DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY FRIENDS OF DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY GIFT OF IXike University Press Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/wordironyitscont01knox THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 0 THE WORD IRONY M AND ITS CONTEXT , 1500-1755 NORMAN KNOX DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 1 961 © 1961, Duke University Press Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 60-13606 Cambridge University Press, London, N.W. /, England Printed in the United States of America by the Seeman Printery, Durham, N. C. mw To Helen Davis Knox The publication of this book was assisted by grants to the author by the Graduate School of Duke Uni¬ versity and the Carnegie Institute of Technology and by funds from the grant to Duke University Press by the Ford Foundation. PREFACE In the last century and a half the word irony has become one of the most complex, ambiguous, and fascinating terms in the whole arsenal of literary criticism and analysis, to say nothing of its popu¬ larity in day-to-day speech. Cosmic irony, the popular irony of Fate, dramatic irony, Socratic and Romantic irony, the ironies of tension and paradox promulgated by the New Critics—we have only to try cataloging these and the rest to realize how complex are the meanings now available in this protean word; behind the recent notoriety is a long, involved, and sometimes important ca¬ reer which began in the age of Socrates. It is of some interest to have the history of such a word. G. G. Sedgewick wrote the first part of that history in a doctoral thesis presented at Harvard in 1913 when he traced the word from its first appearance in Aristoph¬ anes through Classical and medieval Latin; in the present study I attempt to continue his history by following the fortunes of the English word from the early sixteenth through the middle of the eighteenth century. I have had a second point of view in mind. Since it is not al¬ ways easy to know what Renaissance and Augustan writers meant when they used such terms as irony , a close study of them sharpens our tools for understanding these periods. Consequently I have pursued the uses of irony somewhat further than was necessary to a general history of the word and have in addition explored the meanings of banter and raillery , two other crucial words neither of which has been carefully studied before and both of which were intimately connected with irony. I had also hoped to survey two other subjects: English classical criticism of the art of ironic writing; the social and moral attitudes of the Augustans and their fore- Vlll PREFACE runners toward that whole range of discourse variously called satire, ridicule, raillery, humor, irony, and banter. In the long history of irony moral and social judgments have played an unusually large role, and this was especially true in the English classical period. However, only the first subject plays a part in this book. Although I have collected materials for a study of the second, that will have to wait upon another span of free time. It may seem to the reader that I have cited evidence and quoted it at inordinate length. I heartily sympathize, but determined on such extensive documentation for several reasons. The materials this study is based on are widely scattered in books and periodicals of all sorts, many to be found only in certain of the great research libraries; however, once found the bits of evidence are usually brief enough to be quoted rather fully. Simply as a convenience to scholars, then, full quotation and citation of sources seemed ad¬ visable. Other considerations also demanded extensive quotation. Although the central meanings of irony are not hard to substantiate, there is some question as to whether irony really did convey cer¬ tain peripheral meanings during the English classical period. Here the evidence needs to be displayed in all its ambiguity and scantiness. It is helpful, moreover, to see a number of passages illustrating each meaning, for, as we all know, even within defined limits the sense of a word adjusts itself, perceptibly but evasively, to a variety of contexts. I have tried to allow the reader to sample for himself the varieties of context to which each sense of irony adjusted itself. And I have frequently supplied a generous portion of context: any¬ one who has consulted the New English Dictionary knows how un¬ satisfying many of the illustrative quotations there are because of their brevity. Deprived of a covering definition, they would per¬ mit various interpretations of the word at issue. It is in Chapter II that I have assembled the mass of biblio¬ graphical evidence on the meaning of irony and have attempted to distinguish as precisely as I can among different senses of the word. As in a dictionary, ten basic meanings and a number of subordinate ones are numbered i through x with the subordinate meanings listed i.A.i. and so on. In cross-references I indicate a section of PREFACE IX the Dictionary so: “Diet. i.A.i.” Under each heading in the Dic¬ tionary certain materials follow in invariable order: a general defi¬ nition and discussion; a list of Classical precedents, if any (arrived at through G. G. Sedgewick’s studies, which should be consulted for more comprehensive listings, both Classical and medieval); a list of references to English texts. References to ambiguous pas¬ sages are followed by a question mark in brackets. The English list is broken at chronological intervals by quotations, sometimes fol¬ lowed by explanatory comments if they seem useful. When the list is taken up again it is preceded by the word “Also.” For the meaning of such a term as irony there are of course two types of evidence: the abstract definitions given by the period itself, to be found in rhetorics, dictionaries, and casual explanations; and the actual use of the word in contexts sufficiently concrete to de¬ fine its immediate meaning. The Dictionary relies heavily on actual use of the word: abstract definitions are notoriously ambiguous and in the average rhetoric and dictionary unthinkingly derivative. For this reason, and also because the stock definitions of the age were themselves a factor which influenced the development of meaning, I have chosen to consider them separately in a note preceding the Dictionary. Probably very few readers will want to pursue the meaning of irony through so detailed and interrupted a discussion as the Dic¬ tionary offers; even those who do may be grateful for a summary. This Chapter I supplies, as well as a concentrated history of the word’s meaning in Greek and in Classical and medieval Latin, and a discussion of the variety of meanings current in our own day. Chapter I, then, opens the book with a brief view of the whole his¬ tory of irony which for some readers will be enough of that, for others will be a helpful springboard into the Dictionary. In the first two chapters it becomes evident that for the Eng¬ lish classical age the central and dominant referent of irony was the rhetorical device of attacking someone or something from behind— or through—a mask of ostensible praise. In Chapter III I have isolated a large number of such ironies, each of which was actually called irony by someone writing during the period, and have at- X PREFACE tempted to analyze the varieties of technique associated with the word. In doing this I have tried not to read back into the eight¬ eenth century our twentieth-century ironies developed in the atmos¬ phere of subjective and individual psychology which began to per¬ meate our world not long after the Augustans passed off the stage; nor have I made any attempt to use the elaborate tools of stylistic analysis which sometimes lead us now to say rather different things about a literary work than the Augustans would have said. What I have tried to do in disentangling the scheme of techniques as¬ sociated with the word is to work from roughly the same point of view that critics of the English classical age would have taken if one had tackled the job, though none did. My purpose here is twofold: to catalog these techniques; and to fill out the central meaning of irony by analyzing the sorts of thing that were most likely to rise to the top of people’s brains when the word was pre¬ sented to them. However, granting that certain techniques were evident in writing called irony, to what degree did the sense of the word really involve the technique? We should be very cautious in answering this question. For instance, the “grave irony” of Cervantes and Richard Owen Cambridge in presenting their burlesques was often noticed by the Augustans. Both authors made conscious use of what nowadays we would call dramatic irony. Are we to conclude, therefore, that our sense of dramatic irony had already attached itself to the word? Chapter IV is a discussion of English classical criticism, both theoretical and practical, of the art of ironic writing and it proceeds after the usual fashion of such essays; then, at the end of the chapter, after reviewing certain developments detailed in Chapters III and IV, I have tried to answer this question about the meaning of the word. In Chapter V the meanings of raillery and banter are explored and their relationships to irony suggested. Errors of transcription have undoubtedly slipped unnoticed in¬ to some quotations and references. I have tried to keep these to a minimum and can only beg the reader’s tolerance of whatever errors of this sort have stowed away successfully. The staff of the Duke Press has been most helpful, and I am especially obliged to PREFACE XI Ashbel Brice, William Owens, and John Menapace for their ex¬ pert handling of a difficult manuscript. My thanks are due a number of libraries for their courteous generosity in opening their collections to me and helping me use them. The chief of these are the Houghton and Widener libraries at Harvard, the Bodleian at Oxford and the British Museum, the New York Public Library and the Columbia University Library, the University of Pennsylvania Library, and the custodians of the N.E.D. files at the University of Michigan. To Professors James L. Clifford, E. L. McAdam, and Pauli F. Baum I am indebted for their kind help in getting me started on this study; to Professor Clifford I am also indebted for the initial impetus towards publica¬ tion. Generous grants to the author from the Graduate School of Duke University and from the Carnegie Institute of Technology, and funds from the grant to the Duke University Press by the Ford Foundation, have helped to make publication possible. Professor Benjamin Boyce has, at considerable sacrifice of time and trouble, read the manuscript at each of its stages and counseled me on its revision, and Professor George Sherburn has also offered a number of useful criticisms. That I either began or finished this work, how¬ ever, is in large measure due to the unfailing aid and encouragement of Professor W. H. Irving, to whom as teacher and friend, I am above all deeply grateful. Bibliographical Note. In the notes to the body of this study I have given abbreviated references consisting of author’s name, short title, and in parentheses either the date of the edition used if I used an early edition, or the name of the editor, translator, or series if I used a modern edition, translation, or reprint. Full data can be found in the Bibliography. CONTENTS ONE. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 3 i. The Classical background 3 ii. The English classical age 7 iii. Groundwork for the modern ironies 16 TWO. THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 24 i. The currency of irony during the English classical period 24 ii. Stock definitions of irony and related terms 30 TEE DICTIONARY 38 I. IRONY AS PRETENSE AND DECEPTION 38 I. A. Constant dissimulation 39 i.b. Self-depreciation in order to achieve a practical end 41 i.c. Falsely attributing some attitude or act to another 41 II. IRONY AS LIMITED DECEPTION 42 II. A. A temporary deception which tricks one’s interlocutor into revealing the truth 42 II. b. Ambiguous language intended to conceal part of its meaning from part of the audience 43 iii. BLAME-BY-PRAISE AND PRAISE-BY-BLAME 45 III. a. Irony of manner 45 iii. b. Limited discourse 55 m.B.i. Praise-by-blame 35 m.B.ii. Blame-by-praise 58 iv. IRONY AS SAYING THE CONTRARY OF WHAT ONE MEANS FOR EMPHASIS, THE CONTRARY BEING NEITHER FALSE PRAISE NOR FALSE BLAME 76 1 v.a. Pretending to omit what one is all the while asserting 77 iv. b. Using any kind of contrary expression 77 XIV CONTENTS v. IRONY AS UNDERSTATEMENT 78 v.a. Denial of the contrary 79 v.B. Intimation 80 Vi. IRONY AS INDIRECTION 82 Vi.A. Statement of a corollary of one’s criticism without statement of the criticism itself 82 VI. B. Meaningful refly to a submerged meaning of a remark 83 vii. IRONY AS THE GRAVE ELABORATION OF A FICTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CASUAL SATIRE OR AIMLESS MYSTIFICATION 84 vni. IRONY AS ANY DISCOURSE NOT MEANT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY 90 ix. IRONY AS ANY KIND OF DERISIVE ATTACK 90 x. DRAMATIC IRONY 92 THREE. THE METHODS OF BLAME-BY-PRAISE ASSOCIATED WITH IRONY 99 i. Socratic self-depreciation 99 ii. Direct fraise 104 iii. Simple concession 111 iv. Ironic advice 116 v. Ironic defense 119 vi. The fallacious argument 123 vii. Burlesque 125 viii. The fictitious character 1 3 5 FOUR. CRITICISM OF THE ART OF IRONY 141 i. The glaring light of contrary comparison 141 ii. The two strategies of irony 142 iii. Clues to meaning 146 iv. The question of clarity 154 v. The mask of gravity 162 vi. The virtue of consistency 173 vii. The question of length 177 viii. The new critical importance of irony 181 ix. The meaning of the word again 185 CONTENTS XV FIVE. RAILLERY AND BANTER 187 i. Railing and Raillery 189 ii. Banter 208 BIBLIOGRAPHY 222 INDEX 253 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 ONE THE MEANING OF IRONY : INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY i. The Classical background} The ultimate force of Greek ecpwv may have been either “say¬ ing” or “asking,” but when it first appears in Aristophanes and Plato it seems to be “a sort of vulgar expression of reproach”— Billingsgate—meaning “sly, mocking pretence and deception.” In both Old (Aristophanes) and New (Philemon) Comedy the fox is the symbol of the ironist. “Sly, smooth deceiver—that is his char¬ acter.” The word is not found in Greek before the Peloponnesian War and is never found in tragedy or the more serious poetry. The central fact about the history of irony in Greek use is its inseparability from Socrates’ personality and influence. But it is essential to remember that neither Socrates nor his friends ever used the word in a serious way to describe the Socratic method, and that the idealizations of Socratic dialectic which modern writers have embodied in “Socratic irony” were never attached to the word irony in classical Greek and Latin. The dominant sense of eipwvsi'a in Plato as well as Aristophanes was “mocking pretence and decep¬ tion.” Nevertheless, since the modes of deception practiced by Socrates were sarcastic praise and disingenuous self-depreciation, the 1 What follows, including the quoted passages for which no references are given, is taken from G. G. Sedgewick’s “Dramatic Irony” (1913). The only available copy of this dissertation is not permitted to leave the Harvard College Library, but Mr. Sedgewick presented the main thread of the story, with the chief refer¬ ences to Classical and medieval texts, in the first of his Alexander Lecturer for I 934"3 5 (Of Irony , 1948). Although I have examined in translation many of the major passages to which he refers, I am entirely indebted to Mr. Sedgewick’s work for the generalizations here offered. 4 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-175; word was in Plato especially linked with these. Although there is some possibility that even before its use by Plato eipwveia had empha¬ sized the self-depreciating mode of deception, it was Aristotle in the Ethics who hardened this sense into shape by his distinctions be¬ tween the mean of Truth, the one extreme of Alazony or boastful exaggeration, and the other of Eirony or self-depreciating conceal¬ ment of one’s possessions and powers. Here for the first time irony attains some semblance of dignity, perhaps through its use by Soc¬ rates, insofar as Aristotle comments that if a man cannot tell the precise truth, he exhibits better taste in depreciating than in exag¬ gerating his virtues. But this is faint praise and the dominant connotation of the word remains reproachful. In Demosthenes and Theophrastus irony as deceptive self-depreciation takes another turn. Here it is “a vicious dissimulation of one’s political and social powers” for the purpose of escaping responsibility and shirking one’s duty. Theophrastus’ character of the Ironist describes a man who “never can be got to do anything, or to commit himself in speech so that he is forced to take sides in an active discussion. This is irony which has become a social vice.” In his Rhetoric Aristotle had recommended irony as a rhetori¬ cal weapon, although with some distaste, and the word had ap¬ parently long been discussed by the rhetoricians before its meaning in this context was defined, for the first time in extant literature, by the Rhetoric to Alexander , now credited to Anaximenes of Lamp- sacus, an historian of the fourth century b.c. To blame-by-praise and to praise-by-blame—that is the essence of rhetorical irony. Soc¬ rates’ way of exalting his opponent while depreciating himself was, as Ariston explained, a mode of it. By the second century b.c. irony had probably passed into common currency both in writing and in speech. It was no longer a colloquialism or necessarily a term of reproach. To the concept of irony the late Greeks and the Romans added little. Although Socrates was constantly in mind as they used the word and although they still felt in it over¬ tones of pretense, mockery, and self-depreciation, all of these were absorbed into the rhetorical strategy of “saying one and gyving to THE MEANING OF IRONY : INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 5 understand the contrarye.” This definition was a constant attend¬ ant upon later uses of the word. It was in Cicero that irony first attained to a complete and posi¬ tive dignity; he was flattered to be thought an ironist worthy of Socrates’ company. 2 And it was also Cicero who, for the first time in extant literature, distinguished between irony as a mere figure of speech and as a pervasive habit of discourse. The word “dis¬ course” should be emphasized here, for Cicero does not imply a habit of thought or anything approaching a philosophic view, as is clear in a passage often translated during the English Renaissance: “Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call etptov in every conversation, pretending to need information and pro¬ fessing admiration for the wisdom of his companion.” 3 This dis¬ tinction was made more exact by Quintilian, who, although he names only two categories, the “trope” and the “schema,” in effect distinguishes three categories of irony: (i) a brief figure of speech embedded in a straightforward context (“trope”); (2) an entire speech or case presented in language and a tone of voice which con¬ flict with the true situation (“schema”); (3) a man’s whole life (“schema”): “a man’s whole life may be coloured with irony , as was the case with Socrates, who was called an ironist because he assumed the role of an ignorant man lost in wonder at the wisdom of others.” 4 Moreover, irony for Quintilian may act as an indication and expression of that ethos “which is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous. . . .” 5 Thus Quintilian comes very near to describing irony as “a habit of genuine thought and conversation,” though it would be possible to avoid this implica¬ tion. 6 2 The charm which Socratic irony had for Cicero and other Romans is discussed in G. C. Fiske, “Plain Style in the Scipionic Circle” (1919) and Mary A. Grant, Ancient Theories of the Laughable (1924). 3 Cicero De officiis I. 30. 4 Quintilian Institutio IX. ii. 44-33. 5 Ibid., VI. ii. 9-16. 0 Although I am not at all qualified to speak on the subject, it does seem to me that Mr. Sedgewick pushes Quintilian’s conception of irony as an admirable habit of thought a little too far. 6 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 In the fifteen centuries between Quintilian’s death and the first appearance of irony in English little that was new happened to the word. The rhetorical definition of it as saying one thing and mean¬ ing the contrary—blame-through-praise or vice versa—was passed on from one rhetorician to another: Alexander Numenius (second cen¬ tury), Aquila Romanus (third century), Julius Rufinianus (prob¬ ably third century), Phoebammon ( ca . 400), Tiberius Rhetor, Mar- tinanus Capella (fifth century), Zonatus (fifth century), Isidorus (600-636), Bede, Gregorius the Corinthian ( ca . 1150). These rhetoricians often occupied themselves with distinguishing the minor varieties of rhetorical irony. Chleuasmus “is a speech which makes an attack under cover of a smile.” Mykterismus “is a mocking speech accompanied by a breathing through the nostrils.” Sarcasm “is to show the teeth.” Bede noted seven species of irony out of many. Several of the rhetoricians classified irony under allegory, which can of course be defined abstractly in terms almost identical with those used for irony. Quintilian had so classified it, Cocondrius named two sorts of allegory, irony and enigma, and Bede stated the connection. The Aristotelian concept of irony as genuinely deceptive self¬ depreciation did “not often exist in ‘a pure state’ outside of Aristotle and his school: its presence is usually as vaguely felt in later litera¬ ture as it was in Greek literature before Aristotle.” However, it seems to play a part in certain uses of the word by Cicero, Plutarch, Lucian, Philostratus, Justin Martyr, Themistius (the Byzantine rhet¬ orician of the fourth century), Suidas, and a rhetorician quoted in Bekker’s Anecdota Graeca. That irony of political and social self¬ depreciation noted by Demosthenes and Theophrastus apparently disappeared. The early Greek sense of “cunning deceit,” “vulgar, mocking pretence” clung to the word in that it sometimes expressed a greater disapprobation than we feel in it today. Aristotle’s praise was half¬ hearted at best, Themistius thought irony evil, Cicero “knew per¬ fectly well that an stptov was generally a person whom one shouldn’t know,” in Quintilian “irony seemed to carry with it grave and rea¬ sonable cause of offence,” Plutarch used the word to express dis- THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 7 approval, the general attitude of Dionysius of Halicarnassus to¬ ward ironists was hostile, Stobaeus (fifth century) thought irony vulgar, Pollux ( fl . 180 a.d.) called the ironist a “babbler,” and Hesychius of Alexandria (fifth century), Photius, and Suidas ex¬ pressed similar attitudes. But such disapprobation was not the dominant attitude. “Not late in ancient times men began to look upon irony as we look on it today: as a name and a method that carry no reproach save in being misused.” ii. The English classical age At the beginning of the sixteenth century an educated English¬ man could encounter Latin ironia in Quintilian and the medieval rhetoricians and lexicographers. The Latin word was, so far as we now know, first translated into English as “yronye” in Thordynary of Crysten men, 150X But throughout the century the Latin or French form of the word was as likely to turn up in an English context as the English form, and although an occasional author ostentatiously aired the word, it is fair to say that it remained esoteric and technical. As the first half of the seventeenth century pro¬ gressed irony became a more readily available English word. In 1615, for instance, appeared a book entitled Essayes and Characters Ironicall, and Instructive. But the word, though now available, continued to be a bit of “refined and elegant speech” rather than commonly current. During the Restoration it might have achieved wider currency than it did had not raillery been imported from the Continent, for raillery became the popular and easy word for refer¬ ring to the spate of controversial mockery that flowed from the printing presses 7 while irony remained relatively technical. It was perhaps Defoe’s specific defense of his Shortest Way with the Dis¬ senters as “ironic” that began the process which was to bring the word down from its pedestal, for this “irony” of his became a foot¬ ball for the various answerers to his explanation. But it was not until the decade of the 1720’s, after the clear-cut ironies of Defoe and Swift and the constant, obtrusive ironies of controversial pam- 7 See pp. 189-208 below. 8 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 phlets and periodicals, that irony became common in the literary and general discourse of the day. During this decade Thomas Gordon, the “Essay on Gibing,” the Craftsman, Orator Henley, the Dunciad, and Anthony Collins all paid emphatic attention to irony by name and thus made the word familiar to readers of popular literature. 8 In view of the relative unimportance of the word irony during most of our period, it need not surprise us that there were no major developments comparable to those Sedgewick has traced through Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, and the Rhetoric to Alexander, or those which remain to be traced in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The contribution of the English classical period was to introduce certain Classical concepts of irony into the main stream of English literary culture and to develop these older concepts in small ways. As it happened, the great achievements in the use of irony by English ironists of the Restoration and Augus¬ tan periods were precisely in that mode encompassed by the tradi¬ tional concept of irony as a verbal device of blame-through-praise. This fact stimulated the elaboration of that concept but it did not stimulate anyone to extend irony into startlingly new realms. Nor were the developments that did occur primarily the work of “great” authors, as Mr. Sedgewick seems to say they were in the Classical ages or as to some extent they have been in the last 170 years. So far as the English classical period is concerned, develop¬ ments grew out of the circumstances and spirit of the age, and they were often defined by little men voicing common thoughts. Thus in the history of irony’s meaning John Hoskins was more important than Ben Jonson; in criticism of the art of irony Thomas Gordon was more important than John Dryden. 9 This is not to say that no major authors of the period contributed at all to the history of the concept of irony. Gabriel Harvey seems to have had a wide acquaintance with the tradition of ironic writing from Aristophanes to Sir Thomas More and a real admiration for the fine art of the thing. 10 Francis Bacon had some interesting things to say about 8 For a more detailed discussion of the currency of irony, see pp. 24-30 below. * See pp. 24-30 below for evidence indicative of the relatively minor role played by most of this period’s “great” authors in developing the meaning of irony. 10 Diet. I.A, m.B.i, iII.B.ii. THE MEANING OF IRONY-. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 9 the philosophical method and the irony of Plato and his master, Socrates, comments which indicate the limits of the concept of Socratic irony in Bacon’s time. 11 Shaftesbury, inspired by his theo¬ ries of good taste and good humor and by an abiding esteem for Socrates, may well have been one of the few men during our pe¬ riod to view irony so named with independent originality. 12 More than any other English author Jonathan Swift elaborated and gave importance to the concept of irony as praise through seeming blame, and he also focused attention on the grave manner which came to be closely associated with irony. 13 Although both Pope and Swift used irony primarily to mean blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame, their lively perceptions led them to extend the word to other devices as well, devices not strictly definable as blame-by-praise. 14 Although Fielding’s contributions as a critic of the art of irony were con¬ siderable, his use of the word itself was conventional. It is evident, then, that the history of irony during our period was not a dialogue among great authors. Formal definitions, however, were important during our period because the word was not, until late, in frequent and easy use. Not being sure of it, people went to the definitions of the rhetorics and dictionaries for instruction. When these were misapplied, as they easily could be, irony found itself being used in strange ways. Never¬ theless, in spite of a considerable loss of interest in rhetoric after the Restoration, these stock definitions were by and large the start¬ ing points for thought about irony until well into the eighteenth century. After all, what else was there? It was only in the early eighteenth century, when ironic writing had become a popular and clear-cut mode, that people were impelled by such writing to pur¬ sue the concept of irony somewhat further than its conventional formulations. There were four of these. By far the most popular was the formula that irony is “saying the contrary of what one means.” Derived from Cicero, Quintilian, and the medieval rhetoricians, 11 Diet. m.B.i, Ul.B.ii. 12 Diet. 11. B, 111 .A, m.B.ii. 13 Diet. m.B.i. 14 Diet. m.B.ii, iv.b, v.b, vii. 10 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 this definition appeared regularly from Thordynary of Crysten men to Dr. Johnson. A much less popular formulation, although it turned up occasionally from Miles Coverdale to John Lawson, was that irony is “saying something other than one means.” Cicero had distinguished this irony as different from the first, because it does not say “the exact reverse of what you mean” but only some¬ thing “different.” Although this distinction was noted in one or two English versions of the formula, it was more often ignored. The third stock definition, less stereotyped in phrasing and more useful than the first two, had been stated by Quintilian as “to censure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretence of blame.” Though not stated as frequently as the first formula, this definition was used by a number of writers from Thomas Wilson to the Earl of Chester¬ field. Finally, the English defined the word as meaning any kind of “mocking or scoffing,” regardless of the rhetorical structure. Although Cicero and Quintilian had described irony as one type of jest, they had not extended the word’s reference in this wholesale way. But the definition seems to have reflected actual usage, as we shall see. 15 In the rhetorics of the Renaissance especially, three words were closely related to irony. Antifhrasis was used as a synonym, with no distinguishing difference. Sarcasm was also considered to be very near in meaning to irony , with the difference that it referred less definitely to a specific rhetorical method. The emphasis of sarcasm was felt to be on the “bitterness” of feeling displayed by a verbal attack, and generally speaking, this distinction continued in actual use into the eighteenth century. As we saw above, Quintilian and some of the medieval rhetoricians classified irony as a type of allegory. This connection continued in three Renaissance rhetorics— Sherry’s, Fraunce’s, and Puttenham’s. The association was based on the observation that both irony and allegory say something dif¬ ferent from what they mean. In the seventeenth century the con¬ nection fell into disuse. However in the Augustan age a number of writers—Thomas Gordon, Pope, the Publick Register , Allan Ramsay—pointed out the allegorical methods involved in certain treatises that were also ironical, and the irony involved in certain 15 For a more detailed discussion of stock definitions, see pp. 30-37 below. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 11 allegories. But none of these men identified irony and allegory as variations of the same method, and Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopaedia for 1778-88 pointed out the all-important difference: “allegory im¬ ports a similitude between the thing spoken and intended; irony a contrariety between them.” 16 When we turn to actual use of the word irony in contexts suf¬ ficiently explicit to limit its meaning, we find that the situation was somewhat more complicated than the abstract formulas indicated, and that certain developments, relatively minor in nature, did oc¬ cur during these 250 years. Although it was certainly not common or conventional, the sense of deception which had been attached to the word in Aristophanes, Plato, Aristotle, Demosthenes, and Theophrastus and which con¬ tinued as an overtone in some medieval writers, also cropped up during the English classical period. The instances of such use be¬ fore 1640 can all be explained as Classical reminiscences of the kind we might expect to find during this period of self-conscious recovery of the Classical heritage. Thus Thordynary of Crysten men, which contains the earliest appearance of irony as an English word, trans¬ lates into Christian terms the Aristotelian doctrine of the two ex¬ tremes which depart from the mean of truth: the lies of boasting, called “jactaunce,” and the lies of self-depreciation, called “yronye.” 17 Near the end of the century there is in several of Gabriel Harvey’s uses of irony the distinct sense of genuinely deceptive speech and action, clearly derived from his acquaintance with Classical usage. 18 In his Christian Morals Sir Thomas Browne uses irony to mean “constant dissimulation,” and one suspects that he chose the word to display his erudition, for in his day dissimulation was the natural and common word to use here. 19 The relationship of irony and dissimulation was actually rather complicated. When Greek irony had been adopted into Latin it had not always been transferred as ironia; it had frequently, as in Cicero, been called dissimulatio. Consequently several Renaissance 16 For a more detailed discussion of words related to Irony see pp. 35-37, i35n. below. 17 Diet. 1.6. 18 Diet. 1.A. 19 Diet. 1 .a. 12 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-!755 handbooks, notably Thomas Wilson’s Rhetorique and Hoby’s Cour¬ tier , discussed the various devices of rhetorical irony under the term dissimulation —without any notion of conveying the sense of actual and complete deception. At the same time, since English irony did not customarily retain the Classical sense of deception, English translators often preferred other words to translate Greek eipwveia when it was meant to convey this sense, and dissimulation was a natural English synonym which they often chose to use. This rather confusing situation cleared up after the early seventeenth century. Thereafter dissimulation was rarely used to name the ironic devices of verbal attack but continued to be an available sub¬ stitute for irony as real deception. 20 The sense of deception in irony did not, however, totally dis¬ appear with the Renaissance. Two uses of irony as at least limited deception, dated 1640 and 1696, can probably be dismissed as obtuse or disingenuous misapplications of a stock definition to suit an argu¬ ment. 21 But in the Augustan age there was a very real sense of the trickiness involved in much of the controversy and pamphlet warfare of the time. It seemed to some people that the rigor of battle and the rigor of the laws led a few ironists to use less than honest irony 5 that is, the insincere praise of the ironists was not really meant to be seen through at all, or not, at least, by those who could harm the ironist. Thus irony once more attached to it¬ self upon occasion the overtone of actual deception, though this usage was not frequent. 22 By far the most frequently used meaning of irony was, during the English classical period as during the preceding eighteen or nineteen centuries, “censure through counterfeited praise.” This meaning was attached to the word upon its first appearance in Eng¬ lish, and thereafter, according to my sampling, two out of every three appearances of irony utilized it. So dominant was this sense that people sometimes assumed that if a device was referred to as irony it must necessarily be blame-by-praise, although it might in actuality be something else. 23 The stock definitions always linked 20 Diet. 1. 21 Diet. 11.A and ii.b. 22 Diet. i.C and ii.b. 23 Diet. m.B.ii. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 13 blame-by-praise with “praise through counterfeited blame,” but this sense was much less frequently invoked in actual use of the word. Only after Swift and his group had made praise-through-blame a pervasive and delightful mode of letter-writing and conversation did this sense gain importance, and it is worth adding that only in this sense did irony achieve a positively warm and agreeable con¬ notation. 24 To blame-by-praise, then, was the central and dominant mean¬ ing of irony. But it was not the only meaning. No doubt there are a number of ways by which a word can widen its area of reference, but two of them were especially important to the history of irony. First of all, the irony of blame-by-praise has a feeling, an atmosphere, which is characteristic. It sometimes happened that people felt this efFect and called the device which elicited it irony , although analysis shows that the device was not blame-by-praise. Second, we have seen that the most popular definitions of irony were not “blame by praise” and “praise by blame” but were more abstract: “saying the contrary” or “saying something different.” Such definitions could lead a writer to call a thing irony which was not blame-through-praise. These factors came into play especially when the rhetoricians, beginning with Cicero and Quintilian, set out to illustrate and classify various rhetorical devices. Thus the device sometimes called fraeteritio or negatio was called irony in the rhetorics of Quintilian, Abraham Fraunce, John Smith, Hobbes, and Anthony Blackwall. By negatio we refuse to say what in fact we are saying: “I will not call him a thief, I will not name all the safes he has cracked.” And of course this refusal is the “contrary” of what we mean. Moreover, Quintilian and at least a few writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries used irony to refer to certain other logical contraries than this, as when Pope commented on Swift’s setting out “to praise the Court, or magnify Mankind.” It is only fair to add that a number of the uses of irony to name such contrary speech which is not blame-by¬ praise do have a tenuous connection with blame-by-praise. Pope was attributing to Swift an attitude of approbation rather than one 24 Diet. in.B.i. 14 the WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 of disapprobation, and negatio sometimes refuses to blame. But since not all the instances I have collected can produce even a ten¬ uous relationship to blame-through-praise, it seems reasonable to consider this sense of irony , i.e., the employment of contraries other than those of praise and blame in saying the opposite of what one means, an established, though minor, meaning of the word. 25 Cicero and Quintilian both exercised a good deal of ingenuity in discussing and classifying jests. One of the obvious characteristics of many jests is indirection, which produces surprise5 indirection is also an invariable characteristic of the irony of blame-by-praise. It may have been this likeness of effect, this working by implication rather than by direct statement, which led Cicero and Quintilian to connect two types of jest with irony. One is the statement of a corollary of one’s criticism without statement of the criticism itself. Thus Afer replied to Didius Gallus, who after making great effort to secure an appointment complained on getting it that he had been forced into accepting, “Well, then, do something for your country’s sake.” 26 The second type is the meaningful reply to a submerged meaning of some remark. For instance, when a witness asserted that the accused had attempted to wound him in the thighs, Gaius Caesar replied, “What else could he have done, when you had a helmet and breastplate?” 27 Like the irony of blame-by-praise, these tactics are indirect attack, but they are not blame-by-praise. Al¬ though English rhetoricians did not use general terms with any great consistency in referring to jests, some did classify such in¬ direct verbal attack under irony, and there are one or two instances in casual writing during our period of the same extension of mean¬ ing. 28 With the exception of the irony of manner, which we will re¬ turn to shortly, we have now surveyed the fortunes during the English classical period of the various meanings that first appeared in the Classical use of our word. But the English were not un¬ original during this period, although their first contribution may be 25 Diet. iv. '"Quintilian Institutio VI. iii. 68. " 7 Ibid.., VI. iii. 89-92. 28 Diet. vi. THE MEANING OF IRONY : INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 15 considered somewhat unfortunate. We have already observed that one of the stock definitions for irony throughout the English classi¬ cal period was “mockery, derision,” 29 and this definition seems to have reflected actual usage. It is not difficult to understand how, in the Renaissance at least, the name of a particular kind of derision could be used loosely to refer to any kind of derision, especially since irony was not a very familiar term and the period had a cavalier attitude toward words. Perhaps this usage would have died out in the Restoration and Augustan periods had it not been for the tremendous quantity of blame-by-praise irony that was pub¬ lished. Much of this was very complicated stuff and no one could be blamed for not trying to distinguish in every case between blame- by-praise derision and other kinds, especially since blame-by-praise probably was the dominant mode. Consequently one occasionally encounters in the early eighteenth century as well as in the six¬ teenth and seventeenth the general use of irony to mean simply derision, mockery, ridicule of any sort. 30 The second innovation made by the English was to use irony for the sort of understatement we are familiar with in Anglo-Saxon literature. In the rhetorics of the English classical period such understatement was discussed regularly under the names litotes and meiosis. However, at the end of the sixteenth century John Hos¬ kins, apparently for the first time, called it irony., and in this de¬ velopment we see once more the feeling of the thing together with the ambiguity of stock definitions leading to an extension of mean¬ ing. Just as all blame-by-praise irony works by indirection and im¬ plication, so too can understatement work by “Intimation” and “dis¬ sembling,” as Hoskins comments. It says something different from what it means and leaves the intended meaning “to our under¬ standing.” Moreover, understatement often has somewhat the effect of blame-by-praise or praise-by-blame. Thus, to say of a man that he is “no notorious malefactor,” meaning he is just short of being that, has the surface effect of defending him. Or to say of an Atlas “Milo had but a slender strength” has the surface effect of minimizing his strength when in actuality we go on to praise it. 29 See p. 34 below. 30 Diet. IX. l6 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Some such factors as these led Hoskins on to illustrate under irony the kind of understatement which in fact uses a method quite dif¬ ferent from blame-by-praise, for to say “Titormus had a reasonable good arm” when we mean that he had a remarkably strong one is not to blame him but to understate his capacity. Thomas Blount and John Smith, as we know, copied from Hoskins, and thereafter understatement seems to have been an available meaning of irony, as it is today. 31 The chief contributions of the early eighteenth century seem to have grown out of the nature of its satiric literature. We have al¬ ready noted that a great deal of this satire was blame-by-praise irony, much of it employing very complicated techniques. We have only to think of the Tale of a Tub, the History of John Bull, the Scriblerus papers, Gulliver’s Travels, and Jonathan Wild to realize how prominent was the technique of using a fictional structure of some sort to elaborate, or to serve as the vehicle of, an irony. Such fictions were not meant to be taken seriously even as fiction, and readers of the Augustan age became quite sophisticated about such things. They were exceedingly conscious that almost any pamphlet or periodical they happened to pick up might proceed very gravely to pull their leg, usually with the intention of satirizing someone or something and often by means of a simulated appro¬ bation of it. Considering the vague and cavalier way in which such terms as irony, ridicule, raillery, and banter were popularly used under the impact of such literature, we need not be surprised that the Augustans sometimes extended irony to mean any kind of discourse not meant to be taken seriously, or any gravely elaborated fiction the purpose of which was to mystify or satirize—whether through blame-by-praise or some more direct method. 32 iii. Groundwork for the modern ironies But what of those ironies which have become catchwords in the last 170 years? During the English classical period did no one 31 Diet. v. 32 Diet, vii and vm. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY I 7 use irony to mean the irony of Fate? dramatic irony? the irony of philosophic detachment? Before we can settle this point it is crucial to arrive at working definitions of these modern ironies. David Worcester’s dissection of contemporary meanings is a good starting point. He arrives at a definition of the irony of manner through analysis of the individual manners exhibited by the eiron of Greek comedy, Socrates, Chaucer, ingenu satire of the eighteenth century, and of the twentieth. 33 The eiron of Greek comedy “is the close¬ mouthed Yankee who has no objection to being thought a fool. He will even encourage his detractors by speaking in a thick dialect, tugging his forelock obsequiously, or otherwise depreciating him¬ self.” 34 The whole personality of Socrates is a complex and sophisti¬ cated analogy to this rather simple character-type of comedy. In argument and philosophical inquiry that personality expresses it¬ self by feigning ignorance and asking disingenuous questions under a mask of sympathetic approval. “As in jiujitsu, the expert presses gently and the victim ties himself into knots.” 35 But more than this, Socrates was able to encompass the most diverse contradictions without faltering. He could take both philosophers and street- corner loafers seriously; he was at home in aristocratic society or in the marketplace. He hid mystical ideas beneath ugliness and buffoonery; he claimed to be the most ignorant and was declared by the oracle to be the wisest man in Greece. He could treat the most serious and the most comic matters in the same breath. Chaucer exploited the manner in his own way. In his poems he appears “bashful and a little weak in the head” and is “all anxiety to please,” 36 with ready sympathy for another man’s point of view. Literary powers he makes no claim at all to—he is merely the stenographer, the translator, the harmless drudge. Too, he is a somewhat lonely figure in the band of pilgrims, “in the company but not quite of it, observant of every nuance despite his downcast eyes ... he preserves his own detachment instead of wooing the 33 David Worcester, Art of Satire (1940), pp. 90-108. 34 Ibid., p. 92. 35 Ibid., p. 94. 36 Ibid., p. 95. l8 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1753 regard of anyone.” This, says Worcester, “is the very bearing of the ironical observer”; 3 ' Chaucer’s “ironical manner . . . diffuses an air of genial skepticism and penetrating humor through his major writings.” 38 In the voyages imaginaires of the eighteenth century the irony of manner received a new incarnation in the “simple soul” who relates his adventures, “a plain, matter-of-fact sort of man, a close observer of detail, but no critic of higher principles and no philos¬ opher.” 39 The twentieth century has given the manner a further twist: Theodore Gumbril in Antic Hay, Walter Bidlake in Point Counter Point, by Aldous Huxley; Paul Pennyfeather in Decline and Fall, Adam Fenwick-Symes in Vile Bodies, by Evelyn Waugh—all follow a common pattern. They are gray, subdued observers in a world of startling events and startling people. . . . Through their wondering eyes we have a kaleidoscopic vision of a violent, chaotic, and purposeless civilization. There is something new and striking in this development of the ingenu theme. Older writers used irony as a means of lending force to their creative beliefs. The Socratic irony takes wing into the Platonic myth. Swift’s writings constitute an inverted evangel of reason. Behind Vol¬ taire’s icy grin is the burning resolve, “ Ecrasez I’infame!” But the irony of the modern hero serves no ulterior purpose and reveals no creative thought. It is irony for its own sake; a manner worn as a protective garment by a dissociated and neurotic personality. . . . this sort of irony turned back on itself is the natural vehicle for the writer who wishes to jar our civilization into the realization of its own frustration and spiritual chaos . 40 Our guide now turns to dramatic irony and the irony of Fate. Relying on their “knowledge of life,” their assumption that in a particular situation certain facts and principles are dependable guides, men proceed to act on them in the expectation that foreseeable and desirable results will follow. Regrettably, what follows is often exactly the consequence they did not foresee and least desire. They can perhaps then look back to see that certain facts would have forewarned them if they had not been blind, oblivious of the preg- 37 Ibid., p. 98. "''Ibid., p. 1 o 1. ""ibid., p. 103. 40 Ibid., pp. 106-8. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 19 nant omens. Now, their eyes open, they see that they were de¬ ceived—by Fate? Just as a conceited fop may after being deceived by ironical encomiums on his beauty see through the disingenuous praise, just as an innocent reader may after being deceived by Socrates’ self-depreciation and mock sympathy penetrate his real intention, so in everyday life a man may feel that some omniscient Fate has been cleverly misleading him toward an unexpected event. He calls this “the irony of Fate.” When the irony of Fate occurs in a piece of literary art two other factors are usually part of it. First, the omens of the final event can be controlled by the author. He may, if he likes, use soothsayers, prodigies, and portents; he may use the equivocations of oracles 5 he may use double-edged language of any sort. Al¬ though the characters in the play are blind to any underlying significance in these omens, the audience understands it—as the characters too will eventually understand it. Thus, just as in the Modest Proposal we follow Swift’s real meaning as he says one thing and means another, so we follow the omens of a play which mean one thing to the characters caught up in it and mean another to us, the audience. Here we have dramatic irony , also sometimes called tragic and Sophoclean irony. In dramatic irony, the ringmaster disappears. There is no signpost, not even a misleading one, to inform the spectators that irony is present. All the work of detection and interpretation is left to them. There is no obligation to explore beneath the surface level of the narrative. As a result, everyone who does so is translated into a ringmaster on his own account. To detect for oneself the freakish operations of chance in hu¬ man life, the opportunities missed by a hair, the warnings ignored, the prayers that, granted, bring destruction, is to be the omniscient author, to look down from a great height, and to feel a complete detachment from human affairs . 41 Such detachment is what produces the highly complex irony of, for instance, Aldous Huxley as he juxtaposes human passion and biological determinism, the emotional content of music and the mechanics of sound, sentimentalism and behaviorism, rationality and irrationality. Ibid., pp. 119-20. 41 20 the WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Romantic irony, says Mr. Worcester, is simply a vague historical term which can be reduced to the two meanings already distin¬ guished: What Schlegel admired was dramatic irony, in which the author sup¬ presses his own personality and arranges his materials in such a way that every spectator is his own ironic observer. Although the author is in¬ scrutable, he is revealed in the choice and juxtaposition of materials. What Tieck practised was irony of manner, bolstered up by the traditional tricks of burlesque. . . . Tieck’s fictitious personality, constantly intruding in his work, is reminiscent of Sterne, Cervantes, Fielding, and Byron, though less finished than any of these . 42 Mr. Worcester, then, would like to reduce the terms for modern concepts of irony to two, or possibly three: irony of manner; dramatic irony; and the irony of Fate where dramatic irony is inappropriate. It is only fair to warn the reader that Mr. Sedgewick breaks down this complex of ideas in a somewhat different way and uses different names. Thus he limits Socratic irony to Socrates’ dialectical meth¬ od. 43 Isolating that element of detached observation which plays a part in Worcester’s irony of manner and dramatic irony, Sedgewick calls it the irony of detachment or spiritual freedom. “By this we mean the attitude of mind held by a philosophic observer when he abstracts himself from the contradictions of life and views them all impartially, himself perhaps included in the ironic vision.” 44 Romantic irony, Mr. Sedgewick goes on to say, is a form of this irony of detachment. 45 Dramatic irony he defines in much the same way as does Worcester, except that he does not include under it the concept of spiritual detachment. There is no disagreement over the irony of Fate. For further observations on the meanings of irony as they have developed over the past 170 years the reader may turn to A. R. Thompson, J. A. K. Thomson, F. McD. C. Turner, and the commentators listed by Haakon Chevalier. 46 42 Ibid., pp. 125-26. 43 G. G. Sedgewick, Of Irony (1948), pp. 12-13. 44 Ibid., p. 13. 45 Ibid., pp. 14-18. 46 A. R. Thompson, The Dry Mock (1948) ; J. A. K. Thomson, Irony (1927) ; F. McD. C. Turner, Irony in English Literature (1926); H. M. Chevalier, The Ironic Temper (1932). THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 21 “I am confident,” says Mr. Sedgewick, “that Socratic irony con¬ tains the germs of all the newer ironies which have so afflicted the literature of the last century.” 47 It is certainly true that modern minds have found at least four distinct ironies in the life of Socrates. There was first of all his repeated use of the limited figure of speech which we have called blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame. There was, second, Socrates’ elaboration of this figure into his dialectical method, a novel and fruitful technique for puncturing sham and pursuing truth. It is this dialectical method which Mr. Sedgewick means by Socratic irony. Third, there was Socrates’ whole way of life, his deepening of self-depreciation and mocking sympathy into a pervasive manner of action toward people and ideas and events. This Mr. Worcester calls the irony of manner. And finally, there was Socrates’ genius at encompassing the most diverse elements in harmonious thought. In this Mr. Worcester finds what Sedge¬ wick calls the irony of detachment. So far as I have been able to discover, no one during the English classical period used the word irony to refer to a dialectical method, either Socrates’ or anyone else’s, 48 and no one found in Socrates the irony of detachment. It is, I think, fair to say that most people during this period thought of Socrates’ irony as simply a famous example of mixing blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame in an extraordinarily effective figure of speech. We have already noted that Ariston and Cicero and Quintilian had so described it, so that from the beginning of the English classical period people would have been familiar with the idea. 49 But we observed above, in our survey of Classical notions of irony, that Cicero and especially Quintilian had also distinguished between irony as a figure of speech and irony as a pervasive man¬ ner, a manner which in the life of Socrates permeated all his actions and words. Quintilian’s observations were of course available to English thought from the beginning of our period, and it is cer¬ tainly true that the English were aware not only that Socrates used irony as a figure of speech but also that he used this figure con- 47 G. G. Sedgewick, Of Irony (1948), p. 13. 48 Diet. Ill.B.ii n. 5. 49 Diet. m.B.i and Ill.B.ii. 22 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 stantly. But there is a difference between the repeated use of a verbal device and the extension of the principle of that device through the creation of a whole personality, and in English classical references to Socrates’ constant use of irony it is usually impossible to discern whether the irony of manner is implied or not: certain references and translations during the Renaissance and later may imply it. In Shaftesbury, however, I think we do find the word irony used to name a manner, inspired by Socrates, that is very near our own conception. So far, then, Sedgewick is right; what¬ ever notion of our irony of manner there was in the English classi¬ cal period stemmed from Socrates. There is, however, the star¬ tling exception of Fulke Greville, who used “Ironia” to name the irony of manner which an author may assume throughout the whole of one of his works. Greville’s use of irony does not seem to be directly inspired by Socrates, although it is reminiscent of the Classi¬ cal notions of self-depreciation. 50 The case of dramatic irony is even more ambiguous. In Thomas Nashe I have unearthed two contexts and in Robert Burton one context in which irony appears, seemingly, to mean dramatic irony as Worcester defines it. Whether this meaning was consciously intended or was accidental, whether as Nashe and Burton were playing with words in their exuberant Renaissance way the word irony accidentally exploded, I have no way of determining. 51 What does seem clear is that people did not notice the explosions, for I have found no later uses of irony which invoke this sense of the word in a clear-cut fashion. On the other hand, certain mid¬ eighteenth-century developments in the methods and criticism of blame-by-praise irony do seem to indicate how a sense of dramatic irony evolved. These developments are discussed in Chapters IV and V below, where we find that in the second quarter of the eight¬ eenth century irony began to be used rather frequently to name the ironic approval of an author in presenting fictitious characters and situations, characters and situations which an audience discovers to be ridiculous through interpretation of the dramatic situation it- 60 Diet. III.A. 61 Diet. x. THE MEANING OF IRONY: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 23 self rather than through ironic comments made by the author in his own person. Although I do not myself think that mid-century writers used the word irony to mean any more than the ironic ap¬ proval of the authors of such fictions, it is not hard to see how frequent association of the word with such dramatic constructs might lead to the extension of meaning we are looking for. 52 52 See pp. 185-86 below. TWO THE MEANING OF IRONY : THE DICTIONARY i. The currency of irony during the English classical feriod By the mid-eighteenth century irony as an English word had passed through three stages. (i) During the sixteenth century the term was seldom used except in technical works and by an occasional author airing his erudition. The English classical rhetorics and dic¬ tionaries sometimes specify the French ironie as mediator in bring¬ ing the Latin ironia into English 1 —as does Skeat 2 —but in the linguistic travail of sixteenth-century England it was often doubt¬ ful that irony was naturalized; the Latin or another form was as likely to turn up in an English context as the English. (2) In the seventeenth century the English form was customarv and capable of natural use in an erudite context, but it was by no means a part of popular speech or even of general literary discourse. (3) In the first decades of the eighteenth century irony began to appear, though not widely, in general literary discourse; then between 1720 and 1730 it settled into literary discussion and general speech as one of the conventional terms of literary reference. The reason for this final development is evident. The clear-cut ironies of Defoe and later of Swift and the constant, obtrusive ironies in contro¬ versial pamphlets and periodicals were matters of daily talk from 1 John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), p. 45; “Ironical, Ironique, F. of Ironicus, L. of ’Etpcovtoo;, Gr .”— Bailey, Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1724); “Irony (of ironia, L. of eipwo, G. a dissembler)” — Benjamin Martin, Lingua Britannica Reformata (1749); “Irony, n.s. ironie, Fr. i spoivsia” — Johnson, Dic¬ tionary (1755-56); “Irony ironie , F. of ironia , L. of etpwvsta, Gr.”—Bailey, Universal Etymological English Dictionary (1766). 2 W. W. Skeat, Concise Etymological Dictionary (1882). THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 25 the City through Covent Garden, St. James’s, Westminster and out to Twickenham; the word had to be taken off its pedestal to deal with this pervasive thing. But at the beginning of the sixteenth century only the best educated were acquainted with it. J. A. K. Thomson remarks that “the word was hardly in use in Latin, and in English not in use at all.” 3 It was, however, available in the medieval rhetoricians and lexicographers, 4 and in Quintilian, whose influence dominated educational circles. 5 The English form “yronye” appeared, so far as we know at present, for the first time in Thordynary of Crysten men , 1502. 6 In Whytinton’s 1534 translation of Cicero’s De of- ficiis I.30, Socrates was “a symuler whom the grekes call irona.”" 1 In Wylkinson’s 1547 translation of Aristotle’s Ethics the word is not used at all: in II. vii the opposite of the boaster is “called humble”; 8 in IV. iii the ironical self-depreciation which the magnan¬ imous man may use in speaking to common people becomes simply “thynges of mirthe”; 0 and in IV. vii. 1-17 the opposite of the boaster “dispraiseth himself”: “the humble ma dispraiseth himself to fly strife & busines as did Socrates to have quiete life.” 10 Wylkin- son evidently does not understand Aristotle’s notion of the ironical man nor does the English word occur to him as an equivalent. In 1548 John Hooper categorizes one of Moses’ remarks as “ ironice ” 41 and in his 1553 translation of De officiis 1 .30, Grimalde uses the Greek word but not the English equivalent. 12 Huloet’s Dictionarie of 1572 does not list irony P Not once in his translation of Plutarch does Thomas North see fit to use irony in a context in which 3 J. A. K. Thomson, “Erasmus in England” (1930-31), pp. 73-74. 4 G. G. Sedgewick, “Dramatic Irony” (1913), pp. 172-89, 192-94. 5 J. W. H. Atkins, Renascence Criticism (1947), p. 40. 9 Thordynary of Crysten men (1506), Part IV, sec. xxii. 7 Roberte Whytinton, Tullyes Offyces (1534), sig. Gi r . 8 John Wylkinson, Ethiques of Aristotle (1547), sig. C2 rsv . 9 Ibid., sig. E 2 v -E 3 r . 10 Ibid., sig. E5 v -E 6 v . 11 John Hooper, Early Writings (Parker Soc.), p. 420. 12 Nicolas Grimalde, Ciceroes duties (1558), fol. 47T 13 Richard Huloet, Dictionarie (1572). Cooper’s Latin-English dictionary lists Ironia, illustrating it with five allusions to Cicero and one to Terence. Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus (1578). 26 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Plutarch had used the Greek word. 14 Baret’s Alvearie of 1580 trans¬ lates Cicero’s noma with “mocking, or dissimuling” but not with irony}'' In the English rhetorics of the second half of the century this figure of speech was usually listed as ironia . 16 “Ironice” appears again in Danett’s Comines, 1596. 17 Perceval’s Dictionarie neither in 1599 nor in 1623 gives irony in the English-Spanish section, although ironia appears in the Spanish-English section. 18 This negative evidence illustrates the degree to which in the sixteenth century ironia was not yet at home in the English lan¬ guage, but the English word was used at times, though almost always with some tentativeness or ostentation. This is not entirely gone in Jonson’s Cynthia}s Revels (1601): “. . . the whole Court shall take it selfe abusde By our ironicall confederacie .” 19 In 1615, however, John Stephens felt safe in calling the second edition of his book Essayes and Characters Ironicall, and Instruc¬ tive, 20 and Brinsley’s 1616 translation of De officiis I. 30 makes an indicative advance over earlier versions: Socrates was “an Eironist in al his speech, whom the Grecians named ecpwva. . . .” 21 The status of our word at this time is nicely settled by Henry Cockeram. His The English Dictionarie: or, An Interpreter of hard English Words. . ., 1623, includes both “ Ironically ” and “ Ironie .” 22 In the 1626 edition he explains the two parts of the lexicon: The first book hath the choisest words themselves now in use, where¬ with our Language is inriched & become so copious, to which words the common sense is annexed. The second Booke contains the vulgar words, which whensoever any desirous of a more curious explanation by a more refined and elegant speech shall look into, he shall there receive the exact & ample word to expresse the same. . . , 2,1 14 North, Plutarch (1595), pp. 197, 290, 461, 559-60, 688, 849, 948, 1019. 15 John Baret, Alvearie (1580). 10 Warren Taylor, Tudor Rhetoric (1937), pp. 35-36. It is of course true that most of the figures were given their Latin names in the rhetorics of this time. ''Thomas Danett, Comines (Whibley), p. 200. 18 Richard Perceval, Dictionarie (1599) and (1623). 10 Jonson, Works (Herford-Simpson), IV, 130-32. '"John Stephens, Essayes and Characters Ironicall (1615), title page. 21 John Brinsley, Tallies Offices (1631), p. 221. 22 Henry Cockeram, English Dictionarie (Tinker). 23 Ibid. (1626), “A Premonition from the Author to the Reader.” Robert THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 27 “ Ironie ” and “Ironically ” are honored with a place in the first book, and in the second, “ Ironically ” is offered as the elegant equivalent of “Mockingly .” There is no change in the 1639 edi¬ tion. 24 Neither Francis Hickes in translating Lucian’s True His¬ tory II. 17 25 nor Thomas Heywood in translating Lucian’s Di¬ alogues of the Dead XX. 5 26 chose to use irony where Lucian had used the Greek word, but in translating Lucian’s Literary Promethe¬ us i 27 Jasper Mayne did. John Bulwer’s Chirologia (1644) and Pathomyotomia (1649), 28 two rather pretentious discourses on the gestures which should accompany effective speech, use “ironie” and “ironicall” to describe the various gestures of this type. John Smith’s Rhetorique of 1657 uses both ironia and irony , but the English form appears far more often. 29 In his 1680 edition of De officiis L’Estrange translates I. 30 not with irony but with “Innocent Raillery ,” 30 an example of how raillery became at this time the popular word while irony remained esoteric. The same preference for raillery is evident throughout Ferrand Spence’s trans¬ lation of Lucian (1684-85) 31 but in the Fisher 22, the True History II. 17, and Demonax 6 Spence does use irony where Lucian had. 32 Dryden’s Lucian also uses irony in Fisher 22 and Demonax 6, 33 and Dryden’s Plutarch uses “Ironical” in Pomfey 30 34 as the English equivalent for the Greek word. A convincing indication of how limited was the use of our word in this period is that in all his critical efforts of various kinds—essays, discourses, lives, prologues Cawdry’s A Table Alphabetical! conteyning and. teaching the true writing, and understanding of hard usuall English wordes, borrowed from the Hebrew, Greeke, Latine, or French, etc. With the interpretation thereof by plaine English words. . . . 1604, had included '■'■ironie, (g) a mocking speech.” 24 Ibid. (1639). 25 Francis Hickes, Lucian (1634), p. 135. 26 Thomas Heywood, Lucian (1637), p. 137. 27 Jasper Mayne, Lucian (1663), p. 1. 28 John Bulwer, Chirologia and Chironomia (1644), frontispiece, pp. 79-80, 95, 170, 177-78, 181-83, 183, 189. Pathomyotomia (1649), PP- 64-65. 29 John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), pp. 45-48, 74-76, 77, 77-79, 79-80, 165, 203-4. 30 Roger L’Estrange, Tally’s Offices (1681), p. 53. 31 Ferrand Spence, Lucian (1684-85), I, sig. A7 V , Cp, D8 r , p. 7; III, 44. 32 Ibid., II, 31-32, 208; III, 44. 33 Dryden, Lucian (1710-11), III, 358; IV, 130. 34 Dryden, Plutarch (1683-86), IV, 140. 28 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 and epilogues—Dryden uses it only once, in his Life of Lucian; and in the collection of John Dennis’ critical essays made by E. N. Hooker, it appears in a likely context only once. The route by which irony entered general use is evident in The Fox with his Fire-brand Unkennell'd and Insnared: Or, a Short Answer to Mr. Daniel Foe's Shortest Way with the Dissenters. As also to his Brief Explanation of the same (London: 1703). Defoe had explained that the Shortest Way was an irony, and the author of this pamphlet replies: To be short and brief with him: It is granted him that he is a very Ironical Gentleman all over: That he has a very Ironical Name, but is still more Knave than Fool: That he has a very Ironical Style, but what abounds with more Malice than Wit: But that he is free from any seditious Design, is such an Irony, that it must move Laughter more than Attention or Belief, and make a Jest of himself and the Govern¬ ment together; at this rate of Explanation, Mrs. Cellier's Meal-Tub, Fitz Harris's Libel, Robert Young's Flower-Rot-Association, and Fuller's Shams upon the Parliament, and some of our best Ministers of State, were all Ironies too. . . , 35 The pamphlet continues in this vein, belaboring Defoe’s defense of irony from all sides at once. It is probably accurate to say, how¬ ever, that not until the decade 1720-30 did irony finally become a word one was likely to meet periodically, if not frequently, in the polite—and impolite—conversation and general literature of the day. Early in the decade Thomas Gordon wrote his essay “Of Libels,” in which he specifies at length the rules to be followed by “all Ironical Defamers.” 36 The Art of Railing, 1723, offers a nearly verbatim reprint of Gordon’s essay, 3 ' and the hostile “Essay on Gibing” refers knowingly to the irony of Socrates and of the Bible. 38 During the years 1727-30 the Craftsman 39 carried on a 15 The Fox with his Fire-brand Unkennell’d (1703), pp. 3-4. M FI amourist II (1725), pp. 96-105. 37 This pamphlet of 27 pages consists of a history of railing (pp. 1-11), Gor¬ don’s essay presented without acknowledgment and with the change of only a few words (pp. 11 -1 8), and a sample of political railing (pp. 19-27). It is possi¬ ble that Gordon wrote the whole pamphlet, lifting material from himself. It was summarized in the Free Briton for July 22, 1731, and excerpts from this summary appeared in the Gentleman's Magazine, I (1731), 296-97. 38 “An Essay on Gibing” (1727), pp. 5-10. 39 Craftsman (1731), I, 102-4, 106 (No. 18, Feb. 7, 1727); II, 172-74 (No. THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 29 running attack against the injustice of the government’s “inter¬ preting” perfectly innocent statements as libelous ironies and in¬ nuendoes. The Craftsman 1 s attack is sometimes straightforward but more often tongue-in-cheek, and the word Irony appears regularly. The essay for February 7, 1727, explains just what irony is and how it operates. In 1729 Orator Henley defended irony by name, along with other ways of jesting, in An Oration on Grave Conundrums , and Serious Buffoons. . . , 40 and half a dozen of the notes added to the 1729 edition of the Dunciad comment on the author’s irony} 1 In the same year appeared the longest and most elaborate defense of irony made during this period, Anthony Collins’ A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing. 42 This 77-page contro¬ versial pamphlet is entirely derivative in thought, consisting largely of multitudinous displays of irony and ridicule used by people of reputation from Socrates and Christ to Shaftesbury and Swift, but its wide-ranging and exhaustive use of examples, the representative nature of its arguments, and the emphasis of its orientation make it a milestone in the history of general concern over irony. The word itself appears on nearly every page. The year 1729, then, looks like a turning point. From the beginning of the Gentleman 1 s Magazine the word appears in its pages. 43 The Preface to Select Getters taken from Fog’s Weekly Journal , 1732, remarks: “It will be observ’d that many of them are written in an ironical and ludicrous Style. . . .” The Promoter for March 23, 1736 (No. 144) complains that the Grub-street Journal had not maintained through¬ out its career the “ironical Transversion of Censure” with which it had started, and the Grub-street for April 14, 1737, answered this criticism with a short dissertation on the merits and short¬ comings of irony. In the March 26, 1748 (No. 17) issue of the Jacobite’s Journal Fielding makes a similar explanation of why he has stopped using a strictly ironic method of writing the paper. 68, Oct. 21, 1727) ; V, 210 fE. (No. 179, Dec. 6, 1729), 232-34 (No. 182, Dec. 27, 1729); VII, 94-95 (No. 226, Oct. 31, 1730). 40 John Henley, Oration on Grave Conundrums (1729), pp. 1-4. 41 Pope, Dunciad, (Sutherland), pp. 62-63, IT 9> 186-91, 201-6. 4a Anthony Collins, Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony (1729). 43 Gentleman's Magazine, I (March, 1731), 107; III (June, 1733), 282-83; X (Nov., 1740), 547-48; XV (April, 1745)) 207-8. THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 3 ° Smollett uses some form of the word irony eight times in Peregrine Pickle, not a particularly esoteric work . 44 Such appearances of the word in the popular literature of the time indicate that it had finally achieved general currency . 45 ii. Stock definitions of irony and related terms Before the late eighteenth century little attempt was made to carry the explicit definition of irony beyond the type of the dictionary entry and the traditional rhetorical classifications; within this scope certain stock definitions, used by Quintilian and Cicero in their dis¬ cussions of verbal irony, were passed down from dictionary to dic¬ tionary and from rhetoric to rhetoric and turned up in the unsys¬ tematic explanations of more casual writers. By far the most popular of these stock formulations was that irony means saying the con¬ trary , or opposite, of. what one means. This had first appeared in the Rhetoric to Alexander, moved on through Cicero, Quintilian, and the medieval rhetoricians , 1 and then settled down in English . 2 44 Smollett, Peregrine Pickle , I, 43-44, 204; II, 38, 68, 253; III, 31; IV, 101, 109-10. 46 Nevertheless Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741, 1743), lists the four principal tropes as “the metaphora, metonymia, synecdoche and ironia;” not until the 1778-88 edition were the names of these tropes Anglicized. But John Oldmixon, Logick and Rhetorick (1728) had discussed irony without once using the Latin form of the word, and Leonard Welsted, Longinus (1727), pp. 77-78, had used irony quite naturally as the English equivalent of the Greek word. In his trans¬ lations of Quintilian and of Cicero’s De Oratore and Academica , all published at mid-century, William Guthrie uses irony as the equivalent of the Latin term wherever it seems appropriate. William Guthrie, Cicero De Oratore (1822), pp. 197-200, 287; Quinctilianus His Institutes (1756), I, 229; II, 29-30, 56, 62, 235!!., 249, 279-80, 286; Morals of Cicero (1744), p. 377. 'Sedgewick, “Dramatic Irony” (1913), pp. 192-94. Cicero On Oratory II. 67 ff. Quintilian Institutio VIII. vi. 54-58; IX. ii. 44-53. 2 Thordynary of Crysten men (1506), Part IV, sec. xxii. Thomas More, Works (1557)) chap, v, p. 939. Hoby, Courtier (Everyman), pp. 159-61. Abraham Fraunce, Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), Book I, chap. vi. Puttenham, Arte of Eng¬ lish Poesie (Willcock-Walker), pp. 186-91. Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1593), pp. 35-36. Florio, Worlde of Wordes (1598) and (1611). Richard Perceval, Dictionarie (1599). John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style (Hudson), pp. 29-30. John Bullokar, English Expositor (1621). Henry Cockeram, English Dictionarie (Tinker). William Whately, Prototypes (1640), Book III, chap xxxix, p. 21. Thomas Fuller, The Holy State (1642), pp. 73-74. John Bulwer, Chirologia and Chironomia (1644), pp. 181-83. Thomas Blount, Aca- THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 3 1 It was usually stated baldly and without qualification. Dr. Johnson gives: “A mode of speech in which the meaning is contrary to the words.” 3 The Earl of Chesterfield tells his son: “This is a figure of speech called Irony- which is saying directly the contrary of what you mean. . . .” 4 Several of the early dictionaries and rhetorics offer “saying black is white” as an illustration, which cannot have been very illuminating to the uninstructed. 5 * * Their situation is made fun of by Middleton and Rowley, who use a tailor’s rhetoric as repre¬ sentative of the learning of “Mechanick Rabbles” of the age: By his Needle he understands Ironia , That with one eye lookes two wayes at once: G and Sir Thomas Browne points out a fallacy which arises from over¬ awareness of this device: “The circle of this fallacy is very large; and herein may be comprised all Ironical mistakes, for intended expressions receiving inverted significations. . . .”' One distinction is recorded, however, in a few dictionaries: “a figure in speaking, when one means contrary to the signification of the word, or when a man reasoneth contrary to what he thinks, to mock him, whom he argues with. . . .” 8 A second, considerably less popular, formula was that Irony demie of Eloquence (1654.), pp. 25-26. John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), PP- 45 - 48, 74-76. Hobbes, The Art of Rhetoric (Molesworth), p. 517. John Prideaux, Sacred Eloquence (1659), PP- 12-14. Edward Phillips, New World of Words (1662) and (1706). Robert Ferguson, The Interest of Reason in Religion (1675), pp. 299-300. Art of Speaking (1708), pp. 63, 305-11. George Granville, Un¬ natural Flights in Poetry (Spingarn), p. 296. Edward Cocker, English Dictionary (1704). John Harris, Lexicon Technicum '( * I * 7 ° 4 )- Bailey, Universal Etymo¬ logical English Dictionary (1724),(1733),(1745),(1757),(1766),(1790). Bailey, Universal Etymological English Dictionary II (1727). Bailey, Dictionarium Britan- nicum (1730). Anthony Blackwall, Introduction to the Classics (1728), pp. 176- 79. John Oldmixon, Logick and Rhetorick (1728), pp. 21-28. J. K., New Eng¬ lish Dictionary (1731). Thomas Dyche, New English Dictionary (1765). Pocket Dictionary (1753). World (Chalmers), XXVII, 277-79 (No. 104, Dec. 26, 1754). Warren Taylor, Tudor Rhetoric (1937), pp. 35-36. ! J°knson, Dictionary (1755-56). 1 Chesterfield, Letters to His Son (Strachey-Calthrop) , I, 36. "John Bullokar, English Expositor (1621) and (1719). Henry Cockeram, English Dictionarie (Tinker), (1626) and (1639). John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), p. 45. "Middleton and Rowley, World tost at Tennis (1620), sig. C v -C2 r . 7 Thomas Browne, Works (Sayle), Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Book I, chap. iv. 8 Thomas Blount, Glossographia (1656). See also: Thomas Elyot, Bibliotheca (1552). Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus (1578). Benjamin Martin, Lingua Britan- nica Reformata (1749). Robert Ainsworth, Thesaurus (1751). THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 32 means saying something other than one means? People were not always sure whether this was only a more general way of saying the same thing or the definition of another kind of irony. Cicero had said: Ironical dissimulation has also an agreeable effect, when you say some¬ thing different from what you think; not after the manner to which I alluded before, when you say the exact reverse of what you mean, as Crassus said to Lamia, but when through the whole course of a speech you are seriously jocose, your thoughts being different from your words. . . . 10 Hoby’s Courtier offers a modern version of this passage 11 and Pri- deaux seems to recognize the difference in a footnote to “ Iroma”\ Simulatio , Because we speak one thing, and mean another. ... It is like¬ wise called by Tully, Inversio, a turning upside down of a thing, or contrary to the right form. A proper tearm to expresse this Trope where the contrary is meant to what is said. . . . 12 Quintilian, however, had used this formula as another way of stating the first one, 13 and some of the dictionaries and rhetorics give it as their only definition of irony, apparently assuming that no difference is involved. It is this abstract formula which George Daniel has in mind as he describes the cloud of arrows that descended upon the French cavalry at Agincourt, and how the English archer aimed: Yet here: (and ’tis the Ironie of warre Where Arrowes forme the Argument;) he best Acquitts himselfe, who doth a Horse praefer To his proud Rider; and the object, Beast Transfformes Philosophy but yet the Rule Makes out, to Act, on the more Passive Soule . 11 8 The formula is stated in: Cicero Academica II. 15 and On Oratory III. 53. Quintilian Institutio VI. ii. 15-16. Miles Coverdale, Remains (Parker Soc.), II, 333. Thomas Wilson, Rhetorique (G. H. Mair), pp. 134-56. Richard Sherry, Rhetorike (1555), fol. xxiii, xxvi. John Marbeck, Notes and Common-places (1581), p. 560. Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie (Willcock-Walker), pp. 186- 91. Edward Cocker, English Dictionary (1724). Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741, 1743) and (1778-88). Benjamin Martin, Bibliotheca Technologica (1737), pp. 178-80. John Lawson, Lectures Concerning Oratory (1760), pp. 257-68. 10 Cicero On Oratory II. 67. 11 Hoby, Courtier (Everyman), pp. 159-61. 12 John Prideaux, Sacred Eloquence (1659), PP- See also John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), PP- 45-48. 13 Quintilian Institutio VIII. vi. 54-58. 14 George Daniel, Poems (Grosart), IV, 149-50 (“Trinarchodia,” stanza 198). THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 33 The clever archer aims at something other than he means to hit. The third stock formula, used ordinarily to clear up the vague¬ ness of the other two, was not only the most instructive but also the most variable in phrase. Quintilian had stated it in its persistent form: “It is permissible to censure with counterfeited praise and praise under a pretence of blame.” 15 The seventeenth century en¬ livened it. Irony is “calling that foule which is faire, or that sweete which is sowre,” 16 irony “expresseth a thing by contrary, by show of exhortation when indeed it dehorteth,” 17 “An Irony is a nipping jeast, or a speech that hath the honey of pleasantness in its mouth, and a sting of rebuke in its taile.” 18 Other more subdued versions appear occasionally throughout our period. 19 Giving the name of a virtue to a vice or of a vice to a virtue was a frequently offered subformula which seems to account for Fielding’s peculiarly me¬ chanical use of irony in the following passage: By Wisdom here, I mean that Wisdom of this World, which St. Paul expressly tells us is Folly; that Wisdom of the Wise, which, as we read both in Isaiah and in the Corinthians, is threatned with Destruc¬ tion: Lastly, I here intend that Wisdom in the Abundance of which, as the Preacher tells us, there is much of Grief; which, if true, would be alone sufficient to evince the extreme Folly of those who covet and pursue such Wisdom. But tho’ the Scriptures in the Places above cited, and in many others do very severely treat this Character of worldly or mock Wisdom, they have not, I think, very fully described it, unless perhaps Solomon hath done this ironically under the Name of Folly. An Opinion to which I am much inclined; and indeed what is said in the loth Chapter of Ec¬ clesiastes of the great Exaltation of a Fool, must be understood of a Fool in Repute, and such is the Wise Man here pointed at. In the same Manner, the best Writers among the Heathens have obscurely and ironically characterised this Wisdom. What is a covetous ls Quintilian Institutio VIII. vi. 54-58. 10 John Marbeck, Notes and Common-places (1581), p. 560. 17 John Hoskins, Directions for Speech and Style (Hudson), pp. 29-30. Thomas Blount, Academie of Eloquence (1654), pp. 25-26, repeats this phrase. 18 Edward Reyner, Government of the Tongue (1658), pp. 223-27. 19 Cicero On Oratory II. 67. Thomas Wilson, Rhetorique (G. H. Mair), pp. 134-56. Edward Phillips, New World of Words (1706). Bailey, Dictionarium Britannicum (1730). Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1741, 1743) and (1778- 88). Memoirs of Grub-street (1737), I, viii-x. Chesterfield, Letters to His Son (Strachey-Calthrop), I, 36. 34 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Man ? says Horace, he is both a Fool and a Madman. Now Avarice is the very highest Perfection and as it were Quintessence of this Kind of Wisdom . 20 At times, in the process of assimilating ironia , the English seem to have slipped into giving the word a more general definition than it had traditionally had. Both Cicero and Quintilian had discussed irony as a particular type of jest, and the function of the device was given as derision; it is not surprising then that some of the rhetorics and dictionaries extended the word’s reference to any mock or scoff, regardless of rhetorical structure: Now is ironia as much to say as a mockage, derision, or meaning of another thing, than is expressed in the words . 21 ironie , (g) a mocking spaech . 22 Ironically. Spoken scoffingly. Ironie. Speaking by contraries, saying black is white . 23 Ironia is taken for dissimulation, whereby one thing is thought and another spoken; it signifies also taunting speeches, or a speaking by con- • 24 tranes. . . . Ironical, (Greek) spoken in mockery, or by that figure called Irony, which is a speaking contrary to what a man means by way of bitter gibing or scoffing . 25 Ironie ... a speaking by contraries or mockingly . 26 Ironia, a scoffe or flout. . . . 2 ‘ Ironia ... a mock or scoffe, also a trope . 28 ironical, spoken by way of Railery. rallery, a close or secret Jibe, pleasant drolling, or playing upon another in discourse . 29 20 Fielding, Covent-Gar den Journal (Jensen, 1915), II, 126. 21 Miles Coverdale, Remains (Parker Soc.), II, 333. 22 Robert Cavvdry, A Table Alfhabeticall (MLA facs.). 23 Henry Cockeram, English Dictionarie (Tinker). Edward Cocker, English Dictionary (1704) gives the same kind of entries. 24 John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), pp. 45-48. See also Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie (Willcock-Walker), pp. 154-55, 186-91; and Warren Taylor, Tudor Rhetoric (1937), pp. 35-36. 25 Edward Phillips, New World of Words (1662). 20 Elisha Coles, English Dictionary (1676). 27 Angel Day, English Secretorie (1595), Part II, pp. 79-80. 28 Francis Holyoke, Dictionarium (1627). 20 B. N. Defoe, Comfleat English Dictionary (1735). THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 35 Although after the Restoration such distinctions were pretty much ignored as being pedantry, Renaissance rhetoric involved irony in its complex classifications of rhetorical terms. In these irony was ordinarily classed as a trope, along with metonymy, metaphor, and synecdoche, and tropes were also divided into those consisting of a single word and those consisting of a sequence of words. A Trope or turning is when a word is turned from his naturall significa¬ tion, to some other. . . . The excellencie of tropes is then most apparant, when either manie be fitlie included in one word, or one so continued in manie, as that with what thing it begin, with the same it also end. . . . 30 There be two kindes of tropes. The first coteineth Metonymia , the chage of name: and Ironia , a scoffing or jesting speach. The second comprehendeth a Metafhore and Synecdoche . 31 Irony was also occasionally classed as a figure—a term the meaning of which varied with the rhetorician using it 32 —but without any change in the status of irony. Within this framework a number of connections were made between irony and other rhetorical devices. The “ancient flirtation between rhetorical irony and allegory” 33 con¬ tinued through Sherry, 34 Fraunce, 35 and Puttenham, but the pair went pretty much their own ways thereafter. Puttenham explains the relationship: . . . Allegoria , which is when we speake one thing and thinke another, and that our wordes and our meanings meete not. . . . Of this figure . . . we will speake first as of the chief ringleader and captaine of all other figures. . . . 36 30 Abraham Fraunce, Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), Book I, chap. i. 31 Ibid., Book I, chap. ii. See also: Richard Sherry, Rhetorike (1555), fol. xxiii. Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1593), p. x. Thomas Granger, Divine Logike (1620), p. 175. John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), pp. 45-48. Hobbes, The Art of Rhetoric (Molesworth), p. 515. John Prideaux, Sacred Eloquence (1659), pp. 12-14. Art of Speaking (1708), p. 62. Anthony Blackwall, Introduction to the Classics (1728), pp. 148 ff., 176-79. 32 See: Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie (Willcock-Walker), pp. 137-38, 142- 43, 154-55, 158-60. Abraham Fraunce, Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), Book I, chaps, i and xxvii. Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1593), p. 1. Anthony Black- wall, Introduction to the Classics (1728), p. 148. The convolutions of rhetoric during this period may be explored in W. P. Sandford, English Theories of Public A ddress (1931). 33 G. G. Sedgewick, Of Irony (1948), p. 6. 34 Richard Sherry, Rhetorike (1555), fol. xxvi. 35 Abraham Fraunce, Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), Book I, chaps, i and vi. 30 Puttenham, Arte of English Poesie (Willcock-Walker), pp. 186-91. See also PP- 154 - 55 - 36 the WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Puttenham lists enigma, proverb, irony, sarcasm, asteismus, mic- terismus, antiphrasis, and charientismus as “souldiers to the figure allegoria.” In the rhetorics of the time sarcasm , “a nipping taunt,” “a bitter kind of derision,” was sometimes classified separately from irony, 37 sometimes said to be “neer to an Irony, but that it’s some¬ what more bitter,” 38 and sometimes listed as a subtype of irony. 39 Like allegory, antiphrasis was defined in the same words as irony. “a forme of speech which by a word exprest doth signifie the con¬ trary,” 40 but unlike allegory, antiphrasis in actual use referred to the same strategy as irony did, although John Smith accepted this distinction: “ Antifhrasis and this [ irony\ are of very nigh affinity, only differing in this, that Antiphrasis consists in the contrary sense of a word, and Ironia of a sentence.” 41 Asteismus, “whan a thyng is polished with some mery conceit,” micterismus, “a counterfayted laughter,” and charientismus, “when thinges that be hardely spoken, be mollifyed with pleasaunte woordes” 42 were three other devices which frequently turned up in the company of irony, and Sherry, Smith, and Prideaux classify them as subtypes of irony. 43 Preteri- tion, “when you say you let passe that which notwithstanding you touch at full,” 44 was also sometimes classed as a type of irony. 40 In¬ deed, the rhetoricians played something of a shell game with these terms— irony, sarcasm, antiphrasis, asteismus, micterismus, and char¬ ientismus —for an illustration used in one guidebook under irony was likely to turn up in another under sarcasm and in another under antiphrasis. The differences among these terms were not significant, 27 Ibid. See also Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1593), pp. 37-38. 38 Thomas Hall, The Schools Guarded (1655), pp. 163-70. John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), pp. 79-80. Ephraim Chambers, Cyclopaedia (1728), (1741, 1743), under “Sarcasm.” 30 Richard Sherry, Rhetorike (1555), fol. xxvi. John Prideaux, Sacred Elo¬ quence (1659), pp. 12-14. 40 Peacham, Garden of Eloquence (1593), pp. 24-25. 41 John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), pp. 45-48. 42 Richard Sherry, Rhetorike (1555), fol. xxvi. 13 Ibid. John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), PP- 77-79- John Prideaux, Sacred Eloquence (1659), PP- 12-14. Prideaux adds three other subtypes: chleuasmus, diasyrmus, and exutenismus. 44 John Smith, Rhetorique (1657), p. 165. 45 Ibid. Abraham Fraunce, Arcadian Rhetorike (1588), Book I, chap. vi. Anthony Blackwall, Introduction to the Classics (1728), pp. 195-98. THE MEANING OF IRONY: THE DICTIONARY 37 but the difference between allegory and irony was so considerable that the association based on identity of abstract definition fell into disuse. 46 40 In the 1778-88 edition of Ephraim Chambers’ Cyclopaedia this distinction, which had not appeared in earlier editions, was added to the article on “allegory”: “Scaliger considers allegory as one part, or side, of a comparison. It differs from irony , in that allegory imports a similitude between the thing spoken and intended; irony a contrariety between them.” THE DICTIONARY i. IRONY AS PRETENSE AND DECEPTION This earliest Greek sense of the word, which persisted in vary¬ ing forms and degrees in both Greek and Latin, was not carried over into common English usage. In translations dissimulation, or occasionally hypocrisy, was substituted for irony 1 in this sense (dissimulation could also be substituted for irony in the sense of blame by seeming praise, 2 as it had been in Latin). I have, how- . . very often the signification of a Greek Term translated word for word, is quite another thing in our Language; for example, Irony which with us is a raillery in conversation or Rhetorical Trope; with Theophrastus it signifies somewhat be¬ tween cheating and dissembling. . . .” —Bruyere, Manners of the Age (1699), “Prefatory Discourse.” Dissimulation was substituted for the Greek irony in the following translations, except where otherwise noted: Aristophanes Clouds 449: Thomas Stanley, History of Philosophy (1655-62), Part III, p. 76 (another substitute); Lewis Theobald, Clouds (1715), p. 25 (another substitute). Aristotle Rhetoric II.V.11-12: Hobbes, A Briefe of the Arte of Rhetoric (1637?)) pp. 82-83; Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1686), p. 102. Aristotle Ethics II.vii.12: John Wylkinson, Ethiques of Aristotle (1547), sig. C 2 r 6- T (another substitute). Demosthenes First Philippic 7: Thomas Wilson, Demosthenes (1570), p. 35 (another substitute); Demosthenes (1702) (another substitute). Theophrastus Characters (Loeb), pp. 41-43: Bruyere, Manners of the Age (1699), sig. Hh 7 r & v ; Eustace Budgell, Theophrastus (1714), p. 5; Henry Gaily, Theophrastus (1725), p. 120; John Healey, Theophrastus (1616), p. 4 (“Cavil¬ ling”). Plutarch Lives , “Demetrius” 18, “Agis” 19, “Pompey” 30: North, Plutarch (1595), pp. 948, 849 (“hypocrisy”), 688; Dryden, Plutarch (1683-86), IV, 264. Lucian True History II.17: True History from the Greek (1744), p. 65 (“hypocrisy”). See also John Baret, Alvearie (1580), “dissimuling.” 2 Thomas Wilson, Rhetorique (G. H. Mair), pp. 184-85. Hoby, Courtier (Everyman), pp. 159-61. Edward Phillips, Neva World of Words (1706), under “Dissimulatio.” THE DICTIONARY: i, i.a 39 ever, encountered several English passages in which irony is used to mean genuine and thorough deception of some sort. i.a. Constant dissimulation This differs from most of the other ironies (Diet, hi through x) in that actual deception, not indirect satire, is intended. Gabriel Harvey, Works (Grosart), II, 294-318: He would either wisely hold his peace: or smoothly flatter me to my face: or suerly pay-home with a witnesse: but commonly in a corner, or in a maze, where the Autour might be uncertaine, or his packing intricate, or his purpose some way excusable. No man could beare a heavy injury more lightly: or forbeare a learned adversary more cunningly: or bourde a wilfull frend more dryly: or circumvent a daungerous foe more co¬ vertly: or countermine the deepest underminer more suttelly: or lullaby the circumspectest Argus more sweetly: or transforme himselfe into all shapes more deftly: or play any part more kindly. He had . . .such an inextricable sophistry, as might teach an Agathocles to hypocrise pro¬ foundly, or a Hieron to tyrannise learnedly .... nothing but his fact discovered his drift; & not the Beginning, but the End was the interpreter of his meaning. He could speake by contraries, as queintly as Socrates; and do by con¬ traries, as shrewdly as Tiberius. . . . Stephen Gardiners Fox, or Macchiavels Fox, are too-young Cubbes, to compare with him; that would seeme any thing, rather than a Fox, and be a Fox rather then any thing else. . . . his curses, [were] like the blessinges of those witches in Aphrica, that forspoke, what they praysed, and destroyed, what they wished to be saved. I have seene spannels, mungrels, libbards, antelops; scorpions, snakes, cockatrices, vipers, and many other Serpents in sugar-worke: but to this day never saw such a standing-dish of Sugar-worke, as that sweet-tongued Doctor; that spake pleasingly, whatsoever he thought; and was other- whiles a fayre Prognostication of fowle weather. Such an autenticall Irony engrosed, as all Oratory cannot eftsoones counterpane. Smooth voyces do well in most societies; and go currently away in many reckn- ings, when rowgh-hewne words do but lay blockes in their own way. He found it in a thousand experiences; and was the precisest practitioner of that soft, and tame Rhetorique, that ever I knew in my dealings. 40 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 . . . if ever any were Hypocrisy incarnate, it was he. . . . I twice, or thrise tryed him to his face, somewhat sawcily, and smartly: but the Picture of Socrates, or the Image of S. Andrew, not so un- mooveable. . . . It is not the threatener, but the underminer, that worketh the mischief: not the open assault, but the privy surprize, that terrifieth the old souldiour. . . . [Cf. Aristotle Rhetoric II.v.li-12.] Gabriel Harvey, Marginalia (Moore Smith), p. 138: Pestilens Ironia. magae laudant arbores, animalia, pueros, puellas: eademqwtf necant occulte. Also: Gabriel Harvey, Marginalia (Moore Smith), pp. 139-40, 143. In his character of Dr. Perne quoted at some length here Harvey implies that the Doctor sometimes used verbal irony (“bourde a wilfull frend ... dryly”), but Harvey’s chief complaint is quite simply that Perne was a hypocrite and dissembler. The significant fact is that Harvey tends to define Perne’s hypocrisy in terms of blame-by-praise. Perne spoke “by contraries”; his curses “forspoke, what they praised” 5 he was “a standing-dish of Sugar-worke.” We know that Harvey claimed a wide Classical knowledge 3 and in the character quoted there are traces of Aristophanes’ “foxy deceit” ( Clouds 449) and of Aristotle’s and Theophrastus’ self-depreciator (Aristotle Rhetoric II.v.n-12; Theophrastus Characters [Loeb], pp. 41-43). What Harvey seems to have done, then, is to formu¬ late the Classical sense of deception in terms of rhetorical blame-bv- praise, so that Perne’s “autenticall Irony” is insincere praise that is actually meant to deceive and thereby hide' evil intentions. Several notes in the Marginalia use irony in the same way. Thomas Browne, Christian Morals (1716), Part III, sec. 20, pp. 108-9: Though the World be Histrionical, and most Men live Ironically, yet be thou what thou singly art, and personate only thy self. Swim smoothly in the stream of thy Nature, and live but one Man. To single Hearts doubling is discruciating: such tempers must sweat to dissemble, and prove but hypocritical Hypocrites. Simulation must be short: Men do not easily continue a counterfeiting Life, or dissemble unto Death. He 3 See pp. 62-63 below. THE DICTIONARY: i.a-i.c 41 who counterfeited!, acts a part, and is as it were out of himself: which, if long, proves so ircksome, that Men are glad to pull of their Vizards, and resume themselves again; no practice being able to naturalize such unnaturals, or make a Man rest content not to be himself. Browne uses irony here to mean simply lifelong deceit and hypocrisy. Since by his time dissimulation would have been a much more natural word to use, we may suppose that Browne chose “Ironically” for its esoteric connotation, the word probably suggesting itself to him by reason of its early Greek sense of foxy deceit and Theophrastus’ use of it to name his character of the dissembler. i.b. Self-depreciation in order to achieve a practical end Classical Precedents: Aristotle Ethics IV.vii.1-17. Demosthenes First Philippic 7. Theophrastus Characters (Loeb), pp. 41-43. Plutarch Lives, “Pompey” 30. Thordynary of Crysten men (1506), Part IV, sec. xxii: Also a man fyndeth another maner of lyenge the whiche may be called jactaunce & is comytted in spekynge or ymagenynge of hymselfe more grete thynges than there is of godnes of nobles of prowesse or of vertues and after the grevousnes of the cyrcustaunces it is oftentymes mortall synne. Also to saye of hym selfe ony thynge of his feblenesses & neces- sytes or of his synnes or to take bestymentes of abjeccyon to the ende that a man be renowmed & reputed humble abjecte & grete thynge in merytes & devocyons before god the which thynge is not suche as a man it sheweth that may be mortall synne and such synne is named yronye not that the whiche is of grammare by the whiche a man sayth one & gyveth to understande the contrarye. . . . Also: Dryden, Plutarch (1683-86), IV, 140. i.c. Falsely attributing some attitude or act to another The Fox with his Fire-brand UnkennelPd (1703), pp. 3-4: Mr. Foe ’’s Ironical Vein has only this for Its Vindication, which must make it too the greater Jest, That those Knights of the Post only de¬ sign’d their Libels and Associations for the Pockets of particular Per¬ sons; but Mr. Foe, with a Shorter Way indeed, paums his upon the whole Government and Constitution at once; and very Ironically dresses up the Church and State in the Lions and Bears Skin, and such Ironical 42 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 Figures as are not to be found in the Tropes of our Modern Rhetorick, but a barbarous Irony that was much practised by the Old Romans on the Primitive Christians, the better to bring their Dogs to worry them. Also: Ibid., pp. 21, 23. The anonymous author here is saying that the ironical exaggerations of Defoe’s Shortest Way with the Dis¬ senters were not meant to act as the satiric vehicle of a “contrary” and supposedly genuine meaning; they were meant to be taken at face value and believed. Thus the Shortest Way was a pack of lies and libels knowingly foisted upon the public, and this was a kind of irony different from most rhetorical irony. (Cf. Diet, ii.b, Shaftes¬ bury.) 11. IRONY AS LIMITED DECEPTION ii.a. A temporary deception which tricks one’s interlocutor into revealing the truth This sense differs from Diet. 1 in that the deception lasts only long enough to produce the desired effect, but it differs from verbal irony (Diet, iii.b, iv through vm) in that the result is produced by the deception and not by seeing through an apparent deception. William Whately, Prototypes (1640), Book III, chap, xxxix, p. 21: [While Joseph rules in Egypt his brothers come to him for food; Joseph imprisons them, binds Reuben, hides his cup in Benjamin’s sack and then accuses them of theft. Finally melted by Judah’s oration, Joseph reveals himself. All this, says Whately, Joseph did “to bring them to thorough repentance for their sin.”] Againe, it may seeme to be lawfull by the example of Joseph in way of probation and tryall, to counterfeit discontent, and to lay grievous things to the charge of men, and presse them as if they were guilty, though one know the contrary: I still say, if it be done by way of tryall, so that at last it be made manifest, that it was meerely in tryall, and that which would seeme a lye, if it were affirmed expressely and not with reference to such an end, being said to such an end is not a lye, because it is indeed not an affirming, but a seeming to affirme for a time. So Salomon seemed angry, and commanded to divide the child betwixt the two wrangling harlots that came before him, our Saviour THE DICTIONARY: i.c-ii.b 43 made as if he would have gone further, when the Disciples had him in with them at Emmaus. So if a Judge seeing great probability, and in a manner certainty of the guiltinesse of an offendour, shall affirme some¬ thing to him, to draw a confession from him, as for example, that some companion of his hath confest it, and that it is in vaine for him any longer to deny, or that he was seene at such time in such a place, by such and such, when indeed these things were not so, but somewhat equivalent to them, was true, viz. Arguments convincing their guiltinesse, even as much as these things would, though not to make them confesse. I say such courses taken by way of probation and tryall, and finding out guiltiness, are not to be esteemed lyes, because here the meaning is to be taken according to the present show of words. These be but a kind of ironicall carryage, no more lies than an irony, that by affirming one thing in such and such a manner and gesture, doth affirme the quite contrary. This unusual use of the word is obviously the product of overstrained rationalizing. ii. b. Ambiguous language intended to conceal fart of its meaning from fart of the audience This sense differs from Diet, i in that the underlying meaning is intended to be perceived by certain of the audience, even if only by the ironist as his own audience. It differs from the verbal ironies (Diet, iii.b, iv through vm) not only in the actual deception in¬ volved, but also in the motive, which is not so much rhetorical effec¬ tiveness attained through the use of certain verbal devices as it is the urge to self-expression through any kind of ambiguity which will pass the censor. Christopher Ness, History of the Old and New Testament (1696), I, 234: [Ness is discussing Jacob’s answer to Isaac, “I am Esau.”] Some say, that Jacob neither lyed, nor sinned in what he said. . . . They say that his Speech to Isaac, if expounded in the best sense, is no Lye, but an Irony . . . which is a witty way of speaking words, that in a strict ac¬ ceptation sounds not true, yet importeth some great truth when taken by the right handle. . . . Thus Jacob’s Speech importeth, that he was the Person to whom the Blessing (which Isaac was to pronounce) be- 44 THE WORD IRONY AND ITS CONTEXT, 1500-1755 longeth, for Esau had resign’d it to him by the sale of his Birthright; which purchase gave Jacob a civil right to the Blessing. Irony here is very close to allegory. Craftsman (1731), VII, 94-95 (No. 226, Oct. 31, 1730): [Caleb is giving examples of the way his historical essays are ridiculously forced into parallels of modern events.] I often wonder that the weekly Advocates for Power have never insisted on two famous Instances of Court Prosecutions in the Reign of Edward IV to justify their ironical Constructions. One is that of a poor Grocer, who was hang’d in that Reign, for saying that He would make his Son Heir of the Crown; alluding, either innocently, or for the Sake only of a little Pun upon the Times, to his own House, which bore the sign of the Crown. The other Instance was of a Gentleman, who was condemn’d as a Traytor, upon the following Account. The King having kill’d a favourite white Deer in his Park, He was so much griev’d at his Loss, that he suffer’d himself to wish, in a Transport of Passion, that the Horns of the Deer were in the Belly of Him, who advis'd the King to do it. This was interpreted, by the state Casuists of those Times, into a Design of compassing the Death of the King; for, said They, the King kill’d the Deer without any Body’s Advice; from whence it follow’d that the Gentleman wish'd the DeePs Horns in the King's own Belly; innuendo, He had an Intention of murthering the King, which is high Treason; and He was executed accordingly. Shaftesbury, Characteristics (1714), I, 71-72: If Men are forbid to speak their minds seriously on certain Subjects, they will do it ironically. If they are forbid to speak at all upon such Subjects, or if they find it really dangerous to do so; they will then redouble their Disguise, involve themselves in Mysteriousness, and talk so as hardly to be understood, or at least not plainly interpreted, by those who are dispos’d to do ’em a mischief. And thus Raillery is brought more in fashion, and runs into an Extreme. Although the above passage is far from unequivocal, Shaftesbury seems to be following a tendency of his time to apply the word loosely to all kinds of derisive attack (Diet, ix) with the emphasis in this context on the deceptive function of some kinds. For a full discus¬ sion of Shaftesbury’s use of irony see Diet, iii.a below. Also: Anthony Collins, Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony 0729 ), PP- 23-26. THE DICTIONARY: ii.b, iii.a 45 iii. BLAME-BY-PRAISE AND PRAISE-BY-BLAME iii.a. Irony of manner The irony of manner may be the manner of an author in a work of art or the pervasive manner of a man in his relations with other men. In this sense irony refers to an expression of personality, a manner of speech and action which conveys to the observer a distinct image of character. That character is one of great modesty and self-effacement joined to sympathetic admiration of others, and as such represents the principles of praise-by-blame and blame-by-praise projected through the whole image of a personality. This sense differs from that irony of detachment which is one component of dramatic irony (Diet, x) in that it is an expression of an attitude rather than the attitude itself. It differs from the verbal ironies of blame-by-praise and praise-by-blame (Diet, iii.b) in that it is not a limited device. During the English classical period some refer¬ ences to Socrates’ constant use of irony seem to imply an awareness of the irony of manner. Classical Precedents: Plato Symposium 216 de [?], 2i8