DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY GIFT OF Duke... Uni varsity.Press ENTANGLING ALLIANCE There is nothing which will have a greater effect to overawe the English, and induce them to respect us and our rights, than the Reputa¬ tion of a good understnading with the French. My voice and advice will, therefore, always be for discharging, with the utmost fidelity, gratitude, and exactness, every obligation we are under to France, and for cultivat¬ ing her friendship and alliance by all sorts of good offices. John Adams to Robert R. Livingston, Paris, July u, 1783 For unless treaties are mutually beneficial to the Parties, it is in vain to hope for a continuance of them beyond the moment when the one which conceives itself to be overreached is in a situation to breaks off the con¬ nexion. And I believe it is among nations as with individuals, the party taking advantage of the distresses of another will lose infinitely more in the opinion of mankind and in subsequent events than he will gain by the strode of the moment. George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, Philadelphia, July 28, 1791 The Jacobin’s Creed / believe there is no God but nature; no religion but revolution (alias regeneration;) no just government but anarchy; and no civil liberty where the guillotine is not erected. 1 believe that Roberspierre [Ac] was the great apostle of liberty, and that he would have emancipated the whole world from the shackles of laws, had not death cut short his glorious career. I believe Genet is a prodigy of wisdom, and that his ipse dixit is better authority than Montesquieu, Pufferdorf [Ac], and Vattel, those musty, antiquated aristocrats. I believe that war is better than peace, confusion than order, terror than mildness, and the guillotine than all the courts of justice extant. I believe that the United States of America ought to be under the direc¬ tion of my brothers in France, and that George Washington, commonly called President Washington, is an impertinent jackanapes for counter¬ acting our noble designs. I believe the terrorists were a band of consummate statesmen, genuine patriots, great benefactors, and virtuous representatives. I believe that no person who dissents from our fraternity, ought to be permitted to speak, write or communicate his sentiments. The New Hampshire and Vermont Journal: Or, The Farmer’s Weekly Museum (Walpole, N. H.), July 12, 1796. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE M Politics & Diplomacy under George Washington by Alexander DeConde Duke University Press Durham, N. C. 1958 (C) 1958, Duke University Press LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGUE CARD NUMBER 58-85OO PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE SEEMAN PRINTERY, INC., DURHAM, N. C. To Thomas A. Bailey TEACHER AND FRIEND Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/entanglingallian01deco PREFACE This is the first book to deal with the interaction of politics and diplomacy centering on the French alliance of 1778 in the Washing¬ ton years, and the second book to treat the alliance as a central theme. The first, Edward S. Corwin’s French Policy and the Amer¬ ican Alliance of 1778 (Princeton, 1916), covered the period of the alliance’s origins to the Treaty of Paris of September 3, 1783. Based primarily on French archival sources, written from the viewpoint of European diplomacy, and concentrating on diplomatic history al¬ most exclusively, it concluded that even though by treaty the alliance remained in force it really ended with the peace of 1783. The alliance had done its work. The United States were free and inde¬ pendent and France had deprived Great Britain of a vast continent. While stressing the Washington years, this book takes up where Professor Corwin ended, touching on the period of the Confedera¬ tion, taking into account changes in points of view toward the alliance by both France and America, and showing that for over a decade the alliance still lived. Although this book covers basically the presidency of George Washington from 1789 to 1797 and assesses the period as diplomatic history, it is not a diplomatic history in the traditional sense; it is a synthesis of domestic political history and diplomatic history. Its main theme is the interaction ^ foreign policy and domestic p olitics centering on the Bren dTaflianc e. Al¬ though I hope it will contribute to~a betteFTmderstanding of Wash¬ ington’s presidency, it does not attempt to fill the need for a full and satisfactory account of Washington as President. 1 1 After the type for this book had been set, Charles Scribner’s Sons pub¬ lished George Washington: First in Peace (New York, 1957). This volume, which concludes Douglas Southall Freeman’s biography of Washington (six volumes of which had been completed before Freeman’s death), was written by John Alexander Carroll and Mary Ashworth Wells, Freeman’s former PREFACE viii At the beginning of the federal government, as George Washing¬ ton took office, the French alliance was the cornerstone of Amer¬ ican foreign policy; it had contributed immeasurably to American independence and had established American foreign policy orienta¬ tion. At the end of Washington’s second term, in fact as he pre¬ pared his farewell to public life, the life-giving alliance was dead and the United States were virtually at war with France. The main problem dealt with in this book is how and why in eight formative years such a drastic reversal in foreign policy took place. In probing the problem I have attempted, wherever possible, to analyze the role of ideas and attitudes in the evolving Franco-Amer- ican rupture. This approach, within the context of the main theme, led to an analysis of die origins of national political parties as well as of the origins of foreign policy, for from the beginning foreign policy mixed with domestic politics; it was an intrinsic part of party origins. In dealing with conflicting ideas, I have tried, wherever appro¬ priate, to show the relationship between domestic political develop¬ ments and foreign policy and also the political basis for foreign- policy decisions. In stressing the relations of domestic politics and diplomacy, I encountered the usual difficult questions: What in¬ fluenced foreign policy and how? Was determination of foreign policy in these formative years governed by the idea? Did foreign policy in practice conform to principle or was it ad hoc? If one were to view history in its broad sweep where the human actors, like figures in a Chinese landscape painting, are dwarfed and appear insignificant in comparison to impersonal forces over¬ shadowing them, the answers to such questions might not appear perplexing. In a detailed study of this kind, however, big questions cannot be satisfactorily answered with broad generalizations. The more we concentrate on individual men, on their special ideas, and on the events they influenced, perhaps decisively, the more important the role of the individual, of the individual idea, and of the specific event seems. While each piece of the pattern may conform to a gen¬ eral idea, each fitting of the piece appears ad hoc, a unique approach, at a unique time, to a unique problem. assistants. It covers the last seven years of Washington’s life, including his second term as President. PREFACE IX Whether the decisive factor in determining foreign policy was the ad hoc response to the special situation or the over-all idea or principle apparently was not preordained by circumstances, but de¬ pended upon the particular situation. In sum, the application of the principle, if principle appears the determining factor, was ad hoc. While dealing primarily with men and events, I have emphasized analysis, interpretation, and ideas, trying to weave these into the nar¬ rative. This kind of problem-analysis cannot be confined easily to straight chronological treatment. The same problems, the same policies, the same developments, to be understood, often have to be approached from different angles and perspectives; hence there is bound to be some repetition. The Jay treaty, for example, had to be approached from three different avenues: I had to take into con¬ sideration the British position, the French position, and the role of American politics and diplomacy. I endeavored to keep repetition to a minimum, using it only for clarity and emphasis. In dealing with ideas, I have tried not to isolate them but to relate thought to action. Wherever possible I sought to pin down ideas to specific events, hoping to avoid the pitfall of supporting an idea of one year with the events of other years. Men and ideas change; out-of-context ideas tend to give a distorted view of history. This is one reason why I tried to support most citations with place and date. Except for illustrative purposes, I have cast a wary eye on official documents, particularly party pronouncements, official de¬ fenses, and personal apologies. Policy, even though embedded in ideas, is the unfolding of events, not the uttering of pious words. ***** While my sources are varied the book is based primarily on a re-examination of original sources. I relied often on the invaluable contributions of other scholars, but usually I traced their work to the sources. In many instances ideas were original with the men who wrote on the period. To them I am most grateful and acknowledge a great debt, and I hope that in the text I have given adequate recog¬ nition to the sources of ideas and interpretations. From the three major countries in this study, France, Great Britain, and the United States, I have used archival material, manu¬ script and printed, without, I hope, giving an official cast to my findings. Some of the most illuminating sources proved to be the X PREFACE writings of partisan observers, secondary statesmen, and men of ideas and discernment contemporary with the events studied. Per¬ sonal dispatches, letters, diaries, and newspapers proved, in most cases, more enlightening than official documents. I hope that in their presentation and refinement they prove as much a challenge and a stimulus to the reader as they did to the writer. Like all who have attempted works of historical synthesis I am indebted to many for help. To those who have aided directly and indirectly I am deeply grateful. The following merit my special appreciation. Professor Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford University provided encouragement from beginning to end. My colleagues in the Duke University Department of History took time from their own pressing obligations to aid me when needed. Professor Paul H. Clyde gave portions of the manuscript exacting textual criticisms and offered sound counsel; Professor William T. Laprade read the entire manuscript and saved me from grievous errors; Professor John R. Alden also read the entire manuscript; contributed valuable suggestions, and gave personal guidance; Professor John Tate Lan- ning gave help when sorely needed. Professor Russell A. Fraser of the Princeton University Department of English read parts of the manuscript and uncovered flaws in English usage and style. Ashbel G. Brice, Director of Duke University Press, gave courteous and needed assistance and John Menapace, also of Duke University Press, contributed long hours of invaluable editorial help. All share in whatever merits the book may have, but the shortcomings, of course, are mine. 1 am also indebted to several foundations which have contributed generously to the improvement of American historical scholarship. In particular I owe thanks to the Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid-of-research for 1951 and to the Duke University Council on Research for financial support in research and publi¬ cation. Without their assistance 1 could not have completed the research on which this book is based. The staffs of libraries and historical societies without exception provided courteous and generous help. In particular I thank the staff of Duke University Library for assistance beyond the require¬ ments of duty. Mr. Benjamin E. Powell, Mr. John P. Waggoner, Mr. Elvin Strowd, Miss Gertrude Merritt, Miss Wilhelmina Leman, PREFACE xi Miss Shirley Stevens, Mrs. Catharine J. Pierce, Miss Florence E. Blakely, Mrs. Margaret Thomson, Miss Mattie Russell, and Mr. Emerson Ford merit personal appreciation. In my earlier researches the staff of the Huntington Library made the life of scholarship notably pleasant. Miss Norma B. Cuthbert and Miss Mary Isabel Fry showed an unusual consideration for my problems. In the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress Mr. Robert H. Land, Mr. Percy C. Powell, and Mr. John J. de Porry, not only were gracious in their help, but also made my research trips to Washing¬ ton pleasant personal experiences. I owe Mrs. Frank A. Hanna more than the usual thanks for typing the final draft of my manu¬ script. My wife, Jeanne Seeger DeConde, gave encouragement and assumed more than her share of family obligations while this book was in progress. Alexander DeConde Durham, North Carolina July i, ig$6 ■ BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Since the footnotes are unusually full and should serve as satisfactory guides for those who may wish to trace through the sources, this book does not have a formal bibliography. The first entry of any item is listed by author in the index so that the interested reader may easily obtain the full title by turning to the page where it is cited. Most of the printed materials used in this study may be obtained in any of a number of major research libraries in the United States. Most of the newspapers cited are in the Duke University Library, the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, and the Library of Congress. The manuscript sources are in a number of scattered depositories; the place of each depository is mentioned with the first entry of each manuscript citation. Below are a number of journal titles most frequently cited and their abbreviations as used in this book. Alumni Bulletin of the University of Virginia ABUV American Historical Association Annual Report AHA Ann Rep (year) American Historical Review AHR American Journal of International Law AJIL Columbia University Quarterly CUQ French-American Review FAR Historical Magazine HM Journal of Economic and Business History fEBH Journal of Modern History JMH Journal of Race Development JRD Journal of Southern History JSH Mississippi Valley Historical Review MVHR New England Quarterly NEQ Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography PMHB Political Science Quarterly PSQ XIV BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society PAAS Quarterly journal of the University of North Dakota QJUND Revue des deux mondes RDM Revue d’histoire diplomatique RHD Review of Politics RP South Atlantic Quarterly SAQ Southwestern Social Science Quarterly SSSQ Virginia Magazine of History and Biography VMHB William and Mary Quarterly WMQ World Politics WP CONTENTS Bibliographical Note xiii I. BASIS FOR ACCORD AND SEEDS OF DISCORD 3 II. POLITICS: The Hamiltonian System 31 III. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 66 IV. THE JAY TREATY: Prelude to Peace or War? ioi V. FRANCO-AMERICAN COMMERCE: An Unrealized Hope 141 VI. THE FRENCH FRENZY 164 VII. GENET AND NEU T R ALITY: Incompatibles 204 VIII. WESTERN INTRIGUE, SELF-CREATED SOCIETIES, AND A MUTINOUS FLEET 235 IX. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND AGAINST TYRANTS 275 X. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: Anachronism in Paris 31 i XI. SCHOOL FOR SCANDAL: James Monroe in Paris 342 XII. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 392 " XIII. ADET’S WAR WITH WASHINGTON’S GOVERNMENT 423 ^XIV. DIPLOMACY IN POLITICS: The Election of 1796 456 XV. EPILO GUE: The Significance of the Washington Years in American Diplomacy 501 5*3 INDEX ENTANGLING ALLIANCE CHAPTER ONE BASIS FOR ACCORD AND SEEDS OF DISCORD They \the French ] are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and on that point we may, l believe, depend upon them; but it is not their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so. —John Jay to Robert R. Livingston, Paris, November 17, 1782. It is our firm connexion with France that gives us weight with Eng¬ land and respect throughout Europe. If we were to brea\ our faith with this nation, on whatever pretense, England would again trample on us and every other nation despise us. . . . In my opinion, the true political interest of America consists in obser- ing and fulfilling, with greatest exactitude, the engagements of our alli¬ ance with France, and behaving at the same time towards England so as not entirely to extinguish her hopes of a reconciliation. —Benjamin Franklin to Samuel Cooper, Passy, France, December 26, 1782. * * * * * The day [March 4, 1797] ought to be a jubilee in the United States,” exulted the Republican press. 1 Why? Was it because austere John Adams had just become President? Actually, the cause for jubilation was the end of the second administration of President George Washington. On this day he ceased to guide the new nation he had fathered. The attacks of his political opponents and their 1 Aurora (Philadelphia), March 6, 1797, quoted in John B. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States from the Revolution to the Civil War (8 vols., New York, 1886-1926), II, 306 n. 4 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE unconcealed joy over his departure marked the failure of an ideal. Washington had hoped to establish a nation without political parties, a land freed from the woes and jealousies of Europe. According to his enemies, “after bringing the country to the very brink of ruin, Washington had fled from the gathering storm. Hav¬ ing run the ship [of state] between rocks and shoals, he had aban¬ doned the helm and left the vessel to her fate.” When he became President, “America was indeed a happy land; now by his means she has become most miserable. Then every Frenchman was her friend; now every Frenchman is her foe.” 2 The criticism, however unjust, penetrated to the core of the dominant problem of Washing¬ ton’s last years in office. From friend to foe in eight years, this was indeed a turnabout in Franco-American relations. Why and how did such a drastic reversal take place ? What were the causes and what were the forces involved ? What happened to thcTlife-giving Franco-American alliance of 1778 which was to endure “forever”? What were the politics of these years and how did they affect American foreign policy? For answers to these questions and to others equally significant we shall have to go back to the beginning of George Washington’s first term and also glance briefly at the earlier background of American foreign relations. * * * * * Ever since France had aided Americans in their revoludon against England she had occupied a special place in American hearts. Regardless of the motives behind French help, most Ameri¬ cans believed that without France there probably would have been no United States of America. 3 The bonds between the United 2 Aurora (Philadelphia), March 13, 14, 1797, cited in ibid. 5 For differing views on why France aided the colonies, see Edward S. Cor¬ win, French Policy and the American Alliance of iyj 8 (Princeton, 1916), pp. 1-22 (this is the standard study of the French alliance through 1783); Claude H. Van Tyne, “Influences Which Determined the French Government to Make the Treaty with America, 1778,” American Historical Review, XXI (April, 1916), 528-541; see also Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution (New York, 1935), pp. 41-69 (this is the basic study for the diplomacy of the period and is based on wide knowledge of the sources). For basic French documents on the alliance, see Henri Doniol, ed., Histoire de la participation de la France a I'etablissement des Etats-Unis d’Amerique (5 vols., Paris, 1886-92), V, 610 If. See also the historical intro¬ duction in John J. Meng, ed., Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alex- ACCORD AND DISCORD 5 States and France were wrought in the American Revolution and went beyond formal agreements of friendship. Yet there were formal agreements, two treaties signed at Paris on February 6, 1778. * * * 4 5 The first, a “Treaty of Amity and Commerce,” constituted the first official recognition of the United States by a major power. It brought France into the struggle against Great Britain. By its terms both countries granted each other most-favored-nation treat¬ ment and other liberal trading privileges. i The second agreement was a “Treaty of Alliance.” If war should break out between France and Great Britain—a war which was almost certain to follow—as a result of the first treaty, the “defensive alliance” provided that France and the United States would fight together until American independence was assured. Neither party was to “conclude either Truce or Peace with Great Britain, without the formal consent of the other first obtain’d.”' France guaranteed American independence and territory “forever” and renounced possession of any portion of the North American mainland held by Great Britain in 1763. In return the United States pledged to guarantee French possessions in America against all powers “forever.”" Although partnership with France had been eagerly sought, some Americans were reluctant to make a military alliance. 6 Men such as John Adams, whose labors earned him the title “Atlas of In¬ dependence,” did not like becoming embroiled in European conflicts, andre Gerard 1778-1780: Correspondence of the First French Minister to the United States with the Comte de Vergennes (Baltimore, 1939). Various theories which attempt to explain the “why” of French aid to the American cause are summarized in Arthur B. Darling, Our Rising Empire 1763-1803 (New Haven, 1940), pp. 22-26. ‘For the texts of the treaties see David Hunter Miller, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (7 vols., Washing¬ ton, 1931-), II, 3-41. 5 Great Britain, through a spy, Dr. Edward Bancroft of Westfield, Massa¬ chusetts, knew of the terms of the alliance and of the commercial treaty long before they were known in America. Samuel F. Bemis, “British Secret Service and the French-American Alliance,” AHR, XXIX (April, 1924), 490- 9 *- 6 Dr. Benjamin Rush, for example, wrote to John Adams, Yorktown, January 22, 1778, “Our people here pant for a French war,” they wish and pray for it. Lyman Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush (2 vols., Princeton, 1951), I, 190-191. 6 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE or having Europe become involved in American affairs. 7 Memories of past wars were too fresh. ^- 253-254. 78 Otto Vossler, Die amenhanischen Revolutionsideale in ihrem verhaltms zu den europaischen: Untersucht an Thomas Jefferson (Munchen, 1929), maintained that Jefferson’s years in France had a profound influence on his thinking; that Jefferson returned to America wishing “to make his country come up to the ideals of the French revolutionary ideology,” p. 127. For a digest of Vossler’s book, see R. R. Palmer, “A Neglected Work: Otto Vossler on Jefferson and the Revolutionary Era,” WMQ, 3rd Series, XII (July, 1955), 462-471. 3 ° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE new government had succeeded the Confederation—peacefully. The two contemporary revolutions in government, in France and in the United States—one characterized in relative terms by peaceful change to the right and the other by violent upheaval to the left— were to influence the course of Franco-American relations and the political development of the American nation. CHAPTER TWO POLITICS THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM To ma\e us one nation as to foreign concerns, and beep us distinct in Domestic ones, gives the outline of the proper division of powers between the general and particular governments .—Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, December 16, 1786. A ruler must be a man, a man of feeling, who can ma\e allowances for the frailties of human nature. He must be of no party, for the moment he espouses the side of a party he becomes prejudiced, and sees everything by halves.—Georgia Gazette (Savannah), June 9, 1794, reprinted from the Hartford Gazette. * * * * * u nder the Articles of Confederation the weakness or apparent weakness of the national government deprived American diplo¬ macy of effectiveness. Keenly aware of American impotence when contrasted to European might, the founding fathers argued that a vig¬ orous and respected foreign policy could be based only on a stronger national government, such as the new federal Constitution would provide . 1 Foreign affairs were at the heart of the politics of ratifica- 1 Evidence of this argument can be found in the Federalist in the words of all three authors. Note, for example, Federalists Nos. 2-5, any edition. See the argument of Thomas Dawes of Boston in support of the Constitution in Bancroft, History of the Constitution, pp. 399-400. Men like Washington, who were impressed with the international weakness of America’s position, supported the change to the new Constitution to strengthen that position. See Washington to Thomas Jefferson, Mount Vernon, Jan. 1, 1788, and to Henry Knox, Mount Vernon, March 3, 1788, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXIX, 350-351 and 435; Beloff, Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy, p. 121. Jefferson’s experience as minister to France had con- IP- ENTANGLING ALLIANCE tion, politics which divided the country into factions favoring or op¬ posing the adoption of the Constitution of 1789. At the same time, just as the French Revolution and events abroad influenced American foreign relations and domestic politics, the political differences at home, often originating with or dominated by local issues, gave direction to foreign policy. To place basic developments in foreign affairs in the George Washington administrations in proper per¬ spective, therefore, we shall probe the beginnings of national political parties. During these embryo-years politics on a national level and foreign policy—as they touch directly on the scope of this study—revolved broadly around two major issues. The first was the economic-politi¬ cal system of Alexander Hamilton; the second consisted of problems arising from the wars of the French Revolution. Within both issues domestic politics and foreign affairs were intertwined. Foreign policy, in fact, became the outstanding issue between the two national political parties which sprang into existence in these years. * 2 Before Washington completed his first term so obvious was the in¬ terconnection between domestic politics and foreign affairs that most people recognized them as two sides of the same coin. * * * # # vinced him that the Confederation government needed strength in foreign affairs; see Caleb P. Patterson, The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jef¬ ferson (Austin, Texas, 1953), p. 33. See also Jefferson’s criticism of the Con¬ federation Congress’s treaty-making power in letters to James Monroe (Paris, June 17, 1785) and to John Adams (Paris, July 7, 1785) in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, IV, 54-55, and in Andrew S. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (20 vols., Washington, 1903-4), V, 32; hereinafter cited as Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Worlds. For the general reac¬ tion in the states, see Allan Nevins, The American States during and after the Revolution, 1775-1789 (New York, 1924), pp. 599-601. 2 In the Washington administrations foreign events and foreign issues dominated American politics; Americans along the coast, in thought and ideals, were closer oftentimes to Europe than to their own hinterland. They be¬ lieved that the fate of their country depended upon the outcome of events in Europe. American newspapers therefore devoted most of their news columns to European news. Politically, intellectually, and diplomatically Americans in these years were tied closely to Europe. See Samuel Eliot Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, 1765-1884 (2 vols., Boston, 1913), II, 51-52; W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate: A Study of the Struggle Between President and Senate Over the Conduct of Foreign Relations (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 14-15- THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 33 When George Washington launched die new government under the federal Constitution in 1789 there were no national political parties. Political groupings had long existed in the colonies and then in the states, and group-political action led to adoption of the new Constitution. Some historians have seen in the contest over ratification of the federal Constitution the basis for the formation of American political parties.'* In principle, theory, and composition they saw in the federalists, who supported ratification, and in the antifederalists, who opposed it, the fundamental division followed by national political parties when they developed in the 1790’s. While there was much in common between the forces which fought die battle of ratification and those which sought to control the machinery of government after ratification, the special state and local political groups, federalist and antifederalist, did not blossom in¬ to national political parties. They broke up after the Constitution was adopted and were never reconstituted on their old foundations. 4 8 For example, see Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History (2nd ed., New York, 1945), pp. 26-28, and Charles A. Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy (New York, 1915), pp. 9-33; Manning J. Dauer, The Adams Federalists (Baltimore, 1953), pp. 3 ff. Dauer discusses the basis of early political groupings. For a contemporary rejec¬ tion of pre-1778 political alignment as the origin of political parties, see James Madison’s “A Candid State of Parties,” Sept. 26, 1792, reprinted from the National Gazette in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison (9 vols., New York, 1900-1910), VI, 106-119. For a contemporary account of political parties in this period by a keen foreign observer, see La Roche- foucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , II, 511-520. The whole design of the federal¬ ists, he asserts, was to detach the United States from England, to destroy the French alliance. * The literature on the origin of political parties is voluminous and confus¬ ing. Much of it is based on mere conjecture. Some of the most enlightening information on party origins is to be found in special studies dealing with local political situations. The bulk of recent scholarship supports the view expressed herein. For general treatments of party origins, see Binkley, American Political Parties . . . ; Edgar E. Robinson, The Evolution of American Political Parties (New York, 1924); James A. Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States (3rd ed., New York, 1924). For specialized studies, see George D. Luetscher, Early Political Machinery in the United States (Phila¬ delphia, 1903); O. G. Libby, “Political Factions in Washington’s Administra¬ tions,” Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota, III (July, 1913), 239-3 1 8; Walter R. Fee, The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789-1829 (Somerville, New Jersey, 1933); David K. McCarrell, “The Formation of the Jeffersonian Party in Virginia” (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, Duke University, 1937); William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy in New England (New Haven, 1916); Bernard Fay, 34 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Regardless of the precise origin of political parties, the men who controlled the new government came mainly from among those who fought for ratification of the Constitution—the federalists. They chose the most illustrious of their number for the nation’s first president. From the beginning George Washington identified himself with one of the early special political alliances and was its most prominent figure. Yet he was not a candidate of that or any other political group. For President he was the choice of almost all men. His Revolutionary exploits won the unanimous support of the electoral college; his reputation united Americans behind the new government he was drafted to lead. But for his support, furthermore, the new Constitution might never have been adopted. * * * * 5 Despite pleas of Hamilton and others that he was an “indispens¬ able” man and that upon his acceptance of the Presidency “the suc¬ cess of the new government in its commencement may materially depend,” Washington was reluctant to embrace the high office; he wished to be saved “from the dreaded Dilemma of being forced to accept or refuse.” Unwilling to enter an unexplored field, “en¬ veloped on every side with clouds of darkness,” the hero of the Revolution had but one thing more he desired of fife—to live “in peace and retirement." 6 That his friends should ignore his deep-felt desires was logical. They needed his services and enormous prestige to pilot the government. “Early Party Machinery in the United States: Pennsylvania in the Election of 1796,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LX (Oct., 1936), 375- 390. One of the recent studies incorporating previous scholarship on the subject is an unpublished doctoral dissertation in the Duke University Library by Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., “The Jeffersonian Party to 1801: A Study of the Formation of a Party Organization” (Dept, of History, 1952); another recent study which breaks new ground is Harry Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia, 1789-1796,” Journal of Southei'n History, XIX (Aug., 1953), 283-310. 5 Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington: A Biography (6 vols., New York, 1948-1954), VI, 140 (hereinafter cited as Freeman, Washington). 0 Washington to Thomas Johnson, Mount Vernon, April 20, 1788, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXIX, 463; to Alexander Hamilton, Mount Vernon, Oct. 3, 1788, XXX, no; to Benjamin Lincoln, Mount Vernon, Oct. 26, 1788, XXX, 119; Nathaniel W. Stephenson and Waldo H. Dunn, George Washington (2 vols., New York, 1940), II, 250. For an interesting brief commentary on Washington’s acceptance of the Presidency, see Douglas S. Freeman, “Washington’s Hardest Decision,” Atlantic, CXC (Oct., 1952), 45 - 51 - THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 35 Washington took office as, theoretically, a nonpolitical president. During his eight years in office he did not consider himself a party man. In a sense he was not a political president and many con¬ temporaries did not consider him such. In him was centered the unity of the government. Abhorring politics and parties, he identi¬ fied political opposition as “faction,” something disloyal, something to be distrusted. He often referred to himself as “one, who is of no party,” and urged his countrymen to “drive far away the demon of party spirit.” 7 His thinking reflected political ideas of the times. The Consti¬ tution had no provision for political parties, and a government above party was Washington’s ideal. 8 In his first inaugural address he spoke out against “party animosities.” Almost eight years later as he looked forward to retirement he defended his ostensibly non¬ political administration. “I was no party man myself,” he declared, “and the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them.” 9 On the basis of a nonpolitical administration and of using the best talents regardless of differing political outlook Washington chose Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson to fill his two most important departmental posts, the Treasury and State departments. Ironically, these two men of divergent political and social philoso¬ phies within his government rendered Washington’s governmental ideal unworkable. They became the principal architects of Ameri¬ ca’s first national political coalitions. In practice, Washington’s was a conservative-aristocratic govern¬ ment dominated, for the most part, by the same group of men who 7 Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 275-276; Louis M. Sears, George Washington (New York, 1932), pp. 368-370; Libby, “Political Factions in Washington’s Administrations,” OJUND, III, 299. 8 For a concise summary of Washington’s political views, see Harold W. Bradley, “The Political Thinking of George Washington,” JSH, XI (Nov., 1945), 469-486; also Norman J. Small, Some Presidential Interpretations of the Presidency (Baltimore, 1932), p. 16. Washington’s contemporaries were also perplexed as to the place of political parties in government; see Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History (New York, 1948), p. 92 n.; and Stuart G. Brown, The First Republicans: Political Philosophy and Public Policy in the Party of Jefferson and Madison (Syracuse University Press, 1954), p. 49. 9 Washington to Thomas Jefferson, Mount Vernon, July 6, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXV, 119. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 36 had been responsible for the drafting and the adoption of the federal Constitution. 10 Theoretically nonpolitical at its inception, the administration, as it established itself, became increasingly political. By the end of his first term, although he did not realize it, or at least would not admit it, Washington had become essentially a political president, 11 and his government, as he came more and more under the influence of Alexander Hamilton, a one-party government. Political parties had, by this time, become a part of American society. 12 -V- -V- -V- tv" IT TP TP The political foundations of Washington’s government were, for the most part, anchored in the philosophy, ideas, and govern¬ mental program of Alexander Hamilton. 13 A brilliant young man of thirty-four when he became Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton had already acquired a taste for high office and a thirst for power. He had already formed his ideas on politics and foreign policy, 10 Sears, George Washington, pp. 414, 445. Washington, even though in¬ fluenced by his advisers, was fully responsible for his administration. See White, The Federalists . . . , pp. 7, 27; Robinson, The Evolution of American Political Parties, p. 59. No man who had opposed ratification of the Consti¬ tution was in Washington’s official family. u “To the end of his life Washington failed to recognize the close rela¬ tionship between partisan politics and the practical views of the majority.” Bradley, “Political Thinking of George Washington,” JSH, XI, 480; see also James Hart, The American Presidency in Action, 1789: A Study in Constitu¬ tional History (New York, 1948), p. 2. 12 Cunningham, “The Jeffersonian Party to 1801 . . . ,” pp. 107, 175, 183- 184. 18 For a concise appraisal of Alexander Hamilton and his policies, see Rexford Guy Tugwell and Joseph Dorfman, “Alexander Hamilton: Nation Maker,” Columbia University Quarterly, XXIX and XXX (Dec., 1937, and March, 1938), 209-226 and 59-72; Vernon L. Parrington, Main Cunents in American Thought ... (3 vols., New York, 1927-30), I, 292-306; for a precise outline of his life, see Allan Nevins in the Dictionary of American Biography; for a readable one-volume biography, see Nathan Schachner, Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1946); for an over-all view of the Hamilton- Jefferson clash, see Claude Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, The Struggle for Democracy in America (Boston, 1925); for a contemporary appraisal see La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , II, 466-467. Even those who were opposed to Hamilton’s policies recognized his great talent. Contemporaries believed that Hamilton directed the conduct of the Washington government, particularly in the latter years. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 37 and lie had formulated plans for putting those ideas into practice. To understand these ideas and plans a brief survey of his back¬ ground should prove useful. In the British West Indies where he had been born, the illegiti¬ mate son of Scottish and French parents, Hamilton had lived his first seventeen years. 14 In 1772, just before he reached eighteen, he went to New York at the expense of relatives and there entered King’s College (later Columbia University) to complete his educa¬ tion. He quickly distinguished himself, revealing a remarkable mental maturity, and, espousing the colonial cause in opposition to British policies, he engaged actively in New York politics. When hostilities broke out Hamilton took up arms under Ameri¬ can colors, and at twenty-two became one of General Washington’s aides-de-camp with the rank of lieutenant-colonel. In this strategic, if relatively unglamorous job, he came to know Washington; he learned much of the army; and more important, he learned much of the nation in the making. 15 Never reconciling himself to irksome clerical duties, he chafed impatiently under the conviction which he was to carry to his grave—that he was capable of and destined for a brilliant military career. 16 Hamilton, not fortunate enough to have been born into the ruling landed aristocracy he admired, married into that society. At twenty-five, approximately a year before the surrender at York- town, he wed the second daughter of General Philip Schuyler, one of Washington’s four major-generals and one of the wealthiest of the New York land barons. 1 ' In political, social, and financial 14 Hamilton has generally been considered to have been two years younger than he was in fact. This in part explains his reputation for extraordinary precociousness. See Harold Larson, “Alexander Hamilton: The Fact and Fiction of His Early Years,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, IX (April, 1952), 145-146, and Broadus Mitchell, “The Secret of Alexander Hamilton,” Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIX (Autumn, 1953), 595-609. 15 How warm or how cordial was the friendship between Hamilton and Washington is a moot question. See Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton . . . , p. 41; John C. Hamilton, History of the Republic of the United States of America, as Traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton and His Con¬ temporaries (7 vols., New York, 1857-64), II, 172-177. 16 This is stressed in Adrienne Koch, “Hamilton, Adams and the Pursuit of Power,” Review of Politics, XVI (Jan., 1954), 48; see also Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton . . . , p. 27. 17 Moreau de Saint-Mery in his Voyage aux Etats-Unis de l’Amerique, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 38 outlook, Hamilton found himself at home in his father-in-law’s aristocratic circle. With the zeal and conviction often evident in the newly converted, he became an apostle of wealth, status, and stability. 18 After the end of the war and with establishment of the govern¬ ment under the Articles of Confederation, Hamilton practiced law, served a term in Congress, and threw himself into the movement for a stronger central government. His contributions in support of the federal Constitution were major. In collaboration with James Madison and John Jay he defended the Constitution in The Feder¬ alist. He alone wrote over half the papers in this brilliant commen¬ tary on republican government. Even though he had early fought the British in defense of the American cause, Hamilton admired the Bridsh consdtution and system of government, which he maintained were the best in the world. At the Constitutional Convention he asserted, for example, that Americans could do no better than to model their new govern¬ ment after the British consdtution. 19 Having no faith in the people, he distrusted the common man. To him the man-in-the-street was ignorant, irresponsible, lacking in control, completely incapable of wise government, and dominated by “selfish passions.” Power in government should be entrusted to men of intelligence, educa- I 793 ' I 79 8- e d- Stewart L. Mims (New Haven, 1913), p. 147, maintained that by his marriage Hamilton also acquired powerful connections in English political circles. For the English translation see Kenneth and Anna M. Roberts, eds. and translators, Moreau de St. Mery’s American journey, 1793- 1798 (Garden City, 1947), pp. 137 and 154 n. Such connections undoubtedly did not detract from Hamilton’s pro-English leanings. 18 For an instructive commentary on Hamilton’s position in regard to government and the “protection of wealth,” see Thomas P. Govan, “The Rich, the Well-born, and Alexander Hamilton,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXVI (March, 1950), 675-680. 19 See Hamilton’s comments in the Committee of the Whole as reported by James Madison, June 18, 1787, in Charles C. Tansill, ed., . . . Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States (Washing¬ ton, 1927), p. 220; also Frederick S. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union (New York, 1907), p. 155; Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson: Their Contribution to Thought on Public Administration (Chicago, 1944), p. 2 (hereinafter cited as Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson ); James Bryce, The Predictions of Hamilton and De Tocqueville (Baltimore, 1887), p. 13. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 39 tion, and wealth—an elite of superior individuals. 20 As men with property interests for the government to protect, they would have a selfish stake in that government, a stake they would defend. Men, according to Hamilton, were not to be trusted on their own —“every man must be supposed a \nave .” 21 Even those whom he would have govern others were essentially untrustworthy, as they too placed “selfish passions” above principle. But Hamilton used those “selfish passions” to build the kind of strong central government he desired. 22 JL JL JL if X X X Envisaging himself as something of a prime minister in Washing¬ ton’s official family, Hamilton developed and carried out a bold program designed to place the country on respectable footing in the world community of nations and to give it financial stability. At the same time he tried to weave his political philosophy into the nation’s government in its formative years. His immediate ob¬ jectives were to establish the nation’s credit at home and abroad and to strengthen the national government at the expense of the states. To do this he launched a program which may be con¬ sidered under four categories: economic, political, diplomatic, and constitutional. Using economics as hkfbTueprint, Hamilton under¬ took to construct a governmental foundation on which to build a nation. Whatever contributed to a strong union, hence to his system, he believed was good policy. 23 Actually, Americans took the first step in this program before Hamilton assumed office. Even so, he apparently had a hand in its formulation and it represented his views. 24 In essence it con- 20 Govan, “The Rich, the Well-born, and Alexander Hamilton,” MVHR, XXXVI, 675-680; Tansill, ed., . . . Formation of the Union . . . , p. 221; Cald¬ well, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 10. 21 Hamilton in “The Farmer Refuted,” Feb. 5, 1775, citing David Hume, in John C. Hamilton, ed., The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton (7 vols., New York, 1850-51), II, 51 (hereinafter cited as Hamilton, ed., Hamiltons' Worlds). 22 At the Constitutional Convention Hamilton urged strengthening the national government at the expense of the states. See his remarks, June 19, 1787, in Tansill, ed., . . . Formation of the Union . . . , pp. 786-787. 23 For a variation of this interpretation, see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jeffer¬ son, p. 51; Joseph Charles, “Hamilton and Washington: The Origins of the American Party System,” WMO, 3rd Series, XII (April, 1955), 245. 24 Edward Channing, A History of the United States (6 vols., New York, 1905-1925), IV, 64; Hamilton, History of the Republic . . . , IV, 4-7. 4 ° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE sisted of a series of laws passed by Congress in die summer of 1789: the tariff act, the tonnage act, die act to regulate the collection of duties, and the act for the registering and clearing of vessels. 25 This commercial system produced needed revenue and laid down a policy of limited protection for American industrial and com¬ mercial interests, and, through discriminatory imposts, could be an effective instrument in foreign policy. As finally passed, the laws favored Great Britain to the disadvantage of France and so laid the foundation for Hamilton’s system. 26 Hamilton himself proposed the next step. In January, 1790, he laid before Congress his plans for funding the national debt at rface value and for assumption in full by the national government of debts incurred by the states during the Revolutionary War. 27 So that American credit and status abroad might rise from their low state, most congressmen felt that the nation’s foreign debt— 15 See Annals of the Congress .... I, 46 (June n and 17, 1789); 53 (July 27, 1789); 73 (Aug. 25, 1789); U. S. Congress, Senate, Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress of the United States from 1789 to 1895 . . . , 54th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Document No. 219 (Washington, 1935), pp. 9-11; William Hill, The First Stages of the Tariff Policy of the United States, Publications of the American Economic Association, VIII (Baltimore, 1893), 107-130. Nathan Schachner in Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (2 vols., New York, 1951), I, 479, maintained that “every governmental policy— foreign as well as domestic—hinged on the financial structure of the United States.” See also Beloff, Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy, pp. 113-115; also Nathan Schachner, The Founding Fathers (New York, 1954), pp. 36-46. In later years an ardent Republican in attacking Hamilton’s commercial system, which he characterized as the “war system,” declared that it was like a “common hall” in a structure which “gives you access to all the rooms of the federal building,” Abraham Bishop, Connecticut Republi¬ canism : An Oration on the Extent and Power of Political Delusion . . . [delivered Sept., 1800] (Philadelphia, 1800), pp. 3, 10. 29 The motives behind the tariff and tonnage laws have been the subject of much controversy as to whether they were essentially protective or revenue- producing. See Thomas W. Page, “The Earlier Commercial Policy of the United States,” Journal of Political Economy, X (March, 1902), 178; David W. Brown, The Commercial Power of Congress Considered in the Light of Its Origin (New York, 1910), pp. 154-155; Davis R. Dewey, Financial History of the United States (12th ed.; New York, 1934), pp. 80-85. 27 Hamilton spelled out his program in four notable reports which he sub¬ mitted to Congress: (1) the First Report on the Public Credit, Jan. 14, 1790, (2) the Second Report on the Public Credit, Dec. 13, 1790, (3) the Report on the National Bank, Dec. 14, 1790, and (4) the Report on Manufactures, Dec. 5, 1791. The reports are in Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton (9 vols., New York, 1885-86), Vols. II and III. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 4 1 owed chiefly to French and Dutch creditors—should be paid in full. 28 But the proposed face-value payment of the domestic debt held by American bondholders—rascals and speculators as well as the original creditors—aroused opposition in Congress. Hamilton and his followers insisted that the entire national debt, domestic and foreign, which they felt could not rightfully be divided, should be paid at face value. The opposition, led by James Madison in the House of Representatives, fought such payment on the ground that government bonds had depreciated to about twenty to fifteen cents and even as low as seven cents on the dollar and at those low figures had been bought by speculators who could afford to hold them and who anticipated a financial killing under Hamilton's scheme. 29 To allow such men to capitalize on their greed, the op¬ position maintained, would be to reward government-sponsored speculation and to discriminate against patriotic original holders. The contention was sound. Many of Hamilton’s friends and others privy to the proposed funding had precipitated a scramble of specula¬ tion in an effort to buy the seemingly worthless bonds at low prices from unsuspecting holders, particularly from those in the South. 30 Hamilton’s motives in proposing funding were as much political and diplomatic as they were economic. By paying the debt he 28 Jefferson also favored paying the foreign debt. He believed that “the existence of a nation having no credit, is always precarious.” Jefferson to James Madison, Paris, May 3, 1788, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Worlds, VI, 455, and Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 289. 29 For Madison’s role in the battle over assumption, see Irving Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution, ij8j-i8oo (Indianapolis, 1950), pp. 290-305. According to Brant, Madison by fighting Hamilton’s assumption scheme “split the original Federalists asunder, fused one part of them with the radical wing of the vanishing Anti-federalists and gave direction to the political cleavage which swiftly divided the American public into Federalists and Republicans.” Moreover, Madison “planted the seed and started the growth of the party which received the Jeffersonian label. He did this before Jef¬ ferson re-entered the national scene from his diplomatic exile.” In Virginia Hamilton’s assumption proposals created a political opposition to the govern¬ ment; in fact, Hamilton’s fiscal program may have produced the first real antagonism against the Washington administration. See Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia,” JSH, XIX, 289, 297. 30 Remarked anti-Hamilton William Maclay, “The great object is, by fund¬ ing and so forth, to raise the certificates to par; thus the speculators, who now have them nearly all engrossed, will clear above three hundred per cent.” William Maclay, The Journal of William Maclay, United States Senator from Pennsylvania, ijSy-ijyi (New York, 1927), p. 195, entry of Feb. 19, 1790. 4 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE would establish American credit abroad and would bind the men of wealth and status, who had come to acquire most of the domestically held bonds, to the new national government. Through exchange of their bonds at face-value for interest-bearing certificates, Hamilton would reward them handsomely and at the same time place the government in their debt. America’s wealthy citizens would acquire a vested interest in, and, to protect their own inter¬ ests, would support, the government. Hamiltonians pushed the funding plan dirough Congress. Similar motives impelled Hamilton to propose, and the Congress to adopt, assumption of state debts by the federal government. Regarding the Constitution as weak cement for union—“a frail and worthless fabric”—and sectionalism as an ever-present danger, he hoped through assumption to add strength to the central govern¬ ment by making the states financially dependent. 31 The French charge d’affaires understood Hamilton’s objective. He observed that funding the state debts would help to consolidate the United States and believed that Hamilton’s system would make a nation of a dozen republics. 32 Another foreign diplomat, however, noted general dissatisfaction with Hamilton’s measures and increasing distrust between Northern and Southern states. 33 ^j. Another step in the program was creation of the first Bank of the United States, modeled after the Bank of England. Four-fifths of the bank’s capital stock was to be subscribed by private indi¬ viduals; the remaining fifth was to be held by the federal govern¬ ment. While remaining a privately controlled bank, it would serve as a depository for federal funds and would be authorized to issue paper money on the basis of securities it held. Again in this proposal Hamilton went beyond the realm of 31 For a fuller discussion of the funding and assumption schemes, see John S. Bassett, The Federalist System, IJ89-1801 (New York, 1906), pp. 30-38; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 83-121. 32 Louis-Guillaume Otto to [Minister of Foreign Affairs], New York, Jan. 19, 1790, Edmond C. Genet Papers, Library of Congress, VII, 2176-2177. 33 John Hamilton, British Consul at Norfolk, to Duke of Leeds, Norfolk, Va., April 10, 1791, British Foreign Correspondence: America, Henry Adams Transcripts, Library of Congress. Hereinafter cited as the Henry Adams Transcripts. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 43 finance, and the measure, in the long run, proved more important for its political and constitutional implications. His reasons for wandng the bank may be reduced to three: first, by benefiting the business classes, which would largely control it, the bank would serve as another tie between that group and the central government; second, by chartering the bank Congress would at the same time add strength to the federal government—by accepting the principle of implied powers; and, third, by enlarging the powers of the na¬ tional legislature the federal government would increase in power while the sovereignty of state governments would decline. There was nothing in the Constitution which authorized Con¬ gress to create a bank. Basis might be found only in the clause of Article I of the Constitution which gave Congress power to enact laws which were “necessary and proper” for carrying out the powers of government as laid down by the Constitution. 34 When con¬ fronted with the bank charter after it had passed Congress, Washing¬ ton asked his department heads, as came to be his practice, to sub¬ mit their written opinions on the question before signing it. He was puzzled as to its constitutionality. 35 Declaring that Congress had no powers not granted it specifical¬ ly by the Constitution, Jefferson maintained the bank measure was unconstitutional. In referring to the “necessary and proper” clause, he made the word “necessary” the foundation for his contention that, while the bank might be a useful instrument for regulating the currency, it certainly was not indispensable or “necessary” for the task. 36 Hamilton, on the other hand, advanced the doctrine of implied powers by asserting that the federal government, within the limits of its delegated powers, could determine necessary methods for executing its functions. In referring to the “necessary and proper” 34 For details on the bank, see John T. Holdsworth and Davis R. Dewey, The First and Second Ban\s of the United States (National Monetary Com¬ mission, 6ist Cong., 2nd Sess., Senate Document No. 571, Washington, 1910), pp. 9-144, and Joseph S. Davis, Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations, Harvard Economic Studies, XVI (2 vols., Cambridge, 1917), pp. 50-54; James O. Wettereau, “New Light on the First Bank of the United States,” PMBH, LXI (July, 1937), 263-285. 33 Freeman, Washington, VI, 291-293. 33 Jefferson’s “Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank,” Feb. 15, 1791, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 284-289. 44 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE clause, he, in turn, emphasized the word “proper” as the basis for his argument. Since Congress had the right to regulate the currency, it had the power to charter a national bank as a “proper” and advantageous means for regulating the currency. 37 Washington accepted Hamilton’s views and in February, 1791, signed the bank bill into law. In carrying out his program Hamilton was defeated in only one sweeping measure. This was in his proposal, embodied in the Report on Manufactures of December 5, 1791, to aid the growth of infant American industries through various protective laws. Be¬ hind the report lay the basic idea that the general welfare required encouragement of manufactures and that the federal government was obligated to direct the national economy to that end. Previously Madison and others had urged a protectionist tariff policy, which at the time was a special policy of expediency designed to strike at England. In his report Hamilton, too, urged a protec¬ tionist commercial policy, but not a policy of immediate expediency. It was, instead, a broad theoretical policy fitting his over-all system, a policy based not on antagonism toward England but on admira¬ tion of England’s commercial society, which Hamilton would have America emulate. 34 Instrumental in this first important Hamil¬ tonian defeat was the opposition of Jefferson and Madison. 33 ,j|. 37 See Hamilton’s “Opinion as to the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States,” Feb. 23, 1791, Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 104-138. For accounts involving the principals of the bank issue, see Malone, Jeffer- son and the Rights of Man, 337-350; Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, 268-273; Freeman, Washington, VI, 289-293. 38 The report is in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, III, 294- 416; for a discussion of the theory of the report see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, pp. 63-68; Arthur H. Cole, Industrial and Commercial Correspond¬ ence of Alexander Hamilton Anticipating His Report on Manufactures (Chi¬ cago, 1928), p. 234; see also Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 185-188. 39 The ideological basis for the defeat is stated succinctly in Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration (New York, 1950), pp. 127-131. Despite the defeat, Hamilton’s ideas expressed in the Report in¬ fluenced Federalist thought and deed. In later years, for example, William Vans Murray, Federalist congressman from Maryland, in analyzing the program he had supported in Congress, placed at the head of his list manu¬ factures—“agreeable to Mr. Hamilton’s excellent Report (and indeed of A. Smith & others) of 1791.” See William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Princeton). THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 45 Two more major steps completed Hamilton’s policy structure. One was an excise tax placed on whiskey; the other was the Procla¬ mation of Neutrality of 1793. To pay for funding and assumption the government needed money. To raise money and to assert the power of the federal government Hamilton proposed an excise tax on distilled liquors. 40 For various reasons this tax, when adopted, hit hardest the small farmers of the interior, West and South, who commonly converted their corn into easily transported, easily sold, and easily consumed whiskey. While designed to raise money, the excise tax was also a political device. This internal tax, imposed by the central government in a domain considered by the states to be theirs exclusively, would serve to impress the anti-Hamiltonian rural folk with the power of the central government. At the same time, through federal enforcement, the tax would serve to combat sec¬ tionalism. Heartily opposed by Westerners from the day it first became law in March, 1791, the excise tax finally, in 1794, led to an uprising of farmers in western Pennsylvania known as “The Whis- kev Rebellion.” 4 1 To Hamilton the rebellion presented an opportunity he had long coveted. Some Hamiltonians, however, were frightened; they be¬ lieved that the “insurrection” was part of a plot to destroy the federal government. 42 Under the Constitution Congress had power to use the militia “to execute the laws of the union” and to “suppress insurrections.” Congress, in turn, had authorized the President to call out state militia for such enforcement. With Western farmers openly defying national law, the issue was clear. The strength of the federal government, as opposed to local defiance, was for the first 40 See Hamilton’s First Report on the Public Credit, Jan. 14, 1790, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, II, 90-92; Hamilton’s theory of collateral taxation is discussed in Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, pp. 57-61. 11 For accounts of the Whiskey Rebellion, see American State Papers, Miscellaneous, I, 83-113; Leland D. Baldwin, Whiskey Rebels: The Story of a Frontier Uprising (Pittsburgh, 1939); Bennett M. Rich, The Presidents and Civil Disorder (Washington, 1941), pp. 2-20; Russell J. Ferguson, Early West¬ ern Pennsylvania Politics (Pittsburgh, 1938), pp. 126-129; Raymond Walters, Jr., Alexander James Dallas: Lawyer-Politician-Financier (Philadelphia, 1943), pp. 52-64; Harry M. Tinkcom, The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsyl¬ vania, IJ90-1801: A Study in National Stimulus and Local Response (Harris¬ burg, Pa., 1950), pp. 91-112. 4a William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Dec. n, 1795 (Princeton). ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 4 6 time to be tested on the field of battle. Would the states remain loyal to the Union? Would they respond to a call to use force on behalf of the central government against a sister state? The crisis was met. Four states, including Pennsylvania, answered Washington’s call for troops. At the head of federal troops, 9000 foot and 3000 horse, Hamilton put on a show of force and marched on Pennsylvania’s western counties. Opposition melted away and no battle ensued. A few rebel leaders were apprehended and in time pardoned. Their detention was not important. What did matter was that federal authority had triumphed against its first rebellious adversary and that in the crisis it had won support of state governments. 43 Expressing well the Hamiltonian attitude, a congressman re¬ joiced that “the insurrection in Pennsylvania is the happiest event that ever happened to the United States. It has exhibited Democracy in practice and even Democrats are frightened with the horrid monster ... the suppression of this insurrection will give the Govern¬ ment of the United States a tone, an energy, and dignity, which will defy all the efforts of Anarchy and Jacobinism.” 44 But Hamilton’s policies needed more than domestic success. They were predicated upon peace and friendship with Great Britain. Without a sympathetic and co-ordinated foreign policy Hamilton’s elaborate blueprint for the making of a nation could not be translated into a functioning system of government. In Hamilton’s view, moreover, the attitude of foreign powers was the determining force in measuring the prestige of a government. 45 When news of war between France and England reached the United States in April, 1793, Hamilton, in opposition to Secretary of State Jefferson, urged President Washington to announce Amer-^ ica’s determination to remain neutral. In addition to harbor^ ing a personal partiality for England he saw that if the United^ 43 Adrienne Koch in “Hamilton, Adams and the Pursuit of Power,” RP, XVI, 49 stresses Hamilton’s role in the Whiskey Rebellion as evidence of Hamilton’s influence over Washington and that the government was function¬ ing according to his views. 44 Zephaniah Swift to David Daggett, Philadelphia, Nov. 11, 1794, in Franklin B. Dexter, ed., “Selections from Letters Received by David Daggett, 1786-1802,” Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, New Series, IV (1885-87), 373. 46 See Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 11. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 47 States did not remain at peace with and friendly to Great Britain — r despite the alliance with France—his entire program would collapse. Most of America’s trade was with Great Britain; the Hamil¬ tonian program was financed by the income from import duties; war against Great Britain would destroy the program. 46 Without British trade the new nation’s efforts to establish a respectable credit standing abroad would fail. The very existence of the country, the Secretary of the Treasury feared, would be jeopardized. Great Britain, with her powerful navy, was then the only power capable of mounting a transatlantic attack against the United States. She must not be antagonized. Shunting aside obligations under the French alliance and gratitude for French help in the Revolution, . Hamilton was convinced that England was the nation whose in¬ terests were most compatible with those of the United States. 47 y While more will be said about the neutrality legislation, it is sufficient at this point to indicate that Washington followed Hamil¬ ton’s advice and issued the Proclamation of Neutrality on April ' 22, 1793. Thus in its major aspects Hamilton completed his program. * * By the end of 1790 and the beginning of 1791 Hamilton’s con¬ temporaries realized that his economic-political-constitutional-diplo¬ matic measures were dividing the country. In government and out men were coalescing into two political facdons. Precisely when this division took place is not known. Historians and students of poli¬ tics have advanced varying interpretations as to when the split oc¬ curred and what produced it. Despite blurred details of party origin, scholars generally agree that the first national political parties were spawnedJ)y the Hamiltonian system and solidified by^ foreign- policy problems arising out of relations with France and England. By 1792, the close of Washington’s first term, the United States had two clearly discernible national political groupings. One of these looked to Hamilton and Washington for leadership. 48 For significance of Anglo-American trade, see Bemis, Jay’s Treaty ..., pp. 33-36. In 1790 nearly two-thirds of America’s foreign trade was with countries under the British flag; see Emory R. Johnson and others, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States (2 vols., Washington, 1915), n, 6-7. 47 For a discussion of Hamilton’s ideas on foreign policy bearing on a similar theme, see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, pp. 74-75. 4 » ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Successful though he was in gaining support of Washington and of other prominent conservatives for his program, Hamilton was never able to win any appreciable popular support for it. His plans, however, were not predicated on the assumption of popular support, which he held in contempt. 48 With each new success Hamilton’s policies aroused greater and more effective opposition, so much so that Thomas Jefferson, alarmed by various aspects of the Hamil¬ tonian “system,” undertook, with James Madison, the task of organiz¬ ing a political opposition to contest die control of government by Hamilton and his followers. 49 Even though he may have deplored “faction” and party strife, Washington was not above partisan politics, particularly in his second administration. While Hamilton designed the economic- political program, Washington made it the basis of his government. Although he relied heavily on department heads and deferred to their views, all decisions were his; responsibility for policies followed rested ultimately with Washington. 5 " The President accepted Hamilton’s policies because he was under the influence of his Secretary of the Treasury, and because he too believed that only a strong central government could secure a re¬ spected place in the world community of nations. Washington’s method of conducting government aided implementation of Hamil¬ ton’s ideas. Foreign policy, a main source of conflict between Jefferson and Hamilton, was generally the major subject for discus¬ sion in Cabinet meetings. In these meetings Hamilton, backed by his personal partisans, almost always won acceptance for his ideas on foreign policy. 51 48 Many Federalists shared Hamilton’s contempt for “popularity,” which was believed to be “an evil most felt in a free govt. ... a vice without limits.” William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 23, 1795 (Princeton). See also Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton .... pp. 29, 266; Schachner, Alex¬ ander Hamilton, p. 339; Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, pp. 7, 11-12. Hamilton apparently never fully understood the necessity of popular leader¬ ship for the kind of “system” he wanted. 49 See Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 350; Brant, Madison: Father of the Constitution . . . , pp. 332-333. 50 See Bradley, “The Political Thinking of George Washington,” JSH, XI, 486; White, The Federalists . . . , p. 27; Herbert Agar, The Price of Union (Boston, 1950), p. 74. 81 Freeman, in Washington, VI, 293, maintained that Washington believed in a strong central government because only thus could the United States THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 49 The men who accepted the political leadership of Hamilton and Washington—in the main they were merchants, bankers, and professional men of New England and the Eastern Seaboard— formed the core of America’s first national political coalition, the Federalist party. 5 ' They emphasized efficient government and stable social and economic conditions, as opposed to uncontrolled freedom, which they saw as anarchy. The party dedicated itself to secur¬ ing a government under the tutelage of the rich and well-born; indeed, many of die Federalists favored a monarchy. 53 Financially and polidcally, Federalist leaders were bound to¬ gether by common interests. 54 Their organization had more the cohesiveness of a closed corporate body than of a political organiza¬ tion, which by its very nature must cater to diverse interests. The interlocking lines of connections among Federalist leaders crossed the Atlantic and extended to England. By marriage, blood relation¬ ships, and common financial interests, Federalist leaders were tied to persons of high finance and politics in Great Britain, the ruling element in Parliament. 50 British influence with them was remain free. See also Bradley, “The Political Thinking of George Washing¬ ton,” JSH, XI, 472; Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 228; White, The Federalists . . . , p. 217; Charles, “Hamilton and Washington . . . ,” WMQ, 3rd Series, XII, 255-256. 62 Not the same federalists who had fought for ratification of the Consti¬ tution. 63 No evidence has been unearthed to reveal that the Federalists in power ever set on foot “definite projects” for establishing a monarchy; see Louise B. Dunbar, A Study of “Monarchical” Tendencies in the United States, from ijj6-i8oi, “University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences,” X, No. I (Urbana, Ill., 1923), 115. Nonetheless, Republicans believed that Hamiltonians saw “no stability, no security in any kind of government but a monarchy.” Jefferson, The Anas, Nov. 21, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 209. 64 Federalists never did form a truly national political party in the same sense that their opponents did; they never did believe in political parties; see Binkley, American Political Parties . . . , p. 49; Marshall Smelser, “The Jacobin Phrenzy: Federalism and the Menace of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity,” Review of Politics, XIII (Oct., 1951), 458. In New Jersey, for example, al¬ though Federalists were dominant until 1800 they never organized a highly developed state machine. Richard P. McCormick, The History of Voting in New Jersey: A Study of the Development of Election Machinery, 1664-igu (New Brunswick, 1953), pp. 87-88. SB Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 167-168; Samuel E. Morison, The Maritime History of Massachusetts, iy8^ to i860 (Boston, 1921V pp. 168-69. 50 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE not based on mere theorizing or intellectual predilection; it was in the air they breathed. In spite of Washington’s Federalist views, in the beginning of the national government whatever political “opposition” existed directed its elf n o^agai nst him hur _againsr Hamilton. 56 As the government sank roots, those who opposed die Federalists were at first known simply as andfederalists. Later, as they coalesced and formed a political organization, they were distinguished as Republi¬ cans, and their organization became the Republican party. ***** Differing with Federalists in fundamental issues, Republicans favored a comparatively weak national government under popular control, a government whose primary foundation was to be the small farmer of the interior. In foreign policy Republicans sup¬ ported the French alliance, whereas Federalists would scuttle the alliance and favored close ties with England. The Republicans, opposed to a governmental elite of intellect and wealth, believed that the common people, the small farmer folk, were capable of governing themselves. In general, they espoused local political autonomy as against \centralized polidcal control, and fought the fourfold Hamiltonian program. Governments were not ends in themselves, Republicans contended; governments existed to promote the individual happi¬ ness and well-being of all men,, not to enrich the special few. With their main concentrations in the back-country settlements and in the rural-planter South, Republicans had in Thomas Jefferson the leader who met their needs. 57 66 Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 421; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution . . . , pp. 351-370; for Washington’s popularity, see Freeman, Washington, VI, 322, 353-354. 67 Joseph Charles in “Adams and Jefferson: The Origins of the American Party System,” WMQ, 3rd series, XII (July, 1955), 446, concluded that “Jefferson did not create a party; a widespread popular movement recognized and claimed him as its leader.” For a succinct statement of the Jeffersonian view of government and how it differed from the Hamiltonian position, see Beloff, Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy, pp. 127-139; see also Carl L. Becker, “What Is Still Living in the Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,” American Historical Review, XLVIII (July, 1943), 691-706; Charles M. Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy (Chapel Hill, 1935 )- THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 5i Unlike Hamilton, Jefferson was a great planter and aristocrat in his own right, being during most of his life the master of some 10,000 Virginia acres and from 100 to 200 slaves. Yet he was the champion of die small farmer, a liberal by intellectual conviction . 58 Again unlike Hamilton, he knew the back country, its people, and its problems. Born the son of a pioneer gentleman-settler in one of Virginia’s western counties, he grew to manhood among frontiers¬ men and small farmers of the interior. After being educated in his early years by a tutor, Jefferson at seventeen went to Williamsburg, where he entered the College of William and Mary. There for the first time he saw town life; for the first time he saw “culture.” Leaving William and Mary he turned to law, which in turn led to politics and public office. In or out of office he was active in the events which led to the American Revolution, making notable contributions with his writ¬ ing. From his pen flowed the words of the Declaration of Independ¬ ence. Following terms in the Virginia House of Burgesses and in the Continental Congress in the summer and autumn of 1775, Jefferson served as war-governor of Virginia. Elected governor in 1779, he served a term of office which was not particularly noteworthy and which ended ingloriously. Once again, in 1783, he served in Con¬ gress, this time for six months. Being a poor public speaker, Jef¬ ferson was never able to sway men in large groups. Like Hamilton, he did his most effective work in public office with his pen. Leaving behind him domestic tribulations of a raw govern¬ ment, Je fferso n in 1784 sa iled jor France to assi st John Adams and Benjamin Franklin in obtaining commercial treaties for the new United States. In the following year Congress appointed him Fra nklin’s su ccessor as minister to France, a post he held until October, 1789. Jefferson was convinced that America’s welfare depended on continued close relationship with France, a doctrine he called the ‘jpolar star” of his policy. 5 ^ Although he placed his country’s welfare above the French alliance, he believed that his country owed to France a debt of gratitude and thought that s8 Becker, “. . . Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,” AHR, XLVIII, 700. 60 Jefferson, “The Anas,” Dec. 27, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 52 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE i France would serve as a valuable counterpoise against England. Regarding England as selfish, commercially arrogant, and hostile - to the United States, he feared her as a country not to be trusted. 60 With France in revolution Jefferson ended his duties abroad and in Nove mber, 178(3, returned to the United State s. Soon after his re¬ turn President Washington offered him die post of Secretary of State. Always shy and somewhat fearful of publicity, Jefferson was at first reluctant to accept the office, but finally, for patriotic reasons, he con¬ sented. He began his new duties in March, 1790. While Jefferson had not personally taken part in establishing the new government and had considered the Articles of Confederation as forming an excellent framework for a democratic society, he nonetheless had favored a stronger national government and in general approved of the federal Constitution. In particular he ap¬ proved of placing foreign affairs under exclusive federal control. 61 From firsthand experience he had seen the flaws in a diplomacy lacking the support of a national government. Unaware of the conservative reaction in government during the years he was in France, the new Secretary of State applied himself to his job and soon grasped the significance of the power wielded in the new order of affairs by Hamilton. What particularly shocked Jefferson was that the nation’s former enemy and his own object of distrust—England—was emulated and held in high esteem by those in power while France, ally and proven friend, was scorned and hated. 62 When Jefferson came into Washington’s official family Hamilton had already launched his fourfold program. The rich, 60 The literature on Jefferson is enormous. For reliable short biographies, see Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson: The Apostle of Americanism (2nd rev. ed.; Boston, 1939); Saul K. Padover, Jefferson (New York, 1932); Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson: A Biography (2 vols., New York, 1951); the most recent and best multivolume biography, of which two volumes have been published, is Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time (Boston, 1948—); for a discerning French appraisal of Jefferson, see La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , II, 77-80; for Jefferson’s ideas, see Adrienne Koch, The Philos¬ ophy of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1943). 01 Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 174; Jefferson believed that the primary function of the government of the Confederation was manage¬ ment of foreign affairs; the state governments were responsible for domestic affairs; see Patterson, The Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson, p. 77. 62 See Schachner, Thomas Jefferson . . . , I, 406-407. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 53 and those who aspired to be rich, were praising it, and the debate over assumption and funding was reaching a climax. 63 At the outset Jefferson and Hamilton showed no hostility; they had not met until they became colleagues in the spring of 1790. Despite his concern over things he heard and saw in the govern¬ ment, Jefferson at first appeared determined to co-operate with Hamilton. He even expressed approval of part of the Hamiltonian program, as for example the payment of the foreign and domestic debt at face value. Active and organized political activity was far from his mind. As the Hamiltonian program developed and as Hamilton’s ideas came to dominate government, early making them¬ selves felt in foreign affairs, the Secretary of State found himself increasingly at odds with the Secretary of the Treasury. 64 Jefferson in principle opposed assumption of state debts, but he yielded to Hamilton on this issue to avoid an apparent sectional split in the Union. He made a “bargain” with Hamilton over the location of the national capital. The South got the nation’s capital city and Hamilton and the Northern financiers received in return “assumption” of the state debts by the federal government. 63 On the question of the national bank the two men were far apart. After Washington, in February, 1791, signed the bank bill into law, Jefferson turned from private appeals to the President to open political opposition to advance his own ideas and govern¬ mental program. The unity Washington cherished had not lasted through his first term in office. 66 63 Hamilton had also already started to implement his concept of administra¬ tive responsibility, that is, his role in government; see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 218. 64 Hamilton, for example, corresponded directly with American ministers abroad and directly with foreign diplomatic representatives in the United States; see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 228. 65 For a detailed account of the “bargain,” see Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 298-303, 506. For newspaper debate over the seat of government, see Margaret Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia, 1789- 1801, “Smith College Studies in History,” V, Nos. 1-2 (Northampton, Mass., 1919-1920), 106. 60 One of Jefferson’s recent biographers believes that the bank issue marked the “definitive break” between Hamilton and Jefferson and that more than any other cause it hastened formation of the Federalist and Republican parties. See Schachner, Thomas Jefferson . . . , I, 416, 422; also Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 349-350. 54 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Differences between Hamilton and Jefferson were not merely personal, nor were the political parties they came to head based upon personalism. They, as individuals, symbolized issues larger than personal quarrels. Their ideological differences represented "the political division between two segments of American society. 67 Jefferson feared concentrated power most; his ideal was as little government as possible. Foreign affairs, not the everyday affairs of the people, were the major concerns of the federal government. Focal and domestic problems were, he felt, the exclusive concern of the state governments. In this way American soil would breed no tyranny; its fertility would be for liberty only. 68 To Hamilton, on the other hand, this would lead to hateful anarchy. ^Hamilton wanted to build a nation based on industry and commerce, a nation with a balanced economy. Jefferson, in contrast, would build his America on the small farmer and the artisan. Being something of a pacifist, Jefferson saw commerce as a weapon of coercion with which to avoid war; Hamilton would, and did, use commerce to support a stratified society modeled on that of England. In their ideas on society, on the kind of nation they envisioned the America of the future to be, can be found an important link to the foreign-policy concepts of Jefferson and Hamilton. Although Jefferson accepted commerce and industry as necessary adjuncts to agriculture, he was wedded to the idea of an agrarian America, and detested commercial, industrial society. England to him was an example of what the United States should not be; he was convinced that it would be fatal for the United States “to become a mere city of London, to carry on the commerce of half the world 87 For covenient summary of “The Hamilton-Jefferson Feud,” see White, The Federalists . . . , pp. 222-236; also Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 421; Beloff, Thomas Jefferson and American Democracy, p. 132. The “root” of Jefferson’s opposition to Hamilton’s program seems to have been essentially political rather than economic: Hamilton was likewise politically motivated. At times he opposed measures or reversed himself primarily to be on the side opposite Jefferson. See Tugwell and Dorfman, “Alexander Hamilton . . . CUQ, XXX, 66 n.; for economic emphasis, see Beard, Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy, p. 216; for future im¬ plications of the Jefferson-Hamilton clash, see James Truslow Adams, “Jeffer¬ son and Hamilton Today: The Dichotomy in American Thought,” Atlantic Monthly, CXLI (April, 1928), 443-450. 88 Jefferson’s concepts of government are discussed in Caldwell, Hamil¬ ton and Jefferson, pp. 112-117. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 55 at the expense of waging eternal war with the other half.” That through commerce, banking, industry, and other allied evils, Eng¬ land was losing her freedom—the most striking example of such a country in the world—he never wearied to point out. If Americans did not profit by the example, he feared they would suffer the same loss . 60 This concept, in part, explains Jefferson’s foreign-policy orientation toward France and his antipathy toward England. Hamilton, on the other hand, saw no future in an essentially agrarian economy. Everything in society he admired and would seek to reproduce—commerce, industry, banking, a stable social stratification in which the wealthy ruled—could be found in Eng¬ land. England was an island; Hamilton would make a con¬ tinent in her image . 70 In France he saw an agrarian economy racked by anarchy, instability, and, as a result of revolution, by the excesses of democracy. In the French Revolution and ideas of French philosophers, Jefferson saw the kind of liberty he wanted for the United States. ' The evolving French Revolution, in fact, strengthened his convic¬ tion that France and America were bound together not merely by political alliance but also by ideology, by strength of ideas . 71 With 69 See Becker, “. . . Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,” AHR, XLVI 1 I, 700; for Jefferson’s enmity toward England, see Woolery, The Rela¬ tion of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, pp. 85-86. 70 For evidences of Hamilton’s use of England as a model, see the compara¬ tive statements in Govan, “The Rich, the Well-born, and Alexander Hamil¬ ton,” MVHR, XXXVI, 675-680. “Hamilton,” noted a contemporary as to his system, “seems to have profited by the practice of the wisest European nations, England especially.” See Peter Van Schaack to Henry Van Schaack, Kinder- hook, Feb. 7, 1790, in Henry C. Van Schaack, The Life of Peter Van Schaac\, LL.D. (New York, 1842), p. 434. 71 To Brissot de Warville Jefferson declared that he was “eternally attached to the principles” of the French Revolution, Philadelphia, May 8, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 249. In general, however, Jefferson is con¬ sidered to have been slightly influenced by French thought; see Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition . . . , pp. 49-52. Yet such a conclusion is difficult to reconcile with his admiration of France and the principles of the French Revolution. Certain French thinkers, probably the Physiocrats, undoubtedly had an influence on Jefferson as did certain aspects of French society; see Joseph Dorfman, “The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson,” Political Science Quarterly, LV (March, 1940), 106. Hamilton, for example, believed that Jefferson “drank freely of the French philosophy, in religion, in science, in politics.” Hamilton to Col. Edward Carrington, Philadelphia, May 26, 1792, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 259; see also Vossler, { ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 5 6 Hamilton and his followers constantly avowing their admiration for the English constitution, English finance, and English society, Jeffersonians concluded that “the zealous apostles of English des¬ potism” were working to establish a monarchy in North America in the image of the mother country. That Americans could coun¬ tenance such an idea distressed Jefferson, who saw America’s national welfare threatened by France’s monarchical enemies, “the con¬ federacy of princes against human liberty.”' 2 Hamilton was con¬ vinced that the everlasting tie with England could not be escaped. “We think in English,” he said. Even though the national political struggle that was in the mak¬ ing from 1791 to 1793 was the product, in many respects, of domestic differences, the question of foreign policy was always pres¬ ent. Control over foreign policy was inherent in the struggle; it sparked organized political activity. The future and immediate wel¬ fare of the American democratic experiment was harnessed to rela¬ tions with Franc e anT England. And it was precisely in the critical area of foreign affairs that Hamilton and Jefferson first clashed. 73 Die amcripanischen Revolutionsideale in ihrem verhaltnis zu den europaischen: Untersucht en Thomas Jefferson (Munich, 1929), p. 127; Palmer “A Neglected Work . . . ,” WMQ, 3rd Series, XII, 466-467. Vossler maintains that Jefferson turned from Locke to Rousseau. Woodrow Wilson believed that Jefferson’s ideas were “un-American” because “of the strain of French philosophy that permeated and weakened all his thought . . . ,” quoted in Latane, “Jefferson’s Influence on American Foreign Policy,” Alumni Bulletin of the University of Virginia, XVII, 245-246. 72 The quotations are from Jefferson to Brissot de Warville, Philadelphia, May 8, 1793, and Jefferson to James Madison, Philadelphia, May 19, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 249, 261; see also Jefferson to Harry Innes, Philadelphia, May 23, 1793, pp. 265-266. Jefferson’s “rooted aversion to Great Britain,” contended the British minister in Philadelphia, stemmed from being a British debtor. This united him in sympathy with other debtors, “the great mass of individuals who were in a similar situation”; see George Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts. 73 The greatest personal grievance which Jefferson held against Hamilton was his interference in foreign affairs. Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 452; also pp. xx, 304, 328; White, The Federalists . . . , p. 224; Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 228. In Connecticut, as elsewhere, for example, differing views on foreign policy provided the issue which split the people into two political groups or parties. Richard J. Purcell, Connecticut in Transition, iyjy-1818 (Washington, 1918), p. 288. To Jefferson and other Republican leaders the unanimity of sentimental appeal offered by the French THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 57 The Hamiltonian program conflicted with the foreign policy which Jefferson as Secretary of State wanted. Anglo-American and Franco- American relations, in their political”implications, were inseparable. Foreign policy, therefore, dominated domestic politics and American life as it has at virtually no time since. JA. X ■7Y" TV* 'TV TP By the spring of 1791 Jefferson and Hamilton were committed to political war. Hamilton’s victory in the bank issue had been but one of many factors hastening the formation of national political alignments. Jefferson, Madison, and their cohorts launched an offensive against Hamilton. With widespread disapproval of Wash¬ ington’s policy toward France as a rallying point, they organized popular opposition to Washington’s policies, an opposition which had existed but which had not before been exploited.' 4 Even though Jeffersonians made policy toward France a central issue the Jeffer¬ sonian objective remained constant—destruction of Hamiltonianism and capture of the government. Jefferson tried to sabotage Hamilton’s status with the President,' 1 to emasculate his Treasury Department, to destroy him through attacks in the House of Representatives, and in all ways to demolish his power. Though often driven to the defensive, Hamilton fought back, counterattacked, and continued to press forward his program. On one occasion, when he opposed placing the Secretary of State second in line for the Presidency, Hamilton said that he “ran counter to Mr. Jefferson’s wishes; but if I had no other reason for it, I had already experienced opposition from him which rendered it a measure of self-defence.”' 5 Revolution, which they favored, presented political opportunities which they did not fail to utilize for party purposes. McCarrell, “Formation of the Jef¬ fersonian Party in Virginia,” pp. 100-101. In Pennsylvania, too, foreign policy split the people politically; year after year the governor referred to foreign policy in his message to the state legislature. Kenneth R. Rossman, Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill, 1952), p. 290. 71 Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia . . . ,” JSH, XIX, 300. 76 By May, 1792, Hamilton was convinced that Jefferson “aims with ardent desire at the Presidential chair,” and that such desire was a source of Jeffer¬ sonian party politics. Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington, Philadelphia, May 26, 1792, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 261. The 58 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE As for the assaults on the administration’s policy toward France, Hamilton believed that Jefferson and Madison in foreign policy were “unsound and dangerous,” that they had “a womanish attachment to France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain.” If they were left to pursue their own course in foreign policy he was convinced that in less than six months they would have the country at war with England. Jefferson, he concluded, had come back to the United States “electrified with attachment to France, and with the project of knitting together the two countries, in the closest political bands [ffc].”' b This Hamilton was determined to thwart. For two years, 1791 to 1793, the feud raged; for two years the two antagonists remained in Washington’s “non-partisan” govern¬ ment; and for two years the President usually sided with Hamil¬ ton. 77 So critical a struggle could not be restricted to those in govern¬ ment. Partisans of the press enlivened the feud. At the urging of Madison, in October, 1791, Philip Freneau founded a weekly news¬ paper, the National Gazette, in Philadelphia. Poet, experienced newspaperman, and politician, Freneau was more Jeffersonian than Jefferson. While editor of the National Gazette he held an official government position given him by Jefferson—that of translating clerk in the Department of State at $250 per year. His official duties were not to interfere with his newspaper work; they did not. 78 entire letter should be read for insight into the Hamilton-Jefferson feud. Carrington was an old and trusted friend to whom Hamilton in confidence unburdened his woes. 78 Ibid., pp. 259-260. 77 Hamilton’s concept of governmental responsibility was broad. In his view a cabinet or administrative officer, in order to carry out his responsibili¬ ties, could undertake more than his specific duties required; he was not restricted to the limits of his office. Under such an idea it was logical for Hamilton to attempt to control all aspects of government to implement his system and for him to interfere in the functions of Jefferson’s Department of State. See Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, pp. 29, 220-221. ,s Freneau denied, as did Jefferson, that he was controlled by Jefferson in his newspaper activity. Philip M. Marsh, “Freneau and Jefferson: The Poet- Editor Speaks for Himself About the National Gazette Episode,” American Literature, VIII (May, 1936), 187. John Ward Fenno, however, “proved,” so he declared, “to every impartial mind, that Mr. Jefferson is the Institutor and Patron of the National Gazette,” Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Sept. 15, 1792. William Loughton Smith, in his pamphlet, The Politicos and Views of a Certain Party Displayed (n. p., 1792), p. 27, accused Jefferson THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 59 In virulent prose and poetry, Freneau each week attacked Hamilton, Washington, and even Mrs. Washington. Freneau’s tirades were not unchallenged. In vituperation they were matched, if not exceeded, by John Ward Fenno in the Gazette of the United States. Founded in 1789 in New York and trans¬ planted to Philadelphia in 1790 when that city became the national capital, the Gazette of the United States had the trappings of a semi¬ official newspaper—government printing contracts, especially from the Treasury Department, subsidies and editorial contributions from prominent Hamiltonians, and a policy in complete accord with the Hamiltonian program.' 9 Washington could no longer ignore the bitter intra-administra¬ tion strife. In August, 1792, he took notice of the “internal dis¬ sensions . . . harrowing and tearing our vitals.” To both Jefferson and Hamilton he sent pleas for “mutual forbearances, and temporis¬ ing yieldings on all sides.” But the tear in the “goodly fabric” of government could not be repaired with soft words; Jefferson and Hamilton could not be reconciled. 80 Admitting his aversion to Hamilton’s system, which “flowed from principles adverse to liberty,” Jefferson in his response com¬ plained of Hamilton’s dominance in the government, of his tamper¬ ing with Jefferson’s domain of foreign policy, particularly “in the case of the two nations with which we have the most intimate con¬ nections, France and England.” Despite this aversion to Hamilton’s of setting up Freneau with the express purpose of ruining Hamilton. For further information on the Jefferson-Freneau relationship, see Lewis Leary, That Rascal Freneau: A Study in Literary Failure (New Brunswick, 1941), pp. 193-246; Philip M. Marsh, “Jefferson and Freneau,” American Scholar, XVI (Spring, 1947), 201-210; Samuel E. Forman, The Political Activities of Philip Freneau, “Johns Hopkins Studies in Historical and Political Science,” XX, Nos. 9-10 (Baltimore, 1902); Philip M. Marsh, ed., Monroe’s Defense of Jefferson and Freneau Against Hamilton (Oxford, Ohio, 1948). 76 For Fenno’s activities, see Frank L. Mott, American Journalism: A His¬ tory of Newspapers in the United States Through 260 Years: 1690-1950 (rev. ed.; New York, 1950), pp. 122-123. 80 See Washington to Jefferson, Mount Vernon, Aug. 23, 1792, and to Hamilton, Mount Vernon, Aug. 26, 1792, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXXII, 128-134; Freeman, Washington, VI, 368-371. The British minister recognized that open hostilities within the administration could not continue, and that reconciliation was hopeless, Hammond to -, Philadelphia, Nov., 6, 1792, Henry Adams Transcripts. 6o ENTANGLING ALLIANCE foreign policy, which “was exactly the reverse” of his own and which he considered to be “inconsistent with the honor and in¬ terest of our country,” Jefferson maintained that he had executed the administration’s foreign policy faithfully. Without retreating from his position he then made clear his intention to resign. Considering himself “as the deeply injured party,” Hamilton, too, refused to retreat. He said that Jeffersonian “machinations,” designed to subvert his system, were a danger to the government and he “considered it as a duty to endeavor to resist the torrent.” To restore tranquillity within the government he suggested diat both he and Jefferson resign. 81 This was precisely what the Presi¬ dent did not want—“faction” destroying the unity of his govern¬ ment. For a while longer he managed to keep both advisers in his official family. About the same time Washington had reached another important decision in the cause of governmental “unity.” Weary of public life, bitterly resentful of press attacks, and disgusted by the prolifera¬ tion of “party spirit,” he had planned to retire to Mount Vernon at the end of his first term. 82 With his official family split, however, and with the political struggle increasing in tempo, he was the only man available who Americans generally still considered to be above party. Fearing collapse of his yet-to-be-completed system, which was dependent on Washington’s continued support, Hamil¬ ton implored the President to reconsider. Washington’s refusal to take a second term, he said, would be “the greatest evil that could befall the country at the present juncture.” Bluntly, he added, “if you quit, much is to be dreaded.” Jefferson too saw danger. He wanted Washington to continue because “Monarchical federalists,” who were using “the new government merely as a stepping stone to monarchy,” might take over completely. Touching on widespread fears that as one consequence the nation might split, he told the President that “North & South will hang together, if they have you 81 Jefferson to Washington, Monticello, Sept. 9, 1792, and Hamilton to Washington, Philadelphia, Sept. 9, 1792, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 293-305. 82 “During the last six months,” reported the British minister, “the Press, which in this country, perhaps more than in any other, is the clearest indica¬ tion of the public mind, has teemed with the most virulent abuse of the President.” Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 61 to hang on.” 83 Others added their pleas, and Washington con¬ sented to stand for re-election. Washington’s decision eliminated the possibility of party strife over the Presidency and perhaps of disunion; the public was still wedded to the concept of a President above partisan politics. Once again fiis people chose Washington unanimously. His^ decision did not, however, eliminate political rivalry. Although party lines were not clearly drawn and men did not wear official party labels, parti¬ sans in the states fought bitterly in the 1792 elections for congres¬ sional seats. 84 On the national level, election of the Vice-President developed into a political battle between hardening Federalist and Republican party alliances, between monarchically inclined “monocrats” and “the Jackalls of Mobocracy.” Republicans trained their political artillery on Vice-President John Adams and concentrated their principal support behind George Clinton of New York. Adams, who had offended some Federalists as well as Republicans, won easily, but Clinton received a heavy vote. In the face of determined Republican opposition, Federalists regarded Adams’s re-election as a triumph. 85 While not yet a political party in the sense of a national organiza¬ tion with a center of operations, the Republican “interest” had done well in its first challenge to Federalist dominance. The Executive Branch remained in Federalist hands, as did the Senate, but in the House of Representatives for the first time the Republicans held 83 Hamilton to Washington, Philadelphia, July 30, 1792, ibid., pp. 235-236; Jefferson to Washington, Philadelphia, May 23, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 5; Freeman, Washington, VI, 355-384. 81 The role of political organization on a party basis in the 1792 elections is discussed in Cunningham, “The Jeffersonian Party to 1801 . . . ,” pp. 48, 77-78. To some Jeffersonians the elections were “a contest between the Treasury Department and the people.” Schachner, Thomas Jefferson . . . , I, 473; see also Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 478-484. 88 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 1, 1793, Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts; Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams (Boston, 1933), p. 242; Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 85-86; Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, Nov. 21, 1792, and Wolcott, Sr., to Wolcott, Jr., Middletown, Conn., Dec. 5, 1792, in George Gibbs, ed., Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, Edited From the Papers of Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury (2 vols., New York, 1846), 1, 83-84. Hereinafter cited as Gibbs, Wolcott Papers. 62 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE a majority. To Jefferson the tide of the Federalist regime was at its “fullest”; soon, he felt, it would “retire and subside.” 86 Varied factors contributed to the growing strength of the Repub¬ licans. Before the 1792 elections the economic prosperity which had come in with the new federal government had crumbled. Hamil¬ ton’s system had been rocked by a financial crisis and by public criticism—not necessarily inspired by Jeffersonians. 8 ' Added to this, American arms late in 1791 suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Indians on the Northwest frontier. General Arthur St. Clair’s rout alarmed the frontier, aroused indignation throughout the country, and created political fodder for the Republicans. While Washington nonetheless continued to remain above party warfare, the bursting of the speculative bubble brought on, it appeared, by Hamilton’s policies, and the revelations of a Republican-inspired congressional investigation of the St. Clair disaster, reacted against Federalists. 88 * * * * * With each house of Congress controlled by a different party, politics became increasingly bitter. Party lines on a national basis emerged strong and distinct. “The spirit of party,” Hamilton complained, “has grown to maturity sooner in this country than perhaps was to have been counted upon.” 89 By its close Washing¬ ton’s administration had lost the nonpartisan flavor it had once pos¬ sessed. “Party-spirit,” it was clear to most observers, “infects the most respectable, as well as the meanest of men.” 90 86 Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney, Philadelphia, Dec. 3, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 143-144; Bassett, Federalist System . . . , pp. 54-55. 87 See Bassett, Federalist System, pp. 52-53; McMaster, History of the People of the United States . . . , II, 38-41; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 214-217. 88 The investigation, in fact, was the first instance of congressional probing of an executive activity; see Wilfred E. Binkley, President and Congress (New York, 1947), p. 46. For the investigation, see American State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 36-39; see also Beverly W. Bond, Jr., The Civilization of the Old Northwest (New York, 1934), pp. 250-252; Bassett, The Federalist System -pp. 53-54. 89 Hamilton to William Short, Philadelphia, Feb. 5, 1793, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 292. 90 La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , I, 545. Another foreigner saw in the rise of parties a disease fatal to the peace and existence of the Constitution. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 6 3 In other ways, too, the complexion of the government changed. More than once Washington had persuaded his Secretary of State to remain when he seemed determined to leave, but finally, despite Presidential entreaties, on the last day of December, 1793, Jeffer¬ son resigned. The breach with Hamilton had become too great for both to remain in the same Cabinet. 91 Jefferson’s resignation caused repercussions in foreign relations, particularly in those with France. Upset by persistent rumors of Jefferson’s resignation, the French Tad long feared that his suc¬ cessor would be less attached to the Franco-American alliance and less opposed to English influence in government. 92 French hopes for strengthening the alliance had rested on Jefferson. No other influential person who had the ear of Washington could be classed pro-French; with the exception of Attorney General Edmund Ran¬ dolph, almost all could be considered pro-English. With Jefferson gone, the French alliance had no defenders in government. Lashed by criticism, tired, and anxious to provide for his family, Hamilton left the Cabinet on January 31, 1795, a year after Jeffer¬ son’s resignation. Although reluctant to see him go, Washington finally accepted his resignation. Hamilton’s departure did not sever his connection with the government; his influence as an .un¬ official adviser became stronger than ever. 93 Washington and his Cabinet members consulted him on almost all policy matters. 01 The term “cabinet,” used to describe Washington’s principal officers as a body of advisers, did not come into general use until 1793. See Henry B. Learned, The President’s Cabinet: Studies in the Origin, Formation and Structure of An American Institution (New Haven, 1912), pp. 135-36; Mary L. Hinsdale, A History of the President’s Cabinet, “University of Michigan Historical Studies,” I (Ann Arbor, 1911), 15. 02 [Minister of Foreign Affairs] to Edmond Genet, Paris, April 10, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 208. After leaving, Jefferson did not let up on his attacks; he redoubled his efforts to discredit the Hamiltonians, stressing time and again that Federalists were British-dominated. Channing, History of the United States, IV, 166-167. 03 Just as the French lamented Jefferson’s leaving, so did the English be¬ moan Hamilton’s departure; they feared mistakenly that with the departure of the most influential member of the administration, they would lose a decisive diplomatic advantage. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 5, 1795, Henry Adams Transcripts; see also Sears, George Washington, p. 453; Washington to Hamilton, Philadelphia, Feb. 2, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Washing¬ ton’s Writings, XXXIV, 109-110. 64 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE While Hamilton, die private citizen, continued to mold govern¬ ment policy, the character and the caliber of the President’s official family changed. After several reshufflings, by August, 1795, the Cabinet had not one of its original members remaining. It had deteriorated in quality and its policy functions devolved on Hamil¬ ton. In the face of rising militant Republican opposition, Washing¬ ton reorganized the Cabinet on a strictly party basis. “I shall not,” he said, “whilst I have the honor to Administer the government, bring a man into any office, of consequence knowingly whose political tenets are adverse to the measures, which the general govern¬ ment are pursuing; for this, in my opinion, would be a sort of political Suicide.” 94 To find outstanding men for Cabinet positions was difficult. After Jefferson’s successor as Secretary of State, Edmund Randolph of Virginia, was forced to resign under a cloud, Washington offered the post to five men, all of whom refused. By the end of January, 1796, the President once more had a complete Cabinet: a party Cabinet, a unified Cabinet, a second-rate Cabinet. Timothy Picker¬ ing headed the Department of State, Oliver Wolcott, Jr., took over the Treasury Department, Charles Lee became Attorney General, and James McHenry became Secretary of War. Although weak, this Cabinet was not rent by an internal feud; it had unity and a common purpose—supplied by Hamilton. 95 At the same time Republicans closed ranks and aimed telling blows at Hamilton, at his fourfold “system,” and at the Washington administration. Even Washington could not escape political assaults and character assassination. Charges of corruption and malfeasance in office were bruited about. Under leadership of Albert Gallatin, 94 Washington to Timothy Pickering, Mount Vernon, September 27, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 315; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 395; Bassett, Federalist System . . . , pp. 136-137. With Hamilton out even Federalists saw that “the government does not seem to grow better, as to its agents. In every part of it—instead of growing more mellow—it seems more crude & green”; they admitted that “we certainly are retrograding as to characters.” William Vans Murray to James McHenry, Philadelphia, Dec. 16, 1794, and Jan. 1, 1795, in Bernard C. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry (Cleveland, 1907), pp. 156, 158. 96 Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 353. THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM 65 the Republican-controlled House of Representatives in 1795 and 1796 attacked Hamilton’s financial structure. 96 To escape political abuse Washington retreated from the Presi¬ dency. Extremely sensitive and still clinging to the shattered ideal of a government above party, Washington in his old age could not stand a political campaign for office. 9 ' His decision not to run re¬ moved the last obstacle to a party battle—America’s first—for IKe Presidency in 1796. With the Hamiltonian system and relations with France main issues, Washington’s tenure of office, which had opened theoretically on a nonpolitical basis, closed in die midst of political warfare. 99 Bassett, The Federalist System . . . , p. 139; Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1879), p. 157. 97 John C. Fitzpatrick, George Washington Himself (Indianapolis, 1933), p. 495; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 410-411. Washington did not reject a third term as a matter of principle; see Charles W. Stein, The Third Term Tradition (New York, 1943), pp. 17-30. CHAPTER THREE ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS Although no longer a dependency of the British Empire, the thirteen Provinces of the American Commonwealth are not regarded by Britons as a land of strangers. The mutual animosities of the war of the Ameri¬ can revolution are already extinguished. Britons and Americans now think of each other only as brethren; a kindred descent, a common lan¬ guage, congenial character, a strong alliance of institutions, arts, and manners render them to one another reciprocally interesting, perhaps much more than, in similar circumstances, any third nation would be to either .—H. Neuman, “The Translator’s Preface,” La Rochefoucauld- Liancourt, Travels Through the United States. A wise govt, will never, in a free country go to War against the feel¬ ings of the People—but it will often refuse to go to war to indulge the heat of the public mind—Its chief value in this respect is to check im¬ politic wars .—William Vans Murray, Commonplace Book, August n, 1795 - * dfc dfe dfc ■Jr ■Jr tt IP As during the years of the Confederation, American foreign policy under the new Constitution was concerned most with England and France. “Great Britain and France,” pointed out a British diplomatist, “have the most essential influence on the in¬ terests of this country [the United States], as well commercial as political.” 1 From the beginning of the new government foreign policy problems became issues in emerging national politics; the government’s foreign policy inspired support or opposition for partisan political reasons. 2 1 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. ‘ Relations with Spain were important and are not ignored. But they are ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 67 The immediate foreign-policy problems of the Washington government were not new; they were carry-overs from the Con¬ federation period. So it was with Anglo-American relations, the most pressing of immediate foreign-policy issues. Old grievances, particularly English violations of the treaty of 1783, discriminatory policies directed against American shipping, and the failure of the British government to establish normal diplomatic relations angered Americans. The British, moreover, gave encouragement to seces¬ sionist sentiment in Vermont. 3 In May, 1785, the Congress of the Confederation initiated diplcF\ matic overtures toward Great Britain by appointing John Adams ' minister to the London government. England did not reciprocate.) When Adams terminated his mission in February, 1788, the United States did not send a successor to London: formal diplomatic rela¬ tions with Great Britain, consequently, were nonexistent. 4 When, in 1789, the new federal government was launched, one of President Washington’s first tasks in foreign affairs was to open normal diplo¬ matic intercourse with Great Britain. Without such intercourse the outstanding difficulties between the two countries appeared to stand little chance of being reconciled amicably. Acting upon the advice of Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, even before a Secretary of State had been appointed, Washington worked unofficially to approach the British through a special execu- touched upon only as they relate to the diplomacy and politics of the French alliance, or as they influenced domestic politics which in turn affected the French alliance. R r Spanish-American relations in this period see Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier: 1783-1795 (Boston, 1927) and his The Mississippi Question 1795-1803 (New York, 1934); Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty: A Study of America s Advantage from Europe’s Distress, 1783-1800 (Baltimore, 1926); and Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy 1793-1813 (Baltimore, 1918). 8 For accounts of the grievances, British as well as American, see Bemis, fay’s Treaty . . . , pp. 1-36; Bemis, “Relations Between the Vermont Separatists and Great Britain, 1789-1791,” American Historical Review, XXI (April, 1916), 547-560; Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America . . . , pp. 53-105; Darling, Our Rising Empire . . . , pp. 110-115; Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, pp. 448-491. 4 Adams complained that while in England he was treated with “dry decency and cold civility which appears to have been the premeditated plan from the beginning.” Adams to John Jay, London, Feb. 14, 1788, in Adams, Wor\s, VIII, 476. 68 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE tive agent, Gouverneur Mor ris.'- Morris, who had been in France on private business, reached London in March, 1790. His assign¬ ment was to open formal diplomatic relations, to obtain a com¬ mercial treaty, and to begin settlement of outstanding disputes be¬ tween the two countries; he attained none of his objectives. 6 In the case of the commercial treaty, for example, rumors were cur¬ rent at the time that the English government wished such a treaty with the United States. Morris found that the British wished to evade a commercial treaty w r hile not peremptorily rejecting one. Construing this as a rejection, he left without a treaty. Not until a crisis between Great Britain and Spain seemed likely to burst in¬ to another world-encompassing war did the British government manifest any favorable reaction to the purposes of Morris’s mission. 1 The crisis, usually referred to as the Nootka Soun d controversy, involved a clash on the outposts of the British and Spanish empires on the northwest coast of North America. 8 In 1789 the British attempted to establish a base on Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island’s west coast. This, however, was territory claimecTby Spain and closed to all foreigners. Enforcing their claim, the Spaniards drove out the English and captured their ships. Both countries alerted allies and prepared for war. Reports reached the American government that “the rage for war & desire to seize on Spanish treas¬ ures, & punish, as they express themselves, an insult to the British flag, pervades all ranks of people in London.” Newspaper stories and other reports stressed that war was inevitable. 9 6 Freeman, Washington, VI, 239; Henry M. Wriston, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations (Baltimore, 1929), pp. 369-371. 8 For Morris’s instructions, see American State Papers, Foreign Relations, I, 122. Hereinafter cited as ASP FR. 7 The rumors were reported by William Short to Secretary of State, Paris, March 3, 1790, National Archives, State Dept. Diplomatic Despatches, France; Morris to Washington, London, May 1, 1790, ibid. 8 The standard work on the Nootka Sound subject is William K. Manning, “The Nootka Sound Controversy” in Annual Report of the American His¬ torical Association for the Year 1904 (Washington, 1905), pp. 279-478; see also Frederick Jackson Turner, “English Policy toward America in 1790- 1791,” AHR, VII (July, 1902), 706-735 and VIII (Oct., 1902), 78-86. These contain reproductions of documents from the English Public Record Office. 9 The quotation is from William Short to Secretary of State, Paris, May n, 1790, National Archives, State Dept. Diplomatic Despatches, France; the ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 69 Spain’s major ally, France, was in revolution; Spain could not count on her for essential aid. Realizing that she alone could not cope with English might, Spain bowed before a British ultimatum. In the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 she agreed to restore British property and acknowledged the right of Englishmen to trade and to settle in territory formerly claimed as exclusively Spanish. 10 Although essentially a problem in European diplomacy and a conflict between rival empires, the Nootka Sound controversy brought to a head critical questions in American diplomacy and politics. When Washington learned of the impending Anglo-- Spanish conflict, he feared that America might become a battle¬ ground, that England would attempt to strike at Spanish terri¬ tory to the south—Louisiana, Florida, and New Orleans. To do this by land Britain might demand permission to move troops across American soil. In the face of such a demand, what should the government do? In August, 1790, Washington turned to his ad¬ visers for their views. * 11 Refusal might mean war with Great Britain; acquiescence in the demand, on the other hand, might lead to hostilities with Spain. The implications of the French alliance had also to be considered. What if France entered the probable war on the side of Spain? Would the United States be compelled to fight England if the Franco-American alliance were subsequently invoked ? Conflicting views in Washington’s official family resulted in confusing advice. At this early date, in their written opinions, Hamil¬ ton and Jefferson revealed fundamental differences. Their differing Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), July 8, 1790, printed a letter from London of June 2r, 1790, which emphasized the inevitability of war. “I wish,” declared the correspondent, “America may profit by the follies of others.” The issue of Oct. 28, 1790, still stressed the inevitability of war, as did Sir John Temple to Duke of Leeds, New York, Jan. 5, 1791, Henry Adams Transcripts. 10 The text of the convention is in Manning, “Nootka Sound Controversy,” PP- 454 - 456 . 11 Washington: Queries to the Heads of the Departments, United States, Aug. 27, 1790, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXI, 102-103. If circumstances had permitted, Washington would have preferred a strict neutrality in the crisis—to profit from it by selling to the belligerents “good things of subsistence.” Washington to Marquis de Lafayette, New York, Aug. 11, 1790, p. 87. Washington’s fears were groundless; Professor Bemis’s re¬ searches in British archives revealed that British plans for attack on Spanish territory were based on naval operations. Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 71. 7 ° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE philosophies disclosed that they clashed over the basic framework of the Washington government—the Hamiltonian system. What Jefferson dreaded most as the result of a war was a British victory. Instead of “two neighbors balancing each other,” he feared, there would be after the conflict only one, whose possessions would encircle the United States. That encircling power would be Ameri¬ ca’s former enemy—Great Britain. To avoid this, he would, if necessary, have had the United States go to war. For the moment he suggested delay, neutrality, and use of the American position as a lever to force to an issue frontier grievances with both England and Spain. 12 He had turned, for instance, to France for assistance in forcing Spain to give to the United States New Orleans and even Florida, arguing that Spain’s possessions west of the Mississippi would then benefit from an American guarantee offered in ex¬ change. 13 The Secretary of State advised a policy of opportunism and watchful waiting; he wished to use the newly acquired bargaining position of the United States to fullest advantage. Hamilton did not. Basic in his thinking was the idea that at almost any cost the United States must keep peace with Great Britain. Without that jpeace his system was doomed. Spanish resentment or retalia¬ tion was of far less consequence. A refusal, he reasoned tortuously, may give “the complexion of partiality to Spain, and of indisposition towards Britain, which may be represented as a deviation from the spirit of exact neutrality.” As to any special consideradons which Spain might claim because of her alliance with France, Hamilton was emphatic. “The Ally of our ally has no claim, as such,” he said, “to our friendship.” 14 13 Jefferson, “Opinion on Course of United States towards Great Britain and Spain,” [Aug. 28, 1790], in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 238-239. 13 See Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Missis¬ sippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams,” AHR, X, 258; Jeffer¬ son to William Short, New York, Aug. 10, 1790, and following “Heads of Consideration on the Navigation of the Mississippi, for Mr. Carmichael,” [Aug. 22, 1790], in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 218-220, 229. 14 Hamilton to Washington, New York, Sept. 15, 1790, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 20-49. Vice-President John Adams wanted no war but advised that the answer “should be a refusal in terms clear and decided, but guarded and dignified.” Adams to Washington, New York, Aug. 29, 1790, in Adams, Wor\s, 497-500. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 71 Although unaware of these official American concerns and of the split among Washington’s advisers, the British government did know that Hamilton and his followers were convinced that the commercial tie with England was indispensable, that there existed in the United States a party in the “British interest.” Through Major George Beckwith, a special paid agent, with no official diplo¬ matic status, of the Governor-General of Canada, it had maintained for a number of years intimate contact with Americans who nursed British proclivities. Beckwith had rushed back from Canada when the Nootka Sound affair threatened. Immediately after his return to New York in July, 1790, he had resumed an earlier friendship with Hamilton. 15 Beckwith carried on an informal diplomacy, some of which was known to General Washington, with Hamilton, with friendly Senators, and with lesser pro-British government officials. He had hinted to Hamilton that Great Britain might be willing to settle her differences with the United States. She might, he added, even be willing to enter an alliance. On this point Hamilton was quick to inform the President and the Secretary of State. Although eager¬ ly sought, a British rapprochement on such terms would injure the French alliance. It was with this situation in mind that Wash¬ ington had sought the advice of his department heads. 16 Even though Great Britain had no official diplomatic relations with the United States, her interests within the Washington govern¬ ment were well-guarded through Beckwith and Hamilton. Always present at social and even official functions, Beckwith aroused un¬ easiness and some suspicion. “The stationing of this Person about 15 See Dorchester to Beckwith, Quebec, June 27, 1790, Nos. 20, 21, Doug¬ las Brymner, Report on Canadian Archives (Ottawa, 1891-1892), pp. 143-144; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , p. 68. The British Consul-General at New York, Sir John Temple, reported to the Duke of Leeds, for example, that in case of war between England and Spain the United States would observe an exact neutrality. New York, Aug. 5, 1790, Henry Adams Transcripts. 16 For Hamilton’s memorandum of his conversation with Beckwith, see Hamilton to Washington, July 8, 1790, in Lodge, The Worths of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 5-7; in a subsequent interview with Beckwith, Hamilton asked for particulars on the proposed alliance. Hamilton to Washington, July 22, 1790, ibid., pp. 7-10; for Washington’s reaction, see John C. Fitz¬ patrick, ed., The Diaries of George Washington, 1748-1799 (4 vols., Boston, 1925), IV, 137-140, diary entry of July 8, 1790; Freeman, Washington, VI, 269-271. 7 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Congress,” observed a British consular official, “hath indeed dis¬ gusted not a few, who heretofore leaned towards Great Britain. ‘An Envoy, say they, from a Colony Governor, to a Sovereign Power, is a business, heretofore unheard of! he can be considered in no other light than as a petty Spy.’ ” With Hamiltonians, nonetheless, Beckwith earned respect and confidence. Hamilton, in fact, told him that Jefferson, the Secretary of State, because of his French “predilections,” could be by-passed; that Washington could be reached, when necessary, through him¬ self. 1 ' In 1790-91 Anglo-American diplomacy was thus channeled not through the Secretary of State but informally through the Secre¬ tary of the Treasury, who considered foreign policy a vital imple¬ menting force in his over-all governmental program. In this he was not alone; he had the support of well-organized and powerful elements in and out of government. Just as the Nootka Sound affair created anxiety in the American government over British policy, it caused concern in the British government over American policy. In London there were those who feared that Americans would grasp the opportunity offered by Anglo-Spanish hostilities to bring to an issue grievances with Great Britain. They might, among other things, use force to take the Northwest posts. For the first time the British government was ready to make concessions in its American policy. Toward Morris the British attitude changed; toward relations with the United States in general cordiality became a keynote. Orders went out to British commanders along the frontier to avoid friction with Americans. 18 In view of British reaction to possible 1T The quotation is from Sir John Temple to Duke of Leeds, New York, May 23, 1791, Henry Adams Transcripts. Temple knew nothing of the purpose of Beckwith’s mission. John Hamilton to Duke of Leeds, Norfolk, April 10, 1791, ibid., also reported that Beckwith aroused uneasiness. Beck¬ with’s report of Hamilton’s sentiments is reproduced in Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , p. 142; see also Samuel F. Bemis, “Jefferson,” The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. by Samuel F. Bemis (10 vols., New York, 1927-29), II, 29; Hamilton’s de facto dominance in Anglo-Ameri¬ can relations is discussed in Bemis, Jay's Treaty. . . , pp. 44-45, 75-76; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 419. 18 The British attitude toward the United States in the Nootka Sound crisis is discussed in detail in Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America. . . , pp. 106-113; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , pp. 52-58, 67-68. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 73 American moves in North America Jefferson’s suggested policy of opportunism appeared to have had a sound basis. With the passing of the Nootka Sound crisis, however, the divergent British policies of Jefferson and Hamilton were not put to the test. The impending foreign-policy crisis, nevertheless, had demonstrated the basic differ¬ ences between the two men before those differences came to a head in domestic matters. * * * * * After he had been in office but six months Jefferson found his foreign policy challenged, sabotaged, or otherwise vitiated by another presidential adviser. The Secretary of the Treasury was attempt¬ ing to establish a foreign policy differing fundamentally from that which he, the Secretary of State, desired to implement. This clash in the views of the two men showed clearly in the issue of American commercial foreign policy. American foreign policy immediately following independence tried to surmount mercantilism and to make treaties with European nations based upon commercial reciprocity. To carry out such a pol¬ icy, James Madison, in the first Congress of the new federal govern¬ ment in April, 1789, proposed a tariff system favoring those countries having commercial treaties with the United States and discriminat¬ ing against those which did not. Although the House of Repre¬ sentatives adopted Madison’s legislation, the conservative, British- oriented Senate killed it. In its stead Congress adopted the revenue- producing but basically protective tariff structure of 1789. 19 Directed against Great Britain, Madison’s proposal continued essentially the commercial policy favored by the Confederation government—preferential treatment for friends and retaliation against enemies. 20 Under the new national government such a 18 Madison’s proposals are discussed in Brant, James Madison, Father of the Constitution. . . , pp. 246-254; in Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 36-46. Hamilton’s influence in defeating the Madison measures was decisive. Bemis, “Jefferson,” in The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 26; for a British reaction to the tariff and tonnage duties see Society of Ship-Owners of Great Britain, Collection of Interesting and Important Reports and Papers on the Navigation and Trade of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Colonies in the West Indies and America, with Tables of Tonnage and of Exports and Imports (London, 1807), pp. 47 ff.; it contains, also, a detailed treatment of Anglo-American commerce. 10 For British discriminations against American shipping, see Emory R. 74 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE policy was now possible. France had a commercial treaty with the United States; Great Britain did not. By a retaliatory policy, therefore, France would be favored at the expense of England; the French alliance would be buttressed. Such a policy, of course, ran counter to the Hamiltonian thesis of no conflict with Great Britain. 21 Commercial war with England would have struck down the Hamiltonian system before it had had a chance to function properly; revenues from British imports were indispensible to its survival. As finally passed, the tariff and tonnage laws of 1789 and 1790 gave certain advantages to American ships over foreign competitors, but they made no distinction be¬ tween foreign countries. In practical application on foreign com¬ merce, however, they were not impartial; they favored Great Britain 22 because most American trade still flowed to England, and with no change in government policy the flow would continue in established channels. What, however, favored England injured France. In view of the special trading privileges and the 1778 commercial treaty France had granted to the United States, Ameri¬ can policy appeared particularly galling to her. Good treatment, concluded the French, was repaid with indiscriminate blows. Americans made no distinction between friend and foe. Johnson and others, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States, II, 11-12. At this time the country was recovering from a business depression that had begun in 1785; its economy was relatively sound, and hence it could have embarked, despite inherent risks, upon a policy of com¬ mercial retaliation with some chance of success. Ibid-, p. 3. 21 For a summary of Hamilton’s views on commerce, see Vernon G. Set- ser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy of the United States 1774-1829, pp. 102-103. 22 Tench Coxe, political economist and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury under Hamilton, analyzed American and British trade restrictions, condensed them into a table of two parallel columns, and concluded that American com¬ mercial regulations were much more favorable to Britain than were British regulations to the United States; see his A View of the United States of America . . . (Philadelphia, 1794), pp. 242-245. For background of Britain’s trade policy toward the United States, see Gerald S. Graham, Sea Power and British North America 1783-1820: A Study in British Colonial Policy (Cam¬ bridge, Mass., 1941), pp. 19-35. The tariff and tonnage laws created a keen interest in the British government; Lord Grenville (William Wyndham), Secretary of State for Home Affairs, referred them to the Committee of the Privy Council on Trade and Plantations for study and report. Bemis, fay’s Treaty. . . , p. 41. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 75 Whatever the French attitude might be, it had no effect on Hamilton. Before either Hamilton or Jefferson had come into the government, the foreign-policy question of commercial discrimina¬ tion had become a political issue which divided Congress. As a political issue it loomed large in the Jefferson-Hamilton feud and in the formation of political parties. 23 jt X X X X X After he had had an opportunity to study Anglo-American rela¬ tions, Jefferson saw in the policy of commercial retaliation a key to his foreign policy. In comparison to the major powers of Europe the United States was insignificant; it had no army, no navy, nor any important weapons of coercion in international relations except one—the threat of trade reprisals. His view was logical. Nations react to pressure. Punish enemies and reward friends. 24 The Secretary of State believed that the threat of trade retalia¬ tion might force England to change her ways; she might accede to American demands for a commercial treaty, for evacuation of the Northwest posts, for compensation for abducted Negroes, for an exchange of ministers, and for a general settlement of Anglo-Ameri- - can problems. As in the Nootka Sound crisis the differences be¬ tween Hamilton and Jefferson were clearly established before they came out into the open over the issue of the bank in 1791. 25 On several occasions as the year 1791 opened Jefferson pressed for a policy of commercial reciprocity or discrimination against Eng¬ land. The first opportunity arose as a result of French protests 23 For political views of Congress on the matter of British policy, see Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 64-66. 21 Anglo-American trade was indispensable to the prosperity of England; no English government could survive an inexcusable loss of the American market. Ibid., p. 35. John Adams, for example, while he was minister to Great Britain urged a policy of trade discrimination and retaliation against England to bring her to heel. Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , p. 98. Adams emphasized as a diplomatic axiom “that he always negotiates ill who is not in a condition to make himself feared.” He concluded also “that we have no means to make an impression on them [the British] but by commercial regulations.” Adams to John Jay, Auteuil, May 5, 1785, in Adams, W or\s, VIII, 242. 26 Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 327-328; Jefferson’s policy of retaliation had a good chance of success; this is indicated in the fears ol British commercial and manufacturing interests. Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , pp. 126-127. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 7 6 against the tonnage laws of 1789-90 which Washington submitted to die Senate on January 19, 1791. Contending that the laws violated the 1778 treaty of amity and commerce because they made no excep¬ tion in favor of French shipping, the French asked that the laws be modified in favor of their vessels. The protests carried the implied direat that the favorable status France granted American commerce might be scuttled. Although Jefferson, who had drawn up the President’s report, would not grant that the treaty had been violated, he favored relaxing the tonnage laws on a reciprocal basis —quid pro quo . 26 This action would strengthen the 1778 alliance by placat¬ ing the French and so advance his diplomacy. But relaxation of the laws needed congressional sanction, and Congress was domi¬ nated by Hamilton. Jefferson’s hopes for a strong commercial tie with France were also in danger of being dashed by the French themselves. American trade had thus far brought no profit, and the French appeared no longer concerned with it. Attachment of Americans to British commerce seemed too firm to be broken. While still friendly, the French, in view of the realities of trade and of established American commercial policy, felt ill-used. 2 ' Doubting the seriousness of the French threat but fearing even more British resentment, Hamilton stood against Jefferson’s plan. “My commercial system,” he said, “turns very much on giving a free course to trade, and cultivating good humor with all the world.” Free trade was essential as long as 90 per cent of it was with Great Britain. Controlled by Hamilton supporters and giving evidence of strong anti-French sentiment, the Senate advised Jefferson to deny the French demand for exemption from the tonnage laws. Commerce and the tie to England, observed a Jeffersonian Senator, “I fear has already revived our ancient prejudices against France. Should we differ with France, we are thrown inevitably into the hands of Britain; and, should France give any occasion, we have thousands and tens of thousands of anti-Revolutionists ready to blow the coals of contention.” 28 26 For the French documents and the text of Jefferson’s reply, see ASP FR, I, 109-116. 2 ' See William Short to Jefferson, Paris, Oct. 21, 1790, ibid., pp. 120-121; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 330. 28 For the quotation from Hamilton, see Hamilton to Jefferson, Jan. 13, ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 77 Again, in his report to Congress of February i, 1791, on the state of the cod and whale fisheries, the Secretary of State struck at the British by urging bounties for American fishermen and reprisals against British commerce. Englishmen, he said, were “mounting their navigation on the ruin of ours.” Only by countermeasures, he added, could that policy be foiled. Clinging to his conviction that with England the United States had a natural commercial rivalry and with France a natural friendship, Jefferson with this report once more clarified his own foreign policy and his politics. They were the antipodes of the Hamiltonian system. The pro-French implications of the report were immediately apparent to the British. The report, designed to arouse “coldness and dislike” toward Great Britain, reflected Jefferson’s anti-British bias and his pro-French policy, said one British consul, a policy which appeared to the British to be gaining ground. Soon it would gain sufficient following to force anti-British measures through Con¬ gress. On February 14, Washington presented Congress with the last of the Jefferson-inspired anti-British reports—the report of the failure of the Morris mission to England. 2 " When Jefferson had taken office in March, 1790, the President had turned the Morris negotiation over to him. By December Jef¬ ferson had concluded that the mission was a lost cause and that Morris should be recalled. So concerned was Morris over the fail¬ ure of his mission that he had urged closer ties with France and a policy of retaliation against Britain. He wanted to strike at the merchants who dominated English trade policy toward the United States. Jefferson believed that England would make no commercial 1791, in Lodge, The W or\s of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 54; Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 296; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 329-330; for the Senate’s action, see Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States of America, I, 77, dated Feb. 26, 1791; the anti-French, pro-British sentiment of the Senate is reflected in Journal of William Maclay . . . , pp. 390-395, entry of Feb. 26, 1790. 39 Sir John Temple to Duke of Leeds, New York, March 19 and May 23, 1791, Henry Adams Transcripts. The reaction of Phineas Bond, British consul in Philadelphia, to the Duke of Leeds (March 14, 1791) is in Schachner, The Founding Fathers, p. 167. The report on cod and whale fisheries, Feb. 1, 1791, is in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Worlds, III, 120-144; it was submitted to Congress on Feb. 4, 1791; see Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 332-333; the report on the Morris mission, with pertinent documents, is in ASP FR, I, 121-127. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 78 treaty without a treaty of alliance designed “to undermine our ob¬ ligations with France.” 30 This fitted the objective of weaning the United States from the French alliance. While Washington accepted Jefferson’s advice and terminated the Morris mission, he waited two months before presenting the data to Congress. Hamilton and Jefferson differed completely on the basic foreign policy and political considerations involved and so on the kind of message the President should send to Congress dealing with the failure of the mission. 31 In the House of Representatives the cumulative impact of the Jefferson reports revived proposals for retaliatory legislation against British commerce. In 1789 and 1790 there had been unsuccessful efforts in both houses to secure the enactment of discriminatory trade laws. The mood of Congress in February, 1791, was different. Out of committee in the House of Representatives came a naviga¬ tion bill—similar to British navigation laws—which discriminated against British shipping. The bill threatened to destroy at one blow Britain’s most valuable commerce and Hamilton’s elaborate system. Jefferson’s anti-British policy seemed about to triumph. 32 But all was not lost. Through Hamilton’s influence and timely action the bill “vanished” before it could be brought to a final vote; sidetracked, reported the British consul at Philadelphia, “to prevent any hasty measures which might interrupt the [commercial] Inter¬ course with Great Britain.” 33 Jefferson had expected his policy to carry in the next session of Congress. When the discriminatory measures collapsed, he suffered a personal political defeat. 80 See Morris to Washington, London, Sept. 18, Nov. 22, 1790; to Robert Morris [Sept., 1790], in Beatrix Cary Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution by Gouverneur Morris, IJ52-1816, Minister to France during the Terror (2 vols., Boston, 1939), I, 604, 613, 616; Bemis, fay’s Treaty. . . , p. 49; Jefferson: Report on British Negotiations [Dec. 15, 1790], in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 262. 31 Woolery, The Relation of Jefferson to American Foreign Policy. . . , p. 90; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 331-332. 82 Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , p. no; The Annals of the Congress. . . , 1st Cong., 3rd sess., Feb. 22, 23, 1791, pp. 2020-2022. 88 Phineas Bond to Duke of Leeds, Philadelphia, March 14, 1791, Henry Adams Transcripts. Bond also reported that increasing anti-British sentiment was a cause for alarm. See also Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 335; Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , p. in; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , p. 87. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 79 The British, in the meantime, had decided to send an accredited minister to the United States. Even though the American naviga¬ tion law was proposed after the British decision, it undoubtedly served to accelerate opening of full diplomatic relations. In England government officials and traders reacted with alarm to the growth and evident strength of the anti-British Jeffersonian coali¬ tion in the American government. Anti-Bridsh and pro-French activities, they believed, were being pushed by a vigorous “French party in America.” This party had disseminated the pernicious im¬ pression that England would enter no commercial negotiation “and that she treated America with ineffable contempt.” 34 Basically, the threat of commercial discrimination, not the discriminatory legisla¬ tion itself, had been instrumental in forcing Great Britain to send a minister to the United States. 35 The first British minister to the United States, twenty-seven-year- old George Hammond, arrived in October, 1791, bringing with him instructions to combat anti-British legislation, and to keep a sharp eye “for renewing former Alliances or forming new Connexions” between the United States and France, but otherwise limited severely in his powers. This, seven years after independence, was a step motivated by British self-interest. President Washington recipro¬ cated by sending to London as American minister Thomas Pinckney of South Carolina, a man satisfying to the British government, and one described by Hammond as belonging to the party of the British interest. 30 * * # * * 84 B. P. Colquhoun to Lord Grenville, Aug., 1791, London, Great Britain, Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports, The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortes- cue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore (No. 30, 10 vols., London, 1892—), II, 157. Hereinafter cited as Dropmore Papers. 35 See Grenville to George Hammond, Whitehall, Sept. 1, 1791, in Bernard Mayo, ed., Instructions to the British Minister to the United States 1791- 1812 in AHA Ann. Rep. (1936) (3 vols., Washington, 1941), III, 17. Ham¬ mond was instructed that the projected retaliatory commercial legislation was to be a principle object of his attention immediately on arriving in America. Hammond’s initial instructions are in pp. 2-13. 36 George Hammond to Lord Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 9, 1792, in Dropmore Papers, II, 250; Samuel F. Bemis, “The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney, 1792-1796,” AHR, XXVIII (Jan., 1923), 228-247. It had been understood that if Great Britain would send a minister the United States would appoint one to London. 8o ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Chronologically, Hamilton and Jefferson clashed first over for¬ eign policy; actually, the differences between the two men, over both foreign and domestic affairs, crystallized almost simultaneously; and, politically, the lines of battle were drawn on most fronts at approxi- /-lfiately the same time. Foreign policy and domestic politics were of the same fabric; what affected one affected the other. Jefferson and his supporters opposed not only the financial aspects of the Hamiltonian system, but its political, diplomatic, and constitutional aspects as well. 3 ' Before the outbreak of war between France and England and before the fight over the bank, Hamilton and Jefferson were steer¬ ing collision courses. The political philosophies of both men ante¬ dated establishment of the national government, as did their attitudes toward England and France and their views of the French alliance. American policy toward England and France had its roots in the Confederation period, changing little in the transition to a new centralized government. This was so because of the Hamilton system and the resulting resistance of Hamiltonians to any policy change which would discriminate against England to bring her to terms. t Hamilton met the threat of tariff discrimination against Great Britain with the argument that it would choke off needed revenues from British imports, that it would lead to commercial warfare in which the young nation was not strong enough to engage, that it would destroy his “system.” He met the threat against the bank with the cogent argument of loose construction. To conduct his campaign he had to be a versatile general. The foreign policy he espoused was not subservient to a domestic financial policy; both .were part of the same thing—his total program. At this time (1791) Hamiltonians diverted the threat of retalia¬ tion; Britain retained her advantages in America. Fearful of future trade reprisals she acceded somewhat to American desires by open¬ ing full diplomatic relations. France, with cause, felt discrimi¬ nated against. Hamilton and those of the “British interest” carried the day on all fronts. The pro-British foreign policy, upon which 37 See Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 304; Schachner, Alex¬ ander Hamilton, pp. 293-294; White, The Federalists. . . , pp. 212-214, 222- 232. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 81 the entire Hamiltonian structure rested, had been saved. But its greatest crisis had yet to be met. # * # # # Officially, Great Britain’s first minister to the United States conducted his relations with the American government through Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State. His relations with Jeffer¬ son, were, in fact, nominal, mere formalities. As he reported, he considered the Secretary of State “as the devoted instrument of a French faction.” The substance of his relations with the United States were through Alexander Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury. Where Beckwith had left off George Hammond con¬ tinued, cultivating not only the valuable Hamilton, but also others in government in the “British interest.” 38 For over a year Hammond went through shadow-motions of diplomacy with Jefferson. In conversations which were from the outset practically meaningless the two men negotiated over outstand¬ ing differences between their two countries. So restricted were Hammond’s powers that he could do little more than talk. He had no authority to make a treaty or any other kind of agreement. His mission was to delay positive action. Even in these foredoomed negotiations with Hammond, Hamil¬ ton wrecked Jefferson’s case. The Secretary of the Treasury told the British minister that Jefferson’s views could be ignored with impunity; they were not a true reflection of government policy. 39 „ In his own field of operations the Secretary of State had been check¬ mated by an intra-administration feud, by domestic political con- 38 Hammond wrote to his superiors that he preferred working with Hamil¬ ton privately and that he would have relations with Jefferson only when abso¬ lutely necessary. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, April 2, Nov. 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. The relationship between Hammond, Jefferson, and Hamilton is discussed in Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 89-108; and the Hammond-Jefferson negotiations are summarized also in Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 396-399. 88 For Hamilton’s thwarting of Jefferson’s diplomacy, see Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, June 8, 1792, Henry Adams Transcripts; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 106-107; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 207-211. Jefferson was aware of “the intimacy of their [Hamilton and Hammond] communications”; he believed that Hamilton “communicated to Hammond all our views & knew from him in return the views of the British court.” The Anas, March 11, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 186. 82 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE siderations, and by foreign-policy objectives pursued by Hamilton. Jefferson was a Secretary of State committed to a foreign policy of his political enemy, to a foreign policy he wished to overthrow. Despite the dominance of Hamilton’s views and the dark out¬ look for Jefferson’s policy all hope was not lost. British delaying actions for a while inspired hopes in Jefferson that the French alli¬ ance might be reinforced and that his foreign policy views might eventually prevail with the President. Aroused by the British tac¬ tics of delay Washington almost returned to the embrace of France. He instructed Jefferson “to endeavor to effect a stricter connection with France.” In view of “the circumstances of dissatisfaction be¬ tween Spain Gr. Brit & us,” he said, “there was no nation on whom we could rely at all times but France, and if we did not prepare in time some support in the event of rupture with Spain & England we might be charged with a criminal negligence.” This pleased Jef¬ ferson. “The very doctrine,” he said, “which had been my polar star.” 40 Even though aware of mounting anti-British sentiment, the British had reason to be content with the status of American diplo¬ macy; it was tailored to objectives of their commercial policy. American discriminatory legislation against their shipping had been quashed; their traders had not been compelled to grant concessions to Americans; their commerce continued to dominate the American market; and within the country the dominant political alliance was British-oriented. With the covert aid of Hamilton, who readily admitted to the British minister the importance of British com¬ merce to his system, and with the help of those of the “British in¬ terest,” Hammond’s diplomacy of delay at the end of its first year succeeded. 41 ***** On the Northwest frontier, while Jefferson and Hammond con¬ ferred, Anglo-American relations smoldered. Continued occupation by the British of the Northwest posts in violation of the peace treaty of 1783 caused the greatest resentment. The British, regretting the generosity of that peace settlement, wanted to revise the boundary. 40 The Anas, Dec. 27, 1792, ibid., p. 212. 41 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 9, 1792, Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts; Bemis, “Jefferson,” in American Secretaries of State. ... II, 36. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 83 With the American violations of the treaty as an excuse, British officials in Canada continued to hold the posts. A parallel objective in England’s policy on the Northwest frontier was creation of an Indian buffer state in American territory in the region of the occupied posts. Nominally independent, the Indian state was conceived as a dike holding back the expanding American frontiersmen, a protective cordon of wilderness for British Canada. Although ostensibly neutral, the Indian state, controlled by the Brit¬ ish, would have hemmed in the American nation, confining it to the Atlantic seaboard. British motives for championing the Indian state were complex, but profit from the valuable fur trade in the region and protection of British Nordi America against a growing United States were important. 42 As the American frontier advanced across the Ohio, challenging the British frontier policy, Indians in the virgin lands resisted the alien encroachment. British officials in Canada supplied the Indians with the weapons they used to attack American settlers. In many in¬ stances British agents intrigued with Indians and encouraged them in their attacks. Added to this were British fears that punitive expeditions sent out by the American government against Indians were in reality aimed at the British-occupied posts. American frontiersmen, on their part, demanded government protection against Indians. When aroused to suspicion, in some cases supported by evidence of British- Indian intrigue, they became bitterly anti-British. The butchering of their friends and relatives by savages of the forest wielding British weapons, no matter how justified by their own actions, had an intense emotional impact on frontiersmen. 43 12 For details on British-American relations on the Northwest frontier, see Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America. . . , pp. 82-140; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 109-133, 161-183. On the Spanish-Ameri- can frontier to the south Spain also wished to erect an Indian barrier between its lands and the aggressive Americans. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier. . . , p. 43. '"See Beverly W. Bond, Jr., The Civilization of the Old Northwe st, p. 253; James H. Perkins, Annals of the West (2nd ed., rev. and enlarged by J. M. Peck; St. Louis, 1851), pp. 361-365; narrative of Thomas Rhea, June 30, 1791, contains evidence of British connivance with Indians, in American State Papers, Indian Affairs, I, 196-197. Even President Washington took note of the “notoriety” of British assistance to the Indians, Washington to Secre¬ tary of State, Mount Vernon, April 4, 1791, in Fitzpatrick, Washington's 8 4 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Frontier grievances had a continuing impact on American poli¬ tics and foreign policy. 44 Men of the Northwest frontier, already Jeffersonian in outlook, pressed their grievances with the national government. They demanded protection against Indian depreda¬ tions—protection which would carry with it possibility of Anglo- American conflict. At the same time, the frontiersmen became stronger supporters of the Jeffersonian party. Thus Anglo-American relations, Indian policy, the advancing frontier, and rising political parties came to a focus at approximately the same time. Collecdvely they built a Are under the Washington administration. 45 Washington moved to pacify the Indians with federal arms. The first expeditions against the Indians failed. General Josiah Harmar was routed in the spring of 1790 and an expedition under General Arthur St. Clair in the winter of 1791 was “cut to pieces, hacked, butchered, and tomahawked.” News of the disaster un¬ leashed Washington’s rage—he angrily labeled St. Clair “worse than a murderer.” 46 Anti-administration forces capitalized on the defeat. Politicians demanded the general’s scalp; both sides in Congress called for and obtained an investigation of the entire affair. 47 Although the Harmar and St. Clair expeditions proved fruitless, their execution had posed a threat to British control over Indians south of the 1783 treaty line; the armies had come too close to the occupied posts; they had endangered British frontier objectives. 48 Writings, XXXI, 267-268; Washington to David Humphreys, Philadelphia, July 20, 1791, ibid., p. 320. 44 The relationship between the local frontier problem of defense against Indian attack and the national problem of foreign affairs is noted also in Russell J. Ferguson, Early Western Pennsylvania Politics, p. 136. 46 See the remarks of William Branch Giles, congressman from Virginia, in Annals of the Congress, 3rd Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 25, 1794, pp. 315-322. Giles listed the Algerine war as another ground of complaint against Great Britain, asserting that it had been brought on by her “artifices.” 48 Washington is quoted in Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 305-307; for details on the Indian expeditions, see William Henry Smith, The St. Clair Papers ... (2 vols., Cincinnati, 1882), I, 167-185; Bond, The Civilization of the Old Northwest, pp. 250-252. 47 Results of the investigations of the Harmar and St. Clair expeditions and pertinent documents are in American State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 20-39. 48 Henry Hamilton, for example, reported to the Duke of Leeds, April 10, 1791, that St. Clair’s “real intentions are to attack Detroit & the other ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 85 Hammond was given orders to press for British mediation and to attempt to secure the Indian barrier state which his government desired. In his dealings with both Jefferson and Hamilton the British minister urged these projects upon them. Not even Hamil¬ ton could embrace the proposals; they were politically dangerous and a desertion of American rights. No external intervention could be allowed, he told Hammond. Indian relations within the ack¬ nowledged borders of the United States were internal matters to be handled exclusively by Americans. 49 Indian atrocities on the frontier continued; British agents in¬ trigued with the Indians and anti-British sentiment continued to spread. With congressional backing Washington once more tried to crush Indian resistance. He placed General “Mad” Anthony Wayne in command of the frontier forces on the Ohio. From sum¬ mer 1792 to winter 1793 Wayne prepared his forces for the northern expedition. 50 During this period Anglo-American frontier relations rose to a crisis. British frontier officials saw in Wayne’s army a threat to Canada; they believed that his real objectives were the occupied posts. As 1793 closed, the threat of war between Great Britain and the United States hovered over the Northwest frontier. On this front the foreign policy of the Hamiltonians appeared headed for disaster. In Europe in the meantime, events posed the same threat —Anglo-American hostilities. t, Jt. X X ”7\“ TT if if Except for existing differences, the opening events of the French Revolution did no immediate violence to Franco-American rela¬ tions. As the Revolution picked up momentum, its course avidly studied by Americans, it divided emerging political party groupings forts in the possession of Great Britain.” Norfolk, Va., Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts. 18 Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, March 17, 1792, in Mayo, Instruc¬ tions to the British Ministers. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 25-27; Lord Dorchester to Dundas, London, March 23, 1792; Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, June 8, 1792, Henry Adams Transcripts. For details, see Burt, The United States, Great Britain, and British North America. . . , pp. 119-126; Bemis, Jays’ Treaty. . . , pp. 117-123. 60 Bond, The Civilization of the Old Northwest, pp. 254-255; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 307. 86 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE in the United States and gave them emotion-arousing national issues. Foreign affairs, the position of the United States vis a vis France or England, became internal issues; domestic politics and foreign policy became one. The French Revolution “drew a redhot plough¬ share through the history of America as well as that of France.” 51 At first Americans greeted the French Revolution with favor; when France went to war against monarchical enemies in April, 1792, they sympathized with her; she was fighting against “Tyrants leagued for the subversion” of liberty. 52 Aside from its effect on American attitudes the first international conflict of the French Revolution did not threaten vital American interests. Neither American commerce nor American neutrality was endangered by France’s fight against the alliance of Austria and Prussia in 1792; there was no question of being dragged into the European war by the 1778 Franco-American alliance. Uninhibited by threat of in¬ volvement and seeing in the French cause a fight for commonly espoused democratic principles, Americans, regardless of political faith, cheered French military successes and establishment of the First Republic. With news of the execution of Louis XVI, of the French invasion of the Austrian Netherlands, and of the subsequent French war declaration of February 1, 1793, against Great Britain, Holland, and Spain, American attitudes and American policy changed. Federalists reversed their previously expressed sympathies for the French Revo¬ lution. 53 As they had done in the past, they rallied to the defense of England. Republicans more than ever became pro-French, pro- Revolution, and anti-English. As a contemporary Federalist poli¬ tician analyzed the situation, the events and theories of the con¬ tinuing French Revolution—“this temper so congenial to a fac¬ tious & disorganized mind”—were seized by Republicans for political 61 Quoted in Charles D. Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, “Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science,” XVI (Baltimore, 1897), pp. ix-x. John Stewart to Genet, Richmond, Va., May 10, 1793, Edmond C. Genet Papers, Library of Congress. Stewart wished to expatriate himself, become a French citizen, and join the struggle for liberty. 63 For an example of a reversal of opinion by a prominent Federalist to¬ ward the French Revolution, a not uncommon experience, see Noah Webster, “To the Public,” New York, March 4, 1797, in Harry R. Warfel, ed., Letters of Noah Webster (New York, 1953), pp. 145-147. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 87 reasons. Through propagation of the “disorganizing principles” of the French they gained reputation. The reason for this, he con¬ cluded, was that the affected adoption of French theory was con¬ nected with the great cause of “French Freedom, so dear to all americans [sic].” 5i War between England and France did not bring anything new into the already established foreign-policy orientation of political parties. What it did was to cast into sharp focus already existing differences; it made the foreign-policy objective of the Hamiltonian system the disputed issue in national politics; it plunged the French alliance into American politics. “The war between France and England,” Jefferson said, “has brought forward the Republicans & Monocrats in every state so openly, that their relative numbers are perfectly visible.” 00 Grasping the new issue of the expanded French Revolution as a matter of expediency rather than as the result of predetermined policy, Republicans in Virginia, for example, con¬ centrated on it to consolidate party lines. 56 In addition to providing a national issue for emerging political parties the Anglo-French war also created foreign-policy dilemmas over problems of neutrality, particularly the rights of neutrals at sea, trade, and treaty obligations. These in turn, because of the inti¬ mate interrelationship between politics and foreign policy, accentu¬ ated party bitterness. New plus old grievances, combined with political pressures, led to a foreign-policy crisis that almost thrust the nation into war with Great Britain and that did give the coup de grace to the aimless Hammond-Jefferson conversations. # * # * * Simultaneously the new diplomatic problems destroyed what¬ ever unity still fronted the Washington administration. Federalists believed that war with Great Britain was national suicide. The British knew this. Hamilton’s system, Hammond reported, con¬ stitutes “the most material props of the government, and were they 54 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Prince¬ ton). 66 Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 326 ;. “Cunningham, “The Jeffersonian Party to 1801. . . ,” p. 85; Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia,” Journal of Southern History, XIX, 310. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE to be too hastily removed, it is not impossible that the whole fabric which they tend to support, might crumble into ruin.” 07 But crumble into ruin Hamilton’s program might. Bound to the French alliance “forever,” the United States in time of war was obligated to defend the French West Indies against the enemies of its ally. France’s enemy was Great Britain, the anchor in the Hamiltonian system. Startled, though not surprised, by news of the Anglo-French war and confronted with a major foreign-policy decision, Washington as usual turned to his department heads for advice. 6 * Again Hamil¬ ton and Jefferson differed. Hamilton saw this as an opportunity to jettison the French alliance and to steer the United States closer to England. Jefferson contended that the treaties were not between governments but between nations and so could not be abrogated unilaterally; the French alliance was still in effect. 59 While not challenging the validity of the French treaties, Wash¬ ington essentially accepted Hamilton’s advice. On April 22, 1793, he promulgated a proclamation of neutrality. On the surface it ap¬ peared as a compromise, yet its purpose was obvious. It declared the United States at peace with both England and France and warned American citizens to refrain from hostile action against the belligerent powers. 60 67 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 5. In No. 8 of the same date Hamilton is cited as deeply concerned over the failure of Great Britain and the United States to settle their differences. Henry Adams Transcripts. At the same time the French feared that their allies might be “reduced by our enemies.” Otto to Genet, Paris, March 8, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress. 68 War was not unexpected, but the French declaration of it was. Charles M. Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793'- A Study in Cabinet Government (New York, 1931), p. 24; Questions Submitted to the Cabinet by the Presi¬ dent, Philadelphia, April 18, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washington s Writings, XXXII, 419-420. 58 Young John Quincy Adams in “Marcellus” III contended that America’s obligation under the French alliance was “dissolved or at least suspended”; the law of nature, he contended, “which supersedes all others,” commanded Americans to remain at peace, neutral. Reprinted from the Columbian Centinel (Boston), May n, 1793, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams (7 vols., New York, 1913-1917), I, 142-146. 80 Washington expressed his desire for neutrality in the European war to David Humphreys and to Gouverneur Morris, Philadelphia, March 23, 25, 1793. Fitzpatrick, Washington's Writings, XXXII, 399, 402; the proclamation is in ASP FR, I, 140. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 89 Politically, the proclamation pleased neither Federalists nor Re¬ publicans. But as Washington was a Federalist and, because the proclamation favored Great Britain, Republicans denounced the President, the proclamation, Great Britain, and Federalists in general. Critics of the administration attacked the proclamation because they believed it abrogated the French alliance “from which we have long enjoyed important advantages” and because it disregarded the nation’s plighted faith. It was not a true neutrality proclamation in that it would provoke France to hostilities against the United States, “a consequence naturally to be expected from the violation of solemn treaties.” 61 Deploring Anglophilism in the Cabinet, Jefferson advised that only the “ardent spirit” of Republicans could prevent American neutrality from becoming a “mere English neu¬ trality.” 62 More than in almost anything in the past Republicans attempted to make political capital out of this unpopular foreign-policy deci¬ sion. Desperate, Federalists were driven to defend the obviously pro-English neutrality policy. Defense was almost political suicide; with Hamilton’s system at stake, however, they had no choice. Washington was alarmed by the violent anti-administration re¬ action to the proclamation of neutrality, coupled with enthusiastic pro-French outbursts on behalf of Citizen Edmond C. Genet, the French Republic’s new minister to the United States, on his trip through the South. Rumors reached him as to the agitated state of public opinion and of plans of anti-administration forces in Virginia to attack him and his policies. To test the rumors and to sample public opinion, Washington, in July, 1793, sent Attorney General Edmond Randolph to Virginia. On his return Randoph reported diat basically Virginia liked the President's policies, that public opinion supported the administration’s foreign policy. The opposi¬ tion, he explained, was limited to a personal antagonism toward Hamilton. 63 91 “Veritas” in the National Gazette (Philadelphia), June 8, 1793, quoted in Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , pp. 64-65. Republicans, basically, wanted to aid France and still remain neutral; this was a difficult position to maintain as they thus appeared to be in favor of war against England. Brown, First Republicans. . . , p. 98. 92 Jefferson to Madison, May 13, [1793], Henry A. Washington, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, III, 557. 9,1 Ammon, “Republican Party in Virginia. . . ,” JSH, XIX, 301-302; see 9 o ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Republicans, who controlled the House of Representatives, saw in the proclamation of neutrality evidence of mercantile influence and of the pro-British faction at work. They insisted that Congress had to decide questions of war and peace. Washington’s action, they contended, was a high-handed, unconstitutional usurpation by the executive of legislative power. Republicans thus cast themselves in the role of defenders of the Constitution, defenders of popular government against dictatorship. But fundamentally they opposed the proclamation for political reasons. It was not a pro-French neutrality in support of the 1778 alliance, and that was a major flaw. “It wounds the national honor,” Madison said, “by seeming to disregard the stipulated duties to France.” 64 Regardless of the bitter partisanship the proclamation had in¬ spired, Washington’s deed, in its wider implications and in at least two important particulars, was of precedent-making significance. First, in foreign affairs it was a bold step in the direction of establish¬ ing the claim of the Executive Branch to exclusive right to determine policy. Such a right is not explicit in the Constitution or else¬ where. Yet Hamilton maintained that the President had the right unilaterally to proclaim neutrality; he insisted that such a proclama¬ tion was merely an executive act and that the executive power rested solely with the President. 60 There was ample reason to con¬ clude with equal justification that the Senate should be consulted in policy-making, that the making of foreign policy was something of a partnership between the Executive and the Senate. Indisputably the power to declare war rested with Congress. This was a power in foreign relations of the most critical kind. Conversely, the power to determine foreign policy, as pointed out by Jeffersonians, was also Jefferson to James Madison, July 21, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 355- 61 See James Monroe to Jefferson, Albemarle, June 23, 1793, in Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe (7 vols., New York, 1898- 1903), I, 261-267; James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, August-September, 1793, No. V, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, VI, 182- 183. Madison’s quotation (Madison to Jefferson, June 10, 1793) is on p. 127 n. The issue of the Proclamation of Neutrality is summarized in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 13-52. 65 Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, June 29, 1793, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 135-147. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 9 l the power to make war or peace. Thus the proclamation represented another Hamiltonian victory. Secondly, and again in line with Hamilton’s views, the Presi¬ dent’s proclamation decision contributed to the strengthening of the central government at the expense of its components. When the Executive Branch acted, it acted for the nation as a whole; its policy was a national policy. In this instance a vital national policy was determined, as was to be the case again and again, solely by the Executive without consultation with the legislative branch where the sectional units of the government were represented. 60 In a sense then, even though Washington sought to placate the sensi¬ bilities of pro-French Republicans by omitting the word “neutrality” from the proclamation, it was a political document. With the issue ready-made, Republicans intensified their attack on the administration. Their tactics succeeded; popular support rallied to their side. They pushed the country toward war with England. But their tactics alone did not bring the country virtually to war; they had assistance from the British government. Washington was in a difficult diplomatic position. By the French treaty of amity and commerce of 1778 the United States was committed to the practice and enforcement of maritime principles which Great Britain had never recognized and which she constantly violated in time of war. Prominent among those principles were: that free ships make free goods, the acceptance of a broad definition of contraband of war, and the freedom of neutrals to trade in non¬ contraband goods with belligerents or between belligerent ports. 6 ' To attempt to enforce these “small navy” principles against British maritime power might mean war with England. Not to enforce them, in the view of many, violated the French alliance and might mean war with France. President Washington seem¬ ingly was in trouble whichever course he chose. Furthermore, any foreign-policy decision involved dangerous political decisions. On ' a See White, The Federalists. . . , pp. 62-63. 67 Great Britain made clear that she did not and would not recognize such principles as free ships, free goods. See, for example, Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, March 12, 1793, in Mayo, Instructions to the British Ministers. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 38. 92 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE this foreign-policy question Republicans and Federalists held ir¬ reconcilable positions. With the opening of war against England, France, aware of her inferior sea-power status, threw open her previously jealously guarded West Indian trade to the United States (it had been partial¬ ly open before). By the hundreds American ships flocked into the French Caribbean ports; profits soared; Franco-American com¬ merce flourished. 68 For a while the strengthened commercial tie with France which Jefferson desired appeared a reality. But the [_ flow of commerce into French channels did not last long. Beginning in June, 1793, Great Britain throttled this lucrative trade. By three orders-in-council, that is executive orders, of June, 1793, November, 1793, and January, 1794, the British govern¬ ment enforced the dictum that commerce prohibited in time of peace would not be allowed in time of war. Known as the Rule of 1756 from its first application by England in the Seven Years’ War, this rule decimated American commerce with the French. 69 In enforcing the orders-in-council British naval officers without warning swooped down upon American vessels trading with the French in the Caribbean. They stripped Americans of property and dignity; confiscated their vessels and their cargoes; impressed American seamen, tossed them into dungeons, beat them, or other¬ wise humiliated them. The British thus partially paralyzed Ameri¬ can Caribbean commerce and endangered American fives.' 0 68 Unrestricted Caribbean trade was what American merchants had antici¬ pated; many had wanted war between England and France so that they as neutrals could take over the British and French carrying trade. Their profits, despite seizures and losses, were enormous. Freedom of the seas was a practi¬ cal dollars-and-cents policy. See Robert G. Albion and Jennie B. Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime: The American Experience 1JJ5-1942 (New York, 1942), pp. 65-69. 08 For details, see Anna C. Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, iyg^-1812, pp. 27-36; for a useful chronological table of British and French restrictions on American trade, see pp. 9-12. A clear account of the British Orders in Council may also be found in W. Allison Phillips and Arthur H. Reede, Neutrality : Its His¬ tory, Economics and Law, Vol. II, The Napoleonic Period (New York, 1936), pp. 37-49. Hammond transmitted the order of June 8, 1793, to Jefferson on Sept. 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 240; for the Orders in Council of Nov. 6, 1793, and Jan. 8, 1794, see pp. 430-431. 70 See the reports of Fulwar Skipwith from St. Eustatia of March 1 and ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 93 In American newspapers reports of Caribbean confiscations and indignities received wide circulation. American tempers boiled, anti-British sentiment mushroomed, and Federalists despaired. The British had given Republicans a ready-made issue—one on which political crusades are built and elections won. Adherents of the French alliance and Republicans in general tried to increase the violence of popular feeling against England. Their tactics were effective; they placed the government’s pro- English foreign policy on the defensive. George Hammond realized that the government had “to temporize, to practice half-measures, and to wait until it shall be able to repress or direct the popular will.” This policy actuated the Federalist administration, he said, “and prevents it from pursuing with steadiness and decision that course of uniform neutrality which it perceives to be essential to the security as well of its constitution, as of its commercial impor¬ tance.” 71 The opposition press attacked Hamilton’s system, Great Britain, and British tyranny as synonymous evils. “Certain fashionable and courtly maxims of the day,” wrote “Americanus,” attempted to in¬ culcate “that peace, and a good understanding with Great-Britain, must be preserved at any price; that by pursuing this policy alone can the infant system of our government take root and stability; and that America ought, imperceptibly, to grow to greatness, like the trees of her wilderness, in the midst of silence and retreat.” These maxims are repugnant to the essential interests of the nation, he said, and “in the opinion of the great body of the yeomanry of America, How from the influence of that partial system of things, wherein the advantage of the many is made subservient to the emolument and aggrandizement of the few; a system already too 7, 1794, to the Secretary of State, ASP FR, I, 428-429; Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime. . . , pp. 73-76. 1 Harpmond wrote to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, that “the pub¬ lic prints teemed with the grossest abuse of Great Britain,” and that pro- French, anti-British demonstrations were connived at by state governors for political reasons. The quotation in the text is from Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, June 10, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. In North Caro¬ lina, where public sentiment was pro-French, the federal government even approached popularity as prospect of war with England loomed. Delbert H. Gilpatrick, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina (New York, 1931), p. 62. 94 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE well understood. . . .”' 2 While Anglophobia increased, the Anglo- American frontier situation reached its most dangerous crisis. Lord Dorchester (Sir Guy Carleton), Governor-General of Canada, in February, 1794, told a delegation of Indians from the American Northwest that American settlements in that region were unauthorized. Soon, he indicated, they would be able to recover the settled lands because within the year Great Britain and the United States would be at war. These hostile Indians were among those General Wayne was preparing to punish. Undoubtedly Dorchester’s intemperate utterances stiffened Indian resistance to¬ ward the United States. At approximately the same time Dorchester had ordered occupation by British troops of Fort Miami, sixty miles southwest of Detroit and in territory clearly American.' 3 The subsequent occupation violated American sovereignty. News of the Governor-General’s speech to the Indians and that of the Caribbean outrages reached the American people at the same dme. Public rage against Great Britain mounted, war talk became common, and Republican political advantage increased. So per¬ sistent was the talk of war that rumors reached England of an American declaration of war against her. Insurance rates on Ameri¬ can bottoms went up.' 4 Anglo-American relations dropped to their lowest point since the American Revolution. The Caribbean spolia¬ tions, the frontier crisis, the festering grievances arising out of the 1783 treaty, and the failure to obtain a commercial treaty, com¬ bined with bitterly anti-British Republican political propaganda, produced early in 1794 an Anglo-American war crisis.' 5 In Congress in bitter partisan debates retaliatory measures against 2 National Gazette (Philadelphia), Dec. 8, 1793. 73 Dorchester’s words and actions, however, had not been authorized by his government; see Grenville to Hammond, Downing Street, Aug. 8, 1794, in Mayo, Instructions to the British Ministers. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 62; for details, see Burt, United States, Great Britain, and British North America. . . , pp. 133-138; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 174-176. 74 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser (Fredericksburg), Nov. 14, 1793. 75 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Princeton). Some Englishmen, fearing that such action would bring on war with the United States, cautioned restraint in seizures of American ves¬ sels. “Iris,” in Sheffield Register (Sheffield, England), Jan. 3 and Feb. 7, 1794. Cited in Alice B. Keith, “Relaxations in the British Restrictions on the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802,” Journal of ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 95 Britain were proposed.' 6 Seizing this as the right time to strike, Jefferson, in one of his last acts as Secretary of State, sent to the House of Representatives on December 16, 1793, a long-postponed report on the state of American commerce." With this report he refurbished his long-cherished weapon of trade reprisals against Great Britain. He pointed out that whereas France and others treated American commerce relatively well, Britain crushed it with restrictions. To meet this evil he urged adoption of a policy based on reciprocal favors and retaliation and recommended what he had always espoused—closer commercial ties with France.' 8 Infuriating to Federalists and obvious in its implications, Jefferson’s report was another well-timed anti-British political measure. In the House of Representatives James Madison, who after Jefferson’s resignation had taken over leadership of Republicans in government, pushed Jefferson’s recommendations as well as similar proposals of his own. He offered seven resolutions calling for dis¬ criminatory duties and for legislation against British shipping. 79 After a week’s delay, Madison’s resolutions touched off full-scale debate on commercial and foreign policy. As Federalism’s mouth¬ piece, William Loughton Smith of South Carolina took the lead. Expressing Hamilton’s ideas, he charged that Jefferson slanted his Modern History, XX, 10. For a brief summary of the crisis, see Raymond C. Werner, “War Scare and Politics, 1794,” Quarterly Journal of the New Yor ^ State Historical Association, XI (Oct., 1930), 324-344. 78 Hammond reported as time went on that Congress received “with avidity every tale of falsehood and calumny that might be propagated with respect to Great Britain. . . .” Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, April 17, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts. 77 The report is in ASP FR, I, 300-304, and Lipscomb, Jefferson's Worlds, III, 261-283. I n the report Jefferson countered Hamilton’s ideas as expressed in the report on manufactures. Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 224. 78 “France,” declared Jefferson, “has, of her own accord, proposed nego¬ tiations for improving, by a new treaty, on fair and equal principles, the commercial relations of the two countries.” ASP FR, I, 304. The British saw clearly the anti-British impact of the report. Hammond reported that “the avowed undisguised tendency of the whole report is to recommend a closer connexion with France, and to inculcate the expediency of a direct system of commercial hostility with Great Britain.” Hammond to Gren¬ ville, Philadelphia, Feb. 22, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts. See also the precis on American affairs, 1794 [Sept.-Oct.], in the Dropmore Papers, III, 526. The resolutions are in Annals of the Congress, 3rd Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 3, 1794, pp. 155-156. ENTANGLING ALUANCE 96 report to favor France by exaggerating British commercial hostility. Sarcastically, he said that Americans were accustomed to “a con¬ stant panegyric on the generous policy of France towards this coun¬ try in commercial relations” and to “a constant . . . philippic on the unfriendly, illiberal, and persecuting policy of Great Britain towards us in the same relations.” 80 This was not a true picture, he said; France was selfishly motivated and hostile and little could be ex¬ pected of her. Commercial discrimination against Great Britain, he feared, would lead to war and to America’s ruin. 81 Madison and other Republicans who joined in the debate, which lasted over a month, would not accept this reasoning. In his final rebuttal Madison attacked Smith’s argument and defended his own resolutions. Among other things, he stressed that his proposals would draw France and the United States closer together, which was precisely what Federalists did not want. 82 In their opposition to the Madison resolutions in the light of increasing public resentment against England, Federalists were characterized as “slaves of British gold,” who raised incessantly the cry of war during the entire con¬ gressional session. “The hireling printers and funding dependents caught the sound,” later explained a Republican writer, “and war, war was echoed through the land. And what was the mighty cause? Why some propositions were made, upon what terms we could regulate our intercourse with nations, to whom we were under no obligations. What would a stranger, who knew nothing of the relation subsisting between us and Great Britain, have thought & most undoubtedly, that we were dependent, and that basely so.” 83 80 For Smith’s speech, see ibid., Jan. 13, 1794, pp. 174-209; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution . . . , p. 191, elaborates on Hamilton’s authorship of Smith’s speech; Hamilton’s outline of Smith’s speech is in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, III, 423-441; Jefferson recognized Hamilton as the author of the speech; see Jefferson to Madison, Monticello, April 3, 1794, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 501-502. In his home town, Charleston, Smith was burned in effigy for defending Great Britain. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 190. 81 For another Federalist attack on Madison’s resolutions, see the speech of Fisher Ames, Jan. 27, 1794, in Wor\s of Fisher Ames, Compiled by a number of his friends (Boston, 1809), pp. 26-57. 82 See Annals of the Congress . . . , 3rd Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 29-30, 1794, pp. 366-395; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution . . . , pp. 392- 393- ““Junius Americanus” in the New Yor\ Journal, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, June 26, 1795. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 97 Madison’s first resolution carried, but before Congress acted on the others, war hysteria hardened its grip upon the nation. Action was postponed, and the resolutions were lost in a flood of legislation aimed at war. They were debated by Republicans, Hammond com¬ plained, “on their political expediency alone. Here an ample range was afforded for the former topics of abuse of Great Britain.” 84 “Mr. Madison’s plan,” pointed out a Jefferson supporter, “does not go far enough: Let us at one stroke stop all trade with the English, till justice is done, and our merchants indemnified. Great Britain could not resist the stroke. She must acquiesce in the measures, and her necessities would at once compel her to act right.” Another writer reviewed the grievances against Great Britain and then concluded that “we had better be at open war with a perfidious nation; than be thus murdered by inches.” 8 '’ Spurred by an enraged public opinion, Congress pressed anti- British legislation which in its war-provoking potential surpassed the Madison resolutions. On March 26, 1794, Congress laid a tem¬ porary one-month embargo against foreign shipping (directed pri- mafiry against Great Britain), and later extended it for another month; it discussed and passed various defense measures, among which was a bill to fortify harbors, and another calling out eighty thousand militia, as well as one for additional military stores. In the Senate a nonintercourse bill was defeated only by the vote of Vice-President John Adams. 81 ’ Bills for sequestration of British debts to offset seizure of Ameri- 84 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Feb. 22, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts. Hammond maintained that Madison’s proposals “excited the most universal attention.” The political effect of the resolutions was clearly recog¬ nized by Americans of both parties. The existence of two parties in Congress was now clear. “Whether the subject be foreign or domestic—relative to war or peace—navigation or commerce—the magnetism of opposite views draws them wide as the poles asunder.” John Taylor, A Definition of Parties, or the Political Effect of the Paper System Considered (Philadelphia, 1794), p. 2 (the date of writing was given as April 5, 1794). 85 “Plain Truth” and “A Native of Columbia,” in the Independent Chron¬ icle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 30 and Feb. 24, 1794. 80 For the legislation and proposed legislation, see Annals of the Con¬ gress . . . , 3rd Cong., 1 st sess., March 26, 1794, p. 531; April 17, 1794, pp. 597-598; Bemis, fay’s Treaty . . . , pp. 194-198; Dauer, The Adams Federalists, pp. 86-87. Adams’s vote on several occasions was decisive in foreign policy matters; he usually voted anti-French. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 98 can ships appeared, and resolutions were passed to increase th( federal army. The resolutions and legislation, much more than trade retaliation, carried seeds of war; hostility to Great Britain, “which pervades the whole Continent,” increased rapidly. 87 Ameri¬ cans caught the war spirit; they volunteered for defense prepara¬ tions and began drilling in volunteer companies. British sailors and officers suffered at the hands of aroused anti-British mobs; some mobs, in places such as Norfolk and Baltimore, tarred and feathered pro-British Americans. Alarmed and overwhelmed Federalists were almost swept into an English war. To defend British actions had become almost im¬ possible. Many Federalists, even Hamilton and Washington, felt that Great Britain had gone too far. William Loughton Smith, for example, changed his tune and urged preparations for war. 88 “Even the Monocrat papers,” reported Jefferson, “are obliged to publish the most furious Philippics against England.” Yet the wai in the making was a Republican war. Federalists wanted none of it; to them it was national suicide. “You cannot imagine,” said John Adams, “what horror some persons are in, lest peace should continue. The prospect of peace throws them into distress.” 89 Certain New England Federalists, morever, took a sectional view of difficulties with Great Britain. They maintained that the South, because of its debts to England, acted to generate irritation with England and thereby plunge the nation into war. The South’s op¬ position to the government, its anti-British attitude, in the opinion of Yankee Federalist Oliver Ellsworth, gave “a baleful ascendancy to French influence.” 90 Fisher Ames deprecated Southern violence 87 For the debate on the sequestration of British debts, see Annals of the Congress ...» 3rd Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 1794, pp. 535 ff. John Quincy Adams wrote to his father that “the sequestration of British debts must be considered as a direct act of hostility. . . .” Boston, April 22, 1794, in Ford, ed., The Writings of John Ouincy Adams, I, 187; Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, May 8, 1794, deprecated hostility to Great Britain, Henry Adams Transcripts. 68 Annals of the Congress, 3rd Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 1794, pp. 506-507. 88 Jefferson to James Monroe, Philadelphia, May 5, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 238; Adams to Wife, Philadelphia, April 19, 1794, in Charles F. Adams, ed., Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife (2 vols., Boston, 1841), II, 156. 80 Oliver Ellsworth to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, April 5, 1794, Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 134. ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR CLOUDS 99 against the British in Norfolk and Baltimore. “Compared with New-England,” he sputtered contemptuously, “the multitude in those towns are but half civilized.” Then he queried, “Will our Yankees like a war the better for being mobbed into it, and because the South will not pay the British debts?” 91 That the pro-French and-British influence upon the government was at least in part secdonal—Southern—was an idea which persisted in New England Federalist circles. In those circles, in fact, “dissolution of the Union” seemed the only cure for the political, foreign-policy, sectional split. 92 Believing that sequestration and trade reprisals were certain steps to disaster and that the war-party was sectional and politically motivated, Federalists groped for a way out of their dilemma. To be shoved into a war they did not want ran counter to their political philosophy; they would not act merely to gratify public passion. 93 To save the nation, to save their kind of government, they adopted the strategy of delay, of urging preparation for war while seeking a formula for peace. 94 Fortunately all hope for peace and for Federalism was not lost. Angered by America’s failure to enforce treaty obligations, France for a while retaliated by seizing, wherever possible, American ships carrying goods to England. In the French view the Franco-Ameri- can alliance obligated Americans to resist British seizures of goods on American ships destined for French ports—the vexing question of free ships, free goods. 95 81 Fisher Ames to -, Philadelphia, May 6, 1794, in Ames, Worlds of Fisher Ames, p. 478. 81 When Oliver Ellsworth and Rufus King suggested dissolution of the Union to John Taylor of Caroline as the cure for the split between Republicans and Federalists, Taylor saw it as a plot of a “British interest.” John Taylor of Caroline to [Madison], May 11, 1794, in John Taylor, Disunion Sentiment in Congress in 1794. . . , ed. Gaillard Hunt (Washington, 1905), pp. 22-23. 88 So certain did war seem that Thomas Pinckney, American minister in London, queried the Secretary of State about moving his family to France when hostilities should break out. Pinckney to Jefferson, Nov. 27, 1793, cited in Bemis, “The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney. . . ,” AHR, XXVIII, 243. 84 Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 194. 88 For the French decrees of May 9 and 23, 1793, and the correspondence relating to them, see ASP FR, I, 243-246. French seizures of American vessels were difficult to stop, related French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Genet, because of the great resemblance between American and English vessels. Paris, March 31, 1793, Genet Papers, VIII, 2690. 100 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE After the initial surprise seizures, moreover, England relaxed her orders-in-council and allowed a temporary resumption of American Caribbean trade.' 10 England paid for many of the confiscated car¬ goes, whereas the French did not. In addition, the English war- trade was more lucrative than that of France; even at its height the French war-trade with America was a poor second to that of England. These were factors which mitigated the drive to war. Even more important as a war deterrent was the fact that Federalists controlled the Senate and the Executive Branch of the government. 9 ' In England, too, there were those who worked to avert war. Realiz¬ ing that the Washington administration was friendly and pro- British, “His Majesty’s Ministers” wanted no war with the United States. At the height of the war hysteria Hammond received in¬ structions to encourage the Federalist government in its “main¬ tenance of a fair Neutrality” and in its policy of friendship toward Great Britain. 98 Federalists therefore were not committed to a lost cause. After partisan struggles, Federalists in Congress blocked the worst of the anti-British legislation. Next, they tried to avoid an English war in a more decisive manner; as a last minute gamble they decided to send a special mission to London. 99 88 See Thomas Pinckney to Jefferson, London, Jan. 9, 1794, and Instructions to Commanders of British Ships, Jan. 8, 1794, ASP FR, I, 430-431. Washing¬ ton, for example, realized that the British Order in Council of Jan. 8 “allayed the violence of the heat.” To Tobias Lear, Philadelphia, May 16, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 355. 97 Federalist control of the Senate was close; it depended, oftentimes, on the casting vote of the Vice-President. Gibbs, Wolcott Papers, I, 116. 68 Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, Jan. —, 1794, in Mayo, Instructions to the British Ministers. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 44. Whether or not England wanted to go to war with the United States was, of course, a vital question to Federalists; see the Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), May 5, 1794. 89 Speaking for Federalists, George Cabot remarked: “We all perceive that, bad as our condition is, war would make it much worse, and therefore must be avoided.” To Samuel Phillips, Philadelphia, March 8, 1794, in Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot (Boston, 1877), pp. 75-77; see also Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, Philadelphia, March 26, 1794, in Seth Ames, ed., Worlds of Fisher Ames (2 vols., Boston, 1854), I, 139-140. CHAPTER FOUR THE JAY TREATY PRELUDE TO PEACE OR WAR? You can have no idea, how deeply the public confidence is withdrawing itself from the President, and with what avidity strictures on his con¬ duct are received; sensible of this, his friends are redoubling their efforts to exalt his name and exaggerate his past services—But all in vain, the vital blow aimed at the Independence & best Interests of his country, by the impending treaty, marl; him in indelible character as the head of a British faction, and no longer blinds the public mind .— John Beckely to James Madison, September io, 1795. The Present crisis appears to me to be most delicate and important since the organization of the Government. The Anti-Federalists, and the per¬ sonal enemies of the Administration, have rallied with astonishing activity. The circumstances of the Treaty has ranged a variety of parties on their side, and given an imposing appearance to their numbers; and I believe they will now make their last effort to shafe the Government .— William Richardson Davie to James Iredell, Halifax, North Carolina, September 4> x 795- * * * # * F rom its inception the plan of a special mission to England was a political move; politics and personal partisanship dominated al¬ most every step of its development. It was conceived by Federal¬ ists to be executed by Federalists for the benefit of Federalists. 1 At 1 Zephaniah Swift, Federalist congressman from Connecticut, had sug- ested Oliver Ellsworth from his own state for the mission, but Southern Republicans objected; they had no confidence in him. “Mr. Hamilton was mentioned, but the Southern Democrats made such rout that it was thought best by Hamilton himself to appoint Mr. Jay against whom one would sup¬ pose there could be no objection, and yet the Southern Democrats object.” 102 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE first Hamilton was to be saviour of party and country; but his un¬ popularity, the strong Republican opposition to him, and Federalist need for his political talents at home, particularly in his relations with President Washington, made another choice imperative. 2 At Hamilton’s suggestion, Washington nominated John Jay, the Chief Justice of the United States, for the mission. Although not yet involved in the more violent political battles, he was almost wholly a political choice. 3 On the basis of his record and past diplo¬ matic experience Jay was admirably qualified for the task. But politically and temperamentally his qualifications were dubious, particularly to Republicans. A staunch and haughty Federalist, an Anglophile, and, though of French ancestry, inveterately anti- French, already unpopular for an ostensible surrender of American navigation rights on the Mississippi in an unexecuted treaty with Spain (Jay-Gardoqui Treaty, 1786), Jay lacked the very things needed most—public confidence and an uncommitted position. To George Hammond, for instance, he revealed that he desired Swift to David Daggett, Philadelphia, April 17, 1794, in Franklin B. Dexter, ed., “Selections from Letters Received by David Daggett, 1786-1802,” Pro¬ ceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, n.s., IV, 372. George Cabot and Caleb Strong, Senators from Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth, Senator from Connecticut, and Rufus King, Senator from New York, headed the movement for a special mission to England; they acted together and consti¬ tuted a clique which shaped Federalist policy in the Senate. See the con¬ temporary notes of Rufus King in Charles C. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King ... (6 vols., New York, 1874-1900), 517- 527, hereinafter cited as King, Rufus King Correspondence. See also, Taylor, Disunion Sentiment in Congress, 1794, p. 8; William G. Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (New York, 1905), pp. 211, 214-217; Oliver Ellsworth to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, April 5, 1794, in Gibbs, Wolcott Papers, I, 134- 1 35; Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, p. 95; Dice R. Anderson, “Edmund Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 112-114; and Joseph Charles, “The Jay Treaty: The Origins of the American Party System,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, XII (Oct., 1955), 592-593. 2 Secretary of State Randolph opposed Hamilton’s appointment; see Mon¬ cure D. Conway, Omitted Chapters of History Disclosed in the Life and Papers of Edmund Randolph (New York, 1888), p. 215. Hereinafter cited as Conway, Randolph. See also King, Rufus King Correspondence, April 13, 1794, I, 519-520; Washington to Monroe, Philadelphia, April 9, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXX, 320-321. 3 See Hamilton to Washington, Philadelphia, April 14, 1794, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 519-532; Monaghan, John Jay, pp. 365-366. THE JAY TREATY 103 to remove every obstacle to Anglo-American friendship. In ac¬ cepting the nomination, which he did not welcome and which he foresaw would make him unpopular, he made clear where he stood. He demanded wide discretion in negotiation and that the anti- British measures in die House of Representatives be blocked, or at least that the President not sanction them. 4 No one but a Jeffersonian would actually have pleased Republi¬ cans, but Jay and his notorious record seemed almost as bad as Hamilton. His nomination struck them as a deliberate polidcal challenge. 5 It immediately touched off a furious political wrangle. After three days of Senate debate Federalists on April 19, 1794, by a margin of 18 to 8 finally rammed the nomination through. 0 Even in a Federalist-controlled Senate, it was now obvious that so controversial a matter as Jay’s mission would face further buffedngs. In Federalist reasoning a matter as vital to party and nation as the Jay mission should not again be set free in the Congress. Previously Washington had relied upon the Senate for collabora¬ tion in the formulation of foreign policy. In addition to obtaining Senate confirmation of envoys the President had followed the prac¬ tice of seeking its approval of diplomatic instructions. Up to the dme of the Jay mission this practice had not caused difficulty, as the Senate was Federalist and dominated by Hamilton; it responded like an amiable partner. At this juncture Federalists saw that the ostensible partnership could no longer function with the harmony Washington cherished; political differences were too deep, even in the still-Federalist Senate. The political challenge of the Republicans had made control of foreign policy by an elite group almost im¬ possible. 4 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, April 28, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts; Jay to Mrs. Jay, Philadelphia, April 15, 19, 1794, in Johnston, ed., Correspondence of John Jay, IV, 3-6; King, Rufus King Correspondence, April 14,15,1795,1,520. 6 One administration critic later went so far as to demand Washington’s impeachment for appointing Jay. This was “Franklin,” a pseudonymous writer who wrote fourteen anti-Jay letters in the Independent Gazetteer (Philadelphia) between March 11 and June 10, 1795. William Cobbett re¬ sponded in kind and in defense of the administration in a pamphlet entitled A Little Plain English. For a summary of the arguments, see Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia . . . , pp. 82-87. 6 U. S. Congress. Senate, Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States (Washington, 1828), April 17, 18, 19, 1794, I, 104 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE In line with Hamiltonian doctrine of loose constitutional inter¬ pretation, the Federalist Senate coterie which had won approval of Jay’s nomination suggested that the practice of executive collabora¬ tion with the Senate be abandoned. “From the Difficulty of passing particular instructions in the Senate,” wrote Rufus King, “it seems to me to be most suitable that the Pr. shd. instruct, and that the Treaty shd. be concluded subject to the approbation of the Senate.” * * 7 Senate partnership in formulation of foreign policy was thus smothered in infancy; the Senate was to be presented with accom¬ plished fact, to be accepted, rejected, or perhaps modified. In this way Federalists shielded the Jay mission from further attacks; in this way political expediency impelled the Executive to assume sole control in execution of foreign policy; in this way Washington established foreign policy precedent which has endured to this day. 8 Federalist strategy infuriated Republicans. Before Jay’s con¬ firmation they demanded that the President be forced “to inform the Senate of the whole business.” But Federalist votes killed their demands. After winning the battle for confirmation, Alexander Hamilton drew up Jay’s instructions. While other Federalist opinion had been sought, Hamilton’s ideas predominated; thoste of Edmund Randolph, the new Secretary of State, were ignored. 6 During the entire negotiation, in fact, Randolph was either ignored or by¬ passed. As in the past, when Jefferson held the post, the Secretary 151-152. Rufus King notes April 20 as the date of Jay’s approval. King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 522. 7 King, Rufus King Correspondence, April 16, 1794, I, 521; for a discus¬ sion of the episode, see White, The Federalists .... pp. 61-62. 8 See Ralston Hayden, The Senate and Treaties: ij8g-i8ij (New York, 1920), pp. 70-71, 94, 103-105. In a body as numerous and as divided as the Senate the necessary secrecy in treaty negotiation would have been impossible. Give and take necessary in diplomatic negotiation, too, would have been im¬ possible. Jefferson recognized this and on more than one occasion viewed conduct of foreign affairs as belonging to the President exclusively. See “Opinion on the Powers of the Senate,” April 24, 1790, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 161; White, The Federalists . . . , p. 62. 0 For drafts of Jay’s instructions, see Hamilton to Washington, April 22, 1794, Hamilton to Randolph, April 27, 1794, “Part of Instructions to John Jay,” 1794, in Lodge, ed., The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 300-308; Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 331; Bemis, fay’s Treaty . . . , p. 210: Anderson, “Edmund Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State, II, 116. THE JAY TREATY 105 of State went through empty formalities in writing instructions to Jay. Not being a confirmed Federalist, he never knew Jay’s real instructions. * * * * * In England Jay was as popular a choice as he was an unpopular one in the United States . 10 Received with warmth, he was wined, dined, and flattered. Assessing Jay as “long-winded and self- opin¬ ionated,” the British reasoned that he “may be attached by good treatment, but will be unforgiving if he thinks himself neglected”; they were aware that “Mr. Jay’s weak side is Mr. Jay .” 11 Concili¬ ation was the British theme. Even though as an opponent the United States might seem inconsequential, England wanted no war if it could be avoided without sacrifice.. Her primary foe was France; any new conflict would detract from the main war. In Parliament, moreover, English merchants made their weight felt. Dreading the loss in trade from their largest and most profitable! customer, they opposed an American war . 12 Jay’s conduct and Britain’s conciliatory attitude did not stem Anglophobia in the United States. On the streets aroused Amer¬ icans still attacked British sailors and officers. In complaining of “the uniformly unfriendly treatment that British officers have experi¬ enced in American ports,” Hammond said the American govern¬ ment must adopt “some effectual mode of protecting from popular 10 Thomas Pinckney, the regular American minister to London, was recognized by the British as being less disposed than Jay to make concessions. See Count Woronzow to Lord Grenville, Harley Street, June 21, 1795, and J. B. Burgess to Lord Grenville, Downing Street, June 28, 1795, Dropmore Papers, III, 78, 87; Bemis, “The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney . . . American Historical Review, XXVIII, 243; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 208. 11 Lord Auckland to Grenville, Beckenham, June 22, 1794, Dropmore Papers, II, 578. 13 Most informed Britons, apparently, recognized the seriousness of diffi¬ culties with the United States and also the importance of keeping the former colonies from being driven once again into the arms of France. Even Lord Hawkesbury, president of England’s Board of Trade, who had long opposed relaxation of the British commercial system in favor of Americans recognized this. See Hawkesbury’s memorandum to Lord Grenville, n. d., in Bradford Perkins, ed., “Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations,” Missis¬ sippi Valley Historical Review, XL (Sept., 1953), 293-304. Other evidence of attempted British conciliation is revealed in Josiah T. Newcomb, “New Light on Jay’s Treaty,” American Journal of International Law, XXVIII (1934), 685-93. io6 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE insult and aggression the British officers in its ports; or it will be otherwise impossible for them to quit their ships in security.” 13 Although Jay’s negotiations fanned anti-British sendment, it was his treaty that enraged Anglophobes and Republicans. \ Jay’s instructions were not on the surface an abandonment of American rights; they contained much that even Republicans could approve. In their very nature, therefore, they stressed provisions which Great Britain under no circumstances would accept. 14 In the four-month negotiation the British held the trump cards. Wil¬ liam Wyndham Grenville (Lord Grenville), the British foreign minister, had a copy of the State Department’s secret cypher, but, more important, he had in Alexander Hamilton an invaluable ally. Even if he had set his heart on it, Jay was committed to a game he could not win. In Jay’s instructions Randolph had incorporated the suggestion that Jay consult with Russian, Swedish, and Danish representatives on the possibility of common action in forming an armed neutrality to resist high-handed British maritime practices. “The principles of the armed neutrality,” Randolph pointed out, “would abundantly cover our neutral rights.” Jay was to “sound those ministers upon the probability of an alliance with their nation to support those principles.” In March, 1794, Sweden and Denmark formed an armed neutrality, and shortly after Jay’s departure for England had invited the United States to join. American adherence was pre¬ cisely what Great Britain did not want; to block it she was apparent¬ ly willing to make concessions. This proved unnecessary. Presi¬ dent Washington and his Federalist Cabinet rejected the invitation on the basis of a desire to avoid entangling alliances. 15 Although the British knew of the invitation, they did not know, at first, of the American rejection. In the Jay-Grenville negotiations the threat of joining the armed neutrality was almost the only 13 Hammond to Grenville, New York, Aug. 3, 1794, Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts. 11 The instructions, dated Philadelphia, May 6, 1794, are in ASP FR, I, 47 2 ; 474 - 16 The quotations are from ibid., p. 473; for more information on the armed neutrality, see Samuel F. Bemis, “The United States and the Abortive Armed Neutrality of 1794,” AHR, XXIV (Oct., 1908), 26-46; Phillips and Reede, Neutrality . . . , II, 91-94. THE JAY TREATY 107 coercive weapon die United States possessed. If the Bridsh govern¬ ment learned of the Washington administration’s decision on the armed neutrality the United States would be in the posidon of a petidoner hopeful of small favors in the negotiation. That hap¬ pened. Fearful of the slightest threat to his pro-English foreign policy, Hamilton assured Hammond beforehand that the American govern¬ ment would not join the armed neutrality. The settled policy of the American government, he told the British minister, was “to avoid entangling itself with European connexions, which could only tend to involve this Country in disputes, wherein it might have no possible interest, and commit it in a common cause with allies, from whom in the moment of danger, it could derive no succour.” Later Hamilton told Hammond that the Cabinet had discussed the armed neutrality and that—as he had predicted—it had decided against joining. 16 Apparently not even Jay could be trusted com¬ pletely to implement the Hamiltonian program as Hamilton wished it. Except in two controversial points, Jay’s Federalist-inspired, Fed¬ eralist-controlled instructions were but recommendations. Few American diplomats have been allowed the discretion that was Jay’s. 17 Two only were the rules from which he was not to deviate. First, he could do nothing contrary to American engagements to France; secondly, he could sign no commercial treaty that did not recognize those obligations to France. Basically the instructions directed him to obtain an agreement in trade reciprocity, “particu¬ larly to the West Indies.” Among other things, he was to adjust grievances arising from the 1783 treaty, gain British recognition of America’s neutral rights, obtain compensation for British seizures of American ships and property, and, if possible, negotiate a com¬ mercial treaty. Fundamental in the instructions was the simple objective—peace. Regardless of other desirable recommendations Jay was to make great concessions for peace—a peace upon which was grounded the entire Federalist structure of government. Yet, Hamilton had in- 18 Hammond to Grenville, New York, Aug. 3, and Philadelphia, Jan. 5, 1795, Henry Adams Transcripts. 17 See Monaghan, John Jay, p. 368; Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 212. io8 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE structed Jay that he was not to do anything which might be inter¬ preted as an abdication of American rights. Obviously the instruc¬ tions were contradictory. Some of the very concessions Jay was al¬ lowed to make were considered American “rights.” Consequently the treaty that Jay signed on November 19, 1794, failed to comport with his instructions, even with the two imperatives upon which he was not to retreat. By ignoring most of his confusing instructions Jay achieved his fundamental objective, peace with England. 18 In comparison Great Britain’s concessions appeared minor. Her most important concession was the signing of the treaty, a treaty of commerce that did not include admission of American vessels, on a reciprocal basis, into the Bridsh West Indies. A second British concession consisted of a promise—a valuable promise Britain had given in the peace treaty of 1783 but had not carried out—to evacu¬ ate the frontier posts. A third concession was another promise, a promise to pay for spoliations under the orders-in-council. The spoliations themselves, however, were not repudiated and were to continue. Aside from these and a few other limited privileges, Jay obtained no commercial concessions the United States had not enjoyed before the treaty. The one explicit privilege of trade with the British West Indies embodied in article twelve was so restrictive that not even a Federalist Senate could accept it. 19 The treaty’s most ominous feature was its blighting effect on the * French alliance. In this it fitted British foreign policy and Federalist objectives; in this it reflected its polidcal as well as its diplomatic character. Considering the treaty’s major provisions, its objectives, and the motives of people responsible for it, the stipulation that nothing in it should violate any treaty the United States had with another nation appeared meaningless. 20 While the Jay treaty gained 18 Monaghan, John Jay, p. 369; Carlton Savage, Policy of the United States towards Maritime Commerce in War (2 vols., Washington, 1934), I, 15; for the text of the treaty with notes, see Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, II, 245-274. 18 Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 258; Robert R. Rankin, The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States (Berkeley, Calif., 1907), p. 30. 20 For a critical appraisal of the Jay treaty, see George A. King, The French Spoliation Claims, Senate Document No. 451, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (Wash¬ ington, 1916), p. 7. King maintained that article XXV of the Jay treaty directly contravened obligations to France. With the Jay treaty, he de- THE JAY TREATY 109 the laudable objective of peace with England when war might have been disastrous, it laid the basis for another war which might have been equally disastrous—a war with France. 21 The treaty ignored maritime principles Americans had bound themselves to uphold: free ships make free goods, freedom of neu¬ trals to trade with belligerents in noncontraband goods, and a re¬ stricted contraband list. By including naval stores as contraband and by acquiescing in the British Rule of 1756 and in other big-navy British maritime practices the United States deserted principles it had obliged itself to observe by previous treaties, particularly by the French treaties of 1778.““ Legalistically and realistically—in view of feeble American sea power—the United States could not have been called upon to force British compliance with these principles. Yet the American government’s abandonment of its maritime principles was, in the view of many, incompatible with treaty obligations to France. Indeed, American acquiescence in the British practices seemed, especially to the French, unconscionably eager. Technically the Jay treaty could have been interpreted, and was by Hamiltonians, as being harmless to France. 23 But such an inter¬ pretation seemingly evaded the treaty’s real intent. The treaty vio¬ lated the spirit if not the letter of the 1778 treaties. Under it Great Britain’s position in relations with America was more favor¬ able than that of America’s French ally. Frenchmen viewed it as a negation of the alliance. 24 Many Americans did also. Was the dared, the United States “committed a flagrant breach of our plighted faith for which she [France] might well call upon us to make reparation.” Ibid., p. 8. 21 One Federalist praised the treaty because it brought a peace which would give the country in the “vigour of youth room to expand into that gigantic size which will in 20 years outgrow the Insolence of Britain & render the U. S. too Formidable to be trifled with.” William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Princeton). 22 Before the treaty had been negotiated Flamilton had revealed to Ham¬ mond that the United States was ready to abandon its established maritime principles. Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , pp. 199-201. 28 Professor Bemis believed that the Jay treaty did not violate the French treaties. See his “Washington’s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of In¬ dependence,” AHR, XXXIX (Jan., 1934), 251 and his John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), p. 46. 24 La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , II, 518; C. S. Hyneman, “Neutrality during the European Wars of 1792-1815,” AJ 1 L, XXIV (1930), 292. Frenchmen had feared an Anglo-American rapprochement. Genet, for no ENTANGLING ALLIANCE treaty a breach of neutrality ? Some Americans thought so. Could a state at peace, according to international practice, alter its relations with belligerents without compromising its neutrality? 20 Jay’s treaty has often been called Hamilton’s treaty because Hamilton sabotaged negotiations on the issue of the armed neu¬ trality. Regardless of the real significance of that episode (probably it did little to alter the basic structure of the treaty or even the tenor of the negotiations), Jay’s treaty was Hamilton’s treaty more than that of any other man. As had been planned, it saved his system. 26 Not only had he had a hand in its inception and dominated its negotiation; he was to be its leading defender, working it through the Senate and being responsible for its execution. This treaty, because of the violent reaction it inspired in France, for a short time made Federalists popular. * * # * * The Jay treaty said little about the frontier-Indian question. While Jay had been negotiating, “Mad” Anthony Wayne had been fighting. At one stroke, in the Battle of Fallen Timbers (August 20, 1794), he settled the immediate Indian problem on the North¬ west frontier. Immediately following the American victory it ap¬ peared that Anglo-American tension in the region would lead to a collision. With arrival of news of the Jay agreement, suspense ended. By the treaty of Greenville of the following year (August 3, 1795), facilitated by the stipulation in Jay’s treaty that the posts were to be surrendered, the United States made a lasting peace with the Indians. With the Jay treaty and the treaty of Greenville there was peace with both British and Indians on the Northwest frontier. 2 ' example, had been instructed to thwart any Anglo-American negotiations for a commercial treaty. LeBrun to Genet, Paris, May 9, 1793, Genet Papers, IX, 2765. 25 James Madison, James Alexander Dallas, and others believed the Jay treaty a breach of neutrality; see C. S. Hyneman, The First American Neu¬ trality: A Study of the American Understanding of Neutral Obligations during the Years 1792 to 1815 (Urbana, Ill., 1934), pp. 42-45; Anderson, “Edmund Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., American Secretaries of State, II, 142. 28 Bemis, Jay’s Treaty . . . , p. 271; Setser, Commercial Reciprocity Policy . . . , p. 130. 27 For details, see Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 334-335; Bond, The Civilization of the Old Northwest, pp. 254-255; Darling, Our Rising Empire . . . , pp. 207-213. THE JAY TREATY hi In the meantime national politics, with foreign affairs predomi¬ nant, continued in ferment. In every step of the way to a treaty Jay had been vilified. The real abuse was not loosed fully until the contents of the treaty were publicly known. Then popular scorn fell upon Jay and the Federalist treaty. Any treaty with England would have suffered at the hands of Republicans and Anglophobes; and so great an abdication of alleged national principle did the Jay treaty seem that even Federalists hung their heads. Some confessed that the treaty “in the opinion of the most candid [is] quite as favourable to the B [ritish] as to ourselves.” 28 With the treaty the Washington administration had met a severe crisis in foreign affairs. But this did not settle the problem of for¬ eign policy towards England and France; the explosive political implications of the treaty had to be dealt with. The treaty was now before the Senate, partially exposed to public opinion, and President Washington confronted the beginning of his greatest political crisis. 29 Washington, displaying little liking for the treaty, had feared the public reaction that would follow its promulgation. The treaty had reached the United States in March, 1795; he then smothered it in secrecy until a special session of Congress could assemble in June. During the four months the President attempted to shield it from attack; but rumors and garbled interpretations reached the public. How would Washington handle this political treaty now that politics had been woven into American national life and conse¬ quently into the treaty-making machinery? There was no prece¬ dent to follow; what he did might establish precedent. For the 28 Timothy Williams to Timothy Pickering, Boston, July 17, 1795, Timothy Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston (microfilm copy). Governor Sam Johnston of North Carolina confessed, for example, that various objectionable articles “have greatly lessened my opinione of Mr. Jay’s abilities as a negotiator. . . .” Johnston to Iredell, Williamston, N. C., Aug. 1, 1795, in J. Griffith McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell (2 vols., New York, 1858), II, 450. Fifteen days later Johnston wrote: “The whole continent appears to be highly enraged against Mr. Jay and his Treaty.” Ibid., II, 453. 28 “There is nothing brilliant in it,” remarked William Vans Murray of the treaty, but it avoided war. This seemed to be an estimate shared by other Federalists. William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 3, 1795 (Princeton). In Pennsylvania the Jay treaty was an effective agent in crystallizing party demarcation. Tinkcom, The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790-1801, p. 99; see also Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin, p. 159. 112 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE first time constitutional procedure for making and approving treaties was to undergo a full test. Critics maintained that the Senate did not know that Jay was to negotiate a treaty. How then, they asked, “could it be demonstrated a treaty negociated with the advice and consent of the Senate?” If the President could thus dispense with the advice of Senators he could just as well dispense with their consent “and render their participation with him in matters of treaty altogether nugatory.” 30 So fearful were Federalists of the adverse impact that the docu¬ ment would have on the public that they pledged each Senator not to divulge the treaty’s contents. 31 For eight days the Senate debated the treaty. Republicans charged to the attack, particularly against article twelve; Federalists defended Jay’s work. Words seemed not strong enough to describe Jay’s “betrayal” of his country with this “dishonorable” treaty; so, at least, it appeared to Republicans. Al¬ though they wanted the treaty approved just as Jay had negotiated it, Federalists realized that Senate consent was impossible in that form, and that retreat was essential. They struck out the most offensive part of the treaty, article twelve, which article imposed a limit of seventy tons upon American ships trading with the British West Indies. As expressed by James Madison, this would have been trade “in canoes.” With not a single vote to spare and according to party alignment the Senate on June 24, 1795, consented to the treaty by a vote of 20 to io. 32 Still bound by the pledge of secrecy, the Senate resolved that the treaty, even though its contents were in the main already known, should not be divulged to the public until the President should so decide. Up to this point not even George Hammond, the British minister, had seen the official treaty. 33 In view of the political heat centering on the treaty, the attempt at secrecy was foolish. The effort failed; in a few days the terms leaked out. 30 “Atticus” in the Aurora (Philadelphia), July 23, 1795. 31 See Annals of the Congress . . . , 3rd Congress, 2nd sess., June 8, 1795, p. 855. 32 See ibid., June 24, 1795, p. 862. From the Senate, only news of the treaty’s approval reached the public, none of the treaty itself. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), July 2, 1795; see also Rankin, The Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation . . . , pp. 30, 37-40. 38 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, June 25, 1795, Henry Adams Tran¬ scripts. THE JAY TREATY JI 3 An anti-Federalist Virginian, Senator Stevens Thomson Mason, did not regard himself as bound by the pledge. He made the treaty articles available to Benjamin Franklin Bache, one of the more scur¬ rilous Republican editors. In his Aurora, Bache flooded Philadel¬ phia with a summary, and then with the full contents of the treaty. 34 Mason, critics maintained, released the treaty to embarrass the gov¬ ernment. “This artifice,” George Hammond said, “has been too successful in its operation.” 3 ’ Immediately the treaty was reprinted in pamphlet form and in other newspapers and widely distributed. Public reaction was overwhelmingly hostile; Americans de¬ nounced the Jay treaty in prose and rhyme. Odes such as this expressed anti-British sentiment: Is it again the patriot’s fate, To mourn his country’s fallen state, To weep her honour lost; To see her bend at Britain’s throne, No wrongs redress’d, her freedom gone, Her independence grown an empty boast? 3 * There is evidence that Senator Mason sold a copy of the treaty to Pierre Auguste Adet, the French minister in Philadelphia, who gave it to Bache for publication. See Bernard Fay, The Two Franklins: Fathers of American Democracy (Boston, 1933), pp. 239-241; Howard C. Rice, “James Swan: Agent of the French Republic, 1794-1796,” New England Quarterly, X (Sept., r 937 ), 480-481. The Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, July 7, 1795, for example, carried the text of the treaty preceded by a letter from Mason in which he stated that he sent a “genuine” copy of the treaty to the press for the information of Americans. For further details, see Timothy Pickering to John Quincy Adams, Sept. 10, 1795, in Octavius Pickering and C. W. Upham, The Life of Timothy Pickering (4 vols., Boston, 1867-73), III, 200-203. Federalists also revealed official information about the treaty to foreign diplomats. Oliver Wolcott, for instance, passed on the substance of Senate proceedings leading to approval to Hammond. Anderson, “Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State . . . , II, 140. Adet reported that he had purchased a copy of the treaty from a Senator, probably Mason, and, without its being suspected that he, Adet, had a hand in it, had it published in Bache’s Aurora. Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadel¬ phia, July 3, 1795, in Frederick J. Turner, ed., “Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1903, II (Washington, 1904), 741-743. Hereinafter cited as Turner, CFM. ” Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 18, 1795. Earlier, June 28, Hammond had told Grenville that after the Senate’s approval of the treaty there was a state of general tranquillity in the United States such as he had not witnessed since his arrival. Henry Adams Transcripts. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 114 Ay yes! unless her suns arise To rend the curst infamous ties and break the magic spell, No more by Britain’s art beguil’d O let us spurn the base born child The Imp of slavery begot in hell. 36 In pleading for organized opposition to the treaty a Virginia Republican declared that the nation had been “dragooned into a treaty with barbarians,” a treaty that was “obtained by British influ¬ ence.” 3, “Sir John Jay” became the most hated man in America. Seldom in time of peace had a treaty aroused such violent public reaction. While much of the reaction against the treaty arose spon¬ taneously, Republicans organized some of it for political purposes; they had a popular national issue around which to rally the party; they would not let that opportunity slip by. 3 * That the treaty vio¬ lated die “rights of friendship, gratitude and alliance which the re¬ public of France may justly claim from the United States” was a foremost criticism of Jay’s work, a criucism with great popular ap¬ peal. 39 Politically, the treaty doomed Jay. Even though recently he had been elected governor of New York, after publication of the treaty 38 From the Aurora, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, July 3, 1795. 37 W. Wilson to Joseph Jones, Sept. 14, 1795, Joseph Jones Papers, Duke University Library. 33 Alexander J. Dallas, prominent Pennsylvania Republican, for example, wrote numerous articles attacking the treaty. His most pretentious work, a twenty-two-thousand-word essay entitled “Features of Mr. Jay’s Treaty,” was published in five parts in the American Daily Advertiser between July 18 and August 17, 1795. Dallas warned that his work should not “be regarded as an instrument of faction, nor made the foundation of slander and abuse,” for the issue at stake was “too momentous to be treated as the football of contending factions.” Walters, Alexander James Dallas, pp. 66-68. The essay ^ is reprinted in George M. Dallas, The Life and Writings of Alexander J. Dallas (Philadelphia, 1871), pp. 160-207. 38 The quotation is from a memorial emanating from a mass meeting of citizens in Philadelphia, July 25, 1795, cited in Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia . . . , p. 88. “Junius Americanus,” in an essay in the New Yor\ Herald (reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, June 26, 1795), attacked the administration for neglecting France and sur¬ rendering to Great Britain’s tyranny. For a French commentary on American public opinion in regard to the Jay treaty, see La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels . . . , I, 381-382. THE JAY TREATY “5 he lost political appeal. “YES, Sir, you have bitched it; you have indeed put your foot in it Mr. Jay—for shame, Sir,—” expressed cer¬ tain public reaction to Jay’s diplomacy. 40 At one time prior to the treaty negotiation Jay had been considered a leading candidate to succeed Washington when the great man chose to step down. Gouverneur Morris went so far as to declare that much of the outcry against the Jay treaty stemmed from a plot to eliminate Jay as a successor to Washington. Regardless of motivation the result was the same—damnation of Jay. Jay, England, and the treaty were damned. The Jay treaty, said the Republican press, was “degrading to the nadonal honor, dan¬ gerous to the political existence and destructive to the agricultural, commercial, and shipping interests of the people of the United States.” 41 France, the ten senators who had “refused to sign the death warrant of American liberty,” and, particularly, the pledge¬ wrecking Mason, were praised. Handbills proclaimed that “France is our avowed Friend. . . . Great Britain is the universal Foe of Liberty.” To be a supporter of the treaty was to be a friend of Eng¬ land and an enemy of France, which was anathema to Republican patriots. 42 Caught unprepared by the popular outburst, the Federalists at first were numbed. Timothy Pickering, for example, viewed popu¬ lar opposition to the treaty “in a very serious light” and was “alarmed at the effect it may have on the French Government, and the advan¬ tage they may be disposed to make of the spirit which is at work to cherish a belief in them that the treaty is calculated to favor Britain at their expense.” 4,1 Soon, however, Federalists recovered; they returned Republican barbs in kind. To them Republican opposition represented “all “Atticus” in the Alexandria Gazette, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Aug. xi, 1795. 41 Charleston City Gazette, July 14, 1795, quoted in Ulrich B. Phillips, “The South Carolina Federalists,” AHR, XIV (July, 1909), 735. In South Carolina as elsewhere the Jay treaty was the source of intemperate party strife. 42 Monaghan, John Jay, p. 391. In New Jersey the Jay treaty caused more public meetings, petitions of protest, and more political feeling than anything since the government was established. Walter R. Fee, The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789-1829, p. 69. 43 Pickering to Edmund Randolph, July 29, 1795, in Pickering, The Life of Timothy Pickering, III, 185. n6 ENTANGLING ALUANCE the detestable arts, all the machinations of disappointed demagogues, and all the malice of even Hell itself, employed to deceive the people and destroy our government. .. Opposition to the treaty was the work of a “violent Jacobin Party” which was determined “either to throw this country into war and anarchy, or reduce us to a Province of France.” 44 Regardless of popular outcry, Federalists took the stand that the treaty was good; come what may the United States now had the faith of the British nation “plighted for Amity.” Previously, because of America’s attachment to France, there existed a strong spirit of resentment toward the United States in the British cabinet. That resentment, reasoned Federalists, was blunted by the Jay treaty. The treaty saved the nation not only from war, they pointed out, but also from civil strife. 45 The popular furor over the treaty did not move the Federalists to change their views. According to their political philosophy, “treaties or any other difficult subject when honestly acted upon by the proper constitutional authority” were to be “acquiesced in though not under¬ stood by the people. If the government do a legitimate act; it has done its duty—it is no less binding because ignorance do not see its policy—Citizens ought either to qualify themselves to Judge under¬ standing^ or to submit without refractoriness to things or obliga¬ tions Constitution [al] formed by their own govt .—This if true at all, is doubly urgent as a duty in a Free Representative Repub¬ lic like ours—Where the appointment of the legislature is actually in the peoples’ hands—” 46 To stem the antitreaty tide unloosed by men with “hell in their hearts and faction on their tongue,” Hamilton brought his pen into service. At the call of President Washington, Hamilton came out of private life to save the Jay treaty. From his pen poured most of the words in thirty-eight letters defending the Jay treaty which ap¬ peared and reappeared in the nation’s press under the signature of “Camillus.” Rufus King and John Jay collaborated with Hamilton in thus producing a Federalist manifesto on foreign policy. 4 ' Ignor- 14 Monaghan, John Jay, p. 395; Timothy Williams to Timothy Pickering, Boston, July 17, 1795, in Pickering, The Life of Timothy Pickering, III, 177. 45 William Vans Murray, Commonplace Book, July 19, 28, 1795, Murray Papers (Princeton). 48 Ibid., July 23, 1795. 4; The “Camillus” series began in the New York Argus on July 22, 1795, THE JAY TREATY 117 ing the treaty’s weaknesses, praising its stronger points, labeling opponents as “rabble,” evil Francophiles, and Jacobins trying to plunge the country into war with England, Hamilton made a bril¬ liant defense of a weak case. He even stumped for the treaty. In New York when he attempted to speak in its defense angry anti¬ treaty partisans stoned him. With blood on his brow he remarked, “If you can use such knockdown arguments I must retire.” 48 Hamilton did not retire. In Jefferson’s words he was “a collos- sus to the anti-republican party,” a “host within himself.” 49 Hamil¬ ton understood the issue as few men did. War at this time, he pointed out, would destroy the nation’s prosperity and stunt its growth. Peace, above all, should be the goal of American foreign policy. Yet “a numerous party among us,” he said, “though dis¬ avowing the design, because the avowal would defeat it, have been steadily endeavoring to make the United States a party in the pres¬ ent European war, by advocating all those measures which would widen the breach between us and Great Britain, and by resisting all those which would tend to close it.” With tongue in cheek, undoubt¬ edly, he insisted that in the treaty the British gave more than did Americans, that there were no improper concessions, that die treaty did not violate the French alliance or other international obligations, and that it was in the interest of the United States. 50 and ran for twenty-five numbers; the remainder appeared first in the New York Minerva; all thirty-eight letters are in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 371-524, V, 3-332. See also King, Rufus King Correspondence, II, 9-13; Monaghan, John Jay, 395; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 367-368. Under the pseudonym of “Curtius” Noah Webster, with the aid of James Kent, also enlisted his pen in defense of the Jay treaty. Along with Hamilton, his efforts were important in reversing antitreaty sentiment. Warfel, Webster, pp. 233-234. 4S Quoted in Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 350. 40 Jefferson to James Madison, Monticello, Sept. 21, 1795, in Ford, Writ¬ ings of Jefferson, VII, 32. 60 The quotation is from Camillus No. I. Lodge, The Worths of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 374-375; see also Monaghan, John Jay, pp. 397-398; Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 350-351. Many Federalists shared Hamilton’s views. It was Federalist dogma that war with Great Britain was suicide. William Vans Murray, echoing views of Federalist leaders, saw no virtue in any kind of war with Great Britain, even if American arms were victorious. Canada, he pointed out, would be the only conquest and it was not worth the candle. He confessed to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., that avoidance of war was about the only argument he had with which to counter attacks against the treaty. William ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 118 Distorted though Hamilton’s views might be, Washington con¬ curred in them. Despite the popular outcry and abuse “by progeny of dirt,” to which Washington as well as Jay had been exposed, the President on August 14, 1795, ratified the treaty. On that day George Washington, in the eyes of Republicans, fell as had Lucifer. On that day an ardent Republican confided to his diary sentiments which many undoubtedly shared. “Washington now defies the whole Sovereign [people] that made him what he is—and can un¬ make him again,” he said. “Better his hand had been cut off when his glory was at its height, before he blasted all his Laurels.” 51 From this time on Washington became increasingly a target for political abuse, a fate which has often befallen American presidents. With his acceptance of the Jay treaty he lost his seeming immunity from political attack. Some critics said Washington ratified the Jay treaty because of a “clear manifestation of an unjust and ungrateful Partiality towards Great Britain.” 02 “Had the meridian blaze of the President’s popularity continued much longer,” said one attacker, “the lamp of American liberty would have been extinguished for¬ ever. Happily for humanity a change has taken place before it was too late, and the consecrated ermine of Presidential chastity, seems too foul for time itself to bleach.” No longer, the writer con¬ tinued, would the name of Washington be fatal to any man against whom it was directed. “The real character of the man is known”; Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 4, 1795, and Aug. 7, 1795 (Princeton). 61 Diary of Dr. Nathaniel Ames, Aug. 14, 1795, in Charles Warren, Jacobin and Junto (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), pp. 12 and 63. Ratifications were ex¬ changed Oct. 28, 1795. Washington’s ratification led to a concerted effort among Republican newspaper editors to make public life so unpalatable that he would virtually be driven from office. Donald M. Stewart, “The Press and Political Corruption During the Federalist Administrations,” Political Science Quarterly, LXVII (Sept., 1952), 436. Certain Federalists had recognized Washington’s dilemma. Wrote William Vans Murray: “From . . . my heart I feel for the President in his dilemma. He must take a more high & decisive Responsibility than he ever has since his election. He must risk the most alarming discontent if he ratifies & war if he does not.” Yet, Murray hoped that Washington would not ratify the treaty; he wanted negotiations con¬ tinued. William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 15, 1795 (Princeton). 62 Phineas Bond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 22, 1796, Henry Adams Transcripts. THE JAY TREATY 119 in “abandoning and deceiving a tried friend and ally [France], he has forfeited the confidence and the affections of the real patriots of America.”' 3 Critics even deprecated Washington’s revolutionary exploits. “With what justice,” asked “Portius” in an open letter to Washing¬ ton, “do you monopolize the glories of the American revolution?” Among other important factors, the critic pointed out, “the success of our revolution must be attributed to the French alliance. . . ,” which, according to Republicans, was being destroyed by the Jay treaty and by Washington. 54 The President had his defenders. In a “Cursory Review of the Past Year [1795],” one of them high¬ lighted Washington’s fall from grace in Republican eyes. “It has been reserved for the deep reproach of America in the past year to troduce [sic] a name more glorious than that of the proudest con¬ queror, or most patriotic king . . . the envenomed shafts of malice have fallen on the champion of freedom, and Washington has been classed with tyrants, and calumniated as the enemy of his country. Gratitude, whither art thou flown! . . . Weep for the national character of America, for, in ingratitude to her Washington, it is sullied and debased throughout the globe!”’' 1 * * * * * Washington’s ratification of Jay’s treaty had been hastened in part by the alleged improper conduct of Secretary of State Edmund Randolph, but more by the astute political maneuverings of the British minister, George Hammond, and by certain Federalist lead¬ ers. As the only remaining member of the Cabinet who was not a thorough-going Federalist and the only Cabinet member who had opposed ratification of the Jay treaty, Randolph had incurred the enmity of Federalists and of the British. Considering him pro- French, Hammond, for example, disliked Randolph; he complained that “acrimony and intemperance” pervaded Randolph’s letters to him, and that the new Secretary of State would not reject but rather would “improve upon the prevarication and subterfuges practiced M “Pittachus” in the Aurora (Philadelphia), Oct. 26, 1795- 84 Aurora, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Oct. 6, 1795. 55 Western Centinel, reprinted in the Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, Jan. 21, 1796. 120 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE by his predecessor.” In his despatches Hammond deprecated Ran¬ dolph. 00 Hammond, it appeared, would have distrusted anyone who was not as cordial as Hamilton. Indeed, both Federalists and Repub¬ licans distrusted Randolph because he tried to be politically neutral. 57 Randolph had urged Washington not to sign the treaty. He told the President that “it is not the interest of the U. S. to be on ill terms with France, lest we thereby throw ourselves too much on G. britain [sic] so vice versa, the U. S. ought to be on good terms with both. It is at least doubtful, whether it be the interest of the U. S. that there should be only one dominant power or game-cock in Europe.” Randolph recommended that if “new negotiations could not be opened up” which might remove some of the obnoxious features of the treaty it “ought to be absolutely broken up.” oS Even though the Secretary of State was alone in his stand, Washington, for the time being at least, had agreed with his conclusions. Randolph, after all, was Secretary of State. A few days later (July 15) the President left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon without signing the treaty. This alarmed inveterate Federalists in the Cabinet and the Bridsh minister. 50 66 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Feb. 22 and April 28, 1795, Henry Adams Transcripts; John Adams noticed animosity between Hammond and Randolph. See Adams to Wife, Philadelphia, May 26, 1794, in C. F. Adams, ed., Letters of Jo/m Adams Addressed to His Wife, II, 162. 6 ‘ Randolph admitted that he was “a man of no party,” distrusted by both Republicans and Federalists. Edmund Randolph, A Vindication of Mr. Randolph’s Resignation (Philadelphia, 1795), p. 97. 68 Randolph to Washington, Philadelphia, July 12, 1795, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., “Edmund Randolph on the British Treaty, 1795,” AHR, XII (April, 1907), 596-597. For Washington’s unfavorable view of the treaty, see his letter to Randolph, Mount Vernon, July 22, 1795, in Fitz¬ patrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 244. See also Randolph to Thomas Pinckney, Philadelphia, July 25, 1795, Rufus King Papers, Huntington Library; this reflects Randolph’s opposition to the treaty; John Marshall, The Life of George Washington (2 vols., Philadelphia, 1846), II, 362. 5 XIII, 669, session of March 5, 1791; XIV, 221-223, session of March 20, 1791. Short re¬ ported that in enacting the discriminatory legislation French legislators were unaware of its rigor—a rigor which would of course invite retaliatory laws. To Secretary of State, Amsterdam, March 4, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 38 Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, July 28, 1791, Aug. 29, 1791; Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VIII, 217, 237-238, 239; Jefferson to Joseph Fenwick, Phila¬ delphia, Aug. 30, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 156 in infancy. By the close of 1791 France and the United States were virtually committed to a trade war. 39 Yet French government officials were anxious, and had been all along, to improve Franco-American trade. Montmorin, the min¬ ister of Foreign Affairs, wanted American commerce on a reciprocal basis with that of France, and Ternant, the new French minister to the United States, exerted himself in urging various French com¬ mercial committees to treat American shipping more favorably. So strongly did those officials press the trade-reciprocity idea based on a new commercial treaty that Short advised caution against entering such a treaty in view of die instability of the French govern¬ ment. Then he counseled that “time cannot but strengthen the demands of the U. S.—Their increasing numbers & commerce & general prosperity will render their connexions more valuable” and in particular such growth will make American friendship essential to nations with Caribbean possessions. Although without posses¬ sions there, he said, the United States will have the power to keep the colonies in the hands of nations to whom the colonies belong and will itself be attached to those countries who offer the greatest commercial advantages in their West Indies. “France of course will be enlisting us by our interest in the guarantee of her possessions in the Islands,” he concluded, “instead of having it on paper only.” 40 Despite the growing commercial barrier between the two coun¬ tries, the ties of French-American friendship were still strong. News of Benjamin Franklin’s death (April 17, 1790) served to spark French enthusiasm for the United States and for things American once again. So great was the popular tribute to Franklin in France that the accompanying feeling of warmth toward the United States spilled over into renewed attempts “to cement the friendship and interests of the two nations.” 41 French overtures, however, were 36 Louis-Guillaume Otto to [Minister of Foreign Affairs], Philadelphia, June 17, 1791, complained of American evasions of the tobacco decree. Genet Papers, Library of Congress; Setser, The Commercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , pp. 122-123. 10 Short to Secretary of State, Paris, May 3, 1791, No. 65, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 41 The National Assembly voted to wear mourning for three days in tribute to Franklin. Rosenthal, America and France, pp. 243-245. See Jeffer¬ son to the President of the National Assembly of France, Philadelphia, March 8, 1791, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VIII, 137-138; Fay, Revolutionary FRANCO-AMERICAN COMMERCE J 57 received in the Senate “with coldness that was truly amazing,” ac¬ cording to William Maclay, who concluded that that body cared not a fig for the French, Franklin, or freedom. 42 Despite the obstacles in the French legislature, efforts to improve American relations continued. On June 2, 1791, the efforts bore fruit in a decree adopted unanimously by the Assembly calling for negotiation of a new American commercial treaty. 43 Insofar as French desires were concerned this was nothing new; it merely formalized an earlier and frequently expressed desire “that the two countries should form a treaty on the footing of the most perfect reciprocity” such as might increase commerce and other bonds. 44 But, even though the decree became law the day after it was adopted, the French executive took no steps to implement it. The new French minister to the United States, Colonel Jean Baptiste de Ternant, left France about three weeks after the June 2 decree was adopted and arrived in the United States in August, but he had not been instructed to negotiate a new commercial treaty with the United States. He was directed to propose to President Washington that the American minister in Paris be authorized to negotiate such a treaty. Jefferson did not like this; he wanted the negotiations to take place in the United States. 45 For almost six months Jefferson waited for another French overture in the light of the June decree. Finally he took the initiative by directing Short to inform the French that the United States was “perfectly disposed Spirit. . . , pp. 286-294; Zook, “Proposals for New Commercial Treaty. . . SAO, VIII, 278; Hazen, Contemporary Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 148-149. 48 Maclay, Journal, entry of Jan. 26, 1791, pp. 368-369. 48 Archives parlementaires. . . , XXVI, 710; Short to Secretary of State, Paris, June 6, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 44 Short to Secretary of State, Paris, Aug. 4, 1790, ibid. 48 Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, Nov. 24, 1791, in Lipscomb, Jefferson's Worlds, VIII, 258; Short to Secretary of State, Paris, Jan. 25, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. In an earlier despatch (May 3, 1791), ibid., Short had reported mistakenly that Ternant, who favored a new commercial treaty, was authorized to negotiate one. Lord Gower, the British ambassador in Paris, also reported that Ternant had received instruc¬ tions to obtain a new commercial treaty. Despatch of June 3, 1791, Paris, in Oscar Browning, ed., The Despatches of Earl Gower (Cambridge, 1885), p. 93. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE i5 8 to meet such overtures, and to concur in giving them effect on the most liberal principles.” 46 In the United States, meanwhile, Ternant took a keen interest in the possibility of arranging a new commercial treaty. Washington, too, showed interest. In his very first conversadon with the French minister the President brought up the subject of the treaty by refer¬ ring to the French decree of June 2. 4 ' Although the treaty issue was clouded by domestic polidcal concerns, Washington’s govern¬ ment did not minimize the importance of French commerce. In his instructions to Gouverneur Morris as he was to take over die American legislation in Paris, Jefferson, as was to be expected, also again stressed the value of French trade. He pointed out that “the most important of your charges” is “the patronage of our com¬ merce and the extension of its privilege, both in France and her colonies; but most especially the latter.” Again in later instrucdons he adverted to this subject and to the commercial treaty; he urged Morris to exert himself to re-establish American “commerce with France on the foodng on which it was at the beginning of their revolution.” 48 The first direct proposal for negotiation of a new treaty came from the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, not from the Secretary of State, who most cherished the object. In October, 1791, while Jefferson and Washington were out of town, Hamilton had a four-hour discussion with Ternant. The Secretary of the Treasury indicated that oustanding difficulties between France and the United States could be settled if they made a new commercial treaty, and indicated that he favored such a treaty. He also hinted that the tonnage duties would be adjusted to meet French desires. 49 Ternant, for his part, informed Hamilton that France already 48 Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, Jan. 5, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; also in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VIII, 258. 47 Ternant to Montmorin, Philadelphia, Aug. 13, 1791, in Turner, CFM, P- 44 - 48 Jefferson to Morris, Philadelphia, Jan. 23 and June 16, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; also in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VIII, 291, 379. “Ternant to Montmorin, Philadelphia, Oct. 9, 1791, in Turner, CFM, pp. 57-60; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 395; Setser, The Com¬ mercial Reciprocity Policy. . . , p. 123; Zook, “Proposals for New Com¬ mercial Treaty. . . ,” SAQ, VIII, 279. FRAN CO-AMERICAN COMMERCE 1 59 had granted enough gratuitous privileges to the United States, and that unless Americans reciprocated properly, she would do nothing further without appropriate compensation. In referring to the French position on the tonnage law, Ternant remarked that he believed the American government should execute the old treaty before worrying about a new one. Hamilton’s expressions of attachment to France at this time are difficult to reconcile with his other words, deeds, and sympathies. Nevertheless, he did take the initiative in bringing the question to Jefferson and Washington, proposing that the Secretary of State engage Ternant in conversations to draw up a plan for the pro¬ posed commercial treaty. The completed plan would be sent to the French government for consideration. From the beginning Jefferson objected to the Hamilton proposal. He pointed out that an unsolicited treaty draft would be binding on the United States but not on France. The main result of such a procedure would be to disclose gratuitously how far the United States was preparing to go for the desired treaty. Washington, believing that the plan should be tried, brushed aside these objections and backed Hamilton. Jefferson then asked Ternant what the basis for a new commercial treaty should be. Ter¬ nant responded that such a treaty should hinge on a single article establishing mutual naturalization privileges. Jefferson devised a brief draft for the proposed commercial treaty which, in essence, called for each nation to receive and treat the citizens, products, and ships of the other nation in its ports on the same basis as its own nationals and shipping. 00 It excepted tariff duties from national treatment; they were to remain as they stood unless they exceeded a certain percentage. Hamilton, objecting to the low schedule of duties set forth, drew up a much higher one, increasing tariffs on certain French imports as much as 25 to 50 per cent according to Jefferson, who summarized Hamilton’s reciprocity in these words: “So they were to give us the privileges of native subjects, and we, as a compensation, were to make them pay higher duties.” 151 '’"Ternant to Montmorin, Philadelphia, Oct. 24, 1791, in Turner, CFM, pp. 61-62. "‘Jefferson’s Anas, dated 1791 but written March ix, 1792, in Ford, Writ¬ ings of Jefferson, I, 185-186; for the treaty project and duty schedule, see i6o ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Hamilton’s sudden interest in the French treaty showed the marks of another astute political maneuver. In his next move the Secretary of the Treasury suggested a similar treaty parley with the newly arrived British Minister, George Hammond. Again Washing¬ ton supported Hamilton. Concluding that Hamilton had proposed the negotiation of a French treaty—a treaty which undoubtedly he would have defeated if it had been consummated—as a necessary preliminary for overtures to Hammond, Jefferson at this time blocked action on a commercial treaty with either France or Eng¬ land. Although forced by political considerations to give up tempor¬ arily further action on a new French commercial agreement, Jeffer¬ son did not abandon hope ultimately of obtaining it. It was while pressing for repeal of the discriminatory French commercial legisla¬ tion of 1791 that he also impatiently prodded the French govern¬ ment for proposals implementing the National Assembly’s decree of June 2, 1791. 52 Finally, in April, 1792, Jefferson informed Ternant “openly and frankly” that the American government desired negotiation of a new commercial treaty. Stressing his attachment to the 1778 alli¬ ance, he explained how important it was for the Franco-American alliance that he be able to present France’s position to Congress in a favorable light. Continued discriminatory legislation, he warned, would be to the advantage of England. 53 Before closing the long interview with die French minister, Jefferson presented his earlier-conceived plan for the proposed com¬ mercial treaty. Embodying the idea that citizens of each country should be entitled to the same privileges as natives in ports of the other, such a treaty would have opened wide France’s West Indian trade to Americans, and it would have given French traders a fa¬ vored status in American ports. It might, in addition, have provided a solid economic base for Jefferson’s objective of strengthening the “Clauses for Treaty of Commerce with France” and “Questions to be Con¬ sidered Of,” [Nov. 26, 1791], ibid., V, 397-400; see also Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 397. 52 Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, Jan. 5, 1792; to Gouverneur Morris, Philadelphia, March 10, 1792, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VIII, 283, 311. 68 Ternant to Lessart, Philadelphia, April 8, 1792, in Turner, CFM, pp. 108-114. FRANCO-AMERICAN COMMERCE 161 French alliance. Such an economic connection accorded, moreover, with the thinking of French ministers then in power. So strong, in fact, was their faith in the power of economic ties that they looked askance at alliances without economic bonds. While it responded favorably to the plan, the French ministry could do little; it was in too precarious a position to formulate long- range foreign policy. 04 Soon it toppled from power. Hopes for immediate action on a new commercial treaty were blocked follow¬ ing the establishment of the Republic in France in September, 1792. In spite of long effort, the treaty was not made; Franco-American commercial relations did not improve; and the 1778 alliance was not supported by the solid economic foundation it needed. Still Jefferson persisted in his efforts to get discriminatory French trade legislation repealed. Within France, too, hope for a strong economic connection survived troubled times. Certain officials believed that through the unifying bonds of common republican principles the French and American peoples could now be drawn into a firmer alliance in defense of republican government. One of the advantages of such an ideological alliance would be better and more advantageous trade relations, the most solid basis for a common connection. 05 In proposing a renewed commercial alliance, French republican officials pointed out that the United States produced what France consumed and was capable of consuming what France pro¬ duced. Why not, suggested one agent, send a commissioner to the United States empowered to propose and to negotiate a treaty em¬ bodying political as well as economic and commercial questions? 05 War pushed aside theories and ideas. The clash with Great Britain in February, 1793, gave the French government new interest in Jefferson’s proposed mutual naturalization agreement. Such a treaty would have permitted virtually untrammeled trade between 64 See Morris to Jefferson, Paris, July 10, 1792, ASP FR, I, 332. In view of the uncertainty of the French government Morris advised not to press for a decision at this “unpropitious moment.” See also Gilbert, “ ‘New Diplo¬ macy’ of the Eighteenth Century,” World Politics, IV, 33-34. 65 “Alliance entre les republiques fran^aise et americaine,” par M. Ducher [probably-Sept. 20, 1792], AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVI, ff. 154-155. 66 “Projet d’un pacte commercial et economique avec les Etats-unis de l’Amerique,” signed d’Hauterive, Oct. 29, 1792, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, VIII, 2470-2471. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 162 France, the French possessions, and the United States; its wartime value would have been incalculable. Faced with the dominating might of British sea power and con¬ sequently forced to turn to American shipping for certain essential supplies, the French government saw more clearly than before the advantages in Jefferson’s plan. Internal developments, too, under¬ scored the need for the treaty. In France’s southern provinces in the winter of 1792 there was a shortage of wheat and flour; more than ever the French needed American provisions in American ships. One of the first acts of the French government following the outbreak of war, therefore, was to place American ships and products on the same status as those of French citizens in French ports. 57 Concurrently it sought to open negotiations with the United States to gain reciprocal advantages for French commerce in Amer¬ ican ports. War, in effect, had driven the French to embrace Jeffer¬ son’s proposals without obtaining equivalent concessions; war had thrust them into the role of suppliant. Shortly before the war ministers of the Republic had written their ideas on a commercial treaty into the instructions of Edmond Charles Genet, Republican France’s first minister to the United States. One of his major objectives was to gain liberal mutual naturalization concessions embodied in a commercial treaty. Re¬ flecting the thinking of republican officials in France, Genet pro¬ posed “a true family compact” embodying political as well as com¬ mercial objectives. Alarmed, the Washington administration interpreted Genet’s overtures, correctly, as an effort to revise the treaty of alliance as well as the commercial treaty of 1778. 58 With France at war with England such a compact would alienate Great Britain to the extent 57 The food shortage is discussed in Rtienne Cathalan, American Consul at Marseilles, to Gouverneur Morris, Sept. 10, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. The decree of the National Conven¬ tion of Feb. 19, 1793, is in ASP FR, I, 147. 58 See “Instructions to Genet,” Dec., 1792, in Turner, CFM, p. 202; Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, May 23, 1793, ASP FR, I, 147; Randolph to Mon¬ roe, Philadelphia, June 1, 1795, ibid., pp. 707-708. Here Randolph reviews in part the history of the attempt to negotiate a new commercial treaty: France’s concessions and increased desires for a closer commercial connec¬ tion, he pointed out, were the result of the war. See also Nussbaum, Com¬ mercial Policy in the French Revolution, p. 203. FRANCO-AMERICAN COMMERCE i6 3 that it bound the United States more closely to France. To Hamil¬ ton and his Federalist followers such a revitalized alliance was out of the question. The question of closer commercial connections with France now took on deeper political coloring. Friendship for France, proponents of a tighter trade connection asserted, was suffi¬ cient for a new treaty favorable to French commerce. Opponents, on the other hand, declared that in view of the “unnatural con¬ vulsed state” in France, this was no time to form a “closer alliance than already existed with a people who had so far transgressed the bounds of humanity,” nor was it a time “to alter either our com¬ mercial or political connexion with France. . . .” 59 Franco-American relations became so entangled in the complexi¬ ties of war, neutrality, and American politics that the proposed com¬ mercial treaty never received full consideration. Never enthusiastic about the alliance and closer commercial relations with France, Washington’s administration—aside from Jefferson—became more than ever opposed to closer ties with France. Yet it did not discard the ultimate objective of improving Franco-American trade. At Jefferson’s suggestion, Washington approved a proposal urging the French government to include in the instructions of Genet’s succes¬ sor powers to negotiate on a possible new commercial treaty. 60 Both of Genet’s immediate successors (Fauchet and Adet) were, in fact, instructed to negotiate a new commercial treaty, but without results. Even though Republicans and others continued to complain of America’s economic vassalage to England and continued to urge as a counterbalance a reorientation of American commerce in favor of France, England continued her near-monopoly of American com¬ merce. 61 With American acceptance of the Jay treaty the chances for making a new French commercial treaty were lost in increasing Franco-American hostility. With them was lost, but not forgotten, the Jeffersonian hope of intimate economic ties with France as a means of fortifying the alliance of 1778. 69 Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., 1st sess., Moore of Virginia, Jan. 25, 1794, pp. 321-322. 60 See Jefferson’s Anas, Aug. 23, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 261-262; Jefferson to Washington, Aug. 22, 1793, Jefferson to Morris, Phila¬ delphia, Aug. 23, 1793, ibid., VI, 395-396. 61 For an attack on the Anglo-American commercial connection as unfavor¬ able to the United States and as being supported by American aristocrats, see the Independent Chronicle and Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 13, 1794. CHAPTER SIX THE FRENCH FRENZY The success of the French arms has been celebrated throughout the country with every demonstration of festivity; and every exertion has been employed to combine the cause of France with the preservation of American liberty. By such artifices as these the public mind is worked upon, and unless speedily checked, may be gradually led on from the dislike of partial grievances to a decided and open opposition to the gov¬ ernment .—George Hammond to Lord Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, I 793 - The arrival and conduct of Mr. Genet excited great sensation throughout the southern states. We were all strongly attached to France—scarcely any man more strongly than myself. I sincerely believed human liberty to depend in a great measure on the success of the French revolution. My partiality to France however did not so pervert by understanding as to render me insensible to the danger of permitting a foreign minister to mingle himself in the management of our affairs, and to intrude himself between our government and people .—John Marshall, Autobiography. French diplomatic representatives to the United States, because of the French alliance and the critical importance of French rela¬ tions, occupied influential posts. 1 Their conduct and their opin- 1 For a contemporary appraisal of French ministers in the United States during the Washington administrations, see Moreau de Saint Mery, Voyage aux Ftats-Unis de I’Amerique, 1793-1798, pp. 295-296; for an English trans¬ lation see Kenneth and Anna M. Roberts, eds. and trans., Moreau de St. Mery’s American Journey, 1793-1798, pp. 275-276; see also Turner, CFM, p. 12. Moreau believed that France’s choice of ministers, on the whole, was unfortunate, and manifested little effort to win American friendship. His view, it should be noted, was a biased one. Turner, too, was not impressed by the French ministers. THE FRENCH FRENZY i6 5 ions had a marked impact not only on Franco-American diplomacy but also on domestic politics. Even before Washington became President, this was evident—strikingly so in the case of Eleonor Francois Elie Moustier, first the Count and later the Marquis de Moustier. 2 Appointed minister to the United States in 1787, the Count de Moustier, accompanied by his sister-in-law, Mme de Brehan, arrived in October to take over his new post. At first he seemed pleased with the friendliness of influential Americans toward France and made shrewd observations as to the course of Franco-American rela¬ tions under the new Constitution. George Washington, he reported, maintained that most Americans “still felt a vivid and sincere grati¬ tude for the King and French nation; but that self-interest alone could regulate relations between nations; that it was very easy to grant that it entirely belonged to His Majesty to see to it that the interests of the United States be closely connected with His own.” This conclusion, pointed out Moustier, was worthy of note “as Gen¬ eral Washington will become President of the United States if he so wishes, and . . . his power and influence in that capacity will be of utmost importance under the terms of the new Constitution.” He praised the Constitution, indicating that the French govern¬ ment considered it desirable and viewed it as a means of strengthen¬ ing the 1778 alliance. “This way of speaking,” he wrote home, “seems to me useful and even necessary, if we consider that the thing is in a way accomplished and that the only course left is to make the most of it.” 3 Following Washington’s inauguration, Moustier gave a magnifi¬ cent ball in his honor. On this well-chosen occasion (May 14, 1789) he sought to impress Washington and his government with the central position of the French alliance in American foreign policy. He did this by presenting two sets of cotillion dancers in complete 2 Biographical sketches of Moustier are in Nouvelle biographie generate (46 vols., Paris, 1853-66), XXXVI, 803; Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne (52 vols., Paris, 1811-62), XXX, 343-346. Scattered details may be found also in Frederic Masson, Le Departement des affaires etrangeres pendant la revolution, 1787-1804 (Paris, 1877). 3 Moustier to Montmorin, New York, Nov. 18, 1788, in Gilbert Chinard, ed., George Washington as the French Knew Him: A Collection of Texts (Princeton, 1940), pp. 89-90. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 166 military costume, one group wearing French colors and the other the buff and blue of the American Revolution. While the dancers celebrated the French alliance they reminded onlookers of war-bred French friendship. 4 Such auspicious aspects of Moustier’s mission appeared to justify the warm recommendations Jefferson, Lafayette, and other notables had given him. He “would give the most perfect satisfaction in America,” predicted Jefferson. To Madison he spoke of Moustier in glowing terms. “He is a great enemy to formality, etiquette, osten¬ tation and luxury. He goes with the best dispositions to cultivate society, without poisoning it by ill example. He is sensible, dis¬ posed to view things favorably, and being well acquainted with the constitution of England, her manners and language, is better pre¬ pared for his station with us. But I should have performed only the lesser, and least pleasing half of my task, were I not to add my recommendations of Madame de Brehan.” Then Jefferson pulled all the stops. “She is goodness itself. You must be well acquainted with her. You will find her well disposed to meet your acquain¬ tance, and well worthy of it. The way to please her, is to receive her as an acquaintance of a thousand years.” Getting back to Mous¬ tier, Jefferson described him as “remarkably communicative. With adroitness he may be pumped of anything. His openness is from character, not from affection. An intimacy with him, may on this account, be politically valuable.” 5 To Moustier Jefferson offered advice on American conditions, saying that he would “find the affec¬ tions of the Americans by circumstances, embracing what they loathe, they realize the fable of the living and dead bound together.” 6 So different were later appraisals of Moustier by other Americans that it does not appear possible that they described the same man. Although recognized as a man of energy, talent, and intelligence, he struck bourgeois Americans as an obnoxious, haughty, and vain French aristocrat, alienating government officials by his persistent advocacy of French recovery of Louisiana. In addition, he alienated 4 See Rufus W. Griswold, The Republican Court, or American Society in the Days of Washington (New York, 1867), pp. 157-158. 6 Jefferson to Madison, Paris, Jan. 30, 1787; to Jay, Paris, Feb. 1, 1787; to Madison, Paris, Oct. 8, 1787, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VI, 67, 85, 335 - 33 6 - 6 Jefferson to Le Comte de Moustier, Paris, Oct. 9, 1787, ibid., p. 339. THE FRENCH FRENZY 167 highly placed Americans by his personal conduct and alleged eccen¬ tricities. He heartily disliked American cooking, and at times apparently took his own food with him when invited out to dine. On another occasion he is reputed to have told Cyrus Griffin, last president of the Continental Congress, that he “was but a tavern-keeper.” 7 These foibles did not endear him to American officials; one critic remarked pointedly that “if France had wished to destroy the little remem¬ brance that is left of her and her exertions in our behalf, she would have sent just such a minister.” 8 Most damaging to American sensibilities, however, was the ap¬ pearance of “an improper Connection” between the Count and Mme de Brehan. As Jay wrote to Jefferson, “You can easily conceive the Influence of such an opinion on the minds and feeling of such a people as ours.” 0 In all, Moustier’s conduct in the United States was felt by Americans to be “politically and morally offensive.” American officialdom, at best lukewarm toward the French alliance, concurred and requested his recall. It was the first such request by the American government touching a foreign minister. Jay, then American Secretary for Foreign Affairs, handled the matter through Jefferson in France. Jefferson considered the ques¬ tion to be a delicate one, for in the event either of failure or of mis¬ management friendship with France would be jeopardized. With the help of the Marquis de Lafayette, Jefferson brought the prob¬ lem before the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Count de Montmorin, who desired close relations with the United States. 10 7 Griswold, The Republican Court, p. 83 n.; Moreau de Saint Mery, Voy¬ age. . . , ed. Mims, p. 295; Fay, Revolutionary Spirit. . . , pp. 274-75; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 197. An unbiased appraisal of Moustier is difficult to obtain. Renaud de Moustier, for example, in “Les Etats-Unis,” Revue d’histoire diplomatique, VI, 520, called him “an impartial, experienced diplomat.” 8 John Armstrong to General Gates (n.p., n.d.), quoted in Monaghan, John Jay, p. 266. 9 Jay to Jefferson, Nov. 25, 1788, quoted in ibid. Such insinuations must have hurt Jefferson, who was on intimate terms with Mme de Brehan, con¬ sidering her “goodness itself.” For the correspondence between Mme de Brehan and Jefferson, see Gilbert Chinard, ed., Trois Amities Francoises de Jefferson, pp. 13-61. 10 Jefferson to Jay, Paris, Feb. 4, 1789, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Worlds, VII, 279-282. i68 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Although Montmorin was willing to call Moustier back to France, he contended that there was no grievance of sufficient gravity against him to justify a recall. He had, moreover, no vacant post to which he could send Moustier if he were recalled. Finally, Mont¬ morin hit upon the device of calling Moustier back to France on leave of absence, ostensibly in response to Moustier’s own earlier- expressed desires. Without the difficulties of an actual recall, the Count de Moustier left the United States in October, 1789, never to return. 11 After Moustier’s departure the French government left the Amer¬ ican ministry vacant for over a year. During that time American affairs were in the capable hands of charge d’affaires, Louis-Guil- laume Otto, later the Count de Mosloy. Otto worked at keeping Franco-American friendship active. On the alliance’s twelfth anni¬ versary, February 6, 1790, he celebrated the occasion with a large entertainment attended by Vice-President John Adams, the heads of departments, the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representa¬ tives, Chief Justice John Jay, Governor George Clinton, and Chan¬ cellor Robert R. Livingston of New York, and the diplomatic body and other foreigners of distinction. 12 So, shortly after the Washington government began not only were full diplomatic relations with Great Britain not established, but also the post of French minister to the United States was vacant. The two most important powers in America’s foreign relations were not represented formally or adequately in the United States. Fur¬ thermore, as it named no immediate successor to Jefferson in France, the Washington administration did not have adequate representa¬ tion in the British and French capitals. Before Jefferson left France governmental authorities consulted him about the next ministerial appointment to the United States. Although there were some doubts as to the congeniality and per- 11 Ibid.; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 267. By his contemporaries Moustier was considered a capable statesman and diplomat: he was twice offered the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and later distinguished himself in a num¬ ber of important diplomatic posts. See the biographical sketches in Nouvelle biographie generale, XXXVl, 803, and Biographie universelle. . . , XXX, 343 - 346 - 12 Griswold, The Republican Court, p. 217; for brief sketches of Otto see Biographie universelle. . . , XXXII, 246; Masson, Le Departement des affaires etrangeres. . . , pp. 242-243. THE FRENCH FRENZY 169 sonal qualities of Colonel Jean Baptiste de Ternant, Jefferson ap¬ proved of his appointment to the post. To make sure of American acceptance, Montmorin through Lafayette later approached Gouver- neur Morris on sending Ternant to the United States. Morris took this as evidence of Montmorin’s sincere desire “of cultivating a good understanding with the United States.” Important factors in the selection of Ternant seem to have been his knowledge of the United States and his being on the whole a person agreeable to the Amer¬ ican government, having served with valor as an officer in the American Revolution. In addition, he spoke English as if it were his own tongue. 13 * * * * * In striking contrast to his predecessor, Ternant proved popular with Americans. 14 But following Moustier’s departure France paid little attention to her diplomatic representatives in the United States. Neither Otto, who was responsible for American affairs until Aug¬ ust, 1791, nor Ternant, who was France’s minister from August, 1791, to May, 1793, was in close touch with the home government. Ternant felt keenly his neglected status, and in his correspondence complained frequently of his being abandoned. 15 With the demise of the constitutional monarchy in September, 1792, the new French government ended Ternant’s uncertainty by deciding to replace him. It apparently distrusted his attitude and loyalty toward the Republic. France’s neglect of American diplomacy at this juncture reflected her immediate domestic and European concerns. Involved first in domestic revolution and then in foreign wars, the French naturally 18 Jefferson to John Jay, Paris, Feb. 4, 1789, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VII, 281; Morris to Washington, Paris, Jan. 22, 1790, ASP FR, I, 381-382; A. Bertrand, “Les Etats-Unis et la revolution Franchise,” Revue des deux mondes, XXXIII (May 15, 1906), 398; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 267. 11 George Hammond ascribed Ternant’s popularity to his service in the American Revolution and to his friendship with Lafayette. To Grenville, Philadelphia, Oct. 3, 1792, Henry Adams Transcripts. 15 Ternant’s neglect is reflected in AAE CP EU, vols. XXXVI and XXXVII and in his correspondence in Turner, CFM, pp. 43-200, particularly pp. 145, 161, 166 (at one time he received only one letter in reply to sixty he had sent to the home government). For an evaluation of Ternant’s mission in the United States, see Bertrand, “Les Etats-Unis. . . ,” RDM, XXXIII, 400- 403; see also Fay, Revolutionary Spirit. . . , p. 304. 170 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE devoted their energies to the most pressing affairs and allowed sec¬ ondary matters, such as relations with the United States, more or less to drift by themselves. 16 This neglect did not mean that French officialdom considered the 1778 alliance valueless; rather, in the turmoil of revolution and continental wars the American alliance, it was felt, could do nothing to affect the outcome. To the United States, however, French relations, quiescent or otherwise, were of primary concern. The French preoccupation with domestic and European affairs was reflected in the diplomatic problems growing out of the August, 1791, Negro-slave insurrection on the French Caribbean island of Saint Domingue. 17 Unable to secure aid from France, the colonial assembly on the island appealed directly to the United States for assistance. It sent agents to Philadelphia to obtain arms and sup¬ plies necessary to suppress the uprising. At first Ternant disre¬ garded normal diplomatic protocol by appealing directly to Presi¬ dent Washington for money and munitions to put down the in¬ surrection and to save the most important possession of America’s ally. 18 Soon, however, he became alarmed. The appeal of French colonists directly to the American government he regarded as a disturbing manifestation of independence, a manifestation that was by no means new. Fearing American designs on the island, Ternant saw the situation as a threat to French dominion in the Caribbean. The French planters of Saint Domingue seemed more deter¬ mined to defend their own interests than to save the colony for France. Some had even appealed to the British in Jamaica for aid. 19 The islanders’ direct diplomacy and the consequent threat to French- American friendship also disturbed Jefferson. An independent 18 Turner, CFM, p. 12. 17 Sylvanus Bourne, American consul at Cap Fran$ais, predicted the hor¬ rors of civil war. Charles C. Tansill, The United States and Santo Domingo, iyg8-i8y3 (Baltimore, 1938), p. 7. “Ternant to Jefferson, March 3, 1792, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVI, f. 48; to Hamilton, March 7, 1792, f. 49; Ternant to Washington, Philadelphia, Sept. 22, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Notes from the French Lega¬ tion; Mary W. Treudley, “The United States and Santo Domingo, 1789- 1866,” Journal of Race Development, VII (July, 1916), 103-104. 19 See Ternant to Montmorin, Philadelphia, Sept. 28, Nov. 24, and Dec. 10, 1791, in Turner, CFM, pp. 45-51, 76-84; Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Haiti, iyy6-i8gi, p. 33. THE FRENCH FRENZY lyi Saint Domingue would be easy prey for the British, and in British hands Saint Domingue’s valuable commerce with the United States would be destroyed. After assuring both the French government and Ternant that the United States had no desire to conquer Saint Domingue, Jeffer¬ son informed the island’s agents that they would have to work through the French Minister to obtain American aid. 20 They did. Out of the revolutionary debt due France, then seven years in arrears, the American government supplied French colonial authorities with funds to purchase arms, foodstuffs, and other supplies necessary to combat the uprising. Without American assistance in the early days of the insurrection the French planters on the island would have been in almost impossible straits. 21 As slave rebellion and the fervor of the French Revolution swept over Saint Domingue many of the refugee French planters fled to the safety of the United States; other planter-aristocrats sought sanc¬ tuary under the British flag, principally in Jamaica. Americans opened hearts and purses to the French refugees, especially after the great and pitiful influx of the summer of 1793. Towns and villages raised subscriptions for refugee-relief; various state govern¬ ments appropriated funds, as did Congress. Not only did the influx tax American resources but also the presence in the United States 80 Ternant to Montmorin, Philadelphia, Nov. 17, 1791, in Turner, CFM, pp. 72-75; Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, Nov. 24, 1791, in Lipscomb, Jeffer¬ son’s Worths, VIII, 259-263. The role of Saint Domingue’s commerce in Franco-American relations is discussed in Logan, The Diplomatic Relations. . ., pp. 26-31; see also Ludwell L. Montague, Haiti and the United States, 1714- 1938 (Durham, N. C., 1940), p. 33. 21 Hamilton, however, raised objection to the legitimacy of the existing French government, questioning its authority to give sufficient receipt. Essen¬ tially, his objection was political rather than financial. Jefferson countered his arguments successfully in this instance. See Hamilton to Washington, Treasury Dept., Nov. 19, 1792, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, IV, 328-331; Woolery, The Relations of Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 104; Jefferson to Ternant, Philadelphia, Nov. 20, 1792, in Lipscomb, Jeffer¬ son’s Worlds, VIII, 440-442. Ternant was given advance payments on the French debt. Too, the American government did not attempt to liquidate the debt in depreciated French currency, but paid an equitable compensation. See Alphonse Aulard, “La Dette Americaine envers la France sous Louis XVI et sous la revolution,” La Revue de Paris, XXXII (May-June, 1925), 531; Logan, The Diplomatic Relations. . . , p. 36; Treudley, “The United States and Santo Domingo. . . ,” JRD, VII, no; Montague, Haiti and the United States. . . , p. 33; Tansill, United States and Santo Domingo. . . , p. 8. I 7 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE of thousands of French aristocrats, loyal to the Old Regime, created a political-diplomatic problem." At first most of the important figures in the American govern¬ ment, including Washington and Hamilton, favored helping their French ally restore its authority over Saint Domingue. 23 As die influence of the French Revolution made headway on the island, however, Federalist opinion turned against the restoration of French rule, which now meant “Jacobin” instead of aristocrat-planter rule. Federalists and refugee-aristocrats agreed that the old order could be maintained only by British intervention. Jefferson, however, op¬ posed this; and despite his sympathy for the French emigres and his distaste for Negro uprisings, he wished the island insurrection¬ ists well in their fight for liberty. 24 The situation on Saint Domingue, complicated by the interweav¬ ing of French revolutionary doctrines, the horrors of a slave upris¬ ing, and political-diplomatic considerations, met with mixed reac¬ tions in the United States. Sometimes sympathy for displaced and suffering humanity overcame political considerations, and sometimes politics came first. Despite its racial aspects and its emotional over¬ tones, the Saint Domingue situation struck Americans as another point of difference between Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians, another irritant among other disturbing factors in Franco-American rela- 22 Treudley, “The United States and Santo Domingo. . . , JRD, VII, m- 115; Logan, The Diplomatic Relations. . . , p. 40. Refugee planters in the United States tended to split into two groups, pro-French Revolution and anti- French Revolution; see Frances S. Childs, French Refugee Life in the United States, 1790-1800 : An American Chapter of the French Revolution (Baltimore, 1940), p. 155. American generosity toward the refugees was also mixed with harsh treatment; see Moreau de Saint Mery, Voyage. . . , ed. Mims, pp. 294-295. Refugees from France, too, flocked to the United States—“many People of fortune and fashion and some of Title.” “Occurrences from 6 Aug. to 1 Sept., 1790,” signed P. Allaire, Henry Adams Transcripts. 23 See, for example, Washington to Ternant, Mount Vernon, Sept. 24, 1791, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXI, 375-376 and note; Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 394. 24 Jefferson later wished that the French “aristocrats & monocrats” could be distributed “among the Indians, who would teach them lessons of liberty & equality.” To Martha Jefferson Randolph, Philadelphia, May 26, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 268. Jefferson, and Hamilton too, however, wanted to exact whatever advantages (within the limits of their political views) were possible from France’s difficulties. Logan, The Diplomatic Rela¬ tions. . . , p. 39. THE FRENCH FRENZY m tions. In the critical war year of 1793 it was to be another compli¬ cating element in the politics and diplomacy of the French alliance. Jt JL TT X X X X Basic differences had disturbed French-American relations from the beginning of American independence. The effect of those differ¬ ences, however, had been to slow the development of closer ties between the two countries rather than to threaten seriously those existing at the beginning of that period. With the arrival of Ed¬ mond Charles Genet, Ternant’s successor, in April, 1793, following destruction of the French monarchy and establishment of the First Republic, Franco-American relations entered a new and dangerous phase. This turn of events, although rooted in other causes as well, can be traced to the unfolding French Revolution, the reactions it aroused in the United States, and the American interests it either threatened or appeared to threaten. From its beginning Americans had, with few exceptions, hailed the French Revolution with sympathy and enthusiasm; they had looked upon it as adding new strength to already existing French ties. As the Revolution progressed, American interest in it seemed to grow; Americans took pride in what seemed to them an imple¬ menting of American ideals adopted by the French, ideals which had become common in both countries. 25 In the first three years of the French Revolution, while there were no frenzied public demon¬ strations in its behalf, as there were to be later, it did win the over¬ whelming favor of the American people. Despite the temper of the American populace there were excep¬ tions to the general feeling. Influential conservatives, such as Wash- 28 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Prince¬ ton); Aratus No. II in the National Gazette (Philadelphia), Nov. 24, 1791; Madison to Edmund Randolph, New York, Oct. 17, 1788, in Gaillard Hunt, ed., The Writings of James Madison, V, 276; Jefferson to Dr. Price, Paris, Jan. 8, 1789, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Wor\s, VII, 253. For an example of extravagant Franco-American sentiments given expression as a consequence of the French Revolution, see the address of twelve Americans, including Joel Barlow and John Paul Jones, to the National Assembly, July 10, 1790, in Robert F. Durden, “Joel Barlow in the French Revolution,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, VIII (Jan., 1951), 332-333 (note also the French response); Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 140-143; Rosenthal, America and France, pp. 155-156, 296-298, 252. J 74 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE ington, Hamilton, John Adams, and Gouverneur Morris, were skep¬ tical of the events in France from the first. Later they were horri¬ fied. 26 Vice-President John Adams, for example, was so disturbed by the political and social principles of the French Revolution, partic¬ ularly when the single assembly became the heart of the new French government, that he felt compelled to express his views in print. This step led to a series of incidents which ruptured the long-standing friendship between John Adams and Jefferson. 27 Proud of their Revolutionary accomplishments, the French praised and defended their new governmental system, as well as their new political doctrines, in books and pamphlets. Even before the Revolution French thinkers gave their political theories wide circulation. One writer, the Marquis de Condorcet, an honorary citizen of New Haven, Connecticut, had in 1788 published a small treatise in which he criticized views expounded by John Adams and in which he also advised Americans to change their constitution in accord with French ideas by concentrating power in a single legis¬ lative body. 28 Condorcet’s ideas, given additional importance by his prominent role in the French Revolution, presented a challenge which Adams could not resist. Adams wrote a series of thirty-two essays which were published in John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States beginning in April, 1790, and running for a year. These papers, the Discourses on 25 For the conservative reaction, see Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall, II, 21-24; Adams, Worlds, I, 452-453; for a shrewd contemporary assessment of the effect of the French Revolution on the United States by a French royalist in the United States, see “An Unknown Correspondent to William Windham,” June 1, 1793, in William Windham, The Windham Papers (2 vols., Boston, 1913), I, 121-124. In later years John Adams estimated that the American reaction to the French Revolution was one third opposed, one third in favor, and one third neutral. Adams to James Lloyd, Quincy, Jan., 1815, Adams, Worlds, X, no-in. 27 For details, see Gilbert Chinard, Honest John Adams, p. 231; Samuel F. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, 26-29; Zoltan Haraszti, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), 38-40, 165-166, 236; Alfred Iacuzzi, John Adams, Scholar (New York, 1952), pp. 141-156. 28 Condorcet wrote his Lettres d’un bourgeois de New-Heaven [r/c] to refute the first volume of Adams’s A Defence of the Constitutions of Govern¬ ment of the United States of America (London, 1787). Condorcet’s refuta¬ tion appeared in 1788 in the first volume of Philip Mazzei’s Recherches his- toriques et politiques sur les Etats-Unis ... (4 vols., Paris, 1788). THE FRENCH FRENZY x 75 Davila, attacked French Revolutionary doctrines and expressed Adam’s own governmental theories, which to opponents appeared antidemocratic and smacked of monarchy. To Adams democracy was unworkable, the first step toward anarchy. He warned the French to abandon their illusory idea that men were by nature good. 29 Convinced that the best government was one of checks and balances, on the English or American model, he lashed out at the idea of government by a single legislative assembly, to him the framework of despotism. To Jeffersonians, Adam’s articles were like a red rag waved be¬ fore an enraged bull. Many felt that Adams should not go unan¬ swered. Although he had no desire to lock horns with the Vice- President, Jefferson shared these sentiments, and, quite unexpectedly, was thrust into the role of challenger. Tom Paine’s The Rights of Man had been published in England early in 1791. Written as a direct reply to Edmund Burke’s Reflec¬ tions on the Trench Revolution, Paine’s pamphlet was a defense of the French Revolution (a second part, appearing a year later, at¬ tacked the English government). In defending the French Revolu¬ tion, Paine coupled it with the American Revolution, a connection which seemed logical to Jeffersonians, but which seemed sacrilegious to Hamiltonians, who were wedded to Burke’s thesis. William Vans Murray, for example, was to label Paine’s reply “a work designed to loosen every sort of Government. . . .” 30 The first part of the work was scheduled for almost immediate republication in the United States, John Beckley, clerk of the House of Representatives, having made arrangements for the reprinting of a copy of the English edition which he owned. Before sending it to the printer he loaned it to James Madison, who passed it on to Jeffer¬ son. To avoid further delay, Beckley asked Jefferson to send it directly to the printer. With the pamphlet Jefferson sent the printer an explanatory note in which he stated that he was pleased to see that at last something would “be publickly said against the political *' According to Adams, just as “cold will still freeze, and fire will never cease to burn,” man will be corrupted by disease and vice. Hazen, Contem¬ porary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 156. All the Davila articles are reprinted in Adams, Worlds, VI, 223-403. 30 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 9, 1795 (Prince¬ ton). ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 176 heresies which have sprung up among us. . . .” 31 Believing that the note would help sell the Paine volume, the printer on his own initiative included it in the preface to the American edition. When the book was published in May, 1791, Jefferson was “sin¬ cerely mortified.” While he approved of Paine’s work and had never made a secret of being “and-monarchical and anti-aristocrati- cal,” Jefferson had no desire to take issue publicly with his old friend. 32 Regardless, the lines were drawn. Jefferson had publicly approved of Paine’s work, Adams despised it; Jefferson had appeared as the foremost American defender of the French Revolution, John Adams as its leading American antagonist. At this time John Quincy Adams, a young lawyer of twenty-four waiting for clients and eager to make his mark in the world, wrote a number of articles under the pseudonym of “Publicola,” attacking Paine’s arguments. 33 For ambitious young men of the period, the writing of anonymous political tracts for the press on current con¬ troversial subjects was a not unusual way to attract public attendon. But young Adams had still another purpose: to defend his father against Jefferson’s public charge of political heresy. So well-done were the Letters of Publicola that at first almost everyone, including Jefferson, attributed them to the Vice-President. Regardless of ori¬ gin, the assaults against Paine invited vehement counterattacks all over the country. Clearly, the French Revolution and the “storm over the rights of man” had laid bare the deep ideological split between the Vice- President and the Secretary of State. As a result of the controversy over Paine’s work, the public began to divide on the questions of the French Revolution and the doctrines it embodied. No longer 31 With Jefferson the central figure, the entire episode is treated in Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, 354-359; see also Adams, Worths, I, 454-455; Moncure D. Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine (3rd ed., 2 vols.; New York, 1908), I, 291-292. 32 The quotations are from Jefferson to Washington, Philadelphia, May 8, 1791, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, V, 329; the phrase “storm over the rights of man” is taken from the title of chap, xxi, Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man. 33 The Letters of Publicola were printed in the Columbian Centinel of Boston in the summer of 1791 and then reprinted throughout the land. Bemis, John Ouincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 26-28. The Letters are reprinted in Ford, ed., The Writings of John Quincy Adams, I, 65-110. THE FRENCH FRENZY 1 77 was American foreign policy concerned almost exclusively with the politics and diplomacy of Anglo-French rivalry, or with the econom¬ ics of the French alliance. With the burgeoning of the French Revolution, it, and American domestic politics as well, became en¬ meshed in the “battle of sentiments and ideas” of the expanding ideological struggle between England and Revolutionary France. 34 To the public Jefferson became the leader of a crusade of democracy against monarchism and, as a result of this, the leading opponent of the Hamiltonian system. In view of the acclaim given Paine’s pamphlet few doubted that Jefferson had quite consciously placed himself at the head of this popular cause, even though he had been thrust there by the force of circumstances. France’s adoption of her first written constitution, the Constitu¬ tion of 1791, provided another source of dissension. This liberal constitution, resembling in many respects that of the United States, was greeted by most Americans who were at all concerned with it with admiration and approval. While not yet a republic, France appeared to approach the American political ideal in progressing from an absolute monarchy to a liberal constitutional monarchy. To democrats this was cause for rejoicing. To conservatives— including most Hamiltonians—the new constitution, with its seem¬ ingly undue extension of popular rights and popular election, was detestable. 35 With American publication of the main framework of the French Constitution of 1791, which the French had put into effect piecemeal since the summer of 1789 as each section was ready, there appeared one of the first noticeable divisions in the general unanimity Amer¬ icans had shown in hailing the Revolution in France. Although not 81 Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, 356; Brant, James Madison : Father of the Constitution. . . , 340-341; Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton: The Struggle for Democracy in America, pp. 208-211. 35 Gouverneur Morris, for example, denounced the new French constitu¬ tion as “good for nothing.” Morris to Washington, Paris, Dec. 27, 1791, in Beatrix Cary Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution by Gouver¬ neur Morris, 1752-1816, Minister to France during the Terror, II, 332-333. John Adams did not know “what to make of a republic of thirty million atheists. The Constitution is but an experiment, and must and will be altered. I know it to be impossible that France should be long governed by it.” To Richard Price, New York, April 19, 1790, Adams, Worlds, IX, 564. Washington, too, was losing confidence in the French Revolution. Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, p. 403. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 178 major, this division in American sentiment, seen with that exposed by the Jefferson-Adams episode, foreshadowed a major split in Amer¬ ican politics. The French Revolution by the close of 1792 had be¬ come an undeniable factor in American politics. In 1793 it became a dominant factor in American foreign policy as well. “The sensa¬ tions it [the French Revolution] has produced here, and the indica¬ tions of them in the public papers,” Jefferson said, “have shown that the form our own government was to take depended much more on the events of France than anybody had before imagined.” 36 # # * * # Before the year 1792 ended and as the French Revolution became more violent, American interest in it, while no longer approaching almost unanimous approval, increased enthusiastically. 37 In Decem¬ ber, 1792, slow sailing vessels from Europe brought electrifying news from France—the Tuileries had been stormed, the Prussians had been stopped at Valmy, the monarchy was no more, a republic had been declared. These events, reported in varying detail, were re¬ printed in American newspapers and the news spread through the countryside. A French frenzy rolled over the land. America be¬ came hysterical. Thrilled by the achievements of their fellow-republicans in France, Americans followed the progress of French armies against the massed bayonets of monarchism. With news of the propaganda Decree of November 19, 1792, which appeared to transform the 3 ' ) To Thomas Mann Randolph, Philadelphia, Jan. 7, 1793, in Ford, Writ¬ ings of Jefferson, VI, 157; a contemporary Federalist account of that party’s change of view toward the French Revolution is in William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 9, 1795, Sept. 21, 1795 (Princeton). In South Carolina, as in other states, domestic politics reflected the influence of events in France and Europe. On January 9, 1793, high state officials at¬ tended a “feast” in celebration of France becoming a republic. City Gazette (Charleston), cited in John H. Wolfe, Jeffersonian Democracy in South Caro¬ lina (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1940), p. 72. Similar sympathy for France was expressed in Rhode Island and Virginia; see Mary Ellen Loughrey, France and Rhode Island, 1686-1800 (New York, 1944), p. 43; David K. McCarrell, “The Formation of the Jeffersonian Party in Virginia,” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, Duke University, 1937), p. iox. 37 According to George Hammond, at this period the French Revolution did not “appear to have excited so much admiration and applause as might have been expected” in the United States. To Lord Grenville, Philadelphia, Nov. 1, 1791, Dropmore Papers, II, 223. THE FRENCH FRENZY 179 French Revolution into an armed crusade on behalf of “liberty” and against “oppression,” American joy became epidemic. 3 * Public demonstrations and celebrations hailed news of each success of French arms. Feasts, civic and private, honoring the rights of man, liberty, equality, or variants thereof, became commonplace. Republi¬ canism became increasingly popular; the cause of France, in the minds of many, became coupled with the preservation of American liberty. Americans decried titles and all that smacked of monarchy. Men and women addressed each other as “Citizen” and by such contrived female variants as “Citess.” They raised liberty poles and wore the tricolored cockade everywhere; they sang French songs; and they drank toasts to French principles. 39 These things hap¬ pened everywhere but in Federalist households. Disapprove though they might, Federalists were helpless to stem the tide of republican zeal, “the spirit of Licentiousness utterly averse from regular gov¬ ernment.” 40 Clergymen too, at this time, joined in to give ecclesiastical bless¬ ings to pro-French Revolution, prorepublican festivities. 41 At one 88 For the decree, see John H. Stewart, ed., A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (New York, 1951), p. 381. 89 This verse sung at a Boston “festival” honoring the French achieve ments seemed to express popular feeling: “See the bright flame arise, In yonder Eastern skies Spreading in veins; ’t is pure Democracy Setting all Nations free Melting their chains.” From the Columbian Centinel (Boston), Jan. 26, 1793, reproduced in Bever¬ idge, The Life of John Marshall, II, 19; in McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, p. 90 n., are printed the words of the French Republican song, Qa ira; George Hammond changed his tune—the French frenzy alarmed him. To Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts (see quotation at the head of this chapter). 40 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795. John Adams lamented that “Dragon’s teeth have been sown in France and come up monsters.” To wife, Philadelphia, Jan. 14, 1793, in C. F. Adams, ed., Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife, II, 120. 41 In the main, however, the clergy tended to be anti-French Revolution and to support Federalists, particularly in New England. An important factor in the political attitude of the clergy was the sympathy of Republicans for the French Revolution. See William A. Robinson, Jeffersonian Democracy in New England, p. 129; Anson E. Morse, The Federalist Party in Massa- i8o ENTANGLING ALLIANCE day-long public demonstration of January 24, 1793, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, the religious sancdon was as obvious as the way to parish church. After beginning the day’s festivities with the dis¬ charge of fifteen cannon, the town folk gathered in the Meeting House, where their leaders addressed them on the principles and foremost events of the Revolution in France. Then followed the word of the minister, who spoke to them in the language, appropri¬ ate to the occasion, of die Prophet Daniel. “Blessed be the name of God forever and ever: for wisdom and might are his and he chang- eth the times and seasons. He removeth Kings” Choir selecdons were in keeping with the ministerial theme. “ ‘Down with these earthly Kings,’ thundered the majestic bass. ‘No King but God,’ was the sublime response.” A parade through town followed the church service, during which a song written by a local citizen, an Ode to Liberty, which was “composed in a mo¬ ment of happy inspiration, was repeatedly sung. . . .” Fittingly, “a cheerful ball closed the enjoyment of this agreeable day.” 42 * * * * * In April, 1793, having been detained for about three months by wind and storm, news-bearing ships from Europe finally brought reliable word of the execution of King Louis XVI, of France’s February declaration of war against Great Britain, Holland, and Spain, and of the coming of the French Republic’s first minis¬ ter to the United States, Citizen Edmond Charles Genet. In the wake of this news the popular clamor for France, for republicanism, and for liberty became louder. America’s ally was now pitted against America’s old enemy, England. To many, particularly to Republicans, this indeed offered cause for renewed rejoicing. 43 chusetts to the Year 1800 (Princeton, 1909), pp. 88-115; f° r the political influ¬ ence of the clergy, see pp. 116-139. 12 Columbian Centinel (Boston), Jan. 30, 1793, quoted in Hazen, Contem¬ porary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 170. 43 Jefferson’s concept of the ideological interdependence between France and the United States, for example, was strengthened by the establishment of the French republic. See Jefferson to Brissot de Warville, Philadelphia, May 8, 1793, in Writings of Jefferson, VI, 249; to Madison, Philadelphia, May 19, 1793, p. 261, he identified American interests with those of France and scored France’s enemies as “the confederacy of princes against human liberty”; to Harry Innes, Philadelphia, May 23, 1793, he expressed his fear for America’s future if France were defeated; “This summer,” he summed up, “is of im- THE FRENCH FRENZY 181 Federalists now shed their cloak of public helplessness and came out openly in defense of England and in opposition to the Revolu¬ tion and France. Having at first embraced the French Revolution as had Jeffersonians, Federalists, in unconcealed horror, now recoiled from it. 44 Accounts of violence and bloodshed, of the apparent decline from constitutional monarchy to control by the mob under the Girondins, terrified American conservatives. The trial and be¬ heading of Louis XVI, acclaimed friend of the United States, upset Republicans as well as Federalists. “Ninety-nine of our citizens out of a hundred,” remarked a prominent doctor, “have dropped a tear to his memory.” 40 Louis’s execution caused more than tears in the Federalist camp; it and the declaration of war against Eng¬ land removed any doubts remaining in Federalist minds that the French Revolution was an evil thing. With Federalists it now became party dogma that the effect of the French Revolution upon the minds of the American people must be counteracted. 46 ***** mense importance to the future condition of mankind all over the earth, and not a little so to ours,” p. 266; see also Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 61. 44 Robert Goodloe Harper is a good example of a pro-French Revolution politician whose views changed with the progress of the Revolution so that he became a vigorous anti-French Revolution Federalist. See his Select Worlds of Robert Goodloe Harper (Baltimore, 1814), “Observations on the Dispute between the United States and France” (Philadelphia, May 25, 1797), pp. 50-51. John Jay, too, at first had welcomed the Revolution and then turned against it. “This revolution had, in my eye, more the appearance of a woe than a blessing. It has caused torrents of blood and tears, and been marked in its progress by atrocities very injurious to the cause of liberty and offensive to morality and humanity.” To Robert Goodloe Harper, New York, Jan. 19, 1796, in Johnston, fay Correspondence, IV, 201-202; another example of change from pro-Revolution sentiment is Noah Webster; see Harry R. Warfel, Noah Webster: Schoolmaster to America (New York, 1936), p. 226. 45 Benjamin Rush to John C. Letsam, Philadelphia, April 26, 1793, in Lyman Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush, II, 635. Remarked Wil¬ liam Bentley, Unitarian clergyman, liberal in politics and theology, Jeffersonian Republican, and personal friend of Jefferson: “The melancholy news of the beheading of the Roi de France is confirmed in the public opinion, & the event is regretted most sincerely by all thinking people. The french loose [j/V] much of their influence upon the hearts of the Americans by this event.” March 25, 1793, in Bentley, Diary of William Bentley, D. D., II, 13. 40 Federalist philosophy in this regard is expounded in William Vans Mur¬ ray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1785. Murray, though a minor ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 182 Into the midst of this pro-French hysteria and into a hail of Federalist scorn stepped “Citizen” Genet, French republicanism’s emissary to the United States. In the new order of things, the French Republic had sent Genet to Philadelphia to strengthen the alliance which had been “too much neglected by the ancient diplo¬ macy of the royal government.” He was to attach Americans to French republican principles, to convince them that they were the new France’s natural allies, and thus to fortify them in support of the 1778 alliance. Ironically, a prime reason for selecdng Genet for such a mission was to forestall the very reaction and alienation that followed news of the execution of the King. 47 Realizing that Louis’s death might be ill-received in the United States, where Americans respected him as the benefactor of their independence, certain Girondin leaders, among them Thomas Paine, Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, and Genet, conceived the idea of rescuing Louis’s neck and at the same time buttressing American friendship by exiling the deposed monarch to the United States. Far-fetched though it might seem, such a plan accorded with the Girondin policy of attempting to build a fraternal union between the world’s two great republics, a union whose foundation would be the moral force of a common democracy and the practical force of an increased mutual trade. 48 figure, was a representative Federalist thinker. An example of efforts “to represent the Republic of France as unfriendly to the United States” so as to influence American public opinion is recorded by Harry Toulmin, a young English liberal, in his journal, Norfolk, July 23, 1793; see Marion Tinling and Godfrey Davies, ed., The Western Country in 7793: Reports on Kentucky and Virginia by Harry Toulmin (San Marino, Calif., 1948), pp. 4, 21. 47 Minister of Foreign Affairs (Le Brun) to the President of the National Convention, Paris, Oct. 20, 1792, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, VIII, 2498; Provisory Executive Council of the French Republic to President Wash¬ ington, Jan. [?], 1783, National Archives, State Dept., Notes From the French Legation. These objectives should not obscure the main goal of Genet’s mis¬ sion: to obtain all possible support from the United States in the imminent war with England and Spain. Maude H. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of History, University of Chicago, 1928), p. 77. For a brief analysis of Girondist foreign policy and the Genet mission, see Richard K. Murdoch, “The Genesis of the Genet Schemes,” French American Review, II (April-June, 1949), 81-87; see a ^ so Frederick A. Schminke, Genet: The Origins of His Mission to America (Toulouse, 1939). 48 Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 595-596; Fay, Revolutionary Spirit. . . , pp. 320-321; Meade Minnigerode, Jefferson, Friend THE FRENCH FRENZY 183 To carry out this plan, the individual who had been slated to be the new minister to the United States was, in November, 1792, replaced by Genet, who had been privy to the plot from its inception and whose Girondin connections were unimpeachable. Officially, Genet was to be minister plenipotentiary to the United States, but privately he was to convey the King and royal family to the United States, where the deposed Bourbon was to become “an American planter.” 49 The plan for Louis’s American banishment was never carried into effect. Lack of political sagacity and courage by Girondins and the clamor for the monarch’s death by radical Jacobins of the Moun¬ tain sealed his doom. While Genet waited to take the King with him to America, he watched his former sovereign’s trial; “the most mournful spectacle I ever witnessed,” he confessed. Only Thomas Paine had the courage to plead openly for Louis’s life. “France has today but one friend,” he said, “the American Republic. Do not give the United States the sorrow, and the King of England the joy, of witnessing the death upon the scaffold of a man who has aided my American brethren in breaking the fetters of English despotism.” 50 Without King or royal family, Genet boarded the frigate L’Embus- cade, and in mid-February, 1793, sailed for the American shore he was destined never to leave. When Genet sailed from France he left behind him a notable family, which had been high in governmental and court circles of the Old Regime, influential and high-placed friends, and for a young man of thirty, an amazing career. 01 The eldest of his four sisters of France, 7793: The Career of Edmund Charles Genet, Minister Plenipoten¬ tiary from the French Republic to the United States as Revealed by His Private Papers, 1763-1834 (New York, 1928), pp. 125-129. Hereinafter cited as Minnigerode, Genet. 40 Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 69; Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville (New York, 1915), p. 315; memorandum by Genet (n.p., n.d.) in Moncure D. Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine (4 vols., New York, 1894-1896), IV, xii. 60 Quoted in Minnigerode, Genet, p. 133. Later Paine’s efforts on behalf of Louis XVI almost sent him to the guillotine. Maryland Gazette (Annap¬ olis), Feb. 6, 1794. 61 Biographical data on Genet drawn from Minnigerode, Genet; J. J. Jusse- rand, “La Jeunesse du citoyen Genet d’apres des documents indedits,” RHD, XLIV (1930), 237-268; George Clinton Genet, Washington, Jefferson and “Citizen” Genet, 1793 (New York, 1899); Greville Bathe, Citizen Genet, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 184 was the celebrated Mme Campan, first lady in waiting to Queen Marie Antoinette, and another was beautiful Mme Angine, mother- in-law of Marshal Michel Ney. From his father, Edme Jacques Genet, who had been head of the Bureau of Interpreters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Ver¬ sailles, Edmond, a precocious child, had received the best in edu¬ cation and had inherited an unusual linguistic proficiency. At six Edmond could read French and English and could recite Greek; at fourteen or younger he translated, with some assistance, the History of Eric XIV from Swedish into French, with his own footnotes. Published copies of his work were presented to the King and Queen, and the King of Sweden sent him a gold medal for the translation. By the time he was fifteen, Genet spoke six languages in addition to his native French—Latin, Greek, Italian, Swedish, German, and English. Before he had reached his fifteenth birthday he began to learn the vocabulary and the mechanics of diplomacy. He became a secretary in his father’s bureau where he translated documents deal¬ ing with the American Revolution. 52 In 1781, following the death of his father, eighteen-year-old Edmond Charles took over as Clerk- in-Chief of the Bureau of Interpreters. Since his first appointment, he had, of course, traveled and had held other diplomatic posts of trust in government, having been secretary to the French Embassies in Berlin and Vienna, 1780 and 1781. His new position, however, placed him in the center of European diplomacy, and once more put him in touch with American affairs. After the death of Vergennes in 1787, the government, for rea¬ sons of economy, abolished Genet’s bureau. Friends at Court then obtained a diplomatic appointment for him at the Court of Cather¬ ine II in St. Petersburg. Leaving for Russia in the autumn of 1787, he saw for the last time the France of die Old Regime. At St. Petersburg, handsome young Genet, in the brilliant uni¬ form of the First Regiment of Dragoons, made an immediate and Diplomat & Inventor (Philadelphia, 1946); Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission”; Woodfin’s sketch in the Dictionary of American Biography; and Genet’s Memoirs in the Genet Papers, Library of Congress. 62 In these early years he met many Americans; John Adams, among others, dined with the Genets. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 7; Genet, Washington, Jefferson and “Citizen” Genet. . . , p. 2. THE FRENCH FRENZY i8 5 striking impression on Queen Catherine; she even presented him with diamond knee buckles. But the Queen’s favor did not last. When charge d’affaires Genet began expressing revolutionary senti¬ ments and revealed his loyalty to the French Constitution of 1791, he became obnoxious to the Queen. Forbidden to appear at Court and placed under surveillance, Genet was expelled from Russia in mid-1792. Later, he maintained that he had no personal enemies in Russia; his functions were the source of difficulty, “after having enjoyed a consideration which has often excited the jealousy of my Colleagues.” 53 On Genet’s return to Paris the then dominant Girondins wel¬ comed him warmly into the highest circles of their party. His obvious talents and his display of revolutionary zeal had not gone unnoticed, and they were not to go unrewarded. In the circle of Mme Roland he mixed with ease; his charm and talents had found a congenial setting. At Mme Roland’s, moreover, after a brief special diplomatic mission in Geneva, his mission to the United States was born and Louis’s banishment was first suggested. “No, no,” protested Mme Roland, “it is not royal heads that we must strike, but royalty.” 54 This is the background of the brilliant young French republican, often described as “ardent,” “eloquent,” “impulsive,” “rash,” who on April 8, 1793, was acclaimed by the populace of Charleston, South Carolina. 55 JL JL IP "TV* ■JT if As Genet basked in the ovation given him in Charleston, Wash¬ ington’s government moved to resolve the critical foreign-policy question thrust upon it by the Anglo-French war and made press- cs Memoirs, n.p., n.d., Genet Papers, Library of Congress, Box 38; Wood- fin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 44, states that Genet was not satis¬ fied in Russia and sought to get out. See also Genet, Washington, Jefferson and "Citizen" Genet. . . , pp. 10-13. 61 The quotation is from Genet’s Memoirs, Genet Papers, Library of Con¬ gress, Box 38. Brissot, apparently, proposed Genet as minister to the United States. Ellery, Brissot de Warville, p. 315; see also Cl. Perroud, ed., Memoires de Madame Roland (2 vols., Paris, 1905), II, 266-267. 65 Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 456, lists contemporary epithets directed against Genet. George Cabot called him “that feather-headed Frenchman,” and to youthful John Quincy Adams he was “a beardless for¬ eigner, a petulant stripling.” 186 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE ing by the Genet mission—the question of neutrality. When in April, 1792, the first war of the French Revolution began, the war of the first coalition, France was pitted only against Austria and Prussia; the conflict was restricted to land campaigns on the Euro¬ pean continent. This, as has already been indicated, had little effect on American diplomacy, commerce, or neutrality. Despite Amer¬ ican sympathy for the French cause, American interests were not involved. Americans were by force of circumstances and geography compelled to remain neutral save in thought. As it became obvious that the scope of the European conflict would widen to include England and so involve the interests of the United States, American statesmen turned their thoughts to the new nation’s position in such a conflict. At the end of February, 1793, Ffamilton and Jefferson prepared a number of questions on the French treaties. All of them, in one way or another, touched upon problems of neutrality and alliance later faced by the government. 06 In April, 1793, with news of the war’s expansion to include Eng¬ land, Holland, and Spain, action succeeded speculation. On April 13, 1793, the President rushed from Mount Vernon, where he was first apprised of events, to Philadelphia that he might deal personally with the foreign policy crisis. On April 18, the day following his arrival in the national capital, he sent to his Cabinet a circular and thirteen questions dealing with the country’s “delicate situation” relative to the French-British war and the French alliance. 5 ' In summary, Washington asked advice on these questions: Shall we issue a proclamation of neutrality ? Shall we receive a minister from the French Republic ? If we receive one, should it be with or without qualification? Under present circumstances are we com- D0 Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Pol¬ icy. . . , pp. 105-106; England expected war with France and moved to coun¬ teract action between the French and American allies. Grenville instructed Hammond, Whitehall, Jan. 4, 1793, “. . . you will be particularly attentive to discover what Negotiations may be on Foot for cultivating a more intimate Correspondence between the French Government and the United States,” and urged the utmost vigilance on this point. Mayo, Instructions to British Ministers, American Historical Association Annual Report for the Year 1936, m > 33 - 6 ' The circular and questions are printed in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXfl, 419-421; the French knew of the circular and questions; there is a copy in AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 221-222. THE FRENCH FRENZY 187 pelled by good faith to adhere to the French treaties of 1778 ? If we are obliged to adhere, is it expedient to do so ? If we have the right to renounce the treaties, would it be a breach of neutrality to con¬ sider them still in operation? If the treaties are still binding, does our pledged guarantee of French possessions in America in the treaty of alliance apply to a defensive war only ? Is France presently engaged in a defensive war? If the war is not defensive, does the guarantee, under any event, still apply? What is the effect of the guarantee? Do the treaties grant special privileges to French war¬ ships in American ports? If the future regent of France were to send a minister, should he be received? In view of the European crisis, should I call Congress into session? 58 The next day, April 19, when Washington met his official family, all weighed and debated each question. First and most pressing was the problem of the neutrality proclamation. The President’s sentiments were clear. He believed it necessary for the United States “to maintain a strict neutrality” to prevent Americans “from embroiling us” with France or Great Britain. 59 In deciding for this policy of neutrality he had the support of all his advisers; in implementing it he brought on Cabinet dissension. While agreeing that the United States must remain neutral, Jefferson and Hamilton attacked the question of the proclamation of neutrality from differing premises. To Jefferson the European war provided an opportunity for Americans to gain important ad¬ vantages and to increase trade at European expense. He realized that neutrals would reap the profits of war; the United States was then caught in a financial panic and needed an economic transfu¬ sion. The Secretary of State opposed an immediate proclamation of neutrality as being against the best interests of the United States. He favored holding it back, making the belligerents “bid for it,” the B8 The authorship of the questions has long been debated. Madison and Jefferson considered Hamilton to be the author, and undoubtedly he was. For a discussion as to the authorship, indicating Hamilton as tbe author, see Thomas, American Neutrality in 1J93: A Study in Cabinet Govern¬ ment, pp. 27-33; Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, a Biography, I, 481. 69 See Washington’s letters to Jefferson and Hamilton, Mount Vernon, April 12, 1792, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXII, 415-416. i88 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE price to be “the broadest privileges of neutral nations.” 60 Here was the opportune time to force commercial concessions and concrete definitions of neutral rights from the warring powers. This ap¬ proach favored France at the expense of England, which did not lessen its attraction for Jefferson. In reporting Jefferson’s views to his government, George Hammond wrote that “Mr. Jefferson is so blinded by his attachment to France, and his hatred of Great Britain, as to leave no doubt upon my mind, that he would without hesita¬ tion commit the immediate interests of his country in any measure which might equally gratify his predilections and his resentments.” 61 Jefferson’s second objection had its basis in strict constitutional construction. The Constitution gave the power to declare war to Congress. Technically, a neutrality declaration was an announce¬ ment that the United States would not go to war. This, he main¬ tained, was merely the negative side of the war-power entrusted solely to Congress; the Executive Branch had no right to encroach on that power. 62 From opposite premises Hamilton argued for an immediate proc¬ lamation of neutrality. In his view the President had ample au¬ thority to proclaim neutrality, at least until Congress again con¬ vened. Declaring neutrality, he retorted to Jefferson, was merely an executive act, and in its entirety the executive power lay with the President. Constitutionally, then, the President had the requisite power to issue a proclamation of neutrality. Countering Jefferson’s contention that at that time it would be unwise to issue the proclama¬ tion, Hamilton insisted that unless immediate action were taken any potential profits would be outweighed by the dangers of in¬ volvement in war. In view of America’s present weakness and meager resources, such a policy would be suicidal. 63 60 Jefferson to Madison, n.p., June 23, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 315-316; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 35-37; Schachner, Thomas Jefferson. . . , I, 479-482. 61 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6, Henry Adams Transcripts. 62 Opponents of the administration, long after the proclamation had gone into effect, continued to attack it as unconstitutional. See the resolution of the Democratic Society of Pennsylvania of April 10, 1794, in Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia, 1789-1801, p. 70. 03 Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 38-39; Hamilton’s reasoning is in “Pacificus” No. 1, June 29, 1793, Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, IV, I 35 -I 45- THE FRENCH FRENZY When Britain went to war with France, Hammond received in¬ structions to “make every practicable exertion to counteract” any effort to implement the Franco-American alliance.'’ 4 In following these instructions, he turned to Hamilton for inside information on the American government’s stand on the alliance and neutrality. At first he feared “secret engagements” beyond those in the original alliance. His mind was set at ease by “Mr. Hamilton and others of consequence in this Government” that there were none. Hamil¬ ton further assured Hammond that the United States, in spite of the French alliance, would maintain a strict neutrality and would not honor French treaty obligations if in conflict with such neutrality. Hammond learned, moreover, “that the President concurs in senti¬ ment with Mr. Hamilton.” 00 Strict neutrality, as envisaged by Hamiltonians, was precisely what Great Britain wanted. Such neutrality, in view of American treaty obligations to France, was of great advantage to England and distinctly disadvantageous to France. In effect, it nullified advantages of the 1778 alliance. Yielding before the strength of the opposition, although not convinced by its argument, Jefferson consented to the issuing of the proclamation of neutrality. “If we preserve even a sneaking neutrality,” he confessed to Monroe, “we shall be indebted for it to the President, & not to his counsellors.” 06 Hamilton’s victory on this issue, as has been seen earlier, was of precedent-making signifi¬ cance. Control of the Executive over the determination and imple¬ mentation of foreign policy was strengthened by broad constitutional interpretation. Washington’s administration had struck a blow against the French alliance, pleased Great Britain so as to pave the way for the Jay treaty, and possibly fended off war in support of the French alliance. 07 81 Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, Feb. 8, 1793, No. 3, in Mayo, Instruc¬ tions to British Ministers. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 35. 66 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6, April 2, 1793, No. 11, Henry Adams Transcripts. 08 Jefferson to James Monroe, Philadelphia, May 5, 1793, Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 239; for an analysis of Jefferson’s ideas on neutrality and other aspects of foreign policy, see Wiltse, The Jeffersonian Tradition, in American Democracy, pp. 191-200. 87 White, The Federalist'. A Study in Administrative History, pp. 62-63; ^e proclamation convinced the British government of American desires to shun a pro-French neutrality and hence was a factor leading to the Jay treaty, Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 49-50. When Thomas Pinckney, for ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 190 On April 22, 1793, Washington issued the proclamation of neu¬ trality with the ostensible backing of all his Cabinet. To sweeten Jefferson’s defeat the word “neutrality” did not appear in the text, but that the declaration was a proclamation of neutrality was recog¬ nized by Federalist and Republican alike. 68 To Republicans it was a desertion of the French alliance. “The cause of France is the cause of man,” a Western critic said, “and neutrality is desertion.” America, bound by alliance to France, should assist her and if neces¬ sary go to war with England. Not only by treaty of alliance, he added, are we bound to France, but also “by a higher principle, if our assistance could avail; the great law of humanity ... the heart of America feels the cause of France.” 69 With the question of neutrality seemingly settled, the Cabinet on April 19 next debated the second question, the problem of receiv¬ ing an envoy from the French Republic. Involved in this also were precedent-making foreign-policy principles; the acceptance of a French Minister meant recognition of the legality of the French Republic. This time Jefferson set the precedent, one which has been followed by successive governments to the days of Woodrow Wilson, and taken up again by the Herbert Hoover administration to become once more the established recognition policy of the United States. Actually, the question of recognition had been set¬ tled before the meeting of the Cabinet.' 0 example, informed the English government of America’s decision to observe a strict neutrality, there was great satisfaction in England. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), May 9, 1793. 98 The proclamation is in ASP FR, I, 140. It was drafted by Edmund Randolph, although often its authorship has been attributed to Jay. Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 43-45. Rufus King expressed his pleasure over the neutrality proclamation but deplored even the small sop allowed Jefferson. He lamented: “. . . I would have wished to have seen in some part of it the word “Neutrality” which every one would have understood and felt the force of.” King to Hamilton, April 24, 1793, in King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 439. Vice-President Adams also supported the proclamation. Dauer, The Adams Federalists, p. 86. See also C. S. Hyneman, The First American Neu¬ trality: A Study of the American Understanding of Neutral Obligations during the Years 1792 to 1815, p. 13. 66 Hugh H. Brackenridge in the National Gazette, April 20, 1793, and July 27, 1793, quoted in Claude M. Newlin, The Life and Writings of Hugh Henry Brackenridge (Princeton, 1932), pp. 132-133. 70 Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 70; Schachner, Thomas Jeffer¬ son. . . , I, 483. THE FRENCH FRENZY 191 With the President’s support, the Secretary of State had, on March 12, 1793, instructed Gouverneur Morris, the American minis¬ ter in Paris, to recognize the National Assembly as France’s legal government. “We surely cannot deny to any nation,” he explained at the time, “that right whereon our own government is founded, that every one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at it’s [he] own will; & that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, presi¬ dent or anything else it may chuse. The will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded.”' 1 Hamilton seems to have been the only Cabinet member who favored reversing the decision by not receiving Genet. In view of his isolated position, Hamilton surrendered on this point, and the Cabinet agreed unanimously that the President should receive the French minister. So divided were the President’s advisors, how¬ ever, that on the remaining questions Washington allowed them * * * 79 to prepare written opinions. Of these questions, those dealing with the status and applicability of the French treaties were the most important. By the treaty of alliance of 1778 the United States guaranteed “forever” against all other powers the possessions of the “Crown of France” in America. 73 Under the commercial treaty the United States and France agreed that if either were at war, the warships and privateers of the belliger¬ ent power should have the right to bring captured prizes into the other’s ports. Those prizes were to be immune from arrest, seizure, search, duties, and examination concerning their lawfulness. The warships were to have the right at all times to depart with their prizes. Similar privileges were not to be extended to the enemy of either signatory.' 4 71 Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 199. 72 Anas, April 18, 1793, ibid., I, 226-227; Hamilton to Jay, April 19, 1793, Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 297-298; Woolery, The Rela¬ tions of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 107. 78 Article n, Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America, II, 39; Hammond, under this article, believed that any attack on the French West Indies “might justly be considered as causus foederis.” To Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6, Henry Adams Transcripts. 71 Article 17, Miller, Treaties. . . , II, 16-17. 192 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Other significant articles forbade citizens of either nation, under the penalty of being punished as pirates, to apply for or to accept any commission or letters of marque to privateer against the ship¬ ping and subjects of the other country. 10 Each country was pro¬ hibited from fitting out privateers of the other’s enemies, as well as forbidden to sell such privateers supplies in its ports or to permit sale of their prizes.' 6 Those provisions obviously were incompatible with the strict neutrality Washington’s government sought. If the treaties were still binding, which legally they were, it would take some involved diplomatic maneuvering to keep the United States at peace. Eng¬ land could well look upon fulfilment of the treaty obligations by the United States as cause of war. Hamilton and his cohorts saw no dilemma. As quickly as possible, they believed, the United States should deny any objectionable obligations and scuttle the alliance. Jefferson and his partisans also wanted to avoid war¬ breeding commitments; in doing so, however, they did not want to antagonize France.' 7 In their written opinions on yet-unanswered questions Hamilton and Jefferson marshaled evidence to support their differing views. Hamilton expounded the thesis that the French treaties were not applicable to the present circumstances, hence not binding upon the United States. When the legitimate government of France was re-established, they might then be continued. If, however, such con¬ tinuance ran counter to the interests of the United States, they might then be renounced. This policy of suspension during the European conflict, he believed, would free the United States from interpreting and applying the onerous treaty articles, preserve American neu¬ trality, and avoid conflict with Great Britain. Involved though Hamilton’s argument was, several points stand out. First, he maintained that the treaties had been made with Louis XVI. Since Louis had been driven from the throne, he 5 Article 21, ibid., p. 19. 76 Article 22, ibid., pp. 20-21. Only articles 17 and 22, maintained Ham¬ mond, conferred considerable advantage on the French. These articles plus the guarantee in the alliance “are the only stipulations which include anything like common principles of offense or defence against any other power. . . .” Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6. 77 See Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 55. THE FRENCH FRENZY *93 said, it would be unfair of the United States to turn the agreements (eventually) against his heirs. It would be moral and just to sus¬ pend the treaties until the outcome of the war determined the per¬ manent government of France. Hamilton’s argument further noted, correctly, that the alliance was defensive. Since France was engaged in an offensive war, the treaties were not applicable.'* How he would determine what a defensive war was, he did not make clear. His most effective point was that the United States would be in a grave position if it aided the Revolutionary government of France and the royalists should emerge victorious. Undoubtedly the best solution was to suspend the treaties until the situation in France were clarified. 79 In an extension of his argument on the nonapplicability of the French treaties, the Secretary of the Treasury urged that, although it had been decided to receive a French republican minister, Genet be accorded a qualified reception. The United States, he said, should reserve “to future consideration and discussion the question— whether the operation of the treaties. . . ought not to be deemed temporarily and provisionally suspended.” 8 " If the United States failed to add such a condition to Genet’s reception, the applicability of the treaties would, he believed, be conceded. France’s enemies would consider the United States France’s committed ally and there¬ fore an enemy, and the United States would be plunged into war. 81 Jefferson could not accept that reasoning. Denying that the French treaties were inapplicable, in whole or in part, he countered Hamilton’s argument almost point by point in his written answers to Washington’s questions. 82 78 Genet, however, was instructed to place the blame for war on England; he was to convince Americans that France resorted to force only after using all means of conciliation within her power. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Le Brun) to Genet, Paris, Feb. 3, 1793, Genet Papers, Fibrary of Congress, VIII, 2632-2633. '“Hamilton to Washington, April and May 2, 1793, in Fodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 74-112; the questions are discussed in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 53-90. 80 Fodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 75. 81 Ibid., pp. 95-99. Such reasoning was in line with assurances Hamilton had given Hammond that although the 1778 alliance “could not be considered as null,” it would not be enforced to such an extent as to “involve the United States in any difficulties or disputes with other powers.” Hammond to Gren¬ ville, Philadelphia, April 2, 1793, No. 11, Henry Adams Transcripts. 82 Jefferson: “Opinion on French Treaties,” April 28, 1793, in Ford, Writ- m ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Regardless of change in the government in either France or the United States, the Secretary of State said, the treaties were binding. King or no king, treaties bound nations, not governments. If the treaties were binding they could not be suspended. Violation of treaty obligations could be justified only if the performing state were incapable of carrying out its commitment or were in imminent danger of self-destruction. This, he argued, was not the case with the United States at that time. Treaty obligations could not be sus¬ pended, as Hamilton would have it, because they were distasteful or dangerous—all political treaties were dangerous. Danger does not vitiate the commitment. The clearest danger obviously was possible war with England over the “guarantee” of the French West Indies. Jefferson recog¬ nized this, but insisted that it was not an imminent danger, and so could not justify suspension of the treaties. The United States, moreover, might never be called upon to implement the guarantee; Jefferson doubted that France would invoke it at all. 83 If France did invoke the alliance, the question of applicability could be met at that time, but not before. To decide whether the Anglo-French war was offensive or defensive, or to decide which side began it, was also a premature and unnecessary action on the part of the United States, and a gratuitous insult to France. Instead of avoiding war and preserving neutrality as Hamilton contended, Jefferson maintained that his colleague’s policy would do just the opposite. “An injured friend is the bitterest of foes,” he warned, “& France had not discovered either timidity, or over-much forbearance on the late occasions.” In conclusion Jefferson said that “not renouncing the treaties now is so far from being a breach of neutrality, that the doing it would be the breach, by giving just cause of war to France.” He de¬ nied, too, that there was any connection between the applicability of ings of Jefferson, VI, 219-231; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 60-65; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, pp. 109-110. 83 He recognized that “we shall be more useful [to France] as neutrals than as parties by the protection which our flag will give to supplies of pro¬ vision.” Jefferson to Morris, Philadelphia, April 20, 1793, in Ford, Writings °f Jefferson, VI, 217; see also Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , pp. 150-151. THE FRENCH FRENZY 195 the alliance and the reception, qualified or otherwise, of the French minister. 84 In developing their opposing views on the question of the condi¬ tions of Genet’s reception, Hamilton and Jefferson had again divided upon the theoretical and practical aspects of governmental recogni¬ tion. The mere act of recognition, according to Jefferson, implied nothing more than acknowledgment of a de facto situation, that a government was in actual control and functioning over a given terri¬ tory, and that there was no implied commitment or obligation, as Hamilton believed, in such recognition. Reservations to Genet’s reception were not necessary to safeguard American neutrality; there was no need to correct any implied approval of the French govern¬ ment through the mere act of recognition. The French alliance had never been renounced; recognition of the new French government, even before receiving its envoy, had continued it in effect. There was nothing in the 1778 treaties on the reception of diplomatic envoys; governments sent diplomats and received them under the common usage of nations. Jefferson’s program of benevolent neutrality toward France to the detriment of England was, in the light of his foreign-policy ideas, logical and by no means unusual. In past conflicts third states had seldom been strictly impartial in their neutrality; usually they had been benevolently neutral in favor of one or the other belligerent. 88 With the Cabinet split on the issues raised by his questions and with his two leading foreign-policy advisers far from neutral on the problem of neutrality, Washington made the final decision. In this instance he sided with Jefferson. Privately, the President had never doubted that the alliance was binding. At least he so told Jefferson. 80 With the positive decision on Genet’s unqualified recep- 84 The quotations are from “Opinion on French Treaties,” April 28, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 225, 231. 85 For a discussion of neutrality obligations in the light of existing interna¬ tional law, see C. S. Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, pp. 15-16, 153-154; and his “Neutrality during the European Wars of 1792-1815,” Amer¬ ican Journal of International Law, XXIV (1930), 281-309. 86 Jefferson was not alone in his stand; Randolph agreed with him on most points. Anas, April 18, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 227; Schach- ner, Thomas Jefferson. . . , I, 485; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 76; even stanch Federalist Rufus King maintained that Hamilton was on weak ground in declaring the French treaties suspended. To Hamilton, April 24, 1793, in King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 439. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 196 tion coupled with acceptance of the French treaties as binding, Washington set another foreign-policy precedent—American adher¬ ence to and respect for the sanctity of treaties. The question of the issuing of a neutrality proclamation, as has been noted, brought into question the scope of the President’s con¬ trol over foreign affairs under the Constitution. Other questions were to raise similar problems. The Constitution was vague on specific responsibilities for the conduct of foreign affairs, and at this time there were no established precedents to serve as guides in the making of foreign policy. Decisions taken then were to become the precedents of later years. In this state of uncertainty under an untried four-year-old Constitution it was to be expected that Jeffer¬ son, Hamilton, and others, in view of their differing political ideas, would disagree as to the constitutional basis of foreign-policy deci¬ sions. The problem of responsibility for control of foreign affairs was implicit in the thirteendi and last of the President’s questions. Should he call Congress into special session because of the European crisis ? Jefferson, holding the view that the Constitution granted Con¬ gress a considerable role in the conduct of foreign affairs (which by precedent has since accrued to the Executive), proposed that Con¬ gress be convened. His colleagues in the Cabinet took the opposite view. While Jefferson’s stand was an outgrowth of his interpreta¬ tion of the Constitution, doubtless it was dictated also by partisan political considerations. By this time he realized that the administra¬ tion was Federalist-dominated and could not be changed from with¬ in. By this time he had set his course in politics, and it was a col¬ lision course with that of the administration. If the administration was not favorably disposed toward republi¬ can France, popular sentiment was. This sentiment would, perhaps, spread to Congress and help to mold foreign policy. 8 ' In the newly elected Congress, Republicans would, for the first time, have a domi¬ nant voice; they would control the House, and the Senate would be divided about evenly with Federalists. By supporting a call for a 87 Fear of popular support for France was an important factor, in fact, which motivated other members of the Cabinet in opposing Jefferson’s pro¬ posal. “Knox,” for example, “sd we shd have had fine work if Congress had been sitting these last two months. The fool [Knox] thus let out the secret.” Anas, Aug. 3, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 255. THE FRENCH FRENZY *97 special session and emphasizing the role of Congress in the formu¬ lating of foreign policy, Jefferson would hasten the day when his party would have an important voice in the conduct of foreign policy and could perhaps counterbalance Federalist predominance in the Executive Branch. After seeing that Hamilton’s views on the other questions deal¬ ing with the alliance and recognition of the French Republic did not prevail whereas his own did, the Secretary of State realized that at this time the aid of Congress was not essential to prevent implemen¬ tation of extreme Federalist policies toward France. He therefore joined with the other Cabinet members in advising against calling Congress into immediate session. 8 * Again Washington’s government set a precedent for retaining foreign-policy initiative almost solely in the Executive. # # # # * While Washington and his advisors debated problems of neu¬ trality and alliance, Genet in Charleston had begun his questionable activities which were to test American neutrality and the French alliance. Even though, as Jefferson had anticipated, Genet’s instruc¬ tions did not call for invoking the 1778 alliance to bring America in¬ to the war, they did imply that being an ally of France and remain¬ ing impartially neutral in the ally’s fight were incompatible. While France preferred American neutrality to belligerency, the neutrality she desired was one weighted in her favor to a degree which involved serious risks for the United States. 80 88 For details, see Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 66-68. 89 The alliance and guarantee of the French West Indies were in the French view of little value at this time. Their value lay in the future. The United States was a country whose resources were increasing incalculably and hence its value as an ally increased in proportion. Supplement to Genet’s instructions, n.p., n. d., in Turner, CFM, p. 210. Too, the French hoped that the lure of unrestricted commerce with their West Indies would be suffi¬ ciently strong so that Americans would not allow them to fall into British hands. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 78. Later, too, the French continued to maintain that American neutrality was of greater advan¬ tage than participation in the war. Statement of Francois Joseph Noel in Charles F. Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Por¬ tions of His Diary from ij\ 95 to 1848 (12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-77), I, 125 (diary entry of Oct. 20, 1795, The Hague). In view of international prac¬ tice, France’s view on American neutrality was logical; see Hyneman, First American Neutrality, pp. 15-16. 198 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE George Hammond saw the situation of the French Republic clearly. “Exposed to formidable enemies in Europe, and unsup¬ ported by a single alliance upon that continent,” he wrote of France, “it is by no means a matter of surprize, that its present rulers should direct their views to the United States and should entertain the hope that a supposed similarity of sentiment, heightened by the offer of commercial advantages, may induce this country to extend still farther its connexions with France.” 90 For England the status of the 1778 alliance was critically important. Even though England’s ministers believed that France would not invoke the alliance, they sought in every way to counteract any attempt to implement it. With the spread of the European war, therefore, the French alliance became an important international pledge. 91 Genet’s instructions had directed him to fortify Americans in the principles which led them to unite with France against England in 1778 and to convince them that France was their natural ally. 92 He was to work for compliance with the treaties of 1778, and to obtain from the American government as favorable a construction of them as possible. Accordingly, he was to see to it that articles which favored French shipping and commerce were executed fully; in American ports French maritime activities were to have the advan¬ tage over those of the enemy. Particularly noteworthy were instructions to begin negotiation for a new and stronger treaty to supersede that of 1778, an alliance that would bind closer the world’s leading republics. 93 France now was ready to bring into the open negotiations for the new com¬ mercial treaty Jefferson and “Citizen” Ternant had discussed. Genet was to negotiate a treaty combining commercial with political in- 60 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6, Henry Adams Transcripts. 91 Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, Jan. 4 and Feb. 8, 1793, Mayo, Instructions to British Ministers, AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 33, 34-35. The British view on the alliance was that France was conducting an offensive war and hence would not venture to invoke the 1778 alliance. 82 Instructions to Genet, Dec., 1792, in Turner, CFM, p. 202; additional instructions, dated Jan. 4, 1793, are in AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 13-14. 83 Hammond, of course, was directed to thwart any such treaty. Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, Jan. 4, 1793, in Mayo, Instructions to British Minis¬ ters, AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 33. THE FRENCH FRENZY *99 terests, an alliance that would establish an intimate co-operation that would serve to expand the “Empire of Liberty.” Other important aspects of Genet’s instructions included plans for the conquest, with American assistance, of Spanish America and of Canada, the latter to go to the United States. Embodying the gran¬ diose revolutionary schemes of the Venezuelan adventurer, Fran¬ cisco de Miranda, France’s plans for overthrowing Spain in South America actually antedated the Genet mission. To draw the United States into an anti-Spanish partnership of revolution and conquest France offered American statesmen the Floridas. Jefferson, appar¬ ently, snapped at the bait. 94 While awaiting American aid Genet was to sow French revolu¬ tionary principles in Louisiana, Kentucky, and other provinces bor¬ dering the United States, and to work to open the Mississippi to navigation from Kentucky. To carry out this part of the mission he had a supply of blank naval and military commissions to be issued to Americans, Frenchmen, and Indian chiefs who would fight France’s enemies, and was to support in other ways agents who might aid him in achieving those objectives. He was to use his diplomacy to secure payment of the debt the United States still owed to France, and with the payments furnish his government with sorely needed provisions and foodstuffs. Secret instructions directed him to propagandize Americans, to influence them so they would favor France in her struggle. Assured of the favorable disposition of Jefferson and Madison, he had orders to tamper with American domestic politics for whatever advantage might accrue to France. 9 ’ e * The Anas, Feb. 20, 1793, Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 217-218; William S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda (2 vols., Chapel Hill, N. C., 1929), I, 122-130; Frederick J. Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams,” American Historical Review, X (Jan., 1905), 259-260; Albert Sorel, L’Europe et la revolution frangaise (8 vols., Paris, 1885-1904), III, 157-175. eG Instructions to Genet, Dec., 1792, in Turner, CFM, pp. 204-206; the need for provisions in France was stressed by the Minister of the Interior, who asked the Minister of Foreign Affairs to instruct Genet to obtain them. Paris, Jan. 13, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 53-54. The British knew or guessed the main points in Genet’s instructions; Hammond was directed to be vigilant in detecting provision shipments to France; he was to inform British commanders in American waters of such shipments. Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, March 12, 1793, Mayo, Instructions to British Ministers, AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 37-40. Tampering with politics and politicians, 200 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE The objectives of Genet’s mission were logical ones for a country fighting a desperate war. That he might do everything possible to cripple Spain and England and to aid France required that he strive for American assistance in realizing his objectives. 90 Without it his mission was destined to fail. The possibility of such assistance, limited though it might be, caused alarm in Great Britain and led to preparations for appropriate countermeasures. If all this was not sufficient to plunge the United States into war, it certainly contra¬ vened the Washington administration’s deliberate policy of impartial neutrality. 9 ' Genet’s first appearance in America—the landing at Charleston— portended trouble. Why had he landed at a place so remote from the seat of government ? Philadelphia was no farther from France than Charleston. According to Genet, contrary winds rather than his own wishes had dictated the choice of landing site; others have dis¬ cerned more sinister reasons for the choice. In any case, his con¬ duct at Charleston was enough to arouse suspicion, even where none had existed previously. Remaining in Charleston eleven days instead of pushing on immediately to Philadelphia to present his creden¬ tials, he started promptly to implement his instructions. 98 of course, was inconsistent with the specific and clear instructions that Genet was not to interfere in internal American affairs. Taking advantage of known party divisions and seeking out favorable political leaders to advance French principles certainly was interfering in internal affairs. See Lebrun to Genet, Feb. 24, 1793, in Turner, CFM, p. 215 n.; Woodfin, “Genet and His Mission,” p. 78; Richard K. Murdoch, “The Genesis of the Genet Schemes,” FAR, II (April-June, 1949), 81-82. To tamper with American politics was the intention of the Girondist government. Jefferson was told that Genet would strengthen too-long neglected Franco-American relations. [Minister of Foreign Affairs] to Jefferson, Paris, Jan. 13, 1793, Genet Papers, VIII, 2588. 98 Subsequent instructions usually emphasized this. [Minister of Foreign Affairs] to Genet, May [?], 1793, “Observations sur les reproches faits au Citoyen Genet,” May, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 384-385, 388-399. 97 Grenville to Hammond, Whitehall, March 12, 1793, Mayo, Instructions to British Ministers, AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 37-40. Great Britain expected the United States to uphold neutrality. 88 The question of Genet’s Charleston landing is discussed in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 79-80. For Charleston’s reaction to Genet’s activities, see Ulrich B. Phillips, “The South Carolina Federalists,” AHR, XIV (April-July, 1909), 733. Charles Biddle in Autobiography of Charles Biddle, 1J45-1821 (Philadelphia, 1883), p. 251, asserts that Genet landed at Charleston in an effort to gage American public opinion—if the United States would join THE FRENCH FRENZY 201 Aided by Governor William Moultrie of South Carolina and by the enthusiastic citizenry of Charleston, Genet quickly established prize courts to dispose of prizes brought in by L’Embuscade, and at the same time outfitted privateers to cruise against British shipping. With Michel Ange Mangourit, French Consul in Charleston, he laid the groundwork of plans to raise two American armies, com¬ posed of frontiersmen, which were to invade neighboring Spanish provinces. Here his blank commissions came into use. George Rogers Clark of Kentucky, for example, was commissioned major- general to head an American frontier army aimed at conquest of New Orleans. After launching these projects, Genet headed for Philadelphia. 09 Instead of taking the easier and faster trip by sea, Genet sent L’Embuscade to Philadelphia while he proceeded overland. His journey northward was a triumphant procession; Republicans, Francophiles, Anglophobes, and ordinary Americans by the score turned out to welcome him and to wave him on. It took him twenty-eight days rather than the expected two weeks to reach Philadelphia. Few, if any, cities outdid the national capital in ac¬ claiming the French republican emissary; to him the acclaim was “a triumph for Liberty.” 100 The succession of joyful public demon- France in the war. A French royalist maintained that Genet landed at Charles¬ ton because the French government wished “to raise the spirit of the people of the Western States in favour of the pretensions of the french republic.’’ An unknown correspondent to William Windham, Philadelphia, June i, 1793, in Windham, Windham Papers, I, 128. 99 Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charleston, April 16, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 211-213; for details on Clarke, see James A. James, The Life of George Rogers Clar\ (Chicago, 1928), pp. 411, 419-420; Richard K. Murdoch, The Georgia-Florida Frontier 1793-1796: Spanish Reaction to French Intrigue and American Designs (Berkeley, Calif., 1951), pp. 9-14; Richard Lowitt, “Activities of Citizen Genet in Kentucky, 1793-1794,” Filson Club History Quarterly, XXII (Oct., 1948), 252-254; Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 78. 100 The quotation is from Genet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadel¬ phia, May 18, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 214-215. Prominent Pennsylvania Republicans had decided that Genet’s Philadelphia reception should surpass all others. Such a welcome would emphasize America’s regard for her sister republic, and, more important, it would aid Republicans in organizing for the autumnal gubernatorial election. From the beginning, consequently, it came to be that Genet’s mission was thrust into the hustings of embryonic party politics in the United States; see Raymond Walters, Jr., Alexander James 202 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE strations and the warm response of Americans he had met person¬ ally up to this time were undoubtedly sufficient to convince him that the United States would go to almost any extreme to support France. He was desdned, nonetheless, for a rude fall from exhilarating heights. Genet’s first jolt in the United States came with news of the proclamation of neutrality, news he heard in Richmond, Virginia; the President delivered the second personally. The cool official reception Washington gave him was far different from the warmth of the people’s embrace. Even before the French envoy reached the United States the President had decided, as Hamilton had advised, to receive him without “too much warmth or cordiality.” As a description of the actual audience, this was an understatement. 101 In presenting his letters of credence Genet did not ingratiate him¬ self with the Federalist administration. At the time, he made clear that his government considered the 1778 alliance in force and appli¬ cable under present circumstances and that it had the right to de¬ mand guarantee of its West Indies possessions. He declared, how¬ ever, that France did not wish to invoke the alliance. 102 There was little doubt, particularly in the minds of Federalists, that Genet and his activities would be fatal to American neutrality; many thought that he had secret instructions to involve the country in the war against Great Britain. 103 In the popular enthusiasm he Dallas: Lawyer-Politician-Financier, pp. 43-44. Later Philadelphia Republi¬ can leaders gave evidence of their hostility to Washington’s policies. At a dinner in Philadelphia in June, 1793, for example, they used Genet and the occasion as a means of protest against administration policies. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 234-238. 101 The quotation is from The Anas, March 30, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 224. Later, Genet remarked about Washington’s coldness; he believed that royalist refugees had influenced Washington and had turned the President against the French Revolution. He felt also that through Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris, they had turned Washington against the alliance. Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, Oct. 7, 1793, CFM, pp. 244- 246. 102 Remarked Jefferson: “It is impossible for anything to be more affection¬ ate, more magnanimous than the purport of his mission. ... In short he offers everything & asks nothing.” To Madison, Philadelphia, May 19, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 260-261. 103 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795. The British minister was aware that despite the general appearance of good will toward Genet “his general conduct has been very far from making a favorable THE FRENCH FRENZY 203 aroused, furthermore, he posed a threat to Federalist political ascend¬ ancy. Fearful of the publicly demonstrated attachment of Amer¬ icans to Revolutionary France, Federalists were struck numb by the “terrorism excited by Genet.” 104 Although Jefferson thought otherwise, the proclamation of neutrality and Genet, as France’s minister, could not for long coexist. One or the other had to go. The Girondist emissary’s ensuing activities underscored this. impression on the President and the other members of his Government.” Nonetheless Hammond was convinced that Genet sought to form a party to overawe, if not subvert, Washington’s government. Hammond to Grenville, June 10, 1793, No. 13, July 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. 104 So recounted John Adams twenty years later to Jefferson, Quincy, June 30, 1813, in Adams, Worths, X, 47. CHAPTER SEVEN GENET AND NEUTRALITY INCOMPATIBLES France, then, being on the offensive in the present war, and our alliance with her being defensive only, it follows that the casus foederis, or condi¬ tion of our guaranty, cannot take place; and that the United States are free to refuse a performance of that guarantee if demanded. — Alexander Hamilton in “Pacificus” No. II, July 3, 1793. It is certainly intolerable arrogance in the President and other officers in the federal government to differ from M. Genet, in his construction of the French treaty. Had not this gentleman a right to determine what its meaning was and act accordingly without consulting America?—“Ca Ira” in Columbian Centinel (Boston), September n, 1793. JL X X ip -Jr x It x The French Republic, fighting for her national existence, de¬ voted her main energies to European affairs and to the war. In comparison, relations with the United States mattered little. She did not need her American ally’s active participation in the war; direct American aid probably would have had little effect on the war’s outcome. Yet, by treaty the United States was France’s ally “for ever.” In the then state of French affairs the strategic role of the United States, while not decisive, was not inconsequential. The United States was more valuable to France as a neutral ally than as a feeble cobelligerent; it was valuable as a source of supplies and as a neutral carrier of French goods. 1 France needed money, 1 France, as the inferior naval power, needed all the neutral help she could get. Heckscher, The Continental System, p. 47; Aulard, “La Dette Ameri- caine. . . ,” La Revue de Paris, XXXII, 540. To take advantage of the neutral American flag, French traders would change their vessels from French to American registry by mock sales or other means, or they would load French GENET AND NEUTRALITY 205 provisions, and foodstuffs badly, and these might be had from a friendly United States. Cut off from her colonies by the British fleet, her vessels swept from the seas, France also looked to the United States to supply her West Indies possessions with necessary provisions. * 2 As a cobelligerent the United States would be cut off from France and her possessions by the British fleet. In the over-all strategy of the war, a belligerent United States would be useful to France only as a force diverting some English energies away from the main struggle. 3 As the naval inferior in the war, France, dependent on the United States for bases and shipping, at first sought to find in America sea¬ men she could use on her privateers sailing against the British. 4 To carry out this program, to make in effect the neutral United States a base and protected sanctuary for operations of French privateers, called for a broad interpretation of French privileges under the 1778 treaties. 5 If, however, these privileges were exploited fully, as Genet’s instructions proposed, the United States might well have goods on American ships as American property; see, for example, John Bach McMaster, The Life and Times of Stephen Girard: Mariner and Merchant (2 vols., New York, 1918), I, 176, 180. Gouverneur Morris was aware that France “may, as a nation, derive greater advantage from our neutrality than from our alliance,” and so informed Washington. To Washington, Paris, March 2, 1793, ASP FR, I, 396. 2 Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime, The American Experience, 7775- 1942, p. 71. Cut off from Baltic sources by the war, France also sought to ob¬ tain naval stores and timbers from neutral United States. Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge, Mass., 1926), pp. 347-348. 3 Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independ¬ ence,” American Historical Review, XXXIX, 250-251. 1 So complete was British naval ascendancy at this time that French and British operations in North American waters were little more than “side¬ shows.” Gerald S. Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America (Toronto, 1950), pp. 217-218. 5 This is reflected in an unsigned essay dated merely 1793 and entitled: “Reflexions sur les traites d’alliance & d’amitie entre la France et l’Amerique par un ami des deux Republiques” in AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVII, ff. 147-153. According to the author, f. 151, even though under the terms of the alliance she could invoke American aid in the war, always-generous France wanted nothing but impartial neutrality from the United States under the terms and privileges of the 1778 treaties. Such privileges precluded an impartial neu¬ trality. 20 6 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE plummeted into war with England. This, as has been indicated, was the critical factor in Hamilton’s domestic and foreign policy, in important aspects of developing national politics, and in the for¬ mulating of American foreign policy, particularly in the agreed-upon neutrality. While both the United States and France had an obvious stake in American neutrality in 1793, America’s concept of neutrality and of her treaty obligations differed from the French view. Without French help the United States probably could not have emerged a nation in 1783. For this aid Americans were in 1793 still grateful. Yet the sense of obligation, strong though it was, could not in the long run be expected to override considerations of self-interest and national existence. 6 America’s struggle for national survival still continued; was still precarious. To survive as a small nation, without being either a French or English pawn, the United States had to steer its course between French and British foreign policies. This meant a policy of cau¬ tious neutrality, not of partisan neutrality as France would have it. In French eyes, of course, because of British naval supremacy, strict neutrality was a partial neutrality favorable to England. In 1793, as it has been since, it was impossible to be impartially neutral. If the United States had acceded to French desires as set forth in Genet’s instructions, England might have plunged the United States into the war, and the American experiment in democracy might have been destroyed before it had been able to sink roots. Any policy of neutrality or of assistance to France, any implementation or interpretation of the French treaties, had to be undertaken with an eye to England’s probable reaction. * * * * * News of Genet’s Charleston reception reached Philadelphia as Attorney General Edmund Randolph was drafting the proclamation of neutrality. On its heels, a week later, came information which challenged the newly devised proclamation and which raised the 8 At one time Americans expressed extravagant sentiments such as this: “That America ought to join France against England in two future wars; one to pay the debt of gratitude already contracted, and the other to show our¬ selves as generous as France had been.” John Adams and others did not take such sentimental ideas seriously. Quoted from John Adams to John Jay, Auteuil, April 13, 1785, in Adams, Wor\s, VIII, 235-236. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 207 problem of executing it notwithstanding treaty obligations to France. On the voyage to Philadelphia the heavily armed L’Embuscade took several English prizes; it captured one of them, the merchant vessel Grange, inside Delaware Bay. Other French vessels—privateers fitted out in die United States and manned by Frenchmen and Amer¬ icans—soon were sailing into American harbors with English prizes in tow, some of them captured in American territorial waters. It was not long before American ports were swarming with French privateers. 7 Those activities elicited immediate protests from George Ham¬ mond; he demanded in particular restoration of the Grange, point¬ ing out that the French had captured it within United States terri¬ torial waters. 8 On May 3, 1793, Jefferson notified Ternant, who still headed the French legation pending Genet’s arrival, of the British protest. He informed the French Minister “that the U. S. being at peace with all parties cannot see with indifference it’s [sic] territory or jurisdiction violated by either,” and asked that the Grange, its crew, and cargo be detained until the American govern¬ ment could decide upon a plan of action. 9 Ternant took no action; the matter awaited Genet’s arrival. Meanwhile Washington’s Cabinet investigated the case and delib¬ erated America’s neutral obligations. Basic in its considerations were two questions, the maritime extent of American territory and the prevention of belligerent hostilities within American territory. In the opinion of Attorney General Edmund Randolph, Delaware Bay was American national territory. The French had seized the Grange, therefore, on neutral ground, an illegal act; it should be restored to the British. The Cabinet accepted Randolph’s opinion; so Jefferson on May 15, 1793, informed Ternant of the decision. As T For details see Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 91 ffGardner W. Allen, Our Naval War with France (Boston, 1909), pp. 5-6; Bemis, “Jeffer¬ son,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 79; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. 245-248. 8 Hammond was not displeased. To Lord Grenville he remarked: “It has been an extremely fortunate circumstance that almost immediately after the appearance of this declaration of neutrality, events should have arisen which have brought the sincerity of it to a practical test.” British State Papers, May 17, 1793, No. 14, quoted in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 91. 8 Jefferson to Ternant, Philadelphia, May 3, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 236-237. 208 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE if sacrificing a right, Genet, who arrived two days later, acquiesced, and restored the vessel to the British. 10 Almost immediately, re¬ ported Hammond, the Grange case brought the sincerity of the neutrality proclamation “to a practical test.” 11 While the government disposed of the Grange case without much trouble, other problems raised by Genet’s activities were more compli¬ cated. In addition to equipping privateers in American ports and recruiting American seamen on American soil, Genet challenged American sovereignty by granting French consuls in the United States audiority to act as admiralty prize courts for the condemna¬ tion and sale of enemy prizes brought into port by French privateers. These activities alarmed Federalists. “These infractions of our neu¬ trality, will, I presume,” Oliver Wolcott, Jr., said, “be censored by die government; they must be restrained in the future or this coun¬ try will inevitably be dragged into the war to the utter ruin of our affairs.” 12 Although in agreement on a general policy of neutrality, Washington’s official family divided on some specific problems of the implementation of neutrality and the interpretadon of the French treaties. On die issues of privateering commissions conferred by Genet and condemnation of prizes in American ports by French consular courts, the Cabinet did not disagree. Such pracdces were illegal and had to stop; they were not allowed by treaty practices and violated American sovereignty. The Cabinet decided, in addition, that out¬ fitting privateers in American ports violated neutrality, and should stop. American citizens enlisting in the United States to serve a foreign power would be prosecuted. 13 This, in substance, was 10 Jefferson to Ternant, Philadelphia, May 15, 1793, ibid., pp. 254-257. The American position provided a famous precedent in international law; see Hyneman, The First American Neutrality. . . , pp. 99-100; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 113; Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 80; Thomas, American Neutrality, pp. 96-97. 11 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, April 2, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. The British government was pleased with Hammond’s efforts to make the United States toe the line of strict neutrality. Grenville to Ham¬ mond, Whitehall, July 5, 1793, No. 8, in Mayo, Instructions to British Minis¬ ters. . . , American Historical Association Annual Report for the Year 19^6, III, 42. 12 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Frederick Wolcott, Philadelphia, May 20, 1793, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 100. 13 The President and his Cabinet acted as they did because they believed that 12 Oliver Wolcott, Jr. to Frederick Wolcott, Philadelphia, May 20, 1793, in GENET AND NEUTRALITY 209 the code of neutrality hammered out in Cabinet meetings by the Washington administration. In the course of debate over these questions, Jefferson, at times supported by Randolph, favored an interpretation of neutral obliga¬ tions advantageous to France, while Hamilton, backed by Knox, took an opposite stand. In most instances, Washington decided the issue. Jefferson complained that his colleagues were playing Eng¬ land’s game and would thus “force France to attack us.” 14 Neither he nor Hamilton, apparently, could divorce neutrality issues from political considerations and from their feelings toward the belliger¬ ent powers. The Secretary of the Treasury had warned the British minister against the Secretary of State, pointing out that “he [Hamilton ] shall exert his influence to defeat the success of any proposition on the part of France, which tempting as it might appear, might ultimately render it necessary for this government to depart from the observ¬ ance of as strict a neutrality as is compatible with its present engage¬ ments, and which is so essential to its real interests.” 10 While Hamilton carried on his revealing intercourse with Ham¬ mond, Jefferson turned to Genet. At first, Jefferson was pleased with Genet, with the great public ovations he received, and with the apparent strength of Republican and pro-French sentiment in the country. He greeted the new French minister cordially, took him into his confidence, explained the political situation, and warned him against Hamilton and the Anglophiles, especially against their in¬ fluence over the President. Jefferson realized that in government councils the cards were stacked against him, and against Genet, although the Frenchman contributed immeasurably to his own downfall. 1 ' 5 American independence depended on a strong assertion of sovereignty; their stand was not predicated on any obligation under international law. See Hyne- man, “Neutrality during the European Wars of 1792-1815,” American Journal of International Law, XXIV, 284, and his The First American Neutrality, pp. 118-144; Hamilton, “No Jacobin,” No. V, Aug. 16, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, VII, 138-139. These problems on Genet and neu¬ trality are treated in detail in Thomas, American Neutrality, chaps, iv and v. 11 The Anas, May 20, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 230. 16 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, No. 6, Henry Adams Transcripts. 16 See Schachner, Thomas Jefferson. . . , I, 489-490; Woolery, The Relation 210 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Jefferson confided to James Monroe the difficulty of upholding the French side in government councils. He explained that “every inch of ground must be fought in our councils to desperation in order to hold up die face of even a sneaking neutrality, for our votes are generally 2 14 against 1/2 The split vote was Randolph. Yet Jefferson exerted whatever political influence he could muster to prevent American neutrality from injuring France. ls Through sup¬ plementary personal representations Jefferson tried to soften the shock of official complaints against Genet. Although officially he presented the government’s views and adhered to the adopted neu¬ trality decisions, Jefferson disavowed any personal support for the actions taken; he informed Genet that he was to be considered “as the passive spokesman of the President.” 19 In defense of his conduct, Genet contended that the 1778 com¬ mercial treaty “expressly” authorized France to arm and to equip privateers in American ports, allowed French privateers to bring their prizes into the ports, and granted French consular prize courts the right to condemn and sell prizes. The treaty did not confer such positive privileges. Article 22 obligated the United States to close its ports to the outfitting of British privateers, and to their prizes, while allowing French privateers and their prizes the use of American ports. This did not, as Genet argued, therefore grant to France what was denied to Great Britain. 20 Yet Jefferson, along with other Americans, believed that the granting to France of the rights denied to Britain was understood by the United States as well as France. Hamilton saw no such im¬ plication. 21 On the basis of convenience and friendship, the United of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 113; Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, Oct. 7, 1793, No. 13A, in Turner, CFM, p. 245. 17 Jefferson to Monroe, Philadelphia, May 5, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 239. 18 Jefferson to Madison, May 12, 1793, ibid., pp. 250-251. 18 Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, Oct. 7, 1793, No. 14, in Turner, CFM, p. 254. 20 See Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, June 17, 1793, and Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, June 22, 1793, ASP FR, I, 154-156; Hyneman, The First Amer¬ ican Neutrality, pp. 74-77; Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secre¬ taries of State. ... II, 79-80. 21 The Anas, May 20, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 229; Hamilton, “No Jacobin,” No. I, Aug., 1793, Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, VII, 118-123. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 211 States could have granted France the right to arm privateers in its ports and to set up prize courts. Such action, however, would have contravened America’s avowed impartial neutrality and have served as the invitation for Britain to drag the country into an unwanted war. Despite his French sympathies Jefferson apparently saw the dangers, agreeing that to remain neutral the United States had to prevent France from using American ports as bases for hostile • 22 actions. Rules for neutral conduct could be debated and formulated, but their enforcement was another matter. Despite Jefferson’s care in approaching the French minister on neutrality violations and his studied efforts to placate the zealous Frenchman, Genet refused to order offending French privateers from American ports. He had expected something more than merely expressed friendship from the United States; he wanted the tangible support of an ally. 23 The result, by the end of June, 1793, was an open struggle between Genet, backed by Francophile elements, and the Executive author¬ ity of the American government. •At- -¥■ -M- •SI* ■Jr r\ 7V TP IP Factors other than neutrality violations and Genet’s intransigence contributed to growing Franco-American frictions and to Franco- Federalist bitterness. In keeping with his instructions, Genet ini¬ tiated his official correspondence with Secretary of State Jefferson by requesting advance payment of the outstanding American debt to France. Since advance payments had already been made to Ternant, and the original contracts allowed advance payments, this was not an unreasonable request, nor could it be construed as a violation of neutrality. Yet the British, basing their view on an earlier refusal by the United States to make advance payments to France, regarded it “as characteristic of this I Washington’s] Government to entangle itself in no new or close connexion with France, and consequently 22 Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 80; see Jefferson to Genet and to Hammond, Philadelphia, June 5, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 282-283, 285-287. 23 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, June 8, 1793, ASP FR, I, 151; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 134. 212 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE to observe as strict a neutrality as might be consistent with its exist- • >>24 ing engagements. As an inducement to advance payment at this time, Genet indi¬ cated that the money would be spent in the United States to pur¬ chase foodstuffs, provisions, and various supplies for Saint Domingue and France. Actually, he intended to divert some of the funds to finance privateers and to raise hostile expeditions against English and Spanish possessions in the Western Hemisphere. 20 If the Treasury could stand the drain, Jefferson favored making advance payments on the debt installments as requested, as he had with Ternant. Hamilton did not. He wanted a curt refusal with¬ out explanation. Finally the Cabinet accepted Hamilton’s view, somewhat modified, and Jefferson came to see that it was to the government’s advantage to refuse advance payment. Washington’s government, therefore, turned down Genet’s first request, and also subsequent demands, for debt payment in advance. 26 Immediately following his request for advance debt payment, Genet brought to the attention of the American government another item prominent in his instructions, the matter of commercial rela¬ tions. First he announced grandiloquently that the National Con¬ vention had by recent decree opened all French home and colonial ports to Americans on the same footing as if they were Frenchmen. This concession to free trade between the two countries, an almost complete breakdown of previous French commercial restrictions, Genet implied was a special privilege, a token of good will France granted uniquely to the United States. Actually, as has been seen, it was a war measure the French promulgated immediately after the outbreak of hostilities with the objective of luring needed sup¬ plies in neutral bottoms into their ports. In principle, nonetheless, 24 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, April 2, 1793, No. n, Henry Adams Transcripts. 26 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, May 22, 1793, ASP FR, I, 142-143; Frederick J. Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas,” AHR, III (July, 1898), 665. 28 See Hamilton to Washington, June 5, 1793, and Jefferson to Washington, June 6, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 414-417; Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , p. 159; Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 131. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 213 it accorded with Jefferson’s earlier plan for a Franco-American commercial treaty. 27 The same decree which opened French ports also directed the French executive to negotiate with the United States for reciprocal concessions; Genet was so instructed. Accordingly, the French min¬ ister, immediately after arriving in Philadelphia, opened negotia¬ tions for a new treaty, to be actually a political as well as a com¬ mercial treaty, “a true family compact” on a liberal and fraternal basis. Earlier there had been considerable sentiment in the Amer¬ ican government for such a treaty, without the new political bonds. Now, in the midst of war, such a proposal, even to Jefferson, was like a siren screaming danger. The intimate alliance France proposed would undoubtedly have engulfed the United States in hostilities. 28 Acting for the administration, Jefferson evaded the issue by delay. He informed Genet that nothing could be done without the advice and consent of the Senate, which would not again convene until autumn. The proposal got no further. Soon caught in the con¬ troversy over neutrality and politics, Genet did not again pursue the matter. 29 JL W. "A* X X X By midsummer, 1793, Genet was openly at war with the Wash¬ ington administration. In effect, he challenged the administration to enforce its own orders. Lacking the necessary means itself, the na¬ tional government called upon state governors to enforce neutrality regulations. If necessary, the governors were to call out militia to stop and to apprehend the “attackers” of neutrality. 30 Despite this decisive step, it was not easy to meet the French minister’s challenge. It proved almost impossible to exclude armed vessels from American ports. Ultimately, despite objections by the Secretary of State, re- 27 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, May 23, 1793, and the Decree of the National Convention of Feb. 19, 1793, in ASP FR, I, 147. 28 See Hamilton, “Camillus” No. XXIV, 1795, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, VII, 394-395; Schachner, Thomas Jefferson. . . , II, 493. 20 To Gouverneur Morris for relay to the French government Jefferson explained the reasons for the delay in “making formal accession to their propo¬ sition to treat,” Philadelphia, Aug. 23, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 396. See also Genet to Jefferson, New York, Sept. 30 and Nov. 14, 1793, and Jefferson to Genet, Germantown, Nov. 5, 1793, ASP FR, I, 244-246. 30 For details see Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 134-135; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 113. 214 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE sponsibility for enforcement of neutrality regulations fell into Hamil¬ ton’s hands. Hamilton instructed customs officials precisely in what they were to do to apprehend neutrality violators. 31 Meanwhile, one of the first attempts to enforce the neutrality orders against American cidzens enlisting on French privateers on American soil brought a partial victory to Genet. Two Americans, Gideon Henfield and John Singletary, had enlisted for service aboard a French privateer in Charleston. When this privateer, dubbed the Citizen Genet, came into Philadelphia in the latter part of May, 1793, the local authorities arrested the two men for violating the neutrality proclamation and jailed them. Genet immediately pro¬ tested. He could not understand why bestowing commissions and enlisting men in the service of the French Republic was offensive to the American government. There was ample precedent to justify his action, he contended. HcTwas “ignorant of any positive law, or treaty” prohibiting Americans from serving on French armed vessels." 8 ^ Genet was right; the federal government in its first four years had passed no law forbidding foreign recruiting on its shores. Ac¬ cording to the official opinion of the Attorney General, however, no specific statute was necessary. Referring to Henfield’s case, Ran¬ dolph declared that Henfield was punishable, “because treaties are the supreme law of the land” and his action violated treaties the United States had “with three of the Powers at war with France.” Since he had disturbed the peace of the United States, Henfield “was indictable at the common law.” 33 When told by Jefferson that Hen¬ field was in civil custody, and so beyond the President’s control, Gene^proceeded to make a test case of Henfield’s trial; he decided to finance the litigation in the first prosecution of an American citi¬ zen for aiding the French. .With Hamilton supplying aid and support for the prosecution, with Randolph arguing the case, and with Genet backing the de- 31 Washington to The Heads of Departments and the Attorney General, Philadelphia, July 29, 1793, Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 34; Hamilton, “Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs,” Philadelphia, Aug. 4, 1793, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 236-241. 33 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, June 1, 1793, ASP FR, I, 151. 33 Opinion of the Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, May 30, 1793, ibid., p. 152. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 2i 5 fense, the trial in the Federal Circuit Court in Philadelphia, in July, 1793, became a legal battle between the Executive Branch of the gov¬ ernment and the French minister. The prosecution’s case convinced the judges, but not the people, and the jury was made up of the people. In their charge to the jury the federal judges declared that Henfield’s offense was a crime punishable by existing laws, that it was the jury’s task to judge the facts; the judges determined the law. In view of the charge, the jury’s role seemed clear; it was to declare Henfield guilty.] Bntjiopnl ar sentimenL was-on t he defendant’s side. Motivated, apparently, by a widespread sentiment that the administration was attempting to give a mere proclamation the force of law, the public reacted against conviction. This sentiment was reinforced by Re¬ publican propaganda. The jury, sharing the popular sentiment for Henfield or perhaps merely reflecting it, declared him not guilty after a two-day deliberation. 34 ) “A Farmer of the back Settlements” said, “The decision of the jury at Philadelphia cannot be sufficiently extolled, since it avenged the Majesty of the Free American people; which the Executive power, the Attorney General and the Judges, attempted to violate.” 30 Genet gloried in the outcome; he had defeated the administration in an acknowledged test case in its own courts; he had humiliated the great Washington. As one Federalist later expressed it, “He show’d the facility of converting an American citizen into a French¬ man and soldier in the bosom of the country.” 30 Popular rejoicing over the jury’s verdict pained Federalists. Popular reaction made the government’s task of enforcing neutrality more difficult. The men of the jury, “worthy sans callottes,” were paraded triumphantly through the streets, /immediately following the trial Genet cele- 84 For details on the case, see The Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Aug. 8, 1793; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 171-173; Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, pp. 130-131, and Charles P. Smith, James Wilson: Founding Father, 1742-1798 (Chapel Hill, 1956), pp. 362-364; more detailed is the account in Frances Wharton, comp., State Trials of the United States during the Administrations of Washington and Adams (Phila¬ delphia, 1849), pp. 49-89; and in Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, I, 112-115. 35 The Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 20, 1794. 86 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 9, 1795 (Prince¬ ton). 2 l6 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE brated die “victory” with a dinner party for die popular hero, “Citi¬ zen” Henfield, who flaundngly re-enlisted on a French privateer. Then, believing his right to enlist Americans had been vindicated legally, the French minister continued openly to flout the neutrality orders; in newspaper advertisements_fle invited all “Friends of Lib¬ erty” to fight in the service of France. 3 ? Although Washington and his advisers saw the effect and recog¬ nized the implications of the verdict, all was not lost. Since the court had declared that the act was punishable by law, Randolph pointed out publicly “that this verdict does not by any means amount to a decision that it is not unlawful to enlist on board French priva¬ teers.” 38 This was clear warning against further enlistments in French service; the government gave orders to proper officials to condnue to enforce the ban. 39 George Hammond did not stew over the decision; Henfield had been acquitted “through die means of a packed jury” he wrote to his superiors. 40 In all, Henfield’s acquittal was not the great triumph Genet imagined it to be. Yet it brought on a crisis sufficiently upsetdng to cause the administra¬ tion to consider seriously the calling of a special session of Congress. 41 Basically, the government’s opposition to Genet’s activities was predicated on the principle, as expressed by Jefferson, that “it is the right of every nation to prohibit acts of sovereignty from being exer¬ cised by any other widiin its limits, and the duty of a neutral nation s ' Minnigerode, Genet, p. 224; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 173- 176; one French recruiting pamphlet directed able-bodied seamen, particularly natives of Ireland, to apply to the French consul. In serving France, it pointed out, Americans would be imitating French heroes of the American Revolution. Dated Philadelphia, Aug., 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress. 3S Edmund Randolph in the Federal Gazette (n.p., n.d.), quoted in Con¬ way, Randolph, p. 183. 39 French consuls, for example, were notified that their exequaturs would be revoked and that they would be liable to prosecution if they violated American neutrality. Jefferson, “Circular to the French Consuls,” Philadel¬ phia, Sept. 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 417. 4U Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, No. 16, Henry Adams Transcripts. 41 Washington to The Heads of Departments and the Attorney General, Philadelphia, Aug. 3, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 33-36. Jefferson was the only Cabinet member who favored calling Congress into special session. For the separate opinions of Knox, Jefferson, Randolph, and Plamilton, see Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 455-462. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 217 to prohibit such as would injure one of the warring Powers.” 42 Hammond early had made clear that Genet’s recruiting of men and his equipping of privateers in the United States injured Great Britain; that these were acts of sovereignty usurped by the French minister which the United States as a neutral country was obligated to stop. 43 The administration itself did not doubt that the French minis¬ ter’s conduct violated American sovereignty. According to Genet’s concepts of neutrality and his interpretations of the 1778 treaties, the prohibitions imposed by the administration were not valid. 44 Backed by American partisans of France and by evidence of exten¬ sive popular support, Genet acted according to his concepts, consider¬ ing the neutrality orders as the workings of the pro-English Federal¬ ists in temporary control of the government, and not as representa¬ tive of national sentiment. Nowhere was his contempt for the au¬ thority of the Federal government better illustrated than in the case of the Little Sarah. JL X X X X X X “A" X The Little Sarah was a small English merchant vessel that had been caught in Philadelphia by the war in Europe. Arming her with four cannon for protection and loading her with cargo, her owners early in May, 1793, sent the vessel to sea. Not far from the American shore Genet’s frigate L’Embuscade captured her and brought her back to Philadelphia as a prize. From this point on her story becomes involved in complex questions of law and neu¬ trality. 45 More important for this study, she soon became the center of a crisis in Franco-American relations, a crisis which brought on the downfall of Genet. 42 Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, June 5, 1793, ASP FR, I, 150. 43 Hammond to Jefferson, May 8, 1793, summarized in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 120-121; see also pp. 165-166. 44 See, for example, Genet’s views in his note to Jefferson, Philadelphia, June 8, 1793, ASP FR, I, 151. A French view of American neutrality was that it cost the French heavily and made dupes of them. T. G. Legury to Genet, Boston, Oct. 30, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, XII, 3730. 45 For accounts of the Little Sarah affair, see, Thomas, American Neutral¬ ity. . . , pp. 137-144; White, The Federalists. . . , pp. 216-217; Henry S. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson (3 vols., New York, 1858), II, 157-171; Hamilton, History of the Republic. . . , V, 294-306; McMaster, History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 112-114. 2 l8 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE For over a month the Little Sarah lay in Philadelphia’s port while questions of her restitution and cargo were being argued. Then in the beginning of July the Cabinet learned through Hamil¬ ton that Genet was outfitting the vessel, now renamed the Petite Democrate, as a privateer. Hamilton suggested that Governor Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania examine the ship. At the request of the Secretary of State the governor verified the report. He found that the Petite Democrate now had fourteen cannon instead of four and that according to schedule she would sail the next day, July 7, I 793- 46 To avoid using force in detaining the vessel, Mifflin sent his Secretary of State, Alexander J. Dallas, on a midnight mission to Genet to ask him to hold the ship in port. Working himself into a “great passion,” Genet denounced Washington as a man misled by evil anti-French advisers. He allegedly indicated that he would appeal over the head of the President to the real sovereigns—the people. In the end he refused to agree to hold the vessel. On the morning of July 7,1793, Governor Mifflin informed Jeffer¬ son of the turn of events and of his having ordered a detachment of militia to seize the ship. With both Washington and Randolph out of town Jefferson was in a dilemma. If the ship sailed, Amer¬ ican neutrality and the authority of the American government would appear meaningless, and England would be offered an ex¬ cuse to wreak reprisals on the United States. On the other hand, if the government used force against the Petite Democrate Franco- American amity and the French alliance would suffer. This Jeffer¬ son would avoid if it were at all possible. On his own initiative he sought personally to resolve the crisis. 47 Before the militia marched into action Jefferson went to Genet, asking him to keep the vessel in port until Washington returned from Mount Vernon, a matter of a few days. Once more Genet raged. Repeating former complaints, he said the crew would resist the use of force. At the same time he indicated that the ship would not be ready for sea for “some time,” but that it would drop down the Delaware River a way; not, however, with the intention 10 The Anas, July 5 and July 10, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 2 35 ' 2 43 - 17 See ibid., p. 237; Kenneth R. Rossman, Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution, pp. 218-219. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 219 of sailing immediately. Jefferson took this plus some gestures as a promise that the vessel would stay. Then he conferred with Mifflin, explaining that the ship would not sail. The governor thereupon dismissed the militia. That left the Petite Democrate unguarded and averted an immediate armed clash. The crisis, however, was not resolved. Clearly Genet had armed the Petite Democrate in defiance of the President’s orders, and clearly he was bent on sending her to sea to attack English shipping. He had admitted as much to Jefferson while denying the President’s authority to stop her. “When treaties speak,” wrote Genet, “the agents of nations have but to obey.” 48 In view of the neutrality violation and of the French minister’s obvious defiance, Hamilton, Knox, and Jefferson met on Monday, July 8, 1793, to map a course of action. Having little faith in Genet or his alleged promise, Hamilton and Knox pressed to prevent the sailing by force if necessary. Located in the Delaware River so as to command the passage to sea was an island called Mud Island. Hamilton and Knox wanted to fortify the island with artillery and to issue orders to fire on the Petite Democrate if she attempted to head for sea. Not to stop the sailing, argued Hamilton and Knox, would be a flagrant violation of neutrality, sufficient to justify Britain’s warring on the United States. Genet’s open defiance of the federal govern¬ ment—“a gross outrage upon, and undisguised contempt of the government”—had to be checked or it would precipitate domestic as well as external crises. His conduct, they said, fitted “a regular plan to force the United States into the war.” The integrity of the na¬ tional government was at stake. In consideration of previous as¬ surances of neutrality to England and as a precedent for similar cases confronting state officials, they argued, the government had no honorable alternative but to stop the equipping of the ship and to prevent its sailing. 49 Critics of the administration, on the other hand, saw the crisis over the Little Sarah as evidence of English machinations. “The government,” declared one of them under the pen name of “Juba,” 48 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, July 9, 1793, ASP FR, I, 163. 48 “Reasons for the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary at War respecting the Brigantine Sarah,” July 8, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, IV, 443-448. 220 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE “is in an uproar because the French have fitted out a brig in Phila¬ delphia, but appears to slumber over the British armaments that have been made here and the multiplied injuries and insults that our flag has sustained from the pirates under English colours.” 50 Others, using pseudonyms such as “Alcanor,” “Metellus,” “Agri¬ cola,” and “Dorax,” also attacked the government’s position. Pro¬ administration groups and individuals, however, were active, vocif¬ erous, and powerful in their proneutrality activities. Merchants and traders in various cities threw their support behind the govern¬ ment. In Philadelphia a merchant group met in July, 1793, to con¬ sider action to be adopted in the case of the Little Sarah. They de¬ manded of the government strict adherence to the proclamation of neutrality. The proadministration Philadelphia press stressed that the United States would have plunged into war “had not the Pro¬ clamation of Neutrality been issued at the crisis at which it was promulgated.” 01 In Boston, too, “merchants and tradesmen” met in support of the government’s stand on the Little Sarah incident; they sent the President a resolution supporting his neutrality policy. “A Thou¬ sand Bostonians,” declared an antiadministration journal, assailed the meeting. Those who voted the resolves, it maintained, were old tories, speculators, funding-system men, custom house officers, Eng¬ lish merchants, and merchants under English influence. If an English privateer, asked the journal, had been fitting out, would these persons have raised such a protest, “would they not rather have assisted it ?” 52 At the Monday Cabinet meeting, meanwhile, Jefferson dissented from his colleagues’ argument, declaring that he was satisfied that the Petite Democrate would not sail before Washington’s arrival. Placing artillery on Mud Island might prompt a departure not now intended. Then, if the ship attempted the passage and were fired upon, she would return the fire; blood would flow. Moreover, a powerful French fleet, expected momentarily, might arrive and join the fray. Under the circumstances forcible detention might 50 National Gazette (Philadelphia), July 27, 1793, quoted in Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , p. 67. 51 The American Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia), Jan. 6, 1794, cited in ibid., p. 80. 62 The Mercury (Boston), July 26, 1793. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 221 lead to war. Such serious responsibility was not to be shouldered by nonelected subordinate officials, particularly when Washington was expected in two days. If the ship did make the open sea British /protests could be met with these explanations. For ten years, Jefferson said, the United States had borne “the grossest insults & injuries” from Great Britain. To rise at a feather against the French, “friends & benefactors,” would be grossly inco n- . sistent. Continuing, he maintained that he would not “gratify the combination of kings with the spectacle of the two only republics on earth destroying each other for two cannon; nor would I, for infi¬ nitely greater cause, add this country to that combination, turn the scale of contest, & let it be at our hands that the hopes of man re¬ ceived their last stab.” ’' 1 In this, as in other issues touching France and Britain, Hamilton and Jefferson differed. Such was the state of public sentiment and such were the divided counsels that greeted Washington when he reached Philadelphia. Lying on his desk, the papers dealing with the affair of the Petite Democrate, were marked ominously “instant attention.” On the basis of his advisers’ opinions it appeared that in the foreign-policy crisis confronting him, Washington had the choice of war with France or war with England. Fortunately, the issue did not preclude other alternatives. After reading the material on Genet and the Petite Democrate, but before seeing Jefferson’s ex¬ planation, he wrote the Secrtary of State, who had gone to his home outside Philadelphia because of illness, a curt letter. “What is to be done in the case of the Little Sarah, now at Chester?” he de¬ manded. “Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the Acts of this Government at defiance, with impunity? and then threaten the Executive with an appeal to the People? What must the World think of such conduct and of the Governmt. of the U. States in sub¬ mitting to it?” 54 Jefferson replied immediately to his chief’s demands, forwarding the formal report on the Little Sarah affair that he had drafted a few days before. After weighing the matter and taking into account the difficulties of stopping the Petite Democrate at this late date, Wash- t,J “Reasons for His Dissent,” [ July 9, 1793], in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, b 34°-344- 64 Washington to The Secretary of State, Philadelphia, July n, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washington s Writings, XXXIII, 4. 222 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE ington—apparently reluctantly—decided against use of force; instead he once more resorted to words. 05 On July 12 Jefferson sent Genet another note informing him that he was not to permit the Petite Democrate, and other vessels in similar status, to depart. 50 A few days later, unhindered, the ship headed for sea, becoming ultimately one of Genet’s best privateers and setting a dangerous example for odier French privateers in American ports. American neutrality thus appeared a sham, Jefferson’s argument was shattered, Wash¬ ington’s authority had been flouted. 01 As Hamilton had argued, the unhampered sailing of the priva¬ teer created an Anglo-American crisis. From repeated assurances by the American government the British had drawn justifiable con¬ clusions that the United States was doing all within its means to prevent breaches of its neutrality. The escape of the Petite Demo¬ crate, however, did not conform with the assurances. Obviously it had escaped because the federal government, although sufficiently forewarned, had not taken necessary measures to enforce its neu¬ trality. Such apparent abdication of neutral obligations could be construed by Great Britain as an unneutral act of omission and a cause of war. Surprisingly, Hammond did not seize the opportunity to strike at the United States, as Jefferson had feared. To his government he reported that the privateer had escaped, “and the government [of the United States], from the want of having any cannon or military in readiness, was compelled to submit to the indignity.” 58 Genet’s conduct in the Little Sarah affair was a first-rate diplo¬ matic blunder. It demolished hope, however, slight, for an Amer- . ican policy of benevolent neutrality toward France as envisaged by Genet and the Girondin regime. Instead, it led the Washington 65 See “Cabinet Opinion on Privateers and Prizes,” July 12, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 344-345; the Anas, July 10, 1793 (committed to writ¬ ing July 13), ibid., I, 242-243; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 361-362. 63 Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, July 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 163. 67 Later Genet informed Jefferson that he had sent the vessel to sea to obtain intelligence on coastal waters for the French fleet which was to sail from Norfolk to New York. The Anas, July 26, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 250. 58 Hammond to Grenville, Aug. 18, 1793, No. 17, British State Papers, quoted in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 143. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 223 administration to define its neutral obligations more strictly. The Cabinet grappled with the whole problem of neutrality and Genet; and finally, at the behest of Jefferson, agreed on July 12, 1793, to submit the complex questions of neutral obligations to the Supreme Court. 59 A careful compilation of American neutrality problems then confronting the government was presented to the Court on July 18, 1793. The judges, for constitutional reasons, refused to consider them. 60 The Cabinet was forced to answer its own questions, a procedure which resulted on August 4, 1793, in the promulgation of “Rules Governing Belligerents.” 61 These rules—eight in number—agreed upon by the Cabinet and accepted by the President, forbade equipping of privateers in American ports and clearly established the American interpretation of Article 22 of the commercial treaty with France. By the first provision not just England, as had been maintained by Genet, but France as well was barred from outfitting ships in American ports. Other provisions clarified specific neutrality obligations which the United States assumed and would enforce. Except for special priv¬ ileges granted France by treaty, the rules applied in the same degree to both France and England. The eighth rule prohibited foreign ™ Ibid., pp. 146-147. This action inspired public attacks on Washington. Why, asked “Juba” in the National Gazette (Philadelphia, July 27, 1793), if he had any doubts on the subject did the President not consult the representa¬ tives of the people in Congress? Then “Juba” answered his own question by indicating that Hamilton’s fear of Congress and the people was the reason. Cited in Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , pp. 66-67. 00 See Jefferson to The Chief Justice and Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, Philadelphia, July 18, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 351-352—the questions are on pp. 352-354; Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices to President Washington, Philadelphia, Aug. 8, 1793, in Johnston, Jay Correspondence, III, 488-489. The Court’s refusal constituted an impor¬ tant step in establishing the purely judiciary function of the Supreme Court; see Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, I, in. 61 The administration knew before the formal reply was received that the Justices would refuse to give an opinion; see Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 3, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 362; the rules, dated Aug. 3, 1793, are in ibid., pp. 258-259. The rules were published by means of Hamilton’s “Instructions to the Collectors of the Customs,” Philadelphia, Aug. 4, 1793, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 236-241; see also Washing¬ ton to The Secretary of State, Philadelphia, Aug. 4, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 37-38. 224 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE recruiting on American soil. Backed staunchly by Federalist opin¬ ion, the rules provided for effective implementation of the neutrality proclamation and gave assurance to Great Britain that the United States would enforce its neutrality/’ 2 Once more Jefferson and Hamilton clashed; this time over re¬ sponsibility for supervising die neutrality regulations. Responsibil¬ ity for administering the neutrality provisions, instead of being Jefferson’s as Secretary of State, was delegated to customs officials under Hamilton’s control in his capacity of Secretary of the Treas¬ ury. In the first week of May, 1793, following adoption of the procla¬ mation, Hamilton had prepared instructions for collectors of cus¬ toms directing them to supervise adherence to the just-published neutrality regulations and to inform him of infractions. Jefferson had objected to Hamilton’s attempted usurping of State Department functions. The collectors of customs, who were predominantly Federalist, Jefferson complained, “are to be made an established corps of spies or informers against their fellow citizens, whose actions they are to watch in secret, inform against in secret to the Secretary of the Treasury.” This procedure, he said, “will at least furnish the collector with a convenient weapon to keep down a rival, draw a cloud over an inconvenient censor, or satisfy mere malice & private enmity.” Coming to the heart of the matter, he added that he could not “possibly conceive how the superintendence of the laws of neu¬ trality, or the preservation of our peace with foreign nations can be ascribed to the department of the treasury, which I suppose to com¬ prehend merely matters of revenue. It would be to add a new & large field to a department already amply provided with business, patronage, & influence.” 63 Jefferson had proposed that grand juries rather than customs officials be charged with responsibility for investigating neutrality violations. Washington, however, had followed Randolph’s sug¬ gestion of directing customs collectors to report neutrality infrac- 02 A sample of Federalist backing was the resolution of September 5, 1793, by a group of Annapolis citizens in support of Washington’s neutrality policy and critical of Genet’s influence in American affairs. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Sept. 26, 1793. 63 Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, May 8, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 244-245; White, The Federalists. . . , pp. 214-216. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 225 tions to the district attorney in each port. The district attorneys, in turn, were to report to the Attorney General. The Secretary of War, in addition, had instructed state governors to help in enforcing the neutrality regulations by guarding against violations. 64 Neither Jefferson nor Hamilton, therefore, had direct responsibility for enforcing neutrality in the ports at the beginning of the Anglo- French conflict. The Little Sarah crisis, however, led Washington to abandon reliance on state governors for enforcing neutrality and to turn once more to Hamilton’s May proposal. At the Cabinet meeting of July 29, 1793, the President had requested his advisors to consider charg¬ ing customs officials with responsibility of preventing neutrality violations. Emphasizing the need for more stringent regulation, he said “unless this, or some other effectual mode is adopted to check this evil in the first stage of its growth, the Executive of the U. States will be incessantly harassed with complaints on this head, and probably when it may be difficult to afford a remedy.” 65 Earlier, Washington had taken for granted that the governors would discover neutrality infractions “in embryo & stop them when no force was requisite or a very small party of militia wd. suffice.” 66 He had not anticipated, as in the case of the Little Sarah, enforce¬ ment in an advanced stage of violation where large force was neces¬ sary and where a clash might lead to war. With adoption of the “Rules Governing Belligerents,” the government put Hamilton’s suggestion into effect; it instructed collectors of customs to enforce the rules. Once more Hamilton’s influence with the President proved stronger than that of Jefferson. The Secretary of State, convinced that supervision of neutrality was the responsibility of the State Department and believing that to remove it from his 84 See Washington to The Secretary of the Treasury, Philadelphia, May 7, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washingtons Writings, XXXII, 451; the circular of governor Henry Lee of Virginia, Richmond, June 8, 1793, in ASP FR, I, 606; Conway, Randolph, pp. 204-205; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 113. 85 Washington to The Heads of Departments and the Attorney General, Philadelphia, July 29, 1793, in--Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 34- ee 66 Quoted from The Anas, July 15, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson. h 243. 226 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE department demonstrated a lack of confidence in him, offered once again to resign. 6 ‘ This episode exposed one more of the perplexing difficulties that confronted Jefferson in assuming responsibility for foreign relations in a Federalist regime while personally advocating Republican poli¬ cies. He was not responsible for formulating foreign policy to the degree that other department heads were responsible for the major functions of their departments. As has been illustrated by previous incidents, and particularly by the case of the Little Sarah, the Presi¬ dent, who constitutionally was in control of foreign policy formula¬ tion, insisted upon holding Cabinet deliberations on important for¬ eign policy questions; he preferred collective opinions to the indi¬ vidual counsel of the Secretary of State. On financial questions, on the other hand, while more technical but no more complex and no less vital, he accepted the individual judgment of the Secretary of the Treasury. Executive practice, therefore, made it relatively easy for Hamilton to wield an important influence in formulating foreign policy and in thwarting Jefferson’s foreign policy objectives. 68 While it was true that Hamilton’s “system” was anchored on a policy of peace with England, which might have justified tampering with Jefferson’s department, it is also true that it was Washington’s practice of collective Cabinet decisions on foreign policy issues which gave Hamilton important advantages in implementing his program in areas beyond the scope of normal Treasury Department con¬ cerns. Jefferson was never able to put into effect his foreign policy views on major questions without Hamilton’s knowledge, inter¬ ference, or obstructions. # # * # # Jefferson, as has been seen, while favoring neutrality, had opposed the neutrality proclamation; when it had been adopted he had sup- 87 See Jefferson to Washington, Philadelphia, July 31, 1793, in Ford, Writ¬ ings of Jefferson, VI, 360-361. There were, of course, other reasons for the resignation offer; see Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 500; Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, 61. Nonetheless, Hamilton’s interference in foreign policy was a prominent reason for the resignation; see White, The Federal¬ ists. . . , pp. 216-217; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 119. 88 For variations of this theme, see Caldwell, Hamilton and Jefferson, p. 228; White, The Federalists. . . , p. 217. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 227 ported it, but he did not do so wholeheartedly. 69 He considered the “guarantee” provision of the French alliance legally and morally binding, and looked upon the proclamation of neutrality as merely a temporary executive expedient; when Congress convened, it would decide on the proper neutrality legislation. Hamilton, on the other hand, saw no need for congressional action. Washington’s procla¬ mation, he believed, had established rightfully a rigid neutrality that suspended the “guarantee” to France. If it were not suspended, he believed, the United States would not then be a true neutral, and war with England might follow. With the Little Sarah affair the questions of the proclamation of neutrality and of the nature of the French alliance became a center of political dispute. But even before the Little Sarah affair the proc¬ lamation had precipitated a public political battle. By June, 1793, Hamilton was smoldering under Republican attacks on the procla¬ mation and was upset by the obvious public support Genet and Republicans were receiving. In defense of the proclamation and his party’s position, he published, under the pseudonym of “Paci- ficus,” seven articles in John Fenno’s Gazette of the United. States from June 29 to July 27, 1793. The articles outlined Federalist policy on neutrality, argued in support of its position toward the belliger¬ ent powers, and attacked the French alliance. 70 The most persistent of the Republican thrusts were taunts that Federalist policy violated the French alliance, that France by treaty was still an ally whom the United States was obligated to aid if called upon to do so. Hamilton countered that the alliance was defensive and that France was the aggressor; she had been first to declare war. “Self-preservation is the first duty of a nation,” he said. “Good faith does not require that the United States should put in jeopardy their essential interests, perhaps their very existence, in one of the most unequal contests in which a nation could be engaged, to secure to France—what? Her West India islands and 0 “ Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 115. Privately, Jefferson deprecated the proclamation, labeling it a “milk and water” pronouncement. Jefferson to Madison, June 29, 1793, postscript of June 30, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 328. 70 The “Pacificus” articles are reprinted in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 135-191; see also Schachner, Hamilton, p. 322; Hamilton, His¬ tory of the Republic. . . , V, 309-311. 228 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE other less important possessions in America.”' 1 Gratitude for French aid during the American Revolution he cast aside, pointing out that not altruism, not love for Americans had motivated France, but revenge—revenge against England for past humiliations. In defense of Executive control of foreign policy, Hamilton argued that the President’s constitutional powers were broad, not narrow as Jefferson had maintained. In carrying out his functions the President “must necessarily possess a right of judging what is the nature of the obligations which the treaties of the country im¬ pose on the government.”'' After several of Hamilton’s trenchant articles had appeared, Jefferson became alarmed over the possible extent of their influence upon the public if left unanswered. Urgently, he turned to Madison. “For God’s sake, my dear Sir,” he wrote, “take up your pen, select the most striking heresies and cut him to pieces in the face of the public. There is nobody who can & will enter the lists with him.” 73 Although disturbed by “Pacificus” and by the proclamation of neu¬ trality which earlier he had labeled “a most unfortunate error” and as violating “die forms and spirit of the Constitution,” Madison was reluctant to tangle once more with Hamilton. 74 Under the signa¬ ture of “Helvidius,” nevertheless, he did challenge “Pacificus,” a “most grating” task, he confessed. To Hamilton’s seven articles Madison responded with five letters published in the same paper, beginning August 24, 1793, and ending September 18, 1793. 75 All five articles attacked Hamilton’s first letter. Labeling Hamil¬ ton’s argument an appeal to those “who hate our republican govern¬ ment and the French revolution,” Madison denied that the proclama¬ tion of neutrality meant suspension of the French alliance. On the basic issue of control over foreign policy he took the narrow consti¬ tutional view that only Congress had the power to decide what 71 The quotations are from “Pacificus” No. II, July 3, 1793, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 159. 72 “Pacificus” No. I, June 29, 1793, ibid., pp. 142-143. 78 Jefferson to Madison, July 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 338; Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 323; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution. . . , pp. 377-378. 74 “I am in hopes of finding that some one else has undertaken it.” Mad¬ ison to Jefferson, July 18 and July 30, 1793, in Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VI, 135, 138-139. 76 The “Letters of Helvidius” are in ibid., pp. 138-188. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 229 treaty obligations were binding on the nation. He refuted “the extraordinary doctrine, that the powers of making war, and treaties, are in their nature executive.” This vicious doctrine, he pointed out, emanated from British sources; for in Great Britain treaty and war powers “are royal prerogatives,” hence executive functions. It would never do for a democracy; it smacked of monarchy—worse still, of British monarchy.''’ Classical pseudonyms fooled no one; the public recognized in “Pacificus” and “Helvidius” the Secretary of the Treasury and the leading member of the House of Representatives. But Hamilton and Madison did not have the field alone; others plunged in, sport¬ ing such cognomens as “Veritas,” “Cato,” and “Ironicus.”" Among these, “A Firm Republican” expressed well the Republican position. Referring to the proclamation of neutrality, he wrote that he “always considered it as a thing which had very little good or harm in it; but assumes the one character or the other, as it is differently re¬ ceived.” Taken merely as a declaration of America’s stand toward the belligerent powers, “it was no more than a promulgation of the law of the land, which every citizen ought to know, conform his actions to; and in that light was a fresh proof of that watchful regard so frequently manifested by him [Washington] towards the people of America.” If, on the other hand, it were taken as enjoining neu¬ trality on American citizens “so far as to dispense with the obliga¬ tions by which we are bound, in our treaties with France, it must be received as a daring affirmation of power, which no man ac¬ quainted with his dispositions, can seriously believe he [Washington] ever contemplated.”™ “Cato” defended the French alliance, urging closer ties with France, and declared that if Great Britain defeated France the United States would be the next victim. Following this reasoning, “A Farmer of the Back Settlement” declared that the United States should have aided France against England even if it meant priva¬ tions and hardship for Americans. 79 Agitated by the controversy, 78 The quotations are from “Helvidius” No. I, August-September [1793], ibid., pp. 139, 143, 150; see also Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitu- tion 7 y ■ ’ PP- 37 8 ' 379 - 7 Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 355. 78 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Dec. 5, 1793. 70 “Cato” wrote for the New Yor^ Diary; reprinted in the Independent 230 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE citizen groups in various towns met and passed resolutions for and against the government’s foreign policy and forwarded their re¬ solves to the President. In Virginia, Federalists such as John Mar¬ shall joined the battle . 80 Though various proadministration resolu¬ tions they appealed to Virginians to support Washington’s neutrality policy. Citizens of Annapolis, Maryland, also expressed satisfaction with government policy and condemned Genet’s activities, as did “Columbus,” who maintained that Genet, if not stopped, “would have exposed us inevitably to the hostilities of all the great mari¬ time powers of the earth .” 81 Antiadministration resolutions adopted by planters, farmers, and other yeomanry in Caroline County, Virginia, for instance, de¬ manded that the French alliance be safeguarded. They expressed fear that the administration was bent on dissolving the alliance and replacing it with “a more intimate connexion” with Great Britain. Other Virginia counties also passed antiadministration resolutions, patterned after those of Caroline County. Support of the French alliance became a rallying point for organized protest against Wash¬ ington’s foreign policies. From these organized attacks against Washington’s French policy Virginia Republicans, for example, gained the confidence that led them to scrutinize critically and then to attack Hamilton’s fiscal program. Foreign policy and politics, in effect, fused on the issue of the French alliance . 82 If not dignified and not in the tradition of European govern¬ ments, brawling over foreign policy at least was something new and Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 6, 1794; “A Farmer” appeared in the Jan. 27, 1794, issue of the latter. 80 Virginia Gazette and General Advertiser (Richmond), Aug. 21, 1793, cited in Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia,” Jour¬ nal of Southern History, XIX, 303. 81 Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Sept. 26, 1793; “Columbus” appeared in the Columbian Centinel (Boston), Nov. 30, 1793. 82 Citizens of Caroline County did, however, profess esteem for Washington and condemn Genet’s activities. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Oct. 10, 1793; Ammon, “The Formation of the Republican Party in Virginia,” JSH, XIX, 300, 304-305. Republicans were opposed to administration foreign policy not because it was neutral but because Washington’s Federalist-oriented government did not give even moral support to the French alliance. In the neutrality proclamation they saw victory for the pro-British commercial classes. This issue of neutrality and the French alliance divided clearly the two national parties, particularly in pivotal Virginia. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 231 democratic. Here was evidence of widening popular participation in important governmental issues, of policy-makers reaching down to the people. For good or evil, foreign policy issues had been forced to the level of domestic politics and were debated publicly in bids for popular support. Republican attacks had compelled Hamilton, contemptuous of public opinion, to bring his case to the very public he detested. At the beginning of America’s national history, as a consequence, the heat of politics gave birth to a democratic approach to foreign policy. Tv Tv Tv *7v“ Not only did Republicans and Federalists battle over foreign policy, but they also vied with each other in aiding Great Britain and France, and hence in subverting American neutrality. While French neutrality violations, highlighted particularly by Genet’s rash conduct, were at this time numerous and conspicuous, the British and their American partisans also flouted American laws. Many vessels, both British and French, were armed and equipped for offensive action in American ports and escaped detection by American officials, or else sympathetic officials connived at their breaking American neutrality regulations. As in the case of French violations, a number of attempts to arm and equip British ships in American ports were brought to the atten¬ tion of the Washington administration. In detecting these British efforts Genet appeared as vigilant and as concerned as did Ham¬ mond over the arming of French privateers. The legal grounds for his protest against British violations of neutrality were stronger than those of Hammond. As has been noted, Washington’s advisers differed markedly in their interpretations of American treaty obli¬ gations to France. With Great Britain there was no problem; the American government was bound to forbid the use of its ports to the British for hostile acts against France. Not only was such conduct unneutral, but it was also prohibited by Article 22 of the commercial treaty of 1778. When they were caught illegally using American port facilities, neither the Bridsh nor their Federalist sym¬ pathizers could justify their acts by an overfavorable interpreta¬ tion of a treaty right as did Genet. Great Britain had no treaty with the United States. 83 83 For details on this problem, see Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 159-162; Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, p. 81. 232 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Whenever Genet received reports, particularly from French con¬ suls in American ports, that English privateers had been armed in places such as Charleston, Baltimore, and Philadelphia, he protested to the Department of State. A typical example of a British ship adding to her armament in an American port was that of the armed privateer Jane. Carrying two unmounted cannon in addi¬ tion to fourteen cannon already mounted, the Jane sailed into Philadelphia’s port, pierced two new portholes, and mounted the extra guns on carriages obtained in the United States. On July 9, I 793 (only four days after the alleged violation), Genet protested to Jefferson that the British were adding armament to the vessel in violation of America’s treaty obligation to France. 84 Following usual procedure in such cases, Jefferson brought the matter to Hammond’s attention. Contending that Genet’s accusa¬ tions were unfounded and that the Jane was not violating American neutrality, the British minister exchanged considerable correspond¬ ence with the State Department over the case. To throw Genet’s exacerbating conduct into sharp contrast with his own, Hammond tried to be particularly accommodating in the exchanges. These unprovocative intentions were difficult to carry into effect before the concentrated offensive hurled against the Jane —the only armed Bridsh vessel in the port—by Republicans and odier French parti¬ sans. In view of the agitation Hammond finally “judged it most ex¬ pedient to consent to the alterations suggested” by Jefferson. 80 The British reduced the Jane’s armament to what it had been when she entered port. Even though he retreated judiciously before Genet’s protests and heated popular agitation, Hammond did attain one valuable objective. By his conduct in the Jane case, which appeared almost exemplary in comparison to Genet’s in similar situations, he placed the French minister in a relatively unfavorably position. 86 He did not openly defy the American government or meet its pro- 84 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, July 9, 1793, ASP FR, I, 163; the Anas, July 29, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 250. 86 Hammond to Grenville, Aug., 1793, No. 17, British State Papers, cited in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 161. 88 See ibid., pp. 161-162; for details on the acdon of the American govern¬ ment, see the Anas, July 29, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 250-251; Cabinet Opinion, Aug. 3, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 457-458. GENET AND NEUTRALITY 2 33 tests with bitter arguments and impassioned pleas for popular sup¬ port. Hammond’s procedure illustrated well British practice, which was to take whatever advantages were possible by secretly arming vessels in American ports, but when caught, to yield gracefully. At this time Hammond’s task in defending British violations of American sovereignty in the ports was less complicated than that of Genet. As article 17 of the French commercial treaty prohibited British privateers from bringing prizes of war into American ports, the privateers never returned once they left port, nor did exigencies of war compel them to use American ports. The British had other bases in the Western Hemisphere easily available from which priva¬ teers could operate. But the same treaty article gave French privateers the specific right to return to American ports with their prizes. Their bases of operation were limited; they were, to a degree, forced to rely upon American facilities in carrying out their depredations. When the French privateers returned to American ports they often brought trouble with them. Genet, differing treaty interpretations, and the complexion of American politics all aggravated this trouble. In all, in this period of American neutrality, despite Genet’s con¬ tinuing protests against the equipping of British vessels, British vio¬ lations of American neutrality in the ports were apparently less than those of the French. Except for special treaty privileges granted the French, American neutrality regulations were applicable in equal degree to both Great Britain and France. By one standard of international conduct the United States was obligated to prevent the use of its ports for the armament of vessels belonging to either belligerent. This allegedly impartial neutrality favored Great Britain and violated the spirit if not the letter of the French alliance, partic¬ ularly as Republicans and Genet interpreted it. Under the terms of the alliance and in accord with past international practice, Genet and France had expected a benevolent American neutrality, under which French actions, while exacerbating, would not have been con¬ strued as violations of American neutrality. This kind of neutrality Genet did not get. 87 87 According to past international practice, the neutrality of third states had not been impartial; it had been benevolent usually toward one belligerent. In this period of transition in practice and standards Genet had expected a benevolent neutrality; see Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, pp. 153- 234 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 154. In this period of transition “there were still fundamental differences of opinion as to the rights of belligerents and neutrals, respectively, under the law of nations.” Phillips and Reede, Neutrality. . . , II, 16. Grotius, for example, spoke of neutrals as “those who in time of war are in a position be¬ tween the contending parties,” and expected the neutrals to look into the merits of the controversy and to take sides accordingly. He did not stress impartiality. Cited in Charles G. Fenwick, American Neutrality : Trial and Failure (New York, 1940), p. 9. CHAPTER EIGHT WESTERN INTRIGUE, SELF-CREATED SOCIETIES, AND A MUTINOUS FLEET Our self-created societies and clubs, as it appears to me, have a tendency, directly or indirectly, to introduce into the measures of government all the precipitation, all the heat and ungovernable passions of a simple democracy. —Nathaniel Chipman to Alexander Hamilton, Rutland, Ver¬ mont, January 9, 1794. Resolved that we ought to resist to the utmost of our power all at¬ tempts to alienate our affections from France, and detach us from her alliance and to connect us more intimately with Great Britain, that all persons who, directly or indirectly, promote this unnatural succession ought to be considered by every free American as enemies to republican¬ ism and their country. —The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Reso¬ lution of January 9, 1794. * # # * # (j enet did not confine his problem-spawning activities to the sea¬ ports; he also caused trouble on the land frontiers. Hatching or abetting various plots, he had planned to launch hostile military expeditions from American soil with American troops against Span¬ ish and English possessions in North America. 1 France’s plans to 1 Some students of this period believe that the real purpose of Genet’s mission was to wrest Louisiana from Spain. See, for example, Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, p. 446. Genet’s plans for attacks on Florida and Louisiana were at this time war measures directed against Spain, not a part of French policy to establish a new colonial empire in North America. Mildred S. Fletcher, “Louisiana as a Factor in French Diplomacy from 1763 to 1800,” Mississippi Valley His¬ torical Review, XVII (Dec., 1930), 369-370. For Genet’s plans to attack Canada, see Benjamin Suite, “Les Projets de 1793 a 1810,” Proceedings and Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, V (1911), 27-31; Eugene P. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 236 use disgruntled American frontiersmen in the Southwest in the con¬ quest of Louisiana and Florida actually antedated Genet’s mission, as did her designs on Canada. * 2 3 Genet was to be the instrument charged by the Girondins with converting plans into action; they would have given any French minister to the United States the same responsibilities. The results of the Genet mission, nonetheless, were stamped unmistakably with his personal imprint.' 5 Genet’s instructions, as has been noted, directed him “to take every measure” which might “germinate the principles of liberty and independence in Louisiana and in the other American provinces bordering on the United States.” 4 He was to do this, if possible, with aid from the American government, relying upon the alliance and pro-French sentiment to induce the government to give the needed assistance. If he could get no aid, apparently, he was to proceed alone. In particular, the instructions emphasized that he could probably rely on the active support of Kentucky frontiers¬ men who “burned” to enjoy free navigation of the Mississippi, a privilege denied them by Spain. In carrying out his frontier proj¬ ects Genet was authorized, at his discretion, to spend as much as he thought necessary. 5 Genet plotted a three-pronged attack against Louisiana and Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800 (New York, 1942), pp. 141-144; “Compte que rend de Mission de Citoyen [Henri] Meriere au Citoyen Genet, Ministre Plentipotentiare de la Republique Fran^aise pres les Etats- Unis,” New York, Sept. 20, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVIII, ff. 233-238. Meriere was a secretary of Genet. 2 See Frederick J. Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas,” American Historical Review, III (July, 1898), 651; Richard K. Murdoch, “The Genesis of the Genet Schemes,” French American Review, II (April-June, 1949), 81-82; see also Brissot to Servan, Minister of War, Paris, Nov. 26, 1792, in Cl. Perroud, ed., /. P. Brissot : Cor- respondance et papiers (Paris, [1911]), p. 312; to the Comite de defense general, Jan. 25, 1793, Brissot reported on the possibility of an attack against Spanish possessions. F. V. A. Aulard, ed., Recueil des actes du Comite de salut public . . . (26 vols., Paris, 1889-1923), II, 10. 3 Turner, “Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack. . . ,” AHR, III, 660; Mur¬ doch, “The Genesis of the Genet Schemes,” FAR, II, 94; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 177. 4 Instructions of Dec., 1792, in Turner, CFM, p. 205. 5 Even though Genet’s initial instructions had been drafted before France went to war with Spain and England, subsequent instructions directed him to proceed with the liberation of Spanish lands. Le Brun to Genet, Paris, [date illegible], 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, VIII, 2665. INTRIGUE 2 37 Florida: one expedition was to descend upon East Florida from the Georgia border, another was to be recruited in South Carolina and then hurled against Louisiana, and the third force was to come out of Kentucky via the Mississippi River to conquer New Orleans. He placed the New Orleans expedition under the command of General George Rogers Clark, hero of the Northwest during the American Revolution, who long had dreamed of wrenching the lower banks and mouth of the Mississippi from Spanish control. Clark had, in fact, suggested an attack against New Orleans to the French govern¬ ment as early as the latter months of 1792.° This was encouraging to Genet, particularly when Clark, in February, 1793, had pointed out that he could take the Spanish possessions with ease, that the magic of his name would cause frontiersmen to flock to his cause.' All he needed was support from the French government in the form of commissions for himself and his cohorts, and of course, money to buy boats, guns, ammuni¬ tion, supplies. Not much else was necessary. The fighting men, Clark indicated, could be paid in land captured from the Spaniard. Once initial expenditures were met, the expedition would be self¬ financing. This, indeed, gratified Genet. He sent to Kentucky a French botanist, Andre Michaux, with enough funds to start the project and instructions to co-ordinate plans and to arrange details for the expedition. 8 8 See Thomas Paine to Dr. James O’Fallon, Passy near Paris, Feb. 17, 1793. This letter reveals also that Jefferson had been sounded concerning Clark’s suitability for the task. Louise Phelps Kellogg, “Letter of Thomas Paine, 1793,” AHR, XXIX (April, 1924), 504-505; John C. Parish, “The In¬ trigues of Doctor James O’Fallon,” MVHR, XVII (Sept., 1930), 259-260; Clark to [French minister], Louisville, Feb. 5, 1793, in Frederick J. Turner, ed., “Selections from the Draper Collection in the Possession of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, to Elucidate the Proposed French Expedi¬ tion under George Rogers Clark against Louisiana, in the Years 1793-1794,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1896 (2 vols., Washington, 1897), I, 967-971; Turner, “Origins of Genet’s Pro¬ jected Attack. . . ,” AHR, III, 653; James A. James, The Life of George Rogers Clar\ (Chicago, 1928), p. 411. 7 Clark to [French minister], Louisville, Feb. 5, 1793, Turner, “Draper Collection,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1896), pp. 967-971. In AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXIX, f. 90, dated Oct. 7, 1793, is an authorization given by Genet to Clark to take command of the Legion of Revolution and Independence of the Mississippi. 8 Genet to Michaux, Philadelphia, July 12, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, X, 3087. Genet authorized Michaux to treat with the French 2 3 8 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE For various reasons Clark, who had become a major general in the French army in command of French revolutionary legions which he was to recruit in Kentucky, was unable to unleash his planned attack in 1793. In autumn and winter of that year he prepared, instead, for an offensive in the spring. Establishing a base on the Mississippi, he gathered men, boats, and supplies. 9 In the meantime Genet put plans for the other expeditions into mo¬ tion. One of the expeditions, destined for New Orleans, was to join Clark’s forces after descending the Tennessee River; the com¬ bined expedition was then to sweep down the Mississippi. While this force attacked from the North, a French naval force was to close the river below New Orleans. 10 As Clark made preparations in Kentucky, the recruiting of men and general preparations for the invasion of the Floridas progressed under the direction of Michel Ange Bernard de Mangourit, French consul at Charleston. During his short sojourn in Charleston Genet had informed Governor William Moultrie of his plans, set them in motion, and turned over responsibility for them to Mangourit. 11 The French consul succeeded in carrying out his responsibilities; and Indians west of the Mississippi to bring French liberty to Louisiana and to concert with Clark and General Benjamin Logan to raise a corps titled the Legion of Revolution and Independence of the Mississippi; also Instructions to Michaux, Oct. 7, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXIX, ff. 82-83; C. S. Sargent, “Journal de Andre Michaux,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, XXVI (1889), 91; Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, July 25, 1793, Turner, CFM, pp. 221-223. 9 For a recruiting notice of “George R. Clark Esq. Major General in the armies of France, and Commander in Chief of the french revolutionary legions on the Mississippi River,” see the Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), Feb. 8, 1794. 10 Instructions for Contre Amiral Sercey, Commandant of the French Re¬ public’s Naval Forces in America, Oct. 4, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXIX, ff. 99-103. The Petite Demoaate was to be a part of this naval force. Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack. . . AHR, III, 668; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 180. For summaries of Genet-Clark intrigues, see F. R. Hall, “Genet’s Western Intrigue, 1793-1794,” Illinois State Historical Society Journal, XXI (1928), 359-381; Regina K. Crandall, “Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas, 1793-1794,” Abstracts of Theses, Human¬ istic Series (University of Chicago, 1928), V, 263-270. 11 Genet informed his superiors that Mangourit was “an excellent patriot.” To Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charleston, April 16, 1793, in Turner, CFM, p. 213. For a sketch of Mangourit as a “dealer in international revolution,” see R. R. Palmer, “A Revolutionary Republican: M. A. B. Mangourit,” Wil¬ liam and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, IX (Oct., 1952), 483-496. INTRIGUE 239 Charlestonians, it seemed, had gone “recruiting-mad for the French service.” 12 More men were enlisted, armed, and ready to join the New Orleans assault from South Carolina than were ready for action in Kentucky. 13 Success in attaching American frontiersmen to the French cause was not at this time difficult to achieve. Sympathy for France was strong in most Western areas. In many regions of Tennessee and Kentucky, for example, French sympathizers organized democratic societies and sowed French ideas on receptive soil, there to be culti¬ vated by Genet’s agents. 14 Men of the West had grievances against Spain, because, among other reasons, she denied them free use of the Mississippi River as an outlet for their produce. This antago¬ nism was, in part, also directed against the Federalist regime in Philadelphia because frontiersmen believed that the administration had not exerted itself to gain coveted rights to the mouth of the river. 15 12 Quoted from the Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), April 5, 1794, citing a letter from Charleston under date of Jan. 3. 18 Mangourit’s preparations are summarized in Richard K. Murdoch, “Citizen Mangourit and the Projected Attack on East Florida in 1794,” Jour¬ nal of Southern History, XIV (Nov., 1948), 522-540 and in Murdoch, The Georgia-Florida Frontier, 1793-1796, pp. 11-24; f° r an account of preparations in Georgia, see E. Merton Coulter, “Elijah Clarke’s Foreign Intrigues and the ‘Trans-Oconee Republic,’ ” Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association for 1918-1919, X, Part I (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1920), 260-267; for correspondence on Mangourit’s preparations, see Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., “Mangourit Correspondence in Respect to Genet’s Projected Attack upon the Floridas, 1793-1794,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1897) (Washington, 1898), 569- 6?9 L 11 Agents reported to Spanish officials, for example, that in Kentucky the democratic societies had hatched a plot “to associate the whole western coun¬ try” in a separatist movement. James White to Gayoso de Lemos, Mero Dis¬ trict, Feb. 1, 1794, in Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., “Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 1765-1794,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1945) (4 vols., Washington, 1946), IV, 252- 253. 15 Westerners welcomed French aid to check English and Spanish intrigues and to reduce the threat of Indian attacks. See E. Merton Coulter, “The Efforts of the Democratic Societies of the West to Open the Navigation of the Mississippi,” MVHR, XI (Dec., 1924), 378-379; Charles H. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia from 1776 to 1861 (Chicago, 1910), p. 63; Archibald Henderson, “Isaac Shelby and the Genet Mission,” MVHR, VI (March, 1920), 451. Spanish officials were aware of the pro-French leanings of Westerners. See Gayoso de Lemos, Governor of Natchez, to Baron Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana, Dec. 23, 1793, in Turner, “Draper Collection,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1896), p. 1028. 240 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE To these hardened frontiersmen the federal government had little apparent value. It did not protect them from recurring Indian attacks on their homes and farms nor did it aid them to break Spain’s grip on their economic welfare through her control of the Mississippi. Westerners believed, as their political leaders empha¬ sized, that they had “an indisputable right to the undisturbed enjoy¬ ment of the Mississippi.” Their leaders, for example, stressed that “too long, my fellow citizens have you placed an implicit dependence on the impartiality and virtue of the General Government. . . . Awake from your lethargic indifference. Think & act for yourselves. Let the example of France and her glorious successes animate you in the pursuit of those advantages which nature has bestowed upon your country.” Then followed the clinching rhetorical question: “What, my countrymen, has been done for you by the General Gov¬ ernment?” 16 “Nature,” declared John Breckinridge, a belligerent Westerner who later, under Jefferson, became Attorney General of the United States, “has done everything for us; Government everything against us.” He and his fellow Westerners considered themselves “deluded by Govt., and sacrificed to the narrow local policy of the Eastern States.” 1 ' For them, these pressing grievances transcended vague national loyalties. Any reasonable solution to their dilemma had great appeal and undoubtedly would win their support. 18 # * * * * In the summer of 1793, as the federal government attempted to negotiate a settlement with Spain which would resolve the dilem¬ ma of Southwest frontiersmen and as Genet’s grandiose schemes 18 “A Centinel” in the Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), Feb. 15, 1794. As far back as the Nootka Sound crisis the English had recognized that West¬ erners, “men hardy, inured to fatigue and danger, expert Marksmen, who live by hunting,” are not loyal to the United States; they owe their allegiance to none. P. Allaire, report on occurrences from Aug. 6 to Sept. 1, 1790, Henry Adams Transcripts. 17 Breckinridge to Samuel Hopkins, Mecklinburg County, Va., Sept. 14, 1794, quoted in Coulter, “The Efforts of the Democratic Societies of the West to open the Navigation of the Mississippi,” MVHR, XI, 387. 18 For failure of the government to protect settlers on the frontier see Turner, “The Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack. . . ,” AHR, III, 653; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, p. 68. Some Westerners favored separation from the United States and an accommodation with Spain. Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1945), IV, p. xxxvi. INTRIGUE 241 began to germinate along the frontier, the United States and Spain headed toward war. 19 Spanish-inspired Indian attacks along the frontier and Spain’s uncompromising control of the Mississippi had led to serious protests from the United States in the fall of 1792. Basically American grievances with Spain, like those with England, stemmed from the American Revolution and the peace of 1783. Spain had obtained Louisiana from France at the close of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 to compensate her for the loss of Florida to England. By right of conquest, she had regained Florida from England at the end of the wars of the American Revolution. In once more controlling the Floridas, Spain faced a new neighbor and a perplexing boundary difficulty. In a secret article in the pre¬ liminary peace treaty with the United States in 1782 Great Britain had agreed that if Spain took the Floridas the boundary should be the thirty-first degree of north latitude; if not, it would be further north, at the mouth of the Yazoo River, 32 0 28' north latitude, which had been the boundary of British West Florida since 1764. Great Britain and the United States did not incorporate this secret article into the final peace between them in 1783. 20 Spain contended, rightly, that as a third power she could not be bound by stipulations of the Anglo-American treaty and especially not by a secret article not incorporated into the final treaty. She had received the Floridas from England without defined boundaries, 19 Jefferson reported to Monroe, “. . .Spain is so evidently picking a quarrel with us, that we see a war absolutely inevitable with her.” Philadelphia, June 28, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 322. Washington urged precautionary measures against Spain in fear of war. To The Secretary of War, Philadelphia, June 14, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washingtons Writings, XXXII, 502-503; see also Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected At¬ tack. . . ,” AHR, III, 665; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 181-182; Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 55. 20 Primary emphasis in this study is on Franco-American politics and diplomacy. The Spanish background is merely summarized and highlighted, primarily from secondary sources, to give adequate background to the main threads of the narrative and analysis. Reliable accounts of Spanish-American diplomacy in this period based on the sources are Arthur P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier: iy8g-ijq^ and The Mississippi Question, 7795- / 5 oj; Samuel F. Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty; and Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1793-1813. Arthur B. Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , covers Spanish-American diplomacy in relation to France and England. Perti¬ nent diplomatic documents may be found in ASP FR, Vol. I. 242 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE and held to her claim for a northern boundary beyond the 31 0 line, enforcing it by occupation. In any case, Spain did control two banks of the Mississippi River. For purposes of navigation, the extent of control was not the vital factor. What was crucial to American frontiersmen was that for several hundred miles along the lower shores the Mississippi River was in alien hands. The trans-Allegheny settlements of Kentucky and Tennessee, which in post-Revolutionary years were being popu¬ lated rapidly, depended for their economic well-being upon unre¬ stricted use of the Mississippi River to the Gulf. As the mountains were almost insuperable barriers to trade with the Atlantic sea¬ board, the Mississippi River was the logical and only usable large water artery for intercourse with the outside world. Americans saw the danger of relying upon Spain for free use of the river when in 1784 she closed it to American shipping. Involved with these boundary and navigation difficulties was control of Indian tribes along the frontier and in the disputed lands. Both Spain and the United States claimed sovereignty over these tribes—Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, Cherokee—and attempted with treaties and presents to win them over. While making agreements with both sides, the Indians virtually allied themselves with Spain, under whose aegis they carried on border warfare against encroach¬ ing American settlers (as did Indians of the Northwest under Brit¬ ish tutelage). These were not the only Spanish problems which faced the government of the Confederation. As with England and France, the United States wanted and needed to work out a program of commercial intercourse with Spain and her colonies, particularly some agreement allowing unstifled trade with Spain’s New World possessions. Spain had conceded such privileges willingly to no power. Basic in Spanish policy was a mercantilism which shut off Spanish America from legal trade with all of the world but Spain. As a new and not yet fully united nation, the United States was in no position to bargain with Spain for commercial concessions, let alone for settlement of the other questions; it had no valuable equiv¬ alent to offer. Almost the only diplomatic weapon held by the United States was a threat, a threat that grew with the passing years. American INTRIGUE 243 frontiersmen were aggressive and impatient, and their women fecund. Each year they added to their strength; each year the popu¬ lation of the transmontane West increased; each year, as Spanish power declined, American power grew. In time it seemed probable that the Spanish-hating and Indian-fighting Westerner might settle by force what the American government could not solve by diplo¬ macy. There was always the danger that American frontiersmen might sweep aside Spain’s lamentable frontier defenses, occupy and hold the disputed border lands, force open the Mississippi, gain control of New Orleans, and impose an illicit commerce on Spain’s wealthier domains to the south. To forestall this, Spain fostered a separatist movement in the Southwest, particularly in the Kentucky area. She hoped to wean the settlers from their American ties and win them to Spanish allegiance through gold and intrigue and through tempting them with special trade privileges on the Mississippi and at New Orleans. Unlike England she was willing to negotiate with the new republic over its outstanding grievances, to make limited concessions to the American viewpoint, but not without some equivalent. In return for American recognition of her exclusive right to control the lower reaches of the Mississippi, Spain was willing to modify her most extensive boundary claims and to agree to a commercial treaty grant¬ ing trade privileges in certain Spanish European ports to Americans. In order to obtain these limited concessions, the United States would have been compelled to surrender its demand for free navigation of the Mississippi. In its essentials, this was the position taken by Don Diego de Gardoqui, the envoy Spain sent to the United States in 1785 to negotiate over issues then unsettled. After extended discussions with Gardoqui, the American Secre¬ tary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, in 1786 agreed to a treaty with Spain in which the United States, in return for the Spanish trade concessions, was to “forbear” use of the Spanish portion of the Mississippi for a period of thirty years, but not to yield the “right” of navigation. This proposal split the Congress of the Confederation along sectional lines. To the Southerner it looked as if Jay had sacrificed the Southwest, which was dependent on free navigation of the Mississippi, to the interests of the Northeast, which desired the trading privileges thus secured. As a result of sectional opposition ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 2 44 in the Continental Congress, where it was impossible to get the necessary two-thirds vote for approval, Jay never completed the treaty. Spain did not, however, retreat. She continued to control the Mississippi and to keep it closed to Americans. The pioneer settler’s fear that in a government controlled largely by Eastern merchants their welfare would be sacrificed to mercantile interests and the consequent sectional distrust fed Spanish intrigue. Gardoqui, having failed to obtain a treaty, turned his attention to fostering a separatist movement in the Southwest with the goal of creating an independent state amenable to Spanish policy. A leading figure and convenient instrument for Spanish plans was an American veteran of the Revolution, General James Wilkin¬ son. While holding a commission from the American government, Wilkinson swore a secret oath of allegiance to the Spanish crown. His task, for which he received Spanish gold, was to detach the Southwest from the government of the Confederation. To facilitate their plans of winning over American frontiersmen, Spaniards, under a special licensing system, opened the Mississippi River to American use and even allowed Westerners to land their cargoes at New Orleans. Unwisely, they also opened the region north of the Flor- idas to American immigration. 21 Despite Spanish conspiracies and concessions and despite the efforts of Wilkinson and others like him to separate the Southwest from the seaboard communities, the region clung to the new federal government of 1789. In 1790, after North Carolina had relinquished her control of the area to the federal government, the United States established a territorial government in Tennessee, and in 1792, after being released from Virginia, Kentucky became a state. These developments did not dissipate discontent in the Southwest; hatred of Spain and distrust of the central government still prevailed. In¬ dian attacks, abetted by Spain, continued to harry frontier settle- 21 Much has been written on the dubious and controversial career of Wilkinson. Accounts of his dealings, with varying emphases, may be found in Thomas R. May and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter : A Biogra¬ phy of General James Wilkinson (New York, 1941), pp. 79-109; James R. Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior : Major-General fames Wilkinson (New York, 1938), pp. 70-109; Manuel Serrano y Sanz, El brigadier Jaime Wilkinson y sus tratos con Espaha para la independencia del Kentucky (ahos 1787 a I 797 ) (Madrid, 1915). INTRIGUE 245 ments and the Philadelphia government did not provide protection. Even though under the Spanish licensing system they had been granted generous use of the Mississippi, Westerners wanted no trammels, however slight, placed on their use of the river. Their chafing under Spain’s continued grip on the river was unabated, and their resentment against the federal government for not obtain¬ ing the desired freedom still smoldered. Unable to obtain desired federal assistance, the frontiersmen were eager to descend upon Spain’s Indian allies—and in several instances they did so—and even upon the Spaniards to protect their lands and livelihood. If not restrained, it appeared that they would plunge the country into war with Spain. As early as the summer of 1791, in fact, English newspapers carried stories that war between the United States and Spain was inevitable and that both sides were pushing preparations for it. 22 The problems of the Southwest and of relations with Spain were far from settlement when Washington became President. Both the President and his Secretary of State were concerned over the dan¬ gerous situation and were aware of the difficulties which had de¬ stroyed the Jay-Gardoqui treaty. Jefferson tried to avoid similar difficulties; his idea was to wait for an opportune moment when Spain was mired in European troubles and then to force a solution by diplomacy that was favorable to the United States, and particu¬ larly to frontiersmen of the Southwest. In the Nootka Sound controversy—at the beginning at least— Jefferson saw the awaited opportune moment, the chance, in fact, to force to a favorable issue frontier problems with both Spain and England. He initiated steps for a treaty with Spain whereby the United States would have acquired the Floridas and free navigation of the Mississippi. In return, the United States would have guaran¬ teed to Spain the west bank of the river. When Spain backed down before British power, the threat of war disappeared, and so did Jeffer¬ son’s hopes of forcing the treaty on Spain. Next Jefferson attempted to enlist French aid in getting Spain " 2 William Short to Jefferson, Paris, July 24, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. Jefferson denied that the United States was preparing for war and maintained that the London newspapers lied. Jefferson to Short, Philadelphia, Nov. 24, 1791, in Lipscomb, Jefferson's Wor\s, VIII, 258. 246 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE to meet American demands on the Mississippi and to accede to American boundary claims. 23 With the help of Lafayette’s influence at court, he was successful. The Count de Montmorin, then French foreign minister, transmitted a memorandum embodying the Amer¬ ican case to the Spanish foreign minister. Prompted—and perhaps startled—by the French intercession, the Spanish government offered to resume negotiations with the United States on the boundary and river questions. Accepting the Spanish offer, President Washington appointed William Carmichael, then charge d’affaires in Madrid, and William Short, recently elevated to American Minister Resident at The Hague, as joint commissioners plenipotentiary to conduct the Spanish negotiations. Before negotiations in Madrid could begin, the fabric of Euro¬ pean politics and diplomacy was rent by revolution in France. In beheading Louis XVI France destroyed her family alliance with the Bourbon monarchy of Spain. On February 1, 1793, the day that Short joined Carmichael in Madrid, France declared war on Spain. Not long after, on May 25, 1793, Spain and Great Britain signed a treaty of alliance; old friends were now enemies and old enemies were dedicated to a common cause. So upsetting to American diplomacy was this European diplo¬ matic revolution that the American commissioners in Madrid post¬ poned presenting their case. The new conditions called for new instructions. Soon after news of war between France and Spain reached America, Spanish border intrigues increased, and the atti¬ tude and conduct of the Spanish charges in Philadelphia toward the American government became intractable. Jefferson believed that the Spanish agents, now that the international situation as reflected in North America was favorable to Spain, were trying to provoke a war. Faced by two hostile and powerful neighbors who were now allies, the United States at this juncture could see no favorable solu- don to its border problems. 24 This was far different from the state 23 “The middle ground held by France between us and Spain,” Jefferson told Short at Paris, required that we place full confidence in France and particularly in Montmorin. Philadelphia, March 12, 1791, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. 24 According to Short, who had obtained a copy of the document, the new Anglo-Spanish alliance provided that a rupture with either ally would be cause for both states to unite against a third power. War with Spain at INTRIGUE 247 of affairs at the time of the Nootka Sound crisis in 1790. The inter¬ national situation, Indian raids along the borders, pressures of domes¬ tic politics, plus the dangerous burden of Genet placed the Washing¬ ton government in a serious dilemma in the summer of 1793. Carmichael and Short attempted to negotiate, but, as they had little or no bargaining power, their efforts proved fruitless. The Spaniards argued, delayed, and evaded. Under the circumstances no reason existed for acceding to American demands; the United States had nothing to offer to Spain and it was yet to be feared. When Carmichael left for the United States in January, 1794, the com¬ mission was dissolved; failure of the negotiation became a fact. -v~ -u. ~y. .y. .y. It "IP •7T 7V* •7V* If Genet’s plans were successful and Southwestern frontiersmen attacked Spanish Louisiana and Florida, there would be war with Spain. As an ally, an already hostile England was committed to join Spain and under the circumstances the United States might be crushed by two powerful neighbors. 20 Genet, moreover, had designs on Canada, dependent of course upon American support and co-operation, which, if carried out, would surely have arrayed England in open warfare against the United States. In propaganda directed to Canadians, Genet stressed that if delivered from English domination they would enjoy freedom, independence, and could join France and the United States in alliance. 26 Although war with Spain seemed probable in any case—Jefferson even considering it “absolutely inevitable”—when Washington’s Cabinet first heard of Genet’s disaster-breeding schemes in the sum¬ mer of 1793, it took prompt measures to forestall him. 27 As early this time would have meant also war with England. See Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 56. 26 Spain’s governor of Louisiana, Baron de Carondelet, for example, ap¬ pealed to John G. Simcoe, Britain’s lieutenant-governor in Canada, for assist¬ ance against Americans in the West. He told his superiors that Spanish and British policies in the West were similar and that the two nations would bene¬ fit mutually by aiding each other. Abraham P. Nasatir, “The Anglo-Spanish Frontier on the Upper Mississippi 1786-1796,” Iowa Journal of History and Politics (April, 1931), XXIX, 181-182. 29 “Les Fran^ais Libres a leurs freres les Canadiens,” pamphlet, n.p., n.d., Genet Papers, Library of Congress. 27 Jefferson to the Governor of Kentucky, Philadelphia, Aug. 29, 1793, ASP FR, I, 455; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 182-185. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 248 as February, 1793, there had been rumors and forewarnings of French designs on Spanish America. In hopes of enlisting Jeffer¬ son’s support, Genet sounded him out, “not as Secy, of State, but as Mr. Jeff.,” on his attitude toward French frontier schemes, particu¬ larly as set forth in Genet’s instructions to Michaux and his mani¬ festo to Canadians which urged diem to shake off England’s yoke and to rely on American friendship. 28 Under the impression that the Kentucky expeditions were to assemble outside the United States, Jefferson cautioned that Amer¬ icans enlisting in the Louisiana project would “be hung, if they commd. hostilities agt. a nation at peace with the U. S.,” then added significantly that he “did not care what insurrections should be excited in Louisiana.” According to Genet, he indicated also that “a small spontaneous irruption of Kentuckians into New Orleans would advance” the treaty negotiations then going on in Spain and might help in persuading Spain to concede a treaty along lines suggested by the United States. 29 At Genet’s request, Jefferson now revised a letter of introduction for Michaux to Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky. The original letter had recommended Michaux merely as a botanist, the revision implied that he had Jefferson’s confidence. The Secretary of State did this even though he knew that Michaux was to carry manifestos calling for rebellion against English rule in Canada and against Spanish rule in Louisiana as well as instructions for organizers of the invasion of Louisiana. 30 Despite the federal government’s promptness in trying to safe¬ guard American neutrality on the frontier, its immediate measures were not effective. Governor Shelby, for example, while at first 28 Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack. . . AHR, III, 663 - 669; Jefferson, The Anas, July 5, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 236. 29 Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, July 25, 1793, Turner, CFM, p. 221. 30 The Genet Papers, Library of Congress, contain accounts of Michaux’s expenditures and Genet’s advances to him. Box 46 contains records of secret expenditures. On July 14, 1793, for example, Genet gave Michaux $250.00 and on July 13, $500.00. Sent by Genet to co-operate with Michaux in the expedition aimed at Louisiana was a Louisiana Creole, Auguste Lachaise, who was made a head of brigade. AAE CP EU, [Paris], 1795, ff. 194-195. For details on Jefferson’s role, see Bemis, “Jefferson,” in Bemis, The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 82. INTRIGUE 249 promising co-operation, refused to prosecute alleged offenders. He pleaded that all citizens had a right to leave the state and that he had no power to prevent them from going and taking arms with them, even if the arms were destined for use against Spain. This had been a good occasion, he said later, to impress upon the national government the need to open the Mississippi. 31 Not understanding the international complications involved, the settlers saw this as an opportunity to take the settlement of the river navigation question into their own hands. Sentiment in Kentucky, commented an astute English observer, indicated “that the project of opening by force the navigation of the Mississippi is not merely a transient senti¬ ment of individuals, but is the fixed universal determination of the great mass of the inhabitants of that part of American territory.” 32 The frontiersmen were in no mood to be stopped by mere ad¬ monitions from the government in Philadelphia. Clark and his men were almost ready to crash into Louisiana, and other forces in Georgia and South Carolina were prepared to invade Florida. For¬ tunately, a combination of circumstances beyond Genet’s control blocked the realization of his invasion plans. Realizing with alarm that the West was in turmoil and perhaps ripe for general insurrection, Washington’s government now took decisive steps to meet the peril and to alleviate Western grievances. These were coupled with the measures designed to uphold Amer¬ ican neutrality. At this juncture, on December 31, 1793, Jefferson, who had sympathized with Western grievances and who had looked upon Genet’s frontier schemes in a more favorable light than had Hamilton and Washington, retired from the State Department. With his resignation Westerners lost their best friend in govern¬ ment. 33 Not long afterward President Washington, on March 24, 1794, issued what was in effect a second proclamation of neutrality. The proclamation’s warning was specific. All men taking part in Western expeditions against Spanish lands, it said, would be prose¬ cuted. To give the proclamation teeth, the neutrality act of June 5, 81 See Shelby’s two letters to Jefferson of Oct. 5, 1793, and Jan. 13, 1794, in ASP FR, I, 455-456; Henderson, “Isaac Shelby,” MVHR, VI, 467; Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , pp. 162-164. 82 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, June 24, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts. 83 Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier. . . , p. 188. 250 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 1794, embodied the proclamation’s provisions into statutory law. The new law prohibited foreign enlistments in the United States, a rule which has guided American neutral conduct to the present. 34 More effective in preserving American neutrality than the gov¬ ernment’s actions, which came after Genet’s enterprises had begun to collapse, were the French minister’s desperate need for funds to finance his projects and the sequence of events in Europe. Having been refused advance payment on the American debt to France, Genet had nowhere to turn for the funds essential in equipping the frontier forces. His coup against Louisiana, the Spanish governor of the province believed, “failed only because of lack of money.” 30 No help could be expected from France, where, by June, 1793, Jaco¬ bins had replaced Girondins. So hard pressed in Europe was the Jacobin regime that it could devote little energy, let alone money, to American enterprises. It recalled Genet, disavowed his activities, and abandoned the frontier projects. Then, on March 6, 1794, Joseph Fauchet, the succeeding French minister, issued a procla¬ mation which quashed the projects and Genet’s already-completed arrangements. 36 34 For the proclamation of March 24, 1794, see Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 304-305; for the neutrality act of June 5, 1794, see The Statutes at Large of the United States of America, I, 381-384; the legislation is discussed in Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, p. 137 and in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 278-279. While attention has been focused on the more numerous and more significant French neutrality prob¬ lems, this is not to imply that there were none with the British. The British, for example, hatched plots against French territory. In one case they planned an expedition from American soil against Saint Domingue. Ibid., p. 187 n. 35 Baron de Carondelet to Juan Delavillebeuvre, New Orleans, April 23, 1794, in Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1945), IV, 271. The financial deficiency was viewed by contemporary Westerners also as a major handicap; see James White to Gayoso de Lemos, Feb. 1, 1794. White spoke of “large promises” by the French unaccompanied by even a “denier of money.” Ibid., p. 252. Judge Henry Innes of Kentucky, Feb. 14, 1794, also wrote to the Spanish governor Gayoso de Lemos in the same vein. He prophesied that the Clark-Genet expedition would “unques¬ tionably fail as it has not the essential ingredients of money and Influence.” Ibid., p. 257. Not being paid, Clark’s men, for example, took to plunder. Columbia Gazette (Columbia, S. C.), June 27, 1794. 36 Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, March 27, 1794, and Turner, “Mangourit Correspondence. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1897), p. 629, contain Fauchet’s proclamation; see also E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy, 1759-1804, p. 72. INTRIGUE 251 If Fauchet had not stopped the projected invasions when he did, the leaders of the projects, despite all handicaps, would at least have attempted them.” Apparently the reasoning of French authorities in halting them was that they did not wish to make still another enemy for France, no matter how weak. The Louisiana and Florida projects were violations of American neutrality; to retain the alliance and American friendship France had to abandon them. 38 Events in Europe, furthermore, caused a change in Spanish diplomacy to the advantage of the United States. The Spanish government, increasingly dissatisfied with its English alliance, saw advantages in American friendship. In the summer of 1794, therefore, it made overtures to the United States to renew disrupted negotiations, re¬ questing that Washington send a new plenipotentiary to Madrid. This request gave birth to the Thomas Pinckney mission, which gained what Westerners had been demanding. Europe’s troubles had worked to America’s advantage, not only to save the United States from an unwanted war but also to settle a festering domestic problem. 39 * JJ, JL JL Jt •Jv if TV" if 37 Mangourit, for example, tried to convince Fauchet’s agent that it was too late to halt the East Florida expedition. Murdoch, “Citizen Mangourit. . . ,” JSH, XIV, 439; see also Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy. . . , p. 77. For Spanish officialdom’s reaction to the projected invasions, see “Circular Addressed by the Government to all the Inhabitants of Louisiana, Feb. 4, 1794,” by Baron de Carondelet, the governor of Louisiana and West Florida, in Kinnaird, “Spain in the Mississippi Valley,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1945), IV, 255-257. Despite drawbacks and handicaps faced by the expeditions, chances for success were not illusory because of the pitiable condition of the Spanish defenses. See Baron de Carondelet to Duke de Alcudia, Spanish Secretary of State, New Orleans, Jan. 1, 1794, in Turner, “Draper Collection,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1896), pp. 1027-1029. Carondelet predicted the loss of Louisiana in case Clark invaded. 88 Turner, “The Origins of Genet’s Projected Attack. . . ,” AHR, III, 671; Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplomacy. . . , pp. 72-73; Fauchet did not com¬ pletely stop the planned invasions. After Genet’s recall a small force landed in Florida and a few French and Americans assembled in Georgia. Francois Barbe-Marbois, The History of Louisiana (Philadelphia, 1830), p. 159. 39 Whitaker, Spanish-American Frontier. . . , pp. 182-183; Bemis, Pinck¬ ney’s Treaty, pp. 239-241; Bemis points out that the decision to send Pinckney to Madrid had been made before the Anglo-American crisis of 1794 which led to the Jay treaty; for the effect of Jay’s treaty on the Spanish negotiations, see pp. 249-279; for a “French view of Genet’s conduct,” [ca. Oct., 1793], see Turner, CFM, p. 283-286. 252 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE A distinctive feature of Genet’s mission and of the American reac¬ tion to the French Revolution was the rise of democratic societies. If they did not appear “as if by magic from one end of the continent to the other,” as Genet expressed it, these “popular” political organi¬ zations did rise swiftly and spread throughout the land in the wake of pro-French Republican sentiment. Philadelphians organized one of the first and most influential of these societies, which were mod¬ eled after the Jacobin clubs of France, a few days after Genet’s arrival. Its leaders lost no time in approaching the French minister. Asked to pick a name for the newly organized club, which some proposed to call “The Sons of Liberty,” Genet suggested the title that was adopted, “Democratic Club.” 40 Once organized, the Phila¬ delphia club sent out invitations for the formation of affiliated socie¬ ties. From all parts of the nation came quick and generally favor¬ able responses. 41 The democratic society of the national capital thus inaugurated something of a national movement. 42 Complex though the origins of the democratic societies are, this seems clear. They were pro-French alliance, pro-French, and anti- English; they were vociferous in their attachment to the French 10 Quoted from Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 219-220; see also Genet, Washing¬ ton, Jefferson and "Citizen” Genet, 7793, p. 34. Genet, reported Hammond, had been instrumental in re-establishing and supporting a club in Philadelphia affiliated to the Jacobin clubs in France. Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. 41 The following account of the Democratic Societies, while based also on varied and independent sources, relies heavily on Link, Democratic-Republi¬ can Societies. . . . Republican leaders in Pennsylvania worked to convert popular interest in the European war into enthusiasm for domestic politics. Alexander J. Dallas, an organizer of the Philadelphia Society, and his cohorts worked to make the society a means of organizing anti-Federalists in the state and nation into a cohesive political group. Walters, Alexander James Dallas, pp. 45-46. For a contemporary account of formation of the Phila¬ delphia society by one of its vice presidents, see Charles Biddle, Autobiography of Charles Biddle, 1745-1821, pp. 252-253. Biddle’s Federalist friends thought he “could be of service by moderating some of the most violent of the party [Republicans] who were inclined to do anything that would involve us in a war with Great Britain.” See also Warren, Jacobin and Junto, p. 53. 42 Citizens of Lexington, Kentucky, for example, embraced “the laudable objects of the Philadelphia Society.” Kentucky Gazette (Lexington), Aug. 24, 1793. Similar society principles were adopted by the Norfolk society. Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, June 13, 1793. In Boston, formation of a Democratic Society attracted great attention and excitement. Morse, The Federalist Party in Massachusetts. . . , pp. 74-75. INTRIGUE 2 53 Revolution; diey were antimonarchical, anti-Federalist, and pro- Republican; and they were suspicious of the federal government while sympathetic to Genet. 43 From these societies, which func- doned apparently as early polidcal pressure groups, Genet received considerable popular support. In welcoming Genet, one society deplored that England, “a na¬ tion from whom we are descended should be among the first in the conspiracy against liberty.” 44 Devotion to France and the French Revolution led a society in Charleston to petition the Jacobin Club in Paris for adoption. “Americans must be alarmed!” declared one of the manifestos; “the interest and preservation of France is that of America.” On another occasion it said that “if the present eventful European contest should terminate in the dissolution of the French Republic, we have no doubt but that the craving appetite of despo¬ tism will be satisfied with nothing less than American vassalage in some form or other.” 45 In almost all conflicts over neutrality and treaty interpretation between Genet and Washington’s government the democratic socie¬ ties supported the French minister. A foremost tenet in their pro- French crusade was support for the French alliance. Piling resolu¬ tion on resolution, they demanded that the government honor the alliance. At their festive gatherings they drank to such toasts as “The Alliance between the Sister Republics of the United States and France. May their union be as incorporate as light and heat and their friendship as lasting as time.” 46 The club in Portland, 48 See Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 125 ff.; Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 194-195; William Miller, “The Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Insurrection,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXII (July, 1938), 234; Warren, Jacobin and Junto, p. 56. 44 German Republican Society of Philadelphia to Genet, Philadelphia, May 5, 1793, signed Henry Kammerer, Pres., Genet Papers, Library of Congress, IX, 2785. 45 The quotations are from a printed pamphlet addressed to the citizens of Charleston, Aug. 20, 1793, in the Genet Papers, Box 49; from Baltimore Daily Repository, Sept. 18, 1793, cited in Eugene P. Link, “The Democratic Societies of the Carolinas,” North Carolina Historical Review, XVIII (July, 1941), 270; see also Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 195-196. 48 This toast was raised in the presence of Genet’s successor, Fauchet, in Philadelphia on May 1, 1794. Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , p. 72. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 254 Maine, declared “that the cause of France is our own, that our Interest, Liberty and public happiness are involved in her fate, that we are bound to support her by every type of principle and grati¬ tude as well as principle of self-preservation.” 47 Another resolution from the Pennsylvania society said that “we ought to resist to the utmost of our power all attempts to alienate our affections from France and detach us from her alliance.” 4t> Other democratic societies were not so timorous; they called for war by the side of America’s transatlantic ally. In cities such as Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York, Americans organized French benevolent and patriotic societies to propagandize for the French Revolution. These French clubs were more akin in their revolutionary zeal and other aspects to the French Jacobin clubs than were the so-called democratic societies, which were more concerned with American political problems. 49 Little wonder that Genet was swayed. He saw about him evi¬ dence indicating that public support for him and the alliance was greater than for the Federalist administration. His efforts to array the United States alongside republican France in her struggle seemed to fit what he construed to be public sentiment. One society even asked its members to arm in defense of the Rights of Man; another, believing war inevitable, called on “all good republican citizens to provide themselves as speedily as possible with such implements of war as may be necessary for their defence.” 50 In keeping with pro-French sentiments, the democratic societies directed some of their wrath against Washington’s proclamation of neutrality. In scornful denunciations, they tarred the proclamation as despotic, unconstitutional, and as an attempt to replace republican government with government by proclamation. In the clubs there was talk of need for a change in government to save democracy. 17 Portland Republican Society Papers, cited in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, p. 128. “The Democratic Society of Pennsylvania, Resolution of Jan. 9, 1794, quoted from Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , p. 68. The Newark Democratic Society, for example, concerned itself with the spread of political information and propaganda. See, Transition from Aristoc¬ racy to Democracy in New Jersey. . . , pp. 40-50. 60 Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, p. 129; Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the Trench Revolution, p. 198. INTRIGUE 2 55 Even Washington himself could not escape attacks by the societies . 51 With the announcement of the Jay mission to England, the abuse heaped upon the President increased. All the societies apparently passed resolutions condemning Jay’s appointment and denouncing the mission. In castigating Jay the New York society declared, a few days after his departure, “We take pleasure in avowing that we are lovers of the French nation; that we esteem their cause as our own.” Hence, “he who is an enemy to the French revolution [Jay] . . . ought not to be intrusted with the guidance of any part of the machine of government.” Viewing the war in Europe as “a war of tyrants against liberty,” the democratic clubs wanted no dealings with Britain, “the cham¬ pion of despotism.” A society in Virginia pleaded, “Let us unite with France and stand or fall together.” Calling for a repudiation of Washington’s policies, particularly the Jay appointment, it la¬ mented that Genet had been “abused,” France denied her treaty privileges, and Americans wishing to aid France with their arms “prosecuted as traitors.” To prevent what it termed despotism and to chastise the executive for what it termed “misconduct,” the society urged Americans to “consider well this experiment”: to amend the Constitution to limit the President’s tenure of office to eight years . 52 After the contents of the Jay treaty became public, democratic so¬ cieties organized mass meetings protesting the “British Treaty,” pub¬ lished public protests in the newspapers, passed scathing resolutions blasting the Federalist document, and circulated antitreaty petitions. Members of one club, while not willing to indulge in the popular 61 See, for example, the resolutions of the Democratic Society of Pennsyl¬ vania of Jan. 9 and April io, 1794, Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia • • • * PP- 67-71. 62 The quotations are from Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 200-203, citing the Independent Chronicle (Boston), May 19 and Aug. 11, 1794. On the other hand, staunch New England Federalist Harrison Gray Otis wrote to his wife, “Should Great Britain be compelled to yield, it is my opinion that our liberties and independence would fall a sacrifice. She is the only barrier to the dreadful deluge, and when that is broken down, it will be time for us to prepare to be good and dutiful subjects to the French.’’ N.p., n.d., cited in Samuel E. Morison, The Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, I, 51. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 256 sport of burning Jay in effigy, left little doubt as to their feelings by indicating, “if the original were here —!” 53 The opposition of the democratic societies to Washington’s for¬ eign policy demonstrates that in their first great crisis in foreign relations, Americans used foreign policy as a political football. Pres¬ sure groups everywhere not only opposed the government’s foreign policy—in many instances merely for domestic political considera¬ tions—but worked also to sabotage it . 54 Their objectives were goals —ideological, political, and economic—which Federalists opposed. They worked against incumbent office-holders, and supported candi¬ dates, almost always Republican, who were favorable to their views; they electioneered. In these political activities their more imme¬ diate objectives varied according to local conditions, but in opposing the national government, particularly in foreign policy, they shared objectives and features common to all of the clubs. In fighting the Federalists, men of the democratic societies went so far in their opposition to lawful governmental leaders as to look upon a repre¬ sentative of a foreign government as a champion of their principles. They trusted Genet, apparently, more than the Washington admin¬ istration . 50 In resorting to direct action in the West and in aiding Genet’s frontier projects, the democratic societies not only acted against a political opposition they distrusted, but in a sense they also revolted against the federal government. * * * * # In attacking the government and in defending France the demo¬ cratic societies created a widespread clamor, but equally vehement 53 South Carolina State Gazette, Nov. 26, 1795, quoted in Link, Demo¬ cratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 133. 34 When, for instance, the New York Democratic Society was established (Feb., 1794), it was joined by so many members of the Tammany Society that the two organizations became almost identical and hence both took on pro-French political coloring. Edwin P. Kilroe, Saint Tammany and the Origin of the Society of Tammany (New York, 1913), p. 92; for evidence of the pro-French attitude of Tammany, see Peter Paulson, “The Tammany Society and the Jeffersonian Movement in New York City, 1795-1800,” New Yor^ History, XXXIV (Jan. 1953), 72-84. 66 At a dinner party given in Philadelphia by a militia regiment, the guests raised a toast to Genet but refused to do the same for Washington. Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 180; see also Minnigerode, Genet, 222. INTRIGUE 257 were the Federalist denunciations of the clubs . 56 How large their national following or how representative of public sentiment the democratic clubs were perhaps will never be known. The mere fact that they aroused frenzied opposition and that their hold upon the public caused alarm would indicate they had a substantial following. Yet Federalists denied that the clamor raised by the societies was, as the Republicans boasted, the voice of the people. They claimed that the societies and the ideas for which they stood represented only a small segment of public opinion, or as one editor said, “Great Cry and Little Wool.” 5 ' In any case, the “Great Cry” of the democratic clubs frightened anti-Republicans and men of wealth; they were afraid of anything, anybody, any idea which might agitate the populace. To them the societies appeared a threat to order, stability, property, and to the vital financial tie to England; an association of political Jesuits “which must be crushed in its infancy or it would certainly crush the government .” 58 Federalists said “the Genet begotten Clubs abuse every man as an enemy to his country who opposes their arrogant assumption of power. These Clubs are become the tyrants of America .” 59 To Hamilton’s wealthy followers, of whom a prominent con¬ temporary said “Gain is their God, and present gain is their polar star,” the mere mention of the democratic clubs aroused anger. The societies would introduce into government, horrified Federalists warned, “all the heat and ungovernable passions of a simple democ¬ racy .” 60 One Virginia dame denounced the democratic society in Kentucky as “that horrible sink of treason,—that hateful synagogue 50 John Quincy Adams, as an illustration, irrespective of political expediency refused to attend “the anarchical dinner” of the Boston society. The clubs, he declared, were “the folly of the day,” to John Adams, Boston, Feb. 10, 1793, Ford, The Writings of John Ouincy Adams, I, 134. 67 Independent Chronicle (Boston), March 2, 1795, quoted in Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 203. 68 Noah Webster, “To the Public,” New York, March 4, 1797, in Warfel, ed., Letters of Webster, p. 146. 69 American Minerva, reprinted in the Georgia Gazette (Savannah), June 19, 1794. The quotations are from Horatio Gates to Madison, n.p., n.d., cited in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 176; Nathaniel Chipman to Hamilton, Rutland, Vermont, Jan. 9, 1794, in Daniel Chipman, The Life of Hon. Nathaniel Chipman (Boston, 1846), pp. 398-399. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 258 of anarchy,—that odious conclave of tumult,—that frightful cathe¬ dral of discord,—that poisonous garden of conspiracy,—that hellish school of rebellion and opposition to all regular and well-balanced authority.” 61 Within the Federalist hierarchy the wrathful voices spoke out charging that the clubs sought to overthrow the Constitution and to destroy the federal system. Oliver Wolcott, Jr., warned “that these popular societies speak the sentiments of certain demagogues, and that the clubs consist of hot-headed, ignorant, or wicked men, de¬ voted entirely to the views of France.” Fisher Ames denounced the “rabble formed into a club,” and ranted that the clubs “were born in sin, the impure offspring of Genet.” He said that “they poison every spring; they whisper lies to every gale,” but that “such foes are to be feared as well as despised.” At election time “they will be as busy as Macbeth’s witches.” 62 Behind the societies many saw the specter of Revolutionary France; they were convinced that the clubs stemmed from those of the dreaded Jacobins in Paris. 63 The danger that they might inspire revolutionary changes in the United States as they had in France and that they might force a realignment in wealth and property led Federalists to launch vicious assaults on them. Spurred on by the knowledge that they had much to lose and nothing to gain by social change, political upheaval, and wartime collaboration with France, they threw ethics aside and fought a death struggle. In Federalist hands a formidable weapon was economic coercion. In Philadelphia in 1793 the large merchants agreed to boycott a marine insurance businessman, Clement Biddle, because of his pro- 61 Virginia Chronicle, July 17, 1794, quoted in Link, Democratic-Republi¬ can Societies. . . , p. 175. Along the same vein a clergyman described the “Jacobins” of the societies as men with “Hell in their heart, and faction on their tongue.” Warren, Jacobin and Junto, p. 54. 62 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, April 14, 1794, Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 134; the Fisher Ames quotations are from Warren, Jacobin and Junto, pp. 56-57, and Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 204. 63 John Quincy Adams wrote, for public consumption: “And as to the democratic societies, they are so perfectly affiliated to the Parisian Jacobins that their origin from a common parent cannot possibly be mistaken,” writing as “Columbus” in the Columbian Centinel (Boston), Dec. 4, 1793, reprinted in Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, I, 156; see also La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels, II, 516-517. INTRIGUE 259 French activities. The same merchants also coerced their employees. To keep their jobs the employees were compelled to vote Federalist. Even the mails were not safe; members of the societies had to exer¬ cise care to keep their mail from being intercepted. At their meet¬ ings they had to guard against rowdies who might turn the gather¬ ings into riots and so lend substance to Federalist charges that the societies were riotous. During elections Republicans had to be vigi¬ lant against fraud and rigged results. Even physical violence had to be warded off, and often was not. 64 Among countermeasures designed to destroy the influence of the popular sociedes Federalists organized antidemocratic societies. While it was true that before the popular clubs had come into existence wealthy conservatives had benefited from organization, and that as Federalists they continued to enjoy powerful support from chambers of commerce and from the Society of Cincinnati, such organizations were not enough. Federalists created the new organizations for the specific purpose of countering the influence of the popular societies, to “check the wild and Jacobinical self-created clubs.” In line with these aims they took such patriotic-sounding names as “The Constitutional Association” (Elizabeth-town, New Jersey) and the “Society of Constitutional and Governmental Sup¬ port” (Norfolk, Virginia). Even George Washington lent his sup¬ port to these ostensibly patriotic organizations. 65 More important than the antidemocratic organizations in com¬ batting the popular societies and the Republicans was the Federalist- dominated press. To keep such journals as John Fenno’s Gazette of the United States (Philadelphia), Noah Webster’s American Minerva (New York), and Benjamin Russell’s Columbian Centinel (Boston) financially viable, wealthy Federalists poured money into them. While Republicans may have exaggerated in contending that the country’s press was overwhelmingly in Federalist hands, their claims may not have been far from the truth. Even in the 1790’s newspapers were substantial businesses requiring capital in¬ vestment, and as business ventures they were controlled by business¬ men. Most of the businessmen were Federalists. Logically, those 61 Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 187. ,6 Ibid., p. 188. 260 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE who supported the press controlled it. Most newspapers in the Fed¬ eralist era were Federalist organs. 66 Through their subsidized press the Federalists were able to im¬ pede or stop the flow of information on activities of the popular societies or of the Republicans. One result of this press dominance was propaganda, widely circulated and widely believed, that the American government was being undermined by “French gold” and that “foreign influence” manipulated the democratic societies. Another piece of effective press strategy directed against the popular clubs was the publication of announcements, without basis in fact, that various clubs had disbanded; this to belittle the societies and to show that they were losing popular support. 67 In part, the Federalist campaign to discredit the democratic clubs was a scheme to destroy Genet. The Federalists believed that the French republican’s popular support came mainly from the demo¬ cratic societies or was whipped up by their activities; they were con¬ vinced that the democratic clubs, “composed of men of superficial minds and low manners” were founded by Genet. To discredit them would be to destroy Genet’s influence. 68 68 For Federalist backing of Webster’s Minerva, see Warfel, Noah Webster, 223-224. In March, 1794, Webster wrote a pamphlet entitled Revolution in France, considered in respect to its Progress and Effects, in which he violently attacked the democratic clubs. Like Washington he detested party spirit which to him was faction—actually opposition—which in turn was death to existing government. Ibid., pp. 228-229. Webster sent a copy of his pamphlet to Washington with an accompanying letter in which he stated that it was “the duty of every good citizen to use his influence in restraining the violence of parties. . . .” Webster to Washington, New York, April 20, 1794, in Warfel, Letters of Noah Webster, pp. 117-118. Washington’s first administration, according to Washington’s latest biographer, enjoyed “the solid endorsement and unqualified esteem of a great majority of the influen¬ tial newspapers of the land.” Freeman, Washington, VI, 399. 87 For details and documentation, see Link, Democratic-Republican Soci¬ eties. . . , pp. 189-190; for political influence of the press see also the com¬ ments in Warren, Jacobin and Junto, p. 127; the author of a Republican pam¬ phlet in 1800 complained that France in the 1790’s received an unfair and even vicious press. Abraham Bishop, Connecticut Republicanism-. An Oration on the Extent and Power of Political Delusion. . . (Philadelphia, 1800), pp. 4 8 - 5 i - , / . 88 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 9, 1795 (Prince¬ ton); Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 191. The democratic societies were not introduced into the United States by Genet; to him belonged little credit or discredit for them, except in indirect influence. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 486. INTRIGUE 261 Highly placed Federalists, as will be seen, were responsible for spreading the story that Genet not only had defied Washington but also had threatened an “appeal to the people.” Such a threat, in the context of the times, carried implications of revolt and mob rule. Whether or not the story was true mattered little; the accusa¬ tion was sufficient. Repeated often enough, it smothered or made fruitless any denials. In the story’s retelling the name Genet selciom was mentioned without a derogatory adjective; overnight the story distorted the popular hero of the societies and Republicans into a villainous monster. In New England, Federalists expanded his villainy to include murder, practically regicide; they jolted people with the fabrication that he had assassinated George Washington. 69 To malign Genet and to bring about his downfall, Federal¬ ists resorted to their greatest public asset, the person and prestige of George Washington. “We go on as usual,” wrote John Adams, “Congress resolving one thing and the democratical societies resolv¬ ing the contrary; the President doing what is right, and the clubs and mobs resolving it to be all wrong.”'" Already a revered figure, Washington was made the object of a Federalist campaign of deifi¬ cation. Federalists apotheosized him in song, story, and poetry. Federalists drank “To Washington—loved as a father, as a god adored.” The campaign began not long after he became Presi¬ dent. His name, noted William Maclay in December, 1790, was “brought forward as the constant cover to every unconstitutional and irrepublican act.”' 1 As the government became wholly Federal¬ ist, as it lost almost all semblance of being nonpolitical, Federalists increased their efforts to enhance the popular esteem of the Presi¬ dent. The war-spawned foreign policy crisis, the democratic socie¬ ties, and the coming of Genet into the midst of an aroused pro- French public sentiment drove Federalists to exploit Washington and the magic of his name to the utmost. Even this was not enough. Abandoning, in practice if not in theory, the myth of being above partisan politics, Washington him- 69 The assassination story is in the Mirrour (Concord), Dec. 16, 1793, cited in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 192. 70 Adams to wife, Philadelphia, May 10, 1794, C. F. Adams, ed., Letters of fohn Adams Addressed to his Wife, II, 159. 71 Maclay, Journal, Dec. 14, 1790, p. 341; see also Link, Democratic-Repub¬ lican Societies. . . , pp. 192-193. 262 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE self finally battled the democratic societies and Republican oppo¬ nents of his administration. Angered by their attacks on him and his government’s policies, the President was willing to believe almost anything about the societies and to impute to them almost any degree of treachery.' 2 When the Whiskey Rebellion broke out, Washing¬ ton, along with other Federalist leaders, placed the blame on the democratic clubs. Clearly, he pointed out on August 26, 1794, the insurrection was “the first formidable fruit of the Democratic Socie¬ ties; brought forth,” he forecast ominously, “too prematurely for their own views, which may contribute to the annihilation of them.” He was convinced that the societies were established “by the artful and designing members . . . primarily to sow the seeds of jealousy and distrust among people, of the government, by destroying all confidence in the Administration of it. . . .”' 3 In his correspondence and elsewhere, Washington continued to place the onus for rebellion and general turmoil on the popular organizations and Genet. “But how can things be otherwise than they are,” he said, “when clubs and Societies have been instituted for die express purpose though clothed in another garb by their diabolical leader G[ene]t whose object was to sow sedidon, to poison the minds of the people of this Country, and to make them discon [tentejd with the Government of it, and who have labored indefatigably to effect these purposes.” 74 Then, in his annual mes¬ sage of November 19, 1794, the President delivered a withering blow, damning the democratic clubs as “self-created societies” which by “formal concert” sought to destroy the government. 70 72 Sears, George Washington, p. 445. 73 Washington to Henry Lee, Germantown, Aug. 26, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 475-476. Like other Federalists, Washington believed that Genet was the “father” of the Democratic Societies. 71 Washington to Major Gen. Daniel Morgan, Carlisle, Oct. 8, 1794, ibid., p. 524; see also Washington to Burges Ball, Philadelphia, Sept. 25, 1794, ibid., pp. 505-507. ,6 The text is in ibid., pp. 28-37. Federalists, of course, echoed Washington’s refrain; see, for example, William Vans Murray to James McHenry, Phila¬ delphia, Dec. 16, 1794, Bernard C. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of fames McHenry, pp. 155-156. Vice-President John Adams, however, while disapproving of the disorders attributed to the clubs believed that the clubs had a perfect right to exist, “that political clubs must and ought to be lawful in every free country.” Adams to wife, Philadelphia, Dec. 14, 1794, in C. F. Adams, ed.. Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife, II, 171. INTRIGUE 263 To James Madison and other Republicans, the “game” was obvi¬ ous: “to connect the democratic societies with the odium of the insur¬ rection—to connect the Republicans in Cong [ res ]s with those Socie¬ ties—to put the P[resident] ostensibly at the head of the other party, in opposition to both. . . .”‘ 6 Even though Republicans saw through and tried to counteract Federalist maneuvers, and even though the democratic societies in general had no connection with the Whiskey Rebellion and were vehement in their denials, Washington’s shot¬ gun denunciation was a heavy if not mortal blow." Federalist tactics proved eminently successful. The awesome prestige of Gen¬ eral Washington, plus blanket condemnation, plus guilt by associa¬ tion were almost impossible to combat. One effect of Washington’s denunciation, however, was to focus public attention on the societies in many places where in the past they had been practically ignored. ,t! Jefferson, for example, de¬ fended the popular organizations; Madison termed Washington’s denunciation “perhaps the greatest error of his political life.”' 11 Other Republicans agreed, and even some Federalists believed, that the President was losing his hold on the public imagination. Men began to talk of turning Washington out of office. His support, as mild Federalist Elbridge Gerry later pointed out, came from “the union of the funded, bank, commercial, Cincinnati and anti-revolu- 79 Madison to James Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 4, 1794, in Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VI, 223; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution. . . , p. 417. 77 Washington’s denunciation “was the most powerful cause of the decline and ultimate disappearance of the clubs.” Miller, “The Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Insurrection,” PMHB, LXII, 325, 334. An acute French observer in the United States also concluded that Washington’s condemnation completed destruction of the clubs. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Travels. . . , I, 43-44. For a contemporary denial that the societies were instrumental in fomenting the Whiskey Rebellion, supposedly expressing sentiment represent¬ ing all the societies, see the Independent Chronicle and the Universal Adver¬ tiser (Boston), Oct. 6, 1794. For an appraisal of Washington’s role in the Whiskey Rebellion, see Bennett M. Rich, “Washington and the Whiskey Insurrection,” PMHB, LXV (July, 1941), 334-352; also in Rich, The Pres¬ idents and Civil Disorder, pp. 2-20. 78 Woodbury, Public Opinion in Philadelphia. . . , p. 115. 79 “The denunciation of the democratic societies is one of the extraordinary acts of boldness of which we have seen so many from the fraction of mono- crats.” Jefferson to Madison, Monticello, Dec. 28, 1794, Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 516; Madison to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 4, 1794, Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VI, 222. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 264 tionary or monarchical interest.” 80 The more radical opposition now turned on Washington, denouncing “idolatry for a popular citizen.” One Republican club member toasted Washington as “a despot from the South, with Democracy on his lips and tyranny in his heart.” 81 More important than name-calling and the personal reaction against Washington were the fundamental issues raised by opponents of the government. With reasoned argument they ac¬ cused the administration of attempting to muzzle opposition and stifle freedom of expression. 82 Among Federalists, however, joy reigned; with them Washing¬ ton’s stock soared to new heights. Seizing his formal denunciation, Federalists turned to Congress to place the seal of death on organized “sedition.” 83 The Senate, controlled by Hamiltonians, responded promptly to the President; using his own words, it passed a motion of censure on the societies. 84 But in the House of Representatives Federalists could not beat down Republican strength. For four days the House debated and in the end refused to sanction a blanket condemnation. William Branch Giles, zealous anti-Hamiltonian from Virginia, could not sit silent “when he saw, or thought he saw the House of Representatives about to erect itself into an office of censorship.” 80 In attacking the President’s phrase “self-created,” which the House struck out of the proposed con¬ demnation by a two-vote margin, he raised his voice against guilt 80 Gerry to John Adams, April 25, 1797, Gerry Papers, quoted in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , pp. 194-195. 81 Quoted in ibid., p. 195. 82 Baltimore Daily Advertiser, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Freder¬ icksburg Advertiser, Jan. 15, 1795. 88 Referring to Washington’s denunciation of the societies, Jeremiah Smith, Jeffersonian-hating Federalist congressman from New Hampshire, wrote to Samuel Smith, Nov. 20, 1794, that “we smile and they pout. They feel it. Let their mortification be increased tenfold.” John H. Morison, Life of the Hon. feremiah Smith, LL.D. (Boston, 1845), p. 65. Regardless of the con¬ nection between the societies and the whiskey uprising, Federalists were determined to squeeze party advantage from it. See also Link, Democratic- Republican Societies, p. 196; Miller, “Democratic Societies and the Whiskey Insurrection,” PMHB, LXII, 348. 81 Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., Nov. 21, 1794; the vote is re¬ corded on pp. 943-945 (Nov. 27, 1794); Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 205. 86 For Giles’s comments, see Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., Nov. 24, 1794, pp. 899-901. INTRIGUE 265 by association and in support of freedom of thought and lawful organization. In America “there was not an individual who might not come under the charge of being a member of some one or other self-created society,” he said, be it religious, political, philosophical, or otherwise. Baptists and Methodists, for example, might be cate¬ gorized as “self-created.” Believing that Congress should avoid legislation designed in any way to circumscribe public opinion, he favored allowing established law to take its course. If the societies were illegal, he said, the law should act; if not, further legislation would be unwise. Giles was not alone in his stand; others echoed his sentiments. James Madison “conceived it to be a sound principle, that an action innocent in the eyes of the law could not be the object of censure to a Legislative body. . . . Opinions are not the objects of legisla- don.” A proper function of Congress, he believed, was to investi¬ gate public servants, but the democratic societies were private, not public agencies. Censure such as that proposed might easily be extended to freedom of speech and the press. The people had to be protected from congressional condemnation when not sanc¬ tioned by law. In answering Federalist contentions, he said “it is vain to say that this indiscriminate censure is no punishment.” Then he touched a heart-beat of democracy. “If we advert to die nature of Republican Government,” he said, “we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.” 86 To such declarations Federalists had responded that whenever such action was debated “there were certain gentlemen in that House, who shook their backs, like a sore-backed horse, and cried out The Liberties of the people.” Congressional condemnation, they said, would discourage the clubs, “by uniting all men of sense against them.” Theodore Sedgwick, consecrated New England Federalist, believed the censure salutary; it “would have a tendency to plunge these societies into contempt, and to sink them still further into abhorrence and detestation.” The conduct of the “despised and repenting societies,” he said, “differed as far from a fair and honor¬ able investigation as Christ and Belial.” 87 “The text in ibid., Nov. 27, 1794, pp. 934-935; quoted also in Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution. . . , p. 418. 87 Uriah Tracy, quoted from Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., 266 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Federalist oratorical salvos were not sufficient to win the battle; the House of Representatives adopted only a mild resolution, omit¬ ting a general damnation of the popular clubs. Federalists recog¬ nized this as a Republican victory and as a rebuke to Washington. He did not take the rebuke in silence; in a partisan blast at the House’s action he called upon the patriotism of the people to check the “artful approaches” to rebellion. 88 To James Madison and other leading Republicans, it was obvious that Washington was deep in party politics. Here, patently, was a political appeal for legislators of his own party. One reason for their defeat, felt wrathful Federalists, was that there were too many members of the societies in Congress; Jacobinism and Gallomania were too strong. The legislature must be cleansed; “mobocrats” must be weeded out and excluded. 89 While Washington’s descent into party politics did not crush opposition or destroy immediately all popular societies, his denun¬ ciations undoubtedly led to their loss of influence and hastened their demise. Although they retreated before the Federalist assault, for awhile they fought back and were influential in electing several Republicans to congressional posts. A few scattered societies were formed after Washington’s condemnation. They had been stigma¬ tized, however, and were on the way to obscurity. 90 Another important factor hastening their end was the attack on the clubs made by leaders of the clergy. 91 In the theological mind the societies were associated with the irreligion and exaggerated outrages of the French Revolution. One fire-spouting preacher Nov. 24, 1794, p. 903; Sedgewick quoted from ibid., Nov. 25, 1794, p. 911; see also Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 206-207. 88 Washington to the House, Nov. 29, 1794, Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., p. 950. 88 See Madison to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 4, 1794, Hunt, The Writings of fames Madison, VI, 219-227; Brant, James Madison: Father of the Consti¬ tution. . . , p. 419. 80 Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , pp. 200-203; Hazen, Contem¬ porary American Opinion of the French Revolution, pp. 207-208; Federalists, however, were still fearful of the societies; see for example, Jay to Pickering, New York, Aug. 17, 1795, in Pickering, The Life of Timothy Pickering, III, 197-198. 81 Vernon Stauffer, New England and the Bavarian Illuminati, pp. m-112; Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , p. 197. INTRIGUE 267 assigned the French to perdition as “execrable monsters” who had desecrated the Sabbath, denied God, immortality, and the resurrec¬ tion. They had butchered 2,000,000 people, men, women, and chil¬ dren, including 24,000 men of the cloth! As mothers pleaded for their children, their outstretched hands were chopped off. The in¬ human perpetrators of these deeds were the wretched sponsors of the popular societies. Obviously then, the societies were sowers of sedi¬ tion infiltrating the country to divide and weaken it. Seen thus as an aspect of the French Revolution, the societies prompted clergymen to throw their potent influence behind Federalists. 92 In addition, Pinckney’s treaty, by winning navigation of the Mississippi, calmed pro-French Westerners; Jay’s treaty, although thunderously damned, placated many frontiersmen because it brought actual evacuation of the British-held Northwest posts; “Mad” Anthony Wayne’s victory at Fallen Timbers and the ensuing Treaty of Greenville freed the Northwest from the Indian menace and ushered in a period of comparative peace and security. With these developments the immediate grievances of the Westerner against the government lost some of their urgency, and the societies lost some of their support. Without much external distraction men could now devote themselves to exploiting the trans-Appalachian wilderness. Events in France, too, contributed to alienating American support for the popular societies and to quenching pro-French ardor in the United States. As the French Revolution became more violent, as Jacobins replaced Girondins, not only did the French-oriented democratic societies fall under a cloud but also some Republicans became alarmed. Newspaper stories and Federalist propaganda, much of it based on facts, most of it exaggerated, branded Jacobin leaders as blood-stained villains whose regime was one of terror, mob violence, and murder. Many Americans, and particularly the Federalists, were convinced that the democratic societies were also committed to alleged Jacobin extremes. 62 The preacher was David Osgood of Medford, Mass., and is quoted in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies. . . , pp. 197-200; for an example of clerical condemnation hailed by Federalists, see Osgood’s The Wonderful Wor\s of God Are to Be Remembered : A Sermon Delivered on the Day of Annual Thanksgiving, November 24, 7794 (Boston, 1794), 29 pp. This was published at the request of the hearers. 268 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE In the course of the violent public reaction against the Jay treaty certain of the Federalist hierarchy expressed fear that the “Amer¬ ican Jacobins” would invite the French Republic to “rescue” Amer¬ ican freedom and would unite with the French to overthrow Wash¬ ington’s government. This “horrible” deed would be done, one Federalist said, on the pretense that the American government was in the hands of the British. Such pretense fitted one objective of the “Democratic Clubs”—to render the government odious to the people. 93 The Boston Jacobins, warned another Federalist, evinced an unconquerable disposition “either to throw their country into war & anarchy, or reduce us to a province of France. Notwith¬ standing the failure and overthrow of their Brother Jacobins in france [r/r] they, like the wounded snake, still retain all their rage and venom, & would fatally wound, if they could, our tender but I hope, immortal Constitution.” Members of the societies, he con¬ tinued, “are offended by being called Jacobins; but there cannot be a more appropriate term for them; in all its horror, & as understood in France.” They “assume the exclusive title of Patriots” and “believe that patriotism was born in the year 1775, that it, & a hatred of the British are synonymous.” They had set up French idols and sacrificed to them. “They have always wished, & now ardently long to join the FJrench] and put at risque our peace & happiness, & the fairest form of Government the World could ever boast of.” 94 These fears spread, the membership of the clubs was divided and decimated, and some of their most prominent leaders were either alienated from or withdrew from them. Sectional splits, as that over the Whiskey Rebellion, also reduced membership. Feder¬ alists exploited the internal dissensions. When the National Con¬ vention denounced and proscribed the French Jacobin clubs Feder¬ alists were delighted; it “gave a shock to their brethren here & gave a confidence to all good Federalists.” 90 While the furor over the Jay treaty aroused the societies to new activity, by 1795-96 most of them had apparently disappeared. Weakened from within and 83 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Aug. 4, 1795 (Prince¬ ton). 84 Jacob Williams to Timothy Pickering, Boston, July 17, 1795, Pickering Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston. 85 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Sept. 21, 1795 (Princeton). INTRIGUE 269 assailed from without, they did not survive Washington’s second term. Associated intimately with the growing Republican party and devoted to the French alliance, the democratic societies were, for a while, important instruments in molding pro-French public senti¬ ment. But like Genet, with whom they were also closely connected, they intensified the hatred and opposition of Federalists and Anglo¬ philes. By sharpening issues and by challenging those in power the societies, nonetheless, made important contributions to then emerging political parties and to the growth of a democratic foreign policy. 90 jl «y. ^ IP TP TP TP Not only were American politics rent by Genet’s activities, by the rise of the democratic societies, and by the violent French and English proclivities of the citizenry, but Frenchmen and English¬ men, supported by their American partisans, brawled on American soil and clashed in American waters. Americans as individuals were not neutral; American neutrality was a precarious tiling. So intense was party spirit and so excited was the public mind that tav¬ ern brawls and street battles between French and English sailors caused little stir in various port cities in midsummer 1793. 97 Toward the close of July, 1793, however, two events did stir Americans and drove them almost to riot. One was a sea duel off Sandy Ffook, New York, between the British frigate Boston and the French frigate L’Embuscade. The other was the arrival of a French fleet giving France a temporary and illusory supremacy in American waters. 98 Commanded by a Captain Courtney, the* Boston had been sent B '’ The role of the societies in party politics is not clear. Link, Democratic- Republican Societies. . . , p. 206, maintains that “the democratic societies laid the ground work for the Republican party.” Cunningham, “The Jefferso¬ nian Party to 1801,” maintains that “there is no substantial evidence that any of the popular societies . . . functioned as an element in a party organization.” He makes a good case that the societies did not constitute a party. Ibid., pp. 101-103. “ 7 Such riots and brawls involving French sailors seemed to be common¬ place in these years; see, for instance, the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Sept. 5, 1793, and May 29, 1795; the Maryland Gazette (Annap¬ olis), Sept. 5, 1793, Jan. 30, 1794, April 10 and May 22, 1794; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 121. 88 Genet boasted to Jefferson of the strength of the French naval force. The Anas, July 23, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 249. 270 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE from Halifax to New York with orders to end the pillage of British commerce by French cruisers and privateers “daily chasing vessels bound in and out” of American ports. Through an error in recogni¬ tion, or perhaps through planned deception, the French took the Boston as their frigate La Concorde. Captain Bompard of L’Embus- cade sent out an officer and about a dozen men in a small boat to welcome his ostensible comrade-in-arms. As the small boat drew up to the ship, the French officer became suspicious of her national¬ ity, but his fears were allayed as she hoisted French colors. Climb¬ ing aboard he found drat he had delivered himself and his men into British hands. Republicans, Francophiles, and Frenchmen fumed over Courtney’s ruse; they demanded revenge for his “vile” English trick. The Englishman did not hesitate. At the Tontine Coffee House on July 29, Courtney posted a challenge to meet “Citizen” Bompard and his now famous L’Embuscade off Sandy Hook. The French captain promptly grasped the challenge." The news spread throughout the city; the populace became excited; business practi¬ cally stood still. Everyone, it appeared, was willing to place money on the outcome of the clash; the stakes in money and prestige were large. As the frigates prepared to do battle on August 1, 1793, off Long Branch on the New Jersey coast, partisan spectators lined the shore and filled the topsides of the vessels which were being used as floating grandstands to give spectators a closer view of the hostili¬ ties. For almost two hours the cannon of the two ships spewed fire, glass, nails, and assorted hardware; both sides suffered severe damage and many casualties. Then, with Captain Courtney slain, the Boston fled. 100 While L’Embuscade was in hot pursuit, which lasted for five hours, a French fleet of some fifteen ships sailed past Sandy Hook into the bay. 101 The appearance of the French fleet, flags 90 Courtney’s challenge and Bompard’s response are in the Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Aug. 8, 1793. 100 Federalists, particularly Hamilton and Henry Knox, were mortified by the battle; they heaped “unqualified abuse” and “censures” on Courtney. The Anas, Aug. 3, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 255. 101 For details of the Boston-L’Embuscade episode, see McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 121-123; Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, p. 108; Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 236-238; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 328 ff.; for Genet’s report on the INTRIGUE 271 flying and salutes booming, coupled with the Bompard victory, sent the populace, particularly the pro-French elements, into raptures. The French admiral was immediately surrounded by thousands of celebrating Americans. The French fleet had sailed into a ready¬ made reception; and when L’Embuscade returned thousands greeted her, lining the shore in shouting, waving multitudes. 102 The French warships, however, brought neither strength to the French cause and to the alliance, nor harmony to deteriorating Franco-American relations. They bore, instead, seeds of more trou¬ ble. Crowded with royalist refugees and manned by mutinous sail¬ ors who had been swept into the sea by armed blacks in Saint Dom- ingue, the warships, in company with a large merchant convoy, had at first limped into American ports for sanctuary, rather than in search of a base for operations against the English. The ships, the sailors, and the refugees were remnants of a white dominance in Saint Domingue which was never to return. With the development of the Revolution in France the home government’s control over its Caribbean possessions had weakened, strikingly so in Saint Domingue where a strong rule had until then kept class and racial discord under control. Following the outbreak of the Revolution, Creoles, or Frenchmen born on the island, elected assemblies in each province and seized control of the island’s gov¬ ernmental machinery. Their power, however, was short lived; the island was turbulent. Planters, poor whites, royalists, and democrats all distrusted each other, and each sought dominance. To this was added further complication when mulattoes, with some support from members of the National Assembly in Paris, entered the power struggle by demanding social and political equality. Soon Negro slaves took advantage of the turmoil to demand freedom. Violence was inevitable. A freedman’s revolt flared up in 1790 and was savagely suppressed. In the following year mulattoes joined affair, see Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, Aug. 2 and 5, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 236-238; for a critical contemporary analysis of the battle, see Biddle, The Autobiography of Charles Biddle. . . , p. 254; for an “authentic” (French) version of the batde, see the Maryland Gazette (Annap¬ olis), Aug. 8, 1793. 10a Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Aug. 15, 1793; Captain Bompard became a popular hero. To the Tammany society of New York he presented the colors of the victorious vessel; his victory, in addition, won him a promotion. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 593-596. 272 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE a white royalist faction in a revolt against the Creole govern¬ ment. Then, in August, 1791, Negro slaves rose suddenly against their white masters, indiscriminately slaughtering and destroying through most of the plantation areas. This placed self-emanci¬ pated Negroes in control of the country’s northern rural districts while whites and mulattoes fought for power around Port-au- Prince in the west. Only in the southern districts did French planters retain effective control. The National Assembly of France, which had added to the tur¬ moil by granting, in May, 1791, a limited franchise to free mulattoes, sent three commissioners to Saint Domingue in 1791 to investigate affairs there and to use special executive powers in an attempt to restore order. They failed. In the meanwhile the Legislative As¬ sembly in France had decreed, in April, 1792, that men of color were entitled the same political rights as white Creoles. To replace the first commission, to enforce the political decree, and to restore peace, the Girondin government sent to Saint Domingue three new commissioners with supreme power. Supported by six thousand troops—four thousand National Guards, and two thousand soldiers of the line—in fifteen ships, the civil commissioners arrived in Sep¬ tember, 1792. Of the three commissioners, the most active and most powerful was Leger Felicite Sonthonax, a confirmed Jacobin. In reorganizing the colony’s government so as to concentrate power into the hands of the commission he headed and particularly in consorting with and leaning upon mulattoes for support, Son¬ thonax alienated the various white groups. Then, by turning to the blacks for support, he lost his mulatto backing. So intense was the resentment of the whites against Sonthonax that when France, in January, 1793, went to war against Great Britain and Spain and Saint Domingue was thus placed in peril of foreign conquest, they would have supported foreign troops against the arch-commission¬ er’s regime. Into this supercharged situation in May, 1793, sailed the new Governor-General of the colony, General Thomas Francis Galbaud. Although an appointee of the Revolutionary regime in the home¬ land, Galbaud was a conservative soldier who held property in Saint Domingue, having married a local heiress. Under the circum¬ stances, and having apparently no one else at the time to turn to, INTRIGUE 273 the whites placed their faith in him. When he landed at Le Cap Fran^ais the anti-Revolutionary whites greeted him with a tumul¬ tuous reception. Sonthonax, realizing that once the General was established the commission’s power would vanish, moved swiftly to forestall Galbaud’s taking control. Backed by mulatto militia, Sonthonax, in June, 1793, declared Galbaud’s credentials invalid and forced the General and his staff aboard a ship to be returned to France. But the Jacobin commis¬ sioner’s coup miscarried. Infuriated by this high-handed treatment of the Governor-General, the sailors and regular troops stationed on the ships of the fleet in the harbor mutinied. Sweeping their officers along with them, they rallied around Galbaud and offered to fight to re-establish his authority. On June 20, 1793, Galbaud, at the head of several thousand armed and trained fighting men, landed at Le Cap Frangais. Immediately, the antirevolutionary whites of the city rushed to his standard. Sonthonax, supported mainly by men of color, was unable to withstand Galbaud’s counterstroke; Galbaud’s forces drove him back to the edge of the city. Beaten and facing further defeat, he took a momentous step. Summoning prisoners, slaves, and insurgent slaves who surrounded the city, he armed them, promised them pardon and freedom, and gave them freedom to loot and sack the city. Blacks in massive thousands crashed into the city. Galbaud’s forces, intoxicated with initial victory, wine, and loot, were smashed or pushed into the sea. With them, back to the ships, fled over ten thousand white refugees; there was no sanctuary on land. 103 Un¬ chained, the black fury killed, plundered, and destroyed indiscrimi¬ nately. Ultimately the Negroes fired the city, leaving it in ashes. All that remained of white domination on Saint Domingue were the ashes of Le Cap Fran^ais. Leaving behind them the holocaust of Le Cap Fran^ais, Galbaud, die mutinous sailors, and the thousands of terror-stricken refugees sailed in a convoy of over a hundred merchant vessels and warships for the United States. This was the first batch of new emigres 103 On his retreat Galbaud freed British prisoners who then fought by the side of French soldiers and sailors—former enemies—against the black fury; Galbaud took these Englishmen with him to America. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), July 18, 1793. 274 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE which made its way to Chesapeake Bay. Later others followed, creating relief and political problems in a number of American ports. This was the fleet Americans greeted so joyfully as it sailed into New York Harbor. 104 104 For detailed accounts of the events in Saint Domingue, see T. Lothrop Stoddard, The French Revolution in San Domingo (Boston, 1914); Bryan Edwards, An Historical Survey of the Island of Saint Domingo . . . and a History of the War in the West Indies in 7793 and 7794 . . . (London, 1801); Cyril L. R. James, The Blac\ Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution (New York, 1938); for a detailed bibliography, see Logan, Diplomatic Relations of The United States with Haiti, pp. 459-496; for some eye-witness comments, see also McMaster, The Life and Times of Stephen Girard, I, 193-211. CHAPTER NINE THE CAUSE OF MANKIND AGAINST TYRANTS As to the present cause of France, although I thinly that they have been guilty of many excesses, that they have many men amongst them who are greedy of power for themselves and not of liberty for the nation, and that in their present temper they are not lively to have a very good gov¬ ernment within any short time, yet l firmly believe their cause to be that of mankind against tyrants. . . . So far l thinly we are interested in their success; and as to our political situation, they are certainly the only real allies we have had. . . . although Mr. Genet is a man of abilities and firmness, he is not endowed with that prudence and command of his temper which might have enabled him to change the opinion of our Executive in those points where they might be in the wrong .— Albert Gallatin to Miss Hannah Nicholson, August 25, 1793. The town is less frenchified than it was. Citizen Genet is out of credit; his rudeness is as indiscreet as it is extraordinary, and everybody is pro¬ voked with him. I life the horizon better than l did; there are less clouds. — Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, Boston, August, 1793. # # # # # hen the French warships sailed into New York harbor on the first day of August, 1793, they aroused varied emotions. 1 Genet had ’ The precise number of French ships reaching the United States is diffi¬ cult to ascertain. According to George Hammond, who made it his business to record movements of French ships, some 15 armed vessels—ships of the line, frigates, and sloops—together with some 120 merchantmen arrived at Norfolk between July 7 and n. The greater part of the merchant vessels proceeded to Baltimore. One ship went to Europe, some went to Boston, some cruised along the coasts. Some of the merchant vessels, moreover, had the appearance of warships. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Aug. 10, ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 276 high hopes—not to be realized. He had grand plans for the fleet. With the ships his projected invasion of Louisiana and Florida would be easier; he might recapture the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, destroy British fisheries in Newfoundland, raid British shipping in North American waters, and support the liberation of Acadia. * 2 The British looked upon the French fleet as a threat to their naval ascendancy in North American waters. 3 Hammond protested the stay of the war vessels in a neutral port. Jefferson replied that the same privileges were available to English ships; this was precisely the admission Hammond sought. The American position did not imply that the administration was undisturbed by the threat to its neutrality policy posed by the presence of the armed vessels. The popular receptions Americans showered on the French ships in the ports were particularly upsetting. 4 1793. Henry Adams Transcripts. These figures approximate those given by Genet. See Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, July 28, 1793, Turner, CFM, p. 225; a list of the ships drawn up by Genet is in AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVIII, f. 143, dated July 31, 1793. 2 Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, Aug. 2, 1793, New York, Oct. 7, r793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 234-235, 264-265; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 420. It was dangerous to send the ships back to France because Great Britain controlled the seas; on this basis, in line with what he conceived to be the desires of his superiors, Genet worked out his plans to use the ships. Logan, The Diplomatic Relations of United States with Haiti. . . , p. 45; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 421; instructions for Contre Amiral Sercey, Commandant of the French Republic’s Naval Forces in America, AAE CP EU, Oct. 4, 1793, Vol. XXXIX, ff. 99- 103. These included plans for attacks on Quebec, New Orleans, etc. In essence, the admiral was instructed to hit the English wherever possible and cause as much damage as possible. Similar instructions, n.p., n.d., are in the Genet Papers, Library of Congress, XI, 3527. 3 Yet Hammond reported that the ships which arrived in New York were in no condition to fight or to proceed on expeditions; they needed repairs, supplies, and seamen. Some thought that the ships would be used against Halifax, the Bermudas, or the Bahamas; others believed that Genet would use the warships to overawe the Federalist government. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Aug. 10, 1793, Henry Adams Transcripts. Spaniards told Ham¬ mond that they feared that Clark’s expedition would be supported by the French fleet in New York. Ibid., March 7, 1794; see also the precis on American affairs, ^94 [Sept.-Oct.], Dropmore Papers, III, 524-525. * See Cabinet Decisions, Sept. 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 411; Jefferson to Hammond, Philadelphia, Sept. 9, 1793, ibid., pp. 422-424; Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 163 n. When news reached Halifax that the French squadron had reached New York and was laying up warm clothing, the British feared an attack there or on Newfoundland. Gerald S. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 2 77 A complicating factor in the pattern of Franco-American amity was the problem created by the new influx of royalist and Revolu¬ tion-hating French refugees. Once established in the United States, these refugee-planters, monarchists in sentiment, constituted a grave danger to the French alliance. Many of them were eager to deal with the enemies of the French Republic. Rather than subject themselves to rule by men of color—their former slaves in many in¬ stances—rather than accept the Revolutionary doctrine of equality, these colonial emigres plotted to turn over their island to the enemy of France—to England. * 5 If the United States returned the refugee-planters to Saint Do- mingue they would be a constant threat to French republican he¬ gemony ; if they remained in the United States they would constitute a continuing menace to the French alliance. Genet met the prob¬ lem; he opposed returning them to Saint Domingue and at the same time sought to make them harmless in the United States. Imme¬ diately after the arrival of the French squadron in New York, Genet warned Jefferson that refugee-planters were plotting to organize in the United States an expedition designed to overthrow the French audiorities in Saint Domingue. 6 As to the mutinous sailors, Genet drew up no stern measures ; he believed royalist whites and Galbaud, who took advantage of their strong racial feelings, had duped them into fighting against the authority of delegates of the French Repub¬ lic. He was particularly bitter against Galbaud for having jeopard¬ ized the safety of Saint Domingue. 7 Graham, Empire of the North Atlantic: The Maritime Struggle for North America, p. 220; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 420. 6 Minnigerode, Genet, 297-299; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 416; Carl L. Lokke, “Saint Domingue in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy in 1795,” Hispanic American Historical Review, XVI (May, 1936), 251, and Lokke’s “London Merchant Interest in the St. Domingue Plantations of the Emigres, 1793-1798,” American Historical Review, XLIII (July, 1938), 795; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 124-125. For some of the exchanges between Genet and the refugees see Frances S. Childs, French Refugee Life in the United States, iygo-1800: An American Chapter of the French Revolution, pp. 142-144. 6 Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, Aug. 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 366. Jefferson informed Genet that “effectual measures” would be taken to stop the expedition; see also Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 297-298. 7 Galbaud was brought to the United States a prisoner by the officers of the fleet who blamed him for their defeat and charged him with plotting to ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 278 To give his personal attention to the problem of disaffection in the French squadron, Genet in the first week of August rushed north to New York. Night and day he labored, or so he declared, to sup¬ ply the squadron’s needs, to remove the cancer of mutiny, to republi- canize the sailors and soldiers, and to counteract the influence among them of “the traitor or imbecile Galbaud,” whom he tried to send back to France for trial. Galbaud, with his wife, warned the disaffected men that Genet was plotting their destruction, and that if they allowed the minister to take him ashore his life would be snuffed out. * * * * * * * 8 Genet’s efforts failed; the soldiers and sailors obeyed no authority; their officers were powerless to control them. Going ashore as they pleased, the defiant men created bedlam. Their behavior did not endear the French to Americans. Estimates placed the number of Frenchmen in New York in August, 1793, as high as five thousand. Logically, many Americans feared the violence and potendal danger from so many armed and apparently uncontrollable foreigners. Some perceived in their presence a sinister design by Genet against the peace of the country. The British added to the turmoil. Ham¬ mond and his agents worked to keep alive the disaffection on the French ships. With the aid of French traitors they succeeded. In a letter to the home office Hammond boasted of the obstacle he had planted to prevent Genet from using the fleet against British North American possessions. 9 turn Saint Domingue over to the British. Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 417. Before Galbaud arrived in the United States, Moissonier, French consul at Baltimore, told Genet that Galbaud should be punished. He implied that Galbaud’s concern for wealth and property and his consorting with men of property was the cause of trouble in Saint Domingue. Balti¬ more, July 16, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, X, 3139; see also Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, July 28, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 224-225. 8 Genet maintained that the squadron had placed itself under his direction of its own accord. Genet to Jefferson, 1797, in Genet, Washington, Jefferson, and "Citizen" Genet, 1793, P- 2 7 - For details see Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, July 28, 1793, New York, Aug. 15, 1793, Sept. 19, 1793, and Oct. 5, 7, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 223-227, 238-241, 242-243, 244-251, 259-260; Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 299-306. Hammond reported that Genet went to New York to prevail on the men and officers of the French ships to proceed on an expedition against British possessions. To Grenville, Philadelphia, Sept. 1793, No. 19, Henry Adams Transcripts. 8 “I have regularly received the fullest information of all its proceedings, THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 279 From ship to ship Genet carried his pleas, urging loyalty and obedience to the officers of the French Republic. With the aid of port authorities, he attempted to police the anchorage, but his labors were in vain. He could not move the defiant crews; they threatened him and his representatives with violence. The mutineers, moreover, would have nothing to do with Genet’s plans to create from among them a volunteer corps to take the ships back to Saint Domingue; what they wanted was to return to France. 10 At the end of August, with the connivance of certain sailors, Gal- baud and his wife escaped; by the middle of September they had made their way to Canada. Soon after the general’s escape the mutiny in the French squadron in New York ended. Vainly Genet tried to apprehend Galbaud and his party. He obtained warrants for the general’s arrest, but pro-English sympathizers, who rallied around the fleeing French royalists, thwarted his plans. 11 from a French Gentleman of distinction,” boasted Hammond, “who, at my instigation, exerted his influence, to discover and frustrate any project, in which this fleet might have been employed to promote the views of the ruling party of France. . . .” To Grenville, Sept. 17, Philadelphia, Sept. 17, 1793, No. 19, Henry Adams Transcripts; see also Hammond to Grenville, Lans- downe, Oct. 12, 1793, Dropmore Papers, II, 443-444. Gov. Mifflin of Penn., for example, to preserve the peace in Philadelphia, asked Genet to keep muti¬ nous sailors aboard the French ships or to see to it that when they came ashore they behaved with decorum. Philadelphia, Aug. 3, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, X, 3217. A list of the ships in the New York squadron is in AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVIII, f. 143, dated July 31, 1793, and signed by Genet. In it Genet listed nine ships of varying armament. 10 For an exchange between the mutinous crew of the warship Jupiter (justifying its conduct) and Genet, see the Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Aug. 29, 1793. Unsuccessfully, Genet tried to send men from another ship aboard the Jupiter to disarm the mutineers. Finally, Genet placed Captain Bompard in command of the Jupiter. “Council of War gathered to organize the forces of the Republic,” New York, Aug. 18, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress. See also Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 301-303; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 426. Hammond reported that Genet, eventually, was obliged to flee New York because of attacks by French sailors. They broke into his house, smashed windows, and destroyed furniture. To Gren¬ ville, Lansdowne near Philadelphia, Oct. 12, 1793, No. 20, Henry Adams Transcripts. 11 “Rapport de l’officier de Garde du 29 aout 1793,” AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXVIII, ff. 381-383. Earlier the General and Mrs. Galbaud complained of their confinement; two American physicians visited them, reported that both were ill and needed exercise, and requested that they be allowed to come ashore for a change of situation. Michael Bayley and James Tillany to Genet, New York, Aug. 19, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, X, 3273. 280 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Galbaud did not remain in his Canadian sanctuary long; in December he returned to the United States. From New York he feuded publicly with Genet. He threatened to sue the French min¬ ister, denounced him for alleged crimes, and in other ways debased him. 1 ’’ Public sentiment was, for other reasons, turning against Genet; Galbaud’s attacks poured oil on the fire. Genet’s need for money was now desperate. The frontier expe¬ ditions had been mired because of lack of funds, and now his war¬ ships were immobilized in American ports, never to be used in his sweeping plans. As George Hammond had forecast, the ships cre¬ ated a dilemma for Genet and the American government . 13 In desperadon Genet turned to Hamilton for advances from the debt owed to France, “particularly to supply the urgent wants of the fleet and Squadron of the Republic which are just arrived from Saint Domingo .” 14 He got no satisfaction. Still he persisted in his pleas to an ally. “Two thousand seamen and soldiers,” he told Jefferson, “whom I support are on the eve of wanting bread. The repairs of our vessels are at a stand. The indispensable expeditions of subsist¬ ence for our colonies and France are suspended.” When his pleas reached Hamilton, the Secretary of the Treasury advised against advancing funds, especially “when the means of execution are uncer¬ tain .” 15 Shortly after reaching Philadelphia, Genet, perhaps unknowingly, had laid the precedent for uncertain execudon. American merchants not long before had supplied the French West Indies, in particular Saint Domingue, with provisions and the authorities there had given them bills drawn on a former French consul-general in the United States and later on Genet. When Genet did not pay the bills—not 12 For an example of Genet’s anti-Galbaud pronouncements, see that of Sept. 16, 1793, directed “to the Crews of the French squadron on the Amer¬ ican Station,” the Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), Sept. 19, 1793; for Gal¬ baud’s views, see the public letter he addressed to Genet, New York, Dec. 24, 1793, printed in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, Jan. 9, 1794. 13 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, No. 16, Henry Adams Transcripts. 14 Genet to Hamilton, Philadelphia, July 19, 1793, Genet Papers, Library of Congress, X, 3144. 15 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, Nov. n, 14, 1793; Jefferson to Genet, Germantown, Nov. 24, 1793; Hamilton to Washington, Treasury Dept., Nov. 23, 1793, in ASP FR, I, 185-186. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 281 for lack of desire but for lack of funds—the American government, feeling diat it had underwritten the advances of its citizens to the French, paid them, in some instances to save traders from bank¬ ruptcy . 16 Knowingly, or otherwise, Genet had made a serious blun¬ der. He had alienated important mercantile interests, the backbone of Washington’s Federalist government, interests essential to hoped- for Franco-American trade, interests he needed most to convert to the support of the French alliance. In not paying the Saint Do- mingue bills Genet created another serious misunderstanding with the Washington administration. “His conduct has been such as to have created a distrust, which never can be surmounted,” said George Hammond. Genet’s breach of contract, he added, “will throw innumerable impediments in the way of any future money con¬ cerns between the Government of France and the government and individual citizens of the United States.” 1 ' Meanwhile, bitter attacks against Genet by the refugee royalists continued. Defying his authority, they held mass meetings and formed expeditions in American ports to be launched against French republicanism in Saint Domingue, conspiring all the while with the English against the Republic. Little wonder that Genet granted the refugees relief out of his meager funds grudgingly and only in order to divert public criticism. Their activities smacked of treason; he could not help distrusting them, and his distrust was shared by his colleagues in consular posts . 18 Genet demanded that the American government, as a helpful ally, arrest traitorous royalist-refugees. He asked also that the United States prohibit further royalist immigra¬ tion from Saint Domingue, and even suggested that it allow French frigates to detain American vessels not provided with passports from 10 Genet to Jefferson, Philadelphia, June 18, 1793; Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, June 23, 1793, ibid., pp. 158-159; the Anas, July 5, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 235. 17 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, No. 16, Henry Adams Transcripts. By this time Hammond was convinced that Genet sought to form a party to overawe if not subvert the American government. 18 See Childs, French Refugee Life. . . , pp. 164-171; for additional details on proroyalist and prorepublican activity in the United States, see Allen J. Barthold, “French Journalists in the United States, 1780-1800,” the Franco- American Review, I (Winter, 1937), 222-223. See also Logan, The Diplomatic Relations. . . , p. 45. 282 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE him so that he could prevent enemies of French republicanism who had escaped the vigilance of American officials from landing. Jefferson pointed out, rightly, that many of Genet’s requests were out of the question, although some had substance. Genet appealed to him, as a friend of liberty, to curtail die flood of royalist- aristocrats “who inundate your continent.” No longer did he appeal merely for die help of an ally; France, he said, entreated the Amer¬ ican government not to aid in her destruction, “not to conspire in the loss of a colony which you ought to defend” under the terms of the alliance. In the name of the French people he begged “that you will not suffer poniards, for their assassination, to be forged in your territory.” 19 Not only did the Saint Domingue fleet bring mutiny and royalist refugees to harass Genet, but also some Americans believed it brought yellow fever, a plague which swept through Philadelphia in the summer of 1793. Surely this was punishment visited by the Lord upon heretics who followed Genet’s banner. 20 In addition, the French ships brought trouble with Hamilton’s customs officials. When the French merchant ships arrived, even though their cargoes were not destined for the United States, cus¬ toms officials demanded payment of the usual tonnage dues. The French captains protested that “by the 19th and 26th articles of the treaty of Alliance [commercial treaty] they are not to be subject to any duties in the harbours of the United States.” Their vessels, pointed out the captains, sought refuge not by destination, but be¬ cause of distress; “the rigorous severity in the application of the revenue laws of [the United States],” they said, “forms an unpleasing contrast with the fraternal reception which the French people receive from the inhabitants.” -1 12 Genet to Jefferson, New York, Sept. 6 and Nov. 29, 1793; Jefferson to Genet, Philadelphia, Sept. 12 and Nov. 30, 1793, ASP FR, I, 177, 187-188; Minnigerode, Genet, 308-312. When Genet asked for arms to defend the French West Indies against English-royalist attacks, Hamilton apparently maintained that this would mean war with Great Britain and the request was refused. Genet, Washington, Jefferson, and “Citizen” Genet, p. 19. 20 McMaster, The Life and Times of Stephen Girard, I, 212; Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, p. 185; for details on the plague, see J. H. Powell, Bring Out Your Dead: The Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Philadelphia in (Philadelphia, 1949). 21 “Protest of Captains of Commercial .Vessels Assembled Under Hauterive, Consul of the French Republic,” New York, July [ ? ] 1793, Genet Papers, THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 283 Lending his support to the captains, Genet also protested. True, some of the captains had unloaded goods and sold them in American ports, but this was not premeditated; they did it out of desperation to obtain funds for revictualling. Genet also insisted that article 19 of the commercial treaty gave the ships sanctuary without pay¬ ment of duties.' 2 Hamilton was adamant; he refused to make an exception for the French merchantmen, claiming they did not fall within the category of shipping mentioned in the commercial treaty. Although the Frenchmen had to pay the duties, public sentiment was in their favor. After the Attorney General ruled that relief could come only from the legislature, Genet, through private hands, sent a petition to Congress, and it passed an act remitting the duties.'" The tonnage-duties episode coupled with further frustration— in particular a seemingly successful English invasion of Saint Do- mingue connived at by emigre planters in London—sent Genet’s temperature boiling. His experiences with the 1778 alliance had been so circumscribed by misadventure that he saw in it nothing of advan¬ tage to France. Fume as he might about the alliance, about ingrati¬ tude and treaty violations, his day as French envoy in the United States was coming to a close. * * * * * Genet’s turbulent career in the United States was an important factor in the emergence of national political parties. What he did Library of Congress, X, 3186. The vessels, in addition to the refugees, were loaded with the annual production of Saint Domingue and had been destined originally for France under escort by the warships. 22 See Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, Oct. 8, 1793, in Turner, CFM, p. 263; Jefferson to Washington, Monticello, Oct. 3, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 435; Jefferson to Hamilton, Philadelphia, Sept., 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 178. 23 Randolph to Hamilton, Germantown, Nov. 15, 1793; Hamilton to Jefferson, Treasury Dept., Nov. 30, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 487-488, 490-491. Hamilton maintained that the ships “are liable by law to the payment of the duty of tonnage, from which it is not within the compass of executive discretion to relieve them, whatever circumstances of hardship may exist.” Cabinet Decisions, Dec. 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 462-463; “Report of a Committee of the House of Repre¬ sentatives. . . ,” 3rd Cong., 1st Sess., ASP FR, I, 314; Annals of the Con¬ gress. . . , 3rd Cong., pp. 1418-1419, “Act for Remission of Duties,” approved March 7, 1794. The tonnage duties situation is discussed also in Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 313-314. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 284 and said was partly influenced by the conviction that he had behind him the support of most Americans, whereas the Washington admin¬ istration did not. In this belief he was encouraged by public mani¬ festations of sympathy on his behalf and in support of the French alliance, particularly by anti-administration politicians seeking polit¬ ical advantage. Failing to get support for the alliance from the government Genet had turned to the people. In so doing he found a party already and conveniently formed, George Hammond said, “and the individuals, who composed this faction, were willing to avail themselves of the influence arising from his official character, his nation and his principles, in their efforts to increase the ascend¬ ancy of the democracy, both in the federal government, and in the separate states. Thus actuated they readily coalesced. . . .” 24 In this way Genet quickened party growth and demarcation. Some of Genet’s troubles were not of his own making and were beyond his power to control. Much of his conduct, however, was arrogant, tactless, defiant, self-defeating, and, if nothing worse, im¬ prudent. His intemperate deeds, his plots, and his flouting of the authority of his host government in time alienated many who from the first had been pro-French alliance and who had been among his most ardent supporters, and even threw off some of the politicians who had tried to use him for party purposes. 20 Thomas Jefferson, a few months earlier, had praised the French¬ man as affectionate, magnanimous, as one who “offers everything & asks nothing.” 2 * 5 But not long after Genet’s arrival, Jefferson ex¬ pressed his disgust with the French envoy’s actions. “Never in my opinion,” he said to another prominent Anglophobe, “was so calam¬ itous an appointment made, as that of the present Minister of F[ranee] here. Hot headed, all imagination, no judgement, pas- 24 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, July 7, 1793, No. 16, Henry Adams Transcripts. 26 In some instances the reaction against Genet and republican France was so strong as to carry men from espousal of radical democracy to firm con¬ servatism and into the bosom of the Federalist party. Too, the Saint Domin- gue slave uprising and the influence of royalist refugees in the South turned many former adherents from the French cause. Liberty and equality for the Negro was a doctrine which had negative appeal in the South. See Ulrich B. Phillips, “The South Carolina Federalists,” AHR, XIV (April and July, I 9°9)> 733-734- 29 To Madison, Philadelphia, May 19, 1793, ibid., pp. 260-261. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 285 sionate, disrespectful & even indecent towards the P[ resident] in his written as well as verbal communications, talking of appeals from him to Congress, from them to the people, urging the most unrea¬ sonable & groundless propositions, & in the most dictatorial style, & c, & c, & c.” 27 In alarm, Madison insisted that Genet “must be brought right if possible. His folly will otherwise do mischief which no wisdom can repair. Is there no one through whom he can be effectually counselled?” 2 ' It was too late. The Little Sarah affair was the last straw; it convinced Washington that he should get rid of Genet. Hamiltonians, who welcomed anything that might destroy Genet, now pounced upon the very thing that caused Jefferson concern— Genet’s alleged threat to go over Washington’s head in a direct ap¬ peal to the people. With this, they succeeded in turning popular feeling against Genet and reversing a hitherto hostile public senti¬ ment. 29 At the same time, aroused Federalist leaders launched a powerful campaign against the French alliance, attempting to show that from the beginning France had sought to keep the United States low, imbecile, and dependent, that she was more an enemy than an ally. 30 As was often the case, Hamilton put into motion events which accelerated the public reaction. 31 With Henry Knox he had heard second hand from Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania details of the midnight interview between Alexander J. Dallas and Genet over de¬ tention of the Petite Democrate. Hamilton then repeated what he had heard to John Jay and Rufus King, stressing Genet’s alleged threat to appeal from the President directly to the people. When 27 Jefferson to Madison, July 7, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 33 8 '33 9 * 28 Madison to Jefferson, July 18, 1793, in Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VI, 135; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 253, 381. 29 Confident that he had public sentiment behind him, Genet had planned, as he had done on his Southern trip, “a journey thro the northern states, to feel the pulse of the people.” It never came off; the plan was lost in the furor over his alleged threat to appeal to the people. The Minerva, reprinted in the Herald: A Gazette for the Country (New York), Dec. 17, 1796. 30 George Cabot to Rufus King, Beverley, Aug. 2, 1793, Henry Cabot Lodge, The Life and Letters of George Cabot, pp. 73-75. 81 See Hamilton to Rufus King, Philadelphia, Aug. 13, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Works, V, 574-576, also undated letter of Aug., 1793, pp. 576-577; Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 319-320; Bassett, The Federalist System. . . , p. 96; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 364, 371. 286 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE King and Jay returned to New York from Philadelphia early in August, 1793, they in turn spread among their friends what they learned from Hamilton. Soon rumors flew from tongue to tongue. Such a threat from a foreign diplomat was serious and dangerous; directed, as it was, against venerated Washington it had a sensadonal effect. Hamilton’s strategy was superb. The appeal-threat reduced the issue of the French alliance to an emotion, to patriotism, to a personal duel between Washington and Genet. 32 Americans privy to the rumors were dumbfounded; some were outraged, others were incredulous, their various reactions colored by their political leanings. Finally, newspapers took notice. Certain pro-French or Republican writers asked Jay and King, as the source of the rumors, either to authenticate them or to deny them. Jay and King certified publicly that what had passed as rumor was fact. Acknowledgment that they had spread the story, written on August 12, 1793, appeared in The Diary; or Loudon’s Register (New York); the statement noted that “Genet, the French Minister, had said he would appeal to the People from certain decisions of the President.” 33 Everywhere Federalist newspapers reprinted the Jay-King certif¬ icate, making the most of an emotion-charged issue. With the issue now a struggle between Genet, an impetuous young foreigner, and Washington, a revered hero and lawful President, patriotism carried the day. The country rallied to Washington’s support. Even Genet could see the turn in the current of public opinion. Wash¬ ington’s name and position, the attacks of high government figures, such as Jay and King, had their desired effect. Republican ranks and Genet’s pro-French adherents were thinned out as if raked by grape- shot. 34 82 Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 364. 83 A fascimile of the Jay-King certificate is in Minnigerode, Genet, p. 320; for details and pertinent documents, see King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 455-480; Monaghan, John Jay, pp. 355-356; the certificate is also reprinted in Henry B. Dawson, ed., “The Citizen Genet,” Historical Magazine, X (Nov., 1866), 329; the important newspaper correspondence dealing with the Jay-King accusation is reproduced on pp. 329-346. 84 Federalists were elated that “Citizen Genet is out of credit” and that “everybody is provoked with him.” Fisher Ames to Thomas Dwight, Bos¬ ton, Aug., 1793, Seth Ames, ed., Worlds of Fisher Ames, I, 129; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 139; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 256; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” pp. 364 ff., 381. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 287 Hard-core elements of the Republican press and of the demo¬ cratic societies still clung to Genet and fought in his defense. They denounced the “certificate men” and cried that all was a Federalist plot to ruin Genet, destroy Franco-American friendship, and under¬ mine the French alliance. Federalist attacks against the French minister, they declared, were nothing new; from the first he had been the object of their scurrility and slander. What was new, they pointed out, were the open efforts of high government officials to ruin and discredit him. 35 Even Hamilton, who had directed the offensive against the French minister, had entered the fray openly. He who detested ap¬ peals to the mob had turned to the people. In a series of four articles appearing in the New York Daily Advertiser in August, 1793, under the title “No Jacobin,” Hamilton turned his pen against Genet and the French alliance, exposing and dissecting the entire controversy over prizes, neutrality, and Genet’s defiant conduct. He denounced “the very disrespectful treatment we have experienced from the agents of France, who have acted towards us from the be¬ ginning more like a dependent colony than an independent nation.” Hamilton never completed his attack; yellow fever cut it short. 30 * * * * * When first confronted with the Jay-King certificate, Genet did not take it seriously. Being false, he maintained, it merited no reply. At the same time he did not conceal from his home government his contempt for the Washington administration; the “weak” Amer¬ ican government, he wrote, “deserves such an appeal.” 37 But the 86 Philip Marsh, “James Monroe as ‘Agricola’ in the Genet Controversy, 1793,” the Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXII (October, 1954), 472-476. Genet believed that the certificate publication was part of the Federalist government’s design “to discard our alliance and to cement one with England. . . .” Genet to Jefferson, 1797, in Genet, Washington, Jefferson, and “Citizen” Genet, p. 28. 86 The articles, written ostensibly in reply to criticisms appearing in the press signed “Jacobin,” are reproduced in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, IV, 198-229; the quotation is from “No Jacobin,” No. II, p. 216; see also Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 323-324; for Jefferson’s com¬ ment, see his letter to Madison, Philadelphia, Aug. 11, 1793, in Lipscomb, Jefferson’s Worlds, IX, 179-180; Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” P- 371 - 87 Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, New York, Aug. 15, 1793, in Turner, CFM, p. 241. 288 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE public furor stirred up by the “certificate” episode could not be dis¬ missed so easily. Even Jay and King had been disturbed deeply by it and had turned to Hamilton for additional support. The Feder¬ alist chieftain had obliged on August 13 by outlining the facts of the Dallas-Genet midnight conversation as he knew and interpreted them and by indicating what they might use in their anti-Genet campaign. “The charge,” he advised, “ought to be insisted upon.” 38 Genet’s friends, too, were concerned; they suggested that he dis¬ avow the Federalist accusations. He did not need much urging. Promptly, and perhaps unthinkingly, on August 13 he wrote directly to the President, later publishing the letter. This was rash; it ap¬ peared to lend credence to the Federalist charge. For, in effect, the letter and its later publication constituted an appeal to the people. It was indeed an extraordinary document for a diplomat to address to a head of state. In it Genet angrily demanded of Washington that he dissipate the “dark calumnies” directed against him by “an explicit declaration that I have never intimated to you an intention of appealing to the people. ... A publication of your answer will be the only reply which shall be given to those party men, who never fail to confound the individual with affairs of state.” 39 Three days later, on August 16, Jefferson replied that the Presi¬ dent had received the letter. “I am desired to observe to you,” he told Genet, “that it is not the established course for the diplomatic characters residing here, to have any direct correspondence with him. The Secretary of State is the organ through which dieir communi¬ cations should pass. The President does not conceive it to be within the line of propriety or duty for him to bear evidence against a dec¬ laration which, whether made to him or others, is perhaps imma¬ terial: he therefore declines interfering in the case.” 40 Genet considered the reply evasive; but in his own letter to Washington he had evaded the question of whether or not he had made the threat of appeal to Dallas. Jay, King, and other Federalists 88 Hamilton to King, Philadelphia, Aug. 13, 1793, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, V, 574-576. 39 The letter to Washington is reproduced in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 330; see also Minnegerode, Genet, pp. 321-323; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 140. 40 Jefferson’s letter is reproduced in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 331; see also Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 323-324; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 140. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 289 were quick to catch the omission and to point to the disingenuous¬ ness of Genet’s statements. Having found its way into print, the entire affair now became public property. When stripped of propa¬ ganda and counterpropaganda—if that were possible—the people could see for themselves in Genet’s letter to Washington what was and was not evasive. With publication of his intemperate letter to Washington, Genet’s popular following melted away faster than ever; even some of his staunchest supporters now deserted him; he became a lost cause. 41 Jefferson, who earlier had seen the political danger of too close a tie to Genet, now cut his lines. “Genet has thrown down the gaunt¬ let to the President by the publication of his letter and my answer,” he told Madison, “and is himself forcing that appeal to the people, and risking that disgust, which I had so much wished should have been avoided.” It would “be true wisdom in the Republican party to approve unequivocally of a state of neutrality,” he was convinced, and “to abandon G. [enet] entirely with expression of strong friend¬ ship & adherence to his nation. . . in this way we shall keep the people on our side by keeping ourselves in the right—I have been myself under a cruel dilemma with him. I adhered to him as long as I could have a hope of getting him right . . . finding at length that the man was absolutely incorrigible, I saw the necessity of quit¬ ting a wreck which could not but sink all who should cling to it.” 4 " Sharing Jefferson’s concern, Madison recounted his observations. He revealed that the anti-Genet revulsion ran so strong throughout Virginia that he found it necessary to attempt to get the people to discriminate between France and her minister’s conduct. 43 Genet’s conduct, he wrote, “as exhibited in the newspapers, is as unaccount¬ able as it is distressing. The effect is beginning to be strongly felt here in the surprise and disgust of those who are attached to the French cause, and viewed this minister as the instrument for cement¬ ing instead of alienating, the two Republics. These sensations are powerfully reinforced by the general and habitual veneration for the 11 Woodfin, “Genet and His Mission,” p. 253. 12 Jefferson to Madison, Aug. n, 1793, quoted from the Madison Papers in Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, If, 363; Jefferson to Madison, Philadelphia, Aug. 25, 1793, in Lipscomb, Jefferson,’s Worlds, IX, 211. 43 Brant, James Madison-. Father of the Constitution. . . , 382-383; McMas- ter, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 140. 290 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE President.” 44 Even pro-Genet Governor Moultrie of South Carolina warned the French minister that his behavior had offended and alarmed friends of France; he could not insult highly respected President Washington and still remain popular in the United States. 45 Not all of his followers deserted the French minister; some stayed and continued the fight with him. But the battle was lost. Throughout the country men pledged their support to Washington, dirough letters, resolutions, pamphlets, and public rallies. 46 Federal¬ ist leaders, in addition, pressed home their attack. Jay wrote to Hamilton that he was tired of Genet’s evasions. Why not, he asked, sink him in one blast by getting Jefferson to acknowledge publicly that Genet had made a threat of appeal to him? 47 The Chief Jus¬ tice’s politics were naive; he failed to distinguish between Jefferson the patriot and Jefferson the politician. Little doubt remained that Republican leaders were worried and that the French alliance was foundering. This danger to the alliance struck James Monroe with special force. He warned Jefferson that “the state into which the conduct of an indiscreet man on the one part and some very wicked men on the other part has thrown us in respect to France fills me with extreme concern.” Clearly, he said, the Hamiltonians are trying “to separate us from France & ultimately unite us with England;” obviously “the certificate of Messrs. Jay & King was concerted at Philadelphia] as the means of bringing the subject before the publick.” Nevertheless, Monroe considered “the whole however as a mere trick and which will ultimately recoil on the authors of it.” 48 As if to embarrass his supporters and to lend proof to the Fed¬ eralist charge of attempting to subvert the government, Genet contin¬ ued to cross swords with Washington. In October, 1793, Washing¬ ton revoked the exequatur of Antoine C. Duplaine, French vice-con- 44 Madison to Jefferson, Sept. 2, 1793, in Hunt, The Writings of James Madison, VI, 191; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 363. 46 New Yor\ Journal, Oct. 23, 1793, cited in McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 140. 46 Similar support by last-ditch supporters poured in for Genet. Minni- gerode, Genet, p. 327. 47 Monaghan, John Jay, p. 357. 48 Monroe to Jefferson, Staunton, Sept. 3, 1793, in Stanislaus M. Hamilton, ed., The Writings of James Monroe, I, 273-274; Minnigerode, Genet, p. 329. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 291 sul at Boston, for using armed force from a French warship in the harbor to rescue a French privateer from the custody of an Amer¬ ican “officer of justice.” Duplaine’s action—consistent with Genet’s orders to the French ships in New York to use force against Amer¬ ican officials in protecting privateers in the port—had outraged the Cabinet. Three times the United States district attorney at Boston brought civil charges against Duplaine, and three times a sympa¬ thetic jury, apparently supported by a sympathetic public opinion, failed to sustain the charges. Up to this point the Duplaine case had the appearance of another Henfield case. Finally, however, Wash¬ ington ordered Duplaine’s exequatur revoked. Jefferson followed this up with a “Circular to the French Consuls” which defined the limits of their jurisdiction. 49 During the furor Genet did not attempt to defend Duplaine’s deed; he defied Washington, challenging the President’s power to dismiss a French representative. He declared that under die Consti- tution the President did not have the power to revoke an exequatur. When notified officially of Duplaine’s dismissal, he responded with a violent protest which he published in the newspapers before deliver¬ ing it to the Secretary of State; in it he refused to admit the “valid¬ ity” of the dismissal, an “arbitrary” presidential act. 50 Like Genet’s other deeds this touched off a newspaper battle. John Quincy Adams, this time writing as “Columbus,” defended the Executive’s power to revoke an exequatur or to dismiss a foreign minister and attacked Genet’s actions as incitement to insurrection. In so doing he delivered a warning against “the interference of for¬ eigners upon any pretense whatever, in the dissensions of fellow- citizens.” Such meddling, he said, “must be inevitably fatal to the liberties of the State.” Under the name “Americanus,” the inevitable opponent rose to Genet’s defense. Congress, which has the power to declare war, he said, not the President, had the power to revoke an exequatur. 51 40 The “Circular,” Philadelphia, Sept. 7, 1793, is in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 417. 60 The Duplaine affair is recounted in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , pp. 212-220; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 120; Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 238-239. 51 The Duplaine affair is described also in Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, pp. 37-38; see Jefferson to 292 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE In spite of mounting complications, for a while it appeared that Genet’s counteroffensive might cause Jay and King’s certificate to recoil. On November 14,1793, Genet wrote to Jefferson and to Attor¬ ney General Randolph demanding that the Federal government prosecute Jay and King for libel. Their certificate, he said, was “a public insult to my nation and to myself” which greatly injured “the cause of my country.” 02 “The lie having effected its purpose,” he said, “I can unfortunately for justice, but too slowly follow it with detection.” With its topsy-turvy mixture of foreign policy and domestic politics, the battle to sink Genet had brought forth the demand of a foreign diplomat that his host government prosecute for libel its highest judicial officer. On November 26, 1793, the press carried another Federalist cer¬ tificate—this one from Hamilton and Knox. In it they declared that Jay and King had obtained their information on Genet’s alleged appeal from them, and that they in turn had gotten it from Gover¬ nor Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania, who had heard it directly from Dallas and Jefferson. 03 In the final analysis, this new “certificate” indicated that in order to clear up the matter, Mifflin, Dallas, and Jefferson—Republicans all—had to affirm the certificates. Both Re¬ publicans and Federalists realized this. Monroe wrote to Jefferson that upon his testimony depended the outcome of the affair. 54 To Jay this was painfully apparent. He regretted that Jefferson and Mifflin remained in the background; he wondered when Jefferson was going to come forward to affirm the Hamilton-Knox certificate. Duplaine, Oct. 3, 1793, ASP FR, I, 178; appended documents are on pp. 179-182. Young Adams’s “Columbus” letters first appeared in the Columbian Centinel (Boston) in Nov., 1793, and are reprinted in Ford, The Writings of John Ouincy Adams I, 148-178. In later years, John Adams, relying per¬ haps too much on tricky memory, asserted that his son’s writings first turned the tide against Genet and the French frenzy. John Adams to William Cunningham, Oct. 13, 1808, ibid., p. 148 n. 62 Genet’s letter is reproduced in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 331; see also Minnigerode, Genet, p. 329; Monaghan, John Jay, p. 358. De¬ spite the brave front, Genet by this time had grown weary. He complained of lack of instructions and that day by day his mission had become more difficult. Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nov., 1793, Genet Papers, XIII, 3910. 03 The Hamilton-Knox certificate is reproduced in Dawson, “Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 335. 34 Monroe to Jefferson, Philadelphia, Dec. 4, 1793, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, I, 279. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 293 While Jefferson and Mifflin remained silent, or until their silence was accounted for, he realized that little could be done. He even urged that Jefferson’s original report to the President on the conver¬ sation with Genet over the Petite Democrate be published. 0 ’ Jefferson and Mifflin refused to clarify the situation to the advan¬ tage of Federalists. While recognizing Genet as a political liability and eager to be rid of him, they would not contribute knowingly to any further discrediting of him, of their party, and of the French alliance. All this was logical, particularly as Jefferson had acknowl¬ edged privately that Dallas told him that Genet had made the threatened appeal/’ 0 Alexander J. Dallas, the key figure in the matter of the alleged “appeal,” indicated publicly that neither Jefferson nor Mifflin could substantiate the “certificate men.” Several days later, December 9, 1793, in the American Daily Advertiser of Philadelphia Dallas gave the purported “facts, relative to Mr. Genet’s conversation with me.” Dallas was, for those who would believe him, quite detailed and specific. “I now most solemnly say,” Dallas wrote, “that Mr. Genet never did, in his conversation with me, declare ‘that he would appeal from the President to the People,’ or that he would make any other appeal which conveyed to my mind the idea of exciting insur¬ rection and tumult.” He said that neither Jay, King, Hamilton, nor Knox had consulted him before publishing their certificates/’ 7 Truly the situation had become ludicrous. In effect, a foreign diplomat had succeeded in labeling as liars several of the nation’s highest officials. Whether or not Genet had threatened an “appeal” in the presence of Dallas mattered little. In Federalist eyes, his actions, his deeds, his entire diplomatic career in the United States constituted an appeal to the people over the head of Washington. Republicans maintained that he was driven to this because Wash¬ ington’s Federalist-oriented government defied popular will and 66 Monaghan, ]ohn Jay, pp. 358-359; Minnigerode, Genet, p. 332. 58 See The Anas, July 10, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 241; for a sketchy treatment of Mifflin’s role, see Kenneth R. Rossman, Thomas Mifflin and the Politics of the American Revolution, pp. 220-221. 57 Dallas’s statement is reproduced in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,’’ HM, X, 336-337; also in King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 464-469; for a discussion centering on Dallas’s role, see Walters, Alexander James Dallas, pp. 48-50. Dallas had submitted a copy of his statement to Jefferson before publication. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 294 sabotaged the French alliance. This was politics, and in political battles truth often is the first casualty. In politics statesmen must be politicians. Name-calling, groundless accusations, guilt by associa¬ tion, lies, deception, and hysteria are thrown into the same cauldron. In 1793 this cauldron was American democracy—just beginning to boil. Federalists were outraged by what Rufus King called Dallas’s “apostacy”; they accused the Pennsylvania Republican of collusion with Genet. 58 Collusion or not, the French minister, thinking he now had die upper hand, once more sprang to the offensive. He directed another letter to Attorney General Randolph on December 16 demanding prosecution of Jay and King for libel. He asked Jefferson, in addition, to “prevail” upon the President to direct Ran¬ dolph “to commence as speedily as possible, a suit which the honor of France and my own are essendally concerned.” 09 Jefferson acted, but not entirely to Genet’s satisfaction. First he told Randolph that Washington recommended prompt action in the case, “as it concerns a public character peculiarly entitled to the protection of the laws.” At the same time he added the proviso that “our citizens ought not to be vexed with groundless prosecutions.” Randolph then told Genet that “this case will not sustain the prosecution which you meditate.” 00 Even though Randolph had turned him down, Genet was not without champions. Several lawyers, among them Edward Living¬ ston, offered to take his case. On December 23, 1793, they told him that in the light of Dallas’s statements they believed that Jay and King “committed an offense, not only against the local law of this country, but against the law of nations, for which they may be indicted and punished.” They recommended prosecuting Jay and King, probably in the Supreme Court. 61 Armed with legal support, Genet was determined to go ahead with the lawsuit. He notified Randolph that “since you refuse to 68 Rufus King in the American Minerva (New York), Dec. 11, 1793, reprinted in King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 462-464. 66 The letters to Randolph and Jefferson are in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 341-342. 60 Jefferson to Randolph, Philadelphia, Dec. 18, 1793, Randolph to Genet, Philadelphia, Dec. 18, 1793, ibid., pp. 342-343. 61 Minnigerode, Genet, pp. 333-334- THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 2 95 cause to be rendered to my Nation, the ally of yours, the justice claimed by its representative, I will apply immediately to the Judges; and should they refuse to admit my complaint, I will cover myself with the mantle of mourning, and will say America is no longer free.” 0 ' A truly noble threat. There is something of the child in most people, and here spoke the child in Genet. When the “certificate men” learned that Washington, through Jefferson, had authorized the Attorney-General to act as he saw fit in response to Genet’s demands for a libel suit, they were horrified. Jay and King considered Washington’s action “as extraordinary as it authorized inferences unfavorable to our characters, and such indeed as both the President and Mr. Jefferson were sensible we did not merit.” 63 They rushed an angry letter directly to the President. In it they denounced Randolph and Jefferson and demanded a certi¬ fied copy of Jefferson’s report on the Dallas-Genet interview which they wished to be allowed to publish. Washington was in a dilemna. The politics and “faction” he abhorred were splitting his government and were driving a wedge between him and his staunchest sup¬ porters. Randolph urged the President to reply to the critics, justifying Jiis course of action. Hamilton, on the other hand, advised him to release a copy of Jefferson’s report to Jay and King. Knox wanted to restore party harmony; he wished to prevent a complete rupture between Jay and King on the one hand and the President on the other. He searched for “some middle course which would satisfy no one, but end in burying the affair in oblivion.” To achieve this goal he asked Jay and King to take back their angry letter to Wash¬ ington; they refused. They wished to settle the matter, but they believed the President should confer with them directly. 04 Washington subsequently invited Jay to Philadelphia, where the two men thrashed out the entire affair. Complaining of the severity of the Jay-King letter to him and pointing out that neither Jeffer¬ son nor Randolph had meant anything harmful or unfriendly, Washington had written out a defense of his conduct in the episode. “Genet to Randolph, Philadelphia, Dec., 1793, reprinted in Dawson, “The Citizen Genet,” HM, X, 344. 63 Statement of Rufus King, Feb., 1794, in King, Rufus King Conespond- ence, I, 476-480. 04 The entire episode is aired in ibid. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 296 The President emphasized the difficulty of his position and the fact that he had to proceed with “caution.” His entire Cabinet was in¬ volved in this unsavory affair. The Chief Justice was being sued for libel and was accused of propagating slanders against the plenipo¬ tentiary of an allied power; and Washington himself was involved, as Jefferson had made the official report to him. Finally, after some animated exchanges, Washington expressed his friendship for both Jay and King and agreed to release Jefferson’s report. They had reached an understanding and had avoided a permanent rupture. They agreed that if Genet, the source of all the trouble, were not recalled soon by his government, Washington would dismiss him. Within a few days King called on the President to make his peace. The two men went through proper rituals. King handed Washington the original of the Jay-King letter. Then Washington took the written defense of his own conduct and set fire to both documents, and thus reduced dissension to ashes. To seal the bargain, Washington gave King the desired extract of Jefferson’s report on the Dallas-Genet conversation. As to Genet’s threatened lawsuit against King and Jay, it turned out almost as Knox had desired. Caught in the flow of other events and recalled finally by his own government, Genet dropped the suit. His successor, Fauchet, who arrived in February, 1794, made clear that he would abandon the legal action. 65 * * * * * Immediately following the escape of the Petite Democrate, Presi¬ dent Washington had decided that the French minister must go and had taken steps to implement his decision. Among the factors which influenced that decision were the activities of George Hammond, who had learned through Hamilton of the sentiment for Genet’s recall before the French government had decided upon it and had contributed every assistance to bring it about. He was motivated by the idea that if the United States could be awakened to a sense of wrongs suffered from France, Americans would react so as to de- 66 Thirty years later Genet still denied having appealed to the people, insisting that a threat to appeal to Congress was not a threat to appeal to the people. Genet to the Albany Argus, Sept. 29, 1823, cited in Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” p. 474; Minnigerode, Genet, p. 363; Turner, CFM, p. 279 n. THE CAUSE OF MANKIND 297 prive France of her only ally capable of supplying desperately needed provisions. But Hammond’s assistance in alienating the two allies was hardly necessary in view of Genet’s official conduct, which had harmed the alliance and caused the American government to decide to get rid of him. 66 During the public airing of the affair of the “threatening appeal,” Genet’s American career as a diplomat was ruined; fight as he might, the fatal decisions had been made. Jefferson, as has been seen, by early summer 1793 had come to consider Genet a liability to the French alliance and to the budding Republican party. Fearing “that he will enlarge the circle of those disaffected to his country,” Jefferson was doing everything in his power “to moderate the impetuosity of his [Genet’s] movements.” Genet’s conduct, he added later, “is indefensible by the most furious Jacobin. I only wish our countrymen may distinguish between him & his nation, & if the case should ever be laid before them, may not suffer their affection to the nation to be diminished.” A crisis was imminent; Jefferson, though he felt that there was blame on both sides, admitted that there was more on Genet’s side. 07 As might have been expected, Hamilton took the initiative. In a Cabinet meeting of July 13, 1793, he moved that Washington ask the French government to recall Genet; Knox suggested that in the meantime the President suspend Genet’s functions. Jefferson op¬ posed Hamilton’s motion and suggested a milder approach. Wash¬ ington said nothing. 6 ” This was a delicate matter; if it were not handled properly American neutrality would be imperiled. Hamil¬ ton even told the British minister not long after that the American government looked forward to war with France as “neither im¬ probable nor distant.” 69 Ten days later Washington reintroduced the problem of Genet’s status to his Cabinet. He believed he should bring Genet’s con¬ duct to the attention of the French government through Gouver- 88 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Aug. 10, 1793, No. 17, Henry Adams Transcripts. 87 Jefferson to Monroe, Philadelphia, June 28 and July 14, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 323, 348-349; Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, p. 118. 88 The Anas, July 10, 1793, committed to writings July 13, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 243. 80 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Aug. 10, 1793, No. 17, Henry Adams Transcripts; also cited in Thomas, American Neutrality. . . , p. 227. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 298 neur Morris, the American minister in Paris, and ask for his recall. At the same time he wanted to draw “a clear line between him & his nation, express[in]g our fr[ien]dship to the latter but insist[in]g on the recall of Genet, and in the mean time that we should desire him either to withdraw or cease his functions.” Supported by Knox, Hamilton urged the President to take strong action; if not, he warned, the government would lose all public support and might even be overthrown by a faction. ,u The Cabinet took no action at this meeting; not until August 1, 1793, after Jefferson had prepared translations of Genet’s correspondence for the Cabinet members to read, did it reach a final decision.' 1 Washington’s advisers agreed to send a full statement of Genet’s conduct and a copy of his correspondence to the French govern¬ ment and to request his recall. Knox suggested sending off Genet himself, but the others rejected the suggestion. Jefferson confided to Madison that “we have decided unanimously to require the recall of Genet. He will sin\ the republican interest if they do not aban¬ don him. Hamilton presses eagerly an appeal i.e. to the people. It’s [n x 7 8 7- “Morris to Jefferson, Paris, June 10, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 439. “Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Feb. 13, 1793, No. 19, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France; also printed in ASP FR, I, 349- 35 1 - 7 J. B. Burges to Lord Grenville, [London], June 28, 1795, Dropmore Papers, III, 87-89. MORRIS IN PARIS 3 X 5 abroad began not long after he had completed his work at the Philadelphia convention; he was sent to France by Robert Morris, arriving there in February, 1789. In Paris his principal duty was to press American claims against the Farmers-General, claims which had arisen out of difficulties connected with certain tobacco con¬ tracts. 8 While engaged in his official tasks, he did not neglect his own fortunes and found occasion to dabble in numerous profitable speculations. 9 At first Morris delighted in the Parisian world and formed an affection for the France of the monarchy. His wealth, culture, family background, aristocratic orientation, affability, and knowl¬ edge of French opened for him the doors of the French nobility, and even those of the court circle. After Jefferson’s departure Morris, for a time, became the most influential American in Paris. With the ladies, too, he was a success. Through his mistress, the Countess de Flahaut, he came to know Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Peri- gord, soon to become one of France’s outstanding statesmen. In March, 1790, Morris interrupted his duties and his pursuit of pleasure in Paris to go to London for President Washington on a special mission as America’s first executive agent to attempt a rap¬ prochement with Great Britain. 10 The mission failed, in part be¬ cause of Morris’s shortcomings and in part because the time was not ripe for success. The English knew he had dabbled in French politics and they believed at this time that he was inclined to be anti- English and pro-French. 11 Abandoning hope of success in his 'There is reason to believe that Morris at this time acted aslo as a special agent in France for John Jay, Secretary of Foreign Affairs; see Henry M. Wris- ton, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, p. 24. 9 Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 93; Howard Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris (New York, 1952), p. 139. Morris apparently had contracted with the French government for the supply of a considerable quantity of flour. Short to Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 7, 1789, No. 7, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 10 See Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , I, 458 ff. For Washington’s instructions, New York, Oct. 13, 1789, see pp. 462-464. 11 Sir John Temple to the Duke of Leeds, New York, March 19, 1791, Henry Adams Transcripts. Temple believed that Morris was pro-French and that he was in the pay of the French government. For Morris’s views on the failure of his mission, see his letters to Washington, London, April 10, 1792; to Robert Morris, no date, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , I, 614-617. Jefferson blamed the British for the failure of 1 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 3 l6 London diplomacy, Morris returned to France. The French Revolu¬ tion germinated as he observed, recorded, advised, judged, and criticized. It was under these circumstances that Morris wrote his remarkable eyewitness commentaries on the French Revolution. 12 Ironically, this man who loved pleasure and hated turmoil lived to witness at first hand two of the world’s great revolutions. Favor¬ ing a constitutional monarchy for France, Morris did his best to save Louis XVI, going so far as to draft a plan for rescuing Louis from his virtual imprisonment in the Tuileries. He schemed and contrived to carry out the plan. Despite these compromising activities, Morris was fortunate polit¬ ically. In George Washington he had a reliable friend, one who still nourished the illusory ideal of a nonpolitical government—al¬ though to most posts he appointed Hamiltonians. Morris, whose friendship went back to the dire days of Valley Forge, fitted diis pattern. He was a conservative with ability—a man the President could trust. 13 When Jefferson relinquished his Paris post, Washington did not immediately appoint another minister in his place. Instead Wil¬ liam Short, as charge d’affaires, represented the United States in the French capital. With the post open, pressures to make an ap¬ pointment beset Washington. “Mr. [Robert] Morris wishes his namesake, Gouverneur (now in Europe selling lands for him),” said Senator Maclay, “placed in some conspicuous station abroad.” Then he belittled Gouverneur Morris’s diplomatic activities, stating that “he has acted in a strange kind of capacity, half pimp, half en¬ voy, or perhaps more properly a kind of political eavesdropper about die British court, for some time past.” 14 Despite Morris’s inauspicious diplomatic record, when Washing¬ ton chose to fill the French post, he appointed him. 15 Jeffersonians the mission and Hamilton blamed Morris. Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 331-332. 12 The latest and unexpurgated edition of these commentaries is Daven¬ port, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . . 18 See Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 345-346. 14 Maclay, Journal, entry of Feb. 25, 1791, p. 389. 18 About Morris’s appointment the Secretary of State asserted with posi¬ tiveness that “No man upon earth knew he was to be appointed 24 hours before he was appointed but the President himself. . . .” Jefferson to Short, Oct. 16, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 122. MORRIS IN PARIS V-7 in the Senate and elsewhere bitterly opposed the appointment. “He is a monarchy man,” said James Monroe, “& not suitable to be em¬ ployed in this country, nor in France.” 10 “Our new Government,” said another Jeffersonian, “is a Government of Stock jobbing and favouritism.” 1 ' Morris’s nomination, and those of two other candi¬ dates to fill posts at The Hague and Madrid, were submitted to the Senate in December, 1791. For a while it looked as if the Senate would approve the other appointments but reject that of Morris. Senate hostility to Morris appeared so strong that it overcame the deference usually accorded Washington. Active and intense sup¬ port from Rufus King and Hamilton, added to the prestige and backing of Washington, finally got the nominadon through by the narrow vote of 16 to n. 18 Certain Republicans surmised that the appointment was the consequence of “an anti republican influence in the President and Senate.” 19 Opposition to Morris appeared soundly based. In his mission to London he had shown ineptitude as a diplomat, in his plottings with royalists he had compromised himself with ruling elements in the French government, and his outspoken aristocratic views were well- known and resented by the French. Morris’s most important quali¬ fications were his political affiliations and views, views that the Hamiltonians shared. In a political government a diplomat should represent the government’s viewpoint, even though such a view¬ point may be the source of trouble with the government to which he is accredited. Washington wrote candidly to Morris about the difficulties en¬ countered in getting the nomination approved, informing him that the congressmen had accused him of “levity and imprudence of conversation and conduct.” Some emphasized, Washington said, “that your habits of expression indicated a hauteur disgusting to those, who happen to differ from you in sentiment ... that in France 16 The quotation from Monroe is cited from King, Rufus King Correspond¬ ence, I, 421; see also Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 171. 17 G. Mason to James Monroe, Gunston Hall, Feb. 9, 1792, James Monroe Papers, Library of Congress. 18 journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate, I, 92-97; the vote, dated Jan. 12, 1792, is on p. 97; see also King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 421; Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, pp. 224-226. 18 “A Firm Republican” in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Adver¬ tiser, Nov. 28, 1793. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 3 l8 you were considered as a favorer of Aristocracy, and unfriendly to its Revolution. . . . That under this impression, you could not be an acceptable public character, of consequence you would not be able, however willing, to promote the interest of this Country in an essential degree.” 20 The President pointed out, too, the criticism based on the failure of the London mission. When news of Morris’s appointment reached Paris, the French protested. Some were disappointed in the appointment because they felt it was inappropriate and because they regretted the depar¬ ture of William Short, who in their view had acquitted himself well as charge d’affaires. Short had hoped for and expected the minis¬ terial appointment himself. Washington sent him, instead, to The Hague. 21 The Duchesse d’Enville, writing to Jefferson to express her disappointment over Short’s departure and her alarm over Morris, said that “his [Morris’s] opinions are so different from those which prevail today that people suppose Congress is little informed of what is going on among us. The national assembly has expressed itself so strongly as holding opinions entirely opposed to those which your successor professes, that I would almost dare to say that if those who appointed him had been well informed they would have sent him to Holland and would have left in France a young man who has all the maturity one could wish, and reason joined to the most conciliating spirit.” 22 In view of Morris’s personal unpopularity with the men in control of the French government he could do nothing favorable for the French alliance. Critics denounced him for having filled Paris for two years “with invectives against every principle of liberty,” as “being personally detested by all leaders of the Revolution,” and as being “the banker, protector and correspondent of the most obnox¬ ious emigrants.” Thomas Paine and other Americans living in Paris considered his appointment a horrible mistake. 23 20 Washington to Morris, Philadelphia, Jan. 28, 1792, in Fitzpatrick, Wash¬ ington’s Writings, XXXI, 468-470; Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, n, 346. 21 Myrna Boyce, “The Diplomatic Career of William Short,” Journal of Modern History, XV (June, 1943), 108-110; later there was dissatisfaction with Short too; see Ternant to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, March 7, 1793, in Turner, CFM, p. 187. 22 Quoted in Walther, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 175-176. 28 Ibid., pp. 176-177; see also Thomas Paine to Jefferson, London, Feb. MORRIS IN PARIS 3 l 9 Even Lafayette, a personal friend of Morris, deplored the appoint¬ ment. He maintained that “as a private man” he had been satisfied with Morris. But Lafayette told Washington, “the aristocratic, and indeed counter revolutionary principles he has professed unfitted him to be the representative of the only nation whose polidcs have a likeness with ours, since they are founded on the plan of a representa¬ tive democracy.” Declaring that he hated whatever resembled des¬ potism and aristocracy, Lafayette continued, “I can not help wishing the American and French principles were in the heart and on the lips of the American ambassador to France.” 24 Morris was conscious of his difficult situation and of the low es¬ teem in which he was held both at home and in France. Since many Frenchmen tended to place a certain responsibility for France’s diffi¬ culties on the United States, almost any American minister would have run into trouble in France at this time. Writing to his mentor Robert Morris, the new minister confessed that his mission “must be a stormy one” and that France “is split up into Parties whose Inveteracy of Hatred is hardly conceivable and the Royalists and Aristocrats consider America and the Americans as having occa¬ sioned their Misfortunes. . . . the Republicans consider every Thing short of downright Democracy as an Abandonment of political Principle in an American.” 25 Some Frenchmen placed the onus for the Morris appointment on the French foreign minister, Montmorin. Many French leaders looked upon the appointment as evidence that the United States had abandoned the principles of liberty and had turned against France and the 1778 alliance. They were convinced that Morris preferred despotism to liberty. 13, 1792, in Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Worlds of Thomas Paine (2 vols., New York, 1945), II, 1322-1323. Paine mentioned that French newspapers gave evidence of French distaste for the appointment. Several French officials attempted to block Morris’s appointment; when this proved too late they sought from the beginning to have him recalled. Short to Jefferson, May 17, 1792, Short Papers, Library of Congress, cited in Boyce, “The Diplomatic Career of William Short,” JMH, XV, m-112. 31 Lafayette to Washington, Paris, March 15, 1792, in Louis Gottschalk, ed., The Letters of Lafayette to Washington 1777-1799 (New York, 1944), P- 361. 36 G. Morris to R. Morris, London, Feb. 15, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 366-367. 3 20 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Having been appointed while on a visit to London and being un¬ certain of his reception in France, Morris did not allow his new duties to hasten his return. When he arrived in Paris early in May, 1792, he heard rumors that the government would not receive him but did not attach much importance to them. 26 Morris presented his credentials to Charles-Frangois Dumouriez, who in March had become Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dumouriez regretted Short’s departure and disliked the Morris appointment, but he accepted the choice of the American government. Nonetheless, he let Morris cool his heels; not until June 3, 1792, did he present Morris to the King. 27 Almost as soon as Morris officially took over his post, he gave evidence of a persecution complex; he seemed beset by petty annoy¬ ances. First he was annoyed at being compelled to pay customs duty on his luggage at Calais; next he complained of being the object of “patriodc curiosity”; he complained that the French cen¬ sored his mail; he expressed anger at being stopped in the streets for identification. These were minor irritants; greater difficulties soon obscured them. A major dilemma which soon confronted Morris was that of mak¬ ing arrangements to pay the debt the United States owed to France, a debt stemming from French loans made during the American Revolution. Already, under Hamilton’s astute guidance, the United States had paid die interest and part of the principal. Before Morris became minister Washington had authorized Short to negodate loans with Holland to facilitate liquidation of the debt. When Morris began his official dudes, therefore, there was in the hands of Dutch bankers at Amsterdam a large sum of money desdned for payment of America’s public debt. As a consequence he early pressed the ministers of foreign affairs for a settlement and was con¬ fident he would get one. 28 Morris and Short made plans with the 20 Morris recorded, for example, in his diary on May 12, 1792, rumors that the French foreign minister did not wish to receive him and “that the Idea of not receiving me was started by Short, but I do not believe it.” Ibid., II, 427. Mme de Flahaut told Morris on his return from England that Du¬ mouriez would not receive him as America’s minister. Esmein, Gouverneur Morris, p. 30. 27 Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 180; Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 436 (entry of June 3, 1792). 2S Morris to Jefferson, Paris, July 10, 1792, ASP FR, I, 331. MORRIS IN PARIS 321 French government for payment. They made those plans and agreed to them before August 10, 1792. 29 On August 10 the French overthrew the monarchy. That con¬ fronted Morris with the question of whether or not he was bound to the same obligations toward the new government as toward the monarchy. This was the same problem which the government back home had to resolve and which split Jefferson and Hamilton. Mor¬ ris’s dilemma became complicated at the end of August because of the demands of Pierre-Helene-Marie Le Brun, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs. Aware that American service of the French debt provided for payments to the French minister in the United States so that he could purchase supplies for Saint Domingue, and that a payment of four hundred thousand dollars was due in the United States on De¬ cember 1, 1792, Le Brun on August 29 had invited Morris to the office of foreign affairs. There, having in mind large American credits in Amsterdam, Le Brun asked the American minister to an¬ ticipate the December 1 payment by sixty days, to make it in Paris, and to double it. 30 Morris said he had no authority to make such a transaction and that he “had no Powers to treat with the present Government.” 31 He did indicate that he would write to his superiors and recommend payment. To French officials this was evasion; speed was essential; correspondence across the Atlantic took months. They were also upset by Morris’s “pretended insufficiency” of powers. Le Brun wrote cuttingly to the American minister that “according to the principle that you are not authorized by your instructions to treat with the new French Government your functions would be nil.. . . The King being suspended from his functions must change nothing, Sir, in the dispositions of a nation with which we have 80 For details see Hamilton to Short, to Washington, to Jefferson, Phila¬ delphia, April 13, 14, 15, 1791, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, IV, 152-156; Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 501-504; Walther, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 181-182; Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 387-389; Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, pp. 246-249; Theodore Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris (Boston, 1888), pp. 280-281. 30 Morris’s diary entry of Aug. 29, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 518. 31 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Aug. 30, 1792, No. 9, ibid. 519-523; also in ASP FR, I, 336-337. 3 22 ENTANGLING ALUANCE links of friendship and of interest and whose independence is our work.” He concluded that “the Government being immutable and always existent no representative may, without an express order from his Court or his constituents, refuse to treat directly with it.” 32 These bold words did not settle the problem as to Morris’s powers to deal with the new Revolutionary French government. But Thomas Jefferson’s instructions did. When Jefferson learned of the situation he directed Morris to carry on with the new French gov¬ ernment and at the same time he announced in clear-cut terms, as has been indicated earlier, what came to be the basic recognition policy of the United States. 33 In the meantime Morris had replied immediately to Le Brun’s remarks, stating once more his own position. Unfortunately, in so doing he referred more than once to the American government as “my Court.” Insignificant in itself, the phrase, coming from the representative of a sister republic, shocked the French and reverber¬ ated across the Atlantic. Morris, it appeared, deliberately flaunted his aristocratic predilections and royalist sympathies. Regardless of the motives behind the use of the expression, it was a thoughtless gesture, doing harm to intangibles in Franco-American amity. Morris, in effect, had driven another nail into his diplomatic coffin. 34 Previously Morris had said he was determined to remain in Paris and had been the only foreign diplomatic representative to remain there during the Reign of Terror. 30 At this point, however, he became indignant over the August 30 letter and demanded his pass¬ port; he would leave Paris. Le Brun hastened to mollify him, de¬ claring that he had misunderstood the letter. “Besides,” explained the French minister, “you Sir who were born in the midst of a free people, should regard the present affairs of France from a different point of view to all the foreign ministers resident in Paris. We up¬ hold the same cause as that of your country, therefore our principles 82 Le Brun to Morris, Paris, Aug. 30, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 527. 88 Jefferson to Morris, Philadelphia, March 12, 1793, in Lipscomb, Jeffer¬ son’s Worths, IX, 36-37. 84 Morris to Le Brun, Paris, Sept. 1, 1792, ibid., II, 528-531; also the note on the use of the word “court.” 85 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Aug. 22, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. At this time Morris described the fleeing diplomats and announced his intention to stay. MORRIS IN PARIS 3 2 3 and yours should be the same and by a chain of natural consequences no reason can oppose your residence in Paris.” 36 Although ruffled, Morris reconsidered immediately and told Le Brun, “I resume my intention of staying on and awaiting the orders of my Court. As to my personal opinions, Sir, they are of no impor¬ tance in so grave a matter, but you may rest assured that I have never questioned the right of every People to be governed as they please. For many years I have sincerely wished that France should enjoy all possible liberty and happiness, and I am certain of carrying out the intentions of the United States in assuring you that these wishes are shared by all my compatriots.” 37 Regardless of the fine words, little had been changed; to French¬ men Morris was a menace to amicable relations between their coun¬ try and the United States. They suspected him of purposely creating difficulties between the two allies. “His ill will is proved,” one offi¬ cial said; he betrays Americans “as well as us.” 38 Upset because Morris’s conduct caused concern in the govern¬ ment and believing that a close accord between France and the United States should continue, Le Brun asked Ternant, then French minister to the United States, to convey to Jefferson the French ver¬ sion of what had transpired and to inform the American Secretary of State of Morris’s hostile attitude. 39 The distrust was mutual; Morris harbored suspicions concerning the French ministers. He told Jefferson that he “had good reasons to believe that a private Speculation was at the Bottom of the Propos¬ als made to me.” 40 Soon the Secretary of State heard from other sources that “the French Ministers are entirely broken with Gouvr. Morris, shut their doors to him & will never receive another com¬ munication from him.” This same witness reported that he had 80 Le Brun to Morris, Paris, Sept. 16, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 544-546. 87 Morris to Le Brun, Paris, Sept. 17, 1792, ibid., p. 547. 88 Claviere, Minister of Public Contributions, to Le Brun, Sept. 10, 1792, quoted in Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 187. 80 Le Brun’s remarks (n.p., n.d.) to Ternant are quoted in ibid., p. 188; for Ternant’s reaction see his despatches to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, Feb. 13 and March 7, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 170, 187; The Anas, Feb. 20, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 217. 10 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Sept. 27, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 549. 3 2 4 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE heard Morris curse “the French ministers as a set of damned rascals” and that “the king wd. still be replaced on his throne.” 41 Weighing his every motion, the French read hostility into most of Morris’s actions. When in his letter of September i, in which he threatened to leave Paris, he had requested a passport to England, French officials suspected that he planned to go to London to plot against their government. Classing Morris an enemy of the French Republic, they accused him of fomenting trouble with the American government and of seeking to transform die French alliance into an Anglo-American alliance. His recall was already in the making. His presence in Paris, declared General Dumouriez, posed “an enigma for the two republics”; France should no longer deal with “this insolent and vile man.” When confronted by the French com¬ plaints, even Washington realized that Morris must go, that he “cd. be no longer contind. there [Paris] consistent with the public good.” 42 Ironically, the world’s two major republics, both created by revolu¬ tion and allies by treaty, sent to each other’s capital not emissaries of good will but propagators of distrust. Both men, Genet and Morris, were intelligent, cultured, and patriotic, but both were antipathetic to the host government. Even though each did his duty as he saw it and each in his own way carried out instructions of the home gov¬ ernment, both committed the cardinal sin of diplomacy. They did not act diplomatically. * * # * * Morris’s doubts concerning the legal status of the new French government, particularly in the problems of recognition and accredi¬ tation and payment of debts to the new government, were shared by others. His predecessor, Short, had also believed that the debt pay¬ ments to France should be suspended and that payments should be made only to the King or to officials of the government to which Morris originally had been accredited. The Dutch bankers, too, had opposed payment; they raised the problem of what receipt France would give, questioning the legality of any receipts unless 11 Report of Col. W. S. Smith to Jefferson summarized in The Anas, Feb. 20, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 216-218. “Washington’s reaction is paraphrased in ibid., p. 217; Dumouriez to Le Brun (n.p., n.d.) is quoted in Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 189. MORRIS IN PARIS 325 signed by the King. 48 Even Jefferson concurred and urged caution and suspension of payment until the political situation in France clarified. 44 As soon as Hamilton heard of the King’s suspension, he directed Short to stop all payments until he received new instruc¬ tions. 45 Although he had serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the new government and as to his powers to deal with it, particularly on the debt question, Morris nevertheless had insisted on paying the money to France as planned. In his view “the Debt from the United States was to the Nation and not to the King of the French, much less to his most Christian Majesty.” He wished “to adhere to the original Nature and Form of the present Payment” because the arrange¬ ment was financially advantageous to the United States; not to adhere to the payments, moreover, would have been politically un¬ wise. As to the form of receipt, he believed the objections of the Dutch bankers could be met or overcome if the United States would accept “a Bill on the Commissaries” of the French treasury. There was little danger, Morris felt, of not being credited with the pay¬ ment. This comprised but one small installment; the debt remained large and other payments were still pending. In the final adjust¬ ment with any other French government, he said, the United States could insist that the payment in question be credited in full. 46 Payment was made, in the end, not as French officials had wanted nor as Short had stipulated, but in the form and with the receipt upon which Morris had insisted. 4 ' Morris had viewed the situation 43 Boyce, “The Diplomatic Career of William Short,” ]MH, XV, 112; Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 182; Short to Morris, The Hague, Aug. 28 and Sept. 4, [1792], in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 508-510. 44 Jefferson to Morris, Philadelphia, Oct. 15, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 120-121. 46 See Hamilton to Short, Newark, Oct. 1 and Philadelphia, Oct. 16, 1792, and Philadelphia, Nov. 5, 1792, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, IV, 3 1 8-322. 40 Morris to Short, Paris, Sept. 20, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 512-513. Morris and Short engaged in a quarrel¬ some correspondence over the debt payments; see pp. 504-515; Boyce, “The Diplomatic Career of William Short,” JMH, XV, 112-113; Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, pp. 250-251. 47 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Dec. 21, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. Here Morris summarized his views on the debts question. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 326 correctly; successive French governments did not question the valid¬ ity of the payment. An important factor which facilitated unques¬ tioned settlement of the debt-payment issue was the attitude of Robespierre when his government assumed power. Eager to recover lost initiative in the French alliance for his government, he placed no real obstacle in the path of settlement. 48 * * # * * While problems of debt payment and recognition had embittered French officials toward Morris and had been important influences in strengthening the convictions that Morris must go, these were by no means the only factors which had made him persona non grata to the French Republic. French republican distrust was also grounded on other evidence. Despite Washington’s and Jefferson’s admoni¬ tions against meddling in French domestic pohtics and despite a promise to Dumouriez that he would not do so, Morris not only en¬ tangled himself in French revolutionary politics, but he also took a hand in royalist intrigue. Before he became America’s official emis¬ sary, Morris had compromised himself by engaging in royalist plots and counterrevolutionary activity. Whatever the moral rightness or wrongness of such activity or the human values involved, the diplo¬ mat implicated always runs serious risk. If the side he supports wins in the struggle for power, he may be acclaimed as a hero; if the side he backs loses, however, not only does he embitter relations between his government and the new government which comes to power in the country to which he is accredited, but also he is a failure as a diplomat and must suffer the consequences. Morris, who had been accepted by and had enjoyed the lavish hospitality of French nobility during his years in France and who had strong aristocratic views anyway, was concerned over the fate of various French aristocrats, particularly those who were his friends, at the hands of vengeful republicans. His home and the American legation became an asylum for French nobles fleeing the guillotine. Among the French aristocrats to whom Morris gave the protection of his home was Count Charles Hector d’Estaing, well-known naval commander in the wars of the American Revolution. 49 Aware that, 48 See Masson, Le Departement des affaires etrangeres. . . , p. 295. 40 See Morris’s diary entries of Aug. 10-16, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 489-491; for Estaing, see p. 519 n. MORRIS IN PARIS 3 2 7 in his position as American minister, the new French authorities would find fault with his receiving and protecting royalists, he would not turn them out; “it would be inhuman to force them into the hands of these assassins.” 50 This activity, while humanitarian and laudable, violated French laws, and when engaged in by a foreign diplomat provided justi¬ fiable cause for serious action by the host government. Actually, Morris had begun aiding and offering sanctuary to royalists while still a private citizen, but he did not cease this counterrevolutionary and antigovernmental activity when he became the American minis¬ ter. 51 Noteworthy among Morris’s counterrevolutionary activities was his role in a plot to snatch Louis XVI and his Queen from the claws of the republicans and to spirit them out of Paris to sanctuary. The plan was conceived at one of the dinner parties Morris gave for Parisian luminaries in the middle of July, 1792. In a garden conver¬ sation with one of the royalist ministers, he discussed the King’s fate; it was by then clear that execution awaited the French mon¬ arch. When, in the course of the conversation, the Frenchman asked what should be done in the present situation, Morris urged that the King get out of Paris. From this evolved the plot to save the King. They exchanged ideas, and those involved later met at Morris’s house. Of the various plans concocted, Louis preferred Morris’s detailed scheme which promised a possibility of success. 52 Even at this crucial time the monarch vacillated; nothing was done. Finally, on July 24, 1792, Louis gave tangible evidence of his trust in Morris by asking the American minister to take custody “Quoted in Henry Cabot Lodge, Historical and Political Essays (Boston, 1892), p. 102; Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, p. 264. 61 The most reliable printed source on Morris’s proroyalist activities is Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 245-246, et passim. For other accounts, see Anne Cary Morris, ed., The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris (2 vols., New York, 1888), I, 555 ff.; Walther, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 190-191; Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 380-385. Esmein, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 25-26, maintains that Morris’s attachment to the Bourbon dynasty lasted as long as he lived. '“Morris's diary entry of July 17, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 467; subsequent diary entries should be read in con¬ junction with an unsigned, undated document addressed “Son Altesse Royale,” written probably by Morris in 1796 to explain the events of the summer of 1792, ibid., pp. 473-479. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 328 of his papers and money; Morris would not accept the papers, but did take the money, which, unlike the papers, “bore no mark of ownership.'' He was to use the money on bribes and the hiring of soldiers to cover the King’s escape. 53 After the slaughter of the Swiss guards on August 10, escape seemed impossible. Revolutionary authorities got wind of the plot and seized and condemned one of the men privy to it. Fortu¬ nately, he died without betraying his conspirators. Others who were under suspicion were saved by judicious bribery, by using the King’s money in Morris’s possession. With the failure of the plot, rumors reached America that Morris had lost his life as a conse¬ quence of his involvement. Though the rumors were false, it ap¬ peared obvious that “Mr. Morris is not, at this time, a very popular character at Paris.’’ 04 Morris had run a great risk. He had com¬ promised his diplomatic status and had endangered American rela¬ tions with the French government. Those in power knew of his intimate relations with the royalists. Until it could get rid of Morris, the French government determined to ignore him or bypass him as a channel to the American government and people. * # * * * Another problem which confronted Morris concerned the Mar¬ quis de Lafayette, America’s adopted son. From the beginning, Lafayette had been a staunch but moderate supporter of the French Revolution, gaining prominence as a defender of the constitutional monarchy and of the King. After the overthrow of the constitu¬ tional monarchy on August 10, 1792, and the taking of the Tuileries, Lafayette was placed in an untenable posidon. First he attempted to save the monarchy by a march on Paris but failed to arouse a suffi¬ cient following. Soon the National Assembly ordered his arrest. His army melted away, leaving him to take care to preserve his own life. On August 19, 1792, he escaped from France across the Belgian border into Luxembourg. There he fell into the hands of the Aus¬ trians, who threw him into prison. Lafayette immediately wrote to William Short at The Hague that he was no longer in the French service, that he was now “an American cidzen, an American officer,” and that he desired the 63 Ibid., p. 477. “ Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), May 9, 1793. MORRIS IN PARIS 3 2 9 assistance of American diplomacy to effect his release. 50 “You must,” he wrote to Short on August 30, “immediately, in the name of the United States, and in common with the other American minis¬ ters, intervene in our affair and free us.” 5 '’ In anxiety Short turned to Morris and to Thomas Pinckney in London for guidance. 57 Pinckney and Morris calmed the alarmed Short; Morris advised that “Monsieur de La Fayette is a Frenchman, and it is as a Frenchman that he is taken and is to be treated.” Although sympathetic and desirous of alleviating Lafayette’s distress, Morris could not see the validity of the Marquis’s claim to American citizenship. Logically, he believed that the United States could not intervene in the affair without becoming a party to the quarrel. Ffe suggested recourse “to Prayer and Solicitation.” 58 Morris was not alone in his view that the American diplomats should not meddle in the Lafayette affair; Pinckney and Jefferson agreed with him. 59 While frowning on any overt efforts, Jefferson, nevertheless, did direct Morris to do his utmost to secure Lafayette’s release. 60 As soon as Morris heard that the Marquis was in dire want, having lost his fortune, he sent the prisoner ten thousand florins. Madame Lafayette and her children also benefited from Morris’s and the American government’s generosity. Morris loaned her money to pay off debts, and, when she was imprisoned, he saved her from death. 61 These were laudable activities, but they did not “Lafayette to Short, Nivelle, Aug. 26, 1792, in Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 398-399. 56 Quoted in Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 194. 67 See Short to Morris, The Hague, Sept. 7, 1792, ASP FR, I, 341; Boyce, “The Diplomatic Career of William Short,” JMH, XV, 113. 68 Morris to Short, Paris, Sept. 12, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 556-557. 60 See Pinckney to Morris, London, Sept. 14, 1792, ibid., pp. 558-559. Washington followed the advice of his diplomatic representatives in not making Lafayette’s plight a subject of formal diplomatic intervention. Bemis, “The London Mission of Thomas Pinckney. . . ,” American Historical Review, XVIII, 245; see also Washington to Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 13, 1793, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXII, 385-386. 60 Jefferson to Morris, Philadelphia, March 15, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 202-203. 01 Morris to W. & J. Willink (Dutch bankers), Paris, Jan. 27, 1793, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 561; see also Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 404-412. 330 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE make Morris any more palatable to the Revolutionary government to whom Lafayette was an enemy of the state. * * * * * Thomas Paine was also trapped by the French Revolution. Im¬ prisoned by the French, he too appealed to Morris for help as an American citizen. Morris and Paine disliked each other intensely. Since the days of the American Revolution Morris had nursed a con¬ tempt for Paine, a contempt which Morris’s biographers have shared; Theodore Roosevelt, for example, labeled him “the filthy little athe¬ ist.” 62 The paths of the two men crossed several times in London and Paris after American independence. In the first years of the French Revolution Paine had achieved high status within the Giron- din hierarchy, playing a not inconsiderable role in the revolutionary drama. Morris believed that during these years, and particularly after he became the American minister, Paine plotted against him. 63 Morris complained, not without justification, that Paine had arro¬ gated rights to himself which were not his to assume, particuarly in meddling in affairs of a diplomatic nature which were within the province of the American minister. Paine, moreover, had plunged dangerously into French politics and had acted to undermine Mor¬ ris’s already precarious status with French authorities by stressing that the American minister was hostile to the French Revolution, which, of course, was true. Morris, he pointed out, was unpopular in the United States, as he was with Americans resident in France whom he had antagonized. Following the fall of the Girondins Paine became harmless to Morris. On December 23, 1793, on the orders of Robespierre, the French clapped Paine into prison; he ap¬ peared destined for the guillotine. He immediately claimed rights as an American citizen. Morris ignored his pleas; he told Robes¬ pierre that he did not acknowledge Paine’s right to pass as an Amer- * • • 04 lean citizen. 62 Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, p. 289, and the latest biographer, Swig- gett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, pp. 7-8, 63-64; Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 247; Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 416. 63 Morris in the summer of 1793 (June 25, 1793) wrote to Robert Morris that he suspected that Paine had intrigued against him and was “confirmed in the idea.” Morris, ed., The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 48. For a discussion of the Morris-Paine antagonism by a partisan of Paine, see Moncure D. Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 77-127. 61 A biographer and partisan of Paine has claimed that Morris, by hinting MORRIS IN PARIS 33 1 Now desperate, Paine turned again to Morris for help in obtain¬ ing freedom. “Though you and I are not on terms of the best har¬ mony,” he pleaded, “I apply to you as the Minister of America” for aid, and “I expect you to make Congress acquainted with my situ¬ ation.” 65 Morris had written unenthusiastically to the French Minis¬ ter of Foreign Affairs, Deforgues, pointing out that Paine, born an Englishman, had become an American citizen and then a French citizen. He concluded that Paine was out of his jurisdiction. 66 To Jefferson, Morris had commented officially that against his better judgment he had claimed Paine as an American. 67 Later he re¬ marked parenthetically that “lest I should forget it, I must mention, that Thomas Paine is in prison, where he amuses himself with pub¬ lishing a pamphlet against Jesus Christ.... I incline to think that, if he is quiet in prison, he may have the good luck to be forgotten,” while if he attracts attention to himself, “the long suspended axe might fall on him.” Morris then expressed doubt as to the validity of Paine’s claim to American citizenship. Even if he were to recog¬ nize such a claim, he now indicated, it would at this time do little good. 68 Paine remained in prison until Morris’s successor gained his freedom for him. 69 * * # * * As the French Revolution unfolded, Morris became increasingly hostile to it. This hostility, coupled with his aristocratic sympathies, colored his views toward the French government, and those biased that Paine had fomented the trouble between Genet and Washington, had set in motion the procedure which led to Paine’s imprisonment. Moncure D. Conway, ed., The Writings of Thomas Paine, III, 158; see also Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 248; Sparks, The Life of Gouverneur Morris, I, 416- 418. 68 Paine to Morris, Luxembourg, Feb. 24, 1794, in Philip S. Foner, ed., The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, 1338-1339. 60 Morris to Deforgues, Paris, Feb. 14, 1794, in Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 120. 67 Morris to Jefferson, Sainport, March 6, 1794, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 08 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, June 21, 1794, ASP FR, I, 402. 69 Partisans of Paine, as most of his biographers have been, have maintained that Morris conspired to keep Paine in prison and that if he had not Paine would have been released quickly. See Foner, The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, Introduction, xxxv; Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 113-115; William M. Van der Weyde, The Life and Times of Thomas Paine (10 vols., New York, 1925), I, 245. 33 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE views found expression in the reports he sent home. 70 Not only did he correspond officially with Jefferson, but also, because of his per¬ sonal friendship with Washington, he went over the head of the Secretary of State and corresponded directly with the President. Given Washington’s conservative outlook and the Hamiltonian make-up of his government, it followed logically that Morris’s biased reports on the French Revolution increased the President’s apprehen¬ sions over French occurrences and created new fears. During the summer of 1792 Morris had reported on French events to Jefferson, concluding that “the best picture I can give of the French nation is that of cattle driven before a thunder storm.”' 1 As Jacobin activity increased, so did his alarm. “We stand on a vast volcano,” he said; “we feel it tremble, and we hear it roar; but how, and when, and where, it will burst, and who may be destroyed by its eruptions, it is beyond the ken of mortal foresight to discover.”'* With the monarchy overthrown and with Paris in turmoil Mor¬ ris surveyed his situation and turned to the Secretary of State for guidance. Even though his credentials were to the deposed mon¬ archy “and not to the Republic of France,” and even though other foreign diplomats were fleeing, he indicated he would remain. 73 While it took courage to remain in Paris, Morris’s action in staying was not the heroic deed that it has been often portrayed. He was not ordered to leave; the other ministers, in most instances, were. Most of the other diplomats represented monarchs and governments committed to antirevolutionary principles; Morris represented an ally and a sister republic; the French expected him to stay. As he admitted, to flee would have given the appearance “of taking part against the late Revolution.” Morris’s sojourn in Paris during the terror, nonetheless, was not without personal danger.' 4 70 For an example of Morris’s correspondence reflecting his views toward the French and the 1778 alliance, see his long letter to Washington, London, Feb. 4, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 349-358. In the letter Morris summed up the Paris situation and reported a secret royalist message to the effect that despite overtures to England the Bourbons were still loyal to the American alliance. 71 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, June 10, 1792, ASP FR, I, 330. 72 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, June 17, 1792, ibid., p. 331. 73 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Aug. 22, 1793, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 531-533- 74 Even Talleyrand had urged Morris to flee; see Morris’s diary entries of MORRIS IN PARIS 333 As the Revolution swirled about him, Morris wrote home more and more of debaucheries he witnessed, dwelling on all that was evil in the Revolution. In September he reported that “we have had one Week of uncheck’d Murders in which some thousands have perished in this City.” To Washington in the following month he alluded to the “sanguinary Events which have taken place” and promised to entertain the President “with the Recital of many Things which it would be improper to commit to Paper, at least for die present.” Washington in his responses reflected Morris’s pessimistic view of French events, noting that “gloomy indeed appears the situation of France at this juncture.” ,J When Morris expressed horror at events in Paris, deprecated venality and corruptness in the govern¬ ment, and made clear his sympathy for deposed royalists, Washing¬ ton replied that events in France had more than made good Morris’s gloomiest predictions.' 6 In Jefferson’s words, Morris had “kept the President’s mind constantly poisoned with his forebodings.”" In Jefferson, Morris could not arouse a spark of sympathy. The Secretary of State knew that Morris was bypassing him and that Morris’s influence with die President counteracted his own. Morris, on his part, knew Jefferson’s views toward France. On one occasion he told Jefferson that it gave him “Pain to write and will I am sure give you pain to read the distressful State of a Country for which we have both a sincere Regard.”'” Jefferson was disturbed by Morris’s one-sided reports, by the somber colors he used in painting the revolutionaries’ side of the French picture. In indirect but meaning¬ ful ways Jefferson expressed his displeasure with Morris. For long Aug. 31, Sept. 5, 7, 1792, ibid., II, 536-538; Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, p. 277. 76 The quotations are from Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Sept. 10, 1792, Morris to Washington, Paris, Oct. 23, 1792, Washington to Morris, Phila¬ delphia, Oct. 20, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolu¬ tion. . . , II, 540, 565, 584. 76 Washington to Morris, Philadelphia, Oct. 20, 1792, in Fitzpatrick, Wash¬ ington’s Writings, XXXII, 188-190. Even before Morris had become minister to France Washington had written to him privately that his reports “will be treasured up, to be acted upon as circumstances will warrant, and as occa¬ sions may present.” Philadelphia, June 20, 1792, p. 61. 77 The Anas, March 12, 1792, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 188. 78 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Sept. 19, 1792, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 334 ENTANGLING x ALLIANCE periods he would not answer Morris’s letters, leaving him in the dark as to instructions and events at home. 79 Between the two men understanding and sympathy appeared lost. * * * * # By the beginning of 1793 it had become impossible for Morris to stay much longer in Paris; his situation was intolerable. He con¬ fessed to Jefferson that leaders in the government’s Diplomatic Com¬ mittee “hate me cordially, tho,” he remarked naively, “it would puzzle them to say why... .” so One reason was that French republi¬ can officials viewed with mounting ill humor the asylum he offered under the cloak of his diplomatic status. They were convinced that he remained in Paris as a spy for England and Austria, particularly after France had gone to war with England in February, 1793. Morris’s house had been visited by armed men, he was prevented from traveling in France, and newspapers discussed his execution. “I am told,” he wrote to Robert Morris, “that the London gazetteers have killed me, besides burning my house, and other little pleas¬ antries of the kind.” 81 His mail was opened and pried into and he was molested in other ways. In the United States it was rumored that so odious had Morris become to the French that to protect him from public vengeance, “excited by his monarchical and aristocratic manoeuvres,” he was provided with a guard. 82 Finally Morris could stand no more; he complained to Le Brun. 83 Morris’s frequent meetings with the British ambassador to France, Earl Gower, and his wife, provided another reason for French dis- 79 Morris complained often of his neglect by Jefferson, stating at one time that “amid the political storms which vex this hemisphere, the opinion of the United States is the polar star which should guide my course, but which is totally concealed from my view.” Morris to Jefferson, Sainport, March 6, 1794, ASP FR, I, 404; see also Morris to Randolph, Sainport, April 15, 1794, ibid., p. 406, in which Morris expresses distrust of Jefferson; see his earlier complaint of neglect to Robert Morris, March 10, 1793, in Morris, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 56-58. 80 Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Feb. 13, 1793, No. 19, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France; also in ASP FR, I, 350. 81 Morris to Robert Morris, March 15, 1793, in Morris, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 38; Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 238. 82 “A Farmer of the back Settlements” in the Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 20, 1794. 83 Morris to Le Brun, March 29, 1793, in Morris, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 41. MORRIS IN PARIS 335 trust. But this liaison ended in August, 1792, when Gower was re¬ called. Now almost alone in Paris and at odds with the authorities, Morris realized that his diary, reflecting as it did his dubious activi¬ ties, was a compromising document. On January 15, 1793, he closed it. To continue his entries, he realized, “would compromise many people.” 84 At the same time he became more circumspect in his letter-writing, particularly to those at home, referring to the tamper¬ ing with his mail as “patriotic curiosity.” Finally, in April, 1793, Morris left Paris, moving to Sainport, some twenty miles away, where he had purchased a house on the banks of the Seine. In the comparative calm of Sainport he spent whatever time he could reading and writing. Business, politics, and diplomacy, however, made inroads. He had to look, for ex¬ ample, into the affairs of American sailors seized by the French. All the time he was at Sainport, in fact, he sent a stream of letters to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs protesting the seizure of American ships in an attempt to secure agreements to prevent fur¬ ther seizures. 85 Le Brun, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured Morris that the attacks against American shipping were unintentional. France wished to do nothing to injure friendship with America. It was difficult, he explained, in carrying on the sea war against British shipping “to contain, within just limits, the indignation of our ma¬ rines and in general of all French patriots against a people who speak the same language, and having the same habits, as the free Amer¬ icans. The difficulty of distinguishing our allies from our enemies has often been the cause of offenses committed on board your ves¬ sels.” 86 Other complications arose from the demands of American adven¬ turers in France employed or financed by the French to outfit ships under the American flag for the French service, or from Americans who, with an eye to the huge profits to be made, had outfitted priva¬ teers on their own. These men sought American passports from Morris. He refused them, maintaining that “real American vessels have their registry and other papers in proper order, consequently, 84 Diary entry of Jan. 15, 1793, ibid., p. 24. 85 For the correspondence on the seizures, see ASP FR, I, 359 ff. 89 Le Brun to Morris, April 14, 1793, quoted in James W. Gerard, “French Spoliations Before 1801,” Magazine of Amaican History, XII (July, 1884), 35. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 33 6 [they] do not need any documents which we can give, and which, in fact, we are not authorized to give.” 8 ' Angry American ship cap¬ tains interned at Bordeaux also made life difficult for Morris. Com¬ plaining that he did nothing on their behalf, they turned to Thomas Paine for help. 88 In fleeing to Sainport, Morris did not escape trouble. His country seat, like his Paris house, became an asylum for royalist friends. Particularly vexing to French republicans was the haven he gave to Countess de Damas, against whom the Paris Committee of General Safety had issued a warrant of arrest. Climaxing Morris’s other activities, this affair became the alleged immediate cause of his recall. Morris, convinced that his diplomatic status permitted him to shelter his friends, refused to give up the Countess. Despite pro¬ tests of French authorities, who pointed out that a French cidzen could not invoke the American’s diplomatic immunity and thus defy the laws of France, he persisted in protecting the wanted royalist. 89 In the meandme Genet’s activities had their effect on Morris’s diplomatic status. When Morris had learned that Genet was appointed minister to the United States he had gathered what information he could about him and informed Washington that Genet “is a Man of good Parts and very good Education, Brother of the Queen’s first Woman.” 90 After being introduced to the new minister by Thomas Paine, Mor¬ ris had dined with him on December 28, 1792. He subsequendy re¬ ported to Washington that Genet “has I think more of Genius than of Ability and you will see in him at first Blush the Manner and Look of an Upstart.” Morris ventured further. “I think that in the Business he is charg’d with,” he said, “he will talk so much as 87 Morris to Pinckney, Paris, Feb. 18, 1793, ASP FR, I, 355; Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, pp. 262-263. 88 For Morris’s protest to the French government in behalf of the captains, see Morris to Deforgues, Sainport, Aug. 20, 1793, ASP FR, I, 373-374; the appeal of the captains to the National Convention of France, Aug. 22, 1793, is on p. 374. The episode is treated in detail in Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 83-85. 88 Granting sanctuary to Countess de Damas, Morris was warned, did harm to continuing Franco-American accord. Committee of Public Safety to Morris, Paris, Nov. 18, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXIX, f. 298; for details, see Walther, Gouverneur Morris, pp. 240-243. 80 Morris to Washington, Paris, Dec. 28, 1792, in Davenport, ed., A Diary of the French Revolution. . . , II, 594. MORRIS IN PARIS 337 to furnish sufficient Matter for putting him on one Side of his Object should that be convenient.”'* 1 Morris complained that Le Brun had slighted him “by sending out Mr. Genet without mentioning to me a Syllable either of his Mission or his errand, both of which nevertheless I was early and sufficiently informed of.” He then revealed he had discovered that Genet had “three hundred blank Commissions for Privateers” to be used secretly in America. By these measures, he surmised, the French hoped to involve the United States in war with Great Britain. Such a policy he considered unsound “since they may as a Nation derive greater Advantage from our Neutrality than from our Alii- >>92 ance. As Girondin control over France weakened, Morris in his reports on French developments concluded accurately that if events contin¬ ued in the same vein Genet undoubtedly would be replaced.'*' In the meantime Genet had laid the groundwork for Morris’s recall. Not long after his arrival in the United States he had approached Jefferson informally on securing Morris’s recall, indicating that “we all depend on you to send us a good minister there [Paris], with whom we may do business confidentially, in place of mr. [.fie] Mor¬ ris.” 94 This was the view of the French foreign office, which be¬ lieved that Morris’s reports were gradually destroying the American friendship basic to the 1778 alliance. An important objective of Genet’s mission, in fact, was to offset Morris’s malevolent influence on Franco-American relations. French officials wanted an American envoy who sympathized with their revolutionary principles, and Morris did not. 90 Involved as he was in more pressing activities, Genet did not go beyond his “confidential observations” on Morris until he knew that his own recall was imminent. In retaliation he then detailed reasons for French dissatisfaction with Morris. Summarizing his government’s major complaints and adding a few new ones, he 91 Morris to Washington, Paris, Jan. 6, 1793, ibid., p. 595. 92 The quotations are from Morris to Jefferson, Feb. 13 and March 26, 1793, and Morris to Pinckney, March 2, 1793, ibid., pp. 596-597. 93 Morris to Washington, Sainport, Jan. 25, 1793, ASP FR, I, 397. 91 Jefferson to Washington, Dec. 11, 1793 (quoting Genet), in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 465. 96 Le Brun to Genet, Paris, March 31, 1793, and later in 1793 (no day and month), Genet Papers, Library of Congress, VIII, 2693; IX, 2765-66. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 33 8 accused Morris of being a “counter-revolutionary” and of “having been the channel of the counsels which conducted Lafayette into the prisons of Prussia.” Denying Genet’s charges, Morris labeled them folly and falsehoods. 9 '’ Morris had the satisfaction of seeing the French minister replaced; indeed, it was he who handled the nego¬ tiations for Genet’s recall. 9 ' The triumph soon tarnished; Morris’s recall followed shortly. In the meantime, Morris maneuvered to influence the character of the mission of Genet’s successor and so influence Franco-American diplomacy on the other side of the Atlantic. Morris informed Wash¬ ington that, “knowing the public and private views of the parties,” he had suggested to Deforgues, the new French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that it might be well if the new French minister to the United States were to declare early that France was determined “not to meddle with the interior affairs of other nations. . . .” 98 He also forwarded details on the diplomatic commission the French had decided to send to America to replace Genet. Fauchet, the new minister, he had heard, was a young man of “genius and informa¬ tion.” This time Morris believed French assurances of friendship for the United States, “because America is the only source from whence supplies of provisions can be drawn to feed this city [Paris], on which so much depends.” 99 Morris’s outlook appeared sound; the French were concerned over the status of the American alliance. The National Conven¬ tion dominated by Robespierre had decreed that in her foreign rela- dons France would be terrible to her enemies and generous to her allies and that she would adhere faithfully to the American alliance. In particular, the decree stressed “drawing still closer the bonds of alliance and friendship” which united France and America. 100 98 Genet to Jefferson, New York, Sept. 18, 1793, ASP FR, I, 173; Morris to Randolph, Sainport, July 23, 1794, p. 411. 97 See Morris to Jefferson, Paris, Oct. 10, 1793; to Deforgues, Paris, Oct. 8, 1793, and Deforgues to Morris, Paris, Oct. 10, 1793, ibid., pp. 372-373, 375. 98 Morris to Washington, Paris, Oct. 19, 1793, ibid., p. 398. 99 Morris to Washington, Paris, Nov. 12, 1793, ibid., p. 398. 100 Robespierre was responsible for this statement; for an English transla¬ tion of the decree of Nov. 17, 1793, which stated succinctly the Jacobin foreign policy, see Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, pp. 475-476; see also Jean Kaulek, ed., Rapiers de Barthelemy: ambassadeur de France en Suisse, 7792-/797 (6 vols., Paris, 1886-1910), III, 246-247. MORRIS IN PARIS 339 French concern for American friendship did not, however, in¬ clude continuance of Morris as minister in Paris. Armed with a de¬ mand for Morris’s recall, Fauchet after reaching America lost no time in presenting it to Washington. In view of the circumstances of Genet’s recall Washington could neither refuse nor evade the request. 101 While maintaining, perhaps wishfully, that Morris “had too slight an influence here [Paris] to be dangerous,” the French were convinced that if American friendship and the alliance were to survive, he must go. 10J Morris’s mission had embittered Franco-American relations, and as it came to a close it touched off a conflict between the Executive and Congress over the control of foreign relations. When the Senate learned of French dissatisfaction with Morris, it voted by a majority of one to call for his correspondence so that it could ex¬ amine his conduct. Certain Republicans took the view that Morris was the key figure in Federalist diplomacy abroad. One critic as¬ sumed that the consuls and the American ministers in London and at the Hague all modeled their conduct after his. 103 Washington re¬ fused to comply with Senate demands. Under the injunction of secrecy, Secretary of State Randolph did supply the Senate with selec¬ tions from the correspondence. This, although a major concession, did not please the senators; the Executive had again asserted and maintained control over foreign policy. 104 Morris’s mission ended as it had begun, with partisan conflict in 101 Fauchet communicated the request for Morris’s recall on April 9, 1794. Randolph to Morris, Philadelphia, April 29, 1794, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic and Consular Instructions; Fauchet to [Minister of Foreign Affairs], Philadelphia, April 21, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XL, f. 183; Fauchet to Randolph, April 9, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XL, f. 378. Morris was aware that Fauchet had been instructed to ask for his recall; he told the French foreign minister that “if this Government wished for any person in my place, the best way would be to tell me so, and I would apply for my own recall.” Morris to Randolph, Sainport, July 23, 1794, ASP FR, I, 411. 102 The Committee of Public Safety, quoted from Walther, Gouverneur Morris, p. 257; Masson, Le Department des affaires etrangeres. . . , p. 345. i°8 p armer 0 f back settlements,” commenting on Franco-American relations since the French Revolution, in the General Advertiser reprinted in the Independent Chronicle and the Universal Advertiser (Boston), Jan. 20, 179 L 104 Monroe to Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 3, 1794, March 16, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, pp. 283-284, 288-289; Swiggett, The Extraordinary Mr. Morris, p. 280; Conway, Randolph, pp. 213-214. 34 ° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE the Senate. Morris pondered his recall; in his opinion it was unwise. “If the government here were fixed on any permanent basis,” he said, “it would be proper for America to have here a man agreeable to the rulers of the country, provided always that he did not, to ren¬ der himself agreeable, sacrifice the interests intrusted to his care. But during the changes which hourly (as it were) take place, it is impossible for any man to do the business he is called on to perform unless he have the consciousness of support from home, and unless those who are here be well convinced that he cannot be removed at the will and pleasure of any faction or party in the country where he resides.” 10 ' Several months later he told Randolph that “when¬ ever a stable Government shall be established in France it will cer¬ tainly be right to have here a man agreeable to that government, and I think a coincidence of mutual interests will render the place of such a man easy and pleasant. Until that period ... I think a firm and decisive tone and conduct will best preserve the peace as well as the dignity of our Country.” 106 Through all of this Washington had approved of Morris’s con¬ duct; when he recalled his friend he made it clear that he did so only because the French demanded it. He informed Morris pri¬ vately that their friendship was still solid and “that notwithstanding your recall, you held the same place in my estimation that you did before it happened.” Then he added “that not until some consider¬ able time after Mr. Fauchet had arrived in this country” did he real¬ ize that France was dissatisfied with Morris and wanted him re¬ placed; “for until then,” he said, “I had supposed you stood well with the powers that were.” The aging President’s memory had slipped. On February 20, 1793, Washington, realizing French hos¬ tility to Morris, had suggested that Jefferson, who possessed the con¬ fidence of both sides, replace Morris at Paris. On December n, 1793, Jefferson had again informed him of French “dissatisfaction” with Morris, alluding to the previous expressions of French distaste for Morris. 107 105 Morris to Robert Morris, Sainport, March 10, 1794, Morris, The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 56-57. 10<) Morris to Randolph, Paris, Aug. 31, 1794, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 107 Washington to Morris, Mount Vernon, June 25, 1794, Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 413-414. Compare The Anas, Feb. 20, 1793 MORRIS IN PARIS 34i Morris’s lack of sympathy for the France of the Revolution had closed to him, from the beginning of his mission, many of the ave¬ nues of diplomacy which should have been his in an allied country. Distrust of and lack of confidence in Morris had influenced French behavior toward the United States. The French government by¬ passed him in matters wherein he should have been consulted and tended to rely too much on the biased reports of its own ministers for knowledge of America—men who were too much swayed by Jeffersonians in their appraisal of American affairs. Morris, who represented and reflected the Federalist viewpoint of Washington’s administration, might have served as a counterforce to the often biased, unsound, pro-French, pro-Republican reports which reached French authorities from their own agents. But Morris’s viewpoint appeared to the French so extreme that he could gain no acceptance for his views or those of his government. Under the circumstances perhaps no man except an extreme partisan of the French Revolution would have been acceptable in Paris. If such were the case, Morris, within the context of his own limitations and those imposed by events, might be considered to have performed his diplomatic functions capably. Yet he acted undiplomatically, appearing at times to go out of his way to antagonize his host govern¬ ment. Franco-American friendship and the 1778 alliance could not long survive two such missions as those of “Citizen” Genet and “monarchy man” Morris. (paraphrasing Washington), and Jefferson to Washington, Dec. n, 1793, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, I, 217, and VI, 465-466; see also Stephenson and Dunn, George Washington, II, 380. CHAPTER ELEVEN SCHOOL FOR SCANDAL JAMES MONROE IN PARIS Monroe’s house has been a school for scandal against his country, its gov¬ ernment and governors, Mr. Jay and his treaty, &c .— John Adams to his wife, Philadelphia, January 14, 1797. I cannot believe that an American minister would ever forget the connec¬ tions between the United States and France, which every day’s experience demonstrates to be in the interest of both Republics still further to ce¬ ment .— James Monroe to the Committee of Public Safety, Paris, Decem¬ ber 27, 1794. * # * * * Following Morris’s recall, the Federalists appeared to face a dan¬ gerous foreign policy dilemma. On the one hand the United States staggered toward war with Great Britain, and, on the other, its rela¬ tions with France floundered in suspicion and misunderstanding, following the ill-starred Genet and Morris missions. In an attempt to avoid war and to salvage what he could from a perilous situation, Washington had sent Jay to London. This, however, aggravated the French problem; to Frenchmen and to American Francophiles, Jay’s mission constituted a betrayal of the French alliance, an alli¬ ance they considered the foundation stone of American foreign policy. To repair the damage wrought by the Morris mission among the French and to counter the revulsion occasioned by the Jay appoint¬ ment among Jeffersonians, Washington appeared eager to choose a minister for the Paris post whom both the Republicans and the French would accept, one who would allay French suspicions of Jay. Randolph assured Fauchet that “we have been anxiously seek- MONROE IN PARIS 343 ing a successor [to Morris] who may be as acceptable to the French republic as the successor of Mr. Genet is to our own.” 1 In his initial effort at filling the vacancy Washington did consider a Hamiltonian; writing confidentially, in April, 1794, he asked Jay if he would accept the permanent post of minister to Great Britain. If he would, Thomas Pinckney, who was then regular minister in London, would be shifted to Paris before Jay arrived in London. Washington’s intention may have been to assuage Pinckney’s feel¬ ings, which had been ruffled by Jay’s special mission. Jay refused the permanent appointment, however, and Pinckney did not go to Paris. 2 The President then turned to the ranks of anti-Federalists to find a man for the Paris legation. According to James Monroe, Washington’s administration “was reduc’d to the dilemna [sic] of selecting from among its enemies or rather those of opposite prin¬ ciples, a person who wo. d be acceptable to that nation [France].” 3 James Madison and Robert R. Livingston were considered and both turned down proffered appointments. Aaron Burr, then in the Senate, was also suggested. 4 Finally Washington turned to James Monroe, Senator from Vir¬ ginia and an outspoken critic of his administration. After deliberat¬ ing and consulting with Madison and other friends, Monroe accepted the appointment “upon the necessity of cultivating France.” 5 Re- 1 Randolph to Fauchet, April 21, 1794, quoted in Conway, Randolph, p. 240; Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address. . . ,” American Historical Re¬ view, XXXIX, 254; Schachner, The Founding Fathers, p. 321. 3 Washington to Jay, Philadelphia, April 29, 1794, Fitzpatrick, Washing¬ ton’s Writings, XXXIII, 345-346. 3 Monroe to Jefferson, Philadelphia, May 4, 1794, Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, I, 295. 4 Ibid., p. 296; Monroe to Jefferson, May 26, 1794, p. 298. Washington offered the Paris post to Jay and Livingston on the same day; see Washington to Livingston, Philadelphia, April 29, 1794, Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXXIII, 345; see also Brant, James Madison: Father of the Constitution . . . , p. 400; William P. Cresson, James Monroe (Chapel Hill, N. C., 1946), pp. 127-128; Arthur Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats: James Monroe and the Virginia Dynasty (Norman, Okla., 1945), 170; Matthew L. Davis, Mem¬ oirs of Aaron Burr with Miscellaneous Selections from his Correspondence (2 vols., New York, 1855), I, 408-409; Nathan Schachner, Aaron Burr: A Bi¬ ography (New York, 1937), pp. 136-137. r> Believing himself “among the last men to whom it wod. be made,” Monroe was surprised by Washington’s offer. Monroe to Jefferson, Phila- 344 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE publicans, “real friends of their country,” rejoiced “that the impor¬ tant trust of drawing closer the ties which unite the sister republics should be placed in hands so worthy of the confidence of republi¬ cans.” 0 The French were delighted with Monroe’s appointment. Fauchet described him as “a true friend of liberty” who wished to strengdien the bonds uniting France and the United States.' To the British, on the other hand, the appointment spelled danger. Ham¬ mond, who described Monroe as “a man of moderate abilities and of embarrassed circumstances,” noted that he was distinguished by his hostility to Great Britain and his admiration for the principles of the French Revolution. * * 6 7 8 The Washington administration knew what manner of man it had chosen for the Paris legation. It would have preferred to retain Morris, but the administration did not have an alternative to a Re¬ publican nomination if it were to placate the French and Republi¬ cans; it is unlikely that they would have accepted another Morris. In sending Monroe to Paris while Jay negotiated in London, how¬ ever, the real purpose of the Jay mission could be camouflaged. By placating the French and offsetting Republican alarm, Monroe was to serve as a cat’s paw for Federalist foreign policy. 9 Monroe, like Washington, Jefferson, and Madison, was a Vir¬ ginian. Born in Westmoreland County and educated at the College of William and Mary, he left his studies to enlist as a lieutenant in delphia, May 27, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, I, 299- 300. 6 Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), June 5, 1794. 7 Fauchet and Le Blanc to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 5, 1794, June 4 and 9, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 333, 377, 392. 8 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, May 27, 1794, No. 22, Henry Adams Transcripts. 8 George Hammond and Phineas Bond believed that Washington’s motive in appointing Monroe was to avoid war. Hammond to Grenville, May 27, 1794, and Bond to Grenville, Jan. 22, 1796, cited in Beverly W. Bond, The Monroe Mission to France, IJ94-IJ96 (Baltimore, 1907), pp. 99-100; Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address. . . ,” AHR, XXXIX, 254; Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 139; James T. Austin, The Life of Elbridge Geny (2 vols., Boston, 1828-1829), r 75 ; Sears, George Washington, pp. 439-440. Jefferson later maintained bitterly that Monroe was appointed “merely to get him out of the Senate.” Jefferson to Dr. John Edwards, Monticello, Jan. 22, 1797, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VII, 112. MONROE IN PARIS 345 a Virginia regiment and took an active part in the American Revolu¬ tion until wounded at the battle of Trenton. He then resumed his work as a law student. During this period he formed an important connection with Thomas Jefferson, then war-governor of Virginia, a friendship that lasted until Jefferson’s death in 1826. In 1782 Monroe was elected to the Virginia legislature. In the following year he won a seat in the Congress of the Confederation. Passed over as a delegate to the Philadelphia convention in 1787, he did not become a founding father. When the Constitution emerged, he opposed it, a logical stand for a confirmed sectionalist represent¬ ing constituents with strong sectional views. Primarily, he main¬ tained, he was against the Constitution’s centralizing features, “the absence of a Bill of Rights, or any express provision limiting the general powers of the government.” 10 When the federal govern¬ ment was established, nonetheless, he sought a post in it. In 1788 he ran against Madison for election to the First Congress, suffering a bad defeat. Two years later he was appointed to a vacancy in the Senate, where he remained until he accepted the Paris appointment. During this time he drew closer to Jefferson, moving near Jeffer¬ son’s beloved Monticello. While he was a Senator Monroe’s political ideas crystallized. From the beginning he criticized the Washing¬ ton administration. He opposed almost all of the Hamiltonian program—the establishment of the Bank, the selection of Morris as minister to France, the Jay mission. In 1792 he served on the Senate committee which investigated charges that Alexander Hamil¬ ton had mishandled public funds. In the course of the investigation Hamilton revealed his sordid affair with Mrs. Maria Reynolds. From this episode Monroe emerged somewhat tarnished although not guilty of dishonorable conduct toward Hamilton. 11 Despite the unfavorable impression the execution of Louis XVI had made on the American people, Monroe was convinced that they were in favor of the French Revolution. 12 When the Anglo- 10 “Monroe in the Virginia Convention of 1788,” Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, I, 189. 11 For details, see Cresson, fames Monroe, pp. 155-169; Schachner, Alex¬ ander Hamilton, pp. 365-372. 12 In Virginia Monroe found scarcely “a man unfriendly to the French revolution as now modified.” Monroe to Jefferson, Fredericksburg, March 27, 1793, Albemarle, May 28, 1793, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, I, 252, 257; Cresson, James Monroe, p. 119. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 346 French war broke out in 1793 he distinguished himself as a French partisan and supporter of the French alliance. Great Britain, not France, he was convinced, had most to gain by forcing a rupture with the United States. He favored a policy of neutrality because it conferred greater advantage on France than would American belligerency. To join France, he maintained, would do her, as well as the United States, more harm than good and would “but benefit the party we meant to injure,” meaning Great Britain. Under a policy of benevolent neutrality “the ports and the bottoms of Amer¬ ica will be free to France; in addition to which every act of gratuity & favor which a generous and grateful people can bestow, without infringement on the other side, will be shewn. France may greatly profit from this situation, for under a wise management immense resources may be gathered hence to aid her operations & support her cause.” 13 At first, therefore, Monroe had considered the proclama¬ tion of neutrality unnecessary but harmless; later, as Washington enforced it against France, he came to look on it as “both unconsti¬ tutional & impolitick.” 14 Like most Republican leaders, Monroe had supported Genet. Unlike many of them he continued to plead Genet’s cause even after men like Jefferson had lost patience with the French minister. Soon he too trimmed his sails; after appraising Jefferson’s views and test¬ ing the prevailing winds of the “publick mind,” he abandoned “Citi¬ zen” Genet. In so doing he expressed “extreme concern” with the effect of Federalist politics and Genet’s conduct on the French alli¬ ance. To counter these effects he prepared a “pointed” attack on Gouverneur Morris and his conduct in France, which apparently he never published. 10 13 Monroe to Jefferson, Albemarle, May 28, 1793, in Hamilton, The Writ¬ ings of James Monroe, I, 256-260. 14 Monroe to Jefferson, Albemarle, June 27, 1793, ibid., pp. 261-267. 16 Monroe to John Brackenridge, Albemarle, Aug. 23, 1793; to Jefferson, Staunton, Sept. 3, 1793; to Madison, Albemarle, Sept. 25, 1793, ibid., I, 272- 278; Cresson, James Monroe, pp. 122-123; Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats. . . , p. 158. Until August, 1793, Monroe was convinced that the adminis¬ tration had seized on the Genet incident merely to stir up public opinion against France, “thinking to separate us from France & pave the way for an unnatural connection with Great Britain” and at the same time advance the fortunes of the “monarchy party.” He was satisfied, however, that public sentiment was still overwhelmingly pro-French. See also Philip Marsh, MONROE IN PARIS 347 Shifting politics brought to Philadelphia in December, 1793, a Congress in which Republicans controlled the House of Representa¬ tives. In the Senate, which was divided equally, Monroe and other Republicans fought for control. In the struggle Monroe rose to im¬ portance. On the issue of the Jay mission, for example, he jumped into the front ranks of the antiadministration forces. When he learned that the administration was considering Hamilton for the London journey, he appealed personally to President Washington to block the appointment. 16 If there must be an emissary, he believed that Hamilton must not be the one chosen. In objecting to Hamil¬ ton’s appointment, Monroe scored his pro-British affiliations, con¬ tending that Hamilton would use the mission for political intrigue against “republicanism” in the United States and “against our con¬ nections with France.” The French reaction in particular caused him concern; it would be so unfavorable, he claimed, as to create a situation “as mortifying as it would be alarming” to the cause of American friendship with France. 17 While Jay, who “had well nigh bartered away the Mississippi,” was more palatable than Hamilton, appointment of the Chief Justice did not allay Monroe’s fears. He wanted no special mission to England, and especially not a Federalist inspired and controlled mission. He saw the Jay mission as an executive plot to break the French alliance and tie the United States to England. 18 * * * * * Monroe, his appointment confirmed, sailed for France in June, 1794. At sea for over a month on a storm-free passage, he had time to digest his instructions. In summary, they were to assure France of the President’s friendship and that he did not recognize the right “James Monroe as ‘Agricola’ in the Genet Controversy, 1793,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXII (Oct., 1954), 472-476. 16 Monroe to Washington, Philadelphia, April 8, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, I, 291-292; for details on this episode see the notes on pp. 291-293. This raised, apparently for the first time, the issue of the right of a senator to criticize a nomination before it was made; see also Washington to Monroe, Philadelphia, April 9, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washing¬ ton’s Writings, XXXIII, 320-321. Washington stressed that he alone was responsible for the nomination. 17 Quoted in Cresson, James Monroe, p. 125. 18 Monroe to Jefferson, Philadelphia, May 4, 1794, Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, I, 292-296. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 348 of foreign intervention in the affairs of the French Republic and to make clear that our policy of neutrality, from which France “did not desire us to depart,” was to continue. With respect to Jay’s mission, he was to allay French suspicions by saying Jay’s instruc¬ tions limited his negotiations to discussions of English spoliations on American shipping and to the question of the Northwest posts. He was to say also that Jay’s instructions forbade him to weaken America’s treaties with France. While “we are unable to give her aids of men or money,” Monroe was to stress that the United States had no “distant intention to sacrifice our connection with France to any connection with England.” The instructions enjoined Monroe specifically to “obviate” the impression, conveyed in the reports to France of Genet and Fauchet, that there were two “irreconcilable” parties in the United States, “one republican, and friendly to the French revolution; the other monarchical, aristocratic, Britannic, and anti-Gallican.” This caveat revealed the Washington government’s anxiety to remove suspicion of a pro-British policy. Among other things, Monroe was explicitly prohibited from en¬ tering into negotiations on a treaty of commerce. As to an alliance, and particularly as to the guarantee clause in the existing alliance, Monroe was to do nothing but give “testimony” of American attach¬ ment to the French cause. All questions touching on these matters, except those on which he had specific instructions, were to be re¬ ferred to Philadelphia. He was to insist on compensation for spoli¬ ations, press claims for repayment of funds expended on French refugees from Saint Domingue, and seek French aid in securing a treaty with the Dey of Algiers and in securing “free navigation of the Mississippi” from Spain. In effect, he was directed to obtain favors without being empowered to insure reciprocal advantages. Monroe, nonetheless, was to “let it he seen, that in case of war, with any nation on earth, we shall cotisider France as our first and natural ally” 19 Although one-sided and lacking in positive commitments, the instructions indicated clearly that the administration wished to main¬ tain close ties with France and they implied that the restricted nature 18 Dated Philadelphia, June 10, 1794, the instructions are in ibid., II, 1-9; the quotations are taken from this text; the italics are Monroe’s. MONROE IN PARIS 349 of Jay’s objectives were such as to make French fears groundless. In comparing Jay’s instructions with Monroe’s, it can be seen that Jay had far greater leeway and that in several particulars Monroe’s in¬ structions were deceptive. Monroe’s own fears concerning the Lon¬ don mission were calmed, though they did not disappear; before he left the United States Jefferson and Robert R. Livingston had im¬ pressed their suspicions of the London mission on him. 20 When in the beginning of August, 1794, Monroe established him¬ self in Paris, all appeared turmoil; no other nation had a recognized diplomatic representative there; hardly a week before, Robespierre had been put to death. Frigidity, if not hostility, stemming from resentment toward Morris, suspicions of the Jay mission, and lack of confidence in American friendship by some government officials, marked the greeting given to Monroe in the Committee of Public Safety, which was then the executive organ. 21 Uncertain as to when he might be received, Monroe, after cooling his heels for some ten days, resolved on direct action. To “attract public attention” to his situation, he bypassed the executive body by appealing directly to the president of the National Convention, the head of the legislative body wherein lay “the sovereign authority of the nation,” for a time as to when he might be received. His direct diplomacy worked. Almost immediately the National Con¬ vention agreed to receive him. 22 On August 14, in a ceremony lasting an hour and a half, the assembled delegates received Monroe “into the bosom of the Conven¬ tion.” Greetings and expressions of fraternity between the French and American peoples were exchanged. Monroe presented two reso¬ lutions from the American Congress. Reflecting the political situa¬ tion in the United States, the letter from the Senate expressed little more than general good will toward the French nation. The mes¬ sage from the House of Representatives was warmer; in florid 20 Bond, The Monroe Mission, pp. 13-15; Cresson, James Monroe, p. 129; Sears, George Washington, pp. 439-440; for Jay’s instructions (Philadelphia, May 6, 1794) see ASP FR, I, 472-474. 21 Monroe to Madison, Paris, Sept. 2, [1794], Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 37-41; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 15; Cresson, James Monroe, pp. 129-130. 22 Monroe to the President of the National Convention, Paris, Aug. 13, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, n-12; to Randolph, Aug. 25, 1794, to Madison, Sept. 2, pp. 31-41. 35° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE language it stressed the common bond between the two countries, voicing full sympathy for America’s ally in her struggle for liberty. Its anti-British overtones pleased the French. In making the presentation Monroe delivered an ardent speech, emphasizing the close union between the two nations and his own desire to promote harmony between them. His words were greeted with applause; “the effect,” he reported, “surpassed my expectation.” Speaking for France, the president of the Convention responded that “it is not merely a diplomatic alliance” which unites our peoples, “it is the sweetest fraternity.” Then, “in the midst of universal acclamations of joy, delight, and admiration,” the president con¬ ferred the kiss and fraternal embrace upon Monroe, who received the accolade in the name of the American people. As a climax the Con¬ vention decreed that “the flags of the United States of America shall be joined to those of France, and displayed in the hall of the sittings of the Convention in sign of the Union and eternal fraternity of the two people[s].” 23 As his instructions had specified, Monroe had not committed the United States “by any specific declarations” to anything he was pro¬ hibited from doing. His worst sin, “in giving testimony of our attachment” to the cause of America’s ally, was indiscretion. Al¬ though he did not violate the letter of his instructions in expressing sentiments which he had always held and which were well known to the administration, Monroe’s actions caused a sensation in Federal¬ ist and pro-British circles, setting off a chain reaction of displeasure; party presses rang with partisan thunder. Republicans, of course, applauded. 24 Across the channel John Jay fumed. Delicate negotiations involv- *® As proof of friendship for its ally the Convention offered to provide Monroe with a house at the expense of the state. Monroe declined because of constitutional prohibition. The congressional resolutions, Monroe’s speech, the speech of the president of the Convention, the house offer and response are in ASP FR, I, 672-675. The Convention’s decree is in Hamilton, The Writ¬ ings of James Monroe, II, 34 n. For details on the flag episode, see McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 257. 24 Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 17, maintained that by his public reception Monroe “exceeded his instructions.” For the American reaction see Fauchet, La Forest, and Petry to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Phila¬ delphia, Oct. 22, 1794, Fauchet to the Commissioner, Philadelphia, Nov. 15, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 442-443, 474-476. MONROE IN PARIS 35 1 ing the welfare of the nation lay at stake, he warned. An exhibition such as Monroe’s could upset everything. It had caused a “disagree¬ able sensation” in England. In Jay’s unneutral view Monroe’s parti¬ san language had compromised American neutrality." 5 The President, disapproving of Monroe’s conduct, agreed with Jay that the American minister in Paris had “stepped over the true line” of neutrality. Yet Washington felt that his language “was sus¬ ceptible of two views.” The Secretary of State, however, delivered to Monroe notice of official displeasure. He stressed in admonish¬ ment that the administration had expected a private reception; it had hoped Monroe’s words would be “so framed as to leave heart¬ burning no where,” and therefore disapproved of the “warm glow” of parts of his speech. In his future conduct, Randolph recom¬ mended “caution.Although he feared that Monroe may have exceeded his instructions, Randolph personally did not share his own officially expressed admonition. He was “delighted” with the con¬ duct of his friend Monroe and so told Fauchet, the French Minister in Philadelphia, confidentially. 27 While Monroe had anticipated that his words would be “scanned with unfriendly eyes in America”—by the Federalists—he responded to Randolph’s official censure with “surprize and concern.” Assert¬ ing that he did not merit reproof, he denied that he had exceeded his instructions. His language, after all, was no stronger than that in the congressional resolutions. In justifying his conduct, Monroe pointed out that when he reached Paris the French were hostile to the United States; Franco-American relations were “in the worst possible situation”; they hung “upon a thread” which “would have been broken” if France were not conciliated and America’s prefer¬ ence for her reiterated. Under the circumstances he thought that by his conduct “every thing was to be gained and nothing to be 26 Lord Grenville made Monroe’s “unneutral” effusions the subject of private protest to Jay, Sept. 7, 1794, cited in Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , pp. 242 n.- 243 n. See also Jay to Washington, London, Sept. 13, 1794, March 6, 1795, in Johnston, Jay Correspondence, IV, 58-60, 163; Jay to Hamilton, London, Sept. 11, 1794, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Worlds, V, 27-28; Washington to Jay, Philadelphia, Dec. 18, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 61. 20 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 2, 1794, ASP FR, I, 689-690. 27 Fauchet (paraphrasing Randolph) to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Dec. 1, 1794, in Turner, CFM, p. 490. 35 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE lost”; that if he had not acted as he had, the United States might have been dragged into war. 28 Given the pro-French and anti-British state of public sentiment in the United States at the time, Federalist politicians and adminis¬ tration officials confined most of their displeasure to private expres¬ sion; they dared not at this point risk making a political issue of Monroe. With the Jay mission a desperate one-party gamble to head off war with Great Britain, they dared not arouse public debate which would endanger the negotiation. Such debate might expose the Jay negotiation as inimical to the still popular French alliance. If the London negotiation failed and if at the same time France were alienated, then the United States instead of one would have two powerful enemies ready to crush it. 29 Secretary Randolph, governed by these considerations and by his personal views, followed his reprimand to Monroe with a peace offering almost immediately. As if in repudiation of his official censure, which he attempted to soften, Randolph instructed Monroe to cultivate French friendship “with zeal,” and “to remove every suspicion of our preferring a connexion with Great Britain, or any manner weakening our old attachment to France.” 30 Randolph wrote this before he had received Monroe’s response to the repri¬ mand. 4f“ Soon after his reception Monroe had turned his attention to out¬ standing American grievances against France. As he had indicated in his reports, Franco-American relations were in a parlous state; American grievances were many. In accord with his instructions he insisted upon compensation for damages to American commerce. He pointed out, in summarizing the American case, that French seizures of British goods on American ships violated the principle of free ships, free goods as given in the Franco-American commercial treaty of 1778. While Great Britain might commit the same deeds, he said, the case was different; she was not an ally and was not bound 38 See Monroe to Madison, Paris, Sept. 12, [1794], to Randolph, Feb. 12, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of Janies Monroe, II, 40, 193-206. 28 Believing that the Jay negotiation might fail, Randolph wished to court France. See Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Sept. 25, 1794, ASP FR, I, 678; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 18-19. 80 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 5, 1794, ASP FR, I, 690-691. MONROE IN PARIS 353 by treaty to abstain from such actions. France, however, was com¬ mitted by treaty not to act in such manner against her ally. Complaining of onerous commercial restrictions on American shipping in French ports, Monroe asked, too, that they be lifted and that French ports be opened to American vessels. Such a policy, he claimed, would be to France’s advantage. Then, though still press¬ ing the American claims, he softened his case by stating that his instructions did not ask him to complain of France’s departure from certain other specified articles of the 1778 commercial treaty. On the contrary, if such departure produced “solid benefit” to France (which he asserted it did not), he said, “the American government, and my countrymen in general, will not only bear the departure with patience, but with pleasure.” 31 In view of his indiscreet disclosures, it is not surprising that the French at first ignored Monroe’s complaints. Seizing upon his voluntary concessions, members of the Committee of Public Safety told him later that it would be detrimental to French interests to comply fully with other provisions in the commercial treaty. They had therefore decided that France’s immediate interest would not permit them to admit free enemy goods in American ships even though that principle was embodied in the commercial treaty. This would not be the first time, they said, that the needs of one party and the conciliatory spirit of the other had made possible a deviation from a treaty. Several times in a special interview they asked if he would insist upon execution of the treaty. Parrying the queries, Monroe said, “I had nothing new to add to what I had already said on that head.” 32 In Philadelphia Monroe’s inept diplomacy—it ap¬ peared so to Federalists—aroused consternation. Washington was incensed; in his view (expressed in later years) Monroe had weak¬ ened “the pivot” on which American claims rested. Again Ran¬ dolph informed Monroe of administration displeasure. 33 81 Monroe to the Committee of Public Safety, Paris, Sept. 3, 1794, ibid., pp. 676-678. 82 The French felt also that they did not profit from the 1778 treaties. Most-favored-nation treatment appeared meaningless and the tonnage laws made no distinction in favor of France. Opinion on Monroe’s note of Sept. 3, 1794, AAE CP EU, n.p., n.d. [1794], Vol. XLII, ff. 26-27; Monroe to Secre¬ tary of State, Paris, Nov. 7, 1794, ASP FR, I, 681-683; Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , p. 234; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 21. 88 Washington’s Remarks on Monroe’s “View of the Conduct of the Execu- 354 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Regardless of its ineptitude in Federalist eyes, Monroe’s diplo¬ macy had a salutary effect on French relations. Within a few months his complaints brought results; not only did the French listen to them, they also acted. Monroe’s arguments alone did not induce a change in the French; ironically, English action reinforced his case. To ease the way for the Jay negotiation, England set aside her provision order of June, 1793. 34 In response to this action and to Monroe’s arguments, French authorities issued two decrees, one in November, 1794, the other in January, 1795, which re-established American privileges under the treaty of 1778 and revoked the obnox¬ ious decree of May, 1793, which had allowed seizure in French ports of neutral ships carrying goods to enemy countries. Then she also promised fair treatment for American seamen, again recognized the principle of free ships, free goods, allowed American shipping free use of French ports, and promised to settle claims for past spoliations. While France paid no immediate compensation, and even though some of the re-established privileges were conditioned upon English actions, in the light of the previous low state of Franco- American relations Monroe’s contribution proved substantial. 35 * * * * * “We are particularly concerned to understand the true state of the different sects of politics” in France, read Monroe’s instructions. Accordingly he sent home long reports on conditions there and on European affairs in general. In one of his reports in October, 1794, he outlined briefly the history of the Jacobins in the French Revolu¬ tion, depicting early Jacobins as “enemies of the ancient despotism” tive of the United States,” [March, 1798], in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXXVI, 198; Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 2, 1794, ASP FR, I, 690; Cresson, James Monroe, 135. 84 Monroe to Secretary of State, Paris, Dec. 2, 1794, and Jan. 13, 1795, Grenville to Jay, Downing Street, Aug. 1, 1794, ASP FR, I, 687, 691, 481-482; Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address. . . ,” AHR, XXXIX, 254; the British Order-in-Council of Aug. 6, 1794, British Record Office, Foreign Office, 5:13, which in part revoked the June 8, 1793 Order-in-Council is printed in New¬ comb, “New Light on Jay’s Treaty,” American Journal of International Law, XXVIII, 686 n. 35 For the French decrees of Nov. 15, 1794, and Jan. 4, 1795, see ASP FR, I, 752-753, 642-643; for discussions of the decrees and Monroe’s diplomacy, see Darling, Our Rising Empire. . . , pp. 234-235; Bond, The Monroe Mis¬ sion. . . , pp. 22-23. MONROE IN PARIS 355 who, as they gained power, established a tyranny of their own. Monroe had written the sketch not to denounce the Jacobins but to show how their virtues had been perverted, how they had “well nigh ruined the Republic itself .” 36 Unknown to Monroe, the sketch became political fodder for Federalists. Reaching the United States at a time when the Federalists were attacking the democratic societies for their nefarious “Jacobin” connections, the report appeared to them like manna from the devil. The administration pounced eagerly on the providentially timed evidence from the pro-French American minister in Paris. “Your history of the Jacobin societies,” Randolph said, “was so appropriate to the present times in our own country, that it was conceived proper to furnish the public with those useful lessons; and extracts were published, as from a letter of a gentleman in Paris to his friend in this city .” 37 Although the sketch at first appeared without signature, Mon¬ roe’s identity as the writer was easily discernible. Madison explained why the administration used the comments on the Jacobin Societies and pointed out they had been extracted from his despatches and printed out of context. “In New York,” he wrote, “they have been republished with your name prefixed.” Not liking what had hap¬ pened, Monroe denounced the “wicked forces” which had taken ad¬ vantage of him. Madison, in informing him of what had happened, had in effect reprimanded him and cautioned the use of more “re¬ serve” in his communications. Fortunately, the publication of his remarks did not do him as much harm in France as might have been expected. With the Jacobins out and in ill repute, the new French authorities welcomed criticism of them . 38 * * * * # Monroe was also instructed to watch for “an opening for France to become instrumental in securing to us the free navigation of the Mississippi.” He awaited his opportunity, and when it arose, under odd circumstances, he grasped it. Twice, in October and in Novem- 86 For the sketch, see Monroe to Randolph, Paris, Oct. 16, 1794, in Hamil¬ ton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 80-85; f° r a discussion, see Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats, pp. 175-176. 87 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, March 8, 1795, ASP FR, I, 699. 88 Madison to Monroe, March 11, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 81 n; Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats, pp. 176-177. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 35 6 ber, 1794, Don Diego de Gardoqui, Spain’s minister of finance, asked him to intercede with the French government so that it would allow him to visit certain baths in France. Monroe concluded quickly that this merely disguised an effort to open peace negotiations, France and Spain still being at ward 9 Unless the issue of Mississippi navigation and allied Spanish-American boundary questions were settled at the same time, he perceived also that such a peace was not to America’s advantage. Ignoring the French channel suggested by Gardoqui, Monroe revealed the correspondence to the French government. With this approach he sought to forewarn the Committee of Public Safety of Spanish peace moves, give convincing proof of American friend¬ ship, and gain an opportunity to enlist French diplomacy in Amer¬ ica’s behalf in the Mississippi question. To strengthen his position he pointed out that “it was the wish of the Spanish Court to com¬ mence a negotiation, and that it had addressed itself through me, to inspire a distrust in me by creating a belief that the United States were more friendly to Spain and Britain than to France.” 40 The Committee of Public Safety advised Monroe to suggest to Gardoqui that he approach the Committee directly. The French then made a request of their own. Would the United States, they asked, grant financial aid in the coming campaign against England ? Although he had “no power on the subject” and so indicated, Mon¬ roe saw this as the opportunity for enlisting French diplomacy against Spain on the Mississippi question which he sought; he now had a bargaining point with which to secure concessions. He inti¬ mated to the members of the Committee that perhaps “considerable” funds might be forthcoming if they gave satisfactory assurances that they would consider America’s points at issue with England and Spain in any ensuing peace negotiations with Spain or England. 41 America’s cause, responded the Committee, would be treated as its own. Monroe thus enlisted the French in an effort to force conces¬ sions from Spain. At the same time he had been instrumental in 89 Monroe to the Committee of Public Safety, Paris, Nov. 13, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 109-IT2. 40 Monroe to the Secretary of State, Paris, Nov. 20, 1794, ibid., p. 120. 41 See Monroe’s “Observations Submitted to the Consideration of the Diplo¬ matic Members of the Committee of Public Safety,” [Nov. 20, 1794], ibid., pp. 124-127. MONROE IN PARIS 357 convincing France that Spain desired peace/ 2 In the meantime other developments beclouded Monroe’s controversial diplomacy. JL JL Jfc X *7v* X X X X Monroe’s handling of Thomas Paine, from the administration and Federalist viewpoint, was another blunder. Paine still lan¬ guished in prison when Monroe took over the American legation. There the revolutionary author nursed his grievances against Morris and Washington, and soon after Monroe’s arrival he sent him des¬ perate appeals for aid. 4 "* Monroe immediately began informal nego¬ tiations and finally, through an official request, secured Paine’s freedom. 44 Ill and aged beyond his sixty years, Paine, after granting a promise that he would not write on political issues while a guest in his home, accepted Monroe’s hospitality. The aged writer stayed for ten months. As soon as Paine had recovered his health he ignored his promise and began to write upon politics and American affairs. Working as a propagandist for the French government, he wrote anti-English articles for circulation in England and in the United States. This embarrassed Monroe. 45 The worst came after Paine left. Believing, wrongly, that Washington had connived at his imprisonment, Paine published a scorching attack on the President, labeling Washington 42 Le comite de salut public a Barthelemy, Paris, May 22, 1795, in Kaulek, Papiers de Barthelemy, VI, 38. 43 See Paine to Monroe, Luxembourg, Aug. 17, 18, 25, Oct. 4, 13, 20, Nov., 1794, in Foner, The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, 1341-1375. 44 Monroe to the Committee of General Surety, Paris, Nov. 1, 1794; to Randolph, Paris, Nov. 7, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 96-98, 107-108. Monroe also was instrumental in securing the release from imprisonment of Mme Lafayette; see Monroe to Randolph, Paris, Feb. 12, 1795, ibid., pp. 204-205; Styron, The Last of the Cocked Hats, p. 180. 45 Cresson, James Monroe, p. 149; Conway, The Life of Thomas Paine, II, 152-180; Fay, The Revolutionary Spirit in France and America, p. 380. An example of Paine’s writing at this time is his pamphlet “The Decline and Fall of the English System of Finance,” written in Paris and completed on April 8, 1796. It was published simultaneously in France, England, and the United States; it is printed in Foner, The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, 651-674. Commented the Federalist New Hampshire and Vermont Jour¬ nal: Or, The Farmer’s Weekly Museum (Walpole, N. H.), Sept. 6, 1796, Paine has published a six-penny pamphlet to prove that Britain w r as on the verge of bankruptcy. His “talent for writing for illiterate minds has never been exceeded,” it said; he “is a man of little reading and erudition; but he makes that little go farther than any man living.” ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 358 a “hypocrite” who was “treacherous in private friendship.” 46 Feder¬ alists were appalled. “Tom, you are surely mad,” said one critic. “Thou hast escaped the guillotine, but thy terrors have prepared thee for a strait-jac\et Z" 47 Monroe’s efforts to stop Paine failed. He feared that he would be considered to have instigated Paine’s attack and that Paine would compromise him by publishing things he had picked up in his house. 48 His fears were realized. His hospitality to Paine did not enhance his already forlorn status with the Washington administra¬ tion; Federalists charged, with some justification, that he had been influenced by Paine’s anti-administration views. Although aware that the administration back home would view dimly almost anything he did, Monroe even in little things seemed to act so as to irritate his official superiors and political opponents. For example, Gouverneur Morris had thought that from the begin¬ ning Monroe had taken the “wrong tone” at Paris. 49 Despite his recall Morris retained considerable political influence. In dealing with him, therefore, Monroe should have been tactful, yet he tried rather to act in a manner that would not offend French authorities, who detested and distrusted the former American minister. In so doing, however, Monroe aroused Morris’s ire in an incident involv¬ ing a passport for Morris, who had chosen to remain in Europe. 00 Another minor incident in which Monroe, in acting with the intention of improving French good will, ended by irritating the Federalists, was that of the exchange of French and American flags. As we have seen, the National Convention had decreed that the American flag should hang with that of France in the hall where its members assembled. Accompanied by “glowing” words Monroe sent an American flag, which the French received in a public cere¬ mony wherein the bearer delivered a speech and received the kiss 46 Paine’s “Letter to George Washington,” Paris, July 30, 1796, is in Foner, The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, 691-723. 47 “No-Painite” in the Minerva reprinted in the Herald: A Gazette for the Country (New York), Aug. 17, 1796. 18 Monroe to Madison, Paris, July 5, 1796, Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 19-27. 48 Diary entry of Oct. 12, 1794, in Morris, ed., The Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, II, 70. 60 Monroe to Washington, Paris, Nov. 19, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 112-114; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 28. MONROE IN PARIS 359 and fraternal embrace. With similar ceremonies the French later presented their tricolor to the United States. While nothing of conse¬ quence came from the incident, Monroe did not report it to Phila¬ delphia for six months. To an administration keenly sensitive to “public ceremonies” in republican France this episode proved another irritant among many. 51 Meanwhile developments across the channel created a major crisis in Franco-American relations and led to Monroe’s undoing as minister to France. Successful though he was in winning French good will, Monroe was never able to overcome French fears con¬ cerning the Jay mission. During the Jay-Grenville negotiations French distrust deepened as rumors emanated from London, despite his efforts to counteract their effect. 52 To divert French “suspicions” Monroe’s instructions had told him to say that Jay “is positively forbidden to weaken the engage¬ ments between this country and France” and to declare “the motives of that mission to be, obtain immediate compensation for our plun¬ dered property, and restitution of the posts.” Accordingly Monroe had met French uneasiness with assurances that Jay’s mission was confined to questions of compensation for depredations on Amer¬ ican commerce and the surrender of the Western posts. 53 The Secretary of State had stressed that it was indispensable that Monroe “should keep the French Republic in good humour with us.” 54 As rumors of a treaty became too convincing even for Monroe, he wrote home that he could no longer believe that Washington had chosen him “to be the organ of an honest and not a double and perfidious 61 Monroe to the President of the National Convention, Paris, Sept. 9, 1794; Monroe to Randolph, Paris, March 6, 1795, postscript of March 9, Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 54-55, 229; Styron, The Last of the Coc\ed Hats, p. 174; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 257; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 28-29; Beckles Will- son, America’s Ambassadors to France {iyyy-igiy) (New York, 1928), p. 69. 62 Monroe to Madison, Paris, Nov. 30, ^94, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 136-137. The Jay negotiations and French distrust, Monroe declared, have “produc’d repellant disposition towards me not from any real distrust in me, but from a distrust of the Ex: adm’n.” 63 Instructions, June 30, ^94, ibid., II, 3; Memorandum of a conversation in Nov., t794, between Monroe and two members of the Committee of Public Safety, ibid., Ill, 395 0.-396 n. 64 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Sept. 25, 1794, ASP FR, I, 678. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 360 policy.”'’' 1 At the same time he continued to receive instructions to cultivate French friendship with zeal and “to remove every suspicion of our preferring a connexion with Great Britain, or in any manner weakening our old attachment to France.” 56 French suspicions were soon confirmed; “like a stroke of thun¬ der,” Monroe said, the reports on the Jay treaty “produced upon all France amazement.” Jay signed his treaty on November 19, 1794, and on January 5, 1795, the French government announced officially its knowledge of the treaty. In the interval a great deal had hap¬ pened. Within a week after the treaty had been signed Jay notified Monroe, informing him “that nothing contained in it shall be con¬ strued to operate contrary to existing treaties between the United States and other powers”; there was no cause for French anxiety. Then he said, “as the treaty is not ratified, it would be improper to publish it.” He did promise, however, to reveal the treaty provisions to Monroe, confidentially , 57 A month later the Committee of Public Safety, in view of the “vague report” concerning “a treaty of alliance and commerce” signed by Jay, invited Monroe to explain as soon as possible what he knew about the treaty. “It is the only means,” the Committee said, “whereby you can enable the French Nation justly to appreciate those reports so injurious to the American government and to which that treaty gave birth.” 58 When Monroe accepted the invitation and appeared before the Committee he had not received the letter in which Jay had indicated that he would reveal the contents of the treaty confidentially, but had received earlier letters from Jay in 65 Monroe to Randolph, Paris, Dec. 18, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 154-163. 56 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Dec. 5, 1794, ASP FR, I, 690. 57 Monroe to Jefferson, Paris, June 23, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 303; in this letter Monroe sketched the state of Franco- American relations, pp. 292-304. Jay to Monroe, London, Nov. 24, 25, 28, 1794, ibid., 169 n., 170 n., 180 n. 68 Committee of Public Safety to Monroe, Dec. 27, 1794, ibid., II, 169 n. Official French reaction to the signing of the Jay treaty, publicly at least, was at first reserved; see Frances S. Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Relations, 1795-1805,” French-American Review, I (Jan.-March, 1948), 22. Although it placed the news at the top of the first column on the front page, the official organ of the French government, the Gazette Nationale ou Moni- teur Universel, Dec. 27, 1794, reported tersely with no comment that Jay and Grenville had signed a treaty of commerce and navigation. MONROE IN PARIS 361 which the latter indicated that the English treaty did not violate treaty obligations to France. Monroe so informed the Committee members. Then, apparently unwittingly, he committed the mistake that was to plague him. “I am altogether ignorant of the particular stipulations of the treaty,” he said, “but I beg leave to assure you that as soon as I shall be informed thereof, I will communicate the same to you.” Touching on the obligation of the French alliance, he then added, “I take it, however, for granted, that the report is without foundation; for I cannot believe that an American minister would ever forget the connections between the United States and France, which every day’s experience demonstrates to be the interest of both Republics still further to cement.” 59 On January 16 Monroe received Jay’s letter offering to reveal the treaty contents confidentially. This placed him in an impossible position; he had already rashly pledged to communicate its terms to the French. In his dilemma he sent a personal messenger to Jay for the treaty. In explaining his situation he pointed out “that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to so it will be useless for me to make to it any new communication short of that.” 50 Jay, who had little confidence in Monroe anyway, rejected the request. “It does not belong to ministers who negotiate treaties,” he said, “to publish them even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed, and remaining open to alteration, or rejection.”'' 1 He then sent copies of Monroe’s letter and his reply to the Secretary of State. Resentful of Jay’s sarcasm, which he knew was intended more for eyes in Philadelphia than for his own, Monroe too voiced his indig- 60 Monroe to the Committee of Public Safety, Paris, Dec. 27, 1794, in Hamilton, The Wor\s of James Monroe, II, 162-163. J a Y> Monroe said, has not “informed me of a single article the treaty contains, nor even the title of it—perhaps because that Gentleman and myself are not in habits of intimacy nor always united in our politics.” Dec. 27, 1794, ibid., 163 n. At first the French were satisfied with Monroe’s assurances that the Jay treaty was not inconsistent with the 1778 alliance; see, for example, J. Q. Adams to Randolph, The Hague, May 19, 1795, in Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, I, 35 *;. 80 Monroe to Jay, Paris, Jan. 17, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 180-181; Monroe to Secretary of State, Feb. 1, 1795, Na¬ tional Archives, Dept, of State, Diplomatic Despatches, France. 91 Jay to Monroe, London, Feb. 5, 1795, ASP FR, I, 517. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 362 nation to the Secretary of State. In outlining his difficulties with Jay he emphasized his own embarrassing position and the threat to his reputation and that of the United States in France. While he did not wish to grant the French a right of inspection, he did wish to satisfy them that the treaty did not violate the 1778 alliance. He concluded the defense of his course by saying that “between nations allied as we are, and especially, when past and recent circumstances are considered, I deem it the most magnanimous as well as the soundest policy.” 62 Soon after refusing Monroe’s request Jay had his secretary, the artist Colonel John Trumbull, “commit the treaty, verbatim, to memory,” and sent him to Paris. There Trumbull informed Monroe that he was authorized to repeat the treaty provided the minister promised “that he would not make any communication of the same to any person whatsoever, especially not to the French government.” Jay justified forwarding the information “in perfect confidence” on grounds that Monroe was an American minister to whom it might prove useful. Monroe refused to receive the information “upon the terms on which it was offered,” and Trumbull withheld his com¬ munication. To Monroe the dilemma was painful. “If I accepted and withheld the communication from the committee,” he said, “I should violate my engagement with that body; and if I gave it, I subjected myself not only to the probable imputation of indiscretion, but likewise certainly to that of breach of promise.” 63 Trumbull was known to be Jay’s secretary, and by his presence in Paris aroused the suspicion of the French government that Mon¬ roe knew the contents of the Jay treaty and was engaged in a plot to withhold the information. To counter these misgivings the American minister felt obligated to reveal his correspondence with Jay and so show why the treaty terms had been kept secret. The French replied that the treaty and the secrecy surrounding it, “could not otherwise than excite uneasiness in the councils of this govern¬ ment, when it was observed that in the height of their war with the 82 Monroe to Randolph, Paris, March 17, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 229-236. 83 Theodore Sizer, ed., The Autobiography of Colonel John Trumbull (New Haven, 1953), p. 185; Jay to Monroe, London, Feb. 19, 1795, ASP FR, I, 518; Monroe to Randolph, Paris, April 14, 1795, Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 238-245. MONROE IN PARIS 3 6 3 coalesced powers, and with England in particular, America had stept forward and made a treaty with that power, the contents of which were so carefully and strictly withheld from this government: for if the treaty was not injurious to France, why was it withheld from her? Was it prudent for one ally to act in such manner in regard to another, and especially under the present circumstances, and at the present time, as to excite suspicions of the kind in ques¬ tion ?” Again Monroe assured the French officials that “the treaty con¬ tained in it nothing which could give them uneasiness; but if it did, and especially if it weakened our connection with France, it would certainly be disapproved in America.” Then, within a few days, he received his first inkling of the treaty terms—a garbled summary from Benjamin Hichborn, a Massachusetts lawyer then in Paris. Monroe suspected Jay’s hand behind this as Hichborn said he ob¬ tained his information “in some free conversation with Colonel Trumbull.” Why, surmised Monroe, should so trustworthy a man as Trumbull disclose the contents to a private individual when he had been instructed to impart them to the American minister who was to be sworn to reveal them to no one else ? Hichborn had concluded, moreover, with the obvious hint that “if this information can be of any service to you in your public capacity, you may make use of it in any manner you may think fit.” 64 In spite of the dubious source of this “most informal of all in¬ formal communications,” Monroe sent Hichborn’s letter to the French with the surety “that they might confide in the credibility of the parties.” Stressing the innocuous quality of the treaty, Hichborn, in his deceptive summary, said it declared simply “that the parties shall remain at peace.” This accorded with the assurances Monroe had been making to the French government, and, apparently, with the impression Trumbull had wished, or had been instructed, to convey. In the meantime Trumbull remained in Paris, and grasped every opportunity to spread the story that the Jay “treaty contained ** Ibid., pp. 240-244; Hichborn to Monroe, Paris, March 31, 1795, ibid., 243 n.; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 33-35, summarizes the Monroe - Trumbull-Hichborn episode. Fauchet’s suspicions also were aroused by the secrecy surrounding the Jay negotiations; see Fauchet to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 4, 1795, in Turner, CFM, p. 562. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 364 nothing contrary to the engagement of existing treaties.” His con¬ tinued presence proved galling to French authorities, who so in¬ formed the American minister. Monroe, through Hichborn, then advised Trumbull to leave France without delay. Trumbull de¬ murred but finally took up a long-delayed errand to Germany. 60 Pacified temporarily by Monroe’s and Jay’s assurances as to the innocuousness of the Jay treaty, but still distrustful of Jay’s diplo¬ macy, the French waited to gather more details and remained rela¬ tively quiet through the spring of 1795. In Philadelphia develop¬ ments took on an ominous hue. The administration upheld Jay in his policy of secrecy. 66 Although skeptical that the treaty would be approved as it stood, Randolph informed Monroe that the treaty pro¬ vided no “reasonable ground for dissatisfaction in the French repub¬ lic.” It would be held secret, he confided, until June 8, 1795, when the Senate would meet to consider it. On another occasion the Secretary of State had said that “there is no ground for charging that treaty as being offensive or defensive; that the obligation of all prior treaties is expressly saved . . . and that the confining of its contents to the President and Secretary of State, is not from any thing sinister towards France, but from the usages in such cases. . . .” 67 Clearly, administration policy was to keep Monroe in the dark until the Jay treaty was ratified and to leave France with the impression that the treaty did nothing to impair the French alliance. When, despite the administration’s policy of secrecy, the treaty contents leaked, Madison passed on information still “a profound secret,” to Monroe. “It is possible,” he warned, “that articles may be included that will be ominous to the confidence and cordiality of France towards the U. S... .” 6S Not until several months had passed did Monroe receive official notice that a copy of the treaty was being sent to him. 65 Col. John Trumbull to John Jay, London, July 23, 1795, in Johnston, Jay Correspondence, IV, 180; Sizer, The Autobiography of Colonel John Trumbull, p. 185; Cresson, James Monroe, p. 141. 68 Randolph to John Jay, March 8, 1795, cited in Bond, The Monroe Mis¬ sion. . . , p. 35. 87 See Randolph to Monroe, Feb. 15, March 8, April 7, 1795, ASP FR, I, 695-696, 699-700, 701. 88 Madison to Monroe, March 26, 1795, Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 154 m-156 n. MONROE IN PARIS 3 6 5 Taking cognizance of French uneasiness and of Monroe’s fears, Randolph at the same time sent a long review of Franco-American relations from the beginning of the European war, outlining the President’s policy and refuting “the imputation of an alienation from France.” Among other things, he upheld the policy of secrecy on the Jay treaty, denied any “deception on the French republic,” and said that Monroe’s instructions, although they did not reveal Jay’s full powers, “were commensurate with fact and propriety” and “were literally true” because the motives behind the Jay mission “were the vexations of our commerce and the posts.” Anticipating trouble, he concluded with the plea that “if injuries are complained of, let us reason together like cordial allies; and compensate where either may have been in fault. But let it be the last blot in the annals of the world, that the United States and France cease to be, what they ought to be, friends, who will endure no separation.” 09 When finally the Secretary of State did forward the treaty with a note of his exchanges with Pierre Auguste Adet, the new French minister in the United States, concerning it, he followed up with comments on the unpopularity of the treaty in the United States. Expressing doubt that the President would ratify the treaty, he concluded that “the present may be well considered as a crisis, taken either upon the supposition of a ratification or rejection.”' 0 The tenor of these last letters, obviously, was far different from the correspondence in the period of secrecy. They reflected administra¬ tion knowledge that Monroe was in a difficult position in France and needed ammunition for defense of a treaty the administration had told him repeatedly did no violence to the French alliance. In those summer months Monroe’s position deteriorated. “My situation,” he said, “since the report of Mr. Jay’s treaty has been pain¬ ful beyond any thing ever experienc’d before. ... I have, however, done everything in my power to keep things where they shod, be, but how long this will be practicable under existing circumstances I know not.” 71 Meanwhile French distrust mounted. Monroe’s 69 Randolph to Monroe, June i, 1795, ASP FR, I, 705-712; the italics are Randolph’s. Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 50, maintains that the Secre¬ tary of State’s words proved intentional deception by the administration toward Monroe and the French. 70 See Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, July 14, 21, 1795, ASP FR, I, 719. 71 Monroe to Jefferson, Paris, June 27, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 311. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 366 friendship for France had been insincere, some Frenchmen thought. His assurances of American friendship, in the face of administration policy, smacked of nothing more than a diplomatic ruse to cover an Anglo-American rapprochement .‘ 2 During this period of increasing tension Monroe, in spite of the obstacles in his way, attempted to carry out other parts of his instructions. * * * * * Of prime importance among these was that concerning naviga¬ tion of the Mississippi. Despite the difficulties over the Jay negoti¬ ations Monroe for a while succeeded in securing French support for the American case. French assistance in gaining freedom of the Mississippi, he said, would go far in proving that French friendship for the United States exceeded that of England, and would strength¬ en the 1778 alliance.' 3 As a result of Monroe’s behavior in the earlier Gardoqui episode the French government used him in opening peace negotiations with Spain and promised in the peace negoti¬ ations at Basel to press the American side in the Mississippi con¬ troversy.' 4 When Thomas Pinckney, the newly appointed American minis¬ ter to Spain, arrived in Paris on his way to Madrid, Monroe briefed him on the state of the Mississippi question and suggested that he go to the French and request their assistance in his coming nego¬ tiations with Spain. Knowing the terms of the Jay treaty, Pinckney shied from this. Monroe had advised that he assure the French the Jay treaty contained nothing injurious to France; Pinckney re¬ sponded he could not do that without exposing the contents of the still-secret treaty. If he did reveal the treaty provisions, French 72 See Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 3, 1795, Turner, CFM, p. 619. 73 See Monroe to the Committee of Public Safety, Paris, Jan. 25, 1795; also “Notes Respecting the River Mississippi,” Paris, Jan. 25, 1795, in Hamil¬ ton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 182-186. 74 Monroe to Randolph, Paris, March 6, 1795, postscript of March 9 and the note, J. C. Mountflorence to Monroe, n.p., n.d., ibid., pp. 228-229 an< f 228 m-229 n.; Monroe to William Short, Paris, May 30, 1795, ibid., pp. 289- 290. For more details on the Mississippi question, see Beverly W. Bond, Jr., “Monroe’s Efforts to Secure Free Navigation of the Mississippi River during His Mission to France, 1795-1796,” Publications of the Mississippi Historical Society, IX (1906), 255-262; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 36-4 r. MONROE IN PARIS 3 6 7 assistance in his negotiations, it appeared, would vanish. 75 When the French did learn what the Jay treaty provided, they suspected the worst of Spanish-American negotiations in Madrid, linking them to the devious diplomacy of the Jay treaty. Even though the French had promised Monroe they would try to win navigation of the Mississippi for the United States from Spain “in reliance that our treaty with England contained nothing injuri¬ ous to France,” they had from the first feared that Pinckney sought an alliance from Spain whereby the United States would obtain Louisiana and the Floridas. Such acquisitions ran counter to French policy; such an aggrandizement would place Anglo-Americans in control of Mississippi commerce upon which French colonies re¬ lied. 76 In their negotiations at Basel, therefore, the French made a deter¬ mined effort to recover Louisiana from Spain, bearing hard on Spain’s fears of American aggression. If Spain returned Louisiana to France, the negotiators pointed out, France would close the Missis¬ sippi to check American expansion westward. 7 ' Monroe, in placing too much faith in the bond of the French alliance, was, it appeared, naive in believing that France would assist the United States to gain free use of the Mississippi. In their appraisal of French motives, the British were closer to the mark. As Phineas Bond pointed out, the French would not assist Americans in obtaining free usage of the Mississippi when that usage under the Jay treaty would also accrue to the British. 78 Yet the British also feared that Pinckney would make an alliance with Spain for navigation of the Mississippi. Secretary of State Timothy Pickering put them at ease by saying “that as it has been the Policy of this Government to avoid every sort of compact and Connexion which might implicate it in Disputes with the European 76 Monroe to Randolph, Paris, June 14, 1795, to Madison, Paris, Sept. 8, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 283-284, 355. 70 See Monroe’s “A View of the Conduct of the Executive,” ibid., Ill, 412-414; “Extrait de deux memoires de le passage qui traitent de St. Domingue et de La Louisiane,” AAE CP EU, n.p., n.d., Vol. XLVII, ff. 179-180. 77 See Le Comite de Salut Public a Barthelemy, Paris, Sept. 16, 19, 1795, in Kaulek, Rapiers de Berthelemy, VI, 150-151, 155; see also instructions, May 12, 14, 1795, ibid., pp. 25, 27. 78 Bond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Dec. 20, 1795, No. 20, Henry Adams Transcripts. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 368 Nations, the necessity of pursuing this system of Conduct was more and more felt, and would be persisted in to the total Rejection of all defensive Alliances.” Then Pickering criticized the French alli¬ ance, adverting “to the great inconvenience which it had occassioned in this Country,” ascribing the alliance “to the particular Exigencies at the Moment it was made, and to the impossibility of foreseeing the Embarrassments which it had produced.” 79 Even though Monroe believed otherwise, neither his diplomacy nor French aid contributed to the success of Pinckney’s treaty. As a contemporary Federalist viewed the situation, an exhausted Spain had made peace with France, violating her alliance with Great Brit¬ ain. Fearing British vengeance, she wished to stand well with the United States. Events beyond the control of American diplomacy made possible the favorable Pinckney treaty. 80 JL Jf. JL JL *7T" if 'TV' TP IP As Franco-American relations deteriorated and as Monroe be¬ came convinced of his untenable position under the Federalist ad¬ ministration, he turned more and more to his Republican friends. 81 Monroe was buttressed in his anti-British, antiadministration, and pro-French views by letters from his Republican friends, recounting in one way or another the violent opposition to the Jay treaty in the United States. 82 In his own letters to them he justified his conduct 78 Bond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 2, 1796, No. 1, ibid. 80 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, March 10, 1796 (Princeton). Pinckney maintained that whatever French aid had been prom¬ ised at Madrid was revoked when France learned of the Jay treaty contents and that he did not seek French aid because of the Jay treaty dissatisfaction. Rufus King’s note of Aug. 30, 1796, in King, Rufus King Correspondence, II, 82. See also Frederick J. Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Missis¬ sippi Valley in the Period of Washington and Adams,” AHR, X, 67; Arthur P. Whitaker, “The Retrocession of Louisiana in Spanish Policy,” AHR, XXXIX (April, 1934), P- 4591 an d Whitaker’s The Spanish-American Fron¬ tier, pp. 203-207; Bemis, Pinckney’s Treaty, pp. 278-279. 81 See Monroe to Jefferson, Paris, June 23, 30, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writ¬ ings of fames Monroe, II, 292-304, 310-312; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp.^6-48. 82 Despite his untenable position Monroe maintained that he did not resign because by so doing, “I should not only have admitted the misconduct of the administration . . . but likewise my own, since it would have exposed me to the suspicion of having accepted the trust to serve a particular purpose, and withdrawing after that was accomplished.” By remaining he thought he MONROE IN PARIS 3 6 9 and attacked administration policy. His criticisms, which made excellent political propaganda, received wide circulation in the United States. Basically, he expressed distrust of England and the conviction that the sheet anchor of American foreign policy was the French alliance. These letters, counteracting news from France written from the British viewpoint, were even printed in the press.* 3 No administration could long tolerate such activities on the part of one of its diplomats. Despite Monroe’s efforts, as summer faded so did the French alliance. In August American newspapers arrived with the text of the Jay treaty and with accounts of the Senate’s approval. After reading the press versions Monroe feared the treaty would sweep away the foundations of Franco-American amity. Yet he did not lose all hope, believing still “that if timely and suitable attempt be made to engage the aid of this government [France] in support of our claims upon England it may be accomplished upon fair and houourable terms.”*' Privately, he blasted the treaty in detail, saying that “no body will I presume attempt to vindicate the head which dictated it.” Label¬ ing it “one of the most extraordinary transactions of modern times,” he said it formed “an important epoch in the history of our country.” The belief that President Washington would not ratify the docu¬ ment remained his main consolation. In place of the treaty, which contained not “one single stipulation in our favor,” he suggested seizure of British possessions in America—the Northwest posts, Bermuda, Canada—to gain respect in France and in Great Britain. In Monroe’s words such action would be “a decisive and powerful diversion in favour of France,” a tangible support to the French alliance.* 5 might stave off French reprisals. Monroe’s “A View of the Conduct of the Executive,” in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, III, 4r6. 83 Monroe offered to supply the Republican press with regular despatches of developments in France. Monroe to George Logan, Paris, June 24, 1795 [dated incorrectly 1796], in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 6-7; Marsh, “John Beckley. . . ,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXII, 58-59. 84 Monroe to Secretary of State, Paris, Aug. 17, 1795, No. 20, National Archives, Dept, of State, Diplomatic Despatches, France. 83 Monroe to Secretary of State, Paris, Sept. 8, 1795, No. 24, ibid.; Monroe to Madison, Paris, Sept. 8, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, Ir > 347 - 359 - 37° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Not far from Paris another American diplomat, John Quincy Adams, also received letters “and papers with accounts of popular movements in opposition to the [Jay] treaty.” Although the popular reaction was not unexpected, he responded far differently from Monroe. Indeed, the news gave him “great anxiety” and “solici¬ tude,” since he believed the violent opposition to the treaty renewed the danger of war which he had hoped had blown over. “It is a dan¬ ger,” he told his father, “so much the more formidable, because I believe the intention is to draw the United States into it [the Euro¬ pean war], merely to make tools of them, in order to procure advan¬ tageous terms for others, who would leave us in the well, after using our weight to get themselves out of it. It would be a war in which we should have everything to lose and nothing to gain; a war com¬ menced against the will of almost the whole people, and which there¬ fore under such a government as ours could not be carried on with success.” Distrustful of the French and certain that they wished to draw the United States into the war for their own selfish reasons, Adams also believed that “ the conduct of the British government is so well adapted to increasing our danger of war, that I cannot but suppose they are secretly inclined to produce it.” Yet he doubted that in case of conflict with Great Britain the French alliance would be of much value, that “the French government would be disposed to contract any engagements which would bind them to a common cause with us. They would give us as many fair words as we could wish, but would stipulate nothing without a consideration more than adequate to it. But if they should even tempt us by the most unlimited obli¬ gations of inseparable participation, the present state of their affairs is such as can inspire but little confidence in the permanency of their cooperation.” Then he said “the only safe connection that can exist with them is that which would not be liable to follow the fate of their internal revolutions.” 86 In Paris Monroe, although he received no immediate official pro- 88 John Q. Adams to John Adams, The Hague, Sept. 12, 1795, in Ford, The Writings of John Ouincy Adams, I, 408-417. Earlier young Adams had sounded similar warnings that France sought to make use of the United States as she did the conquered Dutch provinces, “that is, as an instrument for the benefit of France, as a passive weapon in her hands against her most formidable enemy.” To John Adams, The Hague, May 22, 1795, ibid., p. 356. MONROE IN PARIS 37 1 test from the French government, did not remain long in ignorance of the French reaction to the Jay treaty. “Believe me,” he said, “that since the reports of that treaty transpired I have rested on a bed of thorns.” Later he wrote that “the appearance of the treaty excited the general disgust of France against the American govern¬ ment,” a disgust which “diminished” as knowledge of the violent American reaction against the treaty became known in France. Early in October he learned directly that the French foreign office considered the Jay treaty “as injurious to France.” By promising to deliver a copy of the expected Adet-Randolph correspondence deal¬ ing with the treaty, Monroe on this occasion headed off a formal pro¬ test by the French. 87 Within a few weeks Fauchet arrived in Paris, “extremely dissatis¬ fied” with the Jay treaty; he confirmed the incredible news that Washington had ratified it. 88 At the same time the French govern¬ ment changed; the Directory succeeded the National Convention. Not until the beginning of December did Monroe receive official confirmation of Fauchet’s news. At that time Timothy Pickering, who had succeeded the now disgraced Randolph as acting Secretary of State, so informed him. In his first communication, because un¬ favorable French reaction “may be apprehended,” Pickering out¬ lined his reasons why France had no valid grievances. “In our new engagements we violate no prior obligation,” he said, and stressed “that the negotiation has not proceeded from any predilection in our Government towards Great Britain.” In defense of his conduct, Monroe responded bitterly, pointing out that “the course of events” had placed him “in a very delicate and embarrassing dilemma.” 89 As the year 1796 opened Franco-American relations were on the 87 Monroe’s “A View of the Conduct of the Executive,” in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 422, 425-426; see also the note of J. H. Pur- viance, Paris, Aug., 1796, pp. 426 0.-427 n. 88 Moniteur (Paris), Nov. 16, 1795, carried the news of ratification with no comment. The next day and thereafter it carried reports of American criticism and expressed doubt that the treaty would be implemented. Moni¬ teur, March 29, 1796. According to the official French view the American people did not want the treaty; obviously, therefore, it was the result of British intrigue and collusion with the Washington administration. Cited in Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Relations. . . ,” FAR, I, 23. 89 Pickering to Monroe, Dept, of State, Sept. 12, 1795, ASP FR, I, 596-598; Monroe to Pickering, Paris, Nov. 5, Dec. 6, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 410, 422-427. 37 2 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE verge of collapse. In January Randolph’s Vindication reached France; its uncomplimentary references to the French Revolution added to French dissatisfaction. Then the text of Washington’s December address to the opening session of Congress arrived. In it the President discussed foreign affairs, touched upon the Jay treaty, but omitted any favorable or even specific reference to France. This oversight or slight, according to Monroe, disturbed the French gov- Q0 ernment. With no evidence of attempted conciliation of the affronted French by the Washington government, the expected reprisal was not long in coming. In the middle of February the Minister of Foreign Affairs informed Monroe that the Directory considered the Franco-American alliance as “ceasing to exist” from the moment the Jay treaty was ratified, that it would recall the French minister to the United States and would send a special envoy to Philadelphia to present the abrogation of the alliance. In the French view the Jay treaty aligned the United States with the anti-French “coalesced powers.” 91 France appeared determined to break off diplomatic relations. France’s warlike threat was soon picked up by others, exagger¬ ated, and relayed to Philadelphia. Gouverneur Morris wrote pri¬ vately to Washington that “a fleet is to conduct to you the new french Minister, who will be directed to exact in the Space of fifteen Days a categorical Answer to certain Questions. What these are I can only conjecture but suppose that you will, in effect, be called on to take Part decidedly with France. Mr. Munroe [«V] will no Doubt endeavor to convince the Rulers of that Country that such Conduct will force us into the War against them, but it is far from impossible that the usual Violence of their Councils will prevail.” 92 Alarmed, Washington turned to Hamilton, now a private citizen, for counsel. Among other things, he feared the rumored ultimatum might demand the “dissolution of the Alliance,” or the repudiation of the Jay treaty, with war as the alternative. “Were it not for the 80 Monroe’s “A View of the Conduct of the Executive,” ibid., Ill, 436; for Washington’s address, Dec. 8, 1795, see ASP FR, I, 27-29. 81 Monroe to Pickering, Paris, Feb. 16, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 454-456. 82 Morris to Washington, March 4, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Washingtons Writings, XXXV, 38 n. MONROE IN PARIS 373 unhappy differences among ourselves,” he said, “my answer wd. be short and decisive, to this effect. We are an Independent Nation, and act for ourselves.” Then he added, “we will not be dictated to by the Politics of any Nation under Heaven, farther than Treaties require of us.” This situation has “been brought on us by the mis¬ conduct of some of our own intemperate people; who seemed to have preferred throwing themselves into the Arms of France ... to that manly, and Neutral conduct which is so essential, and would so well become us, as an Independent Nation.” Washington’s view that disloyal Americans had brought on the difficulties with France was not unique; other Federalists shared it and echoed it in the press. 93 Hamilton, stating in his reply to the President that there was “nothing in it [the Jay treaty] to change the nature of our relations with France,” advised that, if France insisted on repudiation of the Jay treaty, the answer should be that such repudiation would be “too humiliating and injurious to allow us to believe that the expectation can be persisted in by France, since it is to require a thing impossible, and to establish, as a price of the continuance of friendship with us, the sacrifice of our honor by an act of perfidy, which would destroy the value of our friendship to any nation.” If France should claim that the treaty violated the principle of free ships, free goods, “the an¬ swer,” Hamilton suggested, could be that the Executive is disposed to enter a new negotiation for a new treaty to modify the 1778 treaties, “so as may consist with a due regard to mutual interest and the cir¬ cumstances of parties.” Referring specifically to the alliance, he added that “if the guarantee of the West Indies should be claimed, the answer may be ‘that the decision of this question belongs to Con¬ gress, who, if it be desired, will be convened to deliberate upon it.’ I presume and hope they will have adjourned—for to gain time is every thing.” 94 Fortunately, Washington was never forced to follow Hamilton’s advice; the French ultimatum was never delivered; the alliance was never put to that critical test. ""Washington to Hamilton, Philadelphia, May 8, 1796, ibid., pp. 38-41; extract from a letter of an American citizen dated Paris, Feb. 14, 1796, in the New Hampshire and Vermont Journal: Or, The Farmer’s Weekly Mu¬ seum (Walpole, N. H.), May 31, 1796. 84 Hamilton to Washington, New York, May 20, 1796, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor^s, VI, 122-125. 374 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Meanwhile, astounded by the French blow, Monroe had acted to divert it. Arguing that the French action would smack of war, that it would convey to the world that “the issue of war and peace was suspended on the issue of the mission,” he pointed out that it would give comfort to the enemies of both countries who alone would profit by destruction of the Franco-American alliance. The French minister countered that “independently of any treaty with England,” which treaty “annihilated” the 1778 treaties, “France had much cause of complaint against” the United States; that under the circumstances his government’s action was “mild” and that France “had rather have a [sic] open enemy than a perfidious friend.” 95 Monroe made clear that France would have just such an open enemy if she persisted in this harsh policy. Realizing that sentiment for strong measures had taken firm hold in French councils, he had explained confidentially that such drastic measures were not neces¬ sary to make the United States change its French policy. “You well know,” he told Charles Delacroix, the French foreign minister, “the number of your friends in America is considerable, and that this number is daily increasing. ... At the present moment they are acting with great energy in America in your favor. . . . They wish to serve you but having no fleet they see not the means. But the moment you take a step of that eclat against them denouncing as it were the whole nation to the world, for you cannot distinguish between the government and the People, and pressing a crisis in their affairs, it merits consideration whether it would not rather dampen their spirits and diminish their zeal in your favor rather than increase it.” Such action, Monroe said, “would do harm both to you and to us, and certainly no good. Left to ourselves everything will I think be satisfactorily arranged and perhaps in the course of the present year: and it is always more grateful to make such arrangements ourselves than to be pressed to it.” In other words Monroe implied that the coming elections (1796) in the United States would bring a pro-French Republican administration to power. “If you will cast 85 Monroe to Pickering, Paris, Feb. 20, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 457-460; to Madison, Paris, Feb. 27, 1796, ibid., pp. 460- 463. MONROE IN PARIS 375 your eyes upon the United States at the present moment,” he said, “you will see them actually in the convulsions of a great crisis, and which is occasioned by this treaty with England and you may be sensible diat the injuries we have received from England in the seizure of our vessels, and other outrages whilst you have shewn a different conduct, towards us, tend greatly to increase our attach¬ ment to you, whilst it excites our indignation against her.” 96 This argument, although unofficial and unknown to Monroe’s superiors, impressed Delacroix. Particularly effective was the point that 1796 was a crisis election year in the United States. After the election, reasoned the French, we can always return to our stern policy if the results are not to our liking. The French government agreed to send its representations to the United States “through the ordinary channel,” and, as Monroe had requested officially, to pre¬ sent him with its specific complaints. 97 Monroe headed off the sending of a special envoy, not by defend¬ ing, but by undermining administration foreign policy. Unortho¬ dox and unauthorized though it was, Monroe’s diplomacy did avert a crisis the government was unprepared to meet. The French minis¬ ter in the United States reported that the decision not to send a special envoy calmed the fears of the Washington administration and that Secretary of State Pickering behaved like a schoolboy put¬ ting on a courageous front in asserting France would not dare take vigorous action against the United States because she needed Amer¬ ican friendship. 98 Pickering’s attitude had not been all bravado. Lord Grenville, Great Britain’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had heard the same rumor that Gouverneur Morris had forwarded to President Wash¬ ington. Acting promptly, he had instructed Robert Liston, the new British minister in Philadelphia, “to assure the American Govern- 06 Monroe to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, Feb. 17, 1796, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLV, ff. ^6-147; a portion of this document is quoted in Bemis, “Wash¬ ington’s Farewell Address. . . , AHR, XXXIX, 258. 87 “Observations sur la lettre de M. Monroe, au Ministre de Relations Exterieure,” n.p., n.d., AAE CP EU, Vol. XLV, ff. 148-149. To Pickering Monroe reported that his efforts to prevent the French special mission were successful without explaining why. Paris, March 10, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of Janies Monroe, II, 463-464. 88 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, June 16, ^96, in Turner, CFM, pp. 922-923. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 376 ment that, if France should commence Hostilities against it” as a result of the Jay treaty, Great Britain “will be ready to enter into such engagements with the United States as may appear best calcu¬ lated to repel an aggression of this nature and to make common Cause against an Attack which can be dictated by no other motive than by a desire, to prevent the Establishment of a good understand¬ ing between Great Britain and the United States and grounded on no other hope than that of exciting internal discontents” in America. Grenville instructed Liston to encourage the Washington govern¬ ment and the “well disposed party” (Federalists) to resist French pressures. This was precisely what Federalists wanted. In Hamil¬ ton’s phrase, “a frigate or two to serve as convoys would not be amiss. If the English had been wise, they would neither have harrassed our trade themselves, nor suffered their trade with us to be harrassed. They would see this a happy moment for conciliating us by a clever little squadron in our ports and on our coast.” Then he added, “a hint might not perhaps do harm.” 99 In Paris, on March n, 1796, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pre¬ sented Monroe with a summary of French grievances. Under three main headings he listed specific complaints against the United States, beginning with “the inexecution of treaties.” The second heading dealt with “the impunity of die outrage made to the [French] re¬ public” by die arrest of Fauchet in American waters by the British, and the third covered the Jay treaty in which the United States “have sacrificed, \nowingly and evidently, their connexion with the repub¬ lic ; and the rights, the most essential and least contested, of neutral- ity. Under the first head the French charged that the United States had by various interpretations of its neutrality policy deprived them of treaty-conferred maritime advantages in American ports. Specif¬ ically, they stressed alleged violations of certain ardcles of the com¬ mercial treaty and of die consular convention of 1788. They com¬ plained that while they should have benefited as a matter of treaty right from an American policy of benevolent neutrality, they did 88 Grenville to Liston, Downing Street, March 18, 1796, No. 2, Secret, in Mayo, Instructions to the British Ministers to the United States, AHA Ann. Rep. (1936), III, 113-114; Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., June 15, 1796, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 404. MONROE IN PARIS 377 not; whereas Great Britain, their enemy who had no such treaty rights, did benefit. The second heading was self-explanatory. In the third the French minister struck at American policy widi vigor and logic. He contended that, by acquiescing in and accepting in treaty form Great Britain’s large-navy maritime principles, the United States had abandoned its principles of small-navy neutrality and had injured France, its ally. Specifically, by agreeing in the Jay treaty to extend the contraband list to include provisions, the United States acknowl¬ edged England’s paper blockade of French colonies and of France herself. Jay’s treaty, he concluded, thus violated neutrality as ac¬ cepted by the smaller maritime powers and vitiated the treaty of alliance because the United States had contracted to defend French Caribbean possessions, not to acquiesce in their blockade. 100 Monroe’s response in defense of American conduct was long and specific. Although he did not deny the basic charges, he did stress extenuating circumstances. Referring to the Jay treaty and the status of American neutrality, he pointed out that while small-navy principles of neutrality were still “extremely dear” to the United States, England had never “acceded to them.” How, he asked, could the United States, alone and without a fleet, compel powerful England to recognize those principles? And if it was impossible for the United States to force Britain to respect those principles, then the American government was not at fault. Despite his argu¬ ment Monroe could not have believed that the United States was free from fault, as the French complaints were, in substance, similar to those he himself had made against the Jay treaty. 101 He had, more¬ over, admitted to the French his own view that administration policy was wrong and should be changed. When the French charges and Monroe’s reply reached Philadel¬ phia, Pickering declared officially that the American minister’s state¬ ment was “sufficient to obviate” the charges although “a more forci- 100 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Monroe, Paris, March n, 1796, ASP FR, I, 732-733; “Expose sommaire des griefs de la republique fran^aise contre le Gouvernment des etats unis de l’amerique,” by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated Paris, March 9, 1796, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLV, ff. 232-325; see also Bemis, Jay’s Treaty. . . , p. 267. 101 Monroe to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 15 and 20, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 467-482; Monroe to Pickering, Paris, May 2, 1796, ibid., pp. 489-492. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 37 8 ble explanation” might have been expected. Privately, however, the acting Secretary of State told President Washington that the “statement is as feeble as could have been desired,” and that it con¬ firmed the suspicions of several months that Monroe’s “ominous letters” were part of a plot to advance “party purposes” in the United States. Implicit in the “solemn farce,” he said, were defeat of the Jay treaty, a change in administration, and possibly war with Eng¬ land. Pickering, in effect, accused Monroe of working against his own government and discredited his diplomacy. 102 * * * * # In Paris, too, Monroe’s diplomacy became more and more dis¬ credited. For a while he heard nothing from the Directory; internal affairs and the war in Europe commanded its full attention. Then in June the French learned that the House of Representatives had supported Washington’s administration and had voted to imple¬ ment the Jay treaty. All hope that the Americans would not put the treaty into force was now gone; the treaty was an accomplished fact. 103 In keeping with French objections, the Minister of Foreign Affairs then informed Monroe officially that the Jay treaty, “con¬ cluded in the midst of hostilities,” had broken the 1778 alliance, had ended Franco-American friendship and American neutrality, and had terminated the commercial treaty. The Directory therefore considered the treaty stipulations concerning neutrality “as altered and suspended.” Although Monroe challenged the Directory’s ac¬ tion he did not deny that the Jay treaty was advantageous to France’s enemy and injurious to France. 104 Still clinging to the conviction that it was to the advantage of the United States not to break with France, Monroe, working in the dark, uncertain as to how long he could bear what he termed his mortifying situation, strove to prevent a complete rupture. He warned Pickering that French discontent had rooted deeply and 102 Pickering to Washington, July 21, 1796, ibid., p. 482 n. 103 See Monroe to Pickering, Paris, May 25, 1796, June 12, 28, 1796, and Monroe to Delacroix, [June 26, 28, 1796], ibid., Ill, 1-6, 9 n.-io n. 104 Delacroix to Monroe, Paris, July 7, 1796, Monroe to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, July 14, 1796, ASP FR, I, 739-740; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 70. MONROE IN PARIS 379 that French officials wanted to give the United States some signal proof of it. 105 He also managed to block the appointment of Man- gourit as charge d’affaires in the United States to replace Adet. To send Mangourit to Philadelphia would have insulted the Washing¬ ton government. 106 Monroe’s success was transitory. He heard rumors that new French reprisals were in the making, among them “seizures of neu¬ tral vessels destined for England.” Then followed the blow he had labored most to avoid. The Directory recalled Adet without appoint¬ ing a successor and declared “that the customary relations between the two nations shall cease.” The reason advanced for this was the Jay treaty—the honor of France, it was claimed, would be tarnished if she acted otherwise. Monroe, although professing not to see the full consequences of the French action, did see that “if the same councils prevail in America the alliance is at an end.” There was little doubt as to Monroe’s personal feelings. “I have detained them seven months,” he said, “from doing what they ought to have done at once.” 107 Not until October did the French notify Monroe officially of the reprisals; the delay, he concluded, was intentional. With the official communication the French gave him a copy of the July decree authorizing their warships to deal with American vessels “as these suffer the English to treat them.” This, in effect, repudiated the com¬ mercial treaty of 1778 in which France had agreed to observe “free¬ dom of the seas” toward neutral United States. The note, in addi¬ tion, revealed that he had taken too pessimistic a view of the French actions. “Ordinary relations,” the French told him, were not to be suspended; they were to be conducted by the consuls. The French did not want a complete rupture; what they wanted was to break the United States’ recent accord with Great Britain and to drive it 108 Monroe to Pickering, Paris, July 24, 1796 [dated incorrectly, 1797], No. 36, National Archives, Dept, of State, Diplomatic Despatches, France. 100 Monroe to Madison, Paris, July 5, 1796, Monroe to Pickering, Paris, Aug. 4, 15, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 23-25, 48- 51, 51 n. Oliver Wolcott, Jr., of Mangourit: “The violence of this man’s charac¬ ter, if he has been in fact appointed, is no good omen.” To Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, Oct. 17, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 387. 107 Monroe to Pickering, Aug. 27, 1796; to Madison, Paris, Sept. 1, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 51 m-52 n., 52-54. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 380 back into the French camp. 108 The French timed their retaliation, moreover, so as to influence the presidential campaign then being waged, a campaign, as Monroe had pointed out, critical to the sur¬ vival of the alliance. In Philadelphia administration dissatisfaction with Monroe and his diplomacy culminated in a successful movement to recall him. Such dissatisfaction had early been apparent to Monroe; but he stayed on, he claimed, to prevent the rupture between France and the United States which he dreaded. 109 That such a rupture would have meant war had it not been for Monroe’s dubious but effective diplomacy seems clear. While the Directory was split over the severity of its policy toward the United States, at least one Director, Lazare Nicholas Marguerite Carnot, pushed vigorously for war. Having won access to the Directors, Monroe parried the war senti¬ ment with convincing arguments, particularly with the argument that war between France and the United States would drive Amer¬ ica into England’s waiting arms. The French alliance would then be supplanted by an English alliance. 110 Playing for time, he hoped that in the 1796 election Jefferson would win the Presidency and preserve peace with France. Monroe’s play for time had not taken into account the sharp pen of Timothy Pickering. Even though Monroe realized that his own politics were in opposition to those of the administration and that his diplomacy was not above criticism, he was stunned by Pick¬ ering’s biting censure of June, 1796, which he described as being ad¬ dressed “as from an overseer on the farm to one of his gang.” 111 Pickering charged Monroe with responsibility for the dangerous state of French relations. The American minister, he said, had failed to explain the views of the administration on the Jay treaty, which 108 Delacroix to Monroe, Paris, Oct. 7, 1796, Monroe to Pickering, Paris, Oct. 6, 21, 1796, ASP FR, I, 745; Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , p. 72. 109 Monroe to Madison, Paris, July 5, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, III, 22-23. Monroe thought that Pickering sought a rupture with France. 110 Louis Marie Larevelliere-Lepeaux, Memoires de Larevelliere-Lepeaux (3 vols., Paris, 1895), II, 257-260. 111 Monroe to Madison, Paris, Sept. 1, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 53. MONROE IN PARIS 3 Sl if effectively presented must have served the purpose “of removing objections and dispelling jealousies” in the French government. Pickering further pointed out that the President “expressly” pre¬ ferred written communications between Monroe and the French government to personal interviews; he wanted Monroe to transmit complete copies of all communications to Philadelphia. 112 Federalist plans to replace Monroe had long been brewing. 113 Opponents had attacked his diplomacy and had subjected his per¬ sonal conduct to innuendo. Rumors, in Alexander Hamilton’s phrase, were “industriously circulated” that the American minister in Paris had engaged in French speculations, “largely in French confiscated estates,” and that he had mismanaged government funds. 114 Washington, too, was aroused by personal grievance against Monroe. He suspected the American minister of being in¬ volved somehow in the situation whereby a personal letter from the President to Gouverneur Morris fell into the hands of the Directory. Using the letter to discomfit the President, the Directory hinted that it contained evidence of American surrender to English hegem¬ ony. 115 Another source of irritation seemingly fostered by Mon¬ roe stemmed from the 1796 Fourth of July celebration in Paris in which he participated. The Americans present quarreled over a 112 Pickering to Monroe, Dept, of State, June 13, 1796, ASP FR, I, 737- 738. For Monroe’s reply, see his letter to Pickering of Sept. 10, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, III, 54-62. Monroe answered that the charge was “unjust and unexpected” and that the supporting evidence was “inapplicable and inconclusive.” 113 The English, too, had wanted Monroe removed. After he had com¬ pleted negotiations for the treaty with England, Jay had suggested the recall of George Hammond from Philadelphia. Lord Grenville agreed but coupled compliance with the suggestion that Monroe be recalled from Paris. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, p. 70. 114 Hamilton to Wolcott, Jr., New York, June 9, 1796, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 403; William Vans Murray Papers, Common¬ place Book, Dec. 10, 1795 (Princeton). Monroe was hit hard by the rumors. See Monroe to George Clinton, Paris, July 25, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 36-39. Yet he had been warned by friends that his enemies would use the charge of speculation in working for his recall. Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 77-78. "“Monroe to Washington, March 24, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of fames Monroe, II, 483; Washington to Monroe, Philadelphia, Aug. 25, 1796, to Pickering, Philadelphia, Sept. 12, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXXV, 187-190, 208-210. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 382 toast to President Washington; the outcome was uncomplimentary to the President and unsavory for the American minister. 116 Dissatisfaction with his personal and political conduct led Cabinet members and highly placed Federalists through spring and summer of 1796 to advocate Monroe’s recall. French reladons, Hamilton said, were “extremely serious. The government must play a skilful card, or all is lost”; it must immediately set out “in earnest about averting the storm.” To do that it must recall Monroe; “we must stop the channels by which foreign poison is introduced into the country,” warned Oliver Wolcott, Jr., “or suffer the government to be overturned.” 117 “A new minister,” reasoned Federalists, “will be able to conciliate this late event [the Jay treaty], with explanation, with the duties the U. S. owe as an ally to France.” 118 Hamilton had in mind several replacements for Monroe, all Federalists. Some Federalists thought “the measure has been too long delayed because they fully believe that the french [r/c] Execu¬ tive has been invited to bully us for daring to be so independent as to be just to ourselves.” Unfortunately “for our own country,” such Federalists lamented, “a fact of this kind however true is not very susceptible of proof.” Yet, they pointed out, “it has been frequently said by Americans coming from France that the execrations of our government were confined chiefly to that circle of society of which Mr. M[onroe] was the center—whatever may be the final destiny of our national system it cannot be doubted that those who are en¬ trusted with the administration will have the concurrence of every honest citizen in displacing fruitless officers & disgracing treacherous >>119 ones. Pickering let no opportunity evade him whereby he could im¬ press upon Washington the advisability of replacing Monroe. His tactics in the John Churchman episode, for example, followed a 119 Monroe to Madison, Paris, July 5, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 19-20; this episode long plagued Monroe; see Monroe to Enoch Edwards, Albemarle, Feb. 12, 1798, ibid., pp. 98-100. 1,7 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Alexander Hamilton, Philadelphia, June 14, 17, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 359, 361; Hamilton to Wolcott, Jr., New York, June 15, 1796, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, VIII, 403-404. 118 William Vans Murray to McHenry, Aug. 29, 1796, in Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry, p. 189. 119 George Cabot to Pickering, Brookline, Mass., Aug. 31, 1796, Timothy Pickering Papers, XX, 344 (Mass. Hist. Soc.). MONROE IN PARIS 3 8 3 standard Federalist tactic in discrediting Monroe. After residing in Paris for two or three years, Churchman, a Maryland scientist, had returned to the United States in July, 1796, bearing a letter from Monroe to Pickering. In the course of discussion involving the let¬ ter’s broken seal Pickering asked about “the sentiments of the French people towards America & particularly the government and “whe¬ ther he had observed any material change of sentiment, especially on account of the Treaty with Great Britain.” Churchman “answered that he had observed no material change; that very little was said by Frenchmen about the treaty—tho’ much was said against it by the American Citizens in Paris.” 120 Pickering relayed this to Washing¬ ton, on whom the inference was not lost: Monroe could not be trusted; he and other antiadministration Americans in Paris were causing trouble with France for party purposes. The Federalist plans to get rid of Monroe were known to the French. From Philadelphia the French minister reported that final¬ ly the enemies of France felt sufficiently strong to brave public opinion and force Monroe’s recall, and to replace him with “a spy of the English court.” Happily, but mistakenly, he did not think the President would dare recall Monroe. 121 * * # * # Washington’s reaction to Monroe’s conduct was far different from what the French minister would have had it. When first impressed with the seriousness of the French reaction to the Jay treaty, concerned about the political situation at home, he reacted as he had in the English and Spanish diplomatic crises; he con¬ sidered sending a special envoy to France to deal with the new crisis. But could he send such an envoy, he asked of Hamilton and his Cabinet, without Senate approval and while the Senate was in re¬ cess ? Other questions also bothered him. Believing Federalist dog¬ ma that the difficulties with France “have been brought on us by the misconduct of some of our own intemperate people” who threw 180 Pickering to Washington, July 29, 1796, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 494 n. Several years earlier Churchman, in his scientific pursuits, had sought congressional support for a proposed voyage to find the magnetic pole. Annals of the Congress. . . , 2nd Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 6, 1792, pp.3i2-3r5. 121 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, June 19, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 925-926. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 384 “themselves into the Arms of France,” he wondered about the inter¬ connection between the Directory’s reception of such a move and the Republican reaction in the United States. Where could he find the man who had the proper qualifications “for such a Mission; and would not be obnoxious to one party or the other”; and what, he asked, should be done with Monroe in such a case? 122 Pouncing upon the opening for a fatal thrust against Monroe, the Cabinet agreed that the President had not the power to send a special envoy “in the recess of the Senate.” Washington’s advisers believed he could meet the crisis only by recalling Monroe and creating a vacancy. They urged the recall so the United States could have in Paris “some faithful organ to explain their real views” and to ascertain the real views of the French. Monroe’s conduct, they pointed out, “exposed the United States to all the mischiefs which could flow from jealousies and erroneous conceptions of their views and conduct.” His attachment to the cause of France, they said, “rendered him too little mindful of the interests of his own country.” 123 One factor among many available to them which Federalists chose to support their argument on this occasion was a letter writ¬ ten by Monroe to George Logan, Philadelphia Quaker and Republi¬ can, which they contended accorded with other evidence of Mon¬ roe’s “political opinions and conduct.” The letter, copies of which Monroe sent to four other prominent Jeffersonians, criticized the Jay negotiation and deplored the weakening of the French alliance. Worse still, in the covering letter Monroe had sent to Logan, he explained to the Quaker that he had “no objection” to having his letter published in Bache’s Aurora. It could be done anonymously— “from a gentleman in Paris to his friend in Philadelphia”—and per¬ haps Monroe might send similar letters regularly if Logan approved. 122 Washington to Pickering and to Hamilton, Mount Vernon, June 24, 26, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXV, 96-97, 101-102; the quotation is from Washington to Hamilton, Philadelphia, May 8, 1796, ibid., p. 41. Capture of the American vessel Mount Vernon by the French privateer Flying Fish served to convince Washington more than ever that relations with France had become critical; for the episode, see Bassett, The Federalist Sys¬ tem. . . , p. 222. 123 Pickering, Wolcott, Jr., and McHenry to Washington, Philadelphia, July 2, 1796, in Worthington C. Ford, ed., The Writings of George Washington (14 vols., New York, i 889-[93]), XIII, 216 n. MONROE IN PARIS 3 8 5 In this way Americans could be “more correctly informed” of the progress of the French Revolution than in the past, when most of their information derived from the English press. 124 How they got the private letter the department heads did not disclose. They used it to stress Monroe’s political treason rather than any harm he may have done to American foreign policy. A minister who made “confidential correspondents” of the “notorious enemies of the whole system of the government,” they pointed out, could not be trusted to do his duty to his government. They at¬ tempted, also, to connect Monroe to other anonymous letters from France. “These anonymous communications from officers of the United States in a foreign country, on matters of public nature, and which deeply concern the interests of the United States, in relation to that foreign country, are proofs of sinister design,” they said, “and shew that the public interests are no longer safe in the hands of such men.” 125 As usual, Hamilton proffered the counsel that Washington fol¬ lowed. Although the Federalist chieftain’s advice, prepared after consultation with Jay, agreed in its main points with that of the Cabinet, it was more perceptive. Hamilton felt that the French crisis was not sufficiently dangerous at the time to warrant a special envoy. He and Jay believed that Monroe’s successor “ought to be at the same time a friend to the government and understood to be not unfriendly to the French Revolution.” General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney was “the only man” they could think of who filled the re¬ quirement. They doubted, however, that he would accept the post, as in the past he had turned down other high offices offered him by Washington. If Pinckney declined, they advised, someone else must be sent. Hamilton feared that in view of French discontent “serious 124 Monroe to Jefferson, Paris, June 23, 1795, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, II, 292-304; he sent copies to Logan, Aaron Burr, John Beckley, and Robert R. Livingston. The covering letter, Monroe to Logan, Paris, June 24, 1795 (dated erroneously 1796) is in ibid., Ill, 6-7; see also Frederick B. Tolies, George Logan of Philadelphia (New York, 1953), pp. 143-144; Cresson, James Monroe, pp. 151-152. 120 Pickering, Wolcott, McHenry to Washington, Philadelphia, July 2, 1796, in Ford, The Writings of George Washington, XIII, 216 m-217 n. Attorney General Charles Lee concurred in the Cabinet opinion, maintaining that it was “not only expedient but absolutely necessary” that Monroe be recalled. Lee to Washington, Alexandria, July 7, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Wash¬ ington’s Writings, XXXV, 126 n. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 386 censure” would fall upon the Executive if he did not attempt an¬ other explanation of the American position. “It will be said,” he warned, “that it did not display as much zeal to avoid misunder¬ standing with France as with Great Britain; that discontents were left to rankle; that if the agent of the government in France were negligent or unfaithful, some other mode ought to have been found.” 126 Washington did not hesitate. Within a few days he confidential¬ ly set in motion the procedure for Monroe’s recall. Simultaneously he sought a replacement “who will promote, not thwart the neutral policy of the Government.” Although having “proofs, little short of positive” that John Marshall would not accept the appointment, he offered it first to him. After Marshall’s refusal he turned to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. In almost the same words as Hamil¬ ton’s he described the desired qualifications to Pinckney. “Where then,” he asked, “can a man be found that would answer this descrip¬ tion better than yourself?” In urging acceptance Washington again echoed Federalist political dogma. “It is a fact too notorious to be denied,” he said, “that the greatest embarrassments under which the Administration of this government labours, proceed from the con¬ centration of people among ourselves; who are more disposed to promote the views of another than to establish a national character of their own; and that unless the virtuous, and independent men of this country will come forward, it is not difficult to predict the consequences. Such is my decided opinion.” 127 Pinckney accepted the appointment. 128 Monroe remained a problem. Apprehensive that when the recall became known it would “set all the envenomed pens to work,” the President cautioned his Cabinet officers against unofficial discussion of causes for the re¬ call. He did feel, however, that “it will be candid, proper and necessary to apprize Mr. Monroe” of the motives “which have im- 126 Hamilton to Washington, July 5, 1796, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alex¬ ander Hamilton, VIII, 407-408; Hamilton, of course, influenced the Cabinet’s reply. For a discussion of Monroe’s recall see Bond, The Monroe Mission. . . , pp. 84-91. 127 See Washington to Pickering, Marshall, and C. C. Pinckney, all three letters dated Mount Vernon, July 8, 1796, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writ¬ ings, XXXV, 126-131. 128 Pinckney to Washington, Charleston, July 27, Aug. 2, 1796, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. MONROE IN PARIS 3 8 7 pelled it.” 129 So well guarded was Washington’s action that it com¬ pletely surprised Adet, the French Minister in Philadelphia, who did not learn of the recall until Pinckney was ready to depart. 130 Secretary Pickering informed Monroe of Pinckney’s appoint¬ ment and of his pending recall. Pinckney would deliver the formal letters of recall, he told Monroe. The reasons for the recall, for the “uneasiness and dissatisfacdon of the President,” were apparent; he had spelled them out in an earlier letter, Pickering pointed out curtly. There were, he added, “other concurring circumstances” to which he referred without elaboration. To maintain “the obliga¬ tions of his office,” and in particular to maintain “the honor and interests of the United States in relation to foreign nations,” the President was obliged to make the replacement. 131 Early in November Monroe received Pickering’s notice, and not long afterward Pinckney arrived in Paris with the letters of recall terminating his mission. Pinckney’s arrival heralded not only the end of the Monroe mission, but also the virtual end of the French alliance. The French foreign office viewed Monroe’s recall as a de¬ liberate affront, as nothing more than a political move by Washing¬ ton against Monroe and his party, a move it would not accept. While willing to maintain at least the semblance of diplomatic relations with Monroe, a minister they knew to be sympathetic to the alliance even though his government was not, the French would have no¬ thing to do with a Federalist committed to the policy of the Jay 128 Washington to Pickering, Mount Vernon, Aug. io, 1796, to Wolcott, Jr., same date, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXV, 174-175, 176-177. Pinckney’s acceptance was delayed for about a month because Washington’s original letter offering the appointment was lost in the mails. Washington to Marshall, and to Pinckney, Mount Vernon, Aug. 10, 1796, ibid., pp. 175-176. Washington was right; the recall was criticized. After hearing Monroe’s side of the recall story Albert Gallatin, for example, was convinced “that the American Administration have acted with a degree of meanness only exceeded by their folly, and that they have degraded the American name throughout Europe.” He was convinced, too, that the administration had used Monroe as a scapegoat. Gallatin to his wife, June 28, 1797, in Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin, pp. 186-187. 180 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Oct. 3, 1796, in Turner, CFM, p. 950. Adet, not far from the mark, interpreted the recall as a result of the “hateful” work of Hamilton and his Federalist cohorts. 181 Pickering to Monroe, Dept, of State, Aug. 22, 1796, ASP FR, I, 741-742; the letter of recall was dated Sept. 9, 1796, and is on p. 742. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 388 treaty. The Directory, therefore, refused to receive Pinckney. 132 In the words of Tom Paine, “the recall of Mr. Monroe cut everything asunder, for though here [France] they were enraged at the Amer¬ ican government, they were not enraged at him. They had an esteem for him, and a good opinion of him; they would listen to him, and he could soften them. But to recall him and to send in his place the brother of the man who was concerned in forming Jay’s treaty was stupidity and insult to both.” Such action tended to confirm French suspicions that “Mr. Monroe was sent for the purpose of amusing them while Jay was to act a contrary part in England.” 133 Although bitter over what it considered deception practiced un¬ gratefully against a generous ally, the French government exonerated Monroe of complicity in it, choosing rather to believe that he had been deceived as much as they. Before he took leave, therefore, the Directory emphasized that its quarrel was with the Federalist admin¬ istration. It informed Monroe “that it will no longer recognize nor receive a minister plenipotentiary from the United States, until after a reparation of the grievances demanded of the American govern¬ ment.” At the same time it hastened to emphasize that its grievances were not with the American people but with the government, that it held the American people in affection “grounded on former good offices and reciprocal interest, an affection which you have taken pleasure in cultivating by all the means in your power.” 134 Monroe’s last official act, though brief and unostentatious, touched the same theme as did his first controversial public appearance in Paris. In his farewell appearance before the Directory he said there was no object he had always had “more uniformly and sincerely at 132 Adet warned the Directory against Pinckney, a conservative South Carolina Federalist, cautioning it not to fall into an American trap as Amer¬ ican protests of friendship were false. To the Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Oct. 3, 1796, in Turner, CFM, p. 950. Upon landing in France Pinckney learned first hand that France was disgusted with American con¬ duct, that it viewed the Washington government as antagonistic, and that with the Jay treaty the United States had thrown itself into the arms of France’s bitter enemy. In effect, he learned that France considered the 1778 alliance shorn of meaning. Pinckney to Secretary of State, Bordeaux, Nov. 17, 1796, No. 1, National Archives, State Dept., Diplomatic Despatches, France. 133 Paine to Jefferson, Havre de Grace, France, April 1, 1797, in Foner, The Complete Wor\s of Thomas Paine, II, 1387, 1389. 131 Minister of Foreign Affairs to Monroe, Paris, Dec. n, 1796, ASP FR, I, 746-747; Austin, The Life of Elbridge Gerry, II, 179. MONROE IN PARIS 3 8 9 heart than the continuance of a close union and perfect harmony between” France and the United States. He had accepted the mis¬ sion with the view of using his utmost efforts “to increase and pro¬ mote this object”; he never deviated, he said, from pursuing it. The French reply, while complimentary to Monroe, criticized the Amer¬ ican government’s action. Indeed, it labeled the recall a “very strange spectacle” for Europe to observe. Again, the French dis¬ tinguished between the American people, who “will always possess our esteem,” and their government. Monroe, they declared, knew “the true interests” of America; he departed to their regret. 1,ij Monroe remained in Europe for several montiis and did not sail for the United States until spring, 1797. Arriving in New York in July, he saw immediately that he and his mission were a focus of political controversy. In attacks in the Federalist press and in Con¬ gress, Monroe was even accused of being a traitor who sold his country for French gold. In the words of John Adams, his house in Paris had been “a school for scandal against this country, its govern¬ ment and governors, Mr. Jay and his treaty.” 1 ' 1 '’ Republicans did not agree with this version of Monroe’s activities. “The Washington faction,” said a Monroe defender, “had affected to spread it abroad that James Monroe was the cause of rupture between the two Repub¬ lics.” Not so, was the reply; it was “the ingratitude and clandestine manoeuvering of the government of Washington, who caused the misunderstanding by signing a treaty injurious to the French Re¬ public.” 137 Nursing a deep resentment against the Federalist government for its treatment of him, Monroe added to the heat of partisan strife over foreign policy, particularly in his feud with Pickering over the reasons for his recall. Finally, like Randolph before him, Monroe presented his case to the people. In December, 1797, he pub- 136 Monroe to the Directory, [Paris, Dec. 30, 1796] and the President of the Directory to Monroe, ASP FR, I, 747. According to a report on public opinion in Paris dated Jan. 2, 1796, the Directory’s stand on Monroe’s recall was popular. Francois V. A. Aulard, ed., Paris pendant la reaction thermi- dorienne et sous le Directoire (5 vols., Paris, 1898-1902), III, 672. 136 Letombe to Delacroix, Philadelphia, July 16, 1797, in Turner, CFM, p. 1045; Adams to wife, Philadelphia, Jan. 14, 1797, in C. F. Adams, ed., Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife, II, 240. 13 ‘ Thomas Paine to the editors of the Bien informe, Paris, Sept. 27, 1797, in Conway, The Writings of Thomas Paine, III, 368-369. 39« ENTANGLING ALLIANCE lished A View of the Conduct of the Executive, in the Foreign Af¬ fairs of the United States, connected with the mission to the French Republic, during the years iy<)4, 5, & 6, a pamphlet in which he reviewed his mission, defended his conduct, reiterated his belief that to preserve the French alliance “was the true interest of Amer¬ ica,” and attacked administration foreign policy. 138 In Paris, meanwhile, Pinckney had protested to the French gov¬ ernment that the sentiments of the American people and those of their government were the same and were misunderstood. With regret he protested that he was “not permitted even to attempt to explain” the position of the Washington administration. The French government refused to listen to his explanation. As he had no official status, Pinckney was informed, he had better leave France; otherwise, he would be subject to arrest under the local police regu¬ lation requiring all foreigners to have a passport signed by their ministers in Paris and countersigned by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pinckney had no passport, nor could he obtain one. In February, 1797, he retreated to Amsterdam to await instructions from home. 139 Before leaving Paris Pinckney had observed that within the French government some felt that “America is not of greater conse¬ quence ... nor ought to be treated with greater respect, than Geneva or Genoa.” Others, he reported, “who regard us as being of some consequence, seem to have taken up an idea that our Government acts upon principles opposed to the real sentiments of a large major¬ ity of our people, and they are willing to temporize until the event of the election of President is known; thinking that, if one public character is chosen, he will be attached to the interest of Great Britain; and that, if another is elected, he will be . . . devoted to 138 See Monroe to Pickering, Philadelphia, July 6, 1797, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, III, 66-67; the pamphlet is printed on pp. 383-457; see also Daniel C. Gilman, James Monroe (Boston, 1898), pp. 67-70. 139 Pinckney to Pickering, plus enclosures, Paris, Dec. 10, 20, 26, 1796, Amsterdam, Feb. 18, 1797, ASP FR, II, 5-10. Fearing that the French refusal to receive Pinckney might mean war, Tom Paine urged the French foreign minister to regard Pinckney—appointed in a recess of the Senate—as in “sus¬ pension” until confirmed by the Senate. In this way Pinckney would not be received and an act of outright hostility would not be committed. Paine’s counsel was not followed; such a course was not “dignified.” See Conway, The Writings of Thomas Paine, III, 368 n., citing AAE CP EU, Vol. XLVI, f. 425. See also Fay, Revolutionary Spirit. . . , p. 381. MONROE IN PARIS 39 1 the interests of France; entertaining the humiliating idea that we are a people divided by party, the mere creatures of foreign influence, and regardless of our national character, honor, and interest. To eradicate this ill-conceived and unfounded opinion will be the work of time and labor, so greatly have they been prejudiced by mis¬ representation.” 140 This misrepresentation could be traced, in the Federalist view, to Monroe. 140 Pinckney to Pickering, enclosed in the letter of Dec. 20, 1796 (Paris), ASP FR, II, 8. CHAPTER TWELVE A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET Fauchet was rec’d. with the most profound attention by the party hereto¬ fore opposed to his country & his cause. ’Tis probable they might hope the fate of his predecessor wo’d. warn him to shun not only his errors but likewise the friends of France, upon the idea they wo’d. be the friends of Mr. Genet. . . . He must soon find that the republican party here are the only friends of that cause in his own country. . . . — James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 3, 1794. Fauchet succeeded Genet. It was a meteor following a comet. No very marked phenomena distinguished his course. But the little twinkling ap¬ pearances which here and there are discernible, indicate the same general policy in him which governed his predecessor. — Alexander Hamilton, “France,” 1796. * # * * * W„, L B Monroe labored unsuccessfully to save the French alliance, Genet’s successors in Philadelphia meddled in domestic politics to advance French objectives. They too proved unsuccessful; and their activities also contributed to the ultimate destruction of the alliance. 1 Their conduct was not motivated by the desire to alienate the American government; to the contrary, they believed that they were working to strengthen the alliance and to bind the United States more closely to France. Given the state of politics and the pro- 1 James A. James, “French Diplomacy and American Politics, 1794-1795,” Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1911 (2 vols., Washington, 1913), I, 163; Fauchet’s secretary Le Blanc considered the mission a failure; see the remarks attributed to him in Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Ouincy Adams, diary entry of July 7, 1795, I, 118-119; Joseph Fauchet, Memoire sur les Ftats Unis d’Amerique, ed., Carl L. Lokke in the AHA Ann. Rep. (1936) (3 vols., Washington, 1938), I (introduction), 85. Hereinafter cited as Lokke, Fauchet Memoire. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 393 British orientation of the Federalist government, they saw that they could not reach their objectives through the ordinary channels of diplomacy. Before resorting to propaganda and threats, Jean Antoine Joseph Fauchet, Genet’s immediate successor, tried the diplomacy of concil¬ iation to achieve French objectives. Although he held the title of minister plenipotentiary, Fauchet did not succeed to all of Genet’s powers. Believing that Genet’s “imprudent” conduct had illus¬ trated the danger of conferring powers which critically affected the interests of the French nation on one man (especially one lacking diplomatic experience) when that individual was a great distance away, the Jacobin government sent a commission of four, headed by Fauchet, to replace Genet. Under a division and balance of powers each commissioner had special functions. While Fauchet’s main concerns were politics and diplomacy, his colleague La Forest, as Consul-General, was charged with responsibility for matters of com¬ merce and finance. Le Blanc, the fifty-year old former head of the Paris police department, became Secretary of the Legation and had charge of all French consulates in American ports. Petry took over the consulate at Philadelphia, the national capital. According to instructions, the commissioners were to act in con¬ cert, with important decisions requiring majority assent. In purely political matters, Fauchet theoretically had the power to initiate action. In practice, it became almost impossible to extricate the purely political from other actions, particularly when the French governments considered that “the Consuls in the United States are not only commercial agents but also political agents in the states in which they reside.” 2 As is usual in joint diplomatic ventures, the commission almost from the first was torn by dissension. Contemporaries described La Forest and Petry as “two notorious intriguers” and Le Blanc as a man of strong opinions/ A prominent French refugee in the United States described Fauchet as “a cowardly slave to the Jacobins” 3 “Instructions to the Commissioners,” Nov. 15, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 288-291; Ferdinand M. Bayard, “Sur notre legation pres les Etats-unis de l’Amerique,” Paris, Dec. 29, ^95 (contains the quotation), AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, ff. 566-567; Gouverneur Morris to Washington, Paris, Nov. 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 398; Conway, Randolph, p. 237. "Turner, CFM, p. 289 n. 394 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE in France. 4 Gouverneur Morris believed that La Forest and Petry would probably sway the conduct of the commission. They ex¬ pected, he warned, to exert their dominance “by two means; one, their greater knowledge of our country, laws, and inhabitants; the other, a persuasion to be inculcated on the minister and secre¬ tary, that they enjoy the confidence of our Government.” 5 While the general complexion of the commission at first seemed satis¬ factory to Federalists, Francophile Republicans had doubts about it. “The political character of these gentlemen,” said Madison, “as heretofore understood, give some uneasiness to the Republican party.” 6 As titular head of the mission, Fauchet set the tone in relations with the American government. In those relations and in his per¬ sonal conduct he was at first as different from Genet as night from day. Unlike Genet, he had had no diplomatic experience, and he spoke no English. A young lawyer of thirty-three, he had been active in the French Revolution and had held a number of govern¬ mental posts of varying degrees of responsibility, thereby achieving a minor distinction. He received his American appointment from Robespierre not because of ability or experience, but as a political reward. 7 Estimates as to his abilities vary. In view of some French officials, Fauchet was a man of parts, but “a young man, and not equal to an embassy as important as that of the United States.” 8 Gouverneur Morris was told that he possessed “genius and informa¬ tion,” whereas George Hammond maintained that “he is inferior to his predecessor not less in abilities than in energy.” 9 Fauchet did not have the immediate popular appeal that Genet had. Four days after his arrival a Philadelphia newspaper remarked 4 Moreau de St. Mery, Voyage aux Etats-Unis de I'Amerique, 1793-1798, p. 295. “Morris to Washington, Paris, Nov. 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 398. 6 Madison to Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 2, 1794, in James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, published by order of Congress (4 vols., New York, 1884), II, 4. 7 Little is known of Fauchet; brief biographical sketches are in Turner, CFM, p. 288 n.; Lokke, Fauchet Memoire, p. 85; James, “French Diplomacy . . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 151-163; Conway, Randolph, p. 237. 8 Adams, Memoirs of John Ouincy Adams, diary entry of March 17, 1795, The Hague, I, 97. 8 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Feb. 22 and April 15, 1794, Henry Adams Transcripts. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 395 that he was “not of a very communicative disposition”; John Adams expressed a general estimate in stating that “he is not quite so un¬ reserved as his predecessor” and seemed distressed by popular atten¬ tion, though “the people have not addressed him or made much noise about him.” 10 Whatever Fauchet’s true abilities may have been, he had been entrusted with a difficult task. Robespierre, convinced that Great Britain was working to destroy the 1778 alliance by dividing the United States from France, saw to it that the French commission received special orders to counteract the ill effects of the Genet mis¬ sion and to re-establish good relations with the United States. 11 Yet he did not relinquish the basic objectives of French foreign policy. English influence in America must be destroyed, his govern¬ ment believed, and France’s views must be made known to the American people through the newspapers and with the co-operation of Americans devoted to the cause of liberty. At the same time Fauchet and his colleagues were instructed to win the confidence of President Washington and his Federalist government. What the Jacobins did not realize at this point was that it was impossible to attempt to destroy English influence and seek popular support, and at the same time to win the confidence of Federalists. 12 Despite these contradictory objectives, the initial instructions reflected a conciliatory and friendly attitude toward the American government. In giving positive assurances of the friendly attach¬ ment of France to the United States, the commissioners were to disavow the conduct of Genet and his agents; put a stop to priv¬ ateering; and recall the letters of marque. On the other hand, they were to see to it that the 1778 treaties were executed according to French interpretation, particularly those articles in the commercial 10 Adams to wife, March 2, 1794, in Adams, ed., Letters of John Adams Addressed to His Wife, II, 145. 11 “Rapport fait a la Convention Nationale, au nom du comite du salut public, par le citoyen Robespierre, member de ce comite Sur la situation politique de la Republique,” Nov. 17, 1793, AAE CP EU, Vol. XXXIX, ff. 279-293. In this report Robespierre denounced Genet and advocated strength¬ ening the Franco-American alliance. la Louis-Guillaume Otto, “Considerations sur la Conduite du governement des Etats unis envers la France, depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1797,” June 17, 1797, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLVII, f. 407; “Means to attack and to destroy English influence in America,” Nov. 26, 1793, ibid., Vol. XXXIX, ff. 324-325; “In¬ structions,” Nov. 15, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 288-294. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 396 treaty allowing French prizes the use of American ports while excluding English prizes. In addition, they were to induce the American government to allow French cruisers and their prizes to take refuge in American ports with the privilege of selling the prizes. In view of the French need for American commerce, the commissioners logically were also to propose a new commercial treaty, more solidly founded than that of 1778. 13 France’s most immediately important goal was the obtaining of food supplies to be sent through the English blockade to relieve shortages she could not alleviate from normal sources then con¬ trolled or blocked by France’s enemies. The French acknowledged readily their dependence on foreign sources for the needed pro¬ visions. American relations were consequently of relatively minor concern to the French war effort in their other aspects. 14 Gouver- neur Morris, pointing out that the French desire for cordiality at this time was related closely to the need for provisions of which America was the only source, noted that “everything, then, which opposes this is prejudicial to the most important interests of the [French] republic.” 10 Fauchet and his colleagues arrived in Philadelphia in February, 1794; the anti-British war hysteria was then at its height and the administration despaired over a possible war with England. For the newly arrived commissioners and for the purposes of French diplomacy this was all to the good. In case of war between the United States and England, their later instructions told them, it was essential that France profit from the crisis by proposing a new, closer alliance with the United States, an alliance which would maintain liberty in both countries, J&t the same time the commis¬ sioners were to advise conquest of Canada. 1 ^ 13 Fauchet’s powers in regard to a new commercial treaty bothered Federal¬ ists; see Wolcott, Jr., to Hamilton, Philadelphia, Oct. 6, 1795, Pickering to Wolcott, Jr., Oct. 6, 1795, in Gibbs, Wolcott Papers, I, 254-255. 14 In a circular letter, dated Paris, June 6, 1793, to French consulates in the United States, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Le Brun, had stressed France’s urgent need for provisions from America, a need which continued urgent. Genet Papers, Library of Congress. The continuing need for food is also stressed in Fauchet, La Forest, and Petry to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Dec. 30, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 525-530. 15 Morris to Washington, Paris, Nov. 12, 1793, ASP FR, I, 398-399; Morris to Deforgues, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, Dec. 9, 1793, ibid., p. 401. 18 Instructions to French Commissioners in the United States, Paris, Feb. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 397 Despite the ill will stirred up by Genet, from the start all ap¬ peared to go well for Fauchet and the objectives of the commission. His first official talks with representatives of the American govern¬ ment pleased him, as did a public expression of fraternity accom¬ panied by the playing of Ca Ira. The American government and people, it seemed, favored close ties with the French Republic. 17 Fauchet’s conduct, prudent and restrained in contrast to that of his predecessor, made, in turn, a favorable impression on administration leaders. His principal occupation, remarked George Hammond, seemed to be to efface the unfavorable impressions left by Genet and to cultivate the good will of all Americans. 18 According to a Feder¬ alist view he was “taught prudence by the follies and ill success of Genet.” 19 ^vven Republicans observed “that Fauchet is going on in the conciliatory plan of reversing the errors of his predecess or.” 2 ] 1 John Quincy Adams found him to be cautious and reserved, but 2, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XL, f. 66. Later Fauchet reported that while the people were pro-French and wanted a war against England, the American government was not prepared and wished to remain neutral; nonetheless, the United States sided with France and it was impossible for it to turn against France. [Fauchet], Note, Aug. 9, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLI, f. 274. 17 Of all the nations in the world, announced the Committee of Public Safety, free America was the only one which supported the French Revolu¬ tion. After the Swiss, America is the ally most natural and necessary for France. Politics, commerce, and the identity of civil structure all presage a permanent alliance between the two peoples. N.p., n.d. [probably Jan., 1794], AAE CP EU, Vol. XL, f. 11. Thus it was that French hopes for using the United States and strengthening the alliance were high when Fauchet landed. He landed at Baltimore on Jan. 29, 1794, but because of bad roads he took several weeks to get to the capital. Fauchet’s reception, moreover, was not all pleasantness in another respect. Before his arrival Genet had published part of his instructions, causing Fauchet considerable embarrassment; see Com¬ missioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, March 21, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 306-309, 315; Anderson, “Randolph,” in Bemis, The American Seaetaries of State. . . , II, 105; Fay, Revolutionary Spirit in France and America. . . , pp. 337-338. Later Fauchet insisted that Genet was wrong in publishing his instructions. Joseph Fauchet, A Sketch of the Present State of Our Political Relations with the United States of North America, trans. [William J. Duane] (Philadelphia, 1797), p. 22. 18 Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Feb. 22, 1794, No. 2, Henry Adams Transcripts. 10 “To the People of the United States,” No. II in the Herald: A Gazette for the Country (New York), Dec. 21, 1796. 20 Madison to Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 9, 1794, Letters and Other Writings of fames Madison (Cong, ed.), II, 6. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 398 committed to a policy of turning the United States against Great Britain: in effect, to a policy of keeping alive the alliance against England. 21 After the French minister had been in the United States a month and a half, President Washington, too, became impressed by his deportment, remarking that “the manners of Mr. Fauchet, and of Mr. Genet . . . appear to have been cast in very different moulds. The former has been temperate, and placid in all his movements, hitherto; the latter was the reverse of it in all respects. The declara¬ tions made by the former, of the friendly dispositions of his Nation towards this Country and of his own inclinations to carry them into effect are strong and apparently sincere.” 22 The press also praised Fauchet for just and honorable conduct in controversial matters dealing with problems of neutrality. Later one Federalist journal went so far as to declare that Fauchet was the best of the French ministers sent to the United States by die revolutionary OQ governments. Republicans, not without “uneasiness” and skepticism, noted the warm reception given Fauchet by Federalists, “the party heretofore opposed to his country & his cause.” Probably, observed Monroe, the fate of Genet is taken by Federalists to be sufficient warning to the new French minister to shun not only Genet’s errors “but like¬ wise the friends of France, upon the idea they wod. be the friends of Mr. Genet.” Fauchet “must soon find,” he said, “that the repub¬ lican party here are the only friends of that cause in his own coun¬ try, and that it was owing to a zeal for that cause and a belief the man was honest, that his errors were in any degree tolerated by them. As yet the conduct of Fauchet appears to be reserved and prudent, and ’tis to be hoped he will finally take a course corre- spond’g. with what the interest of his country may require.” 24 !1 Adams, Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, I, 36-38, diary entry of July n, 1794 (Philadelphia). 22 Washington to Richard Henry Lee, Philadelphia, April 15, 1794, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIII, 331. 23 Columbia Gazette (Columbia, S. C.), Aug. 1, 1794, quoting a letter of June 3, 1794, from Kingston, Jamaica; New Hampshire and Vermont Journal: Or, The Farmer’s Weekly Museum (Walpole, N. H.), Nov. 22, 1796. 21 Monroe to Jefferson, March 3, 1794, in Hamilton, The Writings of James Monroe, I, 284-285. Madison remarked that Fauchet’s demeanor had the aspect of “moderation.” “He takes particular pains to assure all who talk with him of the perseverence of France in her attachment to us, and her A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 399 Federalists from the first were pleased with Republican discomfiture over Fauchet’s replacement of Genet and their uncertainty as to Fauchet’s political orientation in the United States.' 0 Without unnecessary preliminaries, Fauchet plunged into his diplomatic tasks. As has been seen, he dealt quickly with the prob¬ lem of Genet’s disavowal and arrest and stopped the expeditions in preparation against the Spanish lands. At the same time, as Gouverneur Morris had warned, Fauchet attempted to obtain ad¬ vance payment on the debt owed France by the United States, which it was then meeting by regular installments. Plagued by lack of money and concerned over the plight of the Saint Domingue refu¬ gees, Fauchet and the commissioners hoped to relieve their financial embarrassment and to aid the refugees by obtaining from the Amer¬ ican government an advance payment of a million dollars in six months’ time. Washington, on the advice of the Cabinet, refused to make advance payment; he continued to meet the regular install¬ ments. If Fauchet insisted upon the advance payment, Randolph informed him, he could apply to Congress. The French Minister did. The result was a hot debate in the House of Representatives, which voted to make the payment, and a defeat in the Senate. Fauchet did not get the money, and the French mission remained in financial difficulty. 26 * * * * * Intimately connected with the debt payments and Fauchet’s fi¬ nancial needs was the problem of food supplies for the homeland. English naval power had driven French shipping from the seas. Unable to obtain goods on her own, France counted on neutral bottoms, protected by the small-navy doctrine of free ships make free anxiety that nothing which may have taken place may lessen it on our side,” Madison to Jefferson, Philadelphia, March 2, 1794, Letters and Other Writ¬ ings of James Madison (Cong, ed.), II, 3-4. 26 John Q. Adams to John Adams, Boston, March 2, 1794, in Ford, The Writings of John Ouincy Adams, I, 180. 26 Morris to Washington, Paris, Oct. 19, 1793, ASP FR, I, 398; for corre¬ spondence on the debt question, see pp. 427-428; for the House debate, see Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., 1st sess., May 28, 1794, pp. 727-729; May 30, 1794, p. 739. For the Senate’s action, June, 1794, see pp. 129-130; see also Anderson, “Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 106; Conway, Randolph, p. 241. Fauchet thought at first that he was going to get the million dollars. [Fauchet], Note, Aug. 9, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLI, f. 274. 400 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE goods, to bring them to her ports. In particular, she counted on American shipping; the commercial treaty of 1778 embodied this doctrine. In February, 1793, France had thrown open the ports of her colonies to American shipping. At the same time, to over¬ come crop shortages, she had made arrangements to purchase grain from the United States, purchases which she hoped to finance with payments on the Revolutionary debt owed to her. 27 Even though provisions were at times shipped to France as Amer¬ ican property, the British blockade was throttling a desperately needed supply for France and a lucrative commerce for the United States. At first the British seized American food ships bound for France on the general principal that the neutral flag did not protect commerce with France. Later, the British made their seizures under a decree of June 8, 1793, which declared corn, flour, or meal contra¬ band of war, and that any vessel loaded wholly or in part with those foodstuffs was subject to seizure. There was, however, the under¬ standing that the British would pay for the seized cargoes. This was an innovation in international maritime practice, so neutrals protested the British action. But the British persisted in the practice. They argued that France was not waging war accord¬ ing to principles of international law, that France had no recognized government, that the French authorities had taken over the trade in cereals, making that trade an act of the enemy’s government, and finally that the plan to starve France into submission was an impor¬ tant means of forcing her to make peace. 28 France wanted to strike back in kind. American ships carrying British goods, by the 1778 commercial treaty, were protected by the free-ships-free-goods principle. Great Britain was not obligated by treaty to respect the neutral character of American shipping; she had never recognized the free-ships-free-goods principle. By a decree of May 9, 1793, the French authorized their vessels to seize neutral ships carrying goods to England. Since English ships did 27 The decree of the National Convention of Feb. 19, 1793, is in ASP FR, I, 147; see “Cabinet Opinion on French Application,” Feb. 25, 1793, wherein the Cabinet advised Washington that funds be advanced to the French for purchase of provisions, in Ford, Writings of Jefferson, VI, 190; for French food purchases at this time, see Ternant to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Phila¬ delphia, Feb. 25, 1793, in Turner, CFM, pp. 178-179. 29 Heckscher, The Continental System, pp. 43-44. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 401 not respect a neutral flag, decreed the French, neither would theirs. Uncertain, however, about the wisdom of violating the American treaty, the French government responded to strong American pro¬ tests by exempting (May 23, 1793) American vessels from the decree. Finally (July 27), after experimenting with various decrees, the French did retaliate without exception by declaring that they would seize food-carrying neutral vessels bound for enemy ports. 29 As applied to the United States, this violated the 1778 commercial treaty. While acknowledging the treaty violation, the French justified it on the principle of retaliation, claiming that in this respect they were not bound by the treaty provisions. If Americans wanted French treaty compliance they would have to force the British to observe small-navy neutrality principles; in effect, they would have to fight for their neutral rights. Against British sea power Amer¬ icans were helpless and to fight to accommodate France would have been suicidal. 30 To the French, American protests and insistence upon French re¬ spect for American neutral rights as laid down by treaty were puzzling. They could not understand why Americans, as allies, could not see the French position and sympathize with the French dilemma. As allies, reasoned the French, were Americans acting in good faith when they demanded strict fulfilment of treaty obli¬ gations which had been contracted to benefit both parties and which no longer did so? Was it right to invoke against an ally a treaty 29 For details, see Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution. . . , p. 29; Phillips and Reede, Neutrality. . . , II, 27-37; most of the decrees are printed in ASP FR, III, 284-285. 30 Federalist thinking backed up the British view. One Federalist thinker explained that the free-ships-free-goods principle was recognized only by treaty where a nation had relinquished the right of search according to international law. If the nation, such as Great Britain, did not relinquish the right, it could dispute the free-ships-free-goods principle either by reasoning or by force. William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book [c. Aug. 15, 1 795 ] (Princeton). Some French legislators opposed violation of the Amer¬ ican commercial treaty, even on grounds of retaliation. Regardless of how much the treaty hurt, France, they maintained, should respect the sanctity of treaties; she should have regard for a faithful ally. The pressures of French vested interests—especially the owners of privateers—appeared, how¬ ever, to have greater influence than did the sanctity of treaties; see Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution. . . , p. 29 n. 402 ENTANGLING ALUANCE which had been basic to American independence and which had cost France much in blood and treasure? Was it right to insist upon treaty fulfilment in such a way as to injure France? Accord¬ ing to provisions of the 1778 treaty France and the United States promised each other most-favored-nation treatment; yet, reasoned the French, American laws bypassed this principle; they favored no nation. Motivated by political considerations, Congress, it ap¬ peared to the French, wished to break the 1778 treaties and to destroy the Franco-American alliance. 31 Meanwhile the United States protested British seizures. Secre¬ tary of State Jefferson in September, 1793, insisted that British cap¬ ture of food ships was “contrary to the law of nations,” that corn, flour, and meal were not contraband, and that Americans had a right to sell them to France. To restrain Americans from sending grain to France while selling it to England smacked of a partiality to Great Britain which may lead to war with France. “This is a dilemma,” he said, “which Great Britain has no right to force upon us.” Answering Jefferson’s protest, Hammond pointed out that writers on international law had stated that provisions were condi¬ tional contraband. 32 This conflict over provisions and neutral rights almost led to war with England in the spring of 1794. Final¬ ly, in January, 1794, through a mitigating Order-in-Council, the British eased their food seizures. 33 During this time, even though Americans directed their anger primarily against Great Britain, commercial grievances against France also continued to mount as American merchants suffered at the hands of the French Revolutionary governments. An em¬ bargo laid upon foreign vessels in Bordeaux in the summer of 1793 had a crippling effect on Franco-American commerce. In protesting their treatment, American ship captains stranded in Bor¬ deaux pointed out that they had braved great dangers to bring 81 These views are taken from “Observations sur la neutralite des Etats- Unis,” AAE CP EU (no author or date indicated, but probably spring, 1793), Vol. XXXVII, ff. 270-273. 83 Jefferson to Pinckney, Philadelphia, Sept. 7, 1793, ASP FR, II, 239-240; Hammond to Jefferson, Philadelphia, Sept. 12, 1793, ibid., p. 240. 88 The order of Jan. 8, 1794, is printed in ibid., Ill, 264. This order, along with the Jay treaty, contributed to bringing about an Anglo-American rapprochement. Letter from London of Aug. 22, 1794, in the Maryland Gazette, Oct. 30, 1794. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 403 needed supplies to French ports and in return had received hostile Q4 treatment. When Fauchet arrived in Philadelphia to launch his quest for food supplies, the Bordeaux embargo was still in effect. At that time poor harvests and the British food blockade (supported by allies Russia and Spain, who closed their ports to the French), plus other factors, had produced a severe food shortage in France. Famine threatened Paris. More than ever the French needed American provisions. Fauchet and his colleagues bent every effort to get them. Seeing that the Bordeaux embargo raised a serious obstacle to success—he encountered difficulty getting American ships to carry provisions to France because of it—Fauchet complained to his superiors about it, pleading for the release of detained Amer¬ ican vessels. 35 His pleas were heeded. The French government, in April, 1794, lifted the embargo. In so doing the Committee of Public Safety announced that its action was new proof of French friendship for the United States. The action, for a while at least, removed one American grievance against France. 36 Yet some bitterness lingered. While American cap¬ tains in Bordeaux obtained partial reimbursement for their losses, they and others too often ran into further complications in ob¬ taining payment for the food cargoes they brought to French ports. 37 Despite these and other difficulties Fauchet gathered ships and supplies to send to hungry France. So urgent was the French need 34 Gouverneur Morris had protested the embargo and had been promised daily that it would be removed. He was never able to learn why it had been laid. He suspected that the French were suspicious of the voyages, cargoes, and even of the property of some of the American vessels in Bordeaux. To Jefferson, Paris, Jan. 21, 1794, ASP FR, I, 403; for American complaints, see ibid., pp. 373-374; for a discussion of the Bordeaux embargoes (there was a second embargo in 1794), see Clauder, American Commerce as Affected by the Wars of the French Revolution. . . , pp. 38-41. 36 Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, April 4, 1794, May 24, 1794, Turner, CFM, pp. 320-321, 348; James, “French Diplo¬ macy. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 155-156. 311 “Rapport,” AAE CP EU, [n.p., n.d., probably Jan., 1794], Vol. XL, f. 3; Le charge provisoire du Dept, des affaires etrangeres to Gouverneur Morris, Paris, April 6, 1794, announces the decree of the Committee of Public Safety lifting the embargo. 37 For continued American grievances and the 1794 embargo, see Monroe to the Secretary of State, Paris, Sept. 15, 1794, ASP FR, I, 675; Fulwar Skip- with to Monroe, Paris, Oct., 1794, ibid., 749-752. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 4°4 that the Paris authorities did not dare risk piecemeal capture of flour-laden vessels from America; instead of trying to run the Eng¬ lish blockade with individual vessels they resorted to a convoy sys¬ tem. To guard the convoy, which was to assemble in the United States, the French authorities sent along with Fauchet and the com¬ missioners a small squadron of warships under the command of Rear Admiral Pierre-Jean Vanstabel. In February, 1794, the squad¬ ron anchored in Chesapeake Bay, there to await the gathering of the convoy from various ports in the United States and from the French Caribbean islands. 38 With all means at their disposal Fauchet and the commissioners bought foodstuffs and supplies and stored them in vessels in the various ports, vessels which were to rendezvous with Vanstabel’s ships in Hampton Roads to run the English blockade. After un¬ nerving difficulties and delays, the cargo holds were filled and the ships gathered, about 130 strong, to sail under the protecting guns of Vanstabel’s meager squadron. Loaded with some 24,000,000 pounds of flour, toward the middle of April they sailed past the Virginia Capes to precipitate the only major naval battle in the first four years of the Anglo-French war. To get the provisions safely into port, the French risked their battle fleet, sending it to challenge England’s control of the sea if the convoy were in danger. In drawing the British channel fleet from the convoy route the French admiral on June 1—the “Glorious First of June,” the British called it—suffered a terrible mauling. The sacrifice was not in vain. On June 13 the Franco-American convoy reached Brest without the loss of a single vessel, and Amer¬ ican grain helped avert a famine. 39 38 Vanstabel’s squadron, consisting on one 80-gun ship, one of 74 guns, and two 40-gun frigates plus two sloops of war arrived at Norfolk on February 10. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Feb. 20, 1794, No. 1, Henry Adams Transcripts. 38 For general accounts of the convoy problem and the ensuing naval battle, see Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, IJ89-1812 (2 vols., Boston, 1892), I, 122-161; Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes in Wartime. . . , pp. 71-73; for Fauchet’s activities and complaints in preparing the convoy, see Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, March 18, 21, to Minister of Marine, March 21, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 305, 307, 319-320. In July reports reached the United States of the merchant fleet’s safe arrival. Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), July 17, 1794. In autumn, 1794, the French government sent a special pur- A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 405 During the time the convoy was forming, anti-British agitation in the Congress came to a head. In the latter part of March Con¬ gress debated and finally enacted the thirty-day general embargo mentioned in an earlier chapter, and then extended it for another thirty days, to May 25. While Congress discussed the embargo, which was directed primarily against Great Britain, Fauchet kept in close touch with pro-French congressmen. When passage of the embargo seemed certain “many members of Congress” dis¬ cussed it with him and asked when the food convoy would be ready to sail, indicating that for France’s benefit declaration of the embargo might be postponed until the sailing date. 40 There was, however, no postponement, although the Franco-American convoy did not sail until several weeks after the embargo had been estab¬ lished. This did not escape British notice. Hammond complained that the embargo was discriminatory because it was not enforced against the convoy; he maintained it should have been. Secretary of State Randolph disclaimed partiality in its enforcement. 41 As the terminal date for the embargo approached, Fauchet, too, turned against it. If continued and enforced, he realized, it might prevent the sending of other vessels to France, vessels for a convoy he had begun to provision in May. He pointed out to friends in Congress that if they extended the embargo again it would harm France, which depended upon American supplies, more than it would England, against whom it was directed originally. Finally, for various reasons, among them a concern over its adverse effect on the Franco-American alliance, the House of Representatives reversed its stand on the embargo. Fauchet claimed that his efforts had influenced the change. 42 -U- -V- -V- W- '7V' '7V' '7V' TV* 'TV' chasing agent, James Swan, to the United States to buy food supplies. For Swan’s activities, which were considerable during Fauchet’s ministry, see Howard C. Rice, “James Swan: Agent of the French Republic, 1794-1796,” New England Quarterly, X, 473-480. 40 Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, March 21, 1794, in Turner, CFM, p. 317; for a discussion of the embargo and its ex¬ tension, see Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., 1st sess., April 17, 1794, PP- 597-598. 41 Hammond to Randolph, Philadelphia, May 22, 1794, and Randolph to Hammond, Philadelphia, June 2, 1794, ASP FR, I, 462, 465. 4S Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 29, l 7 94> ' n Turner, CFM, pp. 357-360; for the congressional debates on the 406 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Fauchet at first tried to avoid politics and attempted to main¬ tain a “just equilibrium” between Federalists and Republicans. Where possible he sought to keep in the good graces of the Wash¬ ington administration. As he observed political developments more closely—the debates in Congress, the British and French orientation of the political parties—and particularly as he came to realize that the government and Senate were dominated by pro-British Hamil¬ tonians, his attitude changed. In assessing his own position he turned, as Monroe had predicted he would, to the pro-French Jeffer¬ sonians for support. Like Genet before him, he began to distinguish between the American people—the majority of whom be believed were pro-French Revolution—and the Federalist government, which he became convinced was pro-English. 43 In this distinction his judgment appeared sound. Most Americans appeared still drawn to the French Revolution and favored close ties with France. In mid-summer 1794 many Americans celebrated the anniversary of the French Revolution. Raising their glasses for the fifteenth time, imbibers at one festive gathering drank to the toast: “Perpetual union between France and America—May the distress of either nation increase the friendship, and call forth the aid of the other.” 44 At this time dissension and intrigue within the commission mul¬ tiplied Fauchet’s problems. He broke with La Forest and Petry, suspecting them of intriguing with Hamilton and Henry Knox. He and Le Blanc, as a consequence, began a separate correspondence with the home government in which they represented the Washing¬ ton government as sold out to England, Genet as being unjustly persecuted, and their colleagues as being Royalist counterrevolution¬ aries. 45 embargo’s extension see Annals of the Congress. . . , 3rd Cong., 1st sess., May 12, 1794, pp. 675-683; May 29, 1794, pp. 731-734. Congress on June 4, 1794, authorized the President “to lay, regulate, and revoke Embargoes” during the intermission of Congress, ibid., Appendix, p. 1450. 48 For Fauchet’s and the Commissioners’ early attitude toward the Amer¬ ican government, see their despatch, Philadelphia, March 21, 1794, in Turner, CEM, p. 316; for manifestations of change in attitude, see Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 5, 1794, ibid., pp. 330-334; James, “French Diplomacy. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 158. 44 Columbia Gazette (Columbia, S. C.), Aug. x, 1794. The celebration took place in Camden, S. C. 4 " For Fauchet’s suspicions of his colleagues, see his despatches to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 4, 8, 1794, Philadelphia, in Turner, CFM, pp. 372- A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 407 Although now distrustful of the Washington administration, which he saw correctly as subject to Hamilton’s views, and though he now consorted with its political enemies, Fauchet tried to main¬ tain a close touch with it through Edmund Randolph, the only non-Federalist still remaining in Washington’s official family. Ran¬ dolph, declared Fauchet, exhibited the greatest desire to increase Franco-American unity. In “free and friendly conversations” the two men collaborated to maintain this unity. They talked over various measures in advance, agreed upon the steps to be taken, and even sent each other advance copies of letters and communications, “before sending them officially.” They consulted with each other and discussed whatever measures they believed might have either a favorable or adverse effect upon relations between their two coun¬ tries. 46 While it lasted the collaboration had the earmarks of a counterpoise, in part at least, to the Hamilton-Hammond collabora¬ tion. Randolph, however, never gained any real influence in the Washington government; so the French pipeline into the Cabinet from the start was of dubious utility. 47 Among the various factors which complicated Fauchet’s mission were the influence and activities of monarchical antirevolutionary French refugees from the colonies and from France, pressures from Republican politicians who would use him for local political advan¬ tage, Federalist hatred and distrust, activities and influence of the better-financed British diplomatists, intrigues among the members of his own mission, and finally the neglect he suffered from his home government. In comparison to the effect of the Jay treaty upon Franco-American relations, these were relatively minor irri¬ tants. 48 With development of the Jay negotiations whatever rap- 373, 389-390, also p. 717 n.; Louis-Guillaume Otto, “Considerations sur le Con- duite du government des Etats unis envers la France depuis 1789 jusqu’en 1797,” AAE CP EU, [June 17, 1797], Vol. XLVII, f. 407. 48 Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 5, 1794, in Turner, CFM, p. 333; Anderson, “Randolph,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 107. 47 Fauchet characterized Randolph as an “excellent” though “weak charac¬ ter,” a partisan of the French Revolution, a man whose secrets were easy to penetrate, and a great aid in helping to foil the machinations of Hamilton. To Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, June 4, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 276-277. 48 In his correspondence, Fauchet touched on all these problems, see ibid.. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 408 port Fauchet still had in die American government was dissipated. Federalists reversed their attitude toward him; some saw him as the devil incarnate. Even though Fauchet’s suspicions of Federalist designs had been aroused with the first announcement of the Jay mission and though he tried from the beginning to counteract any influence adverse to France which it might generate, he at first labeled the mission “in¬ significant.” America’s destiny was, he felt, bound to that of France. 49 His immediate fears had been that an accommodation * with England would lead to closer Anglo-American commercial ties and so frustrate French policy. These fears motivated his efforts to influence the appointment of the London envoy; he wanted the post to fall to someone who favored the French alliance. In particu¬ lar, he did what he could to thwart the selection of so outspoken an Anglophile as Hamilton. Once Jay was appointed, his concerns centered on finding out what his instructions were. 50 Although Randolph assured him that there was nothing disad¬ vantageous to France in the Jay mission, Fauchet’s doubts increased. The mission was no longer “insignificant”; any Anglo-American rapprochement posed a threat to the French alliance. He pressed the Secretary of State for specific information. Finally, on the advice of the President, Randolph revealed a part of Jay’s instruc¬ tions to Fauchet—to give “proof” that “Mr. Jay cannot enter into a negotiation contrary to what we owe to France. . . .” He accom¬ panied this with professions of friendship for France, asserting that the two allies should draw closer together and that lovers of liberty supported France while “the partisans of slavery prefer an alliance with England.” 51 pp. 287-719; for a discussion of problems and recommendations, see Lokke, Fauchet Memoire, pp. 85-119. 40 Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 27, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 353-354; James, “French Diplomacy. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 159. 60 Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 17, 1794, in Turner, CFM, p. 343; Lokke, Fauchet Memoire, p. 106; for Fauchet’s oppo¬ sition to Hamilton expressed apparently through Randolph, see Rufus King’s memorandum of April 13, 1794, in King, Rufus King Correspondence, I, 519-520. 61 Commissioners to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, May 27, 1794, and Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, June 4, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 354, 374-375; Conway, Randolph, p. 245. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 409 As further evidence of American good will Randolph at the same time took up the question of a new commercial treaty which Fauchet had introduced previously. Randolph pointed out that the time was favorable for discussion of the treaty in question. In the next Congress pro-French elements would probably be stronger than the pro-British faction, and in the meantime public opinion could be cultivated by planting articles favorable to a new treaty in the press. 52 The treaty was never to be negotiated. With Fauchet’s apprehensions aroused and mounting, honeyed words and a partial revelation of Jay’s instructions were meager palliatives. The French minister, not trusting Petry and La Forest, who he believed were compromising the interests of the French Republic, sent Le Blanc to France to inform government authorities directly that France was being deceived by the American govern¬ ment, and advised them to take “instant measures” to foil the American design. 53 The air of mystery covering the Jay negotiations and signs of British concessions to the United States tended to confirm Fauchet’s grave fears that an Anglo-American commercial system was in the making. That the American government was pro-British became in the words of Edmund Randolph “a copious theme with him.” 54 After Fauchet heard that Jay had signed a treaty and learned something of its general purport, though not its precise content, he came to believe that Jay’s instructions had been marked by considerable leeway in negotiation and that the resulting treaty was inimical to French interest. Regardless of this diplomatic set¬ back he still believed that France must attempt to maintain the 68 Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 4, 1794, and to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 13, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 375-376, 638. When Jay left for London Madison and Monroe urged Fauchet to negotiate a new Franco-American commercial treaty. 68 See Le Blanc to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, [Sept. 3, 1794], and Fauchet to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Sept. 16, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 410-411, 421-422; James, “French Diplomacy. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 160; as a result of Fauchet’s complaints the powers of La Forest and Petry ultimately were revoked; they were accused of “aristoc¬ racy and misdemeanors”; see Turner, CFM, p. 717 n.; James A. James, “French Opinion as a Factor in Preventing War between France and the United States, 1795-1800,” American Historical Review, XXX (Oct., 1924), 44 - 45 - 64 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Sept. 25, 1794, ASP FR, I, 678. 410 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE alliance and with it her influence over the United States. He there¬ fore suggested that French attacks against American shipping be stopped and that the French government intercede with Spain that the Mississippi might be opened to Americans. The latter course, he believed, might also be a step toward once again securing Louisi¬ ana. 50 Fauchet, in fact, made control of Louisiana a central factor in “a lasting system to be followed by France towards the United States.” He developed this idea in a plan he sent to his superiors. In his view, the American alliance, because of the Jay treaty, was worthless. Even though France might wish to enforce American compliance with her policy, she had not the means to do so; the United States was not only free from French control, France was dependent on die United States. The French Caribbean colonies, which relied for food upon the United States, were hostages in American hands. War against the United States would not bring American policy into line; it would close off trade essendal to France and would sacrifice the hostage colonies. The best means of keeping America faithful to the alliance, Fau¬ chet suggested, would be to acquire Louisiana. This would furnish France with raw materials and a market for manufacturers and would free the West Indies from dependence on the United States. Through possession of Louisiana France would control the Missis¬ sippi and through judicious use of pressure could control the western growdi of the nation. France then could influence American policy; the alliance could be enforced; no more would it be subject to the caprices of American politics. 56 Fauchet’s reasoning on Louisiana was more than the musing of 60 Fauchet to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Nov. 19, 1794, and Commissioners to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 2, 1794, in Turner, CFM, pp. 482, 551-553; James, “French Diplo¬ macy. . . , AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 160. According to earlier instructions Fauchet and the Commissioners were to inform the American government that negotiation with Spain to open the Mississippi was incompatible with the Franco-American alliance. Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley. . . ,” AHR, X, 264-265. 68 Fauchet to Commissioner of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 4, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 559-571; Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley. . . ,” AHR, X, 265-266; Darling, Our Rising Em¬ pire. . . , pp. 194-195; see also E. Wilson Lyon, Louisiana in French Diplo¬ macy, 1759-1804, pp. 88-89. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 411 a minor diplomatic official; it typified French policy. Although France was still at war with Spain and although it had given up efforts to wrench the territory from Spain by force, the French gov¬ ernment had not abandoned its designs on Louisiana. In the ensu¬ ing peace negotiations the French argued that a restitution of Louisi¬ ana to France would be of great advantage to Spain. It would place a powerful nation between the United States and Spain’s American possessions, a barrier which would end the indignities long endured by Spain at the hands of American frontiersmen. 5 ' But even though it might be controlled by an ally, the United States did not want such a buffer colony on its Western borders. If France per¬ sisted in her policy of acquisition of Louisiana, the United States and France could not for long remain allies. French suspicions of die Jay treaty mounted. Randolph con¬ tinued to assure Fauchet that there was nothing harmful to France in the Jay agreement; even Madison sought to calm Fauchet’s fears on that score. Despite the soft words the Frenchman protested bitterly the secrecy enshrouding the treaty. He was consoled by one development which he felt embarrassed the executive: the treaty would apparently arrive too late to be considered by Congress in its current session. The next Congress, he believed, would have fewer of the British “faction” in it. That, at least, augured well for France. 58 Up to this time, Fauchet continued to stand well with the Amer¬ ican authorities. When they learned that as a result of the fall of Robespierre and the Jacobins he was to be replaced by Pierre Aug¬ uste Adet, Randolph expressed regret that the hitherto “acceptable” Fauchet was to be recalled. Although it was unfortunate that a change of party should mean a change of minister, he felt that “the only thing which essentially concerns us, is, that the representative of the French republic in the United States should lay aside all intrigue, and imitate ourselves in a course of plain and fair deal¬ ing.” 59 67 Le comite salut public a Barthelemy, Paris, May 10, 1795; May 12, 1795 (Instructions), in Kaulec, Rapiers de Barthelemy, VI, 11-12, 14; Lokke, Fauchet Memoire, p. 119 and n. 68 Fauchet to Commissioners of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 8, 16, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 573, 578-581. 68 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, Feb. 15, 1795, ASP FR, I, 696; Ham- 412 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Within a few weeks things changed. On March 8 Jay and his treaty reached Philadelphia. 60 As Fauchet had surmised, they came too late for the current congressional session; Washington, however, called a special session for June 8 to consider the treaty. A few days after the treaty arrived it became, as we have seen, a public issue, touching off a violent newspaper battle as to its terms, still held secret. 01 In Madison’s words, “its contents have produced conjec¬ tural comments without number.” He and other Republican lead¬ ers, nevertheless, had a fairly clear idea of what the treaty contained. As did Fauchet, Madison hoped that it would be impossible for any stipulations “inconsistent with the Treaties with France” to be put into effect. He saw, however, a clear possibility “diat articles may be included that will be ominous to the confidence and cordi¬ ality of France towards the United States. . . .” 62 The Federalists had no faith in French cordiality. Opposed to the French alliance, they believed it would drag the country into a war from which nothing could be gained and much lost. They were convinced that French interest in the 1778 alliance and in Amer¬ ican friendship was predicated on the policy of making the United States a cat’s paw in the struggle against Great Britain. John Quincy Adams, for example, expressed those views to his father, the Vice-President. From his ministerial post at The Hague he warned that it was French policy to make use of the United States as it was making use of the Dutch provinces, “that is, as an instrument for the benefit of France, as a passive weapon in her hands against her most formidable enemy.” As to the Jay treaty, he warned, “the whole French influence in America will exert itself mond maintained that Admiral Vanstabel denounced Fauchet to the National Convention, thus leading to his recall. To Grenville, Philadelphia, Nov. 12, 1794, No. 34, Henry Adams Transcripts. Despite the changes in France many Americans still identified French republicanism with liberty and main¬ tained that America’s future happiness depended on the success of the repub¬ lic. Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, March 17, 1795. eo For Fauchet’s views on Jay’s return, see Commissioners to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, May 31, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 701-703. 61 See William Cobbett, “Popular Proceedings Relative to the British Treaty,” Porcupine’s Worlds (12 vols., London, 1801), II, 233-245. Cobbett, violent Federalist editor, believed that Randolph had divulged the treaty terms to Republicans before Jay’s arrival, hence his clamor, pp. 238-239. 62 Madison to Monroe, Philadelphia, March 26, 1795, Letters and Other Writings of fames Madison (Cong, ed.), II, 40-42. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 4 X 3 with more than usual activity to prevent the ratification of the treaty. . . He was convinced that France “at all events” wanted war between England and the United States. Why? Because, he continued, the French “are sensible of how much importance our commerce is to Great Britain, and suppose that die loss of it would make that nation outrageous for peace, and compel the Minister to make it upon the terms they are disposed to dictate.” French friendship, “tender sympathy,” and “amiable fraternity,” even if the Jay treaty were not ratified, he concluded, were dangerous; French policy was designed to sacrifice American interests to those of France. 63 JL TP TP TV IP TP With the Jay treaty a fact, with his pending recall known, and discouraged by lack of instructions, Fauchet felt that he could do little that would be effective to oppose consummation of die treaty. 64 Administration support for it, particularly the prestige of Washing¬ ton, appeared too powerful to be overcome. In this predicament he looked forward eagerly to Adet’s arrival, believing that the new minister with fresh powers could decisively influence the Senate’s action. While awaiting Adet he tried as best he could to block the treaty’s approval in the Senate. He hoped that in spite of the ma¬ jority in the Senate which had backed the Jay mission there still might be sufficient votes in that body to stop approval. All that was needed for the Senate to reject the treaty, he reported to his government, was eleven out of the then thirty votes. 65 At this time, e * John Q. Adams to John Adams, The Hague, May 22, 1795, in Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, I, 353-363. John Adams passed some of his son’s letters on to President Washington, who read them. Of the letter quoted the President remarked that it “discloses much important infor¬ mation, and political foresight.” Washington to John Adams, Philadelphia, Aug. 30, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 279. Another prominent Federalist saw in French designs and tampering with American politics the objective of partitioning the United States. William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, July 28, 1795 (Princeton). 64 Fauchet and the Commissioners complained constantly that they were placed in an embarrassing position, maintaining that they received no official despatches, letters, papers, bulletins, or decrees of the Convention. English agents in contrast, they pointed out, were kept informed of developments regularly and they managed to monopolize the American press. Fauchet and Commissioners to the Commission of Foreign Relations, Sept. 1, 1794, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLI, f. 332. Commissioners to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, June 9, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 707-710; Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address,” AHR, 4 M ENTANGLING ALLIANCE too, Fauchet assessed France’s position relative to the United States. In his analysis he reported that the political connection as it then existed was practically useless; the American government had shirked its obligations to France. “The treaty of alliance and the reciprocal guarantee which it contained,” he said, “was completely nullified.” 66 Meanwhile Fauchet informed the Federalist administration of his dissatisfaction with developments. After trying once more to secure the treaty terms from Randolph and failing, he turned pub¬ licly to the Republicans, “the partisans of France,” for support. They represented, he was convinced, the great majority of the American people. 6 ' Fauchet had protested bitterly to the American government that it had violated the 1778 treaties, rendered the alliance mean¬ ingless, and had interpreted the commercial treaty in favor of Eng¬ land. Alluding to the Jay treaty, he reminded the Secretary of State “that France is uneasy.” Randolph replied in a stinging let¬ ter in which he said “in the name of the President” that “our treaties with France shall be sacred.” Fauchet responded that there was “a contradiction between the promises and the perform¬ ance of them” and “that the United States had not yet established their neutrality upon as respectable a footing as France desired, and had instructed me to demand.” The professed friendship of the United States toward France “does not permit them to alter their situation towards our most mortal enemies, to our disadvantage, and amidst hostilities, the origin of which undoubtedly date from the independence of America.” He concluded by requesting that the Jay treaty not be ratified until his successor arrived and pre¬ sented his instructions on the situation. 68 XXXIX, 256-257; James, “French Diplomacy. . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (19x1), I, 161. “ Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 19, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 649-650. 87 Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 24, 1795, in ibid., pp. 662-663. 88 Commissioners to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, March 16, 1795, and Fauchet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 24, 1795, ibid., pp. 605-606, 662-663; Fauchet to Randolph, Philadelphia, May 2, 1795, Randolph to Fauchet, Dept, of State, May 29, 1795, and Fauchet to Randolph, Philadelphia, June 8, 1795, ASP FR, I, 608-617; James, “French Diplomacy . . . ,” AHA Ann. Rep. (1911), I, 161-162; Conway, Randolph, p. 248. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 4 r 5 In administration eyes Fauchet had thrown off his mask; he was revealed as akin to Genet in his defiant attitude. Like Achilles, he now sulked in his tent, ignoring usual diplomatic amenities and consorting primarily with Republicans. He no longer visited Ran¬ dolph, whom he now distrusted; and he stayed away from President Washington’s receptions. He claimed shattered health as one ex¬ cuse for his attitude, yet managed to attend Republican celebrations. At a Philadelphia civic festival celebrating a French victory, the “surrender of Holland to liberty,” he addressed the crowd, stressing that “alliances between free peoples were like vows taken by men of virtue” and were not suited to evil doers and perverts, that free peoples would not accept as allies despots who war on nations which seek to break their chains. 69 After such appeals, Fauchet’s last letter to Randolph struck Fed¬ eralists so much as an appeal to the people against the Jay treaty that the administration saw in his protests “an approbation of Mr. Genet’s excesses.” Randolph therefore made clear the government’s position relative to the French minister and to the Jay treaty. While admitting that “a foreign minister has a right to remonstrate with the Executive to whom he is accredited, upon any of those mea¬ sures affecting his country,” he cautioned that “it will ever be denied as a right of a foreign minister, that he should endeavor, by an address to the people, oral or written, to forestall a depending measure, or to defeat one which has been decided.” Such, he concluded, “is an assertion of the sovereignty of the United States, consistent with what is past, and we trust not likely to be contra¬ dicted hereafter.” Fauchet did not receive this letter. It was de¬ livered to his successor. 70 ***** Although his mission was officially closed after Pierre Auguste *® Randolph to Monroe, July 29, 1795, quoted in Lokke, Fauchet Memoire, p. 117 n.; see also p. 86; Victor Dupont to Commissioner of Foreign Rela¬ tions, [March, 1795 1 and a notice on the Philadelphia Civic Festival, April 6, 1795, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIII, ff. 93, 431-432. Fauchet’s dissatisfaction with the Federalist government was not a sudden reversal; he expressed such sentiments openly and in strong language well before the arrival of the Jay treaty. Hammond to Grenville, Philadelphia, Nov. 12, 1794, No. 34, Henry Adams Transcripts. 70 Randolph to Fauchet, Dept, of State, June 13, 1795, ASP FR, I, 620; Commissioners to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, June 9, 1795, in Turner, CFM, p. 708; Conway, Randolph, p. 248. 416 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Adet took over in the middle of June, 1795, Fauchet’s influence on Franco-American relations and on American politics, for ill or good, did not cease. Up to this point, although Fauchet’s conduct had been galling to the administration and to highly placed Federalists, it had not excited public attention.' 1 In comparison to Genet he had lacked color, fire, qualities which could arouse the public. Be¬ fore he left for France all this changed. Fauchet became the cen¬ tral figure in the tragic, Federalist-executed disgrace of Randolph. With dramatic suddenness he was limelighted as a plotting Machia¬ vellian manipulating American politics to advance the selfish inter¬ ests of France. British capture of his despatch No. 10, according to Federalists, was “a kind of interposition of heaven, by almost a miracle”; it revealed the treachery of anti-Federalists and stripped Fauchet of his disguise, revealing that he conspired to overthrow the Constitution, and to separate “all of the western country from the Atlantic States.”' 2 As used astutely by Federalists, the ill-fated de¬ spatch damaged the French alliance. It also stained the Republican party, appearing to compromise some of its main leaders. Point¬ ing out that, if unexplained, the despatch profited the English fac¬ tion in the United States, Adet urged Fauchet to give Randolph an explanatory certificate which would meet the criticisms.' 3 Fauchet had broken with Randolph; nonetheless he supplied the explanation. Randolph, after all, was the only member of the government who had opposed the Jay treaty and the only one who in any way inclined toward France instead of England. Fauchet declared that Randolph had not sold out his country for French gold.' 4 To Federalists, of course, such testimony from a discredited and distrusted diplomat in defense of a tainted Secretary of State was not acceptable. “Fauchet’s letter,” remarked one Federalist, “read it with disgust—clearly the French Govt, by their ministers here have had much to do in our parties agt. govt, for three years, or since Genet’s time.” 10 71 See, for example, W. Bradford to Hamilton, Philadelphia, May 21, 1795, in Hamilton, ed., Hamilton’s Wor\s, VI, 1. 72 “To the People of the United States,” No. II, The Herald: A Gazette for the Country (New York), Dec. 21, 1796. 78 Adet to Fauchet, Aug. 20, 1795, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, f. 265. '‘Fauchet’s explanation is in Conway, Randolph, pp. 319-321. 76 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, [Dec. 5, 1795] (Princeton). A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET ' 4*7 Another postmission episode which added to growing Franco- American bitterness was the British attempt to capture Fauchet and his papers as he sailed for France. The French frigate Medusa, which was to transport Fauchet, had been bottled up in Newport harbor by a British warship of the line, the Africa. Captain Rod¬ ham Home of the Africa, while patroling outside the harbor, stopped several American ships, plucking seamen from their decks. As he hovered he was irked particularly by the fact that he could not re¬ claim seamen at liberty on shore while the French captain, as a matter of treaty right, could. Regardless of treaty or American neutrality Home resolved he should receive the same treatment at American hands as did the French. In an ultimatum of July i, 1795, he so informed the Rhode Island authorities. 76 The extent of Home’s contempt for American neutrality became clear the next day. From New York Fauchet had taken passage on an American coastal sloop, the Peggy, bound for Newport. For¬ tunately for the French diplomat, the Peggy was held up by con¬ trary winds. Leaving most of his baggage aboard but taking his most important papers, he left her in a Connecticut port and pro¬ ceeded north by land. When the Peggy neared Newport she was stopped while in American territorial waters by a shot across her bow from the Africa and searched by Home’s men. Not finding Fauchet, they went through his trunks, scattered his belongings, and left with the few papers they were able to find. Under cover of fog, the Medusa with Fauchet aboard slipped out to sea and Fauchet reached France unscathed but burning with resentment against the United States. 77 The French government in the person of Adet protested that “the neutrality of the United States, and the law of nations, have just been violated in the most serious manner,” that the French 70 Home’s ultimatum was in form of a letter to the British vice-consul in Newport to be delivered to the governor of Rhode Island; see Home to J. W. Moore, July 31, 1795, ASP FR, I, 667. 77 For eyewitness accounts of this episode, see the affidavits reproduced in ibid., pp. 662-663; f° r odier accounts see Pickering to Phineas Bond, Sept. 2, 1795, in Pickering, The Life of Timothy Pickering, III, 233-237; McMaster, A History of the People of the United States. . . , II, 234-235; Henry J. Ford, “Timothy Pickering,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 183-184. The Medusa was described as a “remarkable swift sailer.” Mary¬ land Gazette (Annapolis), Sept. 17, 1795. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 418 Republic had been “outraged,” and, in effect, that the American government was derelict in not affording Fauchet the protection to which he was entitled under international law. To compensate for the “insult” he requested a “reparation proportioned to the outrage committed towards the republic of France on the person of my predecessor.” Adet pointed out also that the menaces of Captain Home, his use of Newport harbor as a station from which to cruise against French shipping, and his demands for advantages similar to those granted by treaty to the French violated Washing¬ ton’s neutrality proclamation, international law, and the French treaties. The Jay treaty, he had been assured, did not weaken those with France; if the United States did not take steps against the British arrogance and violations, he queried, “of what value are the friendship and treaties which connect” the French and American peoples? 78 After some delay, during which the Medusa made her escape with Fauchet aboard, the Washington administration took action against the aggressive British sea captain, ordering him from American waters. Washington then feared that the French and their “parti- zans” would maintain “that the order was never intended to be issued until it was known there would be nothing for it to operate upon.” Without the requisite force, actually, the American govern¬ ment could have done little. Its demands upon Home and the British government were ineffectual. The most decisive coun¬ termeasure taken was to revoke the exequatur of the British vice- consul in Rhode Island who had co-operated with Home in “grossly insulting” the authority of the American government. 79 Such retaliation was not deemed satisfactory by the French gov¬ ernment. As we have seen, when it notified Monroe that the Amer¬ ican alliance was no longer in effect, the Directory listed this episode as the second major specific complaint against the conduct of the American government. It charged that the “outrage” against the 78 Adet to Randolph, Philadelphia, Aug. 10, 19, 1795, ASP FR, I, 662, 665. Inasmuch as Randolph left office on August 19, Adet’s last letter went to Pickering; see also Adet’s report to the Committee of Public Safety, Phila¬ delphia, Aug. 25, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 772-773. 79 Pickering to Adet, Dept, of State, Sept. 5, 1795, and to Gov. Fenner of Rhode Island, same date, ASP FR, I, 665-666; other pertinent documents are reproduced on pp. 666-667; Washington to the Acting Secretary of State, Elkton, Sept. 9, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 302. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 419 French republic had been committed with “impunity.” Monroe at that time answered that the punishment inflicted by the United States was “an adequate one for the offence,” pleading that as the United States had no fleet “it was the only one in our power to inflict” 80 * * * # * Although it had begun auspiciously and though, in Hamilton’s words, “no very marked phenomena distinguished” it, Fauchet’s mission ended with Franco-American relations approaching a break¬ ing point. When Fauchet arrived he found the United States on the verge of war with England, French hopes for an American foreign policy and neutrality favorable to French designs seemed within reach, Federalist policy faced destruction, and Republicans and Francophiles were jubilant. When he escaped into the fog of Newport harbor, without, in Washington’s idiom, “the most favor¬ able impressions of the views of the government towards his own,” a reversal had taken place. 81 The Jay treaty had begun an Anglo- American rapprochement which carried the seeds of war with France. Federalist policy had triumphed, Republicans were en¬ raged, French policy toward the United States had failed, and the French alliance appeared shorn of meaning. The French government recognized the dangerous state of its relations with the United States. The position of France, ad¬ mitted the Committee of Public Safety, was that of a neglected ally, “one which is betrayed and despoiled with impunity.” The United States, the Committee complained, continually evaded its obliga¬ tions under the alliance. Blame for this state of affairs, obviously, rested with England, and, specifically, with the English party in the United States. 82 Only if Federalist power could be broken might the alliance be salvaged. This had not been the French view of Federalists at the begin¬ ning of the Fauchet mission. At first Fauchet had tried to get 80 Delacroix to Monroe, Paris, March n, 1796, ASP FR, I, 732; Monroe to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris, March 15, 1796, ibid., p. 734. 81 Washington’s quotation is from Washington to Acting Secretary of State, Elkton, Sept. 9, 1795, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 3 02 ; 2 82 Le comite de salut public a Barthelemy, Paris, Sept. 16, 1795, in Kaulec, Papiers de Barthelemy, VI, 151. 420 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE along with the administration and its Federalist supporters, and they in turn greeted him warmly. Now even Randolph, with un¬ derstandable bitterness, was convinced that “Fauchet has wrapped himself round with intrigue from the first moment of his career in the United States.” S3 Party chieftain Hamilton now saw little difference between him and Genet. As if in defiance of Washing¬ ton, Fauchet had openly patronized the democratic societies. “At the festivals of these clubs he is always a guest,” Hamilton pointed out scornfully, “always swallowing toasts full of sedition and hos¬ tility to the government.” Such conduct “was neither friendly nor decent in a foreign minister”; it was unkind and contemptuous. “But,” he went on, “the hostility of the views of this minister is palpable in that intercepted letter of his, which unveils the treachery of Randolph. We there learn, that he pretended to think it was a duty of patriotism to second the Western insurrection; that he knew and approved of a conspiracy which was destined to overthrow the administration of our government, even by the most irregular means.” 84 In embittered sentiments expressed to his own government Fau¬ chet reciprocated Federalist scorn. He believed that he had been deceived and so reported to his superiors. 85 Despite his strong feel¬ ings, he blamed French policy as well as Federalist enmity for the deplorable state of Franco-American relations. Negligence and uncertainty, he pointed out, had marked French policy toward the United States since independence. Such policy was indeed in marked contrast to British activity and steadfastness. Putting these ideas and others to paper, Fauchet presented them to the Directory in a seventy-page memoir not long after his return to France. 86 In this memoir he traced past policy, particularly the conduct of his 83 Randolph to Monroe, Philadelphia, July 29, 1795, National Archives, Dept, of State, Diplomatic and Consular Instructions. 84 From the essay “France,” 1796, in Lodge, The Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, V, 346-347. 86 See, for example, the comments on Fauchet in William Ellery to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Newport, Jan. 11, 1796, in Gibbs, Wolcott Papers, I, 297. 86 “Memoire sur les Etats-Unis d’Amerique,” 24 Frimaire, an IV (Dec. 15, 1795) is in AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, ff. 457-527, and has been edited and printed. Lokke, Fauchet Memoire. In his note accompanying the memoir Fauchet told the Minister of Foreign Relations that the memoir was the fruit of long meditations and profound researches on the politics and government of the United States. AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, f. 450. A METEOR FOLLOWS A COMET 421 predecessors, and plotted what he conceived to be the best path for future French policy towards the United States. Even though the Jay treaty had already received Senate approval, Fauchet pointed out that if the French government acted promptly the House of Representatives might be influenced to refuse to vote the appropriations necessary to place the treaty in effect. He recom¬ mended, therefore, a close accord with the Republican party. French efforts in the forthcoming presidential election should be concen¬ trated on defeating Washington and replacing him with a pro- French executive, preferably Jefferson. If the Jay treaty could not be destroyed and Jefferson did not become President, France, he counseled, should resign herself to the situation. There was little she could do to change matters. Only through acquisition of Louisiana, he advised, could the United States be made to feel the pressure of French influence to the degree necessary to make the government amenable to French policy. Despite these views, Fauchet valued the 1778 alliance and Amer¬ ican friendship. Seeing the United States as a land of vast poten¬ tial and as a lucrative commercial partner, he stressed its importance to France and recommended a reconciliation. His recommendation that a policy of firmness would be helpful in bringing about a reconciliation influenced the Directory in its American policy.*' In his analysis Fauchet saw the American political situation clearly. With Federalists in control of the government, French objectives stood no chance of implementation. While his policy of aid to the Republicans meant more and continued trouble with the Federalist- controlled government, in view of anti-French, pro-British Federalist dogma, there seemed to be no logical alternative to it.** As Franco-American relations grew worse, Fauchet expressed his views publicly. In 1797 he published a pamphlet in which he defended French policy towards the United States, expressing ideas similar to those in his memoir. He accused the Federalist govern¬ ment of deserting its ally, an ally which had brought the new nation into being. Yet he pointed out that “the United States, by the 87 E. Wilson Lyon, “The Directory and the United States,” ALIR, XLIII (April, 1938), 514. The Fauchet document provided the basis of the Direc¬ tory’s policy toward the United States in succeeding months. 8H Ibid., pp. 514-515; Fay, Revolutionary Spirit in France and America. . . , PP- 37 °. 395 - 396 - 422 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE extent of their territory, the nature of their population, their charac¬ ter and activity, and by the situation of their coasts, are evidently called to exercise, in North America, a considerable influence. The power which shall know how to conciliate them will find in them an interesting friend, and their neutrality will perhaps be not less to be courted than their alliance.” He advocated in conclusion a French policy of conciliation. Forget the wrongs of the Federalist administration, he counseled; “France has a strong interest to pre¬ serve a good understanding with America.” 89 Fauchet’s venture in American diplomacy had proved a failure. Like Genet before him, he had injured the French alliance. In his influential recommendations for future French policy he sowed seeds for Franco-American conflict and so contributed to the ulti¬ mate scuttling of the French alliance. 8 “ Fauchet, Sketch of the Present State of Our Political Relations with the United States of North America, pp. 16, 28, 30. Because of the Jay treaty, Fauchet contended, “it results that England may legally plunder us under the American flag, and that we arc to respect what she places under that flag.” He pictured the Federalist government, moreover, as “the tool of Great Britain.” James A. James, “French Opinion as a Factor in Pre¬ venting War between France and the United States, 1795-1800,” AHR, XXX, 46. After reading Fauchet’s pamphlet Albert Gallatin said that “it is candid, argumentative, well written, and not in the least tainted with the fashionable French declamation.” In addition to refuting Federalist arguments “on many points, blaming, however, the Directory in many things, he strongly advises a reconciliation. . . .” To his wife, Philadelphia, Dec. 19, 1797, in Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin, p. 188. CHAPTER THIRTEEN ADET’S WAR WITH WASHINGTON’S GOVERNMENT There are people in America who to serve certain purposes are forever harping upon the gratitude which they pretend the United States owes to France, and the French themselves are not infrequently disposed to make a merit of what was certainly a very interested policy. The present government are perhaps disposed to cancel our supposed obligations by violating the stipulations of their treaties. It is my opinion that there is a strong debt of reciprocal obligations between the United States and France, or rather, to spea\ the only honest language upon a political con¬ cern, the relations between the two nations were formed upon a very im¬ portant common interest which still exists, and must continue long to exist. That common interest prescribes a cordial harmony and a punc¬ tual performance of treaties on both sides. The American government is unquestionably and sincerely disposed to cultivate that harmony and faithfully to adhere to its engagements, but it expects a similar return; and I am persuaded that if the French propose to themselves an influence in America by the assumption of a supercilious tone of negotiation, or by disregarding their stipulations, they will fail of success and lose much of the influence which they actually possess .—John Quincy Adams to Joseph Pitcairn, The Hague, November 13, 1796. Nothing can be more insolent than Adet’s appeal to the people of the United States against their Government, in his note to the Secretary of State; and nothing more extraordinary than the conclusion, where he in¬ forms them, though the Directory have determined to act in direct violation of an express article of the [7778] Treaty, that no rupture is contemplated with the United States. If Congress do not exert them¬ selves with spirit in support of the honor and authority of Government, I shall tremble for the event, and l am not without very painful appre- ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 424 hensions in that respect .—Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, December 25, [1796]. ^ T? X X X Fauchet’s successor, Pierre Auguste Adet, arrived in the United States at a time when the French alliance faced a dismal future. Not one friend of France remained in the American government. When Randolph was driven from office the last semblance of a nonpartisan government disappeared, the last feeble voice in govern¬ ment councils which spoke for France in opposition to the pro- British stand of the majority was stilled. Like Genet and Fauchet before him, Adet, in his early thirties when he became France’s minister to the United States, was young. Although educated as a chemist, he had had governmental and diplomatic experience. French officials held his diplomatic abilities in high repute, considering him “a very able and very excellent man. He had been secretary on the first commission the Republic had sent to Saint Domingue. He had then become chief of the adminis¬ tration of the colonies, and subsequently he was appointed a member of the council of marine. At the time of his appointment to the American post he was on a mission in Geneva, a mission he regretted leaving. Arriving in Philadelphia on June 13, 1795, he presented his credentials two days later and then took up his diplomatic activities. 2 Adet made a good initial impression on Federalist leaders. In Hamilton’s judgment he was “more circumspect than either of his predecessors,” and to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., he appeared “to be a mild tempered and well educated man and no Jacobin,” a minister who “will not be violent or troublesome, though there is reason to think that he will promote what he deems the interest of his coun¬ try with much sagacity.” 3 This impression did not last long. Even 'Adams, diary entry of March 18, 1795, The Hague, and of Oct. 20, 1795, Memoirs of John Ouincy Adams, I, 97, 126. 2 For biographical details, see Turner, CFM, p. 728 n.; Nouvelle biographie generate, I, 278; Kaulec, Papiers de Barthelemy, VI, 151 n. Adet, actually, was second choice for the American mission. A. Bertrand, “Les Etats-Unis et la Revolution Frangaise,” Revue des deux mondes, XXXIII (May 15, 1906), 422. 3 Hamilton, “France,” 1796, in Lodge, The Wor\s of Alexander Hamilton, V, 347; Wolcott, Jr., to Mrs. Wolcott, Philadelphia, July 1, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., ADET’S WAR 4 2 5 though he was quiet and kept to himself, Adet made it clear that the American mission was personally distasteful, and his antipathy toward America soon became evident. * * * 4 More noteworthy was the fact that his instructions directed him to maintain a close connection with the French party in the United States. In other respects Adet’s instructions were friendly and concili¬ atory and were not much different in emphasis from those of his predecessor. They covered questions of debt payment, commerce, and navigation, and stressed that he was to see to it that the Amer¬ ican government executed the treaties of alliance and commerce and the consular convention. In particular he was to see that articles 17, 21, and 22 of the commercial treaty were enforced. These articles dealt with the admission of French privateers and their prizes into American ports and the exclusion of France’s enemies. Among other things, Adet was directed to gain the con¬ fidence of Congress and the President, demonstrate that France’s cause was America’s also, attempt to win exemption from tonnage duties, work for a new commercial treaty and a new consular con¬ vention, observe scrupulously the proper form of communication with the President, and obtain a new loan—this last a prime objec¬ tive of the mission. 5 Armed with these instructions, Adet reached Philadelphia while the Jay treaty was before the Senate. Not having been forewarned, he was astonished when he learned of the treaty complications. He reported that the treaty filled him with indignation and placed him in an extremely difficult position as to the action he should take toward it. Like his immediate predecessors, he had no actual instructions as to the Jay treaty. He could not wait for instructions; Wolcott Papers, I, 209. Adet brought with him a handsome wife; “this,” remarked Wolcott, Jr., “is a good sign.” Like Fauchet, Adet did not speak English. Adet did not mix socially; difficulties in his home life, apparently, led him to keep to himself. See Henrietta Liston to James Jackson, German Town, Oct. 16, 1796, in Bradford Perkins, ed., “A Diplomat’s Wife in Phila¬ delphia: Letters of Henrietta Liston, 1796-1800,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, XI (Oct., 1954), 604; Moreau de Saint-Mery, Voyage. . . , p. 295. 4 James, “French Opinion as a Factor in Preventing War Between France and the United States, 1795-1800,” American Historical Review, XXX, 46. 5 Originally Adet’s instructions were intended for Oudart, the first choice for successor to Fauchet; the instructions, dated Oct. 23, 1794, with additions are in Turner, CFM, pp. 721-730. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 426 improvisation and immediate action were imperative. 6 At first he did not publicly show displeasure over the treaty. 7 His indecision did not last long; he soon became convinced that the American government had violated its French treaties and that the alliance was headed for ruin. British gold, promises, and fear, he believed, had dictated the Senate’s approval of the treaty. 8 His views echoed those of his government, which held that with the Jay treaty the United States had plumbed the lowest depth of perfidy in relations with the French Republic, a faithful ally. The treaty was practically a declaration of hostilities between allies; truly England had conquered America, he believed. 9 When, several months later, Washington signed the Jay treaty, England’s conquest appeared complete. Again Adet saw English influence triumph. He turned his rage on Washington. “My con¬ jectures have been verified,” he reported; “the President has just signed the dishonor of his old age and the shame of the United States: he has ratified the Treaty of Commerce and Amity with Great Britain, and Hammond, the English Minister, has left New York for Europe . . . with the definite pledge of the blind submis¬ sion of Washington to the supreme will of [King] George.” Adet insisted that “the feelings of subservience” which bound Washing¬ ton to England “are now displayed in all their strength.” The en- 8 Adet’s plight in regard to instructions from home was no different from that of his predecessors. During these years the Revolutionary governments practically ignored their ministers in the United States. This was a source of major complaint in Fauchet’s memoir; he complained in his despatches that he had not received instructions for a year. See Fauchet’s complaints to Commissioners of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 3, 1795, and to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, April 13, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 559, 634-641; Bemis, “Washington’s Farewell Address. . . ,” AHR, XXXIX, 257. 7 See Wolcott, Jr., to Washington, Philadelphia, July 26, 1795, and to Mrs. Wolcott, same date, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 217-218. Several times when popular demonstrations against the Jay treaty afforded him an oppor¬ tunity to vent his feelings, Adet gave the demonstrators no encouragement; Wolcott, Jr., said Adet “conducted himself with strict propriety” and at this early point in the mission described him as “an amiable and honest man.” 8 Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, June 25, 28, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 735-738, 739-740; Fauchet, A Sketch of the Present State of Our Relations with the United States. . . , pp. 25-26. 8 “Comparative Note on the French Treaty with the United States of 1778 and the American Treaty with England in 1795,” [Jan.-May, 1795], AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIII, ff. 13-15. ADET’S WAR 4 2 7 treaties of Randolph and his friends were not sufficient to shake him from his first resolve. 10 Even though, according to Adet, the Senate and the President had thrown in their lot with Great Britain, one consolation still remained. In the House of Representatives the majority was com¬ posed of “patriots” whose views were favorable to France. Their opposition to the treaty could create a split between the President and the legislature and prevent implementation of the treaty. Before Washington had signed the Jay treaty Adet had taken steps to destroy it. Believing that if the President ratified the treaty all his “efforts to destroy the alliance between the United Sates and England” would be futile, Adet decided to go directly to the Amer¬ ican people, to arouse the “patriotic” pro-French majority in Amer¬ ica against it. After the Senate approval, he purchased a copy of the still-secret treaty from a Senator, Stevens Thomson Mason of Virginia. Then, in an effort to influence public opinion, he plunged into domestic political controversy by publishing its contents. He believed that publication would arouse sentiment against the treaty and would arouse opposition to the “maneuvers” of the pro-English Washington government. 11 When Bache published the treaty in his Aurora it produced the effect desired by Adet; public emotions boiled. “It [the Jay treaty] insidiously aims to dissolve all connec¬ tions between the United States and France, and to substitute a monarchic, for a republican ally,” exclaimed one aroused citizen. 12 10 Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, Sept. 2, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 776-777; the despatch is printed in translation in Chinard, George Washington as the French Knew Him, pp. 106-109. 1 ° France, Washington’s support of the Jay treaty was considered a tragic mistake and inimical to the 1778 alliance; see George Duruy, ed., Memoirs of Barras: Member of the Directorate, trans. Charles E. Roche (4 vols., London, 1895- 1896), entry of March 22, 1795, II, 103. 11 Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, July 3, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 741-742; so aroused were Americans by the Jay treaty, as has been seen, that some even passed resolutions urging that Mason be honored for making the treaty public. Aurora (Philadelphia), Sept. 14, 1795. u “Americanus” in the Independent Gazetteer, reprinted in the Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, July 24, 1795. Adet in July sent home copious extracts from newspapers and analyses of public opinion show¬ ing that Americans were opposed to the treaty and feared that it would wreck the French alliance. These reports contributed to French belief that the treaty would not be implemented. AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, ff. 144-157, 197-200. 428 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Similar sentiments crowded the columns of the Republican gazettes. Next, Adet went to Randolph and asked in confidence if the published text of the treaty was the same as that ratified by the Senate. Randolph, defending the treaty, insisted that there was nothing in it contrary to French interests. At the same time he pointed out that the Senate did not ratify treaties, it approved them; only the President could ratify treaties and he had yet to ratify the Jay treaty. Then he promised Adet an official copy of the treaty, delivering it the same day. A few days later Adet offered his criticisms. England’s favored position under the treaty, he said, precluded negotiation of a new and more favorable Franco-Amer- ican treaty. The Jay treaty, he concluded, was incompatible with France’s special status under the alliance. 1,5 In comparison to the reaction within the Directory Adet’s pro¬ tests were mild. Scanning the evidence, French officials were con¬ vinced that the Jay treaty violated the 1778 alliance and that the American government had ratified it in defiance of antitreaty pub¬ lic sentiment. 14 What to do under the circumstances was the ques¬ tion. Placing the state of American politics before the Directory, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Charles Delacroix, reported that the outrages of the pro-English party in the government had overflowed the cup of forbearance. Yet he believed the people re¬ mained constant in their attachment to France. It was up to the Directory to adopt firm measures to recall France’s allies to their real interests and to make them denounce England, their natural enemy. To prove the necessity for such measures he outlined the history of recent Franco-American frictions. “Is it to our interest,” the Minister asked, “to declare war against the United States or else is it more in line with our politics to oblige this power to break with England?” Implicitly, he went on, 18 Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, July 3, 1795, in Turner, CFM, pp. 742-743; Adet to Randolph, Philadelphia, June 30, 1795, Randolph to Adet, Dept, of State, July 6, 1795, ASP FR, I, 594-596; Ran¬ dolph’s “Memorandum” of July 14, 1795, for Washington, in Fitzpatrick, Washington’s Writings, XXXIV, 245 n., 246 n. On July 27, from Mount Vernon, Washington asked Randolph: “What says Mr. Adet upon the subject of the treaty, and the movements thereupon?” Randolph replied that Adet had been ill and that he did not recollect any of his opinions, although he had bolted into objections “zealously” and retreated “suddenly" (July 31). Ibid., pp. 249-250, 250 n. 11 Mangourit to-, Dec. 23, 1795, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLIV, f. 554. ADET’S WAR 4 2 9 France was in a state of war with the American government, “but only with the government.” The outrages that France suffered in America, the partiality shown France’s enemies, the wrong done by the Jay treaty, the infractions of treaties, all these grievances to¬ gether, he said, constitute certainly a state of hostilities. During this state it was, he felt, not necessary to declare again in consulta¬ tion France’s connection of friendship with the American nation. If war were declared against the United States it would only draw tighter the bonds which united it to England. Together they would take the Antilles and entirely destroy French commerce in Amer¬ ica. There would be no advantage to France in such a war. This was Delacroix’s answer to war-sentiment within the Directory. Then he laid down a guide for French policy. France should try, he recommended, to influence the American people to bring about a rupture between these two natural enemies, the United States and England. What advantage would there be to the United States in such a policy? In noting the American advantages the Minister developed an old theme. The United States might become one of the princi¬ pal maritime powers; its commerce could furnish subsistence to France and to her colonies, in return receiving French manufac¬ tures. The United States allied to France in war against England, could force England to divide her maritime forces. Even though the Washington government was opposed to antagonizing England, the discontent of the people might force Washington to take a strong stand against England. The American people must be incited to popular agitation. The French Minister Plenipotentiary had been playing the dangerous role of inciter; Citizen Adet, Delacroix be¬ lieved, had the qualities for continuing the task. 15 Yet, for a while, the Directory went ahead with plans to replace Adet and to entrust his successor with responsibility for carrying out Delacroix’s policy. That the Jay treaty violated “the alliance which binds the two peoples” stood out as the foremost French grievance in the new set of instructions. 16 10 “Rapport au Directoire Executif par le Ministre des Relations Exteri- eures,” [Paris], Jan. 16, 1796, ibid., Vol. XLV, ff. 41-53. 10 “Memoire pour servir d’instruction politique au Citoyen Vincent, envoye comme Ministre plenipotentiare de la Rcpublique aupres des Etats-unis,” [Paris], March 6, 1796 (signed by the President of the Directory), ibid., XLV, ff. 182-191. 43 ° ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Despite France’s anger the House of Representatives at the end of April, 1796, voted funds to implement the Jay treaty. To Adet as to other Frenchmen this was tragedy, another triumph of Eng¬ land and English gold. 1 ' In analyzing this defeat he asked bitterly: Who committed the American government to make the English treaty? Who persuaded Washington to ratify it? Who agitated to get it through the House of Representatives? “Le parti Anglois” he informed his superiors. Who comprised this English party? Old tories, merchants with British connections and other men of finance, particularly officers of the Bank of the United States. 18 The audacity of this English faction, he believed, had to be curbed if a desirable state of relations of France and Great Britain with the United States were to be re-established. This could be done, he suggested, only by means of the 1778 commercial treaty. Without taking an openly hostile attitude France could declare that the free- ships-free-goods clause in the commercial treaty was inapplicable because Americans allowed the English the special favor of seizing French goods on neutral American ships without allowing similar privileges to the French. France might then retaliate against the Jay treaty by seizing American ships loaded with English goods. These measures would hit hardest pro-English Federalist mer¬ chants, who profited from trade with England and who were com¬ mitted to the Hamiltonian policy. The administration would bear the blame for the consequences of such a disastrous policy, a policy which could be traced to the administration’s Jay treaty. 17 Even elements of the anti-Revolution press of French refugees in the United States had protested against the iniquitous Jay treaty. As if admon¬ ishing a wayward friend forgetful of obligations the press asked of Amer¬ icans: “Allies of France what became of you?” Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Relations. . . French-American Review, I, 27. 18 Delacroix already had analyzed the so-called English party. “The rich merchants in the United States form the English party,” he had told the Directory. “Hamilton is its head: Hamilton is audacious and courageous, but the people do not like him; he does not find partisans in this numerous class which alone brings about revolution.” On this alleged weakness Delacroix had based his hopes for overthrowing the Federalists and reversing American foreign policy. “Rapport au Directoire Executif par le Ministre des Relations Exterieures,” [Paris], Jan. 16, 1796, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLV, f. 46; for details on Delacroix, see Raymond Guyot, Le Directoire et la paix de I’Europe (Paris, 1911), pp. 68-70; Masson, Le Departement des affaires etrangeres. . . , pp. 361-362. ADET’S WAR 43i As a corollary of this retaliatory policy, Adet saw the possibility of electing a pro-French president and of assuring the ascendancy of France in the councils of the American government. In this way, he concluded, France could offset disadvantages growing out of the union between the United States and Great Britain. Honor and national interest would not allow France to observe in silence the conduct of the American government. 10 Regardless of Adet’s views to the contrary, such a policy, if persisted in, and if a pro- French government did not succeed Washington’s, meant hostili¬ ties on the seas between Frenchmen and Americans. It meant the end of the Franco-American alliance. 20 * * * * # In addition to developing his suggestions on policy for his home government, Adet, of course, carried on his other duties. He pressed Randolph to begin negotiations on a new commercial treaty and new consular convention. 21 He protested, as violations of French treaty rights, the seizure by American authorities of the French armed vessels La Vengeance and he Cassius. The cases of these ships illustrate some of the difficulties faced by the Washington ad¬ ministration in trying to reconcile French treaty rights with its policy of neutrality. In the sea war against the British, as we have seen, the French had to depend upon American assistance. France was able to some extent to use her Caribbean islands as bases from which to attack British commerce; she had, however, to rely upon American aid for armaments. Such aid was prohibited by the neutrality legisla- 18 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, May 3, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 900-906. 20 Sir Robert Liston, the new British minister, saw the implications of the Directory’s harsh policy as advocated by Adet. “I am glad to observe,” he told Hammond, “that the French, by illegal captures of American Ships, & other insolent behavior, are likely to spread ill humour against themselves in this country, & turn the publick attention, which the opposition papers are constantly endeavouring to fix on trifling irregularities on our part, into a different channel.” Philadelphia, June 20, 1796, Sir Robert Liston Papers, The National Library of Scotland, microfilm copies in the Library of Con¬ gress. Within the Directory such reaction did not mean too much as there was a militant group which wanted war with the United States, but was restrained by the moderates. Memoires de Larevelliere-Lepaux, II, 258; Lyon, “The Directory and the United States,” AHR, XLIII, 515. 21 The correspondence exchanged on the new commercial treaty is in ASP FR, I, 640-641. 432 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE tion. Yet, the pro-French fervor of Americans—and the desire for profit—made it possible for unarmed French vessels to come into American ports as traders, secretly or otherwise obtain armaments, and go out to sea to prey on British commerce. The next time the vessel appeared in an American port she would be armed as a ship of the French navy, and, if accepted as such, under the 1778 treaty entitled to freedom of American ports. American authorities then faced the question: Was this truly a vessel of the French navy entitled to special treaty privileges or was she a ship which had violated the neutrality laws and hence subject to seizure? One interpretation would offend France and the other would offend Britain. Usually, France suffered. The case of the French privateer La Vengeance fitted this pattern. When she entered New York harbor in July, 1795, with a Spanish prize, New York authorities seized her on the grounds that pre¬ viously she had been armed in an American port in violation of the neutrality laws. Adet protested that her seizure was based on “mere suspicions” and vitiated article 17 of the 1778 commercial treaty. Adet’s protest did little good. According to the federal authorities in New York a libel could be filed against a ship without an affidavit or other evidence to substantiate the allegations upon which the suit was based. Failure to establish his case meant that the libelant would have to stand the costs and damages. This usually acted as sufficient deterrent to prevent abuse of the process. When a war vessel was involved, however, merely by meeting costs of litigation those who would, could put the ship out of action as effectively as if she had been sunk. While involved in the ensuing litigation, La Vengeance was kept from harassing British commerce. La Vengeance was condemned under dubious circumstances. All officers of the district court, Adet charged, were interested in her condemnation. Finally, upon appeal, the sentence was reversed, and the case ultimately decided in her favor. The proceedings had lasted over a year, the vessel being sold meanwhile, according to Adet, for a “tenth part of the cost of her armament.” A French war vessel was thus put out of action permanently by American neutrality laws and red tape. 22 22 For pertinent documents on the case, see ibid., 621-629; see also Adet to ADET’S WAR 433 Similar to the case of La Vengeance was that of the corvette Le Cassius. In this instance American authorities not only seized the vessel, they also arrested the captain, a former American citizen. The arrest, Adet protested, was “a violation of principles and our treaty,” as was the detention of the corvette. He questioned the motives of the person who brought suit against the Cassius by implying that he sought to aid England by immobilizing the ves¬ sel. While not denying the libelant’s English connections, Secre¬ tary of State Pickering noted that the person in question had also a personal motive; he was part owner of the prize taken by the Cassius, and if the corvette and her equipments were confiscated he stood to gain half their value. Even if the Cassius had been armed in the United States, Adet said, her seizure was invalid. She was at the time of seizure a vessel of the French government “and the nineteenth article of our treaty expressly states, that vessels may freely enter and sail from ports of the United States without receiving the least hindrance.” Then he expressed the hope that “the Government of the United States will take proper measures to prevent the force of the republic from being paralyzed in its ports, and evil minded people from abus¬ ing the laws in order to arrest every French vessel coming into the United States. For if a single information be sufficient to stop one vessel,” he pointed out acidly, “there is no reason why the first fri¬ gate which shall arrive from Europe should not be seized as having armed in the United States.” Over a year after the initial seizure, the charges against the cor¬ vette were dismissed. In the meantime, Adet had abandoned the ship to the United States, reserving the right to reparation “for the injuries and damages” arising from the long drawn out proceed¬ ings. 23 Such treatment at the hands of American authorities tended to confirm French views as to the pro-English orientation of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, March 21, 1796, in Turner, CFM, p. 862; for a general discussion, see Ford, “Pickering,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 192-194. 28 For pertinent documents on the Cassius case, see ASP FR, I, 629-639. Adet’s reasons for abandoning the Cassius are in Adet to Commission on Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Sept. 3, 1795, and Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, March 21, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 780- 781, 861-862. 434 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE American government; the French became convinced that under the Federalist regime the alliance was meaningless. Adet also protested that in not defending its neutrality and in allowing the British to seize American provision ships bound for France, the United States “presented to England a poniard to cut the throat of its faithful ally.” 24 In other instances he complained that the United States did not behave like an ally and that it did not act even as a neutral toward France. The British at this time were preparing an attack on French Caribbean possessions, particu¬ larly against Saint Domingue. In preparation they purchased quan¬ tities of flour, other supplies, and horses in the United States and recruited the services of Americans. With the expectation that the French, under the terms of commercial treaty of 1778, would allow the ships to pass unmolested, they chartered American bottoms to carry many of the purchases to their Caribbean destinations. “If your fellow-citizens are prohibited from serving in the cause of France,” Adet told Pickering, “neither should they be permitted to range themselves under the British flag; otherwise neutrality would only be a vain term, and a certain mean[s] of assisting secretly, and without running any risk, a power which no one would dare to aid openly.” Florses, he continued, were contraband of war. If the American government did not stop their export it would be tolerating trade in contraband. The British were enroll¬ ing American grooms. They recruited the crews of their ships blockading French Caribbean ports from mariners they took from American ships. If the American government did not take steps to enforce its neutrality, he concluded, France would blame the United States for loss of her Caribbean islands. 25 For the American government to stop the sale of flour as a “courtesy” to France as Adet asked, Pickering countered, would have been unneutral. While admitting that horses were contra¬ band, and hence subject to confiscation if captured at sea, he maintained that the American government was not obligated to prevent their sale or shipment. In fact, when the governor of Virginia took steps in Norfolk to stop the sailing of a sloop loaded with horses for the British, he was ordered to release the vessel. 2 ‘ Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, Sept. 28, 1795, ASP FR, I, 643. 25 Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, Jan. 12, 1796, and March 29, 1796, ibid., pp. 644-645. ADET’S WAR 435 Backed by an opinion of the Attorney General and by the Presi¬ dent, Pickering contended, in effect, that there was nothing in the sales to the British of which France had any right to complain, that an “impartial neutrality” forbade the United States to place restraints on that trade. 26 This made Republicans bristle. From Portsmouth, Virginia, for example, a Republican reported that the “recruiting business goes on briskly here—I am told about 1500 cavalry will be shipped in a few days—great numbers cross from hence daily. Ask a repub¬ lican what he thinks of this business, he hangs his head. Sighs and says—If I say a word, I shall be the ‘partizan of war and con¬ fusion.’ ” 27 Echoing these sentiments, Senator Stevens Thomson Mason of Virginia said, “the French must be certainly very good natured to bear patiently all this marked partiality to their Enemies yet I hope they will for tho’ I love the French People I am not a partisan of war and confusion!’ 1 * Adet despaired. What good, he wrote to his superiors, does the friendship of the American people do us when the Secretary of State is pro-English and the govern¬ ment is against us? 29 This feeling had been strengthened by an unfortunate occur¬ rence early in Adet’s mission. The French National Convention had decreed that the Republic’s colors should be presented to the United States and had entrusted Adet with the presentation, in which he was to deliver a warm salutation from the Committee of Public Safety. After coming to the United States and discerning the Execu¬ tive’s anti-French orientation, he delayed the ceremony. Fearing that the flag might be slighted and hoping to use the ceremony as 28 See Pickering to Adet, Philadelphia, Jan. 20 and March 25, 1796, and Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, March n, 1796, ibid., pp. 645-650. Richard Hildreth, The History of the United States of North America (6 vols., New York, 1849), IV, 680; for the Virginia embargo on horses, see John Steele to James McHenry, Richmond, March 27, 1796, with enclosures of Jan. 29, in Bernard C. Steiner, ed., “Correspondence of James McHenry,” WMQ, 1st Series, XIII, 102-104. 27 The extract is dated Jan. 20, 1796, in the Federal Gazette and Balti¬ more Daily Advertiser, Feb. 15, 1796. 28 Mason to Joseph Jones, Philadelphia, Feb. 29, 1796, Joseph Jones Papers, Duke University. 29 Adet to Commission of Foreign Affairs, Philadelphia, Jan. 30, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 824-825. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 436 a forum from which to appeal for Franco-American unity, he waited until Congress convened. In December when Adet indicated that he wished to present the flag, President Washington set aside January 1, 1796, “a day of general joy and congratulation” for the ceremony. In delivering the colors to the President, Adet said France was “long accustomed to regard the American people as her most faithful allies” and that she wanted to draw the two countries closer. He pointed out that the American colors were displayed in the hall of the National Con¬ vention. The message from the Committee of Public Safety had the same warm glow; it spoke of the “sacred ties” and the “indis¬ soluble” bonds between France and the United States. Washington’s response, though complimentary to “our mag¬ nanimous allies,” disappointed Adet. He had expected the French flag to be displayed prominently in the House of Representatives; instead, the President announced he would deposit it in the archives of the United States. The French minister expressed his disap¬ pointment to Pickering. Shutting up the flag in the archives, he protested, would be looked upon by the French Republic “as a mark of contempt. Would it not be convenient,” he enquired, “to fix this flag in a similar place to that which yours occupies in France, and where the national honor expected to see it?” Pickering replied with a relatively tactful but admonitory rebuff. Personally he con¬ sidered Adet’s presenting of the colors absurd, an act designed to inflame public passions. 30 Adet reported in disgust that the flag “will be hidden away in an attic and destined to become the fodder of the rodents and insects that live there.” He suggested that the American flag be removed from the hall of France’s legislative body. In his view, French over¬ tures of friendship had been met with indifference and scorn. 31 30 Pickering’s comments were made to Phineas Bond, British charge d’affaires in Philadelphia. Bond to Grenville, [Philadelphia], Jan. 2, 1796, No. 1, Henry Adams Transcripts. 81 For the flag episode, see the documents in ASP FR, I, 527-528. These include the message of the Committee of Public Safety of Oct. 21, 1794, and Adet’s message to Washington and the response of Jan. 1, 1796. For Adet’s protest to Pickering, Philadelphia, Jan. 9, 1796, and Pickering’s response of Jan. 15, 1796, see pp. 656-657. For Adet’s report of the episode, see Adet to Committee of Public Safety, Philadelphia, Jan. 16, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 811-814. For a description of the flag, see Bernard Fay, The Two Franklins, p. 293. ADET’S WAR 437 The distrust between the two countries increased, even minor irritants being magnified into major insults. Adet made an issue, for example, of the fact that a Philadelphia publication in its listing of diplomatic precedence had placed Great Britain in first place, a position France previously had occupied. He asked the American government to suppress the publication. This, of course, could not be done. Pickering pointed out that pulications were private and not subject to government regulation. 32 * * * * * As antagonism between the two nominal allies deepened, their differing interpretations of treaty obligations also contributed to the growing rupture. Prior to 1796 the United States had allowed the French to sell prizes their privateers brought into American ports. To France, maritime underdog in the struggle with Great Britain, this was a valuable privilege. Early in 1796 the Jay treaty went into effect with its article 24 which prohibited “privateers” in the service of England’s enemies from selling their prizes in American ports. Soon after this British officials in the United States asked the Amer¬ ican government to stop the sale of French prize goods in Amer¬ ican ports. The United States then took steps to comply with the request. 33 Early in May the House of Representatives passed a resolution— reputedly written by Hamilton—forbidding the sale of prizes in the United States by all belligerents. Adet entered an immediate pro¬ test against this resolution. It contravened the commercial treaty, he said, and was the opposite of impartial neutrality; it favored England to the disadvantage of France. “But if,” he said, “it be the duty of a neutral neither to grant nor refuse more to one of the belligerent powers than to another, when there do not exist particular stipulations provided for by treaties previous to the war, it follows that the law in question being in favor of Great Britain * 2 Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, March 3, 1796, and Pickering to Adet, Dept, of State, March 14, 1796, ASP FR, I, 657-658. 8S Only British prizes taken by French privateers were not allowed to be sold in American ports. France was the only belligerent who sold prizes in American ports. For details, see Hyneman, The First American Neutrality, pp. 123-125; for Alexander Hamilton’s instructions to collectors of customs governing the sale of prizes, see ASP FR, III, 339; for the instructions of Aug. 4 > ! 793 > see h 140-141. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 438 cannot be conformable to the rules of neutrality.” Pickering replied that France had no right to sell prizes in American ports. As to the charge of favoring Britain, he disposed of it with the argument that “a neutral nation can be responsible only for the equality of its rules of conduct towards the belligerent Powers, and not for the effects of an exact observance of those rules, which must depend on the situation and circumstances of the warring Powers themselves.” 34 By the end of June, 1796, administration policy on the sale of prizes in American ports was clear. France did not have treaty rights allowing such sales; the administration interpreted the Jay treaty as forbidding sale of British prizes taken by French privateers. The Treasury Department, therefore, instructed customs collectors to forbid entry to such prize property. To the Directory this action gave proof to its view that as a result of the Jay treaty France had lost an advantage of her alliance with the United States. 35 Adet now officially gave the American government a copy of the Executive Directory’s decree of July 2, 1796, which was issued after the House of Representatives had implemented the Jay treaty. It declared that France “will treat neutral vessels, either as to confisca¬ tion, as to searches, or capture, in the same manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them.” This policy, amounting to repu¬ diation of the 1778 commercial treaty and hence of the alliance, the decree claimed to be justified on the ground that the commercial advantages secured by the 1778 treaty now benefited enemies of France. As Adet pointed out, France, in effect, expected the United States to force the English to respect American neutrality. France 34 For the House resolution on sale of prizes, see Annals of the Con¬ gress. . . , 4th Cong., 1st sess., May 7, 1796, p. 1329. After the bill was amended the House postponed action on it at this time. There was opposi¬ tion to it “on the ground that the measure . . . approached very nearly to an encroachment upon existing treaties” and that “it might give offence to some of the belligerent powers with whom they desired to be on good terms,” May 3, 1796, p. 1489. For House debate on the bill, see May n, 1796, pp. 1340-1347. See also Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, May 18, 1796, and Pickering to Adet, Dept, of State, May 24, 1796, ASP FR, I, 650-652; Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, June 3, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 911-913. 36 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Collectors of Customs, Treasury Dept., June 30, 1796, ASP FR, I, 340; Executive Directory to Minister of Foreign Relations, Oct., 1796, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLVI, f. 392; the Directory directed the Minister of Foreign Relations to inform the American government that France still claimed the right to sell prizes in American ports. ADET’S WAR 439 followed England’s lead, he said, only because she was forced to do so. “France, bound by treaty with the United States, could find only a real disadvantage in the articles of that treaty which caused to be respected as American property, English property found on board American vessels. They had a right, under this consideration, to expect that America would take steps in favor of her violated neutrality.” 36 These actions and arguments were, in substance, in accord with the policy Adet had urged upon the French govern¬ ment in May. Pickering responded that the Directory’s decree did not distin¬ guish between ordinary neutrals and the United States, which by virtue of the commercial treaty of 1778 stood on ground different than that of other neutrals. British seizures of French goods on American ships had the sanction of international law, he pointed out, but France was restrained by the free-ships-free-goods clause of the 1778 commercial treaty from following the British example. Hence he asked Adet for clarification of the French action. Was American commerce liable to suffer new restrictions at the hands of France? Were the restrictions placed on American commerce con¬ sidered to be of a nature “to justify a denial of those rights which are pledged to us by our treaty with your nation?” 37 Adet’s ultimate answer had almost the character of a nullifica¬ tion of the Franco-American alliance. In a long note with ap¬ pended documents, in which he reviewed the whole quarrel be¬ tween France and the United States over neutrality, he “traced the catalogue of grievances of the French republic” against the United States. He demanded “the execution of that contract which assured to the United States their existence, and which France regarded as the pledge of the most sacred union between two people, the freest upon earth.” He pointed out that “the American Government 80 Decree of the Executive Directory of July 2, 1796, and Adet to Picker¬ ing, Philadelphia, [Oct. 27, 1796], ASP FR, I, 576-577. The French decree was not a sudden departure in French practice; it authorized openly what had been practiced covertly. Bassett, The Federalist System. . . , pp. 220-221. 37 Pickering to Adet, Dept, of State, Nov. 1, 1796, ASP FR, I, 578. Hamil¬ ton did not like Pickering’s answer. “There was something of hardness and epigrammatic sharpness in it,” he said. In his opinion, “our communications should be calm, reasoning, and serious, showing steady resolution more than feeling, have force in the idea, rather than in the expression.” Hamilton to Wolcott, Jr., Nov. 22, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 398. 440 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE cannot pretend to impartiality; it cannot say that it has maintained an equal neutrality between France and England, since it has granted to Great Britain advantages denied to France. But every one of these advantages granted to England was a real injury to the republic; and if it is not maintained, without sporting with all prin¬ ciples, that a government may consider itself as neutral, in granting to a belligerent Power advantages which it refuses to another, it is clear that the Government of the United States, after having made its treaty with Great Britain ceased to be neutral, when it opposed itself to the participation by France, in the favors granted to the English.” Then Adet went on to announce “that the executive directory regards the treaty of commerce concluded with Great Britain as a violation of the treaty made with France in 1778, and equivalent to a treaty of alliance with Great Britain; and that, justly offended at the conduct which the American Government has held in this case, they have given him orders to suspend, from this moment, his min¬ isterial functions with the Federal Government.” He hastened to add that “the American people, are not to regard the suspension of his functions as a rupture between France and the United States, but as a mark of just discontent, which is to last until the Govern¬ ment of the United States returns to sentiments, and to measures, more conformable to the interests of the alliance, and the sworn friendship between the two nations.” 38 At the same time he stressed that “this alliance was always dear to Frenchmen; they have done every thing to tighten its bands. The Government of the United States, on the contrary, has sought to break them.” Then the French minister concluded with a listing of French grievances and a high- flown propaganda appeal to the American people. “Let your Gov¬ ernment return to itself,” he advised, “and you will still find in Frenchmen faithful friends and generous allies.” 39 38 Despite the portentous developments in Franco-American relations John Quincy Adams, at this time in Europe in close touch with political develop¬ ments there, did not believe that France wished “to be at positive variance with the United States.” Later he reported that the Directory did not wish “an absolute rupture” with the United States. John Quincy Adams to Secretary of State, Nov. 16, 1796, and to John Adams, The Hague, Feb. 23, 1797, in Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, II, 43 n., 131. 89 Adet to Pickering, Philadelphia, Nov. 15, 1796, ASP FR, I, 579-583, appended documents follow; “Memoire pour servir d’instructions au Citoyen ADETS WAR 44i This bold appeal to the people against the government and President Washington, according to the Federalist view, not only nullified the French alliance, but also marked a declaration of war on the Washington administration. 40 In the manner of Genet, Adet had bypassed the American government and used the note as a manifesto with which to appeal directly to the American people; at the same time that he forwarded it to the State Department he sent a copy for publication to Bache’s Aurora. A summary of the note’s contents with extracts from the appended documents appeared in print before a full translation had been made in the State Depart¬ ment. Adet’s manifesto, in short, was designed to compel the Federalist government to change its tone and “to enlighten the people.” 41 Federalists were furious. “Nothing can be more insolent than Adet’s appeal to die people of the United States against their Gov¬ ernment,” raged a North Carolina Federalist, “and nothing more extraordinary than the conclusion, where he informs them, though the Directory have determined to act in direct violation of an express ardcle of the Treaty, that no rupture is contemplated with the United States.” 42 Other Hamiltonians centered their fire on the alliance, maintaining that it was the means by which Genet and Adet had sought to draw the United States into war against Eng¬ land. 43 In the same vein another defender of Federalist policy denounced Adet, Ministre plenipotentiare de la republique Francaise, aupres des etats- unis” (from the Executive Directory), [Paris], Aug. 23, 1796, AAE CP EU, Vol. XLVI, ff. 137-140. In this memoir the Directory gave its reasons for recalling Adet, mainly that the recall expressed its view of the conduct of the American government. Delacroix to Adet, Paris, Aug. 24, 1796. In accord with the memoir Delacroix ordered Adet to suspend his functions. Ibid. 10 William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Dec. 10, 1796 (Princeton). Murray claimed that the note revealed French designs to use the United States not as a friend but as an instrument against Great Britain. 41 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, [Nov., 1796], in Turner, CFM, 970; Ford, “Pickering,” in Bemis, ed., The American Secretaries of State. . . , II, 204; Hildreth, The History of the United States. . . , IV, 682-683. 45 Samuel Johnston to James Iredell, Dec. 25, [1796], in McRee, Life and Correspondence of James Iredell, 483. 4 * Columbian Centinel (Boston), Jan. n, 1797; also William Willcocks to Adet in the New Yor\ Gazette, Dec. 8, 1796, reprinted in the Federal Gazette and Baltimore Daily Advertiser, Dec. 5, 1796. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 442 Adet’s note as “a mere in terrorem business. Do the Directory ex¬ pect,” he asked, “the President will [go] down on his knees and ask pardon of the French government, for struggling to preserve peace? Or do they expect the United States will purchase peace with a few million dollars?” Then he prophesied that “the tide of affection for the French will change—it is now turning to keen resentment.” Requesting “one word more,” he counseled that “if the French consider the treaty as violated, it is presumed the United States will take them at their word and consider it as violated on the part of the French. We are then in a situation to take the Pres¬ ident’s advice, never to ferm [sic] another treaty of commerce with any nation. The commercial part of the British treaty will end in two years after the war. Never let another be formed.’ ni While admitting that it angered the pro-British faction and aroused the anti-French press, Adet reported to his superiors that the note’s publication had gained favor with friends of France and that it received a good press among the anti-English papers. 45 To Pickering, Adet’s communications were unsatisfactory explanations for French policy. “If the publication of these notes,” he said, “addressed in reality to the people of the United States, was expected to promote the interests of France, the minister and his government will find themselves egregiously mistaken. I have heard of but one sentiment concerning them, and that of indignation.” What, he wondered, did France want of the United States short of war with Great Britain? Adet’s appeal marked the end of all corre¬ spondence with the French minister; Pickering made no direct reply to its allegations. 46 Adet’s flamboyant appeal had plunged him into the midst of America’s domestic political battles. Federalists pointed out that the manifesto was designed to “wean us from the government and ad¬ ministrators of our own choice; and make us willing to be governed by such as France shall think best for us—beginning with Jeffer- 44 The Herald: A Gazette for the Country (New York), Nov. 23, 1796. 46 Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, [Nov., 1796], in Turner, CFM, pp. 968-972. 46 Pickering to Rufus King, Philadelphia, Nov. 26, 1796, Rufus King Papers, Huntington Library; Pickering to C. C. Pinckney, Philadelphia, Nov. 26, 1796, National Archives, Dept, of State, Diplomatic and Consular Instruc¬ tions. ADET’S WAR 443 son.” 47 But the declaration was said to have been “received by the middle and southern states with satisfaction, and with a determina- don to gradfy France with an administration which will accord with its wishes.” Adet had begun his open campaign to influence the election of 1796. 48 Washington’s second term was coming to a close; he had already delivered his Farewell Address and had indicated his intention to redre from public office. The time seemed ripe to advance the cause of France by helping to defeat the pro-English Federalists and so bring to power the pro-French Republicans. ***** Despite the initial conciliatory efforts of Fauchet and Adet to win the American government to a favorable French policy, Amer¬ ican foreign policy in the French view had continued pro-British. Each French government had therefore resorted finally to the same policy: that of intervention in American politics. In such interven- don they were encouraged, as we have seen, by the Jeffersonians, who contrived to use French diplomatists and French policy for their own ends. Ultimately each minister of the French Republic turned from the government to the opposition party for support of the alliance, each attempted to turn the people against the gov¬ ernment, and each fell from grace by becoming unacceptable to the administration and to Federalist leaders. While over-all American foreign policy was of minor signifi¬ cance to French statesmen, who in these years were occupied with weightier problems in Europe, they were concerned over any Anglo- American rapprochement. They knew that British policy toward the United States was directed to destruction of the Franco-Amer- ican alliance and to alienating the United States from France. Logically, the French viewed with alarm any evidence of success in British policy, minor though it be. To thwart enemy policy they were willing to go to almost any lengths. 4 ' Gazette and Daily Advertiser (Charleston), Jan. 2, 1797, from the Connecticut Courant signed sentinel. Sentinel declared that “as Bulls for the dethroning of Princes used to begin and end with grace; so does this denun¬ ciation of wrath, with love to the people —though coupled by the way, with hatred to the government." “Oliver Wolcott, Sr., to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., Litchfield, Nov. 21, 1796, in Gibhs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 397. 444 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE The United States, caught in the middle of the great Anglo- French conflict, was not entirely a free agent. 49 Whatever it did in foreign policy was bound to affect its posidon relative to one of the struggling powers. American politics reflected this dilemma. Basically then, to the French the real enemy was not the American government, and certainly not the American people, but Great Britain. In keeping with this view, successive French governments from 1793 to 1797, with variations, made a distinction between the attitude of the American people and that of the Federalist government toward France and the alliance. They saw the Washington admin¬ istration as a captive of British policy, dominated by the pro-British mercantile governing minority, whereas the masses were ardently pro-French and pro-alliance. In attacking Federalists and their government, French states¬ men held that they were attacking England, aiding the American people to free themselves from a minority government controlled by the British, at the same time that they were advancing French policy. This view of the welfare of the American people as bound to that of France was held also by Republican leaders and was propagated in their political activities. 50 French statesmen were supported in their conviction that most Americans wanted French friendship, that Americans looked upon France as a partner in revolution, and that Americans were grateful for the life-giving 1778 alliance, by the reports of their ministers in the United States, by those of returned emigres, and by assurances of Republican politicians. Not all French officials or emigres from America shared this 49 See, for example, Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Rela¬ tions. . . ,” FAR, I, 21-22. 60 Ibid., p. 22. The Gazette Nationale ou Moniteur Universel in these years reflected official French policy; nonofficial journals also shared its views. La Decade Philosophique, for example, attacked Washington as one who had “forgotten who were and still are the enemies of his nation,” and who had always had “a striking predilection for the English,” quoted in Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Relations. . . ,” FAR, I, 25-26. William Vans Murray, on the other hand, said that Washington’s vigilance had pre¬ vented an explosion by the French party and that this was why the “anti- federal party” took incessant pains to impress on the minds of the French that the government was British. Therefore, concluded Murray, the French supposed that in ruining the country they injured the British. William Vans Murray Papers, Commonplace Book, Dec. 8, 1795 (Princeton). ADET’S WAR 445 view of American friendship for France. Charles Maurice Talley¬ rand, for example, discounted American gratitude as a basis for Franco-American relations. Discerningly, he observed that, as Americans were concerned with earning wealth, their ties with Great Britain would increase. In the pursuit of gold, he held, passions and emotional connections of the past would vanish. The Jay treaty came merely as the coup de grace ? 1 In the spring of 1797, soon after his return to France from exile in America, Talleyrand addressed the National Institute on the commercial relations between the United States and England. Again he stressed that in spite of superficial and emotional sym¬ pathy for France by Americans, economically and socially the United States was bound to England, that “she remains altogether English in the greater part of her habits.” Clearly, France had failed to exploit her favorable relationship with the United States in the immediate post-Revolution years. Great Britain, consequent¬ ly, had regained the favored trade connection. Indeed, her trade with the United States was at the time far greater than it had ever been. The population of the United States was increasing, and with it American needs, which Britain was capable of supplying. Franco-American amity had a great obstacle to overcome in that Britain and the United States shared a common language and insti¬ tutions based on the common law. “In every part of America through which I travelled,” he pointed out, “I have not found a sin¬ gle Englishman who did not feel himself to be an American, not a single Frenchman who did not find himself a stranger.” Obviously, Talleyrand held no sanguine view on the strength of the 1778 alliance. It was to him a marriage of convenience, little else. 52 In the closing months of 1796, as the American presidential elections approached, the 1778 alliance still appeared desirable to the Directory if it could be revived and supported by a pro-French government in America. * * * * * 61 Georges Pallain, ed., Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand, La Mission de Talleyrand a Londres en 7792. Ses Lettres de l’ Amerique a Lord Landsdowne (Paris, 1889), pp. 421 ff., and cited in Childs, “French Opinion of Anglo-American Relations. . . ,” FAR, I, 28. 62 Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Memoir Concerning the Commercial Re¬ lations of the United States with England (Boston, 1809); the quotations are from pp. 5, 6. 446 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Talleyrand in his memoir had pointed out that to overcome Eng¬ lish advantages in the United States France would undoubtedly have to resort to political action, “that it would, perhaps, require a French establishment in America to counteract their [English] ascendancy with any hopes of success.” 53 The Directory had launched just such a policy, and Adet, like Genet before him, engaged in Western intrigues to implement it. It was not difficult to stir up seccessionist sentiment among frontiersmen of the Western settlements, where such sentiment had never died out. Although Spaniards had long attempted to foment Western secession, Adet, as did other Frenchmen, thought that a secessionist movement would receive greater support if sponsored by France. With an eye to future French repossession of Louisiana, he believed that secession would help the future French military position there. Such a movement would also weaken the Washington government and the Federalist party and would aid his efforts to bring the pro- French Jeffersonians to power. These activities would be conso¬ nant with the policy of the Directory and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delacroix, who saw in Louisiana a means to implement French plans toward the United States, a means with which to influence American foreign policy. 54 In March, 1796, Adet commissioned General Victor Collot, for¬ mer governor of Guadaloupe then on parole from English capture, to make a military, economic, and political reconnaissance of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. Foremost among the general’s objec¬ tives was to ascertain the strength of secessionist sentiment in the West and to assess the possibilities of terrain for military defense. 68 Ibid., P . 13. °* For Adet’s views, see Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 9, 1796, and June 21, 1796, in Turner, CFM, pp. 826-831, 928-930. The French foreign ministry received a number of memoirs in this period sug¬ gesting repossessing of Louisiana; this was stressed among other things in “Memoire sur les Etats unis d’Amerique—La Florida—et Louisiane” and “Analysis of Memoir on Our Situation with the United States,” by C. Derehe, Dec. 2, 1795 and [Feb., 1797], AAE CP EU, Vols. XLIV, ff. 407- 417, and XLVII, ff. 177-178; Turner, “The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” AHR, X, 271; for continuing Spanish interest in Western secession, see Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1J95-1803, pp. 157-158; Durand Echeverria, trans., “General Collot’s Plan for a Reconnaissance of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys, 1796,” WMQ, 3rd Series, IX (Oct., 1952), 5I3-5I4- ADET’S WAR 447 French statesmen hoped that the West, and perhaps the South also, could be induced to secede from the United States, form a new con¬ federation, and make a new alliance with France, one subordinate to French policy. 55 As part of their design French strategists kept in touch with Americans who had been in French service at the time of Genet’s projected attack on Louisiana several years earlier. Gen¬ eral George Rogers Clark and his aide, “Colonel” Samuel Fulton, were among those who supplied the French with intelligence on affairs in the West. Fulton, in particular, worked closely with Adet; in April, 1796, after he had taken a trip West to intrigue with Indians and had consulted with Clark, Adet sent him to Paris with despatches. 56 At this time Fulton assured Clark that “Citizen Adet is Desposed to Do eavery thing in his power for our benifit.” 57 The plan for his “reconnaissance” which Collot submitted to Adet emphasized that France lacked sound information on the existing political situation in the United States. Then he added that the threat to France’s navy, colonies, and foreign trade, “the hostility of the Federal government towards the French Republic openly manifested by the formation, in the midst of a bloody war, of ties of friendship and mutual advantage with our cruelist ene¬ mies; the impossibility of being able any longer to delude ourselves concerning the prodigious influence exercised by the English over the American government and the major portion of the Eastern states,” and the necessity for countering that influence “by some other powerful opposing force” were reason enough for plotting against the government of an ally. 58 66 John Quincy Adams, for example, believed that French plans for a new alliance with a western republic had been formed as early as the time of Genet’s instructions. To John Adams, The Hague, April 3, 1797, in Ford, The Writings of John Quincy Adams, II, 156. '* See Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 9, 1796, in Turner, CFM, p. 828; Murdoch, Georgia-Florida Frontier 1793-1796, pp. 95-96. 57 Fulton Clark, Philadelphia, April 4, 1796, in Turner, “Selections from the Draper Collection,” American Historical Association Annual Report for the Year 1896, I, 1098; Turner, “Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” AHR, X, 270-272; Echeverria, “General Collot’s Plan. . . ,” WMO, 3rd Series, IX, 514; George W. Kyte, “A Spy on the Western Waters: The Military Intelligence Mission of General Collot in 1796,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIV (Dec., 1947), 429. 68 See Echeverria, “General Collot’s Plan. . . ,” WMO, 3rd Series, IX, 516. ENTANGLING ALLIANCE 448 With Adet’s blessing, Collot left Philadelphia in March, 1796, proceeded to Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and New Orleans, and returned by sea to Philadelphia in December. Along the way, to those he trusted, he stressed the advantages of French control over the heart of the North American continent. A force of two thousand to three thousand determined frontiersmen, Collot concluded, was all that was necessary to take the Spanish lands. His maps and his observations outlined a thorough preparation for a possible de¬ fense of French-held Louisiana against Americans at the line of the Alleghenies; the Louisiana envisioned by Collot stretched from the Alleghenies to the Rockies, and hence included both Spanish and American territory. 59 During the reconnaissance Collot learned also of a plot for an attack against Louisiana under English auspices, the so-called Blount Conspiracy. The conspirators, among whom were Senator William Blount of Tennessee, and a number of prominent frontiers¬ men as well as one or more British agents, had planned to seize the poorly defended Spanish dependencies of Louisiana and the Floridas with an army of frontiersmen and Indians. Included in the strategy was a combined land and sea assault on New Orleans across Amer¬ ican territory, with the British supplying the attacking fleet as well as additional troops from Canada. Although the English govern¬ ment later denied responsibility for the plot, it was known to Robert Liston, the British minister to the United States, and received his circumspect support. 60 When he returned to Philadelphia, Collot reported the results of his mission to Adet and informed him of the Blount Conspiracy. 69 Turner, “Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” AHR, X, 273; Kyte, “A Spy on the Western Waters,” MVHR, XXXIV, 431-441. *° For details on this aspect of the Blount Conspiracy, see Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803, pp. 104-114; Francois Barbe-Marbois, The History of Louisiana, pp. 163-164; Turner, “Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” AHR, X, 273-274; Robert Liston to Lord Grenville, Philadelphia, Jan. 25 and March 16, 1797, in Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy, 1795-1797)” AHR, X (April, 1903), 582-583; Perkins, The First Rapprochement, pp. 99-100; for Adet’s comments on the conspiracy, see Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations, Philadelphia, Feb. 24, 1797, in Turner, CFM, pp. 989-993; see also William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge, 1954), pp. 303-310; Heloise H. Cruzat, “Gen¬ eral Collot’s Reconnoitering Trip down the Mississippi and his Arrest in New Orleans in 1796, by order of the Baron De Carondelet, Governor of Louisi¬ ana,” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, I (April, 1918), 305-307. ADET’S WAR 449 Details of the British frontier plot were forwarded to the Spanish minister in the United States, who promptly expressed his fears of a British “coup-de-main” to the Secretary of State. Such intelligence displeased Pickering. Western intrigue, he was convinced, did not implicate the British, but rather resulted from pernicious French influence among the frontiersmen. 01 Since the spring of 1796 Federalist leaders had suspected that France had launched preparations to alienate the Western lands, taking advantage of the uneasily dormant Western discontent. Pickering, Wolcott, Jr., and others believed that in a secret clause of the Franco-Spanish treaty of Basel of July, 1795, France had been promised repossession of Louisiana. “We have often heard,” Picker¬ ing said, “that the French government contemplated repossession of Louisiana; and it has been conjectured that in their negociations with Spain the cession of Louisiana & the Floridas may have been agreed on. You will see all the mischief to be apprehended from such an event. The Spaniards will certainly be more safe, quiet and useful neighbors. For her own sake Spain should absolutely refuse to make these cessions.” 62 Mere rumor of a negotiation for transfer to Louisiana raised Federalist temperatures. Federalist reasoning on Louisiana and France was simple and logical. They were convinced that France had never abandoned her North American aspirations. If France should obtain Louisiana from Spain and, in a peace with Great Britain, regain Canada, obviously “the consequences would be very important to the United States.” Among other things, the acquisi¬ tion would lead to a separation of the trans-Allegheny West from the Union, attempts at which had already been incited by French agents. 63 61 See Yrujo to Pickering, Philadelphia, March 2, 1797, ASP FR, II, 68; Robert Liston to Lord Grenville, Philadelphia, June 24, 1797, in Turner, “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy. . . ,” AHR, X, 589-590; Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, ryg^-180^, p. 104. 62 Pickering to Rufus King, Dept, of State, Feb. 15, 1797, Pickering Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., Boston. Although France did not get Louisiana at Basel, Pickering’s suspicions were justified, as has been indicated, in that France had tried hard to get it. See Le comite de salut public a Barthelemy (Instructions), Paris, May 12, 1795, in Kaulec, Rapiers de Barthelemy, VI, 'TV- 3 The British suspected that Adet had recommended that recovery of Louisiana be joined with repossession of Canada. Liston to Grenville, Philadelphia, Nov. 18, 1796, Henry Adams Transcripts. 450 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Looking to future national development, Federalists reasoned that if French designs reached fruition “the United States would be encircled by an artful, insinuating, active nation, and must forever renounce the hope of obtaining by purchase or amicable means, the territory west of the Mississippi, to the ocean. If the French get footing there, nothing short of conquest will ever enable the Amer¬ icans to secure the property and jurisdiction of that vast country, which would otherwise naturally and easily fall into their range of settlements.” On the basis of such manifest destiny, “whether the French, Spaniards or English will make the best neighbors, is left for every one to determine.” 04 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., for one, did not mince words. If the French succeeded in getting a footing on the continent he was convinced that “they will be the worst and most dangerous neighbours we could have.” Unlike the English, the French will “be like ants and weasels in our barns and granaries.” 6 ' These were not the only dangers. French possession of Louisi¬ ana might lead to French domination of Mexico and Spanish lands to the South. “In the hands of the plodding Spaniards they do no harm and httle good to the world at large,” said a New England newspaper; “but in the hands of an active nation, Mexico would be a dangerous engine of power.” French entrenchment in Louisiana, furthermore, would endanger the possessions of all other powers in the West Indies. Even though grandoise, seemingly far-fetched, and “liable to errors,” such speculations, reasoned Federalists, were valid. Amer¬ icans needed to be vigilant. “The Americans possess the best re¬ gions of the North Continent[,] that is, that portion which unites the best climates, and a soil to make a bold hardy race of freemen. No doubt can exist that it is our interest to keep ourselves detached from European contests, and if possible prevent any powerful na¬ tion from making establishments in our neighborhood, which will be likely to excite jealousies, and controversies hereafter on this side of the Atlantick.” 66 64 The New Y or Herald, reprinted in the New Hampshire and Vermont journal: Or The Farmer’s Weekly Museum (Walpole, N. H.), Sept. 6, 1796. 65 Oliver Wolcott, Jr., to Oliver Wolcott, Sr., Philadelphia, Oct. 17, 1796, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 387-388. 66 The New Hampshire and Vermont journal: Or The Farmer’s Weekly Museum (Walpole, N. H.), Sept. 6, 1796. ADET’S WAR 45 1 Many thinking Federalists in these years echoed this refrain, which in 1796 was not directed against all of Europe, but specifically at France. Such ideas, of course, received their classic statement in Washington’s farewell to public office, and later in the Monroe Doctrine. Even Jefferson, in later years, adopted such reasoning as his own. It followed logically, then, that when Adet sent Collot on his reconnaissance the deed struck Federalist leaders as confirmation of their deep suspicions of French designs. General Collot, moreover, talked too much. He indiscreetly showed his “plan” to a “gentle¬ man” who forwarded the information to Oliver Wolcott, Jr., who in turn brought the damning evidence of the validity of Federalist suspicions to the attention of President Washington. Among other things, Wolcott’s informant stressed that he had seen Collot’s “in¬ structions in writing from M. Adet,” and that the Frenchmen “were moreover instructed to use all means in their power to pro¬ mote the election of Mr. Jefferson as President of the United States.” He implied, too, that Albert Gallatin was in collusion with Adet. Even before his departure, Collot’s objective and the existence of a French plot were known to the American government. 6 ' As a countermeasure, the Washington administration appropri¬ ated a secret service fund of five hundred dollars in hopes of dis¬ covering Adet’s accomplices. Secretary of War James McHenry took immediate steps to head off Collot’s expedition. To General Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest territory, he sent a warning to watch for the French spy who was out to encourage Westerners “to secede from the Union, and form a separate connec¬ tion with a foreign power.” Collot and his party, McHenry be¬ lieved, had important papers; he asked that St. Clair seize them and forward them to President Washington. 68 The Federalist officials also hired an undercover agent to follow Collot and to report on his activities. The agent reported to Oliver 87 See memoranda of May 19 and 21, 1796, Philadelphia, in Gibbs, ed., Wolcott Papers, I, 350-352; Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795-1803, p. 120. Adet had informed American and Spanish officials of Collot’s planned trip, obtaining—not without misgivings—their permission. He did not reveal the real intent of the trip. Kyte, “A Spy on the Western Waters,” MVHR, XXXIV, 431. 08 See McHenry to St. Clair, War Office, May, 1796, in Smith, The St. Clair Papers, II, 395-396. 452 ENTANGLING ALLIANCE Wolcott, Jr., that Collot attacked the Jay treaty and indicated that severe French reprisals would result. “We shall see, said he [Collot], how the mass of the people of this country will like the British alliance, and how they will treat those characters who have given it support; the energy and resources of France are not known in this country, for if they were, they should have been a sufficient motive to defeat British influence.” Then he added that “France has no footing on this continent, but who knows how soon they may get possession of Louisiana and both Floridas from the Spaniards in exchange for some other property? If such be the case, as there is great probability, what will become of the produce of your Ken¬ tucky, your western territory, indeed of all the country this side of the Alleghany mountains? You will be reduced to the necessity of throwing yourself into the arms of the French, and abandon the Union which cannot give you a market. . . .” 69 Several years later Judge Hugh Henry Brackenridge revealed that Collot, while on his “reconnaissance,” had called on him “fre¬ quently” and “without common prudence” had tried to win his support in gaining the Western country for France. Federalist Senator James Ross of Pennsylvania was at that time attempting to convert Brackenridge to support of the Jay treaty. He warned the judge about French intrigues, that “there was a party in the U. S. who wanted to overturn the govmt, who were in league with France, that France, by a secret article of treaty with Spain was to have Louisiana.” This, coupled with Collot’s indiscretions, con¬ vinced Brackenridge that “there was a conspiracy to deliver our country or some part of it at least to the French.” He reported his conversations with Collot to Ross, who gave the information to the President.' 0 Despite the continuing rumors—Monroe even reported from Paris rumors of French designs on Western territory, which the French denied—substantial evidence of French intrigue could not be uncovered. Pickering and other Federalists continued to believe that France threatened the existence of the Union and that Western¬ ers supported her seditious plots. Where there was intrigue, they were convinced, there were Frenchmen and Republicans. This was 460; and Hamilton’s program, 80; ideas on in Farewell Address, 468-469; partisan in Wash¬ ington years, 504; source of con¬ flict between Jefferson and Hamil¬ ton, 48, 59-60 Forman, Samuel E., Political Activi¬ ties of Philip Freneau, cited, 59 n. Founding fathers: appraisal of, 502- 503; and foreign policy, 31 France: accepts peace terms of 1783, 10; accuses U. S. of not maintain¬ ing neutrality, 417-418; alarmed over Anglo-American rapproche¬ ment, 443; attacks American ship¬ ping, 335-336; attitude toward American people, 444; close eco¬ nomic ties with U. S. never realized, 163; commerce with U. S., 352- 354; commercial policy of, 19, 152- 153; concessions to U. S. commerce, 13, 354; constitution of 1791 and American opinion, 177-180; con¬ tends tariff and tonnage duties in¬ consistent with alliance, 147-148; de- 520 INDEX cree calling for new U. S. commer¬ cial treaty, 157; decree retaliating against Jay treaty, 498-499; decrees against neutral shipping and U. S., 400-401, 438; and diplomatic prece¬ dence, 437; Directory’s policy to¬ ward U. S., 428-429; effort to re¬ cover Louisiana, 367; failure of commercial policy, 20; and Fare¬ well Address, 470; fearful of Pinck¬ ney negotiations with Spain, 367; fears of Jay mission, 359; and flag episode with Washington, 435-436; grievances against U. S., 376-377; hostility to Gouverneur Morris, 318, 323-324, 326, 334; in¬ formation on comes through Eng¬ land, 18; injuries to American com¬ merce, 494-495; intervenes in elec¬ tion of 1796, 457; merchants of oppose commercial concessions to U. S., 20, 76; need for food, 396, 399-400, 403; neglected diplomats in U. S., 169; and newU. S. com¬ mercial treaty, 146, 409; opens West Indies to U. S., 92; plans for Cana¬ da, 455; policy toward U. S., 8, 14, 455; reaction to Jay treaty, 360, 371; reaction to John Adams’s election, 493-494; refused to receive Amer¬ ican minister until grievances alle¬ viated, 388; relations with U. S. during Confederation, 17; reposses¬ sion of Louisiana, 449-450, 454- 455; repudiates “freedom of seas” and 1778 commercial treaty, 379; royalty of hostile to U. S., 17; sale of prizes in U. S., 437-438; seizes American ships, 99, 488; special mission of U. S. to, 491-492; spe¬ cial relationship to U. S., 4; strove to build commercial bond with U. S., 144; threat of ultimatum to U. S., 372-373; traders unable to profit from U. S. commerce, 153; treaties of 1778, 205; Treaty of Amity and Commerce, 5; treaty obligations to U. S., 401-402; tried to control U. S., n; ultimatum of and Hamilton, 373; ultimatum of and Monroe, 374-375; U. S. debt to, 16, 171, 199, 324-326; and U. S. Maritime principles, 91; and U. S. relations in 1789, 141-142; and Western intrigue, 446 Franco-American alliance; see French alliance Franco-American relations, reversed in eight years, 4 Franklin, Benjamin: death of and Franco-American relations, 156 n.; diplomacy in France, 27-28; diplo¬ matic skill, 11; and French alliance, 27; quoted, 3; signs consular con¬ vention, 22 Fraser, Charles, Reminiscences of Charleston, cited, 128 n. Free ships, free goods: principles of, 99, 400, 401 n.; French abandon, 498; French violation of, 439 Freeman, Douglas S.: George Wash¬ ington, cited, 34 n.; “Washington’s Hardest Decision,” cited, 34 n. French alliance: 4, 5; American dis¬ trust of, 9, 10; and American neu¬ trality, 189; attacked by Federalists, 477; attacked by Pickering, 482-486; and Benjamin Franklin, 27; at close of Washington administration, 500; considered terminated in 1783, 15; danger to, 431; and democratic so¬ cieties, 252-253; Directory threatens to abrogate, 372; effect of Gouver¬ neur Morris on, 341; effect of Jay treaty on, 108-109; an d election of 1796, 140; end heralded, 387; en¬ dangered by Genet, 290; England wished to displace, 77-78; and en¬ tanglement, 11, 505-506; and Fau- chet, 421, 422; and Federalists, 285, 412, 441; and Federalists and Re¬ publicans, 50; fused foreign policy with politics, 230; and Genet, 197, 198; and Gouverneur Morris, 314; Hamilton attacks, 227-228; Hamil¬ ton tries to jettison, 88: influence on domestic politics, 461-462; and James Monroe, 347; and Jay mis¬ sion, 342; and Jay treaty, 136, 428, 429; Jefferson hoped to reinforce, INDEX 82; and John Quincy Adams, 370; and Louisiana, 410; main bulwark of, 308; meaningless, 499; no de¬ fenders in Washington’s govern¬ ment, 63; and Northwest posts, 13; not invoked by Genet, 202; opposi¬ tion to, 150-151; pleases Washing¬ ton, 7; and possibility of war, 489- 490; and proclamation of neutrality, 90, 227-231; proposal to revise, 162; and protective tariff, 73-74; and Robespierre, 395; source of Franco- American friction, 506; spirit vio¬ lated in 1783, 9; status of, 191-195; supported by Jefferson, 51; Talley¬ rand’s view of, 445; target of Fare¬ well Address, 465, 467; touched off a world war, 8; and U. S. obliga¬ tions, 419; value to France, 170; and Washington’s policy, 510-511 French benevolent and patriotic so¬ cieties, and democratic societies, 254 French Revolution: American reaction to, 173-174; and American Revolu¬ tion, 176-178; attacked by John Adams, 174-175; Federalist opposi¬ tion to, 181; and Franco-American commerce, 145, 154; and Franco- American relations, 30; Gouverneur Morris’s antipathy toward, 314; im¬ pact on U. S., 85-86; influence on Jefferson, 55, 55 m-56 n.; and Jeffer¬ son, 29; problems from wars of, 32; reports of Gouverneur Morris on, 33 x ' 334 i an d Saint Domingue, 172 French ships, and American neutral¬ ity, 431-434 Freneau, Philip, founds National Ga¬ zette, 58-59 Frontiersmen, U. S., and France, 239 Fulton, Samuel, and French in the West, 447 Funding plan, Hamilton’s, 40 Galbaud, Thomas Frajicis: governor- general of Saint Domingue, 272; and Genet, 278-280 Gallatin, Albert: attacks Hamilton’s system, 460-461; leads attacks on 5 21 Hamilton’s financial policies, 64-65; quoted, 275 Gardoqui, Diego de: and Monroe, 356; negotiations with Jay, 243-244 Gazette and Daily Advertiser (Charleston, S. C.), cited, 443 n. Gazette Nationale ou Moniteur Uni- versel, cited, 360 n. Gazette of the United States (Phila¬ delphia): cited, 58 n.; founded, 59 Genet, Edmond C.: abandoned by Jefferson and Madison, 289; alarms Washington, 89; and American merchants, 281; appeal to Congress, 302-303; appeal to the people, 218, 261, 285-289; appraisal of, 284, 306- 310; arrives in U. S., 173; bio¬ graphical sketch, 183-185; blundered in Little Sarah affair, 222; and Canada, 247-248; and commercial treaty of 1778, 210; and debt pay¬ ment, 212; demands prosecution of Jay and King, 292-294; and demo¬ cratic societies, 252-253; desperate need for money, 250, 280; did not invoke French alliance, 197; Fed¬ eralist efforts to destroy, 260; and French fleet, 275-276; and French refugees, 277, 281-282; and Gouver¬ neur Morris, 336-338; and Henfield case, 214-216; injures French alli¬ ance, 290, 297, 308, 309; instructions of, 198-200; and Jay-King certifi¬ cate, 287-289; landing at Charles¬ ton, 200; and mutinous sailors, 278-279; and new commercial trea¬ ty, 162; origins of his mission, 182- 183; Papers, Library of Congress, cited, 142 n.; and political parties, 283-284; protests British violations of neutrality, 232; publication of correspondence, 302-303; reaction to his recall, 300-301; recall, 298-299, 304; shocked by neutrality proc¬ lamation, 202; struggle with Fed¬ eralist government, 211, 213; and tonnage duties, 282-283; and West¬ ern plots, 235-236 Genet, George Clinton, Washington, 522 INDEX Jefferson and "Citizen Genet,” cit¬ ed, 183 n. Georgia Gazette (Savannah), quoted, 31 Gerard, James W., “French Spolia¬ tions Before 1801,” cited, 335 n. Gibbs, George, ed., Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams, cited, 61 n. Gilbert, Felix: “English Background of American Isolationism,” cited, 6 n.; “New Diplomacy of the Eight¬ eenth Century,” cited, 6n. Giles, William Branch, defends demo¬ cratic societies, 264-265 Gilman, Daniel C., James Monroe, cited, 390 n. Gilpatrick, Delbert EL, Jeffersonian Democracy in North Carolina, cited, 93 n- Girondins, plans for Spanish Amer¬ ica, 236 Glorious First of June, British naval victory over French, 404 Goldman, Eric F., ed., Historiography and Urbanization, cited, 465 n. Gottschalk, Louis R.: “Lafayette as Commercial Expert,” cited, 20 n.; (ed.) Letters of Lafayette to Wash¬ ington, cited, 319 n.; Place of the American Revolution in the Causal Pattern of the French Revolution, cited, 8 n. Govan, Thomas P., “The Rich, the Well-Born, and Alexander Hamil¬ ton,” cited, 38 n. Graham, Gerald S.: Empire of the North Atlantic, cited, 205 n.; Sea Power and British North Amer¬ ica, cited, 74 n. Grange (British ship), captured by the French, 207-208 Great Britain: Caribbean ship seiz¬ ures, 93; control over news reaching U. S., 18-19; eases food seizures, 402; and food blockade, 400; His¬ torical Manuscripts Commission Re¬ ports, Dropmore Papers, cited, 79 n.; Jay treaty debate alarms, 136; offers aid against France, 375-376; Orders-in-Council of 1793-1794, 92; policy toward French alliance, 19; policy toward U. S. changes, 72; possibility of alliance with U. S., 453-454; refuses normal diplomatic relations with U. S., 12; relations with U. S., 67; relaxes Orders-in- Council, 100; tie to the U. S., 307; tried to control U. S., 11; and U. S. rapprochement, 140; violates Treaty of Paris of 1783, 12; violations of U. S. neutrality, 231-234, 434-435; war crisis with U. S., 94 Greenville, Treaty of, no, 267 Grenville, Lord, British foreign min¬ ister: had State Department’s secret cypher, 106; offers U. S. aid against France, 375-376 Griswold, Rufus W., The Republican Court, cited, 166 n. Guttridge, George H., David Hart¬ ley, M. P., cited, 15 n. Guyot, Raymond, Le Directoire et la paix de I’Europe, cited, 430 n. Hale, Edward E. and Edward E., Jr., Franlffin and France, cited, 27 n. Hall, F. R., “Genet’s Western In¬ trigue,” cited, 238 n. Hamilton, Alexander: advises Wash¬ ington on retirement, 464; alarmed by French seizures of American shipping, 488; argues French trea¬ ties not binding, 192-193; and armed neutrality of 1794, 106-107; and assumption of state debts, 42- 43; attacks French alliance, 489-490; and Bank of the United States, 43; biographical sketch, 36-39; and Brit¬ ish constitution, 38; clash with Jef¬ ferson over neutrality regulations, 224-226; collaboration with British, 71-72; defends neutrality proclama¬ tion, 227-228; drew up Jay’s instruc¬ tions, 104; and election of 1796, 471- 472; and four-fold program of, 39; four notable reports of, 40 n.; and French alliance, 88; and funding plan, 40-42; and Genet’s appeal to the people, 285-289; initiates Genet’s INDEX 523 dismissal, 297; and Little Sarah af¬ fair, 219; and Monroe’s successor in Paris, 385; and neutrality proclama¬ tion, 187-190; and Nootka Sound crisis, 70; opposes commercial retal¬ iation against England, 76; opposes relaxing tonnage laws, 149; and Pickering’s note of Jan., 1797, 485; policies based on peace with Great Britain, 46-47; and political parties, 35; political philosophy of, 54-55; political system of, 32; program of lacked popular support, 48; pro¬ poses British commercial treaty, 160; proposes modification of French treaties, 373; proposes new Franco-American treaty, 158; quot¬ ed, 204, 392; relations with George Hammond, 81-82; and Report on Manufactures, 44; resigns secretary¬ ship, 63; responsible for Jay’s treaty, no; rivalry with Jefferson, 53, 56- 60, 80, 172; sidetracks anti-British legislation, 78; source of Washing¬ ton’s foreign policy, 508-509; and special mission to France, 492; sug¬ gests British aid against French, 376; suggests new commercial treaty with France, 150 n.; system of and 1796 election, 458; system of under attack, 460-461; and the tie to England, 56 Hamilton, John C.: History of the Republic of the United States, cited, 37 n.; (ed.) Worlds of Alexander Hamilton, cited, 39 n. Hamilton-Knox certificate, 292-293 Hamilton, Stanislaus M., ed., Writings of James Monroe, cited, 90 n. Hammond, George: appointed minis¬ ter to U. S., 79; attacks French alliance, 121; complains of U. S. embargo, 405; contributes to Ge¬ net’s dismissal, 296; and French naval mutiny, 278; gives Fauchet’s despatch to Wolcott, 123; and Ham¬ ilton, 81; and Jefferson, 81; quoted, 164; quoted on American neutrality, 93; and Randolph, 119 Haraszti, Zoltan, John Adams and the Prophets of Progress, cited, 174 n. Harlow, Vincent T., Founding of the Second British Empire, cited, 9 n. Harmar, General Josiah, defeated by Indians, 84 Harper, Robert G., Select Worlds of Robert Goodloe Harper, cited, 181 n. Hartford Gazette, quoted, 31 Hayden, Ralston, Senate and Treaties, cited, 104 n. Hazen, Charles D., American Opin¬ ion of the French Revolution, cited, 86 n. Heckscher, Eli F., The Continental System, cited, 153 n. “Helvidius,” James Madison, 228 Henderson, Archibald, “Isaac Shelby and the Genet Mission,” cited, 239 n. Henfield, Gideon, case of, 214-216 Henry Adams Transcripts: see British Foreign Correspondence Herald: Gazette for the Country (New York), cited, 285 n. Hichborn, Benjamin, and Jay treaty, 3 6 3 Hildreth, Richard, History of the United States, cited, 435 n. Hill, David J., “Franklin and the French Alliance,” cited, 27 n. Hinsdale, Mary L., History of the President’s Cabinet, cited, 63 n. Holdsworth, John T. and Davis R. Dewey, First and Second Ban\s of the United States, cited, 43 n. Holt, W. Stull, Treaties Defeated by the Senate, cited, 32 n. Home, Rodham, attempt to capture Fauchet, 417 Horses, and U. S. neutrality, 434-435 House of Representatives: debate over Jay treaty, 134-139; votes funds for Jay treaty, 430 Hugues, Victor, governor of Guada- loupe, attacked American shipping, 495 524 INDEX Hunt, Gaillard, ed., Writings of fames Madison, cited, 33 n. . Hyneman, C. S.: First American Neu¬ trality, cited, non.; “Neutrality During the European Wars,” cited, 109 n. Iacuzzi, Alfred, fohn Adams Scholar, cited, 174 n. Independent Chronicle and the Uni¬ versal Advertiser (Boston), cited, 12 n. Independent Gazeteer (Philadelphia), cited, 103 n. Indian buffer state, idea of, 83, 85 Indian relations in the Northwest, 85 Iredell, James, Papers, cited, 481 n. Isolationism: early sentiment of, 6n.; during Washington administration, 504-505 Jacobin clubs, and democratic socie¬ ties, 252 Jacobins: history of and James Mon¬ roe, 354-355; succeed Girondins, 250; and U. S. relations with France, 395 Jacobs, James R., Tarnished Warrior, cited, 244 n. James, Cyril L. R., The Blac\ Jaco¬ bins, cited, 274 n. James, James A.: “French Diplomacy and American Politics,” cited, 392 n.; “French Opinion as a Factor in Preventing War,” cited, 409 n.; Life of George Rogers Clar\, cited, 201 n. Jameson, J. Franklin, ed., “Letters of Stephen Higginson, 1783-1804,” cited, 14 n. fane (British ship), case of, 232 Jay-Gardoqui treaty, 243-244 Jay, John: certificate episode and Washington, 295-296; defends his treaty, 116-117; diplomatic skill, n; and French alliance, 15, 342; and Genet’s appeal to the people, 285- 289; instructions of, 107-108; in¬ structions drawn up by Hamilton, 104; nominated for mission to Eng¬ land, 102; offers Monroe treaty con¬ tents, 361; and peace negotiations of 1783, 9; popular in England, 105; quoted, 3; quoted on foreign policy, 12; quoted on French trade, 13; refuses permanent post in London, 343; Republican opposition to mis¬ sion of, 103; and Spanish frontier intrigue, 25; urges Congress not to ratify consular convention, 23 Jay mission: and Fauchet, 407-408; and James Monroe’s instructions, 348 Jay treaty: Adet’s reaction to, 425-426; approved by Senate, 112; attacked by Judge Rutledge, 128; called Hamilton’s treaty, no; contents dis¬ closed, 113; criticized by Monroe, 369; debate in House of Representa¬ tives over, 134-139; and democratic societies, 255-256; effect on France of 260; effect on French alliance, 108-109; an d election of 1796, 140, 458; and Fauchet, 409, 411, 412- 415; and French charge that French alliance vitiated, 377, 378; French retaliation against, 498-499; French view of, 478; Hamilton defends, 116-117; ar *d James Monroe, 359- 366; popular opposition to, 113-115, I 3 2 " I 33‘> ratifications exchanged, 127; ratified by Washington, 118; sows seeds of war with France, 419; violated spirit of French treaties of 1778, 109; and Washington’s great¬ est political crisis, hi; and Whiskey Rebellion, 268 Jefferson, Thomas: abandons Genet, 289, 297; and American debts to France, 16; appraisal of Genet, 284- 285; appraised by Adet, 492 n.; at¬ tacks Washington, 463; and Bank of the United States, 43; biographi¬ cal sketch, 51-53; clashes with John Adams, 175-176; clash with Ham¬ ilton over neutrality regulations, 224-226; and commercial treaty to strengthen French alliance, 160; complains of Hamilton’s tampering with foreign policy, 59-60; defends democratic societies, 263; and diplo- INDEX macy with France, 28-29; drafts new French commercial treaty, 159; on Franco-American commerce, 155; and French alliance, 88; and Genet, 208-209; and George Ham- mond, 81; and Gouverneur Morris, 333-334; insists French treaties bind¬ ing, 193-195; leader of Republican party, 50; and Little Sarah, 219-222; main bulwark of French alliance, 308; and Michaux, 248; and neu¬ trality proclamation, 187-190; and new Franco-American commercial treaty, 157-158; and Nootka Sound crisis, 70; and Northwest posts, 13; opposes Hamilton’s program, 48; and political parties, 35; political philosophy, 54-55; publishes British correspondence, 302; quoted, 31, 311; quoted on French affection for U. S., 18; quoted on source of French news, 18 n.; quoted on U. S. diplomats, 23; report on cod and whale fisheries, 77; report on state of American commerce, 95; resigns secretaryship, 63; rivalry with Ham¬ ilton, 53, 56-60, 80, 172; signs re¬ vised consular convention, 24; and Spanish frontier problems, 245-246; urges Congress to relax tonnage laws, 148-149 Jensen, Merrill, The New Nation, cited, 12 m-13 n. Johnson, Emory R., and others, His¬ tory of Domestic and Foreign Com¬ merce of the United States, cited, 47 n - Johnston, Henry P., ed., Correspond¬ ence and Public Papers of John fay, cited, 10 n. Johnston, Samuel, quoted, 424 Jones, Howard Mumford, America and French Culture, cited, 17 n. Jones, Joseph, Papers, cited, 1140. Jones, R. L., “America’s First Con¬ sular Convention,” cited, 23 Jusserand, J. )., “La Jeunesse du cito- yen Genet,” cited, 183 n. 5 2 5 Kaulec, Jean, ed., Papiers de Barthel- emy, cited, 338 n. Keith, Alice B., “Relaxations in the British Restrictions on the Amer¬ ican Trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802,” cited, 12 n. Kellogg, Louise P., “Letter of Thomas Paine,” cited, 237 n. Kennan, George F., Realities of Amer¬ ican Foreign Policy, cited, 503 n. Kentucky, anti-Spanish sentiment in, 249 Kentucky Gazette (Lexington): cited, 238 n.; quoted, 311 Kent, William, Memoirs and Letters of fames Kent, cited, 471 Kilroe, Edwin P., Saint Tammany, cited, 256 n. Kimball, Marie, Jefferson and the Scene of Europe, cited, 28 n. King, Charles C., ed., Life and Corre¬ spondence of Rufus King, cited, 102 n. King, George A., French Spoliation Claims, cited, 108 n. King, Rufus: certificate episode and Washington, 295-296; defends Jay treaty, 116-117; an d Genet’s appeal to the people, 285-289; “Letters of Rufus King, 1784-1786,” cited, 12 n.; Papers, cited, 494 n. Kinnaird, Lawrence, ed., Spain in the Mississippi Valley, cited, 239 n. Kite, Elizabeth S., “Benjamin Frank¬ lin—Diplomat,” cited, 27 n. Koch, Adrienne: “Hamilton, Adams and the Pursuit of Power,” cited, 37 n.; Jefferson and Madison: The Great Collaboration, cited, 44 n.; The Philosophy of Thomas Jeffer¬ son, cited, 52 n. Kyte, George W., “A Spy on the Western Waters,” cited, 447 n. La Decade Philosophique, cited, 444 n - Lafayette, Marquis de, and Gouver¬ neur Morris, 328-330 La Forest, French commissioner, 393- 394 INDEX 526 Larevelliere-Lepeaux, Louis Marie, Memoires, cited, 380 n. La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, Francois Alexandre Frederic: estimate of the Jay treaty, 478; Travels Through the United States, cited, 28 n.; quoted, 501 Larson, Harold, “Alexander Hamil¬ ton: The Fact and Fiction of His Early Years,” cited, 37 n. Latane, John H., “Jefferson’s Influence on American Foreign Policy,” cited, 29 n. La Vengeance (French vessel), case of, 43 1 ' 43 2 Learned, Henry B., The President’s Cabinet, cited, 63 n. Leary, Lewis, That Rascal Freneau, cited, 59 n. Le Blanc, French commissioner, 393- 394 Le Brun, Pierre-Helene-Marie, and debt to France, 321-322 Le Cassius (French vessel), case of, 433-434 Lee, Charles, appointed Attorney Gen¬ eral, 64 L’Embuscade (French frigate): duel with the Boston, 269-271; sails for Philadelphia, 201 Le Trosne, Guillaume-Frangois, ideas on alliances, 468 Libby, O. G., “Political Factions in Washington’s Administrations,” cit¬ ed, 33 n. Link, Eugene P.: Democratic-Repub¬ lican Societies, cited, 235 n.; “Dem¬ ocratic Societies of the Carolinas,” cited, 253 n. Lipscomb, Andrew S. and Albert E. Bergh, eds., Writings of Thomas Jefferson, cited, 32 n. Liston, Sir Robert, Papers, cited, 43 1 n - Little Sarah: case of, 217-223; Genet’s undoing, 285 Livingston, Edward: demands Jay papers, 134; supports Genet in libel case, 294 Livingston, Robert R., refuses Paris post, 343 Lodge, Henry Cabot: Historical and Political Essays, cited, 327 n.; Life and Letters of George Cabot, cited, 100 n.; War Addresses, cited, 470 n.; (ed.) Worlds of Alexander Hamil¬ ton, cited, 40 n. Logan, George, and Monroe’s letter to, 384-385 Logan, Rayford W., Diplomatic Re¬ lations of the United States with Haiti, cited, 144 n. Lokke, Carl L.: (ed.) Fauchet Me- moire, cited, 392 n.; France and the Colonial Question, cited, 8 n.; “Lon¬ don Merchant Interest in the St. Domingue Plantations,” cited, 277 n.; “Saint Domingue in Anglo- Spanish Diplomacy,” cited, 277 n. Loughrey, Mary E., France and Rhode Island, cited, 178 n. Louis XVI: execution of, 180-181; and Gouverneur Morris, 316, 327- 328; impact of execution on U. S., 86 Louisiana: and Fauchet, 410-411; French effort to recover, 367; French interest in, 25; French pa¬ triots never reconciled to its loss, 26; French repossession of, 449-450, 454-455; and Genet, 236-237; Pick¬ ering warns France on, 453-454 Lowitt, Richard, “Activities of Citizen Genet in Kentucky,” cited, 201 n. Luetscher, George D., Early Political Machinery in the United States, cit¬ ed, 33 n. Lyon, E. Wilson: “The Directory and the United States,” cited, 499 n.; Louisiana in French Diplomacy, cited, 25 n.; The Man Who Sold Louisiana, cited, 20 n. Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de, and ideas on alliances, 468 McCarrell, David K., “The Formation of the Jeffersonian Party in Vir¬ ginia,” cited, 33 n. INDEX McCormick, Richard P., History of Voting in New Jersey, cited, 49 n. McGillivray, Alexander, quoted, 25 n. McHenry, James: appointed Secretary of War, 64; and Collot expedition, 451-452 Maclay, William, Journal of William Maclay, cited, 41 n. McMaster, John B.: History of the People of the United States, cited, 3 n.; Life and Times of Stephen Girard, cited, 205 n. McRee, J. Griffith, Life and Corre¬ spondence of James Iredell, cited, 111 n. Madison, James: abandons Genet, 289; and anti-British trade resolutions, 95-97; attacks Hamilton, 228-229; defends democratic societies, 263, 265; opposes funding of debts, 41; opposes Hamilton’s program, 48; Letters and Other Writings of James Madison, cited, 394 n.; pro¬ poses protective tariff, 73; refuses Paris post, 343; on Washington’s Farewell, 469 Mahan, Alfred Thayer, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolu¬ tion, cited, 404 n. Malone, Dumas: Jefferson and His Time, cited, 52 n.; Jefferson and the Rights of Man, cited, 18 n. Mangourit, Michel Ange Bernard de, French consul in Charleston: aids Genet, 201, 238; Monroe blocks ap¬ pointment to U. S., 379 Manifesto, of Adet against Washing¬ ton government, 439-441 Manning, William K., Nootf^a Sound Controversy, cited, 68 n. Marchand, Jean, ed., “Une lettre du Due de Liancourt a Talleyrand,” cited, 491 n. Marie Antoinette, and court attitude toward U. S., 17-18 Maritime principles, U. S.: and com- merical treaty with France, 91; Jay treaty violated, 109 Marraro, Howard R., “Four Versions 5 2 7 of Jefferson’s Letter to Mazzei,” cited, 463 n. Marsh, Philip M.: “Freneau and Jef¬ ferson,” cited, 58 n.; “James Mon¬ roe as Agricola,” cited, 287 n.; “Jefferson and Freneau,” cited, 59 n.; “John Beckley,” cited, 126 n.; (ed.) Monroe’s Defense of Jefferson and Freneau, cited, 59 n.; “Ran¬ dolph and Hamilton,” cited, 121 n. Marshall, John: and French diplo¬ matic post, 386; Life of George Washington, cited, 120 n.; and neu¬ trality policy, 230; quoted, 164 Maryland Gazette (Annapolis), cited, 69 n. Mason, Stevens Thomson, senator from Virginia: divulges contents of Jay treaty, 113, 427; quoted, 435 Masson, Frederic, Departement des affaires etrangeres, cited, 165 n. Masterson, William H., William Blount, cited, 448 n. May, Thomas R., and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter, cited, 244 n. Mayo, Bernard, ed., Instructions to the British Minister to the United States, cited, 79 n. Mazzei, Philip: and Jefferson letter, 463; Recherches historiques, cited, 174 n. Meng, John J., ed., Despatches and Instructions of Conrad Alexandre Gerard, cited, 4 m-5 n. Merchants, American: and Genet, 281; and Jay treaty, 137 The Mercury (Boston), cited, 220 n. Michaux, Andre: and Genet’s plots, 237; and Jefferson, 248 Mifflin, Thomas, governor of Pennsyl¬ vania, and Genet, 218 Miller, David Hunter, ed., Treaties and Other International Acts, cited, 5 n - Miller, William, “Democratic Socie¬ ties and the Whiskey Insurrection,” cited, 253 n. Mims, Stewart L., ed., Moreau de INDEX 528 Saint-Mery’s Voyage aux Etats- Unis, cited, 3711.-3811. Minnigerode, Meade, Edmund Charles Genet, cited, 182 11.-183 n - Miranda, Francisco de, plans of, 199 Mississippi, navigation of: and Fau- chet, 410; and Monroe, 355-356, 366-368; and Monroe’s instructions, 348; and Spain, 239 Mitchell, Broadus, “The Secret of Alexander Hamilton,” cited, 37 n. Monaghan, Frank, John Jay, cited, 24 n. Monroe, James: accused of disloyalty, 378; appointed minister to France, 343- 344; assures French on Jay treaty, 363; biographical sketch, 344- 347; blunder on Jay treaty, 361; a cat’s paw for Federalist policy, 344; and commerce with France, 352-354; criticizes Jay treaty, 369; defends American policy, 377-378; farewell to Directory, 388-389; and flag episode, 358-359; and Fourth of July episode, 381-382; and French ultimatum, 374-375; held responsi¬ ble for French hostility, 380-381; history of the Jacobins, 354-355; indiscreet concessions to France, 353; instructions of, 347-349; and Jay treaty, 359-366; and navigation of Mississippi, 355-356, 366-368; op¬ poses appointment of Gouverneur Morris to French post, 317; Papers, cited, 317 n.; publishes A View of the Conduct of the Executive, cited, 390, 390 n.; quoted, 342, 392; recall of, 382-387; received by National Convention, 349-350; refuses Jay treaty contents from Trumbull, 362; reprimanded, 351; and Thomas Paine, 357-359; undermines admin¬ istration foreign policy, 375 Montague, Ludwell L., Haiti and the United States, cited, 171 n. Montmorin, Comte de, French for¬ eign minister, defends French alli¬ ance, 15-16 Moreau de Saint-Mery, Mederic Louis Elie, Voyage aux Etats-Unis de l’Amerique, cited, 370.-380. Morgenthau, Hans J., In Defense of the National Interest, cited, 502 n. Morison, John H., Life of Hon. Jere¬ miah Smith, cited, 264 n. Morison, Samuel E.: Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, cited, 32 n.; Maritime History of Massachusetts, cited, 49 n.; (ed.) “A Yankee Skip¬ per in San Domingo,” cited, 495 n. Morris, Anne Cary, ed., Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris, cited, 327 n. Morris, Gouverneur: appointed min¬ ister to France, 316-320; appraisal of mission to France, 341; biograph¬ ical sketch, 311-317; and debt to France, 320-322; executive agent to Great Britain, 68; and French at¬ tacks on American shipping, 335- 336; French hostility to, 334-335; and Genet, 336-338; and Genet’s recall, 304; gives asylum to French royalists, 326-328; ideas on foreign policy, 313-314; and Lafayette, 328- 330; and mission to England, 315; recall of, 337-340; and Reign of Terror, 322-323; report on English mission, 77; reports on French Revolution, 331-334; and Thomas Paine, 330-331; and U. S. debt to France, 324-326 Morris, Robert, 312, 316, 319 Morse, Anson E., Federalist Party in Massachusetts, cited, i79n.-i8on. Mott, Frank L., American Journalism, cited, 59 n. Moultrie, William, and Genet, 201, 238 Mount Vernon (American vessel), case of, 384 n. Moustier, Eleonor Francois Elie, min¬ ister to U. S.: 165-168; advocates French recovery of Louisiana, 26; and French alliance, 15 Moustier, Renaud de, “Les Etats-Unis au lendemain de la guerre de l’in- dependence d’apres la correspon- dance diplomatique inedite du INDEX 529 comte de Moustier,” cited, nn. Mud Island, fortification of, 219, 220 Murdoch, Richard K.: “Citizen Man- gourit,” cited, 13 n.; “Genesis of the Genet Schemes,” cited, 182 n.; Georgia-Florida Frontier, cited, 201 n. Murray, William Vans: Papers, Li¬ brary of Congress, cited, 14 n.; Pa¬ pers, Princeton University Library, cited, 8 n.; quoted, 141; quoted on Anglo-French rivalry, 14 Mutiny of French fleet, 273 Mutual naturalization agreement, France and U. S., 160-162 Nasatir, Abraham P., “Anglo-Span- ish Frontier,” cited, 247 n. National Archives; see State Depart¬ ment National Convention of France, re¬ ceives Monroe, 349-350 National Gazette (Philadelphia): cit¬ ed, 223 n.; founded, 58; quoted, 501 Nationalism, and friction with France, 5 °7 Navigation bill of 1791, and British trade, 78 Neuman, H., quoted, 66 Neutrality: benevolent, 195; British violations of, 231-234; problems of, 87, 186-190; proclamation of, 45, 47, 88-89; proclamation of and dem¬ ocratic societies, 254; proclamation of and French alliance, 90; procla¬ mation of and Jefferson-Hamilton conflict, 187-190; proclamation of and key to Washington’s foreign policy, 467; proclamation of and political controversy, 227-231; proc¬ lamation of and presidential pow¬ ers, 90-91; second proclamation of, 249-250; state governors to en¬ force, 213-214; under law of nations, 234 n.; U. S. policy of, 206, 208- 209; U. S. principles of, 91-92; U. S. “Rules Governing Belligerents,” 223-225 Nevins, Allan: The American States During and After the Revolution, cited, 32 n.; “Hamilton” in Dic¬ tionary of American Biography, cit¬ ed, 36 n. New England, opposes British war, 98 New Hampshire and Vermont Jour¬ nal: Or, The Farmer’s Weekly Mu¬ seum (Walpole, N. H.), cited, 357 n - New Yor\ Diary, cited, 229 n. New Yorp Herald, cited, 1140. New Yor\ Journal, cited, 96 n. New Yor ^ Minerva, cited, 117 m Newcomb, Josiah T., “New Light on Jay’s Treaty,” cited, 105 n. Newlin, Claude M., Life and Writ¬ ings of Hugh Henry Brac\enridge, cited, 190 n. Nootka Sound controversy: and Brit¬ ish attitude toward U. S., 72; dem¬ onstrates Jefferson-Hamilton differ¬ ences, 73; between Spain and Great Britain, 68-69; an d Spanish frontier problems, 245 Nootka Sound Convention, 69 Northwest frontier: British posts, 82- 83; grievances of, 84 Northwest posts, and French alliance, Nouvelle biographie generate, cited, 165 n. Nussbaum, Frederick L.: “American Tobacco and French Politics,” cited, 152 n.; Commercial Policy in the French Revolution, cited, 20 n.; “French Colonial Arret of 1784,” cited, 19 n. Oliver, Frederick S., Alexander Ham¬ ilton, cited, 38 n. Orders-in-Council; see Great Britain Osgood, David, Wonderful Worths of God, cited, 267 n. Otto, Louis-Guillaume, celebrates French alliance, 168 “Pacificus,” Alexander Hamilton, 227 Padover, Saul K., Jefferson, cited, 52 n. Page, Thomas W., “The Earlier Com¬ mercial Policy of the United States,” cited, 40 n. 53 ° INDEX Paine, Thomas: and Gouverneur Mor¬ ris, 330-331; and James Monroe, 357-358; pleads for life of Louis XVI, 183; Rights of Man, 175 Pallain, Georges, ed., Correspondance Diplomatique de Talleyrand, cited, 445 n - Palmer, R. R.: “A Neglected Work: Otto Vossler on Jefferson and the Revolutionary Era,” cited, 29 n.; “Revolutionary Republican,” cited, 238 n. Paltsits, Victor H., ed., Washington’s Farewell Address, cited, 465 n. Parish, John C., “Intrigues of Doctor James O’Fallon,” cited, 237 n. Parrington, Vernon L., Main Currents in American Thought, cited, 36 n. Parsons, Theophilus, Memoir of The- ophilus Parsons, cited, 139 n. Patterson, Caleb P., Constitutional Principles of Thomas Jefferson, cit¬ ed, 32 n. Paulson, Peter, “Tammany Society and the Jeffersonian Movement,” cited, 256 n. Perkins, Bradford: (ed.) “A Diplo¬ mat’s Wife in Philadelphia,” cited, 425 n.; First Rapprochement, cited, 140 n.; (ed.) “Lord Hawkesbury and the Jay-Grenville Negotiations,” cited, 105 n. Perkins, James H., Annals of the West, cited, 83 n. Perroud, Cl., ed.: /. P. Brissot: Cor¬ respondance et papiers, cited, 236 n.; Memoires de Madame Roland, cit¬ ed, 185 n. Petite Demon ate, case of; see Little Sarah Petry, French commissioner, 393-394 Philadelphia Gazette and Universal Daily Advertiser, cited, 412 n. Phillips, Ulrich B.: (ed.) “South Carolina Federalist Correspond¬ ence,” cited, 473 n.; “South Caro¬ lina Federalists,” cited, ii5n. Phillips, W. Allison, and Arthur H. Reede, Neutrality, cited, 92 n. Pickering, Octavius, and C. W. Up- ham, Life of Timothy Pickering, cited, 113 n. Pickering, Timothy: accuses Monroe of disloyalty, 378; and Adet’s mani¬ festoes, 474; becomes Secretary of State, 64, 126; biographical sketch, 126-127; and British violations of U. S. neutrality, 435; criticizes French alliance, 367-368; diplomatic note of Jan., 1797, 484; and French decree of July, 1796, 439; on French seizures of U. S. shipping, 496; holds Monroe responsible for French hostility, 380-381; and Lou¬ isiana, 449; Papers, cited, in n.; re¬ views relations with France, 482- 486; says French alliance not vio¬ lated, 371; warns France on Louisi¬ ana* 453-454 Pinckney, Charles Cotesworth: ap¬ pointment to Paris post, 385, 386; on relations with France, 390-391, 478 Pinckney, Thomas: Hamilton’s candi¬ date for President in 1796, 471; and Lafayette, 329; minister to Great Britain, 79; mission to Spain, 251 n.; Paris post, 343; visits Paris, 366 Pinckney treaty: 368; influence on democratic societies, 267; influence on Jay treaty, 133 Pitkin, Timothy, Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States, cited, 21 n. Political parties: 4, 34-36; and demo¬ cratic societies, 269; and Genet, 283- 284, 309; and Hamiltonian system, 47; origins of, 33 Politics, domestic: and Adet, 456; dur¬ ing Confederation period, 12; and foreign policy, 230-231, 256, 460; and French alliance, 230 Powell, J. H., Bring Out Your Dead, cited, 282 n. President, control over foreign affairs, 196 Press, Federalist and democratic so¬ cieties, 259-260 INDEX Privateers, French: and Genet, 211; outfitting of in U. S., 208 Prize courts, French, in U. S., 208 Prizes, French, sale of in U. S., 437- 43 8 Purcell, Richard J., Connecticut in Transition, cited, 56 n. Quakers of Pennsylvania influenced by Adet, 473 Quasi-War, roots of, 510-511 Randall, Henry S., Life of Thomas Jefferson, cited, 217 n. Randall, James G., “George Washing¬ ton and ‘Entangling Alliances,’ ” cited, 466 n. Randolph, Edmund: bypassed in Jay mission, 104; caught in political warfare, 125; Fauchet and disgrace of, 416; forced to resign 64, 124; on Jay treaty, 365; opposed to Jay treaty, 119-120; out of harmony with Federalist party, 121; relations with Fauchet, 407; reprimands Monroe, 351-352; trip to Virginia, 89; A Vindication of Mr. Ran¬ dolph's Resignation, cited, 120 n. Rankin, Robert R., Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between Great Britain and the United States, cited, 108 n. Ravenel, Mrs. St. Julien, Life and Times of William Lowndes, cited, 130 n. Recognition: of French Republic, 190- 191; policy of U. S., 322 Refugees, French, and Genet, 277, 281-282 Report on Manufactures by Hamilton, 44 Republican party: and proclamation of neutrality, 89; philosophy of, 50 Republicans: concerned over Fauchet, 398-399; dissatisfied with mission of Gouverneur Morris, 339; and Genet’s intervention in the election of 1796, 475 Rice, Howard C.: Barthelemi Tardi- 531 veau, cited, 26 n.; “James Swan,” cited, 113 m Rich, Bennett M.: Presidents and Civ¬ il Disorder, cited, 45 n.; “Washing¬ ton and the Whiskey Rebellion,” cited, 263 n. Rippy, J. Fred, and Angie Debo, “His¬ torical Background of the Amer¬ ican Policy of Isolation,” cited, 6 n. Roberts, Kenneth and Anna M., eds., Moreau de St. Mery’s American Journey, cited, 38 n. Robertson, William S., Life of Miran¬ da, cited, 199 n. Robespierre: appointed Fauchet, 394; and French alliance, 338, 395; and U. S. debt to France, 326 Robinson, Edgar E., Evolution of American Political Parties, cited, 33 n - Robinson, William A.: Jeffersonian Democracy in New England, cited, 33 n.; “Pickering” in Dictionary of American Biography, cited, 127 n. Roland, Madame, and Genet, 185 Role d’equipage and American com¬ merce, 499 Roosevelt, Theodore: Gouverneur Morris, cited, 321 n.; and Thomas Paine, 331 Rosenthal, Lewis, America and France, cited, 17 n. Ross, James, and French intrigue, 452 Rossman, Kenneth R., Thomas Miff¬ lin, cited, 57 n. Rule of 1756, 92 Rush, Benjamin, physician, quoted, 5 n - Rutledge, Judge John: attacks Jay treaty, 127-128; denounced by Fed¬ eralists, 129-131; significance of his rejection, 132 St. Clair, General Arthur, defeat by Indians, 62, 84 Saint Domingue: and Jefferson-Ham- ilton rivalry, 172; rebellion in, 170, 271-274; refugees from, 171 Salem Gazette, quoted, 130 Santo Domingo; see Saint Domingue 53 2 INDEX Sargent, C. S., “Journal de Andre Michaux,” cited, 238 n. Savage, Carlton, Policy of the United States towards Maritime Commerce, cited, 108 n. Schachner, Nathan: Aaron Bun, cited, 343 n.; Alexander Hamilton, cited, 36 n.; The Founding Fathers, cited, 40 n.; Thomas Jefferson, cited, 40 n. Schminke, Frederick A., Genet: Ori¬ gins of His Mission, cited, 182 n. Schuyler, General Philip, Hamilton’s father-in-law, 37 Scott, James Brown, ed., Controversy over Neutral Rights, cited, 499 n. Sears, Louis M., George Washington, cited, 35 n. Sectionalism: and frictions with France, 507; and war crisis of 1797, 491 Sedgwick, Theodore, attacks demo¬ cratic societies, 265 See, Henri, “Commerce between France and the United States,” cit¬ ed, 20 n. Self-interest, idea of, and struggle over foreign policy,’504 Senate: approves Jay treaty, 112; cen¬ sures democratic societies, 264; col¬ laboration in foreign policy, 103- 104 Serrano y Saenz, Manuel, El brigadier Jaime Wilkinson, cited, 244 n. Setser, Vernon G., Commercial Reci¬ procity Policy of the United States, cited, 20 n. Sheffield Register, cited, 94 n. Shelby, Isaac, governor of Kentucky, and Michaux, 248-249 Shephard, William R., “Wilkinson and the Beginnings of the Spanish Conspiracy,” cited, 25 n. Short, William: commissioner to Spain, 246; and Franco-American commerce, 154; and French post, 3 l8 Singletary, John, case of, 214 Sizer, Theodore, ed., Autobiography of Colonel John Trumbull, cited, 362 Small, Norman J., Some Presidential Interpretations of the Presidency, cited, 35 n. Smelser, Marshall: “George Washing¬ ton and the Alien and Sedition Acts,” cited, 126 n.; “The Jacobin Phrenzy,” cited, 49 n. Smith, Charles P., James Wilson, cited, 215 n. Smith, William H., St. Clair Papers, cited, 84 n. Smith, William Loughton: attacks Jefferson’s commercial policy, 95- 96; Politicos and Views of a Cer¬ tain Party Displayed, cited, 58 n.- 59 n - Society of Ship-Owners of Great Brit¬ ain, Reports and Papers on the Navigation and Trade of Great Britain, cited, 73 n. Sonthonax, Leger Felicite, Jacobin commissioner in Saint Domingue, 272 Sorel, Albert, L’Europe et la revolu¬ tion franpaise, cited, 199 n. South Carolina State Gazette, cited, 256 n. Spain: break with France, 246; fric¬ tions with U. S., 12; and Mississippi River, 239; and peace of 1783, 10; peace with France, 368; policy to¬ ward U. S., 25; relations with U. S., 66 m-67 n., 240-247; and separatist movement in the Southwest, 243; and Western intrigue, 446 Sparks, Jared: interviewed Genet, 305 n.; Life of Gouverneur Morris, cited, 312 n. State debts, assumption of, 42 State Department, National Archives: Diplomatic and Consular Instruc¬ tions, cited, 155 n.; Diplomatic Des¬ patches, France, cited, 17 n.; Notes from the French Legation, cited, 170 n. Statutes at Large of the United States, cited, 250 n. Stauffer, Vernon, New England and the Bavarian Illuminati, cited, 138 n. INDEX 533 Stein, Charles W., The Third Term Tradition, cited, 65 n. Steiner, Bernard C.: (ed.) “Corre¬ spondence of James McHenry,” cit¬ ed, 435 n.; Life and Correspondence of fames McHenry, cited, 64 n.; (ed.) “Maryland Politics in 1796— McHenry Letters,” cited, 137 n. Stephenson, Nathaniel W., and Wal¬ do H. Dunn, George Washington, cited, 34 n. Stewart, Donald M., “The Press and Political Corruption,” cited, n8n. Stewart, John H., ed., Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, cited, 179 n. Stoddard, T. Lothrop, The French Revolution in San Domingo, cited, 274 n. Stourzh, Gerald, Benjamin Franplin and American Foreign Policy, cited, 6 n. Styron, Arthur, Last of the Coc\ed Hats, cited, 343 n. Suite, Benjamin, “Les Projets de 1793 a 1810,” cited, 235 n. Supreme Court, refuses to consider neutrality problems, 223 Swan, James, Causes Which Have Hindered the Growth of Trade be¬ tween France and the United States, cited, 145 n. Swiggett, Howard, Extraordinary Mr. Morris, cited, 3150. Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de: and Gouverneur Morris, 315; Memoir Concerning the Commercial Rela¬ tions of the United States, cited, 445 n.; view of the French alliance, 445 Tanguy de la Boissiere, C. C.: answers Pickering’s note of Jan., 1797, 487; Memoire sur la situation commer¬ cial de la France avec les Etats- Unis,” cited, 487 n.; Observations sur la depeche ecrite a le Janvier 1787 par M. Pickering, cited, 487 n.; Sommaire d’observations sur les Etats-Unis, cited, 487 n. Tansill, Charles C.: (ed.) Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union, cited, 38 n.; United States and Santo Domingo, cited, 170 n. Tardiveau, Barthelemi, French trader, advocated recovery of Louisiana, 26 n. Tariff act, U. S., of 1789, 40 Tariff policy, U. S., of 1789, 73 Tariff and tonnage laws of 1789: be¬ gan break with France, 147; fa¬ vored Great Britain, 74; French pro¬ test against, 75-76 Taylor, John: Definition of Parties, cited, 97 n.; Disunion Sentiment in Congress in 1794, cited, 99 n. Ternant, Jean Baptiste de, French minister to U. S.: and commercial treaty, 157-158; popular in the U. S., 169 Thomas, Charles M., American Neu¬ trality, cited, 88 n. Tinkcom, Harry M., Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, cited, 45 n - Tinling, Marion, and Godfrey Davies, eds., The Western Country in 7793, cited, 182 n. Tobacco: contracts with France, 315; French monopoly in, 152 n., 154-155 Tolies, Frederick B., George Logan, cited, 385 n. Tonnage act of 1789, 40 Tonnage duties and Genet, 282-283 Trade; see commerce Treasury Department, jurisdiction over prize property, 438 Treaties: alliance with France, 5; com¬ mercial of 1778 with France, 5; commercial of 1778 and Genet, 210; commercial of 1778 violated by U. S., 22; commercial (new) desired by French officials, 146, 156; com¬ mercial (new) with France, 157- 163; commercial (new) never nego¬ tiated, 409; commercial and politi¬ cal (new) with France, 213; of Greenville, no, 267; Jay-Gardoqui, 243-244; John Adams desired com¬ mercial ones, 5-6; and new diplo- 534 INDEX macy, 7; of Paris, Sept., 1783, 9; violated by Great Britain, 12 Trescot, William H., Diplomatic His¬ tory of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, cited, 509 n. Treudley, Mary W., “United States and Santo Domingo,” cited, 170 n. Trumbull, John, and Jay treaty, 362, 363-364 Tugwell, Rexford Guy, and Joseph Dorfman, “Alexander Hamilton: Nation Maker,” cited, 36 n. Turner, Frederick J.: (ed.) “Corre¬ spondence of the French Ministers to the United States,” cited, ii3n.; (ed.) “Documents on the Blount Conspiracy,” cited, 448 n.; (ed.) “Documents on the Relations of France to Louisiana,” cited, 306 n.; “English Policy toward America,” cited, 68 n.; (ed.) “Mangourit Cor¬ respondence,” cited, 239 n.; “Ori¬ gins of Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana,” cited, 236 n.; “Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley,” cited, 25 n.; (ed.) “Selec¬ tions from the Draper Collection,” cited, 237 n. United States: Articles of Confedera¬ tion, 11; close economic ties to France never realized, 163; com¬ merce with France, 352-354; com¬ merce injured by French, 494-495; commercial policy of, see commer¬ cial policy; debt to France, 16, 171, 320-322, 324-326; embargo of 1794, 405; and French designs on Louisi¬ ana, 411; and French treaty obliga¬ tions, 401-402; grain helps avert French famine, 404; neutrality, 91- 92; neutrality and British violations, 231-234; neutrality enforced by state governors, 213-214; neutrality and “Rules Governing Belligerents,” 223-225; new commercial treaty with France, 409; policy toward France on Jay treaty, 364; policy of neutrality, 206, 208-209; preferred British goods, 21; profited from European troubles, 10; protested British food seizures, 402; rap¬ prochement with England, 140; rec¬ ognition policy, 190-191; relations with France during Confederation, 17; relations with France in 1789, 141-142; relations with Spain, 240- 247; retaliation against British for Capt. Home’s conduct, 418-419; sale of French prizes in, 437-438; shipping hit by French decree, 438; tie to England, 307; valuable to France as neutral ally, 204-205; war crisis with Great Britain, 94 U. S. Congress, Senate: Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Sen¬ ate, cited, 77 n., 103 n.; Tariff Acts Passed by the Congress, cited, 40 U. S. Continental Congress: Journals of the Continental Congress, cited, 16 n.; Secret Journal of the Acts and Proceedings of Congress, cited, 22 n. U. S. Dept, of State, Diplomatic Cor¬ respondence of the United States, cited, 22 n. U. S. maritime principles; see mari¬ time principles Usher, Roland G., “Washington and Entangling Alliances,” cited, 466 n. Van der Weyde, William M., The Life and Times of Thomas Paine, cited, 331 n. Van Doren, Carl, Benjamin Franklin, cited, 27 n. Van Santvoord, George, Sketches from the Lives of the Chief Jus¬ tices, cited, 128 n. Van Schaack, Henry C., Life of Peter Van Schaac\, cited, 55 n. Vanstabel, Admiral Pierre-Jean, com¬ mander of French squadron, 404 Van Tyne, Claude H., “Influences Which Determined the French Government to Make the Treaty with America, 1778,” cited, 4 n. Vergennes, Comte de, French foreign minister: quoted on French alliance, INDEX 535 15; quoted on Louisiana, 25-26; signs consular convention, 22 Vermont, secessionist sentiment in, 67 Vessels, act for the registering and clearing of, 40 Virginia Gazette and General Ad¬ vertiser (Richmond), cited, 230 n. Virginia Herald and Fredericksburg Advertiser, cited, 94 n. Vossler, Otto, Die ameri\anischen Revolutionsideale in ihrem verhalt- nis zu den europdischen, cited, 29 n. Walters, Raymond, Jr., Alexander James Dallas, cited, 45 n. Walther, Daniel, Gouverneur Morris, cited, 305 n. War: alternative to Jay treaty, 138; Anglo-French and influence on U. S., 86-87, r ^°> J 86; crisis of 1794 with Great Britain, 94, 98-99; crisis with Spain, 241-247; Federalist talk of, 486, 488-491; possibilities with France, 140, 428-429; talk of in Directory, 380; threat of between U. S. and Great Britain, 85 Ward, Adolphus W., and G. P. Gooch, eds., Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, cited, 153 n. Warfel, Harry R.: (ed.) Letters of Noah Webster, cited, 86 n.; Noah Webster, cited, 181 n. Warren, Charles: Jacobin and Junto, cited, n8n.; Supreme Court in United States History, cited, 129 n. Washington administration: and Adet’s first manifesto, 439-441; loses nonpartisanism, 62; modified inter¬ pretation of, 502-503 Washington, George: Adet’s reaction to, 426; alarmed by French seizures of American ships, 488; alarmed by reaction to proclamation of neutral¬ ity, 89; appraisal of his foreign policy, 510-511; approves of Gou¬ verneur Morris’s mission, 340; ap¬ proves Hamilton’s policies, 48; at¬ tacked for signing Jay treaty, 118; and Bank of the United States, 44; circular on French war to Cabinet, 186-187; cool to Genet, 202; de¬ cides French treaties are binding, 195-196; decision to retire, 464; dis¬ approves of Monroe’s conduct, 351; favored improved commercial rela¬ tions with France, 145; Farewell Address of analyzed, 465-471; and French flag, 435-436; and French ultimatum, 373; friend of Gouver¬ neur Morris, 316; greatest political crisis, hi; Hamilton’s tool, 509; hastened death of democratic soci¬ eties, 266; headed a partisan foreign policy, 504; impressed by Fauchet, 398; and Jay-King certificate epi¬ sode, 295; launches new govern¬ ment, 33; leaves Presidency, 3, 65; messages to Congress on Franco- American crisis, 480-481, 482; modi¬ fied interpretation of his Presidency, 502-503; and Monroe’s recall, 383- 384; and Morris’s reports on French Revolution, 332; and neutrality regulations, 224-226; and Nootka Sound Crisis, 69; planned retire¬ ment after one term, 60; pleads for peace within administration, 59; pleased with French alliance, 7; po¬ litical ideal, failure of, 4, 499-500; and political parties, 34-35; political target in 1796, 459-460; prevents Genet’s arrest, 305; quoted on Franco-American relations, 17; rea¬ sons for retiring, 462-463; retire¬ ment of, 443; revokes Duplaine’s exequatur, 291; sees political parties grow, 461-462; signs revised con¬ sular convention, 24; and special mission to France, 492; used by Federalists against democratic so¬ cieties, 261-264; an d Western in¬ trigue, 453 Washington, Henry A., ed., Writings of Thomas Jefferson, cited, 29 n. Wayne, Anthony: and Battle of Fall¬ en Timbers, no; commander of frontier forces, 85 Webster, Noah: attacks French alli¬ ance, 490; on French interference INDEX 53 6 in U. S., 477; Revolution in France, cited, 260 n. Weinberg, Albert K., “Washington’s ‘Great Rule’ in Its Historical Evolu¬ tion,” cited, 465 n. Werner, Raymond C., “War Scare and Politics, 1794,” cited, 95 n. Western Centinel, cited, 1190. Western intrigue of French, 446 Wettereau, James O., “New Light on the First Bank of the United States,” cited, 43 n. Wharton, Frances, comp., State Trials of the United States, cited, 215 n. Whiskey rebellion: and democratic societies, 262; and Hamilton’s pro¬ gram, 45-46; and Randolph, 122 Whitaker, Arthur P.: The Mississippi Question, cited, 67 n.; “Retroces¬ sion of Louisiana,” cited, 368 n.; The Spanish-American Frontier, cited, 67 n. White, Leonard D., The Federalists, cited, 35 n. Wilkinson, General James, and Spain, 244 Willson, Beckles, America’s Ambas¬ sadors to France, cited, 359 n. Wiltse, Charles M., The Jeffersonian Tradition in American Democracy, cited, 50 n. Windham, William, Windham Pa¬ pers, cited, 174 Wolcott, Oliver, Jr.: appointed Secre¬ tary of the Treasury, 64; quoted, 456 Wolfe, John H., Jeffersonian Democ¬ racy in South Carolina, cited, 178 n. Woodburn, James A., Political Parties and Party Problems, cited, 33 n. Woodbury, Margaret, Public Opin¬ ion in Philadelphia, cited, 53 n. Woodfin, Maude H.: “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” cited, 182 n.; “Genet” in the Dictionary of Amer¬ ican Biography, cited, 184 n. Woolery, William K., Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American For¬ eign Policy, cited, 21 n. Wright, Louis B., “Founding Fathers and ‘Splendid Isolation,’ ” cited, 466 n. Wriston, Henry M.: Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, cit¬ ed, 68 n.; “Washington and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy,” cited, 505 n. Yellow fever blamed on the French, 282 Yorktown, battle of, 8 Zook, George F., “Proposals for a New Commercial Treaty between France and the United States,” cit¬ ed, 145 n.