Juiltrial ^rttlment 
 
 of iinternational StapidES 
 
 No. 0 
 
 ©Ijf Work of tk? i^aguo (Court 
 
 By N. 3fnlitt0 
 
 Professor of Law, University of Paris 
 
 NOVEMBER, 1911 o 
 
 > 
 
 Published Quarterly by American Society for Judicial Settlement 
 of International Disputes. 
 
 iPaltimare, M. g>. A. 
 
 Eutered as seco: 
 the Postofflce at 
 Julj 16, 1S94. 
 
 rch 21, 1910, at 
 tder the Act of 
 
Work of tijr Olourt 
 
 By N. 
 
 Professor of Law, University of Paris 
 (Translated) 
 
 I 
 
 Three years ago M, Leon Bourgeois closed 
 a most eloquent discourse by saying that the 
 delegates of the Nations at the Second Hague 
 Peace Conference had, in the course of its 
 memorable sittings, “heard the first heart- 
 beats of humanity, very faint as yet, but 
 already quite regular and distinct.” 
 
 That was an admirable metaphor with which 
 to indicate that — compared with society as 
 organized within the state — the society of 
 nations is still, so to speak, in embryo. Its 
 organization, scarcely outlined as yet, is devel- 
 oping bit by bit under our eyes. It already 
 has certain laws ; but these laws are most 
 
 3 
 
incomplete, and the governments are seeking, 
 with increasing regularity and growing activ- 
 ity, to fill numerous gaps. It likewise has a 
 system of justice; but if it is no longer quite 
 private justice neither is it as yet true public 
 justice. It is an intermediary system, a sort 
 of make-believe which all human societies have 
 practised before possessing permanent tri- 
 bunals; its name is arbitral justice. 
 
 This system of justice is of ancient origin. 
 In 1899 the Nations sought to improve it by 
 creating at The Hague an institution termed 
 the Permanent Court of Arbitration. This was 
 the great innovation made by the First Peace 
 Conference. But we must not be deceived by 
 terms. Like the old Holy Roman Empire, the 
 Hague Court by no means merits its title ; it 
 has no permanence and does not present any 
 cf the essential characteristics of a true court 
 of justice. 
 
 That which one really finds at The Hague is 
 simply a place where justice may be dispensed 
 when the Nations are minded to send any 
 judges there. Its locus is a modest house at 
 the edge of a quiet canal, with an audience 
 
 4 
 
room so small that when counsel are numerous 
 the arbitrators are compelled to seek the hos- 
 pitality of the government of the Netherlands. 
 Thanks to the generosity of Mr. Carnegie the 
 Court of Arbitration will soon have an ade- 
 quate locus in the form of a superb marble 
 palace. 
 
 Although we do not find judges resident at 
 The Hague, we find there the means for pro- 
 curing them. There exists at the locus of the 
 Court a long list on which the Nations have 
 each placed at most the names of four men 
 designated by them members of the Court. 
 These men are chosen from among the most 
 honorable and distinguished persons who are 
 disposed to accept the duties of an arbitrator 
 when a case for arbitration arises. The list is 
 designed to facilitate the selection of arbitra- 
 tors by the governments concerned, although 
 their choice is not limited to it. 
 
 At first public opinion was very skeptical as 
 to the future of this institution, so timid and 
 poor did it appear. The authors of it alone 
 manifested any confidence in it. They felt 
 certain that, once installed, the Court would 
 soon be burdened with cases. 
 
 S 
 
Nevertheless after the Court was inaugu- 
 rated it waited three years in vain for a case. 
 
 Its first case came to it from the New World. 
 The United States and Mexico brought before 
 it a money dispute of long standing. And its 
 first decision was finally rendered October 14, 
 1902. 
 
 A beginning had been made. The example 
 was soon followed. Close upon each other’s 
 heels, from 1902 to 1904, in connection with 
 four cases of different nature, twelve Nations 
 came to The Hague to choose their judges. 
 
 But this ardor did not last. In 1905 the 
 Court rose not to sit again for four long years. 
 Then in 1909 it renewed its activity and in 
 twenty months it succeeded in doubling the 
 number of decisions rendered. Seven States, 
 all former pleaders in the first period of its 
 activity — “old offenders” — came to ask the 
 Court to solve for them five different questions. 
 
 II 
 
 Thus the Hague Court has to its credit 
 achievements sufficiently important. In the 
 course of ten years it has been active enough 
 
 6 
 
for us to note its advantages and its defects. 
 But the problem is not simple, and we run the 
 risk of pronouncing a hasty judgment unless 
 we are careful to examine all sides of it. 
 Remarking only the number of cases brought 
 before the Court, the nature of them, and the 
 value of the decisions, we are tempted to 
 declare that the services rendered by the 
 Hague Court are rather mediocre. One notes 
 that the great majority of arbitrations do not, 
 as yet, really come to The Hague. During 
 these ten years of its existence and despite its 
 exceptional activity in the last few months, the 
 Court has attracted to itself hardly one-sixth 
 of the arbitrations which have taken place. 
 
 We must of course remember the difficulties 
 inherent in starting every new institution. 
 We cannot change, in a day, habits practised 
 for generations. As the Hague Court becomes 
 better known and as its work inspires more 
 confidence, it will be more resorted to. There 
 is already discoverable a movement which 
 augurs well for the future : the activities of the 
 Court, renewed in igog and pursued through 
 igio and igii, are about to be continued by 
 the cases which Russia and Turkey, Italy and 
 
 7 
 
Peru have already resolved to submit to it, 
 and by other arbitrations which are actually 
 projected. 
 
 But even from the standpoint of their im- 
 portance, the cases brought before the Hague 
 Court do merit attention. True, the reference 
 of some of them to arbitration was not based 
 upon a crying necessity. The question be- 
 tween the United States and Mexico of the 
 Pious Funds of the Californias was taken out 
 of its pigeon-hole simply to enable the Hague 
 Court to start. Similarly the Boutres of 
 Muscat became a subject of arbitration owing 
 merely to the desire of the States concerned to 
 give practical application to their treaty of 
 arbitration of 1903. Finally the recent Savarkar 
 affair was submitted to the Hague Court for 
 the purpose less of terminating a deadlock 
 between two governments than of satisfying 
 the susceptibilities of certain journals. 
 
 In other cases which have come before it 
 the Hague Court has, however, rendered real 
 service. By means of the Court it was possible 
 to arrive at a peaceful and honorable settle- 
 ment of controversies, the solution of which 
 
 8 
 
could not have been attained by direct nego- 
 tiation. 
 
 True, the solution offered by the Court has 
 not always been what it should have been. In 
 order to estimate properly the value of its 
 awards we must keep in mind the two principal 
 functions of arbitration. Arbitration is, or 
 rather aims to be, a judicial process by which 
 States may have the law defined in disputes of 
 a justiciable nature, though it still preserves 
 its historic office as a diplomatic process, per- 
 mitting States, in the event of political conflicts 
 where their dignity appears to prevent volun- 
 tary compromise, to accept a compromise 
 which an arbitrator imposes upon them in the 
 name of the superior principle of justice. In 
 such a case, it is true, the cause of peace gains 
 more than the cause of law; but law would 
 lose still more if peace were not preserved. 
 And then, homage to justice is never sterile. 
 While awaiting the coming of its proper sway, 
 justice is offering an ever broader shelter to 
 diplomatic concessions. 
 
 According as arbitration fulfills one or the 
 other of its functions, the role of the arbitrator 
 differs and the significance of the award varies. 
 
 9 
 
The %*alue of arbitration as an instrument of 
 law depends above all on the award because it 
 determines legality. The arbitrator ought to 
 be made to feel that peace does not depend 
 upon his decision. He may, and legally he 
 should, say without ulterior motive “let justice 
 be done he should fix his attention less on 
 the adjustment of difficulties than on the prac- 
 tical application of the law. 
 
 As an instrument of peace, on the other 
 hand, arbitration has value by virtue of its very 
 spirit, i. e. because of the pacific intention of 
 the States that employ it. In serious contro- 
 versies, involving national pride, arbitration 
 has a calming effect. That effect results from 
 compromise. The moment an agreement to 
 resort to arbitration is reached, discussions 
 become useless and recriminations lose their 
 object. Moreover, the award is then only of 
 secondary interest. So much so that what one 
 expects from it is simply to confirm the desire 
 for peace which is already manifested by the 
 “compromis” or conditions of the arbitration. 
 The arbitrator should concern himself with 
 justifying the confidence reposed in him by 
 the parties to the controversy, with rounding 
 
 10 
 
the angles and with couching his award in 
 prudent language which will not offend the 
 susceptibilities of either party. 
 
 Each of these offices of arbitration has its 
 own domain, that of justice being limited to 
 controversies of a juridical character, that of 
 peace to controversies of a political character. 
 This distinction is important because, if it 
 leaves its proper domain, each runs the risk of 
 failing in the effect which one has a right to 
 expect of it. To employ pacific arbitration in 
 legal controversies is to interpret falsely the 
 conception of justice. To resort to judicial 
 arbitration in political controversies is to en- 
 danger the maintenance of peace. 
 
 This distinction recommends itself to our 
 judgment because of still another considera- 
 tion: namely, the more the distinction is ob- 
 served the better will we succeed in encour- 
 aging resort to arbitration in political conflicts. 
 It is commonly remarked that arbitration is 
 not susceptible of indefinite extension, that it 
 has its necessary limitations, that political 
 questions are outside of its domain because 
 arbitration, being by definition the adjustment 
 of controversies “on the basis of respect for 
 
law” (Convention of 1907 for the Pacific Regu- 
 lation of International Controversies, art. 37), 
 it cannot be applied to disputes for the solution 
 of which law fails to supply any rules, and that 
 the progress of arbitration must therefore be 
 subordinated to that of law. This thesis is 
 perhaps contestable in theory because there 
 are practically no political questions which 
 may not be translated into questions of law. 
 It is none the less true that as a doctrine it 
 carries weight and in actual practice influences 
 the nature of treaties in which we find obliga- 
 tory arbitration ordinarily confined to very 
 narrow limits. If this be so, it is because in 
 speaking of arbitration one thinks above all 
 about its judicial function. But if we examine 
 its pacific function in which the rigidity of law 
 is less governing and the role of arbitrator be- 
 comes more flexible, the aspect of the question 
 is changed and arbitration appears susceptible 
 of an indefinite extension. Therefore to dis- 
 tinguish between its two functions tends to 
 promote its growth. The conclusion of treaties 
 of obligatory arbitration without reservations 
 is rendered easier because the difficulties which 
 may arise in carrying out such agreements are 
 
 13 
 
caused to disappear in advance. Of course 
 there remains the necessity of separating po- 
 litical questions from juridical questions, and 
 this is not an easy task. Men have occasion- 
 ally asserted that it was an impossible task, 
 and consequently that obligatory arbitration, 
 if limited to juridical questions, was impracti- 
 cal, because, in default of the ability to define 
 what constitutes a juridical question, it is al- 
 ways possible to escape the obligation to resort 
 to arbitration by setting up as an excuse the 
 political character of the controversy. This 
 objection falls if it be understood that the 
 nature of the controversy shall affect only the 
 form of the arbitration without at any time 
 wholly excluding the arbitration. As to the 
 problem of determining the nature of the con- 
 troversy, it would seem that it is a question of 
 attitude of mind rather than a question of 
 kind. In short, that which signifies is less the 
 intrinsic character of the dispute than the com- 
 plexion the dispute takes on by reason of the 
 States which are parties to it, and of the whole 
 circumstances which have brought it up. A 
 controversy plainly juridical may degenerate 
 into a political controversy the moment na- 
 
tional honor becomes involved. The deser- 
 tions at Casablanca constitute a striking case 
 in point. Reciprocally, a question of influence 
 and domination may be made to turn upon a 
 question of law which will be found included 
 in it if peaceful intentions on the part of the 
 States concerned incline them to deprive the 
 dispute of its political character. This is what 
 happened in the Boutres of Muscat case. 
 
 Ill 
 
 But in order that arbitration be effectively 
 employed, according to circumstances, in its 
 several ways, it is not sufficient simply to dis- 
 tinguish the offices it performs, nor to define 
 merely its domain and its logical effects. We 
 must go further and separate them in a some- 
 what material fashion, giving to each its dis- 
 tinct organ. Just here appears the insufficiency 
 of the Hague Court. 
 
 In its practical operation the Hague Court 
 has discovered itself to be rather an adjunct to 
 the chancelleries than a true international tri- 
 bunal. It has been more inclined to the pacific 
 function than to the judicial function. Natur- 
 ally this is the case in connection with matters, 
 
 14 
 
the political side of which is the dominant side, 
 as in the Casablanca arbitration already re- 
 ferred to where the award was a masterpiece 
 of juridical adaptation and diplomatic concilia- 
 tion. But the Court has occasionally acted in 
 the same manner in cases where peace was not 
 threatened and where accordingly the ques- 
 tions of law submitted to the Court should 
 have been approached by it with all the rigor 
 of juridical reasoning. On this score many of 
 its decisions deserve only qualified approval, 
 or are even open to criticism. This is true of 
 the award giving preference to certain credit- 
 ors of Venezuela (February 22, 1904), of the 
 Boutres of Muscat case (August 8, 1905), of 
 the Atlantic Fisheries case, the more especially 
 in connection with the definition of bays (Sep- 
 tember 5, 1910), and of the Savarkar affair 
 (February 24, 1911). 
 
 Such result is due primarily to the way in 
 which the Court is organized. The arbitrators 
 called to sit in each case are the objects of a 
 choice which binds them to the contestants 
 from whom they receive their mandate. Inas- 
 much as they may be diplomats and are some- 
 times nationals of the countries parties to the 
 dispute, they do not bring to the deliberations 
 
 15 
 
o£ the Court— -and have never been suspected 
 of so doing— -the spirit of impartiality and the 
 disposition of the true judge. Being tempor- 
 ary, without connection v/ith those which have 
 preceded and which are to follow them, the tri- 
 bunals called into brief existence at The Hague 
 cannot contribute to the upbuilding of a sys- 
 tematic jurisprudence. 
 
 To remedy this defect, it becomes necessary 
 to proceed to establish the truly permanent 
 Court recommended by the United States. 
 Thanks to the foresight and praiseworthy ac- 
 tivity of American diplomacy we are actually 
 in a fair way to realize this project. And this 
 development is in the natural order of things: 
 in all human society the establishment of a 
 permanent tribunal of public justice has re- 
 sulted from the growth of arbitral justice. It 
 responds today to a real need. The existing 
 Court is specializing more and more in the 
 pacific offices of arbitration, of which it tends 
 to become the true organ in political conflicts. 
 The judicial side of arbitration, on the other 
 hand, awaits its instrument in the field of 
 juridical controversies. When the time is ripe 
 there will appear a truly permanent Court to 
 fill this void. 
 
We may feel certain that its creation will 
 produce considerable changes in international 
 relations, both juridical and political. Among 
 these probable changes there is one which de- 
 serves to be pointed out now for the reason 
 that it will fit in with a tendency which in our 
 day is manifesting itself with growing inten- 
 sity. In various ways one has been impressed 
 lately with the necessity of promoting arbitra- 
 tion in disputes between States and individuals, 
 in freeing it from preliminary diplomatic for- 
 malities which at present impede resort to it. 
 We must do for arbitral justice that which has 
 already been done for the law of prize: give to 
 individuals direct recourse to an international 
 tribunal, just as the Convention of 1907 (art. 
 4, sec. 2 and 3) provides shall be done in con- 
 nection with the International Court of Prize. 
 This step is not possible in connection with 
 the Hague Court as at present organized, 
 its diplomatic character offering a manifest 
 obstacle. It will, on the contrary, be fully 
 realizable in connection with a court truly per- 
 manent which, by its organization and by its 
 judicial spirit, may be expected to meet all the 
 requirements of intemationad justice. 
 
Amrrtrmt ^ori^tu for Suitrial ^rttlrmrnl 
 of Sntrrnational Stsputrs 
 
 The printed proceedings of the Conference 
 of the American Society for Judicial Settle- 
 ment of International Disputes, Washington, 
 December 15-17, 1910, which furnished the 
 occasion for the memorable utterance of Presi- 
 dent William Howard Taft on the subject of 
 an all-inclusive treaty of arbitration, are now 
 ready. 
 
 The collection of addresses will be found of 
 great importance. They throw light on 
 present day problems of an international char- 
 acter, containing most interesting historical 
 reviews of certain aspects of internationalism 
 and a profound study of law and courts which 
 will give the book permanent value. 
 
 The discussion centered largely upon the 
 proposed international court of justice, an idea 
 which has been the hope of leading thinkers 
 of the world for many generations and which 
 
 18 
 
it is confidently believed we are on the eve of 
 realizing. 
 
 The discussions were participated in by 
 such statesmen, educators and men of affairs 
 as; 
 
 President Taft 
 Hon. Simeon E. Baldwin 
 Hon. Richard Bartholdt 
 Justice Henry B. Brown 
 Andrew Carnegie 
 Hon. Joseph H. Choate 
 Hon. Wm. Bourke Cockran 
 Chas. W. Eliot 
 Hon. John W. Foster 
 Hon. Wm. Dudley Foulke 
 The French Ambassador 
 James Cardinal Gibbons 
 Edwin Ginn 
 
 Major-General Frederick D. 
 
 Grant, U. S. A. 
 
 Chas. Noble Gregory 
 Francis W. Hirst 
 David Starr Jordan 
 Frederick N. Judson 
 Harry Pratt Judson 
 Hon. Martin W. Littleton 
 
 Hon. Francis B. Loomis 
 Hon. Henry B. F. Macfarland 
 Frederic D. McKenney 
 The Mexican Ambassador 
 Hon. Andrew J. Montague 
 The Minister of the Nether- 
 lands 
 
 Thomas Nelson Page 
 Jackson H. Ralston 
 Justice William Renwick Rid- 
 dell 
 
 Hon. Elihu Root 
 James Brown Scott 
 Alpheus H. Snow 
 Rear-Admiral Chas. H. Stock- 
 ton 
 
 Hon. Oscar S. Straus 
 Eugene Wambaugh 
 Benjamin Ide Wheeler 
 General Stewart L. Woodford 
 
 They suggest in a comprehensive way the 
 immeasurable direct advantages which would 
 accrue from the establishment of a court, to- 
 gether with certain collateral results such as 
 the upbuilding of international law. Such 
 growth of law would follow as a result of the 
 decisions of the court and as a result further 
 
 19 
 
of the codification of certain spheres of inter- 
 national law which would be Invited by the 
 very existence of such a court. 
 
 The volume will be found useful as a book 
 of reference for those who have occasion to 
 treat this subject in an essay or address at any 
 time. It will be found particularly valuable 
 for students of international questions. 
 
 Price, bound in paper, $i.oo. 
 
 WILLIAMS & WILKINS COMPANY, 
 
 2427 York Road, Baltimore, Md. 
 
Amfrfran &orlrtg fnr 3ubtrial g’fttlfumxl of 
 Sntfmatumal StE)ratfa 
 
 Honorary President, William Howard Taft. 
 
 President, John Hays Hammond, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Vice-President, Simeon E. Baldwin, 
 
 Hartford, Conn. 
 
 Secretary, Theodore Marburg, 
 
 Baltimore, Md. 
 
 Treasurer, J. G. Schmidlapp, 
 
 Cincinnati, Ohio. 
 
 Life membership, $ioo; Sustaining membership, $io a year; 
 Annual membership, fi a year. 
 
 Remit to treasurer, J. G. Schmidlapp, Cincinnati, U.S.A. Address 
 inquiries to secretary, Theodore Marburg, Baltimore, U. S. A. 
 
 The proceedings of the “Judicial Settlement” Conference at 
 Washington, December 15-17, igio, will be printed in English, 
 French, German and Spanish, ^ch member of the Society will 
 be entitled to one copy. Non-members may procure them for 
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 TUNSTALL SMITH, 
 
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 21 
 
Atnrriran ^urtrlQ for ^nDirial @rttlrtnrat of 
 Sntrmational 13iB|mtrB 
 
 Abttfsorg (Samuil 
 Lyuan Abbott, New York. 
 
 Edwin A. Alderman, Virginia. 
 
 James B. Angell, Michigan. 
 
 Simeon E. Baldwin, Connecticut. 
 
 Rickard Bartholdt, Missouri. 
 
 Alexander Graham Bell, Washington, D. C. 
 
 R. L. Borden, Ottawa, Ont. 
 
 Theodore E. Burton, Ohio. 
 
 JoAguiN D. Casasus, Mexico City, Mexico. 
 
 George E. Chamberlain, Oregon. 
 
 Winston Churchill, New Hampshire. 
 
 George B. Cutten, Wolfville, N. S. 
 
 William R. Day, Ohio. 
 
 Jacob M. Dickinson, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Andrew S. Draper, New York. 
 
 Charles W. Eliot, Massachusetts. 
 
 Charles E. Fenner, Louisiana. 
 
 William Dudley Foulke, Indiana. 
 
 James Cardinal Gibbons, Maryland. 
 
 George Gray, Delaware. 
 
 Charles Noble Gregory, Iowa. 
 
 Peter S. Grosscup, Illinois. 
 
 Joseph F. Johnston, Alabama. 
 
 David Starr Jordan, California. 
 
 Harry Pratt Judson, Illinois. 
 
 William H. King, Utah. 
 
 George W. Kirchwey, New York. 
 
 Philander C. Knox, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Charles F. Libby, Maine. 
 
 Francis B. Loomis, Washington, D. C. 
 
 Horace H. Lurton, Tennessee. 
 
 R. McBride, Victoria, B. C. 
 
 Pablo Macedo, Mexico City, Mexico. 
 
 Charles Marcil, Ottawa, Ont. 
 
 22 
 
Publications of the American Society for Judicial 
 Settlement of International Disputes — 
 
 1. The New Era of International Courts, by 
 Simeon E. Baldwin. August, 1910. 
 
 2. The Necessity of a Permanent Tribunal, by 
 Ernest Nys. November, 1910. 
 
 Supplement — The American Society for Judicial 
 Settlement of International Disputes, by James 
 Brown Scott. November, 1910. 
 
 3. The Importance of Judicial Settlement, by Elihu 
 Root. February, 1911. 
 
 4. The Development of the American Doctrine of 
 Jurisdiction of Courts Over States, by Alpheus H. 
 Snow. May, 1911. 
 
 5. An International Court of Justice the Next 
 Step, by George Grafton Wilson. 
 
 Salient Thoughts, by Theodore Marburg. August, 
 1911. 
 
 6. The work of the Hague Court, by N. Politis. 
 November, 1911. 
 
 It is planned to hold this year’s Judicial Settlement 
 Conference at Cinncinnati November Seventh and Eighth. 
 President William Howard Taft and representative men 
 I various parts of the country have consented to be 
 ent and to make addresses. Members of the society 
 others interested in the cause are cordially invited to 
 
 ANNOUNCEMENT. 
 
3 V/ 
 
 ) 
 
 Sidney E. Mezes, Texas. 
 
 S. C. Mitchell, South Carolina. 
 
 Don Romulo S. Na6n, Argentine Republic. 
 Francis G. Newlands, Nevada. 
 
 L. Oppenheim, Cambridge, England. 
 
 Thomas Nelson Page, Washington, D. C. 
 Walter H. Page, New York. 
 
 W. Peterson, Montreal. 
 
 Sir Thomas Raleigh, London, England. 
 Whitelaw Reid, London, England. 
 
 William Renwick Riddell, Toronto, Ont. 
 
 Uriah M. Rose, Arkansas. 
 
 A. C. Rutherford, Edmonton, Alberta. 
 
 Walter Scott, Regina, Saskatchewan. 
 
 Albert Shaw, New York. 
 
 Hoke Smith, Georgia. 
 
 Bishop Robert Strange, North Carolina. 
 
 Sir Charles Hibbert Tupper, Vancouver, B. C. 
 George Turner, Washington. 
 
 Charles R. Van Hise, Wisconsin. 
 
 Benjamin Ide Wheeler, California. 
 
 William Allen White, Kansas. 
 
 George G. Wilson, Rhode Island. 
 
 Prince de Cassano, Italy. 
 
Publications of the American Society for Judicial 
 Settlement of International Disputes — 
 
 1. The New Era of International Courts, by 
 Simeon E. Baldwin. August, 1910. 
 
 2. The Necessity of a Permanent Tribunal, by 
 Ernest Nys. November, 1910. 
 
 Supplement — The American Society for Judicial 
 Settlement of International Disputes, by James 
 Brown Scott. November, 1910. 
 
 3. The Importance of Judicial Settlement, by Elihu 
 Root. February, 1911. 
 
 4. The Development of the American Doctrine of 
 Jurisdiction of Courts Over States, by Alpheus H. 
 Snow. May, 1911. 
 
 5. An International Court of Justice the Next 
 Step, by George Grafton Wilson. 
 
 Salient Thoughts, by Theodore Marburg. August, 
 1911. 
 
niiWa iiniversitv Libraries 
 
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