#76,3 
 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 Message of the 
 Conf Pam 12mo #763 
 
MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 Executive Department, 
 
 March 11, 1862. 
 To the Speaker of the 
 
 Ihmse of Representatives : 
 
 I transmit, herewith, copies of such official reports as 
 have been received at the War Department, of the defence 
 and fall of Fort Donelson. They will be found incomplete 
 and unsatisfactory. Instructions have been given to fur- 
 nish further information upon the several points not made 
 intelligible by the reports. It is not stated that reinforce- 
 ments were at any time asked for; nor is it demonstrated to 
 have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating 
 the position ; nor is it known by what means it was found 
 practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the 
 remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or prin- 
 ciple of action the senior Generals abandoned responsibility, 
 by transferring the command to a junior officer. 
 
 In a former communication to Congress, I presented the 
 propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the 
 disaster at Fort Donelson, until official reports could be re- 
 ceived. I regret that the information now furnished is so 
 defective. In the meantime, hopeful that satisfactory ex- 
 planation may be made. I have directed, upon the exhibi- 
 tion of the case as presented by the two senior General-, 
 that they should be relieved from command to await further 
 orders whenever a reliable judgment can be rendered on the 
 merits of the case. JEFFERSON DAVIS. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2011 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/messageofpreside40conf 
 
LETTER FROM SECRETARY OF AVAR. 
 
 Confederate State* of America, War Dep't, ) 
 Richmond, March 11th, 1862. $ 
 Sir: I have the honor to enclose, herewith, the re- 
 ports made by Brigadier-General Floyd and Brigadier- 
 General Pillow of the surrender of Fort Donelson. No 
 statement is made by either General of the mode of his own 
 escape, nor can the exact circumstances which accompanied 
 the surrender he officially known till Brigadier-General 
 Buckner, now a prisoner, is enabled to make bis report. 
 
 I suhmit the whole for transmission to Congress, or such 
 other action as you may deem proper, 
 I am, your obedient servant. 
 
 J. P. P.ENJAMIN, 
 Q Secretary of War. 
 
 To the President. 
 
REPORT OF Gil). J. PILLOW, 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF THE C. S. A. 
 
 Columiu \, Tennessee, 
 February 18th, 1S62. 
 Captain Clarence Derrick, 
 
 Assist<n)t Adjutant Gaicral .' 
 On the 9th instant General A S. Johnston ordered me 
 to proceed to Fort Donelson and take command at that post. 
 On the 10th instant I arrived at that place. In detailing 
 the operations of the forces under my command at Fort 
 Donelson, it is proper to state the condition of that -work, 
 and of the forces constituting its garrison. When I ar- 
 rived 1 found the work on the river battery unfinished, and 
 wholly too weak to resist the force of heavy artillery. I 
 found a ten-inch colnmhiad and thirty-two pounder rifled 
 gun had not been mounted. Deep gloom was hanging over 
 the command, ami the troops greatly depressed and demoral- 
 ized by the circumstances attending the surrender of Fort 
 Henry, and the manner of retiring from that place. 
 
 My first attention was given to the necessity of strength- 
 ening this work and mounting the two heavy guns, and to 
 the construction of defensive works to protect the rear of 
 the river battery. I imparted to the work all the energy 
 which it was possible to do, working day and night with 
 the whole command. 
 
 The battery was without a competent number of artil- 
 lerists, and those that were there were not well instructed 
 in the use of their guns. To provide for this want, I placed 
 the artillery companies under active course of instruction 
 in the use of their guns. I detailed Captain Ross, with his 
 company of light artillerists, to the command of one of the 
 river batteries. These heavy guns being mounted and pro- 
 vision being made for working them, and a proper supply 
 of ammunition having heen procured by my orders from 
 Nashville, 1 felt myself prepared to test the effect of the 
 
fire of heavy metal against the enemy's gunboats, though 
 the work stood much in need of more heavy pieces. The 
 armament of the batteries consisted of eight thirty-two (32) 
 pounders, three thirty-two (32) pound cannonades, one 
 eight (8) columbiad, and one rifle thirty-two (32) calibre. 
 
 The selection of the site for the work was an unfortunate 
 one. While its command of the river was favorable, the 
 site was commanded by the heights above and below on the 
 river, and by a continuous range of hills all around the 
 works to its rear. 
 
 A field work of very contracted dimensions had been con- 
 structed for the garrison, to protect the battery, but this 
 field Avork was commanded by the hills already referred to, 
 and lay open to a fire of artillery from every direction ex- 
 cept from the hills below. 
 
 To guard against the effects of the fire of artillery from 
 these heights, a line of defensive works, consisting of rifle 
 pits and abattis for infantry, detached on our right, but con- 
 tinuous on our left, with defences for our light artillery, 
 were laid off by Major Gilmer, Engineer of General A. S. 
 Johnston's Staff, but on duty with me at the post, around the 
 rear of the battery and on the heights, from which artillery 
 could reach our battery and inner field work, enveloping 
 the inner work and town of Dover, where our principal sup- 
 plies of Commissary and Quartermaster stores were in depot. 
 These works, pushed with the utmost possible energy, were 
 not quite completed, nor my troops all in position, though 
 nearly so, when Brigadier-General Floyd, my senior officer, 
 reached that station. 
 
 The works were laid off with judgment and skill, by Major 
 Gilmer, were well executed and designed for the defence of the 
 rear of work, the only objection being to the length of the 
 line, which, however, from the surroundings, was unavoida- 
 ble. The length of the line, and the inadequacy of the force 
 for its defence, were a source of embarrassment throughout 
 the struggle which subsequently ensued, in the defence of 
 the position. 
 
 I had placed Brigadier-General Buckner in command of 
 the right wing, and Brigadier-General Johnson in command 
 of the left. 
 
 By extraordinary efforts, we had barely got these works 
 in defensible condition, when the enemy made an advance in 
 force around and against the entire line of out-works. 
 
THE BATTLE OF THE TRENCHES. 
 
 The first assault was commenced by the enemy's artillery, 
 against the centre of our left wing, which was promptly re- 
 sponded to by Capt. Green's battery of field artillery. Af- 
 ter several hours of fire between the artillery of the two 
 armies, the enemy's infantry advanced to the conflict all 
 along the line, which was kept up and increased in volume, 
 from one end of the line to the other, for several hours, 
 when, at last, the enemy made a vigorous assault against 
 the right of our left wing, the position assaulted being a 
 height commanded by Col. ITeiman, and defended by his 
 brigade, consisting of the Tenth (luth) Tenn< — e, under 
 command of Lieut. Col. McGarock, Col. Voorhies, Colonel 
 Hughes, and Col. Head's regiments Tenn 
 and defended by Capt. Maney's held battery. 
 
 This assault was vigorously made, and the position as 
 vigorously defended, and resulted in the repulse of the ene- 
 my here and everywhere around the line. The result of the 
 day's work pretty well tested the strength of our defensive 
 line, and established, beyond question, the gallantry of the 
 entire command, all of which fought well their portion of 
 the line. The loss sustained by our forces in this engage- 
 ment was not large, our men being mostly und< r in 
 the rifle pits, but we, nevertheless, Bad quite a number 
 killed and wounded; but, owing to the continued fighting 
 which followed, it was impossible to get any official report of 
 the casualties of the day. On the same day. < ur battery on 
 the river was engaged with one of the enemy's gunlx 
 which occasioned quite a lively cannonading for more than 
 an hour, in which the gallant Capt. Dixon, of the Engineer 
 Corps, was killed instantly at the battery. This officer had 
 been on duty for some months at the post, and had shown 
 great energy and professional skill, ami by his gallant bear- 
 ing on that day. while directing the operations under my 
 orders, had justly won for himself high distinction. Hi's 
 death was a serious loss to the service, and was a source of 
 no little embarrassment in our after operations. On the 
 twelfth (12th) we had quiet, but we saw the smoke of a large 
 number of gunboats and steamboats a short distance below. 
 We also received reliable information of the arrival of a 
 large number of new troops, greatly increasing the strength 
 of the enemy's forces, already said to be from twenty 
 thirty thousand strong. 
 
THE BATTLE WITH THE GUNBOATS. 
 
 On the thirteenth (13) these reinforcements were seen 
 advancing to their position in the line of investment, and 
 while this was being done, six of the enemy's iron-cased 
 gunboats were seen advancing up the river, five of which 
 were abreast and in line of battle, and the sixth some dis- 
 tance to the rear. When these gunboats arrived within a 
 mile and a half of our battery, they opened fire on the bat- 
 tei'y. My orders to the officers, Captain Sinister, and Capt. 
 Standeruitzs, who commanded the lower battery of eight 
 guns, and Capt. Ross, the upper battery of four guns, were 
 to hold their fire, until the enemy's boats should come within 
 point blank range of their guns. 
 
 This they did, though the ordeal of holding their fire, while 
 the enemy's shot and shell fell thick around their position, 
 was a severe restraint upon their patriotic impulses, but, 
 nevertheless, our batteries made no response till the gun- 
 boats got within range of their guns. Our entire line of bat- 
 teries then opened fire. The guns of both parties were well- 
 served, the enemy constantly advancing, delivering direct 
 fire against our batteries, from his line of five gunboats, 
 while the sixth boat, moving up in the rear of the line, kept 
 the air filled with shells, which fell thick and close around 
 the position of our batteries. The fight continued, the ene- 
 my steadily advancing slowly up the river, the shot and shell 
 from fitteen heavy rifle guns tearing our parapets, and plung- 
 ing deep into the earth around and over the batteries, for 
 nearly two hours, and until his boats had reached within the 
 distance of one hundred and fifty (150) yards of our batte- 
 ries. Having come in such close conflict, I could distinctly 
 see the effect of our shot upon his iron-cased boats. We 
 had given two or three well-directed shots from the heavy 
 guns to one of his boats, when she instantly shrunk back and 
 drifted helpless below the line ; several shot struck another 
 boat, tearing her iron case and splintering her timbers, and 
 making them crack as if by a stroke of lightning, when she, 
 too, fell back. Then a third boat received several severe 
 shocks, making her metal ring and her timbers crack, when 
 the whole line gave way and fell rapidly back from our fire, 
 until they passed out of range. Thus ended the first severe 
 and close conflict of our heavy guns with the enemy's gun- 
 boats, testing their strength and the power of our heavy 
 guns to resist them. 
 
The shot from our (32) thirty-two pound guns produced 
 but little effect. They struck and rebounded apparently doing 
 but little damage; but I am satisfied, from close observation, 
 that the timbers of the frame-work did not and could not with- 
 stand the shock of the ten (10) inch coJumbiad or thirty-two 
 pound (32) rifle guns. These gunboats never renewed the at- 
 tack. I learn from citizens, living on the river below, that one 
 of the injured boats sunk, and that others had to be towed to 
 Cairo. This information may or may not be true, but it is cer- 
 tain that all of the boats were repulsed and driven back, after a 
 most vigorous and determined attack, and that two of the 
 boats were badly damaged, and that a third was more Or less 
 injured. It is difficult to over-estimate the gallant bearing 
 and heroic conduct of the officers and men of our batte 
 who so well and so persistently fought our guns, until the 
 enemy's determined advance brought his boats and guns into 
 such close, desperate conflict. Where all did their duty so 
 well, it is almost impossible to discriminate. The Captains 
 already named and their Lieutenants (whose names for want 
 of the official reports I cannot give) all deserve the highest 
 commendation. 
 
 Lieutenant George S. Martin, whose company is at Co- 
 lumbus, Kv.. (but who was ordered to that post by Major- 
 General Polk) commanded one of the guns, particularly 
 tracted my attention by his energy and the judgment with 
 which he fought his gun. The wadding having given out, 
 he pulled off his coat and rammed it down his gun, as wad- 
 ding, and thus kept up the fire until the enemy were finally 
 repulsed. On the evening of this 'lay we received infoi 
 tion of the arrival of additional reinforcements of infantry, 
 cavalry and light artillery by steamboat, all of which were 
 disembarked a short distance below our position. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF DOVER. 
 
 On the fourteenth (14th) instant, the enemy was busy 
 throwing his forces of every arm around us, extending his 
 line of investment cntireh T around our position and com- 
 pletely enveloping us. On the evening of this day we as- 
 certained that the enemy had received by steamboats addi- 
 tional reinforcements. 
 
 We were now surrounded by an immence force said by 
 prisoners whom we had taken, to amount to fifty-two (.52) 
 regiments, and every road and possible avenue of departure 
 
10 
 
 cut off, with the certainty that our sources of supply by the 
 river would soon be cut off by the enemy's batteries, placed 
 upon the river above us. 
 
 At a meeting of general officers, called by Gen. Floyd, it 
 was determined unanimously to give the enemy battle next 
 day at daylight, so as to cut open a route of exit, and thus 
 to save our army. We had knowledge that the principal 
 portion of the enemy's forces were massed in encampment 
 in front of the extreme left of our position, commanding 
 the two roads in the interior, one of which we must take in 
 retiring from our position. We knew he had massed in 
 encampment another large force on the Winn's Ferry road, 
 opposite the centre of our left wing, while still another was 
 massed nearly in front of the left of our right wing. His 
 fresh arrival of troops being encamped on the bank of the 
 river two and a half (2 1-2) miles below us, from which 
 latter encampment a stream of fresh troops were continually 
 pouring around us on his line of investment, and strength- 
 ening his general encampment on the extreme right. At 
 each of his encampments and on each road he had in posi- 
 tion a battery of field artillery, and twenty-four (24) pound 
 iron guns, on siege carriages. Between each of these en- 
 campments on the roads was a thick undergrowth of brush 
 and black jack, making it impossible to advance or manoeu- 
 vre any considerable body of troops. 
 
 The plan of attack agreed upon and directed by General 
 Floyd to be executed was : that with the main body of the 
 forces, defending our left wing, I should attack the right 
 wing of the enemy occupying and resting on the heights 
 reaching to the bank of the liver, accompanied by Col. 
 Forest's Brigade; that Brigadier-General Buckner, with 
 the forces under his command, and defending the right of 
 our line, should strike the enemy's encampment and forces 
 on the Winn's Ferry road ; that the forces under Col. Hei- 
 man should hold his position, and that each command should 
 leave in the trenches troops to hold the trenches. 
 
 In this order of battle it was easy to be seen that if my 
 attack was successful and the enemy routed, that his retreat 
 would be along his line of investment, toward the Winn's 
 Ferry encampment, and thence towards his reserve at the 
 gunboats below. In other words, my success would roll 
 the enemy's force in retreat over upon Gen. Buckner, when, 
 by his attack in flank and rear, we could cut up the enemy 
 and put him completely to rout. Accordingly dispositions 
 
11 
 
 "were made to attack the enemy at five o'clock. A. M., of the 
 fifteenth (loth). I moved out of my position to engage the 
 enemy. The enemy was prepared to receive me in ad- 
 vance of his encampment ; and he did meet me before I had 
 assumed a line of battle, and while I was moving against 
 him without any formation for the engagement 
 
 For the first half hour of the engagement T was much 
 embarrassed in getting the command in position properly to 
 engage the foe. Having extricated myself from the position 
 and fairly engaged the enemy, we fought him for nearly 
 two hours before I made any decided advance upon him. 
 lie contested the field most Btubbornly. The Loss of both 
 armies on this portion of the field was heavy. The enemy's 
 particularly so, as I discovered by riding over the field after 
 the battle. The enemy having been forced to yield, retired 
 slowly toward the Winn's Ferry road, Buckner's point of 
 attack. He did not retreat, but fell back fighting us, and 
 contesting every inch of ground. 
 
 The fight was hotly and Btubbornly contested on both 
 sides, and consumed the day till 12 o'clock, to drive the 
 enemy as far back as the centre, where Gen. Buckner's 
 command was to flank him. AN hile my command was ad* 
 vancing and slowly driving him. I was anxiously expecting 
 to hear Gen. Buckner's command open fire in his rear, which. 
 not taking place, I was apprehensive of some misappreh vi- 
 sion of orders, and came from the field of battle within the 
 work to learn what was the matter. I there found the com- 
 mand of Gen. Buckner massed behind the hill within the 
 work, taking shelter from the enemy's artillery on the 
 Winn's Ferry road, it having been forced to retire before 
 that battery, as I learned from him. My fore: was still 
 advancing, driving tin 1 enemy towards the battery. 1 di- 
 rected Gen. Buckner immediately to move his command 
 round the rear of the battery, turning its left, keeping in 
 the hollow, and attack and carry it. 
 
 Before the movement was executed, my forces, forming 
 the attacking party on the right, with Colonel Forest's 
 regimen! of cavalry, had reached the position of the bat- 
 tery. > 'olonel Forest's cavalry gallantly charged a large 
 body of infantry supporting the b ttery. driving it and 
 forcing the battery to retire, taking six piece- of artillery, 
 four brass, and two twenty-four (24) pound iron guns. In 
 pursuing the enemy falling back from this position. General 
 Buckner's forces became united with mine and engaged the 
 
12 
 
 enemy in a hot contest, of nearly an hour, with large forces 
 of fresh troops, that had now met us. This position of the 
 enemy being carried by our joint forces, I called off farther 
 pursuit after seven-and-a-half hours of continuous and 
 bloody conflict. After the troops were called oft* from the 
 pursuit, orders were immediately given to the different 
 commands to form and retire to their original positions in 
 the trenches. 
 
 The operations of the day had forced the entire command 
 of the enemy around to our right wing, and in front of 
 General Buckner's position in the entrenchment, and when 
 he reached his position, I found the enemy rapidly advanc- 
 ing to take possession of his portion of our work. He had 
 a stubborn conflict, lasting one hour and a half, to regain his 
 position, and the enemy actually got possession of the ex- 
 treme right of his position, and held it so firmly that he 
 could not dislodge him. The position thus gained by the 
 enemy was a most important and commanding one, being 
 immediately in rear of our river batteries and held work for 
 its protection. From it he could readily turn the entrench- 
 ed work occupied by General Buckner, and attack him in 
 reverse, or he could advance, under cover of an intervening 
 ridge, directly upon our battery and field-work. While the 
 enemy held the position, it was manifest Ave could not hold 
 the main work or battery. Such was the condition of the 
 two armies at night-fall, after nine hours of conflict on the 
 fifteenth instant, in which our loss was severe, and leaving 
 not less than one thousand (1,000) of the enemy dead upon 
 the field. We left upon the field nearly all of his wounded, 
 because we could not remove them. We left his dead un- 
 buried, because we could not bury them. Such conflict and 
 carnage has, perhaps, never before occurred upon this con- 
 tinent. We took about three hundred prisoners and a large 
 number of arms. 
 
 We had fought this battle to open the way for our army 
 and relieve us from an investment which would necessarily 
 reduce us, and the position we occupied, by famine. 
 
 We had accomplished our object, but it occupied the Avhole 
 day, and before we could prepare to leave, after taking in 
 the wounded and dead, the enemy had thrown around us 
 again, in the night, an immense force of fresh troops, and 
 re-occupied his original position in the line of investment, 
 thus again cutting off our retreat. We had only about 
 thirteen (13,000) thousand troops, all told. Of these we 
 
13 
 
 had lost in three battles a large proportion. The command 
 had been in the trenches night and day for five days exposed 
 to the snow, sleet, mud and ice water, without shelter and 
 without adequate covering, and without sleep. 
 
 In this condition the general officers held a consultation 
 to determine what we sin Mild do. General Buckner gave it 
 as his decided opinion that he could not hold his position 
 half an hour against an assault of the enemy, and said he 
 was satisfied that the enemy would attack him next morning 
 at day-light. The proposition was then made by the un- 
 dersigned to again fight our way through the enemy's line, 
 and cut our way out. General Buckner said his command 
 was so worn out and cut to pieces, and demoralized, that he 
 could not make another fight ; that it would cost the com- 
 mand three-fourths its present numbers to cut its way out, 
 and it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths to save one- 
 fourth ; that no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice. 
 
 General Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur 
 in this opinion. 
 
 I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out 
 another day, and in that time we could get BteamboatS and 
 set the command over the river, and probably save a large 
 portion of it. To this General Buckner replied, "that the 
 enemy would certainly attack him in the morning, and that 
 he could not hold his position half an hour." The alterna- 
 tive of these propositions was a surrender of the position 
 and command. General Floyd said he would not surrender 
 the command, nor would he surrender himself a prisoner. I 
 had taken the same position. General Buckner said he was 
 satisfied nothing else could he done, and that, therefore, he 
 would surrender the command, if placed in command. Gen- 
 eral Floyd said he would turn over the command to him, if 
 he could be allowed to withdraw his command. To this 
 General Buckner consented. Thereupon the command was 
 turned over to me, I passing it instantly to General Buck- 
 ner, saying : " I would neither surrender the command nor 
 myself." I directed Colonel Forest to cut his way out. 
 Under these circumstances General Buckner accepted the 
 command, and sent a flag of truce to the enemy for an 
 armistice of six hours to negotiate for terms of capitulation. 
 Before this flag and communication was delivered, I retired 
 from the garrison. 
 
 Before closing my report of the operations of the army at 
 Donelson, I must, in justice to the officers and command 
 
14 
 
 under my immediate command, say that harder fighting or 
 more gallant conduct in officers and men I have never wit- 
 nessed. In the absence of official reports of brigade and 
 regimental commands, (of •which I am deprived by the cir- 
 cumstances detailed in this report,) I may not be able to do 
 justice to the different corps. I will say, however, that the 
 forces under my immediate command during this action bore 
 themselves most gallantly throughout the long and bloody 
 conflict. 
 
 I speak with especial commendation of the brigades com- 
 manded by Colonels Baldwin, AVharton, McCausland, Simon- 
 ton and Drake, and of Captains Maney and Green, who 
 fought their guns under the constant and annoying fire of 
 the enemy's sharp-shooters, and of the concentrated fire 
 from his field batteries, from which both commands suffered 
 severely. 
 
 Captain Maney was himself wounded, and had several 
 lieutenants killed and many of his company killed and 
 wounded; so did Captains Porter and Graves. If I should 
 hereafter receive the reports of regimental and brigade com- 
 mands, giving me detailed information of the conduct and 
 bearing of officers and men, I will make a supplemental re- 
 port. 
 
 The absence of official reports deprives me of the means 
 of giving lists ot the killed and wounded of the different 
 commands. 
 
 I am satisfied that in such a series of conflicts our loss 
 was heavy. I know the enemy's was, from passing over the 
 battle-field in the evening immediately after the battle with 
 General Floyd. His loss in killed and w r ounded was terri- 
 ble, exceeding anything I have ever seen upon a battle-field. 
 Our total force on the field did not exceed ten (10,000) thou- 
 sand men, while, from what I saw of the enemy's force, and 
 from information derived from many prisoners of the enemy, 
 we are sure he had thirty or forty thousand (30 or 40,000) 
 -on the field. I must acknowledge my obligations to Major 
 Gilmer, Engineer, for the special and valuable services ren- 
 dered me in laying off these works, and the energy displayed 
 by him in directing their construction, and for his counsel 
 and advice. I likewise acknowledge my obligations to Cap- 
 tain Gustavus A. Heing, my Assistant Adjutant General, to 
 Colonel John C. Burch, my Aid-de-Camp, to Major Field, 
 to Lieutenant Nicholson, to Lieutenant Charles F. Martin 
 •and Colonel Brandon, my volunteer Aids-de-Camp ; to Major 
 
15 
 
 Hays, my Assistant Commissary, and Major Jones, my As- 
 sistant Quartermaster, for the prompt manner in which they 
 executed my orders, under trying circumstances, throughout 
 the long and continued conflicts, and to Major Gilmer, who 
 accompanied me to the field and was with me throughout the 
 entire day. Also to Captain Parker, of my staff, whom I 
 assigned to command of Captain Boss's field battery, with 
 neAV recruits as gunners, after Captain Maney's battery was 
 disabled, and who fought and served them well. The con- 
 duct of these officers, coming under my immediate attention 
 and observation, met my hearty approval and commenda- 
 tion. Colonel Brandon was severely wounded early in the 
 action. Colonel Baldwin's Brigade constituted the front of 
 the attacking force, sustained immediately by Colonel Whar- 
 ton's Brigade. These two Brigades deserve especial com- 
 mendation for the manner in which they sustained the firsl 
 shock of battle, ami. under circumstances of great embar- 
 rassment, threw themselves into position and followed up 
 the conflict throughout the day. 
 
 Being mostly with these two brigades, I can speak from 
 personal knowledge of the gallant hearing of their com- 
 manders. I must also acknowledge my obligations to Brig- 
 adier-General Johnson, who assisted me in the command of 
 the forces with which I attacked the enemy, and who fore 
 himself gallantly throughout the conflict; but having re- 
 ceived no official report from him, I cannot give the de- 
 tailed operations of his command. 
 
 I have pleasure in being able to say that Col. Forrest, 
 whose command greatly distinguished its commander as a 
 hold and judicious commander, and reflected distinguished 
 honor upon itself, passed safely through the enemy's line of 
 investment, and trust it will yet win other honors in de» 
 fence of our rights and just cause of country. 
 
 (Signed) GID. J. PILLOW, 
 
 Brigadier-General C. S. A. 
 
 Official : Jno. Withers, 
 
 A. A. General. 
 
 A. & I. G. 0., March 10, 1862. 
 
REPORT OF JOHN B. FLOYD, 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL OF THE C. S. A. 
 
 Camp near Murfreesboro', 
 February 27th, 1862. 
 Gen. A. S. Johnston : 
 
 Sir: Your order of the 12th of this month, transmitted 
 to me from Bowling Green, by telegraph to Cumberland 
 city, reached me the same evening. It directed me to re- 
 pair at once, with what force I could command, to the sup- 
 port of the garrison at " Fort Donclson." I immedialih 
 prepared for my departure, and effected it in time to reach 
 "Fort Donelson," the next morning, 13th, before day- 
 light. Measures had been already taken by Brigadier-Gene- 
 ral Pillow, then in command, to render our resistance to 
 the attack of the enemy as effective as possible. He had 
 with activity and industry pushed forward the defensive 
 works towards completion. These defences consisted in an 
 earthwork in " Fort Donelson," in which were mounted 
 guns of different calibres, to the number of thirteen. A 
 field work intended for the infantry supports, and con- 
 structed immediately behind the battery, and upon the 
 the summit of the hill in rear. Sweeping away from this 
 field work eastward, to the extent of nearly two miles in its 
 windings, was a line of entrenchments defended on the out- 
 side at some points with abattis. These entrenchments 
 were occupied by the troops already there, and by the addi- 
 tion of those which came upon the field with me. The po- 
 sition of the Fort, which was established by the Tennessee 
 authorities, was by no means commanding, nor was the 
 least military significance attached to the position. The 
 entrenchments, afterwards hastily made in many places, 
 were injudiciously constructed because of the distance they 
 were placed from the brow of the hill, subjecting the men 
 to a heavy fire from the enemy's sharp shooters opposite, as 
 they advanced to or retired from the entrenchments. Soon 
 2 
 
18 
 
 after my arrival the entrenchments were fully occupied 
 from one end to the other, and just as the sun rose the 
 cannonade from one of the enemy's gunboats announced the 
 opening of the conflict, which was destined to continue for 
 three days and nights. In a very short time the fire be- 
 came general along our whole lines, and the enemy, who 
 had already planted batteries at several points around the 
 whole circuit of our entrenchments, as shown by a diagram 
 herewith sent, opened a general and active fire from all 
 arms upon our trenches, which continued until darkness 
 put an end to the conflict. They charged with uncommon 
 spirit at several points along on the line, but most' particu- 
 larly at a point undefended by entrenchments, down it hol- 
 low, which separated the right wing, under the command of 
 Brigadier- General Buckner, from the right of the centre 
 commanded by Col. Heiman. This charge was prosecuted 
 with uncommon vigor, but was met with a determined spirit 
 of resistance, a cool, deliberate courage both by the troops 
 of Brigadier-General Buckner and Col. Heiman, which drove 
 the enemy, discomfited and cut to pieces, back upon the posi- 
 tion he had assumed in the morning. Too high praise can- 
 not be bestowed upon the battery of Captain Porter, for 
 their participation in the rout of the enemy in this assault. 
 My position was immediately in front of the point of attack, 
 and I was thus enabled to witness more distinctly the inci- 
 dents of it. 
 
 The enemy continued their fire upon different parts of 
 our entrenchments throughout the night, which deprived our 
 men of any opportunity to sleep. We lay that night upon 
 our arms, in the trenches. We confidently expected, at the 
 dawn of day, a more vigorous attack than ever ; but in this 
 we were entirely mistaken. The day advanced, and no pre- 
 parations seemed to be making for a general onset ; but an 
 extremely annoying fire was kept up from the enemy's 
 sharp-shooters, throughout the whole length of the entrench- 
 ments, from their long-range rifles. Whilst this mode of 
 attack Avas not attended with any considerable loss, it, never- 
 theless, confined the men to their trenches, and prevented 
 their taking their usual rest. 
 
 So stood the affairs of the field until about three o'clock 
 P. M., when the fleet of gunboats, in full force, advanced 
 upon the Fort and opened fire. They advanced in the shape 
 of a crescent, and kept up a constant and incessant fire for 
 one hour and a half, which was replied to with uncommon 
 
19 
 
 spirit and vigor by the Fort. Once the boats reached a 
 point within a few hundred yards of the Fort, at which time 
 it was that three of their boats sustained serious injuries 
 from our batteries, and were compelled to fall buck. The 
 line was broken, and the enemy discomfited on the water, 
 giving up the fight entirely, which he never afterwards re- 
 newed. I was satisfied, from the incidents of the last two 
 days, that the enemy did not intend again to give us battle 
 in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very 
 heavy slaughter, upon every effort to storm our position; 
 and it was but fair to infer that they would not again renew 
 the unavailing attempt at our dislodgment, when certain 
 means to effect the same end, without loss, were perfectly at 
 their command. We were aware of the fact that extremely 
 heavy reinforcements had been continually arriving, day 
 and night, for three days and nights; and I had no doubt, 
 whatever, that their whole available force on the western 
 waters could, and would, be concentrated here, if it was 
 deemed necessary to reduce our position. I hail already 
 seen the impossibility of holding out, for any length of time, 
 with our inadequate number and indefensible position. 
 There was no place within our entrenchments but could be 
 reached by the enemy's artillery, from their boats or their 
 batteries. It was but fair to infer that, whilst they kept up 
 a sufficient fire upon our entrenchments to keep our men 
 from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to 
 give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on 
 the right and the left banks, and thus to cut off all our com- 
 munications and to prevent the possibility of egress. I thus 
 saw clearly that but one course was left by which a rational 
 hope could be cnterfWined of saving the garrison, or a part 
 of it. That was, to dislodge the enemy from his position on 
 our left, and thus to pass our people into the open country 
 lying southward, towards Nashville. I called for a consul- 
 tation of the officers of Divisions and Brigades, to take place 
 after dark, when this plan was laid before them, approved 
 and adopted, and at which it was determined to move from 
 the trenches at an early hour on the next morning, and at- 
 tack the enemy in his position. It was agreed that the at- 
 tack should commence upon our extreme left, and this duty 
 was assigned Brigadier-General Pillow, assisted by Briga- 
 dier-General Johnson, having also under his command, com- 
 manders of brigades, Col. Baldwin, commanding Mississippi 
 and Tennessee troops, and Col. Wharton and Col. McCaus- 
 
20 
 
 land, commanding Virginians. To Brigadier-General Buck- 
 ner was assigned the duty of making tho attack, from near 
 the centre of our lines, upon the enemy's forces upon the 
 Winn's Ferry road. The attack on the left was delayed 
 longer than I expected, and, consequently, the enemy 
 was found in position when our troops advanced. The at- 
 tack, however, on our part, was extremely spirited, and al- 
 though the resistance of the enemy was obstinate, and their 
 numbers far exceeded ours, our people succeeded in driving 
 them, discomfited and terribly cut to pieces, from the entire 
 left. The Kentucky troops, under Brigadier-General Buck- 
 ner, advanced from their position behind the entrenchments, 
 upon the Winn's Ferry road, but not until the enemy had 
 been driven, in a great measure, from the position he occu- 
 pied in the morning. 
 
 I had ordered on the night before for the two regiments 
 stationed in Fort Donelson to occupy the trenches vacated 
 by Brigadier-General Buckner's forces, which, together 
 with the men whom he detached to assist in this purpose, I 
 thought sufficient to hold them. My intention was to hold, 
 with Brigadier-General Buckner's command, the Winn's 
 Ferry Road, and thus to prevent the enemy, during the 
 night, from occupying the position on our left which he 
 occupied in the morning. I gave him orders upon the field 
 to that effect. Leaving him in position then, I started for 
 the right of our command to see that all was secure there ; 
 my intention being, if things could be held in the condition 
 they then were, to move the whole army, if posible, to the 
 open country lying southward beyond the Randolph Forges. 
 During my absence, and from some misapprehension, I pre- 
 sume, of the previous order given, Brrgadier-General Pil- 
 low ordered Brigadier-General Buckner to leave his position 
 on the Winn's Ferry Road and to resume his place in his 
 trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed 
 before I was aAvare of it. As the enemy was pressing upon 
 the trenches, I deemed that the execution of this last order 
 was all that was left to be done. The enemy in part suc- 
 ceeded in occupying an angle of the trenches on the extreme 
 right of Brigadier-General Buckner's command, and as the 
 fresh forces of the enemy had begun already to move towards 
 our left to occupy the position they held in the morning, and 
 as we had no force adequate to oppose their progress, we 
 had to submit to the mortification of seeing the ground 
 "which we had won by such a severe conflict in the morning 
 
21 
 
 re-occupied by the enemy before midnight. The enemy had 
 been landing reinforcements throughout the day. His num- 
 bers had been augmented to 83 regiments. Our troops were 
 completely exhausted by four days and nights of continued 
 conflict. To renew it with any hope of successful result 
 was obviously vain, and such I understood to be the unani- 
 mous opinion of all the officers present at the council called 
 to consider what was best to lie done. I thought, and so 
 announced, tbat a desperate onset upon the right of the 
 enemy's forces on the ground, where we had attacked theni in 
 the morning, might result in the extricating of a considera- 
 ble proportion of tiie command from the position we were in, 
 and this opinion 1 understood to be concurred in by all who 
 were present. But it was likewise agreed, with the same unani- 
 mity, that it would result in the slaughter of nearly all who 
 did not succeed in effecting their escape. The question then 
 arose, whether in point of humanity, and a sound military 
 policy, a course should lie adopted from which the probabili- 
 ties were that the larger proportion of the command would 
 be cut to pieces in an unavailing fight against overwhelming 
 numbers. I understood the general sentiment to be adverse 
 to the proposition. I felt that in this contingency, whilst 
 it might be questioned whether I should, as commander of 
 the army, lead it to certain destruction in an unavailing 
 fight, yet I had a right individually to determine that I 
 would not survive a surrender there. To ratify both propo- 
 sitions, I agreed to hand over the command to Brigadier- 
 General Buckner through Brigadier- General Pillow, and to 
 make an effort for my own extrication by any and every 
 means that might present themselves to me. 
 
 I therefore directed Col. Forest, a daring and determined 
 officer, at the head of an efficient regiment of cavalry, to be 
 present, for the purpose of accompanying me in what I sup- 
 posed would be an effort to pass through the enemy's line. 
 I announced the fact upon turning the command over to 
 Brigadier-General Buckner, that I would bring away with 
 me, by any means I could command, my own particular bri- 
 gade, the propriety of which was acquiesced in on all hands. 
 This, by various modes, I succeeded in accomplishing to a 
 great extent, and would have brought off my whole command, 
 in oneway or another, if I had had the assistance of the field 
 officers, who were absent from several of the regiments. 
 The command was turned over to Brigadier-General Buck- 
 ner, who at once opened negotiations with the enemy, which 
 
22 
 
 resulted in the surrender of the place. Thus ended the 
 conflict running through four days and four nights; a large 
 portion of which time it was maintained with the greatest 
 fierceness and obstinacy ; in which we, with a force not ex- 
 ceeding 13,000, a large portion of whom were illy armed, 
 succeeded in resisting and driving back, with discomfiture, 
 an army consisting of more than 50,000 men. I have no 
 means of accurately estimating the loss of the enemy. From 
 what I saw upon the battle field, from what I witnessed 
 throughout the whole period of the conflict, from what I was 
 able to learn from sources of information deemed by me wor- 
 thy of credit, I have no doubt that the enemy's loss in killed 
 and wounded reached a number beyond (5,000) five thousand. 
 Our own losses were extremely heavy ; but for want of exact 
 returns I am unable to state precise numbers. I think they 
 will not be far from 1500 killed and wounded. Nothing 
 could exceed the coolness and determined spirit of resistance, 
 which animated the men in this long and perilous conflict, 
 nothing could exceed the determined courage which charac- 
 terized them throughout this terrible struggle, and nothing 
 could be more admirable than the steadiness which they ex- 
 hibited until nature itself was exhausted, in what they knew 
 to be a desperate fight against a foe very many times their 
 superior in numbers. I cannot particularize in this report 
 to you the numberless instances of heroic daring, per- 
 formed by both officers and men, but must content myself 
 for the present, by saying, in my judgment they all desorvo 
 well of the country. 
 
 I have the honor to be, 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 (Signed) , JOHN B. FLOYD, 
 
 Brig. Gen. Commamlvg. 
 
 (Official) John Witiiep.s, 
 
 A. A. GemnriiL 
 
 A. &I. G. O., March 10, 1862. 
 
REPORT OF G. C. WHARTON, 
 
 COLONEL COMMANDING FIRST BRIGADE. 
 
 Headquarters First Brigade, Floyd's Division, 
 Camp near Murfrcosboro', Term., Feb. 22, 1862. 
 Brigadier -General John B. Floyd: 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to submit the following report of 
 the participation of this brigade in the engagement at Fort 
 Donelson. 
 
 The advance of the brigade, the fifty-first Regiment Vir- 
 ginia volunteers, readied Dover, one mile from the Fort, 
 about 11, P. M., on Friday, the 7th. and immediately re- 
 ported to Brigadier-General B. R. Johnson, who was then 
 in command, and was ordered to encamp near the wharf. 
 About 4, P. M., on the 8th, the fifty-sixth Regiment Vir- 
 ginia volunteers arrived, and was ordered to encamp near 
 the fifty-first. From Saturday to Wednesday following 
 there was skirmishing between our cavalry pickets and the 
 enemy. On Wednesday our pickets were driven in, and 
 the enemy reported advancing in force. The brigade was 
 then ordered to take position on the left of Brigadier-Gene- 
 ral Buckner's division, and near the centre of our line of 
 defence. Soon after taking position the enemy commenced 
 to throw shot and shell, which did no execution. Captain 
 Porter's battery was then ordered to take the position which 
 had been assigned to this brigade, and we were ordered to 
 the support of the left wing, commanded by Brigadier-Gen- 
 eral Johnson. We were engaged during the evening and 
 night in constructing breastworks and rifle pits. During 
 Thursday we were under a heavy fire from the enemy's 
 batteries ; there were also frequent engagements with the 
 infantry, in all of which the enemy were repulsed. Thurs- 
 day night we remained again in the ditches. On Friday 
 there was skirmishing with the infantry and sharp shooters. 
 Occasionally sharp firing from the batteries. On Friday 
 evening occurred the terrific cannonading between the gun- 
 boats and the Fort, some of the shells from the boats ex- 
 ploding in and near our lines, but did no injury. On Satur- 
 day morning, at four, A. M., the brigade was withdrawn 
 from the ditches and placed in line, by order of Brigadier- 
 General Pillow, to make an attack on the enemy's extreme 
 
24 
 
 right flank. Col. Baldwin's Brigade was placed in advance. 
 This brigade followed next. About six o'clock the column 
 was put in motion. We had scarcely passed beyond the 
 line of our defence, when the skirmishers of Col. Baldwin's 
 Brigade engaged the enemy's pickets ; in a few minutes the 
 engagement became general. We were then ordered to de- 
 ploy and advance, which was done with spirit and prompt- 
 ness. The enemy, after a very obstinate resistance, was 
 forced to retire, but were either rallied or reinforced on the 
 several ridges, from which they were again and again driven. 
 Our men, cheering as they charged, pursued them nearly 
 tAvo miles, when orders were received that we should retire 
 to our entrenchments. The brigade was very much ex- 
 hausted, having been under fire or in the ditches for more 
 than four days. The loss of the 51st was nine killed, forty- 
 three w T ounded, and five missing; of the 56th eight were 
 killed, thirty-seven wounded, and one hundred and fifteen 
 missing. Lieut. Col. J. W. Massie commanded the 5ist 
 regiment; his bearing was most chivalric and gallant. Capt. 
 G. W. Davis gallantly led the 56th regiment. Lieut. Au- 
 gust Forsberg, attached to the brigade as engineer officer, 
 rendered very efficient service in rallying and leading the 
 men, and throughout the day distinguished himself for gal- 
 lantry and acts of daring. To mention the many individual 
 instances of heroism and daring, would too much lengthen 
 this report, therefore, suffice it to say, that all the officers 
 and men of both regiments behaved with commendable cool- 
 ness and bravery. 
 
 Capt. S. H. Newberry, Lieuts. Henderson and Painter, 
 of the 51st, were wounded; Capt. D. C. Harrison, of the 
 56th, was mortally wounded whilst leading his men to a 
 charge. Lieuts. Ferguson and Haskins were also wounded. 
 A number of improved arms were captured and brought to 
 camp. 
 
 On Sunday morning the 1 6th, the brigade was ordered from 
 Fort Donelson to Nashville, where valuable service was ren- 
 dered in guarding and shipping government stores. Thurs- 
 day, the 20th, the brigade was ordered to this place, where 
 we are now in camp. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 (Signed.) G. C. WHARTON, 
 
 Colonel Cornmanding Brigade. 
 
 Official : John Withers, 
 
 A. A. General. 
 
 A. & I. G, 0., March 8, 1862. 
 
REPORT OF JOHN McCAtTSLAND, 
 
 COMMANDING THE SECOND BRIGADE. 
 
 Headquarters 2d Brigade, Floyd's Division. ) 
 Murfreesboro', Tenn., Feb. 23, 1862. J 
 
 Brigadier-General John B. Floyd : 
 
 Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of 
 the action of this brigade on the 13th, 14th and 15th of Feb- 
 ruary, 1862, in the engagement near Fort Donelson, be- 
 tween the C. S. forces, and the U. S. forces, under General 
 Grant : 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, I received your orders to 
 proceed at once from Cumberland city to Fort Donelson, 
 where we arrived at daylight, and were at once ordered to 
 the trenches. This brigade was posted as a support to 
 Green's battery on the left wing. During the entire day 
 the enemy kept up an incessant fire of shot and shell upon 
 the battery and its support. The men and officers behaved 
 well under the circumstances, and soon became accustomed 
 to the firing. There were five men wounded during the 
 day. On the 14th there was continued skirmishing with 
 artillery and musketry. About 2 o'clock, P. M., the gun- 
 boats commenced a heavy bombardment of the Fort, the 
 shells passing over and taking the line of works in reverse, 
 and many passing over and through this brigade ; however, 
 we suffered no loss, and gathered several large shells (64's 
 I think). About dark another battery was posted in front of 
 our position, and during the night it was placed behind a 
 good earthwork, thrown up by the men. About midnight I 
 received orders to concentrate my brigade near the left 
 wing, which was done promptly ; and at daylight of the 
 morning of the loth, the column under Gen. Pillow sallied 
 from the left, and engaged the enemy in a short space of 
 time. 
 
 This brigade was a reserve for Col. Baldwin's Brigade, 
 but the enemy pressing his right, I at once moved up to his 
 
26 
 
 support, and engaged the enemy, posted in thick under- 
 growth and a rough and rolling country. I ordered the 
 firing to commence as soon as the enemy was in sight ; 
 they were advancing just in front of the 36th Virginia 
 Regiment. They, in a short time, were checked, and then I 
 ordered a charge upon them. The men came up with a shout 
 and charged the enemy, routed him and pursued him for 
 two miles, when we were called back by orders of General 
 Pillow. 
 
 The 36th Virginia Regiment had 14 killed and 46 wound- 
 ed, the 50th Virginia Regiment had 10 killed and 40 wound- 
 ed. On Sunday morning this brigade was forced across the 
 river, and are now arriving at this camp. Lieut. Col. Reid 
 was wounded about the close of the action ; he and Major 
 Smith behaved gallantly during the day. In fact men and 
 officers all behaved well. We captured one field gun and 
 two hundred Enfield muskets. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 (Signed.) JOHN McCAUSLAND, 
 
 Commanding Second Brigade. 
 
 Official : John Withers, 
 
 A. A. General. 
 
 A. & I. G. 0., March 8. 1S62. 
 
PeRrmlife® 
 pH8.5