. Z' ?' ■‘‘t ''• % ■' V' ■j I I Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from Duke University Libraries https ;//archive.org/details/louisxivzenithof01hass H^eroes of tbe IRations EDITED BV lE'cel^gn Hbbott, /lO.H. FELLOW OF BALLIOL COLLEGE^ OXFORD FACTA DUClS VIVENT, 0PEH08AQU6 GLORIA RERUM.—OVJD, IN LIVIAM, 266. THE HERO’S DEEDS AND HARO>WON FAME SHALL LIVE. LOUIS XIV. LOUIS XIV. IN 1661. (From an illustration, based on an old print, in Philippson’s Das Zeitalter L iidwigs XIV.) LOUIS XIV AND THE ZENITH OF THE FRENCH MONARCHY ARTHUR HASSALL, M.A. STUDENT OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD 1 5 G. 1 G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS NEW YORK LONDON 27 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET 24 BEDFORD STREET, STRAND Cbc jiniclutbocket |)rcss 1895 COPYRIGHT, l8g5, BY G. P. PUTNAM’S SONS Entered at Stationers’ Hall, London 'Cbc tinicftcrbocfccr jprcse, IKlcw l^orft CONTENTS. PAGE LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ...... xiii LIST OF AUTHORITIES..XV PROLOGUE I CHAPTER I. OPENING YEARS OF THE REIGN (1643-1651) . . 8 Birth of Louis XIV.—Condition of France upon the death of Richelieu—Arrangements for the government after the death of Louis XIII.—Action of Anne of Austria—Maza- rin’s difficulties—State of the finances—Victories of Enghien and Turenne—The King’s education—The year 1647— Peace between Holland and Spain, January, 1648—French successes in 1648—-Beginning of the Fronde movement— The Peace of Westphalia—The parliamentary Fronde—■ The Treaty of Rueil, April i, 1649—Arrest of Conde, Conti, and Longueville, January 18, 1650—The new Fronde —Retirement of Mazarin from France. CHAPTER 11 . FIRST EXPERIENCES OF WAR AND POLITICS (1651- 1661).45 Louis attains his majority September 7, 1651—Civil war— Return of Mazarin, January, 1652—Turenne joins the royal ^ yG 9 q- VI Contents. cause—The Court returns to Paris, October 21, 1652—War in the I’rovinces—The end of the Fronde, July, 1653—Con-\ tinuance of the war with Spain—Louis with Turenne’s army—Progress of the war—Louis and the Parkment of Paris—The English alliance—French successes—The elec¬ tion of Leopold and the League of the Rhine—The battle of the Dunes—Illness of Louis—Marriage negotiations— The Peace of the Pyrenees— End of the nor thern war—Louis’ marriage with the Infanta—France at the close of Mazarin’s administration. CHAPTER III. LOUIS XIV. RULES (1661-1715) . . . .82 Louis XIV.’s appearance—His faults of character—The influence of Colbert and of Madame de Maintenon—Louis’ pride and belief in himself—His devotion to work—The theory of divine right—His determination to rule—The power of the nobility reduced—The Parlement checked and the independence of the provinces practically destroyed —The man with the iron mask—The elements of constitu¬ tional life in France—Louis’ policy of centralisation suited to the French nation—The aims of the King in 1661— Many of the elements of greatness in Louis’ character— What France and Europe owes to his reign. CHAPTER IV. THE FALL OF FOUQUET AND THE RISE OF COLBERT (1661) ....... IO3-13O The effect of the death of Mazarin—Louis asserts himself— The summer of 1661—Position of Fouquet—His over-con¬ fidence—Intrigues against him—Louis’ visit to Vaux—Louis at Nantes—The arrest of Fouquet—His trial—-The import¬ ance of his fall—The rise of Colbert—Order in the finances —Development of the Navy and the Colonies—TheJVench in the East and West Indies—The Commercial Companies —Colbert’s encouragement of art and literature—The value of his work. Contents. CHAPTER V. PAGE LOUIS’ FOREIGN POLICY AND THE END OF THE DEVO¬ LUTION WAR (1662-1668).... 131-161 The general aims of Louis’ foreign policy—Ilis anxiety to advance Roman Catholicism—The Spanish Succession ques¬ tion—The yiis Dcvolutionis —The affair of Crtqui—The battle of St. Gothard—Death of Philip IV. of Spain—Louis’ negotiations with the Emperor and the German Princes— War between England and Holland—Conference of Breda —Opening of the War of Devolution—The h'rench overrun the Spanish Netherlands—Secret Treaty of Partition be¬ tween Louis and the Emperor—Conquest of Franche- Comte—Formation of the Triple Alliance—Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. CHAPTER VI. THE WAR OF 1672 (1672-1678) . . . 162-195 Louis intrigues after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle—His determination to crush Holland-—Criticism of his policy— Scheme of Leibnitz—Beginning of the Dutch war—French successes—The crossing of the Rhine—Louis’ blundens— Cutting of the dykes and flooding of the country—Refusal of Louis’ terms by the Dutch—Louis’ return to France-— Development of the war—F'ormation of the Coalition of 1673—Reconquest of Franche-Comte by the French—The Empire declares war against France—Sweden attacks Brandenburg—Turenne’s campaign of 1674-5—The deaths of Turenne, Conde, and Montecuculi—The Treaty of Zur- awna—French successes in 1676—Anti-French feeling in England—Battle of Cassel—The Congress of Nimeguen— The Peace of Nimeguen—Position of Louis in 1679. CHAPTER VH. THE TAKING OF STRASBURG (1681) . . . 196-214 The completion of the ceinture de frontilres —Importance of Alsace to France—The French claims—Louis’ resolution to make the Rhine the French boundary on the east—The Contents. viii Chambers of Riimion —French designs against Strasburg— Its defenceless position—The decision of the Parletncnt of Breisach—The policy of the Great Elector—Relations of Louis with England—The Hungarian war—The conduct of Fiirstenberg, Bishop of Strasburg—Fall of Strasburg, Sept. 28, 16S1—Louis’ entry into Strasburg. CHAPTER VIII. THE TRUCE OF RATISBON (1684) . . . 215-229 German opinion on the fall of Strasburg—Position of the Emperor within and without Germany—Louis’ hopes— The siege of Luxemburg—The siege raised—Growing op¬ position to Louis’ aggressiveness—Charles XL and Zwei- brilcken—The Conference of Frankfurt—The Diet of Ratisbon—Invasion of Austria by the Turks—Louis’ atti¬ tude towards the invasion—French policy with regard to Sweden, Poland, and Turkey—The siege of Vienna—John Sobieski the saviour of Europe—Resumption of the siege of Luxemburg—A general European war imminent—The Truce of Ratisbon. CHAPTER IX. THE YEAR 1685 ...... 230-252 Louis’ object to convert the Truce of Ratisbon into a de¬ finitive peace—The Truce a landmark in Louis’ reign— Position of France in 1685—Versailles the residence of the King—French relations with Siam—Growth of French influence in Bangkok—Siamese embassies to France— French expeditions to Siam—A Court revolution overthrows French influence in Siam in 1688—Louis’ policy to the Huguenots—Increase of persecution, 1660-85—Influence of Louvois and Mme. de Maintenon—Louis’ own share in the policy of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes—The Revocation the turning-point in the history of the reign— The emigration of the Huguenots—Its effect on France. Contents. IX CHAPTER X. PAGE THE LEAGUE AND THE WAR OF AUGSBURG (l686- 1697).253-285 Growth of a Phiropean opposition to Louis—Formation of the League of Augsburg, July, 1686—Louis’ demands^—Ilis determination to secure the districts given him for twenty years by the Truce of Ratisbon—The Cologne Archbishop- rick—The Palatinate Succession ejuestion—Seizure of Phil- ippsburg—Criticism of Louis’ action—Revolution of 1688 in England—The German opposition to France is strength¬ ened— Devastation of the Palatinate—Its import and effects —The definite beginning of the war of Augsburg—England’s influence thrown against Louis—War between England and France in Ireland, at sea, and in the Spanish Netherlands— The battles of Beachy Head and the Boyne—Ruin of James 11 .’s cause in Ireland—French defeat at La Hogue —Campaigns in the Netherlands, in Italy, and on the Rhine—Death of Louvois—Defection of the Duke of Savoy —Peace of Ryswick—The Peace only a truce. CHAPTER XL VERSAILLES AND THE PROIVNCES (1678-1700) . 286-314 Louis at the height of his glory—Subservience of the Nobles—The French administrative system—Versailles and the monarchy—The daily life at Versailles—Marly, Fon¬ tainebleau, and the Grand Trianon—The Duke and Duchess of Maine—Madame de Maintenon ; her influence and aims —Her marriage to Louis XIV.—The establishment of Saint-Cyr—The affairs of the regale —The four propositions of 1682—The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes—Religious unity in France—Fenelon and Bossuet—Madame de Guyon and Madame de Maintemon—Banishment of Fenelon— Increase of taxation—Misery in the Provinces—Le Peletier and Pontchartrain—Tenant-right in Picardy, etc.—Popu¬ larity of Louis XIV. in the Provinces. X Contents. CHAPTER XII. PAGE THE SPANISH SUCCESSION QUESTION (1697-1700) 315-33I Explanation of Louis’ willingness to make the Peace of Ryswick—The Spanish Succession question—His intrigues in Spain—The Secret Partition Treaty of 1668—The claims of Louis, of the Emperor, and of the Elector of Bavaria— The first Partition Treaty—Death of the Electoral Prince— The Treaty of Carlowitz—The second Partition Treaty—Its reception in Spain—Louis’ motives in making the Partition Treaties—The probable effect of their adoption upon Eng¬ lish interests—The last will of Charles 11 . of Spain—Would the Partition Treaty be carried out ? CHAPTER XIH. THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR (1702-1713) . 332-383 Louis’ difficult position—His hesitation—Death of Charles II. of Spain leaving the Spanish Empire to the Duke of Anjou—The psychological interest of the problem awaiting solution—The council of November loth—Louis decides to accept the Will, Nov. 16, 1700—Effect of this decision on’ England, Holland, and Austria—Accession of Philip V., January, 1701—Condition of Spanish monarchy—Louis’ determination to reform Spain from Paris—Louis’ mistakes in Europe bring on the Spanish Succession war—His attack on the Dutch barrier—His recognition of the Pretender as King of England—The Grand Alliance—Louis takes charge of the administration of the Spanish government—His direc¬ tion of Spanish foreign policy—The opening of the war— The strength of England and weakness of France—Louis’ ministers—His generals—Villars’ brilliant scheme of 1703 —Its failure—The battle of Blenheim—Arrival of Amelot in Spain—His drastic reforms—The disasters of 1706— Barcelona, Turin, and Ramillies—Battle of Almanza, 1707 —The Convention of Milan—Charles XI 1 . in Germany— The battle of Oudenardt, 1708—The winter of 1708-9— Recall of Amelot, 1709—Louis desires peace. Contents. XI CHAPTER XIV. TAGE PEACE (1709-1713) . 384-414 Change of French policy in Spain—Villars wins Malplaquet, I yog—Negotiations at The Hague and at Gertruydenherg —Their failure—The disasters of Almenara and Saragossa —Victories of Brihuega and Villa Viciosa—Philip V.’s objection to any partition of his dominions—The embassies of Bleco'urt and Bonnac—The change in English policy— Views of Harley and St. John—The battle of Denain— Opening of the Congress of Utrecht—The Renunciations— The Peace of Utrecht—Continuance of the war against the Emperor—Treaties of Rastadt and Baden—France and Spain after the war—Death of the Spanish Queen—Philip’s marriage to Elizabeth Farnese and fall of Madame des Ursins—Louis’ domestic afflictions—Louis’ foreign policy during the war. CHAPTER XV. THE END (1714-1715).415-435 France after the Peace of Utrecht—The new position of Spain—Louis and the Jansenists—Quesnel’s Reflexions— The destruction of Port Royal—Clement XL and the Bull Unigenitus—Review of Louis’ blunders—Criticisms of his religious and foreign policy—The advantages and disadvan¬ tages of the centralised government of Louis XIV.— Diminution of Provincial liberties—His taxation—His latter years—llis death. INDEX • 473 ILLUSTRATIONS. The medals at the heads of chapters are from Les Medailles s»r les Principaux du Regne Entier de Louis^ Paris, 1723. PAGE LOUIS XIV. IN 1661 ' . . . . Frontispiece TABLE OF LOUIS’ ANCESTORS. 12 BEAUFORT. FROM A PRINT IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD . . . . l6 ANNE OF AUSTRIA ....... I4 MATHIEU MOLE. FROM A PRINT IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD .... 32 THE LOUVRE AND THE TUILERIES. BASED ON AN OLD PRINT '. . 50 MAZARIN. FROM AN OLD ENGRAVING ... 54 “ LOUIS ; THE KING ; KING LOUIS.” FROM A SKETCH BY THACKERAY IN HIS “ PARIS SKETCH BOOK 84 LOUISE DE LA VALLIERE.I 12 COLBERT. FROM AN OLD PORTRAIT ‘ . . .126 LOUIS XIV. AT THE AGE OF 4I. BASED ON AN OLD PRINT 140 MAP OF THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS . . . 150 THE GREAT CONDE. FROM AN OLD ENGRAVING ‘ . 156 MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1672 .... 170 ' From Philippson’s Zeitalter Ludwigs des fiirze/inten, Grote, Berlin. ’ Smith, Elder, & Co. xiii XIV Ilhtstrations. THE PASSAGE OF THE RHINE. FROM A COLLECTION OF PRINTS OF LOUIS XIV.’s CAMPAIGNS . . 172 TURENNE*.186 VIEW OF STRASBURG. FROM AN OLD PRINT ' . . 202 vauban" ........ 226 RECEPTION OF THE SIAMESE AMBASSADORS AT VERSAILLES. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH OF A PAINTING. 240 THE REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES. FROM AN OLD PRINT 246 LOUIS IN robes; FROM an old portrait . . 254 JAMES II. OF ENGLAND. BASED ON AN OLD EN¬ GRAVING^ . . . 260 LOUVOIS. FROM AN OLD PORTRAIT “ . . . 270 VERSAILLES . 288 LOUIS XIV.’s BEDROOM AT VERSAILLES. BASED ON AN OLD print” ...... 294 MME. DE MAINTENON ..300 FENELON. BASED ON AN OLD PRINT ”... 308 TABLUAR LIST OF THE CLAIMANTS TO THE SPANISH THRONE ........ 322 WILLIAM III. OF ENGLAND. FROM AN OLD PRINT” 324 CHARLES II. OF SPAIN. BASED ON AN OLD PRINT’ . 332 VILLEROY. AFTER AN OLD ENGRAVING ‘ . . 360 THE EMPEROR JOSEPH I. “.376 SKETCH MAP OF MALPLAQUET .... 387 MARSHALL VILLARS” ..396 MAP OF THE FRONTIER OF FRANCE . . . . 412 ‘ From Erdmannsdorfer’s Deutsche Geschichte von 164S-IJ40, Grote, Berlin. From Philippson’s Zeitalter Ltidwigs des Vierzehnten, Grote, Berlin. “ From Courcy’s Coalition of i^oi. NOTE ON THE AUTHORITIES OF THE REIGN OF LOUIS XIV. F ew periods of European history offer such unrivalled oppor¬ tunities for investigation as that known as the Age of Louis XIV. In the Bibliographie de VHisioire de Francehy G. Monod, will be found an admirable list of the works dealing with the history of France in the 17th century. The contemporary sources of infor¬ mation are numerous. Of these the memoirs of Saint-Simon and those of Mine, de Motteville are the best known and the most valuable, and with the letters of Mine, de Maintenon, of Mine, de Sevigne, and of Charlotte Elizabeth, Uuchesse d'Orleans, the memoirs of Villars, Retz, Choisy, I.e Fare, and Torcy, the journal of Dangeau, and the memoirs of Louis XIV., Pour VInstruction du Dauphin, enable the reader to appreciate the true character of the times. These and many other sources of information have been carefully sifted by the great historians of this particular period, of whom Martin, Ranke, Mignet, and Cheruel are the most distinguished. The histories of France by Martin and Ranke, the History of England, Principally in the ijth Century, by Ranke, Mignet’s A'lgo- ciations Relatives h la Succession d’Espagne sous Louis XIV., ( 'lieruel’s Histoire de la France pendant la Minority de Louis XIV. el sous le Alinisth'e de Mazarin, will continue to be consulted by all who make a serious study of French history in Louis XIV.’s reign. Valuable supplementary works are the Due d’Aumale’s Histoire des Princes de Condi, Lair’s Nicolas Fouquet, Clement’s Colbert, Rousset’s Histoire de Louvois, Lefevre-l’ontalis’ yohn de IVitt, I.egrelle’s La Diplomatic Francaise et la Succession d'Espagne, Courcy’s Coalition de ijor, llaudrillard’s Philip V. ct la Cour de Prance, and Parkman’s volumes— The Old RIgime in Canada and Count Frontenac and New Prance under Louis XIV. Equally XV XVI Note on AtitJiorities. important is the excellent series of Instriiciions aux Ainbassadetirs et Alinistres de Fratice now in course of publication. It is impossible to enumerate all the monographs and essays written to elucidate various episodes of Louis’ reign. Lavallee’s Histoire de la IMaison Royale de Saint-Cyr; Lair’s Louise de la Vallilre ei la yeuuesse de Louis XIV. ; Legrelle’s Louis XIV. et Strasbourg; Lanier’s Atiide Historigue sur les Relations de la France et du Royaume de Siam; Reynald’s Louis XIV. et Guil¬ laume III.; Dr. Bollinger’s Lectures on Louis XIV. and Mme. de Maintenon; Mr. Armstrong’s Elizabeth Farnese; Rocquains’ IIEsprit Re'vohttionaire avant la Revolution ; are but a few instances of the wealth of material ready to the hand of the student. In my attempt to write, with the aid of the knowledge gained from a study of some of the memoirs and histories of the time, a Life of Louis XIV. I have received very considerable assistance from Mr. Evelyn Abbott, Editor of this series. To him and to Mr. Charles E. Thompson, whose courteous help to me when choosing the portraits for the volume has been most valuable, I wish to tender my best thanks. Oxford, February, 1895. LOUIS XIV. >» LOUIS XIV. ROLOGUE. 11E character and position of Louis XIV. are peculiarly dif¬ ficult to estimate, partly on account of the attitude taken towards him during his life¬ time by his own subjects, partly owing to the entire misapprehension under which foreisrn nations laboured as to his real aims. The French people during more than two-thirds of his long reign made him into a god and worshipped him, while at the time of the Spanish Succession war a generation had grown up in England which, says Mr. Wyon in his History of Great Britain during the Reign of Queen Ayine, regarded “ Louis XIV. as a monster of ambition with a mission from the devil to make 1 2 Louis XIV. slaves and Papists of the whole human race, a per¬ fidious tyrant with whom it was useless to think of entering into a compact, whom it was absolutely necessary to bind with chains of iron.” Again at the present day, modern historical writers, for the greater part hailing from France, are well- nigh unanimous in wholesale condemnation of the age of Louis XIV. on the ground that it was essen¬ tially the cause of the French Revolution. Even allowing that it be strictly historical to say that Louis’ reign made the Revolution inevitable, it re¬ mains none the less true that the blame, if there be any, must be shared by the people with the King. The French nation made Louis, and Louis was the epitome of the French nation. It is easy to sympa¬ thise with the many hostile criticisms levelled at the King by German historians, who cannot forgive the devastation of the Palatinate or forget the loss of Strasburg. But it is peculiarly ungracious, ungrate¬ ful, and unhistorical for French writers who are well acquainted with the history of their own country, to allow themselves to be so carried away by feeble republican predilections, as to pour virulent abuse upon the most brilliant period of their history, and their most hardworking, painstaking, and on the whole successful ruler. Louis has certainly as great a claim as Napoleon to be considered a Hero. He, at any rate, left his /Country holding a powerful position in Europe, a id when he died he could boast that his foes had never entered Paris. In spite of his mistakes he succeeded in placing Philip on the Spanish throne. Prologue. 3 The French Revolution undoubtedly tended for a long time to damage Louis’ reputation and to blind men to the real character of his work. And yet the Revolutionists only developed Louis’ system of in¬ ternal administration, and continued with vigour and success his foreign policy. To credit Louis with the evils under which France suffered during the eigh¬ teenth century is to ignore the history of the reigns of Louis XV. and Louis XVI. These monarchs, it is true, found themselves handicapped through the position of the nobles and the weight of taxation. But had they been energetic and enlightened ad¬ ministrators, had they adapted themselves to the needs of the day, France might by securing timely reforms have escaped from the horrors of revolution. As it was, when Louis established a bureaucracy dependent on an absolutism, he gave the French government the shape which it preserved unchanged till 1789. His administrative reforms were admirably suited to the France of his own day. It was the fault of his successors that the bureaucratic system became an impassable barrier between the people and their rulers. There is no doubt whatever that with the majority of his countrymen the rule of Louis XIV. was in the seventeenth century extremely popular. It was admirably calculated to arouse the enthusiasm of his subjects. The French, more than any other Euro¬ pean nation, have always been most easily affected by the love of military glory. They have of all nations ever been sensitive of their prestige, and appreciative of a brilliant foreign policy. 4 Lo2iis XIV. Louis’ reign was, as far as military glory was con¬ cerned, the most glorious in the annals of French history, and never did the prestige of the French arms stand higher. Even at the end of the Spanish Succession war, that prestige was nobly maintained by Villars. At no period in French history was the foreign policy of France conducted with greater ability or with more conspicuous success. In the clearness of his views on foreign policy, Louis was always essentially a Frenchman, while in his dogged perseverance, his close attention to details, his care¬ ful grasp of facts, and his recognition of the necessity of withdrawing from untenable positions, he showed that he possessed characteristics rarely found among Latin nations. Unlike George III., who never rose to a higher level than that of most of his subjects, Louis was in many respects’ head and shoulders above the majority of the Frenchmen of his day. And he was really great when dealing with questions bearing on the future welfare of France as a European Power. His foreign and colonial policy is superior to that of any of his predecessors or successors and should be keenly appreciated by his countrymen of the present day. An unerring instinct told him that Belgium should be in French hands. He was equally bent upon securing Lorraine, Luxemburg, and Savoy. His at¬ tempts to make the Mediterranean a French lake showed consummate statesmanship, while if his colonial, Indian, and Siamese projects had been continued and wisely developed by his successors, France would have very practical reasons for looking back on his reign with gratitude and respect. Prologue. 5 Whether he was revoking the Edict of Nantes, or was avenging an insult offered to his ambassador, or was appealing to the patriotism of the people against the impolitic demands of the insatiable allies after Oudenarde, Louis was always in touch with the majority of his subjects. He set a great value on himself as the holder of the kingly office and the nation accepted his estimate of its importance. In spite of the many faults of his rule, France was ably administered during his reign. The noble class, who hitherto had influenced the government of the country, were unfit to take any share in the ad¬ ministration. Like the Parisians of all time, they were wanting in balance, they had no principles, they were carried away by every passing impulse. The conduct both of the nobles and the Parisians during the Fronde troubles amply justified the es¬ tablishment of a strong centralised monarchy. Ac¬ cepted by the French nation as the only form of government possible after the years of anarchy, it soon became thoroughly popular. In spite of the criticisms offered by Madame de S^vign6, Gui Patin, Bussy-Rabutin, and Ormesson, royalty came to be regarded by a large majority of the nation as the glorious personification of the unity and power of France. And with his natural acute¬ ness of observation, his decision, and his grand man¬ ner, Louis satisfied the aspirations of his people. For more than fifty years he had the most brilliant Court in the world, and he directed the affairs of France and Europe with a magnificence which the reverses at the end of his reign could not efface. The history of the world presents few epochs on -7 Louis XIV 6 which civilisation and literature have thrown greater eclat than that of Louis XIV. Louis was thus pre-eminently a Frenchman in the unique sympathy that existed between him and the nation—a sympathy seen in their aims, in love and in hate, in taste and in prejudice. / As a man he may not have been great, but a greab King he certainly was, and the age in which he lived and which bears his name was a great age. Whatever claim he may bear to the title of Hero must be based upon the determination and courage shown during the last fourteen years of his reign. In spite of the calamities which the war brought upon his country, in spite of the domestic afflictions which wellnigh overwhelmed him, Louis’ skill and ability and courage succeeded, with honour and with com¬ paratively small territorial loss, in extracting France from a death grapple with Europe. Few periods in the reign of any European monarch present more striking examples of real patriotism and heroism than will be found in the history of the great King of France during the years from 1707 to 1713. CHAPTER 1. OPENING YEARS OF THE REIGN. 1643-1651. OUIS XIV. was born on the 5th of September, 1638, at Saint-Germain, in the Chateau Neuf. The news of this event was received with great rejoic¬ ings. The birth of the Dau¬ phin in the pavilion of Henry IV. coincided with successes abroad, which must have re¬ called to men’s minds the deeds of the King of Navarre. The year 1638 brought with it the capture of Alsace by the French armies ; it saw also French ascendancy established in the Mediterranean waters. The terrible Thirty Years’ War was then at its height and till this year, in spite of the victorious career of Gustavus Adolphus, men were still doubtful as to the issue. Under the great Cardinal Richelieu, 7 8 Louis XIV. [1643 France had plunged into the war; and the year 1638 proved to be the “ turning-point of the struggle between France and the House of Austria.” The birth of Louis XIV. upset all the plans of the Court party, and strengthened the hands of Riche¬ lieu at home. The hopes of the opponents of the Minister had been founded entirely on the expecta¬ tion that Gaston of Orleans, the brother of Louis XIII., would succeed to the throne, and destroy at one blow the work of Richelieu. These hopes were now scattered to the winds and in spite of the spasmodic resistance of the nobles during the Fronde, the birth of Louis XIV. decided the mo¬ mentous question for France that the administrative reforms of Richelieu should be adhered to and de¬ veloped. Aristocratic tyranny and selfishness were to yield to an irresistible despotism. A year later Louis XIII. had another son, Philip, destined to become celebrated as the husband of the ill-fated Henrietta, daughter of Charles 1 . of England. At the close of 1642 Richelieu died and with the beginning of the next year it became apparent that the reign of Louis XIII. was drawing to a rapid close. In April the King moved to the new Palace of Saint-Germain, where the air was purer than in Paris. Feeling his end was at hand, he devoted himself to religious exercises and to the settlement of all matters affecting the government of France. On the 25th of April he declared his wishes with regard to the future. In the event of his death his wife Anne of Austria was to be Regent, his brother Orleans to be Lieutenant-General. The real power, 1643 ] Opening Years of the Reign. 9 however, was to lie with the Council of Regency, a body composed of Mazarin, the Chancellor Seguier, Conde, and others. The members were to be irre¬ movable and the Queen and Orleans were to refer to them all questions of importance. The appoint¬ ment of such a Council was, as Mazarin said, an C glTront^ to the Queen. On April 2ist, the Dauphin was christened, Mazarin and the Princess of Conde being his spon¬ sors, and after the ceremony, though only four and a half years old, he told his dying father that he had received the name Louis XIV. “ Not yet, not yet,” answered the sick monarch. Within a month, on May 14th, Louis XIII. died, leaving his country in a far more prominent position than when he succeeded to the throne. France was now recognised “ as the champion of the true rights of nations against the domination of an arrogant House and the Catholic reaction in its worst aspect.” German Protestantism was by the combined efforts of France and Sweden practically secure. At home feudalism had received its death blow; lawless dis¬ order and selfish tyranny were crushed. While Germany was torn in pieces through religious divisions, in France the Huguenots had become loyal subjects. The monarchy was steadily growing and already was beginning to symbolise the unity and the grandeur of France. This improvement in the position of France was due to Richelieu. Though his name is not associated with the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees or with the final overthrow of the great nobles in the lO Louis XIV. [1643 Fronde, he had prepared the way. Under her able minister France was supreme in diplomacy, in arms, and in letters. France was left by Richelieu in a strong position. She held Alsace, Artois, Roussillon, and part of Catalonia. Victorious on the Rhine, she occupied Brisach and the Forest Towns. Sweden and the United Provinces were her trusted allies, the House of Savoy leant on her for protection. The capture of Arras laid open the road into the heart of the Spanish Netherlands. Within France the policy of the great Cardinal seemed equally successful. The kingdom was peace¬ ful and flourishing. Time to complete and consoli¬ date his work was alone required. And there is little doubt that had Richelieu lived a few more years he would have established his system on so firm a basis that no Fronde would have been possible. For Richelieu, though intensely monarchical, in many points resembled the enlightened despots of the eighteenth century. He was keenly alive to the necessity of conciliating public opinion ; he often studied the cahiers of the States-General of 1614 to discover the popular needs. In 1626 he had sum¬ moned an Assembly of Notables and had laid before it his policy. So loyally had this Assembly—composed of magis¬ trates, financial officials, and merchants—supported his plans for the repression of the political designs of the Huguenots, for the creation of a navy and for the development of commerce, that just before his death he had resolved to call another such As- 1643 ] Opening Years of the Reign. 11 sembly to strengthen his hands in the probable event of Louis XIII.’s death. Unfortunately for his country Richelieu died be¬ fore his great work was thoroughly consolidated, and Franee had in consequence to pass through upwards of ten years of confusion till his successor Mazarin was strong enough to complete the overthrow oTTfiF^iis- cordant elements within the kingdom and to place the monarchy at the head of an obedient and united France. No sooner was Louis dead than the Parlemcnt of Paris—that close corporation of lawyers, that body of hereditary magistrates which had bought or in- N herited judicial places and which aspired to take the place of the States-General—at once asserted itself. In 1641 Richelieu had dealt what seemed a decisive blow at its political pretensions. He had forbidden it to take any part in or cognisance of state affairs. On financial matters they could remonstrate, but henceforward these turbulent magistrates were not to regard themselves as a political assembly. The minority of Louis XIV. was, however, an oppor¬ tunity too good to be lost. Just as during the mi¬ nority of Louis XV. so now the Parle^nent asserted its authority, and attempted to regain its former position. Louis XIII. had appointed a Council to control the Queen Regent. On May i8th, four days after Louis XIII.’s death, the Parlement abolished this Council and placed the whole power in the hands of Anne of Austria. At the meeting of the Parlement the young King was present. On May 15th, the Louis XIV. [1643 I 2 day after his father’s death, Louis XIV. had left the ancient chateau of Saint-Germain and had made a solemn entry into Paris, amid the greatest enthu¬ siasm. “ The Queen,” says Gui Patin, “ arrived in Paris at four o’clock in the afternoon attended by ten thousand men, without reckoning the cavaliers and volunteers, who swarmed out of Paris to meet the little King.” The Venetian ambassador was favourably impressed by the appearance of the youthful monarch, and anticipated an era of pros¬ perity for France as soon as this prince “of noble aspect, with his air of greatness ” had attained his majority. On May i8th at 8 A.M. a Lit-de-Justice was held— a solemn assembly to which not only the Parlement but also the Dukes and Peers of France and the great officers of the Crown were summoned. The importance of the assembly lay in the attitude as¬ sumed by the Parlement. Over this Lit-dc-Justice the young King in a violet dress presided. On the right of the throne stood his mother, on the left Madame de Lansac, his governess. Assisted by the latter Louis stood up and said the few words neces¬ sary to open the proceedings. The Parlement, filled with hopes of regaining their political influence, in¬ vested Anne with absolute power during the King’s minority, and appointed the Duke of Orleans Lieu¬ tenant-General of the kingdom and President of the King’s Council. The only symptom of future trouble was to be found in the words of Barillon one of the Presidents of the Chajnbre des Enqukes, who asserted that the Parlement should have the power 1643] Opening Years of the Reign. 13 of urging measures for the reforms of the state. But his words received little support, so satisfied was the majority of the Parlenient with the prospects of the reign. The work of Richelieu would be undone, the intendants would be dismissed, the Chancellor Pierre Seguier, one of Richelieu’s ministers, would be re¬ placed perhaps by Bailleul a member of the Parle- 7 nent, perhaps by Chateauneuf, a noble who had suffered during the late reign. The policy of Riche¬ lieu would, in a word, be entirely reversed and Mazarin would at once return to Italy. On the very evening of the i8th of May the Par- lement knew the worst. The Queen had confirmed Mazarin as First Minister. The pupil and confidant of Richelieu, an Italian adventurer, a low-born ecclesiastic who could hardly speak the French lan¬ guage, had been deliberately chosen to continue Richelieu’s work, the humbling of the Austro- Spanish House and the consolidation of the French monarchy. After the first surprise had worn off, men of the mental calibre of the Duke of Beaufort consoled themselves with the hope that the Queen would simply employ Mazarin temporarily, till she had learnt how to govern the kingdom. Mazarin’s posi¬ tion had hardly been confirmed before the news of the battle of Rocroi came to strengthen and shed lustre upon the new government. The death of Richelieu had raised fresh hopes in the minds of the Spaniard.s and Imperialists. The time had, it seemed to them, come for striking a decisive blow at the heart of France—a blow that should have a tell¬ ing effect upon the negotiations for peace, which had Louis XIV. [1643 H already begun. But the youthful Enghien proved equal to the task of defending France. Aided by the rare gifts of the veteran Captain Gassion, Enghien won a brilliant victory at Rocroi. France was saved from all danger of invasion, Thionville shortly afterwards fell before the victorious French troops, and the way into Germany and the Low Countries lay open for attack from the side of France. The victory of Rocroi and the capture of Thionville came most opportunely to the aid of the government of Anne of Austria and Mazarin. For the moment these successes silenced the voices of intrigue and faction. They proved, moreover, to the world that though Richelieu was dead, his spirit still guided the foreign policy of France, and that the Spanish leanings of Anne of Austria were completely subordinated to her feelings of patriotism and affec¬ tion for her son. These successes then reassured the allies of France, disheartened her enemies, and helped to establish the government on a firm basis at home. Still the difficulties of Mazarin were enormous. Though France was safe from fear of invasion, though her armies were preparing if pos¬ sible to advance into the heart of Germany and dictate’ peace at the gates of Vienna, the attitude of the enemies of the government was most threat¬ ening. The Conde family were opposed to and jealous of Mazarin ; Madame de Chevreuse, who returned to France in July was bitterly hostile to him ; the Duke of Beaufort, grandson of Henry IV. and Gabrielle d’Estrdes, headed a faction mainly composed of the ANNE OF AUSTRIA, # 1643] Opening Years of the Reign. 15 lower noblesse, and was prepared to compass his overthrow. Uncertain as to the future policy of the government, the Huguenots were becoming unquiet, and some of the provinces, owing to the heavy taxa¬ tion, were discontented and ready to take advantage of any weakness shown by those in authority. It was difficult too to prevent Anne of Austria from showering favours on the most unworthy objects. With the indolent Orleans as Lieutenant-General, the avaricious Henry of Conde in the Council, the weak and good-natured Anne as Queen Regent, the docile Pierre Seguier as Chancellor, and the ever watchful and active Mazarin as Chief Minister, the situation was well summed up in the lines: “ La reine donne tout, Monsieur joue tout, M. le prince prend tout, Le cardinal fait tout, Le chancelier scelle tout.” But perhaps the most serious danger to the mon¬ archy was to be found in the claims of Orleans and the House of Cond6 to some of the most important governorships in France. Already Henry of Cond^ held Burgundy; his son-in-law, the Duke of Longue- ville, Normandy; while Provence was under the Count of Alais, a relation of the Cond^ family. The ambitious Henry of Condd now demanded Langue¬ doc for himself, proposing to transfer Burgundy to Enghien. Orleans was at the same time pre.ssing his claims for Champagne. It seemed that Riche¬ lieu’s work was in imminent danger of being undone, and that France would again suffer all the evils of i6 Louis XIV. [1643 provincial governments under a feudal aristocracy which, humiliated by Richelieu, still preserved the memory of its former independence. The whole provincial question bristled with danger to the centralised system lately established by the great Cardinal. By the end of 1643, however, Mazarin had by dint of patience, tact, fertility of resource, and tenacity of purpose triumphed overall the dangers which threat¬ ened, during the early days of the minority, the authority of the infant King. By appealing to Anne’s maternal instinct he checked her over-liber¬ ality and induced her to adopt a more dignified and a firmer attitude towards the factions which sur¬ rounded her. He quieted the Huguenots by assuring them that the toleration of their religion should not be interfered with. He conciliated Orleans by allow¬ ing him the semblance of power, and he successfully undermined the influence of the dangerous Henry of Cond^with the Queen. But with the handsome Beau¬ fort and his faction, Les Importants as they were termed, owing to their ridiculous pretensions, he could make no terms. Reinforced by the returning exiles and especially by the clever and dangerous Duchess of Chevreuse, they threatened to become even dangerous. The Duchess, whose exile by Louis XHI. should have been made perpetual, on her return in July at once attacked Mazarin indirectly. Having failed to secure for the Condd family Brittany, she attempted again unsuccessfully, to introduce her own friends into the Council. Defeated on this point she en- BEAUFORT, (From a print in the library of Christ Church, Oxford.) 1643 ] Opening Years of the Reig 7 i. 17 deavoured to revolutionise the foreign policy of France and to bring about a Spanish alliance. Foiled by Anne’s patriotism and defeated on all points she relinquished her policy of assailing Maza- rin indirectly, and resolved by allying with Beaufort and the Importants to make a direct attack on the Minister’s power. The exile of Madame de Montbazon, one of Beaufort’s allies, owing to a quar¬ rel with Madame de Longueville, determined Beau¬ fort to assassinate Mazarin. But courage failed the conspirators, and Beaufort —le roi des Halles, as he was popularly termed—was arrested on September 2nd and the party of the Imporlatils dispersed. The suddenness of the blow and the completeness of the overthrow of the Imporlatiis recalled the energetic measures of Richelieu. The latter lived again in the prompt and decisive action of his successor. The following lines composed at this time show the popular feeling on the subject: “ II n’est pas mort; il n’a que change d'age, Ce Cardinal, dont chacun en enrage ; Mais sa maison en a grand passetems ; Maints Chevaliers n’en sont pas trop contens, Ains I’ont voulu mettre en pauvre equipage Sous sa faveur renait son parentage Par le nienie art qu’il niettoit en usage, Kt, par ina foi, c’est encore leur terns ; II n’est pas inort. “ Or nous taisons de peur d’entrer en cage ; II est en cour, I’eminent personage, Et pour durer encor plus de vingt ans Demandez-leur a tons ces Importans ; IIs vous diront d’un moult piteux langage, II n’est pas mort.” i8 Louis XII tlo 43 Mazarin was now firmly established in power. A guard of three hundred gentlemen accompanied him whenever he went out. In the Council he was supreme. The Secretaries of State, Le Tellier, Brienne, Gu^ndgaud, and La Vrilliere, were merely his agents and the Duke of Orleans was perfectly docile. Supported by the Queen, Mazarin decided all important inatters without consulting anybody. The minister’s position was immensely strengthened by the overthrow of Beaufort and his friends. He was now strong enough to deal with the serious question of the provincial governments. Champagne owing to its proximity to Lorraine could not be taken out of the hands of the central administration, so he offered and gave the government of Languedoc to Orleans with the ulterior design of stirring up enmity between him and Henry of Cond^, who had set his heart on securing Languedoc for himself. All agitation in the provinces subsided early in 1644 and the government of the Regency seemed to have triumphed over its enemies both within and without the kingdom. Throughout this trying period Maza¬ rin had acted with great discretion. The Queen was surrounded by men and women devoted to herself but hostile to Mazarin. To conciliate these enemies of Richelieu’s home policy Mazarin reversed many of the late Cardinal’s appointments. Madame de Senecey took the place of Madame de Bressac as maid-of-honour to Anne; Claude Le Bouthilier, the Superintendent of the Finances made way on June 5th for Bailleul and the Count of Avaux, Madame de Vaucelas succeeded Madame de Lansac as the 1644] Opening Years of the Reign. 19 young King’s governess. L6on Le Bouthilier, Count of Chavigny, refused to remain in the Council after his father’s fall and his Secretaryship of State was given to Henri de Lomenie de Brienne. The adoption of these well-timed measures rendered Mazarin’s posi¬ tion still more secure. At the end of 1643, too, another change took place which affected the young King. The headquarters of the royal family were moved from the Louvre to the Palais Royal which Richelieu had bequeathed to Louis XIV. In the apartments of Richelieu the young monarch, then five years old, was installed, while Mazarin also occupied rooms in the palace. Under the care of his female attendants Louis remained till his seventh year, though Villeroi, Dumont, P^refixe, and Laporte were respectively nominated his governor, sub-governor, preceptor, and first Valet-de-Ciianibre. His tastes were warlike and consequently all his amusements had a military char¬ acter. A troop of the noblest children in France was organized, was subjected to military discipline, and with the King was drilled each day. Louis delighted in his young soldiers and was very fond of marching at their head, up and down the long gallery of the Louvre. “ The King’s amusements were all war¬ like ” wrote the Count of Brienne, who was one of the young soldiers; “as soon as his little hands could grasp a stick the Queen had a large drum pre¬ pared upon which he played continually.” His principal companions were his brother the Duke of Anjou, the young Count of Quiche, and Louis Henri de Lomenie. But these early years of Louis were not spent in 20 Louis XIV [1644 comfort. Whether through the avarice of the Car¬ dinal or through the difficult}' of getting sufficient supplies, there is no doubt that the condition of the Court was often that of extreme penury and discom¬ fort. It is at any rate certain that the finances of France were in a most desperate state. The good¬ nature of Anne, the rapacity of the courtiers, the large bribes which had to be paid to Orleans and Henry Cond^, the unscrupulousness of the farmers of the taxes, the exorbitant rate of interest paid on loans, the enormous expenses of the war—all these explain the expenditure which in 1642 had been ninety-nine millions, and by 1644 had increased to one hundred and twenty-four millions. The very method of collecting taxes gave oppor¬ tunity for unlimited embezzlement, and Emery, the Controller-General of Finance, was known to take every advantage of a pernicious and oppressive sys¬ tem to enrich himself and the bankers who provided the loans. To raise more money the Taille was severely enforced, numerous fresh offices were cre¬ ated and sold, new taxes were levied. And when these methods did not prove adequate a tax called the Tois^ was invented—a fine on all houses built outside Paris since 1548, followed by a forced loan on the richer classes. These measures, however, not only failed in their object, but caused popular revolts in the provinces and provoked a strenuous resistance on the part of the Parlement of Paris. In fact, the attitude taken by the opponents of the policy of the government was so threatening that Mazarin’s position, if not 1645] Opening Years of the Reign. 2 I actually shaken, tended rapidly to become one of considerable danger. Fortunately another brilliant success abroad came to his aid and gave a temporary prestige to the gov¬ ernment. The year 1644 had witnessed the defeat of Rantzau by Mercy at Duttlingen, followed by the three desperate battles of Fribourg and the occupa¬ tion of the Rhine valley by the French armies. The year 1645 saw the famous attempt of Turenne to arrange with the Swedes a concerted attack on Vienna. In March, 1645, the latter had won the battle of Jankowitz, and Mazarin had arranged that George Ragotsky of Transylvania should send an army to aid Torstenson while Turenne should enter Suabia and march on Vienna. The Emperor was saved by the want of a proper understanding among his enemies, by the illness of Torstenson, and by the defeat of Turenne at Mergentheim on May 5th. The French were checked for the time, but rein¬ forced by Enghien and eight thousand men, Turenne aided his brilliant colleague to win the great battle of Nordlingen on August 3d, when Mercy was killed and the road to Vienna lay open. Though the weakness of the French army after the battle, the illness of Enghien, the retreat of Torstenson into Thuringia, and the retirement of Ragotsky ren¬ dered an advance on Vienna for the moment hope¬ less, the victory of Nordlingen had important effects. The death of Mercy was worth many successes to the French, but above all the brilliant victory of Nordlingen enabled Mazarin to deal firmly with his foes at home. The check at Mergentheim had en- 22 Louis XIV. [1645 couraged the resistance to the government, and had impressed Mazarin with the necessity of being more than usually circumspect. All through his ministry the influence exercised by the course of events out¬ side France upon the home policy of the govern¬ ment was immense, and Mazarin at once took advantage of the victory of Nordlingen to strike a blow at the growing opposition to his rule. A Lit-de-Jtistice was held on September 7th, pre¬ sided over by the young King. At this solemn assembly the Queen took a very firm attitude. The Parlement made no opposition to her demands, and the government withdrew the most unpopular of the taxes, the Toise and the Taxe des aises. To raise money numerous new offices were created, taxes were laid on various trades, and other ex¬ pedients adopted for increasing the revenue. Two days before the Lit-de-Justice Louis XIV. had attained his seventh year, and had arrived at the age when kings were accustomed to pass from the care of women into the hands of men. The Queen, anxious to give Mazarin the supervision of Louis’ education, created him Superintendent of the Education of the King, and letters-patent were pub¬ lished announcing to the world the elevation of the Cardinal to this dignity. Until the King was much older Mazarin seems to have taken little active par¬ ticipation in Louis’s education, which he left in charge of Villeroi his governor, P6r^fixe his teacher, and La Porte his principal Valet-de-Chambre. Villeroi, whose principal claim to fame lies in the fact of his being the father of the Marshal Villeroi, so 1646] Opening Years of the Reign. 23 prominent in the Spanish Succession war, was bound to accompany Louis everywhere, to watch over his safety, and generally to direct his actions. He was a born courtier, and taught Louis at an early age the usages of the Court. His son, the young Villeroi, became one of the young King’s compan¬ ions and favourites. Perefixe, his tutor, was a Doc¬ tor of the Sorbonne, v/ho became later Archbishop of Paris, and who was the author of a history of Henry IV. composed for the benefit of Louis. The young King, Madame de Motteville tells us, “ was taught to translate the Conuncntaries of Ccesar ; he learnt to dance, to draw, and to ride, and he was very skilful at all athletic exercises.” He became also greatly interested in history, and especially de¬ lighted in the wars of Charles the Great, St. Louis, and Francis 1 . La Porte, the King’s chief Valct-dc- CJianibre, the author of some memoirs on the early years of Louis XIV., served him faithfully, though he apparently disliked Mazarin, who always ranked him amongst his enemies. It is La Porte who asserts that Mazarin cared nothing about Louis’ education, and was merely anxious to surround him with his own friends and relations. On the contrary, it seems certain that Mazarin was fully alive to the necessity of carefully educating Louis, but during his early years left the direction of it to his governors. In 1647, when Louis was in his tenth year, he told his mother at a ball at Fontainebleau that he wished to take the government into his own hands. It was discovered that one of Louis’ attendants had sug¬ gested the thought, and Mazarin took the opportu- 24 Louis XIV. [1646 nity of reprimanding Villeroi for the bad education which he was giving Louis. The Cardinal was always keenly alive to the danger of letting the King be surrounded by flatterers. “ These perpetual flatteries are most prejudicial,” wrote Mazarin, “ and make the King dislike those who tell him the truth.” The Cardinal was at that period too much occupied in the absorbing political movements of the time to be able to superintend closely the King’s education. But in the later years of his own life it is well known how carefully and successfully he instilled into Louis the necessity of cultivating habits of order, of regular work, of perseverance, of firmness, and of taking into his own hands the supreme direction of affairs. It is probable that Louis disliked the Cardinal just as any child is apt to dislike his schoolmaster. There seems no doubt that he was encouraged in this dislike by several of those round him, who hoped in some way to profit by sowing discord between the King and the Minister. The numerous stories bearing on Louis’ aversion to the Minister as shown on various occasions at Compiegne, at Fontainebleau, or at the Palais Royal, though doubtless in the main true, have no historical importance. At this period, however, Louis was having forced upon him, by stern experience, convictions of im¬ mense importance to France. Though the Importants had been crushed, and though the young Louis had successfully presided at the Lit-de-Justice, where the complaisance of the Parlement seemed to prove that absolutism in France rested on a secure basis, in reality the posi- 1646] Opening Years of the Reign. 25 tion of the government was most precarious. The political and social condition of France at the be¬ ginning of 1646 was full of danger, and at any mo¬ ment the throne of the Bourbons might be shaken, if not overthrown. Though France was victorious abroad, and apparently tranquil at home, she was in truth on the verge of bankruptcy. The expedients of Mazarin to avert the inevitable crisis only tended to alienate every class. The discontent was univer¬ sal, but for the moment the brilliant victories of the French armies postponed an outbreak in Paris. Successful abroad and supreme at home, the gov¬ ernment of the Regency seemed in 1646 to be in an almost enviable position. Anne of Austria presided over a brilliant circle, and the “ happy hours ” of Compiegne, Fontainebleau, and the Louvre were often looked back upon with regret by many who witnessed the glories of Versailles. In this frivolous and yet magnificent, noble and yet vicious society, Enghien was the most striking figure. He was the hero of Rocroi and Nordlingen, and by these victories he had inaugurated the ascendancy of the arms of France, which continued till the battle of Blenheim. In spite of his treasonable conduct during the latter years of the conflict between France and Spain, he deserves to be placed with Richelieu and Turenne, as having aided in raising the mon-, archy to the highest point of splendour. On his re¬ turn to the capital, he was welcomed by Mazarin and Anne of Austria, and even the little King was taught to praise his “ Cousin.” He was the favour¬ ite of Paris, and his father, the President of the 26 Louis XIV. [1647 Council of State, demanded for him provinces and governments. But Enghien, though an admirable representative of the frivolity, the licentiousness, the lawlessness, and the magnificence of the society of which he had become the idol, had sterner work on hand, and was not content to remain in Paris while French armies were busy on the frontiers. In the Low Countries, the Spanish forces had been successful, and Mardyck, Bergues, and Cassel had been retaken. It was necessary at once to recom¬ mence the war, and to resume active operations. The Court proceeded as far as Amiens, and in 1646 Gaston of Orleans and Enghien, at the head of the French armies, turned the tables on their enemies. Though Orleans’s adhesion to the old routine of a campaign, which regarded long sieges as the height of military skill, checked the achievement of any brilliant successes in the field, Enghien’s presence made itself felt, and the capture of Dunkirk at the end of the campaign was one of his greatest triumphs. His return to the capital was followed by the death of his father, and by his appointment to the civil and military command in Spain. On arriving at Barcelona in the spring of 1647, he found the influ¬ ence of France almost destroyed in Catalonia, and the small French army in a very perilous condition. His well known failure before Lerida was his only reverse when leading a French army, and he was no doubt perfectly right in raising the siege of that strong fortress. Conde’s check, however, unfortu¬ nately coincided with disasters and misfortunes to the French arms in other parts of Europe, and with an 1647] Opening Years of the Reign. 27 increasing deficit in the treasury and a deepening discontent at home. The year 1647 seemed indeed fraught with disas¬ ter and even danger to the French monarchy. The failure of the French at Lerida had shaken its repu¬ tation in Catalonia, the revolt of the VVeimarian troops and the quarrel of Gassion and Rantzau had for the moment not only destroyed Mazarin’s hopes of securing the Spanish Netherlands, but, combined with the success of the Archduke Leopold in taking Landrecies, had even imperilled the French conquests from Courtrai to Dunkirk ; even in Italy the French cause had suffered reverses. “ Mazarin has grown pale,” wrote the Venetian ambassador in August, 1647, “ and his hair has turned white.” Disaster abroad was accompanied by an.xieties at home. In September of the same year the young Duke of Anjou fell dangerously ill ; in November the King himself was attacked by small-pox, and the Queen, worn out, was seized with fever. The friends of Orleans actually looked forward to the reign of Gas¬ ton I., the Iniportaiits once more raised their heads, epigrams became numerous, certain members of the Parlenient began to make preparations for asserting their rights on the first opportunity, and Paris, already seething with discontent, began to stir uneasily. The recovery of the Queen and her sons destroyed the ambitious schemes of Orleans and the Parlanent ; the appointment of Conde to the command of the army of Flanders seemed to augur well for the future success of the French arms. But for a time bad 28 Louis XIV. tl648 luck dogged all Mazarin’s efforts, and his efforts to make peace with the Empire seemed destined to come to nothing. The Elector of Bavaria, who had in 1647 signed the treaty of Ulm with France, now early in 1648 broke the treaty and returned to his allegiance to the Emperor. This defection seemed to destroy all chance of an early peace with the Em¬ pire. But what was even a more serious blow to the foreign policy of Mazarin was the conclusion of a treaty (of Munster) between the United Provinces and Spain, in January, 1648. Ever since the capture of Dunkirk by the French, the Dutch had become uneasy, lest the French should within the near future secure the Belgian Provinces. This uneasi¬ ness was accentuated by the discovery that Mazarin was endeavouring early in 1646 to arrange a peace with Spain—the latter to yield the Spanish Nether¬ lands to France, which country would on her part, abandon all Catalonia and Portugal to the Spaniards. To extend the French frontiers to the Scheldt was always one of Mazarin’s favourite schemes, and the year 1646 seemed unusually favourable for the exe¬ cution of this design. England occupied with her Civil war could not interfere ; Spain had had ample opportunity of recognising not only the difficulty of defending her distant and often disloyal Belgian Provinces against the attacks of French and Dutch, but also the vast importance of thoroughly conquer¬ ing Catalonia, and if possible Portugal. The Dutch opposition to this scheme soon showed itself. It was feared in Holland that Antwerp in French hands would not only rival Amsterdam and 1648] Opening Years of the Reign. 29 so endanger the Dutch trade, but that the presence of a powerful neighbour, such as France, would be a constant menace to the liberties and independence of the Republic. Aided by these fears on the part of the Dutch, the work of Spanish diplomacy was easy. The ancient alliance between the French and the United Provinces was broken, and in January, 1648, the treaty between the Dutch and Spanish governments destroyed all chance of the French frontiers being pushed to the Scheldt. But though the year 1648 opened so gloomily for the French foreign policy, four events revolutionised the condition of affairs in Europe and compelled the Emperor to agree to make peace. The victory of Turenne over the Bavarian troops at Zusmars- hausen (May 17th) rendered Bavaria, now occupied by the troops of Turenne and Wrangel, useless as a check upon a march on Vienna; the capture of Tortosa (July 13th) laid Spain open to a French invasion ; the success of the Swede Koenigsmarck in occupying Little Prague was a strong argument in the mouths of the Duke of Bavaria and the other German Princes who pressed the Emperor to make peace; Condi’s splendid and decisive victory at Lens on August 20th, after a long campaign at the head of a very inferior force, finally decided the Emperor to conclude the peace of Westphalia. As far as foreign policy was concerned the mi¬ nority of Louis XIV. had seen France achieve bril¬ liant successes. She had not extended her frontier to the Scheldt, but she had by securing Alsace ad¬ vanced her boundaries wellnigh to the Rhine. Her Louis XIV. [1648 30 rival Austria, moreover, was permanently weakened by the changes effected in the Germanic constitu¬ tion. The independence of each German state and the introduction of Sweden into the north of Germany were in themselves a considerable check on the power of the Emperor. The Empire was paralysed and the Rhine was no longer a German river. The French were established almost through¬ out all Alsace, and the Imperial dignity was enor¬ mously lessened. The smaller German Princes had learned to look upon France as their protector, and Louis XIV. was to reap later the benefits of Mazarin’s skilful advocacy of the rights of these petty states. The Austro-Spanish House had indeed suffered a severe fall in the Thirty Years’ War. A balance of power was established in Europe under the guaran¬ tee of France which could not easily be overthrown. In spite of her internal troubles the French mon¬ archy had gained immensely in the consideration of Europe; France remained the leading power in Europe and was regarded by the secondary states as their ally and protector. The year 1648 was disastrous to the cause of royalty. Charles I. fell into the hands of his foes and early in the following year ended his life on the scaffold, in Naples a republic was proclaimed and the arms of Spain defied, in Germany the Emperor’s power had been for ever weakened by the recogni¬ tion of the federal character of the Empire, even in Russia an aristocratic movement hostile to the royal power took place. 1648] Opening Years of ike Reign. 31 / France was no exception to the general rule. There the murmuring Parlcment of the early years of Louis XIV.’s reign became the mutinous and rebellious Parle^nent of the period of the Fronde. “ The constellations were terribly against Kings,” wrote Madame de Motteville. For some five years the Fronde filling France with the turmoil and misery of a civil war compromised the conquests and the glory gained by the French armies during the years 1643-48. Dominated at one time by the Parlcment, at another by the Princes, at another by a union of both, the period of the Fronde is marked by intrigue, by selfishness, and by an entire absence of patriotism. There is probably no period in later French his¬ tory which afforded more justification for absolutism. The ready acceptance by the French people of the establishment of Louis XIV.’s despotic power was in great measure due to the factious character of the Fronde movement. It was during these years 1648-54 that Louis learnt some of his first lessons in the art of govern¬ ment. It was during these years that he gained his earliest political experiences. Opposed on all sides by a curious medley of princes like Beaufort, of gen¬ erals like Turenne and Cond6, of ecclesiastics like Paul de Gondi, of ambitious intriguers like Madame de Chevreuse and Madame de Longueville, it was not to be wondered at that Louis’ early experiences taught him the necessity of crushing all opposition. The failure of the P'ronde movement to secure any constitutional concessions or any tangible 32 Louis XIV [1648 reforms was due to two causes. In the first place the Parlemeiit of Paris—a mere corporation of magistrates holding their power from the King— had no right to take the place of the States-General and to pose as the representatives of the nation. This official aristocracy, indignant at Mazarin’s attempt to deprive them of the hereditary rights which belonged to their offices, now proved as hostile to the minister as the feudal aristocracy had been to Richelieu. Though these lawyers spoke brave words about individual liberty, they were far more anxious about the extension of their own privileges and the threatened loss of the “ paulette ” than about the advancement of the liberties of the nation at large. It is indeed true that the first or Parliamentary Fronde (1648-49) did certainly number among its ranks men who, like M0I6, the President of the Parlement and a real patriot, were honest citizens and anxious for the welfare of their country. And undeniably this movement is worthy of a certain amount of respect in that it did attack a most wasteful administration, and a ruinous system of taxation. But the Parlement was incapa¬ ble, from its very constitution, of carrying through a scheme of reform in face of the insuperable difficulties which beset its path. The second cause of the failure of the Fronde movement is to be found in the fact that the New or second Fronde (1649-1653) had no title whatever to any respect. The constitutional leanings of a certain portion of the members of the first Fronde had been to a great Ah:s/iu: \/.VT////'\' MOI.I.F. ('on 'jn HOY OHS.-//- yv-.v///,v /vrj;/,/,v// an ptlr/ann'iiOi-/'•I'ls /nrj. t/rj >. ;nnx s ported by the good wishes of not only the German Protestants but of Pope Innocent XI. and the Em¬ peror Leopold. By the beginning of i68g, Louis’ position was far from being satisfactory. The Turks were unable to create any serious diversion in his favour; Denmark was surrounded by foes. Louis deemed it neces¬ sary to withdraw from the Palatinate. He had seized on the four Rhine Electorates but realised that he could not defend the whole breadth of the annexed districts. His advisers therefore hit upon a ghastly plan of wasting the Palatinate. Accor¬ dingly what is known as the Second Devastation of the Palatinate took place—and this meant the total destruction of its cities, and the ruin of its agricul¬ ture, trade, and prosperity, in order that the advan¬ cing Germans might find a desert between them and France. Madame was in despair at the fate of her beloved country. “ Should they kill me for it,” she wrote on March 20th, “ I cannot help bitterly regretting and deploring my share in my country’s ruin. I am seized with such a horror when I think of all that has been destroyed that every night I think myself at Heidelberg or Manheim in the middle of the desolation. I wake up with a start and do not go to sleep again for two hours. I think of it all as I once knew' it, and as it is now; also the change in my own life, and then I cannot prevent myself 264 Louis XIV. [1689 weeping.” But Madame’s despair could not save her beloved country. The French soldiers devasta¬ ted the Palatinate, the town of Heidelberg was burnt, its magnificent castle was ruined. The whole country was ravaged ; cities and agriculture de¬ stroyed, the Rhine district left in great part a desert. “ The ravage of the Palatinate,” says Mr. Lilly, “was one of those crimes which arouse inextinguish¬ able hatred in the breasts of a people and leave to future generations a terrible legacy of vengeance.” ‘ The memory of Turenne’s devastation in 1674 was still fresh, and this second wanton infliction of misery on the inhabitants of the Palatinate roused Germany and infused new energy into the League. The Diet declared war at Ratisbon in February, 1689, and three armies were at once set on foot. This second devastation of the Palatinate well marks the end of Louis’ culminating period of prosperity, which beginning with the peace of Nimeguen, closes with a deed unsurpassed in cruelty and lawlessness. A thrill of horror ran through Europe, and the pa¬ triotic feelings roused in Germany by this last mani¬ festation of Louis’ arrogance may be said to have never entirely subsided. Some fifty years or so later, when the French at the opening of the Aus¬ trian Succession War were proposing to intervene actively on the side of Prussia, it was found that there was “ one point on which all Germans were agreed without distinction of the greater and lesser states, of Protestant or Catholic, one common feel- ’ Chapters in European History by W. S. Lilly, vol. ii. pp. 84-5. 1689] The League and the War of Augsburg. 265 ing that could impose silence on their special dissen¬ sions; this was sullen and jealous irritation with France.”' The soldiers of France “little knew to what an undying hatred on the part of Germany they devoted the very name of their country, when they inscribed it in letters of blood and fire on all the hills of the Palatinate.” Some of the most eminent of French soldiers like Villars condemned this devastation as opposed to the true science of war and contrary to humanity. Villars himself tries to excuse Louis on the ground that Louvois over-persuaded him. “ The King,” he says, “ whose merciful nature was never really un¬ derstood, had been over-persuaded that the safety of the State depended upon creating a desert between our frontier and the enemy’s armies.” And he continues in still stronger language, “ This pernicious policy had been carried so far that sowing had been forbidden upon a space of four leagues on either bank of the Meuse. It is still unknown by what fatality these atrocious orders were made. The Marquis of Louvois, a man of great intelligence, did not oppose them, and persuaded the King, whose kind nature, nevertheless, I repeat, was un¬ doubted.” But though it may be allowed that Louis was naturally kind-hearted and was perhaps over-persuaded by Louvois, the fact remains that the French had not very long before laid waste the ' For an interesting account of the effect of this devastation of the Palatinate upon the attitude of the German people towards France, see the Duke de Broglie’s, Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, vol. i. 266 Lo7tis XIV. [1689 Piedmontese valleys, and that a little later they proposed to destroy Dublin in order to save Ire¬ land. It would seem that the plan of devastating the Palatinate was quite in harmony with their meth¬ ods of making war. It would have been well for Louis if he had never sent a French soldier into the Palatinate. In the first place the French failed in their aim and the devastation was useless, for the Germans, more united than ever before, took Mainz and Bonn. Be¬ sides, by invading the Electorate, instead of making a movement in a more northerly direction, he had Nsnabled his great rival, William of Orange, to act as he wished and sail for England. That the Revolu¬ tion of 1688 occurred when it did is due to Louis’ excusable though fatal blunder, due to his desire to increase the glory of his house. The whole course of European politics was changed by William’s rapid action, which was alone rendered possible by Louis’ great mistake. Then, again, the devastation of the Palatinate was another fatal blunder. Just as the invasion had ended his connexion with the English Court, so the devastation destroyed his last hold upon Germany. The new war in which Louis found himself in 1689, marks an epoch in the history of France. The decline of the monarchy begins. The Revolu¬ tion of 1688 inaugurates in England a period of constitutional government, of commercial prosper¬ ity, of colonial expansion. The success of William III. represents the victory of constitutional over divine right. With the opening of the war of the 1689 ] The League and the War of A ugsburg. 267 League of Augsburg, “ The Age of Louis XIV.” may be said to be over, just as the Tudor period may be said to end with the defeat of the Spanish Armada. The year 1588 was a turning point in the history of constitutional government and commer¬ cial progress in England ; it also disclosed to the world the real weakness of Spain and indicated her rapid decline. The year 1688, again bringing with it the accession of William III. to the English throne, marks an im¬ portant epoch in the constitutional development of England. It does more, for it sees a revolution in her foreign policy. England comes into line with the members of the League of Augsburg, and in doing so gives a new force to the general European opposition to Louis XIV. The year 1688, too, marks the time when the true character of the French monarchy stands revealed before an indig¬ nant Europe. This revolt of Europe against the violent acts of the French monarchy had been gath¬ ering force and volume during the last ten years, and was not to be appeased till the treaty of Utrecht had lowered the pretensions of France and allayed the apprehensions of all the Teutonic peoples. From 1688 England and Holland definitely united against the aggressive Catholic monarchy of Louis XIV. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and the ac¬ cession of James IL, had brought home to Dutch statesmen the danger from France, and their own helplessness without the alliance of England. That Holland would lose much of her independence by becoming the satellite of England was foreseen 268 Louis XIV. [1689 by many Dutchmen; but in 1688^—9 the Republic of the Netherlands had no other course but to co¬ operate with William III. From 1688, too, a new period in the rivalry of England and France begins. From the Norman Conquest to the reign of Eliza¬ beth, hostility between the two countries was re¬ garded as part of the political creed of each. Elizabeth and the Stuarts, however, found that a French alliance was more suited to the circum¬ stances of the time, and even Cromwell very wisely preferred to ally with Mazarin, than to suspend for a day the commercial expansion of England at the expense of Spain. Had the latter Stuarts acted towards Louis XIV. with the caution and firmness showed by Cromwell in his dealings with Mazarin, the preponderance of France in Europe would not have been dangerous and the Revolution of 1688 might not have been neces¬ sary. But Charles II. and his brother systematically shut their eyes to the needs of the English nation, and persistently ignored not only the general interests of Europe but those of England in order to further their own personal aims. As the whole tendency of Louis’ policy became apparent, the deep-seated antag¬ onism, religious, commercial, and political, between the two countries asserted itself. Nothing short of the Revolution, which destroyed the hopes of the Catholics and reversed the foreign policy of Charles II. and his brother, could possibly have restored the balance of power in Europe. From 1688 England plunged into a contest at once political, commercial, colonial, and religious with her ancient enemy 1689 ] The League and the War of Augsburg. 269 France,—political in that she was opposed to the restoration of James II., to the enslavement or weakening of Germany, and to the extension of the north-east frontier of France,—commercial and colonial, for, apart from the fact that English and French interests clashed in the Mediterranean, France held Canada and that famous scheme for building a line of forts from the Mississippi to the Canadian Lakes to prevent the Anglo-Saxon from developing and spreading his colonies west¬ wards had already been produced,—religious, for it was the fixed belief of Englishmen till the peace of Utrecht that Louis intended to forcibly convert Great Britain to Roman Catholicism. But English¬ men need not have been so apprehensive of an in¬ crease in Louis’ aggressive jaolicy, for the decadence of France dates from 1688. This decadence is nowhere so visible as in the change in the character of the art of war. No doubt owing to Vauban, a great improvement showed itself in the attack and defence of strong places, but though the armies had increased in size, the art of war had distinctly declined. There was no scientific com¬ mander like Turenne, and though many brilliant victories were won, they were not followed up by decisive results. Luxemburg was the most capable general, but his admirable qualities were marred by indolence and ill health. William III., Louis of Baden, Catinat, and Villeroy were poor substitutes for Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Turenne, and the great Conde. Signs of decadence were equally visible in the administration. On the death of the 270 Louis XIV. [1689 able Seignelay in 1690, the incompetent Pontchartrain was appointed Minister of the Marine, and Louvois, who died the following year, was succeeded by Barb^zieux, young and also incapable. Louis as ever had no conception of the value of the work done by his capable ministers. “ Tell the King of England,” he said the day after Louvois’ death, “ that I have lost a good minister, but that his affairs and mine will go none the worse for that.” But though the value of Louvois’ work might not be appreciated by his master, the debt France owes to him is immense. The position of Louis XIV. had never been so threatening to the indepen¬ dence of Europe as it was at the time of William’s landing in England, and had the expectations of the French Court been realised and a long internecine struggle taken place, the conflict between France and Europe might have ended in one more signal triumph for the French King, which would have been in great measure the result of Louvois’ work of organisation. As soon as William III. became master of Eng¬ land and Scotland, the policy of Louis was at once plain. The accession of William was a blow struck at the principles to which he attached the most vital importance. The theory of the Divine Right of Kings had been rudely attacked and the connec¬ tion between Catholic and dynastic ideas contempt¬ uously ignored. To Louis’ Minister of the Marine, Seignelay, the Revolution presented itself in a different but no less forcible manner. He had determined to secure for LOUVOIS. (From an old portrait reproduced in Philippson’s Das Zeitalter Ludwigs XII'',) \ I i 1689 ] The League and the War of Augsburg. 2 71 the French the sovereignty of the Mediterranean, and to gain access to the East Indies through Turkey. The Dutch power was the principal obstacle to the realisation of these schemes. But when in con¬ sequence of the Revolution, England and Holland became closely allied, Seignelay recognised that a most serious change in the aspect of affairs had oc¬ curred. The measures taken by King and Minister were characteristic of the special aims of both. The royal exiles were received with great magnanimity. James’ Queen—the daughter of a niece of Mazarin, whose marriage with James had been brought about by Louis—was conducted from Boulogne by an equerry and received near Versailles by Louis him¬ self, accompanied by his whole court. It is said that a hundred and six coaches were there. There is no doubt that great importance was attached to securing the person of James’ son, the heir to the crown, and Louis greeted him first. In his own coach he conducted Queen Mary Beatrice to Saint- Germain. James 11 . arrived later but did not act with the dignity which his wife had shown. Louis regarded himself as the principal supporter of Catholic and dynastic ideas in the world, he felt bound to support James, and was thus disposed to give Seignelay and Louvois full powers. As a war with England was inevitable, all the military authorities agreed that a diversion in Ire¬ land would be invaluable. The forces of England and Holland would be drawn off there, and Ireland would in the first stages of the war prove of the ut¬ most service in preventing William from acting vig- 272 Lotiis XIV. [1690 orously in any other quarter, and eventually would serve as a basis for a more serious undertaking against England. In March, 1690, a corps consisting of six regi¬ ments, 6300 men under Count Lauzan and several officers, and supported by a fine train of artillery and abundant stores of ammunition, was sent to Ire¬ land. The Count of Avaux with a large sum of money had been in Ireland for some months as diplomatic representative of the French govern¬ ment. He was a man of considerable acuteness, but lacked the power of conciliation and took up a posi¬ tion of hostility to all Protestants in Ireland. Both James and Louis hoped to pacify Ireland and to give the country a government under which Protestants could exist. But the anti-English views of the Catholic Irish were too strong for them and helped to bring about the chaos which followed the arrival of James in the country. To Seignelay it was of the utmost importance that James II. should be maintained in Ireland. Cork and Kinsale he regarded as French ports. Tourville was made Commander-in-chief of the united French fleet, and was ordered to seek out the English ships in their harbours, to inflict as much damage as possible and then to station himself off the mouth of the Thames to prevent communica¬ tion between the Dutch and English, and to destroy the trade between England and the North. The success of James II. was therefore all-impor¬ tant for the military, naval, and commercial undertak¬ ings of the French government. But William HI. 1690 ] The League and the War of Augsbiirg. 2 73 was equally conscious of the absolute necessity on the one hand of a loyal, or at any rate, of an Ireland powerless for harm, and on the other of the com¬ mand of the Channel. The way in which he grap¬ pled with the combined forces of France and of Catholic Ireland and the orders given to the English Admiral showed that he was well aware of the peril to which England was exposed from her Celtic de¬ pendency, and from the French fleet, when com¬ manded by Tourville and directed by Seignelay. No sooner had the latter heard of the existence of discontent in England and Scotland and of Wil¬ liam’s departure for Ireland than he pressed Tour¬ ville to attack the English fleet before William had done anything decisive in Ireland. The English government fully realised the im¬ mense importance of preventing France from ac¬ quiring the preponderance on the sea. Though the condition of the English fleet was bad, it was neces¬ sary to attack Tourville at once, even at the risk of a defeat.' Unassailed he could throw men and arms into Scotland and could capture English merchant¬ men returning from Cadiz. England could not even in those days afford to allow a foreign and hostile fleet to ride unmolested in the channel. Precise or¬ ders were sent to Admiral Torrington to unite with the Dutch fleet, and to attack Tourville wherever he could be found. Through Torrington leaving the Dutch unsupported the French won a naval battle off Peachy Head on July lOth, and though severely damaged, Tourville’s fleet was still able to keep the sea. The contest for the supremacy of the 18 Louis XIV. [1691 274 Channel remained for the moment undecided but the schemes of Louis in Ireland had already suffered an irreparable blow. James had left France early in 1689. “The best thing,” said Louis, on wishing him farewell, “ that I can wish for you is that I may never see you again.” But the principles which were defended by the greatest monarchy of the age were not destined to take root in Ireland. The political and religious controversy which was being fought out in Europe was to be decided in Ireland in a sense hostile to the wishes and ideas of Louis XIV. The battle of the Boyne took place on July ist, and proved decisive. James 11 . returned at once to France, and all chance of using Ireland as a centre for French expeditions against England passed away. Cork and Kinsale instantly capitulated, and thus the whole south coast of Ireland was lost to the Catho¬ lic cause. During the short and last struggle of the Irish in the west under Sarsfield, Louis supplied ammunition, provisions, and money, and St. Ruth, a French general, aided by other French officers, en¬ deavoured to unite and organise the Irish resistance. But St. Ruth was killed on July 12, 1691, and though the Irish, led by one of St. Ruth’s officers. General D’Urson, at first made a good stand in Lim¬ erick, they gradually realised that they could not expect any efficient help from France. The capitu¬ lation of Limerick placed Ireland under Protestant ascendancy, and gave Louis valuable reinforcements in the shape of 12,000 Irish soldiers, who were formed into regiments, and well sustained the cause of France in many a battle-field. 1691 ] The League and the War of Augsbtirg. 275 After the battle of the Boyne the antagonism be¬ tween the united and energetic Catholic monarchy presided over by Louis, and the Protestant Germanic kingdoms of which England was the chief, became more distinct and more clearly defined than ever. It was evident that while on the one hand, in the great European struggle, England held a leading position, on the other, resistance to Louis was not only an English but also a European necessity.' Ireland being no longer a possible theatre of war, the European contest was narrowed to the war on the continent and to a long-continued struggle between the French and English fleets for the su¬ premacy of the sea and more particularly for the command of the Channel. This rivalry between the English and French fleets is the novel feature in what is always regarded as a dreary list of sieges and battles. The success of the French fleet at Beachy Head had roused to a high pitch the English national feeling against France, whose preponderance at sea was at that moment undoubted. In the Parliament of 1691 it was openly stated that England’s power rests upon her fleet alone, and efforts were made to strengthen and render the navy thoroughly efficient. The French realised with equal clearness the impor¬ tance to them of the mastery at sea. Louis and his ministers saw that the object for which the war was being waged, viz., the retention of the reunited districts, would never be gained by a war conducted on the mainland alone. If Holland and England were boldly attacked by sea and forced to ' On England’s relations with the Continent see Ranke. History of England principally in the Seventeenth Century. (Trans.). Vol. v. Louis XIV. [1692- 276 come to terms, the Empire would be compelled to agree to make a peace recognising the acquisition by France of the districts given to her for twenty years at the truce of Ratisbon. Chamlay’s assertion with reference to England that “ the Romans can only be conquered at Rome ” found ready accept¬ ance at the French Court. The Dutch fleet had forced the peace of Breda from the English, why should not the French fleet do likewise? The dis¬ content with William’s rule was general in 1691. Not only Catholics and High Churchmen but men who had taken a leading part in the Revolution like Marlborough and Russell were intriguing with James II. The Princess Anne had quarrelled with William, and James had gathered round him a large body of supporters, who held constant communica¬ tion with his supporters in England. Louis himself had caused enquiries to be made as to the true state of political feeling among Englishmen. In Decem¬ ber, 1691, he asked James what success was likely to attend an expedition to England; the latter replied full of hope. Louis himself convinced, and count¬ ing on the jealousy of the English and Dutch and on the defection of Russell, the admiral of the fleet, decided that England should be invaded in May of the following year. But the English Government were not so unprepared as it was thought, and Russell did not neglect his duty. On May 19, 1692, the battle of La Hogue de¬ stroyed for the time all Louis’ hopes of carrying out nis policy by forcing England to make peace. But the English supremacy of the sea was by no means 1696 ] The Lcagtie and the War of Augskirg. 277 assured, though La Hogue is certainly an important epoch in the history of England’s navy, and in 1693 Tourville managed to capture sixty-two English merchantmen in spite of the proximity of a division of the English fleet under George Rooke. For up¬ ward of a hundred years the French navy was gov¬ erned by the regulations drawn up by Seignelay while the value of the merchant service in time of war continued from his time to receive numerous illustrations. Though a serious blow had been inflicted on Louis’ hopes and on James’ chances of regaining his crown by the battle of La Hogue, neither Louis nor James regarded their chances of success in a future invasion as hopeless. By Louis’ advice James— unlike his son in the later times—agreed to accept very stringent conditions from the English royalists as the price of his return. In 1696, perhaps in con¬ sequence of the unsatisfactory results of the cam¬ paign just ended in the Netherlands, Louis again determined to support an expedition against Eng¬ land. To ensure success it was absolutely necessary that France should be supreme in the Channel if only for two or three days, and it seemed possible that this might be done early in the year. But though Louis was willing to consider a project for landing in England, he insisted that James’ adher¬ ents in England should seize a harbour and defend it till the arrival of the French fleet. As soon as— and not before—a harbour had been seized the French fleet would sail. But James’ supporters refused to move till the arrival of the hrench fleet, 278 Louis XIV. t1692- and so the enterprise was wrecked before any at¬ tempt had been made to carry it out, through the lukewarmness of James’ adherents and the caution if not sagacity of the French king. Later in the year Louis was ready to take advantage of the famous plot to assassinate William though he refused to be in any way connected with it. James 11 . hastened to Calais where the French fleet lay prepared. The plot was discovered, James returned to Saint-Germain and the French ministers countermanded their preparations. Thus the attempts of Louis to secure his ends by obtaining the mastery of the sea and by invading England had by 1696 entirely failed. Similarly on the Continent, though his troops had won several battles, there was small hope that Germany would consent to the permanent loss of the reunited dis¬ tricts. The war was waged on an immense scale, and assumed far greater dimensions than had ever been seen before. Though France had to defend herself by sea and also on the side of the Pyrenees, the principal thea¬ tres of the war were Italy, the Rhine, and the Low Countries. The capture of Mainz in 1689 had indi¬ cated to the King and to Louvois the serious nature of the struggle which was coming; and the mode of carrying on the land war which was arranged with consummate skill showed a full appreciation of the gravity of the position. “ Louis XIV.,” says von Ranke, “ arranged France as if she had been a huge fortress in the heart of Europe, as a base of opera¬ tions and a reserve, if the state of affairs made it desirable for him to take the offensive in any direc- 1696] The Leagtie and the War of A ugshirg. 2 79 tion, and at the same time as a refuge for the defen¬ sive, in case the foes she stirred up might either drive her in, or even in their turn invade her.” In Italy Catinat was fairly successful. William III. had hoped to effect a serious diversion by means of Savoy, who bitterly resented the occupation of Pinerolo and Casale by French garrisons. If the Duke joined the Allies, it might be possible to effect the re-establishment of the Piedmontese Waldenses in their native valleys, and their possible employment, together with the Protestants of southern France against Louis. Similar schemes were projected dur¬ ing the Spanish Succession war and by Alberoni during the Regency of Louis XV. Louis XIV., fully alive to the seriousness of the crisis, at once summoned Victor Amadeus to give up Verona and the citadel of Turin. The Duke imme¬ diately allied himself with Austria and Spain, re¬ stored the Waldenses to their valleys, welcomed a body of French Huguenots, and determined to regain Pinerolo and Casale. But in August, 1690, Catinat won a brilliant vic¬ tory at Staffarda over Victor Amadeus, and Savoy and Nice and the greater part of Piedmont fell into the hands of the French. During the next year, however, in conjunction with an English plan of in¬ vading France from the north, a fine army under Victor Amadeus and Prince Eugene invaded Dau- phine and threatened Casale and Pinerolo. The ill¬ ness of Victor necessitated a retreat, and Catinat defeated the enemy in October, 1693, at Marsaglia and overran all Piedmont. 28o Louis XIV. [1690- On the Rhine after the opening campaign in 1689, the war was mainly defensive. The Empire aided by Russia and Poland was still engaged in the Holy war with the Turks, and though the subjugation of Hungary by Austria had deprived Louis of a useful ally, as long as the war continued the Empire could not employ against Louis its full strength. The campaigns on the Rhine, so fully described by Saint- Simon, are most uninteresting. Lorges, who com¬ manded the French troops, was devoid of military ability, and the long encampments, together with the marchings and countermarches varied by a few skirmishes are quite unimportant. But it was in the Low Countries that Louis took the greatest personal interest, and there the cam¬ paigns, if not very interesting, are at any rate of some importance. In July, 1690, Luxemburg had won a victory over the Prince of Waldeck at Fleurus, but this success was not vigorously followed up, and Louis declared he would have no more battles but would act on the defensive and capture towns in the manner of former days. As usual the arrangements made for the army were excellent, and great atten¬ tion was bestowed on the commissariat. Early in the spring, Mons, a town which in French hands would be of enormous military importance, was be¬ sieged. It fell on April 8th. Louis was present at its capture and returned in triumph to Versailles. He had indeed cause for satisfaction. Though his intervention in Ireland had failed, the French power was preponderant on the sea, and seemed likely was gaining ground in the Netherlands. 1696 ] The League and the War of Augsburg. 281 The League against him had so far shown no signs of extraordinary activity. It was weakened by the Turkish war, by the continued opposition of the Irish and Scottish Jacobites, by the defeat at Staf- farda. But the French cause suffered a heavy loss when Louvois died in 1691, for his successor Barbe- zieux was young and inexperienced. Very char¬ acteristically Louis made himself practically War Minister, and took upon his own shoulders the main burden of the struggle against Europe. In 1692 Louis left Versailles. Early in May he held a great review of his troops, and at the end of the month he appeared before Namur. With Vauban he arranged the plan of attack with the utmost energy and care. “It is,” he writes, “the strongest rampart not only of Brabant, but of the Bishoprick of Liege, of the United Provinces, and of a portion of Lower Germany. Besides securing the communications of all these districts, its situa¬ tion at the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse makes it mistress of these two rivers ; it is splendidly placed, either to arrest the action of France, or to facilitate the forward movements o’f her enemies.” He had the satisfaction of seeing its capture at the end of June. Again the French lost a grand opportunity by not following up their success. Just as Luxemburg should have energetically pursued Waldeck’s forces after Fleurus, so now had Louis been a real warrior of even the type of Frederick the Great he could have driven William III. into Holland. But, as the Dutch war of 1672 had amply proved, Louis was not 282 Louis XIV. [1696 a real soldier. He had no taste for field warfare. He had taken one of the strongest fortresses in Eu¬ rope, and he held its capture to be his most brilliant military exploit. His personal glory was, he consid¬ ered, much enhanced by the deed, and he returned in a triumphant manner to Paris. The next year, 1693, saw the last appearance of Louis in person with his armies in the field. In June he had hoped to take Lifege and compel the Dutch to make peace. William HI., however, was very strongly posted, and now as at Bouchain Louis declined to give battle and returned to Versailles. Luxemburg might again defeat William HI. at Neer- winden, but it was impossible for the French to break the power of the League. The years 1694 and 1695 are uninteresting in the annals of the war. Though Noailles invaded Spain with some success in the former year, and though in 1695 the Rhine provinces were again ravaged, it was quite useless for the French to hope to gain their ends. Luxem¬ burg died early in 1695, and in September of the same year William HI. retook Namur. Though the war languished on all sides, there still seemed no hope of peace, till the defection of the Duke of Savoy, attesting again Louis’ diplomatic skill and the untrustworthiness of Victor Amadeus, brought to an issue the question of peace or no peace. At all hazards Louis was determined to break ,the unity of the League formed against him. By promising Victor, Casale, and Pinerolo, and all ■S^oy, and by affiancing his daughter to the Duke of Burgundy, Louis gained over the Duke and 1697 ] The League and theWar of Augsburg. 283 detached him from the cause of the Allies in 1696. This defection of Savoy seriously affected the League. Louis could now throw 30,000 troops into the Netherlands under Catinat, and the war would be indefinitely prolonged. William III. had long desired peace on the basis of the terms of the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees, but the defection of Savoy seemed to render such an arrangement impossible. No sooner, however, had Louis shown an unexpected readiness to discuss terms of peace, than negotiations began between France and Eng¬ land under the mediation of Sweden. So moderate were Louis’ demands, that when the Congress of Ryswick opened in May, 1697, little difficulty was experienced in settling the terms so far as England was concerned when once Louis had agreed to recog¬ nise William as King of England. In September, the first of the treaties which formed the peace of Ryswick was signed with England, Holland, and Spain. Louis recognised William as King of Great Britain and Ireland and promised not to abet any plots against him. He ceded all places taken or claimed since 1678, even Luxemburg, the most prized of all his conquests in the late war, and agreed to the garrisoning of certain strong places in the Spanish Netherlands by the Dutch, such as Ypres, Menin, Namur, which now received the name of the Barrier. The Dutch, moreover, obtained an advan¬ tageous treaty of commerce, and the policy pursued by Colbert toward the United Provinces was entirely reversed. William HI. had some difficulty in per¬ suading the Germans to make peace. But at last 284 Loiiis XIV. [1697 they consented very reluctantly, and the second treaty was made in October between France and the Emperor and Empire. Louis ceded all places taken since 1678 except Landau and Strasburg, which to the great grief and rage of the Germans he insisted on keeping. He consented to withdraw from the right bank of the Rhine, but though he gave up Philipsburg, Breisach, and Freiburg, he at once ordered Vauban to furnish plans for the buildings and fortifications of a new Breisach on the left bank of the river. Louis further restored Lorraine, which he had occupied for sixty years, to its young Duke, though Saarlouis remained in French hands. An arrangement was come to about Cologne and the Palatinate, Louis accepting a sum of money in lieu of the claims of “ Madame ” on the latter, and fore¬ going his support of a candidate to the electorate of the former. He undoubtedly expected that one result of the pacification of Ryswick would be that many of the German Princes would return to their old connection with France. This expectation is very noticeable in Louis’ in¬ structions to Villars as ambassador at Vienna in 1698. Louis apparently thought that the German Princes would view with distrust if not alarm the increase of the Imperial power, so successful in Hungary and Translyvania and in the war against the Turks. By his conduct between 1678 and 1688, Louis had destroyed the political edifice built by his predeces¬ sors. He now hoped in vain to repair the damage which he had done to one of the most valuable of 1697 ] The League and the War of Atigsburg. 285 the traditions of French foreign policy. But the clause in the treaty of Ryswick which stipulated that the religion of the provinces restored by Louis should remain as it was at the time of their restitu¬ tion had exasperated the Protestant party in Ger¬ many, and nullified the effects of any fear on their part of the possible absolutism of Leopold. The peace of Ryswick was but a truce in the great struggle against the preponderance of Louis XIV. On the most pressing question of the day—the Spanish Succession—not a word was said. Thus left unsolved, the Spanish question was bound to appear shortly on the surface and to tax the skill of all European statesmen. But though Louis’ hope of German alliances was not to be fulfilled, and though he had given up Luxemburg and retired from Barcelona, his diplo¬ macy had again stood him in good stead. The great League was broken up and would not easily be reunited. Lorraine, though nominally indepen¬ dent, was within his grasp, and his position on the north-east was still menacing. In spite of William \lll.’s pledge to the Emperor, he had kept Strasburg and Alsace. Moreover, he had in no way imperilled his claims to the Spanish Succession, and was in a better and stronger position than any other Euro¬ pean power to consider that question whenever it became necessary. CHAPTER XI. VERSAILLES AND THE PROVINCES. 1678-1700. ROM the conclusion of the peace of Nimeguen to the opening of the war of the League of Augsburg is rightly regarded as the period when Louis’ greatness reached its height. His reign had so far been remarkably successful; his wars had been uniformly brilliant. The territories of France had been considerably augmented and her influence in Europe was predominant. The French language was used in German Courts and each petty German princeling emulated Louis XIV. and built himself a Versailles. “ Louis,” says Dean Kitchin,* “ stood at the topmost pinnacle of his glory ; to see * Kitchin. History of France, vol. iii., p. 211. 286 1678-1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 287 how far adulation could go, one must turn to Bayle’s Thoughts on the Comet of 1680, a treatise which for base and shameless flattery stands unrivalled ; or we must read the obsequious historiographer Pellisson, who called his master ‘ a visible miracle or watch La Feuillade’s mad adoration of the statue he had erected to his king on the Place des Victoires at Paris. Thrice he rode round it at the head of his regiment of guards, with all those protestations which in old times the pagans used before the statues of their Emperors. Nor was this merely the extravagance of eccentric courtiers; it entered into all things. The pencil of Lebrun has left on the walls of Versailles the splendid apotheosis of the monarch ; his court poets composed hymns in his glory ; it is recorded that Louis, even hummed his own praises with tears in his eyes.” But Bossuet’s adulation of Louis XIV. in 1685, on the occasion of the death of Le Tellier and a few days after the fatal revocation of the Edict of Nantes had been signed, is perhaps unequalled in servility and inaccuracy : “Our fathers never saw, as we have, an inveterate heresy fall at a stroke; the deluded flocks returning in crowds, and our churches too small to receive them; their false pastors abandoning them without even waiting to be ordered off, glad to pretend that they were banished ; perfect calmness maintained in the midst of so vast a movement; the world amazed at perceiving in so novel an event the most decisive as well as the noblest exercise of authority, and the merits of the sovereign more recognised and revered than even his authority. Touched by so many mar- 288 Lotiis XIV. [1678- vels, let our hearts overflow to the piety of Louis. Let us raise our acclamations to the skies—to this new Constantine, this new Theodosius, this new Marcian, this new Charlemagne.” No opposition existed to Louis’ rule. The States- General had not been called since 1614, and after the Fronde the Parleinent of Paris had no power. In 1673, Louis, by his famous edict, had dealt a final blow at its influence by decreeing that hence¬ forth its courts should no longer be called sovereign, but only supreme, and that no remonstrances could ; made until the royal edicts had been registered. It would seem as if this period in Louis’ reign marked the apotheosis of the French nobility. The gilded saloons of Versailles were filled with magnifi¬ cently dressed nobles, many of whom had performed brilliant feats of arms in the wars and who now crowded to do homage to their great king. But in reality the French nobility were already ruined. Their excessive luxury, their enormous expenses, their enforced absenteeism from their estates aided, and indeed marked, the triumph of the monarchy over the aristocracy. The measures of Louis and Louvois which had destroyed the influence of the nobility in the country and in the army had com¬ pleted the subservience and practical overthrow of the great baronial class. On Louis’ accession the had considerable authority. Richelieu had devoted the years of his ministry to render the no¬ bility submissive to the crown, and to check their almost independent power in the provinces which they governed. His death had given the signal for VERSAILLES. (From an illustration in Philippson’s Das Zeitalter Ludwigs Xn'.-) 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 289 a last great revolt against the new governmental system, and it was not till the death of Mazarin that the traditions of the great nobles were finally laid by and their place taken by a political theory which till 1789 dominated France. The decline of the independent authority of the nobles was accom¬ panied by an increased desire on their part to secure dignities and privileges. They became over-anx¬ ious about questions of rank and precedence. They vied with the King in scrupulousness about points of etiquette. This tendency had been clearly seen during the second Fronde and marked the last strug¬ gles of the decaying nobility. But one character¬ istic which was common to the great French lords at all periods of their history, and which in the end caused their fall was that they never possessed the hearts of the people to any great extent. In spite of isolated instances to the contrary, the French nobles as a class always showed themselves singu¬ larly indifferent to the prosperity as well as to the sufferings of the mass of the nation. The estab¬ lishment of the absolute power of Louis XIV. was in itself a striking proof of the lack of sympathy between noble and peasant. In the seventeenth century the nobles, in consequence of the neglect of their duties towards their dependents, found them¬ selves helpless before the advancing wave of des¬ potism ; in the eighteenth century, from the same cause, they were mere political ciphers when the Revolution came to sweep them awa)^ ^ Louis attacked the nobles in various ways. He legitimised his illegitimate children, and he largely 19 290 Louis XIV. [1678- increased the number of the offices by holding which a man could become ennobled. The nobles were no longer employed in the royal councils ; they had already ceased to have any power in the provinces. By attracting them to Versailles and by encouraging them to prefer an idle life dependent on pensions and privileges to existence at their chateaux in the country, Louis had finally destroyed their last chance of ever offering any effective resistance to the growth of the monarchy. Independent then of all restraints, free from all possible opposition, the monarchy had become the sole authority. The royal power had done great things for civilization, and the French had come to expect everything from the monarchy. In France it was absolute and centralised. Louis’ ministers chosen from the middle-class families were entirely dependent on himself, and the chief offices were kept in ministerial families, such as those of Colbert and Le Tellier. Louis himself remained as indefatiga¬ ble a worker as ever. In spite of the flattery and adoration with which he was surrounded his power of work was still enormous, and what was more im¬ portant it was regular and continuous. “ Nothing,” he said himself, “ is more dangerous than a king who generally sleeps but wakes up from time to time.” And so though festivities might follow one another in rapid succession, and though wars might rage, the work of the governmental machine never ceased, and Louis, when he was not with the army, never failed to preside over its multifarious duties. Un¬ der him and in close connection with him worked 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 291 the four Secretaries of State. The Chancellor and Controller-General were not necessarily Secretaries of State, though sometimes the Controller-General, as in the case of Colbert, was also Secretary of State. The business of the country was transacted as in Spain by means of Councils. But while in Spain the government was hampered by the mutual jealousies and inertness of its members, in France the Councils worked harmoniously and energet¬ ically. The Conseil d'Etat exercised supreme control over all functions of government and was at once execu¬ tive, legislative, and judicial. It was divided into six subordinate departments or Councils :—The Con¬ seil die Roi 071 d'en haut, which consisted of three, four, or five members, all of whom were selected by Louis usually from the legal class. Important matters of internal or foreign policy were managed by it alone. Then came the Co7iseildes Dcpechcs,\v\\\ch. dealt with matters relating to the Interior and in which the Royal Councillors and the Secretaries of State met to transact business ; the Coi7seil des Fina77ces, which was supposed to supervise the Controller-General who was Minister of Finance, the Interior, Trade, Public Works, and Agriculture; the Co77seil des Parties or Conseil priv^, which was a sort of Court of Appeal; the Conseil de la G7tcrre; which had no regular occupation during time of peace; and the Co)7seil d7i Co7/77/7ercc, which was not definitely organised till 1700. Gradually the Controller-General with his 32 intendants absorbed into his own hands the whole internal administration and managed all affairs in his 292 Louis XIV. [1678- own house, and after the King’s death the growth of this close bureaucracy became an unmitigated evil. During Louis’ reign, however, the constant presence of the King formed a connecting link between the four Secretaries of State and gave a unity to the general policy. But before the end of the seven¬ teenth century the evil effects of this exaggerated centralisation had already become obvious to many of the more enlightened intendants.* Though the system of Louis XIV. did not break down under the enormous weight of business which it had to carry during his reign, he practically dealt a death-blow to the monarchy during these years by the completion of Versailles. Though Louis’ taste for building was as expensive as his taste for war, France is greatly indebted to Louis for the marked im¬ provement in Paris during his reign, for the Hotel des Invalides, for the addition to the Louvre, for the broadening of the streets, and for the laying out of parks. The Languedoc canal and many other works carried out by Colbert also testified to the interest of the King in buildings and improvements. But Versailles ruined the monarchy. The im¬ mense works undertaken by Louis and carried out by Levau and Mansard were begun in 1661, but it was not till 1682 that the residence of the Court was definitely fixed there. Louis never cared for Paris, and he wished to punish the city for its conduct during the Fronde troubles. “ Paris,” says Martin, “I’im- portune et lui pese ; il sent sa grandeur h I’etroit dans * On the subject of the Councils see an appendix to A. de Boislisle’s edition of the Memoirs of Saint-Simon. 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 293 cette cite reine qui ne precede pas de lui et qui I’en- veloppe dans sa gigantesques bras ; il bait cette puis¬ sance populaire qui a humilie son enfrance, et plus d’une fois terrasse ses predecesseurs.” Colbert again and again had urged Louis to take more interest in the Louvre and to live in Paris. “ Pendant que,” he said, “ que votre majestd a de- pensd des tres grandes sommes en cette maison, elle a neglige le Louvre, qui est assurernent le plus su- perbe palais qu’il y ait au monde, et le plus digne de la grandeur de votre majeste.” But Colbert was not listened to. Louis was resolved not only not to live in Paris but to make himself a dwelling which should be unique. Fontainebleau, Chambord, and Saint- Germain owed their existence to his predecessors. Versailles and its world were to be his own creation. “Louis,” says Martin, “ a fait ce qu’il voulait; il a cree autour de lui un petit univers, ou il est le seul etre necessaire, et presque le seul etre reel.” At Versailles all was Louis’ work, all was new, symmet- trical, and monotonous; all was vast and wanting in taste; all was commonplace and dull. Inside the palace Louis was represented by artists in peace and in war ; his triumphs in love and his victories over his foes were equally celebrated ; he was glorified alike for his care for the arts and for his administration of an Empire. 1 The King intended to impress the popular imagina¬ tion with the splendour of his Court, to collect and oc¬ cupy the nobility round himself, and to form a small world complete in itself. The Court became far too large ; Versailles contained, it is said, some 60,000 294 Louis XIV. [1678- who were mostly courtiers, and of these the palace itself could house 10,000. Versailles cost the king¬ dom about .^"24,000,000, while the loss of life among the soldiers who were j^mployed to construct the aqueduct of Maintenon was frightful. Immense sums were also spent between 1679 and 1690 on the palace of Marly..^Louis’ habit was to arrive at Marly on Wednesday and leave it on Saturday, spending Sunday at Versailles. Saint-Simon has left imper¬ ishable descriptions of the life both at Versailles and at Marly. When at Versailles the King was wakened by the first valet de chambre at eight o’clock, and then be¬ gan the King’s Lever" or “ Rising,” which was di¬ vided into three parts, each of which was appropriated by a particular class of courtiers. With the valet de chambre, the doctor, surgeon, and the King’s old nurse as long as she lived, were admitted. At a quarter past eight the Grand Chamberlain, or in his absence the first gentleman of the bed-chamber, and all those who had the privilege of “ grand entry ” were admitted. As a rule they only remained a few minutes. Then those who had the “ second entry ” presented themselves, and a few minutes later the crowd which had remained outside were allowed to enter. As soon as the King was dressed he said his prayers by the side of his bed, and then went into his private room where he issued orders for the day. There he was left alone for a time with his children and people such as Mansard with whom he wished to speak on some particular subject. It was at this time that he discussed his building schemes, and his other LOUIS XIV.'S BEDROOM AT VERSAILLES. 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 295 designs for beautifying Versailles. Meanwhile all the Court waited in the gallery till the King went to hear mass. On his way to and from the chapel any one who wished could speak to him. After mass a council was held, except on Thursdays which were devoted to audiences, and on Fridays which were given up to the-King’s confessor. The King dined at one o’clock, and was waited upon by the first gen¬ tleman of the bed-chamber or by the Grand Cham¬ berlain if he was at Versailles. All the courtiers were allowed to be present, and after dinner any one of high rank could have an interview with the King at the door of his room or inside the room if the King bade him enter. Louis loved the ojDen air and usually after dinner he amused himself with hunting stags, shooting, driving, or walking; and each of these amusements had its own regulations and its own etiquette. After taking exercise the King remained upwards of an hour in his own room and then went to see Madame de Maintenon, speaking to any one who wished to do so on the Avay. At a quarter past ten he had supper with the Princes and Princesses, the courtiers being allowed to stand round. After supper the King usu¬ ally spent an hour in his room with his children, he sitting in an arm-chair. His retirement to bed was, like the “ Rising,” conducted with great ceremony and was divided into three parts. In the evenings the King often played cards, the stakes being at times very high, or listened to music; sometimes he dined with Madame de Maintenon. For the courtiers the principal occupation of the day 296 Louis XIV. [1678- was to see the King and if possible to speak to him. It is impossible to describe the fatigue, the dulness, and the insipidity of the life at Versailles. The life at Fontainebleau, at the Grand Trianon, and at Marly was, however, in many respects similar to that of Versailles. Before he created Versailles and Marly Louis had been very much attached to Fontainebleau. There he frequently had musical water-parties in the even¬ ings. It was there that he fell under the influence of Marie Mancini, it was there that he spent his hap¬ piest days with Louise de la Vallibre, it was there that Madame de Maintenon first appeared at the councils.'^ Even after the creation of Marly and Versailles, Louis went once a year with all his Court to Fontainebleau. But after the peace of Nimeguen Louis spent most of his time which was not given up to Versailles in visits to the Grand Trianon or to Marly. In 1687 he built the palace of the Grand Trianon. It was there that, according to Saint-Si¬ mon, the famous window scene took place between Louis and Louvois. Till 1700 Louis constantly vis¬ ited the Grand Trianon. It was at the Grand Tria¬ non that on March 18, 1692, a famous “ appartementl an evening entertainment which began at seven o’clock and ended at ten, was given in honour of the approaching marriage of the Duke of Maine. Though no dancing but only music, and refreshments was al¬ lowed these “ appartements ” were popular, for eti¬ quette was abolished and each one did as he pleased. * For the life at Fontainebleau see Lair, Louise de la VallUre et la jeunesse de Louis XIV, 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 297 The King as a rule only appeared for a few minutes, and previous to the “ appartement ” of 1692 had not been present at one for some years. But on this occasion he stayed a long time and presided at one of the supper tables. After 1700 Louis apparently wearied of the Grand Trianon, and till the end of his life devoted all his attention to Marly. There his building schemes were most costly. Between 1679 and 1715 he must have spent nearly 12,000- 000 of francs. To Marly, originally created as a resting-place after the fatigues of Versailles, Louis became each year more and more attached, until at last he divided his time between it and Versailles. When the custom arose for the King and Court to go each week to Marly, the great object of every courtier was “ etre des Marlys,” and it was known that the best way to please Louis was to ask for leave to accompany him on his “ voyages de Marly.” “ Cela s’appelait se presenter pour Marly. Les hom- mes demandaient le meme jour le matin, en disant au roi seulement: ‘ Sire, Marly ! ’ Les derni^res anneees le roi s’en importuna. Un gargon bleu dcrivait dans la galerie les noms de ceux qui deman¬ daient et qui y allaient se faire inscrire. Pour les dames, elles continu^rent toujours a se presenter.” These exigencies of Court life were intolerable to certain of the Princesses. The young Duchess of Maine absolutely declined to become a slave to the etiquette of Versailles and Marly, and she was rarely present at the official evening parties, or took part in the “ voyages en toilette de gala, et le dinettes dans le carosse du roi.” Moreover she 298 Louis XIV. [1687- avoided moral conversations with Madame de Main- tenon, and gave up her devotional exercises. She was an able woman and determined not only to amuse herself but to become of importance and to secure for her husband, the Duke of Maine, a recognised position. Clagny had been given the Duke by his mother Madame de Montespan, but Clagny was too near Versailles, and the Maines lived at Chateney till 1699, when they bought Sceaux which Colbert and his son had made one of the most beautiful and agreeable houses near Paris. There the Duchess established herself, and though she tried to while away the time with her laborious amuse¬ ments she was nevertheless bored to distraction. She was more successful in her other aims. While she lived at Sceaux the Duke went frequently to Versailles. He followed Louis to Trianon, to Marly, and to Fontainebleau. He always played the part of the affectionate and respectful son, who full of admiration of the glorious majesty of the King, was never so happy as when basking in the royal presence. He was equally attentive to Madame de Maintenon, who repaid his attentions by using her interest with the King on his behalf. And he succeeded. He gained places for himself and his children. He was himself legitimised and became a peer of France. After the death of the Dukes of Burgundy and Berry, an edict of July 1714, placed him and his brother the Count of Toulouse in the succession to the throne. The Duchess of Maine had indeed triumphed at Sceaux. But she was building upon sand. No sooner was Louis dead 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 299 than Maine became, after a short struggle, quantite neglig^able. The Duchess of Orleans was as alive to the dreariness of the Court life as was the Duchess of Maine, but she quietly endured it. The life at Marly was indeed if possible duller than the routine of Versailles. At Marly Madame de Mainte- non was the leading figure and Saint-Simon has fully described her life there. It was during the years following the peace of Nimeguen that Madame de Maintenon’s influence became paramount.* This remarkable woman, the most influential woman, it has been said,' in French history, had great influence on Louis’ character, though probably her influence on French policy has been exaggerated. “ Her position,” says Madame de S^vign^, “ is unique in the world ; there never has been nor ever will be again anything like it.” The vivacious Charlotte Elizabeth, Duchess of Orleans, who disliked her, and with Saint-Simon regarded her as the evil principle of French politics, expresses the general views as to her influence. “ All the ministers,” she writes, “ have placed them¬ selves under the heel of this woman.” f Madame de Maintenon’s work in life was, in her own opinion, to convert the King from evil ways. And there is no doubt that she succeeded. Madame de Montespan was given the Chateau of Clagny, which cost about *The literature on the subject of Madame de Maintenon is enor¬ mous. No one who wishes to form a just estimate of her influence .should omit to read : Madame de Alaintenon. D'aprh des Documents Authenliques. A. Geffroy, 1887. fin the Life and Letters of Charlotte Elizabeth, Princess Palatine, will be found some severe judgments on Madame de Maintenon. 300 Louis XIV [1678- ^12,000, and thither she retired. Madamed de Font- anges was dead, and the life at Court became gradually more and more decorous if not austere. As regards her political influence it would seem that whenever she was asked for advice and gave it she was usually wrong. She blamed however the devastation of the Palatinate, and she probably approved of the acceptance of the Will of Charles II. of Spain. Her partiality for Vill- eroi and Chamillart, if, as is always alleged, it had anything to do with their promotion, was decidedly injurious to the interests of France. She certainly advised Louis on the death of James II. to acknowl¬ edge the Pretender; from 1709 onwards she was in favour of making peace at any price. But she only really cared for matters relating to the Church and her conscience, and it was in religious questions that her in¬ fluence on the King was most clearly seen. The year after her marriage saw the foundation of Saint-Cyr for the education of the poor daughters of the nobility who had been ruined by the exigencies of the military service or by other causes. Mansard was the architect, and the building, which was begun on May 1st, 1685, and finished in July, 1686, cost about ^^56,000. On July 30th, 1683, the Queen had died declaring that under God she owed it to Madame de Maintenon that after twenty years of neglect her husband began to treat her with kindness. Late in the evening of Jan¬ uary I2th, 1684, Madame de Maintenon was privately married to Louis in the chapel of Versailles in the pres¬ ence of five persons, Pere la Chaise who said mass, Harlay the Archbishop of Paris who gave the benedic¬ tion, Louvois, Montchevreuil, who were witnesses, MADAME DE MAINTENON. 1700 ] Versailles and the Provinces. 301 and Bontemps, the King’s first valet de chainbre, who prepared the altar. The marriage itself was never openly acknowl¬ edged, though in private with the King’s family the position of Madame de Maintenon was fully recog¬ nised. She was addressed as “ Madame ” by mem¬ bers of the Court, who always spoke of her as Madame the Marquise de Maintenon. She had a striking and pleasant appearance. “Her voice’’it was said of her at the time of her marriage, “ was most agreeable, and her manner winning, she had a bright and open forehead, eyes full of fire, and the carriage of her figure so graceful and supple that it eclipsed the best at Court. The first impression she made was imposing, through a veil of severity; but the cloud vanished when she spoke, and smiled.’’ Perhaps nothing illustrates better the change that came over Louis’ life in 1683 and the kind of influ¬ ence which Madame de Maintenon exerted over him than the history of the foundation of Saint-Cyr. Louis was in 1684 at the height of his glory. He had extended the frontiers of France, he had con¬ quered Strasburg and Casale, and had bombarded Genoa and Algiers. He had taken Luxemburg, and threatened to annex the Low Countries. He was the terror of Europe and the admiration of his subjects. At this culminating point of his career and reign, Louis decided to change his whole manner of life and henceforth to lead a sober if not austere existence. Both Louis and Louvois at first hesitated when the plan of Saint-Cyr was laid before them. Louvois hinted that after the long war the treasury was ex- 302 Louis XIV [1678- hausted. “No queen of France,” said Louis, “has ever thought of anything like this.” But Madame de Maintenon quietly pleaded her cause. She re¬ minded Louis of his resolution to reform and to convert the whole of his kingdom, and pointed out that such a foundation as she desired would con¬ tribute directly towards the end that he had in view. Louis was touched by her arguments and granted her request. No sooner was the scheme decided upon than Louis took the greatest interest in the welfare of the new foundation, and there exist at the present day some notes which he made with his own hand with reference to the character of the establishment of Saint-Cyr. Up to this time Louis had always been opposed to monastic institutions of any kind, and thought it was for the benefit of his kingdom to re¬ duce the number of priests. He now revised care¬ fully the regulations drawn up by Madame de Maintenon and Madame de Brinon (who was to preside over Saint-Cyr), and had several interviews with thedatter in his own room at Versailles. The interest which he began to take in Saint-Cyr must have helped to distract his mind from the painful contemplation of the results of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and may have tended to allay his anxiety with regard to the League of Augsburg. On September 7, 1686, Louis paid his first visit to Saint-Cyr on the completion of the building. After a solemn service he entered the garden where three hundred demoiselles sang a hymn in his honour, the music being composed by Lulli. 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 303 “ Grand Dieu, sauvez le Roi ! Grand Dieu, vengez le Roi ! Vive le Roi ! Qu’a jamais glorieux Louis victorieux Voye ses enemis Toujours soumis. Grand Dieu, sauvez le Roi! Grand Dieu, vengez le Roi ! Vive le Roi ! ” * At the beginning of 1689 Louis was present at a performance of Esther, and was so delighted that he came several times, on each occasion bringing a num¬ ber of visitors. On the fourth representation a bril¬ liant company was present, including James II., the dethroned King of England. But after a representa¬ tion of Athalie in April, 1691, Madame de Mainte- non awoke to the fact carefully impressed upon her by the clergy, that dramatic performances of this sort were not suitable for an institution such as Saint-Cyr. With characteristic energy she revolu¬ tionised the whole method of life and instruction in her convent. The writings of F^n^lon, who had introduced the new mysticism, were removed, changes were made in the management, and Ma¬ dame de Maintenon herself began a course of the strictest possible supervision over the lives of the pupils. She hoped indeed with Louis that Saint- Cyr as a school of morals and piety would in time leaven all France. But on behalf of religion Ma- * Th. Lavallee, Madame de Maintenon et le Maison Royalede Saint- Cyr, p. 76. 304 Louis XIV. [1678- dame de Maintenon was willing that greater works should be undertaken than even the building of Saint-Cyr. She was as anxious as Louis to bring about unity in religious matters, and she always opposed the Protestants, the Molinists, and the Jansenists. Louis regarded the very existence of Protestants in France as a danger to his rule, and he moreover desired to secure for himself the glory of effecting their conversion. Madame de Mainte¬ non asserts that she pleaded in vain with the King for some mitigation of the proceedings ; nevertheless, she held that the forced conversion of the Hugue¬ nots was incumbent upon a Christian monarch. Her influence was throughout on the side of intolerance. She stirred up and fanned theological hatreds; her religious animosities were most persistent. The banishment of Fenelon was a disgrace to the mon¬ archy, the attacks on the Protestants and the Jan¬ senists were most prejudicial to the nation. She was intimately connected with all these blunders. It was indeed very unlikely that Louis in 1685 of all years would allow himself to be restrained in what he considered to be the final blow to religious independence within France. Ever since 1661 he had shown uneasiness at the presence of the rival authority of the Pope, and several times he had made it clear that he viewed with great dissatis¬ faction the existence of a power which claimed juris¬ diction over his subjects. In the affair, of Crdqui he had won a victory over the temporal power of the Papacy; in that of the regale he attacked the Pope in his spiritual capacity; in 1682 he had successfully 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 305 asserted his claim to be supreme in the Church as well as in the State. The regale or King’s right to receive the revenues of vacant bishoprics and to appoint to all living within the diocese during the vacancy was recog¬ nised all over France except in Guienne, Languedoc, Dauphine, and Province. Louis determined to ex¬ tend his right over these provinces, and in 1673 and 1675 declarations of his right were published. Nicholas Pavilion, Bishop of Alet, and Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, who were Jansenists, protested and appealed to the Pope ; Innocent XL took up their cause, and when the two bishops died forbade Louis to put his views into effect in the diocese of Pamiers. But Louis, rigidly orthodox as he was, breathed defiance at the Pope and called the famous council of 1682 which under the direction of Bossuet laid down four propositions : (1) That the Pope has no authority over the tem¬ poral power. (2) That the spiritual authority of the Popes should be regulated by General Councils. (3) That the exercise of Papal authority should be in accordance with the usages of the Gallican Church ; and (4) Papal decisions in matters of faith are not valid till they have received the consent of the Church. The clergy and nation supported Louis in this contest from patriotic motives. They regarded the Papacy as a foreign power, and it seemed likely Louis XIV [1678- at one time that Louis would play the part of Henry VIII. and supported by a coalition of the bishops of the Court party, like Harlay, with the bishops who held extreme Gallican views, declared the national Church independent. Thus did Louis attempt to establish his supremacy in spiritual, as he had already done in temporal matters. In¬ nocent XL refused to accept the decision of the council and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes did not mollify him. He supported the League of Augsburg; he opposed Louis’ schemes with regard to the Archbishopric of Cologne ; and he desired the success of William of Orange. On his death Madame de Maintenon helped to bring about an understanding between Louis and Alexander VIII. Though Madame de Maintenon cannot be described as the author of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes she longed for the conversion of all France. The Court, the clergy, and the Parlements were all eager for the extirpation of heresy. Argument, bribery, and violence were the three methods em¬ ployed in turn. “ M. Pelisson,” wrote Madame de Maintenon, “ works wonders; he may not be so ^earned as M. Bossuet, but he is more persuasive.” To reunite the sects of the Catholic Church and to \\stamp out the Protestant schism was to her, as it was to Bossuet, one of the principal aims of her life. Neither indeed can Louis be severely blamed for attempting the conversion of the Protestants. “ If Louis XIV. was mistaken in his policy, the mistake was shared by all his ministers, by all the great men of his age, and by all the public bodies of his king- 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 307 dom. The error was the error of the whole of France.” It is impossible to overlook the extreme bitterness with which the French Catholics regarded their Protestant fellow-subjects. When the Chan¬ cellor Le Tellier died in 1685, he thought he had seen the accomplishment of his dearest wish—the religious unity of France. Religious unity, as Louis understood it, was impos¬ sible in France, but his improved life only increased his determination to extirpate heresy, and made him more intolerant than ever of any deviation from the beaten track. Hardly had the Huguenots been sup¬ pressed when his methodical mind received a severe shock from the appearance in France of the religious system known as Quietism. Harlay, the profligate Archbishop of Paris, took up a very pronounced at¬ titude of hostility towards all who espoused these mystic opinions, and was supported by the King. Bossuet, who had just concluded his controversies with the Protestants, was himself involved in a strug¬ gle which resolved itself into a duel between him and Fenelon, the tutor of the Duke of Burgundy, and in 1695 the Archbishop of Cambrai. Fenelon had re¬ fused to agree to a formal condemnation of the opin¬ ions of Madame Guyon whose writings had attracted considerable attention, and had found himself con¬ fronted by Bossuet. The contest between the two was “ a spectacle which for three years engrossed the attention of the whole of Europe.” During the struggle Fenelon published his Explication des Max- inics dcs Saints (1697), a vindication of himself and his opinions which still further exasperated his ene- Louis XIV. [ 1678 - 308 mies. But closely connected with the theological causes of dispute between Bossuet and Fendlon were probably certain political considerations. Each of the men may have hoped on the death of Louis to play the part of a Mazarin or of a Richelieu. Bos¬ suet the tutor of the Dauphin, Fen^lon the tutor of the Duke of Burgundy, had each good reason for their political ambitions. From 1695 to 1697 the struggle between these two prelates raged. Bossuet, a man of action, disliked intensely the views of the mystics and dreaded the effect of their propagation in France. From the first Louis, instigated by Madame de Maintenon and Bossuet, had determined to crush Fen^lon. Fdndlon may or may not have hoped to become the first minister of the Duke of Burgundy whenever the latter became king, but it is very doubtful if Louis’ suspicions roused by the Max- inies were justified. Great pressure was brought to bear on Innocent XII. and at length Fen^lon’s views were condemned at Rome. Innocent had only been gained with difficulty. The Jesuits at Rome had defended Fen^lon, and it was only when Louis’ complaints and remonstrances grew into menaces that the Pope yielded so far as to condemn by a brief of March 12, 1699, twenty-three propositions taken from the Maximes des Saints, without, how¬ ever, declaring them heretical or sentencing the book to the flames. This victory was, however, sufficient for Louis, F6n6lon was banished from the French Court, and Madame de Guyon, whose mysti¬ cal writings had been the origin of the whole de- FENELON. (From an illustration, based on an old print, in Philippson’s Das Zeitalter Ludwigs Xll'i) 17001 Versailles and the Provinces. 309 bate, was with the full approbation of Madame de Maintenon and Bossuet incarcerated at Vincennes. “No wrath like a woman’s” remarked an Italian prelate with reference to Madame de Maintenon’s open partisanship. But while Louis was creating Versailles and Trianon, Marly and Saint-Cyr, while the laborious amusements of Sceaux were in full progress, and while he was at an enormous sacrifice securing an appearance of religious unity, France was suffering unspeakable misery. The Dutch war of 1672 was the first event that upset Colbert’s plans and calcu¬ lations. The necessity of raising money forced him to adopt measures which he abhorred. Loans, new taxes, the sale of public offices, were expedients the disastrous nature of which he was fully aware. But he had no other course open to him. The Dutch war cost more than fifty millions of livres, and the money had to be found. After the Peace of Nimeguen Louis while proceeding with his Reunion policy never paused in his magnificent works at Versailles, Trianon, and Marly, though Colbert urged economy and described the sufferings of the people. Le Peletier, who succeeded Colbert as Con¬ troller-General—and who held that office till 1689, was a well-meaning man, but he was quite unable to resist the extravagant tastes of Louis. In 1684 the weight of the taxes led to riots in the provinces, which reappeared from time to time throughout Le Peletier’s ministry. The many ex¬ emptions from taxation rendered the lot of the roUirier particularly hard and aroused a bitter feel- 310 Louis XIV. [1678- ing towards the rich, who not unfrequently paid little or nothing. Moreover the collection of the taxes was often accompanied by corruption and fraud and violence, and many unfortunate men were thrown into horrible prisons from which they rarely emerged alive. But the year 1685 was destined to bring more troubles upon the French nation. As if existing exactions and the inequalities of taxation were not sufficient evils, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes added fresh difficulties. Before the end of 1685 many of the intendants recognised the import of this blow struck at commerce and industry. But though Louis was aware of the disastrous effects of his act he actually contemplated expelling the Jews from France at this crisis. On May 6, 1688, Le Peletier wrote to the intendant of the Generality of Bordeaux: “ The King desires you to examine the design which he has in his mind of expelling the Jews from the kingdom. But this step should only be taken after much consideration, lest the in¬ terest of commerce which has already been damaged by the exodus of the Fluguenots should fall into utter ruin.” Fortunately for France this project was never carried out. But the disasters caused by the revoca¬ tion did not interrupt Louis’ building schemes. In 1688 nine millions of livres had been spent on the gigantic works for bringing water from the Eure to Versailles, works which were interrupted by the war with the League of Augsburg and were never taken in hand again. It was a very difficult matter to raise money for this new war. An appeal was made to 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 311 the large towns and promises given that no efforts would be spared to bring about a firm, sure, and lasting peace. On this assurance Paris gave 400,000 livres, Toulouse 300,000, and other towns in somewhat similar proportions. The provinces were also called upon to provide additional troops, the result being that the number of the French troops was greater than had ever been seen in the service of a single country. Moreover some towns received permission to borrow, others to repudiate their debts. Additional offices were created and sold and the public debt was largely increased. Le Peletier, not knowing how to raise more money, pleaded ill-health, retired, and was succeeded by Pontchartrain, who became Controller-General in 1689. He simply followed the policy of his prede¬ cessor in an aggravated degree. He was obliged, says a French historian, to have recourse to “ des expedients mesquins :—Vente des lettres de noblesse, creation de charges inutiles, enregistrement des armoires.” No minister ever displayed so much ingenuity in the creation of new offices, and he be¬ queathed to France thousands of privileged func¬ tionaries—a useless and most pernicious legacy. The misery of the provinces during all these years was extreme. In many parts the peasants were re¬ duced to living on boiled herbs alone ; in 1691 the Prince of Conde, Governor of Burgundy, wrote to Pontchartrain that in all the villages which he passed through in a journey which he had just taken in Bur¬ gundy he had not seen a single inhabitant who had not begged from him. Want and destitution were Louis XIV. [ 1678 - 312 universal and they gained ground steadily. And all the while the French armies were gaining brilliant victories at Staffarda, at Fleurus, and Neerwinden. “ The people,” wrote Villani, “ perished of want to the sound of the Te Deum.” From the year 1692 the starving population be¬ came dangerous. Desperate men demanding bread infested the country and threatened all who had property or who were known to have money. The forests became the hiding-places of bands of armed and ferocious peasants who issued out only to rob and to kill. “ France,” said F^nelon in 1693, “ is only “ a large hospital desolate and without food.” The peace of Ryswick checked to some extent the dis¬ tress, and France breathed again. But before she had time to recover her strength she was plunged into the Spanish Succession war and all the evils of the previous twenty years reappeared with terrible force. But taxation, absenteeism, and centralisation were not the only evils from which the provinces suffered. Tenant-right existed over Picardy, the lie de France, Vermandois, Champagne, and Artois. Towards the close of the seventeenth century many nobles who had been ruined by the crushing weight of the military service, or who had exhausted their finances at Versailles and had become impoverished,attempted to raise their rents or to sell their land. Then there arose bitter opposition from the farmers and though the government sided with the provincial and im¬ poverished nobles, legislation failed to stamp out tenant-right. In 1679 and in 1707 and again in 1714 1700] Versailles and the Provinces. 313 royal edicts, such as only a despotic government could enforce, and increasing on each occasion in severity, attempted to deal with this new difficulty. But though the landlords were backed up by all the weapons of the government of the Grand Si'cclc, they failed to assert their so-called rights against the stern resistance of the farmer and peasant. The contrast between the life at Versailles and the life in the provinces during these years is striking. Still more striking was the continued devotion of the French people to the King. In their misery the mass of the French lower orders accused the ministers and their agents of being responsible for their calamities, The towns when making grants for the war expenses were moved as much by patriotism as by fear. Even while a foreign war was eating away all their re¬ sources the inhabitants of a town would willingly and joyfully raise statues and various monuments in honour of Louis XIV. and his victories. In 1685 statues were erected in almost every part of the kingdom. In 1689, Marseilles put up one of Louis on horseback ; in 1691 Tours erected to the glory of Louis a triumphal arch ; and in 1692 the town of Issoire in Auvergne employed the sculptor James Suirot to erect a statue of the King. Undoubtedly there existed throughout France, at any rate down to the Spanish Succession war, a widespread admira¬ tion for and appreciation of the grandeur of Louis’ reign. In 1699, the Moorish envoy, gazing at the Seine from a window in the Louvre, only expressed the general feeling when he declared that if those waters were ink they would not suffice to describe 314 Louis XIV. [1678 1700 adequately the grandeur and magnificence of Louis XIV. The French people had desired military glory, and Louis’ reign since Mazarin’s death had indeed been glorious. The King had not only satisfied all the as¬ pirations of his subjects; he had gained for his coun¬ try in Europe a well earned prestige which it never entirely lost. CHAPTER XII. THE SPANISH SUCCESSION QUESTION. 1697-1700. HERE are many problems in Louis’ long reign which still await solution. Opinions are even now at variance as to the real motives which prompted the King in the full tide of victory to consent in 1668 to the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Till quite lately opinions have been equally divided as to Louis’ reasons for making the peace of Ryswick. He knew there was a strong party both in Holland and England in favour of peace, and that it was well- nigh impossible for William III., in the teeth of a bitter opposition, to carry on war much longer. He was fully aware that the Duke of Bavaria was dissatisfied with his alliance with the Emperor. He 315 Lcmis XIV. [1697 316 had just detached the Duke of Savoy from the Coalition and he could now in consequence expect fresh and startling successes on the north-east fron¬ tier. Spain was not in a condition to defend the Netherlands, and could not even ward off attacks on her northern frontier. During the war France had demonstrated to Europe her enormous strength. Such immense armies had never before been seen in Europe: William III. himself declared that the army with which Conde won Senef would in this last war have been a mere division. The armies of France were the best in Europe. Being in such a comparatively strong position it is somewhat surprising that Louis should not only have made peace, but should have given the allies such advantageous terms. As it stands, the treaty of Ryswick seemed a decided blow to the pretensions of France. Her influence in Poland had just received a check in the election to that throne of Augustus of Saxony and the defeat of the candidature of Cond6. She had already retired from that commanding posi¬ tion in Italy which she owed to the genius and de¬ termination of Richelieu. She had abrogated the four articles of 1682, had made her peace with Rome, and had restored Avignon. But the peace of Ryswick still further curtailed her powers and lessened her prestige. By it she withdrew from her claim to con¬ vert the truce of Ratisbon into a definite peace and so to annex to France the “ reunited ” districts. Moreover, the policy with which Louis had set out in 1661 had not been carried out. Though France was the first power in Europe on land, she 1697 ] The Spanish Stucession Qtiestion. 317 had failed to secure the command of the sea, and the Mediterranean had not been turned into a French lake. Though Vauban had fortified her north-east frontier, she had not as yet annexed the Spanish Netherlands and she had been forced to withdraw from the Rhine frontier. Any hope Louis may have had of securing the Imperial dignity for himself or for the Dauphin had by the end of the century com¬ pletely disappeared. Under these circumstances it has puzzled historians to explain Louis’ consent to the peace of Ryswick, and the moderation of his tone just when it seemed that by the continuance of the struggle for a year or two he might have secured far more favourable terms. Even in the harangue pronounced on February 16, 1699 at Versailles, by Ben Aicha, the envoy of Muley Ismael, Emperor of Morocco, allusion was made to Louis’ unheard of moderation in sacrificing his own gains to the glory of giving peace to so many vanquished nations. The general conclusion now arrived at is that just as Louis in 1668 consented to a treaty in the expec¬ tation of gaining the whole of the Spanish Nether¬ lands on the death of Charles 11 . of Spain, which he regarded as imminent, so in 1697110 again consented to make peace in order to have his hands free when the death of Charles 11 . should take place. That event could not be postponed much longer, and when it should occur Louis was certain to secure a great addition of territory and power. As long as war continued there was always the possibility that in accordance with the wish of the Dutch and Eng- Lotiis XIV [1697 lish, the Archduke Charles would occupy Catalonia, then full of German troops. As the Archduke was a candidate for the throne of Spain, it would obviously be most disastrous to French interests were he in Spain when Charles II. died. In the face of so much jealousy of France in Europe, it was of vital importance to Louis that no armed coalition should be in existence when the death of the king of Spain took place ; it was equally important he .should have leisure to arrange his plans. Louis’ diplomacy and knowledge of foreign pol¬ itics and the inner history of foreign courts was always remarkable. But while the Spanish Succes¬ sion war affords ample illustrations of his well-rea¬ soned policy, the history of the period between the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick and the accept¬ ance of the Will enables us best to appreciate the very unusual sagacity shown by him in his choice of instruments, his close knowledge and clear views of the questions at issue, and the ability with which he kept the main object of his policy in view. Never was a diplomatic game played with more consummate skill, and, as it turned out, with more success. Louis’ previous relations with Spain had not been such as would inspire any confidence that the Spaniards would easily recognise in him a friend and an upholder of their interests. He had injured them in the Devolution war, and his success against the Dutch in the next war would have been followed by the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands. At Nimeguen Spain was again the principal sufferer. 1698] The Spanish Sticcession Question. 319 During the war, however, a revolution had taken place at Madrid. The Queen Regent, who was a sister of the Emperor Leopold, was in 1676 overthrown by the nobles and Don John, a natural son of Philip IV., was received at Madrid with enthusiasm. He was a great admirer of Louis XIV., and as soon as the peace of Nimeguen was made, he hastened to pro¬ pose to Louis that Charles II. should marry Louise of Orleans, one of the royal nieces. The marriage was at first popular in Spain, and Louis hoped, if Louise had no children, to get, through her influence, the right of the Dauphin to the Spanish Succession recognised. In any case he trusted to form a party in Spain capable of sustaining his pretensions. Un¬ fortunately, in September, 1679, Don John died be¬ fore Louise even arrived. Another revolution took place, and the Queen-Mother’s anti-French influence was again paramount. Louis did not despair, and succeeded in forming the nucleus of a French party in Spain, which survived the war of the League of Augsburg, and reappeared after the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick ready to support the French cause. In order to increase and strengthen this party, and to provide for all contingencies, Louis determined to send Harcourt to Madrid. His arrival there in February, 1698, constitutes an epoch in French, if not in European, history. For it was mainly due to Harcourt’s skill that the Spaniards gradually contracted so great a hatred of the Aus¬ trians, that in 1700 it seemed quite natural that the Spanish Empire should be left to Louis’ grandson, and that Louis should accept the Will. 320 Louis XIV. [1698 In his labours Harcourt was aided by the acute difference existing between the views of Europe and those of every Spaniard, whose one object was to prevent any partition. The decline of Spain rendering the development of France possible was so obvious, and the Spanish Empire was so enormous, including the Spanish Netherlands, Sicily, Naples, the Tuscan Ports, Milan, and the dominions in the New World, that Europe was interested in the Succession question and meant to have a voice in the disposal of such vast and dis¬ connected territories. Two attempts had already been made to settle the future government of the Spanish Empire. In 1668, by the Partition treaty between France and Austria, it was settled that on Charles II.’s death Louis should take Franche-Comtd, the whole of Bel¬ gium or the Spanish Netherlands, and certain terri¬ tories in the north of Spain, while the Emperor Leopold was to take Spain and most of her foreign possessions. In 1689 again, William III., filled with an exaggerated fear of Louis XIV.’s schemes, guar¬ anteed to the Emperor Leopold the entire Spanish Succession—an arrangement marked by about the same amount of wisdom as was the determination of the Whigs after the death of the Emperor Joseph 1 . to reconstruct the empire of Charles V. for the benefit of Charles VI. But at the time of the peace of Ryswick neither of the above arrangements held good, and Europe prepared to consider the whole subject de novo. Of the three candidates for the Spanish Succession 1697 ] The Spanish Succession Question. 321 the Dauphin had a good claim if the renunciations of his mother and grandmother were invalid. Louis claimed the Spanish heritage for the Dauphin as the son of Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV., and insisted that the renunciations of Maria Theresa were invalid on the following grounds. In the first place one of the clauses of the marriage contract stated that the renunciation was worthless unless the dowry of Maria Theresa was paid at the time agreed. This dowry had never been paid. Secondly, Louis urged that neither the Cortes nor the Parlement of Paris had ever ratified the renun¬ ciation, that Maria Theresa being a minor had no power to deprive herself of her rights, and further that it was desirable in the interests of Spain that a prince should succeed capable of maintaining the unity of the Spanish Empire. With his large army, his powerful fleet, his excellent generals and clever diplomatists, it seemed that Louis’ arguments had a greater chance of success than the claim of the Em¬ peror Leopold. Leopold claimed by reason of the right (i) of his mother who was a sister of Philip IV., and (2) of his first wife Margeret Theresa, a younger daughter of Philip IV. Neither his mother nor wife had ever signed a renunciation. As his daughter Maria, mar¬ ried to the Elector of Bavaria, had renounced her claims, Leopold regarded his position as unassailable, and was willing to give Spain to his son by a second marriage, the Archduke Charles. The Court of Spain had regarded his candidature with satisfaction. For many years the two branches of the House of 21 322 Louis XIV [1698 Hapsburg had been closely connected, and the feel¬ ing in Spain was in favour of the House of Austria, especially since France was regarded as the natural enemy of Spain. The third candidate was the son of the Elector of Bavaria, the Electoral Prince. And till his death he was the favourite candidate. His claims were prob¬ ably best from a legal point of view, and Charles II. had rightly refused to recognise as valid the renun¬ ciations which Leopold had extorted from his daughter, the mother of the Electoral Prince. And moreover the succession of the Electoral Prince would not disturb the “ balance of power ” so dear to all European statesmen. As King of Spain he would not endanger the tranquillity or the inde¬ pendence of the rest of Europe. But the Emperor refused to regard the Electoral Prince as a formida¬ ble candidate. He caused a will made by Charles H. in his favour, to be annulled, and pressed for¬ ward the claims of his son the Archduke Charles. The question was obviously in all its aspects so thorny, and so likely to lead to a European war that shortly after the, peace of Ryswick negotiations were opened between France, England, and Holland to effect by means of a partition an amicable ar¬ rangement of the difficult question. The relations between England and France after the treaty of Ryswick had remained very unsettled. Though Louis had recognised William as King he had not recognised the succession. James 11 . still lived at Saint-Germain, and Louis declared to Portland, the English envoy, that he had no intention of removing GENEALOGICAL TABLE OF THE CLAIMANTS OF THE CROWN OF SPAIN, 169S-1700. 1699] The Spanish Succession Qtiesiion. 323 him. But having once declared his views on the question of the expulsion of the Stuarts, Louis be¬ came most gracious and made friendly overtures to William. In April, 1698, Tallard was sent to Lon¬ don, negotiations were opened, and Louis told Portland at a hunting party how pleased he was at the overtures made by William. In his extreme anxiety to secure the Spanish kingdom for his grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou, Louis was quite willing to provide against the possible union of the French and Spanish crowns in the future, and it was only after long and obstinate negotiations that he agreed to the substitution of the Electoral Prince for one of his grandsons. By the First Partition treaty (October ii, 1698), the Electoral Prince was to have Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the Span¬ ish possessions in the New World, the Archduke Charles received Milan, and the Duke of Anjou the two Sicilies, the Tuscan Ports (Porto Ercole, Porto San Stephano, Orbitello, Piombino, Telamone, Porto Longone in Elba), Finale, and Guipuscoa. The news of the treaty, as had been expected, filled the Spaniards with rage. Charles II. made a will leaving all the Spanish possessions to the Elec¬ toral Prince, and the Spanish patriotic party were satisfied. William III. and Heinsius were equally pleased, for the Electoral Prince, with no navy, could not endanger the commerce of England and Hol¬ land. Both the Emperor and Louis were discon¬ tented, but the latter agreed with William that the treaty was to be carried out. In January, 1699, the Electoral Prince died. Louis heard of the death of 324 Lotiis XrV, [1699 the Prince at midday on the 8th of February. In the evening he spoke a good deal about it and sympathised with his father the Elector. He had already, however, with his accustomed energy, dic¬ tated two despatches, one for Harcourt, and one for Tallard ordering him to sound William as to a new treaty. On the 13th he drew up a most elaborate scheme for a fresh partition of the Spanish Empire and sent it to Tallard, and again on the 23rd he wrote another long letter to his envoy on the same subject. It was evident from the first that grave difficulties had arisen in arranging a fresh Partition treaty. Louis’ despatch of the 13th is a masterpiece for lucidity and ability. The death of one of the claim¬ ants left the Spanish Empire to be divided between the remaining two. “ I know,” he writes, “ how alarmed Europe would be to see my power raised to a greater height than that of Austria.” With this recognition of the worship of the idea of the balance of power, he proceeds: “ But the Emperor’s power is also so greatly increased by the submission of the princes of the Empire and by the advantageous peace which he has just concluded with the Porte (Treaty of Carlowitz), that it is in the general interest, if he becomes stronger, that my power also should be sufficient to counterbalance that of the Emperor.” Louis then pointed out that he would propose to add Milan to the share allotted to the Dauphin by the First Partition treaty, and that the Archduke should have Spain, the Indies, the African posses¬ sions, the islands of Sardinia, Majorca, Minorca, Ivica, and the Philippines. WILLIAM III. OF ENGLAND. (From an old print, and reproduced in Philippson’s Das Zeitalter Ljedwig-s A'lD.) 1699] The Spanish Sticcession Question. 325 Should the Archduke receive such a share, it is of vital importance that Milan should not be in Haps- burg hands. The Milanese serve as an easy com¬ munication between the two branches of the House of Austria, and in Hapsburg hands would go far to raise the power of that house to the prejudice of the interests of the rest of Europe. “ I foresee,” he continued, “ great difficulties in the way of obtaining the consent of the King of England to the addition of the Milanese to my son’s portion. Should you see that it is impossible to overcome the objections raised, you can make a suggestion for bringing to a satisfactory conclusion this important matter.” The suggestion was nothing less than that Lor¬ raine should be united to France in exchange for the Milanese, which was to be handed over to the Duke. A new power would thus be formed in Italy, and France would have added little to her strength, for, as Louis truly said, Lorraine was so surrounded by French possessions that it was practically already in the power of the French monarchy. But his next suggestion shows how strongly his mind was set on making France invulnerable. “ I would promise,” he said, “ to give to the Duke of Savoy the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily ; he could also have the Tuscan ports and Finale on condition that he ceded to me the Duchy of Savoy, the princi¬ pality of Piedmont, and the county of Nice, and his possessions in Montferrat; which last I would hand over to the Duke of Milan.” Another scheme which he hinted at was to give Louis X/V. [1699 326 the Duke of Savoy the portion allotted above to the Archduke, to hand over to the latter the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, to place the Duke of Lorraine in Milan with Savoy’s possessions of Montferrat, and to leave in the hands of France the remainder of the estate of Savoy with Lorraine and Guipuscoa. One important question was left to the end of the despatch—that of the Spanish Netherlands. And with regard to this debateable land, Louis showed considerable knowledge of the feelings of Europe. “ The King of England and the States-General,” he said, “ would be equally irritated at seeing them in my hands, or in those of the Emperor.” In dealing with this delicate question Louis fore¬ bore to make any definite proposal, but threw out four alternatives which Tallard might lay before William. The first suggestion was to form the Low Coun¬ tries into a republic which should be closely united by treaty with Holland, while the second was to hand them over to the queen of Spain after the death of Charles II. The third project would be, Louis thought, not acceptable to the taste of William. It consisted in renewing the treaty made in 1635 by Louis XIII. with the States-General, for the parti¬ tion of the Low Countries between France and Holland. The fourth suggestion—and this was the one perhaps the most popular with Louis—was to give the provinces as an independent sovereignty to the Elector of Bavaria. But great difficulties were at once experienced. The pretensions of the French had increased ; and 1699 ] The Spanish Succession Question. 327 the proposal that the Spanish Netherlands should be made into a separate principality and given to Bavaria was not well received by William. Louis had in fact proposed that France should be rounded off by securing Lorraine, Savoy, and Nice, and that she should gain a predominant influence in the Nether¬ lands. The maritime powers at once refused to con¬ sider the possibility of the formation of the Spanish Netherlands into an independent state, though they were not opposed to the transfer of Lorraine to France. The Court of Vienna was strongly opposed to the suggested arrangements. The Austrians were looking to the establishment of their power in Italy, and had already in their own minds anticipated the settlement effected at Utrecht. These lengthy negotiations occupied Louis’ full at¬ tention. He examined article by article the propo¬ sitions made by the English. With keen foresight he pointed out the dangers attendant on the Spanish throne being given to the Archduke. “ The Span¬ iards are,” he rightly declared, “jealous of any at¬ tempt to dismember their empire, which they wish to preserve entire. I shall be obliged to take up arms and conquer that portion of the Spanish do¬ minions assigned to my son.” No detail escaped his vigilant eye, and he prepared for all eventualities. After four months of incessant labour Louis agreed to the terms of the Second Partition treaty. But the effects of the death of the Electoral Prince were never entirely removed, and it was only after great difficulty that Holland was induced to agree to the treaty, Louis and William were building upon sand. 328 Louis XIV. [1700 The Emperor would not accept the treaty, and in England its unpopularity was universal. It was not till May, 1700, that the Second Partition treaty was finally ratified. By it the Duke of Anjou secured the Two Sicilies, the Tuscan ports, Guipuscoa, and the Milanese, but the latter was to be exchanged for Lorraine. The Archduke Charles was to receive Spain, the Spanish Netherlands, and the Spanish possessions in America. The news of the Second Partition enraged the Spaniards beyond all bounds. The Queen broke all the furniture in her room, and Charles II. was equally angry. Eng¬ land and Holland were regarded as the originators of the treaty, and Charles, alarmed at the idea of the influence of Protestant powers being felt possi¬ bly in his American possessions, and completely influenced by the French faction supported by Por- tocarrero, was gradually persuaded to forego his natural inclination to leave his dominions to the Austrian House. Innocent XH. advocated the continuance of the union of all the Spanish do¬ minions, and it was held in Madrid that a descendant of the great representative of Catholicism in Europe would be the best sovereign for Spain. On October 7th Charles signed a will leaving his dominions to the Duke of Anjou and his successors ; failing them, to the Duke of Berry. On November 1st he died, and thus terminated one of the most melancholy existences recorded in history.* * A full account of the diplomacy bearing on the Partition treaties will be found in A. Legrelle’s La Diplomatic Franfaise et la Succes¬ sion d'Espagne. 1700 ] The Spanish Snccessiotz Question. 329 Louis’ motives in agreeing to these treaties are hard to follow, and have given rise to much contro¬ versy. He knew that the question of the succession was still a very open one, and that his supporters in Spain could not be depended upon. And he may have thought that at any rate he had secured substan¬ tial gains. Had the terms of either Partition treaty been carried out, the Mediterranean would in all probability have become a French lake, and it was the appreciation of the damage which such a state of things would bring to English trade that caused so much opposition to the treaties in England. Though apprehensions with regard to the balance of power in the Mediterranean were as yet some¬ what inarticulate, English merchants were fully alive to the importance of their interests in the Levant and generally to the value of their ever extend¬ ing intercourse with the Mediterranean countries. Though the causes which have made England a Mediterranean power have been at work for centu¬ ries, the Spanish Succession war proved an important epoch in the history of the English influence and of the European equilibrium in the Mediterranean. Louis was himself fully alive to the importance of securing French influence over at any rate the west¬ ern basin of the Mediterranean. But in his corre¬ spondence he explained his agreement with the partition schemes on general grounds. In writing to Tallard he declared that he had consented to the First Partition treaty in order to ensure the peace of Europe. “ After I have sacrificed so much to give my subjects repose,” he wrote, ” no interest is more im- Louis XIV. [1700 portant than to preserve the tranquillity which they now enjoy.” He was no doubt anxious for a perma¬ nent peace, but he only relinquished his grandson’s claim to Spain with regret. “ I can,” he wrote to Tallard, “enforce my grandson’s rights, but my desire for tranquillity leads me to make terms with England.” At the same time it must be remembered that though he sent Tallard to arrange about a subdi¬ vision of the spoil, Louis was well aware of the effect which would be produced upon the minds of the Spaniards when once they heard of a Parti¬ tion treaty. Historians have therefore been inclined to believe that “ the Partition Scheme was a blind,” and that both “ Partition treaties were in fact part of a game played skilfully by the French King to quiet and delude England and Holland, to paralyse the Emperor, and to incline the Spaniards through fear towards the French interests.” It is difficult, however, to suppose that all Louis’ voluminous cor¬ respondence was dishonest, and that he was playing false during the three years following the treaty of Ryswick. He had most solemnly protested over and over again that he would keep the conditions of the treaty of Partition. Early in 1700, the Emperor had agreed to the Second Partition treaty, the Archduke might have entered Spain as its future sovereign, and if he had done so the war of the Spanish Succession would never have taken place. Harcourt, convinced that a Bourbon prince had no chance of becoming king of Spain, had left Madrid in May. And as late as June of the same year 1700 ] The Spanish Succession Question. 331 Louis informed William that the Spanish Council were strongly disposed in favour of the succession going to his grandson, but he asserted : “ Neither the offer of the Emperor, nor other offers still more advantageous, will ever lead me to violate the engage¬ ments which I have taken.” Twelve days before Charles’ death Louis ordered Tallard to insist that England and Holland should hasten their military preparations so that the treaty of Partition could be carried out. “ I cannot be¬ lieve,” he wrote, “ that they [England and Holland] will fail in executing agreements so formal and so precise, when the time shall arrive to carry them out.” Such words make it wellnigh incredible that Louis should have again and again urged Tallard to hasten the military preparations of England and Holland if he had seriously contemplated taking a step which would bring him into immediate collision with both those powers. He had been for some time busy trying to modify the terms of the treaty so that France should obtain Savoy and Piedmont in place of Naples and Sicily, which were to form a kingdom for Victor Amadeus, and up to the death of Charles H. he was negotia¬ ting on this subject. There seems then little ground for ascribing to Louis a policy of diabolical ingenuity which would have justified the popular opinion of him held in England. Until the death of Charles Louis acted towards the maritime powers in perfect good faith, and fully intended to carry out the partition. On November ist Charles II. of Spain died, leav¬ ing the Spanish Empire to the Duke of Anjou. CHAPTER XIII. THE SPANISH SUCCESSION WAR. 1702-1713. E most momentous question of Louis’ reign now awaited decision. Should he accept the Will of Charles II. ? There is no reason for thinking that Louis’ hesitation was assumed. While on the one hand he saw that the acceptance of the Will would bring to the House of Bourbon a dominion rivalling that of Charles V., on the other it was patent that Europe would not stand by and quietly acquiesce in a political revolution which would gravely affect the equilibrium of the European states-system. Ad¬ vancing years too no doubt contributed to Louis’ hesitation. He was no longer served by the Lionnes, the Colberts, and the Louvois of his more prosperous 332 'I JMHispaniarum, Carolus II d.g KT InDIAR-UM Rex Cathoeicus CHARLES II. OF SPAIN. (From an illustration, based on an old print, in Erdmannsdorfer’s Deutsche Geschichte vou l6^8-i/^o.} 1700 ] The Spanish Succession War. 333 days. While his own views had begun to lack firm¬ ness and clearness, his councillors themselves showed that they were incapable of executing a policy which would have tried the capacities of Louis’ most able ministers. The acceptance of the Will too meant a very con¬ siderable change in his foreign policy. France would have to forego the gradual annexation of the Spanish Netherlands and the extension of her influence in Italy,—a policy which had hitherto been carefully adhered to. Louis’ intention of establishing a great French Empire dominating Europe would also have to be modified. The study of the two weeks succeeding the death of Charles 11 . is of the deepest psychological in¬ terest. Some light is thrown upon the considerations which weighed most with Louis by closely following the historical sequence of events. Tallard had arrived at Fontainebleau on November 2d, and had already heard of the arrival of couriers from Spain bringing news of the Will of Charles 11 ., and of the formation of a strong party at Court in favour of the acceptance of the Will. He had an audience of the King at which Madame de Maintenon and Torcy were present. Tallard expressed himself in favour of adhering to the Partition treaty,* and painted in strong colours the European opposition which would be aroused if Louis accepted the Will. Torcy, Tallard declares, supported him to such an extent that on the next day, the qth, Louis wrote * All allusions to the Partition treaty refer of course to the Second Partition treaty. Louis XIV [1700 'y A to Briord, the French ambassador in Holland, order¬ ing him to tell Heinsius that he would keep to the treaty of Partition. On November 9th the news of the death of Charles II. reached Barbezieux at Fontainebleau, and he had the honour of informing Louis of the fact. The King at once put off his hunting expedition, and issued orders that during the winter no comedies or festivities should take place. An opportunity was thus suddenly offered him of carrying out one of his most cherished hopes, one of his most important political ideas. An enormous increase of the power of his country and of his own prestige would result from the union of the two countries under Bourbon rulers. And not only would the dynastic interests of his house be served ; the interests of religion would also be advanced. The prospect was opened before him of placing the destinies of a great empire under his own most Christian influence. His engage¬ ments with England and Holland caused a natural hesitation, and it was only after a sharp struggle with himself that he decided in favour of the Will. His hesitation was reflected in the attitude of his leading advisers. To a solemn council summoned on the loth of November to discuss the Will of Charles, only three ministers were bidden, Torcy, Pontchartrain, and Beauvilliers, his habitual coun¬ cillors. The Chancellor Pontchartrain had no decided opinion. He contented himself with weighing the pros and the cons, and to the end refused to make any decision. He occupied a middle position between 1700 ] The Spanish Succession War. 335 Beauvilliers, the President of the Council of P"ranee, and Torcy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The former held that Louis should adhere to the plan of Partition, that the acceptance of the Will would be followed by war, and that war would cause the ruin of France ; the latter, on the contrary, strongly urged the immediate acceptance of the Will. To him the accession of the Duke of Anjou to the crown of Spain was of the utmost importance to P'rench interests. He had no doubts, no misgivings, and in the coming years devoted much time and energy to the cause of Philip V. What advice Louis received from Madame de Maintenon is not known. She and the Dauphin were present at this memorable council, but she said nothing during its session, and never seems, at any rate publicly, to have expressed a decided opinion. Monseigneur on the other hand was from the first openly and strongly in favour of the acceptance of the Will. It is not surprising that when face to face with one of the most difficult of modern problems, Louis’ ad¬ visers should have shown great perplexity. The crisis was short but acute, and the pressure of exter¬ nal circumstances proved too strong for the King. Pressing appeals came from Spain, strong represen¬ tations from his own Court; while neither Portugal nor Savoy liked the arrangements made by the treaty of Partition. The affairs in the Peninsula required a prompt and decisive reply. It would seem that Louis’ mind was made up on Thursday, November nth, though the Court did not know in which direc- 336 Louis XIV. [1700 tion. The courtiers only realised that the period of uncertainty had passed away. On Friday, the I2th, a despatch, couched in dignified terms, was sent through Bl^court to the Queen of Spain at Madrid, conveying Louis’ acceptance of the Will. At the same time a long memoir was sent to William III., containing a full description of the cruel dilemma in which, owing to the patriotism of the Spaniards, he had been placed, and the reasons which had induced him to throw over the treaty and accept the Will. In this memoir, which is of peculiar interest, Louis begins by pointing out that up to the death of Charles neither he nor his ministers paid any attention to the general wish of the Spanish nation to place a French prince on their throne : “ Cette inclination g^n^rale des peuples que leur veritable int^ret leur inspirait n’a point 6t6 cultivee par les ministres de sa ma¬ jesty.” He then adduces the reasons which have brought about his decision to accept the Will. In the first place the wishes of Charles II., if carried out, would entirely prevent the union of France and Spain, and so the jealousy of European powers on that score need not be feared. Secondly, the great object of the Partition treaty was to secure the peace of Europe by obtaining the consent of the Emperor to the arrangements made by it. This consent had not been obtained, and consequently war was certain, even if the Partition scheme was carried out. The Archduke on the Spanish throne will naturally oppose any partition of his dominions, and it will be neces¬ sary to enforce the execution of the treaty by dint of arms. A long war will ensue, and such a war is 1700 ] The Spanish Stuccssiou War. 337 contrary to the spirit of the Partition treaty. Then Louis pointed out, thirdly, that the acceptance of the Will was by far the lesser of two evils. France and Spain will remain separate, as they always have been. France will not secure any territory on the Spanish frontier, she will not receive Lorraine nor the king¬ doms of Naples and Sicily. Thus France will liter¬ ally be far weaker than if the Partition treaty was executed. The Spanish ambassador was told of Louis’ deci¬ sion the same day, though the secret was kept till the following week. On Saturday, the 13th, after supper in his own room, Louis playfully asked “ Madame ” and the Princess of Conti what they thought of the Spanish difficulty. Both said that they would send the Duke of Anjou to Spain. “ I am sure,” replied Louis, “ that whatever I do will be blamed by a good many people.” On the following Monday, November 15th, Louis and the Court pro¬ ceeded from Fontainebleau to Versailles, arriving there at four o’clock. He had arranged to make a public declaration of his policy the following morn¬ ing. On Tuesday, November 16, 1700, Louis therefore introduced his grandson to the Court as Philip V. of Spain. Saint-Simon’s description of this impressive scene is well known. After Louis had received a visit from Castel dos Rios, the Span¬ ish ambassador, and had told him that he could salute the Duke of Anjou, who was present, as King of Spain, he ordered the folding doors of his room to be thrown open, and directed that all should enter. After having gazed majestically on the crowd of Louis XIV. [1700 courtiers before him, Louis said, pointing to the Duke of Anjou: “ Gentlemen, there is the King of Spain. The Spanish crown is his by the right of birth, by the Will of the late King, and by the unani¬ mous wish of the entire nation. This is the will of God, and I yield to it with pleasure.” Then turning to Anjou, he continued : “ Be a good Spaniard, it is now your first duty, but remember that you were born a Frenchman, and preserve the union of the two nations; by this means you will render both happy and will give Europe peace.” Then Castel dos Rios approached with his son and exclaimed : “ Quelle joie! II n’y a plus de Pyr6n6es ; elles sont abim^es, et nous ne sommes plus qu’un.” After Louis had given an audience to Sinzendorf, he proceeded to the Chapel, the Duke of Anjou walking on his right hand. It is of little avail to attempt to justify the cancel¬ ling of solemn engagements, or to endeavour to ex¬ plain away obvious facts. But there is still less reason for ascribing to Louis any peculiar malignity in thus disregarding his previous engagements. He simply acted in strict accordance with the political morality of the age. Treaties were in both the XVIIth and XVIIIth centuries viewed with remark¬ able indifference, and many instances might be cited to show that France had not the monopoly of bad faith at that period. Nay, more, it may be urged that Louis’ action was beneficial to Spain and Europe generally. Under the Archduke’s rule it is certain that though the downward career of Spain might have been checked, that remarkable recovery which 1700 ] The Spanish Succession War. 339 she owed to the invigorating, revivifying, Bourbon initiative would never have taken place. She would have remained waterlogged under a dull Hapsburg rdgime. And Europe would not have gained any advantage. The increased Hapsburg influence in Europe would have been disastrous to the growth of civilisation, and the balance of power would not have been placed on any more satisfactory basis. Louis’ decision was undoubtedly beneficial to Chris¬ tendom, and the war that followed was not due to that decision, but to an extraordinary misapprehen¬ sion on his own part and on that of his advisers of the real current of European opinion. The accession of the Archduke to the Spanish throne would have been followed by the revival of an empire on the model of that of Charles V. This result could not have been foreseen at the time, but in those days of sudden deaths it was in 1700 not at all improbable. ' To avert such a possibility, to prevent the return of the days of Francis I. and Charles V., any means might be considered by a Bourbon king as justifiable. To Louis it seemed that no matter what decision he might come to, a European war was absolutely certain. The maritime powers had no love for him, Europe was sluggish and inert. Supposing he clung to the Partition treaty, was it likely that the con¬ tracting powers would support him in carrying it out? Would England or Holland deliberately take up arms in order to rob the Emperor or Spain of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the Tuscan Ports, Savoy, Nice, and Lorraine, in order to place them 340 Loti is XIV. [1700 in the hands of France? It has been well said that if Louis had allowed the Archduke to succeed to the throne of Spain after Charles 11 . had made a will in favour of Anjou, he would have deserved to be canonised as a saint, but he would have lost all claim to be a statesman. The character of Philip was not likely to inspire great confidence among those who, like Madame de Maintenon, the Duchess of Orleans, and the Due de Beauvilliers, knew him best. His piety, his love of justice, his natural straightforwardness and affection for those around him, were counterbalanced by in¬ decision, an uncertain temper, and a distrust of his own powers. He was moreover slow of speech and his voice was disagreeable. He had been brought up with his brothers the Dukes of Burgundy and Berry in severe isolation. They had undoubtedly suffered from over anxiety on the part of their tutors and governors. “ I am miserable,” the young Duke of Berry is reported to have said on hearing of Philip’s accession to the crown of Spain. “ I have no hope of being a king like my brothers, and by the departure of my brother, the Duke of Anjou, all the governors and sub-governors will fall upon me, and I already have too much of those that I have. What will it be then when I have the rest ? It is to be hoped that they will make me infallible.” Had Philip remained some ten years more under the im¬ mediate care of a few wise people who understood his faults, and at the same time appreciated and knew how to develop his good traits, had he become a man before he was made a king, it is quite possible he 1701 ] The Spanish Succession IVar. 341 might have gone down to posterity as a wise ruler, instead of being merely known as the husband of Elizabeth Farnese. “ Madame,” the Duchess of Orleans, probably understood him best. She had loved him from childhood and preferred him to the Duke of Burgundy. She recognised that under his extreme timidity were concealed some excellent qualities. Her influence over him was great, and her letters when in Spain show that she appreciated thoroughly the childlike, easy-going nature of the young sovereign, who was never intended by nature to be a king. Beauvilliers had no confidence in his capacity; the Marquis of Louville, who had known him for years, and who accompanied him and watched over him in Spain, said of him : “ C’est un roi qui ne regne pas, et qui ne regnera jamais.” On his arrival, however, at Madrid Philip shewed unwonted energy, rising early, being present in council with his minis¬ ters, and expressing his opinions on all matters. But this energetic fit soon passed away. He retired to rest from one to three A.M. ; he rose late. He had no memory, not even for important affairs of state, and he soon contracted a great dislike for work of all sorts. Nay, more, he hated amusements and took no delight in anything. He hardly ever spoke in public, and spent all his time in bewailing his depart¬ ure from France, and grieving over his absence from his brothers. In six months all his popularity had disappeared, and the publication of caricatures showed plainly the opinion held of him by the mass of his subjects. 342 Louis XIV. [1701 Philip had bidden his brothers farewell on January 22, 1701, at Saint-Jean de Luz. The parting scenes were very affecting, and not again on this earth were the three brothers to meet. A more difficult task than governing Spain could not be imagined. The Spanish monarchy was a despotism in which the clerical influence was preponderant. The existence of local assemblies, of local customs, of social privi¬ leges checked all attempts of the central power to assert itself in the provinces. At the time of the death of Charles II. the central power itself was hope¬ lessly lethargic and inert, and revolved round the person of the King. Provincial independence and disunion prevented the growth of any national feeling, and in proportion as the central power grew more ineffective, more subservient to official oligarchy, and more and more incapable of creating among the Spanish people the idea of public good, so provincial¬ ism increased in intensity. The system of govern¬ ment by a number of councils—a system tried in France on Louis XIV.’s death with no chance of success—was admirably adapted for preventing all chance of reform, while the privileges of the nobles, accompanied by idleness, pride, selfishness and intrigues, presented a formidable bar to all hopes of regenerating Spain. National unity and civil equality were indispensable for any real improvement. The extraordinary decadence of Spain was now to be followed by an equally extraordinary resurrection. The French monarchy was very different. The public, administration founded by Richelieu, Colbert, and Louvois had no counterpart in Spain. A cen- 1701] The Spanish Succession War. 343 tralised government and a powerful bureaucracy had seriously diminished provincial liberties and individ¬ ual powers of resistance. This system, carefully organised and well administered—like the legal sys¬ tem of Henry II. of England—controlled the des¬ potic tendencies of the King. It had become well- nigh impossible for a French sovereign to over-ride the limits imposed on him by the laws. The sub¬ ordination of all interests to the public good, the diminution of provincial independence, and of social privileges, the establishment of a central administra¬ tion sufficiently powerful to command obedience throughout the length and breadth of the land, such reforms, it was thought, would introduce new life into Spain, would save her from all danger of a dis¬ astrous civil war, and would launch her on a career of prosperity. In the introduction of French influence and of French ideas of administration, lay the only hope of the Spanish monarchy. Spain lay like a water¬ logged vessel by the side of her active and well- equipped ally. The Spanish grandee naturally was opposed to all ideas of reform. Refusing to take any share in the government of his country, he was keenly susceptible to, and ready to resist any gov¬ ernmental influence whatever. Living most of the year in Madrid, and occupied mainly with pleasure and intrigue, the Spanish noble was none the less an important obstacle to any attempt by King or Coun¬ cil to govern the country. A more serious difficulty was the provincial spirit, which saw in any increase of centralisation the curtailment of its liberties and 344 Louis XIV. [1701 privileges. The whole force of France under Napo¬ leon was some hundred years later to retire foiled in its attempt to cope with the independence of the Spanish provinces. During the Spanish Succession war Louis’ first attempt to govern Spain in French fashion were similarly doomed to failure, and for some years the waves of reform and centralisation dashed harmlessly against the walls of that provincial¬ ism, which was never stronger or more aggressive than at the time of the accession of Philip V. This pro¬ vincial temper was clearly illustrated in 1705, when a disastrous civil war broke out, which continued till after the peace of Utrecht. Not recognising the immense and almost insuperable obstacles in his way, Louis determined, on his grandson’s accession, to govern Spain through Philip, and by directing his policy to restore Spanish finances and make Spain a useful ally in the coming European struggle. To all Spaniards in whom a real love of their country outweighed every other consideration local and personal, the very idea of a close union with France opened up a new vista of immense possibili¬ ties. To them Louis XIV. appeared as the “ incar¬ nation of active royalty, active, just, and benevolent.” He was to them a sort of god who could on the one hand in a few months re-establish order in the finances and honesty in the administration, and on the other give strength to the army and navy, and introduce a universal system of equal justice for poor and rich alike. Louis himself was prepared to direct the Spanish policy and to inaugurate reforms. He had in fact little choice. Philip had arrived in Madrid 1701] The Spanish Snccessio)i War. 345 on February i8, 1701, and before the year was over it was evident that a European war was on the verge of breaking out. In 1701 the Emperor had begun hostilities in Italy, and on May 4, 1702, war was formally declared against France and Spain in London, Vienna, and at The Hague. This war Louis had to a great extent brought on himself. The mere acceptance of the Will would not have led to any serious hostilities. Neither England nor Holland would have taken up arms, and without their assistance the Emperor was power¬ less. Louis had been right in his conjecture that England would not quarrel with him about the acceptance of the Will. The Second Partition treaty was, like its predecessor, intensely disliked in England, and on the same grounds. And the rea¬ sons of the English dislike are not difficult to under¬ stand. By the treaty France would become mistress of the Mediterranean, and the English trade in the Levant would be ruined. The possession of Gui- puscoa would enable her to secure trade with the West Indies and South America. France would not only make the Mediterranean into a French lake; she would gain the command of the sea, and with it universal monarchy. The balance of power founded by the peace of Westphalia and confirmed at Nime- guen and Ryswick would be endangered if not entirely overthrown. In England men would have preferred war to the treaty, but they preferred the Will to both. Louis’ decision to accept the Will was received in England and in Holland with resignation if not satisfaction. 346 Louis XIV. [1701 The Will provided that the Spanish monarchy was to remain independent, and the execution of the Will would not, it was thought, compromise the ex¬ isting equilibrium of European forces. But Louis made an undoubted mistake in the month of Decem¬ ber, 1700, when he reserved the rights of Philip to the French throne. Public opinion was at that time so extremely sensitive on the question of the possible union of the crowns of France and Spain, i. e., of a universal Bourbon monarchy in the West, that a man usually as keenly alive to the necessity of putting himself in the right as Louis was, ought to have de¬ ferred to the general feeling. Louis’ motives indeed were probably easily explained. The Duke of Berry had shown no signs of capacity, and Louis may have thought that in the event of the death of the Duke of Burgundy, Philip might be called to the French throne, and Berry sent to govern Spain. Moreover, there were numerous precedents for reserving rights in similar cases. Henry III., the elected king of Poland, had reserved his rights to the French throne. But whatever may be urged in justification of Louis’ action in reserving the rights of Philip, the fact re¬ mains that Louis blundered. Europe demanded in 1700 what it demanded and obtained some eleven years later, a solemn guarantee before Europe that the two crowns should be forever separated. The fatal declaration of Louis placed then a formidable weapon in the hands of his religious and political adversaries. This error, serious as it was, might not, however, have led to war had not Louis followed it up by, if 1701 ] The Spanish Succession War. 347 possible, graver mistakes. Though Philip V. had been recognised by William III., by the States-General, and by many of the lesser princes of Europe, such as Savoy, Bavaria, Brunswick-Wolfenbiittel, and others, Tallard had been for some time convinced that the acceptance of the Will would be followed by war, and the same conclusion appears to have been forced upon and definitely accepted by Louis. He was advised that his true policy was to seize all he could before the inevitable war began. To this extraordinary and fatal want of appreciation of the real feeling of the English and Dutch peoples at this critical moment, the war was probably due, though many writers aver that his imprudent action, so un¬ like the sagacity which marked his conduct from the peace of Ryswick to the death of Charles II., was due to the reappearance of his former ambitious policy and to his conviction that he could now dic¬ tate the law to Europe. Certainly his seizure early in 1701 of the line of Spanish fortresses known as the Dutch Barrier, altered the whole complexion of affairs, while his contemptuous release of the cap¬ tured Dutch garrisons recalled his similar blunder in 1672. This line of fortresses, including, as it did, Luxemburg, Namur, Mons, and the seaports of Nieuport and Ostend, were of the utmost impor¬ tance to Holland. If they remained in Erench hands there was no security that Holland would not her¬ self be conquered. The Dutch were infuriated; public opinion in England was roused, and William HI. was enabled on September 7th to lay the foun¬ dation of the Grand Alliance in the Triple League 348 Louis XIV. [1701 between England, the Emperor, and Holland. By the terms of the Grand Alliance the kingdoms of France and Spain were never to be united or gov¬ erned by the same person, and a reasonable satis¬ faction was to be given to the Emperor and the English King. The three powers further agreed to recover the Spanish Netherlands as a barrier for the protection of the United Provinces from the French, to protect Dutch and English commerce, and to compel the cession of the Milanese, and the Italian dominions of the Spanish crown for the Emperor. It was quite possible that even then England might have refused to engage in a European war had Louis acted with prudence and moderation, and re¬ stored the barrier fortresses. Instead of doing so, however, and moved perhaps by female influence, cer¬ tainly by a misplaced feeling of chivalry, and an injudicious zeal for the Church, he recognised the Pretender, James III., as King of England. He thus not only broke his engagements solemnly entered into at Ryswick, but he alienated the English nation. The effects of this mistake were most disastrous upon France. Public opinion in England rose to fever heat. Indignation at the insult was followed by alarm at the prospect of further ag¬ grandisement by Louis. Universal dominion and the establishment of Catholicism all over Europe were supposed to be the objects of his policy. It is, while impossible to extenuate, extremely difficult to explain Louis’ entire misapprehension of the condition of public feeling in England. The English had no wish for war, and the dismissal of 1701 ] The Spanish Succession War. 349 the Dutch guards, the reduction in the army and navy, and the recognition of Philip V. as King of Spain by William, ought to have convinced Louis that if he only walked warily he could carry out his own solution of the problem which had been puzzling Europe for half a century. But French statesmen have rarely at a great crisis interpreted aright the temper of England, and Louis, in spite of the fact that he had the best information of any European monarch, was no exception to the rule. He never had understood English political life, and his failure to appreciate the real position of affairs in England in 1701, combined with his over¬ weening ambition and confidence in his own powers, brought with it a heavy penalty. War being upon him, it was absolutely necessary to take immediate action. Practically all Europe was opposed to him. Spain, therefore, must be turned into a useful ally. France and Spain re¬ organised by French methods would, closely allied, be supreme in southern Europe and command the Mediterranean. The Turk would thus be controlled and Louis would occupy a paramount position in southern Christendom. It was therefore at once necessary to direct the policy of Spain, and to re¬ organise her administration. For this work a man was required. Louis decided with characteristic decision that he was the man. From 1701 to 1709, in answer to the Spanish Junta which begged him to assume the direction of affairs, he took charge of the Spanish monarchy and carried on the administration of the Spanish government. All attempts at reform, 350 Louis XIV [1702 however, failed, owing to intrigue and dissensions at the Spanish Court, till the intelligence of the am¬ bassador Amelot triumphed over all difficulties, and for the moment it seemed as if the governmental machine of France would be introduced into Spain. But the disasters of the war endangered the throne of Philip V. and the security even of that of Louis XIV. Amelot’s policy was interrupted. Louis was compelled to relinquish his schemes for the complete regeneration of Spain and to look to the safety of his own throne. Till 1709, however, Louis endeavoured to carry out the superhuman task of warring against united Europe while organising in the smallest details an internal revolution in Spain. He was not only con¬ tent to direct the life of the King and Queen of Spain, he took an active part in supervising the whole administration. That such interference would arouse discontent among the Spaniards was recog¬ nised by Louis, but he hoped that in consideration for the benefits gained by Spain from the French alliance, Spain would acquiesce in his supremacy, and in his unremitting intervention. France had placed at the disposal of Spain her armies, fleets, and resources. In return it seemed a small thing to insist upon the recognition of French influence in the Spanish councils. It was obvious that unless thorough and sweeping reforms were at once carried out, the close union of the two countries would only result in the ruin of France. Certainly as long as the war lasted, excep¬ tional measures were necessary, and Louis, who saw 1702 ] The Spajiish Sticcessioii War. 351 clearly the advantages to Spain of a reorganisation of the government in every particular, naturally ex¬ pected the hearty co-operation of the Spanish nation. No time was lost in further considerations, and Louis promptly began his attempt to guide the des¬ tinies of Spain. He advised the immediate creation of a Supreme Council, known as the Despacho, and composed of four persons. By means of a strong executive Louis hoped that the necessary reforms might be carried out. In order that Spain should be able to be an efficient ally, her finances must be reorganised. Louis therefore appointed to this task Orri, a laborious administrator, full of expedients and bent on destroying the abuses which disgraced the finan¬ cial system of Spain. A hard and insolent reformer, Orri became at once unpopular. Nevertheless he began the work of reform, which was continued till the outbreak of the French Revolution by a series of skilful administrators. Similar reforms were to be carried out in the army, navy, and all depart¬ ments of state. Over this stupendous work the French ambassador was to preside. He was to guide the King, reorganise the Court, supervise the reforms, and be present at the meetings of the Des¬ pacho. He was to be in frequent communication with Louis, who himself issued directions on every subject. Never, perhaps, was Louis’ love of the details of administration so clearly illustrated. He knew all about the personnel of the Spanish gov¬ ernment ; and not an appointment nor a dismissal took place without his authorisation. To govern 352 Louis XIV. [1702 Spain from Paris was a herculean task, but Louis did not shrink from it. While Philip was in Italy from February to De¬ cember, 1702, Louis not only directed the govern¬ ment of Spain, but also carefully organised the details of Philip’s expedition. During 1702, there¬ fore, Louis managed the affairs of France, Spain, and Italy. But Spain occupied most of his atten¬ tion. For the work which he had in hand the choice of efficient agents was obviously of the utmost im¬ portance. Harcourt, most unfortunately for the success of Louis’ policy, fell dangerously ill at this critical moment, and the Comte de Marsin was appointed ambassador with instructions not to inter¬ fere directly in the government of Spain, but merely to offer advice. Louville was given to Philip as a councillor and private friend, and Anne Marie de la Tremoille, Princesse des Ursins, was appointed attendant of the young Queen Louise of Savoy. For many years the Court of Spain lived in entire and well-nigh abject dependence upon Louis. This subordination, however, of Spain to France was never popular among the Spaniards themselves. People do not like being reformed and organised by force, and the Spaniards of all people required very delicate handling. Full of pride, their suscepti¬ bilities were very easily wounded. All Louis’ at¬ tempts to unite the Spanish and French aristocracy by an exchange of honours and decorations failed to prevent continual bickerings and feuds. As early as the end of 1702, before the reverses to the French and Spanish armies had interfered with Louis’ 1703 ] The Spanish Succession War. 353 plans, a strong opposition to his policy had showed itself, and many Spaniards, already weary of the French domination, spoke of .the Archduke as a pos¬ sible King of Spain. This public discontent was far harder to grapple with than the attempts of either Philip or his Queen to secure a small modicum of independence. Early in 1703 a palace intrigue, fomented by the ambitious Princesse des Ursins, resulted in the temporary overthrow of the Despacho, and the retirement of Porto-Carrero. This insubor¬ dination was at once checked by Louis. Portocar- rero was recalled, the Despacho re-established, and the Court of Madrid was never so submissive to that of Versailles as during the rest of the year 1703. In matters of Spanish foreign policy, Louis was equally all powerful. He promised Guelders and Limbourg to the Elector of Bavaria with the title of hereditary governor of the Low Countries. No question of importance was settled in Spain without his advice being asked, and on the occurrence of the disaster of Vigo Bay a letter arrived from Louis to Philip in which he gave directions with reference to the remnant of the treasure, which had arrived in Spain. The years 1703 and 1704 formed a critical period in the history of Louis’ relations with Spain. The allegiance of even Castille to Philip was not assured, that of the other provinces was more than doubtful. Nor was Louis fortunate in the choice of his repre¬ sentatives at Madrid. Marsin had given way to the Cardinal d’Estr^es, whom Louis considered to be a most capable envoy, and whom Saint-Simon 354 Louis XIV. [1703 describes as being “ vif, ardent, bouillant, haut k la main, accoutume a decider, souvent trop de feu en se traitant les affaires.” But his sojourn in Spain was short, and his successor, the Abbe d’Estr^es, after nearly a year’s residence in Madrid, gave way to the Due de Gramont, whose embassy ended in the spring of 1705. This task of administering the Spanish Empire from Paris would have taxed all the energies of Louis and his ministers in peaceful times ; as it was one can only wonder at the temerity with which such a task was undertaken during a European war. By the end of 1702 Louis knew all the details of the personal administration of Spain, and no appoint¬ ment was made, and no dismissal was effected, with¬ out his sanction. The nomination to the archbishop¬ ric of Seville was approved by him, he drew up a list of the Gentlemen of the King’s Bedchamber, he fixed upon the President of the Council of Finances. The saying of the French envoy in Spain accurately represents the position of affairs: “We wait,” says he, “ for the decision of the King on all points.” During these years palace intrigues and dissen¬ sions between Louville, the Princesse des Ursins, the Cardinal, and Abbe d’Estrees went far to com¬ promise the work begun by Louis XIV. The vio¬ lence of the Cardinal and I.ouville, though for a time successful, made the French influence very unpopular. The recall of the Cardinal in October, 1703, followed by that of Louville three months later, and the brief exile of the Princesse des Ursins early in 1704, brought about by the Abbd d’Estr^es, 1704 ] The Spanish Succession War. 355 only increased the discord at the Spanish Court. The recall of the Abb^ d’Estrdes, who had become hateful to Philip and his Queen, owing to the part he had taken in the opposition to the exiled princess, was followed by further intrigues. The Due de Gramont was distinctly not the man for the crisis. “ II avoit pour lui,” says Saint-Simon, “ son nom, sa dignity, et une figure avantageuse, mas rien de plus.” He plunged into the labyrinth of palace intrigues, formed a cabal, the object of which was to ruin the Queen’s influence, opposed the return of the Princesse des Ursins, and openly declared that Louis governed Spain from Paris. All the ambas¬ sador’s plans failed; Louis allowed the Princesse des Ursins to return, and agreed to the wishes of Philip and the Queen. He moreover disavowed any intention of openly governing Spain from Paris. De Gramont, finding he was not supported by his sovereign, had no option but to ask for his recall. With the arrival of his successor, Amelot, Marquis de Gournay, a man of very different calibre to that of his predecessors, begins a period of some four years when the plans of the French King with re¬ gard to Spain on the whole received a successful trial. Though hampered by disasters in the field, the policy of Louis, as carried out by Amelot, was not only extremely valuable at the time, but en¬ sured for Spain immense benefits in the future. Amelot’s embassy brought with it such startling changes that it might almost be said that the work of reform in Spain was never seriously taken in hand till his arrival at Madrid in 1705. 356 Lo2iis XIV. [1705 Before, however, Amelot had arrived, Louis had already realised that the war was likely to prove far more serious for France than any previous one. When the war broke out it might at first sight have appeared likely that France would at least hold her own. She had all the resources of Spain at her back, she could rely on the support of Portugal and Savoy, and above all among her allies were numbered the Electors of Cologne and Bavaria. The value of the alliance of Bavaria could not be over-rated. By it Germany was divided and the road to Vienna lay open. With such allies the French cause, to judge from previous European contests, might appear to possess the elements of success. But the war had hardly passed through its initial stages when it was seen that the conditions of this new contest were dissimilar from those of previous wars, and that the supremacy of France was likely to be, if not entirely effaced, at any rate seriously diminished. The true causes of those disasters to France which left her at the Peace of Utrecht shattered and launched on that downward course which saw her influence in Europe destroyed in 1763 and her mon¬ archy overthrown in 1792, are not far to seek. In the first place the England of Queen Anne was very different from the England of the Stuarts or even from the England of William III. Strong and united, with Scotland no longer a danger, and Ireland at her feet, the England of Marlborough, Godolphin, and Somers was a formidable foe. And if England 1705 ] The Spanish Sncccssion War. 357 was growing in strength, her rival was beginning to feel the effects of a long period of despotic rule, characterised by some fatal mistakes. At this tre¬ mendous crisis France felt keenly the loss of the finest elements of her national life, of which she had been deprived by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. Moreover, at the very outset of the war, the disorganisation of the state was very appar¬ ent. At a time when great statesmen and able administrators were required, the principal offices of the government were held by a Court favourite. Louis’ ministers and generals, though in many cases capable men, could not compare in ability with Col¬ bert, Louvois, Lionne, Conde, and Turenne. Of his four Ministers of State, Saint-Aignan, Duke of Beau- villiers, was the President of the Council of Finance. The son-in-law of Colbert and the friend of Madame de Maintenon, Beauvilliers had gained the confidence of the King, and indeed that of all who knew him, by his high character, his devotion to his duties, and his modesty. He had advised Louis not to accept the Will, and he was strongly opposed to the ill- timed recognition of the Pretender. Phelypeaux, Count of Pontchartrain, the Chancellor of France and Minister for the Marine had been named Con¬ troller-General in 1689, and on the death of Seign- elay he was also given the post of Minister of the Marine and Minister of the King’s Palace. In 1699 Louis had relieved him of all his offices and made him Chancellor. He was a man of great indepen¬ dence of character, and in order to defend the liber¬ ties of the Gallican Church had even resisted the 358 Louis XIV [1705 bribes of Madame de Maintenon. A hard-working, well-informed man, he was for those days remarkably honest, and had a conciliatory manner which made him popular. Saint-Simon, whose friend he was, describes his character in flattering terms. Jean Baptiste Colbert, Marquis of Torcy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had seen much of Europe, having been ambassador in England, Denmark, and Por¬ tugal. Of all Louis’ ministers he was the most capa¬ ble, and showed during his ministry so much zeal for the welfare of France, and so much ability in discharging the duties of his office, that on Louis’ death, the Duke of Orleans, who had always disliked him, made him a member of the Council of Regency. The fourth minister, Chamillard, of all Louis’ min¬ isters, was, it has been said, the most modest and the least capable. In 1699 he had succeeded Pontchar- train as Controller-General, and in 1700, on the death of Pomponne, had been made a Minister of State. In 1701, on the death of Barbezieux, he added the duties of Minister of War to his other functions. The friend of Madame de Maintenon and Beau- villiers, he had never desired the honours that were forced upon him. Saint-Simon, who liked him, speaks highly of his personal qualities, and there is no doubt that the much-abused Chamillard was fully alive to his unfitness for the posts of Controller- General and Minister of War. When the unfortu¬ nate minister, who possessed no statesmanlike qualities, shrank from the responsibility of filling the two most difficult offices in the Government, Louis, unconscious of the gravity of the situation. 1705 ] The Spanish Sticcession War. 359 assured Chamillard of his support. “Je vous seconderai,” he graciously said. Louis had for so many years been assured by Louvois, that he had himself conducted, often from Versailles, the campaigns of his armies, that he seems not to have realised the immense value of the ser¬ vices of his late Minister of War. And further Louis does not seem to have recognised that his greatest military successes were won when he was himself young, strong, active, and aided by the advice of the greatest military organiser of the century. In 1701, all was changed, though he alone failed apparently to appreciate the fact that any change had taken place. His personal efforts, backed by his long experience, were but poorly seconded by the incapable and timid Chamillard, though the latter was aided by Chamlay, who had been trained by Louvois. “All the wheels of the machine existed but the principal spring was more than half broken.” Louis had undertaken an impossible task, and the colossal struggles of France were unavailing. Even if Louvois had been alive, and the French armies had been led by Turenne or Cond^, it would have taxed all the efforts of the French monarchy to combat the European Coalition of 1701, led by Marlborough and Eugene. As it was Catinat and Boufflers were old, and Vendome, Villars, Berwick, Noailles, and Tesse were practically untried men. Though before long Villars, Vendome, and Berwick showed that they were great command¬ ers, and the art of war received some brilliant illus¬ trations from these French generals, their efforts were from the first checked and hampered by the eleva- Louis XIV. [1705 360 tion of men like Villeroy to the supreme command, by the lack of military resources, and by the meddling and inefficient war administration. The state of things in many points anticipated the position of affairs in 1870. From Versailles the movements of the armies were directed and the most contradict¬ ing orders were given. At Versailles, too, the knowledge of the geography of Germany was of a very elementary character. As might be expected, the most serious mishaps to the French arms were the inevitable result of this mischievous system. Villars found himself in 1702 ordered to march across the Rhine with an army, the ranks of which were half empty, insufficiently officered, and the men badly supplied with arms and even clothing. The move¬ ments of 1704 were ruined through the delay caused by the chiefs writing for orders from Versailles and through Villeroy being unable to understand the drift of the contradictory directions which he re¬ ceived. In i7o7Tess^ complained that for seven or eight days bread and water had been the only food supplied to his troops, and that the officers could not be provided with any horses. Under conditions such as these, which augured ill for the success of the French, Louis had begun his herculean task of defying all Europe. Armies had to be provided and kept up in Italy and Flanders, on the Rhine and in Spain. In Flanders Boufflers, who had distinguished himself by seizing the Barrier towns early in 1701, had, after some slight successes in 1701 and 1703, suffered severe reverses at the hands of Marlborough, who. VILLEROY. (From an illustration, after an old engraving, in Erdmannsdorfer’s Deutsche Geschichte von 16^8-1^40.) 1702 ] The Spanish Succession War. 361 by the end of 1703, had driven the French out of the Electorate of Cologne, and had captured Liege, Bonn, and Luxemberg, and had occupied all Spanish Guelders. But these reverses were not entirely due to the presence of Villeroy, who shared the chief command with Boufflers in the Netherlands in 1703, or to the superior generalship of Marlborough. It had been decided at Versailles that decisive blows were to be struck in Germany and in Italy. The commanders in Flanders were ordered to remain on the defensive, and many of their troups were sent to reinforce the army in Alsace under Catinat. The integrity of the French monarchy had just received a blow in the loss of Landau, and the Elector of Bavaria was in a precarious position, exposed to the attacks of the Imperialists. Catinat had become timid and irresolute at a moment when it was abso¬ lutely necessary to take the offensive, and by a bold invasion of Germany to drive back the Germans and confirm the Bavarian alliance. Villars, whose skill and audacity were well known, was put in command of an expeditionary force, and passing the Rhine he inflicted a disastrous defeat upon the Imperialists at Friedlingen on October 14, 1702. The equivocal conduct of the irresolute Elector of Bavaria, who, instead of effecting a junction with Villars, fell back towards Ingolstadt, compelled the retirement of the French into Alsace. The next year saw an attempt to carry into execution one of the most brilliant conceptions devised during the war. Like Turenne in 1645, and like Napoleon, in 1809, Villars planned nothing less than a march on Vienna. This design, 362 Louis XIV. [1703 audacious as it was at first sight, was quite feasible in 1703, and had it not been for the conduct of the Elector, the campaign of 1809 might have been anticipated by a series of movements as successful and as brilliant as those executed by the Emperor. At the beginning of 1703 Villars besieged and took Kehl (March 12th), and having, in spite of the mur- murings at Versailles at his delay, made very careful preparations, he crossed the Rhine again on April 5th, and effected a junction with the Elector at Vil- lingen on May 6th. No time could have been more opportune for a march in Vienna. Before the year was out the Hungarians were in fierce rebellion. In Italy the Austrian troops were fully occupied, while Louis of Baden was held in check by Tallard from Alsace. Villars and the Elector with an army of 40,000 men were now in the centre of Germany, and ready to strike at the heart of the Empire. But jealousies and animosities at once sprang up and interfered with the successful execution of any plan of operations. Villars’ project can best be learned from his own words. “ He resolved,” he tells us in his memoirs, “ in order to conceal his purpose as long as possible, to extend his men in quarters as far as Ulm, as though his principal object had been to enable his wearied cavalry to recover their strength. It was then settled that the Elector should pass some days at Munich, that the Bavarian army should spread itself along the Danube from Ulm to Regensburg, and that about June ist the infantry of the Elector, and a considerable detachment from the French 1703 ] The Spanish Succession War. o A 0^0 army, should embark in boats . . . and should descend on Passau, meeting some of the Elec¬ tor’s troops on the Inn, and all the necessary artillery which was at Braunau, a fortified place on the Inn. By carrying out this project Passau would certainly be taken within three days : Linz, as weak a place, would fall, and Vienna could be quickly reached.” Villers, who had himself lived in Vienna for three years, was convinced that its capture would be an easy matter, and like Turenne and Napoleon he had grasped the importance of the iq^per valley of the Danube and realised that its occupation prac¬ tically placed Vienna at his mercy. Eugfene years later himself allowed that Villars’ magnificent project could have been carried out. “ The Emperor Leopold thought Vienna was so cer¬ tain to fall that he was about to leave it. . . . The only troops available to defend the city were a few recruits on the way to join their regiments.” But unfortunately, after much hesitation, the Elec¬ tor had made up his mind to adopt another plan. He proposed to effect a junction with Vendome’s troops and then to penetrate into Austria by way of the Tyrol. In June, Villars being left to protect Bavaria, the Elector marched to join Vendome at Brixen. But the latter never got further than Trent, and the Elector was checked by the rising of the Tyrolese. The defection of the Duke of Savoy compelled Vendome to make a hurried re¬ treat and Maximilian found that any attempt to advance through the Tyrol would result in the loss of all his army. Meanwhile, though the position of 364 Louis XIV. [1703 Villars on the Danube had become perilous in the extreme, with his accustomed daring he still hoped to carry out his great project. Though threatened by the forces of Louis of Baden and Count Styrum^ he proposed to the Elector to take advantage of the Hungarian revolt and to march on Vienna. “ Let us make two armies,” was his advice to Maximilian, “ it is possible to defend Bavaria with one ; let .the other march into the Austrian dominions. You will meet 30,000 Hungarians in rebellion. An army of the enemy must be directed to defend Austria; and meanwhile the Duke of Burgundy who has taken Brisach and has no foe in his front, will invade the Empire.” But not receiving any reinforcements from Tallard (who served under Burgundy) or any co-operation from the Elector, Villars was left to extricate him¬ self from his position between an enemy in his front and one in his rear. On September 20th he com¬ pletely defeated Count Styrum at Hochstadt, and shortly afterwards he resigned his command and re¬ turned to Versailles and was succeeded by Marsin. There is little doubt that had Villars been properly supported from Versailles, had he been ably seconded by Vendome and Tallard, and had his plans not been frustrated by the Elector of Bavaria, the war which terminated in 1714 might have ended in 1703. No doubt Villars’ inability to secure the hearty co-opera¬ tion of the incapable and vacillating Maximilian was due in some measure to his own impatient temper and want of tact. Still, in spite of Villars’ short¬ comings, his conception of a decisive march on 1704 ] The Spanish Succession JVar. 365 Vienna was admirable, and France lost in 1703 a grand opportunity of compelling the Emperor to sue for peace. The events of 1704 demonstrated clearly the value of the services of Villars and proved the turning- point in the war. An advance on Vienna was again meditated, but Marsin was probably incapable of carrying out a great design, and he was as usual ham¬ pered by want of soldiers, of money, and of munitions of war. The allies, however, had by this time realised the serious results which might flow from these un¬ checked operations on the Danube. Marlborough’s famous march to the Danube was followed by the devastation of Bavaria and the battle of Blenheim. The defeat of the French saved the Empire and Vienna from French invasion, and placed Bavaria in subjection to the Emperor. Tallard was taken prisoner, Landau was recaptured by Baden, and Trar- bach and Treves were reduced by Marlborough and the Emperor. Leopold erected a statue on the field of battle with the inscription : Agnoscat tandem Ludoviens XIV. neminem debere, ante obitnm, aut feliccm, ant magnum vocari. Early in 1705 Amelot arrived in Spain, but the condition of affairs both there and in Europe gener¬ ally, were extremely unpropitious for the inaugura¬ tion of his master’s system. Louis’ anxieties, heavy enough already owing to the defections of Savoy and Portugal in 1703, the landing of the Archduke in Spain, the rising in the Cevennes, and the loss of Gibraltar in 1704 had been greatly increased by the defeat at Blenheim and the necessity of defending Lotiis XIV [1705 366 the Rhine frontier. Though Vendome to some ex¬ tent restored the French cause in Italy by the battle of Cassano in August, 1705, and though Villars’ suc¬ cessful campaign on the frontier of Lorraine had frustrated the hopes of the allies and had produced an excellent effect, the gravity of the situation was such that it was very remarkable that Louis should have continued to carry out with calmness and firm¬ ness his schemes for the reorganisation of Spain. Within Spain itself there seemed less chance of carrying through a successful reform policy in 1705 than in 1701. By 1705 the scandalous intrigues of the French at Madrid had alienated a large number of Spaniards, who forgot the great advantages which Spain de¬ rived from Louis’ assistance in arms and money. The enthusiasm with which the accession of Philip V. had been greeted had subsided, and the partisans of the House of Austria were encouraged. A strong anti-French party was openly formed and grew upon the discontent caused by the loss of Gibraltar, the increasing disbelief in the power of Louis XIV., and the discord in the Court. All the more credit is then due to Louis and Amelot, the former for encouraging, the latter for carrying out a work which bestowed immense bene¬ fits on Spain. Amelot’s indomitable courage sur¬ mounted all difficulties, and in spite of the continued failure of the French and Spanish armies, and of the fierce opposition within Spain itself, he accomplished so many real reforms that it may be said that mod¬ ern Spain dates from his period of office. Under 1705] The Spanish Succession War. ^67 his influence Spain began to be rapidly transformed. The industries, letters, arts, and to some extent the institutions of France were introduced, and it has been truly asserted that had it not been for the terrible disasters experienced by the Spanish and French armies, which led to his recall, and in part to a modification, and in part to a postponement of all his schemes of reform, Amelot would have proved himself the Colbert of Spain. He was recognised by Saint-Simon as a man of honour, of sense, possessed of considerable enlight¬ enment, and endowed with great power of work. He had had a legal education, and owed his advance¬ ment to merit alone. His modesty and natural urbanity did not prevent him from adhering firmly to any resolution which an unerring instinct showed him was right. His simplicity, sagacity, straight¬ forwardness, and trustworthiness had enabled him to succeed, in spite of his want of family connection, in whatever he had undertaken. His residence in Spain afforded fresh proof of the success which had ever attended his efforts, and was marked by the inauguration of reforms which were continued by Alberoni and the statesmen who came after him. During the preceding four years Louis XIV.’s views regarding Spain had undergone considerable modifications. He had learned much of the temper of the inhabitants and of the methods of the gov¬ ernment, which was new to him. He had, moreover, gauged to some extent the character of Philip V. and the capacities of his various councillors. He had made many false steps. He had formed not a Louis XIV. 11705 368 few erroneous opinions. His schemes for the thor¬ ough reorganisation of Spain on French lines had obviously failed. It was necessary to acknowledge that failure. And in 1705 it was more than ever necessary to look facts in the face, and to recognise boldly that the situation in Spain was most critical. Its revenues had not increased since the death of Charles II., its leading governmental departments remained in a state of chaos. Had the Archduke Charles made a bold bid for the throne of Spain in the spring of 1705, it is difficult to see how Philip could have resisted the attempt. None of the haughty Spanish grandees who surrounded their king were remarkable for statesmanlike qualities. It was clear that the country could not be saved by the men who formed the Spanish Court. It was there¬ fore necessary to inaugurate a new political system in accordance with which Philip should ostensibly govern Spain, while increased powers should be given to the French ambassador, who should be prac¬ tically the First Minister of the Spanish monarchy. Louis had, moreover, recognised that it was not possible for him to carry out his policy without the assistance of the Princesse des Ursins. She was in¬ dispensable to the success of his schemes. The appointment of Amelot was approved by her, and in her hands was practically left the composition of the new Spanish ministry. Henceforward by means of the Princess and of Amelot, Louis proposed to govern Spain. The Princess solemnly promised Louis to act in perfect harmony with Amelot, and she returned to Spain in August, 1705. 1705] The Spanish Succession War. 369 It was a bold experiment, but its success justified Louis’ decision. The King, it was stated in Ame- lot’s instructions, was so satisfied with the solid qualities of the Princess and her knowledge of Span¬ ish affairs, that he thought he could not do better than send her back to Madrid at once. Having decided that the Princess and Amelot were to be the organs of the French government in Madrid, the work of reforming and reorganising the whole gov¬ ernmental machine was promptly taken in hand. A new Despacho was formed, consisting of five mem¬ bers, but practically controlled by Amelot; a French Jesuit, Pfere Robinet, succeeded Daubenton as Philip’s confessor, and changes were made in almost all departments which were calculated to insure efificiency in the Spanish state system. The moving spirit was, however, Amelot, acting in accordance with the views of the Princesse des Ursins, which she had previously expressed to Louis. “ La Prin¬ cesse des Ursins,” wrote Louis to his embassador in June, 1765, “a propose ce que je vous ^cris.”* The programme of the new government was am¬ bitious enough even for peaceful times. It consisted of nothing short of the introduction of the French system of government into Spain. For the estab¬ lishment of this system three things were necessary: the humiliation of the nobles and of the religious orders, and their complete subordination to the cen¬ tral authority, and the destruction of the provincial *For an excellent account of Louis’ policy to Spain see A. Bau- drillart, rhilippe J". el la Cour de France, Vol. /. 370 Louis XIV. [1706 liberties of the non-Castilian portion of Spain. The nobles feared the introduction of the French mon¬ archical spirit, and viewed any attempt at change with great suspicion. Louis’ directions to Amelot fully justified these suspicions, and are interesting as throwing light on his own fatal policy to the French nobility. “You must,” he wrote, “ preserve all the external prerogatives of their dignity, and at the same time exclude them from all matters on which their knowledge would tend to increase their repu¬ tation.” To prevent the Spanish nobles taking any part in state affairs, to destroy all union between them, and to leave them a useless and harmless appendage of the Court was the definite aim of Louis’ representa¬ tive in Spain. The opposition of the nobles to the introduction of the French monarchical system, and that of the religious orders to any attempt to force upon them the position of the Gallican clergy, was, however, as nothing compared with the difficulties to be apprehended from any attempt to change the provincial institutions and liberties. But during the course of a long and terrible war it is impossible to inaugurate changes of a sweeping character, and the military disasters of 1706 interfered largely with Louis’ hopes of carrying out fully his schemes for Spanish reform. Philip’s failure to regain Barcelona in May was the beginning of a series of disasters. On May nth, the day on which the siege of Barce¬ lona had been raised, a total eclipse of the sun took place. As the sun in his glory was Louis’ favourite emblem, the eclipse was thought to portend further 1706 ] The Spanish Siiccession War. 371 disasters to tfie French cause. The Anglo-Portu- guese army, after taking Salamanca, pushed on, and the Archduke was proclaimed king of Spain in Madrid on June 25th. All reforms were thrown to the winds, and the abolition of the privileges of the Catalans was indefinitdy postponed. Aragon in¬ clined towards the side of the Archduke, Catalonia and Valencia openly declared for him. Philip showed unexpected courage and energy, and was warmly praised by his grandfather. News of the failure of Philip at Barcelona, and of the disaster of Ramillies, had reached the F'rench King on the same day. But Louis was always seen at his best in the hour of adversity. He surveyed the position of affairs with dignity and calmness, and urged Philip to guard against capture by his enemies. “ All depends,” he wrote, “ upon the preservation of your person.” “ We have not,” he added, “ been success¬ ful in Flanders ; it is necessary to submit to the judgment of Providence.” The Spanish monarchy seemed at its last gasp, and the wildest expectations of the allies likely to be realised. Madrid was in the hands of the Arch¬ duke, and Philip and his Queen were fugitives. The fidelity of the Spanish grandees was shaken, and many of them hastened to recognise the Archduke as king of Spain. Even the aged Porto-Carrero gave his allegiance to Charles. But Philip showed un¬ expected energy, and the loyalty of the Castilian people never wavered. The fury of the Madrid populace was indeed such that the Archduke and his army could barely get the necessaries of life, and Louis XIV. [1706 11 - the occupation of Madrid by the foreigner was of very short duration. But the disasters of 1706 had convinced Louis of the necessity of peace. One French army under Villeroy had been defeated in May at Ramillies, and another under Orleans and Marsin had been over¬ thrown in September at Turin. The Netherlands were lost, and the French cause in Italy was ruined. Madrid had been occupied by the Archduke, and Berwick had been driven back into the west from Portugal. These successive disasters seemed likely to overwhelm France, and to bring about a speedy close of the war. Villars alone had gained successes, and had not only driven the Germans beyond the Rhine, but had even contemplated taking the ag¬ gressive. But in spite of this gleam of success it seemed impossible for France, crippled as she was, to continue the war. Louis had justification when he wrote in October that the government could no longer carry on hostilities, and that he had proposed to the English and Dutch that negotiations for peace should be opened. But no treaty could be signed unless Philip was prepared to sacrifice a portion of his dominions. However, the allies refused to treat, and nothing was left to Louis but to carry on war¬ like operations with vigour. The allies paid dearly for their error. Flushed with success, they had missed an excellent opportunity of securing more than their just share of the spoils of war. The for¬ tunes of France and Spain were at their lowest ebb in 1706. With the year 1707 matters began to mend, and 1707 ] The Spanish Succession War. 373 though Louis experienced disasters, he was never reduced to the position of 1706. The King and ministers made prodigious efforts. Though ex¬ hausted and badly administered, France had still immense resources, and thousand of recruits joined the armies. In April, 1707, the victory of Almanza, with which the name of Berwick will ever be associ¬ ated, proved even more decisive than Blenheim. It assured the throne of Spain to the House of Bour¬ bon, and enabled the interrupted reforms of Amelot to be continued. Aragon and Valencia returned to their allegiance to Philip, and many of their privi¬ leges were suppressed. A great step was taken towards that centralisation of powers at Madrid which Louis had always advocated, and which Amelot was enabled in part to carry out. The con¬ stitution of Castile was solemnly promulgated in Valencia and at Saragossa, and was henceforth ac¬ cepted in the kingdom of Spain. Thus the political results of Almanza were of vast importance to Spain and in their later effects proved the wisdom of Louis’ views with regard to the necessary reforms in that country. But though success had begun to attend the efforts of Louis in the Spanish peninsula, he was not deterrred from carrying out a new policy with regard to Italy. It had become quite apparent to the French king that it was impossible for him to carry on war successfully at four different centres. The foreign policy of both Richelieu and Mazarin had been marred by a similar attempt, and very wisely in 1706 Louis had determined to withdraw from Italy, and to employ the released troops on 374 Louis XIV. [1707 his exposed north-eastern frontier and in Spain. He fully realised that before peace could be made Philip would be compelled to consent to some parti¬ tion of his dominions. The evacuation of Italy would no doubt leave that country in the hands of Austria, but Spain would be preserved to Philip, and France would be saved avast expenditure of money and the sacrifice of a large number of soldiers. The evacuation of Italy, arranged in March, 1707, by the convention of Milan—so justly attacked by English writers as an act of treachery on the part of the Emperor, was undoubtedly a wise action on the part of Louis, though Philip himself naturally resented the unopposed occupation of north Italy by the Austrians and the inevitable seizure of Naples. Philip’s worst fears were soon realised. The retirement of the French from Italy was fol¬ lowed in August not only by the loss of Milan, but by the further loss of Naples, while the Duke of Savoy invaded Provence and besieged Toulon. The Whigs, too, delighted at the victory of Ramillies, took up a more hostile attitude than ever towards Louis, and in October passed their celebrated reso¬ lution that no peace “ can be safe or honourable for her Majesty and her allies, if Spain and the Spanish West Indies be suffered to continue in the power of the House of Bourbon.” But on the whole the year 1707 was favourable to the French. The inroad into Provence and the attack on Toulon failed, owing to the resistance of Tesse and to a quarrel between Amadeus and Eugfene. The allies retired discomfited behind the 1707] The Spanish Succession War. 375 Alps, and the English fleet failed to supply the Camisards with arms. Moreover, a great French army in the Low Countries had, under the skilful leadership of Vendome, kept invasion back, and even advanced to the Sambre, and Villars on the Rhine successfully assailed the lines constructed from Stolhofen to Kehl and the Black Forest, and invaded Germany with the object of combining his operations with those of Charles XII., or at any rate of aiding the revolted Hungarians. He levied con¬ tributions in Swabia and Wtirtemberg, and filled the coflers of the army. If Charles XH. had effected the desired junction at Nuremberg, Vienna would have fallen, and the Swedish King would have been master of the Empire. But the influence of Marl¬ borough turned Charles from the French alliance, and Villars’ hopes were again disappointed. If he had to fall back across the Rhine on the approach of a strong force under the Elector of Hanover, his campaigns had inspired his troops with fresh courage. Though the Spanish monarchy had lost Milan through the retirement of the French, and in August of the same year Naples, the loss of which was hast¬ ened by the hostility of Clement XI. to the Bourbon Church policy, Philip V. found himself at the end more secure in his possession of the Spanish throne than he was at the beginning of 1707. On his reiterated requests, Louis agreed, in 1708, to recon¬ sider the question of interfering actively in Italy. There the overbearing conduct of the Emperor had produced deep discontent among the Italian states. 376 Louis XIV. [1708 But Louis was unwilling to risk men and money unless he could be sure that the Italians had thrown off their habitual lethargy. Tess^ was sent to report on the condition of the Italian peninsula, where he found everywhere divisions, uncertainty, and general want of energy. The Emperor had ordered a con¬ siderable army to march into Italy to consolidate his conquests, and unless Louis did the same the Italians would naturally side with the Imperial cause. Louis dfd not send troops, and adhered to the policy inaugurated by the convention of Milan. Clement XL was compelled to recognise the Arch¬ duke as king of Spain. The year 1708 was indeed not only marked by political failure, but also by military disasters. The carefully prepared expedi¬ tion to Scotland on behalf of James Edward failed through the sudden indisposition of that prince, and the complete supremacy of England on the sea, while the campaign in Flanders ended in the defeat of Oudenarde, the capture of Lille, and the invasion of France. These continued disasters again brought forward the question of peace. Louis was anxious to bring the war to a close ; he was prepared to agree to the partition of the Spanish Empire; he was ready to accept as Philip’s share Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, and the Tuscan presidencies. On one occasion, when some one spoke of found¬ ing another Saint-Cyr, Madame de Maintenon said that there were other things much more urgent, “ to secure peace, and relieve the poor people of their burdens.” “Yes,” added Louis, “that is what a king should aim at: peace in his kingdom, and relief THE EMPEROR JOSEPH I. (Prom a print reproduced in Philippson’s Das Zciialtcr Litdwigs XIV.') i I ! 'i I 1 1708] The Spanish Succession War. 377 of his people. But to obtain these advantages for them we are forced against our will to oppress them. We want peace, but a good peace, and I ask it of God continually, who alone can change the hearts of those who oppose it.” There is no doubt that Louis was sincerely anxious for peace. The terrible winter of 1708-9 only con¬ firmed him in his pacific views. The Court was the scene of cabals and intrigues. The ministers Beau- villiers, Torcy, Pontchartrain and Chamillard were opposed by the Duke of Maine, Boufflers, Huxelles, Harcourt, and Villeroy. There was even a division of opinion among the ministers themselves. Chamil¬ lard desired peace at any price. Spain he regarded as a useless encumbrance, and he desired to break off the close alliance between her and France. The state of the finances was appalling. A Colbert would have despaired of ever bringing order into the existing chaos. To raise money with which to pay the soldiers, Chamillard had created privileges and posts of all sorts and kinds, the sale of which produced large sums. New taxes had been levied even on marriages and baptisms. Lotteries had been established. After every possible device had been adopted for raising money, the condition of the finances was such that it was obviously impossible for France to continue the war. Chamillard had for some time been anxious to retire from his office, and told Louis that the burden was too heavy for him, and would kill him. “ Well,” said the old King, “ let us die together.” But at last Louis agreed to defer to public opinion, and the device so frequently 378 Louis XIV. [1708 adopted in the years immediately preceding the Revolution was tried, Chamillard being succeeded by Desmarets, a nephew of Colbert. The public credit was for a moment restored, and new supplies were raised on loan. The change, however, brought little real improvement. The south of F'.ance had not recovered from the Camisard struggle ; in Paris Jansenism had again raised its head, and the Arch¬ bishop and the royal power were in opposition. The frightful winter brought with it famine and insurrec¬ tions. The price of the absolute necessaries of life was almost prohibitive, and under the very windows of the King’s rooms the people clamoured for bread. Revolutionary placards were posted up, anonymous letters spoke of Ravaillac and Brutus ; Madame de Maintenon and Chamillard were directly attacked. The hospitals were crowded and overflowing, corpses of peasants who had died of hunger were frequently seen in the woods. The P'rench nation had suddenly found itself pauperised and in danger of bankruptcy. To any one who understood the financial condition of the country peace seemed absolutely indispensable. No one grasped the position of things better than did Louis XIV. Though seventy years old, in intel¬ ligence and in courage he was superior to any of his ministers. He worked each day as regularly as he did when he took up the cares of government upon Mazarin’s death. His knowledge of the details of the administration was more profound than ever. He had such a lively appreciation of the evils under which France was suflering that after the winter of 1708-9 he determined to subordinate all considera- 1709 ] The Spanish Sticcession War. 379 tions to the one object of bettering the condition of France. In this self-imposed task Louis was aided by Ma¬ dame de Maintenon. Ever since the opening of the war she had been obliged against her wish to take some part in political affairs. She held conferences with the ministers; she gained the confidence of Vil- lars ; her letters to the Princesse des Ursins prove the enormous interest which she took in Spanish affairs. Her solicitude for the King led her to keep from him many events of a vexatious character. Her principal care was for him, and she knew no other will than that of her husband. Her many submissions, self- sacrifices, and losses of friends for his sake only aug¬ mented her desire for rest and peace. The troubles of the end of the reign were not attributable to her, for her advice was rarely taken. But her work in caring for the King is beyond all praise. Through¬ out his troubles she acted the part of a faithful and loving wife, for whom Louis showed the greatest regard. The King would often come into her room and lock the door. Then “ sometimes he sheds tears, which he cannot control. Presently a minister comes, bringing bad news. If my presence is required I am called ; if not I retire in some corner and pray. Sometimes I hear that all is going wrong; then my heart beats, and I cannot sleep at nights.” In 1707 Louis had realised the necessity of with¬ drawing from Italy, and the convention of Milan had signified to the world the reality of his convic¬ tion of the need of lessening the area of the strug¬ gle. Early in 1709 he decided to give up his attempt Louis XIV. [1709 380 to govern Spain through his envoy and the Princesse des Ursins, in other words to relinquish all active attempts to establish firmly a Bourbon on the throne of Spain, and to leave Spain to defend itself. This new decision, this important modification of the policy of 1701, was signified to Europe by the recall of Amelot in April, 1709. But though Louis might decide to abandon Spain, though he might recall his ambassador, he could not undo the work of the last four years. The period of Amelot’s embassy saw a silent revolution effected in Spain. Since his arrival an army had been created, well equipped and regularly paid. The finances had been placed on a better footing than in any previous reign, and all signs of poverty in the royal household had passed away. Moreover, excellent changes had been quietly carried out in the government. The royal authority had been firmly established, the power of the coun¬ cils had been regulated, the independence of the nobles curbed, and the Church forced to contribute to the necessities of the State. Though the provin¬ cial liberties had been to some extent suppressed, the provinces were on the whole loyal; anarchy had given way to a central authority which endeavoured to mete out equal justice to rich and poor alike. The allies were so convinced of the uselessness of attempting to conquer Spain that, content with hold¬ ing their own in Catalonia, they devoted all their efforts to force Spain to yield to their wishes by victories gained over France in the Netherlands. With every prospect of success, their tone when 1709 ] The Spanish Succession War. ;8i Louis demanded peace in 1709 was haughty and overbearing. Louis sincerely desired peace. He was convinced of the hopelessness of any further attempts against the combined forces of the allies. He was prepared to cede Spain and the Indies to the Archduke, and to reserve Naples and Sicily to Philip. He was ready to restore Strasburg to its position as a free Imperial city. He was, in fact, prepared to propose terms which one would have thought even the rapa¬ cious Dutch would have accepted. But Philip, as in 1706, resolved to throw himself upon the patriotism of his subjects. And in 1709 he was in a far stronger position than in 1706. In 1706 he relied mainly upon the people of Castille, while many of the nobles declared for the Archduke. In 1709, well-nigh the whole of Spain was prepared to support him, and the nobles .were among the foremost to oppose any par¬ tition of the Spanish Empire. In arranging terms of peace with the allies, it was obvious that Louis could not now speak for his grandson. This new complication was not lost sight of by the English, Imperial, and Dutch plenipoten¬ tiaries. They had no intention of continuing a war with Spain while France was enjoying the blessings of peace. They therefore insisted that Louis should be responsible for the renunciation by Philip of his crown within two months, and that, failing the latter’s assent, Louis was to aid the allies in com¬ pelling him to agree to the treaty. But the pre¬ liminaries of The Hague were not destined to be accepted. Louis’ soul revolted against the humiliat- 382 Louis XIV. [1709 ing conditions. He recalled his envoy in May, and broke off negotiations. “ If I must continue the war,” he said, “ I will contend against my enemies rather than against my own family.” The whole of France shared his indignation, and when the pro¬ posals of the allies were read to them by the King’s order, the troops of Villars demanded with fury to be led against the foe. In a circular published by the advice of Torcy and sent to each province, Louis appealed to the French nation to support him in his endeavour to secure reasonable terms. He showed the unreasonableness of the allies, and expatiated on their insincerity and intolerable proposals. “ See¬ ing, then,” he said “ that our enemies in their pre¬ tence to negotiate are palpably insincere, we have only to consider how to defend ourselves, and show them that France united can resist the united powers of Europe in their attempts, by fair means or by foul, to ruin her. All the ordinary sources of revenue are exhausted. I come before you for your counsel and assistance, at a time when our very safety as a nation is at stake ; let us show our ene¬ mies that we are still not sunk so low, but that we can force upon them such a peace as shall consist with our honour and with the good of Europe.” The effect of this appeal was at once seen. The war from being dynastic became national, from being a war for the interests of the Bourbons it became a war for the preservation of the French kingdom, if not for the very existence of the French nation. The enthusiasm of his subjects gave Louis an army larger than any which he had yet been able to put into the 1709 ] The Spanish Succession War. 383 field, and the command was given to Villars. The campaign which saw the battle of Malplaquet was at once opened, but none the less Louis was as firmly convinced as ever of the absolute necessity of peace. CHAPTER XIV. PEACE. 1709-17 I 3. O keep French troops in Spain was to make peace impossible. To show his enemies then how sincerely desirous he was to end the disastrous war, Louis determined to order the with¬ drawal of his troops from Spain. The carrying out of this reso¬ lution was a necessary comple¬ ment to his intention to lessen, if not wholly abandon, his political influence in that country. The political and military abandonment of Spain were simultaneous. With difficulty Louis was persuaded to allow the French troops to remain in Spain till August, 1709; at the beginning of Septem¬ ber Bldcourt succeeded Amelot, but with very differ- . ► ent functions. Amelot had combined the functions j of Prime Minister with those of French ambassador. < 384 1 1709 ] Peace. 385 Blecourt was to be a mere envoy and to confine his duties to observing closel)^ all that went on, and by working cordially with the Princesse des Ursins, to keep Louis informed as to the exact position of things in Spain. His position though a modified was still a delicate one. The hatred felt against the French was now universal, and the popular feel¬ ing was encouraged by the Spanish ministers. This hostility was regarded by Louis with equa¬ nimity. Torcy and all his ministers were convinced that no peace could be made unless Philip V. was dethroned, or the allies could be persuaded that no political union based upon a formal treaty existed between France and Spain. The battle of Malpla- quet, fought on September nth, was a glorious de¬ feat for the French. It restored the nation’s respect for itself; it saved France from invasion. The difficulties which Villars had to contend against during the campaign only served to bring out his military genius. His army was at the outset without proper food or clothing, inferior to the op¬ posing forces in point of numbers, and deeply dis¬ couraged. Within a short time the great French Marshal succeeded in converting his dispirited troops into a fine army, well found and well fed. He acted at first strictly on the defensive, but after one of his lieutenants, Artagnan, had taken Warneton, a small town on the Lys, and 1600 prisoners, he hoped to be able to save Tournay. But the town fell on July 27th and the citadel capitulated on September 2nd. The victorious allies under Marlborough and Eugene then marched upon Mons, the capital of 386 Louis XIV. [1709 Hainault, and Villars was ordered to try and save it. Boufflers, old and decrepit, willingly consented to serve under his young and illustrious colleague, and refused the latter’s invitation to share the com¬ mand. Though too late to prevent the investment of Mons, Villars advanced to Malplaquet, a village situ¬ ated on the top of a ridge a few miles to the south¬ west of Mons, and during the night and day after his arrival, took up a strong position. On either side were woods, that of Laniere lying on the east and that of Taisniere on the west. From the high¬ road, which Villars skilfully fortified, the ground falls away in ravines towards the plain of Mons. On September nth the allied troops attacked Villars’ fortifications, and one of the bloodiest battles of the war took place. Boufflers commanded the right wing, and was opposed to Tilly and the Prince of Nassau, nephew of William III. Villars himself fought, on the left, which was threatened in front by Eugene, and on the extreme right of the allies by Withers. At first the allies were driven back with great loss, but when Withers threatened to out¬ flank the French left, Villars was compelled to with¬ draw troops from the centre. Marlborough, with his unfailing judgment,seized the opportunity and hurled upon the weakened centre English and Dutch troops under Tilly and Cadogan. Villars had been wounded and carried off the ground, and Boufflers was com¬ pelled to retire. With consummate skill the old warrior succeeded in drawing back in good order, leaving the allied forces in possession of the ground. and Laniere is the Trouee, an open gap through which Mons can he approached from the south and west. Villars, attempting to raise the siege of Mons, fortified himself on the high ground near Malplaquet. The allies took the offensive, but it was not till Villars had to send reinforce¬ ments to hold the wood of Taisnicre, against Withers, that Marlborough pierced the weakened French centre. 387 Lo 7 iis XIV. [1710 388 It was a dearly bought victory; the French lost about 12,000 men, while the allies did not lose less than 20,000. Though Mons fell, the campaign did much to restore the spirit of the troops and the con¬ fidence of the nation. Villars had shown that the dreaded Marlborough could be faced and fought, and Louis rightly interpreted the popular feeling when he "made Artagnan a marshal, and showered favours upon the wounded general. The King still desired to come to terms with his foes. But for a time his hopes for peace were frustrated. The answer of the Dutch in February, 1710, to his expressed desire for peace was more in¬ solent than ever. Philip was to be dethroned by Louis, and then only would peace be possible. And Philip himself had successfully opposed his grandfather’s wishes. The deliberate inaction of Bezons, the commander of the French troops in Spain, had in September destroyed any hope of Spanish success in the latter months of 1709, and Philip firmly declined to consent to the transference of Luxemburg, Mons, Namur, Charleroi, and Nieu- port to the Elector of Bavaria. English writers as¬ sert that Louis’ object was really to hand over the Spanish Netherlands to the Dutch as a bribe to induce them to desert the Grand Alliance. In any case the project failed. Philip refused to yield a single town and the English made with the Dutch a Barrier treaty which cemented their alliance still more closely. In the spring of 1710 Louis again signified his will¬ ingness to enter into negotiations. Opinion at the 1710] Peace. 389 Court lay strongly in the direction of peace, though different views were held as to the best means to bring about a settlement. Madame de Maintenon since 1706 had openly and frequently declared in favor of an immediate peace. She was willing, if necessary, to turn the French arms against Philip, and to carry out the wishes of the allies. Clearly realising the lamentable condition of France, and convinced that God wished to punish her country for the undue extension of its limits and for its inso¬ lence and pride, Madame de Maintenon declared in her letters that it was of no avail to struggle against the hand of God. She was much perturbed at Louis’ conversion to a moral life being almost coincident with the beginning of a series of misfortunes, which increased as the end of his life drew nigh. “The designs of God,” she wrote at the time, “ are incom¬ prehensible. Three Christian kings—namely, Louis, the Pretender, James Edward, and Philip V.—appear to be abandoned, and heresy and injustice triumph. Let us hope that it will not be for long.” For the sake of securing peace to her own country she was ready to sacrifice Philip. Though her views were clear and decided, and though they were based on religious conviction, they fortunately did not pre¬ vail with Louis. The Grand Dauphin, the father of Philip, naturally supported his son. It was only when France seemed to be on the brink of destruction that, yielding to the unanimous opinion of the members of the Council, he agreed that France should give a subsidy to the allies. The Duke of Berry sided with his father. He de- 390 Louis XIV. [1710 plored Louis’ intention of abandoning Philip and applauded the latter’s determination to fight to the last. The Duke of Burgundy, after the disasters of 1709, had become a strong advocate of peace. He recognised the necessity of abandoning Spain, but, like Louis, he refused to consider the possibility of fighting against Philip. The Duke of Orleans, labour¬ ing under suspicion of plotting to succeed Philip in case the latter was dispossessed, had little influence. Of the ministers, while Desmarets, Pontchartrain, and Torcy were inclined to peace at any price, and were thus more or less in sympathy with the views of Madame de Maintenon, Beauvilliers and Voysin sided with Louis and the Princes. All were, however, agreed upon the necessity of peace, and negotiations were opened at Gertruyden- berg in March. Louis’ offers were far more con¬ siderable than those which were afterwards accepted at Utrecht. But the real point at issue was the de¬ thronement of Philip by French troops. At long sittings of the Council, on May i ith and June ist, the matter was fully discussed in all its bearings. Finally it was decided to recognise the necessity of a par¬ tition of the Spanish monarchy. Sicily and Sar¬ dinia were to be reserved for Philip, and France was to pay the allies a subsidy during the continuance of the war. A chain of barrier fortresses was to be set up to satisfy the Dutch, and the whole of Alsace was to be ceded to the Empire. These with other conces¬ sions made the terms offered by Louis well worthy of acceptance by the coalition. The allies, however, most unwisely insisted that France must aid in 1710] Peace. 391 the dethronement of Philip, and declined to make peace on any other terms. Louis, as a last resort, offered, if the allies would retire from their position, not to ask for any compensation for Philip. The allies, however, refused to consider the question, and on July 25th the P'rench envoys set off for Paris. There was great joy in Spain at the news of the rup¬ ture of the negotiations at Gertruydenberg. The Duke of Medina Celi had fallen on April 15th, and P'rench influence, guided as ever by the Princesse des Ursins, had now still further triumphed. Louis re¬ newed his close connection with Spain, placed Ven- dome at the head of the army in the Peninsula, and thought of sending Amelot back to Madrid. But the disasters of Almenara in June, and of Saragossa in August, followed by the entry of Charles into Mad¬ rid, checked for a time the rising hopes of the sup¬ porters of Philip at Versailles. The peace party raised their heads, and Louis for a moment feared that any further effort would be useless. Pie de¬ termined to persuade Philip to abdicate quietly, and the Due dc Noailles was sent to Spain to make this proposal. The year 1710 thus marks the com¬ plete desertion of the policy adopted in 1701. The condition of Spain seemed fully to justify the fears of Louis XIV. It had been denuded of French troops, and its government no longer directed from Versailles, had fallen into the hands of men hos¬ tile to the P'rench system. P'ranee had moreover offered to the allies a subsidy to enable them to expel Philip, and Louis had attempted to persuade his grandson to abdicate voluntarily. 392 Louis XIV. [1711 But from 1710 the light began to dawn both in Spain and France. The change of government in England marked a weariness of the war throughout that country, and a deep distrust of the war policy of the Whigs. In Spain the victories of Brihuega and Villa Viciosa (Dec. 8th and loth) destroyed the hopes of the Archduke Charles and replaced Philip on the throne. In spite of the embassy of Noailles the King had firmly refused to abdicate, and he was fully justified. The Spanish nation devoted to Philip’s cause was more determined than ever to ad¬ here to the sovereign of their choice. Lastly Louis on hearing Noailles’ report and delighted with the victory of Villa Viciosa changed his whole attitude and wrote encouraging letters to his grandson. The year 1711 opened most hopefully, and before the end of January Vendome’s successes in Catalonia still further damaged the fortunes of the allies in Spain. In April, the death of the Emperor Joseph 1 . brought fresh hopes to the House of Bourbon. An express was sent by Louis to Philip with the news. Surely, it was now argued, if the Spanish Empire was parti¬ tioned and forever separated from the French monarchy, the balance of power in Europe would be less endangered than by the union of the Spanish and Imperial crowns under Charles VI. Though Louis’ endeavours to make some arrange¬ ment with Austria failed, the English Tory statesmen were now willing to consider terms of peace on the basis of the continued possession by Philip of Spain and the Indies. Philip himself strongly opposed any partition of his dominions and resented extremely i7in Peace. 393 the loss of Gibraltar to the English. To his com¬ plaints Louis wrote letters of moderation and good sense. “ There are occasions,” he said, “ when it is necessary to know how to lose.” But Philip was governed by his wife and the Princesse des Ursins, and both ladies were opposed to concessions. With¬ out any clear policy, devoid of counsels of vigour or energy, Philip took no advantage of the victory of Villa Viciosa and things were allowed to drift. Nothing could be expected from a Court influenced by women and incapables, honeycombed by intrigue, and dominated by indolence. At this crisis, as at every crisis during the war, the initiative had to come from France. A capable envoy must be sent at once to obtain the adhesion of the Court of Spain to a reasonable partition of the Spanish Empire. Taught by experience Louis now recognised that a first minister was absolutely necessary if order was to be restored and wise counsels were to have the upper hand in Spain. It was obviously inconvenient to place the French ambassador in such a position, and a Spaniard would naturally refuse to carry out a policy of partition. An Italian then must be found, and Torcy wrote suggesting three Italian cardinals. But the Court of Spain offered a strenuous resistance. The Princesse des Ursins replied that Philip would have no first minister. Louis was in a difficult posi¬ tion. The Spaniards detested the French influence, the suspicions of the allies would be at once aroused if they noticed any tendency towards the union of the two kingdoms such as Amelot’s residence in Spain had seemed to imply. Louis’ solution was a 394 Louis XIV. [1711 wise one. From 1711 in clear and emphatic terms he renounced the policy of governing Spain from Versailles or of uniting the two monarchies under one head. This new definite policy carried out during the embassy of the Marquis of Bonnac to Spain in 1711 was embodied in the famous renun¬ ciations which publicly recognised the separation of the two monarchies of France and Spain. Henceforward France may influence but not govern. The two nations may be united in a friendly alliance and the reigning houses by ties of blood. But Spain must be left to work out her own fortunes. She must appear before Europe a power as independent as that of France or of England. Whatever Louis’ wishes and hopes had been in the earlier phases of the war, events had proved too strong for him. The independent spirit of the Spaniards was a reve¬ lation which he slowly was compelled to recognise, and though the accession to the Imperial throne of the Archduke Charles enabled the English Tory Government to modify the policy of the Whigs and to permit a Bourbon to sit on the throne of Spain, public opinion in England insisted on the renun¬ ciations. Probably no task was ever undertaken by Louis more difficult than that of persuading the Spaniards to consent to a partition of their dominions. His envoy Bonnac was observant, sagacious, and faithful, and he fulfilled the expectations formed of him in carrying out his most delicate mission with infinite success. He immediately grasped the political situa¬ tion. He saw that Philip V. was without any power of 1712] Peace. 395 decision, and was governed absolutely by the Queen, who, embittered by her misfortunes, was strongly averse to any concessions, and that the Princesse des Ursins was alone capable of influencing the Queen, but very sensitive of any attempt to lessen her authority at the Court. To manage such a trio required tact, and Bonnac advised Louis to assert no authority over the King and Queen, and when writ¬ ing to them to seemingly allow them full indepen¬ dence. Four days after his arrival Philip signified to his grandfather his assent to the loss of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and his adhesion to the Assiento treaty. At the close of 1711 France seemed to be still in a most perilous situation. Marlborough certainly had fallen in disgrace, but the enemies of France were apparently still united in desiring her ruin. France was only saved by the victory of Denain, and by the policy of Harley and St. John. In his interview with Villars before the latter’s departure for Flanders, the aged monarch spoke of the possible advance of the allies to Paris, and told the Marshal that he had resolved, should such an advance be made, to collect as many troops as he could, and die in a last attempt to save his country, and his crown. The English commander, Ormond, on July 16th, 1712, proclaimed a suspenion of arms with the French, and Villars, with whom Ormond was in constant correspondence, published a like pro¬ clamation with regard to the English. Weakened by the withdrawal of the British army, the allies suffered a series of disasters. Eugene had left Albemarle with eight thousand men in an entrenched camp at 396 Louis XIV. [1712 Denain. This camp Villars determined to storm. On July 24th the attack was made, the principal obstacle being a deep ditch in front of the entrench¬ ment. Villars, recognising the importance of rapid¬ ity of movement, refused to spend any time in filling the ditch with fascines. “ Our fascines,” he said, “ shall be the bodies of the first fallen.” After a stubborn defence the allied forces fled in panic, and a large number perished in the Scheldt. “Villars,” said the great Napoleon in after days, “saved France at Denain.” The Marshal had again given evidence of the quickness of eye for which he was well known, and of his unconquerable energy and dash. Before the end of the year the reduction of many towns had established a strong barrier, and France was safe. It is impossible to overestimate the political importance of Denain. Louis XIV. at once recognised the real meaning of the victory. On July 29th he wrote to Villars: “ I cannot speak too highly of the way in which you formed the design in concert with the Marshal Montesquieu, the secrecy which you preserved, and the means you took to execute it. Nothing is more likely to advance favourable negotiations of peace than the re-establish¬ ment of that superiority of our arms which has been so unfortunately lost for many years. . . . The powers now in deliberation will be much more tract¬ able when they see the disappearance of all Prince Eugene’s hopes of the invasion of my kingdom. This is the result which I hope to gain le fruit que j'esptre retirer') from the very important service which you have just rendered me.” MARSHAL VILLARS. ( From Courcy's Coalition of IJOI.) 1712] Peace. 397 Louis was not deceived in the estimate which he had formed of the importance of Denain. The capture of Marchiennes, Saint-Armand, Mortagne, Douai, and Bouchain restored the prestige of the French arms, and, with the defections of the English placed to the Dutch and the Imperialists in great measure at Louis’ mercy. The allies, furious at the failure of their plan of securing ascendancy at the conference, for a time suspended all negotiations. But Louis’ anxiety for peace was not only equalled but surpassed by that felt by the English ministry. Bolingbroke determined if necessary to make a sepa¬ rate treaty with France, and visited Paris early in August. Ten days’ personal negotiation with Torcy adjusted the principal points of difficulty, and smoothed the way for a satisfactory settlement of all the matters at issue between the two countries. Before his departure Bolingbroke had an interview with Louis at Fontainebleau. There he found the Court in high spirits at the successes of Villars. Even Louis, on hearing of the capture of Marchiennes, had thanked the courtiers for their congratulations. In his interview with Bolingbroke, the aged King, speaking rapidly and indistinctly, acknowledged his obligations to the Queen of England and avowed his earnest desire for peace. On Bolingbroke’s arrival in London a suspension of arms with France for four months was proclaimed in London. The congress of Utrecht was opened on January 12, 1712, but before many weeks were over both 39^ Louis XIV. [1713 Bourbon Courts had been thrown into inexorable grief and consternation at the successive deaths of the Duchess and Duke of Burgundy, followed by that of their eldest child the Duke of Brittany. In both Paris and Madrid it was believed that the Duke of Orleans was sweeping away the royal family in order to secure the throne for himself, and it was asserted that neither the lives of Louis XIV. or Philip V. were safe. But these domestic afflictions only increased the determination of the allies to force from Philip an absolute renunciation of all claims to the French throne. To this the Court of Spain offered an obstinate resistance, and during a great part of 1712 Louis had to employ alternately per¬ suasion and menaces to induce Philip to accede to his demands. On July 8th the Spanish nation was informed in a proclamation that their King had renounced all claim to the French throne, and in December these renunciations of Philip were rati¬ fied by the Spanish Cortes. Somewhat naturally the English ministers desired that the States-General should ratify the French renunciations. But Louis regarded such a request as a personal insult, and Torcy wrote to Bolingbroke that “ the Estates in France have nothing to do with questions regarding the succession to the Crown, they have not the power either to make or to abrogate the laws.” It was indeed true that practically the States-General could hardly be said to exist. The sovereignty in France resided in the King alone, and all that Louis would concede was that the Parlement of Paris should register the renunciations. In March, I 7 I 3 > 1713] Peace. 399 the renunciations of the Dukes of Berry and Orleans were solemnly registered by the Parlement. The Spanish ambassador in France was, however, firmly convinced that all these renunciations were worth¬ less, and that in the event of the death of the Dauphin, Philip V. would return to France. The question, too, of Bavaria required delicate handling. The ally of Louis, the Elector had lost his territories after Blenheim, and, after Malplaquet, he had been compelled to leave his government of the Spanish Netherlands and to fly into France. Re¬ stored in 1711, he was recognised by Philip V. in 1712 as hereditary sovereign of the Low Countries. Maximilian’s chances of being restored to Bavaria seemed indeed remote. He had been put to the ban of the Empire, and even Louis thought the recovery of Bavaria from Austria was impossible. But the Elector owed his eventual restoration to the deter¬ mination of the Dutch not to allow any ally of Louis to reign over the Spanish Netherlands. Eventually, after much negotiation, the best solution of a difficult matter was found to lie in the restoration of Maximilian to his hereditary dominions. In February, 1714, a close alliance was formed be¬ tween France and Bavaria, which remained unbroken for many years, and which resulted in the accession of Charles of Bavaria to the Imperial throne as Charles VIL, in 1742. On April ii, 1713, the Peace of Utrecht was finally signed. To England France yielded Newfoundland, Acadia, and Hudson’s Bay, though she reserved Cape 400 Louis XIV. [1713 Breton and her share in the fisheries of the coast. She also promised to dismantle Dunkirk and to recognise the Protestant Succession in England. She was forced to see the firm establishment of Eng¬ land as a Mediterranean power, and her dreams of domination over Southern Europe dispelled. At the time of the Partition treaties, and again when he accepted the Will, Louis had definitely aimed at making the Mediterranean into a Bourbon lake. But the English interests in the Mediterranean Sea were very considerable. And not the least important results of the Spanish Succession war were that Eng¬ land, obtained ample securities for the interests which she had already acquired in the Mediterranean, and that Louis was compelled to relinquish schemes which Napoleon a century later again attempted in vain to realise. With regard to Holland, France agreed to the establishment of a Barrier, and to the cession of the Spanish Netherlands to Austria. She managed, hoAV- ever, to regain Lille, Aire, Bethune, and Saint-Venant. With Prussia there was little to settle. France recog¬ nised the royal title of the Elector, his rights over NeufchMel, and his possession of Upper Guelder- land. The King of Prussia on his part renounced all his claims on the principality of Orange, and on the lordships of ChMon and Chatel-Berlin in Franche- Comte. France further recognised the claims of the Duke of Savoy to Sicily with the title of King. She restored to him Savoy and Nice, and it was agreed that if Philip’s line failed, the House of Savoy should reign in Spain. Louis made no con¬ cealment of his delight at the conclusion of peace. 1714] Peace. 401 Writing to Philip, he congratulates him on the fact that he was now recognised, even by his enemies, as King of Spain, and declares that at one time he had never hoped for such a happy result of the war. France had suffered severe defeats and had been forced to make cessions to England, but these ces¬ sions were mainly in America, and as a compensation she could look to the establishment of a Bourbon dynasty at Madrid. Far different were the feelings of Philip. Spain had lost heavily by the peace. Her possessions in Italy and the Netherlands were handed over to the Emperor and to the Duke of Savoy, while England secured Gibraltar and Mi¬ norca, and the Assiento or grant of the slave trade with America. She was now shut out as it were from the general life of Europe, and remained isolated behind the Pyrenees. This feeling of rage and dis¬ appointment explains Philip’s delay in signing the treaties of peace with England, Savoy, and Holland, and his deep-seated determination to reconquer on the first opportunity his lost possessions in Italy. But Spain was at this moment helpless, and Louis, determined to obtain peace, could always secure Philip’s obedience by threatening as a last resource to withdraw the French troops from Spain. Though the Emperor stood out, he could do nothing without his allies. Villars proved too strong for Eugene, took Landau and Freiburg, and on March 6, 1714, the Peace of Rastadt between France and Austria was made, followed by that of Baden between France and the Empire. Writing in F'ebruary to Madame de Maintenon, about the signature of the Peace of 402 Lords XIV. [1714 Rastadt, Louis had said: “ I thought you would not be sorry to hear this good news a few hours before the rest of the world, but say nothing about it, only that Prince Eugene has returned to Rastadt, and that the conferences are going on again. I am sure of peace and rejoice at it with you. Let us thank God with all our hearts.” By the treaties with the Emperor and Empire, Louis secured the replacement of the Electors of Bavaria and Cologne in their territories ; he kept Alsace and Strasburg, and the terms in the Peace of Ryswick with regard to the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic faith in all his dominions were re¬ tained. The Emperor, on his part, agreed to accept the conclusions come to at Utrecht with regard to his possessions of Naples, Sardinia, Milan, the Tuscan Ports and the Spanish Netherlands. He further agreed to the formation of a Barrier, and Louis recognised the erection of Hanover as an Electorate. Spain was not included in the above arrange¬ ments, and Philip felt deeply hurt that his grand¬ father should have made peace with the Emperor without compelling him to renounce the title of King of Spain. Till the death of Louis XIV. the relations between France and Spain were strained. The reforms of Amelot and Orri admirable though they were in many respects, had been accompanied by the appearance of a vast number of French finan¬ ciers and contractors in Spain. Extortion had in¬ creased under the French system, and taxation had become heavier. The French agents of Louis had begun the work of financial and commercial re- 1714] Peace. 403 organisation, but much remained to be done. The French were unpopular at Madrid, and the death of Philip’s brave Queen, Maria Louisa of Savoy, in February, 1714, ‘followed by that of the Duke of Berry on May i ith, only increased the hostile feeling against the French. The remaining surviving son of the Duke of Burgundy, a child of four, alone stood between Orleans and the succession, and it seemed quite possible that round him might rage, in the near future, a struggle between the two branches of the Bourbon family. Philip himself was determined to break through his renunciations and, though not to unite France and Spain under the same head, to place them in the hands of the same branch of the House of Bour¬ bon. Suspicious of Orleans, he demanded that the Dauphin should be put under his own care, and that in the event of Louis’ death the Regency should be confided to him. But Louis absolutely refused to listen to Philip’s schemes for the abrogation of the renunciations. The death of Anne had thrown the government of England into the hands of the Whigs, who, as Louis believed, desired an excuse for re¬ opening the struggle. Apart from a question of policy, Torcy assures us that Louis was sincere in his determination not to break pledges solemnly given. But an event soon occurred which ended for a time the influence of France upon Spain. The marriage of Philip to Elizabeth Farnese brought with it the fall of the Princesse des Ursins in December, 1714, and gave an intimation to the world that Spain was prepared to act independently of P'rance. As 404 Louis XIV. [1715 the Princesse des Ursins “passed the mountains,” writes Mr. Armstrong, in his Life of Elizabeth Farncse, “ the Pyrenees recovered their existence, and Spain and France were separate.” Whatever had been her faults, the Princesse had on the whole used her talents in the service of France. It is not too much to say it was greatly due to her agency that the influence of the Grand Monarque was exercised in varying degrees in Spain for some fifteen years. She was seen at her best when working with Amelot, whose wisdom and discretion held her quick and jealous temper in check. Always governed by am¬ bition, always jealous of any diminution of her power, she fell from a position almost unique in the history of modern European monarchies through want of tact and loss of temper. Louis was un¬ usually fortunate in his agents, but he rarely was served with greater ability than by the celebrated Princesse des Ursins.’ Her return to Versailles proved to be only the prelude of her exile. The celebrated friendship be¬ tween her and Madame de Maintenon had long since cooled, and moreover she and the Duke of Orleans were mortal foes. When the latter heard of her probable arrival, he proposed at once to go to Paris, since, as he himself declared, he would not answer for himself should they meet. Madame de Maintenon promptly recognised the necessity of getting rid of her former friend. After a short stay at Versailles * Mr. Armstrong in his Life of Elizabeth Farfiese gives a graphic description of the condition of Spain at the end of the Spanish Succession War. 1715] Peace. 405 and several interviews with the king at Marly, it was clearly intimated to the unfortunate and heart-broken woman that though Louis would grant her a pension, she would do well to reside in Italy. After remain¬ ing in Genoa some years, she established herself in Rome, and there spent the rest of her life among strangers far away from the France that she loved and had served so well. To her constant watchful¬ ness and untiring energy the Bourbons owed their possession of Spain. After the peace of Utrecht was signed, Louis de¬ voted himself to the completion of the policy which since 1711 he had set himself to carry out—the po¬ litical union and the dynastic separation of the crowns of France and Spain. And this policy was one which after the stormy scenes of the Regency commended itself to statesmen in both countries and influenced the destinies of two nations down to the Revo¬ lution. A close union between France and Spain—Louis had said—was necessary for the benefit of both. Each kingdom should, however, govern itself accord¬ ing to its usages and customs, and remain indepen¬ dent of foreign intervention. Thus the jealousy of hostile Europe would be unable to find any ground for asserting that Spain was the creature of France. But Louis had not before his death secured even the partial adhesion of Spain to this policy without ex¬ periencing grave difficulties, and the political union between the two countries was in danger of ship¬ wreck during the meeting of the Congress of Utrecht. Louis desired peace. He was old, and France was 4 o6 Louis XIV. [1715 exhausted. He was convinced that she could not withstand another European attack. He was anxious to hand down to his successors France at peace and with her borders extended. And no sooner had the Peace of Utrecht been made than his desire to keep that peace became overwhelmingly strong. Honour forbade that the renunciations should be broken. The close union of France and Spain depended on the strict adhesion to the terms of peace. Philip on the other hand was young. He owed his throne to the national feeling in Spain against the dismemberment of the monarchy. He was the founder of a new dynasty. How could he, then, be expected, before he had been on the throne of his adopted country twelve years, to consent to a serious and disgraceful partition ? He had during the long war been almost miraculously saved time after time from absolute ruin. Would he not be justified in trusting to Providence to cover the plans of his ene¬ mies with confusion ? Spain had actually suffered less than France. She was less exhausted, less denuded of men, less impoverished. As to the re¬ nunciations, Philip regarded them as only extorted by force and only made to be broken. The authority of Louis XIV. alone compelled the unwilling agree¬ ment of Philip to the partitions and to the denuncia¬ tions. No sooner was Louis dead than the schemes of Alberoni and Elizabeth Farnese expressed the real wishes of the Spanish King, and for a time checked that union between the two monarchies which it had been the object of Louis XIV. to bring about. 1715] Peace. 407 The history of the last fifteen years of the reign of Louis XIV. must ever be regarded as the most remarkable in his life, so far as he himself is con¬ cerned. At no period did Louis show more energy and vitality ; at no period was his influence more strongly felt, at no period was his personality more generally recognised. During the years from 1702 to 1708 and from 1712 to 1715, the Court life proceeded pretty much on its old lines. The young Duchess of Burgundy did her best to direct the gaieties of the courtiers. She took part in the hunting and riding expeditions, in the comedies and fetes. And at the end of 1707 we find the Court assembled at Marly and the Duchess arranging entertainments to divert the King and Queen of England. The victory of Almanza gave, perhaps, some justification for these festivities. But the King, old and austere, took little part in any Court gaieties, and though Madame de Maintenon sometimes arranged comedies to amuse him, and though at the beginning of 1708 he appeared at some masques, it was always difficult to distract him from serious considerations. From 1708 to 1712 the Court became sombre and saddened. These were the years of disasters abroad, followed by attempts on the part of the allies to make peace on terms humili¬ ating to France ; these were the years when famine and misery stalked through the country, and when death visited the royal family. The gaiety of the Duchess of Burgundy came suddenly to an end when her husband, blamed for his share in the disas¬ trous campaign of 1708, returned to be attacked by a 4 o8 Louis XIV [1715 malignant and badly informed public opinion. In the spring of 1711 the death of the Dauphin filled the whole Court with dismay, which gave way to absolute despair when the Duchess of Burgundy, her husband, and her eldest son, the Duke of Brit¬ tany, were carried off early in 1712. The whole of France was dazed and overwhelmed with grief. The hopes of “ the Burgundy party,” which on the death of the Dauphin had turned their eyes towards Cam- brai, in anticipation of the accession of the young Duke of Burgundy, were dashed to the ground. The political life of F^nelon was finished, and with the death of Burgundy passed away the best chance ever offered to the House of Bourbon of preventing a future revolution by strengthening their hold on their people by wise and timely reforms. “ We have no longer a Court,” wrote Madame de Maintenon ; “ all those who were its ornaments have disappeared.” During these years of terrible disasters abroad and of heartrending misfortunes within his own family, Louis showed a marvellous control over himself. He felt his afflictions, says Saint-Simon, and could not restrain his tears before his ministers and once before Villars. But he showed undoubted courage in the calm and dignified way in which he faced mis¬ fortune. He preserved, as a rule, the same impassive exterior when good news, such as the success of the negotiations for peace, had been conveyed to him. This self-control, which he first learnt to exercise during the struggle with Conde and the Fronde, never left him, and continued to the end of his life. 1715] Peace. 409 Saint-Simon’s description of Louis’ courage under adversity is well known. Overwhelmed with his country’s misfortunes and his domestic griefs, the old King showed throughout a constancy and a strength of will which surprised all who knew him. His constant trust that the future would bring him good fortune, his unshaken courage, his wisdom—it was such qualities as these, says the Court historian, which gained for him the admiration of Europe and for which he deserved the name of Great. It was not till 1712 that the Court shook off its gloom. Peace was in sight and Villars’ victory at Denain in July, 1711 had saved France from invasion and had retrieved the national honour. Peace restored many nobles to Versailles, and till the death of Louis the Court became again brilliant and gay. After four years of restraint a reaction natu¬ rally set in, and the last three years of Louis’ reign form a prelude, so far as the Court was concerned, to the days of the Regency. Just as at the Restoration of Charles II. so in 1712 disasters and a period of constraint were succeeded by an outburst of immorality. Gambling increased, scandals multiplied. Madame de Maintenon was fully alive to this state of things, but was quite unable to check it. Her position was indeed assured, and the troops of place hunters still believed that her authority was paramount. She interviewed the min¬ isters and to some e.xtent guided their counsels ; she was treated as Queen by the King’s regiment; it was said that Louis had appointed her to be Regent on his death. But she was too fully occupied with 410 Loins XIV [1715 guarding Louis from all trouble and annoyance to be able to exert an energetic influence in favour of a reformation of morals. Though Louis was rapidly approaching his end his political activity was still remarkable. He was determined before his death to carry out the terms of the peace of Utrecht with regard to the Spanish monarchy, and by careful arrangements with refer¬ ence to the Regency on his death to leave France and Spain at peace. In accordance with these reso¬ lutions Louis sent Berwick to Catalonia to aid Philip in reducing Barcelona, and in spite of the sympathy shown to the revolted Catalans by the Emperor and by England Louis carried out his intention. The fall of Barcelona on September 13, 1714, marked the end of the Catalan revolt. Philip was anxious to proceed to severities, but Louis urged moderation and clemency. He was willing that the walls of Barcelona should be razed to the ground, and that the whole country should be forced to accept the laws of Castille, but he strongly advised that the Catalans should be allowed to enjoy their municipal privileges, and that a courageous people should not be treated with useless inhumanity. Majorca and Ivica were conquered in the following spring, and Louis could rest satisfied that, in spite of the obstacles placed in his way by the Austrians and English, the Emperor had lost all influence in Catalonia and in the Balearic Islands, and that Philip was master of his dominions. His next task was to leave the two branches of the Bourbon House in amity, and to provide for the succession. To effect this Philip and 1715] Peace. 411 Orleans must be reconciled. The suspicion that Orleans had aimed at succeeding Philip, if the latter was dethroned, had never been removed, and it re¬ quired much tact and correspondence to bring about a reconciliation. But Philip never wavered in his resolve to secure control over the Dauphin, and, if he died, the eventual succession to France. And this determination ran counter to Louis’ dispositions. In July, 1714, he had given Maine and Toulouse the position of Princes of the Blood, and a little later he had left the Regency to Orleans in conformity with his rights of birth and the spirit of the late treaties. The education of the young Louis was to be placed in the hands of Fleury, Bishop of Frfejus, while the Duke of Maine was to be his guardian, Villeroy his governor, and Le Tellier his confessor. In this manner had Louis by the time of his death settled the important political questions which re¬ quired immediate solution. But the intrigues of the Spanish party made it quite clear that on Louis’ death the Regent would have grave difficulties with Spain. Louis’ own predilections were in favour of the Duke of Maine, and it is to his credit that he did not permit himself to make grave political blunders in order to satisfy his own personal wishes. France could, on the whole, look back on the war of the Spanish Succession, and on the settlement of Utrecht with satisfaction. The system established by the peace of Westphalia would, in the opinion of Europe, have been overthrown had the crown of Spain been united to that of France or Austria. And it was that conviction which was answerable for the 412 Lotiis XIV [1715 war of eleven years. The coalition of 1701 and the preliminaries of peace signed in London in 1711 (October) averted these two dangers. French blood had been spilt in Germany and on the banks of the Rhine from 1702 to 1708, in Italy and Provence from 1701 to 1707, in the Low Countries from 1701 to 1712, and in Spain from 1701 to 1714. In spite of her disasters, the position of France was very differ¬ ent in 1714 from what it had been in 1648. No one then could have foreseen her steady development and consistent territorial aggrandisement. She had secured by the treaty of the Pyrenees Artois and Roussillon and many other important places, by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle a portion of Flanders, by the treaty of Nimeguen Franche-Comt6, by the treaty of Ryswick the rest of Alsace and Strasburg. The system inaugurated at Munster and Osnabriick in 1648 had proved successful. The theory of the balance of power had been kept diligently before their eyes by all statesmen, and the pacification at Utrecht was the triumph of that theory. While Spain was left entirely independent, her territories in Italy and Flanders were given to the Emperor and to Savoy. Austria herself was checked by the two rising powers of Savoy and Prussia, the latter of whom was destined to succeed France in the position of defender of the German liberties. Louis’ error in attempting to enrich himself at the expense of the Empire had resulted in the enhance¬ ment of the power and prestige of the Emperor. At one time, when the allies refused to make peace at the Hague and Gertruydenberg, it had seemed likely afteoJ^^ *^^^iOGCNBuscH eCRCCN Of ZQO/VJ DQ^eti ANTWERP -J^^^^'funNcpo'x'^^ijroc c^mt fii BOULOOH^ BRUSSELS rou^J^A. \OOliAJ(:^ii ,iv ^ .c* IRA> 4 ^ E AfOArr ^OCBi r/iANHroBr bouillon MAINZ sedAn\^ ST£NA9^ MANNP^lllhl HtlOtLOOBC clcaMont^ M€A\ ^Mti/AieuBc CHACONS LANQAU .Hi^£NAU fANCr THE FRONTIER OF FRANCE AFTER 16^^8-/659^17/3 = DISTRICTS CCOeO TO FRANCE /nttsuM \tHI1 Il'fSOt/A Bftt/ttrei otN 1715] Peace. 413 that the European equilibrium would be endangered if not destroyed by the partial annihilation of the French power. Europe was saved from this calamity by the heroism of Louis himself, by his regard for the honour and welfare of his people, by his keen sense of what was expected from the royal power. His indomitable energy during misfortune was backed up by the devoted zeal of his ministers, by the skill of his ambassadors, and especially by the prudence of Torcy. The fall of the Whigs in 1710, followed by the dismissal of Marlborough and the death of Joseph I., each in its turn contributed to bring the leading European ministers to take a statesmanlike view of the situation. The untiring efforts of Louis during these last days of the war were admirably seconded by the brilliant successes of Villars. At Utrecht, Louis received the reward of his labours. He ob¬ tained terms far more favourable than those offered at Gertruydenberg, and he had the satisfaction of feel¬ ing that he had preserved not only the integrity of his kingdom, but French nationality itself. During these years the intimate connection subsisting be¬ tween the Monarch and the people receives ample illustration, while the general conviction that the sovereign was the incarnation of his subjects was of vital importance, and its thorough acceptance by the French nation colours and explains their attitude dur¬ ing the whole of the Spanish Succession war. Had France been governed in that critical year of 1709 by any other than a monarchical system, she would have suffered serious territorial loss, and would have been left humiliated, dismembered, and ruined. 414 Louis XIV. [1715 From that fate Louis had saved her, and at the end of the war he had added a page to her history which, if in many respects an overwhelmingly pathetic and painful one, will at any rate be remembered among the most glorious in her history. CHAPTER XV. THE END. 1714-1715. RANGE after the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht was, com- 2:)ared with most European countries, in a strong position. She had undoubtedly suffered enormously from the calami¬ ties of the war, and was much exhausted. By the terms of the treaty of Utrecht, she had lost consid¬ erably, especially in the colonies. Tournai, Menin, Ypres, and Fumes had been ceded in the North, Exiles and Fenestrelles in the Alps. But Artois, Roussillon, Franche-Comt6, Alsace, and Flanders remained to her, and Lorraine was almost within her grasp. Compared with her position in 1643, she had achieved an enormous territorial extension. 415 4 i6 Louis XIV. t1715 Her prestige was little if at all diminished ; she had again shown herself invincible. She had defended herself against a terrible Teutonic onslaught, during which struggle the question of the Spanish Succes¬ sion had lost itself in the reappearance of the old rivalry between the French Bourbons and the Aus¬ trian Hapsburgs. Though the balance of power in the Mediterranean was preserved, France had succeeded in carrying out the principal aim of her policy. She had placed a Bourbon on the Spanish throne and had kept him there. No doubt the allies were perfectly justified, in 1701, in attacking France and Spain by land and by sea. Though French historians delight in pointing out that as Philip remained on the Spanish throne the desolating war of 1701-1712 was useless, it must be remembered that the political condition of Europe in 1712 was very different from what it was in 1701. In 1701 Louis XIV.’s power was not only still unbroken, and his schemes of aggrandisement still vast, but Philip was his nominee and instrument. In 1712 Louis’ power had been brought very low, he had relinquished all schemes of aggression, and Philip had shown himself independent of his grand¬ father. His renunciations, and his adoption of an independent attitude towards France, coincided with the accession of Charles VI. to the Imperial throne and with the failure of the allies in Spain. The Spanish power had been destroyed in Italy, and the Low Countries had been handed over to Austria. “ Bourbonism ” had received a check and its power of aggression was for the time minimised. 1715] The End. 417 The Grand Alliance, in its earlier stages, was per¬ fectly justifiable, but from 1707, the date of the cele¬ brated Whig Resolution, the allies began to deviate from the path which they had chosen in 1701. Like the coalition of 1793 their object from 1707 was to reduce France to the rank of a second rate power. Each of the allies was bent on territorial acquisitions though the balance of power continued to be the pretext of hostility. It was not till the Tories under Bolingbroke and Harley came into office in 1710, that the new policy inaugurated by the Whigs was repudiated. The treaty of Utrecht was then made. The new European position taken up by England in 1688, and the extraordinary growth of her power and resources, had been one of the main causes of the disasters to the French armies; the retirement of England from the war was the principal cause of the French success at Denain, her victories against the Emperor, and the maintenance of her position in Europe in 1715. And the results of the war, while they satisfied the honour of France, were in¬ valuable to Spain and to England. France owed her safety not a little to Spain her¬ self. The allies had found it impossible to succeed in face of the patriotism of the Castilians, and after Almanza and Villa Viciosa the Spanish resistance was of the utmost value to France. Henceforward, Spain having passed through the fire of adversity, had to be reckoned with as a European power. The great qualities of the Spanish race had shown them¬ selves ; Spain gained by losing her outlying prov¬ inces, and a veritable renaissance took place under 27 4 i8 Lotiis XIV. [1715 the* Alberonis, Ripperdas, and others, culminating in the reign of Charles III. In saving Spain from the House of Hapsburg, Louis XIV. had done much for the balance of power. Though “ Bourbonism ” be¬ came the terror of misguided English statesmen, there was surely something to be said for an alliance between the Bourbons of France, Spain, and Italy, as a counterpoise on the one hand to the Teutonic peoples, and on the other to the growing Slav in¬ fluence. There was never any real danger of the Pyrenees ceasing to exist, and Louis’ solution of the greatest international puzzle of the seventeenth century was, after the war of the Spanish Succession, recognised to be the only possible one. If there was any real danger of a universal monarchy, that danger in the early years of the eighteenth century came rather from Vienna than from Paris. France too owed a deep debt to her own people. In spite of the unpatriotic conduct of the inhabi¬ tants of the Cevennes, in spite of the complaints of F^n^lon and of Vauban, the nation as a whole had loyally supported the government. After Malpla- quet Villars had not suffered any reproaches, but was allowed to persevere and to win victories at Denain and Landau. France lastly owed much of her success to her able diplomatists, who had watched her interests with extraordinary skill and success. But though Louis bequeathed the tradition of a brilliant and successful foreign policy to his succes¬ sors, he left to succeeding generations in France a religious legacy, which proved the source of much 1715] The Ejtd. 419 trouble and confusion. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes had been carried out and the reduction of the Cevennes during the latter war had removed any further danger from the Huguenots. But the Jansenists remained a strong party, including, as they did, many of the clergy and magistrates and well-to- do bourgeois. Jansenism it had been said reached even to the throne of the King. This division in the Gallican Church between Jesuitism and Jansen¬ ism was regarded by the government with disfavour on account of the political side of Jansenism. Every opponent of the existing state of things naturally sided with that party which professed independence of thought, and opposition to extreme centralisation. Louis had always regarded the Jansenists with sus¬ picion. He knew they did not see the necessity of absolute union in both religion and politics, he sus¬ pected that they desired provincial liberties, the free¬ dom of the Church from state control, and more power for the aristocracy. He was himself consid¬ erably influenced in religious matters by Le Tellier, the successor of Pere La Chaise, and Le Tellier was a hard intolerant Jesuit. There is no doubt that the Jesuits took advantage of the King’s dislike of any tendency to divide the nation into two hostile camps; they exaggerated the independence of the Jansenist opinions and their factious designs ; they accused them of being the enemies of all authority whether residing in the Pope or in Bishops or even in Kings ; they accused them, moreover, of trying to secure for Orleans the succes¬ sion to the throne. Louis was thoroughly alarmed. 420 Loins XIV. [1715 Hoprobably thought that the Jansenists and Hugue¬ nots were equally heretics, and he believed that unless severe measures were at once taken his successor would find on his accession that a civil war was on the point of breaking out. Madame de Maintenon, many of whose friends were Jansenists, was distracted by her fears and doubts. De Noailles, the Archbishop of Paris, was himself a moderate Jansenist, and had seen much of Madame de Maintenon. But the Jesuit faction was unrelenting. In 1705 a Bull from Clement XL de¬ stroyed the Peace of Clement IX. (1668) and pro¬ claimed the heretical nature of the Jansenist opinions; in 1710 Louis ordered the destruction of Port Royal, which was rased to the ground. Not content with this success, his advisers determined to obtain a condemnation of the doctrines contained in Quesnel’s Reflexions morales sur le Nouveau Testa¬ ment, a book published in 1695, strongly recom¬ mended by De Noailles and other bishops, and very popular in France. In 1713 Clement XL was induced by the Jesuits to issue the famous Bull Unigenitus in which he ex¬ plicitly condemned loi propositions taken from Quesnel’s book. To accomplish this result pressure of the most illegitimate kind had been brought to bear on the Pope. When the French envoy asked Clement later why he had condemned such an odd number, the latter replied, seizing his arm and burst¬ ing into tears: “ O! M. Amelot, M. Amelot, what would you have had me to do ? I strove hard to cur¬ tail the list, but Father Le Tellier had pledged him- 1715 ] The End. 421 self to the King that the book eontained more than a hundred errors, and with his foot on my throat he compelled me to prove him right. I have condemned only one more.” ' Not even at Rome had theological hatred been carried to a like extent, and the blame for these pro¬ ceedings must be shared by Louis, Madame de Maintenon, and Le Tellier. The effects of this Bull were most disastrous. De Noailles and eight bishops refused to accept it, and were supported by the Parlemcnt of Paris and many of the most intelli¬ gent of Frenchmen. Louis refused to yield or to adopt a neutral attitude, and insisted on regarding the opposition to the Bull as opposition to his own authority. A cruel persecution of the well-to- do and orderly classes at once took place, 30,000 of whom are said to have suffered, and the result of perhaps the saddest episode in the lives of Louis and of Madame de Maintenon was that up to the Revo¬ lution the nation remained divided into two hostile camps. In passing judgment on the general character of Louis’ rule and its effects upon P'rance, it must always be remembered that his rule was popular. France had from the beginning of her history shown a strong inclination for a monarchial form of govern¬ ment, and just as she had welcomed the rule of Henry IV. as a relief from the civil wars, so she gladly preferred the despotism of Louis XIV. to any further ruinous attempts to secure a semi-constitu- ' For an impartial account of the struggle between the Jesuits and Jansenists, see Roequain, L'esprit Revoliitionaire Avant la Revolution, 422 Louis XIV. [1715 tional regime. In a long reign such as was that of Louis, it is an easy matter to find subjects for criticism. Perhaps, however, the portion of his life for which the least allowance will be made, is the period be¬ tween his mother’s death in 1667 and his marriage to Madame de Maintenon. In these years the most successful and, from a military point of view, the most glorious of his reign, his private life, unlike that of Justinian, was often open to severe criticism. He seems to have thought he could fly in the face of even the low moral standard of the day, and not only emulate, but surpass the conduct of Charles II. of England. Freed from his mother’s control, Louis plunged into a course of life which continued till the death of Maria Theresa. In 1671 he appeared in public driving with Madame de Montespan and Louise de la Valliere. Such conduct on the part of one who held a prominent position in Europe had very evil effects, and before long every German princeling had his Versailles and his mistresses. Carried away by his successes, and by the extrava¬ gant adulation of a brilliant Court, Louis appears to have thought that he was above criticism. During this period of his career his political mistakes (though often disastrous) were the natural result of over-confidence or bad advice, and to some extent could be excused on the ground of youth and inex¬ perience. The non-acceptance of the Dutch terms, followed by the release of the Dutch prisoners, were blunders which were redeemed by the brilliant campaigns of 1715] The End. 423 Turenne, and the territorial acquisitions made at the peace of Nimeguen. The success which attended Louis’ Rdiinion policy, and the preposterous claims with which he justified that policy, need not astonish a generation which has followed the policy of France in Africa and in the far East during the XIXth century. But the truce of Ratisbon was a most unfortunate blunder, and can with difficulty be ex¬ plained. Louis was at that time intent on the con¬ struction of Versailles, he had acquired a brilliant European position, he was the most admired and envied monarch in Europe. He probably thought that the Netherlands were within his grasp, and that the hostility of the Emperor was of little account. Nevertheless the truce of Ratisbon was an error, the consequences of which were most serious. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the attack on Philipsburg in 1688, and the devastation of the Palatinate in 1689 are the great blots in the reign to which most historians naturally turn. All of these have been fully discussed in previous chapters. Each brought its own retribution during the Spanish Suc¬ cession war. France in her need sadly missed the men who would have been the flower of her troops, she realised what the revolution of 1688 had done for England, and she experienced the undying hos¬ tility of the Germans, anxious to avenge the devas¬ tated Rhineland. When we approach the Spanish Succession war we are at once in a land where confusion worse con¬ founded seems to reign. Most writers find that Louis’ intention of placing Philip on the Spanish 424 Louis XIV. [1715 throne was in itself monstrous, and was the cause of the long war which proved so disastrous to France. In a previous chapter it has been sufficiently shown that the actual acceptance of the Will was not in itself a misfortune for the world, but that it probably offered to Europe the best solution of the difficult Spanish Succession question. The war was caused by Louis’ extraordinary want of moderation in face of a highly excited state of feeling in Europe. If he had not reserved Philip’s right to the French throne, if he had not seized the barrier towns, if in a word he had faithfully carried out the treaty of Ryswick and had not taken up an aggressive attitude, it is very probable that the war might have been averted. By bringing on his country through these ill-con¬ sidered and rash acts a devastating war, Louis in¬ flicted on France an injury almost comparable to that caused by the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, and in consequence on his death he left France un¬ conquered indeed, but overwhelmed by the miseries entailed upon her by the long wars, and from which she did not recover before the Revolution. He left behind him, too, a legacy of discontent which proved in the end fatal to his family. All these misfortunes might have been averted by a wise policy at the time of the acceptance of the Will. But the feeling of overweening pride and his exaggerated self-confidence, which in 1672 and in 1684 had been so strongly in evidence, seem again to have possessed Louis. No sooner did he win some great success than he appeared to lose all sense of moderation, and the power of seeing things as they 1715] The End. 425 were. Prosperity brought with it apparently an aggressive spirit and for the time eliminated all wise counsels. On the other hand, no sooner do danger and difficulties arise than the real heroism of the man appears, and we at once understand the influence that he wielded for so many years. The appoint¬ ment of Chamillard was unpardonable and Louis’ belief that he, at his age, could correct his minister’s blunders, direct simultaneous operations with success in Flanders, on the Rhine, in Italy or in Spain, be¬ sides organising the whole of the Spanish govern¬ ment, fills us with wonder. All through his reign the feeling of admiration at his energy, his conscien¬ tiousness, his labours, his devotion to his country, his influence on men as widely different in their tastes and ability as were Bolingbroke and Villars, Saint-Simon and Bossuet, contend with the feeling of amazement at the pettiness of some of his acts, at his religious bigotry, at the influence of the Court over his choice of generals, at his preference for Villeroy to Villars, at his suspicions of Turenne. Had Louis been content to devote his whole ener¬ gies to the territorial extension of Franee, to the expan¬ sion of her colonies, and the increase of her trade, pos¬ terity might haveaccused him of ambition, and blamed him for his vast expenditure. Such a line of policy would, however, in his case have been excusable, for his interest in diplomacy was great, and his fondness of military operations excessive. He could, too, have found some justification in the similarity of his own views with those of most of his subjects, and he could always point out that in diplomacy and in war, France 426 Louis XIV. [1715 held during his reign a leading position in Europe. But from the date of his marriage with Madame de Maintenon, his resolution to lead a sober and severe life synchronises with a determination not to rest sat¬ isfied with a policy which had brought his country glory and territory, but to plunge into the labyrinth of religious controversies and to root out of France alt opinions which did not agree with those held by himself and his spiritual advisers. Naturally igno¬ rant, all his ignorance and all his intellectual defi- ciences were at once revealed in a strong light as soon as he allowed himself to be influenced by a number of unstatesmanlike ecclesiastics, and encouraged by a narrow-minded enthusiast like Madame de Main- tenon. There is not a touch of greatness in Louis’ reli¬ gious policy. That he was seriously religious there is no reason to doubt. “ Father,” he once said to Massillon after the termination of his first course at Versailles, “ I have listened in my chapel to many great preachers, and I have been very well satisfied with them ; but as often as I hear you, I am very ill satis¬ fied with myself.” But Louis’ religious policy teems with ignorance, vindictiveness, and short-sighted¬ ness. After 1704 even Massillon was excluded from Court favour, owing to his supposed inclination to Jansenism. The interests of France were ignored, measures utterly un-Christian and cruel were adopted, and the country was left rent and torn by religious divisions. But in his attitude to Europe, Louis’ greatness is distinctly recognized. Though he left France at 1715] The End. 427 war with herself over a religious question, he could at any rate rest satisfied that before he died western Europe was at peace. He was in all his political and diplomatic relations a great King. His designs were magnificent, and his appreciation of the true policy of France was, as a rule, correct. In his later years, during the Spanish Succession war, his great¬ ness was more than ever apparent, and was acknowl¬ edged by English statesmen. The tragic incidents of his declining years only serve to bring out more distinctly his better and greater qualities. Louis’ mistakes, serious though they were, did not prevent his rule from conferring real benefits on France. The establishment of an orderly, well- organised government rescued the country from the chaos which characterised the Fronde period, and launched heron a career of prosperity which the long wars could only temporarily check. Throughout the length and breadth of the land the law reigned supreme. Feudal anarchy became impossible, and powerful nobles with great local influence ceased to exist in any part of France. The centralised administration which was established under the au¬ thority of the King worked its will unfettered by the States-General, the Parlemcnts, the nobility, or any local bodies. At the Revolution this theory of a centralised administration was adopted by the Jacobins, and the system of Louis XIV. was not only adhered to but developed. And this centralising tendency was only the natural outcome of the gradual development of France. She had been built up by the annexation 428 Lo7iis XIV. [1715 of outlying territories, each of which was allowed to retain its privileges and customs. Thus Artois, Brittany, Burgundy, Languedoc, and Provence re¬ tained their own provincial estates on Louis’ acces¬ sion, and not unfrequently by these estates a very independent attitude was assumed. There seems little doubt that it was for the benefit of France and for the increase of her influence that the political independence of these provincial estates should be temporarily suspended by the growth of the King’s absolute authority. Union and centralisation were demanded by the geographical position of France. In a similar manner all independent life in the cities disappeared. In most of the municipalities corrup¬ tion was common and the government inefficient. Louis’ measures were,unfortunately more in the direc¬ tion of abolition than of reform, and the net result was that all interest felt by the citizens in the gov¬ ernment of the towns was destroyed. But as a com¬ pensation, the system of guilds was broken down, industries were organised, manufactures were encour¬ aged, and France was prepared, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, to take her part in the coming industrial revolution. The power of the monarchy, too, exercised a bene¬ ficial influence in the region of law. The political powers claimed by the Parlemeiit were set aside, and they were bidden to limit themselves to their judicial duties. Great improvements were also effected in the legal system, and though much re¬ mained to be done, the code of Louis XIV. proved of incalculable value. This centralised system was 1715 ] The End. 429 then the outcome of the whole previous history of France; it conferred enormous benefits on the country, it was the only system fitted for the needs and aspirations of the French people, and as such has been adopted by all succeeding French govern¬ ments. The faults of the absolutism of Louis XIV. are obvious. With regard to the nobles the policy of the government did not go far enough. It has been very truly said by a modern writer that the absolute power of the King “ was held in check by the in¬ numerable usages and traditions of a highly civilised society.” The existence of these traditions may have tended to incline the government to pursue a compromising policy with regard to the nobles, but whatever was the cause, the results of the policy adopted were most disastrous. The whole history of France in the seventeenth century proves con¬ clusively that the nobles were unfit to be trusted with political power. In overthrowing their political influence, Louis’ government had done well. But no attempt was made to destroy their privileges, and these remained to bring upon the nobles and with them the monarchy, revolution and ruin. The greatest mistake to be ascribed by Louis’ govern¬ ment was that, in respect to the privileges of the no¬ bles, it pursued an illadviscd and fatal policy. Had Louis placed himself at the head of a social revolu¬ tion and reduced the nobles to a condition similar to that enjoyed by the English peerage, the monarchy would probably have been saved, and France spared years of revolutionary trouble. 430 Loiiis XIV. [1715 Much alleviation in taxation might have been given to France in the eighteenth century had Louis increased the powers of local assemblies over the collection of the taille. Louis’ government like that of Justinian was costly, and its costliness was increased by the expense of collecting the taxes. The central administration was forced to employ an army of officials whose opportunities of profit were very considerable. Had the system of as¬ sessing and collecting the taxes by local assem¬ blies been extended, a great saving would have been affected and taxation consequently diminished. It was a calamity for France that the results of the centralised system were not only the permanent impoverishment but also the destruction of much vitality in the provinces, and in the city govern¬ ments, followed by the overwhelming increase of the influence of Paris. But the indirect results of the governmental system of France in the second half of the seventeenth century must not be entirely laid to the charge of Louis. In the social and political condition of France a strong centralised government was the necessity of the hour, and with the estab¬ lishment of the unquestioned authority of the King, France enjoyed increased prosperity, while the sphere of her influence in Europe was widely ex¬ tended. Had Louis destroyed the privileges of the nobles, had he entirely abolished the political func¬ tions of the Parlcments, had he wisely given the local assemblies more power in the matter of taxa¬ tion, France would have developed in the direction of a constitutional government. He had, however, 1715] The End. 431 given France a definite form of government suitable to the times in which he lived. The establishment of a bureaucracy dependent on an absolutism did won¬ ders for France in the seventeenth century. It is much to be regretted that Louis’ successors did not introduce the modifications required by the existence of new conditions and new ideas in the eighteenth century. Their failure to adapt themselves to the exigencies of the times cannot be laid to the charge of the Grand Monarque. Louis’ latter days were clouded with grief. He had witnessed the tragic death of the Duke of Burgundy in 1712 at Marly “la funestre Marly,” where one of the best known and most pathetic scenes in his life took place. Mary Beatrice, whom Louis had always treated with the greatest respect and affec¬ tion, had lost her daughter Louisa and in her grief came to visit Louis still mourning over the sorrows of his house. It is related that they laid aside all court etiquette, weeping together in their common grief because, as the Queen said, “ We saw the aged were left, and that death had swept away the young.” On August 10, 1715, Louis took his last walk in the gardens at Marly, which is so closely associated with Madame de Maintenon and so fully described by Saint-Simon. To the last Madame de Maintenon remained his watchful guardian and his intelligent companion. Her devotion was unsurpassed, while her virtuous existence at a Court distinguished, be¬ fore her marriage to Louis, by frivolities and vice, renders her worthy of much honour. “ She never did harm to a soul,” was the verdict of the Regent 432 Louis XIV. [1715 Orleans, “ and she always tried to keep peace and harmony among all.” Throughout her life she showed an unusual unity of purpose and ever con¬ scientiously endeavoured to practise the doctrines which she had adopted. “ Though her life was a romance, her character was prosaic. But her superi¬ ority consisted not in rare qualities, but in the posses¬ sion of a high degree of those which are common to the majority of sensible persons.” She was indeed worthy of being termed one of the most remarkable women in French history. Louis’ political interests remained as keen as ever, and in one of his last letters he urged Philip V. to support the claims of the Pretender. With that chivalry which had led him to recognise the Pre¬ tender’s claim to the English throne on James IP’s death, Louis again after the death of Anne seemed to be gradually preparing to re-assert by arms the claims of the Stuarts against the Hanoverian regime. But before steps could be taken which might have had momentous effects upon the fortunes of England, the aged King was no more. On August nth he had written a letter to Philip, and after that day he never left his rooms. He met death with firm¬ ness and courage. His advice to his great-grandson showed an appreciation of his own errors. “ Try,” he said, “ to keep peace with your neighbours : I have been too fond of war; do not imitate me in that, nor in my too great expenditure.” He seemed conscious of the serious blunder made in the expulsion of the Huguenots, for he declared that the clergy were mainly responsible. On August 26th, addressing 1715] The End. 433 the Cardinals Berry, Rohan, and Le Tellier, he said that he died in the faith of the Church, then he added that he was grieved to leave the affairs of the Church in the condition in which they then stood, that they knew that he had only done what they wished^ and that they had to answer before God for all that he had done. Madame de Maintenon was most constant, and sometimes nursed him for four¬ teen hours without a break. On August 26th, Louis himself begged her “ to leave him and not to return, as her presence affected him too much.” She re¬ mained almost all the 27th by the King’s bedside. In the evening of the 28th she went to Saint-Cyr, but she spent most of the 29th with the King. On the 30th the King was worse, and bidding farewell to the Princesses and to Madame de Maintenon, he ordered the latter “ to repair at once to Saint-Cyr.” ' On September ist the Great Monarch breathed his last. In Spain the news of his death was received with more feeling than in France, where everyone was looking forward to a new re'ginie. P'or fifteen years Louis had consistently supported Philip with counsel and with armies. It was to P'rench assistance that Philip owed his throne and his ability to stand against a European coalition. It was due to Louis’ advice and aid that Spain entered upon that new period of her existence, which culminated in the reign of perhaps Spain’s greatest king, Charles III. Finally, it was under the influence of Louis that the system of political alliance between the two countries was inaugurated. It might be expected, then, that 28 434 Louis XIV. [1715 Spain, which owed its regeneration to Louis, should receive the news of his death with some appearance of sorrow. I In France the event was marked by universal re¬ joicing. The absolute monarchy of France had already passed its zenith ; with Louis’ death it en¬ tered upon a period of steady decline. The central administration had indeed done much for France, but too high a price can be paid for uniformity and bureaucracy. The cries of joy which greeted the news of Louis’ decease expressed perhaps unconsciously the general sentiment in favour of greater freedom of life and thought, and a widespread desire for some change. For the moment France was weary of military glory, she was suffering from the exhaus¬ tion produced by the late war, she was rent by reli¬ gious divisions. Of Louis’ great contemporary, the Emperor Aurungzib, who had lately died, it has been said : “ Every plan that he formed came to little good ; every enterprise failed.” This dictum might accurately describe Louis’ internal policy. In contrast to his foreign policy his home policy had been a grand failure. Painfully and methodically Louis had throughout his life done what he con¬ ceived to be his duty. His ministers,” says Miche¬ let, “ might change of die ; he, always the same, went through his duties, ceremonies, royal fetes, and the like with the regularity of the sun which he had chosen as his emblem.” He had marked out for himself a path, and in the full belief that he was acting for the best interests of his country, had steadfastly pursued it. His scheme of government 1715] The End. 435 was an impracticable one for the France of the eighteenth century, and the universal gladness which welcomed the Regency showed that men recognised that absolutism was unsuitable for the new age. Louis made himself responsible for all the acts of his government. Though his successors—so unfit to rule—undoubtedly aggravated the existing evils in France, he must share with them the blame for the internal condition of his country during the greater part of the eighteenth century. When he died the principle of royalty had already received uncon¬ sciously a severe blow, and it would have required a very able succession of kings to restore that feeling towards the monarchy which had existed in France till within a few years of Louis’ death. Still it would not have proved an insuperable task for an able and popular sovereign. The doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings remained unquestioned in France, the instinct of royalty was strong among-the French people. The birth of the Duke of Burgundy had been the signal for the wildest rejoicing, and it was evident that the sentiment of loyalty was as yet little weakened. In spite of the disasters of the Spanish Succession war, and in spite of the King’s age and the desire of the mass of the nation for a change, the reverence for the kingly office existed with almost unabated force. Louis died convinced of the value of religion, and fully conscious of the sacred character and solemn responsibilities of royalty. THE END. INDEX. A Alberoni, 27g, 367, 406, 418 Alexander VIII., 306 Algiers, 232, 235 Almanza, battle of, 373, 391, 407, 417 Alsace, 7, 29, 30, 192, 197, 198, 204, 205, 227, 285 Amelot, 350, 355 . 365. 366, 369. 370, 373 . 380, 384. 393 . 402 Amsterdam, 28, 227 Anjou, Duke of, 19, 27, too, 323, 335 , 337 , 338, 340 : Philip V., 2, 346, 347 , 349 , 350, 3^6, 368 Anne of Austria, 8, ii, 14, 17, 22, 25, 27, 34, 43, 44, 46, 56, 58, 71-73, 82, 113, 115, 117, 118, 146 Anne of Gonzaga, 42 Anne, Queen of England, 276, 397 , 403 Antoine de Bordeaux, 63 Antwerp, 28 Areillen, conference of, 216 Armada, the Spanish, 267 Artagnan, 385, 388 Assembly of Notables, 10 Assiento, the, 395, 401 Augsburg, League of, 137, 208, 220, 251, 255, 267, 286, 306, 310 Aurungzib, 127, 434 Austrian Succession War, the, 264 Avaux, Count of, 18, 272 Avignon, 316 B Bailleul, 18 Barbary States, 224 Barbezieux, 270, 281, 334, 358 Barcelona, 26, 285, 370, 371, 374, 410 Barillon, 12, 208 Barrier, the Dutch, 283, 347, 388, 402, 424 Bastille, the, 49 Bavaria, province of, 29, 133 ; Elector of, 29, i6g, 184, 215, 216, 220, 254, 255, 259, 315, 324, 326, 353, 361-365, 399 , 400, 402 Beachy Head, battle of, 273, 275 Beaufort, Duke of, 13, 14, 16, 3L 51, 52, 65 Beauvilliers, 329, 335, 341, 377, 390 Ben Aicha, 313, 317 Berry, Duke of, 298, 328, 340, 346, 389, 403 Benvick, Duke of, 359, 372, 410 Blecourt, 336, 384, 385 Bleneau, battle of, 48 Blenheim, battle of, 25, 365 Bolingbroke, 83, 417, 425 Bontemps, 301 Bordeaux, 42, 48, 54 Bossuet, 86, 89, 93, 287, 305-307, 424 Boufflers, Marshal, 215, 261, 359, 360, 374. 375 Bouvines, battle of, 97, 228 Boyne, battle of, 274, 275 437 Index. 438 Brandenburg, the great Elector of, 146, 153, 168, 170, 173, 180, 184, 1S5, 206, 207, 211, 215, 216, 220, 221, 227, 244, 252, 262; Frederick III. of, 262 Bressac, Madame de, 18 Brienne, the elder, 18, 19 ; the younger, loi, 103 Brihuega, battle of, 192 Brittany, province of, 16 ; Duke of, 408 Broussel, 35, 52, 63 Burgundy, Duchy of, 15, 41, 53 ; Duke of, 282, 298, ,307, 308, 340, 341, 346, 364, 390, 398, 407, 408, 431; Duchess of, 407, 408, 435 C Canada, 128, 269 Candia, 224 Casale, 52, 215, 232, 279, 282 Cassano, battle of, 366 Cassel, 26 ; battle of, 189, 190 Castel Rodrigo, 148, 149, 151, 156, 157, 160 Catalonia, 26, 28, 52, 54, 318, 371, 380, 410 Catinat, 84, 215, 269, 279, 283, 359 , 361 Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, 305 Cevennes, the, 365, 375, 418, 419 Chabot-Rohan, 51, 52 Chambord, 233 Chamillard, 84, 100, 358, 359, 377 , 378, 424 Chamlay, 276, 359 Champagne, 15, 18, 34, 47, 54, 55, 63, 312 Charles, Archduke, 318,321, 322, 325, 326, 330, 336, 338-340, 353, 365, 368, 371, 372; Charles VI., Emperor, 392, 394, 410, 416 Charles the Great, 23, 58, 99 Charles I., 8, 30, 35, 38, 194 Charles II. (of England), 47, 51, 67, 113, 122, 139, 142, 146, 162, 167, 168, 181, 189, 208, 209, 211, 218, 219, 227, 260, 268 Charles II. (of Spain), 137-140, 159, 317, 322, 326, 327, 330, 333, 336, 342, 368 Charles III. (of Spain), 418, 433 Charles V., Emperor, 224, 320, 332, 339 Charles VIII., 261 Charles X. (of Sweden), 74 Charles XI. (of Sweden), 220, 254 Charles XII. (of Sweden), 375 Chatenay, 298 Chateauneuf, 35, 51, 247 Chatillon, Duchess of, 51 Chavigny, 35, 50 Chevalier de Chaumont, 239, 240 Chevreuse, Duchess of, 14, 16, 31, 117 Chiny, the county of, 209, 217 Choisy, the Abbe, 114, 229 Christina of Sweden, 65 Clagny, 298, 299 Clement IX., 420 Clement XL, 375, 376, 420 Coalition, the, of 1673, i8i ; of 1793, 417 _ Code of Louis XIV., 99 Colbert, 84, 92, 97, 100, 107, 113-119, 123-131, 134, 137, 143, 158, 160, 195, 231, 232, 233, 237, 245, 246, 250, 283, 292, 293, 369, 342 Colbert de Croissy, 225 Cologne, the Elector of, 220, 227, 257, 258, 262, 284, 402 Compiegne, 24, 39, 50 Conde, Henry, 9, 15, 16, 20, 26 Conde, the great, 14, 21, 25, 26, 27, 30, 34 , 36, 37 , 38, 40-44, 47-50, 53, 56-58, 64, 65, 96, 108, 113, 115, 154, 155, 157, 172, 178, 183, 186, 187, 269, 311, 316, 359, 409 Conference of Cologne, 180 Index. 439 Conference at The Hague (1709), . 381 Constantinople, 224 Convention of Milan, 374, 376, 379 . Corneille, 97 Courland, 223 Courtin, 168 Coventry, Lord, 168 Crequi, g8, 140, 226 ; the affairs of, 304 Cromwell, Oliver, 47, 53, 64-67, 71, 268 D Danby, 190 Danton, 233 Danube, upper valley of, 361- 365 Daubenton, 369 Dauphin, the, 206, 214, 258, 319, 321, 324, 331, 335, 389, 408 Declaration of 1652, 243 Denain, 64 ; battle of, 395, 396, 410, 417 D’Estrees, Abbe, 354, 355 ; Car¬ dinal, 353 Descartes, 97 Desfargues, 241 Desmaret, 378, 390 Despacho, the, 351, 353, 369 Deux-ponts, Duchy of, 220, 222, 254 Devolution War, 135, 138, 145, 164, 165 DeWitt, John, 143, 144, 156, 157, 169, 174. Diet, the Imperial, 153, 208 Dohna, Count, 157 Don John of Austria, 64, 159, 319 Duttlingen, battle of, 21 E Edict of Nantes, 5, 166 ; revoca¬ tion of, 89, 137, 166, 238, 241- 244, 252, 254, 262, 267, 287, 302, 306, 310,419, 423, 424 Egypt, 170, 224 Electoral Prince, the, 322-324 Elizabeth Farnese, 403, 406 Emery, 21, 24 Empire, the, 28, 30 Esthonia, 223 Etampes, battle of, 48 Eugene, Prince, 279, 374, 385, 395 , 396 Exclusion Bill, the, 208 F Fehrbellin, battle of, 184 Fenelon, 89, 304, 307, 308, 408, 418 Ferdinand III. (Emperor), 29, 30, 57 , 67 Fleury, 90 Fleurus, 280, 281 Fontainebleau, 112, 114-116, 233, 333 , 334 Fouquet, Nicholas, 54, 103-124, 142 Francis I., 23, 166, 222, 223, 239 Franche Comte, 132, 154, 155 ; conquest of, 181-183 Frederick the Great, 281 Fribourg, battle of, 21, 217, 284 Friedlingen, battle of, 361 Fronde, the old, 8-37 ; the new, 39-51 ; in the provinces, 52.^., 121 Fiirstenburg, Francis Egon, Bishop of Strasburg, 211, 214, 257, 262 ; Archbishop of Co¬ logne, 57 G Gassion, 14, 27 Gaston of Orleans, 65 Genoa, 227, 232, 235 Gertruydenberg, negotiations at, 390, 39L4I2, 413 George II., 105 George IIP, 4, 97, 105, 250 Gibraltar, 265, 266 Grand Alliance, the, 347, 348, 388. 417 Grand Trianon, 296 440 Index. Gremonville, 97, 152, 175 Guienne, 41, 48, 53 Giii Patin, 5, 12 Gustavus Adolphus, 7, 269 Guzon, Madame de, 307, 308 H Hague, preliminaries of, 381, 412 Hanover formed into an electo¬ rate, 402 Harlay, Archbishop of Paris, 307 Harley, 395 Harcourt, the general, 47, 48 ; the diplomatist, 319, 320, 324, 330, 352 Henrietta Maria, 45, 51, 76 Henrietta of Orleans, 76, 167, 169 Henry II. of England, 343 Henry H. of France, 223 Henry HI. of France, 346 Henry IV. of France, 7, 14, 23, 88, 95, 244, 421 Heinsiiis, 323, 324 Hesse Cassel, 216, 220, 254, 262 Hochstadt, battle of, 364 Hoines, Admiral, 169 I Infanta Margaret, the, 139 Innocent XL, 254, 257, 263, 305 Innocent XII., 312, 328 Intendant, 34, 43, 44 Ireland, 271-275 J Jacobins, the, 53, 427 James II., 167, 189, 218, 219, 254-256, 260, 267, 269, 271- 274, 276-278, 300, 348, 432 James Edward, 376, 389, 432 Jankowitz, battle of, 48 Jansenists, 88, 89, 93, 109, 122, 4I9-42I Jargeau, battle of, 48 Java, 256 Jesuits, the, 308, 419-421 John George HI. of Saxony, 216, 220, 254 Joseph I. (Emperor), 364, 365, 392, 401, 402, 413 Jus Devolutionis, 139, 140, 141 ; war of, 146 ff. Justinian, 422, 430 K Kehl, 228 L La Ferte, Marshal, 58, 64 La Fontaine, 121 La Hogue, battle of, 136, 276, 277 Lansac, Madame de, 12, 18 La Porte, ig, 22, 33 La Vieuville, 54 La Vrilliere, 18, 105 Lens, battle of, 35, 40 Leopold, Archduke, 58 ; Em¬ peror, 67, 145, 153, 159, 160, 181, igi, 207, 209, 216, 220, 226, 242, 251, 255, 263, 322, 324, 330, 336, 348 Le Peletier, 309-3 ii Lerida, 26, 27 Le Tellier, Secretary of State, 18, 87,100, loi, 104, 105, 109, III, 117, iig ; Chancellor, 247 Le Tellier, Louis’ confessor, 4ii,_ 419, 433 Limerick, capitulation of, 274 Lionne, 71, 87, 97, loi, 104, 105, no, 119, 143, 148, 158, 160, 168, 231 Lit de Justice, 12, 22, 24, 51, . 53 , 59 Livonia, 223 Longueville, Duchess of, 17, 31, 41 _ Lorraine, Duke of, 4, 47, 57, I13, 182, 183, 284, 285, 325, 327, 328, 337 Index. 441 Louis of Baden, 269, 364 Louis XIIL, 269, 364 Louis XIV., his youth, 'iff; his first experiences in war and politics, 45 ff; his overthrow of Fouquet, \o'iff; his foreign policy, 131 ff; the war of Devolution, 146 ff; the war of 1672, 162 ff; his rihtnions, 194 ; revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 230 ff; his war against Europe, 253 ff; his life at Versailles, 286 ff; the Spanish Succession question, 315 ff; the war of the Spanish Succes¬ sion, 329 ff; reflexions on his policy, 413 ff; his death, 433 ; character of his government, 82 ff ; 288-292, 427, 431 Louis XV., 3, II, 41 Louis XVL, 3, 42 Louise of Savoy, Queen of Spain, 352, 355 , 403 Louville, 352, 354 Louvois, 84, 99, 134, 148, 154, 158, 165, 167, 170, 171, 173, 176-178, 189, 198, 202, 212, 231, 246, 260, 265, 270, 271, 281, 288, 292, 296, 300, 342, 359 I.ulli, 113, 302 Luxemburg, the Duchy of, 4, 209, 215, 217, 218 ; town of, 215, 217-219, 232, 283, 285 ; Duke of, 183, 187, 189, 269, 281, 282 ; war of, 226-228 M Madagascar, 237 Mademoiselle, La Grande, 37, 49 . 51 Maine, Duke of, 296, 298, 377, 411 ; Duchess of, 297 Mainz, capture of, 278 Maintenon, Madame de, 76, 84, 100, 245, 247-249, 299-308, 333 , 335 , 358, 376. 378, 379 , 389, 390, 401, 402, 404, 407, 409, 421, 422, 426 Malplaquet, battle of, 383, 385- 387 _ Mancini, Madame, 65 ; Marie, 62, 70-73, 296; Olympe, 61, 62, 65 Man with the Iron Mask, the, 94, 102 tiote Marie Therese, Queen of France, 71, 72, 76, 113, 115, 214 Marlborough, 276, 359, 365, 385-387, 413 Marly, 128, 296-298, 407, 431 Martin, 237 Marsaglia, battle of, 279 Marsin, 84, 352, 364, 366, 372 Mary Beatrice, Queen of Eng¬ land, 271, 431 Massillon, 426 Mazarin, 9-82, 85, 87-90, 96- 98, 100, loi, 103, 104, 106, 109, 115-117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 132, 133, 135, 140, 141, 165, 166, 169, 172, 243, 268, 274,_ 289, 308, 314, 373, 378 Mazarinades, 37 Medina Cell, Duke of, 391 Meilleraye, de la, 23, 34, 42 Mergentheim, battle of, 21 Mercy, 21, 22 Milan, convention of, 374 Mohaez, battle of, 225 Mole, 32 Moliere, 97 Montecuculi, 185-187 Montelar, 203, 205 Montespan, Madame de, 168, 193, 297, 422 Montpensier, Mademoiselle de, 73 Muley Ismael, 317 Munster, Bishop of, 145, 146, 191, 216, 220 N Namur, 281-283 Naples, 26, 331, 337 Napoleon I., 2, 37, 170, 172, 344, 361, 363, 396, 400 Neerwenden, battle of, 282 442 Index. Netherlands, the Spanish, 4, 27, 28, 137, 138, 140, 143, 164, 165, 228, 283, 317, 326, 348, 353 , 416 Nobles, the French, g, 38, 288- 290, 410 Nordlingen, battle of, 21, 22, 25 North, Lord, 105 O Omer Talon, 46 Orleans, Gaston of, 7-9, 12, 18, 20, 27, 35, 37, 42-44, 46, 48 ; Philip, Duke of, 189, 190,214, 220, 237, 257 ; Philip (Regent), 355 , 358, 372, 390, 398, 405, 408-411, 419 ; Duchess of, 214, 257, 261, 263, 284, 299, 341 Ormee, the, 54 Orri, 402 Oudenarde, battle of, 5, 227 P Palais Royal, the, ig, 24, 35, 37, 39 , 43 , 56 Palatinate, the first devastation of, 185 ; the second devasta¬ tion of, 137, 263-266, 300, 423 Par lenient of Paris, the, 11-51,' 78, 91, 94, 95, 118, 122, 331, 421, 427, 428, 430 Pellisson, 114, 117 Perefixe, 19, 22, 23, 83 Pere la Chaise, 238, 245, 300, 419 Pere Nithard, 146 Perpetual Edict, the, 175 Philip Augustus, 97 Philip IV., 71, 140, 145 Philip V., vide Anjou, Duke of Philipsburg, 215, 260, 261, 284, 423 Picardy, tenant-right in, 312 Pinerolo, 282 Pomponne, 168, 170, 176, 358 Pondicherry, 237 Pontchartrain, 270, 311, 334, 358, 377 , 390 Port Royal, 89, 420 Portland, Duke of, 322, 323 Provence, invasion of, 374 Q Quadruple Alliance of 1666, the, 146 Quesnel’s Reflexions, 420 Quietists, the, 89 R Racine, 76 Ragotsky, George, 21 Ramillies, battle of, 371, 372 Ratisbon, truce of, 215-231, 254- 256, 258, 260, 316, 423 Renunciations of Philip V., 394, 395 , 398 Resolution (Whig) of 1707, 374, 417 Rethel, battle of, 41, 42, 79 Retz, Cardinal de, 31, 35, 36, 42-44, 50, 51, 53, 65, 96, 109, 122 Reunions, the, 68, 197, 199, 201, 204, 206, 208, 217, 254, 423 Revolution, the English, 134, 261, 266 Revolution, the French, 23, 43, 289 Rhine, League of the, 67, 68, 72, 139 Rhine, passage of, the, 172-174 ; the Upper, 255 Richelieu, Cardinal, 7-11, 13- 19, 25, 32-34, 39. 52, 55 , 68, 90-92, 96, 97, 109, 121, 123, 133, 135, 137, 143. 144, 162, 165, 166, 288, 308, 342, 373 Richelieu, Marshal of, 90 Ripperdas, 418 Rocroi, battle of, 13, 14, 25, 40 Rooke, Admiral, 277 Russell, Admiral, 276 Russia, 220, 280 Ruyter, de, igo I Index. 443 s Saint-Cyr, 301-304, 433 Saint-Germain, 7, 8, ii, 36, 37, 43, 50, 234 Saint-Gothard, battle of, 140, 224 Saint-Ruth, 274 Saint-Simon, 83, 280, 296, 337, 353 , 355 , 367 Salankemen, battle of, 225 Sarsfield, 274 Savoy, Duke of, 4, 220, 251, 255, 279, 282, 283, 316, 325-327, 331, 335 , 363, 365, 374 Schomberg, 188, 227 Seignelay, 136, 270-273 Senecey, Madame de, 18 Senef, battle of, 184, 316 Servien, 54, 97 Sevigne, Madame de, 5 Seguier, g, 15, 35, 59, 104, 105, no, 118 Shaftesbury, 208 Siam, 127, 235-241 Sicily, 326, 331, 337 Sobieski, John, 185 Spain, decline of, 320 ; govern¬ ment of, 342, 343 Spanish Succession question, the, I, 4, 285, 315# Spanish Succession War, the, 23, 279, 312, 318, 329/'-. 409, 410, 425 Staffarda, battle of, 279, 281 States-General, of France, 10, II, 31, 44, go, 95, 427 Strasburg, 2, 196-215, 217, 219, 220, 228, 230, 284, 285 T Tallard, 84, 323, 324, 326, 329- 334 , 347 , 362-365 Temple, Sir William, 128, 157 Tesse, 359, 360, 365, 374, 385, 386 Toekeli, 220 Torey, 333 - 335 , 358, 377, 383, 385, 403, 413 Torrington, Admiral, 273 Torstenson, 2I Toulouse, Count of, 298, 411 Treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle, no, 162-164, 167, 315,412 ; Baden, 402; Bale, 57 ; Breda, 157, 276 ; Carlowitz, 324 ; Copen¬ hagen, 74 ; Dover (secret) l6o, i6g ; Munster (Jan., 1648), 28, 134, 144, 153, 164 ; Nime- guen, 86, 163, 183, 191-194, 196, 202, 208, 231, 245, 255, 260, 264, 309, 318, 319, 345, 412, 423 ; Oliva, 74 ; Baris (1662), 143: Partition (i668), 138, 153, 158; Partition (1698), 323, 324, 329 ; Partition (1700), 327, 328, 330-337, 345 : Pyre¬ nees, 9, 73 - 75 , 77 , 97 , ii 3 . 122, 171, 283, 412 ; Rastadt, 401, 402 ; Roskeld, 74 ; Rueil, 38 ; Ryswick, 127, 225, 283- 285, 315-319, 322, 330, 345 , 348, 412, 424 ; St. Germain- en-laye, igi, 206; Ulm, 28; Utrecht, 267, 269, 327, 344, 399, 400, 401,405, 406,410- 413 ; Westminster, 63, 67 ; Westphalia, 9, 29, 36, 65, 67, 180, 197, 198, 201, 208, 225, 287, 345, 411 ; Zurawna, 186 Triple Alliance of 1668, 156, 157, 159-161, 163, 168 Turenne, 21, 25, 29, 31, 37, 42, 48, 49 , 51, 52, 55 , 56, 58, 61, 64, 66, 70, 80, 97, 99, 100, io8, 114, 122, 147-158, 171- 173, 177, 178, 180, i8i, 183, 184-187, 231, 264, 269, 359- 361, 363, 423 Turin, battle of, 372 Turkey, 133, 135, 216-219, 221- 224, 227, 242, 251, 256, 263 Turkheim, battle of, 185 Tuscan Ports, the, 310, 323, 325, 328 U Unigenitus Bull, 89, 420, 421 Ursins, Princesse des, 352-354, 358, 359, 379. 380, 381, 383, 385, 403, 404 444 Index. V Valliere, Louise de la, 112, 118, 153, 296, 422 Vauban, 100, 128, 148, 149, 151, 152, 172, 180, 182, 183, 189, 194, 216, 231, 246, 269, 281, 284, 317, 418 Vaudois, the, 251, 252 Vendonie, Duke of, 54, 359, 363, 366 Venice, 220, 224 Versailles, 114, 128, 232-235, 237, 281, 282, 287-296 Vienna, siege of, 'zuff. Villars, 4,64, 265, 284, 359, 360- 365. 372. 375 , 379. 382, 383, 385-387, 395-397, 401, 409, 410, 413, 418, 425 Vigo Bay, battle of, 353 Vincennes, 35, 41, 51, TI4 Vincent de Paul, 62 Villeroi, the elder, 19, 22, 24, 37, 83; Marshal, 269, 360, 361, 411, 425 Villa Viciosa battle of, 392, 393 W Wallenstein, 269 William of Orange, 64, 175, 178, 187, 189, 190, 208, 209, 218, 219, 221, 254, 260, 261, 263, 266, 267, 270, 276, 281-284, 285, 315, 322, 323, 326, 327, 330, 336, 347-349 Withers, 286 Wrangel, 29 Y York, Duke of, 103 ; vide James II. Z Zenta, battle of, 225 Zusmarshausen, battle of, 29 Iberoes of the IFlations. EDITED BY EVELYN ABBOTT, M.A., Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. A Series of biographical studies of the lives and work of a number of representative historical characters about whom have gathered the great traditions of the Nations to which they belonged, and who have been accepted, in many instances, as types of the several National ideals. With the life of each typical character will be presented a picture of the National conditions surrounding him during his career. The narratives are the work of writers who are recog¬ nized authorities on their several subjects, and, while thoroughly trustworthy as history, will present picturesque and dramatic “stories ” of the Men and of the events con¬ nected with them. To the Life of each “Hero’’will be given one duo¬ decimo volume, handsomely printed in large type, pro¬ vided with maps and adequately illustrated according to the special requirements of the several subjects. 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