• j - M 5 S' r r \ s > - :< I ?u ' ■- V ■r/y , ) ' - -r .. ! Y :V* a' \ '■ ' ^ , <» ■.. ■* v w r Y j r\ ' ■ v ^ v- r x l c v>,/ ; , )- ? \ \ v * N 5 I '■(■ k m . T _/ — r / / y ( i ' ) • i >- v ■ x , (> - ^ -%* r ' $ , 1 >j*f r V > f - t \ 'l '-x v ; . r u- > M .... 4 ' , , ■ v \ . t : ) / \ • ... ' X C I X - - '' r ( , _ ' / - ■ s \ . . V~ < V -X / . '.I ' ./ r \ v r I' ec: of the Nanona Flood Insurance Program has bee* the mbmAf it pa n da to zone pro pe r t y owners through kss-jhan-acaanai insurance rates. A 1 983 U.S. General .Accounting Office gao stum conc.unec mat sin at 1 9-8, subsidies of between Sac and Scot per no :• nave oeet o". . . .ess-than-actuanal rates woe Federal Mitigation Programs 107 originally incorporated into the system to encourage widespread partici¬ pation and thus indirectly to reduce future federal outlays for disaster assistancej As the gao report states: “Using the very general guidance containecT in the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, previous pro¬ gram administrators set the subsidized rates on the basis of what they believed was affordable and would encourage wide participation. The rates were not set on the basis of any identifiable reduction from the rates the policymakers would have paid without a subsidy. As a result, the extent to which rates are actually being subsidized cannot easily be deter¬ mined” (gao 1983, ii). Subsidized rates were found to be a result of a number of factors, including: untested frequency and severity data in the hydrologic model used to set rates, incorrect assumptions in setting rates in B and C zones, invalidated enforcement and engineering assumptions, and problems of underinsurance. To correct the problems the gao study recommends estab¬ lishing a reserve to cover catastrophic losses, establishing a plan to correct data and methodological weaknesses, establishing a rate structure which reflects variations in risks but which is not unnecessarily complex, and using a greater reliance on recent loss experiences in setting rates. More recent data supplied by the Federal Insurance Administration (1987) for this book indicates that new rate structures may have offset earlier subsidies. As table 1.3 (chapter 1) shows, over the 1978-1986 period, the hurricane-prone states paid total premiums of $1.99 billion while receiving loss payments totaling $1.83 billion. Local implementation and enforcement of minimum nfip standards have also been a problem. While fema has the authority to suspend communities for noncompliance, this is viewed as a harsh sanction and not frequently imposed. Partly in response to this, and the need for an intermediate sanction, fema has recently enacted a rule (January 1, 1986) which will permit it to place noncomplying communities on probation. A premium surcharge of $25 will be placed on every policy in the commu¬ nity as a result. Posthurricane Disaster Assistance The federal government has long been involved in assisting disaster stricken localities to recover and rebuild. The most important piece of federal legislation in this area is the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, which specifies a 108 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS number of different recovery programs. This act established fema as the main agency coordinating the federal response to emergencies and disas¬ ters. Federal disaster assistance does not become available until a presi¬ dential declaration of an “emergency” or “major disaster” is declared. An “emergency” is declared when federal assistance is deemed necessary to supplement the efforts of state and local agencies to avert property damages and loss of life. For the distribution of disaster assistance and reconstruction monies a major disaster must be declared by the president. Such a major disaster is defined as a catastrophe, which in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby, and with respect to which the Governor of any state in which such catastrophe occurs or threatens to occur certifies the need for Federal disaster assistance . . . and given assurance of the expenditure of a reasonable amount of the funds of such state, its local governments, or other agencies for alleviating the damage, loss, hardship or other suffering resulting from such catastrophe (Part 200, Section 200.2). When the state governor requests a disaster declaration of the presi¬ dent, estimates of the type and extent of damages incurred and the extent of financial assistance needed are submitted (and usually developed in collaboration with fema officials). The request for a disaster declaration is first submitted to and reviewed by fema’s regional director, who ten¬ ders a recommendation to the director of fema, who in turn submits a recommendation to the president. Once a declaration is made, a Federal- State Disaster Assistance Agreement is signed by the governor and the regional director of fema specifying the extent and use of federal assist¬ ance funds. Eligible disaster-stricken jurisdictions are designated by the associate director of Disaster Response and Recovery. A federal coordi¬ nating officer (fco), usually the regional fema director, is then designated to oversee and coordinate the distribution of federal assistance. Two types of disaster assistance are provided by fema: (i) individual assistance (assistance for individuals, families, and businesses), and (2) public assistance (assistance for local and state governments) (see Propst Federal Mitigation Programs 109 Table 4.5 Categories of Public Assistance from fema Emergency Work Permanent Work 1. Debris Removal 2. Emergency Protection 1. Road or Street Systems 2. Water Control Facilities 3. Public Buildings and Related Equipment 4. Public Utilities 5. Facilities under Construction 6. Private Nonprofit Facilities 7. Publicly Owned Parks and Recreational Facilities 8. Timber Removal Source: CFR, Title 44. 1984). Included under individual assistance are grants and loans for temporary housing and disaster unemployment. Within the category of public assistance eligible damages are classified as either “permanent” or “emergency” work. Within the emergency work category are included debris removal and emergency protection, while under the permanent work category are included the repair of road and street systems, water control facilities, public buildings, public utilities, and so on (see table 4.5). Damage Survey Reports (dsr) must be filed for each proposed pub¬ lic assistance project and are prepared by federal-state-local damage assess¬ ment teams (see fema 1981). These are then used to develop project applications for actuarial funding, which fema can change or approve. The two categories under emergency work can be funded by fema under a presidential declaration of an emergency, while funding for per¬ manent work categories requires the declaration of a major disaster. (See Propst 1984 for a more detailed discussion of each of these categories.) Also available from fema are Community Disaster Loans which are provided to help localities replace tax revenues lost as a result of a disas¬ ter. These are loans which must not exceed 25 percent of the annual operating budget of the locality in the fiscal year in which the disaster occurred. Repayment of all or a portion of the loan may be canceled if the jurisdiction is unable to meet subsequent local operating budgets as a result of disaster-related expenses and revenue losses. Only one loan to a jurisdiction is permitted. Several additional recovery and reconstruction programs are adminis- 110 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS tered by other federal agencies and may have important influences on poststorm redevelopment. The Small Business Administration provides low-interest loans for rebuilding and repairing houses and businesses. Funds are available through the Federal Highway Administration to assist states and localities in repairing highways in the federal-aid highway system which have been seriously damaged in a natural disaster. (The creating statute is found in 23 usca [United States Code Annotated], Section 125, and implementing regulations are found in 23 cfr, Section 668.101 et seq.) The Office of Elementary and Secondary Education in the Department of Education also provides funds in the case of a presi¬ dential disaster declaration for the rebuilding of damaged or destroyed school structures and for supplementing local resources so that predisaster levels of education are maintained (for example, to make up for deficiencies created by loss of revenues and increased expenditures). Between 1970 and 1981, $3.8 billion has been given to individuals and state and local governments from the President’s Disaster Relief Fund, including 376 major disasters and 84 emergencies. In recent years post¬ disaster recovery programs have come under attack as unnecessary subsi¬ dies for hazardous development. Moreover, the presidential declaration of a disaster or emergency is often viewed as more of a political act than one based on the financial and other capabilities of the state to ade¬ quately deal with the disaster. A report by the gao concluded that fema has difficulty in assessing whether state and local governments are, in fact, capable of dealing with their own disasters (gao 1981). While fema undertakes relatively consistent procedures for assessing the magnitude and severity of disasters, it lacks policies and guidelines for consistently evaluating the capability and commitment of states requesting disaster declarations. It is true that in many situations where disaster declarations are made the capacity of state and local agencies to deal with these situations is clearly adequate. State and local officials have come to view such assistance as “deserved,” regardless of the extent to which it is actually needed. A case in point is the disaster declaration issued for the North Carolina coast following Hurricane Diana in 1983. This was a relatively weak storm and produced a relatively small amount of total damages—some $80 million. The financial and other commitments created by the storm were clearly within the capacity of the state and its local governments. Federal Mitigation Programs 111 The gao has also raised serious questions about fema’s current cost¬ sharing arrangements. Since May 1980 fema has required state and local governments to assume 25 percent of the cost of public assistance pro¬ grams. While no such specific cost-sharing standard existed in the past, states and localities were in theory required to document a “reasonable” commitment to disaster assistance. The gao (1981) observes that the new cost-sharing requirement has created much protest: fema’s cost-sharing policy has created much opposition and concern on the part of Governors, legislators, and organizations of State officials. The Governors who have had to agree to the cost-sharing in order to receive Federal disaster assistance feel the 75/25 percent cost-sharing policy is an arbitrary fema decision that should not have been made without consulting with them and the Congress. They contend that State and local governments already bear a major role in disaster relief because of their ineligible public assistance costs. They also contend that fema’s new policy further burdens the State and local governments by requiring them to pick up, in addi¬ tion to the above mentioned cost, 25 percent of the eligible public assistance costs (pp. 36-37). The fema 75/25 policy, then, is discretionary in that it can be raised or lowered depending upon unique disaster circumstances. The gao report recommends that the cost-sharing question be taken to Congress to “reevaluate the present law and clarify the extent to which supplemental Federal assistance should be given in major disasters and emergencies” (p.38). fema’s apparently strict adherence to the 75/25 cost-sharing ratio is based on a discretionary assessment that this cost-sharing approach results in a reasonable level of State and local government participa¬ tion in disaster relief costs in almost all cases. It obviates the admin¬ istrative problems associated with attempting to determine a reason¬ able commitment for each disaster and also assures compliance with the statutory purpose that the Federal aid be supplemental. More¬ over, fema has left itself free to recommend providing more or less than 75 percent of the assistance should it be convinced in a particu¬ lar situation that an exception is warranted. Under these circum- 112 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS stances, fema’s cost-sharing policy is consistent with existing law. However, the policy has created controversy on the part of Gover¬ nors, legislators, and organizations of State officials (p. 38). In 1986 fema proposed a major overhauling of its disaster assistance regulations, which addressed, among other things, the concerns raised by the gao report. Although the proposed regulations were not adopted, they indicate potential means of reforming the present system to encour¬ age state and local governments to accept more responsibility for disas¬ ters. The proposed system would have incorporated “capability indica¬ tors” into the presidential declaration process. These capability indicators would be based on a formula using the population of the state or county and the ratio of the state’s or county’s per capita personal income to the national average per capita income (Federal Register 1986, 13336). The amount of state and local contribution would be tied to the magnitude of the disaster in relation to state and local capability, under a multitiered sys¬ tem ranging from o percent to 90 percent federal monies for public assist¬ ance depending on the ability of the applicants to recover on their own. Section 1361: Flooded Property Purchase Program Section 1362 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 provides the fia with the ability to purchase structures insured under the nfip and which have been seriously damaged by storm flooding. More specifically, the stated objectives of Section 1362—or the Flooded Property Purchase Program—are: (1) To reduce future flood insurance and disaster assistance costs by removing repetitively and/or substantially damaged structures from flood risk areas; (2) To provide an opportunity for owners of repetitively and sub¬ stantially damaged structures to be permanently removed from flood risk areas, and to reduce risk to life from flooding; and (3) To complement Federal, State and local efforts to restore flood plain values, protect the environment and provide recreational and open space resources, (cfr, Title 44, Sec. 77.2) These structures would then be moved or destroyed and the remaining open space land deeded to the local jurisdiction. The general objective of Federal Mitigation Programs 113 this program is to stop the destruction-reconstruction cycle that exists in areas frequented by repetitive disasters and thus to reduce the number of nfip claims in such areas. To qualify for buy-out under Section 136Z, the following conditions must be met: (1) The property must be located in a flood risk area as deter¬ mined by the Administrator; (2) The property must have been covered by a flood insurance policy under the National Flood Insurance Program at the time dam¬ age took place. (3) The building, while covered by flood insurance under the National Flood Insurance Program, must have been damaged sub¬ stantially beyond repair or must have been damaged not less than three previous times during the preceding five year period, each time the cost of repair equalling 25 percent or more of the structure’s value, or must have been damaged from a single casualty of any nature so that a statute, ordinance or regulation precludes its repair or restoration or permits repair or restoration only at significantly increased cost. (4) A state or local community must enter into an agreement author¬ ized by ordinance or legally binding resolution to take title to and manage the property in a manner consistent with sound land man¬ agement use as determined by the Administrator. (5) The community must agree to remove without cost to the Fed¬ eral Emergency Management Agency (fema), by demolition, reloca¬ tion, donation or sale any damaged structures to which the commu¬ nity accepts title from fema, provided the Administrator may, when it is in the public interest to do so, agree to assume a part or all of the cost of such removal, (cfr, Title 44, Sec. 77.2) Eligible structures must be insured under nfip, and 1362 funds are used to pay the difference between insurance claims and the replacement cost of the structure. Monies are also used to pay for the cost of purchas¬ ing the land on which structures sit. fia utilizes eight “community selection factors” for making decisions about how to spend 1362 monies (see table 4.6). Funding for 1362 was not appropriated by Congress until Fiscal Year 1980 and then was only a very small amount—$5.4 million. 114 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 4.6 Community Selection Factors for the Section 1362 Program 1. The permanent removal of flood-prone structures will contribute to existing, on-going programs for permanent evacuation of floodplains. 2. In addition to hazard mitigation, acquisition will contribute to the achieve¬ ment of multiple community development goals (such as environmental protec¬ tion, open space/recreation, urban renewal, or some other public purpose). 3. The acquisition and relocation of flood-prone structures will have an economic benefit in terms of eliminating future flood insurance claims, avoiding future damage, reducing future disaster relief costs, avoiding business interruption, and reducing loss of life. 4. The distribution of properties to be acquired under Section 1362 (or the distribu¬ tion of these properties combined with properties that can be acquired through other programs) will result in a logical, usable, and desirable land use pattern. 5. Alternatives to acquisition under Section 1362 have been investigated and found to be less effective than Section 1362 in meeting the community’s floodplain management and hazard mitigation goals. These alternatives could include, but are not limited to, floodproofing, structural flood protection, or acquisition and relocation programs of local, state, or other federal agencies. 6. The community has undergone a planning process and found acquisition/ relocation to be the most desirable alternative in terms of cost, degree of flood protection achieved, environmental enhancement, and other factors. 7. The community has demonstrated, or agreed to pursue, an active program of sound floodplain management which exceeds the minimum requirements of the National Flood Insurance Program. 8. The community can actively participate in the planning and implementation of the Section 1362 program through the provision of either financial or staff resources. Source: Propst 1984, p. 36. A consultant’s report to fema on alternative ways of implementing Section 1362 estimated that between 1970 and 1979 over 6,000 struc¬ tures damaged in over 1,000 communities nationwide would have met the statutory eligibility requirements (fema, 1981). Projecting into the future, it is estimated that the number of eligible structures by the year 2000 will number approximately 2,000, requiring some $27 million in federal acqui¬ sition monies (that is, for administrative costs plus the difference between insurance payments and value of the structure and the cost of land at Federal Mitigation Programs 115 comparable sites). The assumptions behind these estimates (for example, fewer properties will be at risk because of elevation requirements) suggest that eligible damaged properties may be more extensive. A major ingredi¬ ent to a successful 1362 program is that of funding. The fema report suggests that some sort of cost-sharing arrangement may be appropriate, perhaps requiring localities to bear the administrative costs and, under some circumstances, the cost of demolition and site clearance. A major problem for the federal insurance program is the extent to which it subsidizes communities and neighborhoods subject to chronic and repetitive flooding. One procedure used by fema in the past for addressing this problem is known as “Constructive Total Loss.” Under this approach fema provided insurance funds beyond the actual extent of damages to property, and up to its total insurance level, if a local ordi¬ nance would prevent the repair or reconstruction of such properties. The idea was to encourage a movement away from floodplain sites that would be repeatedly flooded and would require large flood insurance payments in the future. This practice was discontinued by fema in 1983, reasoning that Section 1362 was specified by Congress to be used for relocations out of high flood risk areas (Federal Register 1983, 3 — 4). An impediment to participation in the program by owners of a dam¬ aged structure may occur in situations where prestorm market values are depressed. In these circumstances 1362 payments of the difference between insurance proceeds and market value may not be sufficient to purchase a similar structure elsewhere. Also requiring localities to place purchased land in perpetual open space may appear unattractive to local officials who are concerned about the loss of their tax base and the other revenues which might be generated through use of the coastal floodplain. The relatively low level of funding which has been made available for Section 1362 also leads one to question the elimination of the Construc¬ tive Total Loss Program. A commentator in a recent article in the Flood Report raises just this point: “The problem which has not been ade¬ quately addressed by fia, however, is one of simple economics. The Sec¬ tion 1362 program has a limited budget of approximately $5 million. Consequently many insureds will not be able to avail themselves of the statutory benefits for relocation. The argument can be made that the National Flood Insurance Program is providing inadequate coverage to insureds in high risk areas” (1983a, 4). 116 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS fema has the authority, as well, under Subpart E of its disaster assis¬ tance regulations, to require the relocation of public structures and facili¬ ties to safer sites in order for a recipient jurisdiction to receive reconstruc¬ tion funds. The proposed 1986 modifications to fema’s disaster assistance regulations would have clarified these provisions. Specifically the regional director can decline requests for funds to rebuild public facilities in areas where “the facility is and will be subject to repetitive heavy damage,” or where other federal mitigation requirements apply. If an applicant juris¬ diction is denied funding, three options exist: (1) A grant-in-lieu may be requested to apply the eligible repair or replacement costs, as applicable, to the reconstruction of the facility at a non-hazardous site. The purchase of the site and road and utility services to the site are the responsibility of the applicant. (2) The estimated restoration costs may be included in a flexible funding grant provided that no part of the grant is used on the facility at the disapproved location. (3) The estimated restoration costs may be included in a small project grant provided that no part of the grant is used on the facility at the disapproved location, (cfr, Title 44, Section 205.75 [a][7]) Poststorm Mitigation: Federal Requirements Section 406 of the Disaster Assistance Act clearly establishes that federal disaster assistance is contingent upon the efforts of local and state recipi¬ ents to mitigate future storm damages. More specifically the law states: As a further condition of any loan or grant made under the provis¬ ions of this chapter, the state or local government shall agree that the natural hazards in the areas in which the proceeds of the grants or loans are to be used shall be evaluated and appropriate action shall be taken to mitigate such hazards, including safe land use and con¬ struction practices, in accordance with standards prescribed or approved by the President after adequate consultation with the appro¬ priate elected officials of general purpose local governments, and the state shall furnish such evidence of compliance with this section as may be required by regulation (Public Law 93-288, Title IV, Section 406). Federal Mitigation Programs 117 Implementing regulations are found in cfr, Title 44, Part 205, Subpart M. The major formal mechanism for ensuring that the above condition is satisfied is for the fema regional director to include a mitigation stipula¬ tion in the Federal-State Disaster Assistance Agreement. As part of these stipulations, fema typically requires the preparation of a Hazard Mitiga¬ tion Plan for the particular disaster area (called a “406 plan”) which identifies natural hazards, potential mitigation opportunities, and specific measures to achieve these opportunities. This plan, which is usually pre¬ pared by the state, is to be completed no later than 180 days after the issuance of the presidential declaration. In theory a number of individuals have a role in the development of the hazard mitigation plan. Initially a joint federal/state/local survey team is established which collects information from site visits, damage survey reports, and other sources and develops specific recommendations con¬ cerning appropriate hazard mitigation measures. A joint federal/state/ local planning team is then established, perhaps including the same indi¬ viduals, that evaluates the adequacy of existing mitigation plans and measures, reviews the recommendations of the survey team, and prepares the Section 406 Hazard Mitigation Plan. Ideally, the planning team includes in this plan specific target dates and schedules for the completion of prescribed mitigation measures and activities, and these become condi¬ tions for the obtaining of fema grants and loans. An additional mechanism or institution to promote mitigation during reconstruction is the Interagency Regional Hazard Mitigation Team. As a result of an interagency agreement signed by twelve federal agencies in December 1980, an interagency hazard mitigation team is established following a natural disaster to coordinate relevant federal programs and postdisaster assistance and to ensure that such actions reduce the losses from future disasters (see McElyea, Brower, and Godschalk 1982). Repre¬ sentatives from each agency are appointed to serve on the mitigation team—one for each fema region. Relevant state and local representatives are also included on the team. Following a disaster the interagency team conducts site visits, assesses the extent and nature of disaster damages, identifies mitigation opportunities, and develops specific recommenda¬ tions for mitigation actions (see fema 1981). The team prepares a hazard mitigation report within fifteen days following the presidential declara¬ tion. A progress report must be prepared by the lead agency in ninety days 118 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS after the issuance of the initial report. Included as well in this report are specific recommendations for how various forms of federal disaster assis¬ tance should be coordinated to achieve these mitigation objectives (see fema 1981). The connections between the interagency hazard mitigation task force and the Section 406 planning requirements are very close. The interagency team findings are available in a shorter time frame and may generally be used as a framework for beginning the preparation of the 406 mitigation report. The 406 mitigation requirements have in the past had little relationship to the disaster assistance funding decisions of fema. The proposed 1986 modifications to the disaster assistance rules, however, would have sub¬ stantially reinforced these requirements. They would have required the 406 plan to include an evaluation of severity, extent, and frequency of the natural hazard and an analysis of hazard vulnerability trends and changes; a description and analysis of current state and local hazard mitigation programs and policies (specifically including discussion of land use plan¬ ning and zoning practices); and a list of proposed hazard mitigation programs, strategies, and recommendations as well as a specific list of proposed actions with agency and jurisdictional responsibilities and com¬ pletion dates identified. Local jurisdictions would have to be actively involved in the development and implementation of these plans. States and localities would have to identify appropriate actions to reduce hazard impacts, which they agree to undertake as a condition of future disaster assistance. Disaster assistance would be withheld if appropriate actions were not implemented. fema’s public assistance regulations have often been criticized because they virtually prevent reconstruction of buildings and facilities in ways which would mitigate future damages. Public assistance funds have gener¬ ally been restricted to what would be required to rebuild facilities to their predisaster condition. New “disaster proofing” criteria incorporated into the proposed 1986 disaster assistance rules would largely correct this problem. The regional director could “authorize disaster proofing not required by applicable codes, specifications and standards when in the public interest.” Such disaster proofing must substantially reduce poten¬ tial future damages, must be structurally feasible, must be cost-beneficial and cost-effective, and consistent with other applicable federal regula¬ tions (for example, the nfip). These disaster proofing measures would be Federal Mitigation Programs 119 acceptable even where they are not an integral part of the repairs to the structure or facility. Under existing regulations disaster proofing modifi¬ cations were limited to 15 percent of the total cost of the project, and states and localities were not permitted to contribute any funds above these costs. Under the proposed rules fema’s share of the disaster proofing is still “not to exceed a small percentage of the eligible project cost,” but the applicant “may contribute any amount necessary to completely fund any disaster proofing measure that meets the other criteria” (Federal Register 1986, 13373). Subrogation Suits: Shifting the Responsibility for Flood Losses fema has recently been attempting to retrieve some of the funds it pays out in flood insurance claims through the legal practice of subrogation. Once the insurance claims have been paid, this permits the insurer—in this case fema —to sue a third party who may be responsible for bringing about the flood damage. While those who are insured relinquish their rights to such action once claims are paid, fema can pursue responsible third parties. In effect, fema is attempting through subrogation to shift some of the responsibility for flood damages to local governments who contribute to them by permitting development in hazardous locations, by not enforcing flood protection ordinances, and so on. The first two subrogation suits brought by fema were the United States v. Parish of Jefferson and the United States v. St. Bernard Parish (both in Louisiana). In the Jefferson Parish case fema contended that, among other things, the jurisdiction failed to enforce the minimum standards required under nfip, such as building elevation and requiring the submis¬ sion of drainage plans for proposed subdivisions (see Flood Report 1983b). It was also contended that the parish did not adequately inspect or main¬ tain the existing drainage system and that it altered this system, contrib¬ uting to increased flood damages. The parish was accused as well of being negligent in failing to require an adequate program for water retention and detention. The legal issue in these cases centered on the extent to which a community’s entrance into the nfip constitutes a form of contract and the failure to comply with nfip standards constitutes a breach of this contract. Recent opinions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that no contract existed, deciding in favor of the parishes. Rather than appeal, fema settled with the Jefferson Parish in 1987. In 120 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS return for dismissal of the litigation the parish and its insurers agreed to pay fema $i million and to comply with floodplain management regula¬ tions (U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Louisiana, Civil Action Nos. 81-1810 and 83-2077). Office of the President: Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 The Floodplain Management Executive Order (No. 11988) was signed by President Carter in 1977. It mandates the consideration by all federal agencies of actions which would encourage development in floodplains. It directs them to refrain from financing or permitting development in these hazard areas unless no “practicable” alternatives exist. If this is deter¬ mined to be the case, agencies are required to ensure that these projects are carried out in such a way that flood damages are minimal and natural floodplain values are restored or preserved. Executive Order 11990, also signed in 1977, instructs federal agencies to provide the same measure of protection to wetlands. Wetlands are not to be destroyed unless no other practicable alternatives exist; and where construction in these areas is unavoidable, agencies must insure that dam¬ ages to wetlands are minimized. NOAA and the Coastal Zone Management Act The Coastal Zone Management Act (czma) was enacted by Congress in 1972, creating a formal framework for collaborative planning of our nation’s coasts by federal, state, and local jurisdictions. States wishing to participate in the program are eligible to receive financial assistance for planning and developing a management program for their coastal areas. Funds are made available on a matching basis, both for program development (Section 305) and program implementation or administration (Section 306). These programs are subject to the guidelines and review of noaa. While financial assistance has been the major incentive for participation in the czm (Coastal Zone Management) program, the federal consistency requirement, contained in Section 307 of the act, has also served to encourage involvement (Brower and Carol 1984). This provision requires federal agencies with programs or development projects in coastal Federal Mitigation Programs 121 areas to conduct them in such a way that they are, to the maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs. This requirement in effect provides participating states with a major legal mechanism by which to control federal actions in coastal areas. Since its enactment, twenty-eight of the thirty-five eligible coastal states and territories have developed coastal management programs (Godschalk and Cousins 1985). Only two hurricane-prone states do not have approved coastal management plans: Texas and Georgia. Under the czma provisions states must define inland coastal zone bound¬ aries, determine permissible land and water uses, and designate areas of particular concern. Specifically mentioned in the legislation among areas of particular concern are: “areas of significant hazard if developed, due to storms, slides, floods, erosion, settlement, etc.” (see nrdc 1977). In many cases these state programs have provided, and continue to provide, an important legal, administrative, and political framework for local and state programs which mitigate hurricane and coastal storm hazards. This will become more apparent in the subsequent chapter deal¬ ing with state programs, and focusing on several key state efforts. Department of Interior and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act Enacted in 1982, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (cbra) was an attempt by Congress to remove some of the federal subsidies and incentives for private development in hazardous barrier islands. The law finds that barrier islands “serve as natural storm protective buffers and are generally unsuitable for development because they are vulnerable to hurricane and other storm damage and because natural shoreline recession and the movement of unstable sediments undermine manmade structures” (Public Law 97-348, 10/18/82, p. 1653, U.S. Statutes at Large). The law created a Barrier Island Resources System and designated 186 “undeveloped” segments of barrier island to be included within it. These islands are located along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts from Maine to Texas (for a history of cbra, see Kuehn 1984). Under the provisions of the law federal expenditures to assist private development in these designated areas is prohibited. These restrictions apply to expenditures for such things as roads and bridges, community 122 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS development, and disaster relief. General revenue sharing grants were specifically excluded from these restrictions, however. Also, as of October i, 1983, the Federal Insurance Agency is prohibited from issuing new flood insurance policies for buildings within designated undeveloped bar¬ riers. Certain other activities may be exempted after consultation with the secretary of the interior, including expenditures for energy resource development, maintenance of channel improvements and essential public facilities, and expenditures for national defense purposes. In September 1985 fema issued its final rules limiting disaster assistance for undevel¬ oped barrier island units. These regulations virtually prohibit disaster assistance. However, the rule does make several exceptions. Disaster assis¬ tance can be made available for: (1) maintenance, replacement, reconstruction, or repair, but not the expansion of publicly owned or publicly operated roads, struc¬ tures, or facilities that are essential links in a larger network or system; (2) repair of any facility necessary for the exploration, extraction, or transportation of energy resources which activity can be carried out only on, in, or adjacent to coastal water areas because the use or facility requires access to the coastal water body; and (3) maintenance of existing channel improvements and related structures, such as jetties, and including the disposal of dredge mate¬ rials related to such improvements, (cfr, Title 44, Section 205.506) The secretary of the interior is required to review the map of the barrier island system at least every five years and to make whatever modifications might be necessary to reflect natural changes in the land. A 1987 report recommended expansion of the cbra system to include some additional areas along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. There has been much debate about the potential effects of the cbra provisions. Godschalk (1984) conducted a study of the initial impacts of cbra, focusing on the impacts in three states: North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida. The two research methods used in this project were case studies (Hutchinson Island, Florida, and Topsail Island, North Carolina) and a mail questionnaire sent to government officials, develop¬ ers, and conservationists asking their opinions about likely impacts. The results of the questionnaire indicated that while respondents felt it was Federal Mitigation Programs 123 too early to see the impacts of cbra, a majority of the respondents believed that the program would not substantially impede future develop¬ ment. On the other hand, findings from the two case studies indicated that development-retarding effects, at least in the short term, were already being felt from the cbra program. On an island such as Topsail (North Carolina) where a road and bridge network was already in existence, the primary impact was from withdrawal of federal flood insurance. The long-term effects of this withdrawal will depend upon how easily the funds can be replaced by the private sector. The author speculates that this may encourage a shift to multifamily and condominium development and thus encourage even higher-density uses. On Hutchinson Island (Florida) where sufficient infrastructure does not exist, a major impact will be felt in the form of withdrawal of federal infrastructure funds. This had already forced developers to consider the construction of a bridge and road improvement themselves, perhaps paying for them through the use of impact fees. While cbra is a relatively recent enactment, it has already been chal¬ lenged in federal court. In Bostic et al. v. United States et al ., plaintiffs argued that their Onslow Beach (North Carolina) location had been erroneously designated as an undeveloped barrier island and that their procedural due process rights had been violated. They also contended that the means used to achieve congressional goals—namely the restric¬ tions in cbra —were irrational and should be struck down on substantive due process grounds. The court did not find these arguments convincing, however, and upheld the constitutionality of cbra (see Flood Report 1984). Strengthening the Federal Programs Despite the array of federal programs aimed at reducing coastal storm hazards, important gaps still exist. Perhaps the most important need is for stronger incentives for state and local governments to implement serious hazard mitigation programs. If the flood insurance program, for example, gave reduced rates to localities with strong mitigation measures, then citizens could see the benefits of mitigation in their bills for insurance premiums. If federal funds were available to help carry out state and local plans for relocating structures from high-hazard areas, then communities 124 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS could undertake these necessary but expensive programs. An example of a successful federal program using incentives is the Coastal Zone Management Program illustrated in the next chapter, which deals with state programs. Coupled with sweeter carrots could be some stronger sticks, as well. If fema could withhold disaster assistance from areas that had disregarded previous hazard mitigation requirements, then mitigation would be taken more seriously. If federal flood insurance could be withdrawn from areas that did not require mitigation following a disaster, that also would enhance mitigation efforts. In addition, the preparation of hurricane preparedness plans needs a stronger financial base. If the funding priority of these plans was raised and a continuing funding source provided, then the necessary technical studies could be completed for the entire hurricane-prone coast on an expedited basis. These potential changes will be covered in more detail in the final chapter. References Allenstein, Karen. 1985. Land Use Applications of the slosh Model (Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes). Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Department of City and Regional Planning. Berke, Philip, and Carlton Ruch. 1985. “Application of a Computer System for Hurricane Emergency Response and Land Use Planning.” Journal of Environmental Management 21: 117-134. Brower, David J., and Daniel S. Carol. 1984. Coastal Zone Management as Land Plan¬ ning. Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association. Carter, Michael T. 1983. Probability of Hurricane/Tropical Storm Conditions: A Users Guide for Local Decision Makers. Washington, D.C.: noaa. Committee on Government Operations. 1983. Federal Assistance to States and Commu¬ nities for Hurricane Preparedness Planning. 98th Congress, 1st Session, House Report No. 98-537, November 17. Conservation Foundation. 1980. Flood Hazard Management and Natural Resources Pro¬ tection. Washington, D.C. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1981. Federal Disaster Assistance Program Hand¬ book for Applicants. Washington, D.C. -. 1984. A Guide to Hurricane Preparedness Planning for State and Local Officials. Washington, D.C. Federal Mitigation Programs 125 -. 1987. “Hurricane Preparedness Studies.” July 23. Washington, D.C.: Earthquake and Natural Hazards Programs Division. Federal Register. 1986. “Proposed Rules for fema Disaster Assistance and Hazard Mitiga¬ tion.” Vol. 51, no. 75 (April 18). Flood Report. 1983a. “fia Abandons Use of Constructive Total Loss Theory.” Vol. 1, no. 3 (October). -. 1983b. “Negligence—Are You Guilty.” Vol. 1, no. 5 (December). -. 1984. “Coastal Barrier Challenge Defeated.” Vol. 1, no. 7 (February). Godschalk, David R. 1984. Impacts of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A Pilot Study. Washington, D.C.: Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, noaa. Godschalk, David R., and Kathryn Cousins. 1985. “Coastal Management: Planning on the Edge.” journal of the American Planning Association 51, no.3 (Summer): 263 — 265. Hildreth, Richard G., and Ralph W. Johnson. 1983. Ocean and Coastal Law. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. Kuehn, Robert R. 1984. “The Coastal Barrier Resources Act and the Expenditures Limi¬ tation Approach to Natural Resources Conservation: Wave of the Future or Island unto Itself?” Ecology Law Quarterly 11: 583—670. McElyea, William D., David J. Brower, and David R. Godschalk. 1982. Before the Storm: Managing Development to Reduce Hurricane Damages. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. National Resources Defense Council. 1977. Land Use Controls in the United States. New York, N.Y.: Dial Press. Propst, Luther. 1984. A Review of Federal Programs Providing Disaster Assistance to Coastal Local Governments Following a Hurricane. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council. 1983. Tampa Bay Region Hurricane Loss and Contingency Planning Study. Summary Report. St. Petersburg, Fla. -. 1984. Tampa Bay Region Hurricane Evacuation Study: Technical Data Report. Update. St. Petersburg, Fla. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 1986. Tri-State Hurricane Evacuation Study: Technical Data Report. Mobile District (Ala.). -. 1987. Eastern North Carolina Hurricane Evacuation Study: Technical Data Report. Wilmington District (N.C.). U.S. General Accounting Office. 1981. “Requests for Federal Disaster Assistance Need Better Evaluation.” Washington, D.C. -. 1983. “National Flood Insurance Program—Major Changes Needed If It Is to Operate Without a Federal Subsidy.” Washington, D.C. 5 State Mitigation Programs and Policies State Mitigation Roles States are key actors in coastal storm hazard mitigation, occupying a strategic position between federal hazard agencies and coastal local gov¬ ernments. While all states provide poststorm emergency management programs, however, there is a wide variety of state attitudes toward appropriate prestorm hazard mitigation roles. Many hurricane-prone states, especially in the South, reflect the “tra¬ ditionalistic” political culture norms identified by Elazar (1966), where political leaders are expected to play conservative and custodial roles, rather than initiatory roles, unless pressed strongly from the outside. Thus, the newer hazard mitigation policies, based on nonstructural and development management approaches, have been actively initiated by only a limited number of states. Outside pressures have been mounting, however. Federal programs have been aimed at encouraging state governments to become directly and actively involved in the regulation and management of their coastal areas. The federal Coastal Zone Management Program has effectively used a voluntary planning approach supported by federal funding to develop rapport and peer pressure for successful state participation, involving traditional as well as progressive states (Matuszeski 1985). fema has likewise attempted to promote more active state mitigation roles based on Section 406 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and its other programs, especially the National Flood Insurance Program. There are also increasing nonfederal pressures. As noted in a mitigation State Mitigation Programs 127 guide for state officials (fema 1986, 7), “The importance of state-init¬ iated mitigation efforts in the future becomes particularly evident in view of. . . the fact that most damage-causing natural events do not qualify for Federal disaster assistance; the increasingly higher costs of refinancing losses with or without a disaster declaration; the repetitive nature of many hazard events; and the increasing concern about state and local liability.” These pressures, federal and nonfederal, are translated into the disaster policies and programs of individual states. State governments, in turn, shape the policies and programs adopted by their localities. They may do this directly by establishing certain planning and regulatory standards which localities must satisfy and indirectly through maintenance of prevailing legal, administrative, and political frameworks. Direct and indirect influences may not always reinforce each other. For instance, a direct standard mandating preparation of local comprehensive plans is enforced in both Virginia and Florida. Yet the courts of these two states take very different positions on the constitution¬ ality of local growth management programs; it is less difficult to adopt an innovative growth management program in Florida where the courts take into account the full range of growth management benefits than in Vir¬ ginia where narrower property rights issues typically are the primary concerns (Godschalk et al. 1979). Individual state roles in hazard mitigation depend on the priority given to disaster prevention by state government leaders and upon the prevail¬ ing state attitude toward government management of development in disaster-prone areas. Within the structure of shared governance it is possi¬ ble to identify three general types of state hazard mitigation roles. Flazard mitigation “innovators” enthusiastically accept the need for hazard miti¬ gation and devise new state planning and development programs to sup¬ plement federal efforts. Hazard mitigation “responders” follow federal guidelines but do not propose additional state actions beyond those required for compliance. Hazard mitigation “skeptics” question the need for federal programs and propose only minimal management of private development in hazard areas. Which role a state plays depends upon both its historic attitudes toward the proper role of governance and its recent hazard experience. Even a skep¬ tical state may go through periods of enthusiastic hazard mitigation and coastal development management following a major hurricane. 128 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 5.1 Summary of State Coastal Management Programs CZM program State mandated ocean setback line Setback line—local option No state setback line, but state control of development in front of first dune State dune protection policy Texas Louisiana X Mississippi X Alabama X X X Florida X X Georgia X South Carolina X X b X North Carolina X X X Virginia Maryland X Delaware X X X New Jersey X X X New York X x e Connecticut X Rhode Island X X X Massachusetts X X New Hampshire X Maine X x g X Source-. Bollens, Leyden, and Beatley 1984. a. Florida (building code)—requires that each coastal county have a building code that addresses hurricane hazards, but it is up to local option as to which specific building code it adopts. b. South Carolina (setback line)—model setback regulations are being developed by the state and would be locally optional. c. South Carolina (reconstruction policy)—policies are being developed for four coastal communities; adoption by these communities would be optional. State Mitigation Programs 129 State building code Dune (including protection hurricane- policy— related local option measures) State capital improvement policy Building State pertaining to State code—local reconstruction coastal/high- wetlands option policy hazard areas program X X X X X X X x a X X X X X x c X X X X X X x d X X X X X X X X x f X X X X X X X X X X X x h X X d. Virginia (building code)—-state building code does not include wind loading requirements. e. New York (setback line)—state setback line not yet implemented. f. New York (building code)—state building code became mandatory for communities January i, 1984. g. Maine (setback line) — a 200-foot setback is included in the “limited residential” zoning category of the Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Program. h. Maine (building code)—state building code does not include wind loading requirements. 130 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS This chapter reviews current state mitigation activities as identified through recent surveys. This review gives a perspective on the state-of- the-art as presently practiced. Then the chapter describes the programs of two of the states more active in initiating innovative coastal development management aimed at hazard mitigation, North Carolina and Florida. This description suggests two models of possible state approaches. Fin¬ ally, the chapter concludes with thoughts on the potential for extending state mitigation efforts. Current State Mitigation Practice State coastal management programs can directly or indirectly assist in hurricane and storm hazard mitigation. Relevant program elements may include: 1. Participation in the Federal Coastal Zone Management Program 2. Ocean setbacks for new buildings 3. Dune protection policies 4. Storm-resistant building code requirements 5. Poststorm reconstruction policies 6. Limitations on capital improvements in hazard areas 7. Wetlands protection programs To identify what states do to mitigate hurricane and coastal storm haz¬ ards, a phone survey of state agencies in all Gulf and Atlantic coast states was conducted in 1983 (Bollens, Leyden, and Beatley 1984). Survey responses illustrate the range of activities undertaken by these coastal states. Activities of each state are shown in table 5.1 and discussed below. One of the most prevalent activities is participation in the Federal Coastal Zone Management Program. Only three of the eighteen Atlantic and Gulf coast states were not participating at the time of the survey: Texas, Georgia, and Virginia. Virginia has since joined the program with an approved plan. As noted earlier, the federal coastal program has done much to strengthen the political, legal, and administrative structure for state coastal zone planning. It has successfully directed the attention of both traditional and innovative coastal states toward environmental pro¬ tection and hazard mitigation, otherwise often low-salience items on state and local political agendas. State Mitigation Programs 131 Building codes are the most commonly adopted mitigation programs. They vary in their stringency and the extent to which they explicitly address storm hazards and often represent the adoption of standard building codes (for example, the Southern Standard Building Code). These building codes are either state-adopted (one state code which must be adhered to by all localities) or local-option. Rhode Island, for instance, has adopted a state building code, while Alabama leaves the adoption of building standards up to its localities. A number of states are implementing coastal setback provisions — either state-administered or local-option. For instance, Georgia under its Shore Assistance Act implements a mandatory setback for oceanfront development, while in South Carolina local setbacks are optional, yet guided by model setback regulations. Two states have enacted provisions which control development in front of the first dune—South Carolina and Massachusetts. Massachusetts has adopted regulations which require a resource impact analysis for beach areas and coastal development stan¬ dards which all but prevent development in areas seaward of the first dune. As a result of the adoption of the South Carolina Coastal Manage¬ ment Act in 1977, the South Carolina Coastal Council has direct permit¬ ting authority over development in front of the primary dune line when a dune exists. Another popular element is dune protection legislation. For instance, under Maine’s Coastal Sand Dune Rules no new development is permit¬ ted on frontal dunes. Under Delaware’s Beach Preservation Act (1972) beachfront homeowners are required to sign a “dune maintenance agree¬ ment” and to submit a surveyed plat of the lot showing existing dune conditions and the proposed location of buildings to ensure sufficient protection of the dune. Only six states have adopted policies to guide reconstruction following hurricanes and coastal storms. In Delaware, if a structure is destroyed by a storm, the owner must receive a permit from the state before it can be rebuilt. Furthermore, the owner must ensure that it is rebuilt as far land¬ ward as possible. The state of South Carolina, through the South Caro¬ lina Coastal Council, has been attempting to encourage the adoption of local recovery plans and policies. Massachusetts has also enacted policies which require the acquisition of a permit for reconstruction of substan¬ tially damaged structures (damage amounting to 50 percent of appraised 132 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS value or greater). The structures must either be moved outside of the flood zone or elevated to a level one foot above the ioo-year Base Flood Elevation. Seawalls which are destroyed to a level beyond 50 percent of their value are not permitted to be rebuilt. Five states have adopted policies pertaining to the state funding of public facilities in hazardous areas. Florida has perhaps been the most active in this area. It has enacted several new provisions under its recent growth management package which substantially restrict future public investment in high-hazard storm areas. Delaware has promulgated a pol¬ icy to discourage the location of “growth sewers” in sensitive coastal areas. Massachusetts, under the provisions of mepa (Massachusetts Envi¬ ronmental Protection Act), discourages the funding of public works where existing hazards would be heightened and where such actions would encourage further growth in sensitive coastal environments; the state actively discourages the location of major capital facilities (for example, sewer treatment plants) on barrier islands. Thirteen Atlantic and Gulf coast states currently have in place systems for regulating and managing their wetlands. Wetlands management can reduce coastal storm hazards, both by keeping people and property away from hazard areas and by preserving natural buffer areas which absorb storm water. Regulations for the state of Virginia are perhaps typical. Virginia’s Wetlands Act (Sec. 62.1-13.1 through 82.1-13.20, Code of Virginia) provides coastal jurisdictions and the Virginia Marine Resour¬ ces Commission with the authority to regulate proposed development in tidal wetlands. These provisions do not stipulate prohibition of develop¬ ment in these areas, but rather provide for the placement of conditions on development, depending upon particular site constraints. Ecological sys¬ tems are not to be unreasonably disturbed, and development is to be “concentrated in wetlands of lesser ecological significance, in wetlands which have been irreversibly disturbed before July 1, 1972, and areas apart from wetlands” (Kusler 1980, 198). Another indication of state coastal hazard reduction activities is pro¬ vided by a survey undertaken by the Coastal States Organization in 1986. This survey covered all coastal states, including Pacific and Great Lakes states as well as Atlantic and Gulf coast states, so it is broader than our telephone survey. Its twenty-three respondents included thirteen of the eighteen Atlantic and Gulf coast states (Coastal States Organization State Mitigation Programs 133 Table 5.2 Support for New Hazard Mitigation Initiatives Would May Would Not Method Support Support Support Mandatory relocation of threatened structures I 9 12 Mandatory relocation of damaged structures 7 6 IO Financial assistance for relocation of threatened or damaged structures (e.g., through flood insurance) 10 I I 2 Limits on disaster relief for threatened structures that do not attempt to minimize damage 8 IO 5 Limits on casualty loss deductions for threatened structures that do not attempt to minimize damage 6 I I 4 Prohibition of federal flood insurance for structures with a previous flood insurance claim 4 13 5 Density limits in high-hazard areas 6 II 4 Education about relocation feasibility and other mitigation tools 18 4 0 Source: Coastal States Organization 1986. 1986). Twenty-two respondents reported that the threat of future storm and/or erosion damage to existing shoreline development was a serious concern in their state. Nineteen said that their state attempts to manage new development to lessen future damage through direct land use regu¬ lations or construction standards, primarily shoreline setbacks and building codes. Eighteen said that they used indirect development man¬ agement methods, primarily land use plans and limits on public invest¬ ment. Twenty said that public works and/or public financing were being used to reduce future damage, primarily through shoreline stabilization and beach nourishment. In terms of new initiatives the coastal states were asked about the likelihood of support for methods to minimize future damage to existing development from storms and/or erosion. As table 5.2 indicates, there was considerable support for a variety of innovative methods, ranging 134 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS from flood insurance and disaster relief incentives to density limits and mandatory relocation of damaged structures. While many states appear to be becoming more active in the manage¬ ment and planning of their coastal areas, enacting and implementing strong state hazard mitigation programs is sometimes difficult. For exam¬ ple, the Texas legislature considered the adoption of a set of innovative hurricane building provisions and a hazard disclosure law but due to intense lobbying by the real estate and development industry were unable to pass these new provisions. More recently the Texas legislature has abolished the Texas Marine and Coastal Council, further illustrating the low level of political support for coastal planning in that state. A “dune bill” was recently defeated in the New Jersey legislature. These regula¬ tions would have required more stringent coastal setbacks and would have prevented reconstruction in hazard-prone areas if structures incurred damages which amounted to more than 50 percent of their value. While surveys can identify individual activities by states, they do not provide the full picture of coastal hazard mitigation policy and program “packages.” Case study descriptions are better at presenting these pack¬ ages. To round out the picture of the state of the art in state hazard mitigation, more in-depth descriptions of the coastal hazard management programs of two states with extensive and innovative efforts are pre¬ sented. These programs can serve as models to be adapted to the unique political, social, and economic circumstances of other coastal states desir¬ ing active hazard mitigation programs. No state program is static; innovative states change even faster than others. The profiles provided here document these two active programs at a particular point in time. Undoubtedly they will undergo further change. Mitigation in North Carolina Hurricanes and Coastal Growth Next to Florida, North Carolina has received more direct hurricane strikes than any other Atlantic coast state. Particularly memorable and devastating storms include Hazel in 1954 and the Ash Wednesday storm of 1962 (Baker 1978; Neumann et al. 1981). Three hurricanes — lone, Diane, and Connie—struck the North Carolina coast during a two State Mitigation Programs 135 month period in 1955. Hurricane activity in the past twenty years has been light, although the state was hit by Hurricane Diana in September 1984. Despite the threat of major destruction, by the time Diana hit the coast it was a relatively weak hurricane, and its effects were reduced by a number of mitigating factors (for example, landfall during low tide). The media build-up given to Diana and its relatively small actual impact may have had a negative effect on the perceived importance of future storm hazard planning. However, it prompted one commentator to describe the storm as a “warning from nature” and a foreshadowing of more serious things to come (Kaufman 1984). Historically the North Carolina coast has not faced the growth pres¬ sures of New Jersey or Florida, but second home and resort development have flourished recently. Between 1970 and 1980 permanent population in the twenty coastal counties increased by 17 percent (Beatley 1985). Much greater levels of growth have occurred along the barrier islands and in the most hazardous locations (French 1979). For instance, by 1980 the small town of Long Beach on Oak Island had experienced a seventeenfold increase over its i960 permanent population (Town of Long Beach 1984). Permanent population figures also tend to underestimate the development pressures experienced by such communities, as much of the building in these areas can be attributed to vacationers and nonresidents. For instance, while the Town of Emerald Isle has an official permanent popu¬ lation of 865, its average seasonal population has been estimated to be around 8,500 (Town of Emerald Isle 1984). North Carolina has approached hazard mitigation as a component of its coastal planning program. According to the director of the Division of Coastal Management, this program has focused on patiently building a “regional consensus” for effective coastal resource management in the politically conservative coastal area, where initially there was widespread opposition to the concept of coastal management (Owens 1985). The North Carolina model could be characterized as a go-slow program ori¬ ented toward local involvement, with consistent and effective staff sup¬ port, which has led over time to progressive hazard mitigation standards integrated into a development management framework (Brower, Beatley, and Blatt 1987). 136 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS The North Carolina Coastal Area Management Act As part of the U.S. Coastal Zone Management Program, the North Caro¬ lina Coastal Area Management Act (cama) was passed in 1974. At the heart of this program is a cooperative arrangement between coastal localities and the state, in which the state provides (through the federal government) financial and technical assistance to local land use planning and localities agree to adhere to and implement state regulations and guidelines. The Coastal Management Program has two primary components: (1) the land use plans developed by coastal localities under guidelines pro¬ vided the state and (2) the delineation and regulation of “Areas of Envi¬ ronmental Concern” (aecs) by the state (jointly implemented with coastal localities). A twelve-member appointed body, the Coastal Resources Com¬ mission (crc), is responsible for overseeing the Coastal Area Manage¬ ment Program. The Division of Coastal Management (dcm), within the State Department of Natural Resources and Community Development, is responsible for the administration of cama and serves a staff function for the crc. A larger advisory body, the Coastal Resources Advisory Council (crac), was established to assist the crc. The requirements of cama apply to twenty counties which experience tidal effects (see figure 5 - 1 )- Local Land Use Planning Local land use planning is a key component of the North Carolina pro¬ gram. While only the twenty coastal counties are required to prepare land use plans, coastal municipalities were given the option of preparing their own plans. Where the county failed to prepare a plan, the crc could prepare and adopt a plan for it. These plans must be updated every five years. All twenty counties and fifty-five municipalities have adopted updated land use plans as of January 1985 (Owens 1985). Once adopted, state agency decisions must be consistent with them and through the federal consistency provisions so also must federal decisions. cama administrative regulations stipulate the content and format of local plans. In addition to analysis and assessment of current and future conditions (for example, documentation of population and land use trends and estimation of future land use needs), each land use State Mitigation Programs 137 plan is required to provide policy statements on those land use issues which will affect the community during the ten-year planning period. Policy statements must address resource protection, resource produc¬ tion and management, economic and community development, con¬ tinuing public participation, and storm hazard planning. Local land Figure 5.1 North Carolina Coastal Zone Counties. Source: Final Environmen¬ tal Impact Statement, North Carolina Coastal Management Program (Department of Commerce 1978). ATLANTIC OCEAN 138 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS use plans must be submitted to the crc for approval in accordance with review standards (N.C. Administrative Code, Subchapter 7B). State Permitting System In addition to local land use plans, a second coastal component of cama is the state designation of “Areas of Environment Concern” (aecs). These are special areas where development cannot occur without review and approval by an appropriate body of government (crc in the case of “major” developments and usually local governments in the case of “minor” developments). These proposals are evaluated against a set of performance standards adopted by the state for each type of aec and for consistency with adopted land use plans. (They apply equally to major and minor types of development.) Two primary categories of aecs have been designated: estuarine areas and ocean hazard areas. The estuarine category contains several kinds of aec designations: coastal wetlands (marsh areas subject to regular flood¬ ing), estuarine waters, public trust areas (generally, navigable waters), and estuarine shorelines (extending seventy-five feet landward from mean high-water level). Within ocean hazard areas the aecs are ocean erodible zones, high hazard flood areas (V-zones as designated under the National Flood Insurance Program), and inlet hazard areas. Five of these aecs — the coastal wetlands, estuarine shorelines, ocean erodible, high-hazard flood, and inlet hazard areas—have particular significance for managing development to reduce hurricane and storm hazards. The ocean erodible zone defines a shoreline area in which struc¬ tures must be built “set back” from the water. More specifically, the administrative standards define the boundaries of the zone as follows: (a) A distance landward from the first line of stable natural vegeta¬ tion to the recession line that would be established by multiplying the long-term annual erosion rate which for the purposes of this Section shall be those as set forth in tables entitled “Long Term Annual Erosion Rates Updated Through 1980,” approved by the Coastal Resources Commission on March 18, 1983, and available without cost from any local permit officer or the Office of Coastal Management (except as such rate may be varied in individual con¬ tested cases, declaratory or interpretive rulings), times 60, provided State Mitigation Programs 139 that where there has been no long-term erosion or the rate is less than two feet per year, this distance shall be set at no feet landward from the first line of stable natural vegetation; and (b) a distance landward from the recession line established in Sub- paragraph (a) of this Paragraph to the recession line that would be generated by a storm having a one percent chance of being equalled or exceeded in any given year. (N.C. Administrative Code, Subchap¬ ter 7H) Inlet hazard zones are land areas subject to a high degree of erosion because of their closeness to shifting inlets. More specifically these zones extend landward from the mean low water line for the distance within which the inlet is expected to migrate based on statistical analysis. Their definition must consider such factors as previous inlet territory, structur¬ ally weak areas near the inlet (such as an unusually narrow barrier island, an unusually long channel feeding the inlet, or an overwash area), and external influences such as jetties and channelization. These areas are identified on inlet hazard area maps approved by the Coastal Resources Commission. In all cases this area is an extension of the adjacent ocean erodible area, and in no case can the width of the inlet hazard area be less than the width of the adjacent ocean erodible area. Performance or use standards have been developed by the state to guide and control development in the aecs. For example, a general use require¬ ment for ocean hazard areas is a mandatory setback of all development a certain distance from the ocean, based upon average annual rate of ero¬ sion and the natural features of the site, as well as the type of develop¬ ment proposed. If a primary or frontal dune does not exist, low-intensity development must be set back from the first line of vegetation a distance of thirty times the average annual rate of erosion or at least sixty feet where the annual erosion rate is less than two feet. Where a primary or frontal dune exists, this setback distance is measured from either the crest of this dune or the first line of vegetation, whichever is farthest. The setback distance is doubled for substantially larger oceanfront uses: Because large structures located immediately along the Atlantic Ocean present increased risk of loss of life and property, increased potential for eventual loss or damage to the public beach area and other important natural features along the oceanfront, increased 140 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS potential for higher public costs for federal flood insurance, erosion control, storm protection, disaster relief and provision of public ser¬ vices such as water and sewer, and increased difficulty and expense of relocation in the event of future shoreline loss, a greater ocean- front setback is required for these structures than is the case with smaller structures. Therefore, in addition to meeting the criteria in this rule for setback behind the primary and/or frontal dune, for all multi-family residential structures (including motels, hotels, condo¬ miniums and motelominiums) of more than 4 units or 5,000 square feet, the erosion setback line shall be twice the erosion setback described in .0306(a) (1) of this rule, provided that in no case shall this distance be less than 120 feet. In areas where the rate is more than 3.5 feet per year, this setback line shall be set at a distance of 30 times the long-term annual erosion rate plus 105 feet. (N.C. Admin¬ istrative Code, Subchapter 7H) No development is permitted in ocean hazard areas which involves sig¬ nificant removal or relocation of sand or vegetation of frontal or primary dunes. The location of public facilities such as roads, bridges, and sewer lines in ocean hazard areas will not be permitted unless these facilities: (1) clearly exhibit overriding factors of national or state interest and public benefit, (2) will not increase existing hazards or damage natural buffers, (3) will be reasonably safe from flood and erosion related damage, (4) will not promote growth and development in ocean hazard areas. Specific use standards are designated which regulate such activities as erosion control projects, dune stabilization, and structural access ways in ocean hazard areas. Any construction or substantial improvements (con¬ stituting 50 percent or more of the market value of a structure) in ocean hazard zones must satisfy an additional set of standards including provis¬ ions to increase wind resistance (must comply with “Coastal and Flood Plain Construction Standards” of the N.C. Residential Building Code) and elevation and piling requirements (similar to nfip requirements). Addi¬ tional use standards are stipulated for construction in Inlet Hazard Areas. These serve explicitly to limit the potential density of construction in such areas. Permanent structures here are not permitted at a density greater than one unit (residential or commercial) per 15,000 square feet, and structures cannot exceed four units in the case of residential structures or State Mitigation Programs 141 5,000 square feet total floor area in the case of commercial buildings. For coastal wetland areas cama regulations indicate that only water- related uses will be permitted in these areas (for example, prohibiting such uses as hotels, motels, restaurants, and residences). Water-dependent uses such as docks and boat ramps would be permitted, as well as bulk¬ heads, groins, and drainage ditches, subject to general standards which prohibit the negative impact of these uses on wetlands (for example, must not increase siltation, must not have negative effects on air and water quality, must not result in stagnant water and so on). Specific use stan¬ dards have been established for such activities as navigational channels and canals, dredging, drainage ditches, nonagricultural drainage, mari¬ nas, docks and piers, bulkheads and stabilization measures, beach nour¬ ishment, and groins. Development in estuarine shorelands—the dry lands in the estuarine system — is restricted from, among other things, producing impervious surfaces which exceed 30 percent of the aec land area. Development in these areas must also provide buffer strips, as well as take other actions sufficient to prevent siltation into estuarine waters. In the spring of 1984 the crc promulgated innovative rules which prohibit the use of shore-hardening structures, such as seawalls and groins. This action should serve as a further stimulus to increase manage¬ ment of growth to avoid ocean-generated hazards. The cama provisions now require that coastal localities explicitly address hurricane hazard mitigation and postdisaster reconstruction in their local land use plan. Several factors served as the genesis for these new provisions. A Post-Disaster Task Force was established in the spring of 1981 to develop state policies for dealing with coastal storm hazards. Concurrent with this effort the Division of Coastal Management con¬ tracted with researchers at the University of North Carolina Center for Urban and Regional Studies to develop a guidebook to assist coastal localities to plan for storm hazards. From this research the center produced a report entitled Before the Storm: Managing Develop¬ ment to Reduce Hurricane Damages (McElyea, Brower, and Godschalk 1982). The Before the Storm report served as an influential model for the incorporation of local storm hazard planning requirements into the cama land use planning provisions. In May 1983 the cama Land Use Planning Guidelines were revised to require that coastal localities incorporate pro- 142 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS visions into their local plans for storm hazard mitigation, poststorm reconstruction, and evacuation. The Land Use Planning Guidelines of the North Carolina Administra¬ tive Code (Subchapter 7B) require localities to prepare storm mitigation policies for their land use plans with the following elements: (i) A composite hazards map and brief narrative description of hazardous areas located within the planning jurisdiction (ii) An inventory and analysis of the existing uses of the land and structures in hazards areas (iii) A description of the relative severity and type of risk or risks and an indication of the monetary value of the losses that might be sustained in each of the hazard areas (iv) Hazard mitigation policies which apply to all hazard areas, including both public and private facilities In developing these policies, localities are instructed to consider separate policies to deal with the effects of high winds, flooding, wave action, and erosion; means of dealing with structures and uses which do not conform to the hazard mitigation policies; means of encouraging hotels, restaurants, and similar large commercial structures to locate outside of erosion- prone areas; and policies to acquire for public access parcels located in hazard areas or rendered unbuildable. The guidelines also require the preparation of a postdisaster recon¬ struction plan which implements the above policies and explicitly distin¬ guishes between immediate cleanup and repair and longer-term recovery issues. Specifically, reconstruction plans must include, among other things, the establishment of poststorm reconstruction guidelines, includ¬ ing the timing and completion of damage assessments; the timing and imposition of temporary development moratoria; and the development standards to which repairs and reconstruction shall conform. Localities are to establish schedules for staging reconstruction “accord¬ ing to established priorities assigned to the restoration of essential ser¬ vices, minor repairs, major repairs and new development.” Localities are also to prepare policies to guide the repair or reconstruction of public facilities and to consider their possible relocation outside of hazard zones. The locality is also required to consider the establishment of a “reconstruction task force” to oversee poststorm recovery and to deal State Mitigation Programs 143 with the policy questions which arise during the reconstruction phase. Evacuation is also a strong concern in the cama guidelines. The local¬ ity, in consultation with the county (where relevant) and the State Divi¬ sion of Emergency Management, must consider the adequacy of the local evacuation plan. “If the required evacuation time exceeds the standard warning time as provided by the National Weather Service, the local government should consider adopting policies which would improve the capacity of evacuation routes, or limit the level of development in areas to be evacuated, or otherwise reduce the amount of time needed to safely evacuate.” Other Mitigation Measures Land acquisition became an important aspect of the North Carolina Coastal Management Program in 1981. In that year the state legislature adopted the state beach access law and appropriated an initial sum of $1 million for its implementation. In 1982 the state also began participation in the national estuarine sanctuary system. The Division of Coastal Man¬ agement has responsibility for implementing both of these programs (see Owens 1983). Under the beach access legislation the crc is directed to give priority in acquisition to parcels which are considered unsuitable for “permanent substantial structures.” North Carolina has adopted a state building code which consists of the Southern Standard Building Code with North Carolina amendments. The wind speed used in much of the coastal zone for minimum wind-loading calculations is 120 mph. This applies to construction on the Outer Banks and parts of Carteret, Onslow, Pender, New Hanover, and Brunswick counties east of the Intracoastal Waterway (N.C. Building Code Council 1978) (see figure 5.2). Anchorage, tie-down, and piling requirements are stipulated for construction in high wind or flood hazard areas. Also, under cama regulations buildings located in ocean hazard aecs must be in conformance with “Coastal and Flood Plain Construction Standards” of the state building code, which provides certain standards for pilings, foundations, and building elevation. The state building code is not an optional document but must be adhered to by all localities. Local governments are not permitted to adopt variations to the state code unless they are formally approved by the N.C. Building Code Council — a twelve-member body appointed by the gover- 144 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS nor (Green 1980). Such approved modifications are rare, and thus coastal localities are prohibited from adopting more stringent storm-resistant construction standards than those in the state building code. An ack¬ nowledgment of this, and the need for more stringent coastal standards, led the council in 1985 to adopt substantial new additions to the N.C. Building Code which would apply only to the coastal region (Beatley 1985). Included among these provisions are more stringent piling depth requirements, fire equipment access requirements, standards for flame- resistant roof materials, and standards requiring sprinkler systems, among others. North Carolina has also undertaken typical emergency management planning steps, including the preparation of evacuation plans at the county and regional level. The Wilmington Office of the Corps of Engi¬ neers, in coordination with fema and the North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, completed the Eastern North Carolina Hurri¬ cane Evacuation Study in 1987. This study covered eighteen coastal counties, 300 miles of open coastline, and 1,700 miles of sound/estuary shoreline, including an estimated 1985 population of 622,800. Clearance times, the times required to clear all evacuating vehicles from the roadway network before the arrival of gale force winds, were computed for each Figure 5.2 Wind Speed Diagram. Basic design wind velocities in mph 90 100 110 120 120 State Mitigation Programs 145 critical roadway segment, based on hurricane severity, degree of seasonal occupancy, and speed of evacuation response. Clearance times ranged from a low of four hours in several locations under moderate conditions to highs of over sixteen hours under worst conditions in Dare County, Bertie County, and Ocracoke Island in Hyde County (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1987, 199) North Carolina Program Evaluation The North Carolina program has been effective in coastal planning, resource management, and establishing local planning. Heath and Mose¬ ley (1980, 34) in their five-year progress report conclude that cama led many coastal jurisdictions to establish planning staffs and boards. It is too early to tell how many of the new local land-use planning programs in the coastal area could survive if the federal and state incentives that accompanied cama were withdrawn .... But this much is clear: the counties, cities, and towns of the coastal area have grasped firmly the planning opportunities offered by cama, and the cama objective of strengthening local planning programs is very much on target. Notably, this has been accomplished with a mini¬ mum of local-state friction or disagreement. Only once did the crc find it necessary to exercise its statutory option of adopting a land- classification plan for a county that did not adopt its own plan [Carteret County]. The success of cama’s local planning aspect has helped earn for North Carolina a national reputation for productive state-local collaboration in coastal management. The political acceptability of cama is partly a result of strongly incor¬ porating local officials into cama policymaking. The strong local flavor of the crc and crac represented compro¬ mises that were essential to secure enactment of cama in 1974. cama’s first five years of administration suggest that these compro¬ mises were also important to the survival of the program once it was launched. Time and again the knowledge of local conditions and the practical experience of crc and crac members have been of immea¬ surable value in supplementing staff expertise. And many observers have noted how membership on crc and crac has converted former 146 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS opponents and critics of cama into valued supporters (Heath and Moseley 1980, 33). Owens (1985) concurs with this assessment, noting that it is an orien¬ tation toward making the land use plans into “people plans” rather than “planner plans” that has increased public acceptance and support of coastal land use planning. This has involved an emphasis on participation and policy rather than technical studies and data. In the absence of a major hurricane strike it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the required incorporation of storm hazard mitigation and reconstruction planning into land use plans. A review of the initial fifteen mitigation and reconstruction plans found that only a few propose a significant redirecting of growth and reconstruction in ways which will substantially reduce future damages and loss of life. Most accept the premise that future growth in hazardous areas will continue (Beatley 1985). There is reason to be optimistic, however, because the plans create a new hazard planning framework for mapping of storm hazard areas, quantification of property and people at risk, consideration of local miti¬ gation goals and objectives, and preparation of poststorm procedures and practices (for example, damage assessment teams and reconstruction task forces). These institutional changes set the stage for informed hazard decisionmaking and incorporate consideration of the threat of hurricanes and coastal storms into the long-range planning programs of coastal localities. Clearly, the regulatory mechanisms of cama — particularly the ocean setback—have reduced the extent of people and property at risk. North Carolina took a major step in prohibiting the practice of shoreline hard¬ ening, and this will have the effect of moving structures further away from the most hazardous coastal locations. The incorporation of storm hazard mitigation goals and policies into local land use plans should ensure that future regulatory decisions will be even more responsive to hazard reduc¬ tion. The North Carolina model of first building a regional consensus in favor of coastal management and then working with coastal officials to gradually develop hazard mitigation standards and regulations has proved very effective. State Mitigation Programs 147 Mitigation in Florida Hurricanes and Coastal Growth The state of Florida has been experiencing phenomenal growth pressures in recent years. Over the course of the single decade between 1970 and 1980 its population grew by approximately 3 million. By the year 2010 it is predicted that its population will number almost 17 million, or close to an 80 percent increase from its 1980 level (elms [Environmental Land Management Study] Committee 1984). Moreover, Florida is the state most vulnerable to hurricanes and coastal storms, with nearly 40 percent of all landfalling hurricanes since 1899 hitting the Florida coast (Neu¬ mann et al. 1981). Florida is one continual coastline, and it is these particularly vulnerable locations which are likely to receive the greatest levels of future growth. It contains approximately 11,000 miles of tidal coastline and some 1160 miles of sandy beaches (O’Connell 1985). These factors have added both to the difficulty of coastal planning in Florida and its urgency and importance. Florida has included coastal planning within overall state comprehen¬ sive planning requirements rather than establishing a special coastal region. Florida went from a skeptical attitude toward growth manage¬ ment in the 1960s to a progressive and innovative attitude during the 1970s and 1980s. In its newfound enthusiasm Florida adopted several of the latest development management techniques from the American Law Institute’s Model Land Development Code: Developments of Regional Impact and Areas of Critical State Concern. These were combined with a statewide requirement mandating the preparation of local comprehensive plans to be reviewed by the state. Recent legislation has expanded plan¬ ning requirements and financial support and directed that local plans be consistent with regional and state plans. Unlike the North Carolina model of regional consensus, Florida has devised a model based on man¬ dated compliance with centralized standards. Developments of Regional Impact One of the most important components of Florida’s growth management system is its procedure for review by regional planning councils of “Devel¬ opments of Regional Impact” (dris). Under the 1972 Environmental Land and Water Act dris are identified as development activities which 148 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS are subject to regional review if they reach a certain size threshold. Included under dri review are airports, attractions/recreation facilities, hospitals, industrial parks, office parks, schools, shopping centers, and residential uses. Each of these uses can occur without review, as long as its size does not reach the specified threshold. For example, dri review is required only for new hospitals with a capacity of 600 beds or more. However, an activity which falls below established thresholds still can be identified as a dri by the Department of Community Affairs if “its char¬ acter, magnitude or location, would have substantial effect on the health, safety or welfare of citizens of more than one county” (Carraway 1984). Once a project is determined to be a dri, a regional planning council assesses its regional impacts and recommends appropriate actions to the local government. The local government in deliberating on the project must consider its consistency with the state land plan, the regional recom¬ mendation, and local development regulations (see Hunsberger 1979; Carraway 1984). The regional planning agency’s recommendations, how¬ ever, are only considered advisory. Development permit decisions can be appealed to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission (the governor and the cabinet). Among other parties appeals can be initiated by the regional planning body and the Department of Community Affairs. While the dri program has no specific regulations concerning hurri¬ cane or coastal storm mitigation, it must assess the impacts of proposed developments on public safety. Approximately five years ago, hurricane hazard reduction began to receive serious attention in the review process and, in particular, evacuation and shelter capacity (Bollens, Leyden, and Beatley 1984; see also Daltry 1980). It is now common for conditions to be attached to dri approvals requiring project evacuation plans, improve¬ ments which facilitate evacuation, or which provide storm shelters. A recent dri review process in Monroe County illustrates the extent of this consideration. The review in this case was for the Port Bouganville/ Garden Cove development proposed in Key Largo. As a condition of approval for this project, the developers agreed to the construction of low-level hurricane shelter structures (built to certain minimum wind and wave standards), road improvements to improve evacuation capac¬ ity, preparation of an evacuation plan and its coordination with county State Mitigation Programs 149 evacuation plans, and procedures for notification and evacuation of hotel/commercial property residents (Wilkerson 1984). The success of the dri program is debatable. The elms Committee report criticized its inability to address the cumulative effects of smaller projects and the fact that it applied to very few developments. In a cross section of Florida counties the elms Committee found that “only in rare cases did the dri cover as much as 10 percent of the residential develop¬ ment” (elms Committee 1984, 40). Developers and representatives of the private sector have, predictably, been quite critical of the dri process. The dri program was heavily criticized by persons from the private sector who had experience in dri reviews. They described the dri as a negative process that evaluates all possible adverse impacts of a development without a balanced consideration of the benefits of the development. Developers complained that this wide-ranging evalua¬ tion is unreasonably time-consuming and expensive, and that it often duplicates the reviews conducted by permitting agencies. Other criti¬ cisms focused on local governments’ practice of using dri review as a convenient vehicle to require contributions of land or funds from dri developers to provide needed capital improvements, while other devel¬ opers in the jurisdiction are not subject to the same requirements. Such exactions are arguably unfair when they fall solely on dri developments (elms Committee 1984, 40). Among the other criticisms of the dri regulations are that they are not adequately enforced, that there are not adequate criteria and standards for evaluating dris, and that there is great uncertainty and difficulty involved in appealing dri decisions. Recent modifications to the dri process, under the 1985 Growth Man¬ agement Package, establish “banded” numeric dri thresholds. When a development is at or more than 80 percent below a numeric threshold it is not a dri. Developments falling over 120 percent of the threshold must undergo the dri review process. When a development is between 80 and 100 percent of the threshold it is “presumed” that it is not a dri, while it is “presumed” that a development is a dri if it falls between 100 and 120 percent of the threshold. This banded approach reduces the uncertainty of designation. 150 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Areas of Critical State Concern The second major program created by the Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972 is the Areas of Critical State Concern (acsc) program (Section 380.5, Florida Statutes). Under this program, the Florida Administration Commission (the governor and the cabinet) has the authority to designate an “area of critical state concern.” To date, four such areas have been designated: the Big Cypress (800,000 acres of wetlands adjacent to Everglades National Park), the Green Swamp (a central Florida wetlands area), the Florida Keys, and the Apalachicola Bay area in the panhandle (Godschalk 1987). As part of the designation procedure, the Administration Commission also adopts a set of principles for guiding development in the designated area. The Department of Com¬ munity Affairs is then given the responsibility for directing and overseeing local planning in this area such that it is consistent with these adopted principles. If the localities fail to adopt appropriate development regula¬ tions, the state has the authority to prepare and enforce its own develop¬ ment regulations. As important as the actual designation of areas of critical state concern is the planning process that must precede it. Before an area can be desig¬ nated under the acsc program, the state must attempt to gain voluntary enactment by localities of an adequate resource management program. The governor appoints a Resource Planning and Management Committee (rpmc) (see Sec. 380.045, Florida Statutes) which coordinates and over¬ sees this voluntary planning process. As the elms Committee reports, this voluntary resource management approach, undoubtedly assisted by the threat of acsc designation, has in recent years been quite successful. In the first three critical areas, local governments were initially unco¬ operative and even antagonistic when the state adopted regulations for the critical area. Recently, however, cooperative relationships have evolved when state agencies and local governments have worked together on rpmc’s. The Charlotte Harbor Committee completed a voluntary resource management plan that has been incorporated into the comprehensive plans of the participating local governments. The Committee is monitoring the implementation of the plan. The Suwannee River Basin Committee drafted a model floodplain ordi¬ nance that has been adopted by all eleven affected counties. The State Mitigation Programs 151 Hutchinson Island Committee was established in 1982 and has recently completed a voluntary resource management plan. Also, an rpmc has recently been formed to study and prepare a report on a growth management program for coastal areas of the Northwest Florida Panhandle (elms Committee 1984, 101). The 1985 Growth Management Package: Creating a Comprehensive Planning Framework In 1985 the Florida legislature adopted a growth management package (Growth Management Act of 1985 and act adopting state plan) which substantially revised and reinforced the intergovernmental planning sys¬ tem. Under this new package local, regional, and state comprehensive plans all must be consistent (see figure 5.3). Consider first the importance of the state plan. The notion of an overall state plan was given a major rejuvenation under passage of the State and Regional Planning Act of 1984. It mandated the preparation and legisla¬ tive enactment of a state comprehensive plan containing general goals and policies for the state. The act required that within one year of the adoption of the state plan, each state agency develop a specific functional plan which implements and is consistent with the goals and policies in the state plan. The state policy plan was developed during 1984-1985 and Figure 5.3 New Florida State-Regional-Local Planning Framework The State Comprehensive Plan (Legislatively Adopted in Chapter 85-57) N* State Agency Functional Plans Comprehensive Regional Policy Plans Department of Community Affairs y Adopts Plan Review Criteria; y Subject to Legislative Review y I / Local Government Comprehensive Plans Revised X Local Land Development Regulations I Development Permits, Orders, and Approvals 152 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS was formally adopted by the legislature in the summer of 1985 as part of the growth management package. The state plan addresses twenty-five substantive areas from education to agriculture. For each of these areas it delineates a general goal and a set of implementation policies. For example, the public safety goal is to protect the public by preventing, discouraging, and punishing criminal behavior, lowering the highway death rate, and protecting lives and prop¬ erty from natural and man-made disasters. In carrying out the state plan the regional planning councils must adopt comprehensive regional policy plans consistent with state goals and policies. For example, the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council’s (1987) Regional Goals, Issues, and Policies contains the same public safety goal as the state plan. It defines the regional disaster issues related to the public safety goal in terms of inadequate hurricane evacua¬ tion times and shelters: Rapid development in the coastal counties of Southwest Florida is predicted to continue. . . . Dense waterfront developments will likely remain a popular investment. The capacity and location of many existing roadways designated as evacuation routes will become even more inadequate for major evacuation traffic during future hurri¬ canes. . . . Typically, these roadways are at capacity or are over capacity during non-emergency use. This slows evacuation times from coastal areas which can range from 12.5 to 18.5 hours for Category 1 storms up to 22.4 hours for Category 3 storms (South¬ west Florida Regional Planning Council 1987, 7-9). The number of public storm shelters has not kept pace with the growing population and the need for added space. For example, in 1983, there would have been a shortage of 163,000 spaces if every¬ one needing public shelter had sought it (Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council 1987, 7-12). The plan then sets regional goals to deal with these defined issues: “By 1 995, evacuation times will be restored to 1985 levels, and by 2010, evacuation times will not exceed 18 hours in any part of the region. . . . By 2010, there will be adequate shelter space for citizens who do not wish to evacuate from the region.” Finally, the regional plan sets policies to carry out the goals. For exam- State Mitigation Programs 153 pie, two policies drawn from the longer, detailed set of regional disaster mitigation policies illustrate the nature of policy specification: “Resid¬ ential development should be discouraged from locating in areas most vulnerable to hurricanes” (7-12), and “to reduce public shelter demand, shelter needs should be reduced through stronger building codes for resi¬ dential areas” (7-14). Florida’s efforts at state-mandated local planning began under the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975 (lgcpa) (Sec¬ tions 163.3161 —3211, Florida Statutes). Under this law comprehensive plans were to be prepared by all local governments. If a municipality refused to prepare a plan, the county in which it is located was to prepare it. If the county refused, the state would prepare the plan. Coastal locali¬ ties were required to include appropriate coastal zone protection elements (Sec. 163.3177[6][g]). While these were to be submitted to the Depart¬ ment of Community Affairs and the Department of Environmental Regu¬ lation for review, no final approval was necessary. These local planning requirements did not receive overwhelming support from Florida commu¬ nities. Many dragged their feet in preparing and implementing these plans. The 1985 growth management package revises and strengthens earlier mandatory local planning requirements. It sets specific deadlines for local plan adoption or amendment and requires that local plans be consistent with the new state plan and the regional policy plans. The Department of Community Affairs is given responsibility for establishing review rules and criteria and reviewing local plans. Coastal localities must now pre¬ pare “coastal management elements” (replacing the previous “coastal zone protection elements”). They must include disaster mitigation and redevelopment components, the designation of high-hazard coastal areas, and beach protection and shoreline use components. Coastal manage¬ ment objectives must include the following disaster-related objectives: Limit public expenditures that subsidize development permitted in coastal high-hazard areas subsequent to the element’s adoption except for restoration or enhancement of natural resources; Direct population concentrations away from known or predicted coastal high-hazard areas; Maintain or reduce hurricane evacuation times; 154 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Prepare post-disaster redevelopment plans which will reduce or eliminate the exposure of human life and public and private property to natural hazards. In addition to these extensive new planning requirements the state legislature also provided substantial funding for localities. If a local plan is found not to be in compliance with these requirements the growth management act provides the Administration Commission with the sanction of cutting off state funds to that jurisdiction (Department of Community Affairs 1986, Rule 9J-5.012.(3][b]). Coastal Construction Regulations One feature of Florida’s program has been the Coastal Construction Control Line (cccl), first enacted in 1971 and implemented by the state’s Department of Natural Resources. Often perceived as a setback line, the cccl program actually only requires that additional, more stringent building standards be adhered to seaward of the line, which is based on anticipated erosion rates. These standards are very similar to those required in V-zones under the National Flood Insurance Program. Under the new growth management laws the intent of the cccl is expanded through the creation of a new zone—the “coastal building zone.” This new building zone extends the area over which more stringent storm- resistant building standards are required. The building zone is defined to include: ( 1 ) all coastal barrier islands (with the exception of 5,000 feet from the cccl on large barrier islands) and ( 2 ) the area between the seasonal high-water line and 1,500 feet landward of a cccl and for areas without a cccl, all of the land 3,000 feet landward of the mean high- water line. Under the new 1985 legislation the state not only requires more strin¬ gent building standards in coastal areas but also requires structures to be set back from the ocean. Specifically, the 1985 legislation creates a “Construction Prohibition Zone” in which permits for new construction will not be issued by the Department of Natural Resources. This zone includes the areas which will be seaward of the seasonal high-water line within thirty years (thirty-year erosion line). The zone, however, cannot be any further landward than existing cccls, many of which are expected to move further landward as new erosion data are generated. Under the new growth management provision, sellers of property which is partially State Mitigation Programs 155 or totally seaward of a cccl must inform potential buyers of this fact. Vehicular traffic on the dunes of coastal beaches is also prohibited under the new law. State Funding Limitations in Hazard Areas Florida has led coastal states in restricting public investments that encour¬ age private development in vulnerable coastal locations. Executive Order 81-105, issued in 1981, placed limits on the use of state monies to facili¬ tate development on barrier islands where a twelve-hour evacuation time has been or will be exceeded. This order was also intended to restrict the use of state funds to finance reconstruction following a hurricane. The state has found this order somewhat difficult to interpret and enforce, and it does not carry the weight of law. More recently a Memorandum of Understanding between the governor’s office and the State Department of Environmental Regulations was entered into to restrict funding for access and transportation systems under the Federal Coastal Barrier Resources Act (cbra). Florida’s efforts to restrict the use of state funds in these sensitive coastal areas was strengthened substantially as a result of two infrastructure provisions in the 1985 growth management package. First, as of October 1, 1985, no state funds can be used to construct bridges or causeways to barrier islands where such improvements do not already exist. Second, after a locality has adopted an approved coastal management element as part of its comprehensive plan, the state may not issue funds which increase local infrastructure capacity unless such improvements are con¬ sistent with it. It is expected that the use of state funds for improvements which are located in, or increase the development of, “high hazard coastal areas,” as designated in the local coastal management element, will not be permissible. Pursuing a similar objective, the Florida Department of Community Affairs, Division of Emergency Management, has recently adopted a state postdisaster redevelopment rule. This rule establishes minimum mitigation requirements that political subdivision and nonpolitical subdivision applicants for federal postdisaster public assistance must satisfy. While the rule is intended to remain in effect for nonpolitical subdivision appli¬ cants, if a political subdivision prepares an acceptable plan satisfying the new Florida growth management requirements, their plan then preempts 156 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS the postdisaster rule. The state will not include local projects on the state’s project application to fema unless the jurisdiction has adopted hazard mitigation plans before a natural disaster which include certain preventive measures or contractually agrees with the state before a natu¬ ral disaster to undertake preventive measures. The rule enumerates what these “preventive measures” are to consist of: 1. Building Codes. To comply with Section 161.56(1) Florida Statutes. 2. Flooding. To participate in the National Flood Insurance Program in conformance with the Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974. 3. Public Infrastructure. To determine the feasibility of eliminating, relo¬ cating, or structurally modifying public infrastructure which has suffered natural disaster damage and implement such determinations as deemed cost effective or otherwise appropriate by the political subdivision. 4. Public Information. To establish a public information system, which includes: (a) An emergency warning system to notify the public of imminent emergencies; (b) A method of notifying the public of the potential dangers and appropriate preparatory measures for natural disasters; (c) A method of notifying the public of flood hazard areas; and (d) A method of notifying the public of evacuation routes. 5. Preventative Planning Measures. To implement preventative planning measures to include: (a) Provisions that sites be designed to utilize and preserve the protec¬ tive capability of dunes and other natural topographical features and vegetation, where feasible, to ameliorate storm damage; and (b) In a coastal area, provisions for post-disaster dwelling unit restric¬ tions designed to, at the maximum, maintain pre-disaster net popu¬ lation densities. 6. To determine on a case by case basis, whether heavy industrial opera¬ tions, with processes or products potentially dangerous to public safety and the environment; schools; and mobile home parks; can be con¬ structed or reconstructed in a coastal high hazard area and to take action as a result of such determination as deemed appropriate by the political subdivision. In making such a determination, a political sub- State Mitigation Programs 157 division shall consider the degree of hazard posed by such construction or reconstruction, the potential advantages to the environment by pro¬ hibiting such construction or reconstruction, the degree of compliance with local zoning and land development regulations and all appropri¬ ate provisions of chapters 161, 163, 187, and 380, Florida Statutes, the availability of alternative sites for the location of such facilities, the impact on public infrastructure of permitting the construction or recon¬ struction, the costs to the community at large, the effect on residents of the area, and the costs to any affected owners of real property. Specific Authority: Section 252.35(2), F.S. Law Implemented: Section 252.35(2), F.S. For non-political subdivision applicants, the rule states that the state will only consider including eligible damages of such applicants “which have contractually agreed with the department before a natural disaster, to determine the feasibility of eliminating, relocating, or structurally modi¬ fying public infrastructure which has suffered natural disaster damage and to implement such determinations where cost effective or otherwise appropriate” (9G-13.004(2]). Florida Program Evaluation Florida has gone further than any other Atlantic or Gulf coastal state in building hazard mitigation requirements into its statewide growth management program. Driven by phenomenal population growth con¬ centrated in its low-lying coastal areas and by its extreme vulnerability to hurricanes, Florida has responded with state-of-the-art hazard miti¬ gation policies and programs. Thanks to unrivaled state legislative interest in growth management initiatives, Florida is a model of cen¬ trally initiated planning and standards. Its structure of mandatory state, regional, and local plans, all required to be consistent with each other, coupled with its strong environmental protection and hazard mitigation requirements, comprise the most ambitious package of ad¬ vanced hurricane hazard mitigation/growth management legislation in the country. If there is a weakness in the Florida approach, it is likely to be found in uneven local implementation of state policies. Given the size of the state and the number of local jurisdictions without strong growth management 158 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS hazard mitigation capabilities, there are bound to be instances where the state’s rational, centralized bureaucratic system is unable to ensure effec¬ tive implementation. As DeGrove (1984, 112) asserts: “Assessing the implementation effort is complicated by the strongly decentralized nature of the process. Most of the responsibility still lies with the state’s some 400 cities, 67 counties, and numerous special districts. These local gov¬ ernments are very uneven in their capacity and political willingness to undertake growth-management initiatives.” Writing before passage of the 1985 growth management legislation, DeGrove (1984, 165) also notes a number of problems with implementa¬ tion of other parts of the Florida growth management effort: “In the Critical Areas section as well as the dri section, Florida’s land manage¬ ment law has not provided an adequate description of state, regional and/or local responsibilities for assuring that public policies are applied over long periods of time as projects are built out. This is a problem that remains to be addressed more fully.” He concludes that Florida’s growth management effort is “alive and reasonably well” as of 1984 but suffers from major weaknesses in the monitoring and enforcement area. While the 1985 growth management legislation attempted to deal with these weaknesses, they will likely persist, given the size and complexity of the state. State Mitigation Models North Carolina provides a model of state hazard mitigation incorporated into a strong regional coastal management program. Much of the effort in North Carolina has gone toward building a regional consensus that coastal management and hazard mitigation are necessary and toward developing local planning and management capability. At the same time a parallel technical staff effort has developed effective guidelines to under¬ gird the program. Florida provides a model of state hazard mitigation incorporated into an ambitious statewide growth management program. Much of the effort in Florida has gone toward building a consensus in the state legislature that growth management is necessary. Only recently has a parallel effort been devoted to funding and building up the growth management capa¬ bilities of local governments. State Mitigation Programs 159 Both the regional and the statewide models have their strengths and weaknesses. While neither is perfect, there are no better state hurri¬ cane hazard mitigation programs to be found. Other states interested in improving their programs can learn a great deal from the North Carolina and Florida experiences. References Baker, Simon. 1978. Storms, People and Property in Coastal North Carolina. Raleigh, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Sea Grant College. Beatley, Timothy. 1985. Coastal Storm Hazard Planning in North Carolina: A Review and Critique. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Bollens, Scott, Kathleen Leyden, and Timothy Beatley. 1984. Review of State Programs to Mitigate Storm Hazards. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Brower, David J., and Daniel S. Carol. 1984. Coastal Zone Management as Land Plan¬ ning. Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association. Brower, David J., Timothy Beatley, and David J. L. Blatt. 1987. Reducing Hurricane and Coastal Storm Hazards through Growth Management: A Guidebook for North Carolina Coastal Localities. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Carraway, Claire B. 1984. “Florida’s dri Statute: Alternatives to the Standard dri Review.” Stetson Law Review 13 (Spring): 619-47. Coastal States Organization. 1986. “Coastal Hazard Reduction Survey.” Raleigh, N.C.: North Carolina Division of Coastal Management. Daltry, Wayne. 1980. “Practical Approaches to Coastal Storm Protection and Mitigation: The Regional (Substate Agency) Role.” Coastal Zone ’80. New York, N.Y.: American Society of Civil Engineers. DeGrove, John M. 1984. Land, Growth & Politics. Chicago, Ill.: Planners Press. Department of Community Affairs, Florida. 1986. Chapter 9J-5, Rules. “Minimum Cri¬ teria for Review of Local Government Comprehensive Plans and Determination of Com¬ pliance.” Tallahassee, Fla.: State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs. Elazar, Daniel J. 1966. American Federalism: A View from the States. New York, N.Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell. elms Committee. 1984. Final Report of the Environmental Land Management Study Committee. Tallahassee, Fla. Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1986. Making Mitigation Work: A Handbook 160 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS for State Officials. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Finger, Bill, and Barry Jacobs. 1982. “Coastal Management: A Planning Beachhead in North Carolina.” N.C. Insight 5, no. 1 (May). French, Steven. 1979. “The Urbanization of Hazardous Areas: Flood Plains and Barrier Islands in North Carolina.” In Perspectives on Urban Affairs in North Carolina, edited by Warren Wicker. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Urban Studies Council. Godschalk, David R. 1987. “Balancing Growth with Critical Area Programs: The Florida and Chesapeake Bay Cases.” Urban Land 46, no. 3 (March): 16-19. Godschalk, David R., David J. Brower, et al. 1979. Constitutional Issues of Growth Management. Chicago, 111 .: Planners Press. Green, Philip P. 1980. “North Carolina’s Comprehensive Building Regulation System.” Popular Government (Spring). Heath, Milton S., and Allen C. Moseley. 1980. “The Coastal Area Management Act.” Popular Government (Spring). Hunsberger, Mark D. 1979. “Growth Management Through dri Review: Learning from the Florida Experience.” Carolina Planning 5, no. 1 (Spring): 34-41. Kaufman, Wallace. 1984. “A Hurricane Warning from Nature.” The Independent, Sep¬ tember 28. Kusler, Jon A. 1980. Regulating Sensitive Lands. Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute. Matuszeski, William. 1985. “Managing the Federal Coastal Program: The Planning Years.” Journal of the American Planning Association 51, no. 3 (Summer): 266—274. May, James W. 1985. “Growth Management: A 1984 Update.” Florida Environmental and Urban Issues 12, no. 2 (January). McElyea, William D., David J. Brower, and David R. Godschalk. 1982. Before the Storm: Managing Development to Reduce Hurricane Damages. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Neumann, Charles J., et al. 1981. Tropical Cyclones of the North Atlantic Ocean, 1871-1980. Washington, D.C.: noaa. O’Connell, David W. 1985. “Florida’s Struggle for Approval under the Coastal Zone Management Act.” Natural Resources Journal 25, no. 1 (January): 61—72. Owens, David W. 1983. “Land Acquisition and Coastal Resources Management: A Prag¬ matic Perspective.” William and Mary Law Review 24, no. 4: 625 — 667. -. 1985. “Coastal Management in North Carolina: Building a Regional Consen¬ sus.” Journal of the American Planning Association 51, no. 3 (Summer): 322-329. Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council. 1987. Regional Goals, Issues, and Poli¬ cies. Part Two of the Regional Comprehensive Policy Plan for Southwest Florida. Fort Myers, Fla. State Mitigation Programs 161 Town of Atlantic Beach, N.C. 1984. Storm Hazard Mitigation Plan and Post Disaster Reconstruction Plan. Prepared by George Eichler and Associates and Satilla Planning. Town of Emerald Isle, N.C. 1984. Storm Hazard Mitigation Plan and Post Disaster Reconstruction Plan. Prepared by George Eichler and Associates and Satilla Planning. Town of Long Beach, N.C. 1984. Hurricane Plan. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1987. Eastern North Carolina Hurricane Evacuation Study: Technical Data Report. Wilmington District. Wilkerson, Robert S. 1984. “Memorandum: Stipulations for Port Bougainville-Garden Cove.” Florida Department of Community Affairs, January Z4. 6 Local Mitigation Tools and Techniques Local Mitigation Roles Local governments may adopt different roles in coastal storm hazard mitigation, ranging from devising innovative local programs to compli¬ ance with federal and state requirements to remaining largely indifferent to mitigation issues. These roles result from a number of factors, includ¬ ing disaster experience, economic growth status, and attitudes toward appropriate governance limits. Like states, many localities in the Atlantic and Gulf hurricane-prone areas have historically favored a limited role for governmental intervention in private affairs. Localities with active local mitigation programs have been relatively rare, though that has begun to change. [Because all mitigation measures are carried out at the local level, where the hurricane strikes and where people and property are exposed and vulnerable in varying degrees depending upon the local mitigation mea¬ sures taken, positive local government roles are crucial to mitigation effec¬ tiveness^ In the vernacular this is “where the rubber meets the road.” Unless the local government has anticipated the potential destruction of a hurricane strike, its residents must suffer the consequences. The term “local government” covers a variety of governmental forms. The two most prominent are the incorporated city or town and the unin¬ corporated county. In most of the Atlantic and Gulf coast states, with the exception of the New England states, the territory of cities and towns includes primarily the built-up urban areas of coastal counties, which have been incorporated in order to take advantage of the taxation and Local Mitigation Tools 163 governance authority granted by states to municipalities. In New England the entire coastline is subject to municipal governance by incorporated cities or towns (sometimes called townships); there is no unincorporated land. All these forms of local government, under state enabling laws, charters, and home rule provisions, are empowered to plan and regulate development and to carry out disaster planning within their jurisdictions. This chapter reviews the mitigation tools and techniques available to coastal local governments. It emphasizes the necessity to move emergency management concerns from an isolated public safety position within local government to active coordination with community planning and devel¬ opment management. It identifies potential prestorm and poststorm development management mitigation strategies. It argues that “pack¬ aging” hazard mitigation with development management, as discussed in chapter z, is the most effective approach because it enhances coordina¬ tion of the relevant tools and techniques that affect the location, rate, type, amount, public cost, and quality of development in hazard areas. Tools and techniques reviewed include those nonstructural approaches listed under growth management in table z.i: (i) planning, (z) devel¬ opment regulation, (3) land acquisition, (4) taxation and fiscal incen¬ tives, (5) capital facilities policies, and (6) programs for information dissemination. Potential Development Management Mitigation Strategies Mitigation strategies include preserving and restoring mitigative features of the natural environment, facilitating evacuation of exposed popula¬ tions, strengthening buildings and facilities to withstand storm forces, and locating new development and relocating threatened existing devel¬ opment out of hazard areas. While development management usually is thought of primarily in terms of influencing new development, a compre¬ hensive development management program can include elements of all these mitigation strategies. Development management measures can protect and restore existing mitigative features of the natural environment.[Barrier island dunes, for instance, act as natural protective systems against hurricane and storm Dune protection regulations can ensure that these natural sys- 164 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS terns are not destroyed by development. With dunes in place buildings located behind them are sheltered from the full forces of storm surge and floodwaters. \Estuaries and wetlands serve as natural sponges during storms, absorbing and holding storm waters?)Wetland protection ordi¬ nances can ensure that these valuable holding areas are not filled in to create more upland for development. The destruction of such resources means that floodwaters will be displaced onto other areas, increasing the extent of property and people at risk. Development management can facilitate evacuation effectiveness. Coor¬ dinating the capital facilities programming of new evacuation routes and bridges with land use plans can ensure that evacuation capacity keeps pace with growth in demand. Incorporating shelter provision into new development projects can ensure that new residents can be safely accom¬ modated during hurricane strikes. Through building codes and other development regulations, exposed structures and public facilities can be strengthened to withstand hurri¬ cane winds and waves./Delineation of hazard areas provides a basis for enforcing more rigorous building regulations, as well as for informing builders and residents of the need for additional structural strength] LLocating new development and relocating existing development out¬ side of hazard areas is a primary nonstructural means of protecting both people and propertyjNearly all the implementation tools used in develop¬ ment management affect new development location, although relocation of existing development is a more unique and difficult challenge. Often mitigation strategies are posed in terms of black and white alter¬ natives. For example, “retreat from the shore,” including letting existing building fall into the sea as the coastline recedes, is sometimes advocated instead of structural protection measures such as groins and seawalls (Pilkey 1987). This leads to debates about the practicality of retreat when the shore is already built-up and expensive buildings are threatened (Sturza 1987). In fact, local governments may need to adopt strategy “mixes” that may include retreat in some areas, beach renourishment in others, maintenance of natural dunes and wetlands in others, and planned relo¬ cation of buildings and roads along with acquisition of property for public open space in others. For example, the mitigation plan for the South Shore of Long Island emphasizes nonstructural measures but also recommends some structural solutions in an effort to recognize variations Local Mitigation Tools 165 in development intensity, shoreline conditions, and institutional programs and philosophies (Long Island Regional Planning Board 1984). Such strategies may have both prestorm and poststorm components, with con¬ tingent plans that are carried out only after certain types of storm damage. In the following discussion, each of the major types of implementation tools is discussed. Examples of their use under various mitigation strate¬ gies are provided. The unique economic, political, and geographic cir¬ cumstances of individual localities will determine their feasible blends of protection, retreat, relocation, renourishment, and/or rebuilding. Planning Various types of local plans affect mitigation. Most communities have prepared the first type, land use or comprehensive plans. Some communi¬ ties also have prepared the second type, poststorm reconstruction plans , either separately or as elements of their emergency management or com¬ prehensive plans. A few local areas may have prepared separate coastal storm hazard mitigation plans. /j^and use or comprehensive plans can provide a rational basis for land use decisions. A community’s land use plan serves as the guiding frame¬ work and formulation for orienting growth and development by identify¬ ing community goals and objectives, development scenarios, and various strategies and means for their achievement^Typically such plans provide a communitywide picture of desirable patterns of development and growth and appropriate activities and uses to be permitted in particular sectors. £A local land use plan may establish, for instance, that high-hazard areas in the community should be reserved for recreational uses or for low- density development. The plan may designate these hazard areas and then provide a set of policies and standards for controlling development in them. Local plans may result in the reduction of storm hazards in their overall effect or they may contain specific hurricane and storm hazard mitigation components^The Development Plan for Sanibel Island, Flor¬ ida, for example, contains as a central feature the reduction of hurricane and storm hazards (City of Sanibel 1980). The future plans of all coastal localities in Florida and North Carolina must include storm mitigation components (see chapter 5). Reconstruction plans can serve either as general guidelines for making 166 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS decisions about redevelopment following a storm or as detailed instruc¬ tions about which uses and site-specific areas and parcels will be permit¬ ted to be rebuilt and in what ways. It has often been suggested that developing such plans in advance of the disaster will provide political and legal support for halting what is typically a very rapid rebuilding of structures in precisely the same hazardous locations (Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977; Rosenthal 1975). Recovery and reconstruction plans pro¬ vide deliberate statements of policy and intention concerning what will be acceptable and unacceptable forms of rebuilding. Ideally, such recon¬ struction plans call for preventing rebuilding, reducing the density of redevelopment, or otherwise protecting development in the most hazard¬ ous locations. Recovery and reconstruction plans also typically establish special pro¬ cedures for postdisaster decisionmaking. Included in these procedures may be the establishment of a special recovery or reconstruction task force which recommends actions for guiding and managing rebuilding (McElyea, Brower, and Godschalk 1982; Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977). Depending upon the extent to which detailed reconstruction plans exist, such a body would have the responsibility of identifying or implementing planned actions to reduce the threat of future hurricanes and severe coastal storms (such as the enactment of a redevelopment moratorium while a reconstruction plan was prepared). Special recovery procedures may also include the formation of damage assessment teams which would provide the reconstruction task force, and other decisionmakers, with crucial information concerning the extent and nature of hurricane forces and damages caused by them (Brower, Collins, and Beatley 1984). Separate coastal storm hazard mitigation plans typically include a vul¬ nerability analysis covering property and people at risk from coastal storms, along with strategies and recommendations for prestorm and poststorm mitigation. For example, the plan for Atlantic County Barrier Islands and Ocean City, New Jersey, discusses people and property at risk and the implementation of storm hazard mitigation strategies in its first section and then provides a section with site specific recommendations for each coastal area (New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec¬ tion 1985). Local Mitigation Tools 167 Benefits and Limitations of Planning The cost of preparing plans and instituting new planning processes varies depending upon their scope and composition. Generally the types of plans discussed here can be developed with modest public investment, particularly if assisted by outside planning agencies (for example, a regional planning council, state planning agency). Moreover, these plans—both before and after the storm—can serve as a foundation for rational decisionmaking concerning development and redevelopment in the com¬ munity. Unless a community has been through the process of analyzing its vulnerability and debating mitigation alternatives, it will be at a loss to cope with these issues in the stressful aftermath of a disaster. Clearly, however, plans by themselves are not highly effective. It is only when they are put into effect through ordinances, the allocation of public funds, and specific community decisions that they will have an impact on reducing local storm hazards. Plans are necessary, but not sufficient, for an effective storm hazard mitigation program. For this reason, we empha¬ size the use of plans as one element of an overall development management/ hazard mitigation program. To continue their effectiveness, plans must be continually updated, monitored, and evaluated. As development patterns or coastal conditions change, plans must be revised in light of these new circumstances. Projec¬ tions and assumptions must be monitored and adjusted as necessary. Finally policies must be assessed in terms of their relevance and imple¬ mentation techniques evaluated in light of their actual, as opposed to expected, results. Development Regulation The most widely used development management tools are those which regulate the location, amount, density, and type of development in coastal localities. Basic types include zoning and subdivision ordinances and variations of these standard regulations. Conventional zoning ordinances may be used to control the type (for example, residential, commercial, recreational), intensity (for example, bulk, height, floor area ratio, set¬ back provisions), and density of development which occurs in high- hazard areas. 168 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Examples of reduction in densities along high-hazard shorelines are plentiful. Several localities along the highly vulnerable South Shore of Long Island, New York, have reduced permissible densities (Long Island Regional Planning Board 1984). Hollywood, Florida, in an effort to pro¬ tect a relatively undeveloped segment of its shoreline, and to keep the area’s population within existing evacuation capacity, severely down-zoned this area from high-density hotel and multifamily uses to single-family detached residences. In its recent hurricane hazard mitigation and postdisaster reconstruction plan, the town of Emerald Isle, North Caro¬ lina, cites its efforts to reduce storm hazards by keeping densities down (see Town of Emerald Isle 1984). The town of Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, permits single-family detached units on half-acre lots, keeping the extent of property at-risk on that island low. The hurricane hazard mitigation and reconstruction plan for Onslow County, North Carolina, recommends that future densities be lowered considerably in West Onslow Beach (Topsail Island) to facilitate evacuation, including more extensive reductions where the hurricane hazard is greatest. The mitigation and reconstruction plan for the town of Nags Head proposes rezoning por¬ tions of its beachfront in order to prevent the future location of high- density uses (Brower, Collins, and Beatley 1984). A relatively common and effective approach is the requirement that new construction be set back a certain distance from the ocean’s edge. These requirements can be found both at the state and local levels. In North Carolina, for instance, new multifamily structures locating in Ocean Erodible Zones (oceanfront areas) must be setback a distance of sixty times the average annual rate of erosion for that particular stretch of coast. Numerous individual coastal localities have adopted setback require¬ ments (see Kusler 1982). Glynn County, Georgia, for instance, has enacted restrictions which vary depending upon the nature of the coastline (that is, whether or not an active dune sequence exists). Sullivan’s Island, South Carolina, has what amounts to a setback provision through the delinea¬ tion of a recreation and conservation district in which development is prohibited. The reduction of damages from hurricanes and storm flooding is specifically cited in each of these ordinances as a major reason for the setbacks. Subdivision ordinances govern the conversion of raw land into devel¬ oped uses and the type and extent of improvements made in this conver- Local Mitigation Tools 169 sion. Subdivision regulations can control the density, configuration, and layout of development. They operate in ways similar to zoning to control the amount and density of development on a particular site. The require¬ ment of a minimum lot size can reduce the amount of new development exposed to storm hazards. Site plan review and other requirements of subdivision approval can provide the opportunity to orient the location of development sites in ways which minimize storm risks. For instance, subdivision provisions may require that new single-family dwellings on lots in hazard areas be sited in ways which maximize distance from high-hazard oceanfront areas. Subdivision approval can be made contingent upon mitigative actions, such as the protection of dunes, wetlands, and natural vegetation. For instance, subdivision and site plan provisions may require that structures locate a sufficient distance from protective dunes. Builders may also be required to “cluster” structures on the safest portions of a parcel, to minimize exposure to storm hazards (see Whyte 1968 for a general descrip¬ tion of the clustering concept and Urban and Regional Research 1982 for an application to hazard reduction). In Gulf Shores, Alabama, developers are encouraged to cluster the development of new structures on the landward side of the highway paralleling the shore, placing recreational and parking facilities on the waterside. A potentially effective strategy is to require or encourage clustering of structures on safer sites or portions of parcels during reconstruction. This is a primary strategy proposed for Long Island communities by the Long Island Regional Planning Board (see lirpb 1984). A promising alternative is to protect the option of moving a structure back from the ocean when the shoreline erodes by requiring lots which are sufficiently deep for this purpose. Such extra-deep lots could be considered analogous to the extra-large lots sometimes required to permit the replacement of a saturated septic tank field, the so-called repair area concept. If necessary, a threatened house could be moved back onto the landward portion of the lot in a safer location. Concomitant with this approach would be the prohibition of immovable structures in such areas. New York has established just such a system for highly eroding areas of Long Island (see chapter 5). As already noted, many of these techniques may be appropriate to impose following a hurricane or severe storm. A moratorium on recon- 170 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS struction can give a locality more time to determine how it wishes to redevelop, and to decide on actions it can take which will minimize the impacts of the next storm. Benefits and Limitations of Development Regulation The cost of regulation has been the source of much debate among plan¬ ners and policymakers. The administrative costs involved in imposing hazard regulations would for most localities be relatively small, as all but the smallest of localities are likely to have already adopted and imple¬ mented zoning and subdivision ordinances. Reducing coastal storm haz¬ ards through such an existing regulatory framework may be relatively costless (administratively). Of course, should a locality wish to develop a regulatory framework from ground zero, public expenses will necessarily be greater, depending upon the complexity of the proposed system. A more serious concern is usually expressed about the economic side effects from such regulations. A number of interests may be affected. At the most discrete level, landowners and developers whose property has been down-zoned as a result of regulations will often experience severe economic effects. Should regulations reduce the absolute amount of devel¬ opment permitted in a locality, it is possible that the general public may experience the economic effects that sometimes result from a lower tax base. This is highly debatable, however, as reduced development also leads to fewer service demands and fewer negative impacts on the natural and man-made environment. It is also possible that reduced levels of permissible development, particularly those which are commercially ori¬ ented, may lead to lower levels of economic activity and may harm local residents who are unemployed or underemployed. Many of the regulatory options for reducing hurricane and coastal storm hazards do not involve reducing the absolute amount of permissi¬ ble development but rather its location relative to hazard zones. The coastal setback, for instance, typically permits the same intensity of devel¬ opment but simply in a slightly different location, for example, farther away from the ocean. It is debatable whether such restrictions serve to dampen overall levels of development. This will depend on the substitut¬ ability of nonhazardous or less-hazardous land and the availability of similar development sites in other jurisdictions which do not have hazard zone regulations. Analyses of the economic effects of the Florida setback Local Mitigation Tools 171 requirements have argued that such an alteration of building location does not have a severe negative economic effect (Florida Department of Natural Resources 1982; Shows et al. 1976). Recent experiences with this type of siting has indicated that there is little or no impact. The Dorchester Condominium, erected in Pelican Bay in Collier County, is sited some 1,300 feet from the water line. Elevated walkovers are being constructed to the beach to provide access and view is unimpeded from the living floors. The price and absorption of this condominium would indicate that the market treated it as a gulf front structure. For smaller units the view would be impeded and thus there might be some negative impact on price. However, the rule imposes no height restriction and therefore the unit could be elevated to obtain the desired view. Such elevations, however, would have a cost (Florida Department of Natural Resources 1982, 14). The effectiveness of development regulations depends both upon the stringency of the measures enacted and the resources and political will invested in enforcing and implementing these regulations. Land use regu¬ lations can be circumvented through such things as zoning amendments, special exceptions, and so on. Consequently an effective form of development regulation must entail provisions which substantially restrict hazard area development (for example, a setback of more than a few feet) and these provisions must be diligently enforced and implemented. Relocation and Land Acquisition A highly effective approach to reducing coastal storm damage is to pre¬ vent the development of hazardous lands through their public acquisi¬ tion. Several types of land acquisition are possible. Fee-simple acquisition involves obtaining the full “bundle of rights” associated with a parcel of land. Undeveloped lands could then be maintained for open space or other public recreational uses which would not involve exposing people or houses to storm threats (Field Associates 1981; Kusler 1979). An alternative to fee-simple acquisition is the purchase of less-than-fee- simple interests in land, in which the public buys only the development rights. Under this arrangement a jurisdiction would pay the landowner 172 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS the fair market value of this right in exchange for agreeing to leave the land in an undeveloped state for some specified period of time or in perpetuity. This is usually accomplished through a restrictive covenant which runs with the deed. Also included in this category of development management measures are relocation programs. Relocation can take at least two forms: (i) relocation of a threatened structure to another site and (2) relocation of the contents of a structure while demolishing or putting to a new use the remaining structure(s) (see Johnson 1978). Relocation of the structure to a hazard-free or less hazardous site, while physically possible, often may be economically infeasible. This will depend on the type of structure involved and the distance over which it must be moved. Relocation of families and their belongings to new housing outside the hazard or high- hazard area may generally be a more feasible approach. This is particu¬ larly true following extensive storm damage, where demolition of dam¬ aged properties (rather than extensive reconstruction) involves fewer opportunity costs. The recent efforts in Baytown, Texas, to purchase properties in the Brownwood subdivision — an area devastated by Hurri¬ cane Alicia—are illustrative of the technique (see chapter 3). Through the use of federal monies, an entire subdivision of destroyed or heavily dam¬ aged single-family homes which had been subjected to repeated flooding was prevented from rebuilding in its extremely hazardous location (see fema 1983a and 1983b). Benefits and Limitations of Relocation and Acquisition There is perhaps no more certain way to ensure that future development does not occur in hazardous locations than for the public to purchase such areas. The use of acquisition poses a number of practical problems, however. The most significant perhaps for most coastal localities have to do with cost and how such acquisitions are to be financed. Fee-simple acquisition of undeveloped land in coastal areas experiencing moderate to high levels of market demand will tend to be very expensive — prohibitively expensive for many communities. The purchase of already- improved land will be even more expensive, although damaged properties purchased in the aftermath of a storm may reduce these expenses substantially. Where “preemption” or “right of first refusal” is legally possible, this Local Mitigation Tools 173 technique can make public acquisition more feasible. Such a mechanism would essentially permit the locality to insert itself in the place of a property buyer in any local land transaction involving hazard areas. This would, then, allow a local government to oversee all land transactions in those areas and to expend its limited funds in acquiring only those lands which are truly threatened by development (that is, are in fact in the process of being sold for development uses). Another approach to cost reduction is reselling fee-simple acquisitions with certain deed restrictions limiting future development in hazardous areas. Proceeds from these sales could then be used on a revolving fund basis to fund additional acquisitions. A locality may also be able to more efficiently use its available acquisi¬ tion funds by coordinating its acquisition decisions with those of private environmental conservation organizations, such as the Nature Conser¬ vancy and the Trust for Public Land. These organizations are often able to move more quickly in land and open space acquisition than are local governments. Although their acquisition decisions are typically based on nonhazard objectives, a community may be able to influence these private purchase decisions, for instance by sharing the costs of their acquisition or in some way facilitating them. The acquisition of development rights may also be more feasible. How¬ ever, while a leading reason for preferring development rights acquisition over fee-simple acquisition is that public expense will be less, this will still be very expensive. In areas where market demand is high, the purchasing of a development right will constitute the major portion of the parcel’s fair market value (Coughlin and Plaut 1978). Because of this fact, this approach may be no more financially feasible than fee-simple acquisition. Taxation and Fiscal Incentives Development management may also include attempts to indirectly influence patterns of development and growth through the use of taxation and other fiscal incentives. The use of differential assessment of certain types of land for tax purposes is based on the theory that by reducing the property tax burden on undeveloped parcels of land holding costs will be decreased, in turn prolonging the time to which they are devoted to undeveloped uses. Almost every state now has a provision for some form 174 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS of differential assessment (Coughlin and Keene 1981; Keene et al. 1976). The uses typically eligible for such reductions are farm and forestland, open space, and recreational uses. These are uses which do occur in coastal high-hazard areas and whose maintenance in an undeveloped state could reduce the amount of property and people exposed to the storm threat. Another set of fiscal approaches includes the use of special assessments and impact fees. Building in and inhabiting high-hazard areas often involves substantially greater public costs than in similar less-hazardous sites. These costs are seen when a hurricane or coastal storm strikes, or even threatens, a locality. There are, for instance, public costs of evacuation, search and rescue, temporary housing, the reconstruction of public facili¬ ties such as roads, utilities, water and sewer lines, and so on. Public policy can acknowledge that such additional public expenses will exist as a result of permitting this development to occur and assess the additional costs to those who will ultimately benefit from these expenditures. This can be accomplished through several means. One approach is to attempt to tie more closely benefits received and costs incurred through the use of special benefit assessments. This would be similar to the special assessment charged to property owners benefiting from the public installation of roads, drainage, and sewer and water services. Such assessments are applied within a district in which property owners are determined to receive a distinct and substantial benefit in excess of the general benefits received by the public at large (Hagman and Misczynski 1978). Applying this concept to storm hazard management, a locality would thus be required to delineate an area in which “special storm services” are provided and in which residents would be subject to the special assessment. A variation on this theme is the impact fee. Here the levy may be designed to recoup and mitigate the overall “impacts” of a project or development on the community at large — impacts that may extend beyond the immediate environs and requirements of a project or development (Hagman and Misczynski 1978; Snyder and Stegman 1987). For instance, while a special assessment may be levied to cover the immediate costs associated with the floodproofing of sewer and water service, an impact fee might be used to pay for mitigation of the broader impacts on the locality created by the development. For example, the jurisdiction might Local Mitigation Tools 175 levy an impact fee according to the extent to which a new project reduces the overall ability of the locality to evacuate in the event of a hurricane. While it may not be designed to cover the costs of an onsite improvement for the particular development’s benefit, the impact fee is designed to compensate the community for the costs of adding evacuation capacity. One potentially effective incentive to reducing the amount of property- at-risk is to permit the transfer of development rights (tdr) from a high- hazard “sending” zone to a low-hazard “receiving” zone in another part of the jurisdiction (Carmichael 1974; Costonis 1973; Rose 1975). Such a system could either be voluntary or mandatory. Under the latter a locality would simply zone the storm hazard area so that fewer units of develop¬ ment are allowed (or prohibit new development entirely), and the owner of land within this zone would then be permitted to transfer all or some of this unused development density to parcels in designated low-hazard areas or to sell these on the open market to others who own land in areas designated for development. The locality would then permit increased levels of development in the low-hazard zone as a result of possessing extra development rights; thus a natural market for the transfer of these rights is created. A voluntary approach would simply present this transfer as an additional option for the landowner—a way of maintaining the land in its undeveloped use if the landowner wishes. The landowner in this case would still have the option of developing his land or selling it for development purposes. Benefits and Limitations of Taxation and Fiscal Incentives Differential assessment is widely used, but its effectiveness at retaining land in undeveloped uses is generally found to be low where the market price of land is high (Keene et al. 1976; Coughlin et al. 1977; Coughlin and Keene 1981). Consequently, differential assessment is likely to be most successful in circumstances (perhaps specific locations in the juris¬ diction) where development pressures are slight-to-moderate and where landowners are actively interested in maintaining the present undevel¬ oped use of the land. This suggests that differential assessment will not be an appropriate tool for managing development in oceanfront and barrier island areas where market demand is extremely great. Differential assess¬ ment will tend to be a more appropriate tool for discouraging develop¬ ment in bay and riverine areas subject to hurricane and storm forces. 176 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Differential assessment will also be a more effective tool at reducing development of hazardous sites when used in collaboration with other approaches, such as the regulation of new development, the fee-simple purchase of land, and the transfer of development rights. For instance, reducing the permissible development density in a hazard location together with preferential assessment may reduce opportunity costs to the land- owner enough to reduce actual conversion of hazard lands to developed uses. It is important to understand, also, that differential assessment is not costless. As a result of reduced or preferential assessment for hazard parcels, local tax rates must be increased (assuming the same level of local services is maintained). This effect is commonly referred to as the “tax shift” and will be greatest in situations where the value of undevel¬ oped preferentially treated land is highest. The effectiveness of impact fees and special hazard area assessments will depend on their intended public objectives. They are most useful in recouping the areawide costs associated with development projects. They will not prevent growth in high-hazard areas, though they can indirectly discourage development there. Their effects on discouraging new devel¬ opment will depend on the availability of substitute parcels of land not subject to such fees or assessments and the elasticity of demand for hazard area development. The greater the ease of land substitutability (that is, abil¬ ity to find similar hazardous parcels in a neighboring jurisdiction or similar nonhazardous parcels in the same jurisdiction), the greater will be the effect of discouraging development in those areas where the fees or assessments apply. The greater the elasticity of demand for oceanfront or hazard zone development (that is, the greater the sensitivity of demand to changes in price), the greater will be the relocation or displacement effect. One eco¬ nomic side effect of this may be a reduction in the local tax base, if develop¬ ment chooses to locate in other jurisdictions that do not have such fees or assessments. Ideally, this would not result if these additional charges applied only to hazard area development while displaced development could be accommodated in other less hazardous sites within the same jurisdiction. It is difficult to predict in advance who will actually bear the costs of impact fees or assessments. Depending upon actual market conditions, it is likely that these costs will be shared by new homeowners, owners of developable land, and developers. Local Mitigation Tools 177 A transfer of development rights (tdr) program avoids many of these problems and uncertainties but presents many of its own. For instance, a large-scale tdr program requires extensive information and knowledge about local market conditions and land development trends. How large, for example, should the receiving zone be (by how much should the locality raise permissible densities?) to ensure an adequate demand for development rights? How readily will landowners in sending zones sell their development rights and when? As experience in the Pinelands (Carol 1987) and in Montgomery County, Maryland (Banach and Canavan 1987), has shown, these are critical questions. Development of a tdr program usually requires the services of a development rights specialist or an economist to devise a system that will operate effectively in the market. The transfer of development rights can also be viewed as a form of compensation when restrictions are placed on development in storm haz¬ ard areas. For instance, although an oceanfront landowner may be pre¬ vented from developing his land (that is, it is now zoned for open space or recreational uses), he may be able to realize a portion of this development potential by selling his allocated development rights to developers of areas of the jurisdiction less susceptible to storm hazards. Viewing tdr primarily as a form of compensation raises several questions; key among them is the extent of compensation deemed to be desirable or equitable. At what point will the market value of a development right be unaccept¬ ably low as a form of compensation? If full or substantial compensation is a goal, this may require a more active role for government in the development rights market, say, by entering the market to buy rights at times when demand is low. Capital Facilities Policy Coastal development—its type, location, density, and timing—is highly influenced by capital facilities such as roads and sewer and water service. Such public investments have been aptly called the “growth shapers.” Two primary dimensions to capital facilities policy have implications for local storm hazard mitigation: one is geographical (where capital facilities are placed) and the other temporal (when they are placed) (Roberts 1986; Nugent 1975). With respect to the first dimension, a locality can develop an explicit set of capital facilities extension policies designed to avoid 178 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS high-hazard areas, thus reducing the amount of development and prop¬ erty which is placed at risk and reducing the potential threats to personal safety. Redirecting capital facilities, and thus the development which accom¬ panies them, into “safer” areas of the locality can be facilitated through several means. One is the clear delineation in the land use plan of urban service areas or districts in which the jurisdiction agrees to provide cer¬ tain facilities and services (for example, see the 1985 Lee County, Florida Plan, which is based on an urban service district concept). This district would also likely entail a temporal dimension, for example, including sufficient land to accommodate further growth under certain assump¬ tions about evacuation capacity and public facilities. Such a practice has several advantages. It provides a long-term perspective on growth and development and permits developers, residents and the locality generally to visualize where and when such facilities will become available in the future (and in turn where they cannot be expected). This, in effect, modifies long-term expectations about where future development will and will not be acceptable to the community. Development pressures may tend to shift naturally as a result of this public designation, as developers, landowners and others realize that certain facilities will not become available outside of these designated areas. The provision and availability of facilities may determine the amount of overall development that can take place in a locality, and suspicions of “no growth” objectives are often held. Desig¬ nation of a service area in “safer” parts of the locality and a good faith effort to satisfy growth demands will tend to enhance the political and legal acceptability of such an approach. In addition to delineating urban service areas in the plan, the locality needs a policy instrument by which to implement the plan through sys¬ tematically identifying, financing, and sequencing specific capital improve¬ ments. This is accomplished by adopting a capital improvements program (cip). Ideally, the cip follows closely designated service boundaries, as well as the comprehensive plan, zoning, and other regulatory and plan¬ ning provisions. The cip provides a five- to six-year framework for mak¬ ing short-term decisions about which improvements to make and where. Avoidance of storm hazard areas can be incorporated into this instrument as a specific cip policy. A close connection between the designation of service areas, the capital Local Mitigation Tools 179 improvement program and the overall planning process in a jurisdiction (including the local comprehensive plan) is essential. This is recognized under current planning and growth management requirements in Florida, for example, where the connection is legislatively mandated (Roberts 1986). From a practical standpoint the concept of guiding growth through capital facilities should be closely linked to the objective of reducing the public costs of such facilities and the extent of public investment at risk in high-hazard areas. The latter is, by itself, a legitimate argument for deny¬ ing facility extension. This is a facility-related reason which is likely to enhance the legal standing of hazard-sensitive capital facilities extension policy. Opportunities may also exist after a storm has occurred to implement these capital facilities objectives. If facilities such as roads and sewers are sufficiently damaged, they may be rebuilt in areas which are less suscepti¬ ble to damage from the next storm. Even if such facilities are not relo¬ cated, they may be repaired and reconstructed in ways which make them stronger or less susceptible to storm forces. Roads can be elevated, for instance, and sewer and water lines can be floodproofed. Poststorm reconstruction may be used not only to reduce the possibility of future facility damage but also to reduce other storm-related hazards. If facility repairs are not permitted to occur after a storm, this may preclude or discourage private development. This technique was used subtly in the Baytown, Texas, case. The option of selling-out and leaving the Brownwood Subdivision was made much more attractive to home- owners because they were uncertain that sewers and roads would be restored and maintained. As a further example, placing power and tele¬ phone lines underground after the storm will ensure safer evacuation when the next storm threatens. A similar approach might be taken to the rebuilding or reconstruction of damaged public buildings such as town halls and fire stations. If sufficiently damaged, it may be logical to move these structures to safer sites in the locality. After Hurricane Camille, for instance, the Pass Chris¬ tian Town Hall was rebuilt on higher ground and, consequently, was much better protected from future storm damages than if rebuilt in the same location. When structures are not relocated, it may be possible to repair or rebuild them in ways that reduce their susceptibility to future storm damages (for example, through elevation). It may be desirable, as 180 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS well, to rebuild these structures in ways which permit their usage as storm shelters. Benefits and Limitations of Capital Facilities Policy Reducing direct public investment—such as construction of public build¬ ings and roads in hazard areas — is highly effective at reducing future public storm damages. Such a policy makes sense in terms of net social efficiency. Moreover, these are investments which the public has a firm handle on and can control directly. However, the effectiveness of public investment decisions at discourag¬ ing hazardous private development depends upon local conditions and market demand. Limiting public investment will only be an effective deter¬ rent if development in high-hazard areas is dependent upon these public facilities. For instance, if coastal development is able to obtain water through individual site wells and dispose of wastewater through septic tanks, limiting provision of public sewer and water facilities by the local¬ ity will do little to impede growth in hazardous zones. It may be necessary for the locality to foreclose other service/facility options available to devel¬ opment by restricting the issuance of septic tank permits, for example. Without valid health reasons, however, foreclosing such alternative options for development may be legally difficult. It is advisable that the jurisdic¬ tion closely coordinate its environmental protection, health, and other community objectives with those of reducing storm hazards. Restricting the depletion of coastal groundwater supplies, for instance, may also serve to advance the effectiveness of capital facilities policy at reducing the number of people and property at risk in high-hazard areas. However, if restricting the provision of public services and facilities leads to a greater assumption of their costs by the private sector, then housing prices will increase. Information Dissemination Classical economic theory holds that the more informed consumers are, the more rational and allocatively efficient their market decisions will be. This implies an additional set of mitigation strategies which aim primarily at supplementing and enlightening individual market decisions regarding the hurricane and storm threat. Several approaches can be taken in this vein. Local Mitigation Tools 181 The first approach is to seek mechanisms and processes which facilitate the effective informing of potential consumers of homes and other build¬ ings of the actual risks associated with their location (for example, in a high-hazard district). This can be done in several ways. It might be required that real estate agents and those selling homes inform prospective buyers about the potential dangers from storm forces. Exactly this approach was proposed in Texas but was not enacted due to opposition from real estate and development interests (Texas Coastal and Marine Council 1981). This approach has been used in California in an attempt to inform pro¬ spective homebuyers of the risks of living near earthquake fault lines (Palm 1981). Under the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act a real estate agent or individual selling property must disclose to the prospective buyer the fact that the property lies in a “special studies zone” (earth¬ quake fault zone). Another approach is to attempt to reduce storm hazards by increasing information on the “supply side.” This might take the form of construc¬ tion practice seminars for coastal builders and developers, introducing hazard-reducing methods for building and designing structures, as well as for siting and planning the orientation of buildings in vulnerable loca¬ tions. This approach was proposed as a primary mitigation strategy fol¬ lowing Hurricane Alicia in 1983 (fema 1983a). Benefits and Limitations of Information Dissemination The administrative costs of a hazard disclosure requirement are likely to be relatively small, particularly if it is attached to an already existing development review process. But its effectiveness at reducing development in hazardous areas is also likely to be marginal. A recent study of the effects of the Alquist-Priolo earthquake hazard zone disclosure require¬ ment (Palm 1981) indicates that it has had little measurable effect on the market behavior of housing consumers. Among the problems identified are the tendency for homeowners to place a low priority on the earth¬ quake threat, the issuance of the disclosure in the latter stages of a home purchase after the decision and commitment to buy are made, a down¬ playing of the importance of the earthquake hazard zones, and a disclo¬ sure vehicle (for example, a line that simply says “in Alquist-Priolo zone”) that conveys little or no real information about the earthquake risk. As Palm (1981, 102) observes, “At present, real estate agents are disclosing at 182 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS the least sensitive time in the sales transaction, and are using methods which convey the least amount of information about special studies zones.” Consequently, if a similar disclosure approach is to be applied to hurri¬ cane and storm hazards in an effective way it must learn from the Califor¬ nia experience. Namely the disclosure must be provided early in the sales transaction, preferably during the initial agent-purchaser meeting, and this disclosure must convey real and accurate information about the loca¬ tion and nature of the hazard. Not only should the disclosure form or procedure be “labeled” in a meaningful way (for example, the home is in a “storm hazard zone” as opposed to an ambiguous “special studies zone”), it must provide a full description of the nature of storm-related risks. Strong resistance from the real estate industry in coastal areas can be expected, and efforts to convince them of the utility of such a proce¬ dure will be essential to its success. More “passive” types of hazard disclosure might also be used. Included in this category would be require¬ ments that hazard zone designations be recorded on deeds and subdivi¬ sion plats and that public signs be erected indicating the boundaries of storm hazard areas (and perhaps the location of past storm damages). Similar reservations about effectiveness apply to construction practice seminars. The success of such seminars depends essentially on the com¬ mitment and willingness to change of builders and developers. Perhaps the most significant impediment to this type of private sector mitigation is that real estate development is a competitive industry in coastal regions and the incurring of substantial mitigation costs by one developer may place him at a competitive disadvantage. This is a major reason, for example, why building codes, subdivision restrictions, zoning ordinances, and other jurisdictionwide requirements are to be preferred to voluntary changes in construction practice. The jurisdictionwide requirements set general rules and create a common set of expectations which do not require any one developer to be placed at a competitive disadvantage. Promising Local Mitigation Approaches This chapter has reviewed the primary development management tools and techniques, the “nonstructural” approaches which can be used to mitigate hurricane and coastal storm hazards. In the past these approaches have been overlooked in favor of more traditional approaches such as Local Mitigation Tools 183 seawalls or building construction standards. Future hurricane and storm hazard mitigation must be integrated into the broader planning and devel¬ opment framework at the local level. Effective mitigation strategies in the future will be “packaged” into multiple-objective growth management policies. Localities will consider the reduction of storm hazards in their land use and comprehensive plan¬ ning, just as they now consider such issues as water quality, traffic conges¬ tion, and the need for open space. Fortunately many of these other local goals overlap with and support storm hazard reduction, making an inte¬ grated program possible. Future hazard mitigation will use a variety of tools and strategies. During the prestorm period in growing coastal communities new growth can be directed toward less hazardous locations. In already built-up com¬ munities, such as Miami Beach, beach nourishment, strengthening, relo¬ cation, and other approaches which protect massive existing investments will be needed. In communities with both developed and undeveloped shorelines, such as Long Island, some combination of techniques will be called for. In all these situations, development management can be used after the storm to redirect reconstruction to areas less susceptible to future storm forces. As this chapter shows, the power of development management as a disaster mitigation approach stems from its broad array of tools and techniques, its centrality as a function of local government, and its ability to influence the placement and form of buildings and facilities. Early attempts at local disaster planning, typically separated from development management in a civil defense or emergency response agency, were limited to a smaller kit of tools, a narrower role in governance, and a reactive stance to the existing urban form and infrastructure. References Banach, Melissa, and Denis Canavan. 1987. “Montgomery County Agricultural Preser¬ vation Program.” In Managing Land-Use Conflicts, edited by David J. Brower and Daniel S. Carol. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. Beatley, Timothy, and David J. Brower. 1985. “Development Management as a Means of Mitigating the Impacts of Coastal Storms.” Presented to the Fourth Symposium on Coastal and Ocean Management, July 30-August 2, Baltimore, Maryland. 184 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Beatley, Timothy. 1985a. Development Management to Reduce Coastal Storm Hazards: Policies and Processes. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. -. 1985b. Coastal Storm Hazard Planning in North Carolina: A Review and Cri¬ tique. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Brower, David J., William Collins, and Timothy Beatley. 1984. Hurricane Hazard Mitiga¬ tion and Post-Storm Reconstruction Plan, Nags Head, North Carolina. Chapel Hill, N.C.: Coastal Resources Collaborative. Carmichael, O. M. 1974. “Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control.” Florida State University Law Review 2:35 — 107. Carol, Daniel S. 1987. “New Jersey Pinelands Commission.” In Managing Land-Use Conflicts, edited by David J. Brower and Daniel S. Carol. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. City of Sanibel, Florida. 1980. Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Costonis, John. 1973. “Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,” Yale Law Review 83. Coughlin, Robert E., and Thomas Plaut. 1978. “Less-than-fee Acquisition for the Preser¬ vation of Open Space: Does It Work?” journal of the American Planning Association 44, no. 4 (October): 452-462. Coughlin, Robert E., et al. 1977. Saving the Garden: The Preservation of Farmland and Other Environmentally Valuable Landscape. Philadelphia, Pa.: Regional Science Research Institute. Coughlin, Robert E., and John Keene, eds. 1981. The Protection of Farmland: A Refer¬ ence Guidebook for State and Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Downing, Donald. 1975. “Sewer and Water Pricing and Investment Policies to Implement Urban Growth Policy.” Water Resources Bulletin 2, no. 2 (April). Federal Emergency Management Agency. 1983a. Interagency Hazard Mitigation Report Covering Brazoria, Chambers, Fort Bend, Galveston, Harris, and Matagorda Counties. Denton, Tex. September. -. 1983b. Interagency Post-Storm Recovery Progress Report. Denton, Tex. December. Field Associates. 1981. State and Local Acquisition of Floodplains and Wetlands: A Handbook on the Use of Acquisition in Floodplain Management. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council. Florida Department of Natural Resources. 1982. Economic Impact Statement: Walton County Coastal Construction Control Line. Tallahassee, Fla.: Division of Beaches and Shores. September. Godschalk, David R., David J. Brower, et al. 1979. Constitutional Issues of Growth Local Mitigation Tools 185 Management. Chicago, III.: Planners Press. Godschalk, David R., and David J. Brower. 1985. “Mitigation Strategies and Integrated Emergency Management.” Public Administration Review 45 (January): 64—71. Haas, J. Eugene, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden. 1977. Reconstruction Follow¬ ing Disaster. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press. Hagman, Donald, and Dean Misczynski. 1978. Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and Compensation. Chicago, Ill.: aspo Press. Johnson, William K. 1978. Physical and Economic Feasibility of Nonstructural Flood Plain Management Measures. Ft. Belvoir, Va.: Institute of Water Resources. Keene, John, et al. 1976 Untaxing Open Space. Washington, D.C.: Council on Environ¬ mental Quality. Kusler, Jon A. 1979. Floodplain Acquisition: Issues and Options in Strengthening Federal Policy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Water Resources Council. -. 1982. Innovation in Local Floodplain Management: A Summary of Community Experience. Boulder, Colo.: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral Science. Lee County, Fla. 1985. The Lee Plan. Fort Myers, Fla. Long Island Regional Planning Board. 1984. Hurricane Damage Mitigation Plan for the South Shore—Nassau and Suffolk Counties, N.Y. Hauppauge, N.Y. McElyea, William, David J. Brower, and David R. Godschalk. 1982. Before the Storm: Managing Development to Reduce Hurricane Damages. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 1985. Coastal Storm Hazard Mitigation: Atlantic County Barrier Islands and Ocean City, New Jersey. Trenton, N.J. Nugent, Michael. 1975. “Water and Sewer Extension Policies as a Technique for Guiding Development.” Carolina Planning 1, no. 1 (Winter): 4—11. Palm, Risa. 1981. Real Estate Agents and Special Studies Zones Disclosure: The Response of California Homebuyers to Earthquake Hazards Information. Boulder, Colo.: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Pilkey, Orrin H. 1987. “A Time for Retreat.” In Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers, edited by Rutherford Platt, Sheila Pelczarski, and Barbara Burbank. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, Department of Geography. Roberts, Thomas H. 1986. “Capital Improvements Programming After the Growth Man¬ agement Act: A Planner’s Perspective.” In Perspectives on Florida’s Growth Management Act of 1985, edited by John DeGrove and Julian Juergensmeyer. Cambridge, Mass.: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Rose, Jerome. 1975. Transfer of Development Rights. New Brunswick N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University. Rosenthal, John C. 1975. “Reconstruction After a Natural Disaster—A Need for Rapid Planning and Development.” Paper presented to a conference of the American Institute of 186 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Planners, San Antonio, Texas. Shows, E. Warren, et al. 1976. The Economic Impact of Florida’s Coastal Setback Line: A Study of Bay County, Florida. Tampa, Fla.: University of South Florida. Snyder, Thomas, and Michael Stegman. 1987. Paying for Growth. Washington, D.C.: Urban Land Institute. Stroud, Nancy. 1978. “Impact Taxes: The Opportunity in North Carolina.” Carolina Planning 4, no.2 (Fall): 20—27. Sturza, R. P., II. 1987. “The Retreat Alternative in the Real World: The Kill Devil Hills Land-Use Plan of 1980.” In Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers , edited by Rutherford Platt, Sheila Pelczarski, and Barbara Burbank. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, Department of Geography. Texas Coastal and Marine Council. 1981. Model Minimum Hurricane Resistant Building Standards for the Texas Gulf Coast. Austin, Tex. Town of Emerald Isle, N.C. 1984. Storm Hazard Mitigation Plan and Postdisaster Recon¬ struction Plan. Prepared by George Eichler and Associates and Satilla Planning. Urban and Regional Research. 1982. Land Management in Tsunami Hazard Areas. Seat¬ tle, Wash. Whyte, William. 1968. The Last Landscape. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Books. 7 Mitigation Practice in High-Hazard Coastal Localities Survey of Practice Aside from individual case studies, little systematic knowledge has been available in the past concerning the extent to which coastal localities are addressing hurricane and severe coastal storm hazards, the types of approaches used, and the extent to which they are effective at reducing these hazards. Without such a comprehensive understanding of local mitigation practice, policymakers have had to rely upon partial evidence in attempting to formulate improved mitigation approaches. In 1984 a comprehensive survey of localities vulnerable to hurricanes and severe coastal storms was undertaken to obtain a better and more complete understanding of the nature of current local mitigation practice. This survey employed a mail questionnaire, administered to high-hazard coastal localities along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. This chapter presents the basic descriptive findings from this survey. The following chapter analyzes the influence of community variables and background character¬ istics on the adoption and effectiveness of mitigation measures. The survey questionnaire was designed to document and evaluate miti¬ gation efforts of those coastal localities which are most susceptible to hurricane and coastal storm forces. Our survey defined these localities as ones which contained “Velocity-zone” or “V-zone” areas. V-zones are coastal waterfront areas where significant waves are anticipated in addi¬ tion to rising floodwaters during severe storms. Under the National Flood Insurance Program, fema provides maps to participating localities show¬ ing the location of their V-zones. Technically V-zones are those areas of 188 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS sufficient fetch to support a minimum three-foot wave (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1975). Within these areas, higher actuarial flood insurance rates apply and special building strengthening provisions are required. Our survey population included 598 localities with V-zones in eighteen Gulf and Atlantic coast states (Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia). 1 In addition four counties in Hawaii were included for a total of 602 localities surveyed. Because coastal localities of very small population were unlikely to have staff resources for exten¬ sive development management programs, and in an attempt to keep the survey size to a manageable level, jurisdictions of less than 1,000 in population (as of the 1980 census) were not surveyed. These high-hazard coastal jurisdictions were asked which techniques they were currently using for: (1) structural alteration of the coastal envi¬ ronment, (2) strengthening buildings and facilities to better withstand storm forces, and (3) guiding and managing development. They were asked to estimate the effectiveness of their current measures in reducing storm hazards and to identify problems or obstacles that they faced in imple¬ menting mitigation programs. In addition, they were requested to provide information about their coastal floodplains, recent storm experience, rela¬ tionships with state and regional agencies, staff resources, and commu¬ nity characteristics. (The questionnaire is included in the Appendix.) Where possible, the questionnaire was sent to a local planning director. If there was no local planner, it was sent to a city manager or county administrator. Where these officials were not available, the recipients were building inspectors, mayors, planning board members, and civil defense officials. Almost two-thirds of the responses were received from planners: planning directors or assistant directors (26 percent), staff plan¬ ners or engineers (24 percent), and planning board chairmen (13 per¬ cent). The remainder of the responses came from building inspectors (9 percent), city managers or county administrators (8 percent), emergency management or civil defense officials (5 percent), town clerks (4 percent), mayors (3 percent), and various others (8 percent). The results thus embody primarily the views of professional, appointed officials, rather than elected officials. They also tend to be weighted toward the views of local planners. Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 189 Table 7.1 Distribution of Survey Respondents by Geographical Region and State Region/State Adjusted Survey Population Survey Responses Percentage of Total Respondents Response Rate New England 135 81 20.1 60.0 Connecticut 19 10 z-4 yz.6 Maine M 19 4-7 79.2 Massachusetts 70 39 9.6 55-7 New Hampshire 4 0 O 0 Rhode Island 18 13 3 - 2 - 72.2 Mid-Atlantic 151 90 2 - 3-3 59.6 Delaware 6 6 i -5 100.0 Maryland zo 17 4.1 q i/-'. 00 New Jersey 60 35 8.8 58.3 New York 65 \ 3 Z 8.1 49.2 Southeast 7 i 57 14.z 80.3 Georgia 17 10 2-4 58.8 North Carolina zz 18 4-4 81.8 South Carolina ZI zo 5-2 95.2 Virginia 11 9 z.z 81.8 Gulf Z40 171 42.3 71.2 Alabama 8 4 1.0 50.0 Florida 153 119 Z9.Z 77-7 Louisiana zz M 3-4 63.6 Mississippi II 6 i -5 54-5 Texas 47 z8 7 -i 59.6 Pacific 4 4 1.0 100.0 Hawaii 4 4 1.0 100.0 Total 6 oz 403 100.0 66.9 Table 7.1 shows the distribution of the survey population and responses. The final response rate was 66.9 percent, with responses from 403 of the 6oz localities surveyed. 2 Pacific, Gulf, and Southeastern localities had the highest response rates, with over a quarter of the responses coming from Florida respondents. 190 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.2 Priority of Storm Hazard to Elected Governing Body in Comparison with Other Local Issues Frequency Percentage Very high priority 66 16.5 High priority 120 30.0 Medium priority 105 26.3 Low priority 81 26.3 Very low priority (N = 400) 28 7.0 Priority of Storm Threat Current literature analyzing the politics of natural hazards suggests that storm threats are of relatively low importance to public officials (Rossi, Wright, and Weber-Burdin 1982; Drabek, Mushkatel, and Kilijanel 1983). We expected similar results from our questionnaire. Approximately 73 percent of the respondents, however, indicated that their jurisdiction’s governing body considered the threat of severe coastal storms of at least medium priority in comparison with other local issues (see table 7.2). Close to half of the respondents (46.5 percent) indicated storm threats to be of either high or very high priority. A partial explanation for this is that these coastal localities would feel the full force of a coastal storm and have the most to lose (that is, the risk to people and property is greatest here) should a hurricane or severe storm occur. Mitigation Programs and Perceived Effectiveness Explicit Storm Hazard Reduction Strategies Respondents were first asked if their locality had an explicit storm hazard reduction strategy in addition to their participation in the National Flood Insurance Program. Surprisingly, given the literature statements about the low saliency of natural hazard mitigation to local governments, half (50.7 percent) of the respondents indicated that such an explicit strategy did exist. Those who indicated that their locality had such a strategy were asked to indicate its specific objectives. Ten objectives were listed in the ques- Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 191 Table 7.3 Objectives of Storm Hazard Reduction Strategy Rank Frequency Percentage 1. Increasing ability of private structures and facilities in hazardous areas to withstand storm forces 122 60.1 2. Conserving protective features of the natural environment (e.g., dune protection) 119 58.6 3. Increasing evacuation capacity 98 48.3 4. Increasing ability of public structures and facilities in hazardous areas to withstand storm forces 96 47-3 5. Locating new public structures and facilities in areas less susceptible to storm hazards 93 45.8 6. Guiding new private development into areas less susceptible to storm hazards 92 . 45-3 7. Provision of adequate storm shelters 82 40.4 8. Structurally altering and/or reinforcing the coastal environment (e.g., seawalls, bulkheads) 70 34-5 9. Relocation of existing public facilities and structures into less hazardous areas 12 5-9 10. Relocation of existing private development into less hazardous areas 9 4.4 (N = 203) Note: Respondents were asked to check all relevant categories. Only those with explicit storm hazard reduction strategies were asked to respond, hence N is smaller for this question. tionnaire with respondents permitted to circle as many objectives as were applicable. Table 7.3 lists the ten storm hazard reduction objec¬ tives in order of the frequency of their selection. The two most fre¬ quently selected objectives (by about 60 percent of the respondents in each case) were: (1) increasing the ability of private structures and facilities to withstand storms and (2) conserving the protective features of the natural environment. The two objectives most closely related to development management also received a relatively high percentage of responses (45 percent): (5) locating public facilities in less suscep¬ tible areas and (6) guiding new development into less hazardous areas. On the other hand relocation, either of private or public structures 192 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.4 Programs Which Structurally Alter the Coastal Environment Average Currently Effectiveness Standard in Use Percentage Rating 3 Deviation 1. Shoreline protection works 281 69.7 3.20 1.00 2. Flood control works 136 33-7 00 1.02 3. Sand-trapping structures 136 33-7 2.72 .98 4. Sand-moving programs 126 3 i -3 2.76 1.21 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. and facilities, was not an objective frequently pursued by these high- hazard coastal localities. Programs Which Structurally Alter the Coastal Environment Three questions on the survey dealt with the specific programs and mea¬ sures which localities had in place which, either by design or by effect, served to reduce storm hazards. Each question pertained to a particular category of storm reduction programs. The first related to actions or desires which served to structurally modify or alter the coastal environ¬ ment. Included in this category are sand-trapping structures (groins and jetties), sand-moving programs (beach nourishment and beach scraping), shoreline protection works (bulkheads, seawalls, and revetments), and flood control works (dikes, channels, and retaining ponds). As shown in table 7.4, substantial use of each of these approaches was found, although shoreline protection works was a clear leader with more than two-thirds of the responding communities indicating that such mea¬ sures were in use (70 percent). The use of sand-trapping, sand-moving, and flood control works was about even, with approximately one-third of the responding communities using these. Note that respondents could select multiple categories on their response. Respondents were also asked to evaluate the extent to which these programs tended to reduce local storm hazards. Comparing the average effectiveness score for each type of approach indicates which are believed to be most successful in reducing storm hazards. 5 Flood control works and shoreline protection received the highest effectiveness ratings, with the Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 193 Table 7.5 Programs and Policies Which Strengthen Buildings and Facilities Average Effectiveness Standard Frequency Percentage Rating 3 Deviation 1. Minimum elevation and floodproofing required by nfip 378 93.8 3.86 .89 2. Building code 362 89.8 3.62 1.00 3. Special storm-resistant standards construction 190 47.1 3.82 .87 4. Floodproofing of public facilities and structures 162 40.2 3-47 .85 5. More extensive elevation and floodproofing 60 14.9 3.98 .90 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. remaining two categories falling considerably behind. Sand-trapping struc¬ tures received the lowest rating even though they were used by almost as many localities as flood control works. Programs Which Strengthen Buildings and Facilities The second category of programs asked about were those designed to strengthen buildings and the private and public facilities that accompany them (see table 7.5). As expected, almost all responding localities had a building code in place (90 percent) and had met the minimum elevation and floodproofing standards required by fema under the provisions of the National Flood Insurance Program (94 percent). About 47 percent of the respondents indicated that they had special storm-resistant building stan¬ dards in place, and well over one-third were floodproofing public facilities and structures. Only 15 percent of the responding localities, however, had adopted elevation and floodproofing standards which were more strin¬ gent than those required under nfip. Of those strengthening measures in use, more extensive elevation and floodproofing were considered the most effective. These were followed closely, however, by the minimum nfip standards and special storm- resistant standards. Building codes were rated fourth in terms of effective- 194 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.6 Number of Development Management Measures in Use Number of DM Measures Frequency Percentage o -5 1 17 29.0 6-10 223 55-3 n-15 56 13-9 Over 15 7 i -7 (N = 403) ness, and finally floodproofing of public structures and facilities received the lowest effectiveness rating in this category. It is important to recognize that overall the building and facility strengthening measures were consid¬ ered much more effective at reducing coastal storm hazards than the structural environment reinforcement measures. Development Management Measures The concept of “development management” is defined for the respondent in the beginning of the survey to include “programs and policies which control or influence the location, density, timing and type of development which occurs in a jurisdiction.” Respondents were asked to indicate which development management tools and measures were currently used in their jurisdiction and the extent to which they serve to reduce local storm hazards. Respondents were asked to answer this question even if a pro¬ gram or policy was not specifically designed to reduce storm hazards. The development management measures were organized under six headings: (1) planning, (2) development regulation, (3) public facilities policy, (4) taxation, financial, and other incentives, (5) public acquisition, and (6) information dissemination. Overall, twenty-one different mea¬ sures were listed in this question, ranging from zoning and subdivision provisions to below-market property taxes. An initial way to understand the extent of use of these techniques is to see how many localities used how many different techniques. Table 7.6 separates localities according to the number of measures currently in use. Most localities were using some form of development management as we defined it. Approximately 29 percent of the localities were using five techniques or fewer. Consequently, more than 70 percent of the respon- Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 195 Table 7.7 Planning Measures Number of Localities Currently in Use Percentage Average Effectiveness Rating 3 Standard Deviation 1. Comprehensive/land use plan 340 84.4 2.94 1.04 2. Evacuation plan 272 67.5 3-53 •99 3. Capital Improvement Program 216 53.6 2-53 1.09 4. Recovery/reconstruc¬ tion plan or policies 87 21.6 2.98 1.02 5. Hurricane/storm component of com¬ prehensive plan 80 19.9 3-33 1.04 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. dents have six or more techniques currently in use. About 16 percent have eleven or more of these measures in use. The majority of localities, roughly 55 percent, fall within the six to ten range. Following is a more detailed look at the specific development manage¬ ment measures contained within each subcategory. It should be remem¬ bered that respondents were asked to indicate the use and effectiveness of these measures regardless of whether they are explicitly designed to reduce storm hazards. Planning Under planning instruments, as shown in table 7.7, the comprehensive or land use plan was the most frequently used with some 84 percent of the respondents indicating that they had such a plan. Evacuation plans ranked second in frequency with 68 percent of the localities having such a plan, while the capital improvement program ranked third with about half the respondents indicating its use. Not surprisingly plans and policy docu¬ ments dealing specifically with the reduction of storm hazards were con¬ siderably fewer in number. About 22 percent had recovery/reconstruction plans or policies and 20 percent had hurricane/storm components of their comprehensive plans. 196 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.8 Development Regulation Number of Localities Average Currently Effectiveness Standard in Use Percentage Rating 3 Deviation 1. Zoning ordinance 354 87.8 3.16 1.06 2. Subdivision ordinance 347 86.1 3.06 1.16 3. Shoreline setback 218 54 -i 3-59 1.01 4. Dune protection 15 * 37-7 3.69 1.04 5. Special hazard area ordinance 109 27.0 3.85 •77 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. Average effectiveness ratings for these tools range from relatively high for evacuation plans and hurricane/storm hazard components to rela¬ tively low for capital improvement programs and basic land use/ comprehensive plans. However, none were ranked below the midpoint (2.5) of the effectiveness scale. Development Regulation This category includes traditional land use controls. The most prominent, zoning and subdivision regulations, are currently in use in most respond¬ ing localities. As shown in table 7.8, approximately 88 percent of the responding localities had zoning in place, and 86 percent had subdivision regulations. Approximately half of the respondents had shoreline setback provisions, while 38 percent and 27 percent, respectively, had dune pro¬ tection and special hazard area ordinances. Respondents generally rate such techniques as shoreline setbacks and dune protection ordinances as being more effective than traditional regu¬ latory measures. This is partly because setbacks and dune protection regulations are more specifically related to storm hazards and are more difficult to circumvent, and partly because the results of these regulations are perhaps more apparent or visible to respondents. Special hazard area ordinances, while the least frequently used, were considered to be the most effective among these techniques. Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 197 Table 7.9 Capital Facilities Policy Number of Localities Currently in Use Percentage Average Effectiveness Rating 3 Standard Deviation 1. Location of public structures and build¬ ings (e.g., hospitals, schools) to reduce extent of risk to public investments 00 H 45-9 3.67 •93 2. Location of capital facilities to reduce or discourage develop¬ ment in high-hazard areas 126 3 i -3 3-43 .85 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. Capital Facilities Policy One potentially effective growth shaping approach is through decisions concerning the construction and location of public facilities, public struc¬ tures, and other public investments. Two entries were provided for capital facilities policy: locating public buildings to reduce risk to them and locating capital facilities to reduce development in high-hazard areas (see table 7.9). Unlike the entries in the previous section, these two capital facilities entries are much more explicitly storm-hazard-related. Indeed, to circle one leaves little doubt that storm hazard reduction is the intended objec¬ tive. While a majority of responding localities do not employ either of these policies, about one-third of the respondents do; this is a significant conclusion (see table 7.9). Survey responses do not indicate the precise form of such capital facilities policies. Are they explicitly developed and adopted by the governing body (that is, formal policies and development “rules” the jurisdiction follows) or are they more informal criteria that local planners and public officials use when making capital facilities deci¬ sions? This is a question left unresolved from the survey data. 198 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.10 Taxation, Financial, and Other Incentives Number of Localities Average Currently Effectiveness Standard in Use Percentage Rating 3 Deviation 1. Transfer of develop¬ ment potential from hazardous to non- hazardous sites (e.g., clustering, planned unit development) 84 20.8 3.46 •95 2.. Reduced or below- market taxation for open space and non- intensive uses of hazard areas 44 10.9 3.00 1.21 3. Impact tax or special assessment to cover the additional public costs of building in hazard area development 7 i -7 3 - 7 i •95 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. As we would expect, the policy of locating public structures outside of hazard areas, which is directly controlled by the government, is consid¬ ered more effective than is orienting public facilities to discourage private development, which has a more indirect effect. However, both have rela¬ tively high effectiveness ratings, and the difference between them is not substantial. Taxation, Financial, and Other Incentives Three types of measures were included under this heading: reduced or below-market taxation, impact taxes or special assessments, and devices for the transfer of development potential. In the questionnaire each of these measures was specifically related to the mitigation of storm hazards. As shown in table 7.10, relatively few responding localities were using Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 199 Table 7.11 Public Acquisition Number of Localities Currently in Use Percentage Average Effectiveness Rating 3 Standard Deviation 1. Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas 118 29.3 3.58 1.04 2. Acquisition of devel¬ opment rights or scenic easements 56 13.9 2.88 1.15 3. Acquisition of dam¬ aged buildings in hazardous areas 12 3.0 3-55 I - I 3 4. Building relocation program (moving structures) 9 2.2 3-33 1.12 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. these techniques. The most frequent, development transfer measures, were used by about one-fifth of the respondents (substantially less frequent than development regulations such as zoning and subdivision ordinances). Impact taxes or special assessments received the smallest number of responses (1.7 percent), with reduced or below-market taxation in second place (10.9 percent). Relatively high effectiveness ratings were obtained for tdr and impact fees, although the generalizability of the latter score is questionable given the low number of observations involved. Public Acquisition As described in chapter 6, an effective mitigation approach is to purchase undeveloped land in high-hazard areas and to keep this land in public hands, preempting its availability for private development. One option here is to purchase the fee-simple title for the land (all the rights to the land), while another option is to purchase only the “development rights” (an easement restricting development). The former is a more traditional approach, and, as shown in table 7.11, a substantial number of respon- 200 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.12 Information Dissemination Frequency Percentage Average Effectiveness Rating 3 Standard Deviation 1. Hazard disclosure requirements in real estate transactions 103 25.6 2-93 1.07 2. Construction practice seminars for builders 62 15.4 3.24 1.06 (N = 403) a. On a five-point scale. dents indicated that such an approach was in use in their jurisdiction (29 percent). A number of respondents (13.9 percent) also indicated that they were using the second approach—the purchase of development rights or easements in high-hazard areas. Two other approaches are included in this section of the questionnaire: programs to purchase damaged build¬ ings and structures in hazard areas and programs to relocate structures outside the hazard areas. An extremely small number of responding local¬ ities had such programs (only twelve and nine localities, respectively). Clearly purchase and relocation of structures in hazardous areas were not frequently used by these coastal localities. Acquisition of undeveloped land and damaged buildings received rela¬ tively high average effectiveness ratings, with building relocation follow¬ ing close behind. Acquisition of development rights or scenic easements was considered of lower effectiveness. Information Dissemination Models of rational behavior suggest that individuals will make responsi¬ ble decisions if they have access to all the relevant information. This belief has spurred interest in programs designed to inform the housing con¬ sumer, the developer/builder, and the general public about the risks asso¬ ciated with hurricanes and severe coastal storms. Two types of informa¬ tion programs were listed in the questionnaire: hazard disclosure in real estate transactions and construction practice seminars. As shown in table 7.12, approximately 26 percent of the responding localities indicated that they have hazard disclosure provisions in place, while approximately 15 Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 201 Table 7.13 Development Management Measures in Order of Frequency Used Survey Communities Using Measure Rank Type of Measure Number Percentage 1 Zoning ordinance 354 87.8 2 Subdivision ordinance 347 86.1 3 Comprehensive/land use plan 340 84.4 4 Evacuation plan 2 - 72 - 67.5 5 Shoreline setback regulation 218 54.1 6 Capital improvement program 2 l 6 53.6 7 Location of public structures and buildings to reduce storm risks 185 45-9 8 Dune protection regulations 152 - 37-7 9 Location of capital facilities to reduce or discourage development in high-hazard areas 126 3 i -3 10 Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas Il 8 29.3 II Special hazard area ordinance 109 27.0 12 Hazard disclosure requirements in real estate transactions 103 25.6 13 Recovery/reconstruction plan or policies 87 21.6 14 Transfer of development potential from hazardous to non-hazardous sites 84 20.8 15 Hurricane/storm component of comprehensive plan 80 19.9 16 Construction practice seminars 62 15.4 17 Acquisition of development rights or scenic easements 56 13-9 18 Reduced or below-market taxation 44 10.9 19 Acquisition of damaged buildings in hazardous areas 12 3.0 20 Building relocation program 9 2.2 21 Impact taxes or special assessments 7 i -7 (N = 403) 202 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.14 Development Management Measures in Order of Perceived Effectiveness Rank Type of Measure Average Effectiveness Rating 3 I Special hazard area ordinance 3.85 2 Impact taxes or special assessments 3 - 7 i 3 Dune protection regulations 3.69 4 Location of public structures to minimize risk 3.67 S Shoreline setback regulations 3-59 6 Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazard areas 3.58 7 Acquisition of damaged buildings in hazard areas 3-55 8 Evacuation plan 3-53 9 Transfer of development potential from hazar- dous to nonhazardous sites 3.46 10 Location of capital facilities to reduce or discourage development in high-hazard areas 3-43 I I Hurricane/storm component of comprehensive plan 3-33 12 Building relocation program 3-33 13 Construction practice seminars 3.24 14 Zoning ordinance 3.16 15 Subdivision ordinance 3.06 16 Reduced or below-market taxation 3.00 17 Recovery/reconstruction plan or policies 2.98 18 Comprehensive/land use plan 2.94 19 Hazard disclosure requirements in real estate transactions 2.93 20 Acquisition of development rights or scenic easements 2.88 21 Capital improvement program 2-53 (N = 403) a. Based on a five-point scale. percent indicated that construction practice seminars were being offered. The average effectiveness rating for hazard disclosure was relatively lower than for construction practice seminars. Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 203 Table 7.15 Relative Effectiveness of Mitigation Approaches: Top Ten Measures in Terms of Average Effectiveness Average Effectiveness Rating Type of Measure 1. More extensive elevation and floodproofing than required by nfip 3.98 Building strengthening 2. Minimum elevation and floodproofing required under nfip 3.86 Building strengthening 3. Special hazard area ordinance 3.85 Development 4. Special storm-resistant construction standards 3.82 management Building strengthening 5. Impact taxes or special assessments 3 3 - 7 i Development 6. Dune protection regulations 3.69 management Development 7. Location of public structures to minimize risk 3.67 management Development 8. Building codes 3.62 management Building 9. Shoreline setback regulations 3-59 strengthening Development 10. Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas OO "3" management Development management a. Note that this is based on a very small number of cases. Summary of Frequency and Effectiveness The most frequently used of all techniques were the familiar zoning and subdivision ordinances and comprehensive plans, each used by over 300 respondents. Over 200 respondents were using evacuation plans, shore¬ line setback regulations, and capital improvement programs. Table 7.13 presents a summary listing of specific development management mea¬ sures ordered according to the frequency of their use. Those measures judged most effective were not those most frequently used. However, several of the more effective measures fell within the 204 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.16 Ranking of the Mitigation Strategies Based on Overall Importance in Reducing Local Storm Hazard Number of Rankings Most Least Important Important 1 2 3 1. Development management (N = 389) 211 (54.2%) 85 (21.9%) 93 (23.9%) 2. Strengthening building and facilities (N = 385) 100 (26.0%) 180 (46.8%) 105 (2.7.3%) 3. Structural reinforcement of coastal environment (N = 384) 84 (21.9%) 11 5 (29.9%) 185 (48.2%) midrange of use. Table 7.14 provides a ranking of these development management measures by their perceived effectiveness. Ranking the Three Mitigation Approaches Table 7.15 ranks the top ten mitigation measures in terms of the average effectiveness ratings obtained in the survey and classifies them according to their overall type (building strengthening, development management, structural alteration of the environment). Three of the top four responses are measures found within the building strengthening category. Of all the mitigation measures more extensive elevation and floodproofing than that required under the National Flood Insurance Program received the highest average effectiveness rating (3.98). As well, the third highest mea¬ sure, special hazard area management, while included under development management, is to a great extent actually another indication of localities implementing nfip requirements. Of the remaining six measures five fall into the development management category and an additional one into the building strengthening category. No measures in the structural alter¬ ation of the coastal environment category were included in the top ten. Thus, both building strengthening and development management mea¬ sures are considered highly effective, although ranking individual mea- Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 205 Table 7.17 Overall Effectiveness Frequency Percentage 1. Very effective 48 12.5 2. Moderately effective 223 57-9 3. Slightly effective 92. 23.9 4. Not effective 22 5-7 (N = 385) sures does not provide information about the extent of effectiveness of the overall approach — that is, the combination of measures. To assess the effectiveness of the overall approaches in reducing storm hazards, respondents were asked to order them (1, 2, or 3, with 1 the most important and 3 the least). Of the three approaches development man¬ agement by far received the greatest number of “most important” responses (see table 7.16). Strengthening buildings and facilities received the most middle rankings, while structural reinforcement of the coastal environ¬ ment received the highest number of “least important” rankings. It should be remembered that this ranking is relative to the specific responding locality. That is, even in circumstances where development management is ranked third (last) by a respondent, the locality may have a solid and innovative development management program. Its lower rank¬ ing may be attributable, for instance, to the importance of structural improvements (for example, in the case where a large amount of the hazard area has already been developed). Overall Effectiveness In order to assess overall effectiveness of hazard mitigation efforts, respon¬ dents were asked to consider all of the strategies and techniques they have in use in their jurisdiction and to rate the combined effectiveness of these at reducing local storm hazards. Most respondents felt that local pro¬ grams were at least partially effective (see table 7.17). Over 70 percent believed their combined programs were either moderately effective or very effective, while only a small 6 percent believed these programs were not effective at all. The majority of respondents (58 percent) placed their localities in the “moderately effective” category. This suggests that the 206 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.18 Obstacles to the Enactment of Development Management in Order of Frequency Cited Rank Frequency Percentage Importance Index 3 1. General conservative attitude toward government control of private property rights (N = 359) 319 88.9 00 2. General feeling that community can “weather the storm” (N = 357) 309 86.6 3.09 3. Lack of adequate financial resources to implement mitigation programs (N = 347) 296 85.3 3.41 4. More pressing local problems and concerns (N = 351) 291 82.9 N 00 5. Opposition of real estate and development interests (N = 3 5 5) 286 80.6 3.06 6. Lack of trained personnel to develop mitigation programs (N = 345 ) 278 80.6 2.91 7. Lack of incentives or requirements from higher levels of government (N = 345 ) 278 80.6 3.02 8. Opposition of homeowners (N = 338) 2 - 52 - 74.6 2.64 9. Opposition of business interests (N = 337) 241 7 i -5 2.60 10. Absence of politically active individuals and groups advocating hurricane/storm mitigation (N = 339 ) 242 7 i -4 2.85 11. Inadequate or inaccurate federal flood insurance maps (N = 342) 2-15 62.9 2-49 a. Based on a five-point scale. majority of localities have programs which have considerable effect in reducing storm hazards (something greater than “slightly effective”), but at the same time these efforts are far from being “very effective.” Thus in most responding jurisdictions much room for increased effectiveness exists, a very important finding in terms of our recommendations in chapter 9. Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 207 Table 7.19 Arguments against Enactment of Development Management in Order of Frequency Rank Frequency Percentage Importance Index 3 1. Development management measures lead to increased developmental costs (N = 368) 315 85.6 3.18 2. Decisions about risks from coastal storms are best left to the individual (N = 346) 246 7 1 - 1 2.66 3. Development management measures dampen local economy (N= 355) M 5 69.0 2.52 4. Particular development management measures are illegal or unconstitu¬ tional (N = 338) 225 66.6 2.42 a. Based on a five-point scale. Obstacles to the Enactment of Development Management An important question in this research is how politically feasible develop¬ ment management is likely to be in coastal jurisdictions. To better under¬ stand why such measures are more or less feasible, we asked respondents to identify local obstacles to the enactment of development management. This was accomplished by presenting respondents with a list of potential obstacles and asking them to assess their relative importance. Two types of data from this question can provide a sense of which obstacles are most important. The first is the absolute number of respon¬ dents that indicated that a particular group or factor was important in their locality. Table 7.18 presents these obstacles in rank order according to frequency selected. General conservative attitudes toward government control of private property rights was the obstacle most frequently selected by respondents (selected by 89 percent). This was followed closely by general feelings that the community can “weather the storm” (87 percent) and a lack of adequate financial resources to implement mitigation programs. Ranked fourth according to frequency selected is the obstacle posed by more 208 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.20 Problems in Enforcement and Implementation of Development Management Measures Rank Frequency Percentage 1. Insufficient funds (N = 195) 116 59-5 2. Public opposition (N = i94) 89 45-9 3. Lack of support by public officials (N = 192) 83 43.2 4. Lack of qualified personnel (N = 195) 79 40.5 5. Insufficient data base (N = 195) 63 32-3 pressing local problems and concerns. Opposition of real estate and devel¬ opment interests rounds out the top five responses. A second measure is the relative importance assigned to the obstacle by the respondent. This is indicated by the calculated average importance score, also shown in table 7.18. The order of the most important obsta¬ cles remains largely the same when degree of importance is considered. The absence of political advocates for storm hazard mitigation moves into the top five, while the feeling that the community can “weather the storm” drops out. Some reordering among the remaining four is also apparent. While lack of financial resources was rated third in terms of the frequency of responses, it moves to first when degree of importance is considered. Arguments Against Development Management To understand the nature of political opposition to development manage¬ ment programs, it is important to know the types of arguments typically made against their use. Survey respondents were asked to evaluate a short list of common arguments, indicating which were important and the extent of their importance. As can be seen in table 7.19, the leading argument is that development management measures will lead to increased development costs. This is the clear leader both in terms of frequency of responses and perceived degree of importance. The traditional argument that decisions about storm risks are best left to the individual is second in frequency and importance, followed by arguments about the effects on the local econ¬ omy and the legality of development management programs. Despite Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 209 Table 7.21 Undesirable Consequences Resulting from Development Management Rank Frequency Percentage 1. Increase in construction costs 106 00 2. Slowed economic growth and development 26 20.5 3. Reduced tax revenues 19 15.0 4. Reduced land values 14 11.0 (N= 127) their relative ranking, all of these arguments appear to be important in a substantial number of the coastal localities in our population. Enforcement and Implementation Problems An important question concerns the extent to which high-hazard locali¬ ties have experienced problems in enforcing and implementing their devel¬ opment management programs. Fifty percent of the respondents indi¬ cated that they had encountered problems enforcing or implementing the development management programs they had identified in earlier ques¬ tions. Respondents were then presented with a more specific listing of possible implementation and enforcement problems and asked to indicate which had been encountered in their localities. Table 7.20 presents the results of this question, in rank order of frequency selected. Clearly a major portion of the responding localities have enforcement and implementation problems, with certain problems, such as insufficient funds and public opposition, more important than others. Unfortunately this question does not permit the respondent to indicate the severity of these problems but only whether they exist or not. For instance, while insufficient funds may have been identified frequently as a problem, it may be a relatively small problem in each individual jurisdiction. Undesirable Consequences of Development Management Respondents were asked to consider whether the development manage¬ ment measures used in their jurisdiction have induced any undesirable 210 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 7.22 Evacuation Knowledge: “Do You Know How Long It Would Take to Safely Evacuate Your Jurisdiction?” Population Yes No Less than 5,000 4i (10.3%) 38 (9.6%) 5,000—19,000 5 2 (13.1%) 85 (21.4%) 20,000-49,000 2 5 (6.3%) 38 (9.6%) 50,000-100,000 18 (4.5%) 33 ( 8 . 3 %) Over 100,000 41 (10.3%) 2 7 (6.8%) Total 177 (44.5%) 221 (55-5%) consequences or side effects. Roughly 66.7 percent indicated that no such consequences had resulted. The one-third of the respondents that had faced undesirable consequences were asked to identify from a list provided in the questionnaire which consequences occurred. The most frequent consequence, selected by more than 80 percent of this group, was an increase in construction costs (see table 7.2.1). The remaining entries ran a distant second, being selected by only 10 percent to 20 percent of the localities with such consequences. Again, however, this question does not take into consideration the severity of the consequences. While most localities may experience an increase in construction costs, the size of this increase was not reported and may not be known. Evacuation Knowledge In most of the localities receiving the questionnaire the issue of evacua¬ tion in the event of hurricane should be quite important. Surprisingly, however, when asked if they knew how long it would take to evacuate their jurisdiction, more than half (55.5 percent) indicated they did not (see table 7.22). A comparison of this response with the population size of the locality indicates that a large portion of those localities that do not know this information are small in size and thus expectedly low in local expertise and hazard management capacity. About 55 percent of the respondents that indicated they did not know how long it takes to evacu¬ ate were in jurisdictions of less than 20,000 in population. For those localities where respondents did know this figure, or were at least able to estimate it, evacuation times ranged from one hour to seventy-two hours. Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 211 Poststorm Adoption of Mitigation Measures Respondents were asked whether or not their locality had been hit by a severe coastal storm (defined as a hurricane, tropical storm, or north¬ easter which caused substantial property damage) since 1970. Approxi¬ mately two-thirds of the respondents answered this question in the affirmative (61.8 percent). If respondents answered yes to this question they were then asked to provide the name (if it had one) and date of the most severe and/or most damaging storm during this period. More than a third of the respondents indicated that their localities had adopted more stringent development management measures following the occurrence of a storm. Approximately 33 percent of the respondents to this question adopted such measures following the most recent storm event, while 37 percent adopted such measures following the most dam¬ aging storm (32.9 percent and 37.2 percent, respectively). As might be expected, this percentage is somewhat higher in response to the more damaging storm. These findings suggest that storm events do significantly prompt development management adoption in coastal jurisdictions and that this is more likely to occur in response to more severe events. Survey Highlights This chapter has described the findings of a mail survey of hurricane- prone localities (containing V-zones under the National Flood Insurance Program) in eighteen Gulf and Atlantic coast states, plus Hawaii. A response rate of approximately 67 percent was achieved, yielding 403 usable responses. By definition these are communities which have a per¬ manent population of at least 1,000. The survey yielded a number of significant implications for storm haz¬ ard policymaking. Highlights of the more interesting and important of these implications are summarized below. In contrast to the findings of much past research on natural hazards, storm hazard mitigation is of relatively high priority to elected officials in the localities surveyed. Over 46 percent of respondents indicated it was of high or very high priority to the local governing body in relation to other local issues, and over 70 percent indicated that it was of at least medium priority. 212 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS About one-half of the respondents (50.7 percent) indicated that their jurisdiction had adopted an explicit storm hazard reduction strategy, in addition to participation in the National Flood Insurance Program. The two most frequently selected objectives of this strategy (about 60 percent each) were (1) conserving the protective features of the natural environ¬ ment and (2) increasing the ability of private structures and facilities to withstand storm forces. Guiding new private development into areas less susceptible to storm hazards was an objective in about 45 percent of the localities with an explicit storm hazard strategy. About two-thirds of the responding localities are currently using shore¬ line protection works (bulkheads and seawalls), while sand-trapping struc¬ tures (groins and jetties), sand-moving programs (beach nourishment and sand-scraping), and flood control works (dikes and channels) are each in use in about one-third of the localities. Most localities have a building code in place and have met the elevation and floodproofing requirements of nfip (about 90 percent each). A little less than half of the respondents indicated that they had adopted special storm-hazard-resistant building standards (47 percent). Only about 15 percent of the communities had adopted more stringent elevation and floodproofing provisions than those required under nfip. Most localities surveyed are using some type of development manage¬ ment. Approximately 70 percent indicated that they were currently using six or more of the twenty-one specific measures listed in the question¬ naire. Roughly half of the communities fall in the six to ten measure range (55 percent). Over 80 percent of the localities had enacted a comprehensive land use plan and zoning and subdivision ordinances. From 40 to 60 percent of the localities were using a capital improvement program, an evacuation plan, a shoreline setback, dune protection regulations, a policy to locate public structures and buildings in less hazardous locations, a policy to locate public facilities so as to discourage hazardous development, and the acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas. Roughly 10 to 25 percent of the localities were using a hurricane/storm component in the comprehensive plan, a recovery/reconstruction plan or policies, a special hazard area ordinance, below-market taxation for open space, programs for the transfer of development potential from hazardous to nonhazard- ous parcels, the acquisition of development rights or scenic easements, Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 213 hazard disclosure requirements in real estate transactions, and construc¬ tion practice seminars for builders. Very few communities were using impact taxes or special assessments, acquisition of damaged buildings in hazardous areas, and building relocation programs. Programs which strengthen buildings and facilities and development management programs are generally perceived to be more effective in reducing local storm hazards than programs which structurally alter the coastal environment. The following ten development management measures were considered by respondents to be the most effective at reducing local storm hazards: special hazard area ordinances, impact taxes and special assessments, dune protection regulations, policies to locate public structures in safer locations, shoreline setback regulations, acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas, evacuation plans, acquisition of damaged buildings in hazardous areas, programs which transfer development potential from hazardous to nonhazardous sites, and policies to locate capital facilities to reduce or discourage growth in hazardous areas. Several of the more conventional development management tools are considered to be less effective, including zoning and subdivision regulations, comprehensive/ land use plans, and capital improvement programs. Over 70 percent of the respondents believed their combined mitigation programs were either moderately effective or very effective. In ranking the importance of different mitigative approaches, develop¬ ment management measures were considered to be most important in the majority of localities, followed by programs to strengthen buildings and facilities and programs to structurally reinforce the coastal environment, in that order. From a list of eleven possible obstacles to the enactment of develop¬ ment management measures, the following five were most frequently identified, with each chosen by over 80 percent of those responding to the question: (1) the general conservative attitude toward government control of private property rights, (z) a general feeling that the community can “weather the storm,” (3) lack of adequate financial resources, (4) the existence of more pressing local problems and concerns, and (5) the opposition of real estate and development interests. In addition, lack of trained personnel, lack of incentives or requirements from higher levels of government, opposition of homeowners and business interests, the absence 214 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS of politically active individuals and groups advocating storm hazard miti¬ gation, and inadequate or inaccurate flood insurance maps, while not as frequently selected, were indicated to be of high importance as obstacles. An important argument against the enactment of development man¬ agement identified by respondents is that such measures lead to increased development costs. Other arguments which were deemed important include: that decisions about risks from coastal storms are best left to the individual, that development management measures will dampen the local economy, and that particular development management measures are ille¬ gal or unconstitutional. One-half of the respondents indicated that they had encountered prob¬ lems in implementing or enforcing development management measures. Of these respondents the most frequently identified type of problem was that of insufficient funds. Public opposition, lack of support by public officials, lack of qualified personnel, and an insufficient data base were also indicated as problems by a significant portion of the respondents. Approximately one-third of the respondents (33 percent) indicated that their localities had experienced negative consequences as a result of development management programs. The most frequent selection by an overwhelming margin was an increase in construction costs. More than half of the survey respondents (55 percent) did not know how long it would take to evacuate their communities should a hurricane threaten. About one-half of these respondents were located in jurisdic¬ tions of less than 20,000 in population. About 60 percent of the respondents indicated that their localities had experienced a hurricane or severe coastal storm since 1970. About one- third of the respondents in this group indicated that more stringent devel¬ opment management measures were adopted in response to these storms. Notes 1. A list of localities containing V-zones was compiled from several sources. First, an initial list was acquired from the most recent fema “communities file”—the data set in which fema stores basic information required for nfip administration. To obtain a more recent updating of this list, and to include jurisdictions which are currently being studied for V-zone designation (under the new wave height methodology), a second list providing the names of study consultants and localities being studied was used to supplement the communities file, fema officials indicated that between these two lists, 95 percent to 100 Mitigation Practice in Coastal Localities 215 percent of V-zone localities would be obtained. As a double check, nfip state coordina¬ tors in every relevant state were contacted and asked to provide an independent list of localities with V-zones in their state. This list was then compared with, and served to supplement, the above lists. 2. Each V-zone locality received a questionnaire in early June 1984. Approximately two weeks after this initial mailing a reminder letter was sent. After another two weeks, a second questionnaire with another reminder letter was mailed. Finally, for those localities which had not yet responded by late August, a letter asking them to indicate why they did not respond was sent. As of December 1, 1984, 420 survey responses had been received, for a preliminary response rate of 66 percent. From the final correspondence with those jurisdictions that had not responded, we attempted to learn whether we had inadvertently mailed questionnaires to localities which did not contain coastal storm hazards. From this we were able to eliminate fourteen nonhazard jurisdictions, bringing our overall survey population to 620. This in turn increased our overall response rate to about 67.8 percent. However, seventeen localities were deleted for consistency reasons, primarily because they contained less than 1,000 in population. This brought the final number of usable survey responses to 403 for a response rate of 66.9 percent (403 of 602). 3. It should be noted that because the data base here represents a population rather than a sample, tests to determine whether differences in effectiveness ratings are statistically significant have not been conducted. References Beatley, Timothy. 1986. Influences on the Priority, Adoption and Effectiveness of Local Coastal Storm Hazard Mitigation. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Department of City and Regional Planning. Beatley, Timothy, David J. Brower, David R. Godschalk, and William M. Rohe. 1985. Coastal Storm Hazard Reduction through Development Management: Results of a Sur¬ vey of Hurricane-Prone Localities. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Center for Urban and Regional Studies. Drabek, Thomas, Alvin Mushkatel, and Thomas Kilijanel. 1983. Earthquake Mitigation Policy: The Experience of Two States. Boulder, Colo.: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. Rossi, Peter, James Wright, and Eleanor Weber-Burdin. 1982. Natural Hazards and Pub¬ lic Choice: The State and Local Politics of Hazard Mitigation. New York, N.Y.: Academic Press. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 1975. Guidelines for Identifying Coastal High Hazard Zones. Galveston District. 8 Influences on Mitigation Priority, Adoption, and Effectiveness Modeling Mitigation Decision Dynamics Local decisions about the political priority of coastal storm hazard reduc¬ tion and local decisions to adopt and effectively implement coastal storm hazard mitigation programs depend upon numerous social, political, and economic factors. In addition to case studies of individual hurricane- stricken localities (chapter 3) and surveys of all hurricane-prone localities (chapter 7), a third way to extend our understanding of the factors affect¬ ing local hazard mitigation is through statistical modeling of their influ¬ ences on government decisions. This chapter presents a causal model that tests the influence of critical factors on local mitigation decision dynamics. 1 The model analyzes influ¬ ences affecting three outcomes of the decision process: (1) the priority of storm hazard reduction within communities, (2) the adoption of a devel¬ opment management program by local governments (a development man¬ agement index), 2 and (3) the overall effectiveness of local mitigation mea¬ sures. These outcomes are treated as dependent variables and data for them, as well as for the majority of independent variables included in the model, are obtained from the hurricane hazard survey reported in the previous chapter. The model posits that priority, adoption, and effectiveness of miti¬ gation and development management depend upon three types of influ¬ ences: (1) environmental factors, (2) policy catalyst factors, and (3) politi¬ cal conversion factors. Significant environmental factors include mea¬ sures of the political and cultural environment (extent of private property Influences on Mitigation 217 ethos, disaster culture), the economic and demographic environments (median home value, recreation/tourism-oriented economy, population size), and the physical environment (availability of nonhazardous sites, percent of the coastal floodplain already developed, percent of land within the floodplain, location on a barrier island). Significant policy catalyst factors include local measures (recent storm history, hurricane probability) and extralocal measures (status in the nfip, number of years in the nfip, state mitigation activity). Significant conversion process fac¬ tors include characteristics of the local political system (absence of politi¬ cally supportive groups, opposition of development interests) and techni¬ cal capacity (planning respondent). In general form the model states that these three types of influences (independent variables) affect the three types of outcomes (dependent variables). Note that the dependent vari¬ ables also affect each other (see figure 8.1). Path analysis is the statistical technique used to analyze the relation¬ ships in the model. Path analysis combines the relationships among vari¬ ables (expressed as regression equations) into a single conceptual frame¬ work and permits the computation of the indirect and direct effects which variables have upon one another, while controlling for other influences (Blalock 1961; Asher 1976; Pedhazur 1973). A three stage analysis was carried out testing influences on each outcome in turn. 3 Many variables and relationships were tested, but only those that proved statistically significant were retained in the final model, which illustrates the significant paths or causal connections between critical variables. Table 8.1 presents those standardized regression coefficients Figure 8.1 The Basic Model of Mitigation Dynamics Influences Outcomes Independent Variables -» Dependent Variables 1. Environmental Factors 1. Mitigation Priority I i 2. Policy Catalyst Factors 2. Development Management / Adoption / I / * / 3. Political Conversion Factors 3. Mitigation Effectiveness 218 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Table 8.1 Mitigation Dynamics Model: Statistically Significant Variables Dependent Variables 3 Mitigation Priori ty b Development Management Adoption 0 Mitigation Effectiveness d Environmental Factors Private property ethos -.113 — .121 — Median home value — .109 — Recreation/tourism economy .190 •175 — Population size — .098 — Availability of nonhazardous sites — — .109 Percent floodplain developed - .220 — — Percent land in floodplain — .266 — — Barrier island location — — -.127 Policy Catalyst Factors Recent storm history .171 .097 -•157 Probability of hurricane •195 — — nfip program status .151 — — a. Standard regression coefficients are statistically significant at the .05 level. Dashed marks indicate that variables were not statistically significant. The following variables were included in all three equations but did not prove statistically signficant in any: a seasonality index (percentage of local housing units that are seasonal), percentage popu¬ lation change from 1970 to 1983, new multifamily development in the 100-year flood- plain, regional government activity, and planning personnel per capita. The opposition of homeowners variable was also included in the storm hazard priority and overall or causal paths which were statistically significant at the .05 level. In the following sections relationships between each type of variable are discussed, and conclusions about the overall process then are presented. Influence of Environmental Variables Several environmental variables were found to be statistically significant. Environmental variables included political and cultural measures, eco¬ nomic and demographic measures, and physical measures. Influences on Mitigation 219 Table 8.1 Continued Dependent Variables 3 Development Mitigation Management Mitigation Priority 6 Adoption c Effectiveness 1 * Number of years in nfip State mitigation activity Political Conversion Factors Absence of political support groups Opposition of development interests Planner respondent 6 Dependent Variable Cross Influences Mitigation priority Development management adoption .166 — — — -174 — — .zoz - - — — -.Z 3 I — .IZ 4 — — .141 .ZIZ — — ,z 4 z effectiveness equations but was not statistically significant. For a full explanation of these variables, see Beatley 1986. b. R 2 = .3723; adjusted R 2 = .3356. c. R 2 = .2134; adjusted R 2 = .1701. d. R 2 = .2586; adjusted R 2 = .2070. e. The planner-respondent variable was included only in the development management adoption equation. Political and Cultural Measures One of the most often mentioned influences on mitigation efforts is the “private property ethos,” involving objections to governmental regulation of property. This exercises a significant negative influence both on the priority of storm hazard reduction and the adoption of development management measures. 4 It also exercises an indirect influence on the effectiveness of a locality’s mitigation efforts. This finding is consistent with the more qualitative case study work reported in chapter 3. This conservative, private property-oriented ethos clearly is an impedi¬ ment to which proponents of coastal storm hazard reduction measures 220 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS must squarely face up. At the local level planners must find ways to heighten concern about storm hazards to make them consistent with the private property ethos. Recasting the mitigation problem in private sector/ private property terms should enhance its salience. Devising storm haz¬ ard mitigation solutions compatible with the protection of private prop¬ erty rights should enhance their political acceptability. For instance, regu¬ latory proposals may have to involve adequate compensation for hazard area property owners who incur losses (for example, through tdr, land acquisition, etc.). The implications are similar for policymakers at higher levels. Economic and Demographic Measures Several variables within the economic and demographic environment cat¬ egory have significant influences in the causal model — population size, median home value, and recreation/tourist economic base. The economic base variable yielded relatively large positive influences on both the prior¬ ity of storm hazard reduction and adoption of development management. This is an interesting result, counter to the expected finding. It was hypothesized that dependence on ocean- and hazard-oriented uses and activities would lead to a lower hazard priority, as well as to a lower tendency to adopt hazard mitigation programs which restrict these uses. This counterintuitive finding led to questions as to whether this particular variable was serving as a proxy for some other influence. Further analysis indicated a very high correlation between localities with a recreation/ tourist economic base and those which could be considered beachfront or oceanfront localities.'’ Thus it appears that one logical explanation is that this variable actually serves as a proxy for location with respect to storm risks, as these localities experience the cumulative effects of ocean derived hazards in much the same way that barrier island localities do. 6 It pres¬ ents a contrast between tourist-oriented beachfront localities like Virginia Beach, Virginia, and nonrecreation/nontourist localities like Baytown, Texas, located further inland. If this interpretation is correct, it suggests that local planners in beachfront recreation-oriented jurisdictions are more likely to be successful at developing support for storm hazard reduction and the adoption of development management to accomplish it. While the geographical location of a community is not a variable that Influences on Mitigation 221 can be manipulated, local planners in these jurisdictions should be aware of this influence on salience and be prepared to take advantage of it. Similarly, state and federal officials may wish to target their mitigation efforts here where storm hazard salience will tend to be greater. It also suggests the need to target efforts at increasing storm hazard awareness in coastal jurisdictions where the proximity to and presence of the storm hazard is not as obvious (for example, along sounds and bays where the piling-up effects of hurricanes and coastal storms can be devastating). Population size was also found to have a positive influence on the adoption of storm hazard mitigation. The greater the population size of a locality, the more likely it is to have adopted development management measures, for instance. This is logical and suggests that such localities both have a greater experience and history of using such measures, and a greater relative need for them. The range of problems and public policy issues that must be addressed in these localities is much greater than in communities of smaller population size. Moreover, larger population size and larger planning staffs were highly correlated (and thus the latter variable was not included in the model), and it can be argued that the positive influence of population on mitigation adoption is at least partly a reflection of this. Population size did not, however, have a significant causal influence on either overall effectiveness or priority of storm hazard reduction. The implications of the influence of the population variable are several. At the local level planners and policymakers in larger jurisdictions are more likely to find a more extensive package of mitigation tools already in place and at their disposal than are planners in smaller localities. These measures may be used in varying degrees to advance the goal of storm hazard reduction. Planners in larger places will generally have greater opportunities to integrate storm hazard reduction into the existing devel¬ opment management framework. Planners in smaller localities may have to start from scratch. For planners and policymakers at higher levels of government this finding suggests that different types of support services are required by localities of different population sizes. Planners in small localities are likely to need basic start-up assistance, which may range from the provision of model ordinances to assistance in land use map¬ ping. Larger localities that are already doing a considerable amount of development management, and indeed which already have in place an 222 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS extensive institutional and administrative framework, are going to find other types of assistance more beneficial. Assistance in the form of politi¬ cal and legal support for their efforts and ways of fine-tuning existing measures to storm hazard reduction objectives will tend to be of greater relevance and utility. Consistent with expected outcomes, localities with higher median home values were more likely to have adopted development management measures. This can be explained in several ways. It may indicate the greater resources of these localities and thus their greater ability to for¬ mulate and enact such measures. It may also be that such measures are perceived to be of greater importance in such localities because the extent of property at risk is greater. It is also probable that more affluent com¬ munities are likely to exhibit a greater overall demand for the amenities that development management measures can bring about. This latter explanation is perhaps more plausible given that median home value did not yield a statistically significant influence on the priority of storm haz¬ ard reduction. The influence of this home value factor implies that local planners in wealthier localities may have an easier time accomplishing hazard mitiga¬ tion under the rubric of protecting the quality of life and the amenity values of the locality. They also are likely to find a greater level of resources and local support for development management. To the extent possible state and federal planners and policymakers should facilitate the incorporation of hazard reduction objectives into quality of life-oriented management measures in more affluent localities. In less affluent places hazard mitigation should be integrated with the economic development objectives which are more likely to be of local concern. At a state and federal level scarce mitigation resources should be directed toward dem¬ onstrating how development management can enhance economic growth in less-affluent localities that are less likely either to have the desire for or ability to develop development management programs. Physical Measures Variables in the physical environment had substantial influence on the priority of storm hazard reduction, as well as on the overall perceived effectiveness of mitigation efforts. The priority of storm hazard reduction is strongly influenced by the proportion of the jurisdiction which lies in Influences on Mitigation 223 the high-hazard floodplain area. The greater this proportion is, the higher will be the priority given to reducing the storm hazard. Where this pro¬ portion is smaller, the salience of mitigation will be lower. From the analysis results a number of implications can be drawn. Local planners will have a harder time achieving local concern about the hazard threat and support for mitigation in jurisdictions where the hazard area is not large in relation to the locality’s total land area. Additional efforts will be needed to enhance awareness in these localities. Policymakers at higher levels of government interested in increasing the local salience of storm hazards may be required to expend extra effort in these jurisdic¬ tions, assuming that the actual property and people at risk are not insignificant. The analysis also indicates that the greater the proportion of the floodplain that is already developed, the lower will be the priority of storm hazard reduction. This supports the conclusions of Burby and French (1981) and Burby, French, et al. (1985). They suggest that where the hazard area is already heavily developed, there may be a prevalent belief that it is too late to do much mitigation. While this feeling may be largely accurate, opportunities for mitigation will still exist (for example, evacuation, reconstruction planning, structural reinforcement). Planners and public officials at all government levels should be aware of this ten¬ dency and adjust their strategies and policies accordingly. Among the physical environment variables influencing overall effective¬ ness was the availability of nonhazardous development sites. The scarcer development sites outside the coastal floodplain, the less effective mitiga¬ tion programs are considered to be. This is logical, as there would be little alternative in many localities but to permit the location of further devel¬ opment in the floodplain and, consequently, more property at risk. The result suggests that public officials should pay particular attention in such situations to encouraging “safer” development in these areas, for exam¬ ple, through better building standards, accessibility to storm shelters, ability to evacuate, and the like. State and federal policymakers should be aware that in many localities where alternative nonhazardous parcels are not available, outside action by their agencies may be necessary to prevent development in hazardous areas of special value (perhaps to protect an important wetlands area or to ensure future public beach access, in addition to reducing storm haz- 224 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS ards). These actions could range from the outright acquisition of such lands to their regulation through some mechanism such as Florida’s Areas of Critical State Concern Program. Location on a barrier island was found to have a negative influence on the overall effectiveness of existing mitigation programs. This is not sur¬ prising and indicates the pervasive nature of storm hazards there, while illustrating how difficult the barrier island mitigation problem is. It is logical that overall perceived effectiveness would be lower in these vulner¬ able but attractive areas. This finding supports the conclusion of barrier island experts (Platt, Pelczarski, and Burbank 1987) that state and federal policymakers ought to funnel additional resources and expertise into barrier island hazard mitigation. Influence of Policy Catalysts Several policy catalyst variables were statistically important in the causal analysis. These variables were grouped under local and extralocal (fed¬ eral, state, and regional) measures. Local Measures Recent storm history exercised the greatest cumulative influence and exhibited a statistically significant effect on the priority of storm hazard reduction, the adoption of development management, and overall effec¬ tiveness. This indicates the importance of storm events in enhancing the awareness of local officials and the public of the need for action to address these perennial hazards. Recent storms can create “windows of opportunity” during which adoption of mitigation programs will be more feasible. Thus planners in localities with a recent history of storm events will have an easier time. While this variable is not open to manipu¬ lation, the local planner can be prepared to take advantage of this natural increase in salience. For instance, disaster experts have argued for advance preparation of poststorm reconstruction plans, as well as mitiga¬ tion provisions which will reduce the impacts of future events (Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977; Rosenthal 1975). While implementing such programs may not be feasible before the hurricane or storm, they may be welcomed after the storm. Because of the high salience and the receptive political climate that Influences on Mitigation 225 often accompany storm experiences, policymakers at higher levels of government may capitalize on such situations by (i) assisting and rein¬ forcing the efforts of local planners and (2) taking direct state or federal mitigative actions that would normally be met with great opposition by local officials. The latter may include the acquisition of hazardous lands, the imposition of more stringent storm hazard planning requirements, or the movement of damaged structures to safer sites. Of course, the reverse of this finding is that planners in coastal locali¬ ties that are just as vulnerable to hurricanes and coastal storms will have a more difficult time in the absence of recent storm damage experience. The collective memory is often short and the planner may have to insti¬ tute a general hazard awareness campaign before amassing support for storm hazard mitigation. Higher levels of government must continuously work toward increasing awareness of and concern for the storm threat. Recent storm history also generates a sizable negative influence on the overall effectiveness of existing mitigation measures. This effect appears to be an issue of perception. Local officials and the public in general are in the best position to realize how ineffective their mitigation efforts really are in the aftermath of a hurricane or severe coastal storm. While this is not a variable that planners and policymakers can manipulate, again, the poststorm period may offer unique opportunities for enacting and imple¬ menting improved mitigation programs. The probability of a hurricane strike, as expected, yielded a positive influence on the priority of storm hazard reduction. It is logical that localities where the chances of a hurricane strike are greater would in turn exhibit a greater hurricane hazard salience. This again suggests that loca¬ tion has a substantial effect on hazard salience. Local planners in these situations will, understandably, have an easier time reaching consensus about the need to address such hazards. Moreover, planners in these com¬ munities can focus their attention on translating salience or priority into tangible mitigation policies. Planners in localities where the hurricane probability is low will be required to spend more of their time on enhancing hazard salience. State and federal awareness campaigns can help here. Extralocal Measures Several extralocal policy catalysts were found to be significant in the model. Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program has a 226 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS positive influence on storm hazard salience. While the direction of causa¬ tion is debatable, it is plausible that involvement in this program will stimulate awareness and concern. Local planners should attempt to build upon this positive influence. Policymakers at higher levels should also consider the greater levels of storm hazard salience which may exist in localities with long histories of nfip involvement. As expected, the use of development management was greater in mitigation-active states. 8 Mitigation effects at the state level do in fact trickle down to the local level. As illustrated in chapter 5, states active in storm hazard mitigation are likely to exercise a number of different types of influences on local policymaking. These types range from actual require¬ ments (for example, requiring that a local land use plan is prepared) to the provision of financial and political support. These results indicate that states should continue to perform these functions, albeit with perhaps more conviction and priority than has often been the case in the past. Planners and policymakers in states low in hazard mitigation efforts should strive for more activity and involvement. Influence of Political Conversion Process Several variables in the political conversion process were statistically significant. 9 These variables are grouped into those affecting balance of power and those related to technical capacity. Balance of Power Measures One of the largest path coefficients influencing the local priority of storm hazard reduction was obtained for the absence of politically supportive groups. The fewer such groups in the locality, the lower will coastal storm hazard priority tend to be. To overcome this impediment planners must nurture and encourage the participation of supportive groups in the polit¬ ical process. For instance, local environmental groups often have goals related to mitigation, and their support can enhance the salience of miti¬ gation. Moreover, local groups, such as chambers of commerce or local taxpayer groups, can be encouraged to support reduction of storm haz¬ ards once they are able to see the connection to their own, more tradition¬ ally defined, interests. Local planners need to realize that concern about storm hazards may be eclipsed by other local issues with vocal supporters Influences on Mitigation 227 and that they must learn to cultivate political support. Officials at higher levels of government must also realize the clear importance of political support and orient their actions and outreach programs to develop and nurture these supportive political interests. The largest and most definitive path coefficient from the overall effec¬ tiveness portion of the model is obtained for the opposition of develop¬ ment interests variable. 10 The greater this opposition, the less effective are mitigation programs. The case studies in chapter 3 support this thesis. The implications here are substantial. Local planners must work more closely with development interests to achieve effectiveness. They should recognize development concerns and seek to quell some of the natural antagonism which arises. For instance, local planners could streamline planning procedures to reduce the time it takes to gain development approval. The influence and power of development interests suggests that planners and policymakers may need to negotiate reductions in storm hazards from private development in a more quid pro quo manner. Take, for instance, new coastal setback provisions enacted in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Under these new regulations most new development must occur landward of a fifty-year erosion line. To relieve some of the burden of this setback requirement, a “setback impact allowance” is also incorporated. This provision allows a developer some relief from the additional sideyard setbacks required for buildings in development areas landward of the control line. The greater the proportion of the building lot affected by the control line, the greater will be the maximum height a building is allowed to be constructed before additional sideyard require¬ ments are imposed. Technical Capacity Measures An early concern in designing the causal model was that the respondent’s background, training, and governmental position would inject an element of bias into the results. Computing correlations between respondent posi¬ tion and the dependent variables did yield a significant relationship between planner-respondents and the development management index. Conse¬ quently, a planner-respondent dummy variable was included in the miti¬ gation stage of the model to control for this bias. This variable exhibits a statistically significant positive influence on the adoption of development management. 228 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Priority of Hazard Reduction and Development Management Measures Both storm hazard priority and the development management index were independent as well as dependent variables in the causal model. Storm hazard priority was found to exercise both a positive effect on the adoption of development management and the overall effectiveness of mitigation measures. The development management index was found to exercise a relatively strong positive effect on overall effectiveness, a relationship which did not exist for the other two major mitigation approaches — structural alteration and building strengthening. These rela¬ tionships indicate, as well, that in addition to the direct effects exercised by the political, environmental, and other variables, indirect effects by these factors are also exerted through their impacts on the intervening variables of priority and adoption. For instance, while percent of the floodplain already developed does not exercise a direct effect on adoption of development management, it does exercise an indirect effect by influ¬ encing storm hazard priority, which in turn influences directly the adop¬ tion of development management. The fact that the coefficient for priority of storm hazard reduction is not larger indicates that hazard mitigation measures often are adopted primarily to meet other equally legitimate local goals and objectives. Recognizing this has implications for planners and policymakers at all governmental levels who wish to encourage local efforts to reduce storm hazards. It suggests first that in many localities it may make more sense for planners to advocate mitigation programs for a variety of politically salable reasons. Moreover, it suggests that planners should look for ways to reduce storm hazards through mitigation programs which satisfy a number of local goals and objectives and respond to a range of local values. This might be described as “strategic dovetailing” (Beatley and Godschalk 1985). Coastal setbacks, for instance, are often a politically feasible form of coastal management because they respond to numerous local goals, including the protection of beach access and development of the local economy, in addition to reducing storm hazards. Planners inter¬ ested in advancing the goal of coastal storm hazard reduction must also nurture the concern and interest of individuals and groups in the commu¬ nity who, while they may not be supportive of the goal of storm hazard Influences on Mitigation 229 reduction, will be supportive of programs which have as side-benefits the reduction of such local risks. The development management index generates one of the largest and most significant path coefficients positively influencing overall effective¬ ness, confirming the descriptive results contained in chapter 7. Moreover, this finding confirms the intuitive expectation that the more extensive the development management package, the greater will be its effectiveness at reducing coastal storm hazards. Critical Factors in Local Mitigation Looking back at the results of the analysis, we can summarize the findings in terms of those factors that had a negative or blocking effect on mitiga¬ tion decisions and those that had a positive or supporting effect. The significant negative environmental factors were percentage of the flood- plain already developed ( — .220), presence of barrier islands (-.127), and existence of a strong private property ethos ( — .121; -.113). The signifi¬ cant negative policy catalyst factor was recent storm history (-.157). 11 The significant negative political conversion factors included the absence of politically supportive groups (-.202) and the opposition of develop¬ ment interests (-.231). Private property ethos negatively affected both priority and adoption dynamics. Percent of floodplain developed and absence of politically supportive groups negatively affected priority. Recent storm history, barrier island presence, and opposition of develop¬ ment interests negatively influenced effectiveness. Many more factors contributed a positive effect. Positive environmental factors included median home value (.109), recreation/tourism economy (.175; .190), population size (.098), availability of nonhazardous sites (.109), and percent land in floodplain (.2 66). Positive policy catalyst factors were recent storm history (.171; .097), hurricane probability (.195), nfip program status (whether or not the locality was in the “regular” program) (.151), number of years in nfip (.166), and state mitigation activity (.174). The positive political conversion factor was planner-respondent (.124). Priority was positively affected by recreation/ tourism economy, percent land in floodplain, recent storm history, hurri¬ cane probability, nfip program status, and number of years in nfip. Development management adoption was positively influenced by median 230 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS home value, recreation/tourism economy, population size, state mitiga¬ tion activity, and planner-respondent. Effectiveness was positively influ¬ enced by availability of nonhazardous sites. The stage analysis also revealed significant positive influences. Priority of storm hazard mitigation had a positive effect on development manage¬ ment adoption (.141) and on overall effectiveness (.212). Development management adoption in turn had a positive effect on overall effectiveness (.242). Underlying each community’s mitigation decisions is a complex set of relationships among political, economic, and geographic factors. The findings from the causal model add to our understanding of the influence and importance of these factors on the priority of storm hazard reduction and the adoption and effectiveness of mitigation programs in hurricane- prone localities. Many of these factors are manipulate by policymakers, and even those that are not permit policymakers to understand better the causal framework and to focus their limited resources and energy on those factors which will have the greatest impact. Many of these findings support and reinforce the findings of other researchers in this area, while other findings provide new insight into the causal relationships which exist in coastal localities. Notes 1. The model presented in this chapter is part of a larger model developed by Beatley (1986), as his doctoral dissertation at the University of North Carolina. Readers inter¬ ested in details of the model specifications and the operational definitions of variables, as well as the outcomes of testing other relationships, may obtain this publication through University Microfilms. The conceptual structure of the model builds upon work on floodplain and land use analysis by Burby and French (1981). 2. The development management index variable is an additive variable of the specific development management measures identified in chapter 7. 3. Our model entails three stages, corresponding to each of the three dependent variables. In the first stage variables are tested for their influence on the priority of storm hazard reduction. Priority then becomes an independent variable in the second stage, which tests variables for their influences on the adoption of development management. Priority and adoption then become independent variables in the final stage, where influences on over¬ all effectiveness are tested. Intermediate stages are not described here in order to simplify the statistical discussion and focus on the policy relevance of the findings. Influences on Mitigation 231 4. A second political/cultural environment variable—disaster culture—also yielded a statistically significant coefficient. Disaster culture refers to the coastal resident’s attitude that copes with hurricane threats through defiance and pride in ability to ride out the storm, rather than evacuating ahead of it (Moore 1964). The coefficient obtained for this variable was surprising, however, in that it was in the opposite direction than expected. It suggests, counter to our hypotheses, that the existence of such an attitude or philosophy will serve to enhance the adoption of development management programs rather than the reverse. A likely explanation for this result was that, as with opposition of development interests, this variable was measuring a response to the adoption of development manage¬ ment programs rather than a preexisting background condition. As a result, the variable was dropped from this stage of the model, although it is included in the other stages. A third environmental variable that was not statistically significant in any of the three stages was a seasonality index, reflecting seasonal population increases. 5. While a separate variable for beachfront location was not created, this observation was obtained from a direct printout and comparison of localities receiving high and low ratings on this variable. 6 . This is an assumption, and it may be that local officials in these types of communities are actually more concerned about protecting tourists and recreational resources. 7. Policy catalyst variables that did not prove to be statistically significant in any of the three stages were: population change (1970—1983), new multifamily floodplain develop¬ ment, and regional government activity. Note that the variable evacuation time, included in earlier versions of this model, has not been included here. 8 . As measured by whether or not a state-mandated coastal setback provision existed. 9. The political conversion variable of planning personnel per capita was also included in the model but was not found to be statistically significant in any of the three stages. 10. It should be noted that the conversion process variables of opposition of development interests and opposition of homeowners were not included in the adoption stage of the model. While these factors are still believed to negatively influence the adoption of development management programs, when they were included in prior analyses, they yielded coefficients in the opposite direction (that is, they were found to positively influence adoption). This was not logical, and it was concluded that these variables were measuring the results of local experiences with development management, rather than preadoption causal influences. In other words mitigation measures may need to be in existence before such opposition is apparent to the respondent. They were consequently deleted from this portion of path model but were included later in the effectiveness stage where this temporal problem does not exist. 11. Recent storm history had positive effects on priority and adoption and a negative effect on effectiveness. 232 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS References Asher, Herbert A. 1976. Causal Modeling. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications. Beatley, Timothy. 1986. Influence on the Priority, Adoption and Effectiveness of Local Coastal Storm Hazard Mitigation. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, Department of City and Regional Planning. Beatley, Timothy, and David R. Godschalk. 1985. “Hazard Reduction through Develop¬ ment Management in Hurricane-Prone Localities: State of the Art.” Carolina Planning 11, no. 1 (Summer): 19-27, 42. Blalock, Hubert M. 1961. Causal Influences in Nonexperimental Research. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press. Burby, Raymond J., Steven P. French, et al. 1985. Floodplain Land Use Management: A National Assessment. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. Burby, Raymond J., and Steven P. French. 1981. “Coping with Floods: The Land Use Management Paradox.” Journal of the American Planning Association 50, no. 4 (Autumn): 447—458. Haas, J. Eugene, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden. 1977. Reconstruction Follow¬ ing Disasters. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press. Moore, Harry E. 1964. . .. and the Winds Blow. Austin, Tex.: The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health. Pedhazur, Elazar J. 1973. Multiple Regression in Behavioral Research. New York, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Platt, Rutherford, Sheila Pelczarski, and Barbara Burbank, eds. 1987. Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers. Chicago, 111 .: University of Chicago, Department of Geography. Rosenthal, John C. 1975. “Reconstruction After a Natural Disaster—A Need for Rapid Planning and Development.” Paper presented to the AiP Conference, San Antonio, Texas. 9 Recommended Mitigation Policies and Strategies The Importance of Coastal Storm Hazard Mitigation If people were not attracted to the beauty and recreational potential of coastal areas, hurricane hazards would not be a problem. Yet because coastal areas are increasingly popular places in which to live and vaca¬ tion, their population growth rate is three times that of the nation as a whole. Moreover, this growth and development is often attracted to the most hazardous and environmentally sensitive coastal areas — barrier islands. Barrier islands, and coastal areas in general, represent dynamic and environmentally complex ecosystems which, in their natural state, retreat before hurricanes and severe storms. Placing people and fixed property in these hazardous and dynamic areas spells the potential for catastrophic losses. While the loss of human life associated with hurricanes has for a number of decades been on the decline, there is reason to believe that future death tolls may be much higher. As people flock to the coast, and as existing road and bridge systems become increasingly clogged, the ability to evacuate becomes severely constrained. Coupled with this is the fact that only marginal improvements in the prediction and forecasting of hurricanes can be expected in the future. Hurricane forecasting is an inexact science, and its shortfalls are accentuated by erratically moving storms, such as the recent Hurricane Elena where predicted and actual tracks were dramatically different. Property losses also may soar. One projection estimated an annual loss from hurricanes in the year zooo of $5.9 billion, topping all other natural 234 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS hazard losses (Petak and Atkisson 1982). The private insurance industry has studied how they could respond to two successive $7 billion hurri¬ cane losses. Meanwhile, the anticipated rise in sea level could cause severe increases in coastal erosion over the next thirty to forty years, leaving much existing development awash (Titus 1984). Future coastal catastrophes are not inevitable. While we have not found a way to avert the annual rash of Atlantic and Gulf coast hurricanes and severe storms, we have discovered ways to protect people and property from their most damaging effects. The most effective mitigation strategy is to manage growth and development so as to keep buildings and resi¬ dents away from the most hazardous coastal areas where storm forces are the most destructive. While this sounds simple, it requires major changes and efforts within the organizations that make up our shared disaster governance system. These changes and efforts must take place in federal, state, and local governments, even though the visible outcomes appear only in local coastal communities. They are applicable to all storm- threatened shorelines, including not only those of the Gulf and Atlantic, but also those of the Pacific and Great Lakes. This chapter sets forth our conclusions about the types of changes that are needed and the necessary efforts to carry them out at each level of government. While our major research focus is on the local level, we also have studied the federal and state contexts which shape and support local mitigation action. Despite our optimistic findings about the high level of local concern, the path-breaking programs of a few areas, and the increas¬ ing mitigation efforts by some federal and state agencies, we are painfully aware of the many remaining gaps in implementing a comprehensive national mitigation policy. This chapter first sketches the outlines of an effective national policy and then suggests effective implementation strat¬ egies. Looking at implementation from the bottom up, we first review what needs to be done by coastal local governments, and then what federal and state governments can do to spark effective local programs. Coastal Storm Hazard Mitigation Policy Goals To be effective, coastal storm hazard mitigation policy must influence a very complex policy arena. Such a policy must deal with both public and private decisionmakers within a multistate coastal region where economic Recommended Mitigation Policies 235 incentives for hazard area development often overpower conservation incentives for preserving the natural environment and public safety incen¬ tives for mitigating storm hazards. Salient characteristics of this arena include the high-impact/low-probability form of the hazard, the intergov¬ ernmental setting for action, the dynamic structure of the shoreline haz¬ ard area, the growing need to move people and buildings out of harm’s way, the traditional expectations about federal disaster relief responsibil¬ ity, the catalytic role of public investment in coastal facilities, and the controversial need to intervene into the private development market to protect the public health and safety. Having studied this arena and past policy in detail, we conclude that an effective national policy must be based on three actions: i. Establishment of a comprehensive set of coastal storm hazard miti¬ gation performance standards , against which state and local plans and programs can be assessed. Such standards would specify acceptable evac¬ uation and shelter capacities relative to exposed populations; prestorm and poststorm development intensities within high-hazard areas; limits on public investments that increase risks of property damage; circum¬ stances when relocation of exposed structures should be considered; con¬ servation and enhancement of natural protective systems such as beaches, dunes, and wetlands; and minimum mitigation plan and program ele¬ ments. These standards would be devised through a process involving representatives of all affected interests, perhaps using the negotiated rule- making procedure employed in some recent federal programs (Susskind and McMahon 1985). Among these representatives would be state, local, and federal officials, coastal builders and developers, coastal scientists and planners, public and private insurance providers, and environmental conservationists. z. Reorientation of federal expenditures related to mitigation to reward state and local programs that meet the performance standards. Such expenditures would use sliding scales based on the degree of compliance to determine federal flood insurance premium rates, public disaster assis¬ tance payments, coastal area infrastructure subsidies, beach nourishment assistance, and perhaps even economic development grants. The underly¬ ing principle would be that public funds would not be used to increase the level of vulnerability to coastal storm hazards. Only if this positive approach did not prove equal to the task would sanctions be invoked to 236 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS require compliance. This reorientation would require a major policy anal¬ ysis by a qualified staff to identify the effects of various expenditures and to recommend alternative means of tying expenditures to conformance with mitigation standards. 3. Incorporation of the mitigation standards into the state and local development management plans and programs that actually guide coastal development. With the reinforcement of clear performance standards and positive expenditure incentives, state and local planners and policymak¬ ers could adopt and implement integrated development management and hazard mitigation plans. The presence of a consistent national policy based on protection of the public health and safety would help overcome the arguments against public intervention into the private development process within hazard areas. Defining the standards in terms of perfor¬ mance criteria rather than fixed specifications would allow for creativity and latitude in adopting the mitigation principles to a variety of state and local circumstances and needs. A mitigation network, including a national conference, workshops, newsletters, and demonstrations, could provide information exchange, research, and education support. This sketch of fundamental needs for a comprehensive policy suggests a direction for reform of the present patchwork of policies affecting mitiga¬ tion. It does not work out all the details of a new policy; many other actors must be involved in formulating that policy if it is to be accepted and implemented. In the meantime a number of individual actions can be taken by the governments involved to improve mitigation effectiveness, while we await such a new policy. The rest of this chapter addresses our recommendations for local, federal, and state strategies to improve miti¬ gation practice. Effective Local Mitigation Strategies The single most effective local strategy for hurricane and coastal storm hazard mitigation is to incorporate mitigation objectives into a multi- objective development management program. Development management measures to reduce storm hazards can be “strategically dovetailed” with other local concerns and objectives to enhance their political salience and feasibility (Beatley and Godschalk 1985). For instance, the acquisition of hazard zone open space may not be politically or economically feasible Recommended Mitigation Policies 237 when hurricane and storm hazard mitigation objectives are considered alone but becomes feasible when other local objectives, such as the need for recreational facilities and beach access, are considered as well. Devel¬ opment controls which reduce the density of development in high-hazard oceanfront areas may be difficult to justify exclusively on storm hazard reduction grounds but again may be feasible where other local goals (for example, aesthetic, recreational, traffic management) are advanced as well. Support for excluding seawalls and other forms of coastal armoring may be difficult to gain on the basis of their negative impacts on sand supply dynamics but becomes feasible in league with a beach preservation campaign. Each locality must adopt a development management program suited to its particular circumstances. For instance, preferential taxation of open space may be an effective incentive to reduce development in hazardous sound and riverine areas but may not work in barrier island contexts where agricultural uses are minimal and the development value of land is very high. Capital facilities planning may not be an appropriate develop¬ ment management strategy in localities where all or most areas are already serviced (that is, where the potential for opening up new areas for devel¬ opment does not exist) but may work well in localities where large areas of undeveloped land exist. Where communities face a lack of evacuation capacity, they could con¬ sider adopting ordinances limiting development in hazard areas to the capacity of evacuation routes, similar to Adequate Public Facility Ordi¬ nances that limit development to the capacity of major roads. They could set up hazard area impact fees or special taxing districts to pay for needed evacuation or vertical shelter improvements. In this way those who benefit from development within hazard areas would pay for the necessary pro¬ tection, rather than transferring the costs to the taxpayer at large. Focal development programs need not be complex to be effective. A relatively simple yet properly written and strongly enforced zoning or subdivision ordinance, in company with a basic land use plan, may be all that is necessary to guide development away from hazard areas, especially in smaller jurisdictions. If provided with an adequate delineation of haz¬ ard areas and shoreline processes, such as erosion rates, then the small jurisdiction can build its mitigation program on a solid base of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare. 238 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS In larger or more complex localities, development management pro¬ grams may need to draw from the full range of available techniques described in this book: (i) land use planning; (2) development regula¬ tion; (3) land and property acquisition; (4) public facilities/infrastructure policy; (5) taxation, fiscal, and other incentives, and (6) information dissemination. Each of the tools and techniques within these approaches involves certain benefits and limitations. We found many hurricane-prone localities not only using these techniques, but also rating them of higher effectiveness than traditional structural and other approaches to hurri¬ cane hazard mitigation. Both simple and sophisticated development management programs are most effective when they acknowledge and protect the intrinsic mitigative features of the natural environment. For instance, sand dunes provide a degree of natural protection from storm waters and should not be allowed to be disturbed by development. Buildings should be placed not only well back from the shore, but also so that they do not undermine the natural integrity of the dune system. As another example, development manage¬ ment programs should be designed to protect the integrity of estuarine areas because these features of the coastal ecosystem serve as natural sponges, retaining and absorbing hurricane floodwaters. Overcoming Local Adoption and Implementation Obstacles Local mitigation programs can be difficult to adopt and effectively imple¬ ment. Our survey and case study findings identified a number of local obstacles to hazard mitigation and development management. One of the most important problems is the lack of political leadership and a political constituency supporting hazard mitigation. Finding ways to encourage elected officials to embrace often thorny hazard mitigation issues and building coalitions of local interests willing to lobby for hazard mitiga¬ tion and development management is crucial. Supporters must be pre¬ pared to face well developed opposing arguments. Negative arguments tend to be of two types: (1) those which deal with the objective, usually economic, impacts of development management programs and (2) those which deal with normative and value issues, usually concerning individual rights. One argument of the first type holds out the specter of deleterious economic effects associated with develop¬ ment management programs. Restricting the amount and density of com- Recommended Mitigation Policies 239 mercial and residential development on the beachfront, so the argument goes, will serve to significantly undermine the local tourist/recreational economy. Yet, in contrast to what we would expect from this argument, experiences by coastal localities with development management indicate that such programs instead enhance community attractiveness. Develop¬ ment management is in effect an approach to protecting the “goose that lays the golden eggs.” However, often this first argument is only a smoke screen for the concerns of shorefront property owners. They see that while overall community economic benefits may increase, property values may shift inland to less hazardous second- and third-tier lots and away from their first-tier shorefront property. Depending on the political influence of these shorefront property owners, which can be substantial in small resort towns, existing land use patterns can be nearly impossible to change (Sturza 1987). A common normative argument is that government has no legitimate right to interfere with the normal risk-taking behavior of individuals who wish to build and live in hazardous locations. This argument overlooks the government’s obligation to protect the public safety. First, in most cases individual decisions to build in a particular coastal location, and in a particular way, can have many negative impacts on neighbors and the community as a whole. These external effects range from clogging evacu¬ ation routes to increasing flood damages to other structures (for example, debris turning into battering rams) to swelling disaster response and recovery costs. Since most individuals lack complete understanding of the nature and magnitude of storm risks, government intervention is justified (Beatley 1985). Recent surveys of Galveston Island residents, for example, indicated that they were grossly uninformed about the time it would take to evacuate the island in the event of a hurricane (Ruch and Christensen 1981). The obligation of government to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public demands a strong mitigation function. In many coastal localities opposition from real estate and development interests represents a substantial obstacle to the adoption and effective implementation of development management programs. Where the power of such interests is strong, public planners and others interested in pro¬ moting hazard mitigation may be forced to strike practical balances between development demands and mitigation needs. They may need to negotiate a quid pro quo arrangement, where developers may be permit- 240 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS ted to build at somewhat higher densities if they incorporate mitigative features into their project locations and site designs. They may need to use development management techniques that clearly incorporate private interests. For instance, Transfer of Development Rights (tdr) may be a particularly feasible technique because it does not restrict the absolute amount of coastal development but simply reshuffles its location while allowing the hazard area owner to realize a monetary return from selling his development rights. Another possible approach is the use of the invest¬ ment amortization concept in hazardous locations, similar to noncon¬ forming uses in zoning ordinances. Property owners would be allocated an economic life span for their hazard area buildings, and after that period if they are destroyed by a hurricane, they would not be permitted to be rebuilt. Finally, another possible approach is to write into hazard area property deeds a statement that the shoreline is a moving edge and that owners who build there without sufficient room to move their build¬ ings back from the approaching water (due to erosion, sea level rise, or storm damage) ultimately may lose their development rights. This would put waterfront property owners on notice that the beaches may move, leaving them without a buildable lot, as on the Galveston Beach after Hurricane Alicia. Funding for local mitigation also constitutes an important obstacle. Coastal localities need dependable sources of income for their mitigation programs, particularly if they involve acquisition of land or development rights, relocation, or beach nourishment. They also need appropriations for continuing staff, technical studies, planning, and management. This funding may well come from the beneficiaries of mitigation programs. Coastal localities can establish special hazard area assessment districts or impact fees to fund mitigation. In North Carolina, localities can levy a hotel/motel occupancy tax for, among other purposes, coastal erosion control measures. While state and federal funding should not be over¬ looked, those local activities benefiting from hazard area locations also should bear a fair share of mitigation costs. The technical capacity of localities is very important. A competent, energetic planning staff is crucial both to initiating a mitigation program and ensuring that the provisions of the program are implemented and enforced. A second technical aspect pertains to the knowledge and data base available to a community when formulating a development manage- Recommended Mitigation Policies 241 ment mitigation program. It would be difficult, for instance, for coastal localities in North Carolina to manage and regulate development near shifting ocean inlets without an adequate understanding of their histori¬ cal movement and natural dynamics. Developing this necessary data base takes special skills and resources. Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for instance, conducted a shoreline erosion study which then served as the basis of a fifty-year erosion setback requirement. As a further example, the Nags Head, North Carolina, hurricane hazard property analysis was quite important in helping the town identify particular areas where devel¬ opment management should be focused, both prior to and following a hurricane or severe coastal storm. In addition this study helped convince local politicians of the vulnerability of the town and the need to plan for coastal storm hazards. Planning for Poststorm Reconstruction Our research indicates that despite the devastation and trauma associated with being hit by hurricanes, localities also enjoy opportunities to rebuild in ways which reduce the future chances of damages and loss of life. Public and private structures can be relocated, densities in high-damage areas can be reduced, and roads and sewer lines can be elevated (see the case studies in chapter 3; see also Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977). Yet, we have found that few coastal localities are prepared to take advantage of these opportunities. More specifically, they lack the legal, institutional, and planning tools to effectively manage the political and economic forces at work following such a disaster. Strong pressures exist to rebuild a devastated community in a rapid manner. Homeowners wish to restore their homes quickly and to return to a sense of normalcy; local businesses want to resume operations and reduce the loss of commercial revenue; and local government officials desire to minimize the impacts of storm damage on the tax base. An influx of outside funds, from insurance payments to federal disaster assis¬ tance, serves to fuel these rebuilding forces. Moreover, public officials are apt to assume natural “helping” roles, seeking to facilitate a rapid rebuild¬ ing and return to normalcy. Coastal localities must anticipate the pres¬ ence of these powerful reconstruction forces and develop a planning and institutional framework to effectively guide and manage them so that important mitigation opportunities are not lost. 242 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS A number of development management measures that can be used in the aftermath of a hurricane or severe storm have potential for effectively guiding reconstruction. The poststorm redevelopment moratorium can be used to prevent premature reconstruction and can provide time for public reconstruction decisionmaking. The Texas Open Beaches Act, which prohibits rebuilding seaward of the vegetation line following a storm, is an example of using changes in the natural environment to guide recon¬ struction. The damage triage, which focuses resources on damaged areas most likely to benefit from them, is useful in managing redevelopment. Substantive decisions concerning appropriate mitigation actions can be addressed in advance of a hurricane through the preparation of a local poststorm reconstruction plan. Such a plan provides policy guidance which can relieve the heavy decisionmaking demands placed on public officials during reconstruction and serve as a politically useful device for resisting pressures from home owners and businesses for premature rebuilding. The reconstruction task force also holds much promise in assisting in the identification of specific mitigation opportunities during reconstruction. While the experience with such an institutional mechanism is not great, enough experience does exist to support its utility. Convened following a storm, the reconstruction task force can serve to effectively oversee poststorm damage assessments, implementation of the reconstruction mor¬ atorium, and application of the poststorm reconstruction plan, among other functions. In addition to the immediate opportunities to rebuild in mitigative ways, the occurrence of a hurricane or severe coastal storm may create a supportive climate for the adoption of long-term mitigation measures. Our research findings indicate that recent storm experiences serve as positive causal influences on the adoption of hazard mitigation. Plan¬ ners and public officials must be prepared to take advantage of these “trigger events” and the changes in the political climate that may result from them. The public awareness and political priority of storm hazard mitigation as a local issue may increase substantially in the aftermath of a hurricane, and this receptive local climate should be capitalized upon. Recommended Mitigation Policies 243 Federal Policy Support for Local Hazard Mitigation To support local mitigation the most important change needed in federal policy is to end public subsidies to private development in hazard areas. Past federal programs often have encouraged and subsidized private devel¬ opment in vulnerable coastal areas. These subsidies have been provided through a number of programs including the provision of federal flood insurance (the National Flood Insurance Program), the federal funding of capital projects in coastal areas (for example, highways, sewer and water facilities), and the provision of disaster assistance funding for the rebuild¬ ing of damaged public facilities. Depending upon local needs and circum¬ stances, different federal subsidies can determine the feasibility of risky development for both individuals and development firms. As we have seen, under the federal flood insurance program an individual building a home in a highly hazardous coastal location can receive insurance pay¬ ments to rebuild it after innumerable flooding events. Acting in tandem, federal disaster assistance monies can be used to rebuild the public facili¬ ties, such as roads and sewer lines, that serve this development. Before the storm federal road and bridge subsidies can facilitate barrier island devel¬ opment, and federal flood insurance can facilitate projects lying in coastal floodplains. Breaking the Build-Destroy-Rebuild Cycle Only recently has the federal government acknowledged the need to get out of the business of subsidizing risky development and to break the past cycle of building-destruction-rebuilding. Congress took a major step in this direction when it enacted the Coastal Barrier Resources Act in 1982. This act prohibits the issuance of federal flood insurance and the provi¬ sion of federal project grants for development in designated “undeveloped” barrier island units. It also places restrictions on the provision of disaster assistance in these areas. The act represents a positive effort to minimize the extent to which the public subsidizes risky development and repre¬ sents a model for future policy (Godschalk 1987). There are other changes which should be made in federal policy to minimize public subsidies to risky development. Federal provision of disas¬ ter assistance needs careful reconsideration both at a conceptual and programmatic level. These provisions grew out of a perceived need to 244 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS offer financial assistance to individuals and state and local govern¬ ments overwhelmed by a particular disaster. The law states that a presidential disaster declaration is only to be made in circumstances where the resources and capacity of the state to handle the disaster are exceeded. Yet, this clear criterion often is ignored in practice. A case in point is Hurricane Diana, which struck the North Carolina coast in 1983. This storm did relatively minor damage, generating all told only $80 million in estimated damages. While a presidential disaster declaration was requested and easily granted, this did not appear to be a case where the resources of the state to deal with the disaster were exceeded. Substantial modifications to fema’s disaster assistance regulations were proposed in 1986, which would have made it more difficult to declare a presidential disaster. These proposed changes would require fema to measure the fiscal capacity of states and localities in a disaster area. If the total damages in the state were less than a fixed proportion of state general revenues (adjusted by a comparison with national per capita income), a disaster declaration would not be recommended by fema. A state’s past efforts at hazard mitigation would also be considered. These efforts to make states and local governments more responsible for mitigating damages from hurricanes and other natural disasters were not adopted, due in part to extensive state and local government opposition. Many states and localities will seriously confront the inadequacies of their development policies only when they must bear significant responsi¬ bility for damages occurring in hazardous areas. Rather than tying disas¬ ter assistance to a state’s ability to pay, we suggest that the disaster assis¬ tance cost-sharing ratio be related to the state’s mitigation efforts, as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The change to a 75 percent federal/25 percent state and local cost-sharing ratio for public assistance funds increased state and local contributions and awareness of their responsibil¬ ity. Basic principles of equity suggest that, as coastal states and localities benefit from hazard area development and have as well the powers neces¬ sary to prevent it from occurring in the first place, they should be expected to use their powers for the public benefit. If they chose not to do so, then they should not expect to receive large disaster payments in compensation for their inaction. In future policy debates concerning the federal obligation to provide Recommended Mitigation Policies 245 disaster assistance, it would be useful to consider a conceptual distinction between a true “disaster” and a regular, periodic natural event. There has always been a sense in which disaster assistance has been viewed as being “deserved,” that is, that society has an obligation to provide for the needs of individuals in circumstances where unexpected and unavoidable trage¬ dies occur. Such a position would support disaster assistance for a com¬ munity devastated, say, by a tornado — a random and unavoidable event. Yet this logic does not apply in the same way to coastal storm hazards. Do residents of Dauphin Island, Alabama, for instance, “deserve” to receive federal public assistance funds to rebuild their roads after every hurricane or storm? In this context many hurricanes and coastal storms are not so much unanticipated national disasters as they are recurring events which should be mitigated by, or alternatively largely paid for by, local govern¬ ments rather than the federal government. The objective should be to avoid compensating those who knowingly subject themselves to repeated storm damage. Beefing Up Mitigation The federal government, and specifically the Federal Emergency Manage¬ ment Agency, should strengthen its poststorm hazard mitigation require¬ ments. At a minimum, adherence to and implementation of previous Section 406 mitigation plans should be a stringently applied requisite for receiving disaster assistance, fema’s proposed disaster assistance regula¬ tions attempted to provide for this. In addition, fema should consider the imposition of mitigation requirements following a disaster, even when an earlier 406 plan does not exist. An excellent point at which this can occur is immediately following the issuance of the Interagency Hazard Mitiga¬ tion Team’s preliminary report. These Interagency Mitigation Teams pro¬ vide a quick and creative analysis of the mitigation opportunities which exist following a hurricane and typically recommend specific actions that should be taken by state and local governments to seize these opportuni¬ ties. fema should increasingly hinge the provision of postdisaster assis¬ tance on the good faith efforts of states and localities to implement these recommendations. Certain fema public assistance regulations have come under fire in the past for their negative effects on mitigation efforts. These past regulations virtually required public facilities and structures to be rebuilt as they were 246 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS prior to the disaster. If a community wished to rebuild a public road or sewer in a safer location, but the costs of this reconstruction were sub¬ stantially greater than rebuilding in the same spot, the community was prevented from even using its own funds to pay the additional expenses. The proposed new “disaster-proofing” criteria would have corrected this problem by permitting the locality to spend whatever amount of its own funds would be necessary. Facility mitigation efforts during redevelop¬ ment should be strongly encouraged under future federal policy. The postdisaster use of the Interagency Hazard Mitigation Team should also be applied to predisaster mitigation exercises, fema should make such expert teams available to coastal localities for a prestorm hazard mitigation “audit.” The team would operate much as it does in the after- math of a hurricane but would focus on the identification of current, prestorm mitigation opportunities, as well as on opportunities that locali¬ ties should be prepared to take advantage of following the next storm. Such a program could lead to better mitigation planning on the part of local governments and long-term reductions in the loss of property and human lives. Visits by the predisaster audit mitigation teams could be funded on a cost-sharing basis among the state and locality and fema. Finally, the technical underpinning for mitigation should be strength¬ ened. More funding is needed for the Hurricane Preparedness Planning Program. These analyses of the vulnerability of both people and property are needed as soon as possible in order to enable local decisionmakers to incorporate them into their development management and hazard miti¬ gation efforts before the storm. Coastal flood hazard maps, believed by some to understate the degree of actual storm risk, need to be updated. Provision of this data base is a critical form of federal support for effective local mitigation. Giving Relocation a Chance fema has at its disposal some underused programs which could fuel major local mitigation initiatives if given a chance. The Section 1362 flooded properties purchase program is perhaps the most promising of these. Under this program the federal government can provide funds for the purchasing of land and damaged structures in the aftermath of a serious hurricane or flooding event. The intent is to prevent the rebuilding of such structures if it is likely that they will be flooded and damaged in Recommended Mitigation Policies 247 the future. Relocating these residents to safer locations is a fiscally respon¬ sible action for fema to take, as future flood insurance claims will be reduced and the extent of future federal liability for such damages will be lowered. The Baytown, Texas, relocation project following Hurricane Ali¬ cia (described in chapter 3), illustrates the potential role this approach could play in reducing future storm damages. The major problem in implementing the 1362 program has been inade¬ quate funding. Relatively small amounts of money have been appropri¬ ated for this program in the past, relative to the need. This 1362 funding level must be increased substantially; the action could be viewed as shift¬ ing funds from future disaster relief payments to current hazard mitiga¬ tion which will reduce the need for future disaster relief. A second prob¬ lem, related to the first, is that 1362 monies do not go very far in coastal areas because of the high market value of property in these locations. Some fema officials have indicated that they do not recommend use of the 1362 approach in coastal areas for this reason. The reverse of that argument is that such high property value is also indicative of the higher value of the property which would be safeguarded against future hurri¬ canes and storms. These 1362 funds should be used selectively in coastal hazard areas, perhaps in league with other state and local programs, such as beach access, where cost-sharing arrangements would increase the impact of limited federal dollars. A final problem is the requirement of “substantial damage” before 1362 applies, relegating it to reactive uses after the disaster has occurred. If eligibility were broadened to include structures with documented high probability of future substantial dam¬ age, more could be done to prevent loss. Coupled with priority for pro¬ jects with cost-shared funding that were covered by an adopted mitigation plan, section 1362 could become a major incentive to act prior to exten¬ sive losses. In May 1986 the Coastal States Organization approved a strong policy statement in favor of relocation for existing structures in high-hazard coastal areas. Specifically, it recommended studying a number of possible alternatives for accomplishing this including, “but not limited to, making relocation of eminently endangered structures an eligible expense under the federal flood insurance program, setting aside a percentage of flood insurance premiums for mitigation and loss prevention programs, estab¬ lishing a trust fund for loss mitigation programs, integrating relocation 248 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS into recreation and open space acquisition programs, and reviewing state and local regulatory and planning programs that facilitate or impede damage prevention” (Coastal States Organization 1986, p.2). Recom¬ mended in the policy statement, as well, is the initiation of one or more large-scale demonstration projects to test the cost and feasibility of relo¬ cation and other damage prevention strategies, and the elimination of public financial investments, tax laws, and other programs which reduce the incentive for property owners to avoid future disaster losses. This strong statement by the coastal states indicates a strong consensus about the need for relocation and the political importance of programs like 1362. Another way to address this problem was proposed by Congressman Walter Jones of North Carolina as an amendment to the 1987 Housing Act. 1 Under this proposal state and local governments could declare a structure eminently endangered, and then its relocation would become an eligible insurance loss claim, provided it was relocated behind the thirty- year erosion setback and the cost was not greater than 40 percent of its insured value. If it were not relocated within a reasonable time and then suffered damage, its claim would be limited to the same 40 percent. The benefits of this approach are that it does not require an appropriation since it is financed through insurance premiums, it holds future premiums down by limiting future claims, and it is directly related to other mitiga¬ tion methods, such as coastal setbacks. Consistent with increased use of the 1362 program, fema should con¬ sider reinstating its informal policy of constructive total loss. This policy — permitting an insurance claim for the full value of a damaged structure that is not to be reoccupied, even where an actual total loss does not exist—would reduce the amount of future coastal property at risk. While this policy lost favor several years ago, it is time for fema to reintroduce the concept into its mitigation arsenal. Reorienting the Flood Insurance Program toward Mitigation The availability of federally subsidized flood insurance is often seen as a major incentive for hazardous coastal development. While this in many ways could be described as a “chicken and egg” issue, our research indi¬ cates that major changes in the way in which the nfip is administered are, indeed, in order. At a broad philosophical level we believe that fema Recommended Mitigation Policies 249 should attempt to manage the nfip more like a conventional, private insurance company, with careful scrutinizing of high-risk policyholders. Insurance premiums should reflect differential risks, and the efforts of individuals, states, and localities to reduce storm risks should be reflected in these rates. fema should also ensure that mitigation requirements are strongly enforced, including insurance cancellation for both individuals and gov¬ ernments if mitigation requirements are not met. fema’s attempts to recover insurance payments from localities through subrogation suits should be continued in the future. Localities wishing to participate in the nfip should understand that fema will hold them accountable for any past negligence in enforcing or implementing nfip requirements, fema should also adopt a more stringent position with respect to providing public assistance to nonparticipating communities following hurricanes and storms. Following Hurricane Elena, for instance, the Florida commu¬ nity of Cedar Key was provided full disaster assistance even though it was not participating in the nfip at the time of the storm. This type of leniency will discourage localities from participating in the nfip in the first place or from fully enforcing its land use requirements. We support fema’s efforts to tie local mitigation effort to reductions in individual policy premiums. Coastal policyholders might be given a lower flood insurance rate, for instance, in a locality where mitigation and posthurricane reconstruction plans had been prepared. Even lower rates might be given to policyholders in localities which had enacted restrictive coastal development regulations. fema should not be timid in identifying levels of risk beyond which it will not insure. It should consider the extent to which insuring structures in V-zones, for example, is simply an unacceptably high risk. Consistent with this philosophy, occasions may arise where, just as an automobile insurance company might cancel a policy, fema should consider termi¬ nating unacceptably risky existing policies (for example, after successive major storm damage events). The knowledge of such a possible action could encourage more responsible coastal development, just as it encour¬ ages safer drivers in the case of automobile insurance. 250 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS Stronger State Mitigation Programs A major conclusion of our study is that state governments play vital roles in promoting safer patterns of coastal development. States can directly regulate coastal development, providing consistent coastwide mitigation. For example, North Carolina’s permitting system for development in Areas of Environmental Concern (aecs) represents an effective state action to safeguard coastal development. As part of this system North Carolina has enacted a rigorous coastal setback provision, substantially reducing the vulnerability of development along their shores to storm hazards and erosion. States can frame and guide local planning and development regulation. Through the imposition of local planning requirements states set com¬ mon planning “ground rules” that all localities must adhere to. Increas¬ ingly these mandatory planning requirements incorporate explicit consid¬ eration of hurricane and coastal storm hazards. The North Carolina cama hurricane hazard mitigation and reconstruction standards, and the provisions of Florida’s 1985 growth management package, illustrate the type of rule-setting appropriate in coastal states. Such state-mandated planning requirements also change the texture of local politics in favor of planning. That is, supportive individuals and groups in the community can now point to the state requirements as a rationale for undertaking such activities, whereas prior to such requirements the local political costs of supporting such provisions might be high. State requirements act as a sort of “political lightning rod,” serving to redirect political opposi¬ tion and antagonism away from local officials. State standards also can ensure equity in coastal development manage¬ ment. A single locality contemplating the adoption of mitigation mea¬ sures may consider it unfair that other coastal localities are not required to undertake similar actions. A set of common state standards ensures that all coastal localities enforce the same mitigation standards. States can encourage and facilitate local mitigation through funding and technical support. This assistance ranges from providing planning monies to providing field support for local delineation and monitoring of hazard areas to the provision of funding for acquisition of coastal high- hazard lands. At the state level it is possible to justify the technical and legal staff work necessary to develop model hazard management tools for Recommended Mitigation Policies 251 use by localities in the field. In order to provide these support services on a reliable, long-term basis, states need to find sources of continuing fund¬ ing for them. One possible approach is the creation of a state trust fund for hurricane and coastal storm hazard mitigation. Ideally such funds would be collected from coastal activities benefiting directly from their coastal locations. State infrastructure and public investment policies can have a substan¬ tial influence on local coastal development patterns in the same way that federal programs do. Coastal states must begin to acknowledge these influences and take actions to ensure that such state investments do not undermine local and state mitigation programs. Florida has been the most active in this area, most recently through the coastal infrastructure policies contained in its 1985 growth management package. States should begin to develop policies which restrict public investment in high-hazard areas, much as the Coastal Barrier Resources Act does at the federal level. State-created regional agencies also can facilitate hurricane and coastal storm hazard mitigation. Coordinating local government actions through a regional agency helps to overcome the problems of political and geo¬ graphic fragmentation often found in coastal areas. The most extensive experience with regional agency involvement in coastal storm hazards planning has been in Florida, primarily in the area of regional evacuation planning. However, regional agencies have increasingly been active in ensuring that local development management decisions adequately incor¬ porate storm hazard planning. These experiences, and the limited experi¬ ences of other regional agencies such as South Carolina’s Coastal Com¬ mission, suggest that these governmental units can play important roles. They can provide technical expertise and manage data bases for develop¬ ment management and hazards planning; they can provide institutional mechanisms for coordinating the mitigative efforts of a number of locali¬ ties; and they can help to enhance the political salience and legitimacy of hurricane and storm hazard mitigation and development management. Averting Coastal Catastrophe: A Final Word In the final analysis, whether or not the United States suffers a crushing coastal storm disaster in the future is both in and out of our hands. The probability of a killer hurricane striking a coastal area is not reducible by 252 CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS human action. The likelihood of massive erosion from sea level rise allow¬ ing a hurricane surge to inundate a coastal area is tied to forces we do not know how to control. What we can manage is how we build on the coast. The clear answer to the question of how to mitigate potential future coastal disasters is to manage coastal growth so as to keep people and property out of harm’s way. This demands that mitigation policy be taken more seriously through¬ out the shared governance system responsible for coping with disaster. At the local level mitigation must be integrated into day-to-day development management decisions. At the federal level policies that encourage devel¬ opment in vulnerable coastal hazard areas must be turned around, and programs spurring local mitigation must be devised. And at the state level political and budgetary priorities must account for coastal disaster miti¬ gation. Nothing less is justifiable in the face of the size of the threat. Notes i. This was adopted on Feb. 5, 1988, as Section 544 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, PL 100-241 (100 Stat 1850). References Beatley, Timothy. 1985. “Paternalism and Land Use Planning: Ethical Bases and Practical Applications.” In The Restraint of Liberty, edited by Thomas Attig, Donald Callen, and John Gray. Bowling Green, Ohio: Bowling Green State University. Beatley, Timothy, and David R. Godschalk. 1985. “Hazard Reduction through Develop¬ ment Management in Hurricane-Prone Localities: State of the Art.” Carolina Planning 11, no. 1 (Summer): 19—27, 42. Coastal States Organization. 1986. “Policy Position: Existing Development in High Haz¬ ard Areas.” Washington, D.C. Godschalk, David R. 1987. “The 1982 Coastal Barrier Resources Act: A New Federal Policy Tack.” In Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers, edited by Rutherford Platt, Sheila Pelczarski, and Barbara Burbank. Chicago, Ill.: Univer¬ sity of Chicago, Department of Geography. Haas, J. Eugene, Robert W. Kates, and Martyn J. Bowden. 1977. Reconstruction Follow¬ ing Disaster. Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press. Petak, William, and Arthur Atkisson. 1982. Natural Hazard Risk Assessment and Public Policy. New York, N.Y.: Springer-Verlag. Recommended Mitigation Policies 253 Ruch, Carlton, and Larry Christensen. 1981. Hurricane Message Enhancement. College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M. Sturza, R. R, II. 1987. “The Retreat Alternative in the Real World: The Kill Devil Hills Land-Use Plan of 1980.” In Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers, edited by Rutherford Platt, Sheila Pelczarski, and Barbara Burbank. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago, Department of Geography. Susskind, Lawrence, and Gerard McMahon. 1985. “The Theory and Practice of Negoti¬ ated Rulemaking.” Yale Journal of Regulation (Fall). Titus, James G. 1984. “Planning for Sea Level Rise Before and After a Coastal Disaster.” In Greenhouse Effect and Sea Level Rise, edited by Michael C. Barth and James G. Titus. New York, N.Y.: Van Nostrand Reinhold. Appendix. Survey Questionnaire Instructions: Please answer the following questions for your planning jurisdiction. Note that we have used the term severe coastal storm throughout. This is meant to include hur¬ ricanes, northeasters and tropical storms. The term development management includes programs and policies which control or influence the location, density, timing and type of development which occurs in a jurisdiction. The term hazard reduction refers to decreases in the potential loss of life and/or property damage from a hazard such as a severe coastal storm. If there are any questions which you cannot answer, please feel free to consult with others who may be able to provide the answer. Where detailed information is called for, but unavailable, please estimate. i. How would you rank the priority given by your jurisdiction’s governing body to the threat of severe coastal storms in comparison with other local issues? (circle one) r) Very High Priority z) High Priority 3) Medium Priority 4) Low Priority 5) Very Low Priority z. Approximately what percentage of your jurisdiction’s land area lies in the 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding under the National Flood Insurance Program)? (circle one) 1) Less than 5% z) 5-19% 3) zo-49% 4 ) 50 - 79 % 5) 80-100% Survey Questionnaire 255 3. How much of the 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding) in your jurisdiction is now developed (land which has been con¬ verted from its natural state)? (circle one) 1) Less than 5% 2) 5-19% 3) 20-49% 4 ) 50 - 79 % 5) 80-100% 4. What is the most common type of land use now in your jurisdiction’s 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding)? (circle one) 1) Single Family Detached 2) Multi-Family 3) Commercial (Including Private Recreational, Hotel/Motel) 4) Industrial 5) Public Recreational/Park Land 6 ) Other (Specify) 5. What are the types of new development that have occurred in the 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding) in the last five years ? (circle all that apply) 1) Single Family Detached 2) Multi-Family 3) Commercial (Including Private Recreational, Hotel/Motel) 4) Industrial 5) Public Recreational/Park Land 6) Other (Specify) 6 . Approximately what percentage of the total dollar value of new development occur¬ ring in your jurisdiction in the last five years has located in the 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding)? (circle one) 1) Less than 5% 2) 5-19% 3) 20-49% 4) 50-79% 5) 80-100% 7. How abundant are residential development sites outside of the 100-year coastal floodplain (i.e., V-zones and A-zones subject to coastal flooding)? (circle one) 1) Very Scarce 2) Scarce 3) Moderately Scarce 4) Abundant 5) Very Abundant 8. Does your jurisdiction have an explicit storm hazard reduction strategy in addition to participation in the National Flood Insurance Program? (circle one) 256 APPENDIX 1) No 2) Yes 9. If yes, which of the following are its objectives ? (circle all that apply) 1) Guiding new private development into areas less susceptible to storm hazards 2) Locating new public facilities and structures in areas less susceptible to storm hazards 3) Relocation of existing private development into less hazardous areas 4) Relocation of existing public facilities and structures into less hazardous areas 5) Increasing evacuation capacity 6) Provision of adequate storm shelters 7) Increasing ability of private structures and facilities in hazardous areas to with¬ stand storm forces 8) Increasing ability of public structures and facilities in hazardous areas to with¬ stand storm forces 9) Structurally altering and/or reinforcing the coastal environment (e.g., seawalls, bulkheads) 10) Conserving protective features of the natural environment (e.g., dune protection) 11) Other (specify) We would now like to ask you several questions about the specific programs and policies in place in your jurisdiction which may contribute to the reduction of coastal storm hazards. Please answer these questions even if your jurisdiction has no explicit storm hazard reduction strategy. Information is requested on three types of programs: those which structurally alter the coastal environment and increase its ability to resist storm forces; those which strengthen buildings and facilities to better withstand storm forces; and those which reduce storm hazards through development management designed to control or influence the location, density, timing and type of development. 10. Following are programs which structurally alter the coastal environment. Indicate which of the following are currently in use in your jurisdiction and, if they are used, to what extent they reduce local vulnerability to storm hazards (from 1 = Don’t reduce hazards at all to 5 = Reduce hazards very much). 1) Sand-trapping structures (e.g., groins, jetties) 2) Sand-moving programs (e.g., beach nourishment, beach scraping) 3) Shoreline protection works (e.g., bulkheads, seawalls, revetments) 4) Flood control works (e.g., dikes, channels, retaining ponds) 5) Other (specify) 11. Following are programs and policies which strengthen buildings and facilities to better withstand storm forces. Indicate which are currently in use in your jurisdiction and, if they are used, to what extent they reduce local vulnerability to storm hazards (from 1 = Don’t reduce hazards at all to 5 = Reduce hazards very much). Survey Questionnaire 257 1) Building code 2) Special storm-resistant building standards (e.g., wind-resistant standards) 3) Minimum elevation and flood proofing standards required under National Flood Insurance Program 4) Elevation and floodproofing standards more extensive than required by National Flood Insurance Program 5) Floodproofing of public facilities and structures (e.g., sewer and water, roads, utilities) 6) Other (specify) Following is a list of plans, programs, and policies which guide and manage develop¬ ment. Indicate which are currently in use in your jurisdiction and, if they are used, to what extent they reduce local vulnerability to storm hazards (from 1= Don’t reduce hazards at all to 5 = Reduce hazards very much). Planning 1) Comprehensive or land use plan 2) Hurricane/storm component of comprehensive or land use plan 3) Capital improvements program 4) Recovery/reconstruction plan or policies 5) Evacuation plan Development Regulation 6 ) Zoning ordinance 7) Subdivision ordinance 8) Dune protection 9) Shoreline setback 10) Special hazard area ordinance Public Facilities Policy 11) Location of capital facilities to reduce or discourage development in high hazard areas 12) Location of public structures and buildings (e.g., hospitals, schools) to reduce extent of risk to public investments Taxation, Financial, Other Incentives 13) Reduced or below-market taxation for open space and non-intensive uses of hazard areas 14) Impact tax or special assessment to cover the additional public costs of building in hazard zone 15) Transfer of development potential from hazardous to nonhazardous sites (e.g., clustering, planned unit development) Public Acquisition 16) Acquisition of undeveloped land in hazardous areas (e.g., for open space) 17) Acquisition of development rights or scenic easements 18) Acquisition of damaged buildings in hazardous areas 19) Building relocation program (moving structures) 258 APPENDIX Information Dissemination 10) Hazard disclosure requirements in real estate transactions n) Construction practice seminars for builders zz) Others (specify) 13. Please rank the following three approaches according to their overall importance in reducing storm hazards in your jurisdiction (i.e., i=most important; 3 = least important). 1) Structural Reinforcement of Coastal Environment z) Strengthening Buildings and Facilities 3) Development Management 14. How would you rate the combined effectiveness of the programs and policies identified in questions 10, 11, and iz at reducing storm hazards in your jurisdiction? (circle one) 1) Very Effective z) Moderately Effective 3) Slightly Effective 4) Not Effective 15. Have you had any problems in enforcing or implementing the development manage¬ ment programs and policies listed in question iz? (circle one) 1) No z) Yes 16. If yes, which of the following have been problems? (circle all that apply) 1) Insufficient Funds z) Lack of Qualified Personnel 3) Insufficient Data Base 4) Public Opposition 5) Lack of Support by Public Officials 6) Other (specify) 17. Have any undesirable consequences resulted from the development management pro¬ grams and policies listed in question iz? (circle one) 1) No z) Yes 18. If yes, which of the following have been experienced? (circle all that apply) 1) Increase in Construction Costs z) Reduced Land Values 3) Reduced Tax Revenues 4) Slowed Economic Growth and Development 5) Other Consequences (specify) 19. We are interested in learning more about the obstacles to the enactment of develop¬ ment management measures which reduce storm hazards in your jurisdiction. Have any of the following been obstacles in your jurisdiction? (Circle appropriate numbers: 1 = not important to 5 =very important.) Survey Questionnaire 259 i) Opposition of business interests z) Opposition of real estate and development interests 3) Opposition of homeowners 4) Absence of politically active individuals and groups advocating hurricane/storm mitigation 5) More pressing local problems and concerns 6) General feeling that community can “weather the storm” 7) General conservative attitude toward government control of private property rights 8) Lack of adequate financial resources to implement mitigation programs 9) Lack of trained personnel to develop mitigation programs 10) Lack of incentives or requirements from higher levels of government 11) Inadequate or inaccurate federal flood insurance maps iz) Other (specify) zo. Following are some arguments often cited in opposition to the enactment of develop¬ ment management measures to reduce storm hazards. How important have these been in your jurisdiction? (Circle appropriate numbers: i=not important to 5= very important.) 1) Development management measures dampen local economy z) Development management measures lead to increased development costs 3) Decisions about risks from coastal storms are best left to the individual 4) Particular development management measures are illegal or unconstitutional 5) Other (specify) zi. Has your jurisdiction been hit by one or more severe coastal storm since 1970 (i.e., hurricanes, tropical storms, and northeasters which have caused substantial property damage)? 1) No z) Yes zz. If Yes, please indicate below the name and date of the most recent and most damaging hurricane/storm during this period. (If most recent is also most severe, write the word “same.”) Z3. Were stronger or more stringent measures to manage development adopted following either or both of these storms? Z4. How familiar are you with sources of state government assistance to localities for storm hazard management? (circle one) 1) Very Familiar z) Somewhat Familiar 3) Neither Familiar nor Unfamiliar 4) Somewhat Unfamiliar 5) Very Unfamiliar Z5. Has your local government received any of the following types of storm hazard management assistance from state government in the past five years? (circle all that apply) 260 APPENDIX i) Floodplain Maps z) Hydrologic Data 3) Information on the National Flood Insurance Program 4) Fielp with Storm Drainage Problems 5) Help with Disaster Preparedness Plans 6) Help in Administering Hazard Area Regulations 7) Grants or Loans for Construction of Storm Protection Works 8) Grants or Loans for Acquisition of Hazard Area Property z6. During the past year, has your local government had any of the following types of contact with state government personnel concerning storm hazard management? (cir¬ cle all that apply) 1) Personal Visits (Face-to-Face Contact) z) Telephone Contacts 3) Correspondence Related to Storm Hazard Management 4) Received Technical Reports on Hurricane Hazard Mitigation 5) Other (Specify) 6) None of the Above; No Contact during Past Year. Z7. Overall, how would you rate storm hazard management assistance available from state agencies? Is it. . . (circle one) 1) Adequate to Meet Local Government Needs z) Barely Adequate to Meet Local Government Needs 3) Inadequate in Relation to Local Government Needs 4) Don’t Know z8. Is there a regional agency involved in local storm hazard mitigation in your area (e.g., a council of government, regional planning agency)? (circle one) 1) No z) Yes Z9. If Yes, have they . . . (circle all that apply) 1) Prepared a regional evacuation plan z) Prepared a regional hazard reduction pfan 3) Modeled or simulated potential storm impacts for the region (e.g., using a SLOSH model) 4) Assisted your jurisdiction in developing a storm hazard management plan 5) Other (specify) 30. Please indicate the approximate peak and permanent populations for your jurisdic¬ tion in 1983. 31. Do you know approximately how long it would take to safely evacuate your jurisdic¬ tion, assuming peak population, should a hurricane threaten? (circle one) 1) No z) Yes If Yes, how long:_hours 3Z. What is the approximate number of full-time staff in your planning department? Survey Questionnaire 261 33. What was the total value of all building permits issued in your jurisdiction in 1983 ? 34. How many square miles are there in your jurisdiction? 35. Rate the following according to their importance to your jurisdiction’s economic base. (Circle appropriate numbers: 1 =not important to 5 = very important.) 1) Tourism and Recreation 2) Manufacturing 3) Service and Trade 4) Retirement 5) Fishing 6) Agriculture 7) Other (specify) 36. What is your position in local government? 37. How many years have you worked in this jurisdiction? 38. Do you have any futher comments about the use of development management to reduce storm hazards? Finally, would you please provide your name, address and telephone number below. This will allow us to keep in touch with you. The information you have provided on this survey will be kept in the strictest of confidence and we will not cite or identify you in any way in our findings. Only aggregate data will be cited. We would be happy to send you a copy of our research findings. If you would like to have a copy, please check the box below. (We will send it to the work address you list below.) Thanks Again for Your Assistance! Without your help this research would not be possible. Please place the completed questionnaire in the enclosed business reply envelope and mail it back to us. No postage is necessary. Index ACSC Program (Florida), 147, 150-51, 158, 224 aecs (North Carolina), 136, 138 — 39, 141, J 43, 2 5° Agriculture, U.S. Department of, 83 Alabama, 3, 7, 16, 49, 52, 56, 59, 63-75, 82., 89, 91, 92, 98, 101, 128-29, I3D 169,188,189,245 Alabama Coastal Area Board, 65, 67 Alabama Department of Environmental Management, 68, 69, 74 Alabama Development Office, 64 Alabama Office of State Planning, 64 Alaska, 103 Alicia (hurricane), 15, 49, 52, 75—92, t72, 181, 240, 247 Allen (hurricane), 14, 77, 89 Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act (California), 181-82 American Law Institute, 147 American National Standards Institute (ansi), 32 Apalachicola Bay area (Florida), 150 Areas of Critical State Concern (acsc) Program (Florida), 147, 150-51, 158, 224 Areas of Environmental Concern (aecs) (North Carolina), 136, 138 — 39, 141, 143,250 Armoring. See Shoreline stabilization and protection Army, U.S., 83 Ash Wednesday storm of 1962, 134 Assessments. See Taxes and taxation Atlantic County Barrier Islands (New Jersey), 166 Atlantic coast, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 12, 15, 121, 122, 130, 132, 134, 139, 157, 162-63, 187, 188, 189, 211, 234 Audrey (hurricane), 12 Automobiles and vehicles. See Evacuation; Roads and highways; Traffic and transportation systems Baldwin County, Alabama, 63—75 Barrier Island Resources System, 121 Barrier islands, 8, 15, 17, 18, 29, 39, 75, 84, 121, 122, 123, 132, 135, 139, 154, 155, 163, 166, 175, 217, 218, 220, 224, 229, 233, 237 Baytown, Texas, 77, 80, 82, 83, 86-87, i 7 2 , i 79 , 22 °, 247 Beach nourishment programs. See Erosion Beach Preservation Act (Delaware), 131 Beaumont, Texas, 101 Before the Storm , 141 Bertie County, North Carolina, 145 Betsy (hurricane), 13, 55 Beulah (hurricane), 13 Big Cypress wetlands (Florida), 150 Biloxi, Mississippi, 53, 55 56, 57, 58, 59, 61 Biscayne Bay (Florida), 98 boca (Building) Code, 31 Bolivar Peninsula (Texas), 80 Bonds. See Fiscal resources and factors 264 Index Bostic et al. v. United States et al., 123 Boston Bay (Massachusetts), 98 Bridges: and evacuation hazards, 38, 53, 73 , 74 , 75 , hi, 113, I 4 °, 1 55 , 164, 133 Brownsville, Texas, 101 Brownwood subdivision (Texas), 82, 86, 87, 172 Brunswick, Georgia, 98 Brunswick County, North Carolina, 143 Budgets and budgetary factors. See Fiscal resources and factors Building codes and standards, 6, 8, 10, 13, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 31-35, 38, 39, 41, 4 i, 44 , 45 , 50 , 53 - 55 , 57 , 58, 59 , 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 81, 82-83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 94 , 95 , 103, 105-6, 112., 113, n6, 118, 119, 128, 129, 130, 131-32, 133, 134, 140-41, 141, 143 - 44 , 153 , 154 , 156,157,163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 179-80, 181, 182, 183, 188, 191, 193-94, 100, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 212, 213, 223, 228, 240, 242. See also Subdivision regulation Building Officials and Code Administrators International, 31 Business and industry, 35, 53, 59, 60, 66, 67, 68, 70, 73, 79, 82, 84, 85, 88, 90, 103, 105, 106, 108, no, 114, 140-41, 142, 149, 156, 167, 170, 206, 213, 239, 241, 242 Buzzards Bay (Massachusetts), 98 California, 181-82 Camille (hurricane), 13, 39, 49, 52, 53 — 63, 90-91, 92, 179 Cape Cod (Massachusetts), 15, 98 Capital. See Fiscal resources and factors Capital facilities. See Public utilities and capital improvements Capital Improvement Programs (cips), 178-79, 195, 201, 202, 203, 212 Carla (hurricane), 13, 78, 80 Carmen (hurricane), 14 Carol (hurricane), 12 Carter, Jimmy, 51, 63, 120 Carteret County, North Carolina, 143, 145 Cartography. See Mapping cbra, 8, 51, 52, 121-23, i55, 2-43, 151 Cedar Key, Florida, 249 Celia (hurricane), 13 Census, U.S., 82, 188 Center for Urban and Regional Studies (UNC), 141 Charleston and Charleston Harbor, South Carolina, 23, 98 Charlotte Harbor (Florida), 98 Charlotte Harbor Committee (Florida), 150 Chesapeake Bay, 98 Cities, incorporated, 162, 163. See also Metropolitan areas; Municipalities; specific cities Civil Defense, 64, 183, 188 Coastal Area Act (Alabama), 65 Coastal Area Board (Alabama), 65, 67, 68 Coastal Area Management Act (cama) (North Carolina), 136, 141, 142-43, 145-46, 250 Coastal Area Management Program (North Carolina), 136, 137, 143, 145 Coastal areas and localities: types of, 14—15. See also specific areas and topics Coastal Barrier Resources Act (cbra), 8, 51, 52, 121-23, i 55 , M 3 , 2 - 5 1 Coastal Construction Control Line (cccl) (Florida), 154-55 Coastal Construction Setback Line (Alabama), 67—68 Coastal High-Hazard Areas (nfip), 105—6 Coastal Hurricane Preparedness Program (Texas), 79-80, 85 Coastal Management Act (South Carolina), 131 Coastal Sand Dune Rules (Maine), 131 Coastal States Organization, 132-33, 247-48 Coastal storms: types of, 9. See also Hurricanes; specific topics Coastal Zone Management Act (czma), 41,51, 52, 120-21 Coastal Zone Management (czm) Program, 120-21, 124, 128, 130, 136 Coast Area Planning and Development Commission (pdc), ioi Code of Federal Regulations, 83 INDEX 265 Collier County, Florida, 171 Commerce. See Business and industry Commerce, U.S. Department of, 83 Community Disaster Loans (fema), 70, 109 Computer simulation, 36—37, 96 Condominium projects, 59, 60, 65—66, 68, 71, 72, 75, 90, 123; setback requirements for, 140, 171 Congress, U.S., 99, 103, in, 113, 115, 120, 121, 123, 243, 248. See also United States government Connecticut, 3, 7, 16, 101, 128-29, 188, 189 Connie (hurricane), 12, 134 Conservation. See Environmental protec¬ tion; Natural resources “Construction Prohibition Zone” (Florida), IJ 4 Construction standards. See Building codes and standards Constructive Total Loss Program (nfip), 115 Corps of Engineers. See United States Army Corps of Engineers Corpus Christi, Texas, 98, 101 Costs. See Fiscal resources and factors Counties. See specific counties Courts. See Legal factors crac, 136, 145 crc, 136, 138, 139, 141, 143, 145 Cyclones, 11,75 Damage Survey Reports (dsrs) (fema), 109 Dams, 24, 28, 50 Dare County, North Carolina, 145 Dauphin Island (Alabama), 245 Death toll, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 13, 23, 53, 55, 63, 77, 78, 108, 233; reduction of, 19, 36, 40, 114, 139-40, 146, I 5 Z > x 54 , Mi Decision Arc Maps, 45 Delaware, 3, 7, 16, 98, 101, 128-29, I 3 I , 132, 188, 189 Delaware Bay, 98 Demography, 2, 217, 218, 220—22 Departments of governments. See United States government; specific states Developers/development: in Alabama, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 75, i 6 9; in barrier islands, 15, 121-22, 123; in coastal areas, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 15, 20, 29, 233; in Florida, 123, 147-49, M 2 , 157, M 8 , 179, 250, 251; in floodplains, 35 — 36, 120, 223, 228; in Georgia, 131; in hazard areas, 1, 40, 41, 61, no, 176, 180, 223, 235, 236, 237, 240, 243, 244, 248, 252; management and control of, 1-2, 3, 8-9, 24, 25, 40-44, 49, 56, 60, 61-63, 67, 69, 72, 74, 83, 84, 85, 89, 94, 126, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, * 35 , i 3 8 , 1 39 i 140, MU Mi, M 3 , 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154-55, M7-58, 163-65, 166, 167-71, 172, M 3 , i 75 , 176, 178, 179, 180, 183, 188, 191, 194—204, 206, 207—10, 212, 213, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 224, 226, 227, 228-30, 231, 236, 237, M 8 - 39 , 140-41, 142-, 246, 2.50, 251, 252; in Massachusetts, 131; in Mississippi, 60; in New York, 164 — 65; in North Carolina, 123, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, M 3 , M^, 158, 241, 250; opposition to development management, 206, 207-10, 213, 217, 219, 227, 229, 239; planning for, 43; rights of, 173, 175, 176, 177, 199, 201, 202, 212, 220, 240; sites for, 223; in the South, 73; in South Carolina, 131, 227; in Texas, 23, 76, 78, 79, 81-82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 134, 181; urban, 1. See also Land use “Developments of Regional Impact” (dris) (Florida), 147-49, 158 Diana (hurricane), 15, 39, no, 135, 244 Diane (hurricane), 134 Dikes, 23, 24, 28 Disaster Assistance Act, 116 Disaster culture, 216, 231 n.4 Disaster relief. See United States government: and disaster assistance Disaster Relief Act of 1970, 59 Disaster Relief Act of 1974, 18, 50—51, 52, 83, 100, 107-8, 116, 117, 118, 126, 245 Disaster Relief Fund (President’s), no Donna (hurricane), 12 266 Index Dredging, 8, 27, 30, 99, 122, 141 Dunes. See Shoreline stabilization and protection Eagleton Amendment, 106 Earthquakes, 6, 41, 181-82 Easements, 25, 81, 88, 199, 200, 212 Eastern North Carolina Hurricane Evacuation Study , 45, 144-45 East Providence, Rhode Island, 33 Ecology and ecosystems, 8, 75, 81, 233, 238. See also Environmental protection Economy and economic factors, 5, 34, 35, 57, 58, 66, 70, 82, 85, 88, 89, 114, 134, 137, 162, 165, 170, 172, 176, 180, 207, 209, 214, 216, 217, 218, 220—23, 228, 230, 234-35, 136-37, 138, 139, 240, 241. See also Fiscal resources and factors Edna (hurricane), 12 Education, U.S. Department of, no Electric power systems, 31, 33, 40, 179 Elena (hurricane), 15, 233, 249 elms Committee (Florida), 149, 150-51 Eloise (hurricane), 14 Emerald Isle (town), North Carolina, 135, 168 Eminent domain, 86—87 Energy resources, 122 Engineering. See Building codes and standards; United States Army Corps of Engineers Environmental Land and Water Manage¬ ment Act, 147-48, 150 Environmental Land Management Study (elms) (Florida), 147 Environmental protection, 5, 8—9, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 41, 42, 44, 45, 50, 61, 63-64, 68, 80, 84, 95, 97, 112, 114, 122, 130, 132, 136, 147-48, 150, 151, i53> 154, 156, 157, 163, 168, 170, 173, 180, 191, 191-93, i° 4 , 105, in, 213, 216-18, 226, 228, 229, 233, 235, 238, 242. See also Ecology and ecosystems; Natural resources Environmental Protection Act (Massachu¬ setts) (mepa), 132 Erosion, beach, 8, 9, 11, 15, 18, 27, 29, 30, 3 U 33 , 5 °, 64, 71, 77 , in, 133 , 138, 139, 140, 142, 154, 168, 169, 227, 234, 237, 240, 241, 248, 250, 151 Escape routes. See Evacuation Estuaries, 8, 9, 17, 18, 132, 138, 141, 143, 144.164, 238 Evacuation, emergency, 4, 10, 11, 19, 23, 14, 15 , 16, 36-40, 41, 44 , 45 , 63, 71, 73 , 74 , 75 , 77 , 80, 84, 85, 88-89, 9 U 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 102, 114, 142, 143, 144-45, MS- 49 , 151, 153 , 155 , 156, 163.164, 168, 174, 175, 178, 179, 191, 195, 196, 201, 202, 203, 210, 212, 214, 223, 231, 233, 235, 237, 139 ,151 Everglades National Park, Florida, 150 Expenditures. See Fiscal resources and factors; Public investments and expenditures Farms and farming, 29, 65, 83, 152, 174, 137 Fatalities. See Death toll Federal Disaster Assistance Act, 52 Federal Disaster Relief Act, 156 Federal Emergency Management Agency (fema), 32, 51, 52, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 77, 81, 83-84, 85, 86, 94, 95, 99-102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108-9, no, 111-12, 113, 114-15, 116, 117, 118, 119-20, 122, 124, 126, 144, 156, 187, 193, 214-15, 244, 245, 246-47, 248-49. See also National Flood Insurance Program Federal Highway Administration (fhwa), 86, 110 Federal Housing Administration (fha), 106 Federal Insurance Administration (fia) (fema), 94, 103, 104, 105, 107, 113, 115,122 Federal National Mortgage Association, 106 Federal-State Disaster Assistance Agree¬ ment, 108,117 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 99 fema. See Federal Emergency INDEX 267 Management Agency fema Disaster Loans, 69 fema Special Revenue Fund, 69, 70 fha, 106 FHBMS, IO4-5 FHWA, 86, 110 FIA, 94, 103, 104, 105, 107, 113, 115, 122 FIRMS, 105 Fiscal resources and factors, 2, 3, 4, 7-8, i 3 > * 3 , 2.9, 38, 4°, 43 , 44 , 5 °, 5 G S 2 -, 53 , 55 , 57 , 67, 69-70, 73 — 74, 75 - 76 , 77, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86-87, 88, 91, 98 — 99, 100, 102, 106, 109, no, in, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 132, 133, 140, 142, M 3 , 147 , 149 , M 3 , 154 , 155 - 57 , 158, 163, 164, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173-77, 179, 180, 181, 194, 198, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 213, 214, 226, 233-34, 235-36, 237, 238, 240, 241, 244, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252. See also Economy and economic factors; Public investments and expenditures Fishing: as economic base, 56, 57, 65, 85 Flood Control Act, 49—50 Flood Disaster Protection Act, 50, 52 Flooded Property Purchase Program (Section 1362 of fema Acquisition Program), 70, 82, 86, 112—15, 246-47, 248 Flood Hazard Boundary Maps (fhbms), 104-5 Flood Insurance Rate Maps (firms), 105 Floodplain Management Executive Order, 120 Flood Report, 115 Floods and flood control, 1, 5, 6, 7-8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 18, 23, 24, 26, 28-29, 3 1 — 32 -, 33 , 35 - 36 , 37, 38, 41, 49-50, 5 Z , 53, 56, 58, 59, 60, 63, 65, 69, 71, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 99, 103-7, 112, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 132, 138, 140, 142, 150, 156, 163, 164, 168, 174, 179, 187, 192, 193, 194, 203, 204, 212, 217, 218, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231, 238, 239, 243, 246. See also National Flood Insurance Program Florida, 3, 4, 7, 16, 21, 27, 29, 36, 38, 63, 66, 68, 95, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 122-23, I 2 - 7 , 128-29, 130, 131, 134, 135 , 147 - 59 , 165, 168, 170-71, 178, 179, 183, 188, 189, 224, 249, 250, 251 Florida Administration Commission, 150, 154 Florida Bay, 98 Florida Department of Community Affairs, 148, 150, 153-54, 155-57 Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, 153, 155 Florida Department of Natural Resources, 154 Florida Keys, 4, 38, 150 Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 148 Florida panhandle, 151 Florida Resource Planning and Manage¬ ment Committee (rpmc), 150, 151 Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 4 Fort Myers, Florida, 4 Frank, Neil, 73, 95 Frederic (hurricane), 14, 49, 52, 60, 62, 63 - 75 , 76, 90-91, 92- Freeport, Texas, 28-29, 79 Freeport (Texas), Hurricane Flood Protection Project, 79 Galveston, Texas, 4, 23, 28, 29, 38, 49, 52, 75 - 92 -, 97 , 101 Galveston Bay (Texas), 75 — 92, 98 Galveston Beach (Texas), 240 Galveston County, Texas, 75—92 Galveston Island (Texas), 75—92, 239 Galveston (Texas) Recovery Task Force, 87 Geological processes, 8, 14-15, 26 Georgia, 3, 7, 16, 98, 101, 121, 128-29, 130, 131, 168, 188, 189 Gloria (hurricane), 15 Glynn County, Georgia, 168 Government departments. See specific U.S. government departments; specific state departments Government National Mortgage Associa¬ tion, 106 Governor’s Emergency Council (Missis¬ sippi), 58, 59 268 Index Gracie (hurricane), 12 Grants. See Fiscal resources and factors Great Lakes, 132, 234 “Greenhouse effect,” 9 Green Swamp (Florida), 150 Groundwater, 61, 80, 180. See also Water supply systems Growth and growth management. See Developers/development; Urban growth Growth Management Act (Florida), 151 Growth Management Package (Florida), 149 Guam, 101, 103 Gulf of Mexico coast, 2, 3, 4, 8, 12, 53-92, 121, 122, 130, 132, 157, 162-63, 187, 188, 189, 211 Gulfport, Mississippi, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59 Gulf Regional Planning Commission, 56 Gulf Shores, Alabama, 49, 52, 63—75, 89, 91, 92, 169 Gulf Shores State Park (Alabama), 65, 69 Harris County, Texas, 80 Harris-Galveston Coastal Subsidence District, 80 Harrison County, Mississippi, 49, 52, 53-63, 89, 92 Harrison County v. Guice, 5 5 Hawaii, 7, 101, 103, 188, 189, 211 Hazard mitigation. See Mitigation of coastal storm hazards Hazard Mitigation Plan (fema), 117 Hazard Mitigation Plan (Texas), 83, 84 Hazel (hurricane), 12, 134 Henderson Point, Mississippi, 60 Highways. See Roads and highways Hilda (hurricane), 13 Hilton Head, South Carolina, 4, 73, 98 Hollywood, Florida, 168 Horizontal evacuation. See Evacuation Hospitals and medical facilities, 19, 42, 53, 82 Housing Act, 248 Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of, 83, 106 Houston, Texas, 76—77, 80, 82, 89, 97, 101 hud, 83, 106 Hurricane Preparedness Planning Program (fema), 52, 100, 101, 246 Hurricane Preparedness Studies , 51, 100, 102 Hurricane Protection Project (Texas City), 79 Hurricane Resistance Building Standards (Texas), 33 Hurricanes: categories of, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 53, 63, 75, 89, 152; and coastal growth, 134-36; deaths during (see Death toll); defined, 11; and development ( see Developers/ development); and ecosystems, 233; evacuation from (see Evacuation); forecasted, 13, 52, 77, 79, 94, 95~99, no, 233; frequency of, 12—13, 16, 55; impact and costs of, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7-8, 11, M-15, 2 - 3 , 36 , 43 , 49 - 9 C 162, 166, 233 — 34, 241, 244; insurance for, 3, 4; and land use, 23; major, 3, 4, 12, 13, 14, 15, 21, 49—91; mitigation of (see Mitigation of coastal storm hazards); nature of, 12-14, 17, 18, 45; paths of major hurricanes mapped, 12, 13, 14, 15; planning for, 40, 56, 60; and population, 3, 13, 14, 23; preparedness plans for, 51, 52, 100, 101, 102, 124, 246; seasons for, 2, 11; seeded, 23, 25; states, regions, and areas prone to, 2, 3, 7, 12, 16, 21, 107, 121, 126, 134, 147, 153, 157, 162, 187, 211, 225, 230, 234, 238; threats of, 1, 4, 6, 23, 25, 146, 166, 190; warning of, 4, 13, 19, 23, 25, 36, 38, 39 , 45 , 5 i, 62, 95, 96, 143, 156. See also specific hurricanes and specific topics Hutchinson Island (Florida), 122-23 Hutchinson Island Committee (Florida), 151 Hyde County, North Carolina, 145 Impact fees, 25, 74, 123, 174-75, 176, i 99 , 2 - 37 , 240 Industry. See Business and industry Information dissemination, 25, 43, 44, 95, INDEX 269 156, 163, 180-82, 194, 200-203, 236, 238 Infrastruture, 8, 42, 59, 61, 70, 74, 81, 123, 155, 156, 157, 235. See also Public utilities and capital facilities Ingall’s Shipbuilding Company, 57 Insurance: flood (see National Flood Insurance Program); general, 3, 4, 23, 34, 60, 71, 77, 82, 86, 87, 88, 106, 107, 234, 235, 241, 248, 249 Integrated Emergency Management System (fema), 52 Interagency Regional Hazard Mitigation Teams, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92, 117, 245, 246 Interior, U.S. Department of the, 70, 83, 94, 95, 121-23 International Congress of Building Officials, 31 Intracoastal Waterway, 74, 143 Investments. See Fiscal resources and factors; Public investments and expenditures lone (hurricane), 12, 134 Jamaica Beach (town), Texas, 81 Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 119-20 Johnson, Lyndon B., 50 Jones, Walter, 248 Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi, 57 Kemah, Texas, 85 Key Largo, Florida, 148-49 Kiawah Island, South Carolina, 28 Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, 39 Lagoons, 17, 18 Lake Okeechobee (Florida), 98 Lake Pontchartrain (Louisiana), 28, 98, 99 Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project, 99 Land use, 1, 5, 9, 23, 25, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 56. 57, 59, 60, 61, 70, 75, 85, 89, 105, 114, 116, 118, 133, 136, 138, 141-42, 143, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 157, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171-73, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 183, !95-96, 199, 200, 201, 202, 209, 212, 213, 220, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 237, 238, 239, 240, 246, 249. See also Developers/development Land Use Planning Guidelines (North Carolina), 141—42 Laws. See Legal factors Lee County, Florida, 97, 178 Legal factors, 20, 40, 55 — 56, 59, 61, 63, 69, 83, 86, 87—88, 89, 116, 119, 120, 121, 123, 127, 130, 147, 166, 172, 178, 179, 180, 207, 208, 214, 222, 241, 250 Levees, 24, 29, 50 Loans. See Fiscal resources and factors Local Building Code Amendments (Galveston), 81 Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act (Florida), 153 Localities and local governments, 8, 18, 20, 21, 30, 31, 32, 36, 43, 44, 51, 52, 56, 57 , 5 8 , 59 , 67 , 70, 91, 94 , 95 , 99, 100, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, no, in, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 126, 127, 130, 131, 136, 138, 142, 143 , 145 , 146, r 47 , 148, 149 , 150, I5G 1 53, 154, 155, !56, 157, i5 8 , 162-83, 188, 190, 192, 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 205, 206, 208, 210, 211, 212, 214, 216, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 231, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251 Long Beach, Mississippi, 53, 55, 56, 57, 59 Long Beach, North Carolina, 135 Long Island, New York, 98, 101, 164—65, 168, 169, 183 Long Island (New York) Regional Planning Board (rpb), ioi, 169 Long Island Sound (New York), 98 Looting during evacuation, 39, 71 Louisiana, 3, 7, 16, 28, 56, 57, 59, 98, 99, 101, 102, 119 — 20, 128 — 29, 188, 189 Lower Laguna Madre (Texas), 98 Maine, 3, 7, 15, 16, 121, 128-29, 131, 188,189 270 Index Mandatory Shoreland Zoning Program, 129 Mapping: of evacuation zones and times, 45, 80; of flood or storm hazard areas, 104-5, 1 4 2 -> 146, 246. See also Evacuation Maryland, 3, 7, 16, 30-31, 98, 101, 1 28-29, I 77> 188, 189 Massachusetts, 3, 7, 15, 16, 98, 101, 128-29, 1 31 — 32-, 188, 189 Matagorda Bay (Texas), 98 Matamoros, Mexico, 101 Medical facilities. See Hospitals and medical facilities mepa, 132 Meteorology. See National Weather Service Metropolitan areas: increased risk from storms, 4, 76. See also Cities Mexico, 101 Miami and Miami Beach, Florida, 4, 27, 29, 36, 95, 183 Mid-Atlantic states, 189 Midwestern United States, 3 1 Mississippi, 3, 7, 16, 35, 49, 52, 53-63, 82, 89, 92, 98, 101, 128-29, 179, 188, 189 Mississippi Sound, 61 Mississippi Supreme Court, 55 Mitigation of coastal storm hazards: in Alabama, 66—67, 71, 71, 74* 75 ; alternative approaches to, 23-45; in coastal areas, 5, 20, 21, 26, 44; decision dynamics of, 216-18; effectiveness of, 190—94, 203, 204, 216—31; in Florida, 100, 148, 157; implementation of, 238-41; influences on, 216-31; major types of, 23-26; national policy for* 5^ 6, 18, 49, 234, 235, 236; nature and objectives of, 11, 14, 18-20, 191, 233-34; performance standards for, 235, 236; planning for, 24, 44, 85; policies and strategies recommended, 1-2, 20, 21, 233-52; poststorm adoption of (see Poststorm recovery and redevelopment); priorities for, 216—31; problems in, 1 — 2, 18, 20, 21; stages of, 18-20, 26; in Texas, 81, 82, 83, 84. See also specific topics Mobile, Alabama, 59, 65, 67 Mobile Bay (Alabama), 98 Mobile District Corps of Engineers, 67 Mobile homes, 10, 11, 105, 156 Model Building Standards (Texas), 34 Model Land Development Code (ali), 147 Monmouth Beach, New Jersey, 29-30 Monroe County, Florida, 148-49 Monte Carlo simulation model, 34 Montgomery County, Maryland, 177 Motels: effect of storms on, 88; setback requirements for, 140 Municipalities, 162-63; in Florida, 153; in Mississippi, 61; in North Carolina, 136. See also Cities Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, 227, 241 Nags Head, North Carolina, 39, 168, 241 Narragansett Bay (Rhode Island), 98 National Aeronautics and Space Adminis¬ tration (nasa), 57 National Flood Insurance Act, 18, 50, 52, 103, 107, 112 National Flood Insurance Program (nfip), 7, 8, 26, 31-32, 33, 35, 52, 53, 55, 57, 58, 60-61, 63, 64, 65, 69, 77, 79, 85, 86, 91, 103—7, 112, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 123, 126, 133, 134, 138,140,154,156,187,188,190, 193, 203, 204, 206, 211, 212, 214-15, 218, 219, 225-27, 229, 23O, 235, 243, 247, 248—49. See also Federal Emergency Management Agency; Floods and flood control National Hurricane Center, 2, 3, 4, 36, 38, 73 . 95 , 96 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (noaa), 94, 95, 97, 120-21. See also National Weather Service National Research Council, 89 National Weather Service (nws) (noaa), 4, 36, 51, 52, 77, 79, 94, 95 - 98 , 100, 101, 102, 143 Natural hazards: types compared, 6 Natural resources, conservation of, 8-9, 41, 42, 44, 130, 132, 136, 150, 151, 153, 156, 163, 168, 191, 192-93, 203, INDEX 271 H2., 235 , 238 Natural Resources Code (Texas), 80 Nature Conservancy, 173 New England, 162-63, New Hampshire, 3, 15, 16, 128-29, 188, 189 New Hanover County, North Carolina, 3 °> 143 New Jersey, 3, 7, 16, 29-30, 101, 128 — 29, 134, 135, 166, 177, 188, 189 New Orleans, Louisiana, 28, 57, 59, 99 New York, 3, 7, 16, 30, 98, 101, 128-29, 164-65, 168, 169, 183, 188, 189 nfip. See National Flood Insurance Program Nixon, Richard M., 58 NOAA, 94, 95, 97, 120-21 North Carolina, 3, 7, 8-9, 16, 21, 30, 35, 39, 45, 68, 69, 98, 1 o 1, no, 122-23, 128-29, 130, 134-46, 147, 158, 159, 165, 168, 188, 189, 230, 240, 241, 244, 248, 250 North Carolina Administrative Code, 142 North Carolina Building Code, 144 North Carolina Building Code Council, 143-44 North Carolina Coastal Resources Advisory Council (crac), 136, 145 North Carolina Coastal Resources Commission (crc), 136, 138, 139, 141, M 3 , MS North Carolina Department of Natural Resources and Community Develop¬ ment, 136 North Carolina Division of Coastal Management (dcm), 135, 136, 138, 141, 143 North Carolina Division of Emergency Management, 143, 144 North Carolina Post-Disaster Task Force, 141 North Carolina Residential Building Code, 140 Oak Island (North Carolina), 135 Ocean City, Maryland, 30-31 Ocean City, New Jersey, 166 Ocean Erodible Zones (North Carolina), 168 Ocracoke Island (North Carolina), 145 Office of Ocean and Coastal Resources Management (noaa), 97 Office of Sea Grant (noaa), 97 Onslow Beach (North Carolina), 123 Onslow County, North Carolina, 143, 168 Open Beaches Act (Texas), 80-81, 87-88, 242 Open space. See Recreation areas Outer Banks (North Carolina), 143 Pacific coast, 132, 189, 234 Pamlico Sound (North Carolina), 98 Parks. See Recreation areas Pass Christian, Mississippi, 53, 55, 57, 59, 179 Pelican Bay (Florida), 171 Pender County, North Carolina, 143 Pensacola, Florida, 98 Pinelands (New Jersey), 177 Planning. See specific topics Pleasure Island (Alabama), 63-75 Politics and political factors, 1, 40, 41, 43, 67, 86, no, 121, 126, 127, 130, 190, 206, 207, 208, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219-20, 222, 224-25, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 236, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 248, 250, 251, 252 Pollution, 61, 74, 99 Population Preparedness Projects (fema), 100 Population vulnerability to coastal storms, 2, 3, 4, 5. *3, i4 ? 2-3, 38, 42-, 100, 233. See also specific regions, states, and cities Port Arthur, Texas, iox Port Bouganville/Garden Cove development (Florida), 148—49 Post-Flood Recovery Progress Report (Hurricane Alicia), 82, 83 Poststorm recovery and redevelopment, 18, 19-20, 24, 25, 26, 41, 49, 57-58, 59-60, 61, 66-75, 82-88, 97, 100, 108, 109-10, 116—19, 126, 129, 130, 131, 141, 142-43, 146, 153, 154, 155-56, 157, 163, 165-66, 167, 168, 169-70, 174, 179, 183, 195, 201, 202, 211, 212, 223, 224, 225, 239, 241-42, 272 Index 2 45 > 2 49 , 2-50 Power. See Electric power systems Preparedness phase for natural hazard disasters, 18, 19, 20 President’s Disaster Relief Fund, 110 Private property ethos, 216-17, 219-20 Property Protection Projects (fema), ioo Public access, 55, 56, 70, 74, 80-81, 88, 122, 142, 164, 171, 237 Public Assistance Categories (fema), 109 Public assistance programs. See United States government: and disaster assistance Public facilities and services, 19, 40, 41, 42, 51, 59, 67, 69, 70, 74, 80-81, 82, 85, 88, 109, 114, 116, 122, 132, 139, 140, 142, 153, 154, 156, 157, 164, 170, 171, 174, 179, 180, 191, 193, i94, 197, 198, 201, 212, 213, 223, 237, 238, 244, 245-46 Public health, safety, and welfare, 1, 5—7, 14, 19, 23, 37, 39, 41, 66, 71, 75, 83, 84, 148, 152, 154, 156, 162, 163, 164, 166, 174, 178, 180, 190, 223, 234, 235, 237, 239, 241, 246, 252 Public investments and expenditures, 40, 42, 130, 132, 133, 155, 167, 171-73, 174, 179, 180, 194, 197, 199-200, 235, 248, 251. See also Fiscal resources and factors Public Law 91-606, 59 Public Law 93-288, 63, 83, 116 Public Law 97-348, 121 Public policy, 1, 5, 6, 14, 21, 23, 41, 49, 90, 113, 158, 174, 176, 208, 209, 214, 221, 225, 234, 236, 242 Public trust areas, 138 Public utilities and capital improvements, 2 5, 43, 53, 63, 66, 71, 72, 75, 109, 129, 132, 133, 140, 149, 163, 164, 174, 177-80, 195, 197-98, 201, 202, 203, 212, 213, 237, 243. See also Infrastructure; specific types of utilities Puerto Rico, 101 Real estate industry, 2, 35, 57, 70, 134, 181, 182, 200, 201, 202, 206, 208, 113, 2 39 Recreation areas, 2, 9, 31, 41, 44, 56, 61, 65, 69, 70, 86, 109, 112, 114, 115, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 177, 183, 198, 212, 217, 218, 220, 229, 230, 231, 233, 236, 237, 239, 248 Refuge. See Evacuation Regional Goals, Issues, and Policies, 152 -—53 Regional planning. See specific regions and topics Relocation of structures, 42, 134, 171-73, 191—92, 199, 200, 201, 202, 213, 225, 235, 240, 241, 247-48 Response phase for natural hazard disasters, 18, 20 Revenue. See Fiscal resources and factors Rhode Island, 3, 7, 16, 33, 98, 101, 128-29, 131, 188, 189 Rivers: flooding of, 6, 13; vulnerability to storms, 175, 237 Roads and highways, 8, 10, 30, 31, 33, 37, 39, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 80, 81, 84, 109, no, 121, 122, 123, 140, 144-45, 148, 15 2 , 164, 169, 174, 177, 179, 180, 233, 237, 241, 243, 246. See also Traffic and transportation systems Sabine Lake (Texas-Louisiana), 98 Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale, 3, 10—11, 12, 16, 53 St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, 119 Samoa, 101 Sanibel Island, Florida, 165 Schools: building/rebuilding of, no, 156; dri review of, 148 Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricanes (slosh), 36-37, 79-80, 84, 96-98, 100, 101 —2 Seafood industry, 56, 57, 65 Section 406 (Disaster Relief Act), 116, 117, 118, 126, 245. See also Disaster Relief Act of 1974 Section 1362 Acquisition Program (fema), 70, 82, 86, 112—15, 246-47, 248 Setbacks. See Shoreline stabilization and protection Sewer systems, 31, 33, 71, 74, 81, 87, 106, INDEX 273 132, 140, 174, 177, 179, 180, 241, 243, 246 Shelby Lakes (Alabama), 64 Shore Assistance Act (Georgia), 131 Shoreline stabilization and protection, 8—9, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26-31, 32, 50, 55, 56, 64, 65, 67-68, 69, 72—73, 78, 79, 81, 84, 88, 99, 106, 128, 129, 130, 131, z 3 *> z 33 , z 34 , 138, i 39 » 140, i 4 z , 146, 153, 154, 155, 156, 163-64, 168, 169, 170-71, 183, 191, 19*, 196, 201, 202, 203, 204, 212, 213, 227, 228, 231, 235, 237, 238, 242, 248, 250. See also Barrier islands Shore Protection Manual, 3 2 slosh, 36-37, 79-80, 84, 96-98, 100, 101 —2 South Carolina, 3, 4, 7, 16, 23, 28, 73, 98, 101, 122, 128 — 29, I 3 I , 168, 188, 189, 2-2-7, 241, 251 South Carolina Coastal Commission, 251 South Carolina Coastal Council, 131 Southeastern United States, 189 Southern Building Code Congress International, 31 Southern Shores (town), North Carolina, 39 Southern Standard Building Code, 55, 64, 72, 131, 143 Southern United States, 31, 73, 126 Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council, 152-53 Special Program to List the Amplitudes of Surge from Hurricanes (splash), 96-97 splash, 96-97 Standard Building Code, 31, 33, 81 State and Regional Planning Act (Florida), 151-52 State Coastal Management Programs, 128-30 States, See specific states Structures. See Building codes and standards Subdivision regulation, 25, 41, 194, 196, 199, 201, 202, 212, 213, 237 Subrogation: and recovery of insurance payments, 119, 249 Sullivan’s Island (town), South Caro¬ lina, 168 Supplemental Building Code for Coastal Construction in High Hazard Areas (Alabama), 72 Suwannee River Basin Committee (Florida), 150 Tampa Bay (Florida), 4, 97, 98, 100, 101 Tampa Bay (Florida), Regional Planning Council (rpc), ioi Taxes and taxation, 5, 7, 8, 25, 40, 41, 43, 58-59, 69, 70, 81, 86, 88, 89, 90, 109, 115, 162, 163, 170, 173-77, i94, 198, 199, 201, 202, 209, 212, 213, 226, 237, 238, 240, 241, 244, 248. See also Fiscal resources and factors TDRS, X75, 176, 177, 199, 220, 240 Telephone systems: protection of, 33, 179 Texas, 3, 4, 7, 16, 23, 28-29, 33 , 34 , 38, 49, 5*, 75-9*, 97, 98, 101, 121, 128-29, 130, 134, 172, 179, 181, 188, 189, 220, 239, 240, 242, 247 Texas A&M University: and hurricane preparedness program, 80 Texas City, Texas, 28, 79 Texas Department of Public Safety, 83 Texas Department of Water Resources, 83 Texas Marine and Coastal Council, 134 Tides, 29, 30, 32, 77, 80, 81, 104, 135, 136,147 Titus, James G., 9 Topsail Island (North Carolina), 122—23, 168 Tornadoes, 6, 13, 14, 53, 63, 245 Tourism, 2, 45, 56, 63, 65—66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 82, 88, 217, 218, 220, 229, 230, 23 1 ,239 Towns. See specific towns Traffic and transportation systems, 37, 69, 85, 89, 155, 183, 237. See also Roads and highways Transfers of Development Rights (tdrs), 175, 176, 177, 199, 220, 240 Transportation. See Traffic and transpor¬ tation systems Transportation, U.S. Department of, 83 Trust for Public Land, 173 274 Index Trust Territories (U.S.), ioi T sunami, 6 Uniform (Building) Code, 31 United States: national disasters in, 4, 5; population of, 2, 233. See also United States government; specific states and topics United States Army Corps of Engineers (usace), 32, 45, 49-50. 59, 67, 69, 86, 94, 95, 97, 99, too, 101, 102, 144-45 United States Census, 82, 188 United States Congress, 99, 103, in, 113, 115, 120, 121, 123, 243, 248. See also United States government United States Court of Appeals, 55-56, 119 United States Department of Agriculture, 83 United States Department of the Army, 83. See also United States Army Corps of Engineers United States Department of Commerce, 83 United States Department of Education, 110 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (hud), 83, 106 United States Department of the Interior, 70, 83, 94, 95, 121-23 United States Department of Transpor¬ tation, 83 United States Environmental Protection Agency, 83 United States General Accounting Office (gao), 98, 106-7, m, 112. United States government: and cam A, 145; and coastal storms, 7-8, 20, 95; and disaster assistance, 5, 8, 18, 26, 49-52, 57, 58, 59, 60, 67-70, 74, 77, 83-86, 91, 100, 107—13, 116, 117, 118, 126, I2 7 , 155 , ! 5 6 > 2 35 > 2 4 C 2 43 - 45 , 2 47 , 249; and land-use planning, 57, 136; and mitigation of coastal storm haz¬ ards, 1, 2, 18, 20, 21, 41, 44, 49, 50-51, 67, 68, 80, 82, 89-90, 94 — 124, 126, 127, 162, 172, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 234, 235-36, 240, 243-49, 252. See also United States Congress; specific agencies United States Navy Seabees, 57 United States Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management, 68 United States Small Business Adminis¬ tration, 83, 110 United States v. Harrison County, 55 — 56 United States v. Parish of Jefferson, 119 — 20 United States v. St. Bernard Parish, 119 United States Veterans Administration, 57, 106 University of North Carolina, 141, 230 University of Texas Medical Branch, 82 Urban growth, 1, 3, 4, 21, 23-25, 38, 40, 61, 76, 84, 85, 90, 106, 114, 141, 162, 178 usace. See United States Army Corps of Engineers Vandalism during evacuation, 39 Vegetation line, 80, 81, 87-88, 138, 139, 140, 156, 169, 242 Vehicles. See Evacuation; Roads and highways; Traffic and transportation systems Vertical evacuation. See Evacuation Virginia, 3, 7, 16, 29, 53, 101, 127, 128-29, 130, I 3 2 , 188, 189, 220 Virginia Beach, Virginia, 29, 220 Virginia Marine Resources Commission, i3 2 Virgin Islands, 101, 103 Wastes and wastewater, 8, 33, 61, 74, 180 Water supply systems, 31, 33, 61, 69, 71, 74, 80, 83, 87, 99, 106, 109, 140, 141, 174, 177, 179, 180, 183, 243 Weather. See National Weather Service Western United States, 31 Westhampton Beach, New York, 30 West Onslow Beach (North Carolina), 168 West Virginia, 53 Wetlands, 8, 9, 51, 52, 99, 120, 129, 130, 132, 138, 141, 150, 164, 169, 223, 235 Wetlands Act (Virginia), 132 Wildlife, 44 Wilmington, North Carolina, 144-45 INDEX 275 Zones (nfip), 104, 105-6, 107, 138, 154, 187-88, 2,11, 214—15, 249 Zoning of hazardous areas, 25, 41, 56, 57, 60, 61, 64-65, 66-67, 71, 73 , 74 , 75 , 89, 118, 129, 157, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 175, 177, 178, 181-82, 194, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 212, 213, 237, 240 About the Authors Timothy Beatley is Assistant Professor in the Division of Urban and Environmental Planning in the School of Architecture at the University of Virginia. Beatley’s primary teaching and research interests include coastal planning, urban growth management, and environmental policy and politics. He is also strongly interested in the subject of ethics as it relates to planning and public policy and has written extensively on this subject. He holds a Ph.D. in planning from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. David J. Brower is Associate Director of the Center for Urban and Regional Studies at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is a lawyer and a planner interested in the management of urban and regional growth to accomplish public and private goals. His research has included the investigation of growth management to mitigate the impact of natural hazards, conserve natural ecosystems, and achieve social equity. He is also President of Coastal Resources Collaborative, Ltd., Chapel Hill and Manteo, North Carolina, and counsel to Robinson & Cole, Hartford, Connecticut. David R. Godschalk is Professor of City and Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he teaches land use and environmental planning. Dr. Godschalk’s work has focused on development management for cities, regions, and coastal areas. He has done research on carrying capacity, hazard mitigation, dispute resolution, citizen participation, and computer information systems. A registered architect, he has been editor of the Journal of the American Institute of Planners, chairman of the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina, and a member of the governing boards of the American Planning Association, the American Society of Planning Officials, and the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning. He holds an A.B. from Dartmouth College, an architecture degree from the University of Florida, and master’s and doctoral degrees in planning from the University of North Carolina. He currently serves on the Chapel Hill Town Council. Godschalk, David R. Catastrophic coastal storms: hazard mitigation and development management / by David R. Godschalk, David J. Brower, Timothy Beatley. p. cm. — (Duke Press policy studies) Bibliography: p. Includes index. ISBN (invalid) 0-8223-0558-X 1. Coastal zone management—South Atlantic States, 2. Coastal zone management—Gulf States. 3. Shore protection—Atlantic Coast (U.S.) 4. Shore protection—Gulf Coast (U.S.) 5. Hurricane protection—South Atlantic States. 6. Hurricane protection—Gulf States. I. Brower, David J. II. Beatley, Timothy, 1957- III. Title. IV. Series. HT392.5.S65G63 1988 333.9i'7i6'o973—dci9 Sv' r \ • ? )' • p i i It ■ h , v \ ( 1 A r • v 4 j 1 , o .? V ( -r .. ' T y Z ~ ,l r r > f r K vA \ r. ! ( & > .) J A’>. ' -* ■ m / y .l : f ( t . \ > 1 i .. •' ‘ , r — L -\ . > ■ y - - f v ; 1 ' -Xi h- < ! r i \ . 1 * P v r - " V ' f U ' - ^ ■ ' > r v 0 ^ 1 . ’ ; ¥ ‘- - ■V i. r \ a/ A si ‘ i i. V . • - . > v ■; < •\ \ : . - v ■' 4 > ■" J - r - W : ■A . -x • - A J -- y ■u. i’ 1 r : / 1 ■ -X. ( -’j f- Y / Stef, ■ y ^-Y\ x -r l :■ ■- ■ \. ' r i 1 -A a. 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