illi^' 
 
 
COL. GEORGE WASHINGTON FLOWERS 
 MEMORIAL COLLECTION 
 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 DURHAM, N. C. 
 
 PRESENTED BY 
 
 W. W. FLOWERS 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2010 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/reportofgeneraljOOconf 
 
KEPORT 
 
 OF 
 
 GENERAL JOSEPH 'E. JOHNSTON, 
 
 OF HIS OPERATIONS IX THE 
 
 DFPAIITMENTS OF MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA 
 
 TOGETHER WITH 
 
 LIEOT. m?Ml PEMBERTOiVS REPORT 
 
 OF 
 
 THE BATTLES OF PORT GIBSON, BAKER'S CREEK. 
 
 AND 
 
 THE SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 
 
 PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF CONGRESS. 
 
 R. M. ^MJTH.^^IJC I'RIN'JKK, 
 
 1 64. 
 
 i 
 

 MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 Richmond, Va., Dec. 29, 1863. 
 To the House of Representatives : 
 
 In response to your resolution of the 1 1th inst., I herewith trans- 
 mit for your information a communication from the Secretary of War, 
 covering a copy of the report of General J. E. Johnston of "his 
 operatiT)ns in Mississippi during the months of May, June, and July, 
 1863," together with a copy of the report of Lieutenant General 
 J. C. Pemberton of his operations during the same time. 
 
 JEFFERSON DAVIS, 
 
 COMMUNICATION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 
 
 Confederate States of Amfrica, 
 War Department, 
 Richmond, Va., Dec. 24, 1863. 
 
 To the President of the Confederate States : 
 
 Sir : In response to a resolution of the House of Representatives, 
 I have the honor to submit herewith the report of General J E. 
 Johnston of his operations in the Department of Mississippi and East 
 Louisiana. In natural connection with this, I likewise stnd the 
 report of Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton of the battles of Port 
 Gibson, Biker's Creek, and the siege of Vicksburg, which is among 
 the reports culled for by the House of Representatives. With the 
 latter is presented a letter from the department asking further expla- 
 nations on some points of the report ;md the answer made thereto at 
 the time by General Pemberton. Subsequently, after seeing the 
 report of General Johnston, General Pemberton considered his reply 
 to that letter as not so fully elucidating the points of inquiry as the 
 additional details presented by General Johnston rendered appro- 
 priate and necessary. He, therefore, asked the privilege of making 
 a further reply, which, in justice to himself, was accorded. That 
 reply is likewise annexed, and thus the whole subject, it is believed, 
 •will be fairly and satisfactorily submitted in appropriate connection. 
 Respectfully submitted. 
 
 JAMES A. SEDDON, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 iF.n*>07 
 
n 
 
 -^u ^ 
 
 1;^^ 
 
 GENERAL JOHNSTON'S REPORT 
 
 OF OPERATIONS 
 
 IN MISSISSIPPI AND EAST LOUISIANA. 
 
 Meridian, Miss., Nov. 1, 1863. 
 
 General S. Cooper, 
 
 Adjutant and Infpecior General: 
 
 Sir: The following report of my operations in the Department of Mis- 
 sissippi and East Louisiana, h respectfully CiTered as a substitute for 
 the imperfect one forwarded by me from Jackson on May 27, 1863. 
 
 While on my way to Mississippi, where I thought my presence had 
 become necessary, I received, in Mobile, on March 12th, the follow- 
 ing telegram from the Secretary of War, dated March 9th : 
 
 " Order General Bragg to report to the War Department for con- 
 ference. Assume yourself direct charge of the Array of Middle 
 Tennessee. " 
 
 In obedience to this order, I at once proceeded to Tullahoma, On 
 my arrival, I informed the Secretary of War, by a telegram of March 
 19th, that General Bragg could not then be sent to Richmond, as he 
 has ordered, on account of the critical condition of his family. 
 
 On the Kith of April, I repeated this to the President, and added : 
 " Being unwell then, I afterwards became sick, and am not now able 
 to serve in the field. General Bragg is, therefore, necessary here. " 
 On the 28th my unfitnoRs for service in the field w?-s reported to the 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 On the 9th of May, I iH;ceived,at Tullahoma, the following dispatch 
 of the same date from the Secretary of War : 
 
 " Proceed at once to Mississippi and take chief command of the 
 forces there-— giving to those in the field, as far as practicable, the 
 encouragement and benefit of your personal direction. " 
 
 It is thus seen that neither my orders nor my health permitted me 
 to visit Mississippi af<:er the 1:2th of March, until the time when I 
 took direct charge of that department. 
 
 1 P 0*' ft 7 
 
From the time of my arrival at Tullahoma until the 14th of April, 
 General Pemberton's reports, all by telegraph, indicated that the 
 efforts of ijie enemy would be against General Bragg rath(?r than 
 himself, and looked to the abandonment of his attempts on Vicks- 
 burg. In that of April l3th, he says: 
 
 " I am satisfied Rosecranz will be reinforced from Grant's army. 
 Shall I order troops to Tullahoma ? " 
 
 On the 17th of xipril, General Pemberton telegraphed the return of 
 Grant and the resumption of the operations against Vicksburg. 
 
 On the 29th of April, he telegraphed : *' The enemy is at Hard 
 Times, in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a pur- 
 pose to attack Grand Gulf, wi^h a view to Vicksburg. He also* 
 reported heavy firing at Grand Gulf. The enemy shelling our bat- 
 teries both above and below. " 
 
 On the 1st of May ho telegraphed: " A furious battle has been 
 going on since day light just below Port Gibson. * * * Enemy 
 can cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. I should 
 have large reinforcements. Euemy's movements threaten Jackson, 
 and if successful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson. " I at once 
 urged him to concentrate and to attack Grant immediately on his 
 landing ; and on the next day I sent the following dispatch to him : 
 *' If Grant crosses, unite all your troops to beat him. Success will 
 give back what was abandoned to win it. " 
 
 I telegraphed to you on the 1st : " General Pemberton calls for 
 large reinforcements. They cannot be seiit from here without giving 
 up Tennessee. Can one or two brigades be sent from the East ? " 
 
 On the 7th, I again asked for reinforcements for Mississippi. 
 
 I received no further '^eport of the battle of Port Gibson, and on 
 5th asked General Pemberton : " What is the result and where is 
 Grant's army ? " I received no answer and gained no additional 
 information in relation to either subject, until 1 reached the Depart- 
 ment of Mississippi, in obedience to my orders of May 9th. 
 
 Then, on May 13th, I received a dispatch from General Pemberton, 
 dated Vicksburg, May I 2th, asking for reinforcements, as the enemy 
 in large force was moving from the Mississippi, south of the Big 
 Black, apparently towards Edwards' Depot, "which will be the battle- 
 field if I can forward sufficient force, leaving troops enough to secure 
 the safety of this place. " 
 
 Before iny arrival at Jackson, Grant had beaten General Bovren at 
 Port Gibson, made good the landing of his army, occupied Grand 
 Gulf, and was marching upon the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad. 
 
 On reaching Jackson on the night of the 13th of May, I found 
 there the brigades of Gregg and Walker, reported at six thousand ; 
 learned from General Gregg that Maxey's brigade was expected to 
 arrive from Port Hudson the next day ; that General Pemberton's 
 forces, except the garrison of Port Hudson (five thousand) and of 
 Vicksburg, were at Edwards' Depot — the general's headquarters at 
 Bovina; that four divisions of the enemy, under Sherman, occupied 
 Clinton, ten miles west of Jackson, between Edwards' Depot and 
 Gurselves. I was aware that reinforcements were on their way from 
 
tbe east, and tliat the advance of those under General Gist would 
 probably arrive the next day, and with Maxey's brigade, swell my 
 force to about eleven thousand. 
 
 Upon this information, I sent to General Pemberton, on the same 
 Eiight, (13th,) a dispatch informing him of my arrival, and o'" the 
 occupation of Clinton by a portion of Grant's array, urging the 
 importance of re-establishing communications, and ordering him to 
 come up, if practicable, on Sehrraan's re:ir at once, and ailding, "to 
 beat such a detachment would be of imitK use value. The troops here 
 could co-operate. All the strength you can quickly assemble should 
 be brought. Time is all important. " 
 
 On Thursday, May 14th, the enemy advanced by the Raymond and 
 Clinton roads upon Jackson. The resistance made by the brigades 
 of Gregg and Walker gave sufficient time for the removal of the 
 public stores ; and at two, P. M., we retreated by the Canton road, 
 from which alone we could form a junction with General Pem- 
 berton. After marching six miles the troops encamped. 
 
 From this point I sent to General Pemberton the dispatch of May 
 I4th, of which the following is a copy: 
 
 " General : The body of troops m'Mitioned in my note of last 
 night compelled Brigadier General Gregg and his command to 
 evacuate Jackson about noon to-day. The necessity of taking the 
 Canton road, at' right angles to that upon w^hich the enemy 
 approached, prevented an obstinate defence. A body of troops, 
 reported this morning to have reached Raymond last night, advanced 
 at the same time from that direction. Prisoners say that it was 
 Mcpherson's corps, (four divisions,) which marched from Clinton. I 
 have no certain information of the other; both skirmished very cau- 
 tiously. Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, 
 directing General Gist to assemble the appproaching troops at a 
 point forty or fifty miles from Jackson, and General Maxey to 
 return to his wagons, and provide for the security of hisbrigaie — for 
 instance, by joining General Gist. Tbat body of troops will be able, 
 I hope, to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions 
 from the east ; and this one may be able to keep hira from the coun- 
 try towards Panola. Can ho supply himself from the Mississippi ? 
 Can you not cut him off from it? And above all, should he be 
 compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him ? As soon 
 as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest 
 of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be 
 able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. 
 
 " Would it not be better to place the forces to support A^'icksburg be- 
 tween General Loring and that place, and merely observe the ferries, 
 so that you might unite, if opportunity to fight presented itself ? 
 
 ** General Gregg will move towards Canton to-morrow. If pris- 
 oners tell the truth, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. 
 It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can bo done only by 
 concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops 
 arrive ; they are to be twelve thousand or thirteen thousand." 
 
 This dispatch was not answered. General Pemberton stated in hia 
 
8 
 
 official report, that it vras received at six, P. M,, on the 16th, *' whilst 
 on the retreat," from the battle-field of Baker's Creek. 
 
 On the next day, (May l£th, Friday,) the troops under me marched 
 ten and-a- half miles further, to Calhoun Station. On the morning of 
 that day, I received a letter from General Pemberton, dated Edwards' 
 Depot, 'May 14th, (Thursday,) five forty, P. M.: 
 
 ** I shall move, as early to-morrow morning as practicable, a column 
 of seventeen thousand to Dillons. The object is to cut off ene- 
 my's communications, and force him to attack me, as I do not consider 
 my force sufiicient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or to 
 attempt to cut my way to Jackson." 
 
 .This v.'as the first communication received fromGeheral Pemberton 
 after my arrival at Jackson ; and from it I learned that he had not 
 moved towards Clinton, ten hours after the receipt of my order to do 
 80, and that the junction of the forces, which could have been effected 
 by the loth, was deferred, and that, in disobedience of my orders, and 
 in opposition to the views of a majority of the council of war, com- 
 posed of all his generals present, before whom he placed the subject, 
 he had decided to make a movement by which the union would be im- 
 possible General Pemberton was immediately instructed that there was 
 but one mode by which we could unite, viz : by his moving directly to 
 Clinton. The brigadier generals representing thi^t their troops re- 
 quired rest, after the fatigue they had undergone in the skirmishes 
 and marches preceding the retreat from Jeckson, and having yet no 
 certain intelligence of General Pemberton's route, or of General Gist's 
 position, I did not move on Saturday. In the evening, I received a 
 reply to my last dispatch, dated four miles south of Edwards' Depot, 
 May IGth, stating it had reached him at sis thirty, that morning; 
 that " it found the army on the middle road to Raymond. The order 
 of counter-march has been issued. Owing to the destruction of ia 
 bridge on Baker's creek, which runs, for some distance, parallel 
 with the railroad, and south of it, our march will be on the road lead- 
 ing from Edwards' Depot, in the direction of Brownsville. This road 
 runs nearly parallel with railroad. In going to Clinton, we shall leave 
 Bolton's Depot four miles to the right. I am thus particular so that 
 YOU may be able to make a junction with this army." In a postscript, 
 he reported " heavy skirmishing now going on in my front." 
 
 On the afternoon of the same day, I received General Pemberton's 
 first reply to the order sent him from Jackson, to attack Sherman, 
 dated Bovina, May 14th, nine o'clock ten minutes, A. M.,as follows : 
 
 ** I move at once, with my whole available force, from Edwards' 
 Depot. In directing this move, I do not think you fully comprehend 
 the condition Vicksburg will be left in ; but I comply at once with 
 your order." 
 
 On May 17th, (Sunday,) I marched fifteen miles in the direction in- 
 dicated in General Pemberton's note, received the previous evening. 
 In the afternoon, a letter was brought from him, dated Bovina, May 
 17th, a copy of which has been forwarded to the War Department.. 
 In this, referring to my dispatch of May 13th, from Jackson, General 
 Pemberton wrote : " I notified you on the morning of the 14th, of the 
 
receipt of your instructions, to move and attack the enemy towards 
 Clinton. 1 deemed the movement very hazardous, preferring to re- 
 main in position, behind the Big Black, and near to Vioksburg. I 
 called a council of war, composed of all the general officers. * * * 
 A majority of the officers expressed themselves favorable to the move- 
 ment indicated by you. The others, including Major Generals Loring 
 and Stevenson, preferred a movement hy which this army might en- 
 deavor to cut off the en-.imy's supplies from the Mississippi. >.'y own 
 views were expressed as unfavorable to any movement which would 
 remove me from my base, which was, and is, Vicksburg. I did not, 
 however, see fit to place my own judgmeiit and opinions so far in op- 
 position as to prevent the movement altogether; but believing the 
 only possibility of success to be in the phin proposed, of cutting off 
 the enemy's supplies, I directed all my disposable force, say seven- 
 teen thousand five hundred, towards Raymond or Dillon's." It also 
 contained intelligence of his engagement with the enemy on the IGth, 
 near Baker's creek, three or four miles from Ed^ffirda' Depot, and of 
 his having been compelled to withdraw, with heavy loss, to Big Black 
 Bridge, lie further expressed the apprehension that he would be com- 
 pelled to fall back from this point, and represented that if so, his j)0- 
 eition at Snyder's Mills, would be untenable, and said : " I have about 
 eixty days' provisions at Vicksburg and Snyder's. I respectfully 
 await your instructions." I immediately replied, May 17th: ''If 
 Ilaynes' Bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, a.nd cannot be 
 held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ulti- 
 mately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both 
 troops ai.d place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not 
 too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the 
 northeast." Tl'hat night I was informed that General Pemberton had 
 fallen back to Vicksburg 
 
 On Monday, May the 18th, General Pemberton informed me, by let- 
 ter, dated Vicksburg, May 17th. that he had retired within the lino 
 of entrenchments around Vicksburg, havjng been attacked and forced 
 back from Big Black Bridge, and that h« had ordered Hayncs' BliJiff 
 to be abandoned. His letter conclmled with the following remark : 
 "I greatly regret that I felt compelled to make the advance beyond 
 Big Black, which has proved so disastrous in its results." It will be 
 remembered that General Pemberton expected that Edwards' Depot 
 would be the battle-field before I reached Jackson, (see his dispatch 
 of the 12th, already quoted,) and that his army, before he received 
 any orders from me, was seven or eight miles east of the Big Black, 
 near Edwards' Depot. 
 
 On May 1 9th, General Pembcrton's reply, dated Vicksburg, May 
 18th, to my communication of the 1 7th, was brought me, near Vernon, 
 where I had gone with the troops under my coinnand, for the purpose 
 of effecting a junction with him, in the event of hi.=» evacuating Vicks- 
 burg, as I harl ordered, in which he advised mc that he had '•assem- 
 bled a council of war of the general ofSccrs of this command, and 
 having laid your instructions before them, asked the free expression 
 of their opinion as to the practicability of carrjiDg them out. The 
 
10 
 
 opinion was unaniraouBly expressed that it was impossible to with- 
 draw the army from this position with such morale and material, as to 
 be of further sevice to the Confederacy." On receiving this informa- 
 tion, I replied: " I am trying to gather a force which may attempt to 
 relieve you. Hold out." The same day I sent orders to Major Gen- 
 eral Gardner to evacuate Port Hudson. 
 
 I then determined, by easy marches, to re-establish my line between 
 Jackson and Canton, as. the'junction of the two commands had be- 
 come impossible. 
 
 * On the 2()th and 2l8t of May, I was joined by the brigades of Gen- 
 erals Gist. Ector and McNair. The division of General Loring, cut 
 off from General Pemberton in the battle of Baker's Creek, reached 
 Jackson on the 20th, and General Maxey, with his brigade, on the 
 23d. By the 4th of June, the array had, in addition to these, been 
 reinforced by the brigade of General Evans, the division of General 
 Breckinridge, and the division of cavalry, numbering two thousand 
 eight hundred, commanded by Brigadier General W. H. Jackson. 
 Small as was this force, about twenty-four thousand, infantry and ar- 
 tillery, notone-thirdof that of the enemy, it was deficient in artillery, in 
 ammunition for all arms, and field transportation, and could not be 
 moved upon that enemy, already entrenching his large force, with any 
 hope of success. 
 
 The draft upon the country had so far reduced the number of horses 
 and mules that it was not until late in June that draught animals 
 could be procured, from distant points, for the artillery and trains. 
 
 There was no want of commissary supplies in the department ; but 
 the limited transportation caused a deficiency for a moving army. 
 
 On the 23d of May, I received a dispatch from Major General Gard- 
 ner, dated I'ort Hudson, May 21st, informing me that the enemy was 
 about to cross at Bayou Sara; that the whole force from Baton Rouge 
 was in his front, ar;d asking to be reinforced. On this, my orders for 
 the evacuation of Port Hudson were repeated, and he was informed : 
 '•'■ You cannot be reinforced. Do not allow yourself to be invested. 
 At every risk, save the troops, and, if practicable, move in this direc- 
 tj^on." This dispatch did not reach General Gardner — Port Hudson 
 being then invested. 
 
 About the 24th of May, the enemy made such demonstrations above 
 the Big Black and towards Yazoo City, that I sent Walker's division 
 to YaKoo City, with orders to fortify it ; and the demonstrations being 
 renewed, placed Boring's division within supporting distance of Walk- 
 er's, and, in person, took post at Canton. 
 
 Dispatches arrived from General Pemberton, dated Vicksburg, May 
 20th and 21st. In that of the 20th, he stated that the enemy had as- 
 saulted his entrenched lines the day before, and were repulsed, with 
 heavy loss. He estimated their force at not less than sixty thousand; 
 .ind asked that musket caps be sent, they being his main necessity, 
 he concluded : "An army will be necessary to save Vicksburg, and that 
 quickly. Will it be sent ?" On the 2 1st, he wrote : "The men credit, 
 and are encouraged by a report, that you are near, with a large force. 
 They are fighting in gocd spirits ; and their organization is complete." 
 
11 
 
 'Caps '«\'ere sent as fast as tlioy ariived. On May 29th I sent a 
 >lispatch to General Pemberton to the following effect : 
 
 *' I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt 
 to save jou and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate 
 you, unless you co-operate, and we make mutually supporting move- 
 ments Communicate your plans and suggestions, if possible."' 
 
 The receipt of this was a-cknowleilged in a communication, dated 
 Vicksburg, June 3d, in which Gen. Pemberton says : " We can get 
 no information from cutsiic as to your petition or strength, and very 
 little in regard to the enemy." 
 
 In a dispatch, dated June inth. from General Gardner, the first re- 
 ceived since his investment, he reported having repulsed the enemy 
 in several severe attacks, but that ho was getting short of provisions,, 
 and ammunition. To which I replied June 15th, informing him that 
 I had not means of relieving him,adiling : " General Taylor will do 
 what he can on the opposite side of the river. Hold the place as long as 
 you can, and, if possible, withdraw in any direction, or cut your way 
 out. It is very important to keep Ijanks and his forces occupied." 
 In a despatch, dated June 20th, I sent him word that General Taylor 
 had intended to attack the enemy opposite Port Hudson on the night 
 of the loth, ami attempt to send cattle across the river. 
 
 The want of field transportation rendered any movement for the re- 
 lief of Port Hudson impossible, h id a march in that direction been, 
 advisable; but such a march would have enabled Grant, (whc 
 had now completed his strong linos around Vicksburg,) to have 
 cut my line of communication, and destroyed my army ; and from the 
 momeiit thati I put my troops in march in that direction, liie 
 whole of middle and north Mississippi would have been open to the, 
 enemy. 
 
 On June 7th I repeated the substance of nn^ dispatch of May 39th 
 to Gen. Pemberton, 
 
 On the 4th of June, I told the Secretary of War. in answer t() his 
 call for my plans, that my only plan was to relieve Vicksburg, an 1 my 
 force was far too small for the purpose. 
 
 On June 10th I told him I had not at my disposal half the troop -, ne 
 necessar.y. 
 
 On the l?t;i I said to him " to take from Bragg a force which would 
 make this army fit to oppose Grant, would involve yielding Tennessee. 
 It is for the Government to decide between this State and Toniies- 
 «ee. 
 
 On the 14th, I sent Gen. Pemberton the following : " All that we can 
 attempt to do is to save you and your girrison. 'i'o <lo this, exact co- 
 operation is indispensable ; by fighting the enemy simultaneously at the 
 eame points of his line you may be extricated. Our joint forces can- 
 not raise the seige of Vicksburg. My communication with the rear 
 can best be preserved by operating north of railroad. Inform mc, as 
 soon as possible, what points will suit you best. Your tleepatcbes of 
 the 12th received. General Taylor with eight thousand men will ca 
 deavor to open communications with you from Richmond," To this 
 fommunication General I'craberton replied, June 2l.st, recommending 
 
12 
 
 me to move north of the railroad towards Vicksburg, to keep the 
 enemy attracted to that side, and stating that he would himself move 
 at the proper time by the Warrenton road, crossing the Big Black at 
 Hankiason's Ferry ; that *' the other- roads are too strongly en- 
 trenched, and the enemy in too heavy force, for a reasonable pros- 
 pect of success," unless I could compel him to abandon his commu- 
 nications by Snyder's. 
 
 On the 1 5th, I expressed to the Department the opinion that, with- 
 out some great blun !er of the enemy, we could not hold both, (Mis- 
 sissippi and Tennnesse,) and that I considered saving Vicksburg 
 hopeless. 
 
 On the ISth, I said, Grant's position, naturally very strong, is en- 
 trenched and protected by powerful artillery, and the roads bstructed. 
 His reinforcements have been at least equal to my whole force. The 
 Big Black covers him from attack, and would cut off our retreat, if 
 defeated. 
 
 On June 22d, in reply to a despacth from (jeneral Pemberton of 
 th-e 15th, in which he said that, though living ou a greatly reduced 
 rations, he had sufficient for twenty days. I informed him that Gen. 
 Taylor had been sent by General E.' K. Smith to co-operate with him 
 from the west bank of the Mississippi, and that, in a day or two, I 
 would try to make a diversion in his favor, and, if possible, open 
 communications; adding, "though I fear my force is too small to 
 €ffect the latter. I have only two-thirds of the force you. told mes- 
 senger Saunders to state to me as the least with which I ougtit to 
 make an attempt. Scouts report the enemy fortyfying towards us, 
 and the roads blocked, " 
 
 A day or two after this, a dispatch was brought me Irom General 
 Pemberton, dated June 22d, suggesting that I should make to Grant 
 ** propositions to pass this army out with all its arms and equipages ;" 
 renewing his hope of my being able, by force of arms, to act with 
 him, and expressing the opinion that he could hold for fifteen days 
 longer. To this despatch I replied, June 27th, informing him that 
 General E. K. Smith's troops had fallen back to Delhi, and that 1 had 
 urged him to assume the direct command; and continued, " the de- 
 termined spirit you manifest, and his expected co-operation, encour- 
 age me to hope that something may yet be done to save Vicksburg, 
 and to postpone both of the modes suggested of merely extricating 
 the garrison. Negotiations with Grant, for the relief of the garrison, 
 should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a 
 confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to 
 propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may 
 be considered as made under my authority.'' 
 
 On the 29th June, field transportation and other supplies having 
 been obtained, the army marched towards the Big Black, and, on the 
 the evening of July 1st, encamped between Brownsville and the 
 river, 
 
 Ileconnoisances, which occupied the second and third, convinced 
 tne that the attack north of the railroad was impracticable. - 1 deter- 
 mined, therefore, to make the examinations necessary for the attempt 
 
13 
 
 gouth of the railroad. Thinking, from what was already known, that 
 the chance for success was much better there, although the conse- 
 quences of defeat might be more disastrous. 
 
 On the night of the 3d, a messenger was sent to General Pember- 
 ton with information that an attempt to create a diverson would be 
 made, to enable him to cut his way out, and that I bope 1 to attack the 
 enemy about the 7th. 
 
 On the 5th, however, we learned the fall of Vicksburg, and, there- 
 fore, fell back to Jackson. 
 
 The army reached Jackson the evening of the 7th, and on the 
 morning of the 9th, the enemy appeared in heavy force in front of 
 the works thrown up for the defence of the place* These, consisting 
 of a line of rifle pits, prepared at intervals for artillery, extended from 
 a point north of the town, a little east of the Canton road, to a point 
 south of the town, within a short distance of Pearl rivc", and coverf^d 
 most of the approaches west of the river ; but were b idly located and 
 constructed, presenting but a slight obstacle to a vigorous assault. 
 
 The troops promptly took their assigned positions in the entrench- 
 ments on the appearance of the enemy, in expectation of an immediate 
 assault. Major General Loring occupying the right; Major General 
 Walker the right of the centre ; Major General French the left of 
 the centre, and Major General Breckinridge the left. The cavalry, 
 under Brigadier General Jackson, was ordered to observe and guard 
 the fords of Pearl river above and below the town. 
 
 The. reports that had, at various times, been made to me by the 
 commanding officers of the troops encamped near Jackson, of the 
 scarcity of water, led me to believe that Sherman, who advanced in 
 heavy order of battle from Clinton, could not beseige, but would be 
 compelled to make an immediate assault. His force was represented 
 to consist of his own and Ord's army corps, and thr;c divisions in 
 addition. The spirit and confi(ience manifested by the whole army 
 under my command, were such that, notwithstanding this vast supe- 
 riority of numbers, I felt assured, with the advantage given by the 
 entrenchments, weak as they were, an assault by him would result in 
 his discomfiture. 
 
 Instead of attacking, the enemy, as soon as they arrived, com- 
 menced entrenching and constructing batteries. On the lOth, there 
 was Fpirited skirmishing with slight cannonading, continuing through- 
 out the day. This was kept up with varying intensity ;.nd but little 
 interruption until the period of our evacuation. Hills, commanding 
 and encircling the town, within easy cannon range, oGfered favorable 
 sites for batteries. A cross fire of shot and shell reached all parts of 
 the town, showing the position to be entirely untenable against a 
 powerful artillery. 
 
 On the 11th, I telegraphed the President, " if the position and 
 works were not bad, want of stores, which could not be collcc'cd^ 
 would make it impossible to stand a seige. If the enemy will not 
 attack, we must, or at the last moment withdraw. Wo cannot attack 
 8f;riou.sly without risking the army. 
 
 On the 12th, besides the usual skirmishiog, there was a heavy can- 
 
14 
 
 nonailc from the batteries near the Canton and south of the Clinton 
 roafJs. The missies reached all parts of the town. An assault though 
 not a vi-^orous one, .was also made on Major General Breckinridge'* 
 line It was quickly repelled, however, principally by the direct fire 
 of Cobb's and Slocumb's batteries, and flank attack of the skirnaisliers 
 of the first, third and fourth Floridaand forty-seventh Georeia rpgi- 
 ments. The enemy's loss was two hundred prisons rs, nearly the same 
 number killed, many wounded, and the colors of the twenty-eighth, 
 forty-first and fifty-third Illinois regiments. 
 
 By the 1 3th, the enemy had extended his lines, until both his flanks 
 rested on Pearl river. 
 
 I t'degi aphed the President on the 14th, that a largo force lately left 
 Vickslurg " to turn us on the north. This will compel us abandon 
 Jackecn. The troops before us have been entrenching and construct- 
 ing birreries since their arrival." 
 
 On the Ifjth, I telegraphed the President, "The enemy is evidr-utly 
 making a seige which we cannot resist. It would be madness to 
 attack dim. The remainder of the army under Grant, at Vicksburg, 
 is, beyond doubt, on its way to this place." 
 
 On the. 1 6th of July, information was received that a large train 
 from Vicksburg, loadcil with ammunition, was near the enemy's camp. 
 This, anil the condition of their batteries, made it probable that Sher- 
 man would, on the next day, concentrate upon us the fire of near two 
 hundred guns. It was also reported that the enemy had crossed Pearl 
 river in rear of their left flank. The evacuation of Jackson that 
 night was. therefore, determined on. 
 
 Our withdrawal was aifected on the night of the 1 6th, All public 
 property and the sick ond wounded, except a few not in a condition 
 be moved, had been previously carried to the rear. The right wing 
 retired towards Brandon by thn new Brandon road, and the left wing 
 by the old Brandon road. The cavalry remained to destroy the 
 bridges over Pearl river and observe theenemy. The evacuation 
 was not discovered by the enemy until th'C next day. 
 
 Our loss, during the seige, was estimated at seventy- one killed, five 
 hundred and four v. ounded, and about twenty-five missing. The army 
 retired by easy marches to Morton, distant about thirty-five miles 
 from Ja-kson. Desertions during the seige and on the march, were, 
 I regret to say, frequent. Two division of the enemy, with cavalry, 
 drove our cavalry through Brandon on the 19th, returning to Jack- 
 son the next day. Their object seemed to be to destroy the railroad 
 bridges and depots. 
 
 Col. J. L. Logan, commanding a mounted force around Port Hudson, 
 reported three successful engagements withdetachnu-nts of the enemy. 
 
 On the i2th of July, I received information from Colonel Logan of 
 the surrender of Port Hudson on the 9th, Subsequently the report 
 of Mijor Jackson, Assistant Adjutant General, was received, inft-im- 
 ing uio of the surrender. That ofii'eer stated that provision was 
 exha lifted and that the position of the enemy rendered it impossible 
 for he li irrison to cut its way out, but two thousand five hundred of 
 the iiairjson were fit for duty at the time of surrender. 
 
15 
 
 The enemy advanced against Yazoo city, both by land and water, 
 on the 13th. The attack by the gun-boats was han-lsomely repulsed 
 by our heavy battery, under the command of Commander Isaac N. 
 Brown of the Navy. The DeKalb, the flag ship of the liosule 
 squadron, an iron-clad, mounting thirteen guns, was sunk by a torpedo. 
 To the force advancing by land no resistance was made by the garri- 
 rison, commanded by Colonel Creasman, of the twenty-ninth Noith 
 Carolina regiment. 
 
 I have introduced my dispatch, of May 14th, into this report 
 because General Peraberton, after stating that it was not received 
 until after the "battle of Baker's Creek, claims, that although he had 
 not acted on those instructions, the letter suggested the very move- 
 ment he had maie, and for the same purpose When the enemy wag 
 at Jackson, the letter suggested a movement for the sole purpose of 
 dislodging him, and so stated. General Pemberton's march, with 
 whatever purpose made, was begun after the enemy had abandoned 
 Jackson, and was almost in his proscnrc. My order of the loth, at 
 which time I should have joined General Pemberton, to take imme- 
 diate command of the main army, but that 1 was still tco weak to 
 attempt such a ride — which was received by him early on the morning 
 of the 16th, required him to abamlon that movement — had he obe^'ed 
 it, the battle of Baker's Creek would have been escaped. 
 
 About the middle of January, finding the cavalry in IMississippi 
 nactive, and being satisfied, by the representations of well informed 
 persons, acquainted with the country, that it could not be usefully 
 employed in Mii^sissippi until late in the spring, and persuaded that a 
 larger cavalry force was needed to cover that portion of Tennessee from 
 which General Bragg 7."as drawing his supplies, I transferred about 
 two-thirds of the cavalry of Mississippi to Tennessee. 
 
 By this transfer from ^Ussissippi, at a time when Genei;^l Gr;int. 
 had fallen back on Memphis, and Sherman and McClernan<l had been 
 repulsed at Vicksburg, I gave strength to the army of Tennessee, 
 which had been greatly reduced by the engagements ne.ir Murfresb.-ro', 
 and enabled General Bragg to cover the country and secure supplies 
 for his army. 
 
 About March 2l)th, General Pemberton applied for cavalry for the 
 protection of the northern part of the State during the planting sea- 
 son ; but his reports, heretofore referred to, indicated that the enemy's 
 forces were to be employed in Tennessee rather than in Mississippi, 
 an<l "\ an Dnrn's cavalry being then absolutely necessary to hold the 
 country from which General Bragg was drawing his supplies, I would 
 not send it, and so informe^l General Pemberton. When he reported 
 that Grant's array was returning to Mississippi, a strong brigade of 
 cavalry was ordered from Tennessee into that State. 
 
 The time to strike the enemy, with the best hope of saving Vicks 
 burg, wa3 when he was landing near Bruinsburg. To do this with 
 any prospect of success, a rapid concentration of all the forces shouM 
 have been made, and an attack. Under this conviction I telegraphe i 
 to Gencial Pembertf)n, on May 1st, from Tullahoma: " If Grant's 
 arn.y lands ou this side of the rivor, the safety of Mi8ai8sii>pi depends 
 
16 
 
 on beating it. For that object you should unite your vrhole force." 
 And again on May 2d : '-If Grant crosses, unite your whole force to 
 beat him ; success will give back what was abandoned to win it." 
 
 These instructions were neglected, and time was given to Grant to 
 gain a foothold in the State. At Port Gibson and Raymond detach- 
 ments of our troops were defeated and driven back by overwhelming 
 numbers of the enemy. 
 
 On the 13th, when I learned that there were four divisions of the 
 enemy at Clinton, distant twenty miles from the main body of General 
 Pemberton's forces, I gave him orders to attack them, and notified him 
 that we could co-operate. This order General Pemberten disobeyed, 
 and so reported to me in bis letter of the 17th. It directed him to 
 move twenty miles to the east, to co-operate with me in attacking 
 Sherman. He moved to -the south, and made our co-operation and 
 junction impossible lie claims that this order compelled him to make 
 the advance beyond the Big Bhvck, which proved so " disastrous." 
 Before I had reached Jackson, and before the order was given, Gen. 
 Pe-mberton made his first advance beyond (east of) the Big Black, to 
 Edward's Depot ; after the receipt of the order, in violation of it, he 
 made his second end last advance from that point to the field of Ba- 
 ker's Creek. He further claims that this order caused the subversion 
 of his " matured plans." I do not know what those plans were, but 
 am startle 1 to find matured plans given up for a movement in violation 
 of my orders, rejected by the majority of his council of war, and dis- 
 approved (as he states) by himself On the 12th, he wrote me that if 
 he could collect force enough, Edward's Depot would be the battle- 
 field. The battle of Baker's Creek was fought three or four miles 
 from Edward's Depot. 'J'he presence of the enemy was reported to 
 him the night before. There was no appa'rent obstacle to prevent 
 his resuming his original position, and carrying out his ".matured 
 plans." 
 
 It is a new military principle that when an officer disobeys a posi- 
 tive order of his superior, that superior becomes responsible for any 
 measure his subordinate may choose to substitute for that ordered. 
 
 But had the battle of Baker's Creek not been fought, General Pem- 
 berton's belief that Vicksburg was his base rendered his ruin inevita- 
 ble. 'He would still have been besieged, and therefore captured. The 
 larger force he would have carried into the lines would iiave added to 
 and hastened the catastrophe. His disasters were due not merel\ to 
 his entangling himself with the advancing columns of a superior and 
 unobserved enemy, but to his evident determination to be besieged in 
 Vicksburg, instead of manoeuvering to prevent a siege. 
 
 Convinced of the impossibility of collecting a sufficient force to 
 break the investment of Vicksburg, should it be completed — appreci- 
 ating the difficulty of extricating the garrison, and convinced that 
 Vicksburg and Port Hudson had lost most of their value by the re- 
 peated passage of armed vessels and transports, I ordered the evactt- 
 ation of both places. General Gordon did not receive this order be- 
 fore the investment of Port Hudson, if at all. General I emberton 
 set aside this order, under the advice of a council of war ; and though 
 he had in Vicksburg eight thousand fresh troops^ not demoralized by 
 
17 
 
 'i^ofeat, decided tbat it " was impossible to withdraw the army from 
 this position, with such morale and raateVial as to be of further ser- 
 vice to the Confe^?eracy ;" but " to hold Vicksburg as long as possi- 
 t)le, with the Hrm hope that the Government m•^\ yet be able to assist 
 me in keepiag this ob>;iruction to the enemy's free naviganon of the 
 Mississippi river." Yick.burg was greatly imperilled when my in- 
 «'ru(U.ior)S from Tiilhihoma, to concentrate, were neglected. It wan 
 5ost whep my orders of the 13th and loih cf May were disobeyed. 
 To this loss were adtied the labor, privations, and certain capture of a 
 gallant army, when my orders f tr its evacuation l^p set aside. 
 
 In this report I hive been compelled to enter inw^any details, an 1 
 to make some animadversions upon the conduct of General Pembor- 
 ton. The one was no pleasant task — the o^hor :i most painful duty : 
 both have been f reed upon me by the official report of General Pern- 
 berton, made to tlie War Department instead of to mo, to whom it 
 was due. 
 
 General Pemberton, by direct assertion and by implication, putn 
 i:pon me the responsibility of the movement wdiich led his army to 
 defoMt at Biker's Creek and Big Black bridge— ^defata which produced 
 the loss of Vicksburg and its army. 
 
 This statement has been circulated bj' the press, in more or les.n 
 detail, and with more or less marks of an official character, until my 
 Biience would be almost an acknowledgment of the justice of the 
 char;^e. 
 
 A prop'.T regard for the good opinion of my Government has com- 
 pelled uic, therefore, to throw aside that delicacy which I would gladly 
 have observed towards a brother officer, suffering much undeserved 
 obloquy, and to show that in 1 is short campaign General Pemberton 
 made not a sin<;le movement in obedience to inv orders, and regarded 
 none of my instructions; and, finally, did not embrace the only <.p 
 portunity to save his army, that given by my order to abandon Vick-i- 
 ^«rg. ^ 
 
 Mogt respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. E. JOHNSTON, GcmraL 
 
-RBIT" GTirP 
 
 OF 
 
 .lEUT. GENERAL PEMBERTON. 
 
 Headquarters Gainesville, Alabama. 
 August 25, 1863. 
 
 General S. Cooper, 
 
 Adft and Insp^r General, Richmond, Va : 
 
 General: I have the honor to forward, by the hands of my aid- 
 de-camp, Lieutenant J. H, Morrison, my report of the operations pre- 
 vious to, and during the siege of Vicksburg together with the reports 
 of subordinate commanders and appendixes A, B and C. 
 
 The report is necessarily very voluminous, but as brief as I could 
 asake it. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servanfr, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General. 
 
 P. S. — I leave to-morrow morning for Demopolis, thence to At- 
 lanta. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 Lieutenant General. 
 
20 
 
 IlKAD(iUAarF.RS, G.VJNKSVdJLF, AlaBAMA, 
 
 August 26, lc63. 
 General S. Coopin, 
 
 Adft and Inssp'r Gmeral, Richmond : 
 
 111 my report uf the operations in Vicksburg, I omitted to mention 
 Major II. M INIatthewB, cliief of ordnance for Stevenson's division, 
 and jicting chief for the entire command, as entitled to commendation 
 for the active and zealous performance of all his duties. Please make 
 the inseriion in my report. 
 
 I am, General, 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 Liivtcnant GeneraL 
 
 DlJMOI'OHS, >U.AKAMA, StplcmhcT 1, 1863. 
 
 General S. Cooptr?, 
 
 Adj't and Insp'r Gr:;iral^ C. S. A : 
 
 GeM'.ral: I have the honor, heicwith, to enclose the following 
 papers, received too late for transmission with others, relating to the 
 *iame sMbject, viz : 
 
 I. Brigadier General Barton's report of actioD at Baker's Creek. 
 
 2 and 3. Brigadier General S. D. Lee's report of action at Baker's 
 'Creek and siege of A'ioksbuig. 
 
 4. Brigadier General Oumming's repoit of battle of Baker's Creek 
 and siege of Vicksburg. 
 
 5 and 6. Colonel \V. A. Reynolds' reports of battle of Baker's 
 •Greek and siege of Viektiburg. 
 
 These are the reports of all the brig de commanders of Stevenson'* 
 division, and are respectfully f^•rwarded in the absence and by the 
 order of Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton. 
 
 Very respectfully, v-our obedient servant. 
 
 R. R. HUTCHINSON, . 
 Assistant Adjutant General, 
 
REPORT OF (IE, YE HAL PRIBERTON. 
 
 Ukaoquartkrs, Gainksvii.i.r, At.abama. ) 
 August 2, 1863. S 
 
 (ieneral S. Cooper. 
 
 Adft and Insp'r (General, Richmond,- Va. : 
 
 Gkneral: At the carliost moment, compatible with the performance* 
 of other and veiT pressing duties, I have the honor to prosent tl^o 
 followin;^ report of the operations of the tipops in the department (.f 
 Mis-sissippi and East Louisima, precoiliag and during the seige re- 
 sulting in the capitulation of Vickshurg. The enemy, after long- 
 continue I and strenuous efforts to reach the right Hank of Vicksburg 
 by forcing a passage through the upper Yazoo river, finally rtdin- 
 (juished his design, and on the nights of the Jth and 5th of April, 
 re-embarked his troops, an<l, before day-light, was in rapid retreat. 
 About the same time a heavy force of the enemy, which had been 
 collected at Baton Rouge, was mostly withdrawn and transferred to 
 western Louisiana, leaving but one division to occupy that place. 
 After consultarion, by telegraph, with Major General Gardner, com- 
 manding Port Hudson and the third military district, deeming the 
 garrison at Port Hudson more than sufficient, under existing circum- 
 stances, and to save supplies at a point so difficult to provide, the navi-_ 
 gation of the Mississippi river being then obstructed to us and the 
 mouth of Red river, from whence large quantities of subsi^te^ce 
 fetores were drawn, being blockaded by one of the enems^'s gun-boats, 
 I ordero i Rust's brigade and two regiments, under Brigadier (reneral 
 Buford, to proceed immediately to Jackson, Mississippi, With the 
 view of employing them against raids of the enemy in northern Mis- 
 sissippi — my great deficiency in cavalry leaving that portion of tho 
 department almost without protection. 
 
 About the 1 1th of March, fearing that the enemy might succeed in 
 opening a canal practicable for the passage of transports across the 
 peninsula opposite Vicksburg, I deemed it necessary to occupy Grand 
 Gulf, near the m outh of Big Black, and assigned Brig. General John J?. 
 Bowen, with hisJMissouri brigade, to that point, with instructions to 
 con-itruct batteries for the protection of the mouth of the Big Clack, 
 an] a3 a secondary obstacle to the navigation of the Miasiseippi river 
 21 
 
22 
 
 General Bowen was also directed to look well to the approaches by 
 the Bayou Pierri. He subsequently informed me that he had prepared 
 for the defence on both sides of the bayou. On the 22nd, five heavy 
 guns Avere mounted and ready for service; two of these were removed 
 from the batteries at Vicksburg, and three, intended for gun-boats 
 being built in the trans-Mississippi department, were detained by my 
 order, it being impracticable to obtain them elsewhere. At the samo 
 time the enemy commenced his movement to reach Vicksburg by the 
 Huchpuccana and Deer creek. Another expedition was also attempted 
 through Steele's bayou via Rolling fork and the Sunflower; the object 
 of both being to enter the- Yazoo river above Haynes' Bluff. In these 
 designs he was completely baffled. Many of our smaller boats, which 
 were alone fitted for the navigation of these streams, and which were 
 employed in the transportation ot supplies for Vicksburg, were neces- 
 sarily directed from this purpose to transport troops to meet and 
 repel these expeditions. The same interruption in the transpotation 
 of supplies was also of constant occurrence during the protracted 
 expedition via the Yazoo pass. 
 
 On the 7th of April, I received a telegram from the President, en- 
 quiring as to the practicability of sending reinforcements to General 
 Bragg, in middle Tennessee, and directing me to send them, if ex- 
 isting circumstances in the department would admit of it. On the 
 same day lin formed the President, by telegram, that, in my judgment, 
 it was not safe to diminish the forces in this department at that time. 
 On the 9':h of April, I telegraphed General S. Cooper, Adjutant and 
 Inspector General, as follows : *' I am confident that no reinforce- 
 ments (if any) have been sent to Rosecranz from Grant. No troops 
 whatever are reported to have gone above the mouth of the Yazoo 
 pass. I endeavor to keep General Johnston advised of any move- 
 ment which may affect his army. The enemy is constantly in motion 
 in all directions He appears now to be particularly engaged with 
 Deer creek, by land from Greenville. I have forces there to meet 
 him. It is reported, b^it not yet confirmed, that a movement under 
 McClernand, in large force, by land, is in progress west of the river 
 and southward. I doubt it. My operations west of the Mississippi 
 must greatly depend on the movement of the enemy's gun-boats. I 
 have several regiments now near Carthage ; I will inform you promptly 
 of anything important, and if I ascertain that part of Grant's army 
 is reinforcing Rosecranz, will dispatch troops to General Johnston, 
 ■as. rapidly as possible," 
 
 On the 11th of April, I again telegraphed General Cooper, Adju- 
 tant and Inspector General, and General J. E. Johnston, at TuUa- 
 homa, as follows: " A scout from Austin reports that forty transports 
 loaded down, but without troops, passed up the Mississippi river on 
 'the 3rd and 4th instant." Brigadier General Chalmers' reports 
 'that ". EUett's marine brigade passed up the Mississippi on the 7th. 
 'The same evening, three gun-boats and nineteen transports, loaded 
 with troops, passed up — the last ten boats from Tallahatchie, twenty 
 •miles up Cold Water, on Wednesday, going up. I tlpnk that most of 
 ^Grant's forces are being withdrawn to Memphis." On the same day, 
 
23 
 
 I again telegraphed General Johnston, as follows : '*Tho following 
 report just received : Scout Kemp reports, * near Byphalia, on the 
 10th, the enemy is strengthening his guard on the Memphis and 
 Charleston railroad. Twelve thousand troops passed Memphis, going 
 up the river, on the 7th.. The same day fifty pieces of artillery were 
 landed at Memphis, and taken to the a\Iemphis and Charleston depot. 
 Part of Grant's army reported to be going to Corinth and down the 
 Mobile ond Ohio railroad, the balance to reinforce Rosecranz.' Law- 
 son reports, near Memphi.^, lOth, marine-brigade gone up the Cumber- 
 land river; also fourteen transports and two gun-boats passed up tho 
 river. On the night of the 7th, a corps of engineers re;\4|Jied Mem- 
 phis from below.'' Acting on these and other corroborating reports, 
 I said to General Johnston, in closing my despatch : '' I am collecting 
 troops here, and can send you four thousand (4,000) at once, if abso- 
 lutely necessary ;" and accordingly, the brigades of Generals Tilgh- 
 man. Rust and Buford, were, on the 1 3th of April, placed under 
 orders to move with despatch to Tullahoma, while General Vaughatrs 
 brigade of East Tennesseeans was ordered to be held in readiness to 
 move at ehort notice. Major L Mims, chief quartermaster, was 
 instructed to furnish the necessary transportation as speedily as pos- 
 sible, and the following dispatch, dated April 12th, was transmitted 
 to General Johnston : '• I will forward troops to you as fast ad trans- 
 portation can be furnished — about eight thousand men. Am satisfied 
 Rosecranz will be reinforced from Grant's army. Shall I order troops 
 to Tullahoma?" On the loth of Apri.l, statements made by persons 
 just out of Memphis, of which I was notified by telegraph, indicated 
 that the retrogade movcmentfrom Vicksburg was probably a ruse, and 
 that an early attack might be expected on that place, and on the iCth 
 I telegraphed General Johnston thus : *' 1 can send you only two 
 brigades. The latest information induces the belief that no large part 
 of Grant's army will be removed.'' On the same day General Steven- 
 eon was directed to delay the movement of Vaughiiu's brigade, and 
 on the 17th, Major ]\Iims, chief quartermaster, was instructed that 
 no more troops would be forwarded in the direction of Tullahoma until 
 further orders. General Tilghman's brigade was hclii in position 
 between Jackson and the Big Black bridge, and on the same day the 
 following telegram was di.epatched to General Cooper, Adjutant and 
 Inspector General: "General iStevenson reports that eight boats 
 attempted to pass Vicksburg last night ; five succeeded in pa.ssing ; 
 one was burned and sunk, and two disabled. General Charaberrf 
 reports, sixty-four steamers left Memphis on tl* 15th instant, loaded 
 with troops and negroes, apparently with intention of making an 
 assault on Vicksburg. The enemy his bine (9j boats between \';ckrf- 
 burg and Port Hudson. I cannot send- an}' mure troops, and iliii.k 
 that those on the way to (icneral Johnston should come baclc.'" Gen- 
 eral Bowen, at Grand Gulf, was immediately advised of the pas.snge 
 of the boats referred to in the above dispatch, and instructed to uiili- 
 draw his troops from the Louisiana shore at the first favorable (;•-);.. r- 
 tunity. lie wa§ also imrnediatt-ly reinforced by the sixth Mi8si>«i}ipi 
 regiment, the first Confederate battalion, and a field battery.- On the 
 
S4 
 
 .aatne dav. the foHtVAing telegram v;asdi3patcht tl to GeneralJohnston ; 
 "The troops sent yonwere talceti f om Port Hu<lson — a brigade, under 
 Brigadier (icneral lluf'.rd. Aggreguto prtflentfour thousand ••ud sixty- 
 five. The enemy has nine boats between Vick-^burg and J'ort Iludion. 
 He bay land forces at New Carthage, from Grant's army, and can 
 reinforce them to any extent. He can use his inne boats to cr.o?;s his 
 troopa to this side The arrival of General Lorenao Thomas has 
 changed the enemy's plans or his movement up -.he river was a ruse. 
 1 ought to have back Buford's brigade; certainly no more troop* 
 should leave this department. A dispatch from Brigadier Geaeral 
 O.almers^ yesterday, says: si.xty-four boats left Memph's since 
 Thursday loaded with sfldif'r.s and negroes, ostensibly to assault 
 Vicksburg. The raft in the Yu3:oo, at Snyder's mills, has given way,, 
 and is entirely destroyed. I am, therefore, compelled to strengthen 
 the batteries there at the expens'S of Yieksburg. General Stevenson 
 reports that eight boats pas;:ed the bend last night. One was burned 
 and two disabled apparently. The other five escaped uninjured. 
 Indications of an attack on Yieksburg are so strong that I am not 
 warranted in sending any more troops from this department." From 
 information receive*! after this dispatch was sent, I learned that eight 
 of the enemy's most formidable gun-boats, besides his transports and 
 barges, succeeded in passing safely on the 18th. I found it a very 
 difficult matter to obtain the necessary hawsers and chains for the raft 
 in the Y^azoo, but it v.-as speedily replaced wnder the active and ener- 
 getic supervision of Mr. Thomas TVeldon. 
 
 My request for the return of the troops forwarded to Middle Ten- 
 nessee to reinforce General Bragg was immediately complied with. A 
 portion of them, however, had reached Chattanooga, the remainder 
 were halted by telegraph at various points on the route, and the whole 
 were restored to this departmesit as soon as was practicable. 
 
 The enemy's vessels of war occupying tlie river betwecji Yieksburg 
 and Grand Gulf, it was impossible for me to operate elfvctualiy in the 
 trans-Mississippi department, to prevent the advance of the enemy to 
 the west bank of the river. ' On the 17th of April, therefore, I ad- 
 dressed the following telegraphic communication to Captain E. Powell, 
 assistant quartermaster at Natchez: '' Forward the following to Lieut. 
 General Smith, or Major General Taylor," viz : •* For the want of 
 the necessary transportation, I cannot operate effectually on the west 
 hank of the river ; the enemy is nov/ in force at New Carthage and 
 llichmond. 1 beg your attenti; n to this." Captain Powell notiiiod me 
 at once that this dispatch had been forwarded by courier. On the i8th, I 
 addressed a second communication, through the same medium, as fol- 
 lows : " Lieutenant General Smith or Major General Taylor : The 
 enemy are cutting a passa<ie from near Y^oung's Point to Bayou 
 Yidal, to reach the Mississippi river, near New Carthage. Without 
 co-operation it is impossible to oppose him. Inform roe what action 
 you intend to take. " To these communiea;ions and to a subsequent 
 one of 22d of April, I received no reply until after the capitulation 
 of Yieksburg, when an acknowledgm^pat of the receipt of that of the 
 22d, dated May 3()th, reached me, 
 
iiv) 
 
 On the 19tli, reporta of raids in northern Mississippi from severs^! 
 points in Tennessee, reached me. All the available cavalry, north of 
 the Soufhern railroad, -.vas at once placed at the disposal of Brigadier 
 Generals Ruggles and Chalmers, commanding, respectively, tlie first 
 and fifth military districts, which embraced all the northern portion 
 of the State cf Mississippi, and both were notified of the expected 
 raid>. Two companies of -cavalry of WauTs Legion, alone, wore 
 ordered to report to B:igadier (-enernl Barton, at Warrenton. One 
 of the marauding expeditions under Colonel CJiierson, which crossed 
 the Tallahatchie river at New Albany, succeeded in passing directly 
 througli the State, and eventually joined CenenU r>;inks' forces at 
 Eaton Rouge, l^a. So great was the consternation created by this 
 raid, that it was impossible to obtain any reliable information of the 
 enemy's movements, rumor placing him in various places at the sjune 
 time. On the 2Uth, I addressed the following telegram to General 
 Johnston : " Can you not make a heavy demonstration with cavalry 
 on the TaUahatchie, towards Abbeville, if only tor fifty miles? The 
 enemy are endeavoring to comped a diversion of my troops to northern 
 Mississippi." The same day, the following communication was 
 addressed to General Johnston, in response to one from him. a>king 
 if I could not send reinfor-cments to the assistance of Colonel Boddy : 
 " I have not sufficient force to give any elTicient assistance to Cnlonel 
 Roddy. The enemy are advancing from Memphis r/« Hernando, from 
 (irand Junction and La Grange via ILdly Springes and Salem and 
 from Corinth fa New Albany. You are aware that 1 have but a 
 feeble^avalry force, hut I shall certainly give you all the aid I can. 
 I hav^iterally no cavalr}'' from (iraiid Gulf to Yazoo city, while the 
 enemy is threatening to pass the river between Vicksburg and (irand 
 (iiilf. having now twelve ( 1 2) vessels below the former place. A 
 gun boat and one transport passed Austin on the J 8th, having in tow 
 fiftev-n flat-boats or pontoons, with twenty-five skiffs on them. 
 Another transport passed Austin on the l!)th, towing sixteen flats or 
 pontoons." Briga<lier (general Buggies was directed to send all his 
 available cavalfy.both Confederate and State, at once towards Corinth 
 as a diversion in favor of Colonel Roddy, General Johnston having 
 informed me that a superior force of the enemy fiom Corinth was in 
 front of Roddy at Tu^cumbia. and desiring rue, if possible, to send 
 aid to the latter. Having no available cavalry to meet the raid of 
 Grierson. which was rav:i";ing the northern portion of the State, I 
 endt'avore'l to employ a portion of Bafoiirs brigade (infantry) then 
 returning to the department, and <lirected the commanding officer of 
 the first regiment, on his arrival at Meridian, to remain until further 
 orders, to pr^ct the most important points on the Mobile and Ohio 
 railroad, an I thereby succeed in saving the valuible property, 
 machinery, etc., at Enterprise, upon which town the enemy hdvancetj 
 and deman<led its suriendert --"t Major Gf-nera'. Loriag having reachetl 
 there with a sufficient force of infiv.i^ry in time, fin ir ol-ject was frus- 
 trated. The enerny hail previously succeeded in destroying sev' lal 
 miles of the track of the Southern railroad wos' of Chunky ri'>r, 
 which, for more than a week, greatly delayed tte trauxportatiou of 
 
26 
 
 troops, and entirely prevented that of supplies, except by wagbns, 
 from our depots on the Mobile and Ohio railroad. 
 
 To meet these raids, as far as possible. Major General Loring was 
 placed in command of all the troops then on the Mobile and Ohio 
 rai-lroad, he was directed not to 1 'ave the line of the road for any 
 great distance, to keep in telegraphic communication with me, and 
 constantly to advise me of his position, and that operations upon that 
 line being minor in importance to those upon the Mississippi river, 
 his troops must be so disposed as to enable him to move them in that 
 direction at a moment's notice. The same day, the following commu- 
 nication was addressed to General Johnston, at Tullahoma: " Heavy 
 raids are making from Tennessee, deep into this State ; one is reported 
 now at Starkeville, thirty (SD) miles west of Columbus. Cavalry is 
 indispensable to meet these expeditions ; the little that I have is on 
 the field there, but totally inadequate. Could you not make a demon- 
 stration Avith a cavalry force on their rear ?" Another expedition 
 having been reported moving across the country in a southwesterly 
 direction from Pontotoc, Brigadier General Featherston, then com- 
 manding Fort Pemberton, on the Yazoo, was ordered to move, without 
 delay, towards Duck Hill or Winina, and General Tilghman, then at 
 Canton, was directed to hold trains in readiness to move to Winina at 
 a moment's notice. This became more necessary as a heavy column 
 of infantry as well as cavajry. v/as reported moving from Memphis, 
 with the supposed view of taking possession of Grenada. The same 
 day, the following communication was telegraphed to General Cooper, 
 Adjutant and Inspector General : " 1 have so little cavalry that I am 
 compelled to divert a portion of m}'^ infantry to meet raids inPnorth 
 Mississippi. If any troops can possibly be spared from other depart- 
 ments, I t;iink they should be sent here." Every effort was made by 
 me to provide cavalry to arrest Grierson's raid, also to accumulate a 
 force for operations* in the direction of Warrenton and Grand Gulf. 
 Thinking it quite as probable that Grierson would return by the route 
 on which he was advancing, as that he would continue his progress 
 southward, on the '24th, Brigadier General Chalmers, at Panola, was 
 directed to move with all his cavalry and light artillery, via Oxford to 
 Okelona, to intercept the force of the enemy then at Newton station, 
 on the Southern railroad. Captain Henderson, commanding special 
 Bcouts at Grenada, was also instructed to send couriers to Generals 
 Loring, Buford and Ruggles, notifying those oflicers by telegrams 
 from the nearest telegraph office, and advising each station ou the 
 road that the enemy had reached ^ ewton on the Southern road. A 
 force was also ordered to proceed from Jackson to Forrest or Lake 
 station, or to such other points as circumstances ^ight render 
 necessary. 
 
 Major General Gardner, at Port Hudson, was notified that the 
 enemy had reached the Southern railroad, that it was probable he 
 would endeavor to form a junction with Banks at Baton Rouge, and 
 was instructed to send all his disposable cavalry to intercept him. 
 Brigadier General Featherstone with his brigade, then at, or en route 
 for, Winina, was ordered to move to Grenada, if there Avas any 
 
27 
 
 npproach of the enemy (as was reported) from the Dorth of that place, 
 unless he was also threatened by an advance from the east. As it 
 was possible that Griersons' forces might return by Jackson, such 
 arrangements, as my means allowed, were made to defend the capital 
 of the State. 
 
 Brigadier General Tilghman, then at Canton, was authorized to 
 mount one of his regiments at that place, by the impressment of 
 horses or otherwise ; and immediate steps were taken to mount the 
 twentieth Mississippi and a detachment of the fourteenth Mississippi, 
 both of these regiments being, at the time, on duty in Jackson. Simi- 
 lar authority was given to General Loring, then on the Mobile and 
 Ohio railroad, to mount what force he could on that line. 
 
 In the impressment of horses and their necessary equipments, 
 Major L. Minis, chief quartermaster, was materially aided by his 
 Excellency, the Governor of Mississippi, Avho was also earnestly 
 advised to mount, by the same process, a portion of the State troops 
 in northern Mississippi. All the cavalry I could thus collect, south 
 of the Southern railroad, was placed under the orders of Colonel R. 
 V. Richardson, until he should fall in with Colonel Wirt Adams, who 
 was then directed to assume command, and direct the movements of 
 the whole. On the 28tb, it was ascertained that Grierson was con- 
 tinuing his movements south of Hazlehurst, and not towards Grand 
 Gulf or the Big Black bridge. Colonel Adams was directed to follow 
 him up, and ambuscade him if possible. These instructions were 
 carried out as far as practicable, and resulted in a smart skirmish near 
 Union Church. Colonel Adams' force, however, was too weak to effect 
 anything important. Grierson, after suffering considerable loss by 
 an ambuscade further south, which was well planned and executed by 
 a cavalry force from ^Injor General Gardner's command, eventually 
 succeeded in joining General Banks army at Baton Rouge. I have 
 been thus circumstantial in reciting the incidents connected with this 
 celebrated raid, that I might clearly demonstrate the great deficiency, 
 I might almost say, absence of cavalry in my departments, and the 
 absolute impossibility of protecting my communications, departments, 
 and even my most vital positions, without it, and further to show that, 
 consequent upon this want of cavalry, I was compelled to employ 
 infantry, and thus weaken my force in that arm at other points. I 
 wrote to General Johnston on March 2oth, urgently requesting that 
 the division of cavalry under Major General Van Dorn, which had 
 been sent to the army of Tennessee for special and temporary pur- 
 poses, might be returned to me. Under date of Tullahoma, April 3d, 
 Colonel B. S. Ewell, A. A. Gcnenil, replied to my request, and from 
 that reply, I make the followiiig extract: ' In the present aspect of 
 aflfiiirs. General Van Dorn"s cavalry is much more needed in this 
 department than in that of Mississippi and east Louisiana, and cannot 
 be sent back as long as this state of things exist. You have now in 
 your department five brigades of the troops you mo.st require, viz : 
 infjintry, belonging to the army of Tennessee. This is more than a 
 compensation for the absence of General Van Dorn's cavalry com- 
 mai; !."' I will terminate this subject with the following telegram, 
 
28 
 
 arMressed to General Jdhnston ai Tullahoraa, on the i27th of April : 
 *• However necessary cavalry may he to the army r)f Tennessee, u i.s 
 indispensahle for me to maintain my communications. The enemy 
 are to-iay at Ilazlehurst, on the N.mv Orleans and Jackson railroad. 
 I cannot defend every station on the road,-^ with infmtry. I am com- 
 pelled to bring cavalry here from northern Missis^^ippi, and .hui the 
 whole of th:;t section of the State is l<ft open. Further, these raids 
 endanger my vital positions." When itse^■med probable that the enemy 
 would succeed in opening a navigable canal across fhe peninsula, oppo- 
 site Vickshurg. and thus, to a gr-^at e.xtent, avoid the batteries estab- 
 lished there, I directed that Grand Gulf should be occupied, and as 
 many heavy giui^* pi fCfd in po-^i'ion as could be. without too much 
 wakeninL: the defences of Vick.sburg. Believing that the urgency 
 of the case d'-manded it, I assumed the responsility of detaining three 
 h^avy guns en route fo:" the trans-Mississippi department, and with- 
 drew two others from the batteries at Vickshurg Insufficient as I 
 knew this battery to be, it was the heaviest 1 could place there. Fort 
 Pemberton, on the Tallahatchie, then occupied our attention, 'i he 
 enemy, in large force, by land and water, was exertiiig all his ener- 
 gies agaijUst that position, Aviih the view of turning the right fiank 
 of Vickshurg. and every available gun was required for its deffi.ce. 
 This necessity continued to exist until the fall of the rivers renders-d- 
 an approach by water impracticable. Grand Gulf was not selected as 
 a position for land defence, but for the protpction of the mouth o-f tl\e 
 Big Black, and also as a precautionary measure against the passage 
 of transports, should the canal before referred to prove a succes, 
 ■which then seemed highly probable. Th^^ necessary works were, 
 however. con>:tru -ted under the direction of Brigadif^r General Bowen, 
 to defend the batteries against an assault from the river front, and 
 agamt a direct attack from or acoss Big Black. When, however, the 
 enemy succeeded in passing sufficient transports to cross his troops 
 froio the west bsink of the river below Grand Gulf, there being a prac- 
 ticable route by which to move his bind forces from above Vicksbing 
 to a point nearly opposite Bruinsburg, the position of Grand Gulf 
 itself lost most of its Value; but so great were his facilities of rr im- 
 portation, and so rapid bis movements, that it whs impractit;able to 
 withdraw the beavy guns. The onlv means of subsisting an arny 
 south of Big Black, are from Vickshurg or Jackson; the form-ir 
 reqtiiring a transportition by dirt road of forty, and the latter of 
 fiirty-five miles, in addition to that by rail Without cavalry I could 
 not have protected my own coinuiunications, much less have cut those 
 of the enemy. To have marched -.m army across Big Black of suffi- 
 cient strength to warrant a reasonable hopeof succe-^sftdly encounter- 
 ing his ver}' superior forces, woubl have stripped Vickshurg and its 
 essential flank defences of their garrisons, and the city itself might 
 have fallen an eapy Drey into the eager hanis of the enemy. The 
 enemy htiving succeeded, on the night of April 16th. (as heretofore 
 related,) in passing the batteries at Vickshurg v;ith a numbap of bis 
 gun-bnat9 and transports, and the report qf a neavy moveinent to tue 
 southward on the Lpuisiana shore being fully confirmed, I imnaediatt-ly 
 
29 
 
 made the necessary di?p«''ilion9 for more pftrfectly gujirding all points? 
 her.ween Vicksburg ancl Grund Gulf, an! reinfurced Brigadier General 
 Bowen with Green's brigade, the ixth Mississippi regiment, the first 
 Oonf. derate battalion, and a battery of fiold ar illery Other truops 
 were collected on the line of the r;»ilroa<l betwei-n Jackson and the 
 Big Jjlack bridge; and measures wore taken to get the troops that 
 were beins: returned from midtile Tennessee info such rositions that 
 they cculd be readily moved at 'a ni'^mctit's notice. Major (General 
 Stevenson was directed to place five thousand m^n in easy supp' rting 
 distance of Wanenton, in additimi to the briga>le already there. 
 Major Lockett, my chief engineer, was sent to Oaud Gu\{. On the 
 22d, I addressed a communicatinn to Cleneral E. Kirby Smith, 
 acknowledging the receipt of one from him of the 1 5th, asking my 
 CO operation on the west side of the Mijsissippi, and stating my 
 inability to do so, because of the enemy's gun-boats in the river, and 
 from want of transportation, and again a?king his cooperation in 
 front of Grand Gulf and Ncat Carthage. 
 
 The following telegram was addressed to Major General Stevenson 
 on the 23d : " I consider it essential that communications, at least for 
 infantry, shorld be ma'le by the shortest practicable route to Gr nd 
 Gulf The indications now are that the attack will not be made on 
 your front or right, and all troops, not al)Solutely necessary to hold 
 the works at Vicksbvrg, should be hehl as a moveable force for either 
 Warrenton or Grand Gulf." On the "28th, Brigadier General Bowen 
 telegraphed, that " trans^ ortsand barg« s, loaded down with troops, are 
 landing at Hard Times, on the west bank." I immediately replied as 
 follows : " Have you force enough to hold your position ? If not, give 
 me the sm.'^llest additional nurubcr with which you can. My i-niall 
 cavalry force necessitates the use of infantry to protect important 
 points." Major General Loring. then at Meridian, was ordered to 
 send two of his regiments across the break on the Southern railrcad, 
 near Chunky river, and Colonels Farrell and Reynolds, who were 
 west of the break, were ordered to proceed immediately to Jackson. 
 Major General Buckn.,r, commanding at Mobile, was notified that I 
 should want hira to assist mc in protecting the Mobile and Ohio rail- 
 road, as I required all the troops I could spare to strengthen General 
 Bowen. 
 
 Major General Gardner, at Fort Hudson, was also ordered to move 
 Gregg's brigade rapidly to Jackson. Brigadier General Tilghraan, 
 then on the Mississi^ipi Central railroad, was directed to move promptly 
 with all of his troops (save bridge guards) to Jackson. Major Clark, 
 commanding at Brcokhaven, was instructed to send couriers to all 
 cavalry commanders near him, ordering them to move towards Grand 
 Gulf, with directions not to encounter the main body of the enemy, 
 but to harrass him in the rear and ilank. Similar instructions were 
 forwarded to 0-yka and Hazdehurst. To (»eneral Johnston, at Tulla- 
 lioma, the follov^'ng telegram wag sent : 
 
 " The enemy is at Hard Tim-^^s, Louisiana, in 1 irgc force, with bar- 
 ges and transport.'*, indicating an attack oa Grand Gulf, with a view 
 
so 
 
 to Vickshxivg. I must look to tlie army of Tennessee to protect the 
 approaches through North Mississippi." 
 
 The following, also, to Major General Stevenson, at Vicksburg : 
 
 " Hold five thousand men in readiness to move to Grand Gulf, and 
 on the requisition of Brigadier General Bowcn, .move them. With 
 your batteries and rifle-pits manned, the city front is impregnable." 
 
 To General Bowen, at the same time, the following was sent : 
 
 **Ihave directed General Stevenson to have five thousand mea 
 ready to move on your requisition but do not make requisition unless 
 absolutely necessary for the safety of your position. I am also mak- 
 ing arrangements for sending you two or three thousand men fromthisf 
 direction, in case of necessity. You cannot communicate with me 
 too frequently." 
 
 I believe that I fully estimated the importance of preventing aa- 
 advance upon Jackson, if it could be done without sacrificing Vicks- 
 burg ; but if the battle was lost, the former was comparatively of 
 little value. Vicksburg might still be held, with Jackson in posses- 
 sion of the enemy, but it was the hope of being able to hold the posi- 
 tion on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson depends, that 
 made me most anxious to reinforce General Bowen ; or, failing in that, 
 at least to have a sufficient force at hand to secure bis retreat across 
 the Big Black. 
 
 On the 3i)th of April, I received the first information of the land- 
 ing of the enemy on the east bank of the Mississippi river. General 
 Bowen reported by telegraph that three thousand (3,000) Federal 
 troops were at Bethel Church, ten miles from Port Gibson, at three 
 o'clock on the evening of the 29th, and that they were still landing 
 at Bruinsburg. Brigadier General Tracey, of Stevenson's division, 
 had reached Grand Gulf with his brigade on the 3l)th. Lieutenant 
 Colonel Brown, ot the twentieth Mississippi, with fifty mounted men 
 of his regiment, left Jackson for the same place on the '29th ; and 
 Major J. D. Bradford, a good artillery officer, was sent to replace the 
 lamented Colonel Wade, as chief o^ crtillery 
 
 Between twelve and two o'clock, P. M., on the 30th, Brigadier 
 General Baldwin, with his brigade of Smith's division, had crossed 
 the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry. At nine o'clock, A. M., May 
 1, General Bowen informed me by telegraph, his army being then ia 
 position three miles south of Port Gibson, that General Baldwin was 
 entering the latter place. On the same day, General Bowen tele- 
 graphed me that prisoners taken reported McClernand in command ; 
 that three divisions had landed, one of which took the right-hand road 
 from Ptodney, and that the enemy's force was estimated at twenty 
 thousand men. He added, however : " I disbelieve the report." At 
 three, P. M., the same day. General Bowen advised me that he still 
 held his position, but that he was hard pressed, and concluded by ask- 
 ing vrhen Major General Loring would arrive. In reply, he was noti- 
 fied by telegram that another brigade from Vicksburg was en route to 
 reinforce him, and would probably reach him before Major General 
 Loring could arrive from Jackson. At 5.30, P. M., he informed me 
 that he was falling back across the Bayou Pierre, and that he would 
 
SI 
 
 endeavor to hold that position until the arrival of reinforcements. 
 On reaching Rocky Springs, about eighteen miles from Grand Gulf, 
 Major General Loring, learning that Brigadier General Bowen had 
 fallen back, before a large force, from Port Gibson, in the direction of 
 Grand Gulf, directed two regiments and a field battery of Tilghman's 
 brigade, which had been withdrawn from the Big Black bridge, to 
 move as rapidly as possible to Grindstone ford, and hoUl it at all haz- 
 ards, to prevent the enemy from flanking Bowen in that direction, and 
 then proceeded himself to the headquarters of General Bowen, near 
 Grand Gulf Major General Loring concurring wuth General Boweis 
 as to the impracticability of holding his position with so small a force,, 
 directed its withdrawal across Big Black, at Hankinson's ferry. 
 
 In his official report, Major General Loring says : " This had hardly 
 been determined upon, when your communication was received, stating, 
 that the enemy had fallen back towards Grand Gulf, and ordering it 
 to move at once out of its position, and to cross the Big Black at Han- 
 kinson's ferry." The movement was promptly carried out. Previous 
 to crossing the river, however, Colonel A. W. Reynolds' brigade, of 
 Stevenson's division, had arrived. Not having heard from General 
 Bowen after 5.30, P. M., on the 1st instant, I dispatched him, via 
 Rocky Springs, on the morning af the 2d, as follows : 
 
 " If you are holding your position on the Bayou Pierre, and your 
 communication is open by the Big Black to this place, continue to 
 hold it. I am informed that you have fallen back to Grand Gulf; if 
 this is so, carry out my instructions just sent in cypher." 
 
 These instructions were, in case he had fallen back to Grand Gulf,, 
 which is a cul dc sac, to destroy his heavy guns and such stores as could 
 not be transported, and endeavor to retire across the Big Black. The 
 last brigade of Maj. Gen. Stevenson's division, which had been hurried 
 forward to reinforce Bowen, with the hope of enabling him to hold 
 his position on the Bayou Pierre, or, in case he should be compelled 
 to fall .back, to protect his retreat, had not all arrived when the retiring 
 column under Major General Loring commenced crossing the Big 
 Black at Hankinson's ferry. 
 
 For the details of the battle at Port Gibson, the list of casualties, 
 etc., I beg to refer to the official report of Brigadier General Bowen, 
 and the reports of his subordinate commanders, which I have the 
 honor to transmit herewith, as also the report of Major General Lor- 
 ing, who commanded the retreat after the column had been put in mo- 
 tion by Brigadier General Bowen. Amongst the slain whom the 
 country deplores, I regret to mention Brigadier General E, D. Tracey, 
 a brave and skilful officer, who fell, where it is the soldier's pride to 
 fall, at the post of duty and of danger. 
 
 Though disastrous in its results, the bloody encounter in front of 
 Port Gibson nobly illustrated the valor and constancy of our troops, 
 and shed additional lustre upon the Confederate arras. Confronted 
 by overwhelming numbers, the heroic Bowen and his gallant officers 
 and men maintained the unequal contest for many hours, with a cour- 
 age and ob.stinacy rarely equalled ; and though they failed to secure 
 :a victory, the world will do them the justice to say they deserved it. 
 
St 
 
 With a moderate cavalry force at my disposal, T am firmly convinced 
 that the Federal army under General Grant would have been unable to 
 maintain its communications with the Mississippi river, and that the 
 attempt to reach Jackson and Vick>burg from that base would have 
 been as signally defeated in ^lay, \&Go, as a like attempt, from an- 
 other base, had, by the employment of cavalry, br^en defeated m De- 
 cember, 1 862. The repulse of General Bowen at Port Gibson, and 
 our consequent withdrawal to the north bank of the Eig Black, ren- 
 dered it necessary that I should, as rapidly as possible, concentrate 
 my whole force for the defence of Vicksburg from an attack in the 
 rear by Grant's army, which was hourly swelling its numbers. Or- 
 ders, therefore, were immediately transmitted to the officers in com- 
 mand at Grenada, Columbus, and Jackson, to. move all available forces 
 to Vicksburg. as rapidly as possible. On the morning of the third,- 
 two of the enemy's barges, loaded with hospital and commissary stores, 
 were destroyed in attempting to pass the batteries at V^icksburg. On. 
 tlie fifth, I telegraphed General Johnston that six thousand cavalry 
 should be used to keep my communications open, and that the enemy 
 advancing on me was 'ouble what I could bring into the field. To 
 the honora'jle Secretary of War I sent the following telegram, under 
 date of May 6 : •' General Beauregard eends but two brigades, per- 
 haps not five thousand men. This is a very insufficient number. The 
 atake is a great one : I c-ah see nothing so important." On the 7ch, 
 the President notified me that all the assist mce in his power to send 
 should be forwarded, and that it Was deemed necessary to hold Port 
 Hudson, as a means of keeping up our communications with the trans^ 
 Mississippi department. Major General Gardner, who, with Brigadier 
 General IM ixcey and five thousand (o,0i)0) men, had previously been 
 ordered to Jackson to reinforce this army, was immediately directed 
 to send Maxcey's brigade rapidly forward, and to return himself with 
 two thousand (2,000) men to Port Hudson, and hold the place at all 
 hazards. On the 7th. indications rendered it probable that the enemy 
 would make a raid on Jackson. The stall" dopartments, therefore, and 
 all valuable stores, were ordered to be remo ed east. In the mean- 
 time, ray troops were so disposed as to occupy the Warrenton and 
 Hall's ferry road, which afforded great facilities for concentration, and 
 various positions on the P>aldwin's ferry road, and from thence between 
 Bovina and Edward's depot, each division being in good feiipporting 
 distance of the other. Colonel Waul, commanding Fort Femberton, 
 was directed to leave a garrison of three hundred- (300) men at that 
 place, and proceed vrith the remainder of his force to Snyder's Mills. 
 On the lOth, information was received from a scouting party that 
 visited Cayuga and Utica, where the enemy had recently been, thaft 
 his cavalry force was about two thousand, and that he was suppo&ed 
 to be moving on V^icksburg. My dispositions were made accord ingJy, 
 and every effort was used to collect all the cavalry possible. Such as 
 could be crbtained were placed under the command of Colonsl Wirt, 
 Adams, who was directed to harrass the euemy an hia line of march,, 
 cut his communications wherever practicable, patrol the country thor- 
 
3b 
 
 onghly, and to keep Brigadier General Gregg, (who bad just arrivc.l 
 with his brigade from Port Hudson, and was then at Raymond,) fully 
 advised of the enemy's movements. On the 1 |tb, Brigadier General 
 John Adams, commanding at Jackson, was directed to hurry forwarJ, 
 as last a3 they could arrive, the troops from South Carolina, to rein- 
 force Brigadier (General Gregg, at Raymond. At this time, informa-- 
 tion was received from Rrig:idier General Tilghman that the oneiny 
 was in force opposite B.ildwin's ferry, and Gregg was notified ticcord.- 
 ingly, and informed that the enemy's movements were apparently to- 
 wards the Big Black bridge, and not, as had been suppobed, agaiast 
 Jackson. On the 12th, the following was addresseii to Major Gcnerr.l 
 Stevenson : 
 
 "From information received, it is evident the enemy is advancin;^ 
 in force on Edv ard's depot and Big Black bridge; hot skirmij^hiug 
 has been going on all the morning, and the enemy are at Fourteen 
 Mile Creek. You must move up with your whole division to thehup- 
 port of Loring and BoWvsn at the bridge, leaving Baldwin's anJ 
 Moore's brigades to protect your right." 
 
 In consequence of this information. Brigadier General Gregg \\:x^ 
 ordered not to aftack the enemy until he was engaged at Edwaid's or 
 the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at any moment,, 
 and to be particularly cautious not to allow himself to be flanked or 
 taken in ihe rear. Thus it will be seen that every measure had been 
 taken to protect Edward's 'epot and Big Black bridge, and by ofT'..'r. 
 ing or accepting battle, to endeavor to preserve my communic-iions 
 with the east. At this juncture, however, the battle of RayniouJ 
 was fought, by a large body of the enemy's forces, and one hiigada 
 of our troops under the command of Brigadier General Gregg. I 
 have received no official report o: that aff.iir, and hence cm nut say 
 how it was fought, or by whom the engagement was brought on IJn. 
 official information represents Brigadier General (iregg and his small 
 comm.ind to have behaved with great gallantry aiKi steadiness, l>ut 
 after an obstinate conflict of several hours they were finally over 
 whelmed by superior numbers, and compelled to retire. The com- 
 mand was withdrawn in good order, and retired to Jackson. On tho 
 14th, a large body of the enemy made their appearance in front of 
 Jackison, ibe capital of the State. After some fighting, our troops 
 were withdrawn, and the enemy took possession of the place; but as 
 General Johnston was commanding there in person, his official r«*f)ort, 
 which has doubtless gone forward, will furnish all the intormation re- 
 quired. 
 
 On the 12th, the following telegram was sent to General J. E. 
 JoLnston : " The enemy is appearently moving his heavy force 
 towards PJdward's depot, on Southern railroad. With my limiiecl 
 force I will do all I can to meet him; that will be the battle- 
 field, if I can carry forward eufficient force, leaving troof s enoiichi 
 to secure the safety of this place, (Vicksburg ) Jteinf^rcements arc 
 arriving very slowly, only fifteen hundred having arrived as yvt. \ 
 urgently ask that more be sent, also that three thousand (3,(MiiA 
 
 r 
 
S4. 
 
 cavr.irj !ic at once sent to operate on this line. I urge this as 3- 
 positive necessity. The enemy largely outnumber me, and I am 
 obliged to hold back a large fore© at the ferries on Big Black, lest he 
 cross and take this place, I am also co'mpelled to keep considerable 
 force on either fiank of Vicksburg, out of supporting distance." 
 The same dispatch was also sent to His Excellency, President Davis, 
 on the same date. The divisions of Major Generals Loring and 
 Stevenson moved from the line they had occupied between Warrenton 
 and Big Black bridge to Edward's depot. General Stevenson, being, 
 directed to keep well closed upon the rear of General Boring's eolumn. 
 On the evening of the 12th, I moved my headquarters to Bovina to 
 be nearer the scene of active operations. The command arrived at 
 Edward's depot on the 13th, and was placed in position, covering all 
 approaches from the south and east in the following order, viz : 
 Bowen on the right, Loring in the centre, and Stevenson on the left, 
 t'his position was occupied from the night of the 13th until the morn- 
 ing of the- 15th, 
 
 On the 13th, the following dispatch w-as sent to General .lohnston : 
 "Genera! Forney reports, from Vicksburg this morning, four trans- 
 ports loadfd with troops, arrived at Young's Point this morning. 
 Five regiments and a battery passed down by Brown & Johnston's. 
 Wagon trains continued to pass back and forth. My reinforcements 
 will be very small, and arrive very slowly. If possible. Port Hudson 
 should be reinforced. I. have been forced to draw largely from there. 
 1 haye no major general to command brigades arriving in Jackson. I 
 ftm in position with eight brigades near Edward's depot." 
 
 Dn the morning of the l4th, while on my way to Edward's depot 
 from Bovina, I leceived the following dispatch, dated May 13th, from' 
 (jleneral Johnston, then at Jackson: "I have lately arrived and 
 learn thot Major General Sherman is between us with four divisions 
 at Clinton. It is important, to re-establish communications, that yoii 
 rnr.y be reinforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once — to 
 beat such a detachment would be cf immense value. The troops 
 here could co-operate. All the troops you ean quickly assemble 
 siiould be brought. Time is all importa;nt." 
 
 I immediately replied as follows: 
 
 Bovina, May 14, I8G3. 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge re<;eipt of your communicatioi^'. 
 1 moved at. once with whole available force, about sixteen thousand,, 
 from Edward's depot, leaving Vaughan's brigade, about fifteen hun- 
 dred, at Big Black bridge ; Tilghraan's brigade, fifteen hundred, now 
 al Baldwin's ferry, I have ordered to bring up the rear of my column ; 
 he will be, howe^^er, from fifteen to twenty miles behind it, Bald- 
 win's ferry will be left, necessarily, unprotected. To hold Vicksburg. 
 are Smith's and Forney's divisions, extending from Snyder's Mills • to- 
 Warrenton, numbering, efi"ective, seven thousand eight hundred men,. 
 The men have been marching several days, arc much fatigued, and 1 
 fear will straggle very much. In directing this move, I do not think 
 
 h 
 
M 
 
 "^cti fiifry cortiprehencillic posiuion that Vicksfctirg will be left in ; but I 
 ■comply at once with your order." 
 
 The " detachment" General Johnston speaks of in his communica- 
 tion consisted of four divisions of the enemy, constituted an entire 
 apiEy corps, numcncaliy greate=r than my whole available force in the . 
 ■3eld ; besides, the enemy had at least an equal force to the south, on, 
 my right f?ank, which would l-e nearer Vicksburg than myself, i:i case 
 I should make the movoment proposed. I had, moreover, positive. 
 information that he v/as daily increasing his strength. I also learned, 
 oa reaching Edward's depot, that one division of the cacray (A. J. 
 Smith's) was at or near Dillons. 
 
 This cinf.nnod -ne iw the opinion, previously expressed, that the . 
 movement indicated by General Johnston was extremely hazardous. 
 "I accordingly called a council of war of all the general officers pre- 
 sent, and placiag the subject befor« them, (including General John-. 
 ■ston's dispatch) in every view in which it appe.'^rcd to me, asked their- 
 opinions respectively. A na^ajority of the officers present expressed, 
 themselves favorable to the movement indicated by General Johustovx. 
 The others, including Msjor Generals Loring and Stevenson, preforreKiTl 
 a movement by which the array might attempt to cut off ihe enemis?'^) 
 sepplics from tie Mississippi river. 
 
 My own views were strongly expressed as unfavorable to anj' 
 advance wb ieh would separate me farther from Vicksburg, which vras m v 
 base. I did not, however, see fit to put my own judgment and opin-- 
 ions 80 far in opposition as to prevent a movement altogether, but,, 
 believing the only possibility of success to be in the plan of cutting - 
 the enemy's communications, it was adopted, and the followiu'^ dis- . 
 patch was a-ddresscd to General Johnston : 
 
 " Edward's Depot, May 14, 1603. 
 
 *' I shall move as early to-morrow morning as practicable with a-, 
 column of seventeen (17) thousand men to Dillions, situated on the 
 mam road leading from Raymond to Port Gibson, seven and a half 
 miles below Raymond, and nine and a half miles from Edward's depot, 
 
 *' The object is to cut the enemy's communication and to forco 
 him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient ta justify an ■ 
 attack on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson. 
 At this point your nearest communication would be through Ray- 
 mond. I wish very much I could join my reinforcements. Whether 
 it will be most practicable for the reinforcements to come by R;'y:iiond»- 
 (leaving it to the right, if the march cannot bo mado through Riy- 
 mond.) or to move them west along the line of railroad, (leaving it to • 
 the left and south of the line of march,) to Bolton's depot, or some other 
 point west of it, you must determine. In either movement, I should 
 be advised as to the time and road, bo that co-operation may be had 
 to enable the reinforcements to come through, 1 send you a map of 
 the country, .which will furnish you with a correct view of the roads 
 and localities." 
 
 Pursuant to the plan laid dov.-n ia thia dispRtch, the army -tyas put- 
 in motion on the 15th, about I P. M., ia accordance with the follow-, 
 ing order, viz : 
 
 fr 
 
36 
 
 "IIeadquarteTis Befartment Missirsfppi and East Louisiana, } 
 ''Edward's Dipot, May 14, 1863. j 
 
 "Special Order. > 
 No. — . S 
 
 ''This army will move to-ioorrow morning, loth instant, in the di- 
 rection of Raymond, on the uiilit;iry road in the tbllowing order : 
 
 "ist. Colonel Wirt Adams' cavalry will form the advance guard, 
 •keepii.g at least one mile in advance of the head of the column, throw- 
 ing oat one company in front of bis column,' and a smsill detachment 
 in its advance, besides the flankers upon hit', column, vhen practica- 
 ble. 
 
 **2d Loring's division will constitute the ri^-ht and the advance 
 in tho line of March. lie will threw a regiment of infantry, with » 
 section of artillery at least two hundred yards in his front, with & 
 company of infantry at least seventy-five yards in its advance, Ofll 
 witii the neces.'^ary detachments and flankers. 
 
 *'3d. Bcwen's division will constitute the centre, and will follow the 
 ' leaiiiiig division. 
 
 *Mih. Stevenson's division will constitute the left, bringing up the 
 rear of the column. 
 
 ''5th. The artillery of each brigade will march in the rear of the 
 ' brig.ide. 
 
 '•6th. The ambulances cf each brigade will follow in the rear of their 
 brigade. 
 
 '"Tih. The ordnance wagons of each division will follow in the rear 
 ' of their division. 
 
 "oth. The wagon train will follow in rear of the entire column, 
 
 "Jth. Should Tilghman's brigade arrive after the departure of the 
 ' column, it will constitute, with a fitld battery, the rear guard, fol- 
 lowing immediately in rear of the V^-agon train. 
 
 '•M'th. A company of Wirt Adams' cavalry will clor^e the order of 
 march 
 
 * 1 Ith. The wagon train will follow in the order of division, that is 
 to say, the wagon train of l>oring's division, on the right of the train ; 
 that of Bowen's in the centre, etc. 
 
 • "'Quartermasters, commissaries and ordnance officers will remain with 
 their trains, unless otherwise ordered Straggling, always digraceful 
 in an army, is particularly forbid<lon. Sttingent orders will be issued 
 by the division comtnanders to prevent this evil; the rear guard is 
 especially instructed to permit no one to fall to the rear under any 
 circumstances." 
 
 A continuous and heavy rain had made Baker's Cret 1: impassible by 
 
 ' the ordinary ford on the main Raymond road, where the country 
 
 bridge had beon washed away by previous freshets; in consequence of 
 
 this, the march was delayed for several hours; but the .vater not falling 
 
 ^ sufficiently to make the creek fordabie, the column was directed by 
 
 the Clinton road, on which was a good bridge, and, after passing the 
 
 . creek, upwards of one and a half miles, was tiled to the right, along 
 
 a neighborhood road, so as to strike the Raymond road, about three 
 
 and a half miles from Edward's depot. The mirch was continued 
 
37 
 
 until the head of the column bad passed Mrs. Elliston's house, where 
 it was halted, and the troops bivouacked in order of march. 
 
 I made my headquarters at Mrs. EUiston's, where I found Major 
 General Loring had osttblisliel his. The divisi<^n3 of Generals Ste- 
 venson and Bowen having been on the march until past midnight, and 
 the men considerabl}- fatigued, desiring also to receive repoits of re- 
 conncisances made in ray frf-nt before proceeding further, I did not 
 issue orders to continue the movement at an early hour the following 
 morning. 
 
 Immediately on fny arrival at Mrs. EUiston's, on the night of the 
 15th, I sent for Colonel Wirt Adams, commanding the cavalry, nnd 
 gove him the necessary instructions for picketing all approaches in my 
 front, and directed him to send out scouting parties to discover the 
 enemy's whereabouts. I also made strenuous efforts to effect the same 
 object through citzens, but without success. Nothing unsual occurred 
 during the night. 
 
 On the morning of the iGth. at about six and a half o'clock. Ool. 
 Wirt Adams reported to me that his pickets were skirmishing v ith 
 the enemy on the Raymond road, some distance in our front. While 
 in conversation with him, a courier arrived and handed me the fol- 
 lowing dispatch from General Johnston : 
 
 " Banton Road, Ten Milks from J.\ckson, ) 
 " May \o, 1863, 8 30 o'clock, A. AT. ) 
 
 "Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracti- 
 cable. The only mode by which wc can unite is by your moving di- 
 rectly to Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that point 
 with about six thousand. I have no means of estimating enrmy's 
 force at Jackson. 
 
 *' The principal officers here differ very widely, and I fear he will 
 fortify if time is left him. Let mehearfrom you immediately. Gen, 
 .Maxcey was ordered back to Brookhaven. You probably have time to 
 make him join you. Do so before he has time to move away." * 
 
 I immediately directed a countermarch, or rather a retrogade move- 
 ment, by reversing the column as it then stood, for the purpose of 
 returning towards Edward's depot to take the Brownsville road, and 
 then to proceed towards Clinton by' a route north of the railroad. A 
 written reply to General John-son's instructions in wliich I notified 
 him that the coun'ermarch had been ordered, and of the rorte I 
 nhould take, was despatched in haste, and without allowing myself suf- 
 ficient time to take a copy. 
 
 Just as this reverse movement, commenced, the enemy drove in 
 r'olonel Adams' cavalry pickets and opened with artillery, at long 
 range, on the head of my column on the Raymond road; not knowing 
 whether this w;\s an attack in force, or simply an armed roconnois- 
 Hance, and boing anxious to obey the instructions of General 
 Johnston, I directed the continuance of the movement, giving the 
 necessary instructions for securing the safety of the wagon tr;iiu. 
 The demonstrations of the enemy soon becoming more serious, orders 
 were sent to divi'^ion commanders to form in line of battle on the 
 cross road from the Clinton to the Raymond road — Loring on the. 
 
38 
 
 right, Bo^cn in the centre, and Stevenson on the left. Major 
 Genera] Stevenson was instructed to make the necessary dispositions 
 for the protection of the trains then on the Clinton road jhuI crossing 
 Baker's Greek, The line of battle ^a.^ quickl}' formed, without any 
 interference on the part of the enemy, the position selected was 
 naturally a. strong one, and all approaches from the front well 
 covered. A short time after the formation of the line, Loring's 
 division was thrown back so as to cover the military road, it being 
 reported that the enemy had appeared in that direction. The enemy 
 made his first demonstration on our right, but, after a lively artillery 
 duel for an hour or more, this attack was relinquished and a large 
 force was thrown against our left, where tkirmishing became heavy 
 about ten o'clock, and the battle began in earnest along Stevenson's 
 entire front about noon. Just at this time, a column of the enemy 
 were seen moving in front of our centre towards the right. Landis' 
 battery, of Bowen's division, opened upon and soon broke this column 
 and compelled it to retire. 1 then directed Major-General Loring to 
 move forward and crush the enemy in his front, and directed General 
 Bowcn to co-operate with him in the movement. Immediately on the 
 receipt of my message, Genc-ral Bowen rode up and announced his 
 readiness to execute his part of the movement as soon as Major 
 General Loring should advance. No movement was made by Major 
 General Loring, he informing me that the enemy was too strongly 
 posted to be attacked, but that he would seize the first opportunity to 
 ■assault, if one should ofi"er. .The enemy still making strenuous 
 efiorts to turn Major General Stevenson's left flank, compelled him to 
 make a similar movement towards the left, thus extending his own 
 line and making a gap between his and Bowen's divisions. General 
 Bowen was ordered to keep this interval closed, and the same instruc- 
 tions were sent to General Loring, in reference to the interval 
 ■between his and General Bowen's division. General Stevenson 
 "iyiving informed me that, unless reinforced, he would be unable to 
 .resist the heavy and repeated attacks along his whole line, Bowen was 
 ■ordered to send one brigade to hia assistance, which was promptly 
 brought forward under Colonel F. M. Cockrell, and in a very short 
 'time his remaining brigade, under the command of Brigadier General 
 Martin E. Green, was put in, and the two together, under their 
 .gallant leaders, charged the enemy and for a time turned the tide of 
 ■battle in our favor, again displaying the heroic courage which this 
 veteran division has made conspicuous on so many stricken fields. 
 'The enemy still continued to move troops from his left to his right, 
 thus increasing his vastly superior forces against Stevenson's and 
 IBowen's divisions. Feeling assured that there was no important 
 £orce in his front, I dispatched several staflf officers m rapid succession 
 ;to Major General Loring, ordering him to move all but one brigade 
 i-'Tilghraan's, which was directed to hold the Baymond road and cover 
 •■the bridge and ford at Baker's Creek) to the left as rapidly as possible. 
 'To the first of these messages, sent about two o'clock, P. M., answer 
 was returned by Major General Loring that the enemy vrfs in strong 
 "force in his front and endeavoring to flank him. Hearing no firing 
 
39 
 
 on the viglit, I repeated my orders to Mujor General Lor'ng, 
 explained to him the condition of affairs on the left, and directo;! him 
 to pnt his two left brigades into the fight as soon as possible. In the 
 transmission of these various messages to and fro over a distance oi 
 more than a mile, much valuable time was necessirily consumed, 
 which the enemy did not fail to take advantage of. 
 
 About lour o'clock, P. M., a part of Stevensoa's division broke 
 badly and fell back in great disorder, but was partially rallied by the 
 strenuous exertions of my:?elf and staff, and put back under their o^?fl 
 officers into the fight; but observing that large numbers of men wcr^) 
 abandoning the field on Stevenson's lofc, desci'ting their comrades, 
 who in this moment of groat-cst trial stood maufully ac their posti, t 
 rode up to General Stevenson and, informing him that I had repeat- 
 edly ordered two brigades of General Loring's division to hi.i 
 assistance and that I was momentarily expecting them, asked him 
 whether he could hold iiis position ; he replie^Vtliat he could not, that 
 he was fighting from sixty thousand to eighty thousand men. I tiici 
 told him 1 would endeavor myself to find General Loring and har.ten 
 him up, and started immediately with that object. I presently met 
 Brigadier General Buford's brigade of Loring's division, on tho 
 march and in rear of the right of Bowen's division. Colonel Cock- 
 reil, commanding the First Missouri brigade, having, in person, some 
 time previously urgently asked for reinforcements, which (none of 
 Loring's troops having come up) I was then unable to give him. One 
 regiment of Baforl's ftrigtide was detached at once and directed to 
 his support ; the remainder of Buford's brigade was moved as rapidly 
 as possible to the a?sistance of General Stevenson. Finding that tho 
 enemy's vastly 8upi?rior numbers were pressing all my forces ;Mig;iged 
 eteadily back into old fields, where all advantages of position would bn 
 in his favor, I felt it to be too late to save the day, even should 
 Brigadier General Feaih.er3ton'3 brigade of General Loring's division 
 come ffp immediately. I could, hovrever, learn nothing of General 
 Loring's whereabouts ; several of my staff" officers were in search of 
 him, but it was not until after General Bowen had porscnaliy informed 
 me that he could not hold his position longer, and not until after I had 
 ordered the retreat that General Loring, Avith Feaiherston's brigade, 
 moving, as I subsequently learned, by a country road which was con- 
 siderably longer than the direct route, reached the position on the 
 left known as Cliompion's llill, where he was forming line of battle 
 when he received my order to cover the retreat. Had the movement 
 in support of the left been promptly made, v/hen first ordered, it is nol 
 improbable that I might have maintained my position, and it is pos- 
 sible the enemy might have been driven back, though his va>;lv 
 superior and constantly increasing numbers would have rendr-.ivl a. 
 necessarv to withdraw during the night to save my communicui rts 
 wi'n Vicksburg. 
 
 Early in the day. Major Lcckett, Chief Engineer, had been in.-tructcd 
 to throw a bridge oyer Baker's Creek, on the llaymond Roa'C The 
 stream had also fallen sufficiently to render the fonl practicable. The 
 retreat v/as ordered to be conducted by that route, and a staff officer iin- 
 
40 
 
 tr.ediatel;^ dispatched to Brigadier General Tilghman, who was directed 
 to hold the Raymond Road at all hazards. It was in the execution of 
 this important duty, which could not have be''n confided to a fitter 
 t:;an, that the lamented General bravely lost his life. He was struck 
 I 7 a fragment of shell, and died almost instantly. Although, as before 
 stated, a large number of men had shamefully abandoned their eom- 
 nands and were making their way to the rear, the main body of the 
 t-cops letired in good order. On reaching the ford and bridge, at 
 Laker's Creek, I directed Brigadier General Bowea to take position with 
 Kis division on the west bank and to hold the crossing until Loring's 
 division, which was directed to bring up the rear, had effected the 
 passage. I then proceeded at once to the entrenched line, covering the 
 vagon and railroad bridges over the Big Black, to make the necessary 
 arrangements for holding that point during the passage of the river. 
 
 In his official report. Major General Stevenson says: "On my 
 Rvrival, about sunset, at the ford on Baker's Creek, I found that the 
 taemy had crossed the bridge above, and were advacing artillery in 
 the direction of the road on which we were moving. One battery had 
 already taken position and were playing on the load, but at right 
 RHgles and at too long a range to prevent the passage of troops. 
 Here I found, on the west side, the brigades of General Green and 
 Cockrell, of Bowen's division, who had there halted and taken up 
 position to hold the point until liOring's division could cross. I 
 fjund Colonel Scott, of the twelfth Louisiana regiment, of Loring's 
 division, halted about half a mile from the ford on the east side, 
 j»>jd directed him to cross. I then addressed a note to General 
 Loring, informing him of what I had done, telling him of the change 
 I had caused Colonel Scott to make in his position, stating that with 
 the troops then there and others that I could collect I would hold the 
 ford and road until his division could cross, and urging him to hasten 
 the movement. To this note 1 recei\ed no answer, but in a short 
 t'rne Colonel Scott moved off his regiment quickly in the direction of 
 his original position, in obedience, I was informed, to orders from 
 General Loring. Inferring from this that General Loring did not 
 intend to cross at that ford, he having had ample time to commence 
 the movement, I suggested to General Green and Colonel Cockrell to 
 move forward to the railroad bridge. My command reached that 
 I oint at about one o'clock that night and bivouacked near Bovina." 
 
 The entire train of the army, under the judicious management of 
 Colonel A. W. Reynolds, commanding Tennessee brigade of Steven- 
 toon's division, was crossed without loss, though the movements of the 
 eriemy compelled Colonel Reynold's brigade to cross the Big Black 
 above the railroad bridge. 
 
 On reaching the line of entrenchments occupied by Brigadier 
 General Vaughan's brigade of east Tennesseeans, (Smith's division.) 
 Ls was instructed by myself, in person, to man the trenches from the 
 ra,ilroad to the left, his artillery to remain as then posted and all 
 vagon§ to cross the river at once. Special instructions were left with 
 Lieutenant J. H. Morrison, Aid-dc-Camp, to be delivered to Generals 
 
it 
 
 Loring, Stevenson and Bowon. as they should arrive, and wpre deliv- 
 ered to all except to General Loririg, as follows : 
 
 *' General Stevenson's division to cross the river and procee<l to Mt. 
 Albau ; General Loiing's to cross and occu])y the west bank ; Brigadier 
 General Bo^ven^s division, as it should arrive, was directed to occupy 
 the trenches to the right and left of Yauirhan's on<l his artillery to ho 
 parked, that it might bo available for any point of the lines most 
 threatened." 
 
 General Stevenson's division, -rriving very late in the j^i-^'ht, did 
 not move bevond Bovina. and I awaited in vain intelligence of the 
 approach of General Loring- It war, necessary to hold the position 
 to enable him to cross the river, should the enemy, which was i I'oba- 
 ble, follow him closely up. For this purpose alone, I continued the 
 troops in position, until it was too late to withdraw them under cover 
 of night. I then deternined not to abandon so strong a front whilst 
 there was yet a hope of his arrival I have not, up to this tune, 
 received General ijoring's report of the share tiiken by his division in 
 the battle of Baker's Creek, nor have I yet been informed of the 
 reason why he failed to rejoin the army under my command. 
 
 'Ihe Big Black river, where it is crossed by the railroad bridge, 
 makes a bend somewhat in the shape of a horse shoe. Af^ro^s this 
 horse shoe, at its narrowest part, a line of rifle pits had been con- 
 structed, making an excellent cover for iinantry, and, at proper inter- 
 vals, dispositions were made for field artillery. The line of pits ran 
 nearly north and south and was about^one mile in length. horth of, 
 and for a considerable distance south of th • railroad, and of a dirt 
 road to Edward's depot, nearly parellel with it extended a bayou, 
 which, in itself, opposed a serious obstacle to an assault upon the pits. 
 This line abutted north on the river and south upoti a cy[)ree'=« brake, 
 which spread itself nearly to the bank of the river. In addition to 
 the railroad bridge, which I had caused to be floored for the passage 
 even of artillery and wagons, the steamer Dot, from which the 
 rnachineiy had been taken, was converted into a bridge, by p];icing 
 her fore and aft across the river. Iktween the works and the biidge, 
 about three-quarters of a mile, the country was open, bein^ either 
 clear or cultivated fields, affording no cover should the troops be driven 
 from the trenches. East and south of the railroad the ti->pogra,phical 
 features of the country, over ^\hich the enemy must nfcessariiy pass, 
 wtre r-imilar to those above described; but north of the railrond, and 
 about three hundred yards in front of the rifle pits, a cop-^e of wood 
 extended from the road to the river. One line was manned on the 
 right by the gallant CockrelTs Missouri brigade, the extrei^e left by 
 Briga'iier General Green's Missouri and Arkansas men, both of Bowen's 
 division, and the centre by lirigadicr (ieneral Vaughan's brigade of 
 east Tonnessecuns, in all, about four thousand (1,()<I0) men. as many 
 as could he advantageously employed in defen<ling the line, with 
 about twenty ^2M) pieces of field artillery. So strong was the posi- 
 tion, that my greatest, almo.st only, apprehension was a flank move- 
 ment tiy I'ridgeport or Baldwin's ferry, which would have endiingered 
 my coinmunications with Vicksburg. Yet this position was abandoned 
 
42 
 
 by our troops almost without a struggle, and with the loss of nearly 
 all our artillery. I speak not now of the propriety or of the neces- 
 sity of holding this position, I had, as heretofore noticed, my object 
 in doing so. I considered that object sufficient, and I also deemed 
 the force employed for the purpose ample. 
 
 Bri^iadier General Vau";hau's brifrade had not been en>Tra"ed at 
 Baker's Creek, his men were fresh and, I believed, were not demoral- 
 ized. I knew that the Missouri troops, under their gallant leaders, 
 could be depended upon. By whoso order the battery horses were so 
 far removed from their guns as not to be available I do not know ; it 
 certainly was not by mine. General Bowen, with whom I had a per- 
 sonal interview in his tent on the night of the 16th and who received 
 his instructions from my own lips, (Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery, 
 of Lieutenant General E, Kirby Smith's staff, being then present and 
 acting as my aid-de-carnp,) I do not believe to be responsible for it ; 
 be was too old and too good a soldier. Enough, however, will, I 
 think, be developed in a few words to cover the whole case. Early 
 on the morning of the 17th the enemy opened his artillery at long 
 range, and very soon pressed forward vritli infantry into the copse of 
 v;ood north of the railroad ; about the same time he opened on Colonel 
 CockrelTs position with two batteiics and advaiice;i a line of skir- 
 mishers, throwing forward a column ^f infantry, which was quickly 
 driven back by our batteftes. Pretty heavy skirmishing was for 
 awhile kept up along our whole line, but presently the enemy, who 
 had massed a large force in th^ vroods immediately north of the rail- 
 road, advanced at a run, with loud cheers. Our troops in their front 
 did not remain to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. One ■ 
 p3rtion of the line being broken, it very soon became a matter of 
 f.auve qui pent. I shall only add, with reference to the affair of Big 
 Black, tiiat a strong position, with an ample force of infantry and 
 artillery to hold it, was shamefully abandoned, almost without 
 resistiiice. 
 
 The troops occupying the centre did not do tlicir duty. Vvith an 
 almost impassable bayou between themselves and the enemy, they lied 
 before the enemy had reached that obstacle. 
 
 I have receiv^ed no report from Brigadier General Vaughan of the 
 operations of his brigade on this occasion. Colonel Cockrell says, in 
 his official report : " After a lively skirmish-fire had been kept up f )r 
 some time along our whole front, I saw the line between the railroad 
 and fir^it skirt of timber north of the railroad beginning to give way 
 and Ihcn running in disorder. I watched this disorderly failing back 
 a few nrinutes, when I saw that the enemy had possession of the 
 trenches north of the lailroad and were rapidly advancing towards 
 the bridge, our only crossing and way of escape ; the enemy now 
 being nearer this crossing than my line, I therefore ordered the 
 brigade to fall back, and, moving rapidly, gained the bridge, crossed 
 over an;! re-formed on the west bank of the river' north of the 
 railro'.id." 
 
 Colonel Gates, commanding second brigade, Bowen''s division, says 
 in his official report: " They (the enemy) formed their men on the 
 
43 
 
 river, in the timber, where wc couhi not see them. They brought 
 their men ont by the right flank, in column of four, about one hun- 
 dred and forty yards in front of my regiment, at a double quick. I 
 then openeil a most terrific fire upon them, and kept it up until the 
 brigade had passed out of my sight behind a grove of timber, imme- 
 diately upon my right. They moved so as to strike the trenches- 
 occupied by General Vaughan's brigade, so I am informed. I do not 
 know whoso troops were there, but it was immediately on the right of 
 Green's brigade. After they had passed me, I listened for our men 
 to open a heavy volley on my right and drive the encm}' back. Upon 
 not hearing any firing on the right, I directed Lieutenant Colonel 
 Law to u\ouut his horse ani go to General Green and know whether 
 the centre was hoMing their position or not. Colonel Law returned 
 in a few minutes and said that General Green ordered me to fall back. 
 I did so at once. After I had got back below the bend of the river, 
 I discovered that they had crossed the ditches and were between me 
 and the lu-idge." In this precipitate retreat but little order was 
 observfi], the object with all being to reach the bridge as rapidly as 
 possible;. Many were unable to do so, but effected their escape by 
 swimiuing the river ; some were drowned in the attempt. A consid- 
 erable number, unable to swim, anJ* others too timid to expose 
 themselves to the fire of the enemy by an effort to escape, remained 
 in the trenches and were made prisoners. In this connection I deem 
 it my duty to make the following extract from the report of Colonel 
 Cockrell : "Captain I. B. Wilson, of the second infantry, company 
 G, claiming to have been exhausted, did not go with his company into 
 the battle of ' Baker's Creek,' and, having made his way to Big 
 I'lack. joined his company in the rilie-pits onrly on the morning of 
 the 17th instant, and when his company was ordered to fall back, 
 abandoned his company and remained lying in the rifle pits, and was 
 captu'-ed by the enemy; and, whilst a prisoner, stated to Colonel 
 Elijah Gates, of the First Missouri cavalry, who was also a prisoner, 
 that he (Captain Wilson) intended to take the oaih and then go to 
 fighting the enemy as a guerrilla. kSucli conduct merits a dismissal 
 iu disgrace, and such an oflicer should not remain in tlie way of gal- 
 lant and efficient officers now commanding his company." In this 
 opinion 1 fully concur. Neither Brigadier (irencrals Bowcn nor 
 Green had furoislied reports of the action on Big Black previous to 
 their death. To the former had been entrusted the defence of the 
 Mc dc punt, and he had received my instructions in person ; the latter 
 had been second iu command. Brigadier General Vaughan having 
 failed to render his report, I am dependent fir the particulars of the 
 action upon those of Colonels Gates and Cockrell, which arc respect- 
 fully forwarded herewith. Major Lockott, Chief Engineer, was 
 instructed to fire both bridges, after seeing that all the troops had 
 crossed; this was effectually accomplished, under his personal super- 
 vision. The guns in position were ample for the defence, but, the 
 infantry failing to support them, they v.ere abandoned; such as were 
 not in jtosition were safely brought from the field, placed in battery 
 on the hlufi' on the west bank, and, with others already establiii^ed, 
 
44 
 
 and a sufficient force of infantry, held the advancing-colurana of the 
 enemy effectually in check. It had become painfully apparent to me 
 that the monde of my army was not such as to justify ap attempt to 
 hold the line of the Big Black river. Not only v^as it gi'ca^Jy 
 weakened by the absence of General Loring's division, but also by 
 the large number of stragglers who, having abandoned their com- 
 mands, were already making their way into Vicksburg. The enemy, 
 by flank movement on my left by Bridgeport, and on my right by 
 Baldwin's or other ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost simultane- 
 ously with myself, or perhaps interpose a heavy force between me and 
 that city. 
 
 Under these circumstances, nothing remained but to retire the army 
 within the defences of Vicksburg, and to endeavor, as speedily as pos:«i- 
 ble, to reorganize the depressed anddiscorafitted troops. Order:^ ware 
 accordingly issued, at ten A. M., and Major General Stevenson di- 
 rected to conduct the retreat, which was executed without haste and 
 in good order. I myself proceeded at once to Vicksburg to prepare 
 for its defence. 
 
 I think it due to myself, in bringing this portion of my report to a 
 conclusion, to state emphatically that the advance movement of 
 the army from Edward's dep^t, on the afternoon of the loth of May, 
 was made against my judgment, in opposition to my previously ex- 
 pressed intentions, and to the subversion of my matured plans. In one 
 contingency alone I had determined to move towards Jack?on. The 
 safety of Vicksburg was of paramount importance ; under no circum- 
 stances could I abandon my communication with it A sufficient fore j 
 must also be left to defend the river front of the city, the approaches by 
 Chickasaw Bayou, by Snyder's Mills and Warrenton, against a coup de 
 main. My effective aggregate did not exceed twenty-eight thousand ; 
 at least eight thousand would be required for these purposes. It 
 would also bo neces8a»ry to hold the bridges across the Big Black, on 
 the line of the southern railroad. With these deductions, my moveable 
 army might reach eighteen thousand five hundred. I give this num- 
 ber as the maximum. 
 
 In the event, therefore, of the enemy advancing with his whole force, 
 east of the Mississippi river, against Jackson, ray communications 
 by the shortest line being open, would have enable me to move upon his 
 rear. Gen. Johnston's forces and my own might have formed a junc- 
 tion, or have attacked simultaneously in front and rear; but I did not 
 think it would be wise to attempt to execute this plan, until the arri-' 
 val of expected reinforcements at or near Jackson, hence I received 
 General Johnson's instructions, on the morning of the 14th, to move 
 to Clinton with all the force I couldquickly collect, with great regret, 
 and I well remember that, in the presence of one or more of ray staff 
 officers, I remarked, in substance, " such a movement will be suicidal." 
 Nevertheless, notifying G^eral Johnston of the fact, I took measures 
 for an advance movement at once, not, it is true, directly towards 
 Clinton, but in the only direction which, from my knowledge of the 
 circumstances surrounding me, I thought offered a possibility of suc- 
 cess. Had I moved directly to Clinton, the enemy would not have 
 
45 
 
 givtn rae battle in front, but would have interpoaed a force greater 
 than my own between me and Yicksburg. 
 
 It is only necessary to refer to the maps accompanying this report 
 to see how feasible was such a movement. 1 have already given m 
 the body of this report the two letters of instructions from General 
 Johnston, dated respectively 13th and 1 5th May, lbG3. In obedience 
 to t!;c injunctions contained in the former, which was received on the 
 morning of the Nth, I lost no time in putting my army in motion in 
 the direction already stated, and for the fL^asons given. 
 
 About seven A. M., on the IGth, I received the letter which reite- 
 rated the previous instructions. I had, in no measure, changed my 
 views :i3 to the propriety oF the movement therein indicated, but I no 
 lon^'!-r felt at liberty to deviate from General' .Johnston's positive 
 ordered lie had been made aware of my views, and did not sustain 
 tht m. The order of march was at ouce reversed, but the army was 
 ha.dly in motion before it became necessary to form line of battle to 
 meet the greatly superior force,>^ of the enemy'. 
 
 Ahont six. P. M., on the 16th, whilst on the retreat, the following 
 communication was handed to mc : 
 
 " Camp Seven Milrs from Jackson, ^ 
 "71% !4th,- 1863. S 
 
 " Gk'-jkkai. : The body of troops, mentioned in my note of last night, 
 compelled Brigadier General Gregg and his command to, evacuate 
 Jackscn about noon to-<lay, the necessity of taking the Canton road, 
 at right angles to that upon which the enemy approaches, prevented an 
 obsrin ite defence. A body of troops, reported this morning to have 
 reiuhod Raymond last night, advanced at the same time from th^t di- 
 rection. 
 
 '' Prisoners say that it was McPhcrson's corps, (four divisions) which 
 marched from 'Jlinton. I have certain information of the other; 
 both r^kirmi^hcd very cautiously. Telegrams were dispatched, when 
 the eiu!n\ was near, directing General Gist to assemble the approach- 
 ing troops at a point for^y or fifty miles from Jackson, and (General 
 M4xc<»y to return to his wagons, and provide for the security of his 
 brigade • for instance, by joining General Gist. That body of troops 
 w 11 be able, I hope, to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing 
 j)rovi.sion from the eaut, and this one may be able to keep hiin from 
 the country towards Panola. Can he supply himself from the Missis- 
 sippi \ Can you not cat him off from it? And, above all, should he 
 be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him ? As jsoou 
 as the reinfcrcora cnta arc all up, they must be united to the rest 
 of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that they be able 
 to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. 
 
 *♦ Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vickeburg be- 
 twc'^ (ioneral Loring and that pluce, and merely obeerve the ferries, 
 B > 'ht you might unite, if opportunity to fight presented itself? Gen. 
 Gi egg wjir move towards Canton tomorrow. If prisoners tell the 
 tru:H. Ill- force at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. It would 
 decide the campaign to boat it, which can only be done by concentrat- 
 
46 
 
 iiig, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops arrive. Tlicy 
 are to be twelve thousand or thirteen thousand. 
 *' Most respectfully, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 
 '< J. E. JOMKSTON.'' 
 
 It will be observed that General Johnston's letter of the 15th, 
 ^hich caused me to reverse my column, with the view of marching to 
 Clinton was received before the retreat commenced, and about eleven 
 hours earlier than this one of the 14th, juf^t presented. 
 
 1 know nothing of the causes which produced thi-5 result, but I rc- 
 Bpectfully invite attention to the fact that, in this letter of the Hth, 
 General Johnston suggests the very movement which I had made, and 
 for the purpose I had indicated. After expressing thehopri that certain 
 dispositions made by hiiGFclf, might prevent the enemy from drawing 
 provisions from the east, or from the country to\Vards Panola, he says : 
 " Can he supply himself from the .\Ji3sissippi. Can you not cut him orf 
 from it, lUid, above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of 
 supplies, beat him." 
 
 1 have introduced General Johnston's letter entire, that the con- 
 text, as well as that portion to which I have particularly called at^ 
 tention, may be considered. 
 
 ^I ha I resisted the popular clamor for an advance, which begiin from 
 the moment the enemy set his polluting foot upon the eastern bank of 
 the Mi sissippi river. I had resisted the universal sentiment, I be- 
 lieve, of the army, I know of my general officers' in its favor, and 
 yielded only to the orders of my superiors. I was not invited by 
 General Johnston to submit my plans to him for his consideration, iC 
 is, therefore, unnecessary now to speak of them. 
 
 0-ne of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black was the 
 necessity of abandoning our defences on the Yazoo, at Snyder's Mill's j . 
 that position, and the line of Chickasaw Bayou, ^Vere no longer tena- 
 ble. All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sc^'.t into 
 Vicksburg as rapidly as possible, the rest, including heavy guns, to 
 be destroyed. 
 
 There was, at this time, a large quantity of corn, probably 25,006 
 or 30,000 bushels, on boats, much of which might have been brought 
 in had it been possible to furnish the necessary wagons. The boata 
 were sent up the river. Two companies were uirected to remain at 
 Snyder's Mills, making a show of force until the approach of the 
 enemy by l.ind should compel them to retire. To them was entrusted 
 the duty of forwarding all stores possible, and of destroying the re- 
 mainder. This detachment rejoined its command in Vicksburg on, " 
 the morning of the 18th. Every precaution was taken to guard the. 
 important approaches to the city by Forney's and Smith's divisions, 
 while the troops which had been engaged in the battles of the I 6th 
 and 17th, were bivouacked in the rear of the entrenchments. During 
 these battles, the troops of Major .General Forney's division were dis- 
 posed asfollovfs: Brigadier General Ilebert's brigade occupied the 
 line along the Yazoo river, from Haines's Bluff to the Mississippi, 
 including the approaches by Chickasaw Bayou ; Brigadier General; 
 
47 
 
 Moore's brigade, with the Mississippi State troops, under General 
 Harris, attached, (about 600,) guarded the front at AVarrenton. and 
 the approaches from the lower ferries on Big Black river ; Brigadier 
 General Shoupe's brigade of Major General Smith's division guarded 
 the river front of the city. Brigadier General Baldwin's brigade, 
 with WauPs legion attached, guarded the approaches to the city from 
 the Hall's ferry road around to the railroad bridge on the Big Black ; 
 the heavy artillery at the batteries on the river front, under Colonel 
 Higgins. Brigadier General Mooi'e's brigade was drawn in at cnce 
 from Warrenton, and placed in the entrenchments on either side of 
 Baldwin's ferry road. Brigadier General Hebcrt's brigade arrived 
 before daylight on the I8th, bringiiig vrith it all the light pieces, and, 
 in addition, two (2) twenty-pound Parrotts and a Whitworth gun. 
 This brigade iitrmcdiately occupied the entrenchments on both eides of 
 the Jackson road. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th, the troops were disposed from right to 
 left as follows : Maj. Gen. Stevenson's division of five brigades oc-upicd 
 the line from the Warrenton road, including a portion of the river front, 
 to the railroad, a distance of about five miles ; Major General Forney, 
 with two brigades, the line between the railroad and the grave -yard 
 road, about two miles ; and Major General Smith, with three brigades, 
 the Mississippi State troops, and a small detachment from Loring s 
 division, the line from the grave-yard road to the river front, on the 
 north, about one ami a quarter miles. Brigadier General Bowen's 
 division was held in reserve to strengthen any portion of the line 
 most threatened, and Waul's Texas legion (about o'lO) was in reserve 
 especially to support the right of Moore's, or the left of Lee's bri- 
 gadef*. On the entire line, one hundred and two pieces of artillery, 
 of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position at such 
 points as were deemed most suitable to the character of the gun — 
 changes of location being made when occasion called for it. Au en- 
 gineer officer, under the supervision of Major Lockett, chief engineer 
 of the department, was assigned to each division, with an assistant to 
 each brigade commander. Daily reports were made, throui^h the 
 proper channel, to Major Lockett, of the operations of the engineer 
 department, and of the progress of the enemy's works. Major Lock- 
 ett thus kept me constantly informed of all important clianges, mak- 
 ing himself a daily report. 
 
 Instructions had been given from Bovina, that all cattle, sheep and 
 hogs, belonging to private parties, and likely to fi.ill into the hands of 
 the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of 
 fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were givert 
 in regard to corn, and all disposable wagons applied to this end. On 
 the 18th, Colonel Wirt Adams, who had been previously directed to 
 cross to the west bank of the Big Black, with all his cavalry, was 
 notified that Snyder's Mills wouM be abandoned, and that he was ex- 
 pected to operate on the flank and rear of the enemy, with the view 
 of cutting off his supplies in that direction. Colonel Adams' force 
 was, however, very inadequate to this purpose. During the ni^ht of 
 the 17th, nothing of importance occurred. Most of the artillery wa 
 
48 
 
 speedily riacei in position on the line?, and immediately maasares 
 were takt^u to arm all lam whi ha I either unavoidably lost, or who 
 had throrn away their arms on the retreat. General Johnston was 
 notified, on the 1 7th, of the resul'. of the battles of Baker's Creek 
 and Big Clack, and informed that I had, in consequence, been com- 
 pelled to evacuate Snyder's Mills. About noon of the 18th May, 
 whilst engaged in an inspection of the entrenchments, with jMiijor 
 Jjockett, my chief engineer, and several of my General officers, the 
 enemy was reported to be advancing by the Jacks )n road, Just at 
 this moment, the following communication was received by courier : 
 
 *' Camp between Livingston and Browinsvflle, ) 
 
 "May 17, 1863. i 
 
 *' Lieutenant General rEMBEiiTON : 
 
 <• Your dispatch of to-day, by Captain Henderson, was received. 
 If Haines's Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is cf no value, and cannot 
 be hold. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ulti- 
 mately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both 
 troopi aitd place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not 
 too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to th«f 
 north- cast. 
 
 *' Most respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 *' J. E. Johnston, Generdy 
 
 The evacuat'on of Vicksburg ! It meant the loss of the valuable 
 stores aP'i munitions of war collected for its defence, the fall of Port 
 Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi river, and the severance of 
 the Confi^dcracy. These were m ghty interests, which, had I deemed 
 the eviiouation practicable, in the sense in which I interpreted General 
 Joiinston s instructions, might well have made me hesitate to execute 
 them. 1 believed it to be in .ny power to hold Vicksburg. I knew I 
 appreciated the earnest desire of the Government and the people that 
 it should be held. I knew, perhaps better than any other individual, 
 under all the circumstances, its capacity for d^-fence. As long ngo as 
 the 17th of February last, in a letter addressed to his excellency, the 
 President, I had suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicks- 
 burg by land and water, and fur that reason the necessity of ample 
 supplies of ammunition, as veil as of subsistence, to stand a siege. 
 My application met his favorable consideration, and additional ammu- 
 nition was ordered. 
 
 With proper economy of subsistence and ordnance stores, I knew 
 that I co'il I stand a siege I ha I a firm reliance in the desire of the 
 Pscsident and of General Johnston, to do all that could be dene to 
 raise a si"ge. I felt that every effort would be made, and I believed 
 it would be snccessful. With these convictions on my own mind, I im- 
 diately summoned a council of war, composed of all my General offi- 
 cers. I laid before them G-meral Johnston's communication, brt de- 
 sire;! them to confine the expression of their opinions to the que;itii)n 
 of practicability. Having obt:iined their views, the following coin- 
 municatioa was addressed to General Johnston : 
 
49 
 
 *• Headquarters Dep't Mississippi and East Lol-isiana, ) 
 
 " Vicksburg, May 18, 1863. I 
 ** General Jos. E. Johnston : 
 
 '* General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 communication, in reply to mine, by the hands of Captain Henderson. 
 In a subsequent letter, of same date as this latter, I informed you that 
 the men had failed to hold the trenches at Big Black bridge, and that, 
 as a consequence, Snyder's Mill was directed to be abandoned. On 
 the receipt of your communication, 1 immediately assembled a coun- 
 cil of war of the General officers of this command, and having laid 
 your instructions before them, asked the free expression of their 
 opinion as to the practicability of carrying them out. The opinion 
 was unanimously expressed, that it was impossible to withdraw the 
 army from this position with such morale and materiel as to be of 
 further service to the Confederacy. While the council of war was 
 assembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and it was at 
 the same time reported that they were crossing the Yazoo river at 
 Brandon's ferry, above Snyder's Mills. I havedecided to hold Vicks- 
 burg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the Government may 
 yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enem\' s 
 free navigation of the Mississippi river. I still conceive it to be the 
 moat important point in the Confederacy. 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 *' J. C. Pembf.rton, 
 '■ Lieutenanf General, commanding."' 
 
 The development of the entrenched line, from the extreme right of 
 Major General Stevenson's position to the left of Major Gc-neral 
 Smith's, \<"as about eight miles — the shortest defensible line of which 
 the topography of the country admitted. The plan was submitted to 
 me immediately aft-T I assumed command of the department of Mis- 
 sissippi and East Louisiana, in the latter part of October, I8G2 ; was 
 approved, and ordered to be carried out with the utmost dispatch. 
 Similar instructions were, about the sarr.e time, given for fortifying the 
 strong position at Snyder's Mills, and the land defonoes of l*ort Hud- 
 son were also ordered to be commenced at once. The line of defence 
 around the city of Vicksburg consisted (as is shown in the map ac- 
 companying the report of Mtijor Lockott, chief engineer.) of a system 
 of detached works (redans, lunettes, and redoubts.) on the prominent 
 and commanding points, with the upu;i1 profile of raised field works, 
 connected, in most cases, by rifle-pits. To man the entire line, I was 
 able to bring into the trenches about eighteen thousand five hundred 
 muskets ; but it was absolutely necessary to ke-^p a reserve always 
 really to reinforce any point heavily threatened. It became indis- 
 pensable, therefore, to roduce the number in the trenches to the mini- 
 mum capable of holding them until a reserve could come to theiraid. 
 It was also ni'(c.-;-:iry that the reserve should be composed of tro<Jps 
 among the best and most reliable. Accordingly, Bowcn's division, 
 (about twentv-four hundred.) and Waul's Texas Ifgion, (about five 
 hundred,) were designated for that purpose, thus rctlucing the force 
 in the trenches to little over fifteen thousand five hundred men. The 
 4 
 
50 
 
 legion was, on the 18th, assigned as a reserve to Forney's division, 
 :md was hehl in rear of Brigadier General Moore's right, but on the 
 evenin<T of the 19th was transferred to Stevenson's division, and 
 during the remainder of the siege was hehl in rear of Brigadier Gen- 
 eral Lee's brigade, occupying one of the most exposed and important 
 positions on the whole line. On the night of the 17th, and during 
 the 18th, Major General Smith, misapprehending my instructions 
 f^iven him immediately after my return from the Big Black, had occu- 
 pied an outer line of defence, on the range of hills north of the Fort 
 Hill road. This line had undoubtedly some advantages ; it was within 
 six hundred yards of the inner line, and partially commanded one of 
 our most important river batteries. I considered, however, that the 
 increased length which would necessarily be given to the whole line 
 of defence — the intervening valley, and other objections to its occu- 
 pation — more than counterbalanced the advantages. The troops and 
 artillery were, therefore, on the night of the 18th, silently and safely 
 withdrawn, and General Smith's division occupied the inner line dur- 
 ini:^ the remainder of the siege. The enemy, however, had made, 
 (luring the day, a demonstration with artillery and infantry on his po- 
 sition, and early on the morning of the 19th he occupied the aban- 
 doned heights. During the day, there was constant and heavy skir- 
 mishing along the left of our centre, on the grave-yard road, accom- 
 jianied with brisk artillery fire. In tlie afternoon the enemy made a 
 charge on Smith's right and Forney's left, but was severely repulsed, 
 losing two stands of colors. Later, their sharpshooters and artillery 
 opened heavily on the Jackson and Baldwin ferry road, A courier 
 was despatched with the following telegram to the President : 
 
 •' We are occupying the trenches around Vicksburg. The enemy 
 is investing it, and will probably attempt an assault. Our men have 
 considerably recovered their morale, but unless a large force is sent at 
 once to relieve it, Vicksburg, before long, must fall, I have used 
 every effort to prevent all this, but in vain." 
 
 '2.i)th. — The enemy continued to move from our right, with heavy 
 cannonading, towards the centre and left ; three guns temporarily dis- 
 abled. At noon, the mortar fleet of Admiral Porter took position on 
 the west side of the peninsula, and commenced the bombardment of 
 the city. The following dispatch was forwarded by courier to General 
 Johnston : 
 
 " The enemy assaulted our entrenched lines yesterday, at two 
 points — centre and left — and was repulsed with heavy loss. Our loss 
 small. 1 cannot estimate the enemy's force now engaged around Vicks- 
 burg at less than sixty thousand ; it is probably more. At this hour, 
 eight and a half o'clock, A. M., he is briskly cannonading with long 
 range guns. That we may save ammunition, his fire is rarely returned. 
 At present our main necessity is musket caps. Can you send them 
 to me by hands of couriers or citizens ? An army will be necessary 
 to relieve Vicksburg, and that quickly. Will it not be sent ? Please 
 let me hear from you, if possible, 
 
 ^Xst. — The fire from the mortar fleet continued without intermis- 
 sion, accompanied by heavy musketry and artillery fire from the rear. 
 
51 
 
 to which but Blight response was given. Several guns were dis- 
 mounted, and a number of oflScers and men killed and wounded. In 
 the afternoon, the enemy's gunboats steamed up, and threw a large 
 number of shells into the city, but without material damage. An- 
 ticipating an attack on the right, Creneral Bowen was ordered to hold 
 his command in readiness to assist the threatened point; and that the 
 safety of the magazines might be secured from the possible danger of 
 disloyal persons within the lines, Gen. Stevenson was ordered to organ- 
 ize a guard for their protection from among the most reputable of the 
 citizens, and to place the guard under the command of a commissioned 
 officer. The prospect of a protracted siege, and the uncertainty as 
 to how many assaults we might have to repel, and in view of the 
 possibility of having to march out from our entrenchments to meet and 
 co-opeiate with an assisting army, expected under General Johnston, 
 rendered it a matter of vital importance that every charge of ammu- 
 nition on hand should be hoarded with the most jealous care. The 
 amount of ammunition in Vicksburg, though large, would not have 
 sufficed for an unlimited daily expenditure for a protracted period. 
 The importance of the most rigid economy, therefore, in its use, was 
 apparent, and strict orders were consequently issued against all picket 
 skirmishing and artillery duels, where neither served any useful pur- 
 pose. These orders were repeated as occasion required. It being 
 impracticable to continue feeding the large number of mules and 
 horses then in Vicksburg, General Stevenson was directed to have 
 them driven beyond the lines for pasturage, or, if practicable, to sendi 
 them, in charge of a detail, to General Jqhnston. By this means, we 
 were relieved of a serious encumbrance, which would else have drawn, 
 heavily upon our limited supplies of forage. Another courier was 
 to-day sent to General Johnston wi:h the following dispatches : 
 
 '* During the past two days the enemy has passed up the river in 
 transports, in large force, for a point not yet discovered. 
 
 " The enemy has continued a spirited firing all day ; also, his shell- 
 ing from mortar boats. Our men have replied rarely. Two large 
 transports came down loaded wich troops. They are evidently rein- 
 forcing their present large force. Am I to expect reinforcements — 
 from what direction, and how soon ? Have you heard anything from, 
 General Loring ? Can you send me musket caps by courier ?" 
 
 *' The enemy kept up incessant sharpshooting all yesterday, on the 
 loft and centre, and picked off our officers and men whenever they 
 hhowcd themselves. Their artillery fire was very heavy, ploughed up 
 our works considerably, and dismounted two guns on the centre. The 
 works were repaired and the guns replaced last night. The great 
 question is ammunition. The men credit and are encouraged by a 
 report that you are near with a large force. They aro fighting iii 
 good spirits, and the reorganization is complete. 
 
 *' P. S. — Brisk musketry and artillery fire to-day, on centre. Three 
 guns there dismounted; will be replaced as far as possible. Officer:^ 
 FufTer most from their sharpshooters. Incessant mortar firing from 
 the river, and last night three of their gunboats engaged the lower 
 batteries." 
 
52 
 
 2271C?. — The fire from the enemy's artillery and sharpphooters in 
 the rear was heavy and incessant until noon, when his gunboats 
 opened upon the city, while a determined assault was made along 
 Moore's, Hebert's and Lee'S lines. I cannot better describe this 
 assault than by the following extracts from the official reports of my 
 several division commanders. General Stevenson says in his report: 
 '* On the morning of the 22nd of May, many indications showed that 
 they (the enemy) contemplated an assault upon the line of General 
 -Lee. A tremendous artillery fire was opened and kept up for about 
 two hours, while the fire of their large force of sharpshooters was 
 heavy and incessant. At about one o'clock, P. M , a heavy force 
 moved out to the assault, making a gallant charge. They were 
 allowed to approach unmolested to within good musket range, M'hen 
 every available gun was opened upon them with grape and canister, 
 and the men, rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley 
 after volley with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally 
 ■<;overed in some places with their dead and wounded, they precipi- 
 "tately retreated." The angle of one of our redoubts having been 
 breached by their artillery previcus to the assault, when the repulse 
 occurred, a party of about sixty of the enemy, under the command of 
 a lieutenant colonel, made a rush, succeeded in effecting a lodgment 
 in the ditch at the foot of the redoubt and planted two colors on the 
 •parapet. It was of vital importance to drive them out, and, upon a 
 call for volunteers for that purpose, two companies of Waul's T<?xas 
 •legion, commanded respectively by. Captain Bradley and Lieutenant 
 ■Hogue, accompanied by the gallant and chivalrous Colonel E. W. 
 Pettus, of the twentieth Alabatra regiment, musket in hand, 
 •promptly presented themselves for the hazardous service. Of their 
 success, and the manner in which it was achieved, General Stevenson 
 ■says: " A more gallant feat than this has not illustrated our annals 
 during the war. The preparations were quietly and quickly made, 
 hut the enemy seemed at once to divine our purpose and opened upon 
 the angle a terrible fire of shot, shell and mushctrj^ ; undaunted, this 
 little band, its chivalrous commander at its head, rushed upon the 
 work and, in less time than it requires to describe it. it and the fl::gs 
 were in our possession Preparations were then quickly made for the 
 use of hand grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of 
 our purpose, immediately surrendered." General Forney in his 
 report, speaking of the assault upon our entrenchment, says: " On 
 the 22nd of May he assaulted three points on my line as, follows: 
 three times on my extreme left and extending to General Smith's 
 front ; twice on the Jackson road, and twice on the Baldwin's ferry 
 road, at eleven o'clock, A. M., and five o'clock, P M. These assaults 
 were made by larger bodies and apparently with greater determination 
 than those of the 19th of May. Colonel Waul's legion had previously 
 been sent to General Stevenson ; but Green's brigade, of Bowen's 
 division, v/as in reserve behind my right, and assisted in repelling the 
 attack at that point. There were also, on this day, two Louisiana 
 regiments of Smith's division in reserve behind my division. The 
 enemy was repulsed in each of his attempts, though he succeeded in 
 
63 
 
 getting a few men into our exterior ditches at oach point cf attack, 
 from which they were, however, driven before night. Hand grenades 
 were used at each point with good effect. A color-bearer and two 
 stands of colors were captured by the second Texas regiment, of 
 Moore's brigade. On this day the casualties in my division were 
 forty-two killed and ninety-five wounded " The loss of the enemy 
 must have reached two thousand." General Smith, in his report of 
 this assault, says : ** The 22nd passed in the same manner until 
 about two o'clock, P. M., when a column was discovered advancing 
 against the right of Shoupe's brigade ; it was immediately driven 
 back. Another then approached on the right of the centre ; this was 
 dispersed without great effort, and with considerable loss. Again the 
 enemy appeared in increased force on my right and Forney's left; he 
 was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This terminated the day's 
 operations, with the exception of the same heavy fire of musketry 
 and r.rtillery kept up until dark along my entire front." After these 
 several decided repulses, the enemy seemed to have abandoned the 
 idea of taking by assault and went vigorously at work to thoroughly 
 invest and attack by regular approaches, and the history of one day 
 is pretty much the history of all. 
 
 23rr/. — This day was unusually quiet, with but little artillery firing, 
 until late in the afternoon. The sharpshooters of the enemy were 
 more cautious, and he was evidently staggered by the severe repulse 
 of the day previous. Many of his dead were still lying unburicd in 
 sight of our trenches. 
 
 The fire from the mortar fleet continued heavy and incessant. At 
 night the engineers were again busily engaged in repairing the works 
 in front of Lee, Moore and Heberr, which were badly shatterc<l. 
 
 24th. — At an early hour the mortar fleet opened and kept up a con- 
 tinuous and heavy bombardment throughout the day. Just before 
 dark the artillery from the rear opened a rapid and heavy fire, but 
 not of long duration. 
 
 In the afternoon the enemy attempted to mine our works on the 
 Jackson road, but were soon driven off by the u-^e of haul grenades. 
 
 During the night the engineers were engaged in increa'sing and 
 strengthening our works. Before daylight our river pickets captured 
 a barge laden with coal, which was sunk, it being fonnd impracticable 
 to unload it. General Stevenson was ordered to have collet)ted all 
 the ammunition scattered in front of our trcnciios and to have the 
 cartrifige boxes of the enemy's dead emptied of their contents, it 
 being important to add in any way to our limited supply cf ammuni- 
 tion, .and of musket caps esp^eially, of which latter we stood greatly 
 in need, having a million more of cartri<lge8 than caps, without which 
 latter, of course, the former could be of no possible value. 
 
 25///. — The enemy appeared in force to-day on the Warrenton and 
 Hall's Ferry roads. The firing was about as usual until six o'clock, 
 when a cessation of hostilities was agreed upon to permit the enemy 
 to bury his dead, killed in the assault of PViday. The following is 
 the corrcBpondencc on the subject: 
 
54 
 
 ** Headquarters Department Mississippi and E, Louisiana, > 
 
 ** Vickskirg, May 25, 1863. J 
 " Commanding General United States Forces in front of Vickshurg : 
 
 " Sir : Two days having elapsed since your dead and wounded have 
 been lying in our front, and as yet no disposition on your part of a 
 desire to remove th-^m being exhibited, in the name of humanity, I 
 have the honor to propose a cessation of hostilities for two and a half 
 (2 1-2) hours, that you may be enabled to remove your dead and 
 dying men. If you cannot do this, on notification from you that 
 hostilities will be suspended on your part for the time specified, I will 
 endeavor to have the dead buried and the wounded cared for, 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ** J. C. Pemberton, 
 " Lieutenant General Commanding.^'' 
 
 To which communication the following reply was received: 
 
 "Headquarters, 3:30, P. M., Department of the Tennessee, ) 
 
 ''Near Vicksburg, May 25, 1863. ] 
 " Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton, 
 
 " Commayiding Confederate Forces, Vickshurg, Miss. : 
 
 *' Sir : Your note of this date, proposing a cessation of hostilities 
 for two and a half hours for the purpose of giving me an opportunity 
 of collecting the dead and wounded, is just received. As it will take 
 some time to send word to all my forces to avail themselves of the 
 opportunity afforded and to return this to you, so that notice may be 
 given to your troops of the cessation of hostilites, I will name six 
 o'clock, P. M , to-day, as the hour when we will commence collecting 
 any wounded or dead we may have still upon the field. From that 
 hour, for two and a half hours, all hostilities shall cease on our side. 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 *' U. S. Grant, 
 " Major Ge7ieral.^^ 
 
 During the day about one hundred prisoners were captured, and a 
 ■working party was sent to throw up obstructions on the flat below 
 the city. No circumstance worthy of special note occurred between 
 this date and that of the 27th. The enemy evidently was discouraged 
 by his previous fruitless and costly .assault upon our works in the 
 rear, and he therefore determined, if possible, to attempt to silence 
 ■our upper battery, and then, by the aid of his gunboats, to effect a 
 lodgment in the trenches immediately above and beyond it. With this 
 •design, on the morning of the 27th, at about nine o'clock, four of his 
 boats engaged our lower batteries ; ac the same time the Cincinnati, 
 a turretcd iron-clad of the largest class, and carrying fourteen guns, 
 pushed boldly down the river, rounded the peninsula, and was soon 
 hotly engaged with our upper battery at short range. After a 
 spirited engagement of about forty .five minutes the Cincinnati was 
 rendered a complete wreck, and only escaped total destruction by 
 being run aground on the Mississippi shore, where she is probably still 
 lying. The lower fleet, witnessing her discomfiture, soon drew off, 
 swith what damage to themselves it is impossible to say. The firing 
 
55 
 
 from otir batteries was most excellent ond too much praise cannot lo 
 awarded to Colonel Iliggins, his officers and men, for their galhiiitrj, 
 coolness and skill. The enemy still continued to work steadily in- 
 completing and strengthening his line of circumvallation. His fire 
 of both musketry and artillery was continuous during each day. 
 Major Matthews, ordnance officer, was instructed to have the large 
 number of unexploded I'arrott shells, scattered around the city, sent 
 to Paxton's foundry and re-cappcd. On the morning of the 29th the 
 enemy opened a terrific fire from the rear, and for four hoars a storm 
 of shot and shell was rained upon the city, seriously damaging many 
 buildings, killing and wounding a large number of soldiers and citi- 
 zens. During the day Ellett's Marine Brigade arrived and anchored 
 at the bend above. Two couriers had arrived from General Johnston 
 on the 2Sth and 29th respectively; the former brought lS,0'iU caps, 
 the latter 20,000 and the following dispatch, the first received since 
 the 18th: 
 
 **May 25, 18G3. 
 ■" Lieutenant General Pkmberton : 
 
 '* My last note was returned by the bearer. 200,0011 caps have been 
 sent. It will be continued as they arrive. Bragg is sending a divis- 
 ion ; when it comes I will move to you. Which do you think th.^ 
 best route ? How and where is the enemy encamped ? What is your 
 force ? 
 
 ** J. E. Johnston." 
 
 (The 2(^0,0 :0 caps mentioned in the above dispatch were captured 
 by the enemy.) 1 dispatched the following reply : " Your dispatch 
 of 25th received this evening, with 20,000 caps. Fontaine yesterday 
 with 18,0011. No messenger from you since 18th. I have lS,Onn 
 men to man the lines and river front. No reserves. I do not thiuk 
 you should move with less than 3i>,000 or 35.000, and then, if pos- 
 sible, towards Snyder's Mills, giving me notice of the time of your 
 approach. The enemy encompasses my lines from right to left flank, 
 occupying all roads He has three corps, Sherman on my left, 
 Mcl'herson centre, McClernand on my right, Hurlbut's division from 
 jSIemphis, and Ellett's Marine Brigade (the last afloat). Enemy has 
 made several assaults. My men are in good spirits, awaiuug your 
 •arrival. Since investment we have lost about 1,000 men, many offi- 
 cers. You may depend on my holding the place as long as possible. 
 On the 27th we sunk one of their best iron-clad gunboats." 
 
 On the 30th I again dispatched as lollows : "Scouts report the 
 enemy to have withdrawn most of his forces from our right yester- 
 day, leaving Hall's Ferry road open — I apprehend, for a movement 
 against you. I expect this courier to return to me," 
 
 The meat ration having been reduced one-half, that of sugar, rice 
 and beans was larg«lv increased. It was important, above all things, 
 that every encouragement should be given to the troops. With this 
 object in view, I ordered tke impressment of chewing tobacco and its 
 issue to the troops. This had a very beneficial influence. The 
 <nemy kept steadily at work day an<i Tiight, and, taking advantage of 
 the cover of the hills, had run his parallels up to within seventy-five 
 
5S 
 
 yards of our -n-orks. He was also loining at different points, and it 
 required the active and constant attention of our engineers to repair 
 at night the damage inflicted upon our works during the daj, and to 
 meet his different mines by countermining. Orders were issued i^ 
 prepare thunder-barrels and petards for the defence of weak points, 
 and every precaution was taken to check the enemy in his operations 
 and to dehiy them as far as possible. 
 
 On the 7th of June, the following dispatch was sent to General 
 Johnston : " I am still without information from you later than your 
 dispatch of 2oth. The en£my continues to entrench his position 
 around V^icksburg. I have sent out couriers to you almost daily. 
 The same men are constantly in the trenches, but are still in good 
 spirits, expecting your approach. The enemy is so vigilant that it 
 is impossible to obtain reliable information. When may I expect you 
 to move, and in what direction ? My subsistence may be put down 
 at twenty days." On the IDth I again dispatched as follows : " The 
 enemy bombard day and night from seven mortars on opposite side of 
 peninsula. He also keeps up constant fire on our lines with artillery 
 and sharp shooters. We arc losing many officers and men. I am 
 waiting most anxiously to know your intentions. Have heard nothing 
 of you or from you since 25th May. I shall endeavor to hold out as 
 long as we have any thing to eat. Can you not send me a verbal 
 message by a courier, crossing the river above or below Vicksburg, 
 and swimming across again opposite Vicksburg," Again, on the 12th, 
 I dispatched as follows : " Courier Walker arrived this morning witb 
 caps. No message from you. Very heavy firing yesterday from 
 mortars and on lines." 
 
 About this time our provisions, particularly of meat, having be- 
 come almost exhausted, General Stevenson was instructed to impress 
 all cattle in the city, and the chief commissary directed to sell only 
 one ration per diem to any officer. He was also instructejl to issue 
 for bread equal portions of rieo and flour, four ounces of each. 
 About the 13th, Captain Saunders arrived from Jackson, via Steele's 
 Bayou, with 200, (){)() percussion caps ; and a day or two subsequent, 
 I leceivod the following dispatch from General Johnston, May 29, 
 1863: 
 
 '' I am too Vi'cak to save Vicksburg; ca« do no more than attempt 
 to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate 
 Tou unless you co-operate, and we make mutually supporting move- 
 ments. Communicate your plans and suggestions if possible." 
 
 On the 14th and 15th, I addressed General Johnston as follows: 
 
 " Vicksburg, 14th June, 18G3. 
 
 " Last night Captain Saunders arrived with 200,01)0 caps, but 
 brought no information as to your position or movement.'^. The 
 enemy is landing troops in large numbers on Louisiana shore above 
 Vicksburg They are probably from Memphis, but it may be from 
 Yazoo. I cannot ascertain positively. On the Grave-yard road tho 
 enemy has run his saps to within twenty-five yards of our works. 
 He will probably attempt to sink a mine ; I shall try to thwart him. 
 I am anxiously expecting to hear from you, to arrange for co-opera- 
 tion." 
 
57 
 
 " VicKSBURG, June 15th, 1SG3. 
 
 " The enemy has placed several very heavy guns in position against 
 our works, and is approachin.s^ them very nearly by sap. His fire is 
 almost continuous. Our men have no relief, are becoming much fa- 
 tigued, but are still in pretty good spirits. I think your movement 
 should be made as soon as possible. The enemy is receiving rein- 
 forcements, AVe are living on greatly reduced rations, but I think 
 sufficient for twenty days yet " 
 
 The enemy had now placed in position, on the peninsula, several 
 very heavy guns, the fire of which was very destructive, and thougti 
 repeated attempts were made, we could not succeed in silencing them.. 
 On the 19th the following telegram Avas sent to General Johnston: 
 
 " The enemy opened all his batteries on our lines about three and 
 half o'clock this morning, and continued the heaviest firo we hive yet 
 sustained, until eight o'clock ; but he did not assault our works Ar- 
 tillery is reported to have been distinctly heard about two o'clock A. 
 M., towards and east of Snyder's Mills, supposed to have been an en- 
 gagement with your troops. On the Grave-yard road the enemy's 
 works are within twenty-five feet of our redan ; also very close on 
 Jackson and Baldwin's ferry roads. 1 hope you will advance with the 
 least possible delay. My men have been thirty-four days and nights 
 in trenches without relief, and the enemy within conversation dis- 
 tance. We are living on very reduced rations, and, as you know, are 
 entirely isolated. "What aid am I to expect from you. The bearer, 
 Captain Wise, can be confided in." 
 
 On the night of the 22d,a party from Cummings' Georgia brigade, 
 Stevenson's division, made a gallant sortie on the Hall's Ferry road, 
 and captured a lieutenant colonel and twelve men, with their en- 
 trenching tools, etc. 
 
 On the night of the 23d, a heavy skirmish occurred in front of 
 Cummings' line, for the possession of a picket station, which resulted 
 in the repulse of the enemy. Under date of the 21st, the following 
 dispatch was sent out to General Johnston : 
 
 "Your dispatches of 1 4th and Kith received. If it is absolutely 
 impossible, in your opinion, to raise the siege with our combined 
 forces, and that nothing more can be done than to extricate the g.ar- 
 rison, I suggest, that, giving me full information in time to act, you 
 move by the north of the railroad, drive in the enemy's pickets at 
 night, and at daylight next morning engage him heavily with skir- 
 mishers, occupving him during the entire day, and that on that night I 
 move by the Warrenton road by llankinson's ferry, to which point you 
 should previously send a brigade of cavalry, with two field batteries, 
 to build a bridge there and hold that ferry ; also Hall's and Baldwin's, 
 to cover my crossing at Hankinson's. 1 shall not be able move with 
 my artillery or wagons. I suggest this as the best plan, because all 
 the other road.s are too strongly entrenched, and the enemy in too 
 heavy force, for a reasonable prospect of success, unless you, move in 
 Bufiicient force to compel him to abandon his communications with 
 Snyder's, which I fitill hope we may be able to do. I await your 
 orders. Captain Cooper understands all my views, and will explain 
 
58 
 
 further." I insert here two dispatches from General Johnston, re- 
 ceived about this time, one of which is acknowledged in my letter 
 above : 
 
 "June 14, 1863. 
 
 " All that we can attempt is to save you and your garrison. To 
 do this exact co-operation is indispensable. By fighting the enemy 
 simultaneously at the same point of his line you may be extricated. 
 Our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg. My communi- 
 cations with the rear can best be preserved by operating north of 
 railroad. Inform mo as soon as possible what point will suit you 
 best. Your dispatches of the 12th received. General Taylor, with 
 eight thousand men, will endeavor to open communication with you 
 from Richmond." 
 
 ''June 22, 1863. 
 
 ''Your dispatch of the 15th received. General Taylor is sent by 
 General E. Kirby Smith to co-operate with you from the west bank 
 of the river, to throw in supplies, and to cross with his force if expe- 
 dient and practicable. I will have the means of moving towards the 
 enemy in a day or two, and will try to make a diversion in your 
 favor, and if possible communicate with you, though I fear my force 
 is too small to eflfect the latter. I have only two-thirds of the force 
 you told messenger Saunders to state to me as the least with which I 
 ought to make an attempt. Scouts report the enemy fortifying to- 
 wards us and the roads blocked. If I can do nothing to relieve you, 
 rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the 
 last moment, if you and General Taylor communicate." 
 
 Late in the afternoon of the 25th the enemy exploded his first mine 
 under the parapet of General Forney's works. In his official report 
 that officer says : " The explosion effected a breach, through which 
 the enemy immediately attempted to charge, but was promptly and 
 gallantly repulsed. The sixth Missouri regiment, which had been 
 held in reserve, was on the spot immediately after the explosion, and 
 its co;nmander. Colonel Eugene Irvin, was instantly killed while 
 attempting to lead a charge over the works. Six men of the forty- 
 thiid Mississippi regiment, who were in a shaft counter-mining at the 
 time of the explosion, were buried and lost. At dark the enemy had 
 possessed himself of the ditch and slope of the parapet, and our 
 forces retired to an interior line, a few feet back. This point was 
 now reinforced by Colonel Cockrell's brigade of Bowen's division, and 
 work was resumed by the enemy and by us, we counter- mining and 
 they mining." From this time until the 1st nothing of moment 
 occurred. On that day, however, the enemy sprung another mine on 
 the right of the Jackson road, which is thus spoken of by General 
 Forney in his report: " The result was the entire demolition of the 
 redan, leaving only an immense chasm where it stood. The greater 
 portion of the earth was thrown towards the enemy, the line of least 
 resistance being in that direction. Our interior line was much 
 injured. Nine men, who were counter-mining, were necessarily lost, 
 and a large number of those manning the works were killed and 
 wounded. The enemy, however, made no attempt to charge, seeming 
 
59 
 
 satisfied vrith having materially weakened the position. I understand 
 that the amount of poAvdcr used bj the enemy in this explosion was 
 one ton. While all this was taking place on the Jackson road, the 
 enemy was by no means idle at other points. At the work on the 
 Baldwin's Ferry road his sappers had nearly reached the ditch. At 
 this place we sprung a countermine, which was unfortunately a little 
 premature." From this time forward our engineers were kept con- 
 stantly and busily employed in counter-mining against the enemy, 
 who was at work day and night in mining on different portions of the 
 line. About this time, our stock of bacon having been almost 
 exhausted, the experiment of using mule meat as a substitute was 
 tried, it being issued only to those who desired to use it, and I am 
 gratified to say it was found by both officers and men not only nutri- 
 tious, but very palatable and every way preferable to poor beef. 
 
 I have already given m exttnso the several letters received from 
 General Johnston up to this time and my replies thereto. In this 
 connection I take occasion to introduce General Johnston's letter of 
 the 2Tth of June, which was never received by me, but a copy of 
 which General Johnston was kind enough to furnish : 
 
 ''June 27, 18G3. 
 
 ** Your dispatch of the 22nd received. General E. K. Smith's 
 troops have bcc-n mismanaged and have fallen back to Delhi. I have 
 sent a special messenger urging him to assume direct command. The 
 determined spirit you manifest and his expected co-operation 
 encourage me to hope something may yet be done to save Vicksburg 
 and to postpone both the modes suggested of merely extricating the 
 garrison. Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, 
 should they become necessary, mus^ be made by you. It would be a 
 confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to 
 propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may 
 be considered as made under my authority." 
 
 To preserve the continuity of the narrative, and ihat events may 
 be mentioned in the order of their dates, I also give General John- 
 Eton's letter of July 3rd, which was received by me on the 10th : 
 " Camp near Birlsong's Ferry, July 3rd. 
 
 " Your dispatches of 2Sth were destroyed by messenger. He 
 states that General Smith's troops were driven back to Monroe. This 
 statement and his account of your condition make me think it neces- 
 sary to create a diversion and thus enable you to cut your way out, 
 if the time has arrived for you to do this. Of that time I cannot 
 judge — you must, as it depends upon your condition. I hope to 
 attack the enemy in your front the 7th, and your co-operation will be 
 necessary. The manner and the proper point for you to bring the 
 garrison out must be determined by you, from your superior knowl- 
 edge of the ground and distribution of the enemy's forces. Our 
 firing will show you wl ere we are cr;gaged. If Yicksburg cannot 
 be saved, the garrison must." 
 
 On the first of July I felt satisfied that the time had arrived when 
 it was necessary either to evacuate the city and cut my way out or to 
 capitulate upon the best attainable terms. My own inclination led 
 
60 
 
 me to hvov the former. With this view, therefore, I addressed to 
 my division commanders — Generals Stevenson, P'orney. Smith and 
 Bowen — the following communication : 
 
 " HEAOqUARTEIlS DEPARTMENT MISSISSIPPI AND E. LOUISIANA, ) 
 
 " Vicksburg,Jnlj 1, 186.3. \ 
 "General: Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies 
 are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate th^ 
 place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if 
 not insuperable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, there- 
 fore, requested to inform me, with as little delay as possible, as to 
 the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches 
 and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacua- 
 tion. You will, of course, use the utmost discretion whilst informing 
 yourself, through your subordinates, upon all points tending to a clear 
 elucidation of the subjects of my inquiry. 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 "John C. Pemberton, 
 *' Lieutenant General commanding. ^^ 
 
 The next day I received a reply from each of those officers, which 
 is herewith submitted : 
 
 " Headquarters Stevenson's Division, > 
 " Vicksburg, July 2, 1863. \ 
 
 " General : Your note (confidential) of yesterdaj^ requesting me 
 to inform you as to the ' condition of my troops, and their ability to 
 make tlie marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish 
 a successful evacuation of this city,' was duly received; and I have the 
 honor to reply thereto, as follows : My men' are very cheerful, but 
 from long confinement — more than forty-five days — in the trenches, 
 on short rations, are necessarily much enfeebled; and a considerable 
 number would be unable to make the marches and undergo tlse fa- 
 tigues which would probably be necessary to a successful evr.cuation 
 of this city. If pressed by the enemy, and it should be necessary to 
 place the Big Black in our rear, on our march, the chances are that a 
 large number of them now in the trenches could not succeed. 1 be- 
 lieve, however, that most of them, rather than be captured, would 
 exert themselves to the utmost to accomplish it. I respectfully trans- 
 mit herewith the opinions of my brigade commanders on these points. 
 " I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " C. L. Stevenson, Major General" • 
 
 " Division Headquarters, near Vicksburg, > 
 
 ''July 2, 186-3. J 
 "General: In reply to your confidential note of yesterday, re- 
 questing to be informed as to the ' condition of my troops, and their 
 ability to make the marches, and undergo the fatigues necessary to 
 accomplish a successful evacuation,' as heart-rending as the reply 
 may be, I have to state that I concur in the unanimous opinion of the 
 brigade and regimental commanders, that the physical condition and 
 health of our men are not sufficiently good to enable them to accom- 
 plish, successfully, the evacuation. The spirit of the men is still, 
 
61 
 
 however, unshaken, and I am satisfied they will cheerfully continue to 
 bear the fatigues and privations of the siog'?. I enclose herewith, for 
 your further information, the brigade reports. 
 " I have the honor to be, 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " John II. Forney, Major (j(/jc;-«/." 
 
 *' Division Headquarters, Jufy 2, I8G3. 
 ** Gf.neral : Your note of yesterday desires from me a reply on two 
 points, viz : The 'condition of ray troops, ar.d their ability to make 
 the marches and undergo the fatigue necessary to a successful evacua- 
 tion of this place.' The length of the marches, and amount of fatigue 
 necessary to a successful evacuation, not being indicated, I confine 
 myself to giving the following information and opinions : There are 
 about three thousand (3,00(1) men in my division, including State 
 troops, in a condition to undertake a march of eight or ten miles a 
 iay in this weather, if there is an opportunity of resting at intervals. 
 Out of these three thousand, only about two thousmd are considered 
 reliable, in case "we are- strouijly opposed and much harrasscd. A 
 secret evacuation I consider almost impossible, on account of the tem- 
 per of many in my command, who would of necessity bo left behind, 
 aot to incution their natural timidity when Icf: alone, which would 
 induce them at once to get into communication with the enemy for 
 :.heir own fancied safety, I vould really expect the enemy to become 
 iware of the movement before my command had cleared the right of 
 )ur line. It is proper to mention that the two thousand alluded to 
 have suffered severely in the loss of field officers during the siege, and 
 svhile their individual bravery remains the same, they will be more 
 readily thrown into confusion, from "want ' f officers to handle them, if 
 i'orccd to halt and go through any formation to oppose an enemy. In 
 3ther words, while under the impression that the the troops will to- 
 iay r. sistan assault as obstinately, or perhaps more so, than when they 
 Srst manned the trenches, I do not think they would do as well out 
 of them and in the field. I believe that General Johnston either has 
 3r will fight Grant ; and my hope has been that he would be suc- 
 cessful, and in time to relieve us. At present, however, I see no 
 ;hance of timely relief from him ; and his dispatches have never indi- 
 jated a hope of being able to raise the siege. Under these circum- 
 stances, I deem it best to propose terms of capitulation, before forced 
 ;o do so from want of provisions. The following, although not called 
 'or by your note, is respectfully stated, on account of a personal con- 
 versation had some days since. In regard to evacuating, with or 
 ivithout entering into terms of agreement with the enemy, I would 
 nuch prefer the former. There is, to my mind, no practical difference 
 between giving up a place openly or secretly. 
 
 " I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 M. L, Smith, Major General. 
 
 "IlEAnquARTERs Bowen's Division, 
 Vicksburg, Miis., July 2, 1863. 
 "Gener\l: In reply to your enquiry of this morning, in regard 
 
G2 
 
 to the condition of my command, to force their way through the 
 enemy's lines in case that the necessity should arise to evacuate this 
 position, 1 have the honor to state that my men are in as good, if not 
 better, spirits than any others in the line, and able to stand as much 
 fatigue ; yet I do not consider them capable (physically) of enduring 
 the hardships incident to such an undertaking. Forty-five days 
 incessant duty, day and night, with short rations — the wear of both 
 mind and body incident to our situation, has had a marked effect upon 
 them, and I am satisfied they cannot give battle and march over ten 
 or twelve miles in the same day. In view of the fact that General 
 Johnston has never held out tlie slightest hope to us that the siege 
 could be raised, that his demonstration in our favor to relieve this 
 exhausted garrison, would of necessity be sufficient to raise it, I see 
 no alternative but to endeavor to rescue the command by making 
 terms with the enemy. Under the most favcrable circumstances, 
 were we to cut our way out, we could not, in my opinion, save two- 
 thirds of our present effective strength ; no provision could be made 
 for our wounded who fell in the attempt, or those we leave behind 
 iT the hospitals, and our army would reach Gfeneral Johnston, if wo 
 should get through, a mere handful of broken-down stragglers, 
 
 '* I would, therefore, recommend an immediate proposition be made 
 to capitulate. If accepted, we get everything we have any right to 
 hope for; if rejected, we can still hold out stubbornly for some days, 
 and our enemy may make the proposal to us. When our rations are 
 exhausted or nearly so, we may accept a surrender with the condition 
 of a general parole instead of imprisonment for the command. If 
 the offer is made at once, we have a better chance of making terms, 
 than when we have ^only one day's resistance in store in case of a 
 refusal. The proposition coming from us, if rejected, will make our 
 men determined to fight to the last ; theirs, on the contrary, will feel 
 tliat after Vicksburg has been offered, their blood is shed to gratify 
 a more vindictive feeling against its garrison, whose only fault has 
 been the noble defence they have made, and I believe that numbers of 
 the enemy haife still enough manhood to admire our courage and 
 determination, and urge liberal terms of capitulation. 
 '' I am, General, very respectfully, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 
 '' John S. Bowen, Alajor General. " 
 
 The opinions of General Stevenson's brigade commanders will be 
 found in that officer's report, while those of General Forney's are 
 presented in the appendix to this. So far as I know, not a solitary 
 brigade or regimental commander favored the scheme of cutting out, 
 and only two, whose views were presented to me, intimated' the possi- 
 bility of making more than one-half of their command available for 
 that purpose. With this unanimous opinion of my officers against 
 the practicability of a successful evacuation, and no relief from 
 General Johnston, a surrender with or without terms, was the only 
 alternative left me. I, therefore, addressed the following note to Major 
 General Grant : 
 
63 
 
 " A^icKSBURG, July 3d, 1863. 
 *' Major General Grant, 
 
 ' '^Commandwg U. S. Forces, near Vickshurg, Miss. : 
 ** General : I have the honor to propose to ycu an armistice of 
 
 hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of 
 
 Yicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to jou, I will appoint three 
 commissioners to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such 
 place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. I make this 
 proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must other- 
 wise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to main- 
 tain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will 
 be handed you under a flag of truce by Major General John S, 
 Bowen. 
 
 "I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 •' John C. Pemberton, Lieut. Gm. commanding. " 
 
 In the course of two hours the annexed reply was received : 
 
 " Headquarters Department of the Tennessee, } 
 Niar Vickshurg, July 3, 1863. \ 
 " Lieutenant General John C. Pfmberton, 
 
 ^^ Commanding Confederate Forces, etc. : 
 
 " General: Your note of this date is just received, proposing an 
 armistice for several hours for the purpose of arranging terms of 
 capitulation through commissioners to be appointed, etc. The useless 
 effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course, can be ended 
 at any time you may choose, by an unconditional surrender of the 
 city and garrison. 
 
 *' Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those 
 now in Vickshurg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, 
 and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to pris- 
 oners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commis- 
 sioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms 
 other than those indicated above. 
 
 ** I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient^servant, 
 
 *' U. S. Grant, 3Iajor General.''^ 
 
 Upon the return of General Bowen with this letter, I understood 
 that it was the dosire of Major General Grant to have a personal con- 
 ference with me, and this being agreed to, at three o'clock, P. M., 
 accompanied by General Bowen and Captain Montgomery, (then sup- 
 posed to be a lieutenant colonel,) I proceeded to the lines, where I 
 met General Grant, surrounded by a number of his officers. I soon 
 learned that there was a mutual misunderstanding in regard to the 
 desire for this interview, and, therefore, informed General Grant that 
 if he had no terms to propose other than were contained in his letter, 
 the conference could terminate and hostilities be resumed imme- 
 diately. After some further conversation, he proposed that General 
 Bowen and Captain Mfntgomery, and two of his s'.aff officers. Major 
 Generals McPherson and 8raith, should retire, consult, and suggest 
 such terms as they might think proper for our consideration. 
 
 After some conversation between these officers, we parted with the 
 
64 
 
 understanding that General Grant would communicate with me by 
 ten o'clock, P. M., and about that hour the following letter was 
 received : 
 
 *' Headquarters Dj-.partment of the Tennessee, > 
 ''Near Vicksburg, July S, 1863. 3 
 
 <• Lieut. Gen, J. C' Pemberton, 
 
 " Cc.mmanding Confederate forces, Vickshurg, Miss. : 
 *' General : In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will 
 submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city cf 
 Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terras proposed, 
 I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight 
 o'clock, A. M., to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out and paroles 
 signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our 
 lines, the officers taking with them their side arms and clothing, and 
 the field, staff and cavalry officers, one horse each. The rank and file 
 will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these con- 
 ditions are acccepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary, 
 can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cook- 
 ing utensils for preparing them ; thirty wagons, also, counting two two- 
 horse wagons or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such 
 articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be al- 
 lowed to all sick and wounded officers, as fast as they become able to 
 travel. The paroles of these latter must be signed, however, whilst 
 officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners. 
 
 " I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 " U. S. Grant, Major General.''^ 
 
 This letter was immediately submitted to a council of general offi- 
 cers. My own inclination was to reject those terms ; but, after some 
 discussion, I addressed Gen. Grant as follows : 
 
 *' Headquarters, Vicksburg, July 3, 1863. 
 
 " Major General IT. S. Grant, 
 
 *' Commanding United States Forces, etc, : 
 *' General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this 
 garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted ; but, in 
 justice both to tho h^nor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the 
 defence of A^icksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, 
 which,- if acceeded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us: 
 At ten o'clock, A. M., to morrow, I propose to evacute the work in 
 and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under 
 my command by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them 
 in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession ; offi- 
 cers to retain their side arms and personal property, and the right 
 and property of citizens to be respected. 
 
 *' I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ** J. C. Pemberton, 
 *' Lieutenant General Commanding.** 
 Early on the morning of the 4th the following reply was re- 
 ceived : 
 
65 
 
 *' Headquarters Department of the Tennf.ssee, ? 
 '^ Before Vickxhurg, Sxx\y 4, 1863. ) 
 '' General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 communication of 3d July. The amendments proposed by you cannot 
 be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer 
 and man with a parole, signed by himself, which, with the completion 
 of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, i 
 ■can mak« no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and 
 their private property. While I do not propo^5e to cause them any 
 undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to have myself under any 
 restraint by stipulation. 
 
 " The property which officers will be allowed to take with them, will 
 be as stated in my proposition of last evening ; that is, officers will be 
 allo";ved their private baggage and side arms, and mounted officers one 
 horse each. If you mean, by your proposition, for each brigade ta 
 march to the front of the line, now occupied by it, and stack arms st 
 ten o'clock, A. M., and then return to the inside, and there remain as 
 prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. 
 Should no notification be received of your acceptance of ray terms by 
 nine o'clock, A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, an i 
 shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags 
 should be displayid along your lines to prevent such of my troop:}, as 
 may not have been notified, from firing upon your men. 
 
 *' I am, General, very respectfully, your obeclient servant, 
 
 " U. S. Grant, Major General:' 
 In response to this note, I immediately despatched the following, ac- 
 cepting the terms of surrender as modified by Gen. Grant : 
 
 "Headquarters, Vicksburg, July 4, 1863 
 " Major General U. S. Grant, 
 
 ** Commanding Vnited States Forcen, Sfc. : 
 " General : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yo^ir 
 communication of this date, and, in reply, to say that the terms pro- 
 posed by you are accepte<l. 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ** Jno. C. Pemberton, Lieut. G:n:'' 
 These terms, it may be proper to add, were approved by every di- 
 vision and brigade commander, with but one exception, (Brig. Ger. 
 Baldwin,) who, witbout'Offering any objection to them, insisted upon 
 holding out, but assigned no reason for it. In accordance with this 
 agreement, the garrison was surrendered at ten o'clock, A. M., and 
 the Federal forces immediately took possession of our works, and 
 placed guards in the city. 
 
 If it should be asked why the fourth of July was selected as the 
 d'ay for the surrender, the answer is obvious. I believed that, upon 
 that day, I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of 
 our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, 
 on the fourth nf .^-ily, into the stronghold of the great river, and 
 that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then wha^ 
 could not be extorted from them at any other time. This question p" 
 time was also discussed by a council of my general officers, and my 
 5 
 
66 
 
 v:.ows concurred in. The assertion that the surrender of Vicksburg 
 was compelled by the want of subsistence, or that the garrison was 
 starved out, is one entirely destitute of truth. There was, at no 
 time, any absolute suflfering for want of food among the garrison. 
 
 That the men were put upon greatly reduced rations, is undenia- 
 k,!y true ; but, in the opinion of many medical officers, it is at least 
 questionable whether, under all the circumstances, this was at all in- 
 j'irious to their health. It must be remembered that, for forty-seren 
 days and nights, those heroic men had been exposed to burning surta, 
 drenching rains, damp fogs and heavy dews, and that, during all this 
 period, they never had, by day or by night, the slightest relief. The 
 extent of our works required every available man in the trenches, and 
 even then they were, in many places, insufficiently manned. It waa 
 r.ot in ray power to relieve any portion of the line for a single hour. 
 Confined to the narrow limits of a trench, with their limbs cramped 
 and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed tof a murderous 
 Sivi'in of bbot and sliell, Avhile the enemy's unerring sharpshooters 
 fitood ready to pick oil every man visible above'the parapet, is it 
 strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? They had made a 
 inost heroic defence. 
 
 Many had met death with a smile upon their lips ; all had cheerfully 
 encountered danger, and, almost without a murmur, had borne priva- 
 tions and hardships, well calculated to test their manhood. They had 
 held the place against an enemy five times their number, admira- 
 bly clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the appliances 
 of war. Whenever the foe attempted an assault, they drove them 
 tack discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and wounded, 
 tnd already had they torn from his grasp five stands of colors, as 
 trophies of their prowess, (none of which were allowed to fall agam 
 i:ato his hands.) 
 
 Knowing the anxious desire of the Government to relieve Yicks- 
 btirg, I felt assured that if within the compass of its power, the siege 
 would be raised; but when forty-seven days and nights had passed, 
 with the knowledge I then possessed that bo adequate relief was to 
 k;o expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the 
 h;ave men whose lives had been entrusted to my care. Hence, after 
 the suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined 
 to make terms, not because my men were starved out ; not because I 
 could not hold out yet a little longer; but because they were over- 
 .powered by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our 
 defences crumbling beneath their feet. The question of subsistence, 
 therefore, had nothing whatever to do with the surrender of Vicks- 
 hiiTg. With an unlimited supply of provisions the garrison could not,, 
 fcr the reasons already given, have held out much longer. My pre- 
 vious dispatches from General Johnston had not made me very san- 
 guine of relief, and his dispatch of June 22d was not calculated to 
 tender me more hopeful. He said : " General Taylor is sent to Gen- 
 eral E. K. Seaith to co-operate with you from the west bank of the 
 nver, to throw in supplies and to cross with his force if expedient and 
 prp/33ticable. I will have the means .of moving towards the enemy in 
 
67 
 
 a day or two, and will try to make a deivorsion in your favor,, aad^.if 
 possible, communicate with you, though I fear my force is too- small 
 to eflfect the latter. If 1 can do nothing to relieve you, rather than 
 surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment, 
 if you and Gen Taylor can communicate." I never received any com- 
 munication ft-om Maj. Gen. Taylor on the subject of co-operation, nor 
 had I any knowledge of his whereabouts or of his forces, and I heard 
 no more from General Johnston until the lOth of July, when I re- 
 ceived his dispatch of ihe 3d, in Vicksburg, from tho bearer, who 
 had been several days confined and a prisoner to the Federal autho- 
 rities. Had I received General Johnston's dispatch of the 27th of 
 June, in which he encouraged the hope that both Vicksburg and the 
 garrison might be saved, I would have lived upon an ounce a day and 
 have continued to meet the assaults of all Grant's army, rather than 
 have surrendered the city until General Johnston had realized or re- 
 lin'iuished that hope; but I did not receive liis dispatch until the 21)th 
 day of August, in Gainesville, Alabama, nor had I the most remote 
 idea that such an opinion was. entertained by General Johnston ; he 
 had for weeks ignored its possibility. 1 had notified him on the loth 
 June, tliat I had enough to subsist my array for yet twenty (20) days,, 
 but he held out no hope of raising the siego. On the 25th May, 
 thirty-four days previous, he liad informed me that on the arrival oif 
 an expected division from Bragg's army, he would *' move to me," I 
 supposed then, with ray co-operation, to raise the siege. No subse-- 
 quent dispatch frora him sustained my understanding of his coramu-- 
 aioation ; all, without exception, of later date, spoke only of the 
 possibility of extricating the garrison. His dispatch of July 3d,, 
 received by me six days after tbe capitulation, held out no such hope;, 
 and lam fully «nd entirely satisfied that no efficient aid would have- 
 been given me even to effect an evacuation. I do not mean nor de- 
 aire to be understood as implying that it might have been given me,. 
 I only express my conviction that had I been able to hold the enemy 
 At bay for yet a month, I do not believe, anxious as I was to co-ope- 
 rato, that 1 would have been relieved by any force from the outside. 
 In a dispatch of the 16th, I think, for I have not the copy, I sug- 
 gested that as General Johnston deemed it impracticable to do more 
 than by possibility relieve the garrison, that a proposition from him 
 for an evacuation of Vicksburg might ^be favorably entertained b,^ 
 General Grant. In his dispatch of the 27th, already alluded to, and 
 previously copied, will be found his views on that point. This dis- 
 patch of June 22d, from General Johnston, rendered it painfully ap- 
 parent, that the siege could not be raised, (to cross the Mississippi 
 river, as suggested, in the face of thp enemy's gunboats and land- 
 batteries was an imposibilfly,) and, unless this was effected, the de- 
 fence which had been so long and gallantly maintained, ceased to be 
 of any practicable utility. Troud as 1 was of my brave troops, hon- 
 oring them aa I did and do, for the courage, fortitude and con.^^tancy 
 they had po nobly displayed, I felt that it would be an act of cruel 
 iahnsianity to subject them longer to the terrible ordeal to which, for 
 
so many days and nights, tliey had already heen exposed. Brain and 
 sinew will alike wear out ; the bravest may bo overpowered by num- 
 bers, and I saw no advantage to be gained by protracting a hopeles.? 
 defence, which I knew must be attended with a useless waste of life 
 and blood. I had then to choose between such favorable terms as I 
 might be able to obtain and an unconditional surrender, or subject the 
 garrison and the citizens, including hundreds of women and children, 
 to the horrors of an assault, which I could no longer hope to repel. 
 Much, and I think unmerited, obloquy has been cast upon me by a 
 ■large portion of the public press for an imputed failure to provide 
 adequately for the subsistence of the garrison of Vicksburg and Port 
 Hudson. The Government and my immediate superior, perhaps bet- 
 ter informed of facts, have, so far as I am aware, refrained from cen- 
 sure, reserving a decision until a full investigation shall have 
 determined to what extent, if any, it is deserved. Immediately on 
 assuming command of the Department of Mississippi and EastLouis- 
 iiana, on the 14th of October, 1862, I gave my earnest and unremit- 
 : ting attention to the reorganization of the several staff departments, 
 and to the great question of supplies. It is unnecessary to speak of 
 the confusion, and general v/ant of system which prevailed. I foun<i 
 most of the- district commanders exercising the authority which per- 
 tained only-to department commanders, or to a general commanding 
 an army in the* field — each appeared to be in a great measure acting 
 independently 'of the other. To some considerable extent this seemed 
 to be necessary under the existing circumstances. 
 
 Major General Van Dorn was in the immediate command of the 
 •army at Holly Springs, and it naturally engaged most of his atten- 
 tion. General Bragg, to whose department the geographical districts 
 just organized into a seperate department had been attached, was too 
 far removed to permit him to give his personal supervision. It re- 
 sulted, almost necessarily, from this state of things, that but little 
 attention had been given to the accumulation of supplies. No depots 
 of importance existed within the limits of the department, nor had 
 any measures been taken to establish them. Much of the season best 
 ' suited to the collection of stores from the trans-Mississippi had gone 
 '' by. They were undoubtedly abundant there ; but my command did 
 -Tiot embrace that 'district of country. I had no control over the 
 ' steauiboats in Red river. ♦It was one thing to purchase supplies, but 
 . another to transport them. Most of the boats were engaged in carry- 
 ing sugar, molasses and salt, either for private parties or for the Gov- 
 ernment. There was great opposition on the part of owners at every 
 attempt to divert them from these purposes. The Government was 
 appealed to, against what was styled the^iolation of the right of the 
 citizen by the military authorities. It required time to ascertain 
 what was needed to be done, and time to acqiiire the means of its ac- 
 complishment. On the 25th October, the necessary orders were 
 issued to procure and transport supplies from the parifahes of Point 
 Coupee, Concordia and Texas. Major Cuney, then chief commissary, 
 was directed to confer with Lieutenant Colonel Broadwell, agent of 
 .the Commissary General^ then in the trans-Mississippi department, 
 
6y 
 
 but to make arrangements for supplying this department, without 
 relying upon him. Major Dillon, commissary of the army with 
 Major General Van Dorn, was directed to use every effort to suhsist 
 it from the northern and northwestern counties. For several months 
 after I entered upon duty in the department, there was not water 
 enough to admit of the passage into the Mississippi of the larger boats, 
 which had been run up the Yazoo or Red river for safety. As early 
 as the latter part of October, I authorized the opening of the raft in 
 the Yazoo, that the smaller boats might pass out. Notwithstanding 
 the violent opposition of private parties, very many of them were im- 
 mediately taken either into tlie permanent employ of the Government, 
 or chartered, as supplies could be obtained. The transportation of 
 sugar and molasses, owned by the Government and by speculators, 
 interfered materially with the rapid accumulation of other sup- 
 plies. When, however, about the 1st of January, the larger boats 
 were able to enter the Mississippi, a sufficient number was at once 
 put into ^Requisition for Government transportation, and a largo 
 amount of corn and bacon was thrown into Vicksburg and Port Hud- 
 son from the trans-Mississippi department. I regret, however, to 
 eay, that from want of proper care and energy upon the part of those 
 responsible for its safe-keeping, a large quantity of corn, which had 
 been landed on the shore, was removed so slowly, and so little precaution 
 used to secure it from the effects of the hoav}' rains of the season, 
 that much was destroyed by that cause and much was carried off by 
 the rapid rist of the river. It happened that just at this time — about 
 the lUth of January — I made an official visit to Port Hudson, and was 
 myself a witness of the consequences of this neglect at that point. 
 On the 14th of January, I adilressed the following letter to Lieutenant 
 Colonel Broadwell, agent of the Commissary General, and also for 
 my department, under my immediate instructions : *' Purchase bacon 
 for this department. If possible, buy several million pounds.* Also 
 send, if you can, a few thousand live hogs to Port Hudson and Vicks- 
 burg. If the present navigation should be interrupted, try "to get the 
 hogs across the river, so that they can be driven to the interior of the 
 State, and rendered available for the use of the troops. If nothing 
 better can be done, you will contract witli energetic men, to get from 
 Texas, two or three hundred wagons loaded with bacon — the meat to 
 be paid for by the chief of subsistence of this department, the trans- 
 ^rtation settled by the quartermaster, and the wagons and teams 
 taken at fair valuation by the Government. You had better attend to 
 salt first, to bacon next, and to sugar afterward. You are properly 
 accredited to commanding generals elsewhere, who are requested to 
 assi^it you in accomplishing ray wishes, as herein indicated." I was 
 extremely desirous, at this time, to procure a sufficient supply of salt, 
 to enable me to cure bacon, and with that purpose, an order was 
 issged prohibiting the exportation of hogs from the department. The 
 difficulty of obtaining salt in sufficient quantity, at the proper sea- 
 son, prevented the success of this plan te any great extent. Though 
 extremely anxious at this time to puiriiase all the meat possible, I 
 did not think it advisable to make large purchases of corn from the 
 
70 
 
 trans-Mississippi, for Vicksburg and Port Hudson, and Lieutenant 
 Colonel Broadwell was so notified. It has already been shown that 
 the large amount at Port Hudson had not been properly secured, and 
 more was still being delivered. The enemy's attempt on Vicksburg, 
 via Chickasaw Bayou, had just signally failed, and his troops been 
 withdrawn and re-embarked. Before the 1st of January, supplies 
 from Deer Creek aiid Sunflower could not be brought down, owing to 
 the low stage of water; and when the rise of those streams admitted 
 of their being landed at Snyder's Mills, the character of the soil and 
 roads over which wagons must pass, Avas such as to render transporta- 
 tion almost utterly impracticable. I had, however, appropriated one 
 hundred wagons for that especial purpose. 
 
 In a comn:unication, dated February 26th, General Stevenson 
 says : '* During wet weather we cannot use the dirt road from 
 Haines' Bluff to this poir,t, (Vicksburg.) The passage of our train of 
 over one hundred wagons would render it impassable in one day. 
 Besides, not being able to haul more than a quarter loai it would 
 prevent its being kept in good order. To relieve it at such times, 
 grain should be obtained by railroad, but it, as now managed, cannot 
 be relied on."- There was an abundance of corn in the depaitment, 
 but in very many instances planters refused to sell, except for cash 
 payments, and the great delay in forwarding funds embarrassed me 
 exceedingly. On the^Oth January, I telegraphed as follows to the 
 Honorable Secretary of War : " Unless funds are sent immediately 
 to Major Theodore Johnston, chief commissary subsistence depart- 
 ment, the army cannot be supplied. Estimates have been forwarded. 
 Please have money sent at once." During this time stores in large 
 quantities were being rapidly collected at various depots, but the dif- 
 ficulty of transportation, owing to the wretched condition of the 
 Southern railroad, the obstacles that were continually thrown in the 
 way by'railroad authorities, and the clamor raised at any attempt of 
 mine to make private interests subservient to Government necessities, 
 had the effect of preventing effectually the rapid accumulation of sup- 
 plies. Positive prohibition had been issued from the War Depart- 
 ment against the interference of commanding generals or other officers 
 with railroad transportation. Immediately on the receipt of this 
 prohibition, I telegraphed the Adjutant and Inspector General, Rich- 
 mond : "If I cannot control the railroads in this department the 
 business of the department and subsistence of the troops will fail# 
 I beg that Colonel Wadley may be sent here at once." Arrange- 
 ments had been made, as already stated, as fully as the means at 
 my disposal would admit, to transfer supplies from Snjder's mills to 
 Vicksburg ; and the chief of subsistence was positively directed to 
 i-keep constantly on hand a supply for not less than sixty days. 
 Similar instructions were given to the chief quartermaster of the 
 department. Every possible effort was made to carry out my orders. 
 If I failed in the full accomplishment of my wishes, it was from cir- 
 cumstances utterly beyond xm control. It must be remembered that 
 almost continuous movements of troops and ordnance were necessary, 
 dn consequence of the, persistent efforts of the enemy from about the 
 
71 
 
 middle of December to the date of the investment of Vicksbur:; 
 
 About the 10th of February, the enemy began his movement 
 through the YazOo Pass. None but our smallest boats could be 
 employed in the upper waters. From this date until the enemy aban- 
 doned his designs, not only by the Pass and Tallahatchie, but also by 
 the Sunflower and Deer creek, the boats which were employed iu 
 bringing down supplies from those small streams, were frequently 
 and necessarily diverted to the transportation of troops and the muni- 
 tions of war. Early in February, also, the enemy succeeded in pass- 
 ing two of his gunboats by our batteries at Vicksburg. This f?,t 
 once rendered the navigation of the Mississippi and Red rivers dan- 
 gerous, and from tliat time forth it was only by watching opportunr 
 ties, and at great ri?k of capture that ^^upplies could be thrown int) 
 Port Hudson and Vicksburg. Nevertheless large amounts were suc- 
 cessfully introduced into both places, (into the latter via Big Black ) 
 Port Hudson, however, received much the larger portion, being easier 
 of access. In addition to the efforts made by agents under my ow:^ 
 instructions to supply Port Hudson, the chief of subsistence of the 
 department was ordered, on the 18th of February, to furnish Mnj.ir 
 General Gardner's commissary with ample funds to meet the deman-M 
 of the service. About the midiUe of the same month, believing it." 
 to be highly probable that not only the subsistence of my own army, 
 but also that of General Bragg's. might be dependent upon thy 
 supplies of the country intersected by the Mobile antl Ohio rail 
 road, I issued positive orders that neither grain nor meat shoulJ 
 be allowed to leave the department by that road. The conditio^ 
 of the Southern railroad daily growing worse, in consequence d 
 the heavy rains and its light structure, every effort was made on 
 my part to aid the managers in its speedy and effectual repair 
 A communication urging its importance in a militiry point of 
 view was addres.-ed to his Excellency the Governor the State, on 
 the 2t)th of February, asking his assistance; by the impressment cf 
 hegroes to labor on it, the vice president having informed me thit 
 planters would not hire their hands. 
 
 On the 28th of February and on the 2d of March, instructions 
 were again sent to Lieutenant Colonel Broadwell, to purchase a".! 
 the "ueat possible at the price suggested by him, and notified 
 also that beef could be crossed safely and to send forward all by 
 could control. 
 
 March lat, Brigadier (Jeneral Buggies was directed by tele- 
 graph as follows : " You must give every possible assistance ia 
 procuring within your district, all the corn, beeves, bacon, or 
 ealted pork, that can be had and forward as rapidly as posssible for 
 army at Vicksburg. Purchase from planters at the lowest price 
 you can, and impress all in hands of speculators at same rate. * 
 About same time Major General Taylor, commanding west Louisi- 
 ana, was respectfully urged to have all the beeves, bacon, and 
 BaltcJ pork possible forwarded, and it gives me much pleasure to 
 add that I am greatly indebted to hi^ active exertions, as well aa 
 to Jjieutenant Colonel Broadwell for large supplies of corn and meai. 
 
72 
 
 On the SSrd of March the following letter was received from Lieu- 
 tanant Colonel Brodwell : 
 
 " Alexandria, La., March 17, 18G3. 
 " General : Four steamboats arrived here to day from Shreveport 
 and Jefierson, loaded chiefly with corn; one of them had 300,0()iJ 
 pounds bacon. Three others,* the 'Charm,' 'Texas' and 'Frolic,' 
 are reported coming down with loads. Five others, the ' Falls City,' 
 'Louisville,' 'Starlight,' ' General Hodges '" and ' Mina ISims,' are 
 . below here with full cargoes, designed for Port Hudson, but the ' 
 Federal gunboats are reported blockading this river. Great God ! 
 how unfortunate. We must try to get cattle to Bowman's Landing, 
 fifteen miles back of Waterproof, and, if possible, swim them at the lat- 
 ter point. But the cattle here are thin and may be unfit for beef when 
 they arrive on the other side. In fact, it is doubtful whether many 
 of tliem ever get through the swamps and bayous through which 
 they are required to pass on this side. As the water declines, I think 
 i: likely that cattle in large quantities can be crossed over by swim- 
 ming, but at present, the prospect of your getting supplies from this 
 tide is gloomy enough. With the- hope. General, that the suspension 
 of steamboat navigation will embarrass you less than is now appre- 
 hended, 
 
 ^' Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 "W. A. Broadwell." 
 On the day of its receipt the above letter was referred to Major 
 Iheodore Johnston, chief of subsistence, for his information, and 
 was returned with the following endorsement : 
 
 " Office Chief of Subsistence, ^ 
 " Dqyariment Mississippi and East Louisiana, } 
 "Jackson, March 24, 1863. ) 
 '■ Respectfully returned. The following boats have arrived out of 
 Eed river and have discharged their cargoes at Port Hudson : 
 ' Frolic,' corn, to A. Q. M, ; ' Bed Chief,' corn, to A. C. S. ; ' Louis 
 Bor,' corn, to A. Q. M. ; 'Starlight,' corn, to A. C. S. ; 'Trent," 
 corn, to A. C. S. ; 'Indian,' corn, to A. C. S, ; * Drover,' corn, to 
 A. C. S. ; ' T. D. Iline,' bacon, hogs, beef, &c., &c. The steamer 
 ' General Hodges,' spoken of, discharged her cargo at Alexandria. 
 The ' Louisville 'had 20,001) bushels corn. The ' Falls City ' turned 
 over ail her cargo, except 350 barrels molasses, to steamer ' T. D. 
 Hine.' Lieutenant Cammack left Alexandria on the 18th instant, 
 oae day later than the communication from Colonel Broadwell. 
 
 " Theodore Johnston, 
 " Major and Chief of Subsistence," 
 Evidence of a similar character, all showing the constant and 
 earnest efforts made by myself and my officers to secure an ample 
 store of subsistence for Vicksburg and Port Hudson, could be 
 adduced to an indefinite extent, but to give the whole would swell 
 ' this report to a huge volume. I content myself, therefore, with 
 throwing a number of letters, orders, telegrams, &c., on this subject 
 into an appendix. 
 
 In the month of March, I was in the receipt of a number of letters, 
 
73 
 
 from respectable citizens, containing suggestions tliat were frequently 
 valuable, but unfortunately they were such as should have been made 
 months before, and some of them at a time wlien I vras not in the 
 Department. But these suggestions, whether timely and valuable in 
 themselves or not, were rendered woi thless to me by reason of the 
 then active military operations on the Yazoo river and its tributaries, 
 which were constantly diverting all of my boats from the important 
 duty of transporting subsistence to the indispensable service of 
 transporting troops and munitions of war. This was also the case, 
 in many instances, where provisions were offered me by citizenp. I 
 was offered supplies of corn and meat, but at a time when, from the 
 proximity of the enemy and other causes, it was utterly impracticable 
 for .me to make them available. In this connection, I cannot forbear 
 saying that, in nine cases out of ten where subsistence was gfT^•red 
 me, the offer carried with it a demand for transportation, which it was 
 entirely out of my power to furnish. To have made purchases under 
 such circumstances would have been simply ridiculous. A cargo of 
 bacon, which had been run up Choctaw Bayou, on the 18th April, to 
 avoid the enemy's gunboats on Red river, was, by the energetic exer- 
 tions of Mr. Howell Hinds, of Jefferson county, Mississippi, 
 successfully transported from the bayou across the river to Port 
 Gibson. I was extremely anxious to get this meat to Port Hudson, 
 but the difficulties of transportation prevented ; and, before it could 
 be removed by General Bowcn to a point of safety, it became neces- 
 sary to destroy much of it to prevent its falling into the hands of the 
 enemy. In this connection I again refer to the fact that, when I was 
 compelled to abandon Snyder's Mills, there was at least 311,000 
 bushels of corn at that place. I mention this to show that there was 
 uo deficiency of corn in the department, but that the great and, 
 indeed, insuperable obstacle was the want of transportation by dirt 
 road, and the almost constant and daily interruption of railroad com- 
 munication on the Southern road, which was the only means of 
 transportation of subsistence to Vicksburg. I think I have now 
 sliown conclusively that I spared no exertions to have Vicksburg and 
 Port Hudson abundantly provisioned, and that whenever the supply 
 fell short of the demand, or of my expectati'ns, it was caused by 
 circumstances wholly beyond my control. In this connection I may 
 add that I had, at the time cf the surrender of Vicksburg, about 
 40,000 pounds of pork and bacon, which had been reserved for the 
 subsistence of my troops in the event oF attempting to cut my way 
 out of the city. Also, 51,241 pounds of rice, 5,000 bushels of peas, 
 1 1 2,2154 pounds of sugar, 3,240 pounds of soap, 527 poun<ls of tallow 
 candles, 27 pounds of star candles, and 428,000 pounds of salt. 
 
 Much unticcessary clamor has been raised about the want of ammu- 
 nition ; that it was large, and that the principal, indeed, t^e only de- 
 ficiency was in musket caps. The appendix devoted to the subject of 
 ordnance will demonstrate that I am not responsible for that defi- 
 ciency, whatever its otent may have been. I therefore beg special 
 attention to my telegrams to Colonel Gorgas, of the Ordnance De- 
 partment, for ordnance and ammunition, commenced as early as 
 
74 
 
 November, within three weeks after I assumed command of the De- 
 partment, and they were continued persistently up to almost the last 
 hour of uninterrupted communication with Richmond. I believe that 
 the Chief of Qrdnanco furnished me with every thing in his power, 
 I only desire that I may not be held responsible for what the Govern- 
 ment could not furnish I am unable, as yet, to give full reports of 
 the casualties at Baker's Creek, Big Black, and during the siege of 
 Vicksburg. They will be forwarded so soon as division commanders 
 shall have rendered them complete. The same with refer^ce to ord- 
 nance and ordnance stores. Very many officers and soldiers have 
 distinguished themselves by particular acts of gallantry, or have ren- 
 dered themselves conspicuous by untiring exertion and devotion to 
 duty. So many indeed, as to preclude the possibility of my referring 
 to each in the body of this report. Attention is therefore rerpectfully 
 invited to the appendix, and to the reports of division, brigade and 
 other commanders. 
 
 I cannot, however, close without expressing my especicial thanks 
 to Major Generals C. L. Stevenson, John II. Forney, and M. L. Smith, 
 and to Brigadier Generals Barton, Cumraings, Lee, and Colonel A. 
 W. Reynolds, of General Stevenson's division ; to Major General For- 
 ney's brigade commanders; Brigadier Generals Ilebert and Moore ; to 
 Major General M. L. Smith's brigade commanders Brigadier Generals 
 Shoupe, Baldwin and Vaughan ; to Colonels Gates, Dockcry and 
 Cockrell, of Bowen's division, and to Colonel Higgins, commanding 
 the heavy batteries, and Colonfel Waul of the Texas legion. If the 
 most unremitting attention to the arduous duties of their position en» 
 title officers to commendation and respect, they Ijave each and all won 
 it during the protracted and trying siege. To Major General C. L. 
 Stevenson, I am particularly indebted for much and valuable aid in 
 many ways, during the siege. To his immediate supervision was prin- 
 cipally entrusted the subsistence of the troops. 
 
 To the officers of my staff I return my sincere thanks for the cheer- 
 ful and zealous manner in which they have discharged all their duties. 
 Colonel Thomas H. Taylor, who accompanied me in the field at 
 Baker's Creek, and who, during the siege, was assigned to duty as 
 inspector general and commandant of the post, in both capacities ren- 
 dered most valuable service. Major Jacob Thompson, inspector gen- 
 eral of the department, also accompanied me on the field, and on that 
 occasion, as on all others, whether in the office or in the active per- 
 formance of the duties of his department, has ever shown himself 
 zealous and competent. Major Thompson, immediately after the re- 
 treat into Vicksburg, was, in company with Major Sprague, dispa'tched 
 to communicate personally with General Johnston. Major R. W. 
 Memminger, I. and A. A. G. and chief of staff', and Major W. H. 
 McCurdle, A. A. G., have for many months been in the constant perr 
 formance oV the arduous and responsible duties pertaining to the Adr 
 jutant General's department. It is little to say that on these officers, 
 assisted by second lieutenant F, M. Stafford, C. S. A. and A. A. A. 
 G.,has devolved a labor and an amount of business scarcely equalled 
 in any other military department of the Confederacy ; day and night 
 
75 
 
 they have devoted themselves to the public service, and I specially 
 commend them and Maj, J. Thompson to the favorable consideration of 
 the Government. No officer in the department has been more con- 
 stantly and actively engaged than Major Samuel Lockett, chief engi- 
 neer. His professional skill and excellent judgment have been ex- 
 hibited wherever occasion required it, from Grenada to Port Hudson. 
 During the siege of Vicksburg, none exposed themselves more fear- 
 lessly to danger than he and his gallant assistants, Captains Pow- 
 hatan Robinson, James Cooper, J. J. Conway, D. Winter and Jamea 
 Hagan, and Lieutenants E. W. McMahon, W. 0. Flynn, Geo. Don- 
 ellen, W. A. Gloster, Southard, Blessing and Mr. Geridar. It gi^^es 
 me pleasure to name them, and to ask a recognition of their merits. 
 I consider myself to have been particularly fortunate in the selection 
 of chief quartermaster of the department of Mississippi and East 
 Louisiana. Maj. L. Mims entered upon the duties of that office imme- 
 diately on my assuming command, and has proved himself eminently 
 qualified for the position ; his energy and capacity I have rarely seen 
 equalled. I believe no man could have done more with the means at 
 his (lii^posal. Maj. Mims was greatly aided by that most excellent and 
 efficient officer, i\Iaj. Geo. Whitfield, quartermaster in charge of trans- 
 portation department. Maj. Theo Johnston, chief of subsistence, has 
 been untiring in his efforts to provide for so largo a command ; he had 
 great difficulties to contend with, and generally has met them suc- 
 cessfully. I am also greatly indebted to Major A. B. Cook, my chief 
 pajma?ter, for the ability and energy he has displayed in the execu- 
 tion of the business of his office. To Major G. L. Gillespie, chief 
 commissary of the army during siege, I owe my thanks ; much is due 
 to his energy and good judgment ; also to Major Orme, General Ste- 
 venson's chief quartermaster. Surgeon E. H. Bryan, acting medical 
 director of the army of Vicksburg, accompanied mo on the field, per- 
 formed all his duties there and during the siege to my entire satisfac- 
 tion. Captain Bruce, ordnance store-keeper, displayed great ability 
 and devotion to duty during the siege. lie was everywhere he shouhl 
 have been, and was emphatically the right man in the right place. 
 
 Colonel C. A. Fuller, Inspector of Heavy Artillery, Lieutenant 
 Colonel I. S. Saunlers, P. A., chief of artillery of the department, 
 performed their respective duties satisfactorily, and Colonel Saunders 
 accompanied me on the field, where he rendered me valuable service. 
 Colonel W. T. Withers, chief of fiield artillery with the army, was 
 active and attentive to his duties and prompt in the execution of 
 orders. In addition to his duties as chief of artillery, Colonel 
 Withers continued in the comraan«l of his regiment ; he also accom- 
 panied me on the field. Captain C. McRae Selph, A. A. G., on duty 
 with Colonel T, II. Taylor, was of great assistance to that excellent 
 officer, more particularly during the siege; he also accompanied me 
 on the field, and was constantly engaged in the transmission of orders. 
 To my personal staff, Lieutenant J. II. Morrison, A. D, C. ; Lieu- 
 tenant J. C. Taylor, A. D. C. ; and Lieutenant II. C. Tupper, 
 twenty-fourth regiment Mississippi volunteers and A, D. C, I am 
 greatly indebted, aot only for service on the field, but for much 
 
76 
 
 laborious duty in the office, and I commend them to the favorable 
 consideration of the Government. Captain L. M. Montgomery, 
 being unable to reach the trans-Missis-sippi department, to which he 
 had been assigned, tendered his services as volunteer aid-de-carap ; I 
 found him an energetic and gallant ofiiccr and a most valuable 
 assistant. To him and to Major S'.urges Sprague, volunteer aid-de- 
 camp, v.'ho also accompanied me on the field and was constantly 
 engaged in the transmission of orders, I tender my sincere thanks ; • 
 also, to Captain James Cooper, fourteenth Mississippi, who served 
 me as volunteer aid-dc-cnmp on the occasion of the battle of Baker's 
 Creek. Captain Barclay and Lieutenant Wilkinson, of Bowen's 
 division, with fifty brave fellows of that command, are entitled to 
 special mention fjr their gallant conduct on the night of the 30th of 
 May, in burning the sunken gunboat Cincinnati, which they accom- 
 plished as far as was practicable with an iron-clad vessel in her 
 condition. They brought off her flag, which I presented to them. 
 My thanks are also due to the following officers and men, who ren- 
 dered valuable service in transmitting dispatches through the enemy's 
 lines to and from General Johnston, viz : Captains Hill, Saulcrs and 
 Cooper; Lieutenant G. D. Wise; Lieutenant Smith, of the twentieth 
 Mississippi regiment ; and privates Walker and McKeinaw, of John- 
 son's cavalry ; Lamar Fontaine, a discharged soldier, and private W. 
 II. Webb, of the twentieth Mississippi regiment, who twice 
 .successfully passed from Vicksburg to General Johnston's headquar- 
 ters. Sergeant Thomas P, Lynch, first Louisiana artillery, 
 commanding the river police, by his vigilance and activity, lendered 
 most valuable services tIirou;:hout the siese, and is entitled, as he 
 deserves, the consideration of the Government. Sergeant R. H. 
 Garner, company K, twenty-third Alabama regiment, was conspicuous 
 for his personal gallantry at Baker's Creek. The men at a gun 
 having been all disabled, he served the piece alone, firing from ten to 
 fifteen rounds. Ordnance Sergeant W. T. Luckett was also distin- 
 guished for his coolness and daring, and was killed while carrying 
 ammunition through a very heavy fire. Private Padie, of the 
 nineteenth "Arkdrusas, was also conspicuous for his heroic bearing. 
 Constantly in the thickest of the fight, always in advance of his 
 regiment, unheeding the orders to retire, his gallantry won universal 
 admiration. To D. H. Hugett, of the engineer corps, my thanks are 
 due. On the 19th of May, I dispatched him to Richmond, with maps 
 and valuable papers. In the face of many obstacles, he succeeded in 
 passing the enemy's lines and successfully discharged his mission. 
 Major J. D. Bradford, Assistant Inspector General, is entitled to my 
 thanks for valuable and important services on several occasions, and 
 1 regret that I was, by his illness at the time of the investment, 
 deprived of them during the siege, 
 
 I cannot close this report without brief tribute to the memory of 
 two of the best soldiers in the Confederate service. I refer to Major 
 General John S. Bowen and Brigadier General Martin E. Green. 
 Always faithful, zealous and brave, they fell, as became them, in the 
 discharge of their duty. General Green died, with a bullet in his 
 
i I 
 
 brain, upon the lines he had so long and so gallantly defendeu. 
 General Bowen, having passed scatheless through the bloody scenes 
 of Shiloh, luka, Corinth, Grand Gulf, Port Gibson, Baker's Creek 
 and Yicksbikrg, perished by disease on the inarch from Vicksburg to 
 Jackson, aftei°the capitulation. I can utter no higher eulogium upon 
 him than to say he always performed his duty and never avoided 
 
 danger. 
 
 Resrectfullv, vour obedient servant, 
 
 ' ' J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 Lkuicnant General. 
 
At»tENDlX A. 
 
 CORRESPOXDENCE RELATIVE TO SUBSISTENCE. 
 
 Jackson, April 22, IS63. 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G.: 
 
 Major : .The management of the commissariat at Port Hudson is 
 unsatisfactory. The facts are as follows. Major J. P.Carr reports on 
 hand, 15th of March : 
 
 Rations of bulk pork, - - - 393,750 
 Rations of bacon, - ^ * - 627,561) 
 
 1,021,310 and 1,674 hogs. 
 
 On hand, as per report 31st of March : 
 
 Rations of "bulk pork, 371,132 
 
 nations of bacon, 622,132 993,264 
 
 (Hogs slaughtered, and included in report of bulk pork.) 
 
 On hand, as per report 15th of April : 
 Rations of bulk pork, - » - - - 3,760 
 Rations of bacon, - 460,000 463,760 
 
 Difference in fifteen (15) days, . - - - 529,504 rations. 
 Bacon and pork, if issued exclusively, for fifteen days, 197,640 '* 
 
 Remaining unaccounted for, ^ - - - 331,864 " 
 
 Major Carr, as will be seen, reports, on the 15th of March : 
 Rations, ..-..-.. 1,021,310 
 
 On hand, 1,674 hogs. 
 
 Between the 15th and 31st of March, the 1,674 hogs 
 were slaughtered, which, at one hundred and fifty pounds 
 each, (a small average,) and three-quarters of a pound 
 to the ration, would make, . - - _ - 334,800 
 
 1,356,110 
 
 On the 17th of April, I addressed Major Carr, as follows : 
 
 •' Your telegraphic to-day gives but eighteen hundred and eighty 
 
7» 
 
 pounds of pork. Is that all you have ? There is a decrease, accord 
 ing to your report, of five hundred and twenty-nine thousand five hun- 
 dred and four rations of bacon and bulk pork within the last fifteen 
 days. Is not this an error ?" 
 
 The following is Major Carrs reply : 
 
 " The last report is correct ; that of the first was bungled by clerk, 
 and is a large over-estimate. In next report there will be a heavy 
 deduction for loss in estimated weight of hogs." 
 
 I have, in a communication to Major Wheadon, chief commissary 
 of General Gardner, insisted that a depot commissary be assigned to 
 duty at Port Hudson. He has assigned Major Carr r:nd Captain 
 J. P. Jones as post commissary. 
 
 If, in the opinion of the Lieutenani; General commanding, any ac- 
 tion is necessary, I would be pleased to have an investigation, or- 
 something done which will prevent a repetition or continuation of 
 such a condition of things as has for some time existed at that post. 
 I cannot determine where the fault lies; but the facts are as stated. 
 Under date of April 5th, Major Carr saj'-s : " The issues have been 
 of pork and bacon, for the greater part of the time, at three-fourths of 
 a pound to the ration, by order of General Gardner." I respectfully 
 request that General Gardner be desired to revoke his order. One- 
 half pound per day is all that has been issued for many months in 
 this department. Ux Virginia, one-fourth of a pound, only, is issued. 
 I request, also, that General Gardner be instructed to have issued, to 
 the troops of his command, beef, five days in seven. 
 1 am, Major, respectfully, etc., 
 
 THEODORE JOHNSTON, 3Iajor and C. S. 
 
 Office Post Commissary, 
 Fo?t Hudson, La., March 29, 1863. 
 
 Major T. F. WiLLsoN, A. A. G.: 
 
 Major : The letters of Major Theodore Johnston and Lieutenant 
 George Cammack, of the 2 1 st instant, which have been referred to me for 
 explanation, are remarkable official papers. They are composed almost 
 entirely of statements made by persons unknown to me, and, for 
 ought I know, quite irresponsible. Certainly their accounts are, in 
 the main, without foundation, and evidently engendered by ill-feeling 
 or a wanton spirit of fault-finding. It is harrassing to have labors, 
 usually extending far into the night, protracted still further by the 
 necessity of answering charges so vague, groundless, and captious. 
 At the time to which Mr. Conrad refers, I had no corn here at all, 
 and was drawing upon the quartermaster's department for my daily 
 supply. Of the five boats said by Lieutenant Cammack to have ar- 
 rived during his stay, three, the Trent, lied Chief and Starlight, were 
 consigtied to me ; the others came to the quartermaster, as he might 
 have learned, had he inquired at official sources, as eagerly as ho 
 eeems to have done of idlers and casual passera-by. The Urge quan- 
 
m 
 
 tity of corn which he saw upon the levee, was a small part of the 
 cargoes discharged at the time of the bombardment, which was being 
 shucked and hauld away as fast as the meagre transportation, and the 
 difficulty of access to the landing, permitted. The same was the case 
 with the salt. The best vindication of this department, and the proof 
 of the justness of the reasons assigned, lies in the celerity with which 
 the whole landing has been cleared since the requisite transportation 
 has been obtained. The statement regarding soldiers throwing corn 
 at each other, and stealing, would be puerile, were it not for the ex- 
 aggeration, which is clearly malicious. The young gentleman who 
 makes it must have seen but little service., and know still less of work- 
 ing fatigue details, or he would not h5!vc hazarded his reputation upon 
 80 frail a venture. As to the unloading the Starlight, and steamboats 
 generally, the small landing Avas crowded, as may be seen from the 
 statement of the lieutenant, that there were five boats here at the time, 
 and it is quite reasonable that the labor should be directed to me at a 
 time to give space, and to save the Avastage which would result from 
 putting off corn in situations inaccessible to wagons. The statements 
 of the anonymous '• Captain of the Trent," are, in the sense in which 
 they are meant, false, as is also that of Captain Woods, in regard to 
 the bulk pork, and of Mr. McCauley, alout the corn. No such things 
 occurred, at all, in this department. I have never had pork lying a week 
 in the rain, or one moment longer than was absolutely necessary to have 
 it hauled. I believe there was only one lot rained upon ; that only 
 for one day. It was re^alted and saved. I have never lost a pound 
 of corn by submersi-on. In conclusion, the letter of Lieutenant Cam- 
 mack is reckless, unfounded, and dictated by an evil spirit unbecom- 
 ing an official document. I am surprised Major Johnston should have 
 lent so eag«r an ear to such vague and thoughtless accusations against 
 an officer whom he has complimented for the very qualities the want 
 of which is now charged. Surely that is not to " render unto Caesar 
 the things which are Caasar's ;" and can only be accounted for by an 
 excessive aversion to unnecessarily expending " toil, time and money," 
 evinced in his letter, as well as in the scanty supplies sent to this, 
 post, coupled with an equally strong desire to escape the consequent 
 responsibility. 
 
 I am, Major, very respectfully, etc., 
 
 JOSEPH P. CARR, 
 Major und A, C. S. 
 
 Office Chief or Subsistence, \ 
 
 Department Mississippi and East Louisiana, > 
 
 Jackson, April 16, 1863. ) 
 
 Major K. W. Memmikgeh, 
 
 A. A, G.f Jackson : > 
 
 Major: In reply to your communication of the 13th instant, ask- 
 ing for information in relation to the amount of supplies that can be 
 
81 
 
 collected, at once, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, say at Meridian, 
 Enterprize, Macon and Columbus, I have the honor to state I am 
 accumulating supplies rapidly, along the line of Mobile and Ohio 
 railroad, but the amount I can collect it is difficult for me to determine 
 with any accuracy. Enclosed is a consolidated statement of the stores 
 now at different points along the road. As they accumulate, I will 
 inform you. 
 
 I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, Major, etc. 
 
 Office of Chief of SuBSisxENCr-, V 
 
 Department Mississippi and East Louisiana, > 
 
 Jackson, April 10, 1863. y 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, 
 
 yi. A. Grneral Jackson, Miss. 
 
 Major : On the 29th ultimo I addressed you a communication on< 
 which I asked that all the purchasing officers in the second mili- 
 tary district, as in all other districts, be instructed not to go out 
 side of their districts, without authority from me. Will you 
 please inform me if such instructions have been issued. Informa- 
 tion, from various sources, has been furnished me to the effect that 
 agents from the several military districts are being sent out in every 
 direction, producing conflict and confusion in the purchase of sup- 
 ples. I quote from a letter received this day from Red river; 
 ** There have been a good many outside commissaries or agents from. 
 Port Hudson and Vicksburg, who, instead of facilitating the shipment 
 of articles necessary for the army, simply create the impression that 
 there must be a great dem-nd, and consequently cause the planter to 
 hold back for higher prices " Such action should cease. 
 I am, Major, very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, 
 
 Major, fyc. 
 
 Jackson, March 9, 1863. 
 
 To Major R. W. Memminger, 
 
 » A. A. G. Jackscn. 
 
 Major: Enclosed I have the honor to forward consolidated report- 
 of commissary stores at the different posts and depots, within the de- 
 partment since the first inst. I have had about nine hundred hogs at 
 Port Hudson slaughtered, which will increase the salt-meat rationg 
 about three hundred thousand. One thousand hogs I have ordered 
 ient to Vicksburg. 
 
 It is too late now to attempt to cure meat, and I have ordered hogfl 
 
62 
 
 killed, and issue I to the troops at that place. By doing thif, I think 
 I will have a sufficiency of meat to subsist the troops well until b -ief 
 cattle can be furnished. There have been received at Vicksburj^, sir.co 
 this report was made up, six hundred thousand rations of, rice, and 
 other stores that were in trsjnsitu on the Mobile and Ohio and Missis- 
 sippi Central railroid^. Miny of the stores th it were on these ronds 
 are not reported at all, for the reas-^n that th y were shipped before 
 the first inst., and not received, prior to that date, at Vicksburg. It 
 Vi'ill be seen, by referer ee to the report, th it there is a larger accumu- 
 lation of stores at Port Hudson, than elsewhere : a portion of thetn 
 has been ordere<l to Vicksburg. There is a boat recently out of Red 
 river, now in Big Black, with one hundred and eighty thousand ra- 
 tions of bacon, five hundred and thirty hogs, and three thousand 
 pounds of lard, for Vicksburg. The railroad, being now in running 
 condition, large quantities of st'^res will be sent to Vicksburg from 
 points on these roads. Besidfsthe boat now in Big Black, the sttMiri^r 
 Iline. with a load of commissary stores, out of Red river, is now at 
 Port Hudson. 
 
 I am, MajoF, etc., 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, 
 Major and Chvf cf Subsistence, 
 
 Office Chief of Sub^is-tf.n'ce, V 
 
 Dr'partment Mississippi and Ea^t Louisiana, > 
 
 Jackson, March 0. V 
 
 INIajor R. W. Memminger. A. A G. : 
 
 I\l uoR : Enclosed is a letter from an officer at Canton, and copies 
 of dispatches from officers at Micon, and replies thereto. 1 respect- 
 fully request that the Lieutenant General commanding deterinirie 
 apoa Buoh course as he may deem advisable m relation to the pur- 
 chaao of bacon, bulk pork and beeves within the department and au- 
 thorize impressments of the artricles that cannot otherwise be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 I am, Major, etc., 
 
 THEODORE JOHNSTON, 
 Major and C kief of Subsistence. 
 
 CoMMLSSARY Offfce, CantoH, March 7, 1863. 
 
 Major Thko. Johnston, 
 
 Chief of Suhistence, Jackson, Miis. : 
 
 Dea.r Sir : My agent returned this evening from gome of the 
 counties above this place, and has purchased some bacon and corn, 
 which will be in in a few days. He reports a good deal of bacon for 
 
83 
 
 «ale ; some are willing to take fifty cents; some ask as muc'i as sev- 
 enty-five cents a pcutnl. He aays t\}^ f.inaers are expecting to hive 
 thiif ra 'at iinpes^ed, aal will no: s;ll u uil it is impi-es-^el; an I then 
 they will be willing to (liviile, believing that, if they sjll all they 
 can spire, an ordt^r might come to iin(ireH3 the bilaiice. M/ agent 
 Bay St that, by setting the price at fifty cents an orJt*r to impress, ha 
 thinks he can get some thirty or fifty thousand pounds in two or three 
 counties above here. 
 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 Vv. W. MERRIWETIIEIl, 
 
 Capt. and A. C, S. 
 
 [CoFV OF Telegram] 
 
 Macon, Miss, March 7, 1863. 
 
 Major TiiEO. Johnston: 
 
 Col. Baskerville, of Columbus, Miss., has an agent here whom he 
 has instructed to piy seventy cents for bacon. What can bo ex- 
 pected for us to do, when such a course is permitted by Government 
 agents. 
 
 Capts. DOWD & BOYCE, 
 A. a S. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., March 7, 1863. 
 Capts. DowD & BovcE, 
 
 Jackson, Mississippi : 
 
 I know of no Government agent by the name of Biskorville. There 
 is a merchant of that nirae who resiiles at Oolumbus. Yo)x are an 
 thorized to impress b icon in the hands of speculators. N ) authority 
 has been given to pay seventy cents for bicon. Take the b.icon. 
 
 TllEO. JOHNS roN. 
 Major and Chief Subsistence. 
 
 Office Cmjef or Subsistence. ^ 
 
 Vrpartment M'.ssissippi and Ea^t Low'smni ^ 
 
 • Jackson, Apiil 14, 1863. ) 
 
 Major R. W, Memminger, 
 
 A. A. G. Jackson Mississippi. 
 
 M\jor : Enalo.scd I remit all the i iformition that I have in relation 
 to the condition of commiusary stores at Port Iludion, except what 
 
84 
 
 has been said by persons whose names I did not take ; but almost all 
 with whom I havo conversed, united in saying that there was great 
 waste of stcrcs at that post. "Wtfbther these statement were true, I 
 have not had an opportunity, of my own knowledge, to ascertain ; but 
 I know the gentlemen, who have made these statements, to be of un- 
 doubted integrity. I am pleased to know that an investigation is to 
 be made, and if there has been neglect of duty the fact will b© 
 known. 
 
 I am Major, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, 
 Major and Chief Subsistence. 
 
 March 21, 1863. 
 
 I found a large quantity of corn on the levee, notwithstanding 
 there had been no arrival previous to the ** Trent" for three or four 
 days. I also noticed on the levee, within a few feet of the water, the 
 four hundred and ten barrels of salt which was discharged there more 
 than a month since. I saw many soldiers shelling corn about the 
 landing, merely to obtain the cobs to throw at one at another ; others^ 
 were filling their haversacks with shelled corn, and corn in the ear. 
 
 Captain Woods stated that he had seen a large quantity of bulk 
 pork remain in the rain on the levee for a week, and half the lot was- 
 epoiled and unfit for use. 
 
 Mr. Macauley told me that two thousand five hundred bushels of 
 corn were submerged on the levee at Port Hudson, and several parties 
 stated that more subsistence bad been wasted than consumed. 
 
 GEO. CAMMACK. 
 
 Offjce Chief of Subsistence, \ 
 
 Department Mississippi and East Louisiana^ v 
 
 Jackson, Miss., March ^S, 1863. ) 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, 
 
 A. A. General: 
 
 Major: Your letter of instruction of the 19th inst., enclosing » 
 communication from W. J. Button, Esq., received. 
 
 Relative to that portion of it instructing concert of action between 
 Major Mims and myself, in order to secure an uniformity in rhe pur- 
 chase price of articles on the part of our respective agents, I would 
 reply that such arrangements have already been made ; and, by refer- 
 ence to the enclosed papers, you will perceive that, as early as the 
 13th of February, I instructed Mr. John McFarland to take possession 
 of the steam transport Edward J. Gay, and send her immediately to 
 
f 
 
 85 
 
 Snyder's Bluff; to place a grist mill upon her, and use her for storing 
 and grinding corn into meal, to be turned over to the commissary for 
 the troops on Yazoo river. 
 
 You will perceive that the boat was taken for some other purpose. 
 The commissary of the second military district has been furnished 
 with the list of prices governing the agents of Major Mims and my- 
 self. 
 
 • I am, sir, very respectfuUv, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 TIIEO. JOHNSTON, 
 Mqjor and Chief of Subsistence 
 
 [Extract.] 
 
 March 21, 1863. 
 
 To Major R. W. Memminger, 
 
 A. A. General ; 
 
 lam informed by Mr. F. D. Conrad, a gentleman of unimpeachable 
 credit, that, about the time when the gunboat " Queen of the West'* 
 was captured by our forces, there was a large quarvtity of corn upon 
 the banks of the river at Port Hudson, which remained unstored for 
 eight or ten days. At the expiration of this time it was removed from 
 the landing, and stored in a damaged condition. 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, 
 Major and Chief of Subsistence. 
 
 Captain J. V. Duvalde, of the parish of West Baton Rouge, was 
 in my office when Mr. Conrad made his statement, and s:ud either that 
 he had heard of or had himself seen the condition of commissary 
 stores at Port Hudson, statt-d by Mr. Conrad as existing. 
 
 [Extract ] 
 
 April 8th, 1S63. 
 
 When I arrived at Port Hudson, the steamer Red Cliief was Ijing 
 at the landing, loaded with corn in shuck. "A detail" was ordered 
 to unload her. One portion of the detail procured coal hods(litdding 
 each about a bushel of corn) and earned the corn to the edge of the 
 bank, where thoy deposited it. The other portion of the detail stood 
 on board the boat and threw the corn on sh(.re, ear by ear. Had 
 proper care been taken in discharging the boat, and the coin beea 
 deposited ten or twelve yards further from the edge of the bank, no 
 corn would have been lost, whoreaa it was deposited upon the very 
 edge of the bank, and when the pile got to a certain [height, almost 
 
8C 
 
 every load from the hods, when deposited upon the top, would roll do .vn 
 into the river. In thia manner, could we ascertain Avith any cer- 
 tainty tho amount of corn which has heen sunk at the landing at 
 Port I-udson ? We could find that we have suffered an tvlmostincrsdi- 
 ile loss in that item alone, and all through neglect. On the Blaff 
 there was sugar, salt, and molassc:},, which had been lying there for 
 more than a month ; the molasses being on end, with the sugar and 
 Fait piled upon it, the cooperage beijig very bad and the whole tot 
 surrounded w th a pool of sugar and molas^ses which had been leaked 
 out. Major Carr says it is impossible for him to do more than he 
 does at present, and that he has had to build his storerooms and ware- 
 houses himself. 
 
 WALT. S. WING ATE. 
 
 [CiXTRACT.J 
 
 Jackson. March 18th, 1863. 
 
 Major General Frank Gardner, Port Hudson : 
 
 Reports are diUly made to me of the waste of stores at Port Ilud- 
 gon. Whether these reports be true, you are best able to determine. 
 I would respectfully request that, in view of the scarcity of subsist- 
 ence stores, and the difficulty of collecting them, you will urge upon 
 the subsistence officers the importance of a proper preservation of ali 
 stores that arrive at Port Hu<ison. 
 
 THEO. JOHNSTON, 
 
 Major and A. C. S. 
 
 "Headquarters Departbient Mtssissippi and East Louisiana, 
 
 Jackson, March 18th, 1863. 
 
 Major MiMS, Chief Quartermaster : 
 
 The General desires to know how many wagons he can calculate 
 upon to transport provisions to Port Hudson via Osyka. He directs 
 that as the roads are in pretty gjo I order, you obtain all the wagons 
 practicable to put on this road. The enclosed letter he refers to you 
 as containing many truths and valuable suggestions both for your 
 department and the commissary. He desires the letter to be returned. 
 Very respectfully, etc , 
 
 J. D. BRADFORD, 
 
 Major and C. S. 
 
S7 
 
 [Telegram.] 
 
 Headquarters, etc., Jackson, March 18, Ic63. 
 
 Major General SinvfNSON, Vicksburg Mis. : 
 
 Put every man at work, if npces?ary, in unloading the cars. Trans- 
 portation on the Mobile und Ohio r.iilroad almost stopped for want of 
 cars. Send Mobile and Ohio cars first. Send all back as fast as 
 unleaded. 
 
 J. C. PJ^MBERTON, 
 JLiiuUnaid General commanding. 
 
 [Telegram.] 
 
 Headquarters, etc., Jackson, March 18, 18G3. 
 Major General Gardneii, Port Hudson : 
 
 Send all spare wagons to Osyka to aid in transportation of sup- 
 plies. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 Litutenant Gaiera/. 
 1 
 
 Jackson, March 18, 1863. 
 
 Major General Steve sson, Vicksburg, Mississippi : 
 
 Have every e.xertion made to repair break in road near Vick.sburg. 
 See Colonel VVadley on the subject. The two boats passed Rodney 
 at four and a half, 1'. M. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General comrnanding. 
 
 [Telegram] 
 
 Jackson, March 19, 18G3. 
 Brigadier General Ciialmehs, Panel i : 
 
 Hive the bacon and corn forwarded to thij point as rapidly as pos- 
 sible. , 
 
 J. 0. PEMBERTON, 
 Lifutmant General commanding 
 
88 
 
 / [Telegram ] 
 
 Jackson, March 19, 1863. 
 Hon. J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War : 
 
 I propose to endeavor to subsist my army as hitherto. Have 
 agents with large amount of funds to make purchases of corn, beef, 
 and bacon west of Mississipjii river, and also collecting some supplies 
 in this State. The instructions of Commissary General to Major 
 Johnston to withdraw his agents from west Mississippi river, and to 
 make all purchases' through Lieutenant Colonel Broadwell, would 
 upset all my arrangements, and is, besides, impracticable. Colonel 
 Broadwell has not been within thi^ department for about six weeks. 
 I am glad to receive assistance from him, but chief of subsistence 
 of this department must, of course, be under my control. Have 
 released, pursuant to your order, all sugar, except six weeks' supply 
 for this department. Navigation of Mississippi river again cut off. 
 Neither subsistence nor ordnance can come or go. I hope you will 
 not attribute my acts or requests to any motives but good of the ser- 
 vice. I have none other. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 [Telegram ] 
 
 Jackson, March 19, 1863. 
 Major General Gardner, Port Hudson : 
 
 Hartford and Monongahela passed Grand Gulf, going up, at seven, 
 A. M. One supply boat at a time might run down and unload at 
 Port Hudson. It is so important that the risk might be run ; but 
 perfect arrangements must be made to destroy her, if necessary. 
 Can you arrange it ? 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 [Telegram.] 
 
 Jackson, March 19, 1863, 
 IMajor General Gardner, Port Hudson: 
 
 If notified by General Stevenson that boats pass up by Vicksburg, 
 )Send about 2()l),()U() pounds of and U),(JUO bushels of corn. 
 
89 
 
 of that which wil arrive by boats at Port Hudson, immediately up 
 Big Black. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Headquarters, etc., Jackson, March 19, 1863. 
 Major General Stevenson, Ficksburg, Mississippi : 
 
 General : I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to say 
 that the chief quartermaster and commissary of the department have 
 been directed to instruct their agents engaged in purchasing and 
 transporting supplies of grain along the Yazoo and its tributaries ; 
 that they will maintain a unanimity of prices, avoiding all competi- 
 tion. It is desired that all instructions as to purchases in this sec- 
 tion should come through the chiefs of the departments. 
 I am, respectfully, etc., 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 
 Headquarters, etc., Jacksom, March 19, 1863. 
 Mtjor T. Johnston, Chief of Subsistence : 
 
 Major: I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to say 
 that in reference to supplies of grain, &c., collected on the Yazoo and its 
 tributaries to be at Snyd r's Bluff, you will make such arrargements 
 with Major L. Mims, chief quartermaster, both as regards the pur- 
 chases and transportation of such supplies as will secure on uni- 
 formity in the purchase, price, and cost of transportation. Y^ou will 
 also see that all your agents obtain and follow such instructions and 
 that uniform price is established throughout. You will see that the 
 agent of the commissary of the secord military district follow similar 
 instructions. The object to be maintained is uniformity in price ; 
 thf-t no competition aiise between the iigfnts of the Quartermaster 
 and Commissary Departments. He also directs you to ctablish on 
 Bome eteam transport a mill for the purpose of grinding corn at such 
 points as is convenient, as he is informed that there are many trans- 
 ports that can be usid as such. 
 
 I am, respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Mississippi and East Loiisiana, ) 
 
 Jackson, March 2<l, 1863. $ 
 
 Major L. Mims, Chief Quartermoitcr : 
 
 Ma.ior : The Lieutenant General commanding directs me to enclose 
 thi8<lippatch to and say to you that you will take measures to provide 
 
90 
 
 boats to transport troops up the river an<l supplies down. You will 
 inform liiin whar. boats you cm obtain. Boats of larger class will bo 
 retained for the transportation on the Yazoo and those of the smaller 
 class kept for the navigation of the smaller streams and the Talla- 
 hatchie. The general ('esires a complete organization of 'the boat 
 system on the Ynzoo. Such bo;its as are being armed anl clad with 
 cotton, will be exempt from these arrangements. 
 I am, respectfully, 
 
 J. D. BRADFORD, 
 
 Major and Commissary. 
 
 Headquarters Department Mis.«;issippi and E. Louisiana, > 
 
 Jackson, March 2U, 1863. ] 
 
 Colonel B, S. Ewell, A. A. G., TuUahomn : 
 
 Colonel: I have the honor to enclose the within communication of 
 Major Mim?, chief quartermaster, with regard to complaints made 
 against his department with his reply. I fully concur and think the 
 case 30 palpable as not to require that further be said should there be 
 any charges specifically brought against any officer of the Qimrter- 
 master's and Commissary Departments in this command. I will use 
 every effort to have the case thoroughly iuvestii-ated. I deem it 
 ficaice necessary to say to you that the efforts which have brought 
 complaints against myself and the officers of the Qu irtermastor's 
 and Commissary Departments acting under ray instructions, have 
 been entirely for the public good. 
 
 Very res^iectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant Genercd commanding. 
 
 I 
 
 IlEADQUARTEftS DEPARTMENT MISSISSIPPI AND E. LoUISI\NA, > 
 
 Jackson, March 20, 1863. J 
 Major General B. Taylor, Commanding, ^c, Alexar dria : 
 
 The Lieutemnt General commanding directs me to say, in reply to 
 j^ur letter of the 12ih instant, that he addressed General Smith only | 
 after repeated assurances from different parties that you had prohib- \ 
 ited his agents in the purchase of supplies ; that Port Hudson depends | 
 almost entirely for supplies on the other side of the river; further, ' 
 that he has ever thought, and is glad to hear, that you are willing to 
 assist him, as he is also to assist you when able. 
 Very respectfully, etc., 
 
 J. c. taytor, a. d. a 
 
91 
 
 IIeadquahters, etc., Jackson, March 21, 1863. 
 
 Major L. Mi MS, 
 
 Chief Quart ermnster : 
 
 Major : The Lieutenant General commanding directs that you will 
 require the quartermaster at ^'ick^burg to report to you the arrival 
 of every train of pupplics and ordnance, reporting the number of car 
 leads of each. You uill render a similar report to these head- 
 quarters. 
 
 I am, Mr.jor, etc., 
 
 J. D. BRADFORD. 
 Major ond Assistant Inspects Gemral. 
 
 [Telegram ] 
 
 Jackson, March 21, 1363. 
 
 Major General Gakdnir, 
 
 Port Hud on : 
 
 Send no boat here until you hear from myself or General Steven- 
 son that the river is clear. I have every confidence cf your using 
 every exertiou to unload the boats. Telegraph every day the amount 
 of corn and meat on hand. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
 Headquarters, etc, Jackson, March 21, 1863. 
 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief of Subsistence. : 
 
 Major : The Lieutenant General directs that you Fend a bonded 
 commissary to the Yazoo with money to make any necessary pay- 
 ments due there and to purchase supplies, not only for the troops at 
 Snyder's Mill.s, but for General Loring and all iho troops in and 
 around the Tallahatchie, Sunflower and Deer Creek. You can, at 
 your option, employ Mr. John W. McFarland for this purpose, 
 making him cither disbursing and purchasing .igent or simply an 
 agent for the procuring <'f supplies as above. lie is reported as an 
 active, energetic aad reliable gentleman and a most trustwurtliy 
 agent. In case you employ Mr. McFarland as agent you can supply 
 him ^viih funds to make immediate payments, or cause all his bills to 
 
92 
 
 l)e paid on presentation. The rates of purchase must conform to those 
 established. 
 
 I am, Major, etc., 
 • J. D. BRADFORD, 
 
 Major and Commissary. 
 
 Jackson, March 22, 1863. 
 
 Major General Stevenson : 
 
 Notify colonel when it is safe to send boats up river from Natchez 
 or Red river. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Headquarters Mississippi and East Louisiana, 
 Jackson, March 22, 1863. 
 Major General Buckner, 
 
 Commandivg, Sfc, Mobile, Alabama : 
 
 General : I have the honor to request that a lot of flour, four 
 hundred and ninety barrels, seized in Mobile, be released and trans- 
 portation allowed to its destination, Captain G. A. Woodward, 
 Vicksburg. This flour was purchased for me in commissary 
 department and is much needed here. You will remember that all 
 produce not grown or raised in this department is allowed to pass 
 freely to Mobile. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 22, ISSS. 
 Brigadier General John S. Bowen, 
 
 Gfand Gulf, Blississippi : 
 
 Do not take more than ten diys' supplies from steamer Hine. I 
 want the Hine to go up to bridge if possible. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 23, 18G3. 
 
 •Major General Stevenson, Vicksburg : 
 
 General Chalmers is paying thirty cents per pound for bacon at 
 
93 
 
 Panola, whilst Majar Reed's agent is offering fifty cents. This must 
 be stopped. Major Reed's agent must not pay more than General 
 Chalmers'. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 » Lieuttnant General. 
 
 Jackson, March 23, 1863. 
 
 General Chalmers, Panola^ Mississippi: , 
 
 General Stevenson has been directed to notify Major Reed not to 
 pay more for bacon than your agents. 
 
 J. (J. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General ccmmanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 24, 1863, 
 
 Major General C. L, Stevenson : 
 
 Additional boats have been ordered to Snyder's Mills, and it is 
 thought they must be there by this time. Additional urgent orders 
 have been given to send all the boats that be controlled. It is impos- 
 sible to do more than he has done. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 24, 1863. 
 
 General Bowen, Grand Gulf: 
 
 Notify at Rodney and Natchez if either of the Federal gunboats 
 pass down, as my object is that boats may run from Red river into 
 Big Black with subsistence. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 24, 1863. 
 G. W. KoDNTz, Natchez : 
 
 Send courier up Red river to notify the boats Charm, Texas and 
 J. H. Tucker that 1 wish them to go up Big Black They should 
 stop at Rodney and obtain all information in regard to movements of 
 Federal gunboats. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
94 
 
 Jackson, March 24, 1863. 
 
 General Bowev, Grand Gulf : 
 
 I have ordered the boats Charm, Texas and J. II, Tucker, loaded 
 with subsistence, up Big Black river. 
 
 J. C PEMBERTON, 
 Luuiei.ant Gtneral commanding. 
 
 , Jackson, March 25, 18G3. 
 
 Majcr General Stf.vens#n, 
 
 V^ickshurg, Mississippi : 
 
 The Charm is at Natchez, loaded with meat, C:m she run for Big 
 Black with safety. Answer immediately, and, if so, telegraph Lieu- 
 tenant Colonel Lovell at Natchez, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Liiutenant Gentral commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 25, 1863. 
 
 Brigadier General Bowen, Grand Gu'f : 
 
 The Charm is at Nutchez, loaded with m'y.it. Will it be safe to let 
 h<»r run up to Big Bluck ? If so. telegrnph Lieutenant Colonel ^Y. 
 S. Lovell at Natchez. Answer iaimydiiittd i,-. 
 
 j; C PEMBERTON, 
 LicuUnant General commanding. 
 
 Jacksov, INIarch 25, 1863. 
 
 Brigadier General Jam S, Bowen, Grand Gu-f : 
 
 Use your judgment in collecting the corn, whenever you deem it 
 eafe and can get a boat. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieuttnant General commanding. 
 
 Jacksom, March 27, 1863. 
 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief of Subsistence : 
 
 I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to say, in 
 
95 
 
 reply to your communication of the 2'»th instant, that you are 
 auiborizei to exchange sale for bacon at the rates you propose. 
 I am, Major, etc., 
 
 II. C. TUPPER, 
 
 Aid-de-Camp. 
 
 Jackson, March 29, 1863. 
 
 Brigadier General Ciulmer?, ^ 
 
 Panola, M ssissippi : 
 
 If you consider it practicable that supplies can be drawn from 
 country along Memphis railroad, pVess it to completion as far as 
 Saidis. You are authorized to impicps negroes, jf it is probable 
 enemy will break up railroad, do nor, press it forward 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, March 30, 1863. 
 
 Major L. Mims, Jackson: 
 
 I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to inquire if 
 arrangenniits have been made to supply animals for the horse cars 
 between O.xford and Holly Spiings. 
 
 I am, Major, \cry respectfully, 
 
 11. C. TUPPER, 
 • Aid-dc-Camp. 
 
 Jackson, March 30, 1SG3. 
 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Cltiif of Subsistence : 
 
 M«jOR : I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to 
 direct you to make arrangements to have the cattle diiven down from 
 the Mississippi Central railroad, without waiting for transportation. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 JI. C. TUPPER, 
 
 Aid de-Camp. 
 
96 
 
 Jackson, March 30, 1863.. 
 
 Brigadier General Chalmers, 
 
 t Panola, Mississippi : 
 
 When parties refuse Confederate money for supplies wanted by the 
 Government, impress them, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON. 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Headquarters Department Mississippi and E. Louisiana, ) 
 
 Jackson, April 1, 1863. ) 
 
 Major John McFarland, Yazoo JCity : 
 
 Sir : In reply to your letter, the Lieutenant Greneral commanding 
 directs me to say that he relies upon you to supply the troops with 
 beef. He will not restrict you to ten cents per pound, but hopes you 
 will obtain it on the best possible terms. Major Johnston will keep 
 you supplied with funds, so you may purchase on the most advan- 
 tageous terms. It would be more difficult to get a proper amount of 
 molasses to you than to procure beef. Say to Mr. Weldon that his 
 account will be paid at Fort Pemberton as soon as the amount is 
 ascertained by a proper officer. General Loring must, in all cases, 
 examine and approve the accounts, and he must keep distinct the 
 expenses properly incurred by each branch of the service. The con- 
 struction of rafts, and the necessary expenses incident thereto, 
 belongs to the engineer bureau; the transportation, &c., to the 
 quartermaster and the subsistence to the commissary. Each of 
 these items belonging to these different classifications must be kept 
 distinct and stated separately. 
 
 I am, with respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 JL. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 He^adquarters Department Mississippi and E. Louisiana, ) 
 
 Jackson, April 3, 1863. \ 
 
 Major L. Mims, 
 
 Chief Quartermaster, Jackson, Mississippi : 
 
 Major : I am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to 
 say that the means of transportation on the Mississippi Central rail- 
 road is by no means sufficient, and the transportation of supplies is 
 thereby greatly delayed. 'Your attention is directed to this fact, to 
 remedy which you will request the authorities of the New Orleans 
 and Jackson railroad to return the cars belonging on the Mississippi 
 Central railroad. If they are unwilling so to do, you will return the 
 
97 
 
 cars (a sufficient number), notwithstanding the diseent of euch 
 authorities. 
 
 I am. very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, 
 Assistant Adjutant General. 
 
 Jackson, April 5, 1863. 
 Major General C. L. StevensoxN : 
 
 The Hine must not go down until mouth of Rod river is open. 
 At last report enemy's fleet was there. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jack80>% April G, 1863. 
 
 Captain E. Powell, Natchi^^z : 
 
 Send a courier at once to Red river to notify all loaded boats to bo 
 in readiness to come to Big Black the moment thev are ordered. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, April 6th, 1863. 
 
 Major L. Mims, 
 
 Jackson^ Missisippi : 
 
 In reply to your communication of this day's date, referring to the 
 necessity of the transfer of corn from the Mobile and Ohio railroad 
 to the Southern railroad. I am directed by the Lieutenant General 
 commanding to say that he deems it advisable that the corn referred 
 to be stored at Meridian, the necessity for its shipment to Vicksbur.: 
 not being very pressing, and regarding it more iiiiportant that tuo 
 cars be retained on the Mobile and Ohio railroad for the purpose of 
 bringing supplies from the country above Meridian to that point, than 
 that at the present time the cars be run through to Vickaburg, and 
 the transporlatlxTi osi the Mobile and Ohio railroad temporarily de- 
 layed. This corn can therefore for the present be stored at Meri- 
 dian, and removed when transportation can be more readily obtained 
 on the Southern railroad. 
 
 Respectfully, etc., 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 7 
 
98 
 
 Jackson, April 6th, 1863. 
 
 M;;jor General Frank Gardner, 
 
 Port Hudson, 
 General — In reply to your communication of 3d instant, enclosing 
 report from Major Carr, A. 0. S., 1 am directed by the Lieutenant 
 General commanding to say, as to complaints in the delay of remov- 
 ing corn, that they were not only preferred by Maj. Johnston, but also 
 by Lieut. Colonel Broadwell, agent for the Commanding General, for 
 supplying the armies of the Confederate States. It would appear 
 that there was inexcusable delay in unloading the boats, and remov- 
 ing the supplies. If there were not sufficient hands, soldiers should 
 be detailed for the purpose. 
 
 I am, respectfully, etc., 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 
 Jackson, April 7th, 1863. 
 
 Lieut. Col. W. S. Lovell, 
 Natchez : 
 You don't mention amount of- corn on river— think it as safe to run 
 up Red river, unless gets- full load. Can take it coming back. Order 
 Hine accordingly. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding y 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Mississippi and E. Louisiana, ) 
 
 Jackson, April 7th, 1863. ) 
 President R. R. : 
 
 Sir : The Lieutenant General commanding the department instructs 
 me to siay that the shipment of Government supplies and stores to 
 Vicksburg is much too slow for the requirements of the service — that 
 he desires that you will give your attention to this, and employ mor© 
 cars in this transportation ; and further, that he thinks one day in the 
 week is all that should be allowed for shipment of private freights. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. TAYLOR, A. D. C, 
 
 Jackson, April 7th, 1863. 
 
 Gen. John S. Bowen, 
 
 Grand Gulf, via Port Gibson : 
 Send a boat to St. Joseph for 1 500 sacks of corn there. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lievi. General Commanding. 
 
99 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Mississippi and E. Louisiana, 
 
 Jackson, April 7th, 1863, 
 Judge J. L. NoBERS, 
 
 Carrolton, Ala. :. 
 Sir : General Pemberton has directed General Ruggles to allow 
 you to purchase the amount of corn mentioned in your letter, in 
 JSoxabee and Lounds counties, and ship it for the use of the destitute 
 families of volunteers now absent in the service, on the conditions 
 and in the manner prescribed in your letter, ' 
 
 Yours, very respectfully, 
 
 J. THOMPSON, I. G. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Miss, and E. La. 
 Jackson, April Sth, 1863. 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief a S. : 
 The Lieutenant General commanding desires to know whether satis- 
 factory and suiScient arrangements have been made for the receipt 
 and keeping of the beef cattle coming from beyond the Mississippi 
 river, and he directs that hereafter no contracts for butchering must 
 be made which allows as compensation to the butcher the hides. 
 These must be retained and kept subject to the control of the quar- 
 termaster's department. 
 
 I am, respectfully, 
 
 J. THOMSON, I. G. 
 
 Jackson, April Sth, 1863. 
 General Stevenson, 
 
 Vicksburg : 
 Steamer ** Dot," with 200,000 pounds bacon, reached Big Black 
 this evening. Have arrangements made at once for its transporta^ 
 tion. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, « 
 Lieut. General Commanding. 
 
 Jack.son, April 9th, 1863. 
 General Stevenson, 
 
 Vicksburg : 
 Have ordered fifteen hundred men from above, as rapidly as possi 
 ble, to Rolling Fork. Send small boats to mouth of Sunflower to 
 take them from large boats. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieut, General Commanding! 
 
100 
 
 Jackson, April 13th, 1863. 
 Geceral Joseph E. Johnston, 
 
 Tullahoma : , 
 
 Cars can not run above Okelona. I am now establishing depots of 
 corn at Enterprise and Meridian ; shall also at Macon and Columbus. 
 Meat can only be obtained in moderate quantities for want of wagon 
 transportation. Will do all I can. Have no knowledge of ray pur- 
 chasing agent^being in Alabama; have ordered recall, 
 
 J. C. PEMPERTON, 
 Lieut General Commandivg. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Miss, and E. La. ) 
 Jackson, April 14, 1853. ) 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief of Subsistence, Jackson .' 
 Major : In reply to your communication of this day, I am directed 
 %y the Lieutenant General commanding, to say that the enemy's 
 ' gun-boats are reported at the mouth of Red river. Nothing can go 
 'down, 
 
 I am, respectfully, 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Miss, and E. La. ) 
 Jwkson, April \Ath, 1863. ) 
 Major L. Mims, 
 
 Chief QuarteriJ^ster, Jackson, Miss. : 
 Major : In connection with the accompanying communication from 
 'General Stevenson referred to you, I am directed by the Lieutenant 
 General commanding to say, he thinks it better to haul the machinery, 
 iron, &c,, to Vaughan's station, from Yazoo city, and that to take off 
 the wagons from hauling corn to Vicksburg, would be to prevent the 
 accumulation of corn, &c , on the line of the Mobile and Ohio rail- 
 road, which is now so much desired. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. W. MEMMINGER, A. A. G. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Miss, and E. La, ) 
 Jacks' n, Aptil ]6th, 1863. ) 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief Commissary : 
 Major : The Lieutenant General commanding directs me to say, 
 that corn and corn meal are not rapidly enough accumulated by your 
 
101 
 
 deportment ; that 85,000 bushels of corn is but a small amount to have 
 on the line of the Mobile and Ohio railroad. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant; 
 
 J. C. TAYLOR, A. D. C. 
 
 Headquarters Df.p't Miss, and E. La., ) 
 Jackson, April 17M, 1863. \ 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chie1 of Subsistence : 
 Sir : The Lieutenant General commanding is very solicitous for 
 the collection of supplies at the different points namod in the order 
 of yesterday, viz : Meridian, Macon, Columbus and West Point. He 
 hopes the greatest energy will be used by all the employees of your 
 department, and no effort be spared to effect the object. He relies 
 upon you to command success. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. THOMPSON, I. G. 
 
 Jackson, April 18th, 1863. 
 General Chalmers, 
 
 Panola, Miss. : 
 I regard the navigation of the Mississippi river shut out from us 
 now. No more supplies can be gotten from the trans-Mississippi de- 
 partment. Can you not supply (15,000) fifteen thousand more from 
 Panola. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commandins. 
 
 Jackson, April 18th, 1863. 
 Major Howell Hinds, 
 
 Fayette, Miss. : 
 We have a cargo of bacon on a boat in Choctaw Bayou, four miles 
 west of Waterproof. It is of vital importance to save it. Can it be 
 transported to tlie river and crossed at Rodney, and from thence sent 
 to the railroad. If so, you will undertake the direction of the enter- 
 piise. Jf you can get it across anywhere you will do a great service, 
 for whflk Lieut. General Pemberton will be most grateful. Answer. 
 
 W. H. McCARDLE, A. A. G. 
 
ro2 
 
 Jackson, April 18, 1863. 
 Brig. General John S. Bo wen, 
 
 Grand Gulf : 
 Steamer Vigo is now in Choctaw Bayou, four miles west of Water- 
 proof, with a cargo of bacon for Vicksburg. Send an energetic com- 
 missary and quartermaster to receipt for the bacon, and provide 
 transportation, by impressment if necessary. What means would 
 you suggest for getting it across the river. It is too necessary for 
 it to be lost. Answer as soon as possible. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
 Headquarters Department Mississippi and E. Louisiana, ) 
 
 Jackson^ Jpril 20th, 1863. ] 
 Major Theodore Johnston, 
 
 Chief Subsistence : 
 Major : 1 am directed by the Lieutenant General commanding to 
 say, in reply to ypur communication of to-day's date, relative to sub- 
 sistence at Port Hudson, La., that he is satisfied with amount now on 
 hand, but hereafter the supply must not be decreased, as it will have 
 to be kept by land. Every effort must be made to supply as fast as 
 consumed. 
 
 I am. Major, your obedient servant, • 
 
 J. H. MORRISON, A. D, C. 
 
 Jackson, April 22, 1863, 
 Colonel W. S. Lovell, 
 
 Natchez : 
 Am arranging to haul the one thousand sacks corn to Port Hudson. 
 You must get all you can for that place. Is it quartermaster or 
 commissary ? 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
 Jackson, April 25th 1863. 
 ^rig. General John S. Bowen, 
 Grand Guf: 
 What amount of bacon in cargo ? I propose sending it to Port 
 Hudson via Woodville. Answer. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERT^, 
 Lieutenant General Commamling. 
 
103 
 
 Jackson, April 26, 1863. 
 Brig. General John S Bowen, 
 
 The meat in Cole's Creek must be sent direct to Port Hudson, visk 
 Washington to Woodville, where General Gardner's agents will take 
 it. What is now on the way to Port Hudson may await further 
 orders. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
 Headquarters Dep't Miss, and E. Lv.. ) 
 Jackson, April S\)ik, 1863. } 
 President Southern R. R., 
 
 Jackson : 
 Sir : It is of the utmost importance that the break in your roaii 
 should be repaired with the greatest expedition, and I hope that you 
 will devote your energy and attention to the matter, and employ such 
 ft force on the work that the necessary repairs may be completed in 
 the shortest possible time, as a great portion of the supplies for this 
 command must come over your road. 
 
 Very respectfully your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
 Jackson, April 3(1, ISG3. 
 Brig. General John S. Bowen, 
 
 Grand Gu'f. 
 The meat at Port Gibson must by no means be allowed to fall into 
 the hands of the enemy. Have the reinforcements arrived ? 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant. 
 
 j! C.PEiMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General Commanding. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 GORRESPONDENCE RELATIVE TO ORDNANCK 
 
 Holly Springs, November G, 1863. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 I need six hundred (600) rounds three-inch Parrott projectiles and 
 three hundred (300) rounds twenty-pounder Parrott as soon as pos- 
 sible ; also, small arms and ammunition ; also, fixed ammunition, as- 
 sorted, for field guns. Have none on hand except what is in the 
 hands of regiments and battalions — only partially supplied. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., Norember 12, 1862. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 Neither of the Parrott guns, siege guns, twenty -four-pounder how- 
 itzers, or twelve-pounder bronze guns, have been received yet. Have 
 any been sent? I am horribly in want of arms» 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General, commanding. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., November 22, 1862. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 The arras sent by messenger, on the 29th, have never been heard of 
 here. Flats will be sent from Chattanooga, as soon as they arrive, 
 for ten-inch guns. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General, commanding.. 
 
105 
 
 VicKSBURG, January 3, 186S. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 Please order General Raines, at Augusta, to send me, at once, 
 thirty thousand pounds of powder. Must have it immediately. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General. 
 
 . Jackson, January 23, 1863. 
 Colonel GoRGAS, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 Please order the four thousand arms required for by Major Mayo 
 sent here without delay. They are indispensable at this juncture. 
 
 J, C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General, commanding^ 
 
 Jackson, February 5, 1863. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Richmond, Va. : • 
 
 I fear you do not appreciate the importance of meeting ordnance 
 requisitions for this department. A constant supply of field and 
 small-arm ammunition, especially pouch and ball, must come. 1 want 
 one million percussion caps immediately. 
 
 . J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General. 
 
 Jackson, April 16, 1863. 
 Colonel GoRGAS, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 I have a battalion of sharpshooters without arms. Can you let me 
 have three hundred (300) Enfield rifles to arm them with ? I need a 
 number of small arms for unarmed men in mv department. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General, commanding. 
 
 Jackson, April 18, 1863. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 If ammunition for the three nine-inch guns is not sent with them, 
 they will be useless to me. Have heard nothing from you of bolts for 
 the "Brooks" gun, nowhere. Without bolts, it had as well been 
 left in Richmond. I have no coal, and am unable to obtain any. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 ■ Lieutenant General, commanding. 
 
106 
 
 Jackson, April 28, 1863. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 Daily complaints are made of friction primers sent to this depart- 
 ment ; usually three out of five fail. It is worse than useless to send 
 tin ones here. Send at least ten thousand (10,000) copper ones, by 
 special messenger, with all haste. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Ueutenant General, commanding. 
 
 Jackson, April 19, 1863. 
 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 The dimensions for eyes for shells are not uniform. Please have 
 the shells fixed with fuses, or have the eyes uniform. Order extra 
 Babots, as many are broken by railroads in transportation. Diiferent 
 arsenals make the eyes larger or smaller than prescribed ; should be 
 corrected. Friction primers frequently fail, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General. 
 
 Jackson, Miss., ^jon7 23, 1863. 
 Colonel J. GoRGAS, Chi(f of Ordnance, Richmond, Va. : 
 
 Have but one (I) ten-inch mojtar; but can throw incendiary shells 
 from ten and eight-inch columbiads. Send me as many as you can, 
 and powder, or better cartridges with them. 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, ' 
 Lieutenant General, commanding. 
 
APPENDIX C. 
 
 List of Officers, Non-commissioned Officers end Er.listed Men Specialljf 
 Mentioned for Gallant Conduct in the Battle of Baker^s Creek crA 
 During the Siege of Vicksburg. 
 
 BAKER S CREEK. 
 
 Mentioned by Major General C. L. Stevenson. 
 
 Brigadier General S. D. Lee, gallant conduct during entire 
 engMgement; having had three horses shit under him. 
 
 Major Anderson, chief of artillery, gallantly falling in full dis- 
 charge of his duties. 
 
 Captain Ridley, company A, first Mississippi artillery, fell fighting 
 his guns single-handed and alone, winning, even from his enemies,, 
 the highest tribute of admiration. 
 
 Captains Corput and Johnson fought their batteries to the last 
 extremity, aided by non-commissioned officers and men. 
 
 Captain Waddill, first Mississippi artillery, fought his guns to the 
 last extremity, and when his battery was re-taken, aided by Lieu- 
 tenant G. D. Wise, ordnance officer of Cummings' brigade, fought 
 his guns until the Missourians had to fall back. 
 
 Major J. J. Reeve, Assistant Adjutant General, gallant conduct 
 and coolness in leading men into action. 
 
 M;ijor Webb, Inspector G«neral, gallant conduct. 
 
 Captain J. W. Matthews, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, gal- 
 lant conduct. 
 
 Surgeon H. M. Compton, gallant conduct. 
 
 First Lieutenant Botts, gallant conduct. 
 
 Colonel G. A. Heyward, volunteer aid-de-camp, gallant conduct. 
 
 Mr. D. E. Noiris, telegraph operator, for rendering valuable 
 services. 
 
 Private A. T. Sullivan, for rendering valuable services. 
 
 Mentioned by Colonel Dockcry, Commanding Missouri Brigade. 
 Sergeant R. H. Garner, company K, twenty-third Alabama, gallant 
 
108 
 
 conduct. Unassisted and alone, he used, with good eifect, a 
 
 pounder rifled hoAvitzer on the flanking column of the enemy, firing 
 from twelve to fifteen rounds. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Dismukes fell mortally wounded while gallantly 
 charging the enemy's batteries. 
 
 Private Padie, nineteenth Arkansas, gallant conduct during the 
 entire engagement, keeping in front of his regiment during the whole 
 day and using his gun with good efl'ect. 
 
 Mentioned by Colonel Cockrell, Commanding Missouri Brigade. 
 
 Captain Waddill, first Mississippi artillery, gallant conduct. 
 . Captains Carrington and Spangle and Lieutenant Dobbins, first 
 Missouri infantry, fell gallantly fighting the enemy. 
 
 Captain Mcllvaine, third Missouri infantry, fell gallantly fighting. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Hubble, third Missouri, fell mortally wounded 
 in the hottest of the fight. 
 
 Captain McKinney, mortally wounded in the hottest of the fight. 
 
 Lieutenant Rankin, first Missouri, mortally wounded while gal- 
 lantly fighting. 
 
 Colonel Riley and Lieutenant Colonel Garland, first Missouri, 
 gallant conduct. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Sentry and Major Carter, second Missouri, 
 gallant conduct. 
 
 Colonel Gause and Major McDonald, third Missouri, gallant 
 conduct. 
 
 Colonel McGowan, Lieutenant Colonel Burle and Major Waddill, 
 fifth Missouri, gallant conduct. 
 
 Major Cooper, sixth Missouri, gallant conduct. 
 
 Captain W. M. Young, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, gallant 
 conduct. 
 
 J. M. Flannagan, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, gallant 
 conduct. 
 
 R. L. Maupin, acting aid-de-camp, gallant conduct. 
 
 DURING SIEGE OF VICKSBURG, 
 
 Mentioned by Major General Stevenson. 
 
 Brigadier General Stephen D. Lee, gallant conduct in repulsing the 
 only decided assault made on General Stevenson's line during the 
 siege. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel E. W, Pettua, gallant conduct in leading charge 
 against the enemy in the ditch and capturing two (2) stands of colors 
 placed by the enemy on the parapet. 
 
 Colonel Gayton, fifty-seventh Georgia, gallant conduct in leading 
 eally. 
 
 Colonel Curtis, forty-first Georgia, gallant conduct in picket fight, 
 capturing one hundred and seven Federals. 
 
 Colonel Garrott, twentieth Alabama, killed. He was a true soldier 
 and a gifted patriot. 
 
 Captain Claiborne, artillery corps, gallant conduct ; killed. 
 
 Lieutenant G. D. Wise, ordnance officer of Cummings' brigade, 
 
109 
 
 gallant conduct. Specially mentioned for valuable services rendered 
 in carrying dispatches to General Johnston. 
 
 Major J J Reeve, A. A. G., gallant conduct and strict attention 
 to duty. 
 
 Major Gillespie, chief of subsistence, valuable services in subsist- 
 ing garrison, by close attention to duties. 
 
 Captain J. W. Johnston, Inspector General Light Artillery, for 
 valuable services rendered. 
 
 Captains Waddill and Grayson, commanding light batteries, valua- 
 ble services. 
 
 Captain P. Robinson, engineer officer, valuable services. 
 
 Major McElwrath, quartermaster, valuable services. 
 
 Mentioned by Colonel Cockrell, Commarding Missouri Brigade. 
 
 Ordnance Sergeant William F. Luckett, mortally wounded whilst 
 carrying ammunition through a severe fire. 
 
 Colon* 1 Eugene Erwin, killed whilst fighting most gallantly. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel l\ S. Sentry, killed whilst fighting most gal- 
 lantly. 
 
 Lieutenants Crenshaw and Roxbery, killed whilst fighting gallantly. 
 
 Colonel A. C. Riley and Lieutenant Colonel Garland, first 
 Missouri, gallant conduct. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Sentry and Major Carter, second Missouri, 
 gallant co'^luct. 
 
 Major McDowell, third Missouri, gallant conduct. 
 
 Coloi.el McGowan and Major Waddill, third Missouri, gallant 
 conduct. 
 
 Major Cooper, sixth Missouri, gallant conduct. 
 
 Captain R. L. Maupin, gallant conduct and valuable services. 
 
 Captain W. P. Pitman, A. I. G. ; Captain IL N. Pollard, A. A. 
 G., and Lieutenant T. B Green, A. D. C, gallant conduct. 
 
 Sergeant Fisher, Lowe's Missouri artillery, gallant conduct. 
 
 Mentioned by. Colonel Edward Uiggins, Commanding River Batteries. 
 
 Captains J. P. Lynch and Johnston, first Tennc?seo heavy artil- 
 lery, for handsomely handling their guns during the entire siege. 
 
 Major F. W. lioadley, first Tennessee light artillery, gallant 
 conduct ; killed. 
 
 Colonel Jackson, first Tennessee heavy artillery, gallant conduct. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Sterling, first Tennessee heavy artillery, gallant 
 conduct. 
 
 Major F. N Ogden, eighth Louisiana battalion, gallant conduct. 
 
 Captains Capers, Bond and Bruce, Lieutenants Agan, Woodlif and 
 Conrad, first Louisiana regular heavy artillery, gallant conduct". 
 
 Lieutenant Mumford, A. A A. G ; Lieutenant W. N. Bridge, A. 
 A. I. G. ; Lieutenant W. Ycrger, A. D. C, and W. C. Flynn, engi- 
 neer officer, valuable services. 
 
 Sergeant Thomas P. Lynch, first Louisiana artillery, valuable 
 services as chief of river police, always discharging his duties with 
 promptness and to the full satisfaction of his commanding officer. 
 
110 
 
 Mentioned by Colonel Waul, Commanding WauVs Texas Legion. 
 
 Captain Popenderick, Assistant Adjutant General, and Lieutenant 
 Simmons, aid-de camp, fell fighting gallantly for their country. 
 Major Cameron, gallant conduct ; killed. 
 Captain S. WicKland, gallant conduct. 
 Captain Flutas, first Louisiana Zouaves, gallant conduct. 
 
 Mentioned by Major General M. L. Smith. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Joy, chief of artillery ; Major Devreaux, A. 
 A. G. ; Major Geriault, A. I. G. ; Major Fearn, quartermaster ; 
 Captain M. McDonald, ordnance officer ; Lieutenant Frost, aid-de- 
 camp; Lieutenant Harrod, aid-de-camp; Surgeon Whitfield; Captain 
 Hobart, volunteer aid-de-camp, gallant conduct and very valuable 
 services. 
 
 Mentioned by Brigadier General Hebert. 
 
 Colonel Charles Herrick, mortally wounded ; gallant conduct. 
 Lieutenant Charles A. Buisle, aid-de-camp ; killed ; gallant con- 
 duct. 
 
 Lieutenant Blessing, engineer officer ; killed ; gallant conduct. 
 Respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, Lieutenant General 
 
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REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL STEVENSON. 
 
 Headquarters Stevenson's Division, ; 
 Bcmopolis, Ala., July 29, 1863. J 
 
 Major : I have the honor to submit the following report of the 
 operation of ray division, from its advance from Vicksburg to the 
 capitulation of the city. It has been delayed to this time by the 8on- 
 stant occupation of myself and my subordinate commanders during 
 the siege of Vicksburg, and by the march which followed its capitu- 
 lation. At about five o'clock, P. M., on the 16th of May, my division, 
 being the rear of the army, left its position in line of battle near 
 Edward's Depot, with the view of cutting the enemy's line of commu- 
 nications with his depot of supplies, and forcing him to give us battle 
 on our own ground We reached the head of the column in bivouac 
 on the Raymond road, at three o'clock, and there halted for the night. 
 
 At sunrise. I was summoned to appear at headquarters, where I 
 was informed by the Lieutenant General commanding that he had re- 
 ceived instructions from General Johnston to join him near Canton as 
 soon as possible, and that he had decided to move at once, in pursuance 
 thereto, towards Brounsville, on the north of the railroad, by the 
 route, as far as the railroad, by which we had advanced the previous 
 night. He directed me to move the trains, as rapidly as possible, to 
 a point at least three miles beyond the Jackson road, and then halt 
 them, arranged to the right and left of the road in such a manner as 
 would afford an uninterrupted passage to the infantry and artillery. 
 I immediately caused the trains to be turned, and, in charge of my 
 fourth brigade, Colonel Reynolds, to be moved rapidly to the rear, in 
 accordance with the instructions I had received. Colonel Reynolds 
 was directed to place one regiment in front of the train, and to form 
 the remainder of his brigade inline of battle, and, covering the Clin- 
 ton and Raymond roads, there to remain until relieved by the next 
 brigade in his rear. It was intended to hold these roads by the 
 brigades, as they puccesaively arrived, until the passage of the entire 
 army could be effected. The success of this movement, depending 
 mainly on the speedy relief of the road from the obstructions caused 
 by the pressure of the train, I despatched two of my staff officers, 
 Majors Noble and Anderson, to superintend the operations of those 
 in charge of the train. About nine and a half o'clock, A. M., the 
 latter reported that the road was open, the trains having been placed 
 as ordered, and free for the passage of the troops. This fact I imme- 
 diately communicated to the Lieutenant General commanding. About 
 nine o'clock, A. M., Lee relieved Reynolds on the Raymond and Clin- 
 ton roads, and in a very short time his skirmishers were engaged by 
 those of the enemy. A brisk skirmish of three quarters of an hour 
 developed our position to the enemy, who at once changed his direc- 
 tion by the right flank, with the view of turning our left. My three 
 •brigades — the fourth, Colonel Reynolds, having moved off with the 
 train — were immediately drawn up in order of battle, Barton on the 
 
113 
 
 "right, Cumniings in the centre, and Lee on the left. As previously 
 stated, the line of the march was a cross road from the Clinton to 
 the Raymond road, intersecting the former nearly at right angles, 
 {see diagram.) It was at this fork that my left rested. The enemy, 
 in columns of division, moved steadily around our left, forcing it to" 
 change direction to correspond, and their movement was so rapid as 
 to keep my line (a single one) in constant motion by the left fliink. 
 Of this fact I informed the Lieutenant General communding. and from 
 time to time every apparent increase of force, or ad<lit!on!il move- 
 ment of the enemy, was promptly reported. Finding that they 
 "were about to concentrate on the left with the larger part of their 
 force, still moving a column to the flank, as 1 had no reserve, I moved 
 General Barton, my right brigade, by the rear to the extreme left. 
 At the time this order was given, the Lieutenant Genv?ral commanding 
 was notified of the fact, and was informed that the enemy had massed 
 a large force on the left, which would doubtless be the main point of 
 attack. My line had now been moved to the left until two regiments 
 of the centre, now the right — the fifty-sixth Georgia, Colonel Wat- 
 kins, and the fifty-seventh Georgia, Colonel Burkalos — occupied the 
 Riiymoud and Clinton roads, with an interval of three hundred (3 0) 
 yards between them and the remainder of their brigades. This sepa- 
 ration was necessary to protect the right and rear of the new line, 
 now threatened by three roads. This new line, upon which the attack 
 was made, was formed as follows: the right rested at the angle of the 
 original line, composed of three (3) regiments, the thi'ty-sixth Geor- 
 gia, Colonel Glenn, the thirty-fourth (Georgia, Colonel Johnson, and 
 the thirty-ninth Georgia, Colonel McCounell, of Cumming's brigade; 
 Lee's brigade, the twentieth Alabiraa, Colonel Gurrett, the twi-nty- 
 thirJ Alabama, Colonel Beck, the thirtieth Alabama, Colonel Shelle3^ 
 the thirty-first Alabama, Lieut. Colonel Arrington, occupied the centre; 
 and Barton's brigade, the fortieth Georgia, Coloiicl Johnson, the 
 forty-first Georgia, Colonel Curtis, the fort^y -second Georgia, Colonel 
 Henderson, the forty-third Georgi;:, Colonel Harris, and the fifty- 
 second Georgia, Colonel Phillips, the left — the left resting on Baker's 
 Creek, near the bridge. A portion of Captain Wa 'dell's battery was 
 posted at the angle of the line to defend the approaches by the Clin- 
 ton and Raymond roads, and the remainder, with two pieces of Capt;iin 
 Johnston's battery, on the left of Cumming's brigade. Captain Rid- 
 ley, with a portion of his battery, was on the left of Barton, as was 
 also Captain Corput's battery. My line, as will thus appear, was 
 necessarily single, irregular, divided, and without reserve. Under 
 the supposition that the army was to move forward in pursuance of 
 the instructions given in the morning, this ground was not recon- 
 noitored with a view to taking up a position for battle, until we were 
 on the move, facing the enemy. 
 
 At about ten atid a half o'clock, A. ^L, a division of tho enemy, jia 
 columns of brigade, attacked Lee and Cummings. They were h>>,nd- 
 goracly met, and forced back some distance, when they were rein- 
 forced, apparently by about three divisions, two of which moved 'oi'- 
 ward to the attack, and the third continued to march towards ♦h* left 
 8 
 
114 
 
 v?ith the view of forcing it. The eneiaj. aow made a vigorous attaci: 
 iu three lines upon the whole front. They were bravely met, and for 
 a long time the unequal conflict was maintained with stubborn reso- 
 lution. But this could not last. Six thousand five hundred (6,500) 
 men could not hold permanently in check four (4) divisions, number- 
 ing, from their own statements, about twenty-five thousand men; and 
 were finally crushed by overwhelming Euaiibers. My right gave v, ay, 
 aad was pressed back upon the two regiments covering the Clintorv 
 and Raymond, roads, where they were in part rallied. Encouraged by 
 this success, the enemy redoubled his efforts, and pressed with the 
 utmost vigor along my line, forcing it back. At this time, about tw-c 
 arid a half o'clock, P. M., Bowen's division of Missouri and Aifkansas- 
 troops. General Green on the right and Colonel Cockerell on the left, 
 arrived, aiid gallantly charged the enemy, supported on the left by a 
 portion of Cumming's and Lee's brigades, and drove them back be- 
 yond the original line. In the meantime, the enemy had continued? 
 his line tr.ovement to our left, and fell upon Barton in overwhelming- 
 numbers, lie charged them gallantly, but was forced back, and the- 
 enemy, following up his advantage, cut him ofi" entirely from the rest 
 of the division. 
 
 It was here that the lamented Major Anderson, my chief of artil- 
 lery, fell in the fearless discha^rge of his dc.ty. In the very front of 
 battle the brave soldier, the nobis gentleman, met his death. There, 
 too, the gillant Bidley, refusing., to leave his guns, single handed and 
 alone fought until he fell, pierced with six shots, receiving, even from 
 his enemies, the highest tribute of admiration. Nothing could pro- 
 tect t\v artiller^y horses from the deadly fire of the enemy ; almost all 
 were killed, and along ray whole line, the pieces, though fought with 
 desperation, on the part of both ofiicers and men, which I cannot 
 praise too highly, almcst all fell into the hands of the enemy. In 
 this manner the guns of Corput's and Johnston's batteries, and Wad- 
 deirs section, were lost. Double shotted, they were fired until, ia 
 many instances, the swarms of the enemy were in amongst ^-hem. 
 Officers and men stood by them to the very latest moment that they 
 could be served, and to Captains Corput and Johnston, and to Lieu- 
 tenant Bates, their subordinate officer, and men, I desire to return 
 the thanks which their gallantry has made their due. 
 
 On the extreme right the guns, under the immediate command of 
 Captain "Waddell, were fought and lost in the same manner, but reta,-= 
 ken by the Missoariansand their brave officers, assisted by Lieutenant 
 G. D!^ Wise. One officer fought on.e of them with his ovm hands,. 
 until Bowon, too, retreated. Early in the day the forty-second regi- 
 ment Georgia volunteers, Colonel liendorson, of Barton's brigade, 
 had been sent to hold the bridge over Baker's Creek. Barton wa?. 
 moved to this point, held it for a time, and finally crossed and took 
 up position near Edward's dopot, which lie held until nearly dark. 
 Here he was joined by many officers and men of Cummlngs' brigade, 
 who, when driven from their positions by the overwhelming numbers, 
 had retreated by the same route he took. The two regiments of 
 Cumtnings' brigade, which I have before mentioned, were kept on the 
 
us 
 
 Olintoii -anti Raymond roads, and, tlins seperated from the brigade, 
 joined Green's brigade, of Bewen's division, in the charge upoa the 
 enemy, and remained with tbem until they retired. 
 
 When reinforced by Bow en's division, and the enemy were being 
 •driven, I infoimcd the Lieutenant General of the fact, and asked that 
 Loring's division might be sent up at once. The attack of Bowen'a 
 divi3ioQ was made about two and a half o'clock, P. M. During the 
 attack of the Missourians, and when the enemy were pressing back of 
 left, thus reinforced, I met the Lieutenant General on the field, and 
 stated to him that, unless Loring's division was brought up, we could 
 not hold the field. lie replied that he had been repeatedly ordered to. 
 ■come forward, and that he would go in person and hasten their move- 
 ments. 
 
 About four o'clock, P. M , Buford's brigade, of Loring's division, ^ 
 
 arrived, bat not until the enemy had taken pos-ession of the Bay- % 
 
 mond road, and turned upon him two captured batteries. Several 
 pieces of Withers' artillery, from a ridge nearly opposite, opened a. ( 
 
 brisk fire, and soon silenced them. About this time I received orders 
 from the Lieutenant General commanding, to withdraw the troops in 
 order to Big Black bridge. I dispatched this order to my brigade 
 •oommander, a?.id, seeing thai our right and rear were exposed, I im- 
 mediately went in that direction, in order to ascertain if, as had l>een 
 reported to me, the enemy were making a movement to cut me o!T by 
 the .ro«:te which we were about to take. On my return, I found that 
 Mazier General Loriag had arrived, and that the troops were retiring 
 in good order. Lee, with his brigade, and that portion of my division 
 'which hatl not been forced to move by the bridge, followed by the 
 two brigades of Loring, Bowen having passed by a route a short dis- 
 tance to the right. 
 
 On my arrival about sunset at the ford on Baker's Creek, I found: 
 that the enemy had crossed the bridge above, and were advancing 
 artillery ia the direction of the road on which we were moving. One 
 battery had already taken position, and was playing on the road, but 
 at right angles, and with too long range to prevent the passage of 
 troops. 
 
 Here I found, on the west side of the brigade of General Green and 
 Oolonel Cockerell, of Bowen's division, who had there halted, and 
 taken up position to hold the point until Loring's division could cross. 
 I found Colonel Scott, of the twelfth Louisiana regiment, of Loring's 
 division, halted about a half a mile from the ford on the east side, and 
 directed him to cross. I then addressed a note to General Loring, 
 informing him of what I had done, telling him of the change I hnd 
 caused Colonel Scott to make ia his p'i!*ition, stating that, with the. 
 troops then there, and others that 1 could collect, I would hold the- 
 ford and real until hisdivisi m could cross, and urging him to haateai 
 the movement. 
 
 To this note I received no answer, but, in a short time, Colo::>el 
 Scott moved off his regiment cjuickly in the direction of his original 
 position, in obedience, I was informed, to orders from General Lo- 
 ring. Inferring from this that General Loring did not intend to 
 
3 
 
 116 
 
 cross at that ford, he hr.ving had ample time to commence the more- 
 ment, I suggested to Genera! Green and Colonel Coclierell to movcy 
 forward to the railroad bridge. My command reached that point 
 about one o'clock that sight, and bivonacked near Bovina. In th© 
 action of the next morning my command took no part. After the 
 enemy had made their successful attack upon the entrenchments upon 
 the east side of the j-iver, I received orders from the Lieutenant Gen- 
 eral commanding to place one of say brigades in position on the 
 heights of the Tvest bank, to cover the crossing of the troops who had 
 occupied the entrenchments. Th)s duty wa'? assigned to and executed 
 by 'he command of Brigadier General Lee. 
 
 At about ten o'clock, A. M., I received orders to take command of 
 the army, and conduct its retreat to the fortifications aro',:!nd Vicks- 
 burg. The brigade of Brigadier General Baldwin, of Smith's divi- 
 sion, was assigned to the duty of bringing up the rear. Just before 
 getting into the works, I was joined by the brigade of Colonel Rey- 
 nolds, to whom, as before stated, had been entrusted the charge of 
 vt,iicxtr.a.i-ns df the whole army. He hrd crossed the Big Black, after 
 mxtch difficulty and delay, occasioned by the absence of any facilities- 
 for ^^o doing at Bridgeport. By a mistake in the transmission of the 
 crder, the regiment of Colonel Beck, Lee's brigade, remained at the 
 Ktvcr, resisted the attempt of the enemy to cross until eleven o'clock 
 • of that night, and only withdrew upon the receipt of peremptory order. 
 The retreat was conducted in a ieisurel}' and orderly manner, and 
 the tf'oops entered the line of fortifications at about three o'clock, 
 IP. M. 
 
 As censure has been cast upon my division for not having fully 
 ;i-naintai«ed their position at the battle of Baker's Creek, it is due to 
 i them and myself that I should here record facts, connected with other 
 (parts of this army, which, in my opinion, contain the explanation in 
 .part, at least, for this failure. 
 
 My divicion started early on the morning of the battle, under the 
 supposition that the army Avas about to retrace its steps to join Gen- 
 eral vJoh'.nstos, north of the railroad, and with that view was weakened 
 i'>y sending one brigade to the rear, in charge of the whole baggage 
 tram. Knowing that this movement exposed our flank to the enemy 
 . for Hcveral mil6S, I prepumed\he army would move quickly as soon 
 as the road wasifree of trains, and accordingly gave my attention, 
 vantil the engageiaent commenced, solely to the roads herein referred 
 to, v-'hicli were the only ones by which the enemy could strike us. 
 At nine and a half o'clock the road was open, but I was directed to 
 ■retaiti my three brigades in line of battle until further orders. 
 
 The enemy engaged us at about ten and a half o'clock. Finding 
 that the main attack was upon me, and in vastly superior force, I dis- 
 patched that information to the Lieutenant General commanding, and 
 from time to time repeatedly asked for reinforcements. The three di- 
 visioiis comprising our army occupied a line of not exceeding two (2) 
 miles, one of them, Bowen's, being at least within hearing of the mus- 
 ketry of the enemy in my front. Reinforcements, Bowen's division, 
 rived at about two and a half o'clock,. P. M. Loring's division did 
 
117 
 
 not arrive ia time to engige the enemy. The three brigades of my 
 division engaged were about six thousand five hundred (6,500) strong. 
 The strength of the enemy, according to their statements, was more 
 than four times that number. The non-arrival of reinforcements for 
 my division early in the day, in my opinion, was mainly the cause 
 of our failure ; as to the reason therefor, it is not for me to express 
 an opinion here. 
 
 On the morning of the eighteenth of May, the pcition to be held 
 by each of the different divisions was assigned by the Lieutenant 
 General himself. The position of the line of defence which was as- 
 signed to my division, included the river front and the works south 
 of the city, from the river to the railroad, a line of about five (5) 
 miles in length. Bentcn occupied the river front and the fortifica- 
 tions on the right ; Reynolds, those on the right centre, to the Ilairs 
 ferry road ; Cumming's the left centre ; and Lee, reinforced by Waal's 
 Texas legion, the extreme left. Several sections and companies of 
 ■artillery, not properly belonging to my division, were posted on my 
 line. Captain Johnston, (Botetourt artillery) company was as- 
 signed to duty as inspector general of light artillery, on my staff, and 
 the artillery, on the right of Hall's ferry road, placed under the ' om- 
 mand of Captain J. B. Grayson, first Louisiana flying artilh-ry ; 
 and that on the left under that of Captain J. F. Waddell of my divis- 
 ion. 
 
 On the evening of the eighteenth the enerny made his appearance 
 in front of our lines, and immediately began to push forward his sharp- 
 shooters. The number of guns, superiority of range and metal, and 
 «xhaustles8 supply of ammunition, enabled them, in a very short time, 
 to plant many batteries in such commanding positions as to dainagc 
 our works matcrialh% and inflict a very considerable loss amongst 
 the men. 
 
 On the morning of the twenty -second of May, many indications 
 showed that they contemplated an assault'upon the line of General 
 Lee. A tremendous artillery fire was opened and kept up for about 
 two hours, whilst the fire of their larger force of sharpshooters was 
 heavy and incessant. At about one o'clock, P. M., a heavy force 
 moved out to the assault, making a gallant charge. They wore al- 
 lowed to approach unmolested to within good musket range, when 
 every available gun was opened upon them with grape and canister, 
 and the men, lising in the trenches, poured into their ranks vollijy 
 after volley, with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground lit-M-ally 
 covered in some places with their dead and wounded, they precipi- 
 tately retreated. An angle of one of our artillery had been breached 
 by th*?ir artillery before the assault, and rendered untenable. To- 
 wards this point, at the time of the repulse of the main body, a party 
 of about sixty of the enemy, under the command of a lieut riant 
 colonel, made a rush, and succeeded in effecting a lodgement in 'he 
 ditch ai tlie foot of the redoubt, and planting two flags on the dig ; of 
 the parapet. The work was constructed in such a manner thic the 
 ditch wa:} commanded by no part of the line, and the only mcit is by 
 which they could be dislodged, was to retake the angle by a dci^pa- 
 
tl8 
 
 rate charge, and either kill or compel the surrender of the whole party 
 by the use of hand grenades. A call for volunteers for this purpose 
 was made, and promptly , responded to by Lieutenant Colonel E. 
 W. Pettus, twentieth Alabama regiment, and about forty (40) men of 
 Waul'a Texas legion. A more gallant feat than this charge has not 
 illustrated our arms during the war. The preparations were quietly 
 and quickly made, but the enemy seemed at once to divine our inten- 
 tion*. and opene 1 upon the angle a terrible fire of shot, shell and 
 mui-ketry. Undaunted, this little band, its chivalrous commander at 
 its head, rushed upon the work, and, in less time thin it required to 
 describe it, it and the flags were in our possession. Preparations 
 were then qui':kly made for the use of hand grenades, when the enemy 
 in the ditch, being informed of our purpose, immediately surren- 
 dered. 
 
 From this time forward, although on several occasions their demon- 
 stTations seemed to indicate other intentions, the enemy relinquished 
 all idea of assaulting us, and confined himself to the more cautious 
 policy of a syt^tera of gradual approaches and mining. The weak- 
 ness of our garrison prevented anything like a system of sallies, but, 
 from time to time, as opportunities offered and the enemy affected 
 lodgments too close to our works, they were made with spirit and 
 success. Amongst them I may particularizea night sally made under 
 comraimd of Lieutenant Colonel Guyton, of the fifty-seventh Georgia 
 regiment, with a portion of that regiment, and of the forty-third 
 Tennessee, the former of CurLming's, and th» latter of Reynold's 
 brigade. 
 
 The enemy had entrenched themselves at three different points on 
 and to the left of Hall's ferry road. The command sallied out, charged 
 tbeir works with admirable gallantry, and took them with consid- 
 erable loss to the enemy, who were in greatly superior force. On the 
 lines occupied by General Barton and Colonel Reynolds, the configu- 
 ration of tl;e ground favoring it, the enemy were prevented from 
 making any close lodgments by a judicious system of picketing and 
 a series of attacks, and, ab.hough they sometimes succeeded, by force 
 ■of numbers, in gaining favorable positions, they were invariably dis- 
 possessed by the daring sallies of the garrison. A reconnoisance made . 
 on the Warrenton road, under Colonel Curtis, forty-first Georgia, re- 
 sulted in the capture of one hundred and seven (.U)7) of the ene- 
 my's pickets. 
 
 The reconnoisance was conducted in a manner which reflects 
 ■credit on that able officer. I cannot find words sufficiently strong 
 to express the pride and gratification afforded me by the dauntless 
 spirit with which officers and men encountered all the dangers, and by 
 the uaraurmuring endurance with which they bore up for forty-seven 
 ■(4") sleepless nights and days, under all the hardships incident to 
 ■their position. Confined, without a moments relief, from the very 
 •day of their entrance into the fortifications to that of the capitulation 
 •of the city, to the narrow trenches; exposed, without shelter, to the 
 'broiling sun and drenching rain ; subsisting on rations barely sufficient 
 for the support of life ; engaged, from the earliest dawn till dark, 
 
119 
 
 and often, during the night, in one ceaseless eon Pact with the enemy, 
 they neither faltered or compiaitied, but ever looking forward with 
 confidence to relief, bcrf- up bravely under every privation, saw 
 their ranks dcciminated by disease aiid the uiissiles of the enemy, 
 Vith the fortitude that adorns the soldier, and the spirit that becomes 
 the patriot who battles in a holy cause. 
 
 It was thus that the true soldier and gifted pntriot, Oo'ior.cl Garrett. 
 'of the tiiVentitth Alabama, died, as did the brave Captain Clniborue, of 
 the Artillery, and many others, whose caiiies I canuot mention with- 
 out extending this toport to too great a, length. Tiie regiment of 
 'Colonel Garrett was lortunatfi in having for its successor Lieutenant 
 Colonel I'^e'tt'us, an -oil^'^er who deserves, and is competent to fill, a 
 'highe'r 'positi-B, 
 
 On 'the first of July I received the accompanying confidential cora- 
 'raunication (marked A) from the Lieutenant General commanding. 
 1 immediately addressed a circular to my brigade commanders, requir- 
 ing their opinions on the points suggested in the note of the Com- 
 manding General. Having received their opinions in writing, copies 
 of which are appended marked B, C, D, E, I submitted the following 
 reply to the Lieutenant General : 
 
 IIf-adquautkhs Stevenson's Division, 
 Vickshurg, July 2d, ISG^^i. 
 General: Your confidential note of yesterday requesting me to 
 inform you as to the condition of ray troops, and their ability to 
 make the marches and undergo the fatigucr. necessary to accomplish 
 a, successful evacuation of tiie city, was duly received, and I have the 
 honor to state in reply thereto, that ray men are very cheerful, but 
 CrQxn long confinement in the trenches and fihort rations are neces- 
 sarily much enfeebled, and a considerable number would be unable to 
 make the march and undergo the fatigues which would proliably be 
 necessary in a successful evacuation of this city. If pressed by the 
 enemy, and it should be necessary to place the Big Black in our rear 
 in our march, the chonces are, that a considerable number of these men 
 •in the trenches would not succeed. I believe, however, that most of 
 them, rather than be captured would exert themselves to the utmost 
 to accomplish it I respectfully transmit herewith the opinions of 
 my brigade commanders on these points. 
 
 I am., General, respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 C. L. Stevenson, Moj. Gunral. 
 
 A council was then called (on the 3d instant,) by the Lieutenant 
 General, in which ho stated that, from information received from 
 General Johnston, all hope of raising the siege of Vickshurg. must 
 bo abandoned, and that it was onlj' possible to save the garrisv^i; The 
 opinion of those prosent was then asked as to the best manner of ac- 
 complishing it, and it was their unanimous opinion that rather th;)n 
 fiurrender, the garrison would attempt to cut its way out undt^r r.!! 
 circumstances, but that if an honorable capitulation could be tiLcUMl, 
 it would be the best and wiscKt course, considering the condition of 
 the men, as stated at that time by their commanders ; and it was sng- 
 
120 
 
 geste'l that a communicatiott should he addressetl to Major General 
 Grant, commanding United States forces, asking him to appoint com- 
 missioners t"0 meet a like number of ours to agree upon terms. It was 
 consented to by the Lieutenant General, reluctantly, I think, and a 
 communication was addressed to General Grant, which resulted in 
 the capitulation. The correspondence between the commanders has 
 already been made public. A strong argument with us in favor of 
 the capitulation was, that we would march the army out in tact, that 
 they would be exchanged in a very short time, and again be armed 
 and equipped for service. In conclutfion, I cjesire to return my thanks 
 to the oificers and men of my command. I have to thank my brigade 
 commanders. Brigp^dier Generals Carton, Cummings and Lee, and Col- 
 onel Reynolds, as also Colonel Waul of the Texas legion, to whose eS- 
 cient CO operation I am greatly indebted for the successful defence of 
 my line at Vicksburg, fur the untiring energy which they displayed 
 in the management of their brigade?, and for examples of devotion, 
 intrepidity and coolness under every danger, by which they inspired 
 their men. It was the fortune of Brigadier General Lee to open and 
 bear the brunt of the battle of Baker's Creek, on Avhich occasion he 
 had- three horses shot under liim, and give the splendid repulse which he 
 did to the only decided assault of the enemy on my line at Yicksburg. 
 To Colonel Reynolds, as I before stated, was entrusted the duty of 
 carrying oft' the trains of the entire army on the day of the battle of 
 Baker's Creek, a charge which he performed with the efficiiency and 
 fidelity which was to be expected from an officer of his skill and ex- 
 pencncc. Without an exception, during the bloody day of Baker's 
 Creek, and during the memorable siege of \''icksb»rg, the field ofii- 
 cers of my command behaved with gallantry and zeal which won my 
 unqualified admiration and esteem. 
 
 It is with deep regret that I record the loss, in the battle of the 1 6th, 
 of Colonel S. Rice Harris, 43d Georgia regiment He was killed at the 
 head of his regiment. I am under obligations to Major II. Evans,. 
 Captain E. B. Smith, and Lieutenant G. D. Wise, who, by the recenlj 
 change of commanders in the brigades, were temporarily without as- 
 signment, for their services on the fifld of Baker's Creek. jMuch 
 against their wishes, Majors 11. M. Mathews, rrdnance officer, and 
 R. Orrne, assistant quartermaster of my own staiF, were left in Vicks- 
 burg when the division advanced to Baker's Creek, as their services 
 as the chiefs of their respective departments could not be dispensed 
 with there. Pre-eminently distinguished throughout the action of 
 Baker's Creek, especially for his indefatigable efforts in rallying the 
 broken regiments, taking them again into action, was my chief of 
 stair, Major J. J. Reeve. For his active assistance to me on that oc- 
 casion, and the gallant and intelligent discharge of his duties day 
 and night during the siege of Vicksburg, I am greatly indebted to 
 him. Major Webb, in}' inspector general, rendered most important 
 services in superintending the removal and securing the safety of the 
 large train that followed the army to the Creek. Captain J. W. 
 Matthews, A. A. A. G., chief surgeon IT. M. Compton, and Lieuten- 
 ant Botts. A. D. C, whose horse was shot under him at Baker's. 
 
121 
 
 Creek, were prompt, daring and energetic in the discharge of their 
 duties. Colonel G. A. Hay ward, A. D, C, has my sincere thanks 
 for the many important services he has rendered me ; always ready 
 for the discharge of duty, he was distinguished for his gallantry on 
 the field of Baker's Creek, and after the investment of the city, bore 
 important information to Gen. Johnston, by whom he was ret;'incd 
 until the capitulation. Mr. D. E. Morris, telegrajih operator, and 
 postmaster A. T. Sullivan, my secretary, accompanied me upon the 
 field of Baker's Creek, and rendered important services. Major G. 
 S. Gillespie, chief of subsistence, is deserving df special commenda- 
 tion. To his energy, seal and judicious exertions we were indebted, 
 in my opinion, for the supplies which enabled us to make so, pro- 
 tracted a defeace of Vicksburg. Captain J. W. Johnston, in&pector 
 general of light artillery, and Captains Waddell and Grayson, com- 
 manding artillery on the left and right of Hall's Ferry road rttpect- 
 tively, were always at their posts, and by the intelligeijce with which 
 they discharged their duties, contributed very mat. rially to the defence. 
 Captain Robinson, engineer officer in charge of my line, performed 
 his duties promptly and efficiently. Major McElrath, acting quaiter- 
 master of my division during the siege, has placed me under many 
 obligations by his ready anticipation of the wants of the command, 
 and his untiring energy in supplying* rhem. Lieutenant G. D. Wise, 
 ordnance officer of Cummings' brigade, has already been especially 
 mentioned. During the siege he was selected to carry important dis- 
 patches through the lines ol the enemy, and the duty was success- 
 fully performed. I recommend him to the notice of the Lieutenant 
 General as a bold and intelligent officer, and one who deserves a higher 
 position. 
 
 Accompanying please find a tabular stiUeuient of the casualties of 
 my division, in the different actions in which it participated up to 
 the 16th of June. The absence of subordinate officers renders it im- 
 possible for me to give my whole loss during the siege of Vicksburg. 
 1 am. Major, respectfully, vour obedient servant, 
 
 C. L. STEVENSON, Major GemraL 
 
 Major R, W. Memmi.nger, A. A. G. 
 
 [A.] 
 
 STKlCTLy CONFIPKNTIAL. 
 
 Headquarters Department Mississippi am) East Louisiana, ) 
 
 Vicksburg, July 1, 1863 \ 
 Major General C. L. Stevenson : 
 
 Commanding Division : 
 
 General: Unless the siege of Vicksburg is rsised, or supplies 
 thrown in, it will be necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I 
 see no pro.«pect of the former; and there are very great, if iif t insu- 
 perable, obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, re- 
 
122 
 
 quested to inform mej, with as little delay as possible, as to the con- 
 dition of jonv troops^ and their ability to make the marches and 
 undergo the'i%tigue necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation. 
 You will, of course, use the utmost discretion, whilst informing your- 
 self, through your subordinates, upon all points tending to a clear 
 elucidation of the subject of my inquiry. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 ■ " J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 hieutenant General commandingi 
 
 m 
 
 TIeadquadters First Brigade, Stevenson's Division, ) 
 
 July ], 1863. 5 
 
 Major General Stevenson, 
 
 Commanding Division : 
 
 General: In reply to your inquir}' as. t-> tho ability of my men to 
 march, and undergo the f;itigues and hardships incidental thereto, I 
 have the honor to state, that prcit)ably half of them are fit to take the 
 field. The command sulfcrs greatly from intermittent fever, and is gen- 
 erally debilitated from the long exposure and inaction of the trenches. 
 Of those now reported for duty, fully one half are now undergoing 
 treatment. These, I think, are unfit for the field. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 S. M. BARTON, Brigadier General 
 
 [C] 
 
 Headquarters Third Brigade, Stevenson's Division, ) 
 
 ■ July I, 1863. 5 
 
 Major General C. L. Stevenson, 
 
 Commanding, &c.: 
 
 General: I am in receipt of your communication, enclosing a copy 
 of a note from the Lieutenant General commanding, of this instant, in 
 the former of which I am direction to give my opinion, as far as con- 
 cerns my brigade, on several points raised in the latter. As to the 
 general facts, that the troops of this brigade are in a condition of 
 gr'eat physical debility ami weariness, it needs but to see them in, or 
 on their short beats to and from, the trenches, to be able to bear testi- 
 mony to it. Everything beyond this assertion of a general fact, must, 
 of course, be mere matter of opinion and conjecture. After much re- 
 flection upon the subject, based upon my own observations, and the 
 remarks^ casual and incidental, of the regimental commanders, I would 
 
123 
 
 state the following as the conclusion at which I have arrived : From 
 Bhortness of rations, greatly more than a confinement of forty-five 
 days to the trenches, under the summer sun of a debilitating climate, 
 few of the men are in their ordinary health and vigor. I am disposed 
 to believe that perhaps one in five of the men now reporte 1 for duty 
 in th^ trenches, ^yould, under different and favorable circumstances, 
 be receiving medical treatment; and have less hesitation in declaring 
 it as my opinion, that of this number of" duty for tlie trenches," ^/7y 
 per centum would, on trial, be found unfit to encounter the fatigues in- 
 cident to the life of the soldier in the field. 
 
 I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. GUMMING S, Brigadier General. 
 
 [D.l 
 
 Headquarters, Second Brfgade, Stevenson's Division, 
 
 l^cnchcs, J\i]y 1, 1863. 
 
 Major General C. L. Stevenson, 
 
 Commanding Division : 
 
 General: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 note, enclosing a copy of one from General Pemberton, relative to 
 supplies, &c.; and on the two points involved, as far as my brigade is 
 concerned, will state that I consider my brigade in tolerable condi- 
 tion ; and though they are weak, from forty-five days' confinement in 
 the trenches, on scant diet, still I consider them equal to UTidergoing 
 the fatigues which would bo incident to our evacuation of this city, 
 taking in view its importance and the interests of our Confederacy, 
 Yours respectfully, 
 
 S. I). LEE, Brigadier Ceneral. 
 
 [E.] 
 
 Headquarters Fourth Ericade, 
 July 1, 186 J. 
 
 Major General C. L. Stevenson, 
 
 ^ Cotn77ianding Division : 
 
 Gr.NERAi, : In reply to your enquiries as to the condition of my 
 troops, and their ability to make the maiches and undergo the fatigue 
 necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation, I have the hcnor to 
 report, that the condition of my troops is not good. Owing to the re- 
 duced quantity and quality of tlie rations on which they have sub- 
 sisted for six months past, to their close confinement in the trenches, 
 constant exposure to the intense heat of the sun, and frequent rainti. 
 
124 
 
 and to impure water which they are obliged to drink, my men arc 
 much reduced in strength, and, in many ins:;mces, entirely prostrated. 
 It wouM be utterly imposs^iblc for most of them, to make a forced march 
 of any distance. !Many cf my men are in the hospital, ;\ad mar^y of 
 those reported for duty in the trenches, are extremely weak, and un- 
 able to undergo the slightest fatigue. Perhaps, on an average, two 
 Jiundred men from each of ray regiments, animated by p itriotic mo- 
 tives, and a desire to be free, might be able to make a march of ten of 
 Sfteen miles, and still be in condition to give battle to the enemy; but 
 hardly more than this number. The spirits of ray men are goo^l ; but 
 I believe that they would, almost to a man, be willing to make vig- 
 orous efforts, and to strike a bl:w for freedom, but I regret to say, 
 that two-thirds are unable to endure a march of ten miles. 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully 
 
 Your obedient servant. 
 
 A. M. REYNOLDS. 
 Cohml comm'Miding Fourth Ihimde. 
 
BEPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL FORNEY. 
 
 Division IlEADdUAaxERS, Enterprise, Miss., ) 
 
 July 21, ISS3. \ 
 Major R. W. Memmint.f.r, ^ ssistcmt A(^jutant General: 
 
 Major : In cotupliauce -^yith instructions of the Lieutenant General 
 commanding, of this date, calling for report of battles of Baker s 
 Creek, Big Black, and also the operations during the siege of Vickshiirg^ 
 I have to report, that on or about the fourth of May, 1 relieved ]\lajor 
 General Stevenson, in command of the second military district, head- 
 quarters at Vickaburg During the battle of Baker's Creek, on the 
 »lGthof May, my command consisted of the following troops, viz : 
 My own division proper, (Ilebcrt's and Moore's brigades,) Major 
 General Smith's division. State troops under General llarris, Colonel 
 Waul's Texas legion, and the heavy artillery, Colonel Iliggins com- 
 manding, posted as follows : General Ilebert, with his brigade, occu- 
 pied the line along the Yazoo river, from Haines's Bluff to the Mia- 
 sissippi river ; General Moore, with his brigade and the State tioops 
 attached, guarding the river front at Vv^arrenton and the approaches 
 from the lower ferries on Big Black river. One brigade of General 
 Smith's division was posted in the city, guarding the river front. V\'^ith 
 the other two brigades of his division, with Waul's legion attached, 
 General Smith guarded the approach to the city, from KaH's ferry 
 around to the railroad bridge on the Big Black river — the heavy ar- 
 tillery at the batteries in town. Besi<les these troops thus posted in 
 the vicinitv uf Vickaburg, there was also, under my orders, ColoneJ 
 Ferguson on the upper Deer Creek and Sunflower river, with a few 
 companies of infantry, a section of artillery, and a small force of cav- 
 alry. None of these troops were engaged in the battles of Baker'a 
 Creek. A portion of General Smith's command was engaged in the 
 battle of Big Black bridge. The part taken by them in that engnge- 
 meat will doubtless be reported through General Smith. 
 
 SIE(.E OF VlCKSBUIiG. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th of May. while the main body of tho 
 army were falling, back to the entrenchments around Vicksburg, I 
 resumid command of my division proper, and in pursuance of in- 
 structions from the Lieutenant General commanding, directed Genera! 
 Ilebert to prepare to evacuate the pest of Snyder'sMill, and to hurry 
 snto Vicksburg all commissary stores possible. For this purpose, all 
 available waggons were sent to him. In the afternoon of the same 
 day, I was directed to place my iroops iu the trenches. Accordingly, 
 Oeneral Moore's brigade was brought at once from its position near 
 Warrcnton, and placed in tho cntrenchmrnts on either side of the 
 Baldwin's ferry road. General Ilebert was directed to march his 
 troops to Vicksburg, bringing with him all ordnance and ordnance 
 fitorcs he could ; to send up the Yazoo all boats at Haines's Bluff, 
 
126 
 
 with orders that they should be fired rather than allowed to fall into 
 the hands of the enemy ; to send mounted men to watch the ap- 
 proaches from Bridgeport and the railroad bridge; and to leave be- 
 hind at Snyder's a few companies, to keep up a show of occupation, 
 with orders to destroy the heavy guns and other public property, (pre- 
 viously prepared for destruction,) whenever it would become evident 
 that the place would fall into possession of the enemy ; and then to 
 make the best of their way to Vicksburg, or endeavor to escape across 
 the Yazoo. A report of the proceedings of this detachment has, I 
 presume, been made to the Lieutenant General commanding, by Col- 
 onel J. W. Patton, who was by him sent back to attend to the maittor. 
 The detachment rejoined its command in Vicksburg, on the morning 
 of the 18th. General Ilobert arrived in Vicksburg with his command 
 before daylight on the morning of the l^th, having succeeded in 
 bringing with him from Snyder's, besides all the ligiH pieces, two* 
 twenty-pounder Paxrott and a Whitworth gun. His troops were soon 
 in the entrenchments on either side of the Jackson road. In bring- 
 ing my troops from their former position, I directed them to drive 
 inside of the fortifications all the beef cattle, hogs and sheep that had 
 been collected from the surrounding country, and squads of mounted 
 men had previously been sent out i'or this purpose. 
 
 On the 18th of May, at about one o'clock, P. M., Brigadier General 
 Shoupe, of General Smith's division, reported the enemy advancing 
 on his position, and by the direction of the Lieutenant General two 
 of General Ilebert's regiments were sent from his right to reinforce 
 his h'ft. The whole of the division (the effective strength of v.hicb 
 was about four thousand seven hundred,) were now in the trenches, 
 from the railroad on the right to the grave-yard road on the left, a dis- 
 tance of about two miles, (Moore on the right, Hebert on the left.) On 
 this hne there were twenty-seven (27) pieces of artillery, most of which 
 were field pieces. This number was afterwards increased by three or 
 four siege guns, placed in rear of ray right. Besides my own troops. 
 Colonel Waul's Texas legion was also assigned to me, and held in re- 
 serve behind Moore's briga(ie. Brigadier General Lee's brigade, of 
 Major General Lee's division, was on my immediate right ; Brigadier 
 General Shoupe's brigade, of Major General Smith's division, on ray 
 immediate left. 
 
 On the 19th, the enemy made his first assault, on my extreme left, 
 and extending along General Smith's division, lie was several times 
 severely repulsed, and finally fell back. By this time, my division 
 front was completely and closely invested. My skirmishers were 
 withdrawn, and skirmishing prohibited, (by order,) in order to hus- 
 band ammunition. During the next <layj the enemy kept up his 
 sharpshooting arid artillery fire, but made no assault. On the 22d of 
 May, he assaulted three points on my line, as follows : Three times on 
 ray extreme left, and extending to General Smith's front, twice on the 
 Jackson road, and twice on Baldwin's ferry road, at eleven, A. M., 
 and five, P. M, The assaults were m.ade by larger bodies, and appar- 
 ently with greater determination, than those of the 19th of May. 
 Colonel Waul's legion had previously been sent to General Stevenson,, 
 
127 
 
 but Green's brigade^ of Bowen's division, was in reserve behind mr 
 right, and assisted in repelling the attack at that point. There \Tere 
 also on this day two Louisiana regiments, of Smith's division, in re- 
 serve behind my division. The enemy was repulsed in each of his 
 attempts, though he succeeded in getting a few men into our exterior 
 ditches at each point of attack, from which they were, however, driven 
 before night. Hand-grenades were used at each point, with good ef- 
 fect. A color-bear.er and two stands of colors were captured by the 
 second Texas regiment, of Moore's brigade. On this day the casual- 
 ties in my division were forty-two killed and ninety-five wounded. 
 The loss of the enemy must have reached two thousand. From this 
 time to the close of the siege, the enemy kept up an incessant fire of 
 flharpshooting and cannonading, in the meantime planting batteries 
 and continuing his approaches, the main points being the work on the 
 Baldwin's ferry road, the one on the Jacksan road, and a point mid-- 
 way between the grave-yard and Jackson roads. Approaches were 
 also made on my extreme left, but this point was, properly speaking, 
 under the supervision of Major General Smith. 
 
 On or abrut the 2d of June my line was contracted by closing in 
 to the right, in consequence of its close investment, and the reduc- 
 tion of its numbers by casualties, my left now resting midway between 
 the grave-yard and Jackson roads. The approaches at all the above 
 mentioned points were brought to within easy hand-grenade distance, 
 and mines were pushed forward under the works. The enemy made 
 strenuous efforts to possess himself of the main works on the Jackson 
 road, defended by the third Louisiana regiment, the occupation of 
 which by him would necessitate the abandonment of our trenches for 
 a considerable distance to the right and left, as it would give him an 
 enfilade fire either way. Opposite this point he planCed a number of 
 heavy siege guns, with which he made a serious breach in the parapet 
 of the redan. The fire of these guns was, howevir, in a groat meas- 
 ure, diverted by the fire of a ten-inch mortar which we had planted 
 clcee to the rear of our lines. We were only permitted to retain this 
 mortar a few days, when it was again removed to the right, and its 
 place supplied by a nine-inch Dahlgreen gun, which the enemy disa- 
 bled the second day after it opened fire. 
 
 On the 25th June, at about five, P. M.» the enemy sprung his first 
 mine under the parapet of this work. The explosion effected a breach, 
 through which the enemy immediately attempted to charge, but was 
 promptly and gallantly repulsed. The sixth Missouri regiment, which 
 had been held in reserve, was on the spot immediately after the ex- 
 plosion, and its commaiidsr, Colonel'Eugene Erwin, was instantly 
 killed while attempting to lead a charge over the works. Six men of 
 the forty-third Mississippi regiment, who were in a shaft counter- 
 mining at the time of the explosion, were buried and lost. At dark 
 the enemy had possessed himself ^f the ditch and slope of the para- 
 pet, and our force retired to an interior line, a few feet back. This 
 point was now reinforced by a part of Colonel CockerclFs brigade, of 
 Bowen's division, and work was resumed by the enemy and by us — 
 they mining and we counter-mining, until the let of July, at about 
 
t^8 
 
 one o'clock, P. M., when the enemy sprung the second mine, -which 
 Wits much heavier than the first. The result was, the entire demoli- 
 tion of the redan, leaving only an immense chasm where it stood. 
 The greater portion of the earth was thrown towards the enemy, the 
 lino of least resistance being in that direction. Our interior line was 
 much injured. ^ ine men, who were counter-mining, were necessa- 
 lily lost, and a large number of those manning the works were killed 
 and wounded. The enemy, however, made no attempt to charge, 
 teeming satisfied with having materially weakened the position 
 
 I understand that the amount of powder used by the enem} in this 
 exploiLdon was one ton. While all this was taking place on the Jack-' 
 son road, the enemy was by no means idle at other points. At the 
 work on the Baldwin's ferry road his sappers had nearly reached the 
 ditch. At this place we sprang a counter-mine, which was unfortu- 
 nately a little premature. 
 
 The artillery, though well served, was but of little advantage to us 
 during the siege. The enemy concentrated a heavy fire, dismounting 
 or disabling gun after gun. To this fire we could make but feeble 
 response. Ammunition was scarce, and orders forbade its use except 
 against advancing columns of infantry, or batteries being planted. 
 The pioportionate loss of officers and men of the artillery was un- 
 usually great. 
 
 On the 1st of July I received a confidential note from the Lieuten- 
 ant General commanding, informing me that unless the siege of Vicks- 
 burg was raised, or supplies thrown in, it would be necessary very 
 shortly to evacuate the place ; that he saw no prospect of the former^ 
 and that very great, if not insuperable obstacles, were in the way of 
 the latter ; and calling for a report as to the condition of my troops< 
 and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigue neces- 
 sary to accomplish a successful evacuation. I laid the matter clearly 
 before ray brigade commanders, and they in turn before their regi« 
 mental and battalion commanders. It was their unanimous ©pinion, 
 in which I concurred, that although the spirit of the men was good, 
 their physical condition and health was so much iiupkaired by their 
 long confinement in narrow trenches, without exercise and:- without 
 relief, being constantly under fire, and consequently on the alert, and 
 living upon greatly reduced rations, that they could not make the 
 marches they would have to make, nor fight the battles they would 
 have to fight, against the greatly superior numbers that would be 
 brought against them, in making the attempt to break through the 
 enemy's lines. I, therefore, favored a capitulation, rather than make 
 this attempt, attended, as I tliought, with such little hope of success. 
 
 Finally, on the 4th of July, at ten, A. M., in accordance with the 
 terras of the capitulation, my troops were marched by regiments over 
 the entrenchments, their arms stacked and left in possession of the 
 enemy, while they returned to bivouac in rear of the trenches. The 
 siege of Vicksburg was a contest which tried more the endurance and 
 resolution of men, and their company and regimental commanders, 
 than the skill of their Generals, My men, during the siege, did their 
 duty, and their whole duty, to the entire satisfacti«B of their General, 
 
129 
 
 'uLlttlT/nl '<^^^^rj. The patience with which my troops 
 
 bmitted to the many privations and hardships to which they were 
 
 ated throni'^7''^'*'^ T'f ^^^ cheerfulness which thJy su - 
 
 Hebert^'s brigade, - - _ 
 
 Moore's brigade, - - . 
 
 Total killed and wounded, 1,140. "^ ^^''' 
 
 I enclose herewith the reports of the brigade commanders • 
 1 liavc the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant 
 JOHN 11. FORNEY, Major -General. 
 
 KiUed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 2(J3 
 
 480 
 
 72 
 
 385 
 
REPORT OF MAJOK GENERAL LORING. 
 
 Headquarters, Lorikg's Division, >• 
 Bovina, Miss., May 6, 1863. V 
 
 To Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. General: 
 
 I^Ij^jor: I have the honor to submit the follotring report of m^' 
 connection with the army recently at and near Grand Gulf: 
 
 Agreeable to instructions from the Lieutenant General commandingj 
 1 left Jackson, Miss., on the first instant, and moved with dispatch 
 in direction of Grand Gulf, via Edward's Depot, talcing with me from' 
 Big Black bridge two regiments of infantry and a battery ef artillery 
 of Tilghraan's brigade. 
 
 Upon reaching Rocky Springs, about eighteen miles from Grand 
 Gulf, we learned that the force under Brigadier General Bowen had' 
 fallen back before a largely superior force, from the position in 
 the direction of Port Gibson, towards Grand Gulf. Hearing that'" 
 the enemy were approaching the Grindstone ford with the view of 
 turning our force, which was then in a cul de sac, we ordered the twc 
 regiments and battery to move as rapidly as possible to the ford, 
 and hold it at all hazards, and then hasten to the command of 
 General Bowenj which we found in the position reported, near Grand * 
 Gulf. General Bowen informed me that his force was about seven 
 thousand men, and then in position opposite the enemy, with a bayou 
 between them, but that his force was wholly inadequate. Besides, 
 that he had but one day's breadstuffs, and no way of getting more, for the 
 reason that the enemy, forty to fifty thousand strong, were marching 
 a column of twenty thousand to turn his rear by the way of Grind- 
 stone ford on the Bayou Pierre; that they had replaced the bridges , 
 across the intervening streams, and were then rapidly approaching. 
 He placed in my possession information and facts to satify my mind 
 that the statements were undoubtedly true. He further informed me 
 that he was fully convinced of the necessity of taking the army out 
 of its position, and had put oflF doing so, hearing that I was coming. 
 I approved of his determination, and directed it to be done at once, 
 determined to fall back to a position where supplies and reinforcements 
 could reach the army. 
 
 This had scarcely been determined upon when your communication 
 was received, stating that the army had fallen back towards Grand Gulf, 
 and ordering it to move at once out of its position, and cross the Big 
 Black at Hankinson's ferry. The necessary order was given for the 
 movement. General Pteynolds being sent with all possible dispatch to 
 Grindstone ford with his brigade, it being all important to hold that 
 position. From some cause or other this brigade failed to reach its 
 destination, and it was left to the regiments before mentioned to hold 
 it, and soon the command was in motion. 
 
 Subsequently we heard of Bartoa's arrival, it being the first informa- 
 tion we received of his approach. I placed General Tilghman in 
 ^prninapd of a brigade, in addition to the two regiments and the bat- 
 
131 
 
 teries referred to, Tvitli vrliich he held the enemy in clieck and drove 
 him back, after he had crossed the Bayou Pierre, "with an advance of 
 some fourteen regiments, with large amount of artillery. The force, 
 with its baggage, in accordance with your orders, crossed Big Black 
 and there remained, (the other instructions having been carried out,) 
 its baggage being sent to the rear to have it out of the way in case 
 the enemy appeared. During the crossing, and after a large portion 
 of the command was over, I learned of the coming of Major General 
 Stevenson with a brigade. 
 
 On the following morning Brigadier General Lee, being ordered to 
 bring up the rear, was left, for that purpose, at the crossing of the 
 Big Black, and kepv the enemy, which proved to be but a reconnoiter- 
 ing force, from coming to this side of the river, or in any way dis- 
 turbing our march. 
 
 The next morning, Monday, 4th May, I received your comraunica- 
 tion to hasten as rapidly as possible to Big Black bridge and Edward's 
 depot, it being feared, from information received, that the enemy was 
 moving rapidly in that direction. This order was obeyed. Subse- . 
 quently an order was received dividing the army, and sending the 
 divisions to difl'crent positions. This was done, and I reported the . 
 facts to your headquarters. 
 
 Very respectfully, &c., 
 
 W. W. LORING, 
 Major General, commanding,. 
 
REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL SMITH. 
 
 Mobile, August 9tli, 1863. 
 Major R. W. Memminger : 
 
 Major: I have the honor to' submit a brief report of the opera- 
 
 -LioDS of my division during the recent siege of Vicksburg. 
 
 The line of defence surrounding the city was divided into three 
 commands, corresponding with the army division, one of which was 
 assigned to me, and constituted the left of the line; the left of my 
 division rested on the river above the city, and extended to th« right 
 about one and a half miles, where it touched Maj. General Forney's com- 
 mand. The division consisted of three brigades : General Shoupe 
 commanding the 26th, 27th and 28th Louisiana, on the right ; en- 
 eral Baldwin, commanding 17th and 31st Louisiana, the 4th and 4-Qih. 
 Mississippi, occupying the centre; General Vaughan, commp-nding 
 o'lth, 6 1st and 6-2d Tennessee ; and Mississippi State troops, under 
 Brigadier General Harris, together with a detachment of Loring's 
 command on the left. The works occupied by me, and which may be 
 termed my front, ran along a narrow ridge, and consisted of a line of rifie 
 trenches, with points prepared for field artillery. This point was ra- 
 ther strong, although parallel with it and some six hundred yards dis- 
 tant, ran another ridge .of the same elevation, and in every respect 
 similar, which was occupied by the enemy and afforded execellent, po- 
 sitions for their batteries, as well as their sharpshooters, and when 
 prepared with field works looking in our direction, became itself, as 
 
 . difficult to assail as our own line. Many advantages would have re- 
 suited from occupying this parallel ridge, and it was included in the 
 
 > system of defence, but increasing as it did the length of the entire 
 line of defence, was abandoned for want of sufficient force to oc- 
 cupy it. The enemy made his appearance before the works on my 
 right early in the afternoon of the 18th of May, and immediately at- 
 tacked the position with artillery and infantry. Tjiey were first met 
 by the 27th Louisiana, subsequently by the 1 7th and 31st Louisiana 
 
 . and 4Gth Mississippi, in advance of the line, and held at bay until 
 dark terminated the attack. During the night of the 18th, my troops 
 and artillery wer^ all withdrawn within the main lines and placed in 
 position, from which they were. never for an instant dislodged during 
 the entire siege. On the 19th, the enemy's main force arrived, and 
 proceeded at once to make a direct assault oa my right, and the first 
 
 ■ effort was directed against the centre of Shoupe's brigade, but being 
 exposed to a heavy and well directed fire, the enemy broke and 
 fled Reforming again, a second advance was attempted against my 
 extreme right, and a bold effort made to rush over and into the works. 
 The assaulting columns seemed to consist of six or seven regitaents, 
 and was formed behind an elevation, concealing it from sight. After 
 
 . coming into view, it moved confidently and determinedly forward. 
 The 26th and 27th Louisiana, supported by the Ist Missouri in re- 
 
 ; serve, received the charge with a withering fire, and after the second 
 
183 
 
 volley the enemy fled in confasion, leaving five colors on the field, ana 
 strewn with the dead and wounded. One or two feeble attempts to 
 rally were easily repulsed, and the day closed with their artillery and 
 sharpshooters keeping up a continuous and heavy fire. The 20th and 
 and 21st were spent by the enemy in erecting new batteries, and keep- 
 ing up from daylight until dark the heaviest possible firing, both of 
 musketry and artillery. The 22d passed in the same m amer, until 
 about two P. M., when a column was discovered advancing against the 
 right of Sharpe's brigade ; it was immediately driven back. Another 
 then appeared on the right of the centre, this was dispersed without 
 great effort and with considerable loss. Again the enemy appeared 
 in increased force on my ri :^ht, and Forney's left ; he was promptly 
 repulsed, and with heavy loss. This terminated the day's operations, 
 with the exception of the heavy fire of musketry and artillery kept up 
 until dark along my entire front. After these several decided repulses, 
 the enemy seemed to have abandoned the idea of taking by assault, 
 and went vigorously at work to thoroughly invest and attack by regular 
 approaches ; and, the history of one day is pretty much the history of 
 all. For the more particular description of operations you are respect- 
 fully referred to the daily report of operations handed in during the 
 siege. While the opposing force was running new parallels, establishing 
 new works for heavy guns, and gradually nearing our lines, we were 
 strengthening our positions, protecting the men with traverses and 
 bomb-proofs, from the terrific fire of shot and shells constantly poured 
 in upon them, and which only ceased at times when the enemy seemed 
 to have temporarily exhausted their supplies of ammunition. The 
 fire of the enemy was only occasionally replied to, except when there 
 were irrdications of an assault, or it became necessary to retard or 
 stop operations on some particular work. The limited amount of am- 
 munition on hand rendered this course necessary, although I am in- 
 clined to think caution in this respect was pushed rather to an ex- 
 treme, and that a little more firing would have proved beneficial. 
 Towards the close of the siege, the attack was mainly carried on by 
 mining. Along my front the enemy exploded no mines on u^ on the 
 contrary, counter ones were prepared, and when their galleries ap- 
 proached within proper distance, were charged and fired, and it is be- 
 lieved with all the desired effect. The good conduct of both officers 
 and men during the forty- seven days in the trenches is worthy of 
 special praise ; neither one or the other could have behaved better, and 
 all credit is to be accorded the Brigadier Generals and the staff offi-- 
 cers for their vigilance, activity and heroic example set to their sol- 
 diers. Brigadier General Baldwin received a severe wound early in 
 the siege, but reported for duty before its close, and, together with 
 General Shoupe, receives my special acknowledgments for gallant ser- 
 vices. The heaviest and most dangerous attack was on the extreme- 
 right, and nobly did the 26th, 27th, 28th, and 31st Louisiana repel 
 and endure it. The casualties among the officers of these regiments 
 indicate the nature of the defence required. Inthe2Gth Louisiana,. 
 Major Martin, one captain and two lieutenants killed. Colonel W. 
 Hall, seriously wounded ; in the 27th Louisiana, Lieutenant Colonel 
 
* 134 
 
 McLaurin, one captain, one lieutenant killed ; Colonel L. B. Marks 
 dangerously ; Major Norwood, one captain one lieutenant severely 
 wounded ; in the 2Sth, one lieutenant killed, and three lieutenants 
 wounded ; in the 31st, Colonel Griffin Avounded. Circumstances aris- 
 ing out of Lieut. General Pemberton's orders have prevented my ob- 
 taining reports from Brigadier Generals Baldwin and Vaughan ; hence 
 to continue the enumeration further is impossible at present, and 
 from the same cause, my report is probably less complete than if, 
 since my arrival from Vicksburg, where I was detained until the 1st 
 instant, time and opportunity had been afforded me for hearing from 
 my division brigadiers. Of the following named officers composing 
 my staff, 1 have to speak in terms of unqualified satisfaction ; all did 
 their duty intelligently, fearlessly, promptly and efficiently : Lieut. 
 Colonel Joy, chief of artillery, Major Devereux, A. A. G., Major 
 Girault, inspector general. Major Fearn, division quartermaster, Cap- 
 tain McDonalu, ordnance officer. Lieutenant Frost and Lieutenant 
 Ilarrod, aid ; and Captain Hobart, volunteer aid, also Surgeon Whit- 
 field, acting division surgeon. 
 
 To the brave Colonel Marks and his gallant regiment (27th Lou- 
 isiana) belongs the distinction of taking the first colors, prisoners and 
 arms lost by the enemy during the siege. The conduct of the entire 
 division was most exemplary, and its courage and cheerfulness in- 
 creased if possible from day to day, under the hardships and priva- 
 tions of the siege, 
 
 I have the honor to be, 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 M. L. SMITH, 3Iajor General, C. S. A, 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BOWEN. 
 
 Headquarters Grand Gl-lf, ^ 
 May 2, 1863. S 
 Major R, W. Memminger, A. A. G. : 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to submit the following synopsis of the bat- 
 tle of Port Gibson, fought by a portion of my comman'l. on the firrt 
 of May. 186^. The whole of the night before, the enemy were land- 
 ing troops at Bruinsburg, just south of the mouth of Bayou Pierre. 
 From that point several roads could be reached by the enemy, all cen- 
 treing at Port Gibson. General Green had been sent out on the Bru- 
 insburg road the day before, with a force of about one thousand men. 
 The enemy attacked him at one, A. M., and after a brisk skirmish of 
 two hours and a half duration, were repuh-^ed. They continually re- 
 ■ccived fresh troops, and rene>ved the attack at daylight on General 
 Green's position. In the meantime. General Tracey had arrived and 
 taken position. This force, nominally twenty- two hundred, was really 
 not more than fifteen hundred, and the men were completely jaded 
 and broken down >\ith continuous marching. The enemy's attack was 
 sustained with great bravery, until between nine and ten o'clock, 
 when, overwhelmed by numbers and flanked on the right and lefn, 
 General Green had to fall back. Courier after courier had been sent 
 for General Baldwin, but his troops were so utterly exhausted that he 
 could not get up in time to prevent this. General Traccy's position 
 on the right was maintained. lie himself was killed early in the ac- 
 tion. All General Green's artillery ammunition was exhausted when 
 he fell back. The enemy captured two pieces of the Virginia battery, 
 on General Tracey 's left and Green's right. Just as the retreat was 
 taking place, General Baldwin arrived. I ordered him to form a new 
 line about one mile in rear ©f General Green's first position, and sent 
 the latter to the right to assist General Tracey. ('eneral Baldwin 
 had no artillery, and that ordered up from Grand Gulf had not ar- 
 rived. Colonel Cockrell, with three Missouri regiments, came up soon 
 after. Two were sent to the left, and one to the right. Ammunition 
 was scarce, especially in General Tracey's command, their ordnance 
 train not having arrived. I now had all the force at my command on 
 the field, excepting three regiments and two battalions, which occu- 
 pied positions which I could not remove them from until the last mo- 
 ment. I (jrdered them up about one o'clock, but only one of them 
 arrived in time to cover the retreat and burn the bridges. Betw-een 
 twelve and one o'clock I attempted, with two of Colonel CockrelTs 
 regiments, to turn the enemy's right flank, and nearly succeeded. 
 They formed three brigades in front of a battery to receive our charge. 
 The first was routed, the second wavered, but the third stood firm, 
 and after a long and desperate contest, we had to give up the attempt. 
 I am of opinion, however, that this attack saved the right from boin" 
 overwhelmed, and kept the enemy back until nearly sunset. All day 
 long the fight raged fiercely, our men every where maintaining their 
 
136 
 
 ground, and I hoped that I could hold it until after dark. Just before 
 sunset a desperate attack was made bv the enemy, they having again 
 received fresh troops. My right was forced to give ground, and I 
 was reluctantly compelled to fall back. The order was given and 
 executed without confusion, General Baldwin, who held the centre, 
 bringing up the rear. The enemy attempted no pursuit, and all 
 crossed in safety to this side of Bayou Pierre, destroying the bridges 
 behind us. General Baldwin, misled by the burning of the railroad 
 bridge, and by rumors that it was the suspension bridge, took the road 
 due north through Port Gibson, instead of the Grand Gulf road, and 
 unfortunately destroyed the bridge over the north fork of Bayou 
 Pierre, cutting me off from most of the meat, which had been sent 
 between the two forks for safety. I had sent a train around to bring 
 it all here, and some of the wagons were cut off. They are coming 
 in, however^ and I expect none will be lost. I am endeavoring to get 
 it over a ferry on North Fork, and if 1 do not succeed, shall, at all 
 events, try to destroy it. I ordered all the commissary stores left in 
 town, mainly corn, to be burned. 
 
 I can give no estimate of losses, returns not having been handed 
 in, but they must be severe. A section of the Virginia battery was 
 captured by the enemy, and not retaken, as reported. Two more 
 pieces had to be left, from want of horses, all having been killed. 
 The men endeavored to drag the pieces off by hand, but had to leave 
 them. The Hudson battery brought off all their pieces, but had lost 
 so many horses they were compelled to abandon their caissons. This 
 battery suffered severely, having twenty men wounded. Nearly all 
 the missing of the whole command can be considered among the killed 
 sud wounded, as very few prisoners were taken. 
 
 The enemy have refused to allow me to bury the dead or visit the 
 wounded, beyond the mere sending of surgeons, who are to remain, 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JNO. S. BOWEN, 
 Brigadier General commanding. 
 
 P. S. — Since writing the above, I have ascertained that the enemy's 
 force engaged exceeded twenty thousand, while my own did not num- 
 ber over fifty-five hundred. 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL MOORE. 
 
 Headquarters Moore's Brigade, Forney's Division, 
 Vicksburg, July 8th, 1863. 
 
 Major S. Groom, A. A. G. : 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to make the follovfing report of the part 
 taken by my brigade during the siege of Vicksburg. The brigade 
 during this time was composed of the second Texas, thirty-fifth 
 and fortieth Mississippi, the thirty-seventh, fortieth, and forty-second 
 Alabama, Longstreet and Tobin's light batteries, and a portion of 
 Land's, Ridley's, David-^on's, and Wall's batteries, in all ninr^tccn 
 guns. An eighteen pound and thirty-pound Parrott and a Whit • 
 worth gun were placed, during the siege, in rear on my line and com- 
 manded by Captain Cowan. On the evening of the 13th of Ma}^ we 
 were ordered to fall back from the position Ave occupied with the bri- 
 gade and two batteries on the Warrenton road, and took a po.^ition in 
 the trenches near Vicksburg, the right resting on the Jackson rail- 
 road, and the left extending to near what is known as the Jackson 
 road. We found the trenches and redoubt in a very imperfect state, 
 the trenches being too long and shallow. By working at night with 
 the small number of tools in our possession, we soon greatly improved 
 thcra ; also constructed approaches, which seem to have been over- 
 looked or deemed unnecessary. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th of May, the enemy engaged and 
 drove in our picket. At about eleven o'clock, A. M., their skirmish- 
 ers and artillery opened in front of our entrenchments. From this 
 time to the close of the siege, forty-nine days, our men were con- 
 fined to the trenches night and day, under a fire of musketry and 
 artillery, which was often kept up during the whole night as well as 
 day. Only those who were a near witness of the siege of A'^icksburg 
 will ever have a true conception of the endurance and suffering of 
 those men, who staid at their post until overpowered, not by the 
 enemy, but by the wants of nature. Those who only think and read 
 of the siege, and those who witnessed and shared its trials, may, per- 
 haps, form widely different conceptions of its nature. Some idea may 
 be formed of the artillery fire to which we were exposed, when I state , 
 that a small party, sent out for that purpose, collected some two thou- 
 sand shells near and in rear of the trenches occupied by our brigade. 
 This was soon after the siege begun, and was but a portion of those 
 that failed to explode. On arriving in our front, the enemy began at 
 once to place their guns under cover, and to Construct rifle pits. No 
 attempt was made to carry our lines by assault until the 22d of May. 
 On the morning and afternoon of that day they made determined 
 assaults, but were gloriously repulsed. Their greatest efforts were 
 made against that portion of the line occupied by that veteran and 
 gallant regiment, the second Texas. This regiment was nobly sup- 
 ported by the forty-second Alabama, occupying the trenches on their 
 
138 • 
 
 right, and the thirty-seventh Alabama on the left. Tobin's and other 
 guns did good service. They were easily repulsed in the morning, 
 but in the afternoon charge they were more determined, coming up 
 and even into the outer ditch of the second Texas redoubt. The 
 second Texas captured two stand of colors. Having failed to carry 
 our works by assault, the enemy now appeared to determine not to 
 attempt it again, but to take us by regular approaches, cr by starving 
 us out, which latter thej doubtless regarded as the most certain and 
 agreeable mode, as they did not assault again even after they had' 
 constructed their line of entrenchments in front of a great portion of 
 our line, and had sapped to within thirty feet of the Texas works, and 
 constructed rifle pits to within thirty paces of the same. From the 
 22d of May to the close of the siege, July 4th, the history of each 
 day was generally but that of the preceding. I cannot speak too 
 highly of the conduct of the officers and men. None ever endured 
 such hardships with more cheerfulness. "When their allowance was 
 reduced to near quarter rations, some complaints might have beca 
 heard; not that more was not issued, but that we had it not to give. 
 
 ' By this time their minds and bodies seemed exhausted, and many 
 remained at their post when they were fit subjects for the hopital. 
 Only those who have tried it can tell the effects produced on men by 
 keeping them forty-seven days and nights in a narrow ditch, exposed 
 to the scorching heat during the day, and often chilly air and dew of 
 night. In compliance with instructions received during the early 
 part of the siege, we used our ammunition with a strict regard to 
 economy. This enabled the enemy to approach more rapidly and 
 with greater impunity than they otherwise could have done. They 
 had two or three times as many guns as we, and generally of much 
 heavier calibre. Many of their shots passed through and through 
 our parapets. Being very near our works, their sharpshooters and 
 artillery rendered it frequently impossible to fire more than a few 
 rounds during the day, for if our cannoniers were not shot down or 
 pieces disabled, their artillery soon filled the embrazures with earth 
 so that the guns could not be used until night enabled us to repair 
 the works. 
 
 Our loss in killed and wounded was as follows : Killed, seventy- 
 two ; wounded, three hundred and eighty-five ; total, four hundred 
 and fifty-seven. A number of the wounded have died in hospitals 
 and not included in the killed above reported. List of killed and 
 
 ^wounded has been furnished, 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 JOHN C. MOORE, 
 
 Brigadier General. 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL BARTON. 
 
 Headquarters First Brigade, Stevenson's Division, 
 
 Vicksburg, June 18, 1863, 
 
 Major J. J. Reeve, A. A. G. : 
 
 Major : I have the honor to submit the following report of the part 
 borne by this brigade in the action of the IGth ultimo : 
 
 I was directed, early in the day, to detach a regiment and a section 
 of artillery, to hold the bridge over Baker's Creek, some two miles to 
 the left and rear on the line of march. Henderson's forty-second 
 Georgia, and Lieutenant Sharkey's section of (Tompany A, first Mis- 
 sissippi artillery, were selected and posted. The remainder of the 
 brigade remained inactive, save an occasional change of position, till 
 near noon, when it was ordered to the left to support General Lee, 
 then pressed. The distance, about one and a half miles, was passed 
 at double quick, troops formed in line of battle on Lee's left, and ad- 
 vanced as rapidly as the nature of the ground would admit. Corput's 
 battery (four rifles) was posted near the road, about six hundred yards 
 from the bridge, my left resting on it, and my right on Lee's left. 
 The position was not a good one : the country much broken, and cov- 
 ered in most part with dense woods. The enemy having turned Lee's 
 left flank, w^ere already in the. timber, pressing vigorously forward. 
 "With impetuous gallantry, the fortieth, forty-first, and forty-third 
 Georgia regiments dashed upon the enemy's line, broke it, and 
 drove it back about three hundred yards. It was here reinforced by 
 his second and third lines, and my further advance was checked. I 
 had reserved the fifty-second Georgia on the left, to protect the flank. 
 It was now moved up rapidly, and in handsome style engaged a brig- 
 ade that was turning the left. The troops on my right now gave way, 
 and my right flank was soon turned and overwhelmed. The left was 
 in like manner enveloped, and a heavy fire poured in from the rear. 
 Having vainly endeavored to cover the left with the forty-second reg- 
 iment, brought forward for the purpose, I was compelled to fall back. 
 The enemy had so nearly surrounded the whole brigade, that this 
 movement was necessarily accompanied with some confusion. The 
 fortieth and forty-second regiments, however, came out with unbroken 
 ranks. The brigade had been terribly handled. Corput's battery, 
 posted near the road on the left, was beautifully served Its horses 
 and many men were killed, and finding it impossible to save the guns, 
 they were fired with double canister to the last, and abandoned only 
 when they could be no longer used. I retired across Baker's Creek, 
 posting the few troops remaining so as to com.mar.d the bridge, and 
 held that position till all had crossed at the ford below, about four, P. 
 M. I then fell back to Edward's Depot, (two miles,) and covered the 
 approach to that place till dark. The enemy, who crossed immedi- 
 ately on our withdrawal from the bridge, followed and attacked at this 
 place, but failed to dislodge us. All of our troops having passed, and 
 
140 
 
 all property at the depot removed or destroyed, I took up the line of- 
 march at nightfall, and joined the army at Big Black bridge at one 
 A. M., on the 17th. & > > 
 
 I take pleasure in naming the following officers for marked and dis- 
 tinguished gallantry : Colonels Harris, forty-third, wounded and a 
 prisonor; Curtis, forty-first; Phillips, fifty-second, missing; Hen- 
 derson, forty-second ; Johnson, fortieth, (sick and unable to command, 
 but present and cheering his men ;) Lieutenant Colonel Young, com- 
 manding fortieth Georgia; Majors Camp, fortieth; Hulsey, forty- 
 second; Nail, forty-first ; Captain Corput; Captain J. W. Johnston 
 and Lieutenant Sharkey, of the artillery ; Captain Thom, my A. A. 
 G. ; Lieutenant Lyons, A. D. C. ; R. F. Patterson, W. Norcum, and 
 C. L. Thompson, acting A. D. 0. The heavy loss of the brigade, over 
 forty-two per cent., is the best evidence I can give of the good be- 
 havior of the men. 
 
 I am, Major, Very respectfully, your obelient servant, 
 
 S. M. BARTON, . 
 Brigadier General. 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL IIEBERT. 
 
 Headquarters IIebert's Division, 
 • Vickshurg, Julj 9, 1863. 
 
 Major S, Groom, 
 
 A, A. G., Forney'' s Division : 
 
 Major : I have the honor respectfully to submit the following re^ 
 ports : On the 17th day of last May, I was stationed at Snyder's Mill, 
 on the Ya2oo river, in command of the Confederate forces at that point. 
 This position I had occupied since the 2d of January. On the ITth 
 of May, at eleven o'clock, A. M., I received orders to prepare to 
 evacuate the place, and to send into Vicksburg the commissary stores, 
 and to have driven in all the cattle, hogs and sheep, that could be 
 gathered in the country. Having but a small number of wagons, and 
 but a few mounted men, I, however, commenced carrying out my in- 
 structions, as far as practicable. At quarter of three, P. M., I re- 
 ceived orders to send to Vicksburg all ordnance stores, and prepar: 
 to spike or destroy the heavy guns. All remaining wagons were 
 loaded witli ordnance stores, and Colonel J. M. Patton put to work to 
 prepare tkc guns for spiking or destruction ; Colonel Patton was the 
 commander of my heavy artillery. At five-and-a-half o'clock, P. M., 
 I received the orders to march my command to Vicksburg, leaving 
 two companies at Snyder's Mill, under an efficient officer, to keep up 
 a show of occupation, and to spike or destroy the guns, and destroy 
 remaining stores, when the enemy would be discovered approaching 
 the position. At the same time, I was ordered to send all our trans- 
 ports and store-boats, then at Ilayues' Bluff, to the upper Yazoo, 
 above Fort Pembcrton. All the boats left in the evening and night, 
 c?/rryingoff such stores as were on board at the time. Lieutenant Co- 
 lonel J. F. Plattsraire, with two companies of his regiment, the twenty- 
 first Louisiana, was assigned to the duty cf holding the place and of 
 destroying the guns and stores remaining, when the necessity for so 
 doing occurred. Having made all arrangements possible, under ex- 
 isting circumstances, with reference to the post of Snyder's Mill, I 
 moved with my command — seven-and-a-half o'clock, P. M. — by the 
 valley road, to Vicksburg, where I reported myself at two-and-a-half 
 o'clock, on the morning of the 18th of May. I was immediately or- 
 dered to the trenches, with instructions to occupy the line, commenc- 
 ing with the works on the immediate right of the Jackson road, and 
 extending to the left so as to occupy the main redan on the. grave-yard 
 road. These dispositions were all made by eight o'clock, in the morn- 
 ing. I found in the main redan, on the left of the Jackson road, one 
 twenty-pounder Parrott gun, of Waddell's artillery, under Lieutenant 
 Bate.'*. Early in the day, Lieutenant J. M. Patton received orders 
 directly from the Lieutenant General commanding, to return to Sny- 
 der's ^Iill for the purpose of disposing of the guns and stores left 
 there. These orders relieved Lieutenant Colonel Plattsmire of the 
 
142 
 
 charge I had assigned him, and I have, therefore, no report to make 
 of ■vfhat was really finally abandoned at Snyder's Mill. 
 
 On the 18th of May, soon after my command had been placed in 
 the trenches, the enemy made his appearance iu front of my line, 
 pressing forward on the grave-^ard road, as if intending an assault. 
 Taking one regiment and one battalion from my right, I sent them to 
 reinforce my left. After the change, and up to the 2d of June, my 
 troops vrere disposed as follows, commencing with my right in the 
 main works, on the immediate right of the Jackson road : Twenty- 
 first Louisiana regiment, with companies C and D, of the third Lou- 
 isiana attached, third Louisiana regiment, forty-third Mississippi 
 regiment, thirty-eighth Mississippi regiment, thirty-seventh Missis- 
 sippi regiment, seventh Mississippi battalion, thirty sixth Mississippi 
 regiment. The artillery was distributed along the line, with a few 
 pieces kept in reserve. At about quarter of four o'clock, P. M., on 
 che IStb, the enemy opened wiih artillery on the grave-yard road ; but 
 no attempt at a charge had been made, or was anticipated. His skir- 
 mishers pressed forward, however, and at night our skirmishers, by 
 direction of the Lieutenant General commandinsr, were drawn into our 
 lines — pickets alone being put out for the night. By the morning of 
 the 19th, the enemy had planted several batteries along my front, on 
 the Jackson and grave-yard road; and his strong line of sharp- 
 shooters was within easy musket range of oijr works. He had also 
 commenced his line of v/orks ; and as far as my front was concerned, 
 he may be said to have completed his investment. The peremptory 
 orders to draw in our skirmishers, not to use our artillery except 
 against advancing columns of infantry, or against artillery being 
 placed in battery, (all to save ammunition,) allowed the enemy to at 
 once make his investment a close one, and to commence his 
 trenches, saps, &c., in close proximity to our works. From that 
 time our entire line became subjected to a murderous fire, and nearly 
 every cannon in my line was, in time, either dismounted or otherwise 
 injured 
 
 At about ten o'clock, A. M., on the 1 9th of May, an attack was 
 made on the grave-yard road, extending along the front of Major 
 General Smith's right and the front of my two regiments and batta- 
 lion on my left. Seeing the advancing columns, I directed Lieutenant 
 Bates' twenty-pounder Parrott and a three-inch rifled piece of the 
 Appeal battery, in the works on the Jackson road to open upon them. 
 This was done with very good effect. The enemy, however, several times 
 pressed on to the assault, but were as often repulsed, notwithstanding 
 the efforts of the officers. Before long, he fell back discomfitted, 
 having suffered severely. 
 
 On the 21st and 22d, he rapidly pushed on his work of entrenching, 
 sapping, constructing batteries, &c., under cover of heavy sharp- 
 shooting and cannonading. On the 22d, hj again advanced to the 
 assault, and apparently with serious and strong determination. On 
 my line, his points of attack were the Jackson and grave-yard 
 roads. He charged three times on the grave-yard road and twice on 
 the Jackson road, but was as often repulsed with very heavy loss. A 
 
14S 
 
 small nuniber only succeeded in reaching our exterior ditch. At 
 the redan of the twenty-first Louisiana a few scaling ladders 
 reached the outer ditch, but were not planted. By dark the 
 enemy had fallen back, severely punished and discomfitted. From 
 that tin>e he seemed to abandon all hope of taking our works by 
 assault and applied himself assidulously to the reduction of our line 
 by regular and sys-Csmatic aproach. On the 2d of June, other troops 
 having been ordered: to occupy the works held by my left, I moved 
 the thirty-sixth and thirty- eighth ^^ississippr regiments and the sev- 
 enth Mississippi battalion to the right, placing them as follows: the 
 thiity-eighth along the Jackson road, between the third and twenty- 
 first Louisiana; tke seventh battalion on the right of the twenty-first 
 Louisiana and the thirty-sixth regiment on the right of the battaliion 
 having massed the third and twenty-first Louisiana more completely 
 to give room for these dispositions. In this order my troops con- 
 tinued until the 2oth of June, when, moving the third Louisiana still 
 to the left, room was made for the sixth Missouri regiment, (Colonel 
 Eugene Irwin,) between the thirty-eighth Mississippi and third Lou- 
 isiana. On this day, (25th of June,) at about half- past five o'clock, 
 and before the sixth Missouri entered the trenches, the enemy sprung 
 his first mine under the redan of the third Louisiana and made an 
 efi'ort to storm the breach effected. He was promptly met and signally 
 repulsed. He, however, occupied our exterior slope and ditch, and 
 till late in the night a brisk fight wi^h sharpshooting and hand-gren- 
 ades was kept up on both sides. At the time the mine was exploded 
 six e^ilisted men of the forty-third Mississippi were at work in a shaft 
 sunk in the templain of the redan for the purpose of countermining. 
 These men were buried and lost.« Colonel Eugene Irwin sprung in 
 the parapet to lead a charge against the enemy in the exterior ditch- 
 He was shot and instantly killed, the service thus losing a brave, 
 accomplished, and distinguished officer. 
 
 In the meantime, before the 2oth of June, the enemy had placed 
 heavy guns in very close range on the Jackson road, and had demol- 
 ished a large amount of parapet. He had, also, by erecting daily 
 new bitteries, approaching and elevating his sharpshooters, compelled 
 us to work incessantly, day and night, repairing our parapets, con-* 
 structing new lines, digging new pits, (fee, cfec. He also had com- 
 menced shelling, with serious effect, from a mortar on th2 .Jackson 
 road. From the 25th of June to the 1st of July, he pressed forward 
 his works and continued his telling fire on our line. On the last 
 day, about half-past one o'clock, P. M., he sprung his second mine 
 under the main redan, on the left of the Jackson road. He, how- 
 ever, made no attempt to storm the breach, to the disappointment of 
 our brave soldiers, who, though.for a moment stunned by the fearful 
 shock they sustained, were instantly ready to meet the fae and once 
 more teach him that he could not take our works by assault. The 
 mi^c was a very heavy one. The entire left face, part of the right, 
 and the outer templain of the redan was blown off, leaving an 
 immense deep chasm. One sapper and eight negroes of the engineer 
 department, occupied in counterming, were buried and lost ; and the 
 
144 
 
 third Louisiana lost one killed and twenty-one wounded, and the 
 Appeal battery four wounded by the explosion. The loss of the sixth 
 Missouri by the mine, I cannot state. It must have been serious. 
 During the 2d of July, and up to eight o'clock, A. M., on the 3d, 
 the enemy's fire was kept up as usual, our troops suffering more than 
 before from mortar shelling. At eight o'clock, A. M., on the 3d, 
 all firing ceased by the sending out a flag of truce. This cessa- 
 tion of hostilities continued until the end of the siege. 
 
 The next day, (the 4th of July,) at ten o'clock, A. M., in accord- 
 ance with the terms of capitulation and orders received, my com- 
 mand stacked their arms in front of their lines, evacuated their 
 trenches, and were marched to bivouac in the rear of our works, 
 where they are now being paroled. ^ 
 
 On the 19th of May, Colonel Charles Herrick reported to me for duty 
 in my brigade. He was at once assigned as chief of artillery on my 
 line. Proceeding to his duties he found himself at the grave-yard 
 road, at the time of the assault of that day. Gallantly joining in 
 the fight, he fell mortally wounded, dying a few days after. 
 
 On the 21st of May, Lieutenant Charles A. Bride, aid-de-camp, re- 
 ceived a painful wound in the shoulder, from a minnie ball. 
 
 On the 1st of July, before the explosion of the mine, Lieutenant 
 Blessing, assistant engineer, was painfully wounded by a sharpshooter. 
 This officer had been unremitting in his labors night and day du- 
 ring the siegCj and showing a gallantry 'and devotion worthy of re- 
 ward. 
 
 Casualties in the difi'erent regiments, batteries and companies will 
 appear in the list of names to accompany this report. 
 
 The above is a brief history of the part taken by my brigad^ in the 
 siege of Vicksburg, terminated J^y the capitulation of the 4th of 
 July, 1883. I will not cite here individual acts of bravery and of 
 devotion. I will not pass encomiurns on officers and soldiers, by 
 name. With few, very few, exceptions, all my officers and soldiers 
 have proved themselves worthy of the admiration of the army and of 
 the country. Forty-eight days and nights passed in the trenches, 
 exposed to the burning sun during the day, the chilly air of night, 
 subject to the murderous storm of balls, shells and missiles of all 
 kinds, cramped up in pits and holes, not large enough to allow them 
 to extend their limbs, laboring day and night, and fed on reduced ra- 
 tions of the poorest kind of food, yet always cheerful, always ready 
 and eager that the foe should advance, calm and resolute, their comrades 
 falling around them every instant, under a fire they were forbidden 
 to return ; such are the claims that my noble officers and soldiers have 
 upon the admiration of their countrymen. The list of casualties suf- 
 ficiently attest that my brigade occupied and held, unflinchingly, one 
 of the most exposed positions of the defence of Vicksburg. Many a 
 gallant spirit was sacrificed ; let their memories be cherished and their 
 names honored. 
 
145 
 
 RecQpitulation of Casualties. 
 
 COMMAND. 
 
 Srd Louisiana, Roginiont, 
 
 36tii Mississippi Regiment, .... 
 37th Mississippi Regiment, ... 
 38th Mississippi Regiment, ... 
 
 43d Mississippi Regiment, 
 
 7th Mississippi Regiment, 
 
 21st and 23d Louisiana Regiments, 
 
 Appeal Battery, 
 
 Emanuel's 
 
 Ratcliffc'e, 
 
 Lowe's, 
 
 Point Coupee 
 
 Ridley's, 
 
 Brigade Headquarters, 
 
 Total, 
 
 KILLED. 
 
 ■WOUNDBD. 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Men.| 
 
 Officers. 
 
 Men. 
 120 
 
 4 
 
 41 
 
 6 
 
 4 
 
 23 
 
 5 
 
 68 
 
 1 
 
 16 
 
 (5 
 
 50 
 
 3 
 
 28 
 
 5 
 
 3G 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 
 37 
 
 . 2v;- 
 
 12 
 
 4 
 
 32 
 
 4 
 
 or. 
 
 8 
 
 66 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 6 
 
 1 
 
 C 
 
 
 8 
 
 ... 
 
 3 
 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 1 
 
 *3 
 
 ... 
 
 5 
 
 1 
 
 ::: j 
 
 "i 
 
 
 24 
 
 179 ; 
 
 37 
 
 443 
 
 7 deserters 
 
 7 deserters. 
 2 deserters. 
 
 6 deserters. 
 2 deserters. 
 
 24 deserters. 
 
 Total killed 203 
 
 wounded 480 
 
 tS^ 
 
 Aggregate killed and wounded 683 
 
 Note. — The casualties may not be exactly correct, but it is known 
 to be nearly so. 
 
 ReepectfuUy submitted, 
 
 LOUIS HEBERT, Brig. General, 
 
 lU 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL LEE. 
 
 Headquarters Second Brigade, Stevenson's Division, ? 
 Demopolis, Ala., Julj 25, 1803. \ 
 
 Major J. J. Reeve, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General, Stevenson's Division : 
 
 Sir: I have the he nor to submit the following report of the part 
 tnlcen in the battle of Baker's Creek, on the IGth of May last, by the 
 Alabama brigade, (second brigade,) Stevenson's division, consisting of 
 the follovring commands, viz : twentieth Alabama regiment, Colonel 
 J. W. Garrett ; twenty-third Alabama regiment. Colonel F. K. Beck ; 
 thirtieth Alabama regiment, Colonel C. M. Shelly ; thirty-first 
 Alabama regiment. Lieutenant Colonel J. M. Arrington ; forty-sixth 
 Alabama regiment, Colonel M. S. Wood, and Waddell's battery, 
 Captain J. F. Waddell. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th of May, the army under the command 
 of Tiieutenant General Pemberton, commenced moving towards the 
 enemy from Edward's Depot, in the direction of Raymond, my brigade 
 occupying, in the line of march, the second position from the rear. 
 The army marched during the greater part of the night, halting a 
 short time before daylight, at a point about six miles from Edward's 
 Depot. Soon after daylight, on the 16th, the array commenced a 
 retrogade movement over the same route it had taken on the preceding 
 night, for the purpose of forming a junction on the nr-rth side of the 
 railroad with the forces under command of General Joseph E. John- 
 ston, General Johnston having evacuated Jackson and moved towards 
 Canton. 
 
 About six, A. M., Major General Stevenson ordered me to move 
 rapidly with my brigade, and relieve Reynold's brigade, on the 
 Edward's Depot and Clinton roads, which was done at about half-past 
 seven, A. M. Fkirmishers, from Reynolds' brigade, being at that 
 time engaged with the enemy on two roads, one leading from Clinton 
 }tnd the other from Raymond. By eight o'clock, my brigade was in 
 line of battle, and skirmishing on both roads — the position occupied' 
 by the brigade being on the extreme left of our line. At about nine 
 o'clock, it was discovered that the enemy was massing troops on the 
 left, evidently for the purpose of turning our left flank, and getting 
 between our army and Edward's Depot. My brigade was at once 
 marched, under fire, by the left flank, for the purpose of checking the 
 enemy, and information of his movements and the corresponding 
 change in my lino was immediately sent to the Major General com- 
 manding, with the request that the gap on ray right should be filled 
 up by other troops. Similar movements, on my part, were frequently 
 made, under fire, throughout the day, until about two P. M., the Major 
 General com.manding being, in each case, notified of my change of 
 position, and of the continuous eff'orts of the enemy to turn our left. , 
 Captain Waddell's battery, which had been placed in position on the 
 
14T 
 
 Raymoml road, and a section of Jolinston"'s battery, wliich Lad been 
 posted on the Rjayraond road, had, during the earlier part of the day, 
 been supported by my brigade ; but, in consequence of my continuous 
 movements to the left, these guns were left to the right of my brigade, 
 and were subsequently supported by General Cummings' brigade. As 
 early as ten o'clock in the morning, it became evident that the enemy 
 was in heavy force and determined on battle, as his skirmishers wen? 
 bold and aggressive, and several divisions of his troops were visible 
 in front of our left. At about two P. M., he advanced in heavy forco 
 on my centre and left, but was handsomely repulsed by th3 forty- 
 sixth, thirtieth, and t;^'enty-third Alabama regiments — the last regi- 
 ment, under the gallant Colonel Beck, liaving moved forward under 
 a heavy fire, and driven back a battery of the enemy, which liad been 
 placed within four hundred yards of our line. 
 
 Having checked the enemy on my centre and left, and having ordered 
 the regiments last mentioned to hold ihcir respective positions, my 
 attention was called to the very heavy fire on my right. Upon pro- 
 ceeding there, I found that Cuiiiming's br'gade had been driven back 
 by the enemy, add that the t\ventieth and thirty-first Alabama regi- 
 ments of my brigade bad been compelled to retire, their right flank>s. 
 having become exposed, and the enemj having giined their rcar^ 
 
 At about the same time the enemy had advanced rapidly on my 
 left, and had almost gained the Edward's Depot road, one-half mile 
 to the rear of my line. Under these circumstances, I ordered the 
 forty-sixth, thirtieth and twenty-third Alabama, regiments to retire 
 about six hundred yards to the rear, where my second line was formed. 
 These three regiments behaved with distinguished gallantly, retaining 
 their position against heavy odds. 
 
 I, at this time, went to the road, about six hundred jards in roar 
 of my line, and found it filled with stragglers, and hearing that 
 Bowen's division was reinforcing on my right, and that Barton's 
 brigade was going on my left, I again returned to my 8eco!:)d line, 
 carrying with me about four hundred stragglers, most of them from 
 the thirty-fourth Georgia, Colonel Johnson, whom I placed ou the left 
 of the thirtieth Alabama regiment, Colonel Shelly. 
 
 With these reinforcements the enemy v,ere broken in some con- 
 fusion, observing which, C«lonel Wood's forty-sixth Alabama, made a 
 most gallant charge wi'h his regiment, moving up almost to bis. 
 original position in the line of battle. Soon afterwards, Bowen'a 
 division, on my right, and Barton's brigade, on my h ft, having- 
 retreated, and the enemy having crossed the Edward's Depot road 
 with at least three regiments, 1 ordered Colonel D. C. Stiih, of my 
 staff, to recall the thirtieth Alabama, Colonel Shelly, and the forty- 
 sixth Alabama, Colonel Wood. 
 
 The, order was delivered to Colonel Shelly, but the enemy having- 
 advf.nced very rapidly upon the right, the forty-sixth Alabama could 
 not bo reached. I regret to say tliat this excellent regimrnt, under it.s. ' 
 gallant field officers CoIolcI Woods, Lieutenant Colonel Kyle and Major 
 Henley, was captured. 
 
148 
 
 My brigade was then rallied about one half-mile from the Edwards' 
 Depot road, and in rear of Buford's brigade, Loring's division, 
 which had just arrived on the field at about half past three, P. 
 M., Major General Loring soon after came up with Featherstone's 
 brigade, and rectgnizing him as senior officer on the field, and not 
 seeing my division commander, Major General Sterenson, I reported 
 to him for orders, and was placed on the left of Featherstone's 
 brigade. General Loring soon afterwards informed me that he had 
 been ordered to retire, and directed me to commence at once the 
 movement towards the ford at Baker's Creek. 
 
 The retreat was conducted with order, and we arrived at the ford 
 iit about six o'clock, P. M., when my brigade was halted During 
 the retreat General Loring sent repeated messages to me to hasten my 
 regiments, which was done. 
 
 On crossing Baker's Creek I found that General Loring had not 
 followed my brigade, but had halted on the opposite side. I at this 
 time received an order from General Pembcrton to move to the 
 bridge upon the Clinton road, and support the cavalry at that 
 point, un-der command of Colonel Adams ; but, before arriving there, 
 I found that the enemy already held the bridge with a large force, 
 and I accordi*ngly retreated towards the Big Black bridge, where the 
 brigade arrived about ten o'clock, P. M. 
 
 Notwithstanding t!he defeat at Baker's Creek, there were many ex- 
 hibitions of personal courage and bravery on the part of the officers 
 and men of my command. I would particularly mention the conduct 
 of Colonels Garrett, Beck, Shelly and Woods ; of Lieutenant Colonels 
 Kyle, forty-sixth Alabama; Pettus, twentienth Alabama; and Smith, 
 thirtieth Alabama. Majors Henly, forty-sixth Alabama; and Patter- 
 son, thirtieth Alabama. Captains Waddell and Johnson, command- 
 ing batteries ; and Captain Anderson, thirtieth Alabama, who was 
 :killed while gallantly performing his duty. 
 
 Adjutant Houston, Alabama ; Sergeant-major Garrard, thir- 
 ty-first Alabama ; Sergant-major McConnell, thirtieth Alabama, also 
 particularly attracted ray attention. 
 
 The above names are those of the persons who came under my 
 personal observation. Other instances of gallantry are mentioned in 
 the reports enclosed. ■' 
 
 Of ray personal staff, I would particularly mention Captain William 
 Elliott, my assistant adjutant general, f3r his conspicuous gallantry. 
 During the latter part of the day he bore the colors of the thirty- 
 fourth Georgia,[which he brought out of the action, the gallant color- 
 bearer having been killed. Colonel D. C. Stith acted with coolness 
 and gallantry ; also Lieutenant H. M. Martin, acting aid-de-camp, 
 and Captain Currell ard Lieutenant Undershell, volunteer aids-de- 
 camp. • 
 
 List of casualties has already been sent in. 
 
 Yours, respectfully, 
 
 S. D. LEE, 
 Brigf!di:r General commanding. 
 
REPORT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL GUMMING. 
 
 I 
 
 Headquarters Third Brigade, Stevenson's Division, 
 
 Enterprise, July 22, 1863. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General Stevenson's Division : 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to make the following report of the opera- 
 tions of this brigaile, commencing with the battle of Baker's Creek, 
 and terminating with the capitulation of Yicksburg: 
 
 On the afternoon of the 15th of May, the brigade left the line of 
 battle, for the two days previous established in front of Edwards' 
 Depot, and proceeded in the direction of Raymond, crossing Baker's 
 Creek at the bridge over that stream. A short distance beyond the 
 bridge, the line of march led from the Raymond road into a neighbor- 
 hood road. Passing to the right, and at about a mile distant from the 
 point of separation of the two roads, the brigade was halted and 
 bivouacked for the remainder of the night, along with the other brig- 
 ades of the division, no line of battle being here estiblished. 
 
 Shortly after sunrise, on the morning of the 16th of May, orders 
 were given to his division, by Major General Stevenson, to retraverse 
 a portion of the route passed over the previous night. This division 
 being the left of the army, the movement was commenced by its left 
 brigade, (Lee's,) in rear (right) of which followed the third brigade. 
 The regiments were promptly brought into position, and the line 
 established, moving by the left flank. When the brigade had pro- 
 ceeded about two-thirds of the distance towards the Raymond road, 
 its left being about five hundred yards distant from that road, it was 
 halted, by order of the Major General. The brigade line was estab- 
 lished on a succession of slight ridges, overlooking a clear field. 
 Strong parties of skirmishers Avere at once thrown out beyond this 
 field, with directions to penetrate the woods on the other side, and 
 engage and hold in check those of the enemy. This they did, under 
 the efficient management of Lieutenant Colonel Jackson, thirty-ninth 
 Georgia regimont, commanding. Shortly after these dispositions 
 were made, word was sent me by General Lee, that in consequence 
 of the passage of the enemy toward his left, he was extending his 
 line in that direction, coupled with the request that I would move by 
 the flank, to preserve the interval between us. The Major General, 
 present with me, directed this to be done, and I moved on the required 
 distance. After making two or more of such moves, my left having 
 by this time crossed the Raymond road, I was informed by the Major 
 General that Lee had bent the left of his line towards the rear — the 
 two branches making an angle more or less obtuse, and was directed 
 to accord my movements with his. Having sent forward an officer of 
 my staff to notify the officer commanding the skirmishers of the change 
 of direction of the line, and to direct him to make their movements 
 to correspond, I at once proceeded from the centre to the extreiui) 
 left of my brigade, to superintend the change. 
 
150 
 
 The directions above referred to were communicated to tlie officers 
 in command of the skirmishers, but to the distance of thi.i line in 
 advance', the inability, in a wooded country, of determining the point 
 at which the change of direction should be made, and especially the 
 fiict that they wefe unable to keep up communication with the skirm- 
 ishers of Lee's brigade, they were unable to follow up the movement;* 
 and later in the day were forced, after a gallant contest, in which 
 they Guffered sevcrol}-, to retire toward the light. In its movement 
 by the left flank, the brigade had entered a wood, rather open for the 
 first few hundred yards, but gradualbr becoming denser. Arrived at 
 the point where the brigade on ray left had filed to the left, it was 
 formed so that the angle formed by the two branches of the line was 
 nearly a right angle. Here my left regiment (the thirty-ninth 
 Georgia; was promptly turned into the new direction. The whole of 
 this regiment, and four companies of the next, (the thirty-fourth 
 Georgia,) had succeeded in getting upon what may be termed the 
 second front of the square, when the halting of Lee's brigade necessi- 
 tated the same on my part.. It should be stated the three left regi- 
 ments — the thirty-ninth, the thirty-fourth, and the thirty-sixth — had 
 each throe companies at the front as skirmishers, in addition to which 
 the thirty-fourth and thirty-sixth regiments had each' one company 
 absent on detached service, thus leaving only six companies of these 
 regiments in line. A halt having been made, as above stated, and 
 the two sides of the square faced outwards, notice was at this moment 
 given me that Lee, whose brigade was concealed from my observaticn 
 by the density of the wood, was moving forward. I imm.ediately ad- 
 vanced the second front, with a view to keep abreast with the supposed 
 movement. The brigade had advanced but a few paces, when I was 
 informed the reported movement by Lee had not been made. A halt 
 Avas at 'once called, and the line, somewhat disordered by the broken 
 and wooded character of the ground traversed, rectified. In this posi- 
 tion, the second front of the brigade was drawn up, on a succession of 
 ridges and knolls, heavily timbered, beyond which, at a distance, gen- 
 erally, of about fifty yards, the ground fell off abruptly. While thus 
 •engaged in rectifying the line, the battle broke upon us, and without 
 previous intimation, received ; the skirmishers having been unable, 
 for the reasons hitherto given, to keep pace with the movera<ent of the 
 line, and being no longer interposed between it and the enemy — 
 though of this I was not informed until afterwards. Favored by the 
 broken and wooded character of the locality, the enemy advanced two 
 very full regiments — ^the seventh *^".d eleventh Illinois — upon that 
 portion of my line forming what I have termed the second front. 
 Each of the regiments would seem to have been formed into a double 
 column, occupying a half regimental front, and their whole line to 
 Taave extended from the point of the angle to about the right of the 
 thirty-ninth Georgia regiment. Approaching, unseen, to within a 
 •distance of less than fifty yards, the enemy poured in a very heavy 
 •and destructive volley, which was at once replied to with eifcct. At 
 •about the same moment, the enemy appeared in front of, and opened 
 £re on, the "first front" of my line, a brisk and efi"ective fire, but 
 
151 
 
 not so near and destructive as that on the second front. On this 
 (second) front, the portions ol tho regiments engaged held, for a time, 
 their position, against the greatly superior force of the enemy, incited 
 by the encouragement and example of their respective coramandery — 
 Colonels McConnell and Johnson — the former of -whom fell here 
 severely wounded. Bat apprised, now, of the exact position occupied 
 by a section of Captain Johnston'.]; battery, to which had been added 
 a piece from AVaddells battery, which position was about opposite the 
 left of the thirty-fourth Georgia regiment, the enemy's right regi- 
 ment, by an oblique movement, placed i'self in rear of the regiment 
 already confronting the thirty-fourth Georgia regiment, and the two 
 united, bore down upon this regiment, and the- right of the thirty- 
 ninth. The position of the thirty-fourth, on the new direction, was 
 unable to withstand the charge of so overpowering a force, and it, 
 together with the right, (thirty ninth Georgia regiment,) compelled 
 to give way. 
 
 Throwing myself at the point at which the break had been made, 
 efforts were made to rally the broken line, but the enemy having ob- 
 tained possession of the batteries, and following up closely their advan- 
 tage, these efforts proved'unsuccessful, and the whole of the second front 
 f(?ll back. By this retrograle movement, the right of the thirty- 
 fourth and thirty-sixth Georgia regiments, which had in the inean- 
 time been engaged with the enemy in the front, were uncovered, and 
 the Colonel of the latter regiment, Glenn, finding that the enemy had 
 penetrated in his rear, as far as his colors, gave the order to fall 
 back. This regiment was rallied, aad held its position against the 
 enemy, advancing in its front, till threatened with being flankeil on its 
 right, it was again compelled to fall bUck to a new position. In a 
 similar manner the two right regiments, fifty-sixth Georgia (Colonel 
 Watkins) -and fifty-seventh Georgia (Colonel Barkuloo,) were com- 
 pelled, in succession, by the uncovering of ttioir left, and ihe passage 
 of the enemy on their front, to fall back, which they did, holding the 
 enemy in check at various points, when .they were able to make a 
 stand. In this movement, Colonel Watkins, who ha.d left his sick 
 room at Vicksburg to take command of his regiment in the fight, was 
 severely wounded. 
 
 With these operations end what may be termed the first phase of 
 the battle, so far as concerns this brigade. 
 
 Barton's brigade, originally on my right, had^in the meantimabccn 
 moved toward the extreme left, thus leaving my right entirely ex- 
 posed This compelled the two right regiments, when they finally fell 
 tack, to proceed as fir as the farm-huusc, in front of our first posi- 
 tion, before commencing their reorganization. The other regiments 
 of the brigade fell back, aud rcf)rincd on the Raymond 'road, the 
 two left regiments, the thirty-ninth and thirty-fourth Georgia, makin / 
 no stand till they reached that road. Here portions of my three left 
 regiments were rallied, together with portions of one or more of L^l-'s 
 regiments, and a lino was formed along this road. While euTigcil in 
 forming this lin^:', we were* not pres^^ed by the enemy, who would seem 
 lo have been similarly occupiod. About this time, a Missouri bri"ude 
 
 9 
 
152 
 
 approached the battle field from the right, and went in on the ground 
 previously occupied by the extreme right of my brigade. As soon 
 as they had completed their reorganization, the fifty-seventh Georgia 
 regiment, and shortly afterwards, the fifty-sixth, now commanded by 
 Lieutenant Colonel Slaughter, accompanied this movement and went 
 in on the right of the Missourians. These regiments had hotly en- 
 gaged the enemy, and particularly in the movement which drove him 
 for a time, advanced considerably beyond the line on which they had 
 first encountered him in the morning. They only withdrew on the 
 general order being given to this eifect. The three regiments which 
 formed on the . Raymond road, as their second line, having been 
 brought into some kindof order, and Barton's brigade on the left hav- 
 ing gone in and engaged the enemy, these regiments immediately 
 thereupon advanced into the wood in their front, and formed abreast 
 with Barton's, engaging the enemy on ground near that originally 
 held by Lee. The contest here was sharp and severe for a time, but 
 of short duration. The enemy flushed with the previous success, 
 and in number much superior to ours, drove our men apparently 
 along the whole division front, slowly at first, afterwards more rap- 
 idly, till, on reaching the wood, the flight became precipitate. Oa 
 this occasion scattered bands of them crossed the road in close pur- 
 suit of the fugitives. After this, it became impossible to rally them 
 aojain, though strenuous efi'orts were made to do so several hundred 
 yards from the road. In this, a^ iu the first and more successful ef- 
 fort to rally, I was greatly assisted by Captain Johnson, whose bat- 
 tery was lost in the first action. The flight was continued towards the 
 lower bridge over Baker's Creek, at which point the greater portion 
 of the army crossed. Crossing with several members of my staff and 
 officers of artillery at a point between the bridges, I repaired to the 
 upper bridge and reported to General Barton, whom I found then re- 
 maining there until nearly sunset. The bridge was theu destroyed or 
 partially so, and we fell back towards Edward's Depot. Here, with 
 portions of two brigades assembled, the enemy's advance Avas held in 
 check till the train was destroyed, and the army had nearly passed the 
 depot by the other road. We then continued the retreat unmolested, 
 to the other side of Big Black. 
 
 I received valuable assistance from the members of my staff, who 
 were all, at different times, in the hottest parts of the fight. 
 
 The regimental commanders and field officers, though their effort* 
 were unsuccessful, without an exception, acted with great courage- 
 and judgment, as did also, as a general thing, the company o-fficers.. 
 
 The list of casualties has hitherto been given. To. recapitulate I 
 make the following statement : 
 
 The brigade went into action about two thousand five hundred 
 strong. Its losses are as follows : 
 
 Killed, ... - - 142 
 
 Wounded, - - - - - 314 
 
 Missing, - - - ' - - 539 
 
 • 
 
 Total, - - - - --995 
 
153 
 
 i 
 
 Of the number reported missing it is probable about two hundred 
 were killed or wounded. I 
 
 This brigade took no part in the battle of Big Black, Leaving 
 Bovina on Sunday, it entered Vicksburg the same evening, (May 
 I7th.) On the morning of the 18th it moved into the trenches, 
 where it remained, without relief, for forty- seven days, until the 
 capitulation of the city on the 4th day of July, 
 
 Its right rested on and included the Hall's ferry road, its left 
 extending to the square fort held by General Lee's right. 
 
 No assault was made by the enemy along the brigade front daring 
 the continuation of the siege. An almost unremitting fire of sharp- 
 shooters was kept up during all hours of daylight daring the whole 
 time, varied by occasional brisk cannonading. 
 
 The enemy's rifle pits, in time, were so extended as to almost 
 entirely envelope the brigade front, and were generally about one 
 hundred and fifty yards distant. At the redoubts, on the IlalFs ferry 
 road, however, they approached much nearer, and were in possession 
 of the foot of the slope, on which one of the redoubts was constructed, 
 about seventy yards distant, at which point they were shielded by'tho 
 configuration of the ground from the fire of the work. Sorties were 
 made upon this point at two diifercnt times. Lieutenant Colonel Cay- 
 ton, fifty-seventh Georgia, commanded on each occasion, and on 
 each a degree of success was attained. In the second, the enemy 
 being badly beaten, leaving eight or ten dead on the field, and losing 
 about the same number, (one a lieutenant colonel,) in prisoners. It 
 was finally deemed advisable, however, to leave this point to be 
 occupied by them. 
 
 At the time of the capitulation they had commenced to mine at this 
 point, as also at another, in front of the fifty-sixth Georgia. At the 
 first-named of these points, we were constructing a countermine. 
 
 The list of casualties has been heretofore given. They are as fol- 
 lows : Total killed and wounded, one hundred and seventy-one, of 
 which number about forty-three were killed. 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 A. GUMMING, Brigadier General, 
 
 Commanding Third Brigade, 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL GATES. 
 
 Headquarters Second Division, ) 
 Demopolis, Ala., Aug. 1, 1863, ) 
 
 To Major Me.mminger, 
 
 A. A. G., Bepaiimtrd Miss^ and East Louisiana : 
 
 Sir : I have the honor, in obedience to ihe instructions of the 
 Lieutenant General commanding, to submit the following report of 
 the action of the second division in the battle of Baker's Creek, on 
 the sixteenth of May last. 
 
 About ten o'clock, on the morning of the twelfth of May, the forces 
 of the enemy attacked my picket, composed of three companies of 
 infantry and a section of artillery,' commanded by Major Parker, 
 some four miles south of Edward's Depot. The enemy opened upon us 
 with skirmishers and artillery. 1 had possession of the creek where 
 the road crosses, leading to Port Gibson, I held them in check at 
 this point for an hour or more, when \ve had to fall back slowly to the 
 reserve, (in order to keep them from flanking us,) which was some 
 two miles south of Edwards Depot. Tiiere 1 put my infantry and 
 artillery in position, and telegraphed to General Bowca my idea of 
 the enemy's movements. 
 
 General Bowen dispatched mo to hold the enemy in check, if pos- 
 sible, until night, then, if I could do no more, to burn the commissary 
 stores then at the depot, and fall back to the bridge on Big Black. I 
 called upon General Bowen for the wagon trains of both brigades, and 
 I would save stores that night. He did so, and by daylight next 
 morning we fhad everything out of the depot — about seventy-five 
 wagon loads. 
 
 At the time General Bowen started the wagons to me, he tele- 
 graphed me to hold my position — that General Grcea would be ordered 
 to my support at once. Accordingly at daylight General Green ar- 
 rived, followed by Colonel Cockerell's brigade, also General Loring 
 and Stevenson's division. They formed lines of battle two miles south 
 of Edward's Depot. 
 
 About tweh'e o'clock General Loring ordered me to take a battallion 
 of sharpshooters, then commanded by Captain Catteron, move to the 
 front and press the Federal pickets, and ascertain whether or not the 
 enemy were there in force. I did so, and drove in the enemy's pick- 
 ets, but soon had to fall back myself, for I was satisfied, from the force 
 they brought up, that their whole force vras there. I reported the 
 same to Generals Green and Bowen. 
 
 About twelve ^o'clock, on the 15th we were ordered to move out 
 on the road leading from the depot to Clinton. We followed the 
 Clinton road until after crossing Baker's Creek ; we then took a neigh- 
 borhood road through some plantations, and about one o'clock, P. M., 
 bivouacked for the night, and threw out skirmishers. 
 
 About sunrise, the IGth, a skirmish commenced with General 
 Grant's and General Pemberton's troops. I was ordered by General 
 
155 
 
 Green to call my men in line, and move, by the right, companies to the 
 rear, •which we did, first and last, to tre distance of about a rAile. 
 We halted, ** about faced," and moved to the front some six hundred 
 yards and halted in the timber. I occupied the right of Green's 
 brigade. General Green sent me word that Genoral Loring was pre- 
 paring for a charge, and did not want his brigade to be behind in the 
 charge. 
 
 We remained in this position, I suppose, about an hour. By this 
 time the enemy had attacked General' Stevenson on our left. We 
 were then moved by the left flank at a double quick, near three-quar- 
 ters of a mile ; were then put in line of battle and niove^l to the front 
 two or three hundred yards before we commmenced firing, then Colo- 
 nel Cockerell met me with his sabre in hand, and exclaimed he was 
 very glad to see me, for he had been under desperate fire. I imme- 
 diately ordered a charge, which my men obeyed as promptly as I ever 
 saw troops in my life. We drove the enemy about a half or three-quar- 
 ters of a mile, through a corn-fiLdd and across some deep ravines, 
 before they brought us to a stand. This was under a desperate fire. 
 They occupied one ridge and I another, with a deep narrow ravine be- 
 tween us. Then they shot my hors;© three times, and he laid down 
 and died like a soldier. Three times I tried to drive them from their 
 position, but my men were not able to ascend the hill on which the 
 enemy's line was formed. At different times my adjutant came id me 
 to know what we were to do for ammunition. I told him to take the 
 ammunition from the dead and wounded, that lay on the field. My 
 loss here was upwards of one hundred men. We held our position 
 until wc were forced, for the want of ammunition, to fall back beyond 
 Baker's Creek, below the bridgeover which we had crossed in going 
 out the night befoi'e. We did so, and formed in open field, to hold 
 the crossing until General Loring could cross. The enemy crossed 
 the creek above where we did, and commenced a heavy cannonade upon 
 us, and soon drove us from our position, though, in the meanwhile, wc 
 replenished our ammunition. 
 
 We then took the road towards Edward's Depot and Big Black 
 bridge. I got there about eleven o'clock, and crossed the livcr to 
 my wagon train. Jus# after sunrise, on the 17th, I was or- 
 dered by General Green, to put my men under arms, and bo ready 
 to move to the east side of the river. In a few minutes I started, 
 (Jcncral Green accompanying me. The firing was then going on be- 
 tween the men who (ccupied the ditch that night and the enemy's 
 'skirmishers. Wc crossed ever the bridge and moved up the river 
 about half a mile. Here General Green halted and ordered me to 
 move four or five hundred yards higher up the river, and take njy po- 
 sition in some rifle pits next to the river, on the left of the line of 
 battle, which we did at once. 
 
 We commenced a heavy skirmish with the enemy. Here my horse 
 received a very bad wound in the jaw, which brought him to the 
 ground. I then went in the ditch myself. We skiruiished with the ene- 
 my for about an hour before they made the charge. They formed their 
 men on the river in the timber, where we could not see tliera. They 
 
156 
 
 brought their men out by the right flank in columns of four, about 
 one hundred and forty yards in front of my regiment, at a double- 
 quick, Colonel Kinsmen's regiment, twenty-second Iowa, General 
 Lawlus' brigade, leading t\& charge. I then opened a most terrific 
 fire upon them, and kept it up until the brigade had passed out of ray 
 sight, behind a grove of timber that stood immediately on my right. 
 They moved so as to strike the ditches occupied by Colonel Vaughn's 
 brigade, so I am informed. I do not know whose troops were there, 
 but it was immediately on the -right of Green's brigade. After they 
 had passed me, 1 listened for our men to open a heavy volley on my 
 right, and dr^ve the enemy back. Upon not hearing any firing on the 
 right, I directed Lieutenant Colonel Law to mount his horse and go 
 to G-eneral Green and know whether the centre was holding the po- 
 sition or not. 
 
 Col.. Law returned in a few minutes, and said that General Green 
 ordered me to fall back ; I did so at once. After I had got back be- 
 low the bend of the river, 1 discovered that they had crossed the 
 ditches, and were between me and the bridge. My Lieutenant Colonel 
 being mounted, tho^ight he could make^his escape, and did so, with the 
 loss of his left arm. I told my men to swim the river. They all took 
 the river except about ninety officers and men. One or two of my men 
 were drowned in trying'to swim the river. 'The officers and men, who 
 could not swim, plead so hard with me to stay with them, that I gave 
 way to them, and all were captured. I remained with the enemy thiee 
 days, and made my escape. I cannot give any account of anything 
 that transpired after this until after the fall of Vicksburg, 
 I am, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 ELIJAH GATES, 
 Colonel First Missouri Cavalry. 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL DOCKERY. 
 
 Headquarters, Enterprise, Miss., 
 July 29, 1863. 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G. : 
 
 Sir : Although not the ranking officer, yet, in obedience to the order 
 of the Lieutenant General commanding, i submit the following as the 
 report of the action of the second brigade, Bowcn's division, in the 
 battle of Champion Hill, or Baker's Creek, on ihe 6th of May last. 
 
 On the 12th of May, the brigade was ordered into position in the 
 ditches of Big Black — Colonel Gates, w ith his regiment, the first Mis- 
 souri cavalry, and a section of artillery, being oh picket near Ed- 
 ward's Depot. 
 
 At three o'clock, A. M., on the 3th, the brigade was ordered to 
 move to Edward's Depot, and take a strong position about a mile from 
 town, on the Port Gibson road, and hold it to the last. Accordingly 
 the brigade moved out, and reached Edward's Depot about daylight, 
 and proceeded out on the Port Gibson road. After marching about 
 two and a half miles. General Bowen joined General Green. At this 
 point the first battalion Arkansas cavalry (dismcunted) sharpshooters 
 was deployed as skirmishers, and the brigade ordered to counter- 
 march. It moved back about three-quarters of a mile, and formed in 
 line of battle on the left of the Port Gibson road. About noon. Gen- 
 eral Loring sent an order to General Green to advance his skirmish- 
 ers and annoy and feel after the enemy. The skirmishers and pickets 
 were thrown forward, and soon engaged those of the enemy near 
 Fourteen Mile Creek. After a few minutes' skirmishing, the enemy 
 fell back. All attempts to draw him out from the creek proved fruit- 
 less. At two o'clock, P. M., on the 15th, the brigade was ordered to 
 move in the direction of Raymond, on the military road. The brig- 
 ade moved back to Edward's Depot ; from thence across Baker's 
 Creek, on the Clinton road. After crossing the creek, the brigade 
 moved on a right-hand road crossing a plantation, and about eleven 
 o'clock, P. M., bivouacked for the night in line of battle, the right 
 of the brigade resting on the Raymond road. About sunrise on 
 the morning of the iGth, the picket being engaged, the brigade was 
 ordered to move back about two hundred yards to the crest of the 
 hill, and there form line of battle. After remaining in this position 
 about tifc-ee-quarters of an hour, General Buford took the ground oc- 
 cupied by the division, and the brigade was ordered to move to the 
 rear, to be held in reserve. Accordingly it was moved in line of 
 battle about three-quarters of a mile, when the line was again formed. 
 As soon as done, the brigade was ordered to advance, bearing to the 
 left. Heavy skirmishing was heard on our left wing. After some 
 manoeuvreing, the brigade recrossed the plantation, and halted in the 
 timber, in a ravine. The battle at this time was raging with great 
 fierceness on the left wing, and the brigade ^^as ordered to move rap- 
 idly by the left flank to its support. After moving about a mile, the 
 
158 
 
 division, Major General Stevenson, -was met, having been repulsed, 
 and closely pursued by the enemy. The troops were formed between 
 our retreating forces and the advancing foe, and charged the enemy. 
 The fighting now became desperate. The enemy finally gave way. 
 The formation of the country was such that the troops could scarcely 
 advance faster than a walk, and many of the hills were ascended with 
 great difficulty. Notwithstanding, the command pushed impetuously 
 forward, driving back in confusion the many fresh lines formed to 
 meet our gallant troops. The enemy had been driven over a mile, 
 and all the artillery captured from Major General Stevenson was re- 
 captured, and several pieces taken from the enemy. I notified Gen- 
 eral Green, commanding brigade, that my ammunition was about 
 exhausted. lie replied thn the ordnance train had been ordered from 
 the field, and that.it would be impossible to refill the cartridge bo.xes ; 
 that the men must use the an^muuition of ours and the enemy's killed 
 and wounded ; that the enemy must be driven as long as it were pos- 
 sible to advance the lines, if it bad to be done with empty guns. 
 
 About this time the enemy began to flank us on the right. A bat- 
 tery Avas opened upon them. 
 
 Here I would mention, and most favorably recommend to the notice 
 of the Lieutenant General commanding, Sergeant P. II. G. Gaines, of 
 company K, twenty-third Alabama infantry, of General Lee's brig- 
 ade, who, unassisted, used with good effect a twelve pounder howitzer 
 on the flanking column. This sergeant alone fired about twelve or fif- 
 teen rounds, when, being noticed by General Green, four volunteers 
 were retained from the regiment supporting a battery a little to the 
 right, I think it was a Georgia regiment who gallantly assisted Ser- 
 geant Gaines in working the piece, causing the enemy to stop their 
 advances at that particular point. The volunteers, whose names I have 
 not been able to learn, deserve great credit for their bravery. 
 
 The enemy continued the flank movement, bearing further to the 
 right. Captain Pittman, A, I. G., was sent to the Lieutenant Gene- 
 ral commanding to notify him of the movement, and to ask for rein- 
 forcements to check it, and also to strengthen the right of the brig- 
 ade. The twelfth Louisiana Avas sent to the su{!port of the right. 
 No troops having been sent to oppose the flanking force, the move- 
 ment was completed, and the brigade, when it was driving everything 
 in front, from right to left, and was within four or five hundred yards 
 of the enemy's ordnance train, was ordered to fall back, to prevent 
 being entirely cut off. Slowly and reluctantly, although terribly cut 
 to pieces, the brigade fell back, and raoveil to the ford onupaker's 
 Creek, leaving our dead and Avounded on the field, the ambulances 
 and many of the surgeons having been ordered off previous to the 
 commencement of the battle,* At Baker's Creek, General Bowea 
 commanded that the troops take position and hold the crossing until 
 the other troops had crossed. Before the troops could get in position 
 or be supplied with ammunition, the enemy crossed the creek above 
 the ford, with a battery and an infantry force, and opened a heavy 
 fire upon us with artillery, at the same time moving the infantry to- 
 wards the road, threatening to cut off the command from Edward's 
 
159 
 
 Depot. The third Missouri cavalry dismounted and deployed as skir- 
 mishers on the creek. General Green moved the brigade as rapidly 
 as possible towards Edward's .Depot, leaving the road to the right, 
 and going around the force attempting to cut hira off. The enemy's 
 infantry came down between the brigade and the third Missouri cav- 
 alry, and cut it oif, with the exception of one company and a few 
 stragglers, who made their way to the brigade. The commander cf 
 the battalion, finding himself cut off. made his way to Major General 
 Loring. The command reached Edward's Depot, and proceeded to 
 the caap at Big Black, where it arrived about midnight, ccmpletely 
 exhausted, and at daylight next morning was ordered into the trenches 
 at Big Black bridge, the report of which engagement was forwarded 
 by Brigadier General Green previous to his death. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Dismukes, of the nineteenth Arkansas, and 
 Lieutenant Colonel llobertson, of the twentieth Arkansas infantry, 
 fell while gallantly charging the enemy's batteries — the former mor- 
 tally wounded, and the latter killed. 
 
 I desire to call the attention of the Lieutenant General command- 
 ing to the pre-eminently gnllant conduct of private Eustis, of the 
 nineteenth Arkansas, who, during the entire engagement, although 
 frequently recalled by his company commander, kept at least twenty 
 or thirty yards in advance of his regiment, using his gun with good 
 effect. 
 
 I have as yet been unable to procure accurate lists of tho killed 
 and wounded. They will be forwarded as soon as obtained. 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 TOM. P. DOCKERY, 
 Colonel nindecnih Arkinsaa ivfaniry, 
 
 Second brigade, second dimsion. 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL DOCKERY. 
 
 Headquarters Second Brigade, Second Division, ) 
 Demopolis, Ala., July 29, 1863. \ 
 
 To Major Memminger, 
 
 A. A. G., Dep't Miss, and East Louisiana : 
 
 Sir : In obedience to the orders of the Lieutenant General com- 
 manding, I submit the following as the report of the part taken by 
 this brigade in the defence of Vicksburg : 
 
 About sunset on the evening of the 17th of May, the remnant of 
 the brigade, (the most of it having been captured at Big Black bridge,) 
 reached the city and went into camp near the cemetery. On the even- 
 ing of the 18th it was ordered to take position in rear of Brigadier 
 General Moore, near the arsenal, and act as reserve, and marched to 
 the support of different points on the line without doing but little or 
 no fighting, until the morning of the 2'2d, the brigade was ordered to 
 Btrengthen the lines of Brigadier General Moore. While on the way 
 to General Moore's lines a courier from Brigadier General Lee to' 
 General Green, reported that General Lee's line had been broken by 
 the enemy. The brigade was moved at a double-quick to the support 
 of General Lee. When near the line of Gen. Lee, his men rallied and 
 drove the enemy from their works ; at least, when we arrived at the 
 works, General Lee's line was complete and no enemy on his works, 
 yet there was a considerable force in a ditch or ravine under General 
 Lee's works. "I was ordered by General Green to take the first 
 Arkansas battalion sharpshooters and open on the enemy in the ditch, 
 which I did, and with such effect as to soon drive them from their 
 hiding place. At one o'clock, P. M., I joined the rest of the brigade, 
 which had gone to the support of General Moore's line, on the Bald- 
 win ferry road. Here the nineteenth and twentieth Arkansas were 
 ordered into the fort occupied by the third Texas infantry, the enemy 
 occupying a position in the ditch and a ravine in front of the fort. 
 About half-past four o'clock, P. M., the first and third Missouri cav- 
 alry, joined by the first Arkansas cavalry, all (dismounted) sallied 
 from the fort, and after a short but desperate fight, drove the enemy 
 from the position with heavy loss. On the next day the brigade 
 moved back to its bivouac near the arsenal, and continued in reserve 
 until the morning of the 28th instant, when it was ordered to take 
 position in the trenches fronting the river, below the city, and the 
 twenty-ninth was ordered to take position in front, above the city, to 
 support the heavy siege batteries, and be ready to meet any attempt 
 to storm the city. The brigade occupied this position until the even- 
 ing of the 2d of June, when it was ordered to move out to the works 
 in the rear of the city, and occupy permanently a gap between the 
 divisions of Generals Smith and Forney. This was one of the most 
 exposed positions in the line — the enemy's guns enfilading the works 
 from right to left, and guns of heavy calibre played upon the works 
 from the front. With the limited number of entrenching tools 
 
161 
 
 on the line, it took all night to repair the damage done to the works 
 during the day. Too much praise cannot be accorded to the officers 
 and men for the untiring energy and perseverance displayed by them 
 in constructing and strengthening the works. On the 26th the enemy 
 commenced digging an approach in front of the fort on my brigade. 
 General Green having been wounded on the day before, he was una- 
 ble to visit the fortifications and watch the movements of the enemy. 
 On the morning of the 27th he was in the ditches, as was his custom, 
 rec^nnoitering the position of the enemy along the front, and while 
 looking over the parapet in front of the sap of the enemy, which was 
 only about sixty yards distant, he was shot through the head by a 
 sharpshooter and almost instantly killed. Here permit me to lay my 
 humble tribute on his tomb. Missouri has lost another of her bravest 
 champions ; the South one of its ablest defenders. It was my for- 
 tune to be intimately associated with him ; knew him well. He 
 joined the army as a private soldier when the tocsin of war first sent 
 its notes throughout the west. He served his country long and faith- 
 fully. His soldiers regarded him with the reverence due a father, and 
 many a tear was shed at his fall. He was a pure patriot, and a gal- 
 lant officer, and a true Christian ; divested of everything like a thirst 
 for military fame, he acted solely from a sense of duty and right and 
 a pure love of country, and thus inseparably twined himself not only 
 around the hearts of his troops, but of all who knew him. 
 
 The command devolving upon me, I at once commenced counter- 
 mines to that of the enemy, one of which was sprung on the night of 
 the 3d of July, with but little damage to the enemy, .^flag of truce 
 having passed out of the line at eight o'clock, on the morning of 
 the 3d, there was a suspension of hostilities, which continued until 
 the surrender of the forces at ten o'clock, A. M., in obedience to 
 the order of the Lieutenant (General commanding. Th« troops up 
 to the time of surrender were cheerfal and confident of success. 
 Our loss was heavy in killed and wounded during the siege. Cor- 
 rect lists of the casualties will be forwarded as soon as they can be 
 made out. 
 
 My thanks are especially due to Captain A. B. Pittman, A. and I. 
 G. ; Captain H. M. Bland, A. A. G., and Lieutenant Thos. B. Green, 
 A. D. C, on the staff of General Green, for the faithful and gallant 
 disc^rge of the duties devolving upon them during the siege, espe- 
 cially after the fall of General Green. It has been my pleasure to 
 witness the conduct of these officers on the battle-field, and it is 
 with pleasure that I bear testimony as to their coolness and 
 pre-eminent gallantry, untiring energy, and perseverance. I 
 earnestly recommend them to the favorable consideration of the 
 Lieutenant General commanding. The thanks of the country are 
 due to Captains Neal and Bareley and Wilkinson, of the first Mis- 
 souri cavalry, for the distinguished service rendered by them in 
 making numerous sorties out to the enemy's front, examining their 
 approaches and mines, and giving much valuable information. 
 
 I would recommend to the favorable notice of the Lieutenant 
 General commanding, Sergeant Fisher, of the lower batteries, Mis- 
 11 
 
162 
 
 souri light artillery, who commanded a gun within three hundred 
 yards of the enemy's batteries, using it with telling effect, tearing 
 down the earthworks, knocking out of position their gabions or sap 
 rollers. Frequently the enemy would open an entire battery or lino 
 of skirmishers upon the gun, sometimes almost levelling the para- 
 pet. Yet the men stood by their gun, replying with good effect, 
 and at night, without any assistance from the infantry, would repair 
 the damage done to their works through the day. 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 TOM. P. DOCKERY, 
 Colonel commanding Second Brigade. 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL COCKERELL. 
 
 Demopolis, Ala., August Ist, 18G3. 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G. : 
 
 Major : In consequence of the death of my gallant and lamented di- 
 vision commander, Major General John Bowen, I respectfully beg 
 leave to submit to you the following report of the part taken by the 
 first brigade Missouri volunteers, Bowen's division, composed of the 
 following named infantry regiments to wit: the first Missouri in- 
 fantry, composed of the first and fourth Missouri regiments, consoli- 
 dated; the second Missouri infantry; the third Missouri infantry ; the 
 fifth Missouri infantry; sixth Missuri infantry; Captain Guibois' 
 battery ; Captain Landis' battery under command of Lieutenant Lan- 
 gen, and the Wade battery, under Lieutenant Walsh, in the battles, 
 of Baker's Creek, Big Black, and during the siege of Vicksburg. 
 
 The brigade bivouacked near the battle field of Baker's Creek on 
 the night of the 15th of May last, and immediately threw forward to 
 the distance of over one hundred yards, a strong line of pickets ; and,, 
 early in the morning of the 16th instant changed po-iition to the front, 
 and left of the first line, and threw forward far in advance of the bat- 
 talion, five companies of skirmishers, Captain Burke's company "D," 
 first Missouri, Captain Wilson's company "G," second Missouri, Cap- 
 tain Canniff 's company "F," 5th Missouri, Captain Adams' company 
 **G," third Missouri, and Captain Duncan's company "E," sixth Mis- 
 souri, all under the command of Lieutenant Colonel T. L. Hubble, 
 of the fifth Missouri infantry. Our cavalry soon engaged the^ 
 enemy a mile or more in front of the brigade, and slowly re- 
 tired to the rear' through my line, k'oon after this, a line of the- 
 enemy appeared about twelve hundred yards in my front, when 
 Lieutenant Langen and Lieutenant Walsh opened on them from 
 the field, and immediately the enemy brought forward a battery 
 and replied lively to our batteries, disabling one of Lieutenant 
 Langen's twelve-pounder guns, and killing four men by the explo- 
 eion of one shell, and very soon after disabling the other twelve^ 
 pounder gun. Both of these disabled guns were carried safely from., 
 the field. The enemy's battery soon withdrew, and we remained in 
 the same position unengaged with the enemy until about or after one 
 .o'clock, P. M., when I received an order directly from Lieutenant 
 General Pemberton, to move and reinforce Brigadier General Lee, on 
 the left of Major General Stevenson s line. I moved in quick and 
 double quick time toward the designated line ; but, before arriving 
 there, 1 received another order to move to Major Geaeral Stevenson's 
 right. I attempted to gain that portion of his line by moving " by 
 file right," but in consequence of his troops giving way, and the ex- 
 posure of my line, moving by the left flank, to the fire of the enemy 
 rapidly advancing, I immediately, on the left " by file into line," 
 formed the brigade in line of battle, under a heavy fire, resting the 
 right of the fifth infantry on the left of General Cummings' brigade,.. 
 
164 
 
 ■whicli had been giving way, but had apparently rallied behind a cut 
 in the road near "VVaddell's battery, then rapidly firing, and moving to 
 the left of my line, to place the second Missouri infantry in posi- 
 sition. Before having completed this, I received information from 
 Captain Maupin, acting on my stafiVthat the right of the brigade "was fall- 
 ing back, and, hastening thither, I found that the brigade on my right 
 had almost wholly disappeared, and that the enemy had captured Cap- 
 tain Waddell's battery, and was occupying the ground and road just 
 previously occupied by this brigade of Major General iStevenson's 
 division, and were firing a most destructive enfilading fire into the 
 brigade, from right to left, and th-nt in consequence of this fearful 
 fire, portions of the third and fifth Missouri infantry had fallen back 
 a short distance. I ordered them to regain their first line, which was 
 quickly done; then I ordered the brigade to charge the heavy, strong 
 lines of the enemy, rapidly advancing and cheering, flushed with their 
 success and the capture of our guns ; and, in the most gallant, dashing, 
 fearless manner, officers and men, with loud cheers, threw themselves 
 forward at a run, against the enemy's hitherto victorious lines. 
 Just at this time, the first Missouri infantry coming up, was placed on 
 the extreme right, and most gallantly charged a very superior force 
 of the enemy, immediately in his front, at the same time being ex- 
 posed to such a destructive, raking fire from the enemy on the right, 
 all the troops having fallen back, that Colonel Riley had to change 
 the front of his two right companies. Soon the enemy's lines in front 
 of the brigade were checked, and after a very stubborn resistance, 
 and a very destructive fire from my whole line, firing continually in 
 its rapid advance, they were severely repulsed and driven back, At 
 this time, Lieutenant Colonel Hubble, with the before named five 
 comranies of skirmishers, who withdrew from the front of ray former 
 position after the brigade moved, came up, and forming in rear of 
 the centre of the brigade line, most cheeringly joined in the charge 
 and overtook our lines. 
 
 Fresh troops of the enemy were rapidly thrown in front of our 
 lines, and were immediately engaged and repulsed. This fearful 
 strife was kept up uninterruptedly for two hours and a half. The 
 soldiers of this brigade fired away the four rounds of ammunition 
 nition in their cartridge-boxes, and, instead of abandoning the field, 
 took from the cartridge-boxes of their fallen and wounded soldiers, 
 and even stripped the slain and wounded of the enemy, with whom 
 the ground was thickly strewn, of all their cartridges — many of them 
 firing from seventy-five to ninety rounds. 
 
 Captain Waddell's battery was recaptured, and this gallant and 
 fearless officer iramediatelyj with the assistance of one or two more, 
 opened his battery upon the fleeing enemy. 
 
 A battery of the enemy attempted to check the impetuous advance, 
 and was quickly charged and captured, but could not be brought off, 
 on account of the horses being killed. 
 
 When all the ammunition in cartridge-boxes, and that gathered 
 from the slain and wounded of friend and foe, was exhausted, the 
 troops began gradually to fall back. 
 
|hS5 
 
 In the early part of the engagement, I sent two of my staff officers 
 for ammunition ; but the ordnance train could not be found. 
 
 Colonel McCown, of the fifth Missouri infantry sent his major after 
 ammunition ; but he likewise failed. 
 
 Colonel Alexander Riley, in his official report to me, states that 
 his ordnance sergeant started to him to supply ammunition fired 
 away by his men, but was ordered across Baker's Creek by General 
 Stevenson. 
 
 Captain Guibois' battery, under Lieutenant Corkney, was placed in 
 position on the left of the brigade, and did effective service in saving 
 the left of the brigade from being flanked. 
 
 Lieutenants Langen and Walsh, with their batteries, did good ser- 
 vice on the right of the brigade, in checking the enemy in his at- 
 tempts to gain the rear of our right flank. At this time I received 
 notice through Captain Pittraan, of Brigadier General Green's staff, 
 that there was an order to retreat, which I delayed communicating, 
 hoping that Major General Loring's division might still arrive in time 
 to push forward the successes and advantages so gallantly and dearly 
 won, having met with, and been informed by, the Lieutenant Gene- 
 ral commanding, in answer to my request for reinforcements, that he 
 had not a man, until General Lorino; should arrive. In the meantime 
 the enemy were rapidly advancing on the right in order of battle, al- 
 most parallel to our own, and I was thus forced to withdraw, 
 which was done in good order. Retreating to and crossing Baker's 
 Creek, I there received an order from General Bowen to remain in 
 position so as to protect the crossing, and enable General Loring's 
 division to cross over, and then to move on Big Black. Whilst de- 
 laying here, the enemy having crossed the creek above us, advanced 
 and placed a battery in position to command the road from this cross- 
 ing to Edward's Depot, and immediately a brisk fire was opened from 
 this battery. A short time after the battery began to fire, I heard 
 commands given to troops at the crossing, indicating that they were 
 marching back. I immediately hastened to the crossing and found 
 Major General Stevenson and staff, and Colonel Scott's twelfth Louis- 
 iana regiment going bacic, with the belief that the enemy had gained 
 the road and cut them off. I informed General Stevenson that this 
 brigade was there, and wh#tmy orders were. He and Colonel Scott's 
 regiment immediately crossed over, and Colonel Scott moved on. 
 
 After this regiment passed, seeing no other troops coming to cross, 
 not even stragglers, and believing that the enemy probably occupied 
 the road to Edward's Depot, I moved the brigade, leaving the road to 
 Edward's Depot to my right, I intersected the road from Edward's 
 Depot to Big Black, and then marched inside, and, by direction of 
 Brigadier General Vaughan, bivouacked in rear of the defences south 
 of the railroad. 
 
 Soon after leaving ray position at the crossing of Baker's Creek, I 
 saw Col.' Scott's regiment marching back, and was informed that Gen- 
 eral Loring had ordered this regiment bs^N to his division, south of 
 Baker's Creek. I ordered the batteries of this brigade not to halt at 
 the crossing, but move rapidly to Big Black ; and a gun was lost. 
 
166 
 
 In this battle, this brigade suffered heavy losses in killed, wounded 
 and missing, as will appear by the following statement : 
 
 
 Killed. 
 
 Wounded. 
 
 Missing. 
 
 •Total. 
 
 First Missouri infantry, 
 
 29 
 
 94 
 
 52 
 
 175 
 
 Second Missouri infantry. 
 
 lU 
 
 35 
 
 38 
 
 83 
 
 Third Missouri infantry. 
 
 13 
 
 63 
 
 44 
 
 120 
 
 Fifth Missouri infantry, 
 
 4 
 
 49 
 
 37 
 
 90 
 
 Sixth Missouri infantry, 
 
 5 
 
 49 
 
 67 
 
 121 
 
 Wade's battery, 
 
 00 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 
 Landis' battery. 
 
 4 
 
 1 
 
 00 
 
 5 
 
 Guibois' battery, 
 
 00 
 
 00 
 
 2 
 
 2 
 
 Total, 65 293 242 600 
 
 Among the killed and wounded were many of our best oflScers. 
 All the killed fell at their post in the full and fearless discharge of 
 their whole duty. 
 
 Among the slain of this well embattled field, must ever be held in 
 lively remembrance the brave and fearless Captains Carrington and 
 Sj|angler, and Lieutenant Dobyns, of the first Missouri infantry, and 
 Captain Mcllvaine, of the third Missouri infantry. And among the 
 wounded, who afterwards died. Lieutenant Coionel T. L. Hubble, of 
 the third, commanding five companies of skirmishers, and Captain 
 McKinney, of the fifth Missouri infantry, and Lieutenant Rankin, of 
 the first Missouri infantry. 
 
 I cannot speak with too much praise of the gallantry, coolness 
 and dashing, fearless and even reckless, impetuosity shown by the offi- 
 cers and soldiers of this brigade in forming their line of battle under 
 heavy fire, with the troops on their right and left falling back past them 
 in disorder and confusion, and a foe greatly outnumbering them rapidly 
 advancing, cheering, and flushed with their hitherto successful 
 charges, and their capture of the guns; and then, in the midst of 
 these, in throwing themselves into the breach, and, with continued 
 cheers, driving the enemy back five or six hundred yards, and re- 
 capturing Captain Waddell's battery and capturing a battery of the 
 enemy. 
 
 With especial commendation I mention |^e names of Colonel Riley 
 and Lieutenant Colonel Garland, of the first Missouri infantry, and 
 Lieutenant Colonel Lenting and Major Carter, of the second Missouri 
 infantry, and Colonel Gause and Major McDowell of the third Mis- 
 souri infantry, and Colonel McCown, and Lieutenant Colonel Bevill, 
 and Major Waddell, of th'e fifth Missouri infantry, and Major Cooper, 
 commanding sixth Missouri infantry. 
 
 Captain W. M. Young, acting with me, was severely wounded at 
 the post of duty and danger. My acting adjutant, J. M. Flanagan, 
 and my acting aid,R. L. Maupin, merit special mention for their cool- 
 ness and discretion amid danger. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BIG BLACK. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th of May, 1863,1 received an order 
 from General Bowen, that his division would remain on the east side 
 
167 
 
 of Big Black. I communicated with and reported to Brigadier Gen- 
 eral Vaughan, and, by his direction, I relieved all portions of his line 
 or brigade in the rifle-pits south of the railroad, and as far towards 
 our right as the bayou. This was early in the morning, and the brig- 
 ade was at once placed in this line. Brigadier Generals Vaughan 
 and Green occupied the rifle-pit north of the railroad. General Green's 
 brigade being on the left. 
 
 The battery horses on my line were all sent back to the river, not 
 by my order, the guns being in position whei^ I moved into the 
 trenches ; but by whose order they were sent so far to the iftr I do 
 not know. 
 
 The enemy soon appeared in ray front, advancing a line of 
 skirmishers, and opening on us with two batteries ; and soon a line 
 of the enemy's infantry began to move towards my line, when the 
 batteries opened on them and drove them back in confusion. After 
 a lively skirmish fire had been kept up for some time along our whole 
 front, I saw the line between the railroad and the first skirt of timber, 
 north of the railroad, beginning to give way, and then running in dis- 
 order, I watched this disorderly falling back a few moments, when 
 I saw the enemy had possession of the trenches north of the railroad, 
 and were rapidly advancing towards the bridge — our only crossing 
 and way of escape ; the enemy now being nearer the crossing than my 
 line, I therefore ordered the brigade to fall back, and, moving rapidly, 
 gained the bridge, crossed over, and reformed on the west bank of 
 the river, north of the railroad. A portion of my command being 
 cut off from the bridge, swam the river and rejoined their command. 
 
 In crossing this bridge I lost two men killed by thg enemy's shell. 
 
 Captain Guibois' and Lieutenant Walsh's batteries were necessarily * 
 abandoned. Lieutenant Langen's battery not being in the trenches, 
 was saved, and the section of twenty-four- pounder howitzers, being 
 posted on the west bank of the river did valuable service in checking 
 the enemy until we crossed. 
 
 Soon I received orders to march to Vicksburg ; which was done the 
 same evening. 
 
 Captain T. B. Wilson, of the second Missouri infantry, company 
 ** G," claiming to have been exhausted, did not go with his company 
 into the batttle of Baker's Creek, and liaving mado his way to Big 
 Black, joined his company in the rifle-pits early on the morning of 
 the 17th instant, and, when his company was ordered to fall back, 
 abandoned his company and remained lying in the rifle-pits, and was 
 captured by the enemy ; and, while a prisoner, stated to Colonel 
 Elijah Gates, of the first Missouri cavalry, who was also a prisoner, 
 that he. Captain Wilson, intended to take the oath and then go to 
 fighting the enemy as a guerrilla. Such conduct merits a dismissal 
 in disgrace, and such an oflicer should not remain in the way cf gal- 
 lant and eflicient oflficers now commanding his company. 
 
 SIEGE OF VICKSBURG. 
 
 On the eighteenth of May, 1863, began the seige of Vicksburg. 
 On this evening I received an order from General Bo wen to move out 
 
168 
 
 on the grave-yard road to support Major General Smith's division. 
 Reporting to General Smith, in obedience to his order, I occupied 
 a line on the extreme left in advance of the main line, afterwards oc- 
 cupied during the seige, and was fired upon by the enemy's skir- 
 mishers before gaining my position. Skirmishing continued till 
 darkness closed in this evening. I had one man killed and eight 
 ■wounded. f 
 
 During the night of the 18th instant, I withdrew in rear of our 
 main line, and renmined in reserve on the right of Brigadier Gen- 
 eral IMd win's bri^de. 
 
 Ab^l tw.o o'clock, P. M., on the 19th instant, the enemy-, massed 
 a large force in front of Brigadier General Shoupe's brigade, and the 
 left of Brigadier General Hebert's, and the right of Brigadier General 
 Bladwin's, and made a most furious and determined assault. Seeing 
 this concentration of the enemy's forces, I immediately moved the fifth 
 Missouri infantry, under Colonel McCown, to the support of General 
 Hebert's left, and the first Missouri infantry, under Colonel A. C . 
 Ililcy, to the support of the line at the stockade, between General He- 
 bert's left and Shoupe's right, and the second Missouri infantry, under 
 Celonel P. S. Lenting, to the support of the twenty-seventh Louis- 
 iana regiment, on Shoupe's right, and the sixth Missouri infantry, 
 Tjnder Colonel Eugene Erwin, to the support of Brigadier General 
 Vaughn's brigade, on the extreme left, then threatened, and held the 
 third Missouri infantry, under Colonel W. R. Gause, in readiness to 
 reinforce any point. The enemy, in large masses, without any regu- 
 lar line, pressed forward very close to our works, but were soon se- 
 verely repulsed and driven back in disorder, and every subsequent 
 effort was likewise repulsed. 
 
 This brigade, with General Shoupe's brave Louisianians, had the 
 honor of receiving the first assault of the enemy, and repulsing them ; 
 suffering, too, the dangers incident to such clash of arms, loosing 
 three killed and sixty-tw© wounded in this engagement. The brave 
 and gallant William F. Luckett, ordnance sergeant, second Missouri 
 infantry, acting with me as aid, whilst bringing up ammunition, was 
 mortally wounded, and afterwards died. 
 
 A brigade remained near the line up to 22d instant. On this 
 day, about two o'clock, P. M., the enemy, preparatory to a charge, 
 moved his whole force as near our lines as could be done, and then 
 made a most desperate and protracted effort to carry our lines by as- 
 sault. This assault was preceded by a most furious fire, from the 
 enemies numerous batteries, of shell, grape and cannister. The air 
 was literally burdened with hissing missiles of death. 
 
 During this terrific clash of arms, the fifth Missouri infantry occupied 
 a line on the left of the thirty-sixth regiment in Hebert's brigade ; the 
 third Missouri infantry occupied the stockade, and the redan to its 
 right; five companies of the Missouri infantry occupied a portion of the 
 line of the twenty-seventh Louisiana infantry, and the other five 
 companies in reserve; six companies of the first Missouri infantry 
 wore placed in the trenches with the thirty-sixth Mississippi regiment, 
 and one company occupied the redan to the right of the thirty-sixth 
 
 I 
 
169 
 
 Mississippi regiment, and the remaining three companies were moved 
 from point to point ; and the sixth Missouri infantry was sent to 
 reinforce Brigadier General Moore's line, and then General Hebert's 
 line, north of the Jackson road. 
 
 Nobly did the officers and soldiers of this brigade greet every assault 
 of the enemy with defiant shouts, and deliberately aimed, fired and hurled 
 them back in disorder. The enemy gained the ditch around the redan 
 to the right of the stockade, and occupied it for some time. Colonel 
 Gause, of the third Missouri infantry, procured some fire shell, using 
 them as hand grenades, and threw them into the ditch wherre they ex- 
 ploded, killing and younding some twenty-two men of the enemy. 
 This day the brigade Tost twenty-eight killed and ninety-five wounded, 
 the third Missouri infantry suffering fearfully, loosing twelve killed 
 and fifty two wounded, having been exposed, during the assault, to an 
 enfilading and rear fire in the redan, against which there was no pro- 
 tection or defence. 
 
 From this day, until the 25th day of June, 1863, the brigade was 
 held in reserve, and ordered from point to point of our whole line, ac- 
 cordingly, as different points of the line were threatened or became 
 endangered by the near approach of the enemy — sometimes on the 
 extreme left, then on the extreme right, and then in the centre; work 
 ing day and night, as circumstances required, to strengthen our de- 
 fences, and having some m-en killed or wounded daily. 
 
 On the 26th day of June, 1863, the sixth Missouri infantry, Col. 
 Eugene Erwin, was in reserve in rear of the third Louisiana infantry, 
 which occupied the redan, north of the Jackson road. About four 
 o'clock, P. M., this day, the enemy exploded a mine, blowing off the 
 outer portion of the redan, and immediately thereafter attempted to 
 carry this point by assault. Colonel Erwin, as soon as the explosion 
 occurred, marched to this point. The enemy occupied the outer slope 
 of this work, and Colonel Erwin and the second Louisiana infantry 
 occupied an inner cross work, about twenty-five feet from the enemy ; 
 and in this position a desperate struggle was made by the enemy to 
 carry this redan, but every effort of the enemy was successfully re- 
 pulsed. 
 
 In this struggle, Colonel Eugene Erwin, of the sixth Missouri in- 
 fantry, a most fearless, prudent and meritorious officer, was pierced 
 by two balls, and poured out the crimsoned treasures of his heart 
 on his country's altar, and now, among the lifeless defenders of 
 Vicksburg, fills a patriot soldier's grave. This day the sixth Missouri 
 infantry lost three killed, and twenty-six wounded. 
 
 On the nigth of the 25th instant. Colonel McCcwn was ordered to 
 this point, and the second Missouri infantry, on the night of the 
 26th inst. 
 
 On the evening of the 26th, having procured a number of six and 
 twelve-pounder shell to be used as hand grenades, I caused them to 
 be thrown into the midst of the enemy, and thus drove them from their 
 position, and reoccupied the entire redan. When the enemy made 
 the assault on the 25th instant, they threw a large number of hand 
 grenades into our lines, doing much injury. 
 
170 
 
 On the evening- of July 1st, the enemy exploded a mine charged 
 with at least two thousand pounds of powder, making a fearful 
 breach through a portion of the redan, burying Lieutenant Cren- 
 shaw and killing Lieutenant Roseberry and several privates of the 
 sixth Missouri infantry, some of whom were blown high up into the 
 air and buried in the wreck. Eight negroes and the overseer in charge, 
 working a counter mine, were also killed. A large number of the 
 sixth Missouri infantry were blown up and thrown over the brow of 
 the hill, and quite a number severely wounded. Simultaneously with 
 the explosion, the enemy opened a terrific fire, at short range, from two 
 eight-inch columbiads, two thirty-pounder Parrott guns and one 
 twelve-pounder howitzer, and a mortar throwing twelve-pound shell, 
 (afterwards ascertained to be a wooden mortar,) concentrating their 
 whole fire on this one point. This mortar did us great damage, having 
 exact range of our position, and throwing shells heavily charged with 
 powder. The force of this terrific explosion threw the ofl&cers and 
 men of the sixth Missouri infantry and a portion of the third Lou- 
 isiana infantry back from the works over the brow of the hill, knock- 
 ing off their hats and their guns out of their hands, bruising and 
 wounding quite a number ; but, notwithstanding this, these gallant 
 soldiers rallied, seized the nearest gun, and rushed back to the works ; 
 the veterans of the third Louisiana infantry raised a cheer which was 
 quickly taken up by our troops. Immediately after the explosion, I 
 ordered up the second Missouri infantry, under Lieutenant Colonel 
 Lenting, to this point, and about six o'clock, P. M., relieved the sixth 
 Missouri infantry with the second Missouri. The fire from the enemy's 
 batteries was kept up till after dark, and from the mortar during the 
 entire night. This day, the sixth Missouri infantry lost eight killed and 
 forty-eight wounded, and the second Missouri infantry lost three killed 
 . and thirty-five wounded, many severely, who afterwards died. Among 
 the killed of to-day is numbered one of the best oflicers in the Mis- 
 souri army, Lieutenant Colonel Pembroke S. Lenting, of the second 
 Missouri infantry ; brave, cool and generous, a model soldier and offi- 
 cer ; and also Lieutenants Crenshaw and Roseberry, of the sixth Mis- 
 souri infantry. On this evening, the first Missouri infantry was 
 moved to this point, and these four regiments, the first, second, and 
 fifth and sixth Missouri infantry relieved each other every six or twelve 
 hours thereafter. The first Missouri infantry occupied this perilous 
 point during the day of the second instant, and late that evening was 
 moved to reinforce General Barton's line on the extreme right. On 
 the morning of the 3d instant, the firing ceased, pending negotiations 
 for the capitulation of the garrison, which took place on the morning 
 of the 4th instant. 
 
 Not having guns enough for the artillerymen of this brigade during 
 the siege, they were placed in charge of guns at different points of the 
 line, and all did good service. 
 
 During the siege of Vicksburg this brigade lost heavily in killed 
 and wounded, as will appear by the following : 
 
171 
 
 Killed. Wounded. Total. 
 
 First Missouri infantry, 
 
 18 
 
 70 
 
 88 
 
 Second Missouri infantry, 
 
 17 
 
 89 
 
 106 
 
 Third Missouri infantry, 
 
 18 
 
 83 
 
 101 
 
 Fifth Missouri infantry. 
 
 20 
 
 52 
 
 72 
 
 Sixth Missouri infantry. 
 
 33 
 
 133 
 
 166 
 
 Landis' battery. 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 10 
 
 Wade's battery, 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 11 
 
 Guibois' battery, 
 
 I 
 
 4 
 
 5 
 
 Total, 113 446 559 
 
 This is a loss in killed and wounded of over one third of the -whole 
 brigade, and shows that this brigade was almost continuousl}^ during 
 the entire siege, exposed to the enemy's fire ; and at no time during 
 this eventful siege did these troops ever waver or fail to go to or 
 occupy any point, regardless of its exposure, and frequently had to 
 and did occupy points on the line so exposed that other troops, 
 although in their own line, would give them up for these troops to 
 occupy. They endured all the dangers, fatigues, exposures, and the 
 weakness consequent on the insufficient rations, with a most com- 
 mendable cheerfulness and soldierly bearing, willing to endure all 
 things for the safety of the garrison, and desirous of holding out and 
 fighting as lorig as there was a cartridge or a ration of mule or horse. 
 And when tlie garrison capitulated, they felt they were disarmed, but 
 in no wise whipped, conquered or subjugated. I cannot commend 
 too highly the field, staft' and lino officers of this brigade for their 
 cool daring and judicious bearing in the faithful discharge of their 
 whole duty, regardless of personal safety and comfort. And I espe- 
 cially commend the constancy of the following named officers in 
 remaining with their respective commands : 
 
 Colonel A. C. Riley and Lieutenant Colonel Garland, first Mis- 
 souri infiintry. Lieutenant Colonel P. S. Lenteng and Major Carter, 
 of the second Missouri infantry, and Major McDowell, of the third 
 Missouri, and Colonel Joseph M. McCown and Major C. A. Waddell, 
 of the fifth infantry, and Major Cooper, of the sixth Missouri. All 
 the company officers, with few execeptions, remained constantly with 
 their commands, and with their men, suffered hardships, exposures 
 and dangers. But the privates justly won and shall receive the mede 
 of praise. 
 
 To Captain R. L. Maupin, acting as my aid, I am under special 
 obligations for the invaluable services rendered me during the entire 
 siege, the very bravest of the brave, cool, prudent and discreet, a 
 braver or a better soldier never bared his bosom or raised his arm in 
 defence of constitutional liberty. He justly merits the gratitude of 
 his country. 
 
 I^have the honor to be, most respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient soldier, 
 
 F. M. COCKERILL, 
 Colonel commanding first brigade Missouri volunteers. 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL REYNOLDS. 
 
 Headquarters Fourth Brigade, Stevenson's Division, > 
 Demopolis, Ala., July 2-7, 1862. \ 
 
 Major J. J. Reeve, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General, Stevenson's Division : 
 
 Major: On the morning of the 18th of May, my brigade was 
 assigned its position, on the line of entrenchments, on the left of 
 General Barton, whose brigade occupied the extreme right, my left 
 resting on the Hall's ferry road, and on the right of General Cum- 
 mings. 
 
 The thirty-first Tennessee, fifty-ninth, and five companies of the, 
 third Tennessee regiment, were assigned to the ditches ; the forty- 
 third regiment, and five companies of the third Tennessee regiment, 
 held as reserve. The artillery, consisting of five light pieces, under 
 Captain Claiborne, were posted in the centre and right centre ; one 
 piece, under Captain Corput, on the left centre ; one section, under 
 Lieutenant Bowers, on the right ; one piece, under Lieutenant Hart- 
 son, on the right centre, and one eighteen-pounder siege piece, on the 
 left centre, under Lieutenant Crane. 
 
 In taking my position, I found the works so weak and easily enfi- 
 laded, that it was necessary to fill up some of the trenches and dig 
 others. Consequently, I did so, and erected new redoubts on the line 
 for my artillery. On the night of the 18th, I threw out a line of 
 skirmishers or pickets, about half a mile in front of my works. 
 Each officer and soldier was assigned his place in the rifle-pits, and 
 my reserves in proper position. 
 
 The precaution of throwing out pickets, at some distance in front, 
 had the effect of keeping the sharpshooters of the enemy at a distance, 
 and preventing my line being annoyed as those on the left of me had 
 been from the beginning, besides giving me the opportunity of 
 strengthening my works unmolested. 
 
 Notwithstanding my line, for the time, was but little harassed by 
 the enemy in my front, it was greatly annoyed by the shells from the 
 gun-boats and mortars, established on the peninsular, and in the 
 river, which opened daily upon our rear. 
 
 About the 29th of May, the enemy, by a superior force, drove in my 
 picket line. After nightfall I attacked the enemy, in turn, and 
 re-established my line. 
 
 On the Ist of June, the enemy established a battery, about eight 
 hundred yards in my front, and opened fire upon me. This gun, 
 however, was soon silenced by Captain Claiborne's rifle pieces. 
 
 On the nights of the 3d and 4th of June, the enemy placed in posi- 
 tion four guns of heavy calibre, which opened on the 5th, at daylight. 
 These guns continued to play incessantly upon my works throughout 
 the siege, except at night, and a few hours during the heat of the day. 
 
 On the 9th of June, several twenty-pounders, Barrett's, were 
 mounted within four hundred yards of our line, our pickets having 
 
173 
 
 been gradually withdrawn — those of the enemy having advanced 
 within seventy-five yards of our line, throwing up works much 
 stronger than those occupied by our troops. These entrenchmets were 
 continuous along my entire line. The sharpshooters were numerous, 
 and kept up such a continal fire, that to show any part of the body 
 above the parapet was almost certain to be struck. 
 
 Frequent sorties were made from my line at night, driving the 
 enemy from their entrenchments and filling them up. Owing to the 
 superior force of the enemy, it was impossible to hold the position 
 gained. 
 
 The fire increased daily, as the enemy would mount additional 
 guns, and increased their number of sharpshooters. This incessant 
 firing continued until the afternoon of the 3d of July, when it ceased, 
 and the garrison capitulated. 
 
 Early in the siege, the fortj'-third Tennesse regiment, Colonel Gil- 
 lispie, commanding, reinforced General Lee, and bore its part in 
 repulsing the charges on his line. 
 
 During those forty-seven days, under the terrific fire of the enemy's 
 artillery and infantry, the ofiicers and men of the brigade bore them- 
 selves with constancy and courage. Often half fed and illy clothed, 
 exposed to the burning sun and soaking rains, they performed their 
 parts cheerfully and without a murmur. 
 
 During the siege, many valuable lives were lost. Among others, I 
 would mention the names of Captain Y. 0. Claiborne, third Maryland 
 battery, and Major Boyd, third Tennessee regiment. The former was 
 killed on the 24th of June, while gallantly fighting his gun. The 
 latter died from exposure. No more gallant officers ever gave up 
 their lives for their country. 
 
 Thf^ officers of my staff performed their duties faithfully and 
 promptly. Major Pfifer, my assistant inspector general. Captain W, 
 II. Claiborne, my acting assistant adjutant general, and Lieutenant 
 W. IT. Patton, my aid, were conspicuous for gallantry and good con- 
 duct during the siege. 
 
 The list of my killed and wounded I have already forwarded to 
 your headquarters. 
 
 I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
 
 A. W. REYNOLDS, 
 Colonel, commanding fourth Brigade. 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL WAUL. 
 
 Headquarters Waul's Texas Legion, > 
 Demojoo^w, July 30th, 1863. } 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. General : 
 
 In obedience to the orders of the Lieutenant General commanding, I 
 have the honor to report the part taken by Waul's Texas legion, in 
 the defence of the city of Vicksburg. 
 
 The position of the legion, which entered the city on the 17 th of 
 May, and present during the siege, consisted of eleven companies of 
 infantry, one company of artillery, a detachment of mounted scouts 
 and a battalion of zouaves, attached to the command. 
 
 Captain Wall's battery of artillery was ordered to report to Gene- 
 ral Forney, under whose command" it remained until the capitulation. 
 The rest of the command, placed in reserve by order of the Lieutenant 
 General, were present on the 18th and 19 th at the different points on 
 Generals Smith's and Forney's line assaulted by the enemy, or when 
 an attack seemed imminent. 
 
 In the afternoon of the 19th, ordered to report to General Steven- 
 son. The command was placed in rear of General Lee's brigade, it 
 being the most assailable and threatened point on General Stevenson's 
 line. 
 
 * On the morning of the 22d of May, the enemy opened with a fierce 
 and incessant fire of artillery, which continued for two hours after 
 the cannonading ceased. The enemy moved in distinct and separate 
 columns against each of the salient points in General Lee's front. 
 Their forces massed in the rear, the a Ivance and supporting columns 
 started at a double-quick with the division in front. 
 
 Two companies of the legion, under the command of Major Steele, 
 were sent to support the garrison in the left redoubt ; the remainder 
 were ordered to the front,, and took an active part in the defence of 
 the line, and the repulse of the enemy, unprotected by breastworks. 
 They were subjected to the most galling fire, and well they sustained 
 the noble cause for which they fought, never relaxing, but with in- 
 creased ardor, until the last of the enemy was prostrated or driven 
 from their sight. 
 
 The loss was very severe — particularly so in officers — every officer 
 of the staff present being either killed or severely wounded. 
 
 Assistant Adjutant General Popenderick and Aid-de-Camp Sim- 
 mons, after exhibiting the most gallant and daring bravery in extend- 
 ing orders under the incessant storm of shell and minnie balls, fell, 
 leaving an undying record of their courage and dauntless bravery. 
 
 After the repulse of the advanced columns of the enemy, it was 
 perceived that a party, more daring, had crossed the ditch of the re- 
 doubt on the left, planted two flags upon the parapet, entered a 
 breach made by their artillery, taking a few prisoners, and driving 
 the garrison from the angle of the fort. 
 
175 
 
 Alive to the importance of the position, General Lee issued and re- 
 iterated orders to Colonel Shelley, commanding the twenty-third Ala- 
 bama, and Lieutenant Colonel Pettus, commanding the forty-sixth 
 Alabama, who occupied the fort, to retake it all hazards, offering the 
 flags to the command capturing them. After several vain attempts 
 they refused to volunteer, nor could the most strenuous efforts of 
 'their chivalric commanders urg*e or incite them to the assault. Gen- 
 eral Lee then directed the Colonel of the legion to have the fort 
 taken. He immediately went there, taking with him one battalion of 
 the legion to aid or support the assailants, if necessary, informing 
 Captain Bradley and Lieutenant Hagan, who respectively commanded 
 the companies that had been previously sent as a support to the gar- 
 rison. These gallant officers not only willingly agreed, but solicited 
 the honor of leading those companies to the assault. Not wishing to 
 expose a larger force than was neccsssary. Captain Bradley was or- 
 dered to select twenty men, and Lieutenant Hagan fifteen from their 
 respective forces. Lieutenant Colonel Pettus, thoroughlj'^ acquainted 
 with the locality and its approaches, came, musket in hand, and most 
 gallantly offered to guide and lead the party into the fort. Three of 
 Colonel Shelley's regiment also volunteered. With promptness and 
 alacrity they moved to the assault, retook the fort, drove the enemy 
 through the breach, then entered, tore down the stand of colors, still 
 floating over the parapet, sent them to the Colonel commanding the 
 legion, who immediately trai^mitted them with a note to General 
 Lee. This feat, considered with the accompanying circumstances, 
 the occupation by the enemy, the narrow pass through which the 
 party had to enter, the enfilading fire of musketry and artillery they had 
 to encounter in the approach, the unwillingness of the garrison, consist- 
 ing of two regiments, to volunteer, and permitting the flags to float for 
 three hours over the parapet, the coolness, courage and intrepiditymani- 
 fested, deserve highest praise for every officer and man engaged in the 
 hazardous enterprise. The enemy, driven from the fort, ensconced 
 themselves behind the parapet in the outer ditch. Two companies were 
 immediately ordered to the fort to aid in dislodging the enemy. Many of 
 the men mounted the parapets into the ditch, subjecting themselves to 
 the aim of its occupants, and the concentrated fire from the enemy's 
 lines. A few shell, used as hand grenades, bursting among the enemy, 
 soon caused them to surrender ; although so soon as we ceased casting 
 missiles, under cover of the approaching darkness, more than half of the 
 number escaped. In the pursuit. Lieutenant Colonel "Wregley, of the 
 second battalion, captured the other stand of colors, snatched by the 
 enemy from the parapet, but dropped in his flight. 
 
 During the remainder of the siege, the command was distributed 
 in the rifle-pits, forming nightly scouting parties, parties of recon- 
 noissance, and supporting our working parties and pickets. 
 
 At ten o'clock of the day of the capitulation, the command marched 
 out of the entrenchments with their colors flying and band playing. 
 Having saluted their colors, they stacked arms, and returned prison- 
 ers, under parole, into camp. It is not thought necessary to enlarge 
 upon the privations they suffered in common with the rest of the gar- 
 
176 
 
 rison, their continued vigils, resolute and unwavering conduct under 
 the necessary and continued exposure to which they were subjected, 
 their desire for every post of danger, even when more than one-third 
 of their number were killed or wounded. The command having lost 
 more officers than the division, by far the largest in the army to which 
 they were attached. 
 The casualties v^ere : 
 
 Killed. Wounded. Missing, 
 
 Officers, - - 10 37 \ 
 
 Enlisted men, - 37 153 7 
 
 47 190 8 
 
 During the siege, this command lost many of its ablest officers. 
 Major Cameron, Captains Carter and Ledbetter, and many others who 
 nobly fell where their duty called them, encouraging and inspiring 
 their men by their own example. 
 
 1 desire to acknowledge to both officers and men for their prompt 
 and willing obedience to every order; ordinary camp murmurings 
 against commissaries and quartermasters were hushed ; scant rations 
 were received with more pleasure than the most abundant heretofore. 
 They entered fully into the wishes of the Lieutenant General to ex- 
 tend over the greatest length of time the provisions on hand. Actu- 
 ated by the sole desire to hold the city^nd defeat the enemy, they 
 were ready to obey, and with eagerness^ny command that prudence 
 and desperation might require. 
 
 In addition to those already mentioned. Major 0. Steele greatly as- 
 sisted by his vigilance and promptness in sustaining discipline, and 
 holding the command prepared for the most sudden emergency. 
 
 Captain H. Westland, by his extensive military labors, in addition 
 to the command of his company, his courage and self-possession 
 amidst the hottest 'of the conflict, recommend him as a valuable officer. 
 
 Captain Fleitas, of the first Louisiana zouaves, prompt and fearless 
 with his brave command, rendered essential support to the legion 
 through the eventful progress of the siege. 
 I am, respectfully, 
 
 T. N, WAUL, 
 Colonel commanding WauVs l^exas Legion 
 
REPORT OF COLONEL HIGGINS. 
 
 Headquarters, Enterprise, Mis8., 
 July 25, 1863. 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G. : 
 
 Major : I have the honor to report the operations of the river bat- 
 teries, under my command, during the recent siege of Vicksburg, 
 The line of battle extended along the river front, commencing at ft 
 point above Fort Hill, on the right of my line, to a redoubt, which 
 terminated the extreme right of the rear line, and met my left — a dis- 
 tance of three miles, and consisted of eight lO-inch columbiads, one 
 9-inch Dalghren, one 8-inch columbiad, one 7.44-inch Blakely gun, 
 one 7- inch Brooks, one 6.4-inch Brooks, three smooth-bore 42-pounGl- 
 ers, two smooth-bore 32-pounders, eight handed and unhanded 32- 
 pounder rifles, one 18-pounder rifle, one 2()-pounder Parrott, one 
 Whitworth, one 10-inch mortar, one 8-inch siege howitzer — making, 
 in all, thirty-one pieces of heavy artillery, besides thirteen pieces of 
 light artillei^, which were placed in position to prevent a landing cf 
 the enemy on the city front. These batteries were divided into three 
 commands, as follows : The upper batteries, from Fort Hill to the 
 upper bayou, were worked by the first Tennessee artillery, under 
 Colonel Andrew Jackson, Jr.; the centre batteries, or those immedi- 
 ately on the city front, were under charge of Major F. N. Ogden, 
 eighth Louisiana battalion of artillery, to whose command were attached 
 Captain S. C. Bain's company of Vaiden light artillery ; the lower 
 batteries were under charge of the first Louisiana artillery, under 
 Lieutenant Colonel D. Beltzhower; a portion of the twenty-third 
 Louisiana volunteers were joined to Lieutenant Colonel Beltzhower'e 
 command. 
 
 On the evening of the 18th of May, 1863, the investment commenced 
 in rear of the city ; at the same time, five of the enemy's gunboatp., 
 four of which were iron-clads, cam-3 up from below, and took position 
 in the river, just out of range of our guns, whilst the river above, and 
 in front of, the city, was guarded by three gunboats, these completing 
 the investment. 
 
 On the evening of the 19th, the enemy's sharpshooters, having ob- 
 tained possession of our abandoned line of water-works, opened a fire 
 upon the upper four-gun water battery, commanded by Major H. N. 
 Hawley, of the Tennessee artillery, thus rendering the battery tem- 
 porarily untenable. Advantage was taken of the darkness of night 
 to construct traverses on the banks, in rear of the guns of this bat- 
 tery ; and at daylight there was ample protection aflforded to the men 
 whilst at the guns. The enemy above commenced feeling our batte- 
 ries, and opened a heavy fire, from three of his iron-clads, upon Cap- 
 tain Caper*8 ten-inch columbiad, on the left of my line. Their fire 
 was kept up for several hours, but without any serious damage. 
 13 
 
178 
 
 At daylight, on the morning of the 20th, the enemy opened firo 
 Tijion the city and batteries, with seven mortars, placed under the 
 banks of the river, on the Louisiana shore. Three iron-clads also 
 shelled the lower batteries, at long range 
 
 On the 22d, at nine o'clock,' A. M., four iron-clads and one wooden 
 gunboat engaged the river batteries ; and after an engagement of an 
 hour and a half were repulsed. Two of the iron-clads were seriously 
 damaged. This engagement was creditable to the first Louisiana ar- 
 tillery, who, with ten guns, and mostly of small calibre, contested 
 successfully against thirty-two heavy guns of the enemy. Our cas- 
 ualties were only two wounded during the fight. One ten-inch co- 
 lurabiad and the eighteen-pounder rifle gun was temporarily disabled. 
 The Blakely gun burst at the muzzle. On the 22d, eleven of the 
 lio^ht pieces on the river front were ordered to the rear ; and were 
 there fought by detachments from my command during the remainder 
 of the siege. 
 
 From the 24th to the 26th, mortars keep up a steady fire upon the 
 city and batteries. The eight-inch siege howitzer, one smooth-bore 
 thirty-two pounder, the twenty-pounder Parrott, and the Whitworth 
 gun, were rftmoved to the rear, with their detachments. 
 
 Soon after daylight, on the morning of the 27th, the enemy's iron- 
 clad gunboat Cincinnati, mounting ten guns, was observed approach- 
 ing our upper batteries, whilst four ilron-clads approached the lower 
 batteries. An engagement took place, which resulted in the complete 
 rc-pulse of the enemy, and the sinking of the Cincinnati, in front of 
 our guns, after an action of thirty minutes. Great credit is due Cap- 
 tains Lynch and Johnson, of the first Tennessee heavy artillery, for 
 the handsome manner in which their guns were handled during the 
 engagement. The enemy's loss was severe, many of their men being 
 killed in the portrholes by our sharpshooters. Many attempts 
 were made by the enemy to recover the guns of the Cincinnati, by 
 ■working every night, to prevent which, fire was opened on the sunken 
 boat every night, from one or two of my guns, during the siege. 
 
 On the 28th, the eighteen-pounder rifled gun was sent to the rear 
 line, in charge of Captain L. B. Haynes, company E, first regiment 
 Louisiana artillery. 
 
 At daylight, on the Slst, a tremendous fire was opened on the city, 
 from the enemy's guns in the rear, which did some damage to the 
 works of the upper batteries. A battery of two small Parrott guns, 
 w^iich opened upon my left at the same time, was silenced by Captain 
 Gaper's ten-inch columbiad. 
 
 June 1st. — A large fire broke out in the city, close upon the maga- 
 Bine of the '' Whig office" battery, which was at one time in great dan- 
 ger. The ammunition was taken out and placed in a more secure 
 position. All the men of my command that could be spared from the 
 guns were ordered out immediately to assist in arresting the progress 
 of the conflagration. 
 
 From June 2d to the 8th, the enemy kept up an incessant fire from 
 the mortar fleet, on the city and batteries ; and each day the gunboats 
 below shelled the woods and the lower batteries. Two of the field- 
 
;l?9 
 
 pieces of my command were turned over to Major Genial M. L, 
 Smith, to be placed in the rear defence. 
 
 June 9th and 10th. — The fire from the mortar fleet continued at 
 irregular intervals. The enemy succeeded in placing sharpshooters 
 in the woods on the Louisiana shore, opposite the city ; but they were 
 driven off by a few well-directed shots from one of the light field-pieces 
 of Major Ogden's command. 
 
 On the morning of June 11th, the enemy opened fire from a ten- 
 inch gun, placed in position at a point almost a mile above the bend 
 of the river, opposite the upper batteries — mortars and gunboats still 
 keeping up a line of fire. 
 
 June 12th. — The ten-inch mortar was order Ito our works in the rear, 
 and was placed in Major General Forney's line. It was manned by a 
 detachment of men from company G, first Louisiana artillery, under 
 Lieutenant C. A. Conrad. 
 
 June 13th to loth. — A thirty-pounder Parrott gun opened on the 
 upper batteries, from the same position as the ten-inch gun mentioned 
 previously. Several of the monitors dropped down the river some five 
 hundred yards, and opened a heavy fire on the upper batteries. The 
 two Parrott guns opened again on Captain Capers, but were silenced, 
 after five shots. 
 
 June 16th. — Having opened fire on Captain Lynch's battery, (up- 
 per batteries,) from a new \V^ork between Edwards' negro quarters and. 
 the river, doing considerable damage to the parapets, traverses, &c.,. 
 but not injuring any of the men or guns. 
 
 June 1 7th, 18th, and 19th. — Mortars still keeping up an irregular 
 fire. The guns on the Louisiana shore fired very rapidly in the morn- 
 ing and evening. Our batteries replied slowly. The Parrott battery 
 opened on Captain Capers, but never fired after our guns opened. 
 Since the surrender it has been ascertained that these two guns were 
 totally disabled by Captain Capers' fire. 
 
 June 20th. — About three, A. M., the enemy opened a heavy fire 
 from both front and rear upon the city and batteries. Firing ceased 
 at half-past seven, A. M. 
 
 June 21st. — Mortars ceased firing. The enemy mounted a one 
 hundred-pounder Parrott gun on the Louisiana shore, under the bank 
 of the river, at a point about five hundred yards above the mortar 
 boats. It opened upon the city during the evening, doing a great 
 deal of damage. Captain Bond, in the lower batteries, opened fire 
 with his eleven-inch columbiad and thirty-two-pounder rifled gun,, 
 when, after a few shots the enemy's gun ceased firing. 
 
 June 22d to 27th. — Firing from the guns on the Louisiana shore 
 was kept up on the city and batteries with great vigor. Our guna 
 replied slowly and with deliberation, but in consequence of the timber 
 on the Louisiana shore, affording ample means of masking batteries^ 
 it was very diflScult to arriw^t any satisfactory result. On the 23th^ 
 the mortars resumed their wR upon the city, and on the same day a 
 number of the enemy's sharpshooters opened upon the city from the 
 brush wood on the Louisiana shore. 
 
 June 28th. — Firing still kept up. The six-inch Brooke gun, in 
 
180 
 
 the upperbatteries, burst one of the bands, and also at the breach. 
 At four, P. M., the one hundred-pounder Pi.rrott gun and two mor- 
 tars opened upon the lower batteries. 
 
 June 29th and 30th. — Heavy firing all along the river front. The 
 gunboats shelled the woods around Captain Capers' battery. The 
 mortar was brought from the rear and remounted in its old position 
 on the redoubt on the extreme of my line. It was successfully used 
 in driving off sharpshooters from that point. In addition to the other 
 guns on the Louisiana shore, the enemy opened two small Parrott 
 guns close to the bank, in front of the city. Their fire was very slow 
 and at irregular intervals, 
 
 July 1st. — The enemy opened fire on the mortar redoubt from his 
 lines. Our works were somewhat damaged by it. The mortar replied 
 and almost immediately afterwards the enemy's fire ceased 
 
 July 2d and 3d. — Heavy firing from all points. At four, P. M,, 
 on the 3d, I opened fire all along my line, and at five, P. M,, the last 
 gun was fired by the river batteries in defence of Vicksburg. 
 
 July 4th, 1S63, — The city capitulated. 
 
 During the siege, I am happy to say that the officers and men 
 under my command discharged their duty faithfully and with alacrity. 
 Owing to the weakness of the infantry force, they were cdled upon 
 to perform other duties than those of working their guns. They 
 formed a portion of the city guard, discharged the duties of firemen 
 in case of fire, policed the river, &c., and the relief were almost 
 nightly under under arms as infantry in the trenches. 
 
 I have not yet received the surgeon's report of our loss in killed and 
 wounded. It will probably not amount to more than thirty. Among the 
 killed was Major H. W. Hoadley, first Tennessee heavy artillery, who 
 commanded the upper water battery. This battery was exposed con- 
 stantly to an unceasing fire of mortar, Parrotts, and sharpshooters. 
 The gallant major was always at his post and fell with his face to the 
 foe, struck on the breast by a fragment of shell. The officers who most 
 distinguished themselves by their gallantry and unceasing vigilance, 
 were : Colonel Jackson, first Tennessee artillery, who, with his dis- 
 tinguished regiment, bore the brunt of the labors and dangers of the 
 eiege, and was always ready, day or night, for any duty to which he 
 might be called, and Lieutenant Colonel Sterling, Captains Lynch 
 and Johnson, of the same regiment; Major T. N. Ogden, eighth Lou- 
 isiana battalion artillery, and Captains J. N, Crory and Grandpie, of 
 the same battalion ; Captains W. C. Capers, R, C. Bond, and R. J. 
 Bruce; Lieutenants R. Agnue and E, D. Woodlief, and C. A. Conrad, 
 first Louisiana artillery. Captain W. C, Capers, by his strict and 
 indefatigable attention to his duties, and gallant bearing, won my 
 admiration. Lieutenant C. A. Conrad, in command of the ten-inch 
 mortar, behaved with great gallantry. Lieutenant W. T. Munfords, 
 Adjutant of the command ; LieutenanjjMjT. M. Bridges, Inspector 
 General ; Lieutenant W. Yerger, Aid-dd^amp, and Lieutenant W. 
 D. Flynn, engineer officer, discharged their duties to my satisfaction. 
 
 It is but an act of simple justice, before closing this report, to make 
 known the good conduct of Sergeant Thomas Lynch, of the first Lou- 
 
 
181 
 
 isiana artillery, who was in command of the picket boats, chief of 
 the river police. By his ceaseless energy and his close attention to 
 his very arduous duties, he made himself almost invaluable, and I 
 ferust the Government will reward his faithfulness. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 EDWARD HIGGINS, 
 ^ Colonel of Artillery, C. S. A., 
 
 Late in command of River Batteries, Vicksburg. 
 
 WLfff' ^ 
 
KEPORT OF MAJOR LUCKETT. 
 
 Gainesville, July 23, 1863. 
 Major R. W. Memminger, 
 
 A. A. G. DepH Mississipp^and East Louisiana: 
 
 Sir : I have the honor, herein, to submit my report ot engineer 
 operations during the period included between the dates May 2d and 
 May 18th, 1863, comprehending the events immediately preceding 
 the siege of Vicksburg. Having returned from an examination of the 
 works at Grand Gulf, on the 30th of April, I received at Jackson an 
 order to join the Lieutenant General commanding at Vicksburg, 
 which I did on the 2d of May. 
 
 The enemy having effected a landing at Bruinsburg, Miss., and 
 forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf on the 30th of April, it became 
 evident that immediate steps would have to be taken to meet him on 
 all available approaches to the city of Vicksburg. The several ferries 
 across the Big Black river and the railroad bridge became points of 
 great strategic importance. I accordingly dispatched an engineer 
 officer to each of these points, with a view of establishing works for 
 resisting a passage of the river by the enemy. On examination, it 
 was found that at Baldwin's, Hall's and Hankinson's ferries, the 
 bluffs abutted against the river on the east bank, leaving wide bot- 
 toms on the west, so that at each of these crossings it became neces- 
 sary to instruct a tete-de-pont or to relinquish the idea of taking the 
 river as a line of defence. These tetes-de-pont were ordered, but 
 before before any thing could be done the army of Grand Gulf, under 
 Major General Loring, had crossed the river at Hankinson's ferry, 
 leaving the east bank in possession of the enemy. During this time, I 
 had gone myself, by the direction of the Lieutenant General, to the 
 railroad bridge and Edward's Depot, to establish works to defend the rail- 
 road and preserve this very important line of communication. Having 
 examined the ground, I directed Captain Wintter, commanding corps 
 of sappers and miners, to take charge of the construction of a tete- 
 de-pont, to cross railroad bridge and telegraph to Captain P. Robin- 
 son, of the engineers at Grenada, to report to me at Edward's Depot 
 with all his assistant engineers. Captain Robinson reported on the 
 9th, and leaving him in charge of the works at the bridge, and direct- 
 ing him to make thorough reconnoissances of the country in the 
 vicinity of Edward's Depot and to the southward, I returned to 
 Vicksburg with Captain Wintter, and put him in charge of all the 
 works around the city to make necessary repairs and put every thing 
 in good condition. 
 
 The tete-de-pont at the railroad bridge was pushed ahead rapidly 
 and finished by the 15th, and at the same time a bridge was made 
 across the Big Black by swinging the steamer Dot across the stream 
 and removing ifcr machinery. On the 12th, the army was ordered 
 across the Big Black to Edward's Depot, and I went to the latter 
 
183 
 
 place f^ conduct the division commanders to the positions assigned to 
 them by the Lieutenant General commanding. On the 15th, orders 
 were received to march upon the enemy, and I took with me, in accom- 
 panying the Lieutenant General, the following assistant engineers, 
 Tiz : Second Lieutenant George Donnallen, engineers ; Captain Jamee 
 Cooper and Sergeant S. McD. Vernon, acting assistant engineers; 
 Captain Robinson and three assistants in charge of the works at the 
 bridge. No engineer operations were found necessary on the march, 
 and the army reached its destination on the Raymond road about nml- 
 night on the 15th, the head of the column being halted beyond Mrs. 
 Elliston's house, some six miles from Edward's Depot. 
 
 THE BATTLE AT BAKER's CREEK. 
 
 At six thirty, A. M., on the IGth, a courier from General John- 
 ston arrived, bringing information to the Lieutenant General com- 
 manding which made a counter-march necessary. I was directed by 
 the Lieutenant General to inform the division commanders that such 
 a move would be made immediately, and communicated his instruc- 
 tions to Major General Stevenson and Brigadier General Brown. 
 
 I returned to headquarters at Mrs. Elliston's about seven thirty, 
 and heard, as I reached the house, the enemy's artillery open on the 
 head of our column on the Raymond road. I was then directed by 
 the Lieutenant General to inform Major General* Stevenson that ;t 
 would be necessary to form his division in line-of-battle on the cross 
 road from the Clinton to the Raymond road, with his left flank cover- 
 ing the former. Having communicated these instructions, I sent Ser- 
 geant Vernon to get a pioneer companj' from General Cummings' bri- 
 gade, and directed him to throw a bridge, as soon as possible, across 
 Baker's Creek, on the main Raymond road, where the county bridge 
 had been washed away. This bridge was constructed and the banks of 
 the creek cut down leading to it, by two P. M. From eight o'clock, 
 A. M., until eleven, I was engaged with my assistants in communiciv- 
 ting orders from the Lieutenant General commanding in regard to the 
 formation of the line-of battle, which was formed on a commanding 
 ridge, and so disposed as to cover all approaches from the front. 
 About noon the battle opened with considerable vigor on the left, and 
 the enemy making an attempt to turn our left flank, rendered a cor- 
 responding movement necessary on our part. This movement opened 
 a considerable gap between the division of General Stevenson aud 
 General Bowen, aud I carried an order from the Lieutenant General 
 to General Bowen to keep the interval closed between himself and 
 General Stevenson, adW to General Loring to the same effect in refer- 
 ence to his and General Bowen's divisions. Between this and three 
 P. M., I carried an order to General Loring to hold his whole division 
 in readiness to move to the left, and to move his left brigade, (GenenU 
 Buford's,) at once to join upon the right of General Bowen's com- 
 mand. Between four and five o'clock the enemy had succeeded, by 
 his vastly superior numbers, in completely turning our left, and our 
 troops began to break and fall back in considerable disorder towards 
 
184 
 
 the main Raymond road, I was then directed by the Lieutenatit Gen- 
 eral to inform General Tilghman that the position he occupied was 
 one of vast importance in securing our retreat, and that he must hold 
 it at all hazards. I found General Tilghman had moved his brigade, 
 8.nd was marching along a by-road towards our left. On receiving 
 the above order he halted his command, and, facing about, returned 
 to the Raymond road and took a position on a ridge some six hundred 
 yards in rear of his first, and just in front of the by-road above men- 
 tioned, along which our army finally retreated. In connection with 
 this day's operation, 1 beg leave to mention, especially, Captain James 
 Cooper, one of my assistants, who displayed great coolness, gallantry 
 and judgment in communicating instructions, and Sergeant Vernon 
 for his energy and skill in constructing the bridge across Baker's Creek 
 above mentioned. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF BIG BLACK BRIDGE. 
 
 Our army having fallen back to the entrenchments covering the 
 railroad and boat bridge, the lines were found about completed, and 
 were manned by General Vaughan's brigade and part of Bowen's 
 division. The enemy opened early on the morning of the 17th with 
 artillery at long range, and soon came up with their infantry, and took 
 possession of a copse of wood in front of our left. I repaired to the 
 bridges between seven and eight o'clock to examine their condition, 
 and seeing signs of unsteadiness among our troops, I sent Lieutenant 
 Donnallan.to the Lieutenant General for instructions in regard to the 
 destruction of the bridges should the enemy succeed in forcing our 
 position. Having received the necessary instructions, I made pre- 
 parations for firing the railroad bridge by piling rails and loose cotton 
 at intervals, and had a barrel of turpentine prepared on the boat 
 bridge. At about nine, A. M., our troops on the left were stampeded, 
 and leaving the trenches came pell-mell towards the river. I stationed 
 an ofiicer at each bridge, and, after seeing that all our men were safely 
 across, I gave a signal to apply the torch. 
 
 In a few moments both bridges were in flames and were quickly and 
 thoroughly burned. 
 
 I have the honor to be. 
 
 Very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 SAM'L H. LUCKETT, 
 Major and Chief Engineer, Deft Miss, and E, La. 
 
 9 
 
REPORT OF MAJOR LUCKETT. 
 
 Gainesville, Ala., July 26, 1863. 
 
 Major R. W. Memminger, A. A. G., 
 
 Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana : 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to submit my report of the engineer opera- 
 tions during the siege of Vicksburg : 
 
 Oar army fell back to the city on Sunday, the 17th of May, and 
 were put in tho trenches, in the following order, viz : Major General 
 Stevenson occupied the line included between the railroad and the 
 Warrenton road, on the south ; General Forney the line between the 
 railroad and the grave-yard road ; and General Smith the line from 
 the grave-yard road to the river front, on the north. On the ISth, I 
 made a careful examination of the entire line, and made the following 
 disposition of the engineer officers under ray command, to facilitate 
 the operations of strengthening and repairing the works: Captain P. 
 Robinson, engineer, was assigned to the line commanded by Major 
 General Stevenson, and had under him as assistants the following 
 officers, viz : Captain J. J. Conway, twentieth Mississippi, detailed, 
 assistant engineer ; acting lieutenant A. W. Gloster, assistant engin- 
 eer ; acting Lieutenant R. R Southard; assistant engineer ; Captain 
 James Cowper, commanding fourteenth Mississippi, acting assistant 
 engineer ; W. B. H. Saunders, office assistant. Captain D, Wintter, 
 commanding company of sappers and miners, was assigned to the line 
 commanded by Major Generals Forney and Smith, and had under 
 him, as assistants, the following officers, viz : First Lieutenant E. 
 McMahon, company of sappers and miners ; second Lieutenant F. 
 Galvoly, company of sappers and miners; Captain James Hogan, 
 acting assistant engineer; acting Lieutenant S. McD. Vernon, as- 
 sistant engineer ; acting Lieutenant Blessing. Lieutenant William 
 0. Flynn, of Captain Wintter's company, was ordered to report for 
 engineer duty to Colonel E. Higgins, commanding the heavy artillery. 
 
 This arrangement gave to each brigade one immediate assistant, 
 whose duty it was to report directly to the brigade commander, and 
 each division an engineer, to take general control. Lieutenant Geo. 
 Donallan, engineer P. A. C. S., I kept in my office to take charge of 
 the procuring and distribution of materials. Wm. Ginder was em- 
 ployed as draughtsman, and Wm. Brown as clerk. 
 
 The working force under ray control was as follows : Twenty-six 
 sappers and miners, of Captain Wintter's company ; eight detailed 
 mechanics and firemen ; four overseers for negroes ; seventy-two 
 negroes hired, twenty being sick ; three four mule teams ; twenty- 
 five yoke of oxen. 
 
 An accurate return of the entrenching tools was never obtained, 
 from the fact that they were always employed and so much scattered. 
 Their number, however, was not far from five hundred, of all kinds. 
 The work on the river was generally done by fatigue parties, detailed 
 from each comqiand to work within the limits of its own lines. The 
 
186 
 
 line of defence around the city of Vicksburg coneisted, ^s shown in 
 the enclosed maps, of a system of detached works (redans, lunettes, 
 and redoubts,) on the prominent and commanding points, with the 
 usual profile of raised field works, connected, in most cases, by rifle 
 pits.^ These works, having been made during the fall and winter of 
 last year, were considerably weakened by washing, and needed 
 strenthening and repairing. Fatigue parties were immediately set to 
 work making these repairs and completing the connection of rifle pits 
 from work to work. On the night of the 1 7th of May and morning 
 of the 18th, all the field guns, Parrott guns, and siege pieces at our 
 disposal, were put in position on the line, and platforms and embra- 
 sures prepared for them. Between the 18th and 22d, the enemy suc- 
 ceeded in establishing their line of circumvallation, at about the dis- 
 tance of eight hundred yards, extending from our extreme left to the 
 front of the square redoubt, (fort Garrett,) on the right of Brigadier 
 General Lee's line. The fire of their artillery and sharpshooters soon 
 became quite annoying, and showed the necessity of erecting numer- 
 ous traverses, to prevent enfilading fire, and the importance of having 
 covered approaches from the rear. All of these improvements were 
 made as rapidly as possible by the engineer, with fatigue parties 
 working at night. On the 22d, the enemy's fire was very heavy along 
 the whole line, and a determined assault was made on the grave-yard, 
 Jackson, and Baldwin ferry roads, and along the whole of General 
 Lee's front, on the right of the railroad. A breach was made in the 
 redoubt near the railroad, (fort Pettus,) and many other of the raised 
 works were considerably battered. All damages were repaired, how- 
 ever, at night, and the morning of the 23d found our works in as good 
 condition as at the beginning of the enemy's operations. 
 
 The enemy, being apparently satisfied with this attempt at carry- 
 ing our works by assault, now commenced their regular approaches, 
 and soon had possession of a line of hills on the main roads, not ex- 
 ceeding three hundred and fifty yards from our salient points. These 
 hills they covered with heavy batteries, and connected as rapidly as 
 possible with the second parallel. On the 24th, some of the enemy's 
 sappers crept up a ravine to within forty yards of the work on the 
 Jackson road, and started a sap, apparently with the intention of 
 mining. When they had reached within tw-enty paces of our work, 
 they were dislodged by hand-grenades, and relinquished their attempt 
 for some time. On the 25th, the enemy appeared in force on the 
 Warrenton road, and commenced establishing batteries in Gett's field, 
 at a distance of some six hundred yards from our advanced redoubt, 
 and they also pushed their first parallel on towards our right, and 
 crossed the Hall's ferry road about one thousand yards from the ad- 
 vanced redoubt on this road. Their line of circumvallation was by 
 this completed, and remained unbroken thenceforward. To prevent 
 any approach of the enemy up the river flat, I attempted to construct 
 an abattis from the hills to the river, and sent out a working party, 
 under Lieutenant Donallan, and Mr. Ginder, for that purpose. The 
 guard for the working party was driven in, after a skirmish and the 
 capure of one hundred of the enemy. The work was not accomplished. 
 
 . ._ A 
 
187 
 
 On this day pits weie started along the river front to connect the 
 line of land defence with the heavy batteries. Along the line the en- 
 gineers were engaged in general repairs, strengthening the parapets, 
 extending the rifle pits, placing obstructions in front of the exposed 
 points, consisting of abattis, palasades, ditches and entanglements of 
 and pick est telegraph-wires and sand-bags ; loop-holes were also made 
 along the whole line to protect our sharpshooters. These sand-bags 
 were made from tent flies and old tents, turned over to me by the 
 quartermaster's department ; and from the same source I obtained a 
 supply of material during the whole seige. A twenty-two-pounder 
 was moved from the river front and mounted on the left of General 
 Smith's line ; a new battery for three guns started in rear of General 
 Lee's, and a new battery for two guns built on the left of General 
 Moore's. 
 
 On the night of the 26th, the usual work of repairs and improve- 
 ments went on. The rifle pits on the river front were pushed ahead ; 
 the battery, in rear of General Lee, was flnnished, and a three- 
 pounder Parrott put in position. On this night, the enemy, for the 
 first time, fired on our working parties, and wounded a lieutenant 
 commanding a fatigue party. 
 
 On the 27th the enemy attacked our river front with their gunboats, 
 without, however, doing any serious damage. They were driven oflf, 
 and the Cincinnati sunk by the upper battery. This battery was pro- 
 tected, by traverses, from an enfilade fire from the enemy's sharp- 
 shooters, on the hills across Mint Spring bayou. 
 
 On the 28th the artillery fire of the enemy was unusually severe, 
 and several of our works were considerably damaged, and especially 
 the works on General Lee's front, and on the grave-yard and Jack- 
 son road. All damages were repaired at night, and a new battery 
 made in rear of General Moore's line, en the right of the Baldwin's 
 ferry road. 
 
 On the 29th the usual repairs and improvements continued along 
 the whole line ; a new battery made in rear of the line left of Hall's 
 lerry road ; the new battery in rear of General Lee improved, and 
 " whistling Dick," an eighteen-pounder rifle piece, put in position; 
 and a new battery started in rear of General Moore's centre ; but the 
 working party were driven off by the enemy's sharpshooters, and the 
 work stopped. 
 
 On the 30th but little work was done on the line under Captain 
 Robinson's charge, excepting along General Lee's front; and during 
 the whcle siegp cur works, from Fort Garrett to the right, were but 
 little injured, the enemy being kept at a considerable distance by a 
 line cf pickets, kept in protected places along the ridge in front of 
 our main line, excepting on the Hall's ferry road. Captain Wintter 
 and his assistants were kept constantly busy putting obstructions in 
 the Yazoo valley and other roads, repairing the embrasures of bat- 
 teries, and strengthening the parapets, which had began to show the 
 effects of the enemy's continual battering The new battery, in rear 
 of General Moore's centre, was commenced by running a covered ap- 
 proach to the position selected. On this day I also started a number 
 
188 
 
 of excavations on the Baldwin's ferry road, in a deep cut, for the pur- 
 pose of scattering our ammunition, which was much exposed to the 
 enemy's fire at the depot magazine. These excavations were put 
 under the charge of Mr. Ginder, with a working force of twenty-five 
 negroes from the jail-gang, and were finished in about a week. 
 
 On the 3 1 st works of repair continued along the whole line. The new 
 works of repair continued, and a breach in the redan on the left of J ack- 
 son's road filled up, and parapets repaired with sand-bags. From June 
 Ist to the 4th, there was no variation in the engineer operations. By 
 the 4th the enemy had succeed in establishing a thick line of parral- 
 lels,not exceeding one hundred and fifty yards from our salient works, 
 and then commenced several double saps against the following Avorks, 
 viz: The Jackson redan, on " grave-yard " road ; the third Louis- 
 iana redan, on left of Jackson's road ; and the lunette, in right of 
 Baldwin's ferry road. I had some thundering barrels and loaded 
 shells prepared, to be placed in these and all other exposed works, to 
 be used in case of an assault. The stockade redan and the stockade 
 in its left, beginning to sufler a good deal from the enemy's artillery, 
 a new line of rifle pits was started in front of the stockade, and 
 the ditch of the redan was prepared for riflemen to give a double 
 line at this point. The enemy continued their saps against this and 
 that of the third Louisiana without much interruption, until the night 
 of the 8th, when their sap-roller was burnt, by firing pieces of port 
 fire and cotton balls, steeped in turpentine, into it from muskets. 
 Their sappers were thus exposed, and forced to retire and com- 
 mence their operations with another roller, some distance back. In 
 spite of all our attempts to stop them, the enemy steadily approached 
 with their saps, until the night of the 13th, when they had reached 
 within sixty feet of the stockade redan, and within forty feet of the 
 third Louisiana, and showed very evidently their intention to attack 
 these salients by mining. I accordingly ordered counter-mines to 
 be started from the ditch of the former to oppose their progress. The 
 latter works having no' ditch, other arrangements had to be made. 
 This work had also become considerably batterred by this time, and 
 the old parapets were nearly gone. A new one was accordingly made 
 a few feet, in rear of the first, and the main body of the work 
 was still preserved entire, and our men protected from the enemy's 
 fire. 
 
 On the night of the 13th, a ten-inch mortar was placed in position 
 in rear of General Moore's centre, and a twenty-pound Parrott in rear 
 of General Green's left. 
 
 On the night of the 14th, a new series of rifle pits were began, 
 running along a couple of spurs in the rear, so as to envelope the 
 stockade and its redan, as a precaution against the contingency of the 
 enemy's carrying the point by assault, or rendering it untenable by 
 his mining operations. 
 
 On the 15th, I discovered that the saps against the lunette, on the 
 right of the Baldwin ferry road, were making rapid progress, and also 
 the one against the railroad redoubt. Counterminers were immediately 
 ordered, and commenced from the ditches of these works. From this 
 
189 
 
 time, until the end of the siege, the main efforts of the enemy were 
 directed against these salient works, viz : The stockade redan ; the 
 third Louisiana redan ; the lunette on the Baldwin ferry road ; and 
 the railroad redoubt ; and Fort Garret, on General Lee's right ; and 
 later, against the work on the Hall's ferry road; against all of which, 
 they ran regular double saps ; and our principal operations consisted in 
 endeavors to impede their progress, and in preparations to meet them, 
 when practicable, by countermining. Retrenchments were also made 
 in rear of all the threatened points, to provide against the possibility 
 of the enemy's being successful in their attempt. The rest of the 
 line, other than the works mentioned above, was but little damaged, 
 and was easily kept in repair by fatigue parties working at night. 
 The third Louisiana redan, being in a very narrow ridge, had no ex- 
 terior ditch, and I found it impossible to get in its front, to start 
 countermines, without exposing our sappers to a terrible fire from the 
 enemy's sharpshooters and batteries, not more than fifty yards dis- 
 tant. A shaft was accordingly started from the inside of the work, 
 but, before it was completed, the enemy had succeeded it getting 
 under the parapet, and had prepared their tnine under the salient. 
 This mine was exploded on the 25th instant, but did no material dam- 
 age, as a parapet had been made to meet such an event, some fifteen 
 feet back of the salient. Five or six men, engaged in making a 
 shaft, were buried by this explosion. An attempt was made to assault 
 the work, immediately after explosion, but our men, having good 
 cover behind the new parapet, repulsed the assailants with consider- 
 able slaughter. 
 
 On the night of the same day, two of our mines, in front of the 
 stockade redan were exploded and completely des royed. The enemy's 
 Bap roller filled up their saps, and two parallels they had started to 
 envelop the redan. Our mines were about thirty-five feet from the 
 counter saps of the redan, and the enemy's sap roller was several 
 paces within this distance, so that they received the full effect of our 
 explosion. The charge in one mine was forty-five pounds, in the 
 other eighty, with the chambers eight feet under ground. On this 
 same night, a nine-inch Dahlgren gun was put in position in rear of 
 General Moore's centre, to counterbatter the enemy's heavy works, 
 on the Jackson road, and the ten-inch mortar was removed to the 
 Warrenton road. 
 
 On the 28th, we sprang another mine in front of the lunette on 
 the Baldwin's ferry road, but, unfortunately, the explosion was pre- 
 mature, and the enemy's sap was hardly near enough to be much 
 injured. The sap roller was, however, burned, at night, by fire balls, 
 tteir sappers driven away, and their progress materially interfered 
 with. A now mine was immediately sprung, and was soon ready for 
 explosion. 
 
 On the 30th, the enemy succeeded again in getting under the third 
 Louisiana redan, and had covered the entrance to their gallery with a 
 timber shelter to protect their sappers from our hand-grenades. To 
 destroy this, I had a barrel, containing one hundred and twenty-five 
 pounds of powder, rolled over the parapet and exploded with a time- 
 
190 
 
 fuse of fifteen seconds. The effect of the explosion was very severe, 
 and fragments of sap rollers, gabions and pieces of timber vrere 
 thrown into the air, and I think some of the enemy's sappers 
 must have been burnt and smothered. They continued their opera- 
 tions and established another mine on the 1st of July, exploded J it 
 about half past one, P. M. The charge must have enormous, as the 
 crater made was at least twenty feet deep, thirty feet across in one 
 direction and fifty in another. The earth upheaved was thrown many 
 vards around, but little of it falling back into the crater. I learned 
 from the enemy's engineers, that they had one hundred and fifty 
 pounds in this mine. The original faces of the redan were almost 
 completely destroyed, the explosive effect extended to a parapet I had 
 made across the gorge of the work, making in it almost a practicable 
 breach for an assault. No assault was attempted however, and I went 
 to work immediately to repair damages as well as possible. Lieutenant 
 Blessing, who had been in charge of this work, was wounded during 
 the day, and I directed Lieutenant Flynn to report to Captain Wintter 
 to take his place. In addition to Lieutenant Blessing, wounded on 
 this day, private Owens and seven negroes, engaged in sinking a shaft, 
 were killed by the enemy's explosion. Captain Wintter, with Lieu- 
 tenant Flynn and Sergeants Bryan and McGinniss, and private St. 
 Vigne, of Captain Wintter's company, worked during the afternoon and 
 night succeeding the explosion with an energy, zeal and coolness, 
 (under a most terrific fire,) worthy of all praise, and by daylight the 
 next morning, the breach was filled and the redan still tenable. To 
 give some idea of the diflficulties attending this work, I will state that 
 the enemy had two nine-inch Dahlgren guns, several heavy Parrotta 
 and field pieces, and a Cochoon mortar playing on this redan, in addi- 
 tion to as heavy a fire of musketry as I ever witnessed to be so long 
 continued. In the course of one hour, that I remained in the work, 
 at least a dozen of the garrison were killed or wounded by the mortar 
 alone. On the same night, one of the enemy's sap rollers, on the 
 right of the Jackson road, was burned, and their sappers driven off 
 by hand-grenades. On the night of the 2d, Captain Robinson 
 exploded one of his mines in front of the railroad redoubt, but with 
 little effect, the explosion being premature. On this night we had 
 prepared the following mines, viz : One in front of work on Hall's 
 ferry road, two in front of Fort Garrett, two on Baldwin's ferry road, 
 one on right of Jackson road, two in front of small redan on General 
 Green's left, and three on General Shoupe's line, all of which would 
 have been ready for the enemy by the time he came within the limit 
 of their effects. These mines contained from one hundred to one hun- 
 dred and twenty-five pounds, and were at an average depth of between 
 six and nine feet under the surface of the earth. The flag of truce, 
 however, on the 3d, stopped all operations on both sides, and the 
 eflficiency of our preparations were not tested. 
 
 The following is a list of casualties among the engineers and my 
 working force : 
 
 Wounded severely, first Lieutenant E. McMahon, company sappers 
 
t91 
 
 and miners; Acting Lieutenant Blessing, assistant engineer; Wm. 
 B. Goeble, clerk to Captain Wintter. 
 
 Killed — Sergeant Cole, company sappers and miners ; private J. 
 Hardy and private Owen. Eight negroes wounded; nine killed. 
 
 In concluding this report, I have the honor to call the attention of 
 the Lieutenant General, commanding, that no one was called upon to 
 perform more arduous and continuous duty than the engineer officers 
 and their assistants, and none more steadily and cheerfully endured 
 all that the duty imposed upon them, or more faithfully discharged 
 every obligation demanded by the difficulties of their situation. 
 Captain D. Wintter deserves especial mention. For fifteen months 
 he hid been at work on the fortifications in and around Vicksburg ; 
 always active, intelligent, and full of energy, as the result of his 
 labors fully testify. I most respectfully urge that he be recommended 
 to the War Department as a deserving candidate for promotion. The 
 Lieutenants of his company, E. McMahon and T. Galooby and Wm. 
 0. Flynn, who have been his assistants, deserve great credit for the 
 services they have performed. Captain Robinson and his as^:istant8, 
 Captain J. J. Conway, Captain James Croper, acting Lieutenants A. 
 W. Gloster and Southard, during the whole siege, were always at 
 their posts, and for forty-eight days and nights, were seldom off duty 
 more than six hours out of twenty-four. Captain James Hogan and 
 acting Lieutenant S. W. McD. Vernon, were equally as tireless and 
 full of zeal ; acting Lieutenant Blessing was wounded while examin- 
 ing the enemy's approaches, and was continually hazarding his life, in 
 attempting to discover the enemy's intentions, and was ever active 
 in his endeavors to thwart them. I would also especially mention 
 private St. Vigne, of Captain Winter's company, who was more than 
 once distinguished for gallantry, and, in addition to performing his 
 duties as sapper and miner, served as an artillerist and sharpshooter, 
 until his ceaseless exertions had made him sick. My office assistants, 
 Lieutenant George Donallan, Mr. Ginders and Mr. Brower, all deserve 
 mention for their strict performance of every duty imposed upon 
 them. Mr. Brower asked (and received) my permission to take every 
 spare opportunity to go to the trenches, and did fine execution as a 
 sharpshooter. 
 
 The following officers deserve particular notice, and, I hope, will 
 be rewarded for their meritorious conduct and the valuable services 
 they have performed : 
 
 Captain D. Wintter, commanding company sappers and minors ; 
 First Lieutenant E. McMahon, Second Lieutenant Wm. 0. Flynn, 
 Captain Jas. Cooper, formerly commanding fourteenth Mississippi ; 
 acting Second Lieutenant Blessing, employed as assistant engineer, 
 and private St. Vignes, of Captain Winiter's company; George C. 
 Brower, Wirt Adams's cavalry, clerk. 
 I have the honor to be, Major, 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 SAMUEL H. LUCKETT, 
 Major and C/iief Engineer, 
 Department Mississippi and East Louisiana. 
 
192 
 
 P S I also beg leave to call the attention of the Lieutenant 
 r.enerai commanding, particularly to the services of Colonel DH 
 Ha/et acting engiS^c^', who, on the night of May 17th, sncceeded 
 S passing thiough the enemy's lines, and carried safely to the Engi- 
 * ill my most importan*- '— "^= «"'^ r^nnpra 
 Respectfully, yours, 
 
 in passing through the enemy's lines, ana carricu ba,i. 
 
 neer Buretu, aU my mosUmportant maps and papers. g ^ j^ 
 
REPORT OF MAJOR MIMS. 
 
 Office of Chief Quartermaster, 
 Department Mississippi and East Louisiana 
 Jackson, Miss., Feb, 5, 1863 
 
 \ 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Waddy, 
 
 A. A. G., Jackson : 
 
 Colonel: I have the honor herewith to present accompanying 
 report from Captain W. M, Gillespie, post and depot quartermaster, 
 showing quartermaster's stores now on hand at this post. From an 
 examination of the requisitions now on hand, I find that they can 
 be two-thirds supplied, with the exception of tents, socks and blankets. 
 Major Anderson, quartermaster at Columbus, informs me he has one 
 hundred tents ready, with the cxcojUion of the rope, and has on 
 hand material for the making of two thousand suits of clothing. 
 
 As I am just collecting the hides taken from the public beeves, and 
 Messrs. Knox & Co., of the Magnolia works, not having had time to 
 complete the tanning of the hides received by therp, I have not been 
 able yet to commence the making of shoes at this point, as I contem- 
 plated. In a little while, I hope to be able to commence the work on 
 a large ami, I trust, profitable scale for the Government. I learn 
 from Captain W. M. Gillespie, acting department quartermaster, that 
 he receives, by purchase, from diSerent contractors throughout this 
 department, an average of four thousand pairs monthly. 
 
 We have three depots for the procurement of supplies — Columbus, 
 Major W. J. Anderson, quartermaster, furnishes about seven hundred 
 suits of clothing per week. For the present, however, we are employ- 
 ing all the force there in the making of tents, two hundred and fifty 
 tents per week being manufactured. Enterprise, Captain G. P. Theo- 
 bald, quartermaster, furnishes twenty-five wagons per month, four 
 hundred pairs shoes, and two hundred and fifty complete suits 0/ 
 clothing. Jackson, Captain W. M. Gillespie, post and* department 
 quartermaster, furnishes one thousand suits per v^'eek, manufactures 
 forty blankets per day. The most of the purchasing done for the 
 department is made through these depots. It should be mentioned 
 that Jackson also manufactures about twenty-five tents per day. They 
 are incomplete, however, for the want of rope. Three factories — the 
 Jackson, Woodville, and Choctaw — work constantly for us, making a 
 sufficiency of woolen goods. They do not make enongh cotton goods 
 for the rcfjuirements of the department. 
 
 Having almost exhausted this department in the way of cooking 
 utensils and wishing to increase the making of tents, I dispatched 
 Major Whitfield to Mobile and Columbus, Georgia, to contract for a 
 large supply of both. At the same time, he was charged to examine 
 into and, if possible, correct evils complained of in regard to the 
 Mobile and Ohio railroad. I have, in addition to supplies set forth in 
 13 
 
194 
 
 accompanying reports, twelve thousand shirts, the same number of 
 drawers, and twenty-eight thousand pounds of leather. 
 
 In regard to the means of transportation, I would state that the 
 Dixie works, at Canton, and other contractors, furnish fifty wagons 
 per month. Harness is also made sufficiently fast to supply the 
 demand. The quartermasters at Enterprise, Columbus, and Port 
 Hudson are authorized to purchase horses and mules. We have, up 
 to this time, had mules on hand fully sufficient for all demands 
 made upon us, and fully one hundred and fifty mules remain, and 
 though these are required, being young and afflicted with distemper, 
 they are not of much service now. I have one hundred horses, pur- 
 chased in Tennessee, which I expect here every day, and purchase 
 on an average one hundred per month 
 
 In regard to the more important subject of corn and fodder, I have 
 the honor to state that I am informed by the reports of Captain D. 
 H. Thomas, Major J. W. Patton, and Captain O'Neill, that there is 
 now in store in Vicksburg, belonging to this department, thirty thou- 
 sand bushels of corn, over halt of which is in sacks. I have, through 
 my agents on the Yazoo river, already purchased one hundred thou- 
 sand bushels of corn, an amount of which, fully sufficient for the 
 wants of Vicksburg, is to be delivered at Snyder's Bluff. Under 
 instructions, a wagon train of one hundred teams, is to be constantly 
 engaged in transporting corn to Vicksburg, and so far as this depart- 
 ment is concerned, Captain O'Neill, in'-^harge of forage at Vicks- 
 burg, is instructed to supply the animals entirely from the bluff, and 
 not to encroach on that in store. 
 
 The reports of Major Bennett and Captain Raphael, at Port Hud- 
 son, advise me there are thirty thousand bushels now stored at that 
 point. At this place and Forest, before transferring any corn to the 
 subsistence department, we had twenty -five thousand bushels in sacks. 
 I am informed by the report of Captain F. Ingate, quartermaster at 
 Okalona, that he has already shipped to Meridian and Enterprise 
 about twenty thousand bushels, and that he has engaged on the 
 Mobile and Ohio railroad sixty-eight thousand bushels. Captain W. 
 B. Lucas, of Macon, reports five thousand bushels. I have given 
 instructions to quartermasters and agents to purchase all that can 
 be procured, and I have good reason to believe that our supply will 
 be abundant. I have directed Mr. McFarland, my agent on the 
 Yazoo, to use every boat on that river to facilitate the purchase 
 and transportation of corn, and I know that, with the assistance I 
 have sent him, as well as that he will employ, that he will employ 
 all means to accomplish the prompt collection of all the corn to be 
 procured on that river and its tributaries. 
 
 I should also state that we have made large engagements of fod- 
 der. As soon as the press for removal of troops is over, we will fur- 
 nish it as required. 
 
 I know of no way to supply Port Hudson during the blockade 
 of the river, than by sending forward corn from this place. If 
 you direct, I will commence this transportation. 
 
195 
 
 I will retxm my efforts to procuro forage and allow no chanca 
 to pass. to procure ererything required in my department. 
 I am, Colonel, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 L. MIMS, 
 Major and Chief Quartermaster, 
 Department 3lfss'.^sippi and East Louistanji. 
 
APPE^^D!X 
 
 TO 
 
 GENERA 
 
 NEKTON'S EEFORT. 
 
• 
 
LETTER OF SECRETARY OF WAR 
 
 TO 
 
 GENERAL PEMBERTOISr. 
 
 C. S. A., War Department, ) 
 Richmond, October let, 1863. ) 
 
 Lieutenant General J. C. Pemberton, 
 
 Richmondy Va. : 
 
 General : At the suggestion of the President, I would call your 
 attention to several points in your recent report of operations 
 in Mississippi, "which it would be gratifying to me to have elucidated 
 or explained. 
 
 The first dispatch of General Joseph E. Johnston, from Jackson, 
 instructed you to advance and attack in the rear the corps of the 
 enemy at Clinton, and promised co-operation in such attack, on his 
 part. Clinton was on the railroad between General Johnston and 
 Jackson, and yourself at Edward's Depot. I understood this direc- 
 tion to instruct you to march towards Clinton at once, and by the 
 direct or nearest route, considering the rear to be the side most remote 
 from him, (General Johnston,) and nearest you, and not to have con- 
 templated that you should make a detour to come around on the rear 
 of the line bj which the enemy had advanced towards Clinton. Was 
 a different view entertained by you of the intent of this order ? 
 
 As the object of the order was to have the corps at Clinton 
 promptly assailed while separate and beyond support, I have sup- 
 posed it contemplated immediate movement on your part, to execute 
 it, and that the distance was not so great but that you might, could 
 you have marched at once, have reached and struck the corps in from 
 twelve to twenty-four hour. 
 
 Will you state the distance, and what obstacles preevonted move- 
 ment on your part for some twenty-six hours ? 
 
 I have deemed it unfortunate that on receiving this first dispatch from 
 Gen. Johnston, you, knowing that he must necessarily be very imper- 
 fectly acquainted with your position and resources, as well as with 
 the movements and forces of the . enemy, did not take the responsi- 
 bility of acting on your better knowledge, and maintain your pre- 
 conceived plan, or if unwilling to do that, that you did not at once 
 carry out strictly the order received. It appears to me the more to 
 
200 
 
 be regretted, that, having written to General Johnston that you would 
 move at once, though against your judgment, in execution of his in- 
 structions, you should afterwards have so far deviated from them as to 
 resolve to direct your movements towards Raymond instead of towards 
 Clinton. When you came to this resolve, you at once informed Gen. 
 Johnston, but it happened, unfortunately, that after the receipt of 
 your first, Gen. Johnston had been compelled to act by the advance of 
 the enemy on Jackson, and to proceed in evacuating, on the supposi- 
 tion that you were executing his first orders, and that you were more 
 easily to be approached by his moving out to the north rather than to 
 the south of the Vicksburg railroad. Had he known of your pur- 
 pose to move toward Raymond, the reasonable inference is, he would 
 have directed his movements southward, or more in the direction of 
 your proposed advance. I think it not unlikely misapprehension on 
 this subject prevented his so moving as to have enabled him to have 
 taken part in the battle so soon to be fought by you. 
 
 Will you explain more fully the motives for your deviation from 
 the direct execution of the instructions, and the consequences which 
 in your judgment would ha-ve resulted from pursuing the instructions 
 literally. 
 
 Were you acquainted with the movements of the several corps of 
 the enemy, when, as it appears, they were separated into two or more 
 distinct columns, separated by twelve or fifteen miles, and when you 
 were nearer to one, and perhaps to two, than they were to each other, 
 could you not have struck at one separately, and if so, what reasons 
 induced you to wait till nearly all their several forces concentrated 
 and attacked you on your march in obedience to General Johnston's 
 renewed order ? 
 
 While I have not approved General Johnston's instructions — as un- 
 der the circumstances, I think it would have been better to have left 
 you to the guidance of your superior knowledge of the position, and 
 your own judgment — I confess to have been surprised that, seeing he 
 had taken the responsibility of positive directions with a view to a 
 prompt attack on a separate detachment of the enemy, you had not 
 seized the occasion, while they were severed, to attempt the blow. I 
 consider the essential part of his orders to have been immediate ad- 
 vance and attack wi a separate column, and that if you could not exe- 
 cute that, you would have been well justified in attempting no other 
 compliance, and falling back on your previous plan. As it was, 
 V either plan was pursued, and invaluable time, and the advantage of 
 position, were lost in doubtful movements ; so, at least, the case has 
 struck my mind. 
 
 On another distinct point I should be pleased to have information. 
 How happened it that General Gregg, with his small force, was so far 
 separate from you, and compelled alone, at Raymond, to encounter 
 the greatly superior forces of the enemy ? Had he been placed at 
 such distance as a covering force to Jackson, the capital ? (or with 
 what view.) 
 
 To recur again to the battle of Baker's Creek, I should be pleased 
 to know if General Loring had been ordered to attack before General 
 
201 
 
 Cummings' brigade gave way ; and whether in your opinion, had 
 Stevenson's division been promptly sustained, the troops with him 
 ■would have fought with so little tenacity and resolution as a portion 
 of them exhibited ? Have you had any explanation of the extraor- 
 dinary failure of General Loring to comply with your reiterated or- 
 ders to attack ? And do you feel assured your orders were received 
 by him ? His conduct, unless explained by some misapprehension, is 
 incomprehensible to me. 
 
 You will, I trust, General, excuse the frankness with which I have 
 presented the foregoing subjects of enquiry. They will doubtless 
 only enable you more fully to explain the movements made by you, and 
 the reasons inducing them, to the satisfaction as well of others inter- 
 ested as of 
 
 Tours, with esteem, 
 
 JAMES A. SEDDON, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
t»c 
 
 LETTER OF GENERAL PEMBERTON 
 
 TO THE 
 
 SECRETARY OE ^^^R. 
 
 Richmond, November 10, 1863. 
 Hon. James A. Seddon, 
 
 Secretary of War, Richmond : 
 
 Sir : To your communication of the first ultimo, I have the honor 
 to make the following reply, taking the points presented in order as 
 you have placed them : 
 
 The first order from General Johnston was, I conceived, to move 
 on the rear of the corps of the enemy, known by him to be at Clin- 
 ton, and I believed his intent to be by the most dir««et route ; but as 
 he did not in his dispatch indicate by what route, it was consequent- 
 ly left entirely with my own judgment and discretion — had I seen 
 fit to move to Clinton at all — to decide the most advantageous route, 
 under the circumstances, for the advance. 
 
 I deem that to have made the movement to Clinton by any route, 
 but more especially by the *' most direct or nearest route," would 
 have been hazardous in the extreme — yes, suicidal ; for in that case 
 would my flank and rear have been entirely unprotected, and a large 
 portion of the enemy's force, of whoso position General Johnston 
 seemed to be entirely ignorant, could have interposed itself between 
 my army and its base of operations, Vicksburg, and have taken that 
 stronghold almost without a struggle, so small was the garrison after 
 I had withdrawn all my available force for the field. 
 
 The object, no doubt, of the order was, that the detachment of the 
 enemy at Clinton should be promptly assailed, ** while separate and 
 beyond support." But was it beyond supporting distance of the other 
 columns ? Of the position of the enemy I was not definitely in- 
 formed, but only knew that the whole of Grant's army — three corps — 
 had taken the general direction northeast towards the railroad. At 
 ' what point on this they would strike, or the positions of the two corps 
 not mentioned nor seemingly regarded by General Johnston, I was 
 not informed, except inasmuch as I had learnt from prisoners that 
 Smith's division was at Dillon's, and the rest of the corps to which he 
 "Was attached was near him. 
 
 Could I make the movement on the one corps at Clinton, irrespec- 
 
204 
 
 tive and regardless of the major force of the enemy ? — jeopardizing 
 my line of communication and retreat, and giving up Vicksburg an 
 easy capture to the enemy, the retention of which in our possession 
 I knew to be the great aim and object of the Government in the cam- 
 paign ; and for this end all my dispositions of troops had been made 
 and plans arranged — plans now subverted entirely by the order under 
 consideration ; for it had not been my intention to make any forward 
 movement from Edward's Depot, "but to have there awaited an attack 
 from the enemy, (which must have taken place in forty-eight hours, 
 or he would have been compelled to have sought supplies at his base 
 on the Mississippi river,) in a chosen position, with my lines secured, 
 and, if overwhelmed by numbers, with a way of retreat open across 
 the Big Black, and which line of defence I would have then held as 
 an obstruction to the enemy's investing Vicksburg. And this disar- 
 rangement of my plans caused *'the delay for some twenty-six hours 
 Not having contemplated an advance, all the arrangements had to be 
 made for the movement, all my available troops had to be collected, 
 and great diflSculty was caused by the heavy rain which fell in the 
 twenty-four hours succeQ^ding the receipt of the order. My move- 
 ment, considering the diflficulties to be encountered, and the prepara- 
 tions necessary to be made, was, I think, promptly executed, and 
 without *' delay," in the usual acceptation of the meaning of that 
 term. 
 
 General Johnston, not having consulted with me, or in any way 
 asked for my plan or opinion, I had perhaps no right to suppose 
 that he was " imperfectly acquainted with my position and resources, 
 as well as with the movements and forces of the enemy ;" but ion the 
 contrary, when he ordered my advance, I would have been just fied in 
 supposing that he must have been better informed as to the disposition 
 of the forces of the enemy than myself; but notwithstanding this, 
 had I been upheld by the opinions of my General officers, I would not 
 have advanced beyond Edward's Depot, as I deemed it very hazardous 
 to make any forward movement ; but would there have awaited, on 
 chosen ground, the attack of the enemy. 
 
 The interval which elapsed between my communication (informing 
 General Johnston, in the first, that I would obey his instructions at 
 once, though against my own judgment ; and, in the second, that I 
 would move in a direction to cut off the supplies of the enemy,) was 
 not long enough to change or interfere with any movement of his. 
 
 By no possibility could General Johnston have effectually co-oper- 
 ated with me in the movement toward Clinton. He, at that time, hav- 
 ing retired before the greatly superior force of the enemy, in the 
 direction of Canton, was some twenty miles distant from Clinton ; 
 and moreover, the enemy would certainly have forced battle from me 
 before I should have reached the latter place. ** The consequence 
 which, in my judgment, would have resulted from pursuing the in- 
 structions literally," would have been the certain fall of Vicksburg, 
 almost without a blow being struck in its defence, so overwhelming a 
 force could the enemy then have thrown, without opposition, on its 
 email garrison. For further elucidation on this point, I beg leave to 
 
205 
 
 refer you to an examination of the positions on the map accompanying 
 my report. 
 
 In consequence of my great deficiency in cavalry — the force of that 
 arm in my command being scarcely adequate for the necessary pick- 
 eting — I was was not *' acquainted with the movements of the several 
 corps of the enemy," but only knew, as before stated, that the general 
 direction of the whole of Grant's army was to the northeast, from its 
 base on Mississippi river. General Johnston, when he sent me the 
 first instructions for the movement on the detachment at Clinton, was 
 not informed of the position of the other detachments of the enemy ; 
 for he wrties me on the next morning, the 14th, that another corps of 
 the enemy, he learns, is at Raymond, to which he had not, in any 
 manner, referred in his letter of the 13th*. 
 
 Having concluded that it would be suicidal to make the direct ad- 
 vance to Clinton, I would have attempted **no other compliance" 
 with the order, had the opinion of my general officers in any manner 
 sustained me in so doing ; but they being all eager for an advance, I 
 made a movement in the shortest possible time to threaten the roads 
 to Raymond and to Dillon, thus to cut off the supplies of the enemy, 
 which a communication previously written (of 14th) by General John- 
 ston, but not received until after the battle of Baker's Creek, sug- 
 gested. General Gregg, with his brigade from Port Hudson, having 
 arrived at a point near Jackson, and being without his wagon trans- 
 portation, was ordered to take position at Raymond, (that being an 
 advantageous point for the collection of the troops, either to move on 
 the flank of the enemy advancing on Edwards' Depot, or to retire on 
 Jackson,) and on there being joined by the reinforcement which were 
 expected, and daily arriving, at Jackson, including, as I hoped, a 
 force of cavalry, to move on the rear and flank of the enemy, should 
 he attack me in position at Edwards' Depot. To await and draw on 
 this attack I had matured all my plans and arrangements, (Vide fol- 
 lowing telegrams to Generals Gregg and Walker on this point,) where 
 it will be seen that, though General Gregg sustained the advance of 
 the enemy ^nobly and bravely, my orders, however, were for him to 
 retire on Jackson, if attacked by a greatly superior force : 
 
 "VicKSBURG, May 11, 1863. 
 " General Gregg : From information from General Tilghman, of 
 the enemy being in force opposite the ferry at Baldwin's, it is very 
 probable that the movement toward Jackson is, in reality, on Big 
 Black bridge, in which case you must be prepared to attack them in 
 rear or on flank. 
 
 ** J. C. Pemberton, 
 ** Lieutenant General commandins^.^^ 
 
 "VicKSBURG, 3Iay 11, 1863. 
 " Brigadier General Walker, Jackson : 
 
 ** Move immediately with your command to Raymond. General 
 Gregg has been ordered, if the enemy advance on him in too strong 
 
 *RoymoDd ie eight miles from Clioton. 
 
206 
 
 force, to fall back on Jackson. You will do likewise, in conjunction 
 witb him. If the enemy advance on you in not too strong force, you 
 will meet them. If, instead of advancing on Jackson, he should ad- 
 vance on Big Black bridge,- the command, under direction of the 
 senior officer, will attack him in rear and flank. 
 
 " J. C. Pemserton, Lieutenant General^ 
 
 **VicKSBURG, May 11, 1863. 
 *' Brigadier General "Walker, Jackson : 
 
 ** Enemy is reported advancing in heavy force on Jackson. Hold 
 your command in readiness, and move towards Raymond, either to 
 support General Gregg, at that place, or to cover his retreat. Tele- 
 graph to hurry up reinforcements. 
 
 " J. C. Pemberton, 
 *' Lieutenant General commanding." 
 
 General Loring had been ordered to attack before General 
 Cumming's brigade gave way, and the order had been again and 
 again repeated; and, in my opinion, "had Stevenson's division 
 been promptly sustained," his troops would have deported themselves 
 gallantly and creditably. I have received no explanation of " the ex- 
 traordinary failure of General Loring to comply with my reiterated 
 orders to attack," and I do feel *' assured that my orders were re- 
 ceived by him." 
 
 Hoping, sir, that these explanations may be satisfactory, 
 I am, with respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 Lieutenant General commanding. 
 
ADDITIONAL RflPORT 
 
 or 
 
 GEISTER^L PEMBERTOISr. 
 
 Richmond, December 14, 1863. 
 Hon. James A. Seddon, 
 
 Secretary of War : 
 
 Sir: Having been allowed the opportunity of reading General J. 
 E, Johnston's report of the military operations in the Department of 
 Mississippi and east Louisiana, during the months of May, June and 
 July last, in justice to myself I request to be permitted to make the 
 following additional report : 
 
 The first order from General Johnston, dated at Jackson, the 13th 
 May, was received by me near Bovina, on the morning of the 14th, I 
 think, between nine and ten o'clock. It was in these terms : " I have 
 lately arrived, and learn that Major General Sherman is between us 
 with four divisions at Clinton. It is important, to re-establish com- 
 munication, that you may be reinforced. If practicable, come up in 
 his rear at once ; to beat such a detachment would be of immense 
 value ; the troops here could co-operate. All the strength you can 
 quickly assemble should be brought ; time is all important." 
 
 In this note. General Johnston does not intimate a probable move- 
 ment of the corps under General Sherman from Clinton upon Jack- 
 son, nor does he say how *• the troops here, at Jackson, could co-op- 
 erate," he only directs me for purposes named, ** if practicable to come 
 up in his (enemy's) rear at once." General Sherman, with his corps 
 of four divisions, was represented by General Johnston to be between 
 him and myself at Clinton. It was not clear to me by what route 
 General Johnston wished me to advance. If the enemy should await my 
 approach at Clinton and give me battle there. General Johnston would 
 have been in his rear, and might have co-operated ; or, if he advanced 
 upon Jackson and engaged the small force there, and I could, by any 
 possibility, in obedience to General Johnston's orders, have come up 
 in his rear whilst so occupied, there would have been co-operation. 
 But in either event, to unite our troops in this way, it is plain that 
 the enemy, whatever his strength, must be first completely routed. 
 
208 
 
 I see no other mode by which a junction could have been effected, 
 unless either General Johnston or myself should pass completely 
 around the position or moving columns of the enemy, I have no 
 reason to suppose he contemplated such a movement when he addressed 
 to me his note of the 13th. In the absence of special instructions as 
 to my route to reach the rear of the enemy at Clinton, I was certainly 
 at liberty to select that which I should deem the most advantageous ; 
 time, or the distance to be marched being only one element, though a 
 very important one, which should influence my selection. I have no 
 desire, however, to conceal the fact that my understanding of General 
 Johnston's orders was to move as rapidly as possible to attack Sher- 
 man's corps at Clinton or 'wherever I might find it ; and I believed 
 that his instructions were influenced by his supposing that these were 
 the only troops I could encounter, as no reference is made to any 
 other force of the enemy. It will be remembered, now, that I received 
 these instructions between nine and ten o'clock on the morning of the 
 14th, near Bovina, on the west of the Big Black river. I, at first, 
 determined to obey them at once, although, in my judgment, fraught 
 with peril and absolute disaster ; and so informed General Johnston, 
 Before leaving Bovina, I gave some necessary instructions to meet 
 this unexpected movement, and, as soon as possible, proceeded to Ed- 
 ward's Depot, where I arrived at about twelve o'clock, and learned 
 from prisoners just captured, that a corps of the enemy was on my 
 right flank, with one division of it near Dillons, It will be observed 
 in General Johnston's communication of 14th, given in my report, 
 unfortunately not received until the evening of the 16th, that he 
 informs me he was compelled to evacuate Jackson about noon on that 
 day; thus showing that, within less than three hours of my receipt of 
 his order, he was, himself, compelled to leave Jackson, the enemy 
 having moved from Clinton against that place. 
 
 And, in the same communication, he further informs me that a body 
 of troops which was reported to have reached Raymond on the pre- 
 ceding night, advanced at the same time from that direction. There- 
 fore, had I moved immediately, which I could not have done with 
 more than sixteen thousand effective men, I should have encountered 
 their combined forces in my front, had they chosen to give me battle ; 
 whilst McClernand's corps, upon my right, could either have inter- 
 posed betvfeen me and Vicksburg, or have moved at once upon my 
 rear. Nor could I have had much assistance from the reinforcements 
 referred to by General Johnston ; for, in the same communication, he 
 informs me that *' telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was 
 near, directing General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a 
 •point forty or fifty miles from Jackson, and General Maxcey to return 
 !to his wagons and provide for the security of his brigade, for instance, 
 by joining General Gist." He, himself, having moved on the 14th, 
 with the small force at Jackson some seven miles towards Canton, and 
 thus placed himself not less than fifteen miles, as I am informed, by 
 the nearest practicable route, from Clinton ; and, on the following 
 day, he marched ten and-a-half miles nearer to Canton and further 
 from Clinton, 
 
209 
 
 Let us suppose, therefore, for the moment, that neglecting all pro- 
 vision for the safety of Vicksburg, and by Avithdrawing Vaughan'e 
 brigade of fifteen hundred men from the defence of the Big Black bridge, 
 (my direct line of communication with Vicksburg,) I had swelled my 
 little army at Edward's Depot to seventeen thousand five hundred, (it 
 must be remembered Tilghman's brigade was west of Big Black guard- 
 ing the important apprcich by Baldwin's ferry, which was threatened 
 by the whole of McClernand's corps, and he could not, tberefo^jhave 
 joined me earlier than the morning of the 15th,) and that I had then 
 pushed hurriedly forward on the direct road to Clinton. I ask any 
 candid mind, what would probably — nay, what must certainly have 
 been the result ? I can see none other than the entire destruction or 
 capture of my army and the immediate fall of Vicksburg. Such were 
 ray firm convictions at the time, and I so expressed myself to my gen 
 eral officers in council, ami such they are still. 
 
 I have explained in my report, why, contrary to my own judg- 
 ment, and to the subversion of all my plans for the defence of Vicks- 
 burg, I determined to advance from my position at Edward's Depot, 
 and thus abandon the line of the Big Black, which (although I had 
 crossed when I learned that the main body of General Grant's army 
 was approaching the Southern railroad, to protect my communica- 
 tions with the east, and more easily to avail myself of the assistance 
 of my reinforcements which Avere daily arriving,) I was yet in a po- 
 sition to recross readily, by both the bridges at the railroad and by 
 Bridgeport, and thus defend my vital positions at Snyder's Mills and 
 Chickasaw bayou, if I should find that the enemy was advancing in 
 too heavy force against Edward's Depot. And I accordingly informed 
 General Johnston, on the 12th May, that the enemy was apparently 
 moving his heavy force towards Edward's Depot, adding, "that wili 
 be the battle-field if I can carry forward sufficient force, leaving 
 troops enough to secure the safety of this place (Vicksburg.)" 
 
 I was firmly convinced that the enemy's supplies must be very lim- 
 ited, as he*moved with but few wagons; and his dependence upon 
 those to be drawn from his distant base at Grand Gulf or Bayoo 
 Pierre very precarious. I had good reason, therefore, to believe that 
 he would be forced either to advance immediately upon Edward's De- 
 pot to give me battle, (which I should have accepted or avoided, ac- 
 cording to circumstances,) or to return at once to his base upon th»; 
 Mississippi river. 
 
 On the 7th May, and previous to my movement across the Big 
 Black, the President of the Confederate States telegraphed me as fol- 
 lows : " I am anxiously expecting intelligence of your further active 
 opcrntions. Want of transportation of supplies must compel the 
 enemy to seek a junction with their fleet, after a few days absence 
 from it. To hold both Vicksburg and Port Hudson is necessary to & 
 connection with trans-Mississippi. You may expect whatever it ie 
 in my power to do." 
 
 I have now thown how important I considered it not to advance be- 
 yond ray direct communication with Vicksburg, and close proximity 
 to the Big Black. Nor tvould I have done so, and I believe that every 
 14 
 
2i0 
 
 general oflScer of my command, who attended the council held at Ed- 
 ward's Depot, will sustain me in the assertion, (so far as his opinion 
 may go,) but for the orders received from General Johnston on the 
 morning of the 14th May. They know, one and all, the loud-voiced 
 public sentiment which urged a^ forward movement. They also know 
 (there may be an individual exception or two) how eager they them* 
 selves were, (though they differed as to the preferable movement,) to 
 leave the position in which they had been in line of battle from the 13th 
 to the morning of the 15th, and to advance upon the enemy; and 
 they know further the feeling of their respective commands on the 
 same subject. I have stated in my official report, and I reiterate 
 here, that ** I had resisted the popular clamor for an advance, which 
 began from the moment the enemy set his polluting foot upon the 
 eastern bank of the Mississippi river. I had resisted, I believe, the 
 universal sentiment of the army, I know of my general officers, in 
 its favor, (I now add there may have been an exception or two,) and 
 yielded only to the orders of my superiors. 
 
 I do not say, nor have I ever said, that General Johnston ordered 
 me to make the movement I did make. He did, however, order a for- 
 ward movement, the consequence of which would, in my judgment, 
 have been utterly disastrous had I attempted literally to execute it. 
 But when it was known that General Johnston had ordered an ad- 
 vance, the weight of his name made the pressure upon me too heavy 
 to bear. The council was, I think, nearly equally divided in opinion 
 as to the respective advantages of the two movements ; among others, 
 those of most experience and of highest rank, advocated that which 
 was ultimately adopted by my accepting what I declared to be, in my 
 judgment, only the lesser of two evils. 
 
 When, on the 28th April, General Bowen informed me by telegraph 
 that ** transports and barges loaded down with troops were landing 
 at Hard Times, on the west bank," I made the best arrangements 1 
 could, if it became necessary, to forward to his assistance as rapidly 
 as possible, all the troops, not, in my opinion, absolutely indispensa- 
 ble to prevent a coup de main, should it be attempted, against Vioks- 
 burg. It was indispensable to maintain a sufficient force to hold Sny- 
 der's Mills, Chickasaw bayou, the city front, and Warrenton — a line 
 of over twenty miles in length. 
 
 In addition to his troops at Young's point, (whose strength I had 
 no means of ascertaining,) which constantly threatened my upper po- 
 silions, the enemy had, as has already been shown, a large force at 
 Hard Times, and afloat on transports between Vicksburg and Grand 
 Gulf, which threatened the latter as well as Warrenton, where a land- 
 ing, undercover of his gunboats, might have been easily effected, and 
 his whole army concentrated there instead of at Bruinsburg ; and 
 this movement would have placed him at once west of the Big Black. 
 It was impossible for me to form an estimate of his absolute or rela- 
 • tive strength at the two points named. 
 
 To concentrate my whole force south and east of Big Black for tke 
 support of General Bowen against a landing at Grand Gulf, or any 
 other point south of it, not yet even apparently threatened, would, I 
 
211 
 
 think, have been unwise, to say the least of it. To show that I was 
 not alone in my opinion, I add a telegram from General Stevenson, 
 then commanding the troops in and about Vicksburg : ** The men will 
 be ready to move promptly. To cross* the Mississippi, both gunboats 
 and transports must pass the batteries at Grand Gulf. An army large 
 enough to defend itself on this side would consume much time in 
 crossing. As it is not known what force has been withdrawn from 
 the front, it is not improbable that the force opposite to Grand Gulf 
 is there to lay waste the country on that side, and a feint to with- 
 draw troops from a main attack here. I venture to express the hope 
 that the troops will not be removed far, until further developments 
 from below render it certain that they will cross in force. 
 
 On the 30th of April, I received, by telegraph from General Bowen, 
 the first information of the landing of the enemy at Bruinsburg, and 
 on the following day (May Ist) the battle of Port Gibson was lost by 
 us. In corroboration of the statement made with regard to the threaten- 
 ing aspect of affairs towards Vicksburg and its flank defences, I beg leave 
 to draw attention to the following dispatches from General Stevenson: 
 
 "Vicksburg, May 29. — * * * Eight boats loaded with troops 
 from our front are now moving up Yazoo. The display made in moving 
 them showed a desiro to attract oar attention." 
 
 *' May 30. — The enemy have been shelling Snyder's at long range 
 most of the day. Forney thinks that five regiments have landed at 
 Blake's lower quarters." 
 
 The only instructions or suggestions received from General John- 
 ston in reference to the movements at Grand Gulf, are contained in 
 the following dispatches, which were dated and received after the bat- 
 tle of Port Gibson, and when our army, in retreat from that posi- 
 tion, was recrossing the Big Black : 
 
 *• TuLLAHOMA, May 1. — If Grant's army lands on this side of the 
 river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beating it. For that 
 object you should unite your whole force." 
 
 ** TuLLAHOMA, May 2. — If Grant crosses, unite your whole force to 
 beat him. Success will give back what was abandoned to win it." 
 
 The question of supplies, and the necessity of a sufficient cavalry 
 force (whithout which I was powerless) to protect my communications, 
 in event of a movement south of Big Black, towards Bayou Pierre, 
 has been sufficiently referred to in the body of my report. 
 
 I have one more remark to make in reference to cavalry. General 
 Johnston informed me, about the middle of April, that he had ordered 
 a brigade to my assistance. So far as my knowledge extends, it did 
 not enter the limits of my department ; for a few days subsequently 
 General Johnston notified me that a strong force of the enemy in 
 front of Roddy prevented his leaving northern Alabama at that time, 
 and requested me, if possible, to send a force to co-operate with him. 
 To this I replied, under date of April 20th, from Jackson, reminding 
 him that I had but a feeble cavalry force, but that I would certainly 
 give Colonel Roddey all the aid I could, and added : ** I have virtu- 
 ally no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City, whilst the enemy is. 
 
212 . 
 
 threatening to pass (cress) the river between Vicksburg and Grand 
 Gulf, having twelve vessels below VicKsburg." 
 
 In relation to the battle of Baker's Creek, I wish to add a few 
 words, in elucidation of my official report. When I left my position 
 at Edwards' Depot, it was with the expectation of encountering the 
 enemy. I was, therefore, neither surprised nor alarmed when, on the 
 night of the 15th, I learned his close proximity. Nor should I have 
 then desired or attempted to avoid battle, but for my anxiety to com- 
 ply with General Johnston's instructions of the 15th instant, in which 
 he says : " The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving 
 directly to Clinton, informing me that we may move to that point 
 with about six thousand," The remainder of this dispatch is em- 
 bodied in my report. I used every exertion to comply implicitly with 
 his directions, but the enemy prevented it. It appears, as will be 
 (Seen by reference, that General Johnston supposed the enemy to be 
 Btill at Jackson, when he wrote on the 15th; while in his note of the 
 I4th, (received subsequently.) the enemy being then also at Jackson, 
 be informed me that the force under General Gist, he '* hopes, will be 
 able to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from 
 the east. This one (Gregg's, with which he was present in person,) 
 may be able to keep him from the country towards Panola. Can he 
 feupply himself from the Mississippi ? Can you not cut him off from 
 ):t, and, above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of sup- 
 plies, beat him ?'' The remainder of this dispatch is also embodied 
 in my report. 
 
 I here insert a dispatch from General Johnston, not given nor re- 
 ferred to in my report : 
 
 " Calhoun Station, 3Iay 16. — I have just received a dispatch from 
 Captain Yerger, infoiming me that a detachment of his squadron went 
 into Jackson this morning, just as the enemy was leaving it. They 
 (the Federals) took the Clinton road. It is matter of great anxiety 
 to me to add this little force to your army, but the enemy being exactly 
 between us, and consultation by correspondence so slow, it is difficult 
 to arrange a meeting. I will take the route you suggest, however, if 
 I understand it. We have small means of transportation, however. 
 Send forward a little cavalay to communicate with me orally. Is the 
 force between us too strong for you to fight, if it interposes itself?" 
 
 The various suggestions and instructions in these dispatches seem 
 to me to evidence a want of clear and well-defined plans; and all, 
 however, seem to ignore Vicksburg, the defence of which I had con- 
 ceived to be the main purpose of the Government in retaining the 
 ;%rmy in Mississippi. 
 
 I would only further remark, that when General Johnston, on the 
 13th of May, informed me that Sherman was at Clinton, and ordered 
 me to attack him in the rear, neither he nor I knew that Sherman was 
 in the act of advancing on Jackson, which place he entered at twelve 
 o'clock, on the next day ; that a corps of the enemy was at Raymond, 
 following Sherman's march upon Jackson, and that another corps was 
 raear Dillons, and, consequently, that the order to attack Sherman 
 could not be executed. Nor was I myself aware, until several hours 
 after I had received, and promised to obey, the order, that it could not 
 be obeyed without the destruction of my army ; but on my arrival at 
 
2LS 
 
 8 Depot, two hours after I received the order, 1 found a large 
 the enemy near Dillons, on my right flank, and ready to &t- 
 in the flank or rear, if I moved on Clinton. Not being able, 
 3, to make the movement, I determined, in consequence of the 
 icated by General Johnston's order for a forward movement 
 Dart, to make the only movement of that description which 
 • promise of success ; and in so doing I relinquished my own 
 the purpose of carrying out what I supposed to be those of 
 i^eneral Johnston. The battle of Baker's Creek, and the entire con- 
 sequences of my movement, resulted from General Johnston's order, 
 and he is, in part, responsible for them ; for if that order had never 
 been given, the battle of Bakers Creek would not kave been fought. 
 
 In relation to General Johnston's complaint that I had made my re- 
 port direct to the War Department, instead of to him, I am surprised, 
 inasmuch as General J. had been previously informed by the War De- 
 partment that I had the right to do so. 
 
 In conclusion, I earnestly ask that there may be as little delay &s 
 possible in reconvening the court of inquiry directed to inveatsgate 
 ftho subjects herein referred to. 
 
 Very rosp^^ctfnlly, your obedient servant, 
 
 J. C. PEMBERTON, 
 
 LieuL'nant General. 
 

 
 
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