own as to Persia’s interests to prevent further Russian aggression southward. 
 — Martens et Cussy, Recueil des Traites. . . (7 vols., Leipzig, 1846), II, 399. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 
 
 U PON the return to England in 1594 of Captain James 
 Lancaster’s ship Bonaventure^ freighted with the riches 
 of plundered Portuguese and Arabian vessels, English 
 interest quickly shifted from the Mediterranean to the newly 
 tried channel to the Far East around the tip of Africa. Competi- 
 tion was keen and the dangers were many in the Mediterranean. 
 Captain Lancaster’s exploit supplied evidence that while the dan- 
 gers of a long voyage to the lands opened up by the Portuguese 
 were many times greater, the opportunities for great wealth from 
 successful voyages were almost unlimited. The chartering of the 
 East India Company on December 31, 1600, and the raising of an 
 initial capital of £68,323, committed the leading merchants ad- 
 venturers of the time to a new policy of trade with the East 
 depending wholly on the passage around the Cape of Good Hope.’^ 
 During the greater part of the next three centuries, the Cape 
 route was employed without thought of the possibility of the 
 development of other channels to India and the Far East either 
 for trade or for communication. Even the activities of the French 
 in Egypt and the occasional sending of special despatches through 
 Syria to the Persian Gulf late in the eighteenth century detracted 
 little from the feeling of reliance on the all-sea route, which had 
 long since become a highway dominated by English ships and 
 marked by English way stations. By the middle of the seven- 
 teenth century a special type of vessel had been devised for the 
 India trade — the early East Indiaman. With the growth of 
 seafaring experience and volume of trade, vessels of this type 
 tended to increase in size, though not, as in the case of the Por- 
 tuguese galleons, at the expense of navigability." By 1 700 some 
 
 ^ H. G. Rawlinson, British Beginnings in Western India, 1579—1657, pp. 36-37. 
 ^ The vessels developed by the Portuguese in the sixteenth centur\- became at last 
 veritable floating fortresses, exceedingly clumsy and unmanageable, as were the 
 Spanish war vessels at the time of the Great Armada. Portuguese galleons disap- 
 peared from the Indian seas for much the same reason as the Irish elk became extinct 
 from the increasing weight of his once useful antlers. 
 
 80 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 8i 
 
 of the largest were of nearly 500 tons burden, though during the 
 the next three quarters of a century they grew little because of 
 special obligations imposed by law on larger vessels. After the 
 beginning of the Industrial Revolution the growth in size was 
 rapid, and by 1800 the Company had several ships chartered for 
 1200 tons. By this time, “ the East Indiamen were the largest, 
 best built, and most powerfully armed vessels in the world, with 
 the exception only of some warships.” ^ 
 
 At the beginning of the seventeenth century there was little 
 difference in construction between a ship of war and a merchant- 
 man. But within a century the exigencies of war on the high seas 
 had contributed to the development of certain types of naval 
 vessels, swift in speed and capable of carrying heavy armaments. 
 The East Indiamen, because of the many dangers to which they 
 were constantly exposed from recognized enemies and pirates, 
 quite naturally came to display many similarities to the frigates 
 of the Royal Navy. Inasmuch as the former were built less for 
 speed and more for cargo carrying, they were somewhat slower 
 in speed and deeper in draught than their naval contemporaries. 
 The Hopey a typical Cojaapany’s vessel of the better class at the 
 beginning of the nmjeteenth century, measured 1480 tons, was 
 200 feet long and of 40-foot beam.^ Vessels of this type represent 
 almost the highest form of sailing vessel ever developed. Only 
 the clipper ship of the eighteen forties excelled in speed and 
 seaworthiness, and these advantages were gained at the sacrifice 
 of cargo-carrying capacity. 
 
 Indeed, the rigors of the Cape route to the East produced in 
 the later East Indiamen noble vessels. Built of English oak, elm, 
 and India teak, copper-fastened throughout, they were stanch and 
 long-lived. For their day they were luxurious in appointments, 
 providing comforts and luxuries for passengers and crew which 
 were not dreamed of in the early days of the Company’s activities. 
 Until the nineteenth century was well advanced and the merchant 
 marine of the Company was suffered to decline because of the loss 
 of trading monopolies, no steamship could vie with the vessels 
 of the East India fleet either in safety or comfort. It is little 
 wonder that the early steamship made way with difficulty and that 
 few officers either of the naval or merchant services were willing 
 to serve on steam vessels during the first half of the nineteenth 
 century. 
 
 All the comforts and the elements of safety devised for the 
 
 ® E. Keble Chatterton, The Old East Indiamen (London, 1914), p. 4. 
 
 * James Wathen, Journal of a Y oyage to Madras and China in 18 ii and 1812 
 (London, 1814), p. 5. 
 
82 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 voyage to India, however, did little to shorten its duration. At 
 the very least, many weeks were required from the time of the 
 taking on of passengers at the ports of the Downs or at Portsmouth 
 to the first landfall off the coast of Ceylon or southern India. As 
 late as 1825, by which time the old East Indiamen were approach- 
 ing their highest stage of development, from five to eight months 
 were required to transmit messages from the Court of Directors 
 of the East India Company in London to the Governor-General 
 at Calcutta, and replies were frequently not received within a 
 period of two years.® Outfits of clothing for children making 
 the passage had to take into consideration the probability of con- 
 siderable growth between departure and arrival.® Wars in Europe 
 frequently were terminated and settlements made long before 
 the fighting in India and adjacent waters, which reflected Eu- 
 ropean rivalries, had ceased. 
 
 It is difficult nowadays to realize the many difficulties and 
 problems of such long voyages, even with the accumulated ex- 
 perience of two centuries as guide. The food supply was not one 
 of the least of these, when, as was often the case, the number of 
 mouths of passengers, officers, and crew numbered two or three 
 hundred. As salt and preserved foods would not suffice for so 
 long a voyage, fresh food, as to meats, was carried alive. On one 
 voyage the Hofe, previously referred to, carried — 
 
 . . . One cow, 50 Southdown sheep, 71 porkers, and more 
 than 600 geese, ducks, and fowls. The cow and sheep were 
 conveniently lodged on deck, on the top of the spars, under a 
 commodious awning, and the fowls in coops. The cow and 
 sheep had an allowance of two hundred-weight of hay 
 weekly, and a daily allowance of 1 5 gallons of fresh water.’ 
 
 These were to feed a total complement of 384 souls as far as the 
 Cape of Good Hope, where additional supplies could be had. 
 
 Such stores of fresh meat made the voyage possible, but 
 scarcely more than tolerable. In cramped and congested quarters, 
 surrounded by dangers from human enemies and in peril from 
 the elements, even the experienced traveller might confess, “ I 
 could not help feeling considerable emotion, and some alarm, 
 upon quitting my native shore upon so long and dangerous a voy- 
 age. . .” ® And the dangers were very real. There was always 
 
 ® ParUamefitary Paper, 1834, No. 478, Appendix 6, p. 34. 
 
 ® [Thomas Twining], Travels in India One Hundred Years Ago (London, 
 1893), p. 2. 
 
 ^ Wathen, of. cit., p. 6. 
 
 ® Ibid., p. 6. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 83 
 
 the likelihood of outbreaks of scurvy, which were vaguely under- 
 stood to be due to improper diet, but which remained baffling to 
 the end of the Company’s history. It was known that “ one 
 with scurvy will recover with fresh food and water.” ^ But 
 during an early nineteenth century voyage scurvy could be treated 
 on board only by aerating the drinking water, washing the decks 
 and woodwork with vinegar, boiling canned soup with the usual 
 ration of peas and oatmeal, serving quantities of oil, vinegar, and 
 mustard, substituting wine for spirits, and sometimes distributing 
 a ration of pickled cabbage, the last item of which may have pos- 
 sessed some real virtue.^” 
 
 Storms at sea were possibly a greater source of dread. The 
 annals of the Company are all too frequently marked by accounts 
 of vessels blown ashore, thrown on reefs, lost through collision 
 or fire at sea, or listed simply as “ missing.” ”■ The storms of 
 the Atlantic and Antarctic were replaced to some extent in the 
 Indian Ocean by the chance of hostile attack. From early in the 
 eighteenth century one of the greatest menaces to East Indiamen 
 arose from the numbers of French frigates which haunted the 
 usual courses to and from India. As the East Indiamen were 
 primarily cargo carriers, the French not infrequently captured 
 them, but as the former went as heavily armed as possible, they 
 seldom capitulated without a struggle. Many of these engage- 
 ments were extremely bloody, partly owing to the numbers carried 
 and partly to the prevailing custom of boarding and hand-to-hand 
 encounters. During the Napoleonic wars, English vessels were 
 driven to sailing in fleets under naval convoy, which reduced the 
 hazard considerably. But no such list of dangers would be com- 
 plete without reference to the pirates found on occasion in all 
 seas, and almost constantly to be anticipated in Indian waters. 
 Some of these hailed from European countries, but more of them 
 came from Arabian and Persian ports, which from time im- 
 memorial had been piratical breeding grounds. The guns of the 
 East Indiamen were frequently not proof against these marauders, 
 whose chosen method of attack was to surround their quarry with 
 numbers of small boats packed with men who might thus swarm 
 on board and massacre passengers and crew alike. 
 
 These and many other dangers often enlivened a voyage around 
 
 ® Edward Terry, A Voyage to India (London, 1655), P- iS- 
 
 “ Captain Wallis’ Voyage around the World,” in the Gentleman's Magazine, 
 XLVI (1766), 417; Sir Henry Grose, Voyage to the East Indies (From A Ele<w 
 Collection of Voyages, vol. II; London, 1767), p. 474. 
 
 The use of the lightning rod to reduce the danger to ships’ masts was known 
 before the end of the eighteenth century. — See Twining, of. cit., p. 41, for the use 
 of a “ chain conductor” during a voyage in 1792. 
 
 See Chatterton, of. cit., pp. 6, 300, and pp. 197 ff. below. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 84 
 
 the Cape, but even imminent dangers could not remove the vast 
 tedium of a passage. Long calms were nearly as hard on nerves 
 as severe storms. Even in fair sailing weather monotony was the 
 rule and many expedients were resorted to for beguiling the time. 
 Strange fish and birds were noted. Sharks were caught. A pass- 
 ing vessel was a notable event. The crossing of the Line was 
 made the occasion for the most outlandish mummeries and 
 breaches of discipline.^® And on a voyage where speed of passage 
 was incidental and caution was the watchword of every English 
 captain, the younger members of the ship’s company seldom re- 
 mained long immune from the subtleties and excitement of flirta- 
 tion, from which the participants did not always emerge un- 
 scathed.^* 
 
 The courses sailed by the East Indiamen were not identical. On 
 the voyage out, the ships almost invariably started from the Com- 
 pany’s docks on the Thames. Passengers usually joined the 
 vessels several days or even weeks later at one of the harbors of 
 the Downs from which the final departure would be made.*® 
 Thence the ships sailed down the Channel for the open Atlantic 
 and on into the Bay of Biscay. From here any one of three or four 
 routes might be taken during the early nineteenth century, de- 
 pending chiefly on the character of the vessel, the skill of its 
 captain, the season of year, and the presumed location of enemies. 
 
 The Portuguese, in opening up the all-sea route, had crept 
 down the African coast within sight of land. This alone goes far 
 to explain the fact that fifty years were required from the begin- 
 ning of the explorations of Prince Henry before the Cape was 
 reached, because of the weak and variable winds prevailing along 
 the coast of Africa. Cabral was apparently the first to discover the 
 trade winds blowing from the coast of South America toward the 
 Cape of Good Hope. It had already been found that from 
 the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands a steady northeast wind 
 would carry vessels within two hundred miles of the Brazilian 
 coast. By thus shaping a triangular course through the Atlantic, 
 the time consumed in reaching the latitude of the Cape might 
 be reduced even as the geographical distance was lengthened. 
 This was the course employed generally until the early years 
 of the nineteenth century, when new styles of rigging and im- 
 
 See Rev. Daniel Tyerman and George Bennet, Journal of Voyages and Traz-sls 
 (2 vols., London, 1831), I, 3—18, passhn-, Wathen, op. at. 
 
 The case of Warren Hastings inevitablj' springs to mind (See Macaulay’s 
 Essay on Warren Hastings) . But this incident lacked the traged}' of numerous 
 others which, according to contemporary journals, too often ended in suicide. 
 
 George, Viscount Valentia, Voyages and Travels to India, Ceylon, the Red 
 Sea, Abyssinia, and Egypt, in the Years 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805, and 1806 (3 vols., 
 London, 1809), I, 3. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 85 
 
 proved ability to tack against the wind recommended more direct 
 courses. 
 
 On many of the earlier voyages the Cape of Good Hope was 
 not touched at all, inasmmch as the more dependable westerly 
 winds were found far to the south in the latitude of 45°. From 
 this region a course might be shaped through the Mozambique 
 Channel, with stops at Madagascar, or on the East African coast, 
 before continuing on to Ceylon. Some vessels, however, con- 
 tinued well to the east of Madagascar, where good winds were 
 found which would continue to Madras Roads or to Bengal. In 
 such instances, the last previous stops would be made at Madeira 
 in the Canaries, or possibly at St. Helena. During this early 
 period Table Bay was an emergency port rather than a regular 
 port of call for the English. 
 
 The capture of Cape Town in 1795 and again in 1806 and 
 contemporaneous changes in sailing technique led to the shaping 
 of more direct courses from Cape Verde to the tip of Africa in 
 which Cape Town became a regular half-way station.^® St. Helena 
 retained much of its importance as a watering station, but vessels 
 in good condition made the stop less and less frequently after 
 the close of the eighteenth century. By the time of the exile of 
 Napoleon Bonaparte in 1815' the island was seldom touched by 
 passing vessels. The return voyage from India differed but little 
 in European waters and not greatly in the Indian Ocean, as such 
 voyages were nearly always made when the winds had reversed 
 their directions. 
 
 Even with improved vessels and new and commodious way 
 stations, the Cape route remained long, difficult, and tiresome.^® 
 It enjoyed the single advantage after 1815 of being politically 
 safe. But with the speeding up of European life, due to the 
 effects of the Industrial Revolution, this route proved to be more 
 and more inadequate, and when new means of transportation 
 presently made possible the development of shorter lines between 
 England and India, the Cape route was doomed to suffer a decline, 
 even though continuing to be the main commercial highway for a 
 half century longer. 
 
 It has been pointed out that the eastern enterprises of Napoleon 
 Bonaparte focused attention throughout the British world on the 
 
 Lord Valentia, of. cit., I, 3-26, gives an excellent account of the resources 
 of St. Helena. 
 
 See Archibald Duncan, The Mariner's Chronicle (London, 1804). 
 
 An article, “ Outward Bound,” in the Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. I, 
 195—206, gives a vivid and excellent description of many details of a voyage to 
 India via the Cape during the early years of the nineteenth century. 
 
86 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 need of new routes of communication between England and India 
 for political purposes/® The Industrial Revolution, which was 
 gaining momentum meanwhile, brought attention to a similar 
 need for economic advantage. The England of Castlereagh, with 
 all its unemployment and want and misery, was not the England 
 of Fox and Pitt, nor would Clive have recognized the Indian 
 Presidencies of Lord William Bentinck’s time. The difference 
 was to be found principally in the widening of horizons, and these 
 expanded in proportion to the growth of commercial interests. 
 English national policy still rested on a mercantile basis j for that 
 matter, mercantile interests were becoming more dominant than 
 ever. The character of the new era beginning with the treaties 
 of Vienna was determined not so much by cabinet officers and 
 parliamentary speakers as by a host of inventors whose combined 
 efforts vastly speeded up industrial life and produced new 
 problems and new relationships. The British statesmen of the 
 nineteenth century were not so free to create national policies and 
 attitudes as their predecessors had beenj they were reduced in- 
 stead to more or less vain attempts to adapt themselves to the 
 working of new forces which they only vaguely comprehended. 
 The bearing of these developments on International relations is 
 even today imperfectly understood, and early nineteenth century 
 statesmen may be dealt with leniently for failure fully to under- 
 stand the interrelation of economic and political forces. 
 
 The growth of English industry and the changing character of 
 the Indian trade during the first quarter of the nineteenth century 
 gave eloquent testimony on the value of India. In early centuries 
 the Indian trade had been confined to goods of quality, for which 
 India exacted payment in specie. But the quantity produc- 
 tion of cheap cloth manufactures, greatly in demand in India, 
 where plenty of raw cotton was grown, changed the old balance of 
 trade and vastly increased India’s economic importance to Great 
 Britain. In 1814, the year in which the East India Company’s 
 trade monopoly with India was removed, manufactured cloth 
 sent out from Great Britain to India amounted to 8 1 7,000 yards, 
 valued at £201,182. By 1819 cloth exports to India had risen 
 to 7,127,661 yards, by 1824 to 23,685,426 yards, and by 1832 
 to 51,833,913 yards, valued at £3,238,248.““ Again, in 1790, 
 before the commercial effects of the new industrial movement 
 were beginning to be considerably felt, British imports from the 
 
 See above, pp. 56, 74, 79. 
 
 Pari. Pap., i8'!7, No. P- 97- See James Silk Bucking-ham, Explanatory 
 Report on the Plan and Object of Mr. Buck'mgham's Lectures on the Oriental World 
 (issued by the Liverpool Committee for Promoting Free Trade to India and China), 
 pp. 30-33- 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 87 
 
 East amounted to 27,000 tons, and exports thence to 26,400 tons. 
 By 1817 the situation had completely altered, with eastern imports 
 into Great Britain amounting to 80,700 tons and exports to India 
 and neighboring countries to 109,400 tons.“^ This indicated that 
 India was becoming very much more essential to British welfare 
 than had ever been the case before, and must be guarded and 
 protected accordingly. But it was very imperfectly seen until 
 the century was far advanced that these commercial changes 
 created an entire new set of relationships with parts of Africa and 
 western Asia, and not only with these regions, but with the prin- 
 cipal continental Powers as well, before a Suez commercial water- 
 way had been seriously thought of. 
 
 Although the Cape route long continued to suffice for the 
 transport of goods, it no longer functioned so satisfactorily after 
 1815 as in earlier times for purposes of communication, either 
 official or unofficial. Business correspondence began to require 
 more speedy channels. Increasing numbers of expatriated Eng- 
 lishmen — clerks, tradesmen, and soldiers — demanded more 
 frequent and facile means of keeping in touch with friends and 
 relatives. It was not the search for new channels of trade, there- 
 fore, but for improved lines of communication which created 
 such new and difficult political problems in the countries of the 
 Near and Middle East after the Napoleonic Wars. To solve 
 these problems the potentiality of steam came to be considered. 
 
 Before the Congress of Vienna, at a time when steam power 
 was being applied to the great river systems of North America, 
 the English were building steam vessels of their own for domestic 
 use. By 1815 steamers were in regular operation on the larger 
 canals and rivers, and within a few years more they were making 
 scheduled trips across the English and Irish Channels. Before 
 1820 far-sighted individuals were predicting the early application 
 of steam to transoceanic transportation,^^ and in 1823 a series of 
 campaigns was launched simultaneously in England and in the 
 Indian Presidencies for the establishment of steam communication, 
 either through the Mediterranean, in conjunction with the opening 
 up of some logical overland route across the intervening land 
 
 Asiatic Journal ani Monthly Register^ XXIII, O.S., 199. See H. L. Hoskins, 
 “ The Growth of British Interest in the Route to India,” in the Journal of Indian 
 History, II, 165—177. 
 
 Interesting contemporary accounts of the development of steam navigation in 
 English waters are contained in Pari. Pap. 1834, No. 478. 
 
 For example, the English Consul-General in Egypt, Mr. John Barker, pub- 
 licly broached the idea as early as 1815, and attempted to take up the matter of 
 steam communication with India with members of the British Government in 1816, 
 but was reproved with the assertion that this was a matter “ not in his competence.” 
 — Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans, II, 126. 
 
88 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 barriers to arms of the Indian Ocean, or around the Cape of Good 
 Hope.^" 
 
 There were good reasons for the recrudescence of routes im- 
 pinging on the Mediterranean as steam navigation came to the 
 fore. The character of the early steam vessel itself suggested 
 this, for it did not give promise of proving practicable over very 
 long routes. It was at once a very expensive and a highly in- 
 efficient piece of workmanship. There was even some doubt at 
 first whether it could ever be used successfully on the high seas. 
 Among the many difficulties to be encountered were the incrusta- 
 tion of boilers and pipes from using salt water, damage to paddle 
 wheels from high seas, the frequent failure of steam pumps, and 
 faulty design and workmanship in general.^® Frequent stoppages 
 were necessary for the lubrication and readjustment of machinery, 
 and extensive repairs were often called for which necessitated the 
 services of specially equipped foundries. 
 
 Early steam engines of all kinds were very inefficient and 
 wasteful. Even for short voyages large quantities of coal w'ere 
 required, while on longer ones almost all of the cargo space had 
 to be used for coal bunkers. For really extensive voyages large 
 and relatively frequent depots of coal were required, and these 
 naturally had to be established by sailing vessels. Even from this 
 brief enumeration of difficulties it is evident that steam vessels, 
 even when assisted by sails, were scarcely equal to any long sus- 
 tained voyage, such as that around the continent of Africa. It 
 was more nearly feasible to employ them on sections of the shorter 
 water routes involving the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay, 
 the Mediterranean, and either the Red and Arabian Seas or the 
 Persian Gulf, where the total sailing distance between England 
 and India was not more than a third of that by the all-sea route. 
 
 English public attention might have been drawn the sooner to 
 the possibilities of effecting speedy communication with the East 
 by steam but for the fact that the regular use of the shorter routes 
 did not survive the Napoleonic Wars.^® The line through Eg\y)t 
 fell into disuse because of the opposition of the Porte to the 
 navigation of the Red Sea and to the prevalence of turbulent 
 political conditions in Egypt. The alternative route through 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831— 1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25; Asiatic Journal XIV, O.S., 5. 
 
 In 1831 a Parliamentary Committee was appointed to “take into considera- 
 tion the frequent Calamities by Steam Navigation and the best Means of guarding 
 against their Recurrence . . — Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 4.3, pp. 305, 520, 
 
 601 ; ibid., 1834, No. 478, p. 25. 
 
 In I 802 and for some time thereafter mails were sent to England from India 
 both via Suez, Cairo and Alexandria and via Basrah and the Syrian desert. At this 
 time private messages were frequently despatched by one or another of these routes, 
 as well. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 89 
 
 Syria and Mesopotamia declined because of chaotic conditions 
 throughout western Asia as well as along the European extension 
 of the line. But the interest which declined in the shorter routes 
 to the East after the Napoleonic period experienced a sudden 
 revival, while political conditions in the countries of western Asia 
 were still highly unsettled. This was due to several factors. The 
 increasingly unsatisfactory political situation in and beyond the 
 Levant was becoming a matter of deep concern, not merely to 
 kings and ministers, but for the first time to great numbers of 
 public minded individuals as well. It was argued on all sides 
 that, to offset the territorial gains of Russia and the political in- 
 fluence of France, Britain must needs develop a more effective 
 line of communication which might be controlled, if need be, 
 during a European conflict. Additional interest in such matters 
 was stimulated at the same time by the publication of the ex- 
 periences of travellers of both sexes who had recently made their 
 way to or from India through Mesopotamia or Egypt and who 
 saw great opportunities for intervention of some kind by their 
 government. Practically all such writers agreed that for travel, 
 as well as despatches, the route via Egypt and the Red Sea might 
 be used with a considerable gain in time, if not in comfort, over 
 the Cape route. However, it was the growing efficacy of the 
 steam vessel which carried much speculation to the point of 
 experiment. 
 
 The first definite scheme recorded for a line of steam vessels 
 between England and India depending on the “ overland ” route 
 through Egypt was the product of an English naval officer, James 
 Henry Johnston. Finding a considerable degree of interest being 
 manifested in England on the subject of steam communication, 
 he attempted in 1822 to form a company with the immediate ob- 
 ject of establishing a steam service between Calcutta and Suez. He 
 was able to secure some financial support in England, where capital 
 was becoming available for almost any kind of new enterprise. 
 He thereupon sailed for Calcutta to complete the organization of 
 his company. Here, however, his project did not appear prac- 
 ticable to any of the financial interests from which support was 
 
 See, for example, Mrs. Colonel Elwood, Narrative of a Journey Overland, 
 from England to the Continent of Europe, Egypt and the Red Sea, to India ... in 
 the years 1825, 1826, 1827 and 1828 (2 vols., London, 1830); Lieut.-Col. Fitz- 
 Clarence, Journal of a Route across India through Egypt to England, in 1817-1818 
 (London, 1819); Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, p. 726; Asiatic Journal, 
 III, N.S. Pt. I, 196—206; Anon., A Few Notes taken during an Overland Journey 
 from England to India . . . (Calcutta, 1826); [John Barker], A Vade-Mecum 
 from India to Europe, by way of Egypt (London, priv. pr., 1827). 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 90 
 
 sought, though, as a caustic contemporary said — “ The details 
 . . . furnished respecting it are so specious, and all the obstacles 
 in the way of its success are so admirably disposed of, that it is 
 astonishing the projector has not been deluged with contributions 
 or subscriptions already, and that a steamer is not unloading in 
 the port of Suez.” Even a more sympathetic writer remarked 
 that — “ We have only to state . . . that the measure has been 
 patronized in our eastern capital in a manner fully equal to the 
 encouragement that is given in the mother country to any spec- 
 ulative scheme of similar or higher character. The journey across 
 the isthmus of Suez is oj course regarded as a trifle.” 
 
 The objections to the plan were numerous and obvious. The 
 initial cost, maintenance, and operation of steam vessels was almost 
 a barrier to commercial profits at that time. No attempts had 
 been made to determine whether a steam vessel could profitably 
 operate on a line as long as that from Calcutta to Suez, even with 
 intermediate stops. It was also exceedingly doubtful whether a 
 steam vessel could operate on this line at all during those summer 
 months when the sopthwest monsoon held sway over the Indian 
 Ocean. But in addition to these difficulties, there was grave doubt 
 whether political conditions in Egypt and Syria would permit of 
 uninterrupted communication between Suez and Alexandria. In 
 any event the Mediterranean end of the line could not readily be 
 developed by such resources as the projector had in view, and in 
 the absence of any government subsidy, it would indeed have been 
 a reckless venture to have embarked on the carrying out of the 
 scheme. 
 
 While the immediate response was disappointing to those in- 
 terested, the proposition was not without result. Early in 1823, 
 a number of enterprising citizens of Calcutta, styling themselves 
 a “ Steam Committee,” called a public meeting for the purpose of 
 considering Johnston’s scheme and raising funds in support of it. 
 The immediate financial subscriptions were inconsiderable, but 
 other results were more noteworthy. The meeting proceeded to 
 organize as a “ Society for the Encouragement of Steam Naviga- 
 tion between Great Britain and India,” and by establishing a 
 “ Steam Fund,” laid the foundations for the eventual realization 
 of their hopes.®" Meanwhile, the Supreme Government of 
 India, which, under the Marquess of Wellesley, had taken the 
 initiative in promoting rapid despatch service during the Na- 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XV, O.S., 477—480. 
 
 23 IhlL, XVII, O.S., 568. 
 
 Calcutta Government Gazette, 17 Jan., 1827; Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 
 735 - — n, App. 25. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 91 
 
 poleonic Wars, was preparing to revive and expand that service. 
 In May, 1823, the new Governor-General, Lord Amherst, wrote 
 the Court of Directors, that — 
 
 We have for some time past been engaged in inquiries 
 respecting the practicability of opening a communication with 
 England through Egypt by means of steam vessels, and ob- 
 serving from the public prints that the subject has been agi- 
 tated in England, we consider it will be acceptable to your 
 Honourable Court ... to be assured that the difficulties 
 on this side of the Egyptian Isthmus are not greater than on 
 the other. . 
 
 On the basis of these considerations, it was suggested to the 
 Directors that the East India Company place two steam ships in 
 operation on each side of the Isthmus of Suez, four steam vessels 
 being considered sufficient for maintaining a monthly communica- 
 tion at that time. This interesting but impracticable suggestion 
 did not impress the materialistic Court, and the recommendation 
 was ignored. More than a decade was destined to elapse before 
 this body would sanction the expenditure of any of their funds for 
 the development of steam lines of their own, and then only under 
 duress. 
 
 At this juncture, however, with both the Government and the 
 public of the Bengal Presidency interested in steam communica- 
 tion, a degree of cooperation was attained which brought the 
 common object a step nearer realization. The Governor-General, 
 who had but lately stated that — “ We do not hold out the en- 
 couragement of Government to the commencement of an enter- 
 prise of which the practicability and ultimate success appeared in 
 our judgment very doubtful,” reconsidered his attitude. By 
 the end of the year (1823) his conversion to a trial of steam 
 navigation was complete. Late in December, he reported to the 
 Court of Directors that, anticipating their approval, “ we accord- 
 ingly resolved to place at the disposal of the Committe the sum 
 of 20,000 rupees as a contribution toward the attainment of the 
 object in question.” But this grant was rigidly conditioned by 
 requiring that any steam vessel despatched from England to India 
 with the view of obtaining a portion of the Bengal steam fund 
 as a reward should be of no less than 300 tons burden,^'* that not 
 
 Ibid., 1831-1832, No. 735. — 11 , App. 25, p. 726. 
 
 Ibid., App. 24, pp. 675-676. 
 
 Ibid., p. 676; Asiatic Journal, XVIII, O.S., 488; ibid., XIX, O.S., 837. 
 
 This provision was inserted without regard to a law on the English statute 
 books that no vessel of less than 500 tons burden might be permitted to sail between 
 
92 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 more than i, 00,000 rupees (i lac) should be granted by the 
 Steam Committee as a premium to any contestant, and that two 
 round trips must be made between England and India before any 
 bonus could be claimed. The Court of Directors generously ap- 
 proved this action, an attitude which is a matter for surprise in 
 view of the reluctance usually shown in permitting any disburse- 
 ments not absolutely necessary. 
 
 The terms of the Bengal Government grant of 20,000 rupees 
 practically determined the conditions under which the Steam 
 Committee undertook to bring about the commencement of steam 
 communication with the home country. At a meeting held on 
 December 17, 1823, a resolution was adopted which included the 
 following item: 
 
 That the amount received under the subscriptions opened 
 for this purpose, ... or if the net receipts from the sub- 
 scription shall exceed . . . one lac of Sicca Rupees, so much 
 therefore as shall amount to that sum, be assigned, as a 
 Premium, to any individuals, or company, being British sub- 
 jects, who may first establish a Communication by Steam 
 Vessels between Qreat Britain and Bengal, by either of the 
 routes above-mentioned, before the expiration of the year 
 1826.®= 
 
 Other details of the offer recapitulated those of the Government 
 donation, and added that the minimum of four steam voyages 
 between England and Bengal must average not more than seventy 
 days each.®® 
 
 The nature of the Calcutta Steam Committee’s award and the 
 date by which the stipulated four voyages were to be completed, 
 appeared to argue in favor of the Cape route, which the Com- 
 mittee evidently had in mind. On this line only one vessel would 
 be required for experimental purposes as against at least two by 
 either of the shorter routes, hence the capital investment would 
 be much smaller. Also, because of the prevailing winds along 
 the route, sails might successfully be employed as auxiliary 
 power, which would be a more doubtful matter in the Red Sea or 
 Persian Gulf. 
 
 England and India. Possibly the law was interpreted as applying onl}- to sailing 
 vessels. The steam vessel which first made the voyage to India came within the 
 law, however, and claimed 500 tons. 
 
 Quarterly Oriental Magazine, VII, xix. 
 
 Neither of the other Indian Presidencies assisted in this, as thev were pre- 
 occupied at this time in considering their own projects for steam lines. There was 
 little feeling of unity among the Anglo-Indian communities, even in such matters 
 of general concern. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 93 
 
 It was quite natural, in spite of the limitations inherent in the 
 steamship, that the first attempt to bridge the distance between 
 England and India by the use of steam was directed to the all- 
 sea route. This was the traditional English passage-way to the 
 East — one which had been acquired and monopolized only after 
 many struggles, and the one which had sufficed for the establish- 
 ment of a great commercial empire in India. Because it was an 
 all-water passage, and could be protected and controlled as long 
 as British fleets dominated the seas, it was naturally looked upon 
 as peculiarly Britain’s own. The passage was subject to no whim 
 of Sultan or Pasha. Jealous and suspicious European govern- 
 ments could not inspect or tamper at pleasure with such com- 
 munications. There need be no transshipment of mails, pas- 
 sengers, or cargoes. Its course did not lie chiefly in the blis- 
 tering tropics. Moreover, the application of steam to this 
 route was thought to promise a transit as speedy as any which 
 could be accomplished by shorter routes having difficult land 
 barriers.®' 
 
 The prospect of large reward immediately attracted a consid- 
 erable number of promoters, both in India and England, and none 
 more powerfully than Capt. Johnston. He readily altered his 
 earlier plan of establishing a line of steam vessels between Cal- 
 cutta and Suez in favor of one between England and India by way 
 of the Cape of Good Hope, and hastened back to England to 
 complete his arrangements. Once again in England he had little 
 difficulty, in view of the tantalizing prospect, in effecting the or- 
 ganization of a steam navigation company with a proposed capital 
 of £200,000. Ownership of the vessel was presently made up 
 into 64 shares of £500 each, which were subscribed by 32 English 
 financiers, most of them members of large London commercial 
 houses.®® It was perhaps appropriate that the offices of the new 
 concern should be located in the South Sea House, a name rem- 
 iniscent of an earlier speculative venture. 
 
 During the year and a half following the publication of the 
 Calcutta Steam Committee’s prize offer, Capt. Johnston and his 
 associates were feverishly at work pushing the construction of a 
 
 Frederick Sheer, The Cape of Good Hope versus Egypt; or Political and 
 Commercial Considerations on the Proper Line of Steatti Comtnunication with the 
 East Indies (London, [1839]), P- 14; Henry Wise, An Analysis of One Hundred 
 Voyages to and from India, China, etc., . . . with Remarks on the Advantages of 
 Steam-power applied as an auxiliary Aid to Shipping . . . (London, 1839), p. 
 xix; Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. I, 85; ibid., XXXI, N.S., Pt. I, 138. 
 
 Oriental Herald, IV, 395—396; Asiatic Journal, 'XNW, O.S., 568; Low, History 
 of the Indian Navy, I, 520; Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 139. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 94 
 
 large steam vessel, in the hope of forestalling any possible rival. 
 This was to be a pioneering venture in more than one respect. 
 The vessel was to be a monster of its kind with a measurement of 
 500 tons burden, in view of the distance to be traversed, the heavy 
 seas to be encountered, and the large amount of fuel to be carried. 
 The ship was no larger than many of the East Indiamen in the 
 East India Company’s fleet, it is true, but this was the first steam 
 vessel built in England designed exclusively for service on the 
 high seas.®® 
 
 While the vessel was building, the wildest rumors were afloat. 
 It was reported in the Indian press that the new vessel would be 
 equipped with an engine of a new type, using such small quantities 
 of fuel that no stops would be required en route for an additional 
 supply. A voyage of sixty days was expected to bring the prodigy 
 from the Thames to the Hooghly. So wild and unfounded were 
 the claims made for the new vessel by those who knew little of it 
 that its subsequent failure nearly to measure up to these sanguine 
 expectations caused a very decided reaction against any plan for 
 the application of steam to the longer ocean routes for years to 
 come. 
 
 Report was also current of other great steamships which were 
 being secretly prepared for the voyage to India in the hope of 
 capturing the substantial prize. But whatever plans may have 
 been on foot, Capt. Johnston was the first to complete his prep- 
 arations for a steam voyage. In March, 1825, the Oriental 
 Herald regaled its readers with the intriguing statement that — 
 
 We are at length enabled to announce the certainty of a 
 steam-vessel sailing for India by way of the Cape of Good 
 Hope. All thoughts of pursuing the route by the Mediter- 
 ranean and Red Sea appear to have been judiciously aban- 
 doned. In the way now chosen there are no obstacles but a 
 supply of fuel at intermediate stations and the weathering of 
 heavy gales off the Cape. The former is a mere question of 
 expenses. . . The latter is only to be determined by ex- 
 periments, but . . . [there is] the strongest hope.^’ 
 
 The prospectus of the venture, published by the Company in 
 stating their plans for a regular line of bi-monthly steamers by 
 the Cape, said of this their first vessel, that “ calculations hold 
 out every prospect of her reaching Calcutta within two months 
 
 Low, op. ch., I, sio. It was said that the Dutch were the first to build steam- 
 ships for ocean navig'ation, to be used in their eastern possessions. 
 
 Oriental Herald, I, 195; ibid., VII, 171. 
 
 Ibid., IV, 395. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 95 
 
 from the time of her leaving Portsmouth.” This estimate was 
 but one-third or one-fourth of the time usually required for the 
 voyage by the ships of the East India Company, but it was 
 supposed that, since a steam vessel would not be dependent on 
 winds, a straight track would materially reduce the distance to be 
 covered. 
 
 By the time Capt. Johnston’s vessel was ready, the entire Brit- 
 ish world awaited with vast interest and deep concern the outcome 
 of the venture. Cynics prepared to scoff and enthusiasts to rejoice. 
 The promoters of the enterprise had such great faith in their cal- 
 culations and in the performance of the vessel that not even a 
 trial trip was made before the commencement of the voyage. 
 But the time allowed by the Calcutta Steam Committee was 
 growing short and final preparations had to be unduly hastened. 
 Those who were fortunate or courageous, as the case may have 
 been, in being selected as passengers for the historic voyage, em- 
 barked at London in the middle of August, 1825, and the steamer 
 immediately set out for Falmouth, whence the official start was to 
 be made. This first stage of the trip was somewhat marred by a 
 dangerous fire, which resulted from the stowing of coal directly 
 over the engine boiler. The incident was minimized and hushed 
 up as much as possible by the Company’s officials, and little time 
 was lost. On August 16, the pathfinding steamship, happily 
 named the Enterfrizey steamed out of Falmouth harbor for Cal- 
 cutta with ffags flying and great paddle wheels churning, and 
 bearing important official despatches and seventeen passengers.^® 
 
 News of the voyage drifted back to England from points along 
 the route. Almost from the outset it became apparent that the 
 vessel was not making the anticipated progress. Subsequently 
 it appeared that the enormous weight of the coal with which the 
 ship started, and its improper location on board, gave the steamer 
 an unlooked for draught, and seriously impeded progress for a 
 considerable time. Storms and head winds caused further delay, 
 providing special handicaps for a paddle steamer where even im- 
 mersion was necessary to effective operation. Finally, after the 
 original fuel supply had been exhausted, the Enterprize was com- 
 pelled to change tack and depend entirely on sails in order to reach 
 the Cape. The voyage from Cape Town, where the single coal 
 depot had been located, was largely a replica of the first half of 
 the voyage.''^ The vessel arrived at Calcutta only after the ex- 
 
 Ibid., IV, 396. 
 
 Ibid., VI, 580-581. Among- the passengers -was a sort of Jonah, one Thomas 
 Waghorn, -who later distinguished himself as a proponent of the route through 
 Egypt. — See Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, Min. of Ev., p. 208. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XX, O.S., 371, 487; ibid., XXI, 663, 785-786; Oriental 
 Herald, VI, 580—581, IX, 360—361. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 96 
 
 piration of 113 days, of which lO had been spent at anchor, 40 
 entirely under sail, and only 62 days under steamd® 
 
 Although bitterly disappointing to those interested in ocean 
 steam navigation and communication, the voyage of the Enter- 
 frize was in many respects remarkable. Considering the experi- 
 mental stage of steam navigation and the nature of the difficulties 
 overcome, the fact that the voyage was completed at all warrants 
 its being rated as something of a triumph.^® Nevertheless, because 
 the conditions laid down by the Calcutta Steam Committee were 
 not met as to time consumed in transit, and because of the con- 
 siderable dependence on sail propulsion, the trip in contemporary 
 eyes was generally considered a dismal failure. Even Capt. 
 Johnston himself admitted before a Parliamentary Committee 
 a few years later that he was “ thoroughly convinced that the 
 communication between England and Calcutta under the existing 
 state of steam navigation [could] never be accomplished but at a 
 heavy sacrifice.” A few other experimental steam voyages 
 made around the Cape of Good Hope about the same time only 
 strengthened this conclusion."*® 
 
 The acknowledged failure of the Enterprize was a great blow 
 to the promoters of the project and to the plans of the Anglo- 
 Indian community at Calcutta. The owners of the vessel were 
 threatened with a considerable loss, since the reward of the Bengal 
 Steam Society could not be claimed, and the vessel was obviously 
 incapable of making regular voyages around the Cape. Partial 
 relief for the investors was furnished, however, by the purchase 
 of the steamer by the Bengal Government for £40,000, which 
 was approximately the cost of building."*® For several years 
 thereafter the Enterprize gave a good account of herself in eastern 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 139; ibid., 1834, No. 478, App. I, p. 5. 
 
 Observations on the Advantages and Possibility of Successfully Employing 
 Steatn Poveer in N avigating Ships between this Country and the East Indies (London, 
 priv. pr., 1829), pp. 3—5. Cf. Niles’ Register, XXX, 92. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 144, 494-495. 
 
 Quarterly Oriental Magazine, VII, xix— xxi; Oriental Herald, IX, 360—361; 
 Asiatic Journal, XXII, O.S., 607; Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, pp. 1—5. The Betsy 
 of Bordeaux was one steam vessel which made the voyage to India in the same year, 
 but with no greater success than that of the Enterprize. A year or so later a Dutch 
 steamship, the Atlas, said to have been 230 feet long, of 1800 tons burden, and with 
 engines totalling 300 horse-power, undertook to establish a steam communication 
 with the Dutch East Indies. This large vessel was reported to have been more com- 
 pletely a failure than the Enterprize. All of these vessels, of course, made use of sails 
 as much as possible. — Observations on the Advantages and Possibilities of Success- 
 fully Employing Steatn Power in Navigating Ships between this country and the East 
 Indies, pp. 6—7. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831— 1832, No. 735. — II, 139-141. 
 
The S.S. Enterprize, which reached India from England 
 
 in 1826 
 
 The Firebrand, first Admiralty Packet Steamer in the 
 Mediterranean 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 97 
 
 waters. During the Burmese War she was employed in towing 
 transports to and from Rangoon and in carrying despatches/” 
 and was subsequently used in an unsuccessful attempt to establish 
 a steam line between Calcutta and Suez. The pioneering efforts 
 of Capt. Johnston were also not permitted to go altogether un- 
 requited. In 1827 the Calcutta Steam Committee voted him one- 
 half of the existing steam fund, the other half being reserved for 
 other meritorious attempts of the same kind. Capt. Johnston, 
 having continued for a time in command of the Enterf rize, spent 
 the remainder of a very useful life at Calcutta originating and 
 developing lines of steam vessels on the great river systems of 
 India.^^ 
 
 The voyage of the Enter'prize was considered by many as show- 
 ing that while the all-sea route might be practicable, it was not 
 profitable for steam navigation.®' However, in spite of this con- 
 clusion, and in face of the disappointing results of other experi- 
 mental voyages, both the Supreme Government of India and the 
 mercantile community at Calcutta persisted in advocating the 
 development of the Cape route by steam vessels as long as any 
 degree of public interest could be maintained and ambitious pro- 
 moters were found to respond. The interest of Calcutta in the 
 all-sea route has already been alluded to in indicating the interest 
 of Anglo-Indian merchants in a waterway which might be utilized 
 for the purposes of steam trade as well as for purposes of com- 
 munication. The Cape route was also free from political dangers. 
 But the rivalry and competition of merchant houses in India, com- 
 bined with the mutual prejudices of the Indian Presidencies also 
 had much bearing on the routes and means advocated for steam 
 communication after 1825.®® 
 
 From the point of view of accessibility from Europe, the Indian 
 presidencies occupy very dissimilar positions. Wind and ocean 
 currents, as well as continental outlines, direct any vessels, whether 
 propelled by steam or sails, from the Cape of Good Hope toward 
 the east coast of India, making Madras and Calcutta the logical 
 eastern termini. Lines of communication extending eastward 
 from the Mediterranean, however, whether traversing Egypt and 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXI, O.S., 634, 735, 785; ibid., XXII, 600 ff., 713; Low, 
 o-p. cit., I, 468, 521. 
 
 Calcutta Government Gazette, 17 Jan., 1827; Asiatic Journal, VIII, N.S., 
 Pt. II, 225; ibid., IX, Pt. II, loi. In 1838 the Enterprize was dismantled and her 
 boilers installed in a new vessel built at Calcutta to receiv'e them. — Asiatic Journal, 
 XXVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 103. 
 
 Low, op. cit., I, 521. 
 
 See Asiatic Journal, XX, O.S., 358-359; Oriental Herald, VI, 574—575. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 98 
 
 the Red Sea, or utilizing natural highways through Syria, Mesopo- 
 tamia, and the Persian Gulf, find in Bombay their logical objec- 
 tive. During the months of June, July, August, and September, 
 to be sure, when the southwest monsoon is at its height, sailing 
 vessels find it impossible to make direct crossings between the 
 Red Sea and Bombay, Even the steam vessels of the early nine- 
 teenth century frequently found it necessary to make wide detours 
 from the mouth of the Red Sea, so that some advantage of the 
 prevailing winds might be taken in reaching the coast of India. 
 But allowing for all deviations, the distance between Suez and 
 Bombay was materially less than between Suez and Calcutta. 
 
 Bombay as the base port for lines of steam communication be- 
 tween England and India would naturally enjoy a considerable 
 moral and commercial advantage over other Indian ports. As 
 the seat of a presidency, Bombay might thus outstrip her sister 
 presidencies of Bengal and Madras, and recover the position of 
 supremacy she had enjoyed before the elevation of Calcutta by 
 the Regulating Act of 1773.“^ Hence it is not strange that the 
 Government and mercantile community of Calcutta, generally 
 aided and abetted by official and mercantile elements of Madras, 
 preferred to agitate for the establishment of steam communication 
 via the Cape of Good Hope rather than to contribute to the rise 
 of a rival presidency. 
 
 On January 16, 1827, a general meeting of the subscribers to 
 the Bengal Steam Fund met at the Town Hall in Calcutta to 
 consider the disposition of the fund, which then totalled over 
 £10,000. After some discussion the subscribers to the fund 
 voted that half the amount of the Fund be awarded to Capt. 
 Johnston, whose efforts were considered meritorious, and that the 
 other half of the fund should “ be held by the Committee 
 for two years to remunerate any successful attempt to carry into 
 effect the original object.” This action was taken in the hope 
 that some one of the several plans then being agitated might bear 
 fruit. 
 
 One of the propositions for a steam line between England and 
 Bengal had as its chief protagonist a young Anglo-Indian, James 
 W. Taylor, a brother of the English political agent at Bagdad 
 and Basrah, Major Robert Taylor.®® Young Taylor, being at- 
 tracted by the prospect of reward which had prompted Capt. 
 Johnston’s venture, spent a part of the year 1825 in England 
 
 Oriental Herald, VI, 574-575; Asiatic Journal, XXII, O.S., S9, 607. 
 
 Quarterly Oriental Magazine, VII, xxi; Oriental Herald, XX, 1S3. 
 
 Barker, of. cit., II, 129; Pari. Pap., 1S34, No. 478, App. S, p. 36. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA 99 
 
 trying to form a company which might compete with Capt. John- 
 ston’s and by early and successful voyages to Bengal secure the 
 coveted award.” A skeleton organization was formed and some 
 funds subscribed, but the project was still only half matured 
 when the Enter-pri^.e sailed on her maiden voyage. The results 
 of this experiment were so negative that Taylor and his associates 
 found it impracticable to continue their attempts to establish a 
 steam navigation concern for the India service at the moment. 
 In 1827 Taylor applied to the Steam Committee at Calcutta for 
 compensation to offset the losses he had already incurred in the 
 cause of steam navigation, but his claims were disallowed. The 
 Steam Committee, while ready to support honest endeavor and 
 worthy experiment, did not wish to be considered a philanthropical 
 organization.®® Following this rebuff, Taylor transferred his 
 attention to steam routes leading eastward from the Mediter- 
 ranean, where his plans more nearly approached fruition. 
 
 Meanwhile, the idea of establishing a steam line via the Cape, 
 fostered by the remainder of the Bengal Steam Fund, was vig- 
 orously taken up by another young promoter, Thomas Waghorn. 
 This unique individual, whose vocabulary did not contain the 
 word “ impossible,” became distinguished as the projector of 
 communication with India by almost all of the known routes, and 
 particularly that through Egypt. Born in 1800, he entered the 
 Royal Navy at the early age of twelve, and at seventeen had suc- 
 cessfully passed the examination for a lieutenancy, establishing 
 a new record in this respect. Because of his extreme youth he 
 did not receive a commission at the time, and for some years he 
 served without rank in the Bengal Pilot Service. During the 
 Burmese War, 1824—1826, he distinguished himself for signal 
 bravery in the capture of a commanding site at Rangoon, but was 
 nevertheless released from the Indian Navy shortly afterward 
 because of his restless propensities. 
 
 Waghorn’s insistent energy soon found a suitable vent in 
 projects for steam communication, which contained enough of 
 romance and of daring to capture his imagination. Discovering 
 that the Calcutta Government was still imbued with the desire 
 to develop the Cape route despite the unsatisfactory performance 
 of the Enterprise, he promptly evolved a scheme for a steam com- 
 
 Ibid., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, pp. 727-728. 
 
 Quarterly Oriental Magazine, VII, xxi. 
 
 London Times, 15 March, 1884, p. 5; Low, op. cit., I, 521; Pari. Pap., 
 1837, No. 539, p. 22. Waghorn was promoted to the rank of lieutenant in the 
 Royal Navy in 1842, “as an official acknowledgment of [his] exertions in es- 
 tablishing the overland route to India.” — Asiatic Journal, XXXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 
 375 - 
 
lOO 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 munication at regular quarterly intervals with which he was able 
 to attract the attention of that Government. 
 
 In February, 1827, Waghorn returned to England armed with 
 a letter of recommendation from the Supreme Government to 
 the Court of Directors. With his project thus sponsored, he set 
 about securing further patronage for a line of mail packet steamers 
 to India. He managed to secure hearings before various com- 
 mercial organizations and he made numerous public addresses, 
 but his incoherent speech, his exaggerated statements, and the 
 recollection of Capt. Johnston’s failure all inhibited any great 
 display of enthusiasm for his proposition. He was able, however, 
 to secure some conditional promises of support from merchants 
 in the India trade, and after insistent appeals, the Court of Direc- 
 tors reluctantly agreed to supply engines for the first vessel which 
 might be built under his plan. Books were thereupon opened for 
 subscriptions by the newly-formed East India Trade Committee, 
 while Waghorn hastened back to Calcutta to bid for the remainder 
 of the Bengal Steam Fund and to secure further support from 
 the Bengal Government. 
 
 He had meanwhile completed his program in detail. He pro- 
 posed to establish a monthly steam communication eventually, 
 beginning with an immediate quarterly service. At the outset 
 only Government and private mails were to be carried, and he 
 anticipated his profits from a new and high rate of postage on 
 these — as much as four shillings for each single letter and four 
 shillings per ounce on parcels. This rate he believed to be justified 
 by the anticipated increase in speed and regularity of delivery. 
 With small steamers of about 280 tons, and with three or four 
 coal depots, he believed that voyages might be made in seventy 
 days, the maximum interval originally prescribed by the Calcutta 
 Steam Committee in its prize offer. For the establishment of 
 this service, Waghorn estimated that an initial capital of only 
 £12,000 would be required.®® 
 
 The project sounded so plausible that a special meeting of the 
 subscribers to the Bengal Steam Fund met on July 30, 1828, to 
 consider making a special appropriation for the work by setting 
 aside some of the conditions originally specified as the basis of 
 awards from the steam fund. There was some difference of 
 opinion in the meeting on this proposal. Capt. H. T. Prinsep, 
 Secretary to the Bengal Government, believed that Waghorn’s 
 calculations as to speed, fuel-carrying capacity, and practicability 
 of such small steam vessels was considerably overrated. But 
 Capt. Johnston, who was present, cast the die by expressing com- 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVII, O.S., 218, 219. 
 
STEAM AND THE ALL-SEA ROUTE TO INDIA loi 
 
 plete faith in Waghorn’s estimate. The meeting thereupon voted 
 that, “ should no speculation promising greater or equal success 
 be undertaken before the 19th of January, 1829, the unappro- 
 priated fund for the encouragement of steam navigation shall, 
 under proper security, be applied for the purpose of enabling Mr. 
 Waghorn to carry his plan into execution.” The Bengal Gov- 
 ernment also approved the proposed postage rates. 
 
 Pausing at every English community en route to England, 
 Waghorn arrived in April, 1829, confident of success.®^ His high 
 hopes, however, were quickly subdued. The English Post Office 
 confronted him with an Act of Parliament prescribing the rates 
 of Indian postage, thus removing the principal basis of his ex- 
 pectation of revenue. The Court of Directors were unwilling to 
 carry out the agreement they had made earlier. Added to these 
 discouragements, the funds from eastern steam committees, which 
 were his chief reliance, were not remitted.®® 
 
 Waghorn felt he had no choice but to return to India to ascer- 
 tain the reasons for lack of support. For one particular reason 
 he decided to go out by way of Egypt and the Red Sea. He was 
 aware of the drift of public attention to this route, now that the 
 Cape route was discredited, and wished to become identified with 
 it should it promise to be more practicable than the other. In an 
 unsuccessful attempt to establish a new record for a speedy pas- 
 sage,®'* Waghorn reached India on March 21, 1830, to find that 
 projects for a steam line between India and Suez were already 
 being everywhere discussed.®® Wishing to keep in the forefront 
 of the movement, Waghorn soon proclaimed himself a leading 
 exponent of the Red Sea route, and remained a conspicuous ad- 
 vocate of the line during the remainder of his life. 
 
 A single event at this moment practically completed the ruin 
 of the Cape route as a line for steam communication between 
 Great Britain and India. On March 20, 1830, the day before 
 Waghorn arrived at Bombay, a sturdy little steamer, the Hugh 
 Lindsay y which had been built at Bombay of India teak and fitted 
 with engines from England, left that port for the Red Sea on an 
 
 Ibid.., XXVI, O.S., 729; XXVII, 218, 219. 
 
 Ibid., XXVII, O.S., 479, 486-487; Low, op. cit., I, 521; Oriental Herald, 
 XX, 185. In supporting his scheme, Waghorn pointed out that it had the approval 
 of the Hon. Hugh Lindsay, Chairman of the East India Court of Directors, Captain 
 Ross, of the late expedition to the North Polar regions, Mr. Maudslay, the steam 
 engineer and manufacturer, and Mr. Gurney, inventor of the steam coach. 
 
 Recourse was also had to printed propaganda. A pamphlet privately printed 
 by Waghorn during this interval, entitled “ Steam Navigation to India by the Cape 
 of Good Hope,” is of considerable interest. 
 
 See pp. 107, 118—120 below. ' 
 
 Asiatic Journal, HI, N.S., Pt., H, 183-184, 198; ibid., IV, Pt. II, 23-24. 
 
102 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 unheralded voyage. Suez was reached about a month later after 
 an entirely successful passage.®® Even the Calcutta Gazette could 
 not refrain from saying that “ this experiment proves not only the 
 practicability but the facility of steam navigation by the Red Sea 
 route.” ®^ 
 
 The Cape route continued to be discussed academically as a 
 possible steam route until the opening of the Suez Canal put a 
 final quietus on its consideration as a principal artery of British 
 communications with the East. Actually, the Cape line was used 
 for purposes of steam navigation only when new steamers were 
 sent out from England for regular service in Indian and eastern 
 waters, until the rise of the South African and Australasian colo- 
 nies demanded steam service of their own late in the century. 
 
 Low, of. cit., I, 520, 526; James Douglas, Bombay and Western India, II, 
 331, n. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 197. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ PASSAGE 
 
 T he possibilities and advantages in steam communication 
 between England and India appealed as strongly to 
 the English in Bombay as to the Calcutta community. 
 This interest did not take form in projects for lines of steamships 
 which would employ the route around the Cape of Good Hope, 
 however. Instead, it focused on one plan after another for the 
 use of steam in the opening up of new lines by way of the Red 
 Sea and Egypt, or, as a possible alternative, by way of the 
 Persian Gulf, Mesopotamia, and Syria. Steam lines around 
 the Cape would benefit Bombay relatively little, while the de- 
 velopment of either of the more direct routes between Europe 
 and India would tend greatly to reduce the isolation of the Bom- 
 bay Presidency and increase its relative importance. Of the two 
 natural channels leading toward Europe, the inhabitants of 
 Bombay had greater faith in the Red Sea, partly because a shorter 
 overland journey was required to reach European waters, and 
 partly because at the outset it was better known than the other. ^ 
 Ground was broken for a steam route by way of the Red Sea by 
 Mountstuart Elphinstone, soon after he became Governor of 
 Bombay.^ In May, 1823, when Calcutta was first taking up the 
 idea of the Cape route, Elphinstone proposed to the Court of 
 Directors in London that the East India Company undertake the 
 opening of the Red Sea route with steam vessels. Earlier at- 
 tempts to make regular use of this line by employing sailing 
 vessels had been fruitless. As Elphinstone pointed out, “ al- 
 though the whole passage from London to Bombay was once made 
 in two months, yet it generally takes three months to go from 
 Bombay even to Suez. The great advantage of a steam boat is, 
 that it is independent of wind. It would therefore go through 
 all the seas between this and England, and at all seasons, nearly 
 at the same rate.” He thought that by means of steam vessels 
 
 ^ Asiatic Journal, XXIV, O.S., 719-722; XXV, O.S., 40-42. 
 
 ^ Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — I, 28. 
 
 103 
 
104 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 communication between Bombay and London might be made 
 more rapid than that between Bombay and Calcutta. As to the 
 European end of such a line, he said, “ We have here alluded to 
 the circuitous communication by the Straits of Gibraltar, because 
 in time of war, when quick communication is most required, we 
 might not be able to send the packets through France. . .” Two 
 steam vessels on each side of the Isthmus of Suez, he thought, 
 would suffice for regular contact. “ Egypt,” he remarked, “ has 
 seldom or never been so disturbed as to stop our packets, but if it 
 were so, the steam boats might for the time go to some port in 
 Syria on the one side and to Bussorah on the other, so that the 
 packet would still pass with great rapidity, though not so quick as 
 through Egypt.” ® 
 
 The Bombay Government made another similar proposal 
 after the voyage of the Enter-prize from England to Calcutta in 
 1825— 1826, but the Court of Directors took no notice. The 
 finances of the East India Company were in bad condition, and 
 the Directors were a body of men to whom any change was 
 anathema. Besides, the respective merits of the two routes men- 
 tioned by Governor Elphinstone were unknown, and remained 
 undetermined for years to come. 
 
 Pending actual attempts to employ steam vessels between 
 Indian and western ports, the estimated advantages and difficul- 
 ties of the route proposed by Governor Elphinstone were played 
 up in contemporary journals according to their respective geo- 
 graphical and editorial prejudices. The Calcutta India Gazette, 
 for example, as was to be expected, believed that “ It [the over- 
 land route] appears to be on the whole much less commodious 
 . . . than that round the Cape of Good Hope. . . A person 
 may consume ten months, where he only calculated on four or 
 five being necessary.”^ The Oriental Herald, published in 
 London by one James Silk Buckingham, wffio had had long and un- 
 pleasant experience in India and had several times used the over- 
 land passage, spoke of the proposed communication in dubious 
 vein. Plundering Arabs, heated desert, lack of fuel, and the 
 plague, he pointed out, furnished almost Insuperable obstacles: 
 and he concluded that, “ However desirable such a speedy com- 
 munication may be, it is not likely, until the obstacles . . . shall 
 be removed, to be carried into effect.” ® The Bombay Courier, on 
 the other hand, saw — 
 
 ^ ?arl. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 726. 
 
 India Gazette, 27 Nov., 1833, quoted in Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, 26. 
 
 ® Oriental Herald, I, 87. Cf. ibid., II, 615; ibid.. Ill, 145. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 105 
 
 An open sea . . . exempt for eight months of the year 
 from stormy and unsettled weather, [which] extends to the 
 straits of Babelmandel, while the island of Socotra affords 
 a convenient situation for a depot of fuel. On passing these 
 straits, the Red Sea, like a vast natural canal, extends nearly 
 due north for upwards of a thousand miles, till it almost 
 meets the Mediterranean; and it is hardly possible to look at 
 a map of the world without receiving a kind of impression 
 that nature, in her physical operations, had intended those 
 two seas to facilitate the communication between Europe, 
 Asia, and Africa, and left it to the enterprise and ingenuity 
 of man to take advantage of her arrangements.® 
 
 This was a rather idealistic picture. Actually, the Red Sea, 
 while truly offering a long, navigable channel, was beset with al- 
 most every kind of impediment and danger known to navigation. 
 Its shores were rocky, with promontories extending far into the 
 narrow sea to catch unwary vessels. Its bed was in places almost 
 bottomless, affording no hold for anchors, in others cluttered with 
 coral reefs and submerged rocks. The winds of the Sea were 
 notoriously fickle, ceasing entirely for hours or days, or coming 
 in tempests to drive unlucky vessels ashore within the reach of 
 watchful and conscienceless plunderers. 
 
 Other dangers appealed equally to the imagination, and one 
 great deterrent to the regular use of either the route through 
 Egypt or that through Mesopotamia and Syria was the dreaded 
 plague, which visited all the countries of western Asia and Egypt 
 nearly every year during the hot season.^ A canal across the 
 Isthmus of Suez was not infrequently mentioned as a possible 
 solution of this and other problems.® But such suggestions were 
 of little avail at so early a date, and the horrors attending the 
 outbreaks of disease in Egypt and Syria were unquestionably one 
 of the most potent factors in delaying the actual opening of either 
 of the shorter land passages in conjunction with steam lines. Fear 
 
 ® Bombay Courier, 25 March, 1826, quoted in Asiatic Journal, XXII, O.S., 607. 
 ^ Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, App. 4, p. 24; Asiatic Journal, XX, O.S., 359; ihii., 
 XXIV, O.S., 7195 ibid., XXV, O.S., 40-42; Oriental Herald, I, 84-87, 176; ibid., 
 5 75 ; Mrs. Col. Elwood, Narrative of a Journey Overland to India, II, 395 ff. ; 
 Frederick Forbes, A.M., M.D., Thesis on the Nature and History of the Plague . . . 
 for 'which a Gold Medal was awarded by the Faculty of Medicine of the University 
 of Edinburgh. . . (Edinburgh, 1840); Lieut. H. Congreve, A Suggestion for the 
 Cure of the Cholera (London, 1842). Plague specifics suggested by medical author- 
 ities and travellers varied from the wearing of medicated clothing and abstention 
 from meats to immersions in olive oil or the inhaling of “ protoxide of nitrogen.” 
 
 ® Asiatic Journal, XVIII, O.S., 330; ibid., XX, O.S., 364, 538—542, 600; Oriental 
 Herald, V, 5-9; Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, App. 6, pp. 28-34; Niles’’ Register, 
 XXXI, 92. 
 
io6 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 of the plague gradually subsided after its characteristics became 
 better known. Dread of nomadic desert tribes, which had a more 
 potent foundation, also was being steadily reduced throughout 
 this early period by the strong arm of Mehemet xA.li, first in the 
 Egyptian desert, and later even in Syria and Arabia.® 
 
 Meanwhile, Governor Elphinstone continued his plans for the 
 navigation of the Red Sea by commencing a series of systematic 
 surveys, and in 1827 at the close of his term he displayed his 
 faith in the value of this route by making his way to England via 
 Egypt.^® His successor at Bombay, Sir John Malcolm, was a no 
 less zealous advocate of the Red Sea route to England. During 
 his energetic administration marine surveys were continued, coal 
 depots were established, and the first concrete proof was given of 
 the feasibility of steam navigation between Bombay and Egypt. 
 Immediately after taking up his duties at the Bombay Presidency, 
 Malcolm outlined a plan for opening the entire line between 
 Bombay and England via Egypt, basing his plan on the use of 
 fast steamships. His main proposal rested on the idea that, to be 
 sufficiently practical, steam voyages must be made in each direction 
 at least once per month. However, as a preliminary arrangement, 
 he suggested that one steamer be put into operation on either side 
 of the Isthmus of Suez, until practical experiment had shown the 
 best method of increasing the service. He believed that by proper 
 cooperation at the Isthmus, mails and despatches might be trans- 
 mitted between India and England in as brief a time as 34 days, 
 and that the expense of such transit could be defrayed by a hea\y 
 postage on private letters. “ 
 
 By way of adding example to precept, Malcolm’s steam plans 
 and other official despatches were forwarded via the overland 
 route to the Court of Directors in December, 1828. These papers 
 stated the Governor’s intention of making an experimental steam 
 voyage in the following year, by sending the Enterfrize steamer, 
 with the consent of the Supreme Government of India, from 
 Bombay to Suez. He requested of the Court that they make ar- 
 rangements for another steam vessel to come to Alexandria, 
 bringing out mails and passengers for India, and receiving those 
 homeward bound. 
 
 Believing that his plan would be approved. Governor Malcolm 
 
 ® David George Hogarth, The Penetration of Arabia: A Record of the Develop- 
 ment of Western Knovsledge concerning the Arabian Peninsula (New York, 1904.), 
 pp. 101 — 104. 
 
 London Times, 15 March, 18S4; Low, History of the Indian Navy, I, 
 525-526. 
 
 Barker, Egypt and Syria under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey, II, 123. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 107 
 
 spent the next few months in making preparations for the steam 
 experiment. He had already established one coal depot at Mocha, 
 on the Arabian coast. In February, 1829, the Thetis y of the 
 Indian Navy, a brig consort carrying a large cargo of coal, and a 
 native ship with miscellaneous naval supplies, were despatched 
 from Bombay to establish depots at Aden, Jeddah, Cosseir, and 
 Suez.^^ Soon afterward a government bulletin was issued, an- 
 nouncing November 15 as the date for despatching the steamer 
 from Bombay, and stating the rates of postage to be collected on 
 private letters.^® Meanwhile, John Barker, the English Consul- 
 General in Egypt, had secured permission from the Egyptian 
 Government for the transmission of English mails and passengers 
 through the domain of the Pasha, who was on the whole well 
 disposed toward the project. 
 
 The immediate results of these well-laid plans were altogether 
 disheartening. No vessel was despatched by any of the authorities 
 in London to cooperate with the Enterprize at Alexandria, and no 
 steps were taken to provide for the carriage of the expected mails 
 and passengers from Egypt to Malta, which was then the ter- 
 minus of the British Government steam packet line. It was 
 rumored in London that the Court of Directors had tried to 
 charter a steamer of adequate size and power for the voyage to 
 Egypt, but, becoming appalled at the expense which would be 
 involved, hastily washed their hands of the whole proposition of 
 steam transit for the time being.^^ 
 
 However that may have been, the Enterprize failed to keep 
 faith on her part. Although repaired expressly for the trial trip 
 to Suez, the vessel had hardly set out for that destination when 
 accidents to her machinery made a return to port imperative. 
 There it was decided that the steamer was unfit for so strenuous 
 and long-sustained a voyage, and having failed to make history 
 on this opportune occasion, the Enterprize thus passed ingloriously 
 from the scene. 
 
 Of the several persons who had hoped to take passage in a 
 steamer from England and continue in the Enterprize to India, 
 only two made their way to Suez. These two were Messrs. J. W. 
 Taylor and Thomas Waghorn. Taylor had been commissioned 
 by the Court of Directors to make certain investigations of the 
 Suez route as a steam passage, but he was primarily interested in 
 establishing a commercial line of steamers on either side of Egypt, 
 between England and Calcutta. His rival, Waghorn, also car- 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, O.S., 103, 339, 622. 
 
 Ibid., I, N.S., Pt., II, 216—217; Oriental Herald, XXIII, 320. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, O.S., 506 ff . ; ibid., I, N.S., Pt. I, 227-278; Barker, 
 of. cit., II, 125-128. 
 
io8 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ried despatches from the Court of Directors addressed to the 
 authorities in Bombay, and hinted darkly at being personally 
 commissioned to examine the practicability of the routed^ Almost 
 simultaneously, still a third young exponent of steam communica- 
 tion, Lieutenant F. R. Chesney, arrived in Egypt where he was 
 furnished with a list of queries from the Court of Directors. 
 The situation was prophetic. Chesney became the great apostle 
 of a steam route to India by the Euphrates River and the Persian 
 Gulf, Waghorn became a leading exponent of the Suez line, while 
 Taylor lost his life in an attempt to determine the relative ad- 
 vantages of the two proposed routes. 
 
 Sir John Malcolm was cautioned by the Court of Directors at 
 the outset of his official term not to waste money on speculative 
 ventures. The policy of the East India Company was to leave 
 such enterprises as the development of steam navigation within 
 the bounds of its monopoly to private initiative.^® Malcolm be- 
 lieved, however, that steam communication could not succeed if 
 left to private agencies because of the magnitude of the task of 
 building, fuelling, and operating steam vessels. So while giving 
 every encouragement to commercial undertakings of this nature, 
 he lost no time in making plans to develop a steam line in con- 
 nection with the Bombay Marine. In 1828 the hull of a steam 
 vessel was put under construction in the Government dockyards 
 at Bombay, and engines were ordered from the famous builder 
 Maudslay in England. 
 
 The failure of the Enterp'ize did not in the least interrupt 
 work on the new vessel, which, in honor of and perhaps to soothe 
 the Chairman of the Court of Directors, was christened the Hugh 
 Lindsay. The vessel, of 41 1 tons burden and equipped with two 
 eighty-horse-power engines, was launched in October, 1829, and 
 was immediately prepared for a voyage to Suez.^® No delay was 
 required for the establishment of coal depots, those prepared for 
 the Enterfrize being already available. The Hugh Lindsay was 
 despatched from Bombay on her maiden voyage March 20, 1830, 
 
 Anriual Register, XCII (1850), Pt. II, 198-199; Barker, op. cit., II, 127. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — I, 288; ibid.. No. 735. — II, 759. 
 
 Oriental Herald, XXIII, 320; Asiatic Journal, XXV^'III, O.S., 103; Low, 
 op. cit., I, 520; Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, pp. 112 ff. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, App. 17, p. 112; Low, op. cit., I, 520. The 
 Hugh Lindsay was not the first steam vessel to be built and used in Indian waters. 
 That honor appears to belong to the river steamer Diana, launched at Calcutta in 
 1823. The Calcutta John Bull is quoted as saying on the completion of the vessel, 
 “ We hail her as the harbinger of future vessels of her kind who will waft us to our 
 native shores with speed and pleasure.” — Low, op. cit., I, 412 n.; Asiatic Journal, 
 VI, N.S., Pt. II, 59- 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 109 
 
 commanded by the experienced and redoubtable Captain James 
 H. Wilsond® The vessel arrived safely at Suez on April 22, 
 having touched at Aden, Jeddah, and Cosseir. In one respect the 
 voyage proved a disappointment. Not only did the Court of 
 Directors fail to despatch a steamer to Alexandria to correlate 
 with the Hugh Lindsay, but they even failed to announce the 
 trial voyage. As a result, there were few mails and passengers 
 at Suez with which to return to India, and the effectiveness of the 
 trial trip was seriously compromised. 
 
 Nevertheless, the results of the first steam voyage up the Red 
 Sea were significant. They showed that even against head winds a 
 rapid passage could be made to Suez by steam, for of the 33 days 
 spent on the voyage, 1 2 had been required for coaling. The time 
 actually consumed on the passage out was 21 days, 6 hours. In 
 the second place, it argued that for long voyages, vessels of 
 greater fuel capacity were needed. The Hugh Lindsay had 
 begun the voyage carrying a much larger fuel cargo than her 
 builders had intended, and this had been barely sufficient. The 
 weight of the coal sank the vessel so deeply into the water that 
 progress was seriously impeded on the first part of the trip in each 
 direction. A third result was the demonstration that such com- 
 munication, if continued, would be exceedingly expensive; it 
 amounted almost literally to “ burning rupees ” for fuel. Yet in 
 one respect, at least, the experiment justified the expectations of 
 the Bombay Government. The mails carried to Suez on this first 
 steam voyage reached England in 59 days, which for the time 
 was an extremely brief voyage, although in the estimation of the 
 East India Company, this fact did not counterbalance the cost of 
 vessel and equipment and the expense of operation.^ Notwith- 
 standing the various difficulties and objections encountered on the 
 first occasion, the Bombay Government undertook other experi- 
 mental voyages, one later in the same year and others at irregular 
 intervals, until the sending out of other steam vessels from Eng- 
 land made a permanent and regular service possible. 
 
 Capt. Wilson had already seen long' service in Indian waters. Before a 
 Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1834, he reported that of his 21 
 years of service, 1 3 had been spent in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. In taking 
 command of the Hugh Lindsay, he gave up a good position in the regular naval 
 service because of his conviction that steam would eventually take the place of 
 sails. Although he remained a leading advocate of the route he thus helped to open 
 up, he received no distinction for his services before his death in 1875. — Pari. Pap., 
 1834, No. 478, App. 17, p. 1 12; Low, op. cit., I, 526-532. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 745—756. The cost of each round 
 trip was estimated at 23,000 rupees, or about £1700. 
 
 Asiatic Joi^nal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 197; “Steam Navigation Extended and 
 Made Profitable,” in the Oriental Herald, XXII, 52-61. 
 
1 10 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Upon his retiring from office late in 1830, Governor Malcolm 
 in his official report to the Company’s Directors summed up his 
 efforts in behalf of steam navigation and outlined a steam program 
 for the future. In preparing this prospectus, he was largely as- 
 sisted by his brother, Sir Charles Malcolm, who, as Superintend- 
 ent of the Indian Navy, had had immediate charge of the first 
 steam voyages, and by Capt. Wilson, of the Hugh Lindsay. The 
 report advocated the establishment under the Bombay Govern- 
 ment of four steam vessels for the Indian service, each with about 
 fifteen days’ coal capacity, three of which should be kept in 
 constant service on the Indian side of the Isthmus of Suez, leaving 
 the fourth in reserve. This establishment, it was thought, would 
 suffice for a regular monthly communication for nine months of 
 the year, for it was generally believed at this time that the service 
 between Bombay and Suez would have to be suspended for three 
 months during the height of the southwest monsoon. Malcolm 
 believed that while this service would be expensive, the cost could 
 be largely or entirely defrayed by receipts from passengers and 
 letters, which might be carried from Bombay to Suez in an average 
 of 25 days, and to England in about double that time.^" This 
 recommendation is of the more interest because after several years 
 of doubt and hesitation and wastage of money in profitless ven- 
 tures, this was essentially the plan put into operation by the East 
 India Company. 
 
 Thus far, one element of a thorough test of the Suez route had 
 been lacking: no attempt had been made by the home authorities 
 to establish a steam link between Malta and Alexandria, even for 
 experimental purposes. Because of this fact, even after the first 
 two voyages of the Hugh Lindsay, the eventual possibilities of 
 the new route, should steam be applied to both sections of the 
 route, were matters of speculation, and opinions varied widely. 
 Years more must have passed without further light being shed on 
 this question but for the fact that the successors of Elphinstone 
 and Malcolm combined in general the hopes of the one and the 
 practical experiments of the other. Thus, regardless of the atti- 
 tude of the Court of Directors and the Bengal Government, the 
 Hugh Lindsay was sent to Suez on further experimental voyages 
 as frequently as the condition of the vessel, fuel supplies, and the 
 seasons would permit. 
 
 In 1831, one of the sailing units of the Bombay Marine was 
 sent to Suez bearing a despatch to the Court of Directors. This 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 7+5; ibid., 1831—1832, No. 734, 
 pp. 223-225. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE iii 
 
 requested that early in 1832 a steamer be sent from Malta, then 
 the terminus of English steam service in the Mediterranean, to 
 Alexandria to receive the mails and passengers to be conveyed to 
 Egypt by the Hugh hindsay at that timed® Assuming that the 
 home authorities would not suffer this voyage to pass unnoticed, 
 announcements were made in all the Indian Presidencies that the 
 Hugh hindsay would leave Bombay for Suez on January 5, 
 1832.®^ 
 
 The voyage was made according to schedule. Fuelling facil- 
 ities had been improved for this trip, so that the passage was made 
 in the remarkably brief time of 21 days, 16 hours, against ex- 
 ceedingly heavy winds and seas, making this perhaps the greatest 
 exploit of steam power up to that time. In other respects the 
 voyage was less noteworthy. The Hugh Lindsayh passengers, 
 who made their way from Suez to Alexandria in the expectation 
 of finding there a steam vessel to convey them to Europe, were 
 altogether disappointed. No such vessel appeared, nor could 
 the English Consul-General, John Barker, throw any light on the 
 intentions of the Directors. The passengers could only await the 
 departure of some chance sailing vessel which might carry them 
 on to Europe. Only after a month of impatient waiting were 
 travellers and mails enabled to proceed to Malta, whence they 
 found their way to England on a Government steam packet.®® 
 Upon the return of the Hugh hindsay to Bombay empty, the 
 disappointment of that English community was intense. It began 
 to appear that the cause of rapid communication with the home 
 country was about to fail at the moment of partial success. The 
 prevailing sentiment was expressed by the Bombay Courier^ which 
 said, in referring to the barren results of the first voyages of the 
 Hugh hindsay : 
 
 We have looked in vain for a single advertisement, or 
 even paragraph alluding to the subject, in the papers from 
 home, which, if it had appeared, would have had the effect 
 of loading the steamer with packets for India, instead of 
 allowing her to return, as she has, to the surprise and dis- 
 appointment of everyone, with one or two dozen letters at 
 the utmost.®® 
 
 Asiatic Journal, IX, N.S., Pt. II, 74. 
 
 The reported discovery of fresh water in the desert between Suez and Cairo 
 about this time gave a decided impulse to the use of the overland route by travellers. 
 See the Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, I, 252—253; Asiatic Journal, IV, 
 N.S., Pt. II, 96. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 766. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, IX, N.S., Pt. II, 74. 
 
II 2 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Obviously little could be accomplished with the means at hand as 
 long as general lack of interest in England and the opposition of 
 the Court of Directors could nullify whatever initiative was 
 shown in India. 
 
 When it became known in England, chiefly through exchanges 
 from Indian papers, what unsupported efforts had been made by 
 the Bombay Government for the establishment of a steam route, 
 loud protests were voiced against the non-progressive policy of 
 the Company. By 1832, the whole matter of improved com- 
 munication with India by means of steam vessels was beginning 
 to recover from the set-back experienced in 1826 at the time of 
 the voyage of the Enterprize. As it had been the English mer- 
 cantile houses which had financed the Cape voyage of that vessel, 
 so now it was the mercantile and financial interests principally 
 which were becoming convinced that there would be advantages 
 in a Suez route. The idea was evolving that mercantile transac- 
 tions of English firms operating in India would be much facili- 
 tated by a rapid despatch of commercial papers, even though the 
 articles of trade themselves might be exchanged as usual in slow 
 sailing vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. 
 
 One of the first steps taken by commercial associations in Eng- 
 land toward establishing a practical basis for the use of the Suez 
 route lay in petitions to Parliament for the repeal of Act 59 Geo. 
 Ill, Chapter 3, which prohibited the levying of any postage rates 
 higher than twopence on single letters (of one ounce or less), and 
 on other packages in proportion, to and from the East Indies.^' 
 While the law itself was not repealed in time to aid some private 
 steamship concerns which were interested in establishing lines 
 leading to India, the agitation resulting from the discussion of the 
 Company’s policy with regard to communication bore good fruit."® 
 
 The Court of Directors of the East India Company thus far 
 were as dilatory in taking up seriously the matter of improved 
 communication with the East as the Company’s governments 
 in the Indian Presidencies were active. After the removal 
 of the Company’s trade monopoly in India commercial motives 
 were no longer operative in the Company’s policy, and only 
 political ones remained.^® For political purposes the Company 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 766; Asiatic Journal, V, N.S., Pt. II, 
 87. Apparently this law had been forgotten or had been ignored b}' some of the 
 India authorities on previous occasions, when they had sanctioned postage rates as 
 high as four shillings an ounce on English mails. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, X, N.S., Pt. II, 87. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, 751; ibid., 1834, No. 478, App. 
 
 2, p. II. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 113 
 
 did not consider it practicable to spend several hundred thousand 
 pounds in merely speeding up their despatches.®^ Even their 
 attitude toward purely private ventures in steam navigation was a 
 curious mixture of hope and fear. If these projects succeeded in 
 establishing lines to India, the Company would inevitably profit 
 from the improved contacts. But the Directors were apparently 
 afraid, at the same time, that if the English public should become 
 interested in the matter, it might result in some way in increased 
 financial burdens on the Company.®^ It was therefore decided 
 by the Court that the safer policy would be to discourage any and 
 ail efforts in the promotion of steam navigation, especially on the 
 European side of the Isthmus of Suez. For this reason, sundry 
 despatches were sent out to the Indian governments soon after 
 1830 forbidding any more steam voyages to the Red Sea 5 but as 
 these mandates were despatched around the Cape of Good Hope, 
 they did not reach their destinations in time to prevent some of 
 the further experiments already mentioned.®® 
 
 For that matter, the worst fears of the Court were presently 
 realized. An interested English public demanded governmental 
 action. Even by 1832 the Government was beginning to evince 
 signs of interest in the matter of access to the East. The late 
 political upheavals in Algeria and European Turkey had con- 
 siderable influence. After 1830 there were persistent rumors and 
 evidences of French political activities in Egypt. Besides this, 
 indications were not wanting that the differences between the 
 Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, and his imperial master, the Sul- 
 tan, which produced a grave crisis in Syria in 1831 and the years 
 following, were prompted by Russia in accordance with her secret 
 schemes of aggrandizement.®* These developments tended to 
 focus attention on the condition of the East India Company, which 
 led to no few changes in the Company’s methods. 
 
 In January, 1832, the House of Commons ordered the appoint- 
 ment of a Select Committee, to investigate “ the present State of 
 the Affairs of the East India Company, and to inquire into the 
 State of Trade between Great Britain, the East Indies, and 
 
 It was estimated in 1832 that to establish a bi-monthly communication between 
 Bombay and Suez would cost the East India Company about £i 00,000 per year. 
 
 Partly to discover whether there were hope of profit, and partly to neutralize 
 hostile criticism, the Company did at intervals send out questionnaires to its func- 
 tionaries for information as to costs and possible returns from steam enterprises. 
 The operating- expenses of the Hugh Lindsay on the second and third voyages to 
 Suez, however, were twice the original estimate, and the Court were aghast at the 
 probable expense of a regular and more extensive service. — Farl. Paf,, 1831—1832, 
 No. 735.— II, App. 25, pp. 752-759. 
 
 Ibid., 1834, No. 478, pp. 10, II. 
 
 Oriental Herald, XIX, 256—257. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 114 
 
 China.” Charles Grant, the President of the India Board, was 
 appointed Chairman of a large Committee of seventy-one mem- 
 bers to carry out this commission. The work of the Committee 
 embraced a great variety of matters connected with trade, finance, 
 and administration. As one feature of these investigations, the 
 India Board sent out questionnaires to various officials connected 
 with the Company’s administration asking for information on 
 “ Steam Navigation between India and Egypt, and between dif- 
 ferent parts of Asia.” Considerable evidence was thus collected 
 relating to the work of steam committees in the Presidencies, trial 
 steam voyages up the Red Sea, surveys in Egypt, and preliminary 
 investigations of the Euphrates River as a possible waterway to 
 the East. Most of this data appeared inconclusive to the Com- 
 mittee,®® and, as some experiments were still in progress at the | 
 time of its report in August, 1832, no recommendations on 
 this head were made to Parliament. The report merely con- 
 tained the statement that, “ Evidence has likewise been received ' 
 as to the means of extending the trade with Asia, the Navigation . 
 by Steam, etc.” 
 
 Meanwhile, for other purposes, English steam lines had been 
 established in the Mediterranean. This body of water, of course, 
 lay completely outside of the sphere of the East India Company, 
 and concern for the protection and development of British in- 
 terests here devolved upon the British Admiralty. Before Eng- 
 lish steam navigation companies were prepared to undertake the 
 establishment of commercial steam lines in the Mediterranean, 
 the British Government had reached the conclusion that armed 
 steamers must be added to the Royal Navy to keep pace with the 
 progress of continental rivals. As early as 1825 the first vessels 
 were put into commission for this purpose, and the nucleus of a 
 steam fleet was thus created. A few of these vessels, all of which 
 were to a large degree experimental, were stationed with the 
 regular Navy, while others, for moral as well as practical pur- 
 poses, were placed in regular service on some part of the line 
 between London and the British naval base at Malta.®® In 1832 
 the Admiralty had three armed steam packet vessels in regular 
 service between Gibraltar and Malta. These had replaced five 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1831—1832, No. 734, p. [2]. 
 
 Ibid., No. 735. — I, 263; ibid., — VI; ibid., — II, 752; (Sir) William 
 Foster, “The India Board (1784—1858),” in Trans, of the Royal Hist. Soc., 3d 
 Ser., XI, 61—85. 
 
 See evidence received: Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 119— 130. 
 
 Ibid., No. 734, p. 60. 
 
 Ibid., 1837, No. 539, p. 1 15. 
 
I TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 115 
 
 sailing vessels previously used on this section. The line between 
 ' England and Spanish ports was at that time still being cared for 
 by sailing vessels, of which there were five in service. Plans 
 were being matured, however, for an increase in the number, 
 power, and range of the units of the steam packet service, and all 
 of this was effected before steam lines were in regular use in 
 eastern waters.®® 
 
 These developments in European waters still left the line be- 
 tween Malta and Alexandria uncared for.^® This missing link 
 was one of the greatest problems to be overcome in the inaugura- 
 tion of steam communication between England and India partly 
 because of the intricacies of bureaucratic government in London, 
 where the Court of Directors of the East India Company came 
 into contact with the Admiralty only through the Board of Con- 
 trol, or, for some purposes, the Treasury and the Post Office. 
 Moreover, to complete any of the shorter lines to the East, 
 foreign territory had to be crossed, and in making any such ar- 
 rangements the services of the Foreign Office had to be enlisted. 
 A mere enumeration of these few of the many difficulties in- 
 volved will go far toward explaining why progress toward the 
 desired end was so slow. 
 
 One of the principal difficulties was the enormous expense 
 involved before any steam line could be put into regular operation. 
 This alone was sufficient to prevent the presidencies from making 
 further strides in this direction because of the hostility of the 
 Court of Directors toward the spending of money on any such 
 doubtful ventures. Furthermore, the two leading Indian Presi- 
 dencies showed a strong tendency from the first to disagree on 
 the best ways and means of accomplishing an object desired by 
 both, and their lack of cooperation was of no little importance in 
 neutralising the effectiveness both of their own endeavors and 
 those coming from other sources. These and other discourage- 
 ments did not prevent the springing up of a group of individual 
 promoters, contemporaneously with the first steam surveys, 
 whose efforts, together with those of Indian steam associations, 
 had considerable effect in developing the interest of all classes in 
 England and in India in the possibilities and advantages of new 
 and rapid means of communication. 
 
 The promoters on whom the limelight focused were young 
 and enterprising men, largely without capital themselves, but who 
 had confidence that they could form steam navigation companies 
 
 Ibid., 1834, No. 478, p. 25 of Evidence. 
 
 Ibid., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 751. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 1 16 
 
 capable of making large profits from government subsidies or 
 monopolistic rates on mails, passengers, and goods to be trans- 
 ported. From the beginning the attitude of the Bombay author- 
 ities and leading citizens was against such speculative undertak- 
 ings, on the ground that they were foredoomed to failure. In 
 Calcutta, on the other hand, they were welcomed as the logical 
 agencies to undertake projects in which there was likelihood of 
 success and substantial earnings. Calcutta, therefore, became the 
 eastern rendezvous of those who aspired to be founders of large 
 and opulent steam corporations employing either the Cape or the 
 Red Sea route to Europe. 
 
 One of the earliest of these schemes to reach an advanced stage 
 of development was that of James W. Taylor. His plan, as out- 
 lined in a prospectus issued in 1829, was — 
 
 No less than to ply between London and Alexandria, 
 touching at Gibraltar and Malta, with four steamers, the 
 least of which, of 550 tons, is to carry from forty to fifty 
 passengers. They are to begin to sail in August [ 1 830] . . . 
 and afterward to follow, the first and fifteenth of every 
 month. On the other side of the Isthmus of Egypt there 
 will be employed six steamers of the same dimensions, to ply 
 between Calcutta and Suez, touching at Madras and Bombay. 
 
 . . . Passengers are to be booked through . . . and to be 
 furnished with the necessary accommodations and subsistence 
 in their journeys across the desert between Alexandria and 
 Suez. There are already prepared the necessary steamers 
 . . . twelve in all, two being to replace such as may become 
 disabled by accidents. The British Government in India 
 agrees to come to the aid of the Company with certain facil- 
 ities for the first two years. 
 
 The plan as advertised pointed out that the promoters asked no 
 cash subscriptions from the public, but only a subsidy for two years 
 after their vessels should begin operating. At the expiration of 
 this period they would give up subsidies and expect to combine on 
 the basis of profits from government contracts and public patron- 
 age at specified rates and schedules.^' 
 
 The Calcutta and Madras Presidencies gave the project some 
 support, although they would have preferred a line around the 
 continent of Africa. The adherence of Bombay was considered 
 essential to the plan by its promoters, and, having completed his 
 
 Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 86; Barker, of. cit., II, 129-130. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, pp. 727—730; Asiatic 
 Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 55. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 117 
 
 organization in England, Taylor left London in October, 1829, 
 to carry his project to Bombay in person. His departure at that 
 moment was due to his desire to anticipate Thomas Waghorn, 
 who was preparing to attempt a trip to India by way of Egypt in 
 record time. Taylor’s passage was replete with incidents and 
 thrills. Leaving London on October 21, he made his way to 
 Suez via Calais, Marseilles, and Malta, arriving in Alexandria 
 after a fortunate voyage on November 8. He proceeded pres- 
 ently to Suez, where he arrived after a trip of 27 days net from 
 London — a real feat for that period. From Suez Taylor reached 
 Bombay on the same sailing vessel which bore his rival, Waghorn. 
 
 At Bombay Taylor encountered numerous difficulties. Gov- 
 ernor Malcolm was at that time engaged in plans for the opening 
 of a steam line to Suez under Government auspices, employing 
 one steam vessel, the Hugh Lindsay, and other units of the Bom- 
 bay Marine for the purpose. In consequence, he was not inclined 
 to give countenance to the new scheme.^® Taylor strongly sued 
 for favor and some temporary support in the form of a subsidy, 
 offering to modify his original terms by granting the Company 
 the use of his vessels in time of war. He even adroitly suggested 
 that the proposed steam line be called the “ Malcolm Line of 
 Steam Packets.” However, the Governor and his Council re- 
 mained incredulous that Taylor could redeem his extensive 
 pledges, while they were certain of the “ almost incalculable ad- 
 vantages ” which would result from a line of government owned 
 and operated steamers.^® 
 
 Taylor was not yet at the end of his resources. Finding the 
 Suez route practically closed to him, he turned to a possible alter- 
 native passage. The Persian Gulf and Tigris-Euphrates route 
 was without European competitors, and had not been surveyed 
 as a highway between East and West. In once more returning to 
 England, then, further to consult the Court of Directors on his 
 steam plans, he decided to proceed through Mesopotamia, which 
 had been suggested as a possible link in a new route to India. He 
 also welcomed the occasion to proceed up the Tigris River to 
 Bagdad, in order to visit his brother, the British Consul, who was 
 strongly imbued with the idea that the ultimate line of com- 
 munication between England and India would lie through Mes- 
 opotamia — an idea never wholly discarded since. 
 
 Taylor left Bombay May 2, 1830, with a packet of despatches, 
 
 Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 86 , 729; ihiJ., IV, N.S., Pt. II, 132; Pari. 
 Paf., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, pp. 732, 734. 
 
 Pari. Paf., ut sufra, pp. 732-735. 
 
 Ibid., p. 727. 
 
ii8 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 in company with a small party of Englishmen who were attracted 
 by the prospect of blazing a new and important trail through 
 western Asia. Arriving at Basrah, the group proceeded up the 
 Tigris to Bagdad, where they were detained several weeks by 
 outbreaks of plague and by Arab disorders in the region to be 
 traversed.^® In September the party undertook a survey of the 
 middle reaches of the Euphrates River for steam purposes. 
 Later at Mosul, Taylor secured commercial concessions from 
 the Pasha of Bagdad, including “ the exclusive navigation of 
 the Tigris for steam-vessels for a period of ten years,” and the 
 monopoly of supply of certain articles, mainly war equipment, to 
 the Pasha himself. At this time, Taylor was enthusiastic over the 
 possibilities of the route, which, he said, was “ in every respect 
 preferable to that of the Red Sea.” 
 
 His enthusiasm, however, proved to be premature. Leaving 
 Mosul, Taylor and his party were attacked by a large force of 
 Arabs intent on plundering. Instead of tamely submitting, the 
 Englishmen stoutly defended themselves. In the ensuing mHee^ 
 Taylor and two of his associates were killed, the remaining three 
 barely escaping with their lives by abandoning all their goods and 
 luggage. “ Thus untimely fell the first projectors of the 
 Euphrates Valley route of steam communication with the east.” 
 With Taylor perished his elaborate plan of steam transit, and the 
 Bombay Government continued its preparations to wmrk the Suez 
 route alone. 
 
 After the death of Taylor, Thomas Waghorn was the most 
 conspicuous of those who hoped to accomplish the herculean task 
 of building up steam navigation lines by their individual efforts. 
 Waghorn already suspected that the development of a steam line 
 by way of the Cape of Good Hope w'as a forlorn hope.®® For 
 this reason, in returning to India to discover why .no funds had 
 reached him from Calcutta and other eastern communities for the 
 construction or purchase of a steam vessel, he deemed it wise to 
 adopt the Red Sea route, both because it promised a quicker pas- 
 
 Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 143. ' 
 
 Ibid., V, N.S., Pt. II, 46. Cf. ibid., VI, N.S., Pt. II, 130. His brother, Major 
 Robert Taylor, was largely instrumental in arranging for these concessions. 
 
 Low, op. cit., I, 524; Asiatic Journal, V, N.S., Pt. II, 46. 
 
 Late in 1834 an Indian naval officer, Capt. Adam Young, asked that the 
 remainder of the Bengal Steam Fund be voted to him for experimental purposes. 
 The Committee decided to pay it over only when a steam vessel had arrived at 
 Calcutta from England in 75 days or less. Nothing further is heard of Young’s 
 project. — Calcutta Courier, 17 Dec., 1834, quoted in Asiatic Journal, XA’^II, N.S., | 
 
 Pt. II, 93. I 
 
 Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 183—184, 198; ibid., IV, N.S., Pt. II, 23-24. j 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 119 
 
 sage and because he might choose to identify himself with its 
 development. The announcement by the Bombay Government 
 that the Enter frize was about to be sent on a trial voyage to Suez 
 in November, 1829, suggested that a test be made of the possible 
 speed of transmitting despatches by this route to India, even 
 though the home authorities decided against sending a steamer 
 from Malta to Alexandria to facilitate the test.®^ For the purpose 
 of making the desired test, a courier’s passports were necessary j 
 but the Court of Directors, to whom Waghorn applied for the 
 papers, did not care to encourage what they termed a “ wild goose 
 chase.” It was only after repeated applications, and as a means 
 of getting rid of his importunities, that the desired passports and 
 special despatches were prepared. Waghorn then planned his 
 departure so as to reach Suez about the time that the Enterfrize 
 was scheduled to arrive. He hoped at the same time to overtake 
 his rival and personal enemy, Taylor, who had already set out 
 for Egypt on his way to India. Leaving London on October 28, 
 he proceeded via Dover, Boulogne, Paris, Milan, and Trieste, 
 thence by sail to Alexandria, and, continuing at once, arrived at 
 Suez on December 8. The first portion of the whole distance, 
 estimated at 2762 miles, had thus been traversed in 40^ travelling 
 days, which was not a bad showing. 
 
 The Enterfrize had not yet arrived from India, and no word 
 had reached Egypt concerning her. Waghorn found it impossible 
 long to restrain his impatience. Unwilling to return even to Cairo, 
 and finding Suez an exceedingly uncomfortable berth, he under- 
 took a foolhardy exploit in trying to defeat Taylor which sub- 
 sequently gained for him more renown than many more worthy 
 efforts. Obtaining a small, open boat at Suez, he sailed out alone 
 into the Red Sea, and by keeping to the centre of that body of 
 water hoped to fall in with the Enterp'ize. After continuing on 
 his course for several days and nights, he reached Jeddah, some 
 660 miles from Suez. Here he learned that an accident to the 
 Enter'prize had prevented her leaving India at all. Waghorn 
 thereupon chartered a native sailing vessel intending to sail the 
 entire distance to India. A short time after leaving port, however, 
 his native crew became extortionate and mutinous, and for safety’s 
 sake he had to remain constantly fully armed and on guard. 
 Under these circumstances, he was very happy to fall in with the 
 
 Bombay Courier, quoted in the Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, O.S., 103, 506, 622, 
 759; ibid,.. Ill, N.S., Pt. II, 13—15. It was rumored that the Court of Directors at 
 first undertook to charter a privately-owned steamer for a Mediterranean voyage, 
 offering the proprietors £1000 for the trip; but when the latter demanded £1500, 
 the Court threw over the whole matter. — Barker, of. cit., II, 128. 
 
 Annual Register, XCII, Pt. II, 198-199. 
 
120 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Thetis^ a brig-of-war of the Bombay Marine, which had been sent 
 to the Red Sea on the double mission of establishing a depot of 
 coal for the Enterfrize and undertaking a survey of the Red Sea 
 as a prelude to the opening of regular steam lines. The Thetis 
 had already established a coaling base at Suez, and was on the 
 point of sailing for Bombay when intercepted. Waghorn gladly 
 embraced the opportunity to discharge his native boat and continue 
 in the Thetis. This arrangement had one great disadvantage, 
 however, for on board was his rival, Taylor, who had sailed in 
 the Thetis from Suez on the day following Waghorn’s arrival at 
 that port. What passed between the two men during this long 
 voyage, we do not knowj but it is interesting in this connection to 
 note that soon after Bombay was reached on March twenty-first, 
 1830, Taylor began considering a line of communication through 
 Mesopotamia and Syria to the Mediterranean as possibly more 
 practicable than one through the Red Sea.” 
 
 In August, 1830, Waghorn was given his last opportunity as 
 the projector of an independent steam corporation by the Calcutta 
 Steam Committee. It was voted to devote the whole of the steam 
 fund remaining after outstanding expenses had been paid toward 
 the realization of the steam line advocated by Waghorn. The 
 money was to be placed with an English financial house as agent, 
 “ to see it applied strictly to the purposes of aiding in the con- 
 struction of a steam vessel . . . Mr. Waghorn giving personal 
 security to refund one-half the amount should he fail to make 
 the voyage out in seventy-five days.” ** Waghorn presently re- 
 turned to England, but owing either to his inability to give the 
 required security or to interest English investors in his scheme, 
 it passed into the limbo of abandoned hopes. His zeal, how- 
 ever, was not without accomplishment. Once the matter of 
 steam transit was taken up in earnest by the minions of govern- 
 ment he was found to be quite useful as a sort of official errand 
 
 Low, op. ch., I, 522—524; Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. I, 195—196; Pt. II, 15. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, IV, N.S., Pt. II, 12. Waghorn constantly complained that 
 his efforts in behalf of steam communication were entirely at his own expense from 
 the first. This is one of the factors which has caused him to be eulogised by his 
 biographers. Probably his personal disbursements were large, but in June, 1830, 
 the Bombay Government paid his expense account up to that time, amounting to 
 £320 IS., and these or other expenses were paid by the Calcutta Steam Committee 
 later. Cf. ibid., pp. 12, 48; Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, p. 736. 
 Other funds with which he was entrusted at times were apparently misused. His 
 propensity for exaggerated statements is illustrated by his testimony before a Select 
 Committee in 1834, when he boastfully spoke of having been at the Island of 
 Socotra “ dozens of times,” which he presently admitted to mean “ three or four 
 times,” and there is some doubt as to the correctness of his revised statement. Cf. 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, Evidence, pp. 208-232; Asiatic Journal, XXIV, N.S., 
 Pt. I, 249. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 12 1 
 
 boy.®® His later work in Egypt as a transportation agent went 
 far toward alleviating the discomforts of travel through Egypt. 
 
 Between March, 1830, and May, 1833, the Hugh Lindsay 
 made four voyages to the Red Sea, each of which clearly demon- 
 strated the utility of that line.®® These long and difficult voyages 
 also went far toward pulling the little cruiser to pieces. In view 
 of this and the disinclination of the Court of Directors to take 
 any steps toward replacing the vessel, a meeting was held in 
 Bombay on May 14, 1833, of those interested in the cause of 
 steam navigation between England and India. The immediate 
 object was to make arrangements for the development of the line 
 from Bombay to Suez, “ it being concluded that the enterprize of 
 private individuals . . . would accomplish the remaining dis- 
 tance.” ®^ This object was to be accomplished by the raising of a 
 “ Steam Fund,” to be administered by a “ Steam Committee,” as 
 at Calcutta. The Bombay Steam Fund differed from its proto- 
 type, however, in being a kind of joint-stock enterprise: sub- 
 scribers of 100 rupees or more were to benefit fro rata from any 
 profits which might at any time accrue from the successful estab- 
 lishment of a steam line. The plans of the Bombay Steam Com- 
 mittee called for the construction of a new steam vessel in Eng- 
 land, to be owned and operated by the Steam Society, and to 
 replace or supplement the Hugh Lindsay. 
 
 At the same time, a new movement was being started in Cal- 
 cutta. It had there become apparent that individual enterprise 
 could not succeed for the time being because of the refusal of the 
 Court of Directors to grant subsidies to such projects. As this 
 destroyed the hope of any immediate development of the Cape 
 route with steam vessels, public interest in Calcutta turned toward 
 the Red Sea route which had already been partly tested and found 
 practicable. With the approval of a majority of the subscribers 
 to the first Bengal Steam Fund, a public “ steam meeting ” was 
 held at the Calcutta Town Hall on June 14, 1833, consider 
 ways and means of action. It was voted first to send a petition 
 to the Court of Directors for a permanent steam establishment 
 which would serve Calcutta. Since a favorable reply to this was 
 a matter of doubt, the meeting voted further to raise a new steam 
 fund which would not be circumscribed by the conditions under 
 which the old had been formed, and which instead might be 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1831-1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, p. 736. 
 
 J. H. Wilson, On Steam Communication between Bombay and Suez, with an 
 Account of the Hugh Lindsay’s Four Voyages (Bombay, 1833); Pari. Pap., 1834, 
 No. 478, App. 2, p. 10; App. 17, pp. 112—113. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XII, N.S., Pt. II, 97. 
 
122 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 applied to any kind of project that promised early results. A 
 new steam committee was therefore formed and a new general 
 subscription begun, but with the express provision that funds so 
 raised should never be joined with the Bombay joint-stock fund. 
 
 The new plan at Calcutta started well. Within a few weeks 
 subscriptions totalled over 50,000 rupees, and plans were being 
 discussed for making the fund effective. This substantial re- 
 sponse to the new appeal for funds was very heartening. It was 
 at once an indication of the importance attached by the Calcutta 
 community to improved communications and an index to the 
 rapidly growing wealth of the Presidency despite the deplorable 
 financial condition of the East India Company. 
 
 The first scheme evolved by the new Calcutta Steam Com- 
 mittee was to secure a loan of the Hugh Lindsay and the existing 
 coal depots on the route to Suez from the Indian Government, 
 all operating expenses for a year to be borne by the new steam 
 fund. The Governor-General, Lord William Bentinck, who was 
 very anxious that a steam line be established, made the counter 
 proposition that the Hugh Lindsay be sent on four voyages to 
 Suez at Government expense, the Bombay and Calcutta Steam 
 Committees jointly supplying the fuel for the quarterly voyages.®® ! 
 The Bombay Steam Committee expressed considerable dislike of i 
 this plan, and especially the idea of working in conjunction with ’ 
 the Calcutta group. They agreed to accept the arrangement, 
 however, on condition that the new Bengal steam fund be placed 
 at their disposal, so, that in case the plan fell through, due to non- 
 support by the Court of Directors after the coal depots were in 
 place, they could still use the amount of their own joint-stock 
 fund for the purchase of a new steamer, as originally intended.®® 
 This suggestion was indignantly rejected by the Calcutta Com- 
 mittee, with the entire approval of the Governor-General. 
 
 Lord William Bentinck publicly expressed keen disappointment 
 at the attitude taken by Bombay, and made a new suggestion that a 
 steamer be purchased or leased by the Supreme Government of 
 India and operated direct from Calcutta to Suez by the Bengal 
 Committee. This plan was based on the recent appearance in the 
 Hooghly River of a new steamer, the Forbes, which although 
 constructed for river service, was considered of sufficient size and 
 
 Asiatic Journal, p. 225 f . ; XIII, N.S., Pt. II, 28, 95, 195. Steam funds similar 
 to that in Calcutta were formed at Colombo (Ceylon), Agra, Delhi, and Madras, 
 though in some places two funds were started, one for small, non-participating 
 subscriptions, and a joint-stock fund for large investments. 
 
 Ibid., XIII, N.S., Pt. II, 141-143. 
 
 Bombay Courier, 1 and 12 Oct., 1833, as given in the Asiatic Journal, XIII, 
 N.S., Pt. II, 168, 194, 257. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 123 
 
 power for the trip to Suez. This suggestion was joyfully adopted 
 by the Calcutta Steam Committee, the joy being all the greater 
 because Bombay had no part in the arrangement. The Forbes 
 was consequently chartered from the owners for a maximum of 
 three voyages to Suez at the rate of 4000 rupees per month, the 
 expense to be borne by the Bengal Government. The Steam 
 Committee assumed the cost of the necessary fuel depots, having 
 already raised about 1,30,000 rupees for the steam fund.®^ 
 
 The announcement that Calcutta was to have an independent 
 line to Suez caused grave concern in Bombay. The Bombay 
 Steam Committee at once adopted a most conciliatory tone, offer- 
 ing to cooperate “ as far as possible ” in carrying out the original 
 proposal. They refused to give up their joint-stock idea, how- 
 ever, so it was finally agreed that the Hugh Lindsay was to make 
 one trip from Bombay at the expense of the Government of India 
 early in 1834, after which the Forbes was to be run for three 
 voyages from Calcutta, thus working out the elements of a com- 
 prehensive scheme of steam navigation to all of the Indian 
 Presidencies. 
 
 Throughout the year 1833 preparations went on apace for the 
 four projected voyages of the next year. A petition was sent to 
 the British Government, asking for steamers to cooperate in the 
 Mediterranean. Coaling vessels were sent out to establish depots 
 in the Maldives, at Socotra, and on the Arabian coast. The 
 Mohammedan King of the Maldives, sensing the loss of his in- 
 dependence, protested that no good harbors or coaling places 
 existed in his islands, and that his subjects were bad people who 
 might harm the English. But his objections were answered by 
 the Calcutta Steam Committee with a present of a silver watch, 
 some silk and muslin cloth, and six 'prints of the Forbes steamer] 
 The native ruler of Socotra proved to be more refractory still. 
 Refusing to sell his island at the price fixed by the Bengal Gov- 
 ernment, it was occupied in force until it was found to be of no 
 considerable value as a way station.®® 
 
 The Hugh Lindsay reached Suez in February, 1834, as per 
 schedule, carrying a number of passengers, each of whom had 
 paid about 1200 rupees (£300) for his passage.®* The Forbes 
 
 India Gazette, 5 Nov., 1833; Calcutta Courier, 23 Nov., 1833; Asiatic Jour- 
 nal, XIII, N.S., Pt. II, 194— 195, 246; ibid., XIV, N.S., Pt. II, 6, 116—117. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XVI, N.S., Pt. II, 227. 
 
 Bengal Hurkaru, 20 Nov., 1834, quoted in Asiatic Journal, XVI, N.S., Pt. II, 
 251. Cf. ibid., XIV, N.S., Pt. II, 95. 
 
 An excellent account of the voyage is given in the Asiatic Journal, XIV, N.S., 
 Pt. I, 198—202. An overland trip at this time was no simple matter. Besides costing 
 heavily in passage money, the passenger had to carry all his accommodations with 
 
124 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 also left Calcutta on the prearranged date, April 1 5, each pas- 
 senger for Suez having paid 100 rupees passage money. Just as 
 the vessel reached Madras, however, its boiler was badly damaged, 
 and the vessel was obliged to return to Calcutta under canvas for 
 repairs.®® This upset the whole Calcutta plan for the time being, 
 and more than a lac of rupees had been spent without result. The 
 Hugh Lindsay was therefore continued in service as frequently 
 as her mechanical condition would permit, while the Forbes was 
 being prepared for a second attempt. 
 
 This took place in September, at the end of the southwest 
 monsoon. The trip was fairly successful, on the whole, Suez 
 being reached after a voyage of 69 days, and mails were sent 
 overland to England, though they had to be conveyed to Malta 
 in a sailing vessel. The return of the Forbes led to a momentary 
 wave of enthusiasm at Calcutta, and the Steam Committee re- 
 solved to send out the steamer for a third time in 1835. The 
 Bengal Government did not approve of this, how'ever, and after 
 a brief day in the limelight, the little Forbes returned to the work 
 for which she had been constructed, that of towing sailing vessels 
 up and down the Hooghly River. For the time being, the 
 remainder of the Calcutta steam fund was employed in subsidiz- 
 ing a campaign of propaganda in England and in facilitating the 
 transit of mails and passengers through Egypt. 
 
 The Bombay Steam Committee meanwhile had done little. 
 The joint-stock subscriptions were not sufficient for the purchase 
 of a new and adequate steamer, and, besides, the Hugh Lindsay 
 continued to be operated at intervals at Government expense.®' 
 At the same time, the tremendous cost at wffiich the Forbes had 
 made a single voyage to Suez and the cost of keeping the Hugh 
 Lindsay in repair and her furnaces supplied with fuel more and 
 more emphasized the fact that the task of establishing adequate 
 
 him. The list of necessities in 1834, as compiled by an experienced traveller, in- 
 cluded the following, principally for the passage through Egt'pt: 450 Spanish 
 dollars, i interpreter-servant, several weeks’ supply of tea, coffee, sugar, salt, pepper, 
 mustard, etc., 2 dozen bottles each of sherry', brandy, and water, separately packed, 
 2 kegs of w'ater for cooking, 2 dozen canisters of bouille, a good supply of candles, 
 powder and shot, i canteen, i camp table, a camp chair, cooking utensils, lantern or 
 cabin lamp, rope, nails, hammer, gimlet, twine, needles, basin, flint and steel, pistol, 
 umbrella, towels, soap, bedding, camp bed with posts and curtains, bread, butter, 
 eggs, charcoal, firewood, tent, and a milch goat, with a cradle so that it could be 
 carried on a camel. See W. H. Bartlett, T/u Nile Boat; or, Glimpses of the Laud, of 
 Egypt (2d ed., London, 1850), pp. 30—31. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XV, N.S., Pt. II, 105, 144, 190— 191. 
 
 Ihid., XVII, N.S., Pt. II, 224; Calcutta Courier, 28 March, 1835, quoted in 
 ibid., XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 13-14. 
 
 What remained of the Bombay Steam Fund, after various minor disburse- 
 ments had been made, was later divided among the subscribers. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 125 
 
 steam lines in the eastern seas was too great for steam committees, 
 even with government support. If lines of rapid transit were to 
 be developed beyond the Mediterranean, the initiative must ob- 
 viously come from still higher sources of authority. 
 
 Although a kind of impasse seemed to have been reached by 
 the end of 1834, the steam organizations in the Indian Presiden- 
 cies were not idle during the next few years. They showered 
 petitions upon the Court of Directors, the House of Commons, 
 and several of the departments of the British Government. Still 
 acting independently, they employed “ steam agents ” in London, 
 whose business it was to carry on lobbying activities, to publish 
 pamphlets and prospectuses, and generally to keep the subject of 
 steam navigation to India before the public eye. 
 
 At home, interest in the Suez route had not been altogether 
 wanting. The voyages of the Hugh Lindsay brough distin- 
 guished travellers, despatches, and mails from India in record time 
 and caused favorable comment in many circles. The sentiment of 
 mercantile interests was increasingly enlisted. The subject of 
 eastern steam lines soon came up for discussion both at the East 
 India House and in the House of Commons. The question of 
 assuming further expense for the development of the Suez route 
 was hotly debated at proprietary meetings of the East India Com- 
 pany. In all of these discussions it was asserted that any further 
 expense incurred for steam communication must inevitably in- 
 crease the already heavy burdens on the peoples of India. But 
 it was also argued that by this same speedy communication, many 
 problems of administration would be lightened, and the Indian 
 peoples benefited accordingly.®® 
 
 Debates in the House of Commons in 1834 led to the decision 
 to give the Euphrates River project a thorough trial before em- 
 barking extensively on any official program for the development 
 of the Red Sea route. Nevertheless, while voting a substantial 
 sum for the steam survey of the Euphrates, the House had before 
 them the recommendation of the Select Committee appointed to 
 consider the matter, that “ it is expedient that measures should 
 be immediately taken for the regular establishment of steam 
 communication from India by the Red Sea.” 
 
 One of the principal difficulties in the way of an adequate line 
 of steamships in the Indian Ocean was the dilapidated financial 
 condition of the East India Company. This corporation was 
 barely solvent in 1835, and had practically become a ward of the 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XV, N.S., Pt. 11 , 119. 
 
 Ibid., XVII, N.S., Pt. II, 276. 
 
126 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 British Government. Partly for this reason, the time was already 
 passing when the Company’s monopoly was looked upon as pro- 
 hibiting any interference in its domains beyond the Mediter- 
 ranean. Sir John Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, 
 in speaking before the House of Commons on August 9, 1835, 
 made the significant remark, that “ The object [steam navigation 
 to India] was one of national importance. . . As to the route by 
 the Euphrates, what might be the issue, he could not say. . . 
 But, supposing the Expedition to succeed, it would still be the 
 duty of the King’s Government to take steps for the navigation of 
 the Red Sea.” 
 
 With this assumption of moral responsibility by the British 
 Government, preliminary arrangements went forward for a 
 tentative establishment of the Red Sea route. The extension of 
 the French steam packet service, which included several fast and 
 comfortable vessels, from Marseilles to Alexandria in 1835 in- 
 sured a rapid and dependable service in the Mediterranean inde- 
 pendently of the British Admiralty packets.'’’ Pressure applied 
 by the Board of Control caused the Directors of the East India 
 Company to order the construction of two large steam vessels for 
 regular service between Bombay and Suez, to supplement the 
 Hugh Lindsay . But final arrangements for the development of 
 this route had to await the outcome of a steam expedition designed 
 to test the practicability of steam navigation on the rivers of 
 Mesopotamia. After 1835, however, regardless of the findings 
 of the Euphrates Expedition, there was little doubt that vessels 
 flying the British flag would soon come regularly and at constantly 
 lessening intervals to either side of the Isthmus of Suez. Already 
 considerable progress had been made. On speed tests, messages 
 had been carried between London and Bombay in as short a time 
 as 52 days, and mails could be transported overland between 
 Bombay and Calcutta by post or “ dawk ” in about ten days more.'® 
 
 For these early accomplishments the steam associations in the 
 Indian Presidencies may claim a large measure of credit despite 
 their quarrels. In the words of a contemporary French traveller, 
 “ It was neither to aid the ambitious schemes of Lord Palmerston, 
 nor to furnish a theme for the harangues of Sir John Hobhouse, 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 38. 
 
 Ibii., XVI, N.S., Pt. II, 1+8. French packets were generally reputed to be 
 faster than British steamers at this time, and in 1835 they sailed for the Levant ‘cia 
 Nice, Genoa, Livorna, Civita Vecchia, Naples, Malta, and Nav'arino everj" ten or 
 twelve days. 
 
 London Times, 18 Aug., 2 Oct., 1835; Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 
 38; Barker, of. cit., II, 132. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, Min. of Ev., p. 76; Asiatic Journal, XIV, N.S., Pt. 
 I, 198 ff.; ibid., XVII, N.S., Pt. II, 22, 276. 
 
TENTATIVE TRIALS OF THE SUEZ ROUTE 127 
 
 that the inhabitants of India had, with admirable zeal and gen- 
 erosity, established regular communication via Suez. . . Their 
 motives were most praiseworthy: one element desired rapid com- 
 mercial operations j others wanted a means of avoiding long trips j 
 all wanted quick news. . . And success was desirable to aliens as 
 well as to the English.” 
 
 V. Fontanier, Voyage dans I’Inde, II, 177-178. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE SHAPING OF A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 
 
 T he NAPOLEONIC wars became national wars after 
 1808, encircled France, and at last overwhelmed the 
 dictator of Europe. In 1814 the allied Powers re- 
 quired the restored Bourbon monarchy in the first Treaty of Paris 
 to give up all thought of continuing Napoleon’s oriental policy.^ 
 At Vienna in 1815 the same Powers, in rearranging the map of 
 Europe, were still apparently in accord on eastern questions. The 
 Quadruple Alliance of September, 1815, brought into close asso- 
 ciation those states which were potential competitors in the Near 
 and Middle East. Thus, with the principal European aggressor 
 crushed, Great Britain might well consider India reasonably 
 secure." 
 
 Unfortunately, this was a false sense of security. First, the 
 Concert of Europe, which was to have proved an antidote for 
 war, soon became hopelessly disrupted over intervention in Spain 
 and in the Spanish colonies. Shortly afterward, the outbreak of 
 hostilities in the Greek Peninsula, where a war of liberation from 
 Turkish despotism was undertaken, raised a number of new and 
 grave issues in which all the great Powers became involved. Be- 
 fore the problems arising here had been solved, a Russian attack 
 on Turkey, the conquest of Algeria by an unchastened France, and 
 the peculiar relation of a new French dynasty to the Belgian 
 Revolution appeared for a time to foreshadow a new European 
 conflict.® Within a dozen years the Concert of Europe was little 
 more than a name. 
 
 Of these developments, the most disturbing from the point of 
 view of routes of access to the East, arose from the Greek war of 
 independence. The Greeks, who had been undergoing a re- 
 
 ^ British and. Foreign State Papers, I, 1 51— 170. See Fontanier, Voyage dans 
 I’Inde, II, 419—420. 
 
 " Edouard Driault, La Question d’Orient, pp. 100— 10 1. 
 
 ® Cf. Charles White, Belgium and the T=o:enty-four Articles (London, 1S34); 
 Sir Robert Peel from His Private Papers (2 vols., London, 1899), II, 159—160; 
 Duke of Wellington, Despatches, etc., (15 vols., London, 1859), III, 445. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 129 
 
 markable commercial i wival since the decline of English and 
 French trade in the Levant/ had the popular sympathy of most 
 of the peoples of western Europe in their struggles to free them- 
 selves from the worse features of Turkish rule. European gov- 
 ernments, however, were for the most part stoutly opposed to 
 the Greek cause, and for several years the Greek question was 
 discussed in the principal chancelleries of Europe without much 
 result other than a general agreement on inaction. Tsar Alexan- 
 der I, who had kept his huge army on a war footing since the 
 Congress of Vienna, made overtures to France for an alliance in 
 which the two Powers would settle the Eastern Question in their 
 own interests. The French, aware of the sentiments of neigh- 
 boring states, refused to rise to the bait. Both Austria and Eng- 
 land were deeply concerned in preventing further Russian prog- 
 ress toward the Golden Horn,® Austria because of concern in the 
 Balkan Peninsula, Great Britain because of budding interest in 
 the routes to the East.® 
 
 Until the Eastern Question assumed serious proportions. Great 
 Britain had done little more toward becoming entrenched in the 
 Near and Middle East since the beginning of the century than to 
 continue raffrochements with native states in perfunctory fashion. 
 For half a generation previously there had seemed to be no reason 
 for an active eastern program. The Napoleonic wars had left in 
 British hands important strategic positions, particularly Malta 
 and the Ionian Isles, which, with Gibraltar, appeared to secure a 
 passage through the Mediterranean. General European exhaus- 
 tion following the long wars and lack of motive for the devel- 
 opment of new routes to the East made for a policy of laisser 
 faire in eastern matters. Besides,,- the Cape route with the 
 new way station at Table Bay sufficed for English transportation 
 needs. 
 
 The Greek Revolution seriously disturbed the calm of the 
 Mediterranean and gave rise to a long period of heated rivalry 
 both within the Mediterranean area and beyond. The principals 
 in the contest which ushered in the insoluble Eastern Question 
 were, besides Britain, France and Russia, whose conflicting inter- 
 ests threatened on many occasions to bring an end to the Turkish 
 Empire but finally resulted in preserving it. The fundamental 
 interests of these three Powers were not essentially different from 
 those of the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The Russians 
 
 ^ Driault, op. cit., p. 104. 
 
 ® Russian spies were believed to be working in considerable numbers in India at 
 this time preparatory to another kind of offensive . — -Asiatic Journal, XV, O.S., 
 105, 403-404. 
 
 ® Driault, op. cit., pp. 106—107. 
 
130 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO t.NDIA 
 
 desired an oudet on the Mediterranean ar i they coveted the riches 
 of India. The French hoped to dominate the Mediterranean and 
 to secure their own means of access to the East by controlling 
 Egypt and maintaining their traditional interests in Syria. For 
 the British it was necessary to safeguard all the lines leading to 
 India and to make them, if possible, into British routes. 
 
 The revival of this eighteenth century struggle grew imme- 
 diately out of the ravaging of the choicest portions of Greece by 
 the Turks after 1821. Within a few years the populations of 
 these once prosperous regions were decimated and much of the 
 country reduced to a wilderness. Treason and disunity among 
 the Greek revolutionaries contributed to the confusion, which at 
 one time promised to end with the reestablishment of the Turkish 
 yoke on a more intolerable basis than ever. For the more prompt 
 recovery of the revolted area, the Sultan in 1824 requested the 
 Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali, to assist him, in consideration of 
 a reward consisting of two Turkish pashaliks.^ The ambitious 
 Pasha agreed to the terms offered, and sent to Greek waters almost 
 his whole naval force as transports for an Egyptian army. The 
 arrival off the Morea of this powerful armament created a con- 
 siderable stir among the nations of Europe where the Greek cause 
 was growing in popularity, and public sentiment presently moved 
 governments to action. 
 
 The temper of the English nation by 1826 brought the Foreign 
 Minister, George Canning, to sympathize with the Greek cause 
 and to favor intervention, in spite of the warnings of imperialists 
 and the doubts of his colleagues. Simultaneously, in France a 
 wave of popular sympathy prompted the Bourbon monarchy, 
 which already favored action on other grounds, to intervene, while 
 Russia had already determined to make capital of the situation, 
 disregarding the cold disapproval of Austria. “ The course to 
 which personal inclination would never have led the Tsar,” says 
 the leading historian of these events, “ was being gradually forced 
 on him by the logic of political necessity^ for, apart from the 
 military reasons . . . the growing influence of England in the 
 Levant was beginning to All him with anxiety. Russia could not 
 afford to see her own prestige completely overshadowed by that 
 of a power which was already recognized as her great rival in the 
 East.” * 
 
 On April 4, 1826, a Protocol was drawn up at St. Petersburg, 
 with English approval, providing that the Turkish Government 
 
 Driault, of. cit., p. 114. 
 
 ® W. Alison Phillips, The War of Greek Iniefendence, 1821— 1S33 (Xew York, 
 1897)) PP- 244-245. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 13 1 
 
 should be made partially to withdraw from Greece.® The Porte 
 flatly refused to accede to this. After some delay, the Protocol, 
 on July 6, 1827, was made into the Treaty of London, by which 
 the contracting parties. Great Britain, France and Russia, bound 
 themselves to secure the autonomy of Greece.^® The Sultan 
 replied by drafting additional armed forces from Egypt, for 
 which he agreed to pay with additional grants of power to Me- 
 hemet Ali. In view of this and in the fear that Russia, acting 
 alone, might advance too far. Great Britain and France despatched 
 a joint fleet to establish a blockade of the Morea, where the 
 recently arrived Egyptian fleet was preparing to cooperate with 
 Turkish forces. On August 8 Canning died, but the change in 
 British policy which this event foretold by bringing into power 
 Lord Goderich and presently the Duke of Wellington, came too 
 late to prevent the English nation being seriously compromised in 
 its eastern relations. 
 
 Sir Stratford Canning, British Ambassador at the Porte, mean- 
 while instructed Lord Codrington, in command of the allied naval 
 forces, regarding the attitude he was to take toward Turkish and 
 Egyptian naval units. “You are,” he said, “to interpose your 
 forces between them [the French and Russians on the one side, 
 and the Ottoman forces on the other], and to keep peace with 
 your speaking trumpet, if possible j but, in case of necessity, with 
 that which is used for the maintenance of a blockade against 
 friends as well as foes 5 I mean force?'* Admiral Codrington 
 either did not wish to keep the peace, or was unable to do so. On 
 October 20, when the two groups of fleets were anchored opposite 
 each other in Navarino Bay, a few obscure shots embroiled them 
 all. Within a few hours the Egyptian and Turkish naval forces 
 had been entirely destroyed.^® 
 
 The reports of this one-sided action were received at the various 
 European capitals with widely differing manifestations of senti- 
 ment. The news was received at St. Petersburg with open re- 
 joicing. The Tsar’s Court believed that at last, having effected 
 an open rupture between the English and Turkish Governments, 
 the greatest obstacle to their own progress toward Constantinople 
 and the Mediterranean had been removed. The Austrian Court 
 confessed to a feeling of chagrin and deep foreboding. At Paris 
 
 ® Sir Edward Hertslet, Maf of Eurofe by Treaty (4 vols., London, 1875-1891), 
 I, 741-743. 
 
 Ibid., I, 769-774; Driault, of. cit., pp. 120 ff.; Feodor Martens, Recueil des 
 Traites et Conventions conclu far la Russie avec les Puissances 6 trangeres (15 tom., 
 St. Petersburg, 1874—1909), VII, Pt. I, 283—291. The Treaty of Akkerman, mean- 
 while forced upon the Turks by Russia, practically made the Black Sea a Russian lake. 
 
 Quoted in William James, The Naval History of Great BritatUf VI, 360. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 361—372. 
 
132 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 both government and populace learned with glee of the destruc- 
 tion of the Mohammedan fleets. The one saw the decline of 
 British influence in the Levant, which had so often obstructed 
 French enterprise j the other rejoiced at the blow given Turkish 
 despotism. At London, however, aside from the glad outbursts 
 of sentimentalists, the victory of Navarino produced a feeling 
 quite contrary to what might have been expected. A sense of 
 disaster pervaded official circles. Editors of some of the more 
 conservative journals referred to the naval action as a British 
 rather than a Turkish defeat, and subsequent developments lent 
 color to the assertion. An interesting commentary on the para- 
 doxical diplomacy of Great Britain at this juncture is shown by 
 the official assertion that although a British fleet had taken part 
 in an unprovoked act of war against a friendly Turkish force, 
 British relations with the Porte were not necessarily altered 
 thereby. The British Ambassador, although compelled to leave 
 Constantinople, was not officially recalled, and the British Gov- 
 ernment continued to maintain that relations with Turkey were 
 on the usual friendly basis. 
 
 The important bearing of the Navarino incident on British 
 imperial interests was not readily understood by the English 
 public, which was saturated with blood-curdling stories of Mo- 
 hammedan atrocities against a defenceless Christian population 
 in Greece. To counteract this feeling and to bring about a gov- 
 ernmental policy in accord with national interests, to save, if 
 possible, the carriage and harness after the horse had been stolen, 
 imperialistic publicists departed from the traditional caution of 
 English writers and stated their arguments with utmost candor. 
 A writer in Blackwood’ s M.aga%ine put the matter succinctly in 
 stating — 
 
 Much has been said, and a good deal written, on the pos- 
 sibility of our being called upon to defend our Indian pos- 
 sessions against the invasion of a European power j and there 
 is still much question of the practicability of such an ex- 
 pedition. . . 
 
 It is almost unnecessary to say, that Russia is the only 
 European nation at all likely to undertake this enterprise, 
 or, indeed, whose situation puts it in her power to attempt it. 
 She is the only nation who has a frontier in Asia, or who 
 comes in contact with those Asiatic nations, whose remoteness 
 leaves them at the mercy of their neighbours. . . She is the 
 only nation who has the means of establishing any permanent 
 
 Phillips, of. cit., pp. 270-272. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 133 
 
 influence or control over the countries lying towards India, 
 or extending her frontiers in that direction. Other European 
 governments may form alliances with princes of central Asia, 
 and may even enjoy a certain share of consideration and in- 
 fluence at their courts,^^ but Russia can make her strength be 
 felt and dreaded, and she can threaten with effect, and dictate 
 with the power of enforcing obedience. . . 
 
 We know that Russia has been led to speculate on the 
 possibility of attempting the invasion of India from her 
 'present position — an attempt to carry it by a coup de main 
 ... We know that it has been pronounced practicable by 
 more than one of her military leaders and we have already 
 noticed the opinion of Napoleon in its favor. . 
 
 The bearing of the Battle of Navarino on the probable ex- 
 pansion of Russia was delineated by a writer in Cohbetds Register ^ 
 who maintained that — 
 
 By this battle we assisted Russia and France to cripple the 
 Turkish power. This was . . . directly contrary to our 
 interest; but we did it because we could not go to war. 
 Russia and France were resolved to sever Greece from the 
 rest of Turkey. . . We knew that they had a design to 
 break up the Turkish power, in order to open a way to 
 India. . 
 
 The intervention of the Allies at Navarino accomplished its 
 immediate end. It enabled the Greeks to carry on their desperate, 
 albeit disunited and feeble, struggles for independence. But in 
 the course of the century, far greater consequences to Turkey and 
 the Great Powers resulted. Russia at once proceeded to make 
 the most of the situation created by the London Treaty and the in- 
 tervention in Greece. The next year she found it possible, by 
 making a favorable treaty with Persia, to go to war against Turkey 
 on her own account. In this move, which was supported by 
 France, Britain could do little more than bite her nails in futile 
 regret and helpless rage. 
 
 Turkey proved to be an easy victim at this juncture. Within 
 a year her resistance had been overcome, her armies driven in, 
 and her capital placed at the mercy of the northern invader. Only 
 the fear of provoking a general European war kept the Russians 
 
 The reference here to French activities in Persia is unmistakable. 
 
 Black’ivood’s Magazine, Sept., 1827, pp. 267-269; David Ross, Ofimons of 
 the European Press on the Eastern Question (London, 1836), pp. 165-168. 
 
 CobbetPs Register, Oct., 1829, quoted in Ross, op. cit., pp. 197-198. 
 
134 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 from occupying Constantinople. The Tsar’s Government was 
 able to bide its time, however, and arrange such a peace with 
 Turkey as might serve Russian purposes on some later occasion. 
 By the Treaty of Adrianople of September 14, 1829, the Sultan 
 consented to the demands previously made by the Allies that the 
 Greeks be freed. This, however, was merely a sop thrown by 
 Russia to the western Powers. Her real purposes were summed 
 up in clauses providing for the permanent weakening of the 
 Ottoman Empire by grants of autonomy to Serbia, Moldavia, 
 and Wallachia, and still more by the transfer to Russia of all 
 claims to Georgia and other Caucasian territories. Moreover, 
 Russia was to be recognized as protector of all Greek Catholic 
 churches within the Empire and was given the right of protection 
 over Russian traders. The situation was full of evil promise.^' 
 So satisfactory had been the terms of peace that Russia found it 
 possible to acquiesce in the position taken by the western Powers 
 that such territorial changes in Europe were a matter of inter- 
 national concern. Consequently, at a conference in London late 
 in the same year Russia agreed to a slight modification of the 
 terms of the Treaty of Adrianople.’® But in all essentials the 
 document stood to constitute a notable Russian diplomatic victory. 
 
 These events had a tendency to revive the whole question of 
 the likelihood of the invasion of India by a European Power, a 
 question which had been dormant since the close of the Napoleonic 
 wars.’® Many English imperialists hastened to indulge in a post- 
 mortem examination of the faults of British foreign policy and 
 the evils likely to result from it. The prevailing theme is well 
 illustrated by the comment of a well-known writer in the Quar- 
 terly Review: 
 
 To preserve the independence of Turkey has long been 
 the primary object of the foreign policy of France and 
 England, especially of the latter — for we have an Asiatic 
 as well as a European interest at stake. . . 
 
 Is it nothing to see projects maturing for direct communi- 
 cation with India through the Turkish territory, while the 
 Danube is rendered navigable — canals are about to connect 
 that stream with the other rivers of Austria, and with 
 those of Russia, Prussia, and Bavaria, so as to establish 
 
 Hertslet, Maf of Eurofe by Treaty, II, 813—831; Brit. and. For. St. Pap., 
 XVI, 647; Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans of Turkey, II, 196, 
 passim; Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, p. 144. 
 
 Brit, arid For. St. Pap., XVI, 647 ff. 
 
 Oriental Herald, XIX, 269—289; Quarterly Reviezv, XLIII, 495, passim; 
 Ross, op. cit., pp. 292—388. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 135^ 
 
 a direct communication between the manufacturing districts 
 of Germany and the marts of Turkey, Persia, Egypt, Arabia, 
 and even India itself? 
 
 And an able contemporary added that because of the clever and 
 unscrupulous manner in which Russia set about advancing her 
 interests, the existence of Turkey was undoubtedly necessary to 
 the existence of Persia and the security of India. 
 
 During these eventful years, British foreign policy, if not 
 essentially changing, was at least becoming definitely defined on 
 some points. In 1827 there was much vacillation and doubt as 
 to what should be British attitude toward the Turkish Govern- 
 ment. That Power had long been courted because it could give 
 commercial privileges or withhold them at pleasure. Likewise 
 it could grant or refuse rights of passage to India by any of the 
 nearer routes and its fiat was unchallenged. But the battle of 
 Navarino — the most enlightening of a series of significant events 
 — suddenly lifted the veil and disclosed to Great Britain and to 
 the world at large not a powerful Empire, but a weak, disin- 
 tegrating state, honeycombed with corruption, stricken with pov- 
 erty, disorganized and disunited, and incapable of any long or 
 consistent course of action. The Ottoman Empire had become 
 little more than a loose confederation, although its traditions still 
 gave its government a prestige quite out of proportion to its real 
 strength. 
 
 In the face of this revelation, British attitude had to be revised. 
 The first impulse was to stand aside and to permit the forces of 
 disruption to complete their work. Religious and moral forces 
 in England, active at the time, strongly contributed to this ten- 
 dency. After the Russo-Turkish War, however, with both Russia 
 and France strong in the eastern Mediterranean, the alternative 
 policy was adopted at London, and the determination to protect 
 and preserve the Turkish state and particularly its capital, Con- 
 stantinople, became a corner stone of British foreign policy for 
 the next half century.^^ 
 
 The most elementary student of modern history knows well 
 that the continued existence of the Turkish Empire up to the end 
 
 Quarterly Review, LIII, 229. For an able summary of the entire situation, 
 see the pamphlet by David Urquhart, published anonymously, entitled, England, 
 France, Russia and Turkey. Urquhart was one of the most authoritative and in- 
 fluential writers of the period. 
 
 British and Foreign Review, No. i, quoted in Ross, of. cit., pp. 347—383. 
 
 See Lieut. -Col. Sir George de Lacy Evans, On the Designs of Russia (London, 
 1828), pp. 231-244. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 136 
 
 of the Great War was little due to its inherent strength, but was 
 due primarily to the jealousies of the Great Powers, none of 
 whom was willing that another should occupy Constantinople, 
 from which place the Near East could be dominated. It is 
 difficult to divorce the Asiatic aspects of the Eastern Question 
 from the purely European ones. That the former were more 
 potent in the early part of the nineteenth century is indicated by 
 the fact that the British took the lead in promoting the belief that 
 the peace of Europe depended on the continued existence of the 
 relatively innocuous Turkish Empire as a European power. 
 
 The contemporary situation in Persia was not calculated to 
 allay any of the fears inspired by events in Europe. The Treaty 
 of Gulistan of 1813^® produced only a lull in Russian penetra- 
 tion southward toward Mesopotamia and the frontiers of India. 
 Following a disagreement over boundaries, the war broke out 
 again in 1826, and was fought with vigor for two years. The 
 Persians, as on previous occasions, found it impossible to cope 
 successfully with the armies from the north, and by the Treaty 
 of Turkmanshah, in 1828, they lost important territories, includ- 
 ing the provinces of Erivan and Nakhchivan. Persia was forced, 
 besides, to grant commercial concessions which went far toward 
 placing her in the relation of vassal to Russia. Although the 
 British viewed these developments with deep concern, they were 
 compelled to take the view that the Persians had waged an agres- 
 sive war, and that the definitive treaty of 1814 must be modified 
 accordingly to exclude the clause binding Great Britain to assist 
 Persia in any war with Russia.^® 
 
 We may be assured [said a writer in the Oriental Herald ^ , 
 that every circumstance conspires to produce the collision of 
 Great Britain and Russia on the confines of India, and that 
 at no very distant time. Russia, at least, will leave nothing 
 unattempted to accelerate the meeting. . .“® To attempt to 
 avert the storm by intriguing in the Court of Persia, is merely 
 to prescribe for symptoms, instead of grappling with the 
 disease itself. 
 
 So, with Russia strongly entrenched in northern Persia, and 
 with Russian agents active in Khiva and Bokhara, the situation 
 
 Sir Percy Sykes, History of Persia, II, 311. 
 
 Martens et Cussy, Recueil des Traites et Conventions, IV, 144—150. 
 
 Sykes, of. cit., II, 318—321. 
 
 That this may not have been far fetched is indicated by an article in the 
 Gazette de Moscovo for 27 Dec., 1832; quoted in Ross, of. cit., p. 353 n. 
 
 Oriental Herald, XIX, 269-2S2. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 137 
 
 t in western Asia was threatening enough to call definite attention 
 i to such routes as might be developed to help offset these advances. 
 Only secret French agents in India and French plans for aggres- 
 sion in Egypt and in Algeria were needed to create as unsatisfac- 
 tory a picture as the worst British pessimist could desire.^® 
 
 While events of the greatest significance to British interests 
 were transpiring in the eastern Mediterranean area, another situa- 
 tion arose in the loosely-knit Turkish Empire which tended to 
 focus the attention and concern of Great Britain on the future of 
 : the Mediterranean itself. Although Russia had taken the place 
 of France in the center of the Near Eastern stage, the latter was 
 not occupying the role of idle spectator. With Britain and Tur- 
 key at odds and the Treaty of London still nominally effective, 
 the French Government saw a prospect of regaining in the Medi- 
 terranean some of the prestige which had been lost on previous 
 occasions. The Barbary states supplied the most desirable sphere 
 of operations at the time. 
 
 France had had commercial relations with northern Africa for 
 decades. Though there had been malheurs at times, relations 
 were generally friendly. For this trade and the necessary pro- 
 tection from pirate raids, France had paid an annual tribute to 
 the Moslem chiefs, as did all other nations who wished to be un- 
 molested in their commercial relations.®® Early in the nineteenth 
 century, however, Algerian pirates became unusually active, due 
 to the disorganization of European naval forces during the 
 Napoleonic wars and the suspension of the usual indemnities. 
 Soon after the Congress of Vienna, various Christian Powers sent 
 punitive expeditions against the Barbary pirates, time after time 
 exacting promises of good behavior which were as often violated.®’' 
 During the twenties, both Great Britain and France blockaded 
 Algerian ports for considerable periods, but without much effect. 
 In view of the accumulation of injuries, the Government of 
 Charles X began contemplating the occupation of Algiers soon 
 after his accession in 1825.®® Only a favorable opportunity was 
 wanting, and it was soon supplied. 
 
 Corres-pondance de Victor Jacquemont avec sa Famille (2 vols., Paris, 1833). 
 This was translated and published in London the year following in order to disclose 
 French plans for recovering their former power in India. See the Quarterly 
 Review, LIII, 19-56. 
 
 Evans, op. cit., pp. 231—232. 
 
 Alfred Zimmerman, Kolonialpolitik (Leipzig, 1905), p. 318. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XI, 185; XII, 994. Cf. London Gazette, 13 April, 
 
 1824. 
 
 H. Lorin, L’Afrique du Nord; Tunisie — Algeria — Maroc (Paris, 1908), 
 
 p. 24. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 138 
 
 In 1827 a long series of Algerian insults to the French flag 
 culminated in a diplomatic outrage. On a state occasion, the 
 fiery Dey of Algiers, engaged in heated argument, struck the 
 French consul in the face with his glove. Upon the receipt of 
 the report of this challenge in Paris, diplomatic relations were 
 immediately broken off, and notice was issued of a renewed 
 blockade of the port of Algiers.^® The next three years were 
 spent in deciding whether Algiers might safely and profitably be 
 occupied by France. Many factors contributed to the belief that 
 aggressive action of the sort contemplated was not only desirable, 
 but even necessary. In addition to the more general motives 
 already described, the Bourbon monarchy was faced with serious 
 domestic problems. Opposition to the reactionary regime was 
 becoming constantly more widely spread and threatening, and 
 the only policy which the ministers of Charles X could devise to 
 popularize the monarchy was one of colonial expansion, which 
 might accomplish the victory of nationalism over liberalism. Al- 
 ready the beginnings of a new colonial empire had been made in 
 Senegal.®* In 1829 it was resolved to take a much more preten- 
 tious step in Africa. 
 
 The French blockade did not prove effective, as had been an- 
 ticipated, and early in 1830 a fleet was prepared to reduce the 
 Algerian strongholds. These extensive naval preparations gave 
 great umbrage to the British, already supersensitive to anything 
 pertaining to the safety of a Mediterranean waterway. Early 
 in March Lord Aberdeen, the Foreign Secretary, wrote the Eng- 
 lish Ambassador at Paris that — 
 
 The formidable force about to be embarked, and the dec- 
 laration in the speech of His Most Christian Majesty 
 [Charles X] appear to indicate an intention of effecting the 
 entire destruction of the Algerian regency, rather than the 
 infliction of chastisement. This probable change in the con- 
 dition of a Territory so important from its geographical 
 position y cannot be regarded by His Majesty’s Government 
 without much interest, and it renders some explanation of the 
 intentions of the French Government still more desir- 
 able. . . The intimate union and concert existing between 
 the two countries give us reason to expect that we shall re- 
 ceive the full confidence of the French Government in a 
 matter touching the interests of both, and which, in its result, 
 
 Zimmerman, of. cit., p. 319; Brit, and For. St. Pap., XIX, 943. 
 
 Lorin, op. cit., p. 23. The disagreement over Senegal was terminated only 
 in 1904, when other outstanding difficulties were settled. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 139 
 
 may be productive of the most important effects upon the 
 commerce and political relations of the Mediterranean 
 Statesd® 
 
 To this Polignac, the chief minister of the Bourbon monarchy, 
 replied that France was obliged to take action to secure reparation 
 for numerous injuries, but that French motives were of the most 
 disinterested kind. The proposed expedition was pictured as a 
 kind of international missionary enterprise, the burden of which 
 France was generously undertaking to bear alone. Furthermore, 
 it was emphasized that, if by any unforeseen developments the 
 existing order in Algiers should be overthrown, the other Chris- 
 tian Powers would be asked to cooperate in determining the new 
 order.^® 
 
 This statement somewhat relieved the tension, but the protests 
 of disinterestedness did not set British qualms entirely at rest. 
 Aberdeen asked that a formal statement be given in writing that 
 the French Government had no other motives in proceeding to 
 Algeria than those of chastisement and restoration of order, and 
 added, “ I will not conceal . . . that the entire silence respecting 
 the rights and interests of the Porte have been observed with 
 some surprise.” To this Polignac replied evasively and at 
 length, stating that the Porte would be consulted in due time, and 
 that meanwhile the French had no ulterior motives. He also 
 deplored the mistrust shown by England, but the specific guaran- 
 tees asked for by the British Foreign Office were not given.®® 
 Two months of temporising passed, with relations becoming 
 cool. By this time, the diplomatic basis on which the expedition 
 was to proceed had been determined. Egypt had refused an invi- 
 tation to cooperate in reducing the Algerian strongholds, the Pasha 
 believing that although the French were his friends, they might 
 one day find it convenient to incorporate Egypt if they once be- 
 came established in North Africa.®® The Russian Government, 
 also, while making no secret of its approval of French action, took 
 no steps toward participation.^® In view of this diplomatic situa- 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Paf., XIX, 942, Aberdeen, 5 March, 1830. 
 
 Ibid., p. 943. 
 
 Ibid., p. 945, Lord Aberdeen, 23 March, 1830. 
 
 Ibid., p. 947, Lord Stuart de Rothesay, 26 March. 
 
 Barker, of. cit., II, 117; Brit, and For. St. Paf., XIX, 953, 956. See W. F. 
 Lord, England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660—1830 (London, 1901), pp. 
 88—89, ^nd Louis Blanc, The History of Ten Years, 1830—1840 (2 vols., London, 
 1844-1845), I, 75-76, in which it is stated that Mehemet Ali agreed to reduce 
 Algiers himself for a consideration but was restrained by the Porte. The objections 
 of the British Cabinet figured in the failure of Egypt to join the undertaking. 
 
 Blanc, of. cit., I, 
 
140 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 tion, the French Government was constrained, on the very eve 
 of the departure of the fleet, to issue a categorical denial of any 
 imperialistic intentions. Upon receipt of this, the British Govern- 
 ment feigned a wholly sympathetic attitude.^^ 
 
 Late in the month of May, the expeditionary squadron sailed 
 from Toulon for Algiers. There the fortifications were bom- 
 barded and destroyed with no great difficulty. The disembarka- 
 tion of troops began on June 14, and by the first week in July the 
 city of Algiers was taken — together with the treasure of the 
 ruling house, some forty million francs. The Dey thereupon ca- 
 pitulated completely, and signed a Convention giving up the 
 control of all fortified coast cities in return for French protection 
 and guarantee of freedom of religion. By the end of July, 
 30,000 French soldiers were encamped along the Algerian sea- 
 board. 
 
 The British Government hastened to offer congratulations 
 upon the successful outcome of the enterprise and to express the 1 
 hope that, now that all of the objectives had been attained, evacu- 
 ation of the province would take place shortly.^® But Polignac, 
 who was largely responsible for the entire proceeding, was an 
 ardent patriot as well as a diplomat. While reassuring the w^atch- 
 ing Powers, he proceeded to strengthen French establishments in 
 Africa up to the very hour when the political exigencies of the 
 July Revolution drove him and the monarchy he represented 
 from power. 
 
 The effect of the July Revolution upon the whole question of 
 the Mediterranean was considerable. Immediately after the 
 accession of Louis Philippe, the Duke of Wellington, then For- 
 eign Minister, Instructed Lord Stuart de Rothesay, British Am- 
 bassador to France, to inquire of the new king whether it w'as his 
 intention to observe the engagements contracted by preceding 
 French governments. The new monarch is quoted as having 
 said in reply — 
 
 As a general rule, it is my most sincere and firm resolution 
 to maintain inviolable all the treaties which have been con- 
 cluded the last fifteen years between the powers of Europe 
 and France. As to that which concerns the occupation of 
 Algiers, I have most particular and powerful motives to 
 fulfill the engagements of my family towards Great Britain 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XIX, 947—961. 
 
 Ibid., XVII, 1198; Jean Darcy, France et Angleterre: Cent Annees de RhaJite 
 Coloniale (Paris, 1904), p. 157 , passim. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XIX, 961. 
 
 ** Edhibiirgh Review, LI, 565— 566. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 141 
 
 ... You may then, M. the Ambassador, assure your govern- 
 ment that mine will conform itself punctually to all the 
 engagements taken by his Majesty Charles X relative to the 
 affairs of Algiers. But I pray you to call the attention of 
 the British Cabinet to the actual state of the public spirit in 
 France, and impress upon it that the evacuation of Algiers 
 would be the signal for the most violent recriminations 
 against my government, which might lead to disastrous re- 
 sults, and that it concerns the peace of Europe not to depopu- 
 larize a new born power endeavoring to strengthen itself. 
 
 It is necessary, then, that assured of our intentions, and con- 
 vinced of our firm will to fulfil the promises of the last 
 government, his Britannic Majesty should leave us the choice 
 of time and means. 
 
 The French Revolution of 1830 destroyed the hope of the 
 Bourbon monarchy of using the Algerian expedition as political 
 capital, but it did give the French an opportunity to acquire an 
 important territory almost undisturbed. A general fear among 
 the Great Powers of a repetition of the days following the revolu- 
 tion of 1789, and difficulties arising in Belgium and Poland, tem- 
 porarily relegated Algeria to the background. The new Orleans 
 Government took advantage of this to embark upon a program of 
 consolidation, pacification, and Gallicization, which laid the basis 
 for a new colonial empire.*® In order to make this African couf 
 more tolerable to the British, the astute and tactful Marquis de 
 Talleyrand was selected as the new French Ambassador to the 
 Court of St. James. Upon his departure for London, Louis 
 Philippe informed him, “ The Algerian affair forms the most 
 delicate part of your mission.” Attempts to smooth over the 
 Algerian affair were furthered by the accession of Lord Palmer- 
 ston to the British Foreign Office in 1830, but progress toward 
 normal relations was slow because of the aggressive tendencies of 
 French Ministers, Thiers, in particular, and the rise of new issues 
 in the Near East. 
 
 The Algerian episode, although not affecting British welfare 
 as much as had been feared, directly contributed to the rise of a 
 
 Blackwood's Mag., XXXVI, 209, quoting M. Sarrons le Jeune, former aide- 
 de-camp to the Marquis de la Fayette. Within three years from the time the first 
 protest was lodged against the Algerian expedition by the British Government, the 
 intention of the French Government to maintain and colonize Algeria had been 
 stated in the Chamber of Deputies. 
 
 Lorin, of. cit., pp. 24-25. 
 
 Darcy, of. cit., p. 162. 
 
142 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 new eastern policy in England — one which savored strongly of 
 imperialism. France had endangered British interests often 
 before. Now at one stroke the French had further despoiled the 
 Ottoman Empire and, by holding extensive territory on both 
 sides of the Mediterranean, were in a fair way to turn it into a 
 “ French lake,” as the Black Sea had already become a Russian 
 lake. The idea that in this partition of Turkish territories Britain 
 might be compelled to take part out of self-defence could not be 
 entirely discarded as unworthy. It was still contrary to English 
 policy to annex territories where native governments might con- 
 tinue under English influence or protection, but wFere native 
 princes proved refractory and crises developed, ordinary policy 
 occasionally had to be set aside to secure a suitable fax Britannica. 
 In the Mediterranean, British influence in Mohammedan states 
 had temporarily vanished at the time of the unfortunate inter- 
 vention in Greece. If territorial acquisition became necessary to 
 offset the large gains of Russia and France, there appeared to be 
 the greatest opportunity and advantage in Egypt, whose Pasha 
 was generally considered a French ward and who was often at 
 odds with his imperial master. A writer in the Oriental Herald 
 ventured to put the thought into words by saying — 
 
 The impression now so generally entertained, of the 
 French having an eye to the possibility that if this event were 
 to take place, a union might be formed between that power 
 and Russia, for the purpose of making an attack on India 
 from two separate points, has induced us to think that a few 
 words on Egypt, as a colony, would not be ill-timed. . . 
 
 And he concludes that — 
 
 It will be well, if Egypt really is to be possessed by any 
 European power, that England should be the first to plant 
 her standard on the banks of the Nile. . . Of all the ac- 
 quisitions that England could make, whether in a military, 
 political, commercial, or colonial point of view, Egypt is the 
 most important. Not only is she the key to India, and the 
 immediate connecting point between that country and Eng- 
 land, but no territory offers more resources for the aug- 
 mentation of our wealth. . . So important is the acquisition 
 of Egypt, that when the valour of Nelson, and the blood of 
 Abercrombie, had once made it our own, as soon ought we to 
 have thought of surrendering the Tow'er of London, as 
 abandoning it.^® 
 
 Oriental Herald^ XIX, 256-257. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 143 
 
 That the British Government did seriously contemplate the 
 occupation of Egypt at various times after 1830 cannot be 
 doubted. This was very well appreciated by the Pasha of Egypt 
 himself, who, although he opposed the will of Britain to the 
 point of open conflict on more than one occasion, was careful 
 never to tempt that tolerant Power too far. One of the instances 
 which might have afforded opportunity for intervention in Egypt 
 occurred soon after 1830 while anxiety in England over the 
 Russian conquests of 1828—1829 and the French conquest of 
 Algeria was still at a high pitch. The rise of a situation which 
 both Russia and France considered opportune and in which the 
 Pasha of Egypt played a leading part can best be approached by 
 reviewing the means whereby Mehemet Ali secured the governor- 
 ship of Egypt and a claim to territories beyond the Isthmus of 
 Suez in Asia. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, whose influence on the Levant was probably 
 greater for nearly half a century than that of any contemporary 
 ruler, was born of obscure Albanian parents in 1769. Of his 
 early life, the little which is known comes chiefly from his own 
 accounts. As a young man he engaged in trade as a tobacco mer- 
 chant, and thus came into contact with those of the outer world 
 who made possible his later career. His education, such as it was, 
 appears to have been gained largely from the gratuitous instruc- 
 tion of a French trader. From this circumstance, Mehemet Ali 
 acquired a respect and an attachment for the French nation which 
 he displayed on many later occasions. 
 
 Following the general peace of 1815, he devoted himself to 
 the improvement of the country which he had come to look upon 
 as his own. Soon, also, he showed signs of imperialistic ambitions. 
 Between 1818 and 1820 he brought various parts of Arabia under 
 his influence and protection. In 1822 his aid was asked by the 
 Sultan in the Greek affair, and he gave it on condition that he be 
 made governor of Crete, Syria, and Damascus. The wiping out 
 of the Egyptian fleet at Navarino caused feelings of bitterness, 
 particularly against England, but Mehemet Ali was too shrewci 
 to display them. Upon receiving the announcement of the action 
 at Navarino, he said resignedly, “ It was to be! ” and assured the 
 representatives of both Britain and France at Cairo that the in- 
 terests of their respective countries would be well cared for.®” 
 
 Felix Meng-in, Histoire de I’Egyfte sous le gouvernement de Mohammed- Aly 
 (2 vols., Paris, 1823), I, 7 ff.; Paul Mouriez, Histoire de Mehemet-Ali, Vice-roi 
 d'Egyfte (2 vols., Paris, 1838), I, 62—66; A. E. P. B. Weigall, A History of Events 
 in Egyft from 1798-1914 (New York, 1915), pp. 44-61. 
 
 Barker, of. cit., II, 57-58. 
 
144 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Mehemet Ali appears to have understood far better than most 
 oriental potentates the extent to which the accomplishment of his 
 aims, and even his very existence, depended upon the sufFerance 
 of the Powers which dominated the Mediterranean, namely, 
 Britain and France, He also appreciated the extent to which the 
 whole policy of Great Britain in the East related to the protection 
 of India, and while his interests frequently ran at cross purposes . 
 to those of the English, he was invariably careful to give no 
 occasion for intervention in Egypt. At such times as he was at 
 odds with Great Britain he was scrupulously careful to protect 
 the lives and property of all Europeans in his domain. 
 
 After the partial settlement of the Greek situation, the Pasha, 
 suggesting that he had fulfilled his duty, asked that the promised 
 Syrian pashaliks be given him for his services during the several 
 years previous. The request was ignored by the Porte, inasmuch 
 as no further advantage could be expected from Egyptian forces. 
 This furnished an opportunity for diplomatic action which the 
 French were not slow to seize. From the beginning of his career 
 the French Government had stood sponsor for Mehemet Ali, 
 and on this as on other occasions his interests and those of the 
 French coincided. Encouraged, then, by secret French advice, 
 Mehemet Ali began the preparation of forces to be used in oc- 
 cupying the claimed Syrian territories. His armies were ready in 
 the summer of 1831, and the Rubicon was crossed when Ibrahim 
 Pasha, son of the Viceroy, captured Gaza, the door to Syria and 
 Arabia. Here there was a considerable pause, while the effects of 
 the first move were studied and the army strengthened. Finding 
 that no great alarm had thus far been raised, Mehemet Ali caused 
 the advance to continue. During the summer months of 1833 ’ 
 Jerusalem, Damascus, Acre, and Aleppo were taken. Here the 1 
 limit of the Pasha’s territorial claims should have counselled a | 
 halt. But the ease with which one stride after another had been ' 
 taken, the chaotic state of Turkish defences, and the glee of the ' 
 French, many of whose officers were serving with the Egyptian 
 forces, for once led his ambition to outstrip his judgment. In 
 August, Egyptian forces crossed from Syria into Asia Minor, in 
 order, as the Pasha said, “ to rescue his master from the tram- 
 mels of Russian influence, and to place about him more worthy 
 counsellors.” A few weeks later a large and well equipped 
 Turkish army was defeated and cut to pieces at Konia, and the 
 door to Constantinople appeared to stand open. 
 
 At this juncture the whole affair definitely became an inter- 
 national matter. Following the Treaty of Adrianople, Russia as- 
 
 Quarterly Review, LIII, 250. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 145 
 
 sumed the pose of protector of Turkey, thus taking advantage of 
 the disaffection introduced into Anglo-Turkish relations by the 
 Greek revolt. While this was gall and wormwood to British im- 
 perialists, there was nothing to be done about it. When Egyptian 
 armies began their triumphant march through Syria in 1833 and 
 a new Egyptian fleet menaced Constantinople, Russia hypocriti- 
 cally offered her military and naval forces for Turkish protection. 
 Although in dire straits, this was at first scornfully refused by the 
 Ottoman Government, which turned to the old ally, England, 
 for assistance. Sir Stratford Canning, recently appointed British 
 Ambassador to the Porte, frantically urged his Government to 
 come to the rescue, but Britain was too seriously affected by the 
 Great Reform wave and by events nearer home in Europe to 
 respond. In despair, therefore, the Turks turned to Russia in 
 the early months of 1833, preferring to risk the Russians in their 
 new role of friends than as enemies. The response was instan- 
 taneous. Russian diplomats, officers, and engineers swarmed into 
 Constantinople. A Russian fleet entered the Bosphorus. The 
 remaining Turkish forces were reorganized by Russian officers and 
 Russian troops embarked for Asia Minor. Still in doubt as to 
 whether the greater danger threatened from a friendly enemy 
 busily engaged in taking peaceful possession of the entire country, 
 or from the forces of a rebellious vassal who protested his loyalty 
 and asked permission from the Sultan whenever his forces were 
 moved nearer the capital city, the Porte was in deepest despair. 
 
 But the peaceful Russian invasion again brought the semblance 
 of unity to the councils of Britain and France. The former now 
 realized that — 
 
 The possession of Constantinople [by Russia] would at 
 once establish her supremacy in Central Asia, by the moral 
 influence it would exercise over the whole Mohammedan 
 world. . . Persia, for the same reason, would cease to be an 
 independent kingdom. Greece, with its islands, would be 
 but a province of Russia. The road to India would be thrown 
 open to her, with all Asia at her back. . . Even a demon- 
 stration against India could augment our national expendi- 
 ture by many millions annually, and render the government 
 of this country difficult beyond all calculation.®^ 
 
 And in view of the actual occupation of Constantinople by the * 
 Russians, the French discovered that they had overplayed their 
 hand. They hastily deserted Mehemet Ali, therefore, in an at- 
 tempt to counteract the Russian peril. The joint proposals of 
 
 Ibid., Liii, 256. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 146 
 
 Great Britain and France were not listened to at first. Only after 
 they had brought much diplomatic pressure to bear was a settle- 
 ment reached. On April 8, 1833, a Convention was signed, by 
 which it was arranged that Mehemet Ali should retain the pasha- 
 liks which had been promised him under the suzerainty of the 
 Sultan. Three months later, on July 8, another Russo-Turkish 
 treaty was signed arranging for compensation to Russia for her 
 “ assistance ” during the late difficulties. The price of this aid i 
 was, to all intents and purposes, Russian control of the Bospho- 
 rus.®^ Russian designs on Constantinople were rapidly being con- 1 
 summated. The upshot of the affair was to throw Turkey again ' 
 into the arms of Great Britain. Prussian drill masters replaced 
 Russian officers in the Turkish army. The Russian peril having 
 for the moment been reduced, France returned to her plotting 
 with the Viceroy of Egypt and laid the basis for another Syrian 
 crisis only five years later. 
 
 Such, in brief, were the events combining to focus British at- 
 tention and concern on the Mohammedan countries of the Medi- 
 terranean. Thus far, Britain had played largely a defensive role 
 in the Near East. This being true, Russia had contrived to 1 
 penetrate far into Turkey and Persia, approaching not only the 
 natural lines of communication from Europe to India and the : 
 East but even the physical frontiers of India itself. France had I 
 managed to hold diplomatic sway in Egypt and to extend her 
 control over the Turkish province of Algeria. The great valley ' 
 of Mesopotamia, though a nominal part of Turkish domain, was ^ 
 still open to European enterprise. At this psychological moment, , 
 when the British hold on India seemed to some degree threatened, 
 a new factor entered and presently conspired to aid the British 
 recovery of power in the Mediterranean and beyond. No states- 
 man heralded the advent of this new agent, however, for none 
 recognized its value. No newspaper captions or “ leading ar- 
 ticles ” greeted its debut. Widely regarded at first with scorn 
 and incredulity, its real influence and value came to be compre- 
 hended only by slow degrees. This new force, whose insidious 
 effect on European diplomacy w^as destined to be profound, was 
 the steamship. 
 
 Some reference has been made to the fact that before the open- 
 ing of the nineteenth century attempts had been made to develop 
 a British line for communications between the Persian Gulf and 
 
 The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. — Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, II, 
 925—928; Barker, op. cit., II, 197. 
 
 Maj. John Hall, England, and the Orleans Monarchy (London, 1912), pp. 
 227—230. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 147 
 
 the Mediterranean for Indian despatches.®® But regular service 
 by this route was discontinued after 1815, and was partially re- 
 established only in 1837 near the end of a steam survey of the 
 Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.®® It was the political situation in 
 the Mediterranean area which, more than anything else, created 
 British interest in the re-opening and the development of this 
 route after 1830. This was not so well known as the route through 
 Egypt and the Red Sea, but its strategic value was considerably 
 greater. The Indian Presidencies, however, were not primarily 
 interested in political routes, but rather in those which would be 
 most reliable and speedy for the exchange of messages and news 
 as well as for the transit of passengers. But their hopes for the 
 development of the Red Sea route had to remain unsatisfied until 
 the possibilities of the development of a practicable route through 
 Mesopotamia had been officially tested, for the Red Sea route 
 lay through Egypt where a Pasha with strong French sympathies 
 held sway. The line through Syria and Mesopotamia came more 
 directly under the control of the Sultan, except where occupied by 
 Egyptian armies, and British reliance was placed on the friendship 
 of the Sultan. 
 
 Other factors contributed to focus attention on the line through 
 Syria and Mesopotamia for a system of regular communication. 
 The Red Sea line was handicapped by certain physical limitations 
 which did not hamper the other. For about a third of a year the 
 southwest monsoon dominated the Arabian Sea and was generally 
 considered an insuperable obstacle to steam vessels as it was to 
 sailing ships. The Red Sea was full of dangers to navigation, 
 and both Cairo and Alexandria enjoyed the most unsavory repu- 
 tations as pest centers. The Persian Gulf, on the other hand, 
 might be approached from Bombay at all seasons of the year, 
 while the lands through which a line would pass in reaching the 
 Mediterranean were believed to be no more detrimental to health 
 than was Egypt. But aside from these considerations, still an- 
 other element entered into the attempt to utilize the Mesopo- 
 tamian line. 
 
 The ocean steamship did not demonstrate its ultimate value 
 during the first third of the nineteenth century. It was expensive, 
 inefficient, and hazardous. Steam river navigation, on the other 
 hand, was altogether in vogue during this period. Profitable lines 
 multiplied on practically all of the larger rivers and canals of 
 western Europe. It seemed entirely logical, therefore, to suppose 
 
 See above, pp. 59, 67. 
 
 ®® Low, History of the Iniian Navy, I, 525; Barker, of. cit., I, 55, 96; Chesney, 
 of. cit., pp. 329-331. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 148 
 
 that steamers would serve a double purpose on the rivers of Meso- 
 potamia; they would probably reap profits from local river traffic 
 and at the same time would provide a convenient, dependable, and i 
 speedy method of transmitting packets between the Persian Gulf 
 and points on the coast of Syria. From here communications with 
 England might be maintained by sea via Malta and Gibraltar, or 
 via Constantinople and thence by post roads and river steamship ■ 
 lines to the English Channel.” Political advantages and the de- ■ 
 velopment of river steam navigation will assist in explaining why, 
 in view of the fact that the Arabian and Red Seas were navigable 
 for a large part of the year, the first serious effort made by the 
 British Government to develop a shorter route to India than that 
 around the Cape of Good Hope was directed to the natural high- 
 way through Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf.®* 
 
 Feeling against Russia, which had been steadily rising since the 
 Treaty of London of July 6, 1827, was especially strong in 1829. 
 From having trapped England in connection with the Near 
 Eastern situation, Russia was proceeding to crush Turkey. Every 
 Russian move was viewed with alarm. “ They have now steam 
 boats on the Volga and the Caspian Sea,” WTOte Thomas Love Pea- 
 cock, Chief Examiner of the India House, in September, 1829. 
 
 “ They will soon have them on the Sea of Aral and the Oxus, and 
 in all probability on the Euphrates and the Tigris. . . They will 
 do everything in Asia that is worth the doing, and that we leave 
 undone.” But some steps were taken to block the Russian ad- 
 vance, and one of the first agents in this move was Capt. Francis 
 Rawdon Chesney, R. A. 
 
 During the Russo-Turkish War, British army officers openly i 
 sympathized with Turkey, and Chesney, with the knowdedge, if I 
 not the consent, of his Government, hastened out to Constant!- ■ 
 nople late in 1828 to enlist with the Turkish forces. Upon his 1 
 arrival he found that the war had already ended. For some w'eeks ' 
 he acted as unofficial observer with the Turkish armies, then re- | 
 turned to Constantinople ready for such tasks of an imperial 
 nature as might present themselves. An attractive enterprise 
 was not wanting. From Sir Robert Gordon, then British xlmbas- 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, Min. of Ev., pp. 13—54. That this was the day 
 of river transportation is shown by the suggestion that commerce with India might 
 be developed via the Rhine, Danube, Orontes, Euphrates, and Indus. Steamers were I 
 already plying on the Rhine and Danube, while railways were still rather frowned ' 
 upon. 
 
 Because this line was estimated to be shorter than that through Egypt and the 
 Red Sea, it later came to be known as the direct route or “ short cut.” 
 
 Pari. Pap. 1834, No. 478, App. 1, p. 10. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 149 
 
 sador at the Porte, Chesney received a commission to proceed to 
 Egypt to examine that country with a view to ascertaining what 
 facilities for through communication might be discovered. 
 
 Arriving in Alexandria with a Turkish firman in May, 1830, 
 Chesney found his task already outlined for him. The India 
 House had just sent out to Consul-General John Barker a con- 
 siderable list of queries respecting the relative advantages of the 
 Egyptian and Syrian routes for communication between England 
 and India. These were turned over to Chesney, who gladly un- 
 dertook to make a comparative examination of the two natural 
 passageways. One of his first steps was to investigate the pos- 
 sibility of transforming the overland route through Egypt into a 
 waterway by the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of 
 Suez. In carrying out this part of his commission, he surveyed 
 both the Isthmus and the proposed canal lines leading from the 
 Nile to the Red Sea. His findings as to levels are interesting, for 
 they disproved, to his own satisfaction, at least, the calculations 
 of the engineers of Napoleon, who had reported a difference of 
 nearly thirty-three feet in the levels of the Mediterranean and 
 Red Seas.^“ This made it appear that the Nile at Cairo was 
 slightly below the mean level of the Red Sea at Suez. Chesney’s 
 report, which showed no appreciable difference in the levels of 
 the two seas, apparently was not convincing to the English au- 
 thorities, for until the time of De Lesseps French estimates were 
 generally accepted as correct, and tentative canal projects by 
 Englishmen were all based on the plan of joining the Red Sea 
 with the Nile in the neighborhood of Cairo. 
 
 While he was engaged in surveying the Isthmus of Suez and 
 becoming constantly more impressed with the importance of im- 
 proved communication with India, Chesney seems to have become 
 imbued for the first time with the idea of substituting the Eu- 
 phrates River for the desert line through Syria and Arabia to the 
 Persian Gulf which had been used at intervals perviously. Hav- 
 ing reported to Sir Robert Gordon and having received the ap- 
 proval of Consul-General Barker on his work in Egypt, Chesney 
 received permission to make a preliminary survey of the Euphrates 
 River primarily to discover its navigability, about which almost 
 nothing was then known. Late in 1830, therefore, he set out 
 from Alexandria for Syria to begin the more hazardous part of 
 his work. 
 
 F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition (London, 1868), pp. 
 4—5, 10—11. Chesney speaks of the estimated difference in levels as 36 feet; Mr. 
 1 . L. Peacock stated that it ivas 30I: feet. The French engineers actually reported 
 a mean difference of 30^ feet. 
 
 Ihid., pp. 364-373; Lane-Poole, Life of General F. R. Chesney^ p. 467. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 150 
 
 At Damascus Chesney conferred with the English Consul- 
 General, Mr. J. W, Farren. The latter had already drawn up 
 plans looking toward the despatch of Indian mails from the Per- 
 sian Gulf to Hit, on the Euphrates, and thence to the Mediter- 
 ranean coast, and he actively assisted Chesney in his efforts to 
 discover the most suitable line from the Mediterranean through 
 Syria to the Euphrates. After considerable rambling about, 
 Chesney definitely set out for the Euphrates on December ii, 
 1830, and fifteen days later was rewarded with his first glimpse 
 of that “ noble river,” which was to dominate all of his sub- 
 sequent career. 
 
 The instructions with which Chesney was supplied by the India 
 House for this portion of his surveys seem to indicate that the 
 Euphrates had previously been discussed as possibly offering a 
 practicable water route for most of the distance from the Medi- 
 terranean to the Persian Gulf. Chesney was instructed to report 
 on Syrian harbors, on any available roads through the Syrian 
 desert to the Euphrates and the time by each route, on the nature 
 of the Euphrates trade, and on the character of Arab tribes along 
 the river. He was to discover at what point navigation ceased, 
 and “ at what point (if any) below Beles it would be possible to 
 procure wood in sufficient quantity for steam-navigation.” This 
 gave evidence that the hopes of those responsible for Indian 
 affairs centred about the possibility of using steam power as far 
 as water courses would permit. 
 
 To determine most of these points, it was necessary to descend 
 the Euphrates to its mouth. As Chesney was alone and unarmed, 
 this was no ordinary matter. He found the Arabs ill disposed 
 toward him, as they habitually were to all strangers. In all of his 
 efforts in Syria and Mesopotamia he experienced unusual diffi- 
 culties because of the attitude of the Egyptian Government to- 
 ward any projects for lines of transit through Syria. Mehemet 
 Ali apparently had no objections to the employment of lines 
 traversing Egypt, for these he could control at will and profit 
 from accordingly. But in the case of lines through Mesopotamia, 
 where Turkish infiuence might predominate to the prejudice of 
 Egyptian interests, the Pasha was determined to put all possible 
 obstacles in the way. On a number of occasions loss of property 
 and threats of violence to European prospectors and surveyors in 
 Syria and Mesopotamia were traceable to the door of the Egvptian 
 Viceroy.®^ 
 
 At Anah on the Euphrates Chesney was able to obtain a small 
 
 Chesney, of. ck., p. 4. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 15, 172—173, fassim; Lane-Poole, of. ck., p. 225, fassim. 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 15 1 
 
 native boat and two native assistants after considerable difficulty. 
 With these he began his descent of the river on January 2, 1831. 
 Proceeding slowly down the river in the midst of a hostile popu- 
 lation, suspicious of his native boatmen, and often without suffi- 
 cient food, Chesney had the greatest difficulty in mapping the 
 course of the river and determining its depth. At Felujah, where 
 the Euphrates and Tigris approach each other, he left his boat 
 and made a flying visit to Bagdad. Here he was warmly wel- 
 comed by the British Agent, Major Robert Taylor, who was an 
 enthusiastic believer in the Euphrates route. 
 
 Chesney’s survey of the Euphrates almost terminated with this 
 brief stop at Bagdad, for here he learned for the first time of 
 other pathfinders who, under orders from Bombay, were engaged 
 at that moment in the same enterprise of discovering possible lines 
 of communication through Mesopotamia. He was informed that 
 in 1830 Messrs. Bowater and Elliott had been engaged in exam- 
 ining the adaptibility of the lower course of the Euphrates to 
 steam navigation. Late in that year they had been joined by 
 Lieut. James W. Taylor, brother of the Resident at Bagdad, and 
 a few of his friends, all newly arrived from India. Shortly after- 
 ward, as has been mentioned, when the party were in the neigh- 
 borhood of Mosul, they were attacked by Arabs, and Taylor and 
 two of his companions were killed. Bowater, one of those who 
 perished, had previously prepared a memoir on the opportunities 
 for steam navigation in the Persian Gulf which was afterward 
 studied by a Parliamentary Committee in 1832.®^ Elliott, one 
 of the survivors of the ill-fated party, before Chesney’s arrival 
 ; was assigned to assist Lieut. Henry Ormsby, who had already 
 1 examined and mapped the harbors of the Syrian coast. In April, 
 1 83 1, 'Ormsby and Elliott set out from Bagdad for a further 
 survey of the lower course of the Euphrates, having already made 
 some examination of the Tigris. Finding that he had been an- 
 ticipated to this extent, Chesney prepared to give up his plans and 
 to retrace his steps, and only with difficulty could Major Taylor 
 persuade him to proceed with his work. For the sake of the 
 Euphrates survey this was most fortunate, as Ormsby and Elliott 
 were unable to complete their work on account of Arab hostility, 
 whereas Chesney succeeded in carrying out a preliminary survey.®® 
 Chesney’s visit at Bagdad was cut short by an outbreak of 
 plague. Hastily leaving the stricken city, he returned to Felujah 
 
 Pari, Paf., 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, 737— 74-1; Low, of. cit., I, 524. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, App. 8, pp. 36-40; App. 16, pp. 52—53. See 
 Ormsby’s “ Narrative of a Journey across the Syrian Desert,” in Trans, of the 
 Bombay Geog. Soc., Vol. II. A good deal of antiquarian interest was displayed by 
 all of these early explorers. 
 
152 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 and continued his descent of the Euphrates, though under the 
 most trying circumstances. Being at last unable to employ assist- 
 ance, and being reduced for food to the scanty donations of 
 occasional friendly Arabs, the completion of the voyage to the 
 mouth of the river seemed to be a hopeless venture. However, a 
 crude raft was finally obtained on which, after many narrow 
 escapes, the descent was completed. Through the interstices of 
 this raft, when he thought himself unobserved, Chesney thrust a 
 long pole at intervals and thus determined the approximate depth 
 of the water. At last, worn and half famished, but with some 
 rough charts of the river, he arrived at Basrah toward the end of 
 April, 1831. 
 
 In beginning his survey of the Euphrates at a point opposite 
 Damascus, Chesney had intended returning and surveying the 
 upper course of the river from that point to the limits of naviga- 
 tion. This plan was out of the question by the time Basrah was 
 reached because of Arab troubles and outbreaks of the plague, 
 which was particularly virulent in 1831 in some of the regions 
 which would have to be traversed. 
 
 Chesney finally found it necessary to return to Constantinople 
 through Persia. En route from Mohammerah, on the Persian 
 Gulf, to Trebizond, on the Black Sea, he passed through Tabriz, 
 where he was given some much needed assistance by the British 
 Envoy, Capt. C. D. Campbell, and his assistant, John McNeill. 
 This chance meeting is the more interesting since Capt. Campbell 
 was later one of Chesney’s successors in charge of river surveys in 
 Mesopotamia, while McNeill, already interested in the develop- 
 ment of new routes to India, was destined to distinguish himself 
 in diplomatic manoeuvres in Persia in 1836—1837, and to stand as 
 one of Chesney’s stanchest supporters in advocating a Euphrates 
 Valley Railway forty years later. From Trebizond, Chesney pro- 
 ceeded via Aleppo to Constantinople and thence home to England, 
 where he arrived at the end of 1 832. 
 
 Some of Chesney’s reports had preceded him to England. His 
 first impressions of the Euphrates, accompanied by sketch maps, 
 had been sent back from Bagdad, and gave a distinctly unfavorable 
 idea of the middle section of the river. Later in the same year he 
 had written the new Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Stratford 
 Canning (afterward Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) that it was 
 doubtful whether a steamer could ascend the Euphrates for any 
 considerable distance. The Lemlum marshes along the lower 
 course would be difficult to pass, he believed, and the rate of the 
 current elsewhere, three or four miles per hour, would be difficult 
 for a steam vessel to overcome. But he reported that, after all, 
 
SHAPING A BRITISH EASTERN POLICY 153 
 
 the most formidable difficulty was the temper of the Arabs, who 
 would surely attack a vessel on every possible occasion.®® His 
 opinions on all of these points proved to be well grounded, but 
 I unfortunately he reversed his opinions in later reports, with the 
 result that thousands of pounds sterling were expended over a 
 I period of several years, and the full development of the Red Sea 
 route was postponed, before the first unfavorable reports on the 
 Euphrates were found to be correct. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, App. 16, pp. 60-61, 92-93. 
 
 I 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 ATTEMPTS TO OPEN THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 
 
 C HESNEY’S return from his first surveys in Mesopota- 
 mia occurred at a peculiarly appropriate moment from 
 the point of view of British foreign relations. The 
 Eastern Question, instead of subsiding after the settlement of 
 1829, was reaching a higher pitch than ever because of the advance 
 of Egyptian forces in Syria under the encouragement of the 
 French, while Russia was beginning to assume the attitude of 
 Turkish protector on the other hand. Although Chesney’s first 
 reports on the navigability of the Euphrates and the facilities for 
 the development of a definite route through this region had been 
 rather unfavorable, his attitude soon underwent a change after he 
 reached England. He was lionized because of his unique and 
 hazardous experiences and was consulted by the King about po- 
 litical conditions in the East. Under these influences, his final 
 reports to the Board of Control, while including some of the data 
 submitted earlier, were quite different in tone. Here was a pos- 
 sibility, he found, of opposing Russian designs more effectually 
 than by enlisting with the Turkish armies. 
 
 This change in attitude on the part of Chesney had far-reaching 
 consequences. It immediately started a long controversy over 
 the relative merits of the “overland” (Egyptian) and “alter- 
 native ” or “ direct ” (Mesopotamian) routes, which lasted with 
 varying intensity through most of the remainder of the century.^ 
 But what was of far greater consequence was the fact that Ches- 
 ney’s approval of the Euphrates as a highway gave Government 
 
 ^ As soon as the Euphrates line began to attract favorable attention, a “ school ” 
 of exponents sprang up, each of whom wished to be considered the pioneer of the 
 route or the originator of the idea. Those who laid claim to such distinction in- 
 cluded the English Consul-General, John Barker, Mr. Thomas L. Peacock, of the 
 East India Company, and Major Robert Taylor. Even the French agent, Victor 
 Fontanier, records in one of his books the statement, “ I am the first to recognize 
 that facile communications with Asia could be of great advantage to all of Europe.” 
 (Voyage dans Plnde, II, 176.) But Chesney, although not the first advocate, must 
 be considered the real apostle of the route to which he devoted his life and much 
 of his fortune. 
 
 154 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 155 
 
 heads the opportunity they desired for advocating the develop- 
 ment of the line for strategic purposes. The decision to adopt 
 this on trial as an official route was encouraged by the rapidity 
 with which steam vessels were being improved, especially for 
 river navigation.^ 
 
 As has already been mentioned, the Select Committee of the 
 House of Commons, which sat in 1832 to consider the affairs of 
 the East India Company, took up the matter of communication 
 with India as a pressing current problem. Along with papers 
 prepared by other explorers, some of Chesney’s maps and final 
 I reports were carefully studied.® Of special interest was his mem- 
 I orandum stating the comparative advantages, as he saw them, of 
 the Red Sea and Euphrates lines. Chesney believed that the 
 ! route through Egypt might be less expensive to develop, but that 
 such advantages as it possessed would be more than offset by a 
 saving in time (of six or seven days), in distance (of about three 
 hundred miles), and in expensive fuel for steamers in using the 
 Euphrates route. He attributed to this line the additional ad- 
 ;! vantages of all-year utility, greater comfort than the overland 
 I route, and large commercial possibilities in the development of 
 I Arab trade. Even the nomadic Arabs, he believed, would tend 
 to become sedentary under the influence of regular and profitable 
 i commercial opportunities.^ 
 
 The year 1833, which saw such startling developments in con- 
 nection with the Egyptian advance in Syria, was in England 
 i devoted to a study of ways and means of utilizing the Euphrates 
 route to proper advantage.® Various members of Parliament 
 became converts to the Euphrates route, and its espousal by the 
 Foreign Secretary, Lord Palmerston, gave assurance of the serious 
 purposes of the Government and its willingness to brave any 
 attitude shown by France or Russia. When “ owing to its political 
 
 ^ Lane-Poole (Ed.), Life of General F. R. Chesney, p. 252, passim. This work 
 is replete with errors, great and small; but it gives the critical reader, nevertheless, 
 an excellent picture of an ambitious and honorable, if somewhat impracticable, 
 ij soldier and imperialist. 
 
 ® Parliamentary Paper, 1831—1832, No. 735. — II, App. 25, pp. 737—741; ibid., 
 1834, No. 478, App. 8, p. 36. See maps in Chesney’s Narrative of the Euphrates 
 Expedition. 
 
 1, ^ Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, App. 16, pp. 70, 71, g8. Cf. Asiatic Journal, VI, 
 
 N.S., Pt. II, 130— 131. Consul-General Farren estimated the time between Bombay 
 ' and London by way of Syria, using steam, at 55 days. Pari. Pap., 1831—1832, No. 
 I 735 - — n, App. 25 , p. 757 . 
 
 ® See Reports on the Navigation of the Euphrates, Submitted to Government by 
 Capt. Chesney, R. A. (London, 1833). His biographer, Stanley Lane-Poole, says 
 i^Life of Chesney, p. 256) that Chesney was regarded as the pioneer of both of the 
 f shorter routes. Only a strong partisan could accept that view. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 156 
 
 bearings ” a discussion of the route rose in the Cabinet, no agree- 
 ment was reached. ** This necessitated making the project, if it 
 was to survive, one for the consideration of Parliament. There- 
 fore, in June, 1834, “ it was settled that Lord Lansdowne should 
 bring up the subject of communication with India before the 
 Lords, and that Mr. Grant [Charles Grant, later Lord Glenelg, 
 President of the India Board] should do the same in the Com- 
 mons.” ’’ The House of Commons was sufficiently impressed 
 with the need for a new and shorter route to India to refer the 
 entire subject to a Select Committee of the House.® The Com- 
 mittee, consisting of Charles Grant and thirty-five others, nearly 
 all men of note, at once began the task of gathering data on the 
 political situation in Persia, the advance of Russia, and the relative 
 advantages of both the Red Sea and Euphrates routes. 
 
 The first witness called was Thomas Love Peacock, Examiner 
 of the East India House. He pointed out the apparent imprac- 
 ticability of ever improving the Red Sea route by means of a Suez 
 Canal, assuming the surveys made earlier by French engineers to 
 be correct. To develop the Red Sea line to India on the existing 
 basis would require, he thought, four steam vessels in Indian 
 waters, costing altogether about £100,000 per year. Considering 
 all factors. Peacock favored the opening of the Euphrates route, 
 employing for this purpose two small, flat-bottomed steamers, at 
 an estimated cost of about £14,000, to ply between the Persian 
 Gulf and a point on the Euphrates opposite the Syrian coast.® 
 Four reasons were given for preferring the Euphrates; the ex- 
 pense of developing the Red Sea route, which did not seem to be 
 warranted by its political or commercial value j the navigability 
 of the Euphrates the year round and the constant accessibility of 
 Indian ports from the Persian Gulfj the necessity of controlling 
 the Persian Gulf rather than the Red Sea in guarding against 
 Russia 5 and the suppressing of piracy in Indian waters by the 
 utilization of the Persian Gulf route with armed steamers, which 
 could at the same time carry on the communications. Peacock 
 agreed with other advocates of the Euphrates route in believing 
 that it should be considered supplementary to that by way of the 
 Red Sea, and he urged the opening of both lines at the earliest 
 possible date.^“ The recommendations of this recognized expert, 
 though obviously representing the views of the proprietors of the 
 
 ® Chesney, of. cit., p. 146. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 148. 
 
 ® Hansard's ParUa 7 nentary Debates, 3d Ser., XXIV, 142. 
 
 ® Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, Min. of Ev., p. 8; ibid., App. 2, p. 12. Chesney 
 liad estimated the cost of such an experiment at £13,000. 
 
 Ibid., Min. of Ev., pp. i— 13. 
 
i SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 157 
 
 I 
 
 [ East India Company and designed to save that concern as much 
 expense as possible, were well received and considerably in- 
 ij fluenced the report of the Committee. 
 
 I; Chesney was summoned to report on his findings during the 
 i survey of 1830-1831. He gave an enthusiastic picture of the 
 :j advantages which would undoubtedly result from a commercial 
 development of the Euphrates. He believed that if order were 
 secured and trade developed many of the nomadic Arabs would 
 become fixed and industrious in their habits. He advocated the 
 experimental opening of the Euphrates with steam vessels for 
 j the duration of a year, with subsequent action to be determined 
 ! by the results of this trial. 
 
 Admiral Sir Pulteney Malcolm was strong in support of the 
 Red Sea route. This was quite natural, for as the officer in charge 
 of the Mediterranean squadron for a number of years he had 
 I seen the growth of the British steam packets in Mediterranean 
 waters from a few experimental hulls in 1825 to a powerful fleet 
 ij of fast steamers in 1834, making carefully scheduled trips be- 
 tween Southampton and Malta. It had long been his desire to 
 extend this line from Malta to Alexandria, there to connect with 
 li steam vessels coming from Bombay. This was the plan he had 
 worked out in conjunction with his brothers. Sir John Malcolm, 
 when Governor of Bombay, and Sir Charles Malcolm, who during 
 the late twenties had been Superintendent of the Indian Navy 
 j with headquarters at Bombay.^ However, as the Admiral had 
 I little knowledge of the Euphrates route, his advocacy of the Red 
 ! Sea line contributed little to the final report. 
 
 ! Among other witnesses was Thomas Waghorn, now the avowed 
 ^ rival of Chesney as he had formerly been of James W. Taylor. 
 I Waghorn’s testimony was characteristic — forceful, disjointed, 
 li exaggerated j but he nevertheless gave the impression of being 
 li exceedingly well informed. After reviewing his own efforts in 
 “ the cause of steam navigation to India, Waghorn devoted his 
 " further remarks to the project of establishing a steam line direct 
 ' from Suez to Calcutta on a quarterly basis, for which he consid- 
 i ered a Government loan of £20,000 sufficient. He was still of 
 j the opinion that the Cape route, of which he had long been a 
 I leading advocate, might be profitably employed by steam lines, 
 j but he had only slurs for the Euphrates project. 
 
 A final bit of evidence, almost prophetic in character, was re- 
 jj ceived from James Bird, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, 
 j who had travelled “ overland,” that is, by way of Egypt, from 
 India. He identified himself as an accurate and impartial ob- 
 
 /Azi., pp. 152-164. Ibid., pp. 20&-232. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 158 
 
 server, pointing out that the Euphrates and Suez routes each had 
 peculiar advantages. But as to trade, he believed it would not be 
 shifted to new channels at once merely by the opening of shorter 
 lines of communication. “ It can,” he said, “ only follow the 
 construction of an iron railway or canal across the isthmus that 
 divides the Red Sea from the Mediterranean.” And as it was 
 not clear to the Committee why there should once have existed a 
 profitable trade overland through Egypt and through Syria which 
 could not be readily revived, he pointed out that “ The commerce | 
 of ancient times was one of luxury, not of domestic manufacture, | 
 as at present 5 and the articles being of small bulk and of com- 1 
 paratively greater value than in these times, afforded to the mer- 
 chant a profit that proved sufficient for meeting the expenses of a 1 
 tedious land journey from the Euphrates (and the Red Sea) to 1 
 the Mediterranean.” 
 
 After carefully weighing the evidence from those most com- 
 petent to speak on the subject in hand, the Committee prepared , 
 their report, which was so well founded and intelligent in most 
 parts that it provided the groundwork for several similar com- 
 mittees during the century. The report, dated July 14, 1834, , 
 
 stated as a thesis that “ a regular and expeditious communication ' 
 with India by steam vessels is of great importance both to Great 
 Britain and to India.” It pointed out that the practicability of : 
 the Red Sea route during eight months of the year had been well 
 established during the previous five years, and that although this 
 was expensive, “ it is expedient that measures should be imme- 
 diately taken for the regular establishment of steam communica- 
 tion from India by the Red Sea. The fact w'as noted that steam ; 
 had not been applied to the Persian Gulf route, where the south- 
 west monsoon need not be taken into consideration, nor to the 
 Euphrates River, where it was believed there would be no obsta- 
 cles during most of the year. There was a question whether, 
 during the dry season, the Euphrates could be navigated. How- 
 ever, since the monsoon months, June, July, August, and Septem- 
 ber, did not coincide with the dry season in Mesopotamia, Novem- 
 ber, December, January, and February, the Committee believed 
 that “ the effective trial of both lines would open a certain com- 
 munication with the Mediterranean in every month of the year, 
 changing the line of the steam vessels on both sides according to 
 the seasons.” 
 
 Ibid., pp. 216—218. 
 
 Ibid., Report of the Committee, pp. 3-4; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., XXV, 
 930-932. 
 
 That is, the two routes were to be synchronized, if possible. It was the 
 southwest monsoon of the one versus the low water of the other. 
 
* SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 159 
 
 For carrying out these recommendations, the Committee pro- 
 posed that the Malta line of steam packets be sent in the future 
 to such ports of Egypt and Syria as would complete the com- 
 munication. It was suggested that the expense of making a trial 
 of the Euphrates route, estimated at £20,000, be voted by Parlia- 
 I ment, as the East India Company had already incurred heavy 
 expense in the Red Sea experiments. In conclusion, it was urged 
 I that the report be acted upon as quickly as possible.^® 
 
 Consideration of the Report came up in the House of Commons 
 on August fourth. Anticipating the argument that any matter 
 pertaining to the development of India should be at the charge 
 of the East India Company, Charles Grant pointed out that some 
 j of the leading objectives of the proposed plan were political and 
 
 * hence belonged to Government. He showed further that the 
 „ East India Company had already spent between £60,000 and 
 
 £70,000 in tentatively developing a line of communication by 
 way of the Red Sea, yet no permanent equipment had been ac- 
 ■" quired for the establishment of a regular service. He also re- 
 marked that since the removal of the last vestiges of the 
 j Company's commercial monopoly in 1833, responsibility for the 
 ||: establishment of lines for mail service, particularly those which 
 I possessed a strategic value, tended to devolve upon the British 
 Government. It was, he said, “ the duty of England to watch all 
 the modes of access to India.” 
 
 No particular objection to the plan was voiced. There was 
 some headshaking 3 even Grant admitted a considerable degree of 
 ' doubt as to the practicability of the route for which he was asking 
 an appropriation. But it was the general consensus of opinion 
 I that the political situation east of the Mediterranean demanded 
 j some action on the part of Great Britain, and that £20,000 was 
 I; not too much to pay for securing the approaches to India. That 
 I amount, consequently, was appropriated, and thus, after years of 
 disinterestedness and inaction the wheels of government were set 
 I in motion by the urge of foreign policy to bring about the estab- 
 lishment of better means of communication. 
 
 \ The India Board was entrusted with the task of carrying out 
 
 I the resolutions of the Parliamentary Committee with the funds 
 voted by the House of Commons. One of the first tasks lay in 
 the selection of the proper personnel for the difficult undertaking 
 of placing and operating steam vessels on the Euphrates. Ches- 
 
 1 A list of eighteen plausible reasons for preferring the Euphrates to the Red 
 
 Sea route was printed in the Bombay Gazette, 7 Aug., 1833. 
 
 H Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., XXV, 930-932. 
 
i6o BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ney was, of course, the logical leader for such an experimental 
 enterprise, and he was sounded by the India Office on his willing- i 
 ness to assume command. At first, either through lack of confi- 
 dence in the reports he had made, or through extreme modesty, 
 he demurred, and only consented to take over the work, without . 
 pay, when he was informed that it was the King’s express wish. 
 Upon accepting appointment, Chesney was instructed to surround i 
 himself with a trained personnel for the diverse tasks ahead. ! 
 Most of the latter part of the year 1834 was devoted to this part 
 of the business. 
 
 The India Board meanwhile placed a rush order with those : 
 pioneers of steamship construction, Messrs. Laird,^® of Birken- 
 head, near Liverpool, for two small, flat-bottomed river steamers, 1 
 to be built in accordance with specifications to be furnished by the 
 Commander of the Expedition. The cost of these vessels and of 
 other equipment was considerably above the original estimates, 
 and before the end of the year mounting expenses made it appear 
 doubtful whether the Parliamentary appropriation would suffice 
 for the work. At the same time, changes in the Cabinet made it 
 impossible to approach the Government for a further appropria- 
 tion. In this dilemma, the Court of Directors of the East India 
 Company agreed to supply an additional £5000 for the venture. 
 Also it was arranged that at the termination of the Euphrates 
 Expedition the Company should purchase the two steamers and 
 either employ them in working a permanent line of vessels on 
 the Euphrates or, in the event of an unsatisfactory outcome of 
 the survey, transfer them to India for the navigation of the 
 Indus.’® 
 
 Meanwhile, throughout the latter part of 1834 a gradual reac- 
 tion had set in against the carrying out of the Euphrates idea. 
 There were not lacking those among Government officials and 
 strategists who ridiculed the whole idea. Some even maintained 
 that the Euphrates route, far from opposing Russian designs, 
 might, if developed, even aid Russian armies in reaching the 
 Persian Gulf.®° Opinion in India was generally against the ex- 
 penditure of any large sum of money in attempting a doubtful 
 project when the Suez route, of proved feasibility, was still un- 
 developed. The Calcutta Courier said, “. . . We look at the 
 
 Mf. M’Gregor Laird, of this firm, had been a witness before the Parliamentary 
 Committee in June, 1834. Many of his suggestions concerning the proper equip- 
 ment for a Euphrates steam survey were carried out. Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 47S, 
 Min. of Ev., pp. 56—70. 
 
 Ibid ., 1837, No. 540, p. 7. 
 
 Quarterly Review, LII, 405-406. 
 
1 
 
 SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE i6i 
 
 jproject here as a very wild scheme, and an absolute waste of 
 . money. . . There are so many startling difficulties in the way 
 . . . that we hope for no useful result from this expensive voyage 
 !of discovery.” Lord Palmerston had at ail times taken care 
 not to commit himself to the undertaking, as he was fearful that 
 ;any such move, backed by the Government, might aggravate the 
 ;already unsatisfactory foreign situation. A fatal blow to the 
 whole project for a Euphrates Expedition was narrowly avoided 
 when Lord Ellenborough replaced Charles Grant as President of 
 the India Board in November at the time of the fall of the Grey 
 Ministry. Ellenborough had been constantly hostile to the plan, 
 and immediately upon taking office he gave instructions to have 
 'all preparations stopped. He soon found, however, that the work 
 jwas too far advanced to be terminated easily, and a word from 
 : King William, who was exceedingly interested in the experiment, 
 brought a grudging assent from the India Office."® 
 
 I The selection of the personnel for the work was made with 
 unusual care. Every one of the fifty young officers and men 
 chosen was an expert in some line of endeavor, and most of those 
 who survived the Expedition distinguished themselves in later 
 years in some kind of national service.®^ Most of these men, 
 recruited from the British Army and Navy, the Indian Navy, and 
 ' English technical industries, were ready for service before the 
 i steamers were completed. Several of them were sent out to 
 Syria to make preliminary surveys of the roads to be taken in 
 transporting the equipment from the Syrian coast to the Euphrates 
 |at Bir. Lieut. Henry Blosse Lynch, I.N., a rather remarkable 
 linguist and diplomat, did excellent service during the winter 
 of 1834—1835 among the Arabs in preparing them for the inno- 
 vation to follow, though much of his work was undone by Me- 
 hemet Ali after the Expedition arrived in Syria.®® 
 
 At the same time, other agencies had been at work. The 
 British Ambassador at Constantinople, Lord Ponsonby, had se- 
 cured from the Porte an official permit for the Euphrates Expedi- 
 tion. This was issued on December 29, in the form of an Im~ 
 
 Calcutta Courier, 30 March, 1835; quoted in Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., 
 Pt. 11 , 10. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d. Ser., CXLVII, 1652-1662, 1676-1683; Quarterly 
 Review, CII, 392 ff.; Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 446. It was the same kind of fear 
 on Palmerston’s part which wrecked a mature plan for a Euphrates Valley Railway 
 in 1857. 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., pp. 281, 304. 
 
 Annual Register, 1835, Pt. II, 18; David Fraser, The Short Cut to India 
 (London, 1909), p. 255; A. H. Layard, in the Quarterly Review, CII, 366 n. 
 
 ' I Low, History of the Indian Navy, II, 33-34; Chesney, Narrative of the 
 ' Rufhrates Expedition, pp. 547-548. 
 
i62 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 perial firman, which came to have an importance later in the 
 century out of all proportion to that originally assigned to it. 
 Addressed to all the Turkish officials along “ the two banks of the 
 Euphrates,” it continued: 
 
 The Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of 
 Great Britain . . . Lord Ponsonby . . . has presented at 
 our Sublime Porte an official note, by which it appears that 
 the British Government asks permission to navigate alter- 
 nately two steam boats on the river Euphrates, which flows 
 at a little distance from Bagdad, in order to facilitate 
 commerce. 
 
 In consequence, an order has been sent to our . . . Gov- 
 ernor of Bagdad and of Bussora, Ali Riza Pasha, to furnish 
 our Sublime Porte with information on the proposed navi- 
 gation.^® 
 
 Although the answer of the Pasha has not yet arrived, the 
 British Ambassador has made yet further representations on 
 this head, informing our Sublime Porte that the English 
 Government awaits our reply. 
 
 Therefore, we have permitted and do permit two steam 
 boats to navigate the Euphrates, alternately, and this naviga- 
 tion may continue as long as it results in no inconvenience, 
 and an official note containing the substance of this has been 
 transmitted to the British Ambassador. 
 
 A Firman couched in the same terms has been addressed 
 to the Pasha of Bagdad and of Bussora. . 
 
 This interesting document furnished to the Expedition was 
 destined to serve as a charter for the subsequent commercial 
 navigation — not of the Euphrates — but of the Tigris River by 
 an English concern, originally organized by the firm of Lynch 
 Brothers, of whom two served with the Euphrates Expedition.'® 
 
 It subsequently appeared that the Pasha of Bagdad was not at all averse from 
 the project. 
 
 Lewis Hertslet (Comp.), A Co 7 nflete Collection of the Treaties and, Con^'en- 
 tions, and Recifrocal Regulations . . . between Great Britain and Foreign Powers 
 . . . so far as they relate to Cotnmerce and Na>vigatio?t . . . (24 vols., London, 
 1840-1907), XIII, 838 — a French text. The translation is mine. A mediocre 
 and incomplete English version is given in C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, 
 Engagements and Sunnuds Relations to India and Neighbouring Countries, VII, 15. 
 
 Just how this finnan could be taken as applying to the Tigris is difficult to 
 understand. Fraser, in his Short Cut to India, p. 254 f., suggests that the Porte did 
 not appreciate the difference between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in 1834, and 
 believed that Bagdad was situated on the latter stream. A Vizirial Letter issued by 
 the Pasha of Bagdad in 1 846, relative to the navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris 
 by English steam boats, may be considered as supplementing and amplifj'ing the 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 163 
 
 ^ The essential character of the Euphrates Expedition and some- 
 thing of its political bearing were indicated by a set of instructions 
 Issued by the Foreign Office. Chesney was made Colonel on 
 I 'special mission — 
 
 ; For the establishment of a communication between the 
 i Mediterranean Sea and His Majesty’s possessions in the East 
 1:’ Indies, by means of a steam communication on the River 
 t: Euphrates. . . It will be Colonel Chesney’s first duty to use 
 ^ every exertion to secure the success of the Expedition in the 
 ' shortest possible time, and always to bear in mind the neces- 
 j| sity of making his arrangements in such a manner as that 
 their utility may be permanent in the event of his success. . . 
 
 I Colonel Chesney is always to bear in mind that the character 
 I of the Expedition is one of peace j that it is undertaken with 
 the permission of a friendly power, without whose counte- 
 nance and cooperation success cannot reasonably be ex- 
 I pected. . 
 
 j However, even with the consent and support of the Turkish 
 Government, it became problematical whether the Expedition 
 icould proceed. A considerable part of the course of the Expedi- 
 rtion through Syria and down the Euphrates River lay within the 
 iterritory assigned to Mehemet Ali by the terms of the Turco- 
 jEgyptian agreement of 1833. The Pasha had no wish to bring 
 [about an open breach with England, but he had no sympathy with 
 ;a project which might easily lead to the establishment of a per- 
 ffmanent barrier to his territorial ambitions. So while promising 
 aid to the Expedition “ as far as his authority extended,” actually 
 he employed every possible device to thwart the success of the 
 1 experiment. In this he was largely successful, as will be noted.®^ 
 Arrangements for the survey were not completed quite as soon 
 as expected. Meanwhile, a controversy developed regarding the 
 proper starting place for the survey. Members of the India 
 Board believed the steamers should be shipped around the Cape 
 and through the Persian Gulf to Basrah, where there would be 
 some facilities for assembling the steamers. Chesney, however, 
 ;Was a bit doubtful regarding the ability of the steamers to make 
 headway against the stiff current in many places along the course 
 
 [firman of 1834. Hertslet’s Com. Treat., XIII, 839—840. Cf. the divergent state- 
 jments in A. H. Layard’s Autobiography and Letters (London, 1903), I, 331 n., and 
 in The Near East, II, 358. 
 
 i 29 Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 5; Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of 
 
 Uhe Rivers Euphrates and Tigris, I, xi. 
 
 f Fontanier, Voyage dans I’Inde, I, 16; Annual Register, Pt. II, 19. 
 
 i 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 164 
 
 of the Euphrates. He insisted that the Expedition should in the 
 first instance proceed down the river, and he finally gained his 
 point.®^ 
 
 Plans were outlined therefore by which the Expedition was to 
 proceed first to Suedia (Seleucia) at the mouth of the Orontes 
 River, which was to serve as a -point de depart. From here the 
 impedimenta of the Expedition would be transported overland 
 past Antioch to the nearest point on the Euphrates, where the 
 steamers would be set up and launched. It was calculated that 
 the melting of snows at the headwaters of the Euphrates would 
 contribute much to the success of the Expedition, and every effort 
 was made to have the steamers ready against the spring flood of 
 1835.®" It was stipulated by the India Board, however, that if 
 the Expedition was unable to cross the Syrian mountains and 
 desert to the Euphrates, the steamers and other material were to 
 be carried by sea to Bombay, whence the Expedition would pro- 
 ceed to the Persian Gulf and so undertake an initial ascent of 
 the river.®® 
 
 The two iron river steamers, appropriately named the 
 Euphrates and the Tigris y were ready early in 1835, and were 
 peculiarly adapted to the work in hand. While they measured 105 
 feet and 87 feet respectively in length, they drew less than three 
 feet of water. To guard against accidents in the rocky channel of 
 the Euphrates, the hulls were divided into several w^ater-tight 
 compartments. The engines were constructed to accommodate 
 either coal or wood as fuel, and their fifty and forty horse-power 
 was considered sufficient to propel them up any rapids likely to be 
 encountered. The two vessels, for facility of transportation, 
 were made up into convenient sections and loaded on an ocean- 
 going vessel, the George Canning, where all stores were packed 
 so as to make transshipment from the Syrian coast to the Euphrates 
 as easy as possible. 
 
 With all at last in readiness, one of the most ambitious path- 
 finding expeditions ever undertaken left Liverpool on February 
 4, 1835, and sailed for the Mediterranean. The George Canning 
 called at Malta for a number of laborers, and touched also at 
 Cyprus, reaching the Bay of Antioch at the mouth of the Orontes 
 on April 3.®^ 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, pp. 60, 61, 63. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XV, N.S., Pt. II, 237—238. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 6; Journal of ths Royal Geographical Society of 
 London, IV, 374, 375. This was Ellenborough’s arrangement. He had insisted on 
 an ascent of the Euphrates being made ever since the Expedition was assured. 
 
 Annual Register, 1835, Pt. II, 19. 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 165 
 
 j It had originally been supposed that the Euphrates and Tigris 
 :ould be transported from the coast across the Syrian desert, some 
 [20 miles, and launched on the Euphrates River in time to take 
 idvantage of the spring freshets in April and May of 1835. To 
 Eis end, an attempt was made to navigate the steamers up the 
 Drontes as far as Antiochd® Immediately after the arrival of the 
 Expedition at Seleucia, Chesney’s engineers began assembling 
 |he Tigris, the smaller of the two vessels. While this was in 
 progress, other materials were landed from the George Canning, 
 iin exceedingly slow and hazardous process. As soon as the Tigris 
 ;vas assembled, her engines were fired and an ascent of the river 
 ^as undertaken. It was soon found that while engines and paddle 
 wheels functioned well, the steamer was incapable of proceeding 
 ;far up the river, both because of the shallow water and the rapid- 
 ity of the current. Consequently the vessel had to be prepared 
 for haulage overland.®® 
 
 j Meanwhile the transport of other machinery and stores to the 
 Euphrates had begun. From the very outset there occurred a 
 heartbreaking series of mishaps and delays, which at times threat- 
 ened to terminate the whole undertaking. One of the greatest 
 [troubles was the unreliability of native workmen. Arab chiefs 
 iwho had definitely engaged to furnish bullocks, camels, or asses, 
 failed to give any assistance, in spite of the liberal hire offered. 
 'Supplies of food bargained for were not delivered. Natives who 
 were employed on one day were often missing on the next — 
 having removed with them sundry stores or bits of machinery 
 [belonging to the Expedition. The most astonishing accidents 
 ioccurred} wagons were overturned, machinery was broken, draft 
 animals were stampeded — all without rime or reason — though 
 the Arabs assisting with the work volubly protested their inno- 
 icence and regret. At times desert sheiks rode in to the scene of 
 ipperations with bands of armed followers to rejoice at the dis- 
 comfiture of the English.®^ Very soon it became obvious that an 
 'Organized system of sabotage was in operation, and that unless it 
 jcould be overcome, the Expedition would never reach the 
 Euphrates. 
 
 j The principal source of these difficulties was presently traced 
 to the activities of Ibrahim Pasha, son and generalissimo of 
 
 Suggestions were made at one time or another during the thirties for a ship 
 ‘Canal between the Euphrates and the Orontes as possibly more practicable than one 
 between the Red Sea and the Nile or Mediterranean, 
 j' Chesney, of. cit., pp. 179—192; Lane-Poole, of. cit., pp. 295 ff. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1837, No. 540, pp. 13-15; Asiatic Journal, XX, N.S., Pt. II, 37; 
 Chesney, of. cit., pp. 172 ff., 469; Lane-Poole, of. cit., pp. 293—295. There are 
 continual hints at Russian collusion in these Syrian troubles, but this may have been 
 largely mere suspicion. 
 
i66 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Mehemet Ali, who was at this time operating with an Egyptian 
 force not far from the scene of the Expedition’s labors in Syria. 
 Partially suspending transport operations, Chesney sent his diplo- 
 matic staff to wait upon Ibrahim and even went in person to 
 demand the support which had previously been promised by 
 Mehemet Ali and the Sultan alike.®* Little satisfaction was ob- 
 tained, however, until after the British authorities had made 
 vigorous representations to Mehemet Ali on the state of affairs 
 in Syria. Then, upon the receipt of new orders from Egypt, 
 Ibrahim changed his attitude and suddenly displayed as much 
 zeal for the cause of steam navigation on the Euphrates as he had 
 formerly shown opposition. He took upon himself the task of 
 coercing the Syrian peasants into lending aid to the transport. 
 But his assistance bore fruit chiefly in his sending out of some 
 Turkish notables from Antioch to assist in roadmaking. This 
 was of course a terrible blow to Turkish pride, and Ibrahim must 
 have taken malicious delight in thus overtly insulting the Sultan, 
 while furnishing a not too effective assistance to the Euphrates 
 Expedition.®® 
 
 By this time many weeks had elapsed^ the Euphrates River 
 was past the flood stage, and still the heavier pieces remained near 
 the port of disembarkation. Furthermore, as spring gave place 
 to Syrian summer, disease came to block activities and to take its 
 toll. Fever and dysentery played havoc with the European force, 
 until at one time the able-bodied were barely able to prevent the 
 complete collapse of the project. In the autumn. Colonel Ches- 
 ney, who had been working at high pitch and doing the labor of 
 several men, was stricken with fever. For weeks he lay at the 
 very point of death. Meanwhile, little more could be done by i 
 his men than to guard the more essential parts of machinery and i 
 supplies from injury and to prepare a yard for the assembling i 
 of the steamers on the Euphrates. 
 
 These and other difficulties combined to extend the work of 
 transporting and assembling the steamers at Fort William, near 
 the Arab town of Bir, from the estimated month to nearly a year. 
 
 On the hostility shown by the river Arabs, see Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., 
 Pt. II, 173, Z37. 
 
 Chesney, of. cit., p. 199; Barker, Syria and Egyft under the last Fi^'e Sultans 
 of Turkey, II, 216, 217; Asiatic Journal, XV, N.S., Pt. II, 94; X^'^III, N.S., Pt. II, 
 26; London Times, 29 Dec., 1835. The motives which prompted Egyptian inter- 
 ferences were probably threefold; (i) fear of being cut off by the British from 
 further conquests to the north, (2) pique at being treated as vassals of the Sultan, 
 and (3) the desire to confine new' commercial routes to Egt'pt, where goods in 
 transit might be made to yield a revenue. Mehemet Ali encouraged British enterprise 
 in developing the Red Sea route in every w'ay, and had already ordered the con- 
 struction of a railway between Alexandria and Suez for British use. Egypt paid 
 for the success of this policy by eventually becoming a British protectorate. 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 167 
 
 The delay naturally involved much additional expense, also 5 but 
 i owing to the peculiar and unexpected nature of the difficulties 
 f which had arisen, the India Office took steps to obtain additional 
 I funds. Sir John Hobhouse, who had succeeded Lord Ellen- 
 borough at the Board of Control early in 1835, was heartily in 
 ' sympathy with the objects of the Expedition. Upon receiving 
 news of Chesney’s illness, he wrote, November 2- 
 
 You may depend upon receiving every support from the 
 home authorities, and as the delay occasioned by the Pasha of 
 Egypt has added to your disbursements, I think it my duty 
 ■ to apply to His Majesty’s Government, as well as to the 
 I Court of Directors, for some addition to the Parliamentary 
 I Grant. . . Whatever may be the result of this enterprise, 
 due justice will be done to your endeavors to ensure its 
 ! success. “ 
 
 j 
 
 I i Shortly after this an additional £5000 was authorized by Parlia- 
 : I ment for the experiment. This and other funds subsequently 
 
 subscribed by the East India Company made possible the con- 
 tinuation of the work and a testing of the route. 
 
 During the spring months of 1836, the transport of the Ex- 
 pedition’s equipment was completed. Following the arrival at 
 I Fort William of the engine boilers, the work of assembling went 
 i on rapidly and preparations were completed for the descent while 
 [: i the river was still at flood stage. The Euphrates was launched 
 q and given a successful trial on March 16. Chesney calculated 
 [ I that Basrah, at the head of the Persian Gulf, should be reached 
 
 I I within two months, and that an ascent of the river with mails 
 : f from India might be made before the river reached its lowest 
 ; I stage. Despatches stating such an intention were sent both to Sir 
 ! ij John Hobhouse, at the Board of Control, and to the Bombay 
 'j Government, so that arrangements might be made in the Medi- 
 terranean, on the one hand, and in Indian waters, on the other, 
 
 ■'I for effecting the quickest possible transport of mails between 
 :j India and England.^^ This was one of the prime objects in 
 q undertaking the survey, and the one which would most readily 
 ■J furnish useful data as to the relative efficiency of the Euphrates 
 [ and Suez routes. 
 
 |j Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 7. A special firman, addressed to Mehemet Ali, 
 
 was issued in December, 1835, by the Sultan, commanding the Pasha to facilitate 
 i British trade in every way possible. — British and. Foreign State Papers, XXIII, 
 
 I 1291-1293. 
 
 Chesney, of, cit., p. 199. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 478, p. 20. 
 
i68 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The Eu'phrates left the temporary base at Fort William soon 
 after her trial trip and proceeded slowly down the great river. 
 She was then joined by the Tigris, which, being the smaller vessel, 
 steamed ahead and acted as pathfinder among the many rocky 
 rapids and sand banks. The technical staff meanwhile made 
 constant soundings, laid down large-scale maps of the river which 
 are still considered of value, and took careful note of conditions 
 along the river banks. At Beles, the point on the river nearest 
 Aleppo, some tentative arrangements were made for a postal 
 station and commercial depot which would be needed when the 
 line should be in full operation. A little further on, at Deir, 
 bitumen and coal in some quantities were found and were tested 
 in the ships’ engines with fair results.^* 
 
 The first part of the survey was made, on the whole, quite 
 successfully. But in the midst of the uneventful and quiet de- 
 scent of the river a disaster occurred, which all but brought the 
 whole enterprise to a sudden tragic end. On the twenty-first of 
 May, about one o’clock on a calm afternoon, a cloud of sand 
 suddenly appeared across the low, flat river valley. Then almost 
 without warning, a cyclonic storm, entirely blotting out the day- 
 light with clouds of whirling sand, swept over the river and 
 enveloped the two steamers which were proceeding with the sur- 
 vey. So entirely unexpected was the storm that no precautionary 
 arrangements could be made. As the wind struck, the two vessels 
 became unmanageable, drifted, and nearly collided. The Eu- 
 'phrates, however, was with difficulty driven in to a bank and made 
 secure. The Tigris barely missed being so fastened, fell off into 
 the stream, turned broadside to the gale, and was overturned and 
 instantly sunk in the midst of the channel. Most of those on 
 board perished, fifteen officers and men and five natives in all, 
 including Lieut. R. B. Lynch of the Bengal Artillery, brother of 
 the second in command of the Expedition. Both Colonel Ches- 
 ney and Lieut. H. B. Lynch were on the Tigris at the time of the 
 wreck, as that vessel had been leading in the survey; but both 
 narrowly escaped by swimming ashore in the almost total dark- 
 ness. After the storm had passed, some time was spent in search- 
 ing for other possible survivors and in taking account of losses. 
 In addition to the irreparable loss of life, some of the maps and 
 
 The Arabs are reported to have been ver^’ much depressed at the si^ht of the 
 armed steamer, recalling their old saying; 
 
 “ When iron floats on the water, 
 
 There is nought for the Arabs but dispersion or slaughter.” 
 
 Chesney, Narrative, pp. 203, 226. 
 
 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 324. Cf. Ne’io York Times Current History, X\TI, 
 931—938. These bitumen springs appear to have been used since ancient times. 
 

 Steamers Euphrates and Tigris on the Euphrates River in 
 
 May 1836 
 
 The Roadstead of Suez about 1840 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 169 
 
 most of the scientific instruments were lost as well.^® As the 
 recovery of the sunken vessel was out of the question, the Eu- 
 phrates was left to continue the survey alone, most of the remnants 
 of the crew of the Tigris returning to England/® 
 
 Although deeply grieved and depressed by this shocking loss, 
 Chesney displayed his characteristic indomitable courage, that 
 quality which, more than any other, fitted him for command. 
 Fearing the effect of the disaster on the continuation of the sur- 
 vey, since the available funds were already nearly exhausted, he 
 wrote in hopeful vein to Sir John Hobhouse: 
 
 The hurricane has been, it is true, a most trying and calam- 
 itous event j but I believe it is regarded by all, even at this 
 early day, as having no more to do with the navigation of 
 the Euphrates, in other respects, than the loss of a packet in 
 the Irish Channel, which might retard, but could not put an 
 end to, the intercourse between England and Ireland. We 
 are therefore continuing our descent . . . hoping ... to 
 bring up the mail from India within the specified time. . 
 
 The determination to continue was heartily approved by the 
 India Board,^® and additional funds were supplied that every 
 effort might be made to carry Indian mails at least once from 
 Basrah to a point opposite one of the Syrian ports on the Medi- 
 terranean. Steam vessels were already waiting at both ends of 
 the Euphrates line, and it remained only for the Expedition to 
 supply the missing link. This continued to be the principal im- 
 mediate object of the survey. 
 
 Most of the lower course of the Euphrates was navigated with 
 somewhat greater expedition than the section between Bir and 
 Anah. All of this portion had been surveyed by Chesney in 1831, 
 but even with this advantage, a great deal of trouble was expe- 
 rienced in passing through the Lemlum marshes. There the 
 river separated into many small tortuous channels, and the main 
 
 A monumental drinking fountain was erected in Bombay by governmental 
 and public subscription soon after the disaster, commemorating those who lost their 
 lives. Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 45. 
 
 London Times, 29 and 30 July, 1836; Asiatic Journal, XX, N.S., Pt. II, 237; 
 XXV, N.S., Pt. II, 98. Attempts to raise the vessel were made later, and although 
 once reported successful, they failed. A part of the iron hull was discovered in a 
 sand bank years later. Cf. “ Report of Mr. William Tartt, Superintending Engineer 
 of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company,” May, 1879, in W. P. 
 Andrew, The Eufhrates Valley Raihvay: a Lecture (1883) pp. 89—90. 
 
 Tarl. Paf., 1837, No. 540, pp. 21—23; Annual Register, 1836, Pt. II, 64 f.; 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 327. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1837, No. 540, p. 10. 
 
170 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 course of the river was often difficult to discover. In many places 
 shore parties had to warp the steamer around sharp bends in the 
 stream. Other delays were due to efforts made in passing to 
 conciliate the numerous and powerful Arab tribes in lower 
 Mesopotamia and to start a bit of traffic in English wares. At 
 some points along the river trading operations were quite success- 
 ful, and Chesney reported to the India Board that they had “ sold 
 and bartered largely with much advantage.” 
 
 As the Expedition approached the head of the Persian Gulf, 
 the friendly overtures of the party were generally not well re- 
 ceived by the Arabs. This was not so much due to prejudice 
 against the innovation of steam navigation, apparently, as it was 
 the result of the machinations of the French Consul at Basrah, 
 M. Victor Fontanier. That wily diplomat had already had much 
 experience in western Asia, having served as special agent of the 
 French Government in the Near East during the years 1821— 
 1829.®“ In 1835 he was again sent out on special mission to dis- 
 cover the ulterior objects of the British Government in organizing 
 the Euphrates Expedition, and to report on British activities gen- 
 erally in western Asia and in India. This commission was per- 
 formed zealously enough, even though he knew none of the 
 native languages and had to rely on interpreters. From the time 
 of the arrival of the Euphrates Expedition in Syria, Fontanier 
 was stationed at Basrah, where he used every means at his com- 
 mand for obstructing the progress of the steam survey. Largely 
 to his efforts was due the increasing hostility of the Arabs toward 
 the English along the lower course of the river. Fontanier even 
 persuaded the Arabs to cut down and throw palm trees into the 
 river at one point, and he had suggested the possibility of stretch- 
 ing a series of iron chains across the river in order to bar the 
 progress of the steam vessel altogether.®" He wrote of the Ex- 
 pedition not long afterward. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1837, No. 540, p. 24. Chesney reported on several occasions that 
 there were good indications of a profitable trade. 
 
 Victor Fontanier, Voyages en Orient, Entrefris far Ordre du Gouvernetmnt I 
 PranQais, de V Annie 1821 a P Annie 1829. . . (2 vols., Paris, 1829). 
 
 Fontanier, Voyage dans Plnde et le Golfe Persiqiie, far PEgyfte et la hi er 
 Rouge. (2 parts in 3 vols., Paris, 1844—1846.) Cf. London Times, 29 Dec., 1835. 
 
 In quoting his instructions and in giving the details of his work, apparently with 
 the approval of the French Foreign Office, Fontanier related facts and incidents of 
 no ordinary delicacy and significance. Whatever may have been the effects of his 
 writings in France, they undoubtedly contributed much to English apprehension of 
 French motives and policies for a number of years. He was evidently convinced that 
 “ This was not a simple voyage of discovery undertaken by love of science or of 
 glory, but a question of the greatest gravity, of which the events of 1S40 were a 
 consequence.” — I, 289. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1837, No. 478, p. 495 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 116; 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 171 
 
 I have studied the details with some care, and though I 
 may know the results it is hoped to attain, I do not think one 
 need flatter himself that it will succeed all at once. . . I do 
 not think an enterprise executed under his [the Duke of 
 Wellington’s] direction could result in taking away, in Asiatic 
 affairs, the advantages to which our geographic position and 
 our anterior relations give us an incontestible right.®® 
 
 In consequence of these difficulties, it was only on June 18 that 
 the Euphrates reached Kurnah, at the junction of the Tigris and 
 Euphrates Rivers. On the following day the Expedition arrived 
 at Basrah, on the Shaat-el-Arab, near the head of the Gulf, 
 where a rousing welcome was given by the little English colony.®* 
 
 Looking toward a rapid descent of the Euphrates River by the 
 Expedition, arrangements had been made during the spring for 
 one of the Indian mails to be brought to Basrah by the Hugh 
 Lindsay y which was to carry back to India the despatches, now old, 
 brought by the Euphrates. Accordingly, the Hugh Lindsay had 
 arrived in the Shaat-el-Arab from Bombay some weeks before 
 the appearance of the Eu'phrateSy bringing out both mails and 
 passengers. But when the Expedition did arrive at last, an over- 
 hauling of the steamer was obviously required before an ascent 
 of the river could be attempted. As this would necessitate fur- 
 ther delay, the commander of the Hugh Lindsay^ already long 
 out of patience, determined to carry his cargo on to Suez, return- 
 ing thence to Bombay for new orders before again proceeding to 
 Basrah. The first Indian mails intended for the new route thus 
 reached Europe by the passage through Egypt or “ overland ” 
 route. 
 
 Proper facilities for the repair of the Euphrates were to be 
 found only at Bushire, on the eastern shore of the Persian Gulf, 
 and there the steamer was taken as quickly as possible. While 
 repairs were in progress, Chesney and a few of his party sailed 
 across the Gulf to Grane, on the Arabian coast, in order to send 
 
 W. F. Ainsworth, Personal Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition (2 vols., London, 
 1888), II, 75, 94—96. C£. Fontanier, Voyage dans I’lnde, I, 295. Fontanier threw 
 
 all the blame for Arab hostility on a fanatical English missionary named Samuel. 
 His polemical literature and rash statements just at the time of the arrival of the 
 Expedition at Basrah probably did give rise to the idea among the Arabs that the 
 British were intending to impose Christianity by force, and the British functionary 
 at Basrah had to compel Samuel to leave, meanwhile publicly burning his literature. 
 
 Fontanier, Voyage dans I’lnde, I, 291—292, 310, 311; Lane-Poole, op. cit., 
 p. 344. Fontanier was treated with uniform consideration and generosity by the 
 British authorities with whom he came in contact, however. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 478, pp. 24, 25; Lane-Poole, op. cit., pp. 327-336. 
 
172 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 despatches to England by the desert route, which had been em- 
 ployed at irregular intervals for about half a century. Chesney 
 hoped by this means partially to neutralize the disappointment 
 arising in England from the many delays and accidents to which 
 the Expedition had been subject. He also considered this a fitting 
 occasion for sending to the India Board a series of reports on the 
 work already accomplished by the survey and on the feasibility 
 of permanently establishing a steam line on the Euphrates. To 
 supplement his own statements, he asked each of his officers for 
 a written, sealed opinion on the advantages of the route being 
 surveyed. 
 
 Most of these reports, reflecting the ideas and wishes of the 
 Commander, spoke in glowing terms of the feasibility of opening 
 a Euphrates steam route. The political advantages of the line 
 were reiterated and the commercial possibilities were reviewed 
 The friendliness of the Arabs was emphasized.'® Only Capt. 
 J. B. B. Estcourt referred pessimistically to the difficulties which 
 the Lemlum marshes afforded. He believed it would be neces- 
 sary to cut a canal for some 23 miles through a section of the 
 marshes before river navigation could be developed in an efficient 
 manner. 
 
 Chesney added his own statement to the others. In this he 
 minimized the difficulties of navigation on the Euphrates, though 
 he thought it might be necessary to cut a short channel through a 
 part of the marsh region. His rather visionary schemes, which 
 tacitly admitted the presence of very real obstacles along the 
 course of the Euphrates, greatly weakened the whole case for the 
 development of the projected route. Nevertheless, in summing 
 up his remarks on the practicability of the Euphrates line, Chesney 
 said, “ It will be admitted, on all hands, that the great river 
 [Euphrates], considering its length, is one of the most navigable 
 in the world.”'® This statement neither he nor. any subsequent 
 navigator of the Euphrates was able to prove. 
 
 The many interruptions suffered by the Expedition during the 
 descent to the Persian Gulf created among Government heads in 
 England the feeling that while the Commander possessed an 
 ample supply of courage and optimism, he was somewhat lacking 
 in that singleness of purpose essential to the accomplishment of a 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 29. In establishing a post at Mohatnnierah for 
 the navigation of the Karun, Chesney enlisted the aid of the sheik of that district 
 by taking him under British protection, although he was in revolt against Turkish 
 authorities. Thus, a convenient precedent was established for the blockade of the 
 Bagdadba/in below Bagdad in similar fashion early in the twentieth century. See 
 Fontanier, Voyage, etc., I, 308. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 26-35. 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 173 
 
 prearranged program. This opinion became a conviction as the 
 reports of the Expedition’s officers were perused and as instruc- 
 tions from England were repeatedly ignored. Instead of con- 
 centrating on an ascent of the Euphrates after reaching the Gulf, 
 on which the verdict of success or failure depended, Chesney 
 decided to widen his operations by making scientific and com- 
 mercial surveys of the other principal rivers finding outlets in the 
 Persian Gulf. As the Euphrates was reconditioned before the 
 arrival of the second Indian mail, a brief survey was made of 
 the lower Karun River, although the hostility of the Arabs made 
 the venture extremely hazardous.” Upon the return to Basrah, 
 Chesney determined to carry some newly-arrived Indian mails up 
 the Tigris to Bagdad, whence they might be sent overland to the 
 Syrian coast. This decision to postpone further the ascent of the 
 Euphrates took no note of the fact that arrangements had just 
 been completed by the India Board at considerable expense to 
 establish a steam link between Malta and the Syrian coast for the 
 express purpose of conveying to England a mail transmitted by 
 the Euphrates line.®® 
 
 The Euphrates arrived at Bagdad on September 30 without 
 particular incident, though considerable time had been lost in the 
 cutting of green firewood along the river banks. Members of 
 the Expedition received a warm reception at the City of the 
 Caliphs, where Major Robert Taylor was still British Resident 
 and where the ruling Pasha was kindly disposed toward British 
 mercantile enterprise.®® Several days were spent here, occupied 
 in fuelling the vessel and discussing the position of the city on the 
 projected Anglo-Indian route in relation to both trade and com- 
 munication. Before returning to Basrah, the Expedition pro- 
 ceeded for a considerable distance farther up the Tigris River 
 surveying and mapping. This and various delays during the 
 descent occupied considerable time, so that it was October 16 
 when the Euphrates again arrived at Kurnah. Here the Hugh 
 Lindsay was found, whose Captain had been very impatiently 
 
 The Arabs of this region, who were claimed both as Turkish and Persian 
 subjects, gave allegiance to neither Government, an attitude productive of frequent 
 hostilities. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 8— ii, 25; “A General Statement of the 
 labors ... of the Expedition to the Euphrates . . . ,” in Journal of the Asiatic 
 Society of Bengal, V, 675—682. 
 
 Major Taylor was a leading advocate of the Euphrates route. His brother 
 had perished in a fray with the Arabs while attempting a survey of the Euphrates 
 in 1830, his son gave testimony in favor of the route before the Parliamentary 
 Committee of 1834, and his daughter married Lieut. H. B. Lynch, of the Euphrates 
 Expedition, in 1838. Taylor owed his influence in Mesopotamia partly to his own 
 family connections, having espoused the daughter of a well-to-do Armenian. 
 
174 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 waiting for a fortnight.®” The opportunity to establish a note- 
 worthy record in the transmission of the mails to England was 
 already lost, but nevertheless preparations were made for an im- 
 mediate ascent of the Euphrates with the belated despatches. 
 
 The first stage of the ascent proceeded well in spite of the low 
 level of the river. Difficulties rapidly multiplied, however, when 
 the Lemlum marshes were reached. Here the steamer had to be 
 towed almost entirely through the narrow, tortuous channels by 
 land parties. But fate ended even this slow progress. On 
 October 30 a faulty air-pump of the Euphrates drew in some river 
 sand and a piston head was broken, thus ending the last hopes that 
 the river might be ascended within the time assigned for the com- 
 pletion of the work. A return to Basrah was imperative. But 
 there was still a chance to get the mails through to the Syrian 
 coast. One of the party, a Mr. James Fitzjames, volunteered to 
 carry them on overland. He, with some of the other passengers 
 who had come out from India, proceeded up the river in a hired 
 native boat, hoping to cross from the upper Euphrates to Aleppo 
 and so to the coast. Hardly had this group passed from the view 
 of those on the steamer when they were attacked by a band of 
 Arabs, utterly despoiled of their belongings including mails and 
 clothing, and threatened with death. After considerable delay 
 they were released. Fitzjames managed to recover the greater 
 portion of the mails and to continue his way by slow stages, being 
 entirely without means. Eventually he reached the coast of Syria 
 and the mails were sent on to England, arriving fully three 
 months later than had been expected.®^ 
 
 Chesney’s original instructions from the India Board directed 
 that after he had once reached Basrah he should consider himself 
 under the direction of the Indian Government. There the direct 
 authority of the Board of Control was to cease and that of the 
 East India Company was to replace it, since it had been arranged 
 that any permanent line of communication between the Persian 
 Gulf and the coast of Syria should be operated by the India 
 authorities. No instructions from. India reached Basrah ahead of 
 the Expedition, however, and Chesney therefore acted on his own 
 responsibility. Following the mishap to the Euphrates at the 
 Lemlum marshes, it was apparent that nothing further of great 
 importance could be accomplished during the few weeks remain- 
 ing of the time allotted to the Expedition. Hence at Basrah, 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXII, N.S., Pt. II, 51 ; Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 40. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 42, 55; Lane-Poole, op. cit., pp. 352-354; 
 Fontanier, op. cit., I, 341—343; Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 116, 261. 
 Fitzjames lost his life with the ill-starred Arctic Expedition under Sir John Franklin. 
 
ATTEMPTS TO OPEN EUPHRATES ROUTE 175 
 
 where the Hugh Lindsay still lingered, Chesney arranged to sail 
 to Bombay to plead at that Presidency for additional time and 
 money for the Euphrates survey. The Euphrates, which was 
 quickly repaired by an engineer of the Hugh Lindsay, was turned 
 over to Captain Estcourt with instructions to employ the time 
 remaining in completing the surveys of the Karun and Tigris 
 Rivers before disbanding the Expedition at Bagdad on January 
 | 3 ij 1837.®" 
 
 Soon after Chesney’s arrival at Bombay, a meeting of the sub- 
 scribers of the Bombay Steam Fund was held to consider his plans 
 for the further development of the Euphrates route. In answer 
 to the objection that the first attempts had not demonstrated the 
 possibility of conveying mails or goods up the Euphrates, Chesney 
 'insisted that the object had not been to open a mail route at once, 
 that it was “ never contemplated, or provided for in any way ” j 
 but that the object had been to determine the navigability and 
 commercial opportunities of the Euphrates, Tigris, and Karun 
 Rivers, all of which had been accomplished.®® The Bombay mer- 
 chants were favorably impressed with Chesney^s account of the 
 commercial possibilities of Mesopotamia, and considered appro- 
 priating £7000 of their steam fund for the permanent establish- 
 ment of two small steamers on the Euphrates, in case other 
 portions of the whole line were developed by British or Indian 
 authorities. 
 
 ' Chesney next approached the Bombay Government with the 
 [suggestion that “ on account of the moral as well as real strength,” 
 the opening of the River Euphrates should be in connection with 
 lithe development of the Red Sea route. He proposed that for 
 I'a period of twelve or eighteen months Indian steamers should 
 sail alternately to Suez and Basrah, at the end of which time 
 experience should determine whether both routes should be per- 
 [manently established.®* The Bombay authorities, while appar- 
 |ently favorably inclined, pleaded lack of authority to act, and 
 preferred the matter to the Supreme Government at Calcutta. 
 Here the scheme was turned down as impracticable. Chesney 
 therefore was compelled to leave India with no more apparent 
 result from his efforts than the gold-mounted sword presented to 
 him by the Bombay merchants.® 
 
 Chesney, Narrative, pp. 322, 329; Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 43—47. 
 Cf. Sir E. A. W. Budge, By Nile and Tigris (2 vols., London, 1920), I, 212. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 45, 297. Cf. Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, 
 jp. II, 12. 
 
 ..(j Ibid., No. 540, pp. 46—47; Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 36. 
 
 jji Chesney, op. cit., pp. 328—331. See Asiatic Journal, XVII, N.S., Pt. II, 276. 
 
 ^ jiVhile Chesney had been engaged with the survey, his enemies, and Thomas Waghorn 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 176 
 
 Meanwhile, the Expedition under Estcourt continued surveys 
 of the Karun and Tigris Rivers until an accident to the rudder of 
 the steamer forced a return to Bagdad. Here, on January 16, 
 1837, the vessel came to rest and the Expedition was officially 
 disbanded. One of the most ironical incidents of the whole sur- 
 vey was the receipt of an order from Bombay, just after the 
 Euphrates had been laid up and her crew discharged, directing 
 that the work of surveying and opening up the Tigris and Eu- 
 phrates Rivers be continued until further notice. This tardy 
 assumption of control by the Bombay Government came too late, 
 however, and several months elapsed before a new force under 
 new auspices could resume the work.®® Most of the disbanded 
 personnel of the original Expedition proceeded overland on 
 camels from Bagdad to Beirut, whence they reached England by 
 way of Malta at the end of May, 1837.®^ The Euphrates^ now 
 transferred to the Indian Government, was not taken to the Indus 
 River, as originally planned, but was left at Bagdad in temporary 
 charge of an English consular agent, Mr. Alexander Hector. 
 This aggressive young man, far from seeing in the dissolution of 
 the Expedition the end of British enterprise in Mesopotamia, 
 saw instead only the commencement. He presently undertook 
 the establishment of a mercantile house in this old commercial 
 entrepot and made a distinct success of it.®® 
 
 Chesney reached England in August, 1837, realizing that the 
 immediate opening of the Euphrates route, at least in the manner 
 he had advocated, was a forlorn hope. His final recommenda- 
 tions to the Board of Control added nothing essential to reports 
 sent back from time to time during the course of the survey.®® 
 His optimism with regard to the Euphrates line was not shared 
 by members of the British and Indian Governments, by the 
 public, or even by several of Chesney’s own officers.'® The lack 
 of enthusiasm arose from the fact that from the original organiza- 
 tion of the Expedition in England in 1834 to the embarkation of 
 
 in particular, had lost no opportunity to undermine the Expedition and the 
 Euphrates Expedition in favor of the Suez passage. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 55-56, 62-63; Ann. Reg., 1S37, Pt. II, 52; 
 Chesney, of. cit., p. 332; Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 357. 
 
 Astatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 72. 
 
 ®® Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, p. 56; Annual Register, 1837, Pt. II, 52 ff.; Layard, 
 Autobiography, I, 331. 
 
 ®® Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 5 1-5 4 i Lane-Poole, op. cit., pp. 3 5 7-3 <53 i 
 Chesney, Expedition for the Survey of the Euphrates and Tigris, II, 600—601, 
 673—686. 
 
 See the statement by Capt. J. B. B. Estcourt in Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, 
 
 p. 61. 
 
SURVEYS OE THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 177 
 
 the survivors at Beirut in 1837 its whole course had been marked 
 by delays, accidents, and disappointments. Of the nineteen 
 officers originally commissioned, only seven were with the Ex- 
 pedition at its close 5 and but thirteen out of the original force of 
 seventy-five Englishmen remained to be disbanded.’^^ Death, 
 
 ( discharge, and special missions had taken a heavy toll. Starting 
 i ’ with high hopes and the confidence of officialdom, it ended in 
 I reproach, disowned alike by the British and Indian Governments. 
 
 The cost of the survey was not one of the least of the charges 
 [ against it. In 1834 Chesney had estimated the probable maxi- 
 i mum expense of the undertaking at £13,000, which was then 
 ; considered a plausible amount by members of the British Cabinet 
 I and others. In order to provide for possible contingencies and 
 j to make possible a thorough experiment unhampered by lack of 
 funds. Parliament and the East India Company appropriated at 
 various times some £30,000. Yet at the breaking up of the Ex- 
 { pedition in January, 1837, experiment had cost more than 
 1 £43,000, exclusive of some £2000 which Chesney had expended 
 ; from his private funds. Y et not one piece of mail from India 
 i had been delivered in England the sooner. In view of these 
 shortcomings, it is not strange that a host of critics lost no oppor- 
 I, tunity of heaping opprobrium on the Euphrates idea and its 
 I principal exponent. 
 
 Nevertheless, the Euphrates Expedition was far from being 
 I the total failure generally believed. From the scientific point of 
 ■' view, it added a great deal of knowledge of the geography of 
 western Asia. The existing commerce along ancient highways 
 ' was computed and future trade opportunities were estimated. 
 j| Strategic locations were considered, together with the political 
 
 ;j.j Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, VII, 41 1, 412; Pari. Pap., 1837, 
 
 b No. 540, pp. 62—66; Asiatic Journal, XXIV, N.S., Pt. I, 237—248; Fontanier, 
 [if; op. cit., I, 294. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 540, pp. 64—66. By various economies, this was 
 I actually reduced to a trifle less than £40,000. Chesney and one of his ofiicers served 
 entirely without pay. Chesney, Narrative, pp. 374—377, Fontanier, op. cit., I, 311. 
 
 A Bombay journal, in sarcastic vein, commented on this in the following 
 “ halting lines ” : — 
 
 “ Let us set up three lines instead of one 
 Ere the Red Sea line has fairly begun; 
 
 Oh ! weep by the waters of Babylon 
 O’er two lakhs spent and still more to pay. 
 
 Besides a few mails that have gone astray.” 
 
 Quoted in James Douglas, Glimpses of Old Bombay and Western India, p. 134. 
 
 James Barber, A Letter to the Right Honourable Sir John Cam Hobhouse, 
 (London, 1837), pp. 5, 6; Capt. Melville Grindlay, A View of the Present State of 
 I the Question as to Steatn Communication with India . . . (London, 1837), p. 10. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 178 
 
 value of routes traversing Syria and Mesopotamia/® A more 
 important result was the reestablishment by the Indian Govern- 
 ment of the dromedary land route from Basrah across the desert 
 regions to Damascus and Beirut. This was designed to serve two 
 of the purposes for which the Euphrates Expedition had been 
 organized, namely, to keep a hand on the general political situa- 
 tion in Asiatic Turkey and in Persia, where war was looming up, 
 and to develop lines which might be used for the rapid transmis- 
 sion of important despatches between Bombay and London, 
 should the route through Egypt be closed for any reason. Before 
 1840 the eastern terminus of the line had been shifted from 
 Basrah to Mohammerah, whence a fast fortnightly service to the 
 Mediterranean via Bagdad and Damascus was maintained in spite 
 of plundering Arabs. 
 
 The principal count that can be brought against the Euphrates 
 survey lies in the fact that it postponed for a time the develop- 
 ment of a route the utility of which had already been proved 
 and which was badly needed — that by way of Egypt and the 
 Red Sea. But even this suspension of activity was of brief dura- 
 tion. Following the long delays in 1835 and 1836 in getting the 
 survey of the Euphrates River actually under way, governmental 
 attention quickly reverted to the Red Sea line which lacked only 
 a sufficient quota of ocean steamships and an arrangement with the 
 Viceroy of Egypt to be made effective. New steamships for the 
 Red Sea line were put under construction in 1836, and by the end 
 of the Euphrates Expedition they were almost ready for service. 
 On June 10, 1837, another Select Committee of the House of 
 Commons was authorized, “ to inquire into the best Means of 
 establishing a Communication by Steam with India by way of the 
 Red Sea.” ” Evidence presented before the new Committee 
 practically ignored the Euphrates surveys and the revived drome- 
 dary post road through Mesopotamia as well. All matters per- 
 taining to the use or development of lines extending between 
 Syria and the Persian Gulf were left to the East India Company 
 and the Indian Presidencies. 
 
 The report of the Committee of 1837', given in on July 15, 
 did little more than sanction arrangements which were already 
 well under way for the inauguration of a new steam service be- 
 tween Bombay and Suez. It ran, in part, as follows; 
 
 Cf. Geographical Journal, XLI (1913), 246-248. 
 
 Bombay Courier, 3 Jan., 1837; Asiatic Jourjial, XXt^II, N.S., Pt. II, 159, 
 294—5; Fontanier, Voyage dans VInde, I, 309, 310, passim; Rev. Horatio Southgate, 
 Narrative of a Tour through Armenia, Kurdistayi, Persia, and Mesopotamia . . . 
 (2 vols.. New York, 1840), II, 188-189. The communication between Bagdad and 
 India remained somewhat irregular, depending chiefly upon the arrival of steamers 
 in the Persian Gulf, while it was kept up at deflnite intervals with Beirut and 
 Constantinople. ” Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, p. iv. 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE 179 
 
 Your Committee have learned with much gratification 
 that arrangements have been entered into between Her 
 Majesty’s Government and the East India Company for the 
 establishment of a Monthly Communication by Steam from 
 Suez to Bombay, and they hail with satisfaction the liberal 
 spirit in which the Court of Directors have met the proposi- 
 tions of Her Majesty’s Government for thus affording a 
 direct intercourse with one portion of the continent of India, 
 and facilitating a communication for Letters with all the 
 Presidencies. 
 
 Inasmuch as ... a direct communication by Steam from 
 the Red Sea to Ceylon, Madras and Bengal, would be prac- 
 ticable at all seasons of the year by the employment of 
 vessels of adequate tonnage and power; and as, under judi- 
 cious arrangements, such extended establishments would 
 appear to offer a prospect of an adequate return for the 
 increased outlay, by the conveyance of Passengers, and of 
 some valuable articles of Merchandize, which cannot be ex- 
 pected from the limited communication with Bombay alone; 
 Your Committee feel bound to recommend a continued and 
 zealous attention to the subject on the part of Her Majesty’s 
 Government and the East India Company. . 
 
 This recommendation was fully carried out while the political 
 situation in western Asia and in Egypt was most unsatisfactory. 
 
 The Euphrates Expedition as originally constituted broke up 
 at a rather critical moment. The political motives which gave 
 Parliamentary support to the steam survey in 1834 were stronger 
 than ever in 1837.^® In view of the avowed designs of Russia 
 and of France, of lukewarmness in Turkey and open opposition 
 in Egypt, Persia, and Afghanistan, and of war clouds looming up 
 in far-off China, British officialdom was loath to terminate all 
 national enterprise in Asiatic Turkey.®" The attempts of the 
 Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, M. Boutenieff, to have 
 British commercial privileges in Mesopotamia cancelled added 
 much to British firmness. This wily Russian diplomat at one 
 time appeared to be making some real headway with his protests 
 
 Ibid., p. iii. 
 
 British and Foreign State Papers, XXIII, 864; XXV, 1247, 1253, 1275; 
 Asiatic Journal, XXII, N.S., Pt. I, 231; Fontanier, of..cit., II, 206 ff.; Journal of 
 the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, V, 297—305; Ross, Opinions of the European Press 
 on the Eastern Question, pp. 410—435, passim. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1841, Nos. [322.], [304.], [323.]; Capt. John Hall, England 
 and the Orleans Monarchy, Ch. 7. 
 
i8o 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 against the firman of 1834.®^ It was the expressed British view 
 that “ Mesopotamia may yet become the soil on wTich the 
 dominion of the East is to be disputed.” So, in spite of the : 
 decision of the Supreme Government of India not to support i 
 Chesney’s recommendations for steam navigation on the Eu- 
 phrates, the Board of Control late in 1836 authorized the Bombay 
 Presidency to carry on the work of river navigation until it was 
 adjudged altogether impracticable, which meant until the political 
 horizon had cleared. 
 
 There is reason to believe that the India authorities welcomed 
 the opportunity to continue the river surveys under a commander 
 more tractable, obedient, and attentive to the imperial cause than 1 
 Colonel Chesney had been. A more acceptable officer was found 1 
 in Lieut. Henry Blosse Lynch. After the dissolution of the 
 Euphrates Expedition, he had been placed in charge of that section 
 of the new Bombay postal line between Bagdad and Damascus, ■ 
 where he had been very successful in having mails transmitted i 
 on schedule time.®® Since he was better acquainted with the Ian- 1 
 guages and mannerisms of the peoples of Mesopotamia and 
 Syria than perhaps any other available person, he was selected by 1 
 the Bombay authorities as commander of a new force, styled 
 “ The Expedition to the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers.” Lynch 
 thereupon assumed command of the Euphrates steamer, pending 1 
 the arrival of some new, light-draught river steamers, which the i 
 Company was having constructed in England. 
 
 The next two years were devoted largely to the completion of : 
 the surveys of the River Tigris, data being collected at all seasons ' 
 of the year. These surveys covered the entire course of the river 
 from Armenia to the Persian Gulf, adding considerably to the 1 
 knowledge of the river and its drainage basin. Considerable 
 attention was given during this work to commercial prospects, 
 which were subsequently exploited by British enterprise.®^ At 
 the same time, this series of river surveys reaffirmed the political 
 value of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys and added appreciably 
 to British influence in that part of Asia throughout the rest of the 
 century.®® 
 
 During the new series of surveys the Euphrates River was 
 again approached from the Persian Gulf. The first attempt to | 
 ascend the river in 1836 had resulted in failure due to the j 
 
 Ainsworth, of. cit., II, 198. Asiatic Journal, III, 3d Ser., 77. j 
 
 Low, History of the Indian Navy, II, 43. Ihid., p. 44. I 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1837-1838, No. 356, p. 6; Jouriial of the Royal Geog. Soc. of : 
 London, IX, 441, 442; J. R. Wellsted, Travels to the City of the Caliphs, along the j 
 Shores of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean (2 vols., London, 1840), I, 104— i 
 106. See the statement in A. H. Layard, Nineveh and Babylon, p. 474. 
 
SURVEYS OF THE EUPHRATES ROUTE i8i 
 
 Lemlum marshes. But in May, 1838, Capt. John C. Hawkins, 
 I.N., in command of the Eu-phrates and with a crew from the 
 Indian Navy’s armed cruiser Clive ^ succeeded in passing the 
 marshes after six days of unremitting toil. The river above was 
 ascended without much difficulty to a point about five hundred 
 miles from Basrah, though the nature of the obstacles encoun- 
 tered made the establishment of a regular steam line on the 
 Euphrates appear, as it had earlier, clearly out of the question.®® 
 Early in 1839, the Court of Directors sent out to the Persian 
 Gulf three iron river steamers, designed further to establish 
 British influence in Mesopotamia and to make trial of the Arab 
 trade. These were made up in sections in England, loaded on 
 sailing vessels, and despatched as secretly as possible round the 
 Cape of Good Hope to Basrah.®’^ Several months were required 
 to assemble and launch the vessels, and they were not employed 
 until the next year. The spring of 1 840, however, saw a flotilla 
 of four steamers bearing British colors on the Shaat-el-Arab. 
 These were the Assyria^ Nitocrisy Nimrody and the now decrepit 
 Euphrates. The ablest officers of the Indian Navy were selected 
 to man the vessels, upon whose exploits rested much of British 
 reputation in the Middle East. Besides Lieut. H. B. Lynch, 
 there were Lieut. C. D. Campbell, Lieut. Felix Jones, Lieut. 
 H. W. Grounds, and Lieut. Michael W. Lynch, joined later by 
 Capt. W. S. Selby, all of whom acquired enviable records for the 
 performance of difficult enterprises.®® 
 
 Most of the year 1840, a year in which war between Britain 
 and France over Syria seemed more than likely, was given over 
 to the periodic navigation of the Tigris from Basrah to Bagdad 
 with mails, goods, and passengers.®® New surveys were resumed 
 in 1841. Capt. Selby made an examination of the Karun River 
 as far as Shuster, including its branches and tributaries.®® The 
 Euphrates River was also ascended for a thousand miles by two 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 277-278; Low, of. cit., II, 43. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 72; Low, of. cit., II, 45. 
 
 H. F. B. Lynch, Arjnenia: Travels and Studies (2 vols., London, 1901), II, 
 440; Budge, By Nile and Tigris, I, 224; Low, of. cit., II, 33—35, 45; Chesney, 
 Narrative, pp. 547—548. Lieut. H. B. Lynch was invalided to England in July, 
 1840, and his brother, Lieut. Michael W. Lynch, died at Diarbekr, on his way to 
 England, in 1841. A third brother had perished on the ill-fated Tigris. Capt. 
 Selby was badly wounded by Arabs in June, 1841, from the effects of which he 
 died after reaching England. The mortality among the pioneers of British im- 
 perialism was exceedingly heavy. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1840, No. [323.], Pt. II, 299-300. During the height of the 
 war feeling, Lieut. Lynch transmitted bulletins on the numbers of armed forces in 
 Arabia, which had considerable influence on the policy of the British Foreign Office. 
 
 P. M. Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia . . . (London, 1902), p. 246; 
 Low, of. cit., II, 47; Layard, Autohiografhy, II, 10; Clive Bingham, A Ride 
 
i82 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 of the steamers under Lieut. Campbell, but although the ascent 
 was made successfully at the time of the spring freshets, the de- 
 scent, which was delayed until autumn for political reasons, was 
 marred by several serious accidents.®^ 
 
 These later surveys were almost altogether ignored, both by 
 the British Government and the Government of India. After 
 the several upheavals which ushered in the forties, the Near and 
 Middle East rapidly subsided into relative quiescence, and the 
 presence of armed steamers on the rivers of Mesopotamia for 
 moral purposes was no longer necessary.®® These supplementary 
 surveys, however, constitute the bond of union between the at- 
 tempts to open a through highway between England and India 
 by the original Euphrates Expedition and projects for a British- 
 controlled railway line through the Euphrates Valley, which were 
 very much in evidence in 1856 and 1857. 
 
 In 1842 the Expedition for the Survey of the Euphrates and 
 Tigris Rivers was formally ended. Pursuant to orders from the 
 Court of Directors, three of the river steamers were withdrawn 
 from Mesopotamia, and were transported, with their officers and 
 crews, to the Indus River by the new and powerful steamer 
 SemiramiSy which was otherwise engaged in operating the Suez 
 line. It is of some interest to observe that Lieut. Felix Jones, 
 with the NitocriSy remained behind to protect British interests at 
 Bagdad and to continue the exploration of the country between 
 the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers as opportunity offered. Such 
 surveys were continued, as a matter of fact, by the “ Surveyor of 
 Mesopotamia,” until the Indian Navy was abolished in 1863, the 
 naval steam forces in the region of the Persian Gulf being aug- 
 mented as political conditions in Persia and neighboring countries 
 demanded.®® 
 
 Through Western Asia (zd ed., London, 1897), pp. 159, 160. Selby, who was 
 badly wounded in an affair with the Arabs near Bagdad in June, 1841, gives his 
 own account of the survey in the Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, XIV, 
 219—246. A. H. Layard, who became prominent years later in diplomatic work, was 
 a member of this surveying party. See his Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and 
 Babylonia ... (2 vols., London, 1887), II, 341—366. 
 
 Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society, VI, 169—186; Chesney, 
 Expedition, etc., II, 699—706; Asiatic Journal, XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 241; 
 
 Barker, op. cit., II, 244—245; HertslePs Com. Treat., XIII, 839. 
 
 Budge, op. cit., I, 212; Morning Chronicle, 10 Aug., 1841; Chesney, Nar- 
 rative, p. 558; Richard Coke, Baghdad: the City of Peace (London, 1927), pp. 
 270—271 . 
 
 Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, XVIII, i— 19; Low, op. cit., II, 
 49, 50; Layard, Autobiography, II, 10; Quarterly Revievo, CII (1857), 3^7 
 an accurate account) ; “ Lettre du Grand Vizier au Pacha de Bagdad, relative a la 
 Navigation de I’Euphrate et du Tigre par les Bateaux a Vapeur Anglais, le 2 Avril, 
 1846,” in Hertslet’s Com. Treat., XIII, 839, 840. The work of Lieut. Jones was 
 later supplemented by that of A. C. Holland, commahding the new armed steamer 
 Co?net, stationed in the Persian Gulf primarily for moral reasons. 
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 O F THE many surveys made along the routes to India 
 in the nineteenth century, that of the original Euphrates 
 Expedition was doubtless the most spectacular. In 
 some respects, however, it was not the most important. Scientific 
 information had been collected and geographical and commercial 
 conditions had been noted, but no practicable line of communica- 
 tion had been opened up by the Expedition. The surveys which 
 were more resultful to this end and which contributed most di- 
 rectly to the opening of new lines of transit were those conducted 
 by the members of the naval force attached to the Bombay Presi- 
 dency, which was known during most of its history as the Bombay 
 Marine. 
 
 The origin of this unique service dates from the earliest days 
 of the East India Company’s activities. At the very outset all 
 vessels of the Company were heavily armed and no discrimination 
 was made among them for naval duty. But in 1612 a marine 
 establishment was created, principally for the purpose of pro- 
 tecting the Company’s Indian factories from the Portuguese, and 
 this laid the foundation for a separate naval force later on.’ Soon 
 after the acquisition of the Island of Bombay, all of the Com- 
 pany’s naval forces in the East were centred at this strategic 
 port, and the Bombay Government retained control of the Marine 
 until its final dissolution on April 30, 1863.^ During this long 
 period the character of the work assigned to the Marine varied 
 greatly from time to time as conditions in eastern waters changed 
 and the interests of the Company fluctuated, but throughout its 
 
 ^ Low, History of the Indian Navy, I, i6; 'Parliamentary Paper, 1852—1853, 
 No. 627, p. 145. Low was one of the officers of the Indian Navy who outlived the 
 establishment and was later entrusted with writing- its history from such papers as 
 remained in the archives of the Company. Most of the early records were destroyed 
 at the time of the abolition of the service. 
 
 ^ Low, op. cit., I, 54 ff., II, 569—571 ; Asiatic Journal, III, N.S., Pt. II, 86. On 
 I May, 1830, the official name of the service was changed from “ Bombay Marine ” 
 to “ Indian Navy.” 
 
 183 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 184 
 
 history it remained one of the leading features of the Company’s 
 organization in staking out, protecting, and developing the 
 Empire of India. 
 
 Upon this Service fell the duty of protecting both European 
 and Indian merchant shipping in the East from enemies and from 
 the swarms of pirates which had flourished in those waters for 
 many centuries. Coupled with this was the task of suppressing, 
 as far as possible, the trade in slaves, which had long been a lead- 
 ing activity of the Mohammedan peoples inhabiting the regions 
 around the Arabian Sea. Also the excluding of European inter- 
 lopers from Indian waters was a large item in the routine work 
 of the Marine.^ The conditions, both moral and physical, under 
 which these duties were performed produced by sheer process of 
 elimination a magnificent marine force while the territories be- 
 longing to the Company were still few and scattered. The 
 strenuous nature of the work also produced a set of traditions 
 such as always attach to an organization performing difficult tasks 
 in a courageous manner. Even the Royal Navy could show no 
 greater spirit of loyalty or devotion to duty than the Bombay 
 Marine, although the exploits of the latter were never widely 
 known in the mother country. The Company did not make a 
 practice of lauding its servants, and these carried on their work in 
 regions so remote and so little known that their exploits rarely 
 attracted attention. Outside of the Company’s own sphere, little 
 notice was given the fact that during the wars of the eighteenth 
 century the Marine furnished able assistance on many occasions 
 in eliminating the French from Indian waters.^ Bare mention is 
 made in English chronicles of the part played by this force in the 
 undoing of Napoleon Bonaparte in Egypt by convoying Indian 
 troops to Egypt, cutting off access to India by sea, and by estab- 
 lishing offensive and defensive positions. It was by these and 
 other performances that the units of the Service pacified the 
 eastern seas, made them into highways of trade and communica- 
 tion, and eventually rendered themselves no longer necessary. 
 
 Not nearly all of the work performed by the Bombay Marine 
 in promoting the Company’s interests was military or naval in 
 character. During the eighteenth century it became a scientific 
 as well as a fighting Service, and it was in this connection that 
 the Marine contributed most to the linking up of England and 
 India. As early as 1772 scientific surveys of the coasts of India, 
 the adjacent coasts of Persia and Arabia, and some of the island 
 
 ^ Pari. Pap., 1852-1853, No. 627, p. 145, evidence given by James Cosmo 
 Melvill before a Select Committee of the House of Lords. 
 
 ^ Low recounts many such incidents. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 185 
 
 groups in the Indian Ocean were undertaken by the Government 
 of India and carried out by the marine officers of the Bombay 
 Presidency.® These surveys, which had as their purpose not 
 merely the collection of data to be entered on sailing charts but 
 information concerning the lands and peoples proximate to the 
 Indian Ocean as well, were carried on steadily until the wars with 
 revolutionary France interrupted them. After the ending of the 
 French menace in Egypt and the illusory Peace of Amiens, they 
 were recommenced in 1804 carried on until almost every 
 mile of the shore line between India and Africa had been laid 
 down on accurate, large-scale maps and the commercial poten- 
 tialities of the countries adjacent estimated.® 
 
 Before the opening of the nineteenth century, all surveys had 
 been more or less casual since their object was to reduce the dan- 
 gers of navigation. .The Napoleonic Expedition to Egypt in 
 1798 and the presence of French troops in that country for some 
 years thereafter suggested the need for more detailed informa- 
 tion concerning the shores of the Red Sea. Besides, the great 
 increase in navigation during the late eighteenth century made it 
 imperative that additional knowledge be obtained and more ac- 
 curate charts be made of extensive sections of coast bounding the 
 Arabian Sea which had not been delineated before. 
 
 In 1803, therefore, the Governor-General of India, Lord 
 Wellesley, authorized the sending of the vessels of the Marine 
 to explore the Red Sea. This survey was entrusted at his own 
 request to George, Viscount Valentia, who had gone out to India 
 in 1802. It was his purpose to sail up the African shore of the 
 Red Sea, for he “ felt it as a national reflection, that a coast which 
 had afforded a profitable and extensive trade in gold, ivory, and 
 pearls, to the sovereigns of Egypt, should be a perfect blank in 
 our charts.” ^ This voyage was made in the Antelope, a vessel of 
 the Bombay Marine commanded by a Captain Keys, but while 
 the mouth of the Red Sea and adjacent ports were examined at 
 some length, the expedition failed to accomplish much because 
 of a feud which developed between Lord Valentia and the Cap- 
 tain. The survey was therefore abruptly broken off.® It was 
 continued in December, 1804, by the cruiser Panther. Some 
 progress was made at intervals until 1806, by which time the 
 situation in Egypt appeared no longer to call for such expensive 
 precautionary measures. There was little trade at this time be- 
 
 ® Low, of cit., I, 185. 
 
 ® Ibid., I, Ch. XII; Pari. Paf., 1852—1853, No. 627, p. 146. 
 
 ^ George, Viscount Valentia, Voyages and Travels, II, 4. 
 
 * Lord Valentia has given in great detail the account of the voyage and its 
 difficulties in his Voyages and Travels, II, 7-85. 
 
i86 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 tween India and Red Sea ports, that of the eighteenth century 
 having largely fallen off.® 
 
 Soon after the surveys of the Red Sea had been begun, the 
 many and obvious advantages to be obtained from a more thor- 
 ough knowledge of the Indian Seas and the countries beyond 
 them led to the creation of a new and important post in the Indian 
 Administration, that of Marine Surveyor-General. Surveys of 
 Indian waters did not begin to assume a very important character, 
 however, until the appointment of Capt. Daniel Ross as Marine 
 Surveyor-General in 1823. In the decade which his service cov- 
 ered, he justly earned the title of “ Father of Indian Surveys,” 
 and through his far-sighted and careful administration of his 
 duties he laid British interests throughout the East under per- 
 manent obligation.^® 
 
 In 1828 Sir John Malcolm, Governor of Bombay, determined 
 to undertake a series of experimental voyages with the object of 
 establishing a permanent steam communication between Bombay 
 and Suez. This program necessitated a new inspection of head- 
 lands, channels, and way stations, as well as the allocation of suit- 
 able fuel depots for the proposed steamers, one of which was then 
 being constructed at Bombay. In order to provide more readily 
 the facilities needed for steam communication, the Marine force 
 was partially reorganized and transformed. The new arrange- 
 ment made both officers and enlisted men liable for any kind of 
 duty either on the standard armed sailing vessels of the Alarine 
 or on the steam vessels about to be added. This change w^as 
 exceedingly unpopular with the Marine force, whose traditions 
 were intimately bound up with the handling of stanch sailing ships. 
 The liability of service on the small, unsightly, and noisy steamers 
 of the time, complicated in manipulation, foul with soot and dust 
 from burning a low grade of coal, and very limited in radius of 
 action, was considered a deep humiliation. Nevertheless, in no 
 great time, the steam arm of the Marine greatly widened its 
 usefulness and contributed much to the growth of British hegem- 
 ony throughout the East. 
 
 This change in the functions of the Service w^as followed by an 
 appropriate change in name. From May i, 1830, the Marine was 
 officially designated the Indian Navy, an appelladon earned by 
 more than two centuries of distinguished service. Much of the 
 
 ® See the “Progress of Maritime Surveys,” in the Journal of the Asiatic Society 
 of Bengal, I, 327. 
 
 Sir Clements R. Markham, A Memoir on the Indian Surveys (2d ed., London, 
 1878), pp. 8-10. 
 
 Low, of. cit., I, 532. Cf. Pari. Paf., 1900, [Cd. 131], “Final Report of 
 the Royal Commission on the .-Idministration of the Expenditure of India,” pp. 
 1 14— 1 19. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 187 
 
 lij 
 
 Ij Navy’s work after this date consisted not merely in the charting 
 ! of maritime channels and coast lines, but in the “ pacification ” of 
 ,1 maritime native states and the acquisition of ports and coaling 
 ' stations by other means than purchase or negotiation. For these 
 phases of the development of new lines of communication the 
 I Indian Navy was well adapted. 
 
 The program of land and marine surveys inaugurated in 1828 
 occupied the attention of the Indian Navy for nearly a generation 
 and made possible the development of regular steam lines cover- 
 I ing long distances in eastern seas before there was any comparable 
 service in European waters. The first step in developing these 
 lines was taken with the despatching of Commander Robert 
 Moresby to explore the group of small islands off the Malabar 
 coast of India known as the Laccadives. Here in this myriad of 
 islands it was thought good harbors might be found offering pro- 
 tection, fresh water, and suitable coaling stations for steamers en 
 route from Calcutta or Madras to the Persian Gulf or Red Sea. 
 Careful investigation failed to disclose any such promising loca- 
 1 tions, however, and this island group, extending from 10° to 14° 
 North Latitude, was thereafter almost totally neglected.’^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Sir John Malcolm was completing his plans for a 
 steam line from Bombay to Suez. Under his instructions a steam 
 vessel was put under construction in one of the Bombay shipyards, 
 ■j This vessel, built of India teak and fitted with engines and boilers 
 j| from England, and christened the Hugh hindsay^ was ready for 
 S service in 1829. In order to test the plan of making regular 
 voyages to Suez it was necessary that coal depots be established 
 s and navigation charts of the Red Sea be prepared as rapidly as 
 ' possible. Early in 1829, Commander Moresby was withdrawn 
 from his survey of the Laccadives and was despatched from Bom- 
 L'! bay in the armed cruiser T hetis to “ determine the best course at 
 li all seasons for steamers proceeding from Suez.” This was a 
 Iji large order, considering the difficulties inherent in the Red Sea, 
 Ij and the survey could not be entirely completed for several years. 
 r The expedition, consisting of the Thetis and a brig consort 
 i| carrying a supply of coal, set out in due time for the Red Sea. 
 
 While new navigation maps were being prepared, supplies of coal 
 j were deposited at various ports in the Red Sea and at Suez.’^^ On 
 ! the return voyage to India, the brig was wrecked and lost on an 
 
 J. Stanley Gardiner, in The Oxford Survey of the British Efnpire (Ed. by 
 A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Howarth), (London, 1914)) (Asia), Chap. 9, 
 j passim. Commander Moresby was the brother of the Admiral of the British fleet. 
 Sir Fairfax Moresby. 
 
 Low, op. cit., II, 68—69; Asiatic Journal^ XXVIII, O. S., 339, 622. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, O.S., 339, 506, 759. See the India Gazette, 5 March, 
 and the Bengal Chronicle, 12 March, 1829. 
 
 I 
 
i88 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 uncharted island in the Red Sea, which untoward incident had 
 the effect of hastening plans for a complete survey and charting 
 of that long body of water. Immediately upon the return of the 
 Thetis to Bombay in March, 1830, a more effective surveying 
 expedition was formed. Moresby was commissioned to chart the 
 northern half of the Sea from Suez to Jeddah in the Palinurus, 
 while one of his fellow officers, Capt. Elwon, was ordered to per- 
 form a similar task for the southern half in the Benares, both 
 vessels being detached from the usual duties of the Marine for 
 this purpose.^® With some intermissions, the triangulation sur- 
 vey thus begun was continued for four years, every part of the 
 Sea being carefully explored. The personnel of this expedition 
 consisted largely of carefully selected young officers from the 
 Bombay Marine, who found in this enterprise a valuable school 
 of experience. Almost all who survived the exceedingly trying 
 conditions under which the work was carried on distinguished 
 themselves later in the cause of steam communication.^® 
 
 The survey of the Red Sea was followed by careful chartings 
 of the southern coasts of Arabia, including some of the neigh- 
 boring island groups. Especial attention was given to the Island 
 of Socotra, which was considered by the Bombay Government as 
 affording a logical place for the establishment of coal and water 
 depots on the steam line to Suez.^^ The survey of Socotra was 
 entrusted to Commander Stafford B. Haines, who terminated his 
 work in less than a year chiefly because of the protests of the 
 Sultan of Fartash, one of the Arab chieftains of the mainland, 
 who exercised authority over the island. But such an attitude was 
 not permitted long to interfere with plans for steam communica- 
 tion. Capt. Daniel Ross was immediately sent out to negotiate 
 with the Sultan and his relatives, with the object of securing for 
 the Indian Government the right of landing coal and supplies at 
 one or more of the harbors on the island. Capt. Ross, by a judi- 
 cious use of persuasion and determination, succeeded in obtaining 
 an Agreement whereby the British were accorded the desired 
 
 During the work of the International Scientific Commission in 1S55, “it 
 was found that all the charts hitherto published of the roadstead of Suez were 
 inaccurate with the exception of that by Commander Moresby, published in 1837.” 
 New Facts and Figures Relating to the Isthsnus of Suess Canal, by Barthelmy St. 
 Hilaire (Ed. by F. de Lesseps), p. 9. 
 
 Low, of. cit., II, 70-72; Markham, of. cit., p. 15. Several of these men I 
 lived to see the end of the Service to w'hich they had devoted their lives. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, Min. of Ev., p. 10; Low, of. cit., II, 75. In 
 April, 1835, the Hugh Lindsay touched at Socotra for the first time en route from 
 Suez to Bombay with mails from England which had been brought to Alexandria i 
 in the steamer African belonging to the British Admiralty. This line of com- 
 munications was in definite, though not regular, operation by this time. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 189 
 
 1 rights/® Immediately after the departure of Capt. Ross, how- 
 ever, vessels of the Indian Navy experienced difficulty in securing 
 ; the promised privileges at Socotra, and it became evident that the 
 j Arabs had little intention of fulfilling their promises. In order 
 I to settle the matter effectually, Commander Haines was supplied 
 with the sum of 10,000 German crowns for the purchase of the 
 island, while in anticipation of success ” a small fleet and force 
 of marines was made ready to occupy the island after the purchase 
 [had been consummated.^® This force reached Socotra in 1835, 
 
 1; where Haines lost no time in opening negotiations with the Sultan, 
 
 ; who was at that moment on the island. Even in view of the 
 [ imposing force brought from India, the Sultan doggedly refused 
 j; to sell the island or any part of it. This emergency had been 
 |[ anticipated, however, and the marine force which had been sent 
 out ostensibly to take peaceable and lawful possession of Socotra 
 proceeded to occupy its strategic positions without leave. 
 
 The British occupation of the island was of short duration. 
 
 I The harbors, having shallow and dangerous bars, were all found 
 I to be unsuited to the needs of steam vessels. The water supply 
 I was insufficient both in quantity and quality for European troops 
 !i or passing vessels. But the decisive factor was that of disease. 
 
 ; Immediately after the occupation began, fevers and other ills 
 [ attacked the force of occupation with such virulence that in a short 
 I time only a small number of marines remained fit for active duty. 
 
 I In November, 1835, Socotra was evacuated by the British force, 
 which returned to Bombay, each of the transports having the 
 I character of a hospital ship.^^ 
 
 This practically ended the serious consideration of Socotra as a 
 major base of operations in the development of steam transit. 
 
 [ The island was mentioned for several years as being capable of 
 : development, but in the meantime better posts had been found. 
 
 , C. U. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties, Engagements and, Sunnuds Relating 
 
 \ to India and Neighbouring Countries, VII, 189. The text of the Agreement is 
 given on page 191. See the Asiatic Journal, XVI, N.S., Pt. II, 10, containing an 
 ' item from the India Gazette, 15 July, 1834. 
 
 Aitchison, of. cit., VII, 189. 
 
 This action became the subject of a good deal of controversy within a few 
 years, it being insisted in some quarters that Haines had not exhausted peaceful 
 measures when the armed occupation was determined upon. Haines gives his own 
 version in a “ Memoir of the South and East Coast of Arabia,” in the Journal of 
 the Royal Geografhical Society of London, XV, 104—160. See Asiatic Journal, 
 XVII, N. S., Pt. II, 22. 
 
 ' Asiatic Journal, XX, N.S., Pt. II, 90, an account based on an item in the 
 
 ! Bombay Courier of 2 Nov., 1835. Aitchison says (^of. cit., VII, 189) that the troops 
 ■, were withdrawn because of the failure of the negotiations for the purchase of the 
 island. There appears to be little doubt, however, that the occupation would have 
 !, been permanent, as was that of Aden a few years later, had the island offered the 
 '■ proper facilities for steam vessels. 
 
190 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Socotra was largely ignored thereafter until late in the century, 
 when the possibility of the seizure and fortification of the island 
 by a European enemy became so great that the island could no 
 longer be safely left alone. In 1 876, following British overtures, 
 the then Sultan bound himself and his heirs never to cede or lease 
 the island to any but the British, and in 1886 it was declared 
 under protection, “ largely owing to the piratical tendencies of 
 its inhabitants.” 
 
 While Socotra was being surveyed, the Persian Gulf w'as re- 
 examined. The first survey had been commenced in 1820 under 
 Capt. Guy in the Discovery and Capt. Brucks in the Psyche. 
 Capt. Guy soon retired, but the survey under Brucks and others 
 lasted almost ten years.^"* The Euphrates Expedition and the 
 possibility of opening a line of communications between India 
 and England through Mesopotamia gave new point to the inspec- 
 tion of the Gulf and the Shaat-el-Arab. At the same time, the 
 Maidive Islands, a numerous group extending between 7° North 
 Latitude and 1° South Latitude were scientifically examined by 
 Capt. Robert Moresby and his subordinates."^ Also the Kuria 
 Muria group were surveyed and charted. Likewise attempts 
 were made at the behest of the Supreme Government at Calcutta ■ 
 to find a navigable channel between Ceylon and the Indian main- 
 land, but this was without success. A passage had to be blasted 
 through Adam’s Bridge, the natural barrier reef, years later.^® 
 
 In 1837 and 1838, Lieut. Carless of the Indian Navy surveyed i 
 Kurrachee and much of the adjacent coast, a work which was im- | 
 mediately of practical value in connection with British operations i 
 against Persia.^® Simultaneously, land parties, detached for j 
 special service from the Navy, were engaged in spying out the j 
 interior of Turkish Arabia and southern Persia. The Arab tribes I 
 inhabiting these maritime districts had long before become ob- I 
 jects of concern to the Indian Government through their plun- I 
 
 Aitchison, of. cit., VII, 189; Gardiner in The Oxford. Survey of the British 1 
 Emfire, II, 335. It is quite probable that the protectorate was declared, not so 
 much because of piracy, which had largely been stamped out long before, as because ; 
 of the rapidly developing German habit of appropriating such eastern lands and 
 islands as were not already under European control. Socotra is still nominally 
 ruled by an Arab Sultan. 
 
 Markham, of. cit., pp. 12—13. 
 
 Lieuts. Young and Christopher, “ Memoir on the Inhabitants of the Maidive 
 Islands,” in the Journal of the Bombay Geografhical Society, I, 54 ff. 
 
 Markham, of. cit., pp. 16—18; Pari. Paf., 1862, No. 266 “Report of the 
 Select Committee appointed to inquire into . . . the practicability of Shortening 
 the Voyage to Her Majesty’s Possessions in Madras, Bengal, and Burmah, by 
 facilitating the Passage through the Obstruction known as Adam’s Bridge, and 
 thereby avoiding the Circumnavigation of Ceylon.” 
 
 Markham, of. cit., pp. 20—22. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 191 
 
 dering propensities, and as far as naval strength was concerned 
 their power had already been broken. These land surveys had as 
 ■ their immediate objects the gathering of both geographical and 
 political information, while commercial possibilities always came 
 in for careful investigation.^^ 
 
 While British Indian surveys were in progress during the 
 thirties, the western part of the Arabian peninsula was being sub- 
 : jected by the troops of the Pasha of Egypt, Mehemet Ali. This 
 i was the first step in that plan of aggrandizement which was to 
 
 i I bring him into open conflict with his liege, the Sultan, and to 
 ^ provoke a dangerous European crisis at the end of the decade.^® 
 ( Fear of Egyptian prowess was so general throughout Arabia 
 
 during these years that it is probable that Englishmen, represent- 
 [ ing a country reputed to be opposed to the schemes of Mehemet 
 I Ali, were suffered to pass in safety through parts of western Asia 
 [ which would normally have been closed to them. At the same 
 il time, it would be difficult to overestimate the hazards incurred 
 i. by those intrepid officers, who, singly or in pairs, penetrated into 
 tj practically every part of western Asia within the span of a few 
 years and gave the world the first definite information of the 
 h' geography and inhabitants of these regions.^® The objects of 
 
 ii these exploits were ostensibly scientific j yet the importance at- 
 11' tached to such missions by the Indian and British Governments 
 I and the expense and labor involved in carrying them out throws 
 
 I much light on their ulterior purposes. 
 
 Several of the surveys on the mainland carried on under the 
 auspices of the Indian Navy have already been alluded to.®“ 
 Messrs. Elliott and Bowater were engaged in exploring the Tigris 
 River until the tragic death of the latter near Mosul in 1830. 
 
 I Elliott was then presently attached to the Mesopotamian survey 
 ! under Lieut. Henry Ormsby, and the investigation of the lower 
 [j Tigris was continued for some time.®^ The Euphrates Expedition 
 under Col. Chesney and his successor, Lieut. H. Blosse Lynch, 
 
 ’ The account of the many negotiations with Arab tribes is perhaps given best 
 
 ' in Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds. It is not difficult 
 to trace the British occupation of Egypt and the partial partition of Persia and 
 ! Syria to the growth of the same interests which first prompted maritime and land 
 ' surveys and the extension of the fax Britannica in the regions touched by the 
 1 1 Arabian Sea. 
 
 I 28 yisiatic Journal, XXII, N.S., Pt. II, 22. 
 
 ; 29 Q Hogarth, The Penetration of Arabia, pp. 104 ff. ; G. F. Sadlier, 
 
 ij Diary of a Journey across Arabia (Bombay, 1866). 
 
 2® See above, pp. 151, 181—182. 
 
 2^ “ Note Accompanying a Survey of the Tigris between Ctesiphon and Mosul,” 
 in the Journal of the Royal Geog. Soc. of London, IX, 441 ff. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 1 
 
 192 
 
 gave occupation to several members of the Indian Navy/^ Mean- 
 while, Lieut. James Wellsted investigated the interior of Arabia 
 from the coast of Hadramaut to Palestine, studying the habits of 
 different Arab groups and carrying to them the intimations of i 
 British power.®® 
 
 But these ventures were not confined to the countries of western 
 Asia nor exclusively to members of the Bombay Marine or Indian 
 Navy. Interest in the countries immediately beyond the “ gates ” 
 of India, stimulated by Russian moves in that direction, led to 
 investigations there. Lieut. John Wood, I.N., devoted the 
 greater part of two years to the penetration of the w'ild and un- 
 known mountain region to the north of India, the only written 
 account of which was ascribed to the Venetian traveller and mer- 
 chant of the thirteenth century, Marco Polo.®^ Lieut. Arthur 
 Conolly, who was attached to the Company’s military forces 
 rather than to the Navy, pushed through the passes leading from 
 India into Afghanistan and Persia, pursuing his adventurous 
 travels even into the confines of Russia.®® That he emerged 
 unscathed seems almost miraculous in view of the enormous 
 hazards encountered. His work was materially supplemented by 
 the dauntless Sir Alexander Burnes in Afghanistan at a critical 
 moment in the relations between that wild frontier state and the 
 Indian Government.®® Burnes was one of the early victims of 
 the hostilities which broke out soon after the completion of his 
 work and which he had done everything in his power to avert. 
 Still others, acting under orders or as private adventurers, dis- 
 appeared into the mountains and deserts and for months or years 
 were lost to view. Indeed, some of them never emerged again, 
 and the manner of their fate was only to be guessed by the rumors ! 
 which, sometimes years afterward, drifted across the mountain 1 
 barriers into Indian frontier settlements. 
 
 In this manner, the sphere of British dominion centring in 
 
 Lieut. H. Blosse Lynch, “ Memoir of the River Euphrates . . in the 
 Journal of the Bombay Geog. Soc., IV, 169 ff. 
 
 James R. Wellsted, Travels to the City of the Califhs, along the Shores of 
 the Persian Gulf and. the Mediterranean ... (2 vols., London, 1840) ; Pari. Pap., 
 1837, No. 539, pp. 32-35. 
 
 iLieut. John Wood, A Personal Narrative of a Journey to the Source of the 
 River Oxus . . . in the Years 1836, 1837 and 1S38 (London, 1841). 
 
 Lieut. Arthur Conolly, Journey to the North of India, through Russia, Persia 
 and Afghanistan. (2d ed., rev., 2 vols., London, 1838). 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes, Cabool: being a Personal Narrative of a Journey to 
 and Residence in that City, in the Years 1836, 1S37 and 1838 . . . (London, 1842). 
 
 See also his Travels in Bokhara . . . and Narrative of a Voyage on the Indus from 
 the Sea to Lahore ... in the years 1831, 1832 arid 1833 (London, 1834); J. W. 
 Kaye, Lives of Indian Officers, Illustrative of the History of the Civil and Military 
 Services of India (2 vols., London, 1867), II, 7 ff.; Asiatic Journal, XX\’', N.S., 
 
 Pt. II, 23. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 193 
 
 India insidiously widened its scope and took cognizance of political 
 !i and geographical relationships that communications and commer- 
 I cial interests might be protected and extended. These missions 
 of British officers seldom deceived those among whom they were 
 made. That long travels should be undertaken for purely scien- 
 tific reasons in countries difficult of access and exceedingly dan- 
 gerous to traverse was inconceivable to the cynical oriental, not so 
 much because his conception of science was so meagre as because 
 his knowledge of human nature was so profound. Proffers of 
 commercial advantages were little more convincing, if more 
 reasonable 5 for trade on a considerable scale was obviously out 
 ! of the question where roads did not exist or where there was little 
 ; to exchange. Besides, did not all British travellers bring official 
 documents sealed with the marks of Government, and did not 
 ! that argue an official — probably a political — interest in the work 
 |i of such agents? It is not to be wondered at that several of those 
 !: who ventured beyond the confines of the British raj were treated 
 :i as spies and were killed or plundered or enslaved or imprisoned. 
 
 I The characteristic attitude of the peoples of western Asia toward 
 1 the English is well illustrated by the words of an old Arab sheik, 
 i' who frankly said to one of the members of Chesney’s Euphrates 
 'i Expedition, “ The English are like ants; if one finds a bit of meat, 
 
 ! a hundred follow.” 
 
 The series of surveys carried on by men belonging to the Naval, 
 
 I: Military, and Civil Services in India ended rather abruptly in 
 1838 due to an unusual combination of fortuitous circumstances. 
 The military and civil sections of the Indian Government were 
 i suddenly compelled to devote their whole energies to a series of 
 ‘ eastern wars which lasted for a considerable period. However, 
 the termination of the surveys came too late seriously to injure 
 f their practical benefits. Already they had been so successful in 
 ' demonstrating the practicability of steam lines between Indian 
 ports and Suez that by 1838 the line was in fairly regular use.®* 
 Steam lines and changes in eastern conditions led the Court of 
 Directors in 1838 to adopt a new policy for the whole of the 
 Indian Navy. The Service was to be placed on the basis of steam 
 , rather than sails, and to be devoted primarily to the transporta- 
 tion of mails and passengers on the line to Europe.®® To make 
 ' this change effective, the Superintendent of the Indian Navy was 
 ; instructed to publish an Order, which read in part as follows : 
 
 I: W. F. Ainsworth, Narrative of the Eufhrates Expedition, II, 197. 
 
 j Low, of. cit., II, 50—52. 
 
 |: Farl. Pap., 1852—1853, No. 627, p. 146. 
 
 t 
 
 i' 
 
 '! 
 
} 
 
 194 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The conveyance of mails for packet service being provided 
 for, the remaining purposes which the Indian Navy would 
 be required for are, against an enemy in case of war, for the 
 transport of troops, stores, and treasure, the protection of 
 the trade from piracy, and for surveying j and . . . w'e 
 have no doubt that all these objects would be attained more 
 effectually by steam than by sailing vessels, [and] it is our 
 intention to effect the arrangement with the least possible 
 delay. . 
 
 An entire new set of regulations was issued at the same time, 
 completely transforming the old Navy into a mixed Service and 
 destroying at one blow a host of dearly cherished traditions.^ 
 Almost simultaneously the office of Marine Surveyor-General 
 was abolished and a new Steam Department created under the 
 Bombay Government. It was evident at once that in the Indian 
 Navy the emphasis was to be placed thereafter on transporting 
 mails and passengers rather than in conducting scientific surveys 
 or in policing the southern shores of Asia, although these remained j 
 contingent duties. There can be little doubt that these alterations j 
 in the Navy were amply justified by the importance to which \ 
 steam navigation had risen, but they were bitterly opposed by | 
 almost the entire force of officers and enlisted men who felt them- i 
 selves disgraced and insulted by the nature of their new duties.'*" ! 
 Many proud spirits preferred to withdraw from the Service rather i 
 than to endure what they considered dishonor. Most of the abler i 
 officers remained, however, and although they found their new i 
 work in many respects distasteful, they did it so effectively that ] 
 their reputations suffered not at all. 
 
 One feature of the change was the retirement of Sir Charles 
 Malcolm, brother of the erstwTile Governor of Bombay, from 
 his post as Superintendent of the Indian Navy. During his ten 
 years of service. Sir Charles had devoted his energies mainly to 
 the realization of the program of steam communication formu- 
 lated by his influential brother, and in retiring he w^as able to 
 consider his cherished task largely accomplished.^® His successor, 
 Capt. Robert Oliver, was a strict utilitarian and without regard 
 for many of the enterprises performed by the Navy' w'hich, how'- 
 
 Low, of. cit., II, 59. 
 
 In 1862 the Indian Navy ceased entirely to exist as a separate organization. 
 
 Douglas, Glimpses of Old Bombay and Western India, p. 140; Asiatic Journal, 
 XXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 320. 
 
 43 It was a fortunate coincidence that the British Admiral in the Mediterranean 
 during those years was another brother. Sir Pultene5’ IMalcolm, whose hearty co- 
 operation did much to secure the establishment of a steam link between Alexandria 
 and Malta, thereby making effective the steam line to Suez. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 195 
 
 I ever glorious or scientific, had been exceedingly costly. His 
 I policy, therefore, was to cut down expenses and to put the Navy, 
 
 I as far as possible, on a paying basis. This was another bitter pill 
 ! to the personnel of the Service, who felt that they were being 
 I compelled to turn merchant. Plans for materially reducing the 
 
 * personnel and even for demoting some of the officers were pre- 
 I vented by the outbreak of hostilities in several quarters about the 
 I same time, and such measures as looked toward the emasculation 
 I of the Navy were postponed. 
 
 ; The changes made at Bombay in 1838 interrupted little pros- 
 . pecting work of importance, for the purposes of the several 
 1 surveys both on sea and land had already largely been accom- 
 I plished. Western Asia was no longer a closed book, a region of 
 ^ conjecture, known only through the writings of the ancients. 
 
 I Within a decade a gap of some fifteen hundred years had been 
 ! bridged by the enterprise and intrepidity of a handful of men. 
 j The results of this work are not easily estimated. It is certain, 
 
 I however, that the surveys largely contributed to the other factors 
 
 • operating at the same time — improved means of communication 
 ' and transportation, rapid growth of European populations, in- 
 1 creasing commercial needs — to bring those countries constituting 
 ! the “ corridor ” to India definitely into European politics. No 
 ; longer might temperamental Mohammedan peoples plunder each 
 I other or lightly engage in civil dissension without exciting the ap- 
 I prehension and perhaps provoking the intervention of European 
 I states, each jealous lest the other thereby derive some advantage.*® 
 I Thenceforward, western Asia was to be the scene of such conten- 
 f tion among Britain, France, and Russia that their foreign policies 
 ' must be studied largely in terms of eastern interests. At the 
 ' beginning of the nineteenth century, Turkey and Persia were 
 f generally looked upon and treated as independent powers of some 
 , importance. By 1 840, they had practically become the wards of 
 ' the great powers of Europe and retained their nominal indepen- 
 ? dence, as they do still, largely because of European rivalries. 
 
 I Before the Red Sea line of communications with Europe could 
 j be considered as established, as numerous trials had shown, a safe 
 i and convenient way station was required between Suez and India 
 I in which steam vessels might refuel, make minor repairs and find 
 I a haven in all cases of emergency. Socotra had at one time been 
 
 f Markham, of. cit., pp. 23, 24, fassim. The surveys interrupted in 1838 
 
 j were resumed at intervals later. Since the creation of the Marine Survey Depart- 
 ment of the Government of India in 1875 they have been practically continuous. 
 
 Aitchison, of. cit., VII, 73—75, 146— 163; Pari. Paf., 1839, ^^8, pp. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 196 
 
 looked upon as the logical base for lines running either to Bombay 
 or to Calcutta, but the brief occupation in 1835 had shown the 
 island to be lacldng in several essentials. The Island of Perim, at 
 the Straits of Babelmandeb in the mouth of the Red Sea, had been 
 found at the beginning of the century too barren and disease- 
 ridden to be of the slightest use in connection with the navigation 
 of the Red Sea.^® The Maldives and Laccadives had been found 
 deficient in harbor facilities, while the thousands of coral reefs in 
 both groups of islands efFectually discouraged navigation in their 
 vicinity. The ports of Mocha and Jedda in the Red Sea, while 
 capable of development, were not well situated for intermediate 
 supply stations, and commercial opportunities alone did not war- 
 rant the expenditures which would be necessary for harbor de- 
 velopment in either case, even if political complications could be 
 avoided. 
 
 Aden was the sole remaining port along the otherwise in- 
 hospitable coast of Arabia which appeared to give promise of 
 suitable accommodations for a growing steam service. As early 
 as 1829 the Bombay Government had secured permission from 
 the local Sultan to land coal on an island in the harbor of Aden 
 for the first voyage of the Hugh Lindsay. Native labor was hard 
 to obtain, however, and when the steamer had arrived on her first 
 trip it required six days to place on board 180 tons of coal. 
 Largely for this reason, Aden was avoided for several years there- 
 after, although the Sultan gave evidence of being well disposed 
 toward the English, hoping to secure their assistance against some 
 of his Arab enemies. Commander S. B. Haines, w'ho visited 
 Aden in 1835 in connection with one of his surveys, w'as struck 
 with the natural advantages of the place, its commodious, well- 
 protected harbor, the ease with which it could be fortified, the 
 quantity and excellence of the fresh w^ater supply, as well as the 
 cordiality of the native population.^' These matters he brought 
 to the attention of the Bombay Government upon his return to 
 India, and his report went far toward directing attention to Aden 
 as perhaps the most promising location for a steam supply base. 
 
 A timely “ incident,” which occurred in 1837, seemed to offer 
 an unusual opportunity for the acquisition of Aden as a supply 
 base upon favorable terms. In January of that year, an Indian 
 
 Gardiner, in the Oxford, Survey of the British Empire, II, 324—345. British 
 authorities did not consider it worth while to extend any formal control over the 
 island, in fact, until 1852, when, with a concession for the construction of a Suez 
 Canal in French hands, it was considered wise to annex the island. 
 
 Low, op. cit., II, 1 16. An excellent account of the natural advantages of 
 Aden is one by Prof. J. Stanley Gardiner, in The Oxford Survey of the British 
 Empire, II, 331—334. Cf. The Indian Year Book: a Statistical and Historical 
 Annual of the Indian Empire (London, 1924), pp. 128, 129. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 197 
 
 trading vessel named the Doria Dowlnt, belonging to the Nawab 
 of Madras and sailing under English colors, went aground in the 
 night time near Aden. The vessel carried a rich cargo, valued at 
 more than £20,000.^® On the following day, parties of desert 
 Bedouins from Aden came on board the vessel, insulted and mis- 
 treated the passengers, several of whom were women, and plun- 
 dered the vessel of every bit of property which could be removed. 
 The passengers, being without boats, were left to shift for them- 
 selves. After a day or so, some of them contrived to build a raft 
 upon which they reached the shore, only to be further mistreated 
 and stripped of all clothing. A few of the passengers who had 
 an interest in the vessel presently managed to obtain passage in 
 another Indian trader to Mocha, where they reported the affair 
 to the Company’s native agent. He, however, made light of the 
 affair, and, handing out a few small sums as alms, dismissed the 
 case. However, two vessels of the Indian Navy chanced pres- 
 ently to put in at Mocha, and the agent of the Nawab of Madras, 
 one of the survivors of the wreck, reported the whole affair to 
 the officers of these vessels. Thus the matter was shortly trans- 
 mitted to Bombay. 
 
 Such occurrences as this were not so rare in Arabian Waters as 
 to cause particular comment among Government officials in India. 
 A great many similar cases were on record, though because of the 
 activity of the Indian Navy they had been growing less and less 
 frequent. Since the Bombay Government had long before as- 
 sumed a moral jurisdiction in such cases, and especially since the 
 plundered vessel had sailed under English colors, the line of 
 action pursued by the authorities was that prescribed by numerous 
 precedents, and for the time being no unusual importance was 
 attached to the case. 
 
 After a preliminary investigation of the affair, Capt. Haines, 
 who had lately been engaged in surveying in Arabian waters, was 
 despatched to Aden to pursue the matter and to demand an ex- 
 planation from the Sultan of the Abdalee Arabs, in whose domain 
 the offense was committed. Capt. Haines made a careful exam- 
 ination of the situation and made a report of more than passing 
 interest. In it he stated that there was every reason to believe 
 that the Doria Dowlut had come to grief as a result of a conspiracy 
 between the officers of the vessel and the Sultan of Lahej, chief 
 of the Abdalees, whereby the ship had purposely been wrecked 
 in the neighborhood of Aden, the conspirators sharing in the sale 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1839, No. 268, “Correspondence Relating to Aden,” pp. 5—7. 
 The name of the wrecked vessel is given in some accounts as the Deria Dowlet. 
 Low (II, 1 16) says the vessel belonged to a niece of the Nawab of the Carnatic 
 (Madras) . 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 198 
 
 of the plunder. It developed that those who removed the cargo 
 from the stranded vessel were in the employ of the Sultan, and 
 the Sultan’s son had been among them. Capt. Haines found 
 much of the plunder still exposed for sale by the agent of the 
 Sultan in the markets of Aden. The Sultan, being asked for an 
 explanation, sent word from his capital at Lahej, a few miles 
 inland, that he knew nothing of the matter and assumed no 
 responsibility. This was the situation laid before the Bombay 
 Government in July, 1837. 
 
 There is nothing to suggest that until this time the Indian 
 authorities had considered the possibility of using the plunder of 
 the Doria Dowlut as a means of advancing British interests. 
 However, at a time when one of the principal topics of interest 
 in all of the Indian Presidencies was the establishment of an 
 adequate steam communication with the home country, and at a 
 moment when two new steamers, lately arrived from England, 
 were actually being groomed for the Suez line with no adequate 
 way station yet in view, the suggestion could scarcely be avoided 
 that perhaps the time was opportune for the acquisition of a naval 
 and supply base at Aden, which was the most advantageous loca- 
 tion yet discovered between Suez and Bombay for such a purpose. 
 The first hint that any action of unusual character might be taken 
 is contained in a memorandum by the Secretary of the Bombay 
 Government, dated August 7, 1837. It says: 
 
 In consequence of the very serious outrage committed 
 against the people and passengers on board the Doria Do’-jolut, 
 a ship belonging, it is said, to the Nawab of the Carnatic, and 
 sailing under British colours, by the Sultan of Aden, it will 
 probably be requisite for this Government to take strong 
 measures for exacting reparation.^® 
 
 The plan as further matured is contained in a minute of the 
 Governor of Bombay, Sir Robert Grant, dated September 23. 
 This statement, which represented the views of all those con- 
 nected with the Bombay Government and which was presendy 
 approved by both the Supreme Indian Government and the Court 
 of Directors in London, ran, in part, as follows: 
 
 The establishment of a monthly communication by steam 
 with the Red Sea, and the formation of a flotilla of armed 
 steamers, renders it absolutely necessary that we should have 
 a station of our own on the coast of Arabia, as we have in the 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1839, No. 268, p. 10. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 199 
 
 Persian Gulf j and the insult which has been offered to the 
 British flag by the Sultan of Aden, has led me to inquiries 
 which leave no doubt on my mind that we should take pos- 
 session of the port of Aden. 
 
 I shall make a short summary of the advantages which 
 Aden offers as a depot for coals, and as a naval and commer- 
 cial station. 
 
 Cape Aden is a high rocky promontory, almost an island, 
 the communication with the main [land] being only by a nar- 
 row strip of land, which is nearly covered at high-water 
 spring-tides, and which a single work and a few men could 
 maintain against any attack. The village of Aden is situated 
 on the eastern shore, and is surrounded by an amphitheatre of 
 lofty mountains, open to attack from the sea at only one spot, 
 on which a small fort might be required. Opposite to, and 
 commanding, the town of Aden is an island, 1,200 yards 
 long by 700 broad, and 400 feet high, upon which barracks 
 could be built for a detachment of troops. . , The water of 
 Aden is good, and the climate healthy. 
 
 The harbour of Aden is excellent, and ruins of great ex- 
 tent prove that it was once a mart of great importance. It 
 might again, under good management, be made the port of 
 export of coffee, gums and spices of Arabia, and the channel 
 through which the produce of England and India might be 
 spread through the rich provinces of Yemen and Hadhar- 
 el-mout. The trade with the African coast would also be 
 thrown into the Aden market. 
 
 As a coal depot, no place on the coast is so advantageous; 
 it divides the distance between Bombay and Suez, and 
 steamers may run into Back Bay during the night and unload 
 at all seasons in perfect security. 
 
 Before the will of the Court of Directors on the matter of 
 using coercion in obtaining a foothold at Aden had reached India, 
 the Supreme Government authorized the Government of Bombay 
 to proceed with measures designed, first, to secure reparation for 
 the plunder of the Doria Dowlut^ and in the second place, to 
 secure the harbor and town of Aden, or at least a coaling base, by 
 
 Ibid., pp. 18, 19. The Supreme Government wrote that it was of the opinion 
 “ that satisfaction should, in the first instance, be demanded of the Sultan of Aden 
 for this outrage. If it be granted, some amicable arrangement may be made with 
 him for the occupation of this port as a depot for coals, and harbour for shelter. 
 If it be refused, the further measures may be considered.” It is pretty evident that 
 by October, 1837, Indian authorities were determined upon securing Aden in one 
 way or another. 
 
200 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 purchase. Capt. Haines was selected for this important mission I 
 as the man best acquainted with the situation both by reason of his i 
 knowledge of the site of Aden and of the susceptibilities of the 
 individuals with whom he would have to deal. 
 
 Capt. Haines was despatched in the sloop-of-war Coote at the i 
 end of the year 1837. Upon arriving at Aden, a formal demand ■ 
 was made for what remained of the property of the Doria Dovolut , 
 and money compensation for that portion which had been sold. 
 After some delay, these demands were complied with. Such . 
 articles as still remained in the markets were given up, and Sultan , 
 M. Houssain ben Fudthel very reluctantly gave his bond for 1 
 4191 dollars more, the estimated value of the remainder of the 1 
 cargo. His willingness thus to make amends came from two \ 
 sources, the certainty that his coast would be blockaded by the ( 
 English should he not comply, and his fear of the Egyptian troops ^ 
 of Mehemet Ali, who, under Ibrahim Pasha, had already overrun 4 
 and conquered a large part of Arabia and were at this time not 
 far from Aden.®® 
 
 The preliminary matter satisfactorily ended, Haines sent pres- 
 ents, accompanied by complimentary notes, to the Sultan and i] 
 some of his relatives, by way of approaching the more important a 
 proposition. The formal statement of the willingness of the 
 Government of India to purchase Aden and the points imme- 9 
 diately about it was delivered on January 1 1, 1838, and occasioned i| 
 quite a sensation among the Abdalee chiefs. The first reaction 
 to the proposal was not unfavorable, and a number of amicable { 
 discussions ensued, both orally and by correspondence. The chief ‘ 
 fear of the old Sultan appeared to be that, once he had given up 1 
 his sole port and concluded the negotiation to the satisfaction of ; 
 the English, he would thereafter be ignored and left at the mercy : 
 of his Arab neighbors. Capt. Haines attempted to quiet his mis- ' 
 givings by presenting to him the draft of a treaty such as would, 
 in all likelihood, be ratified by the Indian Government. This 
 document provided that, in return for a full cession of Aden, the ! 
 Sultan would be paid a sum to be agreed upon, and would be 
 permitted to reside in Aden, to trade through the port in his own 
 vessels duty free, that he and his family would be treated as 
 
 Pari. Pap., No. 268, pp. 20, 27, 36; Low, op. at., II, 116, 117; Aitchison, 
 op. cit., VII, 122. The original demand was for the payment of 12,000 dollars or 
 its equivalent in goods. The “ dollar ” referred to was the rial or German crown, 
 with a value of about 1 5 shillings. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 39, 83; ibid., XXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 35; 
 Low, op. cit., II, 1 17. The Egyptian situation also throws some light on the prompt 1 
 action of the Indian authorities, who foresaw complications with Egypt, and possibly ^ 
 with Turkey, should Aden be taken by Ibrahim Pasha before the English had 4 
 established a claim. See John Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy, pp. 232-233. | 
 
f PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 201 
 
 fl . . 
 
 I ] became their stations, and that the Mohammedan faith would be 
 considered on a parity with Christianity.®^ The Sultan asked that 
 i he also be taken under British protection, by which he doubtless 
 anticipated an opportunity to prey on his neighbors with impunity, 
 but Haines pointed out that any such engagements would be made 
 !j separately and only after the Sultan had agreed to the transfer 
 of Aden. 
 
 Being threatened on the one side by Egyptian forces together 
 with some of the neighboring Arab tribes, and on the other 
 pressed for an early settlement by Capt. Haines, the Sultan, 
 whose will and determination were not of the strongest, finally 
 ^ agreed to the transfer. The documents which were given to this 
 end, however, in keeping with Arab character and the doubts and 
 i fears of the Sultan, were somewhat vague and irregular, probably 
 designed to admit of loose interpretation should the Sultan choose 
 to alter his decision later. The formal transfer of Aden rested 
 I on two papers, dated January 22, 1838.'^ The first of these was 
 ; a letter, bearing the Sultan’s seal, but lacking some of the essen- 
 I tials of a conclusive agreement. This letter, about which there 
 i! has been much controversy, ran thus: 
 i, 
 
 i The Sultan of Aden to Captain Haines. . . You wrote 
 I on the subject of Aden; my support and dependence is upon 
 ^ it. My neighbours from east, north, and west obtain money 
 I from me, and my dependence for the same is from Aden, 
 j Between us a conversation passed, and we arranged the 
 final answer for two months, or in March. I promised it in 
 I two months; and you in the interim go to Bombay and in- 
 
 ,1 form your Government, and I will have a council of my 
 
 :! chiefs and explain to them. When we have both completed 
 
 jl it, and you return in March, you can then make houses or 
 
 ! forts or do what you like; the town will then be yours; but 
 
 II consider the money I have to give my neighbors from it, so 
 
 I that when the town is yours, you must answer them all. 
 ji If when you are in the town, people come to fight you, 
 either by sea or land, I am not answerable, you must answer 
 '! and please all. All this which I have written depends upon 
 
 ; you. When the town is yours, give me half the custom 
 
 fl duties for food. After your return in March, we will meet 
 
 [ Pari. Pap., 1839, No. 268, pp. 23—25, 29. 
 
 I Ibid., pp. 29, 30; Aitchison, op. cit., VII, 122. The date as given by Low 
 
 I (op. cit., II, 1 17), 23 Jan., is incorrect, having been taken from a collection of 
 treaties (the Bombay Book of Treaties, edited by Thomas Hughes, pp. 282-283), 
 I in which the date is erroneously given. See Asiatic Journal, XXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 35; 
 t XXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 39. 
 
202 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 and arrange 5 if you will not give me half the duties, give 
 me pay, either by the month or year, as you please 5 but let 
 my name be respected, and my orders extend over my own 
 people, and yours over yours. You return in March and 
 settle it. 
 
 If you do not come between these months, and the Turks 
 come and take the whole country by strength from me, or 
 any other people, you must not blame me. In March I look 
 only for you, for no other gentleman, but for you. Com- 
 mander Haines.®® 
 
 This letter, being sealed, might have been accepted as suffi- 
 ciently binding and inclusive, even though the terms of transfer 
 were not specified definitely. However, it was accompanied by 
 an explanatory note, which not only cast much light on one or tw'o 
 clauses in the transfer, but appeared to make the deed unaccept- 
 able. This note was dictated to Haines’ interpreter, and said, 
 in part: 
 
 You swear by the Bible, the house of the Sultan M. 
 Houssein and his descendants shall be theirs, and that my 
 orders shall extend over my people, and that my houses, and 
 the guns I have in Aden, are to be mine; every other thing 
 to belong to the English. My orders are to be over my 
 people, and the Jews, and the Arabs; and whatever orders 
 I give them they must obey, and my other subjects to be 
 mine, but Aden to belong to the British.®® 
 
 Capt. Haines instantly replied that it was inconceivable that 
 two regimes might exist in Aden side by side, and he pointed out 
 that only British authority might prevail once the transfer became 
 effective. He regretted that the sealed letter did not answer the 
 requirements of a deed. “ You say you will transfer Aden to the 
 British,” he wrote, “ and that we may commence building forts, 
 houses, etc., and do as we think proper; but such an inconsistent 
 course the Government would not carry into effect. They rnust 
 have the transfer, and money for the same arranged, and con- 
 cluded under your seal.” 
 
 This translation is the one prepared by Haines and forwarded to the Bombay | 
 Government with the original. j 
 
 Pari. Pap.y 1839, No. 268, p. 30. 1 
 
 Ibid., p. 30. Victor Fontanier, French agent in the Nearer East during | 
 these years, quotes Maj. Felix, private secretary of Sir Robert Grant, as satdng ^ 
 that he (the Governor of Bombay) recommended that British motives in attempting ^ 
 to secure Aden be not discussed, “ since it might cause jealousy among the French.” | 
 — Voyag'e dans PInde, II, 168. i 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 203 
 
 Again pressed to name his terms for the sale of Aden, the 
 Sultan tentatively proposed through the interpreter that an an- 
 nual subsidy of 50,000 dollars be paid him. Haines replied that 
 this amount was out of the question, the whole of the customs of 
 Aden being not more than 6000 or 7000 dollars per year. The 
 Sultan finally sent word through his son that he was willing to 
 conclude the agreement for an annual stipend of 8700 dollars, 
 an amount quite within the range of Haines’ power to offer. 
 Plans were then made for the drawing up of the final documents 
 on January 28 in the town of Aden. On the morning of that 
 day, Capt. Haines was about to go ashore from the Coote when 
 he was warned from the shore by his interpreter not to land, as 
 treachery was afoot. It appeared presently that the Sultan, in- 
 fluenced by some of his relatives, had determined to seize Haines, 
 regain possession of both the sealed letter and the bond of resti- 
 tution for the Dorm Dowlut^ and break off relations with the 
 English altogether. Having obtained sufficient proofs of the 
 plot, Haines sent a final warning to the Sultan, and sailed for 
 Bombay.®® 
 
 With his arrival in India, the whole question of the justifica- 
 tion and the expediency of occupying Aden, by force, if necessary, 
 had to be taken up anew. In the months which had intervened 
 since Haines was sent to obtain peaceful possession of the base at 
 Aden, sentiment in official circles had fast been growing in favor 
 of securing it by any means which could be at all explained, this 
 being deemed by some “ the only moment when such a step is 
 likely to be practicable for centuries,” and the possession of 
 which could not but “ be attended with incalculable benefit.” 
 Sir Robert Grant was of this opinion. He had favored direct 
 action in the first instance, but had been overruled by the Supreme 
 Government. Upon receiving Haines’ report, he wrote: 
 
 While ... I am for regarding this intended outbreak as 
 in itself a matter of small consequence, there is one view in 
 which it can hardly be overrated 5 in fact, I cannot but hail it 
 as a most happy incident. It settles conclusively the necessity 
 of our holding the port and harbour of Aden in our own 
 hands, if we mean to avail ourselves of the one as a depot for 
 our coals, and of the other as a shelter for our vessels, 
 whether of war, or transit.®® 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1839, 268, pp. 26—28, 32—37. 
 
 Ibid., p. 37, quoted from a Minute by the Governor of Bombay. 
 
 Ibid., p. 40. There is an excellent account of the strategic value of Aden in 
 the Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, N.S., Pt. I, 3 17-321. 
 
204 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The Supreme Government was also inclined to look upon the 
 moment as opportune. To the case created by the looting of a 
 merchant vessel had been added insults to a special agent of the 
 Indian Government, and, finally, a dangerous plot against his 
 person, if not his life.®^ But, happily, there were still other and 
 even less questionable grounds for proceeding with the occupa- 
 tion. Capt. Haines had secured a sealed transfer of the town 
 and port of Aden to the English before quitting the place. It was 
 true that Capt. Haines had thought the document to have no 
 legal value, inasmuch as the consideration for the transfer was 
 not stated, but the fact that an annual sum of 8700 dollars had 
 been verbally agreed upon subsequently was, of necessity, con- 
 sidered as legally completing the transfer.®^ 
 
 Little time was lost in embarking upon a new plan of action. 
 Pending the receipt of permission from the Home Government 
 to capture Aden by force, Capt. Haines was again despatched to 
 Aden in the Coote with instructions to renew peaceful negotia- 
 tions for the completion of the transfer of Aden.®^ Meanwhile, 
 naval and military forces were to be collected at Bombay ready 
 to be sent to Aden at the earliest possible moment, in case of the 
 failure of the new overtures. Capt. Haines arrived again at 
 Aden at the first of November, 1838, armed with the draft of a 
 treaty to be presented to the Sultan, M. Houssain. If he had 
 expected to be received more cordially after his absence, he was 
 very quickly undeceived. He was ridiculed by the Arabs of Aden 
 for bringing only one small vessel of war^ and was sent insulting 
 and threatening letters by the old Sultan and his son, the latter 
 now acting practically as regent. The Sultan refused to admit 
 that he had ever given any formal bond for the transfer of 
 Aden.®^ Moreover, he even went so far as to refuse to recognize 
 Haines as an authorized agent of the Indian Government. 
 
 While this temporizing was still in progress, the Coote was 
 suddenly denied the privilege of receiving fuel and water from 
 the shore. Believing that show of patience further would be a 
 
 These were matters of serious concern to the Indian Government, not merely 
 because they gave new grounds for offensive action, but because of the necessity of 
 keeping British prestige always at a high pitch in the East for safety’s sake. 
 
 Cf. Fontanier, of. at., II, 167, 168. Fontanier makes it appear that Mehemet 
 Ali had a hand in the settlement. 
 
 The Bombay Government wrote to Haines in December, “ The Governor in 
 Council considers the importance of obtaining a footing at Aden peaceably, or at all 
 events without loss of life, to be incalculably great in regard to the feeling with 
 which its after occupation by the British Government would be viewed, indepen- 
 dently of all other weighty considerations, and that this object should never be lost 
 sight of.” Pari. Paf., 1839, No. 268, p. 61. Comment on so frank a statement 
 seems superfluous. 
 
 ®'* Pari. Paf., 1839, No. 268, p. 67. 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 205 
 
 waste of time, Haines proceeded to blockade the port of Aden, 
 while at the same time sending a request to Bombay by one of 
 the new steamers on the Suez line, asking that the expeditionary 
 force be sent for the forcible seizure of the place. From the 
 beginning of the blockade, communication was kept up in some- 
 what desultory fashion between the Abdalee chiefs and Capt. 
 Haines, but with relations constantly becoming worse. On 
 November 20 a party of Bedouins fired on the pinnace of the 
 Cootey fortunately without effect. From this time on the state 
 of hostilities was hardly veiled, and it was evident that Bedouins 
 were collecting in Aden in considerable numbers to withstand the 
 expected attack of the English and to harass the Coote as much as 
 possible.®® A peaceful settlement was clearly out of the ques- 
 tion now that the old Sultan was a bed-ridden invalid and his 
 government had fallen into the hands of his sons and their 
 friends, who, being young and irresponsible, and seeing little 
 likelihood of gain from the sale of Aden to the English, desired 
 nothing better than war. 
 
 The main expeditionary force for the occupation of Aden ar- 
 rived on January 16, 1839, consisting of two ships bearing some 
 seven hundred European and native troops and a number of guns. 
 Two small vessels had previously come from India, and a cap- 
 tured Arab vessel had been made into a mortar boat. Capt. 
 Haines immediately sent word of the arrival of the force to the 
 Sultan, whose only reply was for a week’s respite in which to 
 decide upon an answer. Since this did not warrant consideration, 
 the little fleet was immediately sent into position for attack. The 
 bombardment of the defenses of the town began at 9:30 A.M. 
 on the same morning, January 16. A brief period of firing 
 knocked to pieces the Arab forts, troops were landed, and by 
 12:30 the whole peninsula was in the hands of the British. The 
 Sultan, his sons, and most of the Arabs escaped to the mainland, 
 and gave no more trouble for the time being. Medical assistance 
 was offered to all who had suffered during the engagement, and 
 Aden soon returned to its normal condition. Within a few days, 
 friendly negotiations were resumed with the Sultan M. Houssain, 
 who bore his losses in good spirit. On February second, a treaty 
 of peace and friendship was signed between the English and the 
 Abdalees, supplemented by another on the fourth at the request 
 of the old Sultan.®® A fortnight later, further to regularize the 
 occupation of Aden, a new treaty of peace and friendship was 
 drawn up, in which the English undertook to forget the recent 
 
 Low, of. cit., II, 1 1 7. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1839, No. 268, p. 92; Aitchison, of. cit., VII, 122. 
 
206 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 hostilities by engaging to pay the Sultan a yearly stipend of 6500 I 
 dollars, and also to assume his tribute obligations to some of the ' 
 neighboring tribes.®^ 
 
 Meanwhile, Aden was made into a regular port of call. Ar- 
 rangements were made for the coaling of steamers, wharves were ■ 
 repaired, and the defenses of the place carefully looked to, al- 
 though no further hostilities were anticipated. As it developed, 
 however, the defensive measures were taken none too soon. In 
 November, 1839, the Abdalees, having secretly planned a coup, 
 made a series of very effective attacks on Aden, almost gaining 
 an entrance on one or two occasions before they were decisively 
 beaten off. The instalments of the Sultan’s stipend were sus- : 
 pended as a result of this, and Aden took on the appearance of a 
 military base. In May and again in July, 1840, heavy attacks 
 were made on the defenses of Aden. Indian reenforcements j 
 quickly brought out from Bombay by the new steam units of the 
 Indian Navy gave material aid in these crises, however, and by ' 
 the end of 1841 the spirit of the Arabs was so broken that no •. 
 serious difficulties again arose. The Sultan’s annuity was again 1 
 begun in 1844, with a year’s back pay as a reward for good be- 
 havior. It was a number of years still before the garrisons of ■ 
 Aden could be greatly reduced with safety, though meanwhile - 
 the use of Aden as a base had suffered no interruption.®* 
 
 The news of the capture of Aden was received throughout the 1 
 British world with profound satisfaction. Neither the British 
 nor the Indian Government was inclined longer to deplore the 1 
 necessity for hostilities, and those who conducted the brief cam- 
 paign were rewarded with gifts and honors.®* Commander ; 
 Haines was vested with entire discretionary power and made : 
 chief officer of the temporary administration. Within the course i 
 of a few months several strategic points had been added to the i 
 locations originally demanded from the Sultan, new^ fortifications 1 
 and batteries had been erected, and Aden became not merely a ' 
 
 Aitchison, op. cit., VII, 136; Low, op. at., II, 125, 126. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 130, 131, 349; ibid.., XXXII, X.S., 
 Pt. II, 322; ibid., XXXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 23, 24, no, ni, 209, 210, 306; Low, 
 op. cit., I, 128—133; Aitchison, op. cit., VII, 123— 141. 
 
 See Pari. Pap., 1839, 277, p. 190; Consul-General Campbell’s favorable 
 
 report on the acquisition of Aden. Commander Haines, who was chiefly responsible 
 for the conduct of operations, was rewarded by the Bombay Government with a 
 sword of the value of 200 guineas, while Lieut. E. W. S. Daniell, who was in charge 
 of some of the shore parties, received a sword costing 100 guineas. — Asiatic Journal, 
 XXXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 306. Fontanier sa\"s, however (o/>. cit., II, 173), that both 
 Lord Palmerston and Sir John Hobhouse protested against the seizure as unwarranted 
 and as a reflection on British honor, but that “ no investigation was ever made.” 
 
PAVING THE WAY TO INDIA 
 
 207 
 
 way station on the new steam route to Suez, but one of the de- 
 fensive bases of the Empire/® 
 
 The acquisition of Aden was one of the last steps in the definite 
 establishment of the Suez route for the regular transportation of 
 mails and passengers to and from India. It was also the logical 
 culmination of the long series of surveys which had characterized 
 the first third of the century in eastern waters. Coming at the 
 moment when the Euphrates Expedition had in essential respects 
 ' failed, the capture of Aden concentrated attention both at home 
 and in India on the route through Egypt, leaving the Euphrates 
 # route to figure in the history of communications only as an alter- 
 I native project. The trade of the port of Aden did not develop 
 I to the extent which had been anticipated, but the post steadily 
 increased in strategic value and importance to communication. 
 With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Aden loomed up 
 i immediately as one of the bulwarks of the Empire, controlling 
 I the transit of the Red Sea, and exercising a far more potent in- 
 fluence on imperial diplomacy than could possibly have been 
 foreseen by those who brought about its capture. 
 
 1 ^® Capt. F. M. Hunter, An Account of the British Settlement of Aden in 
 Arabia (London, 1877); Asiatic Journal, XXXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 276, 277. At the 
 opening of the twentieth century, Aden was one of the six most heavily fortified 
 positions in the British Empire. 
 
 See The Indian Year Book: A Statistical and Historical Annual of the Indian 
 Empire . . . (1913), (Ed. by Sir Stanley Reed), pp. 128, 129. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE ' 
 
 T he year 1835 was characterized in English affairs i 
 by a number of forward strides. At home the read- i 
 justment following the great Reform Bill had been j 
 largely effected without any signs of the ruin which the old Tories j 
 had confidently anticipated from the letting down of the bars to 
 the middle class. Nothing more dangerous was to be expected s 
 from the Bill for the reform of the municipalities which was .1 
 readily enacted in that year. A note of optimism pervaded all d 
 the gloom which could be conjured up by the adherents of the i 
 old order. In foreign affairs the outlook was brighter than for 
 several years previously. Resentment toward France still re- 1 
 mained in many quarters over the ease with which Algeria had 
 been acquired regardless of the pledges given by the old Bourbon n 
 G overnment to the contrary, and the French were suspected of 
 having deep designs in Greece and in the Levant. Nevertheless, ^ 
 the Orleans regime was so absorbed in making the most of the 1 
 new industrial movement as to cause no immediate anxiety, while i 
 English travellers by the hundreds crossed the Channel in the 1 
 new steam boats and revisited favorite haunts which they had not 1 
 viewed since the July Revolution. Relations with Russia were j 
 less critical than they had been a few years earlier. Still, Russia >. 
 had not been forgiven for her trickery in connection with the 1 
 fateful Treaty of London, and she was popularly supposed to be 
 making preparations for securing India w^henever a convenient > 
 occasion might arise. ^ The English were still being viewed with 
 suspicion by the Porte, in consequence of the late misfortunes in 
 Greece, and Mehemet Ali was becoming a greater source of con- 
 
 ^ Par^. Pap., No. 539, Minutes of Evidence, pp. 96, 97; Capt. James 
 
 Barber, A Letter to the Right Honourable Sir John Cam Jiobhouse, Bart., M.P., I 
 Pres, of the India Board, etc., etc., etc., on Steam Navigation zvith India . . . 
 pp. 9—12; Capt. Melville Grindlay, A Viezv of the Present State of the Question as 
 to Steam Navigation with India . . . pp. 8—10, 24, 25; Asiatic Journal, XXII, i 
 N.S., Pt. I, 98, 99. 
 
 20S 
 
: ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 209 
 
 ' cern because of the vigor with which he was undertaking to secure 
 ! the compensation due him for his services during the Greek re- 
 ' volt. Elsewhere, however, the European world was enjoying 
 : one of those relatively quiescent moods which gave little indica- 
 1 tion of later storms to come. 
 
 The British world, under the impulse of rapidly growing in- 
 ! dustry and trade, was thus encouraged to look ahead. The cause 
 i; of improved communications with the East Indies, which had 
 ; been only slowly developing since the premature voyage of the 
 ^ Enterprize in 1825, now entered upon a more vigorous career. 
 
 : As a result of a substantial parliamentary grant, a well-equipped 
 ; steam expedition was engaged in penetrating Syria to the Eu- 
 phrates with the object of establishing an imperial highway and 
 spanning nearly a score of centuries to bring the valley of Meso- 
 ■j potamia again within the European horizon. Surveys in the Red 
 Sea, the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Arabian Sea were 
 locating those channels by which India could more readily be 
 linked with Europe. “ Steam Committees ” of influential Anglo- 
 Indians were keeping up an increasing agitation in the presiden- 
 1 cies, and even though their efforts were largely competitive and 
 i wasteful, the din arising over the issue of improved contacts could 
 i not be misunderstood in the home country. 
 
 I It had long been the complaint of members of the Anglo- 
 i Indian communities that the Government at home took no inter- 
 £ est in improved communication. But similar complaints directed 
 i; against the East India Company were probably better grounded. 
 
 ! The Company, because of the nature of its monopoly, had until 
 1 lately held supreme sway in eastern waters. Its directors had 
 , generally been slow to admit that the development of shorter 
 : lines of communication by means of steam vessels offered any 
 particular advantages. This attitude had been assumed because 
 1 of the obvious expense connected with adequate steam establish- 
 ments and the greater difficulty which would be experienced in 
 maintaining an exclusive political policy in India — a policy char- 
 acterized by careful censorship, the exclusion of all unlicensed 
 persons of any nationality, and the keeping of Indian peoples in 
 ' ignorance of western ideas and institutions. Even if this policy 
 had not dictated an unreceptive attitude toward the growth of 
 rapid steam transit at regular and frequent intervals, the almost 
 : bankrupt financial condition of the Company must invariably 
 1 [> have done so. It is a matter of some interest, therefore, to find 
 : I that after the Directors of the Company had with some difficulty 
 ! been persuaded to contribute several thousand pounds sterling to 
 i the Euphrates Expedition, they were soon further prevailed upon 
 
 i 
 
210 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 actively to take in hand the development of steam lines on the 
 Suez route. 
 
 Several factors combined near the beginning of the year 1835 
 to work a change in the views of the Board of Directors toward 
 rapid communication. To begin with, some of the officials of the 
 Company, who had served with distinction in India, became 
 zealous advocates of the new plan. That was particularly true of 
 Lord William Bentinck, who, after the completion of his term 
 as Governor-General in India, returned to England and remained 
 a strong protagonist of steam communication until his death in 
 1839.^ The efforts of the Malcolms have already been adverted 
 to. The numerous petitions and memorials from the Indian 
 Presidencies also contributed telling influences.^ But still more 
 powerful factors were at work. In 1833 the commercial mon- 
 opoly of the Company for the China trade had been removed, 
 and, because of the deplorable financial status of the concern, 
 the entire revocation of its charter was seriously considered by the 
 British Government, then and for some time thereafter.'^ The 
 matter resulted in the practical assumption by the Government 
 of financial responsibility for the Company, leaving its organiza- 
 tion intact to function very much as an administrative branch of 
 the Imperial Government, though still retaining a large degree 
 of independence of governmental control. But the Government 
 had assumed certain moral and financial obligations for the Com- 
 pany only with the understanding that an enlightened policy 
 would be pursued in future. The Company not only agreed to 
 these conditions, one of which was the development of steam lines 
 in eastern waters, but it also arrived at the conclusion that the 
 more evidences of a progressive policy it could show', the more 
 certain would be the support of the Government. Besides, there 
 was a great likelihood that if the Company did not develop the 
 eastern lines, the British Government would presently invade the 
 East for that purpose.® This change in policy, coupled w'ith 
 the sincere interest of a few of the Directors in the matter of im- 
 proved contacts with India for both administrative and cultural 
 purposes, presently led the Company as actively to promote the 
 cause of steam as it had formerly opposed it.® 
 
 ^ Asiatic Journal, XXIX, N.S., Pt. I, 166; ibid., N.S., Pt. I, 313, 313. 
 
 ® Some of the great English business concerns were anxious for the opening of 
 the new route in the belief that trade would follow communications. A great boom 
 in India cotton was anticipated. — Ibid., Pt. II, 179, 180. 
 
 ^ Barber, of. cit., p. 48; Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., pp. 187—190. 
 
 ® Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 38. 
 
 ® Sir James Carnac, Chairman of the Court of Directors, was especially active 
 in support of a thorough development of steam communication. — Ibid., XXIII, 
 N.S., Pt. II, 34. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 2 1 1 
 
 As long as the Euphrates Expedition gave promise of any ac- 
 complishments of value toward the development of what was 
 generally termed an “ alternative ” route, sentiment was slow in 
 focusing on the route by way of the Red Sea, which the Select 
 Parliamentary Committee of 1834 had designated as the future 
 main artery of communication. The Euphrates Expedition was, 
 of course, a Government project, and British officialdom was more 
 concerned with the circumventing of rivals by means of a strategic 
 line than with the sending of private communications, despatches, 
 and business papers. Nevertheless, some definite progress was 
 made before 1837 toward the permanent opening of the more 
 essential line. The first intimation of a change in the policy of 
 the East India House was contained in a notice issued early in 
 the year 1835 by the Post Office in London, stating that, beginning 
 with the second of March following, letters would be accepted 
 for India by way of Egypt, postage to be prepaid as far as 
 Alexandria.^ Such mails were to be made up on the first of every 
 succeeding month and despatched from Falmouth for Malta in 
 the steam packets of the Admiralty. From Malta they would be 
 forwarded to Alexandria by branch steamers at such times as the 
 necessary vessels were available. That this plan was looked upon 
 as being more than a temporary trial is indicated by the fact that 
 the Admiralty Board simultaneously placed orders for the build- 
 ing of six new steamers expressly for the Mediterranean service.® 
 Private agencies and the good-will of the Pasha were relied upon 
 for the time being to secure the transmission of all private mails 
 to Cairo and across the desert to the Red Sea. From Suez the 
 vessels of the Indian Navy were expected to maintain as regular 
 a service as possible.® 
 
 Another significant gesture was contained in an announcement 
 made in the House of Commons by Sir John Hobhouse, Presi- 
 dent of the India Board, in August, 1835, that an arrangement 
 had been completed between His Majesty’s Government and the 
 East India Company whereby two large steam vessels were to be 
 added to the Indian Navy and used on the Suez line to supple- 
 ment the Hugh Lindsay . While this news was received with 
 
 ^ IbU., XVI, N.S., Pt. II, 148. 
 
 ® Steam to India: or, The New Indian Guide . . . (London, 1835), pp. 242, 
 243. This plan was varied on several occasions by the sending of packets to Beirut 
 or Antioch, instead of Egypt, so that the Persian Gulf route might be given a 
 comparative trial. 
 
 ® The Hugh Lindsay, of course, could not maintain the service alone, and was 
 supplemented by the sailing ships of the Navy for a time, and by the Forbes on one 
 occasion. 
 
 10 Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 38; ibid., XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 178-180; 
 London Times, 18 Aug., 1835. This step had been bitterly opposed by the stock- 
 
212 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 signs of joy both in England and in India, it was at the same time 
 apparent that before the Suez line could be considered as in any 
 sense fully opened, additional facilities would be necessary both 
 on the Indian end of the line and for the transit through Egypt. 
 The conclusion had been reached by all authorities on the subject 
 of improved communications that, although a service requiring 
 steam voyages from India to Suez four times per year had been 
 suggested in Calcutta at various times, nothing less than a regular 
 monthly service would be in any way adequate.^^ It was still 
 considered probable that for three or four months during the 
 height of the southwest monsoon the line by the Persian Gulf 
 and Euphrates would be found more practicable than voyages 
 direct to Suez, even if the new steam vessels being constructed 
 should be able to combat the head winds and heavy seas of the 
 Arabian Sea successfully.^^ 
 
 The arrangements made by Crown and Company in 1835 pro- 
 duced some degree of satisfaction in India only at Bombay. Since 
 the new steamers were to be placed on the Suez-Bombay line, the 
 inhabitants of the second presidency found themselves fairly 
 well provided for and so had less occasion for fault-finding than 
 the Anglo-Indian communities on the opposite side of India. 
 From the beginning, the people of Bombay had placed their faith 
 in Government rather than in private enterprise for the realiza- 
 tion of their hopes, and by 1836 it appeared as if their judgment 
 were about to be vindicated.^® So sanguine were some of the mem- 
 bers of the Bombay Steam Committee, in fact, that at a meeting 
 held on October 20, 1836, it was decided that, “ since steam com- 
 munication was a thing practically assured, and since the [steam] 
 fund was not sufficient for any great purpose,” it should be repaid 
 fro rata to the original subscribers. The members of the Steam 
 Committee afterward reconsidered their action, however, fearing 
 
 holders of the Company, who had insisted that it was not just to embark on a policy 
 which must inevitably lead to the placing of additional burdens on the Indian peoples, 
 who would derive little or no benefit from the establishment and who were not 
 interested in it. India already had to pay an annual proprietors’ dividend of 
 £630,000, it was stated, and the projected steam line would add to this an annual 
 expense of about £150,000. 
 
 Actual test in 1837 appeared to show that more letters were despatched by 
 each monthly mail than by bi-monthly or quarterly voyages. — Asiatic Journal, 
 XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 48. 
 
 The experimental voyages of the Hugh Lindsay, while of considerable value, 
 did not aid a great deal in the solving of many of these problems because of their 
 irregularity and the fact that they had not been made under typical or uniform 
 conditions. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 23, 24; Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. 
 of Ev., p. 16. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 213 
 
 1 1 that the dissolution of their steam fund would signify a lack of 
 ' further interest in the cause which had yet hardly developed 
 ‘1 beyond an embryonic stage. At a subsequent meeting, therefore, 
 j; the previous action was rescinded, and it was voted to apply as 
 ' much of the fund as was necessary to the development and im- 
 ; provement of the passage through Egypt, with particular ref- 
 ! erence to that part of the line between Suez and Cairo.^* For 
 i; several years to come, Bombay funds were wisely employed in 
 j this manner, and many travellers had adequate cause to be thank- 
 ! ful for the arrangements thus made for their comfort and con- 
 venience which contributed materially to rob the desert trip of 
 , its dread. 
 
 Meanwhile, Calcutta and Madras were growing more and 
 i more impatient. The Company’s new steam program of 1835 
 it made no particular provision for these presidencies because mails 
 could be carried by dak across country to and from Bombay as 
 11 rapidly as they could be transported by sea, and passenger traffic 
 \l was estimated to be insufficient to warrant additional steam lines 
 ^ around India.^® The English residents of these capitals, however, 
 
 ■ ; felt that their needs had been overlooked. Their feeling of 
 ' humiliation in not being taken more into account was frequently 
 S aggravated by delays in the transmission of the mails to or from 
 ;j Bombay overland, and especially by the sang froid with which 
 the Bombay authorities despatched packet vessels for Suez with- 
 : out having given due notice in the other presidencies, or without 
 j having waited for the mails known to be en route to Bombay from 
 other Indian centres. Such mails were, of course, held at Bom- 
 bay. until the sailing of the next vessel, which might thus cause 
 5 them to arrive in England later than if they had been despatched 
 I; in sailing ships around the Cape. This carelessness of Govern- 
 i ment officials at Bombay grew from a grievance into an abuse, and 
 I eventually required rigid schedules for the sailings, made binding 
 ' by orders from the Court of Directors and from the Supreme 
 I Government at Calcutta.^® 
 
 ■ At no time did the Calcutta community have much faith in the 
 Company’s plans for steam communication.’^ From the begin- 
 
 j Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, pp. 34, 35. A part of the Steam Fund 
 
 I was placed at the disposal of the Bombay Government for the sending of mail 
 ' overland between Basrah and Beirut. 
 
 I Ibid., XXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 277, 294; Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., 
 
 1 p. 15- The dak (or dasiuk) sometimes made the difficult journey between Calcutta 
 J and Bombay in ten days at this period, though usually at least fifteen were required. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 298; ibid., XXV, N.S., Pt. II, 211 
 1 (quoted from Bengal Hurkaru of 19 Dec., 1837) ; ibid., XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 7, 12, 
 I 37; Bombay Times, 28 Sept., 1839. 
 i Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. I, 236. 
 
214 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ning these merchants and officials were inclined to look to private ^ 
 enterprise as the only means of securing adequate steam service. 1 
 The Company was too obviously content with developing the ! 
 Bombay line for mails and despatches, whereas Calcutta and ! 
 Madras were determined to have not merely their own direct 
 mail service, but transportation facilities, as well, which would ' 
 make possible a much greater degree of personal contact with the 
 mother country. Steam lines to their own ports would enable 
 families to escape to England at the opening of the hot season and i 
 return at its close. With such lines in question business could be 
 more readily transacted, children could be placed in English - 
 schools, and the isolation of residence in India would be lessened 
 to a marked degree. It has been noted that the first private steam 
 enterprises, sponsored by Capt. Johnston and Mr. Waghorn, had 
 failed to materialize, the one through the insufficiency of early 
 steam vessels, and the other largely through paucity of capital. 
 
 In 1836, however, just as the Calcutta Steam Committee was 
 contemplating the purchase of one or more steamers for a quar- 
 terly communication with England around the Cape of Good 
 Hope,^® a new enterprise was launched in London which absorbed 
 attention for the time being and gave momentary promise of 
 success. 
 
 The new scheme was outlined by Major Charles Franklin ' 
 Head, who had been more or less identified with the Suez route 1 
 since, under commission from Governor Malcolm of Bombay, he ! 
 had examined and reported on it in 1830. In 1836 he and some 1 
 associates, organized as a London Steam Committee, came forward l 
 with a well-matured plan for a steamship company to operate i 
 vessels on both sides of the Isthmus of Suez to all of the presi- 
 dencies.’'® The prospectus of the new concern, called the “ East - 
 India Steam Navigation Company,” was published on October 1 1, 
 1836, and gave the details of the project. It proposed a capital 1 
 
 stock of £500,000, made up into 10,000 shares of £50 each. ( 
 
 These funds were to be used in building, at the outset, nine steam- 1 
 ships for operating the entire distance between England and 
 India on a monthly basis, three of them, of 600 tons each, to sail 
 between England and Malta, two, of 480 tons each, to operate 
 between Malta and Alexandria, and the four others, of 600 tons, 
 to sail on the line between Suez and Bombay. The service was j 
 
 to be expanded to all of the presidencies at the earliest possible j 
 moment, and later to be extended to Australia and China, as i 
 
 The Calcutta plan is described in Grindlay, A Vie<u; of the Present State of ^ 
 
 the Question as to Steam Navigation voith India, p. i6. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., pp. 87, 102, passim. 
 
 1 
 
I ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 215 
 
 ii 
 
 I well. Dividends of 5% were to be paid from the beginning, 
 f The Company’s income was to be derived principally from sub- 
 I sidles from the British Government, expected to amount to £74?'' 
 ! 500 per year, and from the East India Company, of perhaps 
 i £65,000 annually, for carriage of mails, loan of vessels in time 
 I of war, and other services.^® 
 
 This scheme contained many of the elements of a plan which 
 was successfully put into operation by another organization in 
 1840, and it is interesting because of its ancestral character and 
 * formative influence. As soon as it was put forward it provoked 
 I wide interest and no small amount of controversy. One writer 
 ;|i argued that the plan was much to be preferred to that considered 
 i by the Calcutta Steam Committee, as the latter proposed only 
 quarterly voyages, whereas the new Company proposed to operate 
 monthly.^^ This seemed to be such a plan as had been advocated 
 a few years before by Mr. T. L. Peacock, of the East India House, 
 when he said before a Parliamentary Committee regarding the 
 establishment of steam connections with India, that “ between 
 doing it efficiently and not doing it at all, there seems to be no 
 advisable medium.” There were many enthusiasts in the 
 eastern presidencies who thought that only a private commercial 
 concern would be able properly to meet the expanding needs of 
 the three presidencies.^® And the report was freely circulated 
 that both the Home Government and the East India Company 
 looked upon the plan with approval, although this report sub- 
 sequently proved to be without foundation.®^ 
 
 On receipt of the first reports of the enterprise from London, 
 all parts of India responded favorably. The Bombay community 
 expressed approval of the enterprise and promised cooperation, 
 but they actually took no steps to advance it, no doubt fearing 
 that its success might prevent or postpone the anticipated full 
 development of the Bombay line by Government agencies.®® An 
 interested group of Madras inhabitants, called together by the 
 Steam Committee in October, 1836, voted “ to support, by taking 
 
 Grindlay, op. cit., pp. 74-78; Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 70. The 
 amounts requested as subsidy were subsequently reduced to £40,000 and £25,000 
 respectively, leaving £58,000 to be made up from private sources, passenger fares, 
 transportation of valuable goods, and the like. 
 
 Grindlay, op. cit., 147— 157. 
 
 22 Ibid., XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 106. 
 
 22 Ibid., XXI, N.S., Pt. I, 316; Barber, op. cit., pp. 35, 37. There were those, 
 however, who thought the East India Company the logical agency for the task. — 
 Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 153, 154. 
 
 2^ Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. I, 70; ibid., XXII, N.S., Pt. II, 256; Pari. Pap., 
 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., pp. 15-16; Dionysius Lardner, Steam Communication 
 ’with India by the Red Sea . . . (London, 1837). 
 
 2® Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.k, Pt. II, 216, 217. 
 
2 i6 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 shares in any Joint Stock Company possessing a charter, which 
 shall be formed in England under the auspices of the committee 
 of which Maj. Head is chairman, for the accomplishing of a 
 steam communication which shall secure to Madras the advan- 
 tage of a direct communication from the Red Sea. . . A 
 
 subscription list of those who would be willing to purchase shares 
 in the concern was also begun. However, when later informa- 
 tion, including the Company’s prospectus, revealed the fact that 
 only Bombay was to be the terminus of the line at the outset, 
 enthusiasm gave place to aloofness. In January, 1837, a meeting 
 of the Madras Steam Committee adopted a resolution which 
 stated that “ The inhabitants of Madras . . . are not yet pre- 
 pared to enter into any negotiation with the Provisional Com- 
 mittee of London in regard to shares in the proposed Indian 
 Steam-Company. . . The number of shares taken here will be 
 much increased, if the port of Madras is included in the benefits 
 of the steam-communication, as well in regard to passengers as 
 letters.” 
 
 The spokesmen of the Calcutta community were especially 
 cool in their attitude toward the new steam company, although 
 their paid agent in London, Capt. Melville Grindlay, was one of 
 its ardent supporters. In replying to the overtures of the officers 
 of the new concern, the Bengal Steam Committee said: 
 
 The Calcutta Committee consider that no plan can be effi- 
 cient which does not embrace the whole communication from 
 England to Calcutta, thereby including every part of India, 
 dropping mails and passengers in its progress, whether at 
 Gibraltar, Malta, Alexandria, Bombay (from Socotra), 
 Galle, Madras, and so on to Calcutta, proceeding the whole 
 way with the utmost despatch. If this despatch is imprac- 
 ticable, as the London Committees have suggested, a com- 
 munication to Calcutta round the Cape would be preferable."® 
 
 The Committee ridiculed the idea of making the project pay as 
 long as it was confined to Bombay. Indeed, they were so cha- 
 grined at the support given it by their agent, Grindlay, that at a 
 later meeting a resolution was unanimously adopted, stating: 
 
 That as Capt. Grindlay has not advocated the plan of ex- 
 tending steam communication to all the ports of India, as 
 prayed for in the petition and memorials of the inhabitants 
 
 28 Asiatic Journal, XXV, N.S., Pt. II. 191. 
 
 27 Ibid., XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 65, III. 2S 106-108. 
 
I ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 217 
 
 ’I of Bengal, entrusted to him for . . . that object, the Com- 
 ^ mittee cannot but feel dissatisfied with his agency, and 
 request, therefore, that he will bring his accounts ... to a 
 close, as soon as practicable.^® 
 
 This action by the stormy petrels of the Calcutta Presidency 
 caused a distinct break with the London Steam Committee, which 
 stoutly upheld the loyalty and conscientiousness of Capt. Grindlay. 
 * The breach was not closed by the appointment of Capt. Barber, 
 
 : one of the members of the provisional steam company, as Grind- 
 lay’s successor.®® From this time forward, the East India Steam 
 ! Navigation Company entered no longer into the calculations of 
 officials and merchants of the principal Indian metropolis. 
 
 ! 
 
 By the first of the year 1837, it was apparent to all well in- 
 formed persons that the Euphrates Expedition had altogether 
 , failed in its object of opening up a line by which mails and pas- 
 sengers could be regularly and safely transported. The first of 
 ! that year also saw two new steamers put into commission on the 
 I line from Bombay to the Red Sea by the East India Company. 
 
 , These vessels, the Atalanta^ of 617' tons and 210 horsepower, and 
 I the Berenice y 765 tons and 220 horsepower, built in accordance 
 ; with the joint arrangement of 1835, were sent out to India by way 
 , of the Cape in December, 1836, and March, 1837, and were im- 
 mediately put into commission.®^ As this arrangement appeared 
 to be entirely feasible, negotiations were soon recommenced by the 
 r Court of Directors and the Board of Control for extending 
 !( the service thus begun so that no interruptions need occur in the 
 ^ monthly service to Suez. 
 
 ; In taking up the matter of the extension of existing arrange- 
 i ments on the Indian side of the Isthmus of Suez, the Board of 
 
 ; Control, supported by other departments of Government, wished 
 i 
 
 29 Ibid., XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 4, 65, 135; ibid., XXIV, N.S., Pt. II, no. The 
 Madras Conservative (23 May, 1837) protested bitterly against this action and asked 
 jf for a plausible reason, insisting that “a just one they cannot give.” The petition 
 li referred to was one drawn up at a meeting on March 5, 1836, and which was sent 
 ^1 to England bearing 3,542 signatures, “including almost every man of influence 
 i j at Calcutta.” 
 
 I "*9 Ibid., XXV, N.S., Pt. II, 77, 78; ibid., XXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 305, 306; ibid., 
 I XXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 188, 207, 208, 277. 
 
 I 9 ^ Low, History of the Indian Navy, II, 50—52; Pari. Paf., 1837, No. 539, 
 Min. of Ev., pp. 21, -passim.-, App. No. I, p. 207; Asiatic Journal, XXII, N.S., Pt. 
 11 , 201, 202. According to the temporary plan, the Atalanta and the Berenice were 
 to sail in alternate months from Bombay to Mocha and Suez. In their outward 
 voyages to Bombay, during which both steam and sails were used, the Atalanta con- 
 sumed 106 days and the Berenice 108 days. Cornpared with these records, that of 
 the Enterfrize of 113 days to Calcutta in 1825 shows up very favorably. 
 
2i8 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 to adopt what had already been termed in Calcutta the “ compre- 
 hensive plan ” of service to all three of the presidencies. The 
 Court of Directors demurred at this, and, stating their belief that 
 India would be sufficiently provided for by a complete develop- 
 ment of the Bombay line, proposed that this feature be left ten- 
 tative, so that as the steam equipment was augmented and more 
 experience was gained the service might be extended to Madras 
 and Calcutta. This proposal was accepted by Sir John Hobhouse 
 for the Board of Control, in order to secure immediate action, 
 though he considered it but “ half a loaf.” Estimates were 
 then prepared of the number of new steamers and the expense 
 required, which showed a cost of £ 88,000 per annum for the 
 operation of four steamers from Bombay, exclusive of their 
 original cost, the total of which was placed at £120,000. It was 
 agreed that this expense was to be shared between Government 
 and Company, the former receiving all income from postage, and 
 the Company having the privilege of withdrawing the vessels 
 from packet service in the event of dangerous hostilities in the 
 East.®® The arrangement having been agreed to by all parties 
 concerned, the Court of Directors sent to the Governor-General 
 of India on June 2 a despatch stating that provisions for a regular 
 monthly communication between Bombay and England by way of 
 the Red Sea had been concluded and directing him to establish 
 the necessary coal depots at Bombay, Mocha, and Suez.®* 
 
 This was the situation when, with the return to England of 
 members of the Euphrates Expedition, the wffiole question of 
 steam communication with India was raised in the House of Com- 
 mons on the night of June 10. Lord William Bentinck, in pre- 
 senting another petition from the Calcutta Steam Committee, 
 took occasion to move the appointment of a Select Committee “ to 
 enquire into the practicability of effecting a steam-communication 
 with India.” Sir John Hobhouse thereupon announced for the 
 first time, that an arrangement had lately been completed by the 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., p. 22; Asiatic Journal, XXII, N.S., 
 Pt. II, 289, 290, “Debate at the East India House.” Nevertheless, there were good 
 reasons for suspecting that steam lines from Suez to Madras and Calcutta, rounding 
 Ceylon at Point de Galle, would be more expensive to operate and would be less 
 profitable than a line to Bombay direct. All parts of India could be served in some 
 fashion from Bombay, while it appeared doubtful whether the increased volume of 
 patronage from the Indian East Coast would warrant the extension of service to 
 those ports. A steam equipment sufiicient for frequent and regular service from 
 Suez to all of the Indian Presidencies would have to be twice as extensive as that 
 required for sailings alone. See Capt. James Barber, Statement of Facts relating to 
 Stea 7 n-Comntunication nxiith India, on the Cojnprehetish'e Plan (London, 1839). 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 163, 259, 325. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., p. 21. Aden, of course, had not yet 
 come to be considered the principal way station. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 219 
 
 I Government with the Court of Directors for the carrying out of 
 I just such an object, and he continued that “ it must be clearly 
 I understood that he consented to the appointment of this commit- 
 f tee on condition that it should not in any way interfere with that 
 arrangement.” Under these conditions the motion was carried. 
 
 Thus, with its power already circumscribed and its functions 
 largely predetermined, the Select Committee of the House of 
 Commons was formed, with instructions “ to inquire into the best 
 j means of establishing a communication by steam with India by 
 ! way of the Red Sea.” Not much time remained before the close 
 
 I of the parliamentary session, but in the time available, the Com- 
 mittee examined all the bearings of the subject as thoroughly as 
 ( possible; Evidence was received from representatives of the 
 I India House, the Board of Control, the Indian steam associations, 
 [I the proposed East India Steam Navigation Company, and 
 il others.^® In order to review and verify the official arrangements 
 [I already embarked upon, the Committee undertook a comparison 
 ! of the probable efficiency of private and public agencies in the 
 transportation of mails and passengers, and the relative adequacy 
 of the Bombay and “ comprehensive ” plans. The final report 
 I of the Committee, handed in on July 15, sanctioned the Govern- 
 ! ment scheme in general. However, Lord Bentinck, Chairman of 
 the Committee, and some others of the group, believed the exist- 
 |[ ing plans somewhat shortsighted, and they insisted upon writing 
 into the report the statement that — 
 
 I Inasmuch as ... a direct communication by steam from 
 the Red Sea to Ceylon, Madras, and Bengal, would be prac- 
 ticable at all seasons of the year by the employment of 
 j vessels of adequate tonnage and powerj and as, under judi- 
 cious arrangements, such extended establishments would 
 appear to offer a prospect of an adequate return for the 
 increased outlay, by the conveyance of Passengers, and of 
 i some valuable articles of Merchandize, which cannot be ex- 
 pected from the limited communication with Bombay alone 5 
 [ Y our committee feel bound to recommend a continued atten- 
 tion to the subject on the part of Her Majesty’s Government 
 and the East India Company. . 
 
 The report of the Committee had no appreciable effect on the 
 [joint plans of the Government and East India Company, but it 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 261, 325. 
 
 I See the list of witnesses in Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, p. [iv]. 
 
 Ibid., p. [iii] 5 Asiatic Journal, XXIV, N.S., Pt. I, 249-264. 
 
220 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 did, by showing the impossibility of securing Government support ^ 
 and guarantees for any similar private venture, bring about the 
 complete disruption of the provisional East India Steam concern. 
 Private initiative in eastern steam navigation was again looked 
 upon with favor only after considerable experience had been 
 gained both by the East India Company and the interested public 
 in the anomaly of operating as mail and passenger steamers boats 
 which were constructed with a view to their capacity as war vessels 
 and which were truculently commanded by officers of the Indian 
 Navy. 
 
 In the meantime, the details of the official scheme of communi- i 
 cation were being worked out rapidly, in marked contrast with 
 the dilatory way in which the matter had been approached in 
 preceding years. One of the matters of concern related to the 
 postage which should be levied on mails to and from India. Ac- 
 cording to existing law, the rates by the overland route must be ^ 
 the same as those charged for transportation in sailing packets 't 
 around the Cape. Since the new steam transit would be very i 
 much more costly than the old, as well as much speedier, the Post i 
 Office Department was finally convinced that a higher rate of I 
 postage would be warranted to help offset the additional expense. 
 Soon after the report of the Select Committee, an Act was passed ; 
 placing the postage on letters of i ounce weight at 4 shillings, and : 
 4 shillings more for each additional one-quarter ounce. Other i 
 rates were in proportion, and it was optional whether they were 1 
 paid in advance. The usual postage charges were retained ! 
 on Government packets in the Mediterranean."® The India 
 rates were high, to be sure, but business houses had expressed j 
 their entire willingness to bear such expense, since correspondence 
 could be sent by the overland passage in about half the usual 
 time. 
 
 The question of establishing coal depots also received careful 
 attention. Heretofore all the coal used in Indian steamers had 
 been sent out in sailing ships around the Cape, and because of the I 
 high quality required, the time and costs involved in shipment 
 and transshipment, and the rapid depreciation of the quality of 
 fuel in the tropics, it was one of the largest items in the mainte- 
 nance of rapid steam service to Red Sea ports. Coal placed at 
 the stations along the route, at such points as Socotra, Aden, 
 
 6 & 7 William IV, ch. 76; The Bengal and. Agra Annual Guide and Gazetteer t 
 for 1841, 3d ed., I, 85, 86; Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 259, 326. The I 
 rates specified for the overland route were also to apply to that by way of Syria ; 
 and the Persian Gulf. 
 
 J 
 
i ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 221 
 
 j Mocha, Jeddah, Cosseir, and Suez, had to be sent out to Bombay 
 !' in sailing vessels, and reloaded and reshipped to Arabia and the 
 j Red Sea. Coal deposited at Suez for the use of the Hugh Lindsay 
 I on the first series of voyages had cost from £8 to £13 per tonj 
 i and as several hundred tons were required for each voyage the 
 fuel item alone sometimes had reached the relatively staggering 
 j sum of £2500 per trip.®^ Thomas Waghorn helped to solve this 
 problem as far as the coal depots in Egypt were concerned. Fol- 
 I lowing his establishment in Egypt in 1835 as an East India agent, 
 he set about organizing a means of conveying coal from Alexandria 
 to Red Sea ports overland. At one time, Waghorn had a large 
 caravan of camels in constant service between Cairo, whence the 
 coal was transported in barges from Alexandria, and Suez, the 
 labor being so cheap at that time that the price of coal at Suez was 
 lowered from about £10 to £3 per ton.^® This was no small 
 factor in the rapidity with which steamships multiplied in eastern 
 waters after 1835, and it was undoubtedly one of Waghorn’s 
 greatest accomplishments. Efforts were continued over a period 
 of several years to locate a suitable supply of coal in India, in 
 Egypt, and even in Syria. Now and then the search appeared to 
 meet with success 5 but comparative tests always proved the greater 
 ! worth of English or Welsh coal.“ 
 
 j| 
 
 ' From the time of the establishment of frequent French packet 
 ; service between Marseilles and Alexandria, many travellers going 
 in both directions had availed themselves of the French line, 
 preferring the speedy land trip between Marseilles and the 
 Channel to the long, rough voyage by the Admiralty packets 
 ' through the Straits of Gibraltar and across the Bay of Biscay to 
 Falmouth. Now that speed was becoming an essential in the 
 ! despatch of mails, the plan was suggested of sending the English 
 mails direct from London through France to Marseilles, thence 
 :: either by Admiralty packet or French steamer to Malta, and from 
 I Malta to Alexandria by British Government vessel. This was a 
 matter of some delicacy, since the British Government could 
 I hardly contemplate having official mails and despatches passed 
 I through the French Post Office. On the other hand, the French 
 authorities hesitated to permit the mails to pass through France 
 in sealed packets, accompanied by an official messenger or courier 
 
 Low, of. ch., II, 138; James Douglas, Glimfses of Old Bombay and Western 
 India, p. 142. Douglas says that at one time coal cost £23 per ton at Suez and 
 required fifteen months to get there. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 175. 
 
 Bombay Times, 15 June, 1839; Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 122, 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, p. 37. 
 
222 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 de cahinety for whose safety and expedition the French Govern- 
 ment would naturally be held to a degree responsible. 
 
 Late in May, 1837, Lord Palmerston took up with the French 
 Government the matter of the transit of the mails through France, 
 and effected a temporary and tentative arrangement whereby 
 official despatches in sealed packages were to be permitted to pass 
 without inspection by the French Post Office if accompanied by an 
 official messenger.^^ This did not apply to the general Indian 
 mails, however. The solution to this rather baffling problem was 
 suggested to the Government by a Mr. Calvert, who had formerly 
 been a resident at Malta. He proposed that in return for the 
 privilege of sending all Indian mails through France en cachety 
 and their transportation through the Mediterranean in French 
 steamers, the French were to be accorded a like privilege of ( 
 sending their eastern mails to or from Alexandria in the Admiralty 
 packets, with the right of passing or exchanging them at Malta 
 unopened. This arrangement would save some ten days in time i 
 between London and Malta for the British mails, with the addi- i 
 tional advantage of speedier and more frequent steam service in I 
 the Mediterranean, the French steamers being faster than those i 
 of the British Government.^* French mails, on the other hand, j 
 might pursue a more direct route between Marseilles and Alex- j 
 andria, with the option of being shipped to or from Suez in the j 
 vessels of the East India Company.^* 
 
 Some time was required to carry these proposals into effect. 1 
 During the course of the negotiations with the various authorities ; 
 of the French Government, English mails were sent as usual by 
 Government packet from Falmouth. After the first of Septem- ; 
 ber, 1837, the sailings from this point for Iberian ports were i 
 weekly, stops being made at Vigo, Oporto, Lisbon, Cadiz, and 1 
 Gibraltar. From the latter station, other vessels continued the I 
 service fortnightly to Malta, Greece, the Ionian Islands, and i 
 Egypt. Mails and passengers destined for India and the East I 
 were transferred at Malta to a third line running direct to Alex- i 
 andria.^* The many stops and transfers along the route retarded 1 
 progress to a great extent, and had much influence on a new series i 
 of attempts to establish a single direct through service from I 
 London to India which came into prominence three years later, j 
 
 Bombay Times, 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., p. 21. 
 
 Ibid., Min. of Ev., pp. 114—116; Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 162; I 
 ibid., XXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 175. French packets were plying- between France and 
 Egypt regularly every ten days in 1837. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., p. 21. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 53. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 223 
 
 Passengers meanwhile might choose their route in travelling 
 to Alexandria. Those to whom time was no great object might 
 sail in the Admiralty packets from Falmouth, transferring with 
 the mails at Gibraltar and Malta. Those desiring greater de- 
 spatch or less mat de mer could proceed from London across the 
 Channel to Paris, from Paris to Marseilles in express carriages, 
 and from Marseilles in a French packet to Alexandria by way of 
 Nice, Livoria, Naples, Malta, and Navarino twice a month. A 
 third alternative lay in reaching Trieste, at the head of the Adri- 
 atic Sea, by any one of a number of routes, and proceeding thence 
 to Alexandria in vessels of the Austrian Lloyd which ran by way 
 of Constantinople.^® At Suez (or Cosseir, if they chose to go by 
 way of Upper Egypt) opportunities for reaching India would, of 
 course, be identical with those for the mails. There was some 
 choice as late as 1837 between steam or sailing vessels of the 
 Indian Navy, although there was seldom an opportunity to exer- 
 cise the choice owing to the fact that, until 1839, all sailing 
 schedules east of Suez were prepared by officials of the Bombay 
 Government and seldom announced long in advance. Of the two 
 : types of vessels, the steamers made much more rapid voyages, as 
 a rule. Voyages between England and India were frequently 
 made by steam within the space of sixty days, and at the height of 
 the southwest monsoon, within eighty-five days. In 1836 one 
 English mail reached Bombay in the space of forty-five days,^® 
 and records established during one season were apt to be broken 
 during the next for some years to come. 
 
 Steam voyages in the Mediterranean by any of the several 
 lines were uniformly accounted a pleasure.^® Such was not the 
 case, however, on the steam vessels of the Indian Navy. For 
 comfort, the sailing vessels employing the Cape route, or even 
 the sailing cruisers of the Indian Navy, were to be preferred to 
 the best of the Company’s steamers. A well-known traveller, 
 who was also an impartial observer, gave the following account 
 of conditions on the Berenice^ one of the crack vessels of the 
 Indian Navy; 
 
 Edward Robinson, Biblical Researches in Palestine and Adjacent Regions . . . 
 (3 vols., London, 1856), I, 3 flF. The Austrian steamers ran twice a month at this 
 time, and were frequently patronized by English travellers. 
 
 London Times, 2 Oct., 1835; Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 192; 
 Morning Herald, 29 Dec., 1835. 
 
 Grindlay, of. cit., pp. 89—91; Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 217. The 
 latter account gives the time as 44 days. Other mails by the same route during the 
 year required from 53 to 85 days. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 299—301; Capt. T. Seymour Burt, Nar- 
 rative of a Late Steam Voyage from England to India (London, 1840) ; Memoranda 
 for Travellers froceeding via Egypt from India to England (London, 1838). 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
224 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 . . . The cabins were small and miserable. Cockroaches 
 abounded. Washing had to be done in a public room. Each 
 passenger was expected to fit up his own stateroom on the 
 government steamers. Sleeping accommodations consisted 
 of a mattress placed on some trunks or boxes, while many 
 slept on tables and benches. The rooms were hot and smelly, 
 and the servants lazy and indolent. Food was served in the 
 common saloon, which also served the purpose of toilet room 
 and lounge for both sexes. . . Piles of coal soot invaded 
 everything. . 
 
 Yet for practical purposes, the trial of monthly steam com- 
 munication, informally undertaken in 1836 and extended in 1837, 
 worked fully as well as its protagonists had expected, even though 
 the service was by no means perfect. There were instances of 
 heartburn in the presidencies when mails from Calcutta and 
 Madras occasionally missed being despatched from Bombay on 
 the proper steamer,®^ In 1838 some of the mail packets being 
 despatched both to and from India by the Mesopotamian route 
 during the monsoon season were seized and rifled by the Arabs 
 and their contents lost.®^ Occasionally steamers putting out from 
 Bombay during the prevalence of the southwest monsoon were 
 unable to reach their destination and had to put back into port.” 
 During the same year, the whole service was seriously disrupted 
 for a time owing to the necessity of diverting some of the Com- 
 pany’s steamers from their usual duties on the Suez line to war 
 service in the demonstration against Persia.®'* By this time, how- 
 ever, dependence on regular Indian mails was such that, instead 
 of provoking a storm of criticism against the whole business of 
 steam transit by the overland route, as would have been the case 
 but a very few years earlier, the wave of indignation was directed 
 
 “ Notes of a Journey through France and Egypt to Bombay,” in Asiatic 
 Journal, XXXII, N.S., Pt. I, 104—106. This is part of a detailed account given by 
 Emma Roberts, who made this particular trip (in 1839) chiefly for the experience. 
 Soon after reaching India, however, she succumbed to the effects of the climate and 
 died at Poona, in September, 1839, but a short time after her “Notes” had been 
 sent in. Miss Roberts ascribed much of the discomfort on board the Company’s 
 vessels to the fact that the officers hated the steam service. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 13, 30. 
 
 Ibid., XXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 159, 294, 295. There appeared to be some reason 
 to suspect that these Arabs had been sent out by the orders of Mehemet Ali for the 
 express purpose of intercepting and plundering the m.ails. This was probably 
 another of his many attempts to discredit the route through Mesopotamia and the 
 Persian Gulf. 
 
 Low, op. cit., II, 55, 56; Douglas, op. cit., p. 137; Asiatic Journal, XXX, 
 N.S., Pt. II, 121, 122. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1843, No. 399, p. 25 Asiatic Journal, XX\'^II, N.S., Pt. I, 89. 
 
I ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 225 
 
 at the Company’s political policy and at a system which permitted 
 a complete suspension of service whenever hostilities threatened. 
 Business houses had come to place a great deal of reliance on 
 speedy and dependable communication, and any defects which 
 developed in the scheme after 1837 elicited a chorus of protests, 
 not so much from the calamity-mongers, as from business houses 
 engaged in the eastern trade. 
 
 The number of Company’s steam vessels in Indian waters was 
 meanwhile growing. To the Atalanta and Berenice, sent out from 
 England in 1836 and early in 1837, was added the S emir amis in 
 April, 1838. This vessel, of 720 tons and 300 horsepower, com- 
 manded by Capt. George Barnes Brucks, who had won his spurs 
 in the surveys of the Indian Navy, was built with the purpose of 
 conquering “ that bug-bear of Bombay imagination, the southwest 
 monsoon.” The Semiramis proved to be unequal to the mon- 
 soon at its height, however. After having returned from armed 
 service in the Persian Gulf, the vessel was despatched from Bom- 
 bay on July 15, 1838, and for eight days plunged into the high 
 ! seas, covering but six hundred miles. With coal practically gone 
 I and paddle wheels battered by the heavy seas, the vessel had to 
 i return to Bombay.®® But this was an exception that proved the 
 I rulcj ordinarily these steamers were able to reach the mouth of 
 I the Red Sea in the most adverse weather.” 
 
 The Semiramis was the first vessel to be added to the Com- 
 ! pany’s fleet in accordance with the j oint plan adopted in May and 
 June of 1837. Some of the later vessels to be added were built 
 in the dockyard at Bombay, and fitted with engines brought out 
 from England. These were to make possible a complete steam 
 service on the Suez line and thus leave the sailing vessels for 
 survey and patrol work. Several new or remodeled steamers 
 were added to the eastern fleet in 1839 and 1840. Early in 1839 
 the Court of Directors found occasion to purchase for the packet 
 service an English coast-wise steamer, named the Kilkenny. She 
 had already been for some time in service, carrying swine from 
 Waterford to Bristol. After a perfunctory overhauling, this 
 vessel, of 684 tons and 280 horsepower, was despatched to Bom- 
 bay and was added to the service under the classic name of 
 j Zenobia, and within a few months became the most unpopular 
 packet in the fleet. The Victoria, 705 tons and 230 horsepower. 
 
 Low, of. cit., II, 52, 53. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 277, 294. 
 
 The voyages to Suez during the monsoon were frequently made under great 
 difficulty, however. See Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. 11 , 121, 122. 
 
226 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 was launched at Bombay late in 1839, and was presently put into 
 service under Commander Henry Ormsby, who had taken part 
 in one o£ the earliest surveys of Mesopotamia. The Victoria was 
 the fastest vessel of the Navy, and, because of her equipment, the ; 
 best passenger steamer. Another Bombay vessel, the Auckland, 
 of 946 tons and 220 horsepower, was launched in January, 1840. 
 In April, the steam-sloop Cleopatra arrived from England, in 
 charge of Commander Robert Moresby. In June another 
 English-built ship, the steam frigate Sesostrls, 876 tons and 220 : 
 horsepower, also in charge of Commander Moresby, made her 
 appearance at Bombay. An iron steamer, the Nemesis, 700 tons 
 and 120 horsepower, built at Liverpool, was sent out in March, 
 1840, and upon her arrival in India was employed in the Chinese 
 War as were some of the others.®® Still other fine vessels were ; 
 added from time to time.®® 
 
 In 1838 the Court of Directors determined to place their whole 
 Navy on a steam basis as soon as new vessels could be acquired. 
 Of the new steamers built, some were constructed with a view to j 
 constant service on the Bombay-Suez line, but all of them were 
 adapted for duty as armed naval vessels whenever need arose. ; 
 This naturally handicapped their utility as packet steamers, and 1 
 there were few regrets when the relatively luxurious vessels of a 
 new steam concern, constructed altogether for peace-time work 
 in conveying mails and passengers, made their appearance within 1 
 a few years east of Suez. Yet to the vessels of the Company’s 
 Indian Navy, sailing ships and steam ships alike, belongs the 
 credit of opening up and partially developing the shorter pas- 1 
 sages to Europe, and without this pioneering work it is difficult to 
 see how a private enterprise could readily have been successful. 
 
 A large part of the efiPectiveness of the overland route de- 
 pended on the passage through Egypt. How this portion of the 
 route, which gave the name “ overland ” to the whole, could best 
 be opened was the source of much perplexity from the first. 
 Neither the British Government nor the East India Company 
 cared to risk becoming involved in political complications with 
 the Pasha on the one hand or the Turkish Government on the 
 other under any sort of guarantee whatever. Hence this very 
 important link in what was otherwise becoming an official route 
 
 Low, op. c'lt., II, 135, 136; Asiatic Journal, XXXII, N.S., Pt. I, 206; III, 
 
 3d Ser., 355-358; Pari. Pap., 1843, No. 301, p. i. The orig-inal Semiramis was | 
 converted into a coal vessel in 1842, and stationed at Aden. Her engines, however, ' 
 were installed in a new teak ship built at Bombay and also christened the Semirajnis. ' 
 
 See Asiatic Journal, XXXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 295. 
 
 J 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 227 
 
 had to be left open to private enterprise. Such mails and de- 
 spatches as had been sent through Egypt prior to 1835 had been 
 carried, with a few exceptions, by private messengers employed 
 either by large business houses in London or by the Bombay 
 Government under the protection of the English Consul in Egypt. 
 But after the Company’s announcement of the new steamers to 
 be placed on the Red Sea line, there was evidently room for more 
 : private enterprise. 
 
 One of the first to sense a great opportunity in the situation 
 ; was Thomas Waghorn. All of Waghorn’s early projects for 
 commercial lines of steamships to ply between Great Britain and 
 |, India first by the Cape route and later by way of the Red Sea had 
 I come to nothing. Still, he had not been idle, having served on a 
 number of occasions as a messenger between the two countries, 
 
 ' and he had lost none of his enthusiasm for the Suez route.®® 
 
 ; Within a few weeks from the time of the announcement of new 
 t steamers to be built for the Suez line, Waghorn authorized the 
 .public announcement that he was about to proceed to Egypt and 
 "establish himself there as an agent for the transporting of mails, 
 "goods and passengers between Alexandria, Cairo, and Suez, so 
 That a definite schedule might be maintained between England 
 land India at all times. According to his plan, mails confided to 
 ii his care would be carried through Egypt by special messenger and 
 '. either embarked at Suez in vessels of the Indian Navy or sent in 
 country ” boats to Mocha, Aden, or Socotra, and thence as op- 
 Iportunity afforded to India. 
 
 But in a field having such bright prospects, Waghorn was not 
 .left long without competitors. Two Englishmen, Messrs. Hill 
 Sand Raven, had already established themselves at Cairo and had 
 'built there a hotel primarily for transient travellers by the over- 
 “land passage. Presently they extended their service and arranged 
 Tor the transportation of these travellers and their belongings 
 'across the desert between Cairo and Suez. In addition, almost 
 {simultaneously with Waghorn, they began the construction of a 
 [ hotel at Suez, where previously there had been no accommodation 
 I of any kind, except such as travellers might provide for them- 
 ' selves. It was a matter of some importance to remain in Suez 
 as brief a time as possible, because of the heat, dust, and general 
 dreariness of the place. According to a contemporary traveller — 
 
 " A lengthy petition from Mr. Waghorn, in which he condemned Chesney’s 
 |Euphrates venture and called attention to the greater advantages of the Suez route, 
 [was read in the House of Commons on 3 July. — Ibid., XVII, N.S., Pt. II, 276. 
 [See C. Rochfort Scott, Rambles in Egypt and Candia ... (2 vols., London, 1837) 
 j[II, 80 ff. 
 
 ! 
 
228 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The present arrangements for making it the point of com- 
 munication between Europe and India by means of steam- 
 navigation on the Red Sea, may probably give to it an 
 impulse and somewhat enlarge its population 5 but it can never 
 become anything more than a mere place of passage, which 
 both the traveler and the inhabitant will hasten to leave as 
 soon as possible. . , Not a garden, not a tree, not a trace 
 of verdure, not a drop of fresh water j all the water with 
 which Suez is supplied for personal use being brought from 
 the fountain Naba, three hours distant across the Gulf, and 
 so brackish as to be scarcely drinkable.®^ 
 
 The comfort of travellers across the eighty-odd miles of : 
 desert lying between Cairo and Suez was materially increased ^ 
 after 1836 by the efforts of the Bombay Steam Committee. This 1 
 group, upon finding that their object of fully establishing the 
 Suez line was about to be carried out by the Government, were 
 for a time at a loss as to what disposition to make of their steam 
 fund with its 1,10,907 rupees. In December, 1836, at the behest ] 
 of the British Consul at Cairo, Mr. Alfred S. Walne, they voted j 
 to apply the fund toward the improvement of the overland 1 
 passage through Egypt. Shortly afterward, the Committee, i 
 with the approval of the Bombay Government, despatched a Col. ) 
 Barr to Egypt to arrange for the building of a series of way 
 stations in the Egyptian desert where through passengers might • 
 pause for rest and refreshment. Col. Barr found an influential ■: 
 patron in the English Consul-General, Col. Patrick Campbell. , 
 Upon the completion of plans for the highway through the desert, 
 the Consul-General addressed a long official letter to the Pasha : 
 requesting permission to erect the desired structures.®® 
 
 Pending the receipt of the expected answer to this communica- 
 tion, arrangements were entered into wfith Messrs. Hill and 
 Raven, whereby they were to furnish carriages, baggage wagons, 
 and other equipment for the desert journey, and have them 
 always in readiness at either end of the line. The Steam Com- 
 mittee undertook the initial expense of this arrangement, commis- 
 
 Robinson, op. cit., I, 47. Anon., A Handbook for India and Egypt, Com- 
 prising the Narrative of a Journey from Calcutta to England . . . and Hints for 
 the Guidance of Passengers by that a:)id other Overland Routes . . . (London, 1S41), 
 said (p. 285) : “ The wretchedness of Suez has often been described, but never in i 
 terms too severe; the hotels belonging to the rival agents, Mr. Waghorn and Messrs. I 
 Hill and Raven, are both uncomfortable.” ! 
 
 F.O. 97/408, Report by Walne to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847; Asiatic Jounuil, 1 
 XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 34, 35. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXTV^II, N.S., Pt. II, 15; W. H. Yates, The Modern History ' 
 and Condition of Egypt ... (2 vols., London, 1843), I, 500—505. 
 
(ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 229 
 
 sioning Messrs. Hill and Raven to act as agents for a period of 
 (five years at a contract price of £1000.®* For an additional sum 
 ^ the agents also contracted to erect the desert stations. These 
 were to consist of five buildings, four of them small, and one, in 
 the center of the desert, of the character of a hotel, with subsidiary 
 servants’ quarters, stables, and the like. An expansion of this 
 service was contemplated later in case of its success.®® It was 
 originally projected that these accommodations, exclusive of food 
 and drink, and including lodging at Messrs. Hill and Raven’s 
 Suez hotel, should be free to overland passengers. The large 
 expense involved in the plan, however, necessitated the charging 
 of nominal rates to all travellers who accepted the conduct of 
 Messrs. Hill and Raven, the whole service being, of course, op- 
 : tional. It was estimated that when this plan was fully in opera- 
 tion, as it was intended to be by 1838, the desert trip could be 
 made in about 24 hours, with only about 20 hours of actual 
 travelling.®® 
 
 Under these conditions a miniature transportation war devel- 
 oped between Waghorn and Messrs. Hill and Raven. Whereas 
 ' the latter were the official agents for the Bombay Steam Com- 
 '' mittee, Waghorn was the accredited agent of the British Post 
 ■ Office.®^ Moreover, his service extended all the way through 
 ij| Egypt, whereas Messrs. Hill and Raven operated the desert line 
 only. A traveller might surrender himself at either Suez or 
 Alexandria to a representative of Waghorn’s concern, and, theo- 
 II retically at least, relinquish all feeling of responsibility for bag- 
 .„gage or means of conveyance until he had again safely boarded 
 '*an out-going steamer. For this service, however, Waghorn 
 |! exacted fees totalling about £13, as against £6 collected by the 
 ^1 rival line for the desert trip only. But travellers by either agency 
 jWere invariably inconvenienced by the operations of the other. 
 1 Waghorn’s clients were not permitted to use the desert way sta- 
 tions, or even to procure water at these stopping places, but Wag- 
 Si horn was frequently able to retaliate by hiring all of the draft 
 1 and carriage animals to be had in Cairo or Suez and thus to em- 
 ( barrass his rivals by temporarily monopolizing the means of trans- 
 portation.®® 
 
 F.O. 97/408, C. A. Murray to Lord Palmerston. Barr was severely criticized 
 by Walne for placing control of the desert station houses in the hands of a com- 
 petitive concern when they should have been opened to the travelling public. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVII, N.S., Pt. II, i6. 
 
 Handbook for India and Egypt . . . p. 261. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 162. 
 
 Ibid., XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 18, 19; ibid., XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 349, 350; ibid., 
 ( XXXII, N.S., Pt. I, 22-30. The whole expense of a trip from London to Cal- 
 
230 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The open rivalry of Waghorn and Hill continued until 1841, 
 when the latter, who possessed more financial backing, w^on out. 
 Waghorn was obliged to give up his independent passenger 
 agency and coalesce with Hill, whose concern was thereafter 
 known as J, R. Hill and Co.®® The enlarged concern proceeded 
 to improve their service by bringing out from England a small 
 iron steamboat, the Jack 0’ 'Lantern^ which plied on the Nile 
 between Boulac, the port of Cairo, and Atfeh, at the junction of 
 the Nile and the Mahmoudie Canal. A small independent com- 
 pany which had maintained horse-drawn track boats on the Canal 
 between Atfeh and Alexandria for some time was purchased by 
 Hill and Co. in 1842, giving them complete control of the entire 
 line from Alexandria to Suez for the time being.’® This period 
 of monopoly, however, was short lived. The Company, which 
 had never prospered in spite of heavy charges, managed to survive 
 the undermining activities of the new and powerful Peninsular 
 and Oriental Steam Navigation Company for some two years, but 
 they presently succumbed to a new monopoly created by the 
 Pasha. The new concern, known as the Egyptian Transit Com- 
 pany, bought out Hill and Co. in 1843, from that time 
 until the opening of the Suez Canal the transh through Egy^Jt 
 in most respects was under the direct control of the Egyptian 
 Government. 
 
 The convenience of travellers was greatly augmented and the 
 whole matter of maintaining regular steamship schedules was 
 materially aided, by the completion in 1839 of a semaphoric tele- 
 graph line from Suez to Cairo. Thereafter passengers for India 
 sojourned in Cairo until their vessel was reported about ready to 
 depart from Suez before they set out across the desert.’® The 
 facilities for making the passage through Egypt still remained 
 primitive and unsatisfactory for some years. Nearly every trav- 
 eller spoke with disapprobation of the arrangements provided. It 
 was only after the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
 Company had succeeded in establishing their own steam lines on 
 both sides of the Isthmus of Suez that the transit through Egypt 
 was very greatly improved. 
 
 Mehemet Ali had from the first taken a deep interest in the 
 
 cutta by way of Marseilles at this time was about £170, not an insig'nificant sum even 
 to the wealthy official class and the “ globe trotters ” who patronized the line. 
 Handbook for India and Egypt . . . p. 370. 
 
 F.O. 97/408, C. A. Murray to Lord Palmerston. 
 
 Report by A. S. Walne as transmitted by C. A. Murray, F.O. 97/40S. 
 
 Gallery of Illustration: The Route of the Overland Mail to India from 
 Southampton to Calcutta (London, 1850), p. 25; Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., II, 53-54. 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 231 
 
 [! various plans for closer contacts between England and India, 
 n Their realization, he foresaw, must inevitably bring his own 
 1 j country into new prominence and might be expected to afford new 
 n commercial opportunities and cultural influences. For these 
 reasons he lent every encouragement to the development of the 
 ; overland route through Egypt, which he would presumably al- 
 ;; ways be able to control, while he left nothing undone to make 
 i: the alternative Euphrates route appear impracticable.’^^ When 
 i steam vessels began to multiply on both sides of his country, he 
 It took counsel as to how he might best exploit the latent oppor- 
 tunities of steam transit. He was at first content to give right of 
 ; free passage through Egypt to both mails and passengers. But 
 by 1834 he had evolved a plan, which, if promptly carried into 
 I' effect, would have dispensed immediately with the need for both 
 (i Mr. Waghorn and Mr. Hillj he had concluded to build a railway 
 || across Egypt from Alexandria to Suez by way of Cairo. This, he 
 believed, would at once facilitate the transit through Egypt, 
 
 I greatly increase travel and transportation of goods and wares, and 
 I also yield a substantial revenue. 
 
 The railway line was laid out by Galloway Bey, one of the 
 several sons of Alexander Galloway, an Englishman, who had 
 spent many years in Egypt engaged in engineering enterprises. 
 Following the railway survey in 1834, Galloway Bey was com- 
 missioned by the Pasha to go to England and secure from the 
 j: English Government a formal approval of his (the Pasha’s) 
 
 I proposition of placing a tariff of 6d. per mile for English goods 
 I on the first portion of the completed line, which would be about 
 I 80 miles in length. Feeling confident that his proposal would be 
 I accepted, and that the Egyptian line would soon entirely replace 
 ■ that by the Cape not only for travel and communication, but for 
 I goods as well, he proceeded to place large orders with English 
 firms for iron rails, ties, and other railway equipment, shipments 
 of which were commenced in 1835.^® 
 
 > The prompt completion of a railway through Egypt, even 
 under the auspices of the Pasha, must surely have given a great 
 » impetus to the completion of measures for regular monthly 
 steam transit on the Suez line. The time required for crossing 
 the country, which ordinarily averaged from eight to ten days, 
 
 i See above, pp. 165-166, fassim. 
 
 i That he overlooked no opportunities to collect duties on foreign goods is 
 
 J indicated by the “ Firman of the Sultan of Turkey to the Pasha of Egypt, relative 
 f to the execution in Egypt of the Treaties of Commerce between the Ottoman Porte 
 j and Great Britain,” of 24 Dec., 1835. — British and. Foreign State Pafers, XXIII, 
 
 I 1291, 1292. 
 
 I Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., pp. 63, 64; App. No. 2, p. 
 
 202. 
 
232 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 
 could thus be reduced to twenty-four or thirty hours.'® By pro- 
 viding express service, travellers and mails could readily avoid 
 exposure to the plague, and the heat and other dangers of the 
 desert journey could be very largely eliminated. Nevertheless, 
 the British Government gave the Pasha^s proposal a wide berth. I 
 The guarantee of a minimum rate of duties on commercial articles 
 in transit might, it was thought, be interpreted as a guarantee of 
 the line itself. Considering the delicate balance of the political 
 situation in the Near East, the unfriendly relations existing be- 
 tween the Pasha and the Porte, and the necessity of keeping on 
 good terms with the Sultan’s Government at all events, caused 
 the British authorities largely to ignore the proposition. Lacking 
 British sanction of his enterprise, the Pasha considered it impru- 
 dent to continue with the construction of the line. The iron 
 rails, being unloaded in Egypt, were left there to rust, the wooden 
 ties were piled up and left to rot, while the railway became, for 
 the time being, only a subject for speculation. Some twenty years 
 were to elapse before the project came to fruition. 
 
 For two years after the adoption of the cooperative plan of 
 communication of 1837, the Board of Control and the Directors 
 of the East India Company anxiously watched the operation of 
 the colossal experiment. They could not remain long in doubt as 
 to the effective character of the results. In spite of the fact that 
 a tremendous expense had been undertaken, the first cost alone of 
 the steamers in operation having amounted to nearly £213,000,” 
 the returns from private mails and passengers were rapidly 
 mounting, while the estimated benefit to business interests in 
 England and India more than compensated for the outlay. That 
 the service was effective was demonstrated beyond doubt by the 
 complaints which arose whenever the slightest interruption oc- 
 curred in the transit. Indeed, a few business men grumbled that 
 it was too effective, since sight drafts sent out by the overland 
 route calculated on the usual six months’ credit frequently reached 
 the purchaser of goods before the goods, sent around the Cape, 
 had been heard of. Bills had thus occasionally to be paid before 
 the goods purchased were seen. This difficulty was soon reme- 
 died, however, by the simple expedient of extending the time of 
 collection from six to nine months.^® 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1837, No. 539, Min. of Ev., p. 64; London Times, z Oct., 1835; 
 Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 193. One of the factors which contributed to 
 the suspension of the railway project was the death at Alexandria on July 3, 1836, 
 of Galloway Bey, who had been an intimate adviser of the Pasha and who had urged 
 the building of the road. — Ibid., XXI, N.S., Pt. II, 53. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1843, No. 301, p. i. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXV, N.S., Pt. II, 140. Cf. Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 372, 
 pp. 107, 108. 
 
1 
 
 ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 233 
 
 Travellers who made the trip to or from India by the overland 
 route, almost invariably preferred it to that by way of the Cape, 
 although it was considerably • more expensive and the passage 
 through Egypt was frequently attended with discomforts. The 
 Government, vtoo, had ample reason to feel gratified at the speed 
 with which despatches could be exchanged during the series of 
 hostile manoeuvres which filled the years after 1837. The issue 
 with Persia in 1837-1838 was more readily terminated, danger 
 from the Syrian crisis of 1838-1841 more easily guarded against, 
 and the war with China much more effectively conducted because 
 of the shortening of time-distances with the East. 
 
 One of the last steps in establishing the overland route was 
 taken when a Post Office Convention between Britain and France 
 was signed on May 10, 1839. This document, providing for 
 “ the conveyance through France of the Correspondence of the 
 East Indies with England, and vice versa,” outlined in detail the 
 reciprocal agreements which had first been discussed two years 
 earlier.^® This document served as the basis for a series of other 
 Post Office Conventions throughout the remainder of the cen- 
 tury, and ranks with treaties of political alliance in its influence 
 for peace. It was drawn up on the very eve of the dangerous 
 political crisis growing out of the conquests of Mehemet Ali, and 
 i there can be little doubt that the understanding reached between 
 the two countries at Paris in May, 1839, resting on a real need of 
 ; cooperative action, exerted its moderating influences to prevent 
 an open clash of the two Powers. 
 
 ® A few weeks afterward, on July 3, a measure was taken which 
 may be considered the final act in the establishment of rapid and 
 permanent postal communication with the East by the overland 
 1 route. On this date the Court of Directors, with the approval of 
 I the Admiralty, Treasury, and Post Office Departments, sent to 
 I both the Bombay and Supreme Indian Governments a list of 
 
 I “ Regulations for the Establishment of a Monthly Communica- 
 ; I tion with India.” This set of instructions, based partly on the 
 
 I I recent Post Office Convention with France, provided for the 
 ! despatch of mails at either end of the long line once in every calen- 
 dar month, gave the schedule to be observed at Suez, Alexandria, 
 
 i and Malta, and provided for all reasonable eventualities. 
 
 I Brit, and For. St. Pap., XXVII, 1004— 1012. See I. G. J. Hamilton, An 
 
 ■fl Outline of Postal History and Practise ’with a History of the Post Office of India 
 if (Calcutta, 1910), p. 149; T. A. Curtis, State of the Question of Steam- 
 i! Communication ’with India ’via the Red Sea . . . (London, 1839) ; Philo-Johannes, 
 j A Modest Defence of the East-India Company's Management of Steam- 
 'I Communication ’with India (London, 1839). 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1843, No. 301, pp. 2, 3. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 234 
 
 1 
 
 Thus was completed the first definite move in the bringing to- ( 
 gether of East and West. It had required much enterprise at 
 both ends of the line to bring about its consummation, and still 
 the right to use it depended on the good will of the Ottoman 
 Porte and the cooperation of the feudatory government of Egypt. 
 Yet it functioned well and regularly for purposes of communica- , 
 tion. Some fifteen years had been required for this establishment ■ 
 since the first tangible step was taken, years characterized by a 
 vast lot of speculation, promotion, controversy, exploration, and 1 
 failure, but a definite beginning had been achieved. The success ] 
 of the line to Bombay was but a greater argument for a service ( 
 which would embrace Madras and Calcutta as well, yet not those ■ 
 communities alone. European interests in Singapore and Sydney 
 were already clamoring for the extension of steam service to 1 
 satisfy their growing needs. Already ephemeral “ Steam Com- i 
 mittees ” were being formed and steam navigation companies ij 
 projected. Moreover, a brief experience with monthly service j 
 sufficed to show that whereas it was both more serviceable and j 
 more profitable than a quarterly scheme, a fortnightly service 1 
 would be more practicable still. Beyond that, although in 1840 ; 
 few could see so clearly into the future, a regular weekly com- 
 munication would be demanded, first to India, then to more out- 
 lying parts of the Empire. But even this would not suffice. The 1 
 electric telegraph and submarine cable could instantly bridge j 
 distance, and the thought was father to the deed. Even here the 1 
 elimination of time-distance has not paused. 
 
 The opening of the line to India by way of the Red Sea de- 
 pended to a considerable extent on the success of the steam engine. 
 Despite the funds subscribed, the active propaganda, and the 
 voluble arguments of enthusiasts, the development of the over- 
 land route kept even pace with the mechanical evolution of the 
 means of transportation. The history of this first stage in the 
 opening of shorter lines to the East is due to the high pressure 
 engine and improved steamship design, as well as to ready capital, 
 large business interests, and extensive advertising. The further 
 development of the overland route and subsidiary lines of transit 
 epitomize the history of still other improvements. During the 
 next fifteen years the steam engine continued to improve, the 
 steamship was more scientifically propelled, the railway became 
 a greater contributing factor to the reduction of long distances, 
 and the electric telegraph played a much more important role. 
 The days of the submarine cable, the screw propeller, the internal i 
 combustion engine and wireless telegraphy were still to come. 
 
 Still, in the development and application of mechanical ap- : 
 
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE 235 
 
 pliances, the human element is everywhere present. Necessity 
 is the mother of invention. Only as needs and stresses developed 
 were new scientific principles sought. Only as these were dis- 
 covered could they be applied j and the methods of application 
 were always in keeping with human interests. At times the hes- 
 itation, the petty quibbling, the foolish errors so intimately asso- 
 ciated with the opening of the new line of communication between 
 London and Bombay seem strangely futile, yet this is but an 
 inevitable feature of the adaptation of new and untried forces to 
 the filling of a great human need 5 a feature of the trial and error 
 method by which all revolutionary processes are carried out. The 
 next fifteen years after the definite opening of the overland 
 passage were also characterized by the promotion of doubtful 
 enterprises, conflicting propaganda, intrigue and bitterness among 
 those who wished an extension of lines of communication. Yet 
 it was also a period of progress. The steam service was speeded 
 up, steam vessels grew larger, more seaworthy and more numer- 
 ous, and for the traveller a long voyage was no longer the tre- 
 mendous ordeal it had been but a few years earlier. And at the 
 end of the period lines of commercial transportation were prepar- 
 ing to follow those of communication with the cutting through 
 of that single great barrier, the Isthmus of Suez. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 
 
 S TEAM LINES in European and in Asiatic waters w'ere 
 phenomenally successful in eliminating time-distances and 
 in drawing West and East together. By the middle of 
 the nineteenth century the indispensability of the overland route 
 could no longer be denied even by the most skeptical. But while 
 steam vessels arriving in Egyptian waters annually became larger 
 and more powerful, increasing in the comfort of their appoint- 
 ments and in their independence of the elements, one great 
 problem remained to be solved before this route could compete 
 commercially with the Cape route or realize its full development 
 as an artery of communication. This problem was concerned 
 with the passage through Egypt. Mails, passengers, arid goods 
 continued to suffer the delays and discomforts consequent upon 
 having to pursue a tortuous course between the Mediterranean 
 and Red Seas. This portion of the route to the East had failed 
 to keep pace with improvements elsewhere because of both politi- 
 cal and material obstacles to facile transit. 
 
 Prior to the formation of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
 Navigation Company, relatively little had been accomplished in 
 the way of simplifying or systematizing the passage through 
 Egypt. ^ A series of station houses had been built in the desert 
 between Cairo and Suez in 1838, but they were pitifully inade- 
 quate from the start because of the rapidly growing number of 
 passengers travelling by the overland route.' The hotels which 
 had been established by rival promoters at Suez were small and 
 
 ^ Gallery of Illustration: The Route of the Overland Mail to India from 
 Southamfton to Calcutta, pp. 7, 8, ff. This pamphlet was prepared bj' Thos. Grieve, 
 Capt. Moresby, and others connected with the P. & O. 
 
 ■ Asiatic Journal, XXXV, N.S., Pt. II, 283— 2S4.; Arthur Anderson, Com~ 
 munication with India, China, etc., via Egypt (London, [1843]). Not all overland 
 passengers crossed from Suez to Cairo. An alternative line provided for the passage 
 of tourists over the hundred miles between Cosseir on the Red Sea and Thebes on 
 the Nile. P. & O. vessels for a time stopped at Cosseir in going to and from Suez. 
 This line never became a main highway, however, and stops at Cosseir were dis- 
 continued after a few years. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 237 
 
 dirty, and did little to remove from that dismal spot its early 
 i reputation of being the most desolate place on earth. Some at- 
 I tempts had been made to provide for the transportation of pas- 
 I sengers and luggage across the desert and between Cairo and 
 Alexandria, but it was only after 1840 that springless carriages 
 ( and vans replaced the somewhat less convenient donkeys and 
 ;! camels formerly provided for conveyance.® One of the chief 
 !■ improvements made during the early period of steam communica- 
 tion was the opening up and improvement of the Mahmoudie 
 { Canal by Mehemet Ali between 1819 and 1837. The canal, 
 
 ; although little more than a wide ditch, provided a water com- 
 munication between the port of Alexandria and the Nile at Atfeh, 
 i a distance of forty miles, and thus made unnecessary a difficult 
 caravan or wagon ride at this end of the journey. However, 
 
 I the equipment at first placed on the canal consisted of small track- 
 ' boats drawn by donkeys, boats which were not only open to the 
 elements and altogether comfortless, but were generally swarm- 
 ing. with vermin. The slow sailing vessels on the Nile between 
 Atfeh and Boulac, the port of Cairo, were little better. The 
 concern of British and Indian authorities in opening the overland 
 route had been the acceleration of the mails. It remained for a 
 private corporation to undertake to improve the facilities for 
 passenger transportation. 
 
 The passage through Egypt underwent a series of mild im- 
 provements with the beginning of the through service of the 
 I Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. In 1841, 
 as a result of the visit to Egypt of Arthur Anderson, one of 
 the founders of the Company, another steamer was placed on the 
 ! Nile and improved trackboats on the Mahmoudie Canal for the 
 I simultaneous accommodation of passengers going in both direc- 
 tions.^ Other river steamers were put under construction for the 
 same purpose. Late in the year 1841, after the termination of 
 hostilities in the Levant, Anderson was able to conclude an ar- 
 i rangement with Mehemet Ali whereby the track across the desert 
 i between Cairo and Suez should be mended and cleared of loose 
 i stones. The Pasha also promised special protection to goods and 
 
 ® See Charles Dickens, Household Words: A Weekly Journal^ Sat., 17 Aug., 
 1850 (Vol. I, No. 21), p. 499, “The Life and Labours of Lieutenant Waghorn”; 
 
 ( George Parbury, Hand-Book for India and Egypt, Comprising the Narrative of a 
 Journey from Calcutta to England . . . (2d ed., London, 1842). 
 
 I * Asiatic Journal, XXXV, N.S., Pt. II, 284; ibid., XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 241, 242. 
 1 The Cairo, which was sent out in 1841 to supplement the Lotus already plying on 
 : the Nile, was an iron vessel, described as “ a remarkably elegant vessel, similar in 
 > appearance to those steamers called the W atermen, running between London and 
 j Woolwick.” The Cairo accommodated a hundred passengers. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 238 
 
 passengers in transit.® Bonded packages were not to be opened. 1 
 The Company was thereafter permitted to use any kind of vehicle 
 for the transportation service, to build depots and magazines, and 
 to place their own steamers under the British flag on both the 
 Nile and the Mahmoudie Canal.® In consideration of these 
 concessions, the Company engaged its Egyptian representatives, 
 Messrs. Briggs and Company, to keep a record of all goods taken 
 through Egypt and to pay annually a transit duty of one-half 
 per cent ad valorem^ instead of the previous three per cent. The 
 Company, in turn, added the amount of this duty to its transporta- 
 tion charges on goods sent in either direction by private shippers. 
 This agreement was reenforced and supplemented by a code of 
 regulations published by the orders of the Pasha on May 13, 
 1843.^ 
 
 In consequence of these improvements, it was next proposed to 
 revive the project of the Egyptian Railway, particularly that 1 
 section from Cairo to Suez, which had remained in abeyance since 1 
 the death of the Pasha’s engineer, Galloway Bey, and the simul- 
 taneous rise of political difficulties, in 1835. Mehemet Ali again 1 
 signified his willingness to construct a line between Cairo and , 
 Suez, a distance of about 100 miles,® at his own expense, and 
 equip the line for passenger as well as commercial transportation, 
 if he were assured by the British Post Office of a definite payment ! 
 for the carriage of British mails. This proposal, which had the 
 support of the P. and O. Company as well as many smaller con- : 
 cerns operating in or through Egypt, had much to recommend it. 
 
 A laborious journey of twenty-four to twenty-eight hours would i 
 be reduced to a comparatively comfortable trip of only a few 1 
 hours, and better steamship schedules could be maintained both 
 in the Mediterranean and in eastern waters. 
 
 The plan enjoyed but a brief day in the limelight, however. ! 
 Mehemet Ali did give orders for the resumption of work on the i 
 road. The carrying out of the plan was conditioned, however, i 
 
 ® The first part, at least, of this agreement was not carried out. See John 
 Alexander Galloway, Observations on the Proposed Improvements in the Overland ! 
 Route via Egypt, with remarks on the Ship Canal, the Boulac Canal, and the Suez i 
 Railroad (London, 1844), pp. 5, 6. 
 
 ® F.O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847. steam tug with a screw 
 propeller was used on the Mahmoudie Canal, one of the first instances where this 
 type of propulsion was commercially employed. 
 
 ’’ Asiatic Journal, XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 323, 398; ibid., 3d Ser., I, 327; Ander- 1 
 son, op. cit., pp. 22—26; [Thomas Waghorn], Messrs. Waghorn & Company’s i 
 Overland Guide to India (London, 1844), pp. 63, 64. 
 
 ® The anonymous writer of the pamphlet. On the Communications between 
 Europe and India through Egypt (London, 1846), insisted (pp. 45, 46) that the 
 railway would not need to be more than 90 miles in length, and that there were no 
 engineering difiiculties in the way, in contrast with those inherent in a ship canal. 
 
I COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 239 
 
 i] by the Pasha’s requirement that “ the British Government agree 
 ij to certain arrangements for the future payment for conveying the 
 1. mails, when the railroad is finished.” ® J. A. Galloway, the 
 ! English engineer in charge, immediately took up the matter with 
 
 II Sir Robert Peel in October, 1843, who referred the subject to the 
 ! Foreign Secretary, Lord Aberdeen. Late in October, Aberdeen 
 . replied stating that “ Her Majesty’s Government would direct 
 I the Consul-General to give his countenance to the undertak- 
 ! ing.” This was not enough to satisfy the Pasha, who was 
 : already under fire, and he insisted that he be guaranteed a revenue 
 
 of a piastre (about i^d.) per letter on the mails transported 
 
 I through Egypt. But at this point the British Cabinet balked, 
 unwilling to endanger the recent arrangement concerning Egypt 
 by official guarantees of any kind. 
 
 i Meanwhile the French had not been idle. Representatives in 
 ( Egypt of the French Government protested vigorously against 
 ■ the prosecution of a plan which would rival the canal already 
 : I projected by French capitalists.^ The old Pasha therefore re- 
 « luctantly abandoned for the second time a scheme which he be- 
 lieved would at once benefit Egypt and Great Britain without 
 ! seriously endangering the interests of other countries. Thus 
 rebuffed in one of his favorite projects, Mehemet Ali set about 
 i; accomplishing at least a part of his object, that of profiting from 
 j{ the essential nature of the route through Egypt for the eastern 
 mails. This had been uppermost in his mind ever since the open- 
 1] ing of the overland route. 
 
 i[ The first step taken in the new plan of action was the 
 [ I removal from the Peninsular and Oriental Company of many of 
 i ' the exclusive privileges which had been granted them less than 
 [; three years before. In 1844, the Company sent out to Egypt a 
 [S new steamer, the Delta, to replace one of the older steamers 
 ij! navigating the Nile. The British Government was expected to 
 1 1; give support in securing permission to operate the new vessel on 
 
 I I the Nile, but it refused to do so, pending the outcome of negotia- 
 I ! tions on a new series of contracts being prepared for the carriage 
 
 ' of mails to the East. The Pasha, scenting a favorable oppor- 
 ij tunity for beginning a series of encroachments on the monopolies 
 
 I ® Galloway, op. cit., p. 13. 
 
 , li Ibid,., p. 13. This instruction was actually issued. — F.O. 97/408, C. A. 
 
 [I Murray to Lord Palmerston, 4 Nov., 1846. 
 
 ! Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., Ill, 427; ibid., IV, 207; Messrs. W aghorn & Cotn- 
 
 il pany’s Overland Guide to India, pp. 72—73. 
 
 I London Times, 29 Jan., 1845; Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 439. 
 
 i F.O. 97/408, A “Separate and Confidential” communication from Murray 
 
 to Palmerston, 4 Nov., 1846. 
 
240 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 
 which British concerns had acquired in the transit arrangements, 
 thereupon refused a license for the use of the Delta on the Nile, 
 stating that he was contemplating a complete reorganization of 
 the transit/^ 
 
 Shortly afterward a new monopoly was created under license 
 from the Pasha known as the Egyptian Transit Company. The 
 circumstances surrounding its origin do not appear to have become 
 wholly known in England at any time, but within a few years its 
 character was largely discovered. The Transit Company proved 
 to be a private monopoly, chartered and financed by the Pasha, 
 and headed by two Englishmen who had already, in 1843, bought 
 out the desert transit business of Messrs. Hill and Company.^® 1 
 These men were given sole rights of transporting mails, passen- 1 
 gers and goods through Egypt, their monopoly of transport being 
 supported by proclamations of the Pasha that no person might i 
 pass through the country except in the conveyances belonging to 
 the Transit Company.^® At the same time, the privileges granted 
 to the P. and O. Company in September, 1841, for employing 
 their boats on the Nile and the Mahmoudie Canal, were revoked, 
 and they were asked to state the conditions under which they 
 would be willing to transfer their somewhat extensive equipment 
 to the new concern. The Company refused to consider disposing 
 of their equipment, and attempted to carry on their own transit 
 between Alexandria and Cairo by chartering their new and com- 
 modious steamer Delta to the Agent of the East India Company 
 so that the mail service might be continued under privileges long 
 possessed by that Company. This scheme was immediately 
 thwarted by the Pasha, however, and the steam outfit of the P. 
 and O. Company remained idle at Alexandria for well over a 
 year. When at last it became sufficiently obvious that, even in 
 consequence of the new postal contracts awarded the P. and 0 . 
 Company in 1845, the right of navigating the Nile would not be : 
 renewed, negotiations for the sale of the entire equipment of the 
 Company in Egypt were begun and eventually consummated.^' 
 
 Ibid., Letter from Briggs & Co. to the P. and O. Company, 26 Oct., 18+4. 
 The Pasha had never conceded to the P. and O. Company the right of navigating 
 the Nile, but had merely issued licenses to that effect for specified vessels, a pri\dlege 
 which might be withdrawn at any time. It was argued that he would have stopped 
 the transit altogether if he had dared, but the author has found no evidence of such 
 a desire. 
 
 See (Anon.), On the Communications betzueen Europe and India through 
 Egypt, pp. 29-33; F.O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847; John A. 
 Galloway, Observations on the Proposed Improvements in the Overland Route (1844). 
 
 Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 440; Illustrated Londo7i Nezvs, 8 Nov., 1845, 
 p. 292. 
 
 F.O. 97/408, Capt. John Lyons, E. I. Co. Agent, to the Secret Committee of 
 the East India Co., 8 Oct., 1846. The last of the equipment was not turned over 
 to the Pasha until February, 1848. 
 
[! COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 241 
 
 Only the British mails remained free from the Pasha’s direct 
 control under the new s) stem. These still were conveyed through 
 Egypt by Post Office a gents under the care of the British Consul- 
 General and with the protection of the Egyptian Government.’® 
 
 ■ In 1845, however, a Postal Convention between the British and 
 ! Egyptian Governments was made necessary because of the altered 
 ’ state of the Egyptian transit. This Convention, which was to 
 
 last for five years, was based on the Anglo-French arrangements 
 ; for the transit of British and Indian mails along the line between 
 I Marseilles and Channel ports. By this new arrangement, Me- 
 * hemet Ali was permitted to levy a tariff on letters and newspapers 
 at so much per pound, the conveyance of mails through Egypt 
 ' thereafter to be at the Pasha’s expense.’® Passengers continued 
 
 ■ to pay for their passage through Egypt such monopolistic rates as 
 I the Transit Company chose to levy. In accordance with a promise 
 ' made by the Pasha, commercial wares transported through Egypt 
 I by the Transit Company passed at the low rate oi ad valorem. 
 
 ' The Transit Company could care for only very small quantities 
 [ of goods, however, and on such as were transported by other 
 p means the Pasha collected duties at 3%, the rate prescribed by 
 J the Balta-Liman Convention of 1838 between Great Britain and 
 : the Porte.®® Thus, with the exercise of considerable patience and 
 
 judgment, Mehemet Ali largely succeeded in carrying out one of 
 1 his dearest projects, that of controlling as well as encouraging the 
 ! use of the route through Egypt. Only one more measure re- 
 I mained to be taken, that of removing the monopoly granted to 
 : the Egyptian Transit Company. It had served its turn. It had 
 ,[ averted open hostility which might otherwise have followed the 
 I termination of the licenses of the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany because the new beneficiaries of the Pasha’s favor were 
 Englishmen. 
 
 About the beginning of the year 1846 the Egyptian Transit 
 Company was broken up with the assistance of the Pasha’s French 
 advisers, and the transit business was made a branch of the gov- 
 ernmental administration.®’ Frenchmen were appointed to take 
 charge of the details of the operation of the transit, replacing the 
 English concessionaires of the previous Transit Company. This 
 was a considerable blow to British pride, and there was no little 
 
 I Ihid., H. Johnson, Packet Agent at Alexandria, to Col. Maberly, 12 Aug., 
 
 and 2 Oct., 1846. No especial provision was made in the Postal Convention for 
 the mails to be accompanied, however. See ihii., Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 
 I 1847. 
 
 I Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 439, 440. 
 
 I F.O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847; Report of Consul A. S. 
 
 '1 Walne. 
 
 I F.O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 4 Nov., 1846, 6 June, 1847; J. Charles- 
 
 Roux, LUsthme et le Canal de Suez, I, 185. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 242 
 
 grumbling at home at the policy of the Government which per- 
 mitted this most essential link in the chain of communications 
 with the East to come into the hands of those hostile to British 
 interests. “ In spite of the importance of rapid communication 
 with India, and in spite of the example of Austria and France, who 
 have occupied half the route to India with their steamers, both 
 the British Government and the East India Company persist in 
 neglecting the route through Egypt,” complained one writer.^^ 
 
 These events, following hard upon numerous evidences of 
 French hostility to English capital and English influence in 
 Egypt, gave considerable concern to the British Government. 
 Palmerston voiced his regrets that the steamers of the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Company had to be turned over to Mehemet Ali,^® 
 and instructed the Consul-General in Egypt, Mr. C. A. Murray, 
 to use all of his influence to maintain the employment of British 
 capital and personnel as far as possible in connection with the line 
 of communications through Egypt. Murray was particularly 
 instructed to keep alive the project of an Egyptian railway as a 
 counterpoise to the canal scheme which was beginning to take on 
 unpleasant proportions. 
 
 Nevertheless, the immediate effects of the establishment of an 
 Egyptian Transit Administration by Mehemet Ali were calculated 
 to remove British apprehensions as far as possible. Facilities for 
 passage, instead of becoming worse, became better. On both sec- 
 tions of the line through Egypt, charges for passengers were 
 reduced, not only below the prices charged by the Transit Com- ' 
 pany, but even below those formerly charged by the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Company.^^ The comfort and safety of passengers 
 was studied, the equipment on both branches of the line through 
 Egypt was constantly augmented, the number of desert station 
 houses was doubled, and the road across the desert was greatly 
 improved.^® There remained some question as to the final dis- 
 position of the desert station houses. At the time of their construc- 
 tion in 1838 with the funds of the Bombay Steam Committee, it 
 was understood that the Committee’s agent was to have sole right I 
 to govern their employment over a period of ten years. This right i 
 
 On the Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, p. 3. 
 
 F.O. 97/408, H. U. Adding'ton, of the Foreign Office, to Arthur Anderson, 
 
 5 Feb., 1847. 
 
 Ibid., Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847; report of Consul Alfred S. Walne. 
 
 F.O. 97/408, Report of Consul A. S. Walne; ibid., Murray to Palmerston, 
 
 6 June, 1847; Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 349, p. 25; On the Communications between 
 Europe and India through Egypt, pp. 29—33; F. W. Simms, England to 
 Calcutta, by the Overland Route, in 1845 . . . (London, 1875); T. H. Usborne, 
 
 A New Guide to the Levant . . . together with Tables of all the Mediterranean 
 Steamers . . . (London, 1840). 
 
[comprehensive plan of communication 243 
 
 I was then to be renewable upon formal application by the British 
 
 II Consul-General. Upon terminating the concession to the Egyp- 
 Itian Transit Company, Robert Thurburn, one of its founders, 
 
 who also held a lease from the Bombay Steam Committee for the 
 desert stations, was deprived of his right to control these 
 ! stations. They were thereupon occupied by appointees of Me- 
 hemet Ali without either explanation or compensation to the in- 
 t terested Bombay parties. There ensued a period of doubt as to 
 I what line of conduct should be pursued by the Bombay authorities, 
 
 I but as the desert transit was efficiently conducted under the new 
 Transit Administration, the issue was allowed to lie dormant.^® 
 
 In most respects the Transit Administration was a success. It 
 ii replaced the separate establishments on the Nile and across the 
 f desert with a single unified system administered as a branch of 
 I the Egyptian Government. The number of passengers using the 
 ; overland route in the first year after it was officially opened was 
 I 275. By 1845 this had grown to 2100, and by 1847 had in- 
 - creased to more than 3000. Transit equipment had been in- 
 creased in proportion. In 1843 5 ° camels were employed 
 
 1 in connection with the transit. In 1846, 2563 were in use. In 
 i| addition to these 440 horses and 46 vans transported the passen- 
 ji gers between Cairo and Suez. The Nile establishment had grown 
 |j to four steamers, with three steam tugs and a number of track- 
 
 E " boats in addition on the Mahmoudie Canal.^^ This arrangement, 
 with some alterations and improvements as traffic increased and 
 the Egyptian Railway became a reality, was not essentially altered 
 ! until the opening of the Suez Canal, which made the overland 
 route, as far as regular traffic through Egypt was concerned, a 
 , thing of the past.^® Meanwhile the rapid increase in both mails 
 I and passengers through Egypt could but call further attention 
 j to the advantages which would inevitably accrue from the con- 
 i' struction of some more modern and adequate means of convey- 
 ance, a railway or a canal. 
 
 F.O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847, Report of Consul A. S. 
 
 1 Walne. Ibid., Murray to Palmerston, 6 June, 1847. 
 
 For the details of the arrangements provided for passenger transportation 
 I through Egypt in 1854, see [Melville Grindlay], Hints for Travellers to India, 
 China and Australia (3d ed., London, 1854), pp. 14—17. 
 
 The year 1850 vras marked by the death of Thomas Waghorn, one of the 
 principal agitators for the opening and development of the overland route. His 
 employments remained characteristic to the last ; he repeatedly made test trips between 
 ! England and India and Egypt and England with mails or despatches, attempting to 
 find the speediest route. After the failure of his transport service between Cairo 
 1 and Suez, Waghorn set up in business as forwarding agent, and in 1848 he entered 
 into partnership with Mr. George Wheatley. This arrangement is still represented 
 [ by G. W. Wheatley & Co. of London. Many of Waghorn’s enterprises were under- 
 taken at his own expense in the hope of repayment, and at the time of his death he 
 
244 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 One of the greatest handicaps to improvements in service on 
 the overland route proved to be the very element which gave the 
 greatest measure of stability to the establishment of the line in the 
 beginning. This was the fact that the line was operated by de- 
 partments of government. The operation of the line, in conse- 
 quence, was subject to all the evils of bureaucracy, such as delay, 
 lack of coordination, irresponsibility, carelessness, neglect, and 
 bungling in general. Such evils were the more pronounced be- 
 cause the steam service, instead of being unified under one de- 
 partment of government, was subject to the direction of several 
 departments of more than one government. The European end 
 of the line was subject to the whims of the Admiralty, the Post 
 Office, the Treasury, and, in some respects, of the Foreign and 
 Colonial Offices. The cooperation of the India Board and the 
 Court of Directors was also required. The eastern end of the 
 line was controlled by various departments of the Bombay Gov- 
 ernment under instructions from the Supreme Government at 
 Calcutta, which, in turn, were guided by despatches from the 
 Court of Directors at home. The very essential Egyptian section 
 of the line came under neither set of authorities and was the 
 source of problems more or less baffling to both. The one great 
 advantage in the governmental control and operation of the line 
 lay in the unlimited financial backing thus supplied. No private 
 corporations, however strong in capital, could have hoped to suc- 
 ceed at the outset, when initial expenses were tremendously great, 
 mistakes and disasters frequent, and income slight.^® 
 
 However, once the line was in full operation and its value fully 
 appraised, public sentiment veered strongly toward its continua- 
 tion under private commercial management. Government w'as 
 concerned mainly with the sending of despatches and very little 
 with the economics of private business. It was content to de- 
 
 was heavily in debt. One of his sisters is reported to have died in a London work- 
 house, and another was rescued from a similar institution and g^iven a small pension. 
 Thus in some respects Waghorn was singularly a failure, due largely to his 
 proclivity for making enemies. Some recognition had come before his death, how- 
 ever. He was given the title of Lieutenant in 1 842 by the .Admiralty, and in the 
 year before his death he had been granted a small pension by the East India Com- 
 pany, only one quarterly instalment of which had been paid prior to his death. 
 Waghorn, however, did succeed in establishing a legend; and if he failed to receive 
 due recognition during his life, the eulogies which have been lavished upon his 
 memory have at least in part atoned. See Household, Words: A Weekly Journal, 
 I, 494—501; Chatha7n and Rochester Observer, 8 March, 1884; Botnbay Cassette, 28 
 March, 1884. 
 
 Astatic Journal, 3d Ser., I, 325. The greater part of this expense was borne 
 by the British Government. In 1838—1839 the net cost to the East India Company 
 of the steam establishments on both sides of Egypt was £30,012. — Pari. Pap., 1840, 
 No. 353, p. 3. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 245 
 
 velop slowly, keeping well behind the actual needs of the public. 
 Private enterprise, on the other hand, found profit in keeping 
 abreast of business conditions and in anticipating public needs. 
 Government heads were satisfied with a single chain of steam 
 communications, terminating at Falmouth or Southampton at one 
 end and at Bombay on the other, disregarding the pleas of the 
 other presidencies of India and the rising clamor of the growing 
 British communities in China, the Straits, Australia, and New 
 Zealand for more effective intercourse with the mother country. 
 Private enterprise took cognizance of all of these fields of en- 
 deavor. The history of the development of steam communication 
 with the East after 1839, therefore, is the record of private 
 initiative backed by government support supplanting government 
 owned and operated lines. 
 
 Some of the first projects for more adequate lines of steam 
 communication came from that portion of India where the urge 
 was greatest. The citizens of Calcutta and Madras could not 
 take advantage of a steam navy as Bombay did, hence they sought 
 other means of improving their contacts with Europe. Early in 
 the year 1839, the subscribers to the Bengal Steam Fund adopted 
 resolutions favoring the early realization of a “ comprehensive ” 
 plan of steam communication j that is, an arrangement whereby 
 all of the Indian Presidencies would be included in a single system 
 of steam communication. Very soon such a project came up for 
 definite consideration. The Steam Committee of London, headed 
 by a Mr. T. A. Curtis, projected a joint stock steam navigation 
 company for the operation of steamships both in European and 
 Asiatic waters to bring all of the presidencies into one system 
 which might later be extended to China and Australia. Profits 
 were anticipated from the carriage of mails, passengers, and 
 goods, as well as from subsidies.®^ 
 
 The Calcutta Steam Association considered the plan worthy of 
 support, and called in a portion of their steam subscriptions to be 
 sent to the English agent of the Association, Capt. James Barber, 
 to assist the new organization, popularly known as the Compre- 
 hensive Company.®® In this the Madras Steam Association 
 joined, while Bombay gave the proposition a wide berth.®* 
 
 31 This was a normal attitude for government to take. Governmental regula- 
 tion of private enterprise is perhaps always more effective than governmental 
 ownership and operation in which the competitive element is lacking. — See Map 
 of the Overland Route between England and India-, Shewing also Other Lines of 
 Communication (London, 1842). 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVIII, N.S., Pt. II, ii, 163; ibid., XXIX, N.S. Pt. II, 89, 
 90, 216; ibid., XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 269, 270. 33 Ibid., XXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 247, 269. 
 
 3 * Ibid., 247; ibid., XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 29, 30; Madras Courier, 16 Sept., 
 1839. The Bombay Times for 28 Sept., 1839, <tid contain this statement, however: 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 246 
 
 While the London company was still in an early stage of de- I 
 velopment, a large public meeting of those interested in steam i 
 communication was held in Calcutta for the purpose of protesting j 
 to Parliament and to the East India Company against the many ( 
 abuses in the existing communications, whereby Calcutta was at j 
 the mercy of the Bombay authorities. After petitions had been 1 
 drawn up and adopted, a partial remedy for the evil was proposed ; 
 by Mr. Thomas E. M. Turton, one of the active members of the 
 Bengal Steam Committee. He proposed that while the Com- 
 prehensive concern was perfecting its plans for establishing a 
 monthly communication over the whole line between England : 
 and India, the Calcutta group should promote the comprehensive 
 scheme by purchasing a single large steamer and establishing a 
 quarterly service between Calcutta and Suez. Such a vessel, he 
 maintained, would thus be the “ precursor ” of others to follow, i 
 and upon the completion of the Comprehensive plan w'ould be j 
 absorbed by it.^® 
 
 This “ Precursor ” plan proved to be the apple of discord in 
 the garden of steam hopes. The Calcutta Steam Committee im- ' 
 mediately broke up into two warring factions. The first, led by i 
 C. B. Greenlaw, Secretary of the Bengal Steam Fund, held that 
 any deviation from the plan outlined by the promoters of the 
 Comprehensive plan would likely wreck it, especially since strong 
 opposition had already developed in London. Turton and his 
 friends, on the other hand, being large subscribers to the Steam 
 Fund, stoutly argued that enough time had already been w’asted 
 in vainly waiting for an adequate communication, and that the ! 
 proposed Precursor would but hasten the complete steam naviga- 
 tion system. They agreed to make common cause with the Com- 
 prehensives if the latter could get under w^ay at once, but 
 otherwise they were determined to put their own vessel into serv- 
 ice.®® Between the two factions bitter hostility soon developed, 
 practically disrupting the Bengal Steam Association and making it 
 exceedingly unlikely that all of the subscriptions to the fund 
 would ever be paid in or employed as originally planned. 
 
 It would be unprofitable to follow all of the turnings in the 
 squabble between the two groups in Calcutta. The quarrel at 
 times was partially patched up and a semblance of unity restored. 
 
 “ We shall always be ready to join heart and hand with our Calcutta contemporaries 
 in hastening the accomplishment of any such scheme of steamers for this employ- 
 ment; but we shall ever oppose any interference with the steady despatch of the 
 overland mails between Suez and Bombay. . 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXI, N.S., Pt. II, 7-13, 99-104, 149. 
 
 Ibid., p. 204. 
 
 ;i 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 247 
 
 But as the issue presently degenerated into a matter of personal 
 hostility, each party determined to succeed at the expense of the 
 other. In October, 1839, Turton and his associates undertook to 
 form a company under the name of “ Eastern Steam Navigation 
 Company ” for the building or purchasing of a Precursor of 
 1200 to 1500 tons, to be propelled by engines of 450 horse- 
 power.®^ This presently led to a secession of the Precursorites 
 and completed the rupture. The Comprehensive group there- 
 upon continued their attachment to the London plan, now 
 launched as the East India Steam Navigation Company, although 
 no complete union with the London group was ever effected.®® 
 
 At this juncture, the Comprehensives received a severe set- 
 back by the refusal of the East India Company to lend the 
 slightest countenance to the undertaking. The Directors stated 
 that they fully appreciated the motives which had led to the 
 formation of the East India Steam Navigation Company, and 
 that they were willing to give encouragement to any established 
 means of comprehensive communication, but that they “ could 
 not support this project in its present stage.”®® At this psycho- 
 logical moment there appeared on the scene an established con- 
 cern, the Peninsular Steam Navigation Company, whose history 
 epitomizes the development of steam shipping in eastern seas 
 after 1840. 
 
 This concern may be said to have originated in 1815. In that 
 momentous year a Mr. Brodie McGhee Willcox set up in business 
 in London as shipbroker and commission agent. He soon asso- 
 ciated with him a young man from the Shetland Isles, Arthur 
 Anderson, who became a partner in the firm of Willcox and An- 
 derson in 1 822. By this time a regular trade had been established 
 with ports of the Peninsula, Oporto, Lisbon, and Gibraltar, with 
 a fleet of sailing vessels. In 1835 Messrs. Willcox and Anderson 
 became the operating agents for a line of steam vessels owned by 
 Messrs. Bourne of Dublin. As this service appeared to promise 
 success, other steamers were chartered, and in 1836 five first class 
 steamers were put under construction for the Peninsular line.^“ 
 
 Prior to September 4, 1837, English mails to Lisbon were 
 
 Ibid., pp. 103, 104. 
 
 3 ® Ibid., XXXII, N.S., Pt. II, 3-5, 95-97, 215, 31 1 ; ibid., XXXIII, N.S., Pt. 
 II, I, 2. The Madras Steam Committee was meanwhile giving the Comprehensive 
 scheme its whole support. 
 
 39 Ibid., XXXII, N.S., Pt. II, I. 
 
 ^9 The Blue Peter, I, No. 2 (Sept., 1921), 43, 44 (an historical summary of 
 the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, by Mr. F. A. Hook, of 
 the Lamson Agency) ; R. W. Come wall-J ones. The British Merchant Service 
 (London, 1898), p. 146. 
 
248 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 conveyed weekly by Post Office sailing packets, wind and weather 
 permitting. At the same time, the mail communication with 
 Cadiz and Gibraltar was only once a month by Admiralty steamer. 
 
 In comparison with this inadequate service, the commercial 
 packets of Messrs. Willcox and Anderson showed a great im- 
 provement. The firm^s first request for a contract for carrying 
 the Peninsular mails was very coldly received by the Post Office, 
 however, for the theory had long prevailed that official mails 
 should be carried only by official agencies. Public demands for 
 a more improved service caused a reconsideration of the mail 
 service before long, and Willcox and Anderson were awarded a 
 contract in competition with their single rival, the British and 
 Foreign Steam Navigation Company. 
 
 In carrying out their contract, Willcox and Anderson made 
 extensive improvements in their lines. No sooner had the service 
 commenced to be profitable than it was further developed. First 
 it was extended, on a commercial basis, to Malta, and then to 
 Alexandria, successfully competing with French and Austrian 
 steam lines. This development, coupled with the growing con- 
 fidence of the Government in the transportation of mails and 
 despatches by private enterprise under contract, paved the w'ay 
 for the continuation of the Company’s transit service first to | 
 Egypt and later into the eastern seas.“ | 
 
 Between September 4, 1837, September i, 1840, the India \ 
 mails using the overland route were forwarded every fourth I 
 Saturday from Falmouth for Gibraltar in the vessels of the ; 
 Peninsular Company. At Gibraltar they were transferred to an i 
 Admiralty steamer and carried to Malta, whence they were con- 1 
 veyed to Alexandria by another Admiralty steamer, the home- 1 
 ward bound mails, of course, being transmitted in reverse order. 1 
 However, as the Peninsular packets had to call at Vigo, Oporto, ! 
 Lisbon, and Cadiz in their passage to and from Gibraltar, and the j 
 Admiralty packets in the Mediterranean were of no more than i 
 140 horsepower,*’ the transmission of the mails between England 1 
 and Egypt frequently required three weeks or even a month. : 
 The establishment of a line from Marseilles through France I 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, pp. 364-365, “A Statement of the Principal i 
 Facts connected with the Establishment and Extension of Steam Communications i 
 with India, China, etc., by the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company,” : 
 by Arthur Anderson; The P. & O. Pocket Book (3d issue, London, 190S), p. 8. 1 
 
 The first mail steamer to sail under contract, the Iberia, was despatched from 1 
 Falmouth 4 Sept., 1837. The contract called for vessels of 140 horsepower. Those 
 actually put on the line rated at 250 horsepower. 
 
 The Blue Peter, I, 44; Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 349, p. 19. 
 
 Some of these had been in service since English steamers first appeared in the 
 Mediterranean in 1825. 
 
I COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 249 
 
 about the middle of 1839 also failed to work the advantage ex- 
 { pectedd^ 
 
 j These matters caused the British Government to intimate to 
 ! the managers of the Peninsular Company that a plan for ex- 
 
 • pediting the mails on the entire line between Alexandria and 
 i! England would be welcomed. The Company thereupon pro- 
 posed to establish a complete line of large and powerful steamers, 
 
 [rating 1800 tons and 430 horsepower, to operate this line, touch- 
 
 • ing only at Gibraltar and Malta. This scheme was unofficially 
 ■ approved by the Government, the actual contract for the service 
 ij being let on the basis of public tenders. The Peninsular Com- 
 i pany found three competitors on this occasion, but easily won the 
 I : contract, agreeing to transport the mails for a smaller sum even 
 j than that required for the inadequate Admiralty packets.^® By 
 
 I I such stages the Peninsular Company acquired an experience, an 
 
 I equipment, and a capital which enabled them to consider a line 
 'I of mail packets from Suez to eastern ports. 
 
 • The Peninsular Company had not been without considerable 
 ij competition in European waters, and from the time that an eastern 
 i' service was first considered it was evident that the project would 
 hnot have clear sailing. Considerable influence was brought to 
 [[bear both on members of Government and on public opinion by 
 i I rival interests to prevent the entrance of the Peninsular concern 
 
 I I into Asiatic waters at all.^^ Chief among these competitors were 
 lithe embryonic East India Steam Navigation Company, which 
 i I boasted members of Parliament in its organization, and the 
 i Eastern Steam Navigation Company, called the “ Precursorites.” 
 IjlThe Peninsular Company with its wide experience, large capital, 
 
 [ and growing fleet of steam vessels naturally bade fair to wreck 
 |i- the plans, if not the aims, of both groups of Indian investors who, 
 ijas subscribers to the Bengal Fund, had been laboring for so many 
 if years to place in service a line of large steamships which would 
 ■|be owned and controlled in the eastern presidencies.^® For a 
 If considerable time, therefore, the London Committee of the Com- 
 j prehensives left nothing undone to retard the cause of the Penin- 
 isular Company.^® 
 
 I ** Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 367. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 367—368. The first vessels placed on this line were the Oriental, 
 1600 tons and 450 horsepower, and the Great Liverpool, 1540 tons and 464 horse- 
 
 ! power. These vessels were already constructed at the time the contract was let. 
 London Times, ii Nov., 1838. Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 370. 
 
 In fact, in remitting funds to the London Committee in 1840, the Calcutta 
 f Comprehensives made it clear that they did so only on condition that the East India 
 Steam Navigation Company establish headquarters in Calcutta. — Asiatic Journal, 
 t XXXII, N.S., Pt. II, 96. 
 
 ! ^9 Ibid., p. 311; ibid., XXXIV, N.S., Pt. II, I. 
 
250 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Meanwhile, in the midst of dissension and bickering, the Com- 
 prehensives and Precursors had each contracted for the construc- 
 tion of a large steam vessel, although adequate funds were lacking 
 in both cases. The knowledge of this situation and the need for 
 a measure of Indian cooperation led Messrs. Willcox and Ander- : 
 son to propose a merger to the London Comprehensive group. ' 
 The projectors of the East India Steam Navigation Company 
 were offered seats in the direction of the Peninsular Company • 
 and the Comprehensive subscribers were to receive proportional 
 shares in a new stock issue of the Peninsular Company, which 
 was about to increase its capitalization and become a joint stock 
 concern.®” 
 
 Before all the details of the amalgamation had been adjusted, 
 the Peninsular Company had received a royal charter of incor- 
 poration, dated December 31, 1840, constituting it the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Steam Navigation Company.®^ The charter was 
 granted, however, subject to the conditions — 
 
 That the Company should open an improved steam com- 
 munication with India throughout, from England, within 
 two years from the date of the charter. That all steam ves- 
 sels to be constructed by the Company, of 400-horse power 
 and upwards, should be so strengthened and otherwise ar- 
 ranged as to be able to carry and fire guns of the largest 
 calibre then used in Her Majesty’s steam vessels of war. 
 That the Government should have a power of inspection, as 
 to their being maintained in good and efficient sea-worthy 
 condition, and that the Company should not sell any of such 
 vessels without giving the pre-emption of purchase to the 
 Government.®' 
 
 Early in 1841 arrangements for the absorption of the East India 
 Steam Navigation Company were completed, the promoters of 
 this enterprise receiving positions in the directorate of the Penin- 1 
 sular and Oriental Company as previously proposed.®® 
 
 Cornewall-Jones, of. cit., p. 149. 
 
 Astatic Journal, XXXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 2, 197—198; The P. & O. Pocket Book, 
 pp. 8—9; Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 70. The Company was incorporated with a 
 proposed capital of £1,500,000. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 370. The Government was also to have the 
 right to commandeer any of the vessels of this eastern fleet in time of war. Toward 
 this new establishment the East India Company agreed to pay £20,000 annually for 
 five years. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 124, 154— 155. .Arthur Anderson stated before a Select Parlia- 
 mentary Committee in 1851 that of the £300,000 subscribed by the Comprehensives, ) 
 only about £30,000 was actually paid in. Cf. Asiatic Journal, XXXr\^I, N.S., Pt. | 
 II, 16. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 251 
 
 Negotiations had meanwhile been started with Turton and his 
 jassociates of the Eastern Steam Navigation Company for effecting 
 a combination with the Peninsular Company. Nothing tangible 
 came of repeated overtures at first. Nevertheless, when the new 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company was formed, three seats in the 
 Board of Directors were reserved for the Precursorites, should 
 they choose to come in on the same terms as had been offered 
 their competitors. Until some time in 1841, the Precursorites 
 'hoped to realize their program and actually place their first vessel 
 ion the Suez-Calcutta line, to be followed by others subsequently. 
 On November 17, however, a meeting of the shareholders of the 
 [Eastern Steam Navigation Company was held in Calcutta at 
 'which the fate of the concern was determined. A proposal to 
 [renew negotiations with the P. and O. Company was passed and 
 the merger was approved subject to the conditions already offered 
 to the Precursorites.®^ 
 
 Thus passed from the scene one of the last of the many at- 
 tempts of the English in India to develop lines of steam vessels 
 iaccording to their own plans.®® English capital and the favor of 
 the British Government and East India Company provided a 
 combination too effective to be withstood by the independent and 
 uncertain Indian interests. Following the formal dissolution of 
 [the Eastern Steam Navigation Company in Calcutta, the London 
 [faction, led by the belligerent Turton, who was one of the princi- 
 pal stockholders of the concern, still refused to consider the sale 
 [of the Precursor or the abandonment of the plan, meanwhile 
 jistriving desperately to secure funds with which to complete the 
 [vessel and place her in service.®® The task proved to be hopeless. 
 [With bankruptcy staring them in the face, those who had con- 
 ijtracted for the building of the Precursor were compelled to offer 
 cher for sale in 1842 “for the protection of themselves for the 
 i many and great liabilities they have incurred.” ®^ With all con- 
 ’ jditions attending the purchase removed, she was purchased by the 
 |P. and O. Company for £45,000 and added to the eastern fleet 
 [of that Company for the carrying out of a new mail contract with 
 [the Government and East India Company. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 252; ibid.., XXXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 
 133-134- 
 
 Ibid., XXXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 254-255; ibid., XXXVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 16, 
 1127, 416. 
 
 “"s Ibid., XXXVII, N.S., Pt. II, 184-185. 
 
 Ibid., XXXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 103; ibid., 3d Ser., Ill, 322, 545; ibid., 3d Ser., 
 IV, 324 539, 540. The Precursor, of 1800 tons and 520 horsepower, was com- 
 pleted in March, 1842, at a cost of £80,000. Following her purchase by the P. and 
 O. Company, she was considerably altered, and was sent out to India in 1844, arriving 
 at Calcutta on 26 Dec. 
 
252 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The two years allowed to the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany by their charter for laying the foundations of an eastern 
 steam service were employed in the building of two new steam 
 vessels, the preparation of coaling and docking facilities, and in 
 improving the transit through Egypt. The first of the new 
 eastern fleet to be completed, the Hindostan, of i8oo tons and 
 520 horsepower, was ready for sea in the early autumn of 1842. 
 Commanded by Capt. Robert Moresby, late of the Indian Navy, 
 the vessel left for India on September 24, making several stops 
 en routey and arrived at Calcutta after a voyage of eighty-seven 
 days. Shortly afterward a sister vessel, the Bentincky was 
 launched at Liverpool, and was despatched from Southampton 
 for Calcutta on August 24, 1843, iriaking the voyage around the 
 Cape of Good Hope in about equal time.®® With this steam 
 equipment, to which the Precursor was shortly added, an experi- 
 mental series of monthly voyages was commenced betw’een 
 Calcutta, Madras, Ceylon, Aden, and Suez, which proved 
 to be practicable from the very start. The first mails destined 
 for Calcutta by the new line were sent out from London 
 in 1843, and from the beginning of the next year service, 
 although not yet completely provided for by contract, was 
 regular.®® 
 
 An investigation of the cost of operation of the line between 
 Suez and Bombay by the comparatively small armed steam ves- i 
 sels of the Indian Navy disclosed the interesting fact that al- I 
 though the average speed of these vessels was low, their expenses ) 
 were correspondingly high. Believing that they w'ere in a posi- 1 
 tion to offer better service at lower cost, the Peninsular and 1 
 Oriental Company made a proposal to the East India Company | 
 in August, 1843, offering to relieve the latter of the Bombay j 
 line of communication and to substitute for the steam vessels of j 
 the Indian Navy, which averaged only about 200 horsepower, j 
 their own fine vessels of 520 horsepower. This service was to be 1 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 253—254; ibid., 3d Ser., II, 326, 432; j 
 Low, op. cit., II, 138—140. Moresby, who had conducted surveys of the Red Sea and ] 
 adjacent waters with such conspicuous success, and had afterwards commanded ( 
 various steamers of the Indian Na\’y', finally left that service in 1841, disgusted j 
 with the lack of appreciation shown him by the East India Company. The entry I 
 of the P. & O. into the eastern field opened up a new and attractive career, and . 
 until his final retirement in 1846, he was considered the ablest commander in the I 
 service of that company. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XL, N.S., Pt. II, pp. 39, 40; ibid., 3d Ser., I, 326-327; II, 
 85-86. That the stockholders of the Company did not suffer from the vast expense ■ 
 contingfent upon carrying; the new program into effect is indicated by the fact that 
 the dividends during these years averaged over 7%, leaving considerable sums still 
 as undivided profits. 
 
I 
 
 jl COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 253 
 
 ij undertaken for an annual sum of £80,000, thus saving the East 
 jl India Company about £30,000 for the transit of the mails.®” 
 j The Court of Directors did not respond to this plan, and it 
 t lapsed. In lieu of this, however, responsible members of the 
 [British Government suggested that the P. and O. Company ex- 
 Itend their regular service eastward to the Straits and China, a 
 service which had been carried on for some time in desultory 
 ; fashion by the Bengal Government.®^ Before this was acted 
 ' upon, an unofficial but important Committee, consisting of repre- 
 ' sentatives of the India Board, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, 
 the India House, the Post Office, and the House of Commons, 
 i spent several weeks in considering the “ comprehensive ” plan in 
 all its aspects.®^ 
 
 ! On the favorable report of this Committee, Admiralty con- 
 il tracts were awarded to the P. and O. Company for the regular 
 1 operation of the two eastern lines, the service to begin on January 
 1 1, 1845.®® By the terms of the agreement, the China mails were 
 jto be conveyed monthly in vessels of 400 horsepower or above to 
 If and from Ceylon, Penang, Singapore, and Hong Kong, connect- 
 ; ing at Ceylon with the line between Calcutta and Suez, in con- 
 sideration of the sum of £115,000 per annum. This contract 
 : was not put up to public bidding, as it was obvious that no other 
 ! company was in a position to undertake the service, in the first 
 ifplace, and in the second, it would have been unjust to the Penin- 
 ,jSular and Oriental Company after they had invested so much 
 : capital in new vessels for executing the service.®^ 
 
 I This arrangement gave India two mail communications with 
 I Europe per month. One was carried on by the steam packets of 
 51 the East India Company between Suez, Aden, and Bombay, 
 
 I whence the mails, and, occasionally, travellers, were transported 
 
 Pari. Pa-p., 1851, No. 605, p. 371. In 1842 the total cost per annum of the 
 ’ monthly service between Suez and Bombay was about £110,000. 
 
 A strictly private enterprise, fostered by the Calcutta firm of Mackey & Co., 
 had been put on foot in 1842 for a line between Calcutta and Singapore. With the 
 f maturing of the Peninsular and Oriental Company’s eastern service, however, this 
 I seems to have fallen through. Asiatic Journal, XXXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 200; ibid., 
 bXL, N.S., Pt. II, 46. See Pari. Pap., 1850, No. 693. 
 
 I Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., II, 663—664. 
 
 [ Ibid., 3d Ser., Ill, 98—99, 322; ibid., 3d Ser., IV, 539—540. The Precursor, 
 
 jwhich had lately been overhauled, was immediately sent out to Calcutta, followed 
 iisoon afterward by the Lady Mary Wood (650 T., 250 H.P.), which was to carry 
 the China mails until the arrival of more adequate vessels. Large steamers were at 
 [the same time put under construction in England for this purpose. 
 
 ' ®^ Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 372. This contract awarded the Company 
 
 I about 121. per mile for the China service, whereas for the Calcutta service payment 
 ^ was made at the rate of about 201. per mile. It 'was estimated that the steam vessels 
 ( [belonging to the Admiralty could not have operated the China line with mails alone 
 for less than 421. 6d. per mile. 
 
254 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 overland by dak to the other presidencies and to the larger : 
 cities of the interior. The other was conducted by the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Company, whose vessels, also touching at Aden, 
 conveyed mails and passengers to Ceylon, Madras, and Calcutta, 
 dropping Bombay and China mails at Ceylon, whence they were 
 carried to their destinations by branch steamers.®® It was evident 
 from the first that this newly-inaugurated plan conferred great 
 benefits, especially of a commercial nature, upon both England 
 and India. Nevertheless, the operation of the scheme was in 
 some respects unsatisfactory, chiefly because it was not unified. 
 Lack of correlation in the sailings and time schedules of the ves- 
 sels of the Indian Navy and of the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany produced frequent delays in the transmission of mails 
 through Egypt and in their despatch from Alexandria.®® But 
 greater annoyances grew out of the complex arrangements for 
 the transit of the mails on the European side. 
 
 According to the schedule adopted by the British Post Office, 
 the mails destined for Bombay and interior Indian cities were 
 despatched from Southampton and London on the third and 
 seventh respectively of each month. The former section of the 
 mail, conveyed by sea to Malta, met there the mail despatched 
 from London on the seventh via Marseilles. From Malta both ] 
 sections were conveyed to Alexandria in Admiralty packets, and | 
 from Suez to Bombay in vessels of the Indian Navy. The second i 
 Indian mail left Southampton on the twentieth of each month in j 
 P. and O. vessels and called at Malta for mails despatched from i 
 London on the twenty-fourth via Marseilles. From Malta the 1 
 combined mail was carried to Alexandria and from Suez to Ceylon 
 in P. and O. steamers, the Bombay and China mails being trans- 
 ferred at Ceylon, while the Madras and Calcutta mails continued 
 in the same vessel. A similar schedule was arranged for the 
 west-bound mails. ®^ But this plan failed to function as intended. 
 Mails destined for London and marked via Marseilles were i 
 frequently transported via Gibraltar instead or vice versa. Thus 
 there were sometimes two London deliveries of the same eastern t 
 mail.®® Moreover, as the P. and O. steamers were almost inva- i 
 riably on time, while those of the Admiralty and the East India ! 
 Company seldom were, great confusion resulted. 
 
 To simplify the system and to iron out several of the wrinkles . 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 349, p. 19. See ibid., 1852, No. 87, “Postal Com- I 
 munication in India.” 
 
 Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., Ill, 655. 
 
 Ibid., 3d Ser., IV, 207; Capt. James Barber, The Overland Guide-Book . . . 
 (London, 1845), p. 9; W. H. Bartlett, The Nile Boat, pp. ii, 19. 
 
 ®® Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 95, 655. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 255 
 
 in the existing plan, the Peninsular and Oriental Company in 
 1845 undertook to effect a substitution of their own vessels for 
 those of the Admiralty on the line between Southampton and 
 Alexandria via Malta in connection with a new line of steam- 
 ships they were about to establish between England, Constanti- 
 nople, and Black Sea ports, running a branch steamer from Malta 
 to Alexandria to connect with the monthly sailings of steamers 
 of the Indian Navy. This service they offered to perform at an 
 annual cost of £ 10,000 less than that required by the Admiralty 
 steamers. Such an arrangement was carried out for a time and 
 with considerable improvement in the Mediterranean service. 
 The Government, however, finding that it had no other employ- 
 ment for the steamers thus discontinued, terminated the plan and 
 resumed sailings as before. This was strongly resented both in 
 England and in India, particularly because of the fact that the 
 Admiralty steamers carried neither goods, parcels nor passen- 
 :^ers.®® Such a condition could not long be tolerated, and within 
 :i few years more it gave place entirely to mail and passenger 
 service by private carriers under Government contract. 
 
 ; Although much remained to be done in the way of systematiz- 
 ng and synchronizing the service, all of India was definitely 
 :':onnected with the home country by 1843 through the agency 
 of steam communication. Calcutta and London had been brought 
 within forty days of each other, the time between Bombay and 
 -.ondon being some ten days less. In either case this was only 
 ..bout one-fourth of the time which had been required for the com- 
 munication at the beginning of the century.’^” 
 
 ' Within the next ten years the whole comprehensive plan was 
 mproved and extended, partly for the sake of better communica- 
 ion between England and the Indian Presidencies and China, and 
 oartly in connection with the development of new steam lines to 
 •he Australian colonies. By 1854 the China steamers sailed twice 
 monthly from Bombay to Hong Kong, picking up the China mails 
 jirought out from Suez at Ceylon, and again stopping at Ceylon 
 n the return voyage for the Bombay mails brought out monthly 
 rtrom England via Suez in the P. and O. steamers. The steamers 
 
 \ 
 
 1 
 
 i'- Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, pp. 373—375; Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 540. 
 i Anderson, Communication with India, China, etc., via Egypt, pp. 3—5 ; Asiatic 
 • ''^urnal, 3d Ser., I, 562, 567; Edward Clarkson, The Suez Navigable Canal for 
 > \ccelerated Communication with India (London, 1843), P- One of the results 
 i ;f the extension of eastern routes was the building of larger and more powerful 
 ;eam vessels. In 1854 the Peninsular and Oriental Company added to their fleet 
 i |ie palatial Himalaya, of 3438 tons and 750 horsepower, the first screw steamer 
 f in the Indian line. This vessel was subsequently purchased by the British Govern- 
 ' I lent and used as a transport. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 256 
 
 of the Indian Navy continued to operate the Bombay-Suez line 
 monthly, but the service had become so unsatisfactory that the 
 East India Company had at last concluded to relinquish the line 
 to a private concern as soon as the necessary contracts could be 
 awarded/^ The full working out of this passenger and mail 
 service was somewhat interrupted by political events in Europe 
 and in India in the years 1854 to 1858, but before the opening i 
 of the Crimean War a complete skeleton of steam lines of com- 
 munication to the East had been constructed, only requiring im- 
 provements from time to time as mechanical evolution and en- 
 larging needs demanded. 
 
 The working out of a complete system of communications with 
 India awaited the establishment of regular steam service to China 
 and Australia. The vigorous young British commonwealths 
 which sprang up in Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand after 
 the cessation of convict transportation W'ere not slow in recogniz- | 
 ing the potentialities of the steamship. Although they were fur- 1 
 ther removed from the mother country than the Anglo-Indians, ( 
 they were also home lovers, and were more acutely conscious, | 
 possibly, of separation from friends and relatives than the more 1 
 sophisticated English in India. 
 
 Until 1841 ships made their way to the Australian settlements ‘ 
 only when there was a cargo of goods or a load of colonists to be I 
 taken out. Other passengers and mails, of course, had to wait on 1 
 such casual sailings. Some approach to the matter of regular 1 
 communication was made in 1841, however, when a line of sailing I 
 packets began making voyages at fairly regular intervals from 1 
 the Clyde to the colony of New South Wales. This was fol- : 
 lowed by other lines of regular service of a similar kind, so that t 
 within a few more years the sailings to and from England and 
 Australia by way of the Cape of Good Hope were about as ade- l 
 quate as that character of service could accomplish. Such com- ( 
 munications were, nevertheless, quite unsatisfactory in two main 1 
 particulars: first, the passage to and from Australia, a distance of 
 approximately 15,000 miles, was very slow, requiring a voyage of ; 
 four or five months j and in the second place, because of the time i 
 
 [Lieut. Thomas Waghorn], Letter to the Rt. Hon. Wm. Ezoart Gladstone 
 M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the Extension of Steam Navigatior , 
 from Singapore to Port Jackson, Australia (London, 1846), p. 22; Grindlay, op. cit. 
 pp. 19, 20, passim. The firm of Grindlay & Co. had been formed bj' Melvillf ! 
 Grindlay, formerly a member of the Bengal Steam Committee and a long stand ■ 
 advocate of steam lines direct to Calcutta. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXIV, N.S., Pt. II, 163. Mails for Australia were regu 
 larly despatched in sailing vessels under British Government contract after February 
 1844. — Ibid., 3d Ser., II, 212. 
 
I' 
 
 |C 0 MPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 257 
 
 consumed and the quantities of food required for passengers, it was 
 [jrelatively expensive, single fare averaging from £75 to £100/^ 
 IjObviously this could be improved only by the establishment of 
 1 lines of large steam vessels. 
 
 I The first step was taken toward improving the communication 
 [iwhen about 1845 a group of Sydney steam enthusiasts formed a 
 j steam association, not unlike those organized in the Indian com- 
 I munities, for the purpose of raising funds for the formation of a 
 1 steam company and for carrying on a campaign for government 
 ' jassistance. Already lines of small steam vessels were in opera- 
 ijtion for coastwise and river traffic in the colonies,'^^ and the ready 
 (isuccess of these small ventures, together with the opening up of 
 Ithe line between Bombay and Suez by the Indian Navy, gave 
 jimpetus to the idea that the establishment of steam lines by one 
 |jor another of the various possible routes between England and 
 I Australia would be practicable.'^® 
 
 \ In spite of the enthusiasm in New South Wales for the pro- 
 jected steam navigation company, it was soon discovered that the 
 iproblem was too large to be solved at the outset by private initia- 
 tive. It was only when the Legislative Council of the colony 
 '^petitioned the Home Government in 1845 “that Her Majesty 
 may be graciously pleased to extend to this colony the benefits of 
 .j|the arrangements under which mails are to be despatched by 
 Isteam conveyance to India and China, on the same terms as other 
 ■British colonies,” that a promising beginning was made. Prog- 
 flress, however, was discouragingly slow. In 1846, 1848, and 
 again in 1850, Select Committees appointed by the Legislative 
 jCouncil of New South Wales studied ways and means of im- 
 proving communications,’^’^ but the Colonial Government found it 
 impracticable to take any active steps in consequence. 
 
 The recommendations of the Committee of 1850, while not 
 followed up at once, had considerable influence on the decisions 
 
 I Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 372, App. No. ii. 
 
 1 Ibid., p. 5; Asiatic Journal, XVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 24, 236; ibid., XXXII, N.S., 
 |Pt. II, 234, 291; ibid., XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 34. The Sydney Gazette said on 23 
 May, 1835: “The impetus which steam navigation gives to exertions in all parts 
 of the colony to which it is directed has had its effects. . . Property ... is daily 
 I increasing in value; new buildings are springing up, and the proprietors of inns find 
 j their account in the facility and expedition of communication.” The first steam- 
 !boat in the waters of New South Wales was put into service in 1831. 
 j Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 372, p. 4; Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 44; 
 
 [Adam Bogue, Steam to Australia, Its General Advantages Considered . . . 
 (Sydney, 1848). 
 
 I Waghorn, op. cit., p. 20. 
 
 j Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 430, “ Copies of the Reports of 1846, 1848, and 1850, 
 
 I of Committees of the Legislative Councils of New South Wales, New Zealand, and 
 [the Mauritius. . 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 258 
 
 of the Home Government later. This report took into considera- • 
 tion the advantages of all possible routes, and reported in favor 
 of the so-called Torres Straits route, by way of Singapore, Ceylon, 
 and Aden to Suez, and from Alexandria to England. The Cape 
 route was considered to be primarily a commercial highway, one 
 which could be as well served by sailing as by steam vessels. The 
 route by way of the Isthmus of Panama was given serious con- ■ 
 sideration, as it promised some unique advantages. It was no 
 longer than the others, and its proximity to the rich commercial 
 marts of North and South America and the West Indies gave it 
 considerable prestige. Moreover, the early completion of the 
 Panama Railway was confidently anticipated.^® 
 
 Meanwhile, the success of the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany in the East, and the agitation carried on by interested Eng- 
 lish groups gave promise of tangible accomplishment.^® On 
 March 27, 1851, the English House of Commons ordered “ that 
 a Committee be appointed to inquire into the existing Steam Com- 
 munications with India and China, and into the Practicability of 
 effecting any improvement therein j and also into the best mode 
 of establishing Steam Communications between England, India, 
 China, Australia, New Zealand, or any of them, as well as any - 
 Points upon the several routes between them.” ®® 
 
 This Committee of seventeen pursued its labors vigorously for 
 more than four months. Almost at the outset of its work the ' 
 fact became apparent that while two separate problems had been - 
 designated in the task assigned, the first, that of suggesting 
 changes and improvements in the service to India and China, de- 
 pended largely on the recommendations to be made regarding 
 the second, which had to do with Australasian lines. The Com- 
 mittee therefore attacked the second problem first, handing in a 
 first report on June fifth. This report was at once comprehen- 
 sive and definitive. It reviewed the urgent need of the Australian 
 communities for regular and rapid steam service j it outlined the 
 character and the merits of each of the three great routes by which 
 steam communication might be established, together wfith the 
 steam companies prepared to develop each 5 it compared the merits 
 of the new screw propeller with the new “ feathering ” paddle 
 
 Pari. Pap., Nos. 349, 430, 372. The computed distance between I 
 
 Plymouth and Sydney by way of Panama was 12,572 miles, requiring' a voyage | 
 estimated at 64 days. By way of Singapore the mileage was calculated as 12,710, 
 the time as 66 days, and by way of the Cape of Good Hope, 13,162 miles and 71 da^. I 
 
 Asiatic Journal 3d Ser., Ill, 322; Waghorn, op. cit., pp. 22, 45; Calcutta 
 Review, XIII, 200—220; Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 372, pp. 47S— 4S5; [R. M. Martin], 
 British Possessions in Europe, Africa, Asia, and. Australasia connected with England 
 by the India and Australia Mail Stea7n Packet Company . . . (London, 1847). 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 472, p. [iij. 
 
ijcOMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 259 
 
 : wheel 5 it considered termini j and, finally, it referred to the sub- 
 : sidies necessary for putting its proposals into effect.®^ 
 
 The Committee found the direct route through Egypt to Point 
 de Galle and thence via Singapore, Batavia, and Cape Leeuwin 
 : most advantageous from the point of view of postal communica- 
 ition. This was also the line adjudged most desirable for pas- 
 senger traffic as far as expedition and economy were concerned, 
 /“although the tropical heats . . . together with the probability 
 of crowded vessels . . . render it the least preferable, in point 
 of comfort.” The Cape line was selected as peculiarly adapted 
 I to the carriage of merchandise, and this also was found to be the 
 •ionly practicable route to Australia entirely under the control of 
 j Great Britain and free from liability of interruption. In view of 
 • these considerations, the Committee felt that it could make but 
 /one logical recommendation, which was “ that the line proposed 
 to be extended from the Cape of Good Hope to Sydney is the one 
 I which combines these advantages to the greatest extent, and at 
 |lthe smallest cost to the public.”®^ The Committee further be- 
 (.lieved that within a few years a steam communication between 
 /Australia and India by way of Singapore would be a natural 
 /result of the growth of Australian colonies. 
 
 This report of the Committee was not acted upon by the Gov- 
 (ternment as the Cabinet did not sympathize with the emphasis, 
 iilaid on the Cape route.®® Nevertheless, most of the features 
 |1 contained in its recommendations were worked out during the 
 : next few years. The General Screw Steam Company, which had 
 [[already established a line to the Cape of Good Hope, placed in 
 service a new class of vessels on the route to Australia by way of 
 ijthe Cape. Even the Panama route was developed for a time, in 
 i| spite of the adverse report of the Committee. The Royal Mail 
 Steam Navigation Company, which had been carrying mails to the 
 West Indies and Mexico under contract for several years, ten- 
 ■ tatively began steam sailings from Panama to Australia. This 
 illine was later developed by the Australian Mail Steam Packet 
 Company. Their service began in 1852, and by 1854 they had 
 completed their preparations for operating a line monthly from 
 Panama by way of New Zealand to Sydney and Melbourne.®^ 
 These two lines to Australia provided facilities for the transporta- 
 tion of considerable quantities of the more valuable kinds of 
 goods, and for some mails and passengers, although neither op- 
 
 t 
 
 Ibid., pp. iii— xi, 72. 
 
 Ibid., pp. vii— xi, 72. 
 
 London Times, 4 and 31 July, 1851. 
 
 j Grindlay, of. cit., pp. 21, 26, fassim-, London Times, 20 Nov., 1852. 
 
26o 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 5 
 
 erated under Government contract. Passenger traffic, however, 
 was not heavy by either of these lines. Those who could not 
 afford the heavy steamship fares, and the bulk of emigrants were 
 among them, reached the Australasian settlements in the large 
 and commodious sailing vessels operated by Messrs. Green, of 
 Blackwall, Messrs. Smith, or Messrs. Wigram & Company.*® 
 These firms had developed magnificent lines of sailing vessels 
 after the termination of the commercial monopoly of the East 
 India Company, and had long been prominent in the Indian trade 
 around the Cape of Good Hope. Travellers to the Far East to 
 whom speed was more and money less of a factor, generally chose 
 to go out by way of the overland route, which was not in the least 
 prejudiced by the report of the Committee of 1851 in favor of 
 the Cape route. 
 
 Having taken up the communication and transportation needs 
 of the Australasian colonies, the Select Committee of 1851 next 
 attacked the question of improving the service to India and China. 
 This matter was taken up with particular reference to the postal : 
 service, yet commercial needs and passenger facilities were con- i 
 sidered as well.*® In substance, the Committee believed that al- I 
 though parts of India received postal service twice a month, all I 
 main parts of that country should receive fortnightly service. 
 This was thought to be feasible without any increase in existing , 
 costs to the Government. It was recommended that the line i 
 between Aden and Bombay be left in the hands of the East India 1 
 Company for “ political reasons,” and that a new postal line be 
 established between Hong Kong and Shanghai.*' There was ' 
 more than a political reason for the former recommendation. 
 Evidence taken by the Committee of 1851 indicated that between ; 
 1845 and 1850 the P. and O. Company had made few improve- ^ 
 ments in their equipment, and had conducted their eastern service 
 in true monopolistic fashion.** With the focusing of public 
 attention on these shortcomings, however, the Directors of the 
 Company read a warning and introduced a number of improve- 
 ments without delay.*® Although the ships of the East India 
 Company continued to operate the Bombay-Aden-Suez line, the 
 
 Grindlay, op. ch., pp. 1-2. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. [iii]. This report was handed in 29 July, 1S51. 
 
 Ibid., pp. vii— xi; ibid., 1852—1853, No. 627, p. 148. The Secretary of the 
 East India Company explained to a Parliamentary Committee in 1853 that “it has 
 been thought desirable . . . that the flag of the Company, as the rulers of India, 
 should be seen constantly in the Red Sea and in Egypt.” 
 
 Ibid., 1852—1853, No. 627, pp. 177—178; ibid., 1851, No. 349, p. 19. 
 
 One of the interesting controversies of the time sprang up around the 
 respective merits of wooden and iron ships for constant steam service. Up to 
 1851, it had generally been assumed that wooden, especially teak, vessels, although 
 
I COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 261 
 
 1 
 
 I P. and O. began a service of their own on this line in 1853 with 
 'larger and faster vessels than those of the Indian Navy.®° This 
 I competition, together with a series of political difficulties in the 
 ! East, which badly disrupted the Naval steam service, eventually 
 lied to the retirement of the East India Company and to the 
 !■ bringing of this pioneer line into the P. and O. system. 
 
 |j The scheme of fortnightly mails to all parts of India and to 
 ‘Singapore and Hong Kong, recommended in 1851, was inaugu- 
 rated early in 1852. The contracts for this service also called 
 I for mail trips between Singapore and Sydney in every alternate 
 month, a service which was extended to New Zealand a little later 
 Ji on.®^ This extended communication, which embraced practically 
 ! all of the points contemplated by those who had originally ad- 
 vocated a comprehensive plan, was organized in several separate 
 sections with several branches. Between England and Alexandria 
 
 I was a fortnightly communication by way of Malta and Gibraltar, 
 || with a branch from Marseilles to Malta. Another fortnightly 
 ' line ran from Suez to Hong Kong via Aden, Point de Galle 
 j (Ceylon), Madras, and Calcutta. From Bombay and Point de 
 i Galle a line continued by way of Penang and Singapore to Hong 
 ;[ Kong. A branch steamer connected Hong Kong with Shanghai, 
 
 I I and a branch line from Singapore via Batavia, Swan River, Ade- 
 laide, and Port Phillip to Sydney was operated in alternate 
 months.®® The Indian Navy supplemented the P. and O. system 
 
 ' by monthly voyages from Bombay to Suez and fortnightly service 
 from Bombay to Aden to connect with alternate P. and O. 
 i sailings.®® 
 
 1 An entire fleet of steamships was required for the working out 
 i of this comprehensive plan. That of the Peninsular and Oriental 
 ! Company alone numbered about twenty-five by 1854, the major- 
 I ity of which were kept in constant service. These vessels ranged 
 . in size from small service steamers employed on short branch 
 I lines, such as those which were employed on the Nile, to the new 
 
 I heavier, were superior as naval vessels, of longer life, and even faster than those of 
 iron. Even the Peninsular and Oriental Company did not deny these advantages 
 of wooden vessels when, in 1850 and again in 1851, they were informed by the 
 British Admiralty that “ no vessel commenced after the date of this letter will be 
 approved of, under the terms of the contract, if built of iron or of any material 
 offering so ineffectual a resistance to the striking of shot.” {Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 
 86, pp. 1—3. See ibid., 1852—1853, No. 627, p. 173.) The Select Committee of 
 j 1851 reported in favor of iron vessels on all points, and within a few years the ban 
 V of the Admiralty on such ships was removed. 
 
 I Pari. Pap., 1852-1853, No. 627, pp. 158-159. 
 
 I London Times, 27 Feb., 4 and 6 March, 1852. 
 
 i Ibid., 8 March, 1852. Ibid., 29 Sept., 1852. 
 
262 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 leviathans of those days, of 1 200 to 2000 tons burden and 500 to I 
 650 horsepower.®^ By 1854 the Peninsular and Oriental Com- I 
 pany were able to put into commission a new screw steam vessel, 
 the Himalaya, of 3500 tons and 750 horsepower, the largest 
 steamer afloat for the time being. Within a decade speed also ' 
 had materially increased. Eight or nine knots per hour had been , 
 considered fast service in the early forties. By the outbreak of 
 the Crimean War, average speeds of eleven or twelve knots were 
 maintained over the longest sections of the eastern lines.®® Thir- 
 teen or fourteen knots were not unusual on short runs, and the 
 southwest monsoon had definitely lost its power to terrify the 
 navigator. Bombay and London had at last been brought within 
 a month of each other for the express traveller — a noteworthy 
 accomplishment.®® 
 
 In addition to the numerous vessels of the P. and O. establish- 
 ment, those of the Indian Navy were only less powerful and 
 superbly equipped. The ships built to replace and supplement 
 those with which the line was opened between Bombay and Suez, 
 while constructed with a view to their utility in time of war, were ' 
 no longer the cramped, comfortless warships of the late thirties. 
 
 As their size and power had increased, accommodations for pas- 
 sengers had likewise. By 1854 such ships as the Assaye, of 1800 i 
 tons and 650 horsepower, and Punjaub, 1 800 tons and 700 horse- 1 
 power, compared very favorably with the palatial steamers of the 
 P. and O. in eastern waters.®^ Moreover, since the Indian Na^y 
 had been placed on a steam basis and employed largely in regular ; 
 passenger and mail service on the Bombay-Suez line, a new gen- 
 eration of naval officers had grown up who were not steeped in 
 the traditions of the old Navy, and to whom there was no disgrace ^ 
 in commanding vessels engaged in work of a commercial nature.®® 
 The lapse of the commercial activities of the Indian Na\y was due 
 more to the exigencies of a new series of naval operations, perhaps, 
 than to the competition of the P. and O. concern. 
 
 The European end of the comprehensive scheme of communi- 
 
 Grindlay, of. cit., pp. 6, 7 ; Messrs. Wag-horn & Co.’s Overland Guide to 
 India by Three Routes to Egyft . . . (2d ed., London 1846), p. 7; David L. 
 Richardson, The Anglo-Indian Passage; Homevsard and Outzvard: or A Card for 
 the Overland Traveller from Southamfton to Bombay, Madras and Calcutta 
 (London, 1849), p. 9; Pari. Paf., 1851, No. 605, pp. 420, 427, fassim. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, pp. 335-338, 383-387- _ j 
 
 In 1845 Lieut. Thomas Waghorn carried despatches from Alexandria to I 
 London -which had consumed a total time of twenty-nine and a half days from | 
 Bombay. Waghorn thought that the time could readily be reduced to twenty-five I 
 days, using the route from Trieste through Germany to the English Channel. — 
 Illustrated London News, 8 Nov., 1845, p. 292. 
 
 Low, History of the Indian Navy, II, 583. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1851, No. 605, pp. xvii, xviii, 104-107, 298-304, 332-335. 
 
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN OF COMMUNICATION 263 
 
 cations was not wholly in the hands of the Peninsular and Oriental 
 
 I Company. Vessels of the British Admiralty had ceased to main- 
 tain a separate service in the Mediterranean, but their place had 
 Ibeen taken by a swarm of fast, up-to-date steam packets of French 
 and Austrian lines. The French packets operating from Mar- 
 Iseilles to ports of the eastern Mediterranean at very frequent 
 intervals were still reputed, as they were earlier, to be faster and 
 ■more efficient than competing English vessels. In 1847’ 
 French had about forty Post Office packets operating in the Medi- 
 
 [,terranean, with service between Marseilles and Alexandria three 
 H times a month.®® After 1845', however, the Austrian Lloyds 
 ('Company, with lines throughout the eastern Mediterranean, 
 iJcaused the greatest anxiety. This concern, founded in 1836 with 
 j'an equipment of seven small vessels, had in 1847 twenty-five 
 large steamers. Weekly voyages were made all through the East 
 ii and many British passengers to and from the Orient patronized 
 Ij this Mediterranean service in spite of attempts by the P. and O. 
 *to discourage such traffic by a high-handed rate discrimination, 
 ij Sailings of British steamers to many parts of Italy, Greece, the 
 ! I Ionian Islands, and Syria had almost entirely ceased as French 
 ! and Austrian vessels captured the local trade of these countries, 
 iJand the idea of a British route to India through Mesopotamia 
 i; lapsed for a time. It was reported in 1851 that the Austrian 
 L Lloyds were even contemplating an arrangement with American 
 ' and Dutch steamship interests for the development of their own 
 [ comprehensive scheme of communication and transportation in 
 f i Asiatic waters.'^®® 
 
 I I This situation gave rise to grave apprehensions in the minds 
 ,j of good imperialists. 
 
 ; Our Indian Empire is now governed by orders transmitted 
 I through Egypt [said one of them]. It is not very states- 
 
 1 manlike to trust to the possibility of sending couriers by way 
 : of the Euphrates and by Persia, when the couriers by the 
 
 ; Euphrates must take their passage in a French steamer to 
 I Beyrout, and those through Persia in an Austrian to Trebi- 
 zond. . . Should Great Britain be engaged in war with any 
 : European power . . . there can be no doubt that every at- 
 
 On the Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, pp. i8, 19; 
 |i British Possessions in Europe, Africa, Asia, and Australasia connected with England 
 by the India and Australia Mail Steam Packet Company . . . p. 7; Pari. Pap., 1851, 
 ff No. 349, p. 25. 
 
 ■| Ibid., 1851, No. 605, pp. 259—265; ibid., 1851, No. 349, p. 22; On the 
 
 Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, pp. 4, 5; Asiatic 
 Journal, 3d Ser., IV, 651. 
 
264 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA I 
 
 tempt would be made by our enemies to interrupt our com- 
 munications with India through Egypt, All Europe regards 
 this interruption as one of the severest wounds that the 
 enemies of England can Inflict on her power. . . A rapid 
 means of communicating between India and Malta, both by 
 means of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf, through 
 Egypt and through Syria, would multiply lO-fold the 
 resources of Britain, and secure the defences of our posses- 
 sions from Canada to Hong Kong. . 
 
 Such warnings as this, however, were unheeded until the issues 
 of a great mid-century European war, in which England was 
 pitted against one of her rivals for hegemony in the Orient, 
 brought public attention in England to focus on the political ad- 
 vantages of having more than one route of access to the Indian 
 Empire. 
 
 In the rapid development of communication by the overland 
 route, the railway had cooperated with the steam vessel. The 
 opening of the Eastern Counties Railway from London to Dover 
 and the Southwestern Railway from London to Southampton, 
 supplanting the express coach by uniformly rapid and dependable 
 service, subtracted hours from the time consumed in a distant 
 journey and added infinitely to the comfort and convenience of 
 travellers. For those who pursued the overland route through 
 France,^”^ the completion of railway lines between Calais and j 
 Paris and Marseilles were noteworthy achievements. By the j 
 middle of the century the most difficult link in the whole com- i 
 prehensive chain, for mails, passengers and goods, was the passage j 
 through Egypt. Although this had been vastly improved since | 
 the opening of the overland route, its development had not kept 
 pace with mechanical evolution elsewhere. But projects were 
 already well under way to remove the obstructing features of 
 this land link, by the completion of a railway between Alexandria 
 and Suez, or by the digging of a navigable canal through the land 
 
 On the Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, p. 3. I 
 See Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 349, p. 22. 
 
 Gallery of Illustration, p. 9. C. W. Whitaker, in his History of Enfield | 
 (London, 1911, p. 38), speaks of a coach, displaced by the opening of the Eastern I 
 Counties Railway, being bought by Thomas Waghorn for use in Egypt. i 
 
 103 term “ overland,” as has already been pointed out, originalh' referred I 
 
 to the land passage through Egj'pt. By 1850 it had come to be applied customarily i 
 to the passage by one of several possible routes across the continent from the English 1 
 Channel to some port on the Mediterranean. It was no longer needed to designate ; 
 the Egyptian passage, since, for purposes of communication, there was but one main : 
 highway to the East. 
 
Comprehensive plan of communication 265 
 
 ibarrier. Thus might the overland route suffice for trade as well 
 as for purposes of communication/'’^ In 1820 it not infrequently 
 required two months to make a voyage from London to Con- 
 stantinople. A generation later Calcutta had been brought within 
 half of that time-distance, and even Sydney, in the very heart of 
 the antipodes, could be reached within the space of two months. 
 Such rapid changes placed some strain on the imagination for a 
 time, but by the middle of the nineteenth century the mind could 
 grasp a trip from London to Lahore or from Southampton to 
 Sydney as readily as from London one could envisage Constanti- 
 nople, Beirut, or Alexandria a little earlier. 
 
 I Steam navigation [said a contemporary], mighty as its 
 progress has been during the last ten years, is yet in its in- 
 fancy. In the perfection of machinery j in the diminution of 
 i the expense of locomotive power j and in prevention of acci- 
 dents, there is much scope for improvements which science, 
 acting upon experience, will in time accomplish. . . There 
 is no limit to the effects of steam power, which will work 
 more changes in society than either the [magnetic] needle, 
 gunpowder, or the art of printing.^'’® 
 
 |i Such an enthusiastic statement was hardly overdrawn, when it 
 |s considered that nearly 100,000 letters were sent in each over- 
 jland mail, and nearly 2000 passengers made their way to and 
 [from India in 1843, comparison with only 275 in 1839,^°® and 
 ^hen steam vessels had grown within a decade from pygmies of 
 [500 tons or less to relatively huge steamships of ;^8oo tons, 
 j Still more significant than mere growth of mails and increase 
 ;’in travel, more potent than increased tonnage and more frequent 
 [sailings, was the series of social changes in India inaugurated by 
 [rapid steam communication. No hint of the profound influence 
 jon native Indian life and thought which was to come from Eu- 
 ropean ideas and methods was discernible in 1843. Yet already 
 (the first pages were being written in the drama of which the first 
 act was the great Revolt of 1857, second was the rise of swaraj 
 and swadeshi later in the century, while the third was written in 
 terms of the late wide-spread program of passive resistance. 
 European influences and institutions, producing unhealthy and 
 [dangerous reactions upon coming in contact with orientalism, 
 jWould hardly have found their way to India to any extensive 
 [degree but for the steamship and new steam routes. 
 
 7 ®“* On the Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, pp. i6, 17. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., I, 567. 
 
 106 Report of C. A. Murray to Lord Palmerston, 6 June, 1847. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 
 DISPUTED GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 t I ^ HE whole fabric of the overland route, both before 
 
 I and after its formal opening in 1839, completely 
 
 J- depended on the availability and constancy of the 
 
 Egyptian section. Egypt was no less a vital link between East 
 and West in the nineteenth than in any previous century. Or- 
 dinarily the political situation in Egypt was of European concern 
 because of only one set of interests — those relating to the use : 
 of the Red Sea. The overweening ambition of Mehemet Ali, 
 however, which aimed at the creation of something akin to an 
 Egyptian Empire, produced a very difficult situation in the dec- 
 ade between 1830 and 1840. By extending his control from 
 Egypt to include Arabia, Syria, and a part of Mesopotamia, thus * 
 dominating both natural routes between East and West, the Pasha 
 contrived to produce a major European problem at the very | 
 moment when capital and science were prepared to embark upon ’ 
 the development of either or both of these routes. ' 
 
 The signing of the Convention of Kutaya between the Pasha 
 and the Porte on April 8, 1833, was popularly thought to be the ' 
 termination of a situation threatening to the tranquillity of Eu- 
 rope. As a guarantee of peace, however, it was an illusion. Rus- 
 sia had not gained a commanding position at Constantinople from 
 any idle or philanthropic motive, and neither Britain nor France 
 could afford to contemplate Russian domination at the Porte. 
 Even while Egyptian troops were being moved south of the 
 Taurus Mountains in accordance with the late Convention, Rus- 
 sian troops and diplomatic corps were busily making Constant!- 1 
 nople into a Russian outpost.^ Before the new' British xAmbassador 1 
 at the Porte, Lord Ponsonby, and the French xAmbassador, Ad- 1 
 miral Roussin, were altogether aware of the prestige gained by | 
 
 ^ J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European i 
 Diplomacy (Oxford, 1917), p. 209; S. Goriainow, Le Bosphore et les Dardanelles 1 
 (Paris, 1910), pp. 33-35; David Ross (Ed.), Opinions of the European Press on the 
 Eastern Question, p. 467. 
 
 266 
 
'IgUARDIANSHIP of the routes to INDIA 267 
 
 l:he Russian Ambassador, Count Alexis Orloff, he had been able 
 |:o arrange a Russo-Turkish alliance embodied in a Convention 
 signed at Unkiar-Skelessi.^ The real kernel of this arrangement 
 vas contained in a secret article whereby, in return for Russian 
 protection, ostensibly against Mehemet Ali, Turkey was bound 
 ;o close the Dardanelles to the ships of war of any other Power. 
 
 At a court where secrets seldom remained long under cover, 
 ;his provision soon became known to the representatives of all the 
 Creat Powers. Immediately a furore arose. Notes of protesta- 
 Sion were sent by the British and French Governments to both 
 Russia and Turkey, denouncing the closing of the Straits. At 
 Constantinople the French Ambassador blustered and threatened 
 ;o break off relations with the Porte, and was only dissuaded from 
 doing so by his British colleague.® Upon reflection, however, 
 [leither France nor Britain desired war, so they failed to find in 
 ihe treaty a casus belli. For that matter, each of these Powers 
 vas too suspicious of the other to work fully in concert. The 
 situation was much improved by a statement issued by the Tsar 
 hat he had no intention of acting upon the treaty privileges just 
 ibtained.^ 
 
 I No sooner had the war spirit of the Powers begun to subside 
 'han it was again aroused by an unexpected incident. Although 
 he native inhabitants of Syria had welcomed the Egyptians as 
 ileliverers from Turkish oppression but a short time before, they 
 pok occasion to revolt against their new masters soon after the 
 figning of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The Sultan glady gave 
 mcouragement to the uprising, and it was not difficult to see the 
 land of Russia both in the Syrian disturbances and in the poorly- 
 ceiled attitude of the Porte, for it was the Russian policy “ to 
 veaken both the rival powers, the easier to make them its prey 
 iterwards.” ® 
 
 I This was the situation when, in August, 1834, the British House 
 j>f Commons voted to appropriate £20,000 for a steam survey of 
 
 ^ British and. Foreign State Papers, XX, 1176—1180; E. Hertslet, Map of Europe 
 •y Treaty, II, 925—927. 
 
 ® F. S. Rodkey, The Turco-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, 
 'ranee, and Russia, 1832—1841 (Urbana, 111., 1924), p. 30; Ross, op. cit., p. 427. 
 
 * Marriott, op. cit., p. 21 1; The Melbourne Papers (Ed. by L. C. Sanders, 
 -ondon, 1889), pp. 337-340; Barker, Syria and Egypt under the Last Five Sultans 
 j/ Turkey, II, 191; Maj. John Hall, England and the Orleans Monarchy (London, 
 1912), P. 155- 
 
 * ® Asiatic Journal, XV, N.S., Pt. II, 94, 95; Ross, op. cit., p. 455. Lord Pon- 
 pnby, British Ambassador at the Porte, was one who was unwilling to give Russia 
 redit for the least sincerity in word or action. His attitude in this regard was 
 naintained by almost all of his successors in office during the remainder of the 
 entury. Of these. Sir Stratford Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe) was the 
 post conspicuous Russophobe. 
 
268 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 the Euphrates River. In political circles this was considered to 
 be a means of keeping in touch with developments in that part of 
 western Asia with which Britain was most concerned and equivalent 
 to serving notice upon the Tsar and upon Mehemet Ali, that 
 along the natural lines to India British interests were to be main- 
 tained regardless of the late events. It mattered little to the 
 British Government under whose control lay the highway to In- 
 dia as long as that highway was always open and safe. It was to 
 be presumed that the occupation of Syria and Mesopotamia by 
 Mehemet Ali would not in itself constitute a danger, but in view 
 of the traditional friendship for Turkey and the degree of French 
 influence with the Pasha, British feeling was, as stated by Lord 
 Palmerston, that “ Turkey is as good an occupier of the road to 
 India as an active Arab sovereign would be.” ® At the same time 
 it was Palmerston’s opinion that “ the mistress of India cannot 
 permit France to be mistress directly or indirectly of the road to 
 her Indian dominions,” ’’ which was equivalent to stating a British 
 doctrine of paramount interest in those portions of the Near East 
 through which ran the natural routes to the East.® 
 
 For more than four years after the signing of the Treaty of 
 Unkiar-Skelessi the European political situation underwent no 
 fundamental change, but enough incidents occurred to keep all of 
 the Powers on the qui vlve. Interest continued to focus on the 
 route to India whenever Egyptian troops and Russian, Turkish, i 
 and French intrigues combined to foment difficulties of any sort. i 
 During this period Mehemet Ali was busily engaged in making : 
 real a nominal control over his new Syrian territories and Arabia. I 
 His object was apparently to solidify the conquests already made l 
 so that when the times were propitious his advance on Constan- i 
 tinople might be resumed with every chance of success. | 
 
 ® Sir Henry Lytton E. Bulwer, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount j 
 Palmerston (3 vols., London, 1870—1874), II, 145. ' 
 
 ^ Ibid., II, 293. 
 
 * F. S. Rodkey states, however {op. cit., p. 10), that “ Her [England’s] interests j 
 in the Near East had never been paramount. It was before the day when oil I 
 counted for much in the diplomatic affairs of nations, and the commercial route to 
 India was still by way of the Cape of Good Hope.” While it is true that for most 
 kinds of goods the Cape route was not supplanted until after the opening of the 
 Suez Canal, it is equally true that the shorter routes of communication not only in- 
 fluenced, but very largely determined, British policy in the Near East after 1830, 1 
 and, as these routes also offered possible avenues of invasion to rival powers, their 
 guarding was one of the major considerations in British foreign policy. No other I 
 view will explain the extent of British participation in the Syrian crisis in 1839—1840, r 
 various campaigns in Persia, the Crimean War, opposition to the French Suez Canal . 
 Company, and the occupation of Egypt. A few new factors entered into the cam- 
 paigns in Mesopotamia during the Great War, but the fundamental issues were , 
 much the same as formerly. See Victor Fontanier, Voyage dans PInde par PtgyfU 
 et la Mer Rouge, I, 289. 
 
iGUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 269 
 
 ' The withdrawal of some of the Egyptian forces from Asia 
 Minor in 1833 made possible the fitting out of an expedition for 
 reduction of the several semi-independent tribes of Arabia. In 
 :834 an Egyptian army of a few thousand well-trained troops 
 [proceeded in leisurely fashion through Arabia to the head of the 
 L^ersian Gulf, receiving the submission of intervening peoples 
 [ind levying tribute.® At the mouth of the Shaat-el-Arab, the 
 pigyptian army established contact with an Egyptian fleet, which 
 iiad been sent around from the Red Sea. For a short time the 
 sland of Bahrein, which occupies a strategic position in the Arabian 
 ijulf, was occupied, but it was presently evacuated because of 
 British protests.^® British forces themselves took possession of the 
 Island in 1839 and maintained the place as a base of operations.^^ 
 further Egyptian exploits in lower Mesopotamia were obstructed 
 oy the watchfulness of the Indian Navy. In view of British at- 
 titude, Mehemet Ali fell back on his customary policy of making 
 baste slowly, and while his forces remained in the vicinity of the 
 [Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea until 1840, their, operations were 
 i'onfined chiefly to overawing the Arab tribes of the interior.^® 
 By 1839 Egyptian forces had brought practically all of Arabia 
 ander control. The ports on the east shore of the Red Sea, in- 
 fluding the important trading centers of Mocha and Jedda, had 
 peen occupied, and the presence of Egyptian forces in the vicinity 
 ()f Aden undoubtedly exerted strong influence on the decision 
 ■■)f British authorities to seize and garrison the place. 
 
 I It is not strange that during this period British policy with re- 
 gard to Egypt was founded on the assumption that a ruler who 
 |vas considered a protege by the French Government and whose 
 administration contained so many French officials could not have 
 friendly sentiments for Britain and was not to be trusted. A 
 Iprilliant French officer. Colonel Seves, better known as Suleiman 
 
 I ® D. G. Hogarth, The Penetration of Arabia, pp. 84—87, 104, -passim-, Ains- 
 TOrth, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, II, 198. It was feared for a time 
 hat Egyptian armies might march up the Tigris and undertake the conquest of 
 Bagdad, and the Turkish Government urged the British to assist in preventing such 
 i step. The Pasha refrained from threatening the city, however. 
 
 ‘ Fontanier, op. cit., I, 360— 361. 
 
 ' Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds Relating to 
 
 i 'ndia and Neighbouring Countries, VII, 35—40. 
 
 Victor Fontanier states that at his suggestion Eg^yptian forces captured and 
 i plundered the Persian town of Mohammerah because Col. Chesney, in the name of 
 Inis Government, had taken its sheik under British protection. — Fontanier, op. cit., 
 I [, 308, 361-378. 
 
 H. E. Egerton, British Foreign Policy in Europe (London, 1918), p. 189; 
 Par/. Pap., 1840, No. 277, p. 191; ibid., 1841, No. [323.], Pt. II, 299, 300. 
 
 I ' Estimates of the size of the Pasha’s army vary from 2500 to 10,000 men. The 
 lumbers had undoubtedly been considerably reduced by 1839. 
 
270 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Pasha, had charge of the Egyptian War Office, and to his energ) 
 and ability may be ascribed much of the effectiveness of the Pasha’s 
 troops. M. de Cerisy, a naval expert from Toulon, remodelec 
 the Egyptian fleet and placed it on a war basis,^^ while one of his 
 fellow countrymen, M. Besson, provided armament and trainee 
 soldiers. Other Frenchmen served in various other capacities.^ 
 In England little note was taken of the fact that the Pasha was 
 more concerned with efficient and loyal service than with th( 
 nationality of his servants. Englishmen who proved their wort! 
 were not infrequently rewarded and honored also. But at al. 
 events, the desire of the British Government to recover its formei 
 prestige at Constantinople as a check on the dangerous intrigues 
 of Russia necessitated a program of opposition to Meheme' 
 Ali’s plans for aggrandizement. 
 
 The activities of Mehemet Ali after his peace with the Sultar 
 were the straws indicating which way the wind blew. Particular!} 
 they reflected the relations of Egypt and France and determinec 
 the relations of France and Britain. From having urged Meheme' 
 Ali to come to terms with his liege in 1833, the French returnee 
 to a policy of abetting and conspiring with the Pasha. As a re- 
 sult, almost immediately after Anglo-French cooperation anc 
 accord had secured the peace of Europe by patching up relations! 
 between the Sultan and the Pasha and had forced Russia tc 
 content herself with only the moral fruits of her diplomatic vic- 
 tory at Unkiar-Skelessi, Anglo-French relations became notice- 
 ably cooler. In 1834 an American observer in Egypt reporter 
 to his home government that “ France regards Egypt as a quasi 
 colony, and aspires to its possession. Egypt looks to France for 
 science and art, and France anticipates a predominance in hei 
 councils, in the contingency of future wars in Europe or Asia.” ’ 
 British political leaders of whatever party found it impossible 
 to continue in harmony with a nation so fully determined tCj 
 maintain a strong hegemony in, if not actually to control, the 
 countries through which intercourse between the Mediterranear 
 and Indian Ocean must take its way. 
 
 The continuation of a vigorous French policy in Algeria, \yhen 
 the hinterland was being penetrated and whence Tunis was threat 
 ened,^^ raised great indignation in England. The Mediterranear 
 
 Edward Robinson, Biblical Researches in Balestine, II, 499. 
 
 Marriott, op. cit., p. 204; William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and- li 
 Successors, p. 145. 
 
 W. H. Hodgson, in a report to the State Department of the U. S. Governmen 
 quoted in Rodkey, op. cit., p. 44 n. 
 
 Blackwood's Magazine, XLVIII, 587; Hall, op. cit., pp. 225—227; H. Lorir 
 UAfrique du Nord; Tunisie — Algerie — Maroc, pp. 26—27, passim. 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 271 
 
 | ;gan to take on the appearance of a “ French lake.” The Eng- 
 ;h press launched a barrage of bitter invective against the French 
 •ogram in Africa, characterizing it as “ an act of as unjustifiable 
 pine as the worst of Napoleon’s ... of as rude a policy as if it 
 id been perpetrated by a Tartar horde.” A pronounced spirit 
 ■ jingoism pervaded the foreign comment in which some of the 
 ore conservative English journals joined.^® 
 
 However, most of the morbid raving at French Algerian en- 
 rprises would have been left unvoiced but for French initiative 
 Egypt. Here the French had given rise to grave anxiety in 
 nes past when distances were greater and the country was in 
 ^centralized confusion. Now that they came as the allies of an 
 jble and powerful autocrat, the situation was alarming, and state- 
 nents of purpose in the French press and even in the Chamber 
 f Deputies gave plenty of ground for apprehension.^^ Additional 
 plor was lent to English fears by the activities of French agents 
 Isewhere in the East: in Syria, Mesopotamia, Persia, and even 
 |i India.^^ 
 
 A great reason for the Pasha’s regard for the French became 
 ipparent in connection with the renewal of hostilities in Syria, 
 ^rom the first Mehemet Ali had regarded his Convention with 
 ^e Porte in the light of a truce, to be broken whenever conditions 
 jhould warrant. In this purpose he was upheld both by the advice 
 f his French officers and the friendly sentiments of the French 
 iTOvernment. The Pasha’s preparations for a renewal of the war 
 jfith Turkey were scarcely veiled.^* He improved military dis- 
 ipline, collected large depots of war supplies principally from 
 Trance, and kept up the morale of his troops by frequent incur- 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Paf., XXII, 254—255, 351; The Melbourne Pafers, pp. 
 137-340, 464-465. 
 
 Black-wood’s Magazine, XLII, 686. Here appears a long and bitter arraign- 
 lent of French motives and policy since the accession of Napoleon Bonaparte. 
 
 Ibid., XLVII, 217; Edinburgh Review, LI, 565—566; Dublin Review, IV, 
 79; Annual Register, 1840, pp. 171—179. The letter from Lord Palmerston to 
 ord John Russell of 29 Sept., 1840, quoted by Prof. G. P. Gooch in The Cambridge 
 ’istorical Journal, I (1924), 176, is interesting. 
 
 Comte S. M. de Cressate, La Syrie Frangaise (Paris, 1915), pp. 18—33, 
 assim; Fontanier, of. cit., I, 227, 272—273; Rodkey, of. cit., p. 69. 
 
 Fontanier, of. cit., I, 347; II, 53—81; Asiatic Journal, XXX, N.S., Pt. II, 
 59; Sir Henry Layard, Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia (2 vols., 
 ondon, 1887), I, 255, 265; Geo. N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question (2 
 ils., London, 1892), I, 595—596. 
 
 In 1835 Lord Ponsonby made official representations to the Turkish Govern- 
 ent that treaties of commerce between England and Turkey were not being carried 
 It in the territories under the Pasha’s rule. The Porte thereupon addressed a firman 
 ' Mehemet Ali (24 Dec.), commanding him to facilitate British trade (and in- 
 dentally the Euphrates Expedition) in every way possible. — Brit, and For. St. 
 af., XXIII, 1291, 1292. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 2'J'l 
 
 sions against the Arabs. His purposes were so obvious and so in- 
 timately connected with the peace of Europe that early in 1838 
 Lord Palmerston instructed the British Consul-General in Egypt, 
 Col. Patrick Campbell, to warn Mehemet Ali against attacking 
 Turkish territory and to ask for an explanation of his extensive 
 military preparations.^* 
 
 The Pasha stated in formal reply that he had not the remotest 
 intention of conquering any of the Sultan’s territory. Neverthe- 
 less, Col. Campbell felt impelled again to report to his Govern- 
 ment, as he had previously, that he was convinced from private 
 conversations with the Pasha that he was intending presently to 
 assert his independence and to maintain it by force, if necessary. 
 Palmerston instructed that the Pasha be warned again of the dan- 
 ger of taking any aggressive step against Turkey, stating at the 
 same time that Great Britain would necessarily be drawn into the 
 matter should any such act occur. However, Mehemet Ali per- 
 sisted both in his plans for declaring himself Independent and in 
 strengthening his army and navy, believing, no doubt, that with the 
 support of France and the influence on Great Britain of the Indian 
 route, which had lately been opened up through Egypt, he would 
 be secure from Egyptian intervention in the event of hostilities."^ 
 Not long afterward the Sultan, unable to tolerate longer the 
 treasonable preparations of his vassal, threw down the gauntlet 
 and brought all of Europe to the verge of war. 
 
 The Egyptian situation was linked up with other and some- 
 what similar problems farther east. In those countries forming 
 a corridor from the Mediterranean to the confines of India, po- 
 litical conditions were little more satisfactory to British interests 
 during the thirties than were those in Egypt. In this sphere 
 Russian and not French aggression was the source of concern and 
 this was not a small factor in the working out of the Egyptian 
 question. During these years there could be little doubt of the 
 existence of Russian intrigues all along the corridor to India. 
 As Palmerston put it, soon after the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi: 
 
 With Russia we are just as we were, snarling at each other, 
 hating each other, but neither wishing for war. Their last 
 communication on Eastern affairs is anything but satisfac- 
 tory. However, there is nothing at present done by us, be- 
 cause there is no danger of anything being done by them. 
 They cannot return to Turkey unless invited by the Sultan, 
 and the Sultan will not invite them unless he is again at- 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XX\U, 694. 
 
 Ibid., 695-704; Hall, of. cit., pp. 239—240. 
 
I GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 273 
 
 • tacked by Mehemet Alij but Mehemet Ali will not stir as 
 1 long as we beg him not to do so, because he knows that our 
 fleet could effectually prevent him. . . Our policy as to the 
 Levant is to remain quiet, but remain prepared. . 
 
 [But this note also indicates why, in spite of a uniformly hostile 
 Ifeeling in England toward everything Russian,"^ Anglo-Russian 
 relations tended to improve, while those with France became in- 
 creasingly unsatisfactory. Turkey was again returning to the 
 [British fold. The French, in consequence, could not be forgiven 
 ifor their entrenched position athwart the overland route, while 
 [the greater arrogance of the Russians in the Middle East failed 
 ■to check the constantly improving relations between the British 
 land Russian Governments after 1834. 
 
 I Even in outline, the charges which might have been preferred 
 [against Russia look serious. The Tsar’s Government protested 
 [Strongly to the Porte against the firman issued for the Euphrates 
 jExpedition in 1834.^® Russian agents, many of them in disguise, 
 [were scattered throughout the countries of western Asia, and not 
 [infrequently were detected in India itself.^® Twice during the 
 jdecade from 1 830 to 1 840 Russian dealings with Persia almost led 
 [to a rupture of Anglo-Russian relations. 
 
 ; The first of these occurred in 1833 at the time of Russian 
 [moves on Turkey, when British officers and equipment reenforced 
 [the Persian armies in the field, where hostilities with the Russians 
 [were taking place spasmodically.®® Shortly afterward Russian 
 [agents, filtering into Persia, weaned that state away from the 
 British, proposing joint operations against the states bordering 
 'India. Henry Ellis, the British representative in Persia, reported 
 [to Lord Palmerston in 1835 that “ The Shah has very extended 
 
 Bulwer, of. cit., II, 182—183; Hall, of. cit., p. 220. From this it becomes 
 apparent that one of the greatest agencies for peace was the British fleet. England 
 was not without a war group, however. An able article in the British and Foreign 
 'Review concluded with the statements that “To England, a war ofens uf fositive 
 advantages, independent of the object,” and that Russia could succeed in Turkey 
 i|“ only by f reventing any collision from taking flaced’’ Quoted in Ross, of. cit., 
 jPp. 480—482. 
 
 David Urquhart, Turkey and Its Resources . . . (London, 1833) ; Le Sultan 
 \et le Pacha d’Egyfte (London, 1839), two pamphlets by the famous polemical 
 writer; Anon., Progress and Present Position of Russia in the East (London, 1836) ; 
 Asiatic Journal, XXI, N.S., Pt. I, 85. 
 
 Martens, Recueil des Traites, N.S., III, 760—762. 
 
 Fontanier, of. cit., I, 290—291 i H, 75. 
 
 P. M. Sykes, A History of Persia, II, 428, fassim; Fontanier, of. cit., I, 346, 
 11 , 199, 200. Fontanier believed that the English were largely responsible for the 
 troubles in this theatre. Their intrigues, he said, “ had a character of avowed 
 lostility to Russia, and leave a long way behind the manoeuvres of which they 
 reproach that power.” 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 274 
 
 schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan, and . . . 
 conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Khandahar 
 is . . . complete. . . This pretension is much sustained by the 
 suggestions of Col. Borowski.” And in November, 1836, the 
 Government of India sent a despatch to John McNeill, newly 
 accredited to the Persian Court, stating that — 
 
 The political interests of Great Britain and of British In- 
 dia are even more concerned than their commercial interests 
 in the exemption of the countries betwen India and Persia 
 from foreign aggression from the westward. The lately 
 contemplated expedition against Herat, if it was not 
 prompted, was, as is well known, strenuously urged on the 
 attention of the Persian Government by the Russian Am- 
 bassador, and the pertinacity with which the Persian Gov- 
 ernment has persisted in this design, in spite of the remon- 
 strances of His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador ... is of 
 itself a sufficient ground for apprehending the existence of 
 some ulterior and unfriendly design towards our interests.®^ 
 
 McNeill, who had been sent to Persia to counteract anti-British 
 influences, was able to accomplish little. He managed to secure 
 a firman from the Shah, giving English merchants such com- 
 mercial privileges as had previously been accorded to Russia 5 
 and the Euphrates Expedition was thus enabled to operate in 
 Persian territory along the Karun and lower Tigris Rivers.^® But , 
 he was not able to dissuade Mohamed Shah from undertaking a 
 siege of Herat, in which a Russian force was expected to co- 
 operate. Here, after giving final notice that Great Britain could 
 not remain an idle spectator in the projected hostilities, McNeill i 
 broke off diplomatic relations. It was only by the timely aid fur- 
 nished by British Indian officers that the Persian attack was . 
 foiled.*" 
 
 The breach with Persia was healed almost as quickly as it was 1 
 created. In May, 1838, while the siege of Herat was still in 
 progress, the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland, reached i 
 the conclusion that a naval demonstration against the Persian coast ^ 
 might produce a salutary effect on the attitude of the Persian : 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XXIII, 864. See the pamphlet by E. Stirling, Oti the 
 Political State of the Countries bet^ween Persia and India (London, 1835). 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XXV, 1247, 1253. 
 
 Ibid., XXIV, 769. McNeill became conspicuous years later in connection i 
 with a projected Euphrates Valley Railway. 
 
 Ibid., XXIV, 1289; Asiatic Journal, XXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 276; Low, History ■' 
 of the Indian Navy, II, 98. 
 
 i 
 
I GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 275 
 
 ' Government as it had on other occasions. Accordingly he gave 
 ( instructions that the Bombay Government prepare a portion of 
 the Indian Navy for such an expedition “ at the earliest practicable 
 period.” The naval squadron prepared for this service, led 
 by the new steam frigate S emir amis y which had just come out from 
 England, left Bombay early in June. The expedition proceeded 
 to the mouth of the Persian Gulf, touched at Mascat and Bushire, 
 and concentrated on the island of Karrack, where troops and stores 
 were landed and the island temporarily taken over. Since this 
 position dominated the town of Bushire, the most important Per- 
 sian seaport, it was hoped that this “ demonstration ” would suc- 
 ceed without the necessity of bombarding the port or undertaking 
 a land campaign.^® 
 
 The expedition succeeded in its immediate object. Being unable 
 to seize Herat and doubtful of his Russian allies, the Shah trem- 
 bled at the prospect of losing his principal seaport, and adopted 
 a conciliatory tone. On August 14, he sent a despatch to the 
 Indian Government consenting to all British demands. He 
 added, “ Were it not for the sake of the friendship of the British 
 Government, we should not return from before Herat. Had we 
 known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friend- 
 ship, we certainly would not have come at all.” Early in Sep- 
 tember the siege of Herat was lifted, the Persian forces retired, 
 and normal relations were presently established with British in- 
 fluence again predominant.®* 
 
 The return of Persia to the British fold did not entirely remove 
 the Russian menace from India. As long as the Afghans in Herat 
 held out, British India appeared safe: the passes were secure. But 
 unexpectedly, before the Persians had withdrawn from Afghan 
 territory, the Amir, Dost Mohammed, came to terms with the 
 Russians, and formed an alliance whereby Russia was to assume 
 protection over this frontier state. The news of this development 
 created a great deal of excitement in the presidencies and caused 
 no little unrest among the native Indian states, where Russian 
 
 Low, o-p. cit., II, 98. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 275—276. The British Resident at 
 Bushire had been insulted and forced to leave in March. 
 
 Low, op. cit., II, 99; Parliamentary Paper, 1839, [171.], “Cor- 
 
 respondence Relating to Persia and Afghanistan.” 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1842, No. [354.], p. 125. Whether the Indian Government had 
 intended to retain Karrack as a permanent base is not known, though there are 
 indications of such a plan. The place proved to be so pestiferous, however, that the 
 troops were withdrawn as quickly as possible after the demonstration had served 
 its purpose. Hardly a soldier was fit for duty at one time. — Asiatic Journal, 
 XXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 213; ibii., XXXIII, N.S., Pt. II, 210; ibid., XXXVII, N.S., 
 Pt. II, 46, 216; ibid. XXXIX N.S., Pt. II, 288; ibid., XL, N.S., Pt. II, 45. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 276 
 
 agents had already sowed the seeds of revolt.®® The outlook was j 
 very dark, indeed. How great the Russian peril really was has j 
 never been determined.^® British army officers who had made ! 
 their way through Afghanistan as far as the frontiers of Russia i 
 a few years earlier insisted that it was highly improbable that a 
 Russian army could have successfully invaded India because of ( 
 the difficulty of depending on such a long line of communications.^^ ■, 
 However, in India the danger appeared real and imminent, and d 
 steps were immediately taken by the Government of India to j 
 meet it. Early in 1 839 an Indian army invaded Afghanistan, took { 
 the principal towns, Khandahar and Kabul, and occupied the r 
 country until the danger from Russia had subsided. Into the un- ? 
 fortunate denouement we can not enter. 
 
 The campaign was not without its naval phase. The port of ■; 
 Kurrachee, in Baluchistan, had been surveyed as a possible point 1 
 of vantage in the previous year. In February, 1839, a squadron of \ 
 vessels of the Indian Navy attacked the place as a feudatory pos- ♦ 
 session of the Afghan state. The protecting fort and the town t 
 were taken and occupied with ease, and Britain thus came into I 
 possession of the second best harbor in India. Because of the great t 
 strategic and commercial value of the port, it was retained at the 1 
 close of the campaign as one of the most important outposts of i 
 the northwest frontier.^® 
 
 While the outcome of the international situation in the Middle i 
 East was still in doubt, the situation in the Levant resolved itself : 
 into an active crisis. When Mehemet Ali announced early in ■ 
 1838 that he was determined to declare his independence and es- ; 
 tablish his own dynasty in Egypt and Syria, the Sultan, Mahmud, 1 
 who had thus far relied on the attitude of the Great Powers to 
 
 Sykes, of. at., II, 423; Pari. Pap., 1839, PP- 176—205. The 
 
 Russian Government at the same time formally stated that they harbored no designs 1 
 on India. 
 
 Curzon, of. at., II, 606. Lord Curzon is inclined to think the real danger 
 from Russia was much exaggerated. 
 
 Lieut. Arthur Conolly, Journey to the North of India, Overland from Eng- 
 land, through Russia, Persia, and Afghanistan (2 vols., London, 1834); Lieut. A. 
 Burnes, Travels into the Bokhara, being the Account of a Journey from India to 
 Cabool, Tartary, and Persia (3 vols. London, 1834); Journal of the Royal Geo- 
 graphical Society of London, IV, 278—317; ibid., V, 297—305; Ross, of. cit., pp. 
 410—429. See H. C. Rawlinson, England and Russia in the East, pp. 139 ff. 
 
 Low, of. cit., II, 100-104; Alexander F. Baillie, Kurrachee {Karachi)-, 
 Past; Present; and Future (Calcutta, etc., 1890), pp. 27—31. Kurrachee proved to 
 be a worthy rival of Bombay not many j'ears later, and since 1839 has been looked 
 upon as a very essential link in the chain of communications binding India with 
 England, because of the location of the city both with reference to possible railway 
 and air lines crossing Asia and to the Suez Canal. 
 
f* 
 
 GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 277 
 
 j 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 p 
 
 I’ 
 
 [ 
 
 prevent his domains from being further disrupted, determined 
 to employ his own resources, if necessary, to prevent the consum- 
 mation of the designs of his vassal. He encouraged the war party 
 at Constantinople, raised new levies of troops, and sent extensive 
 reenforcements into Asia Minor. 
 
 The Great Powers were slow to read in these preparations any 
 serious intention on the part of the Turks. Nevertheless, when it 
 became apparent that Mahmud meant to challenge Mehemet Ali, 
 whether supported by the Powers or not, considerable diplomatic 
 activity was inspired. Russia was especially anxious to prevent 
 hostilities, fearing that in case Russian troops again made their 
 appearance in Turkish territory to bolster up the Sultan, a break 
 with England and France could not be averted.^® For similar 
 reasons the other Powers employed their good offices both with 
 the Sultan and with the Viceroy of Egypt to prevent further war- 
 like preparations. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was, to Britain 
 and France, a powerful deterrent. 
 
 In 1839, the whole Eastern Question, which had previously 
 been realized but scarcely defined, resolved itself clearly in so far 
 as the interests of the Powers in the Turkish Empire were con- 
 cerned. Obviously, in making any settlement of the Eastern 
 Question, the difficulty lay in securing the adhesion of both Russia 
 and France to any general arrangement. British interests could be 
 made to agree with the one or with the other, but hardly with 
 both. 
 
 The geographical position of Russia demanded the recognition 
 of her interests, if not her hegemony, in the outlet from the 
 Black to the Mediterranean Sea.^* To permit either Britain or 
 France to dictate Turkish policies would defeat that aim. France, 
 on the other hand, having sentimental interests in Syria and com- 
 mercial ones in Egypt, felt impelled to assert herself as the nat- 
 ural protector of an Egyptian prince' who would safeguard those 
 interests. Her cue was to prevent either Russian or British dom- 
 inance at Constantinople and to encourage the claims of the Vice- 
 roy of Egypt for independence. As Constantinople was the goal 
 of Russia, Alexandria was the focus of French aims. British in- 
 terests were seriously involved at both points. It was equally 
 important to prevent Russian dominance at Constantinople and 
 French control at Alexandria. A war between the Sultan and 
 the Viceroy might easily bring Russian forces again into Stamboul 
 in accordance with the treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The Turks 
 thus reenforced might then drive back Egyptian armies and re- 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1841, No. [322.], Pt. I, 5-9. 
 
 ** See Rodkey, of. ck., pp. 75 ff. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 278 
 
 cover Syria, but in that case Russia would probably remain en- 
 trenched at the narrow straits and have in her keeping the route 
 to India through Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. This 
 was an eventuality which the British could not afford to risk. If 
 the French succeeded in confirming the hold of Mehemet Ali 
 on Syria, they would, in consequence, dominate both of the natural 
 routes to India, which was unthinkable.^® Austria and Prussia, 
 |having no vital interests in the Levant, were, nevertheless, vi- 
 iltally concerned with perpetuating the European concert. Their 
 influence, therefore, was placed in support of the program 
 which promised most to keep the peace and solve the Eastern 
 Question. 
 
 In April, 1839, the Sultan, believing his armies prepared for 
 battle, refused to heed the restraining counsels of the ambas- 
 sadorial group at Constantinople and ordered his forces into action 
 against those of Mehemet Ali. The Turkish Army moved into 
 territory occupied by the Egyptian forces on April 21, and 
 offered to give battle. The latter, however, while anxious to try 
 conclusions with their enemies, were held back by the Viceroy, 
 pending further negotiations with representatives of the Powers. 
 Hoping to enlist the support of the arbiters of European affairs 
 by a show of moderation, he offered to withdraw his troops from 
 a part of the contested area if the Turks would do likewise, and 
 stated that if he were granted Egypt and the major portion of the 
 occupied territory in hereditary possession, he would give definite 
 guarantees for a beneficial administration.^® United action by the 
 Powers at Constantinople at this juncture might have brought an 
 agreement and a suspension of hostilities. But while the French 
 Ambassador, Admiral Roussin, urged the Porte to put a stop to 
 the advance, the British Ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, who was 
 personally hostile to the whole program of Mehemet xVli, en- 
 couraged the campaign already begun. The upshot of it was, 
 therefore, that although Ibrahim Pasha had been instructed to 
 avoid a clash with Turkish troops as long as possible, he was un- 
 able to do so without actually effecting a retreat. A decisive en- 
 gagement took place on June 21, in which the Turkish army was 
 routed and completely demoralized. Ibrahim Pasha, fully 
 aroused by frequent Turkish raids and the opportunity presented 
 by the victory, was intent on following up his success, when he 
 was checked by the arrival of new orders from Egypt to take every 
 precaution to avoid coming to blowsd'^ 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1840, No. 277, “Report on Egypt and Candia,” p. 4. 
 
 Ibid., 1S41, No. [322.], Pt. I, 21—23, f<^ssim. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 140-146; Hall, op. cit., pp. 238—242. 
 
( GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 279 
 
 Meanwhile, the French and British Governments, anxious to 
 preserve their nominal alliance and desirous of effecting an ar- 
 rangement which would adjust the Syrian tangle, had been tem- 
 porizing/® Each hoped to secure cooperation with the other 
 on its own terms. Palmerston, conscious of the fact that he held 
 ithe whip hand, and confident that none of the Powers would con- 
 sider the issue as one which could seriously disrupt European re- 
 lations, spoke as one on whom the burden of settlement primarily 
 : rested. The French not only resented his tacit assumption that 
 Ithe problem was one chiefly affecting British interests, but ex- 
 pected, by playing off the danger to be anticipated from Russia, to 
 ! effect a settlement on their own terms. The result was that the 
 two Powers rapidly drifted apart. By relying solely on a thread- 
 ibare alliance, the alliance itself was put in jeopardy. The Rus- 
 i sian Government, meanwhile, anxious to destroy the Anglo-French 
 I pact, employed tact and concessions at the proper moment to at- 
 tain the desired result. The Tsar issued formal statements that 
 I the movements of his forces in Persia and the Middle East in- 
 i dicated not the slightest designs on India, and at the same time, 
 through his representative at the Court of St. James, signified his 
 readiness to adhere to a settlement of the Eastern Question on 
 British terms. Austria and Prussia, acting as usual in concert, and 
 i concerned more with an early settlement of a dangerous question 
 I than with the minor details of such a settlement, were willing to 
 : support either France or Russia in conjunction with Great Britain. 
 
 The Egyptian victory of June, 1839, considerably complicated 
 ® matters. In the first place, it made any compromise between the 
 . Sultan and his vassal exceedingly difficult. In the second place, 
 
 I it greatly strengthened the French demands that Mehemet Ali 
 ! be confirmed in hereditary possession of his conquests, a point 
 to which the English Cabinet could hardly agree, while Russia’s 
 i; refusal to take advantage of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi and 
 jl her willingness to leave to the British the physical protection of the 
 Turkish cause reenforced the position held by the English Foreign 
 ' Secretary. The point of common agreement among the Powers 
 I was that the integrity of the Ottoman Empire should be preserved 
 [ and that Mehemet Ali should receive some formal recognition. 
 
 I The issue hinged largely on the disposition of Syria. 
 
 The French believed that by persuading Mehemet Ali to 
 ' adopt a pacific policy in Syria and to modify his original demands 
 I they were gradually leading the way to a settlement.®® In this 
 
 Annual Register, 184.1, pp. 5—16. 
 
 Rodkey, of. cit., pp. 123— 124; Hall, of. cit., pp. 252 ff. 
 
 Rodkey, of. cit., pp. 127—128. 
 
28o 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 belief they were rudely disillusioned, however, when on July 15, ^ 
 
 1 840, the representatives of the four Powers, Great Britain, - 
 Prussia, Austria, and Russia, signed a Convention for the Pacifi- 
 cation of the Levant without reference to and without the 
 knowledge of France. Russia, by abandoning the Treaty of Un- 
 kiar-Skelessi, had won a diplomatic victory. France was isolated 
 and the Anglo-French alliance was destroyed. 
 
 According to the terms of the new Convention, the Sultan 
 promised — 
 
 To grant to Mehemet Ali, for himself and for his descend- 
 ants in the direct line, the administration of the Pashalik of 
 Egypt; and ... to grant to Mehemet Ali for his life, 
 with the title of Pasha of Acre, and with the command of 
 the fortress of St. Jean d’Acre, the administration of the 
 southern part of Syria. . 
 
 The offer was conditioned, however, by provisions that Mehemet : 
 Ali was to make complete submission and to accept the Con- 
 vention within a few days to make it effective in all its parts. 
 Among themselves the Powers thought to solve a difficult ques- 
 tion by writing into the Convention that the Bosphorus and the 
 Dardanelles were to be at all times closed to vessels of war. 
 Thus, a settlement had been provided, although it did not rep- 
 resent the whole of the Concert of Europe, and lacking the sig- | 
 nature of France its value was somewhat problematical.®" It was I 
 also doubtful whether the Pasha would peacefully acquiesce in i 
 the conditions, as he had not been consulted with regard to them, t 
 nor had his case been represented by a friendly Power. 
 
 A few days after the Convention had been signed. Lord Palm- 1 
 erston made known its contents to Guizot, then French Am- 1 
 bassador in London. Guizot’s feelings of pique and chagrin, . 
 however, were hardly a symptom of the storm of rage and dis- 
 approval which burst from the French capital upon receipt of the ‘ 
 news from London. Not only the Foreign Minister, Thiers, and 
 the French Cabinet, but the whole of the French nation, recover- 
 ing from the momentary shock of discovering that England had 
 deserted the French alliance for one with Russia, burst into a par- 
 oxysm of hate and denunciation of -perfide Albion.” By way 
 of giving vent to wounded pride, the Government immediately 
 took steps, hurried on by the popular war clamor, to place France 
 
 Sir E. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, II, 1005. 
 
 The Camh. Hist. Journ., I, 172. 
 
 Annual Register, 1840, p. [172]. 
 
I GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 281 
 
 in a high state of defence and to bring the army and navy to full 
 war strength. Several members of the British Cabinet were con- 
 vinced that France meant to avenge the slight by a resort to war, 
 and when the French asked that the treaty of July 15 be super- 
 ■ seded by another, couched in similar terms, to which she could 
 • subscribe, there was a momentary inclination not only in the 
 I; British Cabinet, but in the councils of Austria and Prussia, to make 
 I the compromise. Palmerston remained convinced, however, that 
 France could not go to the length of declaring war, and stub- 
 bornly refused to concede even minor points which would have 
 been a salve to French amour-frofre and which could hardly have 
 I: injured British prestige. The French, therefore, had no choice 
 ji but to resume more definitely than ever their championship of 
 ii Mehemet Ali and to continue war preparations.®^ 
 
 !: Meanwhile,’ the Convention of July 15 had been presented to 
 
 I and readily approved by the Porte. An ultimatum stating the 
 substance of the Convention was thereupon despatched to the Vice- 
 j roy, while new disorders were encouraged in his Syrian territories. 
 The outcome was much as anticipated. Mehemet Ali scornfully 
 refused to accept the offer of the Powers in the name of the Sultan, 
 believing that his own resources were adequate for maintaining 
 his conquests. In this position he was encouraged by the French 
 ! agent. Count Walewski, who urged the Pasha to hold out for 
 I bettgr terms than those lately accorded him. Mehemet Ali there- 
 I fore suffered the ultimatum to expire without acceding to its 
 I terms, although he intimated to the consuls of the Powers in 
 Alexandria that if he were given the whole of Syria for his life 
 " and Egypt as an hereditary possession he would submit. 
 
 The British Government had meanwhile determined to com- 
 pel the Viceroy to accept such terms as were offered him, even 
 at the risk of wholly terminating the friendly relations which had 
 I heretofore subsisted.®® Instructions were therefore forwarded to 
 Admiral Stopford, commanding the British fleet in the Mediter- 
 ^ ranean, that all communication between Egypt and Syria by sea 
 should be cut off and that the fleet should be prepared to execute 
 1 further measures in case Mehemet Ali should refuse to accede to 
 ! the demands of the Powers. Admiral Stopford divided his naval 
 
 Admiral Sir Charles Napier, T/ie War in Syria (2 vols., London, 1842), 
 I, 29 f. 
 
 Palmerston’s policy was very unpopular throughout with a considerable body 
 of English merchants, who believed that in order to satisfy his wilful pride he 
 would have had no hesitation in bringing their Egyptian interests to complete ruin. 
 See William Cargill, Mehemet Ali; Lord Palmerston; Russia and France (London, 
 1840). 
 
282 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 1 
 
 forces into two sections, the better to carry out his duties, one 
 contingent under Commodore Sir Charles Napier being left to j 
 cruise off the coast of Syria, while the other sailed to blockade the i| 
 harbor of Alexandria. Early in September the two sections of the 
 fleet were reunited, and on September 1 1 the Egyptian forces at ; 
 Beirut under Suleiman Pasha were commanded to withdraw.®® 
 As the reply was unsatisfactory, the British fleet, lately reenforced • 
 by two Austrian frigates, commenced a bombardment on the for- i 
 tifications of the town. The Egyptians were forced to withdraw 
 from the place, and a little later it was occupied by an allied force ; 
 of marines.®^ The Porte followed the news of this action with a 
 firman decreeing the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and the blockade : 
 of both Egypt and Syria. 
 
 These and other operations indicated at once the determination 
 of the Powers to settle the Eastern Question on their own terms 
 and the inability of Mehemet Ali long to resist. They also served 
 notice to the world that the French attitude was not to be taken ; 
 into account in concluding the issue. On their part, the French 
 Government were at their wits’ end upon learning of the bombard- 
 ment of Beirut. The first reaction was a new upflaring of war ■ 
 spirit. More troops were mobilized and emergency military meas- 
 ures were taken. The Thiers admjnistration, which had already i 
 threatened to appeal to arms, although anxious to avoid actually ! 
 coming to blows, felt compelled to demand concessions from the . 
 Allies or to go the full length of the threat. Again the Powers 
 hesitated to adhere to their plan of acting without France and 
 again the masterful Palmerston carried his point.®* 
 
 At this juncture Louis Philippe asserted himself to prevent : 
 the eventuality of a European war. He had refrained from 
 acting previously, believing that Mehemet Ali would prove too 
 strong for the ready execution of the allied plans and that in con- 
 sequence concessions would be made to France. Despairing of 
 this at last, he determined to admit defeat with such grace as he 
 could muster. Thiers was relieved of his office and a new ministry 
 was formed with the pacific and sensible Guizot, erstwhile Am- 
 bassador to the Court of St. James, as the principal member. It 
 became the task of the new ministry to recover for France a place 
 in the councils of Europe by such means as might be found.®® 
 
 Napier, of. cit., I, 55. 
 
 A small British force was meanwhile operating along the middle Euphrates 
 with two steam gunboats, and “ their presence acted as a diversion against Ibrahim 
 Pasha in eastern Syria and . . . exercised a considerable influence during the war 
 with Mehem.et Ali.” — Low, History of the Indian Naw, II, 47. 
 
 G. P. Gooch, in The Camb. Hist. Joum., I, 176; Hall, of. cit., pp. 2S0— 285, 
 292-305. 
 
 Annual Register, 1839, P- 3^1 ; Rodkey, of. cit., pp. 187—193. 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 283 
 
 The Powers of the Concert were vastly relieved and pleased 
 at this move. Those who had lately blamed Palmerston as blinded 
 by antagonism and bent on war now hailed him as the wisest 
 statesman in Europe. For the moment he was without a rival in 
 the courts of the Powers. He chose to use his power, not to make 
 || concessions to the vanquished, but to complete in more arrogant 
 ; fashion than ever the subjection of Egypt. The fate of Mehemet 
 ^ Ali was decreed in London without regard to the willingness of 
 France to participate on almost any terms in the final settlement 
 of the Eastern Question. On November 14, 1840, the pleni- 
 potentiaries of the four Powers signed a memorandum, advising 
 , the Sultan to modify his attitude toward his vassal, and upon com- 
 r plete submission to confirm him in his former position as Pasha. 
 
 I A copy of this note was sent to Mehemet Ali with the recom- 
 ' mendation that he instantly comply with its provisions. Simul- 
 taneously, his forces in Syria were subjected to new attacks both 
 by sea and land in order to hasten his decision. A combined force 
 of British marines, Austrians, and Turks stormed and took Sidon, 
 
 I defeated the Egyptian armies twice, and captured large quantities 
 of war materials. Shortly afterward Admiral Stopford with the 
 British fleet bombarded and reduced the fortress of St. Jean 
 d’Acre, the strongest position on the eastern coast of the Medi- 
 terranean.®® 
 
 The news of these developments thoroughly disheartened the 
 ! old Viceroy. He agreed to surrender the Turkish fleet which had 
 been treacherously given up to him in July, 1839, and to with- 
 j draw his forces from all occupied territory upon being given Egypt 
 - in hereditary possession. When even this concession was with- 
 * held from him, he signified his willingness to surrender uncon- 
 ditionally. The Great Powers, however, while unwilling to leave 
 Mehemet Ali in possession of both routes to the East, were also 
 unwilling to see him utterly divested of power. But even the 
 entire relinquishment of his case into the hands of the Powers did 
 not bring a speedy settlement. Once the danger of a serious war 
 ' was definitely passed, agreement among the signatories of the re- 
 cent supplementary pact of July 15, 1840, was difficult to arrive 
 I at.®^ The conclusion of the whole problem was complicated by the 
 1 fact that no settlement could be considered final which lacked the 
 [ adherence of France, and no means could be devised, in view of 
 i Palmerston’s uncompromising mood, of bringing France into the 
 j Concert on any basis which would be agreeable to all concerned, 
 j The “ road to India ” continued to be the stumbling block. Guizot 
 
 Gooch, in The Camb. Hist. Journ., I, 170. 
 
 ! Brit. and. For. St. Pap., XXVIII, 342-347. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 284 
 
 proposed as a basis for a final settlement, the neutrality of both of 
 the routes between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, by 
 way of the Isthmus of Suez and Red Sea, and by way of Syria, 
 Mesopotamia, and the Persian Gulf, as the Straits had been neu- 
 tralized. These routes, he said, “ are a great interest to all of 
 Europe.” Perhaps a better occasion to protect them might never 
 present itself.®^ | 
 
 None of the French suggestions was acceptable to the British | 
 Cabinet, however, and the firman issued by the Porte to Mehemet 1 
 Ali on February 13, 1841, representing the substance of the wishes \ 
 of the four cooperating Powers, did not receive the concurrence \ 
 of France. This frman conferred Egypt upon Mehemet Ali in ( 
 hereditary sovereignty, but on such a group of strict conditions, ^ 
 financial, military, and political, as practically to nullify the pow'ers j 
 of the Pasha. Mehemet Ali protested loudly at such extensive j 
 restrictions, and this time his protests received a hearing in the ; 
 councils of the great Powers. The British Cabinet had come to j 
 the view stated by Commodore Napier in February, 1841, that — • 
 “ next to Egypt being a colony of England, it is best that it should 
 be an independent power, paying tribute to the Porte. Our com- 
 merce to India will become very extensive} and the facility of 
 traveling become easier every day.” The frman w'as obviously 
 unsatisfactory in a number of respects. One more chance, there- 
 fore, presented itself of securing an arrangement to wFich the : 
 French Government could be a party. Such an arrangement was 
 at length reached. Representations to the Porte that the terms 
 of the frman of February 13 were too severe received the sanction 
 of Louis Philippe’s Government, and on June i, 1841, a new 
 frman, divested of many of the objectionable features of the 
 previous one, was issued to Mehemet Ali and accepted by him. i 
 The quarrel thus being largely patched up both in the Levant ; 
 and among the western Powers, a final formal arrangement 
 in the form of a Protocol was signed at London by representatives 
 of the five Powers, and the Concert of Europe w'as thus re- 
 established.®* 
 
 The signing of this Convention was a matter of considerable 
 importance for the time being in connection with the development 
 of highways to the East. It left no possible rival or competitor in 
 
 F. P. G. Guizot, Memoires four servir a Vhisto'ire de mon temfs (S vols., 
 Paris, 1858—1867), VI, 74, quoted in Rodkey, of. cit., p. 213 n. 
 
 Napier, of. at., II, 179-180. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Paf., XXIX, 703 If.; Annual Register, 1842, p. 2S5. See 
 Vicomte de Guichen, La Crise d’Orient 1839 ^ 1841 et I’Eurofe (Paris, 1921); 
 Adolph Hasenclever, Die Orientalisc/ie Frage in den Jahren 1S3S— 1S41 . . . 
 (Leipzig, 1914). 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 285 
 
 a position to interrupt the completion of British lines of com- 
 munication which had been inaugurated formally just as the 
 Eastern Question was approaching a crisis. Russia had with- 
 drawn frpm the Straits. France was no longer dominant in Egypt 
 and Syria. The will of Palmerston, prince of diplomats, had the 
 force of law in both Constantinople and Alexandria. No longer 
 were there obstacles to the formation of transportation companies 
 operating in the seas bounding Egypt and establishing their own 
 conveyances in Egypt. There being no longer any political ends 
 to serve by a continuation of surveying enterprises in Mesopo- 
 tamia, that route was largely neglected for the more practicable 
 one already in general use. 
 
 The Convention was also prophetic of the future. Already 
 the safety of the routes leading through the Mediterranean and 
 from the Mediterranean eastward entered into European diplo- 
 macy as a major issue. Already Britain was willing to break a 
 French alliance, to accept the hazard of a French war, and to as- 
 sume the responsibility of police duty in the Levant to ensure free 
 and constant access to India. She had at the same time sacrificed 
 much to regain a position of leadership at Constantinople and had 
 begun a policy of active intervention in the states flanking India 
 in order to protect the approaches to India on the north and west. 
 As communications improved, and industries, industrial popula- 
 tions, and commerce grew, these same essential highways were 
 destined to be the cause of later conflicts. In the course of these 
 difficulties, the Crimean War was necessary to keep Russia from 
 penetrating too far into Turkey and Persia toward the Mesopota- 
 mian route and the northwest frontiers of India. A diplomatic 
 duel with France over the building of the Suez Canal, in which 
 Britain failed to prevent the success of a French Suez Canal Com- 
 pany, provoked a new policy, one postponed as long as possible, 
 that of direct instead of indirect control of the routes to the East 
 by Great Britain. This policy was suggested by various prominent 
 Englishmen at the time of the Syrian crisis. Napier stated the 
 case succinctly in his War in Syria: ^ 
 
 . '. . Steam navigation having got to such perfection, ! 
 Egypt has become almost necessary to England as the half- 
 way house to India, and indeed ought to be an English colony. 
 Now if we wished to weaken Mehemet Ali, with a view, in 
 the event of the breakup of the Turkish Empire, which is not 
 far distant, to have seized Egypt as our share of the spoil, 
 we were perfectly right in our policy. . 
 
 Napier, of. cit,, II, 184. 
 
286 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 There is much reason to believe that Mehemet Ali was by no 
 means so unkindly disposed toward Great Britain as was popularly 
 supposed to be the case.®® Although he irritated British suscepti- 
 bilities by arrogant attacks on the Turks and by hampering the 
 work of the Euphrates Expedition, he was ever willing to assist 
 in developing a British highway through his own country of Egypt. 
 Some responsible observers thought that in supporting the Turks 
 and opposing the wishes of the Pasha, the British Government 
 had “ backed the wrong horse.” M. Victor Fontanier, French 
 Vice-Consul and “ official observer ” of British moves in western 
 Asia during these years, and who was anything but sympathetic 
 with British interests, gave a very frank and illuminating view^ of 
 Anglo-Egyptian relations in his V oyage dans Vlnde, written soon 
 after the crisis of 1840. In commenting on British attitude, he 
 said: 
 
 It is difficult to understand . . . what great interest Eng- 
 land had in obstructing the Pasha of Egypt in carrying his 
 conquests as far as he pleased. She probably thought that 
 the Pasha was hostile to her, and that she would become a tool 
 of those [the French] who were supporting him. . . I 
 believe in the good faith of the Pasha with the English. If 
 it [an understanding] were advantageous to the former, it 
 would give the latter an absolute control in the Red Sea and 
 Persian Gulf. It was necessary to represent Mehemet Ali as 
 a friend of the French, though he was little enough that. . . 
 England would certainly have been more diplomatic if she 
 had favored the Pasha rather than the contrary.®' 
 
 A similar view was held by Commodore Sir Charles Napier, 
 who had a large part in British operations in the Levant during 
 the Syrian crisis. 
 
 ... It might, perhaps, [he said] have been politic to have 
 confined Mehemet Ali to Egypt, so that in the event of his 
 stopping the road to India by Suez, w'e might have the road* 
 of the Euphrates open, one remaining in the possession of the 
 Ottoman Empire, and the other in that of the Pasha of 
 Egypt. It is not, however, usual for a Government to quarrel 
 with their own interests, and it is so decidedly to the advan- 
 tage of the Pasha of Egypt to facilitate by every possible 
 means, the passage across the Isthmus of Suez, that on the 
 
 Fontanier, of. cit., II, 177; Quarterly Reviezv, LXt^II, 252—30:. 
 
 Fontanier, of. ch., I, 358. 
 
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 287 
 
 whole I believe the soundest policy of Great Britain would 
 
 have been to have supported Mehemet Ali. . 
 
 There is little evidence to show that Palmerston himself had 
 much conception of the part which the new route of communica- 
 tions had already come to play in the affairs of England, for his 
 attitude toward the wishes of Mehemet Ali could not have exerted 
 a stronger influence on the Pasha to terminate all British inter- 
 course through the countries under his control. Some of the de- 
 partments of Government appreciated the need of keeping open 
 the Red Sea line of communications, however, especially at a time 
 when a British force was operating in Herat against the Persians, 
 another was proceeding against the Afghans, while yet another 
 war was looming up in China.®® 
 
 While Col. Patrick Campbell remained in Egypt as British 
 Consul-General, the Pasha altogether disregarded his exterior 
 political relations and maintained a steady interest in and approval 
 of the steps being taken by British and Indian authorities for the 
 improvement of the steam service in the seas adjacent and in proj- 
 ects for facilitating the passage through Egypt. However, in 
 September, 1839, Col. Campbell was removed from office because 
 of his open friendship for the Viceroy, and Col. G. Lloyd Hodges, 
 who was more sympathetic with the Turkish cause, was sent out 
 to succeed him. Until this time, the Pasha apparently had felt 
 confident that while Britain could not but take strong measures 
 to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, his own re- 
 peated assurances and the many concrete evidences he had given 
 of friendship toward Great Britain and toward British enterprises 
 would be in some measure reciprocated by the British Govern- 
 ment. He was at all times careful, therefore, not to offend British 
 subjects by word or deed, and he believed that his demands for 
 territorial aggrandizement were such as could be approved in 
 London without vitally compromising British policy with regard 
 to Turkey. 
 
 About the time of the arrival of Col. Hodges, Mehemet Ali 
 began to experience his first doubts of the action which the British 
 Government had in contemplation. Although he was well versed 
 in the elements of British foreign policy, he was unable to under- 
 stand Palmerston’s uncompromising and hostile attitude except as 
 
 Napier, of. cit., II, 278—279. See Fontanier, of. cit., II, 177; William 
 Cargill, Mehemet Alt-, Lord. Palmerston ; Russia and France (London, 1840). 
 
 On the Chinese War, see Pari. Paf., 1843, No. 596, “Correspondence and 
 Returns relative to the Supply of Troops, Vessels and Munitions of War, for 
 Carrying on the Military Operations in China.” 
 
288 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 a possible mask for some ulterior motive. Early in 1840 he gave 
 voice to his fear that England was planning to seize and occupy 
 Egypt in order “ to make of it a station on the road to India.” 
 Contemporary articles in the English press pointing out the 
 advantages which would accrue from the occupation of Egypt 
 may well have lent color to the Pasha’s fear. 
 
 After the substance of the four-power pact of July 15, 1840, : 
 reached him, Mehemet Ali threatened to use the one trump card ^ 
 he possessed, the power of closing the Red Sea route, in order to 
 bring pressure to bear on Great Britain. When the English mail 
 of September, 1 840, arrived at Alexandria, Col. Hodges consid- 
 ered it best to secure from the Pasha an expression of his willing- 
 ness to allow the packets to proceed as usual before they were 
 landed. When he called on the Viceroy to request a safe conduct 
 for the British and Indian mails, he was very coldly received and 
 was told no assurances could be given him. Col. Hodges had pre- : 
 viously ascertained from the French Consul-General, however, i 
 that on board the steamer Oriental^ which had just arrived at 1 
 Alexandria, were some French mails addressed to the Pasha and 
 some of the French officers in the Pasha’s service, and that the | 
 Pasha was aware of this. Hodges thereupon replied that he t 
 would give orders that the mails should not be landed. At this | 
 Mehemet Ali relented, and offered to let them pass in safety “ for i 
 this time only.” ■ 
 
 On the same day, September 19, as Col. Hodges learned shortly 1 
 afterward, Mehemet Ali had also been waited upon by Capt. t 
 Thomas Lyons, the agent in Egypt for the East India Company. {. 
 In the discussion which followed bearing on various of the Com- 1 
 pany’s interests during the unsettled times which had arrived, the i 
 Pasha gave assurance that “ not only should the mails pass in per- 1 
 feet safety on the present occasion, but that they should continue J 
 to do so as long as he himself had authority in Egypt.” It sub- 1 
 sequently developed that at the very hour when Hodges called on ' 
 the Pasha and was told that no guarantees could be given for the 1 
 safety in transit of British mails, a mail from India, which had ar- - 
 rived a short time previously at Suez, had already nearly reached . 
 Alexandria under the safe conduct of the Viceroy.'® 
 
 This incident, occurring at a moment when his feeling toward 
 the British Government was very bitter, at the time when the news 
 was coming in of the defeat of Egyptian armies and the bombard- 
 ment of Beirut at the hands of the British, throws considerable : 
 light on both the character and the policies of Mehemet Ali. 
 
 Quoted in Rodkey, op. cit., p. 149. Ibid., pp. 251—252. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1841, No. [323.], Pt. II, 249. Ibid., p. 252. 
 
! GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ROUTES TO INDIA 289 
 
 Realizing that he would gain nothing by interrupting the Indian 
 route, he took care that his action in keeping the route open should 
 not appear in the guise of a concession to the British official repre- 
 sentative, but rather as an act of generosity to British merchant 
 {interests/^ At the moment when the English fleet was bombard- 
 ing Acre, the Pasha was holding conversations with representa- 
 tives of a new British steam line, the Peninsular and Oriental 
 Steam Navigation Company, and he is quoted by one of them as 
 ihaving said, in effect: 
 
 ! I am not at war with the British nation, but only with Lord 
 Palmerston, and therefore I shall give you every facility in 
 passing your passengers and mails through Egypt 5 look to 
 i: me as a friend, and when you go home, explain to your na- 
 ij tion my sentiments. . . It is very bad policy on the part 
 I of your government to fight with me 5 this is your high road 
 to India, and I shall always promote it,'^® 
 
 And at various times during the dark days of 1840 and 1841, 
 jwhen the Pasha appeared to have lost all in his gamble for power, 
 he still found time to discuss with one of the founders of the 
 iPeninsular and Oriental Company the details of an arrangement 
 jwhereby goods in small quantities might be shipped through 
 Egypt. The Pasha readily cooperated with the new corpora- 
 tion in offering security of transport, conveyances, and low tran- 
 sit duties, which he himself determined without reference to his 
 liege at Constantinople.^^ And all the while the navigation of the 
 Nile was being improved, and projects even for a Suez Canal were 
 being discussed.^® 
 
 i. It is one of the most striking facts in the record of the Near 
 Eastern crisis that at no time were communications sent by the 
 
 D. A. Cameron, Egypt in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1898), p. 216. 
 See Pari. Pap., 1840, No. 277, p. 72. 
 
 I Statement of Mr. J. R. Engledue, a Superintendent of the Peninsular and 
 Oriental Company, before a Select Parliamentary Committee in 1858. — Pari. Pap., 
 1858, No. 382, pp. 175—176. 
 
 Arthur Anderson, Comtnunications with India, China, etc., via Egypt (London, 
 priv. pr., 1843), App., pp. 16—18; Asiatic Journal, XXXV, N.S., Pt. II, 283—284; 
 ihid., XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 323. 
 
 Ibid., 398; Anderson, op. cit., App., pp. 32—38. Mehemet Ali chose entirely 
 to ignore the Convention of August 16, 1838, relating to commerce and navigation 
 between Great Britain and Turkey. — Hertslet’s Commercial Treaties, V, 506-535; 
 'Brit, and For. St. Pap., XXVI, 688—692. 
 
 F.O. 97/411, Arthur Anderson to Lord Palmerston, 20 Feb., 1841; D. A. 
 Cameron, op. cit., p. 236; Asiatic Journal, XXXV, N.S., Pt. II, 284. A notification 
 published by the Viceroy 12 Oct., 1841, provided, however, that in future all 
 Vessels navigating the Nile and the new Mahmoudie Canal must be manned by 
 1 Egyptians and sail under the Egyptian flag. See Brit, and For. St. Pap., XXIX, 1195. 
 
290 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Egyptian route in the least delayed or endangered, although mes- 
 sages sent by the route through Mesopotamia were tampered with 
 by the Arabs, in spite of English gunboats on the Euphrates/® 
 Indeed, the correspondence between England and India through 
 Egypt in the five years from 1835 to 1841 considerably more 
 than doubled, the year 1840 showing a large increase over any, 
 previous year.*® The years following also saw a great increase in! 
 the passenger traffic through Egypt, and a large percentage of 
 overland travellers lingered in Egypt to view the curious streets 
 of Cairo and to make tours up the Nile to the Pyramids and not 
 infrequently to the decaying ruins of ancient Thebes. 
 
 English appreciation for the Pasha’s courtesy in maintaining 
 the overland route during the whole period of the political crisis, 
 while conspicuously absent from official correspondence, was never- 
 theless shown by many private concerns after the affair had been 
 settled. As one expression of the attitude held by the English 
 mercantile interests, a committee was formed in London in 1842 
 for striking a gold subscription medal to Mehemet Ali. This 
 was — 
 
 To hand down to posterity an honourable record of the 
 conduct of the Pasha of Egypt during the late war, when, 
 ports being blockaded, towns and villages laid waste, the 
 subjects he governed destroyed by thousands, and his own po- 
 litical and personal existence threatened, he nobly afforded 
 protection to our numerous countrymen in Egypt, and to 
 their property, and permitted them, as in peace, to traffic and 
 travel, the overland route being kept open as usual.®’ 
 
 Asiatic Jouryial, XXXVI, N.S., Pt. II, 241; W. P. Andrew, Memoir on the 
 Eufhrates Valley Route to India (London, 1857), p. 41. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, XXXV, N.S., Pt. II, 96. 
 
 81 Ibid.., XXXVIII, N.S., Pt. II, 416. It was said that “the indefatigable Mr. 
 Waghorn ” was one of the honorary secretaries of the committee. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 T he Canal question, which became a prominent issue in 
 European diplomacy toward the middle of the nine- 
 teenth century, had a long and varied series of anteced- 
 entsd From the time of King Sesostris, eighteen centuries 
 before the Christian era, projects were formed and sometimes exe- 
 cuted for a connection by water between the Mediterranean and 
 Red Seas. Time after time during the rise and fall of empires 
 such waterways were allowed to pass into decay and ruin.^ Yet 
 even after centuries of neglect, the idea of a canal did not perish. 
 It appealed particularly strongly to Napoleon Bonaparte because 
 of the possibility of thus opening up a French channel to the East 
 whereby the English might be circumvented and a French com- 
 mercial empire developed. Hence, among the scientists carried 
 to Egypt on his famous expedition of 1798 were several sur- 
 Iveyors, who were presently engaged in running lines of levels 
 11 between the Mediterranean and Red Seas as the basis for a more 
 -definite canal project.® 
 
 In the Napoleonic enterprise, however, there was one element 
 of novelty. All of the ancient canal undertakings had been 
 ** limited to effecting a communication between the Red Sea and 
 the Nile and only indirectly with the Mediterranean. Those 
 early canals, therefore, had been useful principally in developing 
 Ithe commerce and industries of Egypt itself. There are few 
 evidences of a through traffic from East to West by way of these 
 
 I shallow waterways. With the limited geographical knowledge 
 of ancient times the value of a more adequate waterway was not 
 
 ^ The Oriental Herald, V, 2—5; E. H. Warmington, The Commerce between the 
 
 E Roman Emfire and India (Cambridge, Eng., 1928), p. 8, fassim- W. G. Hamley, 
 A New Sea and an Old Land, being Pafers suggested by a visit to Egypt at the end 
 
 I of 1869 (London, 1871), pp. 1—25. 
 
 ^ Calcutta Review, XXIV, 323. An excellent survey of ancient canal works in 
 Egypt is given in J. Charles-Roux, L'Isthme et le Canal de Suez (2 vols., Paris, 
 1901), I, Ch. I. 
 
 ® j. C. McCoan, Egypt as It Is (New York, 1877), p. 256. 
 
 291 
 
292 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INi. 
 
 apparent.^ But as distant countries became increasn 
 each other in late modern times, the utility of a direc^ 
 sage from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea was obvious 
 parte, then, had in mind a canal which would accommoda 
 largest ocean vessels, and for that reason he broached the idea i/j 
 a waterway, leading, not from the Nile, but directly across 
 Isthmus of Suez.® || 
 
 The French survey of the Isthmus was poorly done. It began. ; 
 in January, 1799, and was interrupted in February. It was re- 
 sumed in September and completed in December of the same 
 year. The staff of surveyors was several times changed, different 
 kinds of instruments were employed on different portions, and 
 the work was done hastily in long sections. No findings w'ere 
 verified by a second examination, due to lack of time and the 
 vigorous hostility of the Arabs. As a very natural result, the 
 findings were filled with errors. One of the conclusions reported 
 by the Surveying Commission and accepted everywhere as gen- 
 uine, was that the waters of the Red Sea were no less than thirty- 
 two feet and six inches above those of the Mediterranean.® This 
 assertion, which alone might have been suspected of error, ap- 
 peared to be supported by old accounts, which showed that salt 
 water was carried as much as twenty miles up an ancient Nile : 
 canal by the tides of the Red Sea.^ | 
 
 The importance of the French survey of the Isthmus of Suez ( 
 to the cause of improved communication can hardly be overrated, j 
 although it resulted in nothing tangible at the time. The results ) 
 of the survey, published in Napoleon’s monumental Descriftion i 
 d’Egypte, so impressed the contemporary world that no one ques- > 
 tinned the accuracy of the reports.® At various times after 1815 i 
 suggestions were not lacking for a canal directly joining the 1 
 Mediterranean and Red Seas, but most of these assumed the cor- 1 
 
 * [David Urquhart], “Mr. Urquhart on the Suez Canal in 1853,” a chapter 
 distributed with the Diplojnatic Revte<iv for 1876, p. 421. 
 
 ® However, Napoleon’s engineers, following their survey, recommended deep- 
 ening the channel of the Nile and the opening of a canal from the Nile to the Red 
 Sea in the first instance. Cf. Tke Ed-inburgh Review, LX, 452. 
 
 ® Description d’Egypte ... I, 57, 58; J. Charles-Roux, op. cit., i, 138—149; 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, pp. 28, 29. The estimate of 32 feet and 6 inches difference 
 in levels is based upon high tide at Suez and low tide at Tineh on the Mediter- 
 ranean. See the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal for Oct., 1825; Southern Quar- 
 terly Review, Jan., 1846, p. 69, (an article by M. Linant, one of the Pasha’s 
 engineers), and the Report and Plan of the International Scientific Commission 
 (London, 1857), pp. 13, 22-25. 
 
 ’’ Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 149—152. 
 
 ® One of the leading Nile-Red Sea projects was brought forward by the English 
 engineer, R. H. Galloway, who was later made a Bey by Mehemet Ali. In 1825 he 
 proposed such a canal to the Pasha, found him favorably disposed toward the idea, 
 and attempted to interest English investors in forming a canal company. Steam 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 293 
 
 ■ rectness of the report of the French engineers.® Definite plans 
 ; had been made for cutting through the Isthmus of Panama, a 
 1 vastly greater task than that of piercing the Isthmus of Suez, 
 , before the fallacy of the difference in levels of the Mediterranean 
 i| and Red Seas had been fully exposed.^® 
 
 1 Those projects which were brought forward after the Napo- 
 , Iconic wars for a direct junction of the Mediterranean and Red 
 
 E Seas across the Isthmus of Suez were generally based on the idea 
 that an isthmian tidewater canal would have a fairly strong cur- 
 » rent running through it, or that locks or “ sluices ” would be 
 I required. “ Various plans for lock canals across the Isthmus were 
 put forward about 1825, when recovery from the late series of 
 I wars and the salutary effects of the Industrial Revolution were 
 ! bringing all kinds of speculative ventures into existence. Most 
 mf these were based on the idea of employing as far as possible 
 the natural waterways already in existence on the Isthmus, the 
 i Bitter Lakes and Lake Menzaleh, and it was said that “ It may 
 I be safely stated . . . that there is not a spot in the world where 
 a water communication of equal extent could be made with the 
 : same facility, and where human skill would produce so great a 
 I change with so small an effort.” “ Were it found practicable 
 to employ steam, it is probable that the voyage from England to 
 I Bombay, which at present occupies four months, might be ac- 
 |,complished by the canal in six weeks, the distance being about 
 17200 miles.” “ 
 
 I When Capt. Chesney went to Egypt in 1830 to begin his work 
 "as a pathfinder, one of his instructions was, he says, “ to survey 
 I the Isthmus of Suez with a view to reporting on the practicability 
 
 I of carrying out the project of a great ship canal, the first modern 
 
 navigation had not then made enough headway, however, to give weight to the 
 enterprise. — Asiatic Journal, XX, O.S., 364, 600. Estimates for building such a 
 |jcanal approximated £1,200,000. — Pari. Paf., 1834, No. 478, p. 33. 
 j I ® See, for example, ti^e article by Capt. J. B. Seeley, in the Asiatic Journal, XX, 
 hO.S., 538 If.; Ibid., XVIII, O.S., 330. Capt. Seeley’s project was primarily a com- 
 i mercial one for a canal Joining the Red Sea with the Nile “ across the Isthmus of 
 l^Suez.” “ A Company estai^lished at Suez,” he said, “ and possessing the Canal, would, 
 in the course of a very f^ years, possess a prodigious trade and realize . . . im- 
 I' mense profits. It would assist the mother country, the East India Company in their 
 i commercial operations, and’open a vast field for speculation.” 
 
 j The Oriental Herald, V, i, based on an account in the London Examiner of 
 
 f 13 March, 1825. 
 
 j Mr. James Silk Buckingham, founder and editor of The Oriental Herald, 
 
 i 'Supported the idea of an isthmian canal with locks, and thought that “this great 
 r undertaking is . . . more worthy of general attention than most of those which 
 [Et present agitate the public mind.” — Ibid., V, 9. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1834, No. 478, p. 29. 
 
 Ibid., p. 34. 
 
 i 
 
294 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 suggestion of which had come from the savants of the French 
 Republic.” Chesney’s report that in his survey of the Isthmus 
 he found no essential difference in the levels of the Mediter- : 
 ranean and Red Seas, although considered by the Select Parlia- 
 mentary Committee of 1831, had little effect on canal projects.^^ 
 The findings of a single unskilled artillery officer could hardly j 
 prevail against those of a corps of reputable professional en- ■ 
 gineers, even of another nation. ' ' 
 
 Meanwhile there was considerable correspondence between the 
 Foreign Office and the India Board respecting the design, “ or ' 
 rather the wish,” of Mehemet Ali to cut a canal from Suez to 
 Cairo. The India Board anticipated “ none but desirable conse- 
 quences from the accomplishment of such a work,” and by 1834 
 British officialdom was ready to give countenance to any such 
 undertaking. Indeed, the forward state of the canal idea tended 
 to neutralize enthusiasm for the projected expedition to the Eu- 
 phrates River in the minds of many. But at this juncture the 
 proposal of the Pasha to embark on a canal joining the Nile with 
 the Red Sea was obscured by several new developments. To , 
 begin with, a French engineer in the service of Mehemet Ali, M. 
 Linant de Bellefonds, usually known as Linant Bey, executed a 
 series of surveys between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, 
 and failed to discover the anticipated difference in levels. His 
 reports to that effect introduced an element of doubt into the 
 practicability of a Nile-Red Sea canal, and stimulated in the mind 
 of Ferdinand de Lesseps, then French Consul in Egypt, the idea : 
 of a direct sea-level canal across the Isthmus.^' In the second 
 place, the proposal made by Galloway Bey that a railway be built 
 from Cairo to Suez, because of the facts that this offered the 
 same opportunities for collecting tolls and could be executed at a 
 cost far below that of any canal, strongly appealed to the Pasha 
 and also commended itself to British authorities. The English ( 
 Consul at Cairo, Col. Campbell, wrote to Palmerston on January ; 
 I, 1834, that: “ Measures have . . . been tap;en for the railroad 
 from this to Suez, and as these operations will occupy the Pasha’s 
 mind (which requires occupation), and that tkey will also require i 
 all the money he can dispose of, it is to be hfhped that these plans 1 
 will be a good guarantee for his future conduct.” 
 
 F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, p. 2. 
 
 S. Lane-Poole (Ed.), Life of General F. R. Chesney, p. 467; C. H. Rockwell, 
 The Suez Canal (1867), p. 2. 
 
 Foreign OfEce, Suez Canal Papers, 97/411, J. Neill to J. B. Macaulay, 9 
 Aug., 1833. 
 
 Cameron, Egypt, p. 236. 
 
 F. O. 97/411, Campbell to Palmerston, i Jan., 1834. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 295 
 
 By the time the refusal of the British Government to guarantee 
 to the Pasha a definite series of rates on mails and goods to be 
 transported by the proposed railway and the death of the chief 
 promoter, Galloway Bey, had brought about a suspension of 
 preparations for the line, the political situation in the Levant had 
 entered upon an acute phase and rapidly developed into a crisis. 
 Nothing further was done with regard to either a canal or a 
 railway until after the settlement of 1841. Thereafter projects 
 for a canal were uppermost for a few years. The East India 
 Company preferred a canal to a railway.^® The newly-formed 
 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company also desired 
 a canal, which would make possible the development of their 
 comprehensive plan of steam communication with a much smaller 
 steam equipment than would otherwise be required. In 1841, 
 when the Managing Director of the Company, Arthur Anderson, 
 was in Egypt making arrangements for the passage of mails, pas- 
 sengers, and goods through the country in connection with the 
 new line of steam vessels, he took occasion to study the question 
 of a sea level canal between Suez and Pelusium. In a memoran- 
 dum on the subject which he sent to Palmerston, he estimated the 
 cost of such a canal as he proposed at £250,000, but thought it 
 would be a profitable venture at ten times the amount, since “ the 
 whole of our political and commercial intercourse with the vast 
 territories of the east would' of necessity fall into the Channel, 
 and the distance between them and Great Britain for all purposes 
 be reduced by many thousands of miles.” He also thought 
 such a canal would benefit.all of Europe except, perhaps, Russia. 
 He believed that the Pasha would give a concession for such a 
 canal, but even if he refused, a right of way could doubtless be 
 secured from the Sultan. The data on which his calculations were 
 based he was obliged to keep secret for the time being, but he 
 secured them from; “ a man who has served as an engineer in 
 Egypt for twenty years;” 
 
 Anderson’s viewk on the practicability of a canal through the 
 Isthmus of Sudz:, divested of their confidential element and pub- 
 lished a little iiater in the form of a pamphlet, had considerable 
 effect on public sentiment in England.®® To the other objections 
 to a canal joining the Nile and Red Sea was added after 1840 the 
 
 Cameron, of. cit., p. 236. 
 
 F. O. 97/411, Arthur Anderson to Palmerston, 20 Feb., 1841. 
 
 F. O. 97/41 1, Arthur Anderson to Palmerston, 20 Feb., and 18 March, 1841. 
 
 Arthur Anderson,, T/ie Practicability and. Utility of Opening a Communica- 
 tion betvjeen the Red Sda and the Mediterranean by a Ship-Canal . . . (London, 
 1843); Asiatic Jourftgly II, 304, 305, “Review of Five Pamphlets for 
 
 Different Plans of Improving' Eastern Communication.” 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 296 
 
 rapidly growing size of the steamship, which would scarcely be 
 able to navigate any channel which could be constructed on the 
 basis of the Nile waterway. Practically all of the plans brought j 
 forward after the close of the Syrian crisis therefore rested on the | 
 idea of a direct cut between the two seas.^® ■ 
 
 At the same time a distinct change occurred in British official 
 attitude toward the whole canal idea. Information secretly trans- j 
 mitted by Anderson and others, casting grave doubts on the 1 
 prevalent view that the Mediterranean and Red Seas differed } 
 some thirty-three feet in levels, made a large, sea-level canal ] 
 appear perfectly feasible.®^ Then it was that the British Foreign j 
 Office began to experience strong fears as to the political questions I 
 which might be induced by the construction of such a waterw'ay, i 
 which would be to all intents and purposes a “ second Bosphorus.” | 
 Lord Palmerston was not long in arriving at the conclusion that, j 
 however great the commercial advantages. Great Britain might j 
 easily be placed in a very awkward position by such a waterway. 
 All the objections and more which had been used to show the 
 impracticability of giving any public guarantees to an Egyptian 
 Railway would naturally apply to a Suez Canal. Such an attitude : 
 as this was only encouraged by the entire willingness of the 
 French to sponsor the canal idea. A line of policy on a matter 
 which held such vast potentialities, of constructive service on the 
 one hand and political danger on the other, was very hard to 
 determine. But the British Foreign. Office could not see that 
 between opposing the actual construction of a new strait severing 
 Africa from Asia and embarking on another line of conduct which 
 might necessitate the annexation of Egypt By force of arms, there j 
 was any middle ground.®® . ■ 
 
 Although the breaking up of the Ottoman Empire was popu- I 
 larly believed to be at hand, it required more courage than the 
 British Government possessed, in view of the unsettled state of ( 
 European international relations, deliberatel3'’ to adopt a policy : 
 which would inevitably create an Egyptian Question apart from 1 
 the perennial Turkish Question. It appeared to the Cabinet and ( 
 particularly to Lord Palmerston that the peace of Europe and the : 
 safety of the British people unquestionably lay in opposing a 
 
 As late as 1842, however, it was stated that “ Mehemet Ali intends to construct 
 a canal between Fostat, Old Cairo, and Kolzim, near Suez, such as formerly existed 
 under the occupation of the Arabs.” — Asiatic Journal, XXXIX, N.S., Pt. II, 342. 1 
 
 Several unofficial surveys were made of the Isthmus of Suez in the fifteen 
 years after 1841, all of them indicating that there was little if any difference in the 1 
 levels of the Mediterranean and Red Seas. See London Times, S April, 1853. 
 
 Edward Clarkson, The Suez Navigable Canal for Accelerated Communication > 
 with India (London, 1843), p. 14. 
 
 i 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 297 
 
 project which could hardly fail to create new international issues 
 of the greatest moment. It therefore became the self-imposed 
 task of the British Government to make an isthmian canal appear 
 the more impossible and impracticable as it became the more 
 ! feasible from an engineering point of view.^® 
 
 : A railway was a different matter. An iron band from Cairo 
 
 to Suez would not alter the geographical status of Egypt in the 
 least, and hence would produce no international complications. 
 Palmerston himself summed up the matter in a despatch to Sir 
 Stratford Canning, British Ambassador at the Porte, on July 24, 
 1851. Referring to French attempts to secure the approval of 
 the Pasha of Egypt for an isthmian canal, he pointed out that 
 one passage in the Firman of Investiture of February 13, 1841, 
 required the Pasha of Egypt to secure the consent of the Sultan 
 on all important matters pertaining to Egypt. 
 
 That passage [he said] can only in reason be considered 
 as applicable to matters which internally or externally would 
 have an important bearing on the condition of Egypt as a 
 part of the Turkish Empire, and can scarcely be construed as 
 applying to so simple a domestic improvement as the con- 
 struction of a Railway. A ship canal from the Mediter- j 
 ranean to the Red Sea, if such a work were practicable, would ^ 
 be a different thing: and it is needless to point out how such 
 a work, changing as it would the relative position of some of 
 the Maritime powers of Europe towards each other, would 
 involve the possibility of political consequences of great im- 
 port and might seriously affect the foreign relations of the 
 Turkish Empire. 
 
 The French, with the support of their Government, were 
 anxious to proceed with a project disavowed by their English 
 rivals. Thereupon, the fundamental importance to Great Britain 
 of the Red Sea route to India and the East asserted itself. In 
 order to prevent the route from falling wholly into the hands of 
 rivals, the British Government was compelled to change its initial 
 attitude of aloofness toward the canal scheme into one of definite 
 opposition. As a counterpoise, the Egyptian Railway was ad- 
 vocated. “ In the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government,” wrote 
 Palmerston to Murray, British Consul-General in Egypt, in May, 
 
 It appears probable that Palmerston was aware of the error in the calculations 
 made by the French surveyors in 1799 was convinced of the possibility and 
 perhaps feasibility of a sea-level canal across the Isthmus of Suez years before the 
 English public had access to information which might lead to the same conclusions. 
 
 F. O. 78/411, Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning, 24 July, 1851. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 298 
 
 1847, “ the commercial advantages to be derived from the canal, 
 even supposing that it should be possible to make it, would be 
 attained nearly as well and at a much less cost of time and money 
 by a railway across the Desert from the Nile to the Red Sea.” 
 
 In this controversy, the other European Powers almost uniformly 
 supported the project for a canal as opposed to a railway.^® The 
 French thus had the advantage of considerable moral support, 
 the friendship and confidence of the Pasha of Egypt, and, as time 
 went on, a vast amount of corroborative data of all kinds on the 
 feasibility of the ship canal. But the English were able long to 
 withstand the weight of hostile influence because of naval su- 
 premacy and the memory of naval actions of 1840,®“ and par- 
 ticularly because of British influence at the Porte. 
 
 By 1847 the French canal proposition had reached a stage 
 sufficiently advanced to warrant definite attention on the part of 
 British authorities: 
 
 It cannot be unknown to your Lordship [wrote Murray 
 to Palmerston, May 3, 1847], that various projects for the 
 junction of the Red Sea to the Mediterranean by means of a 
 ship canal through the Isthmus of Suez have been from time 
 to time discussed. . . Now however that a plan has been 
 formed, purporting to be complete in all its details, and that 
 it has been favourably received by the Egyptian Govern- 
 ment, I think it my duty to give your Lordship such informa- 
 tion as I can collect . . . inasmuch as the project, if it 
 should prove feasible, would doubtless more materially 
 afFect the commercial and political interests of Great Britain 
 in the East than any other change which scientific enterprise 
 could effect in the physical structure of the earth. 
 
 The plan under consideration . . . has been proposed by 
 M. Linant, a French officer, wTo has superintended the con- 
 struction of all the canals, bridges, and aqueducts which the 
 Pasha has made in Egypt, and wEo is certainly one of the 
 
 F. O. Suez Canal Papers, 97/408, Palmerston to C. A. Murray, 27 May, 1847. 
 
 F. O. 97/408, Murray to Palmerston, 4 Nov., 1846; Palmerston to Murray, 
 27 March, 1847; On the Communications between Europe and India through Egypt, 
 pp. 3—7, 44; Galloway, Observations on the Proposed Improvesnents in the Overland 
 Route, pp. 4, 16. 
 
 “ England is . . . the grand object of the Pasha’s fear and jealousy. Nor 
 is his fear unfounded; the occupation of Aden, the War in Syria, and the hostile 
 demonstration against Alexandria, are not likely to be forgotten, while the constant 
 solicitation of Englishmen to be invested with a monopoly of the transit to India 
 tend to nourish jealousy.” — On the Cotnmunications between Europe and India 
 through Egypt, p. 47. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 299 
 
 1 1 
 
 i most practical and experienced engineers in His Highness’ 
 service. . . In the present advanced state of science I dare 
 not take it upon myself ... to assure any one of its im- 
 practicability.®^ 
 
 , This could hardly have been a surprise to Palmerston, who had 
 ‘ already written, on February 8, in urging Murray to push the 
 : railway as much as possible: 
 
 I With regard ... to the Ship Canal . . . you should lose 
 no opportunity of enforcing on the Pasha and his Ministers 
 i the costliness, if not the impracticability, of such a project} 
 
 [ and you should point out that the persons who press upon the 
 
 Pasha such a chimerical scheme, do so evidently for the pur- 
 pose of diverting him from the Railway which would be per- 
 fectly practicable and comparatively cheap.®® 
 
 In reply to Murray’s representation of May 3, Palmerston 
 . pointed out the difficulty of being certain of the practicability of 
 i constructing the canal, or even the certainty of its utility. Mur- 
 . ray was instructed to “ remain entirely passive on the subject,” 
 i and to continue to advocate the railway as a matter of certain 
 I value, and he added that “ the reasons which would make Her 
 Majesty’s Government prefer the railway would also render that 
 
 ( channel of communication better for the interests of the Pasha.” ®® 
 Murray was not slow in taking his cue. In July he was able to 
 I report that “ We may safely number the Suez ship-canal among 
 « the most visionary projects of the day,” and that he thought 
 ’ Mehemet Ali would not go on with it. The railway was being 
 urged as a “ practicable substitute.” ®* Henceforward British 
 ; authorities both at home and in Egypt consistently displayed an 
 , attitude of complete skepticism and incredulity toward the canal 
 
 I scheme. 
 
 Meanwhile the Egyptian Government, inspired by French 
 counsels, determined to make an official examination of the levels 
 of the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In 1845 M. Lenon, en- 
 gineer to the Pasha, who had been in Egypt since the French 
 survey of 1799, expressed his doubt of the correctness of the 
 original calculations, and requested M. Talabot, a friend, to come 
 out to Egypt and revive the project for establishing a water com- 
 
 I F. O. 97/408, C. A. Murray to Viscount Palmerston, 3 May, 1847. 
 
 ; F. O. 97/411, Foreign Office to Mr. Murray, 8 Feb., 1847. Palmerston 
 
 1 insisted all along that if the Canal were to be built, it must be with Egyptian money. 
 F. O. 97/408, Palmerston to C. A. Murray, 27 May, 1847. 
 
 Ibid., Murray to Palmerston, 9 July, 1847. 
 
300 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 munication between the two seas. This led to the forming of a 
 semi-official surveying commission by the Pasha, consisting of 
 Talabot, Robert Stephenson, representing England, and an 
 Austrian engineer, Negrelli.^® These men, with their assistants, 
 devoted considerable time in 1847 to investigating the possibilities 
 of a ship canal. The Pasha facilitated these operations in every 
 way possible, furnishing supplies and equipment, placing at the 
 disposal of the engineers the wide knowledge and practical ex- 
 perience of his own staff of engineers, including the able M. 
 Linant, and bearing the expenses connected with the undertaking, 
 a matter of some £4000. 
 
 The findings of the group had considerable bearing on the 
 future of the canal scheme. All members of the party agreed 
 that there was no essential difference in the levels of the two seas 
 except in the height and time of tides, but they differed widely in 
 their opinions as to the practicability of a sea level canal. The 
 Austrian engineers thought a canal quite possible, if not feasible, 
 and believed that one of the greatest obstacles would be the con- 
 struction of suitable termini and approaches at either end of the 
 channel.®® The French believed that a canal with locks admitting 
 the largest vessels would function successfully. But Stephenson 
 was convinced that any such canal was altogether out of the 
 question. He stated subsequently that he had great faith in the 
 idea of a sea-level canal as long as the thirty-odd feet of difference 
 in level was believed to exist, for he considered a current of three 
 or four miles per hour necessary to keep the channel clear. A 
 long channel without any current flowing through it he believed 
 to be useless 5 in effect he thought the canal would be, as was later 
 said, a “ stinking ditch.” Moreover, he was convinced that any 
 canal accommodating the largest vessels would be impracticable 
 because of its enormous cost 5 and that since it could never be a 
 profitable venture, he maintained it was useless to attempt it.®' 
 Stephenson therefore recommended a railway as the only safe 
 and profitable way of eliminating the unsatisfactory transit ar- | 
 
 rangements of the Transit Administration. Although these con- i 
 
 victions were doubtless inspired by his interest in the proposed 3 
 Egyptian Railway, and were very likely influenced by the known i 
 sentiments of the British Foreign Office, they served as convenient 'i 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 223. Thomas Waghorn wrote Stephenson early ^ 
 in 1847, urging him to have nothing to do with the proposed survey, as it was but i 
 
 a wild scheme with which the plotting French had deluded the now partially de- I 
 
 mented old Pasha. — F. O. 97/411, Waghorn to Stephenson, 13 March, 1S47. 
 
 F. O. 97/408, C. A. Murray to Palmerston, 9 Julj-, 1847. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 224. 
 
 I 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 301 
 
 arguments for the opponents of the canal scheme long after they 
 had been completely disproved.®® 
 
 While the practicability of the canal and all of the accompany- 
 ing issues were being busily discussed throughout western Europe, 
 the old Viceroy of Egypt breathed his last. For months before 
 his death on August 2, 1 849, he had been unsound of mind, and 
 the Government of Egypt had been carried on in his name by his 
 son and heir apparent, Ibrahim Pasha, until his death in 1848, 
 and thereafter by some of his ministers. Mehemet Ali’s succes- 
 sor was his nephew, Abbas Pasha, a stupid and pleasure-loving 
 young man, but one who believed that his interests were bound up 
 with those of the English. During the six years of his rule, 
 therefore, little was heard of the canal. The Pasha’s French ad- 
 visers were all replaced with Englishmen, and as the English 
 Consul-General had the entire confidence of the young potentate, 
 only English schemes were put on foot in Egypt. 
 
 As a result of this diplomatic revolution, the French, who had 
 lately been abetting the Viceroy of Egypt against his suzerain, 
 the Sultan, now betook themselves to Constantinople, where they 
 speedily insinuated themselves into Turkish councils and plotted 
 to overthrow Abbas, and with him English hegemony.®® The 
 Porte was not averse from the idea of ousting the family of the 
 hated Mehemet Ali, and willingly listened to plans for dethron- 
 ing Abbas. The latter was in a precarious position at best, for 
 while British authorities rejoiced at the discomfiture of the French, 
 whom Mehemet Ali was always suspected of favoring, they 
 would take no steps which might involve the slightest obligation 
 with regard to Egypt. The most which could be expected from 
 the British Government was a friendly attitude, and this, at any 
 rate, was given. 
 
 The temporary disappearance of French influence in Egypt 
 made possible the revival of the pet project of the English, the 
 railway, which was desired by Government and commercial in- 
 terests alike. From the time of his accession, the advantages of 
 this enterprise had been pointed out to Abbas, who found the idea 
 attractive. In October, 1850, he had an opportunity to begin 
 definite arrangements for a railway at a time when Robert 
 Stephenson, who had already discussed the canal question with 
 
 Diplomatic Review (1853), p. 421, the opinion of David Urquhart; Bar- 
 thelmy St. Hilaire, New Facts and Figures relative to the Isthmus of Suez Canal, 
 edited by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps (London, 1856), p. 33. See Stephenson’s statement 
 in The Engineer for 15 Feb., 1856. 
 
 [Anonymous], The Present Crisis in Egypt in Relation to Our Overland 
 Communication with India, No. i (London, 1851), p. 15. 
 
302 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 him, was in Egypt. The Pasha remarked that he proposed to 
 build the road in two sections, to avoid unduly wounding French 
 susceptibilities, the first from Alexandria to Cairo, and afterward 
 another from Cairo to Suez. He himself was to advance the 
 money and furnish the labor for the construction, leaving only 
 engineering supplies and railway equipment to be acquired else- 
 where. Stephenson approved these plans and returned to Eng- 
 land. Early in 1851 the Pasha requested him to act as chief 
 engineer for the railway, and in July an agreement was concluded 
 for the enterprise. Stephenson was to complete the railway 
 within two years, and receive for his services the tidy sum of 
 £55,000.*^ 
 
 Work on the railway proceeded steadily in spite of French at- 
 tempts to bring it to a halt by invoking the aid of the Porte.^^ 
 A corps of English surveyors laid out the first section of the line 
 before the end of 1851, and Egyptian fellahs were set at work 
 preparing the embankments for the rails. The line was not 
 completed as quickly as had been planned, but progress on it was 
 so satisfactory that before the end of the year 1853 the section 
 from Alexandria to the Nile was opened, and from that time for- 
 ward the Mahmoudie Canal, the opening of which had been 
 attended with such desirable consequences, gradually fell into 
 disuse.** A part of the line was double tracked at the outset 5 all 
 of it was within a few years. 
 
 The first section of the railway which had been so long ad- 
 vocated was completed none too soon.*® Hardly had communica- 
 tion thus been established between Alexandria and Cairo when 
 Abbas’ short reign ingloriously ended. He was succeeded by 
 Sai'd Pasha, whose first care was to welcome back to Egypt the 
 French who had been ousted by his predecessor. Again English 
 counsels were unsought, and English interests were protected only 
 because of the deference and silent tribute paid to sea power and 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, pp. 223, 224, Examination of Robert Stephenson 
 by the Select Committee of the House of Commons. 
 
 London Times, 30 July, 1851. 
 
 F. O. 78/411, Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning, 24 July, 1851; Anon., 
 The Present Crisis in Egypt . . . p. 23; Anon., The Egyptian Railway-, or. The 
 Interest of England, in Egypt (London, 1852), pp. 3, 4. 
 
 Because of his power of using forced labor, the Pasha expected to construct 
 the line between Alexandria and Cairo, some 140 miles, at a cost of less than £6000 
 per mile. Very little grading was required in this section. Actually the cost, in- 
 cluding the first rolling stock, was about £i 1,000 per mile. The railway was to 
 cross the Nile near Cairo by using the enormous irrigation barrage just completed 
 by French Engineers. Pari. Pap., 1851, No. 605, p. 225; London Times, 4 Dec., 
 1851. 
 
 London Times, 8 April, 1853. 
 
 The line between Cairo and Suez was not completed until 1858. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 303 
 
 to the recovery of British prestige at Constantinople. For with 
 ; the opening of the Crimean War the Porte was compelled to rely 
 f very largely on British strength. 
 
 With the accession of Sai’d Pasha, a definite French project for 
 the construction of a canal across the Isthmus of Suez brought its 
 author, Ferdinand de Lesseps, into prominence. De Lesseps was 
 well fitted to be the founder of such an enterprise. His father 
 had been the French Political Agent in Egypt during the rise of 
 Napoleon Bonaparte, and had materially assisted in the rise to 
 power of Mehemet Ali. In this way Matthew de Lesseps was 
 i largely instrumental in establishing the tradition of French sym- 
 pathy and friendship for Egypt which his son so ably capitalized 
 : later. Young Ferdinand de Lesseps spent his early youth in 
 I company with the members of Mehemet Ali’s household, includ- 
 ' ing Sai’d, who succeeded to the viceroyalty in 1854.^® 
 
 De Lesseps was serving as Sieve or “ understudy ” in the 
 I. French Consulate at Cairo when the first steps were taken toward 
 opening the overland route. There he watched with great inter- 
 , est the early efforts of Chesney and, a bit later, Waghorn.^^ 
 i| Although his early adult life was spent in France and in Algeria, 
 
 1 De Lesseps did not cease to ponder upon the mighty advantages 
 ' which would accrue from an open, fully-navigable channel be- 
 i tween the Mediterranean and Red Seas. He was restrained from 
 I taking any active steps, however, by the realization that nothing 
 : of importance could be accomplished during the lifetime of Me- 
 1 hemet Ali.^® Immediately upon the news of his death, De Les- 
 !, seps determined to put his plans on foot. In a letter, dated Paris, 
 j July 8, 1852, to his boyhood friend S. W. Ruyssenaers, then 
 i Dutch Consul-General in Egypt, he outlined his scheme in fairly 
 tangible form for the first time, but added, “ I confess that my 
 scheme is still a mere dream and I do not shut my eyes to the fact 
 i : that so long as I alone believe it to be possible, it is virtually im- 
 ji possible.” Ruyssenaers replied that it would be untimely to 
 |: push the proposition at the moment, and De Lesseps sadly retired 
 li to his estate in Algeria. 
 
 i! He was still in retirement when the announcement of the 
 
 'i 
 
 Ferdinand de Lesseps, The Suez, Canal. Letters and Documents Descriftive 
 ; of Its Rise and Progress in 1854—1856 (Trans., London, 1876), p. 65. 
 
 •I McCoan, o'p. cit., pp. 257-259; De Lesseps, The Suez Canal ... p. 26; 
 
 i Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, I, fassim- London Times, 8 April, 1853. 
 
 I' Mehemet Ali had opposed the idea of an isthmian canal because he believed 
 
 ; it would have the effect of separating Egypt from Syria and Arabia, which he con- 
 { sidered as rightfully belonging to the Egyptian Pashalik. 
 
 ' De Lesseps, of. cit., p. 2; J. Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 244—246. 
 
304 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 death of Abbas and the accession of Sai'd reached him. His first 
 act was to write to the new Viceroy to renew his old friendship 
 and to assure him of a congratulatory visit. “Not a word was 
 said about the Suez Canal, a subject I shall not broach until I am 
 quite sure of my ground,” he wrote his mother-in-law.®® Hurry- 
 ing out to Egypt, De Lesseps was soon installed in a mansion as a 
 personal and honored friend of the new ruler, whose every deed 
 he was careful to applaud. “ I must act with the greater pru- 
 dence,” he wrote, “ that Ruyssenaers remembers having heard 
 Sa'id Pasha remark, before his accession to power, that if ever he 
 became the Viceroy of Egypt he should follow the example of 
 his father, Mehemet Ali, who had declined to have anything to 
 do with cutting a canal across the Isthmus of Suez because of the 
 difficulties it might lead to with England.” But by a remark- 
 able exercise of tact and patience, De Lesseps was able to translate 
 his social position into a business proposition without in the least 
 exciting the Viceroy’s suspicion or his apprehension. The great 
 plan was first presented on November 15, 1854. Lesseps’ 
 confidence in the scheme and his enthusiasm were infectious. “ I 
 am convinced j ” exclaimed Sa'id, “ I accept your plan. . . Con- 
 sider the matter settled. You may rely upon me.” ®‘ Following 
 this favorable reception of the proposal, De Lesseps presented the 
 Viceroy with an “ impromptu ” minute, containing a plan which 
 had been drawn up and waiting for two years. On November 
 24 a preliminary draft of a concession to be issued by the Viceroy 
 with the consent of his suzerain was prepared and approved, and 
 the great project began to emerge from the realm of pure 
 speculation.®® 
 
 The plan in brief, as embodied in the Viceroy’s Concession, 
 provided for a company to be organized under the auspices of the 
 Pasha and known as the Com-pagnie Universelle du Canal Mari- 
 time de Sue:;:.. The directors of the Company were to be chosen 
 by the Viceroy “ from among those most interested in the enter- 
 prise,” and the concession was to endure for 99 years. The canal 
 works were to be executed at the cost of the Company, but all 
 fortifications were to be installed by the Viceroy. The Egyptian 
 
 De Lesseps, of. cit., p. 7. The letters inserted in this Eng'lish version by their { 
 author were undoubtedly edited rather carefully in order to give the book cohesion I 
 and consistency. i 
 
 Ibid., p. 7. _ _ _ ! 
 
 Ibid., p. 13. Sa'id gave his approval, however, only on condition that there I 
 should be no opposition on the part of the Great Powers. — F. O. 78/ 1156, F. W. A. 1 
 Bruce to the Earl of Clarendon, 3 Dec., 1S54. ! 
 
 De Lesseps, op. cit., p. 26. The text of the minute is given in J. Charles-Roux, ^ 
 of. cit., I, 437-441. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 305 
 
 Government Was to receive 1 5 % of the net profits of the Com- 
 pany, 75 % of the profits were to be paid to the shareholders, and 
 an additional 10% was reserved for the “ founders.” There was 
 to be no discrimination among nations in tariff rates. The route 
 of the canal was not specified, but the concession was purposely 
 made inclusive, so that even the Nile might be used if considered 
 advisable.®* 
 
 Shortly after the completion of the agreement, De Lesseps 
 went, at the Pasha^s request, to explain the arrangement to 
 Frederick W. A. Bruce, who had succeeded C. A. Murray as 
 British Consul-General. The Canal Company was presented, 
 not as a French but as a strictly international enterprise having 
 its origin in Egypt. The plan appeared to be largely free from 
 those features which had made earlier French proposals anathema 
 to the British Government. An international undertaking, in 
 which France should participate no more than Great Britain or 
 Austria, at first Bruce believed, or feigned to believe, to be an 
 acceptable proposition. He replied, according to De Lesseps, that 
 if free capital were involved in such a commercial enterprise, he 
 could anticipate no opposition from England.®® But he also 
 pointed out that, as he had no instructions on the subject, his 
 opinion carried no significance. 
 
 In reporting this conference and subsequent information to 
 the Home Government, Bruce said that he had urged Said not to 
 invest in or guarantee the canal in any way as it was much too 
 large a matter for Egyptian resources. Instead of this, he again 
 urged the completion of a railway line to Suez, “ the money for 
 which would have been found by the contractors of the line now 
 nearly finished.” ®® But regarding De Lesseps’ scheme he con- 
 tinued, “ I have reason to believe that this scheme has been 
 brought forward by Mr. Lesseps without any communication with 
 the French Government.” He believed that such a direct canal 
 as that proposed would “ give Egypt the go-bye,” and that it 
 would have a constant tendency to escape from the jurisdiction of 
 the Egyptian Government, and would in no way enrich the 
 country except as it might create a demand for supplies. The 
 railway, on the other hand, would follow the Nile and bring 
 the route of trade through Egypt. 
 
 F. O., Suez Canal Papers, 78/1156, Traduction of Concession from Sai’d 
 Pasha to Ferdinand de Lesseps. Transmitted to F. W. A. Bruce, Nov., 1854. The 
 complete text of the Concession or firman in 12 Articles, is dated 30 Nov., 1854. — 
 F. O. 78/1156, Enclosure, Lord Cowley to the Foreign Office, 18 June, 1855; 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 422—424. 
 
 De Lesseps, of. cit., p. 27. 
 
 j F. O. 78/1156, Bruce to Clarendon, 3 Dec., 1854. 
 
3o6 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 It is a question well worth the attention and serious con- 
 sideration of the Turkish Government [he said], and of 
 those interested in maintaining the link between the East and 
 the West in the hands of a neutral and unaggressive Power, 
 how far these objects are compatible with the existence of a 
 Powerful Company disposing the money and patronage 
 which such an enterprise would place at their disposal.®^ 
 
 That Bruce did not believe such an enterprise could be divorced 
 from political considerations was also made clear. He believed 
 that even if the French Government furnished no funds, it would 
 probably back the canal in some way. 
 
 It is clear that before £8,000,000 could be found, the 
 neutrality of the Passage must be guaranteed by some ar- 
 rangement in the nature of a Treaty by the Great 
 Powers . . . and in the course of the discussion many ques- 
 tions will arise with reference to the facility to be afforded 
 by it for the Passage of Troops and Military Stores. It is 
 not to be forgotten, moreover, that the first effect of it would 
 be to open a direct Trade from Europe with the Red Sea, 
 which would lead to the formation of Establishments on 
 different points along its coast, and which in the present state 
 of anarchy ... of those countries, would in all probability 
 lead to collision with the natives, and become the pretext for 
 the employment of forcible measures and the formation of 
 permanent settlements.®® 
 
 If the project had been launched without the knowledge of 
 Napoleon III, he was not long in expressing a peculiar interest 
 in it.®“ On December 22, the Viceroy of Egypt was invested wbth 
 the insignia of the Legion of Honor by the French Consul- 
 General, M. Sabatier, on behalf of the French Emperor. In 
 making the presentation, M. Sabatier said, in part: 
 
 In conferring on your Highness this great distinction . . . 
 Napoleon III . . . is . . . anxious to express his deep in- 
 terest in Egypt itself, and in the glorious but arduous work 
 of reorganization and reform bequeathed to your Highness 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Bruce, 3 Dec., 1854. 
 
 This was Stephenson’s estimate of the cost of the waterway. 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Bruce to Clarendon, 3 Dec., 1854. Bruce rather thought that 
 the canal project would further the cause of the railway, however. 
 
 Lord Cowley, British Ambassador to France, wrote to the Foreign Office 
 about this time that the French Government officially denied having anything to do 
 with the canal project. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 307 
 
 by your father of illustrious memory. Your Highness is 
 aware that in carrying out this work the encouragement and, 
 if need be, the support of the Emperor will never fail 
 : you. . 
 
 This alone would have sufficed to make the opponents of the 
 Suez scheme wary. But already, on December 4, the Pasha had 
 i written to the Sultan asking his approval on both the canal and 
 the railway from Cairo to Suez, intending to use the one as a 
 counterpoise to the other. “ I have been told that the question 
 ■ belonged to Paris and London,” wrote De Lessepsj “ I think it 
 ; ought not to leave Egypt until further orders.” But the ques- 
 ; tion refused to stay in Egypt. The Pasha of Egypt was, after all, 
 the vassal of the Sultan, and that fact alone inevitably would have 
 ^ led to the reviewing by the representatives of the Great Powers 
 ; of any proposed measure which might affect the status of the 
 ' Ottoman Empire, concerning which two great nations were then 
 contending with a third. Thus, into the maelstrom of political 
 intrigue already produced by the problems which war had been 
 i invoked to settle, problems for the most part relating to the 
 I protection of India, was interjected a related issue which could 
 not fail of breeding difficulties between the Powers allied against 
 I Russia. 
 
 The British Government, in opposing the canal scheme, chose 
 I to defend its position at Constantinople. In this way official 
 statements which might give umbrage to France could be avoided, 
 the Turkish Government could be made to take the blame for the 
 refusal to issue a firman authorizing a canal, and there also the 
 situation would rest in the hands of a diplomat who would be 
 fully capable of managing the situation. This last consideration 
 was not one of the least. In Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Great 
 Britain possessed an Ambassador of no uncertain type. Being 
 vigorous and aggressive and well acquainted with the devious 
 . paths of Turkish diplomacy, he was so feared by the ministers 
 /surrounding the Sultan, both because of his domineering per- 
 sonality and his unhesitating willingness to invoke the vast powers 
 of the government he represented, that his colleagues frequently 
 spoke of him as “ Sultan Stratford.” He was, moreover, a 
 most narrow-minded imperialist, whose hatred of Russia because 
 of her real and supposed advances in the direction of India had 
 largely been responsible for the opening of the Crimean War, 
 and whose suspicion of French motives in connection with the 
 
 De Lesseps, op. cit., p. 45. P- 71- Ibid., p. 80. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 308 
 
 Suez Canal scheme took no note of the need for French coopera- 
 tion in prosecuting the badly-managed Crimean campaign. Few 
 suggestions from London were needed, therefore, to raise up at | 
 the Porte an insuperable obstacle to the further progress of the I 
 canal idea so long as the Turkish Government remained in awe of \ 
 the imperious and temperamental British Ambassador. 
 
 One of the first definite indications of the position adopted by 
 the British representative at the Porte was contained in a con- 
 fidential despatch from the Grand Vizier, Reschid Pasha, to the 
 Viceroy of Egypt in February, 1855. At the behest of the Eng- 
 lish Ambassador, Reschid dutifully pointed out the obvious ad- ' 
 vantages which a railroad would confer on Egypt and suggested ' 
 that as a railroad would be much less expensive than a canal, and : 
 since two such enterprises would be inadvisable, the canal should : 
 be abandoned.®* Almost at the same moment De Lesseps arrived : 
 at Constantinople in the capacity of a plenipotentiary from the : 
 Viceroy of Egypt to secure the consent of the Porte for the canal. 
 He found the Grand Vizier apparently quite favorable to his ' 
 project,®® although the fear of the British Ambassador was so 
 great among the members of the Turkish Council that De Lesseps 
 was refused recognition in any official capacity.®® The French 
 charge d^ajfaires at Constantinople, M. Benedetti, supported De 
 Lesseps in his efforts as much as possible, but even he had received 
 from his Government “ a hint not to put himself too forward in 
 the matter.” ®^ De Lesseps, therefore, found himself reduced to 
 the necessity of using such personal influence as he had, supported : 
 officially only by the representative of the Austrian Government.®® 
 During the next few weeks De Lesseps labored hard to convert 
 the Turkish Government to the canal undertaking, emphasizing 
 the international character of the enterprise, its approval by 
 France and Austria, and the anxiety of Said Pasha that it be rec- 
 ognized as his project. So sincere and untiring were his efforts 
 that Lord Stratford reported to his Government on February 22, 
 that the Turkish Council, including Reschid Pasha, were very 
 much inclined to grant the request of the Pasha of Egypt, not . 
 that they believed in the canal itself, but because they disliked to 
 give umbrage to the Viceroy and the French Government.®® A 
 
 F. O. 78/1 156, Reschid Pasha to the Viceroy of Egypt, ii Feb., 1855; Foreign J 
 Office to Stratford de Redcliffe, 27 Feb., 1855. ( 
 
 De Lesseps quotes Reschid Pasha as saying that he would like to be rid of ^ 
 Lord Stratford’s influence. — T/ie Suez Canal, pp. 80, 97. 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Stratford de Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon, 12 Feb., 1855. 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, p. 81. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 81, 82. j 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Redcliffe to Clarendon, 22 Feb., 1856. j 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 309 
 
 few days later Lord Stratford reported again that even if he 
 should succeed in postponing the action of the Turkish Council, 
 he believed the desired firman would be issued before long unless 
 he (the Ambassador) could object to it on official grounds. 
 Meanwhile, in order to relieve the pressure concentrating upon 
 him, he prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Office, which 
 was communicated orally to the Grand Vizier, stating — 
 
 It is quite clear that this scheme is founded on ulterior 
 I intentions hostile to British views and interests — and the 
 i [overt] . . . object no doubt is, to lay a foundation for a 
 future severance of Egypt from Turkey and for placing it 
 under French protection. A deep and wide canal interposed 
 between Syria and Egypt, studded with fortifications, would 
 be a military defensive line which, with the Desert in front of 
 it, would render the march for a Turkish army very difficult; 
 and if land is to be conceded to the French company, a 
 French colony or French territory would be interposed be- 
 tween Turkey and Egypt, and any attempt of Turkish troops 
 to cross that line would be held to be an invasion of France. 
 
 I From the moment this enterprise was completed, Egypt 
 would be virtually cut off from Turkey and would be placed 
 i under the protection of France. 
 
 It seems to me that these considerations might be frankly 
 . . . explained to the French Government and they might 
 be asked whether they think it worth while to endanger the 
 alliance by pressing forward this scheme.^® 
 
 With these and other similar vigorous representations, which 
 had the smell, if not the color, of official statements, De Lesseps 
 was foiled in his hope of securing immediate action. Vainly he 
 stated that he had no objection to the Suez Railway, and that 
 since this would be constructed by Egyptian capital while the canal 
 would be an international undertaking, the two enterprises need 
 not conflict in the least. Likewise in vain did he memorialise the 
 Grand Vizier, the Turkish Council, and even Lord Stratford de 
 Redcliffe himself.^^ The Turkish Ministers replied that in the 
 
 Ibid., Memorandum of Stratford de Redcliffe, given to Mr. Chabert, and 
 I communicated orally to Reschid Pasha, [Enclosure with No. 148, 27 Feb., 1855]. 
 Several of these arguments had already been suggested by the Consul-General in 
 Egypt, Mr. F. W. A. Bruce. See F. O. 78/1156, Bruce to Clarendon, 20 Feb., 1855. 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 86—87, 95~96; Inquiry into the Opinions of 
 the Comttiercial Classes of Great Britain on the Suez Ship Canal (London, 1857), 
 pp. 129— 132, “Letter from De Lesseps to Stratford de Redcliffe, Pera, 28 Feb., 
 1855.” Lord Stratford appears to have completely ignored this letter, which 
 reviewed the 'whole case for the canal from a political point of view. 
 
310 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 absence of details of the canal plan furnished by the Viceroy him- 
 self they were unable to take any official action on the matter, and 
 they procrastinated further without committing themselves by 
 appointing a commission to investigate the canal schemed^ Fi- 
 nally, early in March, when it had become altogether obvious ; 
 that the Porte dared not risk offending the British Government 
 at such a critical moment by approving the canal project, De 
 Lesseps took his departure for Egypt, angry and discouraged, but 
 not beatend® He had received intimations that the desired permit 
 would not be long in forthcoming. 
 
 With all of his powers. Lord Stratford was in an uncomfortable i 
 position. Reschid Pasha very probably disliked as well as feared 
 him, and he was none too securely seated in office. The whole i 
 Turkish Council were growing restive under the taunts showered 
 upon them by the diplomats of other nations because of their 
 subservience to the whims of the English “ Sultan,” who had no 
 official instructions to cite for his continued opposition to De ; 
 Lesseps and the canal. But the anxiety of the Turkish ministers 
 proceeded from another source, as well. Intimations came now ' 
 and then of the desire of the Viceroy of Egypt to become inde- 
 pendent and of the wish of the French Government to encourage 
 such sentiments.^® It was also suggested that the Pasha might 
 authorize the construction of the canal on his own authority, basing 
 his action on arguments advanced by British agents in 1851, when 
 French opposition at Constantinople temporarily held up the con- 
 sent of the Porte for the construction of the first section of the ; 
 Egyptian Railway. It had been pointed out to the Viceroy at that 
 time that the railway might well be considered a purely domestic 
 matter, not requiring the approval of the Porte.'® 
 
 Lord Stratford grew fearful of his ability to carry on the tem- 
 porising policy of the Porte much longer. Sincere in his belief, 
 no doubt, that the canal project ranked with Russian conquests in 
 Transcaucasia in its threat to British interests in the East, he 
 begged with such grace as he could muster for permission to 
 proclaim officially the sentiments of his Government. “ It is only 
 by an open official interference that I could hope to succeed in 
 obtaining an indefinite postponement of the plan,” he WTote on I 
 March 21.'^ Faced thus with the direct issue, the Foreign Office J 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Redcliffe to Clarendon, i March, 1855 (Confidential). / 
 
 Ibid., No. 155, (Confidential) ; Redcliffe to F. W. A. Bruce, 26 March, 1855 f 
 (private) ; De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, p. 98. | 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Governor-General of Egypt to Kiamil Pasha, 31 March, i 
 1855. [Enel, in No. 280, 12 April.] • 
 
 Ibid., F. W. A. Bruce to Lord Clarendon, 18 Feb., 1855. 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 81—82. 
 
 ’’’’ F. O. 78/1156, Redcliffe to the Foreign Office, 21 March, 1855. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 311 
 
 I tried another expedient. In response to Lord Stratford’s memo- 
 I randum and request for advice of February 26, he had been in- 
 I formed in a despatch dated March 9 that it was “ the opinion of 
 Her Majesty’s Government that it would not be expedient to 
 make any official protest against this scheme.” But a little later 
 Lord Clarendon, in approving his machinations to prevent the 
 success of De Lesseps’ mission to Constantinople, added: 
 
 Her Majesty’s Government consider that this canal would 
 be useless even if it were possible to execute it, and the con- 
 cession demanded by M. Lesseps is highly objectionable for 
 political reasons: and they recommend the Porte not to grant 
 it on the ground that this is not a moment for bringing so 
 large a project into the money market.^® 
 
 Selections from this and other despatches in the same vein, 
 “ read confidentially ” to Reschid Pasha, were about to cause a 
 shelving of the canal question, when it was unexpectedly re- 
 opened. The French Government, repenting of its early mod- 
 eration, suddenly came forward in active support of the enterprise, 
 On May 21, the French charge d^ajfaires at Constantinople 
 formally demanded the sanction of the Suez concession on the 
 ground that the Viceroy of Egypt had at last supplied all neces- 
 sary details and the British Government had withdrawn its ob- 
 jections.®” This was vigorously denied, both by RedclifFe at the 
 moment and officially by the Foreign Office a short time later.®’ 
 But the incident at least had the effect of clearing the air and 
 bringing out openly the views of the British and French Govern- 
 ments concerning it. 
 
 On June 4, Lord Cowley, British Ambassador at Paris, protested 
 to the French Government against Benedetti’s recent action in 
 support of the canal at Constantinople. Benedetti’s statements 
 were immediately disavowed by Count Walewski, the French 
 Foreign Minister, but the whole question of the canal came up 
 for discussion. Walewski suggested that both Britain and France 
 instruct their representatives at Constantinople to interfere no 
 further in the matter, but to leave it for the decision of the Sultan 
 and the Viceroy of Egypt. To this Cowley replied — 
 
 That his suggestion did not apply equally to both govern- 
 ments. I must maintain, I said, that in respect to the means 
 
 Ibid., Foreign Office to Redciiiie, 9 March, 1855. 
 
 Ibid., Clarendon to Redcliffe, 29 March, 1855 (Confidential). 
 
 Ibid., Redcliffe to Clarendon, 21 May, 1855 (Confidential); Charles-Roux, 
 op. cit., I, 261. 
 
 t F. O. 78/1156, Foreign Office to Redcliffe, 21 May and 6 June, 1855. 
 
312 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 of transit through Egypt, Her Majesty’s Government was 
 much more concerned in the final solution . . . than the 
 French Government, and, as he must know, that Her Maj- 
 esty’s Government had no object in view with reference to 
 Egypt but the rapid transmission of their correspondence to 
 India.*^ 
 
 Count Walewski insisted, however, that this suggestion be made 
 to the British Foreign Office. Cowley duly transmitted the pro- 
 posal, with his own comment that “ unfortunately experience 
 proves, even if your Lordship were inclined to accept this pro- 
 posal, that no orders from the government at home will prevent 
 French agents acting secretly, when they think that any advantage 
 can be obtained over British interests.” 
 
 The British Government demurred at giving a pledge to re- 
 main neutral on the canal question. In reply to the proposal of 
 Count Walewski, Lord Clarendon took occasion to sum up the 
 whole of British objections to the canal, which made a passive 
 attitude on the part of the British Government very unlikely. 
 
 The objections of Her Majesty’s Government to this 
 scheme of a canal are threefold: 
 
 First — They know, whatever may be said by speculators 
 to the contrary, that it is physically impossible, except at a 
 cost which must put out of all question its being profitable 
 as a commercial speculation, and which must therefore prove, 
 that if undertaken, it can be undertaken only for political 
 obj ects. 
 
 Secondly — This scheme, which in any case would require 
 a long time for its execution, would interfere with and greatly 
 delay, if not entirely prevent, the completion of a railway 
 communication between Cairo and Suez, in connection with 
 that already established between Alexandria and Cairo, and 
 would thus be extremely injurious to our interests with ref- 
 erence to India.®^ All that the British Government want in 
 Egypt is an easy and rapid road to India for travellers, light 
 goods, and letters and despatches. They want no ascend- 
 ancy, no territorial acquisition: they only w'ant a thorough- 
 fare j but a thoroughfare they must have, free and unmo- 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Cowley to Clarendon, 4 June, 1855. 
 
 Ibid., Cowley, 4 June, 1855. 
 
 This argument was weak, considering the fact that the Viceroy of Egypt had 
 already ordered the rails for the Suez section of the railway^ and had arranged for 
 the work to proceed on the line regardless of the fate of the canal. F. O. 78/ 1156, 
 Cowley to the Foreign Office, 21 June, 1855. , 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 313 
 
 lested: and the continuation of the railway would give them 
 that thoroughfare rapid, while the continuation of the present 
 political condition of Egypt as a dependency of the Turkish 
 Empire gives them that thoroughfare free and secure. 
 
 The third objection to the canal scheme is that Her MajT] 
 esty’s Government cannot disguise from themselves that it 
 is founded upon an antagonistic policy on the part of France j 
 with regard to Egypt, which they had hoped and believed 
 had given way to the happy change which of late has taken 
 place in the mutual relations of the two countries. . . 
 
 This canal scheme has survived the policy out of which it 
 arose, and it ought to give way to the altered and better 
 policy which now guides the course of the two Govern- 
 ments.®® 
 
 The correspondence between the two Governments continued 
 during June and July without any agreement having been reached 
 by argument. Count Persigny, the French Ambassador at the 
 Court of St. James, after conferring with the Emperor Napoleon 
 III late in June, quoted him as saying that whatever sentiment he 
 had about the canal, he would not press the project over British 
 opposition, and all interference would cease, although he did not 
 want the Turks to think that English influence had made him 
 back down.®® This created such a good impression in London that 
 the British Government also agreed to let the matter drop, it be- 
 ing tacitly understood that nothing would be done about the canal 
 at all for the time being, and the subject was to be considered 
 non avenu.^’’ 
 
 At this point the canal project, as a political issue, temporarily 
 entered a quiescent state. The “ gentlemen’s agreement,” to- 
 gether with the varying fortunes of the Crimean War, for the 
 time being supplanted the canal in the councils of the allies. The 
 
 Ibid., Foreign Office to Lord Cowley, 18 June, 1855. This statement was 
 undoubtedly inspired by Palmerston. When De Lesseps visited England and con- 
 ferred with Lord Palmerston late in June, he was struck with the fact that the 
 objections voiced by Palmerston were those which Clarendon had mentioned, “ with- 
 out omitting one.” “ It was evident,” De Lesseps said, “ that he himself [Palmerston] 
 had dictated them, or that they had, at all events, been written at his direction.” — 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, p. 148. 
 
 F. O. 78/1156, Cowley to Clarendon, 30 June, 1855, (Confidential). 
 
 Ibid., Foreign Office to Cowley, 2 and 18 July, 1855; De Lesseps, The Suez 
 Canal, p. 133. De Lesseps understood this to mean that “ it would be necessary . . . 
 for the French Ambassador to abstain from using his official [italics mine] weight 
 to influence the Porte in favour of the ratification, and for the English Ambassador, 
 on his part, to abstain from demanding of the Porte any engagement contrary to 
 the ratification.” 
 
314 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 canal idea, however, did not lapse. Its projectors, beginning a 
 campaign of public education, profitably employed the following 
 months in developing support among the merchant and scientific 
 classes which would come in good stead in the trying days ahead. 
 
 The frequent declarations made by English authorities that the 
 idea of a maritime canal across the Isthmus of Suez was funda- 
 mentally unsound and intrinsically impracticable, coupled with 
 the unrelenting hostility of the entire diplomatic corps, caused De 
 Lesseps to determine upon a new course of action. With implicit 
 confidence that all reasonable persons must recognize the great 
 advantages and entire feasibility of the canal, he undertook to 
 carry his project over the obstacles raised by the English Gov- 
 ernment to the English people themselves, whose support he 
 reckoned so essential to the eventual success of his scheme. Ar- 
 riving in London at the end of June, 1855, he busied himself with 
 interviewing members of the Government and representatives of 
 the mercantile class. One of his earliest conversations was with 
 Lord Palmerston, to whom he outlined his plan frankly and in 
 detail, expecting an equally candid reply. In this he was not 
 disappointed. 
 
 J 
 
 I must tell you frankly [said the Prime Minister] that 
 what we are afraid of losing is our commercial and maritime 
 pre-eminence, for this Canal will put other nations on an 
 equal footing with us. At the same time I must own that we 
 are not quite easy on the score of the designs of France. Of 
 course we have every confidence in the loyalty and sincerity 
 of the Emperor, but who can answer for those who will come 
 after him? 
 
 Lord Clarendon was no more sympathetic in his views. “ I must 
 tell you,” he said, “ that the traditions of our Government are 
 opposed to the idea of a Canal across the Isthmus. And since I 
 have gone into the question, I confess that my own ideas are un- 
 favorable.” 
 
 These coldTlooded responses were discouraging enough, but 
 they were considerably atoned for by the enthusiasm displayed 
 elsewhere for the canal idea. De Lesseps’ The Isthmus of Suez 
 Questiofiy'^ issued at this time reviewing the advantages to be de- 
 rived by English commerce from the executing of his project, was 
 
 Quoted in Percy Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, I, 53. 
 
 Ibii., I, 53-54- 
 
 London; Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans, 1855. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 315 
 
 well received, as was the prospectus of the proposed Company. 
 The East India Company issued a statement through Mr. J. C. 
 Melvill, its Secretary, that “ . . . the Court [of Directors] must 
 always feel a deep interest in the success of any undertaking that 
 would facilitate the means of communication between this coun- 
 try and India.” And the Peninsular and Oriental Company, who 
 had favored the project from the first, so far ignored the attitude 
 of the Foreign Office as to say that “ the importance of the results 
 that would attend the junction of the Mediterranean and Red 
 Seas by a navigable canal is ... so potent, that no second opinion 
 can exist in the matter 5 and should the project be carried to a 
 successful issue, this company must of necessity participate in the 
 effect it will produce not only upon the commerce of this coun- 
 try, but of the whole world.” Opinion in India also was gen- 
 erally favorable to the canal. The Calcutta Review, represen- 
 ting current opinion in the eastern mercantile centers, said, 
 “ The more the mind reflects upon the true import of this grand 
 undertaking, the more vast and comprehensive do its advantages 
 appear.” 
 
 While this visit to England sowed seeds on fertile soil, it availed 
 nothing toward lifting the weight of English official opposition. 
 Upon his return to Paris in August, De Lesseps rapidly com- 
 pleted arrangements for another measure designed to convince 
 doubtful minds as to the feasibility of the maritime canal from 
 an engineering point of view. This was the convening at Paris 
 of noted engineers from all the principal countries of western 
 Europe, who, acting in concert as an International Scientific Com- 
 mission, were to pass final judgment on the practicability of a 
 sea-level canal and to estimate its cost. De Lesseps selected as 
 members of this important body two Englishmen, McLean and 
 Rendelj Conrad, an expert on the dike system of Holland j Ne- 
 grelli. Director of Public Works in Austria, who had been a mem- 
 ber of the isthmian survey of 1847, and others appointed by the 
 Governments of Piedmont, Prussia, and Austria.®® 
 
 After a brief and sympathetic consideration of the problem, the 
 Commission selected a sub-committee of five members to carry 
 out a new and thorough survey of the Isthmus of Suez. This 
 group proceeded at once to Egypt, where the Viceroy gave them 
 every facility for executing their work as promptly as possible. 
 The survey was completed early in January, 1856, although the 
 
 Ferdinand de Lesseps, Inquiry into the Opinions of the Commercial Classes of 
 Great Britain, pp. 2, 3; Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 54. 
 
 Calcutta Review, XXIV, 341—342. 
 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 264—265; Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 56. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 316 
 
 final report was not published until about a year afterward.®* It 
 was again conclusively shown that no essential difference in levels 
 existed between the Mediterranean and Red Seas j that fresh water 
 could be found at many points along the proposed route of the ; 
 canal 5 that the excavation of the canal would be easyj and that 
 no material obstacles existed to the construction of ports and dock- 
 ing facilities at Suez or at the end terminating near Pelusium on 
 the Mediterranean, A direct rather than an indirect track be- 
 tween the two seas was advocated, and the idea of a canal utilising 
 the Nile was definitely discarded. It was shown that the oft- 
 expressed fears of “ arm chair engineers ” that the mouths of the 
 canal would soon silt up and that the channel itself would be filled 
 by blowing sand v/ere groundless. It was considered that no 
 “ sluices ” or locks would be required in constructing the chan- 
 nel in order to prevent it from becoming a “ stinking ditch.” The 
 expense of construction was estimated at £6,000,000, a much ( 
 smaller sum than the minimum estimate prepared earlier by j 
 Robert Stephenson.®® j 
 
 Even this report, however, did not suffice to silence doubtful | 
 critics in England, who continued in the face of unbiased and in- • 
 disputable scientific evidence to cry out against the impossibility of ] 
 executing the great work at any figures which would admit of ! 
 profitable returns.®® The argument was even advanced in the 
 Edinburgh Review y which was generally view'ed as a mouthpiece : 
 of Lord Palmerston, that the canal would save little either of ' 
 time or expense in the Anglo-Indian passage. 
 
 J As the English shareholders will inevitably find the route 
 round the Cape is infinitely preferable for commercial pur- 
 poses [said the Review], we may rest assured that the Canal 
 will never be executed 5 or, if it were opened, it would, as in 
 ancient times, soon be closed again, as it could never pay its 
 working expenses, . . At present the people of England are 
 
 See Refort and Plan of the International Scientific Commission; ‘Lcith Ap- 
 pendix containing the latest official documents (London, 1857); Charles-Roux, 
 op. cit., I, 268, 445—446. 
 
 Report and Plan of the International Scientific Cosnmission, pp. 39—114; De 
 Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 220-221; Robert Stephenson, The Isthmus of Suez 
 Canal (London, 1858). 
 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 270-271. McLean, the English engineer attached 
 to the International Commission, did not agree with his colleagues on several points, 
 for instance, as regarded the practicability of a sea-level canal without locks. Lord 
 Clarendon was told that the report “ was worded in a manner which enabled him 
 to sign it.” — F. O., 78/1340, John Green to Lord Clarendon, 4 Jan., 1856. 
 
 A despatch from the Foreign Office on 10 September spoke of the canal as being 
 “well treated” in this issue. — F. O. 78/1340, Clarendon to Bruce, 10 Sept., 1856. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 317 
 
 interested in the completion of the Railroad through Egypt 
 and not the Canal.®® 
 
 While members of the English Government were refusing to 
 be convinced by the report of the International Commission, Sai’d 
 Pasha found in it sufficient warrant for issuing a new and revised 
 concession for the proposed Canal Company. This document, 
 dated January 5, 1856, had particular reference to the cutting of 
 a sea-level canal by the route recommended by the International 
 Commission. Some of its provisions, however, were designed to 
 calm the real or feigned fears of Great Britain. Four-fifths of all 
 workmen employed were to be Egyptians. Lands granted to the 
 Canal Company either for temporary or permanent use were to 
 remain under Egyptian sovereignty. And it was specified that 
 the canal with its ports “ shall always remain open as a neutral 
 passage to every merchant ship without preference,” upon the 
 payment of dues.®® This was the basis on which the Company 
 was presently brought into actual existence. 
 
 In January, 1856, soon after the report of the Suez Canal 
 Commission had become known in London, Lord Clarendon urged 
 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe again to point out to the Sultan the 
 likelihood of the detachment of Egypt from the Turkish Empire 
 in case the canal were to be constructed. With regard to the en- 
 thusiasm of the Viceroy for De Lesseps’ plan. Clarendon said, 
 “ The urgency of the Pasha is sufficiently intelligible upon these 
 grounds.” Thus encouraged. Lord Stratford, with great satis- 
 faction continued his notoriously hostile tactics at Constantinople, 
 while Bruce in Egypt was bringing as much pressure as he could 
 muster to bear on the Viceroy.^®^ 
 
 About the same time the agent of the Red Sea and India Tele- 
 graph Company, Lionel Gisborne, was in Egypt for the purpose 
 of securing permission for the erection of land wires between 
 Alexandria and Suez by way of Aden to Bombay. Although 
 
 Edinburgh Review, CIII, 236—265. See the able refutation of this article by 
 M. Barthelmy St. Hilaire, New Facts and Figures Relative to the Isthmus of Suez 
 Canal. (Ed. by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps), (London, 1856), pp. 34, 35, 88 ff. The 
 English corvette Tartarus under Capt. Mansell, was despatched to verify the sound- 
 ings in the Bay of Pelusium reported by the International Scientific Commission. 
 The findings of this independent survey practically coincided with those reported 
 by the Commission, though they were made to appear unfavorable. — F. O. 78/1340, 
 Bruce to Clarendon, 21 July, 1856. 
 
 St. Hilaire, New Facts and Figures, pp. 181—190; De Lesseps, The Suez 
 Canal, p. 233. 
 
 F. O. 78/13^0, Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, 21 Jan., 1856. 
 
 Ibid., John Green to Lord Clarendon, 4 Jan. ; ibid., Bruce to Clarendon, 
 4 March, 21 July, 1856. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 318 
 
 strongly supported in his suit by Consul-General Bruce, Gibsorne 
 was baffled by the procrastination of Egyptian Ministers and their 
 scarcely veiled reluctance to give consideration to any British com- 
 mercial undertaking in view of the obstructionist tactics of British 
 authorities with regard to the Suez Canal. Still hoping to create 
 a friendly attitude in England, De Lesseps recommended to the 
 Viceroy that the matter be disposed of promptly. The latter 
 thereupon gave plenipotentiary powers to De Lesseps for arrang- 
 ing the terms of the concession, and the necessary document was 
 soon completed, to the satisfaction of English interests and the 
 credit of the canal projector. 
 
 The close of the Crimean War early in 1856, far from pro- 
 ducing any greater degree of unanimity among the British, , 
 French and Turkish Governments, had a tendency to encourage ; 
 British diplomats to ignore the tacit agreement made with the 
 Emperor Napoleon late in 1855 and to revive the canal as an 
 open political issue. All of De Lesseps’ efforts to have the canal 
 question reviewed by the representatives of the Powers assembled 
 at Paris in February and March for the purpose of preparing 
 a general peace treaty were unavailing. These diplomats even 
 refused to insert a clause into the Treaty of Paris guaranteeing 
 the perpetual neutrality of any maritime canal which might in 
 future be constructed across the Isthmus of Suez.’®® One of the 
 Turkish Ministers present also declared himself altogether op- 
 posed to the canal.’®’ 
 
 In April De Lesseps made another visit to England to attempt 
 to arrive at an understanding with the Foreign Office. Again he 
 conferred with Lord Palmerston. “ I found Lord Palmerston 
 just as he was in 1 840,” he wrote, “ defiant and prejudiced against 
 France and Egypt.” ’®® Conferences with Lord Clarendon, 
 Prince Albert, the Queen and others were no more productive 
 than that with Lord Palmerston. 
 
 Meanwhile, reports from Constantinople and Egypt alarmed 
 De Lesseps, and caused his early return to the first scene of his 
 labors. English and Turkish intrigues were making great head- 
 way in poisoning the mind even of the Viceroy against the canal 
 scheme. Utterly weary of opposition and defeat, foiled on every 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 238, 239. De Lesseps could rig^htly take 
 pride in recording in this connection, “ I have used all means in my power to promote 
 the liberal principle of free telegraphic communication between England and its 
 eastern possessions across Egyptian territory.” 
 
 De Lesseps, of. at., p. 233; Fitzgerald, of. at., I, 72. 
 
 F. O. 78/13+0, Cowley to Clarendon, 3 April, 1856. 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 256—257. 
 
BEGINNINGS OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 319 
 
 hand, and with the Turkish officers of his own troops displaying 
 mutinous signs, Said was nearly ready to give over the whole canal 
 enterprise for the sake of safety and peace/'*® Upon learning of 
 I these dangerous symptoms, De Lesseps tarried only long enough 
 in Paris before his return to Egypt to prepare a memorandum 
 for the Emperor. In this he called Napoleon’s attention to the 
 I “ gentlemen’s agreement ” of the previous year which had been 
 so flagrantly broken by the British Government. 
 
 Up to this time [he said] Lord Stratford has never ceased 
 : to make use of his influence to inspire the Ministers of the 
 I Porte with prejudices against the plan of cutting through 
 the Isthmus of Suez and to prevent the ratification of the 
 grant regularly and legally made by the Viceroy of Egypt. 
 
 It is, moreover, certain that the English agent in Egypt 
 ' has endeavoured to influence the Viceroy with a view to dis- 
 suading him from a project which excites the warmest sym- 
 pathy in France as well as in the rest of Europe. . . The 
 ; Turks, placed between the powerful threats of Lord Strat- 
 I ford and the scrupulous silence which our Ambassador has 
 I been ordered to maintain, are naturally changing their at- 
 i titude, and testifying feelings hostile to the Canal, to which 
 they were at first favourable.*"*^ 
 
 At this point, De Lesseps disclosed a new and powerful factor 
 I in the critical state of canal negotiations when he pointed out the 
 " recent formation of “ an English Company, which is to have 
 I a grant for the construction of a railway, 350 leagues in length, 
 r from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. . . This railway, 
 
 I the surveys for which are not yet commenced, is today quoted at 
 a premium in the London money market.” 
 
 Here was the clue to the canal’s sudden loss of prestige, to the 
 defection of its Turkish friends, and to the arrogant confidence 
 of the British Foreign Office in refusing longer even a neutral at- 
 ^ titude toward the Maritime Canal Company. The Egyptian 
 Railway had served to counter-balance the Suez Canal idea for a 
 time, and French hostility to the railway justified British in- 
 tolerance of a navigable waterway. Even while the railway, once 
 approved by the Porte, was in building, it was steadily maintained 
 that with the completion of the line the canal would have no 
 additional advantages to offer. But by the close of 1856 the rail- 
 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 79. 
 
 De Lesseps, The Suez Canal, pp. 290-291. 
 
 Ibid., p. 291. 
 
320 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 way line between Alexandria and Cairo had been in use for a con- 
 siderable time and the road from Cairo to Suez was well across 
 the desert. Yet sentiment in Europe in favor of a canal was 
 stronger than ever. The Egyptian Railway had served its pur- 
 pose as a political pawn. But to take its place, a far more formid- 
 able scheme had arisen. It was now proposed to connect the 
 Mediterranean coast with the Persian Gulf, which was adjacent 
 to India, with a line of railway which would speed up communica- 
 tion far beyond the possibilities either of an Egyptian Railway or 
 a Suez Canal. At the same time the limitless resources of Meso- 
 potamia, a potential granary, were to be developed. The novelty, 
 daring, and apparent reasonableness of this scheme were de- 
 pended upon to capture the popular imagination as the Suez 
 Canal idea had, and in this the projectors were not disappointed. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 
 
 T he settlement of the Turco-Egyptian problem in 1841, 
 closely following the official opening of the overland 
 route through Egypt, brought an end to contemporary 
 English plans for developing a land and water line from Syria 
 through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf. For nearly fifteen 
 years thereafter political conditions in the Near East were in a 
 state of relative quiescence, and with Russia and France intent on 
 other matters and Persia, Turkey, and Egypt engaged in no more 
 than the usual intrigues, little alarm was felt for the safety of the 
 Indian approaches. The overland route meanwhile functioned 
 well and supplied a convenient road not merely to India but to 
 the whole of the East. The line through Syria and Mesopotamia, 
 which had long since come to be regarded as a possible alternative 
 route, pointed to India alone and was not capable of practical de- 
 velopment by any known means. It was, in consequence, almost 
 entirely neglected during these years. 
 
 However, the issues inherent in the peculiar combination of 
 races, geographic influences, and national interests in the Near 
 and Middle East were merely dormant during this interval and 
 only awaited a favorable opportunity for cropping out in virulent 
 form. Soon after 1850 major difficulties arose both in Turkey 
 and in Persia, and as each had a distinct political bearing on the 
 security of India, a new interest suddenly awoke in England and 
 the Indian Presidencies in the strategic Mesopotamian route to 
 India. A sketch of some of the fundamental problems involved 
 will throw considerable light on the first and most promising of 
 the several projects for a Euphrates Valley Railway, which served 
 as a parade ground for imperialists and a pawn for statesmen from 
 time to time after 1850. 
 
 The aggressions and jealousies which culminated in the Crimean 
 War had much to do with the rise of plans for a British-owned 
 Mesopotamian railway. The first incidents which led to this use- 
 
 321 
 
322 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 less war were local and more or less obscure. They were much like 
 the dissensions among the various sects in Syria — Mohammedans, 
 Jews, Greek and Roman Catholics — which had often risen be- 
 fore. It was the appeal of the two groups of Christians to their 
 natural protectors, Russia and France respectively, which paved 
 the way for an extension of trouble.^ 
 
 The Powers chiefly concerned for one reason or another were 
 not averse from taking sides. France, under Louis Napoleon 
 Bonaparte, soon to become Napoleon III, was particularly eager 
 for a show of strength. Despite the Emperor’s protestations that 
 he stood for peace, his neighbors were neither surprised nor en- 
 tirely unprepared when his imperialism introduced a new tension 
 into diplomatic relations. As the shrewd Charles Greville con- 
 fided to his Memoirs in 1853,“ difficult to make out what the 
 French are atj with all our intimacy, we must keep on our guard 
 against all contingencies on the part of our imperial neighbor.” ^ j 
 
 Tsar Nicholas welcomed the hostilities among the sects in I 
 Turkey as an evidence that the Ottoman Empire would be un- 
 able to survive much longer. As early as 1 844 he had referred 
 to the Sultan in a conference with Lord Aberdeen as a “ sick man,” 
 and had made tentative overtures for a partition of his territorial 
 effects upon the demise of the invalid. The suggestion had fallen 
 on sterile ground. A similar proposal made to the British Am- 
 bassador in 1853 was given no cordial reception because of the 
 knowledge that Nicholas was already preparing to take aggressive 
 steps against Turkey. Britain had learned the lesson taught by the 
 Triple Alliance of 1827. There was not to be a second Navarino. 
 
 At first the English Government anticipated no dangerous out- 
 growths from the religious discord in Turkey. Two aggravating 
 elements, however, soon transformed a minor quarrel into a major ' 
 crisis. One of these was the hatred of the British Ambassador at ' 
 the Porte, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, for Russia. The other ' 
 was the design of Napoleon III, who had already conceived a i 
 deep dislike for the Tsar, and who saw in the delicately balanced ! 
 Eastern Question an opportunity to make political capital both 1 
 at home and abroad. It was natural, therefore, that when Napo- 
 leon came forward as the champion of all the Roman Catholic 
 Christians in Syria and Palestine and was so recognized by the 
 Turkish Government, Nicholas at once insisted on the recognition : 
 of his position as protector of all Greek Christians. The Turkish 1 
 
 ^ W. Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801—1922, pp. 199 ff. 
 
 ^ The Greville Memoirs (8 vols., London, 1898), VII, 103. See Spencer Wal- 
 pole, The Life of Lord John Russell (2 vols., London, 1889), II, 176—177; Hon. i 
 E. Ashley, The Life of Henry John Temple, Viscount Palmerston (2 vols., London, j 
 1876), II, 6. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 323 
 
 Council, dominated by Lord Stratford, who acted throughout 
 the crisis quite independently of instructions from the Foreign 
 Office, refused the Russian demand. Mediatory efforts of Great 
 Britain, Austria and Prussia were unavailing. Secure in the con- 
 fidence that Britain and France would not permit a despoiling 
 of Ottoman territory, and not averse from a war with the tradi- 
 tional enemy, the Turks were gleeful when Russian forces crossed 
 the Pruth into their Danubian provinces in November, 1853. 
 
 Events marched rapidly on. Foiled by Turkish stamina in 
 their plan of reaching Constantinople quickly by land, the Russians 
 attacked and quickly destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope, thus 
 opening up a road by sea. The “ massacre ” of Sinope proved 
 to be a boomerang for Russia as Navarino had been for Great 
 Britain. The British Cabinet, already wavering, could no longer 
 remain neutral. A political couf by Lord Palmerston in Decem- 
 ber, 1853, committed the British Government to intervention.® 
 An alliance with France was concluded early in 1854, the 
 Crimean War was formally opened. Austria and Prussia, each 
 of whom apparently had as much, or more, cause to oppose Russia 
 by force of arms, remained neutral — an indication that the ori- 
 ental elements in the outbreak of the war were more potent than 
 the occidental. 
 
 The action of Great Britain in resorting to arms against Russia 
 was a surprise to both friends and enemies. The British case 
 was less obvious even than that of the French, but it was more 
 fundamental. This is suggested by the fact that Britain was will- 
 ing to make common cause with a Power commonly looked upon 
 as a dangerous rival, if not an enemy. Even suspicions of bad 
 faith on the part of this ally during the war * and the evacuation 
 of the Danubian principalities by Russian forces failed to lead 
 to a negotiated peace in March, 1855, when there appeared to be 
 no adequate reason for protracting hostilities. The explanation 
 lies in the fact that the theme pervading this whole unfortunate 
 struggle was Asiatic, not European. It mattered little to Great 
 Britain whether the war was conducted in the Balkan Peninsula 
 or on the shores of the Black Sea. The object was to relieve the 
 long-accumulating pressure on Turkey and to check the progress 
 of Russian arms towards the Persian Gulf and the frontiers of 
 
 ® B. K. Martin, “The Resignation of Lord Palmerston in 1853 . . in T/ie 
 Cambridge Historical Journal, I, 107-1 12 ; also his The Triumfh of Lord Palmerston 
 fNew York, 1924), pp. 166—183. 
 
 L. J. Jennings (Ed.), The Correspondence and Diaries of John Wilson Croker 
 (2 vols., London, 1884), I, 498-505; Stanley Lane-Poole (Ed.), Life of Stratford 
 Canning, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe ... (2 vols., London, 1888), II, 302, 
 308; The Greville Memoirs, VII, 139. 
 
324 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 India. It was the same general theme as had pervaded Near 
 Eastern politics, with few intermissions, from 1826 to 1841. The - 
 passage to the East must be safeguarded. This fundamental 
 feature of the war was not generally comprehended in England 
 at the time, but it was no less fundamental for all that. 
 
 That the underlying concern of Great Britain was to be found 
 in routes to the East is further indicated by the change in attitude j 
 toward both Russia and France at the close of the war. Russia, 
 having been checked in her conquests for the time being, was no 
 longer a source of great concern. The Persian key-fortress, Kars, ^ 
 which had been seized by the Russians in November, 1855, had 1 
 been restored, and Russia had given up her claims to the protection 
 of Greek Christians in Turkey. The Turkish Empire had been 
 strengthened by small additions of teritory at Russian expense, , 
 and further fortified by being admitted to the European family 
 of states by the Paris Congress. The Russian peril had at least 
 temporarily subsided.® 
 
 France, on the other hand, emerged from the war a strong 
 Mediterranean Power with a distinct appetite for intervention in 
 the East. Some of the British feeling of suspicion and hostility 
 lately directed at Russia therefore came to focus on the late ally, 
 whose motives and purposes none could fathom.® The Mediter- 
 ranean as a French lake with French influence entrenched on its 
 eastern shores was scarcely preferable to Russian arms in the Dan- 
 ubian principalities or south of the Caucasus. All due precau- 
 tions were taken, therefore, to safeguard British interests in the 
 Mediterranean as long as the French had large forces which might 
 be used for some ambitious project in the eastern Mediterranean.' 
 
 At the close of the Crimean War, Lord Clarendon, Foreign 
 Secretary, wrote to Lord Panmure, Secretary for War — 
 
 You cannot too soon, although in an unostentatious way, 
 put Malta in a complete state of defence, and Gibraltar too. 
 
 It will be easy as well as natural, to deposit at those places 
 the guns, so necessary for their defence, that you will be 
 bringing home from the Crimea.® 
 
 A little later, instructions couched in similar vein were sent 
 from the War Office to Admiral Codrington, who was assisting 
 
 ® T. E. Holland, The European Concert hi the Eastern Question (Oxford, 18S5), 
 pp. 245-246. 
 
 ® Lane-Poole, of. cit., II, 418—421, 433; The Greville Memoirs, VII, 229. 
 
 ^ Ashley, of. cit., II, 125. 
 
 ® Sir George Douglas and Sir George Ramsay (Eds.), The Panmure Papers 
 (2 vols., London, 1908), II, 167, 175, 194. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILV^AY 325 
 
 in the evacuation of forces from the Crimea. With these prepara- 
 tions going on in the Mediterranean, it was natural for the British 
 Government to display an active interest in any feasible plan for 
 riveting British domination on those parts of Asia which were ob- 
 jects of so much solicitude and which had already in indirect ways 
 caused the expenditure of so much blood and treasure. 
 
 During these years British troubles were not confined to the 
 situation in Turkey. Conditions in Persia, never very satisfactory, 
 had rapidly become critical with the revival of the Herat ques- 
 tion. In 1851 the Persian Government undertook to reassert 
 its claim of sovereignty over the little mountain state so strategi- 
 cally situated with reference to the frontiers of India. The Brit- 
 ish Government objected to this purpose, because — 
 
 ... So long as Herat remains under Afghan domina- 
 tion, Her Majesty’s Government can at its discretion ap- 
 point an Agent or Consul to reside in that city. But as soon 
 as it becomes recognized as an integral portion of the Per- 
 sian dominions, this power ceases, and is transferred to the 
 Persian Government, which would then enjoy unfettered 
 liberty for the diffusion of its name throughout Afghanistan 
 and other countries adjacent to Herat.® 
 
 The Persians insisted that they had no sinister designs on the 
 fortress state, but merely desired a recognition of Persia’s ancient 
 political rights.’® The British Government, however, believed 
 that a formal engagement regulating Persian rights of interven- 
 tion in the affairs of Herat might prevent future misunderstand- 
 ings, and after a series of negotiations extending for more than 
 a year a treaty was drawn up between Britain and Persia whereby 
 the latter was not to send troops into Herat unless that state was 
 attacked from without.” This action of Great Britain left a legacy 
 of dislike in Persia which brought complications shortly afterward. 
 
 After the breach of diplomatic relations between Great Britain 
 and Russia, the latter sent an envoy to the Persian Court to sug- 
 gest that the moment was opportune for a joint Russo-Persian at- 
 tack on Turkey. In case of successful operations, Persia was to 
 retain what she had taken or to give it back upon indemnification, 
 
 ® British and Foreign State Papers, XLV, 642 f.; Sir John Shell to Lord Palmer- 
 ston, 29 Dec., 1851. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 661—727. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 727-731, “Engagement of the Persian Government regarding 
 Herat,” 25 Jan., 1853. See C. U. Aitchison, Collection of Treaties, Engagements and 
 Sunnuds, VII, 71. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 326 
 
 and in any event the remainder of the Persian indemnity to Russia, 
 dating from the Treaty of Turkmanshah, was to be remitted. 
 After some hesitation, the Persian authorities found this prospect 
 too attractive to resist, especially since no counter proposition 
 could be expected from Great Britain as compensation for Persian 
 neutrality. In consequence of these developments, the British 
 minister to Persia suffered grave indignities, and toward the end 
 of 1855 he broke off diplomatic relations and left Teheran. 
 
 The failure of the British, who were preoccupied with the Rus- 
 sian war, immediately to follow up the Persian situation, gave rise 
 to the typically oriental conclusion that Great Britain had been 
 out-manoeuvred and had retired from the scene. The moment 
 seemed propitious for tearing up the humiliating treaty of 1853. 
 Hence, in the early months of 1856 a Persian army invaded the 
 territory of Herat and marched to attack the fortress-city. A 
 position so strong could not be taken readily, and it was only after 
 a siege of several months and the able services of a French en- 
 gineer that the place capitulated in October.^® 
 
 A position so commanding could not safely be left in posses- 
 sion of a state associated with Russia, and a British offensive was 
 mandatory. The first step was to arrange a treaty of alliance with 
 Dost Mohammed, Amir of Afghanistan, providing for a joint cam- 
 paign against Persia.^ This done, a declaration of war on Persia 
 was issued, and a plan of campaign mapped out w'hich might 
 accomplish its aim without proving too burdensome.^' From the 
 British bases in India, Persia was most vulnerable in her southern 
 seaports. A combined military and naval force, operating from 
 Kurrachee, first attacked and took the island of Karrack, covering 
 the landing of a military force near the important port of Bushire 
 This town having been captured, a swift campaign was made 
 into the interior, followed by an ascent of the Karun River by a 
 fleet of gunboats and transports. This continued as far as Ahwaz, 
 which was captured after a brief but interesting engagement.^® 
 Already the Persian Government had tired of the unprofitable 
 war and had sued for peace. The final terms of the treaty, drawn 
 up in Paris, were much more generous than the Persians had any 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XLVII, 94—281. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1857—1858, No. 70, p. 8. 
 
 Sir Percy Sykes, History of Persia, II, 349. This treaty was subsidiarj' to one 
 of perpetual peace and friendship negotiated by Sir John Lawrence in 1S55, not a 
 slight accomplishment in itself. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XLVII, 282 IT. 
 
 See Lieut. -Gen. Sir James Outram’s Persian Campaign in 1S57; . . . also, 
 selections from his correspondence as Conitnander-in-chief and Plenipotentiary . . . 
 (London, priv. pr., i860) ; George Dodd, The History of the Indian Revolt and of 
 the Expeditions to Persia, China and Japan (London, 1859). 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 327 
 
 reason to hope for/^ The Shah promised entirely to withdraw his 
 forces from Herat and to recognize the complete independence 
 of the Afghan state. Great Britain was to exercise the office of 
 mediator in case of any future trouble between the two countries. 
 Other than these agreements and a few apologies, the Persians 
 came off scot free, which led to better Anglo-Persian relations 
 for several years subsequently than had existed for a long time. 
 Not the least of the virtues of the treaty was its conclusion in time 
 for the return of British forces to India during the earliest stages 
 of the Mutiny. 
 
 The Russian alliance with Persia, the attack on Herat, and the 
 need of placing a British force quickly on Persian soil all con- 
 tributed materially to a study of ways and means of reducing 
 distances between England and India, and particularly to a con- 
 sideration of lines extending from the Mediterranean to the 
 Persian Gulf. Any such line would have a far greater political 
 value than that through Egypt. It would tend to neutralize 
 French influence in Egypt and in Syria, and would forestall Russia 
 in her design of reaching the Persian Gulf. These, besides its 
 numerous claims to prominence on grounds of economic pos- 
 sibilities and advantages as a route for mail and passenger trans- 
 portation, gave it an important, even if brief, place in the limelight. 
 
 The project of constructing a Euphrates Valley Railway grew 
 out of much the same kind of considerations as those which pro- 
 duced the original Euphrates Expedition. Although the failure of 
 the Euphrates Expedition and subsequent investigations of the 
 Euphrates River had stopped all plans for the use of this passage 
 while river steamers were the only means of establishing regular 
 transit, the steady improvement of the steam locomotive and the 
 success of various long lines of railway in other countries seemed to 
 warrant new consideration of a route which appeared to be so 
 well and in so many respects adapted by nature for a great high- 
 way. In fact, interest in this route had never entirely ceased since 
 the attempt to develop it as a water route to supplement or sup- 
 plant the Red Sea passage.^® Although the Euphrates Expedition 
 did not find the rivers of Mesopotamia suited for regular steam 
 communication and transportation, it did disclose the great com- 
 mercial possibilities of Mesopotamia and the level and unbroken 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., XLVII, 42. Lord Palmerston is quoted as saying, 
 “ The Persian Expedition was most successful, the victories gained by it very brilliant, 
 and the political results highly important.” — T/ie Panmure Papers, II, 470. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, 3d Sen, III, 77-82, “On the Practicability of Advancing 
 an Army from Europe into Asia by the Province of the Euphrates and Tigris,” by 
 Dr. J. W. Winchester. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 328 
 
 valley leading from the mountains of Syria to the head of the 
 Persian Gulf, Fertile minds had already caught visions of the 
 many advantages to be derived from an opening of this region by 
 steam railway instead of by steamer while political and financial 
 difficukies were yet too great to be overcome. 
 
 By the middle of the nineteenth century the vogue of railway 
 building was in full blast. The steam locomotive had caught the 
 popular fancy. Railways were then expected to inaugurate a new 
 era of communication, as much more rapd than the steamboat 
 as that had been superior to the canal barge and the stage coach. 
 At this time when considerable dikances were actually being 
 bridged by railway lines in England, on the continent of Europe, 
 and in India, the first tangible step was taken toward investigating 
 the possibility of building a great trunk line from the English 
 Channel or North Sea to Constantinople, from Scutari to Basrah, 
 and from the Persian Gulf to India. 
 
 The first ambitious but untimely project was brought forward 
 by an Anglo-Indian engineer, Rowland Macdonald Stephenson, 
 the Managing Director of the East Indian Railway Company."® 
 For years he had dreamed of constructing a “ World’s Highway ” 
 which might one day extend from western Europe to the shores 
 of eastern Asia. Fie first obtained the opinions of men who had 
 long represented the British Government in parts of Central Asia, 
 among them Sir John McNeill, Col. L. Hennell and Col. Justin 
 Shell, concerning the possibility of constructing a railway line 
 through Persia and Baluchistan, All reported as believing it pos- 
 sible, though they appeared doubtful of its practicability.^^ Next, 
 in 1 8 50, Stephenson made a kind of path-finding tour through 
 Europe. Armed with credentials and letters of introduction from 
 Lord Palmerston, he presented his project to the heads of the 
 governments of practically all of the European states through 
 which such a line as he proposed might run. Most of the replies 
 to his queries were favorable; some were skeptical; while the at- 
 titude of the French, who wished nothing to interfere with the 
 line between Calais and Marseilles, was decidedly hostile."® 
 Many objections appeared to the idea of attempting the con- 
 struction of a railway line through Europe under the auspices of 
 a single company. Already several of the European countries 
 
 Calcutta Revie>w, XXV, 1+5; Capt. William Allen, The Dead Sea, a New 
 Route to India (London, 1855). 
 
 Calcutta Review, XXV, 145, 151. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 15 1— 154. While Sir John McNeill showed little enthusiasm for 
 Stephenson’s plan, it is quite possible that this influenced him in supporting another 
 Euphrates Valley Railway project a few years later. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 1 71-173. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 329 
 
 were developing railway systems of their own which within a few 
 years promised to furnish a continuous passage from the English 
 Channel to the frontiers of European Turkey. But the outbreak 
 of the Crimean War, and the nature of the relations of France, 
 Turkey, and Russia with Great Britain, encouraged the projector 
 to revive his proposal in modified form. 
 
 On March 31, 1855, he wrote to Palmerston that he believed 
 the time ripe for a reconsideration of an international railway line, 
 since European lines were almost complete from the English 
 Channel to the Danube, and those in India were rapidly pushing 
 forward. The sections of a through railway not already pro- 
 vided for were those through the Turkish Empire. He con- 
 sidered the time very favorable for obtaining from the Sultan 
 a concession which would enable a private company to complete the 
 railways which would link up those of East and West. Such a 
 road, he believed, connecting the European lines with those of 
 India at Bombay by a route through European and Asiatic Tur- 
 key and Persia, would be of great value to all of the countries 
 traversed. It would, he was convinced, “ secure the means of 
 proceeding from London to and from all parts of India within a 
 period of one week, and at a cost of less than half what is now paid 
 for a 6 weeks’ or 4 months’ passage.” 
 
 Palmerston did not find it advisable to encourage this project, 
 partly because of the danger of further complicating the delicate 
 European situation and partly because of the fact that other plans 
 were in the making which promised equal advantages and in- 
 volving no such extensive political problems. This ancestral form 
 of the German Bagdadbahn idea was therefore suffered to pass 
 from the scene, although it had the support of the Government 
 of India, which, at Lord Dalhousie’s instance, had agreed to “ as- 
 sist in surveys and otherwise as far as authority and funds 
 permit.” 
 
 Other suggestions for developing an alternative route through 
 Mesopotamia meanwhile came both from individual and corporate 
 sources.^® A rather highly developed project was brought forward 
 in 1854 for developing the existing trade through Syria to Meso- 
 potamia, Persia, and India. The political and strategic value of 
 
 Edward Davidson, The Railways of India, ‘with an Account of their Rise, 
 Progress and Construction . . . (London, 1868), pp. 144-153. 
 
 Calcutta Reviems, XXV, 173—174. 
 
 Ibid., p. 175 — Letter from the Government of India to R. M. Stephenson, 
 30 Jan., 1856. 
 
 Lane-Poole (Ed.), Life of Chesney, pp. 383, 412, 424. Chesney claimed to 
 be the first to propose a Euphrates Valley railway as he had claimed to be the pioneer 
 in proposing other means of developing both this and the Suez route earlier. 
 
330 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 such a line was urged in an application to the Foreign Office for 
 pecuniary support and diplomatic assistances^ None of these 
 schemes was given countenance by the Foreign Office. 
 
 Plans for a railway through Mesopotamia were not confined to 
 the English world, however. A French company made overtures 
 to the Ottoman Government about the time of the outbreak of 
 the Crimean War, soliciting a concession and certain guarantees 
 for a Mesopotamian railway to be built under French auspices. 
 Because of the rivalry which had already developed between 
 France and Britain over the Suez Canal, this project made little 
 headway toward securing a firman authorizing the road.^® But the 
 concentrating of attention in the Near East in connection with the 
 advance of Russia and the Crimean War, coupled with the several 
 plans and suggestions for a railroad between the Mediterranean 
 and the Persian Gulf, could hardly fail to appeal to both states- 
 men and influential promoters for securing favorable terms from 
 the Turks. 
 
 It secures once and for ever the independence of the Sul- 
 tan [said the Calcutta Revievi\. No power will endure to 
 see the charge of the Highway of the world pass into the 
 hands of any but a second-rate potentate. That Russia will 
 resist we cannot hesitate to believe. . . It is therefore 
 doubly necessary to seize a time when her resistance will 
 avail nothing, will be rather a sound and valid reason for 
 proceeding rapidly with the undertaking. . . When the first 
 locomotive from Calcutta reaches Calais, the freedom of 
 Europe from the Cossacks will have been secured.'® 
 
 By the time these considerations, together with the forward state 
 of Suez Canal plans, had led the British Government to smile upon 
 any such undertaking as a railway through Asiatic Turkey, a new 
 proposition was ready at hand fully adapted to the needs of the 
 situation. 
 
 At the close of the Crimean War, a railway authority of some 
 repute, Mr. (later Sir) William Patrick Andrew, Chairman of 
 the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi Railways, came forward to ad- 
 vocate a “ direct route ” between the Mediterranean and the 
 Persian Gulf. His primary object in promoting the scheme was 
 to bring about the construction of a line which might eventually 
 be linked up with the railway system he was constructing in India, 
 thus providing an all-rail communication between all parts of 
 
 Life of Chesney, p. 423. -® Calcutta Reviev.', XXV, 160— 161. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 424-425. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 331 
 
 India and Europe/® The schemes which had previously been sug- 
 gested by Col. Chesney, Dr. James B. Thompson, R. M. Stephen- 
 son,®^ and others all served to convince Andrew of the practicabil- 
 ity of building a direct line through the Euphrates Valley, and 
 being a business man and promoter rather than a diplomat or an 
 engineer, he proceeded to approach a number of interested per- 
 sons with a scheme for a railway company to carry out the project. 
 
 The move took shape with the formation early in 1856 of an 
 Association for the Promotion of the Euphrates Valley, which 
 soon issued a prospectus for a Euphrates Valley Railway.®® The 
 plan as worked out by the Association proposed — 
 
 . . . To connect the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf 
 by a railway from the ancient port of Seleucia by Antioch 
 and Aleppo, to Ja’ber Castle on the Euphrates, of 80 miles 
 in length, and afterwards from thence to Hit, and other 
 towns, to Bagdad, and on to Kurnah, at the confluence of 
 the Euphrates and Tigris, or Bussorah, at the head of the 
 Persian Gulf. Thence by steamers, communication will be 
 established with all parts of India. . . 
 
 It is only proposed at present to execute the first section, 
 about 80 miles of rail road, from the ancient port of Seleucia 
 to Ja’ber Castle . . . below which point, the navigation of 
 the river is permanently open for steamers of light draught 
 and the boats of the country for 715 miles to Bussorah. . .®® 
 
 On the pamphlets and prospectuses issued by the new Associa- 
 tion, the advantages of the proposed road were made to appear 
 very considerable. It was maintained that this “ short cut,” 
 which when completed to the Persian Gulf would comprise some 
 900 miles of railway, would shorten the passage to India by nearly 
 1000 miles, greatly reducing the time for Anglo-Indian com- 
 munications.®® It was also planned to link up this road, by means 
 
 William P. Andrew, London to Lahore, or the Eufhrates, Scinde and Punjaub 
 Railway (London, 1857). 
 
 W. P. Andrew, The Scinde Railway in its Relations to the Eufhrates Valley 
 and Other Routes to India (London, 1856), p. 200. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1871, No. 386, p. 57; ibid., 1872, No. 322, p. 84; Andrew, 
 Memoir on the Eufhrates Valley Route to India (London, 1857), P- i 75 - 
 
 Andrew, The Scinde Railway in its Relations to the Eufhrates Valley and 
 Other Routes to India, pp. 200—201. 
 
 Ibid., p. 202; London Times, 6 June, 1856. The term “short cut” as 
 applied to this route appears to have been used first by the Times. 
 
 Two Travellers, The Eufhrates Valley Routes to India: An Examination of 
 the Memoir Published by Mr. W. P. Andrew (2d ed., London, 1857), P- i9- It is 
 here shown that the distance saved by this route would not amount to 1000 miles, 
 while the time gained would be but 3 or 4 days instead of 10. This pamphlet was 
 
332 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 of a supplementary railway, with a European trunk line, once 
 such an artery had been completed to Constantinople.®® The Com- 
 pany proposed, moreover, to develop the internal resources of 
 Mesopotamia by reclaiming lands and by furnishing marketing 
 facilities for such surplus products as might be raised by the Arabs. 
 The strategic value of such a road was not overlooked. It was 
 particularly recommended as a logical line for the sending of 
 troops to India, the time of passage from England to Kurrachee 
 being estimated at only 14 days when the road was complete. 
 Since the Euphrates Valley was very level, the cost of building 
 a railroad was estimated at the relatively low sum of £5000 to 
 £6000 per mile.®^ The total cost was placed at £16,000,000. 
 
 The principal concern of the promoters was to enlist the con- 
 fidence and support of the British Government, and nothing was 
 left undone to show what definite political advantages would be 
 derived from the construction of such a line. Russia was still 
 looked upon by many as a dangerous rival in the East as well after 
 the Peace of Paris as before. Her defeat had scarcely been de- 
 cisive, and the change in Anglo-French relations at the close of 
 the war further counteracted the moral effects of the Crimean | 
 campaign. It Was in this connection that the Euphrates Valley j 
 Association scored most heavily. It was shown that Russia, in ex- | 
 tending her conquests southward to the point of endangering j 
 British interests, must follow one of four fairly well defined ] 
 routes: ( i ) the line from Kars to the Euphrates Valley and Meso- ! 
 potamiaj (2) that from Erivan by way of Lake Van to Mosul and ! 
 thence to Bagdad j (3) that from Tabriz to Shuster ^ or (4) the ; 
 road leading from Teheran by Ispahan to Shuster and thence to , 
 the Persian Gulf.®® All of these lines were intersected by the line 
 of the Euphrates, “ which, running in an oblique direction from 
 the head of the Gulf north of Antioch to the Persian Gulf, passes 
 along the diagonal of a great quadrilateral, which has its two 
 western corners on the Mediterranean, its two eastern on the 
 Caspian and Persian Seas, and so takes all Russian lines of advance 
 in the flank.” ®® 
 
 These arguments, coupled with the advocacy of the line by 
 
 published, apparently, in the interests of the Suez Canal, and was a bitter arraign- 
 ment of the Euphrates Valley project from beginning to end. See Andrew, The 
 Scinde Ratlnuay, p. 36. 
 
 Andrew, The Scinde RaiTMay . . . pp. 203, 204; .\ndrew. Memoir on the 
 Eufhrates Valley Route to India, p. 12 n.; London Times, 20 May, 1856. A 
 Channel tunnel between Dover and Calais was suggested for further reduction of 
 time, as it already had been on other occasions. 
 
 Lane-Poole, Life of Chesney, pp. 428-429; London Times, 11 July, 1S57. 
 
 Andrew, Our Scientific Frontier (London, 1880), pp. 98-99. 
 
 Ibid., p. 99. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 333 
 
 Indian authorities, carried great weight with the Government, 
 chiefly because of the possibility of scotching the territorial ag- 
 grandizement of Russia and of providing a worthy diversion to 
 the Suez Canal project. Lord Clarendon expressed himself as 
 entirely in favor of the proposition and pledged the support of the 
 Government. Queen Victoria also expressed approval of the 
 plan. Lord Palmerston carefully refrained from committing 
 himself on the matter, although he allowed it to be understood 
 that he greatly favored the idea of developing the direct route 
 in preference to that through Egypt. Palmerston’s real attitude 
 at this time is indicated by the fact that the Foreign Office under- 
 took to give diplomatic support at Constantinople for the securing 
 of a concession from the Turkish Government. To this end. Sir 
 Henry Bulwer was sent out to Constantinople on special mission, 
 when all plans were ready, to assist Lord Stratford de Redcliffe 
 in guiding the project through the devious channels of Turkish 
 politics, made more than usually devious at this time by the at- 
 tractions being offered by rival French projects. The proposition 
 was taken up with Musurus Pasha, the Turkish minister in Eng- 
 land, in March. After some consideration, Musurus strongly 
 approved the railway idea, and undertook to exert his influence on 
 his Government. His recommendation carried considerable 
 weight with the Grand Vizier, Aali Pasha, who expressed himself 
 as favorably disposed toward the project before a formal request 
 had been made for a concession from the Porte. 
 
 At this point the railway project became associated with a plan 
 for the construction of a line of electric telegraph through Euro- 
 pean Turkey to the confines of India along the line of the rail- 
 way. Such a plan was presented to the Foreign Office for ap- 
 proval in June, 1856, and within a few weeks was given hearty 
 approval for much the same reasons as applied to the railway 
 plan.^® The European and Indian Junction Telegraph Company, 
 which numbered among its projectors several who were also con- 
 nected with the railway, found its interests largely bound up with 
 that enterprise.^* Although the telegraph did not have the same 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., pp. 425-427; Two Travellers, of. cit., p. 196. 
 
 Andrew, Memoir on the Eufhrates Valley Route to India, pp. 192, 193. 
 
 London Times, 4 Sept., 20 Nov., 1856. 
 
 Ihid., 16 June, 1856; Andrew, Memoir on the Eufhrates Valley Route to 
 India, pp. 176, 229-249. 
 
 Andrew, A Letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Political Advantages of the 
 Eufhrates Valley Raihuay, and the Necessity of the Financial Suffort of Her 
 Majesty's Government (London, 1857), pp. 56-58, “Report of the Evidence in the 
 Committee of the House of Commons on the European and Indian Junction Tele- 
 graph Co.”; Telegrafhic Communication with India, Refrinted from “ The Times ” 
 and ^‘Morning Chronicle" (London, 1858), p. 9. Kurrachee about this time ex- 
 
334 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 political value as the proposed railway, its fate hinged on the out- 
 come of the negotiations of the Euphrates Valley Railway Com- , 
 pany in London and at the Porte. 
 
 In August, 1856, the promoters of the railway received a hint 
 from the Foreign Office that the necessary political support for 
 the line might be expedited by some evidence of a scientific nature 
 showing that the section proposed to be built first would be en- 
 tirely feasible. In consequence of this suggestion, the Chairman 
 of the Company, W. P. Andrew, immediately despatched two of 
 his associates, Maj.-Gen. F. R. Chesney and John McNeill, to 
 the Levant with the double purpose of carrying out some pre- 
 liminary surveys and of assisting with the diplomatic negotiations 
 at Constantinople.^® Chesney, who had been made Consulting 
 Engineer of the new Company because of his prominent connec- 
 tion with the Euphrates route, was supplied with instructions from ' 
 Andrew and papers from the Foreign Office giving him full 
 powers in aiding Lord Stratford and Sir Henry Bulwer in securing 
 a concession for the road.^® While Chesney stopped at Con- 
 stantinople, McNeill, accompanied by a corps of surveyors, pro- 
 ceeded to the coast of Syria and occupied himself in inspecting 
 the harbor of Seleucia (Suedia) and the adjacent coast, which 
 had tentatively been selected as the western terminus of the line. 
 Chesney joined him here later, and surveys were made of the 
 Beilan Pass through the Amanus Mountains and of the proposed 
 line as far as Aleppo. Although some formidable grades were 
 found in the mountains, both engineers concluded that they of- 
 fered no insuperable obstacle to a steam line. The harbor of 
 Seleucia was found to be easily capable of improvement as a com- 
 mercial or military port, and although not so commodious as that 
 of Alexandretta, it was adjudged more desirable from the point 
 of view of railway engineering.^^ 
 
 The railway and telegraph lines had meanwffiile been debated 
 at length in the Turkish Council. The early w^illingness of the 
 Sultan’s advisers to grant concessions for these enterprises was 
 gravely modified by the arguments brought forward by a poWer- 
 
 perienced a real “ boom,” because of its relation to the projected lines of com- | 
 munication and the northwest frontier, and aspired to replace Bombay as the principal | 
 port of western India. Although this ambition was not realized, much of the 1 
 development was of permanent character. — See W. P. Andrew, The Port of I 
 Kurrachee . . . (London, 1857) ; A. F. Baillie, Kiirrachee {Karachi) : Past, Present, 1 
 and Future (London, 1890). 
 
 London Times, 4 Sept., 1856. i 
 
 Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, pp. 200—228. 
 
 Lane-Poole, op. cit., pp. 429—453; London Times, 9 Sept., 1856. 
 
I THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 335 
 
 |ful French group for a rival railway project. The English con- 
 'cern demanded as the basis of their concession, first, a guarantee 
 on the part of the Turkish Government of a minimum dividend 
 of 6% per annum for 99 years on the first section of the road from 
 the Mediterranean to the Euphrates, with power to raise capital 
 for steamers, etc., at a rate to be determined later 5 second, a lease 
 for 99 years, free of charge, of all necessary land for the rail- 
 way and works j and third, a guarantee against all competition 
 from works of a similar nature, and the grant of lands, woods, 
 and forests, the property of the Turkish State, at a certain dis- 
 tance on either side of the iine.^® The French syndicate, on the 
 other hand, required no such guarantees 5 and since they were 
 strongly supported by influential persons in Paris, understood to 
 be the Emperor and members of his family, the Turkish Minis- 
 ters hesitated to accept the more formidable English project, in 
 ; spite of the pressure exerted by Redcliffe backed by the Foreign 
 Office.'*® Moreover, the agent of the French project was the ac- 
 complished English traveller and diplomat, A. H. Layard, who 
 from long and intimate acquaintance was -persona grata to some 
 of the Turkish Ministers. Layard had long taken an interest in 
 ithe Euphrates route, having taken an active part in the com- 
 pletion of the surveys of the rivers of Mesopotamia and Persia 
 in 1840 and 1841.®“ His activities on behalf of the French 
 [at a time when Anglo-French relations were rather strained are 
 at least partly to be explained by his personal hostility to Lord 
 Palmerston, and his strong disapproval of Palmerston’s entire 
 foreign policy. 
 
 j During the progress of negotiations at the Porte, when it be- 
 igan to appear that British influence would win the duel, the French 
 j agents proposed an amalgamation of British and French enter- 
 prises, thus making the road essentially an international under- 
 taking and maintaining a united Anglo-French front against Rus- 
 sia.®* This interesting proposal savored strongly of the arguments 
 which had been used to enlist British support in behalf of the Suez 
 (Canal, and it was not long considered by the English interests. 
 The feeling was strong since the close of the Crimean War that 
 the French might prove to be as great a menace in the East as the 
 Russians lately had been. Such complications greatly protracted 
 
 Two Travellers, of. cit., p. 17; London Times, 2 Dec., 1856, 10 Jan., ii 
 Feb., 1857. 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 440; Morning Herald, 30 March, 4, ii, 18 April, 
 
 1857. 
 
 A. H. Layard, Autohiografhy and Letters (2 vols., London, 1903), I, 
 328-331. 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., pp. 440-441. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 336 
 
 negotiations, however, and it was only on January 5, 1857, after 
 the Turks had been reminded that they had most to expect in the : 
 way of future support from Great Britain, that a successful out- 
 come was assured/^ 
 
 The firman granted to the Euphrates Valley projectors was ; 
 based on that prepared for Chesney’s Euphrates Expedition in ; 
 1834. It conceded all of the points asked for by the Company, 
 and once the matter was definitely settled, the Turkish Govern- • 
 ment displayed considerable enthusiasm for the new road. A 
 concession for the proposed telegraph line was authorized about 
 the same time. The Calcutta Review was jubilant over the pros- 
 pects for a new “ overland route.” 1 
 
 i 
 
 Verily, we live in stirring and marvellous times [it said]. I 
 When, ere many years are over, we are borne along the 
 Euphrates-Valley Railway to England in 20 days, or along 
 the “World^s highway” in 10, while our thoughts are 
 flashed along the telegraph wires in so many minutes, we 
 shall begin to feel ourselves so close at home that we shall 
 cease to consider our separation from our mother country as 
 “ an honourable exile.” 
 
 The final report of the surveying commission in charge of Sir i 
 John McNeill indicated more favorable conditions for the con- ; 
 struction of the first section of 1 50 miles of railway than had been i 
 anticipated at first. Few deep cuts or embankments appeared to 1 
 be necessary, and the steepest mountain grade in prospect was 1 
 much less formidable than many found in European lines, i 
 The principal difficulty lay in the frequency with which the River I 
 Orontes would have to be crossed and the number of bridges thus i 
 made necessary. On the whole, however, construction prospects j 
 were surprisingly good. Native labor appeared to be available 
 in abundance. Most of the seven divisions of this first section ■ 
 of the line presented so few engineering problems that the 1 
 average cost per mile came to be estimated at £8,858, a figure well 
 below the original allowance of £10,000.®® 
 
 The Euphrates Valley Railway Company had meanwhile com- 
 pleted its organization. Although the whole scheme rested on 
 the assumption of the correctness of Chesney’s reports in 1837 i 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. at., pp. 441, 442. London Times, 10 Jan., 22 Jan., ii July, 
 
 1857. 
 
 Andrew, Memoir on the Eufhrates Valley Route to India, p. 13. 
 
 Calcutta Review, LV, 46. See, “A Traveller,” The Eufhrates Valley Route 
 to India, quoted in Andrew, Memoir on the Eufhrates Valley Route to India, p. 4. 
 
 Andrew, Letter to Viscount Pabnerston . . . pp. 35—45. 
 
General Francis R. Chesney Bust of Thomas Waghorn at Suez 
 

 
 ',1 • 
 
 
 Jfifr : 
 
 • -’n'.'-'r'' ,'.,S ' ■ "■ ' ■ V'*-' 
 
 '■i. 
 
 ^ >■' 
 
 , ■■ ■ . ' 'i ‘ .*' 
 
 r • > ,-<. ." .-• 
 
 . V' ' '-'v^ 
 
 
 
 ^ t 
 
 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 337 
 
 as to the navigability of the lower Euphrates, which reports had 
 been shown incorrect by later surveys,®® there was little hesitation 
 on the part of the public to support the venture. The Company’s 
 shares were considerably oversubscribed within a few days after 
 the books were opened, and enough capital was then in sight to 
 carry on the work at once.®^ 
 
 After the close of the Crimean War, however, the state of 
 Turkish finances was so low, that notwithstanding the favorable 
 terms of the Turkish firman, the Company considered it wise, as a 
 practical business precaution, to secure the definite support of the 
 British Government in the form of a guarantee of a minimum 
 rate of interest on the capital to be invested. Already some ques- 
 tion had been raised by the critics of the enterprise as to the stability 
 of any project sponsored by the Turkish Government not backed 
 by tangible assets of some nature. 
 
 But who guarantees the guarantee? [asked some of the 
 doubters] . . . The financial difficulties of the Turkish 
 Government are notorious. . . The schemes which are 
 really beneficial to Turkey are projects commercially sound; 
 projects whose advantages are so apparent to capitalists that 
 the money required is forthcoming without a guarantee.®® 
 
 When we have thrown away £10,000,000 or £20,000,000 
 b on wild goose adventures [said the Times^, people may 
 benefit by the experience purchased on terms so extravagant. 
 To catch the public ear something vague and vast must be 
 I poured into it — something promising all, most probably 
 ending in nothing.®® 
 
 The logic of these objections led the Company to stipulate in- 
 formally that, in case the Turkish Government granted the con- 
 cession demanded, guaranteeing a 6% return on the first branch 
 of the line, the British Government would underwrite the agree- 
 ment to the extent of guaranteeing a minimum rate of interest 
 (4%) on the capital invested in the first section of the line. The 
 Foreign Office permitted it to be understood that this arrange- 
 ment would undoubtedly be approved by Parliament. ' 
 
 Sir James Outram, for example, ascended the Euphrates early in May, 1857, 
 
 , in a little steamer, the Planet, drawing only 3 feet 8 inches of water. He reported 
 that he found Chesney’s charts correct for some distance, but further on they were 
 “sadly wrong.” — London Times, 6 June, 1857. 
 
 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1658; London Times, 
 17 Feb., 1857. 
 
 Two Travellers, of. cit., p. 32. 
 
 London Times, 2 Dec., 1856. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 338 
 
 So sanguine were the expectations of the Company’s directors 
 of receiving Parliamentary support, that with the securing of the 
 Turkish concession they believed all doubt concerning the con- 
 struction of the road to be at an end. Soon after the arrival in 
 London of reports of the favorable action of the Porte on the rail- 
 way project, plans were put into execution for the road. Prepara- 
 tions were made looking toward the construction of harbor works 
 at Seleucia by the Turkish Government, stores and supplies were 
 sent out for the commencement of the railway itself, and con- 
 tracts were let for the building of special shallow-draft, flat- 
 bottomed boats to be used on the Euphrates. 
 
 Lord Palmerston was very deliberate with regard to Gov- 
 ernment action toward guaranteeing a minimum rate of interest 
 on the capital to be invested in the railway enterprise. As the 
 weeks slipped by and no move was made toward carrying out that 
 feature of the original plan, fear began to arise that he was pur- 
 posely temporizing and that his enthusiasm for the work had to 
 some degree cooled. 
 
 In order to eflFect decisive action as soon as possible, an im- 
 posing delegation of friends of the Euphrates Valley project, 
 consisting of 96 notables, mainly members of Parliament and 
 conspicuous diplomatic and military men, waited on the Prime 
 Minister on June 22. The deputation was headed by Lord 
 Shaftesbury, who introduced the subject by calling attention to 
 some of the obvious advantages of the alternative route and of the 
 railway in particular. William Andrew followed with a rather 
 extended review of both the political and commercial aspects of 
 the project, and summed up the findings of the engineering staff 
 during the recent surveys. Other members of the group dwelt 
 on various important features of the line, showing particularly 
 how communication would be facilitated thereby. 
 
 In reply. Lord Palmerston assured the deputation that the 
 Government were fully alive to the importance of the Euphrates 
 route 5 that they had supported and would continue to support it. 
 But he added that he could not at the moment give an opinion 
 as to the guarantee on the capital invested. He would have to 
 consult his colleagues on this matter. So he requested Mr. An- 
 drew to put the proposition in writing, that it might receive a 
 
 The slowness with which the British Government took active measures for the 
 sending of reenforcements to India caused a good deal of exasperation. The Times, 
 in the City Article of lo August, said, “ Many people are wondering whether some 
 Russian agency has been at work in India. A more practical question would be 
 whether it is at work in England. . . There is hardly a subject on which the people 
 of England are at this moment more alive then that of the Euphrates route to the 
 Persian Gulf. . .” Cf. The Express, 3 Oct., 1857. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 339 
 
 proper amount of consideration, and he concluded by saying that 
 the Government would be happy to aid the railway if it was in their 
 power.®^ 
 
 The brief war with Persia early in 1857, announcement 
 
 of the outbreak of the great Indian Mutiny in May, gave point 
 to the whole matter and aroused a great deal of public interest. 
 
 ' The Persian campaign, which was as successful as it was brief,®^ 
 ; fortunately ended in time for the transfer of British troops to the 
 scenes of hostilities in India. Even before the news of the In- 
 ' dian Revolt had reached England, the unrest in India and dif- 
 ficulties in China had led to the sending out, in March, of four 
 regiments destined for Hong Kong, and the next month four more 
 regiments were despatched to India, all going by way of the Cape 
 of Good Hope.®® Meanwhile, more alarming reports pouring in 
 from the Indian Presidencies focused attention on the need 
 both for a quicker means of communication and for a more direct 
 route by which troops and supplies could be sent out. 
 
 It was while the oriental situation was at its worst that the mat- 
 ter of guaranteeing a small rate of interest to the stockholders of 
 the Euphrates Valley Railway Company finally came up in Par- 
 liament. The proposed measure appeared to have every chance 
 of success. The public had undoubtedly been enlisted in favor 
 of the railway scheme. Those of the Government who feared 
 
 i that the Turkish Government would fail to make good its guaran- 
 tee of a 6% return on the capital invested, leaving the financial 
 burden on the British Government, were shown that it was alto- 
 i gether probable that, in case the revenues of the railway did not 
 ! bring in a sufficient return, the Turkish Government would un- 
 I doubtedly furnish a part of the guaranteed 6% interest, and the 
 ; British Government would be required to pay only that portion 
 of a minimum rate of 4% which might be wanting above the profits 
 of the railway and the funds supplied by the Turks. This made 
 the necessity of the expenditure of any money in support of the 
 venture by the British Government appear to be a very remote 
 possibility, indeed.®^ 
 
 On the night of August 14, 1857, Mr. Sothern Estcourt, a 
 member of the House who had been interested in the original 
 Euphrates Expedition, introduced the question of a guarantee of 
 
 The Times and Morning Herald, 23 June, 1857; Andrew, Letter to Viscount 
 Palmerston . . . pp. 1-5. 
 
 See the Treaty of 4 March, 1857, in Brit, and For. St. Paf., XLVII, 42-43. 
 See also The History of the Indian Mutiny, p. 224. 
 
 The Panmure Pafers, II, 361-379. 
 
 Andrew, Letter to Viscount Palmerston, pp. 20-21, 23-24, -passim. 
 
340 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 a minimum rate of interest in the House of Commons.®® In 
 speaking on the subject, Estcourt pointed out that the Euphrates 
 route was essential, not as a rival route to that through Egypt, 
 but as a supplementary or alternative route. Many of the ad- 
 vantages which had been urged in favor of the Euphrates line on 
 other occasions were reviewed. He told the House he believed 
 that “ on the whole surface of the globe they would not find so 
 many miles as favorable for engineering purposes ” as along 
 the Euphrates route.®® The line, it was shown, would correlate 
 well with existing railways in India, although, for the present, 
 the Euphrates railway would extend only to the Euphrates, and 
 from thence the communication would be carried on in iron river 
 steamers and in ocean packets, thus completing the connection 
 between the Mediterranean and the ports of Kurrachee and Bom- 
 bay. The whole project having been presented at considerable 
 length, Estcourt asked for a guarantee for the road covering a 
 little more than the period of construction.®' 
 
 Objections to the proposition were voiced by Mr. Crawford 
 and Mr. Gladstone. Crawford considered the railway a “ very 
 chimerical scheme ” on a number of grounds, and proposed a 
 telegraph line instead, which, he thought, would have most of 
 the political advantages of the railway and would avoid the ob- 
 jections inherent in the railway plan.®® Gladstone strongly ob- 
 jected to the idea of giving a guarantee j he “ viewed a guarantee 
 almost with horror.” He thought an outright cash subsidy much 
 preferable. He supposed the Government would lose popularity 
 by rejecting such a “ philanthropic proposal,” but he thought it 
 best not to give other countries a basis “ for alleging that we are 
 setting an example of interference with their government and 
 domestic affairs.” He was inclined to see in such a proposition 
 a means of breaking up the European concert, and he thought the 
 Suez Canal a much better proposition because of its international 
 character. The Euphrates Valley Railway as a private commercial 
 venture he was prepared to support j but it had been advocated 
 primarily as a political project, and was objectionable for that 
 •reason. 
 
 Others debated the qualities of the Euphrates scheme fro and 
 cony agreeing in general that the railway should not be made a 
 
 Estcourt had previously made several attempts to bring- up the subject, but 
 had apparently received intimations that the time -^vas not ripe. See Hansard's Pari. 
 Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1226, 1652. 
 
 66 Ibid., p. 1652. 
 
 6^^ Ibid., pp. 1652-1662; The Times, 15 Aug., 1857. 
 
 66 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1662—1664. 
 
 6® Ibid., pp. 1664-1672. 
 
THE EUPHRATES VALLEY RAILWAY 341 
 
 “ stalking horse to cover up national animosities.” The general 
 tenor of the debate did not appear to favor the railway scheme. 
 Still, the friends of the line did not despair, for Lord Palmerston 
 had but a few days before indicated his entire approval of the 
 plan.^^ When Palmerston rose to speak, however, he immediately 
 crushed the whole project by indicating that Government support 
 would not be given. “ However glad we should be to see that 
 project completed,” he said, “ we cannot hold out the slightest 
 encouragement that we are disposed, either directly or indirectly, 
 to advance any money for the attainment of that end.” He was 
 prepared to promise Government support for a telegraph line to 
 be carried down the Red Sea or through the Euphrates Valley to 
 India, but he was convinced of the “ inexpediency of Govern- 
 ment’s meddling with such enterprises ... to be carried out in a 
 foreign state and the political messes which would result from 
 such a connection.” He maintained that the railway was un- 
 necessary in any case, since the Suez route and telegraphic lines 
 would provide for sufficient communication facilities, while there 
 was a more direct railway route still, through European Turkey, 
 Asia Minor, and Baluchistan.^^ 
 
 This crushing defeat gave the death blow to the Euphrates 
 Valley Railway scheme for the time being, though it did not put 
 an end to public, and even to Government, consideration of the 
 use which might be made of the Euphrates route in times of 
 emergency for the transport of troops. The sudden reversal of at- 
 titude on the part of Lord Palmerston toward a scheme of 
 transportation he was known lately to favor produced no little 
 perplexity and bitterness among those who had relied completely 
 on his support, and even the general public were at a loss to account 
 for the turning down of the project at such a critical time. 
 
 It subsequently developed that Palmerston’s sudden change of 
 mind had been at least partly due to a conference with the Em- 
 peror Napoleon III, who was then in England ostensibly to pay 
 a visit to the King and Queen, on the very morning of August 14.^® 
 Being summoned by telegraph to Osborne, where the Emperor 
 was visiting, Palmerston had a long and secret interview after 
 which he returned to London “ a changed if not a wiser man.” 
 
 In consequence of this interview, Palmerston felt compelled to 
 
 Ibid,., p. 1675. 
 
 Quarterly Review, CII, 392 f. ; Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 445. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1677. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 1676, 1677. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 1677-1683. 
 
 London Times, 8, 10, 11 Aug., 1857. 
 
 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 446; The Times (City Article), 4 May, 1858. 
 
342 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 give up the railway project, because of the attitude he had taken 
 toward the Suez Canal enterprise/^ As a means of preserving the 
 nominal alliance between the two countries, Palmerston undoubt- 
 edly considered it wiser to abandon the railway than to accept the 
 canal, for the alliance obviously would not weather a policy of 
 British aggression on both points. Moreover, it is altogether likely 
 that the need of securing French consent for the use of the over- 
 land route for the despatch of troops to India at this critical stage 
 of the Indian Mutiny was a prominent factor in the abandon- 
 ment of the rail plan.^® In this manner the Emperor obtained 
 a measure of satisfaction for the diplomatic defeat suffered by 
 his agents at Constantinople early in the year when the French 
 railway scheme had been turned down,'® and De Lesseps was to 
 this extent avenged. 
 
 Here the Euphrates Valley project rested for the time being. 
 In view of the many political obstacles to be encountered, the road 
 could not safely be constructed through Turkish territory with- 
 out the active support of the British Government, even had plenty 
 of capital been available. Without some guarantee on the part 
 of the British, the Turkish concession and the guarantee of 6% 
 return on the investment would have lasted only so long as British 
 diplomacy maintained an unquestioned supremacy at the Porte. 
 Not even the armed intervention of France in Syria in i860 re- 
 vived the project. The Euphrates Valley Railway therefore 
 passed into the limbo of abandoned hopes until new issues brought 
 about its revival under a different ministry nearly fifteen years 
 later. It is worthy of note, however, that with the passing of the 
 English project nothing further was heard of the French scheme 
 which was to have demanded no guarantees of any kind. 
 
 Percy Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, I, 97—98. 
 
 Palmerston seems to have been more than a little anxious lest “ France and 
 Russia unite to carry into effect some great scheme of mutual ambition.” This 
 gave point to his care not to cause particular offense to the Emperor Napoleon. — 
 Ashley, Life of Palmerston, II, 127—128. 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 446; Quarterly Reviezv, CXX, 354—397. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 
 
 D E LESSEES’ return to Egypt in November, 1856, was 
 only just in time to prevent the despairing abandon- 
 ment of the whole canal project by the Viceroy, who was 
 met at every turn by intrigues, fostered if not designed by Eng- 
 lish and Turkish agencies, and intended to render his policy in- 
 tolerable/ In order to clear the atmosphere, De Lesseps encour- 
 aged a military expedition into the desert. During the three 
 months occupied by this manoeuvre, two noteworthy steps were 
 taken. In order that the Viceroy might have the encouragement 
 derived from tangible accomplishment, De Lesseps directed the 
 surveying of the Fresh Water Canal, which was to supply the 
 forces of construction on the ship canal and at the same time serve 
 as a source of irrigation for the reclamation of the arid but fertile 
 lands along the course of the proposed waterway.^ The second 
 step was of a very different nature. De Lesseps determined on 
 the bold course of appealing directly from the English Govern- 
 ment to the English people for approval and support. He utilized 
 such leisure as his desert trip afforded, therefore, for outlining a 
 lecture tour in England which would enable him to present his 
 case in person and carry out an advertising campaign of a rather 
 novel sort.® 
 
 In April, 1857, set out for England, armed with maps and 
 plans, descriptive literature, and a number of letters of intro- 
 duction to persons of importance in the mercantile as well as in 
 the political world. The itinerary and details of the series of 
 English meetings were arranged largely by Mr. (later Sir) Daniel 
 A. Lange, an old acquaintance of De Lesseps, and the head of a 
 large mercantile house having extensive interests in India and the 
 Far East.^ The route determined upon included most of the 
 
 ^ Percy Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, I, 78—79. 
 
 ^ F. de Lesseps, The Suez Canal, p. 306. 
 
 ® Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 80—82. 
 
 * John Spencer Price, The Early History of the Suez Canal (Rev. ed., London, 
 
 343 
 
344 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 larger commercial centres in the kingdom. The municipal au- 1 
 thorities were enlisted whenever possible and mass meetings were , 
 held in public buildings at which De Lesseps spoke, although he , 
 was limited almost entirely to the use of French. Lange in each 
 instance gave the substance of the talk in English, questions were 
 entertained, and usually resolutions were drawn up approving the 
 canal plan. No financial support was asked. For the most part, 
 the plan of the meetings met with success.® De Lesseps learned 
 much about the interests and temper of the English people, whom ; 
 he was compelled from any point of view to take into extensive 
 consideration, and he undermined to some degree the oflPensive , 
 policy of the Government by his direct appeal to the country.® 
 
 The resolution voted by the meeting held at Liverpool on 
 April 30 was characteristic of those prepared by other public 
 meetings of the same kind and by various commercial organiza- 
 tions: 
 
 We, the bankers, merchants, and manufacturers of Liver- 
 pool, consider that the execution of this great enterprise 
 would be productive of the greatest advantages to the com- 
 mercial and shipping interests of England, as of all other 
 nations, and earnestly desire that the enterprise may attain, 
 without any impediment, a speedy and successful realization.^ 
 
 Such complimentary statements, judiciously used in advertising, 
 were later employed with telling effect in the financial campaign. 
 
 The resolutions recorded by commercial groups in favor of the 
 canal only served to strengthen the hostility to it in official quar- 
 ters. Since the close of the Crimean War, this opposition had been 
 growing steadily bolder in tone, both at home and abroad.® In 
 
 etc., pr. print., n.d.), pp. 5, 6. This little volume is based on Lange’s own account 
 of these proceedings, and was written primarily to “ vindicate ” Lange from the 
 many criticisms which arose from his connection with the Frenchman. 
 
 ® Diplomatic Review, IV, 352; “Memorial from the Public Meeting of Mer- | 
 chants, etc., of Newcastle-on-Tyne to the Board of Trade in favor of the Lesseps ( 
 Canal Scheme,” 30 May, 1857, in F. O., Suez Canal Papers, 78/13+0. 
 
 ® Lange, however, whose unselfish devotion was largely responsible for the I 
 carrying out of this program, w^as never given the least credit or honor by De I 
 Lesseps, who appears to have regarded him with a high degree of jealousy which 
 was “one of the greatest blots on De Lesseps’ record.” — Price, op. cit., pp. i+, 15. 1 
 
 ^ F. de Lesseps, Inquiry into the Opinions of the C o??imercial Classes of Great 1 
 Britain on the Suez Ship Canal, pp. 6—13. 
 
 ® This is easily discovered in the correspondence of the Foreign Office, which by i 
 September, 1856, had apparently convinced itself that all that was desired by the i 
 Viceroy and his French adviser was a deep and defensible trench across the Isthmus, 
 after which they would declare the canal impossible of completion, leaving the • 
 investors (“ speculators ”) to pay the bill. — F. O., 78/13+0, Clarendon to Redcliffe, 
 
 9 Sept., 1856 (Confidential). 
 
I THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 345 
 
 June, upon his return to London from the provinces, De Lesseps 
 was again assured by Lord Palmerston that “ You know that I 
 j have made no secret of the fact that I am utterly opposed to your 
 ! scheme.” De Lesseps is said to have replied that, far from feel- 
 i ing discouraged by this opposition, he actually welcomed it “ as 
 i an engine for raising the capital.” “ But Palmerston soon had op- 
 portunity to deliver a strong blow at the “ bubble scheme ” in the 
 ; House of Commons. In reply to a query put by Mr. Berkeley on 
 ; July 7 as to whether “ any objection be entertained by Her 
 i Majesty’s Government to the undertaking,” Lord Palmerston 
 ; replied : 
 
 ; Her Majesty’s Government certainly can not undertake 
 to use their influence with the Sultan to induce him to give 
 i permission for the construction of this canal, because for the 
 last fifteen years Her Majesty’s Government have used all 
 the influence they possess at Constantinople and in Egypt to 
 prevent that scheme from being carried into execution. I 
 I believe it is physically impracticable, except at an expense 
 which would be too great to warrant the expectation of any re- 
 turns. However, that is not the grounds on which the Gov- 
 ernment have opposed the scheme. But the scheme is one 
 hostile to the interests of this country, opposed to the stand- 
 j ing policy of England in regard to the connection of Egypt 
 
 I with Turkey, a policy which has been supported by the war 
 
 and the treaty of Paris. The obvious political tendency 
 ... is to render more easy the separation of Egypt from 
 Turkey. . . 
 
 It is one of those plans so often brought out to make dupes 
 of English capitalists and leave them poor. The scheme was 
 launched, I believe, about fifteen years ago as a rival to the 
 railway from Alexandria by Cairo to Suez, which, being in- 
 finitely more practicable and likely to be more useful, ob- 
 tained the preeminence.’” 
 
 On subsequent occasions Lord Palmerston held forth on the 
 floor of the House in similar fashion, denouncing the canal in 
 scathing fashion, calling it “ physically impossible ” in one breath 
 and speaking of the political problems it would create if carried 
 : through in another. He thought it would quickly silt up and he 
 
 ® Quoted in Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 85-86. 
 
 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser., CXLVI, 1043—1044; F. O., 
 78/1340, Supplement to the Free Press, Oct., 1857. Ascribing the inception of the 
 canal idea to a desire to compete with the Egyptian Railway was, of course, putting 
 the cart before the horse. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ! 
 
 346 
 
 was certain that sailing vessels could never use it, while he main- 
 tained that in any event the railway was quicker and more useh 
 ful.“ All of these statements proved to be boomerangs. Being 
 illogical, they failed to convince men who had studied the Refort 
 of the International Scientific Commission, and being only dia- 
 tribes, they alienated from the opposition many who otherwise 
 found scant sympathy with a project which undoubtedly held many 
 political possibilities.^^ Gladstone, for example, warned him that 
 “ You have engaged in a contest in which you will in the end 
 certainly give way ” j and again, “ There is not a statesman in 
 Europe who does not denounce the policy of this opposition as 
 unwarrantable and selfish.” “ Only those like Stephenson, who 
 had long since definitely committed themselves and feared to lose 
 prestige by surrender, or to whom political connections were man- 
 datory, continued to support Palmerston in the House. Going 
 further than many commercial organizations, which in passing 
 resolutions on the subject gave real or implied censure to Palmer- 
 ston’s attitude, a Foreign Affairs Committee of Sheffield went so 
 far as to denounce the Prime Minister as a “ criminal.” Never- 
 theless the Government stubbornly maintained its position, even 
 though this position tended to become constantly more \ailnerable. 
 
 While De Lesseps was apparently making little headway to- 
 ward having the canal concession approved at Constantinople, 
 which had at the outset been assumed on all hands to be requisite 
 before actual construction work could be undertaken, events were 
 moving toward a breaking of the imfasse. The British Govern- 
 ment had thought in 1856 to substantiate their claim that the 
 canal was impracticable from the engineering point of view by 
 quietly despatching the corvette Tartarus^ under the command 
 of Capt. Mansell, to make thorough soundings in the Bay of 
 Pelusium, where it was proposed to place the Mediterranean en- 
 trance to the canal. The survey was well carried out, but the 
 chart made by Capt. Mansell failed to disclose the unfavorable 
 situation anticipated. On the contrary, nothing was found which 
 did not largely agree with the Refort of the International Scien- 
 tific Commission. Capt. Mansell, who may not have wholly ap- | 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVI, 1703, 1705. | 
 
 See, for instance, the criticisms of Palmerston’s remarks in the House of j 
 Commons regarding the canal as interference in the internal affairs of the Turkish I 
 Empire and contradicting the principle of non-interference adopted with regard to j 
 the Euphrates Valley Railway scheme, in the Ost-Deutsche Post, 19 Aug., 1857 j 
 (No. 188). I 
 
 Quoted in Joseph E. Nourse, The Marhbne Caiial of Suez . . . (Washing- | 
 ton, 1884) , p. 23. j 
 
 Report of the Sheffield Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct., 1857, p. 3. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 347 
 
 predated the motives which prompted his survey, failed at first 
 to maintain a very discreet silence upon his findings, and in con- 
 sequence his chart only added weight to the growing quantity of 
 evidence that the canal was feasible^® 
 
 It was becoming evident toward the beginning of 1857 that 
 the canal could make no headway as long as the French Govern- 
 ment kept up active diplomatic pressure in Egypt and the British 
 held sway at Constantinople. The French Government, there- 
 fore, made pretense of dropping the matter entirely and instructed 
 Consul Sabatier to cease all official efforts in Egypt, in behalf 
 of the canal, though as it had no connection with De Lesseps, the 
 French Foreign Office refused to bring any pressure to bear on 
 him.^® Actually, however, the theatre of French diplomatic ac- 
 tion was only transferred from Egypt to Constantinople, where 
 railway projects were beginning to enter into a subject already 
 badly complicated. Here as at Paris the stormy words of Palmer- 
 ston on the floor of the House of Commons began to retard the 
 current of British diplomacy.^^ The representatives of other 
 European nations were also beginning to announce the receipt 
 of official instructions to promote the interests of the Canal Com- 
 pany.^® M. Thouvenel, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 
 was therefore Instructed to render such secret assistance to the 
 canal as he could without actually committing the French Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 This concentration of influence quickly made itself apparent in 
 the vacillating tactics of the Turkish Ministers, and gave Lord 
 Stratford new doubts of his ability long to keep the Porte in tow. 
 “ With Reschid Pasha at the head of the Administration,” he 
 wrote to Lord Clarendon in April, “ I cannot entertain any serious 
 apprehension of his (Lesseps’) succeeding so far as to obtain 
 the Sultan’s consent, but I doubt on the other hand whether a de- 
 cided refusal will be given. It is more probable that the Porte’s in- 
 clination to side with Her Majesty’s Government will be expressed 
 by some new pretext for delay.” Lord Stratford’s opinion 
 
 F. O. Suez Canal Papers, 78/1340, Bruce to Clarendon, 21 July, 1856; 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 69. 
 
 F. O. 78/1340, Cowley to Clarendon, No. 29, 4 Jan., 1837; ibid., Bruce to 
 Clarendon, No. 12, 6 March, 1857 (Confidential); ibid., Cowley to Clarendon, 
 No. 728, 7 May, 1857. 
 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 91. See the Quarterly Review, CII, 357—361. 
 
 18 « Austrian Government believes strongly in the Canal — a highway 
 which will restore to the commerce of Europe its former rectilinear direction instead 
 of its present immense angle of deviation.” — Trans, from the Ost-Deutsche Post, 
 25 Dec., 1857 (No. 296). 
 
 F. O. 78/1340, Redclille to Clarendon, No. 313, 6 April, 1857 (Confidential). 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 348 
 
 proved to be well founded. The Egyptian Government continued 
 to promote the completion of the railway line from Cairo to Suez, 
 the Viceroy’s ardor for the canal appeared to have cooled,^” and 
 Redcliffe retained enough of his dominance at Stamboul to con- 
 test successfully with the growing pressure brought to bear on the 
 Turkish Ministers from all sides to sanction the canal scheme. 
 
 By the close of the year 1857, this persistent and determined ob- 
 struction of the canal by the British Government had produced a 
 much clearer definition of that work as a political issue than Palm- 
 erston, with all of his bitter invectives had ever approached. It 
 had become sufficiently evident to everyone that the real objection 
 to the canal was that it would open up a new strait — un Bosfhore 
 — and hence for the safety of Turkish and British interests, as 
 well as for the sake of the peace of Europe, the canal should be 
 made as much the subject of international engagements as the 
 Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and for the same general rea- 
 son.^’ The Austrian Government was said to be anxious for a 
 common agreement on this matter before the canal was constructed 
 so that it might not become the sole property “ of a great naval 
 power.” There is nothing to indicate that this point of view 
 fer se was particularly acceptable to the British Government, but 
 since it offered another means of postponing definite action by the 
 Porte on the canal concession, the Turkish Ministers were en- 
 couraged to insist that their ratification of the Viceroy’s conces- 
 sion would be impossible until all of the European powers 
 interested had come to an agreement on the subject. 
 
 The course of diplomacy at Constantinople caused De Lesseps 
 again to employ his personal influence at that strategic centre. Ar- 
 riving early in December, 1857, he soon resumed the efforts which 
 he had previously given up in February, 1855. He found the 
 situation much as he had left it, with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe 
 still determining the foreign policies of the Turkish Ministers, 
 whose personal sympathies lay, they privately averred, with De 
 Lesseps. Lord Stratford, however, was on the point of severing 
 his long connection with the Porte as the Great Eltchi, partly as a 
 result of the agreement reached by Palmerston and the Emperor ' 
 
 F. O. 78/1340, Bruce to Clarendon, No. 3, 5 Jan., 1857; Clarendon to 
 
 Bruce, No. 7, 19 Jan., 1857; ibid., Bruce to Clarendon, No. 12, 6 March, 1857 (Con- 
 fidential) ; ibid., No. 15, 23 March, 1857 (Confidential); ibid., No. 17, 28 March, 
 
 1857- .... . ' 
 
 See De Lesseps, Inquiry into the Opinions of the Commercial Classes of Great ( 
 Britain . . . p. 128; Quarterly Review, CII, 354—362. 
 
 Ost-Deutsche Post, 25 Dec., 1857 (No. 296). 
 
 F. O. 78/1340, Redcliffe to Clarendon, No. 1067, 9 Dec., 1857 (Confidential). 
 
; THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 349 
 
 1 Napoleon III at Osborne/^ and De Lesseps had high hopes of 
 I being able to surmount all other obstacles at the Porte. 
 
 Such hopes were premature. Before his departure, Lord Strat- 
 il ford had impressed upon the Turkish Ministers the necessity of 
 ; guarding against two great dangers which would undoubtedly 
 ' I arise in connection with the canal, namely, that the Great Powers 
 j might go to war to determine its control, and that it might result 
 j in the separation of Egypt from Turkey. The absence of the 
 I magnetic personality of the Great Ambassador could not fail to 
 '! dissipate some of the influence of his arguments, but to guard 
 .! against a diplomatic revolution at such a critical time, the British 
 ; Foreign Office let it be understood that a change in representatives 
 ;| at Constantinople did not indicate any change in policy. About the 
 If same time the sudden death of Reschid Pasha, who had been 
 ■ steeped in English prejudices, made the British Foreign Office 
 f I very apprehensive with regard to maintaining its prestige. On 
 li January i, 1858, a telegram in cypher was sent to Mr. Charles 
 , Alison, charge (Pajfaires at the Porte pending the arrival of Sir 
 1 Henry Bulwer as Ambassador, containing the following signifi- 
 
 ;! cant instructions: 
 
 i 
 
 |i Inform Grand Vizier that we have no reason to believe 
 ! that any change has taken place in the policy of the Porte re- 
 specting the Suez Canal, but if the Sultan were to give his 
 j consent to a scheme the direct and obvious object of which 
 
 i| is to separate Egypt from Turkey, the Sultan must not ex- 
 
 pect that the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman 
 1 Empire could hereafter be a principle to guide the policy 
 of the Great Powers of Europe because the Sultan would 
 I himself have been a party to the setting aside of that 
 ji principle.^® 
 
 li ^ 
 
 Three days later, Mr. Alison had the satisfaction of return- 
 ing to the Foreign Office the reply of Aali Pasha, the new Grand 
 Vizier, which was a monument to the effectiveness of the diplo- 
 macy of Lord Stratford. 
 
 ... Aali Pasha desired me to inform you [wrote the first 
 interpreter of the Embassy], that the Porte still withholds 
 its consent to the construction of that canal, that in con- 
 ; sequence of their determination he had been requested by 
 I the Council to draw up a statement setting forth the Porte’s 
 
 I De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Documents four servir a Vhistoire du Canal de 
 
 ^ Suez, 1854, 1855, 1856 (Paris, 1875), zd Sen, p. 148. 
 i F. O., Suez Canal Papers, 78/1421, No. i, i Jan., 1858. 
 
350 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 readiness to view M. de Lesseps’ proposals in a favorable 
 light on certain conditions, to which, he felt satisfied, it 
 would be out of the power of the projectors to accede. . . 
 
 The intention of the Porte in adopting this mode of pro- 
 ceeding is to declare itself opposed to M. de Lesseps’ under- 
 taking and to guard its own interests for the future in the 
 event of public opinion in England ultimately counteracting 
 the intentions or modifying the views of Her Majesty’s 
 Government respecting the construction of the Suez Canal. 
 
 I was also to give you the formal assurance that the con- 
 sent of the Porte would never be given to the project until 
 Her Majesty’s Government had expressed their willingness 
 ^ to sanction it.^® 
 
 This statement from the Turkish Ministry, given formally 
 though not in a signed statement, had considerable bearing on the 
 course of the negotiations in 1858. It enabled English officials 
 to point out to those favoring the canal that the Foreign Office 
 had received an official written promise that Turkish approval 
 would never be given the canal scheme until British consent had 
 been secured, while at the same time the Porte could deny that 
 such a statement had been given in writing.'^ All through the 
 year 1858, in fact, rumors thickened and intrigues increased re- 
 garding the canal, due in part to ministerial and diplomatic changes 
 in several countries and the growing effectiveness of propaganda 
 campaigns both for and against the canal.'® 
 
 The fall of Palmerston in February and the accession of the 
 Derby Ministry with Disraeli in one of the principal offices, al- 
 though hailed with delight by friends of the canal, failed to 
 make any material change in the official attitude of the British 
 Government. Shortly after receiving word of this event, Aali 
 Pasha, who was perhaps secretly in favor of the canal, or at least 
 willing to oblige the Viceroy whose bountiful presents he had 
 received, directed M. Musurus, the Turkish Envoy in London, 
 to ascertain the views of the new cabinet with regard to the canal. 
 Lord Malmesbury replied that “ we entirely concur in the course 
 followed by our Predecessors with regard to the projected Canal, 
 and that we put implicit trust in the formal assurance given by the 
 
 -® F. O. 78/1421, Enclosure in No. i8, Alison to Lord Clarendon, 4 Jan., 1858. 
 
 Ibid., Enclosures in Alison’s No. 190, 25 Feb., 1858, to Foreign Office; De 
 Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Docianents, 2d Ser., p. 17 1. 
 
 It was discovered, for example, that De Lesseps was receiving from the 
 Viceroy the sum of 39,000 francs per month for advertising and propaganda uses, 
 and that the Viceroy had paid some £20,000 to the continental press in 1857 for 
 articles keeping the subject of the canal alive. — F. O., 78/1421, Correspondence 
 between Consul John Green and the Foreign Office, 7, iS, and 26 Jan., 1858. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 351 
 
 Turkish Government that the consent of the Porte would never 
 be given to the Project until Her Majesty’s Government had ex- 
 pressed their willingness to sanction it,” 
 
 De Lesseps, who had prolonged his stay in Constantinople hop- 
 ing for a favorable “ break,” was soon apprised of the stand of the 
 new Ministry, touching the matter of the canal, and realized more 
 fully than before the futility of expecting such agreements as had 
 been reached between the British and French Governments really 
 to change the opposition of the former. This realization became 
 the more vivid when, on March 26, the matter of the canal was 
 again brought up in the House of Commons by Mr. Darby Grif- 
 fith. The Government’s answer was given by Disraeli, who con- 
 sidered it “ a most futile attempt, and totally impossible to be 
 carried out ”5 and he added that even if it were feasible, the opera- 
 tion of nature would soon totally defeat the ingenuity of man.^® 
 Disraeli was cautious enough, however, to remark that the House 
 of Commons had nothing to do with the practicability of the canal 
 idea or with the method of its financing, leaving the inference that 
 only in the external bearings of the canal was the British Govern- 
 ment concerned. A new debate in the House of Commons on 
 I June I, opened by Mr. Roebuck, brought forth only an elabora- 
 tion of previous pronouncements. The warm support tendered 
 to the canal project by various members of the House apparently 
 made no impression on the almost fanatical hostility displayed by 
 Stephenson, who still maintained that the canal was a “ physical 
 impossibility ” and that if built it would be but a “ stinking 
 ditch,” and by Lord Palmerston, who reiterated his former ob- 
 jections to the whole plan, basing his opposition on the danger 
 which would arise should the main channel of access to India lie 
 through a narrow passage controlled by a foreign and not always 
 friendly government. Gladstone believed that the canal offered 
 decided advantages to Great Britain, which country, he insisted, 
 would actually control the canal from the beginning through its 
 naval power and its possession of strategic bases, regardless of the 
 
 F. O. 78/14.21, the Earl of Malmesbury to M. Musurus, ii March, 1858. 
 The words with which this statement was concluded were identical with those con- 
 tained in the formal assurance given by Aali Pasha on January fourth, and were 
 not twisted to contain a new meaning, as De Lesseps said in his Journal. — See his 
 Lettres, Journal et Documents, 2d Ser., p. 174; Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 103. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLIX, 849. 
 
 Robert Stephenson, A Letter addressed to the Editor of the Austrian Gazette 
 ... in refly to the statements of M. de Negrelli (London, 1858), pp. 7—17. The 
 original engineering objection to the idea of a sea level canal had rested on the 
 belief that a difference of some 33 feet in the levels of the Red Sea and the Mediter- 
 ranean would produce a current too strong to be ascended. Stephenson based much 
 of his disapproval on the assumption that a canal having no current flowing through 
 it would become stagnant. 
 
352 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ownership of the waterway.®^ Disraeli, as on an earlier occasion, 
 was careful to say nothing which might embarrass either British I 
 representatives at the Porte or the Turkish Ministers themselves, \ 
 while he attempted to avoid giving umbrage to France. His ; 
 words were non-committal, but his tone was strongly inimical to | 
 the project. Being put to vote, the House overwhelmingly de- I 
 feated the motion that “ This House is of opinion that the power 
 and influence of the country ought not to be employed in obliging 
 the Sultan to withhold his assent to the project,” 
 
 These developments brought a considerable degree of de- 
 spondency to the promoters of the canal. Added to the uncom- 
 promising opposition of every official branch of the English Gov- 
 ernment was the fact that the Viceroy’s finances were running low 
 and the placing of any loan abroad was certain to have an un- 
 favorable reaction on the canal project. Certain English capital- 
 ists offered to arrange for a loan of £2,000,000 to be secured by the 
 Suez railway, but there were objections from the French Consul 
 and the suggestion was dropped.®^ Aside from this, the Austrian 
 Government, which had strongly favored the project at an earlier 
 date was now, with Count Buol as Foreign Minister, quite as 
 strongly opposed. The campaign of propaganda which had been 
 inaugurated many months earlier by De Lesseps and the Viceroy 
 was still in full blast, but its great expense could not much longer 
 Warrant its continuation in view of official commitments.®® 
 
 Once again De Lesseps found himself face to face with total 
 ruin. There was but one possible expedient remaining to be tried. 
 To snatch what measure of success he could from recent defeats, 
 De Lesseps returned to Paris to constitute his company for the 
 construction of the canal. In organizing the corporation and in- 
 stituting a financial policy for the sale of canal shares, De Lesseps 
 displayed the same originality and self-confidence which had dis- 
 tinguished all of his previous endeavors. He entirely disregarded 
 the counsel of capitalists, bankers, and promoters as to the best 
 method of distributing the shares and of providing for adequate 
 money backing for the proposed construction. He even refused 
 
 See John Morley, Life of William Ewart Gladstone (London), 1903), I, 
 591-592. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVI, 1385-1391. 
 
 F. O. 78/1421, John Green to Charles Alison, 24 June, 1858; ibid., Green 
 to Lord Malmesbury, i July and 3 July, 1878. Green, who was the successor of 
 Bruce as Consul-General, thought that at any rate the English offer to acquire an 
 interest in the railway would prevent the French from getting it. 
 
 Ibid., No. 228, 5 May, 1858, Alison to Malmesbury; ibid.. Lord Loftus to 
 Malmesbury, No. 250, 28 July, 1858; Husny, of. cit., pp. 275-279, fassim. 
 
1 
 
 I THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 353 
 
 I to establish subscription agencies in banking houses, although in- 
 I vited to do so by a firm as important as the Rothschilds, because 
 j their terms appeared exorbitant and he wished to conserve as 
 much of the capital as possible for actual expenses of con- 
 I struction.^® 
 
 ' The capital of the Company was fixed at 200,000,000 francs, , 
 i divided into 400,000 actions or shares of 500 francs each. Head- 
 quarters of the Company were established in a modest suite on the 
 I Place Vendome, and here subscription books were opened on 
 l| November 5, 1858. In spite of the fact that almost no English 
 i! money was forthcoming for the venture, the shares were taken up 
 ; rapidly. With the French people the canal, although advertised 
 I as an international enterprise, assumed the character of a patriotic 
 venture because of the outspoken hostility of the British Govern- 
 i ment. De Lesseps afterward related as typical of many small 
 subscriptions, the account of a Frenchman who approached him 
 with a desire to purchase shares in “ the railway of the Isle of 
 Sweden.” It was explained to him that the enterprise was not 
 , a railway, but a canal ^ not on an island, but on an isthmus; and 
 ' not in Sweden, but at Suez. The subscriber was not in the least 
 I taken aback, but averred that it did not matter so long as the proj- 
 ect was against the English.®^ 
 
 ' On November 30 the subscription books were closed. All 
 j of the shares except 85,506, which were reserved for investors in 
 ■ England, Austria, Russia and the United States to make the enter- 
 prise truly international, had been subscribed. The major portion 
 
 I of the capital publicly subscribed, therefore, was French, and most 
 of the shares 'were taken in small lots.®® The Administrative 
 Council of the Company was brought into existence on November 
 22, and by December 20, the organization of the concern was 
 complete. The rather ponderous title of Cornfagnie Universelle 
 du Canal Maritime de Suez was adopted as the official designa- 
 . tion, and statements given out concerning the completion of the 
 ^ organization showed it to be based on the acts of concession of 30 
 November, 1854, and 5 January, 1856, which had been issued by 
 the Viceroy of Egypt.®® 
 
 Even the successful launching of the Canal Company failed to 
 make any material change in the political status of the project. 
 
 ' While it gave De Lesseps the advantage of a strong organization, 
 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 119; Husny, of. cit., p. 281. 
 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 120; J. Charles-Roux, Uhthme et le Canal de Suez, 
 
 I, 286—287. 
 
 38 The Nation, LXX, 7. 
 
 8® De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Documents, 2d Ser., pp. 408-4.11; Charles- 
 Roux, of. cit., I, Annexe No. 16, 453—468. 
 
354 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 a large working capital and the moral support of a tangible ac- 
 complishment of no mean sort, it also gave his enemies new means . 
 of attack. Before the Company was formed, De Lesseps had 
 been in a sense out of reach j the French Government assumed no 
 responsibility for his actions since he acted merely as the agent of 
 the Viceroy. As the head of a large corporation, however, the i 
 projector was a fair mark. His obligations were no longer pri- 
 marily to the Viceroy, but to his stockholders.^® The Viceroy could 
 therefore be threatened with the dangers he had incurred from 
 bringing a Frankenstein’s monster into existence by chartering a 
 corporation, without the consent of his liege lord, and endowing it 
 with almost sovereign rights, while the Sultan himself was con- 
 stantly reminded of the growing likelihood of the severing of 
 Egypt from the Turkish Empire by the labors of a French concern. 
 
 The intrigues fostered by England only increased, therefore, 
 with the rise of the Canal Company, and it appeared as unlikely 
 at the beginning of 1859 ^-S at any previous time that the canal 
 would ever be constructed by a company controlled in France. 
 The English Consul in Egypt, Mr. F. W. A. Bruce, who had com- 
 plained a few years earlier that he was the only European in Egypt 
 not in favor of the canal,^^ had already been supplanted by the 
 more aggressive, if less tactful, John Green,^^ and the influence of 
 Lord Stratford de Redcliffe still held sway at the Porte. It is to 
 the great credit of Sai'd Pasha that he did not altogether desert | 
 the canal scheme during these trying times, as he must have been | 
 tempted to do. He did so far weaken under the constant pressure j 
 as to make pretense of having withdrawn his support, although | 
 what he openly did to obstruct the preparations of De Lesseps for : 
 continuing with the work he atoned for by lending secret as- i 
 sistance.^^ 
 
 It was under such circumstances as these that De Lesseps took 
 another bold step and created another problem. Years before he 
 had argued, in urging the Viceroy to authorize the commencement 
 of work on the canal, that the enterprise was a purely local and 
 internal one, and as such did not require the sanction of the Porte. 
 This position had then appeared to be untenable not only because 
 of the protests of the Turkish Ministers, egged on by the British 
 Foreign Office, but because of the reluctance of the Pasha him- 
 
 F. de Lesseps, Conferences de la rue de la Paix; entretiens sur le canal de) 
 Suez (Paris, 1864), p. 52. 
 
 F. O. 78/1-540, Bruce to Lord Clarendon, Nov. 26, 1856. 
 
 This is evident in the correspondence between Green and the Foreign Office 
 in December, 1859, in which Green reported his conversations with the Viceroy. 
 
 Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 129-131, 137, passim; Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 
 294-297. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 355 
 
 self to proceed with such a doubtful matter. Now, however, De 
 Lesseps found it possible to make a distinction between the canal 
 as an engineering task and the completed waterway as an inter- 
 national highway. In the acts of concession and the empty words 
 of approval uttered at times from the Turkish divan he found suf- 
 ficient authorization for undertaking the construction of the canal, 
 while, reversing his former attitude, he encouraged the settlement 
 of the political status of the completed work by an international 
 congress. De Lesseps now gave over his former character of 
 diplomat and assumed that of president of a commercial corpora- 
 tion whose sole task was to construct a navigable waterway, leaving 
 to others the problems which might issue therefrom. 
 
 Accordingly, in March, 1859, representatives of the Company 
 officially took possession of the properties given up in the acts of 
 concession, and in April De Lesseps recruited such labor as he 
 could find in Egypt, rented a small government steamer, and set 
 out for the Isthmus to begin actual construction. The line of the 
 Fresh Water Canal, a necessary preliminary to the main operation, 
 had been marked out in May, 1857,^^ but the first stroke on the 
 deep-sea canal itself was delayed until April 25, 1859, when con- 
 struction began on the Mediterranean terminus at Port Sai’d.^® 
 Although little progress could be made for some time to come, 
 owing to the Pasha’s fear of allowing the work to proceed, the 
 knowledge that earth had been turned and contracts let created a 
 storm of opposition both in Egypt and at Constantinople. 
 
 The English diplomatic agents did good fishing in the troubled 
 waters. Believing the Viceroy piqued because De Lesseps con- 
 ducted himself as the sole promoter of the project, now that the 
 Company had been formed, no opportunity was lost in Egypt by 
 opponents of the canal of emphasizing the dangers which would 
 arise from the entrenchment of a vast French enterprise in Egypt 
 and the political motives which had undoubtedly guided the whole 
 canal venture. Likewise at the Porte, old dangers and new, 
 accompanied by scarcely veiled threats, were urged upon the 
 harassed Ministers, until they were ready to take the rather delicate 
 step of intervening in Egypt in order to stop construction work.^^ 
 In these efforts Britain was strongly seconded by Austria, whose 
 Internuncio was now thoroughly convinced that De Lesseps was 
 
 ** F. O. 78/1340, Green to Lord Clarendon, No. 8, May 27, 1857. 
 
 De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Documents, 2d Ser., pp. 42, 84—91. This 
 port, it is needless to say, was so called in honor of the Pasha. 
 
 F. O., Suez Canal Papers, 78/1555, A. S. Walne to Lord Malmesbury, 25 
 May, 1859. 
 
 F. O. 78/1555, Telegram from Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Malmesbury, 19 
 May, 1859. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 356 
 
 nothing more than a French agent aiming at the independence of 
 Egyptd® As a result of these representations, the Porte addressed 
 a note to the Viceroy under date of June first, instructing him 
 to have work suspended on the Isthmus pending the formal sanc- 
 tion of the Ported® A few days later this was followed by an 
 official order from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
 Cherif Pasha, to De Lesseps to cease the operations which he had 
 begun on the Isthmus.®® 
 
 Within a few weeks, however, it developed that although De 
 Lesseps had been instructed to suspend his labors, the Egyptian 
 Government had failed to recall the workmen he had enlisted and 
 was oblivious to the fact that construction was still continuing. 
 Reproached with his lack of decisive action. Said replied that 
 those who were engaged in work on the canal at that time were 
 Europeans and he had no control over them. Their own gov- 
 ernments, he pointed out, must do the recalling, and the Pasha 
 must have smiled to think that as the Europeans referred to 
 were Frenchmen, there was little likelihood of their being with- 
 drawn.®^ Foiled at this point, the British Consul could only hope 
 that the annual flood of the Nile would be strong enough to inun- 
 date the scene of the canal operations and thus defeat the French 
 engineers. 
 
 The passive fashion with which the Viceroy thus observed the 
 continuation of the canal enterprise did not fail to give umbrage 
 at the two points where British diplomacy was mobilized to thwart 
 the project. In Egypt the Viceroy was reminded anew of the 
 hazard of permitting a proposed French colony to be developed 
 in the Wady Toumilat lately acquired by the Company. This, it 
 was pointed out, would be a double danger. In the first place, it 
 would perpetually threaten the existence of Egypt and in the 
 second place, it would be a dangerous obstacle in the way of British 
 access to India.®® The British Ambassador at the Porte was no 
 less zealous in picturing the ruin that was daily courted by the 
 Viceroy. He saw the projected French colony in the region ad- 
 jacent to the line of the canal as a permanent barrier between Tur- 
 key and Egypt, a proof that the motive behind the Suez Canal 
 Company was that of detaching Egypt from the Ottoman Empire. 
 Such an event, he pointed out, would dangerously undermine 
 the finances of the Turkish Government, as a considerable portion 
 of the Ottoman debt was secured by the Egyptian revenues. The 
 
 Husny, of. cit., p. 285. 
 
 F. O. 78/1555, Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Malmesbury, 3 June, 1S59. 
 
 Ibid., Walne to Lord Malmesbury, 10 June, 1859. 
 
 Ibid., I July and 10 July, 1859. 
 
 Ibid., Walne to Lord Russell, 21 July, 1859. 
 
1 THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 357 
 
 concern of Great Britain in such developments was emphatically 
 j restated.®^ 
 
 ' Again British diplomatic pressure promised to bear fruit. On 
 ; September 19, the Grand Vizier addressed a note to Sai'd inform- 
 1 ing him that the building of the canal was a matter within the 
 jurisdiction of the Sultan, who regarded the acts of concession 
 j issued by the Viceroy to the Canal Company as null and void, 
 j Sai'd was, therefore, to stop all work on the canal since it was 
 altogether unauthorized.®'^ Upon the receipt of this letter, the 
 i Viceroy appeared to be convinced of the futility of longer dallying 
 j with the canal project. On the fourth of October all of the foreign 
 envoys in Egypt were summoned to a conference at the Ministry of 
 Foreign Affairs. Here the assembled diplomats were addressed 
 by Cherif Pasha on the subject of the instructions from the Porte 
 ji and were informed of his master’s determination of carrying out 
 i the orders at all hazards. This resolution was unanimously ap- 
 M proved by the diplomatic corps and was duly communicated to 
 I their respective governments.®® The canal at last appeared to be 
 ' I definitely defeated. 
 
 There remained but one forlorn hope if the project was to be 
 ■ saved. If the Emperor Napoleon, who had repeatedly shown 
 himself in favor of the canal, could be prevailed upon to espouse 
 it openly and officially, all might not yet be lost. The political 
 situation in Europe, with France at war with Austria, who had been 
 I opposing the scheme, was more favorable than for years past. 
 
 ' Toward the end of July, therefore, De Lesseps returned to Paris 
 ,[ to beg for the active support of the Emperor in behalf of the 
 |l funds subscribed by the French people. Here at last his efforts 
 1 were crowned with success. The Emperor went to the length not 
 I only of promising protection but of instructing his diplomatic 
 I corps to give active assistance at their respective posts. As an in- 
 dication of the genuineness of this change of policy, M. Sabatier, 
 
 1 the French consul in Egypt, whose opposition to De Lesseps and 
 the canal had been real, was recalled.®® 
 
 The Emperor still hoped to avert a breach with England over 
 ■' the matter of the canal. Count Walewski, the Foreign Minister, 
 
 ' was instructed to convey to the British Cabinet the hope that 
 ' English opposition to the enterprise might at last cease.®^ The 
 
 Ibid.., Sir Henry Bulwer to Lord Russell, i6 Aug., 1859. 
 
 1 Ibid., 20 Sept., 1859; Husny, op. cit., p. 288. 
 
 Ibid., Colquhoun to Sir Henry Bulwer, 6 Oct., 1859. Even the French Consul 
 I raised no objection to the abandonment of the canal plan. See the Quarterly Review, 
 CLXV, 439. 
 
 ‘j ®® De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Documents, 3d Ser., pp. 192—240. 
 
 F. O. 78/1555, Lord Cowley to Lord Russell, 9 Oct., 1859. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 358 
 
 British Foreign Oilice, however, quickly quashed any such hopes 
 by reiterating its hostility to the carrying out of canal plans/® 
 This uncompromising attitude at a time when the two countries 
 were trying to maintain the semblance of an alliance might have 
 proved as fatal to the canal as the opposition of France had to the 
 Euphrates Valley Railway had not matters taken a more favorable 
 turn elsewhere. In concluding terms of peace with France, the 
 Austrian Government pledged its support anew to the canal under- 
 taking and promised diplomatic aid at the Porte, despite English 
 attempts to defeat the agreement.®® Presently Russia also joined 
 with the two Powers to bring pressure to bear at the Porte favor- 
 able to the granting of the desired firman to the Suez Canal Com- 
 pany and for reaching international agreements on the political 
 questions involved.®® 
 
 These developments centring in Constantinople, where the 
 Sultan and his Ministers trembled at the insistence of the co- 
 operating Powers on the one hand and the threat of the withdrawal 
 of British friendship and support on the other, had the effect of 
 shifting the scene of British operations again to Cairo. There the 
 English Consul opportunely found a new source of objection to 
 the construction operations in the application of the corvee or 
 forced labor system to the carrying out of digging operations. 
 This, he submitted, was contrary to civilized practice and alto- 
 gether iniquitous,®’' although but a few years before one of his 
 predecessors in Egypt had urged upon the Viceroy this very 
 measure during the construction of the Suez Railway. Still, the 
 cry of virtual slavery in Egypt promised to supply an excellent 
 casus belli, and it was later employed most effectively. 
 
 In January, i860, a new set of Instructions were sent by the 
 British Foreign Office to Sir Henry Bulwer at Constantinople 
 bearing on the situation. He was to point out once more to the 
 Turkish Ministers the lack of need for the canal in view of the 
 Suez Railway, the dangers to be incurred by Egypt, Turkey, and 
 Great Britain should a canal be opened, and the certainty of the 
 withdrawal of British friendship from the Porte in case of the 
 completion of the waterway.®® No secret was made of the fact 
 that the major portion of this hostility to the enterprise was due 
 
 F. O. 78/1555, Russell to Cowley, i+ Oct., 1859. 
 
 Husny, of. cit., p. 290. 
 
 F. O. 78/1555, Correspondence between Lord Russell and Sir Henrt’ Bulwer, 
 Nov. and Dec., 1859. 
 
 Ibid., Colquhoun to Lord Russell, 9 Dec., 1859. 
 
 F. O., Suez Canal Papers, 78/1556, Foreign Office to Sir Heniy- Bulwer, 
 No. 44, 21 Jan., i860; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CLVI, 1354. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 359 
 
 to the fear that France would become entrenched in Egypt on 
 the route to India. Finding that all of these objections were 
 still of no avail in ending construction work, Sir Henry Bulwer, 
 with the approval of his Government, even went to the point a 
 few months later of representing that the Viceroy had no legal 
 right to employ the funds of Egypt in behalf of the enterprise, 
 and intimated that as he had forfeited the conditions under which 
 he held the government of Egypt, he might well be deposed by 
 the Porte.®^ Such a suggestion, coming at a time when France 
 was hastily landing armed forces in Syria to oppose Turkish dis- 
 orders, carried with it considerable weight. 
 
 Even the possibility of being removed failed seriously to shake 
 the resolution of Sai'd Pasha to proceed with the digging of the 
 canal. “ I do not know,” he said to the English Consul on one 
 occasion, “ if this aflFair will be advantageous from a commercial 
 point of view, but I am sure that my name will be immortalised 
 if the canal project is achieved under my reign and with my assist- 
 ance.” The sending of a high Turkish functionary to Egypt 
 at the instance of British agencies to remonstrate with Sai'd and 
 to emphasize the dangers he was incurring, failed to shake his de- 
 termination. He would yield, he said, only to force, and he relied 
 on the friendly attitude of France, Austria, and other Powers to 
 avert the use of force.®® The canal therefore was suffered to gain 
 momentum, though rather slowly, because of the Pasha’s judicious 
 reserve in supplying laborers in great numbers.®^ 
 
 With the affairs in this highly unsatisfactory state, months 
 passed by with no sign of material change. The Viceroy, still 
 loyal to the enterprise which he regarded as his own, supplied 
 such assistance as political exigencies and the gravely depressed 
 state of his finances would allow, although embarrassed on every 
 hand. De Lesseps continued to receive the support of the French 
 Emperor, though often in very halting fashion. And the tone of 
 hostility in England varied only as the consummation of the canal 
 seemed less and less likely and the scheme appeared contemptible 
 rather than directly dangerous. The question of forced labor con- 
 tinued to receive the attention of the British Government. “ The 
 slavery of America,” it was asserted in the House of Commons in 
 
 Husny, of. cit., p. 293; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CLVI, 1354; ibid., 
 CLVII, 221—222. 
 
 F. O. 78/1556, Sir H. Bulwer to the Foreign Office, 15 June, i86o. See 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CLXXII, 1550—1559; London Times, 6 June, 1861. 
 
 F. O. 78/1556, Colquhoun to the Foreign Office, No. 66, 3 June, i860. 
 
 ®® Husny, of. cit., p. 296; London Times, 30 Oct., 1861. 
 
 Husny, of. cit., pp. 296—297; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CLXXHI, 1458- 
 1459 ) 156^) ibid., CLXXIV, 1822; London Times, 3 and 12 May, 1862. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 360 
 
 1862, “ was not so bad as that of the forced labour that was being 
 employed on this canal.” It was maintained that the laborers i 
 were made to serve without pay for long periods of time and that ’ 
 a huge number were being employed on the canal works at all 
 times.®® In November, 1862, Sir Henry Bulwer was sent from 
 Constantinople to examine the state of the canal. He found the : 
 forward state of operations on the canal a matter of surprise, but 
 assured the diplomatic corps that England could never consent to 
 the entrenchment of another great Power along the line of the 
 canal, and maintained that, in that respect, the best interests of 
 Egypt and Great Britain coincided.’^® 
 
 The next phase in the history of canal operations was introduced : 
 by the death of Sai'd Pasha on January 18, 1863, and the accession 
 of his nephew, Ismail. To this Prince it appeared that his prede- 
 cessors had been altogether too absorbed in the canal for its own 
 sake to take sufficient precautions for the interests of his country. 
 
 “ No one is more in favor of the canal than I,” he said, “ but I 
 wish the canal for the sake of Egypt, and not Egypt for the 
 canal.” ” Nevertheless, at the outset of his reign he accepted ob- 
 ligations to the canal enterprise much as he found them, although 
 he preserved a reticence regarding his plans and policies worthy 
 of many a western statesman. Being ambitious, the magnitude of 
 the work appealed to him, and its regenerative influence on much 
 of Egypt could not be denied. Yet he was not prepared to make 
 great sacrifices, and he hoped to recover much of the land which 
 had been so extravagantly ceded to the Company by Sai'd. In all 
 such matters he readily admitted the necessity of being guided by 
 the Porte. 
 
 Such an attitude could not fail to give joy in British circles, and 
 no time was lost in searching for means of exploiting the loyalty 
 of the Viceroy to his liege in order to ruin the efforts of the Canal 
 Company. At this juncture. Sir Henry Bulwer came forward with 
 a ready-made plan well designed to accomplish the subversive 
 purpose in hand. His scheme, in brief, was to undermine the 
 Canal Company by having a pronouncement made by the Porte 
 that, as the Acts of Concession issued by Sa'id had never been of- 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb,, 3d Ser., CLXVIII, 1147; ibid., CLX^^, 1821—1824; | 
 
 ibid., CLXX, 1723—1724. ; 
 
 8® Ibid., CLXVIII, 148; ibid., CLXIX, 577 - 578 ; CLXX, 1770; ibid., I 
 
 CLXXI, 804; Pierre Crabites, “Ferdinand de Lesseps and the Suez Canal,” in The I 
 Nineteenth Century and After (Oct., 1926), p. 592. It was suggested that, in \dew of 1 
 the cotton famine in England resulting from the American Civil War, the Egv'ptian 1 
 fellahs could have been employed to much better advantage in raising cotton. 
 
 '^8 Husny, of. cit., pp. 299, 300. 
 
 Quoted in Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 336. 
 
\ THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 361 
 
 1 
 
 ficially approved, the Suez Canal Company had no standing in 
 Egypt and no authority to proceed with construction work. Is- 
 mail was thereupon expected to hand in an unfavorable report on 
 the dangers which would be incurred by Egypt and the Empire 
 in case the canal were completed, whereupon he would receive in- 
 structions to terminate the work immediately. 
 
 This plan was duly communicated to the Porte, where it was 
 considered in the customary leisurely manner. Finally in July, 
 1863, the ultimatum of the Porte, a modified version of the Eng- 
 lish proposal, was despatched to the Viceroy. He was no longer 
 to permit forced labor on the canal under any circumstances 5 the 
 lands alienated to the Company by Sai'd for the purpose of ir- 
 rigation and colonization were to be repurchased by Ismail and 
 distributed to Egyptian subjects} and the canal itself, if completed, 
 was to be of a depth which would admit merchant vessels, but 
 not vessels of war. In case the Company did not accept these 
 conditions, it was to be dissolved, its shareholders compensated, 
 and the canal executed directly under the auspices of the Egyptian 
 Government. The Company was accorded a period of six 
 months in which to accept or reject these conditions. Meanwhile 
 its operations were practically suspended. 
 
 The terms thus imposed upon the Canal Company were little 
 pleasing to Austria and France. The Austrian Ambassador at the 
 Porte, who protested against such unfair measures, was informed 
 by the British Ambassador that Britain had no wish to oppose the 
 wishes of all of Europe in the matter of the canal, but that she 
 was determined to thwart the military aims of France in this re- 
 gard.^® Such half-hearted admission of the commercial utility 
 of the canal only slightly, reflected the conviction which had by 
 this time taken root in England that eventually the canal would be 
 built. As time passed and it became less likely that the canal itself 
 would prove to be a French military entrenchment and while the 
 actual need of a commercial channel continued to grow, British 
 authorities began to bow to the inevitable and to look toward the 
 day when the canal, under one control or another, must become 
 un fait accomfli. Such an admission was doubtless influenced by 
 the attitude of the commercial classes in England, who had 
 favored the canal on commercial grounds, ever since it was first 
 projected} but the day when official opposition would be lifted 
 was yet postponed, partly because of unwillingness to reverse a 
 traditional policy, but more particularly because of the known 
 imperialistic tendencies of the French Emperor. 
 
 Already, in May, 1863, significant steps had been taken to- 
 
 Husny, of. cit., pp. 301—302. Ibid., p. 302. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 362 
 
 ward constructing at Malta a new port possessing greatly en- - 
 larged harbor and docking facilities. Construction plans aimed 
 at providing a haven which would care for a large and modern ' 
 Mediterranean fleet. New fortifications were put under con- 
 struction which would offer ample security to vessels at anchor. 
 Extensive funds for the work were asked for from the Maltese 
 Government, and the request was supported by a picture of the 
 prosperity which would presently ensue from the piercing of the 
 Isthmus of Suez and the considerable augmentation of shipping 
 in the eastern Mediterranean.^^ 
 
 The six months’ respite granted the Company was employed 
 by its Council in trying to avert the impending disaster. It still ' 
 appeared possible, by the intervention and arbitration of the | 
 French Emperor, to secure better terms from the Sultan. An 1 
 appeal was made to the Emperor, therefore, in the name of French i 
 investors, and although Napoleon was little disposed to become i 
 embroiled in the difficulty, he could little afford to ignore the i 
 appeal which the Porte authorized the Company to make."^® | 
 In consequence, a commission of arbitration was nominated early | 
 in March, 1 864, which sat until July. The award as made by the l 
 Emperor was calculated to determine the Company’s status in j 
 Egypt once and for all and to remove any existing grounds for 1 
 withholding the ^rman of approval by the Porte. It provided j 
 that the Company should no longer have the right of demanding | 
 laborers from the Viceroy, who was to give compensation for the 1 
 termination of this claim to the amount of £1,520,000. All lands i 
 owned by the Company on the Isthmus, except such as were neces- i 
 sary for the operation of the canal, and all subsidiary canals were 1 
 to be relinquished to the Viceroy, who was to give compensation for I 
 all these assets to the total extent of £1,840,000, payable in an- ■ 
 nuities.^® The whole indemnity thus amounted to more than 1 
 three million pounds sterling — not an excessive amount for all 
 that was to be given up, but one badly needed, in view of the poor • 
 financial condition of the Company, for the carrying on of con- 
 struction work. 
 
 Considerable negotiation was required before all of the details 
 of settlement were arranged, but before the end of the year all 
 of the papers had been passed between the Company and the 
 Viceroy, and only the formal approval of the Porte was lacking. 
 
 Husny, op. cit., p. 303. 
 
 De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal, et 'Documents, 4th Ser., p. 422; London Times, 
 
 9 and 16 March, 1864. 
 
 The documents pertaining to this settlement are to be found in Pari. Pap., 
 1876, Egypt No. 6. See also Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 325-328; Charles-Roux, op. cit., 
 
 I, Annexe No. 19, 476—489; London Times, 3 Aug., 1864. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 363 
 
 Even now this essential document was not forthcoming; British 
 objections and influence still stood in the wayd^ In order to be 
 able to continue their work at all, the Company again appealed to 
 the French Emperor for support in February, 1865/® This ob- 
 tained a moral advantage for the Company, but it was not until 
 February 22, 1866, that the Porte reached an agreement with 
 the Viceroy regarding the terms of the French Emperor’s award, 
 and another month had almost elapsed before the definitive firman 
 of approval was issued, March 19, for the execution of the canald® 
 This official sanction, which had been sought for more than a dec- 
 ade and had been the subject of infinite diplomatic difficulties, 
 came at last only when the construction of the canal had reached 
 an advanced state. It ran, in part: 
 
 The realization of the great work destined to give new 
 facilities to commerce and for navigation by the cutting of 
 a Canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea being 
 one of the most desirable events in this age of science and of 
 progress, conferences have been had for some time past with 
 the Company which asks authority to execute this work, and 
 they have ended in a manner conformable, as regards the 
 present and the future, with the sacred rights of the Porte, 
 
 : as well as with those of the Egyptian Government. 
 
 The agreement . . . has been drawn up and signed by 
 the Egyptian Government, in conjunction with the rep- 
 resentatives of the Company; it has been submitted for Our 
 Imperial sanction, and, after having read it, we have given 
 Our assent to it.®“ 
 
 This at last swept the way practically free of political obstacles. 
 Not until this document had been issued was the Company certain 
 to succeed in its efforts. Now that the canal was assured, and in no 
 great time, British opposition gradually ceased and thought was 
 given to ways of turning the new waterway to imperial account. 
 In place of the hope that the canal would never be built rose the 
 hope that it might be placed under international control to pre- 
 vent its becoming a political question once it was in operation.®^ 
 Toward this end the British Foreign Office labored until a hap- 
 
 ’’’’ Hansccrd’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CLXXIV, 870; ibid., CLXXVII, 1759-1760. 
 
 De Lesseps, Lettres, Journal et Documents, 5th Ser., p. 88. 
 
 British and Foreign State Pafers, LVI, 293—294; Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 
 Annexe No. 20, 490; London Times, 21 Feb., 1866. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1876, No. [C. 1415]; Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 333. 
 i C. de Freycinet, La Question d'Egypte (Paris, 1904), pp. 126, 127; Han- 
 
 t sard^s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXVII, 664—665. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 364 
 
 pier solution suddenly made its appearance, namely, the bringing 
 of the canal under the immediate control of Great Britain. 
 
 Preliminary surveys of the Isthmus of Suez made in 1847 
 and in 1855— 1856, had indicated that a sea level canal was al- 
 together practicable, not only because there was no essential dif- ■ 
 ference in the levels of the Mediterranean and Red Seas, but be- 
 cause the character of the Isthmus itself was well adapted for a 
 direct and open cut. The distance across the Isthmus in a direct 
 line was some seventy miles. In all of this distance no natural ob- 
 structions of any importance were to be found, either sand or 
 fluvial deposits prevailing along the whole line. There was 
 abundant evidence that at an earlier geological era the Red and 
 Mediterranean Seas were joined across what is now the Isthmus, 
 and with their recedence left a narrow valley, a part of which was 
 then occupied by salt marshes and lakes and the remainder by a 
 waterless sandy plain which extended into Egypt on the one hand 
 and into Asia on the other. The line finally selected for the course \ 
 of the canal was plainly indicated by nature by providing a natural | 
 depression for almost the whole of the way from the Mediter- i 
 ranean Sea. Along this line, which intersected a series of ancient 
 lake basins but did not lie directly across the Isthmus, there were 
 few elevations of importance, and none of these was of stone 
 formation. Some of the few elevations appeared to be the result 
 of seismic disturbances, while others were merely sand hills which 
 had long since ceased to be moving sand dunes.®' 
 
 One of the greatest problems to be solved in undertaking the 1 
 cutting of a sea-level canal across the Isthmus was not found on i 
 the land at all, but along the shores adjacent to the logical termini 1 
 of an isthmian channel. As the land was low in elevation, so the i 
 seas were shallow for a considerable distance from shore. In both 
 seas the floors proximate to the land consisted largely of soft mud 
 or of easily shifting sand, offering no mean engineering problem 
 in connection with adequate approaches to the canal proper. In the 
 Mediterranean Sea, in addition, strong currents and the action 
 of heavy seas supplied a large measure of difficulty. It was these 
 marine obstacles, in fact, which furnished opponents of the canal 
 with much of their assurance that an isthmian sea-level channel 
 was either impossible or altogether impracticable, and it was on 
 this point that De Lesseps had most expert advice. The Inter- 
 national Scientific Commission, after taking careful note of all 
 these difficulties, were of opinion that they could be satisfactorily 
 overcome by the building of long stone breakwaters and by dint 
 
 82 Report and Plan of th-e International Scientific Commission, pp. 51—61. 
 
I THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 365 
 
 of considerable dredging.*® Engineering plans for the canal were 
 practically complete, therefore, for two or three years before 
 [ actual digging was commenced. 
 
 In March, 1859, soon after the formation of the Isthmus of 
 j Suez Canal Company, a new and complete exploration of the Isth- 
 i mus was begun by De Lesseps and a few assistants preparatory to 
 making a formal beginning on construction work. Although car- 
 I ried out under many dangers and difficulties, the findings were 
 ! not unfavorable. A few months later, on August 25, De Lesseps, 
 
 I on behalf of the Suez Canal Company, turned the first soil for 
 ! the construction of a port on the Mediterranean and so inaugu- 
 rated the gigantic task. A great deal of preliminary work had to 
 be carried out before the digging of the huge trench could proceed. 
 
 I Machinery had to be designed, made, shipped, and set up along 
 the canal. Machine and repair shops were needed. Workmen’s 
 i quarters had to be established, and the details of superintendence, 
 feeding, giving medical attention, paying, and recruiting had to 
 : be worked out with very little experience to serve as guide. 
 
 Construction began from the Mediterranean, as the first requi- 
 j site was a port through which to receive various necessary supplies. 
 The first structures at Port Sai'd were temporary, being replaced 
 gradually by more permanent works as the project advanced. 
 
 I Drafts of Egyptian fellahs were supplied by the Egyptian Gov- 
 ernment and frequently were cared for, if they can be said to have 
 j been cared for at all, by their chiefs. While they were so em- 
 ployed they were paid from six to eight piastres (i/4 to 2 francs) 
 per day, although skilled workmen received more. The question 
 I of food was prominent at the outset, but that of drinking water 
 I was considerably greater, as all had to be brought from a distance, 
 I usually on the backs of camels. Occasionally the supply failed, 
 
 ' and it was rumored now and then, perhaps with considerable truth, 
 
 : that many of the fellahs perished for lack of water.*^ This 
 I problem vanished, however, with the completion of the Fresh 
 Water Canal between the Nile and Ismailia in 1862, by which 
 time as many as 25,000 or more native workmen were being 
 employed.*® 
 
 Much of the early work was performed by hand labor, this be- 
 ing cheap and plentiful and machinery being expensive and poorly 
 designed. As the work progressed, however, more and more 
 machinery was employed and with constantly increasing efficiency. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 68—70, fassim; Nourse, of. cit., p. 21. 
 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., I, 282—284, fassim. 
 
 Nourse, of. cit., p. 52; Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 330 et fasshn-, London 
 Times, 28 Nov., 1862. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 366 
 
 After the withdrawal of fellah labor in 1863, the expense of ex- 
 cavation mounted so rapidly that machinery was employed on a 
 large scale, it having been found more reasonable than hired 
 free labor. Machine design rapidly improved under such circum- 
 stances, naturally, and early mistakes and failures were eliminated 
 as the work advanced. Before the completion of the work in 1 869 
 the Company had at work numbers of dredges and excavators 
 capable of removing a total of 2,000,000 cubic metres of material 
 per month. To accomplish this required the services of less than 
 4000 men, in contrast with the much greater numbers employed 
 earlier. Toward the close of operations the machinery of various 
 kinds employed represented a total of 10,000 horsepower,®® not 
 an impressive total as compared with more recent enterprises, but 
 a matter of wonder for the world at that time. 
 
 The line of work in general proceeded from the Mediterranean 
 toward the Red Sea, although toward the end operations were be- 
 ing carried on at various points simultaneously. Immediately 
 back of Port Said lay the immense basin of Lake Menzaleh, and 
 here dredging began not long after the foundations for a port had 
 been laid on the Mediterranean. Shortly afterward work began 
 on cuttings to connect Lake Timsah with the waters of the Medi- 
 terranean, and the entire line of the canal was well outlined before 
 the death of Said Pasha and consequent political intervention led 
 to the withdrawal of 20,000 laborers almost in a day. A notable 
 event near the close of the year 1862 was the passage of small 
 boats bearing various kinds of supplies from the Mediterranean 
 into Lake Timsah.®^ But at this point the work received a serious 
 setback, and during the next two years little was accomplished. 
 
 In November and December of 1862 a noted English engineer, 
 Mr. John Hawkshaw, made a thorough inspection of the entire 
 line of the canal at the invitation of the Viceroy. His Report, 
 published in 1863, presented a detailed and unbiased account of 
 the work accomplished and the difficulties remaining to be sur- 
 mounted.®® His findings, on the whole, were favorable to the 
 consummation of the project, although he did not share the opti- 
 mism of some of the Company’s engineers as to the time within 
 which the work could be completed. His report is the more note- 
 worthy because it completely refuted the arguments advanced by 
 many of his countrymen, and particularly his fellow engineer, 
 Robert Stephenson, purporting to prove that the canal was not 
 
 Nourse, op. cit., pp. 67—68; Edinburgh Re<uie=w, CVII, 450 ff. 
 
 Calcutta Re<vievj, XXXVIII, 351. 
 
 Report of John Ha’inkshaw, F. R. S., to the Egyptian Govern?nent (London, 
 1863); Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 332 f. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 367 
 
 feasible, and, if once constructed, could not be kept open. The 
 influence of the report was widespread and considerable. It gave 
 the new Viceroy a more favorable impression of the work than he 
 had had previously, and it went far toward convincing members 
 of the British Government that the canal would be completed. 
 But even this analysis failed to convince all doubting Thomases. 
 “We cannot persuade ourselves,” said the Editor of the Calcutta 
 Review, after a lengthy examination of the report, “ that an in- 
 vestment in the Suez Canal would be a safe speculation, and we 
 think that the fact so much dwelt upon by French writers, that no 
 Englishmen have taken shares, may be attributed rather to Eng- 
 lish commercial prudence than to national jealousy.” 
 
 Rapid progress in excavating was made after the first of 1865. 
 With the end of political difficulties in sight and plenty of money 
 in hand from the award made to the Company by the arbitration 
 of Napoleon III, the works were everywhere pushed rapidly. 
 All of Europe received a thrill when it was announced near the 
 close of the year that a steamer drawing four metres of water had 
 passed from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, although part of 
 the voyage had been made by way of subsidiary canals.®® A branch 
 of the Fresh Water Canal also was approaching Suez and facili- 
 tating the progress on the main trench accordingly. Various ves- 
 sels drawing several feet of water passed through the canal in 
 1866. During the next two years thriving towns sprang up along 
 the course of the canal where formerly had been only desolation. 
 Port Sai’d took on the appearance of a thriving, populous seaport, 
 with many permanent buildings raised high on lands recently 
 dredged from the canal entrance. At the intersection of the 
 Fresh Water Canal with the main channel another new town 
 sprang into existence, called after the reigning Viceroy Ismailia. 
 By the time of the opening of the canal it had become a busy 
 metropolis of six thousand inhabitants, containing the pretentious 
 residences of many of those charged with building the canal. 
 Even Suez had recovered much of its ancient size and importance. 
 Being but a miserable, squalid, sun-baked village for centuries 
 after the opening up of the Cape route to the East, it had experi- 
 enced a mild revival with the establishment of the English over- 
 land route in the thirties and forties. The completion of the Suez 
 railway in 1858 had contributed further to the growth and im- 
 portance of the place, and with the erection of warehouses, hotels, 
 and docks, the place had sloughed off much of the deserted air of 
 earlier times. Still, it was the completion of the Suez branch of 
 
 Calcutta Review, XXXVIII, 363. 
 
 Nourse, of. cit., p. 70; Fitzgerald, of. cit., II, 9, lo. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 368 
 
 the Fresh Water Canal which gave the spot a transforming touch 
 and turned a baked desert into a blooming garden. From a vil- 
 lage of a few thousand inhabitants it had in 1869 become an 
 industrious and cosmopolitan town of some twenty-five thousand 
 souls, such was the magic of the canal.®^ 
 
 The near completion of the canal was signalized by the admis- 
 sion of the waters of the Mediterranean Sea into the Bitter Lakes, 
 whose salt basin, having no outlet, was well below sea level. 
 This operation was made a matter of ceremony, the sluices from 
 the dammed-up canal being opened in the presence of the Viceroy, 
 the Prince and Princess of Wales, and other notables, on March 
 18, 1869. Only one remaining barrier separated the two seas, 
 and this was rapidly reduced. Many weeks before the event, De 
 Lesseps gave notice of the formal opening of the canal on Novem- 
 ber 17, and invited the commercial world to make use of the 
 waterway after that date, all vessels to be passed free of charge 
 during a period of four days after the opening. To this general 
 announcement personal invitations to most of the crowned heads 
 of Europe were added by Ismail, who was making a grand tour 
 of the continent during the summer of 1869.®^ The projector was 
 hard put to it to maintain his schedule 5 many obstructions still re- 
 mained until the very hour of the opening, and the failure to re- 
 move any one of them would have vitiated the elaborate ceremo- 
 nies arranged for the occasion and would have drawn a storm of 
 criticism and ridicule from all parts of Europe. Only the fore- 
 sight and undaunted courage of De Lesseps made possible the 
 conquering of one unexpected difficulty after another, until on 
 November 17 an open channel welcomed the ceremonial fleet 
 which slowly steamed through the new waterway in the procession 
 of initiation.®® 
 
 On November 17 stood ready that “ second Bosphorus ” which 
 had set all of western Europe by the ears since the first proposals 
 of its projector in 1852. The consuming ambition of one of the 
 century’s remarkable men was at last realized; his great plan, 
 which had been almost universally scoffed at, denounced and be- 
 
 Captain Clerk, in the Fortnightly Reviezv, Jan., 1869, quoted in Fitzgerald, 
 op. cit., I, 196—198. See Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 355-378. 
 
 A. E. P. B. Weigall, A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914, pp. 
 100 ff.; Charles-Roux, op. cit., I, 388-390; London Times, 5 June, 1869. 
 
 De Lesseps did not consider the inauguration of the canal complete until he 
 had acknowledged his indebtedness to Thomas Waghorn, from whom he obtained 
 some of his early ideas for a canal, by erecting on a jetty at Port Said a large bust 
 of this apostle of the overland route executed by M. Vital-Dubray. This was in 
 place by the end of 1869. — London Illustrated Times, 8 Jan., 1870, p. 20; The 
 Graphic, 8 Jan., 1870, p. 140. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 369 
 
 littled by men in all walks of life and in nearly all countries, had 
 justified itself. A multitude of obstacles, political, personal, 
 financial, and physical, had all been conquered by the strength of 
 one man, and at last the hero received the meed of honor that was 
 due him. Friend and enemy alike gave unstinted praise to the 
 man who could not accept defeat, but must needs turn defeat into 
 victory. 
 
 The victory, moreover, was impressive. A great channel had 
 been dug through deserts and salt marshes where the treacherous 
 Bedouins had once made up the whole of the human population. 
 Roads and harbors on the Mediterranean coast were built where 
 natural facilities had been entirely lacking. All supplies and every 
 drop of fresh water had been brought laboriously from great dis- 
 tances. The interminable tropic sun had precluded the possibility 
 of employing European labor extensively. Yet through this des- 
 ert wilderness a sea level ship canal had been constructed for the 
 commerce of the world, a canal which measured approximately 
 ninety miles in length.®* Nowhere was the depth of water less 
 than twenty-six feet or the width less than seventy-two feet at the 
 bottom of the cut. This was sufficient width for but one vessel 
 only, but ships were enabled to pass each other in opposite direc- 
 tions in the lakes and in sections of double width, sidings or gares^ 
 in other parts of the canal.®® A system of signals along the whole 
 of the canal gave notice of traffic conditions. Ports had been pro- 
 vided at either end capable of caring for large numbers of vessels, 
 with docking facilities and fuel and water supplies. Lighthouses 
 marked either entrance of the canal. For the construction of this 
 great waterway an international corporation had been formed, 
 capable of supplying the 200,000,000 francs necessary for actual 
 construction expenses, in addition to possibly 100,000,000 francs 
 more which had been required for various political and promotion 
 or “ incidental ” expenses.®® On these sums interest at 5 % had 
 been paid from the date of the formation of the Company. 
 
 The service rendered by this notable accomplishment is par- 
 tially indicated by the reduction of mileage and time-distances 
 between western and eastern ports. The distance from South- 
 ampton to Point de Galle around the Cape of Good Hope was 
 approximately 11,650 miles. The canal reduced this distance to 
 
 Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 218. Including the harbor works and approaches at 
 either end, the canal has a length of more than 92 miles. 
 
 Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 224—225, 252—253; Calcutta Review, XXXVIII, 348. 
 
 This was the estimate by M. Fontane, one of the Company’s officers; quoted 
 in Nourse, op. cit., pp. 10— ii. See Fitzgerald, op. cit., II, 66; Charles-Roux, op. 
 cit., I, Annexe No. 23, 501—505. 
 
370 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA I 
 
 about 6,515 miles, effecting a saving of 5,135 miles.®^ This, i, 
 translated into terms of time and fuel economy, represented a , 
 very large saving. The reduction in time for vessels sailing from 
 England to India varied according to size and power of vessel, 
 route taken around the Cape, and other factors, but conservative ■ 
 estimates placed the saving due to the canal at from fifty-one to 
 sixty-seven days.®® The cost of passage between England and ■ 
 India was also materially reduced by the canal route. In 1843 
 at the opening of the overland route a voyage to India cost about I 
 £140. By 1866, after the completion of the Suez Railway and the 
 organization of the Egyptian Transit Administration, the cost 
 had been reduced to slightly less than £100, but further reductions 
 were not in sight as long as the passage remained overland through 
 Egypt. In 1875, however, a passage to India cost but £68 by way 
 of the canal, and the canal toll of 10 francs per passenger was only 
 about one-tenth of the overland fare through Egypt at that time.®® 
 
 In view of the potentialities opened up by the new waterway, 
 it was highly fitting that the formal opening should be made the 
 occasion for a brilliant international gathering representing most 
 of the western nations. Months before the date of the opening 
 mammoth preparations were put under way. The officers of the 
 Company were determined that nothing should be left undone to 
 emphasize the importance of the work or its International charac- 
 ter. The Viceroy was equally resolved that his hospitality and the 1 
 greatness of his country should not be called in question. Even j 
 the desert Arabs, who scarcely owned any superior authority, en- 
 camped in thousands on the banks of the canal to extend the “ hos- 
 pitality of the tent,” and incidentally to witness a great spectacle 1 
 and to gather in such gratuities as appreciative visitors might i 
 shower upon them. The guest of honor was the individual who 1 
 had given De Lesseps the most encouragement and tangible help | 
 during the dark hours of his enterprise, the Empress Eugenie, i 
 She might well speak of the canal as “ our ” labor.^®“ Other no- i 
 tables, who arrived just prior to the opening, were the Emperor 1 
 of Austria, the Crown Prince of Prussia, Grand Duke Michael ; 
 of Russia, the Prince and Princess of Holland, and a brilliant staff i 
 
 From a table in Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 236. See the table of distances in 
 Nourse, op. cit., p. 19. 
 
 Calcutta Review, XXXVIII, 361. It was also stated by a French naval 
 officer that whenever the use of the canal would effect a saving of 24. days or more 
 over the Cape route, the saving in fuel and time would make the canal route the 
 more profitable. 
 
 See Nourse, op. cit., p. 58; Fitzgerald, op. cit., I, 237—240. As for actual 
 time in transit through Egypt, the canal produced no saving over the railway route, 
 but in either instance the time was short, and this item was inconsiderable. 
 
 Fitzgerald, op. cit., II, 39, 40. 
 
THE BUILDING OF THE SUEZ CANAL 371 
 
 of French, Prussian, Russian, Austrian, and Egyptian officers, 
 with other guests, to the number of 6000. Great Britain was of- 
 ficially represented by Mr. Henry Elliott, British Ambassador to 
 Turkey, who was supported by several units of the British Medi- 
 terranean fleet. French, Austrian, Italian steamships and a mis- 
 cellaneous group of vessels from other nations comprised an im- 
 pressive and colorful background for the program in hand. The 
 United States was the only western nation of any considerable size 
 not represented by delegate or vessel. 
 
 Three days were employed by the .marine procession, led by the 
 Empress Eugenie in the French imperial yacht Aigle, in passing 
 through the canal. This part of the ceremonies was interspersed 
 with most elaborate entertainment at Ismailia, on which the Vice- 
 roy had lavished his money without stint. A measure of suspense 
 and excitement attended the passage of the canal by the two score 
 of steam vessels because of the knowledge that there had been no 
 thorough examination of the channel before the formal opening. 
 Several of the steamers did run aground on shoals momentarily, 
 but no serious difficulties were incurred owing to the fact that the 
 draught of all vessels was limited to thirteen feet for the initial 
 transit. On the morning of November 20 the official party 
 reached Suez, and the momentous occasion was successfully ter- 
 minated.^®^ The old overland route was passing and a new all- 
 water route was taking its place. 
 
 The English Government conducted itself handsomely upon 
 the occasion of the opening of the canal. Not only was it rep- 
 resented in the person of the Ambassador to Turkey, but high 
 officials of the Government telegraphed congratulations to De 
 Lesseps upon the consummation of a work so beneficial to com- 
 merce. Lord Palmerston and others of the early opponents of 
 the canal had already passed from the scene, and the great ques- 
 tions of the hour, as far as British attitude toward the canal was 
 concerned, touched no longer on the danger of the separation of 
 Egypt from the Ottoman Empire or the planting of a large 
 French colony along the route to India, but rather on the pos- 
 sibility or desirability of neutralizing the canal through inter- 
 national engagements and the better adjustment of canal tolls. 
 
 It is a matter of some interest that one of the British vessels to make the 
 passage of the canal in the wake of the government vessels was the steamship Ha-wk 
 bound for Suez with the shore end of the British Indian Telegraph Company’s cable. 
 
 For details of this notable event see the Illustrated London News, November, 
 1869; Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 390-4-01; Blackwood’s Magazine, CVII, 85—375; 
 Fitzgerald, of. cit., II, 22—4.2; W. G. Hamley, A New Sea and an Old Land- Being 
 Pafers Suggested by a Visit to Egyft at the end of 1869. Hamley was one of the 
 guests at the opening of the canal. 
 
 Charles-Roux, of. cit., I, 401-407; London Times, 18 Dec., 1867. 
 
 L 
 
372 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Once the canal was in operation and the Franco-German War had 
 removed the Emperor Napoleon, much greater concern for the 
 safety of the canal was expressed in London than in Paris. 
 
 It was very soon evident that with the opening of the Suez 
 Canal the English overland route had merely shifted. Instead 
 of following the railway from Alexandria through Cairo to Suez, 
 it now entered at Port Said and continued by water. The first 
 vessel to pass through the canal and pay tolls in regular course 
 flew the British flag. And it was presently found that, over the 
 course of the flrst few years, practically 75 % of the vessels pass- 
 ing through the canal were British. From the beginning the 
 canal was none the less a British highway because it had been con- 
 structed and was being operated by a corporation which was es- 
 sentially French. The transfer of a large share of pecuniary in- 
 terest in the Company to the British Government was scarcely 
 needed to give point to the fact that the Suez Canal from the out- 
 set was intrinsically British j commercially, by virtue of the volume 
 of British trade, and politically, because of British hegemony in 
 the East. 
 
 Jean Darcy, Cent Annies de Rivalite Coloniale, pp. 345—346; Charles-Roux, 
 op. cit., II, 1, 2, passim-, London Titnes, 28 Jan., 1870; C. H. A. Dali, Frofn Cal- 
 cutta to London by the Suez Canal (Calcutta, 1869). 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 
 
 ^ I ^ HE SUCCESS of steam communication with India and 
 
 I its extension to China and Australia led to striking 
 
 A commercial results without the accompaniment of the 
 various kinds of political difficulties which had been anticipated 
 in some quarters. As monthly service had become fortnightly, 
 and as the time in transit of the overland mails shrank from two 
 months to less than one, the benefits increased in proportion. 
 There was, therefore, much less reason to doubt the efficacy of the 
 electric telegraph, once its principles had been discovered, than 
 that of the early steam vessel. Some fifteen years had been neces- 
 sary for the establishment of regular steam communication be- 
 tween Great Britain and India from the time of the first definite 
 proposals. In even less time from the beginning of telegraphy 
 on a commercial scale lines were in operation between England 
 and India, and a network of land lines and submarine cables 
 connected East and West before steam lines had become adequate 
 and sufficiently rapid. 
 
 Soon after the epoch-making telegraphic experiments of the 
 American, Samuel Finley Breese Morse, became generally known 
 they were applied to long distance as well as local communication. 
 As early as 1839 an insulated wire, serving as a kind of primitive 
 submarine .cable, had been laid under the Hoogly River to con- 
 nect the two banks at Calcutta. In 1851 a much more ambitious 
 enterprise was carried out when a submarine cable was successfully 
 laid under the English Channel connecting England and France.^ 
 With the formal opening of this line on November i, 1852, men 
 began to dream of imperial telegraph and cable lines which would 
 annihilate distance as far as the transmission of messages was 
 concerned.^ 
 
 ^ London Times, z Nov., 1852. 
 
 ^ Calcutta Review, LV, 45—46. This journal says, “To Mr. Adley un- 
 doubtedly belongs the credit of having originated the idea of telegraphic com- 
 munication between England and India which is now being carried out. Even the 
 route suggested by him as the best has been adopted.” 
 
 373 
 
374 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Shortly after the close of the Crimean War some short lengths 
 of submarine cable were laid in the Mediterranean, connecting 
 Corsica, Sardinia, Malta, and Corfu, considerably shortening the 
 time for communication between Alexandria and London by way 
 of Marseilles.^ One of the concerns which aided in the building 
 of these shorter lines was the Mediterranean Extension Tele- 
 graph Company. This group, having obtained the sanction of 
 the British Government for laying cables between Cagliari and 
 Malta and Malta and Corfu, completed its lines in 1857, the 
 Government guaranteed a minimum rate of interest for a term 
 of 25 years on a capital of £120,000, conditional on the mainte- 
 nance of the line. The cable broke frequently, however, and in 
 1859 had to be abandoned altogether. After some negotiations a 
 new cable was laid between Sicily and Malta, to which the former 
 guarantees were made to apply.* 
 
 Meanwhile, telegraph lines had been multiplying in India. 
 Experimental lines had been commenced in 1852, and by the be- 
 ginning of 1856 about 4500 miles of electric telegraph were in 
 operation between the principal Indian centres.® The concern and 
 alarm created by the war in Persia and the dangerous outbreak 
 in India in 1857 brought to the authorities both in England and 
 in India poignant realization of the need for a quicker through 
 communication than could be supplied by lines of steamships, 
 however fast and regular these might be.® Companies w^ere im- 
 mediately formed and others projected for the purpose of estab- 
 lishing direct telegraphic communication between England and 
 India; and “had the British Government been favourably dis- 
 posed towards a guarantee or subsidy, engineers were not w'anting 
 who would have undertaken to connect London with Calcutta by 
 an unbroken wire.” ^ 
 
 One of these companies, the European and Indian Junction 
 Telegraph Co., Ltd., has already been alluded to in connection 
 with the proposed Euphrates Valley Railway. This concern, pro- 
 jected in 1856, sought to connect the existing lines in England 
 and on the Continent with the head of the Persian Gulf, whence a 
 cable was projected by the Government of India to extend to 
 Kurrachee.® At the outset this scheme appeared to promise suc- 
 
 ® The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Exf editions to Persia, China, and 
 Japan, 1856-1857-1858 . . . (London, 1859), P- 225; Parliamentary Paper, 1858, 
 No. 382, p. ix. 
 
 ^ Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, p. 116. 
 
 ® The History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 9, 92—93. 
 
 ® Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, II, 367. 
 
 ^ The History of the Indian Revolt, p. 225. 
 
 ® William Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, p. 229; 
 London Times, 16 June, 1856^ Calcutta Review, LV, p. 46. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 375 
 
 cess. Capital stock to the amount of £200,000 was provisionally 
 subscribed for, and considerable encouragement was offered by 
 the Court of Directors.® The East India Company was not in a 
 position to offer either a subsidy or a guarantee of a minimum rate 
 of interest on the capital to be invested, however, and the delay 
 occasioned by the necessity of securing some measure of Govern- 
 ment support before proceeding with such a huge and doubtful 
 venture gave time for other plans to come upon the scene as 
 competitors.^” 
 
 The question of the best telegraphic route at once became a 
 prominent issue. Inasmuch as telegraphic lines were to a large 
 degree independent of water, wind, and land levels, although no 
 less subject to political conditions and influences, there were more 
 possible routes to be considered in this case. The European and 
 Indian Junction Telegraph Co. planned to construct a line from 
 Seleucia, on the Mediterranean, to Basrah or some similar station 
 on the Persian Gulf, following the course of one or the other 
 of the great Mesopotamian rivers for a major portion of the dis- 
 tance and perhaps avoiding nomadic Arab tribes by using a sub- 
 fluvial line in the Tigris below Bagdad. This plan had the 
 advantage of utilizing a direct route, with one terminus reasonably 
 near to Constantinople, whence land lines were about to be com- 
 pleted to Channel ports, and which might in future be connected 
 by submarine cable with Malta, and with the other terminus within 
 reach of Indian lines already in operation. 
 
 Meanwhile another group of promoters put on foot a proposi- 
 tion to construct a submarine line to India using the Suez and Red 
 Sea route. This line, it was pointed out, was practically free from 
 such political difficulties as would naturally beset the rival line, 
 it could at all times be controlled by British forces, and would 
 form a logical supplement to the mail route. 
 
 In May, 1857, a special Committee of the House of Commons 
 investigated both this and the Euphrates Valley project, and 
 during the summer both were debated in Parliament at consider- 
 able length. Even the refusal of the British Government to 
 guarantee a return on the capital subscribed for a Euphrates 
 Valley Railway did not prevent Government consideration of 
 measures for guaranteeing telegraph lines. Indeed, at the very 
 moment of killing the railway project in the House of Commons, 
 
 ® London Times, 6 Jan., 1857. 
 
 Ibid., 4 May, 1858. 
 
 Ibid., 31 May, 1858. 
 
 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1662—1676, fassim; 
 W. P. Andrew, Letter to Viscount Palmerston, K.G., on the Political Importance of 
 the Euphrates Valley Railway . . . pp. 55-68. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 376 
 
 Lord Palmerston remarked that telegraphic communication 
 seemed to him to stand in a different light from a railway, that 
 telegraphic communication was somewhat similar to postal com- 
 munication. He was inclined to favor the Euphrates Valley line 
 in preference to that by way of the Red Sea, and he believed that 
 Government should support it.^® 
 
 The first British projects for linking up England and India by 
 means of land lines of electric telegraph were destined never to 
 bear fruit. The Turkish Government, which in 1856 under the 
 influence of Reschid Pasha had promised sweeping concessions 
 both for a railway and a telegraph line under English auspices, 
 reversed its decision later after the downfall of that famous 
 Minister. Indeed, in 1858 the Turks decided to construct their 
 own telegraph line from Constantinople through Sivas, Diarbekr, 
 Mosul, and Bagdad, to Basrah, in the hope that either the British 
 or the Indian Government would provide for the completion of 
 the line from the head of the Persian Gulf to Kurrachee and so to 
 India. An English agent, John Staniforth, was employed by the 
 Ottoman Government to purchase the necessary materials and 
 supplies in England, and one of his fellow-countrymen, Lieut. - 
 Col. Biddulph was placed in charge of construction operations.^* 
 Meanwhile, two other Englishmen, Messrs. Lionel and Francis 
 Gisborne, had succeeded in obtaining from the Turkish and Egyp- 
 tian Governments in 1856 concessions for the carrying of a tele- 
 graph line across Egypt in connection with the laying of a sub- 
 marine cable from Constantinople to Egypt and from Egypt ^cta 
 the Red Sea to Kurrachee.*® Armed with such an asset, they 
 returned to England and in 1858 completed the organization of 
 the Red Sea and India Telegraph Co., w'hich proposed to extend 
 telegraphic communication not to India merely, but eventually 
 to the East Indies as well, this program being contingent on re- 
 ceiving the necessary governmental assistance at the outset. The 
 line immediately projected between Suez and Kurrachee, 3043 
 miles in length, was to be constructed in sections, with relay sta- 
 tions at intervals along the Egyptian and Arabian coasts.*® 
 
 Memory of the recent crises in the East, coupled with the fact 
 that a very large capital was required to construct, lay and main- 
 tain either land or submarine electric lines, led the British Gov- 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVII, 1677; F. O. 7S/1340, Sir H. Sejuiour 
 to Lord Clarendon, 19 Aug-., 1857. 
 
 Morning Chronicle, 22 June, 1858. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 90, 184. 
 
 Charles Bright, Submarine Telegraphs: Their History, Construction and 
 Working (London, 1898), p. 57. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 377 
 
 ernment to give a guarantee of a minimum rate of interest on a 
 capital stock of £800, 000, although this guarantee was presently 
 translated into a definite and unconditional subsidy of £36,000 
 per year. With this support, the Company hastened to submerge 
 their first lines, commencing late in the year 1858, on the Con- 
 : stantinople-Alexandria division. 
 
 The preparations made for the working of this line were ex- 
 I ceedingly primitive at this early stage of development of sub- 
 : marine telegraphy. Only a very cursory survey was made of the 
 j submarine route over which the cable was to be laid, and no allow- 
 ance was made for varying depths of water or kinds of sea bottom, 
 j The cable itself was such as might have sufficed for a time for 
 short distances, but it was wholly inadequate both in weight and 
 j insulation for a long distance, being merely a single wire insulated 
 with gutta-percha and covered with a hempen sheath. In con- 
 I sequence, after some 220 miles of cable had been paid out from 
 the Constantinople end, tests showed that the insulation was too 
 faulty to admit of sending messages. The cable was cut, there- 
 fore, and became a total loss without ever having been used.^’^ 
 The next year the laying of another and heavier cable was be- 
 gun in the Red Sea. The first section, from Suez to Aden, 1358 
 ' nautical miles, was landed at two points, Cosseir and Suakin. 
 
 ‘ This line failed to work almost Immediately after its completion, 
 j While the cable was being lifted, repaired and tested in i860, the 
 I second portion of the line, from Aden to Kurrachee, 1685' nauti- 
 j cal miles, was being laid. Intermediate stops were made on this 
 division at Hallana Island and at Mascat. This line also very 
 ‘ quickly developed serious faults, and even the section between 
 [ Kurrachee and Bombay could not be relied upon. After some 
 I months spent in vain efforts to resuscitate the line in its various 
 I sections, the Company despaired of success. The whole line had 
 I to be abandoned before any commercial use had been made of it.’^® 
 The causes of failure were several. In the first place, the sur- 
 veys made of the floors of the Red and Arabian Seas were very 
 inadequate, the cable was laid by compass without any attempt to 
 select a bed of uniform depth, and the cable itself was not equally 
 well adapted to various water temperatures and ocean topography. 
 In the second place, the cable-laying machinery was crude, re- 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, p. 90. One of the principal engineers of this 
 line, Henry Charles Forde, gave some exceedingly valuable evidence to a Parliamen- 
 tary Committee on East India communications in 1866. 
 
 Bright, op. cit., pp. 57—58; E. B. Bright and Sir Charles Bright, The Life 
 Story of Sir Charles Tilston Bright (2 vols., London, 1899), II, 31—32. A new 
 concern, the Telegraph to India Company, was formed in 1862 for restoring and 
 working the lines of the Red Sea and India Company. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 378 
 
 suiting in uneven tension as the cable was lowered into the sea. 
 But at all points the line was pulled taut, and the necessity for 
 slack, to allow the cable to adapt itself to the irregularities of the 
 ocean floor, was not appreciated. The result was, not only in this 
 but in several other instances of early cable laying, that where the 
 cable failed to touch bottom by being suspended from one eleva- 
 tion to another, it collected various kinds of sea growths and 
 presently broke under the weight. Moreover, it was found that 
 the protective wire wrappings of the line quickly disintegrated in 
 the warm salt water of the Red Sea. Marine borers, such as the 
 formidable teredo navalis, which had an inexhaustible appetite 
 for gutta-percha cable insulation, and even sharks, were sources 
 of considerable trouble. In some places, too, where water w'as 
 shallow, tidal action and sharp rocks took their toll of damage.^® 
 
 Although this experience was dearly bought (failures in sub- 
 marine telegraphs in 1859 i860 amounted to more than 
 
 £1,000,000), it was only by such practical experience that the con- 
 struction and laying of successful and efficient subaqueous cables 
 was afterward made possible. Scientists and commercial organiza- 
 tions alike began a more thorough study of marine telegraphic 
 engineering. A great deal of evidence bearing on the causes of 
 failure of the first lines was collected in 1859 by ^ Joffit Com- 
 mittee of eight members, half nominated by the Board of Trade 
 and half by the Atlantic Telegraph Company. Between Decem- 
 ber I, 1859, September 4, i860, this Committee held tw'enty- 
 two sittings, consulting engineers, electricians, professors, physi- 
 cists, seamen, and manufacturers, and carefully investigating every 
 phase of the subject. The report of the Committee, submitted in 
 April, 1861, was published by the Government and became a 
 classic in submarine telegraphic engineering.®® 
 
 Just as the first attempts by private corporations to establish 
 long distance steamship lines had been supplanted by government 
 agencies, so it remained for government to take up the burden 1 
 in telegraphic extension where it was relinquished by commercial j 
 enterprise. The first section of government line between England I 
 and India was a cable laid more or less as a result of accident be- : 
 tween Malta and Alexandria. Soon after the Indian Mutiny, 1 
 the British Government decided to lay a cable between Falmouth | 
 and Gibraltar in order to establish the first link in what was pro- 
 
 The Projected Sub-Marine Cable to India and Australia — considered as being 
 the most direct, expeditious, and secure line of communication. . . By H. A. L., 
 ‘‘The Old Shekarry” (H. A. Leveson), (London, 1869), pp. 20—21; Bright and 
 Bright, op. cit., II, 29—31. 
 
 Bright, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
 
 \ 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 379 
 
 jected as a complete British-controlled line to the East.^^ In 
 1857, however, telegraphic communication had been completed 
 from Bombay and Calcutta to Rangoon, and the President of the 
 Board of Control, Sir Charles Wood, gave assurances that the 
 line would soon be continued to Singapore and on to the Austra- 
 lian colonies. The approach of difficulties with China caused 
 the original destination of the Falmouth-Gibraltar cable to be 
 altered to the Rangoon-Singapore line, and in December, i860, 
 the cable was placed on shipboard to be carried out round the Cape. 
 
 ' On the voyage out, one of the cable-laying vessels was damaged 
 so badly that a return to England was necessary. By the time all 
 was again in readiness, the favorable season for laying the cable 
 had passed. Meanwhile, the conclusion of the war with China 
 removed the principal incentive for the establishment of the 
 ' Rangoon line. Difficulties with the Government of India over 
 the responsibility of maintaining the line contributed further to 
 a change in plan. It was finally decided, therefore, to lay the 
 cable between Malta and Alexandria, since Malta was already in 
 : touch with European lines. 
 
 Early in 1861, a new series of soundings was made for the 
 Malta-Alexandria line to correct the existing charts, which were 
 known to be inaccurate. Since the Red Sea cable had been laid in 
 deep water and had been found for that reason very difficult to 
 raise for repairs, the engineers for this line, Messrs. Lionel Gis- 
 borne and Henry Charles Forde, adopted a shallow water bed 
 along the south shore of the Mediterranean. Within the year 
 1861 the whole of this line was laid in sections: from Malta to 
 Tripoli, Tripoli to Benghazi, and Benghazi to Alexandria. Ex- 
 penses of laying the line were shared by the British and Indian 
 Governments, the former assuming three-fifths of the cost.^® In 
 1861 and 1862 a number of breaks occurred in the section near- 
 est Alexandria, due apparently to irregularities in the ocean floor, 
 but the line worked sufficiently well to give promise of becoming 
 a very essential link in eastern communications.'^ 
 
 The political value of telegraph lines and the extent of capital 
 required for their development led to the development of land 
 telegraphs in Europe on a national basis. To some extent this was 
 also true in Asia. During the years from 1857 1861, Turkish 
 
 Pari. Paf., i866, No. 428, pp. 90, 115, 184. 
 
 Ibid,., pp. 184—185. The Convention between the British and Ottoman Gov- 
 ernments for the establishment of the cable between Malta and Alexandria, dated 
 Constantinople, 21 April, 1861, is given in the Appendix, pp. 349—350. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 1 15, 349-350? 582-591. 
 
 Bright and Bright, of. cit., II, 2—3; Bright, of. cit., pp. 62-64. This cable 
 was replaced in 1868 by a direct line from Malta to Alexandria. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 380 
 
 capital was employed in the construction of a line of wire from I 
 Constantinople, or rather Pera, where all the European lines con- j 
 verged, to Bagdad. The line crossed the Bosphorus by means of j 
 a submarine cable some six miles north of the city, then passed to 
 Scutari and Ismid, and thence by a fairly direct line through An- 
 gora, Sivas, Diarbekr, and Mosul to Bagdad.^® This line, though 
 faulty, opened up another link of about 1000 miles between 
 Europe and India. The Turkish Government had originally in- 
 tended to continue the line on to the head of the Persian Gulf. 
 Below Bagdad so many new difficulties appeared, however, that 
 the completion of the work was postponed for a time, and in 1864 
 the line was carried on to the Gulf by English agencies.^® 
 
 In the meantime, Indian lines were reaching out to join with 
 those from the West. It was originally proposed to construct 
 a land line from Kurrachee along the coast of Baluchistan, Per- 
 sia, and the Gulf until it effected a junction with a wire to be 
 brought down from Bagdad. In 1864, Lieut. -Col. Patrick Stew- 
 art, of Indian Mutiny fame, was despatched from India to Persia 
 on special mission to investigate the practicability of the matter. 
 Col. Stewart reported against the construction of a land line. 
 Political relationships in southeastern Persia were so confused, 
 and the native tribes were so lawless, he found, that a land line 
 would only invite difficulties. In view of this report and the com- 
 plete failure of the first Suez-Aden-Kurrachee cable, the British 
 Government conjointly with the Council for India determined 
 upon laying a new cable between the mouth of the Shaat-el-Arab 
 and Gwadur (Gwadel or Churbar) on the Baluch coast, the most 
 westerly point to which it was considered wise to extend the sys- 
 tem of Indian land lines. Both of these enterprises were carried 
 out. Eventually this land line, as a part of the imperial com- 
 munication, was given up in favor of a cable from Kurrachee to 
 Gwadur,^^ but its completion provided a very useful line at the 
 outset. 
 
 Work on the Persian Gulf cable continued during the years i 
 1862, 1863, and 1864. The Gulf was resurveyed for the purpose ! 
 and a favorable cable bed charted. The cable itself contained all of ; 
 the improvements suggested by several years of experience both I 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 619, 620. 
 
 Sykes, op. cit., II, 368. It had been supposed that the roving tribes of the 
 lower Tigris and the malarious climate would be very difficult obstacles to overcome. 
 These proved to be less formidable than had been anticipated. 
 
 Bright and Bright, op. cit., II, 33—34; Frederick H. Goldsmid, Eastern 
 Persia: an Account of the Journeys of the Persian Boundary Commission, 1S70— 
 71—72 ... (2 vols., London, 1876), I, xlii. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 381 
 
 in eastern and western seas. In contrast with some of the earlier 
 lines, which had weighed less than one ton per nautical mile, this 
 had a weight of over four tons per mile. Two of the most able 
 telegraph authorities of the day, Messrs. Charles Bright and 
 Latimer Clark, were appointed engineers of the 1450-mile line, 
 and the former undertook the personal supervision of its laying. 
 Considerable difficulty was experienced in landing the cable near 
 i Fao at the mouth of the Shaat-el-Arab, as the water was exceed- 
 ingly shallow and the mud bottom very soft. The cable-laying 
 flotilla, consisting of some twelve vessels of the Indian Navy and 
 led by the steamers Semiramis and Zenobia, could not approach 
 within six or eight miles of the shore. The cable had to be cut into 
 relatively short lengths of about one and a half miles and placed 
 in position from various small craft. The line gave perfect tests 
 upon its completion, and was “ the first instance of any great 
 length of cable being a complete and lasting success.” 
 
 Meanwhile, arrangements had been worked out at Constanti- 
 nople and incorporated in conventions at the instance of British 
 authorities which were to provide the basis for the working of the 
 various lines through both Turkish and Persian territory. In 
 October, 1863, was signed a protocol generally known as the Over- 
 land Telegraph Convention,^® “ on the subject of the extension 
 of the line above ground from Bagdad to Bussorah and to Khana- 
 kain, with the object of connecting, by two different lines, 
 the Indian telegraph with the telegraphic network of Eu- 
 rope. . .”®® 
 
 According to the agreement, the Ottoman Government was to 
 undertake the construction of a line between Bagdad and Basrah, 
 whence it would connect with the Persian Gulf cable. Upon the 
 completion of this line another was to be constructed in the same 
 manner from Bagdad to Khanikin, whence a Persian line was al- 
 ready reaching out toward Teheran, Ispahan, and Bushire. At 
 Bushire connection would be made again with the Persian Gulf 
 cable. An additional Turco-Persian Treaty was drawn up at 
 Constantinople in November, 1863, to give further effect to the 
 arrangements between Britain and the Ottoman Government. 
 This treaty provided for the uninterrupted transmission of mes- 
 sages, the code to be employed, rates to be levied, et cetera^ and 
 was particularly important in that it defined a part of the Turco- 
 
 Bright, of. cit., p. 77. See Bright and Bright, of. cit., II, 38-41, 53-61; 
 Pari. Paf., 1866, No. 428, p. 179. 
 
 Sykes, of. cit., II, 368. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1866, No. 428, p. 394. 
 
 C. U. Aitchison, A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sunnuds . . . 
 VII, 4, fassim. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 382 
 
 Persian boundary in a territory which had previously been vaguely 
 claimed by both states.®^ 
 
 The year 1864 saw arrangements almost completed for the 
 communication between Great Britain and India. An Indo- < 
 Ottoman Telegraphic Convention was signed at Constantinople 'j 
 on September 3, amplifying the Protocol of the previous year and j 
 making more definitive arrangements for the telegraphic service t 
 in prospect. Provision was made for the establishment of a British i 
 telegraph office at Fao, and for the employment in all Ottoman ( 
 stations of telegraphic staffs “ possessing a knowledge of the i 
 English language sufficient for the perfect performance of that 1 
 service.” All of the officers of the Ottoman telegraphic admin- i 
 istration at the Constantinople office were to “ be selected from ^ 
 those of the Ottoman telegraph officials who are thoroughly con- | 
 versant with the English language ” — a provision which was 
 to cause a good deal of mutual unpleasantness during the next I 
 few years. One line of wire from Constantinople to Fao was 
 always to be devoted exclusively to Indo-European messages.*® 
 The laying of the cable between Gwadur and Fao was com- 
 pleted in March and April, 1864. The first section of the line, 
 between Kurrachee and Gwadur, was laid last because a land line 
 already connected these two places. *■* Work on the land line be- 
 tween Bagdad and Fao had proceeded rather more slowly. It was 
 only in March, 1865, this final gap was closed and the entire 
 system made ready for operation, although the first messages had 
 been sent in the previous month.** 
 
 The construction of the Persian auxiliary line had also been 
 put under way. The first formal step toward the building of this 
 line was the signing of an Anglo-Persian engagement on Decem- 
 ber 17, 1862. “ The Persian Government considers it necessary,” 
 this ran, “ to construct a line of telegraph without delay from 
 Khanakeen to the capital, Teheran, and from Teheran to the port 
 of Bushirej and they agree that, whenever the English Govern- 
 
 A translation of the Treaty is given in Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, App., 
 pp. 403—404; British and. Foreign State Papers, LVII, 1342—1343. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 350—352; Brit, and For. St. Pap., LIV, 20-25; I 
 Lewis Hertslet, A Complete Collection of .. . Treaties . . . XII, 842—846. 
 
 Bright and Bright, op. cit., II, 61—91. Several of the vessels of the Indian 
 Navy participating in this enterprise were those which had steamed and sailed into 
 the Persian Gulf seven years before to storm the Persian forts and land troops 
 at Bushire. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 187, 436. There was a bit of irony in the 
 fact that Col. Stewart, who had superintended the construction of the Indo-European 
 line to the east of Constantinople, died in that city only a few days before the first 
 messages were sent. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 383 
 
 ment may require to communicate by the said telegraph, they are 
 to be at liberty to do so through the Persian telegraph officers in 
 the way they may desire.” Progress was slow on this line, 
 partly because of intrigues at Teheran, but principally because of 
 f the serious depredations of roving tribes and the obstructions 
 raised by local officials. Nevertheless, by the end of 1864 the 
 I first single-wire line was constructed, and it came into regular use 
 I j just a month after the Turkish line had been completed from 
 ' ' Bagdad to the Gulf 
 
 With the opening of the Indo-European line in the early 
 -I months of 1865, the pioneering period in the movement to estab- 
 lish a telegraphic communication with India came to an end.^* 
 Communications which until the end of the first third of the cen- 
 tury had required months, and had been reduced by the steamship 
 to a few weeks, now were sent in a matter of days. The com- 
 munication with India was still far from perfect 5 there were many 
 interruptions in service and many malicious and careless mistakes 
 were made during the frequent repetition of messages at relay 
 |. stations. Perhaps the greatest difficulty lay in the fact that the 
 communication was in the hands of a number of foreign and not 
 always friendly powers. Even at the time when the Indo- 
 European line was just opened, it was a foregone conclusion that 
 it was only a question of time until new submarine cables would 
 largely or entirely replace the unsatisfactory and cumbersome 
 land lines by channels which, because they lay below the surface of 
 the sea, would be entirely British controlled.®® 
 
 During the next few years much effort was devoted to the sup- 
 plementing of the existing facilities for the exchange of messages 
 between England and India and to the removal of as many ob- 
 structions as possible in the wires in use. From the very first the 
 new lines proved to be of very great commercial advantage, in 
 spite of the fact that the transmission of telegrams was frequently 
 slow and they often reached their destination in an inaccurate 
 or garbled form.^® The number of separate political units to be 
 
 Hertslet, of. cit., XII, 692; Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, p. 398. 
 
 Sykes, of. cit., II, 368; Pari. Paf., 1866, No. 428, p. 436; Bright and Bright, 
 of. cit., II, 92—93. The problem of maintaining a land line along the lower 
 Tigris, where nomadic tribesmen often found telegraph wire of great assistance in 
 making bridges or mending harness, and who had a great proclivity for using the 
 ■ insulators on telegraph poles as targets, was largely solved by choosing line guards 
 from these very tribes. These were paid 1 yr. or 16s. per week as long as their 
 particular sections of the wire remained in working order. They, in turn, bribed 
 their fellows to respect the line. 
 
 Bright, of. cit., p. 77. Pari. Paf., 1866, No. 428, p. 87. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 420—426, 491, et fassi?h. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 384 
 
 traversed was one of the greatest problems. A telegram directed 
 from England to India was first delivered to one of two companies 
 acting as agents for the transmission of messages, the Electric 
 and International Telegraph Co. or the Submarine Telegraph 
 Co. These concerns, operating cables to the Continent, were then ' 
 responsible for the further despatch of the telegrams committed , 
 to them by any of the several routes available between London 
 and Constantinople. The route generally employed by the Elec- 
 tric and International Telegraph Co. lay from London to Frank- 
 fort, thence to Vienna, and on to Constantinople via Belgrade. 
 Occasionally messages were sent to Constantinople through Berlin 1 
 and Vienna instead. The Submarine Telegraph Company at times - 
 employed four different routes in Europe, depending on the state ) 
 of repair and the crowded condition of the various lines. One of t 
 these lay by way of Paris, Munich, and Vienna to Constantinople. • 
 Another lay through Paris and Turin, and via Otranto and Valona ; 
 to Constantinople. A third alternative lay via Brussels, Berlin, 1 
 and Belgrade to the Golden Horn. A fourth, not often em- ^ 
 ployed, ran through Russian territory. Entering Europe at The i 
 Hague, it continued via Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Tiflis to Tehe- < 
 ran, or from Berlin via Mysolowitz and Tiflis to the Persian line.^^ ! 
 In all cases the continental lines were government-controlled, I 
 hence there was considerable “ red tape ” in their operation, { 
 resulting in frequent tardiness in the transmission of private or 4 
 foreign official messages. Government messages in each European | 
 state always had the right of way over any messages originating | 
 beyond the frontier. Espionage was frequent and rates varied. ( 
 On account of the political character of these lines, the situation in i 
 Germany prior to the completion of national unification would f 
 have been intolerable but for a centralized telegraphic adminis- i 
 tration, somewhat akin to the Zollverein, termed the Austro- ( 
 Germanic Union, which included the states of the Dutch Nether- \ 
 lands and Belgium, the Germanic Confederation and Austria. ( 
 It controlled all of the lines entering the Continent by way of ( 
 Brussels and extended its control as far as Belgrade, where the 1 
 Turkish Administration began. Thus the German route pos- : 
 sessed a number of advantages over that through France and 1 
 Italy to Turkey.^^ 
 
 The routes available from Constantinople have already been ; 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. ix-x, 26, 28, 30-31, 38, 443, et passim. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 25-26, 37—39, 84, 87, et passim.. The rate on messages from ' 
 England to India in 1866 was 5/. ir. for every 20 words. This cost was apportioned ’ 
 to each of the telegraphic administrations through which the messages had to pass. . 
 France, Italy, and Spain entered into a telegraphic union somewhat similar to the . 
 Austro-German Union. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 385 
 
 I 
 
 I described. The Turkish line passed from Scutari via Ismid, An- 
 I gora, Sivas, Diarbekr, and Mosul to Bagdad. From here the 
 message might be sent direct to Fao and via the Persian Gulf cable 
 to Gwadur and Kurrachee, connecting at the latter point with 
 Indian lines, or it might be routed from Bagdad to Fao through 
 I the Persian line via Teheran and Ispahan. In either case the 
 Persian Gulf cable was the only artery connecting East and West. 
 Presumably a message followed the route specified at the time 
 j it was first received, but in many instances the English operating 
 I companies used their discretion in selecting one route or another, 
 i and not infrequently the telegraph authorities along the way dis- 
 ! regarded routing instructions and followed their own impulses in 
 sending messages in either direction. 
 
 It was with the intention of avoiding many of the difficulties 
 inherent in the European and Asiatic government land lines that 
 the Red Sea and India Telegraph Company had attempted to 
 establish a submarine cable connection between Suez and Kur- 
 rachee in 1858. The early breaking down of this cable and the 
 failure of the Telegraph to India Company to revive it ruined all 
 prospect of a direct and relatively independent line from the 
 Mediterranean to India for a number of years, and left the cables 
 which had been laid in the Mediterranean to connect with the 
 Red Sea line to serve local purposes only in connection with the 
 despatch and arrival of Mediterranean steam packets.^* In 1866, 
 however, there was a prospect that an alternative line to India by 
 way of the Mediterranean and Egypt would be available. Early 
 in this year the Turkish Government opened a line from Alex- 
 andria across the Isthmus of Suez and through Palestine and Syria 
 via Aleppo to Diarbekr. Inasmuch as this communicated with the 
 Alexandria-Malta cable, and thus provided a complete artery be- 
 tween Europe and India through Asiatic Turkey and the Persian 
 Gulf, the Egyptian Government solicited British patronage. Xll? 
 Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company therefore 
 gave notice in London of the availability of this line, and during 
 interruptions in the direct Turkish route it was largely used. The 
 utility of this line for Indian messages was suddenly destroyed, 
 however, when the Turkish authorities discovered that messages 
 sent by this route, although costing the British sender more, paid 
 less Turkish revenue, and the acceptance of messages between 
 
 During the American Civil War, to be sure, the cables running to Egypt were 
 burdened with commercial messages relating to Egyptian cotton and the cable com- 
 panies reaped a harvest of fees. After 1865, however, these lines were very little 
 used except during the few weeks mentioned in the text. — See Pari. Paf., 1866, 
 No. 428, pp. 85, 97-98, 1 17. 
 
386 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 England and India was ordered discontinued. The line between 
 Malta and Alexandria thereupon relapsed into desuetude, only 
 partially relieved by the sending of local messages or by the 
 transmission to England of messages brought to Egypt by steam 
 packet.^* 
 
 By the time telegraphic communication with Europe had been 
 completed, India was well supplied with land lines. As a system, 
 these impinged on Kurrachee, which had thus become the most 
 important telegraphic station in the East.*^ At the beginning of 
 the year 1865, India had some 14,500 miles of government and 
 3000 miles of railway-owned telegraph lines serving practically 
 all of the great metropoles of the country.^® But unfortunately, 
 the mileage of lines and the fact that most of this was govern- 
 ment property was no index to the quality of service maintained. 
 The efficiency of these lines, indeed, was notoriously poor. This 
 was due in part to the fact that many of the most important tele- 
 graphic branches in India had been hastily constructed for emer- 
 gency use, during and immediately following the Indian Mutiny, 
 in which instances neither the materials employed nor the work- 
 manship were such as would maintain an efficient and permanent 
 establishment. In the second place, “ the dominant idea in start- 
 ing the telegraph in India was to get it constructed cheaply, [and 
 it was believed] . . . that the way to start it cheaply was to put 
 up a thick iron wire on the top of a plain wooden post, without 
 any insulations . . . and having got the cheapest possible line, 
 to get the cheapest possible establishment to work it.” Salaries 
 paid both to officers and to signallers were made as low as pos- 
 sible. Mere boys, almost wholly illiterate, were given charge of 
 sending and receiving messages. Native linemen were employed 
 at low wages without any adequate oversight or direction, and 
 their work was largely neglected. All of these factors combined 
 to breed delay and inaccuracy in the sending of telegrams in India. 
 But coupled with these evils was that of malicious misconstruction 
 of messages whenever native merchants might profit from such 
 errors, and it was an open scandal that commercial intelligence 
 was peddled in Indian markets by Government telegraph clerks. 
 Indeed, of all the difficulties and chances of error to be contended 
 with in sending a message from London to Bombay, Calcutta, or 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 83—84, 100, 118, 195-196. 
 
 Ihid., 1870, No. 1 66, p. 13. 
 
 Ibid., 1866, No. 423, pp. 137, xiii. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 134, 162, 345—346. It was proposed at various times after 1S62 
 that a private company be formed to take over the Indian telegraph lines, but the 
 Government was unwilling to surrender so much power. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 387 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
 i' 
 
 Madras, those encountered between the presidencies and Kurra- 
 chee were decidedly the worstd® 
 
 During the first year of Indo-European telegraphic communi- 
 cations many difficulties and aggravations arose in addition to 
 those which were peculiar to Indian lines. Often breaks in wires 
 along the main trunk lines resulted in long interruptions and de- 
 lays, with no hope of redress on the part of senders of messages. 
 The many different telegraph systems and administrations com- 
 prising even the least complicated of the complete routes made for 
 confusion and irresponsibility. Places of error or causes of delay 
 were difficult to locate. Nevertheless, it early became apparent 
 that the bulk of these evils lay in the Turkish lines. For the most 
 part, European systems worked well and dependably. Persian 
 lines were operated, under Anglo-Persian conventions, by British 
 officials in charge of the Superintendent of the Indo-European 
 Telegraph,^® and except when the wires temporarily failed, good 
 service was rendered. In the case of the Turkish lines, however, 
 no intelligent or adequate supervision was provided for, either 
 for transmission of messages or upkeep of lines. At the same 
 time, Turkish authorities refused to place British officers in any 
 positions of trust and power, partly, perhaps, because of pressure 
 from other European states.®® As a result, messages frequently 
 accumulated in considerable numbers at some of the Turkish relay 
 stations, and were filed in the order in which they arrived. When 
 a spurt of energy or the repair of a wire again started their trans- 
 mission, the sending clerks usually began at the top of the ac- 
 cumulation of telegrams. Some of these reached their destina- 
 tion in good time, a matter of from five to eight days, while others 
 required a month or even more, arriving after the confirming 
 message sent by mail had been delivered.®’' 
 
 In spite of a great deal of irregularity and inaccuracy in the 
 sending of messages between England and India, merchants in 
 both countries uniformly pronounced the telegraph a great con- 
 venience, if not a commercial necessity. Their constant protests 
 at faulty service and the steady increase in the number and value 
 of commercial transactions in the East were becoming insistent by 
 the first of the year 1866.®® Other needs were also crying for at- 
 
 Ibid., pp. 42, 55—56, 86, 98 ff., 105— 110, 112— 113, 408—413, 420. 
 
 In 1865—1866, it was Lieut.-Col. Frederick J. Goldsmid, who was presently- 
 succeeded by Major J. W. Champain. — -Brit, and For. St. Pap., LV, 26-29. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 104—106. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 27, 50, 99, 198. Indeed, in 1866, one message was transmitted 
 between Calcutta and London in less than two hours. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 39-41, 45, 49, 50, 52, 55, 531-537. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 388 
 
 tention. The Australian colonies, which after long agitation and 
 many disappointments had secured regular steam packet service 
 a few years earlier, now came forward with demands for tele- 
 graphic communication with the home country.®^ Lines had 
 already been constructed between the various provincial capitals 
 at the expense of colonial governments. The Dutch had com- 
 pleted a telegraphic link from end to end of Java. Indian tele- 
 graphs had been extended eastward to Rangoon and lines pro- 
 jected to Singapore and China. Colonial representations on this 
 head contributed materially to the focusing of Parliamentary at- 
 tention on the several phases of eastern communications, and on 
 February 27, 1866, a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
 was appointed, largely at the instance of Sir Charles Bright, “ to 
 inquire into the practical working of the present systems of Tele- 
 graphic and Postal Communications between this Country and the 
 East Indies.” 
 
 This Select Committee, representing men experienced in every 
 aspect of communication facilities, held a number of sessions be- I 
 tween March 13 and July 20, when their report was completed. 
 
 A thorough survey was made of existing and proposed lines of . 
 steamships, land telegraphs, and cables. Tbe report of the 1 
 Committee was influenced to no small degree by the striking fact 
 that from the moment the Committee was appointed the tele- 
 graphic service on all Turkish lines particularly, and on European, 
 Persian, and Indian land lines in general, underwent a vast im- 
 provement. Messages were transmitted with a great degree of 
 accuracy and in only a fraction of the time previously consumed, 
 giving conclusive evidence that the majority of evils which had 
 been suffered for some time were not inherent in the electric lines 
 themselves. 
 
 Considerable attention was first given in the report to a speed- 
 ing up of steam communication and postal service to all parts of 
 the East. Proceeding then to telegraphic facilities, it was recom- 
 mended that, “ having regard to the magnitude of the interests, 
 political, commercial, and social, involved in the connection be- 
 tween this country and India,” it was not expedient that the 
 means of intercommunication by telegraph should be dependent 
 upon any line or lines in the hands of foreign governments, how- 
 ever well such services might be administered in times of peace. 
 Because of that, new and independent land lines ought to be es- 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 71-72, 123-124, 183—191, 193-194. 
 
 Ibid., p. ii; Bright and Bright, op. cit., II, 140-143; London Times, 20 Feb., 
 
 1866. 
 
 Pari . Pap ., 1866, No. 428, pp. 27, 38, 41-42, 50-51, 54, 58, 540-555- 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 389 
 
 tablished through Turkey, and the conduct of Persian lines should 
 be improved. Further, the communication by way of the Persian 
 Gulf should be doubled, either by the laying of a second cable, 
 or by continuing the land line from Kurrachee and Gwadur 
 to Bunder Abbas and thence to Ispahan. In conclusion, it was 
 recommended that Government support be given the project of : 
 establishing a direct line under one management between London 
 and the Indian Presidencies and between India and Australia by ; 
 way of China.®® 
 
 j Many of the recommendations of the Select Committee of 
 1866 were carried out. The Persian Gulf cable to Kurrachee 
 I was supplemented a year later by the extension of a line of land 
 ( telegraph from Gwadur to Jask.®^ These lines received rein- 
 forcement in 1868 with the formation of the Indo-European 
 ' Telegraph Company, “ for promoting a more speedy and reliable 
 line of communication between England and India.” The 
 (Tine constructed by this concern was completed in 1870, and 
 ( brought together under a single management a line extending 
 ; through Germany and lower Russia to Teheran, where it met the 
 lines of the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Indian 
 ' Government. As long as this route held a practical monopoly of 
 all messages transmitted between East and West it was naturally 
 a profitable medium of intercourse. From the time the line from 
 India to Europe was first opened until 1870, the Indian Govern- 
 ment realized approximately £100,000 per year on the Persian 
 Gulf cable. 
 
 Such halcyon times, however, could not endure. A great rival 
 water route, possessing advantages as peculiar in the realm of tele- 
 graphic as in that of steam communication, was opened in 1870, 
 and within a few years had gone far toward displacing the land 
 route. The first attempts to connect Europe and India by means 
 of submarine cables were made at a very early stage of telegraphic 
 development, and were, in consequence, failures. But in May, 
 1868, a new era dawned with the formation of the Anglo- 
 Mediterranean Telegraph Company for the construction and ! 
 operation of land lines in Italy connecting with those leading to I 
 England and of a new direct cable from Malta to Alexandria. J 
 Up to 1868 the telegraphic communication between England and 
 Egypt was carried on by means of the submarine cable between 
 
 Ibid.., pp. xv-xvi; Brig-ht and Bright, op. cit., II, 146—148. It was also 
 recommended that the Indian telegraphs be leased or otherwise made over to private 
 concerns for operating. 
 
 Goldsmid, op. cit., I, xlix; Hertslet, op. cit., XII, 855-858. 
 
 Bright and Bright, op. cit., 11 , 78. 
 
390 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Dover and Calais, the French and Italian land lines to Sicily, 
 the Mediterranean Extension Company’s cable to Malta, and 
 thence by the Government cable via Benghazi to Alexandria. 
 This mode of communication proved to be so unsatisfactory that 
 the Anglo-Mediterranean Telegraph Company undertook to 
 rectify it. The Company first purchased a forty-year concession 
 from the Government of Italy for the working of their land wires 
 by English clerks. Then it proceeded to lay a Malta-Alexandria 
 cable, securing permission for this construction by leasing the 
 British Government cable for fifteen years at £2000 per year.®* 
 This provided for efficient service between England and Egypt 
 by way of the Continent. 
 
 The next step in developing a new artery to the East was taken 
 with the formation of the Falmouth, Gibraltar, and Malta Tele- 
 graph Company in 1869 for a line of cable as indicated in the 
 firm’s name. This enterprise, although competing to a degree 
 with the line of the Mediterranean Extension Company between 
 Sicily and Malta, on the capital of which the British Government 
 had guaranteed 6% per annum, nevertheless had a great political 
 and strategic value in making England independent of continental | 
 countries for her Mediterranean communications.®® This line w'as ; 
 opened in June, iSy'o, greatly reducing the time and increasing 
 the efficiency in the service between England and Egypt.®^ 
 
 Meanwhile a third great line of cable was being completed be- 
 tween Suez and Bombay, bringing to fruition the plan in which 
 the Red Sea and India Company had failed ten years earlier. 
 Such a proposition had been made to the India Office in Decem- 
 ber, 1866, by the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Com- 
 pany, which was working the Malta and Alexandria cable on lease, . 
 but as this proposal was based on the idea that a government 
 guarantee of interest would be absolutely necessary, it was allowed 
 to lapse. ®^ The next year a new project was launched under ‘ 
 the name of the Anglo-Indian Telegraph Company for the build- ■ 
 ing of a similar line, and a provisional contract was signed with : 
 the Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company for the ■ 
 manufacture and laying of the cable. At the request of the latter, , 
 a British frigate was despatched to take new soundings in the ■' 
 ' Arabian Sea, and other preparations for the laying of a cable : 
 reached an advanced stage. But difficulties in the raising of the 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1870, No. 277, pp. 4-5. 
 
 Ibid., p. 2. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1871, No. 455, p. 19. 
 
 Joseph C. Parkinson, The Ocean Telegraph to India. A Narrative and a ■ 
 Diary (Edinburgh & London, 1870), pp. 4—5. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 391 
 
 I capital necessary to complete the work again commanded pause, 
 
 ! as the Government consistently turned a deaf ear to all requests 
 for a guarantee of the stipulated five per cent interest.®* 
 
 Still, prospects for profitable investment in a submarine tele- 
 graph reaching to India continued steadily to grow. A memorial, 
 signed by some of the most influential merchants of London and 
 presented to the Secretary of State for India in April, 1868, said: 
 
 The existing telegraphic communication with the East has 
 been proved by the experience of three years’ working to 
 be altogether inadequate to the requirements of the age, 
 and . . . notwithstanding the Government of India has 
 made great efforts and spent large sums to improve the 
 [Indo-European] line, the delays, uncertainty, inaccuracy, 
 and irregularity in the transmission of messages continue as 
 great as when the line was first opened. . . The present 
 system of the existing land lines of telegraphic communica- 
 tion is unsound from beginning to end, and its defaults and 
 failings are such that they cannot be ameliorated or over- 
 come.®* 
 
 In view of the obvious need, a group of capitalists and pro- 
 moters in January, 1869, organized themselves as the BritisE- 
 Indian Submarine Telegraph Company and put their project on 
 foot before the parent organization, the Ang 1ri-Tnr)ia n Compa ny, 
 had been dissolved. A large part of the proposed capital of £1,- 
 200,000 was subscribed by the promoters themselves and plans 
 were made for completing eastern cable lines without recourse 
 to Government aid.®® The Telegraph Construction and Main- 
 tenance Co. undertook to manufacture and lay the cable upon 
 terms which made them essentially large stockholders in the 
 British concern. 
 
 Work progressed rapidly on the enterprise. Late in 1869 the 
 manufacture of the cable was completed, and 3600 nautical miles 
 of cable was loaded on shipboard for the voyage out to the Suez- 
 Bombay line. The flagship of the cable-laying fleet was the 
 giant paddle-wheel steamship Great Eastern, of 25,000 tons and 
 nominal 3000 horsepower. This famous vessel was originally 
 planned as the first of a fleet of six great passenger steamships to 
 ply between Galle and Suez. Failing to make sufficient profits 
 for her owners on her early voyages, she was stripped of much 
 
 Ibid., pp. 3, 6-13. 
 
 H. A. L., The Projected Sub-Marine Cable to India and Australia, pp. 7—8. 
 ®® Pari. Paf., 1871, No. 455, p. 3. 
 
392 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 of her luxurious equipment, and cable tanks were placed where 
 one set of boilers and one smoke-stack had originally been in- 
 stalled. In this unassuming but practical fashion, the Great 
 Eastern “ carried out her destiny in a way far different from that 
 intended, but effective, nevertheless, in annihilating time and 
 space and in bringing West and East together.” 
 
 The Great Eastern alone went out to her work around the 
 Cape of Good Hope, the other vessels with their less valuable 
 cargoes being despatched by way of the recently opened Suez 
 Canal. While the lesser vessels laid sections of the cable in 
 the Gulf of Suez and down the Red Sea, the Great Eastern^ start- 
 ing from the Bombay terminus early in February, 1870, pro- 
 ceeded in her epoch-making task of laying a line direct to Aden. 
 Some difffculties were encountered in depositing the Red Sea cable, 
 but the entire line between Suez and Bombay, with one way 
 station at Aden, was completed and had successfully responded to 
 tests by March 22.®® 
 
 Meanwhile the cables of the Falmouth, Gibraltar, and Malta 
 Company were being submerged. By the end of May, another 
 fleet of four vessels supplied by the cable manufacturers, the 
 Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company, had com- 
 pleted the laying of this 2456 miles of undersea line, and the 
 cable communication between Great Britain and India was com- 
 plete.®® The only land line remaining in this whole system was 
 that across Egypt, which, indeed, remained the weakest link in 
 the chain. However, this was a relatively short line, and few 
 interruptions were experienced because of native tampering with 
 the wires. Thus the old overland route had again been found 
 to be the natural channel for British communication with the 
 East. As in the case of steam communication, Egypt was found 
 to be an obstacle, but not a barrier, and being a fundamental part 
 of the most logical telegraphic route to the East inevitably as- 
 sumed a more important position still in British eyes at the very 
 moment when a French company had succeeded in piercing the 
 Isthmus of Suez for a sea-level ship canal. 
 
 One other aspect of the completion of cable communication 
 with India via Egypt is of some interest. The various lines 
 which, taken together, comprised this cable system had been pro- 
 jected as alternative to those forming the Indo-European sys- 
 tem. Almost from the outset, however, these Eastern lines, as 
 
 Parkinson, of. at., pp. 189-190. 
 
 Percy Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, II, 37 n. 
 
 Parkinson, of. cit., pp. 32-257. Parkinson, as a passenger on the Great 
 Eastern, was an interested eye witness of the laying of the Indian cable. 
 
 ®® Parkinson, of. cit., pp. 265-296. 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 393 
 
 ' they came to be called, because of their exemption from political 
 ■ , surveillance and because of the greater speed and accuracy with 
 which their messages were transmitted, became the main artery 
 of intercommunication between West and East, relegating the 
 . j Indo-European system, with its various tributaries and branch 
 1 ! lines, to the position of an alternative route. 
 
 Far from greeting the advent of the new privately financed and 
 
 I politically independent lines with signs of satisfaction and evi- 
 • ! dence of support, government authorities both in England and in 
 I India actually discriminated in favor of the older Indo-European 
 I lines. The motives for this lack of cooperation were to be found 
 
 ' I principally in the fact that both British and Indian Governments 
 [ retained certain vested interests in lines earlier constructed with 
 
 I I which the new system actively competed.^® The Government of 
 f' India alone had spent some £800,000 on its Persian Gulf lines, 
 I; and was in consequence not disposed to grant any of the several 
 !■' requests of the British Indian Company for telegraphic facilities 
 ! in India, including the use of a special wire from Bombay to Cal- 
 I.' cutta. Indeed, since all telegraphs in India were Government 
 [i' controlled, the British Indian Company were compelled to es- 
 Ij tablish their Bombay offices in the Government telegraph build- 
 il ing, much to their disadvantage. Moreover, it was soon found 
 ■! that their service was seriously injured by the practice of Indian 
 1 Government telegraph employees in routing by way of the Persian 
 
 The following table, based on one given in Pari. Paf., 1871, No. 455, p. 5) 
 t will indicate the character of the lines leading to India at the end of 1870; 
 
 1. Via North Germany 
 and Russia. . . 
 
 2. Via the Netherlands 
 j and Russia. . . 
 
 3. Via Belgium, North 
 „ Germany, and Russia. 
 
 4. Via the Netherlands 
 and Turkey. . . 
 
 5. Via Belgium and 
 Turkey. . . 
 
 6. Via France, Austro- 
 Germanic Union, and 
 
 : Turkey. . . 
 
 7. Via France, Switzer- 
 land, and Turkey. 
 
 8. Via France, Italy, 
 
 I, and Turkey. . . 
 
 9. Via France, Italy, 
 
 ■i and Med. Cables. . . 
 
 10. Via Falmouth, Gib- 
 raltar, Malta, and 
 I Alexandria cables. . . 
 
 Indo-European Co. 
 Foreign Governments 
 & Indo-European Co. 
 Foreign Governments 
 & Indo-European Co. 
 
 Foreign Governments 
 
 Foreign Governments 
 
 Foreign Governments 
 Foreign Governments 
 Foreign Governments 
 Private Company 
 
 Private Companies 
 
 From 
 
 Bushire 
 
 From 
 
 Fao 
 
 Via Indian 
 Government 
 Persian 
 Gulf Lines. 
 
 Via Redlpia Red 
 Sea f Sea 
 Cable I Cable. 
 
394 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Gulf messages which were definitely marked by the sender “ via 
 Red Sea.” Frequent petitions to the India Office against this 
 malicious practice either were pigeonholed or were answered 
 by promises to investigate the complaints. 
 
 Out of the active opposition of the Indian Government and the j 
 passive neglect of the English authorities, a telegraphic confedera- | 
 tion evolved. Soon after the organization of the Falmouth, Gib- { 
 raltar, and Malta and British Indian Companies the need for I 
 cooperative endeavor led to the association of these two concerns I 
 with the Anglo-Mediterranean Company under the general di- S 
 rection of Mr. (later Sir) John Pender, Chairman of the British ij 
 Indian Company.^^ From an informal alliance, these companies J 
 soon became a definite association, under the management of a I 
 Joint Committee of Directors with offices at 66, Old Broad-Street, I 
 London. From time to time other telegraphic concerns represent- ,| 
 ing branches or extensions of the original Mediterranean-Red Sea ij 
 trunk line to India were brought into the system, until it became j 
 incorporated as the Eastern Associated Telegraph Companies, I 
 comprising in 1922, after various mergers of the original con- -j 
 cerns had taken place, eleven different companies. These, serving 
 almost every part of the Old World and much of the New, may 
 be considered as a monument to Sir John Pender.'® i 
 
 The establishment of steam lines connecting Great Britain with ;l 
 India was but the forerunner of a “ comprehensive ” system of 'i 
 steam communication with all parts of the East. Telegraphic lines ■! 
 followed the same order of development. The formation of the ;| 
 British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company was followed by .1 
 the organization of the British India Extension Telegraph Com- 
 pany, for the purpose of carrying a cable from some point in India 
 to Penang, Malacca, and Singapore. This was immediately fol- 
 lowed by a China Submarine Telegraph Company, to carry the 
 cable from Singapore to Hong Kong and Shanghai, and the British 
 Australian Telegraph Company, to carry a cable line from Singa- I 
 pore to Java and thence to Port Darwin. Together, these com- 
 panies represented £1,585,000 in capital, subscribed for the 
 construction of approximately 7000 miles of cable and land lines | 
 beyond India.'® These lines, all a part of the Eastern Group, were 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1871, No. 455, pp. 4 ff., ii, 20, 27-30, 33 - 35 - 
 
 Ibid., p. J et passim. 
 
 Fifty Years of Via Eastern'"-, A Souvenir and Record of the Celebration 
 in Connection vAth the Jubilee of the Eastern Associated Telegraph Companies 
 (London, pr. print., 1922), pp. 14-16. The son of this pioneer. Sir John Denison- 
 Pender, is at present Chairman of the Eastern Group. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1871, No. 455, pp. 15—18, passim. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 8, 27; Parkinson, op. cit., p. 328. 
 
I TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 395 
 
 , J I' 
 
 : in operation before the end of 1871, and went far toward accus- 
 toming the modern world to think in terms of vaster distances. 
 
 From time to time this great cable system was extended and 
 1 improved as new needs arose and technical improvements in cable 
 ' construction and electrical transmission were made. In 1875 du- 
 \ plex telegraphy, that is, the simultaneous sending of two messages 
 1 over the same wire, was successfully applied to a section of cable in 
 i the Mediterranean, and within a few years the whole Eastern 
 
 I [system had been modernized in this way.'^® Before the Great 
 
 I I War many of the original cables had been duplicated and trebled 
 [ in order to accommodate rapidly increasing demands for service. 
 ! A network of “ Eastern ” cables extended throughout the Medi- 
 : terranean, crossed Egypt by special wires and by two different 
 I routes,^^ and penetrated to almost all parts of the Orient where 
 
 political or commercial interests were of any consequence. In 
 1870 the companies comprising the Eastern association owned and 
 1 controlled but a very few thousand miles of submarine cable. By 
 ; 1922 this had grown to 130,000 miles, and the officials of this 
 system could then boast that “ there is hardly any spot in the more 
 1' developed parts of the British Empire and of the world which 
 f' cannot speedily be reached by a message marked ‘ via Eastern.’ ” 
 f The speed of transmission and reduction of sending rates kept 
 pace with the extension of cable lines. In 1876 Egypt might be 
 
 i reached from England under good conditions in three or four 
 
 ii hours, and Bombay might be brought into communication in about 
 I five hours. By 1900 a message could be sent from England to 
 ! Egypt in a matter of twenty minutes, to Bombay in thirty-five 
 ' minutes, to China in eighty, and to Australia in one hundred 
 , minutes. At the opening of the British Empire Exhibition at 
 ' Wembley in 1924 a message despatched from the Exhibition 
 
 grounds by King George encircled the world over British lines 
 and was received at the starting point eighty seconds later. In 
 similar ratio has been the cost of telegraphic service. At the outset 
 of telegraphic communication with India a 20-word message cost 
 £5 ij'., which greatly restricted the number of messages which 
 could profitably be sent.^® By 1891 a standard message over the 
 same distance cost only 4.^., less than one per cent of the original 
 charge. The number of cable messages despatched in either di- 
 rection naturally increased in proportion from a few dozen in 
 
 ! Bright, of. cit., p. 123. 
 
 J. C. McCoan, Egyft as It Is, p. 252. 
 
 Fifty Years of “ Via Eastern,’^ p. 16. See pp. 92—95. Some 30,000 miles 
 of new cable have been laid by this Group since the Armistice in 1918. These 
 figures do not take into account many subsidiary land lines, 
 t Bright, of. cit., p. 168; Pari. Paf., 1866, No. 428, pp. 26, 37, 151. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES IN lA 
 
 396 
 
 1870 to about 2,000,000 in 1895 and untold millions more re- 
 cently over the whole of the system.*® 
 
 But improvements in telegraphic service between England and 
 the East have by no means been confined to the submarine cables 
 of the Eastern Group. The submarine cable lines to India were 
 projected because of the advantages expected to accrue from lines 
 entirely British owned and operated as against the land lines which 
 came under several political administrations. This great handi- 
 cap was to a great extent remedied, however, when, in 1869, 
 Messrs. Siemens Brothers, German manufacturers of all kinds 
 of electrical equipment, acting on concessions secured during the 
 previous year, began the construction of a two-wire line from the 
 Russian frontier at Alexandrovst via Odessa, Tiflis, Julfa, and 
 Tabriz to Teheran, where it joined the wires of the Indian Gov- 
 ernment. Through wires were leased from other European Gov- 
 ernments to complete a two-wire system under one control from 
 England to Bushire, whence the Persian Gulf cable continued the 
 line to India. Messrs. Siemens’ enterprise was absorbed in 1870 
 by the Indo-European Telegraph Company, Ltd., which was able 
 to compete successfully with the cable lines to India, although a 
 greater proportion of profit was received from local messages. 
 
 The opening of the lines of the Indo-European Telegraph 
 Company at the end of January, 1870, inaugurated a series of 
 changes in important land lines in Asia. The British Government 
 transferred its old line between Teheran and Bagdad to the Per- 
 sian Government and built a new two-wire line between Teheran 
 and Bushire. In December, 1872, a Convention was signed at 
 Teheran between Great Britain and Persia providing for the ad- 
 dition of a third wire to the line between Teheran and Bushire, 
 two of these to be employed entirely for international traffic.*' I 
 This arrangement proved to be so satisfactory that it remained un- 
 changed for a number of years.®* 
 
 In 1898 advantages were seen by British authorities in the con- 
 struction of a direct land' line across southeastern Persia via Yedz, 
 Kerman, Bam, and southwestern Baluchistan to Kurrachee. Sur- 
 veys were begun for the line at once, but an Anglo-Persian Con- 
 vention which provided for a three-wire line on iron posts, was 
 
 Fifty Years of ‘‘Via Eastern” pp. 94, 182, 190, 202. 
 
 Sykes, op. cit., II, 368. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXII, 262—266. 
 
 Interruptions did occur now and then along' the line between Shiraz and 
 Shuster, due to the proclivities of the natives for tampering with the line, but the 
 breaks were of short duration. See Arthur Arnold, Through Persia by Cara^'an 
 (N. Y., 1877), pp. 193, 365-366. 
 
r 
 
 Xi 0 '*' 
 
 
 
 
St Petersburg 
 (Leningrad) 
 
 ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION 
 TO INDIA 
 About 1875 
 
 The main line of the projected Euphrates Valley Railway 
 Alternative lines of the projectea Euphrates Valley Railway 
 The main line of the later Bagdad Railway and 
 European connections 
 Overland mail routes 
 Lines of steam navigation 
 Principal Indian railway lines 
 British telegraph and cable lines in operation 
 Foreign telegraphs constituting links in eastern 
 communications 
 
Tobolsk 
 
TELEGRAPHIC ROUTES TO THE EAST 397 
 
 postponed until August, 1901. This “ Central Persian Line ” was 
 begun the next year and opened early in 1907. This completed 
 an all-land line from England to India, excepting the Channel 
 cables, to serve as a great alternative route to the all-British sub- 
 marine cables.®* 
 
 • The development of telegraphic lines to the East gave emphasis 
 to the fact already made apparent by many factors that political 
 I conditions along the shores of the Mediterranean and, to a still 
 greater extent, in the countries of western Asia and Egypt were 
 of fundamental importance to British interests.®® However, the 
 concern with which the British Government viewed conditions in 
 the Near and Middle East was greatly enhanced by the piercing 
 of the Isthmus of Suez for commercial purposes just as lines of 
 cable and land telegraph were effectively linking England and 
 India. The steady growth of the Indian trade, the increase of 
 British investments in Indian enterprises, and the development 
 of telegraphic lines give a fair clue to British policies in the East 
 after 1870, as the evolution of lines of steam communication do 
 for the preceding half century.®® 
 
 One of the concomitants of the development and extension of Persian telegraph 
 lines toward India was the delimitation of the boundaries of eastern Persia. Between 
 1870 and 1873 the Makran and Sistan questions were settled, and other outstanding 
 controversies were ended during the years 1896-1905. These settlements not only 
 [ contributed to the efficiency of telegraphic communication but also greatly simplified 
 f every aspect of the international relations of the states concerned. — See Col. Sir 
 Frederick J. Goldsmid, Telegrafh and Travel: A Narrative of the Formation and 
 Development of a Telegraphic Communication between England and India . . . 
 (London, 1874); Sykes, op. cit., II, 361-366. 
 
 British exports to India in 1871 amounted to £20,181,145, and in 1872 to 
 £26,977,869. Imports from India in 1871 totalled £12,986,083, and in 1872, 
 £14,153,105. — Statesman's Year Book, 1873, pp. xxxiv-xxxv. 
 
 J. Henniker-Heaton, “ The Postal and Telegraphic Communication of the 
 Empire,” in the Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, XIX (1887-1888), 
 170-221. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 
 IMPROVEMENTS IN EASTERN COMMUNICATIONS 
 
 A fter 1836 the overland route was semi-official for mails 
 and despatches, and after 1839 the communications by 
 . this line were officially and regularly maintained. 
 Thereafter mails and passengers passed through Egypt without 
 interruption or hazard, although at this vital point the eastern 
 communications were particularly vulnerable. The overland 
 route was cherished by the Pasha because the tolls levied on the 
 transit brought in considerable revenue.^ And it was fostered by 
 the English because of its invaluable economy in time over the 1 
 Cape route. ; 
 
 In three very important respects, however, the overland route ; 
 was not adequate for imperial purposes. It did not suffice for the ? 
 transportation of large quantities of commercial goods, hence it ' 
 was not primarily a commercial route, except for the sending of i 
 commercial papers. Only the cutting of a ship canal could sup- • 
 ply that deficiency. In the second place, the line was strategically i 
 weak. As the overland portion crossed a portion of the Ottoman 
 domain, it was not subject to British protection and control at all 
 times. This was a serious situation, but it gave rise to still an- 
 other difficulty. This route, at the outset, could not be used as a 
 military high road. In view of the peculiar international status i; 
 of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, the despatch ' 
 of armed British forces through Egypt in either direction was ' 
 likely to raise delicate issues of more than local import. As long : 1 
 as this limitation endured, the usefulness of the overland route i 
 was considerably impaired. But the exigencies of two wars, arising . ' 
 in very different spheres soon after the middle of the century, ■ 
 corrected this third deficiency before solutions of either of the ; 
 others had yet been discovered. 
 
 The first extensive use of either the route through Egypt or 
 
 ^ It was stated before a Select Parliamentary Committee in 1S58 that the net 
 profit of the overland route to the Pasha at that time was about £30,000 per year. — 
 Parliamentary Paper, 1858, No. 382, p. 94. 
 
 398 
 
1 IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 399 
 
 ;hat through Mesopotamia for movements of British troops oc- 
 f;urred during the Crimean War. Considering the nature of the 
 1 more fundamental issues involved, the British Government 
 Adeemed it appropriate to draw certain reenforcements from the 
 Indian forces of the East India Company. During the first two 
 -months of 1855, two regiments of Indian Dragoons, consisting 
 of 1600 men and 1400 horses, were safely transported through 
 Egypt during the hot season for service in the Crimea. At the 
 {close of the war the horses were disposed of in Europe, but the 
 hmen were returned to India by way of Egypt in August, 1856.^ 
 JThis, however, scarcely established a precedent by which British 
 liforces might be despatched through the Ottoman Empire in fu- 
 ture, for the circumstances in 1855 were somewhat unique. Then 
 ■ Great Britain was in close alliance with one of the two European 
 Powers which maintained a lively concern in eastern afFairs, while 
 i the other was a mutual enemy j and the Turks, who were fighting 
 for very existence, welcomed aid from every source. The fact 
 that troops had been successfully transported through Egypt for 
 i European service, however, inevitably suggested the advantages 
 of employing the route for military purposes when a great revolu- 
 tion broke out in India in 1857.® 
 
 Troops for the Persian War, which began in the early months of 
 1857, were drafted largely from the English regiments in India, 
 and these were supplemented by other contingents sent out from 
 j England around the Cape. This emergency was not so great 
 as to suggest measures to the British Cabinet looking toward the 
 sending out of troops through Mesopotamia or through Egypt, 
 and such a move does not appear to have been seriously con- 
 sidered. Far different, however, was the crisis created by the In- 
 dian Mutiny. The suddenness of this uprising and the magnitude 
 of the interests at stake made it incumbent upon the British au- 
 thorities at home to employ every practicable means to place re- 
 enforcements in India at the earliest possible moment. It was this 
 stress of necessity which led to the reconsideration of the short 
 cuts to India as military roads, and the rejection of the one and the 
 adoption of the other. 
 
 The dramatic story of the outbreaks in India in the early months 
 of 1857 has often been related. Such signs of disaffection as ap- 
 peared in native regiments prior to April, 1857, were easily 
 handled and were not looked upon as especially significant to 
 more than a few officers in the Indian service. Questions re- 
 
 ^ Ibid., pp. xxiv, 13, 14. 
 
 3 Ibid., p. 35. 
 
 ^ Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, stated just before his retirement in 
 
400 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 garding the security of India raised in the House of Lords on 
 May 19 were answered by the Minister of War, who said “ that 
 the intelligence recently received from India has not been such as 
 to create any apprehension in the minds of Her Majesty’s Min- 
 isters for the safety of our Indian dominions”} and similar solici- 
 tude expressed in the House of Commons as late as June 1 1 was 
 likewise put to rest with the statement that “ the public need be in 
 no alarm, as the late disaffection among the troops in India had 
 been put to an end,” ® 
 
 Meanwhile the storm had broken out. On May 10 and 1 1, at 
 a time when the British portion of the Indian forces was 8000 or 
 9000 below the normal establishment, mutineers from Meerut 
 seized Delhi and destroyed what Europeans they could. Before 
 the end of May serious disaffection had appeared in almost every 1 
 quarter of India, and such English forces as there were in India 
 were gravely handicapped by the facts that many of their of- 
 ficers were away on leave and that the uprising occurred at the ] 
 moment of a change in administration at Calcutta. The brightest ; 
 spot in the dark situation was the existence of some 4500 miles of ; 
 recently-completed Indian telegraphs, with which to maintain 
 communication and cooperation among the forces in India.® Tele- j 
 graphic and cable communications between India and Europe were i 
 still incomplete, however, and it was only on the night of the i 
 twenty-sixth or morning of the twenty-seventh of June that a ' 
 telegram reached London containing news of the more serious j 
 outbreaks. This message had been despatched from Calcutta on 1 
 May 18, but it contained news from Madras of May 25 and from I 
 Bombay of May 27. This news was transmitted from Bombay 1 
 to Suez and from Alexandria to Trieste by steamer. From the : 
 latter port continental land wires conveyed the message to London , 
 in about 20 hours. Forty precious days had been consumed in ap- : 
 prising the Court of Directors in London of the situation in ' 
 India. ^ 
 
 The response to this situation on the part of the London au- 
 thorities is of more than passing interest. Although the full im- 
 port of the events in India was not yet known or even suspected, 
 the Court of Directors at once recommended to the Board of 
 
 1857 that “India is now in perfect tranquillity from end to end. I entertain no 
 apprehension whatever of danger or disturbance.” — Pari. Paf., 1857— 1S58, No. 
 70, p. 8. 
 
 ® Ibid., 1858, No. 382, p. viii. 
 
 ® The History of the Indian Revolt and of the Expeditions to Persia, China, and 
 Japan, in 1856-7-8, pp. 9, 92-93; Brig.-Gen. Sir Percy Sykes, A History of 
 Persia, II, 367. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, p. ix. Cf. ibid., 1866, No. 428, p. 116. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 401 
 
 Control that the overland route be employed for sending out 
 small bodies of troops, whose early arrival in India would exert 
 a great moral influence on the whole of India. This, in fact, was 
 what one of the ringleaders of the Mutiny, Nana Sahib, had an- 
 ■ ticipated and feared as most likely to stop the course of the re- 
 [ volt.® The Board of Control, however, represented by its Presi- 
 :[ dent, Mr. Vernon Smith, in conference with other members of 
 II the British Cabinet, refused to act on the suggestion of the Di- 
 ! rectors of the Company, and ruled against the use of the overland 
 I route because of “ political and other considerations.” Even with 
 ; despatches pouring in during the months of July and August, each 
 ‘ showing more adequately than the last the enormous scope of the 
 Indian upheaval and pleading for reenforcements by the quickest 
 : possible means, the Board, supported by the Cabinet, remained 
 obdurate on the question of employing either the Euphrates or the 
 j overland route. 
 
 Instead, as the investigation of a Select Parliamentary Com- 
 I mittee subsequently disclosed, such troops as were ready for service 
 ; were despatched to India by the slowest means possible — sailing 
 vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. Such a policy contained 
 ’ more of habit than of sound judgment. As the Parliamentary 
 ; Committee surmised — 
 
 The maintenance of war under such unparalleled cir- 
 cumstances, from so vast a distance, and on such a scale of 
 magnitude, is without example in history j must aggravate the 
 arduousness of the national efforts to an extreme extent, and 
 possibly, for a considerable period. . . Hitherto, on all oc- 
 |j casions, it has been the practice to effect the reliefs of regi- 
 
 Jj ments in India, by this long sea voyage, in sailing vessels. 
 
 ]j This habitude may, perhaps, partly account for the announce- 
 
 ii ment of opinions on the part of the authorities of the Ad- 
 
 j miralty and of other departments, at the commencement of 
 
 i the late events, that sailing vessels would be still preferable 
 
 j to steamers for the conveyance of the troops.® 
 
 As the first excitement and confusion in Government circles 
 gave place to better counsels, steamships were chartered to assist 
 in the conveyance of troops around the Cape. Even here Govern- 
 ; ment heads betrayed their lack of proper knowledge in generally 
 choosing the older type of side-wheel steamships in preference to 
 : the more recent and much more efficient screw steamers. The first 
 , relief of India in this mortal crisis, then, was due not so much to 
 
 ® Ibid., p. 94. ® Ibid., p. xvi. 
 
402 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 the halting and illogical efforts of London bureaucrats as to the j 
 patriotism and promptness of outlying parts of the Empire — 
 Canada, Cape Colony, Mauritius, Ceylon, and others — which 
 sent to India with all possible expedition such forces as they ' 
 could spare. 
 
 Meanwhile, the overland route, which sufficed for the exchange i 
 of important despatches, remained unused for other military pur- 
 poses. The Court of Directors and the Governors of the Indian 
 Presidencies called attention to this highway to no avail. One of j 
 the first acts of the Bombay Government, upon receiving news of 
 the outbreak at Meerut, was to despatch a steamship to Suez to : 
 receive the reenforcements it was assumed would immediately be I 
 despatched by that route. The Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany’s offers to place their great steam fleet at the Government’s 
 service were thanklessly refused. Ambassadors and consuls in i 
 Turkey and Egypt who reiterated their belief that no material I 
 obstacles existed to the transport of British troops through Otto- ^ 
 man territory were summarily informed that such was not the 
 Government’s intention. “ Whatever they were, the “ political ] 
 and other considerations ” remained too strong. 
 
 The nature of these political considerations has never fully been ; 
 disclosed. The Committee which sat in 1858 to ascertain why aid 1 
 was not more promptly sent to India felt itself precluded from in- | 
 quiring into such matters. However, some of the political reasons ! 
 for the unwillingness of the Government to make use of the over- ' 
 land route when the very existence of the Indian Empire was 1 
 at stake gradually leaked out and can be examined with some 1 
 confidence. 
 
 It was the popular supposition at the time that either the Turk- 1 
 ish or the Egyptian Government, or both, felt some justifiable ! 
 hesitation in permitting the use of lines traversing Ottoman ter- : 
 ritory by British troops either because of the danger of estab- 
 lishing such a precedent or because of objections which would be 
 raised by other European Powers. This was not the case.’" It 
 developed subsequently that both the Turkish and Egyptian Gov- 
 ernments were more than willing to assist in the transport of 
 troops and supplies by any practicable route. Lord Stratford de 
 Redcliffe, who was denied permission to ask leave of the Turkish 
 Government at the first news of the Mutiny for the passage of 
 troops through Egypt, was instructed to make such a request 
 several weeks later. In response, the Sultan, surprised at the de- 
 lay of the British Government, not only gave assent immediately. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, p. 171. Ibid.,pp. 82, 119. 
 
 Ibid., p. 1 84. f 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 403 
 
 but, on October 5, issued a special firman for the purposed* His 
 vassal, the Khedive, was even more willing to give full permission 
 * for the use of the overland route as a military highway, though 
 1; his motives, of course, were far from being disinterested. When 
 it was first officially suggested to him that, in order to minimize 
 I; whatever political objections there might be, small bodies of troops 
 i: be despatched through Egypt en bourgeoisy that is, in civilian 
 clothes and minus their military equipment, he was quoted 
 as having burst out that he would arrange for the transport, 
 not merely of 200 men, but of 20,000 if necessary, in uni- 
 I form and with their arms. And on another occasion he added, 
 
 I “ I will not consider them as transit passengers, but as my own, 
 
 I and will carry them by my own private engines, carriages, and 
 I trucks.” 
 
 Probably the Government’s hesitation at first to use the over- 
 land route for military purposes was due to the knowledge that 
 ' such a departure would be displeasing to the late ally, France, 
 
 ! with whom relations were not very cordial since the war with 
 Russia. While the Euphrates Valley Railway was still being fa- 
 ■ vored by British authorities, there are evidences that the French 
 I Government displayed an unwillingness to approve the use of the 
 ' overland route for the movement of troops.’® The Euphrates 
 I project, however, was thrown over by Palmerston about the mid- 
 ! die of August, and it was doubtless more than a coincidence that 
 j late in that month the British Cabinet considered the chief political 
 difficulties at an end and set about securing the consent of Otto- 
 i man authorities which might have been obtained for the asking 
 months before.’® It was generally known in September that the 
 Emperor Napoleon no longer had objections to the use of the 
 I route through Egypt for the relief of India.” Early in October, 
 
 ! the Emperor despatched a communication to London offering to 
 1 facilitate the use of the overland route by permitting British troops 
 to pass through France to Marseilles en route to Egypt and India.’® 
 Thus, it was only after nearly three months of delay that the most 
 i formidable difficulties which stood in the way of the most ef- 
 fectual method of relieving India were removed. 
 
 At the same time there had been “ other considerations ” also 
 which had postponed the use of the overland route. These were 
 bound up with the belief held by Vernon Smith and other in- 
 
 i Ibid., p. 190. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 220, 227. Cf. p. 184. 
 
 Ibid., p. 160; History of the Indian Revolt, p. 502. 
 
 I Farl. Paf., 1858, No. 382, pp. xvii, 25, 27, 133, 152, 154; The Annual 
 
 i Register, 1857, Pt. II, p. 228. 
 
 The Panmure Pafers II, 435. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1858, No. 382, pp. xix, 190. 
 
 1: 
 
404 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 fluential men that Egypt and the Red Sea would be highly in- 
 jurious to the health of troops sent in considerable numbers during 
 the hot seasond® The remarkable physical condition of the troops 
 brought to the Crimea during the hot season by this route and 
 the opinions of experienced men of all ranks were not sufficient to 
 overcome the ingrained prejudice on this point. Even after 
 thousands of troops had actually been sent out by this route in 
 safety and comfort, the President of the Board of Control still 
 upheld the wisdom of employing the Cape route.®” 
 
 By the end of September the India Board had overcome its 
 aversion from the overland route to a large extent, and the East 
 India Company arranged the details of the despatch of troops. 
 The first unit, numbering 200 men, was despatched from Plym- 
 outh on September 30. Thirty-seven days later this regiment 
 arrived at Bombay. Other troops, despatched from Malta about 
 the same time, reached Bombay in sixteen to eighteen days. Still 
 other troop units were sent out overland at regular intervals by the 
 fortnightly mail steamers until well into the next year. The 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company was relied upon for trans- 
 portation facilities on either side of Egypt, even, as agents for 
 the Viceroy’s Transit Administration, assuming responsibility for 
 the passage through Egypt. 
 
 This portion of the journey was greatly simplified by the main 
 line of Egyptian Railway, which bridged the distance between 
 Alexandria and Cairo, about 130 miles. From Cairo the railw'ay 
 was complete in 1857 Station No. 12 in the desert, distant 
 
 58 miles from Cairo. Troops and civilians covered the remaining 
 distance to Suez, about 25 miles, in vans, each accommodating six 
 persons, and requiring about ten hours for the journey. In this 
 way, with a considerable number of vans in readiness, large groups 
 could be transported with considerable facility. In fact, at the 
 height of the troop movement, the entire passage through Egypt 
 was completed in little more than 50 hours. At Suez a small 
 steam tender, Alma, carried the men either to the mail steamer 
 waiting in the anchorage, or to the hulk of the old Bombay Vlarine 
 steamer Zenohia, which was fitted up as a sort of floating hotel to 
 accommodate as many as 300 men at a time pending the arrival of 
 the contract mail steamship.®® Before the first of Vlarch, 1858, 
 
 History of the Indian Revolt, pp. 222, 223. The unfinished state of the Suez 
 Railway was one source of doubt concerning the overland route. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, pp. 121, 125, passim. 
 
 Anon., Railways in Egypt; Communication with India (London, 1857), 
 pp. 15-18. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, pp. 56, 93, 170; History of the Indian Revolt, 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 405 
 
 approximately 5000 officers and men, out of a total of 40,000 
 sent out, had arrived in India via the overland route, and all with 
 little inconvenience.”^ 
 
 The suppression of the revolt was aided to a considerable extent 
 by the adoption of this route, though the failure of the Govern- 
 ment to employ it earlier was the source of great bitterness to 
 those who realized the saving in lives and property which would 
 have been eflFected if the overland route had been adopted at the 
 outset.®^ After 1857 the overland route was employed very 
 largely in sending out reenforcements to India, and the passage of 
 British troops in uniform through Egypt became a sight so famil- 
 iar as not to excite comment.^® 
 
 The wide conviction that the Company had blundered or had 
 been negligent led to the demand of several members of the 
 House of Commons for an investigating committee early in the 
 session of 1858.^® A Select Committee was duly appointed on 
 February 4, “ to inquire concerning the measures resorted to, or 
 which were available, and as to the Lines of Communication 
 adopted for reinforcing our Army during the pending Revolt 
 in India, and to report thereon to the House, with a view to as- 
 certaining the arrangements which should be made towards meet- 
 ing any future important emergencies involving the security of 
 our Eastern Dominions.” 
 
 This Committee, consisting of eighteen men experienced in In- 
 dian affairs, made a thorough study of the means available for the 
 transport of troops to India during the early days of the Mutiny. 
 It was soon discovered that the failure to employ the overland 
 route at the outset was not due, as had widely been supposed, to 
 the Company’s policy, but rather to that of the British Cabinet, 
 which believed that material obstacles stood in the way, and par- 
 ticularly to the prejudice of the President of the Board of Control, 
 
 p. 222 n. Even though the railway was incomplete, the desert had been robbed 
 of its principal terror, for large iron water tanks had been stationed at five-mile 
 intervals, all the way from Cairo to Suez, kept supplied by long trains of camels. 
 Thus travellers and goods might proceed across the desert independently of the 
 railway. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, pp. 38, 280, 297. There was some complaint 
 that the vessels sailing from Suez were too crowded to admit of comfortable sleeping 
 quarters, especially since each steamer carried a considerable quota of passengers. 
 This does not seem to have occasioned any real distress, however. The military 
 hospital established at Suez had very few cases to attend to. 
 
 Ibid., p. xxvii; “Investigator,” Our Ocean Steam Postal Com?nunications: 
 Their Cost and National Advantages (London, 1867), p. ii. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 4.28, pp. 75-76, passim. 
 
 History of the Indian Revolt, p. 501 n. 
 
 Ibid., p. 502, n.; Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, p. [iii]. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 406 
 
 Mr. Vernon Smith, who failed to urge or even to approve the use 
 of the overland route at any time.^® 
 
 After careful sifting of the evidence, the Committee’s findings 
 upheld the Company’s officers on all points. Their report, sub- 
 mitted on July I, said in part — 
 
 It would have been desirable, independently of political 
 considerations, to have taken advantage of the Overland 
 Route at the earliest possible period, and, apart from such 
 considerations, it is much to be regretted that the steps that 
 were taken in September to transmit small bodies of troops 
 by this route were not resorted to at an earlier date. . . 
 
 On the whole, considering the suddenness of the danger, 
 and the distance to which troops were to be sent, the Com- 
 mittee are of opinion that great credit is due to the Court of 
 Directors of the East India Company for the promptitude 
 and efficiency with which they discharged the difficult task of 
 transmitting reinforcements to the Army in India during 
 the past year.^® 
 
 This report was supplemented by a detailed and analytical 
 memorandum, wherein the credit and blame for the sending of re- 
 enforcements to India were more carefully assessed. In this the 
 Committee laid serious charges at the door of the Cabinet, point- 
 ing out that British military officers of all ranks had been passing 
 to and fro through Egypt for years with the tacit consent of all 
 Europe. The fact that India was saved to the British Crown at 
 all was ascribed to the early arrival in India of British forces from 
 Persia and the heroism of such forces as were available for action.®® 
 These findings, however, instead of giving the East India Com- 
 pany a new lease of life for having acquitted itself so creditably 
 during the emergency, actually had the effect of calling attention 
 to the divided responsibility under which India was controlled. 
 To obviate this. Parliament presently determined to assume for 
 the British Government the whole burden of the Indian Adminis- 
 tration. On August 2, 1858, was passed “ An Act for the Better 
 Government of India,” which terminated the life of the East 
 India Company.®^ Thus, the English people as a whole became 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, pp. xv’iii— xxv, xxvii, 36—40, 117—128, 151— 157. 
 
 Ibid., pp. [iii]-[iv]. 
 
 Ibid., pp. xxiv— xxvii. 
 
 21 & 22 Victoria, cap. 106. As the British Government took over the govern- 
 ment of India, so it made definite provision for supplying regular militarj' reen- 
 fcrcements by building or purchasing five transport vessels in 1866, which were 
 kept in regular service during most of the remainder of the century. — Pari. Pap., 
 i860. No. 480; 1865, No. 159; 1867—1868, No. 471. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 407 
 
 the heirs of an empire which, although begun and developed as 
 I an exclusive commercial enterprise, had been peculiarly a national 
 ; undertaking from the first. It was only recognizing a situation 
 I already long existent when, in 1 876, Parliament passed the Royal 
 Titles Bill and conferred on Queen Victoria the title of Empress 
 of India. 
 
 The real or imaginary political considerations which postponed 
 ’ the adoption of the overland route for troop movements in 1857 
 never rose again, and afterward the route was completely estab- 
 lished for communications of all kinds. The Cape route retained 
 I the single advantage of being cheaper than the route through 
 ■ Egypt, partly because of the high passage rates charged by the 
 i Peninsular and Oriental Company and partly because of the Vice- 
 roy’s tolls on mails and passengers. The Euphrates Valley 
 route, too, was defeated and discredited. Having failed to emerge 
 j from the twilight zone of promotive schemes on a very critical oc- 
 ; casion, ft was doomed to remain a wandering spirit, often seen and 
 j heard but never quite able to materialize. Before the end of 
 I 1858 the Suez Railway was completed — thanks to British capital 
 and engineering — and the overland route began to attain some 
 prominence as a commercial route. Before the Suez Canal was 
 opened, fine goods with an estimated value of many thousands of 
 pounds were annually being sent through Egypt.®^ With the or- 
 ganization of the Red Sea and India Telegraph Company in 1858 
 and the completion of plans for the carrying of a telegraph line 
 across Egypt in connection with the laying of submarine cables to 
 India, the supremacy of the overland route was assured. From 
 being an almost insuperable obstacle, Egypt had become no more 
 than a brief and often welcome interlude in an otherwise monoto- 
 nous passage. 
 
 The return to normal conditions after the confusion of mid- 
 century wars found postal arrangements between England and 
 India and the Australian colonies quite inadequate. In the few 
 years since the comprehensive plan of eastern communication 
 had been adopted, needs had largely grown. Moreover, some 
 features of the postal system established before the opening of 
 the Crimean War had been seriously disrupted, owing to the with- 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1858, No. 382, pp. 177, 185—187, 188, 170 ff. The Viceroy’s 
 charge for the passage of enlisted men was £5 per head; for ofBcers, £10 each, and 
 the same amount for civilian passengers. 
 
 Anon., Railways in Egypt, pp. iv— v; The P. & O. Pocket Book (3d Issue), 
 p. lo; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXLVI, 1385—1388. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 90, 184; Charles Bright, Submarine Telegraphs: 
 Their History, Construction, and Working, p. 57. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 408 
 
 drawal of mail steamships for use in connection with war activi- 
 ties, while new mail contracts had been made in haste as emer- 
 gency measures. 
 
 Overland mails to the East had employed either of two routes 
 between England and Egypt since 1837. Either they followed 
 the line first developed by the Admiralty packets from South- 
 ampton to Alexandria via Gibraltar and Malta, or they were de- 
 spatched via Calais and Paris to Marseilles and thence through the 
 Mediterranean. The latter line, provided for by a Postal Conven- 
 tion in 1839, proved to be so advantageous that it came to be 
 looked upon as a permanent arrangement. But as the reduction 
 of time in the transit of mails was ever an aim of the authorities 
 in England and in India, the development of routes across the 
 Continent, which promised to effect further savings of time, re- 
 ceived much attention and led to a reconsideration of routes and 
 time tables. 
 
 The completion of railway lines about 1861 between Channel 
 ports and the Alps and in northern Italy suggested the possibility 
 of employing some Italian port, preferably on the Adriatic, in 
 place of Marseilles for the arrival and departure of eastern mails.®* 
 This project was first brought to the attention of the English Post 
 Office by the new Italian Government in June, 1861, in the form 
 of a suggestion that Ancona be considered as a postal terminus. 
 At that time railway lines were practically complete between Calais 
 and Ancona via Paris and Turin, with the exception of a con- 
 siderable break at Mont Cenis in the Alps. The adoption of this 
 route, the Italians believed, would effect a saving in mail trans- 
 mission of twenty-two hours, with the prospect of a further re- 
 duction within a few years of sixteen more.®^ 
 
 The Post Office authorities of India, who were perhaps more 
 concerned about speed than the home authorities, instantly re- 
 sponded to the suggestion and urged immediate adoption of the 
 Italian route. English postal officials, however, with character- 
 istic caution, undertook a detailed investigation of the possibilities 
 of the proposed route before committing themselves in the slight- 
 est degree. Information supplied by English consular officers in 
 Italy verified the assertion that the port of Ancona was 420 miles 
 nearer Alexandria than was Marseilles, and as communication by 
 rail was much faster than by steam packets, there was a strong 
 presumption that by shifting termini a considerable time saving 
 
 G. W. Wheatley, The Oriental Companion and Overland Guide for Travellers 
 to and from India, Aden, Mauritius, Ceylon, China, Australia, &c., via Egypt 
 (London, 1858), 90 pp. 
 
 Pari. Pap., i860. No. 95, “ The Acceleration of the Night Mail to Calais.” 
 
 Ibid., 1866, No. 428, App., pp. 291—293. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 409 
 
 would be effected. But as the investigation progressed, substantial 
 problems began to loom up. The new Italian railways were for 
 the most part of single track. Their roadbeds were not well 
 ballasted. They were inadequately equipped with rolling stock 
 and were operated by inexperienced staffs. It appeared doubt- 
 ful, therefore, whether they could maintain their advertised 
 schedules. 
 
 These were not the most serious difficulties. It developed that 
 the port of Ancona, in spite of enthusiastic statements by Italian 
 ministers, did not possess the necessary requisites for mail com- 
 munication. It had no adequate wharves and docks, and the har- 
 bor bar would not admit large mail steamers. The whole question 
 of mail contracts was also involved. If the Peninsular and Orien- 
 tal Company altered their service to include the proposed line 
 from Ancona to Alexandria, they would still expect subsidies in 
 proportion to the trouble and expense involved.®® English author- 
 ities were not impressed with offers from a newly-organized 
 Italian company for the carriage of mails in the Mediterranean. 
 The correlation of schedules with the arrival and departure of 
 vessels from Suez offered other problems. Additional obstacles 
 were found in the Mont Cenis road over the Alps, the crossing of 
 international boundaries, and the necessity for frequent re- 
 handling of mails. Considering the difficulties involved, and the 
 fact that regularity and dependability were more important than 
 speed, the Postmaster General, Lord Stanley of Alderley, con- 
 cluded that the prospective advantages of the Italian line did not 
 counterbalance the known merits of the route through France.*® 
 Count Cavour, however, refused to let the plan for an Italian 
 mail route die. By the autumn of 1863 ^^e Ancona line of rail- 
 way had been extended nearly to Brindisi, and negotiations with 
 English authorities were renewed looking toward the passage of 
 eastern mails through Brindisi, and the saving of additional time 
 in postal schedules. This was not immediately followed up. A 
 new impulse was given to the plan in 1865 by the commencement 
 of a mountain railway by the English engineer. Fell, to link up 
 the Italian railway system with that of the French over the Mont 
 Cenis Pass — a distance of about 48 miles. An English army en- 
 gineer, Capt. H. W. Tyler, was detailed to inspect and report on 
 the advisability of transmitting mails by this line. He reported 
 in July, 1866,*^ quite favorably, on the whole. Harbor improve- 
 
 Ibid., pp. 293—294, fassim. 
 
 Ibid., i860, No. 396. 
 
 Ibid., 1866, No. 428, pp. 295—313. 
 
 Ibid., No. 466, “ Eastern Mails (Italian Route) : Report from Capt. Tyler, 
 
 R. E.” 
 
410 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 ments at Brindisi, the Mont Cenis Summit Railway, and local 
 changes on Italian railways awaited completion, but the outlook 
 for the near future was distinctly promising. 
 
 During these years such rapid strides in material improvement 
 of all kinds were being made that confident prediction of lines of 
 communication, even in the immediate future, became impossible. 
 No sooner had the Mont Cenis Summit Railway been completed 
 than a Mont Cenis Tunnel was projected. By the time the pro- 
 jected improvements had been completed on the Mont Cenis- 
 Brindisi route, with an Italian steamship concern, the Societa Ano~ 
 nima Italiana di N avigazione Adriatico Orient ale, operating fast 
 vessels between Brindisi and Alexandria, the line to Marseilles had 
 been improved, and another one offering new advantages had 
 been completed to the Italian frontier through Germany.'*^ 
 
 Early in 1869 Capt. Tyler was again despatched to the Con- 
 tinent to report on the German-Italian route. He carefully ex- 
 amined the entire line, from Ostend, the Channel terminus, via 
 Ghent, Brussels, Liege, Cologne, Mayence, Stuttgart, Munich, 
 and the Brenner Pass to Verona, whence the line reached the 
 Italian railways and provided a connection with Brindisi. The 
 advantages of the line were found to be several. It possessed the 
 political advantage of being independent of France, while offering 
 easy access from Calais via Brussels, and from Paris via Stuttgart. 
 Also, the partial unification of the German states and Bismarck’s 
 forward railway policies provided a uniformity in railway opera- 
 tion not possible a few years earlier. Although this line measured 
 some 150 miles longer than that via Paris and the Mont Cenis, the 
 time required by the two routes was approximately the same.^* 
 Now that mails were despatched to India weekly instead of 
 four times per calendar month, Capt. Tyler believed that all of 
 the European routes might be used to advantage. Already the 
 eastern mails sent from Southampton via Gibraltar each Wednes- 
 day were overtaken at Alexandria by the mails despatched via 
 Paris and Marseilles on Friday. Capt. Tyler proposed that sup- 
 plementary mails be made up on Saturday of each week and sent by 
 special mail and passenger express trains by either or both of the 
 new routes to Brindisi, whence they would reach Alexandria in 
 time to proceed to India in the weekly Peninsular and Oriental 
 steamers. 
 
 These routes, via Marseilles, via the Mont Cenis, and via 
 the Brenner [said Capt. Tyler], will themselves be only 
 provisional, pending the advance of railway communication 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1868, No. i, pp. 7—10. 
 
 Ibid., 1869, No. 177, p. 65 Illustrated London Ne^ios, 16 Jan., 1869. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 41 1 
 
 through the south-east of Europe and through the west of 
 Asia. The lines by Constantinople and the Euphrates Valley, 
 and over the Greek frontier to Cape Sunium, so near to the 
 Suez Canal, have yet to be constructed j and the hope of the 
 Indian traveller of the next generation, chimerical as it may 
 appear to many at present, must be nothing less than to pass 
 dryshod from London to Bombay — through a submarine 
 tunnel from Dover to Calais — through Europe by rail- 
 way — over the Bosphorus by a bridge j and forward by 
 railway down the Euphrates valley and round the Persian 
 Gulf to Bombay.^* 
 
 From an engineering point of view, such a vision was perfectly 
 justified. It failed, however, to take into account the many po- 
 litical problems which leave the project of a through land route 
 to the East a program still unrealized. 
 
 Capt. Tyler’s immediate proposals carried considerable weight. 
 Within the following year the so-called Supplementary Route 
 was regularly employed, with additional rates of postage, for 
 mails via Brindisi, while other communications, marked via Mar- 
 seilles, or via Southampton, followed these earlier lines at re- 
 duced rates. During the Franco-German War, the Ostend- 
 Verona route to Brindisi was employed to good advantage in place 
 of the lines crossing France. After 1870, with some alterations 
 from time to time in the continental lines from the English Chan- 
 nel to Italy, Brindisi served as the principal European port for 
 oriental mail communications until the Great War. The route 
 via Marseilles continued to be employed, and the Paris-Lyon- 
 Mediterranee Railway was popular with thousands of Levantine 
 and oriental travellers. By the beginning of the twentieth cen- 
 tury Boulogne had replaced Calais as the continental port of entry 
 for mails on the Marseilles line. Soon after the opening of the 
 World War, Marseilles and Toulon entirely replaced the Italian 
 ports of Brindisi and Taranto, served by the Peninsular and Ori- 
 ental and the Orient lines respectively, as continental mail ports.^® 
 The comprehensive plan of eastern communication, as inaugu- 
 rated early in the fifties, provided a skeleton plan for future 
 growth and improvement. The Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany, the first contractors for the service, at once embarked on a 
 program of building and buying new vessels on this basis. They 
 established permanent bases at Hong Kong, Calcutta, Sydney and 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1869, No. 177, pp. 7, 8. 
 
 Ibid., 1870, Nos. 62, 312. 
 
 Ibid., 1917) Report of an Imperial Shipping Committee. 
 
412 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Bombay, including extensive docking facilities, especially at the 
 latter port. Better accommodations were provided for passengers. 
 The factor of safety was improved to a commendable degree. 
 Speed was improved on the long eastern lines, from about eight 
 knots per hour in 1851 to a contract speed of nine and one-half 
 knots on the Bombay line and about ten knots in the Mediterra- 
 nean in i 2 : 66 .*^ 
 
 During the same interval the Company had built up a fleet of 
 fifty-seven steam vessels, the newer ones nearly 3000 tons in size. 
 Most of these were in service east of Suez. Mails which were con- 
 veyed from London to Bombay in 28 to 35 days in 1850 covered 
 the same distance in an average of 24 days fifteen years later. 
 Passage rates still remained high in spite of substantial subsidies. 
 This was partly due to a falling ofF of the Peninsular and Oriental 
 trade, owing to growing competition and the cost of fuel for the 
 eastern steamers. Nevertheless, the fare first class from Bombay 
 to London in 1866 was £70, which was but little more than the 
 rate from Southampton to Alexandria fifteen years before, and the 
 number of passengers carried continued to grow. 
 
 About 1865 the Peninsular and Oriental Company commenced 
 a fortnightly service to Shanghai with an extension to Japan. Al- 
 though mails were carried, no subsidy was received for this service 
 at the time. This line alternated with a similar one carried by 
 the French Messageries Imferiales, thus giving the Far East fre- 
 quent European connections. The steam route originally opened 
 to Australia by way of Singapore and Torres Straits did not prove 
 practicable. Early in the sixties it gave place to a monthly line 
 running from Point de Galle to Sydney by way of King George 
 Sound and Melbourne — a service requiring approximately fifty- 
 five days from Southampton in 1864. 
 
 New services were meanwhile being established partly to sup- 
 plement and frequently to compete with the Peninsular and Ori- 
 ental monopoly. About i860 the Bombay and Bengal Steam Ship 
 Company began the formation of a merchant marine capable of 
 securing some of the trade previously handled by the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Company. A more vigorous rival organization was 
 born in 1856 when the Scotch firm of Mackinnon, Mackenzie and 
 Company, long established at Calcutta, formed the Calcutta and 
 Burmah Steam Navigation Company to carry goods and mails fort- 
 nightly between Calcutta, Akyab, Rangoon, and Moulmein. The 
 Mutiny and various disasters nearly ruined the Company, but with 
 
 47 u ^ Practical Man,” The Postal hnp-oveytient ^ith India Question: Ad- 
 ministrative Reform Wanted (Manchester, iS66), p. 14; Thomas Nelson and Sons 
 (Publishers), The Overland Route to India and China (London, 1859). 
 
I IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 413 
 
 i an increase in capital it was able to embark in 1861 on a system of 
 ! steam communication extending from the Persian Gulf on the 
 \ one hand to Malacca and Singapore on the other. By the end of 
 I 1863, with a fleet of seventeen steamers and four more building, 
 j the Calcutta and Burmah Company became the British India 
 ! Steam Navigation Company, Ltd.^® The lines of this concern con- 
 i tinned steadily to expand until it could aspire to compete with the 
 ■ Peninsular and Oriental Company on the Suez line. 
 
 The Company was unsuccessful in attempts to secure British 
 subsidies for carriage of the overland mails, but it did establish 
 a very important service in Arabian and Persian waters. At the 
 outset mails, passengers, and some quantities of goods were car- 
 ried from Bombay to the ports of the Persian Gulf once in six] 
 weeks the year through. By 1864 this had become a monthly 
 service, subsidized by the Indian Government. At Basrah the 
 British Indian vessels established connection with the river steam- 
 ers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, 
 which kept up the communication with Bagdad.^® In 1866 the 
 Company established a new line, subsidized by the Dutch Govern- 
 ment, from Indian ports to the Dutch East Indies. By the time of 
 the opening of the Suez Canal, the Company and its subsidiaries 
 owned a fleet of more than fifty fine steamships, and had become 
 the second largest shipping concern in the East. 
 
 At varying intervals throughout the remainder of the century 
 other steam lines made their appearance in eastern waters and 
 challenged the proud supremacy of the Peninsular and Oriental.^® 
 The first of these to represent other than British capital was the 
 French Com-pagnie des Services Maritimes des NLessageries Im- 
 periales. This concern, which at the outset received a subsidy for 
 carrying French and other European mails three times that of the 
 Peninsular and Oriental Company, first invaded Indian waters in 
 1861. The initial undertaking was to establish a monthly com- 
 munication between Suez and Bombay with seven or eight vessels 
 considerably larger than those of the Peninsular and Oriental.®^ 
 This attempt succeeded and the line was extended within the 
 
 The Blue Peter, I, No. 3, 65—67. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1900, No. [Cd. 131.], p- 94; The Blue Peter, I, No. 2, p. 47. 
 After the Karun River was opened up in 1888, the Lynch Brothers placed steamers 
 on that stream which operated in connection both with their Tigris line and with 
 the British Indian service. This service is still maintained, though under one owner- 
 ship, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company having been absorbed 
 by the Peninsular and Oriental System. 
 
 Pari. Pap., i860. No. 532; ibid.. No. 328, pp. iv, 42, 44~455 308; ibid., 
 1867—1868, No. 19, pp. 3-5; VV. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route 
 to India, pp. 64—66. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 69, 81, 244, 538-539. 
 
414 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 next few years to Calcutta and thence to China and Japan. By 
 1866 the Company had a fleet of twelve vessels in eastern waters, 
 synchronizing with a line from Marseilles to Alexandria and 
 several other subsidiary lines in the Mediterranean and Black 
 Seas. They were then building extensive docks at Suez, with 
 money supplied by the Pasha, with a view to the utilization of 
 the Suez Canal immediately upon its opening.®^ The financial 
 strength of this company, its fine and comfortable vessels and 
 fast, sustained speed cut deeply into the business of the Peninsular 
 and Oriental Company, especially in connection with passenger 
 transportation. The two companies reached a kind of under- 
 standing with regard to passage rates to and from India, however, 
 and travellers were denied the benefits of a rate war. 
 
 Further development of English communications east of Suez 
 awaited the outcome of a Parliamentary investigation during the 
 sixties which resulted from a widespread conviction that the com- 
 prehensive scheme of communication, as inaugurated early in the 
 fifties, had not developed in proportion to growing needs.” It 
 had once been thought that a weekly mail to India would provide 
 an adequate service long hoped for. But while all parts of India 
 were served by the mails which came alternately to Bombay and 
 to Calcutta every two weeks, no single section of that extensive 
 empire enjoyed a weekly communication with Europe. Bombay 
 and the northwest provinces received no portion of the bi-weekly 
 mail which went via Galle and Madras to Calcutta, and so enjoyed 
 only twenty-four mails per year in each direction. One portion 
 of each of the Bombay mails, however, was destined to be sent 
 overland by dak to Calcutta and Madras, and in theory those 
 centres received communications weekly. As it worked out, how- 
 ever, the distances from Suez to the east coast of India were so i 
 long, as compared with the voyage to Bombay, that the mails i 
 despatched overland from Bombay reached the eastern cities 1 
 nearly as soon as the mails brought by sea which had left England ! 
 over a fortnight earlier. As the network of Indian Railways ' 
 grew, and lines which would link Bombay with Calcutta and 
 Madras approached completion, the fortnightly mail service to 
 the latter ports became less and less essential.” The passenger 
 traffic of Calcutta and Madras still demanded regular steamship 
 service, but with the completion of the railways mentioned, it was 
 to be anticipated that a large portion of those travelling to or from 
 the cities of eastern India would prefer to use the overland lines 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, pp. 68, 75, 561-562. 
 
 Ibid., 1865, No. 21 1. 
 
 Ibid., 1866, No. 428, pp. 13, 14, 123, passim. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 415 
 
 to Bombay in preference to enduring a long sea voyage around 
 India and Ceylon.®® 
 
 In other respects the alternative plan of communications was 
 not satisfactory. English economic interests and the English 
 population in India were increasing more rapidly than means of 
 communication were developing.®® Moreover, not only in India 
 i, but throughout the East British interests were served, as to mails, 
 
 ; entirely by the Peninsular and Oriental Company, which, having 
 no real competitors along this line, enjoyed a virtual monopoly of 
 I the overseas communications. For developing and maintaining 
 ! these eastern lines, this concern was heavily subsidized, its direc- 
 tors having been able virtually to write their own contracts with 
 the English Post Office. Since 1854, when the Peninsular and 
 ' Oriental Company took over the Bombay line from the vessels of 
 : the Indian Navy, that Company had been able either to underbid 
 , competitors for mail contracts or to convince the English author- 
 ities of its superior resources and equipment and to secure the 
 awards. The Anglo-Indians almost uniformly believed that they' 
 
 ] were at the mercy of a soulless corporation whose only concern 
 was to pay high dividends to stockholders by charging exorbitant 
 I rates for imperfect service. 
 
 Complaints of the irregularity of mail contracts first brought 
 about the appointment of a Select Parliamentary Committee in 
 i860 to inquire into “the manner in which contracts extending 
 over periods of years have from time to time been formed or 
 modified by Her Majesty’s Government with various steam 
 packet companies for the conveyance of mails by sea.” The 
 principal result was to bring about the passage of an Act of 
 Parliament, even before the formal report of the Committee had 
 been handed in, centralizing more powers and functions in the 
 Post Office Department.®® This lessening of the evils of bureau- 
 cracy had a decidedly salutary effect on the relative efficiency of 
 the mail packet service in the future. 
 
 Ibid., pp. vi, 64, 67, 125—126; ibid., i860, No. [C. 2669]. The Indian 
 railway program looked toward the completion of lines between Calcutta, Bombay, 
 and the North West Provinces in the spring of 1868, and the opening of a line 
 between Madras and Bombay in July, 1869. 
 
 Ibid., 1866, No. 428, App., pp. 531—537. In 1866 British India imported 
 goods to the amount of more than £37,400,000, and exported commodities to the 
 value of more than £18,250,000. 
 
 Ibid., i860. No. 328. 
 
 Act 23 Victoria, cap. 6; Pari. Pap., i860. No. 328, pp. 465-466, 469—471. 
 In addition to the financial control previously exercised by the Treasury and the f. 
 marine functions pertaining to the Admiralty, the Colonial Office frequently had to 
 be consulted on postal matters, while to the Foreign Office fell the task of negotiating 
 postal conventions and the like. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 416 
 
 This one progressive step, however, was not sufficient to stifle 
 the widespread demands for further improvement. In 1866 
 another Select Committee was appointed “ to inquire into the 
 practical working of the present system of telegraphic and postal 
 communications between this country and the East Indies . . . 
 China, Japan, Australia, and the Mauritius.”®® This investiga- 
 tion disclosed, among other things, the fact that the British Post 
 Office was more concerned with costs than with service, and that 
 between this department and the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 pany there existed a “ very comfortable understanding ”5 that 
 the speed maintained by the mail packets, especially east of Suez, 
 was not adequate j and that the portion of postal subsidies borne 
 by the Indian Exchequer was unduly heavy, considering that the 
 British portion of the Indian trade was one-fourth that of the 
 whole Empire.®^ The Committee made specific suggestions for 
 improvement on these points. It was recommended that Bombay 
 be made the principal door to India and the distributing point for 
 a weekly mail, that the speed of mail steamers be increased ma- 
 terially, and costs reapportioned.®® 
 
 It required some years for carrying these recommendations 
 into effect. Early in 1 867 a weekly service to Bombay was under- 
 taken on an experimental basis, but the cost was considered too 
 heavy by the Post Office,®® and the service was discontinued. 
 This left Bombay until 1870 practically two mails per month, 
 four mails, as before, being carried to Madras and Calcutta.®* 
 Meanwhile, the approaching completion of De Lesseps’ Suez 
 Canal and the likelihood that this waterway would considerably 
 affect the working of eastern lines materially contributed to an 
 indefinite postponement of any major changes in communication 
 plans. In spite of a great deal of criticism and hostility from 
 many quarters, the Peninsular and Oriental Company continued 
 to enjoy what was, to all intents and purposes, a monopoly of the 
 mail routes to the East. 
 
 Pari. Pap., i866, No. 428, p. [iii]. 
 
 Ibid., p. 130. The English Post Office even entered into important postal 
 contracts with the Peninsular and Oriental Company while the Committee were 
 arriving at conclusions opposed to contracts of that tj-pe. 
 
 Ibid., pp. ix, passim; “A Practical Man,” op. cit., p. ii, passim; Anon., 
 Postal Improvement v:ith India Question: A dministrative Refortn Wanted (London, 
 
 i866). 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1866, No. 428, p. xv. 
 
 At this time subsidies for the India and China mails averaged 4r. 6 d. per 
 mile of the distance traversed, of which the sea postage of ^d. per single letter 
 (one-half ounce) contributed but a small proportion. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1867, No. 405; 1868, No. i, pp. 4-31; “Investigator,” Our 
 Ocean Steam Postal Communications : Their Cost and National Advantages, pp. 3—5; 
 The Economist, 15 Sept., 1877. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 417 
 
 i 
 
 , The opening of the Suez Canal did not result in the immediate 
 II reduction of time for the carriage of eastern mails. Mail con- 
 ;i tracts with the Peninsular and Oriental Company in force in 1870 
 f| provided for the use of the Egyptian Railway for the overland 
 ' transit, and a series of Conventions between the British and 
 ■ Egyptian Governments regularized this by stipulating what 
 ;i sums should be paid the Viceroy of Egypt for the conveyance of 
 I the mails in sealed packages by the English Post Office in Egypt.®® 
 li Hence, as soon as the Peninsular and Oriental mail steamers 
 I began using the canal, they were under the necessity of landing 
 :j the mails at Alexandria or at Suez, as the case may have been, and 
 r then of continuing through the canal with their cargoes and such 
 passengers as wished to avoid the discomfort of travelling through 
 Egypt. Another stop was then made to take on the mails and 
 j passengers which had passed through Egypt by rail and the 
 I voyage was continued. This, instead of expediting the service, 
 I actually retarded it.®® 
 
 ' A partial improvement of this situation was effected in 1874, 
 I when, by arrangements with the Peninsular and Oriental Com- 
 I pany for a partial abatement of their subsidy, followed by a new 
 Convention with the Egyptian Government, mail packets from 
 England via Gibraltar no longer stopped at Alexandria but pro- 
 ceeded on to the East through the canal. ®^ At the same time the 
 British Post Office reiterated its belief in the greater speed and 
 safety of transmitting the mails through Egypt by rail, and the 
 Brindisi mails continued to follow that route. This was, perhaps, 
 not wholly unnatural in view of the fact that the railway repre- 
 sented British enterprise, while the canal was a French under- 
 taking. It was only after the British Government had acquired 
 a large interest in the canal that the attitude of the Post Office 
 officials altered materially. 
 
 In 1877 another Convention provided for the abolition of the 
 English Post Office in Egypt and placed the transmission of 
 English mails in the hands of the Egyptian Government under 
 the care of English Post Office agents.®® But it was only in 1888, 
 when the Peninsular and Oriental Company had consented to an 
 abatement of nearly £100,000 in their subsidy, that permission 
 
 British and. Foreign State Papers, LII, 53 (1858) ; ibid., LVI, p. 33 (1866) ; 
 ibid., LXIII, pp. 179, 313—316 (1873); Hertslet’s Comfnercial Treaties, XII, 413— 
 422. The line of the railway between Cairo and Suez had been relocated in 1870, 
 providing much better gradients and avoiding the worse portions of the desert. — 
 J. C. McCoan, Egypt as It Is, p. 229. 
 
 The Blue Peter, I, 45. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXV, 12, 13. 
 
 Ibid., LXVIII, 633-634. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 418 
 
 was given for the transmission of all mails through the canal.®® 
 This officially brought to an end the British overland route, the 
 establishment of which had been attended with such momentous 
 consequences almost exactly half a century before. Travellers 
 often continued to make their way through Egypt by rail to vary 
 a tedious voyage through the canal, but as a route for trade and 
 communication, the overland route was no more. 
 
 The re-routing of the mails and subsequent improvements in 
 land and water transportation made possible considerably better 
 postal communication and passenger transportation within the 
 next generation. Those courageous men who labored hard and 
 risked much that Bombay, the nearest port of India, might be 
 brought within 40 days of London would have been incredulous 
 that the same distance would, within three score years, be trav- 
 ersed by steamships in a fortnight. The remotest parts of India, 
 almost inaccessible in 1857, were brought within three weeks of 
 the capital of the British Empire by the opening of the twentieth 
 century. Before the opening of the World War, Australia, in 
 the heart of the antipodes, had been brought within 30 days’ time 
 from London, and a voyage of similar length would compass the 
 distance to Shanghai. 
 
 Neither the overland route nor that by way of the Cape of 
 Good Hope was immediately thrown into the discard by the 
 inauguration of the Suez Canal in November, 1869. The canal 
 of 1869 was a far different channel from the commodious water- 
 way of later years. Being exceedingly narrow and of doubtful 
 depth as well as costly to use, it did not commend itself instantly 
 to all shipping concerns and steam packet companies. It did, 
 however, afford an uninterrupted voyage between West and East. 
 This alone would have brought about extensive changes in trans- 
 portation methods and policies within a few years. But the fact 
 that the opening of the canal synchronized with the general 
 adoption of the compound marine engine in place of the low 
 pressure engines previously in use conspired to effect a veritable 
 revolution in shipping circles. 
 
 The rapid changes of the old order involved in this revolution 
 naturally produced some difficult stresses. Vessels adapted for 
 rapid and efficient service in European waters, where distances 
 were not great, were of no use on the much longer lines of the 
 East. Vessels constructed for mail and passenger service in 
 
 The P, & O. Pocket Book (3d Issue), p. 13. The canal, because of its 
 inadequate size and lack of facilities in other respects, was not a ver}' good business 
 proposition for a number of years after it was opened. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 419 
 
 eastern waters were unable to maintain the faster speeds de- 
 manded in the Mediterranean, and were frequently so constructed 
 that they were unable safely to navigate the canal, where extreme 
 manoeuvreability was required. At the same time the increased 
 speed and economy gained by the use of new types of propelling 
 machinery made entire fleets of fine vessels obsolescent almost 
 in a day. 
 
 These reasons added to the requirements of a newly indus- 
 trialized world made necessary the employment of new types of 
 vessels by all concerns intent on survival, vessels mechanically 
 modern and constructed with an eye to the limitations of the canal. 
 The companies already operating vessels on both sides of the 
 Isthmus of Suez were particularly hard hit by these developments. 
 Not only were they compelled to scrap large portions of their 
 fleets, in which enormous sums of money were invested, but at the 
 same moment they had to contend with hosts of new competitors. 
 The canal ended all that was left of the exclusiveness of the East, 
 and the retirement of much of the costly equipment of the older 
 and more successful companies made possible mercantile com- 
 petition on a new basis. Recognizing this, companies which had 
 not possessed the capital or the experience to create two services 
 in order to carry their operations into the East, now hastened to 
 establish new lines in eastern waters.^® 
 
 For a time it seemed that the P. and O. might pass from the 
 scene altogether. Profits vanished. Mail contracts militated 
 against a rapid adaptation to new circumstances. A new building 
 program had to be undertaken without delay at a time when ship- 
 building concerns were swamped with orders. But by 1875 the 
 crisis was passed with the Company still in a leading position. 
 By that time the Suez Canal was regularly being used by the 
 Company’s vessels, although the service through Egypt was still 
 being operated for both mails and passengers. A few years more 
 and it began to appear that the trials of the years immediately 
 following 1869 had been blessings in disguise. With the con- 
 struction of large and powerful steel ships, faster schedules were 
 maintained with ease and operating costs were at the same time 
 reduced.^^ 
 
 Of other steam navigation companies maintaining eastern com- 
 munications, the British India Company was most affected by the 
 canal and the accompanying mechanical evolution. One of the 
 vessels of this Company, the India, on her way home for new 
 
 See the London Times, 7 Jan., 1870. 
 
 The P. & O. Pocket Book (3d Issue), p. 20. By 1900 eastern freight rates 
 were only one-fifth as high as before the opening of the canal. 
 
420 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 boilers and machinery, was the first ship to reach England by way 
 of the canal carrying an Indian cargo. Other vessels of the Com- 
 pany were refitted in quick succession and new and larger ones 
 were built, enabling the concern to weather the unprecedented | 
 ordeal. To offset the financial stress, a new opportunity arose. 
 From Bombay, Kurrachee, and the Persian Gulf the Company’s 
 lines were extended on to London by way of Red Sea ports, stops 
 being made at Portugal for the conveyance of mails to and from 
 Portuguese East Africa. In 1876a line of vessels from Calcutta, 
 Madras, and Colombo to the Tilbury Docks, London, was in- 
 augurated, and from this main trunk line several branches ex- 
 tended. In 1881 a monthly line from London to Brisbane, 
 Australia, vta the old Torres Straits route, was put into operation 
 under the auspices of the Queensland colonial government, and 
 became the longest mail route operated up to that time.'® 
 
 The later history of both of these pioneering concerns is closely 
 connected with the work of Lord Inchcape, who succeeded Sir 
 Thomas Sutherland as Chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental 
 Company in 1914.^^ Due largely to his efforts these and various 
 other navigation companies were built into a great transportation 
 system. Successive alliances have produced a single traffic system 
 which touches every considerable port of the British Empire, and 
 provides three distinct world-encircling main routes embracing 
 India, China, Australia, New Zealand, and the Americas, connect- 
 ing with most of the by-ways of travel and commerce through- 
 out the globe.'® 
 
 Of the other large shipping companies to make extensive use 
 of the Suez Canal, the Orient Line merits notice. This line w^as 
 inaugurated in 1877 to supply deficiencies in the Australian com- 
 munications. Postal subsidies were granted by the colonial gov- 
 ernments of New South Wales and South Australia. In 1880 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1873, No. 62. 
 
 The Blue Peter, I, 68—70; William Campbell, “Postal Communication with 
 the East; India in Six, and Australia in Sixteen Daj's,” in Proceedings of the Royal 
 Colonial Institute, XIV, 222—246. 
 
 Mr. James Lyle Mackay, who became Lord Inchcape, set up in business in 
 Calcutta in 1874. His mercantile operations prospered, and he lived to construct 
 the most remarkable communication system the world has seen, including practically 
 all of the British steam lines in the East, as well as the Eastern Telegraph Lines, 
 themselves of composite growth. 
 
 The Blue Peter, I, 46. See ibid., I, 69-70; Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
 Navigation Company, Report of the Proceedings at the Eighty-frst Ordinary General 
 Meeting of the Proprietors (7 Dec., 1921), pp. 1 1 ff . Within the year ending in 
 December, 1921, the commissioned vessels of the Peninsular and Oriental system 
 totalled 444. They traversed over 15,000,000 nautical miles and carried 13,237,000 
 tons of cargo and 2,111,564 passengers without a casualty. This year, moreover, 
 was an exceedingly difficult one in shipping circles. 
 
IMPROVEMENTS IN COMMUNICATIONS 421 
 
 the mail service was placed on a fortnightly basis, in addition to 
 which steamers were run at irregular intervals by way of the Cape 
 for goods and passengers. During the hot season of the year the 
 regular mail steamers in going out from England employed the 
 Cape route in preference to the canal and the Red Sea, though 
 later the Cape route was discontinued entirely for passenger 
 service.^® 
 
 These, with other British lines employing the Cape route and 
 connecting at the Isthmus of Panama or across the continent of 
 North America with Pacific Ocean lines, greatly elaborated on the 
 original comprehensive plan of communication with the East.” 
 In this expansion, British corporations were supplemented and 
 duplicated by numerous steam lines representing continental 
 capital before the Suez Canal was ten years old. The fact that 
 competition is the handmaid of progress was amply manifested 
 by the rapidity with which mechanical improvements were adopted 
 by all eastern lines, by the readiness with which branch lines and 
 “ feeders ” were laid out to all parts of the eastern hemisphere, 
 in the successive enlargements of the Suez Canal, and in constantly 
 improving time schedules due to vast improvements in building 
 and propelling steamships.” 
 
 As early as 1843, effects of the opening of the overland 
 route impelled the Editor of the Calcutta Review to observe, 
 that — 
 
 If we regard life merely as a space of time within which a 
 certain number of things may be done or suffered . . , it 
 is obvious that the acceleration and multiplication of those 
 operations in which we are agents or patients, may, in a sense, 
 be said to lengthen life. If the facilities of communication 
 between remote countries are so increased that their inter- 
 course, which required twelve months, can be performed in 
 two, six times as much can be done of those things which 
 depended upon that intercourse j the merchant can transact 
 six times as much business; the statesman can accomplish six 
 times as much good; the philosopher can derive six times as 
 much knowledge; the traveller see six times as much of the 
 world; and all classes, whose enjoyment is connected with 
 the rapidity of communication between places . . . will find 
 their happiness augmented in the same ratio. This is to 
 
 W. J. Loftie, The Orient Line Guide. . . (New ed., London, 1885), pp. 
 xvii, 1—2, 59—71. 
 
 See W. S. Lindsay, History of British Merchant Shiffing (4 vols., London, 
 1876), IV, 613-619. 
 
 Frederick Talbot, The Steamship Conquest of the World, (London, 1912). 
 
422 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 make the space assigned to human life the measure of a 
 greater number of acts and of gratifications than formerly, 
 and what is this but a virtual increase of that space? 
 
 Yet in 1843 material reduction of time-distances had barely 
 begun. In relative terms, the span of human life has become 
 almost infinitely longer, now that information is sent to and from 
 all parts of the East by telegraph and cable in as many minutes, 
 and small quantities of goods may be shipped by air in as many 
 days, as weeks were then required. It does not appear that this 
 has made for greater leisure j it has led, rather, to a vastly in- 
 creased intensity in living and a vastly increased complexity in 
 economic, political, and social relationships. India, for example, 
 has undergone many revolutionary changes in consequence of a 
 closer approach to Europe, and is now not too far away to be 
 represented at Imperial Conferences in London each year.®” The 
 future status of India and its place in the British imperial system 
 will be determined, directly or indirectly, more by routes and 
 methods of communication than by any other factors. 
 
 Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., I, 561. 
 
 See Pari. Pap., 1921, No. [C. 1474], “Conference of Prime Ministers and 
 Representatives of the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India, held in June, 
 July, and August, 1921. Summary of Proceedings and Documents,” p. 67. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE 
 
 T he failure of the Euphrates Expedition of the 
 years 1834—1837 to disclose an easily navigable channel 
 from a point near the Syrian coast to the Persian Gulf 
 and Palmerston’s desertion of the Euphrates Valley Railway 
 scheme in 1857 blocked the construction of an alternative route 
 to India during the lifetime of the East India Company. How- 
 ever, the reports which had been made from time to time on the 
 advantages of developing a channel of communication through 
 Mesopotamia had almost invariably laid stress on the commercial 
 opportunities of the region, and it was this prospect, coupled with 
 the more or less constant political and strategic value of any such 
 line, that again prompted serious reconsideration of a road through 
 the Euphrates Valley. The later projects for Mesopotamian 
 railways were so closely related to economic potentialities that a 
 resume of the commercial opening of the region by an English 
 firm will be worth while. 
 
 The first English merchant to set up in business at the entrepot 
 of Bagdad in the nineteenth century seems to have been one 
 Alexander Hector, who began his endeavor in 1832.’ For sev- 
 eral years he traded in Mesopotamia and operated sailing vessels 
 between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf with little or no outside 
 competition. When Chesney’s Euphrates Expedition arrived at 
 Bagdad, Hector received the members cordially and made himself 
 serviceable in a number of ways. ,Yet, it was this same expedition 
 which disclosed the resources of the region and brought a large 
 degree of “ friendly rivalry ” to this pioneer merchant. 
 
 The beginning of a more extensive commercial development 
 was due to the extraordinary foresight and business acumen of 
 several members of the Lynch family, whose name is still promi- 
 nent in the commercial annals of Mesopotamia. Upon the break- 
 up of Chesney’s expedition at Bagdad in 1837, Lieut. Henry 
 Blosse Lynch, who had been second in command, was placed in 
 
 See Dublin University Magazine, XVIII, 574. 
 
 423 
 
424 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 charge of supplementary surveys by the Bombay Government. 
 As commander of a small flotilla of steam gunboats, Lynch 
 had frequent occasion to navigate the Tigris River between 
 Basrah and Bagdad.^ While engaged in this work his first im- 
 pressions concerning the commercial possibilities of the Tigris 
 basin were confirmed, and at his suggestion one of his brothers, 
 Mr. Thomas Kerr Lynch, joined presently by other members 
 of the family, established a commercial house in Bagdad in 
 1831.® 
 
 The venture prospered from the outset and prospects for large 
 scale development became so favorable that the firm of Lynch 
 Brothers gradually undertook a program of expansion. A few 
 years later, finding that the Bombay Government was contem- 
 plating withdrawing their steamers from the navigation of the 
 Tigris River, the Lynch Brothers offered to assume a certain re- 
 sponsibility for the political situation along the Tigris and to take 
 over the steam navigation of the river for commercial purposes. 
 The India authorities were pleased to acquiesce in this arrange- 
 ment. The Lynch firm thereupon began the operation of the old 
 Euphrates and another steamer which had been brought out in 
 sections from England to replace the Tigris^ lost in 1836.* Al- 
 though this steam equipment was far from efficient, it sufficed for 
 several years until the firm of Lynch Brothers became widely 
 known throughout the Middle East. The British authorities 
 gave such encouragement as was needed to this strategically lo- 
 cated enterprise, and in i860 sanctioned the formation by Messrs. 
 Lynch of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.® 
 Not many years afterward the decrepit steamers of the Indian 
 Navy operated by the Company were withdrawn from the Tigris 
 altogether, and two new steam vessels, especially designed for 
 the purpose of carrying goods between Bagdad and Basrah, were 
 brought out from England, by way of the newly opened Suez 
 Canal. 
 
 The substitution of these privately owned steamers for those 
 of the Indian Navy was carried out only after some political 
 manoeuvring at Constantinople. The original firman under 
 which steam service had thus far been maintained on the Tigris 
 
 ^ Sir Henry Layard, Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana, and Babylonia . . 
 
 II, 178, 180, 213—216. 
 
 ® W. P. Andrew, A Letter to Viscount Palmerston on the Political Importance 
 of the Euphrates Valley Railvoay . . . , p. 6o. 
 
 * David Fraser, The Short Cut to India; The Record of a Journey along the 
 Route of the Baghdad Railway . . . (Edinburgh and London, 1909), pp. 254— 
 255; A. H. Layard, Autobiography and Letters, I, 329. The old Euphrates went 
 down in a gale in the Persian Gulf some years later. 
 
 ® The firm of Lynch Brothers thereafter acted as agents for the navigation 
 company. — Geographical Journal, XLI, 246. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 425 
 
 t. had been made out in 1834 for the purpose of permitting the 
 r English Government to operate two steamers on the Euphrates 
 ^ ■ for commercial purposes in connection with the Euphrates Ex- 
 f pedition.® This firman, while intended to apply specifically to the 
 i' Euphrates River, had been loosely worded, and the Turkish 
 I i authorities had tacitly permitted the application of its provisions 
 i to the Tigris River. The suggestion of British authorities that 
 r the privileges contained in the permit of 1834 be transferred to a 
 1: business corporation produced some objection at first, due to the 
 ! envy of the Turkish authorities at Bagdad, who had been watch- 
 i ing with considerable apprehension the rapid rise to affluence of 
 1 Messrs. Lynch. Unwilling to permit a good opportunity to 
 i escape, the Pasha of Bagdad determined on building his own fleet 
 ' of steam vessels for plying on the Tigris and, possibly, the Eu- 
 i phrates as well. When his first vessel, the Baghdad, was ready, 
 : the Pasha applied to the East India Company for the temporary 
 i loan of the services of Capt. A. C. Holland, who had commanded 
 ! the Company’s steamer Comet in Persian Gulf waters.^ The 
 i petition was honored, and Capt. Holland took command of the 
 I first Turkish steamer on the Tigris. The venture was badly 
 I managed from the beginning, however, the Turks having neither 
 I: the requisite mechanical qualities nor business experience, and the 
 e steamer was removed from service.® With the collapse of this 
 i project Turkish objections to the grant of commercial navigation 
 I rights to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. were 
 largely removed, and the application of a bit of oil to the wheels 
 of diplomacy at the Porte by Sir Henry Rawlinson produced the 
 desired result. 
 
 The authorization of the transfer of commercial privileges to 
 the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co. was embodied 
 in a Vizirial Letter dated January 15, 1861, addressed to 
 the Governor-General of Bagdad. This document followed its 
 prototypes of 1834 and 1842 in being loosely constructed, but 
 since it served as a warrant for the navigation of the Tigris there- 
 after, its contents are of some interest:® 
 
 ® See Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, XIII, 838-839. 
 
 ^ S. H. Longrigg', Four Centuries of Modern Iraq (Oxford, 1925), p. 293. 
 The Comet had replaced the earlier and smaller Nitocris in the Persian Gulf. A 
 second Turkish steamer, the Basrah, constructed, like the Baghdad, in Antwerp, 
 appeared on the Tigris later, but was also retired soon afterward. 
 
 ® Lady Anne Blunt, Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (New York, 1879), P- 443 5 
 Sir E. A. W. Budge, By Nile and Tigris (2 vols., London, 1920), I, 213, 214. Capt. 
 Holland had been an officer in the Indian Navy as early as 1832, at the age of 
 twenty. Subsequently he took part in some of the surveying expeditions on the 
 Karun River, he played an honorable part in the Persian campaign of 1845, and in 
 1861 he was retired from active service. 
 
 ® W. H. Hall (Ed.), Reconstruction in Turkey (New York, 1918), pp. 86-87. 
 
426 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 The British Embassy having recently made certain com- 
 munications for the purpose of obtaining a renewal of the 
 orders which were sent concerning the British steamers and 
 boats authorised by Her Majesty to ply on the Rivers Tigris 
 and Euphrates, it has appeared from the register that per- 
 mission having on a former occasion been applied for by it to 
 station two steamers on the River Euphrates by Bagdad, and 
 to run them by turns, for the purpose of facilitating trade, 
 two Firmans, dated respectively the end of Shaban, 1250 
 (1834), and the beginning of Redgeb, 1257 (1842), were 
 addressed to the late Governor-General of Bagdad, Ali Riza 
 Pasha, authorising the permanent station of two steamers on 
 that river, providing it were proved and established that the 
 advantages resulting therefrom would be mutual, and that 
 no sort of inconvenience would ensue therefrom. Further, 
 that in virtue of a report received respecting the dues payable 
 by vessels and boats navigating the Euphrates and Tigris, 
 and in conformity with the request of the British Embassy 
 for Vizirial instructions, on the ground that British merchant 
 vessels might trade in those two rivers after payment of the 
 fixed dues according to Treaty, and considering that the 
 transport of goods from one point to another on those two 
 rivers, without going out to sea, is in fact internal trade, and 
 that under such circumstances vessels, under whatsoever flag 
 it may be, must pay the same dues as Ottoman vessels or 
 boats. . . For these reasons on the 6th Rebiul-akhir, 1262 
 (1846),^° instructions were sent to Bagdad directing, as 
 above, that these same dues should be levied on British mer- 
 chant vessels engaged in internal trade as on boats belonging 
 to Ottoman subjects. . 
 
 This gave a practical monopoly of navigation rights to the 
 Lynch firm, who made use of their position to develop a very 
 profitable traffic both in goods and passengers between Bagdad 
 and the Persian Gulf, charging such rates as the traffic would bear. 
 The advent of the City of London and her sister vessel, the 
 Dajlah, brought a new era of prosperity to Bagdad and Basrah. 
 Commander Lynch wrote in 1868 that “ the trade between India, 
 England, and the ports of the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates 
 has increased in an extraordinary degree since the expedition first 
 drew attention to these countries. . . Many of the European 
 nations are now represented by mercantile firms at Bagdad.^' 
 
 Hertslet’s Com. Treat., XIII, 839. Ibid., XIII, 845, S46. 
 
 F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, p. 357. See Richard 
 Coke, Baghdad-, the City of Peace, p. 272. 
 
From a frint in tJie possession of Messrs. Thos. H. Parker, London 
 
 The Bentinck at Aden in January 1844 
 
 The Blosse Lynch at Bagdad about 1877 
 
! 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 427 
 
 : Previously the Tigris trade had been confined to vessels of only 
 f twenty to fifty tons burden. These boats required from six to 
 ; eight days to make the journey down stream and from forty to 
 t sixty days to complete the ascent against the swift current. In 
 contrast with this performance the new steamers were able to 
 cover the five hundred miles between Bagdad and the Gulf in a 
 matter of fifty-two to sixty hours, and the return was usually 
 accomplished in four or five days.^^ 
 
 Throughout its history, the path of the Euphrates and Tigris 
 i Steam Navigation Company was constantly beset with many diffi- 
 i culties which required unusual tact and patience to surmount. 
 ^ The Turkish authorities at Bagdad were at all times careful to 
 [ keep the Company’s efforts within the narrowest interpretations 
 f of their concession, restricting normal expansion as the Tigris 
 [ trade developed. The Company were forbidden to employ their 
 I' vessels above Bagdad, or to have in commission more than two 
 • steamers, which were not to be used simultaneously, regardless of 
 1 passenger and freight needs. Objections were frequently raised 
 against the concession itself.^^ 
 
 Much of this opposition is to be explained by the revival in 
 1 1867 of the Turkish steam service and its organization as the 
 I Uman-Ottoman Administration. To the earlier and almost ob- 
 solete Turkish vessels were added three new and modern steamers 
 I in 1867, the Mosul, Frat, and Rasafa^^ and under the enterpris- 
 ! ing Midhat Pasha frequent sailings were made regardless of the 
 amount of business carried on. While these vessels were under 
 no such limitations as those imposed on the Lynch steamers and 
 charged even lower rates, the latter suffered relatively little be- 
 cause of the high standard of service, regular schedules, and 
 business principles on which they were operated. In 1875 the 
 Lynch Company, through diplomatic action at the Porte, were 
 allowed to add a third steamer to their Tigris equipment to act 
 as a reserve to the two others then in service, but the bringing out 
 of the Mejidieh in 1883 under this arrangement brought relations 
 between Company and local governm.ent to an imfasse, which 
 was with difficulty straightened out through the usual diplomatic 
 channels. “ 
 
 In 1904 the Turkish steam service was again reorganized and 
 renamed the “ Hamidieh ” in honor of the Sultan. For some 
 
 Budge, op. cit., I, 214. 
 
 Ibid., I, 215; Layard, Autobiography, I, 331 n. 
 
 Longrigg, op. cit., p. 294. 
 
 Ibid., p. 318; Fraser, op. cit., p. 235. The Blosse Lynch had been brought 
 out in 1876 to replace the Dajlah which had been sunk. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 428 
 
 years it was fairly well conducted, and it even managed to capture 
 a modicum of the Tigris trade. With the Young Turk rising, 
 however, its control again deteriorated, and until the opening of 
 the Great War it carried on at best a precarious existence. The 
 Lynch enterprise meanwhile had run into new difficulties with the 
 German Bagdad Railway enterprise. A series of infringements 
 on the Lynch concession was followed in March, 1914, by the 
 merging of the Lynch interests with those of Lord Inchcape, who 
 already controlled the Peninsular and Oriental, British India, and 
 other steam navigation and industrial enterprises in the East.^^ 
 
 In other lines than the Tigris trade Messrs. Lynch were instru- 
 mental in developing the economic resources of the Middle East 
 during the latter part of the nineteenth century. In order to feed 
 their Tigris line, they opened up roads into Persia, placed steamers 
 on the Karun which were sometimes operated at a loss, built 
 bridges, and developed caravan routes.^® It was perfectly natural, 
 therefore, that the Lynch firm should be deeply interested from 
 the first in the development of their interests by establishing 
 better connections with the Mediterranean on the one hand and 
 India on the other, either by added steamship facilities or land 
 lines of railway, and that their success should exercise some in- 
 fluence in Government circles. 
 
 While the British Government refused to take any official 
 action in 1857 toward opening the Euphrates Valley route by 
 means of a railway, interest continued in some quarters. There 
 was some talk, for instance, of building a Jaffa to Jerusalem rail- 
 way for the commercial opening of Syria, with the object of ex- 
 tending a branch of the road subsequently to the Persian Gulf. 
 In 1862 a group of promoters, headed by Sir Moses Montefiore, 
 issued a prospectus for such a road,^® and Capt. H. B. Lynch, who 
 had just returned from Bagdad to push the proposition of a rail- 
 
 E. M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Po’wers, and the Bagdad Railway (New York, 
 1923), pp. 190-191, 258—260, et fassim; Geographical Journal, XLI, 246—248; 
 Coke, of. cit., pp. 284—285. In 1912 the Euphrates and Tig;ris Steam Navigation 
 Company maintained three steamers on the Euphrates Riv'er as operating agents of 
 the Societe de Transport Fluviaux en Orient, and motor boats were used to supple- 
 ment these. During the War one of the Company’s vessels, the Shushan, maintained 
 a kind of service on the river, but navigation on any extensive scale is still im- 
 practicable. 
 
 Sykes, History of Persia, II, 371-372, 528-530; Curzon, op. cit., II, 332-334; 
 Chirol, op. cit., pp. 161-164; P. M. Sykes, Ten Thousand Miles in Persia (London, 
 1902), pp. 245-246, 250; Geog. Journal, XLI, 247-248. The opening of the 
 Karun River was quite an accomplishment in itself, and was carried out in the teeth 
 of French and Russian opposition. 
 
 Lane-Poole, Life of General F. R. Chesney, pp. 448, 453-460; London Times, 
 14 Sept., 1882. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 429 
 
 way from the Mediterranean to the Tigris, became interested in 
 this. The reorganized Euphrates Valley Railway Company, 
 however, with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as Chairman of the 
 Board of Directors, entered the diplomatic field first. While this 
 Company attempted to make capital at home of the prevailing 
 hostility to the French Suez Canal enterprise, Chesney was sent 
 out to Constantinople to secure a right-of-way from the Turks. 
 Before the end of June, with the aid of Sir Henry Bulwer, he had 
 secured concessions for the construction of a portion of the line. 
 At this stage the project was submitted to the British Government 
 for approval. It found many well wishers in official circles, but 
 it failed to enlist the sympathy of Gladstone and other members 
 of the Ministry, and without the moral, if not financial, support 
 of Government, nothing could be accomplished.^® The Euphrates 
 Valley group thereupon suspended their plans. Lord Stratford 
 made capital of severing all of his connections with the concern, 
 and public interest quickly subsided. The Lynch firm were exas- 
 perated to the point of throwing aside patriotic considerations for 
 the time being in order to seek in French enterprise and capital a 
 resource lacking in England. Even in this they were disappointed. 
 
 A few years later, the pomp and circumstance connected with 
 the official opening of the Suez Canal under French auspices 
 added to several disturbing factors in French international rela- 
 tions, again drew attention to the need for a route to India not 
 under French control. France had acquired a strategic foothold 
 in Somaliland in 1864, which, with the Suez Canal, placed her in 
 a strong position with regard to the control of the Red Sea. More- 
 over, as a counterpoise to British India, France had been busily 
 extending her possessions in Indo-China. Even in European 
 circles the omens were not good. Napoleon III had ignored 
 English attitude in persisting in his conquest of Mexico, and had 
 introduced a dangerous tone into the affairs of the western nations 
 by insisting on “ compensation ” for his neutrality during the 
 Austro-Prussian War. An alternative route to India was no 
 longer merely a subject for theorizing by British merchants or 
 super-imperialists. 
 
 One small but significant indication that the British Govern- 
 ment was taking the situation to heart was the authorization in 
 1868 of the publication of Chesney’s Narrative of the Euphrates 
 Expedition carried on hy order of the British Government during 
 the years 1835, 1836, and 1837. “It is thought advisable by Her 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 460. A railway line in Syria would have been more 
 distasteful to the French than the Euphrates Valley project first proposed because 
 of the traditional connection of France with the Syrian Christians. 
 
430 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Majesty’s Government,” Chesney said at the beginning of the 
 work, “ having regard to the greatly increased importance of the 
 Overland Route question,^^ that it would be for the public advan- 
 tage that the materials of information remaining in my hands 
 should be rendered accessible, and I have received their commands 
 to proceed with the present work.” The press also took up the 
 question again,^® and proceeded with greater vigor than at any 
 previous time to argue, in substance, that “ a commercial nation 
 ought not to repine at the opening of any new highway of com- 
 merce} but a nation administering a distant empire, cannot afford 
 to trust her communications to the chances of commercial equality, 
 which at any time may be disturbed by national or dynastic rival- 
 ries, , During the summer of 1870 a number of surveys 
 
 for possible railway lines were carried on in the mountains of the 
 Syrian hinterland, and these furnished something of a practical 
 working basis for governmental consideration of lines from the 
 eastern shore of the Mediterranean through Mesopotamia to the 
 Persian Gulf.^® 
 
 The next summer the question of opening a Euphrates Valley I 
 route to India was brought up in the House of Commons, Fol- 
 lowing a debate, a Select Committee of the House was appointed 
 on July 4 “ to examine and Report upon the whole subject of 
 Railway Communication between the Mediterranean, the Black 
 Sea, and the Persian Gulf.” This Committee took up the sub- 
 ject committed to them with a will and began the collection of 
 evidence as to the practicability of a railway through the Eu- 
 phrates Valley. Witnesses were summoned whose experience 
 with the region dated back to the first explorations. Among these, 
 naturally, was the now aged General Chesney, whose hopes again 
 rose high of seeing his long-cherished project consummated dur- 
 ing his lifetime. Called before the Committee at its first public 
 sitting on July 17, he reviewed much of the history of the surveys 
 which he had carried out forty years before and reiterated his 
 belief in the Euphrates Valley line.^’ This was one of the last 
 
 This is one of the earliest applications of the term “ overland ” to the route 
 through Mesopotamia after the Suez Canal became a reality. 
 
 (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1868), p. 2. 
 
 London Times, 7 June, 1870. 
 
 Chesney, of. cit., p. 2. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1871, No. 386, p. 61. 
 
 Ibid., 1871, No. 386, pp. ii, 36—37; W. P. Andrew, The Euphrates Valley 
 Route to India (London, 1873), p. 50. 
 
 William Andrew was examined by the Committee on the same date, but his 
 interest in the development of a railway line which might connect with Indian 
 railways which he had developed gave less weight to his evidence than to that of 
 Chesney, who knew the ground thoroughly. 
 
431 
 
 !! 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 f efforts made by this stanch pioneer in the cause to which he was 
 n so devoted, and death, which came before the end of the Parlia- 
 !.'i mentary investigation, spared him the bitter disappointment of 
 t i seeing the project again defeated/® 
 
 The Select Committee of 1870 did not complete its labors 
 i\ during the session, and only a preliminary report was handed in 
 [i on July 27/® It was reappointed on February 19, 1872, to com- 
 |! plete the investigation. During the next few months the geo- 
 li graphical, political, and financial aspects of the various possible 
 fi railway lines leading from European shores to the Persian Gulf 
 were examined in full. Twenty-eight witnesses gave evidence 
 I'j before the Committee, and a great deal of additional information 
 j was collected by addressing lists of queries to the British Consular 
 J officers stationed in various parts of Asiatic Turkey.®® In all of 
 this evidence no note of doubt could be detected concerning the 
 feasibility or even the necessity of a railway line utilizing one of 
 the various overland routes proposed, but there was the greatest 
 difference of opinion as to which line was best adapted to serve 
 
 I the political and commercial purposes of Great Britain. 
 
 Chesney, Sir William Andrew, Telford MacNeill,®^ William 
 Ainsworth, and others, generally those who had been connected 
 in some way with earlier projects for opening up the Euphrates 
 Valley, very strongly supported that route still.®® It was urged 
 I that this was the most direct and the cheapest route that could be 
 I found and the most easily defended, with one of its termini at 
 Alexandretta or Suedia (Seleucia) on the Mediterranean and the 
 other at Koweit (Grane) on the western side of the Persian Gulf. 
 The case for this line represented the ideas of a considerable 
 group of British imperialists, some of whom still continue to ad- 
 
 An excellent biographical sketch is contained in the Annual Register, 1872, 
 Pt. II, p. 136. Chesney’s career was particularly striking and full of misfortune. 
 His domestic life was especially unhappy, which he tried to forget in active, ad- 
 venturous service. He was a very ambitious man, fretting much because of slow 
 promotion, which he was too proud to overcome by the usual means. As an officer 
 he was respected by his subordinates, though he proved to be a severe superior, 
 exacting strictest discipline at all times, and expecting those under him to equal his 
 unusual energy. He devoted most of his life to the realization of his dream to 
 protect British possessions in the East through the opening and control of the direct 
 route which he first surveyed. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1871, No. 386. 
 
 Ibid., 1872, No. [C. 534]. The report from Syria of Vice-Consul E. B. B. 
 Barker, son of John Barker, who had once been stationed in the same region, is of 
 particular interest (pp. 8—12). 
 
 An engineer, son of Sir John McNeill, who had helped survey a route from 
 Antioch through the mountains in 1856. 
 
 See the article by D. Simon Fraser in Ocean Higlmiays: The Geographical 
 Record, H, p. 137. 
 
432 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 vocate the development of this route.®® It was stated by Andrew 
 thus: 
 
 It is not on commercial consideration that I would urge 
 the claims of the Euphrates Valley Railway. It is on im- 
 perial grounds that the scheme commends Itself to our sup- 
 port. I believe that the establishment of the Euphrates 
 route would add incalculably to our prestige throughout 
 Europe and the East, and would do more to strengthen our 
 hold on India than any other means that could be devised. 
 
 It is designed to ultimately form [^sk'\ a through line from 
 Constantinople to the Persian Gulf, and is capable of being | 
 extended eastward to India. It would always be independent 5 
 of any European disturbances, and would constitute the only ii 
 portion of a through line of railway which would be always, 1 
 
 and under all circumstances, at the absolute control of this - 
 
 country.®* 
 
 Most of the authorities consulted agreed that roads starting 
 from Black Sea ports, which had been suggested as a means of . 
 offsetting Russian railways,®® should be avoided, not only because 
 of great engineering difficulties but also because of the danger of ] 
 being cut off at the Straits in time of war. Such a route could 
 hardly serve imperial purposes if it failed to provide a line by 
 which troops and munitions could be transported in times of 
 emergency.®® But other routes were taken under serious con- 
 sideration which would, when completed, provide railways direct 
 from Europe to India. Such lines starting from the Mediter- 
 ranean coast of Asia Minor or from a point opposite Constanti- 
 nople and passing through Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, might 
 be carried on to Kurrachee. It was proposed to link these trunk 
 lines by means of branch railways with the Black Sea on the one 
 hand and the Syrian coast on the other, thus combining the salient 
 features of the other proposed routes in one possessing the ad- 
 vantages of all.®^ Turkish authorities did all in their power to 
 lend weight to projects for lines starting near Constantinople, 
 
 See The Near East, 'KW, 871. 
 
 W. P. Andrew, The Euphrates Valley Railway: a Lecture (London, 1882); 
 
 F. von Loher and Mrs. A. B. Joyner, Cyprus: Historical and. Descriptive (New York, 
 1878), pp. 291—292. 
 
 W. P. Andrew, India and Her Neighbours (London, 1878), p. 375; Andrew, 
 The Euphrates Valley Route to India; a Paper read before the British Association 
 in Brighton, in August, 1872 . . . (London, 1873), pp. 26 S. 
 
 Colburn’s : The New Monthly Magazine, CXLIX, 61 1 ff. 
 
 Ibid., CLI, 201 ff. 
 
433 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 even intimating that no concessions would be given for lines 
 which failed to open up Asia Minor/® It was also freely sug- 
 gested during Committee sessions that in normal times England 
 should utilize the continental railways of Europe from Calais to 
 Constantinople as soon as they were completed, thus duplicating 
 for travel and transportation the arrangement already in use for 
 telegraphic communication/® The idea of a Bagdad Railway, 
 extending to the Persian Gulf or all of the way to India, was 
 slowly but surely evolving. Other Powers of Europe were not 
 slow to comprehend the advantages in such a line. 
 
 The Parliamentary Committee reported on July 22, 1872, 
 stating that it had to recommend for immediate utilization only 
 lines starting from the Mediterranean and reaching some point 
 on the Persian Gulf. As to termini, the Committee preferred 
 Alexandretta on the Mediterranean and Grane on the Persian 
 Gulf. The maximum cost of a railway of average gauge between 
 these points was estimated at £10,000,000, and the saving in time 
 for troops and passengers between London and Bombay was 
 placed at more than ninety hours. 
 
 In presenting their final report and urging action, the Com- 
 mittee affirmed that — 
 
 It would be of vast importance to the interests of this 
 country and of India that some alternative route, such as the 
 one now proposed, should be created by means of a railway 
 between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf} and 
 further, your Committee recommend . . . that the con- 
 struction of an alternative route . . . should be assisted 
 financially by a joint guarantee of the Imperial and Indian 
 Governments. The utmost liability that could fall on Eng- 
 land under this arrangement would be £300,000 per annum} 
 but this is supposing the Turkish Government to fail entirely 
 to pay anything, or the Railway either} and that is a con- 
 
 Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 633; Colburn’s, CLI, p. 227. See Correspondence 
 quoted in Andrew, The Euphrates Valley Railway: A Lecture, p. 84; and the state- 
 ment of Capt. the Hon. Randolph Stewart at the Royal United Service Institution, 
 May 23, 1873, in W. P. Andrew, The Euphrates Valley Route to India, in connection 
 with the Central Asian Question (London, 1873), p. 24. The Turkish Government 
 was reported to be considering constructing a railway of its own through Asia Minor. 
 Pari. Pap., 1872, No. [C. 534], p. 14. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1872, No. 386, pp. 4—5, 15 ff. 
 
 Ibid., No. 322, pp. ii-xix; ibid.. No. [C. 534], pp. 6-8. One of the ad- 
 vantages claimed for the Euphrates Valley route after all the surveys of the past 
 forty years had shown the Euphrates River to be only partially navigable was that 
 the railway could be supplemented while it was in building by steam vessels operated 
 on that river. 
 
434 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 tingency almost too remote to be treated as a liability, or 
 certainly as a probability/^ 
 
 But instead of putting forth a single definite line from the Medi- 
 terranean to the Persian Gulf, the Committee fatally weakened 
 its report by presenting several alternatives, each of which pos- 
 sessed its own peculiar advantages. The inference was, naturally, 
 that further surveys and other investigations would be necessary 
 before the best line could be selected, and the whole subject re- 
 mained in a more or less hypothetical state. 
 
 Five lines were suggested as practicable. There was, first, the 
 line starting from Alexandretta or Suedia, near the mouth of the 
 Orontes, passing through Aleppo to the Euphrates at or near 
 Jiaber Castle, and passing thence down the right bank of the 
 river to Koweit (Grane), which was looked upon as a better 
 terminus than Basrah. In the second place, a line was proposed 
 starting from one of the same points, crossing the Euphrates 
 River at Beles, passing thence down the left bank of that river 
 or the right bank of the Tigris, to a point nearly opposite Bagdad, 
 to admit of a branch line to that city, then re-crossing the Eu- 
 phrates and proceeding to Koweit. Third, a line was proposed 
 starting as before, crossing the Euphrates at Bir, proceeding thence 
 to Orfah and Diarbekr, and following the right bank of the Tigris 
 to the Gulf. The fourth suggestion contemplated a similar line, 
 but one following the left bank of the Tigris. The fifth line was 
 described as starting from Tripoli and proceeding across the 
 desert by way of Damascus and Palmyra to the Euphrates, whence 
 it might follow one of the preceding routes. 
 
 Government heads took no steps toward acting on the recom- 
 mendations of the Select Committee. Although there was less 
 in the way of building a railway through Mesopotamia in 1872 
 than at any previous time, there was also less impulse for imme- 
 diate action. The Suez Canal was taking care of all normal com- 
 munication and commercial needs, and while its control remained 
 for the time being in French hands, France had been removed as 
 a rival and source of danger for an indefinite length of time as a 
 result of the Franco-German War. Britain had also secured some 
 representation on the controlling Board of the Suez Canal Com- 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1872, No. 322, Report. See Curzon, Persia and, th^ Persian 
 Question, I, 632. 
 
 This was pointed out by Earl Granville during a debate in the House of 
 Lords on 26 July, 1882. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1872, No. [C. 534], pp. 8—12. 
 
 Ibid., No. 322, Report; Loher and Joyner, op. ch., pp. 271-272. 
 
435 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 pany, and the likelihood that shipping passing through the canal 
 would be molested in any way appeared to be very remote. Be- 
 sides these considerations, Great Britain had not yet come to 
 realize that inevitably, sooner or later, direct political responsibil- 
 ity would have to be assumed for the territories through which 
 lay actual and potential highways to her indispensable eastern 
 possessions. The old attitude of political aloofness was still being 
 cherished.^® The carrying out of a Euphrates Valley railway 
 enterprise was allowed to wait, therefore, as long as the political 
 situation in Europe appeared to be satisfactory. 
 
 Changes meanwhile were quietly taking place which made the 
 carrying out of plans for a railway from the Mediterranean to 
 the Persian Gulf under British auspices a very doubtful matter at 
 any time in future. British relations with the Porte, which for 
 many years had been very close and generally very cordial, were 
 slowly but definitely becoming less friendly. One after another, 
 those Turkish officials who had long relied on English guidance 
 were removed through death or political reverses. Djemal Pasha, 
 the able Minister of Foreign Affairs and a consistent Anglophile, 
 died in September, 1872. The Grand Vizier, Mahmud Pasha, 
 who had not been averse from English influence at the Porte, fell 
 into disgrace about the same time and was forced to resign. His 
 place was taken by Midhat Pasha, Governor of the Bagdad pasha- 
 lik, who had consistently opposed British objects and interests in 
 Mesopotamia for a number of years. The appointment of 
 Rudschi Pasha in his place as Grand Vizier soon afterward was 
 no gain for England.^® Furthermore, Turkish susceptibilities 
 were gravely hurt when, in connection with the Bulgarian atroci- 
 ties of 1876, Gladstone began his denunciation of the “un- 
 speakable Turk ” in the House of Commons, and wished that 
 the Ottoman Government could be ousted from Europe, “ bag 
 and baggage.” 
 
 This loss of favor at Constantinople was not readily appreciated 
 in England. For several years following the report of the Select 
 Committee in 1872 it was assumed that the Euphrates Valley 
 Railway, when attempted, would receive the hearty support of 
 the Sultan’s Government. But while England procrastinated and 
 neglected Turkish attitude, other states were becoming more 
 active in eastern affairs. Between 1865 and 1871, French, Ger- 
 man, and Austrian syndicates had been authorized to construct 
 
 Lane-Poole, of. cit., p. 470. 
 
 Annual Register, 1872, Pt. I, 283. 
 
 See Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXXX, 1741-1748; Lane-Poole, of. cit.. 
 
 P- 455. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 436 
 
 railway lines in Turkey and Persia/® These came to nothing 
 because of insufficient capital and the inability of the Turkish 
 Government to give suitable financial guarantees. Other com- 
 panies, however, were constantly appearing on the scene after 
 1870. A French railway was begun between Brusa and its port, 
 Mudania, in 1873, although the work was not completed until 
 1892.^® About the same time the opening of the Suez Canal 
 brought about an invasion of Indian and eastern ports by new 
 European steamship companies, which had been practically ex- 
 cluded from the use of the Red Sea as British interests controlled 
 the overland route through Egypt. A strong French company, 
 the Messageries MaritimeSf opened a line to Calcutta and the 
 Farther East in 1872, and in 1873 ^ Russian line of steamers was 
 established to ply between Odessa and Bombay.®® These were 
 developments which were scarcely offset by English commercial 
 expansion, such as that represented by the augmented service of 
 the British India Steam Navigation Company in the Persian Gulf 
 in 1872, or the acquisition of the canal shares of the Khedive of 
 Egypt in 1875. 
 
 However, the factor which, more than any other, tended to 
 keep up considerable British interest in an alternative route to 
 India for a quarter of a century after the Franco-German War was 
 the spectre of an imperialistic Russia, bent on finding a free outlet 
 to some large body of water to the South. This spectre assumed 
 various shapes and appeared now in the European provinces of 
 Turkey, and again in Mesopotamia or Persia, and at other times in 
 the vicinity of the northwest frontier of India, toward which a Rus- 
 sian railway was building.®^ With France definitely removed as a 
 dangerous rival, the motives and machinations of the “ Great 
 Northern Power ” occupied still more attention.®® Much of the 
 evidence received by the Parliamentary Committee in 1871 and 
 
 Curzon, of. cit., I, 614. 
 
 Morris Jastrow, The War ani the Bagdad Railway (Philadelphia, 1917), 
 p. 159 n. 
 
 Andrew, The Eufhrates Valley Route to India, in connection with the 
 Central Asian Question, pp. 5, 19—20; Journal of the East India Association, Xj 
 246—269. 
 
 Journal of the East India Assn., IX, 192. Cf. ibid., VII, 1—24. 
 
 Ocean Highways: The Geog. Rec., II, 137—138. Disraeli is quoted here as 
 having said in a speech at Manchester, “No man can doubt that the entire command 
 of the Black Sea will soon be in the possession of Russia. The time may not be 
 distant when we may hear of the Russian power in the Persian Gulf, and what efEect 
 that may have upon the dominions of England, and upon those possessions on the 
 productions of which we every year more and more depend, are questions upon 
 which it will be well on proper occasions to meditate.” See also the letter from 
 Col. Sir Henry Green, in Andrew, The Eufhrates Valley Route to India (1873), 
 PP- 34 - 37 - 
 
437 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 1872 was designed to show the necessity of building a railway 
 line through Mesopotamia to prevent Russian access to the Per- 
 sian Gulf along the same line.” A paper read before the East 
 India Association in 1877 succinctly summed up the case thus: 
 “ The Eastern Question is for England a Russo-Indian question 
 — v'vz.^ the securing at any cost the neutrality of Constantinople 
 and the Isthmus of Suez, as they affect the route to India, and our 
 relations with Russia in her position in Asia Minor and on our 
 Indian frontier, where Russia has now become our neighbour.” 
 And a Russian paper was quoted as saying that “ India is the 
 Achilles’ heel, where England is most vulnerable.” ” 
 
 If England was reluctant during these years to exploit one of 
 the approaches to India, there was sufficient willingness to pro- 
 ceed to extreme lengths, if necessary, to protect the Indian fron- 
 tier. This evidence was shown by the revival of the Afghan 
 question and the outbreak of the Second Afghan War as a means 
 of checking Russia. That Great Northern Power had made great 
 headway since the first war with Afghanistan. In 1868 she had 
 established her control over the Khanate of Bokhara, which 
 brought her to the very borders of Afghanistan. In 1873 the 
 Khanate of Khiva was absorbed, although the Amir had vainly 
 sued for British support but a little earlier. Partially to offset 
 these moves. Lord Lytton, who had been sent out to India as 
 Viceroy upon Disraeli’s accession as Premier, proclaimed a pro- 
 tectorate over Baluchistan in 1876 and established an advanced 
 military station at Quetta as a door which might be opened 
 into Afghanistan. This was followed by the making of a secret 
 treaty between Russia and the Amir, Sher Ali, in August, 
 1878, a few weeks after the announcement of the Cyprus Con- 
 vention, which practically gave Russia a protectorate in Afghan- 
 istan. At the same time, Afghan refusals to receive a British 
 envoy led to the declaration of a costly and ineffectual war in 
 November.” 
 
 The war had some redeeming features, however. A hostile 
 Amir was replaced by one who, if not friendly to British in- 
 fluences, was no less opposed to those of Russia. The war also 
 
 Andrew, India and Her Neighbours, p. 75; Pari. Paf., 1872, No. 322. 
 
 Journal of the East India Assn., X, 246, a paper by Rev. James Long. 
 
 Ibid., IX, 187. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1881, Central Asia, No. i; London Times, 9 Feb., 1881. An 
 Indian Railway to the Bolan Pass to offset the approach of Russian railway lines 
 and to facilitate the movement of Indian troops to the frontier was being advocated 
 about this time, although the first suggestions for such a line had been made years 
 before. — The Times, 17 Jan., 1879. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 438 
 
 secured control of the mountain wall and secured the defence of 
 India on the northwest. Thereafter, a strategic railway a thou- 
 sand miles away appeared hardly as essential as it had before. 
 Moreover, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on March 13, 
 1881, led to the inauguration of somewhat better relations with 
 his successor, and Anglo-Russian feuds gradually gave place to 
 Anglo-German rivalry. 
 
 While British strategists were no longer agreed on the value 
 of a railway through Mesopotamia for the protection of India,®® 
 the fear of Russian aims led to the continued contemplation of 
 such a line. Under these circumstances the British world viewed 
 with great alarm the approach of hostilities between Russia and 
 Turkey as the outcome of Balkan revolts, although at the opening 
 of the war the Tsar gave emphatic assurance that he had no de- 
 signs on Constantinople. It was inevitable that for the time being 
 Great Britain and Turkey should draw closer together, the latter 
 having full confidence that in case of a Russian invasion of 
 Turkish territory Britain would come to the rescue for the sake of 
 her eastern interests as in 1854.®® 
 
 However, British diplomacy did not follow the same lines as 
 on former occasions. On May 6, 1877, Lord Derby despatched 
 to the Russian Ambassador a statement of British interests in the 
 East with regard to Constantinople, the Bosphorus and Darda- 
 nelles, Egypt, the Suez Canal, and the Persian Gulf. He warned 
 Russia that any attempt to block or interrupt the communications 
 between Europe and the East would be regarded as “ a menace 
 to India and would be inconsistent with the maintenance ... of 
 an attitude of passive neutrality.” Likewise it was stated that 
 Great Britain could not endure Russian occupation of Constanti- 
 nople or Egypt, and a “ hands off ” policy in the Persian Gulf 
 was defined.®® Three weeks later came the Russian reply, agree- 
 ing to abide by the demands of the British Government, and the 
 likelihood of another great European war was greatly di- 
 minished.®^ 
 
 Even with this partial understanding on eastern matters. Great 
 Britain was altogether unprepared for the disaster which befell 
 Turkish arms in December, 1877. The subsequent Treaty of 
 
 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser., CCLIV, 490, 889. 
 
 Journal of the East India Assn., X, 250; W. S. Blunt, of. cit., pp. 67, 68. 
 
 Fortnightly Review, XXVII, 119; St. George Freeman, England’s Duty in 
 the Present Crisis (Dublin, 1877). 
 
 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, IV, 2615—2617. 
 
 Ibid., IV, 2624—2627; G. C. Thompson, Public Opinion and Lord Beacons- 
 field, 1875—1880 (2 vols., London, 1886), II, 186. 
 
439 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 San Stefano, which reduced European Turkey to a small frag- 
 ment of its former size and wrested from her important trans- 
 Caucasian territories, while not directly touching any of the re- 
 gions specifically mentioned in the statement of May 6, 1877, 
 nevertheless so undermined that “inert and friendly Power on the 
 Bosphorus,” on which depended the safety of India, that the 
 British Government, which had already gone nearly to the length 
 of declaring war and had brought out some 7000 Indian troops to 
 Malta by way of the Suez Canal,®^ felt constrained to intervene 
 in the making of final arrangements. On the ground that the 
 Treaty of San Stefano entirely changed the status of Europe as 
 defined by the Powers at Paris in 1856 and must therefore be 
 submitted to another European Congress, Russia protestingly 
 yielded and consented to a review of the Eastern Question at a 
 Congress held in Berlin under the chairmanship of Prince Bis- 
 mark. 
 
 While the Powers, Great Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia, 
 were drawing up the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin, with 
 scant regard for the arrangement made at San Stefano, British 
 authorities, anticipating a settlement which might leave something 
 to be desired in the protection of routes to the East, carried on 
 negotiations at Constantinople on their own account. Various 
 strategic sites in the Eastern Mediterranean had already been con- 
 sidered which might offer a suitable base for operations against 
 Russia in future, and which would afford the requisite protection 
 for the Suez Canal and for any railway which might be constructed 
 from a Syrian port. British policy in this connection was outlined 
 by Lord Salisbury a little later in an official note to the French 
 Government. In it he confessed that — 
 
 The advice has been from various quarters repeatedly 
 pressed upon Her Majesty’s Government to occupy Egypt, 
 or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal.®® Such an 
 
 Quite a controversy was aroused, even in British circles, by the transfer of 
 Indian troops by way of the canal to European waters. Aside from the new theory 
 of imperial relationships, implied in the act, it threw much light on Britain’s attitude 
 toward the canal itself. — Journal of the East India Assn., XI, 152-183 ; Thompson, 
 of. cit., II, 211, 415-416; London Times, 18 April, 1878. 
 
 The Government was the more influenced to take such a step by the reported 
 discovery by the Egyptian Government in 1877 of a plot to blow in the banks of 
 the Suez Canal with nitroglycerine. The imagined ease with which this route might 
 be completely blocked for a considerable period of time caused grave fears, and has 
 undoubtedly been at the bottom of British policy in Egypt ever since. See An 
 Englishman, England in Egypt: The Highway to India-, A Proposal Submitted to 
 the People of England (London, 1877), pp. 5—6. 
 
440 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 operation might not have been at variance with English in- 
 terests, and would have presented no material difficulties. 
 But this policy has never been entertained by Her Majesty’s 
 Government. We had received an intimation from the 
 French Government that any such proceeding would be very 
 unwelcome to the French people, and we could not but see 
 the reasonableness of their objection under the existing cir- 
 cumstances. Her Majesty’s Government have constantly 
 turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that kind.®* 
 
 The turning of a “ deaf ear ” to suggestions for occupying 
 Egypt was doubtless partly due to the knowledge that France 
 had real, that is, extensive financial, as well as political, interests 
 in that country. The occupation by Great Britain of a position on 
 the coast of Syria was also decided against because of the certainty 
 of wounding French feelings. As Lord Salisbury said, in con- 
 tinuing his note — 
 
 They [the British Government] have been likewise rec- 
 ommended to occupy some port on the coast of Syria, such as 
 Alexandretta, but they felt that, however carefully guarded, 
 such a proceeding might, in the present temper of men’s 
 minds, be construed as indicating an intention to acquire ter- 
 ritory on the mainland of Western Asiaj and they did not 
 care to be suspected of designs which are wholly apart from 
 their thoughts. They have, therefore, preferred to accept 
 from the Sultan the provisional occupation of a position less 
 advantageous, indeed, but still sufficient for the purpose, and 
 not exposed to the inconveniences I have mentioned.®® 
 
 This “ less advantageous position ” was the island of Cyprus, 
 which was to serve for Britain as a 'point de depart ” and a 
 “ place d'armes ” for controlling and protecting the route to India. 
 
 The island of Cyprus had long been spoken of as suited for the 
 terminus of a line of steamers from England and as a base for 
 the projected railway from an eastern Mediterranean port to the 
 Persian Gulf.®® The island possessed some fairly extensive har- 
 
 The Marquis of Salisbury to M. Waddington, 7 July, 1878. — British and. 
 Foreign State Papers, LXIX, 1347. 
 
 Ibid., 1347. 
 
 ®® A Dr. J. W. Winchester, an officer in the Company’s forces, writing in 1843 
 on “ The Practicability of Advancing an Army from Europe into Asia by the 
 Provinces of the Euphrates and Tigris,” said of the various strategic positions which 
 might be acquired to protect the line of the Euphrates, “ We consider CN'prus to be 
 the best adapted for that purpose. . . This island’s proximity to the mainland 
 eminently adapts it for a depot, from whence troops and their equipage may be 
 
441 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 bors, which, it was thought, could readily be fortified and used 
 as naval and commercial bases. It was argued by some that such 
 a position, once in English power, would suffice at once to serve 
 the proposed railway lines and to protect the Suez Canal.®^ 
 
 Early in the year 1878 Disraeli had taken pains to discover to 
 his own personal satisfaction whether a Euphrates Valley Railway 
 were really a feasible project by sending out a Capt. Cameron to 
 survey the more difficult sections of the proposed route from a 
 point opposite Cyprus toward Mosul and Bagdad.®® Receiving a 
 favorable report on the matter, Disraeli took up the matter of the 
 acquisition of the island at a time when the Turkish Government, 
 exhausted by a disastrous war, was in no position to haggle over 
 terms, and when there was a disposition to look to Britain as a 
 potential savior from the ruinous terms of the San Stefano treaty. 
 The war with Russia came to a close with Russian armies occupy- 
 ing Turkish provinces south of the Caucasus Mountains. This 
 fact more than any other furnishes a clue to the famous Cyprus 
 Convention of June 4, 1878. 
 
 The progress of the confidential negotiations which have 
 for some time past been in progress between Her Majesty’s 
 Government and the Government of Russia [wrote Lord 
 Salisbury to the British Ambassador at the Porte, A. H. 
 Layard, on May 30], makes it probable that those articles 
 of the Treaty of San Stefano which concern European Tur- 
 key will be sufficiently modified to bring them into harmony 
 with the other European Powers, and with England in 
 particular. 
 
 There is, however, no such prospect with respect to that 
 portion of the Treaty which concerns Turkey in Asia. . . 
 Her Majesty’s Government have consequently been forced 
 to consider the effect which these agreements . . . will have 
 upon the future of the Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman 
 Empire and upon the interests of England, which are closely 
 affected by the condition of those provinces.®® 
 
 transferred to Latakia or Scanderoon (Alexandretta) — From Transactions of the 
 Bombay Geographical Society for 1843, quoted in Asiatic Journal, 3d Ser., Ill, 
 77-78. 
 
 Quarterly Review, CLXVIII, 41; ibid., CCXXVIII, 490; Loher and Joyner, 
 op. cit., pp. 280-281; Hall, Reconstruction in Turkey, p. loi. 
 
 London Times, ii July, 1878; Quarterly Review, CCXXVIII, 490; W. S. 
 Blunt, Secret History of the British Occupation of Egypt (London, 1907), pp. 67-68. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXIX, 1342-1344; Hertslet, Map of Europe by 
 Treaty, IV, 2717-2720. All outstanding- causes of difference between Russia and 
 
442 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Even if it became certain, the despatch continued, that Batum, 
 Ardahan, and Kars would not be Russian centres of intrigue and 
 bases from which Russian armies would attempt the invasion of 
 India, the very presence of Russia in such a location would cer- 
 tainly exercise an undermining influence throughout western Asia. 
 Such an effect must be offset by Great Britain in any way possible. 
 The only surety against the disintegration of Asiatic Turkey, 
 Lord Salisbury averred, would be a British position near the coast 
 of Asia Minor and Syria, the Island of Cyprus being most de- 
 sirable for the purpose. It was not proposed to acquire such a 
 position in absolute ownership, hence, “ while the administration 
 and occupation of the Island shall be assigned to Her Majesty, 
 the territory shall continue to be part of the Ottoman Empire.” 
 Moreover, when Russia ceased to hold fortresses in Asiatic Tur- 
 key, Cyprus would revert entirely to Turkish control. 
 
 With this explanatory statement, Layard was instructed by a 
 separate despatch of the same date to secure the Sultan’s consent 
 to the proposition that “ In order to enable England to make 
 necessary provisions for executing her engagements, the Sultan 
 further consents to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and 
 administered by England.” The Turkish Government ap- 
 parently had little hesitation in giving sanction to this proposal, 
 which practically detached another substantial portion from the 
 Ottoman Empire. All unknown to the other Powers carrying on 
 the negotiations at Berlin, the details of the transaction were em- 
 bodied in an Anglo-Turkish Convention signed at Constantinople 
 on June 4. This document contained in substance the provisions 
 sent to Ambassador Layard from the British Foreign Office, giv- 
 ing Great Britain all administrative rights in Cyprus and binding 
 Britain to prevent by force of arms any further encroachments by 
 Russia on Turkish territory. 
 
 The first official information of the arrangement concerning 
 Cyprus was given out on July 7. Lord Salisbury addressed a 
 note to the French Foreign Minister, M. Waddington, then in 
 Berlin, explaining the ostensible motives of the British Govern- 
 
 Eng-land concerning territories in Asia were compromised by an .\nglo-Russian Con- 
 vention, signed at St. Petersburg, 31 Aug., 1907. (See Brit, and For. St. Pap., 
 C, 555-560). However, owing to the extent of German commercial and political 
 penetration into the Asiatic field and to German influences at the Porte, the agreement 
 concerning the return of Cyprus to Turkey was ignored. Following the entry of 
 Turkey into the Great War as an ally of the General Powers, Cyprus was definitely 
 proclaimed a British protectorate. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1878, No._[C. 2057], p. 17. 
 
 Ibid., 1879, No. [C. 2229], Cj-prus No. i; Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXX, 
 1276 f. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 443 
 
 merit and adding the justification that “The Convention is, as 
 Your Excellency will doubtless have noticed, entirely within the 
 Treaty rights of the two Powers, and therefore it would not, 
 under ordinary circumstances, have been the subject of an official 
 communication.” This information, coming at a time when the 
 labors of the Congress of Berlin were nearing completion, fell 
 like a thunderbolt. There was at first a disposition to review the 
 international aspects of the Convention before the Congress, as 
 the Treaty of San Stefano had been reviewed, but the Powers 
 were finally content to consider the matter un fait accom-pU with- 
 out dispute. Austria acquired the right to “ occupy and adminis- 
 ter ” the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Prussia 
 was not then interested in the acquisition of non-contiguous terri- 
 tory, and France had not recovered from the war with Germany. 
 
 For the sake of secrecy and expediency, the negotiations result- 
 ing in the Cyprus Convention had been carried on very quietly 
 under the direction of Disraeli, as had the purchase of the Suez 
 Canal shares. Having succeeded in his immediate purpose, Dis- 
 raeli found himself under the necessity of justifying the action 
 before his countrymen as he was simultaneously explaining it to 
 the world. That all of his purposes had not come to light while 
 the negotiations were in progress became evident in his first speech 
 on the matter in the House of Commons on July 18. Here he 
 said, in part — “ In taking Cyprus, the movement is not Medi- 
 terranean, it is Indian. I only hope the House will not misun- 
 derstand our motives in occupying Cyprus and in encouraging 
 those intimate relations between the government and population 
 of Turkey. They are not movements of warj they are move- 
 ments of peace and civilization.” And in the House of Lords 
 he said: 
 
 My Lords, we occupy with respect to this part of the world 
 [the Eastern Mediterranean] a peculiar position, which is 
 shared by no other Power. Our Indian Empire is on every 
 occasion ... a source of great anxiety, and the time appears 
 to have arrived when, if possible, we should terminate that 
 anxiety. . . There has been no want, on our part, of invita- 
 tions to neutral Powers to join with us in preventing or in 
 arresting war. Besides the great treaty of Paris, there was 
 the tripartite treaty,^^ which if acted upon, would have pre- 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXIX, 1345—134.7. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXLI, 1773. 
 
 The Treaty of 29 Aug., 1856, between England, France, and Austria, 
 guaranteeing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. 
 
444 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 vented war. But that treaty could not be acted upon, from 
 the unwillingness of the parties to it to act; and therefore 
 we must . . . perceive that if anything could be effectually 
 arranged, as far as our Oriental Empire is concerned, the 
 arrangements must be made by ourselves. . . .Yielding to 
 Russia what she has obtained,^® we say to her, ‘ Thus far and 
 no farther.’ Asia is large enough for us both. . . We 
 believe that the result of the Convention will be order and 
 tranquillity. . . In taking Cyprus, the movement is not 
 Mediterranean, it is Indian.^® 
 
 These statements to Parliament were further supplemented 
 and elucidated in a speech of Disraeli’s at the Mansion House on 
 November 9. 
 
 There is no doubt [he said] that the administration of 
 Cyprus by England will exercise the most beneficial and 
 moral influence upon the contiguous dominions of the Sultan. 
 This was a secondary influence in inducing us to take the 
 step which we have done. It was as a place of arms, for 
 which it is admirably calculated by its geographical position 
 and the variety of its resources, that we fixed on Cyprus, 
 after having examined all the other islands in the Mediter- 
 ranean.^^ 
 
 Months later Lord Salisbury, too, upheld the Cyprus Convention 
 in a speech made at Manchester. 
 
 The occupation of Cyprus [he said] was merely following 
 out the traditional policy of the English Government for a 
 long time past. When the interest of Europe was centered 
 in the conflicts that were waged in Spain, England occupied 
 Gibraltar. When the interest of Europe was centered in the 
 conflicts that were being waged in Italy, England occupied 
 Malta; and now that there is a chance that the interests of 
 Europe will be centered in Asia Minor or in Egypt, England 
 has occupied Cyprus.’® 
 
 The acquisition of the island of Cyprus, however, was not re- 
 ceived even with that degree of approval which had resulted 
 
 That is, the fortresses of Batum, Ardahan, and Kars in Transcaucasia. 
 
 Hansard, ut sufra, pp. 1769-1772; Thompson, op. cit., II, 491—492. 
 
 ’’’’ T. E. Kebbel, Life of Lord Beaconsfield (London, iSSS), p. 148. Similar 
 sentiments were expressed at a banquet at the Mansion House on 3 Aug., just after 
 Disraeli and Salisbury had been presented with the freedom of the City. — See 
 Thompson, op. cit., II, 480-483. Thompson, op. cit., II, 490. 
 
445 
 
 REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 
 
 from the purchase of the Khedive’s Canal shares. Many mem- 
 bers of Parliament, as well as military strategists and students of 
 mercantile and imperial interests in other capacities failed to agree 
 that a Euphrates Valley Railway was either practicable or possible 
 from engineering or from political and commercial points of 
 view. At the time the Cyprus Convention was first brought up 
 in the House of Lords, the Earl of Camperdown, Lord Granville, 
 and others cast aspersions on the “ sanity and wisdom ” of the 
 Government in carrying out such a project, paying Turkey a large 
 annual revenue for an island without harbors, swampy, and un- 
 sanitary, and useless as a naval base.^® Gladstone called the Con- 
 vention an “ insane covenant ” and denounced it roundly.®” 
 Others were apprehensive that England had merely contracted 
 obligations which would commit her to a policy which would 
 offend not only Russia, but Turkey and France as well, and that 
 the very administration of Cyprus would be difficult, costly, and 
 unsatisfactory.®^ 
 
 However, Cyprus had been acquired, as the Premier had said 
 repeatedly, primarily as a place of arms, as a base of operations 
 for the protection of routes to India. Even this aspect of the 
 matter, although there were numerous apologists, failed to carry 
 conviction of the Government’s wisdom. One of the most able 
 and scathing criticisms of Cyprus as a military base was that of 
 Admiral Sir William Martin, who insisted that even if the Eu- 
 phrates Valley Railway could offer any advantages, Cyprus would 
 be useless as a place of arms, no matter how much money was 
 spent in developing it. “ For this worthless thing,” he concluded, 
 “ we are pledged to defend a bankrupt and vicious government.” ®^ 
 
 It was very widely supposed that the taking over of Cyprus, 
 while carried out partly with the idea of safeguarding the Suez 
 Canal, meant primarily that a railway was soon to be constructed 
 through Mesopotamia from Alexandretta or Suedia, either by the 
 
 Hansard's Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXLII, 28—30. 
 
 Thompson, of. cit., II, 490. 
 
 London Times, 25 March, 1879. 
 
 Sir William Fanshawe Martin, Cyfrus as a Naval Station and a Place of Arms 
 (London, 1879), pp. 6, ii. One of his objections to Cyprus was that as a protection 
 to a railway terminus it was useless, since it lay within range of guns which might 
 be planted on the mainland. Apparently he did not see in that fact a corresponding 
 advantage. Some later strategists have contended that Cyprus was wisely chosen. 
 See, for instance, a statement by J. R. van Milligen in the Contemporary Review, 
 CVIII (1915), 332; and, for other criticisms, J. L. Haddon, an engineer with long 
 experience in Syria, in the London Times, ii July, 1878; Sir William Palliser in 
 The Thnes, 2 Feb., 1880; W. S. Blunt, of. cit., pp. 29, 67-68; William Miller, in 
 the Cambridge Modern History, XIII, 415; and Rev. H. T. F. Duckworth, Sot?ie 
 Pages in Levantine History (London, 1906), pp. 3-18. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 446 
 
 English Government or with Government assistance.®® In an- 
 swering his critics in the House of Lords on July 23, 1878, Lord 
 Beaconsfield promised that within a year the roadsteads of Cyprus 
 would be transformed into ample harbors for British fleets.®^ 
 Government attitude once more encouraged private enterprise, 
 notwithstanding the current stringency in the money market.®® 
 In December, 1878, it was reported in London that Ambassador 
 Layard, on behalf of a group of British promoters, had sub- 
 mitted to the Turkish Government in a lengthy document a proj- 
 ect for the construction of a Euphrates Valley line. The plan, 
 in brief, rested on the assumption of entire financial responsibility 
 for the road by the British Government. But in return for this 
 and in lieu of payment of interest on sums to be expended, Turkey 
 was to cede 10,000 square metres of land for every kilometre of 
 line constructed, which was to extend from Ismid through Alexan- 
 dretta to the Persian Gulf. Also, as a guarantee of adequate 
 return on the capital to be invested, estimated at £25,000,000, 
 Turkey was to cede for a period to be determined the revenues of 
 the pashaliks of Basrah, Damascus, and Bagdad. The Turkish 
 Government was said to be very favorably disposed toward the 
 proposition.®® 
 
 The promoters responsible for this scheme, it developed, were 
 a group of men long interested in improved communication 
 through Mesopotamia, formed under the chairmanship of W. P. 
 Andrew into “ An Association for promoting the Construction of 
 a Railway from the Persian Gulf to Constantinople and the Medi- 
 terranean, affording alternate routes to British India and for 
 developing the resources of Asia Minor.” ®^ The Association 
 was headed at the outset by a Committee of fifty-five members, 
 many of them prominent in the political world or of long con- 
 nection with affairs in Asiatic Turkey. Overtures were made to 
 the Government asking for official support of the Association’s 
 project, but this, as in 1857', the Government was very unwilling 
 to give. In the face of the storm of disapproval which had 
 greeted the Cyprus Convention, even the imperialistic Lord Salis- 
 bury, who in July, 1878, had said “ Whatever happens, whatever 
 Ministry be in power, the people of this country will never allow 
 Russian influence to be supreme in the valleys of the Euphrates 
 and Tigris,” refused to give the least countenance to the Associa- 
 
 Lady Anne Blunt, of. cit., p. 7. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXLII, 30. 
 
 W. S. Blunt, “An Indo-Mediterranean Railway: Fiction and Fact,” in the 
 Fortnightly Review, XXXII, 702 f. 
 
 ®® London Times, 17 Dec., 1878. 
 
 ®’^ Ibid., 4 Jan., 1879; Andrew, The Euphrates Y alley: A Lecture, p. 95. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 447 
 
 tion’s scheme.®* As the Government thus deserted its own plan, 
 Cyprus did not become a place of arms ** and the Euphrates Valley 
 project, already modified to become a part of a greater line reach- 
 ing from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf and perhaps on to 
 India, again resolved itself into an academic matter. 
 
 It next captured public attention when the Suez Canal was no 
 longer able without extensive alterations to provide an adequate 
 channel for eastern shipping. While the canal had barely justi- 
 fied itself as a commercial venture during the early years after its 
 completion, by 1882 it was swamped with traffic. In 1870, 486 
 vessels, representing 6 54, 915' gross tons, made use of that water- 
 way. By 1882 this had grown to 3198 vessels and 7,122,125 
 gross tons, on which tolls amounting to £2,422,000 were paid.*® 
 Vessels were tied up for days at either end of the canal awaiting 
 turns to pass through, while many of the newer and larger steam- 
 ships because of their draught could not use the canal at all. 
 Proposals to enlarge the canal, either by widening and deepening 
 the existing channel or by having a new and parallel canal con- 
 structed, perhaps by a separate company, provoked a new exam- 
 ination of the Euphrates Railway as a commercial and strategic 
 artery, since, many believed, this could be built more cheaply 
 than the canal could be enlarged. 
 
 In January, 1882, the Turkish Government approved the 
 application of an English group for permission with guarantees 
 to build a railway from Tripoli in Syria via Aleppo to the Eu- 
 phrates at Hit, where a branch line would cross to Bagdad, and 
 from Hit to Grane on the Persian Gulf. It was not supposed by 
 these promoters that after so much procrastination the English 
 Government would give a financial guarantee, and private capital 
 alone was looked to.®^ But as in many other similar undertakings, 
 capital looked askance at a venture which did not even have the 
 moral backing of the home authorities, and the matter fell 
 through. 
 
 Thompson, of. cit., II, 492; W. S. Blunt, of. cit., p. 29. Mr. Blunt accounted 
 himself largely responsible for Salisbury’s change of attitude with regard to the 
 railway scheme. 
 
 Cyprus still remains the black sheep of Britain’s naval bases. During the 
 World War it was used as bait with which to tempt Greece, and the final disposition 
 of the island is still a matter of some doubt. Administrative problems have always 
 been difficult, and very little money has been spent in developing the island in any 
 way, although some £16,000 was spent in slightly improving the harbor at Fama- 
 gusta. — J. P. Middleton, “Cyprus under British Rule,” in the Quarterly Review, 
 423; The Nineteenth Century, LXXIX, 252; The Near East, XV, 130; XVI, 148. 
 
 Augustus Mongredien, The Suez Canal Question (London, 1883), pp. 4—5, 
 
 7-8. 
 
 Statement of Mr. Cazalet, the chief promoter, as reported in the London 
 Times, 2 Feb., 1882. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 448 
 
 In July of the same year Lord Lamington took occasion to call 
 up the subject of a Euphrates Valley Railway for debate in the 
 House of Lords. He believed it would be impossible to widen 
 the canal and impracticable to construct a new one, but wholly 
 practicable to build the railway for the same general purpose, in 
 support of which he cited evidence dating back to 1834. The 
 railway, he thought, would save ten days in time between Lon- 
 don and Lahore and at least five days between London and Bom- 
 bay, and “ considering that nine-tenths of the traffic passing 
 through the canal was British, he asked their Lordships whether 
 they were prepared to make the same blunder now with respect 
 to the railway that they made in years gone by with regard to the 
 canal.” The Earl of Kimberley, speaking for the Foreign 
 Secretary, said that no one doubted the value of one or all alterna- 
 tive routes, but that it did not follow that the Government ought 
 to guarantee it, and since the project was not likely to succeed 
 without Government backing he was afraid “ the project must 
 remain where it had long been : interesting, but not likely soon to 
 be carried out.” In this he was supported by the Earl of Derby, 
 who saw no military necessity for the road and thought it much 
 more important to widen the canal j and by Lords Ellenborough 
 and Blantyre, and the Earl of Carnarvon, who urged the Gov- 
 ernment “ to omit nothing to secure the safety and efficiency of 
 the old route by the Cape.” Once more the attitude of Parlia- 
 ment put a quietus on active measures for financing a railway 
 company.®^ 
 
 The railway plan continued to maintain its usual desultory 
 existence through the next few years. Again brought up in the 
 House of Lords on July 26, 1883, by Lord Lamington, whose 
 faith seemed hardly to have been shaken by previous failures, it 
 was given lip service by some of the Cabinet members who were 
 plainly embarrassed by a matter which was popular enough and 
 in favor of which many impressive arguments and much weighty 
 evidence could be presented, but which as a Government issue had 
 been sidetracked by the Conservatives in 1878 and 1879 and to all 
 
 Hamard's Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCLXXII, 644-685; The Times, 18 July, 
 
 1882. 
 
 Hansard, ut sufra, pp. 682-685. 
 
 See The Times for 21 July, 2 and 14 Sept., 1882. Many of the press notices 
 were written or inspired by Sir William Andrew, who was knighted early in the 
 year in recognition of his long devotion to an imperial cause. See his Euphrates 
 Valley Route to India . . . pp. 2 ff. The greater part of the many books and 
 pamphlets published by him were mere repetitions of Parliamentary debates, letters 
 written by prominent friends of the Euphrates Valley line, evidence given before 
 Parliamentary committees, and complimentary press notices of his own efforts in 
 behalf of the cause. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 449 
 
 intents and purposes permanently abandoned after the accession of 
 the Liberal Party in 1880. Lord Salisbury “ thought it was one 
 of the most important questions of the day,” but hardly thought 
 the Government should be urged to take it up “ at that time.” 
 
 It was also debated before the Royal United Service Institution 
 in 1884, and elsewhere discussed in connection with the construc- 
 tion of railways through the European provinces of Turkey to- 
 ward Constantinople.®® Half-hearted and futile attempts were 
 made in 1885 and 1886 to revive a lost cause. 
 
 In 1887 some new interest was injected into a railway through 
 Mesopotamia by the actual construction of shore lines and the 
 mobilizing of private capital for the building of longer lines in 
 Asiatic Turkey. The humble beginnings of a network of railway 
 lines east of the Bosphorus were laid, not in Syria or in Mesopo- 
 tamia, where railways of all sorts had been projected for a gen- 
 eration, but in Anatolia, and were laid out with little or no refer- 
 ence to their becoming parts of a great system which might 
 eventually provide a road from the shores of Europe to the outer 
 edges of India. In 1856, the year in which the Euphrates Valley 
 line was first brought to the attention of the English public, an 
 English concern obtained a concession for a line from Smyrna to 
 Aidin. This road, opened in 1866, was still in British hands in 
 1887. Another British group owned the Mersina- Adana line and 
 controlled the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, built between 1871 
 and 1873 by the Turkish Government.®® French interests also 
 had obtained a foothold with the construction of a Smyrna-Cassaba 
 railway and the gaining of rights for another short line. 
 
 These lines, however, were of little more than local importance 
 and were unrelated. A new era of railway development in Asiatic 
 Turkey was inaugurated when, in 1887, two rival groups of 
 European capitalists approached the Ottoman Government for 
 rights to build a railway line from the Straits to Angora, Diarbekr, 
 
 Hansard's Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCLXXXII, 507-512; London Times, 27 
 July, 1883. See the characteristic letter by Sir William Andrew in The Turns for 
 31 July. 
 
 London Times, 29 March, 11 Aug., 4 Sept., 3 Dec., 1884, 21 Jan., 1885; 
 Journal of the East India Assn., XVIII, 4-38. “The Mutual Advantages of the 
 Connection between England and Her Indian Empire,” a paper by Gen. Sir Orfeur 
 Cavenagh, K.C.S.L; Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles M. MacGregor, The Defence of India: 
 a Strategical Study {Confidentiat) , (Simla, 1884). 
 
 ®^ London Tunes, 9 and ii April, 16 Dec., 1885, 6 Aug., 1886; Loher and 
 Joyner, op. cit., pp. 283-292. All real intention of developing Cyprus as a base 
 was given up with the occupation of Egypt in 1882. — The Near East, XXIV, 241 ; 
 Coke, op. cit., pp. 281—282. 
 
 ®* Earle, op. cit., p. 30; Jastrow, op. cit., p. 82. 
 
450 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 and Bagdad. An English group, the holders of the Haidar Pasha 
 Railway, were first on the ground, proposing, under suitable 
 guarantees, to construct the line on a broad gauge. A French 
 company offered a competing proposition for a narrow gauge line. 
 The Turkish Government had little hesitation in prescribing a 
 broad gauge road, but tended to favor the French group which 
 offered the more attractive financial scheme. This led to the 
 suspicion in England “ that there was a political object covering 
 the obstruction offered by the French combination, supported by 
 diplomatic influence.” Later in the year, however, the English 
 group won a concession for a broad gauge line to be built between 
 Ismid and Diarbekr, on condition that the Porte be satisfied as to 
 the financial soundness of the promoters before construction was 
 begun. But on that rock the scheme foundered.^"® Not enough 
 capital could be found in England to put through such a private 
 venture unsupported by diplomatic backing, and the last oppor- 
 tunity for the construction of a line through Mesopotamia under 
 British auspices was lost. The next year the question of the 
 Turkish Asiatic railways was settled by a grant of the right of 
 extending the Scutari-Ismid line to Angora, and eventually to 
 Bagdad, to “ a certain Herr Cualla, representing . . . some 
 German banking firms.” The Euphrates Valley Railway as 
 such was a thing of the past, for it was only a vision. The Bagdad j 
 Railway was becoming a thing of flesh and blood, and its blood 
 was not British. 
 
 Another significant event, the greater meaning of which was 
 not appreciated at the time, was the inauguration of through 
 service between western capitals and Constantinople in the sum- 
 mer of 1888, bringing London and Berlin within three and one- 
 
 London Tirnes, 2 and 10 May, 1887; Robert de Caix, “La France et les 
 Chemins de Fer d’Asie Turque,” in Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, XXXV’^I, 
 385—394; also his articles in L’Asie Frangaise, XIII, 333—336, 402—405; ibid., XIV, 
 144—146; G. Saint-Ives, “Les Chemins de Fer Frangaise dans la Turquie d’Asie,” 
 in Ques. Dip. et Col., XXXVII, 518—522. 
 
 London Times, 9 Aug., 4, 6, and 20 Oct., 1887. 
 
 Sir Arthur Wingate, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the dews (London, 1920), 
 pp. 233-234; The Times, i Oct., 1888. The Times made it appear that the Turkish 
 Government, in thus handing the concession over to German interests, violated a 
 preferential clause in the concession awarded to the holders of the Haidar Pasha 
 Railway some years before. 
 
 Quarterly Review, Jan., 1902, pp. 245—274, “Persia and the Persian Gulf.” 
 There continued to be some talk of defeating German railway plans by the con- 
 struction of a railway from a Mediterranean port to the Persian Gulf along the 
 general lines of the Euphrates Valley project until the opening of the World War. 
 These proposals did not represent any definite purpose, however, as much as chagrin 
 at the success of German capital in a field in which British interests had failed. See 
 Hall, Reconstruction in Turkey, p. 102. 
 
REVIVAL OF PROJECTS 451 
 
 half days of the Golden Horn. “ Punctual to the minute,” ran a 
 despatch from Constantinople on August 14, “the first direct 
 international through train reached Stamboul station at a quarter 
 to eight o’clock this morning, bringing numerous passengers from 
 Paris, Vienna, Pesth, Belgrade, and Sofia.” But this announce- 
 ment, which was greeted with joy in London, did not signify a 
 great stride toward a direct route from London to Lahore, of 
 which Englishmen had dreamed, but rather a stage in the evolu- 
 tion of a nightmarish road from Berlin to Bagdad. 
 
 The Bagdadbahn was destined never to be completed as planned 
 by German interests. Begun soon after the original act of con- 
 cession of March 5, 1903, it languished after the first section was 
 completed the following year because of obstacles of all kinds — 
 physical, financial, and political. Originally intended to extend 
 from Scutari, opposite Constantinople, to the Persian Gulf, it had 
 eventually to find a terminus in Bagdad. Great Britain, by rec- 
 ognizing the independence of various Arab chieftains in lower 
 Mesopotamia, blocked the way to Basrah.’®^ Even the portion of 
 the main line between Constantinople and Bagdad was not com- 
 plete when the World War opened: two mountain sections still 
 lacked: a vital factor during the campaigns in Mesopotamia. 
 
 Even in its unfinished state, the Bagdad line was too great a 
 threat to the safety of India and the security of British commercial 
 interests in Mesopotamia to be overlooked. At a time when im- 
 perial forces could hardly be spared from the western front of 
 war operations, a Mesopotamian campaign was considered nec- 
 essary. Even the disaster which befell the first expeditionary 
 force in 1916 only prompted the fitting out of larger and more 
 successful armies in 1917.’°® To protect the alternative route to 
 India, Bagdad and Mosul were occupied and Mesopotamia passed 
 into British hands. The post-war Mandates Commission was 
 content to translate a control de facto into one de jure, a situation 
 further altered by the setting up by Great Britain for practical 
 purposes of a nominally independent Kingdom of Iraq.’®® 
 
 Thus, the enterprise of foreign capitalists, representing a com- 
 
 London Times, i6 Aug., 12 Nov., 1888. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1911, No. [C. 5635], Bagdad Railway No. i; A. von Gwinner, 
 “ The Bagdad Railway and the Question of British Cooperation,” in the Nineteenth 
 Century, June, 1909; Earle, op. cit., pp. 176—208; A. X. Mahan, Retrospect and 
 Prospect (Boston, 1902), pp. 209—251; Geographical Journal, XLI, 244—248 (with 
 maps); Quarterly Review, CCXXVIII, 491—528; H. Vimard, “ Le Chemin de Fer 
 de Bagdad,” in L’Asie Frangaise, XIII, 1 19-123, 306-310. 
 
 A. T. Clark, To Bagdad with the British (New York, 1918). 
 
 106 Pari. Pap., 1920, No. [C. 1061], Review of the Civil Administration of 
 Mesopotamia; George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference 
 (New York, 1923), pp. 417-427. 
 
452 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 mercial and colonial rival, was required in Mesopotamia as in 
 Egypt to cause a change in British policy from one which carefully 
 avoided political responsibilities to one of direct intervention. 
 
 By 1914 the Ottoman Empire, no longer a ward of Great Britain, 
 was inadequate as an “ occupier ” of the routes to the East. The 
 Eastern Question had reached a new stage in which the dissolution 
 of the Ottoman Empire was at last demanded in the interests of 
 the dominant Powers of Europe. Mandates replaced pashaliks 
 under the new dispensation, with sovereignty residing in London 1 
 and Paris instead of Constantinople. These fundamental changes, 
 however, are more apparent than real. During most of the nine- 
 teenth century the real authority in eastern affairs resided in Lon- 
 don and Paris. One intermediate stage — that of Constantinople 
 — has since been removed in the application of that authority. 
 But in those portions of the former Turkish domain essential to 
 the control of the two trunk routes to the East, the territories em- 
 braced in the kingdoms of Egypt, Iraq, and the Hedjaz, in Pales- 
 tine and the Emirate of Transjordania, Great Britain still prefers 1 
 to apply a sovereign power more or less indirectly. j 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 THE CANAL AND THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 T he opening of the Suez Canal in November, 1869, 
 far from terminating the problems of the Suez Canal 
 Company, merely changed the character of those to be 
 met. The difficulties immediately looming up were several*. In 
 the first place, the canal was not at all complete. Many tasks had 
 been performed in a temporary fashion in order to make possible 
 the official opening on the date set months before. Many portions 
 of the waterway had not yet been deepened to the projected mini- 
 mum of 26 feet. The buoys marking the main channel in many 
 places were only logs. Signaling arrangements along the line of 
 the canal were not finished. In three or four places fhe bends in 
 the channel were so abrupt as to make navigation dangerous. The 
 gares or sidings, too, were inadequate both in size and number. 
 But these difficulties, while considerable, wanted only a continua- 
 tion of construction work for their removal. Far more serious 
 was the fact that the Company lacked the funds necessary for the 
 full completion of the work and the giving of promised services 
 to commerce. Distressing, too, was the disagreement which im- 
 mediately arose between shipping interests and the Canal Com- 
 pany concerning the mode of measuring vessels for the collection 
 of tolls. Finally, the international status of the canal was a nice 
 problem, one which intrigued the officers of the Company and the 
 statesmen of maritime Powers alike for several years to come, until 
 political exigencies and natural evolutionary processes furnished 
 the inevitable solution. 
 
 Various financial difficulties easily overshadowed all of the 
 others during the first few years after the opening of the water- 
 way. It is not proposed to enter here upon the complex financial 
 history of the Company, which is an extensive subject and in many 
 details has little bearing on the canal as an essential route of trade 
 and communication.^ An outline of some of the issues and their 
 
 ^ For a good resume of this phase of canal history, see L. M. Rossignol, Le 
 Canal de Suez (Paris, 1898), pp. 1—5, fasshn. 
 
 453 
 
454 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 settlement, however, will be necessary to explain the development 
 of the canal from a French-owned waterway, which might be used 
 under certain prescribed conditions by British merchant vessels, 
 into a great British imperial highway. 
 
 One of the most pressing questions facing the Company after 
 1869, that of funds for the completion and improvement of the 
 canal, was solved by the transfer to the Khedive, who had already 
 acquired the ownership of the Fresh Water Canal, of the right of 
 using that waterway for various purposes formerly reserved to 
 the Company. For this and fishing rights in the Lakes he paid the 
 Company £400,000. In addition to this, he purchased the Com- 
 pany’s hospitals and warehouses at Damietta and Boulac, no 
 longer needed in connection with the canal, by surrendering to the 
 Company the interest-bearing coupons of his canal shares for the 
 succeeding twenty-five years to the year 1895. These coupons 
 were used by the Company as collateral for a new bond issue 
 which, after disputes concerning the actual value of the coupons 
 had been settled, netted the Company an additional £1,200,000.^ 
 These funds were sufficient to tide over a period of considerable 
 expense and small earnings until somewhat more stable conditions 
 were reached. With these means the canal was finished, im- 
 proved, and maintained while the merchant marines of European 
 countries became accustomed to the new channel. 
 
 The question of tolls was not so easily solved. By the terms of 
 the original concession, the Company were given the right to levy 
 a maximum charge of ten francs per ton “ of capacity ” on vessels 
 passing through the canal. This statement, which doubtless ap- 
 peared definite enough to the projector, was presently found ca- 
 pable of receiving varying interpretations. The question raised 
 was whether the terms of the concession referred to ton of meas- 
 urement or to ton of displacement, and this was further compli- 
 cated by the different rules of measurement in use in different 
 countries. The Canal Company at the outset collected ten francs 
 per ton on the net registered tonnage of vessels as shown by their 
 ships’ papers. As this tonnage was often far less than the real 
 cargo-carrying capacity of the ship, in this respect the Company’s 
 usage resulted in unfair, though involuntary, discrimination.^ 
 
 Meanwhile the operation of the canal had yielded no profits, 
 and the shareholders were becoming impatient for the financial 
 returns so long anticipated. On March 4, 1872, the Company 
 
 " London Times, 30 May, 1870; Percy Fitzgerald, The Great Canal at Suez, 
 II, 74, 84. Fitzgerald gives a fairly complete, though not particularly illuminating, 
 history of the financial transactions of the Company up to the year 1895. 
 
 ® J. Charles-Roux, Ulsthtne et le Canal de Suez, II, 11-16; Fitzgerald, op. cit., 
 II, 131—138. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 45’5 
 
 adopted a resolution which construed the tonneau de cafacite of a 
 vessel to be its real cargo capacity/ This bore hardly on English 
 ships particularly, since it was maintained by the Canal officials 
 that the gross tonnage in English vessels was not fully measured. 
 The new rates had the effect of increasing the tolls on English 
 ships by about 30% the moment when the canal was beginning 
 to prove essential to shipping interests. As a result, a storm of 
 opposition to the Company’s policy arose in England ® and, to a 
 lesser extent, in France and Italy, and the increased rates were 
 paid only under protest. The controversy took on a political 
 complexion, also, when it was rumored in Paris that the Porte, 
 at the instigation of Great Britain, had officially protested against 
 the new rates, and again when some of the suits arising under the 
 new arrangement were tried in French consular courts.® 
 
 The matter was finally referred to an International Commission 
 consisting of the representatives of twelve European states se- 
 lected by the Porte which sat at Constantinople during the last 
 three months of 1873. Its report, given in December of that 
 year, was of considerable importance. It laid the basis for an 
 international plan of tonnage measurements, and its findings were, 
 on the whole, acceptable both to the Canal Company and to 
 shipping interests, enabling the latter “ to carry on business with- 
 out being continually disturbed by changes in the tolls imposed 
 by the Canal Company.” ^ De Lesseps, however, did not accept 
 the award without a trial of strength. At first he announced that 
 he would hold the Porte responsible for all losses incurred from 
 the application of this ruling, estimated at about 700,000 francs 
 per month, and stated his intention of resisting the enforcement 
 of the decision of the Commission to the extent of closing and 
 abandoning the canal itself.® 
 
 This crisis brought forth the first indications that the Suez 
 
 * Fitzgerald, of. cit., II, 304—309, the text of the resolution. See Anon., The 
 Suez Canal (London, 1872), pp. 5, 6. This pamphlet states that because of the 
 increase in the rates levied by the Company some English shipping returned to the 
 Cape route. 
 
 ® Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, 3d Ser., CCXI, 1687; CCXII, p. loi; Earl 
 Granville to Sir H. Elliot, 31 Aug., 1872, quoted in Fitzgerald, of. cit., II, 154-166; 
 The Suez Canal (pamphlet: of. cit.), pp. 5—6. 
 
 ® Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXII, pp. 427—428; CCXIV, p. 369; London 
 Times, 5, 12, and 28 March, 1873. 
 
 ^ Annual Register, 1873, Pt. I, 242; Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXVIII, 
 334-335? 1408; Charles-Roux, of. cit., II, 16-24. The Suez Canal Company vras 
 not represented on this Commission. 
 
 « Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXVIII, 7 14-7 15, 1096. It was suggested 
 in the House of Commons on April 17, that the threatened closing of the canal 
 might go far toward lending weight to the report of the Select Committee which 
 had considered the advisability of a British alternative route two years before. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 456 
 
 Canal was something more than the property of a corporation 
 organized under a charter from the Viceroy of Egypt. In April, 
 1874, an Egyptian force of 10,000 troops, called out by instruc- 
 tions from the Porte under the influence of British representa- 
 tions, and commanded by an English officer, marched to the line 
 of the canal and occupied certain strategic points. At the same 
 time an Egyptian frigate was sent to Port Said to keep the mouth 
 of the canal open.® In view of these moves, De Lesseps recon- 
 sidered his hasty words and gave ear to the advice of the French 
 Government that he comply with the ruling of the Tolls Com- 
 mission and reserve his protests for a further hearing.^® He 
 agreed, therefore, to continue operating the canal, although until 
 the British Government became a shareholder in the Company 
 the ruling of the International Commission was violated in re- 
 gard to some of the details of its provisions concerning the 
 measurement of vessels. “ 
 
 During the course of this heated controversy several interesting 
 points had been raised concerning the status of the canal and the 
 legal position of the Canal Company.^" De Lesseps’ contention 
 that the Company, chartered under Egyptian auspices, could not 
 be sued in French courts was lost in a test case brought against the 
 Company by the hlessageries Maritimes. Thus the essential 
 French character of the Company itself was maintained.’® The 
 interests of the Powers in the canal itself, however, had been 
 established by the International Commission and its award. But 
 throughout the negotiations the primacy of British concern had 
 not only made itself apparent in debates in the House of Com- 
 mons and in the prompting of action on the part of the Turkish 
 and Egyptian Governments, but it had also been tacitly recog- 
 nized by the other Powers. The acknowledgment by De Lesseps 
 and his associates of the authority of the award of the Inter- 
 national Commission when promulgated by the Turkish Govern- 
 ment constituted a victory for British diplomacy. Great Britain 
 was a Power to be reckoned with as much after the completion of 
 the canal as during the trying days of its construction. The posi- 
 tion of the Canal Company, then, was in several respects anom- 
 alous. It was an international corporation subject to a Turco- 
 Egyptian charter, to French maritime law, and to the operation 
 
 ® G. C. Thompson, Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, 1875—1880, I, 248; 
 Charles-Roux, op. cit., II, 25—27. 
 
 Hansard's Pari. Deb., 3d Sen, CCXVIII, 1182. 
 
 J. E. Nourse, The Maritime Canal of Suez, p. 80. 
 
 T. J. Lawrence, The Suez Canal in International La<a) (London, 188+), pp. 
 
 43 - 44 - 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., CCXVIII, 334 - 335 ) 714-715) 1096, 1408. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 457 
 
 of British diplomacy, and the greatest of these was unquestionably 
 the will of Great Britain. 
 
 At the same time, the Company possessed one distinct advan- 
 tage. Where there were several masters there was divided au- 
 [ thority, and none could easily exact obedience. Within two 
 months after the Company had been compelled to bow the knee to 
 the Porte, British political agents were complaining of the measur- 
 ' ing of merchant vessels according to the plan lately condemned by 
 the International Commission. There was no longer any doubt 
 as to the illegality of this practice, but despite both protests and 
 threats, officials of the Company continued to follow their pleas- 
 ure, denying that unfair tactics were being pursued, since vessels 
 used the canal at the option of their owners. As De Lesseps had 
 I anticipated, the Porte hesitated to employ force in executing the 
 ! award of the Commission, since the Company now had the open 
 j sympathy of the French Government. Indeed, De Lesseps even 
 despatched his son, Charles, an officer of the Company, to Con- 
 stantinople to secure with French aid a reversal of the decision of 
 the Commission, pointing out at the same time that unless more 
 funds were forthcoming the upkeep of the canal could not be 
 assured. 
 
 Although the English Government appear to have felt sym- 
 pathy for the financial plight of the Company, the arrogant atti- 
 tude of the officials could not but invite hostility. The Turkish 
 Government were inclined to favor the pleas of the Company 
 for reconsideration of the late decision, but the British Ambas- 
 sador, while “ sympathetic,” stood firmly by the legal nature of 
 the award of the Commission. In the end, after vainly suggesting 
 various compromises, M. Charles de Lesseps had to return to 
 Paris defeated. The British had maintained their stand that the 
 Canal Company was primarily Turkish and not French, and 
 hence Turkish mandates were binding. This, of course, only 
 placed the question of tolls where it had been earlier, with the 
 Canal Company in revolt against the Turkish mandate and with 
 no machinery ready at hand for the enforcement of the tolls 
 decision.^® 
 
 The tolls question was an issue of sufficient importance to define 
 the international status of the Suez Canal Company with con- 
 siderable clarity.^® The controversy produced a general agree- 
 ment among the Powers that while the canal was an artificial 
 
 Official correspondence, quoted in Fitzgerald, of. ch., II, 238 ff. 
 
 Annual Register, 1873, Pt. I, 242. 
 
 This is well illustrated by the debates in the House of Commons. See Han- 
 sard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CXII, 101. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 458 
 
 channel, it was essentially a narrow strait between two bodies of 
 open sea, and as such was a matter of international concern. It also 
 elicited from the Powers an admission that the Canal Company 
 had the right to levy tolls, though subject to the concessions issued 
 by the Khedive of Egypt and confirmed by the Sultan and in 
 keeping with international usage as to measurements of vessels. 
 
 At the same time, the operation of the canal practically, even if 
 not formally, became subject to international law, since various 
 Powers entered into negotiations with the Company, giving that 
 body a quasi-international status, while the partial regulation of 
 canal affairs by Britain and France, operating through the medium 
 of the Sultan and the Khedive, contributed to the same effect.^’’ 
 The exercise of power through these channels, however, was 
 not satisfactory to the principal patron of the canal. The 
 methods available were too difficult and devious and not suffi- \ 
 ciently effective. It was inevitable after the completion of the j 
 waterway was once assured that the possibility of regulating that i 
 channel by direct action of some kind and under adequate inter- 
 national sanction would become the concern of the British Govern- i 
 ment at an early date. Almost from the moment the waterway j 
 was opened to commerce the British Foreign Offfce undertook to 
 secure its full neutrality by a series of international engagements, 
 and at the same time remained constantly alert to discover any 
 means of acquiring full ownership of the canal. The likelihood 
 of some change in control was increased, not merely by the tolls 
 question and the problem as to the legal situation of the Company, 
 but more particularly by the financial embarrassment of the Com- 
 pany, which in spite of temporary alleviation was nearly bankrupt 
 for some years after the opening of the waterway.^® 
 
 The first suggestions which reached De Lesseps that the sale of 
 a part or all of the Company’s interests be made to England, as 
 was indirectly suggested by Lord Granville, were thrown out by 
 the former without a moment’s hesitation. It was reported in 
 1871 that the projector did contemplate with some favor the 
 possibility of transferring control of the Company to an English 
 commercial concern in order to protect French investors, but this 
 project was not then approved by the British Foreign Office.^® 
 The further proposal of De Lesseps that the canal be purchased 
 by the Powers jointly and operated under an International Ad- 
 ministration, while satisfactory to the British Government at the 
 
 Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 48, 49. 1 
 
 The Khedive appears to have been in favor of the acquisition by Great Britain i 
 of some rights of ownership in the Canal as the best guarantee of its safety and i 
 profitable use. Cf. Quarterly Revievj, CLXV, 441—445. 
 
 Fitzgerald, op. cit., II, 273-276; Quarterly Review, CLX\'', 441-445. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 459 
 
 moment, was wholly unacceptable to the Khedive and the Otto- 
 man Government, who lost no time in making their attitude a 
 matter of record. Ottoman territorial rights in the canal could 
 hardly be maintained in the face of such a joint administration. 
 At this point the matter rested while the question of tariffs was 
 being threshed out by the International Commission, the Ottoman 
 ' Government, and the foreign diplomatic corps at Constantinople. 
 
 I By 1875 the Suez Canal was beginning to produce profits for 
 j its owners, and the possibility that the Company might be com- 
 pelled to sell out its interests because of lack of funds grew re- 
 ^ mote. At this time, however, a new situation arose affecting the 
 future of the canal because of the financial predicament of the 
 Khedive, who was in desperate need of funds. Although his 
 reign had begun under very promising auspices, Ismail had failed 
 to maintain the prestige of his predecessors in the eyes of foreign 
 countries, not because he attached less importance to the main- 
 tenance of confidence abroad, but because he undertook to pur- 
 chase high regard at prices which threatened the total economic 
 ruin of his country. Early in his official life he learned the ease 
 with which ready money could be acquired and solicitude and 
 flattery obtained by the process of floating foreign loans. So as 
 time went on and the Pasha’s credit waned, his personal pleasures 
 and his passion for keeping up appearances led to the most waste- 
 ful financial dissipation.^® In 1875, after having squandered 
 vast fortunes, the Khedive was again in desperate need of funds. 
 But by this time the low ebb of his credit and the known urgency 
 of his need made impossible the borrowing of further money 
 except under almost prohibitive terms. 
 
 The extravagancies and increasing irresponsibility of the Khe- 
 dive, together with the economic hold on his resources which was / 
 being acquired by continental states through enormous loans, had 
 already led to some speculation in England as to the effect of 
 such matters on the future of the canal, when it became known in 
 November, 1875, that Ismail was under the necessity of raising 
 the sum of £4,000,000 immediately and on almost any terms to 
 pay interest on loans already contracted. It also became known 
 in London through careful inquiries on the part of Gen. Edward 
 Stanton, British Consul at Cairo, that the Khedive was contem- 
 
 ^ This is well summarized in the report of Mr. Stephen Cave, who was sent 
 out to Egypt to examine the financial condition of that country about the time of 
 the purchase of the Khedive’s Canal shares by the British Government. This report 
 is given in J. C. McCoan, Egypt as It Is, Appendix G, pp. 372-392. The celebra- 
 tions connected with" the opening of the Canal in 1869 alone cost approximately 
 £1,300,000. — A. E. P. Brome Weigall, A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 
 to 1914, p. 104, passim. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 460 
 
 plating using his canal shares as security for a loan from certain 
 French capitalists.^^ This in effect meant the permanent loss of 
 the shares to the Khedive. Lord Derby, disturbed at this thought 
 of the alienation of the shares, on November 20 intimated to M. 
 Gavard, of the French Embassy, that the British Government, 
 whose national interests in the canal were four times those of all 
 the rest of the world, and who valued the canal as a portion of 
 the highway to India, would view with strong disfavor the pro- 
 posed disposition of the Khedive’s shares. It was pointed out 
 that the only two agencies through which the British could bring 
 pressure to bear on the Directors of the Canal Company were the 
 Khedive and the Porte. And since it was difficult to ascertain 
 how far British influence at the Porte would be efficacious, it was 
 a matter of deep concern to the British Government that the 
 Khedive should not dispose of his interests in the canal. The 
 Khedive himself was informed that “ Her Majesty’s Government 
 would regard as a violation of the Firman of the Porte and as 
 Inconsistent with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, any act 
 of the Khedive dispossessing himself of the control over the Suez 
 Canal.” This pronouncement was made partly with the object 
 of distinguishing between property rights in the canal as a com- 
 mercial enterprise and the territorial rights inherent in the 
 Egyptian Government. 
 
 In this dilemma, the Khedive saw but one feasible alternative, 
 which was to offer his shares in the Canal Company, believed to 
 be 177,642 in number, to the British Government for £4,000,000, 
 the sum required by his own immediate obligations. His willing- 
 ness to effect such a sale was communicated to Gen. Stanton on 
 November 23, and was instantly telegraphed to the British For- 
 eign Office. This situation, which had developed very suddenly 
 as well as secretly, placed the British Government in a delicate 
 position. There was considerable doubt, in the first place, as to 
 the attitude of France toward the transaction, in view of the 
 official objection of the Foreign Secretary toward a similar French 
 deal. And in the second place, as Parliament was not in session, 
 the finding of £4,000,000 within the space of a few days was a 
 large problem in itself. The first question was solved with little 
 hesitation by determining to brave the anticipated wrath of the 
 French. The second difficulty, which for a moment loomed up as 
 insuperable, was taken in hand by Premier Disraeli, and solved 
 in a characteristic manner. Already imbued with imperialistic 
 
 T'arliamentary Paper, 1876, No. [C. 1391], Eg^'pt No. i, p. i. 
 
 Ibid., p. 3 ; Thompson, op. cit., I, 248. 
 
 Quoted in Thompson, op. cit., I, 248. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 461 
 
 spirit and believing that an unparalleled opportunity had pre- 
 sented itself, Disraeli instructed Gen. Stanton on the twenty-third 
 to carry through arrangements for securing the shares. At the 
 same time he sought out his friend Baron de Rothschild, the head 
 of a great international banking concern, and asked whether, on 
 his promise that Parliament would repay the money immediately 
 after convening, the firm of Rothschild could advance the neces- 
 sary funds. 
 
 The time was short and the risks appeared large, but the Baron 
 immediately answered in the affirmative. On the twenty-fifth 
 he formally communicated his answer to the Premier: 
 
 As soon as we . . . receive the orders from the Lords 
 Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury, we shall be pre- 
 pared to hold at the disposal of the Egyptian Government 
 four millions sterling, one million on December i, and the 
 remaining three millions during December and January. A 
 2^% commission will be charged and 5% interest until the 
 advance is repaid. There is an understanding also that the 
 Government will apply to Parliament for repayment, as soon 
 as practicable.^® 
 
 On this basis the purchase was consummated, the word of the 
 Prime Minister serving as bond for the approval of Parliament. 
 
 The remaining details of the purchase were carried out with a 
 promptness which suggested anxiety lest some obstruction be 
 placed in the way of the actual transfer of shares. An agreement 
 was drawn up by Gen. Stanton and signed by him and by the 
 Khedive wherein the terms of the transfer were set down. Inas- 
 much as the interest-bearing coupons up to the year 1895 had 
 already been detached from the bonds, the Egyptian Government 
 agreed to pay to Great Britain the 5% per annum during the 
 period for which the coupons were lacking, charging this amount 
 to the revenues of Egypt. Upon surrender of the shares, the 
 British Government was to pay £1,000,000 on December i, and 
 the remainder in December and January. Also, since it had been 
 discovered that the Khedive owned 176,602 shares instead of the 
 presumed 177,642, the price of 1040 shares was deducted from 
 the four million pounds originally agreed upon.^® 
 
 Hansard's Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXXVII, 266—267; British and Foreign 
 State Pafers, LXVI, 670—671. 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1876, No. [C. 1391], p. 6. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 6-7. The 104.0 shares had been disposed of to French capitalists 
 some ten years earlier, of which fact the Khedive’s Ministers professed to be ig- 
 norant until the transfer was in process of being effected. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 462 
 
 Thus, within the space of a week and altogether without the 
 procrastination usually connected with official negotiations, the 
 British Government became a large shareholder in the Company 
 whose work and whose very existence it had so long attempted to 
 destroy. Yet it was with peculiar satisfaction that the British 
 Ministers followed in telegraphic reports the details of the count- 
 ing, registering, boxing, and shipping of the shares from Alexan- 
 dria and their despatch to England on the royal mail steamer 
 Malahar at the close of the year. Destiny, it was felt, had been 
 fulfilled, and Great Britain had entered into a share of ownership 
 which would undoubtedly secure the direct control of an essential 
 part of the principal highway to India. Of the further negotia- 
 tions to be carried on and difficulties to be encountered before this 
 direct control could become to any great degree effective, there 
 was then no inkling. 
 
 By slow degrees the English public learned that what the Prim.e 
 Minister had purchased in November, 1875, had not been the 
 Suez Canal, or the control of the Suez Canal Company, but only 
 a minority of the outstanding shares issued by the Company. 
 These holdings were sufficient in value to give the British Gov- 
 ernment a considerable voice in the affairs of the Canal Company, 
 even though on the strength of these shares alone the Company’s 
 policy could not be controlled. For a time it was an open question 
 whether a rather high price had not been paid for such advantages 
 as had been gained — a very high price, in view of the charges 
 of inconsistency and unfair play which the French were inclined 
 to bring forward. Considerable time was required to solve the 
 problem as to the amount of real power which had been gained 
 by the purchase, but attempts were made at once to quiet French 
 suspicions. On November 27, 1875, Lord Derby despatched a 
 note to the French Ambassador, the Marquis d’Harcourt, ex- 
 plaining the transaction that had lately taken place. England 
 had no wish, he said, that the Khedive should sell his shares or 
 that the status quo in Egypt should be altered in the least. But 
 the British had no power to prevent the sale of the shares, and 
 since the Khedive was apparently determined to sell, the British 
 Government had used the only means at their command to pre- 
 vent the possibility of the shares falling into the hands of inter- 
 ests which might not be favorable to Great Britain. For this pur- 
 pose the Government had been compelled to act quickly in order 
 to exploit the opportunity at all. England’s object, it was care- 
 fully pointed out, was not to establish an exclusive right, which 
 could not be done with a minority of the shares in any event. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 463 
 
 but it was rather to prohibit the establishment of an exclusive 
 right/^ 
 
 The French Government expressed the fear that if the Egyp- 
 tian Government should fail in paying the £200,000 interest on 
 the shares, England would use some means of coercion which 
 would establish English authority in Egypt. Lord Derby dis- 
 claimed any intention on the part of the British Government of 
 taking such action at any time. He personally had favored, he 
 said, the direction of the canal by an International Commission, 
 like that for the Danube, but as the French Government had been 
 opposed to such a plan, he had not brought it forward. However, 
 the passage should be kept free for everyone.^® The situation 
 was smoothed out more readily than had been expected, partly by 
 the surprising attitude displayed by De Lesseps. While he must 
 have felt deeply chagrined at the couf which had made the tradi- 
 tional enemy of the Suez Canal Company its greatest single 
 shareholder, he pretended to see only fortunate results. “ I 
 consider as very good fortune,” he said, “ this singular power 
 which will be established between the French and the English for 
 the exploitation, purely industrial and necessarily pacific, of the 
 Suez Canal.” And in a letter to the British Ambassador in 
 Paris, dated November 24, he put the best light he could upon 
 the transaction, while indulging at the same time in a bit of excus- 
 able reproach : 
 
 Some of the share holders are concerned with the purchase 
 by the English Government of the Khedive’s shares. This 
 anxiety is needless, because when the Canal was first started 
 an important share in the subscription was set aside for 
 English capitalists. 
 
 However, at that time France and Egypt completed the 
 task alone. 
 
 The British Government, which had no financial interest 
 in the undertaking, put every obstacle in the way of the work 
 which had an injurious effect upon the private interests of 
 Egyptian and French share holders. 
 
 The English nation now accepts the share in the Canal 
 
 Pari. Paf., 1876, No. [C. 1391], p. 9. 
 
 -® Ibid., p. 9 ; Affaires Etrangeres, Documents Diflomatiques, Affaires du Canal 
 de Suez (French Yellow Book, Nov., 1875). This mention of an International 
 Commission was doubtless to neutralize French objections to the purchase of the 
 shares. Now that Great Britain was entrenched as a large shareholder, presumably 
 the French would have welcomed such a Commission. French fears are the more 
 interesting in view of British intervention in Egypt a few years later. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1876, No. [C. 1391], p. 9. 
 
464 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 Company which has been loyally reserved for her, and this 
 action can only be to the effect that England will abandon 
 her long-standing attitude of hostility toward the interests of 
 the original share holders of the Canal. 
 
 I think this community of interests is a most fortunate 
 occurrence.®” 
 
 In return for this courtesy, the British Ambassador at Paris was 
 instructed to tell M. de Lesseps, “ that England’s object in the 
 purchase is for the general interest of commerce, and that M. de 
 Lesseps’ pre-eminent part in the construction of the Canal will be 
 recognized and England will always be found anxious to support 
 him in any measures conducive to its welfare.” 
 
 European sentiment generally sanctioned the action of the 
 British Government as a step which could not fail of insuring the 
 safety of the canal and its improvement as a waterway. Prince 
 Bismarck believed that the British Government had “ done the 
 right thing at the right moment in regard to the Suez Canal.” 
 
 In Italy England’s sudden change in attitude toward the canal 
 after having opposed it for so many years was explained by the 
 fact that Turkey was no longer a good ally for England and that 
 a new ally was necessary if Russia was to be opposed successfully 
 in Asia. The new ally was to be Egypt.®® On the whole matter 
 the Porte maintained an ominous silence. 
 
 Complications were not long in appearing, however. Having 
 disposed of his canal shares so easily and advantageously, and still 
 being in dire need of funds, the Khedive bethought him of other 
 holdings which he might similarly dispose of. The original Act 
 of Concession reserved to the Khedive 15% of the net revenue 
 of the Suez Canal. This the Khedive next proposed to sell to 
 Great Britain, hoping that the objections raised on a former oc- 
 casion would be set aside now that the British Government was 
 a shareholder. He pointed out to Maj.-Gen. Stanton that this 
 right might easily carry with it greater power over the Company 
 than the possession of the shares themselves.®* The knowledge 
 that the French Government were anxious to acquire this right 
 again produced a rather delicate situation. It was tactfully solved, 
 however, when Lord Derby, as if entirely ignorant of French 
 negotiations, explained to D’Harcourt that the proposition for 
 the sale of the Khedive’s right had been made, of which the 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1876, No. [C. 1391], pp. lo-ii. Ibid., pp. 12-17, passim. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 18, 20. Ibid., p. 13. 
 
 Ibid., p. 14. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 465 
 
 English Government scarcely approved since the shares already 
 purchased by Britain had a certain claim on the revenue derived 
 from the Khedive’s royalties. At the same time the Khedive was 
 apprised of England’s position with reference to the proposed 
 sale and was strongly counselled to refrain from selling, pending 
 the financial reconstruction of his administration.®® 
 
 Already, in compliance with a request made by the Khedive, a 
 financial commission had been appointed by the British Govern- 
 ment to examine the finances of Egypt in an effort to prevent the 
 complete insolvency of that state.®® This commission, headed by 
 Mr. Stephen Cave, M. P., English Paymaster-General, was ready 
 to start for Egypt at the end of 1875 with the double purpose of 
 setting the Khedive’s house in order and learning just what the 
 position of the British Government was in Egypt since the pur- 
 chase of the canal shares. While the study of the financial situa- 
 tion was in progress. Col. Stokes, a member of the financial mis- 
 sion, acted as the official representative of the British Government 
 in coming to an agreement with the Canal Company concerning 
 British representation in the Council and the Administrative Com- 
 mittee of the Company.®^ The Company had never acted offi- 
 cially on the matter of the Khedive’s participation in the 
 administration of the Suez Canal Company after the detaching of 
 the interest-bearing coupons from his Canal shares. As a matter 
 of courtesy he had been given representation in the Company’s 
 affairs, but not on a carefully defined basis. The position of the 
 British Government with reference to the Company was a matter 
 which had to be determined. On February 23, 1876, Col. Stokes 
 succeeded in arranging with De Lesseps, who was then in Egypt, 
 a protocol defining the position of the British Government. In 
 this agreement, De Lesseps undertook to secure from the Khedive 
 and the shareholders a modification of the statutes of the Com- 
 pany so that three British members might be admitted to the 
 Council, and at the same time he promised informally to secure 
 a place on the Committee of Direction for one of the three Eng- 
 lish members.®® The recognition of British claims to the right of 
 casting ten votes in the general meeting of shareholders, together 
 with a large share in the direction of the Company’s affairs, went 
 
 Ibid., pp. 15—17, 20—21. The Khedive was also informed that the British 
 Government would view as an infraction of the Sultan’s firman any attempt on his 
 part to relinquish control of the canal as a part of the domain of Egypt. The 
 Khedive did sell his 15% rights in 1880 to the Credit Fongier, however. — 
 Annuaire Statistique, 1914, p. 268. 
 
 Hansard's Pari. Deb., jd Ser., CCXXVII, 278. 
 
 Pari. Pa-p., 1876, No. [C. 1391], p. 16. 
 
 Ibid., 1876, No. [C. 1525], pp. 14, 23—24. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 466 
 
 far toward ending all British dissatisfaction with canal policyd® 
 The great waterway had at last virtually achieved an international 
 character, and although the majority of canal stock was still held 
 by continental investors, Great Britain was thereafter conceded to 
 have the leading political interests in the waterway. 
 
 Meanwhile, members of the British Cabinet found themselves 
 under the necessity of explaining to Parliament the purchase of 
 the canal shares and of securing a vote of funds for the carrying 
 out of the contract into which they had entered without Parlia- 
 mentary authorization. On February 14, 1876, the matter was 
 first considered in a Committee of Supply. The Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Northcote, presented the whole of 
 the shares transaction in masterly fashion, answering the critics 
 of the purchase, pointing out that the terms were reasonable, and 
 finally presenting a plan of payment for the shares which would 
 place but a small burden on the state. The motives under which 
 the Premier and his confidantes acted were reviewed, and again it 
 was shown that the purchase was merely a protective measure, to 
 prevent hostile interests from obtaining a greater degree of con- 
 trol of the waterway, as well as to secure the privilege of trans- 
 porting troops to India if and when necessary. “ It has been said 
 that what we should have to do in time of war as the owners of a 
 certain number of shares would be to use force, which is precisely 
 what we should have to do if we owned no shares at all,” he 
 pointed out.^^ 
 
 Further consideration of the matter was postponed a week. 
 When, on February 21, the debate was resumed, Gladstone, who 
 had strongly favored the canal during the period of construction 
 and had not been averse from the investment of English money 
 in it as a commercial enterprise, opposed finding the money for 
 redeeming Disraeli’s pledge. He attacked both the manner of 
 the purchase and its results, holding that no real advantage had 
 been obtained. Disraeli stoutly defended his action. 
 
 I have never recommended and I do not now recommend 
 this purchase as a financial investment [he said]. . . I do 
 not recommend it either as a commercial speculation, al- 
 though I believe that many who have looked upon it with 
 little favor will probably be surprised with the pecuniary 
 results of the purchase. I have always and do now recom- 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1876, No. [C. 1391], p. 24- 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXXVII, 282—283. 
 
 Ibid., p. 273. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 467 
 
 mend it to the country as a political transaction, and one 
 which I believe is calculated to strengthen the Empire. That 
 is the spirit in which it has been accepted by the country, 
 which understands it. . . They are really sea-sick of the 
 “ silver streak.” They want the Empire to be maintained, 
 to be strengthened, they will not be alarmed even if it is in- 
 creased, because they think we are getting a great hold and 
 interest in this important portion of Africa, because they 
 believe that it secures to us a highway to our Indian Empire 
 and our other dependencies. . 
 
 The press generally approved this speech, and the House of Com- 
 mons, recognizing an obligation de factOy voted in supply on 
 February 23 an appropriation of £4,080,000 for the purchase of 
 the shares and the payment of attendant expenses. 
 
 The real debate on the Government’s policy and on the dis- 
 position of the shares, however, came up in the Commons on 
 August 8 in consideration of the proposed Suez Canal Shares 
 Bill. By this time opinion both in and out of Parliament had 
 come to a focus, and the probable bearing of the purchase of the 
 shares on the future of British access to India had been variously 
 estimated. On this occasion opponents of the Premier’s action 
 launched a heavy attack against the proposed Bill which was to 
 define the Government’s position as shareholder. These critics 
 based their principal objections on the ground that in assuming a 
 vast financial burden in the cost of the shares, the British Gov- 
 ernment had acquired no tangible advantages. The House was 
 reminded that in 1871 three directorships in the Canal Company 
 had been offered to Great Britain by De Lesseps when the Com- 
 pany was nearly at the end of its resources and was facing the 
 necessity of selling out. What was offered then for English good 
 will was now being purchased for upwards of four millions 
 pounds sterling, and still the promised votes in the General As- 
 sembly of the Company were being withheld. It was also asserted 
 that the Khedive, who was already bankrupt, could not pay the 
 stipulated interest on the canal shares during the twenty-five years 
 for which coupons were lacking. Other objections were raised to 
 show that the very method of England’s representation on the 
 Suez Canal Board was irregular,^® that in becoming a shareholder 
 
 Ibid., CCXXVII, 441; Thompson, Public Opinion and Lord Beaconsfield, I, 
 249, 250; a good account of the strategic bearing of the canal is contained in the 
 Journal of the East India Association, IX, 188—209. 
 
 After the shares had been purchased, it was discovered that, in order to 
 comply with the rules and regulations of the Company, each of the three directors 
 would have to be provided by the Government with 100 shares. The relation of 
 
468 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 in the Canal Company the Government would have to assume 
 responsibilities which in time of war might prove embarrassing, 
 and that the holding of the shares would not alone keep the route 
 to the Indian Empire open. One of the Prime Minister’s critics 
 (Mr. Lowe) summed up the case by saying, “ In short, now that 
 the preliminary glory of the purchase was over, he would like to 
 know what real advantage England gained by the purchase of 
 these shares at all.” 
 
 At the close of the long and rather acrimonious debate, Disraeli 
 summed up the situation by stating that his critics were wrong in 
 maintaining that England’s interest in an institution could not be 
 at the same time political and commercial. He insisted that such 
 English directors as might have been admitted to the Canal Board 
 in 1871 would not have had more than a fraction of the power 
 of the existing ones, now that England controlled more than half 
 of the canal. And a fellow Conservative even stated that the 
 purchase of the shares had been necessary because of the false 
 position assumed by the Ministry of Lord Palmerston — a tardy 
 admission, and one which found no contradiction in the House 
 now that “ Palmy’s ” days of domination were ended. It was 
 already a foregone conclusion, with the temper of the country 
 favorable to the transaction, that the pending Bill would be 
 passed, and the vote justified the expectation.'*® For better, for 
 worse, the British Government, after keeping its skirts clear of 
 political entanglements in Egypt with scrupulous care for three 
 quarters of a century, had at last accepted a definite responsibility 
 which had been recommended by the Prime Minister on political 
 grounds alone, and which was “ calculated to strengthen the 
 Empire.” 
 
 The fact that the overland route through Egypt never became 
 a major route of trade was due to no lack of commercial enter- 
 prise. Time and again since Warren Hastings’ ill-fated venture 
 of 1773 plans had been made for a regular exchange of goods to 
 and from India by way of Egypt. Early attempts to realize these 
 plans invariably failed. In early days sailing vessels found the 
 Red Sea too difficult of navigation. Even the coming of the 
 steamship made no vast difference because of the difficulties and 
 expense connected with the transportation of goods across Egypt 
 under handicaps furnished by bands of desert marauders, slow 
 
 the directors and their shares to the Company on the one hand and the British 
 Government on the other was a rather nice question. 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCXXXI, 831—835. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 850-851. Pari. Pap., 1876, Public Bills, No. 189. 
 
 Quarterly Review, LXV, 453-458. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 469 
 
 and inefficient caravans, the whims of an oriental government, 
 and a tropical climate. It was stoutly argued in the House of 
 Commons, and for a while it was widely believed, that an Egyp- 
 tian railway would revolutionize this route ; that quick transit and 
 low freight rates would result in turning the great stream of 
 eastern trade to the Red Sea route. This, too, proved to be un- 
 realized} bulky articles of trade could not endure the necessity of 
 two transshipments en route^ even though the distance traversed 
 was nearly halved. With all of its advantages, therefore, the 
 overland route could not compete with the Cape route as a com- 
 mercial artery, although the sending of commercial papers and 
 some quantities of valuable goods added much to its value as a 
 highway for mails and passengers. 
 
 The opening of the Suez Canal created an entirely new situa- ^ 
 tion. The overland route soon vanished and its place was taken 
 by an all-water route possessing all the advantages of uninter- 
 rupted voyage plus a great saving in time, distance and expense. 
 Delays in passing through the canal and high tolls together did 
 not neutralize the advantages of the new route.^® Trade was not 
 long in finding the new channel. With the canal still far from 
 complete, the year 1870 saw a fairly steady stream of maritime 
 traffic. A total of 486 vessels, representing well over half a 
 million gross tons, passed through the canal. Of these vessels 
 nearly 75%, representing some 62% of the whole tonnage, were 
 of British registry.^® This was increased during 1871, in spite of 
 the inefficient state of the canal, to 765 vessels, with a total ton- 
 nage of 1,142,200, about the same proportion of which was 
 British.®® 
 
 By 1875 the number of vessels using the canal was about three 
 times that of the year 1 870, and the Canal Company were enabled 
 to pay a first dividend of 5% on the capital stock, while setting 
 aside funds for the improvement of the waterway. This rapid 
 growth continued for a number of years. During the year 1880, 
 2016 vessels paid tolls on 3,069,642 tons of traffic, and already 
 the facilities of the canal were being taxed. In 1883 the number 
 had risen to the large total of 3307 vessels, with a tonnage of 
 5,776,426 — practically all that the canal as then constructed 
 
 James Douglas, Glimpses of Old Bombay and Western India, pp. 146, 147; 
 Wm. H. Seward’s Travels Around the World (Ed. by Olive Risley Seward, New 
 York, 1873), pp. 519-526; Quarterly Review, CXLII, 429-457. 
 
 F. de Lesseps, The History of the Suez Canal: a Personal Narrative, p. x. 
 
 W. S. Lindsay, History of Merchant Shipping, IV, 613; Statesman’ s Year 
 Book, 1873, pp. xxxiv-xxxv. 
 
 Suez Canal Traffic: Returns (5 vols., London, 1881-1887), for the year 
 1884. About 80% of this was British shipping. 
 
470 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 could accommodate. Indeed, that waterway became so congested 
 that many shippers began to despair of making material saving in 
 time by this route and began to return to the longer but more 
 certain Cape route. For this reason, the number of vessels passing 
 through the canal in 1884, 3284, showed a slight falling off in 
 numbers, though not in total tonnage.®^ A new Suez Canal ques- 
 tion had arisen: within the space of fifteen years from the date of 
 opening, the new waterway had become inadequate. 
 
 Soon after the purchase of the Suez Canal shares by the British 
 Government, the question as to the necessary improvements in 
 the channel, once the estimated maximum capacity of about 3000 
 vessels had been reached, began to receive serious consideration. 
 Strong complaints were being registered by the end of 1881 by 
 shipping interests, particularly in England, directed against the 
 inadequacy of existing canal facilities, and demanding, now that 
 the canal was paying as much as 16% in dividends,®® that steps 
 be taken to remedy the difficulty. Three general plans were 
 proposed from various quarters as possible solutions: the enlarge- 
 ment of the existing canal, the construction of a second and paral- 
 lel canal, or the building of an entirely new channel outside of 
 the land controlled by the Suez Canal Company.'’^ The last of 
 these proposals gained little favor because of the widespread 
 belief even in England that such an enterprise would infringe on 
 the concessions of 1854 and 1855 as confirmed by the Sultan’s 
 firman of 1866. The second suggestion was supported by many 
 engineers and other authorities on the ground that two channels 
 would provide safer and more effective transit facilities than a 
 single channel of equal width. However the Suez Canal Com- 
 pany was not prepared to supply the capital for such a new work, 
 and it was given up. 
 
 Meanwhile the ship-owners of the United Kingdom were 
 growing desperate in their demands for relief. During the last 
 quarter of the year 1883, they held frequent conferences with the 
 officers of the Company and with the heads of the British Gov- 
 ernment. The representations made on these occasions resulted 
 in a joint meeting of the leading British ship-owners with M. 
 Charles de Lesseps, first Vice-President of the Company, on 
 
 Suez Canal Traffic: Return for the year 1885; Augustus Mongredien, The 
 Suez Canal Question, pp. 3—4. 
 
 Mongredien, of. cit., p. 6. 
 
 Ibid., pp. 22—23. It was also suggested that an indirect channel be con- 
 structed from the Nile to the Red Sea and from the Nile to Alexandria, a proposal 
 much like some which antedated the isthmian canal project. A ship railway, to haul 
 vessels over the land, was also proposed. These do not appear to have developed 
 beyond the stage of theory, however. Ibid., pp. 7-1 1. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 471 
 
 November 30, 1883, at the office of the Peninsular and Oriental 
 Company in London, At this conference an agreement was 
 reached as to the future policy of the Canal Company. The 
 agreement in brief provided that the Company should enlarge 
 the existing canal or provide a new one, that in addition to the 
 three directors appointed by the British Government seven others 
 be added from among English ship-owners, and merchants,®® that 
 an office of the Company be opened in London, that the remaining 
 surtax, levied since 1873, be discharged, and that transit and 
 operating charges of the canal be reduced in proportion to the 
 earnings of the Company.®^ 
 
 Most of these points were carried out as agreed upon. The 
 last fifty centimes of surtax was removed from the tolls in Jan- 
 uary, 1884, leaving transit charges at the flat rate of ten francs 
 per net register ton. This amount was gradually reduced accord- 
 ing to a sliding scale as the Company’s dividends increased, until 
 in 1906 the rate stood at yf francs per ton.®® Meanwhile the time 
 required for the transit of the canal was reduced. For some years 
 after the opening of the waterway at least sixty hours were con- 
 sumed by a vessel in passing from one sea to the other. Improve- 
 ments in the types of vessels using the canal effected speedier 
 passages, but the necessity during these early years of tying up 
 or anchoring vessels during the night continued to impede traffic. 
 The installing of electric head lights on vessels in transit in 1887 
 made possible continuous passages and greatly shortened the time 
 required. Further improvements to the same end now enable 
 ships to pass through in about sixteen hours.®® 
 
 At the same time the stresses created by the opening of the 
 canal were producing a veritable revolution in the shipbuilding 
 industry. Since sailing vessels navigated the canal and the Red 
 Sea only with the greatest difficulty, their construction rapidly 
 fell off and steam vessels of new design replaced them. The 
 effects of the canal in the sphere of shipbuilding were felt im- 
 mediately. 
 
 In reference to the Suez Canal . . . [said Sir James El- 
 phinstone in an address in 1871], we must take into con- 
 sideration that the whole of our East Indian trade has been 
 revolutionized by the opening of the Suez Canal. The ships 
 
 Ibid., pp. 20—28. 
 
 Nourse, op. cit., pp. 121, 122. 
 
 The ultimate minimum was fixed at 5 francs per ton. 
 
 Sir Charles McLeod and A. W. Kirkaldy, The Trade, Commerce, and 
 Shipping of the Empire (Vol. VII of The British Empire series, ed. by Hugh Gunn), 
 (London and New York, 1924), p. 81. 
 
472 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 in which we placed so much pride . . . are improved off the 
 face of the earth. Trade with India, right or wrong, must 
 fall into steam trade.®” 
 
 Changes in steamship design followed closely after.®^ In spite 
 of the fact that steam vessels had been in use for half a century, 
 their evolution showed an increase in size rather than a change in 
 principles of construction. The screw propeller had not yet found 
 universal acceptance and most steamships were still equipped with 
 sails with which to supplement their steam power. The most 
 efficient use of the Suez Canal route called for a different type of 
 steamer — one suited for navigation in European and oriental 
 waters alike and with proportions suggested by the problems 
 peculiar to the narrow channel of the canal. 
 
 This situation, which had not been foreseen, was boldly met 
 by British mercantile concerns who gained on their foreign com- 
 petitors by retiring or scrapping old types of vessels and by 
 replacing them with others of new design. New types of propul- 
 sion machinery also were produced, characterized by high pressure 
 boilers and compound engines, which resulted in more economical 
 fuel consumption and more rapid sustained speeds without the 
 use of sails. ®^ Steamships in use in 1870 rarely displaced more 
 than 4000 tons. By 1890 Indian and Australian mail steamships 
 frequently attained a size of 8000 tons, while by 1914 they had 
 grown to 20,000 tons and more, embodying every improvement 
 known to maritime science. 
 
 In this fashion the improvements consequent upon the canal 
 reacted to compel further changes in the canal itself. The dis- 
 cussions of 1883 resulted presently in the adoption of the plan of 
 widening and deepening the original channel. This process, once 
 begun, has been several times repeated as steamships have grown 
 in size and number. From the original dimensions of 72 feet 
 bottom and 150 feet surface width with a depth of less than 26 
 feet, the canal has been enlarged in successive stages until it now 
 measures 147 feet at the bottom and 240 feet at the surface of 
 the cuts with a depth of ^ 4 -^ feet. This is sufficient to accom- 
 modate vessels of 30,000 tons, although it will not admit the 
 very largest steamships, and additional enlargements of the 
 channel will soon be made.®® 
 
 Sir James Elphinstone, “ A Ship Canal between India and Ceylon,” March 28, 
 1871, in the Journai of the East India Assn., V, 40. 
 
 Lindsay, op. cit., Ill, 618-619; Charles Roux, op. cit., II, Ch. 13. 
 
 ®- The Blue Peter, I, p. 68; The P. & O. Pocket Book, 3d issue, pp. 12, 13. 
 
 Steamship companies regularly using the canal still take its physical limitations 
 into account in designing their vessels. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 473 
 
 These improvements are indicative both of the volume of trade 
 and the type of vessels employing the canal. In 1913, 5085' 
 vessels, with a total tonnage of 20,214,856, passed through the 
 canal, an average of fourteen vessels per day throughout the year. 
 This was nearly as much traffic as the canal authorities then could 
 manage, although the necessity of using sidings for the passage 
 of vessels bound in opposite directions was long ago obviated. 
 Constantly increasing depths of channel have been made necessary 
 not so much by merchant vessels, which appear to have reached 
 their maximum size some years ago, as by mail and passenger 
 steamships which continue to grow. The World War consider- 
 ably reduced the business of the canal for several years, though 
 the revival of trade has been very rapid of late.®'* 
 
 The purchase of the Suez Canal shares was looked upon by 
 some of the more optimistic exponents of the Government’s policy 
 as the last step in the long struggle to control or at least make 
 safe the principal route to India, China, and Australia. The 
 opponents of the purchase were convinced that such definite ven- 
 turing into Egypt would produce nothing but trouble; interven- 
 tion in the Khedive’s affairs, loss of the friendship of the Sultan, 
 diplomatic entanglements with other European Powers, and all 
 without tangible gain. Events were to show that the more gloomy 
 outlook, while not being realized immediately, was on the whole 
 well taken. Having taken hold of the tiger’s tail, Britain could 
 not let go, though were it not for the constant necessity of pre- 
 serving a wide margin of safety for the canal itself, Egypt must 
 have been entirely abandoned to its own improvident ways and 
 the fickle guardianship of the Porte long before the opening of 
 the twentieth century. 
 
 One of the earliest indications that the purchase of a large 
 interest in the Suez Canal would lead to new political relationships 
 was to be found in a Bill brought forward in Febi'uary, 1876, to 
 add to the titles of the Queen that of “ Empress of India.” The 
 significance of this move could not be misunderstood, nor were 
 statements wanting to elucidate it. In answer to the strong op- 
 position which developed to the measure on its first reading, 
 Disraeli said (March 9, 1876): 
 
 ... It is desired in India. . . It is anxiously ex- 
 pected. . . Let the people of India feel that there is a sym- 
 
 A good numerical picture of the effect of the War on canal traffic is contained 
 in the Annual Return of S /lipping, Cargo and Passenger Traffic in the Ports of 
 Egypt and Suez Canal Transits, issued by the Ports and Lighthouses Administration, 
 Statistical Office (Cairo, 1922), pp. 45—47. 
 
474 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 pathetic chord between us and them, and do not let Europe 
 suppose for a moment that there are any in this House who 
 are not deeply conscious of the importance of the Indian 
 Empire. . . By passing this Bill ... the House will 
 show, in a manner which is unmistakable, that they look upon 
 India as one of the most precious possessions of the Crown, 
 and their pride that it is a part of her Empire and governed 
 by her imperial throne.®® 
 
 This position was further elaborated in a speech of the Prime 
 Minister made on March 23, in connection with the third reading 
 of the Bill: 
 
 The frontiers of Russia, I will not say a rival Power, but 
 the frontiers of Russia are only a few days’ march from those 
 of her Majesty in India. . . This announcement . . . will 
 signify in a mianner which cannot be mistaken, that the Par- 
 liament of England is resolved to uphold the Empire of 
 India.®® 
 
 In spite of strenuous objections to the Bill on the grounds that it 
 was unconstitutional, inexpedient, and unssthetic, it was passed 
 and received the royal assent.®^ An Empire had been created 
 which depended for its very existence upon the maintenance of a 
 line of communications which crossed the Isthmus of Suez within 
 the domain of the Khedive of Egypt. 
 
 The Royal Titles Act, following closely after the purchase of 
 the canal shares and the sending of a financial mission to Egypt, 
 was looked upon by many as a preliminary move toward British 
 annexation of Egypt. Certainly English attitude toward both 
 Egypt and Russia underwent a considerable change as a result of 
 the events of 1875— 1876. The “highway to India” received 
 attention which had been denied it since its first establishment. 
 
 It is now fully recognized [said a contemporary] that the 
 Canal must be held by England, and will be protected from 
 the land. We cannot run the possible risk of some future 
 Egyptian ruler becoming the ally of an enemy who, before 
 we could take measures for protecting it, might render our 
 road to India useless for an indefinite period. . . .®® 
 
 Hansard’s Pari. Deb., CCXXVII, 1727; T. E. Kebbel, Selected Speeches of 
 the Rt. Hon. the Earl of Beaconsfield (2 vols., London, 1882), ii, 239. 
 
 ®® Hansard’s Pari. Deb., CCXX\^III, 450; Thompson, of. cit., I, 273. 
 
 ®’’ Thompson, op. cit., I, 272. 
 
 ®® A supposed plot had just been uncovered to destroy the canal by blowing in 
 the banks with nitroglycerine. This was thought by some to have been conceived 
 in Russia. The incident caused no little excitement in English circles. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 475 
 
 I can not too strongly insist that the possession of Gibral- 
 tar, of Malta, or of Aden, is as nothing in comparison with 
 our holding the Canal itself and making it strong.®® 
 
 Meanwhile, the continued development of Russian railways in 
 Central Asia,™ and more particularly the belligerent plans of 
 Russia in connection with the Bulgarian uprisings in 1875— 6, 
 led to a new wave of hostility to Russia in which possible danger 
 to the Suez Canal played a prominent part. The Russian declara- 
 tion of war against Turkey on April 24, 1877, greatly increased 
 the apprehension for the safety of the canal, as Egypt, a part of 
 the Ottoman Empire, might come within the area of hostilities. 
 On May 6, Lord Derby despatched a note to the Russian Court 
 defining British interests in Egypt and elsewhere in the Near 
 East. Russia was warned that any attempt to block or intercept 
 the communication between Europe and the East by the Suez 
 Canal would be regarded as a menace to India, and would be in- 
 consistent with the maintenance by England of a policy of passive 
 neutrality. Furthermore, it was stated that European economic 
 interests in Egypt were so extensive that an attack on Egypt or 
 even a temporary occupation would not be regarded with uncon- 
 cern by England, while Russian occupation of Constantinople or 
 of the region bordering on the Persian Gulf was definitely pro- 
 scribed.’^^ The penalty for violation of these conditions, it was 
 understood, would be the sacrifice of British neutrality. A tense 
 moment was greatly relieved when M. Gortchakov, the Russian 
 Ambassador, signified the willingness of his Government to abide 
 by the stipulated terms during British neutrality.™ 
 
 In spite of widespread feeling in England that Russia’s war 
 with Turkey was a war on England’s ally,™ England was “ called 
 on to decide whether out of the wreck she will take Egypt.”™ 
 The mobilization at Malta of a considerable number of Indians 
 brought out by way of the Suez Canal ™ suggested an affirmative 
 answer, but the war ended with Egypt still a part of the Sultan’s 
 
 An Englishman, England, in Egypt: the Highway to India; A Proposal sub- 
 mitted to the People of England, pp. 5—7. 
 
 James Long, “ The Eastern Question in its Anglo-Indian Aspect,” in the 
 Journal of the East India Assn., X, 223—269. See the Calcutta Englishman for 
 Aug., 1876. 
 
 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, IV, 2615— 2617. 
 
 Ibid., IV, 2624—2627. 
 
 Sir Henry Havelock, in the Fortnightly Review, XXVII, 119. 
 
 Edward Dicey, in ibid., XXVIII, 422-434. 
 
 George Foggo, “ The Employment of Indian Troops in Europe,” in the 
 Journal of the East India Assn., XI, 152—183; London Times, 18 April, 1878; 
 Thompson, op. cit., II, 211, 415—416. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 476 
 
 domain and only Cyprus to guard the eastern highways. The 
 annexationists, and they were many, now that France was still 
 laboring under the effects of her late defeat by Prussia, were 
 gravely disappointed, but they did not give up hope of seeing 
 Egypt become a part of the British Empire. A circumstance that 
 lent them considerable encouragement was the fact that the 
 Khedive, as many had anticipated, was unable to keep pace with 
 his obligations, and the possibility of the restoration of his credit 
 began to appear exceedingly remote. 
 
 Proposals brought forward in 1876 to unify and consolidate 
 the Khedive’s debts, which might have given an opportunity for 
 financial rehabilitation, had already largely fallen through.’® In 
 March, 1877, much pressure was brought to bear on the Khe- 
 dive that he was obliged to issue a decree creating a board of 
 commissioners to examine the general state of his finances. This 
 commission of six members, representing Great Britain, France, 
 and other interested states, reported in August, 1878, that because 
 of the continuance of waste and inefficiency of the Khedive’s ad- 
 ministration, only a permanent board of experts, in charge of all 
 branches of Egyptian administration, could possibly save the 
 country. 
 
 Action upon this report was practically obligatory. With 
 greatest reluctance, therefore, Ismail filled some of the more im- 
 portant ministerial offices with British and French experts, and 
 then assiduously devoted himself to the congenial task of bringing 
 discredit upon them. So successful was he in this effort that in 
 April, 1879, his foreign ministers felt it incumbent upon thern to 
 resign, leaving the Khedive again sole master of affairs. During 
 this whole period the Khedive’s extravagances continued as un- 
 bridled and as imposing as ever. The end, however, came w'ith 
 unexpected suddenness. In place of the intervention of Britain 
 and France, who had thus far considered themselves the principal 
 arbiters of Egypt’s destinies, came the ultimatum of Prince Bis- 
 marck, demanding of the Porte the immediate deposition of 
 Ismail, with active intervention in Egypt as the alternative. 
 Coming at a time when the German Empire was not suspected of 
 having imperialistic ambitions, this fiat gave a profound shock to 
 the whole of Europe, and to none more than Britain and France. 
 As the only feasible course of action left, these Powers hastened 
 to join in the German demand, and the Porte was constrained to 
 act accordingly. Late in June, 1879, Ismail was apprised of his 
 removal and of the appointment of his son Tewfik as Khedive 
 in his stead. 
 
 Documents are given in McCoan, op. cit., pp. 393-409. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 477 
 
 The change of regime under pressure enabled the Powers to 
 effect the establishment of a joint financial administration for 
 the new Khedive.” This Dual Control, which to all intents and 
 purposes made the Khedive the ward of Great Britain and France 
 while leaving him otherwise in possession of the usual powers, in 
 spite of some handicaps, promised at the outset to solve the prin- 
 cipal difficulties and to obviate the need of further participation 
 in the affairs of Egypt. Its duration, however, was destined to 
 be brief. The circumstances which brought about its termination 
 and inaugurated an entirely new phase in the history of Egypt 
 grew out of a series of local difficulties in the Egyptian army 
 which had little, if any, intrinsic significance. The setting was 
 simple. Upon the deposition of Ismail, the Egyptian army was 
 reduced from 45,000 to 18,000 men, which created a large group 
 of disaffected soldiers open to sedition.^® Among the many 
 chronic plotters connected with the army was an officer of peasant 
 origin, Ahmed Arabi, who, being at once aggressive, fickle, and 
 unwise, easily fell into the bad graces of the Government and 
 relied on his personal popularity with the military to extricate 
 himself. After several clashes with both Ismail and his successor, 
 in which Arabi was victorious, the situation came to a head in the 
 early months of 1882 when the disaffection in the army began 
 to take on a certain crude national character and as such endan- 
 gered lives and interests of Europeans. 
 
 In May, 1882, an understanding between the English and 
 French Governments led to the sending out to Egypt. of a joint 
 naval expedition intended to exert a moral influence and to protect 
 European residents in Egypt. This had the effect of precipitating 
 the whole movement, which up to this point had been personal 
 and aimless. It needed only a riot in Alexandria on June ii to 
 provoke a race war. The attempt of the Turkish Government 
 to take matters in hand only added fuel to the fire. With all law 
 and order suspended, the British Government believed the time 
 had come for the employment of external force. In this the 
 French would not join, either because of unwillingness to follow 
 English lead or lack of inclination to embark on a course which 
 might have involved consequences.’^® On June ii. Admiral Sey- 
 mour, in charge of the British fleet at Alexandria, determined to 
 hesitate no longer. The French, informed of his intentions, with- 
 drew their vessels, and the British alone commenced the bom- 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXX, 623—624, passim. 
 
 A good account of these developments is contained in Weigall, op. cit., pp. 
 12 1 ff. 
 
 Jean Darcy, France et Angleterre: Cent Annecs de Rivalite Coloniale, pp. 
 
 359 , 360. 
 
BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 478 
 
 bardment of the forts at Alexandria, an act which committed 
 them irrevocably to a large responsibility for conditions in Egypt 
 in future. 
 
 A week later preparations were far advanced for placing a 
 British army in Egypt to restore order. The Turkish Govern- 
 ment raised no objections, but the French remained coldly aloof. 
 One of the first steps toward reducing the Egyptian forces was 
 the seizure of the Suez Canal, in the face of the most determined 
 opposition from De Lesseps and other officials of the Suez Canal 
 Company, who openly sympathized with Arabi since the French 
 fleet had been withdrawn. Not troubling to determine what 
 difficult international questions were being raised, British trans- 
 ports were taken through the canal and troops landed at Ismailia, 
 although the canal dues were punctiliously paid. The dispersal of 
 the Egyptian army and the capture of Cairo were quickly effected 
 by English forces, which scarcely needed the units which had 
 meanwhile come out from India to take part in the imperial 
 adventure. 
 
 These events required a new definition of policy. Early in 
 1883 Gladstone, the “Little Englander,” declared it to be the 
 intention of Great Britain to reseat the Khedive, reconstitute the 
 country, and then to withdraw completely, leaving the future of 
 Egypt to her own people. While there is no need to question the 
 sincerity of this plan, its realization was made impossible by new 
 and grave crises. An emergency arose in the Sudan. This region 
 had long been subject to Turco-Egyptian authority, but, since the 
 deposition of Ismail, had fallen under the control of a religious 
 fanatic known as the Mahdi. After the pacification of Egypt in 
 1882, it became necessary for British forces to extend the fax 
 Britannica to the Sudan to insure their work in Egypt. The con- 
 quest of the Sudan, undertaken in half-hearted fashion under a 
 ministry strongly opposed to such distant enterprises, w'as poorly 
 managed. The destruction of an expeditionary force in 1883 and 
 the death of Gordon at Khartum in 1885 w'ere the evidences of 
 bungling at home, but at least they demonstrated the necessity of 
 continuing the occupation of Egypt. 
 
 Meanwhile, British withdrawal from Egypt grew more and 
 more hypothetical. As the Suez Canal yearly became more vital 
 to English political and commercial interests, fewer risks could be 
 taken for its safety and control.®^ Moreover, Eg\q)t itself, and 
 later the Sudan, became enmeshed in the English economic sys- 
 
 Weigall, of. cit., pp. 155—156. 
 
 See Etienne Martin, U Angleterre et le Canal de Suez: La Question d'Egyfte 
 (Paris, 1892), Introduction; Pari. Paf., 1905, No. [C. 2409], Eg^’pt No. i, p. 2; 
 Quarterly Revie^oj, CLXV, 438-467. 
 
THE CONTROL OF EGYPT 
 
 479 
 
 tern to such an extent as to counsel no haste in carrying out the 
 promise of withdrawal.®^ The very fact of possession eventually 
 argued its own justification. Rival powers presently found com- 
 pensation elsewhere: France in Tunis, and, after the Fashoda 
 incident, in Morocco j Germany in newly opened African regions j 
 Russia in northern Persia and eastern Asia. Long before the 
 opening of the World War and the establishment of a British 
 protectorate in Egypt, that region on the map had taken on the 
 color of red} its retention for the protection of investment both 
 in the East and in the Nile basin was everywhere taken as a matter 
 of course. 
 
 Even the long-debated problem of the international status of 
 the canal was satisfactorily worked out. In 1885 an informal 
 arrangement was reached toward neutralizing the waterway,®® 
 and in 1888 an international congress at Constantinople, repre- 
 senting nine of the Powers most interested in the canal, drew up 
 a Convention, dated October 29, providing that the canal should 
 “always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to 
 every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.” ®^ 
 This, of course, did not alter the position of Great Britain as the 
 guardian of the canal. 
 
 A long period of international peace after the Congress of 
 Berlin of 1878 made special precautions for the safety of the canal 
 unnecessary. The opening of the World War necessitated both 
 the taking of precautionary measures for the safety of the canal 
 and the ending of the anomalous position of Great Britain in 
 Egypt. Upon the entrance of Turkey into the war as an ally of 
 the German Empire, the British “ occupation ” of Egypt came to 
 an end, and in December, 1914, a British protectorate was pro- 
 claimed. An attack on the canal by Turkish forces in 1914— 1915, 
 as a part of the war plans of the German General Staff, while 
 easily repulsed, at least succeeded in preventing a concentration 
 of British forces on the western front at a critical time, since 
 approximately 1 50,000 imperial troops were detained in Egypt. 
 The disastrous Gallipoli campaign of 1915 may be considered as 
 a monument to the firm purpose of safeguarding eastern lines of 
 communication. 
 
 The relative tranquillity of Egypt during the World War gave 
 no sign of new problems which were to follow closely after. 
 Post-war psychology together with the new doctrine of the rights 
 of small peoples combined to breed in Egypt something more akin 
 
 G. L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference^ pp. 306—328, 
 -passim. 
 
 Brit, and. For. St. Pap., LXXVI, 345-351 ; Charles-Roux, op. cit., II, 389-393. 
 
 Brit, and For. St. Pap., LXXIX, 18; W. B. Munro, “The Neutralization of 
 the Suez Canal,” in Annals of the American Academy, XVII, 409-430. 
 
48 o 
 
 BRITISH ROUTES TO INDIA 
 
 to a national spirit than had ever appeared during the revolt of 
 Arabi Pasha. Indeed, so threatening did the movement become 
 that, being constantly reminded of the engagements given when 
 Egypt was first occupied, the Protectorate was given up in Novem- 
 ber, 1921, and on March 15, 1922, a limited monarchy was estab- 
 lished. Ahmed Fuad, already recognized as Sultan, became the 
 first king under the new regime.®® Even this, however, did not 
 mean the complete withdrawal of England from Egypt. In the 
 form of a treaty with the new kingdom, British interests are still 
 guarded and certain rights of intervention are recognized.®^ The 
 Anglo-Egyptian Convention of November, 1921, contained a 
 provision that — 
 
 For the discharge of . . . obligations and for the due 
 protection of British Imperial Communications, British 
 forces shall have free passage through Egypt, and shall be 
 maintained at such places in Egypt and for such periods as 
 shall from time to time be determined. They shall also at 
 all times have facilities as at present for the acquisition and 
 use of barracks, exercise grounds, aerodromes, naval yards 
 and naval harbours.®® 
 
 In such manner has the Suez Canal justified its appellation of a 
 “ second Bosphorus.” It is undoubtedly the most important of 
 the world’s waterways. In the words of Sir Charles Dilke, an 
 undersecretary of the Foreign Office — 
 
 . . . The Canal is the principal highway to India, Ceylon, 
 the Straits Settlements, and British Burmah, where 250,- 
 000,000 people live under our rule, and also the China where 
 we have vast interests and eighty-four per cent of the ex- 
 ternal trade of that still enormous empire. It is also one of 
 the roads to our Colonial Empire in Australia and New 
 Zealand.®® 
 
 It can scarcely be matter of wonder that concern for this highway, 
 which has thus far scarcely required an alternative route between 
 the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, is a key to British 
 foreign policy. 
 
 Pari. Pap., 1921, Egypt No. i, No. [C. 1131]. 
 
 86 New York Times, Current History, XVI, 808—809. 
 
 There are those who still maintain, as many did during the past century, that 
 the annexation of Egypt is the only logical solution of the Egyptian Question. See 
 the Nineteenth Century, C, 635—636. 
 
 ®® Pari. Pap., 1921, No. [C. 1555 ]) Egypt No. 4, p. 4; ibid., 1922, No. 
 [C. i 592 ]> Eg^ypt No. I, pp. 30-31. 
 
 ®® Hansard's Pari. Deb., 3d Ser., CCLXXII, 1719. See The Nation, CIX, 
 No. 2827. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Aali Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey, 
 
 333> 349. 350, 351 «, 357- 
 
 Abbas Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, 301, 
 302. 
 
 Abdalee Arabs, 197, 200, 205, 206. 
 
 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of Turkey, 440, 
 442. 
 
 Abercromby, General Sir David, 60. 
 
 Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, 
 Earl of, British Foreign Secretary, 
 138, 239, 322. 
 
 Aboukir Bay, battle of, 58. 
 
 Acre, St. Jean d’, 144, 283, 289. 
 
 Adam’s Bridge, 190, 190 n. 
 
 Adelaide, 261. 
 
 Aden, base of operations, 60, 65 ; Eng- 
 lish acquisition of, 196, 197, 199- 
 207, 269; port of call, 107, 109, 220, 
 227, 252, 253, 254, 258, 261; tele- 
 graph station, 377, 392. 
 
 Admiralty steam packet service, see Bri- 
 tish Royal Navy. 
 
 Adrianople, Treaty of (1829), 133, 144. 
 
 Afghanistan, British-Indian alliance 
 with (1808), 67; difficulties with, 
 179; treaty with Russia (1878), 437; 
 British intervention in, 437—438. 
 
 Ahwaz, British capture of, 326. 
 
 Aigle, French imperial yacht, 371. 
 
 Ainslie, Sir Robert, British Ambassador 
 to Turkey, on Red Sea issues, 13-155 
 report on French activities, 175 op- 
 posed to Red Sea navigation, 18-21, 
 23—255 concern for safety of Egypt, 
 27—315 Turcophile policy, 37, 39-425 
 final attacks on George Baldwin, 45, 
 47- 
 
 Ainsworth, William, of the Euphrates 
 Expedition, 431. 
 
 Aleppo, 21, 59, 66, 144, 152, 174, 331, 
 334, 385, 447- _ 
 
 Alexander I, Russian Tsar, 71, 129. 
 
 Alexander II, Tsar, 438. 
 
 Alexandretta, 59, 70, 433, 434, 440. 
 
 Alexandria, fortification of, 635 in re- 
 lation to steam lines, 109, no, 21 1, 
 
 216, 221-223, 248, 254, 255, 258, 
 261, 2635 in telegraphic communica- 
 tion, 379, 385, 390, 3955 on improved 
 mail lines, 408—409, 410, 4175 politi- 
 cal bearing of, 277, 477-478. 
 
 Algeria, Algiers, 65 blockade of, 1385 
 French conquest of, 140, 208, 270— 
 271. 
 
 Algiers, Dey of, 138, 140. 
 
 Ali Bey, dictator of Egypt, 5 f., 8. 
 
 Alison, Charles, British charge d'affaires, 
 349- 
 
 Alma, steam tender at Suez, 404. 
 
 Amherst, Earl, Governor-General of 
 India, 91. 
 
 Amiens, Peace of (1802), 185. 
 
 Anatolian Railways, see Turkey, rail- 
 ways in. 
 
 Ancona, mail route via, 408-409. 
 
 Anderson, Arthur, founder of the Penin- 
 sular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
 Company, 237, 2475 on the route 
 through Egypt, 250 n, 295—296. 
 
 Andrew, (Sir) William Patrick, railway 
 promoter, 330, 334, 338, 430 n, 431- 
 432, 446, 448 n. 
 
 Anglo-Indian Telegraph Company, 390— 
 39I) 393. 394- 
 
 Anglo-Mediterranean Telegraph Com- 
 pany, 389-390. 
 
 Anglo-Persian Treaties (1809), 78, 
 
 (1814), 79. 
 
 Angora, 385. 
 
 Antelofe, of the Bombay Marine, 185. 
 
 Arabi, Ahmed, revolt of, 477, 480. 
 
 Arabia, 63, 64, 77, 191, 268—269. 
 
 Arabian Sea, 4, 88, 147, 377. 
 
 Arabs, activities of nomadic, 21, 22, 25, 
 65. 106, 153, 165, 197, 205, 224 n, 
 290. 369, 375, 383, 383 n, 396 n. 
 
 Assyria, iron river steamer, 181. 
 
 Atalanta, S. S., 217, 217 n, 225. 
 
 Atfeh, 230, 237. 
 
 Atlantic Telegraph Company, 378. 
 
 Auckland, East India Company’s S.S., 
 226. 
 
INDEX 
 
 482 
 
 Auckland, George Eden, Earl of, Gov- 
 ernor-General of India, 274-275. 
 
 Auguste, French corvette, 31. 
 
 Australia, steam plans for, 245, 256— 
 259; steam communication with, 255, 
 256—261, 420; cable communication 
 with, 388. 
 
 Australian Mail Steam Packet Company, 
 259. 
 
 Austria, interest in Egypt, 26; on route 
 to India, 66-67; in Balkan Peninsula, 
 129, 130— 1 3 1, 443; views on Suez 
 Canal, 347 «, 355-356, 358-361. 
 
 Austrian Lloyd, steam lines of, 223, 
 263. 
 
 Austro-Germanic Telegraph Union, 384. 
 
 Bagdad, English Residency at, 64-65, 
 66; communications via, 162 n, 181, 
 332, 376, 380, 381, 382, 385, 395, 
 396, 447- 
 
 Bagdad, Pasha of, 59, 65, 118, 162, 173, 
 425—426. 
 
 Bagdad Railway, 67, 329, 428, 433, 
 4j 0-451. 
 
 Baghdad, Turkish river steamer, 425, 
 425 n. 
 
 Bahrein Island, 269. 
 
 Baird, General Sir David, 60. 
 
 Baldwin, George, Political Recollections, 
 7 «; political and commercial agent 
 in Egypt, 10-11, 13—24; influence of, 
 26, 33-34; English Consul-General, 
 35-36; on Red Sea navigation, 38— 
 40; patriotic services, 42—50; retire- 
 ment, 52-53. 
 
 Balkan Peninsula, communication 
 through, 66; disturbances in (1802— 
 1815)1 67; (1853-1856), 323, 324; 
 (1875-1877), 475. 
 
 Balta-Liman Convention (1838), 241. 
 
 Baluchistan, 328, 341, 437. 
 
 Barber, Captain James, agent for steam 
 navigation, 217, 245. 
 
 Barker, John, English Consul at Aleppo, 
 69; Consul-General in Egypt, 87 n, 
 107, 111, 149, 154 n. 
 
 Barr, Colonel, agent of the Bombay 
 Steam Committee, 228. 
 
 Barton, Edward, English Ambassador at 
 Constantinople, 2. 
 
 Basrah, routes to India via, 21, 28, 328, 
 33I1 375i 376, 381; captured by 
 
 Arabs, 40 ; English Residency at, 64 ; 
 facilities of, 163; Euphrates Expedi- 
 tion at, 167, 181. 
 
 Basrah, Turkish river steamer, 425 n. 
 
 Batavia, 259, 261, 394. 
 
 Bedouins, see Arabs. 
 
 Beirut, 176, 178, 178 n, 211 n, 263, 282, 
 288. 
 
 Belgrade, telegraph line through, 384; 
 on Bagdad Railway, 451. 
 
 Benares, Bombay Marine surveying ves- 
 sel, 188. 
 
 Benedetti, Count Vincent, French charge 
 d'afaires at Constantinople, 308. 
 
 Benghazi, cable line via, 379, 390. 
 
 Bentinck, Lord William Cavendish, 
 Governor-General of India, 122, 210, 
 2 1 8—2 1 9. 
 
 Bentinck, Peninsular and Oriental 
 steamer, 252. 
 
 Berenice, East India Company’s S.S., 
 217, 217 n, 223—224, 225. 
 
 Berlin, Congress of, 439, 442-443; 
 
 Treaty of (1878), 439. 
 
 Besson, M., French naval architect in 
 the service of Mehemet Ali, 270. 
 
 Biddulph, Lieutenant-Colonel, telegraph 
 expert, 376. 
 
 Bird, James, of the Bombay Medical Es- 
 tablishment, 157—158. 
 
 Biscay, Bay of, 84, 88. 
 
 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 439, 464. 
 
 Bitter Lakes, 293, 368. 
 
 Blackvoood’s Edinburgh Magazine, 
 quoted, 132. 
 
 Bokhara, 136, 437. 
 
 Bolan Pass, 437 «. 
 
 Bombay, Red Sea trade of, 4; political 
 responsibility of, 65, 180, 183; rela- 
 tion to the Persian Gulf, 75, and the 
 Red Sea, 98, 199; interest in the 
 shorter routes, 103, 109, 175; steam 
 lines to, 252—254, 262, 340; telegraph 
 lines to, 377, 379, 392, 395; mail 
 serv’ice, 414, 416, 424. 
 
 Bombay and Bengal Steam Ship Com- 
 pany, 412. 
 
 Bombay Courier, quoted, 104— 105, in. 
 
 Bombay Marine, see Indian Navy. 
 
 Bombay Steam Committee, 12 1-125, 
 212—213, 228, 242—243. 
 
 Bonaparte, Napoleon, see Napoleon 1 . 
 
 Bonaventure, East Indian trading vessel, 
 83. 
 
 Boulac, 230, 237, 454. 
 
 Boulogne, 1 19, 41 1. 
 
 Boutenieff, Russian Ambassador to Tur- 
 key, 179-180. 
 
 Bowater, Lieutenant John, survey of 
 lower Mesopotamia, 15 1, 191. 
 
 Brandi, merchant and secret agent, 
 29 n. 
 
 Brenner Pass, 410. 
 
 Briggs and Company, English merchants 
 in Egypt, 238. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Briggs, Samuel, English “ Proconsul,” 
 
 6i. 
 
 Bright, Sir Charles, telegraphic pioneer, 
 381, 388. 
 
 Brindisi, 409, 410, 411. 
 
 British and Foreign Steam Navigation 
 Company, 248. 
 
 British Australian Telegraph Company, 
 394 - 
 
 British Indian Extension Telegraph 
 Company, 394. 
 
 British India Steam Navigation Com- 
 pany, 413, 419-420, 436. 
 
 Bruce, Frederick W. A., British Consul- 
 General in Egypt, 305-306. 
 
 Bruce, James, English Consul and travel- 
 ler, 6, 6 w, 9. 
 
 Brucks, Captain George Barnes, 190, 
 225. 
 
 Buckingham, James Silk, 104, 293 n. 
 
 Bulwer, Sir Henry Lytton (Lord Tai- 
 ling) , special agent at Constantinople, 
 333—334, 429; British Ambassador at 
 the Porte, 349, 358—361; Viceroy of 
 India, 437. 
 
 Buol, Count, Austrian Foreign Minister, 
 352 - 
 
 Burmese War, first, 97, 99. 
 
 Burnes, Sir Alexander, 192. 
 
 Bushire, English political establishment 
 at, 65; English demonstrations at, 68, 
 77, 171, 275; telegraphic communica- 
 tion via, 381, 382, 396. 
 
 Cadiz, 222, 248. 
 
 Cagliari, 374. 
 
 Cairo, market place, 8, 46, 57; Pasha of, 
 13; Bey of, 22—23; captured by 
 Turks, 38; route via, 51, 211. See 
 also Egypt, overland route, etc. 
 
 Cairo, iron river steamer, 237 «. 
 
 Calais, 117, 264, 328, 390, 480. 
 
 Calcutta, Interest in improved communi- 
 cation, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97, 1 16, 213— 
 214, 218; steam lines to, 179, 252, 
 253-255, 261, 41 1 ; telegraphic com- 
 munication with, 379; improved mail 
 service to, 414, 416. 
 
 Calcutta and Burmah Steam Navigation 
 Company, 412-413. 
 
 Calcutta Gazette, quoted, 102. 
 
 Calcutta Review, quoted, 315, 330, 336, 
 367, 421. 
 
 Calcutta Steam Committee, 90—92, 100— 
 loi, 120-122, 245. 
 
 Cameron, Captain, survey of route to 
 Bagdad by, 441. 
 
 Campbell, Captain C. D., British Envoy, 
 152; surveys of, 181-182. 
 
 483 
 
 Campbell, Colonel Patrick, British Con- 
 sul-General in Egypt, 228, 272, 287, 
 294 - 
 
 Canal, canals, early Egyptian, 291—292; 
 projects for an isthmian, 17, 27, 105, 
 149, 264, 293, 364; suggestions for 
 a supplementary, 470, 470 n, 471. 
 See Fresh Water, Mahmoudie, 
 Panama, Suez. 
 
 Canning, George, English Foreign Min- 
 ister, 130, 131. 
 
 Canning, Sir Stratford, see Lord Strat- 
 ford de Redcliffe. 
 
 Cape of Good Hope, commerce via, 1, 
 3, 4, 12, 236, 258—260, 418, 421, 
 469—470; communication via, 28, 
 33) 52, 55, 75, 80-81, 82-85, 93, 
 99, 102, 256, 339; political ad- 
 
 vantages of route via, 55, 97, 401, 
 407, 448. 
 
 Cape Town, 85, 95, 129. 
 
 Capitulations, the, 3, 11, 13, 36, 38, 40, 
 46, 66. 
 
 Capper, Colonel James, Observations on 
 the Passage to India, 32-33. 
 
 Carless, Lieutenant, surveys of, 190. 
 
 Carmarthen, Marquis of (Duke of 
 Leeds), British Foreign Secretary, 30. 
 
 Carnac, Sir James, Chairman of the 
 Court of Directors of the East India 
 Company, 210 «. 
 
 Cassab, Youssouf, Chief of Customs at 
 Cairo, 19, 29. 
 
 Cassis, Antoun, customs ofiicer, 23, 26— 
 27. 
 
 Catherine II, Tsarina, 49. 
 
 Cave, Stephen, English Paymaster-Gen- 
 eral, 459 n, 465. 
 
 Cavendish, Thomas, 1. 
 
 Cavour, Count Camillo di, 409. 
 
 Cerisy, M. de, French naval expert in 
 Egyptian employ, 270. 
 
 Ceylon, 82, 179, 252—255, 258. 
 
 Charles X, King of France, 137, 138. 
 
 Cherif Pasha, Turkish Minister, 356, 
 357 - 
 
 Chesney, (General) Francis Rawdon, 
 first survey, 108, 148—154, 157, 293— 
 294; Commander of the Euphrates 
 Expedition, 160, 163, 166—167, 169, 
 171—172, 174—176; later efforts in 
 behalf of Euphrates route to India, 
 329 n, 334, 429--431, 431 n. 
 
 China, first war with, 179, 287; second 
 war with, 339, 379; steam and tele- 
 graph lines to, 214, 245, 252—255, 
 258, 260—261, 420. 
 
 China Submarine Telegraph Company, 
 394 - 
 
INDEX 
 
 484 
 
 Choiseul-GoufEer, French Ambassador to 
 Turkey, 31. 
 
 City of London, river steamer, 426. 
 
 Clarendon, George William Frederick 
 Villiers, Earl of, British Foreign Sec- 
 retary, 310-314, 317-318, 324, 332- 
 
 Clark, Latimer, telegraph authority, 381. 
 
 Cleofatra, East India Company’s S.S., 
 226. 
 
 Cobbett’s Register, quoted, 133. 
 
 Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, 131, 
 324-326. 
 
 Comet, iron river steamer, 182 n, 425, 
 
 425 «• 
 
 Commerce, see Cape of Good Hope route, 
 steam navigation, Suez Canal, etc. 
 
 Communication, lines of to India and 
 the East, via Egypt in the eighteenth 
 century, 6, 10—12, 15—16, 18, 20—21, 
 35, 40—42, 47; in the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, 103, 110, 119, 125, 195—196, 
 211—226, 288—290; via Mesopotamia, 
 65—67, 80, 103; via the Cape of 
 Good Hope, 80-81, 83, 97—98, 103; 
 in general, 115—116, 233, 245—248, 
 252—261; 265, 400, 413—422, 480. 
 See also Overland Route, Steam Navi- 
 gation, Telegraphs. 
 
 Comfagnie Universelle du Canal Mari- 
 time de Suez, see Suez Canal Company. 
 
 Conolly, Lieutenant Arthur, surveys of 
 the Indian passes, 192. 
 
 Constantinople, early English influence 
 at, 2 ; trade with, 1 6 ; routes of com- 
 munication via, 66, 148, 178 n, 255, 
 328, 376, 380, 384, 450; strategic 
 importance of, 135—136, 266, 277. 
 
 Coote, sloop-of-war of the Indian Navy', 
 200, 203—205. 
 
 Corfu, French naval base, 63; cable sta- 
 tion, 374. 
 
 Corsica, French naval base, 56; on cable 
 lines, 374. 
 
 Cosseir, 16 n, 24, 107, 109, 221, 223, 
 236 n, 377. 
 
 Cowley, Earl, British Ambassador at 
 Paris, 311, 312. 
 
 Credit Fongier, 465 n. 
 
 Crimean War, 256, 262, 307, 318, 321- 
 324, 330. 335> 399- 
 
 Culladore, trading vessel, 8. 
 
 Curtis, T. A., steam agent, 245. 
 
 Curzon of Kedleston, George Nathaniel, 
 Lord, 276 n. 
 
 Cyprus, British acquisition of, 440—449. 
 
 Cyprus Convention (1878), 442, 445- 
 446. 
 
 Dajlah, Tigris river steamer, 426. 
 
 Dalhousie, James Andrew Broun Ram- 
 say, Marquis of, Governor-General of 
 India, 329, 399 n. 
 
 Damascus, 143, 144, 178, 181. 
 
 Damietta, 37 «, 49-50, 454. 
 
 Daniell, Lieutenant E. W. S., 206 n. 
 
 Delta, Nile river steamer, 239, 240. 
 
 Derby, Edward Henry Stanley, Earl of, 
 British Foreign Minister, 350; on 
 British interests in Mesopotamia, 438, 
 448; on Suez Canal shares, 460, 462- 
 463; on the Near East, 475. 
 
 Diana, first Indian steamer, 108 n. 
 
 Diarbekr, telegraphs via, 376, 380, 385; 
 on railway lines, 449—450. 
 
 Dilke, Sir Charles, quoted, 480. 
 
 Discovery, surveying vessel of the Indian 
 Navy, 190. 
 
 Disraeli, Benjamin (Earl of Beacons- 
 field), on the Suez Canal, 3 50—3 5 2 ; 
 on Cyprus, 436 n, 437, 441, 443-447; 
 on Suez Canal shares, 460—462, 466— 
 468; on Royal Titles Bill, 473-474. 
 
 Djemel Pasha, Turkish Minister of For- 
 eign Affairs, 435. 
 
 Doria DovL'lut, Indian trader, 197—199. 
 
 Dost Mohammed, Amir of Afghanistan, 
 275. 326. 
 
 Dover, 1 19, 390. 
 
 Drake, Sir Francis, i. 
 
 Dual Control, the, 476-477. 
 
 Dubois-Thainville, French agent in 
 Egypt, 52. 
 
 Duckworth, Sir John Thomas, .\dmiral, 
 62. 
 
 Dundas, Henry, Secretary for War and 
 President of the India Board, 44. 
 
 Duval, Lieutenant Thomas, 59. 
 
 Eastern Associated Telegraph Com- 
 panies, 394-396. 
 
 East India Company, early commercial 
 policy, I, 3, 12—15, 8°) interest in the 
 Red Sea route to India, 16, 25, 29, 
 31, 33-35, 41; loss of trade monop- 
 oly, 86; attitude toward steam com- 
 munication (1825—1835), 100, 104, 
 109, 111— 113, 159, 210; financial 
 condition, 125; later steam program, 
 167, 209, 213, 218, 256, 295; during 
 the Indian Mutiny, 400-404. 
 
 East India Steam Navigation Company, 
 214-215, 217, 219-220, 247, 249- 
 250. 
 
 East India Trade Committee, 100. 
 
 Eastern Counties Railway, 264. 
 
 Eastern Steam Navigation Company, 
 
 247) 249) 251. 
 
 Eg)'pt, political condition of in eight- 
 
INDEX 
 
 eenth century, 9 ; routes and despatches 
 via, 10, 16, z6, 28, 35, 43, 45, 47, 54, 
 91; European interest in and trade 
 with, 17, 21, 24, 33, 38, 43, 48, 58, 
 60 ; relation to steam routes in nine- 
 teenth century, 104, 106, iii, 114, 
 142, 154-155, 226-227, 236-237; 
 
 telegpraph lines across, 376; trade 
 through, 407; English Post Office in, 
 417} financial condition of, 460 ff.; 
 Anglo-French intervention in, 476- 
 477; British occupation of, 478-479; 
 Anglo-Egyptian Convention (1921), 
 480. 
 
 Egyptian railway, proposed, 231-232, 
 238, 242, 243, 297, 305, 310, 319- 
 320; construction and use of, 348, 
 
 358, 367, 370. 404) 405 «, 407) 417- 
 
 Egyptian Transit Administration, 241— 
 243) 300, 370, 404. 
 
 Egyptian Transit Company, 241. 
 
 El Arish, Convention of (1800), 60. 
 Electric and International Telegraph 
 Company, 384. 
 
 Elgin, Lord, British Ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, 64, 66—67. 
 
 Ellenborough, Edward Law, Earl of, 
 President of the India Board, 161, 
 167. 
 
 Elliott, (Sir) Henry, British Ambassador 
 to Turkey, 371. 
 
 Ellis, Henry, British Envoy to Persia, 
 27 _ 3 - 
 
 Elphinstone, Admiral (Viscount Keith) , 
 
 5in. 
 
 Elphinstone, Sir James, quoted, 471-472. 
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, Governor of 
 Bombay, 67, 103, 104, 106. 
 
 English Channel, 84, 87, 88, 148, 223, 
 
 3 ^ 8 , 373 , 375 , 411 . 
 
 Enterfrize, S.S., voyage to India, 95— 
 
 96, 209, 217 n; use in eastern waters, 
 
 97, 106-107. 
 
 Estcourt, Captain J. B. B., 172, 175. 
 Estcourt, Sotheran, 339-340. 
 
 Eugenie, Empress of the French, 370, 
 
 371- 
 
 Euphrates, iron river steamer, in Meso- 
 potamian surveys, 164—165, 168, 173, 
 174, 176; later services, 180— 181, 
 
 424- 
 
 Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation 
 Company, 413, 413 n, 424—427, 
 
 428 n. 
 
 Euphrates Expedition, early stages of, 
 126, 160, 164—165, 209; details of 
 progress, 166-182, 423; political as- 
 pects of, 267—268, 274, 282, 286, 290, 
 
 323- 
 
 485 
 
 Euphrates River, 118, 149. 158, 163, 
 175, 180, 426. 
 
 Euphrates Valley Railway, early pro- 
 posals for, 319, 321, 327, 331-336; 
 activities of the Euphrates Valley 
 Railway Company, 337-342, 358; 
 
 later projects for, 403, 407, 429, 
 446-450. 
 
 Euphrates Valley Route to India, 118, 
 430, 432 - 433 ) 433 «> 434 - 435 ) 446 . 
 See also Chesney, Euphrates Expedi- 
 tion, Euphrates Valley Railway, Meso- 
 potamia, Communication. 
 
 European and Indian Junction Tele- 
 graph Company, 333-334) 374-375- 
 
 Falmouth, 95, 21 1, 222, 223, 245, 248, 
 378. 
 
 Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta Tele- 
 graph Company, 390, 392, 394. 
 
 Fao, 381, 382, 385. 
 
 Farren, J. W., English Consul-General 
 in Syria, 150, 155 n. 
 
 Ears, 76. 
 
 Fashoda Incident, 479. 
 
 Feth Ali Shah, of Persia, 69—70. 
 
 Finkenstein, Treaty of (1807), 70-71, 
 77 - 
 
 Fitzjames, James, 174. 
 
 Fontanier, Victor, French consular agent, 
 126-127, 154 t?, 170, 170 n, 273 «; 
 Voyage dans Vlnde, 286. 
 
 Forbes, S.S., 122—124. 
 
 Forde, Henry Charles, telegraphic en- 
 gineer, 379. 
 
 Fort William, on Euphrates River, 166, 
 167. 
 
 France, growth of interest in the Near 
 East, 5, 6; policy in Egypt in eight- 
 eenth century, 16-17, 27-28; treaty 
 of 1785 with Beys, 29, 37; designs on 
 Egypt and the Levant, 30-35, 39-41, 
 48-5 1) 53-57) 64, 66; war vessels in 
 Indian waters, 83; steam packet serv- 
 ice, 126; conquest of Algeria, 128, 
 137—142; relations with Egypt 
 (1833), 145—146; lines of communi- 
 cation in the Mediterranean, 221— 
 222, 263; policy in the Near East, 
 239) 269-271, 277, 296-299, 301, 
 334-335; intervention in Syria 
 (i860), 342; later imperialistic 
 
 projects, 429, 436, 449-450, 457, 
 463) 479 ; 
 
 Frat, Turkish river steamer, 427. 
 
 French East India Company, 32, 51. 
 
 Fresh Water Canal, 343, 355, 365, 367- 
 368, 454 - 
 
 Fuad, Ahmed, King of Egypt, 480. 
 
INDEX 
 
 486 
 
 Galle, Point de, 216, 218 «, 259, 261, 
 
 369, 391. 412, 414- 
 
 Gallipoli campaign, 479. 
 
 Galloway, J. A., engineer, 239. 
 
 Galloway, R. H. (Bey), engineer, 231, 
 232 n, 238, 292, 294, 295. 
 
 Gardane, General, French Envoy and 
 Ambassador, 70-73. 
 
 General Screw Steam Company, 259. 
 
 George Canning^ English vessel, 164, 
 165. 
 
 Georgia, Persian province of, 71, 72, 
 134. 
 
 German Empire, overland communica- 
 tion through, 66; interests in the Near 
 East, 438, 442 «, 450, 450 «, 451; 
 imperial policy of, 476, 479. 
 
 Gibraltar, strategic value of, 62, 324, 
 444; steam and submarine cable lines 
 via, 114, 148, 216, 222, 223, 
 
 248, 249, 254, 255, 261, 378, 408, 
 410. 
 
 Gisborne, Francis, 376. 
 
 Gisborne, Lionel, 317-318, 376, 379. 
 
 Gladstone, William Ewart, views on Suez 
 Canal, 346; on Euphrates Valley Rail- 
 way, 340, 429; denunciation of Tur- 
 key, 43'5; opposition to the Cyprus 
 Convention, 445 ; on the purchase of 
 the Suez Canal shares, 466, 478. 
 
 Gordon, General Charles George, “ Chi- 
 nese,” 478. 
 
 Gordon, Sir Robert, British Ambassador 
 to Turkey, 148, 149. 
 
 Gortchakov, Russian Ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, 475. 
 
 Goudowitsch, General, Russian field 
 commander in Persia, 72, 73. 
 
 Grane, see Koweit. 
 
 Grant, Charles (Lord Glenelg), Presi- 
 dent of the India Board, 114, 156, 
 159- 
 
 Grant, Sir Robert, Governor of Bombay, 
 198, 202 «, 203, 204 n. 
 
 Granville, Granville George Leveson- 
 Gower, Earl, 445, 458. 
 
 Great Britain, early stages of Levantine 
 policy, 2, 5, 36, 38; early interest in 
 the Red Sea route for despatches, 41; 
 war with prance (1793), 44; weak 
 position in Egypt, 52, 56, 62; Treaty 
 with Turkey (1809), 66; relations 
 with Persia, 67, 79; trade with India, 
 86-87; postal regulations, loi, 112; 
 Select Parliamentary Committee of 
 1832, 1 13; Admiralty vessels in the 
 Mediterranean after 1825, 114; Se- 
 lect Parliamentary Committee of 
 1834, 125, 156, 158-159; policy in 
 
 the Near East after 1815, 129, 134- 
 135 ) 139) i 4 i~i 43 ) preparations for 
 improved communication with India, 
 159) 178—179) 211, 220—221, 232, 
 
 258—260, 263; Post Office Conven- 
 tions: with France (1839), 233; with 
 Egypt (1845), 241; policy in the 
 Near East, 1833—1838, 268, 268 «, 
 270; attitude toward the Suez Canal, 
 312-313) 345, 358, 363-36+) 
 
 troubles in Persia after 1851, 325- 
 326; Anglo-Persian Treaty (1857), 
 326-327; Government telegraphs and 
 cables, 378—380; Anglo-Persian En- 
 gagement (1862), 382; interest in 
 Persian telegraph lines, 388—389, 
 393) hostilities in the Near and Mid- 
 dle East, 1854-1858, 399, 401—406; 
 Royal Titles Bill, 407; steps toward 
 improved communication with the 
 East, 408, 415-417, 430-437; politi- 
 cal difficulties (1875-1878), 435, 
 
 437—441, 450-452; opposition to the 
 Suez Canal, 455—457; control of the 
 Canal, 458, 460—468; subsequent 
 
 policy in Egj-pt, 473-480. 
 
 Great Liverpool, Peninsular and Oriental 
 S.S., 249 n. 
 
 Greece, effects of revolution in, 128- 
 131, 209. 
 
 Green, John, British Consul-General in 
 Egypt) 352 «, 354- 
 
 Green and Company, 260. 
 
 Greenlaw, C. B., steam navigation pro- 
 moter, 246. 
 
 Grenville, William Wyndham, Baron, 
 British Foreign Secretary, 44, 47. 
 
 Greville, Charles, English political 
 diarist, quoted, 322. 
 
 Grounds, Lieutenant H. W., surveys of, 
 181. 
 
 Grindlay, Captain Melville, steam agent, 
 216-217, 256 n. 
 
 Guizot, Frangois Pierre Guillaume, 
 French statesman, 280, 282—284. 
 
 Gulistan, Treaty of (1813), 136. 
 
 Guy, Captain, survey of, 190. 
 
 Gwadur, 380, 381, 3S2, 383, 389. 
 
 Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway, 449, 450. 
 
 Haines, Commander Stafford Bettes- 
 worth. Expedition to Socotra, 188— 
 189; negotiations at and capture of 
 Aden, 196—206. 
 
 Halford, Robert, English trader to the 
 Red Sea, 7. 
 
 Hallania Island, 377. 
 
 Harborne, William, first English Am- 
 bassador to Turkey, 2. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Harcourt, Marquis d’, French Ambas- 
 sador to England, 462, 464. 
 
 Hassan, Capitan Pasha, 37—41. 
 
 Hastings, Warren, Governor-General of 
 India, 7—8, 15. 
 
 Hawkins, Captain John C., 181. 
 
 Hawkshaw, John, 366. 
 
 Hayes, English Consul at Smyrna and 
 charge d’affaires at Constantinople, 
 12. 
 
 Head, Major Charles Franklin, 214, 
 216. 
 
 Hector, Alexander, 176, 423. 
 
 Hedjaz, political conditions in, 9, 452. 
 
 Hennell, Colonel L., 328. 
 
 Herat, besieged by Persians (1838), 
 274-275, 287; troubles after 1851, 
 325-327. 
 
 Hill, J. R., of Hill and Raven, and J. R. 
 Hill and Company, 227—231, 240. 
 
 Himalaya, Peninsular and Oriental screw 
 steamship, 262. 
 
 Hindostan, Peninsular and Oriental 
 steamship, 252. 
 
 Hobhouse, Sir John Cam (Lord Brough- 
 ton) , President of the India Board, on 
 routes to India, 126; cooperation with 
 the Euphrates Expedition, 167; estab- 
 lishment of the Red Sea line, 21 1, 
 2 1 8—2 19. 
 
 Hodges, Colonel G. Lloyd, British 
 Consul-General in Egypt, 287—288. 
 
 Holland, Captain A. C., 182 n, 425, 
 425 n. 
 
 Hong Kong, 253-255, 260, 261, 339, 
 394 , 395 , 411 - 
 
 Hooghly River, 94, 122, 124, 373. 
 
 Hofe, East Indiaman, 81—82. 
 
 Houssain ben Fudthel, Sultan of Lahej 
 (Aden), 65, 197— 199, 206. 
 
 Hugh Lindsay, East India Company’s 
 S.S., construction, 186; voyages to 
 the Red Sea, loi— 102, 108—109, iii, 
 1 13 n; later voyages, 121—124, 171, 
 173, 187, 211, 211 n, 221. 
 
 Ibrahim Bey, de facto Bey of Cairo, 15, 
 38, 43- 
 
 Ibrahim Pasha, son and generalissimo of 
 Mehemet Ali, 165—166, 200, 278, 301. 
 
 Imperial Conferences, 422. 
 
 Inchcape of Strathnaver, Baron (James 
 Lyle Mackay), 420, 420 n, 428. 
 
 India, French agents in, 54, 58, 271; 
 steam navigation interest in, 115; 
 steam communication with, 223, 224; 
 mutiny in, 265, 339, 399—402; Rus- 
 sian agents in, 273; telegraphs and 
 cables to, 374, 379-383, 386-389; 
 
 487 
 
 Government monopoly of telegraph 
 lines, 393-394, 400; Post Office ar- 
 rangements, 408; railways in, 415 «; 
 Indian mails, 414 f. ; Russian designs 
 on, 436-438. 
 
 India, British India Company’s S.S., 419, 
 420. 
 
 Indian dak (dawk), 213, 254, 414. 
 
 Indian Navy, steam plans in connection 
 with, 108; surveys of, 120, 183—195; 
 naval operations, 206, 224, 225, 269; 
 steam packet service, 211, 223, 226, 
 252-256, 261, 262, 424. 
 
 Indian Ocean, 11, 88, fassim. 
 
 Indian Submarine Telegraph Company, 
 391. 
 
 Indo-European Telegraph Lines, 387, 
 
 389, 391-393, 396. 
 
 Industrial Revolution, i ; effect on steam 
 navigation, 81, 85-87; on Suez Canal 
 projects, 293. 
 
 International Canal Commission, 455— 
 457 , 459 - 
 
 International Scientific Commission, 
 188 n, 315-316, 317 n, 346, 364- 
 
 Iraq, Kingdom of, 451, 452. 
 
 Ismai'l, Pasha of Cairo, 25, 38, 50. 
 
 Ismail Pasha, Khedive of Egypt, inter- 
 est in the Suez Canal, 360-362; cele- 
 bration of the opening of the Canal, 
 368—371; financial predicament, 454, 
 458-465, 467, 473; deposition, 476. 
 
 Ismailia, 365, 371, 478. 
 
 Ismid, 380, 385, 449, 450. 
 
 Ispahan, 332, 381, 385, 389. 
 
 Italy, interest in the overland route, 
 408; Italian railways, 408, 409; 
 
 views on the British purchase of 
 Canal shares, 464. 
 
 Jack o’ Lantern, iron steamer for Nile 
 service, 230. 
 
 Japan, steam line to, 412. 
 
 Jask, 389. 
 
 Jaubert, Amedee, French agent in 
 Persia, 69, 70. 
 
 Jeddah, coffee trade with, 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 
 14; limit of legal navigation in Red 
 Sea, 14, 15, 25, 30; Russian design 
 on, 50; as port of call, 107, 109; 
 taken by Mehemet Ali, 269. 
 
 Jerusalem, 144. 
 
 Johnston, Captain James H., pioneer of 
 steam communication, 89-90, 93—98, 
 100—101. 
 
 Jones, Lieutenant Felix, 181, 182, 182 n. 
 
 Jones (Brydges), (Sir) Harford, Politi- 
 cal Agent in Mesopotamia, 64, 69; 
 Embassy to Persia, 73, 75, 77-78. 
 
INDEX 
 
 488 
 
 Kabul, 276. 
 
 Karrack, 76-77, 275, 275 n, 326. 
 
 Kars, fortress of, 324, 332. 
 
 Karun River, surveys of, 172 n, 173, 
 i75> 176, 181, 326; commercial open- 
 ing- of, 428, 428 rt. 
 
 Kaye, Sir John William, quoted, 76, 
 78 n. 
 
 Khandahar, 274, 276. 
 
 Khanikin, 381, 382. 
 
 Khiva, 136, 437. 
 
 Killican, David, English trader in Red 
 Sea, 7. 
 
 King George Sound, route via, 412. 
 
 Kleber, General Jean-Baptiste, 60. 
 
 Koweit (Grane), 431, 434, 447. 
 
 Kurnah, 171, 173, 331. 
 
 Kurrachee, survey of, 190; British 
 seizure of, 276, 276 as a naval 
 base, 326; in Indian communications, 
 332, 340, 374 , 376, 377 , 380, 382, 
 386, 389, 432. 
 
 Kutaya, Convention of (1833), 146, 
 266, 271. 
 
 Laccadive Islands, 187, 196. 
 
 Lady Mary Wood, Peninsular and Ori- 
 ental steamer, 253 «. 
 
 Laird, M’Gregor, steamship builder, 
 160, 160 «. , 
 
 Lamington, A. Cochrane Baillie, Lord, 
 448-449. 
 
 Lancaster, Captain James, early East 
 Indian trader, 80. 
 
 Lange, (Sir) Daniel A., 343, 343 n. 
 
 Layard, (Sir) Austen Henry, English 
 explorer and diplomatist, 335, 441- 
 442, 446. 
 
 Lello, Henry, English Ambassador to 
 Turkey, 2. 
 
 Lemlum Marshes, 152, 169, 174. 
 
 Lenon, M., French engineer in the serv- 
 ice of Mehemet Ali, 299. 
 
 Lesseps, Charles de, 457, 470. 
 
 Lesseps, Ferdinand de, origin of Canal 
 idea, 294, 303—305; promotion of 
 the Suez Canal, 307; diplomacy at 
 Constantinople, 308—311; in England, 
 314-315, 318-319, 343-345; efforts 
 at the Porte, 348-349, 350 n, 351; 
 organization of the Suez Canal Com- 
 pany, 352—354; beginning of Canal 
 construction, 355—357, 359-361, 365; 
 completion of the task, 368—369; 
 opening ceremonies, 370-372; on the 
 tolls question, 455—457; on the sale 
 of the Khedive’s shares, 458, 463- 
 465; on the control of the Canal, 467, 
 468. 
 
 Levant Company, 5, 10, 19, 34, 35 «, 
 43 w, 56. 
 
 Linant de Bellefonds (Bey), French en- 
 gineer in Egyptian service, 294, 298, 
 300. 
 
 Lion, Indian merchantman, 6. 
 
 Lisbon, 222, 248. 
 
 Lisbon, Robert, British Ambassador to 
 Turkey, 46. 
 
 Livorna, route via, 41, 223. 
 
 London, communication -with the East, 
 222, 252, 254, 255, 261, 264, 384, 
 ■passim. 
 
 London, Treaty of (1827), 131, 137, 
 148; Treaty of (1840), 280, 281, 
 283. 
 
 Lotus, Nile river steamer, 237 n. 
 
 Louis XVI, 54. 
 
 Louis Philippe, King of the French, 140, 
 141, 282, 284. 
 
 Low, Charles Rathbone, of the Indian 
 Navy, 183 n. 
 
 Lynch Brothers, commercial operations 
 of, 162, 413 n, 424—428. 
 
 Lynch, Lieutenant Henry Blosse, 161, 
 168, 173 n, 180, 181 n. 
 
 Lynch, Lieutenant Michael W., 181, 
 
 181 «. 
 
 Lynch, Lieutenant R. B., 168. 
 
 Lynch, Thomas Kerr, 424. 
 
 Macdonald, Major, courier, 46. 
 
 Mackinnon, Mackenzie and Company, 
 412-413. 
 
 McLean, English engineer, 315, 316 n. 
 
 McNeill, (Sir) John, engineer and dip- 
 lomat, 152, 274, 328, 334, 336. 
 
 McNeill, Telford, 431. 
 
 Madagascar, 85. 
 
 Madeira, 85. 
 
 Madras, proposed steam lines to, 97, 
 179, 218; support of steam projects, 
 214-216; steam service to, 252, 254, 
 255, 261, 414, 416. 
 
 Madras Steam Association, 216, 245. 
 
 Magallon, Charles, French merchant and 
 consul, 28, 51—53. 
 
 Magallon, Madame, 28. 
 
 Mahdi, the (Mohammed Ahmed), des- 
 pot of the Sudan, 478. 
 
 Mahmoudie Canal, 230, 237, 238, 240, 
 243, 289 n, 302. 
 
 Mahmud H, Sultan of Turkey, 144, 
 1+5. 272-273, 276-278. _ 
 
 Mahmud Pasha, Grand Vizier, 435. 
 
 Maillet, Benoist de, French Consul at 
 Cairo, 4. 
 
 Mails, see Communications, Overland 
 Route, Great Britain, East India Com- 
 
INDEX 
 
 pany, Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
 Navigation Company. 
 
 Malabar, mail steamer, 462. 
 
 Malacca, 394. 
 
 Malcolm, Sir Charles, Superintendent of 
 the Indian Navy, no. 
 
 Malcolm, (Sir) John, missions to 
 Arabia, 65, and Persia, 65, 67-68, 
 74—76, 78; Governor of Bombay and 
 advocate of . Red Sea route, 106, 108, 
 no, 117, 186. 
 
 Malcolm, Admiral Sir Pulteney, 157. 
 
 Maidive Islands, 123, 190, 196. 
 
 Malmesbury, James Hovrard Harris, 
 Earl of, 350. 
 
 Malta, British interest in, 57, 62, 362; 
 as a naval station, 114, 129, 324, 
 439, 444, 475; on steam routes, 107, 
 iio, in, 117, 148, 211, 216, 221— 
 223, 248, 249, 254, 261, 408; on 
 cable lines, 374 , 375 . 379 , 385- 
 
 Mamelukes, Egyptian, 5, 38, 50, 52, 56, 
 63. 
 
 Mandates Commission, 451-452. 
 
 Mansell, Captain, survey of Bay of 
 Pelusium, 346-347. 
 
 Marco Polo, Venetian merchant and 
 traveller, 192. 
 
 Marseilles, routes <vta, 117, 221, 222, 
 248, 254, 261, 263, 264, 328, 403, 
 408, 410, 41 1. 
 
 Martin, Admiral Sir William Fanshavre, 
 445 - 
 
 Mascat, 275, 377. 
 
 Mecca, 4, 9, 12, 50. 
 
 Medina, 4, 50. 
 
 Mediterranean Extension Telegraph 
 Company, 374. 
 
 Mediterranean Sea, early use of, 1-3 ; 
 political bearings of, 49, 140, 142, 
 144, 270—271, 324; steam lines in, 
 87, 88, 114-115, 129, 157, 222-223, 
 248, 263, 408, 414; cables in, 374— 
 3 75 , 'passim. 
 
 Mehemet Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, rise of, 
 61-63, 106, 130; beginnings of an 
 aggressive policy: Algeria (1830), 
 139, Syria (1833), 144, 150, 154, 
 208; opposition to the Euphrates Ex- 
 pedition, 163, 166 n, 224 «; conquest 
 of Arabia, 191, 268-269; interest in 
 the overland route, 230-231; contem- 
 plation of a railway, 238-239; mo- 
 nopoly of the transit through Egypt, 
 240-241; control of Syria and Meso- 
 potamia, 266, 268; precipitation of a 
 Near Eastern crisis, 271-272, 276- 
 282; subdued, 283; threatened block- 
 ing of the overland route, 286-290; 
 
 489 
 
 views on an isthmian canal, 294, 
 294 n, 299, 303, 303 death, 301. 
 
 Mejidieh, Tigris river steamer, 427. 
 
 Melbourne, 259, 412. 
 
 Melvill, James Cosmo, 315. 
 
 Menzaleh, Lake, 293, 366. 
 
 Merchant of Bengal, Indian merchant- 
 man, 6. 
 
 Mersina-Adana Railway, 449. 
 
 Mesopotamia, routes through, 16, 21, 
 33 , 40, 59 , 65, 88-89, 105, 117- 
 118, 126, 146-147, 154-155, 321; 
 surveys in, 178, 181-182; railway 
 projects in, 328-329, 332, 430-435, 
 440—441, 445—451. See also Eu- 
 
 phrates Expedition, Euphrates Valley 
 Railway, etc. 
 
 Messageries Imperiales, Compagnie des 
 Services Maritimes des, 412-414, 
 436, 456. 
 
 Midhat Pasha, 425, 455. 
 
 Minto, Sir Gilbert Elliot, Earl of, Gov- 
 ernor-General of India, 67, 75, 77. 
 
 Mocha, coffee trade with, 4, 6, 14; a 
 port of call, 107, 197, 221, 227; 
 taken by Mehemet Ali, 269. 
 
 Mohammed Abou Dahab, Bey, 9, 13. 
 
 Mohammerah, 172 n, 178, 269 n. 
 
 Monsoon, southwest, 16, 33, 47, 52, 90, 
 no, 124, 147, 158, 212, 225. 
 
 Mont Cenis, 408, 409; Summit Railway, 
 510. 
 
 Montefiore, Sir Moses, 428. 
 
 Moore, George, English trader in Egypt, 
 22. 
 
 Moresby, Commander Robert, 187, 188, 
 190, 226, 252, 252 n. 
 
 Mosul, 118, 332, 376, 380, 385. 
 
 Mosul, Turkish river steamer, 427. 
 
 Mozambique, 85. 
 
 Murat (Morat) Bey, 29, 37—38, 43. 
 
 Mure, French Consul-General in Egypt, 
 241, 242, 297-299, 305. 
 
 Murray, C. A., English Consul-General 
 in Egypt, 241, 242, 297-299, 305. 
 
 Murray, John, British Ambassador at 
 Constantinople, 10, 12. 
 
 Murray, Lord William, 40. 
 
 Musurus Pasha, Turkish Minister to 
 England, 333, 350, 351 n. 
 
 Nana Sahib, 401. 
 
 Napier, Commodore Sir Charles, 282, 
 284—287. 
 
 Naples, 223. 
 
 Napoleon I, Expedition to Egypt and 
 Syria, 55-60, 184; oriental policy, 63, 
 65-66, 71-72, 128; projects for an 
 isthmian canal, 149, 291—292. 
 
490 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Napoleon III, interest in De Lesseps’ 
 plan, 306-307, 313, 319; eastern 
 
 policy, 322, 341; on the Suez Canal, 
 357) 361-363, 367, 372; views on the 
 military use of the overland route, 
 403. 
 
 Navarino, battle of, 131; effects of, 
 132-133, 135, 143; steam service to, 
 223. 
 
 Navy, British Royal, Admiralty vessels, 
 1 14, _i 84 > 248, 254-255. 
 
 Negrelli, Austrian engineer, 300, 315. 
 
 Nelson, Admiral Horatio, 57. 
 
 Nemesis, East India Company’s S.S., 
 226. 
 
 New Zealand, proposed communications 
 with, 245, 256, 258, 259, 261; steam 
 lines to, 420. 
 
 Nice, 223. 
 
 Nicholas I, Tsar, 279, 322. 
 
 Nile River, 149, 237—240, 289, 305. 
 
 Nimrod, iron river steamer, 181. 
 
 Nitocris, iron river steamer, 181, 425 n. 
 
 North, Frederick, Lord, English Prime 
 Minister, 9. 
 
 Northcote, Sir Stafford, Chancellor of 
 the Exchequer, 466. 
 
 O’Donnell, early trader in the Red Sea, 
 22-23. 
 
 Oliver, Captain Robert, Superintendent 
 of the Indian Navy, 194— 195. 
 
 Oporto, 222, 248. 
 
 Orient Express, 451. 
 
 Orient Line, 420—421. 
 
 Oriental, Peninsular and Oriental S.S., 
 249 n, 288. 
 
 Oriental Herald, quoted, 94, 104, 136. 
 
 Orloff, Count Alexis, Russian Ambas- 
 sador at Constantinople, 267. 
 
 Ormsby, Commander Henry, 15 1, 226. 
 
 Orontes River, 336. 
 
 Osborne Conference (1857), 341—342, 
 348-349. 
 
 Ottoman Empire, see Turkey. 
 
 Outram, Sir James, 337 n. 
 
 Overland Route through Egypt, in eight- 
 eenth century, 8, ii, ii n, t8, 40, 57; 
 as a steam route, 89, 91, loi, 106- 
 107, 116, 156-158, 171, 227, 259; 
 character of, 123 n, 232—234, 236- 
 237, 244; improvement of, 226—234; 
 European branches of, 264, 264 «; 
 political bearings of, 266; use of, 
 123-124 n, 243, 290, 321; effect of 
 Suez Canal on, 370—372, 468—469; 
 for telegraph lines, 392; during the 
 Crimean War, 398—399; during the 
 Indian Mutiny, 402-407; routes of 
 
 the overland mails, 408-412, 417- 
 418. See Table of Contents. 
 
 Palinurus, Indian naval surveying vessel, 
 188. 
 
 Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Vis- 
 count, aggressive foreign policy, 141, 
 155; postal negotiations w'ith France 
 (1837), 222; on affairs of the Near 
 East, 268, 272-273; holding of whip 
 hand in the Syrian crisis, 279, 283, 
 285, 287; on an Egy'ptian railway, 
 297; early views on an isthmian canal, 
 296—299; opposition to De Lesseps’ 
 project, 313 n, 314, 316, 318; politi- 
 cal coup of 1853, 323; on the Per- 
 sian expedition (1857), 327 n; on a 
 Euphrates Valley railwa}^, 328-329, 
 33 3) 338) 341-342; unchanging atti- 
 tude toward the Suez Canal, 345—348, 
 35 O) 35I) 371; on telegraphs to India, 
 376; influence of, 468. 
 
 Panama, isthmian canal of, 293, 421; 
 isthmian route, 258, 259. 
 
 Panmure, Lord, Secretary for War, 
 324. 
 
 Panther, Indian Navy cruiser, 46, 185. 
 
 Paris, in eastern communications, 119, 
 264, 384, 408; Congress and Treaty 
 of (1856), 318, 439, 443. 
 
 Paris-Lyon-Mediterranee Railway, 411. 
 
 Peacock, Thomas Love, Examiner of 
 the East India House, 148, 154 n, 156, 
 2I5-_ 
 
 Peel, Sir Robert, British Prime Minister, 
 239. 
 
 Penang, 253, 394. 
 
 Pender, (Sir) John, 394. 
 
 Peninsular and Oriental Steam Naviga- 
 tion Company (P. & O.), line through 
 Egypt) 237-240, 289; early develop- 
 ment of, 247—252; expansion of, 
 253-255) 255 n, 258, 260-262; in- 
 terest in an Isthmus of Suez canal, 
 295) 315; during the Indian Mutiny, 
 402, 404, 407; eastern mail and pas- 
 senger services, 409, 411-413, 415- 
 417; 419-420, 420 n. 
 
 Perim Island, 60, 65, 196. 
 
 Persia, relations with England and 
 France, 67—79, i79) 271; with Russia, 
 273—274; war with Great Britain 
 (1857)) 374) 399- 
 
 Persian Gulf, early trade in, 16; sur- 
 veys of, 33, 80; route via, 98, 117, 
 147, 190, 21 1 n, 264; telegraphic 
 communication via, 3S0— 3S1, 385, 
 
 389) 393 n, 396; Russian influence in, 
 436 ft. 
 
INDEX 
 
 491 
 
 Persigny, Jean Gilbert Victor Fialin, 
 Count, French Ambassador, 313. 
 
 Plague, virulence of in the Levant, 105, 
 105 n, 106, 118, 147. 
 
 Piracy, in eastern waters, 83, 156, 190, 
 190 n; in the Mediterranean, 137. 
 
 Polignac, Prince Jules de, 139, 140. 
 
 Pondicherry, English capture of, 18, 44, 
 47- 
 
 Ponsonby, John, Viscount, British Am- 
 bassador to Turkey, 161, 266-267, 
 271 n, 278. 
 
 Popham, Admiral Sir Home, 65. 
 
 Port Darwin, 394. 
 
 Port Phillip, 261. 
 
 Port Sai’d, 365, 366, 372, 456. 
 
 Portsmouth, 82. 
 
 Portuguese, in the East, 80. 
 
 Precursor, Peninsular and Oriental S.S., 
 251, 251 n, 252, 253 n. 
 
 Price, Captain Robert, English trader to 
 the Red Sea, 9. 
 
 Prinsep, Captain H. T., Secretary of the 
 Bengal Government, loo. 
 
 Psyche, of the Bombay Marine, 76, 190. 
 
 Punjaub, Peninsular and Oriental S.S., 
 262. 
 
 Purchas, Samuel, Pilgrimes, 3 n. 
 
 Quarterly Review, quoted, 134. 
 
 Quetta, military post, 437. 
 
 Railways, English, 264; an era of, 328— 
 330, 408-409. See Egyptian Rail- 
 way, Euphrates Valley Railway, etc. 
 
 Rangoon, 97, 379, 388. 
 
 Rasafa, Turkish river steamer, 427. 
 
 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, British Ambassa- 
 dor to Turkey, 425. 
 
 Red Sea, Christian navigation in, 4, 10, 
 12, 19, 54-55; obstacles to the use of, 
 14, 18, 20, 25, 31, 32, 39-42, 44; ad- 
 vantages of routes via, 89, 98, 103; 
 adoption for steam communication, 
 105, 126—127, 195, 264; limitations 
 of, 147, 149; surveys of, 185—188; 
 use for cable lines, 376, 377, 385, 
 392. See Overland Route, Egypt, etc. 
 
 Red Sea and India Telegraph Company, 
 3i7> 376, 377> 385, 407- _ 
 
 Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, Lord 
 Stratford de, British Ambassador to 
 the Porte, Turcophile policy of, 131, 
 145; on the Suez Canal, 297; hostility 
 to France and Russia, 307—311, 317, 
 319, 322-323; on the Euphrates Val- 
 ley Railway, 335, 429; during the 
 Indian Mutiny, 402; retirement and 
 influence of, 347-349, 354. 
 
 Regulating Act (1773), 98. 
 
 Rendel, James Meadows, English en- 
 gineer, 315. 
 
 Reschid Pasha, Grand Vizier of Turkey, 
 308-311, 347, 349, 376. 
 
 Roberts, Emma, 224, 224 n. 
 
 Romieu, M., French diplomatic agent, 
 69—70. 
 
 Rosetta, 37 n, 38, 62. 
 
 Rosetti, Carlo, merchant and political 
 agent, 6, 23, 26, 57, 61 n. 
 
 Ross, Captain Daniel, Marine Surveyor- 
 General, 186, 188-189. 
 
 Rothesay, Lord Stuart de, British Am- 
 bassador to France, 140. 
 
 Rothschild, Baron Lionel de, 461. 
 
 Roussin, Albin Reine, Baron, French 
 Admiral and Ambassador to Turkey, 
 266-267, 278. 
 
 Royal Mail Steam Navigation Company, 
 259- 
 
 Royal United Service Institution, 449. 
 
 Rudschi Pasha, Grand Vizier, 435. 
 
 Russia, designs on Turkey and Egypt 
 (1787-1790), 4 °) _ 41, 43> 48-50; 
 campaign of 1812 in, 63; attacks on 
 Persia (1805—1808), 69, 72-74; war 
 with Turkey (1828—1829), 128—129, 
 135; policy in the Near East, 113, 
 132— 133; war with Persia (1826), 
 136; on the Algerian situation, 139; 
 advance in the Near East, 145—148; 
 hegemony in Turkey (1833), 266, 
 268; after 1833, 273; agents in India, 
 275-276; policy in Turkey (1839), 
 277; designs on Turkey (1844— 
 1856), 32 2-324; in Central Asia, 
 326-327, 430-437; war with Turkey 
 (1877-1878), 438 —439; policy in the 
 East, 441-444; supposed designs on 
 India, 474—475 ; changes in imperial 
 policy, 479. 
 
 Ruyssenaers, S. W., Dutch Consul- 
 General in Egypt, 303—304. 
 
 Sabatier, General, French Consul- 
 General in Egypt, 306, 347, 357. 
 
 Said, Pasha, Viceroy of Egypt, accession 
 of, 302—303; approval of the Suez 
 Canal project, 304-305, 308; on the 
 Egyptian Railway, 312 n-, later sup- 
 port of the Suez Canal, 317-319, 
 352, 354, 356-361; cooperation dur- 
 ing the Indian Mutiny, 403, 407 n. 
 
 St. Helena, Napoleon exiled to, 79; re- 
 lation to the Cape of Good Hope 
 route, 85. 
 
 Salisbury, Robert Gascoigne Cecil, Mar- 
 quis of (Lord Cranborne), Foreign 
 
492 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Secretary, on the acquisition of Cy- 
 prus, 439-444, 446-447, 449- 
 San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), 439, 
 441, 443. 
 
 Sardinia, 374. 
 
 Scutari, 328, 380, 385. 
 
 Sebastiani, Colonel Frangois Horace 
 Bastien, Count, report on Egypt, 61; 
 French Ambassador to the Porte, 62— 
 63, 66. 
 
 Seeley, Captain J. B., project for a 
 canal, 293 n. 
 
 Selby, Captain W. S., 181, 181 n. 
 Seleucia (Suedia), 164, 331, 334, 338, 
 375> 43i> 434- 
 
 Semiramts, East India Company’s S.S., 
 
 225, 226 n, 381. 
 
 Senegal, 138. 
 
 Sesostris, East India Company’s S.S., 
 
 226. 
 
 Seymour, Sir Edward Hobart, Admiral, 
 477- 
 
 Shah Shujah, Amir of Afghanistan, 67. 
 Shanghai, 260, 261, 394, 412. 
 
 Sheil, Colonel Justin, 328. 
 
 Shere Ali, Amir of Afghanistan, 437. 
 Shore, Sir John (Lord Teignmouth), 
 Goverhor-General of India, 54, 58. 
 Shushan, Tigris river steamer, 428 n. 
 Shuster, 332. 
 
 Sicily, 374, 390. 
 
 Siemens Brothers, telegraph lines to 
 Persia, 396. 
 
 Skiddy, commercial agent in Egypt, 23. 
 Singapore, 245, 253, 258, 259, 261, 388, 
 394- 
 
 Sinope, naval battle of, 323. 
 
 Sivas, 385. 
 
 Smith, Sir William Sidney, British Ad- 
 miral, 51, 60. 
 
 Smith, Vernon, President of the India 
 Board, 401, 403-406. 
 
 Smyrna-Cassaba Railway, 449. 
 
 Societa Anonima Italiana di Navigaziotie 
 Adriatico Orientale, 410. 
 
 Societe de Transfort Flwviaiix en Orient, 
 428 n. 
 
 Socotra, Island of, 123, 188-190, 195— 
 196, 216, 220, 227. 
 
 Southampton, 245, 264, 369, 408, 41 1. 
 Southwestern Railway, 264. 
 
 Staniforth, John, telegraph agent, 376. 
 Stanley of Alderley, Edward John, 
 Baron, Postmaster-General, 409. 
 Stanton, General Edward, British Con- 
 sul at Cairo, 459—461, 464. 
 
 Steam navigation, increase after 1815, 
 87-88, 146—148; consideration by 
 
 Select Parliamentary Committee of 
 
 1834, 156-159; on Bombay-Suez line, 
 214, fassim; report of Select Parlia- 
 mentary Committee of 1837, 219; 
 comprehensive plan of, 2 1 8-2 1 9 ; 
 cost of, 221; in the Mediterranean, 
 222-223; advantages of, 234—235, 
 236, 238; speeds maintained, 262, 
 265; success of, 273; during the In- 
 dian Mutiny, 401; changes in due to 
 Suez Canal, 472-473. 
 
 Stephenson, Robert, railway engineer, 
 300, 302, 316, 366-367. 
 
 Stephenson, Rowland Macdonald, rail- 
 way promoter, 328-329, 331. 
 
 Stewart, Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, 
 380, 382 n. 
 
 Stokes, Colonel, of Egj-ptian Financial 
 Commission, 465. 
 
 Stopford, Admiral Sir Robert, 281—283. 
 
 Straits Convention of 1841, 284. 
 
 Suakin, 377. 
 
 Submarine cables, see telegraphs. 
 
 Submarine Telegraph Company, 384. 
 
 Sudan, in British imperial policy, 478. 
 
 Suez, forbidden trade with, 13, 18, 20- 
 25. 30, 33-34, 39, 41, 42, 57; 
 communication via, 17, 20—21, 28, 
 30-32, 34-35, 41, 52, 111-112, 221, 
 223, 227, 246, 249, 252-253, 258, 
 261, 262, 377, 391; character of the 
 town, 228. 
 
 Suez Canal, practicability of, 289, 292, 
 295-296, 305; first concession for, 
 304-306; construction of, 364—372; 
 effect on communication, 416—417, 
 419; opening of, 429; British interest 
 in after 1872, 434-435, 439, 439 n, 
 445, 447-448, tolls, 453-456; con- 
 trol of, 458; profits of, 459; as a 
 commercial waterway, 469—475; re- 
 lation to British imperial interests, 
 475, 478-480. 
 
 Suez Canal Company, organization and 
 early difficulties, 352-356, 358—363, 
 365-366, 369-370, 453-458; effect 
 of sale of Khedive’s Canal shares, 
 445, 460, 462-468; charges and earn- 
 ings, 469-471. 
 
 Suleiman Pasha (Colonel Seves), French 
 officer in the service of Mehemet Ali, 
 269—270, 282. 
 
 Sutherland, Sir Thomas, Chairman of 
 the Peninsular and Oriental Steam 
 Navigation Company, 420. 
 
 Swallow, sloop-of-war, 15, 21. 
 
 Sydney (New South Wales), 2^6-i^-j, 
 259, 261, 411. 
 
 Sydney Gazette, quoted, 257 n. 
 
 Syria, route through, 59, 80, 89, 321; 
 
INDEX 
 
 493 
 
 French agents in, 64, 271 ; claimed by 
 Mehemet Ali, 143, 144; surveyed, 
 
 150; disturbances in (1833—1834), 
 267, 268, 276—283; railway projects 
 for, 428, 429 w, 430, 432; British de- 
 signs on (1878), 440. 
 
 Talabot, French engineer, 299, 300. 
 
 Tabriz, 332. 
 
 Talleyrand-Perigord, Charles Maurice, 
 Marquis de, 55, 141. 
 
 Taranto, 411. 
 
 Taylor, Lieutenant James W., 98-99, 
 107, n6— 118, 151. 
 
 Taylor, Major Robert, British Agent at 
 Bagdad, 151, 154 n, 173. 
 
 Teheran, 67, 68, 76, 77, 332, 381-383, 
 385. 389. 396 - 
 
 Telegraph Construction and Mainte- 
 nance Company, 385, 390, 392. 
 
 Telegraphs, early cable lines, 373—375; 
 character of early cables, 376-378; 
 land lines in Turkey, 379—380, 383— 
 384; Overland Telegraph Convention 
 (1863), 381; Indo-Ottoman Tele- 
 
 graph Convention (1864), 382; dif- 
 ferent routes to India, 384—385; speed 
 of communication, 387—389, 393 tt; 
 the comprehensive system, 394-395; 
 Anglo-Persian Telegraph Conven- 
 tions: (1872) 396, (1891) 397; 
 
 land lines in India, 400. 
 
 Telegraph to India Company, 377 n, 
 
 385- 
 
 Tewfik, Khedive of Egypt, 476—477. 
 
 Thames River, 84, 94, 95. 
 
 Thetis, East India Company’s brig-of- 
 war, 107, 120, 187—188. 
 
 Thiers, Louis Adolphe, French states- 
 man, 141, 280, 282. 
 
 Thompson, Dr. James B., railway pro- 
 jector, 331. 
 
 Thonus, Baron de, Russian Consul at 
 Alexandria, 37, 49-50. 
 
 Thornhill, Captain Cuthbert, English 
 trader to the Red Sea, 7, 9. 
 
 Thouvenel, Louis, French Ambassador 
 to Turkey, 347. 
 
 Thurburn, Robert, founder of the 
 Egyptian Transit Company, 243. 
 
 Tiflis, 384, 396. 
 
 Tigris, iron river steamer, 164-165, 168, 
 169 n. 
 
 Tigris River, commercial project for, 
 118, 375; surveys of, 173, 175-176, 
 180, 181; trade on, 424-425, 426- 
 428. See Euphrates Expedition, Eu- 
 phrates and Tigris Steam Navigation 
 Company. 
 
 Tilsit, Treaty of (1807), 71-73. 
 
 Timsah, Lake, 366. 
 
 Tipoo Sahib, Sultan of Mysore, 30 n, 
 52, 54 - 
 
 Tistew, Henry, English Consul at 
 Tripoli, 4. 
 
 Torres Straits, route ma, 258, 412. 
 
 Tott, Baron Frangois de, Inspector- 
 General of French echelles, 17. 
 
 Toulon, 53, 56, 63, 140, 411. 
 
 Trebizond, 152, 263. 
 
 Trieste, 119, 222, 262 n. 
 
 Tripoli (Africa), 379; (Syria), 447. 
 
 Truguet, Chevalier de. Treaty of 1785, 
 
 21, 31, 45. 
 
 Turkey, supposed weakness of, 5; ban 
 on Christian use of Red Sea, 9, ii, 16, 
 18, 20, 32—33, 36, 39, 42; relations 
 with Egypt, 37, 43; political condi- 
 tions in, 89; firman for the Euphrates 
 Expedition (1834), 162; engage- 
 
 ments to Russia (1833), 266—267; 
 the Turkish Question, 278—279; fir- 
 man of investiture (1841), 284; ef- 
 fects of new routes on, 295-297, 309, 
 310; views on Euphrates Valley Rail- 
 '"'ay, 333-339; the Ottoman debt, 356; 
 attitude toward the Suez Canal, 356, 
 360—363; Government telegraph lines, 
 376, 379-383, 385, 387-388; charac- 
 ter of the Ottoman Empire, 398; co- 
 operation during the Indian Mutiny, 
 402-403 ; views on the navigation of 
 the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, 425; 
 steamship lines of, 427; railways in 
 Anatolia, 432-433, 433 n, 438-442; 
 other railway lines in, 446, 447, 449, 
 450; relations with the Suez Canal 
 Company, 455-457; rights in the 
 Canal, 458; attitude toward the Brit- 
 ish purchase of Canal shares, 464; war 
 with Russia (1877-1878), 475; treat- 
 ment of Ismail, 476; views on the 
 British occupation of Egypt, 478; in 
 the World War, 479. 
 
 Turkmanshah, Treaty of (1828), 136, 
 326. 
 
 Turton, Thomas E. M., steam promoter, 
 246—247, 251. 
 
 Tyler, Captain H. W., 409— 41 1. 
 
 Unkiar-Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), 267, 
 268, 270, 272, 277, 279-280. 
 
 Urquhart, David, 135 «. 
 
 Valentia, George, Viscount, survey of 
 the Red Sea, 185. 
 
 Van der Velden, early trader to Egypt, 
 
 22. 
 
494 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Venus, French frigate, 39. 
 
 Versailles, Peace of (1783), 28. 
 Victoria, Queen, on Euphrates Valley 
 Railway, 333; Empress of India, 407, 
 _ 473 -_ 
 
 Victoria, East India Company’s S.S., 225, 
 
 226. 
 
 Vienna, Congress of (1815), 86, 87, 
 128. 
 
 Vienna, telegraph lines via, 384. 
 
 Vigo, 248. 
 
 Waddington, William Henry, French 
 Foreign Minister, 442. 
 
 Waghorn (Lieutenant) Thomas, early 
 career, 99—101; tests of the overland 
 route, 107, 118—120; evidence before 
 Parliamentary Committee of 1834, 
 157; transportation agent in Egypt, 
 
 227, 229—231; carrying of despatches, 
 262 compliment to Mehemet Ali, 
 290 w; views on Suez Canal, 300 n-, 
 death (1850), 243 n. 
 
 Walewski, Alexander Florian Joseph 
 Colonna, Count, 281, 311— 312, 357. 
 Walne, Alfred S., British Consul at 
 Cairo, 328. 
 
 Wellesley, Richard (Earl of Morning- 
 ton), Governor-General of India, 58, 
 90, 185. 
 
 Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 
 British Foreign Secretary, 140. 
 
 Wellsted, Lieutenant James R., 192 n. 
 
 W eymouth, English vessel, 36. 
 
 Wheatley, George, of G. W. Wheatley 
 and Company, 243 n, 
 
 Wigram and Company, 260. 
 
 Willcox, Brodie McGhee, of Willcox 
 and Anderson, 247, 250. 
 
 William IV, King, 154, 161. 
 
 Willis, Richard, Secretary to George 
 Baldwin, 45, 46. 
 
 Wilson, Captain James H., pioneer 
 of the Red Sea route, 109, 109 n, 
 1 10. 
 
 Wood, Sir Charles, President of the 
 India Board, 379. 
 
 Wood, Lieutenant John, surveys of, 192. 
 
 Yambo, 50. 
 
 Zenobia, East India Company’s S.S., 225, 
 381, 404.