M 
 
George Washington Flowers 
 Memorial Collection 
 
 DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY 
 
 ESTABLISHED BY THE 
 FAMILY OF 
 
 COLONEL FLOWERS 
 
 
 
T II E OFFICER'S M A N U A L. 
 
 NAPOLP^ON'S 
 
 MAXIMS OF WAR. 
 
 RICHMOND, VA.: 
 VV E ST à J n N S T N 
 1862. 
 
KvANs <fe Cogswell. Printers, 
 No. 3 Broad St.. Chaklksion. S. C. 
 
 \i 
 
 \ 
 
• 
 
 it -2.3 
 
 E E C O M MEND A T I O N 
 
 " After refreshing my memory by looking over 
 again ' Tlie Ofiicer's Manual,' or ' Maxims of Napo- 
 leon,' I think I may safely recommend the republica- 
 tion, in America, of tlie work in English, as likely to 
 be called for by -many officers, regular and volunteer. 
 It contains a circle of maxim«!, deduced from the 
 highest source of military science and experience, 
 with practical illustrations of the principles taken 
 from the most celebrated campaigns of modern times. 
 The study of the book cannot fail to set all young 
 officers on a coursie of inquiry and reflection greatly 
 to their improvement. 
 
 "WINFIKLD SCOTT." 
 
\ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The publisher has reissued this little 
 volume as a publication timely for the 
 occasion. A collection of maxims which 
 directed the military operations of the 
 greatest captain of modern times, cannot 
 fail to prove of great use to such young 
 officers as really desire a knowledge of 
 the art of war. The maxims are illus- 
 trated hy instances drawn from the cam- 
 paigns of Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, 
 Frederick, and jN'apoleon. These great 
 men were all governed by the same 
 principles, and it is by applying these 
 principles to the perusal of their respect- 
 ive campaigns, that ever}^ military man 
 will recognize their wisdom, and make 
 
6 PREFACE. 
 
 such use of them hereafter as his own 
 particular genius shalk point out. 
 
 ''And here, perhaps," says the trans- 
 Lator, CoL D'Aguilar, '' my task might 
 have heen considered finished ; l)ut per- 
 ceiving how ipxcomplete the collection 
 was alone, I have endeavored to supply 
 the deficiency hy having recourse for 
 further illustration to the memoirs of 
 MontecucuUi, and the instructions of 
 Frederick to his generals. The analogy 
 of their principles with those of Napo- 
 leon, has convinced me that the art of 
 war is susceptible of two points of view: 
 one, \^llich relates entirely to the acquire- 
 ments and genius of the general ; the 
 other, which refers to matters of detail. 
 
 " The first is the same in' all ages, and 
 with all nations, whatever he the arms 
 with which they fight. Hence it follows 
 that, in every age, great commanders 
 have heen governed hy the same princi- 
 ples. 
 
PREFACE. 7 
 
 "The business of detail, on the con- 
 trary, is controlled by existing circum- 
 stances. It varies with the character of 
 a people, and the quality of their arms. 
 
 "It is with a view to impress the jus- 
 tice of this remark, that I have sought 
 for facts in difierent periods of history, 
 to illustrate these maxims, and to prove 
 that nothing is problematical in war ; but 
 that faihire and success in military opera- 
 tions depend almost always on the natural 
 genius and science of the chief." 
 
NAPOLEON'S 
 
 MAXIMS OF WAR. 
 
 MAXIM I. 
 
 The frontiers of states are either hirge 
 rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. 
 OF all these obstacles to the march of an 
 army, the most difficult to overcome is 
 the desert ; mountains come next, and 
 broad fivers occupy the third place. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Napoleon, in his military c'areer, appears 
 to have been called upon to surmount every 
 difficult}' which can occur in wars of inva- 
 sion. 
 
 In Egypt he traversed deserts, and van- 
 quished and destroyed the Mamelukes, so 
 celebrated for their address and courage. 
 His genius knew how to accommodate itself 
 to all the dangers of this distant enterprise; 
 
10 napoleon's 
 
 in a country ill adapted to supply the avants 
 of his troops. 
 
 In the conquest of Ital}', he twice crossed 
 the Alps by the most difficult passes, and at 
 a season, too, which rendered this undertak- 
 inir still more formidable. In three months 
 he passed the Pyrenees, defeated and dis- 
 persed four Spanish armies. In short, from 
 the Ehine to the Borysthenes, no natural 
 obstacle could be found to arrest the rapid 
 march of his victorious army. 
 
 MAXIM II. 
 
 Ill forming the plan of a campaign, it 
 is requisite to foresee everytliing the ene- 
 my may do, and to be prepared with the 
 necessary means to counteract it. 
 
 Plans of campaign may be modified 
 ad ùifinitum according to circumstances — 
 the trenius of the oreneral, the character 
 of the troops, and the topography of the 
 theatre of action. 
 
 N o T E . • 
 
 Sometimes we see a hazardous campaign 
 
 succeed, the plan of which is directly at va- 
 
f 
 
 MAXIMS OF WAR. 11 
 
 riance with the priiiciplcs of the art of war. 
 But this success depends generally on the 
 caprice of fortune, or upon faults committed 
 by the enemy — two things upon which a gen- 
 eral must never count. Sometimes the plan 
 of a campaign, although based on sound 
 principles of war, runs the risk of failing at 
 the outset if opposed by an adversary who 
 acts at first on the defensive, and then, sud- 
 denly seizing the initiative, surprises by the 
 skilfulness of his manœuvres. Such was the 
 fate of the plan laid down by the Aulic coun- 
 cil for the campaign of 179G, under the com- 
 mand of Marshal Wurmser. From his great 
 numerical superiority, the marshal had calcu- 
 lated on the entire destruction of the French 
 army, by cutting otf its retreat. He founded 
 his operations on the defensive attitude of 
 his adversary, who was posted on the line 
 of the Adige, and had to cover the siege of 
 Mantua, as well as central and lower Italy. 
 Wurmser, supposing the French army#x- 
 ed in the neighborhood of Mantua, divided 
 his forces into three corps, which marched 
 separately, intending to unite at that place. 
 I^apoleon, having penetrated the design of 
 the Austrian general, perceived the advan- 
 tage to be derived from striking the first 
 
\%, nai'olkon's 
 
 blow Ui^ainat an £11*1113- divided into three 
 corps, witli no conimunicutiQn between tliem. 
 île hastened, therefore, to raise the siege of 
 Mantua, assembled the whole of his forces, 
 and Ity this means became superior to tiie 
 imperialists, whose divisions he attacked and 
 beat in detail. Thus Wurmser, who fancied 
 he had onl}' to march to certain victory, 
 saw himself compelled, after ten days cam- 
 paign, to retire with the remains of his army 
 into the Tyrol, after a loss of twenty-tive 
 thousand men in killed and wounded, fifteen 
 thousand prisoners, nine stand of colors, and 
 seventy pieces of cannon. 
 
 Hence, nothing is so difficult as to pre- 
 scribe beforehand to a general the line of 
 conduct he shall pursue during the course 
 of a campaign. .Success must often depend 
 on circumstances that cannot be foreseen > 
 and it should be remembered, likewise, that 
 nothing cramps so much the efforts of genius 
 as (ijpmpelling the head of an army to be 
 governed by any will but his own. 
 
 MAXIM III. 
 
 An army which undertakes the cou- 
 qiiost of a country, lias its two wings 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 13 
 
 resting either upon neutral territories, or 
 upon great natural obstacles, such as riv- 
 ers or chains of mountains. It happens 
 in some cases that only one wing is so 
 supported ; and in others that both are 
 exposed. 
 
 In the first instance cited, viz,, where 
 both wings are protected, a geiieral has 
 only to protect his front from being pene- 
 trated. In the second, where one wing 
 «nly is supported, he should rest upon 
 the supported wing. In the third, where 
 both wings are exposed, he should depend 
 upon a central formation, and never allow 
 the diiferent corps under his command to 
 depart from this: for if it be difficult to 
 contend w^ith the disadvantac^e of havins: 
 two flanks exposed, the inconvenience is 
 doubled by having four, trebled if there 
 be six — that is to say, if the army is di- 
 vided into two or three different corps. 
 In the first instance, then, as above quot- 
 ed, the line of operation maj^ rest indif- 
 ferently on the right or on the left„ In 
 the second, it should be directed to^mrd 
 the wing in support. In the thira; it 
 2 
 
14 napoleon's 
 
 should be perpendicular to the centre of 
 the army's line of march. But in all 
 these cases it is necessary, at a distance 
 vof every five or six days march, to have 
 a strong post or an entrenched position 
 upon the line of operation, in order to 
 collect military stores and provisions, to 
 organize convoys, to form of it a centre 
 of movement, and establish a ponit of 
 defence to shorten the line of operation 
 of the army. • 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 These general principles in the art of war 
 were entirely unknown, or lost sight of, in 
 the middle ages. The crusaders in their in- 
 cursions into Palestine appear to have had 
 no object but to fight and to conquer, so lit- 
 tle pains did they take to profit by their 
 victories. Hence, innumerable armies per- 
 ished in Syria, without any other advan- 
 taire than that derived from the momen- 
 tar3^ success obtained by superior numbers. 
 
 It wiis by the neglect of these principles, 
 also, that Charles XII, abandoning his line 
 of ^eration and all communication with 
 Sweden, threw himself into the Ukraine, 
 
MAXIMS OP WAR. 15 
 
 find lost the greater part of his army by the 
 fatigue of a winter campaign in a barren 
 country destitute of resources. 
 
 Defeated at Pultawa, lie was obliged to 
 seek refuge in Turkey, after crossing the 
 Nieper with the remains of his army, dimin- 
 ished to little more than one thousand men. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus was the first who 
 brought back the art of war to its'true prin- 
 ciples. His operations in Germany were 
 bold, rapid, and well executed. He made 
 success at all times conducive to future 
 security, and established his line of opera- 
 tion so as to prevent the possibility of any 
 interruption in his communications with 
 Sweden. His campaigns form a new era in 
 the art of war. 
 
 MAXIM lY. 
 
 When the conquest of a conutry is 
 undertaken by two or three armies, 
 wdiich have each their separate line of 
 operation, until they arrive at a point 
 fixed upon for their concentration, it 
 should be laid down as a principle, that 
 
16 napoleon's 
 
 the union of these different corps should 
 never take phice near the enemy ; be- 
 cause the enemy, in uniting his forces, 
 may not onlj/ prevent this junction, but 
 may beat the armies in detaiL 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In the campaign of 1757, Frederick, 
 marching to the conquest of Bohemia with 
 two armies, which had each their separate 
 hne of operation, succeeded, notwithstand- 
 ing, in uniting them in sight of the Duke 
 of Lorraine,, who covered Prague with the 
 imperial army ; hut his example should not 
 be followed. The success of this march 
 depended entirely on the inaction of the 
 duke, who, at the head of seventy thousand 
 men, did nothing to prevent the junction of 
 the two Prussian armies. 
 
 MAXIM V. 
 
 All Tvai-s should be governed by certain 
 principles, for every war should have a 
 definite object, and be conducted accord- 
 ing to the rules of art. (A w^ar should 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 17 
 
 only be undertaken with forces propor- 
 tioned to the obstacles to be overcome.) 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It was a saying of Marshal Yillars, that 
 when war is decided on, it is necessary to 
 have exact information of the nunibcr of 
 troops the enemy can bring into the field, 
 since it is impossible to lay down any solid 
 plan of offensive or defensive operation . 
 without an accurate knowledge of what 
 you have to expect and fear. "When the 
 first shot is fired/' observes Marshal Villars, 
 ^' no one can calculate what will be the is- 
 sue of the war. It is, therefore, of vast 
 importance to reflect maturely before we 
 begin it." When once, however, this is 
 decided, the marshal observes that the bold- 
 est and most extended plans are generally 
 the wisest and the most successfuL '^Whert 
 we are determined upon war," he adds, '^we 
 should carry it on vigorously and without 
 trifling." 
 
 MAXIM VI. 
 
 At the commencement of a campaign, 
 to advance or not to aâ^vance, is a matter 
 
18 napoleon's 
 
 for grave consideration ; but wlien once 
 the offensive has been assumed, it must 
 be sustained to the last extremity. How- 
 ever skilful the manœuvres in a retreat, 
 it will always weaken the morale of an 
 army, because, in losing the chances of 
 success, these last are transferred to tbe 
 enemy. Besides, retreats always cost 
 more men and materiel than the most 
 blood}^ engagements ; with this differ- 
 ence, that in a battle the enemy's loss is 
 nearly equal to your own — whereas in a 
 retreat tlie loss is on your side only. 
 
 note; 
 
 Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats 
 are so favorable as those which are made 
 before a languid and unenterprising enemy, 
 for when he pursues with vigor, the retreat 
 soon degenerates into a rout. "Upon this 
 principle it is a great error," says the 
 marshal, '' to adhere to the proverb which 
 recommends us to build a bridge of gold for 
 a retreating enemy. No; follow him up 
 with spirit, and he is destroyed !" 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 19 
 
 MAXIM y 1 1. 
 
 An army should be ready every day, 
 every night, and at all times of the day 
 and niglit, to oppose all the resistance 
 of which it is capable. With this view, 
 the soldier should always be furnished 
 completely with arms and ammunition; 
 the infantry should never be without its 
 artiller}^ its cavalry, and its generals ; 
 and the différent divisions of the army 
 should be constantly in a state to sup- 
 port, to be supported, and to protect 
 itself. 
 
 The troops, whether halted, or en- 
 camped, or on the march, should be 
 always in favorable positions, possesvsing 
 the essentials req-uired for a field of bat- 
 tle; for example, the flanks should be 
 well covered, and all the artillery so 
 placed as to have free range, and to play 
 with the greatest advantage. When an 
 army is in column of march, it should 
 have advanced guards and flanking, par- 
 ties, to examine well the countrv in front, 
 to the right, and to the left, and always 
 
r 
 
 20 napoleon's 
 
 at such distance as to enable the main 
 body to deploy into position. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The following maxims, taken from the 
 memoirs of Montécuculli, appear to me well 
 suited to this place, and calculated to form a 
 useful commentary on the general principles 
 laid down in the preceding maxim : 
 
 ' 1. When war has been once decided on, 
 the moment is past for doubts and scruples. 
 On the contrary, we are bound to hope that 
 all the evil which may ensue, will not; that 
 Providence, or our own wisdom, may avert 
 it; or that the want of talent on the part of 
 the enemy may prevent him from benefiting 
 by it. The first security for success is to 
 confer the command on one individual. 
 When the authority is divided, the opinions 
 of the commanders often vary, and the ope- 
 rations are deprived of that ensemble, which 
 is the first essential to victory. Besides, 
 when an enterprise is common to man}^, and 
 not confined to a single person, it is con- 
 ducted without vigor, and less interest is 
 attached to the result. 
 
 After having strictly conformed to all the 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 21 
 
 rules of war, and satisfied ourselves tliat 
 nothing lias been omitted to ensure eventual 
 success, w^e must then leave the issue in the 
 hands of Providence, and repose ourselves 
 tranquilly in the decision of a higher power. 
 Let what will arrive, it is the part of a 
 general-in-chief to remain firm and constant 
 in his purposes; he must not allow himself 
 to be elated by prosperity, nor to be de- 
 pressed by adversity: for in war good and 
 bad and fortune succeed each other by turns, 
 form the ebb and flow of military operations. 
 2. When your own army is strong and 
 inured to service, and that of the enemy is 
 weak and consists of new levies, or of troops 
 enervated by long inaction, then you should 
 exert every means to bring him to battle. 
 
 If; on the other hand, your adversary has 
 the advantage in troops, a decisive combat 
 is to be avoided, and you must be content to 
 impede his progress, by encamping advan- 
 tageously, and fortifying ûivorable passes. 
 When armies are nearly equal in force, it is 
 desirable not to avoid a battle, but only to 
 attempt to fight one to advantage. For this 
 purpose, care should be taken to encamp al- 
 ways in front of the enemy; to move when 
 he moves, and occupy the heights and ad- 
 
22 napoleon's 
 
 vantageoiis grounds that lie upon his line of 
 march ; to seize upon all the buildings and 
 roads adjoining to his camp, and post your- 
 self advantageously in the places by which 
 he vtiust pass. It is always something gain- 
 ed to make him lose time, to thwart his de- 
 signs, or to retard their progress and exe- 
 cution. If, however, an army is altogether 
 inferior to that of the enemy, and there is no 
 possibility of manœuvring against him with 
 success, then the campaign must be aban- 
 doned, and the troops must retire into the 
 fortresses. 
 
 3. The principal object of a general-in- 
 chief, in the moment of battle, should be to 
 secure the flanks of his army. It is true 
 that natural positions may be found to effect 
 this object, but these positions being fixed 
 and immovable in themselves, they are only 
 advantageous to a general who wishes to 
 w^ait the shock of the enemj^, and not to one 
 wlio marches to the attack. 
 
 A general can, therefore, rely only on the 
 proper arrangement of his troops, to enable 
 him to repel any attempt the adversary may 
 make upon the front, or flanks, or rear of 
 his army. 
 
 If one flank of an army rests upon a river, 
 
MAXIMS or WAR. 23 
 
 or an impassable ravine, the whole of the 
 cavalry may be posted with the other wing, 
 in order to envelop the enemy more easily 
 by its superiority in numbers. 
 
 If the enemy has his flanks supported by 
 woods, light cavalry or infantry should be 
 despatched to attack him in flank or in rear 
 during the heat of the battle. If practica- 
 ble, also, an attack should be made upon the 
 baggage, to add to his confusion. 
 
 If you desire to beat the enemy's left with 
 your right wing, or his right with your 
 left wing, the wing with which you attack 
 should be reinforced by the élite of your 
 army. At the same moment, the other wino- 
 should avoid battle, and the attacking wing 
 brought rapidly forward, so as to overwhelm 
 the enemy. If the nature of the ground 
 admits, he should be approached by stealth, 
 and attacked before he is on his guard. If 
 any signs of fear are discoverable Tn the en- 
 emy, and which are always to be detected 
 by confusion or disorder in his movements, 
 he should be pursued immediately, without 
 allowing him time to recover himself It is 
 now the cavalry should be brought into ac- 
 tion, and manoeuvre so as to sui-prise and 
 cut off his artillery and bamrao-e. 
 
 *&ô"6' 
 
24 nap.oleon's 
 
 4. The order of march should always be 
 subservient to the order of battle, which last 
 should be arranged beforehand. The march 
 of an army is always w^ell regulated when it 
 is governed by the distance to be accom- 
 plished, and by the time required for its per- 
 formance. The front of the column of march 
 should be diminished or increased according 
 to the nature of the country, taking care 
 that the artillery always proceeds by the 
 main road. 
 
 When a river is to be passed, the artillery 
 should be placed in battery upon the bank 
 opposite the point of crossing. 
 
 It is a great advantage, when a river 
 forms a sweep or angle, and when a ford is 
 to be found near the place where you wish 
 to effect a passage. As the construction of 
 the bridge proceeds, infantry should be ad- 
 vanced to cover the workmen, by keeping 
 up a fire on the opposite bank ; but the mo- 
 ment it is finished, a corps of infantry and 
 cavalry, and some field-pieces, should be 
 pushed across. The infantry should entrench 
 itself immediately at the head of the bridge, 
 and it is prudent, moreover, to fortify on the 
 same side of the river, in order to protect 
 the bridfice in case the enemv should venture 
 an' offensive movement. 
 
I ' MAXIMS OF WAR. 25 
 
 The advanced guard of an ami)' should 
 be always provided with trusty guides, and 
 witli a corps of pioneers : the first to point 
 out the best roads, the second to render 
 these roads more practicable. 
 
 If the army marches in detachments, tlic 
 commander of each detachment should be 
 furnished with the name of the place in 
 writing, where the whole are to be reassem- 
 bled ; the place should be sufficiently re- 
 moved from the enemy to prevent him from 
 occupying it before the junction of all the 
 detachments. To this end, it is of import- 
 ance to keep the name a secret. 
 
 From the moment an army approaches 
 the enemy, it should march in the order in 
 which it is intended to nght. If anything is 
 to be apprehended, precautions are necessary 
 in proportion to the degree of the danger. 
 When a defile is to be passed, the troops 
 should be halted beyond the extremity, until 
 the whole army has quitted the defile. 
 
 In order to conceal the movements of an 
 army, it is necessary to march by night 
 through woods and valleys, by the most re- 
 tired roads, and out of reach of all inhabited 
 places. JNo fires should be allowed; and, to 
 favor the design still more, the troops should 
 3 
 
26 napoleon's 
 
 move by verbal order. When the object of 
 the march is to carry a post, or to relieve a 
 place that is besieged, the advanced guard 
 should march within musket shot of the 
 main body, because then you are prepared 
 for an immediate attack, and ready to over- 
 throw all before you. 
 
 When a march is made to force a pass 
 guarded by the enemy, it is desirable to 
 make a feint upon one point, while, by a 
 rapid movement, you bring your real attack 
 to bear upon another. 
 
 Sometimes success is obtained by pretend- 
 ing to fall back upon the original line of 
 march, and, by a sudden countermarch, seiz- 
 ing upon the pass, before the enemy is able 
 to reoccupy it. Some generals have gained 
 their point by manœuvring so as to deceive 
 the enemy, while a detachment under the 
 cover of high grounds has surprised the pas- 
 sage by a stolen march. The enemy being 
 ensraired in watchino- the movements of the 
 main body, the detachment has an opportu- 
 nity of entrenching itself in its new position. 
 
 5. An army regulates its mode of enamp- 
 ment according to the greater or less degree 
 of precaution, when circumstances require. 
 In a friendly country the troops are divided, 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 27 
 
 to afford better accommodation and supplies. 
 But with the enemy in front, an arm)' should 
 always encamp in order of battle. With 
 this view, it is oi the highest importance to 
 cover one part of the camp, as far as practi- 
 cable, by natural defences, such as a river, a 
 chain, of rocks, or a ravine. Care should be 
 taken also that the camp is not commanded, 
 and that there is no obstacle to a free com- 
 munication between the different corps, and 
 which can prevent the troops from mutually 
 succoring each other. 
 
 When an army occupies a fixed camp, it is 
 necessary to be well supplied with provisions 
 and ammunition, or at least that these should 
 be within certain reach and easily obtained. 
 To insure this, the line of communication 
 must be well establislied, and care taken not 
 to leave an enemy's fortress in your rear. 
 
 When an army is established in winter 
 quarters, its safety is best secured either by 
 fortifying a camp (for which purpose a spot 
 should be selected near a large commercial 
 town, or a river affording facility of trans- 
 port\ or by distributing it in close canton- 
 ments, so that the troops should be near 
 together, and capable of affording each other 
 mutual support. 
 
28 . napoleon's ' 
 
 The winter quarters of an army should be 
 protected, likewise, by constructing small 
 covered works on all the lines of approach 
 to the cantonments, and by posting advanced 
 guards of cavalry to observe the motions of 
 the enemy. 
 
 6. A battle is to be sought, when there is 
 reason to hope for victory, or when an army 
 runs the risk of being ruined without light- 
 ing; also when a besieged place is to be 
 relieved, or when you desire to prevent 
 a reinforcement from reaching the enemy. 
 Battles are useful, likewise, when we wish 
 to profit by a favorable opportunity which 
 offers, to secure a certain advantage, such as 
 seizing upon an undefended point or pass, 
 attacking the enemy when he has commit- 
 ted a fault, or when some misiinderstanding 
 among his generals favors the undertaking. 
 
 If an enemy declines an engagement, he 
 may be compelled to it, either by besieging 
 a place of importance, or by falling upon 
 him unawares, and when he cannot easily 
 effect his retreat. Or (after pretending to 
 retire), by making a rapid countermarch, 
 attacking him vigorousl}^ and forcing him to 
 action. 
 
 The different circumstances under wdiich 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 29 
 
 a battle should be avoided or declined, are, 
 when there is greater danger to be a])pre- 
 hended from defeat than advantage to be 
 derived from victory; when you are very 
 inferior to your adversary in numbers, and 
 are expecting reinforcements; above all, 
 when the enemy is advantageously posted, 
 or when he is contributing to his own ruin 
 by some inherent defect in his position, or 
 by the erroi*s and divisions of his generals. 
 
 To gain a battle, each arm must be ad- 
 vantageously posted, and have the means 
 of engaging its front and in flank. The 
 wings must be protected by natural obsta- 
 cles, where these present themselves, or by 
 having recourse when necessary to the aid 
 of art. 
 
 The troops must be able to assist each 
 other without confusion, and care must be 
 taken that the broken corps do not fall 
 back upon, and throw the rest into dis- 
 order. Above all, the intei-^^als between 
 the different coi-ps must be sufficiently small 
 to prevent the enemy ft*om penetrating be- 
 tween them, for in that case you would be 
 obliged to employ your reserves, and run 
 the risk of being entirely overwhelmed. 
 Sometimes victory is obtained by creating 
 
30 napoleon's 
 
 a diversion in the middle of a battle, or 
 even by depriving the soldier of all hope 
 of retreat, and placing him in a situation 
 where he is reduced to the necessity either 
 to conquer or die. 
 
 At the commencement of a battle, if the 
 ground is level, you should advance to meet 
 the enemy, in order to inspire the soldier 
 with courage ; but if you are well posted, 
 and your artillery advantageously placed, 
 then wait for him with determination : re- 
 membering always to fight resolutelj^, to 
 succor oj^portunely those who require it, 
 and never to bring your reserves into ac- 
 Iton exce^it m the last extremity; and 
 even then to preserve some support, be- 
 hind which the broken corps may i*ally. 
 
 When it is necessary to attack with your 
 whole force, the battle should commence 
 toward evening; because then, Avhatever 
 be the issue, night will arrive to separate 
 the combatants before your troops are ex- 
 hausted. By this means, an opportunity 
 is afforded of affecting an orderly retreat 
 if the result of the battle requires it. 
 
 During an action, the general -in -chief 
 should occupy some spot whence he can, 
 as lar as possible, overlook his whole army. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 31 
 
 He should be informed, immediately, of 
 everything that passes in the different 
 divisions. He should be ready, in order to 
 render success more complete, to operate 
 with fresh troops upon those points whero 
 the enemy is giving way, and also to rein- 
 force hi'' own corps wherever they are in- 
 clined to yield. AVhen the enemy is beat- 
 en, he must pursue him instantly, without 
 giving him a moment to rally ; on tlie 
 other hand, if he is himself defeated, or 
 despairs of victory, he must retreat in the 
 best possible order. 
 
 7. It shows great talent in a general 
 to bring troops, who are prepared for ac- 
 tion, into collision with those who are 
 not : for example, fresh troops against those 
 which are exhausted — brave and disciplined 
 men against recruits. He must likewise be 
 ready always to fall with his army upon 
 a weak or detached corps, to follow the 
 track of the enemy, and charge hinl^ among 
 defiles before he can face about and get into 
 position. 
 
 8. A position is good when the difï'crent 
 corps are so placed as to be engaged with 
 advantage, and without any remaining un- 
 employed. If you are superior in cavalry. 
 
32 napoleon's 
 
 positions are to be taken in plains and 
 open ground ; if in infantry, in an enclos- 
 ed and covered country. If inferior in 
 numbers, in confined and narrow places • 
 if superior, in a spacious and entensive 
 field. AYitli a very inferior army, a diffi- 
 cult pass must be selected to occupy and 
 fortify. 
 
 9. In order to obtain every possible ad- 
 vantage from a diversion, we should ascer- 
 tain first, that the country in which it is to 
 be created is easily penetrated. A diversion 
 should be made vigorously, and on those 
 points where it is calculated to do the great- 
 est mischief to the enemy. 
 
 10. To make war with success, the follow- 
 ing principles should never be departed 
 from : 
 
 To be superior to your enemy in numbers, 
 as well as in morale ; to fight battles in order 
 to spread terror in the country; to divide 
 your army into as many corps as may be 
 effected without risk, in order to undertake 
 several objects at the same time ; to treat 
 WEJ,L those who yield, to ill treat those who 
 resist ; to secure your rear, and occupy and 
 strengthen yourself at the outset in some 
 post which shall serve as a central point for 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 33 
 
 the support of your future movements ; to 
 guard aojainst desertion ; to make ^^ourself 
 master of the great rivers and principal 
 passes, and to establish your line of commu- 
 nication by getting possession of the for- 
 tresses, by laying siege to them, and of the 
 open country, by giving battle; for it is vain 
 to expect that conquests are to be achieved 
 without combats; although when a victory 
 is won, they will be best maintained by 
 uniting mildness with valor. 
 
 MAXI/M Y I II. 
 
 A general -in -chief should ask himself 
 frequently iu the day: "What should I 
 do if the enemy's army appeared now in 
 my front, or on ni}^ I'ight, or my left?" 
 If he have any difficulty in answ^ering 
 these questions, his position is bad, and 
 he should seek to remedy it. 
 
 NOTE, 
 
 In the campaign of 1758, the position of 
 the Prussian army at Hohen Kirk, being 
 commanded by the batteries of the enemy, 
 w4io occupied all the heights, was eminently 
 
34 napoleon's 
 
 defective; notwithstanding, Frederick, who 
 saw his rear menaced by the corps of Laudon, 
 remained six days in his camp without seek- 
 ing to correct his position. It would seem, 
 indeed, that he was ignorant. of his real dan- 
 ger: for Marshal Daun, having manoeuvred 
 during the night in order to attack by day- 
 break, surprised the Prussians in their lines 
 before they were able to defend themselves, 
 and by this means surrounded them com- 
 pletely. 
 
 Frederick succeeded, however, in effecting 
 his retreat with regularity, but not Avithout 
 the loss of ten thousand men, manj^ general 
 officers, and almost all of his artillery. If 
 Marshal Daun had foUow^ed up his victorj^ 
 with greater boldness, the king of Prussia 
 would never have been able to rally his 
 army. On this occasion, Frederick's good 
 fortune balanced his imprudence. 
 
 Marshal Saxe remarks, that there is more 
 talent than is dreamt of in bad dispositions, 
 if w^e possess the art of converting them in. 
 to good ones when the favorable moment 
 arrives. Nothing astonishes the enemy so 
 much as this manœuvre; he has counted 
 upon something ; all his arrangements have 
 been founded upon it accordingly^ — and at 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 35 
 
 the momoiit of attack it escaj:)es him ! '- I 
 must repeat," says the marshal, '^ there is 
 nothing that so Completel}' disconcerts an 
 enemy as this, or leads him to commit so 
 many errors; for it follows, that if he does 
 not change his arrangements, he is beaten ; 
 and if he does change them, in presence of 
 his adversary, he is equally undone." 
 
 It seems to me, however, that a general 
 who should rest the success of a battle upon 
 such a principle, would be more likely to 
 lose than to gain by it -, for if he had to deal 
 with a skilful adversary and an alert tac- 
 tician, the latter would find time to take ad- 
 vantage of the previous bad arrangements, 
 before he would be able to remedy them. 
 
 MAXIM IX. 
 
 The strength of an army, like the 
 power in mechanics, is estimated by mul- 
 tiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid 
 march augments the anorak of an army, 
 and increases its means of victory. Press 
 on ! 
 
36 napoleon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 " Eapidity," says Montécuciilli, '' is of im- 
 portance in concealing the movements of an 
 army, because it leaves no time to divulge 
 the intention of its chief It is, therefore, 
 an advantage to attack the enemy unexpec- 
 tedly, to take him off his guard, to surprise 
 him, and let him feel the thunder before he 
 sees the flash ; but if too great celerity ex- 
 hausts your troops, while, on the other hand, 
 delay deprives you of the fiivorable moment, 
 you must weigh the advantage against the 
 disadvantage, and choose between." 
 
 Marshal Yillars observes, that ^' in war 
 everything depends upon \^eing able to de- 
 ceive the enemy; and having once gained 
 this point, in never allowing him time to 
 recover himself." Villars has united practice 
 to precept. His bold and rapid marches 
 were almost always crowned with success. 
 
 It was the opinion of Frederick that all 
 wars should be short and rapid; because a 
 long Avar insensibly relaxes discipline, de- 
 populates the state, and exhausts its re- 
 sources. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 37 
 
 MAXIM X. 
 
 When an army is inferior in number, 
 inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is 
 essential to avoid a general action. The 
 first deficiency should be supplied by ra- 
 pidity of movement ; the want of artil- 
 lery, by the nature of the manœuvres ; 
 and the inferiority in cavalry, by the 
 choice of positions. In such circumstan- 
 ces, the morale of the soldier does much. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The campaign of 1814 in France was skil- 
 fully executed upon these principles. Na- 
 poleon, with an array inferior in number, an 
 army discouraged by the disastrous retreats 
 of Moscow and of Leipzig, and still more by 
 the presence of the enemy in the French 
 territory, contrived, notwithstanding, to sup- 
 ply his vast inequality offeree by the rapid- 
 ity and combination of his movements. By 
 the success obtained at Champ-Aubert, Mont- 
 mirail, Montereau, and Eheims, he began to 
 restore the morale of the French army. The 
 numerous recruits of which it was com- 
 4 
 
S8 napoleon's * 
 
 posed, liad ak'eady acquired that steadiness 
 of wbicli the old ï*egiments afforded them 
 an example, when the capture of Pai^is, and 
 the astonishing revolution it produced, com- 
 pelled Napoleon to lay down his arms. 
 
 But this cosenquence resulted rather from 
 the force of circunistances than from any ab- 
 solute necessity ; for Napoleon, by carrying 
 his army to the other side of the Loire, 
 mijïht easily have formed a junction w^ith 
 the armies of the Alps and Pyrenees, and 
 have reappeared on the field of battle at the 
 head of a hundred thousand men. Such a 
 force would have amply sufficed to re-estab- 
 lish the chances of war in his favor; more 
 especially as the armies of the allied sove- 
 reio-ns were obliged to manœuvre upon the 
 French territory with all the strong places 
 of Italy and France in their rear. 
 
 MAXIM XI. 
 
 To direct operations wîtli lines far re- 
 moved from each other, and without com- 
 munications, is to commit a fault which 
 always gives birth to a second. The 
 
MAXIMS OP WAR. 39 
 
 detached column has only its orders for 
 the lirst day. Its operations on the fol- 
 lowing day depend upon what may have 
 happened to the main body. Thus, this 
 column either loses time upon emergency, 
 in waiting for orders, or it will act with- 
 out them, and at hazard. Let it therefore 
 be held as a principle, that an army 
 should always keep its columns so united 
 as to prevent the enemy from passing be- 
 tween them with impunity. Whenever, 
 for particular reasons, this principle is 
 departed from, the detached corps should 
 be independent in their operations. They 
 should move toward a point fixed upon 
 for their future junction. They should 
 advance w^ithout hesitating, and w^ithout 
 waiting for fresh orders ; and every pre- 
 caution should be taken to prevent an 
 attack upon them in detail. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The Austrian army, commanded by Field- 
 marshal Alvinzi, was divided into two corps, 
 destined to act independently, until they 
 should accomplish their junction before Man- 
 
40 napoleon's 
 
 tua. The first of these corps, consisting of 
 fortj^-five thousand men, was under the or- 
 ders of Alvinzi. It was to debouch b}^ Monte 
 Baido, upon the positions occupied by the 
 French army on the Adige. Tlie second 
 corps, commanded by General Provéra, was 
 destined to act upon the lower Adige, and 
 to raise the blockade of Mantua. Napo- 
 leon, informed of the enemy's movements, 
 but not entirely comprehending his projects, 
 confined himself to concentrating his masses, 
 and giving orders to the troops to hold 
 themselves in readiness to manœuvre. In 
 the meantime, fresh information satisfied the 
 general-in-chief of the French army that the 
 corps which had debouched by La Coronna, 
 over Monte Baldo, was endeavoring to form 
 a junction with its cavalry and artillery — 
 both which, having crossed the Adige at 
 Dolce, were directing their march upon the 
 plateau of Eivoli, by the great road leading 
 by Incanole. 
 
 Napoleon immediately foresaw that, by 
 having possession of the plateau, he should 
 be able to prevent this junction, and obtain 
 all the advantages of the initiative. He ac- 
 cordingly put his troops in motion, and at 
 two o'clock in the morning occupied that 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 41 
 
 important position. Once master of the point 
 fixed upon for the junction of the Austrian 
 columns, success followed all his dispositions. 
 lie repulsed ever}^ attack, made seven thou- 
 sand prisoners, and took several standards 
 and twelve pieces of cannoi. At two o'clock 
 in the afternoon, the battle of Kivoli was 
 already gained, when Napoleon, learning 
 that General Provéra had jjassed the Adige 
 ' at Anghiari, and was directing his march 
 upon Mantua, left to his generals the charge 
 of following up the retreat of Alvinzi, and 
 placed himself at the head of a division for 
 the purpose of defeating the designs of Pro- 
 véra. f 
 
 By a rapid march, he again succeeded in 
 the initiator}' movement, and in preventing 
 the garrison of Mantua from uniting its force 
 with the relieving army. The corps intrust- 
 ed with the blockade, eager to distinguish 
 itself under the eyes of the conqueror of 
 Eivoli, compelled the garrison to retire into 
 the place, while the division of Victor, for- 
 getting the fatigues of a forced march, rushed 
 with impetuosity on the relieving army in 
 front. At this mom.ent a sortie from the lines 
 of St. George took him in flank, while the 
 corps of Augereau, which had followed the 
 
42 napoleon's 
 
 march of the Austrian general, attacked him 
 in rear. Provéra, surrounded on all sides, 
 capitulated. The result of these two battles 
 cost the Austrians three thousand men in 
 killed and wounded, twenty-two thousand 
 prisoners, twenty <rfbur standards, and forty- 
 six pieces of cannon. 
 
 MAXIM XII. 
 
 An army ought to have only one line 
 of operation. This should be preserved 
 with care, and never abandoned but in 
 the last extremity. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 "The line of communication of an army," 
 says Montécuculli, " must be certain and 
 well established, for every army that acts 
 from a distant base, and is not careful to 
 keep this line perfectly open, marches upon 
 a precipice. It moves to certain ruin, as may 
 be seen by an infinity of examples. In fact, 
 if the road by which provisions, ammunition 
 and reinforcements are to be brought uj), is 
 not entirely secured — if the magazines, the 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 43 
 
 hospitals, the depots of arms, and the places 
 of supply are not fixed and commodiously 
 situated — not cfnly the army cannot keep the 
 field, but it will be exposed to the greatest 
 dangers." 
 
 MAXIM XIII. 
 
 The distances permitted between corps 
 of an army upon the march must he gov- 
 erned by the localities, by circumstances, 
 and by the object in view. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 When an army moves at a distance from 
 the enem}^, the columns may be disposed 
 along the road so as to favor the artillery 
 and baggage. But when it is marching into 
 action, the different corps must be formed in 
 close columns in order of battle. Tlic gen- 
 erals must take care that the heads of the 
 columns, which are to attack together, do not 
 outstep each other-, and that in approaching 
 the field of action they preserve the relative 
 intervals required for deployment. 
 
 " The marches that are made preparatory 
 
44 napoleon's 
 
 to a battle require," says Frederick, " the 
 greatest precaution." With this view, he 
 recommends his generals to be particularly 
 on their guard, and to reconnoitre the ground 
 at successive distances, in order to secure the 
 initiative by occupying those positions most 
 calculated to favor an attack. On a retreat, 
 it is the opinion of many generals that an 
 army should concentrate its forces, and 
 march in close columns if it is still strong 
 enough to resume the offensive; for b}^ this 
 means it is easy to form the line when a 
 favorable opportunity presents itself, either 
 for holding the enemy in check or for at- 
 tacking him if he is not in a situation to 
 accept battle. 
 
 Such was Moreau's retreat after the pas- 
 sage of the Adda by the Austro-Eussian 
 army. Th^ French general, after having 
 covered the evacuation of Milan, took up a 
 position between the Po and the Tanaro. 
 
 His camp rested upon Alexandria and 
 Valentia, two capital fortresses, and had the 
 advantage of covering the roads to Turin 
 and Savona, by which he could effect his 
 retreat in case he was unable to accomplish a 
 Junction with the co?ys d'année of Macdon- 
 ald, who had been ordered to quit the king- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 45 
 
 (lorn of Naples, and hasten his marcli into 
 Tuscany. 
 
 • Forced to abandon his position in conse- 
 quence of the insurrection in Piedmont and 
 Tuscany, Moreau retired upon Asti, where 
 he learned that his communication with the 
 river of Genoa had just been cut off by the 
 capture of Ccva. After several ineffectual 
 attempts to retake this place, he saw that 
 his only safety depended upon throwing him- 
 self into the mountains. 
 
 To effect this object, he directed the whole 
 of his battering train and heavy baggage by 
 the Col de Fenestrelle upon France j then 
 opening himself a way over the St. Bernard, 
 he gained Loano with his light artillery and 
 the small proportion of field equipment he 
 had been able to preserve. 
 
 By this skilful movement, he nat only re- 
 tained his communicatioit^S with France, but 
 was enabled to observe the motions of the 
 army from Naples, and to facilitate his junc- 
 tion with it by directing the whole of his 
 force upon the points necessary for that 
 purpose. 
 
 Macdonald, in the meantime, whose only 
 chance of success depended on concentrating 
 his little army, neglected this precaution, 
 
46 napoAeon's 
 
 and was beaten in three successive actions 
 at the Trebia. 
 
 B}^ this retardment of his march, he ren- 
 dered all Moreau's measures to unite the 
 two armies in the plains of the Po useless, 
 and his retreat, after his brilliant but fruit- 
 less efforts at the Trebia, defeated the other 
 arrangements, also, which the former had 
 made to come to his 8upi:)ort The inactivity 
 of Marshal Suwarrow, however, finally en- 
 abled the French general to accomplish his 
 junction with the remains of the army from 
 ISTaples. Moreauthen concentrated his whole 
 force upon the Appenines, and placed him- 
 self in a situation to defend the important 
 positions of Liguria, until the chances of 
 war should afford him an opportunity of re- 
 suming the offensive. 
 
 When, after a decisive battle, an army has 
 lost its artillery aiîd equipments, and is con- 
 sequently no longer in a state to assume the 
 offensive, or even to arrest the pursuit of 
 the enemy, it would seem most desirable to 
 divide what remains into several corps, and. 
 order them to march by separate and dis- 
 tant routes upon the base of operation, and 
 throw themselves into the fortresses. This 
 is the only means of safety : for the enemy, 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 47 
 
 uncertain as to the precise direction taken 
 by the vanquished army, is ignorant in the 
 first instance which corps to pursue, and it 
 is in this moment of indecision that a march 
 is gained upon him. Besides, tlie move- 
 ments of a small body being so much easier 
 than those of a larger one, these separate 
 lines of march are all in favor of a retreat- 
 ing army. 
 
 :m A X I M X I y . 
 
 Among mountains, a great number of 
 positions are always to be found very 
 strong in themselves, and which it is dan- 
 gerous to attack. The character of this 
 mode of warfare consists in occupying 
 camps on tlie flanks or in the rear of the 
 enemy, leaving him only the alternative 
 of abandoning his position without light- 
 ing, to take up another in the rear, or to 
 descend from it in order to attack you. 
 In mountain warfare, the assailant has 
 always the disadvantage ; even in oflen- 
 Bive warfare in the open field, the great 
 
48 napoleon's 
 
 secret consists in defensive combats, and 
 in obliging the enemy to attack. 
 
 NOTE . 
 
 During the campaign of 1793, in the Mar- 
 itime Alps, the French army, under the or- 
 ders of General Brunet, did all in its power 
 to get possession of the camps at Raus and 
 at Fourches, by an attack in front. But 
 these useless efforts served only to increase 
 the courage of the Piedmontese, and to de- 
 stroy the élite of the grenadiers of the repub- 
 lican army. The manœuvres by which Napo- 
 leon, without fighting, compelled the enemy 
 to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to 
 establish the truth of these principles, and 
 to prove how much success in war depends 
 upon the genius of the general as well as on 
 the courage of the soldier. 
 
 MAXIM XV. 
 
 The first consideration with a general 
 who offers battle, should be the glory and 
 honor of his arms ; the safety and preser- 
 vation of his men is only the second ; but 
 
MAXIMS OF WAP. 49 
 
 it is ill the enterprise and courage result- 
 ing from the former, that tlie latter will 
 most assuredly be found. In a retreat, 
 besides the honor of the army, the loss of 
 life is often greater than in two battles. 
 For this reason, we should never despair 
 while brave men are to be found with 
 their colors. It is by this means that we 
 obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In 1G45, the French army, under the or- 
 ders of the Prince of Condé, was on the 
 march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it 
 was discovered that Count Merci, who com- 
 manded the Bavarians, had foreseen this 
 intention, and had entrenched himself in a 
 strong position which defended Nordlingen 
 at the same time that it covered Donawerth. 
 
 Notwithstanding the favorable position of 
 the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The 
 combat was terrible. All the infantry in 
 the centre and on the right, after being 
 successively engaged, wa« routed and dis- 
 persed, in spite of the eflPorts of the cavalry 
 and the reserve, which were likewise carried 
 away with the fugitives. The battle was 
 5 
 
50 napoleon's 
 
 lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer 
 either centre or right to depend upon, col- 
 lected the remnants of his battalions, and 
 directed his march to the left, where Turenne 
 was still engaged. This perseverance re- 
 animated the ardor of the troops. They 
 broke the right wing of the enemy, and 
 Turenne, by a change of front, returned to 
 the attack upon his centre. Night, too, 
 favored the boldness of Condé. An entire 
 corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut 
 off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy 
 of the French general in this struggle for 
 victory was repaid by possession of the field 
 of battle, together with a great number of 
 prisoners, and almost all tlie enemy's artil- 
 lery. The Bavarian army beat a retreat, 
 and the next day Nordlingen capitulated. 
 
 MAXIM XYI. 
 
 It is an approved maxim in war, never 
 to do what the ^nemy wishes you to do, 
 for this reason alone, that he desires it. 
 A field of battle, therefore, which he 
 has previously studied and reconnoitred, 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 51 
 
 should be avoided, and double care should 
 be taken wliere he has had time to fortify 
 and entrench. One consequence deduci- 
 ble from thi.s principle is, never to attack 
 a position in front which you can gain by 
 turning. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It Aviis without duc regard to this prin- 
 ciple, that Marshal Yilleroi, on assuming the 
 command of the army of Italy, during the 
 campaign of 1701, attacked, with unwar- 
 rantable presumption, Prince Eugene, of 
 Savoy, in liis entrenched position of Chiavi, 
 on the Oglio. The French generals, Catinat 
 among the rest, considered the post unas- 
 sailable, but Yilleroi insisted, and the result 
 of this otherwise unimportant battle was 
 the loss of the élite of tlie French army. It 
 would have been greater still, but for Cati- 
 nat's exertions. 
 
 It was by neglecting the same principle, 
 that the Prince of Condé, in the campaign 
 of 1614, failed in all his attacks upon the 
 entrenched position of the Bavarian army. 
 The Count Merci, who commanded the latter,' 
 had drawn up his cavalry skilfully upon the 
 
52 napoleon's 
 
 plain, resting upon Freyberg, while his in- 
 fkntiy occupied the mountain. After many 
 fruitless attempts, the Prince of Condé, 
 seeing the impossibility of dislodging the 
 enemy, began to menace his communica- 
 tions — but the moment Merci perceived this, 
 he broke up his camp and retired beyond 
 the Black mountains. 
 
 MAXIM XVII. 
 
 Ill a war of marcli and manœuvre, if 
 you would avoid a battle wâtli a superior 
 army, it is necessary to entrench every 
 night, and occupy a good defensive posi- 
 tion. Those natural positions wliich are 
 ordinarily met with, are not sufficient to 
 protect an army against superior numbers 
 without recourse to art. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The campaign of the French and Spanish 
 army, commanded by the Duke of Berwick, 
 against the Portuguese, in the j^ear 1706, 
 affords a good lesson on this subject. The 
 two armies made almost the tour of Spain 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 53 
 
 They began the campaign near Badajoz, and 
 after manœuvring across both Castilcs, fin- 
 ished it in the kingdoms of Valencia and 
 Mnrcia, Tlie Duke of Berwick encamped 
 his army eighty-five times, and although the 
 campaign passed without a general action, 
 he took about ten thousand prisoners from 
 the enemy. Marshal Turenne also made a 
 fine campaign of manœuvre against the 
 Count Montécuculli, in 1G75. 
 
 The imperial army having made its ar- 
 rangements to pass the Rhine at Strasburg, 
 Turenne used all diligence, and, throwing a 
 bridge over the river near the village of 
 Ottenheim, three leagues below Strasburg, 
 he crossed with- the French army, and en- 
 camped close to the little town of Yilstet, 
 which he occupied. This position covered 
 the bridge of Strasburg, so that, by this 
 manoeuvre, Turenne deprived the enemy of 
 all ai)proach to that city. 
 
 Upon this, Montécuculli made a movement 
 with his whole army, threatening the bridge 
 at Ottenheim, b}' which the French received 
 their provisions from upper Alsace. 
 
 As soon as Turenne discovered the desijxn 
 of the enemy, he left a detachment at Yil- 
 stet, and made a rapid march with his whole 
 
54 NAPOLKOX'S 
 
 force iipoii the village of Altenheim. This 
 intermediate position between the two 
 bridLçes, which he wished to preserve, gave 
 him the advantage of being able to succor 
 either of these posts before the enemy had 
 time to carry them. MontécucuUi seeing 
 that any successful attack upon the bridges 
 was not to bo expceto(i, resolved to pass 
 the Ehine below Strasbiirg, and witli this 
 view returned to his first position at Offen- 
 burg. Marshal Turenne, who followed all 
 the movements of the Austrian ai-niy, brought 
 baclv his army also to Vilstet. 
 
 In the meantime, this attempt of the 
 enemy having convinced the French general 
 of tlie danger to which his bridge had ex- 
 posed him, removed it lu'ai'cr to that of 
 Strasburg, in order to diminish the extent 
 of grouiT'l he had to defend. 
 
 MontécucuUi, having commanded the ma- 
 gistrates of Strasburg to collect materials 
 for a bridge, moved to Scherzheim to receive 
 them ; but Turenne again defeated his ])ro- 
 jects by taking a i>osition at Freistett, where 
 he occupied the islands of the l^hine, and 
 immediately constructed a stockade. 
 
 Thus it was that, during the whole of 
 this campaign, Turenne succeeded in gain- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 55 
 
 ing the initiative of the enemy, and obliging 
 liim to follow his movements. He succeeded, 
 also, by a rapid march, in cutting off Monté- 
 ciicuUi from the Town of Offenburg, whence 
 he drew his supplies, and would no doubt 
 have prevented the Austrian general from 
 effecting his junction with the corps of Cap- 
 rara, had not a cannon-shot terminated this 
 great man's life. 
 
 MAXIM XYIII. 
 
 A general of ordinary talent occupying 
 a bad position, and surprised by a supe- 
 rior force, seeks his safety in retreat ; but 
 a great captain supplies all deficiencies 
 by his courage, and marches boldly to 
 meet the attack. By this means lie dis- 
 concerts his adversar}^ ; and if the latter 
 shows any irresolution in his movements, 
 a skilful leader, profiting by his indecision, 
 may even hope for victory, or at least 
 employ the day in manœuvring — at night 
 he entrenches himself, or falls back to a 
 better position. By this determined con- 
 
66 napoleon's 
 
 duct lie maintains the honor of his arms, 
 the iirst essential to all luilitarv superi- 
 ority. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In IGo^i, Marshal Tiircnnc was surprised 
 by the Prince of Condé, in a position wliere 
 his army was completely com})romised. lie 
 had the power, indeed, by an immediate 
 retreat, of covering himself l)y the Somme, 
 which he possessed the means of crossing at 
 Peronne, and whence he was distant only 
 half a league; but, fearing the influence of 
 this retrograde movement on the morale of 
 bis army, Turenne balanced all disadvan- 
 tages by his courage, and marched boldly to 
 meet the enemy with very inferior forces. 
 After marching a league, he found an advan- 
 tageous position, where he made every ilis- 
 position for a battle. It was three o'clock 
 in the afternoon; but the Spaniards, ex- 
 hausted with fatigue, hesitated to attack 
 hiin, and Turenne liaving covered himself 
 witii entrenchments during the night, the 
 enemy no longer dared to risk a general 
 action, and broke up his camp. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAK. 57 
 
 MAXIM XIX. 
 
 The transition from the defensive to 
 the offensive is one of the most delicate 
 operations. , 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 By studying the first campa ign of Napo- 
 leon in Italy, we can learn what genius and 
 boldness may effect in passing with an army 
 from the defensive to the offensive. The army 
 of the îdlies, commanded by General Eeau- 
 lieu, was provided with every means that 
 could render it formidable. Its force amount- 
 ed to eighty thousand men, and two hun- 
 dred pieces of cannon. The French army, 
 on the contrar}", could number scared}^ thirty 
 thousand men under arms, and thirty pieces 
 of cannon. For some time there had been 
 no issue of meat, and even the bread was 
 irregularl}^ supplied. The infantry was ill 
 clothed, the cavalry wretchedly mounted. 
 All the draught-horses had perished from 
 want, so that the service of the artiUery was 
 performed bj'^ mules. To remedy these evils, 
 large disbursements were necessary -, and 
 such was the state of the finances, that tlic 
 
58 napoleon's 
 
 government had only been able to furnish 
 two thousand louis in specie for the opening 
 of the campaign. The French army could 
 not possibly exist in this state. To advance 
 or retreat was absolutely necessary. Aware 
 of the advantage of surprising the enemy at 
 the very outset of the campaign b}^ some 
 decisive blow, Napoleon prepared for it by 
 recasting the morale of his army. 
 
 In a proclamation full of energy, he re- 
 minded them tliat an ignoble death alone 
 remained for them, if they continued on the 
 defensive; that they had nothing to expect 
 from France, but everything to hope from 
 victory, "xlbundance courts you in the fer- 
 tile plains of Italy," said he ; " are you defi- 
 cient, soldiers, in constancy or in courage?" 
 Profiting by the moment of enthusiasm 
 which he had inspired, Napoleon concen- 
 trated his forces in order to fall with his 
 whole weight on the different corps of the 
 enemy. Immediatel}^ afterward, the battles 
 of Montenotte, Milesimo, and Mondovi, ad- 
 ded fresh confidence to the high opinion 
 already entertained by the soldier for his 
 chief; and that army Avhich only a few days 
 ago was encamped amid barren rocks, and 
 consumed by famine, already aspired to the 
 
MAXIMS OF WARr. 59 
 
 conquest of Italy. In one month after the 
 opening of the campaign, Napoleon had ter- 
 minated the war with the King of Sardinia, 
 and conquered the Milanese. Eich canton- 
 ments soon dispelled from the recollection of 
 the French soldier the misery and fatigue 
 attendant on this rapid march, while a vigi- 
 lant administration of the resources of the 
 country reorganized the rnateriel of the 
 French army, and created the means neces- 
 sary for the attainment of future success. 
 
 MAXIM XX. 
 
 It may be laid down as a principle, 
 tliat the line of operation should not be 
 abandoned ; but it is one of the most 
 skilful manœuvres in war, to know how 
 to change it, when circumstances author- 
 ize or render this necessary. An army 
 w^hich changes skilfully its line of oper- 
 ation deceives the enemy, who becomes 
 ignorant where to look for its rear, or 
 upon what weak points it is assailable. 
 
60 napoleon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Frederick sometimes changed liis lino of 
 operation in the middle of a campaign ; but 
 he was enabled to do this, because he was 
 manoeuvring at that time in the centre of 
 German}^ — an abundant countr}^, capable of 
 supplying all the wants of his army in case 
 his communications with Prussia were inter- 
 cepted. 
 
 Marshal Turenne, in the campaign of 
 1746, gave up his line of communication to 
 the allies in the same manner ; but, like 
 Frederick, he was carrying on the war at 
 this time in the centre of Germany, and 
 having fallen with his whole forces upon 
 Rain, he took the precaution of securing 
 to himself a depot upon which to establish 
 his base of operation. 
 
 By a series of manœuvres, marked alike 
 by audacity and genius, he subsequently 
 compelled the imperial army, to abandon 
 its magazines, and retire into Austria for 
 
 CD •^ 
 
 winter quarters. 
 
 Eut these are examples which it appears to 
 me should only be imitated when we have 
 taken full measure of the capacity of our 
 adversary, and above all, when we see no 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 61 
 
 reason to apprehend an insurrection in the 
 country to which we transfer the theatre 
 of war. 
 
 MAXIM XXI. 
 
 When an army carries \vith it a batter- 
 ing train, or large convoys of sick and 
 wounded, it cannot march by too short 
 a line upon its depots. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It is above all in mountainous countries, 
 and in those interspersed with woods and 
 marshes, that it is of importance to observe 
 this maxim ; for, the convoys and means of 
 transport being frequently embarrassed in 
 defiles, an enemy by manœuvring may easily 
 disperse the escorts, or make even a success- 
 ful attack upon the whole army, when it is 
 obliged, from the nature of the country, to 
 march in an extended column. 
 
 MAXIM XXII. 
 
 The art of encamping in position is the 
 same as taking up the line in order of 
 6 
 
62 napoleon's 
 
 battle in this position. To this end, the 
 artillery should be adv^antageousW placed, 
 ground should be selected which is not 
 commanded or liable to be turned, and, 
 as far as possible, the guns should cover 
 and command the surrounding country. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Frederick has remarked that, in order to 
 be assured that 3'our camp is well placed, 
 you should see if, by making a small move- 
 ment, 3^ou can oblige the enemy to make a 
 greater; or, if after having forced him to 
 retrogade one march you can compel him to 
 fall back another. 
 
 In defensive war, all camps should be en- 
 trenched in the front and wings of the posi- 
 tion they occupy, and care should be taken 
 that the rear is left perfectly open. If you 
 are threatened with being turned, arrange- 
 ments should be made beforehand for taking 
 up a more distant position ; and you should 
 profit by any disorder in the enemy's line of 
 march, to make an attempt upon his artil- 
 lery or baggage. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 63 
 
 MAXIM XXIII. 
 
 When you are occupying a position 
 which the enemy threatens to surround, 
 collect all your force immediately, and 
 menace him with an offensive movement. 
 By this manœuvre, you will prevent him 
 from detaching and annoying your flanks 
 in case you should judge it necessary to 
 retire. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This was the manœuvi'^ practised by Gene- 
 ral Desaix, in 1798, near Radstadt. lie made 
 up for inferiority in numbers by audacity, 
 and maintained himself the whole day in 
 position in spite of the vigorous attacks of 
 the Archduke Charles. At night he effected 
 his retreat in good order, and took up a posi- 
 tion in the rear. * ^ 
 
 It was in accordance, also, with this prin- 
 ciple, in the same campaign, tliat General 
 Moreau gave battle at Bibcrach, to secure 
 his retreat by the passes of the Black moun- 
 tains. A few days after, he fought at Schli- 
 engen with the same object. Placed in a 
 good defensive position, he menaced the 
 
G4 napoleon's 
 
 Archduke Charles by a sudden return to the 
 offensive, while his artiller}^ and baggage 
 were passing the Khine by the bridge of 
 Hiiningen, and he was making all the neces- 
 sary arrangements for retiring behind that 
 river himself. 
 
 Here, however, I would observe, that the 
 execution of such offensive demonstrations 
 should be deferred alwaj^s till toward the 
 evening, in order that you may not be com- 
 promised by engaging too earl}^ in a combat 
 which you cannot long maintain with suc- 
 cess. 
 
 JSTight, and the uncertainty of the enemy 
 after an affair of this kind, will always favor 
 your retreat, if it is judged necessary; but, 
 with a view to mask the operation more 
 effectually, fires should be lighted all along 
 the lines, to deceive the enemy and prevent 
 him from discovering this retrograde move- 
 ment, for in a retreat it is a great advantage 
 to gain a march upon your adversary. 
 
 MAXIM XXI A^ 
 
 iSTever lose siglit of tliis maxim: that 
 you sliould establish your cantonments at 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 65 
 
 the most distant and best-protected point 
 from the enemy, especially where a sur- 
 prise is possible. By this means you will 
 have time to unite all your forces before 
 he can attack you. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Ill the campaign of 1745, Marshal Tu- 
 renne lost the battle of Marienthal, by neg- 
 lecting this principle; for if, instead of 
 reassembling his divisions at Erbsthausen, 
 he had rallied his troops at Mergentheim, 
 behind the Taubcr, his army would have 
 been much sooner reunited; and Count Mer- 
 ci, in place of finding only three thousand 
 men to fight at Erbsthausen (of which he 
 was well informed), Avould have had the 
 whole French arm}^ to attack in a position 
 covered b}^ a river. 
 
 Some one having indiscreetly asked Vis- 
 count Turenne how he had lost the battle of 
 Marienthal : " By my own fault," replied the 
 marshal; "but," added he, "when a man has 
 committed no faults in war, he can only 
 have been engaged in it but a short time." 
 
66 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM XXY. 
 
 When two armies are in order of bat- 
 tle,jand one has to retire over a bridge, 
 while the other has the circumference of 
 the circle open, all the advantages are in 
 favor of the latter. It is then a general 
 should show boldness, strike a decided 
 'blow, and manœuvre upon the flank of 
 his enemy. The victory is in his hands. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This was the position of the French army 
 at the famous battle of Leipzig, which ter- 
 minated the campaign of 1813 so fatally for 
 Napoleon; for the battle of Ilanau was of 
 no consequence, comparatively, in the des- 
 perate situation of that army. 
 
 It strikes me that, in a situation like that 
 of the French army previous to the battle 
 of Leipzig, a general should never calculate 
 upon any of those lucky chances which may 
 arise out of a return to the offensive, but 
 that he should rather adopt every possible 
 means to secure his retreat. With this view, 
 he should immediately* cover himself with 
 good entrenchments, to enable him to repel 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 67 
 
 with inferior numbers the attack of the ene- 
 my, while his own equipments are crossing 
 the river. As fast as the troops reach the 
 other side, they should occupy positions to 
 protect the passage of the rear guard, and 
 this last should be covered by a tête de j)ont 
 as soon as the army breaks up its camp. 
 During the wars of the Revolution, too little 
 regard was paid to entrenchments; and it is 
 for this reason we have seen large armies 
 dispersed after a single reverse, and the fate 
 of nations compromised b}^ the issue of one 
 battle. 
 
 MAXIM XXVI. ' 
 
 It is contrarj^ to all true principle, to 
 make corps, which have no communica- 
 tion with each other, act separately against 
 a central force whose communications are 
 cut off. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The Austrians lost the battle of Hohen- 
 linden by neglecting this principle. The 
 imperial army, under the orders of the arch- 
 duke John, was divided into four columns, 
 
68 napoleon's 
 
 which had to march through an immense 
 forest, previous to their junction in the plain 
 of Anzing, where they intended to surprise 
 the French. But these different corps, hav- 
 ing no direct communication, found them- 
 selves compelled to engage separately with 
 an enemy who had taken the precaution of 
 concentrating his masses, and who could 
 move them with facility in a country with 
 which he had been long previously acquaint- 
 ed. 
 
 Thus the Austrian army, enclosed in the 
 ' defiles of the forest with its whole train of 
 artillery and baggage, was attacked in its 
 flanks and rear, and the archduke John was 
 only enabled to rally his dispersed and shat- 
 tered divisions under cover of the night. 
 
 The trophies obtained by the French army 
 on this day were immense. They consisted 
 of eleven thousand prisoners, one hundred 
 pieces of cannon, several stand of colors, and 
 all the baggage of the enemy. 
 
 The battle of Hohenlinden decided the fate 
 pf the campaign of 1800, and Moreau's bril- 
 liant and well-merited success placed him in 
 the rank of the first general of the age. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 69 
 
 MAXIM XXVII. 
 
 When ail army is driven from a first 
 position, the retreating cohimns should 
 rally always sufficiently in the rear, to 
 prevent any interruption from the enemy. 
 The greatest disaster that can happen, is 
 when the columns are attacked in detail, 
 and before their junction. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 One great advantage whicli results from 
 rallying your cohimns on a point far removed 
 from the field of battle, or from the position 
 previously occupied, is, that the enemy is 
 uncertain as to the direction you mean to 
 take! 
 
 If he divides his force to pursue you, he 
 exposes himself to see his detachments beaten 
 in detail, especially if j^ou have exerted all 
 due diligence, and have effected the junction 
 of your troops in sufficient time to get be- 
 tween his columns and disperse them one 
 after the other. 
 
 It was by a manœuvre of this kind in the 
 campaign of Italy, in 1799,^hat General 
 Melas gained the battle of Genola. 
 
70 napoleon's 
 
 General Championet commanded the 
 l^rench army, and endeavored to cul^ off the 
 communication of the Austrians with Timn, 
 by employing corps which manœuvred sep- 
 arately to get into their rear. Melas, who 
 divined his project, made a retrograde march, 
 by which he persuaded his adversary he was 
 in full retreat, although the real object of his 
 movement was to concentrate his forces at 
 the point fixed for the junction of the differ- 
 ent detachments of the French army, and 
 which he beat and dispersed, one after 
 another, by his great superiority in numbers. 
 The result of this manoeuvre, in which the 
 x^ustrian general displayed vigor, decision, 
 and foresight, secured to him the peaceable 
 possession of Piedmont. 
 
 It was also by the. neglect of this principje 
 that General Beaulieu, who commanded the 
 Austro-Sardinian army in the campaign of 
 179G, lost the battle of Milesimo after that 
 of Montenotte. 
 
 His object, in endeavoring to rally his 
 different corps upon Milesimo, was, to cover 
 the high roads of Turin and Milan ; but 
 I^Tapoleon, aw^^-e of the advantages arising 
 from the ardor of troops emboldened by 
 recent success, attacked him before he could 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 71 
 
 assemble his divisions, and, by a scries of 
 skilful manœuvres, succeeded in separating 
 the combined armies. They retired in the 
 greatest disorder — the one by the road of 
 Milan, the other by tluit of Turin. 
 
 MAXIM XXYIII. 
 
 1^0 force should be detached on the eve 
 of a battle, because aiFairs may change 
 during the night, either by the retreat of 
 the enemy, or by the arrival of large rein- 
 forcements to enable him to resume the 
 offensive, and counteract your previous 
 arrangements. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In 179G, the army of the Sambre and 
 Meuse, commanded by General Jourdan, 
 effected a retreat, which was rendered still 
 more difficult by the loss of his line of com- 
 munication. Seeing, however, that the forces 
 of the archduke Charles were scattered, 
 Jourdan, in order to accomplish his retreat 
 upon Frankfort, resolved to open himself a 
 way by AYurtzberg, where there were at that 
 
72 napoleon's 
 
 moment only two divisions of the Austrian 
 army. This movement would have been at- 
 tended with success, if the French general, 
 believing he had simply these two divisions 
 to contend with, had not committed the error 
 of separating himself from the corps of Le- 
 fevre — which he left at Schweinfurt to cover 
 the only direct communication of the army 
 with its base of operation. 
 
 The commission of this fault at the outset, 
 added to some slowness in the march of the 
 French general, secured the victory to the 
 archduke, who hastened to concentrate his 
 forces. 
 
 The arrival of the two divisions, also, of 
 Kray and Wartesleben, during the battle, 
 enabled him to oppose fifty thousand men to 
 the French army, which scarcely numbered 
 thirty thousand combatants. This last was 
 consequently beaten, and obliged to continue 
 its retreat by the mountains of Fuldes, where 
 the badness of the roads could be equalled 
 orUy by the difficulty of the country. 
 
 The division of Lefevre, amounting to four- 
 teen thousand :^n, ^yould, in all probability, 
 have turned the scale in favor of Jourdan, 
 had the latter not unfortunately conceived 
 that two divisions only were opj^osing his 
 passage to Wurtzburg. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 73 
 
 MAXIM XXIX. 
 
 When you have resolved ta fight a 
 battle, collect your whole force. Dis- 
 pense with nothing. A single battalion 
 sometimes decides the day, 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 I think it here desirable to observe', that it 
 is prudent before a battle to fix mpon some 
 point in reaV of the reserve for the junction 
 of the different detachments; for if, from 
 unforeseen circumstances, these detachments 
 should be prevented from joiViing bef )re the 
 action has commenced, they might be ex- 
 posed, in case a retrograd'e movement should 
 be found necessary, to- the masses of the 
 enemy. It is desirabl-e also to keep the 
 enemy in ignorance of these reyiforcements, 
 in order to employ them with greater effect. 
 "A seasonable reinforcement," , says Fred- 
 erick, "renders the success of a battle cer- 
 tain, because the enemy will always imagine 
 it stronger than it really is, and lose courage 
 accordingly " 
 
74 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM XXX. 
 
 Notliiiig is so rasli or so contrary to 
 principle, as to make a flank march be- 
 fore an army in position, especially when 
 this army occupies heights at the foot 
 of which you are forced to defile. 
 
 N T E r 
 
 It was hy a neglect of this principle that 
 Frederick was beaten ^t Kollin in the first 
 campaign of 1757. Notwith-standiiig pro- 
 digies of valor, the Prussians lost fifteen 
 thousand men and a great portion of their 
 artillery, while the loss of the Austrians did 
 not exceed five thousand men. The conse- 
 quence of this battle was more unfortunate 
 still, since it obliged the King of Prussia to 
 raise the siege of Prague, and to evacuate 
 Bohemia. 
 
 It Avas also by making a flank march 
 before the Prussian army, that the French 
 lost the disgraceful battle of Ilosbach. 
 
 This imprudent movement was still more 
 to be reprehended, because the Prince de 
 Soubise, who commanded the French army, 
 was so negligent as to manœuvre, without 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 75 
 
 either advanced guards or flanking corps, in 
 l)resence of tlie enemy. The result was, 
 that his army, consisting of fifty thousand 
 men, was beaten by six battalions and thirty 
 squadrons. The French lost seven thousand 
 men, twenty-seven standards, and a great 
 number of cannon. The Prussians had only 
 three hundred men disabled. 
 
 Thus, by having forgotten this principle, 
 that a flank march is never to be made before 
 an enemy in line of battle, Frederick lost his 
 army at Kollin; and Soubise, at Eosbach, 
 lost both his army and his honor. 
 
 MAXIM XXXT. 
 
 When you determine to risk a battle, 
 reserve to yourself every possible chance 
 of success, more particularly if you have 
 to deal with an adversary of superior 
 talent; for if you are beaten, even in the 
 midst of your magazines and your com- 
 munications, wo to the vanquished! 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 "We should make war," says Marshal 
 Saxe, "without leaving anything to hazard, 
 
76 napoleon's 
 
 and in this especially consists the talent of a 
 general. But when we have incurred the 
 risk of a battle, we should know how to 
 profit by the victory, and not merely con- 
 tent ourselves, according to custom, with 
 possession of the field.'^ 
 
 It was by neglecting to follow up the first 
 success, that the Austrian army, after gain- 
 ing the field of Marengo, saw itself compelled 
 on the following day to evacuate the whole 
 of Italy. 
 
 General Melas, observing the French in 
 retreat, left the direction of the movements 
 of his army to the chief of his staff, and 
 retired to Alexandria to repose from the 
 fatigues of the day. Colonel Zach, equally 
 convinced with his general that the French 
 army was completely broken, and consisted 
 only of fugitives, formed the divisions in 
 column of route. 
 
 By this arrangement, the imperial army 
 prepared to enter upon its victorious march 
 in a formation not less than three miles in 
 depth. 
 
 It was near four o'clock when General 
 Desaix rejoined the French army with his 
 division. His presence restored in some 
 degree an equality between the contending 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 77 
 
 forces; and yet Napoleon hesitated for a 
 moment whether to resume the offensive, 
 or to make use of this corps to secure his 
 retreat. The ardor of the troops to return 
 to the charge, decided his irresohition. He 
 rode rapidly along the front of his divisions, 
 and addressing the soldiers — 'MVe have re- 
 tired far enough for to-day," said he; ^'you 
 know i always sleep upon the field of 
 battle !" 
 
 The army, with unanimous shout, pro- 
 claimed to him a promise of victory. Napo- 
 leon resumed the offensive. The Austrian 
 advance guard, panic-struck at the sight of 
 a formidable and unbroken body presenting 
 itself suddenly at a point where, a few mo- 
 ments before, only fugitives were to be seen, 
 went to the right about, and carried disorder 
 into the mass of its columns. Attacked im- 
 mediatel}^ afterward, with impetuosity, in its 
 front and flanks, the Austrian army was 
 completely routed. 
 
 Marshal Daun experienced nearly the 
 same fate as General Melas, at the battle 
 of Torgau, in the campaign of 1760. 
 
 The position of the Austrian army was 
 excellent. It had its left upon Torgau, its 
 right on the plateau of Siptitz, and its front 
 covered by a large sheet of water. 
 
78 napoleon's 
 
 Frederick proposed to turn its right in 
 order to make an attack upon the rear. For 
 this purpose he divided his arm}'' into two 
 corps, the one under the orders of Ziethen, 
 witli instructions to attack in front, follow- 
 ing the edge of the water; the other under 
 his own immediate command, with which he 
 set out to turn the right of the Austrians. 
 But Marshal Daun having had intimation of 
 the movements of the enemy, changed his 
 front by countermarching, and w^as thus 
 enabled to repel the attacks of Frederick, 
 whom he obliged to retreat. The two corps 
 of the Prussian army had been acting with- 
 out communication. Ziethen, in the mean- 
 time, hearing the fire recede, concluded that 
 the king had been beaten, and commenced a 
 movement by his left in order to rejoin himj 
 but falling in with two battalions of the 
 reserve, the Prussian general profited by this 
 reinforcement to resume the offensive. Ac- 
 cordingly he renowned the attack with vigor, 
 got possession of the plateau of Siptitz, and 
 soon after of the wdiole field of battle. The 
 sun had already set when the King of Prus- 
 sia received the news of this unexpected 
 good fortune. He returned in all haste, took 
 advantage of the night to restore order in 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 79 
 
 his disorganized army, and the day after the 
 battle occupied Torgan. 
 
 Marshal Daun was receiving congratula- 
 tions upon his victory, when he heard that 
 the Prussians had resumed the offensive. 
 He immediately commanded a retreat, and 
 at daybreak the Austrians repassed the Elbe 
 with the loss of twelve thousand men, eight 
 thousand prisoners, and forty-five pieces of 
 cannon. 
 
 After the battle of Marengo, General Mê- 
 las, although in the midst of his fortresses 
 and magazines, saw himself compelled to 
 abandon everything, in order to save the 
 wreck of his army. 
 
 General Mack capitulated after the battle 
 of Ulm, although in the centre of his own 
 country. 
 
 The Prussians, in spite of their depots 
 and reserves, were obliged, after the battle 
 of Jena, and the French after that of Wa- 
 terloo, to lay down their arms. 
 
 Hence, we may conclude that the misfor- 
 tune that results from the loss of a battle, 
 does not consist so much in the destruction 
 of men and of materiel as in the discourage- 
 mentrwhich follows this disaster. The cour- 
 age and confidence of the victors augment 
 
80 napoleon's 
 
 in proportion as those of the vanquished 
 diminish; and whatever may be the resources 
 of an army, it will be found that a retreat 
 will degenerate rapidly into a rout unless 
 the general-in-chief shall succeed, by com- 
 bining boldness wjth skill, and perseverance 
 with firmness, in restoring the morale of his 
 army. 
 
 MAXIM XXXII. 
 
 The duty of an advanced guard does 
 not consist in advancing or retiring, but 
 in manoeuvring. An advanced guard 
 should be composed of light cavalry, sup- 
 ported by a reserve of heavy cavalry, and 
 by battalions of infantry, supported also 
 by artillery. An advanced guard should 
 consist of picked troops, and the general 
 officers, officers and men, should be se- 
 lected for their respective capabilities and 
 knowledge. A corps deficient in instruc- 
 tion is only an embarrassment to an ad- 
 vanced guard. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It was the opinion of Frederick that an 
 advanced guard should be composed of de- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 81 
 
 tachments of troops of all arms. The com- 
 mander should possess skill in the choice of 
 ground, and he should take care to be in- 
 stantly informed, by means of > numerous 
 patrols, of everything passing in the enemy's 
 camp. 
 
 In war, it is not the business of an ad- 
 vanced guard to fight, but to observe the 
 enemy, in order to cover the movements of 
 the army. When in pursuit, the advanced 
 guard should charge with vigor, and cut off 
 the baggage and insulated corps of the retir- 
 ing enemy. For this purpose, it should be 
 reinforced with all the disposable light cav- 
 alry of the army. 
 
 MAXIM XXXIII. 
 
 It is contrary to the usages of war to 
 allow parks or batteries of artillery to 
 enter a defile, unless you hold the other 
 extremity. In case of retreat, the guns 
 will embarrass your movements and be 
 lost. They should be left in position, 
 under a sufficient escort, until you are 
 master of the opening. 
 
82 napolkon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 JSTotliing encumbers the march of an army 
 so much as a quantity of baggage. In the 
 campaign of 1796, Napoleon abandoned his 
 battering train under the walls of Mantua, 
 after spiking the guns and destroying the 
 carriages. By this sacrifice, he acquired a 
 facility of manœuvring rapidly his little 
 army, and obtained the initiative as well as 
 a general superiority over the numerous but 
 divided forces of Marshal Wurmser. 
 
 In 1799, during his retreat in Italy, Gen- 
 eral Moreau being comj^elled to manœuvre 
 among the mountains, preferred separating 
 himself entirely from his reserve artillery, 
 which lie directed upon France by the Col 
 de Fenestrelle, rather than embarrass his 
 march with this part of his equipment. 
 
 These are the examples we should follow; 
 for if, by a rapidity of march, and a facility 
 of concentration upon decisive points, the 
 victory is gained, the materiel of an army is 
 soon re-established. But if, on the other 
 hand, we are beaten and compelled to retreat, 
 it will be difficult to save our equipments, 
 and we may have reason to congratulate 
 
MAXIMS OF. WAR. 
 
 ourselves that we abandoned them in time 
 to prevent them from augmenting the tro- 
 phies of the enemy. 
 
 MAXIM XXXIV. 
 
 It should be laid down as a principle, 
 never to leave intervals bv which the ene- 
 my can penetrate between corps formed 
 in order of battle, unless it be to draw 
 him into a snare. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In the campaign of 1757, tlie Prince of 
 Lorraine, who was covering Prague with 
 the Austrian arm}^ perceived the Prussians 
 threatening, by a flank movement, to turn 
 his right. He immediately ordered a partial 
 change of front by tlirowing back the infan- 
 try of that wing, so as to form a right angle 
 with the rest of the line. But this manœu- 
 vre being executed in presence of the enemy, 
 was not effected witliout some disorder. 
 The heads of the columns having marched 
 too quick, caused the rear to lengthen out, 
 and when the line was formed to the right, 
 a large interval appeared at the salient an- 
 
84 napoleon's 
 
 gle, Frederick, observing tliis error, hasten- 
 ed to take advantage of it. He directed his 
 centre corps, commanded by the Duke of 
 Bevern, to throw itself into this opening, 
 and by this manœuvre decided the fate of 
 the battle. 
 
 The Prince of Lorraine returned to Prague, 
 beaten and pursued, with the loss of sixteen 
 thousand men and two hundred pieces of 
 cannon. 
 
 It should be observed at the same time, 
 that this operation of throwing a corps into 
 the intervals made by an army in time of 
 battle, should never be attempted unless you 
 are at least equal in force, and have an op- 
 portunity of outflanking the enemy on the 
 one side or the othei' ; for it is then only you 
 can hope to divide his army in the centre, 
 and insulate the wings entirely. If you are 
 inferior in number, you run the risk of be- 
 ing stopped by the reverses, and overpower- 
 ed by the enemy's wings, which may deploy 
 upon your flanks and surround you. 
 
 It was by this manœuvre that the Duke of 
 Berwick gained the battle of Almanza, in 
 the year 1707, in Spain.' 
 
 The Anglo -Portuguese army, under the 
 command of Lord Galloway, came to invest 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 85 
 
 Villena. Marshal Berwick, who commanded 
 the French and Spanish army, quitted liis 
 camp at Montalegre, and moved upon this 
 town to raise the siepje. At liis approach, 
 the English general, eager to fight a battle, 
 advanced to meet him in the plains of Al- . 
 manza. The issue was long doubtful. The 
 first line, commanded b}" the Duke of Popoli, 
 having been broken, the Chevalier d'Asfeldt, 
 who had charge of the second, drew up his 
 masses with large intervals between them ; 
 and when the English, who were in pursuit 
 of the first line, reached these reserves, he 
 took advantage of their disorder to attack 
 them in flank and defeated them entirely. 
 
 Marshal Berwick, perceiving the success 
 of this manœuvre, threw open his front, and 
 deploying upon the enemy's flanks, while 
 the reserve sustained the attack in front, 
 and the cavalry manoeuvred in their rear, 
 obtained a complete victory. 
 
 Lord Gallowa}^, wounded and pursued, 
 collected with difliculty the remains of his 
 army, and took shelter with them in Tor- 
 tosa. 
 
 8 
 
86 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM XXXV. 
 
 Encampments of tlie same army should 
 ♦ always be formed so as to protect each 
 other. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 At the battle of Dresden, in the campaign 
 of 1813, the camp of the allies, although ad- 
 vantageously placed upon the heights on 
 the left bank of the Elbe, was nevertheless 
 extremely defective, from being traversed 
 longitudinally by a deep ravine, which sepa- 
 rated the left wing completely from the cen- 
 tre and the right. This vicious arrangement 
 did not escape the penetrating eye of Napo- 
 leon. He instantly directed the whole of 
 his cavalry and two corps of infantry against 
 the insulated wing, attacked it with suj^erior 
 numbers, overthrew it, and took ten thou- 
 sand prisoners, before it was possible to 
 come to its support. 
 
 MAXIM XXXVI. 
 
 When the enemy's arni}^ is covered by 
 a river, upon which he holds several tètes 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 87 
 
 de pont, do not attack in front. This 
 .would divide jour force and expose you 
 to be turned. Approach the river in 
 echelon of columns, in such a manner 
 that the leading column shall be the only 
 one the enemj^ can attack, without offer- 
 ing you his iiank. In the meantime, let 
 your light troops occupy the bank, and 
 when you have decided on the point of 
 passage, rush upon it and fling across 
 your bridge. Observe that the point of 
 passage should be always at a distance 
 from the loading echelon, in order to de- 
 ceive the enemy. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 If you occnp3" a town or a village on the 
 bank of a river, opposite to tliat held by the 
 enemy, it is an advantage to make this spot 
 the crossing point, because it is easier to 
 cover your carriages and reserve artillery, 
 as well as to mask the construction of y oar 
 bridge, in a town, than in the open country. 
 It is also a great advantage to pass a river 
 opposite a village, when the latter is only 
 weakly occupied by the enemy ; because as 
 soon as the advanced guard reaches the 
 
88 napoleon's 
 
 other side, it carries this post, makes a lodg- 
 ment, and by throwing up a few defensive 
 works, converts it easily into a tête de pont. 
 By this means, the rest of the army is en- 
 abled to effect the passage with facility. 
 
 MAXIM XXXVII. 
 
 From the moment you are master of a 
 position which commands the opposite 
 bank, facilities are acquired for effecting 
 the passage of the river; above all, if this 
 position is sufficiently extensive to place 
 upon it artillery in force. This advantage 
 is diminished, if the river is more than 
 three hundred toises (or six hundred 
 3^ards) in breadth, because the distance 
 being out of the range of grape, it is easy 
 for the troops which defend the passage 
 to line the bank and get under cover. 
 Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, 
 ordered to pass the river for the protec- 
 tion of the bridge, should reach the other 
 side, they would be destroyed by the 
 fire of the enemy; because his batteries, 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 89 
 
 placed at the distance of two hundred 
 toises from the landing, are capahle of a 
 most destructive efiect, although removed 
 above five hundred toises from the bat- 
 teries of the crossing force. Thus the 
 advantage of the artillery would be ex- 
 clusively his. For the same i%ason, the 
 passage is impracticable, unless you suc- 
 ceed in surprising the enemy, and are 
 protected by an intermediate island, or, 
 unless you are able to take advantage of 
 an angle in the river, to establish a cross- 
 fire upon his works. In this case, the 
 island or angle forms a natural tete de pont, 
 and gives the advantage in artillery to 
 the attacking army. , 
 
 When a river is less than sixty toises 
 (or one hundred and twenty yards) in 
 breadth, and you have a post upon the 
 other side, the troops which are thrown 
 across derive such advantages from tlie 
 protection of your artillery, that, however 
 small the angle may be, it is impossible 
 for the enemy to prevent the establish- 
 ment of a bridge. In this case, the most 
 skilful 2;enerals, when they have discovt^r- 
 
90 napoleon's 
 
 ed the project of their adversary, and 
 brought their own army to the point of 
 crossing, usually content themselves with 
 opposing the passage of the bridge, by 
 forming a semicircle round its extremity, 
 as round the opening of a defile, and re- 
 moving to the distance of three or four 
 hundred toises from the fire of the oppo- 
 site side. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Frederick observes, that '^the passage of 
 great rivers in the presence of the enemy is 
 one of the most delicate operations in war." 
 Success on these occasions depends on se- 
 crecy, on the rapidity of the manœuvres, 
 and the punctual execution of the orders 
 given for the movements of each division. 
 To pass such an obstacle in presence of an 
 enemy, and without his knowledge, it is 
 necessary not only that the previous dispo- 
 sitions should be well conceived, but that 
 they should be executed without confusion. 
 
 In the campaign of 1705, Prince Eugene, 
 of Savoy, wishing to come to the assistance 
 of the Prince of Piedmont, sought for a 
 favorable point at which to force the passage 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 91 
 
 of the Adda, defended at that time by the 
 French army, under the command of the 
 Duke de Vendôme. 
 
 After havinij: selected an advantao^eous 
 situation, Prince Eugene erected a battery 
 of twenty pieces of cannon on a position 
 which commanded the entire of the opposite 
 bank, and covered his infantry by a line of 
 entrenched parallels constructed on the 
 slope of the declivity. 
 
 The}" were working vigorously at the 
 bridge, wlien the Duke de Vendôme appeared 
 with his whole army. At first he seemed 
 determined to opj^ose its construction, but 
 after having examined the position of Prince 
 Eugene, he judged this to be impracticable. 
 
 He therefore placed his army out of reach 
 of the prince's batteries, resting both his 
 wings upon the river, so as to form a bow^, 
 of which the Adda was the cord He then 
 covered himself with eti trench ments and 
 abattis, and was thus enabled to charge the 
 enem3''s columns whenever they debouched 
 from the bridge, and to beat them in detail. 
 
 Eugene, having reconnoitred the position 
 of the French, considered the passage im- 
 possible. He therefore withdrew the bridge, 
 and broke up his camp during the night. 
 
92 napoleon's 
 
 It was by this manœuvre, also, that, in the 
 campaign of 1809, the Archduke Charles 
 compelled the French to reoccupy the isle 
 of Lobau, after having debouched on the 
 left bank of the Danube. The march of the 
 Archduke Charles was wholly concentric. 
 He menaced Grosaspern with his right, Es- 
 ling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with 
 his left. 
 
 His army, with both wings resting on the 
 Danube, formed a semicircle around Esling. 
 Napoleon immediately attacked and broke 
 the centre of the Austrians; but after hav. 
 ing forced their first line, he found himself 
 arrested by the reserves. In the meantime, 
 the bridges upon the Danube had been de- 
 stroyed, and several of his corps, with their 
 parks of artillery, were still on the right 
 bank. This disappointment, joined to the 
 favorable position of the Austrians, decided 
 Napoleon to re-enter the isle of Lobau, where 
 he had previously constructed a line of field- 
 works, so as to give it all the advantages of 
 a well entrenched camp. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 93 
 
 MAXIM XXXVIII. 
 
 It is difficult to prevent an enemy, 
 supplied with pontoons, from crossing 
 a river. When the object of an army, 
 which defends the passage, is to cover a 
 siege, the moment the general has ascer- 
 tained his inability to oppose the passage, 
 he should take measures to arrive before 
 the enemy, at an intermediate position 
 between the river he defends and the 
 place he desires to cover. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Here we may observe, that this inter- 
 mediate position should be reconnoitred, or 
 rather, well entrenched beforehand; for the 
 enemy will be unable to make an often sive 
 movement against the corps emplo^^ed in 
 the siege, until' he has beaten the army of 
 observation; and the latter, under cover of 
 its camp, may always await a favorable 
 opportunity to attack him in flank or in 
 rear. 
 
 Besides, the army which is once entrenched 
 in this manner, has the advantasre of beinc: 
 
94 napoleon's 
 
 concentrated; while that of the enemy must 
 act in detachments, if he wishes to cover his 
 bridge, and watch the movements of the 
 army of observation, so as to enable him to 
 attack the besieging corps in its lines, with- 
 out being exposed to an attempt on his rear, 
 or being menaced with the loss of his bridge. 
 
 MAXIM XXXIX. 
 
 In the campaign of 1645, Turenn'e was 
 attacked w^ith his army before Pliilipsburg 
 by a very superior force. There was no 
 bridge here over the Rhine, but he took 
 advantage of the ground between the river 
 and the place to establish his camp. This 
 should serve as a lesson to engineer offi- 
 cers, not merely in the construction of for- 
 tresses, but of teies de pont. A space should 
 always be left between the fortress and 
 the river, where an army may form and 
 rally without being obliged to throw, itself 
 into the place, and thereby compromise 
 its security. An army retiring upon May- 
 ence before a pursuing enemy, is necessa- 
 rily compromised; for this reason, because 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 95 
 
 it requires more than a day to pass the 
 bridge, and because the lines of Cassel are 
 too confined to admit an army to remain 
 there without being blocked up. Two 
 hundred toises should have been left be- 
 tween that place and the Rhine. It is 
 essential that all tetcs de pont before great 
 great rivers should be constructed upon 
 this principle, otherwise they will prove a 
 very inefficient assistance to protect the 
 passage of a retreating army. Tetes de 
 pont, as laid down in our schools, are of 
 use only for small rivers, the -passage of 
 which is comparatively short. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Marshal Saxe, in the campaign of 1741, 
 having passed the Moldau in quest of a de- 
 tached corps of fourteen thousand men, which 
 was about to throw itself into Prague, left a 
 thousand infantry upon that river, Avitii or- 
 ders to entrench themselves upon a height 
 directly opposite the tête de pont. By this 
 precaution, the marshal secured his retreat, 
 and also the facility of repassing the bridge 
 without disorder, by rallying his divisions 
 between the entrenched height and the tête 
 de pont. 
 
96 napoleon's 
 
 Were these examples llnkno^Yn to the gen- 
 erals of modern times, or are they disposed 
 to think such precautions superfluous ? 
 
 MAXIM XL. 
 
 Fortresses are equally useful in offen- 
 sive and defensive warfare. It is true, 
 they will not in themselves arrest an 
 army, but they are an excellent means of 
 retarding, embarrassing, weakening and 
 annoying a victorious enemy. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The brilliant success of the allied armies in 
 the campaign of 1814, has given to many 
 military men a false idea of the real value of 
 fortresses. 
 
 The formidable bodies which crossed the 
 Bhine and the Alps at this period, were en- 
 abled to spare large detachments to blockade 
 the strong places that covered the frontiers 
 of France, without materially aifecting the 
 numerical superiority of the army which 
 marched upon the capital. This army was 
 
^ MAXIMS OF WAR. 97 
 
 in a condition, therefore, to act, without the 
 fear of being menaced in its line of retreat. 
 But at no period of military history were 
 the armies of Europe so combined before, or 
 .governed so entirely by one common mind in 
 the attainment of a single object. Under 
 these circumstances, the line of fortresses 
 which surround France was rendered un- 
 available during the campaign; but it would 
 be very imprudent, therefore, to conclude 
 that a frontier guarded by numerous for- 
 tresses may be passed with impunity ; or 
 that battles may be fought with these places 
 in your rear, without previously besieging, 
 or at least investing them with sufficient 
 forces. 
 
 MAXIM XLI. 
 
 There are only two ways of insuring the 
 success of a siege. The first, to tegin by 
 beating the enemy's array employed to 
 cover the place, forcing it out of the field, 
 and throwing its remains beyond some 
 great natural obstacle, such as a chain of 
 mountains, or large river. Having accom- 
 9 
 
98 napoleon's 
 
 plished this object, an army of observa- 
 tion should be placed behind the natural 
 obstacle, until the trenches are finished 
 and the place taken. 
 
 But if it be desired to take the place in 
 presence of a relieving army, without risk- 
 ing a battle, then the whole materiel and 
 equipment for a siege are necessary to 
 begin with, together with ammunition and 
 provisions for the presumed period of its 
 duration, and also lines of contravallation 
 and circumvallation, aided by all the lo- 
 calities of heights, woods, marshes and 
 inundations. ^ 
 
 Having no longer occasion to keep up 
 communications with your depots, it is 
 now only requisite to hold in check the 
 relieving army. For this purpose, an army 
 of observation should be formed, whose 
 business it is never to lose sight of that of 
 the enemy, and which, while it effectually 
 bars all access to the place, has always 
 time enough to arrive upon his flanks or 
 rear in case he should attempt to steal a 
 march. 
 ' It is to be remembered, too, that by 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 99 
 
 profiting judiciously by the lines of con- 
 travallation, a portion of the besieging 
 army will always be available in giving 
 battle to the approaching enemy. 
 
 Upon the same general principle, when 
 a place is to be besieged in presence of an 
 enemy's army, it is necessary to cover the 
 siege by lines of circumvallation. 
 
 If the besieging force is of numerical 
 strength enough (after leaving a corps 
 before the place four times the amount 
 of the garrison) to cope with the reliev- 
 ing army, it may remove more than one 
 day's march from the place ; but if it be 
 inferior in numbers after providing for 
 the siege, as above stated, it should re- 
 main only a short day's march from the 
 spot, in order to fall back upon its lines, 
 if necessary, or receive succor in case of 
 attack. 
 
 If the investing corps and army of 
 observation are onl}^ equal when united 
 to the relieving force, the besieging army 
 should remain entire w^ithin, or near its 
 lines, and push the w^orks and the siege 
 with the greatest activity. 
 
100 napoleon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 "■ When we undertake a siege," says Mon- 
 técucuUi, " we should not seek to place our- 
 selves opposite the weakest part of the for- 
 tress, but at the point most favorable for 
 establishing a camp and executing the de- 
 sie'ns we have in view." 
 
 This maxim was well understood by the 
 Duke of Berwick. Sent to form the siege of 
 Nice in 1706, he determined to attack on the 
 side of Montalban, contrarj^ to the advice of 
 Yanban, and even to the orders of the king. 
 Having a very small army at his disposal, 
 he began by securing his camjD. This he did 
 by constructing redoubts upon the heights 
 that shut in the space between the Yar and 
 the Paillon, two rivers which supported his 
 flanks. By this means, he protected himself 
 against a surprise; for the Duke of Savoy, 
 having the power of debouching suddenly 
 by the Col de Tende, it was necessary that 
 the marshal should be enabled to assemble 
 his forces, so as to move rapidty upon his 
 adversary, and fight him before he got into 
 position ; otherwise his inferiority in num- 
 bers would have obliged him to raise the 
 siege. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 101 
 
 When Marshal Saxe was besieging Brus- 
 sels, with only twenty-eight thousand men, 
 opposed to a garrison of twelve thousand, 
 he received intelligence that the Prince of 
 Waldeck was assembling his forces to raise 
 the siege. Not being strong enough to form 
 an army of observation, the marshal recon- 
 noitred a field of battle on the little river Vol- 
 uve, and made all the necessary dispositions 
 for moving rapidly to the spot, in case of 
 the approach of the enemy. By this means 
 he was prepared to receive his adversary 
 without discontinuing the operations of the 
 siege. 
 
 MAXIM XLII. 
 
 Feuquiere says that " we should never 
 wait for the enemy in the lines of circum- 
 vallation, but we sîioulcl go out and attack 
 him." He is in error. There is no au- 
 thority in war without exception ; and it 
 would be dangerous to proscribe the prin- 
 ciple of awaiting the enemy within the 
 lines of circumvallation. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 During the siege of Mons, in 1691, the 
 Prince of Orange assembled his army, and 
 
102 napoleon's 
 
 advanced as far as Notre Dame de Ilalle, 
 making a demonstration to succor the place. 
 Louis Xiy, who commanded the siege in 
 person, called a council of war to deliberate 
 on what w^as to be done in case the Prince 
 of Orange approached. The opinion of 
 Marshal Luxembourg was to remain within 
 the lines of circumvallation, and that opin- 
 ion prevailed. 
 
 The marshal laid it down as a principle 
 that, when the besieging army is not strong 
 enough to defend the wdiole extent of cir- 
 cumvallation, it should quit the lines and 
 advance to meet the enemy; but when it is 
 strong enough to encamp in tw^o lines around 
 a place, that it is better to profit by a good 
 entrenchment — more especially as by this 
 means the siege is not interrupted. 
 
 In 1658, Marshal Turenne was besieging 
 Dunkirk. He had already opened the 
 trenches, when the Spanish army, under 
 the orders of the Prince Don Juan, Condé, 
 and D'Hocquincourt, appeared in sight, and 
 took post upon the Downs, at a distance of 
 a leaa'ue from his lines. Turenne had the 
 superiority in numbers, and he determined 
 to quit his entrenchments. lie had other 
 advantages also. The enemy was without 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 103 
 
 artillery, and their superiority in cavalry 
 was rendered useless by the unfavorable 
 nature of the ground. It was, therefore, of 
 groat importance to beat the Spanish army 
 before it had time to entrench itself and 
 bring up its artillery. The victor}^ gained 
 by the French on this occasion justified all 
 the combinations of Marshal Turenne. 
 
 When Marshal Berwick was laying siege 
 to Pliilipsburgh, in 1733, he had reason to 
 apprehend that the Prince of Savoy would 
 attack hira with all the forces of the emj)ire 
 before its termination. The marshal, there- 
 fore, after having made his disposition of 
 the troops intended for the siege, formed, 
 with the rest of his army, a corps of observ- 
 ation to make head against Prince Eugene, 
 in case the latter should choose to attack 
 him in his lines, or attempt a diversion on 
 the Moselle or Uj^per Rhine. Prince Eu- 
 gene, having arrived in front of the besieg- 
 ing army, some general officers were of 
 opinion that it was better not to await the 
 enemy in the lines, but to move forward 
 and attack him. But Marshal Berwick, who 
 agreed with the Duke of Luxembourg, that 
 an army which can occupy, completely, good 
 entrenchments is not liable to be forced, per- 
 
104 napoleon's 
 
 sisted in remaining within his works. The 
 result proved that this was also the opinion- of 
 Prince Eugene, for he did not dare to attack 
 the entrenchments, which ho would not have 
 failed to do if he had any hopes of success. 
 
 MAXIM XLIII. 
 
 Those who proscribe lines of circum- 
 vallation, and all the assistance which the 
 science of the engineer can afford, deprive 
 themselves gratuitously of an auxiliary 
 which is never injurious, almost always 
 useful, and often indispensable. It must 
 be admitted, at the same time, that the 
 principles of field-fortiiication require im- 
 provement. This important branch of 
 the art of war has made no progress since 
 the time of the ancients. It is even in- 
 ferior at this day to what it was two thou- 
 sand years ago. Engineer officers should 
 be encouraged in bringing this branch of 
 their art to perfection, and in placing it 
 upon a level with the rest. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 '< If we are inferior in numbers," says 
 Marshal Saxe, '' entrenchments are of no 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 105 
 
 use, for the enemy will bring all his forces 
 to bear upon particular points. If we are 
 of equal strength they are unnecessary also. 
 If we are superior, we do not want them. 
 Then why give ourselves the trouble to en- 
 trench ?" Notwithstanding this opinion of 
 the inutility of entrenchments, Marshal Saxe 
 often had recourse to them. 
 
 In 1797, Generals Provéra and Hohenzol- 
 lern having presented themselves before 
 Mantua (where Marshal Wurmser was shut 
 up), for the purpose of raising the siege, 
 they were stopi^ed by the lines of contraval- 
 lation of St. George. This slight obstacle 
 sufficed to afford Napoleon time to arrive 
 from Eivoli and defeat their enterprise. It 
 was in consequence of neglecting to en- 
 trench themselves that the French had been 
 obliged to raise the siege in the preceding 
 campai c:n. 
 
 MAXIM XLIY. 
 
 If circumstances prevent a sufficient 
 garrison being left to defend a fortified 
 town, which contains an hospital and 
 magazines, at least every means should 
 
106 napoleon's 
 
 be employed to secure the citadel against 
 a coup de main. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 A few battalions dispersed about a town, 
 inspire no terror; but shut up in the more 
 narrow outline of a citadel, they assume an 
 imposing attitude. For this reason it ap- 
 pears to me that such a precaution is al- 
 ways necessary, not only in fortresses, but 
 wherever there are hospitals or depots of any 
 kind. Where there is no citadel, some quar- 
 ter of the town should be fixed uj^on most 
 favorable for defence, and entrenched in such , 
 a manner as to oppose the greatest resistance 
 possible. 
 
 MAXIM XLV. 
 
 A fortified place can only protect the 
 garrison and detain the enemy for a cer- 
 tain .^time. When this time has elapsed, , 
 ^ and. the defences of the place are desti^oy- 
 ed, the garrison should lay down its arms. 
 All civilized nations are agreed on this 
 ^oint, and there never has been an argu- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 107 
 
 ment except with reference to the greater 
 or less degree of defence which a governor 
 is bound to make before he capitulates. 
 At the same time, there are generals — 
 Villars among the number — who are of 
 opinion that a governor should never sur- 
 render, but that in the last extremity he 
 should blow up the fortifications, and take 
 advantage of the night to cut his way 
 through the besieging army. Where he 
 is unable to blow up tUe fortifications, he 
 may always retire, they say, with his gar- 
 rison, and save the men. 
 
 Officers w^ho have adopted this line of 
 conduct, have often brought off three- 
 fourths of their garrison. , 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Ill 1705, the French, wlio were besieged in 
 naguenau by Count Thungen, found them- 
 selves incapable of sustaining an assault. 
 Péri, the governor, who had already dis- 
 tinguished himself by a vigorous defence, 
 despairing of being allowed to capitulate on 
 any terms short of becoming prisoner of 
 war, resolved to abandon the place and cut 
 his way through the besiegers. 
 
108 napoleon's 
 
 In order to conceal his intention more 
 effectually, and while he deceived the enemy, 
 to sound at the same time the disposition of 
 his officers, he assembled a council of war 
 and declared his resolution to die in the 
 breach. Then, under pretext of the ex- 
 tremity to which he was reduced, he com- 
 manded the whole garrison under arms ; and 
 leaving only a few sharpshooters in the 
 breach, gave the order to march, and set out 
 in silence, under cover of the night, from 
 Haguenau. This audacious enterprise was 
 crowned with success, and Péri reached Sa- 
 verne without having suffered the smallest 
 loss. 
 
 Two fine instances of defence in later times 
 are those of Massena at Grenoa, and of Pala- 
 fox at Saragossa. 
 
 The first marched out with arms and bag- 
 gage, and all the honors of war, after reject- 
 ing every summons, and defending himself 
 until hunger alone compelled him to capitu- 
 late. The second only yielded after having 
 buried his garrison amid the ruins of the 
 city, which he defended from house to house, 
 until famine and death left him no alter- 
 native but to surrender. This siege, which 
 was equally honorable to ^ the French as to 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 109 
 
 the Spaniards, is one of the most memorable 
 m the history of war. In the course of it, 
 i^alafox displayed every possible resource 
 which coura-e and obstinacy can supply in 
 the defence of a fortress. 
 
 AH real strength is founded in the mind • 
 and on this account I am of opinion that we 
 should be directed in the choice of a o-ov- 
 ernor, less by his genius than his personal 
 character. His most essential qualities should 
 be courage, perseverance, and soldierlike de- 
 votedness. Above all, he should possess the 
 talent not only of infusing courage into the 
 garrison, but of kindling a spirit of resistance 
 HI the whole population. Where the latter 
 IS wanting, however art may multiply the 
 defences of a place, the garrison will be com- 
 pelled to capitulate after having sustained 
 the first, or at most, the second assault. 
 
 MAXIM XLYI. 
 
 The keys of a fortress are well worth 
 tlie retirement of the garrison, when it is 
 resolved to yield only on those conditions. 
 On this principle it is always wiser to 
 
110 napoleon's 
 
 grant an honorable capitulation to a garri- 
 son which has made a vigorous resistance, 
 than to risk an assault. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Marshal Yillars has justly obsei'ved, that 
 ''no governor of a place should he permitted 
 to excuse himself for surrendering, on the 
 ground of wishing to preserve the king's 
 troops. Every garrison that displays courage 
 will escape being prisoners of war. For there 
 is no general who, however well assured of 
 carrying a place by assault, will not prefer 
 granting terms of capitulation rather than 
 risk the loss of a thousand men in forcing 
 determined troops to surrender.'' 
 
 MAXIM XLVII. 
 
 Infantry, cavalry, and artillery, are noth- 
 ing without each other; therefore, they 
 should always be so disposed in canton- 
 ments as to assist each other in case of 
 surprise. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 ^' A general," says Frederick, " should di- 
 rect his whole attention to the tranquility of 
 
MAXIMS OP WAR. Ill 
 
 his cantonments, in order that the soldier 
 may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose 
 in security from his flxtigues. AVith this 
 view, care should be taken that the troops 
 are able to form rapidly upon ground which 
 has been previously reconnoitered ; that the 
 generals remain always with their divisions 
 or brigades, and that the service is carried 
 on throughout with exactness." 
 
 Marshal Saxe is of opinion that an army 
 should not be in a hurry to quit its can- 
 tonments, but that it should wait till the 
 enemy has exhausted himself with march- 
 ing, and be ready to fall upon liim with 
 fresh troops wlien he is overcome with 
 fatigue. 
 
 I believe, however, that it would be dan- 
 gerous to trust implicitly to this high au- 
 thority, for there are many occasions where 
 all the advantage lies in the initiative, more 
 especially when the enemy has been com- 
 pelled to extend his cantonments, from scar- 
 city of subsistence, and can be attacked 
 before he has time to concentrate his foi*ces. 
 
112 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM XLVIII. 
 
 The formation of infantry in line slioulcl 
 be always in two ranks, because the 
 length of the musket only admits of an 
 effective fire in this formation. The dis- 
 chari>:e of the third rank is not onlv un- 
 certain, but frequently dangerous to the 
 ranks in its front. In drawing up infantry 
 in two ranks, there should be a super- 
 numerary behind every fourth or fifth 
 file. A reserve should likewise be placed 
 twenty-five paces in rear of each fiank. 
 
 • 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 I am of opinion, if circumstances require 
 a line of infantry to resort to a square, that 
 two deep is too light a formation to resist 
 the shock of cavahy. However useless the 
 third rank may appear for the j)nrpose of 
 file-firing, it is, notwithstanding necessary, 
 in order to replace the men who fall in tire 
 ranks in front; otherwise you would be 
 obliged to close in the files, and by this 
 means leave intervals between the compa- 
 nies, which the cavalry would not fail to 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 113 
 
 penetrate. It appears to me, also, that when 
 infantry is formed in two ranks, the columns 
 will be found to open out in marching to a 
 flank. If it should be considered advanta- 
 geous behind entrenchments to keep the in- 
 fantry in two raidîs, the third rank should 
 be placed in reserve, and brought forward 
 to relieve the front rank when fatigued, or 
 when the fire is observed to slacken. I am 
 induced to make these remarks, because I 
 have seen an excellent pamphlet which pro- 
 poses the two-deep formation for infantry as 
 the best. The author supports his opinion 
 by a variety of plausible reasons, but not 
 sufficient, as it appears to me, to answer all 
 the objections that may be offered to this 
 practice. 
 
 MAXIM XLIX. 
 
 The practice of mixing small bodies of 
 infantry and cavalry together is a bad 
 one, and attended with many inconveni- 
 ences. The cavalry loses its power of ac- 
 tion. It becomes fettered in all its move- 
 ments. Its energy is destroyed ; even 
 the infantry itself is compromised, for on 
 
114 napoleon's 
 
 the first movement of tlie cavalry it is 
 left without support. The best mode of 
 protecting cavahy is to cover its flank. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This also was the opinion of Marshal 
 Saxe. "■ The weakness of the above forma- 
 tion/' says he, " is sufficient in itself to in- 
 timidate the platoons of infantry, because 
 they must be lost if the cavalry is beaten." 
 The cavalry, also, which depends on the 
 infantry for succor, is disconcerted the mo- 
 ment a brisk forward movement carries 
 them out of sight of their supports. Mar- 
 shal Turenne, and the generals of his time, 
 sometimes employed this order of forma- 
 tion ; but- that does not, in my opinion, 
 justify a modern author for recommending 
 it in an essay, entitled " Considerations sur 
 l'Art de la Guerre." In fact, this formation 
 has long been abandoned ; and, since the in- 
 troduction of light artillery, it appears to 
 me almost ridiculous to propose it. 
 
 MAXIM L. 
 
 Charges of cavalry are equally useful 
 at the beginning, the middle, and the 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 115 
 
 end of a battle. They slioiild be made 
 always, if possible, on the flanks of the 
 infantry, especially when the latter is en- 
 gaged in front. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The Archduke Charles, in speaking of cav- 
 alry, recommends that it shoukl be brought 
 in mass upon a decisive point, when the mo- 
 ment for employing it arrives ; that is to 
 say, when it can attack with a certainty of 
 success. As the rapidity of its movement 
 enables cavahy to act along the whole line 
 in the same day, the general who commands 
 it should keep it together as much as possi- 
 ble, and avoid dividing it into many detach- 
 ments. When the nature of the ground 
 admits of cavalry being employed on all 
 points of the line, it is desirable to form it 
 in column behind the infantr}^, and in a po- 
 sition whence it may be ea-sily directed 
 wherever it is required. If cavalry is in- 
 tended to cover a position, it should be 
 placed sufficiently in the rear to meet at full 
 speed any advance of troops coming to 
 attack that position. If it is destined to 
 cover the flank of the infantry, it should, for 
 the same reason, be placed directly behind 
 
116 napoleon's 9 
 
 it. As the object of cavalry is purely offen- 
 sive, it should be a rule to form it at such a 
 distance only from the point of collision as 
 to enable it to acquire its utmost impulse, 
 and arrive at the top of its speed into ac- 
 tion. With respect to the cavalry reserve, 
 this should only be employed at the end of 
 a battle, either to render the success more 
 decisive, or to cover the retreat. Napoleon 
 remarks that, at the battle of Waterloo, the 
 cavalry of the guard which composed the 
 reserve, was engaged against his orders. 
 He complains of having been deprived from 
 five o'clock of the use of this reserve, which, 
 when well employed, had so often insured 
 him the victory. 
 
 MAXIM LI. 
 
 It is the business of cavalry to follow 
 up the victory, and to prevent the beateu 
 enemy from rallying. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Victor or vanquished, it is of the greatest 
 importance to have a body of cavalry in 
 reserve, either to take advantage of victory. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 117 
 
 or to secure a retreat. The most decisive 
 battles lose half their value to the conquer- 
 or, when the want of cavalry prevents him 
 from following up his success, and depriving 
 the enem}^ of the power of rallying. 
 
 AVhen a retiring army is pursued, it is 
 more especially upon the flanks that the 
 weight of cavalry should fall, if you are 
 strong enough in that arm to cut off his 
 retreat. 
 
 MAXIM LII. 
 
 Artillery is more essential to cavalry 
 than to infantry, because cavalry lias no 
 fire for its defence, but depends upon the 
 sabre. It is to remedy this deficiency 
 that recourse has been had to horse-ar- 
 tillery. Cavalry, thei^efore, should never 
 be without cannon, whether when attack- 
 ing, rallying, or in piosition. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Horse-artillery is an invention of Fred- 
 erick. Austria lost no time in introducing 
 it into her armies, although in an imperfect 
 degree. It was only in 1702 that this 
 
118 napoleon's 
 
 arm was adopted in France, where it was 
 brought rapidly to its j^resent perfection. 
 
 The services of this arm durini»: the wars 
 of the Revolution were immense. It may 
 be said to have changed to a certain extent 
 the character of tactics, because its facility 
 of movement enables it to bear with rapidi- 
 ty on every point where artillery can be 
 employed with success. JSTapoleon has re" 
 marked in his memoirs that a flanking bat- 
 tery which strikes and rakes the enemy 
 obliquely, is capable of deciding a victory 
 in itself. To this we may add that, inde- 
 pendent of the advantages wiiich cavalry 
 derives from horse-artillery in securing its 
 flanks, and in opening the way for a suc- 
 cessful charge by the destructiveness of its' 
 fire, it is desirable that these two arms 
 should never be separated, but ready at all 
 times to seize upon* points w-here it may 
 be necessary to employ cannon. On these 
 occasions, the cavalry masks the march of 
 the artillery, protects its establishment in 
 position, and covers it from the attack of 
 the enemy, until it is ready to open its 
 fire. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. IIQ 
 
 MAXIM LIII. 
 
 In march, or in position, the greater 
 part of the artillery should be with the 
 divisions of infantry and cavalry. The 
 rest should be in reserve. Each srun 
 should have with it three hundred rounds, 
 without including the limber. This is 
 about the complement for two battles. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 The better infixntry is, the more important 
 it is to support it by artillery, with a view to 
 its preservation. 
 
 It is essential, also, that the batteries at- 
 tached to divisions should march in the 
 front, because this has a strong influence on 
 the morale of the soldier. He attacks always 
 with confidence when he sees the flanks of 
 the column well covered with cannon. 
 
 The artillery reserve should be kept for a 
 decisive moment, and then employed in full 
 force, for it will be diflScult for the enemy at 
 such a time to presume to attack it. 
 
 There is scarcely an instance of a battery 
 of sixt^^ pieces of cannon having been car- 
 
120 napoleon's 
 
 ried b}' a charge of infantry or cavalry, 
 unless where it was entirely without sup- 
 port, or in a position to be easily turned. 
 
 MAXI]>i LIY. 
 
 Artillery should always be placed in 
 tlie most advantageous positions, and as 
 far in front of the line of cavalrv and 
 infantry as possible, without compromis- 
 ing the safety of the guns. 
 
 Field batteries should command the 
 whole country round from the level of 
 the platform. They should on no ac- 
 count be masked on the right and left, 
 but have free range in every direction. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The battery of eighteen pieces of cannon, 
 which covered the centre of the Eussian 
 army at the battle of La Moskwa (Boro- 
 dino), may be cited as an example. 
 
 Its position, upon a circular height which 
 commanded the field in every direction, added 
 so powerfully to its effect, that its fire alone 
 sufficed, for a considerable time, to paralyze 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 121 
 
 the vigorous iittack made by tlic French 
 with their right. Although twice broken, 
 the left of the Russian army closed to this 
 battery, as to a pivot, and twice recovered 
 its former position. After repeated attacks, 
 conducted with a rare intrepidity, the bat- 
 tery was at length carried b}^ the French, 
 but not till the}' had lost the élite of their 
 army, and with it the Generals Caulincourt 
 and Montbrun. Its capture decided the re- 
 treat of the Ilussian left. 
 
 I might advert likewise to another in- 
 stance, in the campaign of 1809, and to the 
 terrible effect produced by the hundred 
 pieces of cannon of the Guard which Gen- 
 eral Lauriston directed, at the battle of 
 TVagram, again!^t the right of the Austrian 
 army. 
 
 MAXIM LY. 
 
 A General should never put his army 
 into cantonments, when he has the means 
 of collecting supplies of forage and pro- 
 visions, and of thus providing for the 
 wants of the soldier in the field. 
 11 
 
122 napoleon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 One great advantage Avliieli results from 
 having an arm^- in camp is, that it is easier 
 to direct its spirit and maintain its discipline 
 there. The soldier in cantonments aban- 
 dons himself to repose; he ends b}^ finding a 
 pleasure in idleness, and in fearing to return 
 to the field. The reverse takes place in a 
 camp. There, a feeling of ennui, and a 
 severer discipline, make him anxious for the 
 opening of the campaign, to interrupt the 
 nionoton}^ of the service and relieve it with 
 the chances and variety of war. Besides, an 
 army in camp is much more secure from a 
 surprise than in cantonments — the defect of 
 which usually consists in their occupying too 
 great an extent of ground. When an army 
 is obliged to go into quarters, the Marquis de 
 Peuquière recommends a camp to be selected 
 in front of the line, where the troops can be 
 frequently assembled — sometimes suddenly, 
 in order to exercise their vigilance, or for 
 the sole purpose of bringing the different 
 corps together. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 123 
 
 MAXIM LYI. 
 
 A good general, a well-organized sys- 
 tem, good instructions, and severe disci- 
 pline, aided by eôective establishments, 
 will always make good troops, indepen- 
 dently of the cause for which they fight. 
 
 At the same time, a love of country, a 
 spirit of enthusiasm, a sense of national 
 honor, and fanaticism, will operate upon 
 young soldiers with advantage. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This remark appears to me less applicable 
 to officers than to soldiers, for as war is not 
 a state of things natural to man, it follows 
 that those who maintain its cause musf be 
 governed by some strong excitement. Much 
 enthusiasm and devotedness are required on 
 the part of the troops for the general who 
 commands, to induce an army to perform 
 great actions in a war in wliich it takes 
 no interest. This is sufficiently proved by 
 the npathy of auxiliaries, unless when in- 
 spired by the conduct of their chief. 
 
124 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM LYII. 
 
 When a nation is without establish- 
 ments and a military system, it is very 
 difficult to oro^anize an armv. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 This is an unanswerable truth, more par- 
 ticularly with reference to an army intended 
 to act upon the system of modern war, and 
 in which order, precision, and rapidity of 
 movement, are the principal essentials to 
 success. 
 
 MAXIM LYIII. 
 
 The first qualification of a soldier is 
 fortitude under fatigue and privation. 
 Courage is only the second ; hardship, 
 poverty and want, are the best school 
 for a soldier. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Valor belongs to the young soldier as 
 well as to the veteran; but in the former 
 it is more evanescent. It is only by hab- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 125 
 
 its of service, and after several campaigns 
 that the soldier acquires that moral courage 
 which makes him support the fotigues and 
 privations of war without a murmur Ex- 
 perience by this time has instructed him to 
 supply his own wants. He is satisfied with 
 what he can procure, because he knows that 
 success is only to be obtained by fortitude 
 and perseverance. Well might Nai^oleon 
 fay that misery and want were the best 
 school for a soldier; for as nothing could be 
 compared with the total destitution of the 
 army of the Alps, when he assumed the 
 command, so nothing could equal the bril- 
 liant success which he obtained with this 
 army in the first campaign in Italy The 
 conquerors of Montenotte, Lodi, Castiglione, 
 Bassano, Arcole and Rivoli had beheld only 
 a few months before, whole battalions cov- 
 ered with rags, and deserting for the want 
 of subsistence. 
 
 MAXIM LIX. 
 
 There are ûve things the soldier should 
 never be without— his musket, his am- 
 munition, his knapsack, his provisions 
 
126 napoleon's ' 
 
 (for at leatst four days), and his entreiich- 
 ing-tool. The knapsack may be reduced 
 to the smallest size possible, if it be 
 thought proper, but the soldier should 
 always have it with him. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It is fortunate that Napoleon has recog- 
 nized the advantage of giving to every sol- 
 dier an entrenchiug-tool. His authority is 
 the best answer to the ridicule which has 
 been thrown upon those who proposed it. 
 An axe will be found to inconvenience the 
 foot-soldier as little as the sword he wears 
 at his side, and it will be infinitely more 
 useful. When axes are given out to compa- 
 nies, or are carried by fatigue-men during 
 a campaign, they are soon lost; and it 
 often happens, when a camp is to be formed, 
 that a difficulty arises in cutting wood and 
 building huts for the soldier; whereas, by 
 making the axe a part of every man's ap- 
 pointments, he is obliged to have it always 
 with him; and whether the object be to 
 entrench himself in a village, or to erect huts 
 in a. camp, the commander of a corps will 
 speedily see the advantage of this innova- 
 tion. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 127 
 
 When once the axe has been generally 
 adopted, we shall, perhaps, see the desira- 
 bility of issuing pickaxes and shovels to 
 particular companies, and also the benefit of 
 more frequent entrenchments. It is more 
 particularly^ during retreats that it is impor- 
 tant to entrench when the army has reached 
 a good position ; for an entrenched camp 
 not only furnishes the means of rallying 
 troops which are pursued, but if it be forti- 
 fied in such a manner as to render the issue 
 of an attack doubtful to the enemy, it will 
 not only sustain the morale of the soldier in 
 the retreat, but afford the general-in-chief 
 opportunities for resuming the offensive, and 
 2)rofiting by the first false movement on the 
 part of his adversary. It will be recollected 
 how Frederick, in the campaign of 1761, 
 when surrounded by two Kussian and Aus- 
 trian armies, whose united force was quad- 
 ruple his own, saved his army by entrench- 
 ing himself in the camp of Buntzalvitz. 
 
 MAXIM LX. 
 
 Every means should be taken to attach 
 the soldier to his colors. This is best 
 
128 napoleon's 
 
 accomplished by showing consideration 
 and respect to the old soldier. His pay 
 likewise should increase with his leng-th 
 of service. It is the height of injustice 
 not to pay a veteran more than a recruit. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Some modern writers have recommended, 
 on the other hand, to 'limit the period of 
 service, in order to bring the whole youth 
 of a country successively under arms. By 
 this means they purpose to have the levies, 
 en masse, all ready trained and capable of 
 resisting successfully a war of invasion. But 
 however advantageous at first sight such a 
 military system may appear, I believe it 
 will be found to have many objections. 
 
 In the first place, the soldier fatigued with 
 the minutia3 of discipHne in a garrison, will 
 not feel much inclined to re-enlist after he 
 has received his discharge, more especially 
 since, having served the prescribed time, he 
 will consider himself to have fulfilled ull the 
 duties of a citizen to his country. Eeturn- 
 ing to his friends, he will probably marry, 
 or establish himself in a trade. From that 
 moment his military spirit declines, and he 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 129 
 
 soon becomes ill îidapted to the business of 
 war. On the contrary, the soldier who 
 serves long, becomes attached to his regi- 
 ment as to a new famil3^ He submits to 
 the yoke of discipline, accustoms himself to 
 the 2')rivations his situation imposes, and 
 ends by finding his condition agreeable. 
 There are few officers that have seen ser- 
 vice who have not discovered the difference 
 between old and young soldiers, with refe- 
 rence to their power of supporting the 
 fatigues of a long camj^aign, to the deter- 
 mined courage that characterizes the attack, . 
 or to the ease with which they rally after 
 being broken. 
 
 Montécuculli observes, that *'it takes time 
 to discipline an army; more to inure it to 
 war; and still more to constitute veterans." 
 For this reason, he recommends that great -»' 
 consideration should be shown to old sol- 
 diers ; that they should be carefully pro- 
 vided for, and a large body of them kept 
 always on foot. It seems to me, also, that 
 it is not enough to increase the pay of the 
 soldier according to his period of service, 
 but that it is highly essential to confer on 
 him some mark of distinction that shall 
 secure to him privileges calculated to en- 
 
130 napoleon's 
 
 courage him to grow gray under arms, 
 and, above all, to do so with honoi'. 
 
 MAXIM LXI. 
 
 It IS not set speeches at the moment of 
 battle that render soldiers brave. The 
 veteran scarcely listens to them, and the 
 recruit forgets them at the first discharge. 
 If discourses and harangues are useful, it 
 is during the campaign : to do away un- 
 favorable impressions, to correct false 
 reports, to keep alive a proper spirit in 
 the camp, and to furnish materials and 
 amusement for the bivouac. All printed 
 orders of the day should keep in view 
 these objects. 
 
 NOTE 
 
 The opinion of the genoral-in-chief, ener- 
 getically expressed, is, notwithstanding, pro- 
 ductive of irreat effect on the morale of the 
 
 soldier. 
 
 In 1703, at the attack of Horn bee. Mar- 
 shal Yillars, seeing the troops advancing 
 without spirit, threw himself at their head : 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 131 
 
 ''What!" said he, "is it expected that I, a 
 marshal of France, should be the first to 
 escalade, when I order you to attack ?" 
 
 These few words rekindled their ardor; 
 officers and soldiers rushed upon the works, 
 and the town was taken almost without loss. 
 
 "We have retired far enough for to-day; 
 you know I always sleep upon the field of 
 battle!" said Napoleon, as he flew through 
 the ranks at the moment of resuming the 
 offensive at Marengo. These few words suf- 
 ficed to revive the courage of the soldiers, 
 and to make them forget the fatigues of the 
 day, during which almost every man had 
 been engaged. 
 
 MAXIM LXII. 
 
 Tents are unfavorable to health. The 
 soldier is best when he bivouacs, because 
 he sleeps with his feet to the fire, which 
 speedily dries the ground on which he 
 lies. A few planks, or a little straw, shel- 
 ter him from the wind. 
 
 On the other hand, tents are necessary 
 for the superior officers, who have to write 
 and to consult their maps. Tents should, 
 
132 napoleon's 
 
 therefore, be issued to these, with direc- 
 tions to them never to sleep in a house. 
 Tents are always objects of observation 
 to the enemy's staff. They afford infor- 
 mation in regard to your numbers and 
 the ground you occupy ; while an army 
 bivouacking in two or three lines, is only 
 distinguishable from afar by the smoke 
 which mingles with the clouds. It is im- 
 possible to count the number of the fires. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The acknowledged advantage of bivouack- 
 ing is another reason for adding an entrench- 
 ing-tool to the equipment of the soldier; for, 
 with the assistance of the axe and shovel, 
 he can hut himself without difficulty. I have 
 seen huts erected with the branches of trees, 
 covered with turf, where the soldier was per- 
 fectly sheltered from the cold and wet, even 
 in the worst season. ' 
 
 MAXIM LXIII. 
 
 All information obtained from prison- 
 ers should be received with caution, and 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 133 
 
 estimated at its real value. A soldier 
 seldom sees anything beyond his com- 
 pany ; and an officer can afford intelli- 
 gence of little more than the position and 
 movements of the division to which his 
 regiment belongs. On this account, the 
 general of an army should never depend 
 upon the information derived from pris- 
 oners, unless it agrees with the reports 
 received from the advanced guards, in 
 reference to the position, etc., of the 
 enemy. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Montécuculh wisely observes that "pris- 
 oners should be interrogated separately, in 
 order to ascertain, by the agreement in their 
 answers, how far they may be endeavoring 
 to mislead you/' Generally speaking, the in- 
 formation required from officers who are pris- 
 oners, should have reference to the strength 
 and resources of the enemy, and sometimes 
 to his localities and position. Frederick re- 
 commends that prisoners should be menaced 
 with instant death if they are found at- 
 tempting to deceive by false reports. 
 12 
 
134 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM LXIY. 
 
 ITotliing is so important in war as an 
 undivided command ; for this reason, 
 when war is carried on against a single 
 power, there should be only one arm}^ 
 acting upon one base, and conducted by 
 one chief. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 " Success," says the Archduke Charles, ^' is 
 only to be obtained by simultaneous eiforts, 
 directed upon a given point, sustained with 
 constancy, and executed with decision." It 
 rarely happens that any number of men 
 who desire the same object are perfectly 
 agreed as to the means of attaining it; and 
 if the will of one individual is not allowed to 
 predominate, there can be no ensemble in the 
 execution of their operations; neither will 
 they attain the end proposed. It is useless 
 to confirm this maxim by examples. His- 
 tory abounds in them. 
 
 Prince Eugene and Marlborough would 
 never have been so successful in the cam- 
 paigns which they directed in concert, if a 
 sj^irit of intrigue and difference of opinion 
 had not constantly disorganized the armies 
 opposed to them. 
 
MAXIMS OP WAR. 135 
 
 MAXIM LXY. 
 
 The same consequences which have 
 uniformly attended long discussions and 
 councils of war, will follow at all times. 
 They will terminate in the adoption of the 
 worst course, which in war is always the 
 most timid, or, if you will, the most pru- 
 dent. The only true wisdom in a general 
 is determined courage. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Prince Eugene used to say that councils of 
 war " are only useful Avhen you want an 
 excuse for attempting nothing." This was 
 also the opinion of Villars. A general-in- 
 chief should avoid, therefore, assemblincr a 
 council on occasions of difficulty, and should 
 confine himself to consulting separately his 
 most experienced generals in order to bene- 
 fit by their advice, while he is governed at 
 the same time in his decision by his own 
 judgment. By this means, he becomes re- 
 sponsible, it is true, for the measures he 
 pursues; but he has the advantage also of 
 acting upon his own conviction, and of be- 
 
136 napoleon's 
 
 ing certain that the secret of his operations 
 will not be divulged, as is usually the case 
 where it is discussed by a council of war. 
 
 MAXIM LXYI. 
 
 In war, the general alone can judge of 
 certain arrangements. It depends on him 
 alone to conquer difficulties by his own 
 superior talents and resolution. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 The officer who obeys, whatever may be 
 the nature or extent of his command, will 
 always stand excused for executing implicit- 
 ly the orders which have been given to him. 
 This is not the case with the generai-in-chief, 
 on whom the eafety of the army and the suc- 
 cess of the campaign depend. Occupied, with- 
 out intermission, in the whole process of 
 observation and reflection, it is easy to con- 
 ceive that he will acquire by degrees a 
 solidity of judgment which will enable him 
 to see things in a clearer and more enlarged 
 point of view than his inferior generals. 
 
 Marshal Yillars, in his campaigns, acted 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 137 
 
 almost always in opposition to the advice of 
 his generals, and he was almost always fortu- 
 nate. So true it is, tliat a general, who feels 
 confident in his talent for command, must 
 follow the dictates of his own genius if he 
 wishes to achieve success. 
 
 MAXIM LXYII. 
 
 To authorize generals or other officers 
 to lay down their arms in virtue of a par- 
 ticular capitulation, under any other cir- 
 cumstances than when they are composing 
 the garrison of a fortress, aflbrds a dan- 
 gerous latitude. It is destructive of all 
 military character in a nation to open such 
 a door to the cowardly, the weak, or even 
 to the misdirected brave. Great extremi- 
 ties require extraordinary resolution. The 
 more obstinate the resistance of an army, 
 the greater the chances of assistance or of 
 success. 
 
 How man}^ seeming impossibilities have 
 been accomplished by men W'hose only 
 resource was death ! 
 
138 napoleon's 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In the campaign of 1759, Frederick di- 
 rected General Fink, with eighteen thousand 
 men, upon Maxen, for the purpose of cutting 
 oif the Austrian army from the defiles of Bo- 
 hemia. Surrounded by twice his numbers. 
 Fink capitulated after a sharp action, and 
 fourteen thousand men laid down their arms. 
 This conduct was the more disgraceful, be- 
 cause General Winch, who commanded the 
 cavalry, cut his way through the enemy. 
 The whole blame of the surrender fell, there- 
 fore, upon Fink, who was tried afterward by 
 a court-martial, and sentenced to be cashiered 
 and imprisoned for two years. 
 
 In the campaign of Italy in 1796, the Aus- 
 trian General Provéra capitulated with two 
 thousand men in the castle of Cossaria. Sub- 
 sequently, at the battle of La Favorite, the 
 same general capitulated with a corps of six 
 thousand men. I scarcely dare to revert to 
 the shameful defection of General Mack in 
 the capitulation of Ulm in 1805, where thirty 
 thousand Austrians laid down their arms — 
 when we have seen, during the wars of the 
 Revolution, so many generals open them- 
 selves a way by a vigorous .effort through 
 the enemy, supj^orted only by a few battal- 
 ions. 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 139 
 
 MAXIM LXVIII. 
 
 There is no security for any sovereign, 
 for any nation, or for any general, if offi- 
 cers are permitted to capitulate in the 
 open field, and to lay down their arms in 
 virtue of conditions favorable to the con- 
 tracting party, but contrary to the inter- 
 ests of the army at large. To withdraw 
 from danger, and thereby to involve their 
 comrades in greater peril, is the height of 
 cowardice. Such conduct should be pro- 
 scribed, declared infamous, and made pun- 
 ishable with death. All generals, officers 
 and soldiers, who capitulate in battle to 
 save their own lives, should be decimated. 
 
 He who gives the order, and those who 
 obey, are alike traitors, and deserve capi- 
 tal punishment. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Soldiers, who are almost alwa3^s ignorant 
 of the designs of their chief, cannot be re- 
 sponsible for his conduct. If he orders them 
 to lay down their arms, they must do so; 
 otherwise they fail in that law of discipline 
 
140 napoleon's 
 
 which is more essential to an army than 
 thousands of men. It appears to me, there- 
 fore, under these circumstances, that the 
 chiefs alone are responsible, and liable to the 
 punishment due to their cowardice. We have 
 no example of soldiers being wanting in their 
 duty in the most desperate situations, where 
 they are commanded by officers of approved 
 resolution. 
 
 MAXIM LXIX. 
 
 There is but one honorable mode of 
 becoming prisoner of war. That is, by 
 being taken separately; by which is meant, 
 by being cut off entirely, and when we 
 can no longer make use of our arras. In* 
 this case, there can be no conditions, for 
 honor can impose none. We yield to an 
 irresistible necessity. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 There is always time enough to surrender 
 prisoner of war. This should be deferred, 
 therefore, till the last extremity. And here 
 I may be permitted to cite an example of 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 141 
 
 rare obstinacy in defence, which has been 
 related to me by ocular witnesses. The cap- 
 tain of grenadiers, Dubrenil, of the thirty- 
 seventh regiment of the line, having been 
 sent on detachment with his company, was 
 stopped on the march by a large party of 
 Cossacks, who surrounded him on every side. 
 Dubrenil formed his little force into square, 
 and endeavored to gain the skirts of a wood 
 (within a few muskets' shot of the spot 
 where he had been attacked), and reached 
 it with very little loss. But as soon as the 
 grenadiers saw this refuge secured to them, 
 they broke and fled, leaving their captain 
 and a few brave men, who were resolved not 
 to abandon him, at the mercy of the enemy. 
 In the meantime, the fugitives, who had ral- 
 lied in the depth of the wood, ashamed of 
 having forsaken their leader, came to the 
 resolution of rescuing him from the enemy, 
 if a prisoner, or of carrying off his body if 
 he had fallen. With this view, they formed 
 once more upon the outskirts, and opening 
 a passage with their bayonets through the 
 cavalry, penetrated to their captain, who, 
 notwithstanding seventeen wounds, was de- 
 fending himself still. They immediately sur- 
 rounded him, and regained the wood with 
 
142 napoleon's 
 
 little loss. Such examples are not rare in 
 the wars of the Eevolution, and it were de- 
 sirable to see them collected by some con- 
 temporary, that soldiers might learn how 
 much is to be achieved in war by determined 
 energy and sustained resolution. 
 
 MAXIM LXX. 
 
 The conduct of a general in a conquer- 
 ed country is full of difficulties. If severe, 
 lie irritates and increases the number of 
 his enemies. If lenient, he gives birth to 
 expectations which only render the abuses 
 and vexations, inseparable from war, the 
 more intolerable. A victorious general 
 must know how to employ severity, justice 
 and mildness by turns, if he would' allay 
 sedition or prevent it. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Among the Eomans, generals were only 
 permitted to ari'ive at the command of arm- 
 ies after having exercised the different func- 
 tions of the magistracy. Thus by a previous 
 knowledge of administration, they were pre- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 143 
 
 pared to govern the conquered provinces 
 with all that discretion which a newly-ac- 
 quired power, supported by arbitrary force, 
 demands. 
 
 In the military institutions of modern 
 times, the generals, instructed only in what 
 concerns the operation of strategy and tac- 
 tics, are obliged to intrust the civil depart- 
 ments of the war to inferior agents, who, 
 without belonging to the army, render all 
 those abuses and vexations, inseparable from 
 its operations, still more intolerable. 
 
 This observation, which I do little more 
 than repeat, seems to me, notwithstanding, 
 deserving of particular attention ; for if the 
 leisure of general officers was directed in 
 time of peace to the study of diplomacy — if 
 they were employed in the different embas- 
 sies which sovereigns send to foreign courts 
 — they would acquire a knowledge of the 
 laws and of the government of these coun- 
 tries, in which they may be called hereafter 
 to carry on the war. They would learn also 
 to distinguish those points of interest on 
 which all treaties must be based, which have 
 for their object the advantageous termina- 
 tion of a campaign. By the aid of this 
 information they would obtain certain and 
 
144 napoleon's 
 
 positive results, since all the springs of ac- 
 tion, as well as the machinery of war, would 
 be in their hands. We have seen Prince 
 Eugene, and Marshal Yillars, each fulfilling 
 with equal ability the duties of a general 
 and a negotiator. 
 
 When an army which occupies a conquered 
 province observes strict discipline, there are 
 few examples of insurrection among the peo- 
 ple, unless indeed resistance is provoked (as 
 but too often happens), by the exactions of 
 inferior agents employed in the civil admin- 
 istration. 
 
 It is to this point, therefore, that the gen- 
 eral-inrchief should principally direct his 
 attention, in order that the contributions 
 imposed by the wants of the army may be 
 levied with impartiality ; and above all, that 
 they may be applied to their true object, in- 
 stead of serving to enrich the collectors, as 
 is ordinarily the case. 
 
 MAXIM LXXI. 
 
 î^othing can excuse a general who 
 takes advantage of the knowledge ac- 
 quired in the service of his country, to 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 145 
 
 deliver up her frontier and her towns to 
 foreigners. This is a crime reprobated 
 by every principle of religion, morality 
 and honor. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Ambitious men who, listening only to ♦ 
 their passions, arm natives of the same land 
 against each other (under the deceitful pre- 
 text of the public good), are still more crim- 
 inal. For however arbitrary a government, 
 the institutions which have been consolida- 
 ted by time, are always preferable to civil 
 war, and to that anarchy which the latter is 
 obliged to create for the justification of its 
 crimes. 
 
 To be faithful to his sovereign, and to 
 respect the established government, are the 
 first principles which ought to distinguish a 
 soldier and a man of honor. 
 
 MA*XIM LXXII. 
 
 A general-in-cliief has no right to shel- 
 ter his mistakes in war under cover of his 
 sovereign, or of a minister, when these 
 are both distant from the scene of opera- 
 13 
 
146 napoleon's 
 
 tien, and must consequently be either ill 
 informed or wholly ignorant of the actual 
 state of things. 
 
 Hence, it follows, that every general is 
 culpable who undertakes the execution of 
 ^a plan which he considers faulty. It is 
 his duty to represent his reasons, to insist 
 upon a change of plan, in short, to give 
 in his resignation, rather than allow him- 
 self to be made the instrument of his 
 army's ruin. Every general-in-chief who 
 fights a battle in consequence of superior 
 orders, with the certainty of losing it, is 
 equally blâmable. 
 
 In this last-mentioned case, the general 
 ought to refuse obedience ; because a 
 blind obedience is due only to a military 
 command given by a superior present on 
 the spot at the moment of action. Being 
 in possession of the real state of things, 
 the superior has it then in his power to 
 afford the necessary explanations to the 
 person who executes his orders. 
 
 But supposing a general-in-chief to re- 
 ceive positive order from his sovereign, 
 directing him to fight a battle, with the 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 147 
 
 further injunction, to yield to his adver- 
 sary, and allow himself to he defeated — 
 ought he to obey it ? 'No. If the general 
 should he able to comprehend the mean- 
 ing or utility of such an order, he should 
 execute it ; otherwise he should refuse to 
 obey it. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 In the campaign of 1697, Prince Eugene 
 caused the courier to be intercepted, who 
 was bringing him orders from the emperor 
 forbidding him to hazard a battle, for which 
 everything had been prepared, and which 
 he foresaw would prove decisive. He con- 
 sidered, therefore, that he did his duty in 
 evading the orders of his sovereign ; and the 
 victory of Zanta, in which the Turks lost 
 about thirty thousand men, and four thou- 
 sand prisoners, rewarded his audacity. In 
 the meantime, notwithstanding the immense 
 advantages which accrued from this victory 
 to the imperial arms, Eugene was disgraced 
 on his arrival at Yienna. 
 
 In 1793, General Hoche, having received 
 orders to move upon Treves with an army 
 harassed by constant marches in a moun- 
 tainous and difficult country, refused to 
 
148 napoleon's 
 
 obey. He observed, with reason, that in or- 
 der to obtain possession of an unimportant 
 fortress, they were exposing his army to 
 inevitable ruin. He caused, tberefore, his 
 troops to return into winter quarters, and 
 preferred the preservation of his army, upon 
 which the success of the future campaign 
 depended, to his own safety. Eecalled to 
 Paris, he was thrown into a dungeon, wliich 
 he only quitted on the downfall of Eobe- 
 spierre. 
 
 I dare not decide if such examples are to 
 be imitated ; but it seems to me highly de- 
 sirable that a question so new and so impor- 
 tant, should be discussed by men who are 
 capable of determining its merits. 
 
 MAXIM LXXIII. 
 
 The first qualification in a general-in- 
 chief is a cool head — that is, a head which 
 receives just impressions, and estimates 
 things and objects at their real value. 
 He must not allow himself to be elated 
 by good news, or depressed by bad. 
 
 The impressions he receives either sue- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 149 
 
 cessively or simultaneously in the course 
 of the day, should be so classed as to 
 take up only the exact place in his mind 
 which they deserve to occupy ; since it is 
 upon a just comparison and consideration 
 of the weight due to different impres- 
 sions, that the power of reasoning and of 
 right judgment depends. 
 
 Some men are so physically and mor- 
 ally constituted as to see everything 
 through a highly-colored medium. They 
 raise up a picture in the mind on every 
 slight occasion, and give to every triv- 
 ial occurrence a dramatic interest. But 
 whatever knowledge, or talent, or cour- 
 age, or other good qualities such men 
 may possess, nature has not formed them 
 for the command of armies, or the direc- 
 tion of great military operations. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 <' The first quality in a general-in-chief," 
 says Montéciiculli, " is a great knowledge 
 of the art of war. This is not intuitive, 
 but the result of experience. A man is not 
 born a commander. He must become one. 
 13* 
 
150 
 
 NAPOLEON s 
 
 Not to be anxious ; to be always cool ; to 
 avoid confusion in his commands; never to 
 change countenance; to give his orders in 
 the midst of battle with as much composure 
 as if he were perfectly at ease. These are 
 the proofs of valor in a general. 
 
 '' To encourage the timid ; to increase the 
 number of the truly brave ; to revive the 
 drooping ardor of the troops in battle ; to 
 rally those who are broken ; to bring back 
 to the charge those who are repulsed; to 
 find resources in difficulty, and success even 
 amid disaster; to be ready at a moment to 
 devote himself, if necessary, for the welfare 
 of the state. These are the actions which 
 acquire for a general distinction and re- 
 nown." 
 
 To this enumeration may be added, the 
 talent of discriminating character, and of 
 employing every man in the particular post 
 which nature has qualified him to fill. "My 
 principal attention," said Marshal Villars, 
 " was alwaj^s directed to the study of the 
 younger generals. Such a one I found, by 
 the boldness of his character, fit to lead a 
 column of attack ; another, from a disposi- 
 tion naturally cautious, but without being 
 deficient in courage, more perfectly to be 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 151 
 
 relied on for the defence of a country." It 
 is only by a just application of these per- 
 sonal qualities to their respective objects, 
 that it is possible to command success in 
 war. 
 
 MAXIM LXXIV. 
 
 The leading qualifications which should 
 distinguish an officer selected for the 
 head of the staff, are, to know the coun- 
 try thoroughly ; to be able to conduct a 
 reconnoissance with skill ; to superintend 
 the transmission of orders promptly ; to 
 lay down the most complicated move- 
 ments intelligibly, but in a few words, 
 and with simplicity. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Formerly, the duties of the chiefs of the 
 staff were confined to the necessary prepa- 
 rations for carrying the plan of the cam- 
 paign, and the operations resolved on by 
 the general-in-chief, into effect. In a battle, 
 they were only employed in directing move- 
 ments and superintending their execution. 
 
152 napoleon's 
 
 But in the late wars, the offieera of the staff 
 were frequently intrusted with the command 
 of a column of attack, or of large detach- 
 ments, when the general-in-chief feared to 
 disclose the secret of his plans by the trans- 
 mission of orders or instructions. Great 
 advantages have resulted from this innova- 
 tion, although it was long resisted. By this 
 means, the staff have been enabled to per- 
 fect their theory by practice, and they have 
 acquired, moreover, the esteem of the sol- 
 diers and junior oflâcers of the line, who are 
 easily led to think lightly of their superiors, 
 whom they do not see fighting in the ranks. 
 The generals Avho have held the arduous 
 situation of chief of the staff during the 
 wars of the Eevolution, have almost always 
 been employed in the different branches of 
 the profession. Marshal Berthier, who filled 
 so conspicuously^ this appointment to Kapo- 
 leon, was distinguished by all the essentials 
 of a general. He possessed calm, and at 
 the same time brilliant courage, excellent 
 judgment, and approved experience. He 
 bore arms during half a century, made war 
 in the four quarters of the globe, opened 
 and terminated thirty-two campaigns. In 
 his youth he acquired, under the eye of his 
 
MAXIMS or WAR. 15o 
 
 father, who was an engineer officer, the tal- 
 ent of tracing phxns and finishing them with 
 exactness, as well as the preliminary quali- 
 fications necessary to form a staff-officer. 
 Admitted by the Prince de Lambesq into 
 his regiment of dragoons, he was taught 
 the skilful management of his horse and his 
 sword — accomplishments so important to a 
 soldier. Attached afterward to the staff of 
 Count Eochambeau, he made his first cam- 
 paign in America, where he soon began to 
 distinguish himself by his valor, activity 
 and talents. Having at length attained 
 superior rank in the staff-corps formed by 
 Marshal de Segur, he visited the camps of 
 the King of Prussia, and discharged the du- 
 ties of chief of the staff' under the Baron 
 de Bezenval. 
 
 During nineteen years, consumed in six- 
 teen campaigns, the history of Marshal Bcr- 
 thier's life was little else but that of the 
 w\ars of Napoleon, all the details of which he 
 directed, both in the cabinet and the field. 
 A stranger to the intrigues of politics, he 
 labored with indefatigable activity; seized 
 with promptitude and sagacity upon general 
 views, and gave the necessary orders for 
 attaining them with prudence, perspicuity, 
 13** 
 
154 napoleon's 
 
 and conciseness. Discreet, impenetrable, 
 modest; he was just, exact, and even se- 
 vere, in everything that regarded the ser- 
 vice; but he always set an example of 
 vigilance and zeal in his own person, and 
 knew how to maintain discipline, and to 
 cause his authority to be respected by every 
 rank under his orders. 
 
 MAXIM LXXV. 
 
 A coramandant of artillery should un- 
 derstand well the general principles of 
 each branch of the service, since he is 
 called upon to supply arms and ammu- 
 nition to the difterent corjDS of which it is 
 composed. His correspondence wnth the 
 commanding officers of artillery at the 
 advanced posts, should put him in pos- 
 session of all the movements of the army, 
 and the disposition and management of 
 the great park of artillery should depend 
 upon this information. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 After having recognized the advantage of 
 intrusting tlie supply of arms and ammuni- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 155 
 
 tion for an army to a military body, it 
 appears to me extraordinary that the same 
 regulation does not extend to that of pro- 
 visions and forage, instead of leaving it in 
 the hands of a separate administration, as is 
 the practice at present. 
 
 The civil establishments attached to ar- 
 mies are formed almost always at the com- 
 mencement of a war, and composed of per- 
 sons strangers to those laws of discipline 
 which they are but too much inclined to 
 disregard. These men are little esteemed 
 by the military, because they serve only to 
 enrich themselves, without respect to the 
 means. They consider only their private 
 interest in a service whose glory they can- 
 not share, although some portion of its suc- 
 cess depends upon their zeal. The disorders 
 and defalcations incident to these establish- 
 ments would assuredly cease, if they were 
 confided to men who had been employed in 
 the army, and who, in return for their la- 
 bors, were permitted to partake with their 
 fellow-soldiers the triumph of their success. 
 
156 napoleon's 
 
 MAXIM LXXVI. 
 
 The qualities which distinguish a good 
 general of advanced posts, are, to recon- 
 noitre accurately deiiles and fords of every 
 description; to provide guides that may 
 be depended on ; to interrogate the curé 
 and postmaster ; to establish rapidly a 
 good understanding with the inhabitants; 
 to send out spies ; to intercept public and 
 private letters; to translate and analyze 
 their contents; in a word, to be able to 
 answer every question of the general-in- 
 chief, when he arrives with the whole 
 army . 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 Foraging parties, composed of small de- 
 tachments, and which were usually intrusted 
 to young officers, served formerly to make 
 good officers of advanced posts; but now the 
 arm}^ is suppHed with provisions by regular 
 contributions: it is only in a course of par- 
 tisan warfare that the necessary experience 
 can be acquired to fill these situations with 
 success. 
 
 A chief of partisans is, to a certain ex- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. 
 
 157 
 
 tent, independent of the army. He receives 
 neither pay nor provisions from it, and 
 rarely succor, and is abandoned during the 
 whole campaign to his own resources. 
 
 An officer so circumstanced must unite 
 address with courage, and boldness with 
 discretion, if he wishes to collect plunder 
 w^ithout measuring the strength of his little 
 corps Avith superior forces. Always ha- 
 rassed, always surrounded by dangers, which 
 it is his business to foresee and surmount, a 
 leader of partisans acquires in a short time 
 an experience in the details of war rarely to 
 be obtained by an officer of thelinej because 
 the latter is almost always under the guid- 
 ance of superior authority, which directs 
 the whole of his movements, while the talent 
 and genius of the partisan arc developed 
 and sustained by a dependence on his own 
 resources. 
 
 MAXIM LXXVII. 
 
 Geuerals-in-chief must be guided by 
 their own experience, or their genius. 
 Tactics, evolutions, the duties and knowl- 
 edge of an engineer or artillery officer, 
 
1^ napoleon's 
 
 may be learned in treatises, but the 
 science of strategy is only to be acquired 
 by "experience, and by studying tlie cam- 
 paigns of all the great captains. 
 
 Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and Fred- 
 erick, as well as Alexander, Hannibal, and 
 Csesar, have all acted upon the same prin- 
 ciples. These have been : to keep .their 
 forces united ; to leave no weak part 
 unguarded; to seize with rapidity on 
 important points. 
 
 Such are the principles which lead to 
 victory, and which, by inspiring terror at 
 the reputation of your arms, will at once 
 maintain fidelity and secure subjection. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 "î^ great captain can only be formed," 
 says the Archduke Charles, '^ by long expe- 
 rience and intense study : neither is his own 
 experience enough — for whose life is there 
 sufficiently fruitful of events to render his 
 knowledge universal ?" It is, therefore, by 
 augmenting: his information from the stock 
 of others, by appreciating justly the discov- 
 eries of his predecessors, and by taking for 
 his standard of comparison those great mili- 
 
MAXIMS OF WAR. ^ ^ lA 
 
 tary exploits, in connection with their poli- 
 tical results, in which the history of war 
 abounds, that he can alone become a great 
 comni^mder. % 
 
 MAXIM LXXVIII. 
 
 Peruse again and again the campaigns 
 of'Alexander, Hannibal, Cî^esar, Çriistavus 
 Adolphus, Turenne,fc Eugene, and Freder- 
 ick. Model yourself upon them. This 
 is the only, means of becoming a great 
 captain, and of acquiring the secret of the 
 art of war. Your own genius will be 
 enlightened and improved by this study, 
 and you will learn to reject all maxims 
 foreign to the principles of these great 
 commanders. 
 
 NOTE. 
 
 It is in order to facilitate this object that 
 I have formed the present collection. It is 
 after reading and meditating upon the his- 
 tory of modern war that I have endeavored 
 to illustrate, by examples, how the maxims 
 of a great captain may be most successfully 
 applied to this study. May the end I have 
 had in view be accomplished ! 
 
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