~ .--r y ; > ■ v tin; / SPIRIT ■Y . Cé^^'J MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, MA USUAL MARM/^NT, i Diivi. of i:.\<;i x i i:i> va ltd KJiANK SCIJAUJ- M >I,I AIIUA. wo >• COL. GEORGE WASHINGTON FLOWERS MEMORIAL COLLECTION DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY DURHAM. N. C. PRESENTED BY W. W. FLOWERS J Cr>l^ù2^ THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS, BY MARSHAL MARMONT, DUKE OF RAGUSA. Translated from the last Paris edition (1859), and augmented by Biographi- cal, Historical, Topographical, and Military Notes ; with a new version of General Jomini's celebrated Thirty-fifth Chapter, of Part I, of Treatise on Grand Military Operations. BY FEANK SCHALLEE, Colonel 22d Regiment 3Iississippi Infantry, Confederate Army. COLUMBIA, S. C: EVANS AND COGSWELL 1864. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by EVANS & COGSWELL,. In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Confederate States for the District of South Carolina. Printed by Evan» ant> Cogswell, Colombia, S. C» INDEX. Dedication to President Jefferson Davis 7 Letter of Colonel Schaller to President Davis 9 Reply of President Davi« H From the Translator 13 List of Works used in the preparation of Notes 15 Dedication of Marshal Marniont's work to the Army of France 19 Some Introductory Advice to the Military Student 21 PART FIRST. GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. CHAPTER I. Definitions 27 CHAPTER II. General principles 31 CHAPTER III. Bases, Lines of Operation, and Strategy 34 CHAPTER IV. Tactics 41 CHAPTER V. Manœuvres 44 PART SECOND. ORGANIZATION, FORMATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF ARMIES. CHAPTER I. Organization and formation of troops 47 First Section: Infantry 47 Second Section: Cavalry 56 9 44996 4 in hex. CHAPTER II. Artillery 6S CHAPTER III. Fortifications 9S CHAPTER IV. Administration 114 First Section : Subsistence 115 Second Section : Hospitals , 118 OHAPTBB V. ' Military justice aud composition of courts 122 PART THIRD. DIVEItS OPERATIONS OP WAR. CHAPTER I. Employment of the different arms 128 CHAPTER II. Offensive and defensive wars .141 CHAPTER III. Marches and encampments 147 CHAPTER IV. Grand roconnoissances, and precautions they require 156 CHAPTER V. Detachments in presence of the enemy — their chances, and the dangers which accompany them , 158 CHAPTER VI. , Battles 1 G2 CHAPTER VII. Conduct of the general the day following the victory 177 CHAPTER VIII. Retreats 181 INDEX, 5 CHAPTER IX. Night attacks and surprises 185 CHAPTER X. Dcfonce of fortresses .200 PART FOURTH. PHILOSOPHY OF WAR. CHAPTER I. Morale of soldier», and how to form them. Former armies, and those of the present time 20 CHAPTER II. Military spirit, and difficulties of commanding 223 CHAPTER III. Picture of a general who answers to all the requirements of the command 232 "CHAPTER IV. Reputation of generals 260 Conclusion 262 APPENDIX. Exposition of the general principles of the Art of War 26 "44996 THIS VOLUME IS INSCRIBED TO His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, PRESIDENT OP THE CONPEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, AND Commander-in-Chief op their Armies and Navies, with sentiments of the greatest ESTEEM. LETTER OF COLONEL SMALLER TO MS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT DAVIS. Columbia, South Carolina, November 10, '1S63. Hia Excellency, Preaident Jefferson Davis, Richmond, Virginia. Mr. President: Every soldier of the Confederate States Army, of whatever grade, who is imbued with the spirit of advancement and emu- lation in his profession, has long since felt the want of the material which inigkt serve him as a basis for both the study of, and research into, military matters. Struggling as we are — alone, isolated, and without any exterior aid from any quarter of the world — presenting the greatest moral spectacle, and, in the exhibition of our unity and perseverance, the most graphic instance of a nation's devotion to the cause of liberty history has ever furnished — the soldiers of this Confederacy, amid their manifold priva- tions, have not even had the gratification of comparing their illustrious deeds with those of other military nations, related to us by prominent military writers, and the study of whose works forms so important a part of a soldier's education. The want of a work on the art of war, which could be easily compre- hended by.one even who had devoted but little time or thought upon military matters, and which yet would not bo beneath the consideration of the educated soldier, being seriously felt, it was often brought to the notice of the writer. During the period of my incapacity to «erve in the field, arising from the effects of severe wounds, I have sought to prosecute, and I trust to have done so with some advantage, the study of military matters. Consulting those of my professional friends to whose opinion consid- eration must be accorded, among several recent French and German works upon the military art at my disposal none struck mo as worthier of being known to the great body of the Confederate Army than the work of Marshal Marmont, entitled : "Be l'Esprit des Institutions Militaires," Paris, 1859 ; and I have, in consequence, completed a translation thereof, with such military, historical, and topographical notes of my own, as appeared to bo necessary for its complote understanding. Concise, and of comparatively small compass for so extensivo a subject as is presented by the consideration of the Art of War, it nevertheless forms a complete treatise upon it, and every important principle of that 10 art "which elevates and preserves empires," and through the agency of which we will have to achieve our independence, is clearly and fully il- lustrated. It is proper here to state that I have, in my notes, carefully abstained from criticising any of the operations of any of our generals, although reference has been made to illustrate, through the events of our own war, yet fully impressed upon the minds of our own soldiers, the princi- ples of the art. When once our independence is achieved, and the tableau of our suc- cesses and reverses is spread before us in all its glories and shadows, then, and only then, it appears to me, can a thorough criticism of our military operations be useful to the country and beneficial to the military student. To you, Mr. President, whose genius has not only organized an army, but has achieved the still greater task of maintaining and strengthening it, amid circumstances the most unfavorable, until it has become, in numbers, spirit, devotion, and efficiency, more formidable than it has ever before been, even after a period of over thirty months of active warfare — to you, then, whose great achievements in this respect alone make you a master of the art of war, I have proposed, and herewith most respectfully beg permission, to dedicate my work. * • * With sentiments of the hiehest esteem, I remain, your Excellency's Most obedient servant, FRANK SCHALLER, Colonel 22d Regiment of Mississippi Infantry. REPLY OF HIS EXCELLENCY, PRESIDENT DAVIS, TO COLONEL SCHALLER. Confederate States op America, Executive Department, Richmond, Va., Nov. 25, 1863. Dear Sir : It gives me pleasure to acknowledge your letter of the 10th inst., and thank you for the personal kindness therein expressed. The work of Marshal Marmont, Duc de Ragusa, "De l'Esprit des Insti- tutions Militaires," is an interesting one, and a good translation of it will add something to our military literature. In the 1st and 2d volumes of the United Service Journal, published in England in 1845, will be found a translation of this work, but evi- dently by one not skilled in the knowledge and use of the English language. Another translation, therefore, will be timely and useful. The request you have been pleased to make in relation to the dedica- tion, I grant, of course, with pleasure. Very truly and respectfully yours, JEFFERSON DAVIS. Colonel F. Schaller, etc., Columbia, S. C. FROM THE TRANSLATOR. In offering to the officers and soldiers of the Confederate Army this little volume, I refrain from making any excuses. Many of them will be better able than myself to judge of its intrinsic merits. It will be seen that, as an appendix, I have incorporated with it the lucid and justly celebrated chapter of General Jomini, giving, in a masterly mauner, the exposition of the general prin- ciples of the art of war. I have sought to preserve its original force and integrity as much as my knowledge of the English language enabled me to do, and I believe it to.be a faithful ver- sion. It is intended to be the forerunner of the entire work, which, as soon as the labors shall be finished, will appear in a form worthy of the illustrious author. Nothing but the great want of material, which is felt so much by our officers, has deter- mined me to detach it, and to publish it in advauce; its perusal will be attended with profit to soldiers of all ranks. I can only express the hope that my companions-in-arms may find, in this Jittle volume, some further encouragement steadfast- ly to advance in the glorious contest in which they are engaged, and that the arms of the Confederacy may soon be surmounted by the crown of Peace, as the finishing feature of their laurel and cypress-entwined glories. For the defects of the work, as chargeable to myself, I would bespeak indulgence. 2 LIST OF WORKS USED IN THE PREPARATION OP NOTES. 1. Annales des Provinces Unies, par Basnage. A la Haye: 1726. 2. Traité des Grandes Opérations Militaires ; par le Lieutenant-Gé- néral Jomini. Paris : 1818. 3. History of the War in France and Belgium in 181 è ; by W. Siborne. London: 1818. 4. Histoire Critique et Militaire des Guerres de la Révolution; par le Lieutenant-Général Jomini. Paris : 1820. 5. Atlas des plus mémorabiles Batailles, Combats, et Sièges ; par Fr. de Kausler, Major à l'Etat-Maj or-Général Wurtembergeois. Carls- rouhe et Fribourg : 1831. 6. History of the late Polish Revolution; by Major Joseph Hordyn- ski, Polish Army. Boston : 1833. 7. Military Technical Dictionary; by Captain Burn, R. Artillery. Woolwich: 1842. 8. A View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Armies ; by Robert Jackson, M.D., Inspector-General of Army Hospitals. London : 1845. 9. Géographie, Physique, Historique, et Militaire; par La Vallée. Paris: 1850. 10. Military Maxims of Napoleon; translated from the French, by Lieutenant-General Sir G. C. D'Aguilar, C.B. London : 1852. 11. Military Encyclopaedia; by J. H. Stocqueler. London: 1853. 12. On Fire-arms; by Colonel Chesney, R. Artillery. London: 1853. 13. On Cavalry; by Captain Nolan, 15th Hussars. London: 1854. 14. History of Europe; by Sir A. Alison. London: 1857. 15. Histoire delà Campagne de 1815; par Lioutenant-ColonelCharras. Bruxelles: 1858. 16. U. S. House of Representatives, 35th Congress, 2d Session. Ex. Doc. No. 2. Washington : 1858. 17. Der Italienische Krieg, 1859; von W. Riistow. Zurich : 1859. 18. L'Italie Confédérée. Histoire Politique, Militaire, et Pittoresque de la Campagne do 1S59 ; par A. de Césena. Paris : 1859. 19. U. S. Senate, 36th Congress, 1st Session. Ex. Doc. No. 2. Washington: 1860. 20. Hand-book Dictionary; by Lieutenant-Colonel Percy Scott, Com- mandant Isle of Wight Artillery. London : 1861. 16 SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 21. Official Reports of Battles: published by order of Congress C. S. Richmond, Va.: 1862. 2" 2. The Practice of War; by C. F. Pardigon. Richmond, Va. : 1863- [Translation.] 23. Histoire et Tactique des trois Armes, et plus particulièrement de l'Artillerie de Campagne; par Ild. Favé, Capitaine d'Artillerie. Paris : 1853. THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 2* DEDICATION OF MARSHAL MARMONT'S WORK TO THE ARMY OF FRANCE. To the Army I dedicate my work. It has been my cradle. In its ranks I have passed my life. I have constantly partaken of its hard- ships, and more than once I have shed my blood during the heroic times, the memory of which will never be lost. Arrived at that age at which all the interests arid consolations of a lifetime are to be found in the meditation upon the past, I address to the army this last souvenir. Those soldiers, my companions in arms, possessed every military virtue. To bravery and the love of glory, so natural to Frenchmen, they joined great respect for discipline, and boundless confidence in their chief — the first elements of success. While under my command, and when opposed to equal forces, they have never been beaten. Often victors, despite the inferiority of num- bers, they but seldom gave way to immense superiority in strength and the fatality of circumstances ; always remaining sufficiently formidable to make the enemy almost regret his victory. The soldiers of the present time worthily follow the examples of their predecessors; and the courage, patience, and energy they unceasingly show during the long and painful African wars, prove that always, and everywhere, they will respond to the wants and the exigencies of the country. The -former have been the object of my most assiduous cares and my liveliest solicitude. The latter, as long as I shall live, will have my most ardent sympa, thics. THE MARSHAL, DUKE OF RAGUSA. SOME INTRODUCTORY ADVICE TO THE MILITARY STUDENT. Scarcity of military works— Special treatises do not contain the principles of the subject— Character of ancient writers— Polybius and Vegetius more curious than useful— Character of actual war— Difficulties of command iu modern warfare — In what it consists— Alexander, Hannibal, Ca?sar— Dreams of Knight Folard— Cnmp of Rayeux— Experience of Dumesnil-Durand — General Rogniat— Particular ob- ject of this book— Wealth of military literature—Standard works— Napoleon's writings— Archduke Charles' principles of strategy— Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr— Twenty campaigns, and fifty years of experience. Notks.— 1. Polybius. 2. Vegetius. 3. Gen. A. S. Johnston, Confederate Army. 4. Chevalier Folard. 5. Lieu tenant-General Rogniat. 6. Thersites. 7. Memoirs of Montholon. 8. Archduke Charles of Austria. 9. Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr 10. Ségur. No modern work upon the art of war or military institutions contains a complete exposition of principles. Several special treatises upon the different arms have been published, but the principles of the subject at large have never been established in any. Superficial views, technical ■ and minute details, without any sufficient indication of the aim and the means, can there only be found. Ancient writers have searched into military questions even more pro- foundly; but what remains of their theories, since, through the discovery of gunpowder, military science has been so completely modified ? Polybius 1 and Vegetius 2 can still satisfy our curiosity ; but we may no longer look in their writings for any useful and connected instruc- tion. Ancient and modern wars have no point of resemblance, their moral affinity perhaps excepted, or that sublime part of the art which consists in the knowledge of the human heart— a knowledge which, at all times, is so necessary in directing men, and which, in war, exercises a yet more prompt and decisive influence. Everything has changed in the form and proportions of arms; their greater range keep3 the combatants at greater distances; they cause greater terror, and contribute materially to prodigious results. To this may be added the smaller number of combatants in former times. But the art of commanding "tiers nowadays many more difficulties. With the ancients, who fought always with the hand, the army was 22 THE SPIRIT OF formed in a compact manner; the small number of soldiers occupied but a very limited space; its front barely equalled that of one of our brigades. If a general could not himself see every one, he was at least within sight of all of his men. Operating upon so small a scale, the supreme chief could hasten everywhere; he was a combatant him- self, giving the example, sword in hand. In our days, the general wages war by means of Will and Thought; his skill in wielding the sword is without importance ; the mind embraces quite another range than is apparent to our perception; and a general, in short, is nowa- days much less of a soldier, although he should now and then be one, but rather a moral being who, by force of his influence upon the understanding, appears to govern events like the mysterious powers of 'nature. 3 Thus, actual war constitutes an entirely novel art, for which neither model nor precept could be found in the wars of the Greeks and Romans. If the greatest captains of antiquity, Alexander, Caesar, or Hannibal, could return to this earth, and come suddenly upon a field of battle, their genius would comprehend nothing ; and they would have need of more than one campaign to understand completely the mechanism of the profession, as well as the consequences of our new arms and institutions. These truths are so evident to him who has led in war, that it may well be asked how, in the times of Louis XIV, the reveries of Cheva- lier Folard 4 could have been seriously entertained; and later, the still more foolish vagaries of Ménil-Durand, who was on the point of estab- lishing a special camp at Bayeux to obtain comparative practical knowledge of formations and manœuvres. It will be still more aston- ishing that a general of our epoch, Lieutenant-General Rogniat, 5 of the engineers, an officer of merit in his special arm, should have written a large book to revive and enlarge upon these vagaries ; and if he did not figure among combatants, he could and might at least have seen some battles. I propose to give a summary of the principles of organization, mili- tary institutions, and of active operations. I have endeavored to show that nothing should be left to hazard in these matters ; that everything depends upon a generating principle, from which the necessary conse- quences flow. A principle is discovered by the careful consideration of the end, and by seeking the best means to attain it. A genius applies recognized principles ; in this consists the whole art of war. I have deemed it useful to expose them in the simplest manner, and MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 23 to embrace, in a treatise on the rudiments of the military art, all the branches of that art, and at the same time the different services of armies, by stripping them of the technical charlatanism which too often accompanies them. Yet to these principles the studies of military men are not limited; they should read attentively, in addition, the history of the campaigns of groat generals — because the wholo genius of these superior men is to be found in their application. In this respect military literature i3 very rich ; but a choice must be made. It is preferable to go back to the source ; the works of those, therefore, who have commanded, should be sought; because little good is to be gained from campaigns described by subalterns, who, strangers to all the difficulties of command, and often to the very first notions of the profession, set themselves up for masters by censuring ; they are modern Thersites, 6 severe in languago but feeble of heart and arm, rather made to talk than to act. Their works are a tissue of errors and misrepresentations. Above all documents deeply to be studied, the papers dictated by Na- poleon, and published under the title of " Memoirs of Montholon,"' 1 are recommended. In every line the superior genius, the power of reasoning, and the au- thority of the great captain, are recognized. His decisions and explana- tions, though sometimes susceptible of controversy, offer the most valuable precepts; he who knows how to meditate upon and comprehend them will have the instinct of war. An older work, which can not be studied too much, is the book pub- lished by the Archduke Charles of Austria, under the title of " Principles of Strategy." 8 In it the application of these principles is seen in his movomonts, when operating in 1796 against the Armies of the Rhine and Sambre-and-Meuse; it is an exemplification of all the rules of grand warfare. The Memoirs of Marshal Gouvion Saint Cyr, 9 and The History of the Russian Campaign, 10 by Ségur, will likewise be read with advantage. From such sources healthy instruction, or the most correct opinions, can alone be drawn.* I have occupied myself with the constitution of the different arms, and their best employment, for a long time ; and I believe the principles which I am about to lay down to be true. I recommend them to the * I visited, in 1826, during an entire day, the field of battle of the Moscowa, with neveral French and Russian officers who had participated in that struggle; upon the ground I read the three descriptions by Ségur. Chitmbray, and Boutourlin : in my opinion, the first givos tha only correct account of the manner in which the events must hare occurred. — Note of Jut far. 24 THE SriRÎT OF ardent, intelligent, and valorous youths who have replaeod us ; I have written for them. The work I publish is the last contribution which, at the decline of my life, I am able to offer for the benefit of a science I have always cul- tivated with ardor, and a profession to which I am passionately attached. In the moments of my leisure I found a great charm in the prepara- tion of this resume of my past studies and recollections. It is the fruit of my meditations, developed by long and frequent conversations with Napoleon, tAventy campaigns, and more than half a century of experi- ence. NOTES. 1. Polybius, Greek historian; scholar of Philopromen ; friend and counsellor of Scipio JEmilianus ; commander of the Achî^an cavalry ; defender of Greek in- dependence. Among his works the military reader will find a treatise of the Roman Art of War, and another on Tactics. Died, of a fall from his horse. B.C. 121, 82 years old. His works have been translated into English by Hampton. 2. Vegetius, Roman military writer of great celebrity under the reign of the Emperor Valentinian, A.D. 386. His works may be found in S vols., published at Strasbourg, 1806. 3. A general, in short, is nowadays niuch less of a soldier, al- though he should now and then be one. This should be understood that a general, when occasion requires it, will not hesitate to perform the part of a sol- dier by joining in the combat. That he should be a soldier, in the sense of the term ordinarily applied, is presupposed. Our glorious General Albert Sidney John- ston, when leading Bowen's brigade to the charge to restore the wavering fortunes of the battle, at a moment which proved to be the turning-point of the struggle (Shiloh, April C, 1802), forcibly illustrates this remark, and his act and heroic death •will not only bo one of the most magnificent passages of our history, but a sublime precept to every Confederate general. [Vide Chapter 3, l'art TV.] 4. Chevalier Charles de Folard, born at Avignon in 1GG9 ; died there 1752; second lieutenant in the regiment of Borry, 1688 : distinguished in campaign of 1701 ; thrice wounded in the Battle of Cassano, in 1705, gained by Louis, Duke of Vendôme, over the Imperialists, in the war of the Spanish succession. In 1714 ho fousht at Malta against the Turks ; joined King Charles XII of Sweden, re- maining with him to his death. His last campaign was with Marshal Berwick against Philip V of Spain, in 1719. In his Commentaries on .Polybius ho has given his views at length, especially his system of columns, l'or which he will chiefly be interesting to military men. His other principal works are : Nouvelles Décou- vertes sur la Guerre; Traité de la Defense des Places, and Traité de la Guerre de Partisan. 5. Lieutenant-General of Engineers Rogniat has published a very interesting work, entitled " Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre." In it he gives a complete exposition of the Roman art of war, and especially treats of the organi- zation and tactical formation of the army of that celebrated military people, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 25 recommending the legionary formation as being suited for our times. His work is written in a very philosophical manner, and quite interesting— in some respects, instructive. 6. Thersites, one of the Crocks in the army before Troy, Homer describes him as equally deformed in person and in mind. Such was his propensity to indulge in contumelious language, that he could not abstain from directing it against, not only the chiefs of the army, but even Agamemnon himself. He ultimately fell by the hand of Achilles, while he was ridiculing the sorrow of that hero for the slain Penthesilea. " 7. The Memoirs of Montholon (Mémoires de Napoléou, diet, au Montho- lon et Gourgaud, 7 vols., London, 1823) are a perfect treasure to the military student, resplendent with the genius of its illustrious author. They were dictated to the two generals, Montholon and Gourgaud, who voluntarily accompanied the emper- or to St. Helena, and are generally known under the name of the former. Count Charles Trist.am dc Montholon, born at Paris, 1783. One of the noblest characters the period in which he lived has produced. The son of a soldier, and himself on* from his fifteenth year, he servod under Bonaparte on the ISth Brumaire (8th o: November, 1799); subsequently aide-de-camp to Marshal Berthior ; distin- guished himself at Austerlitz, Wagram, Jena, and Friodland ; specially attached to Napoleon. Commandant of the Department of the Loire, 1814; general in 1815; accompanies the emperor to St, He.ena; edits his memoirs; accompanies the' present emperor to Boulogne ou the Oth of August, 1840; imprisoned in France, General Gaspard Gourgaud, born at Versailles, 1783; educated at Polytechnic School ; Teacher of Fortification at Chartres and Metz. 180], enters 6th regimen 4 artillery ; in 1S05, wounded at Austerlitz; distinguished in Battles of Jena, 1806- Poland, 1807; Siege of Saragossa, 1808; Battle?, of Abenshwrg, Eckmilhl. Ratisbon,' Ebersberg, Esslingon, and Wagram, 1809. Director of armory at Versailles; in Russia, 1812; at Liitzen and Bautzen, 1813; saved the emperor's life at Brienne, 1814; distinguished at Nangis, Laon, and Rheims; with the Bourbons until their flight; again joins Napoleon; adjutant-general after the Battle of Ligny; oue of the last at Waterloo, 1S15; accompanies Napoleon to St. Helena ; returns in 1818, to Europe ; publishes an account of the Battle of Waterloo, for which arrested and banished ; assist?, on 15th of December, 1840, at the reinterment of Napoleon in the Church of the Invalides, whore Ik; placed the hat on the emperor's coffin. 8. Archduke Charles ha? given to the military student two works, from which the greatest benefit may be derived. They are : ! . QrundsaeUe der Strategic erhxwtert durch die Darsiclhmg du Ftfdzugti von 1796, in Deidschland. (Princi plcsof Strategy, illustrated by the Campaigns of 1796, iu Germany.) Vienna ■ 1813* Five volumes, with a map of thcïluutre of war, and eleven plans. And, as a con- tinuation of the same, 2. Die Geschichte des Feldzttges von 1799. in Dndschland und in der Schweiz. (History of the Campaign of 1799, in Germanv and Switz- erland.) Vienna: 1819. Two volumes, witli an atlas in folio. " His memoirs are model* of lucid and authentic military history, worthy to bo placed beside the Commentant of Ofliuar or the Reveries of Marshal Saxe'. The principles of strategy on a great scale, to. which the greatest successes or revokes in war are to b* ascribed, never were more profoundly reflected on, or lucidly ex plained, than by th,, great commander. Like th* Dictator, he diaenaew bU own mesures with an impartiality which is. literally spiking, i toute preuve To 26 THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. the merits of others, and, most of all, his opponents, he is over alive, and yields a willing testimony; he is silent only on the praise due to his own great achieve- ments." — Alison. He was born in 1771, and died in 1847. In 1793, commands in Brabant the van- guard of Prince of Cobourg; Governor of the Netherlands. 1796, field-marshal of the German empire ; beats Moreau ; routs Jourdan at Amberg, WUrtzburg, etc.; forces Jourdan and Moreau to retreat over the Rhine; takes possession of the fortress of Kehl, in winter of 1797 ; in 1799, defeats Jourdan in Suabia ; op- poses Massena in Switzerland; 1800, Governor-General of Bohemia ; 1801, Minister of War; 1805, commands against Massena, and beats him at Caldiero ; commander- in-chief of army of Austria; 1809, is beaten by Napoleon in Bavaria ; shortly after bouts Napoleon at Aspern; is beaten at Wagram ; 1814, Governor of Mentz and Captain-General of Bohemia. Lives in retirement until his death. 9. The works which Marshal St. Cyr has written are: 1. Guerres de 1792—1794. 4 vols. Paris : 1829. 2. Histoire Militaire, 1799— 1813. 4 vols. Paris: 1831. 3. Guerre en Catalogne. Paris : 1829. He was born at Toul, a town in the Department of Meurthe, and on the railroad from Strasburg to Paris, in 1784. Enlisted as a private and marched to tho Rhine, and rose from grado to grade. General of division in 1795 ; with Massena in Italy, 1798 ; appointed to succeed Massena. In 1799, sent to the Rhine ; commanda third corps under Moreau. 1800, tardy at Battle of Mœskirch ; beats the Austrians at Biberach ; saves Moreau at Memmingen ; retires from the army of Moreau ; fights in Italy. 1801, ambassador to Madrid ; commands Neapolitan army till 1805. 1S05, colonel-general of cuirassiers ; distinguished in campaigns of Prus- sia and Poland. 1807, Governor of Warsaw; sent into Spain; superseded by Augereau ; exiled two years. Greatly distinguishes himself at Polotsk in 1812, and is made a marshal. Commands at Dresden, and capitulates in 1813. Goes over to the Bourbons in 1814; made Peer of France; retires upon return of Napo- leon from Elba; is made Minister of War by Louis XVIII; retires, and again Minister of War in 1818. Permanently retires in 1819. Died in March, 1830. 10. The work of Segur is entitled : Campagne de 1812. 2 volumes. Paris: 1825. Although Count Segurwas not a military man, he has yet given an admirable military history of the disastrous campaign of 1812. His history is brilliant in the highest degree, and well worthy to bo perused by tho military student. PART FIRST. GENERAL THEORY OF THE MILITARY ART. CHAPTER I. DEFINITIONS. Art of war — Genius of war — Necessity of knowledge of the human heart — Why a man may he equal to ten, and ten mon worth but one — Mind and character — Military arts — Strategy, tactics, artillery, fortifications — Organization, manoeu- vres, administration — Dangers — Physiognomy of battles — Sacrifice of life to some good purpose — Profession of arms. Notes. — 1. Licutenant-General Jackson, Confederate Army. 2. Rogniat on Bravery. Before entering upon the subject I shall begin with some definitions : The Art of War is the whole of the necessary knowledge to conduct a mass of armed men, to organize, move, and lead it to battle, and to give the greatest valor to the elements composing it, while watching over their preservation. The Genius of War consists in the talent to apply these elements at the right time and in the most suitable manner — to devise the best com- binations with surety and promptitude, in the midst of dangers and critical situations. The genius of war is incomplete, if to the faculty of these combina- tions, and which I shall call technical, a general does not join the knowledge of the human heart — if he has not the instinct to divine what passes in the souls of his soldiers and those of the enemy. These varia- ble inspirations form the moral aspect of war; they are that mysterious action, which, imparting sudden power to an army, makes one man worth ten, and ten men worth but one. 1 Two other faculties are equally necessary — authority and decision. They are both gifts of nature. A great general, then, must possess vast intelligence — but, still more, character. His character directs the execution; it alone, both in mod- ern times and in antiquity, has made generals of the first ordor. Militari/ Arts consist in the knowledge of scientific or mechanical transactions, which regulate the details of execution and the employ- ment of the means. 28 THE SPIRIT OF Thug, strategy, tactics, artillery, fortifications, organisation, and the administration of armies, arc military arts with which a general should be familiar. Every art has its theory; but the talent of employing it with advantage demands frequent application and the spirit of observa- tion. Of all human events, those of war most especially claim, without contradiction, the assistance of the auxiliary called experience. We must try to accustom ourselves to the dangers of battle presented in such various forms. Man, born bravo, will at first expose himself fear- lessly to perils, sometimes with pleasure even; but time alone will teach him the faculty of appreciating the most useful manner in which to sacrifice his life. 2 Finally, the Profession of Anns is life consecrated to military labors ; and this delinition applies particularly to those who execute. XOTES. 1. Lieutenant-General Jackson, Confederate Army.— Our own struggle against the devastators of our country and the destroyers of the great undamental principle of self-government has produced one character who pos- sessed the genius of war in a remarkable manner — Lieutenant-Général Jackson. He certainly knew how to throw his troops upon the enemy at the right time and in the most suitable manner. If wo can not as yet determine whether the original conception of his various able movements must be ascribed to him — a question which history alone must establish — the great merit is due him now. and will hereafter, in all times, be sutficient to illustrate his name — that he was by far the greatest executor this war has, as yet, brought to light. Not alone did he carry out all of his movements with the greatest decision and vigor, but his self-command in the midst of critical dangers, the smoke of battle, and the uncertainties of war, was something astonishing and assuring to all around liim. His adjutant-general, Doctor Dabney, a Presbyterian divine, tells us that he found himself in a most critical situation at Coal Harbor on Friday morning, the 27th June, 1SG2; when moving forward, he did not know at what time the enemy might intercept bis march, and thus frustrate the wisest combinations of the gencral-in-chief. Only a Jackson could have remained as steady and full of confidence under like circum- stances. But, however high we must place him as an able strategist and master of technical combinations, las peculiar gift was the knowledge of the human heart It is believed that ho was one of the strictest disciplinarians in the service; his troops have made as hard marches and goffered as great privations as any, and yet did we ever hear that any of them did complain or murmur? It is only a genius who can bring about such results; those who fail to inspire their troops with a due degree of love and veneration are but ordinary men. He gained the- admiration of even our enemy. A fact which demonstrates that, even amid nations the most debased and corrupted, a spark of Godlike virtue will sometimes call forth an unwilling acknowledgment! The following is the tribute of Governor Letcher, of Virginia, to his memory in his annual nn-saage to the legislature : MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 29 " Since tile commencement of this war Virginia has been called upon to mourn over the loss of many other gallant sons ; but of all hev jewels, the- most brilliant was the illustrious Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson — a graduate of West Point — highly distinguished in the Mexican war — and, at the opening of the pres- ent war, a quiet, unpretending professor in our State Military Institute. He was called from the professor's chair to the field ; and his sagacity, his energy, and the unparalleled success which crowned his efforts, won for him a reputation that made him the pride of his own state — endeared him to the people of the Confederacy — attracted to him the attention of the nations of the earth, and compelled the re- spect and admiration even of those heartless enemies who have drenched our laud in blood, and brought wailingand lamentation to the firesides of thousands of their own misguided people. For decision of character — for stern and unbending i - eso- lution — for pure and elevated patriotism — for sound and inflexible integrity, and for prompt and energetic action, ho was surpassed by no man of his times. The record of his achievements will constitute some of the brightest pages in the his- tory of the war, when that history shall have been written. His reputation as a military leader of the highest ability and merit has been fairly and firmly estab- lished in the judgment of the army and the country, and his name will be honored and his fame will be cherished ' While the earth bears a plant, or the sea rolls a wave.' " General Jackson was not only a great man, but he was, emphatically, a good man. He was pure and upright, earnest and honest, conscientious and true in his intercourse with the world. In all the relations of life — as a boh, a husband, a father, and a- citizen — he was faithful and reliable As a member of the Presby- terian Church his ' walk and conversation' attested the sincerity of his profession. The death of such a man, and at such a time, could not fail to produce the most profound sensation throughout the Confederacy. He had won the confidences of the people of all classes. Their affections were entwined around him — their hopes centred in him — and they looked to him as one of the great instruments pro- vided by an All-wise Providence for their deliverance, and for the establishment of their independence upon a new basis. His death was regarded as a national calamity, and it was succeeded by manifestations of the most heartfelt grief and the most sincere sorrow. " He has passed from life, but his example is still left to encourage and stimulate us to greater exertions in the noble cause in which we aro engaged. That examplo cau not fail to exert a most powerful influence iu awaking our dormant energies; in rousing us up to greater effort»; in inspiring us with greater zeal, and in ani- mating us with a nobler spirit and a more determined courage. His whole soul was in the cause, and ho performed his duty cheerfully and with the most scrupu- lous fidelity. The redemption of tho people from the yoke of Yankee tyranny was the object nearest his heart, and to its accomplishment he directed his efforts- The chcek8of the deserters, and stragglers, and laggards should burn with shame when contemplating his devotion aud his self-sacrificing spirit. They should ap- preciate surh an example, and should resolve at once to emulate it, and should return to tho path of duty with a fixed purpose to relieve their land from the tread of the invader, or, M he did, sacrifice thfir lives in the effort. If such shall be tin result, he will not have died in vain. The sacrifice, great as it was, will Impress upon thf> country an Invaluable lesson for the instruction of the present and future generations.'' 30 THE SPIRIT OF And the great Thunderer, the English Times, thus announces his death. May Mth, -Tin- r'njif. -ii.Tat" lanreli won on the field of Chanceiiorsviiio must be twined with the cypres». Probahly no disaster of the war will have carried such grief to South- ern hearts as the death of General Jackson, who has succumbed to the wounds received in the great battle of the 8d of May. Even on this side of the ocean the gallant soldier's fate will everywhere be heard with pity and sympathy. Not only as a brave man fighting for his country's Independence, but as one of the most con- summate geaerala thai bia ooantry has produced, ' StonewaQ ' Jackson will carry With him to his early grave the regrets of all who Ban admire greatness and genius. From the earliest days of the war he has been conspicuous for the most remarkablo military qualities. That mixture of daring and judgment, which is the mark of * heaven-born' generals, distinguished him beyond any man of his time. Although the young Confederacy has been illustrated by a number of eminent soldiers, yet tho applause and devotion of his countrymen, confirmed by the judgment of European nations, have given the first place to General Jackson. The military feats he accom- plished moved the minds of the people with an astonishment which is only given to the highest genius to produce. The blows he struck at the enemy were M terrible end decisive as those of Bonaparte himself. Tho march by which he surprised the army of Pope last year would be enough, in itself, to give him a high place in military history. But, perhaps, the crowning glory of his life was the great battle in which he fell. When the Federal commander, by crossing the river twelve miles above his camp, and pressing on, as he thought, to the rear of the Confederates, had placed them between two bodies of his army, he was so confident of success as to boast tho enemy was the property of the Army of the Potomac. It was reserved to Jackson, by a swift and secret march, to fall upon his right wing, crush it, and, by an attack un- surpassed in fierceness and pertinacity, to drive his very superior forces back into a position from which he could not extricate himself except by flight across the river. In the battle of Sunday Jackson received two wounds, one In the left arm. the other in the right band. Amputation of the arm was necessary, and the Southern hero sank under the effect of it, supported to the last by his simple and noble character, and strong religious faith."' 2. Rogniat on Bravery. — Quite in opposition to Marshal Marmont. General Rogniat, in his twelfth chapter of his highly philosophical work, tells us that man, far from being born brave, is, on the contrary, a coward from the very first, and that he can only acquire the military virtue of bravery by experience; in short, that it is an artificial, not an innate, quality. He furthermore says: "Nature has given us instinctively the desire to preserve life, in the shape of a feeling of fear which evades everything that might become dangerous to it; and that courage consists in surmounting and conquering this sentiment." Passions, he maintains, make us blind to dangers, even in the midst of the most evident perils; and they force us to brave all. in spite of the counsels of prudonce. Why, then, are young men braver than the old, when the former have much more to lose than those whose course in life is nearly oompleted? Because passion influences the first more powerfully than the latter, in whose bosoms the fires of youth have given way to the icicles of old age. Ignorance dares a danger for a moment. But experience soon enlightens, and fear succeeds security. Thus he saw young French recruits follow, at Ltltzen, their officers in the midst of perils unshrinkingly, and with less hesitation than at Baut- zen, only a few days later. Experience had taught them the danger. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 81 CHAPTER II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES. Very few — Infinite variety of circumstance» in which an army may ho fourni — Combinations resulting therefrom — Hazard to be considered — Disproportion between the genius of Napoleon and that of his adversaries — With equal chances, victory will always be with him who knows how to make himself superior in strength at a given moment — Inferiority in numbers compensated by the qualities of troops — Barbarians always yield to disciplined troops less numerous — After a first success, the spirit of troops replaces the weight of arms — Greeks and Persians — Marathon and Plataea — Conquests of Alexander — Romans against Germans and Gauls — French against Turks — Advantages of taking the initiative — Campaign of Italy in 1796 and 1797 — Axiom. Notes. — 1. Battle of Marathon. 2. Battle of Platam. 3. General Wurmser. There arc but few general principles for the conduct of armies, but their application calls forth a host of combinations which can neither be foreseen nor classified as rules. The conditions in which an army may find itself vary infinitely; the principal points of importance are the mass of the elements com- posing it, the relative state of the two armies, the nature of the thoatre of war and of the adjoining countries, the part to be assumed, either defensive or offensive, and the reputation and character of the general against whom the field is taken, etc. An immense field is open to combinations by divers circumstances — so much so, that the vastest mind would not be able to embrace them all. Hence, the greatest generals have committed faults ; the beût generals are those who have been guilty of the least number. The more elements are admitted in calculating these circumstances, tho better will events be controlled ; generals should foresee the probable 83 much as the possible; even accidental risks ought to be guarded against. Thus, when the period of reverses is at hand, great catas- trophes can bo prevented. This foresight was ono of Napoleon's highest faculties during tho period of his fortune; his adversaries being almost destitute of it, results were obtained by him at the time which astonished the world. I shall establish some principles by which a general's conduct should always be regulated. The aim I may indicate, but the means of accomplishing the same must always be subordinate to circum- stances. Whenever two armies, nearly of equal strength and in tho same moral condition, engage each other, their chances of success are alike. To render them more favorable, movements are planned to deceive the ol THE SPIRIT OF enemy, and through fear he is led to divide his forces. Then the general who is most skilful will promptly réassemble his forces to overthrow bis adversary's; any temporary superiority thus acquired will greatly facilitate his victory. Numerical superiority, at tho moment of battle, is of extreme im- portance. Undoubtedly the quality of troops is to be considered more than the number; but, La the presont state of European armies, numbers and the concentration of means contribute powerfully to success. It is different when barbarians .ire to be met, who, devoid of organization and without discipline, form no compact body; they operate without unity and harmony; i\ey are afways inferior, at any time, when opposed to the weakest but well-united body. Two repeat- ed attacks without success, and often a single charge, will scatter the less brave; tho others follow the contagion of tho example, and soon all will be dispersed. Then the spirit of the troops replaces the arms. The wars of the Greeks against the Persians, the Battles of Marathon 1 ami Platioa,- the conquests of Alexander, the triumphs of small Roman armies against the Turks despite the disproportion of numbers, can all be cited and explained in this connection. When aiming to disperse the forces of the enemy, those points necessary for his security should be particularly harassed : and when- ever he gives way to appearances he must be attacked upon a weak point with superior forces. This is precisely what, in fencing, is termed a feint, when, sword hi hand, we are engaged in single combat. Two or three partial advantages prepare the way for more considerable successes, which, in the end, will decide the fate of the campaign. It will, therefore, be seen how important it is for a geueral to take the iuitiative in his movements; he will then control tho mind of his adversary, and a first chance oftentimes gives an ascendency never again lost. The favorable moment must be spied. A too great dis- proportion in forces and the different auxiliaries may be an insur- mountable obstacle; in that case we must wait until the confidence of the enemy leads him to commit some fault. Diligently improving the occasion, a skilful general can obtain advantages which will permit him to change rôles, and to pass from a defensive to an offensive atti- tude. A notable instance of this kind took place in 1796, during the immortal Italian campaign. The French army, having reached the frontiers of the Tyrol in a defensive attitude, found itself greatly inferior to the Austrian army, reinforced and led by \Vurmscr s in person. When the hostile general attacked, his forces were divided; the French general united his, and soon a first success permitted him, in his turn, to assume the offeusive. Then began a series of victories, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 33 in which the French army maintained its ascendency in number, upon almost every field of battle. To resume, in a single word, this part of the art of war, which relates to the general movements of an army, it is to be observed that, in every instance, it rests upon a calculation as to the time required, the distance, and celerity of movement. XOTES. 1. The Battle of Marathon was fought by the Persians and Athenians, near the seacoast of Greece, not far from Athena, B.C. 490. The Persians, as is most generally supposed, had an army of one hundred thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry; the Greeks only eleven thousand men. Rather than endure the uncer- tainties and horrors of a siege, the Greek general, Miltiades, resolved to meet the enemy and attack nim in the plains of Marathon. Taking a position at the loot of a mountain to guard hie roar, he felled trees on both extremities of his wing* to make the enemy's cavalry useless. At the expense of his centre, the wings had been considerably strengthened, and after the first onset of the Greeks, which was bravely received by the Persians under Dotis, the latter took advantage of the apparent mistake of Miltiades. and endeavored to break his centre. But the Greeks, having foreseen this manœuvre, themselves gave way in the centre, and wheeling both of then- wings, attacked the enemy simultaneously in front and rear, routine him completely. The loss of the Persian, was six thousand four hundred; that of the Greeks not two hundred. 2. The Battle of Platœa was fought between the Persians, under Mardo- niUB, some three hundred and fifty thousand strong, and the Creeks, about seventy thousand, under the Spartan. Pausanias. near the city from which it derive, its name m the province of Bœotia, in Hellas. We have no intelligible account of the tactics employed m this battle, which freed Greece forever from Persian aggression; and it appears that the battle was rather gained by a judicious use of the ground than by any extraordinary bravery or skill of the Greeks. The latter, rent by internal dis- sensions m their army, arising from jealousies against the commander-in-chief were besides, disheartened by the want of water, and the continual harassing of thé Persian troopers in an exposed country. Pausanias, therefore, resolved to retreat toward the city of Plata». It being construed by the Persian general into a flight' he eagerly pressed forward, was led into an unfavorable position, and being at first chafed by a gallant band of Spartans, the remainder of the Greek army were reas- sured^ an.l the Persians no. only were thoroughly beaten, hut so massacred by the infuriated conquerors that not three thousand of . hem are said to have remained- Mardonius himself gallantly felling, while striving to restore the equilibrium of his roups. This ha. tie teaches tour lessons : 1. That everything in war depends up.,:, a "■'" ,l "- ''""<• -'"1 that there is no cause for despair while V et an amy remains. 8. How eaj er an enemy is to fell i nto a trap, when he once Imagines that tl PP oa> ■">'* '''■ r: ' 1;z "'- :; - The importance of the select] f the ground and a thorough knowledge of the topography of the country in which we operate, and the! a retn-,t or abandonment of ground is sometimes the prelude t., rictory 1 That only « i.h :, total rout of the invader, such as the PewUuw experienced, may we I to put an end to this war. 3. General Wurmser.-lt was this geni ; tune to be placed again; 34 THE SPIRIT OF a young giant. Napoleon, when he was already seventy-two years of age. Raised under Frederick the Great's tuition, thmigii on the Austrian side, he OOOld not fail to possess considerable talent. His operations in Italy, and his firmness in advei>it j \ BOffldently show that he was not a general of ordinary merit. Born 1724; serves during the seven yeaiVwar; heats the Prussians at Ilalielschword, 1779; crosses the Rhine. March 31,1793; compelled to rectOM, dose of 1793; captures Manheim, November 22, 1795; commands Army of Italy. 179G; throws himself into Mantua, September 30, 1796; capitulates, 1797 ; soon after dies of exhaustion at Vienna. CHAPTER III. BASES, LINES OF OPERATION, AND STRATEGY. Base of operation — Line of operation — Strategic points — Strategic lines — Chess- board of Napoleon — Consequences of violation of principles at Marengo — Mo- rcau's strategy — His tactics — Hohenlinden — Character of that battle — To whom belongs the victory — General Richepanse — Importance of mobility in an army — Usage of Russians — Independence of reserves — Necessities relative to lines of operation — Liberty of communications — Base of operation — Its extent influenc- ing line of operation — Fundamental axiom of Napoleon — Great success due its observance in 1805, 1806, 1809 — Parallelism of bases of operations of opposed armies — March of 1812 — Absence of base of operation — Admiral TchitcliHkoff and General Kaptzievitch — Examples of useful changes of line and base of operation — 1797, Austrian army after reduction of Mantua — 1814, Marshal, Duke of Dal- matia, at Toulouse — Two principles. Notes — 1. Moreau. 2. March of French army. 3, Campaign of 1806. 4. For- tress of Mayence. 5. Bale. 6. Beresina. 7. Generals A. S. Johnston, J. E. John- ston, and B. Bragg. 8. Mantua. 9. Soult. 10. Adour. 11. Toulouse. 12. Bor- deaux. The base of operation of an army is the country the forces protect, which furnishes their necessaries, which every day sends thcin the articles of all kinds they consume in men, horses, provisions, and am- munition, and which receives their sick and wounded, etc. The line of operation is determined by the general direction of the march, which indicates the object of operation or the point to be at- tained. General movements, executed beyond the sight of the enemy and be- fore the battle, are called strategy. Strategic points are those which it is important to occupy, be it to menace the communications of the enemy, or to cover our own. They should be chosen so as to facilitate the combinations of movements of \ MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 35 the different columns of an army. Generally, a spot where many roads cross is a strategic point; in a mountain country, the spot whore several valleys meet is a strategic point. Strategic lines are those which unite divers strategic points, and which are used in the movements executed between the latter ; they should be as short as possible. The judicious choice of strategic points and lines is the safety of armies in reverses, and the cause of the greatest results in successes. Napoleon particularly possessed the genius of strategy ; no general has ever surpassed him in this respect ; none knew better, beforehand, how to find the point where it was necessary to strike. A large army is composed of several columns ; they are necessarily separated in order to subsist and to move with facility. The most dis- tant parts should be able to arrive in time for the battle, either to take part in the conflict, or to serve merely as a reserve. The object of strategy is to regulate the march for the promptest reunion upon the same point, be it at the centre or upon one of the wings. A march thus regulated is what Napoleon was in the habit of calling his chess-board. All of his first campaigns havo had this character, except at Marengo, where, deviating from this principle, he was about to succumb ; upon the day of action he is always seen to reassemble, upon the field of battle, all the forces he could reasonably dispose of. Moreau, 1 on the contrary, whose talents have been so highly praised, understood nothing of strategy. His skill consisted in the application of tactics. Personally very brave, in the presence of the enemy he handled troops well when they occupied a field which his view could embrace ; but his principal battles he only fought with a part of his forces. At Hohenlinden, where the success was so overwhelming, Moreau ought to have been defeated, and he probably would have been, if the Austrians had not manoeuvred with a carelessness unexampled. The French army was composed of twelve divisions ; the three of the right were commanded by General Lecourbe, and the three of the left, Gener- al Sainte-Suzanne commanding, did not assist in the battle. The Aus- trian army was united, but marched unconnectedly ;'the centre column, which encountered no obstacle, and followed the main road, with almost all the artillery, was open to an isolated attack, and not even formed; it was liable, at any moment, to be assailed in flank. This remarkable fortuno was not due to the dispositions of General Moreau. General Richepanse, a man of mind and courage, finding himself with his divis- ion surrounded by the Austrians, who began to organize, faced about, and seized one hundred piece» of cannon, marching by column upon the high road. 36 THE SPIRIT OF The reunion of an army at the moment of tho conflict being the ob- ject, and the rapidity of marches the means to obtain it, tho divisions, which are the units, should be able to combine promptly, and, to that effect, be susceptible of very rapid movements. An army will have, under all circumstances, a slow inarch, but the rapidity should bo im- parted to the elements which compose it. Therefore the divisions should not be too much burdened with artillery and army stores. I do not approve tho custom of the Russians, who encumber them with ord- nance. The great reserves of material and army stores of every kind should have an independent march, able to defend themselves, and, when required, be escorted by special troops. It is tho duty of the general-in -chief to keep them always within reach of the point where they can be most useful, according to their destination. There is another object which should call forth the greatest solici- tude of a general ; he should have his line of operation covered perfect- ly, whilst menacing that of the enemy. Free communications arc nec- essary for the maintenance of an army; once lost, tho moral condi- tion is compromised. Confidence — this powerful element of tho mind, which nothing in the world can supply in troops — does not always resist such a trial. Hence the necessity of a large base of operation. If a fortress and several fortified points are situated upon this base, or if a river forms part of it, great advantages may result. The more this base is extend- ed, the better is the line of operation covered. This was one of Napo- leon's fundamental axioms; he never violated it with impunity. In his splendid campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809, he has given great examples, and profited, with skill, by favorable circumstances result- ing from the position of our frontier. Two armies, which have parallel bases of operation equal in extent, are in like condition; and one of them, in turning the other, is also necessarily turned. But it is not the same when two bases of opera- tion have different lengths, or are inclined toward each other. In 1S05, the French army, after the tine march from the shores of La Mancha to Germany,' 2 was directed upon the flank and rear of the Austriau army which had invaded Bavaria. One battle lost upon the Danube would have thrown it back upon the Rhine; one battle gained overthrew the hostile arms. Id 1 S06 3 the French army, at the beginning of the campaign, found itself upon the flank of the Prussian army; its communications with France from Mayeuce* to Bale 5 were not the less free; they were, be- sides, so well assured that a reverse could not have had any serious consequences, and one single victory brought about the results so well known. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 37 In 1812, when Napoleon withdrew, without limitation, from his point of departure (for it is necessary to remark that the dimension of a base of operation, to satisfy the requirements, is not absolute, but relative to the length of the line of operation), his base disappeared. Established from the first upon the position of divers nnny corps, the base would have been sufficient, if the army had remained nearer the frontier. But these corps were abandoned to themselves upon the march, a prey to the chances of war; and meeting bodies of the enemy of at least equal strength, the sequel was, that the army lost all its communications. Arrived upon the banks of the Beresina, Napoleon should have been thoroughly beaten, and the remnants of his army ought to have been annihilated, since there was no miracle required, and Admiral Tchit- chakoff and General Kaptzievitch could have attributed to themselves no credit whatever in that case. But there are circumstances where it is useful and salutary to change, in the midst of a campaign, the direction of the lino of operation, and to choose another base; and although the most natural idea and the most habitual usage would be to take a position in advance of the coun- try to be defended, it yet sometimes happens that its security is in the most efficacious manner assured by taking a line of operation which appears to abandon it to the enemy. 7 When, in 1797, after the reduction of Mantua, 8 the French army marched upon Vienna, the Austrian army, which fouud itself in an in- ferior conditiou to give battle, retired in the direction of the capital. If, instead of operating thus, it had taken position in tho Tyrol, the natural obstacles presented in that country would have established a kind of equilibrium between the respective forces ; the troops, consisting of new levies from Hungary «and Croatia, which could not serve with utility on the day of battle, would have been sufficient to cover the frontier of Friuli, to hold in check a French corps, and paralyze its ac- tion, despite the excellence of its troops (because the French army was composed of troops of like nature). Furthermore, the Austrian army, in taking this line of operation, would havo met efficient reinforcements, which it could have only received by the borders of the Rhine. Lastly, if the war had brought the belligerent armies into Suabia and Bavaria, all the Austrian forces, reunited upon the centre of operations, would have been able to manœuvre under the most advantageous circum- stances. The Austrian army committed, then, a great mistake in adopt- ing this line of operation. Here is another example : In 1814 the marshal, Duke of Dalmatia, 9 after having operated upon the Adour, 1 " was obliged to leave the basin of that river, and directed his line of operation upon Toulouse. 11 In this» ho acted wisely, because he thus- removed tho English army from # 38 THE SPIRIT OF the contre of France more surely than by retiring upon Bordeaux, 12 •where it would have followed him; a small body of troops, sustained by the national guards, placed in rear of the heaths and covering Bor- deaux, would have defended that city, provided the spirit of the epoch and internal political complications had not rendered these wise dispo- sitions useless. Reviewing the matter, strategy has a twofold aim : 1. To reunite all the troops, or tho greatest number possible, upon the point of conflict, if the enemy has there but a portion of his; in other terms, to manage to secure a numerical superiority for the day of battle. 2. To cover and assure one's own communications, while all tho time menacing those of the enemy. NOTES. 1. Moreau, born at Morlaix. Bretagne, 1763; brigadier-general, 179*; general of division, 1794; commander of Army of the Rhine; retreats into France; commanda Army of Italy, 1798; beaten by Buwarrow; commands, 1799, Army of Danube and Rhine; passes the Danube and Rhine; gives battles at Mœskirch, Engen, Meminin- geu, Biberach, Hochstaedt, Nordlingen, etc.; beats the Austrians at Hohenlinden, December 3, 1800; accused and tried for conspiracy; exiled; goes to America; Bet- ties at Morrisville, on Delaware river, 1805; returns to join the Allies; is mortally wounded hefore Dresden; dies, September 1, 1813; buried at St. Petersburg. 2. March of the French army from the shores of La Mancha to Germany. — An army of one hunched and eighty thousand marched, in from seven- teen to twenty-two days, from Cherbourg, on the British channel, to the Rhine, to concentrate near Ulm, in Germany. The distance from Cherbourg to the Rhine is some five hundred miles. This was the splendid army which fought the campaign of Austerlitz, and was composed of ten corps, commanded by Bernadotte, Marmont, Davoust, Soult, Lannes, Ney, Augereau, Murat (cavalry), guards (Mortier and Bessières), and "Wrede (Bavarians). 3. The Campaign of 1806 ended with the victories of Jena and Auerstaedt over the Prussians. The line from Mayence, in Germany, to Bale, in Switzerland, iH of exceeding importance. 4. Mayence, or Mainz (the ancient Maguntiacum metropolis of Germania Prima), is on the left bank, in the basin of the Middle Rhine, a very strong place in form of a semicircle, of which the Rhine is the diameter, covered by three fortified fronts to the north, the west, and the south, which include fourteen bastions and a double rampart, defended by six forts — the most considerable of which is Hauptstein, commanding all tho environs; the isles of the Rhine are fortified, as well as the suburbs of Cassel, on the right bank. Mainz was formerly the capital of an eccleiskis- tical electorate; it was taken by the French in 1792, retaken by the King of Prussia in 1793, ceded to France by the treaty of Campo Formio, and remained in the possession of the latter till 181-1, when it was given up to the Grand-Duko of Hesse- Darmstadt, and declared a fortress of the Germanic Confederation. 5. Bale, a city in the basin of the Uppor Rhino,' built on both sides of tho river, capital of a Swiss canton, centre of the routes from Southern Germany into France, MILITARY INSTITUIONS. 39 and .having now a railroad to Dijon, another to Strasbourg, both in France, and a third along the right bank of the Rhine, through Freybourg, Kehl. Carlsruhe, and Manheim, to Frankfort-on-the-Main, and on to Cassel. Bale is the true gate into France, and which is kept closed only by the neutrality of Switzerland. Passage of the Allies here in 1814 and 1815. 6. The Beresina, an affluent on the right bank of the Dneiper, rises in the marches of Dokchitsky, traverses a country of forests and bogs, where there is no advancing but upon raised causeways; flows past Studzianka, celebrated for tin- disastrous passage of the French army on the 26th of November, 1812, and for the double battle which they fought on that occasion with the Russians, on both banks of the river. Borisow, a town situated on the road from Wilna, by Minsk, to Smolensk, and the possession of which by the Russians compelled the French to seek a passage at Studzianka. After leaving this place the Beresina receives an affluent, which passes by Minsk, a town situated in the midst of extensive fo/ests, on the road from Warsaw to Smolensk, and the possession of which by the Russians, in 1812, was one of the causes of the disaster of the Beresina. Had Napoleon directed his retreat upon Vitebsk, as he at first intended, and which he certainly would have done notwithstanding the reported bad state of the roads, had he known of Tchitchakoffs proximity to the Beresina, while he himself was at Oreha, the passage of the Beresina would have never been attempted. The passage of this stream cost the French twelve thousand killed and drowned, and sixteen thousand prisoners; and if Kutusoff had been more expeditious, and Admiral Tchltchakoff more predent it is probable that neither Napoleon himself, nor a single man of his army, would have escaped. 7. Generals A. S. Johnston, J. E. Johnston, and B. Bragg.— This remark is forcibly illustrated by three events in our own war: 1. The splendid retro- grade movement of General A. S. Johnston from the heart of Kentucky to the confines of the State of Mississippi, in February and March, 1862, which culminated in the Battle of Shiloh. 2. The withdrawal of General J. E. Johnston's army from the lines of Manassas to the lines of Richmond, which culminated in the Battle of Seven Pines, May 31, 1862, so glorious to the Confederate arms. 3. The abandonment of Tennessee by General Bragg, which resulted in the Battle of Chiclcamauga. 8. Mantua, situated among three small marshy and unhealthy lakes on the Mincio. It is the ancient capital of a sovereign duchy, and is now one of the strong- est places in Europe. Its position on the left bank of the Po invests it with a degree of importance equal to that which attaches to Alexandria, on the right bank. It communicates with the mainland by five causeways, which are defended by five fortresses: the first of these, called La Favorita— battle here of 1797, gained by Na- poleon over tho Austrian* — leads to Verona; the second, named Santa Georgia — battle in 1797, gained by Napoleon over the Austrians — leads to Legnano; the third, called Del Pietoli, skirts the Lower Mincio, and leads to Governolo; the fourth, called the Ccrese. leads to Guastalla; and the fifth, called De la Pradella, leads to Cremona. From the lakes of Mantua a canal is drawn off to the south-west, which joins the Po, and forms, with the two streams, a triangular island of admirable fertility, which is called the .Seraglio. This island is the great resource of the garri- son of Mantua, which draws its provisions from it. ami. l>y means of it. remains mistress of the course of the Po. Tho most celebrated of the many sieges which Mantua has experienced was that of 1796, in which Napoleon waa obliged to de- 40 TÎIE SPIRIT OF stroy successively tin •■ Lustrian armies before he could render himself master of the in A;iril. 1848, Charles Albert, Sing of Sardinia, blockaded it. but was obliged to raise the siege; invested it again on the 13th of July, 1S4S. but was compelled, on the 20th of July, by the able movements of Radetzky. to abandon it. Is now incorporated with the Kingdom of [taly. 9. Marshal Soult fought, on the loth of April. ISU. the Batth^of Toulouse against "Wellington, the last which was fought amid the tottering \^Wk of the Na- poleonic dynasty. His admirable firmness and fidelity amid the universal gloom is above all praise. Military writers have censured him for taking the position of Toulouse, instead of that at Bordeaux, forgetting the political disturbances in the latter city at the time, and the necessity of surrender had he been unsuccessful in its defence. 10. The A.dour, a river of France, rises in Mount Tourmatel, in the Pyrenoes; falls in the Bay of Biscay, north of Bayonne. 11. Toulouse, head-quarters of the tenth military division: not now fortified; surrounded by an old. very thick wall, with Hanking towers, only accessible from the snith : situated upon the right bank of the Garonne. It has upon the left bank its suburb of St. Cyprien, built upon a creek, surrounded by a strong brick wall, which constitutes a good tête de pont. It is the point of convergence of the roads from Spain — the strategic position of the entire south of France. Occupying the middle between the two extreme points of invasion, it prevents the junction of the two corps d'orwt'i',. which may have debouched by Bayonne and Perpignan, and enables the French to manoeuvre upon both banks of the Garonne as far as the Pyrenees. 12. Bordeaux, chief town of the Department of the Gironde; head-quarters of the twelfth military division; on the left bank of the Garonne, which is crossed by a magnificent bridge one thousand five hundred and ninety-eight feet long: its port can accommodate twelve hundred vessels, each of six hundred tons burden. Two forts Médoc and Pate, and a citadel, defend it about twelve miles below. Still lower are the forts of Boyan and Pointe de Grave. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 41 CHAPTER IV. TACTICS. In what it consists— Easy theory — Difficulties of practice — What is required of a genera] at the head of a large army — Living providence — Necessity of tactical talent for subordinate generals — Author at camp <>f Zeist — Comparisons of strat- egy with tactics — In what consists genius of war, in regard t<> both — Skill of Napoleon — Liitzen, sudden battle — Historic detail — Battle not at Starsiedel — Battle of the Moskowa — llefuse of reserve — Napoleon untrue to Ins principles of war — Uselessness <>f fresh troops the day after hat tie — Why? — Waterloo — Guard ordered too late. Notes. — 1. Zeist. 2. Battle of Borodino. Tactics are the art of handling troops upon a field of battle, and to make theni march without confusion. They treat of the art to main- tain order in the midst of apparent disorder, produced by that multitude of men, horses, and machines, the union of which composes an army, and to draw the greatest possible advantage from it. Tactics are the science of the application of manœuvres. A man can be great in manoeuvres without possessing any genius, the perfection in which is only attained after much practice; nothing is easier to un- derstand than the theory, but the practice is not without difficulties. The general must be familiar with the means provided and calculated upon by the orders, that, with a moment's glance of the eye, he should know how to judge the ground upon which he will be engaged ; he must know how to calculate distances, determine the precise direction, ap- preciate the details, and to knit the links of circumstances into a chain. This kind of merit was incomplete in Napoleon, which is explained by the first portion of his career. Simply an officer of artillery, until the moment when he was called to the head of armies, he has never commanded either a regiment, brigade, division, or corps d'armée.* Ho could not have acquired this faculty of moving troops upon a given ground, which, by varying incessantly the combinations, developes the skill with every day's move. The wars of Italy scarcely ever offered to him any application of this nature, because generally the actions were reduced to conflicts for posts, the attack and defence of defiles, and to operations in the moun- tains. Later, when he had assumed supreme power, the strength of the armies which he conducted requiring their organization into army * It was Brigadier-Genera] Chanee, commanding at Paris during the winter of 1795— '96, who taught the manoeuvres to General Bonaparte, then general-in-chief of the Arm] Of the Interior. — Note, of Author. 4# 4 V 2 the spirit op corps, rendered skill in manœuvres still less necessary. A general, at the head of eighty, one hundred, or one hundred and fift}- thousand men, gives but the impulse; he fixes the principal points of move- ments, issues orders concerning the general circumstances of the army, and provides for the great accidents which occur; he is the living prov- idence of the army. Generals who manceuvro and lead are those who* command thirty thousand men and the generals under their orders ; they must be familiar with tactics. If I have had some repu- tation in this respect, I owe it to my long sojourn at the camp of Zeist, 1 where, for more than a year, I have been constantly occupied with the instruction of excellent troops, and sought to instruct myself with that emulation and fervor which a first command-in-chief gives in the beautiful years of youth. Tactics have the same aim as strategy, but upon a smaller scale and a different theatre. Instead of operating upon a vast country and during entire days, the action is upon a battle-field which the eye can overlook, and where the movements are accomplished in a few hours. The base of combinations, the proposed aim, is alwa3 r s to be stronger than the enemy upon a certain point of the field. The talent is to bring suddenly upon the most accessible and most important positions the means to break the equilibrium and to gain the victory ; and finally, to execute, with promptitude, the movements which disconcert the enemy, and which take him unawares. To effect this, it is essential that the reserves be employed at the right time; and this is the genius of war. It will be carefully avoided to engage them too soon or too late; too soon, is to employ uselessly one's means, and to miss them at the moment when they will be most necessary : too late, is either to permit the victory to remain incom- plete, or the reverses to thicken until they become irreparable. Every one should be obliged to expend the total amount of the ener- gy he possesses ; but when the moment of exhaustion comes — and it is that moment which to recognize is so important — theu it is urgent to send succor; finally, do not fail to ask for them some time in ad- vance of the urgency. Napoleon was very skilful in this respect; he knew precisely when the turning point of the battle was at hand. At Liitzen he furnished mo with a striking example. The battle was begun unexpectedly. Believing that the enemy was retreating, the emperor had left Leipzig with two corps d'armée, and had prescribed to me to make a strong reconnaissance upon Pegau. Sotting out from Wippach, where I had passed tho night, I thought it prudent to move by the right of the ravine, although that road was longer; I did not wish to compromise my communications with the main body of the army, which owed it» MILITARY INSTITUTION S. 43 safety to this circumstance. I arrive! at Starsiedel, perfectly formed, at the precise nioniout when the enemy, having surprised the third corps, was about to surround and to destroy it. I had time partly to cover it and to protect its right while it hastened to arms. The battle opened instantly ; immense masses of troops, an enormous cavalry, and considerable artillery, attacked me. While the third corps sustained at Kaya a very obstinate conflict with the infantry, Napoleon fell upon that point. The forces which were in my front not ceasing to aug- ment, I scut to him to demand reinforcements ; he replied that the battle was at Kaya and not at Starsiedel; and he was right. I had prevented that tho battle was not lost in the beginning, but it was gained by him in the centre. On other occasions Napoleon determined loss judiciously. On the Moskowa' 2 he showed a sad want of circumspection in refus- ing to orfler his guard to march, although General Belliard asked for it at two o'clock. The Russian army was then in the greatest confusion; immense results would have been obtained with fresh troops ; one hour of respite saved the enemy. Napoleon thus was untrue to one of his favorite principles, which I have heard him pronounce: "Those who retain fresh troops for the day after the battle are nearly always beaten." He added : " If useful the last man should be given, because the day after a complete suc- cess there are no other obstacles ahead; prestige alone assures new triumphs to the conqueror." Alike, at Waterloo, Napoleon gave his guard too late. If it had marched, while the cavalry performed prodigies, the English infantry would probably have been overthrown, and the French army, rid of the English, would have been able to receive, fight, and conquer the Prussians. In review, tactics can thus be defined: the art of movements, exe- cuted in presence of the enemy, with that formation offoring most advantages, and which is most in harmony Avith the circumstances. NOTES. 1. Zeist.— A. village in tho Netherlands, in the province of Utrecht. 2. Battle of Borodino.— This battle, which is also called the Battle of the Moskowa. was fought on the 6th of September, 1812, and opened Napoleon the way into the City of Moscow. The Village of Dorodino is seventy-five miles west-south- west of this ancient capital of the Russian empire, and in the centre of an ex- Hngly strong )> >-itiun. hilly and full of ravines, traversed by tho river Kolots- cha, an affluent of the Moskowa. In this position, protected by strong redoubts and extensive field-works, the Russians, under KutusofT, one hundred and thirty- two thousand strong, with pix hundred Bad forty cannon, essayed to bar Napoleon's march upon their capital, who was advancing with part of his forces, quite as 44 THE SPIRIT OF strong, however, as Kutusoff, yet Laving sixty cannon the Leas. It an enemy's strength, posted behind such fortifications as the Russians had, and th>- remains "t" which can be traced to this very day, is thereby doubled or even tripled, then Napoleon's victory, although one of direct attacks, may be classed among the most remarkable, and certainly the most sanguine he ever fought. On the day preceding the battle a strong advanced work had been carried by tlie French with great slaughter. Davoust propositi to Napoleon to march during that eight, with forty thousand men, around the extreme left of the Russians, and by Ney simultaneously attacking in the centre, to carry consternation into their ranks. Had Davoust's suggestion been followed, and had the emperor evinced more vigor and resolution individually, there is no doubt that the Russians would have been thoroughly beaten. After a most frightful carnage, the Russians having lost thirty- three generals, fifteen thousand killed, and forty thousand wounded, and the French thirty-five generals, thirteen thousand killed, and thirty-seven thousand wounded, the Russian army remained intact, and slowly retreated upon Moscow. In this battle four hundred pieces of artillery were at one time directed against a single redoubt. Napoleon attacked in echelons, with the right under Davoust in front. There Marshals Ney and Davoust earned immortal glory. CHAPTER V. MANŒUVRES. Means of tactics— March and battle order— Formations for both— Deployment mixed with columns— Example— March in the plains of the Tagliamento in 1797— At- tack of position — Skirmishers in advance of columns— They cover the deployment — Formation in square— Its speciality— Their difficulties— Squares formed on march — Example in Egypt — Two special causes indicated this formation — Forma- tion of six ranks became superfluous, and is abandoned — Difficulties of formation in squares for march. Note. — The Tagliamento. Manœuvres are the means of tactics. They consist in the art of moving masses, and to pass them, without confusion, but with rapidity, from the order of march to the order of battle, even in the midst of fire, and reciprocally. The battle and the march can be executed with all the formations ; but there are preferable formations, both for the battle and the march; and, again, those for the battle vary according to circumstances. Thus, the deployment is used when the enemy is to be received in po- sition and when he marches, in order to subject him to the greatest fire ; otherwise, he would approach scarcely without any danger. I MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 45 troops march against him, the deployment can still be used, but not without great dangers, by reason of the wavering which the march in line of battle always occasions, and from the disorder which results therefrom. It is then preferable to have only a part of the troops de- ployed, and to intermix them with columns, which are so many com- pact points where the authority of the officers experiences less trouble to maintain order. In this formation the right and centre of the French Army of Italy traversed, in 1797, the vast plains of the Tagliamento, and in presence of the Austrian army. The attack of a position roquires the most rapid march, and the ground to be run over being often bristling with obstacles, the troops should always be formed in columns by battalions. These small masses are easily moved; they traverse all defiles without any effort : the rear, less exposed to the fire of the enemy than tho head, pushes the latter, and the column arrives sooner. In order to complete this disposition, numerous skirmishers should precede the columns and march in a direction corresponding with the intervals of battalions, so as to divide the fire of the enemy, and, if nec- essary, to cover the deployment, without, however, masking the heads of the columns, which can immediately commence firing. Skirmishers thus placed have points of support; their rallying places are designated and within their reach, so that they can never be compromised. The formation by square can only be accidental, and to resist the at- tack of a numerous cavalry in an open country. As it is very difficult to move in that formation, especially when engaged with infantry, the troops should bo accustomed to pass in the quickest possible manner from the deployed into the deep order, and reciprocally. Still, in Egypt, we have seen troops marching by squares, and during entire days. But this was owing to two causes : to accustom the soldiers to the impetuous attacks of a new enemy, and to cover the sick, tho wounded, and the artillery. The squares were even formed unnecessarily and almost ridiculously heavy, by placing the men in six ranks. It is true that this was suppressed as soon as it became apparent that these precautions were exaggerated, and squares of three and even two ranks were considered sufficient, and then the formation was only em- ployed at the moment when an immediate charge of the enemy could be foreseen. • Generally, the march in square is detestable; however short, it leads to disorders ; because the rules of the march are not the same upon the different sides of the square — two march in lino of battle, and the others by the flank. 4G THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. NOTE. The Tagliamento descends from the mountains which enclose, the upper course of the Piavc, and taking a course from the north-west to south-east, it washes Tolmezzo. defended by a fort : receives the Fella, which comes from the Gorgo of Tarvis, and bathes Chiusa-Veneta, a fortified position; flowing thence, from north to south, it passeB Osopo, a fortified place Of great Importance to the defence of the road from Italy into Austria; forms a multitude of islands and canals; bathes Valvasone. near which, in 1797. Napoleon defeated the Archduke Charles, and finishes its course in the lagunes. This river is very Important 00 account of the road which it opens into Germany, and which was that followed by the French in 1797, 1S05, and 1S09. PAKT SECOND ORGANIZATION, FORMATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF AR- MIES. CHAPTER I. ORGANIZATION AND FORMATION OF TROOPS. Both consist of the faculties of the man and the nature of the arm. Order and obedience. Tho organization and formation of troops are no arbitrary matters ; their aim being to form a compact mass from an assemblage of men and to make a whole of, them, and a unit which is movable; the regu- lations to be adopted repose upon conditions determined by the facul- ties of the man, and by the nature of the weapons he uses. To form troops, order must first be established and obedience be as- sured. With this aim, a classification and successive bands have been created, which, with skill combined, oblige a large mass of individuals to submit to the action of authority. FIRST SECTION. INFANTRY. In squal, unit is the man — In company, squad forms uuit — In battalion, com- pany — In army, battalion — Company for organization and administration — Bat- talion for manœuvre and battle — True limits of battalion — Conditions of bat- talion — Necessity to form it with regard to reach of voice — One officer for forty soldiers — Strength of battalions in Austrian and English armies — In- conveniences and advantages of number in the battalion — French battalions- Limit indicated by author — Necessary diminutions of the entire strength — Ita greatest reduction when arrived before the enemy — Strength of battalion accord- ing to adopted formation — Three ranks — Two ranks — Fire of three ranks — Purely theoretical — Inevitable fusion of third rank into the two first — Cause of disorganization — Object of formation in three ranks — Modifications to ba made in formation of two ranks— How this formation becomes best — Formation of regiment — Is ttrbitrary — Question of administration and economy— Keginaent s nith strong bnttalions — Their great advantages — Economy, spirit of corps, facill- 48 THE SPIRIT OF ty of echelons-— Qualities of colonel— Order, justice, and firmness— Special corps /—Principles applied— Regiments of light infantry in France and Russia— Only so in name— Chasseurs of Tincennes — Austrian chasseurs— English chaasenrs— Voltigeurs — Their application with strong advance guards and in mountain war- fare — Necessity of strong companies — Particular inst ruction, strength, and youth —Good garrison battalions for guard of places— Dangers of confiding the guard to bad corps — The point of support of the army in the field escapes at moment of need — Examplo : garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo — Major Aubert. Note. — Remarks on Confederate infantry. In the beginning a small aggregation, easily governed, was formed ; several of these aggregations were united, and their chiefs submittod to a superior chief; in that case the unit was no longer man, but a union of men. Thus a squad, composed of eighteen to twenty men, obeys a sergeant, aided by corporals; the squads united form a company, which the captain commands, aided by officers ; aud several companies form another mass, which is called battalion. The chief comes into contact with only four, six, or eight men, and he commands through their intervention, and acts thus upon the whole. The company is the element of organization, discipline, and adminis- tration ; the battalion is the true military element in infantry, and the unit for battle ; the movements and manœuvres are by battalion, and by battalion the battle is delivered. As to strength, the battalion can vary, but in certain limits, deter- mined by the nature of the organizations themselves. The proverb should not be understood literally: The God of armies is with (he heavi- est battalions — a proverb which undoubtedly has been also applied to large armies, designating a part for the whole. Two conditions must be observed in the numerical composition of the battalion : it must be movable; and when deployed, the voice which commands must be heard at the two extremities of the line. Within these limits tho number of companies composing a battalion, and the strength of each, can more or less be increased. A proportion must be established between the number of officers and soldiers. That indicated by experience as agreeing best with the econ- omy of a well-established service is one officer for forty soldiers, or twenty-five officers for a battalion of one thousand. men. It must be, however, understood that a large number of officers has but one incon- venience — that of costing too much to the state; in every other respect it is useful, be it in multiplying the means of action, of surveillance, and of examples of courage, or in facilitating rewards by a more rapid ad- vancement. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 49 The effective of the organization varies with the different nations. The strongest battalions are in Austria; England has the weakest. The total in Austria exceeds twelve hundred men ; this is too much for a good servico ; such a number can not be moved with order and facility. I see, however, an advantage in this disposition ; since the losses during war continually take place, and when reinforcements have not yet arrived, a battalion of such strength can resist longer; a large dimi. nution of strength does not unfit it for service. In France weak battalions are habitually employed, and their effec- tive strength, evon upon the entrance of a campaign, is still almost always below tho complement of organization. I shall put one thousand men as tho limit for the strength of a bat- talion, because even this number is not always maintained during peace, and at tho moment when it leaves the garrison to take the field. After constant observation I have found that the best administered bat- talion is the strongest one; and assuming a diminution of one-fifth for hospital details, workmen who remain with the depots, those required for the trains, etc., etc., a battalion of one thousand men will then have but eight hundred men under arms; after several months of active ser- vice it is reduced to five hundred — a force still sufficient to face the enemy. The formation adopted for battalions influences their numerical com- position also. In all armies of the Continent, infantry is formed in three ranks; it is formed in two in England. This last formation appears to me far pref- erable. Nothing justifies a third rank. Without entering into the detail of fires, I will appeal to experience. On drill the fire may be delivered in three ranks, but not in war. Tho French regulations prescribe that the weapon be passed to the third rank, which is uniformly required to load it. This theory is not ap- plicable before the enemy, and long practice has demonstrated its in- utility. The battle is fought by firing when in position. The best formation, then, is that which mostly facilitates firing, gives it a better direction, and the greatest development; in fact, the third rank will soon be confounded with tho two first, because instinct teaches the most advantageous formation ; but this change being against orders, it brings about a kind of disorganization ; it is, therefore, better to sanc- tion this formation at once, and make it permanent. In placing troops in three ranks, the object has undoubtedly been to give greater consistence to the march in line of battle ; but this msans is not sufficient. Even with three ranks, a line moving is but little solid; and for the march in lino of battle I should prefer a less heavy formation. 5 50 THE SPIRIT OF With a slight modification, tho formation in two ranks is equal to all requirements. Thus : In position, the troops, when formed in two ranks, have for action a front by one-half greater than thoy would have were they formed in three ranks. In the march in line of battle, ploy the first and fourth divisions in rear of the second and third, and you will have four ranks; and at the moment of halting you will present a front, it is true, less by one-fifth than that of the actual formation (four divisions in line of battle, each composed of three ranks), but in two minutes it will be doubled. Here is, then, a solid and compact formation for tho march, which permits a battalion to fire everywhere in case of a sudden charge of the surrounding cavalry of the enemy, by a simple about-face, exe- cuted by the first and fourth divisions, which double the second and third. The formation in two ranks, with this disposition introduced into the march by line of battle, appears to me incontestably the best. After the formation of the battalion comes that of the regiment. Here everything is arbitrary, and depends upon the caprices of those in power ; the regiment may be two or three, or from four to five and six battalions strong ; it is only a question of administration and economy, numbers of men ; there are less staff officers, and the advantages arising Regiments composed of many battalions are less costly, with equal from living together are given to a greater number of men. Generally, these regiments are in better moral condition and have a more energetic esprit de corps, because a larger number of individuals partake of its reputation and glory. The consciousness of their ability to distinguish themselves is more powerfully developed — so much so, that they would cheerfully endeavor to execute tho most heroic deeds. In wars of in- vasion, in the occupation of vast countries, regiments thus constituted are able to form echelons to assemble the men who have remained in the rear. These intervening corps receive the recruits, drill them, and strengthen the battalions which are in face of the enemy. Thus a great economy in men is obtained — an economy which is not less important than that of money. In general, the regiment is an essentially administrative formation; it again acquires a kind of social constitution, animated by a love equal to that of country and of home. The colonel is the chief of this social assembly — its father and magis- trate ; and certainly, without wishing to depreciate his courage, the first military virtue, the essential qualities of a colonel, and those which chiefly influence the efficiency of hi3 regiment, are less an extraordinary intrepidity, than the spirit of order, of justice, and great firmness. Tho best corps are those thus commanded. It should be a principle to instruct a regiment of infantry in all MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 51 branches of the service, and the exigencies of war point to the light in- fantry as the most proper organization. However, special corps have been considered useful, and I partake of this opinion. For advanced guards, and detachments in broken and mountain countries, men are required who have been endowed with a particular instruction — who know, by instinct, how to surmount all obstacles — and who, trained with the greatest address, can make their fire terribly murderous. But, as far as I am informed, the true principles have not been ap- plied in every country. In France and Russia there are regiments of light infantry ; theso corps differ from ordinary regiments of the line only in name and uni- form. The Chasseurs de Vincennes have recently been established in France. The institution is good, but incomplete, as long as the battal- ions which compose this corps are not divided into field and garrison battalions, according to the principles I hereafter shall lay down. In Austria there are battalions of chasseurs ; in England, companies, belonging to a regiment, which never leave the depot. These two* or- ganizations are superior to ours ; but they stand yet in need of being modified. The regiments of infantry have their voltigeurs ; in this respect an immodiate necessity is satisfied. In recruiting the voltigeurs of the centre companies, men can always be chosen capable of performing good service. Special corps of light infantry should have a force proportionate to the necessities of heavy vanguards and mountain warfare. Regiments of several battalions are too strong for this service ; and since it neces- sitates an extremely great division of the men, a chief can only command a small number. An organization should, then, be adopted which pre- sents to the enemy only a strong battalion. In this case the companies should be very strong. I should wish to see a battalion of light infantry twelve hundredrmen strong, composed of six companies of two hundred men each, commanded by five officers. But the particular instruction and the special formation of these troops is not the only thing required ; they should have more strength, and should be younger than other troops ; the choice of the men is most im- portant. If a new corps is formed, it can be constituted in the most satisfactory manner; but. at the expiration of several years, there will be found, for the training and perfection of young soldiers, nothing but heavily moving skeletons, and tho corps will have lost all its former agility. Light infantry corps should be composed of two battalions — one of twelve hundred men, to be always maintained at its full complement and constantly ready for war: the other of four companies, composed 52 TIIE SPIRIT OF of six or eight hundred men, which I will call garrison battalion, de- signed to instruct the recruits, and to receive all men still fit for service, but who are no longer suitable for outpost duty, which requires so much strength and youth. I see another advantage in this disposition ; excellent troops arc placed at the disposal of a general, with which he can either garrison fortresses or protect fortified posts menaced by the enemy. I know that the resolution is very hard to place in a fortress a good regiment, or a part of one, which is able to go into the field ; but, never- theless, it is absurd and sad to confide the guard and the defence to bad corps. They surrender the place at the fir3t attacks of the enemy, and the general sees the point of support upon which ho counted vanish at the moment when most necessary to him. I have twice painfully experienced this in Spain. General Dorsenno had formed the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo with negligence; and this fortress, which had held out for twenty-five days of opened trenches against the French army and the most powerful material, wag taken in four days by the English, while the Army of Portugal was hastening to its succor. Later, I had with the greatest care fortified the passage of the Tagus at Almaras, in order to render sure the communication of the Army of Portugal with that of Southern Spain. Works strengthened with ma- sonry and defended by small redoubts covered the left bank, and ad- vanced forts disputed the only passages by which the enemy's artillery could debouch. This post of Almaras was of great importance, and I had placed in it garrisons of sufficient strength. But these troops were mixed, and the bad ones had the majority — especially a German bat- talion, called Prussian. The good troops occupied the outposts defending the Pass of Miravette. The enemy appeared suddenly ; the English column, with which the artillery marched, stopped, and could not pass. But another column, having traversed by foot-paths the girdle of rocks which border the plateau, arrived with ladders, and mounted to the assault. The slightest resistance was sufficient to repulse an at- tack so audacious, executed in full daylight. The commandant of the fort, Major Aubert, a very brave soldier, mounted the parapet to en- courage his intimidated troops ; he was killed ; his death spread terror among his men, and the garrison fled to the other bank of the Tagus, abandoning the fort to the enemy, who retired after having destroyed the means of defence. NOTES. Remarks on Confederate Infantry.— I believe our system of regiments with ten companies to be unwieldy ; and that of two battalions, each of six hun- dred and forty men, divided into four companies, with sixteen line-officers, and com- MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 53 manded by the lieutenant-colonel and major respectively, the whole to be directed by the colonel, to be much more effective ; because : 1. Six hundred and forty men, in but four companies, will move better, more quickly ; and straggling, especially in long marches, will be less frequent. 2. The lieutenant-colonel and major would take more interest in their respective commands, since they Mill have the consciousness of being in command in reality and always. They would be thus forced to take greater interest, even if thoy did not have tho desire. As now, the duties of these field-officers are not sufficiently defined. It is true, in battle they have charge of the right and loft wings respec- tively, but in many cases this appears the entire performance of their position. Colonels are not always willing to divide their important duties with officers in whom they do not repose entire confidence. Such a thing may not happen in regular armies, established for centuries, but it is of daily occurrence in an army called into existence as ours has been, and where reliance in an officer's desire for improvement and strict performance of his duties had to take the place of the requirements necessary for his official position, which it was supposed he would bo anxious to secure. If it is voluntary on the part of a colonel to assign such duties to his field-officers as he may think fit, he will often only yield to the demands of necessity, whenever he is so overworked as to make assistance absolutely requisite— from no other motive, but that what he himself does he knows to be done properly. But if, on the other hand, the organization of an army is such as to give to the two subordinate field-officers the powers of the colonel, as now possessed, their sense of duty will be stimulated; because they then will, in reality, have specific services to perform, the neglect of whichthey know will subject them to ignominy and punishment. 3. Then the colonel's position would be more important and becoming to his rank. lie would no longer be the commanding officer of a battalion, but that of a regiment consisting of two battalions; performing the duties, on a smaller scale, of a general of brigade ; and better fitted to assume the latter command, as colonels now generally are, whenever the casualties of war call them to some temporary or per- manent command of the kind. A colonel, moreover, no longer fettered by small duties of every kind, would have more time left for the perfection of his regiment, and the majority of brigade manoeuvres could be performed by his regiment at any time. 4. One line-officer to every thirty-ono men appears more than sufficient. An offi- cer can easily manage forty men. 5. Whenever a portion of such a regiment would bo required for separate duty, it would still feel itself an efficient body, and have reliance as such, since it would still preserve a regular organization, having another battalion around which to rally, which is not the case if four companies are taken away from ten. For this reason independent battalion» of less than ten companies cau not be effective. This is a matter worthy of consideration, especially on account of the requirements of the field of battle. 6. Brigades could then be efficiently regulated; and a brigadier ought never to command more than three of such regiments, which would give to him a front of battle of six battalions, or two battalions for each division (right, centre, left) of the line, consisting in all of three thousand eight hundred and forty men under anus. 7. It would reduce the number of officers: an important consideration, whenever it is admitted that it be the duty of a country to provide for those officers who become disabled in the service. 6« 54 THE SPIRIT OF 8. A beneficial emulation would be excited between the two battalions of tho regiment. If mobility, corps d'esprit, and economy are important considerations, I believe they are attained by a like organization. The following conditions, however, are inseparable : 1. The battalions must never be permitted to fall below an effective of two-thirds, that is, four hundred men under arms. Below that number a downward course commences which nothing can check. To gain this point, the* distribution of rocruits Bhould be more just than it has been in many cases. The general com- manding alone, it appears to me, could equitably determine which regiments may be entitled to the first recruits — for it must be owned there is a difference between regiments which have become depleted through the bad management of their colonels and insufficient attention of their sanitary officers, or those whose corps d'esprit is not sufficiently established to prevent desertions en force, and those whoso thin ranks are to be ascribed to their valor upon the field of battle. To keep up regiments in a proper strength is so important that it deserves the most serious attention. I believe that the bravest man will fight better when he knows he can, in ca«e of need, rely upon some succor. Soldiers of those regiments will fight best who can yet boast of a becoming strength of their commands, and when they are conscious that they will not be permitted to waste themselves away without reinforcements ; that, on the contrary, they will be upheld as long as their country has yet a name. Those brigades will fight best who, by reason of equal dimensions of their commands, have the additional weight which superior mobility, impulsion, and spirit confers. Justice demands that they be upheld in strong numbers, because, in tho eyes of the world, and, alas! in those of many commanders, a regiment is a regiment, and expected to perform equally heavy duties with the strongest. The pride of these glorious old regiments will never lead them to complain of hardships. They have learned, upon many a hard-fought field, that it is valor, combined with obedience, which gives victory, and that the country's independence is never won by com- plaints. Their bravery will be the same when marching to death with but one hun- dred and twenty-five men, conscious that not one-half of them will issue from tho smoke of battle ; but it is rather the bravery of despair — like that of the Last Ten of the Fourth regiment of Poland. If we look at the percentage of the killed and wounded of the différent regiments engaged in a given battle, we will find that where small regiments lose fifty per cent, of their number, strong bodies pass the ordeal with a loss of but twenty-five per cent. To properly estimate their services upon the field of battle, the losses of regiments must be compared with their previous effective strength. This appears, beyond controversy, to be established through the consideration of the killed and wounded during the Battle of Shiloh, the materials for which I have taken from the " Official Reports of Battles, published by order of Congress, in 1862." General Bragg had •. 13,5S9 men Lieutenant-General Polk had 9,136 " Li eu tenant-General Hardee had 6,789 " Major-General Breckinridge had 6,439 " And, in the ratio of their effective strength, it appears that the percentage of killed and wounded increases with smaller corps. These percentages of loss are : Bragg-'s corps lost 22.04 per oent. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 55 Polk's corps lost n , an „ , , , ■ •. 25.60 per cent. Hardee s corps lost 3003 u u Breckinridge's corps lost 32 9g „ {i or precisely ten men more from every one hundred mc7iha^d General Braga, xoho commanded the strongest corps. *> rw Jih who Gardner's cavalry, In killed, wonnded, and m issing- which latter are not included in the previous calculation-lost 6.86 per cent., but they were hardly engaged. The Battle of Shiloh furnishes a very fine example, because the troops were commanded. A more uniform battle, in almost every respect, can hardly be con ceived. The brigades of Cleburne and of the gallant Statham-in which latte, r y regiment had the honor to serve-lost, it appears from the same report, heavier than any others upon the field-the first nine hundred and seventy-eight men, and he *z:;z^ * ■? si r four men - statham,s *«**>* •» °- °< *££ est, barely numbering two thousand men. 2. It is a question to be determined by the Department of War how long it may be expedient to permit conscripts, especially those who have withdrawn their ser nee from the cause of the country so long, to volunteer. After a certain indul- gence this boon no longer belongs to them. col'Jd^Tv 7 8t 7, 0f C ° nSoIidation ' *■** "P™ the just foundation of the 17 >\ Z P yed byth6 differeDt regiments and th(?ir exploits, can alone a ve the efficiency of the army, and to carry out any good system of reorganization it is absolutely necessary. The unanimous and spontaneous re-enlistments of our noble «armies in the field show that no sacrifice will be too great for such men. Soldiers are the very first to see the necessity of reform. Tlfe following basis for consohdation appears to me a just one : Let those regiments be preserved fir* who enlisted for the war at the beginning of the struggle. a ° Second. Those who enlisted for three years. Third. Those who unanimously re-enlisted, according to General Orders No 1 Adjutant and Inspector-General's office. January 1, 1862 Kurth Regiments established from such fragments" of one year regiments as declined to re-enlist entire. Fifth and last. Those regiments which were organized afterward Under the restriction, however, that each and every regiment which shall have been found to be wanting in corps d'esprit and bravery be disbanded Such a basis rests upon good conduct and patriotism, and no other consideration can be admitted. 4. We have, then, to increase the number of non-commissioned officers Upon their efficiency the discipline of a regiment mainly depends. 5. Each battalion must then have a separate non-commissioned staff. The com- mwioned staff, as now existing, is deemed sufficient, and. if necessary, two subal- terns of the line may be detailed in rotation to the field-officers commanding battalions, to act as adjutants. 6 The number of officers of the line and field must then be continually at it* full complement. To effect this, the establishment of a reserve list is the most eflective measure. As soon as the absence of an officer, from any legitimate cause, exceeds a certain period, disorganization commences; because, and especially i„ our own service, what is called f " electioneering," a remnant nf,,„i it ical ,„act ices, berins- a practice which sulli,* ft« honor of every officer engaged therein. Hence it i, important that their place, be filled at once. This practice arose from the volun- 56 THE SPIRIT OF teer system, but it is fast disappearing before the rigors of executive jti-t i«-»v, mili- tary honor, and discipline. SECOND SECTION. CAVALRY. 1 Fire-arms are accessory — Its speciality In the combat of corps by corps — Impetuoei- ty of it* movements — Superiority of French cavalry — Its exploits in Italy — Scarcity of good commanders — Three counted in twenty years of warfare — Their names — Indispensable qualities of a cavalry general — Promptitude in survey- ing condition of affairs — Rapidity of decision — Prodigality and dash in the at- tack — Conservation and minute attention to needs before battle — Employ with- out reserve at the given moment — Particular character of Murat — The march of column without object before the enemy — Why — Necessity of formation in two ranks — Squadron unit of combat — Mobility combined with regularity; basis of its strength — Best reputed formation — Unit of combat same as unit of adniinis tration — Faulty organization under the Empire, reformed at peace — Line of caval- ry in battles; divers formations of the French, Germans, and Russians — Part of cavalry — Sees and hears for the army — Gains tho victor} - — Liitzen and Bautzen — Incomplete victories — Cavalry in battle — Two objects to accomplish — Heavy cav- alry — Lances and sabres — Light cavalry — Fire-arms, carbines, and pistols — Dra- goons — Mounted infantry — Speciality of that arm — Beliefs and convictions — Ne- cessity to employ small horses — Shoeing and clothing — Armament of cavalry in general — Lances, sabres, pistols, and carbines — Lance in particular — Little suited for light cavalry — Its origin — True arm of cavalry of the line — Sabre and lanco compared — Lance at Dresden — Cuirassiers repulsed — Breach made by hfty lances — Prejudices of routine — Cossacks — Their aptitude — Formed by nature — Cossacks of the Don — Degenerated — Cossacks of Asia, of Kouban — Russian hussars and chas- seurs, cavalry of the line — How Austria might have Cossacks — France will havo hers — How — Defensive arms as suited for cavalry — The best — Should be also ap- plied to infantry — Instruction of cavalry — Its time object — Horse and rider — Equitation — Accustomed to charge — Promptly rallied — Inconvenience of light charges when instructed — Sad education of the animal — New indications given by the author. Notes. — 1. Remarks on Confederate cavalry. 2. Marshal Murat. 3. General Nan- souty. In cavalry as in infantry, above all, the object should bo tho attain- ment of order, obedience, and mobility; but tho mannor of combating and the nature of weapons not being the same, everything is different in tho application of that arm. Fire-arms are with cavalry an almost superfluous accessory ; most frequently they only serve as means for signals. Cavalry is destined to fight body to body; it must cross swords with the enemy, dash at him, overthrow, and pursue him. The pursuit of the enemy is its habitual office ; for but rarely two parties engage in a hand-to-hand encounter. At tho moment of their meeting the less confident one stops and flies. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 57 Tho movements of this arm must always be rapid and impetuous ; sometimes even, but with small bodios only, it should fight with a hardi- hood bordering on imprudence. For the conflict the French cavalry is the best in the world ; it al- ways charges with the utmost impetuosity. It will sometimes become the victim of rash enterprises ; but, in general, what favorable results are secured through this habit of headlong boldness ! In our first im- mortal campaigns of Italy, how many thousands of prisoners we owed to a handful of horsemen ! To command cavalry, and to direct considerable masses, superior qualities and particular merit are required. Nothing is more rarely met with than a man who knows how to handle and to conduct these masses so as to employ them at the right time and in the proper man- mer. But three can bo enumerated in the French armies during a pe- riod of twenty years of warfare : Kellermann, Montbrun, and Lasalle. Tho necessary qualities of a general of cavalry are of a nature so varied and so rarely united in the same person, that they almost ap- pear an isolated, particular gift. Above all, the talent is required to survey, with one glance of the eye, the situation, surely and promptly ; a rapid and energetic decision, which, however, does not exclude prudence, is next ; because an error or a fault committed at the beginning of a movement, are irreparable, by reason of the limited time which remains for execution. It is oth- erwise with infantry, the march of which, compared with that of a gener- al and his aides-do-camp, is always slow. Tho general of cavalry should study to shelter his troops from tho fire of the enemy as long as they are in position ; but when the moment of launching them against the enemy arrives, he should be prodigal. Upon the eve of a battle, and until they aro called upon to engage tho enomy, he should administer to the comfort of men and horses with tho minutest care; he should keep his forces in the highest condition, both physically and morally; but, at the arrival of the proper moment, he should expend this cavalry without regard to the chances of loss, with the «ole purpose of achieving the greatest advantage. A general scarcely ever satisfies, in the same degree, these two require- ments. One, an excellent administrator, preserves his cavalry; but, too much occupied with this thought, he does not dare to launch it against the enemy, and when tho day of battle comes it is useless. Another, always ready to go into action, takes so little care of it dur- ing tho campaign, that his troops perish miserably before they see an enemy. To cite two examples: This defect of careful treatment will be charged upon Murat, 2 and the contrary excess upon General 5 , who commanded tho cavalry of the Imperial guard at Wagram after Bessières was wounded. If ho had charged at the moment when 58 THE SPIRIT OF Macdonald mado his offensive movement, sustained by the artillery of the Imperial guard, and when he had overthrown the Austrian right, twenty thousand prisoners would have fallen into our hands. Before the cavalry charges the enemy and the men fight against each other, it should never attack in columns. This formation will serve to facilitate the march, but at the instant the enemy is approached the deployment should begin. A column of cavalry, once surrounded, is soon destroyed, because there are but few soldiers who then can make use of their arms. The cavalry should deploy in two ranks, so as to arrest the disorders which happen in the first — formerly it was de- ployed in three ; it will not be difficult to recognize the evil of this formation. The unit of combat is the squadron ; the rule to determine its strength is to combine the greatest mobility with maintenance of order. A squadron having too large a front will be easily put into disorder by the smallest obstacle, and every troop in disorder is half conquered. According to experience, the best formation, and that which joins the greatest strength and consistence with great mobility, is a squadron of forty-eight files, divided into four platoons of twelve each. Platoons of sixteen and eighteen files are also suitable at the beginning of a cam- paign, especially of light troops, when more active service and numer- ous detachments weaken the corps. The less number of men and horses permits that in cavalry which would be impossible in infantry, namely: the unit of combat is the same as the unit of administration. ' The perfection of the service, generally, would demand such an or- ganization of all the arms as could both be applied to the combat and the daily existence — that is, to the police of barracks, for the purposes of administration and manoeuvres ; an organization which constantly keeps the troops under the hands of the same chiefs, and which ^thus would impart greater stability and power. Formerly squadrons were composed of two companies. One of the captains found himself subordinate to the other — a vicious combination. He who commands must have a social superiority, constant and deter- mined, over those who obey; such is the fundamental principle of mili- tary subordination. Still wo have made war with squadrons thus formed; but, since peace, a profound discussion has united all factions ; the company-squadron has been adopted, and the soldiers, whatever their position and the circumstances, are governed by one chief.* *Lieutenant-General Préval, who, under the Restoration, was member of the Council of War, and one of its luminaries, is the author of the principal ameliora- tions which have been brought about in the organization of the cavalry. — Note of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 59 There is a difference in the manner of the French, German, and Rus- WithT ie th " reg r dS \ f ° rmati0n ° f the CaVaIr ^ iD line of battle. With u the squadrons have regular intervals; with those foreign arm ie8 they are joined by twos, and form a division without intervals. This formation, while preserving the same degree of mobility in the reZr^ glVeS ™ n8i8tence k° eaeh point of the line, and, in that respect it has some advantage ; but, on the other hand, with the Freneh formation, there is a line, the front of which is larger, with an ooual num er of combatants, which gives a greater expansion to the Tn" orlwWk 71 ,"L fegard t0 thCS6 tW ° formatio -> the advantages and drawbacks of which appear to me equally balanced Cavalry is necessary in war to disclose and give news of the enemy. Such is especially, the duty of the light cavalry ; it is the eye and the ear of he army ; without it a general is always surrounded with peril wfthln 7 1S ' 1 fUrtherm0re ' U3eful for co ^ and to profit from victory. Without cavalry, a gained battle gives no decisive result «i,i Pr0 °/p f thi . 8 Caa ^ Cited ' IU 1813 ' nfter haviQ g *>eaton the Rus- ons and Prussians at Lutzen and Bautzen with infantry alone, as far as the moral condition of the army was concerned these victories were of great importance, but no real advantages resulted from them A flying enemy can always rally, if he is not rapidly followed up at the moment of disorder. ^ Cavalry in battle has a twofold object : 1. To engage theenemy's nav- al y and to pnrsne the beaten army. 2. T„ engage the infantry which may throw itself in the way. To engage infantry, heavy and iron-clad cavalry is necessary, which sufficiently protected and sheltered from the fire, so as to confront it fearlessly. It should be armed with lances and sabres ; each man will be armed with a pistol; no other fire-arms are necessary except a cer- tain number of carbines per squadron, so that each regiment have the means of clearing itself, should it be isolated. There is a fourth kind of mounted troops, a very old institution,* and which has been misapplied-it is not known why ; I speak of the dra- In principle they were entirely mounted infantry; they ought always to have preserved this character. In that capacity dragoons can ren- der in a thousand circumstances, immense services-such as detach- monta for surprises in retrograde movements, and, above all, in pursuits. But it would be necessary, in conformity to their institution, to mount hem upon horses too small to be placed in line ; otherwise the aspira- tions and pretensions of colonels will soon convert them into cavalry ancTthey will then become both bad infantry and cavalry. •Marshal Briaaac, in the 10th century, during the Plodm^wo warn, miaod th. flr B t corp. of dragoon,, and u.od it to great advantag*.--^/^,.' 60 THE SPIRIT OF A body of troops should have its beliefs, its convictiong, and its faith, resulting from sanctioned principles, and even prejudices, inculcated in the minds. But the intelligence of the soldiers must not bo confused by the profession of différent opinions; so as to say, for instance, in a solemn manner, when exercising them on horseback, that cavalry should always triumph over infantry; and when the moment of exer- cises on foot arrives, to teach them per contra, how good infantry is invincible by cavalry. With their application the axioms recur to the minds of tho soldier, and almost generally in a reverse manner. As a foot-soldier he recollects how redoubtable the cavalry is ; as a horseman, he never forgets how much the infantry is to bo dreaded by tho cavalry. I repeat, that no institution is moro useful than that of the dragoons; but it must not be falsely employed. Let the horses be small, as al- ready said ; let their harness and equipment of men and horses be uni- formly calculated for tho commodious and rapid service of a true infan- try corps, armed with good guns and bayonets, and well supplied with ammunition. Let the dragoons, lastly, bo shod and clad for easy and rapid marches. As for the regular cavalry, cavalry of the line, and cuirassiers, I would compose their armament of lances and half-curved sabres, suit- ed for the double purpose of cutting and thrusting, and of a pistol; each squadron should have twenty breech-loading carbines. In another work I have considered the question of the lance. Not to leave the matter of which I am speaking incomplete, I will here repro- duce the arguments recommending that weapon, according to the expression of the Marshal of Saxe : The queen of arms. I will, then, commence at once by remarking that it is totally unfit for light cavalry, which, having to defend itself against several enemies at the same time, should be provided with fire-arms and sabres. Yet the light infantry has been armed with the lance in those countries in which it was introduced. But it is known with what facility now usages are adopted ; in the most civilized countries the authority of example leads to a blind con- fidence. The origin is never traced, nor the circumstances which ex- plain it ; essential differences are not taken into account, and from this dates the beginning of faulty and inconsiderate applications. From whence comes, then, the false employment of the lance in tho arming of mounted troops ? From the example given by warlike hordes, such as the Cossacks and Arabs. These hordes inhabit plains whore horses are abundant; they fight without instruction and rules, and employ the lance in a wonderful manner. Therefore it has been said, by considering them light troops ; the lance should be of service to light cavalry. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 61 And neither bas it been sought to ascertain tho origin of this weapon, nor why these hordes employ it 30 skilfully. In a barbarous country, whcro no kind of industry has, as yot, pene- trated, where neither manufactories nor magazines of arms exist, nor money to buy tho lattor abroad, a man mounts a horse and looks about fora weapon; ho cuts along limb of light wood, sharpens a point, hardens it near tho fire, and ho has a lance. Afterward ho procures a nail, puts it in, and his weapon is more dangerous. Finally, this staff is clad with iron regularly fashioned, and he has a lance such as has been adopted for troops. The Cossacks and Arabs did not arm themselves in such a manner by choice, but by necessity; and if they have become redoubtable for their skill in handling the lance, it is becauso they have exercised with it from infancy. Nothing, then, can be drawn from such examples for light troops, specially organized in a civilized country. The lance is the weapon of the cavalry of the line, and principally destined to combat infantry. Tho sabre can not take its place;, what use will cavalry make of sabres if the infantry remains firm, and is not afraid? The horsemen can not sabre the foot-soldier, because the bayo- nets keep the horse at too great a distance. On tho other hand, if the horse, which remains the only offensive arm of the horseman, be killed, it falls and makes a breach, and this breach gives to those who are near it the means to penetrate. On the whole, tho advantage of the struggle then is with the infantry. On the contrary, suppose the same line of cavalry, furnished with a range of pikes preceding tho horses' by four feet, and tho chances of success will be entirely different. But for light troops the sabre is better suited than the lance ; in hand- to-hand conflicts a short weapon is managed with more facility, and is more advantageous, than a long one. All things being equal, it is cer- tain that a hussar or a chasseur will beat a lancer ; they have the time to parry and thrust again before the lancer, who, beset by them, will bo obliged anew to resume the dofensivo. The sabre, destined for light troops, should be slightly curved ; the perfectly straight sabre is less suited for single combat. The same troops should, in addition, bo supplied with fire-arms, cither to increase their power of resistance or to be able to announco their approach to troops which they arc ordered to warn or to sustain. As regards cuirassiers and the entire cavalry of tho line, it would bo suitable that they have both the lance and the straight sabre. The lir.-trank would charge with the lance; the second sabre in hand. The shock once produced and the ranks broken» the sabres of the second rank will complete their work. In times • I ' i< Irj I Iweya l v the iront, and the 62 THE SPIRIT OF stroke came direct; the long weapon then would havo been preferable. This oxplains to us the use of the lance by the knights. Tn support of my opinion, I will cite a fact in regard to the manner Qf employing the lance and obtaining great effects from it. In lSlo, at the Battle of Dresden, our cuirassiers had several times charged the infantry, abandoned by the cavalry, upon the left erf the Austrian army. The infantry always resisted ; it repulsed our attacks, although the rain had prevented almost all the muskets being fired. This resistance was not overcome until the cuirassiers were preced- ed by fifty lancers, forming the escort of General La Tour Maubourg. The lancers made a breach; the cuirassiers were able to penetrate, and destroyed all. It is true the infantry fired but few shots; but under every other circumstance the question would not have been uncertain had the cuirassiers been armed with the redoubtable lance. The lance is equally victorious in cavalry engagements, line against line, and when the enemy has only sabres. It is admirable at the mo- ment of attack; and it is not less suitable for pursuit. To resume. I am, then, authorized in saying that the lance should bo the principal weapon of the cavalry of the line, and the sabre only an auxiliary one ; and that the armament of light troops should consist in sabres and fire-arms. Undoubtedly, routine and contrary prejudices will yet, for a long time, combat these principles, whose truth seems to me, however, to be perfectly demonstrated. The Russian army has an immense advantage over all other European armies. The Cossacks serving in it compose a light, admirable, inde- fatigable, and intelligent cavalry ; they know with precision what to do, and where they are; they reconnoitre the country well, observo every- thing, and can perfectly rely upon themselves. They can not bo com- pared with any systematically instructed light cavalry; nature has formed them for this service; their intelligence is developed through the daily necessities to which they are subjected. I speak of the Cos- acks of the frontiers, who, continually at war with their neighbors, al- ways in the presence of an enterprising and tricky enemy, are obliged to watch unceasingly for their own security. The Cossacks of the Don, who wero formerly admirable, have become less efficient and intelligent since their country is surrounded by sub- jugated provinces. Still, numerous tribes of Cossacks remain to guard the frontiers of Asia, especially those on the Kouban, upon the line, and Terek, and to the east of the Caspian sea. During a war, Rus- sia can dispose of and bring to Germany more than fifty thousand of this cavalry, which leaves the regular cavalry in careful preservation for the day of battle. This circumstance permits Russian hussars and chasseurs to be considered cavalry of the line, and prevents them from being employed as light troops ; because, on account oY their different MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 63 instruction and non-employment as light troops, they understand scarcely anything of those duties which the Cossacks perform so ad- mirably. Austria could have something analogous to the Cossacks, but not on so large a scale. She could easily procure ten thousand troops of this kind by forming a corps of five hundred horse in each frontier regi- ment. I do not understand why, in a country where everything is combined with such care, and where the organizations are so well con- sidered, something resembling it has not, as yet, been introduced. France, when she shall have conquered Algeria, can without any trouble levy Arab troops which, in times of war, will render her in- calculable service. The attainment of this object calls for the unre- mitting attention of the government; and to arrive at this end, it would be well at once to increase the native troops as much as possible, so as to have a host of men attached to the glory of our arms, accustomed to unite their interests with ours, to rejoice with our success, and to be able to furnish good non-commissioned officers, whose want will be felt in proportion as the organization extends itself. The cavalry being destined to fight body against body, it may be asked, why the question has not been considered, to secure it from the blows of the enemy ? Little would suffice to guard it from a sabre cut, a thrust of the lance, and even to deaden a musket ball,' fired from a short distance, or a pistol-shot. The Orientals, whose conflicts are always melees, have had this foresight at all times, and are often clad with mailed coats. The bust could be guarded by a coat of mail of buffalo-skin, such as the Castilian .peasants wear; as for the head, the shako could be lined within by two crossed pieces of wood, as if is sometimes used; the limbs should be protected by one or two light iron plates, placed on the outside of the sleeves and pantaloons. This dou- ble cuirass of buffalo-skin, trimmed and ornamented, would make an elegant dress, resembling that of the Roman soldiers; and this light and comfortable attire might, perhaps, be equally suited for infantry of the line, and which, favorable to health, would protect the soldiers from the grievous effects of a change of clothing to suit the temperature. The dress would then bo reduced to a sort of vest, like that of the cuiras- siers ; and the dress of buffalo-skin, worn only when under arms, would be the insignia of service. I will add one word concerning the instruction of the cavalry, which has always appeared to me to be incomplete. Too much attention can never be bestowed upon equitation, and to make the horseman a perfect master of his animal. Man and horse should make but one individual— thus realizing the centaurs of fabulous memory. Horsemanship is everything. It subjugates and breaks the horse. Manoeuvres will always be performed with sufficient correctness when 64 THE SPTRTT OP the soldiers are good horsemen. Encouragement of all kind should ho given to obtain this result. The troops must, furthermore, be instructed to charge thoroughly, without occupying themselves particularly with preserving order, which this impetuous manner of the movement would render impossible, and which is the best means to beat the enemy; but, at the same time, they must be accustomed to rally at the first signal with promptness and dexterity. They must be constantly reminded of this, and prepared for it with all means. The apparent disorder of the charge will not then influence their moral state. On the contrary, if the charges are made njodcrate in instruction, being, in consequence, still less lively before the enemy, they will never overthrow him ; at the first disorder the soldiers will believe themselves lost. But instructed, as I have before said, they will consider this dis- order an habitual circumstance, easily repaired, and without any danger. The following mode is often employed in drill, in great manoeuvres, and in sham-battles : The infantry is charged by the cavalry, and, bearing in mind that it is only a sham-fight, the cavalry stops before having reached the infantry, or escapes through the intervals. Noth- ing is worse than such an education of horses ; by thus accustoming them to avoid obstacles, they will never be brought to confront them, because their habits will accord with their instinct, and, perhaps, with that of the rider's. This practice is pernicious; it should be banished from the exercises, and replaced by perfectly opposite lessons. The re- sults will be immense in war. I conceive it in the following manner : A line of infantry is placed to face a line of cavalry; the files of both lines are so divided that a horse and man can easily pass through the intervals. At first, the cavalry moves off at a pace, and rides through the infantry ; this is repeated several times at the trot and gallop, until the horses execute this movement, so to speak, by themselves. It is then accompanied by several shots, which fire is extended along the entiro line, and which gradually becomes heavier ; and, if it be wished that the noise be still greater, files of infantry of six ranks may be formed, and the actual shock of the fire of an entire battalion is produced. After several days of like exercise, such cavalry will be more suited to attack infantry than any other; and the horses being drilled and ac- customed to throw themselves upon heavy discharges in their very front, they will carry their riders by themselves, even if the latter were en- deavoring to moderate their, ardor. NOTES. 1. Kemax'ks on Confederate Cavalry. — That we, with such magnificent material, should see our cavalry occupying the third place among the three arms, in both efficiency or usefulness, must be owing either to some radical defect in our system of organization, or to our want of experienced cavalry officers — to which, in particular, I do not feel prepared to decide. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. G5 In all modern wars cavalry has played a great rôle. It is the only weapon wliich can take advantage of a beaten enemy, pursue, and rout liim. Hence it has been fostered and trained in every well-regulated military system. Frederic the Great owes his most signal victories to the Impetuous attacks of his hussars. Napoleon lurried his masses of heavy cavalry against the decisive point, and felt assured of victory. The Polish lancers dashed into many a. Russian square in 1830 and 1631. The cavalry charges of Inkennan and Balaklava are immortel. On the plains of Italy both French and Austrian horsemen, in the late war, performed prodigies. And all these blight deeds of arms were performed by men who had to be taught to ride after they were twenty years of age, and upon horses that had been broken by riding-masters who themselves xvould not have dared to mount a luihl young horse, as our eitvalrists do. There, severe application gives, In a small degree, what our national customs richly bestow upon us; and yet, what immense disparity in the achievements! The fact is, that we content ourselves with proudly pointing to OUT valorous young men upon fine horses, and to say: "Look at our cavalry!" ami the great majority of the officers, not knowing themselves how to handle a sabre, can, of course, not im- part its use to their men. Thus dash, valor, and horsemanship aro absolutely thrown away as soon an the revolver ha^been emptied of its loads, and skilful swordsmen are closing upon them. It may be easy to say that such things will not occur, because wo have to contend against enemies who do not even know how to ride, and the nature of our country forbids our ever employing large bodies in an actual charge in battle; but is it less necessary to be prepared against an inferior antago- nist, or is it less requisite to be as skilful in all the requirements of a horseman upon the scout, the pursuit, and in grand reconnaissances ? The fact is, that a majority of the officers in higher commands in the cavalry ser- vice appear not to be impressed with the importance of their arm, and are cither too indolent, or do not know how to instruct. Nor has our cavalry, in general, a« yet been reduced to that degree of subordination and discipline, without which nothing important can bo achieved. Otherwise, Ave ought to have a magnificent cavalry, after three years of warfare, as we have splendid infantry and artillery. An important step has been taken in organizing dur cavalry into divisions. Larger bodies of cavalry are thus brought together, and emulation is excited; the duties of each regiment, moreover, become less burdensome. If it is true — of which I am by no means persuaded — that we, on aocount of the nature of the ground, have to let our infantry and artillery alone sustain the shock of battle, and thus must give up the best part of a victory, we might just as well dismount tho greater part of our cavalry force, and employ the rest in scouting and piqueting alone: because then even grand reconnaissances would become dangerous. With this organization into divisions, a step has 1 n taken in the right direction, and we may. perhaps, soon hope to seo tho cavalry perform an efficient part in tho shock of the g rea t battle. "With these Strictures it is not intended to say that our cavalry has done nothing. No man could be more sensible of its achievements under such leaders as Van l>"in, Stuart. Morgan, Hampton, she Lees, Wharton, Wheeler, Forrest, sod others, than is tin- writer: but the 07*01 and MOff in ngn if mil duty of cavalry, the routing of a beaten ene my ,] yet been acc omplish ed. No Instances are oooesiary of what cavalry emi do: history furnishes thousand» of, them J and if one would con- ten,) that the nature of the -round witli us h Midi M toi,, ibid anything like a charge or affective pursuit, he shows but Ignorance as to Hie topography of Bwo- pean battle-fields. 6* 60 THE b'l'iHlT OJ One fact should always be before the Confederate cavnlry officer, namely: that ho has under his oosnmand m fine riders and aa splendid ^hots ,-is the world prednoM — that he ought to perfect Uiis men in discipline, the use of the sabre, and to precision in drill : and then I sincerely believe that he might outstrip the most renowned exploits of the arm. And here I beg to say one word in favor of the " queen of arms 1 '— the lance. Ono of my friends, a master oi the sword and a skilful handler of the lance, has essayed to draw attention to the weapon and to form a body of lancers, and he has failed, a» I understand. Furthermore, from high authority, I heard that some of our supe- rior officers serving with the Army of the Potomac, in the beginning of the war, tried to introduce the weapon, and that they also failed, because the troops did, not favor it. While we have tin's aversion for a formidable weapon, our enemies, it is said, are now actually organizing a strong body of lancers. This latter fact will, perhaps, more surely than anything else lead us to inquire whether it be not pos- sible to arm the Confederate cavalry with lances. If our men have no desire to employ either the sword or the lance, it is not because they dislike to use it, but because they feel that it ia a harmless tool in their hands, since they arc not taught how to use it. Did we leave the choice of tho weapon to our infantry and artillery, I have no^loubt that a good many infantry soldiers would prefer the light fowling-piece to the heavy musket, and the artillery- men would never bother themselves about heavy guns. I believe, on tho contrary, that our men would like the lance, were its utility and efficiency once shown to them practically, as a man becomes attached to his sword as soon as lie feels him- self a master of it. It would, I believe, be a beneficial move if a good officer of cavalry could obtain authority to take live hundred young volunteers from the dif- ferent cavalry regiments, and, by a system of thorough drill and discijilinc, mako them a body of perfect lancers. Neither artillery nor squares have stood before them. Stationed on our coasts, especially, where the features of the ground favor their charging and pursuing, I believe them to be invincible. In a mi'h'e the lance is replaced into the receptacle near the left stirrup, and, by means of the straps, secured to the person of the lancer in such a manner that it doe- aot interfere with the u«7, his father being an aubergiste, or country innkeeper. Trior to that, the father of Joachim had bee.n a steward to one of the Talleyrands, and, through the influence of that distinguished family, young Murat was placed at the College of Chaors, and intended for the Church. His character, however, little fitted him for that profession, and he enlisted into a regiment of chasseurs. From this he was, within a brief period, dismissed for insubordination. He returned to his native village, and took charge of his father's horses until the breaking out of tho Revolution, when he entered the constitutional guard of Louis XVI, from which he passed, as sub-lieutenant, into a regiment of chasseurs. During the Reign of Terror he professed himself an enthusiastic champion of equality, and rose to the rank of colonel ; but these predilections did not prevent him from making himself useful to Bonaparte in 1795, and ho was rewarded by being placed on the personal staff of the foture emperor in the Italian campaign of '96. From that hour the fortunes of Murat closely followed those of his patron. The fiery valor which the handsome swordsman, as he was called, showed in a hundred fights, the splendid though somewhat fantastic costumein which he delighted to figure, and the love of daring achievement, which drew an air of ancient romance over all his actions, invested him, in the eyes of his admiring fellow-soldiers, with the renown of some paladin of old; and his en- terprising talents in the field obtained for him the graver distinction, in the cool judgment of Napoleon himself, of "Tho best cavalry officer in Europe." He com- manded that arm in the campaigns of Egypt, Italy, Austria, and Prussia; and in all — at Aboukir, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Eylau, and Friedland — his services were brilliantly conspicuous. After the Egyptian campaign he obtained the hand of Caro- line, youngest sister of Napoleon ; and in 1806 was raised to the dignity of a sovereign prince, and recognized by the Continental powers as Grand-Duke of Berg and Cleves. In 1808 he commanded the French army in Napoleon's invasion of Spain, from which country he was recalled and sent to Naples to ascend the throne of that kingdom, vacated by the elevation of Joseph Bonaparte to the Spanish crown. Tn 181- he accompanied Nnpoleon on the expedition to Russia, in the command of the eavalry of the grand army — the most numerous and splendid body of horse, perhaps, which the world has ever leen arrayed in the ages of civilized warfare. At the Battle of Boro- dino Murat performed prodigies of valor; at the same time. Napoleon (who was Standing on a scaffold, which gave him a complete view of Urn champ de ba taille) htul his misgivings as to the over-impetuosity of his brother-in-law. That battle, one of the meal ensanguined on record, opened the way to Moscow. Bat this city was a fatal possession t" the French — driven out of it. n* they were, by Ore, t>> experience nil the horrors of the Russian winter. Mm at served 1 1 i • • emperor again in the cam- paign of 1813; but. after the illsastllHM Battle "f Leipzig, finally deserted him in his fallen fortunes, and became the aUj of his bas. This nnpàrdonable ad of weakness and treachery w:>-i followed l>y another. Though he had saved his throne for a time, the hesitation of the I V i tigniT < "t Viens i to at knou ledge his regality alarmed him ; and when Nap Aeon reappeared la France, u im.">. ha aned his ntmoal smleavors to induce the Italians tj arm for their national independence. Rut in this he most (jS THE SPIRIT OF aignally foiled, and was compelled to fly. In :i fit <>f desperation he again landed In arms "ii the c >as1 of Calabria, with a handful of followers, and was captured and [gnominkrasly shot by sentence of a Neapolitan oourt-martial — a base and most unwarrantable art. but worthy < >f its perpetrators. The people of Naples loved him much, fbf hi' was always milil and merciful BS a BOVereign. That he was one of the ivalry officers of modern times there can nol he a doubt; hut it is equally certain that lie was wholly unfit for a chef a? armée. He was a strange mixture — brave, vacillating, faithless, vain, wholly devoid of public principle, with a warm heart and kindly feelings. • 3. General Nansouty was the general alluded to by Marshal Marmont. The French army was unfortunate, at the crisis of the Battle of Wagram, in losing the services of the gallant Bessières. General Nansonty permitted the Austrians to retire in the most perfect order. Napoleon, although this victory laid prostrate before him the Austrian empire, in a fit of ill humor exclaimed : " Was ever any- thing seen like it? We have gained neither any guns nor prisoners. The day will be without any decisive result!" CHAPTER II. ARTILLERY. Importance — Simplest the best — In what perfection should consist — Necessity to restrain number of calibres — Character of siege artillery, and for defence of places — Inutility of 16-pounders — Field artillery — Conditions — t'>-ponnders — .Made the wars of the Empire — 8-poumlers. principal inconvenience — 12-pounders, their object — Batteries of 24-pounders — Services upon battle-field — Hollow pro- jectiles — Large mortars — Mortars Marmont d la Yillantroy — Mountain artillery — Rockets à la Congrèvc — Wall-pieces — Dimensions — Weight— How determined — Theory of explosion — How range is diminished — Friction, expansion — Long pieces and heavily charged — Experience with 35-poundcrs — Maximum of range — What length— Inconvenience of length, giving greatest range— Length of 23, 88, 24-pounders — Inconveniences of instantaneous inflammation of powder — Particu- lar phenomenon— Powder of General Rutti — Extraordinary force — In two schools destroying all pieces — Causes of this fact— Better the enemy of good — Weight of pieces — Force of recoil — Analogy — Experience of 1802 and 1803 — Founded the system — Artillery of the Empire — Comparative weight of cannon and ball — Lightness of English pieces — Uniformity of construction of material — Importance— M. de Gribauval — His principles badly understood— Twenty-two kinds of wheels reduced to five — Unit of combat— Composition of battery — Its three elements— Importance of mobility — Its actual perfection— Work of M. Vallée— Artillery drivers— Made all campaigns of the republic — Artillery train, creation of author— System perfected under tho Restoration — Artillery of now invention — General considerations — Congrèvc rockets — Views of author upon their employment — New combination of arms for battle — Two infantries — Proportion of arms— Infantry— Artillery— Its importance when cannon can not be employed— Mountain warfare— War on the plain— Effects of rockets in the MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. CO first kind of warfare — Experience to follow — Necessity to be prepared for their employ — Revolution in the art of war — Paixhans' artillery — Character of heavy artillery — Swiftness compared with mass — System preferred — Distinction — Mobile artillery — Fixed artillery — Analysis of advantages of Paixhans' artillery — Resistance of air — Quantity of motion — Destructive action — Paixhans' cannon in the défonce of places — Will change marine system — Ship of the line compared with frigato — Historical of Paixhans' guns — Influence of author upon their adoption. Notes. — 1. Remaria on Confederate artillery. 2. Armstrong, Whitworth, and Rlakely guns. 3. Brass ordnance. 4. Deflection of Armstrong guns. 5. Projec" tiles for Armstrong gOlfS. 6. Restraining the recoil of the Armstrong gun. 7. Shrapnel or spherical case. ~8. Double-shotting. 9. Penetration. 10. Ricochet fire. 11. Salvo. 12. Spiking and unspikiiig guns. 13. Glass hand-grenades. 14. Grummet and jnnk wads. 15. Gun cotton or pyroxyle. 16. Carcass. 17. Lasso harness. 18. Slow-matches. 19. Ice. 20. Passage of rivers. 21. Pontoons. 22. Distance by sound. 23. Tactics of English artillery. 24. Present artillery tactics of the French. 25. Napoleon's organization for offensive warfare and plan of at- tack. 26. Tablo showing the personnel and materiel of a Prussian, Austrian, Rus- sian, French, and English light battery. The third arm which has become indispensable in warfare is artillery. It is of capital importance; but its efficiency depends particularly upon its organization, and the principles upon which the latter is based. I will endeavor to establish these principles and to develop their consequences. I shall first commence with the material, and will then pass to the means necessary to make the best employment of it. The most simple artillery is the best. If one calibre could satisfy all requirements, and if the same carriage could serve for all different transports, the perfection of artillery would be attained. But it is not thus. Artillery must produce many different effects ; these effects being determined, it is necessary to find the calibres which can produce them, while limiting their number to strict necessity ; because, so soon as one calibre can serve for the same object, there is ono too many, and it becomes prejudicial, on account of the complications it leads to in regard to ammunition, changes, and repairs. Artillery should be of three kinds : siege and fortress artillery, field artillery, and mountain artillery. In each of these divisions, and despite the difference which necessarily exists in the weight and dimen- sions of the several pieces, yet, as much as possible, the same calibres should bo adopted, that tho same ammunition may be used. In sieges and the defence of places, pieces are necessary which kill the men, dismount the cannon of the enemy, and which are of great range. Experience has demonstrated that 12-poundcrs attain this object perfectly well. In this species of warfare it is, besides, requisite to destroy the ram- parts, crumble them to pieces, and to open a practicable way to penetrate 70 THE SPIRIT OF . into the stronghold. Here artillery is no longer a deadly weapon, but simply a tool, a machine — the battering-ram of the ancients; it has only become more powerful and expeditious. To obtain this effect, 24-pound- er8 are absolutely indispensable. Sixteen-pounders, formerly used, have, therefore, become superfluous — insufficient in one case, and exces- Bive in the other. Field artillery should follow the troops in all their movements, and, promptly arriving upon a fixed point, should crush the enemy. A light, easily transported material is, then, necessary, which being of the great- est mobility, need not stop before an} 7 obstacle the field may present. I believe 6-pounders, used all over Europe, and which I adopted when at the head of the French artillery, are sufficient for this purpose. With this calibre all the wars of the Empire have been fought. The 8-pound- ers have been again introduced. There is no doubt that their superiority gives some advantages ; but it is a great inconvenience to augment the weight of the ammunition by one-third, thus requiring more considera- ble means of transportation — means which are always wanting in war. A second object in field manœuvres is to produce great effects with the aid of powerful reserves; to silence the fire of fiold-works upon which the enemy supports himself; to arm those which have been con- structed ; to open non-terraced walls, and to protect the passage of rivers. For this, 12-pounders are required, but less heavy than those employed in sieges or in the defence of places. Finally, every army should be accompanied by one or two batteries of short 24-pounders, to bo fired with a less charge than one-third of the weight of the ball, and which, in a thousand cases, will render the greatest services on the day of battle. The calibres, as just considered, should then be in accordance with the eflects to be produced ; and notwithstanding their great number, they can be reduced to three, by varying the dimension and the weight of pieces. But this is not all. Hollow projectiles, bombs, and howitzer shells are also used ; it has been sought to adapt their calibre as much as possible to that of cannon, and no difficulty has been experienced. The shell of a diameter of five inches, five lines, which has the same diameter as the 24-pounder, is used everywhere, with the advantage of being equally suited for cannon and howitzer. A heavier calibre has been found useful for siege howitzers, and, in accordance with system, a diameter of eight inches has been given ^o them, which permits the em- ployment of these shells in the 8-inch mortars, so useful in the attack and defence of places. We come now toother mortars of superior calibre. Here the great- er the calibre, the greater the effect. The expense and difficulty of the transportation of ammunition are the only argumeuts against their MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 71 use. Tho mortars destined to receive a very heavy charge, cast upon a plate which supports them, and which wero formorly called after me, as well as those called Villantroy mortars, are only applicable for coast defence, on account of their immense weight, and because their particu- lar object is to obtain a very great range, which is useless in sieges and in the defence of places. Later, I shall spoak of a newly-invented artillery, which, while pre- serving tho principle of unity of calibre, can be employed to produce different effects. The calibres of which I have just spoken are, then, the only ones which siege and field artillery requires. Finally, we como to artillery suitable for mountain warfare. With- out entering into details, I will remark that it should be composed of pieces light enough to bo carried on the back of mules ; heavier pieces, which are transported upon carriages, are more embarrassing than use- ful. Congrève rockets are also eminently suited for mountain warfare. I shall speak of this invention hereafter. There exists yet another weapon which could be most advantageous- ly employed ; it is the wall-piece, but recontly introduced, which is charged at the breech, and throws balls of several ounces weight with great accuracy, ranging equally with pieces of small calibre. These guns, distributed to the number of ten or twelve in each regiment, and placed, with their ammunition, % upon a single carriage, would occa- sionally be of extreme utility. After having spoken of the calibre of guns and the motives of their choice, it is proper to say a word as to the other dimensions of pieces, and their weight. Their determination is not arbitrary ; it is derived from positive circumstances, which directly influence a good service. The length of a cannon depends upon the charge which is used. Ex- periments have not shown tho precise limit for the greatest range; it has not been obtained in order to avoid other drawbacks, but it is pret- ty nearly determined. The gas which is formed by the ignition of the powder, and the explosion of which produces the force which pushes the ball, operates as a spring does when set free ; or, in proportion of its action upon tho ball in movement, it augments the force which pro- pols it, and consequently the range. This action is the result of ignition. If tho ignition is not complete when the ball has left the cannon, thero is a diminution of range ; if it is completed prematurely, and the ball has received the whole impulsion before having traversed the whole length of the cannon, there is also a diminution of range ; but then it is the friction which occasions it. The quantity of the powder must be such that this expansion of the gas which, it produces when inflam- ing, accompanies (lie ball fmrn the bottom of the breech to tho mouth, peithcr more nor lull ; UuM, with loo - trongtr charge? arc no sary, and with SO iter piece* weaker charge? mutt bo used. 72 THE SI'IRIT OF In France, a uniform charge for cannon has hecn adopted, represent- ed by ono-third of the weight of the ball. "With this charge, a series of experiments for the determination of the length which gives the great- est range has been made, and pieces of thirty-five calibres in length have been cast. After having noted the range obtained, the chace of the gun has been diminished by sawing off the length of one calibre, and the range was found to be greater. The operation was renewed, and the result always the same, until roaching twenty-seven calibres ; and, when pass- ing this limit, to twenty-six calibres, the range decreased. It was then concluded that, with a piece of twenty-soven calibres in length and a charge of one-third of the weight of tho ball, the maximum range was obtained. But, with such a length, the manoeuvring of pieces is dilficult, and to remain within the mean of the limits for siege and fortress pieces, that of twenty-two has been adopted. For field-pieces, which require yet easier and more prompt manoeuvring, this length has been reduced to eighteen calibres ; in foreign countries it has been fixed at fourteen. I do not speak of howitzers, an arm particularly designed for rico- chet firing, established upon different principles, and required to fulfil different conditions. I will now make a remark founded upon a well-established fact, the application of which is important, and which will be a matter of aston- ishment. Powder should inflame with rapidity, but not instantaneous- ly ; otherwise the inert force (vis inertix) occasions a shock of such vio- lence as to destroy tho gun itself. Its action must bo successive. A particular fact has given me the means to examine this phenomenon. General Rutti, an officer of great merit, and placed at the head of the Department of Powder and Saltpetre, had succeeded in manufac- turing powder of extraordinary strength, and he believed to havo ob- tained a very important object. Five hundred thousand pounds of this particular powder had already been mado, and it was determined to preserve it as a precious article for times of war. Luckily, circum- stances changed this destination. The new powder was ordered to be consumed for the exercises of the guard in 1828. In two schools all the cannon were burst and unfitted for service. These facts ascertain- ed, I sought their cause, and no other explanation but that which I havo given could be obtained. In this case the adage may woll be repeat- ed : "Better is the enemy of good." As to the weight of pieces, it can bo diminished very considerably and without inconvonience, with regard to resistance ; but the gun-car- riages suffer by it, and are easily broken. The force of the recoil, oper- ating upon too light a mass, produces a brisk shock, and destroys it. After the weight of tho piece haa reached a certain limit, whatever the MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 73 excess of the weight of the metal, the gun-carriage should be strength- ened to that extent. This fact will be understood through the following examplo, which any one might see at any day: A juggler places upon his breast a stone of great weight, and braves tho effect of a blow with a club, while, should this blow fall upon a smaller stono, he would bo wounded. In 1802 and 1803, when I was engaged in establishing tho new system of artillery, which has served during the whole period of the empire, experiments which I ordorcd upon tho weight of the metal demonstrat- ed that that which satisfies equally the requirements of mobility and conservation is a weight of one hundred and twenty pounds per pound of the weight of the ball, well propelled by a charge of one-third of the weight of the ball; so that a 6-pounder gun, for instance, should weigh 6X120=720 pounds. The English have attached great importance to the lightness of field artillery. They do not give, at least they did not give, thirty years ago, more than ninety pounds per pound of the weight of the ball ; but they had likewise diminished the charge to one-fourth instead of one-third. Another word upon the material. Gun and other carriages are neces- sary elements for artillery service ; their use alters and destroys them, and replacements become constantly necessary. Hence tho immense advantage of a perfectly uniform construction. M. de Gribauval, first inspector-general of artillery, author of the first regular system, has had the glory of establishing this uniformity. Thus the remains of a carriage constructed at Auxonne or at Toulouse can serve to repair a like carriage constructed at Strasbourg. But, loft to the influence of the officers of the workmen, their pedantry led to useless divisions and subdivisions in the construction of material, thus occasioning, in a systematic manner, renewed great embarrassments, almost equivalent to the confusion from which the servico had just escaped. To give an idea, I will cite but one fact which has remained in my memory. There were, as well as I can recollect, twenty-two kinds of wheels in his system of artillery. In the system of 1803 I reduced them to ten. Nowadays four or five arc only used; and I believe that no material has ever attained a like perfection. In the first war fifty pieces of cannon, well commanded, had more effect than one hundred, such as they were formerly.* From the praise I have accorded to modern artillery, I only except the calibre of eight, which has been again introduced, and its exagger- ated weight for field-pieces has again been fixed at one hundred and fifty pounds per pound of the ball. ♦Marshal Y alée, formerly central LMpeetor "f artillery under tbo Restoration, i^ thfl author of the fine syptem of artillery, in persoand ànd M m adopt- ed in ttêm -■ Xntchy Authnr 7 74 THE sriRIT OF But the best material in the world producos but an indifferent effect, if it i3 not placed in the hands of men who can proporly manage it; and however remarkable the instruction of the corps of artillery has always been in France, many things were still wanting; its organiza- tion was very imperfect. The most glaring faults have been successively remedied, and to-day the requirements of a well-established sorvice appear to have been sat- isfied. The unit of combat in artillery is the battery. It is composed of from six to eight pieces, always marching together, with their ammunition, and placed under the same command. It is in artillery what the bat- talion is in infantry — the squadron in cavalry. This body must, then, be homogeneous and compact; the elements which compose it must be organized in the same spirit, and be accustomed to act together. There are three distinct elements : the material, or the guns, properly speaking, those who serve them, and those who conduct them. If these elements do not thoroughly accord, then artillery is imperfect. The first merit of artillery, after the bravery of the cannoniers, is accuracy of fire and mobility. It is, then, easily seen of what impor- tance is the management of the horses charged with drawing the cannon. Formerly, everything was divided; the cannon remained in the arsenal or in park until the moment of an engagement; the horses bo- longed to a contractor, and the conductors were his servants, treated without consideration, having no prospects of fortune whatever, and called drivers of artillery. With this monstrous organization the whole Republican campaigns were made. Under the Consulate and during the Empire this service was raised, and the corps of artillery trains, with its non-commissioned officers and officers, was formed. Thus the prospect of advancement was held out, and the name driver was replaced by that of soldier of the train. My influence acted directly upon this organization — it was mostly my work; and, in order not to offend the rights of grades for the command, I took care to give to the officors of the train only very inferior grades in comparison with those of the corps of artillery. Thus was prevented (which is indispensable), namely : all embarrass- ment and conflict in the relations of chief officers of batteries and those who conducted them. Tho latter, on account of their inferior instruction, should never have superior authority, and this difference in the grades placing them properly upon the list of military gradation, kept awako the spirit of duty and obedience. This organization lastod during the entire period of tho Empire. At the end of the Restoration the Council of War, of which I was ono of the vice-presidents under tho Dauphin, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 75 changed the organization of the corps of artillery. It was divided into batteries, having their material, cannon, and horses conducted by can- noniers of the second class, who were at the same time instructed to manoeuvre and serve tho cannon, and which were called cannoniers — conductors. This organization has certainly attained perfection. During the last few years two kinds of cannon have been invented, whose effect, according to my understanding, will be wonderful, if they are properly employed in the first war : tho Congrèvo rockets for field service, and guns called Paixhans for the defence of coasts and for- tresses. I firmly beliove that the resistance of the latter wiïfr be increas- ed. The conduct of war and the organization of armies will, likewise, experience a great modification. But these two objects merit particular development. \ The part which Vrtillery plays in warfare has acquired, with every day, more importance, not only by reason of its augmentation, but also on account of its great mobility, which permits its movements to be infinitely combined. However, there are limits to that mobility which gives the means of assembling upon a given point a great amount of artillery. The number of cannon which can be carried into war is equally limited, on account of the expenses and embarrassments an ex- cess of material would produce — embarrassments of such extent upon marches, as to greatly surpass any advantages to be derived from their use in the moment of action. Experience has demonstrated that tho maximum should be four pieces for one thousand men : besides, this pro- portion will, after a few months of a campaign, be greatly exceeded, since the material is not subjected to the same causes of diminution as the infantry and cavalry, and the personnel of artillery being less nu- merous and, therefore, more easily kept at its proper complement. But the Congrève rockets, which have, by degrees, arrived at great per- fection, and which are now directed with sufficient accuracy, make an artillery which, through the development susceptible in their applica- tion, may becoino a principal arm. Indeed, when tho weapon only consists of projectiles ; when no ma- chine i3 any longer necessary to throw them, and whon no longer any surface is presented to the enemy upon which ho can direct his shots; when, finally, by means of very simple dispositions, an instantaneous fire can so be developed as to cover the whole front of a regiment with a shower of balls, representing tho firo of a battery of one hundred pieces of cannon — then the means of destruction are such as to make any attack, such as tho rules ami principles of actual warfare havo pre- scribed it. an utter impossibility. I would conceive tin- employment of the Congrève rockets in the fol- lowing manner: I would instruct fivo or six hundred men in each regi- ment in the service of this new arm. Two chariot? would suffice to car- 70 THE SPIRIT OF ry one hundred rocket-frames such as the Austrians have adopted, and at the word of command these one hundred rocket-frames, each served by three or four men, would develop such a fire as can hardly be con- ceived. To a fire like this could you oppose masses, evon troops in line of battle, upon several parallel lines ? Assuredly not. But the gain of the battle consists in making the enemy recoil ; the space which separates us from him must then be traversed by marching, and to do this with the least possible danger, that arm must be employed which can run over the distance with the greatest celerity. Hence cavalry suits best ; and this cavalry even will bo subjected to a new mode of manoeuvring, in order to face the enemy's fire with the least chances of destruction. Therefore it must be scattered as skirmishers, ready, however, to unite at a given signal, to prepare for the shock which must follow the charge. Infantry then changes roles ; it becomos the auxiliary of the Congrève rockets, or rather these rockets become its weapon, and guns are only accessory. In this new system infantry will have need of an entirely different instruction. It will be divided into two parties : the first charged with the service of the rockets ; the second, in order to support the former, and to serve for its rallying point the moment it will come into immedi- ate contact with the enemy. The proportion of the arms must then be changed; more cavalry than infantry will be needed ; a cavalry which is drilled in a special manner, and an infantry -artillery, if I may ex- press myself thus, whose employment will be limited to the service of the rockets, to sustain and protect them, to occupy entrenched posts, to defend fortresses, and to carry on mountain warfare. But this new artillery assumes great importance in a thousand situa- tions where cannon are of no use whatever. In mountains, a few pieces with great difficulty are now carried, which produce but little effect. With rockets we have a long range weapon, which can be everywhere estai - lished in great profusion, upon the crest of rocks as well as upon less elevated positions. In perfect plains every edifice is transformed into a fortress, and every village church roof becomes at will the platform for a formidable battery. In a word, this invention, such as it is, and as improvements will make it, lends itself to everything, is suited for all circumstances and combinations, and ought to have an immense ascendency over the destiny of the world. Served by a special corps, and considered purely as artillery, the em- ployment of the rockets would be necessarily rare, and would produce but little effect. An immense development is the only way to make them useful, powerful, and a matter of astonishment ; they should, then, properly speaking, become the arm of the army. The nature of things is but slowly considered. Routine acts a long MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 77 time without employing itself with any possihlo modification? and ameli- orations; therefore the power of Congrève rockets will not he appre- ciated hut in a long period. But if, in the first war, a skilful and calculating general would consider the question in all its hearings and consequences, if he would quietly prepare his means to display them upon the battle-field, he will obtain such successes as defy all resistance until the enemy would employ the same means. At the moment of this grand trial the personal genius of the chief will have a great ascen- dency over the issue of the war. However seemingly rational the result may be which I predict, ex- perience alone will incontestably establish the merit of this new inven- tion. The wise man will feel no absolute conviction until facts have realized his expectations, so many are the unforeseen circumstances modifying the deepest calculations and the most seducing probabilities. Taking everything into consideration, appearances are such that a skilful and enlightened general should, in the first war, prepare to employ this new arm to astonish the enomy by its effects. If he uses it altogether, ho will probably be master of the campaign; if his adver- sary has been as vigilant as himself ho will, at least, guard himself from defeat. But his foresight should embrace all consequences of this new agent, considering its relations to the other arms — their pro- portions, manœuvres, and manner of being served. After the successful employment of Congrève rockets during a cam- paign, it is evident that they will be adopted by all armies; then the equilibrium will be re-established, and none will have an exclusive ad- vantage But the art of war will be powerfully modified. More lively actions and their greater moral effect will make the battles shorter, and diminish the effusion of blood — since it is not the number of killed which gives victory, but that of those who can be frightened. I repeat that Congrùve rockets should create a revolution in the art of war, and they will be the first success and glory of him who, before any other, has developed their importance and the advantages to be de- rived from them. I come now to the Faixhnns guns. Heavy artillery, to fulfil its purpose, should have great range, and the projectiles it carries a great quantity of motion. To obtain the lat- ter, ono of two things is necessary: either the velocity must bo very great and the projectile less heavy, or the projectile must be very heavy and have less velocity — since the quantity of motion of a body is equal to its mass, multiplied by its velocity. Until now, a less heavy ball with considerable velocity has been pre- ferred, on account of the difficulty of transporting projectiles. But if this was right during when the means have to be transported in a short and fixed period, it was wrong under different circumstances, 7* 78 THE srtitiT OP where sufficient time could be given to make transportation easy, what- ever the weight of the material. For the defence of fortresses, tho armament of coasts, and marine service, this artillery possesses immense advantages, which I will analyze in a succinct manner: 1. The resistance of the air to the motion of bodies being in propor- tion to the square of the velocity, it is much less with these projectiles, and hence both range and accuracy of fire are greater. Supposing a velocity of twelve hundred feet per second to be that of the ordinary ball, and four hundred feet that of the Paixhans ball, the resistance of the air will be as nine to one. 2. The quantity of motion of a twenty-four pound ball with a velocity of twelve hundred feet, will be represented by the number 28,808; while the Paixhans ball, of the 12-inch calibre, or of one hundred and forty pounds weight, with four hundred feet of velocity, will be ex- pressed by 56,000 — nearly double; that of a thirty-six pound ball, with the same velocity of twelve hundred feet, will bo 43,000 — consequently much more feeble. 3. The action of destruction being like the surfaces of the square of the diameters, the proportion will be one to four. 4. Finally, the thirty-six pound ball traverses the breastwork of an earthwork, or the sides of a vessel, or it buries itself. Wherever it may lodge, it causes no damage : and if it penetrates a plank, the hole is easily stopped up ; but the Paixhans projectile produces different ravages. By its great diameter and the slowness of its movement, with an equal quantity of motion, the effect is contrary to that pro- duced by great velocity; it demolishes a larger surface, makes an im- mense breach, and if a battery is struck, it must be reconstructed ; if a vessel, it sinks, without any possibility of being saved. The defence of a place, supported by such means, raises it almost to the moral strength of attack; and the employment of this arm upon the sea against vessels will cause the disappearance of squadrons, and especially that of large vessels. The superiority of a ship of the lino against a vessel of inferior class has two causes : the ship carries artil- lery against which the thickness of timber of a frigate can offer no resistance; and the latter carries artillery of insufficient calihre to affect a ship of tho line. Thus a frigate is unable to make the slightest attack upon a vessel of the line, since tho fire of the former has only danger for the crew, and influences the manœuvres, while the fire of the ship of the line destroys, besides, the opposing vessel itself, and can, in a moment, send it to the bottom of the sea. But now a small ship, either steam or sail, of but inconsiderable strength, can carry one or two pieces, a single ball of which suffices to destroy the largest vessels ; ten small vessels, each armed with two heavy guns, can quickly surround a vessel and make an end of it. In MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 79 this case, vessels costing as much as 1,500,000 francs, offer no guaran- tee of security or exploits. The Paixhans artillery is, then, the destruc- tion of navies as now constituted. During the Restoration, Lieutenant-Colonel Paixhans, an officer of great distinction, conceived the idea of proposing this artillery. Louis XVIII nominated a commission of generals and admirals to examine it, over which I presided. The exposition o.f this system struck me by its novelty and just conclusions, and I became its declared partisan. Experiments were, however, necessary to determine the range, great- est accuracy of fire, and manner of manoeuvring this ordnance most easily. They were made at Brest, and succeeded perfectly, surpass- ing the expectations of the author. From thence date those changes in artillery which have immensely modified war upon the seas, in rendering large vessels superfluous ; the defence of coasts has become easier and surer; and on this account, it appears to me, the de- fence of fortresses will be much prolonged. But the adoption of this new arm should not disponse with the employment of hollow projectiles, fired from 36 and 24-pounders — since their effects, though less power- ful, are still formidable against an enemy, and favorable for defence. NOTES. 1. Remarks on Confederate Artillery.— Hereafter, artillery officors of our service will have to give important testimony as to the determination of ques- tions which are now being inquired into amid the shock of battle. The increased range of artillery, still on the ascendency, and, in the case of heavy guns, apparently destined to assume a fabulous extent, and their relative effects upon armieR and fortifications of all kinds, with the artillery officer ; the best mode of resisting the effects of modern artillery by means of earth, stone, and iron, and those of iron-clad navies, with the engineer officer; and the influ- ence of the improved small-arms upon men, courage, and tactics, with the officers of all arms — are still points susceptible of controversy; and our officers will be peculiarly apt to give opinions thereon worthy of consideration, since whatever science and military skill can bring to bear on the Issue of the strngglo is now being practically tested. And, in view of these important questions at issue, it is gratifying to know that our officers of artillery appear to be fitted in a -high degree for that dnty. The artillery service of the Confederate States, more than any, has won laurels in this war. No one can witness the performances of our corps of artillery without bo- Ing impressed most favorably. And because artillery officers feel at OOC* that they must study and attend to their duties, or else their weapon, instead of achieving its high mission of breaking the confidence of the advancing enemy, becomes an encumbrance, they have earned the first place among the arms of the Confeder- ate States; and any unbiassed critic, who has had the opportunity of seeing the achievements of European artillerists, must say that those of our army are not surpassed hy any in DOthl of mobility, Hccuracy of fire, and bravery of the men. A dilicreul organisation of OOr artillery into regiments, brigades, and divisions, so as to Rive r mon rapid proniotton to ill-- oorps, appears to be Jail and neeapaai y. Now. a captain of artillery lia* t ti *• Broq bin of being acaptuin as long 80 the âlPiitiT of as the war lasts, except ho he fortunate enough to be selected by his commanding general as the chief of artillery, with the rank of major or lieutenant-colonel. It will he perceived that Marshal Marmont's chapter OH artillery does not r rap. which screws on to the end of the piece. The shot is of cast-iron, and in form precisely like a nincpin. with its thickest part at the middle pared off. to fit with mechanical precision tho hexagonal nid«s of the bore. Thus the projectile haï a hnarillf surface on the whole of the barrel, and runs fit'cly in or out of the mm. so thai in H f an enemy's shot striking the breech and jamming the «crew, or ot hei injury to it. the gun could be used an a muzzle-loader with the HUM fi'ility as an ordinary smooth bore field-piece. We 84 THE SPIRIT OF need scarcely say that this is not the case with the Armstrong; anything happening to the arrangement of the breech at once rendering the gun useless, till another breech is fitted on at the factories at Elswick or Woolwich. With the Whit worth gun there is no chamber for the reception of shot and pow- der — an advantage of the utmost importance. The Armstrong chamber adds to the length of the gun, without being rifled, or assisting in impelling the shot in any way. With the Whitworth, the gun is rifled throughout its entire length from end to end, and every inch is used to aid the flight and give rotation to the pro- jectile. From the chamber in the Armstrong being of a certain size, it follows that only shot of a certain length can be used. In the Whitworth, on the con- trary, it is contended that shots of any length, or a charge of powder of any strength, can be used indifferently. Thus the 3, 12 and 80-pounders are, in fact, only guns of the calibre we mention, as long as they are required to throw a distance of five or five and a half miles. Reduce this enormous range to the dis- tance at which long range guns are generally used — say three thousand yards — and the length of the projectiles of these ordnance may be more than doubled: the 3-pounder used for nine pound shot, the 12-pounder for thirty-two pounds, and the 80-pouuder for a shot of even two hundred pounds. In naval warfare, great weight must be attached to these advantages. 12-pounder boat guns could be used as 12-pounders or 36-pounders, according to the distance at which they chose to engage, while ships could double-shot or even treble-shot their broadsido guns as. they closed with an enemy. The only limit, in fact, to the number of shots with which the Whitworth can be loaded when engaged at close quarters, is the limit to the strength of the powder to eject them. Thus, in the course of the experiments tried to ascertain this fact, it was found that the 3-pounder got rid of ten shots» placed one over another, at one discharge, but failed to eject eleven, when all the powder in the charge burnt out like a squib through the touchhole, leaving the Bhots in the gun. Captain TMakely has lately advanced a claim to a portion of the world-wide fame which Sir W. Armstrong and Mr. Whitworth have achieved for themselves by the invention of their wonderful ordnance. Ho has constructed a new cannon eight and a half feet long, and weighing only forty-eight hundred woight, which projects shells of fifty-eight pounds weight to a distance of upwards of a mile and a half, with only five degrees of elevation — beating, it is alleged, Mr. Whitworth's 80- ponnder solid shot gun, weighing eighty-four hundred weight, by one hundred yards, at the same elevation. It has also been asserted that as Captain Blakely's gun is six inches in bore, and Mr. Whitworth's only four and a half, the initiatory velocity of the shells from the former must be vastly superior, and their advan- tages at shorter ranges still greater than at the distance chosen for experiment. We subjoin, as a further illustration, a debate in the House of Lords on the con- troversy between the Armstrong and Whitworth guns, on February 9, 1864, which will prove of interest to artillery officers: "The Earl of Hardwicke wished to know whether Hor Majesty's ships were sup- plied with any guns or projectiles that could penetrate the iron plates of a ship's side four inches and a half thick. This question had a most important bearing upon the warlike power of this country. By modern improvements the range of mus- ketry had been so extended that field artillery was commanded by it. Inventors then set about devising means to meet this altered state of musketry range, and one invention was produced which excited the wonder of artillerists by length of range and precision of aim. He was a member of the Cabinet to whom the inven- tion was made known, and after the most careful consideration of the experiments MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 85 made and the results obtained, the government entered into negotiations with Sir W. Armstrong to superintend the manufacture of guns on his principle for the pub- lic service. The government then in power was careful to limit the manufacture to field guns, and he believed those guns wore now regarded as very valuable weapons. By the peculiar mode of rifling adopted by Sir W. Armstrong, and the, exact fitting of the projectile to the bore of the gun. breech-loading was necessary, and in that shape the Armstrong gun was undoubtedly an excellant weapon: « Soon after a rival appeared to the gun in the form of iron plating for ships. Ex- periments were made, the result of which was to prove that the old 68-pounder gun was the most destructive weapon. Immediately afterward appeared another in- vention of cauuon and projectiles upon a wholly different principle. Ho did not think the government had done justice to themselves nor to the inventor by the course they had pursued, although it was not unnatural when another inventor had been placed at the head of the government manufactory of cannon, and had expended about two and a half millions of money in producing weapons upon his principle. The Armstrong guns were found to be ineffective against iron plating, but nevertheless they formed a portion of the armament of our ships-of-war^ together with 68-pounder guns of the old pattern. "It appeared that Mr. Whitworth had not been permitted to carry out his experiments exactly in the mannor he wished, although he was well known as a man who had devoted much attention to the subject of the manufacture of guns, and in 1857 had taken out a patent to secure his invention. At last Mr. Whitworth was permitted to make some experiments, and the House would understand the reason for the question he was about to put when ho stated that Mr. Whitworth had never failed to penetrate the iron plating to which his guns were opposed, thus rendering our iron-plated ships no better than the old wooden ships. That fact should Induce the government to allow Mr. Whitworth to show all that he could do; and if that gentleman succeeded in all that he undertook to do the result would be to relieve this country from a great expenditure, and to give us again a fleot of ships which could fight and float in the severest weather. "In May, 1860, an experiment took plan-, of which he believed the noble duke was a witness. One of Mr. Whitworth's guns was fired against the Trusty, a ship plated with four-inch iron, originally built for harbor defence. The result of the experi- ment was that every shot from the Whitworth gun passed clean through the iron plating. He then brought a heavier gun, and the result was the same. Since then there had been important experiments at Shoeburyness against targets made exactly to represent ships' sides. Mr. Whitworth brought a 70-pounder gun and also a 12-ponnder, and the effect, he understood, was marvellous. At every dis- charge his shot went clean through the target, and there could be no hesitation as to the result of his gun on a ship's side. "He had spoken of sol id projectiles: he now turned to shell. In 1862 Sir William Armstrong Stated to B scientific society at Sheffield: f which she has risen."' Tlie war of 1805 and the Treaty of Presbourg brought about theunioa of the Venetian states with the kingdom of Italy, when Napoleon, with a view of making Venice a great military station and entrepôt of the commerce of the Levant, order- ed the construction of enormous works in the port, and covered the city on the land side with forts and redoubts. The Treaty of 1814 caused her ouce more to pass under the dominion of Austria. Her port is the most considerable of the Austrian monarchy, and the seat of all her navy; many new outworks, both upon the lagune islands and in its villages on the mainland, have rendered it a fortress of the first class. 7. Turin, on the left hank of the Po, defended by a citadel, the only relic of its former fortifications: has an arsenal, military school, etc., and one hundred and fifteen thousand inhabitants. Taken by d'Harcourt in 1640; besieged in 1706 by the French; besieged and taken from the French by the Russians in 1799; retaken by the former in 1800, and retained by them until 1814. 8. Prince Eugene of Savoy, celebrated in the contests with Louis XIV of France; born in 1663, at Paris; died at Vienna April 27, 1736, in the service of Austria. Served in Hungary in 1683; 1691 delivered Coni, took Carmagnole; 1697 com- manded the Imperial army ; defeated the Turks at Zentha; in War of Succession marched into Italy with thirty thousand men; surprised Corpi, swept the Adige, and beats Marshal Villeroy at Chiari ; 1702 surprises Cremona, but fails : defeated by the Duke of Vendôme at Santa Vittoria and Luzzara; defeated in 1704 by the French at Ilochstedt; defeated in 1705, in Lombardy. at Cassano, by the Puke of Vendôme; relieves Turin in 1706: gained the Battle of Suae in 1707; wins the Battle of Malplaquet, September 10, 1709, against Marshals De Villars and De Boufflei : 1712. takes Douai; beaten by Villars at Denain, in 1710; in 1717 he fought and gained the Ball le of Belgrade against the Turks; in 1733 lost Philipsbourg. 9. Denain, a town on the river Scheldt. 10. Marshal Villars, born in 1653 at Lyons, others say at Moulins de Pierre; died at Turin in 1734. Aide-de-camp to Marshal Bellefons; 1702, beats the Austrians at Freilingen; takes Kehl in 1703, and gains the Battle of Ilochstedt; conquers the fanatics of Languedoc in 1704; 1707, breaks the lines of Stollhofen ; dangerously wounded at Malplaquet ; captures Denain, Marchieunes, Douai, Bouehain, Landau, Fribourg, etc.; commands in Italy in 1733; took 1'isighitone, Milan, Novarra, Tor- tona; marshal-general of the French armies. 11. The City of Paris is divided by the river Seine into two portions, besides the islands. The southern portion is the less considerable and the most elevated ; it forms a semicircle, of which the Seine is the diameter. It is protected on the east by the river, gradually disappears to the south on a wide plateau, which, by its blending with the plains of Beance, leaves the city on this side without defence; on the west it may be turned by Saint-Denis, Argeriteuil, Saint-Germain, and Ver- sailles. The northern portion is the larger and the more strategically important ; MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 1(J9 liko the other, it forms a semicircle, of which the river is the diameter. It is cover- ed on the west by the Seine from Sèvres to Saint-Denis; on the east by the Marne from Saint-Mam to Lagny; and, lastly, on the north by a line of heights separating the waters which fall into the Seine, near Saint-Denis, from those which How into it or into the Marne between Saint-Clond and Lagny. This aeries of rising grounds, of little elevation, at first runs along the Maine in undulating hills; it then sinks down into a plain between between Rosny and Montreuil; rises again in the plateau of Belleville; is lost in the plain of Saint-Denis; ascends into the high, steep, isolat- ed mound forming tho Montmartre; again sinks into the plain of Batignolles; and terminates in the gentle hills of Chaillot and of Passy, which border the Seine, and at last disappears in the Bois de Boulogne. Such is the whole amount of what nature has provided for the defence of tho metropolis of modern civilization; and yet, however inconsiderable these series of heights may at first sight appear, they offer some military positions— as : 1. To the north-east, the plateau de Belleville, about 460 feet high, and in extent from 328 to 1,040 yards; it is broken by hollows, and covered with woods, houses, and gardens, and forms a steep acclivity close to the very walls of Paris, by the mound of Chau- mont, 377 feet high ; Bagnolet and Charonne cover the débouches to the east, Ro- niainville to the north, Pantin and Prés Saint-Gérvais to tho west, where it is far- ther protected by the canal of the Ourcq. 2. To the north-west the hill of Mont- martre. 427 feet high and 1,100 yards in extent, which looks down upon the walls of Paris, and is steep on all sides except that toward the city, where the slope is more gentle ; on tho east and west sides the quarries that have been hollowed out of it render it inaccessible, and on tho north the village makes it a true redoubt. It is so strong a position that, protected by artillery, it could never be taken but by surprise. The heights of Montmartre and of Belleville are separated by the great depression of the plain of Saint-Denis, an extensive and fertile field without undu- lations, or trees, or houses, and which is covered on the west by the Seine, on the east by the canal of Saint-Denis, a derivation from the canal of the Ourcq, and which enters the Seine close to Saint-Denis, to tho south of which it passes. The pli i eau of Belleville, the hill of Montmartre, and the plain of Saint-Denis are thus the military positions which defend Paris on the east and north. Their impor- tance was understood in 1814 by the Allies, who directed all their efforts against these three points, and here that battle was fought which delivered up the capital of France to the confederated armies of Europe. A similar disaster is no longer to be apprehended; the focus of the greatest revolution which has ever happened in the world is now secured from the attacks of feudal Europe, Paris is fortified : 1. My a continuous rampart embracing both banks of the Seine, bastioned, and having an escarpment of masonry of thirty-three feel high; this enoeùlfe encloses th« Lot suburbs of Paris, and extends, on the right bank, beyond Bercy, Charonne, Batignolles, Ternes, Passy, Autrui], and Point-dnJour; OD the left bank it is car- ried beyond 7a*gjrard, Petit4fantroage, PetH-Gentilly, and Haison-Blanche. 2. By outworks that sure casemated, and of which the principal are the forts of Charenton, Nogent, Etotny, Noisy, ELomalnrille, tl • n the banals of the Ourcq and of Beint-Denis, and the fortifications "f Baint-Denis Itself, upon the right bank; the forta of Blont-Valerj atrouge, B [Try, on the left bank. in the blase of oontinu d as of Paris entirely. Nor did the period of hie reversée, from 1M2— 1S14, lead him to protect the capital nf his empire H» BSTSf dreamed thai FtSAM "uld 10 110 ^HE SPIRIT OP ever become, as long as he wielded the power of his legions, the scone of war and de- vastation. When, finally, in the latter part of the year 1813, his situation became imminently critical, he turned his attention to the capital, but it was too late Had Paris of 1814 been the Paris of 1864 it would have never been taken. In the Confederate States we have no such central point as Paris is to France. Richmond, it is true, has become of great importance, no less in a political than in a military point of view, but it neither contains the whole military resources of the Confederacy, nor would its loss dispirit our people as that of Paris did the French in 1S14; but Richmond is so far of the utmost importance, that if the casualties of war would wrench it from our grasp, wo hare not a single fortified point within the Confederacy where we could fall back upon, reorganize, and concentrate at leisure, before an enterprising enemy flushed with success. It appears, then, to be a matter of the greatest urgency that we should establish one or more large entrenched camps where, beforehand, we should concentrât o provisions and material of war enough to sustain an army of one hundred thousand men, with fortifications ready, and a haven of refuge at hand, when a day of reverses comes. There are several very strong and strategically important points both in South Carolina and Georgia, which would make admirable large entrenched camps. These entrenched camps could servo another useful purpose. The recruits from several states might be concentrated there and instructed en masse ; the most important military workshops, etc., could be there united, etc. 12. Siege. — Major-General Twemlow says : u When the siege of a fortress or strong position is determined on, the first point to be ascertained is the time in which it should be taken; the second, the force requisite to effect the object ; the third, the reserves requisite to replace casualties and supplies of all kinds ; the fourth, the strength of the covering army to prevent reliefs and reinforcements. "As regards the first and second points, time and force, they ought to admit of calculation; if means adequate are not available, the siege should not bo un i> r- taken ; the law of nations should forbid it, in the same manner as a blockade, with- out a sufficient force to exact it, would not be legal. On the third point, it is clear that, without resources of men, ammunition, stores, food, and requisites of every description, the effective prosecution of a siege is impracticable. And, fourthly, we have the recent example of Mooltan, that a strong place in an enemy's country can not be invested without a covering army preponderant in the field. 13. Time Of Reducing Fortresses. — The expense and duration of resist- ance of a front of fortification of e.vch of the systems, is as follows : System. Probable expense. Duration of resistance. Vaubaus first system $200,000 . 19 days. " second and third 400,000 29 " Cormontaigne 300,000 30 " Coehorn 250,000 21 " Bousmard and Chasseloup 1,000,000 34 " Montalembert 1,500,000 80 " Carnot 500,000 18 " Mr. Ferguson's from 40,000 without casemates, To 300,000 with them. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. Ill 14. Some Practical Matters. — Bursting open Gates.— The simplest meth- od is to suspend a bag of gunpowder, containing fifty to sixty pounds, near the middle of the gate, upon a nail or gimlet, having a small piece of port-fire or Bick- ford's fuse inserted in tho bottom. Leathern bags are best for this purpose, but sand bags filled with powder, propped up and ignited, will demolish almost any gate or barrier. If, instead of being suspended, the powder should be placed at the bottom of the gate, any spare time might be advantageously employed in heaping rubbish, stones, or any other available heavy material, over it, as completely as time and circumstances may admit. Hurdles were much used by the ancients in their field-works, and are still occasionally found serviceable for revetting, or for laying on wet ground alternate- ly with beds of fascines. Layers of hurdles, covered with heath and ballast, were extensively used by Stephenson in tho substructure of the Liverpool and Man- chester railroad where it crosses the Chat Moss. In the trenches at Antwerp, deluged with incessant rain, the French laid doublo tiers of fascines, and over these a layer of strong hurdles, for the passage of artillery. Hurdles for portability may be made six feet long by two feet nine inches broad, weighing about fifty pounds when dry. Revetments may be made by hurdle-work, by driving stout sticks along the face of the slope to be revetted to a depth of about two feet in the ground at its base. Branches are then woven in and out between these stakes, and vertical binders applied, when the wattling is completed. Similar wattle-work is employed in Flanders for revetting the submerged escarps of wet ditches. Gabions. — Up to the year 1853 they were made of wicker-work, but in that year it was proposed to make them of plain sheet-iron, when they were only required for a temporary purpose, and of galvanized iron when required for permanent use. They have since been made of various shapes and in various ways. At Sebastopol, where there was a great want of them, the hay-bands were randed. as It is called, round upright pickets, and they were used with good effect. Moro recently a gabion was prepared by Sergeant-Major J. Jones, of the English Royal Engineers, constructed with wrought-iron bands and twelve upright pick- ets, which having been most favorably reported on by the Royal Engineer Perma- nent Oommittee at Chatham, and the Ordnance Select Committee, Sir John Burgoyne, I.G.F., in October, 1860, gtrve directions for the invention to be adopted generally in the service, and included in the list of stores to accompany armies in the field. The new gabion is formed of bauds of common or galvanized sheet-iron, known as twenty-inch gauge, three and a half inches in width, fixed on wooden pickets. The advantage it possesses over the old kind of wicker gabion, hitherto in use by the royal engineers in the construction of their earth-works and defences, are of the most striking character. The old description of gabion occupies three men three hours in Baking; whureas, on a recent occasion, in the presence of his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge and staff, two sapperH made one of the iron gabions in four and a half minutes. From experiments made, it has been ascertained that one hundred men can inake five thousand four hundred of these iron band gabions in nine hours: while the same number of men in the same time would only make one hundred wicker ones. The chief merits il Major Jones' gabions are that they are more pu table, inas- much a» one hundred of his gabions require less room for stowage than six of the wicker onos: and they are much lighter, eaefa weighing about twenty-nine pounds, or thirty-one pounds less than the old kind ; they are much cheaper, costing com- 112 THE SPIRIT OP plete 5s. Id. each, or Is. Id. less than the preseut description ; more simple in their construction, and more durable. Being of iron, they are. of course, incombustible; and the bands are applicable to the construction of flying suspension-bridges, hospital beds, ambulance litters, stabling and hutting for cavalry and infantry troops on active service . Mantlets. — Captain Tyler, English Royal Engineers, in an admirable lecture, delivered on the 16th of April, 1858, before the Council of the United Service Institution, recommends the use of mantlets in sapping operations. " This method would," he says, "hare the great advantage of enabling the workmen to place several gabions at a time instead of one only : of enabling them to work in larger numbers and in greater security; aud, what is more important than all, of enabling them to carry the trench forward with much greater rapidity. These mantlets need not be very portable, nor need they be capable of being moved rapidly ; all that is necessary is that they should be musket-proof, about six feet high by two feet five inches broad ; should be placed on wheels, and should be movable slowly in any desired direction, each by one man. They ought also to be furnished each with a couple of loop-holes for the purpose of observation, »s well as to enable its occupant to fire, when necessary, toward his front, without exposing himself." A writer in Blackwood's Magazine, December, 1859, in giving an account of the bloody and disastrous fight in the Peiho river, June 25, 1859, alludes to a striking innovation in Chinese warfare, by an ingenious aud successful application of mantlets in the defence of the Takeu forts, and adds : " These mantlets would be quite worthy of imitation in our own fortifications, and the cleverness with which they are worked deserves all praise. Ilad they been fitted to the upper port or embrasure-sill, any accident to the lanyard would have caused them to fall down and block up the gun-port, so that they would have to be blown away to enable the gun to work ; but placed as they were, by attach- ing the lanyards to the gun-carriage, as the piece recoiled it closed its own mant- let, and if the lines were shot away the mantlet merely fell down, and left the gun to fight in an ordinal embrasure. " They were of stout wood, covered externally with a wattling of rattans, so as to be rifle-proof. The mantlet worked on hinges, or rollers, fitted to the outer and lower edge of the embrasures, and was triced up and lowered down by means of lines leading upward through the parapet on each side of the gun. When closed up, the casemated embrasures were not easily detected in the smoke of action, and the gun was loaded and laid point-blank before being run out. Directly all was ready, down went the mantlet, out ran the gun. a shot was fired into the mass of vessels, and as the gun recoiled the mantlet went up again with such expedition that our men required sharp eyes to detect which of the enemy's embrasures was firing, and ought next to be silenced." Parallels. — The distance of the first parallel varies according to the range of grape and musketry. At Sobastopol the first parallel was constructed at three times the usual distance from the works, namely, 1,800 yards. Screens of Cloth or CARTAS. — "Screens might bo so useful on many occasions of both attack and defence" of fortresses. " that it is surprising they havo not been oftener employed." Sir J. Jones mentions somewhere, that "At Badajos the British engineers extended a canvas screen to cover an unfinished boyeau; and the French, mistaking it for an earthen parapet, suffered tho excavation to be completed without molestation. Similar screens were used at Gibraltar," during the siege in 1781, " to mask a thorough repair of the batteries overlooking the MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 113 neutral ground. They are reoammended also by Albert Durer and Maggi, in tbeir treatises on fortification." The paragraph above, marked with inverted commas, is an extract from Lieut. Yule's work on Fortification, published in 1851. Albert Durer, to whose treatise it refers, and who recommends the use of screens, published a book on fortification in the year 1527 ; and Maggi's writings on the same subject were printed in the sixteenth century. So that the application of such a mode of shelter or conceal- ment in the attack or defence of fortresses is known to bo of early date. Yet, on one occasion, a reference to its utility being made in an assemblage chiefly com- posed of naval and military officers, seems to have excited a little merriment. Mr. Ferguson, in his " Portsmouth Protected," says : « One of the objections made to my system was, that it would be easy to place a few riflemen in pits or in the nearest parallel, and that they could easily keep down the fire of the place by killing any man who ventured to approach the guns. There did not appear to me any difficulty in avoiding this danger, and, consequently, when the discussion at the Royal United Service Institution came on, I took with me a few yards of baize, with two or three iron rods, and showed how I would propose to stick them along the crest of Ihe parapet, and to hook on the green baize, letting it drop down across the embrasures in front of the guns. The baize was full of slits, through which the besieged could see or fire without the possibility of their being seen by the besiegers. This unorthodox expedient was received with 'great laughter,' aud afforded an excellent opportunity for criticism during the following three nights. When we entered Sebastopol we found curtains of rope hung up, exactly as I proposed, across the embrasure, and rope wound round the guns so as to stop the hole in the curtain through which the gun was fired. This rope-cloth, if I may so call it, was rifle-bullet proof, and would probably stop grape, while round shot would pass through without doing it much injury. There can be no doubt that the maintenance of the fire till so late a period was mainly owing to this expe- dient. The question is, whether was the Russian expedient or mine the best? Theirs was expensive and cumbersome, difficult to apply in all circumstances, and If once damaged not easy to repair; mine was light and cheap, available every- where, and replaced in a moment if knocked over. It is true it would not stop a ball ; but blind fire from rifles is a very innocent amusement, and as the parties fired at were invi«ible there was but little to fear from this cau&e. Experience only can decide which modification was the best, but with all due deference to the Russian?, I am inclined to think the lighter mode will be found most generally applicable." On the occasion of the English asiault of the works on the Peiho, the embra- sures and guns of the Chinese batteries were effectually screened by mantlets and matting from tbe observation of the attacking gunboats, until the opening of a well-directed and most destructive fire disclosed them. Captain Tyler, English Royal Engineers, reviving the subject of screens or cur- tains, in a lecture at the Royal United Service Institution in April, 1858, a-.-; " It is evident that mere screens of canvas, or other suitable material, would be of greal ate 111 temporarily obstructing the view of the besieged, and hiding from them the movements and projects of the besiegers for a sufficient time to enabl- the latter to throw up parapets of a more permanent Datura. f the contracted portion of old Bannatis, now called the Kingdom of Poland, for the subjugation of a people who, like us, were fighting fur the light of self-government. His plan of operation was ably conceived. Pushing forward the main portion of his immense host upon the military road which runs due west from the ancient Po- lish province of Grodno to Warsaw, and touches the town of Siedlioe, where rested the Polish right, ho was, while entertaining tLe contre and left of the Polish lino, to make a vigorous eff:rt agninet ond outflank tho right of tho Pole;, and thus bsth 12 134 THE SPIRIT OF cut their communications with their capital and interpose his forcos between them and their powerful fortress of Zamosk, on the River Wieprz — thus hoping to deal out, in considerably less than ninety days, to the Folish rebellion the death-blow, as our enemies no less confidently expected, at the beginning of this struggle, to do the same with us. However, there were in his front soldiers commanded by generals who, in the school of Napoleon, had mastered grand operations. Against him he found pitted men such asChlopicki and Skrzynecki. Their plan of operations was speedily form- ed. Orders were despatched to the different Polish corps who confronted the vast masses of Diebitsch to fall back in the direction of Warsaw, to cover the capital — a movement which, in its general features, strongly resembled that of our forces in thjippring of 1862, for the protection of Richmond. The Russians, deeming the Poles discomfited by their show of superior strength, now began a general forward movement from all points, in pursuance of their pro- gramme of turning the Polish right. While their centre marched upon the high- road and seized Siedlice, some fifty-five miles east of Warsaw, their columns of the right wing debouched upon Warsaw from the north-east. Upon the Polish right, at the village of Stoczek, Vas posted a corps of observation, commanded by General Dwernicki. This small corps, consisting of barely five thousand men, was, early on the morning of the 14th of February, assaulted by the Russian General Kreutz with fifteen thousand men and twenty-four pieces of artillery. After a sanguinary strug- gle the night saw the Russian column in utter disorder, driven back upon their main body. The first action of the war had resulted gloriously for the Poles ; and the Russians — what, with superstitions beli^l they thought more disastrous even than the loss of the battle — had left in thefljfrms of the Poles an image of the Holy Mother, which had cheered them undH^Kiè fire of cannon, and was borne in the very centre of their columns while marching to the combat. The Polish right wing was now, in. conformity with the general plan, more con- tracted toward the centre. But, before this was executed, another heavy action at Boimie resulted, on the following day (15th), in the defeat of the Russians by the small corps under command of General Zymirski. Two days later, on the 17th, the Polish right and centre were simultaneously at- tacked. At Minsk, the Polish right, the Russians were again discomfited. The centre column, far in advance of the Polish right and left, was under command of General Skrzynecki. On the same day, at Dobre, while slowlj' retreating, it was closely followed by thirty thousand Russians and sixty pieces of cannon, under Diebitsch and the Grand-Duke Constantino. With a masterly coup oVœil Skrzynecki arrested his march near the Village of Dobre, and calmly awaited the debouching of the Russian masses behind a strong position, lined in front with ponds and marshes, with but a single passage across, which could be completely reached by the fire of his twelve pieces of heavy calibre. Urged to deeds of heroism by their illustrious leaders, the Russians, for an entire day, vainly attempted to force the passage, and six thousand in killed and prisoners were by them left upon the field. Night set in upon another day glorious for the Poles. On the 18th the entire Polish line was retrograding with exemplary order, and on the 19th the army was from Warsaw but forty miles ; and on the same day the spirit- ed combat of Swierza took place, where General Dwernicki beat Prince Wurtem- berg, who had passed the Vistula at Pulawa, and was approaching Warsaw. On the same day was fought the battle of Wavre, by Sir A. Alison styled the Bat- tle of Grochow; and on the 24th and 25th were fought the Battles of Bialolenka (24th), and of Grochow (25th), both likewise mitfoalled, by the same writer, the Bat- dff MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 135 tie of Praga. His account of all those actions is so mixed up that it is barely possi- ble to discern the true occurrences. The Battles of Wavre and of Bialolenka were nearly fought upon the same ground as the Battle of Groehow. From the 14th to the evening preceding the great bat- tle ten days had passed, during which some ten sanguinary battles had been fought, in which the Poles, though retreating, had been uniformly successful. The heroism and endurance of their small army during these memorable ten days is above all praise. In that short space of time the whole Russian army had been engaged by a force not above one-sixth its strength, and thirty thousand of the invaders had been either killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. For a like series of sanguinary actions, against such an overmatched force, we look in vain in history. By it is demonstrated what a brave people may do in the defence of its homes and the liberty of its country. Only a cause just and grand could be contested for with like devotion. In the middle of winter, in a climate in- finitely more rigorous than ours, in addition to forced and harassing marches, the days were spent alternately in .ghting and marching, with but little rest for all; for such were the requiremen s of the hour that, continually, while one-third were resting upon the snow-covered ground, two-thirds had to be kept under arms to guard their comrades' slumber. For the straggler in the rear, had there been any, there would have been no quarter. Numberless hordes of Cossacks were hovering around, day and night, ready to pounce upon the isolated victim as the hawk does upon its prey. A continuous retreat, necessities of war, so disastrous in nearly all its annals, appeared to have for this brave race nothing dispiriting. Their morale was not shaken an iota; on the contrary, they seemed to draw inspiration from the hourly increasing proximity to their capital, where, they well knew, tender hearts were awaiting them, to cheer them on with noble devotion in the great battle which was destined to be fought under the very walls of the ancient city. The army of the Poles was now concentrated, with remarkable success, for not a Bingle column of theirs had been cut off or defeated, on the west side of the Village of Groehow, one Polish mile, or some seven English miles, from the City of Warsaw, and it occupied a line which had been choseu with admirable genius. The right of the Polish line rested upon the impenetrable marshes of the Vistula, called the Marshes of Goclaw. The left was posted upon the slight elevation which commands the Village of Kawenzyn, near the Vistula. From right to left there stretched, for about three miles, an unbroken plain, composed mostly of cultivated fields, without any other obstacles save those presented by the furrows which divide the fields of the different proprietors— thus forming a magnificent field for all the manœuvres of the three arms. Between the centre and the left the Polish line was perpendicularly traversed by the high-road already mentioned, which leads from the province of Grodno, through SiecUjce, upon Warsaw, and for the possession of which road, open- ing the way to the city, the battle was being fought. There was, however, upon this line, and between the Polish centre and left, a po- sition which, in Polish history, was destined to become as famed as is the little " wood of birches " in the Battle of llochkirch in Prussian annals— namely, a forest of elder trees, situated in front of the Polish army, and for the possession of which incredible efforts were made, during the Btruggle, by vast Russian hosts. The Russian position was upon a front parallel to that of the Polish forces, con- cealed by the dense woodlands which surround the Village of Groehow. and which the Russians occupied in force. The road from Siedliec to Warsaw, having passed over a country thickly wooded, after leaving the Village of Groehow debouches upon the vast plain, stretching for seven uiile^ away toward the capital; and from 136 THE SPIRTT OF the belt of woodlands, which concealed the Russian line of battle, the invaders be- held, on the cold, frosty morning of the 25th of February, 1831, the magnificent pros- pect, of the towers and domes of the rich and populous capital of the country, in front the Vistula winding through the expanse, and which they had come to destroy — confidently trusting that it would, by the mere force of overpowering numbers, be their conquered prize before the evening sun had set in. The Russian army consisted of eight corps of combatants, and three in reserve. Their left wing was between the Village of Wavre and the marshes of Goclaw, and composed of four divisions of infantry, forty -seven thousand strong, four divisions of cavalry, fifteen thousand seven hundred, with one hundred and twenty pieces of cannon. The centre, which rested opposite the forest of elder3, consisted also of four divisions of infantry, fifty-seven thousand men. three of cavalry, ten thousand five hundred strong, and had one hundred and eight pieces of cannon. The right wing, opposite the Village ofKawenzyn, was composed of three and a half divisions of infantry of thirty-one thousand men, four of cavalry, fifteen thousand seven hundred and fifty men. with fifty-two pieces of cannon. Upon the borders of the great forest, opposite the forest of elders, was placed the reserve, commanded by Grand-Duke Constantine, in infantry and cavalry twenty thousand strong, with thirty-two cannon — making a grand total of one hundred and ninety-six thousand infantry and cavalry, with three hundred and twelve pieces of artillery. Against this enormous host the Poles could muster, after great exertions, but a vastly inferior force, numbering not more than forty-three thousand four hundred infantry and cavalry, with ninety-six guns. General Szembek, commanding the right wing, had seven thousand infantry, with twenty-four guns, and occupied the space between the high-road and the marshes of the Vistula. The centre, composed of Skrzynecki's and Zimirski's divisions, fifteen thousand strong, with sixty guns, occupied the space between the forest of elders to the high-road ; the left wing oc- cupied the Village of Kawenzyn with a force'of six thousand five hundred men and twelve guns, under the command of General Krakowiecki. The entire cavalry, nine thousand five hundred strong, commanded by Generals Uminski, Lubinski, Skar- zynski, and Jankowski, were deployed in rear of the infantry and artillery, readj' to precipitate themselves upon the Russian columns whenever an opportunity should offer. Besides these, a small reserve of four battalions and eight squadrons, in all about five thousand four hundred men, under the command of General Pac, were posted upon both sides of the Warsaw high-road, a little to, the rear of General Szembek. Thus, in sullen silence, the opposing hosts remained during the night of the 24th, awaiting the day which was to decide upon the fortunes of a country, and which to thousands was to be the last one which should dawn upon them. The night was un- usually serene and clear.. Thousands of watch-fires, around which the weary Poles were reposing, illumined the horizon, while along the dark line of the forest which enclosed the Russian hosts everything would have seemed quiet as the night but for the dense volumes of smoke ascending from behind the curtain. Far in the dis- tance myriads of lights were to be seen, showing the extent of the Polish capital, which, like beacons, shone all night — for but few were there in the ancient city who, wrapt in slumber, were forgetful of the threatening dangers. With the break of day the armies were awaiting, in serried columns, the begin- ning of the struggle. The first rays of light had scarce dispelled the darkness when, upon the Polish left, in the direction of Kawenzyn, debotiched from the forest the Russian right, with a force as large as the entire army of the Poles. Fifty pieces of artillery preceded the columns, on the winga of which hung clouds of cavalry in MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 137 threatening masses. A tremendous cannonade was directed upon the village, which, soon in flames, was wrapt in clouds of smoke. To this overpowering force there were opposed seven battalions and twelve guns. With unflinching resolution Gen- erals Krakowiecki and Malachowski made the most gallant efforts to keep their ground. At the head of their columns, on foot, they repeatedly charged the advan- cing battalions of the enemy, while the twelve pieces of artillery, skilfully served, tore whole streets through the enemy's masses — unmindful of the concentrated fire of the Russian artillery — directing every discharge into the dense advancing hosts. For five long hours this gallant band withstood the successive shocks, till at last, weary of unsuccessful efforts, the enemy's fire slackened and soon died away. Thus the great attack upon the Polish left had been repulsed. Mai>hal Diebitsch, during the whole of this attack, had firmly expected that tho Polish left would bfl forced. He had, therefore, directed the whole masses of tho Russian right upon the Village of Kawenzyn. expecting to force the Poles to weaken their centre in order to sustain their left. But they well knew that no succor could be expected from any quarter in the defence of the positions assigned to them re- spectively, and thus they had formed the resolution to conquer or to die upon the ground. Up to ten o'clock in the morning the centre and right of the Polish line had re- mained unattached. But when the efforts against their left became apparently use- less, Diebitsch resolved upon a great demonstration against the Polish right. Two hundred pieces of cannon, as if by magic, began to vomit their missiles of death against the Polish line. The earth seemed to tremble under foot. Covered by this tremendous fire, the Russians now began to debouch from the forest, and in one mo- ment the plain of Wavre was covered with their columns. Looking over that plain, between the forest of elders and the Vistula, the eye saw nothing but one undivided mass of troops in motion; not even the different divisions could be distinguished* from each other. Still under cover of the guns, the Russians steadily advanced. But a great catastrophe awaited them. In an incredibly short space of time the en- tire cavalry of the Poles had been collected; issuing through the openings left be- tween the columns of the infantry, they threw themselves upon the Russians, and, with one grand charge, swept them from the field. This brilliant success inspired the Poles with tho greatest ardor. When the brave horsemen returned from the charge cries of defiance rent the air from the entire Polish line, striking terror into the enemy's ranks. A lull now succeeded in the unequal contest. Rapidly the Russians concentrated one hundred and twenty guns against the forest of elders, held by Generals Skrzy- necki's and Zimirski's divisions, composed of the very flower of the Polish army. Among the devoted soldiers holding this now for ever memorable forest was the cele- brated Fourth regiment of infantry, which, on the day inaugurating the revolution, had. to a man, taken the solemn oath administered by their brave colonel, Bogus- lawski, never to fire a single shot, but always to attack with the bayonet, until their country should be free— a pledge carried out under their succeeding colonel, Bor- cenzki, and especially in the fierce struggle i >f (! mcliow, and so faithfully that, at the end of the revolution, but ten nun remained. One hundred thousand men now assaulted the forest of elders, ami after a fierce Struggle the Poles, were driven from their position. But the artillery, with a bravery never BUrpawed, dashed within two hundred yards of the Russian columns, and a tremendous discharge Of grape, double-Shotted, Shattered the advance columns of the confidently marching host. The Polish infantry, but fourteen battalions strong, with a fierce charge of the bayonet, repulsed the Russians, and the forest was re- 12« 138 THE SPIRIT OF taken. But in an Instant fresh regiments of infantry were hurried against the biasing forest, while the Russian cuirassiers attacked both Hanks. While they were endeavoring to break through the line the Polish cavalry, ever on the start, defeat- ed the iron-dad regiments, and drove tlieni back in utter confusion. The Polish in- fantry a second time was driven from the forest. Again the artillery shattered the Etassians, and again, with one charge, they were repulsed by the infantry, and the forest retaken a second time. The other portions of the line, during these fierce at- tacks, were not unmolested. On the right and left the combat raged furiously, with- out, b^owever. making any visible impression upon the stout Polish infantry. Toward two o'clock in the afternoon, while the combat was extending along nil points of the lino, the enemy made one grand last effort against the forest of elders, when the second division, terribly reduced, began to give way, and the Russian col- umns at once poured into the interval which had thus been made. Destruction appeared inevitable; the crisis of the battle seemed to have come; and already the wavering preceding a great catastrophe was to be seen in the Polish centre, when the battle was restored by one of the most daring artillery charges on record. The five Polish batteries of Adamski, Maslowski. Hildebrand, Bielak, and Picntka ad- vanced, like cavalry, to the charge, throwing themselves into the interval with un- daunted resolution, and. approaching close to the rapidly advancing Russian columns, opened a fire of grape which spread destruction and disorder in their ranks. The Russians halted in astonishment at so daring a charge ; and while they were yet at bay, the batteries, with the celerity of thought, had taken shelter in rear of the now confidently advancing second division, which, for the ninth and last time, had now retaken the blood-stained ground of the forest. For four hours this terrible massacre had lasted. Under their heroic leaders, Skrzynecki, Zimirski, Boguslawski, Czyzewski, and Rohland, the Polish centre exe- cuted deeds of daring such as have never been surpassed. Opposed, a living mass, to the concentrated tire of one hundred and twenty guns, they never wavered for a moment under a storm of missiles more terrible than had been hurled by four hun- dred French guns, nineteen 3 r ears before, against the great redoubt, of the Moskowa, Changes of front, the attack in columns, and in echelon, the concentration of forces upon the Russian points which were wavering, reserving their fire until close to the enemy and not wasting a single shot, were executed with an activity, order, and coolness unparalleled. Only by such conduct could the tremendous attack of the Russians have been withstood for four hours by fifteen thousand men, who, at the ninth attack, had been reduced to less than ten thousand. Like the infantry and artillery, the Polish cavalry had performed prodigies. Be- sides protecting the advancing artillery, the different charges which they executed with such bravery, they were manoeuvred with the utmost skill by their generals, and continually called upon to shift from point to point in order to fill tlie voids oc- casioned by the inferiority of the Polish forces, so as always to present to the enemy an unbroken line. By such manœuvres of the three arms combined, and executed with the greatest celerity and determination, in which every commander performed his duty with the greatest devotion, the plans of the enemy were never permitted to be fully develop- ed and executed; and his dazzling force, which at first sight would have been «up- posed capable of absolutely crushing the small Polish army, was, in effect, but one great unwieldly mass, which only confidently marched to the combat under the pro- tection of an enormous number of guns, the fire of which, during the whole day, upon every portion of the Polish line, had been steadily maintained, whether neces- sary or not, with the utmost regularity. * MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 139 The battle had now raged for nearly twelve hours, and the loss of life on both «idea had been immense. The three grand attacks of the Russians, it is true, had been unsuccessful, but at the cost of weakening the extended Polish line to such a degree as to make it exceedingly dangerous to await a new attack upon the same front. The Polish generals therefore determined to withdraw their forces to the rear upon the same line, the centre of which had beon occupied during the struggle by the small reserve corps of General Pac, near an obelisk of iron, immediately upon the high-road, or some half a mile from the former line of battle. The object was to gain a more commanding position; to draw the enemy upon the open plain; to concentrate the forces still more, and to place them upon two lines — the second to bo composed of the whole of the Recond and a part of the third division, which, having withstood the main attack in the centre, were nearly exhausted. Furthermore, it was expected that the enemy would be led into the error to suppose the manoeuvre a retrograde movement, forced upon the Poles by their losses, and that they felt themselves too weak to continue the defence of the forest. To execute this manoeuvre, and to enable the second division to retire from the forest of elders without being molested, the artillery was left with some twenty squadrons to protect the retrograde march. The artillery and cavalry were, ordered to evacuate their positions gradually, and the former to take post in the centre under the protection of the whole of the cavalry, which, formed in echelon, were prepared for a general attack. The change was as admirably executed as it was conceived. The enemy had no suspicion of its object, but, presuming it to be a flight, at once undertook to profit by it. It was then that Marshal Diebitsch, sure of victory, saw himself already at Warsaw, and, in the exultation of the moment, exclaimed : "Clio- rozo! tiepier ja dumaiu po skonczanii etoy krwawoy sraeenia, ja wsostianii hudu wziat u) Bclwerderskom dwarce." "Well, then, it appears that, after this bloody day. I shall take tea in the Belvidere palace." It was about three o'clock when the second division began to retire by echelons- To hasten the execution of this movement General Chlopicki ordered that the col- umns, retiring in succession, on reaching a considerable distance from the enomy should quicken their pace as they proceeded, in order to form the second line as soon as possible, and to give space for the operations of the artillery and cavalry. It was at this moment that General Zimirski, who had lost several horses under him and had just mounted a fresh one to superintend this movement, was struck by a twelve- pound ball, which carried off his arm. making a terrible wound in his shoulder, of which he died in a few hours. The melancholy loss of this general was most deeply felt by the whole army, and particularly by his own division, but it did not interfere with the success of the movement. The brave General Czyzewski immediately took command of the division, greatly supported by Generals Hohland and Zaluski. As soon as the last columns of the Poles quitted the forest of elders the Russian troops began to debouch from it, and the Polish artillery commenced a terrible fire. The bravo Colonel Picntka, who was still in front, checked the advance of the col- umns. B oated , with the most perfect suiiij-frnvl. Upon a disabled piece of artillery, he directed an unremitting fire from his battery. The artillery and cavalry, after bavin;.' protected the retrograde movement of the centre, still held their ground to enable the wings also to retire undisturbed. The whole Poliah army VM HOW in full march for the new line of battle, and the second division had already begun to form the SOOOnd line, and had commenced firing by battalions. At this moment Marshal Diebiteeh, with admirable celerity, had massed a heavy force of cavalry between the Village of Kawensyn and the forest of elders to penetrate and annihilate the retiring Polish columns. Forty squadrons, 140 TIIK M'IRIT OF at their head five regiments of cuirassiers, issued from the borders of the forest upon the plain, in one solid body — ten thousand admirable horsemen coming to the charge. In their way was nothing but the battery of Colonel Picntka. supported by a sin- gle regiment of lancers. Pientka, with gnat coolness, greeted them with one tre- mendous discharge of grape: then limbering up, he quitted a poet, at full gallop, which he had held for five hours, to save himself from being cut off. Animated by this rapid retreat, the Russian squadrons now came onward upon a trot, and in line perpendicular to a battery of rockets which had been stationed in the second Polish line, between the second and third divisions. But Skrzynccki's division had already formed in squares to receive the onset. Nearer and nearer they fame toward the wall of fire of rhc brave, second division, when suddenly the battery of rockets opened fire. The horses of the cuirassiers, maddened by tho shower of flakes of fire and the hissing noise of the rockets, stopped, reared, turn- ed, partly fled and partly dashed through the Polish lines. Throwing the rear col- umns of the heavy mass into inextricable confusion, the squares now opened fire, and from the plain were seen dashing onward the renowned Polish lancers, completing the utter rout of the, five minutes before, apparently invincible host. So nearly complete, in fact, was their destruction, that of a regiment of cuirassiers which was at the head of the attacking force, called the regiment of Albert, bearing the designation of "Invincible*' upon their gorgeous helmets, not a man escaped. A portion of this cavalry had. however, penetrated, and was dashing onward toward Praga, where, from the wills of the fortress, they were received by a murderous fire of artillery and utterly annihilated, upon their retreat, by the Polish cavalry. The whole Polish line had now, as if by magic, formed into squares. But as soon as the cavalry column was seen to retreat, overthrowing in their course the Russian artillery and infantry which had been ordered up to support the grand attack, and carrying utter consternation into the Russian ranks, the squares deployed. Gen- eral Chlopicki, the Polish commander, while the change of lino was being executed, had been severely wounded in the leg by a grenade. It was necessary to appoint, upon the field of battle, a new commander-in-chief, and the Polish generals, with singular unanimity, called Skrzynecki to that responsible position, although lie was junior to many of them. Under his orders the whole Polish line pressed onward upon the now retreating and utterly discomfited Russians. A cavalry force of ten thousand fresh men would probably have completed their destruction. But we have seen the immense task which the Polish cavalry had already so ably discharged. Worn-out, they could not attempt a prolonged pursuit. Tho Russians left upon the fiold of battle thirty thousand men. Tho Poles had sustained a los6 of tweivo thousand in killed and wounded, or oue-thifd of their army — a loss equal to that sustained by the Confederate arms upon the bloody field of Shiloh, with only this difference : that the majority of the wounds received by the Russians at Grochow was from the bayonet of the Poles, and that of the hitter mainly from the artillery and musketry-fire of the Russians. Such was, in its main features, the hard-coutested Battle of Grochow. Warsaw had been temporarily saved. Diebitsch was disgraced; and months elapsed before the Russians again assumed the offensive. This battle has been sketched as an illustration of what the three arms of the service may accomplish when skilfully combined. There is, besides, no instance in modern history where such an inferiority of forces defeated a like immense host. This achievement will never fuil to fill us with admiration for a people who can thus MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 141 fight for liberty, and who, after a despotism of over thirty years has kept them in chains, have again risen, and are now sustaining themselves for over three years, against the enormous powers of the Russian Czar. The germ of liberty never dies; and if we, with advantages much greater than those of the Poles, can not achieve our independence, we do not deserve to have it. But wo most assuredly will achieve it, if, mindful of the great lessons which history teaches, we can rise above the slimy level of extortion and the greed of gain, shake off the apathy which now disgraces those at' home, and come back to the glorious days of 1861, when all was fervor and patriotic devotion. If we do so, success is not doubtful for a minute ; if not, what mortal man can tell how long our brave soldiers in the field will retain that spirit which hitherto has made them the barrier between us and utter degradation ? CHAPTER II. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARS. The applications of the principle easier in the latter than in the former— Particu- lar characteristics of each — Necessity of studying contemporaneous wars — Why— They instruct better — Wars of Frederic— Resources of his genius— The campaigns of the Revolution — Memoirs of Gouvion Saint-Cyr— Operations of the Archduke Charles in 1796— Campaigns of Italy in 1796 and 1797— First example of strategic operations upon a vast scale — Immense results with mediocre means — In one year, an audacious and skilful offensive and a model in defen- sive operations — Unexampled victories — Immortal epoch— Summary of achieve- ments — Should be written with commentaries — Campaigns of 1805, 1806, and 1809— Spanish wars— Neglect of principles — Awakening in 1814— One against ten — Thirty-five thousand men of remnants — Champ-Aubert, Vauchamps, Gué- à-Trême, Paris — Song of the Swan. Notes.— 1. The Battle of Liitzen. 2. Marshal Mortier. I have already stated, and I repeat, that the movements of war, be they offensive or defensive, should always be founded upon a calcula- tion as to both time and distance. But the applications of this prin- ciple are easier in defensive than in offensive wars. In the latter the combinations are vaster, the conditions more variable, and the elements of calculation more uncertain. At every moment a general may be forced to change his programme, to abandon an attack in order to defond himself, and to escape from great dangers. A more extended genius is then necessary, to bo always ready to vary one's projects, and to execute new combinations. In defensive warfare the theatre is more contracted; the operations are conducted upon sections of country well known, and the nature of 142 THE SPIRIT OF which can be exactly appreciated. The number of combinations being less, they are more easily carried out and provided against. In offen- sive war the genius must supply experience and divine the nature of the country destined for operations ; the points of support which are counted upon vary, and sometimes disappear altogether. In defensive war the field of operations has been well prepared and studied; the pivots of operation are fixed, and everything can be calculated with precision. A superior genius is then more necessary for an offensive war, while an extensive knowledge of the profession of war, the talent to choose well the points of support, great foresight, and indefatigable activity, may be sufficient for the requirements of the defensive war. This mode of warfare is, however, far from being easy — since, prop- erly speaking, a general is only reduced to assume the defensive when it becomes apparent that his disposable means are inferior to those of the enemy. Besides, in modern wars, with such an equality in arms, instruction, and experience, numbers are of great importance. The difference which exist between such and such an army, and such and such a campaign, depends more particularly upon the morale of the troops, and its appreciation is not prescribed by the rules of the profes- sion, but must be sought in that sublime part of the art which treats of the knowledge of the human heart, the movements of which are so rapid and mysterious. After having laid down the principle upon which the movements of armies depend, it can only be developed by examples. Instruction lies in the study of the most memorable campaigns. Dogmatical teachings are founded upon facts. They can be chosen from successes as well as reverses — by dividing the recital of each event into that part which treats of the combinations, and the other which depended upon hazard. The study of the events of our epoch should be preferred; the exam- ples will be better comprehended, because the events are better known. Besides, on account of the progress which the art of war has expe- rienced, and the actual and ever-increasing mobility of our armies, those achievements have become easy which formerly were impracti- cable. The former wars which are still full of useful instruction are those of Frederic II. It is true that the examples of those times are no longer applicable to our days, because everything is changed ; but that great captain's campaigns should especially be studied in regard to their moral aspect. When, after having been beaten at Hochkirch, with the loss of some two hundred pieces of cannon, Frederic is seen to retire upon two single points only, upon the Spree, and there takes a menacing position toward the enemy, the explanation of such a mystery is vainly asked for in our days. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 143 In reflecting upon the weakness of Frederic's resources, we further- more inquire how, in the presence of such numerous enemies and during so many years, he could have maintained and recruited his armies. Truly, we hardly know which to admire most, whether the glory of his victories, or his talents for discovering new resources and preserving his forces. The long wars of our epoch, the great events presented to our con- templation, and the careful examination of all attending circumstances, the military student must equally observe in our armies and those of the enemy. The first campaigns of the Revolution present nothing, both with us and with our adversaries, which is not susceptible to severe criticism ; the proof of this may be found in reading the first volume of tho Memoirs of Marshal Grouvion St. Cyr, which, in this respect, are of the greatest interest. The operations of Archduke Charles in 1796, when opposing the French Armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, are tho first example of operations systematically combined upon a vast scale. The work of this prince can not be studied too much; his principles are there established by an exposition of his operations and the motives which dictated them. While all grand principles of war may be de- duced from them, their application is, at the same time, found in the facts narrated. But the campaigns requiring most reflection are those of the French army in Italy in 1796 and 1797. They all unite exactness of calcu- lations, correctness of movements, and a profound knowledge of men and things. Never was war more admirably and perfectly conducted. The most sublime part of the art of war has been illustrated through it. With mediocre means immense results have been obtained. This war, which lasted hardly one year, presents models of all kinds : an offensive skilfully and audaciously conducted; a defensive where inferior forces have constantly repulsed superior forces, but often man- aging upon the field of battle to have a superiority of numbers; a war which, by the skill of direction and the vigor of execution, has led to a series of unoxamplod victories. It was an immortal epoch, the pro- digious achievements of which have surpassed everything either before or after: because, in a series of combats so long continued, and exe- cuted in the midst of so many divers movements, it is impossible to discover a single fault, or a single neglect of the true principles of the art. At the moment of the opening of the campaign the French army, scarcely thirty thousand men strong, and in want of everything, had not even completed its preparations when it was forced to commence 144 THE SPIRIT OF aotive operations — the enemy approaching from Genoa to cover that place. The hostile army was attacked, composed, it is true, of troops of two different nations, but more than fifty thousand men strong. The Austrians were beaten, pursued, and soon consisted of but a single division. The French army then threw itself upon the Piedmontese army; complete and rapid successes augmented the confusion and the discouragement of the Allies, and the King of Sardinia made peace. By a precipitate march the passage of the Po was seized, which river the French army could not cross in strong force on account of the want of material. An energetic action cleared the line of the River Adda of the enemy. Milan opened its gates. Soon after, an insurrec- tion convulsed a whole province ; the insurrection was quelled. The army, which had scarcely slackened its march for a moment, passed the Mincio in strong force, arrived upon the Adige, and took a defen- sive position which covered the conquests made in loss than fifty days. Hostile armies were successively formed, and expended upon us their useless efforts. Mantua fell ; we marched upon Vienna, and the peace was concluded. Nothing would be more useful for the instruction of officers who de- vote themselvas to the study of grand warfare and to military concep- tions of a higher order, than to write this memorable campaign, with the details and documents belonging to it. Commentaries should be joined to it, which, explaining the reasons of the movements, would show the character of the campaign and its results. The fine cam- paign of 1805, so well conducted and so remarkable in its conclusion, but, it is also true, favored by immense and almost incredible faults of our adversaries; that of 1S06, which completed it; finally, that of 1809 — may well be objects of special study and instructive commen- taries, because this great epoch of Napoleon's life can not be too muoh admired. But with silence wo are compelled to pass over tho Spanish wars and those following that time, or at least we can only speak of their faults, and show that fortune abandoned Napoleon on the day when he became unfaithful to the true principles of the art.which hitherto he had always respected. Then the accumulation of men and means was useless. From the date of this epoch of sad memory, if tho Battles of Liitzen 1 and Bautzen are excepted, Napoleon is not recognized in any oue of his campaigns. A kind of awakening, however, came later. The great captain wa3 himself again in 1814; but the spirit of the people and his soldiers only fought for him; he had no longer an army; we could hardly place one man against ten. The forcos of which Napoloon could dis- pose, in his movements between the Seine and the Marne, never exceed- ed thirty-five thousand men of shattered remains. My corps, which MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 145 alone had the honor of combating at Champ-Aubert, Vauchamps, Montmirail, and the second affair of Gué-à-Trêrne, had never as many as four thousand men, the remains of fifty-two different battalions. At Paris, sustained by the Duke of Treviso 2 , our united forces only amounted to fourteen thousand men, and the enemy had fifty-three thousand men engaged, and thirteen thousand were disabled. It was the song of th'e swan. NOTES. 1. The Battle of Lutzen.— The opening of the campaign of Napoleon in 1813, after the great emperor's misfortunes in Russia, was characterized by his want of cavalry, and by the many conscripts, young and inexperienced soldiers, of which his army consisted. The veterans Of Jena, Austerlitz, and Wagram lay buried beneath the snows of the vast Eastern plains. Opposed to him he found the coalition of Prussia, a state whose politics have at all times been signalized by wavering and treachery — and Russia, eager to avenge the invasion of her territories. They both controlled vastly superior means to those of Napoleon, and an extraordinarily pow- erful body of cavalry was ready to take advantage of any of the defeats which the French should meet. It was at this period that Napoleon proclaimed to his legions the maxim, forced upon him by circumstances, and wrung from him against his conviction, to assure his young conscripts : " Q 'une bonne infanterie soutenue par de Vartillerie doit savoir se suffire." (" Let it be demonstrated that a good infantry, sustained by artillery, is amply sufficient.") The great military road leading from "France into Germany, upon which Napoleon advanced, crosses into Germany at the confluence of the River Main with the Rhine, protected by the strong fortress, Mayence. From thence it leads in a north- eastern direction through the very centre of Germany to Weissenfels, Lutzen, and to the City of Leipzig, a strategic position of great importance ; from there it leads to Dresden, capital of the Kingdom of Saxony, where it crosses the Elbe, and from which city three important roads go to Berlin, North-eastern Prussia, and the heart of Bohemia. Napoleon's purpose was first to humiliate the Prussians as at Jena in 1806, and then to debouch upon the Russians. This was, however, in meas- ure prevented by the exceedingly vigorous movements of the Allies, who, crossing the Elbe at several points, occupied Leipzig and threatened Napoleon's communica- tion with France, before the latter had scarcely half concentrated his forces. The central point upon which the French forces moved was Leipzig. Viceroy Eugene, whose gallant attitude in keeping the Allies in check had permitted Napoleon to make his proper dispositions, was at Merseburg, a town some eleven miles north- west from Leipzig. As soon as Napoleon had en ssed the Soale the Allies m forward with greal promptness to prevent his man!) upon Leipzig, and h solved to give battle in the plains of Liitzen. a small town already Immortalized by tlm heroic death ofOustavxu 2dolpb.ua of Sweden in it'.:.; - .', it is a very remarkable position. The road, after having ascended the defile of Poaerna, runs along a pla- teau exceedingly favorable for combat, and densely dotted with little villages. The strategical combination of the Allies was to refuse tlieir right, to make a feint attack upon the centre, but to throw their whole weight upon the French rigid, thus to en- tirely change Vie position of the French, and to cut them off from the great road to Fran-x. vpon. wln^.h thvjjvàt were advancing. Napoleon waa expecting no 6ercuu resistaûos until ho eliould bavo <-c?upi<.d L-iipzig ^nd wa * advancing upon Dresden, 13 14(5 THE SPIRIT OF when both armies came suddenly, on the 2d of May. into collision, both in open columns and under march. South of Liitzcn. and to the westward, there runs a little streamlet, with steep banks on both sides, called the Flossgraben. This the Allies had crossed in farce In four heavy columns. In front of this streamlet lie four small villages — Gross-Goer- Mhen, Klein-Goemchen, Rahno, and Kaya — which was the French right, forming an irregular quadrangle, and of which Kaya is Dearest to LUtzen and to the high-road to Leipzig, and of which the first, Gross-Goerschen, was only occupied by one divis- ion of the French under General Souham. The Allies overwhelmed Souham, took the village, and with shouts of triumph carried Klein-Goerschen and Rahno like- wise. The situation became critical ; but Napoleon had already mastered the ene- my's combinations, and directed all of his forces to his right. The troops halted upon the high-road and wheeled into line. Mannont hastened across the fields. Eugene heard the firing from afar, and retraced his steps. The brave Ney now supported Souham with three divisions, and by a splendid charge regained the lost villages. The Prussians, returning to the attack under Wittgenstein, threw the French into confusion. They not only earned the villages again, but drove the French be- yond Kaya, the key of the French position. The French now abandoned their whole line of battle, taking a new position some six hundred yards in rear. It was six o'clock in the evening ; the battle had already lasted eight hours. The most alarming despatches reached the emperor, who, upon his left, awaited the issue of the struggle on the right. He at once set out in person, and reached the position where his troops appeared to be in the greatest disorder. But, as at Marengo his presence reanimated the heroes of Italy, so here the young conscripts cried " Vive Vempereur /" when they Baw him, and formed for a renewed struggle. Kaya having now become the decisive point of the battle, Napoleon led his troops to the attack himself to retake it. A most desperate conflict ensued. The reinforcements had come up, and with Beventy thousand men the Allies were pressed, and the brave Ney again drove them beyond Kaya. But in the meantime the Russian artillery, sustained by the infantry of the re- Horve, had taken an advantageous position upon the French left, and were making a great impression. The Village of Kaya was retaken a third time, and the French army repulsed from all the villages again. The decisive moment now came. Sixty guns of the Imperial Guard, under the immortal Drouot, sustained by sixteen battalions of the Young Guard, advanced to the final issue, as the Old Guard often had done before the disastrous Russian cam- paign, followed by the entire cavalry of the reserve. Kaya was regained, and the successful advance of Eugene upon the rear of the forces which assaulted the French upon the left decided the struggle in favor of the arms of France. Here Napoleon once more showed his genius in all its splendor. Surprised at Gross-Goerschen in the morning at ten o'clock, with but Ney's corps at hand, and his troops scattered upon the high-road at a distance of thirty miles, he was in im- minent danger of having his army pierced. He saw that the struggle was to be for the possession of Kaya, in spite of the feint attacks of the enemy upon his left, and that he contrived to restore the battle after the heavy repulse from Kaya at six in the evening, entitles him to the highest glory. His inferiority in cavalry, six thousand against thirty thousand of the Allies, pre- vented him from pursuing them, and to reap any fruits from this and his subse- quent great victory at Bautzeu. It was a campaign in which his talents were taxed to the utmost; but nothing MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 147 could replace his want of cavalry, and tbc fatal issue of Leipzig may be traced to this cause. Without its vigorous and decisive concurrence, after an impression has % once been made upon the enemy, nothing but barren victories may be expected. But then the cavalry must bo highly disciplined, well drilled In firing, and es- pecially in the handling of the sword. We have the most splendid material for cavalry in the world. Neither the Cos- sack nor the Hungarian Honved are superior to the Southern horseman. The Banger of the Confederate States surpasses them all. The foreign levies of the United States do not know how to ride, and will never learn it. How many Confederate colonels of cavalry are there who are swordsmen ? These remarks may offer to them some food for meditation and imitation. 2. Marshal Mortier, Duc de Treviso.— The career of this officer was of the most brilliant nature. He was a captain in 1791, and rose, during the wars of revolutionary France, to the rank of general of division. He was employed with the Armies of the North, the Sambre and Meuse, and the Rhine. In 1801 he was in sole command of the seventeenth division of the Army of Hanover. Created a marshal of the empire in May, 1804, he served with great distinction with tho Grand Army, then in Spain, and again with the Grand Army of France. After the departure of Napoleon for the Island of Elba he joined the Bourbons, and held many appointments of importance under the Restoration. In 1831 he was Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honor. In 1834-5 Minister of War and President of Council. Napoleon created him Duc de Treviso. He was Chevalier of the Order of St. Esprit, and bore several foreign (Austrian and Portuguese) orders. He died in July, 1835. CHAPTER III. MARCHES AND ENCAMPMENTS!. Marches within reach of the enemy— Precautions— Composition of advance guards —Out of the enemy's reach— Utility of light troops— Wooded and broken coun- tries—Scouts on the flanks— Thrown out in fan-shape— Camps— Suitable spots- Natural obstacles— To camp this side— Why— Surprises— Two modes of camping —Deployed and massed troops— Which preferable— Way of execution— Conse- quences of disregard of rules— Uaynau, 1813— The division Maison surprised— Fine revenge upon the Prussiaus at Vauchamps, Hohenlinden, Falkenheim— Marches in tho enemy's presence— This is tactics— Vigilance and foresight of the chief— Discipline and quick manoeuvres on the part of tho army— Parallel march of the French and English armies in 1812— Historicarfletails— Flank movements —French army Marches like a regiment— The two generals hesifate to give bat- tle—They keep within a space of five leagues— The only instance of a march of this kind. Notes— 1. March Regulations of Doctor Jackson. 2. The Battle of Hohenlinden. Marches within reach of the enemy can not be executed with too much 148 THE SPIRIT OF precaution, nor the encampments be selected with too much prudence. Every one knows how the former are executed. Still, marches are modi- fied by the nature of the country, the composition of the advanced guards, and by the respective position of the arms of which they are composed. The object being to obtain news from the enemy, and to have knowl- edge of nis arrival upon his approach, it is useful to gain this informa- tion at the greatest possible distance from the enemy, without, however, compromising the security of one's detachments. The vanguard of an army, if it be not in the presence of the enemy, should at least march at a considerable distance from the mass of the troops, and that of a division should be at a march of several hours' duration ahead. Light troops must be employed with intelligence, and neither should they be spared — for in this service particularly consists their useful- ness ; if they permit the army to be surprised, the officer who commands them fails in his duty, and he can allege no sufficient excuse. In bro- ken and wooded countries, especially, the precautions must be doubled. Scouts thrown out upon the flanks should bo sustained by detachments upon which they can fall for support; the detachments should, besides, be strong enough to defend, when necessary, those defiles for some time, which would enable the enemy to turn the army. By combining the march of troops sent out to reconnoitre the enemy, so as to be always formed in the shape of a fan, every surprise is guard- ed against; and they are never exposed, because their point of retreat is always upon the line of operation of the army. Upon marches, encampments are established to repose troops and to satisfy their wants, but never to engage the enemy. An encampment is placed, by preference, upon the banks of a small stream, near to a vil- lage, to supply the soldiers with water, and to bring within their reach the resources usually found among an agglomerated population. But whatever be the importance of these considerations, security should likewise be considered, and the means must not be neglected to provide against unforeseen attacks and surprises. I do not allude here to the guards ; they must always cover and surround a camp; they are of the greatest necessity, be it only for the police. If there be any obstacle, the encampment should be placed upon this side and never beyond it — at least, for the greater portion of the troops. It would, undoubtedly^ be advantageous to have passed the defile upon commencing the day's march, and to debouch more easily ; but this ad- vantage is more than counterbalanced by the security of repose. If there be no obstacle, or if the obstacle may be easily turned, a surprise is to be feared ; a numerous cavalry may suddenly appear, as if rising from the ground; then security must be even sought in the selection of the encampment. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 149 There are two ways of camping: the troops are deployed upon the color-line, or formed en masse by battalion. This last disposition is much to be preferred, and offers many advantages. It is executed in the following manner: A division is placed upon two lines, and each battalion is formed in columns by division ; it is, furthermore, separated in two demi-battal- ions in columns by platoons. The interval separating the two fractions is equal to the front of a division, and forms a perpendicular street to the line of battle of the encampment. The tents or barracks are established upon the right and left, and their front is placed so as to open upon the street, either directly or by a tranversal lane. Whenever the battalion takes arms, each soldier falls into his platoon, which is formed in the camp street, almost at the same time with the battalion, ready to march. If impetuosity leads a body of cavalry to precipitate itself upon the camp, it will find all the troops massed, and, so to speak, entrenched in the midst of their tents and barracks. The violation of the above rules led, on the 29th of May, 1813, near Haynau, in Silesia, to a deplorable event. The division Maison, which, having marched during tho entire day, and taken position without sufficiently reconnoitring the same, was surprised ; twenty-two Prus- sian squadrons, ambuscaded in the neighboring wood, debouched sud- denly at the moment when the division was about establishing itself in camp ; the consequence was, its being almost entirely destroyed, with- out having been able to offer any resistance. Upon another occasion the same negligence on the part of the Prus- sians gave to us a fine revenge, and obtained for us an easy victory. After the roinbat of Champ- Aubert (10th of February, 1814), where my corps d'armeë alone destroyed and took prisoners almost the whole Russian corps of Olsufieff, the emperor ordered me to repair to Etoges to cover the army in that quarter, while he was to march upon Montmi- rail, occupied by the corps of Sacken. Sacken, beaten, retired upon Château-Thierry, where he passed the Marne to arrest Napoleon's pur- suit, who had followed him. During this time Blucher in person had advanced with Klcist's corps, and had marched upon Etoges ; on the 13th he took his measures to force me to evacuate this advantageous post. After having feigned that I wished to defend it, in order to retard Bliicher's march, I commenced to retreat; the enemy kept near to me, but followed with great circumspection, and until the evening we en- gaged, only feebly, our light troops. I took position upon the borders of the woods of Fromentière, and the enemy encamped within two cannon-shots of myself. I had communicated the arrival of Blucher to Napoleon, and, having made him acquainted with the movements I had just executed, I was assured of his prompt return. Ou tho 14th, at four 13* 150 THE SPIRIT OF o'clock in the morning, I began to march upon Montrairail, and despatched an officer to obtain information from the emperor. Ho was approaching, and sent me word that I might attack the enemy whenever I would find it convenient, and that he was within supporting distance. There is, in front of the Village of Vauchamps, toward Paris, an ad- vantageous and easily to be defended position ; it is upon the declivity o* the plateau which borders the valley in which Vauchamps is built. Upon the right of this position, a wood in front gives the means to take in reverse any body which, inconsiderately advancing, would fail to secure it at first. I occupied this wood in a cautious manner ; I deployed upon the hill-side, placed my cannon in battery, and awaited the enemy. The corps of Kleist, whose strength was four times greater than my own, believed they had nothing to apprehend, and marched with exceed- ing confidence, his troops disposed in columns and touching each other, without any distance between them, and even without having any flank- ers ; finding the village unoccupied he traverses it, but, assailed by a murderous artillery and musketry Are, attacked at the same time in the front and upon the flanks, he was put in confusion, retired through the village in the greatest disorder, and our cavalry falling upon him, four thousand prisoners fell into our hands. From this moment the enemy retreated from morning till night, without any regular formation, and this favorable action for us was followed for him by a new catastrophe. The victory of Hohenlinden 2 , the glory and results of which were so great, is an event of like nature. The centre column of the Austrian army which followed the high-road, and with which a large portion of the artillery was joined, marching in lateral columns to facilitate tho transportation, outstripped the other columns, and it moved without having sufficiently reconnoitred its line of march, on account of the confidence which the combat of the preceding day had given the troops, and from the belief that the French army was beaten and retreat- ing. It suddenly encountered the latter in the depth of the forest. Attacked with vigor before having been ablo to mako the necessary dis- positions for. resistance, soon taken in flank, this immense column* of material was surrounded, and the battle gained. Nothing is more delicate and merits more attention than traversing, with a numerous artillery, a very wooded country in presence of the enemy. Whatever be the urgency of quickly uniting under like cir- cumstances, too many precautions to guard against a surprise can not be taken, because the consequences of the least negligence are nearly always deplorable. On the twenty-ninth of August, 1813, after the Battle of Dresden, I was charged with the pursuit of the hostile army, the greater part of which was retreating upon the road to Attenberg. After having beaten the corps which covered the movement of concentration at Poasendorf MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 151 and Dippoldiswaldc, I was to continue iny march the following morning upon Falkenheim. Arrived at the Village of Frauendorf, I learned that the enemy occupied, with a Strong vanguard, a good position at Falkenheim. Before bringing on the engagement in the forest which I was compelled to traverse, and which was occupied by some light troops, I had it thoroughly ransacked and cleared by some three or four thousand infantry, extended upon a very large front. After having freed it from the enemy, I occupied the borders of the forest with my vanguard, and awaited the entire junction of my corps. I then de- bouched with all my means ; the enemy was overthrown and driven from his position in a moment, and left behind almost his entire artil- lery. , , There are also marches executed in presence of the enemy, with an army entirely united, thoroughly formed, and ready to combat, the ob- ject of which is to force an enemy to quit a position he occupies. These marches belong to tactical movements, but nothing merits great- er attention and requires more precautions. To execute a movement of this kind very disciplined and well drill- ed troops are necessary, commanded by activo and intelligent generals, and by a chief endowed with great foresight. The Army of Portugal, in 1812, under my command, executed such a inarch with success. The French and English armies were encamped upon both banks of the Duero ; the first was inferior to the other by six thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry. Despite the inferiority of forces, I had been obliged to assume the offensive. I had been instructed, through my official correspondence, that any important succor would not be given to me; and, on the other hand, the English army, already so su- perior, was enabled within a few days to receive powerful reinforcements from Estramadura by the bridge of Alcantara, while the Army of Ga- licia, which blockaded Astorga, had just become disposable and oper- ated upon my rear in consequence of the reduction of that city, which, on account of the scarcity of provisions, was upon the point of opening its gates. I concluded that, to change the state of things, it was neces- sary for me to assume the offensive, but with prudence : so to manœuvre as to force the enemy to retreat, and not to engage him until it became necessary. The passage of the Duero was then resolved upon and exe- cuted. The French army, fully united, encountered the next day two English divisions at Tordesillas de la Orden, who retired in haste; they were hotly pursued and would probably been destroyed, being quite isolated, had the French cavalry been less inferior to that of the enemy. The two armies found themselves, upon the evening of this pursuit, facing each other, and separated by the Guarena, a marshy streamlet. 152 THE SPIRIT OF On the twentieth of July the French army, formed throughout in order of battle broken into platoons, made a manœuvre by the flank to the right, to ascend the streamlet ; arrived at a ford, known in advance and promptly taken advantage of, the head was thrown upon the left bank, seized at once a plateau which extended indefinitely in a direction menacing the retreat of the enemy, and debouched upon it under the protection of a very heavy battery which covered its movements. The Duke of Wellington at first believed to be able to oppose this offensive march, but it was executed with so much spirit and unison that he soon renounced the idea of attacking us.* He contented him- Belf in following the French army in the direction of a plateau parallel to that which we held. The two armies continued their march, separated by a narrow valley, always in readiness to receive battle ; several hundred cannon- shots were exchanged, by taking advantage of the more or less favor- able positions arising from the sinuosities of the plateau, and both gen- erals were willing to receive battle, but neither to offer it. They arriv- ed thus, after a march of five leagues, in the respective positions which they wished to occupy — the French army upon the heights of Aldea- Rubia, the English army upon those of Saint-Cristoval. This remarkable march is, to my knowledge, the only one of this kind which has been executed in our times. But it may occur again, in a war where the forces are balanced, and when the generals are only willing to engage with advantages already assured, or when certain and very favorable circumstances take place. NOTES. 1. March Regulations of Dr. Jackson. — A knapsack crammed with nec- essaries, so as to load a foot-soldier like a pack-horse, oppresses by its weight, con- sequently consumes a part of the power which is intended for, and which ought to be reserved for, military exertion. Superfluity of baggage is a common error in the British service ; and the usual manner of disposing of it for carriage is not, moreover, well contrived. A full knapsack rolls upon the back like a billet of wood, and shoulder-straps gall the skin, if the whole weight of the pack bear upon the shoulder. To remedy the rolling of the back and the galling of the shoulders, the shoulder-straps are joined by a belt across the breast. The remedy is worse than the evil it is intended to remedy; and it is worse for this reason, that few persons are aware of the mischief which it occasions. The pressure of a cross-belt confines the free motion of the chost, and impedes respiration. Whatever impedes free respiration increases the heat of the body beyond the just temperature. It Is thus that a person who joins the shoulder-straps of his pack by a belt across the breast is oppressed with heat, and pants for breath, frequently without adverting to the cause which occasions the increase of heat and oppression. On the contrary, * The Duke of Wellington told me afterward that the French army marched at that moment like one regiment. This was his own expression. — Note of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 153 where the pack is supported wholly by the shoulder-straps, though the shoulders may be galled the respiration is free, and the body is less liable to be overheated. As soldiers are supposed to be arrangée! in companies according to powers of exertion, and as there must necessarily be some variety in the effective power of companies, it is obvious to common sense that the least effective companies ought to be placed in front, the movement being there least embarrassed. The rate of the slow pace is three miles per hour— the rate of the exerted pace, four. These paces are to be changed at stated intervals only, time and distance being measured exactly by an officer, who leads at a justly-regulated step. If this be not don© with care, a precise effect cau not be expected in combined movement; and hence it happens that by the neglect or by the transgression of this fundamental rule of order, the military purpose is defeated, or less completely executed than it might, be. Various contingencies arise, in the course of a march, which oblige individuals to leave the ranks. The act of leaving the ranks is unmilitary in appearance, and reprehensible irregularities not unfrequently follow the practice of it. In order, therefore, to remove all shadow of pretext for the occurrence of such necessity, it will be proper that a general halt be made for five minutes at the end of the first hour, so that every one may, during the interval, adjust those personal concerns which require adjustment. The march of the first hour is supposed to be per- formed at the slow pace ; that of the second, at the accelerated. The column halts for fifteen minutes or more at the end of the second hour; and, during the halt, the individuals are supposed to recline, or assume a horizontal position-for it is only in the recumbent position that the limbs experience the full benefit of rest. When fifteen minutes have expired, the march is resumed at the slow pace When the hour is completed, the column halts five minutes for purposes of personal adjustment, and, at a given signal, resumes its course at the accelerated pace. In this manner a journeyof fourteen miles is performed in the space of four hours and twenty-five minutes, including the time allowed for halting; and if the march be Conducted in the manner proposed, no person, it is presumed, who is fit to be admitted into the military ranks, will fail in performing it. A distance of four- teen miles is a common day's march for troops on ordinary service. Circumstances sometimes occur which require that the distance be lengthened, even that it be doubled. The exertion will not, it is believed, bear hard upon well formed troops, if due care be taken in adjusting the primary arrangement, and due consideration employed in directing the subsequent steps of the march. For example it is understood that a halt for the space of one hour takes place after the performance of the first part of the allotted march, and that the shoes, socks, and trowsers or breeches, and levins, be then taken off; the feet, legs, and thighs washed', or bathed in cold water, if the nature of the halting ground supply water in suffi- cient quantity for that purpose. If water be deficient, the lower extremities may be rubbed with a wet towel, and exposed to the cool air. Such is a simple expe- dient only, but it restores vigor and capability of exertion equal to some hours of rest. If hunger or faintness be felt by any one, a crust of bread, with a morsel of cheese, washed down by tea, or vinegar and water-with which every soldier is understood to be provided-is sufficient to remove it. The march is to be resumed at the expiation of an hour; and, with the observance of the rules prescribed the distance, it is presumed, will be performed with ease in the calculated time if care has been taken in the primary arrangement to separate the weak and ineffi- cient parts from the sound and effective. 154 THE SPIRIT OF 2. The Battle of Hohenlinden.— From Munich, the capital of Bavaria, a high-road leads in an easterly direction into Austria, through the following places : Hohenlinden, eighteen miles; Matenpot. twenty-four miles; Haag, twenty-eight miles ; turning north-east, it strikes the Tillage of Ampfing, forty miles ; and five miles further the Town of Muehldorf, forty-five miles from Munich ; beyond it the road crosses the River Inn. Another road leaves Munich, south and parallel to the former, to Salzburg in the Tyrol, passing through Ebersdorf, eighteen miles east-south-east, and Wasser- burg, thirty-one miles east-south-east from Munich, crossing the Inn likewise beyond the latter place. The forest of Hohenlinden spreads out in contiguous masses, forming a natural stockade at from fourteen to seventeen miles in length and four miles in depth, and its depth is traversed by these two roads. Hohenlinden and Ebersburg lie upon the entrance to and on the Munich side of the forest; in other words, the forest is the defile and those two villages the points upon which an army, coming from Austria, debouches after having traversed the defile. Between these two roads are some impracticable by-roads. From Muehldorf, as far as Hohenlinden, the country is hilly, intersected by woods and rivulets; from Hohenlinden, as far as Munich, it is but one fine and continuous plain. Moreau's forces were, on the 1st of December, 1300, in straggling and detached columns, moving from Hohenlinden upon these two roads toward Austria; Lecourbe and Sainte-Suzanne's divisions were detached far in the rear. Moving thus from west to east, Grenier, who commanded the left, while leisurely approaching Ampfing was suddenly attacked by the Austrians, under Archduke John, who were being moved from north to south, and thus thrown perpendicularly upon the French, perfectly united and sixty thousand strong. Grenier was routed at once. In vain Ney, Grandjean, Hardy, and Legrand strove to make a stand; and the decline of the day saw the French army, thoroughly beaten and panic-stricken, returning through the forest toward Hohenlinden. Archduke John was content, and failed to take advantage of the victory. He gave to the enemy one day, the 2d of December, to reorganize. Moreau, whose genius was up to the emergency, knew that the Austrians would have to traverse the forest to follow up their victory. He took a position in front of Hohenlinden, where the forest begins, and awaited his adversary. Before daylight on the 3d the Austrians marched in three heavy columns through the foiest. The roads were terrible, and it snowed incessantly. The centre, forty thousand strong, with one hundred cannon and five hundred cais- sons, marched upon the Muehldorf high-road ; the right upon the lower road, under Latour, twenty-five thousand strong; the left and the light troops upon cross-roads. The centre, outstripping the other columns because it marched upon the best road, debouched upon Hohenlinden at nine in the morning, when Grouchy drove it back. The Austrians, however, steadily gained ground; but Grouchy and Grandjean, at the head of fresh battalions, repulsed them once more. Meantimo the Austrian right began to debouch, but Ney opposed it most effectually. The French general, Richepanse, meantime had advanced, early in the morning, between (he space occupied by the two high-roads, to take the Austrian centre in the rear — whether by Moreau's orders, or independently, is a disputed point, but, it is most probable, by the orders of Moreau. He arrived within sight of the Village of Matenpot, where the rear of the Austrian centre rested, composed of artillery and MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 155 the cavalry-both reposing, the latter dismounted-and was about toattack, when he himself was pureed by the Austrian left, under Riesch. Thus brought between nILTt?r 8 \ ; eS,ag l a ° ral0f medi ° Cre taleDt and courage would have per- mitted he centre to march unmolested, and either turned against the lesser body o sought safety in retreat. But Richepanse engaged both by himself, assailing th cavalry and artillery, «id charging the commander of his severed forces to hold the position they then occupied against Riesch. This he did nobly, and no efforts of the latter dislodged him. The success of Richepanse's efforts was iZZLeT Utm ° 8t C ° U3ternati0n °™* th ° ~ of the centre ; it fledtwlrd At the moment when Richepanse arrived near Matenpot, Moreau nearly found himself overwhelmed by the Austrians. But when he heard the cannon in the rr 1b MRtenPOt he direCtC<1 NCy aml *-* to make • ^ ÏS "h h ov rth w the now consternated enemy. The fugitives meeting the onward près u re of the rear columns pursued by Richepanse, a perfect rout ensued, and the day was gained. Grenier, who commanded the French left, and already o^pow ered by the Austrians, upon the intelligence of the rout of the centre resûm d the offensive and drove Latour back into the woods. Moreau's beTd ouaTra -re that night at Haag. The Au.trians lost over one hundre cllTTrll hundred caissons, and eighteen thousand men ; the French nine thousand The most .mportant lesson which this battle teaches is the importance of follow WW a vector». Wo see here that the Austrians were as JJsZontoXt of December as a general could wish to be. Moreau and all of his general, not alone, but the men, were in consternation. It is most likely that S f Awhduke John had secured the defile of llohenlinden and pressed on toward u^ch M reau would have been obliged to cross the frontiers of France. But one daVe delay brought upon the Austrian arms the heaviest defeat they had as y et ei pe. The second observation is, the very confident manner with which the Austrian* The third observation to be made is, that had the French trusted alone tn « strength of their position and contented themselves to KE££££ hey would have been conquered a second time. Moreau wis already exhau td m the centre, and the left, under Grenier, beaten; the Austrians were ah" dv concentrating in the plain of Hohonlinden in front of the woods But Riche pause's turning manœuvre decided the day. It was the most bri .iant manœuv," e°Lcute C d a T ,Sn ' * WaS a defen8he attUude 8kilful * COmb -d wi h a WgZ ! Zer at' 6 m ° VCmeut ' which decided the whole campaign. Thlfact tl at General Moreau was awaiting with impatience the movement of RichTl appears to establish, beyond controversy, that he ha^ordcred it «^ sô *' In ou; war wW TT"' lf DOt the or ^rs, of the general commanding. In our WW, where direct attacks are so prevalent, Lieutenant-General Jackson th a e 8 ^t^r — »* wiU always stamp upo^a ~ 156 THE 8PJRIT OF CHAPTER IV. GRAND RECONNOISSANCES, AND PRECAUTIONS THEY REQUIRE. Great difficulty in the conduct of an army — We must seek the enemy — Necessity of permanent contact — Rôle of cavalry — The curtain must be lifted — Precept — Consequences of its disregard — The Army of Portugal in the Valley of the Tagus — Twofold reconnoissance upon Almeida and Elbodon — English cavalry flies — Brigade of infantry isolated — Fuente-Guinaldo — The reconnoissance not properly carried out — The English army escapes — Smiles of fortune. , To know the position of the enemy, to be informed in time of the movements which he is executing, to gather sufficient facts from which his projects may be divined, is one of the greatest difficulties which the command of an army presents continually. Nothing should be neg- lected to arrive at exact information, and the surest means is to be constantly in contact with the enemy by means of light troops, to have frequently small engagements, and to take prisoners, whose answers are generally always naive and sincere. More can be ascertained from them than from the most faithful spies; the latter often confound the names of corps and generals, and estimate the strength of the troops upon which they report very inaccurately. When two armies, through the combinations of war, find themselves suddenly in the presence of, or have remained for a long time at a cer- tain distance from, each other, it is well to be assured more positively of the situation of affairs ; and then are made what we call grand re- connaissances. These operations demand great prudence, and even particular foresight, especially if it be undecided whether to engage or not, at least in extraordinary and very advantageous circumstances. It is necessary to employ a large force of cavalry, and, if possible, only light cavalry and horse-artillery, so as to remain more surely master of one's own movements. The question is, how to withdraw the curtain which covers an army, and when a general has sufficiently penetrated to the front to see with his own eyes the situation of the enemy, he has attained his object. But he should also be in a proper state of sustaining the troops which are engaged, and to gather them, should they have become scattered in a lively attack. He will have within reach a corps of in- fantry of respectable size, and in the rear of this corps the whole army will be disposed in such a manner as to be enabled to march at once, should circumstances require their taking any part in the action. One moment of hesitation may lead to the neglect of the employment of those sudden circumstances which, seized in the proper manner, would have brought about unforeseen advantages. I may cite one instance where the disregard of this precept prevent» MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 157 ed me from achieving an easy victory over the English army in Spain. The recital of faults is, perhaps, more instructive than the account of successes. In 1811 I occupied the Valley of the Tagus with the Army of Port- ugal. My mission was to watch over the safety of two strong places which covered the north and the south— Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz— which belonged to the Armies of the South and the North, and made part of their department. Ciudad-Rodrigo being in want of provi- sions, General Dorsenne, commanding the Army of the North, organized a large train and made preparations to conduct it. He furnished, as an escort, a force of ten thousand infantry and two thousand horse. Rut the co-operation of the Army of Portugal was necessary to assure his march, the English army being encamped in his proximity. I car- ried the greater portion of the army beyond the Col de Banos, and I marched in echelon from Tamames until I reached the River Aguéda. I marched upon Rodrigo with fifteen hundred cavalry. General Dor- senne arrived there likewise, and securing his large train of munitions of war in that place, left there a small division of three thousand infantry, commanded by General Thiébauld. The rumor had been circulated that the English were disposed to invest Rodrigo, and that all army stores within reach had been concentrated in the place. To secure them would have been opportune for them, and it became necessary to make a double reconnaissance upon the road to Almeida and toward the heights of Elbodon, upon which the outposts of the English army had been established. This reconnaissance was to be executed by the cavalry of the Army of Portugal, commanded by General Montbrun. General Thiébauld received orders to sustain the latter when neces- sary. The position of Elbodon having been carried in a moment, the English cavalry was put to flight, and a brigade of English infantry found itself isolated. After having bravely sustained several charges, it retreated upon Fuente-Guinaldo. Favored by the difficult nature of the ground, and thanks to the rapidity of its march and its bravery, we were unable to take it. It became important to occupy without delay the Village of Fuente-Guinaldo, it being the point of convergence of many roads, and of strategical importance for the concentration of the army. The division of Thiébauld was therefore called upon ; but placed too far away, because the object of its march had only been the defence and security of a convoy, and the field of battle having become singularly distant, owing to the enemy's retreat, it arrived too late, and its extreme weakness forbade its being thrown, at the begin- ning of the night, upon the entrenchments of Fuente-Guinaldo, toward which place the columns, coming from différent sides, were directed. Had eight thousand men been at my disposal I would have been able to act with confidence. Fuente-Guinaldo would have fallen into mv 14 y 158 THE SPIRIT OF power ; the light division, placed at Martiago, upon the right bank of the Aguéda, would probably have been taken or destroyed, the English army dispersed, and its corps, being without communication, would have been in the most critical position. Having had time to unite, it hastened to make good its retreat, and the opportunity of an easy and complete success was passed. I repeat that, when making a reconnaiatance in force, the troops should always be disposed so as to prevent the enemy from forcing them to a serious engagement; but, at the same time, they should be able either to rally troops should they have been beaten, or to profit from fortuitous and favorable circumstances. Whatever consideration we accord to our adversary, we should never believe him to be infalli- ble ; fortune often smiles when least expected, and we should always be prepared to prove that we are not unworthy of its favors. CHAPTER V. DETACHMENTS IN PRESENCE OF THE ENEMY— THEIR CHANCES, AND THE DANGERS WHICH ACCOMPANY THEM. Hare for object to profit from an expected victory — Examples of failures not count- ed upon — Wurmser in 1796, near the Lake of Garda — Alvinzi at Montebaldo and Corona — Detachment upon the Adige — Detachments upon the Po, Tosino, and Adda — Supposition of a retreat upon Genoa — Forty-five thousand men against twenty-two thousand — The Austrian army attacks — Battle of Marengo lost at five, p. m. — Return of Desaix's division, detachod upon the Genoa road — Fine victory — But a dangerous example to follow — Rout at the Katzbach in 1813 — Conclu- sions, and precepts. Notk — The Battle of Marengo. Sometimes a general, too much preoccupied with the hopes of a suo- cess, makes beforehand, without having as yet beaten the enemy, such dispositions as will give great results to his victory. To attain this ob- ject he divides his forces and sends them in different directions ; instead of conquering, he is beaten. His detachments are either surrounded or destroyed, and a campaign opened under good auspices, ends by a se- ries of reverses. In support of this I can cite several examples : In 1796 Wurmser opens the campaign in Italy with an army supe- rior to the French; a column turns the latter, and throws itself upon its communications toward Brescia. This column, too feeble to resist tho united French army, retiree at ite approach. Separated from the great MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. ]59 er portion of the .army by mountains and the Lake of Garda, it remains a stranger to succeeding events, and the French army, posted in tho centre of tho enemy's position, beats, one after the other, every corps which successively appears in its front. In the same year, 1796, General Alviuzi debouches from the Tyrol and attacks the French army, occupying the chain of the mountains of Baldo and La Corona. Believing a victory to be certain, he detaches a corps of five thousand men, commanded by Colonel Lusignan, who, after having followed the borders of the Lake of Garda, changes direc- tion, approaches the Adige, and takes a position in rear of the French army and upon its direct line of communication. This corps is held in check by the feeble division of Rey, which rejoined the army and estab- lished itself in front of the Austrians. The battle is gained by the French army, and the corps of Lusignan attacked, is routed and almost entirly captured. In 1800 Napoleon debouches into Italy with an army of sixty thou- sand men. Having passed the Po and completely turned the Austrian army, he finds himself upon its communications, and is about to seize all the roads by which it could seek to retire*. To attain this ob- ject he places part of his forces upon the left bank of the Po, upon the Tesino, while he was compelled to despatch a division upon the Adda and the Oglio to cover himself in that quarter. Then, supposing that the Austrian army, assembled at Alexandria, would most likely retreat upon Genoa, he detaches a division in the direction of Novi, to close that road likewise. But twenty-two thousand men were at his disposal, while the enemy had a force of forty-five thousand men assembled upon the Bormida. The enemy attacks, and the Battle of Marengo takes place; disputed with obstinacy, at five o'clock in the evening it seems as lost, when the division despatched toward Novi arrives. General Desaix, who oommanded it, had wisely stopped its march when hearing the cannonade, to await further orders. He retraces his steps, and arrives yet in time to be useful as a reserve force, and the battle is gained, although but twenty-seven thousand men had in all been en- gaged, and of these twenty-two thousand alone had been obliged to sus- tain the shock of tho battle. Thus our forces, in this instance, amount- ed to but two-thirds of those of the enemy, and but for one fortunate circumstance they would have numbered but one-half. It was un- doubtedly a fine victory, the results of which were immense ; but it would be dangero us to take its strategical combinations as a model, * The army which fought at Marenço only consisted of Victor's corps, which wan composed of the two small divisions of Gardaune and Chamberlhac, and of Lannes' corps, composed of the divisions of Votrin and Monier, the division of Boudet, five thousand strong, a very small force of cavalry, and thirty-two pieces of cannon.- Nott vf Author. 160 THE SPIRIT OF since the battle ought to have been lost, on account of the superiority of forces and the means which were brought against us. If victories under such circumstances are likely, their possibility must not be too much relied upon. An energy, correspondingly in- creasing with less favorable circumstances, may undoubtedly be shown, but the latter must not be wantonly provoked. In 1813 the French Army of Silesia, more than eighty thousand strong, concentrated at Goldsberg, commanded by the Marshal-Duke of Taren- tum, confronted an army nearly equal, commanded by Blucher. The Duke of Tarentum advances upon the enemy, supposing him to be massed at Jauer : he detaches, at the moment of his making a motion, the division of Puthod, to march by way of Schoenau upon Jauer, so as to engage the enemy in flank. But Blûcher at the same moment himself takes the offensive; the French army having reconnoitred badly, suddenly encounters the ene- my near the Katzbach, and is obliged to accept battle without having united its forces. Bad combinations and a series of unfortunate cir- cumstances lead to confusion. The French army being beaten, is forced to fall back ; the division of Puthod loses its communications ; thrown back upon the flooded Bober, overwhelmed by numbers, and after hav- ing valiantly striven to resist, it is captured entirely. From the examples above cited, and many others which could be added, the following conclusions are drawn : 1. Nothing is more dangerous than to make a detachment of any im- portance before the battle has been fought, a victory been achieved, and a decided advantage over the enemy been obtained. 2. The execution of this hazardous combination requires that the army have a sufficient superiority to assure great probabilities of vic- tory, and that concentrated forces be never weakened beyond the strength of those of the enemy. 3. When distant from an enemy who is strong enough to give battle, and when marching toward him, the space of at least one day's march from the enemy's forces must be occupied by the vanguards and light troops, so as to be informed of his movements, and to modify ours cor- respondingly. 4. Lastly, when it is believed that an isolated detachment can be made with advantage, its direction must be determined and troops be stationed to support it, in such a manner as always to assure its retreat upon the army, and that it in no case be in danger of losing its commu- nications. NOTE. The Battle of Marengo.— Early on the 14th of June, 1800, Napoleon was here surprised, while one-half of his forces were detached, and the remainder, about MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 161 twenty-two thousand men, under Lannes and Victor, were disposed in obliqueorder by echelon, left in front, and the right at half a day's march in the rear, in march- ing order. Marengo is near the fortress of Alexandria, upon the marshy borders of the Fontanone, in a perfectly level plain. The Austrian general, Melas, with over thirty thousand men and two hundred cannon, fell suddenly upon the French Orders were immediately sent to Desaix to come up. The Austrian infantry overthrew Gardanne, the advance guard, in front of Ma- rengo. Victor stemmed the tide for over two hours unsupported, and was at length rc.nforced by Lannes' vanguard. The Austrians steadily progressed, and Melas, hearing that the French general, Suchet, had arrived at Aqui, a village some twelve miles south of the battle-field, detached a body of twenty-five hundred horsemen to hold him in check. Meantime Victor was obliged to retreat through Marengo upon a pos,t,on some five miles west and a little to the south, to the Village of San Guili- ano. Lannes retreated across the plain, amid a terrible fire, with admirable preci- sion and coolness, in echelons by squares. Although the French horse, under Kel- lermann and Lampeaux, made most gallant efforts to disconcert the Austrian infantry, the latter progressed steadily onward, and a total rout of the French was already impending. At eleven o'clock, a. m.. Napoleon with hie staff, and two hundred grenadiers of the Guard, arrived upon the battle-field, and the sight of him reanimated his soldiers He brought with him the vanguard of Desaix's division, and at the same time when Napoleon rallied his centre, and at the head of a demi-brigade of Lannes' divis- ion, advanced toward the Austrians, Monier, with five battalions of Desaix's van- guard and eight hundred grenadiers of the Guard, fell upon the extreme left of the Austnaus at Castel Ceriolo, and carried that village. Retaken by the Austrians in the ensuing struggle, Cara St. Cyr again stormed it, and held it the remainder of the day. While the French right was thus victorious, the left was thrown into irreparable disorder, and giving way on all points. Napoleon had already resolved to withdraw northward across the fields toward Pavia, and abandon the battle-field. Melas, as- sured of victory, had given up the command to Zach, to rest at Alexandria. In this emergency, at four, p. m., Desaix made his appearance at St. Giuliano. . The battle," counselled this brave soldier, * is undoubtedly lost, but we have time to gam another one." Victor and Lannes were reformed and massed in front of San Giuhano ; Marmont prepared a masked battery of twelve guns, and Desaix advanced at the head of four thousand men to the charge. Zach, unsuspectingly advancing, was received by the discharge of this masked battery, and Desaix debouched from the villages ; while advancing toward the staggered enemy, he fell, pierced by a ball in the breast. The enemy, recovering from the surprise, advanced with six thou- sand Hungarian grenadiers, and the French, in their turn, hesitated and broke. In this moment Kellermann charged. He describes it thus : « The combat was en- gaged; Desaix soon drove back the enemy's tirailleurs on their main body; but the ■ight of that formidable column of six thousand Hungarian grenadiers made our troops halt. I was advancing in line on their flanks, concealed by festoons of vines- a frightful discharge took place; our line wavered, broke, and fled. The Austrians rapully advanced to follow up their success, in all the disorder and security of vic- tory. I see it ; I am in the midst of them ; they lay down their arms. The whole did not occupy so much time as it took me to write these six lines,- and the French ach.eved a complete victory. Loss: Imperialists, 7,000 killed and wounded, 3 000 prisoners, 8 standards, 20 pieces of cannon. French, 6,000 killed and wounded 1,000 prisoners. 11 ' lt>2 THE SPltUT Off This battle illustrates: 1. The importance of concentration of forces. 2. The danger of receiving an enemy when disposed by columns in echelon, because any disorder in front speedily spreads to the rear, and the successive columns, instead of coming up to the aid, will mostly find themselves overwhelmed by retreating forces. 3. The folly of the Austrian general to detach twenty-five hundred of his cavalry to check a movement in his rear, when General Suchet was fully twelve miles distant, and could not have come up for several hours — time enough to beat the French. 4. That a victory was won, through Desaix's counsel, from four, p. M., to sunset. Thus, one single hour, late in the day, decided the fate of Italy. CHAPTER VI. BATTLES. Rules and principles — Variations — Nature of terrain — Strength of position aug- ments the number of troops — Defiles in advance — Formation upon two lines — Not absolute ; commands should embrace both lines — Why — Reserve — General dispo- sition — Defensive battles— Choice of position — Rear free and protected— Offensive battles — Strategy and tactics — Dash, intelligence, and skill in manœuvres — Ge- nius of the French for the offensive — Immense difficulties in that warfare as re- gards administration and maintenance of troops — The defensive the genius of the English — Wellington in Spain — Masséna menaces Portugal — The Duke shelters himself behind the Coa and two fortresses — Retires upon Lisbon, awaiting the disorganization of the French— System decided upon and perseveringly followed —Renewed at Waterloo — The English give a defensive battle — Precepts — Transi- tion from the offensive to the defensive — Example — Offensive war the genius of Napoleon — His campaign in Italy offensive, then defensive, then again offensive —1805— Austerlitz— Jena— 1809— Ratisbon— Wagram ; a front attack— 1812, Bat- tle of the Moskowa — Importance of a flank movement — Direct attacks — Likes to employ great strength— 1813, Llitzen, defensive— Bautzen— Leipzig— Bad battle- field — The 18th of October, defensive — Battles of Brienne, Craon, Laon, Arcis, Champ-Aubert, 31ontmirail, Vauchamps, Montereau — What to do at Paris — 14,000 men against 54,000—13,000 of the enemy hors de combat— The time of bat- tles — Regulated according to circumstances — With superior forces attack soon in the morning — Why — Napoleon at Waterloo — With equal forces attack in the middle of the day— Why— 1796, reverse of Cerea and Due Castelli— Wurmser out of Mantua, — Victory of Saint-George — Defensive battles a part of the profession — Frederic II in the Seven Years' War — His campaigns resemble Napoleon's — Every general has his own manner of conducting war — Turenne and Condé — Alexander and Ca?.sar — Fabius, Hannibal, and Scipio. Notes. — 1. Confederate corps of reserves. 2. The lines of Torres-Vedras, in Portu- gal. 3. Wellington's strategy. 4. The Battle of Waterloo. To treat in detail of all the dispositions which the conduct of a battle demands, is a thing impossible. A thousand unforeseen circumstances may force us to modify them — fortuitous accidents may suddenly change MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 163 the entire disposition. I will, then, limit myself to the consideration and the statement of those rules which it is necessary to follow, and of the principles which must be respected to make preparations for the battle, and to distinguish the particular character which belongs to it. As to the manner of giving battle, there is nothing m<>ro variable. It differs with the nature of the operations to be executed, and the charac- ter of the mission the army has been charged with. It varies with the composition of armies, and the degree of genius belonging to the sol- diers; still more, it differs by reason of the order of talent and the de- gree of capacity of the commanding generals. I shall enter but little into technical details respecting the formation ami preliminary position of troops, since these dispositions depend, above all, upon the nature of the ground upon which a general is called to engage the enemy. Thus, for instance, it is evident that a position near the battle-field, which may serve as a support and increaso the means of sustaining ourselves, must be occupied in force, and in such a manner as to bo fruitful of some salutary action, either when attacked, or when we ourselves assume tho offensive. The strength of a position renders less disadvantageous tho inferiority in the number of troops ; defiles, placed in advance, render a part of our means of defence superflu- ous, and increase the difficulties of attack. As for the rest, the simplest reasoning, and oftentimes instinct alone, suffices to indicate the modifica- tions necessary to be made in the manner of formation sanctioned by usage. I will only recall, in a few words, that, aside from the influenco of localities, as a fundamental principle the formation of troops upon sev- eral lines has been adopted. The first line is deployed, and the second is in column of battalions at a distance equal to that of the deploy- ment, ready, if needful, to march or to move into line of battle; and a third line, composing the reserve, in column of brigades, ready to be moved wherever it may become most useful. I shall make, however, one observation upon general dispositions. It is, that the command of troops should be divided in such a mannor an to embrace both lines — that is to say, the corresponding parts of each should be under the authority of the same chief. The reason for this is easily understood. Since the second line is destined to sustain the first, tho movements of the same fractions in both lines should accord per- fectly. It is not the same with the reserve; it forms a complete and in- dependent corps, whose means should be perfectly concentrated to act according to circumstances. Thus, a corps d'année of four divisions, dis- posed to "give battle, would have, in my opinion, the following forma- tion : Tn the first line, three brigades of three different divisions, and in the second tho three other brigades of tho same divisions, and the fourth 164 THE SriRIT OF division in rear, united, and formed in two massos, each constituting a brigade. The cavalry would thus be placed : That of divisions, upon the flank or in rear of their respective divisions, and the great bodies of cavalry upon several lines and upon the flanks of the army, off the second line, and, in preference, upon that side where the country is most open and favorable to its movements and action. As for the artillery, that of the reserve will keep in rear of the reserve infantry, ready to move wherever required. Finally, I will add that the art of directing well a battle consists, particularly, in the judicious employment, and at the right time and in the right manner, of or^e's reserves ; and that the general who, in a well- contested battle, has fresh and disposable troops at the end of the day, when his adversary has given his all, is almost certain of victory 1 . I will now establish the character of battles, by dividing them into two classes : Defensive battles and offensive battles. For the first, the conditions of success are : The choice of a good position, whose flanks are well supported and the rear of which is per- fectly secure and open to movements, with obstacles in front which render the approach of the enemy more difficult; lastly, brave and dis- ciplined troops, commanded by an energetic and stubborn soldier. Offensive battles, above all, require an excellent strategical combina- tion and tactical skill, and, particularly, troops accustomed to manoeuvre and to march well, and who are adroit and intelligent, and of a spirit not to be mistaken. It is necessary that the soldier should look upon success as a matter of course, and that he associate himself with it be- forehand. In applying these observations, which I believe to be of rigorous ex- actness, to the spirit of different armies, and by taking, for example, troops which resemble each other the least, we recognize the French as those troops which most nearly satisfy the requirements of offensive bat- tles, and we accord to the English the first place in defensive battles. If it is, besides, remarked that the difficulties of administration and the maintenance of troops are immense in offensive warfare, while for the defence only money and the will are required ; and when we further re- flect that the English army, by its composition, manners, and wants, ought to be more abundantly supplied than any other — we are more and more strengthened in the conclusion that defensive warfare, with all its consequences, is more in accordance with the talents of the English army, and that it would be less easily conducted with a French army. The events of the Peninsular war, yet fresh in our remembrance, de- monstrate this truth. The English general, either by his nature and his peculiar character, or owing to his ability in comprehending the circumstances in which he had been placed, understood, from the be- MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 165 ginning, the systom which ho ought to follow, and never deviated from it. ^ For a long time he perseveringly took advantage of a powerful aux- iliary which the force of circumstances had given into his hands— our misery; he never ceased to turn it to account. His army, abundantly provided with everything, able to concentrate at any day, was constantly in a condition for movements, and always menacing. Military and po- litical -calculations alone were considered in its operations; while the French army, suffering from all kinds of wants, and discharging duties of every nature, daily lost in strength and means. If a position could not be attacked, the English general occupied it and waited until it was in danger of being turned, or until the French army had thrown itself against insurmountable natural obstacles, in pure loss consuming its valor. Thus, when Marshal Masséna, at the head of a superior army, threat- ened to invade Portugal, Wellington took position in rear of two strong places, being, besides, covered by the Coa, and waited until the French army had wasted a part of its resources by two sieges— abandoning to the fate of war the garrison of these two places, which did not belong to his army— he retired when they capitulated, and fearful of being attacked, took a position at Busaco. After having repulsed the French army, which inconsiderately had attacked him, he retired and disap- peared while the latter was manoeuvring to turn him, and the English army withdrew within the lines of Lisbon, where art had added to powerful natural means of resistance 2 . The English general waited patiently until want and misery had dis- organized and destroyed the French army ; he followed his system in so rigorous a manner that he left it at peace, although it was within his sight and the range of his artillery, and unable to give battle or to oppose any serious resistance, weakened as it was by the absence of from fifteen to twenty thousand men who, leaving their arms stacked, dispersed over a space of some fifteen to twenty leagues into the inte- rior of Portugal to seek for provisions. Nearly reduced to one-half, the French army returned to Spain, after having abandoned all of its cannon, its entire material, on account of the want of draught-horses, and with three-fourths of its cavalry dismounted. It had sustained immense losses, although it had but once fought— at Busaco— and had been engaged in only two combats of little importance during the re- treat. Wellington always followed a like system; and when later he was face to face with Napoleon at Waterloo, he again fought a defensive battle 3 . It is then seen that, in a defensive war, which is always a question of time, battles should not be given except very rarely— since marches 160 i THE SPIRIT OP and divers circumstances sometimes disorganize and destroy the means of an adversary more surely than tho most signal victory. Regarding the particular requirements of offensive battles, they should always be given by the front; and the talent consists in forcing the enemy, by means of wisely-conceived dispositions, to attack where we have been able to render resistance most easy. But there are like- wise battles which, commencing with an offensive movement, are afterward reduced to a defensive action : this happens when prudent and circumspect commanders are at the head of nearly equal forces, ready to give battle. The campaign in Spain in 1812 offers an example of this kind : the English army being superior by eight thousand infantry and four thousand cavalrj T to that of the French. Tho French general, after having for a long time remained on the defensive, awaiting promised reinforcements, and officially informed that they would not be sent, was obliged to assume the offensive to prevent the continually increasing dangers of his situation. But in assuming the offensive, and in forcing the enemy to recoil by means of strategical movements, he did not wish, however willing to fight, to renew, by an inconsiderate attack, those events which had be- fore taken place. He desired, on the contrary, should there be any battle, that it be fought upon ground of his own choice, and to accept, not to initiate it. On the other hand, the English general, true to his system, was equally desirous of reducing any action to the defence of his position. From it arose the remarkable movements which took place from the Duero to the Tormes toward the middle of the month of July, 1812. This system being followed by both parties, the English army was obliged to make a retrograde march. Its return upon the Aguéda and reoccupation of Portugal would, incontestably, have been the imme- diate result of this part of the campaign, if a movement had not been executed without orders in the French army, and if tho marshal who commanded it had not received a serious wound three-quarters of an hour before the battle, which unsettled the command and prevented the timely reparation of committed errors, and led to an action which should only have been brought about at a later day and under better auspices. Despite these drawbacks, the losses were equal in both armies. Although I believe firmly that the French troops, when well com- manded and properly provided for, are equal to all modes of warfare, I yet believe that offensive war is more within the spirit, nature, and the character of our soldiers. The same was, above all others, the par- ticular genius of Napoleon. I have already remarked that no man has ever possessed, in a higher iMILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 167 degree than he, the talent of strategy ; all his offensive marches, until the period of the Russian war, were skilfully conceived. The powerful resources of which he disposed, the energy with which they were em- ployed, and the morale by which they were animatod — his activity, the absolute liberty of his projects and combinations— all were calculated to precipitate events, and, by exalting the spirit of his soldiers, to over- whelm the enemy in advance with discouragement; and he was not very far from the fear of being conquered in one defeat. What series of splendid operations were executed by this almost supernatural genius ! In the bogiuning of his career, in Italy, he turns all the positions of the enemy and beats him in detail, before the latter had been able to concentrate. He passes the Po without having an enemy in his front, because he had foreseen his movements. The war becomes defensive; but soon he changes its character, and, in attacking, he again applies the genius particular to him. In 1800 he enters Italy and forces the Austrian army to receive battle in the most discouraging situation, and under most grievous disadvantages, after having lost both its communications and point of retreat. In 1805 the simple direction of his armies which he threw upon the Danube in masses, after having occupied the Black Forest with the heads of his columns to engage the attention of the enemy, decides tho question of the campaign — because Mack, instead of bringing about the catastrophe of the Austrian army by an unreasonable confi- dence, ought to have retired. As it was, one simple movement placed us in possession of the whole of Bavaria. At Austerlitz we see a tactical movement decide the fate of the battle in a few hours. At Jena the same astonishing results were brought about by like means. As long as this system was followed, we see every enterprise of Napoleon crowned by equal success. In 1809, at the outset of the campaign before Ratisbon, the same spirit regulates his operations. But soon his system changes. Tho passage of tho Danube, after having been baffled the first time, is exe- cuted with success, and followed by the victorious battle in the plain of Wagram. Here an attack in front, a direct manœuvre, constituted the combat. Attending circumstances left no choice. The passage of a river like the Danube is not an easy matter, and can not be executed without the knowledge of the enemy ; and if an army placed upon the opposite bank seeks to prevent it, we must at once prepare for a heavy engagement while debouching; then the rapid accumulation of means, and the energy with which they are directed, are the only assurances of victory. In 1812 it depended upon his own will to give to the great battle which wae fought upon the Mof kowa the character of hie preoeding vie- 168 THE SPIRIT OF tories ; by a simple flank movement he could have engaged the Russian army with much greater advantage, and a chance for still greater results in the future would have been opened. But already a marked taste for direct attacks, and the enjoyment of employing force, appeared to man- ifest itself, with him, and a sort of disdain for the concours of art and the combinations of the mind. He vanquished, but with immense losses and inadequate advantages. In 1813 he varies in his application of strategy. At Liitzen, being surprised, the battle commences by being defensive, but soon becomes offensive. At Bautzen his strategical movements are well and skilfully con- ceived. But at Leipzig we ask how Napoleon, who had it in his power to change the theatre of operations, could himself select a battle-ground so disadvantageous, and which the simplest calculations should have shown as being fraught with disaster. The battle of the 18th of Octo- ber was defensive, and presented no chance of success, since the battle of the 16th had not been gained; and as the enemy, on the 17th, had received a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty thousand men, he should have then avoided it, and should have retreated without delay. The Battles of Brienne and of Craon, those of Laou and Arcis, fought in France, could effect no real advantage, owing either to the manner of concentrating the forces or to the direction which the attacks assumed. All operations of this epoch were limited to partial movements directed upon separate corps. On these occasions only the remaining energy of the French army was properly exercised, and these combinations were, besides, within the range of Napoleon's genius — who, sundry times thereafter, made several happy applications, as at Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Montereau — where, in giving to an obsti- nately-maintained defensive tho character of the offensive, he made use of the greatest feature of his genius. But at last, reduced to the necessity of giving battle, through the union of the enemy's entire forces, when obliged to deliver it he should have given it a defensive character, selected a position under the walls of Paris, and fortified that city; he should have concentrated all of his resources and those of the capital, which he alone was able to turn to account, and there, for a last time, tried his fortune. If fourteen thousand men, consisting of remains of a former army, abandoned to themselves, could, in an open country — without a single work of art to sustain them, and deprived of all succor which the city would have been able to furnish, owing to the disappearance and the flight of the superior authorities — resist, for ten hours, the colossal forces united in their front, of which fifty-four thousand men had been engaged and thirteen thousand disabled, it is easy to foresee what would and MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 169 should have happened if thirty thousand men could have fought under the protection of good works, tripling their force, and, aided hy the re- sources of Pari3, concerted action would have been the result of Napo- leon's presence and authority. But this sort of resolution was not within the range of his genius ; he neither could bring himself to contemplate it nor to prepare for its exe- cution ; in this last resort he placed his reliance solely upon the pow- erful lever with which public opinion appeared to favor him, and, how- ever mighty this power of opinion may be, it can only be durable as long as the condition of the country is base A upon something positive and real. One moro remark upon offensive battles. At what hour should they be given? and this is a question of great importance, worthy of exam- ination. The hours, if the choice can be had, should be changed according to circumstances. If there is any decided superiority authorizing a firm reliance upon victory, the attack must take place early in the morning, so as to enable us to draw profit from obtained successes. There is not one military man who does not keenly remember the grief he experienced when the night closed upon success, or the impatience with which he ex- pected thé morning after a reverse. Again. The attack should be made as soon as possible, when the troops are all held well in hand, and when the enemy has not as yet concen- trated his. It is vainly asked why Napoleon, at Waterloo 4 , during the longest days of the year, attacked the English only at eleven in the morning, though well knowing, through an intercepted letter of Bliicher to Wellington, that the former would not be able to debouch until four o'clock in the evening; since, if Napoleon was victorious, he would have confronted the Prussian army after having beaten the English; and had the battle been against him, he at least would not have had a second army upon his hands in the very midst of the engagement. Great military questions are nearly always reduced to simple ideas; and here the formula is, whether one has a better chance in fighting one against one, or one against two. But if the forcos are pretty nearly equal and render victory uncertain, it is better to attack toward the middle of tho day ; the consequences of a reverse are then less to be feared, and a general should, above all, think of preserving his army. The destruction of the enemy is only effected with the second line of the order which our duties and interests prescribe to us. And, furthermore, if the question rests unsolved, the whole night remains to prepare for a now attack and other combinations. Then the troops have had some repose, they have been able to take a meal before the engagement] and they are in a condition to display strength and energy. On tho contrary, the army which defends itself 15 170 THE SPIRIT OF is full of reflection and agitation ; it can not give itself up to the same degree of reposo, and, oftentimes, its morale decreases as the moment of action approaches. In the midst of our triumphs in Italy we experienced two slight re- verses in two succeeding days — at Cereaand Aile due Castelli — owing to the extrenje fatigue and a little disorder which existed in Masséna's di- vision. As it was important to keep Wurinser shut up in Mantua, and to guard against a new check, the troops were permitted to repose until noon; they took arms only after having had a meal, and the victory of Saint-George's was not doubtful for one moment. To sum up. Defensive battles are more a part of the profession, while offensive battles, well-prepared and well-conducted, are the portion of genius. Such was, likewise, the peculiar character of the wars of Fred- eric II, because the great defensivo Seven Years' War had almost en- tirely the character of the offensive; and, in this respect, his campaigns resemble several of Napoleon's very much, with the difference, resulting from the times and the state of the art. In attentively perusing the recital of the actions of great generals, the character of their troops are recognized by the manner of their em- ployment. Their particular excellencies are always detected, since it must be admitted that those who excelled in a particular kind of war had a special genius for it; the instinct which nature has imparted, if it be not our foremost guide, at least powerfully contributes to the. de- velopment of our faculties. In all centuries the operations of great generals have worn a peculiar physiognomy; even those conducted by men most frequently compared present essential differences to our reflection. The campaigns of Tu- renno and of the great Condé bear no resemblance whatever; it is the same with the generals of antiquity, if wo compare Alexander with Caesar and Fabius, or Haunibal with Scipio. A skilful general should, at the beginning of a campaign, be fully impressed with the importance of his situation, the more or less favora- ble chances of which depend upon the character of his troops, their number, the task assigned to him, and the resources which have been placed at his disposal. The powers thus given him he ought to bring into action in the manner most likely to attain the object with which he has been charged, even if the particular mode of execution required of him does not agree with his tastes or wishes. NOTES. 1. Confederate Corps of Reserves.— Before we may expect any extraor- dinary achievements from reserve bodies of troops, another principle must be adopted in their choice. Now we have no body of reserve corps in any of our ar- mies. Certain regiments or brigados are simply detailed as a reserve corps for thftt MTLITARY INSTITUTIONS. 171 temporary duty. In doing so, we neglect one of the greatost stimulants to excel upon the field of battle: the creation anrl education of bodies upon whom the whole army looks with pride, and to whom superior excellence is willingly accorded ; bodies, who, when they once march, are sure to carry everything before them, and whose organization, instead of being temporary, should be permanent. Such bodies can only be created in times of war, because upon the field of battle their glories ought, first to be incontestably established. Now the proper time ap- pears to have come to create them. The bravest, best drilled, and the most steady troops should compose the corps of reserves of every army; We have all the ele- ments in our armies; and we have an example in Napoleon's Guards, and in the present Imperial Guard of France. Has a regiment particularly distinguished itself upon the field of battle, let the vote of the whole army assign it to the corps of reserves. The next battle-field would, no doubt, show great emulation, and every army would soon have a splendid corps of reserves. Has an officer particularly distingiiished himself, let him be pro- moted into the reserves; and only the bravest general among the brave should command a brigade of reserves. In «he Italian war of 1859, one of the principal reasons which contributed to the speedj' overthrow of the Austrian army was the want of an Imperial Guard such as the French army had. This guard is its reserve corps. In it all old veterans serve, and a young soldier has no chance to be admitted to its ranks before ho has given proof of his prowess upon the field of battle. With the Austrians the whole army consisted of comparatively young soldiers, but few having served more than two years; 1 and none over three. It is, therefore, easily understood why they could not stand before the French Imperial Guard. There seems to be no special legislation of Congress,"or even any particular ordors from the Department of War, necessary to effect the object (except such an order from the latter would at once effect it). Every general commanding an army can himself, and ought himself, to do it. Many of our indecisive fields of battle might have worn a different aspect but for a fresh corps of reserves. We are forcibly re- minded of Sharp8burg, and, alas! too many other fields of that kind. " Had we but had five thousand more men," may be heard after almost every battle. This has its significance, and expresses some general want. 2. The lines of Torre3-Vedras, in Portugal.— The famous lines con-' Btructed here during the Peninsular war by Lord Wellington were not only, in their kind, the proudest monument of British military science, but present the most stupendous example of a mountain-chain of entrenchments which any age of the world has yet seen. The recoil of Mass6na's army from these lines formed the point of reaction in the career of French conquest, from which all the subsequent reverses of Napoleon may bo dated. It was at the close of 1809 that these stupendous lines were commenced. The offensive movements which led to the Battle of Talavera having put to the test the value of Spanish co-operation, and having fully demonstrated the utter ineffici- ency of their armies from want of organization, want of discipline, and skilful offi- cers, it became apparent t . > WelUngtOB that the contest would, in the next campaign, devolve on the small body of veteran British and the newly-raised Portuguese troops Under his command, and a defensive system Of warfare ensue. To prepare for a final struggle was thenceforward the great object of consideration; and as the hope of successfully defending an extended and open frontier, like that of Portugal, against a very superior and highly skilful enemy could scarcely be entertained, it was decid- 172 THE SPIRIT OF ed to seek out some positions in the lower part of Estremadura. not liable to be turned or passed, and having an assurod communication with the sea. which should command all the approaches to Lisbon, and which positions, being entrenched in the strongest manner, would offer a point' of concentration for the whole of the defi-n- eive forces of Portugal, army, militia, irregular, etc., where they might, in conjunc- tion with the British, be victualled and supplied with ammunition for any period of time, while occupying a most favorable field for deciding the fate of the capital and the kingdom in a general action. With these views, while the army was centred on the Guadiana, Lord Wellington, after a minute personal reconnoissance of the country, commenced a chain of fortified posts across the Peninsula. Wben complet- ed they formed a double and nearly parallel chain of redoubts and other entrench- ments. The outer, or advanced line, extended from the mouth of the small River Zezandra, on the ocean, through the mountain point of Torres-Vedras and Monté Agraça, the keys of the position, to Alhandra, on the Tagus ; and following the trace of its defensive features, this outer line measured twenty-nine miles. In rear of this, the second or principal line of defence across the Peninsula, had its left on the sea, at the mouth of the little River St. Lorenzo (in front of Ericena), and its right on the Tagus at Via Longa — occupying, on its trace, the strong mountain- passes of Mafra, Montachigne, and Buccelas, through which run three of the four great roads to Lisbon, while the fourth skirts the river. The principal line, in its sinuosities, measured twenty-four miles; the direct breadth of the nook of the Pen- insula, between the flanks of the two lines, being, however, twenty-five and twenty- two miles respectively. 3. "Wellington's Strategy. — As a matter of interest, wo subjoin here the remarks of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, of the English army, on the strategical talents of the Duke of Wellington, mostly condensed from General Jomini : "In respect to the influence produced by Wellington on the progress of the art of war, although his campaigns tend to confirm the great truths of the science, it can not be said that he created or brought into practice any important principles In the higher branches of the science which had not been previously illustrated in the operations of Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and other celebrated gen- erals. "At the same time it may be claimed for Wellington that he had a system of his own, which forms an important and interesting subject for reflection and dis- cussion. " The combination of the defensive with the offensive, generally used by Wel- lington, has been thus described by various military writers: " In the Peninsula, and more particularly in Portugal, he had under his com- mand a mass of native troops, better adapted to act as light troops and harass the enemy in his operations, than for a pitched or regular battle. '•Having experienced the fiery ardor of the French attack, the impetuosity of columns led by Masséna and Ney, ho devised very skilfully the means of first blunting the force of that impetuosity, and then overcoming it. "His plan was to choose positions very difficult of access ; the approaches he covered with clouds of Spanish and Portuguese tirailleurs, thoroughly conversant with the art of taking advantage of inequalities of ground; his artillery he placed partly on the tactical crest of the position, partly a little in rear of it. " By these means he shattered the columns on the march by a murderous fire of artillery and musketry, while his excellent British infantry, one hundred paces behind the crest of the hill, was kept in reserve without being exposed. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 173 "When tlio columns reached the sum mit, fatigued, out of breath, and already [d'-cimated, a general discharge from the infantry and artillery of the second line hurst upon them, followed up immediately by a charge upon their half-disordered masses. •'This description has only reference to the campaigns of Wellington in Spain and Portugal — rugged countries to which, as well as to the peculiar characteristics of the troops composing his army, such a system was perfectly suited. In the campaign in Belgium a modification of this system was necessarily adopted. " The position at Waterloo was on a plateau, with a gentle slope in front of it, forming a glacis, over which the infantry had a magnificent range of fire, and its effects were terrific. The flanks of the British were well protected, and Welling- ton could observe the movements of the enemy from the summit of the plateau, while his own were, in a great measure, concealed. With all these advantages it still remains a question whether his system would have been successful on that day, if a multitude of other circumstances had not lent their aid. " We admire the sagacity with which the various materials, or nationalities, placed in Wellington's hands, wore used to the best advantage; but one of the most striking characteristics of his operations, as far as respects the art of war, is his almost constant use of deployed lines two deep. "His successes in the Peninsula and at Waterloo, gained with the troops so formed, and generally attributed to the deadly fire of his lines of infantry, have given rise to controversial discussions on the relative advantages of the formation of troops in columns and in lines. u In these discussions, highly useful in some respects, the tendency in too many instances has, unfortunately, been to reduce the system of war to absolute rules ; as if it were possible to decide absolutely that troops should on all occasions be formed either in column or in line. " The locality in which they are to act, national character, and other circum- stances, must be considered by the general ; and it is for his genius to decide when and where the one formation*or the other may be the most advantageous." It is curious to perceive how the paragraph commencing with " The position at Waterloo," etc., differs from the same in Note No. 4. They are both translations from Jomini. Of course Mr. Pardigon's is the cor- rect version, and Colonel Graham cither did not know French sufficiently to trans- late correctly, or he purposely perverted the meaning of Jomini. 4. The Battle of "Waterloo.— Of the Battle of Mont- Saint- Jean, as it is call- ed by the French, La Belle Alliance by the Prussians, and Waterloo, very singular- ly, by the English — the Village of Waterloo having been fully two miles to the rear of the English front of battle — so much has been written, and so many diverging opi§ions by many celebrated military writers are on record, that it appears ex- ceedingly difficult to form a just and correct estimate of it as regards the merits of the great leaders therein engaged. And while we know, in almost every bat- tle fought by Napoleon, to whom to ascribe the honors of tho victory, to this very day English and Prussian writers violently dispute who really gained the Battle of Waterloo ; and the latter proclaim Marshal Blucher as the victor as firmly as the English maintain that tu Wellington alone the honors are due. They both, however, agree that the French were beaten by the skill of their own generals. But to throw some light, even at this late day, upon the subject, I beg to refer to the incontestable fact of numbers, as established in the otlicial data of "Cap- tain Siborne's Waterloo Campaign." We find there evidence, which perhaps has 15* 174 THE SPIRIT OF as yet but little been considered, tbat out of C7.661 men under Wellington pres- ent upon the field of battle, but 23,991 were Englishmen (and it maybe well sup- posed that the greater part of those were gallant Irishmen), and the remaining troops — that is, 43.670 men — were mostly Germans, in which number are included nearly 18,000 of Dutch and Belgians. Of artillery, these foreign troops actually had one-half — that is, seventy-eight out of one hundred and fifty-six guns. Furthermore we see. from the same source, that the loss of the English troops, not including that of the large body of foreign troops, was 5 672 in killed and wounded during the entire action — that is, from morning, eleven o'clock, when the village clock of Nivelles gave the signal to the bloody conflict, until night covered the ghastly scene — and that the Prussians, who appeared upon the field of battle late in the afternoon, still lost as many as 4,810 in killed and wounded; so that wo must infer, if the English troops fought very splendidly, the Prussians did not the less so. We see, therefore, no substantial grounds to award the greater glory to either. But, despite the convincing figures of Siborne, it must be a matter of astonish. ment if the English, far from according any credit to these large bodieB of foroign troops, both military men and historians have not only depreciated their services, but also not hesitated to cast injurious reflections upon their character — a course which can not be defended, since there is no record that those troops failed in their duty; on the contrary, we know that a body of these very auxiliaries defended and maintained the important position of the Orchard of Hougoumont against the severest efforts of the French. It illustrates strongly a feature of their national character — great selfishness and unblushing unfairness whenever their national pride, interest, or prejudices dictate a course different from that which justice, honor, and magnanimity would appear to indicate. In regard to the respective merit to be attributed to the great commanders engaged in the Battle of Mont-Saint-Jeau, so much is established, that Napoleon's combinations, which culminated in this battle, admit of no adverse criticism ; they are acknowledged, even by English historians, as having been signalized by the genius so singularly revived after the groat reverse of Leipzig, In October, 1813» and which was demonstrated by his subsequent magnificent campaign of 1814, when, in the plains of La Champagne, he, with barely GiiOOO men, kept in check, for a long period, the combined hosts of the Kussians, Prussians, awd Auetrians, amounting to over 200,000 men. Not very long ago two officers, who speak the French language — one, Colonel ( 'barras, a French exile — the other, a Captain Brialmont, of the Belgian army — have written voluminous works to prove that Napoleon showed very little if any gener- alship, extolling that of Wellington to the skies. But their motives are easily per- ceived, and their reward has been the contempt of all unprejudiced men and the high praises of the British press. The emperor's plan of operations, upon setting out from Paris, was to antici. pate the junction of Wellington with Blucher : to turn to the right and beat the Prussians, and then seek Wellington and defeat him. The first part of his in- tended operations succeeded as well as could have been expected, and Blucher was beaten at Ligny on the sixteenth of June — bu-t two days anterior to the final struggle — and it would have ended in the total destruction of the Prussians but for the unpardonable want of vigor and resolution on the part of Ney, who, having been directed to march by way of Quatre-Bras aud Bly, upon Blucher's rear, per- mitted himself, despite the emperor's urgent despatch — " The, fate, of France is in your hands" — to be kept at bay by a few thousand men in front of Quatre-Bras — giving Wellington time there to concentrate and defeat him. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 175 Both Wellington and Bllicher now retreated ; the former from Quatre-Bras to Gtmappe and Waterloo-the latter from Ligny to Wavre. Wellington halted in front of the straggling little Village of Waterloo to make a stand, BlUcher having promised him to unite-on the 18th. To prevent the junction of their forces Napoleon had detached Marshal Grouchy, With a force of thirty-five thousand men, toward Wavro and Somhref. with strict directions to watch and keep within sight of Bllicher. Either a traitor or an im- becile, hut. most likely the former-since his previous glorious career gives him greater cla.ms to intelligence-the marshal failed to do this; and, although within sound of the firing of Waterloo, knowing that the fate of his country was about to be deeded, and against the urgent entreaties of Count Gerard, one of hig 1 .eutenants. he refused to march to the emperor's assistance. In this circumstance we must seek the main reason of Napoleon's loss of the battle-for the issue could not have been doubtful had he been able to dispose of Grouchy», corps. When, finally, after having worsted the English upon every point, a corps of seventy-two thousand Prussians, with two hundred and twenty-eight cannon, made its appear- ance npon the field of battle, it was beyond human power to preserve the victory. mil, ha well-contested action is shown by the great loss of the Prussians, whoso main body was not engaged before seven o'clock in the evening From the battle-field of Waterloo, or rather from the Chateau of Hougoumoot, it is about ten miles north to Brussels, six miles south to Genappe, eight and a half miles south to Quatre-Bras, fifteen and a half miles south-east bv east to Ligny-ali on the same road-and but eight and a half miles east to Wavre- which dntanco could have been made by Grouchy in a forced march of three hours, by his infantry and foot-artillery, and in one and a half hours by his cavalry and light-artillery. On the other hand, it is an equally well established fact that Wellington was already beaten, and, but for Grouchy', failure, would not now be called the great victor of W aterloo and conqueror of Napoleon. General Jomini gives the follow on? ", ™ 6 T fieS ° f the l0B8 ° f the battle in a cha P ter written ^ 1856 (wide p 206 of Mr. C. P. Pardigon's translation of «The Practice of War," Richmond,' «At Waterloo, the English general took position on a plateau sloping gently down and forming a glacis, where the artillery formed a magnificent line of fire and ranged with its most terrible effect; moreover, both flanks were well pro! tected. Wellington could descry from the crest of the plateau the least move- ments of the French army, while the latter could not .ee anything of his But notwithstanding all those advantages, his system could not have prevented him from losing the battle, had not several other circumstances turned in his favor « 1st. The-rain soaking the ground, rendered very slow and toilsome the offon- eive march of the French, deprived of all the impulse of the first attacks, and did not permit them to be properly supported by artillery. -2d. The formation, from the beginning, in too deep columns, especially at the right wing. "3d. The incoherent use of the three arms, since-the cavalrv and the infantry made several alternate attacks, without ever being simultaneously engaged. «4th. Caetly, and above all, the unexpected arrival of the whole of the Prussian army, falling at the decisive moment on the right flank and NitftLT ox tue rkar of the French. J * All military men of experience will agree that, in spite of mud and the good bearing of the English infantry, if the main body of the French infantry had 176 THE SPIRIT OF pushed forward in columns by battalions, just after the great charge of cavalry, the combined army would have been broken and thrown back upon Antwerp. Even independently of those circumstances, the English army, but for Vie arrival of Blucfur. would have been compelled to fall back!" Alison and other English historians admit that Wellington was outgeneralled in the beginning of the struggle. Wellington, whose claims as a master of defensive warfare can not be denied, can, however, not be ranked as a first-class general ; to— t of all could he be placed in a line with the incomparable genius which controlled the operations of a Napoleon, as theEnglish would make us believe. General Jomlui tells us, in Nos. 2 and 3, of Napoleon's failures — and they were serious; still Welling- ton did not take advantage of them, merely maintaining his defensive position. It may be safely asserted that, in like circumstances, had Napoleon seen that Welling- ton committed such mistakes, he would have acted widely different. Furthermore, in this battle, which alone would give to Wellington not even the reputation of a second-rate general, he violated one of the most important maxims of war. by taking a position in front of the woods of Soignes, with but one military road in his rear to retreat upon, thus leaving behind him a defile. This road was at that time the only one practicable for artillery, cavalry, and baggage-trains. There are certainly, as all English writers maintain, in order to shield Wellington from any censure, many roads which traverse the forest of Soignes; but they were, at the time, mere foot and bridle paths, upon which a retreat could not be conducted without destruction. Had the Prussians not come up in the nick of time, Welling- ton would have been totally routed upon his retreat; and the consequences of his violation of one of the principles of war would have become more disastrous to him thau the passage of the defile of Hohenlinden was to the Austriaus fifteen years before. If, however, his partisans still contend that Wellington acted right in thus placing himself — a defence which could not possibly be supported by any rules of the art — the inference is not improper that he was driven to bay by Napoleon's capable operations, which resulted in the Battle of Ligny. Wellington is the only remarkable Englishman the wars with Napoleon pro- duced. The immense consequences which followed in the train of the Battle of Waterloo could not but heighten the lustre of that victory — and to these two rea. sons the great admiration the English possess for their Wellington can easily be traced. As to Marshal Bliicher, history has pronounced its judgment upon him likewise. Ho was a general personally very brave, and always ready to engage in combat himself, rather than to employ his head — leaving that disagreeable work to his generally able chiefs of staff. The obstinacy with which he maintained a combat, and his great loyalty, so little found among French generals, were not the least of his good traits, and under a proper leader he would most» likely have made a gen- eral of the character of Murat, but not a Ney. » His often injudicious dispositions and inconsiderate impulses led to more defeats than victories. His coarseness, however, was astonishing, and almost amounted to brutality, though he could have never become a Butler. Under his explicit orders the Prussian squadrons pursued and slaughtered the French with a degree of barbarity that has but seldom been equalled in history, and which, long since, has been stamped with the seal of unqualified condemnation ; and the remembrance of their cruel deeds will be fresh in the breasts of French- men as long as one of their national standards is raised. Blucher'8 motto was: " Forward ;" but uot the "forward" which aims to achieve some great and humane end through the medium of military operations, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 177 but that which is characterized by rapino, murder, and annihilation — which, at last, would bring us back to the horrors of the most uncivilized timos, and which to check is the duty of every Christian nation. • To apply somewhat the cause of the loss of the Battle of Waterloo to our own struggle, instances could be cited where generals, charged by the general- in-chief of the army with which they served with certain operations upon which the fate of the battle, or the campaign, or, who knows, the cause, might have de- pended, appear to have signally failed to carry these operations into effect. They permitted the struggle to proceed, and did nothing, when their'appearance upon either the flank or the rear of the enemy might have socured the moat decisive victory; or, when the commander of a large detachment, though within hearing of the conflict, and knowing that the great struggle was going on, remained inde- cisive, did not move to where the fire was heaviest, and had either not the courage or the good sense to assume the responsibility of hastening to the support of the main body. There are omissions in military life which may not be within reach of the Arti- cles of War, but which, sooner or later, will bring upon the officer thus failing the condemnation of the entire nation, and which will consign his name to those who ignominiously deceived the high trust reposed in them. Such failures can bo ex- cused as little in a simple colonel as in the exalted rank of a general of whatever grade, because the pate op the country, and. in our case, the immense, stake ofhu~ man liberty, may depend upon it. Grouchy, whether he was in reality a traitor, or whether he failed simply to seize the decisive moment, i6 helçj in execration. No Frenchman mentions his name but with a curse upon his lip or in his heart. Such will be the fate of those of whom hereafter it shall be established that they betrayed their trust ; that they permitted their bravo comrades to be slaughtered, and a cause to be ruined, despite the wisest and most effective measures of both the general-in-chief and the government, when they had it in their power to turn the scales of victory, and bring about the glorious consummation of our struggle. CHAPTER VII. CONDUCT OF THE GENERAL THE DAY FOLLOWING THE VICTORY. Many know how to gain battles, but few how to profit from them — LosseB in a bat- tle iucrease indecision and timidity — Schœrer at Loano — Clairfait at Mayence — Moreau in 1800 — Brune on the Mincio — Napoleon's conduct — He never needed to fight a second battle — Great fatigues momentary — Abundance and repose gained for a long time — Limits — Russian campaign — An offensivo movement of three months — Requirements of a serious pursuit — Necessity of suiting the means to the end — After Wagram — March upou Zna'im — Passage of the Taya — Offered suc- cor must never bo refused. Note. — Marshal Davoust. Generals who gain battles are less rare than those who know how to profit from victory. They would make the engagement the object, while it is but the means. This may especially bo remarked of former wars ; still, even in our own times, examples are not wanting. 178 THE SPTRTT OF An ordinary general thinks only of the losses he has sustained, and hardly suspects those of the enemy; from it arise indecision and fatnl timidity, instead of a feeling of confidence, most probably authorized by all attending circumstances. In 1795, after the Battle of Loauo, Schœrer could have invaded Italy without any serious engagement. In the same year Clairfait, after his signal victory before Mayence, could have easily advanced under the very walls of Strasbourg, had he marched without delay. In 1800 Mo- reau would have been able, by means of rapid movements, to complete his successes at the very outset of the campaign. In the same year, in Italy, Brune, after the passage of the Mincio and the Adige, could have entirely destroyed the Austrian army which was retiring before him; the least display of energy would have been sufficient, to such a degree did circumstances favor him. Napoleon is the first general, in our epoch, who knew how to draw from victories all the results of which they were susceptible. After a battle had been gained he marched with rapidity to pursue the enemy, in order to gain easy successes, and to deprive him of his remaining little confidence. With such a system, a new battle became rarely necessary for the attainment of an important object. While thus marching it was, of course, impossible to provide in any great degree for the wants of the army, and inconveniences resulted therefrom, but they were of much less weight than the advantages which were assured. As a fertile country was, besides, traversed, in the midst of a compact population, the sufferings of the soldiers were much mod- erated, the rapidity of the march was soon slackened, and important spoils, with immense resources, fell into the hands of the conqueror. Abundance and repose thereafter furnished the means of not only re- pairing the losses, but also of augmenting the effective. While Napo- leon made war in Germany he acted in this manner, and found himself well off. Vienna, twice occupied, supplied him with incalculable re- sources, and was itself a pledge in the negotiations, whose value could not be too highly estimated. But there is a limit in these operations which can not be exceeded without impunity. When this system of war was applied to Russia, the question was not to make ten or twelve rapid marches, in the midst of a country full of resources and inhabited by a mild people, accustomed to order and obedience; it was, on the contrary, an offensive movement of nearly three months' duration*, almost without halting, in a poor coun- try, offering but the most indifferent resources, and inhabited by an oftentimes hostile people. This movement had not for its object the * Passage of the Niémen, 23d of June ; entrance Into Moscow, 14th of September — tho movement occupying eighty-three days. — Note of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 179 pursuit of a vanquished army, but to overtake an army which was con- tinually falling back upon now resources, while wo were expending ours upon the march alone, and to alleviate the sufferings, of every descrip- tion, which our soldiers underwent* — sufferings which soon engendered a state of things bordering on disorganization. Napoleon was then marching into certain misfortune. If we are right in saying that, to satisfy one of the great principles of war, a general should seek to profit from his successes, and to neglect nothing to complete them by rapid movements in the pursuit of the beaten enemy, we likewise perceive that this rule is by no means without its limits, and that its application should always be subordinate to the exi- gencies of particular circumstances. But if a serious pursuit must be undertaken, the most powerful and compact resources must be lavished upon it, suitable to surmount all ob- staeles. If, on the contrary, a general is forced to keep back, he strengthens the morale of tho enemy, and advantages escape him upon which we could have rightfully counted. After the^ Battle of Wagram, on the 8th of July, Napoleon ordered me to the command of one of the vanguards of the Grand Arm}'. Masséna was following the main body of the enemy's army, which was retreating upon the road of Hollabrun. I was thrown upon the road to Nicolsburg, to pursue Prince Rosemberg, who was marching in that direction, and Marshal Davoust received orders to sustain me with his corps. I over- threw the troops in my front; and as they changed direction and aban- doned the road to Moravia to march upon Laa, to effect there a pas- sage over the Taya, so as to unite with their main body at Znai'm, I took the same direction. On the evening of the 9th, when I had arrived upon that river, I received a message from Marshal Davoust, written from Wilfersdorf, to the effect that if I wished succor he was ready to join me. I had experienced but little resistance from the enemy, and no circum- stance authorized me in deeming any succor necessary ; I, therefore, extended no invitation to that effect to Marshal Davoust. I thought, besides, that since nobody had moved upon Nicolsburg, Davoust ought to cease marching upon that town. Still everything happened differently from what circumstances had authorized me to be- lieve. Davoust marched upon Nicolsburg in order to subsist more easily ; and I marched upon Znai'm, where I expected to meet nothing but a rear-guard, and to be able to join Masséna. But the retreat of the enemy had been slower than I thought, and two-thirds of -his army *The first corps, when entering upon the campaign, was eighty-five thousand men strong; at the review of Moscow it had only fifteen thousand. The French cavalry of the line, when commencing the campaign, counted fifty thousand men ; at the levitw of Moscow, six thousand. — Aote of Author. 180 THE SPIRIT OF were still on the other side of the river with nearly the whole train, and one-third was in my front. I took a defensive position to resist his as- saults ; and this position being sufficiently near to Znai'm, influenced the retreat of the enemy's army, by commanding the passage of the bridge over the Taya. Despite his reiterated efforts, he could not dis- lodge me ; still I did not feel the fault I had committed the less, in not calling for Davoust's support, and that which he himself had committed in not at once marching to sustain me. The retreat of the hostile army having been broken, and the greater portion of his forces obliged to re- treat upon very difficult cross-roads and to again ascend the Taya, the sequel would probably have been the loss of the greater portion of his material and his disorganization. This success would have had incal- culable consequences. Succor which is believed superfluous should never be called for; but if any is offered it ought never to bo refused. Often a fortuitous occa- sion arrives when, unexpectedly, such succor is of the utmost im- portance. NOTE. Marshal Davoust, Prince d'Eckmuhl.— This distinguished soldier of the French Republic and the Empire was educated for the army at the Ecole Militaire. At fifteen years of age he received his commission as a sub-lieutenant, and'in 1788 was appointed to the cavalry in the Royal Champagne regiment. Soon after the breaking out of the revolutionary war he was raised to the rank of provisional chef de brigade, and in 1796 was general of brigade. In these capacities he fought in Belgium, on the Rhone, and Moselle, and in Egypt. Ho particularly distinguished himself at the passage of the Rhine, in tho attack and capture of the entrenchments of the enemy at Diersheim and Honnau ; in tLe expedition to Upper Egypt with General Desaix, and at the Battle of Aboukir, on July 25, 1799. Napoleon Bonaparte, discovering his military talents, appointed him a general of division, and gave him the command of cavalry with the Army of Italy in 1800, and in the following year appointed him inspector-general of the French cavalry. When the camp was formed at Bruges in 1803, tho command- in-chief was conferred on Davoust. He subsequently received the bâton of a marshal of the empire, and in that exalted capacity commanded the corps d'armée ort the Rhine and in Germany, contributing, by his skill and bravery, to the subju- gation of Prussia and Austria. In 1808 he was created Due d'Auerstadt, and in 1809 was raised to the dignity of Prince d'Eckmuhl. After the campaign in Germany he held command in the Grand Army which struggled for Frencli dominion in Spain and Portugal. Upon the restoration of the Bourbons he was 'deprived of all the appointments he 'enjoyed ; but in August, 1817, the privileges and emoluments of a French marshal were restored to him. He lived to enjoy them until 1823. when he died in Paris, on the 1st of June. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 181 CHAPTER VIII. RETREATS. In presence of a stronger force — Delicate operation — Difficulty consists in the morale of troops — Different effect upon the soldier when he marches from the enemy — To scorn the enemy is to excite his respect — First dispositions — Necessity of retard- ing the enemy's march — Echelons — Partial combat»— Rear-guard — Importance of artillery — The enemy kept at bay— 1814, Bltlcher before Vindé — Six thousand men retire in peace before forty-five thousand — Retreat upon the Voire after the Bnttlo of Brienne— The enemy attracted at Pertho — The defile of Rosnai passed without disorder, and as if on drill— Retreats with troops equal in number to the enemy's — Position chosen in advance — Calculation as to time, distance, and celerity — Retreat upou the Duero — Moroau retreating upon the Rhine — Masséna in Portugal. % Note. — Marshal Blasséna. That retreats executed in the presence of a superior enemy have al- ways called forth great eulogiums is very reasonable, since they are among the most delicate and momentous operations of war. The principal difficulty is to be found in the morale of troops, which, under such circumstances, is greatly shaken. It is a singular fact what a different impression is made upon the soldier when he stands face to face with the enemy, and when his back is turned toward him. In the first case, he only €ees what really exists,* in the second, his imagination never fails to magnify the danger. It is, therefore, the duty of a general to inspire his troops with sentiments of pride and with confidence, justified in view of their situation, and to make the power and necessity of these impressions felt as one of the means of their safety. He must teach the soldier that, by scorning the, enemy, the latter will respect him. In ordinary cases, when a general is obliged to retire at the approach of the hostile army, and when no additional circumstances may require his prolonged stay in the position he is about to evacuate, both reason and prudence require of him to begin his movements before the arrival of the enemy. In keeping an interval of from six to seven miles at least, his march will be pursued with increased ease and facility. But circumstances may occur when it becomes necessary, above every other consideration, to retard the enemy's march, and to oblige him to lose time in making dispositions for attacking us, which will suddenly become superfluous, because we withdraw as soon as the prospects of the opening of the engagement becomes serious. In such an event both excellent troops, and great precautions on the part of him who commands thctn, arc required. Security then must be found in the dispositions of the echelons and the precision of movements. 1G 182 THE SPIRIT OF If the retiring corps is of such disproportion with the pursuing as to forbid the commander of the former to offer battle, partial combats, if prudently sustained and initiated, are still in his power and without danger. To this end, all necessary movements and dispositions should be made beforehand, so as to prevent his troops from being seized by any kind of embarrassment, and to maintain their march in as easy and light a manner as possible. He will strengthen his rear-guard with a sufficient body of artillery, without encumbering the same. The artil- lery should be well servod, perfect in its material, and ought to contain several pieces of heavy calibre. This artillery, if divided into two or three sections, in echelon, will march with facility, and be well prepared for any successive and instantaneous stands for resistance that may be requisite. The enemy will thus be forced to stop and make his dis- positions before the attack takes place, and at the moment his disposi- tions aro finished the movement is once more begun, and we disappear. Then the enemy advances again, but is held at bay by the fire of the artillery, which soon will show its superiority over his — beoauso the one, in pursuing, extends his columns, while the other party, by retiring, is constantly withdrawing from the battle-field and approaching the re- serves. And, from this time, a like constant change will take place in the respective forces thus coming into contact. On the 25th of February, 1814, I executed a movement of this kind very successfully. I operated upon the left bank of the Aube, and my corps was composed of about six thousand men of all arms. The Prus- sian army, commanded by Marshal Blucher, and forty-five thousand strong, passed that river at Plancy, and marched against me. I took position upon the heights of Vindé, in rear of Sezanne. The appear- ances were such that I imparted to the hostile general the belief of being resolved to engage him. He made complete dispositions to attack and surround me, and massed a battery of thirty guns. The moment came ; all my troops gave way with order, unity, and celerity, and the enemy began to pursue ; but during the march, which continued all day, circumstances conspired in keeping him always at a distance, and he was obliged- to stop his march frequently, in order to reassemble his forces whenever they became too pressing. I arrived at Ferté-Gaucher, while continually exchanging cannon-balls, and took position in rear of Morin. I had only lost those struck by the enemy's balls, and neither a single living man nor one piece of cannon had been left behind. On the day succeeding the Battle of Brienne I was charged by Na- poleon to retire upon Voire, and to take, at first, a position at Perthe, to attract the attention of the enemy the longest time possible, thus making a diversion in favor of the main body of the troops, who were retiring upon the Aube by the bridge of Lesmont. After parading my MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 183 forces during the day, and proparing my retreat to make it with surety, I executed it, without any loss, under the cannon of the enemy. I passed the defile of Rosnai, without disorder and as if upon drill, before me the army of the enemy, which almost entirely had been directed upon me ; it was unable to clear the Voire, the passage of which it had several times attempted in vain. If the retiring army is of sufficient force to measure itself with the enemy, the dispositions will be analogous. Its security rests then in the manner of disposing the echelons; the end, however, is always the application of the fundamental principle already established — that is, to be always more numerous than the enemy at the moment of the en- gagement upon the battle-field. The best disposition to be made in a similar combination, is as fol- lows : To set out with the army at an early hour, leaving a strong rear- guard, which marches as late as possible, without, however, compro- mising itself, and to take a position upon a defensive ground at such a distance that the enemy could not arrive there before three hours of sunset. Whatever his ardor to engage, there is no time to make the requisite preparatory dispositions ; and if he ventures upon an attack without having completed them he ought to be crushed, because the encamped army has all of its forces assembled, while he necessarily can only dispose of a part of his own. It was thus when the Army of Portugal retired, in 1812, very inferior to the English, within sight of the latter, from the banks of the Tonnes, to take a position upon the Duero, the enemy making no effort at any time to pursue it. In 1796, when General Moreau evacuated Bavaria to retire upon the Rhine, and was followed by the Austrian army, he reduced the above theory to practice; and when, finally, too heavily pressed, and march- ing perfectly concentrated, he made a halt, gave battle, and came off victorious. But if an army upon retreat, and even a simple rear-guard, finds upon its route an impregnable position, which the enemy can only seize by turning at a distance, it should always remain in occupation of the same as long as it can be done without danger. If the enemy manœuvres to cause its evacuation, the operations of the campaign will thereby be delayed, and time is everything to him who defends himself. If the enemy, In his impatience, attacks with some degree of ardor, and rushes upon obstacles of some extent, an easy victory will be achieved, sometimes exceedingly murderous for the enemy, and sus- ceptible of changing the respective mor^il state of both armies in favor of the defenders. This happened in Portugal on the 27th of September, 1810. The English army, inferior to the French, occupied a post on the 26th, 184 THE SPIRIT OF upon the mountain of Busaco, a counterfort of the Sierra d'Accoba. The right of the position being impregnable, barred the road, while the left, supported by higher mountains, was of easy access. Masséna, to whom the emperor had recommended to profit by his superiority, and to force the enemy to receive battle, resolved to attack him at once, and, unhappily, without having before sufficiently reconnoitred the entire front of his position. After unheard-of efforts the corps of General Reignier succeeded in scaling the mountain under the enemy's fire ; but having arrived upon the plateau, and finding the entire Eng- lish army in lino of battle, it was easily overthrown, and in a few minutes lost the ground which it had cost a painful and brave struggle of one hour to gain. Six thousand men were disabled. The next day, at the sight of the French army operating against its right, the English army disappeared. The result of this unfortunate combat changed the morale of the two armies ; it diminished, on our part, that blind confi- dence which is so necessary to success, and enhanced that of the enemy. Had this event not taken place, an attack upon the lines of Lisbon would, most probably, have been attempted, and had it suc- ceeded, the Peninsular war would have been terminated. NOTE. Marshal Massena, Prince of Essling.— Originally a private soldier, he advanced gradually, between August, 1775, to September, 1784, through the vari- ous ranks of corporal, sergeant, fourrier, and adjutant sous-officer. In 1789 he re- ceived leave of absence; but we find him rejoining the army in 1791, and obtain- ing the command of a battalion in 1792. In the autumn of the following year he was made a general of brigade, and in the winter a general of division. Ho made all the campaigns of the Revolution with the Armies of the Alps, Italy, the Rhine, and Helvetia. In 1799 he was commander-in-chief of the Army of the Danube. Everywhere so much success attended his operations, that he acquired the appel- lation of * L'Enfant gâté de la Victoire." On the assumption by Napoleon of the imperial crown, Masséna was made a marshal. The years 1805 and 1806 saw him commanding armies in Italy, and in 1809 he was at the head of the corps of ob- servation on the Rhine. The failure of Soult, Victor, Ney, etc., induced Napoleon to send Masséna into Portugal, but it was only to sustain defeat at Busaco and Fu- entes d'Onore, and to be compelled to retire from before the formidable lines of Torres-Vedras. Upon his retroat he lost some forty thousand men. Returning to France, he was made Governor of Toulon in 1813, chief-commandant of the eighth military division, and governor. In July, 1815, he was Governor of Paris, and died April 4, 1817. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 185 CHAPTER IX. NIGHT ATTACKS AND SURPRISES. A surprise a good fortune — Good troops never meet with surprises, and only under- take them — Night attacks — Opportunities — Few troops to be employed — Disorder- in tho enemy's ranks — Certain success against indifferently disciplined troops—' Necessity of very precise instructions — Examples : Austrian army at Hochkirch — Affair at Etoges in 1814; surprise of Ouroussow's corps — Chevert at Prague — Prince Eugene of Savoy at Cremona — Details — Presence of mind of French sol- dier — Attempt of the English against Berg-op-Zoom ; fine defence of General Bizanet — General Laudon at Glatz — Enterprise against the T of Mantua — Colo- nel Dufour at the Fort of Bard — M. de Sénarmont. Notes. — 1. The Battle of Hochkirch. 2. Celebrated turning manoeuvre of Fred- eric after the battle. A theory treating of surprises can not be established. It should bo an impossibility to execute surprises in the daytime, and it would al- ways be so if every chief and every soldier did unceasingly perform the duties of his profession with exactness and intelligence ; but some- times things happen differently. Still, whenever we succeed, and tho enemy can be surprised, we must look upon it as a fortunate occurrence, from which too much profit can not be derived, since there is no oper- ation in war promising a more prompt and easy consummation. Troops which are in the required order of formation for such an en- terprise, and who know that they are about to be engaged — who are, fur- thermore, imbued with a consciousness of their strength and a feeling of confidence — such troops, attacking a surprised enemy, can not be re- sisted by anything; they have all the advantages on their side, and have a right to consider the victory as already secured. Only very good troops, animated with an excellent spirit, and com- manded by a skilful general who takes his resolutions promptly, may sometimes escape a catastrophe, when placed in like circumstances. But it is also true that similar troops and a general of that kind will never conduct themselves so as to be placed in such a condition. It is entirely different with night attacks,- there can be no surprise, in the common acceptation of the term; in that case it is a mere unfore- seen, impetuous attack, and ignorance of the true dispositions of the enemy, owing to the fact of our inability to reconnoitre the presence of the enemy during the night-time, except at a very short distance, whenever armies are very near each other. Only in case of very great proximity I believe such an enterprise to be possible; because, otherwise' it would be necessary to march a long distance before the attack can take place, and then the different col- umns, at the moment of action, would most likely be unable to act with any degree of harmony between them. 16* 9 186 THE SPIRIT OF I repeat, then, that such actions can only happen when two armies have approached very close to each other; then, bodies of medium strength alone should at first be employed; they should attack simulta- neously upon several points, and seek, above all, to create disorder in the ranks of the enemy. If they succeed in this, the effects of a victory are obtained without any great sacrifices, and we are enabled to profit from it in proportion as the condition of affairs would thereafter per- mit us to do. Against mediocre and indifferently disciplined troops such actions will especially be advantageous. If such troops, in the midst of the uncertainty of a real attack, arc moved forward, confusion soon spreads among them, and sometimes it will even happen that the different col- umns mistake and combat each other, entirely to the profit of the as- sailants, who will be merespectators of the scene ; while he who attacks, on the contrary, employing but part of his troops, after having given to them precise instructions as to the sphere in which they will be re- quired to operate, and having made them acquainted with the position and direction of the other columns, will be much less apt to fall into like fatal errors. More than once the columns of the same army, oper- ating during the night, have each mistaken the other for the enemy, and much damage has been done*. If a simple accident can lead to such actions, it is easily understood how possible it is to originate them ; they will then be much more serious, since the presence of the enemy is a reality, and he can make himself felt in a direct manner. It is, therefore, well, should circumstances be very favorable, sometimes to attempt night attacks ; at first to employ but a limited number of troops, who, by seeking to become masters of several important points, and to keep near enough to overwhelm the en/smy in force at break of day, can derive the greatest advantage from such operations. The most striking example of a night attack of this kind may be found in the enterprise of the Austrian army against the Prussians at Hochkirch, during the night of the thirteenth of October, 1758. Both armies were in close proximity. Marshal Daun planned the attack with skill, and General Laudon executed it with great vigor. It was favor- ed by the blind confidence of Frederic the Great, who failed to perceive the dangers which menaced him. A spirited attack, executed with sev- eral columns, made the Austrians masters of the great battery in the Prussian camp. The battle lasted with great energy until ten o'clock in the morning, when the Prussian army was forced to a retreat, which * As a testimony, see the rash action of the Austrian army at Karausebes, in 1789. under Joseph I. The different columns mistaking each other for the enemy, at night fired upon each other, and more than six thousand men were disabled. — Note of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 187 it executed with order and without being pursued, after having lost nearly its whole artillery. The excellent character of the Prussian troops and the prestige of the name of the great captain who had been 'con- quered, alone saved the army 1 , 2 . But if circumstances permitting an undertaking of this nature do but rarely occur, and if the execution of the attack requires great delicacy and much meditation, yet there are other circumstances in which a com- mander should manifest no hesitation, and where, without running any risk in case of failure, success will be attended with the greatest results. If troops who are beaten, and upon the retreat, inconsiderately take a position in the evening too near the pursuing enemy, and are unpro- tected by any material obstacles, the circumstances are exceedingly fa- vorable; then a night attack, executed with but few troops, but led with vigor and intelligence, will always be eminently proper. In the evening of the Battle of Vauchamps I had the fortune to ap- ply this principle with much success. On the lith of February, 1814, after the rash morning's action of Vauchamps, which cost four thousand prisoners to the Prussian army, the enemy commenced his retreat; my corps pursued him with much ardor, and I succeeded in surrounding his rear-guard, composed of a Russian division, with my cavalry, augmented by a reserve of the same arm which Napoleon had placed under my disposition. This Russian infantry bravely resisted the charges directed upon it, and continued to march. When arrived at Etoges, upon the approach of night, and under shelter of the woods which it had crossed, the Russian infantry arrested its march and made preparations for encamping for the night. I had received an order from Napoleon to halt at Champ-Au- bert and take position there ; but being perfectly acquainted with the place, having left there only the preceding day, and knowing that the position of Etoges was as bad for the enemy as it was favorable to us, and foreseeing that, on the day following, I would most likely be charged with covering the emperor's movement to gain the vicinity of the corps manoeuvring in the basin of the Seine, I considered it of urgency to attempt a sudden assault upon the Russian infantry, and not to wait until they had evacuated the Village of Etoges. I concen- trated eight hundred infantry and formed in columns upon the main-road, placing only fifty men upon the right and loft into the woods, at a distance of one hundred paces, to guard the flanks, and myself marching with them. I moved forward with the strictest silence, prohibiting the men from firing a single shot, but charging them to fall upon the enemy as soon as they should come sufficiently within his presence. The distance from Champ-Aubert to Etoges is about two 188 THE SPIRiT OF miles. In half an hour we had reached the enemy's outposts. The Russian troops, occupied with their camping operations, were scattered about, and only the grand-guards and posts of observation were under arms. With a bayonet-charge we drove everything before us, and threw ourselves upon the village; and in one moment, after having re- ceived scarcely five hundred shots, the entire infantry and artillery, consisting of about four thousand men, were in our power, with Prince Ouroussow, the commanding officer. After a decided reverse and a precipitate retreat, no matter how or- derly the latter is executed, we must then be sufficiently distant from the enemy on the evening of the engagement to be beyond his reach ; and after an undoubted success we must never hesitate to make a sud- den attack during the night upon a beaten enemy, who imprudently has placed himself within reach of the blows of his victor. I come now to surprises, whose object is to seize a fortified place. Enterprises of this kind have been undertaken several times; some have succeeded, others have failed ; and although it is a difficult matter to recognize in any precise manner the circumstances influencing the issue of such undertakings, they may still somewhat be indicated by seeking to discover the conditions upon which success depends. When such operations can be executed, hesitation should never influ- ence their trial, since their success will oftentimes suddenly change both the system and the character of a war, and secure advantages much greater than those resulting from a gained battle. Commonly, operations are carried on by means of intelligence estab- lished with the inhabitants. Sometimes money is a sufficiently strong inducement to seduce them; but when religious or political passions are exercising their influence, the chance of encountering individuals whose character passes for honorable, and who are disposed to serve us, is pretty often presented. There are likewise enterprises solely exe- cuted by the application of ruse, audacity, and courage, which are suc- cessful, and whose project is based upon the known weakness of a garrison, or some negligence which has crept into the service. Among the number of the last-mentioned I recall the surprise of Prague by the French army in 1741, which rendered the name of Chevert celebrated, and the taking of Tort Mahon in 1756. The fundamental principle for success in a surprise, be it favored or not by any one within the place, is to become promptly master of one of the issues leading to the open country. The number of troops, introduced either by stealth or escalade, must always be very limited; and it can never increase as rapidly as the troops uniting for the de- fence within, nor promptly enough to become formidable to the garrison placed on the defensive ; the principal object must then be to send MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 189 powerful succor with the least possible delay. If this is not done, and the garrison, together with their commander, do not lose their heads, the most hardy enterprises of this kind will always fail. But it is an important matter to consider that, with even the most favorable elements, failure is yet possible, should the garrison thus sur- prised be animated by an excellent spirit, and if the soldiers are en- dowed with great energy, which prevents them from thinking, at the first moment, of the disproportion of their forces and their immediate danger, and which would lead them to think of defending themselves rather than to seek safety in retreat. In that case every soldier fights where he happens to be ; the smallest squads, however feeble, band to- gether and defend themselves from behind the door of a house, at the corner of a street, or under the shelter of a wagon, etc. The enemy's combinations are suddenly deranged, and the march of the first troops is checked; it is the first step toward securing the safety of the place. New chances thereafter are presented with every minute ; other troops form in the same manner as the preceding, and the garrison is soon ral- lied and placed beyond any danger, through the power of that moral action which foresees, unites, and, acting by combined movements, comes off victoriously from a strife which at first appeared to be fraught with its destruction. In like circumstances, the first soldiers who find themselves thus con- fronted by the enemy should have but one thought — that of the safety of all, and of the glory which always accompanies some great act of devotion. This sentiment has never been more forcibly illustrated, or has been executed with greater success, than during the surprise of Cremona, on the 1st of February, 1702. The character of the French soldier has never been shown in a more glorious manner ; it stands alone in history, and is the greatest exhibition of what courage and valor are able to achieve. Cremona was occupied by the head-quarters of the army and a garrison of eight thousand men. The great extent of the place, the negligent manner with which the interior service was performed, and the security reigning everywhere within its enclosure, as well as the habitual neglect of military duties, wore remarked by Prince Eugene of Savoy, and gave origin to the plan of seizing tho place by surprise and of making the garrison prisoners. The discovery of an ancient aque- duct, long since abandoned, furthermore favored the enterprise. A priest was gained over, who, with soveral other inhabitants, made prep- arations to favor the undertaking. Four hundred grenadiers were In- troduced in disguise and remained concealed in a church, and some other troops penetrated through tho aqueduct. A walled door was de- molished during tho night; six thousand picked troops, at the head of whom was Princo Eugene himself, the first general of that epoch, ap- 190 THF. SPIRIT OF parently took possession of the city ; finally, the enemy arrived upon the place d'armes, the principal square of the town, and occupied the principal communications before any alarm had startled the garrison. But at the cry " The enemy is in the town !" every one woke up and rushed to arms, and small engagements were at once commenced at all points. Marshal Villeroi was taken a prisoner ; all the generals except two were either killed, wounded, or captured, and the management of the defence was entirely left to the instinct of the soldiers. Voices, appearing almost providential, made themselves heard, indicating the movements and combinations through which the garrison could alone be saved ; and these troops, surprised in their beds, undressed, and without any officers to lead them, who were vainly endeavoring to join their men, fought with the greatest fury in the midst of this chaos for twelve hours, with- out either taking food or drink, and in the very middle of winter, devoid of any clothing. They finally drove the enemy who had at first attack- ed them from the town, after having placed them in imminent danger of being captured. And thus this enemy, commanded by an illustrious captain, was entirely mistaken in its calculations, which was that they would encounter only a battalion going to its daily drill, and in the ex- pectation of a reinforcement of four thousand men whose sole duty it was to prevent the flight and escape of the garrison. Nothing more sublime can be conceived. If, under such grievous and extraordinary circumstances, a garrison knew how to find safety iu its own energy, we may easily judge of what must happen if a garrison does not abandon its trust at the first sight of danger, and endeavors to resist a feeble detachment which has penetrated by means of a surprise; and when the disproportion of numbers is so great between the attack- ing and defending forces, the mere resistance for one hour will decide the event, since it dispels the eflects of being taken unawares, always so powerful ; then we arrive within the precincts of reality, a thousand times less formidable, whatever degree of danger it may be fraught with, than those which imagination suggests. In our days an event like the one I have just related has made our arms illustrious. It is not generally known, but it is well to recall it to memory, and to transmit the circumstancos to posterity. When, in 1814, the scenes of war were removed from the banks of the Rhine, and Holland evacuated, it became at once hostile to France. English troops, under command of General Graham, were soon disem- barked there, in order to sustain the public spirit, and to give some de- gree of consistency to the approaching revolution. General Molitor) when evacuating Hollaud, left garrisons in the most important fortresses; but the state of our armies then did not pormit the assignment of many troops to this, object, and most likely but de- pot-battalions were employed for it. The garrison of Bcrg-op-Zoom, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 191 in view of the importance and the extent of that place, was brought up to four thousand men. The conscripts, not coming from ancient France, having deserted, it was reduced to at least three thousand men, and with this weak body alone the brilliant deed of arms which I am about to relate was accomplished — an action as glorious to that hand- ful of brave men as to General Bizanet, their commanding officer, at- tended as it was with the wisest and most far-seeing measures of the latter, succeeded b}' still more energetic ones when the moment of ac- tion had come. This case differed from the surprise of Cremona, where the successful issue had solely been brought about by the obstinate courage of the soldiers. At Berg-op-Zoom the soldiers showed them- selves eminently brave as well as resolute and energetic; still it was especially through their submission to the laws of discipline, and their ready obedience to the voico of their chief, that they triumphed over the enemy. The iusufficienc}' of the garrison had determined General Bizanet to concentrate all of his troops in tho city, and to evacuate the interior works, among which his small force almost disappeared. He remedied the difficulties resulting from this measure by increased surveillance and a large number of patroles, in doubling his interior posts, and es- tablishing numerous night-piquets, ready at any time to spring to arms. General Graham, who commanded the English in Holland, and who was at a short distance from Berg-op-Zoom, informed of the small num- ber of defenders within the fortress, believed he would be able to seize it!by a coup-de-main. He counted, likewise, upon the concours of the inhabitants, having means of receiving intelligence from within the place. He devoted to this enterprise four thousand eight hundred men, and choso for its execution the night of the 8th of March, tho anniversary of the birth of the Prince of Orange. Tho assailant divided his troops into four columns, destined to make four simultaneous attacks; the two first were to escalade the rampart, one to effect an entrance between the gate of Anvers and the seaport, and the other between the gates of Anvers and Breda; the third column was to show itself in front of the gate of Strenbcrg, in order to make a false attack; lastly, the fourth column was to effect an entrance be- tween the city and tho port by profiting from the low water. At ten o'clock at night the third column surprised the outpost noar the Strenberg gate, but was arrested in a complete manner by the fire of the troops stationed within a stockade of circular palisades which had been erected tor the defence of tho fixed bridge. The garrison at once rushed to arms. At the .same time the fourth column entered between tho port without being perceived by the guard-boat, and penetrated into the city. But 192 THE SPIRIT OF some troops being sent against it, tho column wa6 divided — one portion being held in check and arrested, and the other penetrating through the rampart, where it was pursued. The second column had been successful in its escalade, and was marching upon the Anvers gate to open it to General Graham, who was waiting upon the glacis with the remainder of his troops and his caval- ry. But a strong support of piquets being sent in great haste by Gen- eral Bizanet to the Anvers gate, it succeeded in preventing the English from seizing it, and tho first column having been repulsed in its esca- lade, was driven away with great loss. These different engagements, in all directions, occupied nearly the whole night. At the first dawn of day General Bizanet made an attack with the remainder of his troops, and drove the enemy through the sea-gate and overthrew him. Unable to make a retreat, and torn by the canister-shot of the exterior works, the English columns were thus obliged to lay down their arms, with a loss of twelve hundred dead and six hundred wounded, among whom were two general officers, and two thousand one hundred and seventy-five prisoners, including one general and four colonels, four thousand small-arms, four flags, and a large amount of ammunition, etc. General Graham solicited an armistice of three days to inter his dead, remove the wounded, and receive the paroled prisoners. Any comment, after the mere recital of such an action, is unnec- essary. We see from this that French blood has been glorious during all epochs ; our customs bestowing extraordinary importance upon the ac- quirement of military glory, and a proper acknowledgment of the value of the sacrifice of life (a sacrifice which is only adequately com- pensated when a nation knows how to appreciate the same), has greatly contributed in France to develop the virtue of devotion to the coun- try, the only safeguard for the preservation and the power of nations. The spirit of the army will not change, if only our appreciation of its virtues remain as it is ; and may Providence, for the destiny of the country, decree that it be thus ; and that those unfeeling minds, who see social happiness in nothing but material prosperity, and whose fa- tal aberrations show a total unacquaintance with the knowledge of the human heart, may never exercise a power and influence in the councils of the country which, if followed, could not but prove disastrous. ■ I endeavor in vain to seek for an instance, in my memory, where French troops have been successfully surprised ; but there are many to be cited among foreign troops. Two of them happened with the Prus- sians in the Seven Years' War: at Glatz in 1760, and at Schwoidnitz in 1761. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 193 Genoral Laudon had for some time been in correspondence with several officers, garrisoned within the fortress of Glatz, by means of monks who were within the city. The Austrians had scarcely arrived before the place when they opened trenches, and, informed of the time when the officers in their favor would be on guard in the advanced fort, named De»la Grue— a fort hewn in rock, and apparently impregnable— they directed a lively attack upon that point; the besieged fled, and the Austrians pursuing with vigor, both parties entered the fortress pell- mell. The troops within reach following the example of those that had preceded them, the Austrians made themselves masters of the place without having experienced the least resistance. In the case of the fortress of Schweidnitz, the surprise happened in the following man- ner : Five hundred prisoners of war were held in its precincts, and among them an Italian major named Iloca, a partisan officer. 'This officer acquired the good-will of the commandant, and obtained permis- sion to walk at liberty within the fortress. He soon obtained a knowl- ' edge of the position of the different posts and the details of the service. Intriguing in the city, he managed to corrupt those who might be of service to him. Upon his reports General Laudon conceived the pro- joct of surprising the place, which was executed on the night of the 30th of September. He distributed twenty battalions for four attacks. The commandant of Schweidnitz, was at a ball; but on account of several alarming indications he had ordered the garrison under arms, without, however, taking the precaution of sending some person outside of the fortress" to ascertain whether the enemy was approaching— so that the Austrians advanced as far as the palisades without having been per- ceived, and surprised the Stricgauet gate; in the confusion, the prison- ers of war, having laid aside their masks, seized the interior gate, and in less than an hour the city was taken and the garrison made prisoners of war. I will mention, in addition, two surprises which were attempted in our own times, but which failed solely on account of their faulty exe- cution. In 1796, when the French were placed in position to besiege Mantua, it was considered as possible and very opportune to carry, in the very first night, the T work by surprise. This unlined work protects a long curtain separated from the body of the place, which is only flanked by two heavy towers; it made, therefore, at that time, and did so until the construction of the Fort of Pictoli, which was built by us, the best part x)f the defence of Mantua from that side. The garrison was considered to be weak and exhausted by illness ; three hundred soldiers had been clad in the uniform of one of the regiments in garrison at the place, and placed under the orders of an Italian officer, a deserter from the Aus- trian army, serving in our rank? ; he was to feign a defence of the island 194 THE SPIRIT OF upon which the fort is situated, and to appear as being heavily pressed by French troops ; to throw himself upon the barrier of the covered way, as if soeking shelter,- to have it opened to hira, and thus to secure fend seize the entrance to the fort. But the officer of whom I have just spoken, not caring to fall into the hands of the Austrians and be hanged, was too timorous in the execution of his rôle, while Marat, who com- manded the troops who were to support him, was too slow and circum- spect. The troops of the garrison, whose vigilance was excited by rea- son of so much slowness, were not to be duped by any such farce, which £ould only have succeeded by means of great activity and extraordinary swiftness. The second is the enterprise against the Fort of Bard in 1800. Its garrison consisted of barely one hundred and fifty men ; the assault would infallibly have succeeded had it been conducted with the least dogree of discernment. Colonel Dufour, a brave soldier, but wholly • devoid of intelligence and incapable of reflection, was charged with the command of the column which was to carry the gate. Instead of ap- proaching in silence, and placing his ladders against the wall noiseless- ly, which he would have been able to scale in an instant, he ordered, like an insane man, the beating of the charge when debouching from the village. The garrison, thus advised of its danger, placed itself in a position for defence. Dufour received a ball in the breast, and the at- tack was repulsed with a considerable loss of men. This check made that hardy and unexampled enterprise necessary — to conduct the artil- lery by hand, under the walls of that same fort, in the night time, de- spite the enemy's fire, and thus to clear the defile.* NOTES. .1. Battle of Hochkirch, fought on the 14th of October, 1758, between the Prussians under Frederic II and the AustrianB under Fiold-Mar6hal Daun. Strength of armies : Prussians — 51 battalion b, 29,000 men; 108 squadrons, 13,000 —total, 42,000 men. Austrians— 116 battalions, 69,000 men; 128 squadrons, 15,000 men ; light-horse, 6,000— total, 90,000 men. Loss of Prussians : 246 officers, 3,851 men, 101 cannon, 30 colors. Losb of Austrians: 325 officers, 5,614 men, according to their own statements. King Frederic, misled through inaccurate reports, was under the impression * I am entitled to claim for myself the merit, conception, and execution of this audacious enterprise, of which I directed all details personally. The First Consul was only concerned in it as far as he authorized its execution; but justice requires of mo to aasociate with it the name of my chief of staff, then Lieutenant-Colonel De Sénarmont, an officer of great merit and bravery, who after- ward rose to be lieutenant-general, and was killed in front of Cadiz. His assist- ance contributed powerfully to its success. This officer was one of the beat known in the artillery service, in which his fethor before him h«d ilroady bfon distin- guished— A T otc of Author MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. I9n that Field-Marshal Daun was under full retreat into Bohemia. He immediately resolved to follow him with the hulk of his forces, and left Bautzen on the 10th of October for Hochkirch, a little village some seven miles to the east of the former town, and some throe miles to the south of the main branch of the great military high-road from Saxony into Silesia. But his army had no sooner reached the defile of Jenkwitz when it was met hy the advanced light troops of Laudon's corps. Soon there was no doubt that the Austrians were assembled in force in his front; and Frederic, repulsing the enemy toward Hochkirch, secured that strong position, leaning his right upon it, and resolving to attack the enemy without delay, despite thn objections of several of his generals. At the same time orders were despatched to General Rctzow, who held the left Of the Prussian position, to occupy an elevation called the Stromberg, a point of the utmost importance, controlling, as it did, the entire field of battle. This General Retzow neglected to do before the Austrians ; and to this failure the disas- trous issue of the battle must mainly be ascribed. The attack was to have taken place on the part of the Prussians ; but when Retzow had failed to secure the key of the field, and it had been promptly seized by the Austrians, Frederic was eminently conscious of the danger of his position, and he replied to Marshal Keith's remark : " If Dauu leaves us in this camp, he ought to be hanged," laughingly : " It is then to be hoped that he is more afraid oi us than of the rope ; " but he resolved, as soon as the provisions should arrive from 8axony, to take a different position, and to turn the right flank of the Austrians by anight movement, in order to menace their line of advance into Silesia. For this enterprise the night of the 14th of October had been fixed. The result of a whole campaign, and the lives of ten thousand brave men, hung thus, as the sequel demonstrated, upon the difference of one day. While Frederic was thus lying in fancied security, almost within cannon-shot oi the rapids-accumulating an i threatening masses of his adversary, Marshal Daun had meditated and was resolved upon a brilliant manœuvre, destined to crush the Prussian hero. For the first time in the Austrian general's career against tho great king, he had resolved to attack him. The movement was to be executed by the Austrian left, against the strongest position of the Prussians, the wood-encircled and fortified Tillage of Hochkirch. during the night of the loth of October. At five o'clock in the morning of the 14th the dispositions for the complete turning of the Prussian right wero to have been completed, and a strong attack with overwhelming forces was there to be made. A feint attack was to be executed upon tho centre, while tho Austrian right was to retain its strong position, and onlj' advance to the attack when the complete suc- cess upon the Prussian right at Hochkirch was secured. Unfortunately for the Prussians, the great turning manœuvre of tho Austrians was a complote success. Despite the rigor of tho climate in those latitudes at that season, the deuse fog which had settled over tho whole country, and the immense difficulties of marching through pathless woods under such circum- stances, this march was splendidly executed, and reflects the highest credit upon the Austrian arms. To completely deceive the Prussians, during the 13th of Octo- ber, and continuing during the night, largo bodies of troops were assiduously felling trees and constructing abattra iu front of the Prussian position, persistently challenging each other, and keeping up a great noise, as if from that quarter the main danger to the Austrians threatened. In front of Hochkirch WU then a little birch wood, before which the dark masses of tho Austrians had assembled within musket-range of the Prussiau 19G THE SPTRIT OP advanced posts, at four o'clock on the cold, foggy morning of the 14th of October. So great was the security of the Prussians that the infantry lay, undressed, in slumber within their tents, and even the cavalry, save a few regiments, among which that of Ziethen, had unsaddled their horses. "When the village-clock ol Hochkirch struck five o'clock, the Prussian free-battal- ions, which held the birch wood, were attacked by the infantry of one of Daun'a divisions and the Pandours of Laudon's corps, and, after a 6hort struggle, thrown back upon the three battalions of the extreme Prussian right, which hastened to the succor of the retreating advanced guard. Formed with the alacrity of veter- ans, they opposed to the Austrians an impenetrable front, and had already driven them beyond the birch wood, when they were suddenly assailed in rear by Croats and infantry who had penetrated to their abandoned camps. Still they continued the struggle, but were at last compelled to cut their way through the rapidly- augmenting masses in their rear, and to retreat to the village, behind the shelter of a battery of eighteen heavy 12-pounders. Simultaneously with this attack, Laudon had *epulsed the Prussian videttes of the right flank, and General Ziethen was compelled to withdraw behind Hochkirch likewise. Quickly taking advantage of his easy success, Laudon established a battery of eight guns upon the heights of Meschwitz, from which tho whole camps of the right wing were at his mercy. Now thoroughly alive to the dangers of the situation, the entire Prussian lines were under arms, and three fresh battalions of the second line advanced to the succor of the troops who had been driven from the wood of birches, where, after having re- taken it, they were a second time forced to give way to overwhelming numbers. Upon this success Daun advanced his whole line and took the heavy Prussian bat- tery in front of Hochkirch, throwing the Prussians entirely into the village, and occupying the whole ground in front and flank, with the exception of a few gardens and the church-yard — the latter defended valiantly by the battalion of Major Lange. It was now half-past five o'clock. Marshal Keith and General Ziethen made several fruitless attempts to retake the heavy battery, with invincible resolution. The former, who so long had illustrated the Prussian arms, here fell, and Ziethen was disastrously driven back to Hoch- kirch. The village itself now became the theatre of one of the most bloody episodes of modern times. Up to this time Frederic had never doubted that the demonstration of the Austrians was but a feint. But now he ordered heavy reinforcements for the possession of Hochkirch. Prince Francis of Brunswick and Prince Maurice of Dessau led their troops against the hosts of the enemy. The former, while endeav- oring to retake the great battery, was violently assailed in both flanks; his troops, after a stout resistance, were overpowered, and, after the fall of their heroic com- mander, retreated in utter disorder behind the village. Hochkirch was in flames, and the Prussians were rapidly giving way. But another band of heroes, under Prince Maurice, issued from the disorder, and, driving the Austrians beyond the vil- lage, retook the birch wood ; and, had he received reinforcements, he would have held himself thero. He was at last obliged to give way, ami with the utmost difficulty he effected his retreat. Amid all the storm raging around him, Major Lange, with his weak battalion, had maintained his important position within the enclosures of the church-yard of Hochkirch. The successive attacks of seven regiments he had withstood; but when Prince Maurice gave way the flood overpowered him also. His fate was a sad one. After prodigies of valor his bravo command was entirely de- stroyed, and this intrepid officer himself fell with the band of heroes ho had led MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 197 Zicthen, with his renowned horsemen, had meantime charged the Austrian cavalry repeatedly, but without effect, and was at last driven beyond HocVikirch with great loss. From the wreck of the Prussian right wing Prince Maurice of Dessau made a last attempt with four battalions to retake the ill-fated village, now burning furi- ously. After a severe contest the forlorn-hôpe gave way; the heroic prince fell dead, pierced by two nuïsket-balls. At this crisis the king placed himself in person before three regiments and one battalion of the guards. Incredible efforts they made to wrench the victory from the hands of the Austrians ; they even penetrated to the right of the village to the very spot where their right flank had sustained at first the conflict. Their attack might have succeeded had not, at the moment they charged, a repeated rear-attack thrown them into disorder. With this last attempt ended the efforts of the Prussians to regain the village, which henceforth remained in the enemy's possession. It was now after seven o'clock in the morning, and the heavy fog at last cleared away and revealed to the king the extent of the disaster. The plain to the right and rear of Hochkirch, toward the defile of Dresa, was dotted with the retreating and advancing columns, and shattered remains of both contending hosts in confu- sion. Both generals appear, at this moment, to have understood the situation alike. Frederic, now conscious of the great disaster which had befallen him, rapidly sent orders to establish a new line of battle to the rear of the former, and by an entire change of front, which brought the Prussian right wing nearer toward the high- mad to Bautzen. Marshal Daun, on his part, rapidly concentrating his scattered columns, endeavored to cut off the retreat of the Prussians upon Saxony, and had nigh succeeded when Major Moellendorf repulsed his columns with a hastily-col- lected body of infantry and artillery, and thus achieved the great glory of keeping open to the beaten but not discouraged Prussians their last and only line of retreat. Simultaneously with this attempt, General Colloredo was repulsed on the other flank while trying to turn the left of the new Prussian position, and under both trials the Prussian army finally and heroically formed their new line of battle, con- fidently awaiting the further attacks of the enemy. Marshal Daun contented himself, seeing the sang-froid and resolution of the Prussian right, to await the issue of the Duke of Ahremberg's attack upon the Prus- sian left, from which he expected to give the finishing stroke to the fortunes of his adversary. During the sanguinary struggle on the right, the Prussian general on the left had been permitted to remain unattacked, conformable to the orders of Daun. But when the successive reinforcements, drawn from the centre toward Hochkirch, threatened to weaken the line so as to endanger his safety, ho slowly retired, closely followed by the Austrian overwhelming forces, to the shelter of a heavy battery of thirty guns, yet intact. Finally, at the moment when Frederic was endeavoring to safely withdraw his right, the left was fiercely assailed by Ahrcmberg, who, with surprising rapidity, overthrew all the forces in his front, •charged, and took the great Prussian battery of the left, and made many prisoners. But this preciouH advantage was neither followed up by the duke nor by the mar- shal. The latter was satisfied with the honors of Hochkirch, and remained a peace- able spectator of the wise retreat of the king, which now took place from every portion of the field. General Retzow, who had neglected to seize the Stromberg. without the posses- sion of which Daun would never have thought himself strong enough to attack Fred- eric, was confronted by the Prince of Durlach, entirely cut off from the main body of 17* iy& THE SPIRIT OF the king's army, and in an extremely perilous position. If the Duke of Ah rem berg had failed t<* reap any fruits from a decisive repulse of the enemy, Prince Durlach failed still more deplorably against General Retzow. The latter eluded him perfect- ly, and, although making a detour to avoid the enemy's main body, a portion of his command arrived in time upon the field of battle to repulse a charge of the enemy'.* cavalry upon the flank of the Prussian main body. Retzow himself, with the re- mainder of his forces, joined later. With this skilful extrication from a dangerous position, if he did not atone for, he at least considerably softened, his previous failure. To cover his retrograde movement Frederic placed his cavalry in large intervals upon the plain; the baggage passed through the defile of Dresa; the infantry fol- lowed, and he took a new position upon the mamelons, called Spitzbergen, to the north of the battle-field, and half-way between Hochkirchand Bautzen — in fact, the same position which the Allie> .subsequently occupied after the Battle of Liitzen in 181:3. 2. Celebrated turning manœuvre of Frederic after the battle — Daun, after the decisive repulse of the king, took a new position in advance of Hochkirch, upon the line of the Spree, facing Saxony, hardly three miles from the king's new camp, and covering effectually the grand route into Silesia — contenting himself to watch the Prussians, and thus forgetting the important maxim in war, that the fruit of a victory depends upon the profit we draw therefrom — the most de- sirable talent of a general. The condition of Frederic after the battle would have been a disheartening one to any second-rate general, and would most probably have led to tho conclusion of the struggle ; but to the king it presented but new chances to improve his situation ; and, sustained by the fine spirit of his brave veterans, he resolved, by a grand de- tour, after having received reinforcements, to fall upon the rear of the Austrians. As soon aB he had gained his new camp the resolution was instantly taken and an- nounced in these words : "Daun lias permitted us to escape; the game is not lost; %vc loill repose a feio days, and then march upon Silesia to deliver JVeiss. The great route from Saxony to Silesia, shortly after issuing fiom Bautzen, divides into two branches, both running nearly due east. The northern branch, after ten miles, passes the Town of "Weisscnberg, and unites again with the southern branch at the Town of Reichenbach, distant from Bautzen fifteen miles; whence the road continues past Markersdorf, where Duroc fell in 1813 at the side of Napoleon, to the fortress of Gcerlitz, on the Neiss, at a distance of six miles. The Austrian camp covered both of these roads in advance of Weisscnberg, and was some fivo miles from Bautzen— Frederic's camp being an equal distance to the north of that town. From the Austrian camp the distance to Gcerlitz was about eighteen miles, or one good day's march. To the north of these roads the country is exceedingly hilly, and dotted with woods and small villages, traversed by little streams, effectually covering any move- ments, but, nevertheless, dangerous on account of the enemy's numerous light troops scouring the country, and which could only be executed upon miserable cross-roads, almost impassable in the rigorous season which had set in. The king'6 project was to transport the bulk of his stores and artillery, and to execute a rapid march through this difficult country, so as to gain Gcerlitz before the enemy. This point once reached, there appeared no further obstacle to his rapid advance for the deliver- ance of the Silesian fortress of Neiss, which, being besieged by the Austrian general, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 199 Harsch, with thirty thousand men, was' already believed to be near reduction. Neiss once delivered, lie was to return to Saxony upon rapid marches, for the succor of Dresden, only held by a small force. To deceive the Austrians the sick and wounded were transported north to Glogau. The munitions of war were sent, at first, directly north, but suddenly turning at Kumcrau to the right, disappeared in the intricacies of that difficult country. Both movements were well known to the Austrians, who now felt perfectly sure of the intention of the king to evacuate Saxony, and to retreat within his hereditary do- minions. On the 24th of October, at six in the evening, the trains and baggage, under Braun, were sent ofT, and after a march of six miles, directly north, parked at Neu- dorf. The infantry occupying the villages in«rfront and on the flanks, retired to camp at ten o'clock at night in the greatest silence, leaving the advanced guards of cavalry there stationed until next morning. At ten o'clock at night the tents were struck and the army began the march by lines and by the left. The vanguard marched to the north-east upon Dresa, passed the Little Spree, changed direction to the right, and marched all night upon Ullersdorf, fourteen miles from camp, a little Tillage whose left flank and front being protected by small watercourses and three lakes, formed an eligible position for defence. The first column, composed of the entire infantry, followed the same route; the second column passed Neudorf, upon a line to the rear of the infantry, and was there followed by Braun's convoy, arriving at the position of Jenkendorf, near Ullersdorf, on the 25th, at noon. Finally, the rear-guard, under Prince Henry, occupied the abandoned position all night, and fol- lowed the main body early in the morning. Nearly the entire Prussian army was concentrated, at break of day of the 25th of October, at Ullersdorf, some ten miles to the north of G œil it z. The Austrians were only aware of the kind's departure late at night on the 24th. when the king was yet some fifteen miles from Gœrlitz. The distance of their camp from that fortress, upon a splendid military high-road, was but eighteen miles, while Frederic had to execute a march nearly double that distance. Had Daun at once marched, it is probable that he would have gained possession of it before Frederic; but he contented himself to send General Caramelly to pursue the rear- guard, and only in the afternoon of the 25th he detached the grenadiers, the reserve, and two regiments of hussars from lieichenbach to observe the march of the Prus- sians. Lascy, who commanded this detachment, seeing Frederic encamped at Ullers- dorf, no longer was in doubt, and resolved in consequence to set out at night and occupy Gœrlitz and the heights of Landskrone, in advance of that town. Frederic, however, here again foiled the Austrians. Setting out at night, two o'clock, with the advance guard and the entire cavalry, he marched across the coun- try upon Ober-llengersdor'f, five miles from Gœrlitz, followed at three by the infan- try. At break of day he met the Austrians in his way, but overthrowing them, after a sharp combat, he gained the town. The consequences of this brilliant manœuvre were of the greatest importance. Although closely followed by the Austrians, he rapidly inarched into Silesia. The siege of Neiss was abandoned on the 5th of November, and on the 8th already we eee Frederic marching upon Saxony to deliver Dresden. Thus, in the middle of winter. Frederic had, in six Weeks, twice changed the direction of the war, delivered two places of the first rank, torn from a victorious army all the fruits of victory, and thrown it back upon its own frontiers. 200 THE SPIRIT OF CHAPTER X. DEFENCE OF FORTRESSES. Esesential conditions — Importance of the office of commander — Glories compared — Of true courage and the truly brave — Defence of Grave by Chamilly — Of Lille by Bouffi ers — Of Saint-Sébastien by Rey — Of Burgos by Dubreton — Of Wittenberg by Lapoype — Necessity of a legal inquiry in all cases of surrender — Sorties — Their opportuneness and aim — Surprises easy — Prague in 1741 — Rodrigo in 1812 — Badajoz, Saragossa, Genoa. Notes. — 1. A singular Polish Couucil of War. 2. Siege of Grave in 1674. The first element requisite for the successful resistance of a fortified place is a good commandant. If to this first and indispensable require- ment a sufficiently strong garrison and a large amount of stores of all kinds, such as provisions, munitions, etc., be added, the most extraor- dinary results may be obtained. The fortifications themselves may bo more or less perfect, but this always desirable perfection is a matter of little importance when com- pared with those results owing to the courage and the resolution of him who directs the defence. The commandant of a place is its very soul; it lives in him and through him. If, at the beginning of a siege, the garrison be a bad one, it will soon become a good one under a good commandant, who knows how to awaken its sentiments of honor, patriotism, and glory, which sometimes grow dull in the soldier's heart. It is an excellent thing to gain battles; the glory which falls upon the chief is dazzling; success calls forth every sentiment of enthu- siasm and admiration; but it is a still more excellent thing, more meritorious at least, to defend a place for a period exceeding certain supposed limits. The glory of a victorious battle, however brilliant it may be for the general, is necessarily always divided; that which the commandant of a fortress acquires belongs to him almost entirely. That glory is his OAvn work; it is the fruit, not of combined action accomplished under certain circumstances, but of a long series of uninterrupted, persever- ing efforts, renewed without cessation, with the same consciousness of their inutility, if succor does not arrive in good time; and the efforts of each succeeding day are not rewarded by the prospect of the pleas, ures of victory; they are, on the contrary, associated with the ever- present feeling of our relative weakness, and their only aim is to retard the success of, and not to triumph over, the enemy, without the least hope of changing the ultimate issue in any way. Every man of nerve has always sufficient courage and energy for the requirements of a period of twenty-four hours ; and if success attends the efforts every man appears to be a hero ! But how rare is it to find MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 201 tbe same courage, tenacity, and ardor in reverses ; the truly brave alone will then show these qualities, and their number can be easily counted. But the commandant of a besieged fortress is placed in a still more difficult position ; he must not alone, from the very beginning, pre- serve his moral courage — a virtue so seldom accorded to man by Prov- idence — but that same courage must grow within him in measure as circumstances become more difficult, and when it would be natural to suppose that it should sink — because his deportment must counter- balance the effect of the miseries and sufferings which he, with the gar- rison, will be obliged to endure. The commander alone appears to be interested in the defence, because he reaps the glory almost entirely, while those under his orders only endure the sufferings. Moreover, whenover a commandant is inclined to surrender, he will always find those who will come forward to applaud such an action, and officers ready to make him easy should his mind still entertain any scru- ples or doubts as to the propriety of his resolution; and whenever a commander is inclined to submit to the decision of a council "of war the question whether it be time or not to capitulate, the result will always be in the affirmative; and it even sometimes happens that there are persons who would not protest against the surrender, did they know that their opinion would be of any power in changing the deci- sion of the majority of the council. 1 Nothing appears more worthy of admiration than the defence of a place prolonged to the utmost limits, but there is, likewise, nothing which happens less frequently. Justice demands, then, that we should render the names of those immortal who have acquired glory of this kind. The most celebrated defence known to history, in modern wars, is that of Grave, 2 on theJMeuse, by Chamilly, in 1675; nothing can be compared to it. This city had received the depots of the army froua the time of the invasion of Holland by Louis XIV, and enclosed a large amount of stores. Its extent is of mean dimensions, and it was garrisoned by five thousand men, who defended themselves during five months of opened trenches against all the efforts of the Prince of Orange, whose loss amounted to thirty thousand men ; and Chamilly only surrendered upon the king's express order, carrying with him to France all of his ordnance.* * I have always had the ambition of being charged with the defence of a large fortress, having the innate consciousness that such a task would not have been beyond my capacity. Had there even been any occasion in my experience, I would have ordered the reprint of the journal of the Siege of Grave, bo that every officer, non-commiasioned officer, and soldier would have had an example before him, worthy to bo followed. Should the day ever coma when regiments are pro- vided with libraries, this work, of the greatest interest for the military man, should not fail to find a plarfl in it. — Note of Author. 202 THE SPIRJT OF After the last mentioned admirable defence, that of Lille and ita citadel must bo ranked next. Marshal Boufflers, who commanded there, acquired immortal glory by it. In our own days sieges have not been of frequent occurrence; still we can not pass that of Saint-Sébastien in silence, which was command- ed by General Rey — resulting in a long and obstinate defence, which caused to the English army very considerable losses. The defence of Burgos, under the orders of General Dubreton, who, though attacked by a less powerful force than he himself disposed of, •«till acquired some glory; and that of Wittenberg upon the Elbe, under General Lapoype, may likewise be mentioned. But in comparison with a few extraordinary instances of resistance, which we can not but admire, how many mediocre defences and culpa- ble, unpunished surrenders are there, which are looked upon by public opinion with a degree of indulgence entirely unmerited. The preservation of a fortified place is a matter of such capital importance, influencing, as it does, sometimes in the most powerful manner, the fate of an army or even of an entire country, that ita surrender should always be the occasion for a legal inquiry, in order to bring out, in all their clearness, the whole train of circumstances, of the defence which led to the capitulation. The commanding officer should then be either severely punished, or be rewarded and overwhelmed with praises; a different course of proceedings ought not to be admitted. The navy regulations prescribe the trial of every captain of a vessel who has lost his ship, no matter how the occurrence took placf. If he performed his duty, he is acquitted and honorably dismissed. Any indulgence in legislation in matters concerning the sea will be easily understood, because, upon an element a.s changing as the water, circumstances much more powerfully influencing' and conquering science, vigilance, and courage, may happen. But upon terra firma nothing varies ; unless the reduction be caused by the want of army stores of any kind, there can bo no legitimate excuse : we can but choose between either censure or praise. The military regulations upon this point mu3t be vigorously enforced, and if a commander surrenders before the en- ceinte has a practicable breach, and before he has sustained at least one assault, he has committed a crime, and should receive due punishment. I shall not enter into technical details as to the attack and defence of places; special works have treated of these matters sufficiently satis- factorily. I will be content with making some reflections upon the general direction to be followed in the defence. In the case of large fortresses, the custom is too prevalent of making sorties long before the commencement of the siege, and a portion of one's means, forces, and confidence is thereby expended, which to re- tain for the moment when courage and vigor are of the greatest neces- ?ity, W'uld bemufh more u^o f nl and important. By frying any distance MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 203 from the fortifications we lose thoir support, and voluntarily deprive ourselves of a succor which establishes some sort of equilibrium between tho troops of the garrison and the attacking force. I would, therefore, at any rate, at least have some hopes of raising tho siege by making a sortie with the larger portion of the garrison, and to remain sufficiently near to have the efficacious support of the cannon of the fortress. But if these sorties should be prohibited, those whose object it is to destroy works begun by the enemy can not be made too often : the prin- cipal aim being to arrest the enemy and to gain time, which can be at- tained by giving him frequent causes for alarm and in bringing about short and lively engagements, which will force him to recommence the same works several times. In measure as the enemy approaches the place and the siege is progressing, sorties, with but few troops and upon a restrained field of battle, should become more frequent. Finally, at the very time when the great proximity of the enemy puts so often the idea into the heads of commanders to surrender, the true defence should commonce : and it even appears to me that it ought never to be finished, if with every day new obstacles are prepared, if interior entrenchments were beforehand constructed, and such dispositions made that the be- sieged would never be completely deprived of the fire of his artillery, but would always retain some well-covered pieces of cannon for the de- fence of the breach. This precaution alone, which should be particu- larly considered and taken, may decide the safety of the place during several days, and add much to the glory of the defence. I will close this chapter with a remark by which commandants of besieged fortresses can not too much profit. They should particularly guard against surprises, because the more a thing appears improbable, the greater will be the effect when it happens. A brave garrison do- fends a breach, and the enemy will uot'be able to contend long against it; but if at the moment when all attention is directed upon the defence of an open point, the defenders hear that the enemy has effected an en- trance into the fortress by escalade at another point, then men's minds will be upset, tho defence of the breach will be abandoned, and the place is taken. The strictest surveillance of all points should, therefore, never be re- laxed, and those appearing in least danger of being attacked, because they arc considered impregnable, should be guarded most — since they are the very points which tho enemy will choose in preference, becauso it is evident that if these points appear to sustain themselves, it is not likely that any one will be charged with their defence. In 1741 the fortress of Prague was the object of very noisy night at- tacks upon two points on the part of the French army ; and while these demonstrations attracted the attention of the entire garrison < other troop» ,p er* ?iknt!y ftkectad upon a point of the c the 204 THE SPIRIT OF new city, some considerable distance from them; they scaled the wall with a single ladder, mounted the rampart, and, finding nobody defend- ing the place, the gate near was at once opened and the city, with its garrison, taken almost without any engagement. In our days, in 1S12, the garrison of Rodrigo bravely defended a practicable breach in the body of the place and repulsed the enemy; but fifty English soldiers scaled the castle with ladders, which commanded all other points, having a revetted scarp, and being very high; they created alarm within, disorder ensued, and they thus becamo masters of the town. The Town of Badajoz was besieged in the same year, and well garri- soned, commanded by a distinguished soldier, General Philippon, who already, the year preceding, had sustained a glorious siege. Entrench- ed around the breach, he repulsed the assaults of the enemy ; but the castle, the walls of which were eighty feet high, were scaled by fifty men, alarm and disorder spread through the town, and it was taken. Under no pretext should watchfulness ever bo relaxed. Means of re- sistance must be everywhere created; and even in those parts of the fortress which appear least exposed to an attack, especially at the com- mencement of a siege, and when the enemy may and should suppose that all means of defence have been concentrated upon the points upon which he is about to direct his attacks.* NOTES. 1. A singular Polish Council of "War.— In 1674, when, the Grand- "Vizier. in his retreat after the defeat near Leopol, in Gallicia, invested Trembowl x, a small town, strongly fortified, in the province of Podolia, and summoned the commandant of the Polish garrison, Samuel Chrasanowski, a Jew, to surrender, he received the following reply : "Thou art mistaken if thou expectest to find any gold within theso walls ; wo have nothing here but steel and soldiers. Our number, indeed, is small, but our courage is great." The Turks at once attacked the town upon all points, with an overwhelming force and great vigor. A council of war, convoked by the commandant, advised to open negotiations for the surrender of the town, in order to save it from the fury of the Moslem hoi des; when suddenly the wife of the commandant, a Jew- * I have not included among the number of remarkable defences that of Saragos- sa by the Spaniards, because it belougs to another class of events. An immense population, refugees from the country, with a large amount of provisions — a popu- lation excited to fanaticism by religion and patriotism, whose numbers being con- stantly double that of the besiegers, and whose daily losses were hardly felt, occu- pying thosa immense and indestructible convents as strong as real fortresses — could and ought to have for a long time frustrated our efforts. But circumstances of this kind can not recur, and this defence can offer no precepts which might be of nse in a regular war. As to the Siege of Genoa, it was a remarkable and great operation, but rather tho defence of an entrenched camp, and not that of a fortress. —tfcte of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 205 ess, appeared in their midst, and, with two daggers in her hands, thus confronted her husband, saying: "One of these daggers is destined for thee, if thou surren- derest this town; the other I will plunge in my own breast." After this impassioned appeal the council, of course, had nothing more to do but to submit, and dispersed ; and, fired by the resolution of this Jewish heroine, a vigorous resistance was continued, in which the bravo wife of the commandant, togother with others of her sex, participated by supplying ammunition to the soldiers and by stimulating their courage. By a singular providential coincidence this noble devotion was not destined to romain unrewarded. King Sobiewski, at the head of a Polish army, a few hours afterward appeared to relieve the garrison, completely routed the Turks, and upon their retreat took eight thousand prisoners. (Mentioned in the Polish histories of Naraszewicz, Bantkie, and Lelewel.) 2. Siege of Grave in 1674.— The celebrated journal of this siege, alluded to by Marshal Marmont, would bo too voluminous for this work. The following account is therefore given in its place : Rabenhaupt, the Dutch general, was still in front of Grave, which had been in- vested for a long time, and was beiug besioged regularly. This place, built upon the banks of the Meuse, was strong by its position. The French, anxious to keep it while abandoning other forts, had augmented its fortifications, and mounted more than three hundred pieces of cannon. A garrison of four thousand men, under command of Count do Chamilly, defended it. De Betonce, Saint-Ju*t, and Saint-Louis, old officers, and the Marquis of Guiscard, commanded the regiment Normandy, sustained by those of Bourgogne, Languedoc, Vendôme, and Dampierre. Rabenhaupt had, since the month of July, made himself master of the posts likely to facilitate the enemy's communications. By means of friends within they made an attempt to retake Fort Ravesteyn, but the traitors were discovered and punished. The Meuse only remained to the besieged to pass their soldiers across to forage on the other bank. Several engagements took place with the horsemen, who attempted to pass the river in order to destroy a dyke which was in their way. Colonel Huudebek bravely defended it. Four hundred cannon- shots were fired upon him in a single day, doing, however, little harm, the balls passing above him. The entire cavalry within the town, sustained by four hun- dred and fifty infantry, made a sortie to carry th«i guard off, stationed in the direc- tion of Velp, but mot such a vigorous resistance that they were obliged to retiro. Nine French officers, who had dined with Count de Chamilly, desirous of sig- nalizing their debauchery by something extraordinary, advanced as far as the dyke with twenty soldiers. Animated by the fumes of wine, they at first over- threw the opposing force ; but Colonel Hundebek having arrived to the succor of his retreating men, the attacking party took refuge within the church of Velp; but seeing that the building was about to be set on fire, they were not foolhardy enough to remain in it, preferring rather tg surrender than to be burnod alive. Another still more audacious performance took place. Three huudred horsemen» with as many footmen mounted behind them, in full daylight, made a sorti» toward Velp, overthrew the company of Rainmaker, there on guard, took the greater part of the officers prisoners, and would have caused much more disorder had not General Spaen obliged them to retreat iuto the city. Rabenhaupt, who had his head-quarters at Balgoyen. pushed the attack, threw shells, red-hot balls, and fire-pots into the city. Ho erected ;i battery with which he destroyed th* #t- j lu and a numbt.r cf h opus ; <-rd*red i"Joli§t*jn to tak» a position, with flva 18 206 THE SPIRIT OF regiments and five field-pieces, at Overaeselt, to harass the besieged from that quarter; and Colonel Winbergen to pass the Mense with eight hundred men, and to encamp within musket^-range of the town. Count do Chamilly ordered a sortie with two hundred and fifty footmen to drive those near Colonel Hundobek's quarters from the tronche?. DuPas, who had been Governor of Narde, took part in this action, and sought, by extraordinary bravery, to effaco the disgrace of hiK condemnation.* He charged with such courage that he drove away those who defended the approaches ; but Colonel Litzau, on guard near head-quarters, camo promptly to their succor ; the French were in their turn repulsed, and Du Pas loft there a life which had become insupportable to him, and which he sold dearly. The besiegers battered with such success the ravelin on his side of the Meuse, that Count de Chamilly, foreseeing an assault which his men would not be able to sus- tain, ordered them to retire after haviug sprung the mine, and to entice the Hol- landers; but the latter took the precaution to wait until it had exploded, and only six or seven men perished. Upon this ravelin a battery to bombard the platform upon the bank of tho Meuse was ejected. Tho besieged, fearing that their gun upon this platform might fall into the river, withdrew it, which rendered the position useless, and gave greater scope to the besiegers. Throe rows of palisades would have to be forced before they could become masters of the entrenchments. It was done; but the besieged, having sent succor promptly forward, regained and alternately lost it three times. Finally, when the Hollanders pressed the regiment Bourgogne heavily, which held the position, it retired, springing a mine which killed several persons and throw the remaining troops into confusion. Chamilly, profiting from this disorder, ordered the regiment Normandy to advance, which drove the Hollanders from every position they had occupied. The engage- ment lasted until nine in the evening. The following day a suspension of arms was agreed upon, to inter the large number of tho dead. The horses had been killed, as forage was scarce in the town; still there wore plenty of provisions left for the men. While Grave was thus Invested from all sides, Chamilly did not cease to receive news from without, by means of swimmers who passed the Meuse below the water, but even money to pay and animate his garrison, which began to fear that the siege, which had lasted too long already, would be prolonged indefinitely. They were in this inquietude when the Princo of Orange arrived at camp with commence with its difficulties. This system gives to tho soldier local and provincial ideas, which, after so many revolutions through which we have passed, would not be without danger, easily to be fore- seen, should like events again take place; perhaps it likewise dimin- ishes military spirit in times of peace, and tends to make a union of peasants rather than of soldiers : but these difficulties may be easily remedied if the number of assemblies be increased, and tho duration of the time devoted to camps of instruction be prolonged. As to the advantages, they are great and incontestable. With regard to the administration, the recruiting is more easily accomplished; the uilicers of the corps have the means to superintend the men absent on leave, and the transfer from peace-footing to war-footing is wonderfully simplified. In the moral aspect, to the sentiments of honor which make every soldier a part of the glory of his own regiment, and individually responsible for the same, ^o add, at the same time— and the effect is by MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 217 no means unimportant — the obligation of defending the reputation of the province in which he is born. It is an additional motive and anew encouragement. Furthermore, a soldior who has distinguished himself is rewarded for his good conduct by the esteem which he enjoys in his corps ; while, by the system followed in France, he is deprived of this advantage upon his retirement from service. Returned to his home, his achievements are no longer known; he thus loses that prize held highest in his life — the enjoyment of the good fame he has won. It would follow him, on the contrary, if, amid the scenes of his childhood, he could gather around him the companions of his youth ; he would then be surrounded by the halo which his well-merited and conquered honors shed around him to the day of his death.* NOTES. 1. Success in organizing the Confederate Army— General Samuel Cooper, C. A.— Confederate soldiers and United States soldiers. — The most remarkable instance, without doubt, in modern times, of the rapid and successful raising of an army, under most difficult circumstances, is to be found in that of the Confederate States. In Europe, where military organization is so complete — where standing armies have been since the time of Charles VII of France — where everything needed for the raising and equipping of large bodies of men, in all branches, is so abundant, and where, even in the most peaceable times, a great nucleus of old soldiers may always be found — the feet of raising a large army presents nothing remarkable. Even in times of exhaustion, as was the case with Prussia in 1813, or with Franco in 1814 and 1815, there was still a powerful nucleus around which every man able to bear a musket could bo rallied. The instance which may be likened to the Confederate States was the rapid for- mation of a Polish army in 1830, complete in its organization ; but there again we find a nucleus of thirty-two thousand men, splendidly organized and disciplined, who at once embraced the causo of their country. That which would mostly seem to resemble the case of the Confederacy appears the Army of tho United States, but, upon examination, nothing could be further from the truth. The Unitod States had over twenty thousand regular troops. The large depots of arms and ammunition, the great military and naval arsenals of construction, built up with Southern gold, were within their territories. The navy, without the ex- ception of one man-of-war, was theirs. Tho trade with tho world stood open to them. Manufactories of every kind were at work to fill tho requisitions of the array. What they could not themselves supply, England was only too glad to furnish. * The Council of War in 1828 was occupied by this question. General d'Ambru- çiac, one of the most distinguished officers of the army, the reporting member of the Committee on Inlantry, had presented a mixed system which, by creating an excellent reserve, solved the question in a perfectly satisfactory manner. Fate or- dained that nearly all the labors of that council, in which military questions were profoundly and carefully debated, '-ame to no conclusion. — Kite of Au' ) r 19 218 THE SPIRIT OF The Confederate States found almost nothing with which to create an army, save their heroic sons, and about a hundred thousand, mostly old-fashioned, muskets; no artillery, no ships, no manufactories. Everything had to be created and to be de- veloped. There was no nucleus around which to rally, save the love of country and the few old and tried officers who have since raised the name of the South so high as to be the theme of admiration upon the lips of every tyranny-despising man. Tbo commerce of the world was shut to us. What was freely granted to our enemies, to us was denied. • No people has ever been more willing to sacrifice everything for the cause of lib- erty than ours; but an army could not be created and organized without expe- rienced men, and, happily, they wore found. Out of a very chaos of men, with valor certainly, but with only little notion of dis- cipline, by a wise system of gradual tuition and organization, armies have been made, the most wonderful structures of human society. For now three years they have gallantly checked tho invaders upon a hundred bloody fields; but they still exist. A population of less than six millions of people have now had for three years an army which bore upon its lists at no timo less than half a million of combatants; the fourth year is approaching, and still, to-day, as wo are assured by the highest au- thority, an army confronts our foes which is as strong, as brave, better disciplined, and as ready to die for the country, than any we have had before. Tho men may be often ragged and barefooted, but their guns are shining, their bayonets are sharp, and they have plenty of ammunition. . In Richmond there is a department, so quietly managed that a passer-by would hardly suspect its existence, but for the large number of uniformed men which may be seen to come and go. Over this department presides General Samuel Coopor, Adjutant and Inspector-General of our armies — one of the chief agents who have achieved all this. With a talent for organization unrivalled in the annals of war, he has discharged the tremendous task devolving upon him. President Davis hap- pened once to be the Secretary of War of the United States, and he went out of office with the reputation of having been the most efficient they ever had. There he acquired, no doubt, that large experience of judging men in that army, for which he has since been remarkable. Thero he likewise learned the value of General Cooper. True to the principles of liberty upon which the former Union reposed, General Cooper could not bo brought to violate thorn. He, therefore, joined us, giving up high rank, friends, and home, for an uncertain future, but for a glorious cause; and from the day he was appointed tho first general in our army bis labor* have been unremitting and severe. To discharge his duties, justice, delicacy, firmness, intense application, and sagacity were required. General Coopor has beon successful in each ; and the highest praise which can be given to any public officer ho has won: namely, there is, perhaps, no officer of the army who is so universally esteemed and respected by those under him as he. He is.no longer in the prime of manhood, but still in the full vigor of mind. In military service for now fifty years, he, nevertheless, may be seen hard at work early in the day and late at night. The application to duty of one so advanced in years would shame thousands of men not one-half his age. When the names of those shall be enumerated by a grateful posterity who, by their wisdom and experience, haw guided our people to the goal of independence, General Cooper will not be the last, for his services have been among the first. He has been likened to Berthier, the celebrated adjutant-general of tho first Na- poleon. He may bo compared to that marshal as regards bis capacity f:v 'Tgcniza- ticn; in erery other respect he is vastly superior. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. !19 W hen we consider the chief difference between the Confederate and United States' armies, nothing could better express it than the remarks of Marshal Marmont in the preceding chapter : " Can we compare, in point of morality, an army composed of the sons of families elevated by a spmt of order and obedience to the laws, to . one which, perhaps, has in its ranks some individuals who are animated by a love of war and of glory, but the great majority of which is composed of vagabonds, whose bad morals 'keep them strangers to a quiet and laborious life?" The character of the Federals did not stand very high long before this war had prominently brought out their most abominable traits. It is curious now to read some remarks which have been made, long ago, to illustrate it. Dr. Robert Jack- son, for instance, in his " View of the Formation, Discipline, and Economy of Ar- mies," a late inspector-general of English army hospitals, and who had ample oppor- tunity of judging, having been attached to the English forces in America during the Revolutionary war, gives a very unimpassioncd account of his impressions. He does not think them M Capablo of leaving their homes for ho\iseless liberty in the woods. The majority, particularly those wbose ancestors, if not banished from Great Britain for evil deeds, had been adventurers in pursuit of fortune, had little attachment to the country unconnected with its productiveness ;" hence, he says, ''It is reasonable to believe that it was more in irritation from violence committed on property by arbitrary taxation, from hopes of getting rid of British debts, or from a factious spirit among themselves, than from a real desire of independent lib- erty," that they revolted. "They talk boastingly when danger is distant; they are not in general bold and resolute when tho hand of power grasps closely." He be- lieves them to be "easily affected by fear" and a resolute front; but " always ready to bribe themselves," they are "sufficiently shrewd" whenever this practice is at- tempted upon them. " Though not daring in close combat, they were not without courage. It was a courage of circumstance, the direct combat: front to front was supported with res- olution, the retrograde was precipitate when the flanks' were turned, when the de- sign of turning them was discovered, or when a front attack Avas threatened by tho bayonet. Accustomed to circumvent, and to shoot from behind cover, they were themselves afraid of being circumvented ; and impressed, perhaps, with the idea of circumvention, they moved off precipitately at the appearance of suspicious manoeu- vres being practiced against them; they had not, as a soldier ought to have, a face for flank and rear." The Federals, like the Russians, then, appear, in the opinion of Dr. Jackson, not proof against the bayonet; and, like the Austriaus, have always a wholesome dread against rear attacks; two hints which can not be too much acted upon by Confed- erate generals. Agreeing with Marmont, he pronounces them " Speculators after gain, rather than patient and industrious as simple laborers." He considers them deficient in two qualities that are essential to the formation of military force, "Namely, the subordi- nation which submits patiently to such forms of moulding and discipline as renders the human race a machine, obedient to the will of a general, to whatever point it may be directed, or to whatever purpose it may lie applied; or. secondly, the ardent luve of country which, rising to enthusiasm, produces acts of individual heroism beyond the calculations of tacticians, and superior to the acts of mere mechanism." An English writer very recently compares thus the Northern and Southern armies: ••The Southern army, compared with thai of the North, is supposed in Europe to be physically Inferior. That opinion, so far at least as it applies to the troops met 220 THE SPIRIT OP with along the route from Culpeper Court-house to Richmond, is a mistake. Tall, straight, muscular, the Confederates are in general as fiue a material for war as any men in the world. These Virginians, particularly, make a magnificent soldiery. One of the most marked différences between the two armies is that between the men's faces. The countenance of the rank and file, on each side, differ so much as to present a strong contrast. The stolid expression which one observes in faces at the military posts along the Baltimore and Ohio railway, compares unpleasantly with the expression of the frank, genial, intelligent countenances in the ranks of the South. The distinction is, to a very groat extent, one of class, but is referable partly to differences of race. The Celtic and Teutonic casts are not so pleasant to behold as that of the Anglo-Saxon ; and the Virginians, save so far only as they partake of a Huguenot mixture, are of almost purely the same stock as that of England. " The Virginians are British in their blood and in their habits. Their sympathies have always been strongly conservative and English. In the time of Cromwell they protested against the usurpation of the Parliament, in their declaration to support the Stuarts — the ' Old Dominion.' " It would be a profitable and useful task to elucidate the chief characteristics which distinguish the Northern and Southern soldier; but it is be} r ond the scope of these notes. We only trust that an abler pen will undertake it. But we can not omit to remark the exposition of our enemy's cruelties, in the masterly Address of Congress to the People of the Confederate States. It should be scattered broadcast all over the world, anil in all languages. A portion of it we can not neglect to cite here : First, the picture of our army : " Our army is no hireling soldiery. It comes not from paupers, criminals, or emi- grants. It was originally raised by the free, unconstrained, unpurchaseable assent of the men. All vocations and classes contributed to the swelling numbers. Aban- doning luxuries and comforts to which they had been accustomed, they submitted cheerfully to the scanty fare and exactive service of the camps. Their services above price, the only remuneration they have sought is the protection of their al- tars, firesides, and liberty. In the Norwegian wars the actors were, every one of them, named and patronymically described as the king's friend and companion. The same wonderful individuality has been seen in this war. Our soldiers are not a con- solidated mass — an unthinking machine — but an army of intelligent units. To des- ignate all who have distinguished themselves by special valor, would be to enumerate nearly all in the army. The generous rivalry between the troops from different states has prevented any special pre-eminence, and hereafter, for centuries to come, the gallant bearing and unconquerable devotion of Confederate soldiers will inspire the hearts, and encourage the hopes, and strengthen the faith, of all who labor to obtain their freedom." And, then, the picture of the enemy's atrocities : "Not content with rejecting all proposals for a peaceful settlement of the con- troversy, a cruel war of invasion was commenced, which, in its progress, has been marked by a brutality and disregard of the rule of civilized warfare, as stand out in unexampled barbarity in the history of modern wars. Accompanied by every act of cruelty and rapine, the conduct of the enemy has been destitute of that forbear- ance and magnanimity which civilization and Christianity have introduced to miti- gate the asperities of war. The atrocities are too incredible for narration. Instead of a regular war, our resistance of the unholy efforts to crush out our natural exist- ence is treated as a rebellion, and the settled international rules between belliger- MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 221 • ents are ignored. Instead of conducting the war as betwixt two military and politi- cal organizations, it is a war against the whole population. Houses are pillaged and burned. Churches are defaced. Towns are ransacked. Clothing of women and i nfants is stripped from their persons. Jewelry and mementos of the dead are stolen. Mills and implements of agriculture are destroyed. Private salt-works are broken up. The introduction of medicines is forbidden. Means of subsistence are wantonly wasted to produce beggary. Prisoners are returned with contagious diseases. The last morsel of food has been taken from families, who were not allowed to carry on a trade or branch of industry. A rigid and offensive espionage has been introduced to ferret out ' disloyalty.' Persons have been fbrced to choose between starvation of helpless children and taking the oath of allegiance to a hated government. The cartel for exchange of prisoners has been suspended, and our unfortunate soldiers subjected to the grossest indignities. The wounded at Gettysburg were deprived of tlieir nurses, and inhumanly left to perish on the field. Helpless women have been exposed to the most cruel outrages, and to that dishonor which is infinitely worso than death. Citizens have been murdered by the Butlers, and McNeils, and MilroyH, who are favorite generals of our enemies. Refined and delicate ladies have been seized, bound with cords, imprisoned, guarded by negroes, and held as hostages for the return of recaptured slaves. Unoffending non-combatants have been banished or dragged from their quiet homes to be immured in filthy jails. Preaching the Gospel has been refused except on condition of taking the oath of allegiance. Par- ents have been forbidden to name their children in honor of ' rebel ' chiefs. Prop- erty has been confiscated. Military governors have been appointed for states, satraps for provinces, and Haynaus for cities." 2. Duke "Wallenstein. — Wallenstein, Duke of Mecklenburg and Count of Waldstein, is a name conspicuously distinguished in the military operations of Eu- rope during the early part of the seventeenth century, especially in the " Thirty Years' "War." The family of Waldstein had belonged to the nobility of Bohemia for many centuries, and the hero of this memoir was born in his father's Castle of Her- manie, in September, 1583. In his youth he pursued his studies at Pavia and Bo- logna, where he acquired an extensive knowledge of languages, mathematics, and other sciences connected with the military art. Waldstein, anxious to signalize himself by military deeds, went to Hungary, and served in the imperial army against the Turks. After the Peace of Sitvatowk, in 1606, Waldstein returned to Bohemia, and married an aged but wealthy widow, who died in 1614, and left him large estates in Moravia. In 1617 he raised a body of two hundred dragoons, with which ho as- sisted the Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, who was at war with the Venetians. In a short time he saw himself at the head of several thousand men; and, after the successful conclusion of the campaign, toward the end of 1617, the Emperor Ma- thias made him his chamberlain and colonel in his armies, and created him count. Immediately afterward he married the daughter of Count Harrach, and the emperor, on this occasion, conferred upon him the dignity of a Count of the Holy Roman Em- pire. The States of Moravia appointed him commander of the Moravian militia; but on his refusal to join the Bohemians against the emperor they deprived him of his command, and confiscated his estates. Waldstein was now appointed quarter- master-general of the imperial army, and in the course of the following campaign, by his timely relief of Boucquoi, who was attacked by Counts Mansfield and Thurn, near Tegu (10th of June, 1619), he saved the emperor from being made a captive in his own capital. It seems that the resources of the emperor being exhausted, Wald- stein gave large sums for the rapport of his master. After the overthrow of King 222 THE SPIRIT OF Frederick of Buhemia the estates of his adherents were confiscated, and the reward of Waldstein was the lordship of Friedland, and other property of immense value. Waldstein was neither intoxicated by his triumph nor by his wealth. In 1621 he took the field against Betlen Gabor, the Prince of Transylvania, and forced him to sue for peace, which was granted on condition that he should give up his claim to the crown of Hungary. During the two ensuing years Waldstein was principally occupied with the management of his estates; but Betlen Gabor having again taken up arms against the emperor, Waldstein hastened to Hungary, and arrived just in time to save the imperial army, which was besieged in the camp at Goding, on the frontiers of Moravia. As a reward for this victory the emperor, toward the close of 1623, conferred upon him the title of prince, and in the following year (1624) created him Duke of Friedland and Prince of the Holy Roman Empire. On the de- claration of war of th« Union of Lower Saxony, headed by Christian IV, King of Denmark, which put the emperor into great embarrassment, Waldstein raised, at his own expense, twenty-eight thousand men, with whom he marched toward tho Lower Elbe. Tho renown of his military skill, his wealth, and his liberality was so great, that men flocked to his camp from all parts of Europe, whom the iron hand of their commander kneaded into a well-united mass. The results of this campaigu, so glorious for the imperialists, belong to the history of the Thirty Years' War. Tho campaign was begun and finished in 1626. Waldstein lost twenty thousand men by disease and fatigue; but in the beginning of 1627 he was again at the head of fifty thousand men. On the 1st of August, 1627, he was at Troppau. On the 30th ho took Domitz, in Mecklenburg, after a rapid march of two hundred and fifty miles. The Danish war was finished by the Peace of Lubeck (13th of May, 1629). Waldstein'^ reward was the Duchies of Mecklenburg. He chose Wismar for his residence, and obtained from the emperor the title of Admiral of tho Baltic and the Oceanic Sea (the German Sea). His plan was to form a navy with the assistance of the Hanse- atic towns, and to prevent Gustavus Adolphus, the King of Sweden, from choosing Germany for the theatre of his ambition. No sooner was Waldstein invested with Mecklenburg than his numerous secret enemies changed their calumnies and in- trigues into open accusations. Maximilian. Duke of Bavaria, and Tilly, were among the most powerful of his enemies. Maximilian at length declared to the emperor that he and all Germany would be ruined if "the dictator imperii" remained longer at the head of the imperial armies. Ferdinand, after long hesitation, dismissed Waldstein from his command in 1630, at the very moment when Gustavus Adolphus left the coast of Sweden for the invasion of Germany. Waldstein then retired to Bohemia, and resided alternately at Prague and at Gitschin, where he lived with such splendor as to make the emperor himself jealous. The empire was on the brink of ruin, and there was only one man who could save it. This man was Wald- stein. When he at last yielded to the supplications of the emperor to resume the command, he showed that he felt all his importance. Among his other conditions ho demanded that he should have sovereignty of the provinces that he might con- quer, and that the emperor should give him, as reward, one of his hereditary states (Bohemia?), of which he should bo the sovereign, though as a vassal of the emperor. The campaign of Waldstein against Gustavus Adolphus was unsuccessful. After losing the Battle of Liitzen he punished with death many generals, colonels, and inferior officers, who had not behaved well in the engagement, ne soon re- paired his losses, and his arms were victorious in Saxony and Silesia. But his haughtiness became insupportable, and he openly manifested his design to make himself a powerful member of the empire. His old enemies, among whom was the Duke of Bavaria, now conspired against him. They represented him as designing MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 223 to overthrow Ferdinand's power in Germany, and tho emperor was the more ready to believe the accusation as it became known that France had offered to Waldstein to aid him in obtaining the crown of Bohemia. The emperor ordered him to with- draw from Bohemia and Moravia, and to take up his winter-quarters in Lower Sax- ony (December, 1633) ; but Waldstein neither would nor could obey his order, which he regarded as a violation of the conditions on which he had resumed the command. Finding, however, that tho emperor was resolved to dismiss him, he prepared to re- sign the command. His faithful lieutenants urged him not to abandon them, and, in order to prove their invariable attachment, they signed a declaration at Pilsen, 12th of January, 1634, in which they promised to stay with Waldstein as long as he would be their commander. This is the famous declaration which has always been represented as a plot against the emperor. Piccolomini, Gallas, and several other Italian and Spanish officers availed themselves of the occasion to ruin Wald- stein, and induced the emperor to sign an order by which Waldstein was deprived of his command and declared a rebel. Piccolomini and Gallas were commissioned to take Waldstein, dead or «live. Waldstein ultimately took rofuge in the Castle of Eger, whence he tried in vain to negotiate with his onomies. It was through tho treacheryof some of his own officers, who had been bribed by the emperor, that ho was destined to die. On the 25th of February, 1634, the commandant of Eger gave a splendid entertainment to Waldstein's officers, at which tho duke was not present, on account of his ill-health. After dinner an armed band rushed into the room, and the friends of Waldstein fell beneath their swords. Captain Devereux, at tho head of thirty Irishmen, then rushed into the apartment of Waldstein, who receiv- ed his death calmly from the hands of their leader, as he stood in his night-dress, in an utterly defenceless state. CHAPTER II. MILITARY SPIRIT AND DIFFICULTIES OF COMMANDING. A mystery — Danger — Instinct of preservation — Relative activity — Soldier and gen- eral have the same sentiment — Nobility of profession — Friendship — Fear — Disci- pline^ — Imitation — Rewards for true courage— Bravery — Three degrees — Which most ran? — Its rewards — Reciprocal confidence — New armies not possessed with it — National guards — Appreciation of the enemy's character — Napoleon's real genius — Confidence, discipline, instruction, necessary to constitute an army — Two different kinds of soldiers — Their relative value — Why do we go to war — Com- mand — Profession and genius — Authority — Predestination — Napoleon — Qualities requisite for the command — Will — Mind, character — The predominating element — Equation — Historical names — Decision — Counsellors ex officio— Painful duty of command — Responsibility — Resume — Inferior commands — Note — General who is alBO sovereign — General Bonaparte has more merit than Emperor Napoleon — Parallel — Whom to prefer for command, sovereign or general. Not;:.— CalmneHH of generals after having made all dispositions for tho battle. A union of one hundred thousand men in the same spot, far a'.-ay from thtir lamiliea. property, and interest? : tho exhibition of their do- 'Zl\ TUE SPIRIT OF cility, obedience, mobility, and state of preservation: finally, the ex- istence of a spirit which animates them in such a manner as to lead them to throw themselves with pleasure into the most imminent dangers, in which many of them will find death itself, at the mere signal of a single man — is assuredly one of the most extraordinary spectacles which could be presented in the society of mankind; it is a phenomenon, the cause and principle of which can only be found among the mysteries of the human heart. It is a part of our nature to seek and love emotions : the idea of dan- ger pleases us, although there are but few men who, at the most threat- ening moment, would not be disconcerted. But we feel the necessity of comparing ourselves with other men : emulation is natural to us ; every ofîe loves to believe himself and to see himself superior to his associates. Such is the motive power, by virtue of which our instinct of conserva- tion gives way to the noblest impulsss of courage. The sphere of activity in which self-love moves depends upon the situation of the individual. Every one wishes to be seen and admired. Man, placed in a crowd of men, finds his horizon in the immediately surrounding mass; in a more elevated position, the extent of the hori- zon is enlarged; and he who attains the very pinnacle, looks down upon the world. This sentiment, so honorable to mankind, inspires the most generous actions. It is the stimulus iu the simple private's breast as well as in the general's. Thus, in every grade, is the profession of the soldier a noble one, since it consists of sacrifices for all, which are, beyond any- thing else, rewarded by public esteem and glory. To speak disdainfully of those who compose the great body of armies, is nearly akin to blas- phemy ; to speak of them with indifference, is not to understand the conditions of our own nature. The sentiment I have just painted resembles and is compatible with another sentiment equally noble — namely : friendship. Common dangers, glory, and common interests, ostablish the strong- est and sincerest bands; and as everything is connected and united in the great mystery of society, it is precisely in a state of war and in the midst of perils — that is, when society stands most in need of such bands — that friendships are most habitually formed; or, in other words, that habit of companionship, the enprit de corps, to which public opinion at- taches so much importance. An exchange of rendered services, some reciprocal aid received or given, doubles, nay augments tenfold, the strength and security of each individual. Thus, a strong appreciation calls forth, develops, and ex- alts man's virtues in measure as circumstances render their practice more necessary, whenever self-preservation renders their exercise of importance. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 225 But the heart of man is ever changing, and the host sentiments are combated by others springing from the same principle, but only con- sidered in a different light. I brave a danger in order to save my com- rade, because I count upon him in a like instance; but should the im- mediate danger appear to me too pressing, and fear be superior to the interest by which I am attached to tho individual in danger, the instinct of my future preservation vanishes in my eyes before the power of the present peril, and, fleeing from danger, I forget all the motives which should have led me to brave it. The sentiment which determines my conduct in this instance, and which is called fear, is not of rare occur- rence in face of a real danger: it is even more common than could be believed, and exercises a greater influence in the case of a large body of men. It is, therefore, precisely in order to oppose this, and to strength- en contrary sentiments, that the power of discipline has been called to the assistance of authority ; and as example exercises a great influence upon mankind, and since brave men, above all others, often carry away their comrades, those who act differently from the common rule can not be too much rewarded in every possible way, in order to carry their generous dispositions to a still higher degree ; because, upon these very men, the fate of battles oftentimes depends. Bravery, in the present armies of Europe, and particularly in the case of officers, may be classed thus : Bravery which prevents an officer from dishonoring himself, and which leads him to perform his duty rigorously; it is not of any rare occurrence. That which urges a man even beyond the requirements of his duty ; it is much less common. . Finally, that which decides a man to risk his life without hesitation in order to ensure a success to which he has been charged»to contribute; it is of the rarest occurrence. Thus, whenever this degree of bravery is shown, honors, riches, and great consideration should be its reward; and the opportunity of bestowing such recompenses being limited and scarce enough, there can be no fear that the expenses might become a heavy charge upon tho treasury of a state. The sentiments of which I have just spoken are not the only ones which should find a home in the breast of military men. To impart to troops the whole valor of which they are susceptible, it is necessary that confidence exist among all those composing an army. Tho soldier must believe in the valor of his comrade. He must be convinced that his officer, equally brave, is superior to him in experience and in instruc- tion ; he will suppose his general to be as brave as any, and possessing much more science and talent. If this be the case, then the army forms a bundle of fasces which nothing can break. In it we must seek for the first requirement of the strength of armies, and the first element of success. 226 I HI ri±*lRlT OF But this fuudainontal principle, which we call confidence, is only in- herent in old and tried troops, and not in new troops, who do not know each other as yet. Hence the absurdity of a system of national guards designed to replace troops of the line. Even supposing national guards to consist of the bravest men in the world, they will, nevertheless, bo worth nothing at their first trial — since the valor and the capacity of each individual can only be appreciated by the others after some actual experience. The first, encounters, therefore, will be made without tho assistance of confidence, and will most probably lead to great and irre- parable disasters. For a general the entire moral aspect of war consists in the knowl- edge of the movements which animate the minds of military men, and in the correctness of his judgment of the same, combined with the ap- plication he makes of knowledge thus obtained in the various chances of war. This knowledge must embrace both tho troops of the enemy he has already once met and expects to engage, as well as his own soldiers. Here is, then, a faculty, independent of the profession proper, and it is nothing less than the inheritage of genius. All great generals have possessed it; and never any man in the world in a higher degree than Napoleon. Discipline, which is the auxiliary of courage, is likewise necessary as a means of order. Its whole importance is at once felt when wo reflect upon the mechanism of an army, and ask ourselves how a like multitude is able to exist, both when moving and when at rest. To constitute an army it is not sufficient to unite men in a greater or less number; they must also -be organized. I have already explained by what mechanism obedience is secured — namely : by bringing him who commands, according to the different grades of military organization, into contact with a limited number of men, upon whom his powers are easily exercised. As soon as this division was set at work and the organization com- pleted, discipline commenced its operations; that is to say, the subor- dinates were accustomed to a passive deference toward their superiors. After it came instruction. Thus we see three different operations are necessary to make of a mass of assembled men an army : 1. To organize them ; 2. To discipline them : 3. To instruct them. And the complement of organization, of discipline, and of instruc- tion, is confidence. It is tho essential element, whoso absence de- prives an army of the greater part of its valor. This confidence should extend to all and each one; soldiers should have confidence among MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 227 each other in all reciprocal relations ; and every soldier and officer should confide in the superior chiefs, and, above all, in the supreme chief. This precious element, which influences every result in so powerful a manner, incroases proportionately in its eftects with the greater in- telligence of the soldiers — because this confidence, being founded upon a knowledge of men and things, is not a sentiment which has been but indifferently considered, nor a blind faith. Soldiers without intelligence have but little mobility, and vary less than others who are more lively and greater reasoners. The command of the former is moro easily excroisod, and there is less risk in giving it to a general of but limited capacity; the latter soldiers, on the contrary, will have moro or less valor, with the greater or less worth of the gen- eral placed at their head. Tu speaking of these two kinds of soldiers, I have especial reference to the Germans and French. The Germans have often obtained suc- cesses with vory mediocre chiefs; the French are worth ten times their number if they are commanded by a chief whom they love and osteem. They will be below all comparison with a general who can neither inspire them with esteem nor with confidence. They have proven this at Hochstett, in 1704; before Turin, in 1706; and in 1813, at Vittoria. The reason of this is a simple one. War is not made for us to be killed ! The objoct is always to conquer the enemy; and if one runs the risk of dying, it is conditional that the sacrifice of one's life to which one submits may be of some use. Whenever the moment comes that an intelligent mass of men see no probability at all of victory before them, there is no further chance of a glorious engagement ; from that very time they will hesitate to compromise their lives, and seek to preservo them for a time when the sacrifice shall be attended with some useful result. J havo sought to explain the divers movements which pass in the soldiers' heart — movements which, in tho opinion of the ignorant, ap- pear to result in contradictory phenomena, and who, by considering meu as so many passive machines, do not at all compchond tho varia- tions of which thoy arc susceptible. I come, now, to the consideration of the command, and I will essay to establish its necessary qualifica- tions. The art of war is composed of two distinct parts: tho profession proper, and the moral part, which is an appendix of genius. I have already considered war in its moral aspect, and I will but add a word or two as to the qualities which give authority to a chief over those surrounding him. There are soma persons who have an innate faculty of acting upon the minds of other?, a natural r orer of exerting their authority, ^bioh 228 THE SPIRIT OF mnkcs obedience to them an easy matter. This authority is a particu- lar gift, and springs from hidden causes beyond the comprehension of our mind. One who obeyed yesterday and is called upon to command to-day, handles his power, from the very moment even in which he be- comes invested with the same, with as much facility us if he had al- ways been entrusted with it. On the other hand — and the examples are frequent — another exercises authority over his equals which, though not contested, does not seem to repose upon any right, and he may not be endowed even with any superiority of mind ; this faculty is one of the effects of a proper organization. The legal chief, possessing this faculty, imbues those who have to obey with salutary fear. lie pass- es for a severe man, and the very severity which is supposed to be part of his character makes its application unnecessary. One glanco, a sin- gle word, acts upon the minds of others with irresistible ascendency. These men are specially selected by Provideuce to command. But as such natural and powerful influences over equals are but rare- ly met with, it has been necessary to prepare the structure of obedi- ence by accustoming subordinates to honor and to respect their chiefs. This structure is composed of military grades; they determine the rights of command, and give a social position, distinct and constant, to those who are invested with it. Upon elevated grades public honors have been conferred, to act upon the mind and to speak to the imagi- nation. Finally, nothing has been neglected to exalt these deposita- ries of power in public opinion, in order to secure obedience the more readil} 7 . Obedience is easy in ordinary times, when no obstacles oppose themselves to preserve regularity and order, but it becomes difficult in times of danger, suffering, and passion. When the general has the reputation of courage and ability, osteem and confidence are at once excited in the breasts of his soldiers, and his power over them is there- by augmented; should he join to this the great consideration of illus- trious birth, by which his social position is a very elevated one, he will be still more exalted in the eyes of the multitude. The greater the power and reputation of him who is invested with authority, tho more easily will ho be obeyed. All these requirements, being united in the person of Napoleon, greatly favored his successes. They made, if I may express myself thus, the necessary elements of the command. But what are the per- sonal qualities which the exercise of command requires ?* *I have above stated the qualities most favorable for the exercise of command ; and it results therefrom that, when a general is at the same time the sovereign, everything conspires to come to his assistance. As, for instance : absolute liberty in his projects, movements, and operations; accumulation of means and resources; absence of responsibility; liberty to engage in hazardous combinations, which, with great dangers, may lead also to great successes; certainty of being always MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 229 The art of war, considerod as a profession, wholly rosts upon combi- nation and calculation. I have already enterod into circumstantial de- tails when speaking of strategy and tactics. But that the combinations may lead to favorable results, it is necessary that a strong will direct them ; because the chango of measures already resolved upon, if tho motives leading to such a change arc not sufficien-tly explained, has many difficulties, and oftentimes results in great disasters. Two things a genoral must, therefore, possess: Mind and character. obeyed, whatever may happen, and to be served with zeal, etc. When compared with a position so advantageous, a simple general has only the most limited powers at his disposition. Whatevor these powers, he can only exercise them within certain limits. It is not sufficient for him to perforin his duties in a satis- factory manner, hut ho must for ever be prepared, aud in advance, to justify his undertakings. Lastly, difficulties may occur in obtaining the obedience which is duo his grade ; and rivalries, hate, and intrigues may conspiro to become as pow- erful an auxiliary for his overthrow as tho enemy ho has to fight. The two positions can not be compared; and the merit attached to a successful general is much greater than that of a sovereign. Thus, the glory which Napo- leon acquired in Germany is not at all equal to that of General Bonaparte in Italy. In the first campaigns, without name, without experience in the command of armies, with the most feeble and incomplete resources, an inferior and badly- provided army, he obtained glorious successes, conquered Italy, and maintained himself there. In tho other campaigns, if we leave out of consideration the series of splendid combinations they developed, tho magnitude of resources of all kinds, their accumulation and abundance alone, it would appear, should have enabled a general to gain the victory without any application of genius. The chances of success being more numerous with the military sovereign than with a general, it appears desirable that the former should command ; it is, how- ever,, different in reality. In the first place, who will be the competent judge of the sovereign's talent? and who can be the guarantee that his illusions will not inspire him with fatal confidence? Supposing, even, that he did not assume the supreme command until after numerous trials, there will be another great danger to the state, namely: should he be unsuccessful, public confidence in tho very stability of his power will be shaken — a vast social disaster ! Besides, public interest requiros that the commanders of armies be controlled by some other power. Whatovor may be tho latitude conferred upon a chief, there are certain limits which he should not be permitted to exceed : and should a general be left entirely free to act, who can warrant that he would he moderato in the chances presented to him? The greatness of catastrophes is in proportion to the accumulation of means and the extent of the enterprises, and then society may be shaken to its very foundation. The faults of a general may always be repaired in a powerful country; those of the BOYereign, who is exalted in public esteem and conse- quence, will lead to its complete ruin. Therefore the sovereign should content himself to govern and control the administration, to create resources, and to make them abundant ; he should likewise bestow unlimited confidence upon him who is worthy of it. and reward with magnificence and without jealousy: but ho should never assume the charge and responsibilities of the actual command of the «rmios — S">:tr of Avthcr 20 230 THE SPIRIT OF Mind — because, without it, no combinations can be made; one surren- ders without any defence. Character — because, without a strong and obstinate will, the execution of conceived plans will never be secured. But here the relative qualities prevail over the absolute qualities, and character should control mind. In this state we find the element of success. If every quality could be expressed by figures, I would prefer a general having five parts of mind and ten parts of character, to one who has fifteen parts of mind and eight parts of character. Whenever character has the ascendency over mind, and the latter is of a certain extent, the chances are that an object determined upon will be attained. But if mind is superior to character, the judgment, projects, and the di- rection are being continually changed, because a man of vast intelli- gence considers questions at every instant in a new aspect. If strength of will does not interpose between these continual changes, we float for ever between two parts, irresolute which one to take. We end by choosing none whatever (which is worse still); and, instead of approach- ing our object, an uncertain march brings us further from it, and we are lost in a wilderness. It would, however, be a very wrong conclusion to suppose that much mind is not requisite to achieve great things. We nowhere meet with any generals who possessed a mediocre mind in ancient and modern times, among any of the names which have become historical — Alexan- der, Hannibal, Scipio, and Caesar. They all possessed the most distin- guished faculties of intelligence. The same we find to be the «ase with the great Condé, Luxembourg, the great Eugene, Frederic, and Napo- leon. But every one of these great men joined to superior qualities of mind a still higher degree of character. This necessity of possessing a character outbalancing the mind, is felt by him who is called upon to command, at almost every instant; be- cause, in that position, it becomes frequently of moment to take a deter- mined part and to come to some speedy decision. Hence that which men deprived of character dread most is to arrive at a determination ; a fatal instinct leads them to postpone a resolution, oftentimes of great urgency, and which, when at last made, is of no further avail because it was delayed, and sometimes even becomes disastrous. This remark authorizes me to proclaim this principle : A general is justified in receiving counsel when he feels the want thereof; but to be habitually led by counsels, unless he be compelled to do so by the su- preme chief, can never be attended with success. The necessity, therefore, of coming to a resolution is the most pain- ful duty of a commander. In that moment responsibility rises before him with its imposing cortege — all the duties with which he is charged, and all that is dear to him in the inmost depths of his heart, are vividly before his mind. The responsibility toward those dependent upon him, MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 231 the discharge of the responsibilities assumed toward the public welfare, toward himself, and his conscience; in its complete aspect, a responsi- bility so immense and terrible in proportion as the general is penetrated with the consciousness of the duties devolving upon him. There is but one way to support this weight; he must have enough strength and resolution to place himself above all consequences— sure to find, in his conscience and his intentions, a generous approbation of all his actions, after having devoted to them all the capacity and the intelligence of which he is capable. But there are very few men able to rise to such a height. This necessity of coming to a decision is both of the greatest importance and of the greatest difficulty to him who commands. But whenever the part has been chosen so as to admit of no further modifi- cation, and the cannon begin to thunder, when the battle has begun, and every one has received the indication of the part allotted to him in the opened drama., then a commander-in-chief may rest tranquil. He has again found the security and repose of mind of which he was de- prived before the battle opened. We have seen, then, that a general unites all the qualities promising success, when he possesses the mind to see, judge, and combine, and the character to execute; when, furthermore, he has a complete knowledge of men, their leading passions, and their secret motives, of which war calls forth so many; when, besides, danger, far from paralyzing his faculties, causes them to augment and to show forth with renewed en- ergy ; when, finally, he loves his soldiers and is beloved by them, and when he unceasingly thinks of their preservation, their interests, and well-being as a father should of his children. I have only said that success is then promising, and not secured; because war has such va- ried chances, and is subjected to so many hazards, that nothing is cer- tain before actual success has been comple'ted. In treating of the necessary qualities for the exercise of command, I ' have intended to speak of the chief command. Any other command, however extended it be, cau not, at the moment of its becoming subor- dinate, be at all compared to a chief command, however limited the lat- ter may be, considering the number of troops— because there the same difficulty, which I have sought to make comprehended, does no longer interpose, namely: the necessity of resolution. J have commanded under Napoleon both armies of different strength and corps d'armée. Only ten thousand men, left to the sole control of their chief, require much more solicitude, and leads to much greater embarrassments, than the command of fifty thousand men belonging to an army of two hun- dred thousand men. In the last case they are moved, march, and fight according to given orders and a fixed object— comparatively easy mil- ters; and whenever the engagement or the march is terminated and the ' camp is established, the general can repose as the lowest soldier does, and has nothing to do but to nwait ordors. At that very time, on the' 232 THE SPTRTT 6 F. contrary, ïa tbe commander-in-chief harassed the most hy troubles and providential measures of all kinds. NOTE. Calmness of Generals after having made all dispositions for the Battle. — This calmness, so well described by Marmont. appears to have been one of tbe chief characteristics of all great generals. Frederic the Great, after his dispositions had been made, frequently threw him- self upon a bed of straw to take some rest, or, seated before a camp-fire, would quietly muse and fall asleep. Napoleon never rested until even the slightest matters had beeu carried out to his satisfaction, and during the night preceding the battle would himself receive all the reports; when this was done, he was soon enjoying a few hours' rest in the midst of his faithful guards, until Berthier would wake him to mount on horse- back on the morning of the battle. Just before the Siege of Rodrigo, when the proximity of the allies to Marmont's army placed them in considerable danger by reason of the non-arrival of their flank divisions, a Spanish general was astonished to find Wellington, the English commander, lying on the ground in front of his troops, serenely and iniperturba- bly awaiting the issue of the peril. "Well, general," said the Spaniard, "you are here with two weak divisions, and you seem to be quite at your ease ; it is enough to put one in a fever." " I have done the best," the duke replied, " that could bo done, according to my own judgment, and hence it is that I don't disturb myself either about the enemy in my front, or about what they may say in Eng- land." — Edinburgh Review, July, 1859. In General A. S. Johnston and Lieutenant-General Jackson, of our army, we remark the same characteristic feature. CHAPTER III. PICTURE OP A GENERAL WHO ANSWERS TO ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMAND. His bravery — His calmness — His sang-froid — His dash — He must have an estab- lished reputation — If not, he must eagerly seize the opportunity to establish it — His physical qualities — Privileges of youth when called to command — He knows the value of time — His activity is without limit — Ho must be everywhere — His severity — His sentiment of order — Kindness united to severity — Merited punishments — He must çespect the uniform of soldier — His gravity — Does not exclude affability — Facility of access to him — He must attend to everything at once — His magnificence — In what it ought to consist — His topographical knowl- edge—Campaign of Marengo — Fort of Bard — How to deceive the enemy — How to discover the enemy's intentions — The general's entire independence necessa- ry — A general not to be absolutely dependent upon the government. A review of the life and character of the late General Albert Sidney Johnston, Confederate Army. I will here, in a few words, group together the qualities and the bear- ing which should characterize a general called to a chief command. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 233 He is a brave man, and recognized as such by the whole arniy ; his courage can not be one moment called in question, or become the object of the slightest doubt. His bearing is characterized by calmness and sang-froid, without, however, excluding that dash and impetuosity so well calculated to inspire and carry with it those who witness the sairie. If his reputation in this respect be not sufficiently established, hé should seek and seize the opportunity of giving to it an incontestable ba- sis ; otherwise he will never be able to exercise upon his generals, offi- cers, and soldiers that power, commanding respect and esteem, which is so indispensable to success. This reputation once achieved, he must avoid being prodigal of his life, without, however, being too much concerned about its preser- vation. His mind is, as has heretofore been established, subordinate to his character. His bodily strength is proof against the greatest fatigues, and con- siderations of health never prevent him from inspecting personally the most important matters; since even the best made reports, and the accounts of the cleverest persons, will never have the same precision acquired by a personal investigation. If nature has endowed him with superior faculties, it is desirable that he be called to the chief command at an early age. By it, his successes will be sooner secured. He will then possess that wonderful energy and confidence in himself which doubles his strength. An object of sympathy and good-wishes to every young soldier of his army, he will at the same time never be wanting in that great deference due to age, and he will be personally endowed with sufficient experience. There are matters, a just knowledge and judgment of which is only acquired by time and by experience, and which can never be divined. But, on the other hand, a too prolonged habit of obedience diminishes, rather than develops, the qualities requisite for command. It is especially necessary that he should have seen war when very young, and shortly after entering upon his career; if this be not tho case, he will only slowly and with difficulty acquire that tact and in- stinct which an early acquaintance with war creates, and by which its difficulties are singularly simplified. He will continually be impressed by the fact that a surprise can only be the consequence of culpable negligence, 'and that a surprised general is dishonored. By guarding against derelictions of duty, he will not only shelter himself, but all of his subordinates, against any reproach. Knowing the value of time, the only treasure which can never be again recovered, he will dispense with writing much, by leaving it to those in whose sphere of duty it is to transmit his orders; he will only reserve to himself their revision and approval. A good general has 20« 23-4 THE SPIRIT OF never written much in the field ; the head and not his hand ?hould be busy; he employs his time more usefully by giving verbal instructions, and to turn it to account by preserving the freedom of his judgment to inspect whether his iutentious have been carried out in the proper spirit, and in the meditation of new combinations. His activity must be with but limits; by his often unexpected pres- ence he will keep every one in foar of being caught when wanting iu the discharge of his duties, and in this way he will keep alive the zeal of all. Every one of his decisions will be ruled by impartial justice; he will be severe in the maintenance of order and discipline; thus warranting to the soldiers the enjoyment of their rights, and the greatest degree of welfare compatible with their situation. If severity is one of his duties, there is another one, discharged with much more pleasure, and which is not less important. I allude to the rewards due to glorious actions and good conduct. lie must not be prodigal nor parsimonious in their distribution; he must make it his own business to obtain them; and ho should place even more impor- tance in their acquisition than he would in his own personal recom- pense Let him, however, reflect well that he award them to those only who have a right to their claim; because a reward justly made is an encouragement to the heart of the generous, while an unmerited recompense destroys all emulation, and is, moreover, productive of intrigues. The instinct of the men. and their innate love of justice, will quickly see through the spirit which influenced the manner of the distribution of rewards. If the general is true to these principles, if ho satisfies the conditions just enumerated, he will bo the object of respect, esteem, and affection on the part of his troops. The necessity of order is so vividly felt bj r military men, that they always love a general whose severity is the warrant of that order; they confidently trust him, because firmness and equity characterize all his decisions. Kindness without severity leads to nothing ; it is mistaken, both by impression and in reality, for feebleness — which makes a chief the play- thing of surrounding influences. But kindness, accompanied by severity, resting upon principles, makes the general the idol of his soldiers. Rigor, however great, is based upon laws, and i*estricted to certain limits, which should prevent it from becoming injurious. A man easily resigns himself to a merited punishment, but injury is irri- tating. The greater the calmness with which a punishment is inflicted, the greater will be its effect. If a chief is violent, he can not complain if his subordinates murmur. A general should also treat every one who wears a soldier's uniform with consideration. There is something so noble in their profession, the sacrifice of life is so sublime, that those MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 235 who, by reason of their calling, are always ready to offer it, have a right to command consideration, even if they have merited severe punish- ment. A general should be habitually grave in his manners whenever he comes into contact with his subordinates; still, these manners do not forbid a sort of familiarity and dignified gaiety, as they will inspire affection and esteem. A feeling of fraternity is naturally excited among military men by common dangers, privations, and fatigues: nor is this manifestation in any way incompatible with the regulations of military subordination and the maintenance of discipline. The less a general appears to be conscious of his superiority, the more is the soldier awaro of the same. A general should be accessible to everybody. Despatches which he receives should bo at once opened, forgetful of any personal inconvenience. Should he even bo roused twenty times in one night, amid the fatigues of a campaign, to receive reports of little consequence, he should never prohibit his being called up again. News, in war, may be of such importance, and a delay of but two hours may prove so fatal, that the safety of an army sometimes depends upon it. A general's mode of living should bo. as magnificent as his fortune may permit. His first luxury will be the keeping of a great number of horses; he should have a number of them sufficient for any possible emergency. The second object of his magnificence should be a house, adapted for the exercise of the greatest hospitality. An officer whose duties carry him to head-quarters during war, should never leave it without having experienced proofs of his general's hospitality. It is not only an act laudable in itself, but staff-officers, or officers finding themselves at a great distance from their corps, would, if the general did not take care of them, be reduced to great stress- for their subsist- ence, and might even be compelled to suffer. To this consideration of humanity may be joined another, which even affects the good of tho service. The officer, charged with some mission, hastens his arrival, knowing in advance that lie will be hospitably received. He accelerates his march because he is kindly disposed toward his chief, and for his own interest; and time is so important *a consideration during war, • that we should economize it as much as possible. A general should neglect nothing to obtain, beforehand, a minute knowledge of the country into which ho proposes to carry his opera- tions. He will procure the best statistics; he will know in what the resources of all kinds constat, if he study the topography of his field of operations but carefully. The least negligence in the pursuit of this study may lead to tho gravest consequences. We can not too much re- flect upon all matters belonging to the characteristics of a country, and to be able to turn every resource to account. By procuring at any price 236 THE SPIRIT OF the very best maps, and by looking at them continually, even sometimes in a vague manner, he will be sure to acquire happy ideas, which may become of immense value to his operations. The insufficiency of information of this nature nearly occasioned the miscarriage of the immortal campaign of Marengo in 1800, at its very outset, and led to many difficulties. The First Consul did not know of the existence of the Fort of Bard, and its means of resistance; it would have been an easy matter for us to seize it, had we attached to the first bodies of troops some pieces of sufficiently heavy calibre. The fact that the Little Saint-Bernard, which debouches, like the Great Saint- Bernard, into the valley of Aosta, was also practicable for artillery, had been ignored; the passage of the mountains would have been much more prompt, and would not have presented so many obstacles, the con- quering of which may justly be considered as one of the most remark- able operations of our epoch. Every one of his projects demands the profoundest secresy ; a general should communicate them to those only who are called upon to execute them, and not until the moment when this knowledge becomes necessa- ry. How many well-conceived enterprises have miscarried because they were known to the enemy ! On the other hand, nothing is more favorable to success than to permit a belief to gain ground, contrary to what we wish to execute; by deceiving those who surround him, a gen- eral will most surely deceive the enemy. But it is of quite as much importance for him to inquire into the projects of the enemy as it is to hide his own; a general will neglect nothing in this respect. Without reposing a blind faith in his spies, he will well pay and entertain them. It is especially useful to procure intelligence from those employed near the enemy's head-quarters. To succeed in this, the first one of his cares will be to know the de- tail of the organization of the different corps composing the army of the enemy, and the names of the commanding generals. With this aid, and that of light troops, well commanded, who, constantly engaging the enemy, make prisoners, he has important documents at his disposal relative to the enemy's movements. The capture of a single soldier of such and such a regiment announces the presence of a certain division which belongs to a certain corps, and from it a general perceives the spirit and the object of the manœuvres and operations of his adversary. It will be scarcely believed how much candor, simplicity, and truth are contained in the answers of a prisoner, without his suspecting the range of the questions he is asked, and without his believing in the least that he harms the cause he has served with zeal, and which he is very far from wishing to compromise. Finally, the general who holds his glory dear must keep himself aloof from any absolute dependence, in any of his operations; it will always MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 237 bo fatal. An enlightoned government does not assume the pretension to direct everything; its rôle is limited to the indication of the object, after having determined the nature of the means and their quota. To the general alone it belongs to determine the system to be pursued and the combinations to be followed, since he is placed in the face and the midst of the surrounding difficulties. Rather than submit to any too direct action of the government, the general should abandon a com- mand which he is not permitted to exercise in its whole plenitude; it is either necessary that the government renounce the entertaining of dif- ferent views from the general, and still accord him its confidence — or that the genoral be deprived of the command, if it be believed that he is following a bad system. The government should only act upon a general who has its confidence through the influence of counsels which do not bear the character of imperative orders; it will, above all, take care not to place near him any counsellor ex officio: since there is nothing more absurd than such a system; and, as I have already said, its results can not but be always fatal. A general may very properly provoke discussions, and consult enlightened persons; he may even ac- cept counsels if he thinks it useful ; but he should never be compelled to ask for and submit to them. A general at the head of an army has but two rôles to play — to obey or to command. Let the government give the command of its armies to those it believes to be worthiest, and let it accord to them, at the same time, an unreserved confidence ; if not, let the generals be displaced. A REVIEW OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER OF THE LATE GENERAL ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON, C. S. A. I. Two foreign officers, in the service of the Confederate States, were ordered to report for duty to General Albert Sidney Johnston in the month of October, 1861. When leaving his head-quarters at Bowling Green, in the State of Kentucky, having then seen and spoken with him for the first time, they simultaneously exclaimed, when outside of the enclosure of the unpretending quarters : "He is the very beau ideal of a general !" To one of these officers, who now feebly attempts to pay this hum- ble tribute to the memory of the departed hero, this, his first impulsive exclamation, has become the basis of the greatest veneration of which he is capable. In the prime and vigor of genius, and upon the outset of a brilliant career, at the period of manhood when the maturity of powers has been reached, such as are attained through a course of trials and of hard 238 TJIE SPIRIT OF service falling to the lot of the American officer of the frontier; emi- nentl}' fitted for the most responsible position that man can be called upon to fill — the command of thousand of human beings — making him one of the pillars upon which the fortunes of a country reposed, and the hopes and liberties of a nation rested — General Johnston, too soon, ito our clouded perception, met the death which it is a true soldier's highest honor to covet — the death upon the field of battle, when the legions which he had led were marching to victory. Others, whose names are as dear to Southern soldiers as that of Al- bert Sidne} 7 Johnston, have, indeed, risen higher and higher from those cohorts which form the Army of the Confederacy, since his fall, and some have shared his fate; but there is no one whose name calls forth greater sorrow in the national bosom, or is destined to shine more illus- triously, than that of the chief who fell upon the bloody ground of Shiloh. The full character and glory of such a man can neither be perceived nor established amid the agitation of a struggle for life and liberty such as that in which we are engaged. New reputations arise every-day ; a few will be lasting, but the majority (and some, it may be, whieh at this very time cast a shadow over the truly great) will sink into obscurity before the scrutinizing researches of serene and unimpassioned history. Asperity, jealousy, and ambition — more developed, perhaps, among mili- tary men than in any other class of mankind — will then have run their course. Now, every rising name is more or less subject to such bale- ful influences ; and some persons (and they are the most ungenerous of all) even continue their aspersions after the victim is no more ; and can we say, in truth, that the memory of Johnston, even after his form is cold and he is sleeping his last sleep, has been unassailed or justly dealt with ? MVe, who have witnessed the prominent men of our struggle moving upon the theatre of action, and who have been inspired through them, can only furnish the materials from which, long after we have ceased to breathe, the future historian will erect the monuments of their glory, or pronounce the verdict of their shame, and consign them to tombs of utter forgetfulness. General Johnston was born in the old Pioneer State of Kentucky — a commonwealth which has given to us some of the most illustrious men. Appointed from Louisiana, he entered the United States Military Acad- emy of West Point. The severe discipline and exactions of that for- merly celebrated training-school of Southern soldiers (now, no doubt, suffering, alike with every Northern national institution, from the in- fluences of a corrupt government) brought out his military traits. Un- like hundreds of cadets who, after a short probation, had to succumb and to make room for more worthy competitors, he, at the expiration of the usual period of rigid application, graduated the eighth among a MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 239 'class of forty-one; and when we now look at the slender list remaining, we entertain no doubt that he will be for ever the leader of his class. Upon his leaving West Point General Scott tendered to him the posi- tion of an aide-de-camp on his staff. But General Johnston, with a true soldiçr's aspirations, rather sought the hardships of the camp and the dangers of warfare in preference to the easy life and continuous round of pleasures of the metropolis of North America, and left for the field as a lieutenant in the Second infantry. From this time commences a series of arduous duties on the fron thprs of the United States — operations which form a connecting-link between peace and war — services which may justly be compared to the celebrated achievements of the French army in the sandy plains of Algeria, and to the hardships of the Russian army among the rockj; mountains of the Caucasus. The chieftains of both these nations, many years after, met upon the shores of the Crimea, and there they practi- cally demonstrated, when confronting each other with highly disci- plined armies, how far they had profited from warfare against savage and uncivilized nations. So with us has the continuous warfare against an unfortunate but barbarous race resulted in lasting benefits to our officer.", which have been amply shown in our struggle. Continued service of this kind, however, without the inducements of distinction greater than is offered againqf, bands of savage guerillas, had the natural effect of making the majority of officers of the late United States army neglectful of completing the structure of military science and acquirements other than mere duties of routine, the foundation of which had been laid in the military school; nor, indeed, did they have, in many cases, the opportunity of prosecuting their studies amid the ever- recurring changes from post to post, often thousands of miles from the belt of civilization. This neglect, so common among them, must have been seriously felt when their view had to embrace many thousands of men, and when their mettle was being tested by "grand operations" quite different from the contracted nature of partisan warfare. But such neglect can not be imputed to General Johnston. Indeed, his reputation for skill and learning was at that early day spreading among his companions-in-arms — a reputation gloriously vindicated by his future career. Nor was his experience in the field, in the old service, of slender pro- portions. We see him mentioned with distinction in the so-called Black Hawk war, in the wide Western territories, as the adjutant of the Sixth United States infantry. In that war we find General Johnston, Gen- eral Taylor, and President Davis all serving together. There, most probably, was begun that deep and lasting friendship, which, outliv- ing all the attempts of slander and of envy, still lingers over the tomb of tho noble soldier, and which throws unfading hsnor o-er him who 240 THE SPIRIT OF did not withdraw the light of his trust and affection from the darkened path of a friend, upon whom were heaped tho reproaches of nearly an entire nation. As a singular coincidence we may mention that, in that same war, figured Abraham Liricoln, the valorous captain of a company of militia, distinguished for cowardice and utter inefficiency in the po- sition he had assumod ; and whose military fame, then so auspiciously begun, has since spread in so remarkable a manner that we have no further need to revert to it. Fired by a cause which strongly appeals to every generous bosom, General Johnston, during the memorable struggle of Texas for inde- pendence, united his fortunes with those of the infant republic. The people of Texas were not slow to discern and to employ the experience of pne quite willing and ready to serve in tho capacity of a private soldier for tho vindication of tho sacred principle of self-government; and from the position of adjutant-general of tho Texas forces he rose to that of senior brigadier-general of the army, and subsequently was Secretary of War until tho year 1840 ; thus giving four years of undivided service to a state which now points, with proud distinction, to him as the first of her honored sons. Thus, the gallant sons of three great states — Kentucky, Texas, and Louisiana — are united with his history, and are called upon to vindi- cate and avenge his death. In Kentucky stands the home of his childhood, Texas guards the spot where he had gathered around him a devoted family, and in Louisiana repose his ashes. Alas ! not even these have been left untouched, by the sacrilegious hands of our enemies. Though the fortunes of war have temporary separated these states from the main portion of the Confederacy, their sons will still find, in the life and example of Albert Sidney Johnston, a new and lasting incentive to pursue steadfastly the glorious path they have heretofore trodden. Upon the broaking out of the war with Mexico and the United States, he served as colonel of a Texas regiment until it was disband- ed, and afterward on the staff of Major-General W. 0. Butler, as inspector-general, at the storming of Monterey, in whose report of that action he was most favorably mentioned. During the campaign he was greatly trusted by General Taylor — who, indeed, paid to the young soldier the high compliment of sending for him before the Battle of Palo Alto for consultation. There Zachary Taylor, A. S. Johnston, and Jefferson Davis were a noble trio among the many rising men, but no soldier was more revered and trusted than Albert Sidney Johnston. He was then regarded as the great military man of the United States army. Many reputations went down in that war; and the great glories gained by sonie while it lasted have since faded, and are eclipsed by the deed» of men who were then but in subordinate rank, such aa MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 241 Beauregard, Joseph B. Johnston, Bragg, Lee, Davis, and Albert Sid- ney Johnston. There is no task more pleasing, and yet more sad, than to turn over the leaves of official documents — now almost forgotten in the greater grandeur of the present — which illustrate past deeds of arms, and to meet the names of those who, then giving promise of great actions to come, have sinco boen inscribed by a grateful nation, with letters of gold, upon the tablet of fame. While we mourn ovor the departed heroes, we, with proud and swelling hearts, bid God-spoed to those who have hitherto been spared. And there wc road their own modest accounts of actions which havo made them famous — strongly in con- trast, when we turn the pages, with those written in the spirit of self- laudation and evident consciousness of their own glories, by men whose achievements have sunk into oblivion, because there was no element of greatness to be found in them ; and on other pages we encounter the records of gratified commanders, expressed in terms of praise, which now sound almost prophetic. There we see nearly all the names which our history has since made great. There are the documents — results of laborious duties, constant dangers, severe privations, and hard studies — which have become the foundation of the edifice of martial honor, and to which the historian will ever recur with fond satisfaction. And that which strikes the reader most is the unpretending, unembellished, and modest character of these papers — the stamp of true greatness. When we contrast them with documents of a like nature of renowned commanders of other nations, the same feature may there be found; content to receivo what will voluntarily be given, they lavishly bestow all credit upon those who wore led by their genius alone. A true soldier, though stern and unyielding in the discharge of his duties, is not, therefore, the loss modest, and has no grain of that overbearing manner which strongly marks those characters who find all the satisfaction they desire in the contemplation of their own greatness. Every one who in the least reflects upon the character of General Johnston, must be penetrated with the conviction that this noble trait was one of his most admirable qualities. The higher he rose upon the ladder of military advancement, the more honors and friends his sta- tion gathered around him, the more is it apparent. Unmoved by the increasing responsibilities of his various positions, and the applause of friends, or the words of interested flatterers — the Scylla upon which many a fair reputation is wrecked — his modesty was the same. Intimately linked to it was a degree of forbearance and charity, rarely attained by mortal man. and without its equal in the history of modern times. The letter to President Davis, in explanation of his abandonment of Kentucky — which, though written in private eoofi- 21 242 THE SPIRIT OF dence to an unwavering friend, has since become the property of the nation — magnanimously uttered in the very midst of condemnation heaped upon him, will not fail to carry sorrow to our hearts for ever, and is a solemn warning to the nation, as well as to individuals, not to pass judgment with clouded vision. In the expedition against the Mormons, for the command of which he was singled out from many distinguished United States' officers, some other of his prominent traits appeared : moderation and firm- ness. To them the honorable success of that expedition must be mainly ascribed. Reviewing the condition of affairs in a despatch to General Scott, commanding the United States army, he says, January 20, 1858 : "My information respecting their conduct since is, that their troops are organized to resist the establishment of a territorial government by the United States; and, in furtherance of that object, they have erected works of defence in the mountain-passes and near Salt Lake City. Knowing how repugnant it would be to the policy or interest of the government to do any act that would force these people into unpleasant relations with the Federal government, I would, in con- formity with the views also of the commanding general, on all proper occasions have manifested in my intercourse with them a spirit of con- ciliation; but I do not believe that such consideration for them would be properly appreciated now, or rather would be wrongly interpreted ; and, in view of the treasonable temper and feeling now pervading the lead- ers and the greater portion of the Mormons, I think that neither the honor nor the dignity of the government will allow of the slightest concession being made to them. " They should be made to submit to the constitutional and legal demands of the government unconditionally. An adjustment of exist- ing difficulties on any other basis would bo nugatory. "Their threat to oppose tho march of the troops in the spring will not have the slightest influence in delaying it ; and if .they desire to join issue, I believe it is for the interest of the government that they should have the opportunity." General Scott, who appears to have been chafed by tho refusal of General Johnston to serve on his staff, did not forgive him for many years. Only after the general had been appointed colonel of the Second United States cavalry, and his splendid administration of the Department of Texas had forced General Scott to testify the regard which no man can withhold from real worth, the relations of the two soldiers became more cordial; and during the period of the expedition to Utah General Scott appears to have been a warm friend of General Johnston, and he repeatedly gave evidence of the favorable opinion be entertained of him. In a despatch directing him to take command, he saya : MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 243 "No doubt is entertained that your conduct will fully meet the moral and professional responsibilities of your trust, and justify the high confidence already reposed in you by the government." And upon some other occasion the adjutant-general of General Scott, Irvin McDowell, of Bull Run memory, writes to him : " The general directs me to add that he has equal confidence in your judgment, discretion, zeal, and gallantry ; and in the delicate and responsible duty with which you are charged he desires to leave you as little trammelled as possible." But such was General Scott's desire to earn some further laurels, that he felt ill at ease to permit one of his able lieutenants alone to reap the harvest, and he gravely announced to General Johnston, through his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Lay : "The general-in-chief himself will set sail for the Pacific, in the steamer of the 5th proximo" (February 5, 1858), "clothed with full powers for an effective diversion or co-operation in your favor from that quarter." The Mormons probably never knew in what serious danger their rear at one time was ; and it must be considered lucky for them, Gen- eral Scott, and the final success of the expedition, that this "effective diversion " was soon after relinquished. Before that little army, which was to penetrate through the bound- less plains of the West, to enforce obedience to civil authority, lay a distance larger and fraught with greater obstacles than was presented to the French in their memorable onward march to Russia. When compared with that marvellous host, it was indeed but a handful of mcu which thus was determined to brave the difficulties of a march through regions which, for the most part, were bereft of any comforts whatever, and which might have become, through the interposition of the powers of nature and the failure of supplies, as disastrous to them as the return of the French from Russia had been in 1812. Every- thing sustaining man and beast had to be transported over a distance of more than a thousand miles. For two years the greatest burden to which any general is subjected— the provision of bread, and many other anxious cares — were sustained by General Johnston in a manner which at once stamped him a leader entitled to the highest honors. All reports concur in pronouncing that little army to have been a model of discipline, efficiency, and confidence in themselves and their leader. Those wild and silent plains will probably never again see such a body of men : and when we compare what the character of the Army of the United States was then, and what it has become since, the contemplation excites a shudder, and forces the conviction upon us that a final dissolution is indubitable, and can not, in ihe natural course of events, called forth through the utter disregard of all the 244 THE SPIRIT OP laws of society, be very distant. The condition of the Army of Utah, under difficulties and embarrassments such as are only presented by the existence in a wilderness, showed the administrator acquainted with even the most minute details of the service ; and it gave prom- ise of greater things to come. Speaking of this gallant little army, and the United States army in general, Mr. Floyd, the Secretary of War, in his annual report of 1858, to President Buchanan, says: " These regiments have accomplished within the year a march, aver- aging for each the extraordinary distance of twelve hundred and thir- ty-four miles. These marches, in the main, have been made through the uninhabited solitudes and sterile deserts which stretch away between the settlements of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, upon routes which afforded nothing to facilitate the advance, except only the herbage which the beasts of burden might pluck by the wayside. "Every item of supply, from a horseshoe-nail to the largest piece of ordnance, has been carried from the depots along the whole line of those tedious marches, to be ready at the exact moment when necessity might call for them. The country traversed could yield nothing. * * No disaster has befallen the army, * * and the privations, hardships, toils, and dangers to which it has been continually subject- ed, have been borne without a murmur." And, in another place : "The conduct of both officers and men attached to the Army of Utah has been worthy of all praise. The commander, Brevet Brigadier- General A. S. Johnston, who joined his command at a time of great trial and embarrassment, with a calm and lofty bearing, with a true and manly sympathy for all around him, infused into his command a spirit of serenity and contentment which amounted to cheerfulness, amidst uncommon hardships and privations which were unabated throughout the tedious and inclement season of winter. The destruction of our trains by the Mormons, the disasters which necessarily flowed from it, drove General Johnston to the necessity of sending a detachment of men to New Mexico for supplies essential to preserve the whole com- mand from the greatest extremity, and to enable him to prosecute his march with all practicable despatch." Again, one year after, Secretary Floyd said, in his annual report : " I can not commend in terms too high the wise prudence and officer- like conduct of the general commanding the army in Utah. The dis- cipline of his command is admirable, and its efficiency is unsurpassed. Much has been done through the army under command of General Johnston toward improving the roads in Utah, and to give to the public fuller knowledge of the condition of the territory." When, finally, through his moderation, wisdom, and firmness, the MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 245 difficulty was nearly settled, and the restraints of military power could with safety be relaxed, he issued a proclamation to the Mormons, in which he assured them that " No person whatever will be in anywise interfered with or molested in his person or rights, or in the peaceful pursuit of his avocations ; and, should protection be needed, that they will find the army (always faithful to the obligations of duty) as ready now to assist and protect them as it was to oppose them while it was believed they were resisting the laws of their government." Such wore the noble sentiments and forbearance of a Southern soldier toward a sect of fanatics who had dono all in their power to harm him, and who acknowledged no obligations either to God or man, but what they themselves had decreed. Though he wielded the terrible scourge, which at his bidding would have destroyed and carried in its train a thousand horrors, he was firm against temptations of martial fame as long as there remained a chance to perform the more glorious part of pacificator. For the interests of humanity he thus achieved every- thing; for himself he claimed nothing, save the honor of having scru- pulously discharged his duty. In all of his numerous correspondence he but a single time, in his official despatches to army head-quarters, alluded to his personal feel- ings or affairs, or asked any indulgence. When his task was complet- ed he wrote the following to General Scott, showing thereby another shining quality — his unceasing devotion to public duty : "On the arrival of General Harney or Colonel Sumner," he said, "I desire to be ordered to join my regiment. If that can not be granted, I request that the general will grant me a furlough for four months, with leave to apply for an extension. I have had no relaxation from duty, not for a day, for more than nine years." II. We come now, with hesitation, to review the latter portion of his life. With hesitation, because many things are now obscure which, in the interest of the country, can not be cleared up, although strong and con- vincing testimony, now available, could be brought forward. Conform- ing to the spirit of our remarks in this volume, we must leave, and we gladly do so, the task of revelation to those who, from their position and knowledge, may be most competent, when our independence shall have been established, and harm can no longer result by untimely criti- cism ; nay, when Truth and History imperatively demand that nothing be withheld. We do so with hesitation, because it is felt what restraints this necessity imposes upon the desire to do full justice. And gladly would the memory of Albert Sidney Johnston have been left to slumber in the silent admiration of a nation to that glorious day when ringing bells (if, indeed, they have not all disappeared for the casting of can- 21* -46 TUE SPIRIT OF non) shall proclaim the advent of peace, did we not strongly feci that it has hitherto been somewhat neglected. There is no danger that it conld ever pass away; but it behooves us to bring the traits aud charac- ter of our lamented leadors ever prominently forward for the emulation of our soldiers as much as the welfare of the country, and our honor requires that we judge with charity those who are living. When the separation took place which inaugurated, on the part of tho Xorth, a relentless war, the Southern olliccrs of the former United States army, with but few exceptions (who, whatever their achievements have been since, in a wicked attempt of subjugation, will be consigned to eternal shame) hastened to tender their swords to their native states. Among these was General Johnston, then commanding the Department of the Pacific. The anxiety is well remembered with which his arrival was anticipated, who, from the distant shores of the Western ocean, was known to be on his way to cast his lot with his native South. With the knowledge that the Government of the United States, which, through the medium of General Scott, had already offered him the chief com- mand of an army, to be in rank second only to the Lieutenant-General of the United States — which offer was answered by his resignation — would most probably lay difficulties in his way, should he choose the easy and comfortable route by steamer from San Francisco, ho at once resolved to undertake, with but few companions, the tedious journey, full of hardships, known as the overland route, and arrived safely within the territory of the Confederate States in the latter part of the summer of 1S61, entering New Orleans on the last day of August. Those who, at the time of his arrival at Richmond (September 5), were in that city, will not have forgotten the deep impression which his matchless figure and noble demeanor made upon the people. He did not pass the streets without being the object of general notice aud national pride — an interest so unusually awakened in republican coun- tries. He was at once assigned to the Department of the West — an appointment received with satisfaction throughout tho country. The enemy had just been disastrously checked in his first attempt upon Richmond in July, 1861, through tho native prowess of Southern volunteers — who, upon that field so well auguring for Southern arms, had begun to record the long story of their glories, bravery, and forti- tude under reverses, since so splendidly illustrated. The anxiety and uncertainty felt by the people at the opening of a war, the result of which could not be foreseen by mortal man, before yet the sullenly opposing armies had met in the shock of battle, had given way to consciousness of strength ,• but, alas ! in the train of that unexpectedly complete victory followed the exaggerated contempt for the bravery and endurance of our adversary, and a dangerous degree of confidence, penetrating alike the people and the army, and to which the reverses MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 247 soon following can plainty be traced. There, at Manassas, the battle had been fought against troops from New England and the North-east- ern states, descendants of men who already, in the times of Washington, had been notorious for inefficiency and cowardice in the field. Upon a different arena were shortly to be met the hardy sons of the West, by nature and education alike differing from their effeminate companions- in-arms of the East. At that early period already the importance of the Western states and territories, intersected by the affluents of the Missouri and Missis- sippi rivers, loomed up in the distance. The power in men and internal resources of the enemy there threatened us most where the great valley of the Mississippi spreads, in teeming beaut}', the most magnificent portion of the Southern states. By means of the streams, each vicing in grandeur with the most renowned of Europe, which descend the western slopes of the Alleghany mountains, and which, rolling through the most fertile states of the former Union, unite their waters with those of the Farther of Waters, the enemy was enabled to penetrate into the very centre of our Western states. The check at Manassas had directed the full attention of the enemy to these vital points; and while wo wore glorifying ourselves he was vigorously preparing for the great onward movement which, temporarily checked at Shiloh, has since been fraught with never-ceasing disasters to the Confederacy, and still calls for a victorious general to drive back the hordes of the enemy 'across the Ohio river, and .redeem what we have lost. The general who shall accomplish it will be the saviour of his country ; for upon successes in that quarter alone may we build the hopes of a speedy termination of the war. Unfortunately, the wavering course of Kentucky, which has since been bitterly repented by that unhappy state, now controlled by a des- potism worse than that of the Czar, prevented us from at once seizing the mouths of two of these great affluents, the Tennessee and Cumber- land rivers, both upon Kentucky's soil, in the north-western corner of the state, and as one glance upon the map will show, the key and the most remarkable strategical position of Central North America. Could these have been secured, through a spontaneous and hearty co-operation of the people of Kentucky with their Southern brothers, and the line of the Ohio been ours, this war would have been checked long ago. As it was, our scrupulous regard for the rights of a sister state was miserably rewarded, and would have well-nigh worked our destruction but for the incomparablefortitude nf the South. We had then no meansof arresting or impeding the naval armaments upon the Ohio, in view of the southern borders, almost within hearing of the workmen's hammers, who were to forgo the chains for the people of the Confederate Btatei und of Ken- tucky; and thus we were compelled to see the formidable fleet of gun- 248 THE SPIRIT OF boats rapidly completing which was soon to penetrate to the very heart of Tennessee, and to the confines of Alabama and Mississippi. When our eyes were being opened, and Kentucky's neutrality became a myth, Major-General Polk, with great promptitude and the coup d'osil of a soldier, on the 4th of September seized and occupied Columbus, in Kentucky, on the Mississippi, to protect that river. This remarkable position was at once made impregnable against an attack by water, and its rear was secured by a camp of observation at Feliciana, thirty miles cast of Columbus, and which held the enemy at Paducah in check — thus establishing the left of a line of defence. Nearly thrco hundred miles to the east, amid the wild mountains of Eastern Kentucky, and forming the extreme right of the line, Brigadier-General Zollikoffer had taken a position at Mill Springs, where the mountains of White Oak creek rest upon the Cumberland river, to protect the remarkable defile called Cum- berland Gap, where three states meeting, the mountains effectually bar the advance to the invader save through a gorge easily defended. Upon the centre of the line which unites these two points the railroad from Louisville to Nashville passes through a country-town, Bowling Green, nestled between hills, and in the narrow valley of Barren river. This town had been occupied by Brigadier-General Buckner with a force of four thousand Kentuckians, a portion of the State Guard, the nucleus of a body of refugees, who thus early raising the standard against Northern oppression, have since made glorious the name of the Pioneer State in Confederate annals. To protect the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, the State of Tennessee had constructed two forts. One, Fort Henry, was on the right bank of the Tennessee — the other, Fort Donelson, near Dover, on the Cumberland ; both as high up as the boundary of the state permitted, hastily and unsatisfactorily construct- ed, and, owing to the scarcity of heavy ordnance, but indifferently armed. This was the situation of affairs when General Johnston, on the 28th of October, 1861, assumed command of the Department of the West, with head-quarters at Bowling Green. Weeks before this event hap- pened the people of the Confederacy generally were impressed with the idea that powerful forces had already been collected at every point of the line for a triumphant march upon the City of Louisville, the capital of Kentucky, and that nothing was wanting but that General Johnston should give the order for the deliverance of the state from Yankeo thraldom. Instead of this visionary force he found but a small body of troops, and an advance upon Louisville with much less than twelve thousand men was out of the question, especially when the enemy, roused by his presence, was already concentrating the main body of his forces in front of Bowling Green. Nothing remained, then, to be done but to MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 249 make his defensive line as strong as circumstances and the means at his command permitted. The means at his command wero very small, and the difficulties of organization very great. Nevertheless, by the end of November, in ad- dition to the garrisons established upon intermediate points of the im- mense line, he was enabled to concentrate some thirteen thousand men at Bowling Green. The exaggerated estimates of his strength, while checking the enemy with salutary effect, of course in the same ratio enhanced the confidence of our people; yet this could not bo avoided. But urgent representations were made to all the governors immediately interested in the maintenance of the line of Kentucky, and nothing was from them concealed. The aid given was very feeble. The State of Mississippi alone nobly responded, and sent to General Johnston a re- spectable force, with part of which Major-General Polk was enabled to relieve a division of well-organized and disciplined troops undor Colonel (late Major-General) Bowen, and send them to Bowling Green. Briga- dier-General Hardee had brought a further accession, and Brigadier- General Floyd joined with his brigade from Western Virginia. Considerable accession to the force of General Johnston would no doubt have resulted, had the people of these different states responded to the demands of the Provisional Government, and enlisted for the war. The scarcity of arms was so great that the government did not feel authorized to arm twelve-months' men, when the war-troops enlisting could barely be supplied. But the people indulged in the most disas- trous delusions, and could not be brought to turn from the contemplation of the glories of Manassas. In these endeavors, steadily pursued, General Johnston did not neg- lect the demands of the hour. Everything that could be done was done promptly and vigorously. Out of a mass of undisciplined volunteers were moulded steady soldiers. The departments of the army were ad- ministered with rigid economy. The fortifications were strengthened; Bowling Green strongly defended by a cordon of detached forts; new works were erected at Clarksville, on the Cumberland, while in the rear the Town of Nashville was commenced to be fortified, should the difficulty of subsistence or other causes make a position behind the line of the Cumberland more desirable. An important railroad, easily assailable, and the only direct line of communication with Major-Gen- eral Polk, was maintained. The result of all this was unshaken confidence on the part of im troops in their commander. But what endeared him most to his soldiers was the great justice which was the basis of all his decisions, the prompt- ness with which wrongs were rectified, and the facility of access to the chief commander, as well as the genuine cordiality and dignity with which every one was met by him. Heavy labors on forts in mid-winter were endured 250 THE SPIRIT OF without a murmur, since every soldier knew that General Johnston would never hesitate to expose himself whenever necessary. His head- quarters were a model of order, simplicity, and prompt despatch of business. His decisions to personal applications were immediate and final. His bearing was that of a knight of the olden times. The writer will never forget the shouts which greeted the general whoncver the troops passed in review. With the most vigorous exertions and appeals General Johnston, upon the beginning of the year 1862, found himself at the head of some twentj'-three to twenty-four thousand troops, while the enemy was con- fronting him with a force consisting of one hundred and seven regiments, numbering at least sixty-live thousand men. The demonstrations of the enemy had begun on the 7th of November, 1861, twelve days after General Johnston assumed command, against the forts of Columbus. There Major-General Polk, with greatly inferior forces,, defeated Major-General Grant on the west bank of the Missis- sippi, by crossing his troops from the left bank — a victory which, while giving us increased confidence, so disconcerted the enemy that he suspended any further operations against that point. Another column, the vanguard of Buell's forces, next appeared in front of the centre, at Woodsonville, a point some twenty miles north of Bowling Green, on the 17th of December. They met with our grand-guards, and were checked by the gallant attitude of our troops under Breckinridge and Hindman. Thus baffled upon two points of the line, a concentrated movement was made against our extreme right, under Major-General Crittenden, on the 19th of Janu- ary, 1862, at Mill Springs. Major-General Crittenden, with quick reso- lution, under difficulties which deserved a better rosult, did not await the junction of the enemy's two columns in his front, and marched against one — when, after a gallant struggle, he was compelled to desist in his attack, and, under great hardships, crossed the Cumberland during the night. The enemy had only been awaiting the completion of the fleet of gunboats to make demonstrations by water. Long before Fort Henry fell, in view of the disappointments to which General Johnston had been subjected, he was fully aware that his line, unless it was strongly reinforced, could not be held ; and in the mouth of January, 1862, when one day looking with Colonel Bowen upon a map, showing the course of the Tennessee river, these memorable and prophetic words fell from his lips, when pointing out a spot marked " Shiloh Church" : " Here the great battle of the South-west will be fought." Toward the latter part of .January General Beauregard arrived at head-quarters. He was astonished that General Johnston, with so small a force at his command, could have so long held so large a line. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 251 In a conferonoe ho fully coincided with hig plan of future operations, namely: tho withdrawal from Kentucky, and the necessity of deciding the fate of Nashville and of Tennessee at Fort Donelson. After Major- G encrai Crittenden's defeat, events rapidly followed each other. Fort Henry, garrisoned by twenty-one hundred men, fell. Thle commanding officer^ Brigadier-General Lloyd Tilghman (late Major-General), after having, with a few cannoniers, worked his guns to the last — thus giving to the entire infantry, under the junior com- mander, Colonel Heiman, a brave foreigner, the chance of escape to Fort Donelson, nobly preferring, with his stout little band, to share a long and painful captivity — surrendered when the last gun could no longer bo fired. With its fall the roar of General Johnston's line was at the power of the enemy. Major-General Grant now rapidly, on the 13th of February, had completed the investment of Fort Donelson, and oommenoed the at- tack. Of the troops at Bowling Green General Johnston had detachod twelve thousand men, under Brigadier-Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner to sustain the garrison. After three days of severe and ob- stinate defenco, Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Billow having with- drawn on the night of the 15th, with a small portion of the troops, Brigadier-General Buckner surrendered himself and the entire remain- ing garrison. Thus the left of the line of defence was severed from the centre. Immediately after the fall of Fort Henry, preliminary orders had been given for the evacuation of Bowling Green and for tho march of its garrison, eleven thousand, upon Nashville. The magazines, heavy armament, and the subsistence stores were quietly removed before even the troops knew that the town was to be given up. When Major- General Hardee, the immediate commander of the Army of Central Kentuky, left his head-quarters, the shells of the baffled enemy were dropping in the midst of his escort, and the last train had barely left when the advance forces of the onemy entered, fired the town, and in- discriminately let loose the horrors of war upon the inhabitants of the once quiet and peaceful country-town. When the advance brigade of the troops marching upon Nashville, under Colonel Bowen, was within half a day's march of the city, the spirit of the troops was raised to the highest pitch of enthusiasm upon hearing the news from an aid of the commanding general, Colonel Wil- liam Preston, that the brave garrison of Fort Donelson was still hold- ing out. But when the troops entered the capital of Tennessee, on Sunday, the 16th of February, the dejection of the citizens assembled upon the public square at once told the stor}' of the fall of the fort, and that it had already been resolved, as a matter of military neces- sity, to abandon the indefensible position of the city, and leave it to the mercy of the invader». 252 THE SPIRIT OF Nashville is situated upotf the left of the Cumberland, upon a slight plateau, gradually rising from the river bank. Had this plateau been unassailable from the heights which encircle it, a defence might have been made; but the attempt was useless with a force of only eleven thousand men, and the prospect of seeing fifty thousand men debouch upon the city from every road to the west, no|^h, abd oast, not consider- ing the auxiliary of the enemy's gunboats, the arrival of which was every moment to be expected. The demoralization existing among the Tennessee troops, aided by the depression which had seized the citizens, would, moreover, have de- feated any idea of defence. Before their eyes was the prospect of at once abandoning their state and all they held dear. Unschooled in the trials of war,» as our troops are now, this was to them appalling. But few untried troops will remain steady under such influence?, and it required all the energy of the more brave to control and keep their men in ranks. Here was apparent the unsatisfactory nature of volunteer troops, led by men elected by themselves, and who, no matter how estimable in common life, were not proof against the storms of adver- sity. Their bad influence over their men was felt to an extent which would have been disastrous to the whole army but for the steadiness and cheerfulness shown by the general commanding, and the vigorous exertions of those selected by him. At this dark hour in the general's life, when from every quarter the voices of ignorant assailants were heard — when a portion of his troops, stimulated by those whose sacred duty it was to check and command them, openly denounced him — and when a hasty press did all to under- mine the reputation of a man whom it should have sustained in the difficult task before him — General Johnston's character roso above all the din and clamor, and shone forth with immortal lustre. No com- plaint, no accusation ever escaped him; there was no weariness, no wavering, or indecision under his heavy burden. In those cold, stormy days of mid-winter, so well recollected by thoso who endured their rigor, when men and nature appeared to conspire against him, his mind was ever active and his vision clear; unceasingly working for the good of his country, striving to unite discordant elements, and to encourage, when all was dark to even the bravest, with an unfaltering faith in God, and a reliance that He would vindicate His servant, he conceived and determined upon that brilliant movement, by a rapid march, closely followed by the converging columns of the enemy on his flank and rear, to advance upon the Tennessee, cross the river, and behind its line to concentrate his forces with those of General Beaure- gard, at or near Corinth, in Northern Mississippi — a manœuvre which will associate his name with those great commanders who, in tho midst of gloom, gloriously issued from seemingly insurmountable diffi- culties. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 253 One of General Johnston's great qualities was the knowledge of the value of men, and the faculty of assigning to them the position most suitable to their talents — a quality, it must be confessed, of the utmost importance to a commander. This was illustrated in the selection of the officers of his staff. Unlike some Confederate generals we might mention, he sought to associate with himself men who were prominent in their profession and noted for their military attainments, and not those wiiose only recommendation was the personal claims they might have upon him. General Johnston's staff was composed of men who would have been an honor to any staff of any country, and such as no general need hesitate to confer with in moments of danger and in deli- cate situations. When he had determined to effect a junction with General Beaure- gard, two of the most trusted officers of his staff, as he himself has re- corded, decidedly opposed the attempt, deeming it too hazardous and impracticable. But such was General Johnston's firmness that noth- ing could influence him when once he had deliberately decided upon his course. We shall see how, in a similar case, he rejected advice coming from even more weighty sources. Before him lay a distance of over two hundred, and thirty miles, to be traversed in mid-winter, by troops unaccustomed to the hardships of prolonged marches and to privations, and who had hitherto, for the most part, lived in comparative ease during their career as soldiers. At Murfreesboro', Tennessee, a halt was made, and the command was reorganized and augmented by Major-General Crittenden's division and the fugitives from Donelson. Confidence in themselves and their leader was rapidly re-established in the forces ; on the 22d of February — that is, six days after the fall of Donelson — the reorganization of the army was completed and the orders issued, and the march, after all the munitions of war had been removed, was resumed through Shelbyville and Fayette- ville upon Decatur, on the Tennessee, where tho troops crossed in safe- ty, and were rapidly established in cantonments along the line of the railroad to Corinth; and finally, toward the end of March, tho army of Genoral Johnston, 20,000 strong, united with General Beauregard at Corinth, which brought his force to nearly 50,000 men. The main points of the Western campaign of 1861-62 have been here rapidly sketched for no other purpose than to fully and forcibly illus- trate the disadvantages and disheartening circumstances in which General Johnston found himself from the very day when he arrived at Bowling Green, and to vindicate his memory, with reference to his con- duct under these circumstances, from any doubts remaining. Even while he was yet making his way across the Western plains, a train of events had occurred which ever afterward disastrously operated against him. We do not know which to admire most — hie masterly 22 254 THE SPIRIT OF check of the enemy's columns, while they were yet seeking the weak points of his lino of over three hundred miles, and the splendid disposi- tion ho made with his handful of men by which it was covered, ere yet Forts Henry and Donelson had given way — the fall of one exposing his rear, and that of the othor severing his left from the centre — or the for- titude and the resources of military genius he displayed in the midst of reverses such as alone would have been sufficient to sink any general not of the highest order, even if these reverses had not been attended by premature and criminal judgment against him on the part of his traducers. None but a general of the first rank could have maintained an army of volunteers, restored its confidence, and with it resumed the offensive, under like circumstances. History furnishes many exam- ples where the morale of armies, composed even of regular troops, was entirely destroyed by causes much less potent than those which oper- ated against General Johnston ; not even Frederic II, after the great disaster of Hochkirch, displayed greater genius ; but only few instances can be cited where an army was managed with more fortitude and suc- cess than that which followed the leadership of the lamented hero. When the chief officers of his staff advised against his march to join the forces under General Beauregard, he, with the resources of a master of strategy, who with one glance embraces the great points of the cam- paign, and a genius unexampled in our war, had already planned the great change from the defensive to the offensive, and the glorious bat- tle of which that march was but the prelude. It was not, then, mere obstinacy, or any undue regard of unfavorable chances, which caused him to insist upon a movement which was to be but a link of a great strategical combination ; but a rigid execution of a plan which he felt could alone save his country and his own fame; and with invincible resolution he steadily pursued the programme which, foreshadowed by his remarkable, well-authenticated words to the late gallant Major-General Bowen — " Here the great battle of the South-west will be fought" — ripened into life, and became a monument of history — alas ! at the expense of a life too precious for the nation to be sacrificed for even so magnificent a battle. Nor was his sole aim the mere possession of the battle-ground of Shi- loh. His vision reached further. On the morning of the eventful 6th of April, when he was informed that the enemy had permitted himself to be surprised, he said to a staff-officer, with now significant import, " To-night we will water our horses in the Tennessee." Clear and full, like a map in his mind, as he had ordered, that battle was developed as a game of chess. With overwhelming forces he over- threw everything before him. At a critical moment, when the enemy offered an obstinate resistance, and when the possession of the contest- ed point became the turning-point of the battle, th« last resarvos had MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 255 been brought into action, and it became a sacred duty, at any cost, to restore the battle, his knightly form was seen leading his troops to the combat. " Fix bayonets !" rang his clear voice ; onward they charged, and the field was* won. During the latter portion of March the .troops occupied the chief points of the Mobile and Ohio, and Memphis and Charleston railroads, which unite at Corinth, Mississippi, where head-quarters were estab- lished ; the right was at Iuka, Mississippi, eight miles from the Tennes- see river, under command of Major-General Crittenden ; the centre at Corinth, some twenty-two miles from the river; and the left rested upon the Memphis road, still further from the stream. This line pro- tected the Gulf states from any further advance. Still, various attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right, by attacking the batteries of Eastport, which, however, were promptly checked by the forces of Major-General Crittenden and Brigadier-General Breckinridge. The enemy, in the meantime, had concentrated a heavy force, under Major-General Grant, on the left bank of the Tennessee, near Pittsburg Landing, opposite our centre, threatening Corinth, with the intention of. awaiting the arrival of Major-General Buell, who, by forced marches, was hastening to effect a junction with Grant. In perfect security against the formidable opponent they deemed to have entirely discom- fited, they reposed upon the beautiful banks of the river, leisurely awaiting the command of the senior general hastening to their support. A change— "one of the most delicate operation of war," as Napoleon has said— was hero determined upon by General Johnston : the transi- tion from the defensive to the offensive, against an enemy flushed with success. . Now, for the first time, he had an army with which ho was confident he could teach a lesson to the enemy. With the junction of his force to the disciplined corps of Pensacola, under Major-General Bragg, and the troops of General Beauregard and Major-General Polk, full confi- dence animated every regiment of the army, and it burned for the opportunity to hurl back the invaders. As soon as the preparations and the laboVs of organization could be completed, he had resolved to march upon tho enemy, to surprise and defeat him near the river, and, with a victorious army, to meet Buell. With the zealous co-operation of his generals, the different columns were reported ready on the 1st of April. General Beauregard, to whom the immediate command of the troops had been offered, declined on account of his ill-health ; but Major- General Bragg consented to take upon himself, in addition to the com- mand of his'corps d'urm/r, the arduous duties of chief of»the general staff. The army was divided into four corps, commanded by Major- Generals Polk, Bragg, Hardoe, and Brigadier-General Breckinridge, respectively — the corp? of the latter acting as a reserve. 256 THE SPIRIT OP The three first-named corps marched from Corinth, the last from Burnsville, a point between the centre and right of the line, upon Farmington. The corps of reserves, having the longest march to per- form, upon roads made impassable by drenching rains which had over- taken the troops in ^rivouac, found almost insuperable difficulties to arrive in time at the common rendezvous at Monterey, and, in fact, could not reach there before twelve hours after the appointed time. The artillery of Brigadier-General Breckinridge, fast in the mud, was only relieved after great difficulties by large detachments sent to the rear from the regiments composing the corps. The perplexities were so great that Brigadier-General Breckinridge reported his situation to the general. "Let a new road be cut" was, according to Major Hayden, the laconic reply the messenger received. The attack was to have been made on the morning of Saturday, the 5th of April, and the troops were ordered to march from Monterey — a few homesteads, surrounded by woods, and some eleven miles from the river — at three o'clock in the morning, But a heavy rain falling during the night upon worn-out troops, retarded the preparations for the march of the army until about seven o'clock. Then, when in ser- ried ranks and upon many lines, overhead gloomy clouds charged with rain, in the morning mist, at the head of every regiment, the general's last battle-order was read. " Soldiers of the Army of the Mississippi," said he, " I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country. With reso- lution and disciplined valor, becoming men fighting as you are for all that is worth living or dying for, you can but march to decisive victo- ry over the agrarian mercenaries who have been sent to despoil you of your liberties, your property, and your honor. " Remember the precious stake that is involved in this contest ; remember the dependence of your mothers, your wives, your sisters, and your children is upon the result. "Remember the fair, broad, abounding land, the happy homes, and the ties that would be dissolved and desolated by your defeat. " The eyes and hopes of eight millions of people re'st upon you. You are expected to show yourselves worthy of your race and your lineage; worthy of the women of the South, whose noble devotion in this war has never been exceeded at any time. . " With such incentives to brave deeds, and in the trust that God is with you, your generals will lead you confidently to the combat, fully assured of ultimate and glorious success." When the reading was concluded there rose from every line such successive: shouts of determination and patriotic devotion, as gave unmistakable evidence of victory. But, owing to the difficult march over rough roads, and the immense host assembled in one spot, delays occurred which retarded the arrival MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 257 of the rear column at Mickey's house, six miles from the river, until near four in the afternoon. General Johnston had advanced on a per- sonal reconnoissance within two miles of Shiloh Church, and would have hcgun the attack that evening but for the greatly fatigued con- dition of the troops. In such proximity to the enemy it was greatly to be feared that he would become aware of and prepare for the im- pending danger. In tho ovening of Saturday a council of war was held. Several commanders called the attention of the commanding goncral to tho long delay of thirty-six hours, which should have given ample time to the enemy to reçoive the shock ; and one of the general officers there assembled strongly urged a rctroat. But General Johnston decided upon and ordered the attack for the coming morning. He followed thus the maxim of Napoleon, that "When once tho offensive has been assumed, it must be sustained to the last extremity. However skilful the manœuvres, a retreat will always weaken the morale of an army ; because, in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats cost always more men and material than the most bloody engagements, with this difference: that in a battle the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own, whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only." The wisdom of General Johnston's decision was apparent the follow- ing morning, when Major-General Hardee, with his corps, surprised and overthrew the advance forces of the enemy. From that moment he never doubted a complete victory, and the speedy recovery of all the territory he had lost — a result destined to remain unfulfilled by the interposition of the hand of death. Wo do not here design to record the character, events, failures, and consequences of the Battle of Shiloh, but only wish to confine ourselves to those facts immediately bearing upon the illustrious name heading this paper. For this purpose we are sure we could offer no more accept- able and interesting account than that which flowed from the pen of Colonel, now Major-General, William Preston, the intimate friend of General Johnston, given in a letter to the general's son, Colonel W. Preston Johnston, aide-de-camp to President Davis, dated " Corinth, April 18, 1862." "The country from Corinth to Pittsburg," says Colonel Preston, "passes over low and swampy lands, poor and uncultivated, to Mon- terey, eleven miles from the former place. The road then passes north- ward to a farm-house called Mickey's for about four miles, and a num- ber of country roads, through hilly and wooded uplands, some seven miles to the Tennessee river. Owl creek flows nearly east into the Tennessee near Pittsburg, and Lick creek in a general parallel direc- tion about five miles distant to the south. Tho ridge xlividing the small 22* 258 the spirit of branches and tributaries of these creeks lies from Mickey's north-cast- ward to the river, and country roads traversing hills becoming bolder and more difficult as you approach the river, pass by Shiloh, a little country chapel thrco miles from Pittsburg. Occasional fields and cab- ins intervene, but the clearings are not numerous or extensive. The enemy were encamped near Shiloh, before Pittsburg, on the verge of some -woodlands, half a mile from the river, and near the fields. * * * " The morning of the 6th of April was calm, bright, and beautiful. We were in the saddle before the dawn was clear, and a fire between skirmishers opened in the front on the line of Hardee's advance. Be- tween dawn and sunrise sharp volleys were heard, and the general, with his staff, rode to the verge of the wood near a field where Hindman's brigade was suffering under a heavy fire. Some of the men were break- ing ranks, and there were many dead and wounded. The general, in person, rallied the stragglers, and I rode forward, where I found Gen- eral Hindman animating and leading on his men. He informed mo that he desired support, and, having reported it to the general, he re- quested me to order General Bragg to advance. General Bragg, when found by me, stated that the order had been given ten minutes before. " General Hindman pushed on in the direction of the advanced camp of the enemy, occupied by the 13th and 18th Wisconsin regiments, and other troops, from which there was a heavy fire of musketry and artil- lery. " General Johnston then passed to the left at a point in front of the camps, near two cabins, subsequently used as a hospital. A field of an hundred acres, fringed with forest, extended to the north-east. Through this General Cleburne's brigade moved in beautiful order, and with loud and inspiring cheers, in the direction of the centre of the advanced camp. Heavy firing was heard as they neared it. " General Johnston then went to the camp assailed, which was carried between seven and eight o'clock. The enemy were evidently surprised. The breakfasts were on the mess-tables, the baggage unpacked, the knapsacks, arms, stores, colors, and ammunition abandoned. I took one stand of colors from the colonel's tent, which was sent by me, next morning, through Colonel Gilmer to General Beauregard. " General Hardee reported his men still advancing at this camp about nine o'clock, and conferred with General Johnston, who was reconnoi- tring a second line of camps near the river, where the enemy were post- ed in force. They then commenced shelling the first camp, apparently attracted by the presence of the stall' and escort; the distance being, I should think, six or eight hundred yards, and shells from the gunboats, of large size, were thrown. General Johnston received a report and rough draft at this timo from Captain Lockett, stating that the enemy were strongly posted on the left in front of our right. Hoavy muskotry MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 259 firing and cannonades indicated that Bragg and Hardee were success- fully advancing on our left. "General Johnston rode down the hill to escape the shells, and his escort back toward the woods. This was about half-past nine. After pondering a little while he determined to bring forward Breckinridge's reserve, and, feeling his way to the river, to turn the enemy's left. The brigade of Chalmers was moved to our extreme right: Botfen's next, eight hundred yards in rear of Chalmers', and Statham's eight hundred yards in rear of Bowen's, in an echelon of brigades. Statham's bri- gade, under the immediate command of Breckinridge, then assailed the camp near the river, when they wore vigorously met, and a fierce strug- gle ensued. " General Johnston then deployed Bowen's brigade, and advanced to the support of Breckinridge. Batteries were brought forward, and Chalmers' extended on the right to the river. The enemy's left flank was completely turned. A few minutes afterward he was struck by a ball, and passed on. His horse was wounded in two places, and a minie ball severed the artery of his leg : but still riding on, concealing his wound, he fell at length from exhaustion. Governor Harris was near him. I found him a few minutes after he was shot, and asked him to speak to me. I could find no wound on his body. He breathed for a little while, but did not speak, or recognize me, and expired without a pang— his countenance bearing the same noble serenity in death that it had done in life. "After his death we bore his body back to the camp, concealing his death, and roporting to General Beauregard, with whom we remained until the close of the day; and the remains were afterwards conveyed to Now Orleans and deposited in the Cemetery of St. Louis." # * * * * • • * Thus fell a soldier who united, in ft remarkable degree, the attributes of a general as he should be ; and who offers, in the completeness of his character, the most worthy subject of study and emulation to the Confederate army. Thus fell a citizen in the defence of his country, unswerving in his devotion and patriotism. Just, pure, and good, his name will become a household-word in every family ; and as years roll onward, and much that now is will be obscured or forgotten in the mists of the past, his eminent virtues will grow more and more in brilliancy. Thus died a martyr in the defence of what nations hold most dear, and which it is most wicked to undermine and attack — the sacred right of self-government— the independence of one's country— the security and sanctity of our homes, and all that man loves and cherishes— with- out which life is but a burden, and death a heavenly favor. 260 THE SPtRIT OF CHAPTER IV. REPUTATION OF GENERALS. Marshal Brune— Three great epochs of his life — Switzerland, Holland, Italy — De- spite exceptions, merit should be judged by success — Classification of generals — The first class — In antiquity and modern times — The second class — Is more nu- merous — The third clasB — Generals composing it are rare — The fourth and last class. Note. — Marshal Bi une. I will terminate this work by some reflections upon the reputation of generals, and the reasons which should establish the same. Generals sometimes attach their names to successes to which they are strangers ; these arc successes obtained either despite their bad disposi- tions, or in consequence of received and properly-followed counsels. I have known several which come under this category — among which the most notable is Marshal Brune,* who, judged by this standard, was of great mediocrity. Nevertheless, his name i3 associated with three glorious souvenirs : With the successes of the French army against the Swiss, in 1798 ; against the English and Russians, in 1799 ; and against the Austrians in Italy, in 1800. In Switzerland, the superiority of our forces and the divisions exist- ing in that country, necessarily decided the question in his favor. In Holland he was not at the engagement of Berghen ,• the Battle of Be- wervich was brought about by accident, and suddenly fought without any plan of conduct or any aim. The follies and the stupidity of the Duke of York alone led to any definite results. In 1800, in Italy, after brilliant successes, to which the gencral-in-chief was nearly a stranger, we were in a condition, had wo but had another man at our head, to de- stroy the hostile army entirely. On the other hand, we could cite examples where the efforts of men of •great talent were wholly unattended by fortune. But these different examples do not prevent us from judging by re- sults, and this is the justest manner of appreciating the value and the merit of generals. To assume a different basis, and to support one's judgment by the opinion alone which one has formed of a general's mind and talents, would be to enter into an inextricable labyrinth, and would often lead to error — since every one would then but look through the prism of preju- dice, friendship, and passions. If we are sometimes mistaken by judg- • Dospite his private qualities and his deplorable end, we can not but point out Marshal Brune as one of the most singular aud striking instances of the caprices of fortune. — Note of Author. MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 261 ing upon the basis of facts, we will err much more frequently by solely reposing our judgment upon a personal knowledge of the individuals* Fortune may once or twice overwhelm a man with its favors who is not worthy of them, and it may betray the highest combinations of genius and humiliate a noble character; but when the strife is prolonged and events are multiplied, then a man, complete in all the requirements of a general, will infallibly succeed ; and if continuous reverses succeed each other we may boldly conclude that, despite a superior mind and quali- ties which have dazzled us, one defect of harmony in his qualities will destroy the charm. I may class generals in four categories. In the first I place generals who have gained every battle they fought. The very first place in public opinion incontestably belongs to them. But their number is so small that we can barely find their names. In antiquity I see but Alexander and Caesar. The Grecian generals whose names have become illustrious, as Miltiades and Epaminondas, owe their celebrity to one or two actions. In modern times I see only Qustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Luxembourg, and Napoleon until 1812; because I place, with reason, among the number of reverses for which a general is accountable, the destruction of armies, the cause of which was a want of care and an ex- ceeding improvidence. In the second category I place generals who, having often gained bat- tles, sometimes lost them aftor they had disputed them obstinately. They are among those whose greatest number is inscribed in the temple of memory. Perhaps there are some among them worthy to figure among those of the preceding class ; because, between two equally meri- torious generals, while the victory must be decided in favor of one of them, it will be but a dearly-bought one, and its results will be limited. In the third category will be those generals who, habitually unlucky in war, and sustaining frequent reverses, have never been destroyed or discouraged, but have always maintained an imposing and respecf-in- spiring front toward the enemy. These generals are rarely met with, since they must have a great as- cendency over those who surround them. Such have been in antiquity Sertorius and Mithridates, and in modern times the celebrated Wallen- stein, and William III, King of England. Finally, in the fourth category, wo naturally find those who lose their armies without fighting, and without making the enemy win hia victory through a vigorous resistance. Their names can be easily recalled, for each country and every epoch has furnished instances of them. NOTES. Marshal Brune. — Guillaume Marie Anne Brune, born on the 13th of May, 17G3. This officer entered th» French army in 1791. and was at once appointed 262 THE SPIRIT OP adjutant-major. He continued attached to the adjutant-general's departiuont until 1797. when he was promoted to the rank of division-general. In this distin- guished position he successively commandeer the Armies of Italy, Holland, the West, and the Reserve. In December, 1801, he was appointed a state councillor, and in September, 1802, was sent on an embassy to Turkey. On the 19th of May, 1804, General Brune received a marshal's bâton. In the following year be com- manded the coast army, and in December, 1806, he was appointed Governor General of the Hanseatic towns. During the Empire he passed through the degrees of the Legion of Honor ; and as he declared his adhesion to the Bourbon cause after the Battle of Toulouse, he was, in 1814, honored with the cross of a Chevalier de St. Louis, created a peer of France, and governor of the eighth military division In 1815. He did not long survive the fortunes of his great master. Napoleon, or his own new honors. In August, 1815, he was brutally murdered by an infuriated mob at Avignon, instigated by some malicious leaders, who accused him of having been an active participator in the massacres of 1792, when, in fact, he was at the time serving on the frontiers. CONCLUSION. From all that precedes, I believe we are able to draw the following conclusions : 1. The fundamental principle of the organization of an army is found in the united spirit which influences an assemblage of men, and which, through it, becomes a compact mass and a unit, infusing, by means of a skilful and ingenious system of mechanical movements, an extraordinary degree of mobility into all the different parts of which the army is composed. 2. The several parts forming the elements of this whole must have dimensions, a form, and limits, which are the necessary consequences of the faculties of the man and the arms he uses. 3. Nothing is arbitrary in tho organization of troops and the move- ments of armies. Everything, on the contrary, should depend upon rulos, which themselves are derived from certain laws. Their applica- tion at the right time and in the proper manner forms the whole science of military operations. 4. An army is composed of its material and the men. There are natural and determined relations between these two elements, which, however, vary with the circumstances and the end proposed. These proportions do not depend upon caprice, but solely upon the nature of things. 5. The greater or lesser efficiency of these two elements powerfully influences tho result, and tho quantity of each mostly depends upon its quality. 6. A third element influences the value of troops — it is the moral MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. 263 element. It alone oftou surpasses all others in importance, although the latter influence, to some exteut, the efficiency of a body of troops, because it is requisite that tho body be in existenoe before the spirit can animate it. Thus, beyond a certain limit, the real strength of an army is not aug- mented by reason of the number of its soldiers and the resources in material, but much more by reason of the spirit by which it is ani- mated. 7. To develop the spirit of an army, to augment its confidence, to speak to its imagination, to exalt tho soul of the soldier — such should be the constant object of a general's cares and efforts. 8. Military spirit has for its element the esprit de corps ; it is a pow- erful resort which can never be fostered too much. In the opinion of each soldier the army to which ho belongs, and the general under whom ho serves, should appear invincible; ho should constantly maintain that his division is the best one in tho army, and his regiment the bravest and most glorious one in tho service. With these convictions, his strength and his courage will be tenfold augmented. 9. Lastly, every warrior should be profoundly imbued with the idea of his country's glory, and devotion to his chief magistrate, who is tho representative and exponent of its grandeur. He should constantly re- member, that love for his country, the divine sentiment by Providence graven into the heart» of every human being, will sustain him «always, will make him a great man, and that it will place him absve all even- tualities. But this sentiment should not be a vain expression — it must bo sincere, serious, and energetic ; its reality should be proven, when- ever necessary, by every sacrifice. History of every age has transmitted to us examples ; even if they are rare, they are sublime, and their re- sults have astonished mankind. 10. The best army is the one, therefore, which most fully satisfies the conditions above enumerated; their " ensemble " and their accord constitute its true value. As these conditions are almost ever changing ani of difficult appreciation — because the mind can not embrace all possible combinations at once — no one can in advance determine the effective power of an army in any rigorous and dofinite manner; we can only judge of an army before it has been tried, by a sort of instinct which is not very far from the truth. But at a later period this value can, with certainty, bo determined by the nature of the performances of an army, and their results. My labors come here to a close. This sketch suffices for the fulfil- ment of the object I have had in view. To give to each part of which it is composed all the finish of which it would be susceptible, requires too extended labors, which I have neither the strength nor the wish to undertake. I ha/*, however, aaid en mgh to lead the minds of «oldier» 264 THE SPIRIT OF to reflect upon their calling, and to show to them that our sublime pro- fession is based upon certain principles which ought never to be disre- garded ; and that when they are respected, they impart the greatest possible value to the means of action they control, which, in fact, should be the constant aim of him who is called upon to command. APPENDIX. EXPOSITION OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE ART OF WAR. A Z^f„7' r encra J Jo ; ,m ' s ce,cbratetI *"*<«» ™^> l.y Tu „ e " ara " de ° W"»™» mttaire.» From the French, by Colonel Fn«K Schaller, Confederate Army. There have existed, in all time,, fundamental principles upon which the correct combmations of war repose, and to which they shou d all be compared, to enable us to judge of their true merit. The» principle. are immutable, independent of the kind of arms of ations of winch tbe.r application is susceptible. For thirty centuries IZZ h" Tr' S Wh ° haVe ' m ° re ° r "" ha ^«^ applied em J™, Ha , nn ' b , al ™ re «™* «>>«»»; Greece and Rome have fur- shed several ; Alexander oftentimes manoeuvred with skill; fesar did no less successfully lead to wars of invasion and great „pc at in" Tamerlane even, of whom we know so little, has left institution which .llnstrate upon every page, that natural genius which knows how to command men and to triumph over every obstacle. When we dm pare the causes of the victories of antiquity with those of moder" we are ,„„te surpnsed to find that the Battles of Wagram, of Ph,, . ' and Cannae were gained through the same first cause ' However, through some fatality difficult to be comprehended the greater part of writers who have treated upon the miHtary ar ann ar sory detads the proper direction of great operations, or the wise em- ployment of masses on the day of battle. The resuit has been a hosHf work. ,„ wh.ch the authors by arranging, i„ their own manner inl :: :.;• n t s 'at:b vcun " oubtediy proven a <™ ai ° f -^ «« crud.ton but at the expense of obscuring a science which they had he mtenfon to place within the reach of every one: several of them The An of War to the manner in which officer, should carry their sword, and to the sh ape of goa-rMinxU. 266 AFFENDIX. The result of these fatiguing dissertations has been to persuade many military men, otherwiso very estimable, that there are no rules what- ever in warfare ; an absurd and unsustainable error.* Undoubtedly, there exists no system of war exclusively good, because they all arc tho results of hypothetical calculations. A system is a combination of the human mind, subject to deceive itself, and which oftentimes, by the aid of high-sounding phrases and technical words artfully arranged, gives to the falsest ideas the color of truth. But it is entirely different with principles. They aro invariable; the human mind can neither modify nor destroy them. To give exact notions of war it was, therefore, necessary that authors, instead of creating absurd systems, which destroy each other, should have begun by establishing the principles with which all combinations may be reconciled. This would have been a greater and moro difficult labor — but one which would have,secured some fixed result. We would not now find so many persons incredulous about the real state of the science. Mack would not have written, in 1793, that the longest lines were the strongest; Billow, in his chapter of eccentric retreats, would not have pretended that a beaten army, to save itself, ought to be di- vided into as many corps as there are roads to retreat upon, should it even never succeed in reassembling its columns thus broken ; neither would a system of cordon have been introduced, which scatters an army upon all the different roads, at the risk of being taken, as Turenne did with that of Bournonvillc in Alsatia. Frederic hrad wisely written that the talent of a great captain con- sisted in forcing his enemy to divide; and, fifty years thereafter, sever- al generals thought it an admirable manœuvre to divide their own forces as much as they could. Such a subversion of ideas could not fail to be the consequence of that uncertainty which controlled individ- ual opinions; in fact, the grossest errors would not have thus been ad- vanced, and the most eminent truths of the art would not have been misconstrued by military men, if, instead of laying down vague suppo- sitions and uncertain calculations, military writers had endeavored to demonstrate incontestable principles, and to give a common regulator to opinions till thon divergent. • I heard a general of a certain reputation say, at the Château of Austerlitz, when speaking of a cavalry charge : " I would like very much the famous tacti- cians to explain to me by what rule we came out of that charge, where the squad- ron of both parties were mixed together." Undoubtedly, in a incite of cavalry, where the troops are already too much engaged to think of manoeuvring, the only rule is to sabre; but is there anything proved by this truth? What was that charge by itself in the grand ensemble of the battle? Napoleon, who ordered it, has ex- plained it already; it was the action of a secondary mans to restrain an effort of the enemy, while the g\^t blcrw wan Struck upon a different portion oi the field. . APPENDIX. 207 I have dared to undertake this dilficult task without, perhaps, pos- sessing the necessary talent for its complete solution; but it has ap- peared to me of importance to lay down the basis, whose development would have been much longer postponed, had we not been enabled to profit by circumstances in order to establish them. The only means to arrive at ray aim was first to indicate the princi- ples, and theu to show their application and their proofs by the history of twenty celebrated campaigns. This history [General Jomini is here speaking of his history of the wars of Frederic II, the wars of the Rev- olution, and of those of the Empire] should, then, present a strong and rational criticism of every operation which would be contrary to es- tablished rules. Had I approved of what was in opposition with these rules, I would have been guided by blâmable and unworthy motives in the work I have undertaken. Whatever were the personal qualities of a general and the reputation which ho enjoyed, I have frankly re- vealed every fault he has committed; I have not even hesitated an instant to come into collision with my private affections. After such an avowal, my reflections can neither be attributed to envy nor to per- sonal enmity; the cause will be entirely in the interest of the art. The fundamental principle of all military combinations consists in making, with the largest mass of one's forces, a combined effort upon the decisive point. It will be well understood that a skilful general can, with sixty thou- sand men, beat one hundred thousand men, if he succeeds in throwing fifty thousand men into action upon a single portion of tho line of the enemy. The numerical superiority of the troops not engaged becomes, in such a case, more hurtful than advantageous, because it can not but increase the disorder, as tho Battle of Leuthen has proved. The means of applying this maxim are not very numerous ; I am going to attempt to indicate them : I. The first means is to tako the initiative of the movements. Tho general who succeeds in placing this advantage on his side is master, to employ his forces where ho deems it suitable to carry them; the one, on the contrary, who awaits tho enemy can not be master of any combinations, since he subordinates his movements to those of his adversary, and because he has it no longer in his power to arrest the latter's designs when they are in full execution. The general who takes the initiative knows what he has to do ; ho conceals his march; surprises and overwhelms an extremity and a weak part. The one who waits is beaten upon one of his parts, before he is even informed of the attack. II. The second means is to direct one's movements upon that weak part which it is most advantageous to carry. The choice of this part depends upon tho position of tho enemy. The most important point 268 APPENDIX. will always be the one whose occupation will procure the most favor- able chances and the greatest results. Such will bo, for example, those positions which aim at gaining the communications of the enemy with the base of his operations, and to crowd him back upon some insur- mountable obstacle, such as a sea, a large river without any bridge, or a great neutral power. In double and disunited lines of operations, it is requisite to direct one's attacks upon the points of the centre; by throwing thither the mass of one's forces the isolated divisions which guard those points are overwhelmed. The scattered corps upon the right and the left can no longer operate in concert, and are forced to make those eccentric retreats, whose terrible effects have been felt by the armies of Wurm- ser, of Mack, and of the Duke of Brunswick. In simple lines of operations and in contiguous lines of battle the weak points are, on the contrary, upon the extremities of the line. Indeed, the centre is within reach of being simultaneously sustained by the right and the left; while one extremity, when attacked, would be overthrown before sufficient means could arrive from the other wing to support it, because its means would be much too far distant, and could not be employed except one after another. A deep column, attacked upon its head, is in the same situation as a line attacked upon its extremity ; they will both be successively engaged and beaten, as has been demonstrated by the defeats of Ross- bach and Auerstedt. However, it is easier to make new dispositions in the case of a deep column, than it would be with a line of battle which would find itself attacked upon one extremity. In executing, by strategy, a general movement upon the extremity of the line of operations of the enemy, not only can we act in masses upon a weak part, but we can, from this extremity, easily gain the rear and the communications with either the base or with the secondary lines. Thus Napoleon by gaining, in 1805, Donauwerth and the line of the Lech, had established his masses upon the communications of Mack with Vienna, which was the base of that general with Bohemia, and he made it impossible for him to join the Russian army, which was his most important secondary line. The same operation took place in 1806, upon the extreme left of the Prussians, about Saalfeld and Gera. It was again repeated in 1812, by the Russian army in its movements upon Kaluga and Krasnoï, and in 1813 by the Allies, when they direct- ed their march across Bohemia, upon Dresden and Leipzig, against the right of Napoleon.* • It has been remarked that central lines did not save Napoleon in the direction of Dresden in 1813, nor in the Champagne in 1814; but I may observe, in my turn, that he, nevertheless, owed to this system his momentary successes in both of these campaigns. The cause of his reverses consisted in the inequality of the strife and the secondary means; in the difference of the nature of his troops ; iu APPENDIX. 269 III. The result of the preceding truths proves that, if it be requisite to attack by preference the extremity of a line, it is likewise necessary to beware of attacking both extremities at the same time, at least if one hare not very superior forces. An army of sixty thousand men, which forms two corps of about thirty thousand combatants each, by attacking both extremities of an army equal in numbers, deprives itself of the means of striking a decisive blow by uselessly multiply- ing the number of the means of resistance which the enemy can oppose to its two detachments. It even exposes itself, by an extended and disunited movement, to the assemblage of its adversary's masses upon one point, and to be annihilated by tho terrible effect of their superior- ity. Multiplied attacks upon a larger number of columns are still more dangerous, and more contrary to the great principle of the art, especially as they can not enter into action at the same instant and upon the same point. It follows from this maxim that it is suitable, on the contrary, when we have masses much superior to those of the enemy, to attack upon both extremities ; we thus succeed to bring into action more men than he upon each one of his wings, while by koeping very superior forces upon one single point tim adversary might deploy his, and force us to combat with equal numbers. Care should be taken in such a case to throw the heavy portion of one's forces upon that wing where the attack would promise the most decisive results. This we have demon- strated by the relation of the Battle of Hochkirch, in the Seven Years' War. placing Bohemia and Bavaria in the rear of his extreme right, and, so to say, upon his own communications. For the rest, I may still add that the system of central masses had not been applied until then but by armies of one hundred and fifty to two hundred thousand men at most, and as it would be useless to concen- trate more forces upon the same line, since it is already a difficult matter to en- gage as many troops on the same day and upon the same battle-field. Nor have I given any exclusive preference to central operations, since I have often presented those upon one extremity of the enemy's line as most advanta- geous. Besides, we must not confound a central line of operations opposed to two parties upon one single front (for example, that of Archduke Charles against Moreau and Jourdan in 1796), with a line of operations totally surrounded by enemies; these last are much less favorable; they may even become dangerous, when the masses of the enemy are more numerous. Finally, I may say, in resuming, that one mass surrounded by all Europe risen against it, composed of heterogeneous parts, famished by its own greatness, and by light troops such as have never before been seen, could not have, by means of a central position alone, escaped the fate which struck Napoleon in Saxony. But one exception alone does not destroy a rule or a general maxim: and, in all ordi- nary ware, a power which will fight with equal chances — that is to say, with equal means — by applying this system will inevitably triumph, if its enemies follow a contrary system. I appeal to the most distinguished general officers of all armies, and cite as proofs the best feats of arms in modern history. 270 APPENDIX. IV. To make a combined effort with a large mass upon one single point, it is requisite, in strategic movements, to keep one's forces upon a space very nearly square, that they may be more disposable.* Large fronts are as contrary to good principles as broken, disunited lines, great detachments, and isolated divisions, unable to maintain them- selves. V. One of the most efficient means to apply the general principle which we have indicated is, to make the enemy commit faults con- trary to that principle. With several small bodies of light troops, we can give him uneasiness upon several important points of his commu- nications. It is likely that, not knowing their strength, he will oppose to them numerous divisions, and break up his masses ; these light troops contribute likewise to protect the army perfectly against any kind of danger. VI. It is very important, if we take the initiative of a decisive move- ment, to neglect nothing concerning the enemy's positions, and the movements which he would be enabled to make. Espionage is a useful means, whose perfection can not be too highly estimated; but what is still more essential is, to have always a perfect system of reconnois- sances by partisan rangers. A general should scatter small parties in every direction, and their number must be increased with as much care as this system must be avoided in great operations. To this end sever- al divisions of light cavalry will be organized, which never enter into the lists of combatants. To operate without these precautions wouM be to march in darkness, and to be exposed to disastrous chances which a secret movement of the enemy would produce. They have been too much neglected, because the department of espionage has not been suf- ficiently organized beforehand, and officers of light troops have not al- ways the necessary experience to conduct their detachments/}" * By this it must not be understood that it is necessary to form a regular squared column, but that the battalions should bo disposed upon the ground so as to bo able to march, with the same degree of promptitude, from all points toward the one which would be assailed. f The immense advantages which the Cossacks have given to the Russian armies are a proof of the truth of this article, written in 1806. These light troops, insignificant in the shock of a great battle, are terrible in the pursuit. They are the most formidable enemy of all the combinations of a general, since he is never sure whether his orders have been received and executed, as 'his convoys are always compromised, and his operations uncertain. As long as an army possesses only a few regiments of them, their whole value is unknown; but if their number is from fifteen to twenty thousand, their whole importance has been felt,.especially in countries whose population is not opposed to them. As soon as they have once carried off a convoy, it is necessary to escort them all, and that the escort be a numerous and well-conducted one. We are never certain APPENDIX. 271 VII. It is not sufficient, for the proper operations in war, to skilfully throw our masses upon the most important points ; wo must also know how to engage them there. When wc are onco established upon these points, and remain there in inaction, then is the principle forgotten. The onemy is enabled to make counter-manoeuvres, and, in order to deprive him of this means, it is necessary, as soon as we have gained his communications, or one of his extremities, that wo march upon him and engage him. It is at that time particularly that a well-combined and simultaneous employment of our forces is of importance The masses present do not decide any battles, but the masses in action. Tho first decide in the preparatory movements of strategy ; tho last deter- mine the success of the action. To obtain this result, a skilful general must seize the instant when it becomes necessary to carry the decisive position of the battle-field, and he must combine the attack so as to engage all of his forces at tho same time, with the sole exception of the troops retained to form the corps of reserves. When an effort based upon such principles will not be successful in procuring the victory, it need not be expected from any other combina- tion, and the only remaining hope will be to strike a last blow with this corps of reserves, in concert with the troops already engaged. VIII. All the combinations of a battle may be reduced to three sys- tems : The first, which is purely defensive, consists in awaiting the enemy in a strong position, without any other aim than to maintain ourselves there ; of such a nature were the dispositions of Daun at Torgau, and of Marsin within the lines of Turin. These two events sufficiently de- monstrate how vicious such combinations are. The second system, on the contrary, is entirely offensive; it consists in attacking the enemy wherever we can find him, as Frederic did at Lcuthcn and at Torgau, Napoleon at Jena and Ratisbon, and the Al- lies at Leipzig. of any tranquil inarch, because we never know where the enemy is. These mean jobs require immense forces, and tho regular cavalry is soon put " liars de service" by fatigues which it can not bear. The Turkish militia was nearly as effectivo against the Russians as the Cossacks were against other Europoan armies: tho convoys are not more secure in Bulgaria than they were in Spain and Poland. As for the rest. 1 believe that in the other armies several thousands of volunteer hus- sars or Lancers, raised in the beginning of the war, well-conducted, and operating where their chiefs WOnld conduct them, would neatly answer the same end; but they must always be considered as "tnfaSM ptrdtu" because, should they receive their orders from the adjutant-general's office, they would no lonj sr !"• partisans. It is true tbej would not have the same qualities, and would not, in the long run, light as woll a? Oos6acks>. but to si, inevitable evil we mu^f oppose every possible idy. 272 APPENDIX. The third system, lastly, is somewhat the mean between the two others; it consists in selecting a field of battle whose strategical con- veniences and advantages of "terrain " are perfectly known, in order to await the enemy there, and to choose, during the day, the very mo- ment most suitable for taking the initiative, and to fall upon the adversa- ry with every chance of success. The combinations of Napoleon at Rivoli and at Austerlitz, those of Wellington at Mont-Saint-Jean and in most of his defensive battles in Spain, must be ranked in this class. It would be a difficult matter to give fixed rules to determine the em- ployment of these two last systems, which arc the only ones suitable. Re- gard must be had to the moral state of the troops of each party, to the national character, whether it be more or less phlegmatic or impetuous, and, lastly, to the obstacles which are presented by the field of battle. It is therefore seen that these circumstances, above all others, must di- rect the genius of a general, and these truths may be reduced to the threo following points : 1. That with troops well accustomed to war and upon ordinary ground, the absolute offensive or the initiative of the attack is always most suitable. 2. That upon grounds of difficult access, either by nature or owing to other causes, and with disciplined and submissive troops, it is per- haps more advantageous to permit the enemy to arrive in a position previously well known, in order to take thereafter the initiative against him, when his troops are already exhausted by their first efforts.* 3. That the strategical situation of the two parties may, nevertheless, require that we sometimes attack with strong force the positions of our adversary, without permitting any local consideration to prevent us from so doing — such are, for examplo, the circumstances in which it would be requisite to prevent the junction of two hostile armies, to fall upon a detached part of the enemy's army, or upon an isolated corps beyond a stream, etc. IX. The orders of battle, or the most suitable dispositions to conduct troops into combat, should have for their object to give to the troops at the same time mobility and solidity. It appears to me that, to satisfy both of these conditions, troops remaining upon the defensive might be partly deployed and partly in column, as was the Russian army at Ey- lau ; but the corps disposed in order to attack a decisive point must be composed of two lines of battalions; each battalion, instead of being deployed, would be formed in column by divisions in the following manner :")" * The Battle of Kvmersdorf, which offers many points of resemblance with that of Mont-Saint-Jean, additionally justifies this train of reasoning. + A division of two platoons : thus, the battalion having six companies or six platoons, will have three divisions; which, in fact, will form it upon three lines. 6 th. 5th. APPENDIX. 4th. 3d. 2d. 273 1st batt. • 12th. 11th. 10th. 9th. 8th. 7 th. This order offers infinitely more solidity than a deployed line, whose wavering prevents the impulsion so necessary for such an attack, and which hinders the officers from leading their commands. However> to facilitate the march, to avoid the too great depth of the mass, and to augmont, on the contrary, the front, without at the same time lessening its consistence, I believe it to bo suitable to place the infantry in two ranks. The battalions will thus become more mobile, since the march of the second rank, pressed between the first and the third, is always fatiguing, wavering, and in consequence less lively. They will, be- sides, have all the strength desirable, as the three ployed divisions will present six ranks in depth, which is already more than sufficient. Finally, the front, augmented by one-third, will have a greater fire, in case it should avail itself of it, and at the same time it will greatly impose upon the enemy, and, by showing to him moro men, it will give less play to his artillery. X. Upon grounds of difficult access, such as vineyards, enclosures, gardens, and entrenched heights, the defensive order of battle should be composed of battalions deployed in two ranks, and covered by numerous platoons of skirmishers. But tho attacking troops, as well as the reserve, could not be better placed than in columns of attack in the centre, as we have indicated it in the preceding article, because the reserve, before being ready to fall upon tho enemy at the decisive mo- ment, should be prepared to do it with forco and vivacity — that is to say, in columns.* This reserve may, however, be partly deployed until * It has been said that Lord Wellington fought nearly always deployed. This may he true in the case of troops which romain always upon the defensive ; hut in the case of offensive and manoeuvring wings, I believe that it is necessary to form columns. In the contrary case it will bo entirely the fault of the beaten army if it permits itself to be conquored by such a system, because a general ought to desire no hotter chance than t.> have an adversary who always gives battle witii deployed lin^s. I once more appeal] in regard t" this subject) to the générale who have been engaged in the great European wars. It remain* only to add that, by considering one order of battle M th* m - it is not intended to say that 24 274 ÀrrENDix. the moment of attack, in order to be imposing to the enemy by its extent. XL If the art of war consists in concerting a superior effort of one mass against the weakest parts, it is incontestably necessary to push a beaten army in a lively manner. The strength of an army consists in its organization, and in the "ensemble" resulting from the bond of all parts with the central point which causes them to mo™. After a defeat, this "ensemble" exists no longer ; the harmony between the head which combines and the corps which should execute is destroyed — their relations are suspended and nearly always broken. The entire army is one weak part ; to attack the same is equivalent to marching to a certain triumph. What proofs of these truths we find in the march upon Roveredo and the gorges of the Brenta, to complete the ruin of Wurmser; in the march from Ulm upon Vienna — in that from Jena upon Wittenberg, Custrin, and Stettin [* This maxim is often neglected by mediocre generals. It seems that the whole effort of their genius and the goal of their am- bition is limited to become masters of the field of battle. A victory of this kind is nothing but a mere shifting of troops without any real utility. XII. To render decisive the superior shock of one mass of troops, it is necessary that the general do not in any degree attend less to the moral condition of his army. What would, in fact, be the value of fifty thousand men placed in line of battle before twenty thousand, if they were not possessed of the necessary impulsion to engage and overthrow the enemy? Not only the soldier is thereby affected— it influences still more particularly those who are called upon to lead him. All troops are brave when the chiefs give the example of a noble emu- lation and of a proper devotion. A soldier must not face the fire by reason of fear alone, which a rigorous discipline inspires ; it is neces- sary that he cheerfully confront it, imbued with that self-love which impels him not to cede anything to his officers in point of honor and bravery, and especially through that confidence in the wisdom of his victory would be entirely impossible, if it bo not strictly applied; localities, gen- eral causes, superiority of numbers, the moral condition of the troops, and the generals, all are considerations to be weighed in the general aspect. And when we reason upon a general maxim, it must be admitted that every one of these chances are of equal weight. * This chapter was published in 1806. Since then the Russian army has fur- nished a renewed proof of this truth, by the activity and the perseverance with which it followed up its successes toward the close of the year 1812. The Emperor Alexander has likewise made a brilliant application of this principle in 1814. APPENDIX. 275 chiefs and the courage of his companions-in-arms with which his supe- rior has succeeded in inspiring him.* A general must he enabled to rely, in his calculations, upon the devo- tion of his lieutenants to the honor of the national arms. It is neces- sary that he be perfectly secure that a vigorous shock will take place wherever he has ordered that it be executed. The first means to arrive at this end is to make himself beloved, esteemed, and feared; the second means is to entrust into the hands of this general the choice and the fate of his lieutenants. If the latter have arrived at their respective grades by the right alone which seniority confers, it may be decided beforehand that they scarcely ever will be possessed of the necessary qualities to completely discharge the important functions of their rank. This circumstance, by itself, may lead to the failure of the very best conceived enterprises. It is seen, by this rapid exposition, that the scienoe of war is com- posed of three general combinations, each of which offers but a small number of subdivisions and chances of execution. The only perfect operations would be those which would present the application of these three combinations, since that would be the permanent application of the general principle before indicated.! * The rules undoubtedly vary according to the different nations, and all the lesser lights and shadows illustrative of the point of honor are not applicable to every army, as the Austrian military journal has with reason remarked, when speaking of one of my chapters. But whatever this journal may advance in this respect it is certain that the rigors of discipline did not alone make the legions of Suwarrow so brave, but because he had the talent to electrify them in his own manner. Despite the criticism of the writer of that article, I still persist in believing that corporeal punishment is entirely unfit to act as an incentive. Its effects may be to modify, soften, and amend the disposition of the soldier, but it will never mako him a good one, any more than the declamations which have, perhaps, become too general against this punishment. There are other means to excite the morale of an army, and I will cite an example for illustration. At the affair of Culm, a^rgeant of the regiment of Devaux, when delivering to Prince Schwarzenberg ^standard which he had taken, explained to this marshal the re-entering and salient angles, formed by a streamlet and the Tillage which had been attacked by the corps of Colloredo. An officer of engineers could not have spoken better, and the prince himself was struck by it. This brave man had been a non-commissioned officer for nine years; ho was handed two ducats (about six dollars), aud the hope of a medal was held out to him for his standard, and his truly didactic narrative. Ought ho not have merited -another recompense, and was he not fit to command a company ? f National wan, where we are obliged to combat and conquer an entire people, alone make an exception to these rules; in wars of this kind it is a difficult mat- ter to bring a people to subjection without dividing our forces— since, whenever wo assemble them to give battle, we expose ourselves to lose the provinces already conquered. The means to guard against these inconveniences is to have an army continually 27G APPENDIX. The first of these operations is the art of encompassing the lines of op- erations in the most advantageous manner ; this is precisely what is com- monly and improperly called a ]>lan of a campaign. I really do not see what is meant by this denomination, since it is a matter of impossibilit)' to make a general plan for the whole of a campaign, the first movement of which may overthrow the whole scaffolding, and in which it would be impossible to see beyond the second movement. The second branch is the art to carry one's masses, in the most rapid manner p>ossible, upon the decisive point of the primitive line of operation, or upon the accidental line. This is what is vulgarly meant by "strate- gy." But strategy is merely the means of execution of this second combination ; its principles may be found in the above-mentioned chapters. The third branch is the art to combine the simultaneous employment of one's greatest mass upon the most important point of a field of battle; this is, properly, the art of combats, which several authors have desig- nated by the name of "order of battle," and which others have pre- sented under the name of "tactics." And here we have the science of war in a few words. It was for having forgotten this small number of principles that the Austrian gen- erals have been beaten from 1793 until 1800 and 1805 ; it was for the same cause that the French generals lost Belgium in 1793, Germany in 1796, Italy and Swabia in 1799. I need not observe to my readers that I have treated here of the prin- ciples only which relate to the employment of troops, or of the purely military part of the art of war; other no less important combinations are indispensable for the proper conduct of a great war, but they belong to the science of governing empires rather than to that of commanding armies. To be successful in great enterprises it is not only requisite to calcu- late the state of the respective armies, but also that of the means of the second line, which is designed to act as a reserve, and to replace -the losses of all kinds, both in personnel and materiel. It sfclso necessary to know how to judge of the interior state of the nations according to what they have already previously sustained, and of the relative situa- tion of their neighbors. Nor is it any less required to place into the balance the passions of the peoples against whom the war will be waged, their institutions", and the attachment they have for them. The situa- tion of the provinces must likewise be taken into account, as well as the in the field, and independent divisions for the purpose of organization in the rear. These divisions should be commanded by well-iuformed generals, good administra- tors, firm and just at the same time, because their individual labors may as much contribute to the submission of the provinces entrusted to their care as the fore» of arms. APPENDIX. 277 distance of the power which it is intended to attack, because the disad- vantages of the aggressor are multiplied in measure as he increases the depth of his line of operations. Lastly, it is necessary to judge of the nature of the country into which the war is going to be carried,* and the solidity of the alliances which may be mado for a distant enterprise. In a word, it is indispensable to know that science, a mixture of pol- itics, administration, and of war, the bases of which Montesquieu has so well laid down in his work upon the causes of the grandeur and tho de- cadence of the Romans. It would be difficult to assign to this science any fixed rules, and even any general principles ; history is the only school in which we may find some good precepts; and it is likewise very rarely that we encounter any circumstances which resemble each other sufficiently to be taken for our guidance at a certain epoch, and to shape our actions according to what was done several centuries beforo. . Tho passions of men exercise so great an influence upon events as to make it a matter of impossibility to prevent the failure of any undertaking, even when others, in similar circumstances, have succeeded. Napoleon may, perhaps, have known this science, but his contempt for men caused him to neglect its application. It was not any ignorance of tho fate of Cambyses or of the legions of Varus which caused his re- verses ; nor was it any forgetfulness of the defeat of Crassus, or of the disaster of Emperor Julian, and the result of the Crusades; it was the opinion which he had that his genius would secure to him incalculable means of superiority, and that his enemies, on the contrary, possessed none whatever. He is fallen from the pinnacle of his grandeur for having forgotten that mind and strength of man have also their limits, and that, the more enormous are the masses set in motion, the more is the power of genius subjected to the imprescriptible laws of nature, and the less it controls events. This truth, which has been demonstrated by the results of the affairs of Katzbach, Dennewitz, and even of Leipzig, would by itself make an interesting subject of study. It does not enter into my plan here to repeat the important precepts which Montesquieu and Machiavel have left to us upon the great art of directing the movements of empires. In the course of the narrative of these celebrated campaigns some reflections will bo suggested upon the change which the wars of the Revolution have caused in the ideas upon the organization and the manner of displaying national forces, upon their employment, and the consequences which will probably result therefrom in the future revolutions of the body-politic. Armies are no longer composed to-day of troops recruited voluntarily from the superfluity of a too numerous population; they are riations entire, call- * This led me to write, as long ago as 1805, volume v, chapter iv, that the system of Napoleon was not applicable either to Russia or Sweden, 278 APPENDIX. ed to arms by law; and they no longer fight for some demarcation of a frontier, but, in some sort, for their existence. This state of things throws us back to the third and fourth centuries, and recalls to us those shocks of immense peoples which disputed among each other the European continent; and if legislation and a new inter- national law do not interpose to limit these levies en masse, it is impos- sible to foresee where these ravages may stop. War will become a plague more terrible than ever, since the population of civilized nations will be gathered in, not, as in the Middle Ages, in order to resist savage hordes and devastators, but for the sorry maintenance of a political balance, and in order to determine, at the end of a century, whether such and such a province ought to have a prefect from Paris, Petersburg, or from Vienna, who wourd govern it with about the same laws and usages. It would be, however, high time that the cabinets should arrive at more generous ideas, and that henceforth blood should no longer flow save in the defence of the great interests of the world. If this wish, truly European, must be consigned to banishment with the beautiful dreams of perpetual peace, let us deplore the little passions and interests which lead enlightened nations to cut each others' throats more pitilessly than barbarians; let us deplore the progress in arts, sciences, morals, and politics, which, far from bringing us any nearer to the perfection of the social state, appear to carry in their train the centuries of the Huns, the Vandals, and the Tartars.