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AN 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE, 
 
 4 V D 
 
 ITS INFLUENCE 
 
 o m 
 
 GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS. 
 
 B T 
 
 WILLIAM GODWIN. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES. 
 VOL. I. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR G. C. J. AND J. ROBINSON, PATERNOSTER.ROW. 
 M.DCC.XCIII. 
 
Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2012 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 http://archive.org/details/enquiryconcernin121godw 
 

 
 
 P R E F A C E. 
 
 3-Zo, I 
 
 } 
 
 TT* E W works of literature are held in greater 
 ■*■ eftimation, than thofe which treat in a me- 
 thodical and elementary way of the principles of 
 fcience. But the human mind in every enlight- 
 ened age is progreffive ; and the beft elementary 
 treatifes after a certain time are reduced in their 
 value by the operation of fubfequent difcoveries. 
 Hence it has always been defired by candid en- 
 quirers, that preceding works of this kind fhould 
 from time to time be fuperfeded, and that other 
 productions including the larger views that have 
 fince offered themfelves, fhould be fubftituted in 
 their place. 
 
 It would be ftrange if fomething of this kind 
 
 were not defirable in politics, after the great 
 
 change that has been produced in men's minds 
 
 upon this fubjeft, and the light that has been 
 
 i thrown 
 
 336493 
 
vi PREFACE. 
 
 thrown upon it by the recent difcuffions of Ame- 
 rica and France. A fenfe of the value of fuch a 
 work, if properly executed, was the motive which 
 save birth to thefe volumes. Of their execution 
 the reader muft judge. 
 
 Authors who have formed the defign of fuper- 
 feding the works of their predeceffors, will be 
 found, if they were in any degree equal to the de- 
 fign, not merely to have collected the fcattered 
 information that had been produced upon the 
 fubjecl;, but to have increafed the fcience with the 
 fruit of their own meditations. In the following 
 work principles will occafionally be found, which 
 it will not be juft to rejecl; without examination, 
 merely becaufe they are new. It was impoflible 
 perfeveringly to reflect upon fo prolific a fcience, 
 and a fcience which may be faid to be yet in its 
 infancy, without being led into ways of thinking 
 that were in fome degree uncommon. 
 
 Another 
 
PREFACE. vff 
 
 r Another argument in favour of the utility of 
 fuch a work was frequently in the author's mind, 
 and therefore ought to be mentioned. He con- 
 ceived politics to be the proper vehicle of a libe- 
 ral-morality. That defcription of ethics delerves 
 to be held in flight efhmation, which feeks only 
 to regulate our conducl in articles of particular 
 and perfonal concern, inftead of exciting our atten- 
 tion to the general good of the fpecies. It ap- 
 peared fufficiently practicable to make of fuch a 
 treatife, exclusively of its direcl; political ufe, an 
 advantageous vehicle of moral improvement. He 
 was accordingly defirous of producing a work, from 
 the perufal of which no man fhould rife without 
 being ftrengthened in habits of fincerity, fortitude 
 and juftice. 
 
 t 
 
 Having {rated the confiderations in which the 
 work originated, it is proper to mention a few cir* 
 cumftances of the outline of its hiftory. The fen- 
 timents it contains are by no means the fuggeflions 
 »f ji fudden effervefcence of fancy. Political en- 
 
 lr* ■ * c l u ^ r y : 
 
 336433 
 
Vlll 
 
 P R E F A C E.. 
 
 quiiy had long held a foremoft place in the writer's 
 attention. It is now twelve years fmce he be- 
 came fatisfied, that monarchy was a fpecies of go- 
 vernment unavoidably corrupt. He owed this con- 
 viction to the political writings of Swift and to a 
 perufal of the Latin hiftorians.. Nearly at the 
 fame time he derived great additional inftruclion- 
 from reading the moft confiderable French writers 
 upon the nature of man in the following order,. 
 Syjltme de la Nature, RoufTeau and Helvetius. Long 
 before he thought of the prefent work, he had fa- 
 miliarifed to his mind the arguments it contains on 
 juftice, gratitude, rights of man, promifes, oaths 
 and the omnipotence of truth. Political com- 
 plexity is one of the errors that take ftrongeft hold 
 on the underftanding ; and it was only by ideas 
 fuggefted by the French revolution, that he was 
 reconciled to the defirablenefs of a government 
 of the fimpleft conftruclion. To the fame event he 
 owes the determination of mind which gave exift- 
 ence to this work. 
 
 t-U^ 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 IX 
 
 Such was the preparation which encouraged him 
 to undertake the prefent treatife. The direct, ex- 
 ecution may be difmiffed in a few words. It was 
 projected in the month of May 1791 : the com- 
 pofition was begun in the following September, 
 and has therefore occupied a fpace of fixteen 
 months. This period was devoted to the purpofe 
 with unremitted ardour. It were to be wifhed it 
 had been longer ; but it feemed as if no con- 
 temptible part of the utility of the work depended 
 upon its early appearance. 
 
 The printing of the following treatife, as 
 well as the compofition, was influenced by the 
 fame principle, a defire to reconcile a certain de- 
 gree of difpatch with the necefiary deliberation. 
 The printing was for that reafon commenced, long 
 before the compofition was fmifhed. Some dif- 
 advantages have arifen from this circumftance. 
 The ideas of the author became more perfpicuous 
 and digefted, as his enquiries advanced. The 
 longer he confidered the fubject., the more accu- 
 
 b rately 
 
x PREFACE. 
 
 rately he feemed to underffand it. This circum- 
 ftance has led him into a few contradictions. The 
 principal of thefe confifts in an occafional inaccu- 
 racy of language, particularly in the firft book, re- 
 fpe cling the v/ord government. He did not enter 
 upon the work, without being aware that govern- 
 ment by its very nature counteracts the improve- 
 ment of individual mind ; but he underftood the 
 full meaning of this propofition more completely 
 as he proceeded, and faw more diftinctly into the 
 nature of the remedy. This, and a few other de- 
 feats, under a different mode of preparation would 
 have been avoided. The candid reader will 
 make a fuitable allowance. The author judges 
 upon a review, that thefe defeats are fuch as not 
 materially to injure the object of the work, and 
 that more has been gained than loft by the con- 
 duct, he has purfued. 
 
 The period in which the work makes its ap- 
 pearance is fmgular. The people of England 
 have affiduoufly been excited to declare their loy- 
 5 alty, 
 
PREFACE. xi 
 
 alty, and to mark every man as obnoxious who is 
 not ready to fign the Shibboleth of the constitu- 
 tion. Money is raifed by voluntary fubfcription 
 to defray the expence ofprofecutingmen who fhall 
 dare to promulgate heretical opinions, and thus to 
 opprefs them at once with the enmity of govern- 
 ment and of individuals. This was an accident 
 wholly unforefeen when the work was under- 
 taken ; and it will fcarcely be fuppofed that fiich 
 an accident could produce any alteration in the 
 writer's defigns. Every man, if we may believe 
 the voice of rumour, is to be profecuted who 
 fhall appeal to the people by the publication of 
 any unconftitutional paper or pamphlet ; and it it 
 added, that men are to be profecuted for any un- 
 guarded words that may be dropped in the 
 warmth of converfation and debate. It is now to 
 be tried whether, in addition to thefe alarming en- 
 
 7 o 
 
 croachments upon our liberty, a book is to fall 
 under the arm of the civil power, which, befide 
 the advantage of having for one of its exprefs ob- 
 jects the dinuading from all tumult and violence, 
 
 b 2 is 
 
Xll 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 is by its very nature an appeal to men of ftudy and 
 reflexion. It is to be tried whether a project is 
 formed for fuppreffmg the activity of mind, and 
 putting an end to the difquifitions of fcience. 
 Refpefting the event in a perfonal view the author 
 has formed his refolution. Whatever conduct his 
 countrymen may purfue, they will not be able to 
 fhake his tranquillity. The duty he is moft 
 bound to difcharge is the aflifting the progrefs of 
 truth ; and if he fuffer in any refpecT; for fuch a 
 proceeding, there is certainly no viciffitude that 
 can befal him, that can ever bring along with it a 
 more fatisfaclory confolation. 
 
 But, exclufively of this precarious and unim- 
 portant confideration, it is the fortune of the pre- 
 fent work to appear before a public that is panic 
 ftruck, and imprefTed with the moft dreadful ap- 
 prehenfions of fuch do&rines as are here deli- 
 vered. All the prejudices of the human mind 
 are in arms againft it. This circumftaric'e may 
 appear to be of greater importance than the other. 
 
 But 
 
PREFACE. xiii 
 
 But it is the property of truth to be fearlefs, and 
 to prove victorious over every adverfary. It re- 
 quires no great degree of fortitude, to look with 
 indifference upon the falfe fire of the moment, 
 and to forefee the calm period of reafon which 
 will fucceed. 
 
 January 7, 1793. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FIRST VOLUME. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL 
 INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETY. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS PRINCIPLES. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FIRST BOOK. 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL 
 INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 *HE fubjetl propofed. — Syftem of indifference — of paffive obe- 
 dience — of liberty. — Syjlem of liberty extended. Page i 
 
 CHAP. II, 
 
 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 Frequency of war — among the ancients — among the moderns — the 
 French — the Englijh. — Caufes of war. — Penal laws. — Def- 
 potifm, — Deduction.— Enumeration of arguments. 5 
 
 b • CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN ORIGINATE IN 
 THEIR PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 No innate principles. — Objections to this ajfertion—from the early 
 ablions of infants— from the defire of f elf -prefervation— from f elf- 
 love— from pity — -from the vices of children — tyranny — fullennefs. 
 — Conclufon. Page 12 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF MORAL IMPROVE- 
 MENT CONSIDERED. 
 
 I. LITERATURE. 
 Benefits of literature. — Examples. — EJfential properties of literature. 
 
 — Its defedls. 
 
 II. EDUCATION. 
 
 Benefits of education. — Caufes of its imbecility. 
 
 III. POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 Benefits of political infiitution. — Univerfality of its influence — proved 
 by the mi/lakes offociety. — Origin of evil. 19 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 EXEMPLIFIED. 
 
 Robbery and fraud, Hvo great vices infociety — originate, 1. in ex- 
 treme poverty — 2. in the ofentation of the rich — 3. in their 
 
 tyranny 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 tyranny — rendered permanent — I. by legiflation — 2. by the ad- 
 m'mijlration of law — 3. by the inequality of conditions. Page %$ 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE OF PERPETUAL IM- 
 PROVEMENT. 
 
 Perfectibility of man — in/lanced, firfi y in language. — Its beginnings. 
 • — Abfirattion. — Complexity of language. — Second in/lance : al- 
 phabetical writing. — Hieroglyphics atfirfl univerfal. — ProgreJJive 
 deviations. — Application. 43 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THESE PRINCIPLES FROM 
 THE INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE. 
 
 PART 1. 
 
 OF MORAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSES. 
 
 'The queflion fated. — Provinces of fenfation and refection. — Moral 
 caufes frequently mifiaken for phyfical. — Superiority of the former 
 evident from the varieties of human character . — Operation of 
 phyfical caufes rare. — Fertility of reflection. — Phyfical caufes 
 in the firfi infiance fuperior, afterwards moral. — Objection from 
 the effect of breed in animals. — Conclufion. 51 
 
 b2 PART 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF NATIONAL CHARACTERS. 
 
 Char after of the priejlhood. — All nations capable of liberty. — 'The 
 ajfertion illujlrated. — Experience favours thefe reafonings. — Means 
 of introducing liberty. * Page 60 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THESE PRINCIPLES FROM 
 THE INFLUENCE OF LUXURY. 
 
 The objeftionjlated. — Source of this objeftion. — Refuted from muta- 
 bility—from mortality— from the nature of truth, — The pro- 
 bability of per fever ance confidered* 71 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF SOCIETT. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Nature of the enquiry. — Mode of purfuing it. — Difinftion between 
 fociety and government 77 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF. JUSTICE. 
 
 Connection of politics and morals. — Extent and meaning of jujl 'ice.— • 
 Subjetl of jujlice : mankind. — Its difribution meafured by the 
 capacity of its fubjecl — by his ufefulnefs. — Family affeclion con- 
 fdered. — Gratitude ccnfdered. — Objctlions : from ignorance — > 
 from utility. — An exception fated. — Degrees of jujlice. — Applica- 
 tion. — Idea of political juf ice % Page 80 
 
 APPENDIX, No. I. 
 
 OF SUICIDE. 
 
 Motives of fuicide: I. e [cape from pain — 2. benevolence.-— 
 Martyrdom confnlered. <}2 
 
 APPENDIX, No. II. 
 OF DUELLING. 
 
 Motives of duelling: i. revenge — 2. reputation for courage. — 
 Fallacy of this motive. — Objection anfwered. — Illuf ration. 94 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF DUTY. 
 
 A difficulty fated. — Of abfoluie and practical virtue. — Impropriety 
 
 rf this difinElion, — Univerfality of what is called practical virtue 
 
 8 ■ — infanced 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 —injlanced in robbery — in religious fanaticifm. — The quality of 
 an aft ion diJlinSl from the difpoftion with which it is performed. — 
 Farther difficulty. — Meaning of the term, duty. — application. — 
 Inferences. Page 97 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE EQJJALITY OF MANKIND. 
 
 Phyjical equality. — Objection. — Anfwers. — Moral equality. — How 
 limited. — Province of political jujiice. 104 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 The quejlion jlated. — Foundation of fociety. — Oppofte rights smpofji- 
 ble. — Conclufon from thefe premifes. — Difcretion confdered. — 
 Rights of kings. — Immoral confequences of the doStrine of rights. — 
 Rights of communities. — ObjeSlions : 1. the right of mutual aid. 
 — Explanation. — Origin of the term, right. — 2. rights of pri- 
 vate judgment and of the prefs. — Explanation. — Reafons of this 
 limitation upon the functions of the community : 1 . the inutility of 
 attempting reftraint — 2. its pernicious tendency. — Conclufon. 
 
 109 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE EXERCISE OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 
 Foundation of virtue. — Human actions regulated : 1. by the nature 
 of things — 2. by pofitive infitution. — 'Tendency of the latter : 1 . 
 5 to 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 to excite virtue .-—Its equivocal character in this refpeci.—2. to 
 inform the judgment. — Its inaptitude for that purpofe. — Province 
 of conscience conjidered. — 'Tendency of an interference with 
 that province. — Recapitulation. — Arguments in favour of pofitive 
 injlitution : i . the necejfity of repelling private injuftice. — Objec- 
 tions : the uncertainty of evidence — the diverfty of motives — 
 the unfuitablenefs of the means of correclion — either to imprefs 
 new fentiments — or to frengthen old ones. — Punifment for the 
 fake of example conjidered. — Urgency of the cafe. — z. rebellion 
 — 3. war. — Objections. — Reply. P a ge I2 o 
 
 BOOK III. 
 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS. 
 
 The quejlion fated.— Firjl hypothecs : government founded in fu- 
 perior frength. — Second hypothecs : government jure divino. — 
 Third hypothefis : the focial contraSl. — The firjl hypothefs exa- 
 mined. — The fecond. — Criterion of divine right : 1. patriarchal 
 defcent — 2 . jujllce. x 3 9 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 
 
 Queries propofed. — Who are the contrasting parties? — What is the 
 
 form of engagement ? — Over how long a period does the contrast 
 
 extend? — To how great a variety of propoftions ? — Can it extend 
 
 to laws hereafter to be made ? — Addrejfes of adhefon confidered* 
 
 '—Fewer of a majority. Page 143 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF PROMISES. 
 
 The validity of promifes examined. — Shown to be inconjifent with 
 j if ice — to be foreign to the general good. — Of the expeclation ex- 
 cited. — The fulfilling expeclation does not imply the validity of a 
 promife. — Conclusion . 1 r o 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 Common deliberation the true foundation of government — proved from 
 the equal claims of mankind— from the nature of our faculties — 
 from the objeSi of government — from the effedis of common delibe- 
 ration. — Delegation vindicated. — Difference between the doclrine 
 here maintained and that of a focial contrail apparent — from the 
 merely profpeclive nature of the former— from the nullity of pro- 
 mifes— from the fallibility of deliberation. — Conclufon. 157 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 OF LEGISLATION. 
 
 Society can declare and interpret^ but cannot enacl.—Its authority 
 only executive. Page 1 66 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 Obedience not the correlative of authority. — No man bound to yield 
 obedience to another. — Cafe of fubmlffion conjidered. — Foundation 
 of obedience. — Ufefulnefs of foclal communication. — Cafe of confi- 
 dence confidered. — Its limitations. — Mlfchlef of unlimited confi- 
 dence. — Subjection explained. jgg 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Moral principles frequently elucidated by Incidental reflection — by in- 
 cidental pajfages in various authors. — Example. 176 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Argument In favour of a variety of forms — compared with the ar- 
 gument In favour of a variety of religious creeds. — Tljat there is 
 one bejl form of government proved— from the unity of truth — 
 from the nature of man. — Objection from human weabiefs ana 
 prejudice. — Danger in ejlabllflng an Imperfect code. — Manners 
 
 c of 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 of nations produced by their forms of government. — Gradual im- 
 provement necejfary. — Simplicity chiefly to be dejired. — Publi- 
 cation of truth the grand inftrnment — by individuals, not by go- 
 vernment — the truth entire , and not by parcels. — Sort of progrefs 
 to be dejired. Page 1 79 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS PRINCIPLES. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 Every individual the judge of his own refi/ldnce. — Objection. — 
 
 Anfwered from the nature of government — from the modes of re- 
 
 fftance. — 1. Force rarely to be employed — either where there is 
 
 fmall profpedt offuccefs — -or 'where the profpeSl is great. — Hi/lory 
 
 of Charles the firfl eflimated. — 2. Reafoning the legitimate 
 
 mode. 1 9 1 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF REVOLUTIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 DUTIES OF A CITIZEN. 
 
 Obligation to fupport the conjlitution of our country confidered— 
 mujl arife either from the reafon of the cafe, or from a perfonal 
 and local confideration.—Thefr/i examined. — 1'hefecond. 
 
 Page 198 
 SECTION II. 
 
 MODE OF EFFECTING RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 Perfuajion the proper inflrument — not violence — nor refentmenU — ■ 
 Latenefs of event defirable. 202 
 
 section in. 
 
 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 Meaning of the term. — Affociations objected to — 1. from the fort of 
 perfons 'with whom a jujl revolution fhould originate — 2. from the 
 danger of tumult. — Objects of ajjociation. — In what cafes ad~ 
 mifjibk. — Argued for from the neceffity to give weight to opinion 
 —from their tendency to af certain opinion. — Unnecejfary for thefe 
 purpofes. — General inutility. — ConceJJions. — Importance of facial 
 communication. — Propriety of teaching rejiftance confidered. 20$ 
 
 . C2 SECTION 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF THE SPECIES OF REFORM TO BE DESIRED. 
 
 Ought it to be partial or entire ? — Truth may not be partially 
 taught. — Partial reformation confdered. — Objection. — Anfwer. 
 — Partial reform indifpenfble. — Nature of a ju/l revolution — 
 how dijlant? Page 219 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF TYRANNICIDE. 
 
 Diverfty of opinions on thisfubjecl. — Argument in its vindication. — 
 The def ruction of a tyrant not a cafe of exception. — Confequences 
 of tyrannicide. — AJfaJJination defcribed. — Importance of fncerity. 
 
 226 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE CULTIVATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 OF ABSTRACT OR GENERAL TRUTH. 
 Its importance as conducing — to our intellectual improvement— to our 
 moral improvement. — Virtue the bejl fource ofhappinefs. — Proved 
 by comparifon — by its manner of adapting itfelf to all ftuations — 
 by its undecaying excellence— cannot be ejfeblually propagated but 
 by a cultivated mind. — Importance of general truth to our political 
 improvement. 231 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 OF SINCERITY 
 
 Nature of this virtue, — Its effects — upon our own actions — upon 
 cur neighbours. — Its tendency to produce fortitude. — Effects of in- 
 Jincerity. — Char abler which fncerity would acquire to him who 
 pratlifed it. — Objections. — 'The fear of giving unneceffary pain. — 
 Anfwer. — The defre of prefer ving my life. — This objection proves 
 too much,-— Anfwer. — Secrecy confdered. — The fecrets of others. 
 — State fecrets. — Secrets of philanthropy. Page 238 
 
 APPENDIX, No. I. 
 
 OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 AND VIRTUE. 
 
 Can eminent virtue exijl unconnected with talents ? — Nature of 
 virtue. — It is the offspring of under/landing. — 7/ generates under - 
 ftanding. — Illuf ration from other purfuits — love — ambition—' 
 applied. 
 
 Can eminent talents exijl unconnected with virtue f — Argument in 
 the affirmative from analogy — in the negative from the univer- 
 fality of moral f peculation— -from the nature of vice as founded in 
 mifiake. — The argument balanced. — Importance of a fenfe of 
 jufice. — Its connexion with talents. — Illiberally with which 
 men of talents are ufually treated. 253 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 APPENDIX, No. II. 
 OF THE MODE OF EXCLUDING VISITORS. 
 
 Its impropriety argued— from thejituation in which it places , i. the 
 vijitor — 2. thefervant. — Objetlions : — Pretended necejjity of this 
 practice, I . to preferve us from intrufion — 2. to free us from 
 difagreeable acquaintance. — Characters of the honeji and dijhoneji 
 man in this refpeSt compared. Page 265 
 
 APPENDIX, No. III. 
 
 SUBJECT OF SINCERITY RESUMED. 
 
 A cafe propofed. — Arguments in favour of concealment. — Previous 
 queflionx Is truth in general to be partially communicated? — 
 Cujlomary effebls of fncerity — of infincerity — upon him who 
 prabiifes it — 1. the fufpenfion of improvement — 2. mifanthropy — 
 3. dijingenuity — upon the fpeclators. — Sincerity delineated. — Its 
 general importance. — Application. — Duty rejpebiing the choice of 
 arejidence. 272 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY. 
 
 Importance of the quejiion.— Definition of necejjity. — Why fuppofed 
 to exifl in the operations of the material univerfe. — The cafe of the 
 operations of mind is parallel. — Indications of necejfity — in hi/lory 
 — in our judgments of char abler — in our fchemes of policy — in our 
 
 ideas 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ideas of moral difcipline. — Objection from the fallibility of our ex- 
 pectations in human cbndudi. — Anfwer. — Origin and univerfality 
 of the fentiment of free will. — The fentiment of necejity alfo uni- 
 verfal. — The truth of this fentiment argued from the nature of 
 - volition. — Hypothefs of free will examined. — Self-determination. 
 —'Indifference. — The will not a diftinct faculty. — Free will dif- 
 advantageous to its pojfejfor — of no fervice to morality. Page 2 8 3 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 INFERENCES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY- 
 
 Idea it fuggefls to us of the univerfe. — Influence on our moral ideas 
 — adtion — virtue — exertion — perfuafion — exhortation — ardour — 
 complacence and averfon — puni/hmeni — repentance — praife and 
 blame — intellectual tranquillity. — Language of necefjiiy -re- 
 commended. 305 
 
 / CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 Nature of mechanifm. — Its clajfes, material and intellectual.— 
 Material fyjlem, or of vibrations. — The intellectual fyjlem mojl 
 probable — from the conf deration that thought would otherwife be 
 a fuperfiuity—from the e/labli/loed principles of reafoning from 
 effects to caufes. — Objections refuted. — Thoughts which produce 
 animal motion may be — 1. Involuntary. — All animal motions 
 •were firjl involuntary . — >2. Unattended with confcioufnefs. — The 
 
 mind 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 mind cannot have more than one thought at any one time.— Ob- 
 jection to this ajfertim from the cafe of complex ideas— from 
 various mental operations — as comparifon — apprehenfion — rapidity 
 of the fucceffion of ideas. — Application. — Duration meafured by 
 confcioufnefs. — 3. A diJlinSi thought to each motion may be 
 unnecejfary — apparent from the complexity of fenfble imprefjions. 
 — 'The mind always thinks. — Conclufion. — Tide theory applied to 
 the phenomenon of walking — to the circulation of the blood.— Of 
 motion in general. — Of dreams. Page 318 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 Hypothefes of benevolence and felf love — fuperiority of the former. — 
 Adlion is either voluntary or involuntary. — Nature of the firjl of 
 thefe clajfes. — Argument that refults from it. — Voluntary aclion 
 has a real exiflence. — Confequence of that exiflence. — Experimental 
 view of the fubjecl. — Suppoftions fugge/led by the advocates of 
 felf love — that we calculate upon all occajions the advantage to 
 accrue to us. — Falfenefs of this fuppofition. — Suppofition of a con- 
 trary fort. — We do not calculate what would be the uneqfitiefs to 
 refult from our refraining to atl — either in relieving diflrefs — or 
 in adding to the Jlock of general good. — Uneafnefs an accidental 
 member of the procefs. — The fuppofitions inconfjlently blended. — 
 Scheme of felf love recommended from the propenfty of mind to 
 6 abbreviate 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 abbreviate its procefs—from the fmplicity that obtains in the 
 natures of things. — Hypothejis of felf love incompatible with 
 virtue. — Conclufon. — Importance of the quefion. — Application. 
 
 Page 341 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE. 
 
 // is the road to happinefs — to the cfeem and affetlion of others.— 
 Objection from mifconfirutlion and calumny. — Anfwer. — Virtue 
 compared with other modes of procuring e/leem. — Vice and not 
 virtue is the fubjecJ of obloquy — infanced in the bafe alloy with 
 which our virtues are mixed — in arrogance and oferdation — in 
 the vices in which perfons of moral excellence alLw ihemfelvcs. 
 — 'The virtuous man only has friends. — Virtue the road 
 to profperity and fucccfs in the world — applied to commercial 
 tra factions — to cafes that depend upon patronage. — Apparent 
 exceptions where the dependent is employed as the infrument of 
 vice. — Virtue compared with other modes of becoming profperous. 
 — Source of the difrepute of virtue in this refpedl. — ConceJJion. — 
 Cafe where convenient vice bids fair for concealment — Chance of 
 detection. — Indolence — apprehenfhenefs — and depravity the off- 
 fpring of vice. 362 
 
 AN 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 OF THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 THE SUBJECT PROPOSED. — SYSTEM OF INDIFFERENCE — OF 
 PASSIVE OBEDIENCE — OF LIBERTY. — SYSTEM OF LIBERTY 
 EXTENDED. 
 
 THE queftion which firft prefents itfelf in an enquiry con- BOOK I. 
 cerning political inftitution, relates to the importance of * ^ > 
 
 The fubjcct 
 
 the topic which is made the fubject of enquiry. All men will propofed. 
 grant that the happinefs of the human fpecies is the moft defir- 
 able object for human fcience to promote ; and that intellectual 
 and moral happinefs or pleafure is extremely to be preferred 
 
 B to 
 
2 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 BOOK I. to thofe which are precarious and tranfitory. The methods 
 
 1 ' which may be propofed for the attainment of this object, are 
 
 various. If it could be proved that a found political inftitutiore 
 was of all others the moft powerful engine for promoting indi- 
 vidual good, or on the other hand that an erroneous and corrupt 
 government was the moft formidable adverfary to the impfove— 
 ment of the fpecies, it would follow that politics was the firft 
 and moft important fubjecl: of human inveftigation. 
 
 Syflem of in- The opinions of mankind in this refpect have been divided* 
 
 difference : 
 
 By one fet of men it is affirmed, that the different degrees of 
 excellence afcribed to different forms of government are rather, 
 imaginary than real; that in the great objects of fuperintendance 
 no government will eminently fail ; and that it is neither the 
 duty nor the wifdom of an honeft and induftrious individual to 
 bufy himfelf with concerns fo foreign to the fphere of his in- 
 o r paflive duftry. A fecond clafs, in adopting the fame principles, have 
 
 obedience i; 
 
 given t6 them a different turn. Believing that all governments. 
 are nearly equal in their merit, they have regarded anarchy as 
 the only political mifchief that deferved to excite alarm, and have 
 been the zealous and undiftinguifhing adverfaries of all inno- 
 vation. Neither of thefe claffes has of courfe been inclined 
 to afcribe to the fcience and practice of politics a pre-eminence 
 over every other,. 
 
 •f liberty. But the advocates of what is termed political liberty have al- 
 
 1. wavs 
 
 \ 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ways been numerous. They have placed this liberty principally BOOK I. 
 
 in two articles j the fecurity of our perfons, and the fecurity of 
 our property. They have perceived that thefe objects could not 
 be effected but by the impartial adminiftration of general laws, 
 and the inverting in the people at large a certain power fufli- 
 cient to give permanence to this adminiftration. They have 
 pleaded, forne for a lefs and fome for a greater degree of equa- 
 lity among the members of the community ; and they have 
 confidered this equality as infringed or endangered by enormous 
 taxation, and the prerogatives and privileges of monarchs and 
 ariftocratical bodies. 
 
 But, while they have been thus extenfive in the object of their 
 demand, they feem to have agreed with the two former clalfes 
 in regarding politics as an object of fubordinate importance, and 
 only in a remote degree connected with moral improvement. 
 They have been prompted in their exertions rather by a quick 
 fenfe of juftice and difdain of oppreffion, than by a confcioufnefs 
 of the intimate connection of the different parts of the focial 
 fyftem, whether as it relates to the intercourfe of individuals, or 
 to the maxims and inftitutes of ftates and nations *. 
 
 It may however be reafonable to confider whether the fcience Syft emo fli- 
 of politics be not of fomewhat greater value than any of thefe e d, r } exte " d " 
 
 * Thefe remarks will apply to the Englifh writers upon politics in general, 
 from Sydney and Locke to the author of the Rights of Man. The more com- 
 prehenfive vitw has been perfpicuoufly treated by Rouffeau and Helvetius. 
 
 B 2 reafoners 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 BOOK I. reafoners have been inclined to fufpedt. It may fairly be quef- 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 .*— — * ' tioned, whether government be not ftill more confiderable in its 
 
 incidental effects, than in thofe intended to be produced. Vice, 
 for example, depends for its exiftence upon the exiftence of 
 temptation. May not a good government ftrongly tend to ex- 
 tirpate, and a bad one to increafe the mafs of temptation ? Again, 
 vice depends for its exiftence upon the exiftence of error. May- 
 not a good government by taking away all reftraints upon the- 
 enquiring mind haften, and a bad one by its patronage -of error 
 procraftinate the difcovery and eftablifhment of truth-? Let us 
 confider the fubjecT; in this point of view. If it can be proved 
 that the fcience of politics is thus unlimited in its importance, 
 the advocates of liberty will have gained an additional recom- 
 mendation, and its admirers will be incited with the greater 
 cagernefs to the inveftigation of its principles, 
 
 , CHAP, 
 
V s 1 i - 
 
 G H A P. IL- 
 HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 FREQUENCY OF WAR — AMONG THE ANCIENTS — AMONG 
 
 THE MODERNS — THE FRENCH — THE ENGLISH. CAUSES 
 
 OF WAR. — PENAL LAWS. — DESPOTISM. — DEDUCTION. 
 
 ENUMERATION OF -ARGUMENTS. 
 
 WHILE we enquire whether government is capable of book r. 
 _ „ . „ r , . . CHAP. II. 
 
 improvement, we lhall do well to conhder its preient ^ v - > 
 
 effects. It is an old obfervation, that the hiftory of mankind war: 
 
 is little elfe than the hiftory of crimes. War has hitherto been 
 
 confidered as the infeparable ally of political inftitution. The among the- 
 
 ancients : 
 
 earlieft records of time are the annals of conquerors and heroes, 
 a Bacchus, a Sefoftris, a Semiramis and a Cyrus. Thefe princes 
 led millions of men under their ftandard, and ravaged innume-- 
 rable provinces. A fmall number only of their forces ever re- 
 turned to their native homes, the reft having periihed of tlif- 
 eafes, hardfliips and mifery. The evils they inflicted, and the 
 mortality introduced in the countries againft which their expe- 
 ditions were dirc&ed, were certainly not lefs fevere than thofe 
 which their countrymen fufFered. No fconer does hiftory be- 
 come more precife, than we are prefented with the four great 
 monarchies, that is, with four fuccelsful projects, by means of 
 
 bloodihedj . 
 
6 HISTORY OF 
 
 <?S?o tV bloodfhed, violence and murder, of enflaving mankind. The 
 
 '_-li.ii.j- . 11* 
 
 ' v ' expeditions of Cambyfes againft Egypt, of Darius againft the 
 
 Scythians, and of Xerxes againft the Greeks, feem almoft to fet 
 credibility at defiance by the fatal confequences with which they 
 were attended. The conquefts of Alexander coft innumerable 
 lives, and the immortality of Caefar is computed to have been 
 purchafed by the death of one million two hundred thoufand 
 men. Indeed the Romans, by the long duration of their wars, 
 and their inflexible adherence to their purpofe, are to be ranked 
 among the foremoft deftroyers of the human fpecies. Their 
 wars in Italy endured for more than four hundred years, and 
 their conteft for fupremacy with the Carthaginians two hundred. 
 The Mithridatic war began with a maflacre of one hundred and 
 fifty thoufand Romans, and in three angle actions of the war 
 five hundred thoufand men were loft by the eaftern monarch. 
 Sylla, his ferocious conqueror, next turned his arms againft his 
 country, and the ftruggle between him and Marius was attended 
 with profcriptions, butcheries and murders that knew no re- 
 ftraint from mercy and humanity. The Romans, at length, 
 fufFered the penalty of their iniquitous deeds ; and the world was 
 vexed for three hundred years by the irruptions of Goths, Van- 
 ■dals, Oftrogoths, Huns, and innumerable hordes of barbarians. 
 
 among the I forbear to detail the victorious progrefs of Mahomet and 
 
 moderns.: 
 
 the pious expeditions of Charlemagne. I will not enumerate 
 the crufades againft the infidels, the exploits of Aurungzebe, 
 
 Gen- 
 
POLITICAL SOCIETY. 7 
 
 Gengifkan and Tamerlane, or the extenfive murders of the £0 OK I. 
 
 CiiAl t II* 
 
 Spaniards in the new world. Let us examine the civilized and 
 favoured quarter of Europe, or even thofe countries of Europe 
 which are thought mod enlightened. 
 
 France was wafted by fucceflive battles during a whole cen- the Fre«ch: 
 tury, for the queftion of the Salic law, and the claim of the 
 Plantagenets. Scarcely was this conteft terminated, before the 
 religious wars broke out, fome idea of which we may form from 
 the liege of Rochelle, where of fifteen thoufand perfons fhut up 
 eleven thoufand perilhed of hunger and mifery ; and from the 
 maflacre of Saint Bartholomew, in which the numbers aflaffinated 
 were forty thoufand. This quarrel was appeafed by Henry the 
 fourth, and fucceeded by the thirty years war in Germany for 
 fuperiority with the houfe of Anuria, and afterwards by the 
 military tranfactions of Louis the fourteenth. 
 
 In England the war of Crefiy and Agincourt only gave place the Englifh. 
 to the civil war of York and Lancafter, and again after an in- 
 terval to the war of Charles the firft and his parliament. No 
 fooner was the conftitution fettled by the revolution, than we 
 were engaged in a wide field of continental warfare by king 
 William, the duke of Marlborough, Maria Therefa and the 
 king of Pruflia.. 
 
 And what are in moft cafes the pretexts upon which war is Oaufes-of? 
 
 war. 
 
 under- 
 
S HI ST OH Y OF 
 
 chap"ii "undertaken? What rational man could poflibly have given him- 
 
 1 e ' felf the leaft difturbance for the fake of choofing whether Henry 
 
 the fixth or Edward the fourth fhould have the ftyle of king of 
 England? What Englishman could reafonably have drawn his 
 fvvord for the purpofe of rendering his country an inferior de- 
 pendency of France, as it mull .neceffarily have been if the am- 
 bition of the Plantagenets had fucceeded ? What can be more 
 deplorable than to fee us firft engage eight years in war rather 
 than fufFer the haughty Maria Therefa to live with a diminilhed 
 fovereignty or in a private ftation ; and then eight years more 
 to fupport the free-booter who had taken advantage of her 
 helplefs condition ? 
 
 The uTual caufes of war are excellently defcribed by Swift. 
 " Sometimes the quarrel between two princes is to decide which 
 •of them mall difpoffefs a third of his dominions, where neither 
 . of them pretends to any right. Sometimes one prince quarrels 
 with another, for fear the other fhould quarrel with him. 
 Sometimes a war is entered upon becaufe the enemy is too 
 .ftrong ; and fometimes becaufe he is too weak. Sometimes our 
 neighbours want the things which we have, or have the things 
 which we want ; and we both fight, till they take ours, or give 
 us theirs. It is a very juftifiable caufe of war to invade a country 
 after the people have been wafted by famine, deftroyed by pef- 
 tilence, or embroiled by factions among themfelves. It is jufti- 
 fiable to enter into a war againft our neareft ally, when one of 
 his towns lies convenient for us, or a territory of land^ that 
 
 would 
 
POLITICAL SOCIETY. g 
 
 would render our dominions round and compact. If a prince BOOK '• 
 
 r r CHAP. II. 
 fends forces into a nation where the people are poor and igno- * y ' 
 
 rant, he may lawfully put the half of them to death, and make 
 flaves of the reft, in order to civilize and reduce them from their 
 barbarous way of living. It is a very kingly, honourable and 
 frequent practice, when one prince defires the afliftance of an- 
 other to fecure him againft an invafion, that the afliftant, when 
 he has driven out the invader, mould feize on the dominions 
 himfelf, and kill, imprifon or banifh the prince he came to re- 
 lieve * " 
 
 If we turn from the foreign tranfactions of flates with each Penal lavs, 
 other, to the principles of their domeftic policy, we mail not 
 find much greater reafon to be fatisfied. A numerous clafs of 
 mankind are held down in a ftate of abject penury, and are con- 
 tinually prompted by difappointment and diftrefs to commit 
 violence upon their more fortunate neighbours. The only mode 
 which is employed to reprefs this violence, and to maintain the 
 order and peace of fociety, is punifhment. Whips, axes and 
 gibbets, dungeons, chains and racks are the moft approved and 
 eftablifhed methods of perfuading men to obedience, and im- 
 prefling upon their minds the leflbns of reafon. Hundreds of 
 victims are annually facrificed at the fhrine of pofitive law and 
 political inftitution. 
 
 * Gulliver's Travels, Part IV. Ch. r. 
 
 C Add 
 
IO 
 
 HISTORY OF 
 
 BOOK I. 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Defpotifm. 
 
 DeducVon. 
 
 Add to this the fpecies of government which prevails over 
 nine tenths of the globe, which is defpotifm : a government, as 
 Mr. Locke juftly obferves, altogether " vile and miferable," and 
 "more to be deprecated than anarchy itfelf *." 
 
 This account of the hiftory and ftate of man is not a decla- 
 mation, but an appeal to facts. He that confiders it cannot 
 pofTibly regard political difquifition as a trifle, and government 
 as a neutral and unimportant concern. I by no means call upon 
 the reader implicitly to admit that thefe evils are capable of re- 
 medy, and that wars, executions and defpotifm can be extir- 
 pated out of the world. But I call upon him to confider whe- 
 ther they may be remedied. I would have him feel that civil 
 policy is a topic upon which the fevereft inveftigation may 
 laudably be employed. 
 
 If government be a fubject, which, like mathematics, natural 
 
 * Locke on Government, Book I. Ch. i. §. i ; and Book II. Ch. vii. §.91. The 
 words in the laft place are : " Wherever any two men are, who have no Hand- 
 ing rule and common judge to appeal to on earth for the determination of con- 
 troversies of right betwixt them, there they are ftill in the Ji 'ate of nature, and 
 under all the inconveniences of it, with only this woeful difference to the fub- 
 jea, Sec" 
 
 Moft of the above arguments may be found much more at large in Burke's 
 
 Vindication of Natural Society ; a treatife, in which die evils of the exifting 
 
 political inftitutions aredifplayed with incomparable force of reafoning andluftrt ' 
 
 of eloquence, while the intention of the author was to fliew that thefe evils were 
 
 to be confidered as trivial. 
 
 4 philofophy 
 
POLITICAL SOCIETY. n 
 
 philofophy and morals, admits of argument and demonftration, BOOK I. 
 
 C/HAr . II. 
 
 then may we reafonably hope that men lhall fome time or other v ' 
 
 agree reflecting it. If it comprehend every thing that is moll 
 important and interefting to man, it is probable that, when the 
 theory is greatly advanced, the practice will not be wholly neg- 
 lected. Men may one day feel that they are partakers of a 
 common nature, and that true freedom and perfect equity, like 
 food and air, are pregnant with benefit to every conftitution. 
 Ifj there be the fainteft hope that this fhall be the final refult, 
 then certainly no fubject can infpire to a found mind fuch ge- 
 nerous enthufiafm, fuch enlightened ardour and fuch invincible 
 perfeverance. 
 
 The probability of this improvement will be fufficiently efta- Enumeration 
 blifhed, if we confider, first, that the moral characters of men ofar S uments * 
 are the refult of their perceptions: and, secondly, that of all 
 the modes of operating upon mind government is the moll con- 
 fiderable. In addition to thefe arguments it will be found 
 thirdly, that the good and ill effects of political inftitution 
 are not lefs confpicuous in detail than in principle ; and, 
 fourthly, that perfectibility is one of the moil unequivocal 
 characteristics of the human fpecies, fo that the political, as well 
 as the intellectual ftate of man, may be prefumed to be in a 
 courfe of progreffive improvement. 
 
 C 2 CHAP. 
 
i2 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN ORIGINATE IN 
 THEIR PERCEPTIONS. 
 
 NO INNATE PRINCIPLES.- — OBJECTIONS TO THIS ASSERTION 
 
 —FROM THE EARLY ACTIONS OF INFANTS FROM THE 
 
 DESIRE OF SELF-PRESERVATION — FROM SELF-LOVE 
 
 FROM PITY FROM THE VICES OF CHILDREN — TYRANNY 
 
 SULLENNESS. CONCLUSION. 
 
 CIJAi\ ill. W 
 
 BOOK I. \"^ 7 E bring into the world with us no innate principles : 
 confequently we are neither virtuous nor vicious as we 
 
 No innate 
 
 principles. firft come into exiftence. No truth can be more evident than 
 this, to any man who will yield the fubjecl: an impartial con- 
 fideration. Every principle is a propofition. Every propofition 
 confifts in the connection of at leafl: two diftinct ideas, which are 
 affirmed to agree or difagree with each, other. If therefore the 
 principles be innate, the ideas muft be fo too. But nothing can 
 be more incontrovertible, tban that we do not bring pre-eftab- 
 lilhed ideas into the world with us. 
 
 Let the innate principle be, that virtue is a rule to which we 
 are obliged to conform. Here are three great and leading ideas, 
 not to mention fubordinate ones, which it is necefTary to form,, 
 before we can fo much as underftand the propofition. 
 
 The 
 
CHAP. III. 
 * . ' 
 
 ORIGINATE IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS. 13 
 
 What is virtue ? Previoufly to our forming an idea correfpond- r ^^?^ 
 ing to this general term, it feems neceffary that we fhould have 
 obferved the feveral features by which virtue is diftinguifhed, and 
 the feveral fubordinate articles of right conduct, that taken 
 together, conftitute that mafs of practical judgments to which 
 we give the denomination of virtue. Virtue may perhaps be 
 defined, that fpecies of operations of an intelligent being, which 
 conduces to the benefit of intelligent beings in general, and is pro- 
 duced by a defire of that benefit. But taking for granted the uni- 
 verfal admiffion of this definition, and this is no very defenfible 
 affumption, how widely have people of different ages and countries 
 difagreed in the application of this general conception to particulars? 
 a difagreement by no means compatible with the fuppofition that 
 the fentiment is itfelf innate. 
 
 The next innate idea included in the above propofition, is that 
 of a rule or ftandard, a generical meafure with which individuals 
 are to be compared, and their conformity or difagreement with 
 which is to determine their value. 
 
 Laftly, there is the idea of obligation, its nature and fource, 
 the obliger and the fanction, the penalty and the reward. 
 
 Who is there in the prefent ftate of fcientifical improvement, 
 that will believe that this vafl chain of perceptions and notions is 
 
 fomething 
 
i 4 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN 
 
 chapVit f° metnm g tnat we bring into the world with us, a myfiical 
 
 v ~"~ v ' magazine, fhut up in the human embryo, whofe treafures are to 
 
 be gradually unfolded as circumftances fhall require ? Who does 
 not perceive that they are regularly generated in the mind by a 
 feries of impreflions, and digefted and arranged by aflbciation 
 and reflexion ? 
 
 Objections to Experience has by many been fuppofed adverfe to thefe rea- 
 
 tbis affertion : r ' ' rr 
 
 aftwns oTi^ f° nm gs - but it will upon examination be found to be perfectly 
 fonts i j n narmon y -with them. The child at the moment of his birth is 
 
 totally unprovided with ideas, except fuch as his mode of exist- 
 ence in the womb may have fupplied. His firlt impreflions are 
 thofe of pleafure and pain. But he has no forefight of the ten- 
 dency of any action to obtain either the one or the other, pre- 
 vioufly to experience. 
 
 A certain irritation of the palm of the hand will produce that 
 contraction of the fingers, which accompanies the action of grafp- 
 ing. This contraction will at firft be unaccompanied with defign, 
 the object will be grafped without any intention to retain it, and let 
 go again without thought or obfervation. After a certain number 
 of repetitions, the nature of the action will be perceived ; it will 
 be performed with a confcioufnefs of its tendency ; and even the 
 hand ftretched out upon the approach of any object that is de- 
 fired. Prefent to the child, thus far inftructed, a lighted candle. 
 The fight of it will produce a pleafurabk date of the organs of 
 
 perception. 
 
ORIGINATE IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS. 15 
 
 perception. He will ftretch out his hand to the flame, and will c^^/fj 
 have no apprehenfion of the pain of burning till he has felt the ' » ' 
 fenfation. 
 
 At the age of maturity, the eyelids inftantaneoufly clofe, when 
 any fubftance, from which danger is apprehended, is advanced 
 towards them ; and this action is fo fpontaneous, as to be with 
 great difficulty prevented by a grown perfon, though he mould 
 explicitly defire it. In infants there is no fuch propenfity ; and 
 an object may be approached to their organs, however near and 
 however fuddenly, without producing this effect. Frowns will 
 be totally indifferent to a child, who has never found them affo 
 ciated with the effects of anger. Fear itfelf is a fpecies of fore- 
 fight ; and in no cafe exifts till introduced by experience. 
 
 It has been faid, that the defire of felf-prefervation is innate. I from the 6V. 
 
 fire of felf- 
 
 demand what is meant by this defire ? Muft we not underftand prefenation: 
 by it, a preference of exiftence to non-exiftence ? Do we prefer 
 any thing but becaufe it is apprehended to be good ? It follows, 
 that we cannot prefer exiftence, previoufly to our experience of 
 the motives for preference it poffeffes. Indeed the ideas of life 
 and death are exceedingly complicated, and very tardy in their 
 formation. A child defires pleafure and loathes pain, long before 
 he can have any imagination refpecting the ceafing to exift. 
 
 Again, it has been faid, that felf-love is innate. But there fromfelfJoTes 
 cannot be an error more eafy of detection. By the love of 
 
 felf 
 
16 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN 
 
 w 
 
 c^?Av"iii felf we underftand the approbation of pleafure, and difiike of 
 ' * ' pain : but this is only the faculty of perception under another 
 
 name. Who ever denied that man was a percipient being ? 
 
 Who ever dreamed that there was a particular inftinct necelTary 
 
 to render him percipient ? 
 
 from pity : Pity has fometimes been fuppofed an inftance of innate prin- 
 
 ciple ; particularly as it feems to arife more inftantaneoufly in 
 young perfons, and perfons of little refinement, than in others. 
 But it was reafonable to expect, that threats and anger, circum- 
 ftances that have been affociated with our own fufferings, fhould 
 excite painful feelings in us in the cafe of others, independently 
 of any laboured analyfis. The cries of diftrefs, the appearance 
 of agony or corporal infliction, irrefiftibly revive the memory of 
 the pains accompanied by thofe fymptoms in ourfelves. Longer 
 experience and obfervation enable us to feparate the calamities of 
 others and our own fafety, the exiftence of pain in one fubject 
 and of pleafure or benefit in others, or in the fame at a future 
 period, more accurately than we could be expected to do pre- 
 vioufly to that experience. 
 
 from the vices Such then is univerfally the fubject of human inftitution and 
 education. We bring neither virtue nor vice with us at our 
 entrance into the world. But the feeds of error are ordinarily 
 fown fo early as to pafs with fuperficial obfervers for innate. 
 
 Our 
 
ORIGINATE IN THEIR PERCEPTIONS. 1 7 
 
 BOOK I. 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 1 v * 
 
 tyranny: 
 
 ,. Our conftitution prompts us to utter a cry at the unexpected 
 fenfation of pain. Infants early perceive the afliftance they 
 obtain from the volition of others ; and they have at hid no 
 means of inviting that afliftance but by an inarticulate cry. In 
 this neutral and innocent circumftance, combined with the folly 
 and imbecility of parents and nurfes, we are prefented with the 
 firft occafion of vice. Afliftance is necefiary, conducive to the 
 exiftence, the health and the mental fanity of the infant. Em- 
 pire in the infant over thofe who protect him is unneceflary. 
 If we do not withhold our afliftance precifely at the moment 
 when it ceafes to be requifite, if our compliance or our refufal 
 be not in every cafe irrevocable, if we grant any thing to im- 
 patience, importunity or obftinacy, from that moment we be- 
 come parties in the intellectual murder of our offspring. 
 
 In this cafe we inftil into them the vices of a tyrant j but we fulknnefi. 
 are in equal danger of teaching them the vices of a flave. It is 
 not till very late that mankind acquire the ideas of juftice, retri- 
 bution and morality, and thefe notions are far from exifting in 
 the minds of infants. Of confequence, when we ftrike, or when 
 we rebuke them, we rifk at leaft the exciting in them a fenfe of 
 injury, and a feeling of refentment. Above all, fentiments of 
 this fort cannot fail to be awakened, if our action be accom- 
 panied with fymptoms of anger, cruelty, harfhnefs or caprice. 
 The fame imbecility, that led us to infpire them with a fpirit of 
 tyranny by yielding to their importunities, afterwards dictates to 
 
 D us 
 
i8 
 
 BOOK 1. 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 THE MORAL CHARACTERS OF MEN, &c. 
 
 us an inconfiftent and capricious conduct, at one time denying 
 them as abfurdly, as at another we gratified them unreafonablyv 
 Who, that has obferved the confequences of this treatment, how 
 generally thefe miftakes are committed, how infeparable they are 
 in fome degree from the wifeft and the heft, will be furprhed at 
 the early indications of depravity in children * ? 
 
 Conclufion. From thefe reafonings it fufficiently appears, that the moral 
 qualities of men are the produce of the impreffions made upon 
 them, and that there is no inftance of an original propenfity to evil. 
 Our virtues and vices may be traced to the incidents which make 
 the hiftory of our lives , and if thefe incidents could be diverted 
 of every improper tendency, vice would be extirpated from the 
 world. The talk may be difficult, may be of flow progrefs, and 
 of hope undefined and uncertain. But hope will never defert 
 it ; and the man who is anxious for the benefit of his fpecies, 
 will willingly devote a portion of his activity to an enquiry into 
 the mode of effecting this extirpation in whole or in part, an 
 enquiry which promifes much, if it do not in reality promife 
 ' every thing. 
 
 * The arguments of this chapter are for the moft part an abftrac~t, the direct 
 ones from Locke on the Human Underftanding, thofe which relate to experience 
 from Hartley's Obfervations on Man, and thofe refpecting education from the 
 Emile of J. J. Roufleau. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
[ 19 ] 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF MORAL IiMPROVE- 
 MENT CONSIDERED. 
 
 I. LITERATURE. 
 
 BENEFITS OF LITERATURE. — EXAMPLES. — ESSENTIAL PRO- 
 PERTIES OF LITERATURE. — ITS DEFECTS. 
 
 II. EDUCATION. 
 
 BENEFITS OF EDUCATION. — CAUSES OF ITS IMBECILITY. 
 
 HI. POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BENEFITS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTION. — UNIVERSALITY OF 
 
 ITS INFLUENCE PROVED BY THE MISTAKES OF SOCIETY. 
 
 ORIGIN OF EVIL. 
 
 THERE are three principal caufes by which the human BOOK I. 
 CHAP IV. 
 mind is advanced towards a ftate of perfection ; literature, * v— — ' 
 
 or the difFufion of knowledge through the medium of difcuffion, 
 
 whether written or oral ; education, or a fcheme for the early 
 
 impreflion of right principles upon the hitherto unprejudiced 
 
 mind ; and political juftice, or the adoption of any principle 
 
 of morality and truth into the practice of a community. Let us 
 
 take a momentary review of each of thefe. 
 
 D 2 I. LIT ERA- 
 
20 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF 
 
 T. LITERATURE. 
 
 BOOK I. Few engines can be more powerful, and at the fame time 
 
 t v ' ■»' more falutary in their tendency, than literature. Without en- 
 Benefits of r ' i r f t • \ • 
 
 literature. quiring for the prefent into the caufe of this phenomenon, it ' 
 is fufficiently evident in fact, that the human mind is ftrongly 
 infected with prejudice and miftake. The various opinions 
 prevailing in different countries and among different claffes of 
 men upon the fame fubject, are almoft innumerable ; and yet of 
 all thefe opinions only one can be true. Now the effectual way 
 for extirpating thefe prejudices and miflakes feems to be lite- 
 rature. 
 
 Esampler. Literature has reconciled the whole thinking world reflecting 
 
 the great principles of the fyftem of the univerfe, and extirpated 
 upon this fubject the dreams of romance and the dogmas of 
 fuperftition. Literature has unfolded the nature of the human 
 mind, and Locke and others have eftablifhed certain maxims 
 reflecting man, as Newton has done reflecting matter, that are 
 generally admitted for unqueflionable. Difcuffion has afcer- 
 tained with tolerable perfpicuity the preference of liberty over 
 flavery ; and the Mainwarings, the Sibthorpes, and the Filmers, 
 the race of fpeculative reafoners in favour of defpotifm, are 
 almoft extinct. Local prejudice had introduced innumerable 
 privileges and prohibitions upon the fubject of trade ; fpecu- 
 lation has nearly afcertained that perfect freedom is mofl favour- 
 able 
 
MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. 21 
 
 able to her profperity. If in many inftances the collation of ($??■£■ h, 
 
 evidence have failed to produce univerfal conviction, it muft * *— » 
 
 however be confidered, that it has not failed to produce irre- 
 fragable argument, and that falfhood would have been much 
 fhorter in duration, if it had not been protected and inforced by 
 the authority of political government. 
 
 Indeed, if there be fuch a thing as truth, it mufl infallibly Effential pro- 
 
 perties of li- 
 
 be ftruck out by the collifion of mind with mind. The reftlefs terature. 
 activity of intellect will for a time be fertile in paradox and 
 error; but thefe will be only diurnals, while the truths that occa- 
 fionally fpring up, like fturdy plants, will defy the rigour of 
 feafon and climate. In proportion as one reafoner compares 
 his deductions with thofe of another, the weak places of his 
 argument will be detected, the principles he too haftily adopted 
 will be overthrown, and the judgments, in which his mind was 
 expofed to no finifter influence, will be confirmed. All that 
 is requifite in thefe difcuflions is unlimited fpeculation, and a 
 fufEcient variety of fyftems and opinions. While we only dif- 
 pute about the heft way of doing a thing in itfelf wrong, we fhall 
 indeed make but a trifling progrefs ; but, when we are once per- 
 fuaded that nothing is too facred to be brought to the touch- 
 ftone of examination, fcience will advance with rapid ftrides. 
 Men, who turn their attention to the boundlefs field of enquiry, 
 and ftill more who recollect the innumerable errors and caprices 
 of mind, are apt to imagine that the labour is without benefit 
 
 and 
 
22 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF 
 
 r£?A°T> K h anc ^ endlefs. But this cannot be the cafe, if truth at laft have 
 * ; ' any real exiftence. Errors will, during the whole period .of 
 their reign, combat each other ; prejudices that have pafTed un- 
 fufpected for ages, will have their era of detection ; but, if in 
 any fcience we difcover one folitary truth, it cannot be over- 
 thrown. 
 
 Its de r eas. Such are the arguments that may be adduced in favour of 
 
 literature. But, even fhould we admit them in their full force, 
 and at the fame time fuppofe that truth is the omnipotent arti- 
 ficer by which mind can infallibly be regulated, it would yet 
 by no means fufficiently follow that literature is alone adequate 
 to all the purpofes of human improvement. Literature, and 
 particularly that literature by which prejudice is fuperfeded, and 
 the mind is ftrung to a firmer tone, exifts only as the portion 
 of a few. The multitude, at leaft in the prefent ftate of human 
 fociety, cannot partake of its illuminations. For that purpofe 
 it would be neceffary, that the general fyftem of policy mould 
 become favourable, that every individual fhould have leifure for 
 reafoning and reflection, and that there fhould be no fpecies of 
 public inftitution, which, having falfhood for its bafis, fhould 
 .counteract their progrefs. This ftate of fociety, if it did not 
 precede the general diflemination of truth, would at leaft be the 
 immediate refult of it. 
 
 But in reprefenting this ftate of fociety as the ultimate refult, 
 2 we 
 
MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. 
 
 2 3 
 
 we mould incur an obvious fallacy. The difcovery of truth is BOOK I. 
 
 ' CHAP. IV. 
 
 a purfuit of fuch vaft extent, that it is Scarcely pofilble to pre- 
 fcribe bounds to it. Thofe great lines, which feem at prefent 
 to mark the limits of human understanding, will, like the miSts 
 that rife from a lake, retire farther and farther the more clofely 
 we approach them. A certain quantity of truth will be fuffi- 
 cient for the fubverfion of tyranny and usurpation ; and this 
 fubverfion, by a reflected force, will affift our understandings 
 in the difcovery of truth. In the mean time, it is not eafy to 
 define the exact portion of difcovery that mult neceiTarily pre- 
 cede political melioration. The period of partiality and injuftice 
 will be Shortened, in proportion as political rectitude occupies 
 a principal fhare in our difquifition. When the molt consider- 
 able part of a nation, either for numbers or influence, becomes 
 convinced of the flagrant abfurdity of its institutions, the whole 
 will foon be prepared tranquilly and by a fort of common con-- 
 fent to fuperfede them. 
 
 II. EDUCATION. 
 
 But, if it appear that literature, unaided by the regularity Benefis of 
 of institution and difcipline, is inadequate to the reformation of 
 the fpecies, it may perhaps be imagined, that education, com- 
 monly fo called, is the beSt of all Subsidiaries for making up its 
 defects. Education may have the advantage of taking mind 
 in its original State, a foil prepared for culture, and as yet unin- 
 
 fefled 
 
CHAP. IV. 
 v. 
 
 24 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES 
 
 'Hap^ tv ^ e ^ c ^ with weeds ; and it is a common and a reafonable opi- 
 nion, that the tafk is much eafier to plant right and virtuous 
 difpofitions in an unprejudiced underftanding, than to root up 
 the errors that have already become as it were a part of 
 ourfelves. If an erroneous and vicious education be, as it has 
 been fhewn to be, the fource of all our depravity, an education, 
 deprived of thefe errors, feems to prefent itfelf as the molt na- 
 tural exchange, and rauft neceffarily render its fubject virtuous 
 and pure. 
 
 I will imagine the pupil never to have been made the victim 
 of tyranny or the flave of caprice. He has never been per- 
 mitted to triumph in the fuccefs of importunity, and cannot 
 therefore well have become reftlefs, inconftant, fantaftical or 
 unjuft. He has been inured to ideas of equality and inde- 
 pendence, and therefore is not paflionate, haughty and over- 
 bearing. The perpetual witnefs of a temperate conduct and 
 reafonable fentiments, he is not blinded with prejudice, is not 
 liable to make a falfe eftimate of things, and of confequence has 
 no immoderate defires after wealth, and fplendour, and the grati- 
 fications of luxury. Virtue has always been prefented to him 
 under the moft attractive form, as the fureft medium of fuccefs 
 in every honourable purfuit, the never-failing confolation of dis- 
 appointment, and infinitely fuperior in value to every other ae- 
 quifition. 
 
 I« 
 
OF MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. 25 
 
 It cannot be doubted that Such an education is calculated to BOOK r. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 produce very considerable effects. In the world indeed the v — -v- — -* 
 
 Caufes of its 
 
 pupil will become the Spectator of Scenes very different from imfowKty. 
 what his preconceived ideas of virtue might have taught him to 
 expect. Let us however admit it to be poffible fo to temper 
 the mind, as to render it proof againft the influence of example 
 and the allurements of luxury. Still it may be reafonable to 
 doubt of the Sufficiency of education. How many instances may 
 we expect to find, in which a plan has been carried into exe- 
 cution, fo enlightened, unremitted and ardent, as to produce 
 theSe extraordinary effects ? Where muSt the preceptor himSelf 
 have been educated, who Shall thus elevate his pupil above all 
 the errors of mankind ? If the world teach an implicit deference 
 to birth and riches and accidental distinctions, he will Scarcely 
 be exempt from this deference. If the world be full of intrigue 
 and rivalShip and SelfiShneSs, he will not be wholly difinterefted. 
 If falShood be with mankind at large reduced to a SyStem, re- 
 commended by the prudent, commanded by the magistrate, in- 
 forced by the moraliSt *, and practiSed under a thouSand forms, 
 
 the 
 
 * The following paffage is extracted from Lord Kaimes, late one of the judges 
 of the kingdom of Scotland. 
 
 " Cuftom-houfe oaths now a-days go for nothing. Not that the world 
 grows more wicked, but becaufe nobody lays any ftrefs upon them. The duty 
 on French wine is the fame in Scotland and in England. But as we cannot 
 afford to pay this high duty, the permiffion underhand to pay Spanifh duty for 
 
 E French 
 
26 THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF 
 
 r*HAp K tv ^ ie individual w ill not always have the fimplicity to be fincere,.. 
 or the courage to be true. If prejudice have ufurped the feat of 
 knowledge, if law and religion and metaphyfics and govern- 
 ment be furrounded with myftery and artifice, he will not know 
 the truth, and therefore cannot teach it ; he will not poffefs the 
 criterion, and therefore cannot furnifh it to another. Again; if 
 a man thus mighty, thus accomplifhed, thus fuperior to rivalfhip 
 and comparifon, can be found, who will confent to the. profana- 
 tion of employing him in cultivating the mind of a boy, when 
 he fhould be inftrucling the world I 
 
 Education, in the fenfe in which it has commonly been un— 
 derftood, though in one view an engine of unlimited power, is- 
 
 French wine, is found more beneficial to the revenue than the rigour of the law». 
 The oath however muft be taken that the wine we impart is Spanifh, to entitle 
 us to the eafe of the Spanifh duty. Such oaths at firft were highly criminal, 
 becaufe directly a fraud againft the public ; but now that the oath is only ex- 
 acted for form's fake, without any faith intended to be given or received, it 
 becomes very little different from faying in the way of civility, ' I am, fir, your, 
 friend, or your obedient fervant." — Loofe Hints upon Education,, Appendix, 
 p. 362. Edinburgh, 178 1. 
 
 Archdeacon Paley in a work, the feventh edition of which lies before me,, 
 and which is ufed as a text book in the univerfity of Cambridge, fpeaks thus : 
 
 " There are falfiioods which are not lies ; that is, which are not criminal ;, 
 as — a fervant's denying his mafter, a prifoner's pleading not guilty, an advocate 
 aflerting the juftice, or his belief of the juftice of his client's caufe. In fuch 
 inftances no confidence is deftroyed, becaufe none was repofed." Principles of 
 Moral and Political Philofophy, Book III. Part I. Chap. xv. London, 1 790. 
 
 exceed- 
 
MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. a 7 
 
 exceedingly incompetent to the great bufinefs of reforming BOOK I. 
 mankind. It performs its talk weakly and in detail. The grand 
 principles that the inventor feeks in his machines, and the phi- 
 lofopher in inveftigating the fyftem of the univerfe, are fuch, as 
 from a few fimple data are fufficient to the production of a 
 thoufand events. But the education I have been defcribing 
 is the reverfe of this. It employs an immenfe combination of 
 powers, and an endlefs chain of caufes for the production of a 
 Tingle fpecimen. No ta£k, which is not in its own nature im- 
 practicable, can eafily be fuppofed more difficult, than that of 
 •counteracting univerfal error, and arming the youthful mind 
 againft the contagion of general example. The ftrongeft mind 
 that propofed this as its object, would fcarcely undertake the 
 forming more than one, or at mod a very fmall number, of 
 pupils. Where can a remedy be found for this fundamental 
 -difadvantage ? where but in political juflice, that all comprehen- 
 five fcheme, that immediately applies to the removal of counter- 
 faction and contagion, that embraces millions in its grafp, and 
 -that educates in one fchool the preceptor and the pupil ? 
 
 III. "POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 The benefits of political juftice will beft be underftood, if Benefits of 
 we confider fociety in the moft comprehenfive view, taking lilcT* JU ~ 
 ■into our eftimate the erroneous inftitutions by which the human 
 mind has been too often checked in its career., as well as thofe 
 
 E 2 well 
 
28. THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF 
 
 J?P°„ K }' well founded opinions of public and individual intereft, which 
 CHAP. IV. ■ r r ' 
 
 * v — — ' perhaps need only to be clearly explained, in order to their 
 
 being generally received. 
 
 UnlverfaKty Now in whatever light it be confidered, we cannot avoid 
 
 of its influ- ° 
 
 «ce : perceiving, firft, that political inftitution is peculiarly ftrong in 
 
 that very point in which the efficacy of education was deficient, 
 the extent of its operation. That it in fome way influences 
 our conduct will hardly be difputed. It is fufficiently obvious 
 that a defpotic government is calculated to render men pliant, 
 and a free one refolute and independent. All the effects that 
 any principle adopted into the practice of a community may 
 produce, it produces upon a comprehenfive fcale. It creates a 
 fimilar bias in the whole, or a confiderable part of the fociety. 
 The motive it exhibits, the ftimulus it begets, are operative, 
 Hbecaufe they are fitted to produce effect upon mind. They 
 will therefore inevitably influence all to whom they are equally 
 addreffed. Virtue, where virtue is the refult, will ceafe to be a 
 tafk of perpetual watchfulnefs and contention. It will neither 
 be, nor appear to be, a facrifice of our perfonal advantage to 
 difmterefted confiderations. It will render thofe the confederates, 
 fupport and fecurity of our rectitude, who were before its moft 
 formidable enemies. 
 
 proved by the Again, an additional argument in favour of the efficacy of 
 
 miftakes of -.'„,-. •re i r n 
 
 focUty. political inftitutions, anfes from the exteniive influence which 
 
 3 certain 
 
MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. 29 
 
 certain falfe principles, engendered by an imperfect fyftem of BOOK r. 
 
 fociety, have been found to exert. Superftition, an immoderate v v • 
 
 fear of fhame, a falfe calculation of intereft, are errors that have 
 been always attended with the moil extenfive confequences. 
 How incredible at the prefent day do the effects of fuperftition 
 exhibited in the middle ages, the horrors of excommunication 
 and interdict, and the humiliation of the greateft monarchs at 
 the feet of the pope, appear ? What can be more contrary to 
 European modes than that dread of difgrace, which induces the 
 Bramin widows of Indoftan to deftroy themfelves upon the 
 funeral pile of tbeir hufbands ? What more horribly immoral 
 than the miftaken idea which leads multitudes in commercial 
 countries to regard fraud, fallhood and circumvention as the 
 trueft policy ? But, however powerful thefe errors may be, the 
 empire of truth, if once eftablifhed, would be incomparably 
 greater. The man, who is enflaved by fhame, fuperftition or 
 deceit, will be perpetually expofed to an internal war of opi- 
 nions, difapproving by an involuntary cenfure the conduct he 
 has been moft perfuaded to adopt. No mind can be fo far ali- 
 enated from truth, as not in the midft of its degeneracy to have 
 inceffant returns of a better principle. No fyftem of fociety 
 can be fo thoroughly pervaded with miftake, as not frequently to 
 fuggeft to us fentiments of virtue, liberty and juftice. But 
 truth is in all its branches harmonious and confiftent. 
 
 The 
 
3© THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES OF 
 
 BOOK I. The recollection of this circumftance induces me to add as a 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 * * ' concluding obfervation, that it may reafonably be doubted whe- 
 ther error could ever be formidable or long-lived, if government 
 did not lend it fupport. The nature of mind is adapted to the 
 perception of ideas, their correfpondence and difference. In 
 the right difcernment of thefe is its true element and moft con- 
 genial purfiiit. Error would indeed for a time have been the 
 refult of our partial perceptions ; but, as our perceptions are 
 continually changing, and continually becoming more definite 
 and correct, our errors would have been momentary, and our 
 judgments have hourly approached nearer to the truth. The 
 doctrine of tranfubftantiation, the belief that men were really 
 eating flefli when they feemed to be eating bread, and drinking 
 rihuman blood when they feemed to be drinking wine, could 
 •never have maintained its empire fo long, if it had not been 
 ^reinforced by civil authority. Men would not have fo long 
 perfuaded themfelves that an old man elected by the intrigues 
 -of a conclave of cardinals, from the moment of that election 
 -became immaculate and infallible, if the perfuafion had not been 
 maintained by revenues, endowments and palaces. A fyftem 
 -of government, that fhould lend no fanction to ideas of fana- 
 -ticifm and hypocrify, would prefently accuftom its fubjects to 
 think juftly upon topics of moral worth and importance. A 
 Hate, that fhould abftain from impofing contradictory and im- 
 practicable oaths, and thus perpetually ftimulating its members 
 
 i to 
 
MORAL IMPROVEMENT CONSIDERED. 31 
 
 to concealment and perjury, would foon become diftinguifhed BOOK I. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 for plain dealing and veracity. A country, in which places of ^ * ' 
 
 dignity and confidence fhould ceafe to be at the difpofal of 
 faction, favour and intereft, would not long be the refidence of 
 fervility and deceit. 
 
 ev:2. 
 
 Thefe remarks fugged to us the true anfwer to an obvious origin of 
 objection, that might otherwife prefent itfelf, to the conclufion 
 to which thefe principles appear to lead. It might be faid, that 
 an erroneous government can never afford an adequate folution. 
 for the exiftence of moral evil, fince government was itfelf the-: 
 production of human intelligence, and therefore, if ill, muft have 
 been indebted for its ill qualities to fome wrong which had pre- 
 vious exiftence. 
 
 The propofition afferted in this objection is undoubtedly true.- 
 All vice is nothing more than error and miftake reduced into 
 practice, and adopted as the principle of our conduct. But error 
 is perpetually haftening to its own detection. Vicious conduct 
 is foon difcovered to involve injurious confequences. Injuftice 
 therefore by its own nature is little fitted for a durable exift- 
 ence. But government " lays its hand upon the fpring there is 
 in fociety, and puts a flop to its motion *." It gives fubftance and 
 permanence to our errors. It reverfes the genuine propenfities 
 
 * Logan, Philofophy of Hiftory, p. 69. 
 
 of 
 
3 t THREE PRINCIPAL CAUSES, &c. 
 
 BOOK I. f mind, and, inftead of fuffering us to look forward, teaches us 
 CHAP. IV. ' ' ° ' 
 
 .' * ' to look backward for perfection. It prompts us to feek the 
 
 public welfare, not in innovation and improvement, but in a 
 timid reverence for the decifions of our anceftors, as if it were 
 the nature of mind always to degenerate, and never to advance. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ r 
 
 j 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 EXEMPLIFIED. 
 
 ROBBERY AND FRAUD, TWO GREAT VICES IN SOCIETY — 
 ORIGINATE, I. IN EXTREME POVERTY — 2. IN THE OS- 
 TENTATION OF THE RICH 3. IN THEIR TYRANNY 
 
 RENDERED PERMANENT — I. BY LEGISLATION — 2. BY 
 THE ADMINISTRATION OF LAW — 3. BY THE INEQUA- 
 LITY OF CONDITION. 
 
 T 
 
 HE efficacy of political inftitutions will be rendered ftill BOOK I. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 more evident, if wc enquire into the hiftory of the raoft * . ' 
 confiderable vices at prefent exifling in fociety ; and if it can be 
 fhewn that they derive their inveteracy from political inftitution. 
 
 Two of the greateft abufes relative to the interior policy of Robbery and 
 
 » l-i • m • 1 1 fraud, two 
 
 nations, which at this time prevail in the world, will be allowed great vices ia 
 
 fociety » 
 
 to confift in the irregular transfer of property, either firft by 
 violence, or fecondly by fraud. If among the inhabitants of 
 any country there exifted no defire in one individual to pofTefs 
 himfelf of the fubftance of another, or no defire fo vehement 
 and reftlefs, as to prompt him to acquire it by means inconfiftent 
 with order and juftice ; undoubtedly in that country guilt could 
 
 F hardly 
 
34- INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL 
 
 chap v h ar d'y be known but by report. If every man could with 
 ' v ' perfect facility obtain the neceffaries of life, and, obtaining them,, 
 feel no uneafy craving after its fuperfluities, temptation would 
 lofe its power. Private intereft would vifibly accord with public 
 good ; and civil fociety become all that poetry has feigned of 
 the golden age. Let us enquire into the principles to which 
 thefe evils owe their exiftence, and the treatment by which they 
 may be alleviated or remedied. 
 
 originate, i. Firft then it is to be obferved, that, in the moft refined ftates 
 
 in extreme 
 
 poverty. of Europe, the inequality of property has arifen to an alarming 
 height. Vaft numbers of their inhabitants are deprived of 
 almoft every accommodation that can render life tolerable or 
 fecure. Their utmoft induftry fcarcely fuffices for their fup- 
 port. The women and children lean with an infupportable 
 weight upon the efforts of the man, fo that a large family has 
 in the lower order of life become a proverbial expreflion for an 
 uncommon degree of poverty and wretchednefs. If ficknefs 
 or fome of thofe cafualties which are perpetually incident to an 
 aftive and laborious life, be fuperadded to thefe burthens, the 
 diftrefs is yet greater. 
 
 It feems to be agreed that in England there is lefs wretched- 
 nefs and diftrefs than in moft of the kingdoms of the continent. 
 In England the poors' rates amount to the fum of two millions 
 fterling per annum. It has been calculated that one perfon in 
 
 fevea 
 
INSTITUTIONS EXEMPLIFIED. 35 
 
 feven of the inhabitants of this country derives at fome period ?°°*5- r ; 
 
 of his life affiftance from this fund. If to this we add the per- ' » ' 
 
 fons, who, from pride, a fpirit of independence, or the want of 
 a legal fettlement, though in equal diftrefs, receive no fuch 
 affiftance, the proportion will be confiderably increafed. 
 
 I lay no ftrefs upon the accuracy of this calculation ; the ge- 
 neral fact is fufficient to give us an idea of the greatnefs of the 
 abufe. The confequences that refult are placed beyond the 
 reach of contradiction. A perpetual ftruggle with the evils of 
 poverty, if frequently ineffectual, muft neceffarily render many 
 of the fufferers defperate. A painful feeling of their oppreffed 
 fituation will itfelf deprive them of the power of furmounting 
 it. The fuperiority of the rich, being thus unmercifully exer- 
 cifed, muft inevitably expofe them to reprifals ; and the poor 
 jtnan will be induced to regard the ftate of fociety as a ftate of 
 war, an unjuft combination, not for protecting every man in 
 his rights and fecuring to him the means of exiftence, but for 
 engrofling all its advantages to a few favoured individuals, and 
 referving for the portion of the reft want, dependence and mi- 
 fery. 
 
 A fecond fource of thofe deftrudtive paflions by which the 2. ; n the of- 
 
 £■!••■•• ■ ' tentation of 
 
 peace of lociety is interrupted, is to be found in the luxury, the the rich: 
 pageantry and magnificence with which enormous wealth is 
 nfually accompanied. Human beings are capable of encoun- 
 
 F 2 tering 
 
3 6 INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL 
 
 BOOK I. tering with chearfulnefs confiderable hardships, when thofe hard- 
 fhips are impartially fhared with the reft of the fociety, and they 
 are not infulted with the fpectacle of indolence and eafe in 
 others, no way deferving of greater advantages than themfelves. 
 But it is a bitter aggravation of their own calamity, to have the 
 privileges of others forced on their obfervation, and, while they 
 are perpetually and vainly endeavouring to fecure for themfelves 
 and their families the pooreft conveniences, to find others re- 
 velling in the fruits of their labours. This aggravation is affi- 
 duoufly adminiftered to them under moft of the political efta- 
 blifhments at prefent in exiftence. There is a numerous clafs 
 of individuals, who, though rich, have neither brilliant talents 
 nor fublime virtues ; and, however highly they may prize their 
 education, their affability, their fuperior polifh and the elegance 
 of their manners, have a fecret confcioufnefs that they pofTefs 
 nothing by which they can fo fecurely alTert their pre-emi- 
 nence and keep their inferiors at a diftance, as the fplendour of 
 their equipage, the magnificence of their retinue and the fump- 
 tuoufnefs of their entertainments. The poor man is ftruck with 
 this exhibition ; he feels his own miferies ; he knows how un- 
 wearied are his efforts to obtain a {lender pittance of this pro- 
 digal wafte ; and he miftakes opulence for felicity. He cannot 
 perfuade himfelf that an embroidered garment may frequently 
 cover an aching heart. 
 
 3. in the?* A third difadvantasre that is apt to conned poverty with 
 
 tyranny: ° x * 
 
 difcontent 
 
INSTITUTIONS EXEMLPLIFIED. 37 
 
 difcontent confifts in the Infolence and ufurpation of the rich. BOOK i. 
 
 r CHAP. v. 
 
 If the poor man would in other refpeds compofe himfelf in * * ' 
 
 philofophic indifference, and, confcious that he poffeffes every- 
 thing that is truly honourable to man as fully as his rich neigh- 
 bour, would look upon the reft as beneath his envy, his neigh- 
 bour will not permit him to do fo. He feems as if he could 
 never be fatisfied with his poffeffions unlefs he can make the 
 fpedacle of them grating to others ; and that honeft felf-efteem> 
 by which his inferior might otherwife arrive at apathy, is ren- 
 dered the inftrument of galling him with oppreffion and in- 
 juftice. In many countries junice is avowedly made a fubjed 
 of folicitation, and the man of the higheft rank and moft fplen- 
 did connections almoft infallibly carries his caufe againft the 
 unprotected and friendlefs. In countries where this fhamelefs 
 pradice is not eftablifhed, juftice is frequently a matter of ex- 
 penfive purchafe, and the man with the longeft purfe is pro- 
 verbially victorious. A confcioufnefs of thefe fads muft be 
 expeded to render the rich little cautious of offence in his deal- 
 ings with the poor, and to infpire him with a temper over- 
 bearing, didatorial and tyrannical. Nor does this indired op- 
 preffion fatisfy his defpotifm. The rich are in all fuch countries 
 diredly or indiredly the legislators of the ftate ; and of confe- 
 quence are perpetually reducing oppreffion into a fyftem, and 
 depriving the poor of that little commonage of nature as it were, 
 which might otherwife ftill have remained to them. 
 
 The 
 
38 
 
 INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL 
 
 BOOK I. 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 » . > 
 
 The opinions of individuals, and of confequence their defires, 
 for defire is nothing but opinion maturing for action, will al- 
 ways be in a great degree regulated by the opinions of the com- 
 munity. But the manners prevailing in many countries 
 are accurately calculated to imprefs a conviction, that inte- 
 grity, virtue, .understanding and induftry are nothing, and that 
 opulence is every thing. Does a man, whofe exterior denotes 
 indigence, expect to be well received in fociety, and especially 
 by thofe who would be underftood to dictate to the reft ? Does 
 he find or imagine himfelf in want of their afliftance and fa- 
 vour ? He is prefently taught that no merits can atone for a 
 mean appearance. The leffon that is read to him is, Go home, 
 enrich yourfelf by whatever means, obtain thofe Superfluities 
 which are alone regarded as eftimable, and you may then be 
 fecure of an .amicable reception. Accordingly poverty in fuch 
 countries is viewed as the greateft of demerits. It is efcaped 
 from with an eagernefs that has no leifure for the fcruples of 
 honefty. It is concealed as the moft indelible difgrace. While 
 one man choofes the path of undiftinguifhing accumulation, an- 
 other plunges into expences which are to impofe him upon the 
 world as more opulent than he is. He haftens to the reality 
 of that penury, the appearance of which he dreads ; and, toge- 
 ther with his property, facrifices the integrity, veracity and 
 character which might have confoled him in his adverfity. 
 
 rendered per- 
 manent : 
 
 Such are the caufes, that, in different degrees under the dif- 
 ferent 
 
INSTITUTIONS EXEMPLIFIED. 39 
 
 ferent governments .of the world, prompt mankind openly or BOOK I. 
 
 fecretly to encroach upon the property of each other. Let us * v ' 
 
 confider how far they admit either of remedy or aggravation 
 from political inftitution. Whatever tends to decreafe the in- 
 juries attendant upon poverty, decreafes at the fame time the in- 
 ordinate deilre and the enormous accumulation of wealth. Wealth 
 is not purfued for its own fake, and feldom for the fenfual grati- 
 fications it can purchafe, but for the fame reafons that ordinarily 
 prompt men to the acquisition of learning, eloquence and fkill, 
 for the love of diftinction and fear of contempt. How few would 
 prize the poffeffion of riches, if they were condemned to enjoy 
 their equipage, their palaces and their entertainments in folitude, 
 with no eye to wonder at their magnificence, and no fordid 
 obferver ready to convert that wonder into an adulation of the 
 owner ? If admiration were not generally deemed the exclufive 
 property of the rich, and contempt the conftant lacquey of po- 
 verty, the love of gain would ceafe to be an univerfal paffion. 
 Let us confider in what refpects political inftitution is rendered 
 fubfervient to this paffion. 
 
 Firft then, legiflation is in almoft every country grofsly the 1. by fegif- 
 
 • n • lation : 
 
 favourer of the rich againft the poor. Such is the character of 
 the game laws, by which the induftrious ruftic is forbidden to 
 deftroy the animal that preys upon the hopes of his future fub- 
 fiftence, or to fupply himfelf with the food that unfought thrufts 
 itfelf in his path. Such was the fpirit of the late revenue laws 
 
 of 
 
4 o INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL 
 
 CHAP v °^ ^ rance > w 'hich in feveral of their provifions fell exclufively 
 v — ^ 1 U p 0n tne humble and induftrious, and exempted from their ope- 
 ration thofe who were beft able to fupport it. Thus in England 
 the land tax at this moment produces half a million lefs than it 
 did a century ago, while the taxes on confumption have ex- 
 perienced an addition of thirteen millions per annum during the 
 fame period. This is an attempt, whether effectual or no, to 
 throw the burthen from the rich upon the poor, and as fuch is 
 an exhibition of the fpirit of legislation. Upon the fame princi- 
 ple robbery and other offences, which the wealthier part of the 
 community have no temptation to commit, are treated as capital 
 crimes, and attended with the moft rigorous, often the moft in- 
 human punimments. The rich are encouraged to affociate for 
 the execution of the moft partial and oppreffive pofitive laws. 
 Monopolies and patents are lavifhly difpenfed to fuch as are able 
 to purchafe them. While the moft vigilant policy is employed to 
 prevent combinations of the poor to fix the price of labour, and 
 they are deprived of the benefit of that prudence and judgment 
 which would felect the fcene of their induftrv. 
 
 a. by the ad- Secondly, the adminiftration of law is not lefs iniquitous than 
 
 minifttation 
 
 ,«f law: t he fpi r it in which it is framed. Under the late government of 
 
 France the office of judge was a matter of purchafe, partly by an 
 open price advanced to the crown, and partly by a fecret douceur 
 paid to the minifter. He, who knew beft how to manage hi s 
 market in the retail trade of juftice, could afford to purchafe the 
 4 good 
 
INSTITUTIONS EXEMPLIFIED. 41 
 
 •good will of its functions at the higheft price. To the client J^9?^ h 
 
 juftice was avowedly made an object of perfonal folicitation, and * * ' 
 
 a powerful friend, a handfome woman, or a proper prefent, were 
 articles of much greater value than a good caufe. In England 
 the criminal law is adminiftered with tolerable impartiality fo far 
 as regards the trial itfelf ; but the number of capital offences, and 
 of confequence the frequency of pardons, open even here a wide 
 door to favour and abufe. In caufes relating to property the 
 practice of law is arrived at fuch a pitch as to render all juftice 
 ineffectual. The length of our chancery fuits, the multiplied ap- 
 peals from court to court, the enormous fees of counfel, attornies, 
 fecretaries, clerks, the drawing of briefs, bills, replications and re- 
 joinders, and what has fometimes been called the glorious un- 
 certainty of the law-j render it often more advifable to refign a 
 property than to contefl it, and particularly exclude the im- 
 poverifhed claimant from the faintefl hope of redrefs. Nothing 
 certainly is more practicable than to fecure to all queftions of 
 controverfy a cheap and fpeedy decifion, which, combined with 
 the independence of the judges and a few obvious improvements 
 in the conftruction of juries, would infure the equitable applica- 
 tion of general rules to all characters and ftations. 
 
 Thirdly, the inequality of conditions ufually maintained by 3- by the in- 
 equality of 
 political inftitution, is calculated greatly to enhance the imagined conditions. 
 
 .excellence of wealth. In the ancient monarchies of the eaft, 
 
 ,and in Turkey at the prefent day, an eminent ftation could 
 
 G fcarcely 
 
CHAP. V. 
 
 » . ' 
 
 42 INFLUENCE OF POLILTICAL, Bee. 
 
 *h ap v ^ carce ^7 fail t0 excite implicit deference. The timid inhabitant 
 trembled before his fuperior; and would have though,, it little 
 lefs than blafphemy, to touch the veil drawn by the proud fatrap 
 over his inglorious origin. The fame principles were extenfively 
 prevalent under the feudal fyftem. The vaffal, who was re- 
 garded as a fort of live ftock upon the eftate, and knew of no 
 appeal from the arbitrary fiat of his lord, would fcarcely venture 
 to fufpect that he was of the fame fpecies. This however con- 
 stituted an unnatural and violent fituation. There is a propen- 
 sity in man to look farther than the outfide j and to come with 
 a writ of enquiry into the title of the upftart and the fuccefsful. 
 In England at the prefent day there are few poor men who do not 
 confole themfelves, by the freedom of their animadverfions upon 
 their fuperiors. The new-fangled gentleman is by no means 
 fecure againft having his tranquillity difturbed by their furly and 
 pointed farcafms. This propenfity might eafily be encouraged, 
 and made conducive to the moft falutary purpofes. Every man 
 might, as was the cafe in certain countries upon record, be in- 
 fpired with the confeioufnefs of citizenfliip, and be made to feel 
 himfelf an active and efficient member of the great whole. The 
 poor man would then perceive, that, if eclipfed, he could not be 
 trampled upon ; and he would no longer be flung with the furies 
 of envy, refentment and defpair. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 43 ] 43 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE OF PERPETUAL 
 
 IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 PERFECTIBILITY OF MAN — INSTANCED, FIRST, IN LAN- 
 GUAGE. — ITS BEGINNINGS. — ABSTRACTION. — COMPLEXI- 
 TY OF LANGUAGE. — SECOND INSTANCE: ALPHABETICAL 
 
 WRITING. HIEROGLYPHICS AT FIRST UNIVERSAL. 
 
 PROGRESSIVE DEVIATIONS. — APPLICATION. 
 
 IF we would form to ourfelves a folid eftimate of political, or BOOK I. 
 CHAP. VI 
 indeed of any other fcience, we ought not to confine our » v * J 
 
 furvey to that narrow portion of things which pafTes under our f man : 
 own immediate infpection, and rafhly pronounce every thing 
 that we have not ourfelves feen, to be impoffible. There is no 
 characteriftic of man, which feems at prefent at leaft fo eminently 
 to diftinguifh him, or to be of fo much importance in every 
 branch of moral fcience, as his perfectibility. Let us carry back 
 our minds to man in his original ftate, a being capable of im- 
 preffions and knowledge to an unbounded extent, but not having 
 as yet received the one or cultivated the other ; and let us con- 
 trail this being with all that fcience and genius have effected : 
 and from hence we may form fome idea what it is of which hu- 
 
 G 2 man 
 
44 
 
 BOOK I. 
 CHAP. VI. 
 « ^ ' 
 
 HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE 
 
 man nature is capable. It is to be remembered, that this being: 
 did not as now derive afliftance from the communications of his; 
 fellows, nor had his feeble and crude conceptions affifted by the^ 
 experience of fucceffive centuries ; but that in the ftate we are. 
 figuring all men were equally ignorant. The field of improve- 
 ment was before them, but for every ftep in advance they were - 
 to be indebted to their untutored efforts. Nor is it of any con- 
 fluence whether fuch was actually the progrefs of mind, or 
 whether, as others teach,. the progrefs was abridged, and. man. 
 was immediately advanced half way to the end of his career by 
 the interpofition of the author of his nature. In any cafe it is 
 an allowable and no unimproving {peculation, to confider mind 
 as it is in itfelf, and to enquire what would have been its hiftory, . 
 if, immediately upon its production, it had been left to be acted 
 upon by thofe ordinary laws of the univerfe with whofe opera- 
 tion we are acquainted. 
 
 inftanced, i. 
 in language. 
 
 One of the acquifitions- mod: evidently requifite as a prelimi- 
 nary to our prefent improvements is that of language. But it is 
 impomble to conceive of an acquifition, that muft have been in 
 its origin more different from what at prefent it is found, or that 
 lefs promifed that copioufnefs and refinement it has fince ex- 
 hibited. 
 
 Its begm- lt s beginning was probably from thofe involuntary cries, 
 
 which infants for example are found to utter in the earlieft 
 
 ftages 
 
OF PERPETUAL IMPROVEMENT. 45 
 
 ft'agcs of their exiftence, and which, previoufly to the idea of BOOK I- 
 6 ' ■> f l CHAP. VI. 
 
 exciting pity or procuring afliftance, fpontaneoufly arife from the ' » 
 
 operation of pain upon our animal frame. Thefe cries, when 
 actually uttered, become a fubject of perception to him by whom 
 they are uttered j and; being obferved to be conftantly afTociated 
 with certain preliminary impreffions and to excite the idea cf 
 thofe impreffions in the hearer, may afterwards be repeated from 
 reflection and the defire of relief. Eager defire to communicate 
 any information to another, will alfo prompt us to utter fome 
 fimple found for the purpofe of exciting attention : this found 
 will probably frequently recur to organs unpractifed to variety, 
 and will at length fland as it were by convention for the inform- 
 ation intended to be conveyed. But the diflance is extreme 
 from thefe fimple modes of communication, which we polfefs in 
 common with fome of the inferior animals, to all the analyfis 
 and abftraction which languages require.. 
 
 Abftraction indeed, though as it is commonly underftood it Abftraftion. 
 be one of the fublimeft operations of mind, is in fome fort co- 
 eval with and infeparable from the exiftence of mind. The next 
 ftep to fimple perception is that of comparison, or the coupling 
 together of two ideas and the perception of their refemblances 
 and differences. Without comparifon there can be no preference, 
 and without preference no action : though it muft be acknow- 
 ledged, that this comparifon is an operation that may be per- 
 formed by the mind without adverting to its nature, and that 
 
 neither 
 
46 HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE 
 
 BOOK i. neither the brute nor the favage has any confcioufnefs of the 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 1 v ' feveral fteps of the intellectual progrefs. Comparifon immediately 
 
 leads to imperfect abftraction. The fenfation of to-day is clafled, 
 if fimilar, with the fenfation of yefterday, and an inference is 
 made refpe&ing the condud to be adopted. Without this degree 
 of abftraction the faint dawnings of language already defcribed 
 could never have exifted. Abftra&ion, which was neceffary to 
 the firft exiftence of language, is again affifted in its operations 
 by language. That generalifation, which is implied in the very 
 notion of thought, being thus embodied and rendered palpable, 
 makes the mind acquainted with its own powers and creates a 
 reftlefs defire after farther progrefs. 
 
 ofbnguage. But, though it be by no means impoffible, to trace the caufes 
 that concurred to the production of language, and to prove them 
 adequate to their effect, it does not the lefs appear that this is 
 an acquifition of flow growth and ineftimable value. The very 
 fteps, were we to purfue them, would appear like an endlefs 
 labyrinth. The diilance is immeafurable between the three or 
 four vague and inarticulate founds uttered by animals, and the 
 copioufnefs of lexicography or the regularity of grammar. The 
 general and fpecial names by which things are at firft compli- 
 cated and afterwards divided, the names by which properties 
 are feparated from their fubftances and powers from both, the 
 comprehenfive diftribution of parts of fpeech, verbs, adjectives 
 and particles, the inflexions of words by which the change 
 
 of 
 
OF PERPETUAL IMPROVEMENT. 47 
 
 of their terminations changes their meaning through a variety BOOK I. 
 
 of fhadings, their concords and their governments, all of them * ► ' 
 
 prefent us with fuch a boundlefs catalogue of fcience, that he, 
 who on the one hand did not know that the boundlefs tafk had 
 been actually performed, or who on the other was not intimately 
 acquainted with the progreflive nature of mind, would pro- 
 nounce the accomplifhment of them impoflible. 
 
 A fecond invention, well calculated to imprefs us with a fenfe Second m- 
 
 1 nance : al- 
 
 of the progreflive nature of man, is that of alphabetical writing. Poetical 
 Hieroglyphical or picture writing appears at fome time to have Hierogly- 
 
 pliics at firft 
 
 been univerfal, and the difficulty of conceiving the gradation anwerfaL 
 from this to alphabetical is fo great, as to have induced Hartley, 
 one of the moft acute of all philofophical writers, to have re- 
 courfe to miraculous interpofition as the only adequate folution. 
 In reality no problem can be imagined more operofe, than that 
 of decompofing the founds of words into four and twenty Ample 
 elements or letters, and again finding thefe elements in all other 
 words. When we have examined the fubject a little more clofe- 
 ly, and perceived the fteps by which this labour was accom- 
 plished, perhaps the immenfity of the labour will rather gain 
 upon us, as he that fhall have counted a million of units, will . 
 have a vafter idea upon the fubjeft, than he that only confiders 
 them in the grofs. 
 
 In China hieroglyphical writing has never been fuperfeded by Progreflive 
 5 alpha- 
 
4« HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE 
 
 FHM^vi a *P na ketical, an ^ this from the very nature of their language, 
 
 ^* — * ' which is confiderably monofyllabic, the fame found being made 
 
 to fignify a great variety of objects, by means of certain fhadings 
 of tone too delicate for any alphabet to be able to reprefent. 
 They have however two kinds of writing, one .for the learned, 
 and another for the vulgar. The learned adhere clofely to their 
 hieroglyphical writing, reprefenting every word by its corre- 
 fponding picture ; but the vulgar are frequent in their deviations 
 from it. 
 
 Hieroglyphical writing and fpeech may indeed be confidered 
 in the firft inftance as two languages, running parallel to each 
 other, but with no neceffary connection. The picture and the word 
 each of them reprefent the idea, one as immediately as the other. 
 But, though independent, they will become accidentally affociated* 
 the picture at firft imperfectly, and afterwards more conftantly 
 fuggefting the idea of its correfpondent found. It is in this man- 
 ner that the mercantile claffes of China began to corrupt, as it is 
 ftyled, their hieroglyphical writing. They had a word fuppofe 
 ■of two fyllables to write. The character appropriate to that 
 word they were not acquainted with, or it failed to fuggeft itfelf 
 to their memory. Each of the fyllables however was a diftinct 
 word in the language, and the characters belonging to them per- 
 fectly familiar. The expedient that fuggefted itfelf was to write 
 thefe two characters with a mark fignifying their union, though 
 m reality the characters had hitherto been appropriated to ideas 
 S of 
 
OF PERPETUAL IMPROVEMENT. 49 
 
 of a different fort, wholly unconnected with that now intended ^°K L, 
 
 to be conveyed. Thus a fort of rebus or chararde was produced. * » ' 
 
 In other cafes the word, though monofyllabic, was capable of be- 
 ing divided into two founds, and the fame procefs was employed. 
 This is a firft ftep towards alphabetical analyfis. Some word, 
 fuch as the interjection 0! or the particle A is already a found 
 perfectly fimple, and thus furnifhes a firft ftone to the edifice. 
 But, though thefe ideas may perhaps prefent us with a faint view 
 of the manner in which an alphabet was produced, yet the actual 
 production of a complete alphabet is perhaps of all human dif- 
 coveries, that which required the moft perfevering reflection, the 
 luckieft concurrence of circumftances, and the moft patient and 
 gradual progrefs. 
 
 Let us however fuppofe man to have gained the two firft Application, 
 elements of knowledge, fpeaking and writing ; let us trace him 
 through all his fubfequent improvements, through whatever 
 conftitutes the inequality between Newton and the ploughman, 
 and indeed much more than this, fince the moft ignorant plough- 
 man in civilifed fociety is infinitely different from what he would 
 have been, when ftripped of all the benefits he has derived from 
 literature and the arts. Let us furvey the earth covered with the 
 labours of man, houfes, inclofures, harvefts, manufactures, inftru- 
 ments, machines, together with all the wonders of painting, 
 poetry, eloquence and philofophy. 
 
 H Such 
 
So HUMAN INVENTIONS CAPABLE, &c. 
 
 £Q?JF £\ Such was man in his original ftate, and fuch is man as we at 
 
 CHAP. VI. & * 
 
 * ^ ' prefent behold him. Is it pcflible for us to contemplate what 
 
 he has already done, without being imprefled with a ftrong pre- 
 fentiment of the improvements he has yet to accomplifh ? There 
 is no fcience that is not capable of additions ; there is no art 
 that may not be carried to a ftill higher perfection. If this be 
 true of all other fciences, why not of morals ? If this be true 
 of all other arts, why not of focial inftitution ? The very con- 
 ception of this as poflible, is in the higheft degree encouraging.. 
 If we can ftill farther demonftrate it to be a part of the natural 
 and regular progrefs of mind, our confidence and our hopes will 
 then be complete. This is the temper with which we ought to 
 engage in the ftudy of political truth. Let us look back, that 
 we may profit by the experience of mankind ; but let us not 
 look back, as if the wifdom of our anceftors was fuch as ta 
 leave no room for future improvement.. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 5i 1 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THESE PRINCIPLES FROM 
 THE INFLUENCE OF CLIMATE. 
 
 PARTI. 
 
 OF MORAL AND PHYSICAL CAUSES. 
 
 THE QUESTION STATED. — PROVINCES OF SENSATION AND 
 
 REFLECTION. MORAL CAUSES FREQUENTLY MISTAKEN 
 
 FOR PHYSICAL. — SUPERIORITY OF THE FORMER EVIDENT 
 FROM THE VARIETIES OF HUMAN CHARACTER. — OPE- 
 RATION OF PHYSICAL CAUSES RARE. — FERTILITY OF 
 REFLECTION. — PHYSICAL CAUSES IN THE FIRST IN- 
 STANCE SUPERIOR, AFTERWARDS MORAL. OBJECTION 
 
 FROM THE EFFECT OF BREED IN ANIMALS. — CONCLU- 
 SION. 
 
 THERE are certain propofitions which may be confidered book I 
 indifferently, either as corollaries flowing from the prin- 
 ciples already eftablifhed, or as a fource of new arguments 
 againft the validity of thofe principles. In the firft view they 
 are entitled to a clear and perfpicuous ftatement, and in the fe- 
 cond to a mature examination. For example : 
 
 Ha The 
 
52 OF MORAL AND 
 
 ph'a'p 1 vii ^ e cau ^" es which appear to operate upon the human mind 
 ^r — ^—-r J may be divided into two claffes : perceptions, which are ren- 
 
 The queltion ' 
 
 dated. dered directly a fubject of reafoning, and regarded by the intel- 
 
 lect as inducements to action ; and perceptions, which act indi- 
 rectly upon the mind, by rendering the animal frame gay, vi- 
 gorous and elaftic, or on the contrary fluggifh, morbid and 
 inactive. According to the fyftem already eftablifhed, the 
 former of thefe are to be regarded as the whole, the latter being 
 fo comparatively inefficient and fubordinate as to ftand in the 
 eftimate as almoft nothing. To many reafoners however they 
 have by no means appeared of fo trivial importance, and it may 
 not be ufelefs to examine for a moment the ideas they have 
 formed, and the reafons which have induced them to afcribe 
 fb much to the meanefl branch of the human constitution.. 
 
 Impreffions upon our fenfes may act either as phyfical or 
 moral caufes. Indifpofitlon of the body operates upon the mind, 
 principally in the firft of thefe ways, feeming without any 
 formal deliberation of the underftanding to incline us to diffa- 
 tisfaction and indolence. Corporal punifhment affects us prin- 
 cipally in the latter mode, fmce, though it directly introduces a; 
 painful ftate of the mind, it influences our conduct, only as it 
 is reflected upon by the underftanding, and converted into a 
 motive of action. 
 
 Provinces of It may be a curious fpeculation to examine how far thefe 
 
 fenfation and 
 
 refkaion. 6 claffes 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. - 53 
 
 clafles are diftinct from each other. It cannot be denied but J5PRJL?:. 
 
 that fenfation is of fome moment in the affair. It poffeffes the * * ' 
 
 initiative. It is that from which all the intellects with which 
 we are acquainted date their operations. Its firft effect upon 
 mind does in the majority of cafes precede reflection and choice. 
 In fome cafes the imprefCons upon our fenfes are forefeen by 
 us, and may confequently be refifted in the outfet. But it 
 would be a contradiction to affirm that they can always be fore- 
 feen. Forefight is itfelf the offspring of experience. 
 
 Meanwhile, though they can only in particular inftances be Moral caufe* 
 
 frequently 
 
 forefeen, and of confequence completely foreftalled, yet much miilaken for 
 
 phyficaL 
 
 of their effect is in all cafes to be afcribed to deliberation and 
 choice. " I feel a painful fenfation, and I perfuade myfelf that 
 it is wifer to fubmit, and thus cherifh and fecond its influence, 
 than to refift. I conceive myfelf unfortunate, oppreffed by a 
 combination of unfavourable accidents, and am rendered by this 
 conception gloomy, difcontented and wretched. I fatisfy my- 
 felf that my fituation is fuch as to render exertion unreafon- 
 able, and believe that the attempt would produce nothing but 
 abortive and fruitlefs torture. I remain liftlefs, fluggiih and 
 inactive." 
 
 How different would be the fum of my fituation, if I were 
 animated by fentiments of chearfulnefs, induftry and courage ? 
 It has been faid " that a rainy day has been known to convert a 
 
 man 
 
54 OF MORAL AND 
 
 BOOK r. man of valour into a coward." How eafily would this external 
 CHAP.vrr. ' 
 
 ^ « ' difadvantage have been furmounted, if his mind had been more 
 
 full of the benefits to arife from his valour, if the rainy day 
 had been put in the balance with his wife and children, the moft 
 illuftrious rewards to be bellowed upon himfelf, and freedom 
 and felicity to be fecured to his country ? " Indigeftion," we are 
 told, " perhaps a fit of the tooth-ach, renders a man incapable of 
 ftrong thinking and fpirited exertion." How long would thefe 
 be able to hold out againft a hidden and unexpected piece of 
 intelligence of the moft delightful nature? 
 
 When operations of an injurious nature are inflicted on the 
 body, and are encountered by the mind with unalterable firm- 
 nefs, what is the degree of pain which in fuch inftances is fuf- 
 fered ? Was the language of Anaxarchus merely a philofophical 
 rant, " Beat on, tyrant ! Thou mayeft deftroy the fhell of Anax- 
 archus, but thou canft not touch Anaxarchus himfelf?" How 
 much pain was really endured by Mutius Scsevola and arch- 
 bifhop Cranmer, when each fteadily held his hand to be 
 devoured by the flames ? How much is endured by the favage 
 Indinns, who fing in the midft of tortures, and farcaftically pro- 
 voke their tormentors to more ingenious barbarity ? 
 
 The truth that feems to refult from thefe confiderations is, 
 that indifpofition only becomes formidable in proportion as it 
 is feconded by the confent of the mind ; that our communi- 
 cation 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. S 5 
 
 cation with the material univerfe is at the mercy of our choice; „„°.OK I 
 
 CHAr, VII* 
 
 and that the inability of the underftanding for intellectual ex- * « ' 
 
 ertion is principally an affair of moral confideration, exifting 
 only in the degree in which it is deliberately preferred. 
 
 " The hero of to-day," we are told, " fhall by an indigeftion or Superiorityof. 
 
 the former 
 
 a rainy atmofphere be converted into a coward to-morrow." evident from 
 
 the varieties 
 
 Waving the confideration of how far this fact where it exifts is in ° f human 
 
 character. 
 
 reality of a moral and intellectual nature, let us examine to what 
 degree a principle of this fort is the true index of human 
 actions. We have already eftablifhed it as a fundamental, that 
 there are no innate ideas. Of confequence, if men were prin- 
 cipally governed by external circumftances fuch as that of at- 
 mofphere, their characters and actions would be much alike. 
 The fame weather, that made you a coward, would make me 
 fo too, and an army would be defeated by a fog. Perhaps 
 indeed this cataftrophe would be prevented by the impartiality 
 of the moifture, in proportion as the enemy advanced, which he 
 neceffarily muft do, into the fame atmofphere. 
 
 Every thing that checks the uniformity of this effect, and 
 permanently diftinguilhes the character of one man from that 
 of another, is to be traced to the affociation of ideas. But affc- 
 ciation is of the nature of reafoning. The principal, the mod 
 numerous and lafting of our affociations, are intellectual, not 
 accidental, built upon the refemblances and differences of things, 
 
 not 
 
5 G OF MORAL AND 
 
 CH 
 
 BOOK I. no t U p n the contingency of their occurring in any given time 
 * * ' or place. It is thus that one man appears courageous and an- 
 other cowardly, one man vigorous and another dull, under the 
 fame or nearly the fame external circumftances. 
 
 Operation of ln re ality the atmofphere, inftead of confiderably affecting 
 taufes rare. t j ie ma f s f mankind, affects in an eminent degree only a fmall 
 part of that mafs. The majority are either above or below it ; 
 are either too grofs to feel ftrongly thefe minute variations, or 
 too bufy to be at leifure to attend to them. It is only a few, 
 whofe treatment has been tender enough to imbue them with 
 extreme delicacy, and whofe faculties are not roufed by ftrong 
 and unintermitted incitements, who can be thus blindly directed. 
 If it fhould be faid " that the weather indeed is too great a trifle 
 to produce thefe confequences, but that there are pains and in- 
 terruptions which fcarcely any man can withftand ;" it may be 
 anfwered, that thefe occur too feldom to be miftaken for the 
 efficient principles of human character, that the fyftem which 
 determines our proceedings rifes from a different fource, and 
 ordinarily returns when the pain or interruption has fubfided. 
 
 There can be no queftion more interefting than that which 
 we are now confidering. Upon our decifion in this cafe it 
 depends, whether thofe perfons act wifely who prefcribe to 
 themfelves a certain difcipline and are anxious to enrich their 
 minds with fcience, or whether on the contrary it be better to 
 
 trull 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 57 
 
 truft every thing to the mercy of events. Is it pofiible that BOOK r. 
 
 we fhould not perceive from the very nature of the thing the ' > ' 
 
 advantages which the wife man poffeffes over the foolifh one, 
 and that the points in which they refemble will be as nothing 
 compared to thofe in which they differ ? In thofe particulars 
 in which our conduct is directed merely by external impreffions 
 we refemble the inferior animals ; we differ from them in the 
 greater facility with which we arrange our fenfations, and com- 
 pare, prefer and judge. 
 
 Out of a fingle fenfation a great variety of reflections may Fertility of 
 
 reflection. 
 
 be generated. Let the thing perceived be a material fubflance of 
 
 certain regular dimenfions. I perceive that it has an upper and 
 a lower furface, I can therefore conceive of it as divided. I can 
 conceive of the parts into which it is formed as moving towards 
 and from each other, and hence I acquire the ideas of diftance 
 and fpace. I can conceive of them as ftriking againft each other, 
 and hence I derive the notion of impenetrability, gravity and 
 momentum, the flownefs, rapidity and direction of motion. Let 
 the fenfation be a pain in the head. I am led to reflect upon its 
 caufes, its feat, the ftrudture of the parts in which it refides, the 
 inconvenience it impofes, the confequences with which it may 
 be attended, the remedies that may be applied and their effects, 
 whether external or internal, material or intellectual. 
 
 It is true that the infant and inexperienced mind cannot thus Phyfial 
 
 1 r j • . ,*. caufes in the 
 
 analyie and conjure up differtations of philofophy out of its moft firft inftance 
 
 I trivial 
 
5 8 OF MORAL AND 
 
 BOOK I. trivial fenfations. Such a capacity infers a long feries of pre- 
 
 CHAP.VII. . . 
 
 ' — > ' ceding imprefiions. Mind is in its infancy nearly what thefe 
 
 fuperior, af- 
 terwards philofophers defcribe, the creature of contingencies*. But the far- 
 ther it advances, the more it individualifes. Each man has habits 
 and prejudices that are properly his own*. He lives in a little 
 univerfe of his own creating, or he communicates with the om- 
 niprefent and eternal volume of truth.. With thefe he compares 
 the fucceffive perceptions of his mind, and upon thefe depend the 
 conclulions he draws and the conduct he obferves. Hence it in- 
 evitably follows, that phyfical caufes,. though of fome confe- 
 quence in the hiftory of man, fink into nothing, when compared, 
 with the great and inexpreffible operations of reflection. They 
 are the prejudices we conceive or the judgments we form, our 
 apprehenfions of truth and falfhood, that conftitute the true bafis 
 of diftindtion between man and man.. The difference between 
 favage and favage indeed, in the firft generation of the human 
 fpecies and in perfect folitude, can only be afcribed to the dif- 
 ferent impreffions made upon their fenfes., But this difference 
 would be almoft imperceptible.. The ideas of wifdom and folly 
 would never have entered the human mind, if men, like beafls, 
 derived neither good nor evil from the reflections and difcoveries 
 of their companions and anceftors.. 
 
 Objeftion Hence we are furnifhed with an anfwer to the analogical ar- 
 
 from the ef- 
 
 fe& of breed gument from the confiderable effects that phyfical caufes appear 
 
 in animals. ' 
 
 to produce upon brutes. " Breed for example appears to be of 
 
 unqueftionable importance to the character and qualifications of 
 
 6 horfes 
 
PHYSICAL CAUSES. 59 
 
 horfes and dogs ; why mould we not fuppofe this or certain ^°° K *v 
 
 LfXXrxl . VH» 
 
 other brute and occult caufes to be equally efficacious in the dfs ' *—/. 
 
 of men ? How comes it that the races of animals perhaps never 
 degenerate, if carefully cultivated; at the fame time that we have 
 no fecurity againft the wifeft philofopher's begetting a dunce?" 
 
 I anfwer, that the exiftence of phyfical caufes cannot be con- 
 troverted. In the cafe of man their efficacy is fwallowed up in 
 the fuperior importance of reflection and fcience. In animals 
 on the contrary they are left almoft alone. If a race of negroes 
 were taken, and maintained each man from his infancy, except 
 fo far as was neceffary for the propagation of the fpecies, in fo- 
 litude ; or even if they were excluded from an acquaintance with • 
 the improvements and imaginations of their anceftors, though 
 permitted the fociety of each other, the operation of breed might 
 perhaps be rendered as confpicuous among them, as in the dif- 
 ferent claffes of horfes and dogs. But the ideas they would other- 
 wife receive from their parents and civilifed or half-civilifed neigh- 
 bours would be innumerable : and, if the precautions above men- 
 tioned were unobferved, all parallel between the two cafes would 
 ceafe. 
 
 Such is the character of man confidered as an individual. He Conclufios* 
 is operated upon by exterior caufes immediately, producing cer- 
 tain effects upon him independently of the exercife of reafon ; 
 and he is operated upon by exterior caufes mediately, their im- 
 preffions furnifhing him with materials for reflection, and af- 
 
 I 2 fuming 
 
60 OFNATIONAL 
 
 CHAP.VH ^ umm S tne f° rm °f motives to act or to refrain from acting.. 
 But the latter of thefe, at leaft fo far as relates to man in a 
 civilifed ftate, may (land for the whole. He that would change 
 the character of the individual, would miferably mifapply his ef- 
 forts, if he principally fought to effect this purpofe by the opera- 
 tions of heat and cold, drynefs and moifture upon the animal 
 frame. The true inftruments of moral influence, are defire and 
 averfion, punifhment and reward, the exhibition of general 
 truth, and. the development of thofe punifliments and rewards, 
 which wifdom and error by the very nature of the thing con- 
 stantly bring along with them. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 OF NATIONAL CHARACTERS. 
 
 CHARACTER OF THE PRIESTHOOD. ALL NATIONS CAPABLE 
 
 OF LIBERTY. — THE ASSERTION ILLUSTRATED. — EXPERI- 
 ENCE FAVOURS THESE REASONINGS. — MEANS OF INTRO- 
 DUCING LIBERTY. 
 
 AS is the character of the individual, fo may we expect to find 
 it with nations and great bodies of men. The operations 
 of law and political inftitution will be important and interesting, 
 the operations of climate trifling and unworthy of notice. Thus 
 there are particular profeffions, fuch as that of the priefthood, 
 which muft always operate to the production of a particular 
 
 character. 
 
 Priefts 
 
CHARACTERS. 61 
 
 Priefts are upon all occafions accuftomed to have their opinions ^OK I. 
 liftened to with implicit deference : they will therefore be im- j^ » i 
 
 Character of 
 
 perious, dogmatical and impatient of oppofition. Their fuccefs [ lie P" 6 "-- 
 with mankind depends upon the opinion of their fuperior inno- 
 cence ; they will therefore be particularly anxious about appear- 
 ances, their deportment will be grave and their manners formal. 
 The frank and ingenuous fallies of mind they will be obliged to 
 fupprefs ; the errors and irregularities into which tlvey may be 
 drawn they will be ftudious to conceal. They are obliged at fef 
 intervals to affume the exterior of an ardent devotion ; but it is 
 impoffible that this fhould at all times be free from occafional 
 coldnefs and diffraction. Their importance is connected with 
 their real orfuppofed mental fuperiority over the reft of mankind ; 
 they muft therefore be patrons of prejudice and implicit faith. 
 Their pro fperity depends upon the reception of particular opinions 
 in the world ; they muft therefore be enemies to freedom of en- 
 quiry ; they muft have a bias upon their minds imprefTed by 
 fomething different from the force of evidence. Particular moral 
 eaufes may in fome inftances limit, perhaps fuperfede the in- 
 fluence of general ones, and render fome men fuperior to the 
 character of their prefeffion ; but, exclufively of fuch exceptions, 
 priefts of all religions, of all climates and of all ages will have a 
 ftriking fimilarity of manners and difpofition. In the fame man- 
 ner we may reft affured that free men in whatever country will 
 be firm, vigorous and fpirited in proportion to their freedom, and 
 that vafTals and flaves will be ignorant, fervile and unprin- 
 cipled. 
 
 The 
 
6z OF NATIONAL 
 
 BOOK T. The truth of this axiom has indeed been pretty univerfally 
 CHAP.VII. . . 
 
 1 ' admitted: but it has been affirmed to be " impoffible to eftablifh a 
 
 All nations 
 
 capable of f ree government in certain warm and effeminate climates." To 
 
 liberty. ° 
 
 enable us to judge of the reafonablenefs of this affirmation, let 
 us confider what procefs would be necefTary in order to intro- 
 duce a free government into any country. 
 
 The anfwer to this queftion is to be found in the anfwer to 
 that other, whether freedom have any real and folid advan- 
 tages over flavery ? If it have, then our mode of proceeding re- 
 flecting it ought to be exactly parallel to that we fhould em- 
 ploy in recommending any other benefit. If I would perfuade 
 a man to accept a great eftate, fuppofing that pofTeffion to be a 
 real advantage ; if I would induce him to felect for his com- 
 panion a beautiful and accomplifhed woman, or for his friend 
 a wife, a brave and difinterefted man ; if I would perfuade him 
 to prefer eafe to pain, and gratification to torture, what more is 
 necefTary, than that I fhould inform his underftanding, and make 
 him fee thefe things in their true and genuine colours ? Should 
 I find it necefTary to enquire firft of what climate he was a 
 native, and whether that were favourable to the pofTeffion of 
 a great eftate, a fine woman, or a generous friend ? 
 
 The advantages of liberty over flavery are not lefs real, though 
 unfortunately they are lefs palpable, than in the cafes juft enu- 
 merated. Every man has a confufed fenfe of thefe advantages, 
 but he has been taught to believe that men would tear each 
 other to pieces, if they had not priefts to direct their con- 
 
 fciences, 
 
CHARACTERS. 63 
 
 fciences, and lords to confult for their fubfiftence, and kings to BOOK i_ 
 
 ' CHAP.VII. 
 fteer them in fafety through the inexplicable dangers of the po- v « ' 
 
 litical ocean. But whether they be milled, by thefe or other pre- 
 judices, whatever be the fancied, terror that induces them quietly 
 to fubmit to have their hands bound' behind them, and the 
 fcourge vibrated over their heads, all thefe are queftions of rea- 
 fon. Truth may be prefented to them in fuch irrefiftible evi- 
 dence, perhaps by fuch juft degrees familiarifed to their ap- 
 prehenfion, as ultimately to conquer the moft obftinate pre- 
 poffeffions.. Let the prefs find its way into Perfia or Indoftan, 
 let the political truths difcovered by the beft of the European 
 iages be transfufed into their language, and it is impoffible that 
 a few folitary converts mould not be made; It is the property 
 of truth to fpread ; and, exclusively of great national convul- 
 fions, its advocates in. each fucceeding age will be fomewhat 
 more numerous than in that which went before. The caufes, 
 which fufpend its progrefs, arife, not from climate, but from the 
 watchful and intolerant jealoufy of defpotic Sovereigns. 
 
 Let us fuppofe then that the majority of a nation by how- The affertioa 
 
 illullrated. 
 
 ever flow a progrefs are convinced of the defirablenefs, or, which 
 amounts to the fame, the practicability of freedom. The fup- 
 pofition would be parallel, if we were to imagine ten thoufand: 
 men of found intellect, (hut up in a madhoufe, and fuperintended. 
 by a fet of three or four keepers. Hitherto they have been per- 
 fuaded, for what abfurdity has been too great for human intellect 
 
 to 
 
64 OF NATIONAL 
 
 i5R9F.rU to entertain ? that they were deftitute of reafon, and that the 
 ■CHAP.VII. J 
 
 1 v ' fuperintendence under which they were placed was neceffary 
 
 for their prefervation. They have therefore fubmitted to whips 
 and draw and bread and water, and perhaps imagined this ty- 
 ranny to be a blefling. But a fufpicion is at length by fome 
 means propagated among them, that all they have hitherto en- 
 i dured has been an impofition. The fufpicion fpreads, they re- 
 flect, they reafon, the idea is communicated from one to another 
 through the .chinks of their cells, and at certain times when the 
 vigilance of their keepers has not precluded them from the plea- 
 fures of mutual fociety. It becomes the clear perception, the fet- 
 tled perfuafion of the majority of the perfons confined. 
 
 What will be the confequence of this opinion ? Will the in- 
 fluence of. climate prevent them from ' embracing the obvious 
 means of their happinefs ? Is there any human underftanding 
 that will not perceive a truth like this, when forcibly and re- 
 peatedly prefented? Is there a mind that will conceive no in- 
 dignation at fo horrible a tyranny ? In reality the chains fall off 
 .of themfelves, when the magic of opinion is diflblved. When a 
 great majority of any fociety are perfuaded to fecure any benefit 
 to themfelves, there is no need of tumult or violence to effect it. 
 The effort would be to refill: reafon, not to obey it. The pri- 
 fonei's are collected in their common hall, and the keepers in- 
 form them that it is time to return to their cells. They have 
 no longer the power to obey. They look at the impotence of 
 
 their 
 
CHARACTERS. 6 S 
 
 their late matters, and finile at their prefumption. They quietly BOOK. I. 
 ' r r i *i / CHAP.VII. 
 
 leave the manfion where they were hitherto immured, and par- 5 v ' 
 
 take of the bleffings of light and air like other men. 
 
 Let us compare this theoiy with the hiftory of mankind. If Experience 
 
 1 favours thefe 
 
 the theory be true, we may expect to find the inhabitants of reaf«nn%s. 
 neighbouring provinces in different Hates, widely difcriminated 
 by the influence of government, and little aflimilafed by refem- 
 blance of climate. Thus the Gafcons are the gayeft people 
 in all France; but the moment we pafs the Pyrenees, we 
 find the ferious and faturnine character of the Spaniard. Tims 
 the Athenians were lively, penetrating and ingenious, but the 
 Thebans unpolifhed, phlegmatic and dull. — It would be reafon- 
 able to expect that different races of men, intermixed with each 
 other, but differently governed, would afford a flrong and vifible 
 contraft. Thus the Turks are brave, open and fincere, but the 
 modern Greeks mean, cowardly and deceitful. — Wandering tribes 
 clofely connected among themfelves, and having little fympathy 
 with the people with whom they refide, may be expected to have 
 great fimilarity of manners. Their fituation renders them con- 
 fpicuous, the faults of individuals reflect difhonour upon the whole, 
 and their manners will be particularly fober and reputable, unlefs 
 they fhould happen to labour under fo peculiar an odium as to 
 render all endeavour after reputation fruitleis. Thus the Armeni- 
 ans in the Eaft are as univerfally diflinguifhed among the nations 
 with whom they refide, as the Jews in Europe ; but the Arme- 
 
 K nians 
 
66 OF NATIONAL 
 
 BOOK I. n } a ns are as much noted for probity, as the Tews for extortion.— 
 CHAP. VII. r J J 
 
 J v ' What refemblance is there between the ancient and the modern 
 
 Greeks, between the old Romans and the prefent inhabitants of 
 Italy, between the Gauls and the French ? Diodorus Siculus de- 
 fcribes the Gauls as particularly given to taciturnity, and Ariftotle 
 affirms that they are the only warlike nation who are negligent 
 of women. 
 
 If on the contrary climate were principally concerned in form- 
 ing the characters of nations, we might expect to find heat and 
 cold producing an extraordinary effect upon men, as they do 
 upon plants and inferior animals. But the reverfe of this ap- 
 pears to be the fact. Is it fuppofed that the neighbourhood of 
 the fun renders men gay, fantaftic and ingenious ? While the 
 French, the Greeks and the Perfians have been remarkable for 
 their gaiety, the Spaniards, the Turks and the Chinefe are not 
 lefs diftinguifhed by the ferioufnefs of their deportment. It was 
 the opinion of the ancients that the northern nations were in- 
 capable of civilifation and improvement ; but the moderns have 
 found that the Englifh are not inferior in literary eminence to 
 any nation in the world. Is it afferted, that the northern na- 
 tions are more hardy and courageous, and that conqueft has' 
 ufually travelled from that to the oppofite quarter ? It would 
 have been truer to fay that conqueft is ufually made by poverty 
 upon plenty. The Turks, who from the deferts of Tartary in- 
 vaded the fertile provinces of the Roman empire, met the Sara- 
 cens. 
 
CHARACTERS. 67 
 
 oens half way, who were advancing with fimilar views from the «?P A D K „!v 
 
 no lefs dreary deferts of Arabia. In their extreme perhaps heat ' « ' 
 
 and cold may determine the characters of nations, of the negroes 
 for example on one fide and the Laplanders on the other. Not 
 but that in this very inftance much may be afcribed to the 
 wretchednefs of a fterile climate on the one hand, and to the in- 
 dolence confequent upon a fpontaneous fertility on the other. 
 As to what is more than this, the remedy has not yet been dis- 
 covered. Phyfical caufes have already appeared to be powerful, 
 till moral ones can be brought into operation. 
 
 Has it been alledged that carnivorous nations are endowed 
 with the greateft courage ? The Swedes, whofe nutriment is 
 meagre and fparing, have ranked with the mod diftinguifhed 
 modern nations in the operations of war. 
 
 It is ufually faid, that northern .nations are moft addi&ed to 
 wine, and fouthern to women. Admitting this obfervation in its 
 full force, it would only prove that climate may operate upon 
 the grofler particles of our frame, not that it influences thofe 
 finer organs upon which the operations of intellect depend. But 
 the truth of the firfl of thefe remarks may well be doubted. The 
 Greeks appear to have been fufficiently addicted to the pleafures 
 of the bottle. Among the Perfians no character was more co- 
 veted than that of a hard drinker. It is eafy to obtain any thing 
 
 K 2 of 
 
68 OF NATIONAL 
 
 ^ 00KI rr °^ tne negroes, even their wives and children, in exchange for 
 J * ' liquor. 
 
 As to women the circumftance may be accounted for from 
 moral caufes. The heat of the climate obliges both fexes to go 
 half naked. The animal arrives fooner at maturity in hot coun- 
 tries. And both thefe circumftances produce vigilance and jea- 
 loufy, caufes which inevitably tend to inflame the paflions *. 
 
 Means of b- The refult of thefe reafonings is of the utmoft importance to 
 
 troducing 
 
 liberty. him who fpeculates upon principles of government. It is of little 
 
 confequence what difcoveries may be made in moral and political 
 fcience, if, when we have afcertained moft accurately what are 
 the intellectual requifites that lead to wifdom and virtue, a blind 
 and capricious principle is to intrude itfelf, and taint all our con- 
 clufions. Accordingly there have been writers on the fubjec~t of 
 government, who, admitting, and even occafionally declaiming 
 with enthuhafm upon the advantages of liberty and the equal 
 claims of mankind to every focial benefit, have yet concluded 
 that the corruptions of defpotifm and the ufurpations of arifto- 
 • cracy were congenial to certain ages and divifions of the world, 
 and under proper limitations entitled to our approbation. 
 
 * The majority of inftances in the three preceding pages are taken from 
 Hume's Effay on National Characters, where this fubjecl is treated with much 
 ability. Effay s, Vol. I, Pait I, Effay xxi. 
 
 But 
 
CHARACTERS. 69 
 
 But this hypothecs will be found incapable, of holding out BOOK I. 
 againft a moment's ferious reflection. Can there be any ftate of 
 mankind that renders them incapable of the exercife of reafon ? 
 Can there be a period in which it is neccffary to hold the human 
 fpecies in a condition of pupillage ? If there be, it feems but 
 reafonable that their fuperintendents and guardians, as in the cafe 
 of infants of another fort, mould provide for the means of their 
 fubfiftence without calling upon them for the exertions of manual 
 induflry. Wherever men are competent to look the firft duties 
 of humanity in the face, and to provide for their defence againft 
 the invafions of hunger and the inclemencies of the iky, there 
 they will out of all doubt be found equally capable of every other 
 exertion that may be neceffary to their fecurity and welfare. 
 Prefent to them a conftitution which fhall put them into a fimple 
 and intelligible method of directing their own affairs, adjudg- 
 ing their contefts among themfelves, and cherifhing in their 
 bofoms a manly fenfe of dignity, equality and independence, 
 and you need not doubt that profperity and virtue will be the 
 refult. 
 
 The real enemies of liberty in any country are not the peo- 
 ple, but thofe higher orders who profit by a contrary fyftem. 
 Infufe juft views of fociety into a certain number of the liberally 
 educated and reflecting members ; give to the people guides and 
 inftru&ors ; and the bufinefs is done. This however is not to 
 be accomplifhed but in a gradual manner, as will more fully 
 
 4 appear 
 
;o OF NATIONAL CHARACTERS. 
 
 chapVit a PP ear m ^ e Sequel. The error lies, not in tolerating the worft 
 forms of government for a time, but in fuppofing a change im- 
 practicable, and not inceuantly looking forward to its accom- 
 plifhment. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 7i 3 
 
 CHAP. VIIL 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THESE PRINCIPLES FROM 
 THE INFLUENCE OF LUXURY. 
 
 THE OBJECTION STATED. — SOURCE OF THIS OBJECTION. — 
 
 REFUTED FROM MUTABILITY FROM MORTALITY FROM 
 
 SYMPATHY — FROM THE NATURE OF TRUTH. — THE PRO- 
 BABILITY OF PERSEVERANCE CONSIDERED. 
 
 T 
 
 HERE is another proportion relative to the fubject, BOOK I. 
 which is lefs to be confidered as an afTertion diftinft in > J _ J 
 
 The objeo 
 
 itfelf, than as a particular branch of that which has juft been tion ftatcd. 
 difcuffed ; I mean the propofition which affirms, " that nations like 
 individuals are fubject to the phenomena of youth and old age, 
 and that, when a people by luxury and depravation of manners 
 have funk into decrepitude, it is not in the power of legiflation 
 to reflore them to vigour and innocence." 
 
 This idea has partly been founded upon the romantic notions Source of thi't 
 
 objection. 
 
 of paftoral life and the golden age. Innocence is not virtue. 
 Virtue demands the active employment of an ardent mind in 
 the promotion of the general good. No man can be eminently 
 virtuous, who is not accuftomed to an extenfive range of reflec- 
 tion. He muft fee all the benefits to arife from a difinterefted 
 
 proceed- 
 
7 2 OF THE INFLUENCE 
 
 BOOK I. proceeding, and muft underftand the proper method of producing 
 
 1 * ' thofe benefits. Ignorance, the flothful habits and limited views 
 
 of uncultivated life have not in them more of true virtue, though 
 they may be more harmlefs, than luxury, vanity and extrava- 
 gance. Individuals of exquifite feeling, whole difguft has been 
 excited by the hardened felfifhnefs or the unblufhing corruption 
 which have prevailed in their own times, have recurred in 
 imagination to the forefts of Norway or the bleak and uncom- 
 fortable Highlands of Scotland in fearch of a purer race of man- 
 kind. This imagination has been the offspring of difappoint- 
 s ment, not the di&ate of reafon and philofophy. 
 
 It may be true, that ignorance is nearer than prejudice to the 
 reception of wifdom, and that the abfence of virtue is a con- 
 dition more hopeful than the prefence of its oppolite. In this 
 cafe it would have been jufter to compare a nation funk in 
 luxury, to an individual with confirmed habits of wrong, than 
 to an individual whom a debilitated conftitution was bringing 
 fall to the grave. But neither would that comparifon have 
 been fair and equitable. 
 
 Refuted from The condition of nations is more fluctuating, and will be 
 
 mutability : 
 
 found lefs obftinate in its refiftance to a confiftent endeavour for 
 their improvement, than that of individuals. In nations fome 
 of their members will be lefs confirmed in error than others. 
 A certain number will be only in a very fmall degree indifpofed 
 
 to 
 
OF LUXURY. 73 
 
 to liften to the voice of truth. This number will perpetually BOOK I. 
 
 r t ■> CHAP.V1XI. 
 
 increafe. Every new convert will be the means of converting ' * ' 
 
 others. In proportion as the body of difciples is augmented, the 
 modes of attack upon the prejudices of others will be varied, and 
 fuited to the variety of men's tempers and prepoffeffions. 
 
 Add to this that generations of men are perpetually going off fn>m morta- 
 lity ! 
 the ftage, while other generations fucceed. The next gene- 
 ration will not have fo many prejudices to fubdue. Suppofe a 
 defpotic nation by fome revolution in its affairs to become pof- 
 feffed of a free conftitution. The children of the prefent race 
 will be bred in more firm and independent habits of thinking ; 
 the fupplenefs, the timidity and the vicious dexterity of their 
 fathers will give place to an erect mien, and a clear and decifive 
 judgment. The partial and imperfect change of character which 
 was introduced at firft, will in the fucceeding age become more 
 unalloyed and complete. 
 
 Laftly, the power of focial inftitutions changing the character f rom {ym pl _ 
 of nations is very different from and infinitely greater than any l r ' 
 power which can ordinarily be brought to bear upon a folitary 
 individual. Large bodies of men, when once they have been en- 
 lightened and perfuaded, act with more vigour than folitary in- 
 dividuals. They animate the mutual exertions of each other, 
 and the united forces of example and fhame urge them to per- 
 feverance. The cafe is not of that cuftomary fort where the 
 
 L power 
 
CH 
 
 74 OF THE INFLUENCE 
 
 200K I. power of reafon only is tried in curing any perfon of his errors j 
 but is as if he fhould be placed in an entirely new fituatiom 
 His habits are broken through, and his motives of action 
 changed. Inftead of being perpetually recalled to vicious prac- 
 tices by the recurrence of his former connections, the whole 
 fociety receives an impulfe from the fame caufe that acts upon 
 any individual. New ideas are fuggefted, and the furprife of 
 novelty confpires with the approbation of truth to prevent men 
 from falling back into imbecility and languor. 
 
 from the na- 
 ture of truth. 
 
 The queftion may in reality be reduced to an enquiry, whe- 
 ther the human underftanding can be made the recipient of 
 truth, whether it be pofhble for an effort fo ftrenuous to exift 
 as to make men aware of their true interefts. For let this be 
 granted, and the confequence is inevitable. It has already fuf- 
 ficiently appeared, that whatever is politically right or politically 
 wrong, muft be in all cafes of no trivial confequence to the wel- 
 fare of mankind. Monarchy for example will by all men be 
 acknowledged to be attended with many difadvantages. It acts 
 upon infufficient and partial information, it generates intrigue, 
 corruption, adulation and fervility. If it could be proved, that 
 it produced no advantages in equal proportion, and that its 
 abolition would not lead to mifchief, anarchy and diforder is 
 there a nation upon the face of the earth to whom thefe propofi- 
 tions were rendered palpable, that would endure to fubmit to it ? 
 Is there a nation upon the face of the earth, that would fubmit 
 7 to 
 
OFLUXURY. 75 
 
 to the impofitlons of its adminiftration, the wars it occafions, BOOK I. 
 
 r ' ' CHAl'.VIir. 
 
 and the lavifh revenues by which it is maintained, if they knew * * ' 
 
 it to be merely an excrefcence and a difeafe in the order of 
 fociety ? 
 
 But it has been farther alledged, that, even mould a luxurious The proba- 
 bility of per- 
 nation be prompted by intolerable grievances and notorious ftverance 
 
 conQdered. 
 
 ufurpation to aflert the juft principles of human fociety, they 
 would be unable to perpetuate them, and would foon be led 
 back by their evil habits to their former vices and corruption : 
 that is, they would be capable of the heroic energy that mould 
 expel the ufurper, but not of the moderate refolution that mould 
 prevent his return. They would roufe themfelves fo far from 
 their lethargy as to aflume a new character and enter into dif- 
 ferent views ; but, after having for fome time acted upon their 
 convictions, they would fuddenly become incapable of under- 
 ftanding the truth of their principles and feeling their influence. 
 
 Men always act upon their apprehenfions of preferablenefs. 
 There are few errors of which they are guilty, which may not 
 be refolved into a narrow and inadequate view of the alternative 
 prefented for their choice. Prefeut pleafure may appear more 
 certain and eligible than diftant good. But they never choofe evil 
 as apprehended to be evil. Wherever a clear and unanfwerable 
 notion of any fubject is prefented to their view, a correfpondent 
 action or courfe of actions inevitably follows. Having thus gained 
 
 L 2 one 
 
7 6 OF THE INFLUENCE OF LUXURY. 
 
 BOOK I. one ftep in the acquifition of truth, it cannot eafily be conceived 
 chap. vin. r n / 
 
 ' ""— "* of as loft. A body of men, having detected the injurious con- 
 
 fequencesof an evil under which they have long laboured, and 
 having fhaken it off, will fcarcely voluntarily reftore the mifchief 
 they have annihilated. Nothing can reconcile them to the re- 
 vival of falfhood, which does not obliterate their prefent coa- 
 vi&ion of truth. 
 
 AN 
 
;/ 
 
 A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF SOC1ETT. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 NATURE OF THE ENQUIRY — MODE OF PURSUING IT. — DIS- 
 TINCTION BETWEEN SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 MR. Locke begins his celebrated Treatife of Government BOOK II. 
 CHAP. I 
 with a refutation of the patriarchal fcheme of fir Robert v . v ' '■> 
 
 Filmer ; and, having thus cleared his ground, proceeds to obferve, enquiry. 
 that " he, that will not give juft occafion to think that all go- 
 vernment in the world is the product only of force and violence, 
 and that men live together by no other rules but that of beafts, 
 
 muft 
 
>^ PRINCIPLES 
 
 cH^p 1 !' mu ^ °^ necem ^ v fi n d out another rife of government, and 
 
 * * ' another original of political power *." Accordingly he proceeds 
 
 through the greater part of his treatife to reafon abftractedly 
 upon the probable hiftory of the early ages of mankind, and 
 concludes that no legitimate government could be built upon 
 any other foundation than that of an original contract. 
 
 It is to be fufpected that this great man, friend as he was to 
 the liberty and the interefts of mankind, intrepid and fagacious 
 in his fearch after truth, has been guilty of an overfight in the 
 firft ftep of the inveftigation. 
 
 Mode of pur- There are two modes, according to which we may enquire 
 into the origin of fociety and government. We may either 
 "examine them hiftorically, that is, confider in what manner they 
 have or ought to have begun, as Mr. Locke has done ; or we 
 may examine them philofophically, that is, confider the moral 
 principles upon which they depend. The firft of thefe fubjects 
 is not without its ufe ; but the fecond is of a higher order and 
 more efiential importance. The firft is a queftion of form ; the 
 fecond of fubftance. It would be of trivial confequence practi- 
 cally confidered, from what fource any form of fociety flowed, 
 and by what, mode its principles were fanctioned, could we be 
 always fecure of their conformity to the dictates of truth and 
 juftice. 
 
 * Bock II. Chap. i. § i. 
 
 It 
 
OF SOCIETY. 
 
 79 
 
 It is farther necefTary before we enter upon the fubjecT: care- BOOK II. 
 
 CHAP. i. 
 
 fully to diftinguifh between fociety and government. Men af- v - 
 fociated at firft for the fake of mutual afliftance. They did not 
 forefee that any reftraint would be neceflary, to regulate the con- 
 duel: of individual members of the fociety, towards each other, 
 or towards the whole. The neceffity of reftraint grew out of the 
 errors and perverfenefs of a few. An acute writer has expreffed 
 this idea with peculiar felicity. " Society and government," fays 
 he, " are different in themfelves, and have different origins. 
 Society is produced by our wants, and government by our wick- 
 ednefs. Society is in every ftate a bleffing ; government even 
 in its beft ftate but a neceflary evil *. 
 
 * Common Senfe, p. i. 
 
 GHAP. 
 
[ So ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 CONNECTION OF POLITICS AND MORALS. — EXTENT AND 
 MEANING OF JUSTICE. SUBJECT OF JUSTICE: MAN- 
 KIND. ITS DISTRIBUTION MEASURED BY THE CAPACITY 
 
 OF ITS SUBJECT BY HIS USEFULNESS. — FAMILY AFFEC- 
 TION CONSIDERED.- — GRATITUDE CONSIDERED. — OBJEC- 
 TIONS : FROM IGNORANCE — FROM UTILITY. AN EX- 
 CEPTION STATED. DEGREES OF JUSTICE. APPLICA- 
 TION. — IDEA OF POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK II. | ^ ROM what has been faid it appears, that the fubjec~t of 
 
 1 ><- — ' -*~ the prefent enquiry is ftrictly fpeaking a department of 
 
 of politics and t ] ie f c i ence D f morals. Morality is the fource from which its 
 fundamental axioms muft be drawn, and they will be made 
 fomewhat clearer in the prefent inftance, if we aflume the term 
 juftice as a general appellation for all moral duty. 
 
 morals. 
 
 Extent and 
 meaning of 
 juftice. 
 
 That this appellation is fufficiently expreflive of the fubject 
 will appear, if we confider for a moment mercy, gratitude, tem- 
 perance, or any of thofe duties which in loofer fpeaking are con- 
 tradiftinguifhed from juftice. Why mould I pardon this criminal, 
 2 > remunerate 
 
OF JUSTICE. Si 
 
 remunerate this favour, abftain from this indulgence ? If it -S9PJF H" 
 partake of the nature of morality, it muft be either right or v ~ ( ""' 
 wrong, jufl or unjuft. It muft tend to the benefit of the in- 
 dividual, either without intrenching upon, or with actual advan- 
 tage to the mafs of individuals. Either way it benefits the whole, 
 becaufe individuals are parts of the whole. Therefore to do it 
 is juft, and to forbear it is unjuft. If juftice have any meaning, 
 it is juft that I fhould contribute every thing in my power to the 
 benefit of the whole. 
 
 Confiderable light will probably be thrown upon our invefti* Subjeft of 
 
 ° juftice : man- 
 
 gation, if, quitting for the prefent the political view, we examine k;nd » 
 juftice merely as it exifts among individuals. Juftice is a rule of 
 conduct originating in the connection of one percipient being 
 with another. A comprehensive maxim which has been laid 
 down upon the fubject is, " that we fhould love our neighbour 
 as ourfelves." But this maxim, though pofTefting confiderable 
 merit as a popular principle, is not modelled with the ftri&nefs 
 of philofophical accuracy. 
 
 In a Ioofe and general view I and my neighbour are both of Its diftHbu- 
 
 tion mea- 
 
 us men ; and of confequence entitled to equal attention. But in fared by the 
 
 capacity of 
 
 reality it is probable that one of us is a being of more worth its fabjea : 
 and importance than the other. A man is of more worth than 
 a beaft ; becaufe, being pofTelTed of higher faculties, he is capable 
 of a more refined and genuine happinefs. In the fame manner 
 
 M the 
 
82 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK II. the illuftjious archbifhop of Cambray was of more worth thary 
 
 CHAP. II. r J 
 
 * v ' his chambermaid, and there are few of us that would hefitater 
 
 to pronounce, if his palace were in flames, and the life of only 
 
 one of them could be preferved, which of the two ought to bo 
 
 preferred. 
 
 by_his ufeful- But there is another ground of preference, befide the private 
 confideration of one of them being farther removed from the 
 ftate of a mere animal. We are not connected with one or two 
 percipient beings, but with a fociety, a nation, and in fome 
 fenfe with the whole family of mankind. Of confequence that 
 life ought to be preferred which will be moft conducive to the? 
 general good. In faving the life of Fenelon, fuppofe at the mo- 
 ment when he was conceiving the project of his immortal Te- 
 lemachus, I fhould be promoting the benefit of thoufands, who 
 have been cured by the perufal of it of fome error, vice and con- 
 fequent unhappinefs. Nay,, my benefit would extend farther, 
 than this, for every individual thus cured has become a better 
 member of fociety, and has contributed in his turn to the hap~ 
 pinefs, the information and improvement of others. 
 
 Suppofing I had been myfelf the chambermaid, I ought to. 
 have chofen to die, rather than that Fenelon fhould have died.. 
 The life of Fenelon was really preferable to that of the chamber- 
 maid. But underftanding is the faculty that perceives the truth 
 of this and fimilar propofitions j and juftice is the principle that 
 I regulates 
 
OF JUSTICE. 83 
 
 regulates my conduct accordingly. It would have been iufl in BOOK IT. 
 b ' ° ' J CHAP. II. 
 
 the chambermaid to have preferred the archbifhop to herfelf. ' * ' 
 
 To have done otherwife would have been a breach of juflice. 
 
 Suppofing the chambermaid had been my wife, my mother Family auc- 
 tion conil- 
 Or my benefactor. This would not alter the truth of the pro- dered. 
 
 pofition. The life of Fenelon would (till be more valuable than 
 
 that of the chambermaid ; and juflice, pure, unadulterated juflice, 
 
 would flill have preferred that which was moft valuable. Juflice 
 
 would have taught me to fave the Fife of Fenelon at the expence 
 
 of the other. What magic is there in the pronoun " my," to 
 
 overturn the decifions of everlafling truth ? My wife or my 
 
 mother may be a fool or a proflitute, malicious, lying or difhonefl. 
 
 If they be, of what confequence is it that they are mine ? 
 
 ■ 
 
 " But my mother endured for me the pains of child bearing, Gratitude 
 
 coniidercd. 
 
 and nourished me in the helpleffnefs of infancy." When fhe firfl 
 fubjected herfelf to the necefhty of thefe cares, ihe was probably 
 influenced by no particular motives of benevolence to her future 
 offspring. Every voluntary benefit however entitles the beflower 
 to fome kindnefs and retribution. But why fo ? Becaufe a 
 voluntary benefit is an evidence of benevolent intention, that is, 
 of virtue. It is the difpofition of the mind, not the external 
 action, that entitles to refpect. But the merit of this difpofition 
 is equal, whether the benefit was conferred upon me or upon 
 another. I and another man cannot both be right in preferring 
 
 M 2 our 
 
84 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 o2^p tt' our own individual benefactor, for no man can be at the fame 
 ^—^-v-^—^ time both better and worfe than his neighbour. My benefactor 
 ought to be efteemed, not becaufe he beftowed a benefit upon, 
 me, but becaufe he beftowed it upon a human being.. His de- 
 £ert will, be in exact proportion to the degree, in which that 
 human being was worthy of the diftinction conferred. Thus 
 every view of the fubject brings us back to the confideration of my 
 neighbour's moral worth and his importance to the general weal, 
 as the only ftandard to determine the treatment to which he is 
 entitled. Gratitude therefore, a principle which has fo often been 
 the theme of the moralift and the poet, is no part either of juftice 
 or virtue. By gratitude I underftand a fentiment, which would 
 lead me to prefer one man to another, from fame other con- 
 fideration than that of his fuperior ufefulnefs or worth : . that is K 
 , which would make fomething true to me (for example this pre-- 
 ferablenefs) 4 which cannot be true to another man, and is not; 
 true in.itfelf *.. 
 
 @bj«aionss ; It may be objected, "that my relation, my companion, or my, 
 benefactor will of courfe in many inftances obtain an uncommon: 
 
 from lgno-. portion of my. regard : for, not being univerfally capable of dis- 
 criminating the comparative worth of different men, I fhall in- 
 evitably judge moft favourably of him,, of whofe virtues Ihave 
 received the moft unquestionable, proofs j and thus fhall be com-~ 
 
 ^-This argument refpe&ing gratitude is ftated with great clearnefs in an Efiay 
 on the Nature of True Virtue, by the Rev. Jonathan Edwards, j 2mo. Billy. 
 
 6 pelled, 
 
 ranee 
 
Q¥ JUSTICE. 8s 
 
 celled to prefer the man of moral worth whom I know, to BOOKii. 
 
 another who may poffefs, unknown to me, an. eflential fupe- * • ' 
 
 iiority." 
 
 This compulfion however is founded only in the prefent im- 
 perfection of human nature. It may ferve as an apology for 
 my error, but can never turn error into truth. It will always 
 remain contrary to the ftrict and inflexible decifions of juftice. 
 The difficulty of conceiving this is owing merely to our con- 
 founding the difpofition from which an action is chofen, with 
 the a&ion itfelf. The difpofition, that would prefer virtue to 
 vice and a greater degree of virtue to a lefs, is undoubtedly a 
 fubjed: of approbation ; the erroneous exercife of this difpofition 
 by which a wrong object is felected, if unavoidable, is to be de- 
 plored, but can by no colouring and under no denomination be 
 converted into right*. 
 
 It may in the fecond- place be objected, " that a mutual from utility* 
 commerce of benefits tends to increafe the mafs of benevolent 
 action, and that to increafe the mafs of benevolent action is to 
 contribute to the general good." Indeed ! Is the general good 
 promoted by falfhood, by treating a man of one degree of worth, 
 as if he had ten times that worth ? or as if he were in any de- 
 gree different from what he really is ? Would not the moft 
 beneficial confequences refult from a different plan ; from my 
 
 * See this fubjecr. more copioufly treated in the following chapter. 
 
 conftantly 
 
§6 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 chap n' con ^ an ^7 an d carefully enquiring into the deferts of all thofc 
 
 1 * — '* with whom I am connected, and from their being fure, after a 
 
 certain allowance for the fallibility of human judgment, of being 
 treated by me exactly as they deferved ? Who can tell what 
 would be the effects of -fuch a plan of conduct univerfally 
 adopted ? 
 
 i 
 An exception There feems to be more truth in the argument, derived chiefly 
 
 from the unequal diftribution of property, in favour of my pro- 
 viding in ordinary cafes for my wife and children, my brothers 
 and relations, before I provide for ftrangers. As long as pro- 
 viding for individuals belongs to individuals, it feems as if there 
 mufl be a certain diftribution of the clafs needing fuperintendence 
 and fupply among the clafs affording it, that each man may 
 have his claim and refource. But this argument, if admitted at 
 all, is to be admitted with great caution. It belongs only to or- 
 dinary cafes ; and cafes of a higher order or a more urgent 
 neceflity will perpetually occur, in competition with which thefe 
 will be altogether impotent. We rauft be feverely fcrupulous in 
 meafuring out the quantity of fupply; and, with refpect to 
 money in particular, mufl remember how little is yet underftood 
 of the true mode of employing it for the public benefit. 
 
 Degrees of Having confidered the perfons with whom juftice is COnver- 
 
 fant, let us next enquire into the degree in which we are obliged 
 to confult the good of others. And here I fay, that it is juft 
 
 that 
 
O F J U S T I C E. 87 
 
 that I fhould do all the good in my power. Does any perfon ^ 00K IL 
 in diflrefs apply to me for relief? It is my duty to grant it, 
 and I commit a breach of duty in refufing. If this principle be 
 not of univerfal application, it is becaufe, in conferring a benefit 
 upon an individual, I may in fome inflanees inflict, an injury 
 of fuperior magnitude upon myfelf or fociety. Now the fame 
 juftice, that binds me to any individual of my fellow men, binds 
 me to the whole. If, while I confer a benefit upon one man, k 
 appear, in flaking an equitable balance,, that I am injuring the 
 whole, my action ceafes to be right and becomes abfolutely 
 wrong. But how much am I bound to do for the general weal, 
 that is, for the benefit of the individuals of whom the whole is 
 compofed ? Every thing in my powej. What to the neglect of 
 the means of my own exiflence ? No ; for I am myfelf a part 
 of the whole. Befide, it will rarely happen but that the pro- 
 ject of doing for others every thing in my power, will demand 
 for its execution the prefervation of my own exiflence ; or in 
 other words, it will rarely happen but that I can do more good 
 in twenty years than in one. If the extraordinary cafe fhould 
 occur in which I can promote the general good by my death, 
 more than by my life, juflice requires that I fhould be content 
 to die. In all other cafes, it is jufl that I fhould be careful to 
 maintain my body and my mind in the utmofl vigour, and in 
 the befl condition for fervice *. 
 
 Vide Appendix to thia- chapter, No, I. 
 
 I will 
 
$8 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 phap n ^ w *^ ^" u PP°^ e f° r example that it is right for one man to 
 
 * ' poflefs a greater portion of property than another, either as the 
 
 fruit of his induftry, or the inheritance of his anceftors. Juftice 
 obliges him to regard this property as a truft, and calls upon 
 him maturely to confider in what manner it may beft be em- 
 ployed for the increafe of liberty, knowledge and virtue. He 
 has no right to difpofe of a milling of it at the will of his caprice. 
 So far from being entitled to well earned applaufe for having 
 employed fome fcanty pittance in the fervice of philanthropy, 
 he is in the eye of juftice a delinquent if he withhold any portion 
 from that fervice. Nothing can be more incontrovertible. Could 
 that portion have been better or more worthily employed ? That 
 it could is implied in the very terms of the propofition. Then it 
 was juft it fhould have been fo employed. — In the fame manner 
 as my property, I hold my perfon as a truft in behalf of man- 
 kind. I am bound to employ my talents, my understanding, my 
 ftrength and my time for the production of the great eft quantity 
 of general good. Such are the declarations of juftice, fo great 
 is the extent of my duty. 
 
 But juftice is reciprocal. If it be juft that I fhould confer a 
 benefit, it is juft that another man fhould receive it, and, if I • 
 withhold from him that to which he is entitled, he may juftly 
 complain. My neighbour is in want of ten pounds that I can 
 fpare. There is no law of political inftitution that has been made 
 to reach this cafe, and to transfer this property from me to him. 
 
 But 
 
OFJUSTICE. 89 
 
 But in the eye of fimple juftice, unlefs it can be fhewn that the B r 00K Ir - 
 
 money can be more beneficently employed, his claim is as com- * « ' 
 
 plete, as if he had my bond in his poffeffion, or had fupplied 
 me with goods to the amount *. 
 
 To this it has fometimes been anfwered, " that there is more 
 than one perfon, that flands in need of the money I have to 
 fpare, and of conlequence I muft be at liberty to bellow it as I 
 pleafe." I anfwer, if only one perfon offer himfelf to my know- 
 ledge or fearch, to me there is but one. Thofe others that I cannot 
 find belong to other rich men to affift (rich men, I fay, for every 
 man is rich, who has more money than his juft occafions de- 
 mand), and not to me. If more than one perfon offer, I am 
 obliged to balance their fitnefs, and conduct myfelf accordingly. 
 It is fcarcely poffible to happen that two men lhall be of exactly 
 equal fitnefs, or that I lhall be equally certain of the fitnefs of 
 the one as of the other. 
 
 It is therefore impoffible for me to confer upon any man a 
 favour, I can only do him a right. Whatever deviates from the 
 law of juftice, even I will fuppofe in the too much done in 
 favour of feme individual or fome part of the general whole, is 
 fo much fubtracled from the general ftock, is fo much of abfolute 
 injuftice. 
 
 * A fpirited outline of thefe principles is fketched in Swift's Sermon on 
 Mutual Subjection. 
 
 N- The 
 
9 o 
 
 BOOK II. 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Application. 
 
 OF JUSTICE. 
 
 The inference moil clearly afforded by the preceding reafon- 
 ings, is the competence of juftice as a principle of deduction in all 
 cafes of moral enquiry. The reafonings themfelves are rather of 
 the nature of illuftration and example, and any error that may 
 be imputed to them in particulars, will not invalidate the general 
 conclufion, the propriety of applying moral juftice as a criterion 
 in the investigation of political truth. 
 
 Idea of poli- 
 tical juftice. 
 
 Society is nothing more than an aggregation of individuals. 
 Its claims and its duties muft be the aggregate of their claims 
 and duties, the one no more precarious and arbitrary than, 
 the other. What has the fociety a right to require from me ? 
 The queftion is already anfwered : every thing that it is my 
 duty to do. Any thing more ? Certainly not. Can they change 
 eternal truth, or fubvert the nature of men and their actions ? 
 Can they make it my duty to commit intemperance, to maltreat 
 or affaffinate my neighbour ? — Again. What is it that the fociety 
 is bound to do for its members ? Every thing that can contri- 
 bute to their welfare. But the nature of their welfare is defined 
 by the nature of mind. That will moft contribute to it, which 
 enlarges the underftanding, fupplies incitements to virtue, fills us 
 with a generous confcioufnefs of our independence, and carefully 
 removes whatever can impede our exertions. 
 
 Should it be affirmed, " that it is not in the power of any po- 
 litical fyftem to fecure to us thefe advantages," the conclufion I 
 
 am 
 
OF JUSTICE. 91 
 
 am drawing will ftlll be incontrovertible. It Is bound to contribute 5295 II' 
 
 every thing it is able to tbefe purpofes, and no man was ever * v * 
 
 yet found hardy enough to affirm that it could do nothing. 
 Suppofe its influence in the utmoft degree limited, there muft be 
 one method approaching nearer than any other to the defired 
 object, and that method ought to be univerfally adopted. There 
 is one thing that political inftitutions can afluredly do, they can 
 avoid pofitively counteracting the true interefts of their fubjects. 
 But all capricious rules and arbitrary diftinctions do pofitively 
 counteract them. There is fcarcely any modification of fociety 
 but has in it fome degree of moral tendency. So far as it pro- 
 duces neither mifchief nor benefit, it is good for nothing. So far 
 as it tends to the improvement of the community, it ought to be 
 univerfally adopted. 
 
 N 2 APPENDIX, 
 
9 2 OF SUICIDE. 
 
 APPENDIX, No. I. p. 87. 
 OF SUICIDE. 
 
 MOTIVES OF SUICIDE: I. ESCAPE FROM PAIN. — 2. BENEVO- 
 LENCE. — MARTYRDOM CONSIDERED. 
 
 BOOK II. f"T*^HIS reafonine; will explain to us the lone; difputed cafe 
 
 CHAP. II. f 1 or 
 
 v v ' -*- of fuicide. " Have I a right under any circumftances- 
 
 Appendix.. 
 
 Motives of to deftroy myfelf in order to efcape from pain or difgrace ?"' 
 i.Efcape Probably not. It is perhaps impofiible to imagine a fituation, 
 
 from pain, _ 
 
 that fhall exclude the poffibility of future life, vigour and uieful- 
 nefs. The motive affigned for efcape is eminently trivial, to 
 avoid pain, which is a fmall inconvenience ; or difgrace, which is 
 an imaginary evil. The example of fortitude in enduring tnemj. 
 if there were no other confideration, would probably afford a 
 better motive for continuing to live. 
 
 a. Benevo- « j s there then no cafe in which fuicide is a virtue ?" "What mail 
 
 knee. 
 
 we think of the reafoning of Lyeurgus, who, when he deter- 
 mined upon a voluntary death, remarked, " that all the faculties a 
 rational being poffefled were capable of a moral ufe, and that, 
 after having fpent his life in the fervice of his country, a man 
 ought, if pofiible, to render his death a fource of additional 
 benefit ?" This was the motive of the fuicide of CodruSj Leonidas. 
 and Decius. If the fame motive prevailed in the much admired 
 7 fuicido 
 
O F S U I C I D E. 9i 
 
 fuicide of Cato, if he were inftigated by reafons purely benevo- ®OOK \\' 
 lent, it is impoffible not to applaud his intention, even if he v ~ — * ' 
 
 ' r l *■ A-rtxDix. 
 
 were miftaken in the application. 
 
 The difficulty is to decide in any inflance whether the re- 
 courfe to a voluntary death can overbalance the ufefulnefs I may 
 exert in twenty or thirty years of additional life. But furely it 
 would be precipitate to decide that there is no fuch inftance. 
 There is a proverb which affirms, " that the blood of the martyrs 
 is the feed of the church," It is commonly fuppofed that Junius 
 Brutus did right in putting his fons to death in the firft year of 
 the Roman republic, and that this action contributed more than 
 any other caufe, to generate that energy and virtue for which 
 his country was afterwards fo eminently diflinguiihed. The death 
 of Cato produced an effect fomewhat fnnilar to this. It was 
 dwelt on with admiration by all the lovers of virtue under the 
 fuhfequent tyrants of Rome. It feemed to be the. lamp from 
 which they caught the facred flame. Who can tell how much it 
 has contributed to revive that flame in after ages, when it feemed 
 to have been fo long extinct ? 
 
 Let it be obferved that all martyrs [wap'i^-.-] arc filicides by the Mirtyrdom 
 
 CB-iiidertd 
 very iignification of the term. They die for a teftimony [/Axplupic ] ; 
 
 that is, they have a motive for dying. But motives iviycJc 
 
 only our own voluntary acts, not the violence put upon us by 
 
 another. 
 
 APPENDIX* 
 
94 OF DUELLING. 
 
 APPENDIX, No. II. 
 OF DUELLING. 
 
 MOTIVES OF DUELLING: I. REVENGE.— 2. REPUTATION FOR 
 COURAGE. — FALLACY OF THIS MOTIVE. — OBJECTION AN- 
 SWERED. — ILLUSTRATION. 
 
 phap^tt' T^ ma y ^ e P ro P er m this pl ac e to bellow a moment's confi- 
 **; — » ' •*■ deration upon the trite, but very important cafe of duelling. 
 
 Appendix. * \ / * ° 
 
 Motives of a very fhort re fledion will fuffice to fet it in its true light. 
 
 duelling. J " 
 
 i. Revenge. This deteftable practice was originally invented by barbarians 
 
 for the gratification of revenge. It was probably at that time 
 thought a very happy project for reconciling the odioufnefs of 
 malignity with the gallantry of courage. 
 
 2. Reputation j$ ut m jjjjg light it is now generally given up. Men of the 
 
 lor courage. ° ° * ° x 
 
 beft underftanding who lend it their fanction, are unwillingly 
 induced to do fo, and engage in fingle combat merely that their 
 reputation may fuftain no flander. 
 
 Fallacy of Which of thefe two actions is the truefl teft of courage : the 
 
 this motive. 
 
 engaging in a practice which our judgment difapproves, becaufe 
 we cannot fubmit to the confequences of following that judg- 
 ment j or the doing what we believe to be right, and chearfully 
 
 encoun- 
 
OF DUELLING. 05 
 
 encountering all the confequences that may be annexed to the J?5?p {{' 
 practice of virtue ? With what patience can a man of virtue \ — . ' 
 
 r Appendix. 
 
 think of cutting off the life of a fellow mortal, or of putting an 
 abrupt clofe to all the generous projects he may himfelf conceive 
 for the benefit of others, merely becaufe he has not firmnef* 
 enough to awe impertinence and falfhood into filence ? 
 
 " But the refufing a duel is an ambiguous action. Cowards Objedlon. 
 may pretend principle to fhelter themfelves from a danger they 
 dare not meet." 
 
 This is partly true and partly falfe. There are few actions Aafwewd. 
 indeed that are not ambiguous, or that with the fame general 
 outline may not proceed from different motives. But the man- 
 ner of doing them will fufhciently fhew the principle from which 
 they fpring. 
 
 He, that would break through an univerfally received cuftom EWfratioa. 
 becaufe he believes it to be wrong, muft no doubt arm himfelf 
 with fortitude. The point in which we chiefly fail, is in not 
 accurately understanding our own intentions, and taking care 
 beforehand to free ourfelves from any alloy of weaknefs and 
 error. He, who comes forward with no other idea in his mind 
 but that of rectitude, and who exprelfes, with the fimplicity and 
 firmnefs which full conviction never fails to infpire, the views with 
 which he is imprelled, is in no danger of being miftaken for a 
 3 • coward. 
 
96 OFDUELLING. 
 
 phap tt" C0Warc ^* ^ ^ e hefitate, it is becaufe he has not an idea perfectly 
 v r — » ' clear of the fentiment he intends to convey. If he be in any 
 
 Appendix. * j 
 
 degree embarraffed, it is becaufe he has not a feeling fufficiently 
 generous and intrepid of the guilt of the action in which he is 
 preffed to engage. 
 
 If there be any meaning in courage, its firft ingredient mud be 
 the daring to fpeak the truth at all times, to all perfons, and in every 
 pofhble fituation. What is it but the want of courage that fhould 
 prevent me from faying, " Sir, I ought to refufe your challenge. 
 What I ought to do, that I dare do. Have I injured you ? I 
 will readily and without compulfion. repair my injuftice to the 
 uttermoft mite. Have you mifconftrued me ? State to me the 
 particulars, and doubt not that what is true I will make appear 
 to be true. Thus far I will go. But, though I mould be branded 
 for a coward by all mankind, I will not repair to a fcene of de- 
 liberate murder. I will not do an act that I know to be flagitious. 
 I will exercife my judgment upon every proportion that comes 
 before me; the dictates of that judgment I will fpeak; and upon 
 them I will form my conduct." He that holds this language 
 with a countenance in unifon with his words, will never be fui- 
 pected of acting from the impulfe of fear. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 > 
 
[ 97 1 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF DUTY. 
 
 A DIFFICULTY STATED. — OF ABSOLUTE AND PRACTICAL 
 VIRTUE. — IMPROPRIETY OF THIS DISTINCTION. — UNI- 
 VERSALITY OF WHAT IS CALLED PRACTICAL VIRTUE 
 
 INSTANCED IN ROBBERY — IN RELIGIOUS FANATICISM. — 
 THE QUALITY OF AN ACTION DISTINCT FROM THE DIS- 
 POSITION WITH WHICH IT IS PERFORMED — FARTHER 
 DIFFICULTY. — MEANING OF THE TERM, DUTY. APPLI- 
 CATION. — INFERENCES. 
 
 THERE is a difficulty of confiderable magnitude as to the BOOK II. 
 CHAP. III. 
 fubject of the preceding chapter, founded upon the dif- » , ' 
 
 A difficulty 
 
 ference which may exift between abftradl juftice and my appre- ftated. 
 henfions of juftice. When I do an act, wrong in itfelf, but 
 which as to all the materials of judging extant to my under- 
 ftanding appears to be right, is my conduct virtuous or vicious? 
 
 Certain moralifts have introduced a diftinction upon this head Of abfolute 
 between abfolute and practical virtue. " There is one fpecies of virtue. 
 virtue," they fay, " which rifes out of the nature of things and 
 is immutable, and another which rifes out of the views extant 
 to my underftanding. Thus for example fuppofe, I ought to 
 
 O worfhip 
 
98:. . OF DUTY. 
 
 rw\v tt'i wor ^^P Je^us Chrift ; but, having been bred in the religion of 
 * * ' Mahomet, I ought to adhere to that religion, as long as its evi- 
 dences fhall appear to me conclufive. I am impannelled upon 
 a jury to try a man arraigned for murder, and who is really in- 
 nocent. Abfcractedly confidered, I ought to acquit him. But 
 I am unacquainted with his innocence, and evidence is adduced 
 fuch as to form the ftrongeft prefumption of his guilt. De- 
 monftration in fuch cafes is not to be attained ; I am obliged in 
 every concern of human life to aft upon prefumption ; I ought 
 therefore to convict him." 
 
 Impropriety It may be doubted however whether any good purpofe is 
 
 of this diC 
 
 tlndion. likely to be anfwered by employing the terms of abftradt fcience 
 in this verfatile and uncertain manner. Morality is, if any thing 
 can be, fixed and immutable ; and there muft furely be fome 
 ftrange deception that fhould induce us to give to an action 
 eternally and unchangeably wrong, the epithets of reftitude^ 
 duty and virtue. 
 
 Umverfality Nor have thefe moralifts been thoroughly aware to what ex- 
 
 of what is 
 
 called praai- tent this admiflion would carry them. The human mind is in- 
 
 cal virtue : 
 
 credibly fubtle in inventing an apology for that to which its 
 inclination leads. Nothing is fo rare as pure and unmingled 
 hypocrify. There is no a&ion of our lives which we were not 
 ready at the time of adopting it to juftify, unlefs fo far as we 
 were prevented by mere indolence and unconcern.. There is 
 
 fcarcely 
 
OF DUTY. 
 
 99 
 
 fcarcely any juftification which we endeavour to pafs upon others, BOOK n. 
 
 3 J J V . . . CHAP. III. 
 which we do not with tolerable iuccefs pafs upon ourfelves. * v— — ' 
 
 The distinction therefore which is here fet up would go near to 
 
 prove that every action of every human being is entitled to the 
 
 appellation of virtuous. 
 
 There is perhaps no man that cannot recollect the time when inftanced in. 
 
 lubbery : 
 
 he fecretly called in queftion the arbitrary divifion of property • 
 eftablifhed in human fociety, and felt inclined to appropriate to 
 his ufe any thing the pofleffion of which appeared to him de- 
 firable. It is probably in fome fuch way that men are ufually 
 influenced in the perpetration of robbery. They perfuade them- 
 felves of the comparative inutility of the property to its prefent 
 pofleflbr, and the ineftimable advantage that would attend it in 
 their hands. They believe that the transfer ought to be made. 
 It is of no confequence that they are not confident in thefe 
 views, that the impreffions of education fpeedily recur to their 
 minds, and that in a feafon of adverfity they readily confefs the 
 wickednefs of their proceeding. It is not lefs true that they did 
 what at the moment they thought to be right. 
 
 But there is another confideration that feems ftill more decifive ,n religions 
 
 fanaticifm. 
 
 of the fubjedt before us. The worft actions, the moft contrary to 
 abftradt juftice and utility, have frequently been done from the 
 moft confeientious motives. Clement, Ravaillac, Damiens and 
 Gerard had their minds deeply penetrated with anxiety for the 
 
 O 2 eternal 
 
ioo O F D U T Y. 
 
 ,£??•? IU eternal welfare of mankind. For thefe objects they facriftced 
 CHAP. ill. J J 
 
 *■ » ' their eafe, and chearfully expofed themfelves to tortures and death. 
 
 It was benevolence probably that contributed to light the fires of 
 Smithfield, and point the daggers of Saint Bartholomew. The 
 inventors of the Gunpowder Treafon were in general men re- 
 markable for the fandity of their lives and the feverity of their 
 manners. It is probable indeed, that fome ambitious views, and 
 fome fentiments of hatred and abhorrence mixed with the benevo- 
 lence and integrity of thefe perfons. It is probable that no wrong 
 action was ever committed from views entirely pure. But the de- 
 ception they put upon themfelves might neverthelefs be com- 
 plete. At all events their opinions upon the fubjed could not 
 alter the real nature of the action. 
 
 The quality The true folution of the queftion lies in obferving, .that the 
 
 of an aftion 
 
 diftlnft from difpofition with which an adion is adopted is' one thing, and the 
 
 the difpofi- r ° 
 
 tion with adion itfelf another. A right adion may be done from'a wrong 
 
 which it is t> 
 
 performed. difpofition ; in that cafe we approve the adion, but condemn the 
 ador. A wrong adion may be done from a right difpofition ; 
 in that cafe we condemn the adion, but approve the ador. If 
 the difpofition by which a man is governed have a fyftematical 
 tendency to the benefit of his fpecies, he cannot fail to obtain 
 our efteem, however miftaken he may be in his condud. 
 
 Farther dif- But what fhall we fay to the duty of -a man under thefe cir- 
 
 fieulty. 
 
 cumftances ? Calvin, we will fuppofe, was clearly and confcien- 
 
 tioufly 
 
O F D U T Y. 101 
 
 tlouily perfuaded that he ought to burn Servetus. Ought he to BOOK II. 
 
 have burned him or not ? " If he burned him, he did an action v v ' 
 
 deteftable in its own nature ; if he refrained, he acted in oppofi- 
 tion to the beft judgment of his own underftanding as to a point 
 of moral obligation." It is abfurd however to fay, that it was in 
 any fenfe his duty to burn him. The moft that can be admitted 
 is, that his difpofition was virtuous, and that in the circumftances 
 in which he was placed an action greatly to be deplored flowed 
 from that difpofition by invincible neceffity. 
 
 Shall we fay then that it was the duty of Calvin, who did 
 not underftand the principles of toleration, to ad upon a truth 
 of which he was ignorant ? Suppole that a perfon is to be tried 
 at York next week for murder, and that my evidence would ac- 
 quit him. Shall we fay that it was my duty to go to York, 
 though I knew nothing of the matter ? Upon the fame prin- 
 ciples we might affirm that it is my duty to go from London to 
 York in half an hour, as the trial will come on within that 
 time ; the impoffibility not being more real in one cafe than in 
 the other. Upon the fame principles we might affirm, that it 
 is my duty to be impeccable, omnifcient and almighty. 
 
 Duty is a term the ufe of which feems to be to defcribe the mode Meaning of 
 in which any being may beft be employed for the general good. duty. 
 It is limited in its extent by the extent of the capacity of that 
 being. Now capacity varie8 in its idea in proportion as we 
 
 vary 
 
102 
 
 BOOK II. 
 CHAP. 111. 
 
 OF DUTY. 
 
 vary our view of the fubjed to which it belongs. What I am 
 capable of, if you coniider me merely as a man, is one thing ; 
 what I am capable of as a man of a deformed figure, of weak 
 underftanding, of fuperftitious prejudices, or as the cafe may hap- 
 pen, is another. So much cannot be expected of me under thefe 
 difadvantages, as if they were abfent. But, if this be the true de- 
 finition of duty, it is abfurd to fuppofe in any cafe that an action 
 injurious to the general welfare can be claiTed in the rank of 
 duties. 
 
 Application. To apply thefe obfervations to the cafes that have been ftated. 
 Ignorance, io far as it goes, completely annihilates capacity. As 
 I was uninformed of the trial at York, I could not be influenced 
 by any confideration refpecting it. But it is abfurd to fay that it 
 was my duty to neglect a motive with which I was unacquainted. 
 If you alledge, " that Calvin was ignorant of the principles of tole- 
 ration, and had no proper opportunity to learn them," it follows 
 that in burning Servetus he did not violate his duty, but it does 
 not follow that it was his duty to burn him. Upon the fup- 
 pofition here ftated duty is filent. Calvin was unacquainted with 
 the principles of juftice, and therefore could not practife them. 
 The duty of no man can exceed his capacity ; but then neither 
 can in any cafe an act of injuftice be of the nature of duty. 
 
 Inferences. There are certain inferences that flow from this view of the 
 
 fubjed, which it may be proper to mention. Nothing is more 
 
 common 
 
OF DUTY. 103 
 
 common than for individuals and focieties of men to alledge that BOOK II. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 they have acted to the beft of their judgment, that they have * « ' 
 
 done their duty, and therefore that their conduct, even fhould 
 it prove to be miftaken, is neverthelefs virtuous. This appears 
 to be an error. An action, though done with the beft intention 
 in the world, may have nothing in it of the nature of virtue. 
 In reality the moft efTential part of virtue confifts in the incef- 
 fantly feeking to inform ourfelves more accurately upon the fub- 
 ject of utility and right. Whoever is greatly mifinformed re- 
 flecting them, is indebted for his error to a defect in his philan- 
 thropy and zeal. 
 
 Secondly, fince abfolute virtue may be out of the power of a 
 human being, it becomes us in the mean time to lay the greateft 
 ftrefs upon a virtuous difpofition, which is not attended with the 
 fame ambiguity. A virtuous difpofition is of the utmoft con- 
 fequence, fince it will in the majority of inftances be productive 
 of virtuous actions ; fince it tends, in exact proportion to the 
 quantity of virtue, to increafe our difcernment and improve our 
 underftanding ; and fince, if it were univerfally propagated, it 
 would immediately lead to the great end of virtuous actions, the 
 pureft and moft exquifite happinefs of intelligent beings. But 
 a virtuous difpofition is principally generated by the uncontrolled 
 exercife of private judgment, and the rigid conformity of every 
 man to the dictates of his confcience. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
i<?4 OF THE EQUALITY 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE EQUALITY OF MANKIND. 
 
 PHYSICAL EQUALITY. OBJECTION. ANSWERS. MORAL 
 
 . EQUALITY. HOW LIMITED. PROVINCE OF POLITICAL 
 
 JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK II. npHE equality of mankind is either phyfical or moral. 
 
 CHAP. IV. | , 
 
 * v ' ■*■ Their phyfical equality may be confidered either as it 
 
 equality. relates to the ftrength of the body or the faculties of the mind. 
 
 Objeftlon. This part of the fubject has been expofed to cavil and ob- 
 
 jection. It has been faid, " that the reverfe of this equality is 
 the remit of our experience. Among the individuals of our 
 fpecies we actually find that there are not two alike. One man 
 is ftrong and another weak. One man is wife and another 
 foolifh. All that exifts in the world of the inequality of con- 
 ditions is to be traced to this as their fource. The ftrong man 
 pofTefTes power to fubdue, and the weak ftands in need of an 
 ally to protect. The confequence is inevitable : the equality of 
 conditions is a chimerical aflumption, neither poffible to be re- 
 duced into practice, nor defirable if it could be fo reduced." 
 
 3 
 
 Upon 
 
OF MANKIND. 105 
 
 Upon this ftatement two obfervations are to be made. Firft, BOOK II. 
 
 ' CHAP. IV. 
 
 this inequality was in its origin infinitely lefs than it is at pre- ' 
 
 1 J ° J r Aulwers. 
 
 fent. In the uncultivated flate of man difeafes, effeminacy and 
 luxury were little known, and of confequence the ftrength of 
 every one much more nearly approached to the ftrength of his 
 neighbour. In the uncultivated ftate of man the underftandings 
 of all were limited, their wants, their ideas and their views nearly 
 upon a level. It was to be expected that in their firft departure 
 from this ftate great irregularities would introduce themfelves ; 
 and it is the objecT: of fubfequent wifdom and improvement to 
 mitigate thefe irregularities. 
 
 Secondly, notwith (landing the incroachments that have been 
 made upon the equality of mankind, a great and fubftantial 
 equality remains. There is no fuch difparity among the human 
 race as to enable one man to hold feveral other men in fub- 
 je&ion, except fo far as they are willing to be fubjecT:. All go- 
 vernment is founded in opinion. Men at prefent live under any 
 particular form, becaufe they conceive it their intereft to do fo. 
 One part indeed of a community or empire may be held in fub- 
 je&ion by force ; but this cannot be the perfonal force of their 
 defpot ; it muft be the force of another part of the community, 
 who are of opinion that it is their intereft to fupport his au- 
 thority. Deftroy this opinion, and the fabric which is built upon 
 it falls to the ground. It follows therefore that all men are 
 eflentially independent. — So much for the phyfical equality. 
 
 P The 
 
ioS OF THE EQUALITY 
 
 cmap' tv ^^ e mora ^ equality is ftill lefs open to reafonable exception. 
 >j — p- — ~! By moral equality I underftand the propriety of applying one 
 *T m unalterable rule of juftice to every cafe that may arife. This 
 
 cannot be queftioned but upon arguments that would fubvert th^e 
 Very nature of virtue. " Equality," it has been affirmed, " will 
 always be an unintelligible fiction, fo long as the capacities of 
 men fhall be unequal, and their pretended claims have neither 
 guarantee nor fanctien by which they can be inforced *." But 
 furely juftice is fufficiently intelligible in its own nature, ab- 
 ftracted from the confideration whether it be or be not reduced 
 into practice. Juftice has relation to beings endowed with per- 
 ception, and capable of pleafure and pain. Now it immediately 
 refults from the nature of fuch beings, independently of any arbi- 
 trary conftitution, that pleafure is agreeable and pain odious, plea- 
 fure to be defired and pain to be obviated. It is therefore juft and 
 reafonable that fuch beings mould contribute, fo far as it lies in 
 their power, to the pleafure and benefit of each other. Among 
 pleafures fome are more exquifite, more unalloyed and lefs pre- 
 carious than others. It is juft that thefe fhould be preferred. 
 
 Erom thefe fimple principles we may deduce the moral 
 equality of mankind. We are partakers of a common nature, 
 
 * " On a dit — que nous avians tons les mimes droits. J'ignore ce que'c'ejl que let 
 memes droits, ou il y a inegalite de talens ou de force, & nulle garantie, nulle 
 fitntlion." Raynal, Revolution d'dmerique, p. 34. 
 
 7 and 
 
OF MANKIND. 107 
 
 and the fame caufes that contribute to the benefit of one con- j?°2p tv 
 
 tribute to the benefit of another. Our fenfes and faculties are of * » 
 
 the' fame denomination. Our pleafures and pains will therefore 
 be the fame. We are all of us endowed with reafon, able to com- 
 pare, to judge and to infer. The improvement therefore which 
 is to be defired for the one is to be defired for the other. We 
 fhall be provident for ourfelves and ufeful to each other, in pro- 
 portion as we rife above the atmofphere of prejudice. The fame 
 independence, the fame freedom from any fuch reftraint, as fhould 
 prevent us from giving the reins to our own underftanding, or 
 from uttering upon all occafions whatever we think to be true> 
 will conduce to the improvement of all. There are certain op- 
 portunities and a certain fituation moft advantageous to every 
 human being, and it is juft that the e fhould be communicated 
 to all, as nearly at lead as the general economy will permit. 
 
 There is indeed one fpecies of moral inequality parallel to the How limited. 
 phyfical inequality that has been already defcribed. The treat- 
 ment to which men are entitled is to be meafured by their 
 merits and their virtues. That country would not be the feat 
 of wifdom and reafon, where the benefactor of his fpecies was 
 confidered in the fame point of view as their enemy. But in 
 reality this diftinction, fo far from being adverfe to equality in 
 any tenable fenfe, is friendly to it, and is accordingly known 
 by the appellation of equity, a term derived from the fame 
 origin. Though in fome fenfe an exception, it tends to the fame 
 
 P 2 • purpofe 
 
108 OF THE EQUALITY OF MANKIND. 
 
 BOOK II. purpofe to which the principle itfelf is indebted for its value. 
 CHAP. IV. r 
 
 It is calculated to infufe into every bofom an emulation of ex- 
 Province of cellence. The thing really to be defired is the removing as much 
 
 political juf- ii. 
 
 tice. as pouible arbitrary diiuncuons, and leaving to talents and 
 
 virtue the field of exertion unimpaired. We mould endeavour 
 to afford to all the fame opportunities and the fame encourage- 
 ment, and to render juftice the common intereft and choice. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ *°9 ] *°9 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 THE QUESTION STATED. — FOUNDATION OF SOCIETY. — OP- 
 POSITE RIGHTS IMPOSSIBLE. — CONCLUSION FROM THESE 
 
 PREMISES. DISCRETION CONSIDERED. RIGHTS OF 
 
 KINGS. IMMORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
 OF RIGHTS. RIGHTS OF COMMUNITIES. — OBJECTIONS : 
 
 I. THE RIGHT OF MUTUAL AID. — EXPLANATION. — ORI- 
 GIN OF THE TERM, RIGHT. 2. RIGHTS OF PRIVATE JUDG- 
 MENT AND OF THE PRESS. — EXPLANATION. — REASONS 
 OF THIS LIMITATION UPON THE FUNCTIONS OF THE 
 COMMUNITY: I. THE INUTILITY OF ATTEMPTING RE- 
 STRAINT. 2. ITS PERNICIOUS TENDENCY. — CONCLU- 
 SION. 
 
 THERE is no fubjett that has been difcuffed with more BOOK II. 
 CHAP.V. 
 eagernefs and pertinacity than the rights of man. Has he * * * 
 
 The queftion 
 
 any rights, or has he none ? Much may plaufibly be alledged on ftated. 
 both fides of this queftion ; and in the conclufion thofe reafoners 
 appear to exprefs themfelves with the greateft accuracy who em- 
 brace the negative. There is nothing that has been of greater 
 diflervice to the caufe of truth, than the hafty and unguarded 
 manner in which its advocates have fometimes defended it : and 
 
 it 
 
•no 
 
 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 BOOK II. Jt w ill be admitted to be peculiarly unfortunate, if the advocates 
 
 CHAP. v. r ' 
 
 on one fide of this queflion fhould be found to have the greateft 
 quantity of truth, while their adverfaries have exprefied them- 
 felves in a manner more c<^fonant to reafon and the nature of 
 things. Where the queftion has been fo extremely darkened by 
 an ambiguous ufe of terms, it may at any rate be defirable to 
 try, whether, by a patient and fevere inveftigation of the firft 
 principles of political fociety, it may be placed in a light confi- 
 derably different from the views of both parties. 
 
 Foundation 
 of iociety. 
 
 Political fociety, as has already been obferved, is founded in 
 the principles of morality and juftice. It is impoflible for intel- 
 lectual beings to be brought into coalition and intercourfe, with 
 out a certain mode of conduct, adapted to their nature and con- 
 nection, immediately becoming a duty incumbent on the parties 
 concerned. Men would never have aflbciated, if they had not 
 imagined that in confequence of that aflbciation -they would mu- 
 tually conduce to the advantage and happinefs of each other. 
 This is the real purpofe, the genuine bafis of their intercourfe ; 
 and, as far as this purpofe is anfwered, fo far does fociety anfwer 
 the end of its inftitution. 
 
 Oppofite 
 tights im- 
 poflible. 
 
 There is only one poftulate more, that is neceffary to bring 
 us to a conclufive mode of reafoning upon this fubject. What- 
 ever is meant by the term right, for it will prefently appear that 
 the fenfe of the term itfelf has never been clearly underftood, 
 
 there 
 
RIGHTS OF MAN. m 
 
 there can neither be oppofite rkrhts, nor rig-'nts and duties hoftile BOOK II. 
 
 1 r to & CHAP. 7. 
 
 to each other. The rights of one man cannot claih with or be v •. — - 1 
 
 deftructive of the rights of another ; for this, inftead of render- 
 ing the fubject an important branch of truth and morality, as the 
 advocates of the rights of man certainly underftand it to be, 
 would be to reduce it to a heap of unintelligible jargon and in- 
 confiftency. If one man have a right to be free, another man 
 cannot have a right to make him a flave ; if one man have 
 a right to inflicT: chaftifement upon me, I cannot have a right to 
 withdraw myfelf from chaftifement ; if my neighbour have a 
 right to a fum of money in my pofleflion, I cannot have a right 
 to retain it in my pocket. — It cannot be lefs incontrovertible, that 
 I have no right to omit what my duty prefcribes. 
 
 From hence it inevitably follows that men have no rights. Conclufion: 
 By right, as the word is employed in this fubjecl, has always pre mifes. ~ 
 been underftood difcretion, that is, a full and complete power of 
 either doing a thing or omitting it, without the perfon's becoming 
 liable to animadverfion or cenfure from another, that is, in other 
 words, without his incurring any degree of turpitude or guilt. 
 Now in this feme I affirm that man has no rights, no difcretionary 
 power whatever. 
 
 It is commonly faid, " that a man has a right to the difpofal Difcreuoa 
 
 confideredo. 
 
 ©f his fortune, a right to the employment of his time, a right to 
 the uncontrolled choice of his profeifion or purfuits." But this 
 
 can 
 
ii2 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 BOOK II. can never be confidently affirmed till it can be fhewn that he 
 CHAP.V. J 
 
 1 v ' has no duties, prefcribing and limiting his mode of proceeding in 
 
 all thefe refpects. My neighbour has juft as much right to put 
 an end to my exiftence with dagger or poifon, as to deny me 
 that pecuniary affiftance without which I muft ftarve, or as to 
 deny me that affiftance without which my intellectual attain- 
 ments or my moral exertions will be materially injured. He has 
 juft as much right to amufe himfelf with burning my houfe or 
 torturing my children upon the rack, as to fhut himfelf up in 
 a cell carelefs about his fellow men, and to hide " his talent in 
 a napkin." 
 
 If men have any rights, any difcretionary powers, they muft 
 be in things of total indifference, as whether I fit on the right 
 or on the left fide of my fire, or dine on beef to day or to- 
 morrow. Even thefe rights are much fewer than we are apt to 
 imagine, fmce before they can be completely eftablifhed, it muft 
 be proved that my choice on one fide or the other can in no 
 poffible way contribute to the benefit or injury of myfelf or of 
 any other perfon in the world. Thofe muft indeed be rights 
 well worth the contending for, the very effence of which con- 
 fifts in their abfolute nugatorinefs and inutility. 
 
 In reality nothing can appear more wonderful to a careful 
 
 enquirer, than that two ideas fo incompatible as man and rights 
 
 mould ever have been aflbciated together. Certain it is, that one 
 
 4 of 
 
RIGHTS OF MAN. 113 
 
 of them mufl be utterly exclufive and annihilatory of the other. ROOK n. 
 
 1 J CHAP. V. 
 
 Before we afcribe rights to man, we mufl conceive of him as a *■ •» " 
 
 being endowed with intellecl, and capable of difcerning the dif- 
 ferences and tendencies of things. But a being endowed with 
 intellecl:, and capable of difcerning the differences and tendencies 
 of things, inftantly becomes a moral being, and has duties in- 
 cumbent on him to difcharge : and duties and rights, as has al- 
 ready been fhewn, are abfolutely exclufive of each other. 
 
 It has been affirmed by the zealous advocates of liberty, " that Rights of 
 princes and magiftrates have no rights ;" and no pofition can be 
 more incontrovertible. There is no fituation of their lives that 
 has not its correfpondent duties. There is no power intrufted to 
 them that they are not bound to exercife exclufively for the 
 public good. It is ftrange that perfons adopting this principle 
 did not go a ftep farther, and perceive that the fame reftriclions 
 were applicable to fubjecls and citizens. 
 
 Nor is the fallacy of this language more confpicuous than its immoral 
 immoral tendency. To this inaccurate and unjuft ufe of the of the dec- 
 term right we owe it, that the mifer, who accumulates to no end rights. 
 that which diffufed would have conduced to the welfare of thou- 
 fands, that the luxurious man, who wallows in indulgence and 
 fees numerous families around him pining in beggary, never fail 
 to tell us of their rights, and to filence animadverfion and quiet 
 the cenfure of their own mind by reminding us, " that they 
 
 Q^ came 
 
"4 
 
 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 look ir. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 came fairly into poffeffion of their wealth, that they owe nos 
 debts, and that of confequence no man has authority to enquire 
 r hto their private manner of difpofing of that which is their 
 own." A great majority of mankind are confcious that they; 
 ftand in need of this fort of defence, and' are therefore very ready 
 to combine agaihft the ihfolent intruder, who ventures to en- 
 quire into " things that do not concern him." They forget, that 
 the wife man and the honeft man, the friend of his country and 
 his kind, is concerned for every thing by which they may be 
 affected, and" carries about with him a diploma, conftituting him 
 inquifitor general of the moral conduct of his neighbours, wifhL 
 a duty, annexed' to recal them to virtue, by every leffon that 
 truth can enable him to read, and every punifhment that plains 
 fpeaking is competent to inflict. 
 
 Rights of 
 communi- 
 ties. 
 
 It is fcarcely neceffary to add, that, if individuals have no 
 rights, neither has fociety, which poifeues nothing but what in* 
 dividuals have brought into a common ftock. The abfurdity of 
 the common opinion, as applied to this fubjedt, is ftill more 
 glaring, if poffible, than in the view in which we have already 
 confidered it. According to the ufual fentiment every club affem- 
 bling for any civjtl purpofe, every congregation of religionifts af- 
 fembling for the worfhip of God, has a right to eftablifh any 
 provifions or ceremonies, no matter how ridiculous or deteftable,. 
 provided they do not interfere with the freedom of others. Rea- 
 fon lies proftrate under their feet. They have a right to trample 
 
 upon 
 
RIGHTS OF MAN. 115 
 
 upon and infult her as they pleafe. It is in the fame fpirit we p„9 p U- 
 
 have been told that every nation has a right to choofe its * » ' 
 
 form of government. A mod acute, original and ineftimable 
 author was probably mifled by the vulgar phrafeology on this 
 fubject, when he afferted, that, " at a time when neither the peo- 
 ple of France nor the national affembly were troubling themfelves 
 about the affairs of England or the Englifh parliament, Mr. 
 Burke's conduct was unpardonable in commencing an unpro- 
 voked attack upon them *." 
 
 There are various objections that lugged themfelves to the Objections. 
 theory which fubverts the rights of men ; and if the theory 
 be true, they will probably appear in the refult to be fo far 
 from really hofiile to it, as to be found more fairly deducible 
 from and confident with its principles, than with any of thofe 
 with which they have inadvertently been connected. 
 
 In the fird place it has fometimes been alledged, and feems to 1. The rights 
 
 of mutual aid. 
 
 refult from the reafonings already adduced under the head of juf- 
 tice, that " men have a right to the afiidance and co-operation 
 of their fellows in every honed purfuit." But, when we affert Explanation, 
 this propofition, we mean fomething by the word right exceed- 
 ingly different from what is commonly underdood by the term. 
 We do not underdand fomething difcretionary, which, if not 
 voluntarily fulfilled, cannot be confidered as a matter of claim. 
 
 * Rights of Man, page i. 
 
 0^2 Oil 
 
n6 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 BOO^ n. On the contrary every thing adduced upon that occafion was 
 "*— — < ' calculated to fhew that it was a matter of Strict claim ; and per- 
 haps fomething would be gained with refpect to perfpicuity, if 
 we rather chofe to diftinguifh it by that appellation, than by a 
 name fo much abufed, and fo ambiguous in its application, as 
 the term right. 
 
 Origin of the The true origin of this latter term is relative to the prefent 
 
 term, right. 
 
 State of political government, in which many of thofe actions 
 which moral duty moil Strictly enjoins us are in no degree brought 
 within the fphere of legislative fanction. Men uninfluenced by 
 comprehenfive principles of juStice, commit every Species of in- 
 temperance, are felfifh, hard-hearted, licentious and cruel, and 
 maintain their right to all thefe caprices, becaufe the laws of 
 their country are filent with regard to them. Philofophers and 
 political enquirers have too frequently adopted the fame princi- 
 ples with a certain degree of accommodation ; though in fact 
 men have no more right to thefe erroneous propensities in their 
 moft qualified fenfe, than they had to them originally in all their 
 extravagance. It is true, that, under the forms of fociety now 
 exifiing in the world, intemperance and the caprices of perfonal 
 intercourfe too frequently efcape without animadverfion. But 
 in a more perfect form, though they may not fall- under the 
 cognifance of law, the offender will probably be fo unequivocally 
 reminded by the fincerity of his neighbours of the error he has 
 6 com- 
 
RIGHTS OF MAN. 117 
 
 committed, as to be in no danger of running away with the ^9P l ), IT * 
 opinion that he had a right to commit it. ' * ' 
 
 A fecond and more important objection to the doctrine I am *. Rights of 
 
 private judg- 
 
 maintaining is derived from the rights as they are called of pri- ment and ot ~ 
 vate judgment, and the liberty of the prefs. But it may eafily be 
 fhewn, that thefe, no more than the articles already mentioned, 
 are rights of difcretion. If they were, they would prove, that a 
 man was ftrictly jufliliable in publishing what he believed to be 
 pernicious or falfe, and that it was a matter of perfect moral in- 
 difference whether he conformed to the religious rites of Con- 
 fucius, of Mahomet, or of Chrift. The political freedom of Explanation. 
 confcience and of the prefs, fo far from being as it is commonly 
 fuppofed an extenfion, is a new cafe of the limitation of rights 
 and difcretion. Confcience and the prefs ought to be unrenrained, 
 not becaufe men have a right to deviate from the exact line that 
 duty prefcribes, but becaufe fociety, the aggregate of individuals, 
 has no right to affume the prerogative of an infallible judge, and 
 to undertake authoritatively to prefcribe to its members in mat- 
 ters of pure fpeculation. 
 
 One obvious reafon againft this affumption on the part of the Rcafons of 
 
 fociety is the impoffibility by any compulfatory method of bring- tion upon the 
 
 . .- . functions of 
 
 ifig men to uniformity of opinion. The judgment we form upon the commu- 
 
 . ... nity. 
 
 topics of general truth, is or is imagined to be founded upon 1 . The inu- 
 tility of at- 
 
 evidence : and, however it may be foothed by gende applications tempting re- 
 
 it rain t. 
 
 to 
 
n8 RIGHTS OF MAN. 
 
 i 
 
 pha'p v* t0 *^ e Detra y m g i ts impartiality, it is apt to repel with no little 
 pertinacity whatever comes under the form of compulfion. Per- 
 fection cannot perfuade the understanding, even when it fub- 
 dues our refolution. It may make us hypocrites ; but cannot 
 make us converts. The government therefore, which is anxious 
 above all tilings to imbue its fubjects with integrity and virtue, 
 will be the fartheft in the world from difcouraging them in the 
 explicit avowal of their fentiments. 
 
 2. Its perm- ;g ut there is another reafon of a higher order. Man is not, as 
 
 cious ten- ° 
 
 dency. j^g b een already fhewn, a perfect being, but perfectible. No 
 
 government, that has yet exifted, or is likely prefently to exift 
 upon the face of the earth, is faultlefs. No government ought 
 therefore pertinacioufly to refill the change of its own inftitu- 
 tions ; and {till lefs ought it to fet up a ftandard upon the vari- 
 ous topics of human fpeculation, to reftrain the excurfions of an 
 inventive mind. It is only by giving a free fcope to thefe ex- 
 curfions, that fcience, philofophy and morals have arrived at their 
 prefent degree of perfection, or are capable of going on to 
 that ftill greater perfection, in comparifon of which all that 
 has been already done will perhaps appear childifh. But a pro- 
 ceeding, abfolutely neceflary for the purpofe of exciting the mind 
 to thefe falutary excurfions, and ftill more neceffary in order to 
 give them their proper operation, confifts in the unreftrained 
 communication of men's thoughts and difcoveries to each other. 
 If every man have to begin again at the point from whkh his 
 
 ., neigh- 
 
RIGHTS OF MAN. 119 
 
 neighbour fet out, the labour will be endlefs, and the progrefs in BOOK II. 
 . ° ' , CHAP. v. 
 
 an unvarying circle. There is nothing that more eminently con- * * * 
 
 tributes to intellectual energy, than for every man to be habi- 
 tuated to follow without alarm the train of his fpeculations, and 
 to utter without fear the conclufions that have fuggefted them- Concludou. 
 felves to him.. — But does all this imply that men have a right to 
 a£t any thing but virtue, and to utter any thing but truth ? 
 Certainly not. It implies indeed that there are points with which 
 fociety has no right to interfere, not that difcretion and caprice 
 are more free,, or duty lefs ftric~l upon thefe points, than upon*, 
 any others with which human a&ion is converfanU 
 
 CHAP. 
 
IZO 
 
 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE EXERCISE OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 
 
 FOUNDATION OF VIRTUE. — HUMAN ACTIONS REGULATED*. 
 I. BY THE NATURE -OF THINGS. — 2. BY POSITIVE INSTI- 
 TUTION. — TENDENCY OF THE LATTER: I. TO EXCITE 
 
 VIRTUE. ITS EQUIVOCAL CHARACTER IN THIS RESPECT. 
 
 2. TO INFORM THE JUDGMENT. — ITS INAPTITUDE FOR 
 
 THAT PURPOSE. PROVINCE OF CONSCIENCE CONSIDERED. 
 
 TENDENCY OF AN INTERFERENCE WITH THAT PROVINCE. 
 RECAPITULATION. — ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF POSI- 
 TIVE INSTITUTION: I. THE NECESSITY OF REPELLING PRI- 
 VATE INJUSTICE. OBJECTIONS: THE UNCERTAINTY OF 
 
 EVIDENCE. THE DIVERSITY OF MOTIVES. THE UNSUIT- 
 
 ABLENESS OF THE MEANS OF CORRECTION — EITHER TO 
 IMPRESS NEW SENTIMENTS — OR TO STRENGTHEN OLD 
 ONES. PUNISHMENT FOR THE SAKE OF EXAMPLE CON- 
 SIDERED. URGENCY OF THE CASE.— 2. REBELLION. 
 
 3. WAR. — OBJECTIONS. — REPLY. 
 
 BOOK II. f 1 ^ o a rational being there can be but one rule of conduct, 
 
 CHAP. VI. I fa ' 
 
 ^ — v-: — ' •*■ iuftice, and one mode of afcertaining that rule, the exer- 
 
 Foundation J 
 
 of virtue. c jf e f hi s understanding. If in any inftance I be made the me- 
 chanical inftrument of abfolute violence, in that inftance I fall 
 
 under 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 121 
 
 under no defcription of moral conduct either good or bad. But, BOOK ir. 
 
 if, not being operated upon by abfolute compuliion, I be wholly k « * 
 
 prompted by fomething that is frequently called. by that name, 
 and act from the hope of reward or the fear of punifhment, my 
 conduct is pofitively wrong. 
 
 Here however a diftinction is to be made. Juftice, as it was 
 defined in a preceding chapter, is coincident with utility. I am 
 myfelf a part of the great whole, and my happinefs is a part of 
 that complex view of things by which juftice is regulated. The 
 hope of reward therefore and the fear of punifhment, confined 
 within certain ftrict limits, are motives that ought to have in- 
 fluence with my mind. 
 
 There are two defcriptions of tendency that may belong to Human ac- 
 any action, the tendency which it poffeffes by the neceffary and gulated, 
 univerfal laws of exiftence, and the tendency which refults from ture of 
 the pofitive interference of fome intelligent being. The nature 
 of happinefs and mifery, pleafure and pain, is independent of all 
 pofitive inftitution : that is, it is immutably true that whatever 
 tends to procure a balance of the former is to be defired, and 
 whatever tends to procure a balance of the latter is to be re- 
 jected. In like manner the promulgation of virtue, truth and 
 political juftice muft always be right. There is perhaps no 
 action of a rational being that has not fome tendency to promote 
 thefe objects, and confequently that has not a moral character 
 founded in the abftract nature of things. 
 
 R The 
 
122 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 CHAR vi ^ he tenc ^ enc y °f pofitive inftitution is of two forts, to fur- 
 2 7i~^^' nifh me with an additional motive to the practice of virtue or 
 tion. 1 " ' U " r ^g nt > an d t0 inform my underftanding as to what actions are 
 Tendency of r ight and what actions are wrong. Much cannot be'faid in com- 
 mendation of either of thefe tendencies. 
 
 i. To excite Firft, pofitive inftitution may furnifh me with an additional 
 
 virtue. J 
 
 Its equivo- motive to the practice of virtue. I have an opportunity of con- 
 
 cal character 
 
 in this re- tributing very efTentially to the advantage of twenty individuals j 
 they will be benefited, and no other perfons will fuflain a ma- 
 terial injury. I ought to embrace this opportunity. Here let 
 us fuppofe pofitive inftitution to interfere, and to annex fome 
 great perfonal reward to myfelf to the performance of my duty. 
 This immediately changes the nature of the action. Before I 
 preferred it for its intrinfic excellence. Now, fo far as the po- 
 fitive inftitution operates, I prefer it, becaufe fome perfon has 
 arbitrarily annexed to it a great weight of felf-intereft. But vir- 
 tue, confidered as the quality of an intelligent being, depends 
 upon the difpofition with which the action is accompanied. 
 Under a pofitive inftitution then this very action, which is in- 
 trinfically virtuous, may, fo far as relates to the agent, become 
 vicious. The vicious man would before have neglected the ad- 
 vantage of thefe twenty individuals, becaufe he would not bring 
 a certain inconvenience or trouble upon himfelf. The fame man 
 with the fame difpofition will now promote their advantage, be- 
 caufe his own welfare is concerned in it. Twenty, other things 
 
 equal, 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 123 
 
 equal, is twenty times better than one. He that is not governed ^j®®^ * T ; 
 
 by the moral arithmetic of the cafe, or who acts from a difpo- ' » ' 
 
 fition directly at war with that arithmetic, is unjuft. In other 
 words, morality requires that we mould be attentive only to the 
 tendency which belongs to any action by the neceflary and uni- 
 verfal laws of exiftence. This is what is meant by the princi- 
 ple, " that we fhould do good, regardlefs of the confequences ;" 
 and by that other, " that we may not do evil, from the profpect of 
 good to refult from it." The cafe would have been rendered ftill 
 more glaring, if, inftead of the welfare of twenty, we had fup- 
 pofed the welfare of millions to have been concerned. In reality, 
 whether the difparity be great or final], the inference ought to 
 be the fame. 
 
 Secondly, pofitive inftitution may inform my underftanding 2. To inform 
 
 ,-l* • thejudg- 
 
 as to what actions are right and what actions are wrong. Here ment. 
 
 , , Its inaptitude 
 
 it is proper for us to reflect upon the terms underftanding and for that pur- 
 
 pofe. 
 
 information. Underftanding, particularly as it is concerned with 
 moral fubjects, is the percipient of truth. This is its proper 
 fphere. Information, fo far as it is genuine, is a portion detached 
 from the great body of truth. You inform me, " that Euclid 
 aflerts the three angles of a plane triangle to be equal to two right 
 angles." Still I am unacquainted with the truth of this propo- 
 fition. " But Euclid has demonftrated it. His demonftration has 
 exifted for two thoufand years, and during that term has proved 
 fatisfa&ory to every man by whom it has been underftood." 
 
 R 2 I am 
 
124 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 ri?AP^ vf ^ am neverthelefs uninformed. The knowledge of truth lies in 
 the perceived agreement or difagreement of the terms of a pro- 
 pofition. So long as I am unacquainted with the middle term 
 by means of which they may be compared, fo long as they are 
 incommenfurate to my understanding, you may have furnifhed 
 me with a principle from which I may reafon truly to farther 
 confequences, but as to the principle itfelf I may ftri&ly be faid 
 to know nothing about it. 
 
 Every proportion has an intrinfic evidence of its own. Every 
 confequence has premifes from which it flows ; and upon them, 
 and not upon any thing elfe, its validity depends. If you could 
 work a miracle to prove, " that the three angles of a triangle were 
 equal to two right angles," I mould ftill know, that the propofi- 
 tion was either true or falfe previoufly to the exhibition of that 
 miracle ; and that there was no necefTary connection between 
 any one of its terms and the miracle exhibited. The miracle 
 would take off my attention from the true queftion to a queftion 
 altogether different, that of authority. By the authority ad- 
 duced I might be prevailed on to yield an irregular affent to the 
 propofition ; but I could not properly be faid to perceive its 
 truth. 
 
 But this is not all. If it were, it might perhaps be regarded 
 as a refinement foreign to the concerns of human life. Pofitive 
 institutions do not content themfelves with requiring my afient 
 
 to 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 125 
 
 to certain propofitions, in confederation of the refpectable tefti- BOOK II. 
 r v ' >* CHAP. VI. 
 
 mony by which they are inforced. This would amount to no 
 
 more, than advice flowing from a refpeclable quarter, which after 
 all I might reject, if it did not accord with the mature judg- 
 ment of my own understanding. But in the very nature of thefe 
 inftitutions there is included a ianction, a motive either of punifh- 
 ment or reward to induce me to obedience. 
 
 It is commonly faid, " that pofitive inftitutions ought to leave Province of 
 
 confcience 
 
 me perfectly free in matters of confcience, but may properly in- confidercd. 
 terfere with my conduct in civil concerns." But this diftinction 
 feems to have been very lightly taken up. What fort of moralift 
 muft he be, who makes no . confcience of what panes in his in- 
 tercourse with other men ? Such a diftinction proceeds upon the 
 fuppofition, " that it is of great confequence whether I bow to 
 the eaft or the weft ; whether I call the object of my worlhip 
 Jehovah or Alia ; whether I pay a prieft in a furplice or a black 
 coat. Thefe are points in which an honeft man ought to be 
 rigid and inflexible. But as to thofe other, whether he fhall be 
 a tyrant, a fiave or a free citizen ; whether he fhall bind himfelf 
 with multiplied oaths impoffible to be performed, or be a rigid 
 obferver of truth ; whether he fhall fwear allegiance to a king 
 de jure or a king dc faclo, to the beft or the worft of all pofhble 
 governments ; reflecting thefe points he may fafely commit his 
 confcience to the keeping of the civil magiftrate." In reality 
 there are perhaps no concerns of a rational being, over which 
 
 4 morality 
 
126 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 ckavvt mora '^y does not extend its province, and reflecting which he 
 ' v ' is not bound to a confcientious proceeding. 
 
 an C interfe ° f * am fatisfied at prefent, that a certain conduct, fuppofe it be 
 that Evince a r *S^ attention to the confidence of private converfation, is in- 
 cumbent upon me. You tell me, " there are certain cafes of 
 fuch peculiar emergency as to fuperfede this rule." Perhaps I 
 think there are not. If I admit your propofition, a wide field of 
 enquiry is opened, reflecting what cafes do or do not deferve to be 
 confidered as exceptions. It is little likely that we mould agree 
 reflecting all thefe cafes. How then does the law treat me, for 
 my confcientious difcharge of what I conceive to be my duty ? 
 Becaufe I will not turn informer (which, it may be, I think an 
 infamous character) againft. my moil valued friend, the law ac- 
 cufes me of mifprifion of treafon, felony or murder, and perhaps 
 hangs me. I believe a certain individual to be a confirmed vil- 
 lain, and a raoft dangerous member of fociety, and feel it to be 
 my duty to warn others, perhaps the public, againft the effect 
 of his vices. Becaufe I publifh what I know to be true, the law 
 convicts me of libel, fcandalum magnatum, and crimes of I 
 know not what complicated denomination. 
 
 If the evil flopped here, it would be well. If I only fuffered 
 a certain calamity, fuppofe death, I could endure it. Death has 
 hitherto been the common lot of men, and I expect at fome time 
 or other to fubmit to it. Human fociety mufl fooner or later 
 
 be 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 127 
 
 be deprived of its individual members, whether they be valuable, BOOK II, 
 
 or whether they be inconfiderable. But the punifhment acts not » , * 
 
 only retrofpedtively upon me, but profpectively upon my con- 
 temporaries and countrymen. My neighbour entertains the fame 
 opinion refpecting the conduct he ought to hold as I did. But 
 the executioner of public juftice interpofes with a powerful argu- 
 ment, to convince him that he has miftaken the path of abftra£t 
 rectitude. 
 
 What fort of converts will be produced by this unfeeling- 
 logic ? " I have deeply reflected," fuppofe, " upon the nature of 
 virtue, and am convinced that a certain proceeding is incumbent 
 on me. But the hangman, fupported by an act of parliament, 
 affures me I am miftaken." If I yield my opinion to his d'tElum^ 
 my action becomes modified, and my character too. An in- 
 fluence like this is inconfiftent with all generous magnanimity 
 of fpirit, all ardent impartiality in the difcovery of truth, and all 
 inflexible perfeverance in its aflertion. Countries, expofed to the 
 perpetual interference of decrees inftead of arguments, exhibit 
 within their boundaries the mere phantoms of men. We can 
 never judge from an obfervation of their inhabitants what men 
 would be, if they knew of no appeal from the tribunal of con- 
 fcience, and if, whatever they thought, they dared to fpeak, and. 
 dared to act. 
 
 At prefent there will perhaps occur to the majority of readers 
 
 but. 
 
128 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 BOOK II. h u t f ew luilances of Jaws, which may be fuppofed to Interfere 
 
 \_* Jri i"j. it • VI. 
 
 v v ' with the confcientlous difcharge of duty. A confiderable num- 
 ber will occur in the courfe of the prefent enquiry. More would 
 readily offer themfelves to a patient refearch. Men are fo fuc- 
 cefsfully reduced to a common ftandard by the operation of po- 
 fitive law, that in moft countries they are capable of little more 
 than like parrots repeating each other. This uniformity is ca- 
 pable of being produced in two ways, by energy of mind and 
 indefatigablenefs of enquiry, enabling a confiderable number to 
 penetrate with equal fuccefs into the receffes of truth ; and by 
 pufillanimity of temper and a frigid indifference to right and 
 wrong, produced by the penalties which are fufpended over fuch 
 as fhall difintereftedly enquire, and communicate and acT: upon 
 the refult of their enquiries. It is eafy to perceive which of 
 thefe is the caufe of the uniformity that prevails in the prefent 
 inftance. 
 
 Reeapkula- If there be any truth more unqueftionable than the reft, it is, 
 
 tion. 
 
 that every man is bound to the exertion of his faculties in the 
 difcovery of right, and to the carrying into effect all the right 
 with which he is acquainted. It may be granted that an infallible 
 ftandard, if it could be difcovered, would be confiderably bene- 
 ficial. But this infallible ftandard itfelf would be of little ufe in 
 human affairs, unlefs it had the property of reafoning as well 
 as deciding, of enlightening the mind as well as conftraining the 
 body. If a man be in fome cafes obliged to prefer his own 
 
 judg- 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. t2 g 
 
 judgment, he is in all cafes obliged to confult that judgment, BOOK II. 
 
 J fc> b j b > chap. VI. 
 
 before he can determine whether the matter in queftion be of v « ' 
 
 the fort provided for or no. So that from ^his reafoning it ulti- 
 mately appears, that no man is obliged to conform to any rule 
 of conduct, farther than the rule is confiftent with juftice. 
 
 Such are the genuine principles of human fociety. Such Arguments 
 
 in favour of 
 
 would be the unconftrained concord of its members, in a ftate pofitive in. 
 
 ftitution : 
 
 where every individual within the fociety, and every neighbour 
 without, was capable of liftening with fobriety to the dictates of 
 reafon. We fhall not fail to be impreffed with confiderable re- 
 gret, if, when we defcend to the prefent mixed characters of 
 mankind, we find ourfelves obliged in any degree to depart from 
 fo fimple and grand a principle. The univerfal exercife of pri- 
 vate judgment is a doctrine fo unfpeakably beautiful, that the 
 true politician will certainly refolve to interfere with it as fpar- 
 ingly and in as few inftances as poflible. Let us confider what 
 are the emergencies that may be thought to demand an ex- 
 ception. They can only be briefly ftated in this place, each of 
 them requiring to be minutely examined in the fubfequent ftages 
 of the enquiry. 
 
 In the firft place then it feems neceffary for fome powerful i.Thenecef- 
 arbitrator to interfere, where the proceedings of the individual ling private 
 
 n r • injuftice. 
 
 threaten the molt injurious confequences to his neighbours, and 
 where the inftant nature of the cafe will not accord with the 
 
 S uncertain 
 
130 
 
 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 ®?PJFH* uncertain progrefs of argument and conviftion addreffed to the 
 
 CnAl • VI* 
 
 v v ' mind of the offender. A man, fuppofe, has committed murder, 
 
 or, to make the cafe more aggravated, feveral murders ; and, 
 having thus far over-It epped all thofe boundaries of innocence 
 and guilt which reftrain the generality of men, it is to be pre- 
 fumed from analogy that he may be led to the commiffion of 
 other murders. At firft it may appear to be no great infringe- 
 ment upon the exercife of private judgment, to put it under fome 
 degree of reftraint, when it leads to the commiflion of atrocious 
 crimes. There are however certain difficulties in the cafe which 
 are worthy to be confidered. 
 
 Objeaions : Firft, as foon as we admit the propriety of a rule fuch as that 
 above ftated, our next concern will be with the evidence, which 
 
 the uncer- 
 tainty of evi- 
 dence : 
 
 fhall lead to the acquittal or conviction of the perfon accufed. 
 Now it is well known, that no principles of evidence have yet 
 been laid down that are infallible. Human affairs univerfally 
 proceed upon prefumption and probability. An eye-witnefs muft 
 identify the perfon of the offender, and in this he may be mif- 
 taken. We muft neceffarily be contented with presumptive proofs 
 of his intention ; and often are or imagine ourfelves to be obliged 
 to admit prefumptive evidence of the facT: itfelf. The confe- 
 quence is inevitable. And furely it is no trivial evil, to fubject 
 an innocent man eventually, to the public award and the efta- 
 blifhed puniihment annexed to the moft atrocious crimes. 
 
 Secondly, 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. i 3 i 
 
 Secondly, the fame external action will admit of every pof- BOOK II. 
 fible made of virtue or vice. One man fhall commit murder, to * — rv ' 
 
 the diverfity 
 
 remove a troublefome obferver of his depraved difpofitions, who of motIves : 
 will otherwife counteract and expofe him to the world. A fe- 
 cond, becaufe he cannot bear the ingenuous fincerity with which 
 he is told of his vices. A third, from his intolerable envy of 
 fuperior merit. A fourth, becaufe he knows his adverfary me- 
 ditates an act pregnant with extenfive mifchief, and he perceives 
 no other mode by which its perpetration can be prevented. A 
 fifth, in the actual defence of his father's life or his daughter's 
 chaftity. Each of thefe men, except perhaps the laft, may act 
 either from momentary impulfe, or from any of the infinite 
 {hades and degrees of deliberation. Would you award one in- 
 dividual punifhment to all thefe varieties of action ? Can you 
 pretend in each inftance to afcertain the exact quantity of wrong, 
 equivalent to each ? Strictly fpeaking no two men were ever 
 guilty of the fame crime; but here comes in pofitive law with its 
 Procruftes's bed, and levels all characters, and tramples upon all 
 diflinctions. 
 
 Thirdly, punifhment is not the appropriate mode of correct- the unfuit- 
 
 ablenefs of 
 
 ing the errors of mankind. It will probably be admitted, that the means of 
 
 corre&ion : 
 
 the only true end of punifhment is correction. That queftion 
 will be difcuffed in another part of the. prefent enquiry. " I have 
 done fomething, which though wrong in itfelf, I believe to be 
 right ; or I have done fomething which I ufually admit to be 
 
 S 2 wrong ; 
 
132 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 BOOK II. 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 wrong ; but my conviction upon the fubjecT: is not fo clear and 
 forcible, as to prevent my yielding to a powerful temptation." 
 There can be no doubt, that the proper way. of conveying to my 
 underftanding a truth of which I am ignorant, or of impreffing 
 upon me a firmer perfuafion of a truth with which I am ac- 
 quainted, is by an appeal to my reafon. Even an angry expof- 
 tulation with me upon my conduct will but excite fimilar paf- 
 fions in me, and cloud inftead of illuminate my underftanding. 
 There is certainly a way of expreffing truth, with fuch benevo- 
 lence as to command attention, and fuch evidence as to inforce 
 conviction in all cafes whatever. 
 
 cither to im- Punifhment inevitably excites in the fufferer, and ought to 
 
 prefs new 
 
 fcntiment*: excite, a fenfe of injuftice. Let its purpofe be to convince me 
 of the truth of a propofition, which I at prefent believe to be 
 falfe. It is not abftractedly confidered of the nature of an argu- 
 ment, and therefore it cannot begin with producing conviction. 
 'Punifhment is a fpecious name, but is in reality nothing more 
 than force put upon one being by another who happens to be 
 ftronger. Now ftrength apparently does not conftitute juftice, 
 nor ought " might," according to a trite proverb, to " overcome 
 right." The cafe of punifhment, which we are now confidering, 
 is the cafe of you and I differing in opinion, and your telling me 
 that you muft be right, fince you have a more brawny arm, or 
 have applied your mind more to the acquiring fkill in your 
 weapons than I have. 
 
 But 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT. 1.3.3 
 
 But let us fuppofe, " that I am convinced of my error, but r J^" )< p,F \J- 
 that my conviction is fuperficial and fluctuating, and the object ' * — •? 
 
 J l 01 J ortoftrength- 
 
 you propofe is to render it durable and profound." Ought it. to en old oneSi 
 be thus durable and profound ? There are no doubt arguments 
 and reafons calculated to render it fo. Is it in reality problema_ 
 tical, and do you wifh by the weight of your blows to make 
 up for the deficiency of your logic ? This can never be de- 
 fended. An appeal to force muft appear to both parties, in pro- 
 portion to the foundnefs of their underftanding, to be a con- 
 feflion of imbecility. He that has recourfe to it, would have no 
 occafion for this expedient, if he were fufficiently acquainted 
 with the powers of that truth it is his office to communicate. If 
 there be any man, who, in fufFering punifhment, is not confcious 
 of injuftice, he muft have had his mind previoufiy debafed by 
 flavery, and his fenfe of moral right and wrong blunted by a 
 feries of oppreffion. 
 
 LThe cafe is not altered for the better, if I fufFer punifhment, Punifhment 
 not for my own correction, but for an example to others. Upon f example 
 this fuppofition a new difficulty is introduced, reflecting the pro- 
 priety of one man's being fubjected to pain, for the fake of im- 
 proving the character and eradicating the vices of another. 
 The fuffering is here alfo involuntary. Now, though will cannot 
 alter the nature of juftice, it muft be admitted that the voluntary 
 fufferer has at leaft one advantage over the involuntary, in the 
 confcious liberality of his purpofe. He that fuffers, not for his 
 
 own * 
 
134 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 ^P°J C IX * own correction, but for the advantage of others, Hands, fo far 
 
 ' * ' as relates to that fuffei'ing, in the fituation of an innocent perfon. 
 
 If the fuffering had relation to him perfonally as a vicious or 
 imperfect character, it muft have relation to him in refpect either 
 to the paft or the future. It cannot have relation to him as to 
 the paft, for that is concluded and beyond the reach of altera- 
 tion or remedy. By the fuppofition it has not relation to him 
 but to others as to the future. 
 
 It ought to be obferved in this place, that by innocence I do 
 not underftand virtue. Innocence is a fort of neutral character, 
 and ftands in the mid way between good and harm. Undoubtedly 
 it were better, that a perfon ufelefs to fociety mould be deftroyed 
 than a man of eminent worth, and a perfon likely to prove in- 
 jurious than either. I fay likely to prove injurious ; for the 
 fault already committed, being irrevocable, ought not to enter into 
 the account, and we have nothing to do but with the probability 
 of its repetition. It is in this fenfe that the f&fferer ftands upon 
 a level with many of thofe perfons,^who are ufually denomi- 
 nated innocent. 
 
 It muft alfo be allowed, that there are cafes in which it is 
 proper that innocent men fhould fuffer for the public good. But 
 this is a queftion of a very delicate nature, and the fevere moralift 
 will be very reluctant to condemn that man to die for the be- 
 nefit of others, who is defirous to live. 
 
 7 As 
 
OE PRIVATE JUDGMENT. i 25 
 
 As to every other circumftance in the cafe of him who is BOOK II. 
 
 punifhed for an example to others, it remains precifely the fame v » * 
 
 as when we fuppofed him to be punifhed for his own reformation. 
 It is ftill an argument of the moft exceptionable nature employed 
 to correct the opinions of mankind. It is ftill a menace of vio- 
 lence made ufe of to perfuade them of the truth or faifhood of 
 a propofition. It has little chance of making them wife, and can 
 fcarcely fail of making them timid, diflembling and corrupt. 
 
 Notwithstanding all thefe objections, it would be difficult to Urgency of. 
 
 ♦ lip csic 
 
 find a country, refpecting which we could fay, that the inhabi- 
 tants might with fafety be difmifled from the operation of punifh- 
 ment. So mixed is human character, fo wild are its excurfions, 
 fo. calamitous and deteftable are the errors into which it occa- 
 sionally falls, that fomething more than argument feems neceflary 
 for their fuppreflion. Human beings are fuch tyros in the art 
 of reafoning, that the wifeft of us often prove impotent in our 
 attempts, where an inftant effect was moft powerfully wanted. 
 While I ftand ftill to reafon with the thief, the aflaflin or the 
 oppreffbr, they haften to new fcenes of devaluation, and with un- 
 fparing violence confound all the principles of human fociety. I 
 fhould obtain little fuccefs by the abolition of punifhment, unleis , 
 I could at the fame time abolifh thofe caufes that generate tempt- 
 ation and make punifhment neceflary. Meanwhile the argu- 
 ments already adduced may be fufhcient to fliew that punifh- 
 ment . 
 
136 OF THE EXERCISE 
 
 PM° p R vr ment is always an evil, and to perfuade us never to recur to it 
 1 * ' but from the moft evident neceffity. 
 
 2. Rebellion. The remaining cafes in which it may feem requifite to have 
 
 3. War. recourfe to the general will of the fociety, and to fuperfede 
 
 . v the private judgment of individuals, are, when we are called 
 upon to counteract the hoftilities of an internal enemy, or to re- 
 Objeftlons. pel the attacks of a foreign invader. Here as in the former in- 
 ftance the evils that arife from an uiurpation upon private judg- 
 ment are many and various. It is wrong that I fhould contribute 
 in any mode to a proceeding, a war for example, that I believe to 
 be unjuft. Ought I to draw my fword, when the adverfary appears 
 to me to be employed in repelling a wanton aggreffion ? The 
 cafe feems not to be at all different, if I contribute my property, 
 the produce it may be of my perfonal labour; though cuftom 
 has reconciled us to the one rather than the other. 
 
 The confequences are a degradation of character and a relaxa- 
 tion of principle, in the perfon who is thus made the inftrument 
 of a tranfaction, which his judgment difapproves. In this cafe, 
 as has been already ftated generally, the human mind is com- 
 preifed and unnerved, till it affords us fcarcely the femblance of 
 what it might otherwiie have been. And, in addition to the 
 general confiderations in fimilar cafes, it may be obferved, that 
 the frequent and obftinate wars which at prefent defolate the 
 
 human 
 
OF PRIVATE JUDGMENT: 137 
 
 human race would be nearly extirpated, if they were fupported J5?PJF|£ 
 
 only by the voluntary contributions of thofe by whom their prin- v « ' 
 
 ciple was approved. 
 
 The objection, which has hitherto been permitted practically Reply. 
 to fuperfede thefe reafonings, is the difficulty of conducting an 
 affair, in the fuccefs of which millions may be interefled, upon 
 fo precarious a fupport as that of private judgment. The men, 
 with whom we are ufually concerned in human fociety, are of fo 
 mixed a character, and a felf-love of the narrowed kind is fo 
 deeply rooted in many of them, that it feems nearly unavoidable 
 upon the fcheme of voluntary contribution, that the mod gene- 
 rous would pay a very ample proportion, while the mean and 
 avaricious, though they contributed nothing, would come in for 
 their full fhare of the benefit. He that would reconcile a perfect 
 freedom in this refpect with the intered of the whole, ought 
 to propofe at the fame time the means of extirpating felfifhnefs 
 and vice. How far fuch a propofal is feafible will come hereafter 
 to be confidered. 
 
 AN 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS. 
 
 THE QUESTION STATED. — FIRST HYPOTHESIS : GOVERN- 
 MENT FOUNDED IN SUPERIOR STRENGTH. — SECOND HY- 
 POTHESIS : GOVERNMENT JURE DIFINO. THIRD HYPO- 
 THESIS : THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. — THE FIRST HYPOTHE- 
 SIS EXAMINED. — THE SECOND — CRITERION OF DIVINE 
 RIGHT: I. PATRIARCHAL DESCENT — 2. JUSTICE. 
 
 IT has appeared in the courfe of our reafonings upon the na- BOOK III. 
 CHAP I 
 ture of fociety, that there are occafions in which it may be » ' • 
 
 rr r • r ^^ e quetlion 
 
 neceflary, to fuperfede private judgment for the fake of public ftated. 
 
 T 2 good, 
 
140 
 
 BOOK III. 
 CHAP. I. 
 v „ * 
 
 SYSTEMS OF 
 
 good, and to control the acts of the individual by an act to be 
 performed in the name of the whole. It is therefore an intereft- 
 ing enquiry to afcertain in what manner fuch acts are to be 
 originated, or in other words to afcertain the foundation of po- 
 litical government. 
 
 Firft: hypo- 
 thefis : go- 
 vernment 
 founded in 
 fuperior 
 ftrength. 
 
 There are three hypothefes that have been principally main- 
 tained upon this fubject. Firft, the fyftem of force, according 
 to which it is affirmed, " that, inafmuch as it is neceffary that the 
 great mafs of mankind fhould be held under the fubjection of 
 compulfory reftraint, there can be no other criterion of that re- 
 ftraint, than the power of the individuals who lay claim to its 
 exercife, the foundation of which power exifts in the unequal 
 degrees, in which corporal ftrength and intellectual fagacity are 
 distributed among mankind." 
 
 Second hypo- 
 thelis : go- 
 vernment 
 jure d'rvino. 
 
 There is a fecond clafs of reaforiers, who deduce the origin of 
 all government from divine right, and affirm, " that, as men de- 
 rived their exiftence from an infinite creator at firft, fo are they 
 ftill fubject to his providential care, and of confequence owe alle- 
 giance to their civil governors, as to a power which he has 
 thought fit to fet over them." 
 
 Third hypo- 
 thefis : the 
 focial con- 
 trad. 
 
 The third fyftem is that which has been raoft ufually main- 
 tained by the friends of equality and juftice j the fyftem accord- 
 ing to which the individuals of any fociety are fuppofed to have 
 
 entered 
 
POLITICAL WRITERS. x 141 
 
 entered into a contract with their governors or with each other, BOOK in. 
 
 & ' CHAP. 1. 
 
 and which founds the rights of government in the confent of v v / 
 the governed. 
 
 The two firft of thefe hypothefes may eafdy be difmifled. The firft h Y- 
 
 J ' pothefis exa- 
 
 That of force appears to proceed upon the total negation of ab- mined, 
 {tract and immutable juftice, affirming eveiy government to be 
 right, that is poflefled of power fufficient to inforce its decrees. 
 It puts a violent termination upon all political fcience ; and 
 feems intended to perfuade men, to fit down quietly under their 
 prefent difadvantages, whatever they may be, and not exert them- 
 felves to difcover a remedy for the evils they fuffer. The fecond The fecond. 
 hypothefis is of an equivocal nature. It either coincides with 
 the firft, and affirms all exifting power to be alike of divine de- 
 rivation ; or it muft remain totally ufelefs till a criterion can be 
 found, to diftinguifh thofe governments which are approved by 
 God, from thofe which cannot lay claim to that fanction. The Criterion of 
 
 divine right. 
 
 criterion of patriarchal defcent will be of no avail, till the true 1 . Patriarchal 
 claimant and rightful heir can be difcovered. If we make utility 2 . juftice. 
 and juftice the teft of God's approbation, this hypothefis will be 
 liable to little objection ; but then on the other hand little will 
 be gained by it, fince thofe who have not introduced divine 
 right into the argument, will yet readily grant, that a government 
 which can be ihewn to be agreeable to utility and juftice, is a 
 rightful government. 
 
 The 
 
v ^—J 
 
 142 SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL WRITERS. 
 
 EOOK III. Tta third hypothecs demands a more careful examination. If 
 any error have infinuated itfelf into the fupport of truth, it be- 
 comes of particular confequence to detect it. Nothing can be of 
 more importance, than to feparate prejudice and miftake on the 
 one hand, from reafon and demonftration on the other. Where- 
 ever they have been confounded, the caufe of truth muft necef- 
 farily be a fufferer. That caufe, fo far from being injured by the 
 diffolution of the unnatural alliance, may be expected to derive 
 from that diffolution an eminent degree of profperity and luftre. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ H3 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 
 
 QUERIES PROPOSED. — WHO ARE THE CONTRACTING PAR- 
 TIES ? — WHAT IS THE FORM OF ENGAGEMENT? — OVER 
 HOW LONG A PERIOD DOES THE CONTRACT EXTEND? — 
 TO HOW GREAT A VARIETY OF PROPOSITIONS? — CAN IT 
 EXTEND TO LAWS HEREAFTER TO BE MADE? — ADDRESSES 
 OF ADHESION CONSIDERED. — POWER OF A MAJORITY. 
 
 UPON the firft ftatement of the fyftem of a focial contrail BOOK III. 
 various difficulties preient themfelves. Who are the parties ». v j 
 
 Queries pvo- 
 
 to this contract? For whom did they confent, for themfelves poicd. 
 only or for others ? For how long a time is this contract to be 
 confidered as binding ? If the confent of every individual be 
 neceflary, in what manner is that confent to be given ? Is it 
 to be tacit, or declared in exprefs terms ? 
 
 Little will be gained for the caufe of equality and juftice, if Who'arethe 
 
 contracting 
 
 our anceftors, at the nrft inftitution of government, had a right parties ? 
 indeed of choofing the fyftem of regulations under which they 
 thought proper to live, but at the fame time could barter away 
 the underftandings and independence of all that came after them 
 3 to' 
 
144 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 
 
 B ?P, I i E 1, t0 the lateft pofterity. But. if the contract muft be renewed in 
 CHAP. II. r / > 
 
 1 « ' each fucceffive generation," what periods muft be fixed on for 
 
 that purpofe ? And if I be obliged to fubmit to the eftablifhed 
 government till my turn comes to affent to it, upon what prin- 
 ciple is that obligation founded ? Surely not upon the contract 
 into which my father entered before I was born ? 
 
 What Is the Secondly, what is the nature of the confent, in confequence 
 
 form of en- ■* 
 
 gagement? of which I am to be reckoned the fubject of any particular go- 
 vernment ? It is ufually faid, " that acquiefcence is fufficient; 
 and that this acquiefcence is to be inferred from my living 
 quietly under the protection of the laws/' But if this be true, 
 an end is as effectually put to all political fcience, all difcrimina- 
 tion of better and worfe, as by any fyftem invented by the moft 
 flavifh fycophant that ever exifted. Upon this hypothefis every 
 government that is quietly fubmitted to is a lawful government, 
 whether it be the ufurpation of Cromwel or the tyranny of Cali- 
 gula. Acquiefcence is frequently nothing more than a choice on the 
 part of the individual of what he deems the leaft evil. In many 
 cafes it is not fo much as this, fince the peafant and the artifan, 
 who form the bulk of a nation, however dhTatisfied with the 
 government of their country, feldom have it in their power to 
 tranfport themfelves to another. It is alfo to be obferved upon 
 the fyftem of acquiefcence, that it is in little agreement with the 
 eftablifhed opinions and practices of mankind. Thus what has 
 been called the law of nations, lays leaft ftrefs upon the allegiance 
 5 of 
 
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 145 
 
 of a foreigner fettling among us, though his acquiefcence is cer- ^,??^ I {[' 
 
 tainly moft complete ; while natives removing into an unin- ' » ' 
 
 habited region are claimed by the mother country, and removing 
 into a neighbouring territory are punifhed by municipal law, if 
 they take arms againft the country in which they were bora. 
 Now furely acquiefcence can fcarcely be conftrued into confent, 
 while the individuals concerned are wholly unapprifed of the 
 authority intended to be refted upon it. * 
 
 Mr. Locke, the great champion of the doctrine of an original 
 contract, has been aware of this, difficulty, and therefore obferves, 
 that " a tacit confent indeed obliges a man to obey the laws of 
 any government, as long as he has any poffeffions, or enjoyrruent 
 of any part of the dominions of that government; but nothing 
 can make a man a member of the commonwealth, but his 
 actually entering into it by pofitive engagement, and exprefs 
 promife and compact, f" A fingular diftinction ; implying upon 
 the face of it, that an acquiefcence, fuch as has juft been de- 
 fcribed, is fufficient to render a man amenable to the penal re- 
 gulations of fociety ; but that his own confent is neceffary to 
 entitle him to its privileges. 
 
 A third objedion to the focial contract will fuggefl itfelf, as Orer how 
 
 r !■' • 1 r 1 1 i" . l° n £ a period 
 
 ioon as we attempt to aicertain the extent 01 the obligation, even does the con- 
 tract extend ? 
 
 * See Hume's EfTays. Part II. Eflay xii. 
 
 f Xreatife of Government. Book II. Ch. viii. j. 119, 122. 
 
 U fuppofing 
 
146 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 
 
 BOOK ill. fuppofing it to have been entered into in the moft folemn man^ 
 
 * v ' ner by every member of the community. Allowing that I am: 
 
 called upon, at the period of my coming of age for example, to 
 declare my afTent or diffent to any fyftem of opinions or any 
 code of practical inftitutes ; for how long a period does this de- 
 claration bind me ? : Am I precluded from better information for 
 the whole courfe of my life ? And, if not for my whole life, 
 why for a year, a week or even an hour ? If my deliberate 
 judgment or my real fentiment be of. no avail in the cafe, in 
 what fenfe can it be affirmed that all lawful government is--: 
 founded in my confent r 
 
 JwT S of at But the queftion of time is not the only difficulty. If you 
 propofkions ? demand m y a fl* en t to any propofition, it is neceffary that the 
 propofition fhould be ftated fimply and clearly. So numerous 
 are the varieties of human underftanding, in all cafes where its 
 independence and integrity are fufficiently preferved, that there 
 is little chance of any two men coming to, a precife agreement 
 about ten fucceffive proportions that are in their own nature, 
 open to debate. What then can be more abfurd than to prefent 
 to me the laws of England in fifty volumes folio, and call upon 
 me to give an honeft and uninfluenced vote upon their whole . 
 contents at once ? 
 
 Can It extend But the focial contract, confidered as the foundation of civil 
 
 to laws heie- 
 
 aftertobe government, requires more of me than this. I am not only 
 
 made ? 
 
 obliged 
 
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. i 47 
 
 obliged to confent to all the laws that are actually upon record, BOOK ur. 
 b / i > GHAE.II, 
 
 but to all the laws that fhall hereafter be made. It was under ' y ' 
 
 this view of the fubject, that Roufleau, in tracing the con- 
 fequences of the focial contract, was led to affert, that " the great 
 body of the people, in whom the fovereign authority refides, 
 can neither delegate nor refign it. The eflence of that autho- 
 rity," he adds, " is the general will ; and will cannot be repre- 
 fented. It mult either be the fame or another ; there is no 
 alternative. The deputies of the people cannot be its reprefen- 
 tatives ; they are merely its attorneys. The laws, that the com- 
 munity does not ratify in perfon, are no laws, are nullities.*" 
 
 The difficulty here ftated has been endeavoured to be provided AddrefTes of 
 
 r ... . r adhefion con- 
 
 againft by fome late advocates for liberty, in the way of addrefles fiderei 
 of adhefion ; addrefles, originating in the various diftricfs and 
 departments of a nation, and without which no regulation of 
 conftitutional importance is to be deemed valid. But this is a 
 very inadequate and fuperficial remedy. The addreflers of courfe 
 have feldom any other remedy than that above defcribed, of in- 
 
 * " La fouverainete ne part it re reprefcntee,par lameme ralfon quelle lie pent ctre 
 alienee ; elle conjijte eJJenUellement dans la volont'e generate, et la volonte tie fe rcpre- 
 fente point : elle ejl la me me, ou elle ejl autre ; il ti'y a point de milieu. Les deputes du 
 peuple tie font done point fes reprefentans, Us tie font que fes commijfaires ; /'// ne peuvent 
 , rien conclure dejinitivement. Touie loi que le peuple en pcrfonne n'a pas ratijiee, ejl 
 , fOiUe ; cc n' 'ejl point tine loi." Du Contract Social. Liv. III. Chap, xv, 
 
 U 2. difcriminate 
 
148 OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 
 
 H?, , 1 ^ l }}' difcriminate admuTion or rejection. There is an infinite difFer- 
 CHAP. II. J 
 
 y i ' ence between the firft deliberation, and the fubfequent exercife 
 
 of a negative. The former is a real power, the latter is feldorrs 
 more than the fhadow of a power. Not to add, that addrefles 
 are a moft precarious and equivocal mode of collecting the fenfe 
 of a nation. They are ufually voted in a tumultuous and fum- 
 mary manner; they are carried along by the tide of party ; and 
 the fignatures- annexed to them are obtained by indirect and ao* 
 cidental methods, while multitudes of byftanders, unlefs upon 
 fome extraordinary occafi on, remain. ignorant of or indifferent, 
 to the tranfaction. 
 
 Power of a 
 
 majority. 
 
 Laftly, if government be founded in the confent of the people,, 
 it can have no power over any individual by whom that confent 
 is refufed. If a tacit confent be not fufHcient, ftill lefs can I be 
 deemed to have confented to a meafure upon which I put an 
 exprefs negative. This immediately follows from the obferva- 
 tions of Rouffeau. If the people, or the individuals of whom 
 the people is conftituted, cannot delegate their authority to a re- 
 prefentative ; neither can any individual delegate his authority 
 to a majority, in an aflembly of which he is himfelf a member. 
 The rules by which my actions ihall be directed are matters of a 
 confideration entirely perfonal ; and no man can transfer to 
 another the keeping of his confeience and the judging of his 
 duties. But this brings us bac-k to the point from which we fet 
 
 . out». 
 
OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT. 149 
 
 out. No confent of ours can diveft us of our moral capacity. BOOK III* 
 
 r ' CHAP. 11. 
 
 This is a fpecies of property which we can neither barter nor *— n • 
 
 refign ; and of confequence it is impoflible for any government 
 to derive its authority from an original contract, 
 
 CHAP. 
 
I 150 ] 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF PR O M I S E S. 
 
 "THE VALIDITY OF PROMISES EXAMINED. — SHEWN TO BE IN- 
 CONSISTENT WITH JUSTICE. TO BE FOREIGN TO THE 
 
 GENERAL GOOD. OF THE EXPECTATION EXCITED. THE 
 
 FULFILLING EXPECTATION DOES NOT IMPLY THE VALI- 
 DITY OF A PROMISE. CONCLUSION. 
 
 BOOK ill. HHHE whole principle of an original contract proceeds upon 
 ^r — x—- 1 ■*■ the obligation under which we are placed to obferve our 
 
 lne validity ° 
 
 ■ ofpromif-s promifes. The reafoning upon which it is founded is, " that we 
 
 .•examined. x , 
 
 have promifed obedience to government, and therefore are bound 
 to obey." It may confequently be proper to enquire into the na- 
 ture of this obligation to obferve our promifes. 
 
 Shewn to be We have already eftablifhed juftice as the fum of moral and 
 
 inconfiftent 
 
 awithjufticej political duty. Is juftice then in its own nature precarious or 
 immutable ? Surely immutable. As long as men are men, the 
 conduct I am bound to obferve refpedting them muft remain the 
 fame. A good man muft always be the proper object of my 
 fupport and cooperation ; vice of my cenfure ; and the vicious 
 :man of inftruclion and reform. 
 
 1 What 
 
OF PROMISES. rji 
 
 What is it then to which the obligation of a promife applies ? BOOK ill. 
 
 Ori.rVl . Ill* 
 
 What I have promifed is either right, or wrong, or indifferent. 
 There are few articles of human conduct that fall under the latter 
 clafs ; and the greater fhall be our improvements in moral fcience 
 the fewer ftill will they appear. Omitting thefe, let us then con- 
 fider only the two preceding claffes. " I have promifed to do 
 fomething juft and right." This certainly I ought to perform. 
 Why? Not becaufe I promifed, but becaufe juftice prefcribes it. 
 " I have promifed to bellow a fum of money upon fome good and 
 refpectable purpofe. In the interval between the promife and 
 my fulfilling it, a greater and nobler purpofe offers itfelf, and 
 calls with an imperious voice for my cooperation." Which 
 ought I to prefer ? That which beft deferves my preference. 
 A promife can make no alteration in the cafe. I ought to be guid- 
 ed by the intrinfic merit of the objects, and not by any external 
 and foreign confideration. No engagements of mine can change 
 their intrinfic claims. 
 
 All this muft be exceedingly plain to the reader who has follow- 
 ed me in my early reafonings upon the natnre of juftice. If every 
 Hulling of our property, every hour of our time and every faculty 
 of our mind, have already received their deftination from the prin- 
 ciples of immutable juftice, promifes have no department left up- 
 on which for them to decide. Juftice it appears therefore ought 
 to be done, whether we have promifed it or not. If we difcover 
 any thing to be unjuft, we ought to abftain from it, with what- 
 
 ever . 
 
152 OE PROMISES. 
 
 BOOX ill. e ver folemnity we have engaged for its perpetration. We were 
 CHAP. III. J ° ° A * 
 
 v v ' erroneous and vicious when the promife was made ; but this 
 
 affords no fufficient r.eafon for its performance. 
 
 •tote fo- : But it will be faid, " if promifes be not made, or when made 
 
 reign to ge- _ _ , 
 
 jieral good, be not fulfilled, how can the affairs of the world be carried on ? 
 By rational and intelligent beings acting as if they were rational 
 and intelligent. A promife would perhaps be fufficiently inno- 
 cent, if it were underftood merely as declaratory of intention, and 
 not as precluding farther information. Even in this reftrained 
 fenfe however it is far from being generally neceffary. "Why 
 mould it be fuppofed that the affairs of the world would not go 
 on fufficiently well, though my neighbour could no farther de- 
 pend upon my affiftance than it appeared rational to grant it ? 
 This would be a fufficient dependence if I were honeft, nor 
 would he if he were honeft defire any thing more. If I were 
 difhoneft, if I could not be bound by the reafon and juftice of 
 the cafe, it would afford him a flender additional dependence to 
 callin the aidof a principle founded in prejudice and miftake : 
 not to fay, that, let it afford ever fo great advantage in any par- 
 ticular cafe, the evil of the immoral precedent would outweigh 
 the individual advantage. 
 
 It may be farther objected, " that this principle might be fuf- 
 ficiently fuited to a better and more perfect ftate of fociety, but 
 that at prefent there are difhoneft members of the community, 
 
 who 
 
OF PROMISES. 153 
 
 who will not perform their duty, if they be not bound to it by 52?p "J* 
 fome groffer motive, than the mere moral confederation." Be ' v 
 it fo. This is a queftion altogether different from that we have 
 been examining. We are not now enquiring whether the com- 
 munity ought to animadvert upon the errors of its members. 
 This animadverfion the upright man is not backward to encoun- 
 ter, and willingly rifks the penalty, which the fociety (for the 
 fociety is more competent to afcertain the jufl amount of the 
 penalty than the preceding caprice of the parties) has awarded 
 in cafes apparently fimilar, if he conceive that his duty requires 
 from him that rifk. 
 
 But to return to the cafe of promifes. I fhall be told, that, Oftheexpec 
 
 tation exci- 
 
 " in choofing between two purpofes about which to employ my ted. 
 money, my time or my talents, my promife may make an effen- 
 tial difference, and therefore having once been given ought to 
 be fulfilled. The party to whom it was made has had expecta- 
 tions excited in him, which I ought not to difappoint ; the party 
 to whom I am under no engagement has no fuch difappointr 
 ment to encounter." What is this tendernefs to which I am 
 bound, this expectation I muft not dare to difappoint ? An ex- 
 pectation that I mould do wrong, that I mould prefer a lefs good 
 to a greater, that I fhould commit abfolute evil ; for fuch mufl be 
 the refult when the balance has been flruck. " But his expecta- 
 tion has altered the nature of his fituation, has engaged h'm in 
 
 X under- 
 
154 OF PROMISES. 
 
 jE9?3HJ?" undertakings from which he would otherwife have abftained." 
 
 CHAP. III. & 
 
 * *— — J Be it fo. He and all other men will be taught to depend more 
 
 upon their own exertions, and lefs upon the affiftance of others > 
 which caprice may refufe, or juftice oblige me to withhold. He 
 and all others will be taught to acquire fuch merit, and to en- 
 gage in fuch purfuits, as fhall oblige every honeft man to come 
 to their fuccour, if they fhould ftand in need of affiftance. The 
 refolute execution of juftice, without liftening to that falfe pity, 
 which, to do imaginary kindnefs to one, would lead us to injure 
 the whole, would in a thoufand ways increafe the independence^, 
 the energies and the virtue of mankind.. 
 
 L t>* 
 
 Hiife. 
 
 The fulfilling Let us however fuppofe, " that my conduct ought to be in- 
 
 expeftation 
 
 does not im- fluenced by this previous expectation of the individual." Let 
 
 ply the validi- 
 ty of a pro- us fuppofe, " that, in felecting an individual for a certain office,. 
 
 my choice ought not to be governed merely by the abftracT: fitnefs 
 of the candidates, but that I ought to take into the account the 
 extreme value of the appointment from certain circumftances to- 
 one of the candidates, and its comparative inutility to the other.'*' 
 Let us farther fuppofe, " that the expectation excited in one of 
 them has led him into ftudies and purfuits to qualify himfelf for 
 the office, which will be ufelefs if he do not fucceed to it ; and 
 that this is one of the confiderations which ought to govern my 
 determination." — All this does not come up to what we have been 
 taught refpecting the obligation ef a promife, 
 
 2 For, 
 
OF PROMISES. i 55 
 
 For, firft, It may be obferved, that it feems to be of little con- BOOK HI. 
 
 CHAP, III, 
 
 iequence in this ftatement, whether the expectation were excited 
 by a direct promife or in fome other manner, whether it were 
 excited by a declaration of mine or of a third perfon, or laftly> 
 whether it arofe fingly out of the reafon of the cafe and the pure 
 deductions and reflections of the expecter's mind. Upon every 
 one of thefe fuppofitions his conduct, and the injury he may 
 fuftain from a difappointment, will remain the fame. Here then 
 all that has been commonly underftood by the obligation of a 
 promife is excluded. The motive to be attended to, flows from 
 no folemn engagement of mine, but from an incidental confe- 
 quence of my declaration, and which might juft as eafily have 
 been the confequence of many other circumftances. The con- 
 federation by which it becomes me to be influenced is, not a re- 
 gard for veracity, or a particular defire to preferve my integrity, 
 both of which are in reality wholly unconcerned in the tranfac- 
 tion, but an attention to the injury to be fuftained by the lofing 
 candidate, whatever might be the original occafion of the conduct 
 out of which the injury has proceeded. 
 
 Let us take an example of a dill fimpler nature. " I live in. 
 Weftminfter ; and I engage to meet the captain of a fhip from 
 Blackwal at the Royal Exchange. My engagement is of the 
 nature of information to him, that I fhall be at the Exchange at 
 a certain hour. He accordingly lays afide his other bufinefs, 
 and comes thither to meet me." This is a reafon why I fhould 
 
 X 2 not 
 
156 OF PROMISES. 
 
 chap, in not *" a ^ ^ m un ^ e ^" s f° r f° me ver 7 material caufe. But it would 
 v ' feem as if the reafon why I fhould not fail him would be equally 
 cogent, if I knew from any other fource that he would be there,, 
 and that a quantity of convenience equal to the quantity upon the 
 former fuppofition would accrue from my meeting him. It may 
 be faid, " that it is eflential to various circumftances of human in- 
 tercourse, that we fhould be able to depend on each other for a 
 fteady adherence to engagements of this fort." The flatement 
 however would be fomewhat more accurate if we faid, " that it 
 Was eflential to various circumftances of human intercourfe, that 
 we fhould be known to beftow a fteady attention upon the 
 quantities of convenience or inconvenience, of good or evil, that 
 might arife to others from our. conduit." 
 
 ConclufioB. It is undoubtedly upon this hypothefis a part of our duty 
 
 to make as few promifes or declarations exciting appropriate 
 expectations as poflible. He . who lightly gives to another the 
 idea that he will govern himfelf in his future conduct, not. by 
 the views that fhall be prefent to his mind when the conduct 
 {hall come to be determined on, but by the view he fhall be able 
 to take of it at fome preceding period, is vicious in fo doing. 
 But the obligation he is under refpe&ing his future conduit is, to 
 acT; juftly, and not, becaufe he has committed one error, for that 
 reafon to become guilty of a fecond* 
 
 i 
 
 GHAP. 
 
[ '57 3' 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 COMMON DELIBERATION THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF GO- 
 VERNMENT — PROVED FROM THE EQUAL CLAIMS OF 
 
 MANKIND — FROM THE NATURE OF OUR FACULTIES 
 
 FROM THE OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EF- 
 FECTS OF COMMON DELIBERATION. — DELEGATION VIN- 
 DICATED.- — DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DOCTRINE HERE 
 MAINTAINED AND THAT OF A SOCIAL CONTRACT AP- 
 PARENT FROM THE MERELY PROSPECTIVE NATURE OF 
 
 THE FORMER — FROM THE NULLITY OF PROMISES — FROM 
 THE FALLIBILITY OF DELIBERATION. — CONCLUSION.. 
 
 H 
 
 AVING rejected the hypothefes that have moll generally BOOK III. 
 been adduced to account for the origin of government v v 1 
 
 confidently with the principles of moral juftice, let us enquire 
 whether we may not arrive at the fame object, by a fimple in- 
 yeftigation of the obvious reafon of the cafe, without having re- 
 courfe to any refinement of fyftem or fiction of procefs. 
 
 Government then being introduced for the reafons already Common de- 
 liberation the 
 
 afligned, the firft and moft important principle that can be ima- tp e founda- 
 tion of go- 
 
 gined relative to its form and ftru&ure, feems to be this ; that, as vemment * 
 
 government 
 
i 5 S OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 B00 £ £?' government is a tranfaction in the name and for the benefit of 
 CHAP. iv. b 
 
 y * — J ;the whole, every member of the community ought to have fome 
 
 fhare in its adminiftration. The arguments in fupport of this 
 proportion are various. 
 
 proved from i. It has already appeared that th^re is no criterion perfpicuoufly 
 defignating any one man or fet of men to prefide over the reft. 
 
 claims of 
 ■ mankind 
 
 from the na- 2. All men are partakers of the common faculty reafon, and may 
 
 ture of our 
 
 faculties : be fuppofed to have fome communication with the common pre- 
 ceptor truth. It would be wrong in an affair of fuch momen- 
 tous concern, that any chance for additional wifdom fhould be 
 rejected ; nor can we tell in many cafes till after the experiment 
 how eminent any individual may one day be found in the bufi- 
 nefs of guiding and deliberating for his fellows. 
 
 from the ob- 3. Government is a contrivance inftituted for the fecurity of in- 
 ject of go- 
 vernment : dividuals ; and it feems both reafonable that each man fhould 
 
 have a lhare in providing for his own fecurity, and probable that 
 
 partiality and cabal fhould by this means be mofb effectually 
 
 ^excluded. 
 
 from the ef- 4. Laftly, to give each man a voice in the public concerns comet 
 
 fefts of com- 
 mon deiibe- neareft to that admirable idea of which we fhould never lofe 
 
 ration. 
 
 fight, the uncontrolled exercife of private judgment. Each man 
 would thus be infpired with a confcioufnefs of his own import- 
 ance, 
 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 159 
 
 ance, and the flavifh feelings that fhrink up the foul in the pre- B00K n r« 
 
 r r CHAP. IV. 
 
 fence of an imagined fuperior would be unknown. ' v * 
 
 ' Admitting then the propriety of each man having a fliare in 
 directing the affairs of the whole in the firfl inftance, it feems 
 neceffary that he fhould concur, in electing a houfe of reprefenta- 
 tives, if he be the member of a large ftate ; or, even in a fmall 
 one, that he fhould affift in the appointment of officers and ad- 
 miniftrators ; which implies, firfl, a delegation of authority to 
 thefe officers, and, fecondly, a tacit confent, or rather an admiffion 
 of the neceffity, that the queftions to be debated fhould abide 
 the decifion of a majority. 
 
 But to this fyftem of delegation the fame objections may be Delegation 
 
 vindicated. 
 
 urged, that were cited from RoufTeau in the chapter of the Social 
 Contract. It may be alleged that, " if it be the bufinefs of every 
 man to exercife his own judgment, he can in no inftance fur- 
 render this function into the hands of another." 
 
 To this objection it may be anfwered, firfl, that the parallel is 
 by no means complete between an individual's exercife of his* 
 judgment in a cafe that is truly his own, and his exercife of his 
 judgment in an article where the neceffity and province of go- 
 vernment are already admitted. Wherever there is a government 
 there muft be a will fuperfeding that of individuals. It is abfurd 
 
 to 
 
j6o OF POXITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 529 p ^v' tG eK P e & that every member of a fociety mould agree with every 
 other member in the various meafures it may be found neceffary 
 'to adopt. The fame neceflity, that requires the introduction of 
 force to fupprefs injuftice on the part of a few, requires that the 
 fentiments of the majority mould direct that force, and that the 
 minority mould either fecede, or patiently wait for the period 
 when the truth on the fubject contefted Ihall be generally un- 
 derftood. 
 
 ♦ — 
 
 Secondly, delegation is not, as at firft fight it might appear to 
 be, the act of one man committing to another a function, which 
 ftrictly fpeaking it became him to exercife for himfelf. Delega- 
 tion, in every inftance in which it can be reconciled with juflice, 
 is an act which has for its object the general good. The indivi- 
 duals to whom the delegation is made, are either more likely 
 from talents or leifure to perform the function in the moft eligi- 
 ble manner, or at leaft there is fome public intereft requiring that 
 it mould be performed by one or a few perfons, rather than by 
 every individual for himfelf. This is the cafe, whether in that 
 firft and fimpleft of all delegations the prerogative of a majority, 
 or in the election of a houfe of reprefentatives, or in the appoint- 
 ment of public officers. Now all conteft as to the perfon who 
 ihall exercife a certain function, and the propriety of refigning 
 it, is frivolous, the moment it is decided how and by whom it 
 can moft advantageoufly be exercifed. It is of no confequence 
 
 that 
 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 161 
 
 that I am the parent of a child, when it has once been afcertain- B°Q K ill. 
 
 ed that the child will receive greater benefit by living under the \ 1 ' 
 
 fuperintendence of a ftranger. 
 
 Laftly, it is a miftake to imagine that the propriety of reftrain- 
 ing me when my conduct is injurious, rifesout of any delegation 
 of mine. The juftice of employing force when every other 
 means was infufficient, is even prior to the exiftence of fociety. 
 Force ought never to be reforted to but in cafes of abfolute ne- 
 ceflity ; and, when fuch cafes occur, it is the duty of every man 
 to defend himfelf from violation. There is therefore no delega- 
 tion neceflary on the part of the offender ; but the community 
 in the cenfure it exercifes over him ftands in the place of the in- 
 jured party. 
 
 It may perhaps by fome perfons be imagined, that the doctrine Difference 
 
 between the 
 
 here delivered of the juftice of proceeding in common concerns doctrine here 
 
 maintained 
 
 by a common deliberation, is nearly coincident with that other and that of a 
 
 focial con. 
 
 doctrine which teaches that all lawful government derives its traa appa- 
 rent : 
 authority from a focial contract. Let us confider what is the 
 
 true difference between them. 
 
 In the firft place, the doctrine of common deliberation is of a f r°m the 
 
 merely pro- 
 
 profpective, and not a retrofpective nature. Is the queftion re- fpeftive na- 
 ture of the 
 fpecting fome future meafure to be adopted in behalf of the fjrm er: 
 
 community ? Here the obligation to deliberate in common pre- 
 
 Y fents 
 
162 OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 CHAP. IV 
 
 v. 
 
 rw a p ru ^" ents *&ti£> as eminently to be preferred to every other mode of 
 deciding upon the interefts of the whole. Is the queftion 
 whether I fhall yield obedience to any meafure already promul-- 
 gated ? Here I have nothing to do with the confideration of 
 how the meafure originated ; unlefs perhaps in a country where 
 common deliberation has in fome fort been admitted as a Hand- 
 ing principle, and where the object may be to refift an innova- 
 tion upon this principle. In the cafe of fhip money under king 
 Charles the firft, it was perhaps fair to refift the tax, even fup- 
 pofing it to be abftracledly a good one, upon account of the au- 
 thority impofing it ; though that reafon might be infufHcient, in 
 a country unufed to reprefentative taxation. • 
 
 Exclufively of this confideration, no meafure is to be refilled 
 on account of the irregularity of its derivation. If it be juft, it 
 is entitled both to my chearful fubmiffion and my zealous fup- 
 port. So far as it is deficient in juftice, I am bound to refift. 
 My fituation in this refpecl: is in no degree different from what 
 it was previoufly to all organifed government. Juftice was at 
 that time entitled to my affent, and injuftice to my difapproba- 
 tion. They can never ceafe to have the fame claims upon me, 
 till they fhall ceafe to be diftinguifhed by the fame unalterable 
 properties. The meafure of my refiftance will however vary 
 with circumftances, and therefore will demand from us a fepa- 
 rate examination. 
 
 Secondly, 
 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 163 
 
 Secondly, the diftinction between the doctrine here advanced BOOK III. 
 J ' CHAP. IV. 
 
 and that of a focial contract will be better underftood, if we re- r v ' 
 
 From the 
 
 collect what has been faid upon the nature and validity of pro- nulllt ) r of 
 
 * / sr prorruks 3 
 
 mifes. If prornife be in all cafes a fallacious mode of binding a 
 man to a fpecific mode of action, then mull the argument be in 
 all cafes impertinent, that I confented to fuch a decifion, and am 
 therefore bound to regulate myfelf accordingly. It is impoffible 
 to imagine a principle of more injurious tendency, than that 
 which fhall teach me to difarm my future wifdom by my paft 
 folly, and to confult for my direction the errors in which my ig- 
 norance has involved me, rather than the code of eternal truth. 
 So far as confent has any validity, abftract juftice becomes a 
 matter of pure indifference : fo far as juftice deferves to be made 
 the guide of my life, it is in vain to endeavour to fhare its au- 
 thority with compacts and promifes. 
 
 We have found the parallel to be in one refpect incomplete from the 
 
 fallibility of 
 
 between the exercife of thefe two functions, private judgment deliberation. 
 and common deliberation. In another refpect the analogy is 
 exceedingly ftriking, and confiderable perfpicuity will be given 
 to our ideas of the latter by an illuftration borrowed from the 
 former. In the one cafe as in the other there is an obvious 
 principle of juftice in favour of the general exercife. No indi- 
 vidual can arrive at any degree of moral or intellectual improve- 
 ment, unlefs in the ufe of an independent judgment. No ftate 
 
 Y 2 can 
 
164 OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 
 
 ch\p iv' can ^ e We ^ or happily adminiftered, unlefs in the perpetual ufe 
 
 *■ * ' of common deliberation refpecting the meafures it may be requi- 
 
 fite to adopt. But, though the general exercife of thefe faculties 
 be founded in immutable juftice, juftice will by no means uni- 
 formly vindicate the particular application of them. Private 
 judgment and public deliberation are not themfelves the ftandard 
 of moral right and wrong ; they are only the means of difco- 
 vering right and wrong, and of comparing particular propor- 
 tions with the ftandard of eternal truth. 
 
 Condufion. Too much ftrefs has undoubtedly been laid upon the idea, as of 
 a grand and magnificent fpectacle, of a nation deciding for itfelf 
 upon fome great public principle, and of the higheft magiftracy 
 yielding its claims when the general voice has pronounced* 
 The value of the whole muft at la-ft depend upon the quality of 
 their decifion. Truth cannot be made more true by the number 
 of its votaries. Nor is the fpectacle much lefs interefting, of a 
 folitary individual bearing his undaunted teftimony in favour of 
 juftice, though oppofed by mifguided millions. Within certain 
 limits however the beauty of the exhibition muft be acknow- 
 ledged. That a nation fhould dare to vindicate its function of 
 common deliberation, is a ftep gained, and ra ftep that inevitably 
 leads to an improvement of the character of individuals. That 
 men fhould unite in the affertion of truth, is no unpleafing evi- 
 dence of their virtue. Laftly, that an individual, however great 
 
 may - 
 
OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY. 165 
 
 may be his imaginary elevation, mould be obliged to yield his ^0 K TTI - 
 
 perfonal pretenfions to the fenfe oi the community, at leaft l « ' 
 
 bears the appearance of a practical confirmation of the great 
 principle, that all private confiderations muft yield to the gene- 
 ral good. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
r m ] 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 OF LEGISLATION. 
 
 SOCIETY CAN DECLARE AND INTERPRET, BUT CANNOT 
 ENACT. — ITS AUTHORITY ONLY EXECUTIVE. 
 
 BOOK in. T TAVING thus far inveftigated the nature of political func- 
 
 CHAP. V B I 
 
 v , v / tions, it feems neceffary that fome explanation fhould be 
 
 given in this place upon the fubjecl: of legiflation. Who is it that 
 
 . has the authority to make laws ? What are the characteriftics by 
 
 which that man or body of men is to be known, in whom the 
 
 faculty is vefted of legiflating for the reft ? 
 
 Society can To thefe queftions the anfwer is exceedingly Ample : Legifla- 
 
 declare and 
 
 interpret, but tion, as it has been ufually underftood, is not an affair of human 
 
 cannot enaft. 
 
 competence. Reafon is the only legiflator, and her decrees 
 are irrevocable and uniform. The functions of fociety extend, 
 not to the making, but the interpreting of law ; it cannot decree, 
 it can only declare that, which the nature of things has already 
 decreed, and the propriety of which irrefiftibly flows from the 
 circumftances of the cafe. Montefquieu fays, that " in a free 
 
 3 , ft ate 
 
OF LEGISLATION. 167 
 
 ftate every man will be his own legiflator *." This is not true, chap. 1 "' 
 fetting apart the functions of the community, unlefs in the * « ' 
 limited fenfe already explained. It is the office of confcience to 
 determine, " not like an Afiatic cadi, according to the ebbs and 
 flows of his own paffions, but like a Britifh judge, who makes 
 no new law, but faithfully declares that law which he finds al- 
 ready writtenf." 
 
 The fame diftinclion is to be made upon the fubject of autho- Its authon'ty 
 
 only execu- 
 rity. All political power is ftrictly fpeaking executive. It has tive. 
 
 appeared to be neceflary, with refpect to men as we at prefent 
 find tbem, that force mould fometimes be employed in reprefling 
 injuftice ; and for the fame reafons it appears that this force 
 fhould as far as poffible be veiled in the community. To the 
 public fupport of juftice therefore the authority of the commu- 
 nity extends. But no fooner does it wander in the fmalleft 
 degree from the great line of juftice, than its authority is at an 
 end, it ftands upon a level with the obfcureft individual, and 
 every man is bound to refift its decifions. 
 
 * " Dans un etat libre, tout homme qui ejl cenfe avoir une ame libre, chit etre gouver- 
 nipar lui-meme." Efprit des Loix, Liv. XI. CL vi.. 
 
 t Sterne's Sermons. — " On a Good Confcience." 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ x<58 ] 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 OBEDIENCE NOT THE CORRELATIVE OF AUTHORITY. — NO 
 MAN BOUND TO YIELD OBEDIENCE TO ANOTHER. — CASE 
 OF SUBMISSION CONSIDERED. — FOUNDATION OF OBEDI- 
 ENCE. USEFULNESS OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. CASE 
 
 OF CONFIDENCE CONSIDERED. — ITS LIMITATIONS. — MIS- 
 CHIEF OF UNLIMITED CONFIDENCE. SUBJECTION EX- 
 PLAINED. 
 
 BOOK III. J"AVING enquired into the juft and legitimate fource of 
 
 H 
 
 ■*■ - 1 authority, we will next turn our attention to what has 
 ufually been confidered as its correlative, obedience. This has 
 always been found a fubject of peculiar difficulty, as well in re- 
 lation to the meafure and extent of obedience, as to the fource 
 of our obligation to obey. 
 
 Obedience The true folution will probably be found in the obfervation 
 
 not the cor- 
 relative of that obedience is by no means the proper correlative. The ob~ 
 
 authority. 
 
 je£t of government, as has been already demonftrated, is the 
 exertion of force. Now force can never be regarded as an ap- 
 peal to the underftanding ; and therefore obedience, which is an 
 
 ad 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 691 
 
 a£t of the underftandin£ or will, can have no legitimate connec- BOOK III. 
 
 ° b CHAP. VI. 
 
 tion with it. I am bound to fubmit to juftice and truth, be- ' • ' 
 
 caufe they approve themfelves to my judgment. I am bound to 
 co-operate with government, as far as it appears to me to coin- 
 cide with thefe principles. But I fubmit to government when I 
 think it erroneous, merely becaufe I have no remedy. 
 
 o 
 
 No truth can be more fimple, at the fame time that no truth No man 
 
 bound to 
 
 has been more darkened by the gloffes of interefted individuals, yield obedi- 
 ence to 
 than that one man can in no cafe be bound to yield obedience another. 
 
 to any other man or fet of men upon earth. 
 
 There is one rule to which we are univerfally bound to con- 
 form ourfelves, juftice, the treating every man precifely as his 
 ufefulnefs and worth demand, the acting under every circum- 
 ftance in the manner that fhall procure the greateft quantity of 
 general good. "When we have done thus, what province is there 
 left to the difpofal of obedience ? 
 
 I am fummoned to appear before the magiftrate to anfwer Cafeoffub- 
 
 miffion confi- 
 
 for a libel, an imaginary crime, an act which perhaps I am con- dered. 
 vinced ought in no cafe to fall under the animadverfion of law. 
 I comply with this fummons. My compliance proceeds, perhaps 
 from a conviction that the arguments I fhall exhibit in the court 
 form the beft refiftance I can give to his injuftice, or perhaps 
 
 Z from 
 
170 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 B HA J p vt' ^ r0m perceiving that my non-compliance would frivoloufly and 
 * « ' without real ufe interrupt the public tranquillity. 
 
 A quaker refufes to pay tithes. He therefore fuffers a tithe 
 
 proclor to diftrain upon his goods* In this action morally fpeak- 
 
 ing he does wrong. The diftindtion he makes is the argument 
 
 of a mind that delights in trifles. That which will be taken from 
 
 o 
 me by force, it is no breach of morality to deliver with my own 
 
 hand. The money which the robber extorts from me, I do not 
 
 think it neceflary to oblige him to take from my perfon. If I 
 
 . walk quietly to the gallows, this does not imply my confent to 
 
 be hanged. 
 
 In all thefe cafes there is a clear diftindtion between my com- 
 pliance with juftice and my compliance with injuftice. I con- 
 form to the principles of juftice, becaufe I perceive them to be 
 intrinfically and unalterably right. I yield to injuftice, though I 
 perceive that to which I yield to be abftractedly wrong, and 
 only choofe the leaft among inevitable evils. 
 
 Foundation T^e ca f e f volition, as it is commonly termed, feems parallel 
 
 of obedience. 
 
 to that of intellect. You prefent a certain propofition to my 
 mind, to which you require my affent. If you accompany the 
 propofition with evidence calculated to fhew the agreement be- 
 tween the terms of which it confrfts, you may obtain my aflent. 
 I If 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. i 7 i 
 
 If you accompany the proportion with authority, telling me BOOK III. 
 
 that you have examined it and find it to be true, that thoufands k * ' 
 
 of wife and difinterefted men have admitted it, that angels or 
 Gods have affirmed it, I may affent to your authority; but, 
 with refpe£t to the propofition itfelf, my underftanding of its 
 reafonablenefs, my perception of that in the propofition which 
 ftrictly fpeaking conftitutes its truth or its falfhood, remain juft 
 as they did. I believe fomething elfe, but I do not believe the 
 propofition. 
 
 Juft fo in morals. I may be perfuaded of the propriety of 
 yielding compliance to a requifition the juftice of which I can- 
 not difcern, as I may be perfuaded to yield compliance to a re- 
 quifition which I know to be unjuft. But neither of thefe 
 requifitions is ftrictly fpeaking a proper fubject of obedience. 
 Obedience feems rather to imply the unforced choice of the 
 mind and affent of the judgment. But the compliance I yield 
 to government, independently of my approbation of its mea- 
 sures, is of the fame fpecies as my compliance with a wild beaft, 
 that forces me to run north, when my judgment and inclination 
 prompted me to go fouth. 
 
 But, though morality in its pureft conftruction altogether Ufefulnefs of 
 
 - ' facial com- 
 
 ■cxcludes the idea of one man s yielding obedience to another, munication. 
 yet the greateft benefits will refult from mutual communication. 
 There is fcarcely any man, whofe communications will not 
 
 Z 2 fome- 
 
172 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 chap vt' f° met i m ' es enlighten my judgment and rectify my conduit. But 
 the perfons to whom it becomes me to pay particular attention 
 in this refpecl:, are not fuch as may exercife any particular 
 magiftracy, but fuch, whatever may be their ftation, as are 
 wifer or better informed in any refpecl than myfelf. 
 
 Cafe of con- 
 fidence confi- 
 dered. 
 
 There are two ways in which a man wifer than myfelf may 
 be of ufe to me ; by the communication of thofe arguments 
 by which he is convinced of the truth of the judgments he has 
 formed ; and by the communication of the judgments them- 
 felves independent of argument. This laft is of ufe only in re- 
 fpect to the narrownefs of our own understandings, and the time 
 that might be requifite for the acquifition of a fcience of which 
 we are at prefent ignorant. On this account I am not to be 
 blamed, if I employ a builder to conftrudt me a houfe, or a 
 mechanic to fink me a well ; nor fhould I be liable to blame, 
 if I worked in perfon under their direction. In this cafe, not 
 having opportunity or ability to acquire the fcience myfelf, I 
 truft to the fcience of another. I choofe from the deliberation 
 of my own judgment the end to be purfued ; I am convinced 
 that the end is good and commendable ; and, having done this, 
 I commit the felection of means to a perfon whofe qualifications 
 are fuperior to my own. The confidence repofed in this in- 
 ftance is precifely of the nature of delegation in general. No 
 term furely can be more unapt than that of obedience, to exprefs 
 our duty towards the overfeer we have appointed in our affairs. 
 
 3 Similar 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 173 
 
 Similar to the confidence I repofe in a fkilful mechanic is the B00K: Iir - 
 
 r CHAP. VI. 
 
 attention which ought to be paid to the commander of an army. v - 
 It is my duty in the firft place to be fatisfied of the goodnefs of 
 the caufe, of the propriety of the war, and of the truth of as many 
 general propofitions concerning the conduct of it, as can pofhbly 
 be brought within the fphere of my understanding. It may well 
 be doubted whether fecrecy be in any degree neceffary to the 
 conduct of war. It may be doubted whether treachery and fur- 
 prife are to be clafled among the legitimate means of defeating 
 our adverfary. But after every deduction has been made for 
 considerations of this fort, there will ftill remain cafes, where 
 fomething muft be confided, as to the plan of a campaign or the 
 arrangement of a battle, to the fkill, fo far as that fkill really 
 exifts, of the commander. When he has explained both to the 
 utmoft of his ability, there may remain parts, the propriety of 
 which I cannot fully comprehend, but which I have fufncient 
 reafon to confide to his judgment. 
 
 tions. 
 
 This doctrine however of limited obedience, or, as it may ItsBauta- 
 more properly be termed, of confidence and delegation, ought to 
 be called into action as feldom as poffible. Every man mould 
 difcharge to the utmoft practicable extent the duties which arife 
 from his fituation. If he gain as to the ability with which they 
 may be difcharged, when he delegates them to another, he lofes 
 with refpect to the fidelity ; every one being confcious of the 
 fincerity of his own intention, and no one having equal proof 
 
 of 
 
174 
 
 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 ch°\p l \k °^ t1aat °^ anotner * A. virtuous man will not fail to perceive the 
 1 » ' obligation under which he is placed to exert his own under- 
 Handing, and to judge for himfelf as widely as his circumftances 
 will permit. 
 
 Mifchief of 
 
 unlimited 
 
 confidence. 
 
 The abufe of the doctrine of confidence has been the fource of 
 more calamities to mankind than all the other errors of the 
 human underftanding. Depravity would have gained little ground 
 in the world, if every man had been in the exercife of his inde- 
 pendent judgment. The inftrument by which extenfive mif- 
 chiefs have in all ages been perpetrated has been, the principle 
 of many men being reduced to mere machines in the hands of 
 a few. Man, while he confults his own underftanding, is the or- 
 nament of the univerfe. Man, when he furrenders his reafon, 
 and becomes the partifan of implicit faith and paffive obedience, 
 is the moft mifchievous of all animals. Ceafing to examine every 
 proportion that comes before him for the direction of his con- 
 duel, he is no longer the capable fubjecT: of moral inftru&ion. 
 He is, in the inflant of fubmiffion, the blind inftrument of every 
 nefarious purpofe of his principal ; and, when left to himfelf, is 
 open to the fedu&ion of injuftice, cruelty and profligacy. 
 
 SubiefHon 
 •explained. 
 
 Thefe reafonings lead to a proper explanation of the word 
 fubjecl. If by the fubjec~t of any government we mean a perfon 
 whofe duty it is to obey, the true inference from the preceding 
 principles is, that no government has any fubjeets. If on the 
 
 contrary 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 175 
 
 contrary we mean a perfon, whom the government is bound to TOOK ill. 
 
 protect, or may juftly reftrain, the word is fufficiently admifhble. k * ' 
 
 This remark enables us to folve the long-difputed queftion, what 
 it is that conftitutes a man the fubject of any government. Every 
 man is in this fenfe a fubject, whom the government is competent 
 to protect on the one hand, or who on the other, by the violence 
 of his proceedings, renders force requifite to prevent him from 
 difturbing that community, for the prefervation of whofe peace, 
 the government is inftituted* 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
[ '& 3 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 MORAL PRINCIPLES FREQUENTLY ELUCIDATED BY INCI- 
 DENTAL REFLECTION — BY INCIDENTAL PASSAGES IN 
 VARIOUS AUTHORS. — EXAMPLE. 
 
 chap vr T" ^ w *^ generally be found that, even where the truth upon 
 v - — » ' -*• any fubiett has been moft induftrioufly obfcured, its occa- 
 
 Appendix. J J J » 
 
 Moral pnn- f 10na i irradiations have not been wholly excluded. The mind 
 
 ciples ire- / 
 
 cidatcdb U " nas no f° oner obtained evidence of any new truth, efpecially in 
 
 fle&ionr- "" tne f c i ence °f morals, but it recollects numerous intimations of 
 
 that truth which have occafionally fuggefted themfelves, and is 
 
 aftonifhed that a difcovery which was perpetually upon the eve 
 
 of being made, fhould have been kept at a diftance fo long. 
 
 by ind- This is eminently the cafe in the fubjecl: of which we are 
 
 fages in va- treating. Thofe numerous pafTages in poets, divines * and phi- 
 
 rious authors. 
 
 lofophers, which have placed our unalterable duty in the ftrongeft 
 contraft with the precarious authority of a fuperior, and have 
 taught us to difclaim all fubordination to the latter, have always 
 been received by the ingenuous mind with a tumult of applaufe. 
 There is indeed no fpecies of compofition, in which the feeds of 
 
 * " Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more 
 that they can do." Luke, Ch. XII. Ver. 4. 
 
 a morality 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 *77 
 
 a morality too perfect for our prefent improvements in fcience, BOOK ill. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 may more reafonably be expected to difcover themfelves, than in k — ■*« ' 
 
 Aptendix. 
 
 works of imagination. When the mind fhakes off the fetters 
 of prefcription and prejudice, when it boldly takes a flight into 
 the world unknown, and employs itfelf in fearch of thofe grand 
 and interesting principles which mall tend to impart to every 
 reader the glow of enthufiafm, it is at fuch moments that the 
 enquiring and philofophical reader may expect to be prefented 
 with the materials and rude (ketches of intellectual improvement*. 
 
 Among the many paflages from writers of every denomina- Example, 
 tion that will readily fuggeft themfelves under this head to a 
 well informed mind, we may naturally recollect the fpirited 
 reafoning of young Nerval in the tragedy of Douglas, when he 
 
 * This was the opinion of the celebrated Mr. Turgot. a He thought that 
 the moral fentiments of mankind might be confiderably strengthened, and the 
 perception of them rendered more delicate and precife, either by frequent ex- 
 ercife, or the perpetually fubjedting them to the anatomy of a pure and en- 
 lightened underftanding. For this reafon he confidered romances as holding 
 a place among treatifes cf morality, and even as the only books in which 
 he was aware of having feen moral principles treated in an impartial 
 manner." " Mi Turgot penfoit qu'tm pent parvenir a fortifier dansles homines leurs 
 fentimens moraux, a les rewire plus dilicats ct plus j'ftes, foit par Pexcrcice de ces 
 fentimens, foit en apprenant a les foumettrc a Vanalyfe d'uue raifon faine et eclair ee. 
 Cejl par ce motif qu'il regardoit les romans comme des livres de morale, et mime 
 dijoit-il, comme les fails oh il cut vu de la morale" 
 
 Vie de M. Turgot, par M. dc Comhrcct. 
 
 A a is 
 
178 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 chap vi' * S ca ^ ec * u P on ^7 * orc * Randolph to ftate the particulars of a 
 
 *7 ' ' conteft in which he is engaged, that lord Randolph may be 
 
 able to decide between the difputants. 
 
 " Nay, my good lord, though I revere you much„ 
 
 My caufe I plead not, nor demand your judgments 
 
 To the liege lord of my dear native land 
 
 I owe a fubjefl's homage ; but even him 
 
 And his high arbitration I reject. 
 
 Within my bofom reigns another lord. — 
 
 Honour ; fole judge and umpire of itfelf." Act IV. 
 
 > 
 
 Nothing can be more accurate than a confiderable part of the 
 philofophy of this paffage. The term "honour" indeed has 
 been too much abufed, and prefents to the mind too fantaftical 
 an image, to be fairly defcriptive of that principle by which the 
 actions of every intellectual being ought to be regulated. The 
 principle to which it behoves us to attend, is the internal deci- 
 sion of our own underftanding ; and nothing can be more evident 
 than that the fame reafoning, which led Norval to reject the 
 authority of his fovereign in the quarrels and difputes in which 
 he was engaged, ought to have led him to reject it as the regula- 
 tor of any of his actions, and of confequence to abjure that 
 homage which he fets out with referving. Virtue cannot pof- 
 fibly be meafured by the judgment and good pleafure of any 
 man with whom we are concerned. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
I m ] 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF A VARIETY OF FORMS — COMPAR- 
 ED WITH THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOUR OF A VARIETY OF 
 RELIGIOUS CREEDS. — THAT THERE IS ONE BEST FORM OF 
 
 GOVERNMENT PROVED — FROM THE UNITY OF TRUTH 
 
 FROM THE NATURE OF MAN. — OBJECTION FROM HUMAN 
 WEAKNESS AND PREJUDICE. — DANGER IN EST ABLISHING 
 AN IMPERFECT CODE. — MANNERS OF NATIONS PRODU- 
 CED BY THEIR FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. — GRADUAL IM- 
 PROVEMENT NECESSARY. — SIMPLICITY CHIEFLY TO BE 
 DESIRED. — PUBLICATION OF TRUTH THE GRAND IN- 
 STRUMENT BY INDIVIDUALS, NOT BY GOVERNMENT 
 
 THE TRUTH ENTIRE, AND NOT BY PARCELS. — SORT OF 
 PROGRESS TO BE DESIRED. 
 
 A PROPOSITION that by many political reafoners has BOOK in. 
 CHAP. VII. 
 been vehemently maintained, is that of the propriety of ' v -f 
 
 Argument in 
 
 inftituting different political governments fuited to the charac- fav ? ur of a 
 
 variety of 
 
 ters, the habits and prejudices of different nations. " The Englifh forms : 
 conftitution," fay thefe reafoners, " is adapted to the thought- 
 fell, rough and unfubmitting chara&er of this iiland race ; the 
 
 A a 2 flownefs 
 
180 OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 char vil fl° wne f s a nd complication of Dutch formality to the phlegma- 
 tic Hollander ; and the fplendour of the grand monarque to the 
 vivacity of Frenchmen, Among the ancients what could be- 
 better afTorted than a pure democracy to the intellectual acute- 
 nefs and impetuous energy of ^the Athenians ; while the hardy 
 and unpoliihed Spartan flourifhed much more under the rugged. 
 and inflexible difcipline of Lycurgus ?. The great art of the 
 legiflator is to penetrate into the true character of the nation 
 with whom he is concerned, and. to difcover the. exact ftructure 
 of government which is calculated to render that nation flourifh- 
 
 ing and happy." Accordingly an- Engliihman who mould 
 reafon upon thefe poftulata might fay, " It is not neceifary I 
 fhould aflert the Englifh conftitution to be the happieft and 
 fublimeft conception of the human mind ; I do not enquire into= 
 the abftract excellence of that government under which France- 
 made herfelf illuftrious for centuries. I contemplate with en- 
 thufiafm the venerable republics of Greece and Rome. But I 
 am an enemy to the removing ancient land-marks, and difturbing; 
 with our crude devices the wifdom of ages. I regard with 
 horror the Quixote plan, that would reduce the irregular great- 
 nefs of nations to the frigid and impracticable flandard of meta- 
 physeal accuracy*." 
 
 This. 
 
 * Thefe arguments bear fome refemblance to thofe of Mr. Burke. It 
 was not neceffary that they fhould do fo precifely, or that we fhould take ad- 
 vantage of the nrgtimeittttm ad hom'mem built upon his fervent admiration of the 
 
 Englifh 
 
OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 181 
 
 This queftion has been anticipated in various parts of the BOOK in. 
 prefent work ; but the argument is fo popular and plaufible to a ' * ' 
 fuperfkial view, as juftly to entitle it to a feparate examination. - 
 
 The idea bears fome refemblance to one which was formerly compared 
 
 with the ar- 
 
 infifted upon by certain latitudinarians in religion. " It is gument in fa- 
 vour of a va- 
 
 impious," faid thev, "to endeavour to reduce all men to uni- riety of reli- 
 gions creeds. 
 
 formity of opinion upon this fubjecT:. Men's minds are as 
 various as their face?. God has made them fo ; and it is to be 
 prefumed that he is well pleafed to be addrened in difFcrcnt 
 languages, by different names, and with the confenting ardour 
 of difagreeing feels." Thus did thefe reafoners confound the 
 majefty of truth with the deformity of falfhood ; and fuppofe 
 that that being who was all truth, took delight in the errors, 
 the abfurdities, and the vices, for all falfhood in fome way or 
 other engenders vice, of his creatures. At the fame time they 
 were employed in unnerving that activity of mind, which is the 
 fingle fource of human improvement. If truth and falfhood be 
 in reality upon a level, I fhall be very weakly employed in a 
 ftrenuous endeavour either to difcover truth for myfelf, or to 
 imprefs it upon others. 
 
 Truth is in reality fingle and uniform. There rauft in the That there 
 
 is one belt 
 
 Englifh conftitution. Not to fay that we fhall feel ourfelves more at our eafe in 
 examining the queftion generally, than in a perfonal attack ur on this illuftrious 
 and virtuous hero of former times. 
 
 I nature 
 
i8a 
 
 OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 rwAp K vrr" nature or " things be one beft form of government, which all 
 f v * ' intellects, fufficiently roufed from the flumber of favage ignorance, 
 
 o 
 
 vernment w j]j b e i rr efiftibly incited to approve. If an equal participation 
 of the benefits of nature be good in itfelf, it muft be good for 
 you and me and all mankind. Defpotifm may be of ufe to keep 
 human beings in ignorance, but can never conduce to render 
 them wife or virtuous or happy. If the general tendency of 
 defpotifm be injurious, every portion and fragment of it muft 
 be a noxious ingredient. Truth cannot be fo variable, as to 
 change its nature by croffing an arm of the fea, a petty brook 
 or an ideal line, and become falfhood. On the contrary it is at 
 all times and in all places the fame. 
 
 from the 
 unity of 
 truth : 
 
 from the na- 
 ture of man. 
 
 The fubje& of legiflation is every where the fame, man. 
 The points in which human beings refemble are infinitely more 
 confiderable than thofe in which they differ. We have the fame 
 fenfes, the fame inlets of pleafure and pain, the fame faculty to 
 reafon, to judge and to infer. The fame caufes that make 
 me happy will make you happy. We may differ in our opi- 
 nions upon this fubjecT: at firft, but this difference is only in pre- 
 judice, and is by no means invincible. An event may often 
 conduce moll to the benefit of a human being, which his erro- 
 neous judgment perhaps regarded with leaft complacency. A 
 wife fuperintendent of affairs would purfue with fteady attention 
 the real advantage of thofe over whom he prefided, carelefs of 
 the temporary dlfapprobation he incurred, and which would laftno 
 1 longer 
 
OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 183 
 
 longer than the partial and mifguided apprehenfion from which 589p }} I% 
 it flowed. ^— - — ' 
 
 Is there a country in which a prudent director of education 
 would propofe fome other object for his labours than to make 
 his pupil temperate and juft and wife ? Is there a climate that 
 requires its inhabitants to be hard drinkers or horfe-jockies 
 or gamefters or bullies, rather than men ? Can there be a corner 
 of the world, where the lover of juftice and truth would find him- 
 felf out of his element and ufelefs ? If no ; then liberty muft be 
 every where better than fl'avery, and the government of recti- 
 tude and impartiality better than the government of caprice. 
 
 But to this it may be objected that " men may not be every ObjtfUon 
 
 from human 
 
 where capable of liberty. A gift however valuable in itfelf, if weaknefs and 
 
 prejudice. 
 
 it be intended to be beneficial, muft be adapted to the capacity 
 of the receiver. In human affairs every thing muft be gradual ; 
 and it is contrary to every idea that experience furnifhes of the 
 nature of mind to expect to advance men to a ftate of perfection 
 at once. It was in a fpirit fomewhat fimilar to this, that Solon, 
 the Athenian lawgiver, apologifed for the imperfection of his 
 code, faying, " that he had not fought to promulgate fuch laws 
 as were good in themfelves, but fuch as his countrymen were 
 able to bear." 
 
 The experiment of Solon feems to be of a dangerous nature. Dang** m 
 
 eftablifhing 
 
 A code, fuch as his, bid fair for permanence, and does not an imperfea 
 
 code. 
 
 appear 
 
*H 
 
 BOOK III. 
 CHAP. VII. 
 ». . ' 
 
 OF FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 appear to have contained in it a principle of improvement. He 
 did not meditate that gradual progrefs which was above de- 
 fcribed, nor contemplate in the Athenians of his own time, the 
 root from which were to fpriiig the poffible Athenians of fome 
 future period, who might realife all that he was able to conceive 
 of good fenfe, fortitude and virtue. His inftitutions were rather 
 calculated to hold them down in perpetuity to one certain de- 
 gree of excellence and no more. 
 
 Manners of This fuggeffion furriifhes us with the real clue to that ftriking 
 
 nations pro- m \ 
 
 duced by coincidence between the manners of a nation and the form of its 
 
 their forms of 
 
 government, government, which was mentioned in the beginning of the 
 chapter, and which has furnifhed fo capital an argument to the 
 advocates for the local propriety of different forms of government. 
 It was in reality fomewhat illogical in thefe reafoners to employ 
 this as an argument upon the fubjecl, without previoufly afcer- 
 taining which of the two things was to be regarded as a caufe 
 and which .as an effect, whether the government arofe out of 
 the manners of the nation, or the manners of the nation out of 
 the government. The laft of thefe flatements appears upon the 
 whole to be neareft to the fact The government may be in- 
 debted for its exigence to accident or force. Revolutions, as 
 they have mofl frequently taken place in the world, are epochas, 
 in which the temper and wilhes of a nation are leaft confulted*. 
 When it is otherwife, ftill the real effect of the government 
 
 See Hume's Eflap. Pavt JJ. ElTay xii. 
 
 which 
 
OFOBEDIENCE. i% 
 
 which is inftituted, is to perpetuate propenfities and fentiments, Jj^fjFyT?"' 
 which without its operation would fpeedily have given place to v * ' 
 other propenfities. Upon every fuppofition, the exifting corre- 
 fpondence between national character and national government 
 will be found in a jufl confideration to arife out of the latter. 
 
 The principle of gradual improvement advanced in the laft Gradual i'm- 
 
 r r <-> « provement 
 
 cited objection muft be admitted for true ; but then it is necef- peceffary. 
 fary, while we adopt it, that we mould not naffer ourfelves to 
 act in direct: oppofition to it ; and that we fhould choofe the beft 
 and moft powerful means for forwarding that improvement. 
 
 Man is in a ftate of perpetual progrefs. He muft grow either Simplicity 
 
 chiefly to be 
 
 better or worfe, either correct his habits or conlirm them. The ddired. 
 government propofed muft either increafe our paflions and pre- 
 judices by fanning the flame, or by gradually difcouraging tend 
 to extirpate them. In reality, it is fufficiently difficult to imagine 
 a government that {hall have the latter tendency. By its very 
 nature political inftitution has a tendency to fufpend the elafticity, 
 and put an end to the advancement of mind. Every fcheme for 
 embodying imperfection muft be injurious. That which is 
 to-day a considerable melioration, will at fome future period, if 
 preferved unaltered, appear a defect and difeafe in the body po- 
 litic. It were earneftly to be defired that each man was wife 
 enough to govern himfelf without the intervention of any com- 
 pulfory reftraint ; and, fince government even in its beft ftate is 
 
 B b an 
 
i86 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 ^ . 
 
 an evil, the object principally to be aimed at is, that we mould 
 have as little of it as the general peace of human fociety will 
 permit. 
 
 Publication But the gi-and inftrument for forwarding the improvement of 
 
 of truth the 
 
 grand initra- mind is the publication of truth. Not the publication on the 
 
 ment : 
 
 by indivi- P ar ^ °f government ; for it is infinitely difficult to difcover in- 
 governmentt ^dbbly what the truth is, efpecially upon controverted points, 
 and government is as liable as individuals to be miftaken in this 
 refpect. In reality it is more liable ; for the depofitaries of go- 
 vernment have a very obvious temptation to defire, by means 
 of ignorance and implicit faith, to perpetuate the exifting flate 
 of things. The only fubftantial method for the propagation of 
 truth is difcuffion, fo that the errors of one man may be detect- 
 ed by the acutenefs and fevere difquifition of his neighbours. 
 All we have to demand from the officers of government, at leaft 
 in their public character, is neutrality. The intervention of 
 authority in a field proper to reafoning and demonflration is 
 always injurious. If on the right fide, it can only difcredit 
 truth, and call off the attention of men to a foreign confideration. 
 If on the wrong, though it may not be able to fupprefs the 
 fpirit of enquiry, it will have a tendency to convert the calm 
 purfuit of knowledge into paffion and tumult. 
 
 the truth en- " But in what manner (hall the principles of truth be commu- 
 
 tire, and not 
 
 by parcels, nicated fo as bed: to lead to the practice ? By fhewing to man- 
 a kind 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 1S7 
 
 kind truth in all its evidence, or concealing one half of it ? Shall BOOK III. 
 
 ' ° CHAl'YII. 
 
 they be initiated by a partial difcovery, and thus led on by 
 regular degrees to conclufions that would at firft have wholly 
 alienated their minds ?" 
 
 This queftion will come to be more fully difcuflfed in a fol- 
 lowing chapter. In the mean time let us only confider for the 
 prefent the quantity of effect that may be expected from thefe 
 two oppofite plans.- 
 
 An inhabitant of Turkey or Morocco may perhaps be of 
 opinion, that the veiling power in the arbitrary will or caprice 
 of an individual has in it more advantages than difadvantages. 
 If I be defirous to change his opinion, mould I undertake to re- 
 commend to him in animated language fome modification of 
 this caprice ? I fhould attack it in its principle. If I do other- 
 wife, I mall betray the ftrength of my caufe. The principle 
 oppofite to his own, will not poffefs half the irrefiflible force 
 which I could have given to it. His objections will amine 
 vigour. The principle I am maintaining being half truth and 
 half fallhood, he will in every ftep of the conteft poflefs an advan- 
 tage in the ofFenfive, of which, if he be fufficiently acute, I 
 can never deprive him. 
 
 Now the principle I fhould have to explain of equal law and 
 equal juftice to the inhabitant of Morocco, would be as new to 
 
 B b 2 him, 
 
iS8 OF OBEDIENCE. 
 
 chap" vh ^im, as an 7 Principle of the boldeft political defcriptidn that I 
 1 * ' could propagate in this country. Whatever apparent difference 
 may exift between the two cafes, may fairly be fufpe&ed to 
 owe its exiftence to the imagination of the obferver. The rule 
 therefore which fuggefts itfelf in this cafe is fitted for univer- 
 fal application. 
 
 Sort of pro- a s to the improvements which are to be introduced into the 
 
 grels to be r 
 
 «!dired. political fyftem, their quantity and their period muft be deter- 
 
 mined by the degree of knowledge exifting in any country, and 
 the ftate of preparation of the public mind for the changes that 
 are to be defired. Political renovation may ftridtly be confider- 
 ed as one of the ftages in intellectual improvement. Literature 
 and difquifnion cannot of themfelves be rendered fufficiently 
 general ; it will be only the cruder and groffer parts that can be 
 expected to defcend in their genuine form to the multitude ; 
 while thofe abftract and bold fpeculations, in which the value of 
 literature principally confifts, muft neceffarily continue the por- 
 tion of the favoured few. It is here that focial inftitution offers 
 itfelf in aid of the abftrufer powers of argumentative communi- 
 cation. As foon as any important truth has become eftablifhed 
 to a fufficient extent in the minds of the enterprifmg and the 
 wife, it may tranquilly and with eafe be rendered a part of the 
 general fyftem ; fince the uninftructed and the poor are never 
 the ftrenuous fupporters of thofe complicated fyftems by which 
 opprefiion is maintained ; and fince they have an obvious in- 
 
 tereft 
 
OF OBEDIENCE. 189 
 
 tereft in the practical introduction of fimplicity and truth. One BOOK III. 
 
 r r . J CHAP. vir. 
 
 valuable principle being thus realifed, prepares the way for the v *— -* 
 
 realifing of more. It ferves as a refting-place to the human mind 
 in its great bufinefs of exploring the regions of truth, and 
 gives it new alacrity and encouragement for farther exertions. 
 
 AN 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS PRINCIPLES. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 EVERY INDIVIDUAL THE JUDGE OF HIS OWN RESISTANCE. 
 
 OBJECTION. ANSWERED FROM THE NATURE OF GO- 
 VERNMENT FROM THEMODESOF RESISTANCE. 1. FORCE 
 
 RARELY TO BE EMPLOYED EITHER WHERE THERE IS 
 
 SMALL PROSPECT OF SUCCESS — OR WHERE THE PROSPECT 
 IS GREAT. — HISTORY OF CHARLES THE FIRST ESTI- 
 MATED. 2. REASONING THE LEGITIMATE MODE. 
 
 IT has appeared in the courfe of our reafonings upon politi- BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. I. 
 cal authority, that every man is bound to refi-ft every unjuft v * — -* 
 
 Every indi- 
 
 proceeding on the part of the community. But who is the viduaithe 
 
 judge 
 
192 
 
 OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 EOOK1V. judge of this injuftice ? The queftion anfwers itfelf : the private 
 judgment of the individual. Were it not fo, the appeal would 
 be nugatory, for we have no infallible judge to whom to refer 
 our controverfies. He is obliged to confult his own private 
 judgment in this cafe, for the fame reafon that obliges him to 
 confult it in every other article of his conduct. 
 
 judge of 
 Ins own re- 
 filtance. 
 
 Objection. " But is not this pofition neceffarily fubverfive of all govern- 
 
 ment ? Can there be a power to rule, where no man is bound to 
 obey ; or at leaft where every man is to confult his own under- 
 ftanding firft, and then to yield his concurrence no farther than 
 he fhall conceive the regulation to be juft ? The very idea of 
 government is that of an authority fuperfeding private judgment j 
 how then can the exercife of private judgment be left entire ? 
 What degree of order is to be expected in a community, where 
 every man is taught to indulge his own fpeculations, and even 
 to refift the decifion of the whole, whenever that decifion is op- 
 pofed to the di&ates of his own fancy ?" 
 
 Anfwered 
 from the na- 
 ture of go- 
 vernment : 
 
 The true anfwer to thefe queftions lies in the obfervation with 
 which we began our difquifition on government, that this 
 boafted inftitution is nothing more than a fcheme for enforcing 
 by brute violence the fenfe of one man or fet of men upon 
 another, neceffary to be employed in certain cafes of peculiar 
 emergency. Suppofing the queftion then to lie merely between 
 the force of the community on one part, and the force with 
 
 which 
 
OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 *93 
 
 which any individual member fhould think it incumbent upon BOOK IV. 
 ' t r CHAP. I. 
 
 him to refill their decifions on the other, it is fufficiently evident 
 that a certain kind of authority and fupremacy would be the re- 
 fult. But this is not the true ftate of the queftion. 
 
 It Is farther evident, that, though the duty of every man to 
 cxercife his private judgment be unalterable, yet fo far as relates 
 to practice, wherever government fubfifts, the exercife of private 
 judgment is fubftantially intrenched upon. The force put by 
 the community upon thofe who exercife rapine and injuftice, 
 and the influence of that force as a moral motive upon its mem- 
 bers in general, are each of them exhibitions of an argument, 
 not founded in general reafon, but in the precarious interference 
 of a fallible individual. Nor is this all. Without anticipating 
 the queftion of the different kinds of refiftance and the election 
 that it may be our duty to make of one kind rather than another, 
 it, is certain in fact, that my conduct will be materially altered 
 by the forefight that, if I act in a certain manner, I fhall have 
 the .combined force of a number of individuals to oppofe me. 
 That government therefore is the beft, which in no one inftance 
 interferes with the exercife of private judgment without abfolute 
 neceflity. 
 
 The modes according to which an individual may oppofe any £ rom the 
 
 C 1 * 1 1_ • • 1 t r r r • mode;, ok le- 
 
 lneaiure which his judgment difapproves are of two forts, action fiUance. 
 and fpeech. Shall he upon every occafion have recourfe to the / -Force rare- 
 
 *■ J ly to be cm- 
 
 Cc former? l ;lc J' cd » 
 
19+ OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 529! l Y' former ? This it is abfurd fo much as to fuppofe. The ob- 
 
 CriAr. I. ■ * 
 
 k v ' jedt of every virtuous man is the general good. But how can 
 he be faid to promote the general good, who is ready to wafte 
 his active force upon every trivial occafton, and facrifice his life- 
 without the chance of any public benefit ? 
 
 either where " But he referves himfelf," I will fuppofe, " for fome great oc- 
 
 there is fmall ■ , . ' 
 
 profpeft of canon ; and then, carelefs as to fuccefs, which is a large object 
 
 fticcefs > 
 
 only to little minds, generoufly embarks in a caufe where he has 
 no hope but to perifh. He becomes the martyr of truth. He 
 believes that fuch an example will tend to imprefs the minds of 
 his fellow men, and to roufe them from their lethargy." 
 
 The queflion of martyrdom is of a difficult nature. I had 
 rather convince men by my arguments, than feduce them by 
 my example. It is fcarcely poffible for me to tell what oppor- 
 tunities for ufefulnefs may offer themfelves in the future years of 
 my exiftence. Nor -is it improbable in a general confederation* 
 that long and perfevering fervices may be more advantageous 
 than brilliant and tranfitory ones. The cafe being thus circum- 
 ftanced, a truly wife man cannot fail to hefitate as to the idea of 
 offering up his life a voluntary oblation. 
 
 Whenever martyrdom becomes an indifpenfible duty, when; 
 nothing can preferve him fhort of the cleareft dereliction of prin- 
 ciple and the moll palpable defertion of truth, he will then meet 
 
 it 
 
OF RESISTANCE. 195 
 
 it with perfect ferenity. He did not avoid it before from any ^P.^Y* 
 
 * * CtlAr. I. 
 
 weaknefs of perfonal feeling. When it rnuft be encountered, * « ' 
 
 he knows that it is indebted for that luftre which has been fo 
 generally acknowledged among mankind, to the intrepidity of the 
 fufferer. He knows that nothing is fo eflential to true virtue, 
 as an utter difregard to individual advantage. 
 
 The objections that offer themfelves to an exertion of actual 
 force, where there are no hopes of fuccefs, are numerous. Such 
 an exertion cannot be made without injury to the lives of more 
 than a {ingle individual. A certain number both of enemies and 
 friends muft be expected to be the victims of fo wild an under- 
 taking. It is regarded by contemporaries, and recorded by hiftory 
 as an intemperate ebullition of the paffions ; and ferves rather as 
 a beacon to deter others, than as a motive to animate them. It 
 is not the frenzy of enthufiafm, but the calm, fagacious and de- 
 liberate effort of reafon, to which truth muft be indebted for its 
 progrefs. 
 
 But let us fuppoie, " that the profpect of fuccefs is confidera- „r where the 
 ble, and that there is reafon to believe that refolute violence may great, 
 in no long time accomplifh its purpofe." Even here we may be 
 allowed to hefitate. Force has already appeared to be an odious 
 weapon ; and, if the ufe of it be to be regretted in the hands of 
 government, it does not change its nature though wielded by a 
 band of patriots. If the caufe we plead be the caufe of truth, 
 
 C c 2 there 
 
196 OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 r?*AP I ' V " t ' ierc 1S ll ° doubt that by our reafonings, if fufficiently zealous 
 
 ' ' and conftant, the fame purpofe may be effected in a milder and 
 
 more liberal way *., 
 
 In a word, it is proper to recoiled here what has been efta- 
 bliihed as to the doctrine of force in general, that it is in no cafe 
 to be employed but where every other means is ineffectual. In 
 the queftion therefore of refiftance to government, force ought 
 never to be introduced without, the moft imminent neceffity-; 
 never but in circumftances- fimilar to thofe of defending my 
 life from a ruffian, where time can by no means be gained, and, 
 the confequences inftantly to enfue. are unqueflionably fatal. 
 
 Hiilorybf The hiflory of king Charles the firft furnifhes an inftructive 
 
 Charles the J - ° 
 
 firft efti- example in both kinds. The original defign of his opponents 
 
 mated. 
 
 was that of confining his power within, narrow and palpable 
 limits. This obj eel,, after a ftruggle of many years, was fully 
 accomplished by the parliament of 1640, without bloodfhed 
 (except indeed in the fingle inftance of lord Strafford) and: 
 without commotion.. They next conceived. the project of over- 
 turning the hierarchy and the monarchy of England, . in oppofir 
 tion to great numbers, and in the laft point no. doubt to a ma? 
 jority of their countrymen. Admitting thefe objects to have 
 been in the utmoft degree excellent, they ought not, for the pur- 
 
 * See this cafe more fully difcufied in the following chapten . 
 
 pofe 
 
OF RESISTANCE. 
 
 197 
 
 pofe of obtaining them, to have precipitated the queftion to the BOOK IV. 
 
 extremity of a civil war.. 
 
 " But, fince force is fcarcely under any circumftances to be 2 - Reafoning 
 
 the legitimate 
 
 employed, of what nature is that refiftance which ought con- mode. 
 ftantly to be given to every inftance of injuftice ?" The refift- 
 ance I am bound to employ is that of uttering the truth, of 
 cenfuring in the moft explicit manner every proceeding that I 
 perceive to be adverfe to the true interefts of mankind. I am 
 bound to difTeminate without referve all the principles with 
 which I am acquainted, and which it may be of importance to 
 mankind to know ; and this duty it behoves me to practife upon 
 every occafion and with the moft perfevering conftancy. I 
 muft difclofe the whole fyftem of moral and political truth, 
 without fuppreffing any part under the idea of its being too 
 bold and paradoxical, and thus depriving the whole of that 
 complete and irrefiftible evidence, without which its effe&s mufl: 
 always be feeble, partial and uncertain.. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ i9« ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF REVOLUTIONS. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 DUTIES OF A CITIZEN. 
 
 f 
 
 OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR 
 COUNTRY CONSIDERED — MUST ARISE EITHER FROM THE 
 REASON OF THE CASE, OR FROM A PERSONAL AND 
 LOCAL CONSIDERATION. — THE FIRST EXAMINED. — THE 
 SECOND. 
 
 > 
 
 BOOK IV. ^TO queftion can be more important than that which refpects 
 ' f- ^ the bell mode of effecting revolutions. Before we enter 
 
 Section I. . 
 
 Obligation to upon it however, it may be proper to remove a difficulty which 
 
 fupport the . r • 1 r 
 
 conftitution has fuggefted itfelf to the minds of fome men, how far we ought 
 
 ofourcountry 
 
 confidered : generally fpeaking to be the friends of revolution ; or, in other 
 words, whether it be juftifiable in a man to be the enemy of the 
 conftitution of his countiy. 
 
 " We live," it will be faid, " under the protection of this con- 
 ftitution ; and protection, being a benefit conferred, obliges us 
 to a reciprocation of fupport in return." 
 
 7 To 
 
Section I. 
 
 DUTIES OF A CITIZEN. 199 
 
 To this it may be anfwered, firft, that this protection is a very 529p rr" 
 equivocal thing ; and, till it can be mown that the vices, from 
 the effects of which it protects us, are not for the moft part the 
 produce of that conftitution, we fhall never fufficiently under- 
 stand the quantity of benefit it includes. 
 
 Secondly, gratitude, as has already been proved *, is a vice and 
 not a virtue. Every man and every collection of men ought to 
 be treated by us in a manner founded upon their intrinfic qualities 
 and capacities, and not according to a rule which has exiftence 
 only in relation to ourfelves. 
 
 Add to this, thirdly, that no motive can be more equivocal 
 than the gratitude here recommended. Gratitude to the confti- 
 tution, an abftract idea, an imaginary exiftence, is altogether 
 unintelligible. Affection to my countrymen will be much better 
 proved, by my exertions to procure them a fubftantial benefit, 
 than by my fupporting a fyftem which I believe to be fraught 
 with injurious confequences. 
 
 He who calls upon me to fupport the conftitution muft found muft an 'k 
 
 either from 
 
 his requifition upon one of two principles. It has a claim upon the reafon of 
 
 the cafe, or 
 
 my fupport either becaufe it is good, or becaufe it is Britifh. £ rom , a P" T ' 
 
 * ** " fonal and lo- 
 
 cal coniidera-- 
 tion. 
 f Book II. chap. ii. p. 83. 
 
 Againft. 
 
2oo DUTIES OF A CITIZEN, 
 
 chap tY' Againft the requifition in the firft fenfe there is nothing to 
 ^- — » — r* object. All that is neceffary is to prove the goodnefs which is 
 The firft ex- a f cr ibed to it. But perhaps it will be faid, " that, though not 
 
 amined. r r ' •> to 
 
 abfolutely good, more mifchief will refult from an attempt to 
 overturn it, than from maintaining it with its mixed character of 
 partly right and partly wrong." If this can be made evident, 
 undoubtedly I ought to fubmit. Of this mifchief however I 
 can be no judge but in confequence of enquiry. To fome the 
 evils attendant on a revolution will appear greater, and to others 
 lefs. Some will imagine that the vices with which the Englifh 
 conftitution is pregnant are confiderable, and fome that it is 
 nearly innocent. Before I can decide between thefe oppofite 
 opinions and balance the exifting .and the poffible evils, I muft 
 examine for myfelf. But examination in its nature implies un- 
 certainty of refult. Were I to determine before I fat down on 
 which fide the decifion mould be, I. could not ftri&ly fpeaking be 
 faid to examine at all. He that defires a revolution for its own 
 fake is to be regarded as a madman. He that defires it from a 
 thorough conviction of its ufefulnefs and necemty has a claim 
 upon us for candour and refpedL 
 
 Thefecond. As to the demand upon me for fupport to the Englifh confti- 
 
 tution, becaufe it is Englifh, there is little plaufibility in this 
 argument. It is of the fame nature as the demand upon me to 
 be a Chriftian, becaufe I am a Briton, or a Mahometan, becaufe 
 
 I am 
 
DUTIESOFACITIZEN. 201 
 
 I am a native of Turkey. Inftead of being an exprefTion of re- 5S9 p V?" 
 
 fpect, it argues contempt of all government, religion and virtue, ' v ~ - T^ 
 
 and every thing that is facred among men. If there be fuch a 
 thing as truth, it muft be better than error. If there be fuch a 
 faculty as reafon, it ought to be exerted. But this demand makes 
 truth a matter of abfolute indifference, and forbids us the exercife 
 of our reafon. If men reafon and reflect, it muft neceffarily 
 happen that either the Englifhman or the Turk will find his 
 government to be odious and his religion falfe. For what pur- 
 pofe employ his reafon, if he muft for ever conceal the conclu- 
 fions to which it leads him ? How would man have arrived 
 at his prefent attainments, if he had always been contented with 
 the ftate of fociety in which he happened to be born ? In 
 a word, either reafon is the curfe of our fpecies, and human 
 nature is to be regarded with horror ; or it becomes us to em- 
 ploy our underftanding and to act upon it, and to follow truth 
 wherever it may lead us. It cannot lead us to mifchief, fince 
 utility, as it regards percipient beings, is the only bafis of moral 
 and political truth. 
 
 Dd SECTION 
 
[ 202 ] 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 MODE OF EFFECTING RESOLUTIONS. 
 
 PERSUASION THE PROPER INSTRUMENT — NOT VIOLENCE- 
 NOR RESENTMENT. — LATENESS OF EVENT DESIRABLE. 
 
 Section II. 
 Perfuafion 
 the proper in- 
 ftrument : 
 
 BOOK IV. / 1>Q return to the enquiry refpe&ing the mode of effe&ing 
 
 * ' -*• revolutions. If no queftion can be more important, there 
 
 is fortunately no queftion perhaps that admits of a more complete 
 and fatisfactory general anfwer. The revolutions of ftates, which 
 a philanthropift would defire to witnefs, or in which he would 
 willingly co-operate, confift principally in a change of fenti- 
 ments and difpofitions in the members of thofe ftates. The true 
 inftruments for changing the opinions of men are argument and 
 perfuafion. The beft fecurity for an advantageous iflue is free 
 and unreftritted difcuffion. In that field truth muft always 
 prove the fuccefsful champion. If then we would improve the 
 focial inftitutions of mankind, we muft write, we muft argue, we 
 muft converfe. To this bufinefs there is no clofe ; in this pur- 
 fuit there fhould be no paufe. Every method fhould be em- 
 ployed, — not fo much pofitively to allure the attention of man- 
 kind, or perfuafively to invite them to the adoption of our 
 opinions, — as to remove every reftraint upon thought, and to 
 
 throw 
 
MODE OF EFFECTING REVOLUTIONS. 203 
 
 throw open the temple of fcience and the field of enquiry to all BOOK IV. 
 
 wJtoJUXla 11b 
 
 the world. * « ' 
 
 Section II. 
 
 Thofe inftruments will always be regarded by the difcerning not violence : 
 mind as fufpicious, which may be employed with equal profpecT: 
 of fuccefs on both fides of every queftion. This consideration 
 fhould make us look with averfion upon all refources of violence. 
 When we defcend into the lifted field, we of courfe defert the 
 vantage ground of truth, and commit the decifion to uncertainty 
 and caprice. The phalanx of reafon is invulnerable ; it advances 
 with deliberate and determined pace ; and nothing is able to 
 refill it. But when we lay down our arguments, and take up 
 our fwords, the cafe is altered. Amidft the barbarous pomp of 
 war and the clamorous din of civil brawls, who can tell whether 
 the event fhall be profperous or miferable ? 
 
 ment. 
 
 We muft therefore carefully diftinguifh between informing norrefent- 
 the people and inflaming them. Indignation, refentment and fury 
 are to be deprecated ; and all we fhould afk is fober thought, 
 clear difcernment and intrepid difcuffion. Why were the revo- 
 lutions of America and France a general concert of all orders and 
 defcriptions of men, without fo much (if we bear in mind the 
 multitudes concerned) as almoft a diflcnticnt voice j while the 
 refiftance againft our Charles the firft divided the nation into 
 two equal parts ? Becaufe the latter was the affair of the feven- 
 teenth century, and the former happened in the clofe of the 
 
 D d 2 eighteenth. 
 
_^ 
 
 Section II. 
 
 104 MODE OF EFFECTING REVOLUTIONS. 
 
 BOOKrv. eighteenth. Becaufe in the cafe of America and France philo- 
 fophy had already developed fome of the great principles of 
 political truth, and Sydney and Locke and Montefquieu and 
 Rouffeau had convinced a majority of reflecting and powerful 
 minds of the evils of ufurpation. If thefe revolutions had hap- 
 pened ftill later, not one drop of the blood of one citizen would 
 have been fhed by the hands of another, nor v»ould the event 
 have been marked fo much perhaps as with one folitary inftance 
 of violence and confifcation. 
 
 Latenefs of There are two principles therefore which the man who defires 
 
 event defiva- 
 
 ble. the regeneration of his fpecies ought ever to bear in mind, to 
 
 regard the improvement of every hour as effential in the difco- 
 very and difTemination of truth, and willingly to fufFer the lapfe 
 of years before he urges the reducing his theory into actual exe- 
 cution. With all his caution it is poflible that the impetuous 
 multitude will run before the ftill and quiet progrefs of reafon ; 
 nor will he fternly pafs fentence upon every revolution that fhall 
 by a few years have anticipated the term that wifdom would 
 have prefcribed. But, if his caution be firmly exerted, there is 
 no doubt that he will fuperfede many abortive attempts, and con- 
 fiderably prolong the general tranquillity. 
 
 SECTIO 
 
[ 205 I 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 MEANING OF THE TERM. — ASSOCIATIONS OBJECTED TO 
 
 I. FROM THE SORT OF PERSONS WITH WHOM A JUST 
 REVOLUTION SHOULD ORIGINATE — 2. FROM THE DAN- 
 GER OF TUMULT. OBJECTS OF ASSOCIATION. IN WHAT 
 
 CASES ADMISSIBLE. ARGUED FOR FROM THE NECESSITY 
 
 TO GIVE WEIGHT TO OPINION FROM THEIR TENDENCY 
 
 TO ASCERTAIN OPINION. UNNECESSARY FOR THESE 
 
 PURPOSES. — GENERAL INUTILITY. CONCESSIONS. — IM- 
 PORTANCE OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION. — PROPRIETY 
 OF TEACHING RESISTANCE CONSIDERED. 
 
 A 
 
 QUESTION naturally fuggefts itfelf in this place re- bookiv. 
 
 • CHAP II 
 
 fpecting the propriety of affociations among the people at v " ', 
 
 large, for the purpofe of effecting a change in their political in- Meaning of 
 ftitutions. It mould be obferved, that the affociations here fpoken 
 of are voluntary confederacies of certain members of the fociety 
 with each other, the tendency of which is to give weight to the 
 opinions of the perfons fo affociated, of which the opinions of 
 the unconfederated and infulated part of the community are d'ef- 
 
 titute. 
 
2o6 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 ch? p il* tltute ' ^kis q ue fti° n therefore has nothing in common with that 
 ^~ — '~7? l other, whether in a well organized ftate every individual would 
 not find his place in a deliberative as well as an elective capacity ; 
 the fociety being diflributed into diftricts and departments, and 
 each man poflefling an importance, not meafured by the capri- 
 cious ftandard of fome accidental confederacy, but by a rule im- 
 partially applied to every member of the community. 
 
 Aflbciations Relative then to political auociations, as thus explained, there 
 are two confiderations, which, if they do not afford reafon for 
 undiftinguifhing condemnation, at leaft tend to diminifh our 
 anxiety to their introduction. 
 
 i. from the In the firft place revolutions lefs originate in the energies of 
 
 fortofperfons i • i 
 
 with whom a the people at large, than in the conceptions of perfons of fome 
 
 juft revolu- 
 
 tion fhould degree of ftudy and reflection. I fay, originate, for it muft 
 
 originate : 
 
 be admitted, that they ought ultimately to be determined on by 
 the choice of the whole nation. It is the property of truth to 
 diffufe itfelf. The difficulty is to diftinguifh it in the firft 
 inftance, and in the next to prefent it in that unequivocal form 
 which fhall enable it to command univerfal affent. This muft 
 neceflarily be the tafk of a few. Society, as it at prefent exifts 
 in the world, will long be divided into two claffes, thofe who 
 have leifure for ftudy, and thofe whofe importunate neceffities 
 perpetually urge them to temporary induftry. It is no doubt to 
 be defired, that the latter clafs fhould be made as much as poffible 
 
 to 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 207 
 
 to partake of the privileges of the former. But we fhould be BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 careful, while we liften to the undiftinguifhing demands of be- * ^— — ' 
 
 ' ° ° Section III. 
 
 nevolence, that we do not occafion a greater mifchief than that 
 we undertake to cure. We mould be upon our guard againft an 
 event the confequences of which are always to be feared, the 
 propagating blind zeal, where we meant to propagate reafon. 
 
 The ftudious and reflecting only can be expected to fee 
 deeply into future events. To conceive an order of fociety 
 totally different from that which is now before our eyes, 
 and to judge of the advantages that would accrue from its infti- 
 tution, are the prerogatives only of a few favoured minds. 
 When thefe advantages have been unfolded by fuperior penetra- 
 tion, they cannot yet for fome time be expected to be under- 
 ftood by the multitude. Time, reading and converfation are 
 necelfary to render them familiar. They muft defcend in regu- 
 lar gradation from the mod thoughtful to the moft unobfervant. 
 He, that begins with an appeal to the people, may be fufpected 
 to underftand little of the true character of mind. A unifier de- 
 fign may gain by precipitation ; but true wifdom is beft adapted 
 to a flow, unvarying, inceffant progrefs. 
 
 Human affairs, through every link of the great chain of 
 
 neceffity, are admirably harmonifed and adapted to each other. 
 
 As the people form the laffc ftep in the progrefs of truth, 
 
 they need leaft preparation to induce them to affert it. Their 
 
 3 prejudices 
 
20.3 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 » , > 
 
 Section III. 
 
 prejudices are few and upon the furface. They are the higher 
 orders of fociety, that find, or imagine they find, their advantage 
 in injuftice, and are eager to invent arguments for its defence. 
 In fophiftry they firft feek an excufe for their conduct, and then 
 become the redoubted champions of thofe errors which they have 
 been affiduous to cultivate. The vulgar have no fuch intereft, and 
 fubmit to the reign of injuftice from habit only and the want of 
 reflection. They do not want preparation to receive the truth, 
 fo much as examples to embody it. A very fhort catalogue of 
 reafons is fufficient for them, when they fee the generous and 
 the wife refolved to affert the caufe of juftice. A very fhort 
 period is long enough for them to imbibe the fentiments of 
 patriotifm and liberty. 
 
 daiferVf 15 Secondly, affociations muft be formed with great caution 
 
 tumult. not tQ k £ a ]ii e d t0 t umu it. The conviviality of a feaft may lead 
 
 to the depredations of a riot. While the fympathy of opinion 
 catches from man to man, efpecially in numerous meetings, and 
 among perfons whofe paffions have not been ufed to the curb of 
 judgment, actions may be determined on, which folitary reflec- 
 tion would have rejected. There is nothing more barbarous, cruel 
 and blood-thirfty, than the triumph of a mob. Sober thought 
 {hould always prepare the way to the public affertion of truth. 
 He, that would be the founder of a republic, fhould, like the 
 firft Brutus, be infenfible to the energies of the mod imperious 
 paffions of our nature. 
 
 Upon 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 209 
 
 Upon this fubjed: of auociatidns an obvious diftih&ioh is to ^^ ™' 
 
 be made. Thofe, who are diffutishcd with the government of ^~^^J^ L 
 their country, may aim either at the corrcdion of old errors, or °^K as of 
 
 J * J till l".. I'l'-j '. '•) . 
 
 the counteracting of new encroachments. Eoth thefe cbjeds are 
 legitimate. The wife and the virtuous man ought to fee things 
 precifely as they are, and judge of the adual constitution of his 
 country with the fame impartiality, as if he had limply read of 
 it in the remoteft page of hiftory. 
 
 Thefe two obieds maybe entitled to a different treatment. The In what cafe» 
 
 J ' admuiible. 
 
 firft ought undoubtedly to proceed with a leifurely ftep and in all 
 poflible tranquillity. The fecond appears to require fomething 
 more of adivity. It is the charaderiftic of truth, to truft much 
 to its own energy, and to refill invafion rather by the force of 
 convidion than the force of arms. The individual oppreffed 
 feems however particularly entitled to our affiftance, and this can 
 beft be afforded by the concurrence of many. The cafe may re- 
 quire an early and unequivocal difplay of opinion, and this per- 
 haps will afford an apology for fome fort of affociation, provided 
 it be conduded with all poflible attention to peaceablenefs and 
 good order. 
 
 Few arguments can be of equal importance with that which we Argued for 
 
 from the ne- 
 
 are here difcufling. Few miftakes can be more to be deplored «ffity_to 
 
 give weight 
 
 than that which fhculd induce us to employ immoral and in- t0 °P in >°ns 
 jurious methods for the fupport of a good caufe. It may be 
 
 E e alledged s 
 
2IO 
 
 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Sechon III. 
 
 alledged, " that afTociation is the only expedient for arming the 
 fenfe of the country againft the arts of its oppreflbrs." Why arm? 
 Why fpread a reftlefs commotion over the face of a nation, which 
 may lead to the moft deftructive confequences ? Why feek to 
 beftow upon truth a weight that is not her own ? a weight that 
 muft always produce fome obliquity, fome blind and unen- 
 lightened zeal ? In attempting prematurely to anticipate the 
 conqueft of truth, we fhall infallibly give birth to deformity 
 and abortion. If we have patience to wait her natural progrefs, 
 and to affift her caufe by no arguments that are not worthy of 
 her, the event will be both certain and illuilrious. 
 
 from their 
 tendency to 
 afcertain 
 opinion. 
 
 Unneceflary 
 for thefe 
 purpofes. 
 
 A fimilar anfwer will fuggefl itfelf to the objection, " that 
 aflbciations are neceflary unequivocally to afcertain the opinion 
 of the people." What fort of opinion is that, which thus ftands 
 in need of fome fudden violence to oblige it to ftart from its 
 hiding-place ? The fentiments of mankind are then only equi- 
 vocal in external appearance, when they are unformed and un- 
 certain in the conception. When once the individual knows his 
 own meaning, its fymptoms will be clear and unequivocal. Be 
 not precipitate. If the embryo fentiment at prefent exifting in 
 my mind be true, there is hope that it will gain ftrength by 
 time. If you wifh to affift its growth, let it be by inftrudtion, 
 not by attempting to pafs that fentiment for mine which you 
 only wifh to be fo. If the opinion of the people be not known 
 to-day, it will not fail to fhew itfelf to-morrow. If the opinion 
 
 of 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 211 
 
 of the people be not known to-day, it is becaufe that which you BOOK IV. 
 
 would have fuppofed to be their opinion is not fufhciently their **■ 
 opinion. You might as well think of hiding the inhabitants of 
 England, concealing their towns and their cultivation, and 
 making their country pafs for a defert, as of concealing their 
 real and deliberate fentiment. 
 
 Thefe are the expedients of men who do not know that truth is General in- 
 utility. 
 omnipotent. It may appear to die for a time, but it will not 
 
 fail to revive with frefh vigour. If it have ever failed to pro- 
 duce gradual conviction, it is becaufe it has been told in a 
 meagre, an obfcure or a pufillanimous manner. Ten pages that 
 mould contain an abfolute demonftration of the true interefts of 
 mankind in fociety could no otherwife be prevented from 
 changing the face of the globe, than by the literal deftruction of 
 the paper on which they were written. It would become us to 
 repeat their contents as widely as we were able ; but, if we at- , 
 tempted any thing more than this, it would be a practical proof 
 that we did not know they contained a demonftration. 
 
 Such are the reafonings that fhould decide upon our abftracl: Conceffiont. 
 opinion of every cafe of aflbciation that comes before us. But, 
 though from hence it fhould fufhciently appear that aflbciation is 
 fcarcelyin any cafe to be defired, there are conn derations that fhould 
 lead us fometimes to judge it with moderation and forbearance. 
 There is one mode, according to which the benefit of mankind 
 
 E e 2 may 
 
212 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 E 2° p T Y' ma 7 ^eft be promoted, and which ought always to be employed. 
 > » ' But mankind are imperfe£t beings, and there are certain errors 
 
 Section III. 
 
 of his fpecies which a wife man will be inclined to regard with 
 indulgence. Aflbciations, as a meafure intrinfically wrong, he 
 will endeavour at leaft to poftpone as long as he can. But it 
 muft not be diffembled that in the crifis of a revolution they will 
 fometimes be unavoidable. While opinion is advancing with 
 filent ftep, imagination and zeal may be expected fomewhat to 
 outrun her progrefs. Wifdom will be anxious to hold them at 
 bay ; and, if her votaries be many, fhe will be able to do this 
 long enough to prevent tragical confequences. But, when the 
 call is thrown, when the declaration is made and irrevocable, 
 fhe will not fail, be the confufion greater or lefs, to take the 
 fide of truth, and forward her reign by the bell means that the 
 neceffity of the cafe will admit. 
 
 importance But, though afTociation, in the received fenfe of that term, 
 
 of focial com- , , 
 
 munication. muit be granted to be an inftrument of a very dangerous nature, 
 it fhould be remembered that unreferved communication in a 
 fmaller circle, and efpecially among perfons who are already 
 awakened to the purfuit of truth, is of unqueflionable advantage. 
 There is at prefent in the world a cold referve that keeps man 
 at a diftance from man. There is an art in the practice of 
 which individuals communicate for ever, without any one telling 
 his neighbour what eftimate he fhould form of his attainments 
 and character, how they ought to be employed, and how to be 
 
 improved. 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 213 
 
 improved. There is a fort of domeftic tactics, the object of COOK IV. 
 r J CHAP. II. 
 
 which is to inftruct us to elude curiofity, and to keep up the k « ' 
 
 Slction III. 
 
 tenour of converfation, without the difclolure either of our 
 feelings or our opinions. The philanthropic has no object more 
 deeply at heart than the annihilation of this duplicity and re- 
 ferve. No man can have much kindnefs for his fpecies, who 
 does not habituate himfelf to confider upon each fucceflive occa- 
 fion of focial intercourfe how that occafion may be moll benefi- 
 cently improved. Among the topics to which he will be anxious 
 to awaken attention, politics will occupy a principal fhare. 
 
 Books have by their very nature but a limited operation ; 
 though, on account of their permanence, their- methodical dif- 
 quifition, and their eafinefs of accefs, they are entitled to the 
 foremoft place. But their efficacy ought not to engrofs our 
 confidence. The number of thofe by whom reading is neglect- 
 ed is exceedingly great. Books to thofe by whom they are read 
 have a fort of conftitutional coldnefs. We review the arguments 
 of an " infolent innovator" with fullennefs, and are unwilling to 
 ftretch our minds to take in all their force. It is with difficulty that 
 we obtain the courage of ftriking into untrodden paths, and quef- 
 tioning tenets that have been generally received. But converfation 
 accuftoms us to hear a variety of fentiments, obliges us to exercife 
 patience and attention, and gives freedom and elasticity to our men- 
 tal difquifitions. A thinking man, if he will recollect his intellectual 
 hiftory, will find that he has derived ineftimable advantage from 
 the ftimulus and furprife of colloquial fuggeftions ; and, if he 
 
 review 
 
2i 4 OF FOLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 ^OOK iv. review the hiftory of literature, will perceive that minds of great 
 * ' acutenefs and ability have commonly exifted in a clufter. 
 
 ujectionIII. ' 
 
 It follows that the promoting of the beft interefts of mankind 
 eminently depends upon the freedom of focial communication. 
 Let us imagine to ourfelves a number of individuals, who, having 
 firft ftored their minds with reading and reflection, proceed 
 afterwards in candid and unreferved converfation to compare 
 their ideas, to fuggeft their doubts, to remove their difficulties, 
 and to cultivate a collected and ftriking manner of delivering 
 their fentiments. Let us fuppofe thefe men, prepared by mu- 
 tual intercourfe, to go forth to the world, to explain with fuc- 
 cinclnefs and fimplicity, and in a manner well calculated to arreft 
 attention, the true principles of fociety. Let us fuppofe their 
 hearers inftigated in their turn to repeat thefe truths to their 
 companions. We mall then have an idea of knowledge as per- 
 petually gaining ground, unaccompanied with peril in the means 
 of its diffufion. Reafcn will fpread itfelf, and not a brute and 
 unintelligent fympathy. Difcuflion perhaps never exifts with fo 
 much vigour and utility as in the converfation of two perfons. 
 It may be carried on with advantage in fmall and friendly 
 focieties. Does the fewnefs of their numbers imply the rarity 
 of their exiftence ? Far otherwife : the time perhaps will come 
 when fuch inftitutions will be univerfal. Shew to mankind by a 
 few examples the advantages of political difcuflion undebauched 
 by political enmity and vehemence, and the beauty of the fpec- 
 tacle will foon render the example contagious. Every man will 
 
 commune 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. *\ 5 
 
 commune with his neighbour. Every man will be eager to tell BOOK IV. 
 and to hear what the intereft of all requires them to know. ' • ' 
 
 Section III. 
 
 The bolts and fortifications of the temple of truth will be re- 
 moved. The craggy fteep of fcience, which it was before difficult 
 to afcend, will be levelled with the plain. Knowledge will be ac- 
 ceflible to all. Wifdom will be the inheritance of man, from 
 which none will be excluded but by their own heedleflhcfs and 
 prodigality. If thefe ideas cannot completely be realifed, till 
 the inequality of conditions and the tyranny of government are 
 rendered fomewhat lefs oppreflive, this affords no reafon againft 
 the fetting afloat fo generous a fyftem. The improvement of 
 individuals and the melioration of political inftitutions are 
 deftined mutually to produce and reproduce each other. Truth, 
 and above all political truth, is not hard of acquifition, but from 
 the fupercilioufnefs of its profeflbrs. It has been flow and 
 tedious of improvement, becaufe the ftudy of it has been rele- 
 gated to doctors and civilians. It has produced little effect upon 
 the practice of mankind, becaufe it has not been allowed a plain ^ 
 and direct appeal to their underftandings. Remove thefe obfta- 
 cles, render it the common property, bring it into daily ufe, 
 and you may reafonably promife yourfelf confequences of the 
 moft ineftimable value. 
 
 But thefe confequences are the property only of independent 
 
 and impartial difcuflion. If once the unambitious and candid 
 
 circles of enquiring men be fwallowed up in the infatiate gulf 
 
 of noify affemblies, the opportunity of improvement is inftantly 
 
 4 annihilated. 
 
Section ill. 
 
 216" OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS', 
 
 S?5Vt- T X" annihilated. The happy varieties of fentiment which fa emi- 
 nently contribute to intellectual acutenefs are loft. Activity of 
 thought is fhackled by the fear that our aflociates fnould diic'laim. 
 us. A fallacious uniformity of opinion is produced, which no 
 man efpeufes from conviction, but which carries all men along 
 with a refifdefs tide. Clubs, in the old Engiifh fenfe, that is, 
 the periodical meeting of fmall and independent circles, may 
 be admitted to fall within the line of thefe principles. But they 
 ceafe to be admifhble, when united with the tremendous appa- 
 ratus of articles of confederacy and committees of correfpond- 
 ence. Human beings fhould meet together, not to enforce, 
 but to enquire. Truth difclaims the alliance of marihalied 
 numbers. 
 
 It feems fcarcely neceffary to add, that the individuals who 
 are engaged in the tranfaclions here cenfured, have frequently 
 been inftigated by the beft intentions, and informed with the 
 moft liberal views. It would be in the higheft degree unjuft, if 
 their undertakings fhould be found of dangerous tendency, to 
 involve the authors in indifcriminate cenfure for confequences 
 which they did not forefee. But at the fame time, in propor- 
 tion to the purity of their views and the foundnefs of their 
 principles, it were eameftly to be defired that they would 
 ierioufly reflect on the means they employ. It,would be deeply 
 to be lamented, if thofe who were the trueft friends to the wel- 
 fare of mankind, mould come, by the injudicioufnefs of their 
 conduit, to rank among its enemies. 
 
 From 
 
OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 217 
 
 From what has been faid it is fufficiently evident, that no alarm 5? T 0K IV ' 
 
 J ' CHAP. II. 
 
 can be more groundlefs, than that of violence and precipitation * v — rr? 
 
 * * Section 111. 
 
 from the enlightened advocates of political iuftice. There is Pro P™ et >' of 
 
 however another objection which has been urged againft them, 
 
 teaching re 
 
 fiilance 
 
 fidered 
 
 built upon the fuppofed inexpediency of inculcating upon the peo- 
 ple at large the propriety of occafional refiftance to the authority 
 of government. " Obedience," fay thefe objectors " is the rule ; 
 refiftance the exception. Now what can be more prepofterous, 
 than perpetually to infift with all the pomp of eloquence upon 
 an expedient, to which only an extreme neceffity can oblige us 
 to have recourfe* ?" 
 
 It has already been {hewn that obedience, that is, a furrender 
 of the understanding to the voice of authority, is a rule to which 
 it can never be creditable to human beings to conform. Tran- 
 quillity indeed, a ftate in which a man mall leaft be difturbed 
 in the exercife of his private judgment by the interpofition of 
 violence, is an object we mould conftantly endeavour to promote ; 
 but this tranquillity the principles here inculcated have little 
 tendency to difturb. 
 
 There is certainly no truth which it can be for the general 
 intereft to conceal. It muft be confefled indeed, that a fingle 
 
 * This argument, nearly in the words here employed, may be found in 
 Hume's Eflay on Paflive Obedience. ElTays, Part II, Eflay xiii. 
 
 F f truth 
 
2i8 OF POLITICAL ASSOCIATIONS. 
 
 chap nf ' trutn ma y be £° detached from the feries to which it belongs, as, 
 ^ "~~^t when feparately told, to have the nature of falfhood. But this 
 
 Section III. r j ■> 
 
 is by no means the cafe in the prefent inftance. To inform 
 mankind of thofe general principles upon which all political in- 
 ftitutions ought to be built, is not to difFufe partial information. 
 To difcover to them their true interefts, and lead them to conceive 
 of a ftate of fociety more uncorrupt and more equitable than 
 that in which they live, is not to inculcate fome rare exception 
 to a general rule. If there be any government which muft be 
 indebted for its perpetuity to ignorance, that government is the 
 curfe of mankind. In proportion as men are made to under- 
 ftand their true interefts, they will conduct themfelves wifely, 
 both when they act and when they forbear, and their conduct 
 will therefore promife the moft advantageous iflue. He, whofe 
 mind has carefully been inured to the dictates of reafon, is of all 
 men leaft likely to convert into the rafh and headftrong invader 
 of the general weal.. 
 
 SECTION 
 
[ 219 ] 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 OF THE SPECIES OF REFORM TO BE DESIRED. 
 
 OUGHT IT TO BE PARTIAL OR ENTIRE ? — TRUTH MAY 
 NOT BE PARTIALLY TAUGHT. PARTIAL REFORMA- 
 TION CONSIDERED. — OBJECTION. — ANSWER. PARTIAL 
 
 REFORM INDISPENSIBLE. — NATURE OF A JUST REVOLU- 
 TION — HOW DISTANT ? 
 
 THERE is one more queftion which cannot fail occa- BOOK IV. 
 _ * CHAP. II. 
 fionally to fuggeft itfelf to the advocate of focial reform- * « ' 
 
 Section IV. 
 
 ation. " Ought we to defire to fee this reformation introduced Ought it to 
 
 be partial or 
 
 gradually or at once ?" Neither fide of this dilemma prefents cntire • 
 us with the proper expedient. 
 
 No project can be more injurious to the caufe of truth, than Truth may 
 
 not be par- 
 
 that of prefenting it imperfectly and by parcels to the attention tia % taught. 
 of mankind. Seen in its juft light, the effect produced cannot 
 fail to be confiderable ; but, fhewn in fome partial and imperfect 
 way, it will afford a thoufand advantages to its adverfaries. 
 Many objections will feem plaufible, which a full view of the 
 fubjcdt would have diffipafed. Whatever limits truth is error ; 
 and of confequence fuch a limited view cannot fail to include a 
 
 F f 2 considerable 
 
220 
 
 OF THE SPECIES OF 
 
 Section IV. 
 
 ^S ap tT' con fi^erable mixture of error. Many ideas may be excellent as 
 parts of a great whole, which, when violently torn from their 
 connection, will not only ceafe to be excellent, but may in fome 
 cafes become pofitively injurious. In this war of pofts and 
 fkirmifhes victory will perpetually appear to be doubtful, and 
 men will either be perfuaded, that truth itfelf is of little value, 
 or that human intellect is fo narrow as to render the difcovery 
 of truth a hopelefs purfuit. 
 
 Partial re- 
 formal -on 
 confidered. 
 
 Objection. 
 
 It may be alledged, that " one of the confederations of 
 greateft influence in human affairs is that of the gradual decline 
 of ill things to worfe, till at length the mifchief, having proceed- 
 ed to its higheft climax, can maintain itfelf no longer. The 
 argument in favour of focial improvement would lofe much of 
 its relative energy, if the opportunity of a fecret comparifon of 
 poflible good with actual evil were taken away. All partial 
 reforms are of the nature of palliatives. They fkin over the 
 difeafed part inftead of extirpating the difeafe. By giving a 
 fmall benefit, perhaps a benefit only in appearance, they cheat 
 us of the fuperior good we ought to have demanded. By 
 {tripping error of a part of its enormities, they give it frefh 
 vigour and a longer duration." 
 
 Anfwer. We muft be cautious however of pufhing this argument too 
 
 far. To fuppofe that truth ftands in abfolute need of a foil, 
 
 or that me cannot produce full conviction by her native light, is 
 
 4 a con- 
 
REFORM TO BE DESIRED. tzi 
 
 a conception unworthy of her enlightened advocates. The true BOOK IV. 
 folution will probably be found in the accurately diftinguithino; J * * 
 
 J ° Section IV, 
 
 the fources of reform. Whatever reform, general or partial, fhall 
 be fuggefted to the community at large by an unmutilated view 
 of the fubje£t, ought to be feen with fome degree of complacency. 
 But a reform, that mail be offered us by thofe whofe intereft is 
 fuppofed to lie in the perpetuating of abufe, and the intention of 
 which is rather to give permanence to error by diverting it of its 
 moil odious features, is little entitled to our countenance. The 
 true principle of focial improvement lies in the correcting public 
 opinion. Whatever reform is ftolen upon the community un- 
 regarded, and does not fpontaneoufly flow from the energy of 
 the general mind, is unworthy of congratulation. It is in 
 this refpecl with nations as with individuals. He that quits a 
 vicious habit, not from reafon and conviction, but becaufe his 
 appetites no longer folicit him to its indulgence, does not deferve 
 the epithet of virtuous. The object it becomes us to purfue is, 
 to give vigour to public opinion, not to fink it into liftleflnefs 
 and indifference. 
 
 When partial reformation proceeds from its legitimate caufe, Gradual re 
 the progrefs fociety l.as made in the acquisition of truth, penfible. 
 it may frequently be entitled to our applaufe. Man is the 
 creature of habits. Gradual improvement is a mod confpicuous 
 law of his nature. When therefore fome considerable advantage 
 is fufficiently underftood by the community to induce them to 
 
 defire 
 
222 OF THE SPECIES OF 
 
 BOOK IV. defire its eftablifhment, that eftablifhment will afterwards read 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 * >, • to the enlightening of intellect and the generating of virtue. It 
 
 Section IV. 
 
 is natural for us to take our Hand upon fome leading truth, and 
 from thence explore the regions we have ftill to traverfe. 
 
 There is indeed a fenfe in which gradual improvement is the 
 Only alternative between reformation and no reformation. All 
 human intellects are at fea upon the great ocean of infinite truth, 
 and their voyage though attended with hourly advantage will 
 never be at an end. If therefore we will ftay till we fhall have 
 devifed a reformation fo complete, as fhall need no farther re- 
 formation to render it more complete, we fhall eternally remain 
 in inaction. Whatever is fairly underftood upon general prin- 
 ciples by a confiderable part of the community, and oppofed by 
 none or by a very few, may be confidered as fufficiently ripe for 
 execution. 
 
 Nature of a To recapitulate the principal object of this chapter, I would 
 
 tion. 
 
 once again repeat, that violence may fuit the plan of any political 
 partifan, rather than of him that pleads the caufe of fimple juf- 
 tice. There is even a fenfe in which the reform aimed at by the 
 true politician may be affirmed to be lefs a gradual than an entire 
 one, without contradicting the former pofition. The complete re- 
 formation that is wanted, is not inftant but future reformation. 
 It can in reality fcarcely be confidered as of the nature of action. 
 It confifts in an univerfal illumination. Men feel their fitua- 
 7 tion, 
 
REFORM TO BE DESIRED. 223 
 
 tion, and the reftraints, that fhackled them before, vanifh like a BOOK IV. 
 ' ' ' CHAl\ II. 
 
 mere deception. When the true crifis fhall come, not a fword ' « ' 
 
 * Section IV. 
 
 will need to be drawn, not a finger to be lifted up. The adver- 
 faries will be too few and too feeble to dare to make a ftand 
 againfl the univerfal fenfe of mankind. 
 
 Nor do thefe ideas imply, as at firft fight they might feem to How dlftant ? 
 imply, that the revolution is at an immeafurable diftance. It is 
 of the nature of human affairs that great changes fhould appear 
 to be fudden, and great difcoveries to be made unexpectedly, 
 and as it were by accident. In forming the mind of a young 
 perfon, in endeavouring to give a new bent to that of a perfon 
 of maturer years, I fhall for a long time feem to have produced 
 little effect, and the fruits will fhew themfelves when I leaft ex- 
 pected them. The kingdom of truth comes not with oftentation. 
 The feeds of virtue may appear to perifh before they germinate- 
 
 To recur once more to the example of France, the works of 
 her great political writers feemed for a long time to produce little 
 profpect of any practical effect. Helvetius, one of the lateft, in a 
 work publifhed after his death in 1771, laments in pathetic ftrains 
 the hopelefs condition of his country. " In the hiflory of every 
 people," fays he, " there are moments, in which, uncertain of 
 the fide they fhall choofe, and balanced between political good 
 and evil, they feel a defire to be inftructed ; in which the foil, fo 
 to exprefs m-yfelf, is in fome manner prepared, and may eafily be 
 
 impiegnatej 
 
224 OF THE SPECIES OF 
 
 F-StTd ] 7r impregnated with the dew of truth. At fuch a moment the pub- 
 ^ * — 77^ lication of a valuable book may give birth to the moft aufpicious 
 
 Suction IV. ' ° r 
 
 reforms ; but, when that moment is no more, the nation, become 
 infenfible to the bed motives, is by the nature of its government 
 plunged deeper and deeper in ignorance and ftupidity. The foil 
 ' of intellect is then hard and impenetrable ; the rains may fall, 
 may fpread their moifture upon the furface, but the profpect of 
 fertility is gone. Such is the condition of France. Her people 
 are become the contempt of Europe. No falutary crifis fhall ever 
 reftore them to liberty*." 
 
 But in fpite of thefe melancholy predictions, the work of re- 
 novation was in continual progrefs. The American revolution 
 gave the finifhing ftroke, and only fix years elapfed between the 
 completion of American liberty and the commencement of the 
 French revolution. Will a term longer than this be necefTary, 
 
 * " Dans chaqtie nation il eji des momens ou les citoyens, incertains du parti qu'ils 
 doivent prendre, et fufpendus entre tin bon et un mauvais gouvernement, eprouvent la 
 foifde I'inflruBion, ou les efprits,fi je I'ofe dire, prepares et ameublis peuvent etrefa- 
 cilement penetres de la rofie de la verite. £hi'en ce moment un bon ouvrage paroiffe, 
 il peut opirer d'heureufes reformes : mais cet infant paffe, les citoyens, infenfible s a la 
 gloire, font par la forme de leur gouvernement invinciblement entraines vers I'ignorance 
 et Vabratiffement. Alors les tfprits font la terre endurcie : I'eau de la verite y tombe, 
 y coule, mais fans lafhonder. Tel ejl I' Hat de la France. Cette nation avilie ell au- 
 joutd'hui le mepris de V Europe. Nulle crife falutaire tie lui rendra la liberte." 
 
 De I'Homme, Preface. 
 
 before 
 
REFORM TO BE DESI RED. 2=5 
 
 before France, the molt refined and confiderable nation in the 529p \Y' 
 world, will lead other nations to imitate and improve upon her * * ' 
 
 OiCTiONiV. 
 
 plan ? Let the true friend of man be inceffant in the propaga- 
 tion of truth, and vigilant to counteract all the caufes that might 
 difturb the regularity of her progrefs, and he will have every 
 reafo.n to hope an early and a favourable event. 
 
 g CHAP. 
 
[ 226 j 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF TYRANNICIDE. 
 
 DIVERSITY OF OPINIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. ARGUMENT IN 
 
 ITS VINDICATION. THE DESTRUCTION OF A TYRANT 
 
 NOT A CASE OF EXCEPTION. — CONSEQUENCES OF TYRAN- 
 NICIDE. — ASSASSINATION DESCRIBED. — IMPORTANCE OF 
 SINCERITY. 
 
 BOOK IV. A QUESTION, conneded with the mode of effecting re- 
 
 CriAP. III. r — ^ 
 
 * ' •*■ -*- volutions, and which has been eagerly difcufled among 
 
 Diverfity of 
 
 opinions on political reafoners, is that of tyrannicide. The moralifts of anti- 
 
 thisfubjeft. r • ' J 
 
 quity warmly contended for the lawfulnefs of this practice ; by 
 the moderns it has generally been condemned. 
 
 Argument In The arguments in its favour are built upon a very obvious 
 
 Its vindica- 
 tion, principle. " Juftice ought univerfally to be adminiftered. Upon 
 
 lefler criminals it is done, or pretended to be done, by the laws 
 of the community. But criminals by whom law is fubverted, and 
 who overturn the liberties of mankind, are out of the reach of the 
 ordinary adminiftration of juftice. If juftice be partially admi- 
 niftered in fubordinate cafes, and the rich man be able to opprefs 
 I the 
 
OF TYRANNICIDE. 227 
 
 the poor with impunity, it muft be admitted that a few examples BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. III.. 
 
 of this fort are infufficient to authorife the laft appeal of human ' » ' 
 
 beings. But no man will deny that the cafe of the ulurper and 
 the defpot is of the mod atrocious nature. In this inftance, all 
 the provifions of civil policy being fuperfeded, and juftice poi- 
 foned at the fource, every man is left to execute for himfelf the 
 decrees of eternal equity." 
 
 It may however be doubted whether the deftruction of a ty- The deltruc- 
 
 r r • t,on °^ a 'y* 
 
 rant be in any refpect a cafe of exception from the rules proper rant not a 
 
 cafeofcxccp- 
 
 to be obferved upon ordinary'- occafions. The tyrant has cer- tion. 
 tainly no particular fanctity annexed to his perfon, and may be 
 .killed with as little fcruple as any other man, when the object is 
 that of repelling immediate violence. In all other cafes, the ex- 
 tirpation of the offender by a felf-appointed authority, does not 
 appear to be the proper mode of counteracting injuflice. 
 
 For, firft, either the nation, whofe tyrant you would deftroy, Confequ 
 is ripe for the affertion and maintenance of its liberty, or it is not. cid«u 
 If it be, the tyrant ought to be depofed with every appearance 
 of publicity. Nothing can be more improper, than for an affair, 
 interefting to the general weal, to be conducted as if it were an 
 act of darknefs and fhame. It is an ill leffon we read to man- 
 kind, when a proceeding, built upon the broad bafis of general 
 juftice, is permitted to fhrink from public fcrutiny. The pift(i 
 and the dagger may as eafily be made the auxiliaries of vice as 
 
 G g 2 of 
 
 ences 
 
228 OF TYRANNICIDE. 
 
 CHAP, iil °f v i rtue « To profcribe all violence, and neglect no means of 
 v information and impartiality, is the moft effectual fecurity we 
 
 can have for an iffue conformable to the voice of reafon and 
 truth. 
 
 If the nation be not ripe for a ftate of freedom, the man, 
 who aflumes to himfelf the right of interpofing violence, may in- 
 deed fhew the fervour of his conception, and gain a certain de- 
 gree of notoriety. Fame he will not gain, for mankind at pre- 
 fent regard an act of this fort with merited abhorrence ; and he 
 will inflict new calamities on his country. 1 he confequences 
 of tyrannicide are well known. If the attempt prove abortive, 
 it renders the tyrant ten times more bloody, ferocious, and cruel 
 than before. If it fucceed, and the tyranny be reftored, it pro- 
 duces the fame effect upon his fucceffors. In the climate of def- 
 potifm fome folitary virtues may fpring up. But in the midft of 
 plots and confpiracies there is neither truth, nor confidence, nor 
 love, nor humanity. 
 
 Aflkffinati'on Secondly, the true merits of the queftion will be ftill farther 
 
 defcnbed. 
 
 underftood, if we reflect on the nature of aflafli nation. The 
 miftake, which has been inciu-red upon this fubject, is to be im- 
 puted principally to the fuperficial view that has been taken of , 
 it. If its advocates had followed the confpirator through all his 
 windings, and obferved his perpetual alarm left truth mould be- 
 come known, they would probably have been lefs indifcriminate 
 
 4 ' in 
 
OF TYRANNICIDE. 229 
 
 In their applaufe. No action can be imagined more directly at BOOK TV. 
 rr ? * CHAP. ill. 
 
 ^ 
 
 war with a principle of ingenuoufnefs and candour. Like all 
 that is moft odious in the catalogue of vices, it delights in obfcu- 
 rity. It fhrinks from the penetrating eye of wifdom. It avoids 
 all queftion, and hefitates and trembles before the queftioner. It 
 ftruggles for a tranquil gaiety, and is only complete where there 
 is the moil perfect hypocrify. It changes the ufe of fpeech, and 
 compofes ever) 7 feature the better to deceive. Imagine to your- 
 felf the confpirators, kneeling at the feet of Cxfar, as they did 
 the moment before they deftroyed him. Not all the virtue of 
 Brutus can fave them from your indignation. 
 
 There cannot be a better inftance than that of which we are Importance 
 treating, to prove the importance of gen ral fincerity. We fee in 
 this example, that an action, which has been undertaken from 
 the belt motives, may by a defect in this particular tend to over- 
 turn the very foundations of juftice and happinefs. Wherever 
 there is alTafTination, there is an end to all confidence among 
 men. Proteus and alTeverations go for nothing. No man pre- 
 fumes to know his neighbour's intention. The boundaries, that 
 have hitherto ferved to divide virtue and vice, are gone. The 
 true interefts of mankind require, not their removal, but their 
 confirmation. All morality proceeds upon the alTumption of 
 fomething evident and true, will grow and expand in proportion 
 as thefe indications are more clear and unequivocal, and could 
 not exift for a moment, if they were deftroyed. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
I 230 3 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE CULTIVATION OF TRUTH. 
 
 BOOK IV. "I^ERHAPS there cannot be a fubject of greater political 
 
 *. .. ' 
 
 PE1 
 ir 
 
 importance, or better calculated to lead us in fafety through 
 the mazes of controverfy, than that of the value of truth. Truth 
 may be confidered by us, either abftractedly, as it relates to certain 
 general and unchangeable principles, or practically, as it relates 
 to the daily incidents and ordinary commerce of human life. 
 In whichever of thefe views we confider it, the more deeply we 
 meditate its nature and tendency, the more fhall we be ftruck 
 with its unrivalled importance. 
 
 SECTION 
 
[ 831 ] 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 OF ABSTRACT OR GENERAL TRUTH. 
 
 ITS IMPORTANCE AS CONDUCING — TO OUR INTELLECTU AL 
 
 IMPROVEMENT TO OUR MORAL IMPROVEMENT. VIRTUE. 
 
 THE BEST SOURCE OF HAPPINESS. — PROVED BY COMPARI- 
 SON — BY ITS MANNER OF ADAPTING ITSELF TO ALL 
 SITUATIONS — BY ITS UNDECAYING EXCELLENCE — CAN- 
 NOT BE EFFECTUALLY PROPAGATED BUT BY A CULTI- 
 VATED MIND. — IMPORTANCE OF GENERAL TRUTH TO 
 OUR POLITICAL IMPROVEMENT. 
 
 ABSTRACTEDLY confidered, it conduces to the perfection BOOK IV. 
 CHAP - IV « 
 of our understandings, our virtue and our political infti- v , ' 
 
 Section I. 
 tUtionS. Its import- 
 
 ance as con- 
 ducing 
 
 In the difcovery and knowledge of truth is comprifed all that to our Intel - 
 
 • • in- • • leftual im- 
 
 which an impartial and reflecting mind is accuftomed to admire, provement: 
 It is not poffible for us ferioufly to doubt concerning the pre- 
 ference of a capacious and ardent intelligence over the limited 
 perceptions of a brute. All that we can imagine of angels and' 
 Gods confifts in fuperior wifdom. Do you fay in power alfo ? 
 It will prefently appear that wifdom is power. The truths of 
 
 general 
 
«3' 
 
 OF THE CULTIVATION 
 
 BOOK IV. general nature, thofe truths which preceded, either fubftantially 
 CHAP. iv. t> ' r j / 
 
 1 •' * or in the nature of things, the particular exiftences that fur- 
 
 Section I. . 
 
 round us, and are independent of them all, are inexhauftible. 
 Is it poflible that a knowledge of thefe truths, the truths of ma- 
 thematics, of metaphyfics and morals, the truths which, accord- 
 ing to Plato's conception *, taught the creator of the world the 
 nature of his materials, the refult of his operations, the confe- 
 quences of all poflible fyftems in all their detail, mould not exalt 
 and elevate the mind ? The truths of particular nature, the hif- 
 tory of man, the characters and propenfities of human be- 
 ings, the procefs of our own minds, the capacity of our natures, 
 are fcarcely lefs valuable. The reafon they are fo will beft ap- 
 pear if we confider, fecondly, the tendency of truth in con- 
 ducing to the perfection of our virtue. 
 
 to our moral Virtue cannot exift in an eminent degree, unaccompanied by 
 an extenfive furvey of caufes and their confequences, fo that, 
 having ftruck an accurate balance between the mixed benefits 
 and injuries that for the prefent adhere to all human affairs, we 
 may adopt that conduct which leads to the greater! poflible ad- 
 vantage. If there be fuch a thing as virtue, it mult admit of 
 degrees. If it admit of degrees, he muft be moft virtuous, who 
 choofes with the foundeft judgment the greateft poflible good of 
 his fpecies. But, in order to choofe the greateft poflible good, 
 
 * See the Parmenides. 
 
 be 
 
CHAP. IV. 
 Section I. 
 
 O F T R U T H. 233 
 
 he muft be deeply acquainted with the nature of man, its gene- BOO K rv 
 ral features and its varieties. In order to execute it, he muft 
 have confidered all the inftruments for imprefling mind, and 
 the different modes of applying them, and muft know exactly 
 the proper moment for bringing them into action. In what- 
 ever light we confider virtue, whether we place it in the action 
 or the difpofition, its degree muft be intimately connected with 
 the degree of knowledge. No man can love virtue fufficiently, 
 who has not an acute and lively perception of its beauty, and 
 its tendency to produce the only folid and permanent happinefs. 
 What comparifon can be made between the virtue of Socrates 
 and that of a Hottentot or a Siberian ? A humorous example 
 how univerfally this truth has been perceived might be drawn 
 from Tertullian, who, as a father of the church, was obliged to 
 maintain the hollownefs and infignificance of pagan virtues, and 
 accordingly allures us, " that the moft ignorant peafant under the 
 Chriftian difpenfation pofleffed more real knowledge than the 
 wifeft of the ancient philofophers *." 
 
 We fhall be ftill more fully aware of the connection between Vtrtue the 
 virtue and knowledge, if we confider that the higheft employ- ofhappinefc: 
 ment of virtue is to propagate itfelf. Virtue alone is happinefs. proved by 
 
 companion : 
 
 The happinefs of a brute that fpends the greater part of his life 
 in liftleflhefs and fleep, is but one remove from the happinefs of 
 a plant that is full of fap, vigour and nutrition. The happinefs 
 
 * Apologia, Cap. xlvi. See this fubjecl: farther purfued in Appendix, No. I. 
 
 H h of 
 
234 0F THE CULTIVATION 
 
 rw a p \v °^ a man wn0 P urmes licentious pleafure is momentary, and his 
 >— > — r J intervals of Wearinefs and difguft perpetual. He fpeedily wears 
 himfelf out in his fpecious career ; and, every time that he em- 
 ploys the means of delight which his corporeal exiftence affords 
 him, takes fo much from his capacity of enjoyment. If he be 
 wife enough like Epicurus to perceive a part of thefe difad- 
 vantages, and to find in frefh herbs and the water of the fpring 
 the trueft gratification of his appetite, he will be obliged to feek 
 fome addition to his ftock of enjoyment, and like Epicurus to 
 become benevolent out of pure fenfuality. But the virtuous 
 man has a perpetual fource of enjoyment. The only reafon on 
 account of which the truth of this affertion was ever contro- 
 verted, is, that men have not underftood what it was that con- 
 ftituted virtue. 
 
 by its manner It is impoflible that any fituation can occur in which virtue 
 
 of adapting 
 
 itfeiftoaii cannot find room to expatiate. In fociety there is continual 
 
 fituations : 
 
 opportunity for its active employment. I cannot have inter- 
 courfe with any human being who may not be the better for 
 that intercourfe. If he be already juft and virtuous, thefe qua- 
 lities are improved by communication. It is from a fimilar 
 principle that it has been obferved that great geniufes have 
 ufually exifted in a clufter, and have been awakened by the fire 
 ftruck into them by their neighbours. If he be imperfect and 
 erroneous, there mull be always fome prejudice I may contri- 
 bute to deftroy, fome motive to delineate, fome error to remove* 
 7 U 
 
OF TRUTH. 235 
 
 If I be prejudiced and imperfect myfelf, it cannot however happen J*00 K IV. 
 
 that my prejudices and imperfections mall be exactly coincident o — ~ W ~~T' 
 
 with his. I may therefore inform him of the truths that I know, 
 
 and even by the collifion of prejudices truth is elicited. It is 
 
 impoffible that I fhould ftrenuoufly apply myfelf to his mind 
 
 with fincere motives of benevolence without fome good being 
 
 the remit. Nor am I more at a lofs in folitude. In folitude I 
 
 may accumulate the materials of focial benefit. No fituation can 
 
 be fo defperate as to preclude thefe efforts. Voltaire, when 
 
 fhut up in the Baftille, and for ought he knew for life, deprived 
 
 of books, of pens and of paper, arranged and in part executed 
 
 the project of his Henriade *. 
 
 Another advantage of virtue in this perfonal view, is that, by its unde- 
 
 caying exccl- 
 
 while fenfual pleafure exhaufts the frame, and paffions often ex- fence : 
 cited become frigid and callous, virtue has exactly the oppofite 
 propenfities. Paffions, in the ufual acceptation of that term, 
 having no abfolute foundation in the nature of things, delight 
 only by their novelty. But the more we are acquainted with 
 virtue, the more eftimable will it appear ; and its field is as end- 
 lefs as the progrefs of mind. If an enlightened love of it be 
 once excited in the mind, it is impoffible that it fhould not con- 
 tinually increafe. By its variety, by its activity it perpetually 
 
 * Vie de Voltaire, par M*** (faid to be the marquis de Villette). A Geneve, 
 1 786. Chap. iv. This is probably the beft hiftory of this great man which has 
 yet appeared. 
 
 H h 2 renovates 
 
236 OF THE CULTIVATION 
 
 BOQKiV. renovates itfelf, and renders the intellect in which it refide* 
 
 StCTION I. 
 
 ever new and ever young. 
 
 eannot be ef- All thefe reafonings are calculated to perfuade us that the mofl 
 
 foiitually pro- ° 
 
 pagated but precious boon we can beftow upon others is virtue, that the 
 yatedmtnd. higheft employment of virtue is to propagate itfelf. But, as 
 virtue is infeparably connected with knowledge in my own 
 mind, fo can it only by knowledge be communicated to others. 
 How can the virtue we have juft been contemplating be created, 
 but by infufmg comprehenfive views and communicating ener- 
 getic truths ? Now that man alone is qualified to give thefe 
 views, and communicate thefe truths, who is himfelf pervaded 
 with them. 
 
 Let us fuppofe for a moment virtuous difpofitions as exifting 
 without knowledge or outrunning knowledge, the laft of which 
 is certainly poflible, and we fhall prefently find how little fuch 
 virtue is worthy to be propagated. The rnoft generous views 
 will in fuch cafes frequently lead to the moll nefarious actions. 
 A Calvin will burn Servetus, and a Digby generate the gun- 
 powder treafon. But, to leave thefe extreme inftances, in all 
 cafes where miftaken virtue leads to cruel and tyrannical actions, 
 the mind will be foured and made putrefcent by the actions it 
 perpetrates. Truth, immortal and ever prefent truth, is fo 
 powerful, that, in fpite of all his inveterate prejudices, the 
 upright man will fufpect himfelf, when he refolves upon an 
 
 action 
 
OF TRUTH, 237 
 
 action that is at war with the plained principles of morality. BOOK W 
 He will become melancholy, difiatisfied and an-cious. His firm- „ *~-r* 
 
 *•**" * * Section I. 
 
 nefs will degenerate into obftinacy, and his juftice into inexora- 
 ble feverity. The farther he purfues his fyftem, the more erro- 
 neous will he become. The farther he purfues it, the lefs will 
 he be fatisfied with it. As truth is an endlefs fource of tranquil- 
 lity and delight, error will be a prolific fountain of new miftakes 
 and new difcontent. 
 
 As to the third point, the tendency of truth to the improve- Importance 
 
 of general 
 
 ment of our political inftitutions, this is in reality the fubject of tru th to our 
 
 political im- 
 
 the prefent volume, and has been particularly argued in fome of provement. 
 the earlier divifions of the work. If politics be a fcience, the 
 inveftigation of truth muft be the means of unfolding it. If 
 men refemble each other in more numerous and eflential par- 
 ticulars than thofe in which they differ, if the beft purpofes that 
 can be accomplifhed reflecting them be to make them free and 
 virtuous and wife, there muft be one beft method of advancing 
 thefe common purpofes, one beft mode of focial exiftence 
 deducible from the principles of their nature. If truth be one, 
 there muft be one code of truths on the fubject of our reciprocal 
 duties. Nor is the inveftigation of truth only the beft mode of 
 arriving at the object of all political inftitutions, but it is alfo the 
 beft mode of introducing and eftablifhing it. Difcuflion is the 
 path that leads to difcovery and demonftration. Motives fer- 
 ment in the minds of great bodies of men till all is ripe for 
 
 action* 
 
238 O F S I N C E R I T Y. 
 
 5S° n J X't adion. The more familiar the mind becomes with the ideas of 
 
 Crl-lr. IV. 
 
 g" — *~r - ' which they confift and the proportions that exprefs them, the 
 more fully is it pervaded with their urgency and importance. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 OF SINCERITY 
 
 NATURE OF THIS VIRTUE. — ITS EFFECTS — UPON OUR OWN 
 ACTIONS — UPON OUR NEIGHBOURS. — ITS TENDENCY TO 
 PRODUCE FORTITUDE. — EFFECTS OF INSINCERITY. — CHA- 
 RACTER WHICH SINCERITY WOULD ACQUIRE TO HIM 
 WHO PRACTISED IT. — OBJECTIONS. — THE FEAR OF 
 
 GIVING UNNECESSARY PAIN. ANSWER. THE DESIRE 
 
 OF PRESERVING MY LIFE. — THIS OBJECTION PROVES 
 TOO MUCH. — ANSWER. — SECRECY CONSIDERED. — THE SE- 
 CRETS OF OTHERS. — STATE SECRETS. — SECRETS OF PHI- 
 LANTHROPY. 
 
 Section II T T is evident in the laft place, that a ftridT: adherence to truth 
 
 N^ToTthil will have the bell effetl: upon our minds in the ordinary 
 
 commerce of life. This is the virtue which has commonly been 
 
 known by the denomination of fincerity ; and, whatever certain 
 
 accom- 
 
O F S I N C E R I T Y. 239 
 
 accommodating moralifts may teach us, the value of fincerity ^9PJ^ \Y: 
 will be in the higheft degree obfcured, when it is not complete. ]■ * — ~i 
 
 <=><-> r Section II. 
 
 Real fincerity depofes me from all authority over the ftatement 
 of fads. Similar to the duty which Tully impofes upon the 
 hiftorian, it compels me not to dare " to utter what is falfe, or 
 conceal what is true." It annihilates the baftard prudence, which 
 would inftruct me to give language to no fentiment that may be 
 prejudicial to my interefts. It extirpates the low and felfifh 
 principle, which would induce me to utter nothing " to the dis- 
 advantage of him from whom I have received no injury." It 
 compels, me to regard the concerns of my fpecies as my own 
 concerns. "What I know of truth, of morals, of religion, of 
 government, it compels me to communicate. All the praife 
 which a virtuous man and an honeft action can merit, I am 
 obliged to pay to the uttermoft mite. I am obliged to give 
 language to all the blame to which profligacy, venality, hy- 
 pocrify and circumvention are fo juftly entitled. I am not em- 
 powered to conceal any thing I know of myfelf, whether it tend 
 to my honour or to my difgrace. I am obliged to treat every 
 other man with equal franknefs, without dreading the imputation 
 of flattery on the one hand, without dreading his refentment 
 and enmity on the other. 
 
 Did every man impofe this law upon himfelf, he would be itseffefls 
 obliged to confider before he decided upon the commiflion of an aftionsJ 
 equivocal a&ion, whether he choie to be his own hiftorian, to 
 
 be 
 
*4° O F S I N C E R I T Y. 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Section II. 
 
 be the future narrator of the fcene in which he was engaging. 
 It has been juftly obferved that the popifh practice of auricular 
 confeflion has been attended with fome falutary effects. How 
 much better would it be, if, inftead of a pra&ice thus ambigu- 
 ous, and which may be converted into fo dangerous an engine 
 of ecclefiaftical defpotifm, every man would make the world his 
 confeffional, and the human fpecies the keeper of his con- 
 fcience ? 
 
 B pon our How extenfive an effect would be produced, if every man 
 
 were fure of meeting in his neighbour the ingenuous cenfor, 
 who would tell to himfelf, and publifh to the world, his virtues, 
 his good deeds, his meanneffes and his^follies ? I have no right 
 to reject any duty, becaufe it is equally incumbent upon my 
 neighbours, and they do not practife it. When I have dis- 
 charged the whole of my duty, it is weaknefs and vice to make 
 myfelf unhappy about the omiffions of others. Nor is it poflible 
 to fay how much good one man fufficiently rigid in his ad- 
 herence to truth would effect. One fuch man, with genius, 
 information and energy, might redeem a nation from vice. 
 
 , The confequence to myfelf of telling every man the truth, 
 
 to produce regardlefs of perfonal danger or of injury to my interefts in the 
 
 world, would be uncommonly favourable. I mould acquire a 
 
 fortitude that would render me equal to the moft trying fitua- 
 
 tions, that would maintain my prefence of mind entire in fpite 
 
 of 
 
OF SINCERITY. 
 
 241 
 
 Section II. 
 
 of unexpected occurrences, that would furnifh me with extern- BOOK IV. 
 1 .. CHAP. IV. 
 
 porary arguments and wifdom, and endue my tongue with *- 
 
 irrefiftible eloquence. Animated by the love of truth, my 
 underftanding would always be vigorous and alert, not as before 
 frequently fubject to' liftlefTnefs, timidity and infipidity. Ani- 
 mated by the love of truth, and by a paffion infeparable from its 
 nature, and which is almoft the fame thing under another name, 
 the love of my fpecies, I fliould carefully feek for fuch topics as 
 might molt conduce to the benefit of my neighbours, anxioufly 
 watch the progrefs of mind, and incefTantly labour for the extir- 
 pation of prejudice. 
 
 What is it that at this day enables a thoufand errors to keep E ff- e & 3 f 
 their ftation in the world, prieftcraft, tefts, bribery, war, cabal, fincerit y" 
 and whatever elfe is the contempt and abhorrence of the enlight- 
 ened and honeft mind ? Cowardice. Becaufe, while vice walks 
 erect with an unabafhed countenance, men lefs vicious dare not 
 paint her with that truth of colouring, which fhould at once 
 confirm the innocent and reform the guilty. Becaufe the 
 majority of thofe who are not involved in the bufy fcene, and 
 who, pofTefling fome difcernment, fee that things are not alto- 
 gether right, yet fee in fo frigid a way, and with fo imperfect a 
 view. Many, who detect the impofture, are yet abfurd enough 
 to imagine that impofture is neceffary to keep the world in 
 awe, and that truth being too w^ak to curb the turbulent paf- 
 fions of mankind, it is exceedingly proper to call in knavery 
 and artifice as the abettors of her power. If every man ,to-day 
 
 I i ' would 
 
 m- 
 
242 OF SINCERITY. 
 
 '-i 
 
 BOOK iv. would tell all the truth he knows, three years hence there would 
 ^~~~ s -'~~^ be fcarcely a falfhood of any magnitude remaining in the 
 civilifed world. 
 
 Chat-after There is no fear that the character here defcribed fhould de- 
 
 which hti- 
 
 centy would generate into ruFgednefs and brutality *. The motive by which 
 
 acquire to °- °° J • 
 
 '"Wj v h is animated afFords a fufficient fecurity againa: fuch con- 
 
 -practiied it. J o 
 
 fequences. " I tell an unpleafant truth to my neighbour from a 
 conviction that it is my duty. I am convinced it is my duty, 
 becaufe I perceive the communication is calculated for his 
 benefit." His benefit therefore is the motive of my proceeding, 
 and with fuch a motive it is impoifible I mould not feek to 
 communicate it in the moft efficacious form, not roufing his 
 refentment, but awakening his moral feelings and his energy. 
 Meanwhile the happieft of all qualifications in order to render 
 truth palatable, is that which rifes fpontaneouily in the fituation 
 we have been confidering. Truth according to the terms of the 
 fuppofition is to be fpoken from the love of truth. But the face, 
 the voice, the gefture are fo many indexes to the mind. It is 
 fcarcely poffible therefore that the perfon with whom I am con- 
 verfing mould not perceive, that I am influenced by no malig- 
 nity, acrimony and envy. In proportion as my motive is pure, 
 at-leaft after a few experiments, my manner will become unem- 
 barrafled. There will be franknefs in my voice, fervour in my 
 gefture, and kindnefs in my heart. That man's mind muft be 
 
 * See a particular cafe of this fincerity difcufled in Appendix, No. II. 
 
 I of 
 
OF SINCERITY. 243 
 
 of a very perverfe texture, that can convert a beneficent potion BOOK iv. 
 
 J r ■ r CHAP. IV. 
 adminiftered with no ungenerous retrofpect, no felfifh triumph, J * ' 
 
 Section II. 
 
 into rancour and averfion. There is an energy in the fincerity 
 of a virtuous mind that nothing human can refill. 
 
 I flop not to confider the objections of the man who is im- Objeftlons. 
 merfed in worldly profpecls and purfuits. He that does not 
 know that virtue is better than riches or title muft be convinced 
 by arguments foreign to this place. 
 
 But it will be aiked, " What then, are painful truths to be dif- The fear of 
 clofed to perfona who are already in the molt pitiable circum- ceflary pain, 
 fiances ? Ought a woman that is dying of a fever to be informed 
 of the fate of her hufband whofe fkull has been fractured by a 
 fall from his horfe ?" 
 
 The mod that could poflibly be conceded to a cafe like this, Anfwer. 
 is, that this perhaps is not the moment to begin to treat like a ra- 
 tional being a perfon who has through the courfe of a long life 
 been treated like an infant. But in reality there is a mode in 
 which under fuch circumftances truth may fafely be communi- 
 cated ; and, if it be not thus done, there is perpetual danger that 
 it may be done in a blunter way by the heedlefs loquacioufnefs 
 of a chambermaid, or the yet undebauched fincerity of an infant. 
 How many arts of hypocrify, ftratagem and falfhood muft be 
 employed to cover this pitiful fecret ? Truth was calculated in 
 
 I i 1 the 
 
Section II, 
 
 244 OF SINCERITY. 
 
 BOOK IV. th e nature of things to difcipline the mind to fortitude, humanity 
 CHAP. IV. _ fa * ' 7 
 
 and virtue. Who are we, that we fhould fubvert the nature of 
 things and the fyftem of the univerfe, that we mould breed up 
 a fet of fummer infects, upon which the breeze of fincerity may 
 never blow, and the temped of misfortune never beat I 
 
 The defire of " But truth may fometimes be fatal to him that fpeaks it. 
 
 preftrving lriri-r-. i 
 
 my life. A man, who fought for the Pretender in the year 1745, when 
 
 the event happened that difperfed his companions,, betook him- 
 felf to folitary flight. He fell in with a party of loyalifts who 
 were feeking to apprehend him ; but not knowing his perfon, 
 they enquired of him for intelligence to guide them in their pur- 
 fuit. He returned an anfwer calculated to cherifh them in their 
 miftake, and faved his life*" 
 
 This objec- This like the former is an extreme cafe ; but the true anfwer 
 
 tion proves 
 
 too much. will probably be found to be the fame. If any one fhould quef- 
 tion this, let him confider how far his approbation of the con- 
 duit of the perfon above cited would lead him. The rebels, as 
 they were called, were treated in the period from which the 
 example is drawn with the rnofl illiberal injuffice. This man, 
 guided perhaps by the mod magnanimous motives in what he 
 had done, would have been put to an ignominious death. But, 
 if he had a right to extricate himfelf by falfhood, why not the 
 wretch who has been guilty of forgery, who has deferved pu- 
 nifhment, but who may now be confcious that he has in him 
 
 materials 
 
OF SINCERITY. 24 
 
 H-S 
 
 StCTlON II. 
 
 materials and Inclination to make a valuable member of fociety ? J , ,9?i5 }7 T ; 
 
 CriAr. IV. 
 
 Nor is the inclination an effential part of the fuppoiition. Where- 
 ever the materials exift, it will perhaps be found to be flagrantly 
 unjuft on the part of fociety to deftroy them, inftead of diicovering 
 the means by which they might be rendered innocent and ufe- 
 ful. At this rate, a man has nothing to do but to commit one 
 crime, in order to give him a right to commit a fecond which 
 fhall fecure impunity to the firfh 
 
 But why, when fo many hundred individuals have been con- Anfwer. 
 tented to become martyrs to the unintelligible principles of a 
 pitiful feci:, mould not the one innocent man I have been de- 
 fcribing be contented to offer himfelf up a victim at the lhrine of 
 veracity ? Why fhould he purchafe a few poor years of exile 
 and mifery by the commhTion of fallhood ? Had he furren- 
 dered himfelf to his purfuers, had he declared in the prefence of 
 his judges and his country, " I, whom you think too wicked and 
 degenerate to deferve even to live, have chofen rather to en- 
 counter your injuflice than be guilty of an untruth : I would 
 have efcaped from your iniquity and tyranny if I had been able; 
 but, hedged in on all fides, having no means of deliverance but in 
 falfhood, I chearfully fubmit to all that your malice can inflict 
 rather than violate the majefty of truth :" would he not have 
 done an honour to himfelf, and afforded an example to the 
 world, that would have fully compenfated the calamity of his 
 untimely death ? It is in all cafes incumbent upon us to dif- 
 
 charge 
 
Section II. 
 
 246 OF SINCERITY. 
 
 rw° K IV ' charge our own duty, without being influenced by the enquiry 
 whether other men will difcharge or neglect theirs. 
 
 It muft be remembered however that this is not the true jet 
 of the argument. The ftrefs does not lie upon the good he 
 would have done : that is precarious. This heroic action, as 
 it is to be feared has been the cafe with many others, might be 
 configned to oblivion. The object of true wifdom under the 
 circumftances we are confidering, is to weigh, not fo much what 
 is to be done, as what is to be avoided. We mull not be guilty 
 of infincerity. We muft not feek to obtain a defirable object by 
 vile means. We muft prefer a general principle to the mere- 
 tricious attractions of a particular deviation. We muft perceive 
 in the prefervation of that general principle a balance of univer- 
 fal good, outweighing the benefit to arife in any inftance from 
 fuperfeding it. It is by general principles that the bufinefs of 
 the univerfe is carried on. If the laws of gravity and impulfe 
 did not make us know the confequences of our actions, we fhould 
 be incapable of judgment and inference. Nor is this lefs true 
 in morals. He that, having laid down to himfelf a plan of fin- 
 cerity, is guilty of a fingle deviation, infects the whole, conta- 
 minates the franknefs and magnanimity of his temper (for for- 
 titude in the intrepidity of lying is bafenefs), and is lefs vir- 
 tuous than the foe againft whom he defends himfelf; for it is 
 more virtuous in my neighbour to confide in my apparent ho- 
 jae fty, than in me to abufe his confidence. In the cafe of mar- 
 
 tyrdom 
 
O F S I N C E P. I T Y. 2.1.7 
 
 tyrdom there are two things to be confidered. It is an evil not BOOK-IV, 
 J ° ■ CHAP. IV. 
 
 wantonly to be incurred, for we know not what c;ood vet re- r k •■ — ~rf 
 
 1 ' - -fa Sloiion II. ■ 
 
 mains for us to: do. - It is 'an evil not to be avoided at the ex- 
 pence of principle, for we fhould be upon our guard againft fit- 
 ting an inordinate value upon our own efforts, and imagining 
 that truth would die, if we were to be deftroyed. 
 
 " But what becomes of the great duty of fecrecy, which the Secrecy con- 
 fide red. 
 incomparable Fenelon has made a capital branch in the education 
 
 of his Telemachus ?" It is annihilated. It becomes a truly vir- 
 tuous man not to engage in any action of which he would be 
 afhamed though all the world were fpedtator. Indeed Fenelon 
 with all his ability has fallen into the moft palpable inconfiitency 
 upon this fubject. In Itbaca a confiderable part of the merit of 
 Telemachus confifls in keeping his mother's fecrets *. When 
 he arrives in Tyre, he will not be perluaded to commit or 
 fuffer a deception, though his life was apparently at flake f . 
 
 What is it of which an honeft man is commonly afhamed ? 
 Of virtuous poverty, of doing menial offices for himfelf, of hav- 
 ing raifed himfelf by merit from a humble fituation, and of a 
 thoufand particulars which in reality conflitute his glory. With 
 refpect to actions of beneficence we cannot be too much upon 
 our guard againft a fpirit of orientation and the character that 
 imperioufly exacts the gratitude of its beneficiaries ; but it is 
 certainly an extreme weaknefs to defire to hide our deferts. So 
 
 * Tilemaque. Liv. XVI. \ Liv. III. 
 
 far 
 
248 
 
 OF SINCERITY. 
 
 E 29 I 5 IY; far from defirin"; to withhold from the world the know- 
 CHAP. IV. & 
 
 SectionII. 
 
 ledge of our good deeds, we ought to be forward to exhibit an 
 attractive and illuftrious example. We cannot determine to 
 keep any thing fecret without rifking at the fame time to 
 commit a hundred artifices, quibbles, equivocations and falf- 
 hoods. 
 
 The fecrets But the fecrets of others, " have I a power over them ?" Pro- 
 
 of others. 
 
 bably not : but you have a duty reflecting them. The facts with 
 which you are acquainted are a part of your pofTeflions, and you 
 are as much obliged reflecting them as in any other cafe, to 
 employ them for the public good. Have I no right to indulge 
 in myfelf the caprice of concealing any. of my affairs, and can 
 another man have a right by his caprice to hedge up and re- 
 State fecrets. ftrain the path of my duty ? — " But ftate fecrets ?" This perhaps 
 is a fubject that ought not to be anticipated. We fhall have 
 occafion to enquire how minifters of the concerns of a nation 
 came by their right to equivocate, to juggle and over-reach, 
 while private men are obliged to be ingenuous, direct and 
 fincere. 
 
 Secrets of There is one cafe of a lingular nature that feems to deferve a 
 
 j>. nt iropy. f e p arate examination ; the cafe of fecrets that are to be kept for 
 the fake of mankind. Full juftice is done to the affirmative fide 
 of this argument by Mr. Condorcet in his Life of Voltaire, where 
 he is juftifying this illuftrious friend of mankind, for his gentle- 
 nefs and forbearance in afferting the liberties of the fpecies. He 
 
 firfi 
 
OF SINCERITY. 2 49 
 
 firft enumerates the inceffant attacks of Voltaire upon fuperftition, BOOK IV. 
 
 • • i n •• • CHAP. IV. 
 
 hypocritical authorities and war ; and then proceeds : " It is true, * v / 
 
 Section II. 
 
 the more men are enlightened, the more they will be free ; but 
 let us not put defpots on their guard, and incite them to form 
 a league againfl the progrefs of reafon. Let us conceal from 
 them the ftricl: and eternal union that fubiifts between knowledge 
 and liberty. Voltaire thought proper to paint fuperftition as the 
 enemy of monarchy, to put kings and princes upon their guard 
 againfl the gloomy ferocity and ambition of the priefthood, and 
 to demonftrate that, were it not for the freedom of thought and 
 inveftigation, there would be no fecurity againft the return of 
 papal infolence, of profcriptions, affaffinations and religious war. 
 Had he taken the other fide of the queftion, had he maintained, 
 which is equally true, that fuperftition and ignorance are the 
 fupport of defpotifm, he would only have anticipated truths for 
 which the public were not ripe, and have feen a fpeedy end to 
 his career. Truth taught by moderate degrees gradually en- 
 larges the intellectual capacity, and infenfibly prepares the equa- 
 lity and happinefs of mankind ; but taught without prudential 
 reftraint would either be nipped in the bud, or occafion national 
 <:oncuffions in the world, that would be found premature and 
 
 therefore abortive"*." 
 
 What 
 
 * " Plus les hcmtnes feront eclaires, plus lis feront Hires.— Mais n avertiffons point 
 ■Its cpprejjeurs de former une ligue contre la raifon, cachons leur Vetroite et neceffaire 
 union des lumieres et de la libcrte. — Quel /era done le devoir d'urt philofophe ? — // 
 etiairera les gouvernemens fur Uut ce quill out a craittdre des pretres.—Il fera voir 
 
 K k qui 
 
*-_ 
 
 Section II. 
 
 250 OF SINCERITY. 
 
 BOOK IV. What a cowardly diftruft do reafonings likethefe exhibit of the 
 omnipotence of truth ! With refpedt to perfonal fafety, it will be 
 found upon an accurate examination that Voltaire with all his 
 ingenuity and ftratagem was for fixty years together the object 
 of perpetual, almoft daily perfecution from courts and minifters*. 
 He was obliged to retire from country to country, and at laft to 
 take advantage, of a refidence upon the borders of two ftates 
 with a habitation in each. His attempts to fecure the patronage 
 of princes led only to viciffitude and difgrace. If his plan had 
 been more firm and diredt, he would not have been lefs fafe. 
 Timidity, and an anxious endeavour to fecure to ourfelves a 
 protestor, invite perfecution; With the advantages of Voltaire, 
 with his talents and independence, he might have held the 
 tyrants of the world in awe. 
 
 que, fans la liberie de penfer le mime efprit dans le clerge ramenerait les mimes 
 affhffinats, les mimes fupplices, les memes profcriptions, les mimes guerres civiles. — 
 Ail lieu de montrer que la fuperjlition ejl I'appui du dcfpotifme, avant que la raifon ait 
 raffemble affez de force, il prvuvera qu'elle ejl Vennemie des rois. — Tel ejl F efprit de 
 tous les ouvrages de Voltaire — ^ue des hommes, inferieurs a lui, ftevoyent pas que Jt 
 Voltaire exit fait autrement, ni Montefquieu ni Rouffiau n'auraient pu ecrire leurs 
 euvrages, que P Europe ferait encore fuperjlitieufe, et rejlerait long-tems efclave. — En 
 attaqtiant les oppreffeurs avant d 'avoir eclairi les citoyens, on rifque de perdre la libertJ 
 et d'etoujfer la raifon. L'hiftoire offre la pr.euve de cette verite. Combien de fois y 
 malgri les ginereux efforts des amis de la liberte, une feule bataille n'a-t-ellepas reduit 
 des nations a une fervitude de plufteurs fiecles !—Pourquoi ne pas profit er de cette 
 gxperience funefe, et favoir attendre des progres des lumieres une liberte plus reelle. 
 plus durable et plus paifible ?" 
 
 * Vie de Voltaire, par 3£***, throughout.. 
 
 A* 
 
OF SINCERITY. n S i 
 
 As to the progrefs of truth, it is not fo precarious as its fear- BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 ful friends may imagine. Mr. Condorcet has iuftly infinuated ' ^~rf 
 
 J ° -J J SSCTION II. 
 
 in the courfe of his argument, that " in the invention of printing 
 is contained the embryo, which in its maturity and vigour is 
 deftined to annihilate the flavery of the human race*." Books, 
 if proper precautions be employed, cannot be deftroyed. Know- 
 ledge cannot be extirpated. Its progrefs is filent, but infallible ; 
 and he is the moft ufeful foldier in this war, who accumulates 
 in an unperifhable form the greateft mafs of truth. 
 
 As truth has nothing to fear from her enemies, fhe needs not 
 have any thing to fear from her friends. The man, who pub- 
 limes the fublimeft difcoveries, is not of all others the moft likely 
 to inflame the vulgar, and hurry the great queftion of human 
 happinefs to a premature crifis. The object to be purfued un- 
 doubtedly is, the gradual improvement of mind. But this end 
 will be better anfwered by exhibiting as much truth as pofhble, 
 enlightening a few, and fufFering knowledge to expand in the 
 proportion which the laws of nature and neceflity prefcribe, than 
 by any artificial plan of piecemeal communication that we can 
 invent. There is in the nature of things a gradation in difcovery 
 and a progrefs in improvement, which do not need to be affifted 
 by the ftratagems of their votaries. In a word, there cannot be 
 a more unworthy idea, than that truth and virtue fhould be 
 
 * " Peut-etre avant P invention de P imprimerie Hait-il impo/fible ti fe foujlvaire an 
 
 K k 2 under 
 
2 S i OF SINCERITY. 
 
 BOOK IV. under the necefllty of feeking alliance with concealment. The 
 
 CHAP. IV. J b 
 
 ! — — - — r J man, who would artfully draw me into a little, that by fo doing 
 
 SECTION II. ' J ' * & 
 
 he may unawares ftirprife me into much, I infallibly regard as. 
 an impoflor. Will truth, contracted into fome petty fphere and 
 fhorn of its beams, acquire additional evidence ? Rather let me 
 truft to its omnipotence, to its congeniality with the nature of 
 intellect, to its direcl: and irrefiftible tendency to produce liberty, 
 and happinefs, and virtue. Let me fear that I have not enough of 
 it, that my views are too narrow to produce impreffion, and 
 anxioufly endeavour to add to my flock ; not apprehend, that,, 
 exhibited in its noon-day brightnefs, its luflre and genial nature.- 
 fhould not be univerfally confeffed %. 
 
 * See this. fubjec"t farther purfued in Appendix, No. III... 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
[ 2 S3 1 
 
 APPENDIX, No. I. p. 233. 
 
 OF THE CONNEXION BETWEEN UNDERSTANDING 
 
 AND VIRTUE. 
 
 CAN EMINENT VIRTUE EXIST UNCONNECTED WITH TA- 
 LENTS ? — NATURE OF VIRTUE. — IT IS THE OFFSPRING 
 OF UNDERSTANDING. — IT GENERATES UNDERSTAND- 
 ING. — ILLUSTRATION FROM OTHER PURSUITS — LOVE — 
 AMBITION — APPLIED. 
 
 CAN EMINENT TALENTS EXIST UNCONNECTED WITH VIR- 
 TUE? ARGUMENT IN THE AFFIRMATIVE FROM ANA- 
 LOGY IN THE NEGATIVE FROM THE UNIVERSALITY OF 
 
 MORAL SPECULATION — EROM THE NATURE OF VICE AS 
 EOUNDED IN MISTAKE. — THE ARGUMENT BALANCED. — 
 
 IMPORTANCE OE A SENSE OF JUSTICE. ITS CONNEXION 
 
 WITH TALENTS. ILLIBERALITY WITH WHICH MEN OF 
 
 TALENTS ARE USUALLY TREATED.. 
 
 A PROPOSITION which, however evident in itfelf, feems BOOK iv. 
 CHAP. IV 
 never to have been confidered with the attention it de- ^ v ../ 
 
 r • . rr • Appendix, 
 
 lerves, is that which affirms the connexion between underftand- No. I. 
 
 . . Can eminent 
 
 ing and virtue. Can an honeft ploughman be as virtuous as virtue «jft 
 
 unconne&ed 
 CatO ? with talents ? 
 
254 CONNEXION BETWEEN 
 
 BOOK IV. c a t ? I s a man f W eak intellects and narrow education as. 
 v r — » ' capable of moral excellence as the fublimefl genius or the mind 
 
 Appendix, a " 
 
 No. I. moR. ftored with information and fcience ? 
 Nature of vlr- To determine thefe queftions it is necefiary we fhould recol- 
 
 iue. 
 
 lect the nature of virtue. Confidered as a perfonal quality it 
 confifts in the difpofition of the mind, and may be defined a de- 
 fire to promote the benefit of intelligent beings in general, the 
 quantity of virtue being as the quantity of defire. Now defire 
 Is another name for preference, or a perception of the excel- 
 lence real or fuppofed of any object. I fay real or fuppofed, for 
 an object totally deftitute of real and intrinfic excellence, may 
 become an object of defire by means of the imaginary excellence 
 that is afcribed to it. Nor is this the only miftake to which hu- 
 man intelligences are liable. We may defire an object of abfo- 
 lute excellence, not for its real and genuine recommendations) 
 but for fome fictitious attractions We may impute to it. This is 
 always in fome degree the cafe, when a beneficial action is per- 
 formed from an ill motive. 
 
 How far is this miftake compatible with real virtue ? If I de- 
 fire the benefit of intelligent beings, not from a clear and diftinct 
 perception of what it is in 'which their benefit confifts, but from 
 the unexamined leflbns of education, from the phyfical effect of 
 fympathy, or from any fpecies of zeal unallied to and incom- 
 menfurate with knowledge, can this defire be admitted for vir- 
 tuous ? 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 355 
 
 tuous ? Nothing fcems more inconfiftent with our ideas of virtue. 5S9 p rv' 
 
 A virtuous preference is the preference of an object for the fake *": — » ' 
 
 * ■ J Appendix, 
 
 of certain beneficial qualities which really belong to that object. No- " 
 To attribute virtue to any other fpecies of preference would be 
 the fame as to fuppofe that an accidental effect of my conduct, 
 which was altogether out of my view at the time of adopting it, 
 might entitle me to the appellation of virtuous. . 
 
 Hence it appears, firft, that virtue confifts in a defire of the It IstheofF- 
 , fpring of un- 
 
 benefit of the fpecies : and, fecondly, that that defire only can be demanding. 
 
 denominated virtuous, which flows from a diftinct perception 
 of the. value, and confequently of the nature, of the thing defired^ 
 But how extenfive muft be the capacity that comprehends the. 
 full value of that benefit which is the object of virtue ! It 
 muft begin with a collective idea of the human fpecies. It. 
 muft difcriminate, among all the different caufes that produce a- 
 pleafurable ftate of mind, that which produces the moft exqui- 
 fite and durable pleafure.. Eminent virtue requires that I ihould 
 have, a grand view of the tendency of knowledge to produce 
 happinefs, and of juft political inftitution to favour the progrefs- 
 of knowledge. It demands that I fhould perceive in what man- 
 ner focial intercourfe may be made conducive to virtue and fe- 
 licity, and imagine the unfpeakable advantages that may arife* 
 from a coincidence and fucceffion of generous efforts. Thefe 
 things are neceffary, not merely for the purpofe of enabling me 
 to employ my virtuous difpofition in the beft manner, but alfo. 
 2 foe 
 
*5 6 
 
 CONNEXION BETWEEN 
 
 B rap tv' ^" or t ^ ie P ur P°fe of giving to that difpofition a juft: animation and 
 vigour. God, according to the ideas ufually conceived of that 
 being, is more benevolent than man, becaufe he has a conftant 
 and clear perception of the nature of that end which his pro- 
 vidence purfues. 
 
 Appendix, 
 No. I. 
 
 It generates 
 under- 
 standing. 
 
 A farther proof that a powerful understanding is infeparablc 
 from eminent virtue will fuggeft itfelf, if we recoiled that earned 
 defire never fails to generate capacity. 
 
 Illuftration 
 from other 
 purfuits : 
 
 love; 
 
 This proportion has been beautifully illuftrated by the poets, 
 when they have reprefented the paflion of love as immediately 
 leading in the breaft of the lover to the attainment of many 
 arduous accomplifhments. It unlocks his tongue, and enables 
 him to plead the caufe of his paffion with infinuating eloquence. 
 It renders his converfation pleafing and his manners graceful. 
 Does he defire to exprefs his feelings in the language of verfe ? 
 It dictates to him the moft natural and pathetic {trains, and fup- 
 plies him with a juft and interefting language which the man of 
 mere reflection and fcience has often fought for in vain. 
 
 ambition : No picture can be more truly founded in a knowledge of 
 
 human nature than this. The hiftory of all eminent talents is of 
 a fimilar kind. Did Themiftocles defire to eclipfe the trophies 
 of the battle of Marathon? The uneafinefs of this defire would 
 not let him fleep, and all his thoughts were occupied with the 
 3 invention 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. * S 7 
 
 invention of means to accomplifh the purpofe he had chofen. It BOOK IV. 
 
 r r r CHAP. IV. 
 
 is a well known maxim in the forming of juvenile minds, that * * * 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 the inftruction, which is communicated by mere conftraint, No. I. 
 makes a flow and feeble impreffion ; but that, when once yoiy 
 have infpired the mind with a love for its object, the fcene and 
 the progrefs are entirely altered. The uneaiinefs of mjnd which 
 earneft defire produces, doubles our intellectual activity ; and as 
 furely carries us forward with increafed velocity towards our 
 goal, as the expectation of a reward of ten thoufand pounds 
 would prompt me to walk from London to York with firmer 
 refolution and in a fhorter time.. 
 
 Let the object be for a perfon uninftrucled in the rudiments 
 of drawing to make a copy of fome celebrated ftatue. At firft, 
 we will fuppofe, his attempt fhall be mean and unfuccefsful. 
 If his defire be feeble, he will be deterred by the mifcarriage 
 of this eflay. If his defire be ardent and invincible, he will 
 return to the attack. He will derive inftruction from his failure. 
 He will examine where and why he milcarried. He will ftudy 
 his model with a more curious eye. He will perceive that he 
 failed principally from the loofe and undigefted idea he had 
 formed of the object before him. It will no longer ftand in his 
 mind as one general mafs, but he will analyfe it, bellowing upon 
 each part in fucceinon a feparate confideration. 
 
 The. cafe is fimilar in virtue as in fcience. If I have con- £p pi; e d. 
 
 L 1 ceived 
 
CONNEXION BETWEEN 
 
 r hap tv" ct ^ VC( ^ an earneft defire of being a benefactor of my fpecies, I 
 V: — - * mail no doubt find out a channel in which for my defire to 
 
 Appendix, * 
 
 N0, *■ operate, and fhall be quick-fighted in difcovering the defects or 
 comparative littlenefs of the plan I have chofen. But the choice 
 of an excellent plan for the accomplifhment of an important 
 purpofe, and the exertion of a mind perpetually watchful to re- 
 move its defects, imply confiderable underftanding. The far- 
 ther I am engaged in the purfuit of this plan the more will my 
 capacity increafe. If my mind flag and be difcouraged in the 
 purfuit, it will not be merely want of underftanding, but want 
 of defire. My defire and my virtue will be lefs, than thofe of 
 the man, who goes on with unremitted conftancy in the fame 
 career. 
 
 Can eminent Thus far we have only been confidering how impoflible it Is 
 
 talents exift 
 
 unconnected that eminent virtue fhould exift in a weak underftanding, and it 
 
 with virtue ? 
 
 is furprifing that fuch a propofition mould ever have been con- 
 tefted. It is a curious queftion to examine, how far the con_ 
 verfe of this propofition is true, and in what degree eminent 
 talents are compatible with the abfence of virtue. 
 
 Argument in Erom the arguments already adduced it appears that virtuous 
 dvefromana- defire is another name for a clear and diftinct perception of the 
 £y " nature and value of the object of virtue. Hence it feems moft 
 
 natural to conclude, that, though underftanding, or ftrong perci- 
 pient power is the indifpenfible prerequifite of virtue, yet it is 
 i neceflary 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE: 259 
 
 neceffary that this power fhould be fixed upon this object, in B^OK IV. 
 
 . . . CHAP. IV. 
 
 order to its producing the defired effect. Thus it is in art. * s ' 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 Without genius no man ever was a poet ; but it is necefTary that No. I. 
 general capacity fhould have been directed to this particular 
 channel, for poetical excellence to be the refult. 
 
 There is however fome difference between the two cafes, in th^nega* 
 
 • r r r r • • n- • r ti ve f rcm the 
 
 Poetry is the bufinefs of a few, virtue and vice are the affairs of univerfalityof 
 
 , moral iptLU- 
 
 all men. To every intellect that exifts one or other, of thefe laticm: 
 qualities muft properly belong. It muft be granted that, where 
 every other circumftance is equal, that man will be moft virtuous, 
 whofe underftanding has been moft actively employed in the 
 ftudy of virtue. But morality has been in a certain degree an 
 object of attention to all men. No perfon ever failed more or 
 lefs to apply the flandard of juft and unjuft to his own actions 
 and thofe of others ; and this has of courfe been generally done 
 with mofl ingenuity by men of the greater! capacity. 
 
 It muft farther be remembered that a vicious conduct is always from thena- 
 the refult of narrow views. A man of powerful capacity and founded in " 
 extenfive obfervation is leaft likely to commit the miftake, either 
 of feeing himfelf as the only object of importance in the uni- 
 verfe, or of conceiving that his own advantage may beft be pro~ 
 moted by trampling on that of others. Liberalaccomplifhments 
 are furely in fome degree connedf ed with liberal principles. He, 
 who takes into. his view a whole nation as the fubjects of his 
 
 L 1-2- operation; 
 
260 
 
 CONNEXION BETWEEN 
 
 r w a p rtr °P erat i° n or the inftruments of his greatnefs, may naturally be 
 expected to entertain fome kindnefs for the whole. He, whofe 
 mind is habitually elevated to magnificent conceptions, is not 
 likely to fink without ftrong reluctance into thofe fordid pur- 
 suits, which engrofs fo large a portion of mankind. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Appendix, 
 No. I. 
 
 The argu- 
 ment ba- 
 lanced. 
 
 But, though thefe general maxims muft be admitted for true, 
 and would incline us to hope for a conftant union between emi- 
 nent talents and great virtues, there are other confiderations 
 which prefent a ftrong drawback upon fo agreeable an expecta- 
 tion. It is fufficiently evident that morality in fome degree 
 enters into the reflections of all mankind. But it is equally 
 -evident, that it may enter for more or for lefs ; and that there 
 will be men of the higheft talents, who have their attention 
 diverted to other objects, and by whom it will be meditated 
 upon with lefs earneftnefs, than it may fometimes be by other, 
 men who are in a general view their inferiors. The human mind 
 is in fome cafes fo tenacious of its errors, and fo ingenious in the 
 invention of a fophiftry by which they may be vindicated, as to 
 fruftrate expectations of virtue in other refpects the beft founded. 
 
 Importance 
 of a fenfe of 
 ullice. 
 
 From the whole of the fubject it feems to appear, that men 
 ■of talents, even when they are erroneous, are not deftitute of 
 virtue, and that there is a degree of guilt of which they are 
 incapable. There is no ingredient that fo effentially contributes 
 to a virtuous character as a fenfe of juftice. Philanthropy, as 
 2 con- 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 261 
 
 contradiftinguifhed to juftice, is rather an unreflecting feeling, BOOK TV. 
 than a rational principle. It leads to an abfurd indulgence. ** « f 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 which is frequently more injurious than beneficial even to the No * *• 
 individual it propofes to favour. It leads to a blind partiality, 
 inflidting calamity without remorfe upon many perhaps, in 
 order to promote the imagined intereft of a few. But juftice 
 meafures by one inflexible ftandard the claims of all, weighs 
 their oppofite pretentions, and feeks to diffufe happinefs, becaufe 
 happinefs is the fit and reafonable adjunct of a confcious being. 
 Wherever therefore a ftrong fenfe of juftice exifts, it is common 
 and reafonable to fay, that in that mind exifts confiderable 
 virtue, though the individual from an unfortunate concurrence 
 of circumftances may with all his great qualities be the inftru- 
 rnent of a very fmall portion of benefit. Can great intellectual 
 energy exift without a ftrong fenfe of juftice ? 
 
 It has no doubt refulted from a train of fpcculation fimilar to j ts C on- 
 this, that poetical readers have commonly remarked Milton's talents, 
 devil to be a being of confiderable virtue. It muft be admitted 
 that his energies centered too much in perfonal regards. But 
 why did he rebel againft his maker ? It was, as he himfelf 
 informs us, becaufe he faw no fufficient i*eafon for that extreme 
 inequality of rank and power which the creator aflumed. It 
 was becaufe prefcription and precedent form no adequate ground 
 for implicit faith. After his fall, why did he ftill cherifh* the 
 fpirit of oppofition ? From a perfuafion that he was hardly and 
 
 injurioufly 
 
2 6a CONNEXION BETWEEN. 
 
 oh a p iv ""yurioufly treated. He was not difcouraged by the apparent 
 
 ^ — * ' inequality of the conteft: becaufe a fenfe of reafon and juftice 
 
 Appendix, a ' •> 
 
 No. I. wasftronger in his mind, than a fenie of brute force:, becaufe 
 he had much of the feelings of an Epidletus or a Cato, and little 
 of thofe of a flave, He bore his torments with fortitude, becaufe 
 he difdained to be fubdued by defpotic power.. He fought re- 
 venge, becaufe he could not think with tamenefs of the~ unex- 
 poftulating authority that affirmed to difpofe of him. How bene- 
 ficial and illuftrious might the temper from, which thefe qualities 
 flowed have proved with a fmall diverfity of. fituation ! . 
 
 Let us defcend from thefe imaginary exiftences to real his- 
 tory. We fhall find that even Casfar and Alexander had their 
 virtues.. There is great reafon to believe, that, however miftaken 
 was their fyftem of conduct, they imagined it reconcileable and 
 even conducive to the general good. If they had defired the- 
 general good more earneftly, they would have underftood betters- 
 how to promote- it,. 
 
 Upon the whole it appears, that great talents are great ener- 
 gies, and that great energies cannot flow but from a powerful ! 
 fenfe of fitnefs and juftice. A man of uncommon genius is..at 
 man of high paflions and lofty defign ; and our paflions. will be 
 found in the laft analyfis to have, their fureft foundation in a* 
 fentiment of juftice. If a man be of an afpiring and ambitious 
 temper, it is becaufe at prefent he finds himfelf out of his place,, 
 
 and' 
 
UNDERSTANDING AND VIRTUE. 163 
 
 and wifhes to be in it. Even the lover imagines that his qua- BOOK l 7' 
 
 CHAP. IV* 
 
 lities or his paffion eive him a title iuperior to that of other men. !; ■ ' 
 
 r ° * Appendix, 
 
 If I accumulate wealth, it is becaufe I think that the mod rational No * ** 
 plan of life cannot be fecured without it ; and, if I dedicate my 
 energies to fenfual pleafures, it is that I regard other purfuits as 
 irrational and vifionary. All our paflions would die in the mo- 
 ment they were conceived, were it not for this reinforcement. 
 A man of quick refentment, of ftrong feelings, and who per- 
 tinacioufly refifts every thing that he regards as an unjuft 
 affumption, may be confidered as having in him the feeds of 
 eminence. Nor is it eafily to be conceived that fuch a man 
 fhould not proceed from a fenfe of juftice to fome degree of 
 benevolence ; as Milton's hero felt real companion and fympathy 
 for his partners in misfortune. 
 
 If thefe reafonings are to be admitted, what judgment fhall nj&aality 
 
 with which 
 
 we form of the decifion of doctor Johnfon, who, fpeaking of a men of ta- 
 
 lents are 
 
 certain obfcure translator of the odes of Pindar, fays, that he ufually 
 
 treated, 
 
 was " one of the few poets to whom death needed not to be 
 terrible * ?" Let it be remembered that the error is by no means 
 peculiar to doctor Johnfon, though there are few inftances in 
 which it is carried to a more violent extreme, than in the general 
 tenour of the work from which this quotation is taken. It was 
 natural to expect that there would be a combination among the 
 multitude to pull down intellectual eminence. Ambition is com- 
 
 '* lives of ihe Poets : Life of Weft. 
 
 mon 
 
264 .CONNEXION, &c. 
 
 BOOK IV* mon to all men ; and thofe, who are unable to rife to diftinc"tiorr,. 
 
 CHAP. IV. \ ... . 
 
 * — — v ' are at leaft willing to reduce others to their own ftandard. No- 
 
 Appendix, / 
 
 No. I. man can completely underftand the character of him with whom 
 he has no fympathy of views, and we may be allowed to- 
 revile what we do not underftand. But it is deeply to be re- 
 gretted that men of talents fhould fo often have entered into this 
 combination.. "Who does not recollect with pain the vulgar 
 abufe that Swift has thrown upon Dryden, and the mutual jea- 
 Ipufies and animofities of RoufTeau and Voltaire, men who, 
 Qughttp have co-operated for. the faivation of. the world?. 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
APPENDIX, No. II, p. 242. 
 OF THE MODE OF EXCLUDING VISITORS. 
 
 ITS IMPROPRIETY ARGUED — FROM THE SITUATION IN 
 WHICH IT PLACES, I. THE VISITOR — 2. THE SERVANT. — 
 OBJECTIONS: — PRETENDED NECESSITY OF THIS PRAC- 
 TICE, I. TO PRESERVE US FROM INTRUSION — 2. TO FREE 
 US FROM DISAGREEABLE ACQUAINTANCE. — CHARACTERS 
 OF THE HONEST AND DISHONEST MAN IN THIS RESPECT 
 COMPARED. 
 
 THIS principle refpecting the obfervation of truth in the BOOK IV. 
 PHAP1V 
 common intercourfes of life cannot perhaps be better 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 illuftrated, than from the familiar and trivial cafe, as it is com- No. II. 
 
 Its impro- 
 
 monly fuppofed to be, of a mafter dire&ing his fervant to fay priety 
 
 argued : 
 
 he is not at home, as a means of freeing him from the intrufion 
 of impertinent guefts. No queftion of morality can be foreign 
 to the fcience of politics ; nor will thofe few pages of the prefent 
 work be found perhaps the leaft valuable, which here and in 
 other places* are dedicated to the refutation of errors, that 
 by their extenfive influence have perverted the foundation of 
 moral and political juftice. 
 
 * Vide Appendices to Book II, Chap. II. 
 
 Mm Let 
 
266 OFTHEMODEOF 
 
 » 
 
 BOOK IV. L e t us £ r f)- according to the well known axiom of morality, 
 put ourfelves in the place of the perfon whom this anfwer 
 
 CHAP. IV 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 No. II. excludes. It feldom happens but that he is able, if he be in 
 
 from the rr 7 
 
 fituation In 
 which it 
 
 pofTeffion of any difcernment, to difcover with tolerable accuracy 
 places, l.the w hether the anfwer he receives be true or falfe. There are a 
 
 viljtor : 
 
 thoufand petty circumftances by which falfhood continually 
 detects itfelf. The countenance and the voice of the fervant, 
 unlefs long pradtifed indeed in this leflbn of deceit, his cold and 
 referved manner in the one cafe, and his free, ingenuous and 
 unembarrafTed air in the other, will almoft always fpeak a 
 language lefs ambiguous than his lips. But let us fuppofe only 
 that we vehemently fufpecT; the truth. It is not intended to 
 keep us in ignorance of the exiftence of fuch a practice. He 
 that adopts it, is willing to avow in general terms that fuch is 
 his fyftem, or he makes out a cafe for himfelf much lefs favour- 
 able than I was making out for him. The vifitor then who 
 receives this anfwer, feels in fpite of himfelf a contempt for the 
 prevarication of the perfon he vifits. I appeal to the feelings of 
 every man in the fituation defcribed, and I have no doubt that 
 he will find this to be their true ftate in the firft inftance, how- 
 ever he may have a fet of fophiftical reafonings at hand by 
 which he may in a few minutes reafon down the firft move- 
 ments of indignation. He feels that the trouble he has taken 
 and the civility he intended intitled him at leaft to truth in 
 return. 
 
 Having 
 
EXCLUDING VISITORS. 267 
 
 Having put ourfelves in the place of the vifitor, let us next B00K IV. 
 r r ' CHAP. IV. 
 
 2. the fcr- 
 vant. 
 
 put ourfelves in the place of the poor defpifed fervant. Let us * v ' 
 
 ■ * Appendix, 
 
 fuppofe that we are ourfelves deflined as fons or hufbands to „^°- f jJ- 
 give this anfwer that our father or our wife is not at home, 
 when he or fhe is really in the houfe. Should we not feel our 
 tongues contaminated with the bafe plebeian lie ? Would it be 
 a fufficient opiate to our confciences to fay that "fuch is the 
 practice, and it is well underflood ?" It never can be underflood : 
 its very intention is, not to be underflood. We fay that " we 
 have certain arguments that prove the practice to be innocent." 
 Are fervants only competent to underhand thefe arguments ? 
 Surely we ought beft to be able to underfland our own argu- 
 ments, and yet we fhrink with abhorrence from the idea of per- 
 fonally acting upon them. 
 
 Whatever fophiflry we may have to excufe our error, nothing 
 is more certain than that our fervants underfland the leffon we 
 teach them to be a lie. It is accompanied by all the retinue of 
 falfhood. Before it can be gracefully pra&ifed, the fervant 
 mufl be no mean proficient in the myfleries of hypocrify. By 
 the eafy impudence with which it is uttered, he befl anfwers the 
 purpofe of his mafler, or in other words the purpofe af deceit. 
 By the eafy impudence with which it is uttered, he befl flifles 
 the upbraidings of his own mind, and conceals from others the 
 fhame impofed on him by his defpotic tafk-mafler. Before thii 
 can be fufficiently done, he mufl have difcarded the. ingenuous 
 
 M m 2 franknefs 
 
268 OFTHEMODEOF 
 
 chap *iv ^ ran ^ ne ^ s by means of which the thoughts find eafy commerce 
 ^~P^~^ with the tongue, and the clear and undifguifed countenance 
 No. II. w hich ought to be the faithful mirror of the mind. Do you 
 think, when he has learned this degenerate leffon in one 
 inftance, that it will produce no unfavourable effects upon his 
 general conduct ? Surely, if we will practife vice, we ought at 
 leaft to have the magnanimity to practife it in perfon, not 
 cowardlike corrupt the principles of another, and oblige him to 
 do that which we have not the honcfly to dare to do for 
 ourfelves. 
 
 Objeaions: But 5* ' 1S &*&> " tnat &&* ne * s neceffary, and that the inter- 
 Pretended courfe of human fociety cannot be carried on without it." What, 
 this praftice, is it not as eafy to fay, " I am engaged," or " indifpofed," or as 
 
 I. to preferve „ 
 
 us from in- the cafe may happen, as " I am not at home r Are thele an- 
 fwers more infulting, than the univerfally fufpe&ed anfwer, 
 the notorious hypocrify of " I am not at home ?" 
 
 The purpofe indeed for which this anfwer is ufually em- 
 ployed is a deceit of another kind. Every man has in the ca- 
 talogue of his acquaintance fome that he particularly loves, and 
 others to whom he is indifferent, or perhaps worfe than indif- 
 ferent. This anfwer leaves the latter to fuppofe, if they pleafe, 
 that they are in the clafs of the former. And what is the bene- 
 fit to refult from this indifcriminate, undiftinguifhing manner of 
 treating our neighbours ? Whatever benefit it be, it no doubt 
 
 exifts 
 
EXCLUDING VISITORS. 269 
 
 exifts in confiderable vigour in the prefent ftate of polifhed fo- BOOK IV. 
 ciety, where forms perpetually intrude to cut off all intercourfe 5 « ' 
 
 J * * ' Appendix, 
 
 between the feelings of mankind; and I can fcarcely tell a man No - IL 
 on the one hand " that I efteem his character and honour his 
 virtues," or on the other " that he is fallen into an error which 
 will be of prejudicial confequence to him," without trampling 
 upon all the barriers of politenefs. But is all this right ? Is 
 not the efteem or the difapprobation of others among the moft 
 powerful incentives to virtue or punifhments of vice ? Can we 
 even underftand virtue and vice half fo well as we otherwife 
 fhould, if we be unacquainted with the feelings of our neigh- 
 bours refpecting them ? If there be in the lift of our acquaintance 
 any perfon whom we particularly diflike, it ufually happens that 
 it is for fome moral fault that we perceive or think we perceive 
 in him. Why fhould he be kept in ignorance of our opinion 
 refpecting him, and prevented from the opportunity either of 
 amendment or vindication ? If he be too wife or too foolifh, too 
 virtuous or too vicious for us, why fhould he not be ingenu- 
 oufly told of his miftake in his intended kindnefs to us, rather 
 than be fuffered to find it out by fix months enquiry from our 
 fervants ? 
 
 This leads us to yet one more argument in favour of this dif- 2. to free us 
 ingenuous practice. We are told, " there is no other by which ag°Teabie 
 vre can rid ourfelves of difagreeable acquaintance." How long acquamtai 
 .(hall this be one of the effects of polifhed fociety, to perfuade us 
 
 that 
 
270 OF THE MODE OF 
 
 chap iv* t ^ iat we are mca P aD l e °^ doing the moft trivial offices for our- 
 *r — • ' felves ? You may as well tell me, " that it is a matter of indif- 
 
 Apphndix, ' 
 
 No. II. penfible neceffity to have a valet to put on my {lockings," In 
 reality the exiftence of thefe troublefome vifitors is owing to 
 the hypocrify of politenefs. It is that we wear the fame indifcri- 
 minate fmile, the fame appearance of cordiality and complacence to 
 all our acquaintance. Ought we to do thus ? Are virtue and 
 excellence entitled to no diftinctions ? For the trouble of thefe 
 impertinent vifits we may thank ourfelves. If we practifed no 
 deceit, if we affumed no atom of cordiality and efteem we did 
 not feel, we ihould be little peftered with thefe buzzing intruders. 
 But one fpecies of falfhood involves us in another ; and he, that 
 pleads for thefe lying anfwers to our vifitors, in reality pleads 
 the caufe of a cowardice, that dares not deny to vice the diftinc- 
 tion and kindnefs that are exclufively due to virtue. 
 
 Charafters of The man who acted upon this fyftem would be very far re- 
 
 the honeft 
 
 and diihoneft moved from a Cynic. The conduct of men formed upon the 
 
 man in this 
 
 refpeft com- fafhionable fyftem is a perpetual contradiction. At one moment 
 
 pared. 
 
 they fawn upon us with a fervility that difhonours the dignity 
 of man, and at another treat us with a neglect, a farcaftic info- 
 lence, and a fupercilious difdain, that are felt as the fevereft 
 cruelty, by him who has not the firmnefs to regard them with 
 neglect. The conduct of the genuine moralift is equable and 
 uniform. He loves all mankind, he defires the benefit of all, 
 and this love and this defire are legible in his conduct. Does 
 5 he 
 
EXCLUDING VISITORS. 271 
 
 he remind us of our faults ? It is with no mixture of afperity, BOOK l v - 
 
 * ; ' CHAP. IV. 
 of felfifh difdain and infolent fuperiority. Of confequence it is ^ — * ' 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 fcarcely poffible he fhould wound. Few indeed are thofe effe- No< IL 
 minate valetudinarians, who recoil from the advice, when they 
 diftinguifh the motive. But, were it otherwife, the injury is no- 
 thing. Thofe who feel themfelves incapable of fufFering the 
 mod benevolent plain dealing, would derive leaft benefit from 
 the prefcription, and they avoid the phyfician. Thus is he de- 
 livered, without harfhnefs, hypocrify and deceit, from thofe whofe 
 intercourfe he had leaft reafon to defire ; and the more his cha- 
 racter is underftood, the more his acquaintance will be feledt, his 
 company being chiefly fought by the ingenuous, the well dif- 
 pofed, and thofe who are defirous of improvement. 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
C 272 ] 
 
 APPENDIX, No. Ill, p. 252. 
 SUBJECT OF SINCERITY RESUMED. 
 
 A CASE PROPOSED. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF CONCEAL- 
 MENT. — previous question: IS TRUTH IN GENERAL 
 TO BE PARTIALLY COMMUNICATED ? — CUSTOMARY EF- 
 FECTS OF SINCERITY — OF INSINCERITY — UPON HIM 
 WHO PRACTISES IT — I. THE SUSPENSION OF IMPROVE- 
 MENT 2. MISANTHROPY— 3. DISINGENUITY — UPON 
 
 THE SPECTATORS. — SINCERITY DELINEATED — ITS GENE- 
 RAL IMPORTANCE. APPLICATION. — DUTY RESPECTING 
 
 THE CHOICE OF A RESIDENCE. 
 
 SOOK IV. ' I 'O enable us more accurately to judge of the extent of the 
 
 chap. IV. I _ . _ 
 
 « „ » "■■ obligation to be fincere, let us luppofe, " that I am 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 No. in. refident, as a native or otherwife, in the kingdom of Portugal, 
 
 A cafe pro- 
 
 pofed. and that I am of opinion that the eftablifhment, civil and re- 
 
 ligious, of that country is in a high degree injurious to the wel- 
 fare and improvement of the inhabitants." Ought I explicitly 
 to declare the fentiments I entertain ? To this queftion I an- 
 fwer, that " my immediate duty is to feek for myfelf a different 
 refidence." 
 
 The 
 
SINCERITY RESUMED. 275 
 
 The arguments in favour of concealment in this cafe are ob- ?J^°i? I T' 
 vious. " That country is fubject to a hierh decree of defbotifm, **; — * ' 
 
 ' J ° ° x Appendix, 
 
 and, if I delivered my fentiments in this frank manner, efpe- . No - m - 
 
 J ' * Arguments 
 
 cially if alone with this I were ardent and indefatigable in en- in favour ot 
 
 J ° a concealment. 
 
 deavouring to profelyte the inhabitants, my fincerity would not 
 be endured. In that country the inftitution of the holy inqui- 
 fition ftill flourifhes, and the fathers of this venerable court would 
 find means effectually to filence me, before I had well opened my 
 commiffion. The inhabitants, wholly unaccuftomed to fuch bold 
 affertions as thofe I uttered, would feel their pious ears inexpref- 
 fibly fhocked, and the martyrdom I endured, inftead of pro- 
 ducing the good effects with which martyrdom is fometimes at- 
 tended, would foon be forgotten, and, as long as it was remem- 
 bered, would be remembered only with execrations of my me- 
 mory. If on the contrary I concealed my fentiments, I might 
 fpend a long life in acts of fubftantial benevolence. If I con- 
 cealed them in part, I might perhaps by a prudent and gradual 
 difclofure effect that revolution in the opinions of the inhabi- 
 tants, which by my precipitation in the other cafe I defeated 
 in the outfet. Thefe arguments in favour of concealment are 
 not built upon cowardice and felfifhnefs, or upon a recollection 
 of the horrible tortures to which I mould be fubjected. They 
 flow from confiderations of philanthropy, and an endeavour 
 fairly to eftimate in what mode my exertions may be rendered 
 mofl conducive to the general good." 
 
 N n Before 
 
274 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 ' v ' 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 No. III. 
 Previous 
 queftion : Is 
 truth in ge- 
 neral to be 
 partiallycom- 
 municated ? 
 
 SUBJECT OF 
 
 Before we enter upon their direct examination, it may be pro- 
 per to premife fome general obfervations. In the firft place, let 
 us calmly enquire whether the inftance here ftated be of the na- 
 ture of an exception or a rule. " Ought I univerfally to tell 
 only a fmall part of the truth at a time, careful not to fhock the 
 prejudices of my hearers, and thus lead them imperceptibly to 
 conclusions which would have revolted them at firft ; or am I 
 to practife this method only, where the rifk is great, and my life 
 may be the forfeit ?" It would feem as if truth were a facred 
 depofit, which I had no right to deal out in fhreds to my fellow 
 men, juft as my temper or my prudence fhould dictate. It 
 would feem as if it were an unworthy artifice, by an ingenious 
 arrangement of my materials to trick men into a conclufion, to 
 which franknefs, ingenuity and fincerity would never have con- 
 ducted them. It would feem as if the fhock I am fo careful to 
 avoid were favourable to the health and robuft conftitution of 
 mind ; and that, though I might in this way produce leaf! tem- 
 porary effect, the ultimate refult would afford a balance greatly 
 in favour of undifguifed fincerity. 
 
 Cuftomary 
 effetts of fin- 
 cerity: 
 
 A fecond preliminary proper to be introduced in this place 
 confifts hi a recollection of the general effects of fincerity and 
 infincerity, the reafons for which the one is commonly laudable 
 and the other to be blamed, independently of the fubjects about 
 which they may be employed. Sincerity is laudable, on account 
 of the firmnefs and energy of chara&er it never fails to produce. 
 
 " An 
 
SINCERITY RESUMED. 275 
 
 " An upright man," it has fometimes been faid, " ou^lit to BOOK IV. 
 r ° ' ' ° CHAP. IV. 
 
 carry his heart in his hand." He outfit to have an insrenuouf- ^ * ' 
 
 J 00 Appendix, 
 
 nefs which fhrinks from no examination. The commerce be- N0, llL 
 tween his tongue and his heart is uniform. Whatever he fpeaks 
 you can depend upon to be the truth and the whole truth. The 
 defigns he has formed he employs no artifice to conceal. He 
 tells you in the firft inftance : " This is the propofition I mean 
 to demonftrate. I put you upon your guard. I will not take 
 you by furprife. If what I affirm be the truth, it will bear your 
 fcrutiny. If it were error, I could have recourfe to no means 
 more equivocal, than that of concealing in every ftep of the procefs 
 the object in which my exertions were intended to terminate." 
 
 Infincerity is to be blamed, becaufe it has an immediate afinfince- 
 
 rity : 
 
 tendency to vitiate the integrity of character. " I mult conceal upon him 
 me opinions I entertain," fuppofe, "from the holy father in- ;t : ° pia 
 quifitor." What method mail I employ for this purpofe ? Shall I ,. t hefufpen- 
 hide them as an impenetrable fecretfrom all the world ? If this be pavements 
 the fyftem I adopt, the confequence is an inftant and immediate 
 end to the improvement of my mind. It is by the efforts of a 
 daring temper that improvements and difcoveries are made. 
 The feeds of difcovery are fcattered in every thinking mind, 
 but they are too frequently ftarved by the ungenial foil upon which 
 they fall. Every man fufpects the abfurdity of kings and lords, 
 and the injuftice of that glaring and opprefiive inequality which 
 fubfifts in moil civililed countries. But he dares net let his 
 
 N n 2 mind 
 
276 , SUBJECT OF 
 
 il??o 17/ mind Ioofe in fo adventurous a fubjedt. If I tell my thoughts* 
 CHAP. IV. J Jot 
 
 •; * ' I derive from the act of communication encouragement to 
 
 Appendix, ° 
 
 No. III. proceed. I perceive in what manner they are received by others, 
 and this perception acts by rebound upon my own progrefs. If 
 they be received cordially, I derive new encouragement from 
 the approbation of others. If they be received with oppofition 
 and diftruft, I am induced to revife them. I detect their errors, 
 or I ftrengthen my arguments, and add new truths to thofe 
 which I had previoufly accumulated. What can excite me to 
 / the purfuit of difcovery, if I know that I am never to commu- 
 nicate my difcoveries ? It is in the nature of things impoffible, 
 that the man, who has determined with himfelf never to utter 
 the truths he knows, fhould be an intrepid and indefatigable 
 thinker. The link which binds together the inward and the 
 outward man is indhToluble ; and he, that is not bold in fpeech, 
 z.wi'fan- will never be ardent and unprejudiced in enquiry. Add to this, 
 
 thropy : 
 
 that confcious difguife has the worft effect upon the temper, and 
 converts virtue, which ought to be frank, focial and ingenuous, 
 into a folitary, morofe and mifanthropical principle. 
 
 d'f sre- But l et us conceive that the method I employ to protect my- 
 
 nuit y : felf from perfecution is different from that above ftated. Let us 
 
 fuppofe that I communicate my fentiments, but with caution 
 and referve. This fyflem involves with it an endlefs train of 
 falfacod, duplicity and tergiverfation. When I communicate 
 my fentiments, it is under the inviolable feal of fecrecy. If my 
 
 zeal 
 
SINCERITY RESUMED. 277 
 
 zeal carry me any great lengths, and my love of truth be ardent, BOOK iv.. 
 
 J J b o ■> J J CHAP. IV. 
 
 I fhall wifh to communicate it as far as the bounds of prudence 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 will poffibly admit, and it will be ftrange if in a courfe of years iNo - UL 
 I do net commit one miftake in my calculation. My grand 
 fecret is betrayed, and fufpicion is excited in the bread of the 
 father inquifitor. What (hall I do new ? I mud, I fuppofe, 
 ftoutly deny the fact. I mull compofe my features into a con- 
 fident exprefiion of the mod natural ignorance and furprife* 
 happy if I have made fuch progrefs in the arts of hypocrify and 
 falfhood, as to put the change upon the wild bead who is ready 
 to devour me. The mod confummare impodor is upon this 
 hypothecs the man of mod perfect virtue. 
 
 But this is not all. My character for benevolence being well 
 known, I am likely to be furrounded by perfons of good 
 humoured indifcretion rather than by inveterate enemies. Of 
 every man who quedions me about my real fentiments I mud 
 determine fird, whether he fimply with t. be informed, or 
 whether his defign be to betray me. The character of virtue 
 feems in its own nature to be that of firm and unalterable relo- 
 lution, confident in its own integrity. But the character that 
 refults from this fydem begins in hefitation, and ends in difgrace. 
 I am quedioned whether fuch be my real fentiments. I deny it. 
 My quedioner returns to the charge with an, " Oh, but I heard 
 it from fuch a one, and he was prefent when you delivered 
 them." What am I to do now ? Am I to afperfe the character of 
 
 the 
 
:2 7 8 SUBJECT OF 
 
 chap iv t ^ ie ^ one ^ re P°rter of my words ? Am I to make an impotent 
 effort to get rid of the charge ; and, inftead of eftablifhing my 
 character for orthodoxy, aftonifh my informer with my cool and 
 intrepid effrontery ? 
 
 Appendix, 
 No. III. 
 
 npon the Infincerity has the worfl effect both upon him who praclifes, 
 
 sfpe&atars. J r . r 
 
 and upon them who behold it. It deprives virtue of that 
 confcious magnanimity and eafe, which ought ever to be ranked 
 among its nobleft effects. It requires the perpetual exercife of 
 prefence of mind, not for the purpofe of telling the moft ufeful 
 truths in the beft manner, but in order to invent a confiftent 
 catalogue of lies, and to utter them with a countenance at war 
 with every thing that is paffing in my heart. It deftroys that 
 confidence on the part of my hearers, which ought to be infe- 
 parable from virtue. They cannot all of them be expected to 
 underfland the deep plan of benevolence and the total neglect of 
 all felnih and timid confiderations by which I am fuppofing my 
 conduct to be regulated. But they can all fee my duplicity and 
 tergiverfation. They all know that I excel the moft confum- 
 mate impoftor in the coolnefs with which I can utter falfhood, 
 » and the craft with which I can fupport it. 
 
 Sincerity de- Sincerity has fometimes been brought into difrepute by the 
 
 !L»eated. , ... 
 
 abfurd fyftem according to which it has been purfued, and ftill 
 oftener by the whimfical picture which the adverfaries of undif- 
 tinguilhing fincerity have made of it. It is not neceffary that I 
 
 ihould 
 
 
SINCERITY RESUMED. 279 
 
 fhould flop every perfon that I meet in the ftreet to inform him BOOK IV. 
 r J * CHAP. IV. 
 
 of my fentiments. It is not neceffary that I fhould perpetually * ' 
 
 * ' i J Appendix, 
 
 talk to the vulgar and illiterate of the deepeft and fublimeft No ' IXI ' ' 
 truths. All that is necefTary is, that I fhould practife no con- 
 cealment, that I fhould preferve my difpofition and character 
 untainted. Whoever queftions me, it is neceffary that I fhould 
 have no fecrets or referves, but be always ready to return 
 a frank and explicit anfwer. When I undertake by argu- 
 ment to eftablifh any principle, it is neceffary that I fhould 
 employ no circuitous methods, but clearly ftate in the firft. 
 inftance the object I have in view. Having fatisfied this origi- 
 nal duty, I may fairly call upon my hearer for the exercife of 
 his patience. " It is true," I may fay, " that the opinion I deliver 
 will appear fhocking to your prejudices, but I will now deli- 
 berately and minutely affign the reafons upon which it is founded. 
 If they appear fatisfactory, receive ; if they be inconclulive, reject 
 it." This is the ground work of fincerity. The fuperflruclure 
 is the propagation of every important truth, becaufe it conduces 
 to the improvement of man whether individually or collec- 
 tively ; and the telling all I know of myfelf and of my neigh- 
 bour, becaufe Ariel juftice and unequivocal publicity are the beft 
 fecurity for every virtue. 
 
 Sincerity then, in ordinary cafes at leaft, feems to be of fo its general 
 much importance, that it is my duty firft to confider how to impou ' ulce " 
 
 preferve 
 
CHAP. IV 
 
 ^ v 
 
 Al'PENDTX, 
 
 ,No. III. 
 
 1S-0 SUBJECT OF ■ 
 
 ohap tv P re ^" erve m y Sincerity untainted, and afterwards to felect the beft 
 means in my power in each particular fituation, of benefiting 
 mankind. Sincerity is one of thofe paramount and general rules> 
 which is never to give way to the affair of the day. I may 
 imagine perhaps that falfhood and deceit may be moft beneficial 
 in fome particular inftances, as I might imagine upon the fubje£t 
 of a preceding chapter, that it would be virtuous to plant my 
 dagger in the heart of a tyrant. But we fhould be cautious of 
 indulging our imaginations in thefe inftances. The great law of 
 always employing ingenuous and honourable means feems to be 
 of more importance than the exterminating any local and tem- 
 porary evils. I well know in the'prefent cafe what good will 
 refult from a frank and undifguifed principle of action, and 
 what evil from deceit, duplicity and falfhood. But I am much 
 lefs certain of the good that will arife under particular circum- 
 ftances from a neglect of thefe principles. 
 
 Application. Having thus unfolded the true ground of reafoning upon this 
 fubjecl:, we will return to the queftion reflecting the conduit to 
 be obferved by the reformer in Portugal. 
 
 Duty-re- 
 fptfting the 
 choice of a 
 
 reiidence. 
 
 And here the true anfwer will perhaps be found to be that 
 
 which has been above delivered, that a perfon fo far enlightened 
 
 upon thefe fubjedts, ought by no confideration to be prevailed 
 
 upon to fettle in Portugal ; and, if he were there already, ought 
 
 4 to 
 
SINCERITY RESUMED. 281 
 
 to quit the country with all convenient fpeed. His efforts in Por- BOOK IV. 
 tugal would probably be vain j but there is fome other country in k * ' 
 
 Appendix, 
 
 which they will be attended with the happieft confequences. No. in. 
 
 It may be objected, "that fome perfon muft begin the work 
 of reformation in Portugal, and why mould it not be the indi- 
 vidual of whom we are treating ?" But the anfwer is, that, in 
 the fenfe fuppofed in this objection, it is not neceffary that any 
 body fhould begin. Thefe great and daring truths ought to be 
 publifhed in England, France and other countries ; and the dif- 
 femination that will attend them here, will produce a report and 
 afford an example, which after fome time may prepare them a 
 favourable reception there. 
 
 The great chain of caufes from which every event in the uni- 
 verfe takes its rife, has fufficiently provided for the gradual in- 
 ftruttion of mankind, without its being neceffary that indivi- 
 duals fhould violate their principles and facrifice their integrity 
 to accomplifh it. Perhaps there never was a mind that fo far 
 outran the reft of the fpecies, but that there was fome country 
 in which the man that poffeffed it might fafely tell all he knew. 
 The fame caufes that ripen the mind of the individual are acting 
 generally, ripening fimilar minds, and giving a certain degree 
 of fimilar impreffion to whole ages and countries. There exift 
 perhaps at this very moment in Portugal, or foon will exift, 
 minds, which, though mere children in fcience compared with 
 
 O o their 
 
« » — ' 
 
 Appendix, 
 No. III. 
 
 282 SUBJECT OF SINCERITY RESUMED. 
 
 chap iv' tne * r §iS ant * c neighbours in a more favoured foil, are yet accu- 
 rately adapted to the improvement of their countrymen. If by any 
 fport of nature an exotic fhould fpring up, let him be tranfplant- 
 ed to a climate that will prove more favourable to his vigour and 
 utility. Add to this, that, when we are inclined to fet an inordinate 
 value upon our own importance, it may be reafonable to fufpe£t 
 that we are influenced by fome lurking principle of timidity or 
 vanity. It is by no means certain that the individual ever yet 
 exifted, whofe life was of fo much value to the community, as 
 to be worth preferving at fo great an expence, as that of 
 his fincerity. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ *8 3 1 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION. — DEFINITION OF NECES- 
 SITY. — WHY SUPPOSED TO EXIST IN THE OPERATIONS 
 OF THE MATERIAL UNIVERSE. THE CASE OF THE OPE- 
 RATIONS OF MIND IS PARALLEL. INDICATIONS OF NE- 
 CESSITY — IN HISTORY IN OUR JUDGMENTS OF CHA- 
 RACTER — IN OUR SCHEMES OF POLICY — IN OUR IDEAS 
 OF MORAL DISCIPLINE. OBJECTION FROM THE FALLI- 
 BILITY OF OUR EXPECTATIONS IN HUMAN CONDUCT. — 
 ANSWER. ORIGIN AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE SENTI- 
 MENT OF FREE WILL. THE SENTIMENT OF NECESSITY 
 
 ALSO UNIVERSAL. THE TRUTH OF THIS SENTIMENT 
 
 ARGUED FROM THE NATURE OF VOLITION. HYPOTHE- 
 SIS OF FREE WILL EXAMINED. SELF-DETERMINATION. 
 
 INDIFFERENCE. — THE WILL NOT A DISTINCT FACULTY. 
 
 FREE WILL DISADVANTAGEOUS TO ITS POSSESSOR. 
 
 OF NO SERVICE TO MORALITY. 
 
 T T AVING now finifhed the theoretical part of our enquiry, BOOK IV 
 * -* fo far as appeared to be neceffary to afford a foundation ( 
 for our reafoning reflecting the different provifions of political 
 
 O o 2 inflitution, 
 
284 OF FREE WILL 
 
 BOOK IV. inftltution, we might directly proceed to the confideration of 
 CHAP. V. ' ° ' r 
 
 *■ * ' thofe provifions. It will not however be ufelefs to paufe in 
 
 this place, in order to confider thofe general principles of the hu- 
 man mind, which are moil intimately connected with the topics 
 of political reafoning *. 
 
 None of thefe principles feems to be of greater importance 
 than that which affirms that all actions are necenary. 
 
 Importance Moft of the reafonings upon which we have hitherto been 
 
 of the quef- 
 
 tion. employed, though perhaps conflantly built upon this doftnne 
 
 as a poftulate, will yet by their intrinfic evidence, however in- 
 confiftently with his opinion upon this primary topic, be admit- 
 ted by the advocate of free will. But it ought not to be the 
 prefent defign of political enquirers to treat the queftions that 
 may prefent themfelves fuperficially. It will be found upon 
 maturer reflection that this doctrine of moral neceffity includes in 
 " it confequences of the higheit moment, and leads to a bold and 
 
 comprehenfive view of man in fociety, which cannot pombly be 
 entertained by him who has embraced the oppofite opinion. 
 Severe method would have required that this propofition mould 
 have been eftablilhed in the firft inftance, as an indiqV enable 
 
 * The reader, who is indifpofed to abftrufe fpeculations, will find the other 
 members of the enquiry fufnciently connected, without an exprefs reference to 
 the remaining part of the prefent book. 
 
 foundation 
 
AND NECESSITY. 285 
 
 foundation of moral reafoning of every fort. But there are well B p°K IV. 
 
 difpofed perfons, who notwithstanding the evidence with which ' » * 
 
 it is attended, have been alarmed at its confequences ; and it was 
 perhaps proper, in compliance with their miftake, to fhew that 
 the moral reafonings of this work did not {land in need of this 
 fupport, in any other fenfe than moral reafonings do upon every 
 other fubjecT:. 
 
 To the right understanding of any arguments that may be Definition of 
 
 neceflity. 
 
 adduced under this head, it is requifite that we mould have a clear 
 idea of the meaning of the term neceffity. Ke who affirms that 
 all actions are neceffary, means, that, if we form a juft and 
 complete view of all the circumftances in which a living or in- 
 telligent being is placed, we fhall find that he could not in any 
 moment of his exiftence have acted otherwife than he has adted. 
 According to this affertion there is in the tranfactions of mind 
 nothing loofe, precarious and uncertain. Upon this queftion 
 the advocate of liberty in the philofophical fenfe muft join iffue. 
 He muft, if he mean any thing, deny this certainty of conjunc- 
 tion between moral antecedents and confequents. Where all is 
 conftant and invariable, and the events that arife uniformly flow 
 from the circumftances in which they originate, there can be no 
 liberty. 
 
 It is acknowledged that in the events of the material univerfe whyfup- 
 
 pofed to exifl 
 
 every 
 
2 86 OF FREE WILL 
 
 E Q°K T V- thing is fubjected. to this neceffity. The tendency of inveftiga- 
 ' * ' tion and enquiry relatively to this topic of human knowledge 
 
 in the opera- A / v . • ° 
 
 tions of the } las been, more effectually to exclude chance, as our improve- 
 
 material um- i r 
 
 vtrle> ments extended. Let us confider what is the fpecies of evidence 
 
 that has fatisfied philofophers upon this point. Their only folid 
 
 i . - . ■ 
 
 ground of reafoning has been from experience. The argument 
 
 which has induced mankind to conceive of the univerfe as go- 
 verned by certain laws, and to entertain the idea of neceffary 
 connexion between fucceffive events, has been an obferved fimi- 
 larity in the order of fucceffion. If, when we had once remark- 
 ed two events fucceeding each other, we had never had occafion 
 to fee that individual fucceffion repeated ; if we faw innumerable 
 events in perpetual progreffion without any apparent order, fo 
 that all our obfervation would not enable us, when we beheld 
 one, to pronounce that another of fuch a particular clafs might 
 be' .expected to follow; we fhould never have conceived of the 
 exigence 'of neceffary connexion, or have had an idea corre- 
 sponding to the term caufe. 
 
 Kence it follows that all that ftrictly fpeaking we know 
 of the material univerfe is this fucceffion of events. Uniform 
 fucceffion irrefiftibly forces upon the mind the idea of abftract 
 connexion. When we fee the fun c"onftantly rife in the morning 
 and fet at night, and have had occafion to obferve this pheno- 
 menon invariably taking place through the whole period of our 
 
 exiftence, 
 
AND N ECES S IT Y. 2S7 
 
 exigence, we cannot avoid believing that there is fome caufe pre- B OOK iv. 
 
 ducingthis uniformity of event. But the. principle or virtue by v * ' 
 
 which one event is conjoined to another we never fee. 
 
 Let us take fome familiar illustrations of this truth. Can it be 
 imagined that any man by the inflection and analyfis of gun- 
 powder would have been enabled, previoufly to experience, to, 
 predict its explofion ? Would he previoufly to experience have 
 been enabled to predict, that one piece of marble having a flat and 
 polifhed furface might with facility be protruded along anathei?. 
 in a horizontal, but would with considerable pertinacity refill 
 fepai-ation in a perpendicular direction ? The fimpleft phsaoa 
 mena of the mod hourly occurrence, were originally placed at an 
 equal diftance from human fagacity. 
 
 There is a certain degree of obfeurity incident to this fubject 
 arifing from the following circumftance. All human knowledge 
 is the refult of perception. We know nothing of any fubftance 
 but by experience. If it produced no effects, it would be no 
 fubject of human intelligence. We collect a confiderable- num- 
 ber of thefe effects, and, by their perceived uniformity having 
 reduced them into general claffes, form a general idea annexed 
 to the fubject that produces them. It muft be admitted, that a 
 definition of any fubftance, that is, any thing that deferves to be 
 c alled knowledge reflecting it, will enable us to predict fome of 
 its future poffible effe&s, and that for this plain reafon, that defi- 
 nition 
 
aSS OF FREE WILL 
 
 CHAP. V 
 * ,. ' 
 
 ?hap \7' nitloa 1 3 prediction under another name. But, though, when 
 we have gained the idea of impenetrability as a general pheno- 
 menon of matter, we can predict fome of its effects, there are 
 others which we cannot predict : or in other words, we know 
 none of its effe&s but fuch as we have actually remarked, added 
 to an expectation that fimilar events will arife under fimilar cir- 
 cumftances, proportioned to the conftancy with which they have 
 been obferved to take place in our paft experience. Finding as 
 we do by repeated experiments, that material fubftances have the 
 property of refiftance, and that one fubftance in a ftate of reft, 
 when impelled by another, paffes into a ftate of motion, we are 
 ftill in want of more particular obfervation to enable us to pre- 
 dict the fpecific effects that will follow from this impulfe in each 
 of the bodies. Enquire of a man who knows nothing more of 
 matter than its general property of impenetrability, what will be 
 the reful t of one ball of matter impinging upon another, and 
 you will foon find how little this general property can inform 
 him of the particular laws of motion. We fuppofe him to know 
 that it will communicate motion to the fecond ball. But what 
 quantity of motion will it communicate ? What effects will the 
 impulfe produce upon the impelling ball ? Will it continue to 
 move in the fame direction ? will it recoil in the oppofite direc- 
 tion ? will it fly off obliquely, or will it fubfide into a ftate of 
 reft ? All thefe events will appear equally probable to him whom 
 a feries of obfervations upon the paft has not inftructed as to 
 what he is to expect from the future. 
 
 4 From 
 
AND NECESSITY. 289 
 
 From thefe remarks we may fufficiently colled what is the B ^?K IV - 
 
 v^ 
 
 ipecies of knowledge we poflefs respecting the laws of the material 
 ttniverfe. No experiments we are able to make, no reafonings we 
 are able to deduce, can ever infbruct us in the principle of caufa- 
 tion, or fhew us for what reafon it is that one event has, in 
 every inftance in which it has been known to occur, been the 
 precurfor of another event of a certain given defcription. Yet 
 we reafonably believe that thefe events are beund together by a 
 perfect neceflity, and exclude from our ideas of matter and 
 motion the fuppofition of chance or an uncaufed event. AfTo- 
 ciation of ideas obliges us, after having feen two events perpetu- 
 ally conjoined, to pafs, as foon as one of them occurs, to the re- 
 collection of the other : and, in cafes where this tranfition never 
 deceives us, but the ideal fucceflion is always found to be an 
 exact copy of the future event, it is impoffible that this fpecies 
 of forefight mould not convert into a general foundation of rea- 
 foning. We cannot take a fingle ftep upon this fubject, which 
 does not partake of the fpecies of operation we denominate ab- 
 ftraction. Till we have been led to confider the rifing of the 
 fun to-morrow as an incident of the fame fpecies as its rifing to- 
 day, we cannot deduce from it fimilar confequences. It is the 
 bufinefs of fcience to carry this taik of generalifation to its 
 fartheft extent, and to reduce the diverfified events of the uni- 
 verfe to a fmall number of original principles. 
 
 Let us proceed to apply thefe reafonings concerning matter to The caicof 
 
 _ the opera 
 
 P p the 
 
290 OF FREE WILL 
 
 E°°K IV. the illuftration of the theory of mind. Is it poffible in this latter 
 
 \ f~^ theory, as in the former fubjett, to difcover any general princi- 
 
 is parallel. pi es ? Q an intellect be made a topic of fcience ? Are we abl6 to 
 
 reduce the multiplied phenomena of mind to any certain ftand- 
 
 ard of reafoning ? If the affirmative of thefe questions be con-i 
 
 ceded, the inevitable confequence appears to be, that mind, as 
 
 well as matter, exhibits a conftant conjunction of events, and 
 
 affords a reafonable prefumption to the neceffary connexion of 
 
 thofe events* It is of no importance that we cannot fee the 
 
 ground of that connexion, or imagine how propofitions and. 
 
 reafoning, when prefented to the mind of a percipient being,, 
 
 are able by neceffary confequence to generate volition and animal, 
 
 motion ; for, if there be any truth in the above reafonings, we: 
 
 are equally incapable of perceiving the ground of connexion 
 
 between any two events in the material univerfe, the common; 
 
 and received opinion that we do perceive fuch ground of con»- 
 
 nexion being in reality nothing more than a vulgar prejudice., 
 
 indlcationsof That mind is a topic of fcience may be argued from all thofe 
 branches- of literature and enquiry which have mind for their 
 
 in hiftory : fubjedt. What fpecies of amufement or inftruction would hif- 
 tory afford us, if there were no ground of inference from moral 
 caufes to effects, if certain temptations and inducements did not 
 in all ages and climates produce a certain feries of actions, if we 
 were unable to trace connexion and a principle of unity in men's 
 tempers, propenlities and traafaftions ? The amufement would 
 
 be 
 
AND NECESSITY. 2 9 i 
 
 be inferior to that which we derive from the perufal of a chro- BOOK iv. 
 
 r CHAP. V. 
 
 nological table, where events have no order but that of time ; v — v— — ' 
 fince, however the chronologift may neglect to mark the inter- 
 nal connexion between fucceflive tranfactions, the mind of the 
 reader is bufied in fupplying that connexion from memory or 
 imagination : but the very idea of fuch connexion would never 
 have fuggefted itfelf, if we had never found the fource of that 
 idea in experience. The inftruction arifing from the perufal of 
 hiftory would be abfolutely none ; fince inftruction implies in 
 its very nature the claffing and generalifing of objects. But, 
 upon the fuppofition on which we are arguing, all objects would 
 be unconnected and disjunct, without the poffibility of afford- 
 ing any grounds of reafoning or principles of fcience. 
 
 The idea correfpondent to the term character inevitably in- in our judg- 
 ments of cha- 
 cludes in it the affumption of necefTary connexion. The cha- rader: 
 
 racter of any man is the remit of a long feries of impreffions 
 
 communicated to his mind, and modifying it in a certain man-' 
 
 ner, fo as to enable us, from a number of thefe modifications and 
 
 impreffions being given, to predict his conduct. Hence arife 
 
 his temper and habits, reflecting which we reafonably conclude, 
 
 that they will not be abruptly fuperfeded and reverfed ; and that, 
 
 if they ever be reverfed, it will not be accidentally, but in con- 
 
 fequence of fome ftrong reafon perfuading, or fome extraordinary 
 
 event modifying his mind. If there were not this original and 
 
 ■effential connexion between motives and actions, and, which 
 
 P p 2 forms 
 
392 
 
 OF FREE WILL 
 
 BOOK IV. forms one particular branch of this principle, between men*» 
 
 eHAP.V. r r r ) 
 
 * v ' paft and future actions, there could be no fuch thing as character,. 
 
 or as a ground ~o£ inference enabling us to predict what men 
 would be from what they have been.. 
 
 iuourfcheme 
 c£ policy : 
 
 From the fame idea of neceflary connexion arife all the 
 fchemes of policy, in confequence of which men propole to 
 themfelves by a certain plan of conduct to prevail upon others 
 to become the tools and inftruments of their purpofes. All the 
 arts of courtfhip and flattery, of playing upon men's hopes and 
 fears, proceed upon the fuppofition that mind is fubject to cer- 
 tain laws, and that, provided we be fkilful and afliduous enough 
 in applying the caufe, the effect will inevitably follow. 
 
 m our ideas 
 of moral dif- 
 eipline. 
 
 Laftly, the idea of moral difcipline proceeds entirely upon this 
 principle. If I carefully perfuade, exhort, and exhibit motives 
 tcTanother, it is becaufe I believe that motives have a tendency 
 to influence his conduct. If I reward or punifh him, either with 
 a view to his own improvement or as an example to others, it 
 is becaufe I have been led to believe that rewards and punifh- 
 ments are calculated in their own nature to affect the fentiment* 
 and practices of mankind.. 
 
 Obje&ion There is but one conceivable objection againft the inference 
 
 from the falli- 
 bility of our from thefe premifes to the neceflity of human actions. It may 
 
 expectations 
 
 in human be ailedged, that " though there is a real connexion between 
 
 conduit, 
 
 motives 
 
AND NECESSITY. 293 
 
 motives and actions, yet that this connexion may not amount B00K IV - 
 
 ' ' CHAP. V. 
 
 to a certainty, and that of confequence the mind ftill retains an v * * 
 
 inherent activity by which it can at pleasure diflblve this con- 
 nexion. Thus for example, when I addrefs argument and per- 
 fuafion to my neighbour to induce him to adopt a certain fpe- 
 cies of conduct, I do it not with a certain expectation of fuccefs, 
 and am not utterly difappointed if all my efforts fail of their 
 effect. I make a referve for a certain faculty of liberty he is 
 fuppofed to poffefs, which may at laft counteract the beft digefted 
 projects." 
 
 But in this objection there is nothing peculiar to the cafe of Anfwer. 
 mind. It is juft fo in matter. I fee a part only of the premifes, 
 and therefore can pronounce only with uncertainty upon the con- 
 cluhon. A philofophical experiment, which has fucceeded a 
 hundred times, may altogether fail upon the next trial. But 
 what does the philofopher conclude from this ? Not tha^here 
 is a liberty of choice in his retort and his materials, by which 
 they baffle the beft formed expectations. Not that the con- 
 nexion between effects and caufes is imperfect, and that part of 
 the effect happens from no caufe at all. But that there was 
 fome other caufe concerned whofe operation he did not perceive, 
 but which a frefh inveftigation will probably lay open to him. 
 When the fcience of the material univerfe was in its infancy, 
 men were fufficiently prompt to refer events to accident and 
 chance ; but the farther they have extended their enquiries and 
 
 y obfervation^ 
 
294 OF FREE WILL 
 
 B R 0KI »Y # obfervation, the more reafon they have found to conclude that 
 
 CHAP. V. ' } 
 
 every thing takes place according to neceffary and univerfal 
 laws. 
 
 The cafe is exactly parallel with refpect to mind. The po- 
 litician and the philofopher, however they may fpeculatively en- 
 tertain the opinion of free will, never think of introducing it 
 into their fcheme of accounting for events. If an incident turn 
 out otherwife than they expected, they take it for granted, that 
 there was fome unobferved bias, fome habit of thinking, fome 
 prejudice of education, fome fingular affociation of ideas, that 
 difappointed their prediction ; and, if they be of an active and 
 enterprifmg temper, they return, like the natural philofopher, to 
 fearch out the fecret fpring of this unlooked for event. 
 
 Origin and The reflections into which we have entered upon the doctrine 
 
 tiniverfality 
 
 ofthefenti- of caufes, not only afford us a fimple and impreffive argument 
 ^« in favour of the doctrine of neceffity, but fuggeft a very obvious 
 
 reafon why the doctrine oppofite to this has been in a certain 
 degree the general opinion of mankind. It has appeared that 
 the idea of neceffary connexion between events of any fort is 
 the leffon of experience, and the vulgar never arrive at the uni- 
 verfal application of this principle even to the phenomena of 
 the material univerfe. In the eafieft and moft familiar inftances, 
 fuch as the impinging of*t>ne ball of matter upon another and 
 its confequences, they willingly admit the interference of chance, 
 7 or 
 
A N D N E C E S S I T Y. 295 
 
 ©r an event uncaufed. In this inftance however, as both the im- BOOK iv. 
 
 pulfe and its effects are fubjedts of obfervation to the i'enfes, they * » f 
 
 readily imagine that they perceive the abfolute principle which 
 eaufes motion to be communicated from the firfl ball to the fe- 
 cond. Now the very fame prejudice and precipitate conclufion, 
 which induce them to believe that they difcover the principle 
 of motion in objects of fenfe, act in an oppofite direction 
 with refpect to fuch objects as cannot be fubjedted to the exa- 
 mination of fenfe. The manner in which an idea or propofition 
 fuggefted to the mind of a percipient being produces animal mo- 
 tion they never fee ; and therefore readily conclude that there is 
 no neceffary connexion between thefe events. 
 
 But, if the vulgar will univerfally be found to be the advo- The fentl- 
 
 n , mcntofne- 
 
 eates of free will, they are not lefs ftrongly, however lnconfift- ccffity alfo 
 ently, impreffed with the belief of the doctrine of neceffity. It 
 is a well known and a juft obfervation, that, were it not for the 
 exiftence of general laws to which the events of the material 
 univerfe always conform, man could never have been either a 
 reafcning or a moral being. The moft confiderable actions of 
 our lives are directed by forefight. It is becaufe he forefees the 
 regular fucceffion of the feafons, that the farmer fows his field, 
 and after the expiration of a certain term expects a crop. There 
 would be no kindnefs in my adminiftering food to the hungry, 
 and no injustice in my thrufting a drawn fword againft the 
 
 boforo.- 
 
 uiHYerfal.. 
 
296 OF FREE WILL 
 
 BOOK IV. bofom of my friend, if it were not the eftablifhed quality of food 
 chap. v. J * J 
 
 \ .. i 
 
 to nourifh, and of a fword to wound. 
 
 But the regularity of events in the material univerfe will not 
 of itfelf afford a fufEcient foundation of morality and prudence. 
 The voluntary conduct of our neighbours enters for a fhare into 
 almoft all thofe calculations upon which our own plans and de- 
 terminations are founded. If voluntary conduct, as well as ma- 
 terial impulfe, were not fubjected to general laws, included in 
 the fyftem of caufe and effect,^ and a legitimate topic of predic- 
 tion and forefight, the certainty of events in the material uni- 
 verfe would be productive of little benefit. But in reality the 
 mind paffes from one of thefe topics of fpeculation to the other, 
 without accurately diftributing them into clafles, or imagining 
 that there is any difference in the certainty with which they are 
 attended. Hence it appears that the moft uninftructed peafant 
 or artifan is practically a neceflarian. The farmer calculates as 
 fecurely upon the inclination of mankind to buy his corn when 
 it is brought into the market, as upon the tendency of the feafons 
 to ripen it. The labourer no more fufpects that his employer 
 will alter his mind and not pay him his daily wages, than he 
 fufpects that his tools will refufe to perform thofe functions to- 
 day, in which they were yefterday employed with fuccefs *. 
 
 * The reader will find the fubftance of the above arguments in a more diffu- 
 
 fiv.e form in Hume's Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, being the 
 
 ihird part of his Effays.. 
 
 Another 
 
AND NECESSITY. 197 
 
 Another argument in favour of the doctrine of neceffity, not ®^| r ^ ■ 
 lefs clear and irrefiftible than that from the confideration of caufe V — *-— ' 
 
 lne truth or 
 
 and effect, will arife from any confiftent explication that can be ^^Jued 
 given of the nature of voluntary motion. The motions of the [™™ o f h * "?" 
 animal fyftem diftribute themfelves into two great clafles, vo- tlon - 
 luntary and involuntary. Involuntary motion, whether it be 
 conceived to take place independently of the mind, or to be the 
 refult of thought and perception, is fo called, becaufe the con- 
 fequences of that motion, either in whole or in part, did not 
 enter into the view of the mind when the motion commenced. 
 Thus the cries of a new-born infant are not lefs involuntary 
 than the circulation of the blood ; it being impoflible that the 
 founds firft refulting from a certain agitation of the animal 
 frame mould be forefeen, fince forefight is the fruit of expe- 
 rience. 
 
 Prom thefe obfervations we may deduce a rational and con- 
 fiftent account of the nature of volition. Voluntary motion is 
 that which is accompanied with forefight, and flows from inten- 
 tion and defign. Volition is that ftate of an intellectual being, 
 in which, the mind being affected in a certain manner bv the 
 apprehenfion of an end to be accomplished, a certain motion of 
 the organs and members of the animal frame is found to be pro- 
 duced. 
 
 
 
 Here then the advocates of intellectual liberty have a -clear 
 
 Q^q dilemma 
 
298 OF FREE WItL 
 
 BOOK IV. dilemma propofed to their choice. They muft afcribe this free* 
 
 CHAP. V. r * J 
 
 v v 1 dom, this imperfect connexion of effects and caufes, either to our- 
 
 voluntary or our involuntary motions. They have already made 
 their determination. They are aware that to afcribe freedom to 
 that which is involuntary, even if the afiumption could be main- 
 tained, would be altogether foreign to the great fubjects of mo- 
 ral, theological or political enquiry. Man would not be in any 
 degree more of an agent or an accountable being, though it could : 
 be proved that all his involuntary motions fprung up in a for- 
 tuitous and capricious manner. 
 
 But on the other hand to afcribe freedom to our voluntary 
 actions is an exprefs contradiction in terms. No-motion is vo- 
 luntary any farther than it is accompanied with intention and 
 defign, and flows from the apprehenfion of an end to be ac- 
 complished. So far as it flows in any degree from another fource, 
 fo far it is involuntary. The new-born infant forefees nothing t 
 therefore all his motions are involuntary.. A perfon arrived at 
 maturity takes an extenfive furvey of the confequences of his ac- 
 tions, therefore he is eminently a voluntary and rational being. 
 If any part of my conduct be deftitute of all forefight of the ef- 
 fects to refult, who is there that afcribes to it depravity and 
 vice ? Xerxes acted juft as foberly as fuch a reafoner, when he 
 caufed his attendants to inflict a thoufand lafhes on the waves of 
 the Hellefpont. 
 
 The 
 
 
a:nd necessity. 
 
 299 
 
 nation. 
 
 The truth of the doctrine of neceffity will be ftill more evi- B 99 K Iv - 
 
 J CHAP.V. 
 
 ■dent, if we confider the abfurdity of the oppofite hypothefis. h~ — X~T^ 
 
 One of its principal ingredients is felf determination. Liberty of fre 5 w , 1 ' 1 
 
 * * P J examined. 
 
 in an imperfect and popular fenfe is afcribed to the motions of Self determi- 
 the animal fyftem, when they refult from the forefight and de- 
 liberation of the intellect, and not from external compulfion. It 
 is in this fenfe that the word is commonly ufed in moral and po- 
 litical reafoning. Philofophical reafoners therefore, who have 
 defired to vindicate the property of freedom, not only to our 
 -external motions, but to the acts of the mind, have been obliged 
 to repeat this procefs. Our external actions are then faid to be 
 free, when they truly refult from the determination of the mind. 
 If our volitions, or internal acts be alfo free, they mult in like 
 manner refult from the determination of the mind, or in other 
 words, " the mind in adopting them" mud be " felf determined." 
 Now nothing can be more evident than that that in which the 
 mind exercifes its freedom, muft be an act of the mind. Liberty 
 therefore according to this hypothefis confifts in this, that every 
 choice we make has been chofen by us, and every act of the 
 mind been preceded and produced by an act of the mind. This 
 is fo true, that in reality the ultimate act is not ftyled free from 
 any quality of its own, but becaufe the mind in adopting it was 
 felf determined, that is, becaufe it was preceded by another act. 
 The ultimate act refulted completely from the determination 
 that was its precurfor. It was itfelf neceffary ; and, if we would 
 look for freedom, it muft be in the preceding act. But in that 
 
 Q^q a preceding 
 
300 OF FREE WILL 
 
 ^HAP ! V P recec ^ n g ac ^ alfo,,if the mindrwere free, it was felf determined^,. 
 
 * v ' that is, this volition was chofen by a preceding volition, and by 
 
 'the fame reafoningthis alfo by another antecedent to itfelf. All 
 the ads except the firft were neceiTary, and followed each other 
 as inevitably as the links of a chain do, when the firft link is 
 drawn forward. But then neither was this firft act free, unlefs 
 the mind in adopting it were felf determined, that is, unlefs this 
 act were chofen by a preceding act. Trace back the chain as 
 far as you pleafe, every act at which you arrive is necefTary. 
 That act, which gives the character of freedom to the whole, can 
 never be difcovered ; and, if it could, in its own nature includes 
 a contradiction. . 
 
 Indifference. Another idea which belongs to the hypothefis of felf deter- 
 mination, is, that the mind is not neceflarily inclined this way 
 or that by the motives which are prefented to it, by the clear- 
 nefs or obfcurity with which they are apprehended, or by the 
 temper and character which preceding habits may have gener 
 rated ; but that by its inherent activity it is equally capable of 
 proceeding either way, and paffes to its. determination from a 
 previous ftate of abfolute. indifference. Now what fort of activity 
 is that which is equally inclined to all lands of actions ? Let us 
 fuppofe a particle of matter endowed with an inherent propenfity 
 to motion. This propenfity muft either be to move in one par- 
 ticular direction, and then it muft for ever move in that direc- 
 tion unlefs counteracted by fome external impreffion ; or it muft 
 
 have 
 
AND NECESSITY. 301 
 
 have an equal tendency to all directions, and then therefult muft ^00x IY". 
 be a-ftate of perpetual reft. 
 
 The abfurdity of this conlequence is fo evident, that the ad- 
 vocates of intellectual liberty have endeavoured to deftroy its 
 force by means of a diftinction. " Motive," it has been faid, 
 " is indeed the occafion, theji/ie qua non of volition, but it has 
 no inherent power to compel volition. Its influence depends - 
 upon the free and unconftrained furrender of the mind. Be- 
 tween oppofite motives and confrlerations the mind can choofe 
 as it pleafes,. and by its determination can convert the motive 
 which is weak and infufHcient in the comparifon into theftrongeft." 
 But this hypothefis will be found exceedingly inadequate to the 
 purpofe for which it is produced. Motives muft either have a 
 neceflary ^nd irrefiftible influence, or they can have no influence- 
 at alL 
 
 For, firft, it muft be remembered, that the ground or reafon 
 of any event, of whatever nature it be, muft be contained 
 among the circumftances which precede that event. The mind 
 is fuppofed to be in a ftate of previous indifference, and there- 
 fore cannot be, in itfelf confidered, the fource of the particular- 
 choice that is made. There is a motive on one fide and a mo- 
 tive on the other: and between thefe lie the true ground and- 
 reafon of. preference. But, wherever there- is tendency to pre- 
 ference, there may be degrees of tendency. If the degrees be^ 
 
 equal,. 
 
302 OF FREE WILL 
 
 chap vl* e( l ua ^ preference cannot follow : it is equivalent to the putting 
 """"* equal weights into the oppofite fcales of a balance. If one of 
 
 them have a greater tendency to preference than the other, that 
 which has the greateft tendency muft ultimately prevail. When 
 two things are balanced againft each other, fo much amount 
 may be conceived to b>e ftruck off from each fide as exifts in the 
 fmaller fum, and the overplus that belongs to the greater is all 
 that truly enters into the confideration. 
 
 Add to this, fecondly, that, if motive have not a necefTary in- 
 fluence, it is altogether fuperfluous. The mind cannot firft 
 choofe to be influenced by .a motive, and afterwards fubmit to 
 its operation : for in that cafe the preference would belong 
 -wholly to this previous volition. The determination would in 
 reality be complete in the firft inftance ; and the motive, which 
 came in afterwards, might be the pretext, but could not be the 
 true fource of the proceeding*. 
 
 The will not Laftly, it may be obferved upon the hypothefis of free will, 
 
 culty. n *" that the whole fyftem is built upon a diftinction where there is 
 
 no difference, to wit, a diftinction between the intellectual and 
 
 .active powers of the mind. A myfterious philofophy taught 
 
 men to fuppofe, that, when the underftanding had perceived 
 
 .any object to be defirable, there was need of fome diftinct 
 
 * The argument from the impoflibility of free will is treated with great force 
 «of reafoning in Jonathan Edwards's Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will. 
 
 2 power 
 
AND NECESSITY. 303 
 
 power to put the body in motion. But reafon finds no ground B OOK *£• 
 
 for this fuppofition ; nor is it poffible to conceive, that, in the * *— — ' 
 
 cafe of an intellectual faculty placed in an aptly organifed body, 
 preference can exift, together with a confcioufnefs, gained from 
 experience, of our power to obtain the object preferred, without 
 a. certain motion of the animal frame being the neceffary remit. 
 "We need only attend to the obvious meaning of the terms in 
 order to perceive that the will is merely, as it has been happily 
 termed, the laft adt of the underftanding, one of the different 
 cafes of the affociation of ideas. What indeed is preference, 
 but a perception of fomething that really inheres or is fuppofed 
 to inhere in the objects themfelves ? It is the judgment, true or 
 erroneous, which the mind makes refpecting fuch things as are 
 brought into comparifon with each other. If this had been 
 fuiEciently attended to, the freedom of the will would never 
 have been gravely maintained by philofophical writers, fince no 
 man ever imagined that we were free to feel or not to feel an 
 impreffion made upon our organs, and to believe or not- to 
 believe a propofition demonftrated to our underftanding. 
 
 It mufl be unnecefTary to add any thing farther on this head, Free w!n dis- 
 advantageous 
 
 unlefs it be a momentary recollection of the fort of benefit that to its P ofl « f - 
 
 for: 
 
 freedom of the will would confer upon us, fuppofmg it to* be 
 poffible. Man being, as we have now found him to be, a 
 fimple fubftance, governed by the apprehenfions of his under- 
 ftanding, nothing farther is requifite but the improvement of his ■ 
 
 reafonlng 
 
3 o 4 OF FREE WILL AND NECESSITY. 
 
 chapv^' rea f° nm g faculty, to -make him virtuous and happy. But, did 
 v * ' he pofi^fs a faculty "independent of the underftanding, and capa- 
 hle of refilling from mere caprice the molt powerful arguments, 
 the beft education and the moft fedulous inftru&ion might be of 
 no ufe to him. This freedom we fhall eafily perceive to be his 
 bane and his curfe ; and the only hope of lafting benefit to the 
 fpecies would be, by drawing clofer the connexion between the 
 external motions and the underftanding, wholly to extirpate it. 
 The virtuous man, in proportion to his improvement, will be 
 under the conftant influence of fixed and invariable principles; 
 and fuch a being as we conceive God to be, can never in any 
 one inftance have exercifed this liberty, that is, can .never 
 ofnofervlce have adfced in a foolifh and tyrannical manner. Freedom of the 
 will is abfurdly reprefented as neceflary to render the mind fuf- 
 ceptible of moral principles ; but in reality, fo far as we acT: with 
 iiberty, fo far as we are independent of motives, our conduct is 
 as independent of morality as it is of reafon, nor ls_ it poflible 
 that we fhould deferve either praife or blame for a proceeding 
 thus capricious and indifciplinable. 
 
 to morality i 
 
 CHAP. 
 
£ 3°5 3 
 
 CHAP. VI, 
 
 INFERENCES FROM THE DOCTRINE OF 
 
 NECESSITY. 
 
 IDEA IT SUGGESTS TO US OF THE UNIVERSE. — INFLUENCE 
 
 ON OUR MORAL IDEAS ACTION VIRTUE — EXERTION 
 
 PERSUASION EXHORTATION — ARDOUR COMPLA- 
 CENCE AND AVERSION PUNISHMENT REPENTANCE 
 
 — PRAISE AND BLAME — INTELLECTUAL TRANQUILLITY. 
 —LANGUAGE OF NECESSITY RECOMMENDED. 
 
 c 
 
 ONSIDERING then the doctrine of moral neceffity as BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 fufficiently eftablifhed, let us proceed to the confequences 
 
 Idea it fug- 
 that are to be deduced from it. This view of things prefents us S efts 1 ? us of 
 
 the univerfc 
 
 with an idea of the univerfe as connected and cemented in all its 
 parts, nothing in the boundlefs progrefs of things being capable 
 of happening otherwife than it has actually happened. In the 
 life of every human being there is a chain of caufes, generated 
 in that eternity which preceded his birth, and going on in regu- 
 lar proceffion through the whole period of his exiftence, in con- 
 fequence of which it was impofTible for him to act in any 
 inftance otherwife than he has acted, 
 
 Rr . The 
 
3 o6 INFERENCES EROM THE 
 
 B00I £ IY; The contrary of this having been the conception of the mafs 
 
 CHAP. VI. J ° r 
 
 >— — « * of mankind in all ages, and the ideas of contingency and acci- 
 
 Influence on o ? cr j 
 
 ourreoral dent having perpetually obtruded themfelves, the eftablifhed 
 language of morality has been univerfally tinctured with this 
 error. It will therefore be of no trivial importance to enquire 
 how much of this language is founded- in the truth of things,., 
 and how much of what is expreffed by it is purely imaginary. 
 Accuracy of language is the indifpenfible prerequifite of found 
 knowledge, and without attention to that fubject we can never 
 afcertain the. extent and importance, of the. confequences of 
 neceffity. 
 
 aftjon:. Firit then it appears, that, in the emphatical and refined fehfe 
 
 in which the word has fometimes been ufed, there is no fuch> 
 thing as action. Man is in -no cafe ftrretly fpeaking the begin- 
 ner of any event or feries of events that takes place in the uni- 
 verfe, but only the vehicle through which certain caufes operate^, 
 which caufes, if he were fuppofed. not to exift, would ceafe to, 
 operate.. Action however, in its more fimple and' obvious fenfe, 
 is fufficiently real*, and exifts equally both in. mind and 'in matter.- 
 When a ball upon a billiard board is (truck by a perfon 
 playing, and afterwards impinges upon a fecond ball, the ball 
 which wasfirft in motion isfaidto act upon the fecond, though it 
 operate in the flricleft. conformity to the imprefhon it received, and; 
 *he motion it communicates be precifely determined by the chv 
 cumftances of the cafe. Exactly fimilar. to this, upon the prin- 
 ciples? 
 
DOCTRINE OP NECESSITY. 307 
 
 ciples already explained, are the actions of the human mind. COOK IV. 
 
 r j r ? CHAP. VI. 
 
 Mind is a real caufe, an indifpenfible link in the great chain of ^— -— v ' 
 
 the univerfe ; but not, as has fometimes been fuppofed, a caufe 
 of that paramount defcription, as to fuperfede all neceflities, and 
 be itfelf fubject to no laws and methods of operation. Upon 
 the hypothefis of a God, it is not the choic, apprehenfion or 
 judgment of that being, fo properly as the truth which was the 
 foundation of that judgment, that has been the fource of all con- 
 tingent and particular exiftences. His exigence, if neceffary, 
 was necefTary only as the fenforium of truth and the medium of 
 its operation. 
 
 is this view of things incompatible with the exiftence of virtue:; 
 virtue ? 
 
 If by virtue we underftand the operation of an intelligent 
 being in the exercife of an optional power, fo that under the 
 &me precife circumftances it might or might not have taken 
 place, undoubtedly it will annihilate it. 
 
 J3ut the do&rine of neceffity does not overturn the nature of 
 things. Happinefs and mifery, wifdom and error will ftiH be 
 diftinct from each other, and there will ftili be a connexion 
 between them. Wherever there is diftinc~tion there is ground 
 for preference and defire, or on the contrary for neglect and 
 averfion, Happinefs and wiftlom will be objects worthy to be 
 
 R r 2 defired, 
 
3 d8 INFERENCES FROM THE 
 
 BOOK IV. defired, mifery and error worthy to be difliked. If therefore 
 
 CHAP. VI. ' 7 7 
 
 by virtue we mean that principle which aflerts the preference of 
 the former over the latter, its reality will remain undiminished b^ 
 the doctrine of neceffity*. 
 
 Virtue, if we would fpe-ak accurately, ought to be confidered 
 by us in the firft inftance objectively, rather than as modifying 
 any particular beings. It is a fyftem of general advantage, in 
 their aptitude or inaptitude to which lies the value or worth- 
 kfsnefs of all particular exiftences. This aptitude is in intel- 
 ligent beings ufually termed capacity or power. Now power in 
 the fenfe of the hypothecs of liberty is altogether chimerical. 
 But power in the fenfe in, which it is fometimes affirmed of in- 
 animate fubftances, is equally true of thofe which are animate; 
 A candleftick has the power or capacity of retaining a candle in 
 &. perpendicular direction,. A knife has a capacity of cutting. 
 In, the fame manner a human being has a capacity of walkings 
 though it may be no. more true of him, than of the inanimate 
 fubftance, that he has the power of exercifing or not exercifing 
 that capacity. Again, there are different degrees as well as dif- 
 ferent claffes of capacity. One knife is better adapted for the 
 purpofes of cutting than another.. 
 
 Now there are two confiderations relative- to any particular 
 being, that excite our approbation,, and this whether the being 
 be pofTefTed of confcioufiiefs or no. Thefe confiderations are 
 
 capacity 
 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 309 
 
 capacity and the application of that capacity. We approve of a ,?j9?p ™ 
 
 fharp knife rather than a blunt one, becaufe its capacity is greater. * » ' 
 
 We approve of its being employed in carving food, rather than 
 in maiming men or other animals, becaufe that application of 
 its capacity is preferable. But all approbation or preference is 
 relative to utility or general good. A knife is as capable as a 
 man of. being employed in the purpofes of virtue, and the one 
 is no more free than the other, as to its employment. The mode 
 in which a knife is made fubfervient to thefe purpofes is by ma- 
 terial impulfe. The mode in which a man is made fubfervient 
 is by inducement and perfuafion. But both are equally the 
 affair of necelfity. The man differs from the knife, Juft as the 
 iron candleftick differs from the brafs one ; he has one more 
 way of being acted upon. This additional way in man is mo- 
 tive, in the candleftick is magnetifm.. 
 
 But virtue has another fenfe, in which it is analogous to duty. 
 The virtue of a human being is the application of his capacity 
 to the general good ; his duty is the bed poffible application of 
 that capacity. The words thus explained are to be confidered as 
 rather fimilar to grammatical diftin'ction, than to real and phi- 
 lofophical difference. Thus in Latin bonus is good as affirmed 
 of a man, bona is good as affirmed of a woman. In the fame 
 manner we can as eafily conceive of the capacity of an inanimate 
 as of " an animate fubftance being applied to the general good, 
 and as accurately defcribe the beft poffible application of the one 
 
 a&.. 
 
3 io INFERENCES FROM THE 
 
 book IV. as f fh e other. There is no effential difference between the 
 two cafes. But we call the latter virtue and duty, and not the 
 former. Thefe words may in a popular fenfe be confidered .as 
 either mafculine or feminine, but never neuter. 
 
 exertion : -But, if the doctrine of neceffity do not annihilate virtue, it 
 
 tends to introduce a great change into our ideas refpecting 
 it. According to this doctrine it will be abfurd for a man to 
 fay, " I will exert myfeif," " I will take care to xememfeer," 
 or even " I will do this." All thefe expreffions imply as if 
 man was or could be fomething elfe than what motives make 
 him. Man is in reality a paffive, and not an active being. In 
 another fenfe -however he is fufficiently capable of exertion. 
 The operations of his mind may be laborious, like thofe of 
 the wheel of a heavy machine in afcending a hill, may -even tend 
 to wear out the fubflance of the fhell in which it acts, without 
 in the fmalleft degree impeaching its paffive character. If we 
 were conftantly aware of this, our minds would not glow left 
 .ardently with the love of truth, juftice,, happinefs and man- 
 kind. We fhould have a nrmnefs and fimplicity in our conduct, 
 not wafting itfelf in fruitlefs ftruggles and regrets, not hurried 
 along with infantine impatience, but feeing events with their 
 confequences,, and calmly and unrefervedly given up to the influ- 
 ence, of thofe comprehenfive views which this doctrine infpires. 
 
 perfuafionj As to our conduct towards others in inftances where we were 
 
 2 * concerned 
 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 3 ji 
 
 concerned to improve and meliorate their minds, we fhould ad- BOOK IV. 
 r CHAP. VI. 
 
 drefs our reprefentations and remonftrances to them with double ' ' 
 
 confidence. The believer in free will can expoftulate with or 
 correct his pupil with faint and uncertain hopes, confcious that 
 the cieareft exhibition of truth is impotent, when brought into 
 conteit with the unhearing and indifciplinable faculty of will ; 
 or in reality, if he were confident, fecure that it could produce 
 no effect at all. The neceffarian on the contrary employs real 
 antecedents, and has a right to expect real effects. 
 
 But, though he would reprefent, he would not exhort, for exhortation : 
 this is a term without a meaning. He would fuggeft motives 
 to the mind, but he would not calf upon it to comply, as if it 
 had a power to comply or not to comply. His office would- 
 confift of two parts, the exhibition of motives to the purfuit of 
 a certain end, and the delineation of the eafieft and mod ef- 
 fectual way of attaining that end. 
 
 There, is no better fcheme for enabling us to perceive how 
 far any idea that has been connected with the hypothecs of li- 
 berty has a real foundation, than to tranflate the ufual mode of 
 expreffing it into the language of neceffity. Suppofe the idea 
 of exhortation fo tranflated to ftand thus : " To enable any ar- 
 guments I may fuggeft to you to make a fuitable impreffion it 
 is neceffary that they fhould be fairly confidered. I proceed 
 therefore to evince-to you the importance of attention, knowing, - 
 
 that, 
 
3 i2 INFERENCES FROM THE 
 
 BOOK IV. t h a t if I can make this importance fufficiently manifeft at- 
 CriAP. VI. r ' 
 
 **- — ' tention will inevitably follow." I mould however be far better 
 
 employed in enforcing directly the truth I am defirous to im- 
 prefs, than in having recourfe to this circuitous mode of treating 
 attention as if it were a feparate faculty. Attention will in rea- 
 lity always be proportionate to our apprehenfion of the import- 
 ance of the fubjecl: before us. 
 
 ardour: At firft fight it may appear as if, the moment I was fatisfied 
 
 that exertion on my part was no better than a fiction, and that 
 I was the paffive inftrument of caufes exterior to myfelf, I 
 fhould become indifferent to the objects which had hitherto in- 
 terested me the moll deeply, and lofe all that inflexible perfe- 
 verance, which feems infeparable from great undertakings. But 
 this cannot be the true ftate of the cafe. The more I refign 
 myfelf to the influence of truth, the clearer will be my per- 
 ception of it. The lefs I am interrupted by queftions of li- 
 berty and caprice, of attention and indolence, the more uniform 
 will be my conftancy. Nothing could be more unreafonable 
 than that the fentiment of neceffity fhould produce in me a 
 fpirit of neutrality and indifference. The more certain is the 
 connexion between effects and caufes, the more chearfulnefs 
 fhould I feel in yielding to painful and laborious employments. 
 
 complacence ft is common for men impreffcd with the opinion of free 
 will to entertain r-efentment, indignation and anger againft thole 
 
 who 
 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 313 
 
 who fall into the commiffion of vice. How much of thefe 5R9p ^i 
 
 feelings is juft, and how much erroneous ? The difference be- v — v— 
 tween virtue and vice will equally remain upon the oppofite 
 hypothefis. Vice therefore muft be an object of rejection and 
 virtue of preference ; the one muft be approved and the other 
 difapproved. But our difapprobation of vice will be of the 
 fame nature as our difapprobation of an infectious diftemper. 
 
 One of the reafons why we are accuftomed to regard the 
 murderer with more acute feelings of difpleafure than the knife 
 he employs, is that we find a more dangerous property, and 
 greater caufe for apprehenfion, in the one than in the other. 
 The knife is only accidentally an object of terror, but againft 
 the murderer we can never be enough upon our guard. In the 
 fame manner we regard the middle of a bufy ftreet with lefs 
 complacency as a place for walking than the fide, and the ridge 
 of a houfe with more averfion than either. Independently 
 therefore of the idea of freedom, mankind in general find in 
 the enormoufly vicious a fufEcient motive of antipathy and 
 difguft. With the addition of that idea, it is no wonder that 
 they mould be prompted to expreflions of the moft intemperate 
 abhorrence. 
 
 Thefe feelings obvioufly lead to the prevailing conceptions on punifliment : 
 the fubject of punilhment. The doctrine of neceflity would teach 
 us to clafc punilhment in the lift of the means we poflefs of re- 
 
 S s forming 
 
314 INFERENCES FROM THE 
 
 J?r??£ IX* forming error. The more the human mind can be fhewn to be 
 CHAP. VI. ° 
 
 — — v • under the influence of motive, the more certain it is that pu- 
 
 nifhment will produce a great and unequivocal effect. But the 
 doctrine of neceffity will teach us to look upon punifhment 
 with no complacence, and at all times to prefer the moft direct 
 means of encountering error, which is the development of 
 truth. Whenever punifhment is employed under this fyftem, 
 it will be employed, not for any intrinfic recommendation it pof- 
 feffes, but juft • fo far as it mail appear to conduce to general 
 utility. 
 
 On the contrary it is ufually imagined, that, independently of 
 the utility of punifhment, there is proper defert in the criminal, 
 a certain fitnefs in the nature of things that renders pain the 
 fuitable concomitant of vice. It is therefore frequently faid, 
 that it is not enough that a murderer fhould be tranfported to 
 a defert ifland, where there fhould be no danger that his malig- 
 nant propenfities fhould ever again have opportunity to act ; 
 but that it is alfo right the indignation of mankind againft him 
 fhould exprefs itfelf in the infliction of fome actual ignominy 
 and pain. On the contrary, under the fyftem of neceffity the 
 ideas of guilt, crime, defert and accountablenefs have noplace.. 
 
 repentance: Correlative to the feelings of refentment, indignation and an- 
 ger againft the offences of others, are thofe of repentance, con- 
 trition and forrow for our own. As long as we admit of an 
 
 eflentiali 
 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 315 
 
 ciTential difference between virtue and vice, no doubt all erroneous p^OK ! ^- 
 
 conduct whether of ourfelves or others will be regarded with ' « ' 
 
 difapprobation. But it will in both cafes be confidered, under 
 the fyftem of neceflity, as a link in the great chain of events 
 which could not have been otherwife than it is. We fhall there- 
 fore no more be diipofed to repent of our own faults than of 
 the faults of others. It will be proper to view them both as 
 actions, injurious to the public good, and the repetition of 
 which is to be deprecated. Amidft our prefent imperfections 
 it will perhaps be ufeful to recollect what is the error by which 
 we are moft eafily feduced. But in proportion as our views ex- 
 tend, we fhall find motives enough to the practice of virtue, 
 without any partial retrofpect to ourfelves, or recollection of our 
 own propenfities and habits. 
 
 In the ideas annexed to the words refentment and repentance prai'fe and 
 there is fome mixture of true judgment and a found conception 
 of the nature of things. There is perhaps flill morejuftice in the 
 notions conveyed by praife and blame, though thefe alfo are for 
 the moft part founded in the hypothefis of liberty. When I 
 fpeak of a beautiful landfcape or an agreeable fenfation, I em- 
 ploy the language of panegyric. I employ it flill more empha- 
 tically, when I fpeak of a good action ; becaufe I am confcious 
 that panegyric has a tendency to procure a repetition of fuch 
 actions. So far as praife implies nothing more than this, it per- 
 fectly accords with the fevereft philofophy. So far as it im- 
 
 ■S s 2 plies 
 
3 l6 
 
 INFERENCES FROM THE 
 
 B 2°p w P nes tnat tne man cou ^ have abftained from the virtuous action 
 I applaud, it belongs only to the delufive fyftem of liberty. 
 
 intellectual 
 tranquillity. 
 
 A farther confequence of the doctrine of necefllty is its ten- 
 dency to make us furvey all events with a tranquil and placid 
 temper, and approve and difapprove without impeachment to 
 our felf poffeflion. It is true, that events may be contingent as 
 to any knowledge we poffefs refpecting them, however certain 
 they are in themfelves. Thus the advocate of liberty knows 
 that his relation was either loft or faved in the great ftorm that 
 happened two months ago ; he regards this event as paft and 
 certain, and yet he does not fail to be anxious about it. But 
 it is not lefs true, that all anxiety and perturbation imply an im- 
 perfect fenfe of contingency, and a feeling as if our efforts 
 could make fome alteration in the event. When the perfon re- 
 collects with clearnefs that the event is over, his mind grows 
 compofed ; but prefently he feels as if it were in the power of 
 God or man to alter it, and his diftrefs is renewed. All that 
 is more than this is the impatience of curiofity ; but philofophy 
 and reafon have an evident tendency to prevent an ufelefs curio- 
 fity from difturbing our peace. He therefore who regards all 
 things paft, prefent and to come as links of an indiftbluble 
 chain, will, as often as he recollects this comprehenfive view, 
 be fuperior to the tumult of paflion ; and will reflect upon the 
 moral concerns of mankind with the fame clearnefs of percep- 
 tion, the fame unalterable firmnefs of judgment, and the fame 
 8 tranquillity 
 
DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY. 317 
 
 tranquillity as we are accuftomed to do upon the truths of BOOK IV. 
 17 r CHAP. VI. 
 
 geometry. * * ' 
 
 It would be of infinite importance to the caufe of fcience and Language of 
 
 neceflity re- 
 
 virtue to exprefs ourfelves upcn all occafions in the language commended.. 
 of neceffity. The contrary language is perpetually intruding, 
 and it is difficult to fpeak two fentences upon any topic con- 
 nected with human action without it. The expreflions of both 
 hypothefes are mixed in inextricable confufion,j uft as the belief 
 of both hypothefes, however incompatible, will be found to 
 exift in all uninftructed minds. The reformation cf which I 
 fpeak would probably be found exceedingly practicable in it- 
 felf ; though, fuch is the fubtlety of error, that we fhould at firft 
 find feveral revifals and much laborious ftudy necefTary before it 
 could be perfectly weeded out. This muft be the author's 
 apology for not having attempted in the prefent work what he 
 recommends to others. Objects of more immediate importance 
 demanded his attention, and engroffed his faculties. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 3i8 ] 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 ' ' OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 NATURE OF MECHANISM — ITS CLASSES, MATERIAL AND 
 INTELLECTUAL. MATERIAL SYSTEM, OR OF VIBRA- 
 TIONS. — THE INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM MOST PROBABLE 
 
 FROM THE CONSIDERATION THAT THOUGHT WOULD 
 
 OTHERWISE BE A SUPERFLUITY FROM THE ESTA- 
 BLISHED PRINCIPLES OF REASONING FROM EFFECTS TO 
 
 CAUSES. OBJECTIONS REFUTED. THOUGHTS WHICH 
 
 PRODUCE ANIMAL MOTION MAY BE — I. INVOLUNTARY. 
 
 ALL ANIMAL MOTIONS WERE FIRST INVOLUNTARY. 
 
 2. UNATTENDED WITH CONSCIOUSNESS.— THE MIND 
 CANNOT HAVE MORE THAN ONE THOUGHT AT ANY 
 ONE TIME. — OBJECTION TO THIS ASSERTION FROM THE 
 
 ■CASE OF COMPLEX IDEAS FROM VARIOUS MENTAL 
 
 r OPERATIONS — AS COMPARISON APPREHENSION — RA- 
 PIDITY OF THE SUCCESSION OF IDEAS. APPLICATION. 
 
 DURATION MEASURED BY CONSCIOUSNESS. — 3. A DIS- 
 TINCT THOUGHT TO EACH MOTION MAY BE UNNECES- 
 SARY. — APPARENT FROM THE COMPLEXITY OF SEN- 
 SIBLE IMPRESSIONS.— THE MIND ALWAYS THINKS. — CON- 
 CLUSION. THE THEORYAPPLIED TO THE PHENOMENON 
 
 OF WALKING — TO THE CIRCULATION OF. THE BLOOD.— 
 OF MOTION IN GENERAL. — OF DREAMS. 
 
 BOOK IV. r~lp\ HE do&rine of neceffity being admitted, it follows that 
 
 CHAP.VII. 
 
 * v ' -»- the theory of the human mind is properly, like the 
 
 Nature of 
 
 eiechanifm: ^qqxj of every other feries of events with which we are ac- 
 
 quainted, 
 
OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND. 319 
 
 quainted, a fyftem of mechanifm ; underftanding by mechanifm 52 *Jf v Yj 
 nothing more than a regular connexion of phenomena without ' * ' 
 any uncertainty of event, fo that every incident requires a fpe- 
 cific caufe, and could be no otherwife in any i-efpec~t than as the 
 caufe determined it to be. 
 
 But there are two forts of mechanifm capable of being applied its dhfles 
 
 material and 
 
 to the folution of this cafe, one which has for its medium only intellectual, 
 matter and motion, the other which has for its medium thought. 
 Which of thefe is to be regarded as mod probable?. 
 
 According to the firft we may conceive the human body to Material fyf- 
 be fo confcituted as to be fufceptible of vibrations, in the fame biat'ions.. 
 manner as the firings of a mufical inftrument are fufceptible of 
 vibrations. Thefe vibrations, having begun upon the furface 
 of the body, are conveyed to the brain ; and, in a manner that 
 is equally the refult of conftrudtion, produce a fecond fet of 
 vibrations beginning in the brain, and conveyed to the different 
 organs or members of the body. Thus it may be fuppofed, 
 that a piece of iron confiderably heated is applied to the 
 body of an infant, and that the report of this uneafmefs, or ir- 
 ritation and feparation of parts being conveyed . to the brain, 
 vents itfelf again in a fhrill and piercing cry. It is in this man- 
 ner that we are apt to imagine certain convulfive and fpafmodic 
 affections to take place in the body. The cafe, as here defcribed,. 
 is fimilar to that of the bag of a pair of bagpipes, which, being 
 
 preffed; 
 
32o OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 Chap vu P re ^ ec ^ * n a certam manner, utters a groan, without any thing 
 
 v ~ — * ' more being neceffary to account for this phenomenon, than the 
 
 known laws of matter and motion. Let us add to thefe vi- 
 brations a fyftem of afTociations to be carried on by traces to 
 be made upon the medullary fubftance of the brain, by means 
 of which paft and prefent impreflions are connected according 
 to certain laws, as the traces happen to approach or run into 
 each other ; and we have then a complete fcheme for accounting 
 in a certain way for all the phenomena of human action. It is 
 to be obferved, that, according to this fyftem, mind or perception 
 is altogether unnecefTary to explain the appearances. It might 
 for other reafons be defirable or wife, in the author of the uni- 
 verfe for example, to introduce a thinking fubftance or a power 
 of perception as a fpe&ator of the procefs. But this percipient 
 power is altogether neutral, having no concern either as a me- 
 dium or otherwife in producing the events *. 
 
 The JnteUec- The f eC ond fyftem, which reprefents thought as the medium 
 
 tual (yltera ' 
 
 molt proba- 
 Me: 
 
 * The above will be found to be a tolerably accurate defcription of the hypo- 
 thefis of the celebrated Hartley. It was unneceffary to quote his words, as it 
 would be foreign to the plan of the prefent work to enter into a refutation of 
 any individual writer. The fagacity of Hartley, in having pointed out the 
 neceffary connexion of the phenomena of mind, and fhewn the practicability 
 ■of reducing its different operations to a Ample principle, cannot be too highly ap- 
 plauded. The reafonings of the prefent chapter, if true, may be confidered 
 as giving farther ftability to his principal dodrine by freeing it from the fcheme 
 <of material automatifm with which it was unneceflarily clogged. 
 
 of 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. qzi 
 
 of operation, is not lefs a fyftem of mechanifm, according to BOOK I v. 
 r ' ] > s CHAP.VII. 
 
 the doctrine of neceffity, than the other, but it is a mechanifm v * ' 
 
 of a totally - different kind. 
 
 There are various reafons calculated to perfuade us that this laft from the con- 
 
 iideration that 
 
 hypothefis is the moft probable. No inconfiderable argument thought would 
 
 otherwife be a 
 
 may be derived from the fingular and important nature of that iuperfluity : 
 property of human beings, which we term thought ; which it 
 is furely fomewhat violent to ftrike out of our fyftem as a mere 
 fuperfluity. 
 
 A fecond reafon ftill more decifive than the former, arifes from tlle 
 
 ellablifhed 
 
 from the conftancy with which thought in innumerable inftances P ni ] cl P lcs ° f 
 
 * reafoning 
 
 accompanies the functions of this mechanifm. Now this con- from effcfts to 
 
 r caufes. 
 
 ftancy of conjunction has been fhewn to be the only ground we 
 have in any imaginable fubject for inferring neceflary connexion, 
 or that fpecies of relation which exifts between caufe and effect. 
 We cannot therefore reject the principle which fuppofes thought 
 to have an efficient fhare in the mechanifm of man, but upon 
 grounds that would vitiate all our reafonings from effects to 
 caufes. 
 
 It may be objected, " that, though this contiguity of event Objeaiom 
 
 . , refuted. 
 
 argues neceflary connexion, yet the connexion may be exactly 
 the reverfe of what is here ftated, motion being in all inftances 
 the caufe, and thought never any thing more than an effect." 
 But this is contrary to every thing we know of the fyftem of 
 
 T t the 
 
322 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 2B9p vYf t ^ ie unrver f e > m which each event appears to be alternately both 
 
 v « ' the one and the other, nothing terminating in itielf, but every- 
 thing leading on to an endlefs chain of coniequences. 
 
 It would be equally vain to objecl, " that we are unable to 
 conceive how thought can have any tendency to produce mo- 
 tion in the animal fyftem ;" fince it has juft appeared that this 
 ignorance is by no means peculiar to the fubjecT: before us. We 
 are univerfally unable to perceive the ground of neceifary con- 
 nexion. 
 
 Thoughts It being then fufEciently clear that there are cogent reafons to 
 
 which pro- 
 duce animal perfuade us that thought is the medium through which the mo- 
 motion may 
 
 be, tions of the animal fyftem are generally carried on, let us pro- 
 
 ceed to confider what is the nature of thofe thoughts by which 
 the limbs and organs of our body are fet in motion. It will 
 then probably be found, that the difficulties which have clogged 
 the intellectual hypothefis, are principally founded in erroneous 
 notions derived from the fyftem of liberty ; as if there were any 
 effential difference between thofe thoughts which are the me- 
 dium of generating motion, and thoughts in general. 
 
 i. involuntary. Firft, thought may be the fource of animal motion, without 
 partaking in any degree of volition, or defign. It is certain 
 that there is a great variety of motions in the animal fyftem, 
 which are in every view of the fubjecl involuntary. Such, for 
 example, are the cries of an infant, when it is firft imprefled 
 4 with 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 3*3 
 
 with the fenfation of pain. Such muft be all thofe motions BOOK IV. 
 
 r CHAP.VII. 
 
 which flowed from fenfation previously to experience. Voli- **- 
 tion implies that fomething which is the fubjecl cf volition, 
 is regarded as defirable ; but we cannot defire any thing, till we 
 have an idea correfponding to the term futurity. Volition im- 
 plies intention, or defign ; but we cannot defign any thing, till we 
 have the expectation that the exiftence of that thing is in fome way 
 connected with the means employed to produce it. An infant, 
 when he has obferved that a voice exciting companion is the re- 
 fult of certain previous emotions, may have the idea of that 
 voice predominant in his mind during the train of emotions 
 that produce it. But this could not have been the cafe the firft 
 time it was uttered. In the firft motions of the animal fyftem, no- 
 thing of any fort could poflibly be forefeen, and therefore nothing 
 of any fort could be intended. Yet in the very inftances here pro- 
 duced the motions have fenfation or thought for their conftant 
 concomitant ; and therefore all the arguments, which have been 
 already alledged, remain in full force to prove that thought is 
 the medium of their production. 
 
 Nor will this appear very extraordinary, if we confider the 
 nature of volition itfelf. In volition, if the doctrine of necef- 
 fity be true, the mind is altogether paflive. Two ideas prefent 
 themfelves in fome way connected with each other ; and a per- 
 ception of preferablenefs neceffarily follows. An object having 
 certain defirable qualities, is perceived to be within my reach ; 
 
 T t 2 and 
 
3*4 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP.VII. 
 
 i. . i 
 
 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 and my hand is neceffarily ftretched out with an intention to 
 obtain it. If a perception of preferablenefs and a perception of 
 defirablenefs irrefiftibly lead to animal motion, why may not the 
 mere perception of pain ? All that the adverfary of automa, 
 tifm is concerned to maintain is, that thought is an eflent'.al link 
 in the chain ; and that, the moment it is taken away, the links 
 that were before it have no longer any tendency to produce mo- 
 tion in the links that were after it. It is poflible, that, as a nu- 
 merous clafs of motions have their conflant origin in thought, 
 fo there may be no thoughts altogether unattended with motion. 
 
 AH animal Here it may be proper to obferve, that, from the principles 
 
 motions were 
 
 firft involun- already delivered, it follows that all the original motions of the 
 
 tary. 
 
 animal fyftem are involuntary. In proportion however as we 
 obtain experience, they are fucceflively made the fubjects of 
 reflection and forefight ; and of confequence become many of 
 them the themes of intention and defign, that is, become vo- 
 luntary. We mall prefently have occafion to fuipecT: that mo- 
 tions, which were at firft- involuntary, and afterwards by ex- 
 perience and affociation are made voluntary, may in the procefs 
 of intelle&ual operation be made involuntary again. — But to 
 proceed. 
 
 2. unattend- Secondly, thought may be the fource of animal motion, and 
 
 fcioufnefs. yet be unattended with confcioufnefs. This is undoubtedly a, 
 
 diftin&ion of considerable refinement, depending upon the pre- 
 
 cife 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 325 
 
 cife meaning of words ; and, if any perfon fhould choofe to ex- BOOK ]Y. 
 
 prefs himfelf differently on the fubjec~t, it would be ufelefs ob- * v ' 
 
 ftinately to difpute that difference with him. By the confciouf- 
 nefs which accompanies any thought there feems to be fomething 
 implied diftinc"t from the thought itfelf. Confcioufnefs is a fort 
 of fupplementary reflection, by which the mind not only has the 
 thought, but adverts to its own fituation and obferves that it. has 
 it. Confcioufnefs therefore, however nice the diftinction, feems 
 to be a fecond thought. 
 
 In order to afcertain whether every thought be attended with The mind 
 
 - , . . r . cannot have 
 
 confcioufnefs, it may be proper to confider whether the mind more than one 
 
 thought at 
 
 can ever have more than one thought at any one time. Now any one time. 
 this feems altogether contrary to the very nature of mind. 
 My prefent thought is that to which my prefent attention is 
 yielded ; but I cannot attend to feveral things at once. This af- 
 fertion appears to be of the nature of an intuitive axiom ; and 
 experience is perpetually reminding us of its truth. In com- 
 paring two objects we frequently endeavour as it were to draw 
 them together in the mind, but we feem to be obliged to pafs 
 fucceffively from the one to the other. 
 
 But this principle, though apparently fupported both by rea- Objection to 
 
 this afTc-rtion 
 
 fon and experience, is not unattended with difficulties. The firft fr r om thc , cafe 
 
 of complex 
 
 is that which arifes from the cafe of complex ideas. This will ideai : 
 beft be apprehended if we examine it as relates to vifible objects. 
 
 " Let 
 
« , — > 
 
 326 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 rHA? vii " ^ et us ^* u PP°^ e tnat I am at prefent employed in the act of 
 reading. I appear to take in whole words and indeed clufcers 
 of words by a fingle ad: of the mind. But let it be granted for 
 a moment that I fee each letter fucceffively. »Yet each letter is 
 made up of parts : the letter D for example of a right line and 
 a curve, and each of thefe lines of the fucceffive addition or 
 fluxion of points. If I confider the line as a whole, yet its ex- 
 tension is one thing, and its terminations another. I could not 
 fee the letter if the black line that defcribes it and the white fur- 
 face that bounds it were not each of them in the view of my 
 organ. There muft therefore, as it fhould feem, upon the hy- 
 pothefis above ftated, be an infinite fucceffion of ideas in the 
 mind, before it could apprehend the fimpleft objects with which 
 we are converfant. But we have no feeling of any fuch thing, 
 but rather of the precife contrary. Thoufands of human be- 
 ings go out of the world without ever apprehending that lines 
 are compofed of the addition or fluxion of points. An hypo- 
 thefis therefore, that is in direct oppofition to fo many apparent 
 facts, muft have a very uncommon portion of evidence to fuf- 
 tain it, if indeed it can be fuftained at all." 
 
 The true anfwer to this objection feems to be the following. 
 The mind can apprehend only a fingle idea at once, but that 
 idea needs not be in every fenfe of the word a fimple idea. The 
 mind can apprehend two or more objects at a fingle effort, but 
 it cannot apprehend them as two. There feems no fufficient 
 
 reafoa 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 327 
 
 reafon to deny that all thofe objedts which are painted at once BOOK IV. 
 
 1 CHAP.VII. 
 
 upon the retina of the eye, produce a joint and fimultaneous l « — - 1 
 
 impreffion upon the mind. But they are not immediately con- 
 ceived by the mind as many, but as one : fo foon as the idea 
 fuggefts itfelf that they are made up of parts, thefe parts can- 
 not be confidered by us otherwife than fucceffively. The re- 
 folution of objects into their fimple elements, is an operation 
 of fcience and improvement ; but it is altogether foreign to 
 our firft and original conceptions. In all cafes the operation is 
 rather analytical than fynthetical, rather that of refolution than 
 compofition. We do not begin with the fucceflive perception 
 of elementary parts till we have obtained an idea of a whole ; 
 but, beginning with a whole, are capable of reducing it into its 
 elements. 
 
 The fecond difficulty is of a much fubtler nature. It confifts from various 
 
 mental opera- 
 
 in the feeming " impoffibility of performing any mental opera- tiuns : 
 tion, fuch as companion for example, which has relation to two as compari- 
 or more ideas, if we have not both ideas before us at once, if 
 one of them be completely vanifhed and gone, before the other 
 begins to exift." The caufe of this difficulty feems to lie in the 
 miftake of fuppofing that there is a real interval between the two 
 ideas. It will perhaps be found upon an accurate examination, 
 that, though we cannot have two ideas at once, yet it is not 
 juft to fay, that the firft has perifhed before the fecond begins to 
 exift. The inftant that connects them, is of no real magnitude, 
 
 and 
 
J 
 
 zS OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 BOOK IV. a nd produces no real divifion. The mind is always full. It is 
 
 CHAP. VII. r J 
 
 1 * ' this inftant therefore that is the true point of comparifon. 
 
 It may be objected, " that this cannot be a juft reprefentation, 
 fince comparifon is rather a matter of retrofpect deciding be- 
 tween two ideas that have been completely apprehended, than a 
 perception which occurs in the middle, before the fecond has 
 been yet obferved." To this objection experience will perhaps 
 be found to furnifh the true anfwer. We find in fact that we 
 cannot compare two obje&s till we have paned and repaffed them 
 in the mind. 
 
 apprehenfion: « Suppofing this account of the operation of the mind in 
 comparifon to be admitted, yet what fhall we fay to a complex 
 fentence containing twenty Ideas, the fenfe of which I fully 
 apprehend at a fingle hearing, nay, even in fome cafes by that 
 time one half of it has been uttered ?" 
 
 The mere talk of understanding what is affirmed to us is of 
 a very different nature from that of comparifon, or any other 
 fpecies of judgment that is to be formed concerning this affirma- 
 tion. When a number of ideas are prefented in a train, though 
 in one fenfe there be variety, yet in another there is unity. 
 Firft, there is the unity of uninterrupted fucceffion, the perennial 
 flow as of a fbream, where the drop indeed that fucceeds is nu- 
 merically diftincT: from that which went before, but there is no 
 
 ceflation. 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 329 
 
 ceffation. Secondly, there is the unity of method. The mind 529 pvt? 
 
 apprehends, as the difcourfe proceeds, a ftricl: aflbciation, from ' *-"■" ■* 
 
 fimilarity or fome other fource, between each idea as it follow* 
 in the procefs, and that which went before it. 
 
 The faculty of understanding the different parts of a difcourfe 
 in their cornexion with each other, fimple as it appears, is in 
 reality of gradual and flow acquifition. We are by various 
 caufes excluded from a minute obfervation of the progrefs of the 
 infant mind, and therefore do not readily conceive by how im- 
 perceptible advances it arrives at a quicknefs of apprehenfion 
 relative to' the fimplefl: fentences. But we more eafily remark 
 its fubfequent improvement, and perceive how long it is be- 
 fore it can apprehend a difcourfe of any length or a fentence of 
 any abftrac"tion. 
 
 Nothing is more certain than the pofflbility of my perceiving 
 the fort of relation that exifts between the different parts of a 
 methodical difcourfe, for example, Mr. Burke's Speech upon 
 Oeconomical Reform, though it be impoffible for me after the 
 fevereft attention to confider the feveral parts otherwife than 
 fuccefllvely. I have a latent feeling of this relation as the dif- 
 courfe proceeds, but I cannot give a firm judgment refpe&ing 
 it otherwife than by retrofpedt. It may however be fufpe&ed 
 that, even in the cafe of fimple apprehenfion, an accurate at- 
 tention to the operations of mind would ihow, that we faarcely 
 
 U u ia 
 
Mo . OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 ph a p vt't * n an ^ mu " ance near a fingle fentence, without returning again 
 
 * y ' and again upon the fteps of the fpeaker, and drawing more 
 
 clofely in our minds the preceding members of his period, before 
 he arrives at its conclufion ; though even this exertion of mind, 
 fubtle as it is, be not of itfelf thought fufficient to authorife us 
 to give a judgment upon the whole. There may perhaps be 
 cafes where the apprehenhon is more inftantaneous, A fimilar 
 exception appears to take place even in fome cafes of judgment 
 or comparifon. A new affociation, or a connecting of two idea s 
 by means of a middle term, which were never brought into 
 this relation before, is a talk of fuch a nature, that the ftrongeft 
 mind feels fome fenfe of effort in the operation. But, where 
 the judgment accurately fpeaking is already made, the operation 
 is in a manner inftantaneous. If you fay, that a melon is a 
 larger fruit than a cherry, 1 immediately alTent. The judgment, 
 though perhaps never applied to this individual fubjecl:, may be 
 faid to have been made by me long before. If again you 
 tell me that Csefar was a worfe man than Alexander, I inftantly 
 apprehend your meaning ; but, unlefs I have upon fome former 
 occafion confidered the queftion, I can neither affent nor dilTent 
 till after fome reflection. 
 
 Rapidity of But, if the principle here ftated be true, how infinitely rapid 
 
 the fuccefiion 
 
 of ideas. muft be the fuccefiion of ideas ? While I am fpeaking no two 
 
 ideas are in my mind at the fame time, and yet with what fa- 
 cility do I pafs from one to another ? If my difccurfe be argu- 
 mentative. 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 331 
 
 mentative, how often do I pafs the topics of which it confifts in ^ ^ *Y* 
 
 review before I utter them, and even while I am (peaking con- v v ' 
 
 tinue the review at intervals without producing any paufe in my 
 difcourfe ? How many other fenfations are perceived by me du- 
 ring this period, without fo much as interrupting, that is, with- 
 out materially diverting the train cf my ideas ? My ey^e fuccef- 
 fively remarks a thoufand objects that prefent themfelves. My 
 mind wanders to the different parts of my body, and receives a 
 fenfation from the chair upon which I fit, from the table upon 
 which I lean ; from the pinching of a fhoe, from a finging in 
 my ear, a pain in my head, or an irritation of the breaft. 
 When thefe mod perceptibly occur, my mind paifes from one to 
 another, without feeling the minuteft obflacle, or being in any 
 degree diffracted by their multiplicity. From this curfory view 
 of the fubject it appears that we have a multitude of different fuc- 
 ceffive perceptions in every moment of our exiflence*. 
 
 Confcioufnefs, as it has been above defined, appears to be one Application 
 of the departments of memory. Now the nature of memory^ 
 fo far as it relates to the fubjeel of which we are treating, is ex- 
 ceedingly obvious. An infinite number of thoughts palled 
 
 * An attempt has been made to calculate thefe, but there is no reafon to be- 
 lieve that the calculation deferves to be confidered as a llandard of truth. Sulfa- 
 tions leave their images behind them, fome for a longer and fome for a fhorter 
 time ; fo that, in two different inftances, the calculation is in one cafe eight, and 
 in another three hundred and twenty to a fecond. 
 
 See Watfon on Time, Ch. II. 
 U u 2 through 
 
332 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 •^?°,?J V * through my mind in the laft five minutes of my exiftence. How 
 CHAP.VII. t> j j 
 
 v v— - J many of them am I now able to recoiled ? How many of them- 
 
 fhall I recoiled! to-morrow ? One impreffion after another is per- 
 petually effacing from this intellectual regifter. Some of thenl 
 may with great attention and effort be revived ; others obtrude 
 themfelves uncalled for ; and a third fort are perhaps out of the 
 reach of any power of thought to reproduce, as having never 
 left their traces behind them for a moment. If the memory be 
 capable of fo many variations and degrees of intenfity, may 
 there not be fome cafes with which it never connects itfelf ? If 
 the fucceflion of thoughts be fo inexpreffibly rapid, may they not 
 pafs over fome topics with fo delicate a touch, as to elude the 
 fupplement of confcioufnefs ? 
 
 Duration It feems to be confcioufnefs, rather than the fucceflion of 
 
 meafured by 
 
 confcioufnefs. id eaSj that meafures time to the mind. The fucceflion of ideas 
 is in all cafes exceedingly rapid, and it is by no means clear that 
 it can be accelerated. We find it impracticable in the experi- 
 ment to retain any idea in our minds unvaried for any percep- 
 tible duration. Continual flux appears to take place in every 
 part of the univerfe. It is perhaps a law of our nature, that 
 thoughts fhall at all times fucceed to each other with equal ra- 
 pidity. Yet time feems to our apprehenfion to flow now with a 
 precipitated and now with a tardy courfe. The indolent man 
 reclines for hours in the fhade ; and, though his mind be per- 
 petually at work, the filent lapfe of duration is unobferved. 
 3 But, 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 333 
 
 But, when acute pain or uneafy expectation obliges confcioufhefs **00K IV. 
 
 to recur with unufual force, the time then appears infupportably ' « ' 
 
 long. Indeed it is a contradiction in terms to fuppofe that the 
 fucceffion of thoughts, where there is nothing that perceptibly 
 links them together, where they totally elude or inftantly 
 vanifh from the memory, can be a meafure of time to the mind. 
 That there is fuch a ftate of mind in fome cafes afluming a per- 
 manent form, has been fo much the general opinion of man- 
 kind, that it has obtained a name, and is called reverie. It is 
 probable from what has been faid that thoughts of reverie, un- 
 derftanding by that appellation thoug'its untranfmitted to the 
 memory, perpetually take their turn with our more exprefii 
 and digefted thoughts, even in the moft active fcenes of our life. 
 
 Laftly, thought may be the fource of animal motion, and yet 3. a di'ftinft 
 
 c t /-)• i 1 thought to 
 
 there may be no need of a diftincT: thought producing each in- each motion 
 
 . . . . ma y De in- 
 
 dividual motion. This is a very important point in the fubject neceflary : 
 
 before us. In uttering a cry for example, the number of 
 
 mufcles and articulations of the body concerned in this operation 
 
 is very great ; fhall we fay that the infant has a diftinct thought 
 
 for each motion of thefe articulations ? 
 
 The anfwer to this queftion will be confiderably facilitated, if apparent 
 
 11 n. 1 • I'll- rr- from the 
 
 we recollect the manner in which the lmpreliions are blended, complexity of 
 
 . c . fenfible im-. 
 
 which we receive irom external objeds. The fenfe of feeling preffions. 
 is diffufed over every part of my body, I feel the different fub- 
 
 ftances 
 
BOOK IV. 
 CHAP. VII. 
 v „ t 
 
 334 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 fiances that fupport me, the pen I guide, various affections and 
 petty irregularities in different parts of my frame, nay, the very 
 air that environs me. But all thefe impreffions are abfolutely 
 fimultaneous, and I can have only one perception at once. Out of 
 thefe various impreffions, the moft powerful, or that which has 
 the greateft advantage to folicit my attention, overcomes and 
 drives out the reft ; or, which not lefs frequently happens, 
 fome idea of affociation fuggefted by the laft preceding idea 
 wholly withdraws my attention from every external object. It 
 is probable however that this perception is imperceptibly modi- 
 fied by the miniature impreffions that accompany it, juft as we 
 actually find that the very fame ideas prefented to a fick man, 
 take a peculiar tinge, that renders them exceedingly different 
 from what they are in the mind of a man in health. It has been 
 already fhown, that, though there is nothing lefs frequent than 
 the apprehending of a fimple idea, yet every idea, however 
 complex, offers itfelf to the mind under the conception of unity. 
 The blending of numerous impreffions into one perception is a 
 law of our nature, and the cuftomary train of our perceptions is 
 entirely of this denomination. Mean while it deferves to be re- 
 marked by the way, that, at the very time that the moft methodical 
 feries of perceptions is going on in the mind, there is another fet 
 of perceptions, or rather many fets playing an under or in- 
 termediate part ; and, though thefe perpetually modify each 
 other, yet the manner in which it is done is in an eminent degree 
 minute and unobferved. 
 
 Thefe 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 335 
 
 Thefe remarks furnifh us with an anfwer to the long dlfputed EOOK IV- 
 queftion, whether the mind always thinks ? It appears that in- "■ * ' 
 
 1 • lr The mind 
 
 numerable impreffions are perpetually made upon our body, always 
 
 thinks. 
 
 and the only way, in which the flighteft of thefe is prevented 
 from conveying a diftinct report to the mind, is in confequence 
 of its being overpowered by fome more confiderable impreffion. 
 It cannot therefore be alledged, " that, as one impreffion is found 
 to be overpowered by another while we wake, the ftrongeft only 
 of the fimultaneous impreflions furnifhing an idea to the miud ; 
 fo the whole fet of fimultaneous impreffions during fleep may 
 be overpowered, by fome indifpofition of the fenforium, and 
 entirely fail of its effect." For, firft, the cafes are altogether 
 different. From the explication above given it appeared, that 
 not one of the impreffions was really loft, but tended, though 
 in a very limited degree, to modify the predominant impreffion. 
 Secondly, nothing can be more unintelligible than this indifpo- 
 fition. Were it of the nature which the objection requires, 
 fleep ought to ceafe of its own accord after the expiration of a 
 certain term, but to be incapable of interruption from any 
 experiment I might make upon the fleeper. To what purpofe 
 call or make him ? Shall we fay, that it requires an impreffion 
 of a certain magnitude to excite the fenforium ? Rut a clock fhall 
 ftrike in the room and not wake him, when a voice of a much 
 lower key produces that effect. What is the precife degree of 
 magnitude neceffary ? We actually find the ineffectual calls that 
 are addreffed to us, as well as various other founds, occafiorally 
 
 mixing 
 
^6 OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 EOOK IV. m ixing with our dreams, without our being aware from whence 
 4 v ' this new perception arofe. 
 
 To apply thefe obfervations. If a number of impreffions may 
 come blended to the mind, fo as to make up one thought or 
 perception, why may not one thought, in cafes where the mind 
 acts as a caufe, produce a variety of motions ? It has already 
 been fhown that there is no effential difference between the two 
 cafes. The mind is completely paffive in both. Is there any 
 fufficient reafon to fhow, that, though it be poffible for one fub- 
 ftance confidered as the recipient of effects to be the fubject of a 
 variety of fimultaneous impreffions, yet it is impofhble for one 
 fubftance confidered as a caufe to produce a variety of fimulta- 
 neous motions ? If it be granted that there is not, if the mere 
 modification of a thought defigning a motion in chief, may 
 produce a fecondary motion, then it muft perhaps farther be 
 confeffed poffible for that modification which my firft thought 
 produced in my fecond, to carry on the motion, even though 
 the fecond thought be upon a fubject altogether different. 
 
 Conclufioa. The confequences, which feem deducible from this theory of 
 
 mind, are fufficiently memorable. By mowing the extreme 
 fubtlety and fimplicity of thought, it removes many of the diffi- 
 culties that might otherwife reft upon its finer and more evanef- 
 cent operations. If thought, in order to be the caufe of animal 
 motion, need not have either the nature of volition, or the 
 
 v concomitant 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 337 
 
 concomitant of confcioufnefs, and if a finele thought may BOOK IV. 
 
 b ° : CHAP.VII. 
 
 become a complex caufe and produce a variety of motions, it v * ' 
 
 will then become exceedingly difficult to trace its operations, or 
 to difcover any circumftances in a particular inftance of animal 
 motion, which can fufficiently indicate that thought was not the 
 principle of its production, and by that means fuperfede the force 
 of the general arguments adduced in the beginning of this 
 chapter. Hence therefore it appears that all thofe motions 
 which are obferved to exift in fubftances having perception, and 
 which are not to be difcovcred in fubllances of any other fpecies, 
 may reafonably be fufpected to have thought, the diftinguifhing. 
 peculiarity of fuch fubftances, for their caufe. 
 
 There are various daffies of motion which will fall under The theory 
 
 . r r applied to the 
 
 this definition, befide thoie already enumerated. An example phenomenon 
 
 of wulluno" : 
 
 of one of thefe claffies fuggefts itfelf in the phenomenon of walk- 
 ing. An attentive obferver will perceive various fymptoms cal- 
 culated to perfuade him, that every ftep he takes during the 
 longeft journey is the production of thought. Walking is in 
 all cafes originally a voluntary motion. In a child when he 
 learns to walk, in a rope dancer when he begins to pradtife 
 that particular exercife, the diftinct determination of mind pre- 
 ceding each ftep is fufficiently perceptible. It may be abfurd to 
 fay, that a long feries of motions can be the refult of fo many 
 exprefs volitions, when thefe fuppofed volitions leave no trace 
 |n the memory. But it is not unreafonable to believe, that a 
 
 X x fpecies 
 
33* OF THE MECHANISM 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAP.VII. 
 
 * 1 ' 
 
 fpecies of motion which began in exprefs defign, may, though 
 it ceafes to be the fubject of confcious attention, owe its con- 
 tinuance to a continued feries of thoughts flowing in that direc- 
 tion, and that, if life were taken away, material impulfe would 
 not carry on the exercife for a moment. We actually find, 
 that, when our thoughts in a train are more than commonly 
 earned, our pace flackens, and fometimes our going forward is 
 wholly fufpended, particularly in any lefs common fpecies of 
 walking, fuch as that of defcending a flight of flairs. In 
 afcending the cafe is ftill more difficult, and accordingly we are 
 accuftomed wholly to fufpend the regular progrefs of reflection 
 during that operation. 
 
 to the clrcu- Another clafs of motions of a ftill fubtler nature, are the re- 
 lation of the 
 blood. gular motions of the animal economy, fuch as the circulation of 
 
 the blood, and the pulfation of the heart. Are thought and 
 
 perception the medium of thefe motions ? We have the fame 
 
 argument here as in the former inftances, conjun&ion of event. 
 
 When thought begins, thefe motions alfo begin ; and, when it 
 
 ceafes, they are at an end. They are therefore either the caufe 
 
 or effect of percipiency, or mind ; but we fhall be inclined to 
 
 embrace the latter fide of this dilemma, when we recoiled that 
 
 we are probably acquainted with many inftances in which 
 
 thought is the immediate caufe of motions, which fcarcely yield 
 
 in fubtlety to thefe ; but that, as to the origin of thought, we 
 
 are wholly uninformed. Add to this, that there are probably 
 
 no 
 
OF THE HUMAN MIND. 339 
 
 » 
 
 no motions of the animal economy, which we do not find it in BOOK IV. 
 
 J CHAP. VII. 
 
 the power of volition, and ftill more of our involuntary fenfa- ' * ' 
 
 tions, to haflen or retard. 
 
 It is far from certain that the phenomenon of motion can any Of motion in 
 
 general. 
 where exift where there is not thought. Motion may be diftri- 
 
 buted into four daffies ; the fimpler motions which refult from 
 what are called the effential properties of matter and the laws of 
 impulfe ; the more complex ones which cannot be accounted 
 for by the affumption of thefe laws, fuch as gravitation, elafti- 
 city, electricity and magnetifm ; and the motions of the vege- 
 table and animal fyftems. Each of thefe feems farther than 
 that which preceded it from being able to be accounted for by 
 any thing we underftand of the nature of matter. 
 
 Some light may be derived from what has been here ad- Of dreams. 
 vanced upon the phenomenon of dreams. " In fleep we fome- 
 times imagine" for example " that we read long paffages from 
 books, or hear a long oration from a fpeaker. In all cafes 
 fcenes and incidents pafs before us that in various ways excite 
 our paffions and intereft our feelings. Is it poihble that thefe 
 fhould be the unconfcious production of our own minds ?" 
 
 It has already appeared, that volition is the accidental, and by 
 no means the neceffary concomitant, even of thofe thoughts 
 which are moll active and efficient in the producing of motion. 
 
 X X 2 It 
 
34° OF THE MECHANISM OF THE HUMAN MIND. 
 
 BOOK IV. It is therefore no more to be wondered at that the mind fhould 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 be bufied in the compofition of books which it appears to read, 
 
 than that a train of thoughts of any other kind fhould pafa 
 
 through it without a confcioufnefs of its being the author. In 
 
 fact we perpetually annex wrong and erroneous ideas to this 
 
 phrafe, that we are the authors. Though mind be a real and 
 
 efficient caufe, it is in no cafe a firft caufe. It is the medium 
 
 through which operations are produced. Ideas fucceed each 
 
 other in our fenforium according to certain neceffary laws. 
 
 The moft powerful impreffion, either from without or from 
 
 within, conftantly gets the better of all its competitors, and 
 
 forcibly drives out the preceding thought, till it is in the fame 
 
 irrefiftible manner driven out by its fucceffor. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 34 1 1 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 OF THE PRINCIPLE OF VIRTUE. 
 
 HYPOTHESES OF BENEVOLENCE AND SELF LOVE — SUPERIOR- 
 ITY OF THE FORMER. — ACTION IS EITHER VOLUNTARY 
 
 OR INVOLUNTARY. NATURE OF THE FIRST OF THESE 
 
 CLASSES. ARGUMENT THAT RESULTS FROM IT. VO- 
 LUNTARY ACTION HAS A REAL EXISTENCE. — CONSE- 
 QUENCE OF THAT EXISTENCE. EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 
 
 OF THE SUBJECT. SUPPOSITIONS SUGGESTED BY THE 
 
 ADVOCATES OF SELF LOVE — THAT WE CALCULATE UPON 
 
 ALL OCCASIONS THE ADVANTAGE TO ACCRUE TO US. 
 
 FALSENESS OF THIS SUPPOSITION. SUPPOSITION OF A 
 
 CONTRARY SORT. — WE DO NOT CALCULATE WHAT 
 WOULD BE THE UNEASINESS TO RESULT FROM OUR RE- 
 FRAINING TO ACT — EITHER IN RELIEVING DISTRESS — ■ 
 
 OR IN ADDING TO THE STOCK OF GENERAL GOOD. 
 
 UNEASINESS AN ACCIDENTAL MEMBER OF THE PROCESS. 
 
 THE SUPPOSITIONS INCONSISTENTLY BLENDED. 
 
 SCHEME OF SELF LOVE RECOMMENDED FROM THE PRO- 
 PENSITY OF MIND TO ABBREVIATE ITS PROCESS FROM 
 
 THE SIMPLICITY THAT OBTAINS IN THE NATURES OF 
 
 THINGS. HYPOTHESIS OF SELF LOVE INCOMPATIBLE 
 
 WITH VIRTUE. — CONCLUSION. — IMPORTANCE OF THE 
 
 QUESTION. APPLICATION. 
 
 T 
 
 HE fubjedt of intellectual meclianifm fuggefted itfelf as BOOK IV. 
 
 chap. vnr. 
 the moft fuitable introduction to an enquiry into the v v ' 
 
 moral principles of human conduct. Having firft afcertained 
 
 that 
 
342 - OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 BOOK \J r \ th at thought is the real and efficient fource of animal motion, it 
 CHAP- vii r. ° ' 
 
 v v ' remains to be confidered what is the nature of thofe particular 
 thoughts in which the moral conduct of man originates. 
 
 Hypothefes Upon this queftion there are two opinions. By fome it is 
 
 or bencvo- x - 1 l j 
 
 fclflov fuppofed that the human mind is of a temper confiderably duc- 
 
 tile, fo that, as we in certain inftances evidently propofe our 
 own advantage for the object of our purfuit, fo we are capable 
 no lefs fincerely and directly in other inftances of defiring the 
 benefit of our neighbour. By others it is affirmed, that we are 
 incapable of acting but from the profpect or ftimulant of per- 
 fonal advantage, and that, when our conduct appears moft re- 
 trograde from this object, the principle from which it flows is 
 
 Superiority fecretly the fame. It fhall be the bufinefs of this chapter to 
 
 of the for- 
 mer, prove that the former hypothefis is conformable to truth. 
 
 Aflion is j t [ s t0 be prefumed from the arguments of the preceding chap- 
 
 tary or mvo- ter t h at there exift in the theory of the human mind two claffes of 
 
 Unitary. ' 
 
 action, voluntary and involuntary. The laft of thefe we have 
 minutely inveftigated. It has fufficiently appeared that there 
 are certain motions of the animal fyftem, which have fenfation 
 or thought for their medium of production, and at the fame time 
 arife, to have recourfe to a ufual mode of expreffion, fpon- 
 taneoufly, without forefight of or a direct reflecting on the refult 
 which is to follow. But, if we admit the exiftence of this 
 phenomenon, there does not feem lefs reafon to admit the 
 exiftence of the other clafs of action above enumerated, which 
 6 is 
 
OF VIRTUE. 343 
 
 is accompanied in its operation with a forefight of its refult, BOOK IV. 
 
 and to which that forefight ferves as the reafon and caufe of ex- v * ' 
 
 iftence. 
 
 Voluntary action cannot proceed from all perceptions indif- ^ a .' llire ° rthc 
 criminately, but only from 'perceptions of a peculiar clafs, viz. chiles. 
 fuch perceptions as are accompanied with the idea of fomething 
 as true refpecting them, fomething which may be affirmed or 
 denied. One of the firft inferences therefore from the doctrine 
 of voluntary action, is the exiftence of the underftanding as a fa- 
 culty diftinct from fenfation, or, to fpeak more accurately, the 
 poflibility of employing the general capacity of perception, not 
 merely as the vehicle of diftinct ideas, but as the medium of 
 connecting two or more ideas together. This particular habit, 
 when it has once been created, gradually extends itfelf to every 
 province of the mind, till at length it is impoffible for any thing 
 to make a clear and diftinct impreflion upon the fenforium, with- 
 out its being followed with fome judgment of the mind con- 
 cerning it. 
 
 It is 4 thus that man becomes a moral being. He is no farther 
 fo than he is capable of connecting and comparing ideas, of 
 making propofitions concerning them, and of forefeeing certain 
 confequences as the refult of certain motions of the animal fyftem. 
 
 . But, if the forefight of certain confequences to refult may be 
 
 the 
 
344 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 clP°' K IV f ^ ie m ^ c i ent reafon of action, that is, if there be fuch a thing 
 
 * v ' as volition, then every forefight of that kind has a tendency to 
 action. If the perception of fomething as true, joined with 
 the confcioufnefs of my capacity to act upon this truth, be of it-, 
 felf fufficient to produce motion in the animal fyftem, then every 
 perception fo accompanied has a tendency to motion. To apply 
 this to the fubjec~t before us. 
 
 Argument I perceive a certain agreeable food, I perceive in myfelf an 
 
 that refults . . , " . "' ' '■ ' 
 
 frumit. appetite which this food is adapted to gratify, and thefe percep- 
 tions are accompanied with a confcioufnefs of my power to ap- 
 propriate this food. If no other confideration exift in my mind 
 beyond thofe which have juft been ftated, a certain motion of the 
 animal fyftem irrefiftibly follows. 
 
 Suppofe now that the perfon about whofe appetites thefe pro- 
 pofitions are converfant, is not myfelf but another. This varia- 
 tion cannot materially alter the cafe. Still there remain all the 
 circumftances neceflary to generate motion. I perceive the 
 food, I am acquainted with the wants of the perfon in queftion, 
 and I am confcious of my power of adminiftering to them. 
 Nothing more is neceflary in order to produce a certain move- 
 ment of my body. Therefore, if, as in the former cafe, no 
 other confideration exift in my mind, a certain motion of the 
 animal fyftem irrefiftibly follows. Therefore, if ten thoufand 
 other confiderations exift, yet there was in this, feparately con- 
 
 fidered. 
 
OF VIRTUE. 345 
 
 fidered, a tendency to motion. That which, when alone, muft nnPrFvXl 
 
 inevitably produce motion, mUit, however accompanied, retain v « ' 
 
 its internal character. 
 
 Let us however fuppofe, which feems the only confiftent Y° ]un t«7 ac - 
 
 ** * J tion has a real 
 
 mode of fupporting the doctrine of felf love, " that there is no exiftence « 
 fuch thing practically confidered as volition, that man never 
 acts from a forefight of confequences, but always continues to 
 act, as we have proved him to act at firfl, from the mere im- 
 pulfe of pain, and precifely in the manner to which that im- 
 pulfe prompts him, without the rational faculty having any ten- 
 dency to prolong, to check or to regulate his actions." What 
 an incredible picture does this exhibit to us of the human mind? 
 We form to ourfelves, for this cannot be difputed, opinions, we 
 meafure the tendency of means to the promotion of ends, we 
 compare the value of different objects, and we imagine our 
 conduct to be influenced by the judgments we are induced to 
 make. We perceive the preferablenefs of one thing to another, 
 we defire, we chufe ; all this cannot be denied. But all this 
 is a vain apparatus ; and the whole fyftem of our conduct pro- 
 ceeds, uninfluenced by our apprehenfion of the relative value 
 of objects, and our forefight of confequences favourable or 
 adverfe. 
 
 There is no other alternative. "Once admit the understanding Confequenc* 
 to an emaent lhare m the bufmefs, and there is no reafon that ence. 
 
 Y y Gail 
 
34 6 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 BOOK IV. can poffibJy be affigned, why every topic, which is the object 
 of human underflanding, fhould not have its portion of effi- 
 ciency. Once admit that we act upon the apprehenfion of 
 fomething that may be affirmed or denied reflecting an idea, and 
 we fliall be compelled to acknowledge that every propofitioa- 
 including in it the notion of preferablenefs or the contrary, of 
 better or worfe, will, fo far as it falls within the compafs of 
 our power real or fuppofed to effect, afford a motive inducing, 
 though with different degrees of energy, to animal motion.. 
 But this is directly contrary to the theory of felf love. They 
 who maintain that felf love is the only fpring of action, fay in 
 effect, not only that no action is difinterefted, but that no dif- 
 interefted confideration contributes in any degEee as an induce- 
 ment to action. If I relieve the virtuous diftrefs of the beffe * 
 of men, I am influenced according to them by no particle of 
 love for the individual or companion for his diftrefs, but ex— 
 clufively by the defire of procuring gratification to myfelf. 
 
 Let us confider this cafe a little more clofely. If I perceive- 
 either that my profperity or exiftence mull be facrificed to 
 thofe of twenty men as good as myfelf, or theirs to mine,, 
 furely this affords fome fmall inducement to adopt the former- 
 part of the alternative- It may not be fuccefsful, but does it 
 excite no wifh however fleeting, no regret however ineffectual ? 
 The decifion of the queftion is in reality an affair of arithmetic ; : 
 k there no human being that was ever competent to underftand 
 
 it ? 
 
OF VIRTUE. 347 
 
 it? The value of a man is his ufefulnefs; has no man ever be- ^J~^ 
 lieved that another's capacity for ufefulnefs was equal to his own? ' * " 
 I am as 40, confequently the others are as 800 ; if the 40 were 
 not myfelf, I mould perceive that it was lefs than Soo ; is it pof- 
 fible I fhould not perceive it, when the cafe becomes my own ? 
 
 But the advocates for the fyftem of felf love generally admit, 
 ■" that it is poffible for a man to facrifice his own exiftence in 
 order to preferve that of twenty others j" but they affirm, 
 *' that in fo doing he acts from perfonal intereft. He perceives 
 that it is better for him to die with the confcioufnefs of an he- 
 roic action, than live with the remorfe of having declined it." 
 That is, here is an action attended with various recommenda- 
 tions, the advantage to arife to twenty men, their tranquillity 
 and happinefs through a long period of remaining exiftence, the 
 benefits they will not fail to confer on thoufands of their contem- 
 poraries, and through them on millions of pofterity, and laftly his 
 own efcape from remorfe and momentary exultation in the per- 
 formance of an act of virtue. From all thefe motives he felects 
 the laft, the former he wholly difregards, and adopts a conduct 
 of the higheft generality from no view but to his own advantage. 
 Abftractedly and impartially confidered, and putting felf as fuch 
 out of the queftion, this is its leaft recommendation, and he is 
 absolutely and unlimitedly callous to all the reft. 
 
 •Confidering then the fyftem of difintereftednefs as fufficiently Experiment! 
 
 view of tb« 
 
 Y y 2 eftablifhed fubjeft. 
 
343 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 ru ?p K vm eftablifhed in theory, let us compare it with the leflbns of ex- 
 * x^ — ' perience. There are two different hypothefes by which this 
 
 buppolmons * * * - * 
 
 th ffS dvt 't 7 tneor y i s oppofed ; the one affirming " that in every thing we 
 of felt love: do,, we employ, previoufly to the choice of the mind, a calculation 
 by which we determine how far the thing to be done will con- 
 duce to our own advantage j" the other afcribing our actions 
 " to the fame blind and unintelligent principle, by which, when a 
 child cries, he frequently utters a found unexpected by himfelf, 
 but which inevitably refults from a certain connexion of an or> 
 ganized body with an irritated mind." 
 
 that we cal- How far does experience agree with the firft of thefe hy- 
 all occafions pothefes I Surely nothing can be more contrary to any thing we 
 to accrue to are able to obferve of ourfelves, than to imagine, that in every 
 ad, of pity fuppofe, we eftimate the quantity of benefit to arife 
 to ourfelves, before we yield to the emotion. It might be faid 
 indeed, that the mind is very fubtle in its operations, and that, a 
 certain train of reafoning having been rendered familiar to us, 
 we pafs it over in our reflections with a rapidity that leaves no 
 trace in the memory. But this, though true, will contribute 
 little to relieve the fyftem we are confidering, fince it unfortu- 
 nately happens that our firfi emotions of pity are leafl capable of 
 being accounted for in this way. 
 
 «b 
 
 Falftnefs of To underftand this let us begin with the cafe of an infant. 
 
 this fuppofi. 
 
 •ion. Before he can feet fympathy, he muft have been led by a 
 
 feries 
 
OF VIRTUE. 
 
 349 
 
 feries of obfervations to perceive that his nurfe for example, is BOOK IV. 
 
 r r ' CHAP. VIII. 
 
 a being poflefled of confcioufnefs, and fufceptible like himfelf v *— -* 
 
 of the impreflions of pleafure and pain. Having fupplied him 
 with this previous knowledge, let us fuppofe his nurfe to fall 
 from a flight of flairs and break her leg. He will probably feel 
 fome concern for the accident ; he will umlerftand the meaning 
 of her cries, fimilar to thofe he has been accuftomed to utter 
 in diftrefs ; and he wilL difcover fome wifh to relieve her. 
 Pity is perhaps firft introduced by a mechanical impreflion upon 
 the organs, in confequence of which the cries uttered by 
 another prompt the child without direct defign to utter cries 
 of his own. Thefe are at firft unaccompanied with compaflion, 
 but they naturally induce the mind of the infant to yield atten- 
 tion to the appearance which thus imprefied .him.. . 
 
 In the relief he wifhes to communicate is he prompted by 
 reflecting on the pleafures of generofity ? This is by the fuppo- 
 fition the firft benevolent emotion he has experienced, and pre- 
 vioufly to experience it is impoflible he mould forefee the plea- 
 fures of benevolence. Shall we fuppofe that he . is influenced 
 by other felfilh confiderations ? He confiders, that, if his 
 nurfe die, he will be in danger of perifhing; and that, if 
 fhe be lame, he will be deprived of his airings. Is it pof- 
 fible that any man fhould believe, that, in the inftantaneous 
 impulfe of fympathy, the child is guided by thefe remote con- 
 fiderations ? Indeed it was unneceflary to have inftanced in an 
 fittion apparently benevolent, fince it is equally clear that our 
 
 moil 
 
35 o OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 BOOK IV. mo fl- f am iliar a&ions are inconfiftent with this explanation. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. r 
 
 v v ' We do not fo much as eat and drink, from the recollection that 
 
 thefe functions are necefTary to our fupport. 
 
 Suppofidon The fecond of the two hypothefes enumerated, is diametrically 
 
 of a contrary 
 
 fort. the reverfe of the firft. As the former reprefented all human 
 
 actions as proceeding from a very remote deduction of the in- 
 tellect, the latter confiders the whole as merely phyfical. In 
 its literal fenfe, as has already been feen, nothing can be more 
 incompatible with experience. Its advocates therefore are obliged 
 to modify their original aflumption, and to fay, not that we act 
 merely from fenfation, but that fenfetion affords the bafis for 
 reflection ; and that, though we be capable of conducting our- 
 felves by fyftem and forelight, yet the only topic to which we 
 can apply that forefight is the removal of pain. In reality all 
 that which is regularly adapted to the accomplifhment of a certain 
 purpofe, muft be admitted to flow from the dictates of reflection. 
 The tear ftarts, the cry is uttered at the prompting of fenfation 
 .only, but we cannot lift a finger to relieve except as we are com- 
 manded by the underftanding. 
 
 We do not Here then we are prefented with the commencement of a new 
 
 calculate what 
 
 would be the feries. If uneafineis be ftill the fource of the phenomena, at 
 
 uneafmefs to 
 
 xefukfromour l ea ft it is now under a different form. Before, a certain emotion 
 
 refiaining to 
 
 aft : was produced, reflecting which no intention was extant in the 
 
 either in re- mind. Now an action or a feries of actions is adopted with a 
 
 lieving dif- 
 
 •trefs.: certain view and leading to a certain end. This end is faid to 
 
 2 be 
 
OF VIRTUE. 3S i 
 
 be the removal of uneafinefs. Whether it be or no is a queftion BOOK IV. 
 
 * CHAP. VIII. 
 
 which recollection in many cafes is competent to enable us to v ""~*~ <* * 
 
 decide. If we frequently deceive ourfelves as to the motive by 
 which we are prompted to act, thi3 is chiefly owing to vanity, 
 a defire of imputing to ourfelves, or being underftood by the 
 world to act from a principle more elevated than that which 
 truly belongs to us. But this idea is leaft prevalent with chil- 
 dren and favages, " and of confequence they ought to be moft 
 completely aware that the project they have conceived is that of 
 removing uneafinefs. It feems to be an uncommon- refinement 
 in abfurdity to fay, that the end we really purfue is one to 
 which we are in no inftance confcious ; that our action is wholly 
 derived from an unperceived influence, and the view extant in. 
 the understanding altogether impotent and unconcerned. . 
 
 In the cafe we have juft examined uneafinefs is the firft ftep or in adding 
 
 to the flock 
 
 in the procefs ; in others which might be flated uneafinefs is of general 
 
 good. 
 
 not the firft ftep. " In the purfuit" fuppofe " of a chemical 
 procefs I accidentally dhcover a circumftance, which may be of 
 great benefit to mankind. I inftantly quit the object I was ori- 
 ginally purfuing, profecute this difcovery, and communicate it 
 to the world." In the former proceeding a fenfation of pain 
 was the initiative, and put my intellectual powers into action. 
 In the prefent cafe the perception of truth is the original mover. 
 Whatever uneafinefs may be fuppofed to exift, rendering me 
 anxious for the publication of this benefit,, is the confequence of 
 
 the 
 
35« €F THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 J?,?»9, K J,Y; tne perception. The uneafinefs would never have exifted if the 
 
 CHAP. VIII. r r 
 
 K ~~~ y ' ' perception had not gone before k. 
 
 Uneafinefs Biitit lias been faid, " that, though the perception of truth in 
 
 an accidental 
 
 member of this cafe goes firft, the pain was not lefs indifpenfible in the 
 
 the procefs. 
 
 procefs, fince, without that, action would never have followed. 
 Action is the child of defire, and a cold and uninterefting deci- 
 fion of the underftanding would for ever have laid dormant in 
 the mind." Granting that pain in a certain modified degree is a 
 conftant ftep in the procefs, it may neverthelefs be denied that 
 it is in the ftricteft fenfe of the word indifpenfible. To perceive 
 that I ought to publifh a certain difcovery, is to perceive that 
 pubKfhing is preferable to not publifhing it. But to perceive a 
 preference is to prefer, and to prefer is to choofe. The procefs 
 is in this cafe complete, and pain, in the fenfe in which it comes 
 in at all, Is merely an accident. Why do I feel pain in the 
 neglect of an ad of benevolence, but becaufe benevolence is 
 judged by me to be a conduct which it becomes me to adopt? 
 Does the underftanding wait to enquire what advantage will re- 
 fult from the propofitions, that two and two make four, or that 
 fuch and fuch caufes will contribute to the happinefs of my 
 neighbour, before it is capable of perceiving them to be true ? 
 
 The fame principle which is applied here, is not lefs applica- 
 ble to fame, wealth and power, in a word to all thofe purfuits 
 which, engage the reflecting and fpeculative part of the civilifed 
 
 world. 
 
OF VIRTUE. 
 
 353 
 
 world. None of thefe objects would ever have been purfued, BOOK iv. 
 
 J r ' chap. vnr. 
 
 if the decifions of the intellect had not gone firft, and informed ' * ' 
 
 us that they were worthy to be purfued. 
 
 Neither of the two hypothefes we have been examining would The fuppofi- 
 
 tions incoa- 
 
 perhaps have been reckoned fo much as plaufible in themfelves, fificntiy 
 
 r r r blended. 
 
 if they had not been blended together by the inadvertence of their 
 fupporters. The advocates of felf love have been aware, that 
 the mere fenfitive impulfe of pain would account for a very 
 fmall part of the hiftory of man ; and they have therefore infen- 
 fibly Hided from the confideration of uneafinefs to be removed, 
 to that of intereft to be promoted. They have confounded the 
 two cafes of fenfation and reflection ; and, taking it for granted 
 in the latter that private gratification was the object univerfally 
 purfued, have concluded that they were accounting for all human 
 actions from one principle. In reality no two principles can be 
 more diftinct, than the impulfe of uneafinefs, which has very 
 improperly been denominated the love of ourfelves, and that de- 
 liberate felf love, by which of fet defign we purfue our own ad- 
 vantage. One circumftance only they have in common, that of 
 reprefenting us as incapable of understanding any propofition, 
 till we have in fome way or other connected it with perfonal in- 
 tereft. This is certainly a juft reprefentation of their confe- 
 quences ; fince, if I were capable of underftanding the naked 
 propofition, that my neighbour flood in need, of a candle for 
 
 Z z inflance 
 
354 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 CH 
 
 niAp'vm" ^ n ^ ance t0 De removed from one end of a room to the other, 
 
 ' this would be a reafon of action, a motive, either ftrong or weak, 
 
 either predominant cr the contrary. But, if this confideration 
 
 entered for any thing into the ground of my proceeding, the 
 
 whole would not be refolvable into felf love. 
 
 .Scheme of An hypothefis, which has been thought to have fome ten- 
 
 felf love re- 
 commended dency to relieve the difficulties of the fyftem of felf love, is that 
 
 from the pro- 
 
 penfity of « f the mind's reafoning out for itfelf certain general principles, 
 
 mind to ab- 
 breviate its which are a fort of refting-places in the procefs, to which it 
 
 procefs. 
 
 afterwards recurs, and upon which it acts, without being at the 
 trouble in each inftance of application, of repeating the reafona 
 upon which the general principle was founded.. Thus in geo-- 
 metry, as we proceed to the higher branches, we perpetually 
 refer to the earlier propofitions as eftablifhed and certain, with- 
 out having at the time in our minds perhaps the fmalleft recol- 
 lection of the way in which thofe early propofitions were 
 demonftrated." But this reprefentation, though true, has very- 
 little tendency to decide in the fubject: before us. It is ftill true,, 
 that, if I be capable of underitanding a propofition as it relates 
 to the intereft of my neighbour, any reafoning about the pro- 
 pofition by which it is. indirectly connected with my own 
 intereft, is unneceiTary to put me into a ftate of action. It is 
 ftill true, that my action has a direct; and an indirect tendency ; 
 and, till it can be Ihown that there is fom.ething in the nature of 
 
 mind 
 
OF VIRTUE. 
 
 3SS 
 
 mind that unfits it for entertaining the direct purpofe, an un- BOOK IV. 
 
 prejudiced enquirer will be very little difpofed univerfally to * * ' 
 
 have recourfe to that which is indirect. 
 
 The hypothefis of felf love feems to have been originally in- fr°m the fim- 
 plicity that 
 
 vented from a love of "that fimplicity, which appears to be the obtains in the 
 
 J natures of 
 
 ultimate term in all grand difcoveries relative to the fyftem of things, 
 the univerfe." But fimplicity, though well deferving our appro- 
 bation, can fcarcely of itfelf be a fufficient iiipport for any 
 opinion. The fimplicity however in this cafe is more apparent 
 than real. Not to repeat what has been faid relative to the 
 coalition of two hypothefes very incongruous in their own nature, 
 there is little genuine fimplicity in a fcheme, that reprefents us 
 as perpetually acting from a motive which we lead fufpected, 
 and feeks by a circuitous and intricate method for a recommen- 
 dation of little intrinfic value, rejecting in all cafes the great and 
 obvious reafon which the firft view of the fubject fuggefted. 
 True fimplicity is altogether on the fide of the oppofite fyftem, 
 which reprefents man as capable of being governed by the 
 nature of the thing, and of acting from the motive which he 
 fuppofes to influence him ; which requires nothing but percep- 
 tion to account for all the phenomena of mind, and, when a 
 reafon exciting to action is apprehended, does not feck for an 
 additional principle to open a communication between the judg- 
 ment and the choice. 
 
 Z z 2 . There 
 
35 6 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 BOOK IV. There is one obfervation more, which, though it be not fo 
 
 CHAP. VIII. ' ' b 
 
 _*; — ^—r J conclufive as fome of thofe which have been mentioned, ought 
 
 Hypothelis ' ' ° 
 
 of feif love not to jjg omitted. If felf love be the only principle of action, 
 
 incompatible ■?.*.* ' 
 
 with virtue, there can be no fuch thing as virtue. Virtue is a principle in 
 the mind, by which we are enabled to form a true eftimate of 
 the pretenfions of different reafons inviting us to preference. 
 He, that makes a falfe eftimate, and prefers a trivial and partial 
 good to an important and comprehenfive one, is vicious. It is 
 in the difpofition and view of the mind, and not in the good 
 which may accidentally and unintentionally refult, that virtue 
 confifts. Judas's act in betraying Chrift, according to the 
 Chriftian fyftem, may be regarded as a real and eflential caufe 
 conducing to the falvation of mankind. Yet Judas's act was 
 not virtuous, but vicious. He thought only of the forty pieces 
 of filver, the price of- his treachery, and neglected every consi- 
 deration of public utility and juftice. Juft fo in the cafe ftated 
 early in the prefent chapter, the public benefactor, abfolutely and 
 ftrictly fpeaking, prefers forty to eight hundred or eight hundred 
 millions. So far as relates to the real merits of the cafe, his 
 own advantage or pleafure is a very infignificant confideration, 
 and the benefit to be produced, fuppofe to a world, is ineftima- 
 ble. Yet he falfely and unjuftly prefers the firft, and regards 
 the latter, abftractedly confidered, as nothing. If there be fuch a 
 thing as juftice, if I have a real and abfolute value, upon which 
 truth can decide, and which can be compared with what is 
 greater or lefs, then, according to this fyftem, the beft a&ion that 
 5 ever 
 
OF VIRTUE. 
 
 357 
 
 ever was performed, may, for any thing we know, have been the BOOK IV. 
 
 action in the whole world of the moft exquifite and deliberate ' « ' 
 
 injuftice. Nay, it could not have been otherwife, fince it pro- 
 duced the greateft good, and therefore was the individual in- 
 ftance in which the greateft good was moft directly poftponed 
 to perfonal gratification. 
 i 
 Nor will this objection be much relieved by the fyftem 
 already alluded to of refting-places, enabling a man in a certain 
 degree to forget the narrow and felfifh principles in which his con- 
 duel originated. It can fcarcely be queftioned, that the motives 
 which induced a man to adopt his fyftem of conduct, and with- 
 out which he never would have adopted it, are of more import- 
 ance, than the thoughtleffnefs and inattention by which they are 
 forgotten, in deciding upon the morality of his character. 
 
 From this train of reafoning the refult is, that men are capa- Conclufion. 
 ble of underftanding the beauty of virtue, and the claims of 
 other men upon their benevolence ; and, underftanding them, 
 that thefe views, as well as every other perception of the in- 
 tellect, are of the nature of motives, fometimes overpowered 
 by other confiderations, and fometimes overpowering them, but 
 always in their own nature capable of exciting to action, when 
 not counteracted by pleas of a different fort. Men are capable 
 no doubt of preferring an inferior intereft of their own to 
 a fuperior intereft of other people ; but to this preference it is 
 
 perhaps 
 
358 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 CHAiFviii perhaps neceffary, that they fhould imagine the benefit to 
 
 1 y ' themfelves to be great and the injury to others comparatively 
 
 fmall, or elfe that they mould have embraced the pernicious 
 -opinion that the general good is bed ferved by each man's 
 applying himfelf exclufively to his perfonal advantage. 
 
 Importance There is no doctrine in which the generous and elevated 
 
 of the cjuef- 
 
 tlon. mind refts with more fatisfaction, than in that of which we are 
 
 treating. If it be falfe, it is no doubt incumbent upon us to 
 make the beft of the fmall remnant of good that remains. But 
 it is a heartlefs profpect for the moralift, who, when he has 
 done all, has no hope to perfuade mankind to one atom of real 
 affection towards any one individual of their fpecies. We may 
 be made indeed the inftruments of good, but in a way lefs 
 honourable, than that in which a frame of wood or a meet of 
 paper may be made the inftrument of good. The wood or the 
 paper are at leaft neutral. But we are drawn into the fervice 
 with affections of a diametrically oppofite direction. When we do 
 the moft benevolent action, it is with a view only to our own 
 advantage, and with the moft fovereign and unreferved neglect of 
 that of others. We are inftruments of good, juft in the fame 
 manner as bad men are faid to be the inftruments of providence, 
 even when their inclinations are moft refractory to its decrees. 
 In this fenfe we may admire the fyftem of the univerfe, where 
 public utility refults from each man's contempt of that utility, and 
 where the moft beneficial actions of thcfe, whom we have been 
 
 accuilomed 
 
OF VIRTUE. 359 
 
 accuftomed to term the beft men, are only inftances in which Bo p K Iv% 
 
 juftice and the real merits of the cafe are mod flagrantly violated. * • ' 
 
 But we can think with little complacence of the individuals of 
 whom this univerfe is compofed. It is no wonder that philo- 
 fophers, whofe fyftem has taught them to look upon their fellow 
 men as thus perverfe and unjuft, have been frequently cold, 
 phlegmatic and unanimated. It is no wonder that Roufleau, 
 the moft benevolent of all thefe philofophers, and who moft 
 efcaped the general contagion, has been driven to place the per- 
 fection of all virtue in doing no injury*. Neither philofophy 
 nor morality nor politics will ever fhow like themfelves, till man 
 Ihall be acknowledged for what he really is, a being capable of 
 juftice, virtue and benevolence, and who needs not always to be 
 led to a philanthropical conduct by foreign and frivolous con- 
 fiderations. 
 
 The fyftem of difinterefted benevolence proves to us, that it 
 is poflible to be virtuous, and not merely to talk of virtue ; that 
 all which has been faid by philofophers and moralifts refpe&ing 
 impartial juftice is not an unmeaning rant ; and that, when we call 
 upon mankind to diveft themfelves of felfifh and perfonal con- 
 fiderations, we call upon them for fomething which they are 
 able to practife. An idea like this reconciles us to our fpecies j 
 teaches us to regard with enlightened admiration the men who 
 
 * " La plus fublime vertu eft negative ; elle nous injlruit de ne jamais f aire dtt mat 
 « perfonne." Emile, Liv. II. 
 
 3 have 
 
360 OF THE PRINCIPLE 
 
 BOOK IV. h ave appeared to lofe the feeling of their perfonal exiftence in 
 
 v — — « ' the purfuit of general advantage ; and gives us reafon to expert, 
 
 that, as men collectively advance in fcience and ufeful inftitu- 
 tion, they will proceed more and more to confolidate their pri- 
 vate judgment and their individual will with abftract juftice and 
 the unmixed approbation of general happinefs. 
 
 Application. What are the inferences that ought to be made from this 
 doctrine with refpect to political inftitution ? Certainly not that 
 the intereft of the individual ought to be made incompatible with 
 the part he is expected to take in the intereft of the whole. 
 This is neither defirable, nor even poffible. But that focial in- 
 ftitution needs not defpair of feeing men influenced by other 
 and better motives. The legiflator is bound to recollect 
 that the true perfection of mind confifts in difintereftednefs. 
 He fhould regard it as the ultimate object of his exertions, to 
 induce men to eftimate themfelves at their true value, and 
 neither to grant to themfelves nor claim from others a higher 
 confideration than they juftly deferve. Above all he fhould 
 be careful not to add to the vigour of the felfifh paflions. He 
 fhould gradually wean men from contemplating their own bene- 
 fit in all that they do, and induce them to view with com- 
 placency the advantage that is to refult to others. 
 
 The laft perfection of this feeling confifts in that ftate of mind 
 which bids us rejoice as fully in the good that is done by others, 
 
 as 
 
O F V I R T U E. 361 
 
 as If it were done by ourfelves. The truly wife man will COOK IV. 
 
 1 ] chap. vnr. 
 
 be actuated neither by interefl nor ambition, the love of ' </— — ' 
 
 honour nor the love of fame. He has no emulation. He is 
 not made uneafy by a companion of his own attainments with 
 thofe of others, but by a comparifon with the ftandard of right. 
 He has a duty indeed obliging him to feek the good of the 
 whole ; but that good is his only object. If that good be 
 effected by another hand, he feels no difappointment. All men 
 are his fellow labourers, but he is the rival of no man. Like 
 Pedaretus in ancient ftory, he exclaims : " I alfo have endeavoured 
 to deferve ; but there are three hundred citizens in Sparta better 
 than myfelf, and I rejoice." 
 
 3 A CHAP. 
 
t 562 ] 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE. 
 
 IT IS THE ROAD TO HAPPINESS — TO THE ESTEEM ANJ5 
 AFFECTION OF OTHERS. OBJECTION FROM MISCON- 
 STRUCTION AND CALUMNY. ANSWER. — VIRTUE COM- 
 PARED WITH OTHER MODES OF PROCURING ESTEEM. 
 
 VICE AND NOT VIRTUE IS THE SUBJECT OF OBLOQUY — ■ 
 INSTANCED IN THE BASE ALLOY WITH WHICH OUR VIR- 
 TUES ARE MIXED IN ARROGANCE AND OSTENTATION 
 
 IN THE VICES IN WHICH PERSONS OF MORAL EXCEL- 
 LENCE ALLOW THEMSELVES. THE VIRTUOUS MAN ONLY 
 
 HAS FRIENDS. VIRTUE THE ROAD TO PROSPERITY AND 
 
 SUCCESS IN THE WORLD APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL 
 
 TRANSACTIONS — TO CASES THAT DEPEND UPON PA- 
 TRONAGE. APPARENT EXCEPTIONS WHERE THE DE- 
 PENDENT IS EMPLOYED AS THE INSTRUMENT OF VICE. 
 —VIRTUE COMPARED WITH OTHER MODES OF BECOM- 
 ING PROSPEROUS. — SOURCE OF THE DISREPUTE OF VIR- 
 TUE IN THIS RESPECT. — CONCESSION. — CASE WHERE 
 
 CONVENIENT VICE BIDS FAIR FOR CONCEALMENT. 
 
 CHANCE OF DETECTION. INDOLENCE APPREHEN- 
 
 SIVENESS — AND DEPRAVITY THE OFFSPRING OF VICE. 
 
 •BOOK IV. T TAVING endeavoured to eftablifh the theory of virtue 
 
 CHAP. IX. I— § m : 
 
 ■*■ ■*■ upon its true principle, and to fhew that felf intereft is 
 neither its bafis in juftice and truth, nor by any means necefTary 
 
 to 
 
 _j 
 
OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE. ^3 
 
 to Incite us to the practice, it may not be improper to confider ROOK IV. 
 
 in what degree public intereft is coincident with private, and bv * « ' 
 
 that means at once to remove one of the enticements and apo- 
 logies of vice, and afford an additional encouragement and direc- 
 tion to the true politician. 
 
 In the firft place then, there appears to be fufKcient reafon i t Is the road 
 to believe, that the practice of virtue is the true road to individual 
 happinefs. Many of the reafons which might be adduced in 
 this place have been anticipated in the chapter of the Cultivation 
 of Truth. Virtue is a fource of happinefs that does not pall in. 
 the enjoyment, and of which no man can deprive us *. The 
 effence of virtue confifts in the feeing every thing in its true 
 light, and eftimating every thing at its intrinfic value. No man 
 therefore, fo far as he is virtuous, can be in danger to become 
 a prey to forrow and difcontent. He will habituate himfelf, 
 refpecting every fpecies of conduct and temper, to look at its 
 abfolute utility, and to tolerate none from which benefit cannot 
 arife either to himfelf or others. Nor will this be fo difficult a 
 tafk as it is commonly imagined. The man, who is accuftomed 
 upon every occafion to confult his reafon, will fpeedily find a 
 habit of this nature growing upon him, till the juft and difpaf- 
 fionate value of every incident that befals him will come at length 
 fpontaneoufly to fuggeft itfelf. Thofe evils which prejudice has 
 
 * Ch. IV. p. 233. 
 
 3 A 2 taught 
 
364 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 599? Jy taught Co great a part of mankind to regard with horror, will ap- 
 pear to his undemanding difarmed of their terrors. Poverty, 
 obloquy and difgrace will be judged by him to be very trivial 
 misfortunes. Few conditions can be fo deftitute as to deprive 
 us of the means of obtaining for ourfelves a fubfiftence. The 
 reafonable mind perceives at once the poffibility of this and the 
 beft method of executing it ; and it needs no great ftretch of un- 
 derftanding to decide, that real happinefs does not confift in lux- 
 urious accommodations. With refpect to obloquy and difgrace, 
 the wife man may lament the tendency they poffefs to narrow 
 the rphere of his ufefulnefs ; but he will readily perceive, that, 
 Separately from this confideration, they are no evils. My real 
 value depends upon the qualities that are properly my own, and 
 cannot be diminished by the flander and contempt of the whole 
 world. Even bodily pain lofes much of its fting, when it is 
 encountered by a chearful, a compofed, and a determined fpirit. 
 To all thefe negative advantages of virtue, we may add the po- 
 fitive fatisfaction of a mind confcious of rectitude, rejoicing in 
 the good of the whole, and perpetually exerted for the promo- 
 tion of that good. 
 
 There are indeed fome extreme cafes of the election of a vir- 
 tuous conduct, reflecting which it is difficult to pronounce. 
 Was it Regulus's intereft to return to Carthage to a tormenting 
 death, rather than fave his life by perfuading the Roman fenate 
 4o-.an exchange of prifoners ? Probably it was. Probably, with 
 
 the 
 
OF VIRTUE. 3 6$ 
 
 the exquifite fes'ling of duty with which Regulus was animated, ^,9°^ |^* 
 
 a life that was to be perpetually haunted with the recollection of ' * ' 
 
 his having omitted the nobleft opportunity of public fervice, was 
 not worth his purchafe. His reafoning, fo far as related to 
 perfonal intereft, might be like that of Cato in the play : 
 
 " A day, an hour, of virtuous liberty 
 Is worth a whole eternity in bondage 
 
 * » 
 
 Secondly, virtue not only leads to the happinefs of him who to the efteem 
 pra&ifes it, but to the efteem and affection of others. Nothing f athew. 
 can be more indifputable, than that the direct road to the efteem 
 of mankind, is by doing things worthy of their efteem. The 
 moft artful fcheme for pafllng things upon others for fomewhat 
 different from what they really are, is in momentary danger of 
 detection ; and it would be an egregious miftake to fuppofe, that 
 men efteem any thing but what comes to them under the ap- 
 
 * The firft of the three heads difcufled in this chapter is inferted chiefly for 
 the fake of method, few perfons having really doubted that virtue is the moft 
 genuine fource of individual tranquillity and happinefs. It is therefore difmifled 
 with all practicable brevity. The two remaining heads had a ftronger claim to 
 difcuflion. It unfortunately happens to be the generally received opinion, that 
 rigid virtue is neither the fureft road to other men's approbation and efteem, 
 nor the moft probable means of fecuring our external profperity. If the author 
 had known of any work at prefent exifting, that had appeared to him to place 
 this fubjec"t in any degree in its true light, he would have omitted the reafon- 
 jngs of this shapter. 
 
 pearancc 
 
3 
 
 66 
 
 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 BOOK IV. pearance of virtue. No man ever exifted of a tafte fo depraved 
 CHAP. ix. r r 
 
 1 « ' as to feel real approbation of another, for the artfulnefs of his 
 
 flattery, or the cunning with which he over-reached his neigh- 
 bours.. 
 
 Objeaion There is indeed one difadvantage that occurs under this head, 
 
 iiruaion "and confifting in this circumftance, " that no man truly admires 
 c umnyr vvhat he does not underftand. Now, in order thoroughly to 
 comprehend the value of any mental effort, whether of a purely" 
 intellectual or moral nature, it is perhaps neceflary that the ge- 
 nius or virtue of the fpedtator fhould be equal to that of him 
 by whom it is made. It is an inevitable law of our nature, that 
 we fhould in a great meafure judge of others by ourfelves, and 
 form our ftandard of human nature by an invefligation of our 
 own minds. That, refpe&ing which we feel a clear and diftinct 
 conviction that we are ourfelves incapable, we are prone to 
 fufpe£t to be mere fhow and deception in others. We are 
 the more inclined to this, becaufe we feel their virtues to be a 
 reproach to our indolence, and therefore are little difpofed to 
 make a liberal eftimate of them." 
 
 Anfwer. But, though there be fome truth in thefe obfervations, they 
 
 have frequently been made much too indifcriminate, by the mi- 
 fanthropy and impatience of thofe, who have conceived their 
 eftimation with their neighbours or the world to fall greatly 
 fhort of their merit. It mull be admitted that mankind are 
 
 reluctant 
 
OF VIRTUE. 367 
 
 reluctant to acknowledge a wifdom or a virtue funerior to their BOOK iv. 
 
 . .. . CHAP. IX. 
 own ; but this reluctance is by no means invincible. It is abfurd ' v ' 
 
 to fuppofe that no man believes himfelf the inferior of his neigh- 
 bour, or that, when he reads the plays of Shakefpeare, the phi- 
 lofophy of RoufTeau, or the actions of Cato, he fays, w I am as 
 fkilful, as wife, or as virtuous as this man." It would be ftill 
 more abfurd to fuppofe that men may not in a considerable degree 
 perceive the beauty of paflages they could never have written, 
 and actions they would never have performed. 
 
 It is true that men of high moral excellence are feldom efti- Virtue com- 
 pared with o- 
 mated at their true value, efpecially by their contemporaries, ther modes of 
 
 procuring 
 
 But the queftion does not relate to this point, but to that other, eiteera. 
 whether they be not efteemed more than perfons of any other 
 defcription, and of confequence whether virtue be not the beft 
 road to efteem ? Now, let a fpecious appearance be maintained 
 with ever fo much uniformity of fuccefs, it is perpetually in 
 danger of detection. It will always want fomething of anima- 
 tion, of confiftency and firmnefs that true virtue would produce. 
 The imitation will never come up to the life. That temporifing 
 and compliance, which are careful not to contradict too much 
 the prejudices of mankind, and in which the principal advantage 
 of a merely exterior virtue confifts, will always bear fomething 
 fufpicious about them. Men do not love him who is perpetually 
 courting their applaufe. They do not give with a liberal fpirit 
 what is fought with too unwearied an afliduity. But their praife 
 
 is 
 
368 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 5r9?£ VL' is involuntarily extorted, by him who is not fo anxious to ob- 
 
 CHAP. IX. f ' J 
 
 * * ' tain fuccefs, as to deferve it. 
 
 Vice and not If men of virtue be frequently misinterpreted or mifunder- 
 
 virtue is the 
 
 fubje&ofob- flood, this is in a great degree to be afcribed to the imperfection 
 
 loquy : 
 
 of their virtue and the errors of their conduct. True virtue 
 Jnftanced in fhould hold no commerce with art. We ought not to be fo de- 
 
 tbe bafe al- 
 loy _ with firous to exhibit our virtue to advantage, as to give it free fcope 
 
 which our 
 
 virtues are aru j fuffer it to exhibit itfelf. Art is nearly allied to felfifh- 
 
 mixed : 
 
 nefs; and true virtue has already been fhown to be perfectly 
 difinterefted. The mind fhould be fixed only on the object 
 purfued, and not upon the gracefulnefs or gallantry of the 
 purfuit. We fhould be upon all occafions perfectly ingenuous, 
 exprefhng with fimplicity the fentiments of our heart, and 
 fpeaking of ourfelves, when that may be neceffary, neither with 
 oftentation and arrogance on the one hand, nor with the frequently 
 applauded lies of a cowardlike humility on the other. There is- 
 a charm in fincerity that nothing can refifl. If once a man 
 could be perfectly frank, open and firm in all his words and 
 actions, it would be impoffible for that man to be mis- 
 interpreted. 
 
 in avro;T?nce Another fruitful fource of mifreprefentation has appeared to 
 
 and often ta- , c . . ; ' 
 
 tion: be envy. 13ut, it we be regarded with envy, it may be 
 
 fuipected to be in a great meafure our own fault. He will 
 
 always be envied molt, who is moft arrogant, and whofe mind 
 
 i moft 
 
OF VIRTUE. 369 
 
 moft frequently recurs to his own attainments and the inferiority BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 of others. Our virtues would feldom be contemplated with an v v ' 
 
 uneafy fenfe of reproach, if they were perfectly unafluming. 
 Any degree of orientation in their lefs corrupted neighbour, as 
 it humbles the vanity of mankind, mud be expected to excite 
 in them a defire of retaliation. But he whofe virtues flow from 
 philanthropy alone, whole heart expands with benevolence and 
 good will, and who has no defire to make his fuperiority felt, 
 will at all times have many friends and few enemies. 
 
 Virtue has alfo frequently been fubject to miirepsefentation •» ' t,ie vice » 
 1 } J r 11 which 
 
 from a farther circumftance which is mofl properly chargeable p^fons of 
 
 moral excel 
 
 upon the fufferers, and that is, the inequality of their actions. lence ayow 
 It is no wonder, if we firfl roufe the angry paffions of mankind 
 by our arrogance, and then render our motives fufpected by a 
 certain mixture of art in the exhibition of our characters, that 
 the follies and vices we commit, if they be of a glaring kind, 
 mould too often furnilh a triumphant argument to fupport 
 againfl us the accufation of hypocrify and deceit. It unfortunate- 
 ly happens, that, when men of an ardent fpirit fall into error, 
 their errors are inevitably confpicuous. It happens, that men, 
 who have dedicated the flower of their flrength to laudable pur- 
 pofes, too often think they have a right to indulge in relax- 
 ations unworthy of the energy of their characters. They would 
 furely avoid this fatal miftake, if they duly reflected, that it is 
 not their individual character only that is at flake, but that they 
 
 3 B are 
 
37° OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 <?h?p it are injuring the caufe of juftice and general good. Prudential 
 
 * *: — -* and timid virtues, unalloyed with imprudent and thoughtlefs 
 
 vices, are beft underftood by the vulgar. Their reign indeed is 
 fhort ; they triumph only for a day : but that they are trunfitory 
 is of little avail, while thofe who are mod worthy of lafting 
 efteem, wantonly barter it for gratifications, contemptible in. 
 themfelves, and fatally important in their effects. 
 
 The virtuous g ut t0 re turn to the comparifon between the efteem and 
 
 man only has 
 
 fnends. affection that accrue from virtue, and from any other plan of 
 
 conduct. The produce in the latter cafe mull always be in 
 a considerable degree barren, and of very fhort duration. 
 Whether the good name acquired by virtue be more or Iefs, 
 virtue will appear in the end to be the only mode for its acqui- 
 sition. He who merits the efteem of his neighbours and fellow 
 citizens, will at leaft be underftood by a few. Inftances might 
 be adduced in which perfons inftigated by the pureft motives 
 have been eminently unpopular. But there is perhaps no in- 
 ftance in which fuch men have not had a few friends of tried 
 and zealous attachment. There is no friendfhip but this. No 
 man was ever attached, to an individual but for the good quali- 
 ties he afcribed to him ; and the degree of attachment will 
 always bear fome proportion to the eminence of the qualities. 
 Who would ever have redeemed the life of a knave at the ex- 
 pence of his own ? And how many inftances do there occur of 
 fuch heroic friendfhip where the character was truly illuftrious ? 
 
 In 
 
OF VIRTUE. | 7 j 
 
 In the third place, virtue will probably be .found the fecureft BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 road to outward profperity and fuccefs in the world, according v — 
 
 ° Virtue the 
 
 to the old maxim, " that honefty is the beft policy." It is roa ? t0 P rof - 
 
 ' penty and 
 
 indeed natural to fuppofe that a good name fhould eminently [uccil ' % il > <J« 
 
 ° ' world : 
 
 contribute to our fuccefs. This is evident even in the humbleft 
 
 walks of life. That tradefman, other things equal, will always applied to 
 
 i . . .... commercial 
 
 be molt profperous, who is molt fair and equitable in, his traniVftions: 
 dealings. Which is molt, likely to fucceed, he who never gives 
 expectations that he cannot fulfil, or who is perpetually dis- 
 appointing his cuftomers ? he who is contented with a reafon- 
 able profit, or who is ever upon the watch to outwit thofe with 
 whom he deals ? he who puts one conftant price upon his com- 
 modities, or who takes whatever he can get, favouring a fuf- 
 picious cuftomer unreasonably, and extorting with mercilefft 
 avarice from an eafy one ? in a word, he who wiflies to keep 
 the perfons with whom he is concerned in prefent good humour, 
 or who would give them permanent fatisfa&ion ? 
 
 There is no doubt, that, though the former may obtain by 
 his artifices a momentary fuccefs, the latter will in the fequel be 
 generally preferred. Men are not fo blind tc their own intereft 
 as they have fometimes been reprefented, and they will foon feel 
 the advantage of dealing with the perfon upon whom they can 
 depend. We do not love to be perpetually upon our guard 
 againft an enemy, and for ever prying into the tricks and fub- 
 terfuges of a depraved heart. 
 
 3 B 2 But 
 
Z?2 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 EOOK IV. But what fhall we fay to fhofe cafes in which advancement 
 
 to cafes that 
 
 depends upon patronage ? There are two circumftances under 
 depend upon this head which feem to form an exception to the rule above 
 
 patronage. * 
 
 Apparent ex- delivered. The firft is that of a patron, whofe vicious and 
 
 ception where 
 
 the depend- imperfect character renders the co-operation of vicious men 
 
 ent is em- 
 ployed ae the neceffary to his purfuits, whom therefore he will be contented 
 
 inftrument 
 
 of vice, to reward, even while he defpifes. The fecond is that of an 
 
 office, and it is to be feared fuch offices exift, which may 
 require a compliant and corrupt character in the perfon who is. 
 to fill it, and for the obtaining of which vice of a certaio. 
 iort is a neceffary recommendation.. 
 
 Virtue com- It muft no doubt be admitte4 as to this fubject in general,, 
 
 pared with 
 
 other modes that, fo far as relates to fuccefs in the world, vicious men will 
 
 of becoming 
 
 profperous. often prove fortunate. But it may reafonably be queftioned,, 
 whether vice be in the firft inftance the moft likely road to for- 
 tune. The candidatea for this equivocal fpecies of preferment 
 may be numerous. An individual cannot diftinguifh himfelf in. 
 the crowd but by a portion of ability, which it may well be 
 fuppofed would not have been unfuccefsful in the career of 
 virtue. After all, not every candidate, not even every ikilful 
 candidate, will be victorious.. There is always a ftruggle in the 
 breaft of the patron between contempt and a corrupt motive ; 
 and, where there is ftruggle, the decifion will fometimes be on 
 the fide which the client leaft dehres. Even when fortune 
 feems to have overtaken him, his fituation is ftill precarious. 
 His fuccefs is founded upon a local and mutable bafis ; his 
 3 patron 
 
OF VIRTUE. 373 
 
 patron may defert him, may be deprived of his power or his ?29p T v' 
 
 life ; and the client, who, after having facrificed every principle ' « ' 
 
 to his hopes of advantage, mifles his aim, or is cut fhort in his 
 career, is in all cafes a fubject of derifion. A bad eminence is 
 always unftable ; and, if we could fum up the numbers of thofe 
 who have facrificed their virtue to their ambition, we fhould 
 probably find that a great majority of them had egregioufly 
 mifcarried in their calculation. 
 
 In the mean time, if we turn to the other fide of the eftimate,. 
 «ve fhall in the firft place inevitably fufpect that efteem muft lead 
 to fome of the fruits of efteem. But, exclufively of this confi- 
 deration, if there be offices for which vice of a certain fort is a 
 neceflary qualification, there are alfo undoubtedly a multitude of 
 offices which cannot be well difcharged but by a man of inte- 
 grity. The patron, though he would perhaps willingly provide 
 for his pander or his parafite at the expence of his country, will 
 not be inclined to truft a man of accommodating principles with 
 the fuperintendence of his fortune or the education of his child.. 
 With the exception of the two cafes that have been ftated, inte- 
 grity, as it is the firft qualification for difcharging a function 
 with propriety, will alway% occupy a foremoft place in the re- 
 commendation of the client. The employer, whofe object is 
 the real intereft of himfelf, his friends or his country, will have 
 a powerful motive inducing him to prefer the honeft candidate. 
 Ability may be almoft equally requifite ; but ability and virtue, 
 
 if 
 
CHAP. IX. 
 
 374 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 J?hap ^ if we fliould choofe to fuppofe that there is no neceflary alliance 
 between them, will at leaft by no perfon be thought exclufive of 
 each other. If a knave may in fome cafes obtain an employ- 
 ment of truft and real importance, it is vehemently to be fuf- 
 pected that this would not have happened, if an honeft man of 
 ■equal ability had been at hand. Add to this that virtue is per- 
 petually gaining ground upon us. The more it is tried, and the 
 more it is known, the more will it be refpetted. It is to the 
 man of real virtue, whofe character is not brought into fufpicion 
 by the equivocal nature of fome of his proceedings, whofe virtue 
 confifts in benevolence, equanimity and juftice, that all will have 
 recourfe, when they have the fuccefs of the affair in which they 
 are concerned deeply at heart. 
 
 Source of the Nothing has tended more to bring honefty as an inftrument 
 
 •difreput 
 virtue i 
 refpeft. 
 
 virtue in this of fuccefs into general difrepute, than the fort of complaint that is 
 
 frequently heard from fuch as are unfuccefsful. Thefe men will 
 naturally have recourfe to the moft fpecious topic of felf confo- 
 lation, and there is none that more obvioufly fuggefts itfelf than 
 the fuppofition that they failed through their too much virtue. 
 Thus the man of rugged temper who is perpetually infulting the 
 foibles of others, the timid man who i# incapable of embracing at 
 once a perilous alternative, the fcrupulous man who knows not 
 what to admit or reject and is always undetermined upon his 
 courfe of action, and a thoufand others, are forward to impute 
 their mifcarriage to their integrity, though ftrictly fpeaking it 
 was in every one of thefe cafes to be afcribed to their vices. 
 
 5 There 
 
OF VIRTUE. 37 $ 
 
 There is another confideration which deferves to be taken ^?d II' 
 
 into account in this eftimate. There is a degree of virtue which > £ — ' 
 
 Conceilioa. 
 
 would probably render me difinclined to fill many eminent fta- 
 tions, to be a great lawyer, a great fenator, or a great minifter. 
 The functions of thefe fituations in the prefent ftate of man- 
 kind are of fo equivocal a nature, that a man, whofe moral 
 views are in the higheft degree fublime, will perhaps find in 
 himfelf little forwardnefs to exercife them. He will perhaps 
 conceive that in a private flation, unincumbered with engage- 
 ments, unwarped by the finifter motives that high office will 
 not fail to prefent, he may render more lafting fervices to man- 
 kind. But furely it is no very formidable objection to fay, that 
 honefty will prevent a man from acquiring what he has no wifh 
 to acquire. 
 
 A cafe of fomewhat a different nature has been fuggefted, and Cafe where 
 
 convenient 
 
 it has been afked, " Whether honefty be the beft road to fuccefs, vic e bids fair 
 
 for conceal- 
 where the violation of it bids fair for perpetual concealment ? ment » 
 
 Fortune has led me to the military profeffion, I lack advance- 
 ment, but promotions in the army are cuftomarily made by pur- 
 chafe. Thus circumftanced, I find by accident a fum of money, in 
 fecreting which I am in little danger of detection, and I apply this 
 fum to purchafe me a commiffion. Should I have more effectually 
 promoted my worldly fuccefs by a more fcrupulous conduct ?" 
 
 The anfwer to this queftion ought probably to be affirmative, chance of de- 
 
 ttaion. 
 
 In 
 
376 OF THE TENDENCY 
 
 5?,?'I T Y; Iti the firft place we are to confider the chance of detection 
 CHAP. IX. r ' 
 
 The direct tendency of the laws of the material univerfe is fuch, 
 as to force the more considerable and interefting actions cf hu- 
 man beings into publicity. No man can render himfelf invifible. 
 The moft artful confpirator cannot fufficiently provide againft a 
 thoufand petty circumflances, that will lead, if not to conviction, 
 at lean: to prefumption againft him. Who is there that would 
 wifh to have faftened upon him the fufpicion of a bafe and difin- 
 genuous procedure ? This feature in human affairs is fo remark- 
 able, as to have furnifhed topics to the literary induftry of former 
 centuries, and to have been interpreted God's revenge againft the 
 unjuft. Suppofe that in this cafe I found the money dropped in 
 a field. Will the owner have no fufpicion where he loft it ? 
 Will no human being have obferved that I was near the fpot at 
 the queftionable period ? The chances are certainly againft me, 
 and a mere balance of chance would probably have been fuffi- 
 cient to prove that honefty is the beft policy. The bare circum- 
 flance of my fuddenly pofTeiling a fum of money without vi- 
 fible means of acquiring it, a circumftance to which the attention 
 of my neighbours is always fufhciently alive, would caft an un- 
 pleafant ftain upon my character. How often has the well con- 
 trived train of the politician, triumphing in the infcrutability of 
 his wifdom, been baffled by the moft trivial accidents ? Since 
 therefore, " the race is not to the fvvift, nor the battle to the 
 ftrong," the trueft wifdom is to a<3 fo as to fear no detec- 
 tion. 
 
 There 
 
OF VIRTUE. 377 
 
 There are other circumftances which tend to eftablifh the book rv. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 fame propofition. The man, who depends upon his courage, ?~~7~r* — f 
 his ability, or his amiable character for recommendation, will 
 perpetually cultivate thefe. His conftancy will be unwearied ; 
 and, confcious of the integrity of his means, his fpirit will be in- 
 trepid and erect. The progrefs of this man, if his ardour be 
 fufficiently great to infpire him with ability, and to render him 
 quick fighted to the detection of his miftakes, will be inceflant. 
 But the man who has employed foul means, will depend partly 
 upon them, and cannot be fo fervent in the cultivation of the 
 true. If he always efcape detection, he will always fear it, and apprehen- 
 
 fjvenefs i 
 
 this will fully the clearnefs of his fpirit. Vice cannot compare 
 with virtue in its tendency to individual happinefs. This is not 
 the fubject we are confidering in this place j but this will apply- 
 to our fubject. Remorfe, uneafinefs and confufion of mind are 
 calculated to prevent me from perceiving the true point of pro- 
 jection in my affairs, and detract much from the probability of 
 my rifing to eminence in any profeffion. 
 
 Laftly, the man who has once yielded to a difhoneft tempta- and deprarlty 
 tion, will yield to it again. He has loll the confiftency of cha- of e vi°e.' Pn "^ 
 racter and difdain of vice, which were his firmeft fecurities. He 
 that fays, " I will be difhoneft now, and difhoneft no more," for- 
 gets fome of the moft obvious and characteriftic features of the 
 human mind. If he efcape fufpicion in the firft inftance, he will 
 
 3 C only 
 
37 8 OF THE TENDENCY OF VIRTUE. 
 
 B °o*£ l Y' only difgrace himfelf more foully in the fecond : if the remorfe 
 CHAP. IX. J ° - * 
 
 * x and degradation of fpirit arifing from one bafe ac"tion could pe- 
 
 rifh, they would be fixed and invigorated by other bafe actions 
 growing out of the firft. 
 
 AN 
 
4-, *. \ 
 
 v*>' 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 SECOND VOLUME. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER. 
 
 BOOK Vt 
 
 OF OPINION CONSIDERED AS A SUBJECT OF 
 POLITICAL INSTITUTION. 
 
 BOOK VIL 
 
 OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 OF PROPERTY. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FIFTH BOOK. 
 
 OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 JJETROSPECT of principles already efabli/hed.—Di/lribution 
 of the remaining fubjecls. — Subject of the prefent book. — 
 Forms of government. — Method of examination to be adopted. 
 
 Page 379 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF EDUCATION, THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 
 
 Nature of monarchy delineated. — School of adverfty. — Tendency of 
 
 fuperfluity to infpire effeminacy — to deprive us of the benefit of 
 
 -experience. — Illu/irated in the cafe of princes. — Manner in which 
 
 they are addrejfed. — Inefficacy of the inflruclion be/lowed upon 
 
 ihenu 383 
 
 b 2 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 Principles by which he is influenced — irrefponjibility — impatience of 
 control — habits of dijfipation — ignorance — dijlike of truth — dijlike 
 of jufiice.— Pitiable Jit u at ion of princes. Page 397 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 
 
 Suppofed excellence of this form of government controverted— from 
 the narrownefs of human powers. — Cafe of a vicious adminif ra- 
 tion — of a virtuous adminijlration intended to be formed. — Monar- 
 chy not adapted to the government of large fates. 408 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF COURTS AND MINISTERS; 
 
 Syfiematical monopoly of confidence. — Char abler of ' minifters — of their 
 dependents. — Venality of courts. — Univerfality of this principle. 
 
 414 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 Monarchy founded in impoflure. — Kings not entitled to fuperiority— 
 inadequate to the functions they pojjefs. — Means by which the im- 
 poflure is maintained — i.fplendour — 2. exaggeration, — 'this im- 
 
 popure 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 pojlure generates — r. indifference to merit — 2. indifference to truth 
 — 3. artificial dejires — 4. pufillanimity \ — Moral incredulity of mo- 
 narchical countries. — Injujlice of luxury — of the inordinate admira- 
 tion of wealth. Page 423 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 
 
 Diforders attendant on fuch an election. — Election is intended either 
 to provide a man of great or of moderate talents. — Confequences of 
 thefirfl — of the fecond* — Can elective and hereditary monarchy be 
 combined? 435 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 Liable to mofi of the preceding objections — to farther objections pecu- 
 liar to itfelfi — Refponfibility confdered. — Maxim, that the king 
 can do no wrong. — Functions of a limited monarch. — Impoffbility of 
 maintaining the neutrality required. — Of the difmiffion of minifiers. 
 — Refponfibility of min'fiers — Appointment of 'minifers , its import- 
 ance — its difficulties. — Recapitulation. — Strength and weaknefs of 
 the human fpecies. 441 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 OF A PRESIDENT WITH REGAL POWERS. 
 Enumeration of powers — that of appointing to inferior offices — of 
 pardoning offences — of convoking deliberative affemblies — of affix- 
 ing 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 ing a veto to their decrees. — Conclufon. — 'The title of king eftl- 
 mated, — Monarchical and arl/locratical fyflems^ Jlmilarity of their 
 effecls. Page 454 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 
 
 Birth confidered as a phyfcal caufe — as a moral caufe. — Arljlocra- 
 
 tlcal ejllmate of the human fpecies. — Education of the great. 
 
 Recapitulation. 46 1 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 MORAL EFFECTS OF ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 Importance of practical jujlice. — Species of Injujilce which arl/locracy 
 creates.— Ejlimate of the Injury produced. — Examples. 468 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 
 OF TITLES. 
 
 Their origin and hlftory. — Their inferable abfurdity. — Truth the 
 only adequate reward of merit. 474 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 Intolerance of arl/locracy — dependent fir itsfuccefs upon the Ignorance 
 of the multitude. — Precautions neceffary for its fupport. — Differ- 
 ent kinds of arl/locracy.— Arl/locracy of the Romans : Its virtues 
 
 — Its 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 — its vices. — Arijlocratkal dlflribuiion of property — regulations 
 by which It is maintained — avarice it engenders. — Argument 
 againfl innovation from the prefent happy eflablijhment of affairs 
 confidered. — Conclufon. Page 478 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
 GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY. 
 
 Definition. — Suppofed evils of this form of government — afcendancy 
 of the Ignorant — of the crafty — Inconjlancy — rafj confidence — 
 groundlefs fufpicion. — Merits and defecls of democracy compared. 
 —Its moral tendency. — Tendency of truth. — Reprefentation. 489 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 Importance of this topic. — Example In the dodirine of eternal punl/h- 
 ment. — Its inutility argued— from hlfiory—from the nature of 
 mind. — Second example: the religious fancilcn of a leglfiatlve 
 fyfiem. — This Idea Is, 1. in fricl conjlrucllon Imprablicable — 2. 
 injurious. — Third example : principle of political order. — Vice has 
 no ejfentlal advantage over virtue. — Impojlure unnecejfary to the 
 caufe ofjuflce — not adapted to the nature of man. 499 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 Offenfive war contrary to the nature of democracy.' — Defenfve war 
 
 exceedingly rare. — Erroneoufnefs of the ideas commonly annexed to 
 
 2 the- 
 
C O N T E N T S. 
 
 the phrafe, our country. — Nature of war delineated. — Insufficient 
 caufes of war — the acquiring a healthful and vigorous tone to the 
 public mind — the putting a termination upon private infults — the 
 menaces or preparations of our neighbours — the dangerous con- 
 fequences of concejjion. — Two legitimate caufes of war. Page 51 1 
 
 CHAP. XVII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECT OF WAR. 
 
 The repelling an invader. — Not reformation— not rejlraint — not in- 
 demnification. — Nothing can be a fufficient object of war that is 
 not a fufficient caufe for beginning it.— Refections on the balance 
 of power. 52 1 
 
 CHAP. XVIIL 
 
 OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 
 
 Offentive operations. — Fortifications. — General adlion. — Stratagem. 
 — Military contributions. — Capture of mercantile vejfels. — Naval 
 war. — Humanity. — Military obedience. — Foreign pofifefijions. 526 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND TREATIES. 
 
 A country may look for its defence either to a funding army or an 
 univerfal militia. — The former condemned. — The latter objected 
 to as of immoral tendency — as unneceffiary — either in refpecl to 
 courage — or difcipline. — Of a commander. — Of treaties. 534 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS, 
 
 G H A P. XX. 
 
 OF DEMOCRACY AS CONNECTED WITH THE 
 TRANSACTIONS OF WAR. 
 
 External affairs are of fubordinate confideration. — Application. — 
 Farther objections to democracy — i. it is incompatible with fecrecy 
 '—'this proved to be an excellence — 2. its movements are too flow— : - 
 3. too precipitate. — Evils of anarchy confidered. Page 542 
 
 CHAP. XXL 
 OFTHE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Houfes of affembly. — This infiitution unjujl. — Deliberate proceeding 
 the proper antidote. — Separation of legiflative and executive power 
 confidered. — Superior importance of the latter. — Funclions of 
 minifiers. 550 
 
 CHAP. XXII. 
 
 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 
 
 Quantity of adminifiration necejary to be maintained. — Objects of ad- 
 minifiration : national glory — rival/hip of nations. — Inferences : 
 1. complication of government unnecejjary — 2. cxtcnfive territory 
 fuperfiuous — 3. conjlraint, its limitations. — Projecl of government: 
 police — defence. 558 
 
 c CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS* 
 
 C H A P. XXIII. 
 
 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 
 
 They produce a ficlitlous unanimity — an unnatural uniformity of 
 opinion. — Caufes of this uniformity. — Conferences of the mode of 
 declfion by vote—~i. perverfion of reafon—z. contentious difputes 
 -*— 3. the triumph of ignorance and vice. — Society incapable of 
 aclingfrom Itfelf — of being tvell conduced by others.- — Conclufion. 
 —Modification of democracy that refults from thefe confiderations* 
 
 Page 56S 
 
 CHAP. xxrv. 
 
 OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Political authority of at national qjjembly — of jurles.-^-Confequencs 
 from the whole* 576^ 
 
 BOOK 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 OF OPINION CONSIDERED AS A SUBJECT OF 
 POLITICAL INSTITUTION, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 '. - 
 
 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL 
 
 SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 
 
 Arguments in favour of this fuperinfendence. — Anfwer. — The exer- 
 tions of fociety in its corporate capacity are, I. unwife — 2. inca- 
 pable of proper effect. — Of fumptuary laws, agrarian laws and 
 rewards .—Political degeneracy not incurable. — 3. fuperfluous — 
 in commerce— in fpeculative enquiry — in morality. — 4. pernicious 
 — as undermining intellectual capacity — as fufpending intellectual 
 improvement — contrary to the nature of morality — to the nature 
 &f mind. — Conclufon. Page 5 8 r 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 Their general tendency. — Effedls on the clergy : they introduce, 1. 
 implicit faith — 2. hypacrify : topics by which an adherence to them 
 is vindicated. — Efecls on the laity. — Application. 603 
 
 C2 CHAP. 
 
C ON TE.NTl 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINION IN 
 RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Of herefy. — Arguments by which the fupprejjion of herefy is recom- 
 mended. — Anfwer. — Ignorance -not.neceffary to make men vir- 
 tuous. — Difference of opinion not fubverfve of public fecurity. — ■ 
 Reafon, and not force, the proper corrective of fophiftry. — Ab- 
 furdity of the attempt to rcfira'm thought — to refrain the freedom 
 of fpeech. — Confequences that would refult. — Fallibility of the 
 men by whom authority is exercifed. — Of erroneous opinions in 
 government. — Iniquity of the attempt to refrain them. — Tendency 
 _ of unlimited political difcufjion.. Page 610 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF TESTS. 
 
 Their fuppofed advantage's are attended with injuftice — are nuga- 
 tory. — Illujiration. — Their difadvantages — they enfnare — • ex- 
 ample— fecond example — they are an ufurpation. — Influence of 
 tefis on the latitudinarian — on the puri/l. — Conclufion. 622 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 O F O A T H S. 
 
 Oaths of office and duty. — Their abfurdiiy. — Their immoral confe- 
 quences. — Oaths of evidence lefs atrocious. — Opinion of the liberal 
 
 and 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 and refolved ref peeling them. — Their ejential features : contempt of 
 veracity— falfe morality. — Their particular Jlruclure. — Abfracl 
 principles ajfumed by them to be true. — Their inconfi/lency with 
 thefe principles. P a g e 631 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 » 
 
 OF LIBELS. 
 
 Public libels. — Injujlice of an attempt to prefcribe the method in 
 which public queftionsjball be difcujfed. — Its pufllanimity. — Invi- 
 tations to tumult. — Private libels. — Reafons in favour of their 
 being fubjetied to rejlraint. — Anfwer. — 1. 7/ is necejfary the truth 
 Jbould be told. — Salutary effects of the unreflrained invefligation 
 of character. — Objeclion : freedom of fpeech would be productive 
 of calumny, not of jujlice. — Anfwer. — Future hi/lory of libel. — 
 2. It is necejfary men fhould be taught to be Jt/icere. — Extent of 
 the evil which arifesfom a command to be infincere. — The mind 
 fpontaneoujly Jhrinksjrom the pr of ecu t ion of a Ubet. — Conclufion. 
 
 6 37 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 Diflinclion of regulations conftituent and legijlaiive. — Suppofed cha- 
 racter of permanence that ought to be given to the former — incon- 
 fjlent with the nature of man. — Source of the error. — Remark, — 
 Abfurdity of the fyjlem of permanence. — Its futility. — Mode to be 
 
 furfucd 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 purfued hi framing a conjlitution. — Conflituent laws not more im- 
 portant than others. — In what manner the confent of the difiriSls 
 is to be declared. — 'Tendency of the principle which requires this 
 confent. — // would reduce the number of conflk utional articles — 
 parcel out the legijlakve power — and produce the gradual ex- 
 tinction of law. — ObjecJion. — Anfwer. Page 652 
 
 CHAP. VIII. . 
 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 Arguments in its favour. — Anfwer. — 1. It produces permanence of 
 opinion. — Nature of prejudice and judgment defcribed. — 2. It re- 
 quires uniformity of operation.' — 3. It is the mirror and tool of 
 national government. — The right of punijhing not founded in the 
 previous funSlion of inflrubling. 66 c 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 Reafons by which they are vindicated. — Labour in its ufual accepta- 
 tion and labour for the public compared. — Immoral e feels of the 
 infitution of falaries. — Source from which they are derived.- — 
 Unnecejary for thefubfiflence of the public funtlionary— for dignity. 
 
 Salaries of inferior officers — may alfo be fuperfeded. — Taxation 
 
 Qualifications. 6 » , 
 
 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 OF THE MODES OF DECIDING A QUESTION ON 
 THE PART OF THE COMMUNITY. 
 
 Dedjion by lot, its origin— founded in the fyjlem of difcrctionary 
 rights— implies the defertion of duty. — Dccijion by ballot — incul- 
 cates timidity— and hypocrify. — Decifion by vote, its recommenda- 
 tions. Page 68 j 
 
 BOOK VIL 
 
 OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 CHAP. % 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT 
 WHICH RESULT FROM THE PRINCIPLES 
 OF MORALITY. 
 » 
 
 Definition ofpunijhment. — Nature of crime. — Retributive jujlice not 
 
 independent and abfolute — not to be vindicated from the fyjlem of 
 nature — Deferta chimerical property. — Conclufon. 687 
 
 6 CHAP. 
 
C O NTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 GENERAL DISADVANTAGES OF COERCION. 
 
 Confcience in matters of religion cotijidered — in the conducl of life.— ■ 
 Bejl practicable criterion of duty — not the decifon of other men — ■ 
 but of our own undemanding. — Tendency of coercion. — Its 
 various ctajfcs confdered. Page 696 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF THE PURPOSES OF COERCION. 
 
 Nature of defence confdered. — Coercion for rejlraint—for reforma- 
 tion. — Suppofed ufes of adverfty — defective — unneceffary. — 
 Coercion for example — 1. nugatory. — 'The necejjity of political 
 coercion arifes from the defebts of political infitution. — 2. unjujl. 
 —Unfeeling char abler of this f pedes of coercion. 705 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE APPLICATION OF COERCION. 
 
 Delinquency and coercion incommenfurable. — External adtion no proper 
 fubjebl of criminal animadverfon. — How far capable of proof — ■ 
 Iniquity of this Jfandard in a moral — and in a political view. — 
 Propriety of a retribution to be meafured by the intention of the 
 ofender confdered. — Such a projecl would overturn criminal law 
 • — would abolijl) coercion. — Infcrutabiliiy, 1. of motives. — Doubt- 
 fulnefs of hifory.: — Declarations of fujferers. — 2. of the future 
 
 condufl 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 conducl of the offender — uncertainty of evidence — either of the 
 facls — or the intention. — Difadvantages of the defendant in a cri- 
 minal fuit. Page 715 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF COERCION CONSIDERED AS A TEMPORARY 
 
 EXPEDIENT. 
 
 Arguments in its favour. — Anfwer. — 7/ cannot Jit men for a better 
 order offociety. — The true remedy to private injujlice defcribed — 
 is adapted to immediate practice. — Duty of the community in this 
 refpecl. — Duty of individuals. — Illuftrationfrom the cafe of war 
 — of individual defence. — Application. — Difadvantages of anar- 
 chy — want of fecurity — of progrejive enquiry. — Correfpondetit 
 difadvantages of defpotifm. — Anarchy awakens, defpotifm de~ 
 preffes the mind. — Final refult of anarchy — how determined. — 
 Suppofed purpofes of coercion in a temporary view — reformation 
 '—example — reflraint ,—Conclufon, 727 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 Jts fphere defcribed. — Its feveral clajfes. — Death with torture. — 
 Death abfolutely. — Origin of this policy — in the corruptnefs . of 
 political inflitutions — in the inhumanity of the injlitutors. — C 
 poral punijhment . — Its abfurdity. — Its atrocioufnefs. — Privai . 
 freedom.—~Duty of reforming our neighbour an inferior cotijiue 
 
 d tion 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 tion in this cafe, — Its place defined. — Modes of reflraint. — In- 
 difcriminate imprifonment. — Solitary imprifonment. — Its feverity. 
 "—Its moral effeSls. — Slavery. — Banifment. — i. Simple bani/h- 
 ment. — 2. Tranfportation. — 3. Colonifation. — 'This projecl has 
 mifcarried from unkindnefs — from ojficioufnefs.—Its permanent 
 evils.'— Recapitulation. Page 745 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 Difficulties to which this fubjetl is liable — exemplified in the dif- 
 iinclion between overt aclions and intentions. — Reafons againjl 
 this dijlin&ion.— Principle in which it is founded. 760 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 OF LAW. 
 
 Arguments by which it is recommended. — Anfwer. — Law is> 1, 
 Endlefs — particularly in afreeflate. — Caufes of this difadvantage. 
 *—%. Uncertain. — Inftanced in quefions of property. — Mode in 
 which it mufi be Jiudied. — 3. Pretends to foretel future events. — 
 Laws are a fpecies of promises — check the freedom of opinion — 
 are deflruclive of the principles ofreafon. — Di/honefiy of lawyers* 
 —An honefl lawyer mifchievous. — Abolition of law vindicated 
 en thefcore of wifdom — of candour— from the nature of man.-*— 
 Future hifiory of political jufiice. — Errors that might arifo in the 
 commencement. — Its gradual progrefs. — Its efecls on criminal 
 law. — on property* 764 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 OF PARDONS. 
 
 Their abfurdity. — Their origin. — Their abufes. — Their arbitrary 
 character. — Dejlruclive of morality. Page 781 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 
 OT PROPERTT. 
 
 CHAP. L 
 
 GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTT DELINEATED. 
 
 Importance of this topic. — dbufes to which it has been expofed.-~ 
 Criterion of property : jujlice. — Entitles each man to the fupply 
 of his animal wants as far as the general flock will afford it—- 
 to the means of well being. — Eftimate of luxury. — Its pernicious 
 effeSts on the individual who partakes of it. — Idea of labour as 
 the foundation of property confidered. — Its unreafonab/enefs. — - 
 Syjlem of popular morality on this fubjeft.—Def efts of that fyjlem. 
 
 787 
 <J 2 CHAP. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE GENUINE SYSTEM 
 
 OF PROPERTY. 
 
 Contra/led with the mif chiefs of the prefent Jyftem, as confijling — i. 
 In a fenfe of dependence.— 7., In the perpetual fpeSlacle of inju/lice t 
 leading men ajlray in their dejires — and perverting the integrity of 
 their judgments. — The rich are the true penf oners. — 3. In the 
 difcouragement of intellectual attainments. — 4. In the multiplica- 
 tion of vice — generating the crimes of the poor — the pajjions of the 
 rich — and the misfortunes of war. — 5. In depopulation. Page 799 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 ADMIRABLE EFFECTS OF LUXURY. 
 
 Nature of the objection. — Luxury not necejfary — either to population 
 — or to the improvement of the mind. — Its true character. 814 
 
 CH A P. IV. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 ALLUREMENTS OF SLOTH. 
 
 The objeClionJlated. — Such a fate offociety mu/l have been preceded 
 by great intellectual improvement. — The manual labour required 
 in this fate will be extremely fmall. — Univerfality of the love of 
 di/iincJion. — Operation of this motive under the Jyjlem in quefion 
 
 i 
 
 '—will finally befuperfeded by a better motive* 81ft 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING RENDERED 
 
 PERMANENT. 
 
 Grounds of the objection. — Its ferious import. — Anfwer. — The in- 
 troduction of fuch a Jyflem mtift be owing, \. to a deep fenfe of 
 jujltce — 2. to a clear injight into the nature of happinefs — as 
 being properly intellectual — not confjling in finfual pleafure — or 
 the pleafures of delufon. — Influence of the pafjions corf de red. — 
 Men will not accumulate either from individual forefght — or 
 from vanity. Page 829 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 INFLEXIBILITY OF ITS RESTRICTIONS. 
 
 Nature of the objection. — Natural and moral independence difiingui/h- 
 e d — the flrjl beneficial — the fecond injurious. — Tendency of re- 
 faction properly fo called. — The genuine fyfiem of property not a 
 fyflem of refriSlions — does not require common labour, meals or 
 magazines. — Such rejlriclions abfurd — and unnecejfary . — Evils 
 of cooperation. — Its province may perpetually be ditninijhed. — 
 Manual labour may be extingui/hed. — Confluent activity of in- 
 tellect. — Ideas of the future fate of cooperation. — lis limits. — Its 
 legitimate province. — Evils of cohabitation — and marriage. — They 
 oppofe the developement of our faculties — are inimical to our 
 
 4 happinefs. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 happinefs-—and deprave our underjlandings. — Marriage a branch 
 of the prevailing fyji em of property, — Conferences of its abolition. 
 -—Education need not in that Jl ate offociety be afubjetl of poftive 
 injlitution. — Thefe principles do not lead to a fullen individuality 
 — Partial attachments confidered. — Benefits accruing from ajujl 
 xffeBlion — materially promoted by thefe principles. — The genuine 
 fyjlem of property does not prohibit accumulation— implies a certain 
 degree of appropriation — and divifion of labour. Page 839 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION. 
 
 The objection fated. — Remotenefs of its operation. — Conjectural ideas 
 refpecling the antidote. — Omnipotence of mind. — Illujlrations. — 
 Caufes of decrepitude. — Youth is prolonged by chearfulnefs — by 
 clearnefs of apprehenfon — and a benevolent character. — The 
 powers we pojfefs are ejfentially progrejjive. — EffeSls of attention, 
 • — The phenomenon of fleep explained. — Prefent utility of thefe 
 reafonings. — Application to the future Jl ate offociety. 860 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING THE GENUINE 
 SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 
 
 Jipprehenfons that are enter tair.ed on thisfubjecJ. — Idea qfmajfacre. 
 — Inference we ought to make upon fuppofition of the reality of 
 2 theft 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 thefe apprehenpons. — Mif chief by no means the necejfary attendant 
 en improvement. — Duties under this circumjiance, I. Of thofe 
 •who are qualified for public injlruclors — temper— fincerity.— 
 Pernicious effefts of dijfimulation in this caje. — 2. Of the rich and 
 great. — Many of them may be expeSled to be advocates of equality. 
 — ConduSl which their inter efi as a body prefer ibes. — 3. Of the 
 friends of equality in general. — Omnipotence of truth. — Importance 
 ef a mild and benevolent proceeding. — Connexion between liberty and 
 equality. — Caufe of equality will perpetually advance. — Symptoms 
 of its progrefs-^Idea of its future fuccefs* — Conclufion. Page 8 7 $ 
 

A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 B O O K V. 
 
 OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 RETROSPECT OF PRINCIPLES ALREADY ESTABLISHED. — 
 DISTRIBUTION OF THE REMAINING SUBJECTS. SUB- 
 JECT OF THE PRESENT BOOK. — FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. 
 METHOD OF EXAMINATION TO BE ADOPTED. 
 
 I 
 
 N the preceding divifions of this work the ground has been BOOK v. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 fufficiently cleared to enable us to proceed with confiderable »■ * • 
 
 Retrofpeft of 
 
 explicitnefs and fatisfaction to the practical detail of political in- principles al- 
 ready cfta- 
 ftitution. It has appeared that an enquiry concerning the prin- blifhed. 
 
 ciples and conduct of focial intercourfe is the moft important to- 
 pic upon which the mind of man can be exercifed *; that upon 
 thofe principles well or ill conceived, and the manner in which 
 they are executed, the vices and virtues of individuals depend*; 
 
 * Book I. 
 3 C 2 that 
 
380 OF LEGISLATIVE AND 
 
 chap T" t ^ iat P°^^ ca ^ inftitution to be good muft have its fole foundation 
 
 1 v ' in the rules of immutable juftice*; and that thofe rules, uniform 
 
 in their nature 3 are equally applicable to the whole human racef » 
 
 Diftribution. The different topics of political inftitution cannot perhaps be 
 pialniag fub- m ore perfpicuoufly diftributed than under the four following 
 heads : provifions for general adminiftration ; provifions for the 
 intellectual and moral improvement of individuals; provifions 
 for the adminiftration of criminal juftice ; and provifions for the 
 regulation of property. Under each of thefe heads it will be our 
 bufinefs, in proportion as we adhere to the great and compre- 
 henfive principles already eftabliftied, rather to clear away abufea 
 than to recommend farther and more precife regulations, rather 
 to Amplify than to complicate. Above all we fhould not forget, 
 that government is an evil, an ufurpation upon the private judg- 
 ment and individual confcience of mankind ; and that, however 
 we may be obliged to admit it as a neceffary evil for the prefent, 
 it behoves us, as the friends of reafon and the human fpecies, to 
 admit as little of it as poflible, and carefully to obferve whether, 
 in confequence of the gradual illumination of the human mind, 
 that little may not hereafter be diminifhed. 
 
 Subjea of And firft we are to confider the different provifions that may 
 
 boX C be made for general adminiftration; including under the phrafe 
 
 * Book II, Chap. II. 
 t Book I, Chap. VII, VIII. Book III/ u Chap. VII. 
 
 general 
 
EXECUTIVE POWER. tfi 
 
 general adminiftration all that fhall be found neceflary of what " 00K v - 
 b J CHAP. I. 
 
 has ufually been denominated legiflative and executive power. ' • ' 
 
 Legiflation has already appeared to be a term not applicable to hu- 
 man fociety*. Men cannot do more than declare and interpret law ; 
 nor can there be an authority fo paramount, as to have the pre- 
 rogative of making that to be law, which abftracT: and immutable 
 juftice had not made to be law previoufly to that interpofition. 
 But it might notwithftanding this be found neceflary, that there 
 fhould be an authority empowered to declare thofe general prin- 
 ciples, by which the equity of the community will be regulated, 
 in particular cafes upon which it may be compelled to decide. 
 The queftion concerning the reality and extent of this neceflity it 
 is proper to referve for after confideration. Executive power 
 confifts of two very diftinct parts : general deliberations relative 
 to particular emergencies, which, fo far as practicability is con- 
 cerned, may be exercifed either by one individual or a body of 
 individuals, fuch as peace and war, taxation f , and the feledtion 
 of proper periods for convoking deliberative aflemblies : and par- 
 ticular functions, fuch as thofe of financial detail, or minute fu- 
 perintendence, which cannot be exercifed unlefs by one or at 
 moll by a fmall number of perfons. 
 
 In reviewing thefe feveral branches of authority, and confider- Forms of go- 
 vernment. 
 ing the perfons to whom they may be mod properly confided, we 
 
 * Book III, Chap. V. 
 
 f I ftate the article of taxation as a branch of executive government, fince it 
 is not, like law or the declaration of law, a promulgating of fome general prin- 
 ciple, but is a temporary regulation for fome particular emergence. 
 
 7 cannot 
 
ed. 
 
 382 OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER. 
 
 ch^ap \' cannot ^° better than adopt the ordinary diftribution of forms of 
 ^~~j f government into monarchy, ariftocracy and democracy. Under 
 toT-'Ti't eacn °^ t^ e ^ e heads we may enquire into the merits of their 
 refpective principles, firft abfolutely, and upon the hypothefis of 
 their Handing fingly for the whole adminiftration ; and fecondly, 
 in a limited view, upon the fuppofition of their conftituting one 
 branch only of the fyflem of government. It is ufually alike 
 incident to them all to confide the minuter branches of executive 
 detail to inferior agents. 
 
 One thing more it is neceflary to premife. The merits of each 
 of the three heads I have enumerated are to be confidered nega- 
 tively. The corporate duties of mankind are the refult of their 
 irregularities and follies in their individual capacity. If they 
 had no imperfection, or if men were fo conftituted as to be 
 fufficiently and fufficiently early corrected by perfuaficn alone, 
 fociety would ceafe from its functions. Of confequence, of the 
 three forms of government and their compofitions that is the 
 beft, which fhall lead impede the activity and application of our 
 intellectual powers. It was in the recollection of this truth that 
 I have preferred the term political inftitution to that of govern- 
 ment, the former appearing to be fufficiently expreffive of that 
 relative form, whatever it be, into which individuals would fall, 
 when there was no need of force to direct them into their pro- 
 per channel, and were no refractory members to correct. 
 
 4 CHAP 
 
[ 3*3 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 OF EDUCATION, THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 
 
 NATURE OF MONARCHY DELINEATED. SCHOOL OF AD- 
 VERSITY. — TENDENCY OF SUPERFLUITY TO INSPIRE EF- 
 FEMINACY TO DEPRIVE US OF THE BENEFIT OF EXPE- 
 RIENCE ILLUSTRATED IN THE CASE OF PRINCES. — 
 
 MANNER IN WHICH THEY ARE ADDRESSED. INEFFICACY 
 
 OF THE INSTRUCTION BESTOWED UPON THEM. 
 
 F 
 
 IRST then of monarchy: and we will firft fuppofe the BOOKV. 
 
 ' tir CHAP. II. 
 
 fucceffion to the monarchy to be hereditary. In this cafe v * ' 
 
 we have the additional advantage of confidering this diftin- 
 guifhed mortal, who is thus fet over the heads of the reft 
 of his fpecies, from the peiiod of his birth. . 
 
 The abftracl: idea of a king is of an extremely momentous Nature of 
 
 monarchy 
 
 and extraordinary nature ; and, though the idea has by the delineated. ? 
 accident of education been rendered familiar to us from our 
 infancy, yet perhaps the majority of readers can recollect, the 
 period, when it ftruck them with aftonifhment and confounded 
 their powers of apprehenfion. It being fufficiently evident that 
 fome fpecies of government was neceffary, and that individuals 
 
 muft.; 
 
384 OF EDUCATION, 
 
 chap If. mu ^ concede a part of that facred and important privilege by 
 " which each man is conftituted judge of his own words and 
 
 actions, for the fake of general good, it was next requifite to 
 confider what expedients might be fubftituted in the room of 
 this original claim. One of thefe expedients has been monarchy. 
 It was the intereft of each individual that his individuality 
 {hould be invaded as rarely as poffible ; that no invafioa fhould 
 be permitted to flow from wanton caprice, from fmifter and 
 difingenuous views, or from the mitigation, of anger, partiality 
 and paflion ; and that this bank, feverely levied upon the peculium 
 of each member of the fociety, Should be adminiftered with 
 frugality and difcretion. It was therefore without doubt a very 
 bold adventure to commit this precious depofit to the cuftody of 
 a fingle man. If we contemplate the human powers whether of. 
 body or mind, we Shall find them much better fuited to the fuper- 
 intendence of our private concerns and to the adminiftering occa- 
 sional affiftance to others, than to the accepting the formal truft 
 of fuperintending the affairs and watching for the happinefs of 
 millions. If we recollect the phyfical and moral equality of 
 mankind, it will appear a very violent ufurpation upon this prin- 
 ciple to place one individual at fo vaft an interval from the reft 
 of his fpecies. Let us then confider how fuch perfons are ufual- 
 ly educated, or may be expected to be educated, and how well 
 they are prepared for this illuftrious office. 
 
 School of ad- ft i s a common opinion that adverfity is the fchool in which all 
 
 verfitv. * ' 
 
 extraordinary 
 
 verfity 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 385 
 
 extraordinary virtue muft be formed. Henry the fourth of BOOK v. 
 
 France and Elizabeth of England experienced a long feries of ' «— * J 
 
 calamities before they were elevated to a throne. Alfred, of 
 whom the obfcure chronicles of a barbarous age record fuch fu- 
 perior virtues, pafled through the viciffitudes of a vagabond and 
 a fugitive. Even the mixed, and upon the whole the vicious, 
 yet accomplifhed, characters of Frederic and Alexander, were 
 not formed without the interference of injuftice and perfecution. 
 
 This hypothec's however feems to have been pulhed too far. 
 It is no more reafonable to fuppofe that virtue cannot be matured 
 without injuftice, than to believe, which has been another pre- 
 vailing opinion, that human happinefs cannot be fecured with- 
 out impofture and deceit. Both thefe errors have a common 
 fource, a diftruft of the omnipotence of truth. If their advo- 
 cates had reflected more deeply upon the nature of the human 
 mind, they would have perceived that all our voluntary actions 
 are judgments of the understanding, and that actions of the 
 molt judicious and ufeful nature muft infallibly flow from a real 
 and genuine conviction of truth. 
 
 But, though the exaggerated opinion here ftated of the ufefuk Tendency of 
 
 r - fupcrfluity 
 
 nefs of advernty be erroneous, it is, like many other of our to infpire ef- 
 feminacy : 
 errors, allied to important truth. If adverfity be not neceflary, 
 
 It muft be allowed that profperity is pernicious. Not a genuine 
 
 and philofophical profperity, which requires no more than found 
 
 3 D health 
 
386 OF EDUCATION, 
 
 chTp Ti ^ ea ^^ w ^k a f° un d intellect, the capacity of procuring for our- 
 
 * » ' felves by a moderate and well regulated induftry the means of 
 
 fubfiftence, virtue and wifdom : but profperity as it is ufually 
 underftood, that is, a competence, provided for us by the 
 caprice of human inftitution, inviting our bodies to indolence, 
 and our minds to lethargy ; and ftill more profperity, as it is 
 underftood in the cafe of noblemen and princes, that is, a fuper- 
 fluity of wealth, which deprives us of all intercourfe with our 
 fellow men upon equal terms, and makes us prifoners of ftate, 
 gratified indeed with baubles and fplendour, but fhut out from 
 the real benefits of fociety and the perception of truth. If truth 
 be fo intrinfically powerful as to make adverfity unneceffary to 
 excite our attention to it, it is neverthelefs certain that luxury 
 and wealth have the moft fatal effects in diftorting it. If it 
 require no foreign aid to affift its energies, we ought however to 
 be upon our guard againft principles and fituations the tendency 
 of which may be perpetually to counteract it. 
 
 Nor is this all. One of the moft effential ingredients of 
 virtue is fortitude. It was the plan of many of the Grecian 
 philofophers, and moft of all of Diogenes, to fhow to mankind 
 how very limited was the fupply that our neceflities required, 
 and how little dependent our real welfare and profperity were 
 upon the caprice of others. Among innumerable incidents upon 
 record that illuftrate this principle, a fingle one may fuffice to 
 fuggeft to our minds its general fpirit. Diogenes had a Have 
 
 whofe 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE, 387 
 
 whofe name was Menas, and Menas thought proper upon fome SOOK v. 
 
 occafion to elope. " Ha !" faid the philofopher, " can Menas ' « ' 
 
 live without Diogenes, and cannot Diogenes live without Me- 
 nas ?" There can be no leflbn more important than that which 
 is thus conveyed. The man that does not know himfelf not to 
 be at the mercy of other men, that does not feel that he is in- 
 vulnerable to all the viciffitudes of fortune, is incapable of a con- 
 ftant and inflexible virtue. He, to whom the reft of his fpecies 
 can reafonably look up with confidence, muft be firm, becaufe 
 his mind is filled with the excellence of the object he pur- 
 fues ; and chearful, becaufe he knows that it is out of the power 
 of events to injure him. If any one fhould choofe to imagine 
 that this idea of virtue is {trained too high, yet all muft allow 
 that no man can be entitled to our confidence, who trembles at 
 every wind, who can endure no adverfity, and whofe very 
 cxiftence is linked to the artificial character he fuftains. Nothing 
 can more reafonably excite our contempt, than a man who, if 
 he were once reduced to the genuine and fimple condition of 
 man, would be reduced to defpair, and find himfelf incapable of 
 confuking and providing for his own fubfiftence. Fortitude is 
 a habit of mind that grows out of a fenfe of our own inde- 
 pendence. If there be a man, who dares not even truft his 
 own imagination with the fancied change of his circumftances, 
 he muft neceffarily be effeminate, irrefolute and temporifing. 
 He that loves fenfuality or oftentation better than virtue, may be 
 entitled to our pity, but a madman only would entruft to his 
 difpofol any thing that was dear to him. 
 
 3 D 2 Again, 
 
j88 OF EDUCATION, 
 
 BOOK V. Again, the only means by which truth, however Immutable 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 v < — ' in its own nature, can be communicated to the human mind is. 
 
 to deprive us 
 
 of the benefit through the inlet of the fenfes. It is perhaps impoffible that a, 
 
 ofexpe- 
 
 tiencei man fa^ U p m a cabinet can ever be wife. If we would 
 
 acquire knowledge, we mufh open our eyes, and contemplate- 
 the univerfe. Till we are acquainted with the meaning of terms- 
 and the nature of the objeds around us, we cannot underftand; 
 the propofitions that may be formed concerning them. Till we 
 are acquainted with the nature of the objects around us, we can- 
 not compare them . with the principles we have formed, and 
 underftand the modes of employing them.. There are other 
 ways of attaining wifdom and ability befide the fchool of adver- 
 fity, but there is no way of attaining them but through the 
 medium of experience. That is, experience brings in the 
 materials with which intellect works j for it mufl be granted that 
 a man of. limited experience will often be more capable than he 
 who has gone through the greateft variety of fcenes ; or rather 
 perhaps, that one man may collect more experience in a fphere 
 of a few miles fquare,. than another who has failed round the 
 world.. 
 
 To conceive truly the value- of experience we muft recollect: 
 the infinite improvements the human mind has received in ai 
 long feries of ages, and how an enlightened European differs, 
 from a folitary favage. However multifarious are thefe improve- 
 ments, there are but two ways in which they can be appro- 
 priated by any individual j either at fecond hand by books and 
 7 convention,, 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. $$ 9 
 
 converfation, or at firft hand by our own obfervations of men and book v. 
 
 C t'l A i . j. 1. 
 
 things. The improvement we receive in the firft of thefe modes ' *— — ' 
 
 is unlimited ; but it will not do alone. We cannot underftand 
 books, till we have feen the fubjects of which they treat. 
 
 He that knows the mind of man, muft have obferved it for 
 himfelf ; he that knows it moft intimately, muft have obferved it 
 in it? greateft variety of fituations. He muft have feen it with- 
 out difguife, when no exterior fituation puts a curb upon its 
 paffions, and induces the individual to exhibit a ftudied, not a 
 fpontaneous character. He muft have (een. men in their un- 
 guarded moments, when the eagernefs of temporary refent- 
 ment tips their tongue with fire, when they are animated and 
 dilated by hope, when they are tortured and anatomifed by 
 defpair, when the foul pours out its inmoft felf into the bofom 
 of an equal and a friend. Laftly, he muft himfelf have been an 
 actor in the fcene, have had his own pafhons brought into play,, 
 have known the anxiety of expectation and the tranfport of 
 fuccefs, or he will feel and underftand about as much of what 
 he fees, as mankind in general would of the tranfactions of the 
 vitriolifed inhabitants of the planet Mercury, or the falamanders 
 that live in the fun. — Such is the education of the true philo- 
 fopher, the genuine politician, the friend and benefactor of 
 human kind. 
 
 "What is the education of a prince ? Its firft quality is extreme iiMrated & 
 
 the caie of 
 
 tendernefs. princes. 
 
390 OF EDUCATION, 
 
 chap n ten( fe rne f s - The winds of heaven are not permitted to blow 
 -' v ' upon him. He is drefTed and undreffed by his lacqueys and va- 
 lets. His wants are carefully anticipated; his defires without 
 any effort of his profufely fupplied. His health is of too much 
 importance to the community to permit him to exert any con- 
 fiderable effort either of body or mind. He muft not hear the 
 voice of reprimand or blame. In all things it is firft of all to be 
 remembered that he is a prince, that is, fome rare and precious 
 creature, but not of human kind. 
 
 Wanner in As he is the heir to a throne, it is never forgotten by thofe 
 
 which they 
 
 are addreffed. about him, that confiderable importance is to be annexed to his 
 favour or his difpleafure. Accordingly they never exprefs them- 
 ielves in his prefence frankly and naturally, either reflecting him 
 or themfelves. They are fupporting a part. They play under 
 a mafk. Their own fortune and emolument is always upper- 
 moft in their minds, at the fame time that they are anxious to 
 appear generous, difinterefted and fincere. All his caprices are 
 to be complied with. All his gratifications are to be ftudied. 
 They find him a depraved and fordid mortal ; they judge of his 
 appetites and capacities by their own ; and the gratifications they 
 recommend ferve to fink him deeper in folly and vice. 
 
 What is the refult of fuch an education ? Having never expe- 
 rienced contradiction, the young prince is arrogant and prefump- 
 tuous. Having always been accuftomed to the flaves of necef- 
 
 fity 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 391 
 
 litv or the flaves of choice, he dees not underftand even the B00K v - 
 
 ' CHAP. II. 
 
 meaning of the word freedom. His temper is infolent, and im- ' ^— '. 
 
 patient of parley and expoftulation. Knowing nothing, he be- 
 lieves himfelf fovereignly informed, and runs headlong into dan- 
 ger, not from firmnefs and courage, but from the moft egregious 
 wilfulnefs and vanity. Like Pyrrho among the ancient philo- 
 fophers, if his attendants were at a diftance, and he trufted him- 
 felf alone in the open air, he would perhaps be run over by the 
 next coach, or fall down the firft precipice. His violence and 
 prefumption are ftrikingly contrafted with the extreme timidity 
 of his difpofition. The firft oppofition terrifies him, the firft 
 difficulty feen and underftood appears infuperable. He trembles 
 at a fhadow, and at the very femblance of adverfity is diflblved 
 into tears. It has accordingly been obferved that princes are 
 commonly fuperftitious beyond the rate of common mortals. 
 
 Above all, fimple, unqualified truth is a ftranger to his ear. It 
 either never approaches ; or if fo unexpected a gueft fhould once 
 appear, it meets with fo cold a reception, as to afford little encou- 
 ragement to a fecond vifit. The longer he has been accuftomed 
 to falfhood and flattery, the more grating will it found. The 
 longer he has been accuftomed to falfhood and flattery, the 
 more terrible will the tafk appear to him, to change his taftes, 
 and difcard his favourites. He will either place a blind confi- 
 dence in all men, or, having dete&ed the infincerity of thofe 
 who were moft agreeable to him, will conclude that all men are 
 
 $ knavifh • 
 
59 2 OF EDUCATION, 
 
 BOOK V. knavifh and defigning. As a confequence of this laft opinion, 
 
 * • ' he will become indifferent to mankind, callous to their fufferings, 
 
 and will believe that even the virtuous are knaves under a craftier 
 mafk. Such is the education of an individual, who is deftined 
 to fuperintend the affairs and watch for the happinefs of millions. 
 
 In this picture are indeed contained all thofe features which 
 naturally conftitute the education of a prince, into the conduct- 
 ing of which no perfon of energy and virtue has by accident 
 been introduced. In real life it will be varioufly modified, but 
 the majority of the features, unlefs in very rare inftances, will 
 remain the fame. In no cafe can the education of a friend and 
 benefactor of human kind, as fketched in a preceding page, by 
 any fpeculative contrivance be communicated. 
 
 Inefficacy of Nor is there any difficulty in accounting for this univerfal 
 tionbeftowed mifcarriage. The wifeft preceptor thus circumftanced muft la- 
 
 upon them. , _ + .. 
 
 bour under infuperable' difadvantages. No ntuation can be fo 
 unnatural as that of a prince, fo difficult to be underftood by him 
 who occupies it, fo irrefiftibly propelling the mind to miftake. 
 The firft ideas it fuggefts are of a tranquillifing and foporific na- 
 ture. It fills him with the opinion of his fecretly pofTeffing fome 
 inherent advantage over the reft of his fpecies, by which he is 
 formed to command and they to obey. If you affure him of 
 the contrary, you can expect only an imperfect and temporary 
 credit ; for facts, which in this cafe depofe againft you, fpeak a 
 
 language 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 
 
 593 
 
 language more emphatic and intelligible than words. If it were BOOK V. 
 ° b l ° CHAP. II. 
 
 not as he fuppofes, why ihould every one that approaches be 
 eager to ferve him ? The fordid and felfiih motives by which 
 they are really animated he is very late in detecting. It may 
 even be doubted whether the individual, who was never led to 
 put the profefhons of others to the tell by his real wants, has in 
 any inftance been completely aware of the little credit that is 
 often- due to them. A prince finds himfelf courted and adored 
 long before he can have acquired a merit entitling him to fuch 
 difiinctions. By what arguments can you perfuade him labo- 
 rioufly to purfue what appears fo completely fuperfluous ? How 
 can you induce him to be diffatisfied with his prefent acquifitions, 
 while every other perfon affures him that his accomplishments 
 are admirable and his mind a mirror of fagacity ? How will 
 you perfuade him who finds all his wifhes anticipated, to en- 
 gage in any arduous undertaking, or propofe any diftant object 
 for his ambition ? 
 
 "But, even fhould you fucceed in this, his purfuits may be ex- 
 pected to be either mifchievous or ufelefs. His underftanding 
 is diftorted ; and the bafis of all morality, the recollection that 
 other men are beings of the fame order with himfelf, is extir- 
 pated. It would be unreafonable to exped from him any thing 
 generous and humane. Unfortunate as he is, his fituation is 
 continually propelling him to vice, and deftroying the germs of 
 integrity and virtue before they are unfolded. If fenfibility be- 
 
 3 E gia 
 
394 
 
 OF' EDUCATION, 
 
 BOOK V. g* in to difcover itfelf, it is immediately poifoned by the blighting 
 1 v *. winds of flattery. Amufement and fenfuality call with an im- 
 perious voice, and will not allow him time .to feel. Artificial as 
 is the character he fills, even mould he afpire to fame, it will be 
 by the artificial methods of falfe refinement, or the barbarous in- 
 ventions of ufurpation and conqueft, not by the plain and unor- 
 namented road of benevolence. 
 
 Some idea of the methods ufually purfued, and the effects pro- 
 duced in the education of a prince, may be collected from a late 
 publication of the celebrated madame de Genlis, in which fhe 
 gives an account of her own proceedings in relation to the chil- 
 dren of the duke d'Orleans. She thus defcribes the features of 
 their difpofition and habits at the time they were committed to 
 her care. " The duke de Valois (the eldeft) is frequently coarfe 
 in his manners and ignoble in his expreffions. He finds a great 
 deal of humour in defcribing mean and common objects by vul- 
 gar expreffions ; and all this feafoned with the proverbial fertility 
 of Sancho Panza himfelf, and fet off with a loud forced laugh. 
 His prate is eternal, nor does he fufpect but that it muft be an 
 exquifite gratification to any one to be entertained with it j and 
 he frequently heightens the jeft by a falfhood uttered in the 
 gravefl manner imaginable. Neither he nor his brother has the 
 leaft regard for any body but himfelf; they are felfifh and grafp- 
 ing to an extreme, confidering every thing that is done for them,- 
 as their due, and imagining that they are in no refpeft obliged 
 
 to 
 
THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCE. 395 
 
 to confult the happinefs of others. The flighteft reproof is be- 529$ Y; 
 
 yond meafure fhocking to them, and the indignation they con- v v ' 
 
 ceive at it immediately vents itfelf in fullennefs or tears. They 
 are in an uncommon degree effeminate, afraid of the wind or 
 the cold, unable to run or to leap, or even fo much as to walk 
 at a round pace, or for more than half an hour together. The 
 duke de Valois has an extreme terror of dogs, to fuch a degree 
 as to turn pale and fhriek out at the fight of one." " When the 
 children of the duke d'Orleans were committed to my care, they 
 had been accuftomed in winter to wear under-waiftcoats, two 
 pair of ftockings, gloves, muffs, &c. The eldeft, who was eight 
 years of age, never came down flairs without being fupported 
 by the arm of one or two perfons ; the domeflics were obliged 
 to render them the meaneft fervices, and, for a cold or any 
 flight indifpofition, fat up with them for nights together*." 
 
 Madame 
 
 * " M. . de Valois a encore des manures bien dcfagrcables, des exprejfions ignobles, & 
 de terns en terns le plus mauvais ton. A pr'cfent qitil ejl a fan aife avec moi, il me 
 debite avec conjiance toutes les gentilleffes qit'on Jut a apprifes. Tout cela affaifonne de 
 tons les proverbes de Sancho, et d'nn gros rire force, qui ti'ejl pas le tnoindre defes defa- 
 gremens. En outre, il ejl ties bavard, grand conteur, <£f il ment fouveut pour fe di- 
 vertir ; avec cela la plus grande indifference pour M. & Mde. de Chartres, n'y penfaiit 
 j'amait, les voyant froidement, ne dcftrant point les voir. — lis etoient I' tin isf I 'autre de 
 la plus grande impoliteffe, oui fcf non tout court, on unjigne de the, pen reconnoijfant, 
 parce qtfils croient qu'il n'efl point defoins, d' attentions, ni d'cgards qu'on ne les doive. 
 11 ti etoit pas pojfible de les reprendre fans les met t re ati d'effpoir; dans ce cas, toujour s 
 des pleitrs ou de Pbumeur. lis etoient tres douillets, craignant le vent, le froid, ne 
 
 3 E 2 pouyanty 
 
396 OF EDUCATION. 
 
 B T 9?5 Y; Madame de Genlis, a woman of uncommon talents and com- 
 CHAP. II.. ' 
 
 1 v ' prehenfive views, though herfelf infected with a confiderable 
 
 i number of errors, corrected thefe defects in the young princes. 
 
 But few princes have the good fortune to be educated by a mind 
 fo powerful and wife as that of madame de Genlis, and we may 
 fafely take our ftandard for the average calculation rather from 
 her predeceffors than herfelf. She forms the exception ; they 
 the rule. Even were it otherwife, we have already feen what 
 it is that a preceptor can do in the education of a prince. Nor 
 fliould it be forgotten that thefe were not of the clafs of princes 
 deftined to a throne. 
 
 pouvant, non feukment ni courir nifauter, tnais meme ni marcher d'un ben pas, 5s* 
 plus d'une demi-heure. Et M. le due de Valois ayant une peur affreufe des chiens au 
 point de pdlir & de crier quand il en voyoit tin." 
 
 " Hjhiand on m'a remis ceux que Jai eleves, Us avoient /'habitude de porter en hiver 
 des gillets, des doubles pair es de bas, des grands manchons, &c. L'aine, qui aveit huit 
 ans, ne dejeendoit jamais un efcalier fans s'appuyerfur le bras d'une ou deux perfonnes. 
 On obligcoit des domejliques de ces enfans a leur rendre lesfervices les plus vils : pour un 
 rhume, pour une legere incommodite, ces domejliques paffoient fans ceffe les nuits, is"c." 
 Lefons d'une Gouvernante a fes Ekves, par Mde. de Sillery Brulart 
 (ci-devant comteffe de Genlis), Tome II. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 397 ] 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 PRINCIPLES BY WHICH HE IS INFLUENCED — IRRESPONSI- 
 BILITY — IMPATIENCE OF CONTROL — HABITS OF DIS- 
 SIPATION — IGNORANCE — DISLIKE OF TRUTH — DISLIKE 
 OF JUSTICE PITIABLE SITUATION OF PRINCES. 
 
 s 
 
 UCH is the culture ; the fruit that it produces may eafily be BOOK V, 
 
 J CHAP. in. 
 conjectured. The fafhion which is given to the mind in v v — — ' 
 
 youth, it ordinarily retains in age ; and it is with ordinary cafes 
 only that the prefent argument is concerned. If there have been 
 kings, as there have been other men, in the forming of whom 
 particular have outweighed general caufes, the recollection of 
 fuch exceptions has little to do with the queftion, whether mo- 
 narchy be generally fpeaking a benefit or an evil. Nature has 
 no particular mould of which Ihe forms the intellects of princes; 
 monarchy is certainly not jure divino ; and of confequence, what- 
 ever fyftem we may adopt upon the fubjed of natural talents, 
 the ordinary rate of kings will poflefs at belt but the ordinary 
 rate of human underftanding. In what has been faid, and in 
 what remains to fay, we are not to fix our minds upon pro- 
 digies, but to think of the fpecies as it is ufually found. 
 
 But, 
 
398 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 ^?P,? T Y; But, though education for the moft part determines the cha- 
 CHAP. in. ' ° r 
 
 1 * ' racier of the future man, it may not be ufelefs to follow the dif- 
 
 quifition a little farther. Education in one fenfe is the affair of 
 youth, but in a ftricter and more accurate fenfe the education of 
 an intellectual being can terminate only with his life. Every in- 
 cident that befals us is the parent of a fentiment, and either con- 
 firms or counteracts the preconceptions of the mind. 
 
 Principles by Now the caufes that acted upon kings in their minority, con- 
 
 whlch he is . , r . . . 
 
 influenced: tinue to act upon them in their maturer years. Every thing is 
 
 carefully kept out of fight that may remind them they are men. 
 
 irrefponfibi- Every means is employed that can perfuade them that they are 
 
 lity : 
 
 of a different fpecies of beings, and fubject to different laws of 
 exiftence. " A king," fuch at leaft is the maxim of abfolute 
 monarchies, " though obliged by a rigid fyftem of duties, is ac- 
 countable for his difcharge of thofe duties only to God." That 
 is, expofed to a hundred fold more feductions than ordinary men, 
 he has not like them the checks of a vifible confutation of 
 things, perpetually through the medium of the fenfes making 
 their way to the mind. He is taught to believe himfelf fupe- 
 rior to the reftraints that bind ordinary men, and fubject to a 
 rule peculiarly his own. Every thing is trufled to the motives 
 of an invifible world ; which, whatever may be the eftimate to 
 which they are entitled in the view of philofophy, mankind are 
 not now to learn are weakly felt by thofe who are immerged in 
 fplendour or affairs, and have little chance of fuccefs in contend- 
 
 4 in S 
 
PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 399 
 
 ing with the impreflions of fenfe and the allurements of vifible fX?9p X* 
 objects. v v ' 
 
 It is a maxim generally received in the world " that every king Impatience 
 is a defpot in his heart," and the maxim can feldom fail to be 
 verified in the experiment. A limited monarch and an abfolute 
 monarch, though in many refpects different, approach in more 
 points than they feparate. A monarch, ftri&ly without limi- 
 tation, is perhaps a phenomenon that never yet exifted. All 
 countries have poffeffed fome check upon defpotifm, which to 
 their deluded imaginations appeared a fufficient fecurity for their 
 independence. All kings have pofferfed fuch a portion of luxury 
 and eafe, have been fo far furrounded with fervility and falfhood, 
 and to fuch a degree exempt from perfonal refponfibility, as 
 to deftroy the natural and wholefome complexion of the hu- 
 man mind. Being placed fo high, they find but one ftep be- 
 tween them and the fummit of focial authority, and they cannot 
 but eagerly defire to gain that ftep. Having fo frequent occafions 
 of feeing their behefts implicitly obeyed, being trained in fo long 
 a fcene of adulation and fervility, it is impoffible they mould not 
 feel fome indignation at the honeft firmnefs that fets limits to 
 their omnipotence. But to fay, " that every king is a defpot in 
 his heart," will prefently be fhown to be the fame thing as to 
 fay, that every king is by unavoidable neceffity the enemy of 
 the human race. 
 
 The 
 
4 oo PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 BOOK v. The principal fource of virtuous conduct is to recollect the 
 CHAP. III. r r 
 
 1 — — v — -; abfent. He that takes into his eftimate prefent things alone, 
 
 habits of dif- 
 
 fipation: -will be the perpetual Have of fenfuality and felfifhnefs. Fie will 
 have no principle by which to reftrain appetite, or to employ 
 himfelf in juft and benevolent purfuits. The .caufe of virtue and 
 innocence, however urgent, will no fooner ceafe to be heard} 
 
 -than it will be forgotten. Accordingly nothing is found more 
 •favourable to the attainment of moral excellence than medita- 
 tion : nothing more inimical than ,an uninterrupted fucceffion of 
 amufements. It would be abfurd to expect from kings the re- 
 collection of virtue in exile or difgrace. It has generally been 
 obferved, that even for the lofs of a flatterer or a favourite they 
 fpeedily confole themfelves. Image after image fo fpeedily fuc- 
 ceed in their fenforium, that no one of them leaves a durable 
 
 -impreffion. A circumftance which contributes to this moral in- 
 fenfibility, is the effeminacy and cowardice which grow out of 
 perpetual indulgence. Their minds fpontaneoufly fhrink from 
 painful ideas, from motives that would awaken them to effort, 
 
 .and reflections that would demand feverity of difquifition. 
 
 ignorance : 
 
 What fituation can be more unfortunate than that of a ftran- 
 ger, who cannot fpeak our language, knows nothing of our 
 manners and cuftoms, and ente i-c into the .bufy fcene of our af- 
 fairs, without one friend to advife with or affift him ? If any 
 thing is to be got by fuch a man, we may depend upon feeing 
 him inftantly furrounded with a group of thieves, (harpers and 
 j2 .extortioners. 
 
PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 401 
 
 extortioners. They will make him fwallow the moft incredible BOOKV. 
 ' CHAP. III. 
 
 ftories, will impofe upon him in every article of his neceffities or v u * 
 
 his commerce, and he will leave the country at laft, as unfriended 
 and in as abfolute ignorance as he entered it. Such a ftranger is 
 a king ; but with this difference, that the foreigner, if he be a 
 man of fagacity and penetration, may make his way through 
 this crowd of intruders, and difcover a fet of perfons worthy of 
 his confidence, which can fcarcely in any cafe happen to a king. 
 He is placed in a vortex peculiarly his own. He is furrounded 
 with an atmofphere through which it is impoffible for him to 
 difcover the true colours and figure of things. The perfons that 
 are near him are in a cabal and confpiracy of their own, and 
 there is nothing about which they are more anxious than to 
 keep truth from approaching him. The man, who is not ac- 
 ceffible to every comer, who delivers up his perfon into the 
 cuftody of another, and may, for any thing that he can tell, be 
 precluded from that very intercourfe and knowledge it is moft 
 important for him to pcffefs, whatever name he may bear, is in 
 reality a prifoner. 
 
 . Whatever the arbitrary inftitutions of men may pretend, the 
 more powerful inftitutions of nature forbid one man to tranfacl 
 the affairs and provide for the welfare of millions. A king foon 
 finds the neceflity of entrufting his functions to the adminiftration 
 of his fervants. He acquires the habit of feeing with their eyes 
 and acting with their hands. He finds the neceffity of confid- 
 
 3 F ing 
 
4 o2 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 pwapSYt m & i m P uc itly m ^eir fidelity. Like a man long fhut up in a 
 dungeon, his organs are not ftrong enough to bear the irradia- 
 tion of truth. Accuflomed to receive information of the feelings 
 and fentiments of mankind through the medium of another per- 
 fon, he cannot bear directly to converfe with bufinefs and affairs. 
 Whoever would detach his confidence from his prefent favour- 
 ites, and induce him to pafs over again in fcrutiny the principles 
 and data upon which he has already determined, requires of him 
 too painful a talk. He haftens from his informer to communi- 
 cate the accufation to his favourite, and the tongue that has been 
 accuflomed to gain credit, eafily varnifhes over this new difco- 
 very. He flies from uncertainty, anxiety and doubt to his rou- 
 tine of amufements ; or amufement prefents itfelf, is importunate 
 to be received, and prefently obliterates the tale that overfpread 
 the mind with melancholy and fufpicion. Much has been faid 
 of intrigue and duplicity. They have been alledged to intrude 
 themfelves into the walks of commerce, tc haunt the intercourfe 
 of men of letters, and to rend the petty concerns of a village with 
 faction. But, wherever elfe they may be ftrangers, in courts 
 they undoubtedly find a congenial climate* The intrufive tale- 
 bearer, who carries knowledge to the ear of kings, is within 
 that circle an object of general abhorrence. The favourite 
 marks him for his victim ; and the inactive and unimpaf- 
 fioned temper of the monarch foon refigns him to the vin- 
 dictive importunity of his adverfary. It is in the contempla- 
 tion of thefe circumftances that Fenelon has remarked that 
 8 « kings 
 
PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 403 
 
 " kings are the mod unfortunate and the moft mifled of all hu- _£? OK v - 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 man beings*." 
 
 But in reality were they in poflefllon of purer fources of in- Diflike of 
 formation, it would be to little purpofe. Royalty inevitably al- 
 lies itfelf to vice. Virtue, in proportion as it has taken poflef- 
 fion of any character, is juft, confident and fincere. But kings, 
 debauched by their education, ruined by their fituation, cannot 
 endure an intercourfe with thefe attributes. Sincerity, that 
 would tell them of their errors and remind them of their cow- 
 ardice ; juftice, that, uninfluenced by the trappings of majefty, 
 would eftimate the man at his true defert ; confiftency, that no 
 temptation would induce to part with its principles ; are odious 
 and intolerable in their eyes. From fuch intruders they haften 
 to men of a pliant character, who will flatter their miftakes, put 
 a falfe varnifh on their actions, and be vifiteel by no impertinent 
 fcruples in aflifting the indulgence of their appetites. There is 
 fcarcely in human nature an inflexibility that can refill perpetual 
 flattery and compliance. The virtues that grow up among us 
 are cultured in the open foil of equality, not in the artificial 
 climate of greatnefs. We need the winds to harden, as much as 
 
 * " Les plus malheureux & les plus aveugles de tens les hommes." Telctnaque, 
 Liv. XIII. More forcible and impreflive defcription is fcarcely any where to 
 be found, than that of the evils infepar<ible from monarchical government, 
 contained ;n this and the following book of Fenelon's work. 
 
 o 
 
 F 2 the 
 
404 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 
 
 CHAP HI ^ e ^ eat t0 c ^ er ^ U3, Many a mind, that promifed well in its 
 .*— — v ' outfet, has been found incapable to ftand the teft of perpetual 
 
 indulgence and eafe, without one fhock to waken, and one 
 
 calamity to. flop it in its fmooth careen. 
 
 diflike of Monarchy is in reality fo unnatural an inftitution, that man- 
 
 juftice. . . 
 
 kind have at all times flrongly fufpedted it was unfriendly 
 to their happinefs. The power of truth upon important topics 
 is fuch, that it may rather be faid to be obfcured than oblite- 
 rated-; and fallhood has fcarcely ever been fo fuccefsful, as not to- 
 have had a refllefs and powerful antagonifl in the heart of its 
 votaries. The man who with difficulty earns his feanty fub- 
 fiftence, cannot behold the oftentatious fplendour of a king r 
 without being vifited by fome fenfe of injuflice. He inevitably, 
 questions in his mind the utility of an officer whofe fervices are 
 hired at fo enormous a price. If he confider the fubject with 
 any degree of accuracy,, he is led to perceive, and that witb, 
 fufficient furprife, that a king is nothing more than a common- 
 mortal, exceeded by many and equalled by more in every requi- 
 site of ftrength, capacity and virtue. He feels therefore that 
 nothing can be more groundlefs and unjuft than the fuppofing 
 that one fuch man as this is the fittefl: and moft competent in- 
 ftrument for regulating the affairs of nations, 
 
 Thefe refledions are fo unavoidable that kings themfelves 
 have often been aware of the danger to their imaginary happi- 
 nefs. 
 
PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE. 405 
 
 nefs with which they are pregnant. They have fometimes been -P^OK V. 
 
 ^ 1 1 - i j. . Ill* 
 
 alarmed with the progrefs of thinking, and oftener regarded the v « ' 
 
 eafe and profperity of their fubjects as a fource of terror and 
 apprehenfion. They juftly confider their functions as a fort of 
 public exhibition, the fuccefs of which depends upon the credu- 
 lity of the fpectators, and which good fenfe and courage would 
 fpeedily bring to a termination. Hence the well known maxims 
 of monarchical government, that eafe is the parent of rebellion, 
 and that it is necefTary to keep the people in a ftate of poverty 
 and endurance in order to render them fubmiflive. Hence it 
 has been the perpetual complaint of defpotifm, that " the reftive 
 knaves are overrun with eafe, and plenty ever is the nurfe of 
 faction*." Hence it has been the leffon perpetually read to 
 monarchs : " Render, your fubjects profperous, and they will 
 fpeedily refufe to labour ; they will become flubborn, proud, un- 
 fubmiflive to the yoke, and ripe for revolt. It is impotence and 
 mifery that alone will render them fupple, and prevent them from 
 rebelling againft the dictates of authority f." 
 
 It is a common and vulgar obfervation that the ftate of a king pitiable fitu- 
 is greatly to be pitied. " All his actions are hemmed in with princes. 
 
 * Tragedy of Jane Shore, Act III. 
 
 f " Si vous mettez les petiples dans I'abondance, Us ne travailleront plus, lis 
 deviendront ficrs , indocile s, et /front leu tours prets afe revolt er : il n'y a que la foible ffe 
 (t la mi/ere qui les rendent fouples, et qui les empichent de refifter a I'autorite." 
 
 Telemaque, Liv. XIII. 
 
 ' anxiety 
 
4 o<5 PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE, 
 
 ?9? K Yr'r anxiety and doubt. He cannot, like other men, indulge the gay 
 
 * v * a nd carelefs hilarity of his mind ; but is obliged, if he be of an 
 
 honeft and confcientious difpofition, to" confider how necefTary 
 the time, which he is thoughtlefsly giving to amufement, may 
 be to the relief of a worthy and oppreffed individual ; how 
 many benefits might in a thoufand inftances refult from his in- 
 terference ; how many a guilelefs and undefigning heart might 
 be cheared by his juftice. The conduct of kings is the fubjecl: 
 of the fevereft criticifm, which the very nature of their fituation 
 difables them to encounter. A thoufand things are done in 
 their name in which they have no participation ; a thoufand 
 ftories are fo difguifed to their ear as to render the truth 
 abfolutely undifcoverable ; and the king is the general fcape-goat, 
 loaded with the offences of all his dependents." 
 
 No picture can be more juft, judicious and humane than that 
 which is thus exhibited. Why then mould the advocates of 
 antimonarchical principles be confidered as the enemies of kings? 
 They would relieve them from " a load would fink a navy, too 
 much honour *." They would exalt them to the happy and 
 enviable condition of private individuals. In reality nothing can 
 be more iniquitous and cruel than to impofe upon a man the 
 unnatural office of a king. It is not lefs inequitable towards 
 him that exercifes it, than towards them who are fubjected to it. 
 
 * £liake fpe are : Henry the Eighth, Act III. 
 
 Kings, 
 
PRIVATE LIFE OF A PRINCE, 407 
 
 Kings, if they underftood their own interefts, would be the firft BOOK V. 
 
 6 ' } . . CHAP. III. 
 
 to efpoufe thefe principles, the raoft eager to liften to them, the v *— — J . 
 
 moft fervent in exprefling their efteem of the men who under- 
 take to imprefs upon their fpecies this important truth. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 4°3 ] 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 GF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 
 
 SUPPOSED EXCELLENCE OF THIS FORM OF GOVERNMENT 
 CONTROVERTED — FROM THE NARROWNESS OF HUMAN 
 POWERS. — CASE OF A VICIOUS ADMINISTRATION — OF A 
 VIRTUOUS ADMINISTRATION INTENDED TO BE FORMED. 
 — MONARCHY NOT ADAPTED TO THE GOVERNMENT 
 OF LARGE STATES. 
 
 BOOK V. ' I ^HERE is a principle frequently maintained upon this fub- 
 
 1 ; 
 
 Suppofed ex- 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 *■ jedt, which is well entitled to our impartial confideration. 
 
 cellence of It is granted by thofe who efpoufe it, " that abfolute monarchy, 
 
 this form of 
 
 government from the imperfection of thofe by whom it is adminiftered, is 
 
 controverted: 
 
 moft frequently attended with evil j but they aflert, " that it is 
 the beft and moft defirable of all forms under a good and 
 virtuous prince. It is expofed," fay they, " to the fate of 
 all excellent natures, and from the beft thing frequently, if cor- 
 rupted, becomes the worft." This remark is certainly not very 
 • decifive of the general queftion, fo long as any weight fhall be 
 attributed to the arguments which have been adduced to evince 
 what fort of character and difpofition may be ordinarily expected 
 in princes. It may however be allowed, if true, to create in 
 the mind a fort of partial retrofpect to this happy and perfect 
 
 defpotifm ; 
 
OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 
 
 409 
 
 defpotifm : and, if it can be fhown to be falfe, it will render BOOK v. 
 r CHAP. IV. 
 
 the argument for the abolition of monarchy, fo far as it is con- v *— *•* 
 
 cerned, more entire and complete. 
 
 Now, whatever difpofitions any man may pofTefs in favour flom the • 
 
 narrownefc 
 
 of the welfare of others, two things are neceflary to give them °^™ n 
 validity ; difcernment and power. I can promote the welfare of 
 a few perfons, becaufe I can be fufficiently informed of their 
 circumftances. I can promote the welfare of many in certain 
 general articles, becaufe for this purpofe it is only necefTary that 
 I fhould be informed of the nature of the human mind as fuch, 
 not of the perfonal fituation of the individuals concerned. But 
 for one man to undertake to adminifter the affairs of millions, to 
 fupply, not general principles and perfpicuous reafoning, but 
 particular application, and meafures adapted to the neceffities of 
 the moment, is of all undertakings the mod extravagant and 
 abfurd. 
 
 The moft natural and obvious of all proceedings is for each 
 man to be the fovereign arbiter of his own concerns. If the 
 imperfection, the narrow views and the miftakes of human 
 beings render this in certain cafes inexpedient and impracticable, $*,. 
 
 the next refource is to call in the opinion of his peers, perfons & 
 
 who from their vicinity may be prefumed to have fome general 
 knowledge of the cafe, and who have leifure and means minute- 
 ly to inveftigate the merits of the queftion. It cannot reafonably 
 
 3G be 
 
4 io OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 
 
 rHApSv ^ e doubted, tnat foe fame expedient which men employed in 
 
 * » ' their civil and criminal concerns, would by uninftru&ed mortals 
 
 be adopted in the afleflment of taxes, in the deliberations of 
 commerce, and in every other article in which their common 
 interefts were involved, only generalifing the deliberative af- 
 fembly or pannel in proportion to the generality of the queftion 
 to be decided. 
 
 Monarchy, inftead of referring every queftion to the perfons 
 concerned or their neighbours, refers it to a fingle individual 
 placed at the greateft diftance poflible from the ordinary mem- 
 bers of the fociety. Inftead of diftributing the caufes to be 
 judged into as many parcels as they would conveniently admit 
 for the fake of providing leifure and opportunities of examina- 
 tion, it draws them to a fingle centre, and renders enquiry and 
 examination impofllble. A defpot, however virtuoufly difpofed, 
 is obliged to act in the dark, to derive his knowledge from other 
 men's information, and to execute his behefts by other men's 
 inftrumentality. Monarchy feems to be a fpecies of government 
 profcribed by the nature of man; and thofe perfons, who 
 furnifhed their defpot with integrity and virtue, forgot to add 
 omnifoience and omnipotence, qualities not lefs neceflary to fit 
 him for the office they had provided. 
 
 Cafe of a Let us fuppofe this honeft and incorruptible defpot to be ferved 
 
 vicious ad- 
 
 miniftration : by m inifters, avaricious, hypocritical and interefted. What will 
 
 the 
 
OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 411 
 
 the people gain by the good intentions of their monarch ? He ?OOK v - 
 
 will mean them the greateft benefits, but he will be alto- v » ' 
 
 gether unacquainted with their fituation, their character and 
 their wants. The information he receives will frequently be 
 found the very reverie of the truth. He will be taught that one 
 individual is highly meritorious and a proper fubjecl: of reward, 
 whofe only merit is the profligate cruelty with which he has 
 ferved the purpofes of his adminiftration. He will be taught 
 that another is the pelt of the community, who is indebted for 
 this report to the fteady virtue with which he has traveried 
 and defeated the wickednefs of government. He will mean the 
 greateft benefits to his people ; but when he prefcribes fomething 
 calculated for their advantage, his fervants under pretence of 
 complying fhall in reality perpetrate diametrically the reverie. 
 Nothing will be more dangerous than to endeavour to remove 
 the obfcurity with which his minifters furround him. The man, 
 who attempts fo hardy a tafk, will become the incefTant object 
 of their hatred. Though the fovereign mould be ever fo feverely 
 juft, the time will come when his obfervation will be laid 
 afleep, while malice and revenge are ever vigilant. Could he 
 unfold the fecrets of his prifon houfes of ftate, he would find ' 
 men committed in his name whofe crimes he never knew, 
 whofe names he never heard of, perhaps men whom he honoured 
 and efteemed. Such is the hiftory of the benevolent and 
 philanthropic defpots whom memory has recorded ; and the 
 conclufion from the whole is, that, wherever defpotifm exifts, 
 
 3 G i there 
 
4 i2 
 
 OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 
 
 BOOK V. there it will always be attended with the evils of defpotifm, 
 
 CHAP. IV. . , 
 
 capricious meafures and arbitrary infliction. 
 
 of a virtuous « But will not a wife king take care to provide himfelf with 
 
 adminiftra- 
 
 tioii Intended good and virtuous fervants ?" Undoubtedly he will effect a part 
 
 to be formed. ° . . 
 
 of this, but he cannot fuperfede the eflential natures of things. 
 He that executes any office as a deputy will never difcharge it 
 in the fame perfection as if he were the principal. Either the 
 minifter muft be the author of the plans which he carries into 
 effect, and then it is of little confequence, except fo far as re- 
 lates to his integrity in the choice of his fervants, what fort of 
 mortal the fovereign fhall be found ; or he muft play a fubordi- 
 nate part, and then it is impoffible to transfufe into his mind 
 the perfpicacity and energy of his mafter. Wherever defpotifm 
 exifts, it cannot remain in a fingle hand, but muft be tranfmitted 
 whole and entire through all the progreffive links of authority. 
 To render defpotifm aufpicious and benign it is neceffary, not 
 only that the fovereign fhould poffefs every human excellence, but 
 that all his officers fhould be men of penetrating genius and un- 
 fpotted virtue. If they fall fhort of this, they will, like the 
 minifters of Elizabeth, be fometimes fpecious profligates *, and 
 fometimes men, who, however admirably adapted for bufmefs, 
 confult on many occafions exclufively their private advantage, 
 worfhip the riling fun, enter into vindictive cabals, and cuff 
 
 # Dudley earl of Leicefter. 
 
 down 
 
OF A VIRTUOUS DESPOTISM. 41-, 
 
 down new fledged merit *. Wherever the continuity is broken, BOOK v. 
 ° J ' CHAP. IV. 
 
 the flood of vice will bear down all before it. One weak or dif- ^— — v ' 
 
 ingenuous man will be the fource of unbounded mifchief. It is 
 the nature of monarchy under all its forms to confide greatly in 
 the difcretion of individuals. It provides no refource for main- 
 taining and diffufing the fpirit of juftice. Every thing refts 
 upon the permanence and extent of influence of perfonal 
 virtue. 
 
 Another pofition, not lefs generally aflerted than that of the Monarchy 
 
 not adapted 
 
 defirablenefs of a virtuous defpotifm, is, " that republicanifm is t0 the S°- 
 
 vernment of 
 
 a fpecies of government practicable only in a fmall ftate, while Iar £ e ftatcs - 
 monarchy is beft fitted to embrace the concerns of a vaft and 
 flourifhing empire." The reverfe of this, fo far at lead as relates 
 to monarchy, appears at firft fight to be the truth. The com- 
 petence of any government cannot be meafured by a purer 
 flandard, than the extent and accuracy of its information. In 
 this refpect monarchy appears in all cafes to be wretchedly 
 deficient ; but, if it can ever be admitted, it rauft furely be in 
 thofe narrow and limited inftances where an individual can with 
 leaft abfurdity be fuppofed to be acquainted with the affairs and 
 interefls of the whole. 
 
 * Cecil earl of Salifbury, lord treafurer ; Howard earl of Nottingham, lord 
 admiral, &C. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 4H ] 
 
 i 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 OF COURTS AND MINISTERS. 
 
 SYSTEMATICAL MONOPOLY OF CONFIDENCE. — CHARACTER 
 OF MINISTERS — OF THEIR DEPENDENTS. — VENALITY OF 
 COURTS. — UNIVERSALITY OF THIS PRINCIPLE. 
 
 BOOK V. T Y 7 E fhall be better enabled to judge of the dlfpofitions 
 
 chap.v. v/y ; # J *\ r 
 
 * *— * " " with which information is communicated and meafures 
 
 are executed in monarchical countries, if we reflect upon 
 another of the evil confequences attendant upon this fpecies of 
 government, the exiftence and corruption of courts. 
 
 Syftematical The character of this, as well as of every other human inftitu-r 
 confidence, tion, arifes out of the circumftances with which it is furrounded. 
 Minifters and favourites are a fort of people who have a ftate 
 prifoner in their cuftody, the whole management of whofe un- 
 derstanding and actions they can eafily engrofs. This they 
 completely effect with a weak and credulous mafter, nor can 
 the moft cautious and penetrating entirely elude their machina- 
 tions. They unavoidably defire to continue in the adminiftra- 
 tion of his functions, whether it be emolument, or the love of 
 homage, or any more generous motive by which they are 
 
 attached 
 
OF COURTS AND MINISTERS. 415 
 
 attached to it. But the more they are confided in by the ^S9f Yr' 
 
 fovereign, the greater will be the permanence of their ikuation ; * »— •* 
 
 and the more exclufive is their poffeflion of his ear, the more 
 implicit will be his confidence. The wifeft of mortals are liable 
 to error ; the mod judicious projects are open to fpecious and 
 fuperficial objections j and it can rarely happen but a miniiler 
 will find his eafe and fecurity in excluding as much as poflible 
 other and oppofite advifers, whofe acutenefs and ingenuity are 
 perhaps additionally whetted by a delire to fucceed to his 
 office. 
 
 Minifters become a fort of miniature kings in their turn. Charafterof 
 Though they have the greatefl: opportunity of obferving the im- 
 potence and unmeaningnefs of the character, they yet envy "it. 
 It is their trade perpetually to extol the dignity and importance 
 of the mafter they ferve ; and men cannot long anxioufiy endea- 
 vour to convince others of the truth of any propofition without 
 becoming half convinced of it themfelves. They feel themfelves 
 dependent for all that they moft ardently defire upon this man's 
 arbitrary will ; but a fenfe of inferiority is perhaps the never 
 failing parent of emulation or envy. They affimilate themfelves 
 therefore of choice to a man to whole circumftances their own 
 are confiderably fimilar. 
 
 In reality the requifites, without which monarchical govern- of their dc 
 
 • pcudoitS. 
 
 meat cannot be preferved in exiftence, are by no means fuffi- 
 
 ciently 
 
4 i6 OF COURTS 
 
 book v. dently fupplied by the mere intervention of minifters. There 
 muft be the minifters of minifters, and a long bead roll of fub- 
 ordination defcending by tedious and complicated fteps. Each 
 of thefe lives on the fmile of the minifter, as he lives on the 
 fmile of the fovereign. Each of thefe has his petty interefts to 
 manage, and his empire to employ under the guife of fervility. 
 Each imitates the vices of his fuperior, and exacts from others 
 the adulation he is obliged to pay. 
 
 It has already appeared that a king is neceffarily and almoft 
 unavoidably a defpot in his heart. He has been ufed to hear 
 thofe things only which were adapted to give him pleafure ; and 
 it is with a grating and uneafy fenfation that he liftens to com- 
 munications of a different fort. He has been ufed to unhefita- 
 ting compliance ; and it is with difficulty he can digeft expoftu- 
 lation and oppofition. Of confequence the honeft and virtuous 
 character, whofe principles are clear and unfhaken, is leaft 
 qualified for his fervice; he muft either explain away the 
 feverity of his principles, or he muft give place to a more 
 crafty and temporifing politician. The temporifing politician 
 expects the fame pliability in others that he exhibits in himfelf ; 
 and the fault which he can leaft forgive is an ill timed and 
 inaufpicious fcrupulofity. 
 
 Expecting this compliance from all the coadjutors and inftru- 
 
 ments of his defigns, he foon comes to fet it up as a ftandard 
 
 5 by 
 
AND MINISTERS. 4 ! 7 
 
 by which to judge of the merit of all other men. He is deaf to BOOK V. 
 
 ' CHAP. V. 
 
 every recommendation but that of a fitnefs for the fecret 
 
 fervice of government, or a tendency to promote his intereft and 
 extend the fphere of his influence. The worft man with this 
 argument in his favour will feem worthy of encouragement ; 
 the beft man who has no advocate but virtue to plead for him 
 will be treated with fupercilioufnefs and neglect. It is true the 
 genuine criterion of human defert can never be fuperfeded and 
 reverfed. But it will appear to be reverfed, and appearance will 
 produce many of the effects of reality. To obtain honour it 
 will be thought neceflary to pay a fervile court to adminiftration, 
 to bear with unaltered patience their contumely and fcorn, to 
 flatter their vices, and render ourfelves ufeful to their private 
 gratification. To obtain honour it will be thought neceflary by 
 afliduity and intrigue to make to ourfelves a party, to procure 
 the recommendation of lords and the good word of women of 
 pleafure and clerks in office. To obtain honour it will be 
 thought neceflary to merit difgrace. The whole fcene confifts 
 in hollownefs, duplicity and falfhood. The minifter fpeaks 
 fair to the man he defpifes, and the flave pretends a generous 
 attachment, while he thinks of nothing but his perfonal intereft. 
 That thefe principles are interfperfed under the worft govern- 
 ments with occafional deviations into better it would be folly to 
 deny ; that they do not form the great prevailing features where- 
 ever a court and a monarch are to be found it would be madnefs 
 to aflert. 
 
 3 H The 
 
418 OF COURTS 
 
 chap v *^ ie fundamental difadvantage of fuch a form of government 
 
 v < ~ is, that it renders things of the moll eflential importance fubjed: 
 
 through fucceffive gradations to the caprice of individuals. The 
 fuffrage of a body of electors will always bear a refemblance 
 more or lefs remote to the public fentiment. The fuffrage of an 
 individual will depend upon caprice, perfonal convenience or 
 pecuniaiy corruption. If the king be himfelf inacceflible to 
 injuftice, if the minifter difdain a bribe, yet the fundamental evil 
 remains, that kings and minifters, fallible themfelves, muft upon 
 a thoufand occafions depend upon the recommendation of others. 
 "Who will anfwer for thefe through all their claffes, officers of 
 ftate and deputies of department, humble friends and officious 
 valets, wives and daughters, concubines and confefTors ? 
 
 Venaliiy of It is fuppofed by many, that the exiftence of permanent heredi- 
 tary diftindtion is necefTary to the maintenance of order among 
 beings fo imperfect as the human fpecies. But it is allowed by 
 all, that permanent hereditary diftinction is a fiction of policy, 
 not an ordinance of immutable truth. Wherever it exifts, the 
 human mind, fo far as relates to political fociety, is prevented 
 from fetding upon its true foundation. There is a perpetual 
 ftruggle between the genuine fentiments of underftanding, which 
 tell us that all this is an impofition, and the imperious voice of 
 government, which bids us, Reverence and obey. In this 
 unequal conteft, alarm and apprehenfion will perpetually haunt 
 the minds of thofe who exercife ufurped power. In this artifi- 
 cial 
 
AND MINISTERS. 419 
 
 cial ftate of man powerful engines muft be employed to prevent BOOK V. 
 
 him from riling to his true level. It is the bufmefs of the go- l « ' 
 
 vernors to perfuade the governed, that it is their intereft to be 
 flaves. They have no other means by which to create this 
 fictitious intereft, but thofe which they derive from the perverted 
 underftandings and burdened property of the public, to be 
 returned in titles, ribbands and bribes. Hence that fyftem of 
 univerfal corruption without which monarchy could not exift. 
 
 It has fometimes been fuppofed that corruption is particularly UnlverMty 
 incident to a mixed government. " In fuch a government the ci P le » 
 people poffefs a certain portion of freedom ; privilege finds its 
 place as well as prerogative ; a certain fturdinefs of manner and 
 confeioufnefs of independence are the natives of thefe countries. 
 The country gentleman will not abjure the dictates of his judg- 
 ment without a valuable confideration. There is here more 
 than one road to fuccefs ; popular favour is as fure a means of 
 advancement as courtly patronage. In defpotic countries the 
 people may be driven like fheep ; however unfortunate is their 
 condition, they know of no other, and they fubmit to it as an 
 inevitable calamity. Their characteriftic feature is a torpid 
 dullnefs in which all the energies of man are forgotten. But in 
 a country calling itfelf free the minds of the inhabitants are in a 
 perturbed and reftlefs ftate, and extraordinary means muft be 
 employed to calm their vehemence." It has fometimes happened 
 to men whofe hearts have been pervaded with the love of 
 
 3 H 2 virtue, 
 
420 
 
 OF COURTS 
 
 B S ap v' v ^ rtue -> °f which pecuniary proflitution is the molt dtiious corrup- 
 * * ' tion, to prefer, while they have contemplated this picture, an 
 
 acknowledged defpotifm to a ftate of fpecious and imperfect 
 
 liberty. 
 
 But this picture is not accurate. As much of it as relates to 
 a mixed government muft be acknowledged to be true. But 
 the features of defpotifm are much too favourably touched. 
 Whether privilege be conceded by the forms of the conftitution 
 or no, a whole nation cannot be kept ignorant of its force. No 
 people were ever yet fo funk in ftupidity as to imagine one 
 man, becaufe he bore the appellation of a king, literally equal 
 to a million. In a whole nation, as monarchical nations at leaft 
 muft be expected to be conftituted, there will be nobility and 
 yeomanry, rich and poor. There will be perfons who by their 
 fituation, or their wealth, or their talents, form a middle rank 
 between the monarch and the vulgar, and who by their con- 
 federacies and their intrigues can hold the throne in awe. Thefe 
 men muft be bought or defied. There is no difpofition that 
 clings fo clofe to defpotifm as inceffant terror and alarm. What 
 elfe gave birth to the armies of fpies and the numerous ftate 
 prifons under the late government of France ? The eye of the 
 tyrant is never clofed. How numerous are the precautions and 
 jealoufies that thefe terrors dictate ? No man can go out or 
 come into the country but he is watched. The prefs muft ifTue 
 no productions that have not the imprimatur of government. 
 
 All 
 
AND MINISTERS. 421 
 
 All coffee houfes and places of public refort are objects of BOOK v. 
 
 x ■ J CHAP. V. 
 attention. Twenty people cannot be collected together, unlefs ! v— * 
 
 for the purpofes of fuperftition, but it is immediately fufpected 
 that they may be conferring about their rights. Is it to be 
 fuppofed, that, where the means of jealoufy are employed, the 
 means of corruption will be forgotten ? "Were it fo indeed, the 
 cafe would not be much improved. No picture can be more 
 difguftful, no ftate of mankind more deprefiing, than that in 
 which a whole nation is held in obedience by the mere opera- 
 tion of fear, in which all that is moft eminent among them, and 
 that fhould give example to the reft, is prevented under the 
 fevereft penalties from expreffing its real fentiments, and by 
 neceflary confequence from forming any fentiments that arc 
 worthy to be expreffed. But in reality fear was never employed 
 for thefe purpofes alone. No tyrant was ever fo unfocial as to 
 have no confederates in his guilt. This monftrous edifice will 
 always be found fupported by all the various inftruments for 
 perverting the human character, feverity, menaces, blandifh- 
 ments, profeffions and bribes. To this it is in a great degree 
 owing that monarchy is fo very coftly an eftablifhment. It is 
 the bufinefs of the defpot to diftribute his lottery of feduction 
 into as many prizes as poflible. Among the confequences of a 
 pecuniary polity thefe are to be reckoned the foremoft, that 
 every man is fuppofed to have his price, and that, the corrup- 
 tion being managed in an underhand manner, many a man, 
 
 who 
 
422 OF COURTS AND MINISTERS. 
 
 •BOOK V. w h appears a patriot, may be really a hireling ; by which 
 
 * " ' means virtue itfelf is brought into difcredit, is either regarded 
 
 as mere folly and romance, or obferved with doubt and 
 fufpicion, as the cloke of vices which are only the more 
 humiliating the more they are concealed. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 4*3 3 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 MONARCHY FOUNDED IN IMPOSTURE. — KINGS NOT EN- 
 TITLED TO SUPERIORITY — INADEQUATE TO THE FUNC- 
 TIONS THEY POSSESS. MEANS BY WHICH THE IMPOS- 
 TURE IS MAINTAINED — I. SPLENDOUR 2. EXAGGERA- 
 TION. THIS IMPOSTURE GENERATES 1. INDIFFERENCE 
 
 TO MERIT — 2. INDIFFERENCE TO TRUTH — 3. ARTIFICIAL 
 
 DESIRES 4. PUSILLANIMITY. MORAL INCREDULITY 
 
 OF MONARCHICAL COUNTRIES. INJUSTICE OF LUXURY 
 
 OF THE INORDINATE ADMIRATION OF WEALTH. 
 
 LET us proceed to confider the moral effects which the in- BOOK V. 
 CHAP. VI. 
 ftitution of monarchical government is calculated to pro- ' » * 
 
 Monarchy 
 
 duce upon the inhabitants of the countries in which it flourifhes. founded m 
 
 impofturc. 
 
 And here it mull be laid down as a firft principle that monarchy 
 
 is founded in impofture. It is falfe that kings are entitled to Kfngs not 
 
 entitled to 
 
 the eminence they obtain. They poffefs no intrinfic fuperiority fuperiority : 
 over their fubjects. The line of diftin&ion that is drawn is the 
 offspring of pretence, an indirect means employed for effecting 
 certain purpofes, and not the offspring of truth. It tramples 
 upon the genuine nature of things, and depends for its fupport 
 6 upon 
 
4 2 4 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 raAp'vi upon this argument, "that, were it not for impofitions of a 
 v » ' fimilar nature, mankind would be miferable." 
 
 inadequate Secondly, it is falfe that kings can difcharge the functions of 
 
 tions they royalty. They pretend to fuperintend the affairs of millions, 
 and they are neceflarily unacquainted with thefe affairs. The 
 fenfes of kings are conflruded like thofe of other men, they can 
 neither fee nor hear what is tranfacted in their abfence. They 
 pretend to adminifter the affairs of millions, and they poffefs no 
 fuch fupernatural powers as mould enahle them to act at a 
 diftance. They are nothing of what they would perfuade us to 
 believe them. The king is often ignorant of that of which half 
 the inhabitants of his dominions are informed. His prerogatives 
 are adminiflered by others, and the loweft clerk in office is 
 frequently to this and that individual more effectually the 
 fovereign than the king himfelf. He knows nothing of what 
 i>s folemnly tranfacted in his name. 
 
 Means by To conduct this impofture with fuccefs it is neceflary to bring 
 
 which the < m 
 
 impofture is over to its party our eyes and our ears. Accordingly kings are 
 
 fupported : _ 
 
 j.fplendour: always exhibited with all the fplendour of ornament, attendance 
 and equipage. They live amidft a fumptuoufnefs of expence ; 
 and this not merely to gratify their appetites, but as a neceffary 
 inftrument of policy. The mofl fatal opinion that could lay 
 hold upon the minds of their fubjects is that kings are but men. 
 .Accordingly they are carefully withdrawn from the profanenefs 
 
 of 
 
OF SUBJECTS. 42j 
 
 of vulgar infpection ; and, when they are exhibited, it is with R OOK v. 
 6 r . J CHAP. VI. 
 
 every artifice that may dazzle our fenfe and miflead our judg- ' * ' 
 
 ment. 
 
 The impofture does not flop with our eyes, but addrefTes 2 : exa gg era - 
 itfelf to our ears. Hence the inflated ftyle of regal formality. 
 The name of the king every where obtrudes itfelf upon us. It 
 would feem as if every thing in the country, the lands, the 
 houfes, the furniture and the inhabitants were his property. 
 Our eftates are the king's dominions. Our bodies and minds 
 are his fubjects. Our reprefentatives are his parliament. Our 
 courts of law are his deputies. All magiftrates throughout the 
 realm are the king's officers. His name occupies the foremofl 
 place in all flatutes and decrees. He is the profecutor of every 
 criminal. He is " Our Sovereign Lord the King." Were it 
 poffible that he mould die, " the fountain of our blood, the 
 means by which we live," would be gone : every political 
 function would be fufpended. It is therefore one of the funda- 
 mental principles of monarchical government that " the king i 
 cannot die." Our moral principles accommodate themfelves to 
 our veracity : and accordingly the fum of our political duties 
 (the moft important of all duties) is loyalty; to be true and 
 faithful to the king ; to honour a man, whom it may be we 
 ought to defpife ; and to obey; that is, to acknowledge no- 
 immutable criterion of juftice and injuftice. 
 
 3 I What 
 
426 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 BOOK V. What mull be the effe&s of this machine upon the moral 
 CHAP. VI. r 
 
 ' v ' principles of mankind ? Undoubtedly we cannot trifle with the 
 
 This impof- r r J 
 
 turegene- principles of morality and truth with impunity. However 
 
 rates, I. in- * * * * 
 
 difference to gravely the impofture may be carried on, it is impofiible but 
 that the real ftate of the cafe Ihould be ftrongly fufpe&ed. Man 
 in a ftate of fociety, if undebauched by falfhoods like thefe, 
 which confound the nature of right and wrong, is not ignorant 
 of what it is in which merit confifts. He knows that one man 
 is not fuperior to another except fo far as he is wifer or better. 
 Accordingly thefe are the diftinclions to which he afpires for 
 himfelf. Thefe are the qualities he honours and applauds in 
 another, and which therefore the feelings of each man inftigate 
 his neighbour to acquire. But what a revolution is introduced 
 among thefe original and undebauched fentiments by the arbi- 
 trary diftindtions which monarchy engenders ? We ftill retain in 
 our minds the ftandard of merit, but it daily grows more feeble 
 and powerlefs, we are perfuaded to think that it is of no real 
 life in the tranfactions of the world, and prefently lay it afide as 
 Utopian and vifionary. 
 
 2. Jndiffe- Confequences equally injurious are produced by the hyper- 
 
 truth : bolical pretenfions of monarchy. There is a fimplicity in truth 
 
 that refufes alliance with this impudent myfticifm. No man is 
 entirely ignorant of the nature of man. He will not indeed be 
 incredulous to a degree of energy and rectitude that may exceed 
 the ftandard of his preconceived ideas. But for one man to 
 5 pretend 
 
•OF SUBJECTS. 427 
 
 pretend to think and adl for a nation of his fellows is fo prepof- BOOK v. 
 r r r CHAP. VI. 
 
 terous as to fet credibility at defiance. Is he perfuaded that the ' « ' 
 
 impofition is falutary ? He willingly affumes the right of intro- 
 ducing fimilar falfhoods into his private affairs. He becomes 
 convinced that veneration for truth is to be claffed among our 
 errors and prejudices, and that, fo far from being, as it pretends 
 to be, in all cafes falutary, it would lead, if ingenuoufly 
 pra&ifed, to the deftru&ion of mankind. 
 
 Again, if kings were exhibited fimply as they are in them- 3- artificial 
 
 defire : 
 
 felves to the infpection of mankind, the falutary prejudice, as it 
 has been called, which teaches us to venerate them, would 
 fpeedily be extinct : it has therefore been found neceffary to 
 furrpund them with luxury and expence. Thus are luxury and 
 expence made the ftandard of honour, and of confequence the 
 topics of anxiety and envy. However fatal this fentiment may 
 be to the morality and happinefs of mankind, it is one of thofe 
 illufions which monarchical government is eager to cherifh. In 
 reality, the firft principle of virtuous feeling, as has been elfe- 
 where faid, is the love of independence. He that would be juft 
 muft before all things eftimate the objects about him at their 
 true value. But the principle in regal ftates has been to think 
 your father the wifeft of men becaufe he is your father *, and 
 
 your 
 
 * " The perfons whom you ought to love infinitely more than me, are thofe 
 to whom you are indebted for your exiftence." " Their conduft ought to regu- 
 
 3 I 2 late 
 
4 2S OF SUBJECTS, 
 
 BOOK v. your kine the foremoft of his fpecies becaufe he is a kino;. The 
 
 CHAP. VI. ' b t b 
 
 ftandard of intellectual merit is no longer the man but his title. 
 To be drawn in a coach of ftate by eight milk-white horfes is 
 the higheft of all human claims to our veneration. The fame 
 principle inevitably runs through every order of the ftate, and 
 men defire wealth under a monarchical government, for the 
 fame reafon that under other circumftances they would have 
 defired virtue. 
 
 Let us fuppofe an individual who by fevere labour earns a 
 fcanty fubfiftence, to become by accident or curiofity a fpectator 
 of the pomp of a royal progrefs. Is it poflible that he mould 
 not mentally apoftrophife this elevated mortal, and afk, " What 
 has made thee to differ from me ?" If no fuch fentiment pafs 
 through his mind, it is a proof that the corrupt inftitutions of 
 fociety have already diverted him of all fenfe of juftice. The 
 more fimple and direct is his character, the more certainly will 
 thefe fentiments occur. What anfwer fhall we return to his 
 enquiry ? That the well being of fociety requires men to be 
 treated otherwife than according to their intrinfic merit ? Whe- 
 
 late yours and be the ftandard of your fentiments." " The refpect we owe to 
 our father and mother is a fort of -worjhip, as the phrafe filial piety implies." 
 «' Ce que -vous devez aimer avant met fans aucutie comparaifon, ce font ceux a qui vous 
 dtvez la vie." " Leur conduit e doit regler la votre et fixer votre opinion." " Le 
 fefpccl que nous devons a notre pere et a notre mere ejl un cuke, com me I'exprime le 
 mot piete filiale." Lemons d'utie Gouvernante, Tome I. 
 
 4 • ther 
 
OF SUBJECTS. 429 
 
 ther he be fatisfied with this anfwer or no, will he not afpire to BOOK v. 
 
 r CHAP. VI. 
 
 poffefs that (which in this inftance is wealth) to which the ' « ' 
 
 policy of mankind has annexed fuch high diftinction ? Is it not 
 indifpenfible, that, before he believes in the rectitude of this 
 inftitution, his original feelings of right and wrong mould be 
 wholly reverfed ? If it be indifpenfible, then let the advocate of 
 the monarchical fyftem ingenuoufly declare, tbat, according to 
 that fyftem, the intereft of fociety in the firft inftance requires 
 the total fubverfion of all principles of moral truth and juftice. 
 
 "With this view let us again recollect the maxim adopted in 
 monarchical countries, " that the king never dies." Thus with 
 true oriental extravagance we falute this imbecil mortal, " O king, 
 live for ever !" Why do we this ? Becaufe upon his exiftence the 
 exiftence of the ftate depends. In his name the courts of law 
 are opened. If his political capacity be fufpended for a moment 
 the centre to which all public bufinefs is linked, is deftroyed. In 
 fuch countries £very thing is uniform : the ceremony is all, and 
 the fubftance nothing. In the riots in the year 1780 the mace 
 of the houfe of lords was propofed to be fent into the paffages 
 by the terror of its appearance to quiet the confufion ; but it 
 was obferved that, if the mace mould be rudely detained by the 
 rioters, the whole would be thrown into anarchy. Bufinefs 
 would be at a ftand, their infignia, and with their infignia their 
 legiflative and deliberative functions be gone. Who can expect 
 firmnefs and energy in a country, where every thing is made to 
 
 depend 
 
430 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 ch^ap vi depend not u P on juftice, public intereft and reafon, but upon a 
 
 v * ' piece of gilded wood ? What confcious dignity and virtue can 
 
 there be among a people, who, if deprived of the imaginary 
 guidance of one vulgar mortal, are taught to believe that their 
 faculties are benumbed, and all their joints unftrung ? 
 
 4. pufiiiani- Laftly, one of the moft eflfential ingredients in a virtuous 
 
 mity. 
 
 character is undaunted firmnefs ; and nothing can more power- 
 fully tend to deftroy this principle than the fpirit of a monarchi- 
 cal government. The firft leflbn of virtue is, Fear no man ; the 
 firft lefTon of fuch a conftitution is, Fear the king. The firft 
 leflbn of virtue is, Obey no man*; the firft leflbn of monarchy 
 is, Obey the king. The true intereft of mind demands the 
 annihilation of all factitious and imaginary diftinctions ; it is 
 infeparable from monarchy to fupport and render them more 
 palpable than ever. He that cannot fpeak to the proudeft defpot 
 with a confcioufnefs that he is a man fpeaking to a man, and a 
 determination to yield him no fuperiority to which his inherent 
 qualifications do not entitle him, is wholly incapable of fublime 
 virtue. How many fuch men are bred within the pale of monar- 
 chy? How long would monarchy maintain its ground in a 
 nation of fuch men ? Surely it would be the wifdom of fociety, 
 inftead of conjuring up a thoufand phantoms to induce us into 
 error, inftead of furrounding us with a thoufand fears to deprive 
 
 * Book III, Chap. VI. 
 
 113 
 
OF SUBJECTS. 43I 
 
 us of true energy, to remove every obftacle and fmooth the path BOOK v. 
 
 OJ J r CHAP. VI. 
 
 of improvement. ' . ' 
 
 Virtue was never yet held in much honour and efteem in a Moral incre- 
 dulity of mo- 
 monarchical country. It is the inclination and the intereft of narehicai 
 
 countries. 
 
 courtiers and kings to bring it into difrepute ; and they are but 
 too fuccefsful in the attempt. Virtue is in their conception 
 arrogant, intrufive, unmanageable and ftubborn. It is an af- 
 fumed outfide, by which thofe who pretend to it intend to 
 gratify their rude tempers or their fecret views. Within the 
 circle of monarchy virtue is always regarded with difhonourable 
 incredulity. The philofophical fyftem which affirms felf love to 
 be the firft mover of all our actions and the falfity of human 
 virtues, is the growth of thefe countries *. Why is it that the 
 language of integrity and public fpirit is conMntly regarded 
 among us as hypocrify ? It was not always thus. It was not till 
 the ufurpation of Caefar, that books were written by the tyrant 
 and his partifans to prove that Cato was no better than a fnarling 
 pretender f. 
 
 There is a farther <confi deration, which has feldom been injuflioe of 
 adverted to upon this fubjedt, but which feems to be of no in- 
 
 * MaximeSj par M. le Due de la Rochefoucault : De la Fntijfete dct Vertus 
 Humaines, par M. Efprit. 
 
 t See Plutarch's Lives ; Lives of Csefar and Cicero : Ckcrcnis EpijloU ad 
 Atticurn, Lib. XII. Epijt. XL, XLI. 
 
 confiderable 
 
43 2 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 BOOK V. confiderable importance. In our definition of juftice it appeared 
 CHAP. VI. r J rr 
 
 * v ' that our debt to our fellow men extended to all the efforts we could 
 
 make for their welfare, and all the relief we could fupply to 
 their neceffities. Not a talent do we pofTefs, not a moment of 
 time, not a (hilling of property, for which we are not refponfible 
 at the tribunal of the public, which we are not obliged to pay into 
 the general bank of common advantage. Of every one of thefe 
 things there is an employment which is beft, and that beft juftice 
 obliges us to felect. But how extenfive is the confequence of 
 this principle with refpect to the luxuries and orientation of 
 human life ? Are there many of thefe luxuries that will ftand 
 the teft, and approve themfelves upon examination to be the beft 
 objects upon which our property can be employed ? Will it often 
 come out to be true, that hundreds of individuals ought to be 
 fubjected to the fevereft and moft incefTant labour, that one man 
 may fpend in idlenefs what would afford to the general mafs eaie, 
 leifure, and confequently wifdom ? 
 
 of the inor- Whoever frequents the habitation of the luxurious will 
 miration of fpeedily be infected with the vices of luxury. The minifters 
 and attendants of afovereign, accuftomed to the trappings of 
 magnificence, will turn with difdain from the merit that is 
 obfcured with the clouds of adverfity. In vain may virtue plead, 
 in vain may talents folicit diftinction, if poverty feem to the 
 faftidious fenfe of the man in place to envelop them as it were 
 
 with 
 
 ealth. 
 
O? SUBJECTS. 433 
 
 with its noifome effluvia. The vcrv lacquey knows how to B °0K V. 
 
 ^ ' CHAP. VI. 
 
 repel unfortunate merit from the great man's door. 
 
 Here then we are prefented with the lellbn which is loudlv 
 and perpetually read through all the haunts of monarchy. 
 Money is the great requifite for the want of which nothing can 
 atone. Diftinction, the homage and efteem of mankind, are to 
 he bought, not earned. The rich man need not trouble himfelf 
 to invite them, they come unbidden to his furly door. Rarely 
 indeed does it happen, that there is any crime that gold cannot 
 expiate, any bafenefs and meannefs of character that wealth can- 
 not cover with oblivion. Money therefore is the only object 
 worthy of your purfuit, and it is of little importance by what 
 finifter and unmanly means, fo it be but obtained. 
 
 It is true that virtue and talents do not (land in need of the 
 great man's affiftance, and might, if they did but know their 
 worth, repay his fcorn with a juft and enlightened pity. But 
 unfortunately they are too often ignorant of their ftrength, and 
 adopt the errors they fee univerfally efpoufed in the world. Were 
 it otherwife, they would indeed be happier, but the general 
 manners would probably remain the fame. The general manners 
 are fafhioned by the form and fpirit of the national government ; 
 and, if in extraordinary cafes they become difcordant, they 
 fpeedily fubvert it. 
 
 The evils indeed that arife out of avarice, an inordinate admi- 
 
 3 K ration 
 
434 OF SUBJECTS. 
 
 j? T 9?£ Y,'r ration of wealth and an intemperate purfuit of it, are fo obviousi 
 
 CHAP. VI. ' 
 
 * « ' that they have constituted a perpetual topic of lamentation and> 
 
 complaint. The object in this place is to confider how far they 
 are extended and aggravated by a monarchical government, that 
 is, by a conftitution the very efTenee of which is to accumu- 
 late enormous wealth upon a fingle head, and to render the 
 orientation of fplendour the chofen inftrument for fecuring 
 honour and veneration. The object is to confider in what 
 degree the luxury of courts, the effeminate foftnefs of favourites $ 
 the fyftem, never to be feparated from the monarchical form, of 
 putting men's approbation and good word at a price, of individuals 
 buying the favour of government, and government buying the 
 favour of individuals, is injurious to the moral improvement of 
 mankind. As long as the unvarying practice of courts is cabal, 
 and as long as the unvarying tendency of cabal is to bear down 
 talents, and difcourage virtue, to recommend cunning in the 
 room of fincerity, a fervile and fupple difpohtion in pre- 
 ference to firmnefs and inflexibility, a convenient morality as 
 better than a ftrict one, and the ftudy of the red book of promo-r 
 tion rather than the ftudy of general welfare, fo long will 
 monarchy be the bitterefi and moll potent of all the adverfaries 
 of the true, interefts of mankind. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
t 435 3 
 C H A P. vn. 
 
 OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 
 
 DISORDERS ATTENDANT ON SUCH AN ELECTION. — ELEC- 
 TION IS INTENDED EITHER TO PROVIDE A MAN OF 
 GREAT OR OF MODERATE TALENTS. — CONSEQUENCES OF 
 
 THE FIRST — OF THE SECOND. CAN ELECTIVE AND 
 
 HEREDITARY MONARCHY BE COMBINED? 
 
 H 
 
 AVING confidered the nature of monarchy in general, it BOOK V. 
 
 J _ b m CHAP. VII. 
 is incumbent on us to examine how far its mifchiefs may ' ' 
 
 Di (orders at- 
 
 be qualified by rendering the monarchy elective. tendant on 
 
 * J b ' fuch an elec- 
 
 tion. 
 
 One of the moft obvious objections to this remedy is the 
 difficulty that attends upon the conduct of fuch an election. 
 There are machines that are too mighty for the human hand 
 to conduct ; there are proceedings that are too gigantic and 
 unwieldy for human inftitutions to regulate. The diftance 
 between the mafs of mankind and a fovereign is fo immenfe, 
 the truft to be confided fo ineftimably great, the temptations of 
 the object to be decided on fo alluring, as to fet every paflion 
 that can vex the mind in tumultous conflict. Election will 
 therefore either dwindle into an empty form, a conge a Hire with 
 the fuccefsful candidate's name at full length in the conclufion, 
 
 ^ K 2 an 
 
436 OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK v. an election perpetually continued in the fame family, perhaps in 
 
 CHAP. VII. f f . !■> r r 
 
 v * ' the fame lineal order of defcent ; or will become the fignal of a 
 
 thoufand calamities, foreign cabal and domeftic war. Thefe 
 evils have been fo generally underftood, that elective monarchy 
 in the ftrict fenfe of that appellation has very few advocates. 
 
 Rouffeau, who in his advice to the Polifh nation appears 
 to be one of thofe few, that is, one of thofe who without 
 loving monarchy conceive an elective fovereignty greatly pre- 
 ferable to an hereditary one, endeavours to provide againft the 
 diforders of an election by introducing into it a fpecies of forti- 
 tion*. In another part of the prefent enquiry it will be our 
 bufinefs to examine how far chance and the decifion by lot are 
 compatible with the principles either of found morality or fober 
 reafon. For the prefent it will be fufficient to fay, that the pro- 
 ject of Rouffeau will probably fall under one part of the follow- 
 ing dilemma, and of confequence will be refuted by the fame 
 arguments that bear upon the mode of election in its moft 
 obvious idea* 
 
 The defign The defign with which election can be introduced into the 
 
 of election is < m 
 
 either to pro- conftitution of a monarchy muft either be that of raifmg to the 
 
 vide an of- 
 ficer of great kingly office a man of fuperlative talents and uncommon genius, 
 
 or of mode- 
 rate talents, or of providing a moderate portion of wifdom and good inten- 
 tion for the difcharge of thefe functions, and preventing them 
 
 * Confiderations fur U Gouvernement de Pologne, Chap. VIII. 
 
 8 from 
 
OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 437 
 
 from falling to the lot of perfons of notorious imbecility. To BOOK v. 
 b r } CHAP.VII. 
 
 the firft of thefe defigns it will be objected by many, " that ^""p ' 
 
 genius is frequently nothing more in the hands of its pofTelTor q^Rcesof 
 than an inftrument for accomplishing the moft pernicious inten- 
 tions." And, though in this affertion there is much partial and 
 miftaken exaggeration, it cannot however be denied that genius, 
 fuch as we find it amidft the prefent imperfections of mankind, 
 is compatible with very ferious and effential errors. If then 
 genius can by temptations of various forts be led into practical 
 miftake, may we not reafonably entertain a fear refpecting the 
 effect of that fituation which of all others is moft pregnant with 
 temptation ? If confiderations of inferior note be apt to mis- 
 lead the mind, what fhall we think of this moft intoxicating 
 draught, of a condition fuperior to reftraint, ftripped of all thofe 
 accidents and viciflitudes from which the morality of human 
 beings has flowed, with no falutary check, with no intellectual 
 warfare where mind meets mind on equal terms, but perpetually 
 furrounded with fycophants, fervants and dependents ? To 
 fuppofe a mind in which genius and virtue arc united and per- 
 manent, is alfo undoubtedly to fuppofe fomething which no cal- 
 culation will teach us to expect fhould offer upon every vacancy. 
 And, if the man could be found, we muft imagine to ourfelves 
 electors almoft as virtuous as the elected, or elfe error and pre- 
 judice, faction and intrigue will render his election at leaft pre- 
 carious, perhaps improbable. Add to this that it is fufficiently 
 evident from the unalterable evils of monarchy already enume- 
 rated „ 
 
438 OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK V. rated, and which I fhall prefently have occafion to recapitulate, 
 
 CHAP.VII. ' ... r 
 
 1 » ' that the firft act of fovereignty in a virtuous monarch, whofe 
 
 difcernment was equal to his virtue, would be to annihilate the 
 
 conftitution, which had raifed him to a throne. 
 
 ofthefecond. But we will fuppofe the purpofe of inftituting an elective 
 monarchy not to be that of conftantly filling the throne with a 
 man of fublime genius, but merely to prevent the fovereignty from 
 falling to the lot of perfons of notorious mental imbecility. Such 
 is the flrange and pernicious nature of monarchy, that it may be 
 doubted whether this be a benefit. Wherever monarchy exifts, 
 courts and adminiftrations rauft, as long as men can fee only 
 with their eyes and act only with their hands, be its conftant 
 attendants. But thefe have already appeared to be inflitutions 
 fo mifchievous, that perhaps one of the greateft injuries that can 
 be done to mankind is to perfuade them of their innocence. 
 Under the moft virtuous defpot favour and intrigue, the unjuft 
 exaltation of one man and depreflion of another will not fail to 
 exift. Under the moft virtuous defpot the true fpring there is 
 in mind, the defire to pofiefs merit, and the confcioufnefs that 
 merit will not fail to make itfelf perceived by thofe around it, 
 and through their efteem to rife to its proper fphere, will be cut 
 off; and mean and factitious motives be fubftituted in its rooifi. 
 Of what confequence is it that my merit is perceived by mortals 
 who have no power to advance it ? The monarch, fhut up in 
 his fanctuary and furrounded with formalities, will never hear of 
 
 it. 
 
OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 459 
 
 it. How fhould he ? Can he know what is paffing in the Jj?P™ ™j 
 
 remote corners of his kingdom ? Can he trace the firft timid ' ' 
 
 bloffoms of genius and virtue ? The people themfelves will lofe 
 their difcernment of thefe things, becaufe they will perceive 
 their difcernment to be powerlefs in effects. The offspring of 
 mind is daily facrificed by hecatombs to the genius of monarchy. 
 The feeds of reafon and truth become barren and unproductive 
 in this unwholefome climate. And the example perpetually 
 exhibited of the preference of wealth and craft over integrity and 
 talents, produces the moil powerful effects upon that mafs of 
 mankind, who at firfi; fight may appear Ieaft concerned in the 
 objects of generous ambition. This mifchief, to whatever it 
 amounts, becomes more ftrongly fattened upon us under a good 
 monarch than under a bad one. In the latter cafe it only 
 reftrains our efforts by violence, in the former it feduces our 
 understandings. To palliate the defects and fkin over the 
 deformity of what is fundamentally wrong, is certainly very 
 perilous, perhaps very fatal to the bed interefts of mankind. 
 
 A queftion has been ftarted, whether it be pcflible to blend Candiaive 
 1 r n anc j heredi- 
 
 elective and hereditary monarchy, and the conftitution of *■**? monar - 
 
 ' J 7 chy be corn- 
 
 England has been cited as an example of this poffibility. What bined • 
 
 was it that the parliament effected at the revolution, and when 
 
 they fettled the fucceflion upon the houfe of Hanover ? They 
 
 elected not an individual, but a new race of men to fill the 
 
 throne of thefe kingdoms. They gave a practical inftance of 
 
 their. 
 
44 o OF ELECTIVE MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK V. their power upon extraordinary emergencies to change the 
 fucceffion. At the fame time however that they effected this in- 
 action, they denied it in words. They employed the ftrongeft 
 expreffions that language could furnifh to bind themfelves, their 
 heirs and pofierity for ever to adhere to this fettlement. They 
 confidered the prefent as an emergence, which, taking into the 
 account the precautions and reftrittions they had provided, could 
 never occur again. 
 
 In reality what fort of fovereignty is that which is partly 
 hereditaiy and partly elective ? That the acceffion of a family or 
 race of men mould originally be a matter of election has nothing 
 particular in it. All government is founded in opinion ; and 
 undoubtedly fome fort of election, made by a body of electors 
 more or lefs extenfive, originated every new eftablifhment. To 
 whom in this amphibious government does the fovereignty 
 belong upon the death of the firft pofleflbr ? To his heirs and 
 defcendants. What fort of choice fhall that be confidered, which 
 is made of a man half a centuiy before he begins to exift ? By 
 what defignation does he fucceed ? Undoubtedly by that of 
 hereditary defcent. A king of England therefore holds his crown 
 independently, or, as it has been energetically exprefTed, " in con- 
 tempt" of the choice of the people *. 
 
 * This argument is ftated with great copioufnefs and irrefiftible force of 
 reafoning by Mr. Burke towards the beginning of his Reflections on the Revo- 
 lution in France. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
r 4+1 i 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 LIABLE TO MOST OF THE PRECEDING OBJECTIONS — TO 
 FARTHER OBJECTIONS PECULIAR TO ITSELF. — RESPON- 
 SIBILITY CONSIDERED. — MAXIM, THAT THE KING CAN 
 DO NO WRONG. — FUNCTIONS OF A LIMITED MONARCH. — 
 IMPOSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE NEUTRALITY RE- 
 QUIRED. — OF THE DISMISSION OF MINISTERS. — RESPON- 
 SIBILITY OF MINISTERS. — APPOINTMENT OF MINISTERS, 
 ITS IMPORTANCE — ITS DIFFICULTIES. RECAPITULA- 
 TION. — STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE HUMAN 
 SPECIES. 
 
 I PROCEED to confider monarchy, not as it exifts in BOOK V. 
 '■ CHAP. VIII. 
 countries where it is unlimited and defpotic, but, as in cer- * « ' 
 
 tain inftances it has appeared, a branch merely of the general 
 
 conftitution. 
 
 Here it is only neceflary to recollect the objections which Liable to 
 
 molt of the 
 
 applied to it in its unqualified ftate, in order to perceive that they preceding 
 
 objections: 
 
 bear upon it with the fame explicitnefs, if not with equal force, 
 under every pofllble modification. Still the government is 
 
 3 L founded 
 
442 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK v. founded in faluhood, affirming that a certain individual is emi- 
 
 CHAP.VIIf. ' ° 
 
 v « ' nently qualified for an important fituation, whofe qualifications 
 
 are perhaps fcarcely fuperior to thofe of the meaner! member of 
 the community. Still the government is founded in injuftice, 
 becaufe it raifes one man for a permanent duration over the heads 
 of the reft of the community, not for any moral recommenda=- 
 tion he poflefles, but arbitrarily and by accident. Still it reads 
 a conftant and powerful leHbn of immorality to the people at 
 large, exhibiting pomp and fplendour and magnificence inftead 
 of virtue, as the index to general veneration and efteem. The 
 individual is, not lefs than in the moft abfolute monarchy, 
 unfitted by his education to become either refpectable or ufeful. 
 He is unjuftly and cruelly placed in a fituation that engenders 
 ignorance, weaknefs and prefumption, after having been ftripped 
 in his infancy of all the energies that fhould defend him againft 
 the inroads of thefe adverfaries. Finally, his exiftence implies 
 that of a train of courtiers and a feries of intrigue, of fervility, 
 fecret influence, capricious partialities and pecuniary corruption. 
 So true is the obfervation of Montefquieu, that " we mull not 
 expect under a monarchy to find the people virtuous*." 
 
 to farther B u t [f we confider the queftion more narrowly, we fhatl 
 
 objections 
 
 peculiar to perhaps find, that limited monarchy has other abfurdities and 
 itfelf. r r » „ j 
 
 vices which are peculiarly its own. In an abfolute fovereignty 
 
 * " // n'ejl pas rare qitil y ait des princes vertueux ; mats il eji tret difficile dans 
 une monarchic que le peuple lefoii." Efprit des Loix y Liv. Ill, Chap, F. 
 
 the 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 443 
 
 the kino: may if he pleafe be his own minifter: but in a li- BOOK v. 
 ° J r ' chap, vii r. 
 
 mited one a miniftry and a cabinet are eflential parts of the ' * ' 
 
 constitution. In an abfolute Sovereignty princes are acknow- 
 ledged to be refponfible only to God ; but in a limited one there 
 is a refponfibility of a very different nature. In a limited 
 monarchy there are checks, one branch of the government 
 counteracting the exceffes of another, and a check without 
 refponfibility is the moll flagrant of all contradictions. 
 
 There is no fubject that deferves to be more maturely con- R e r P onfi- 
 fidered than this of refponfibility. To be refponfible is to be fidered. 
 liable to be called into an open judicature, where the accufer 
 and the defendant produce their allegations and evidence on 
 equal terms. Every thing fhort of this is mockery. Every 
 thing that would give to either party any other influence 
 than that of truth and virtue is fubverfive of the great ends 
 of juftice. He that is arraigned of any crime mufl defcend 
 a private individual to the level plain of juftice. If he can 
 bias the fentiments of his judges by his pofleflion of power, 
 or by any compromife previous to his refignation, or by 
 the mere fympathy excited in his fucceflbrs, who will not 
 be fevere in their cenfures, left they fhould be treated with 
 feverity in return, he cannot truly be faid to be refponfible at 
 all. From the honeft infolence of defpotifm we may perhaps 
 promife ourfelves better effects, than from the hypocritical dif- 
 claimers of a limited government. Nothing can be more per- 
 nicious than falfhood, and no falfhood can be more palpable 
 
 3 L 2 than 
 
444 0F LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK V. than that which pretends to put a weapon into the hands of the 
 
 * * ' general intereft, which conftantiy proves blunt and powerlefs in 
 
 the very act to ftrike. 
 
 Maxim, that It was a confufed feeling of thefe truths, that introduced into 
 
 the king can 
 
 do no wrong, limited monarchies the principle "that the king can do no 
 wrong." Obferve the peculiar confiftency of this proceeding. 
 Confider what a fpecimen it affords us of plain dealing, frank- 
 nefs and unalterable fmcerity. An individual is firft appointed^ 
 and endowed with the moft momentous prerogatives, and then 
 it is pretended that, not he, but other men are anfwerable for the 
 abufe of thefe prerogatives. This pretence may appear tolerable 
 to men bred among the fictions of law, but juftice, truth and 
 virtue revolt from it with indignation. 
 
 Functions of Having firft invented this fiction, it becomes the bufinefs of 
 
 a limited 
 
 monarch. fuch conftitutions as nearly as poflible to realife it. A miniftry 
 muft be regularly formed ; they muft concert together ; and the 
 meafures they execute muft originate in their own difcretion. 
 The king muft be reduced as nearly as poffible to a cypher. So 
 far as he fails to be completely fo, the conftitution muft be 
 imperfect. 
 
 What fort of figure is it that this miferable wretch exhibits in 
 the face of the world ? Every thing is with great parade tranf- 
 a£ted in his name. He aftumes all the inflated and oriental ftyle 
 which has been already defcribed, and which indeed was upon 
 
 that 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 445 
 
 that occafion tranfcribed from the practice of a limited monarchy. BOOK v. 
 
 We find him like Pharaoh's frogs " in our houfes and upon our ' » ' 
 
 beds, in our ovens and our kneading troughs." 
 
 Now obferve the man himfelf to whom all this importance is 
 annexed. To be idle is the abftract of all his duties. He is 
 paid an immenfe revenue only to dance and to eat, to wear a 
 fcarlet robe and a crown. He may not choofe any one of his 
 meafures. He muft liften with docility to the confultations of 
 his miniflers, and fanction with a ready aflent whatever they 
 determine. He muft not hear any other advifers, for they are 
 his known and conftitutional counfellors. He muft not exprefs 
 to any man his opinion, for that would be a finifter and un- 
 conftitutional interference. To be abfolutely perfect he muft 
 have no opinion, but be the vacant and colourlefs mirror by 
 which theirs is reflected. He fpeaks, for they have taught him 
 what he fhould fay ; he affixes his fignature, for they inform 
 him that it is neceflary and proper. 
 
 A limited monarchy in the articles I have defcribed might be ImpofiibiKty 
 
 of maintain- 
 
 executed with great facility and applaufe, if a king were what ing the neu- 
 trality re- 
 fuch a conftitution endeavours to render him, a mere puppet quired. 
 
 regulated by pulltes and wires. But it is perhaps the moft 
 
 egregious and palpable of all political miftakes to imagine that 
 
 we can reduce a human being to this ftate of neutrality and 
 
 torpor. He will not exert any ufeful and true activity, but he 
 
 6 will 
 
446 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK V. w ill be far from paflive. The more he is excluded from that 
 
 CHAP. VIII. r 
 
 * * ' energy that chara&erifes wifdom and virtue, the more depraved 
 
 and unreafonable will he be in his caprices. Is any promotion 
 vacant, and do we expecT: that he will never think of beftowing 
 it on a favourite, or of proving by an occafional election of his 
 own that he really exifts ? This promotion may happen to be of 
 the utmoft importance to the public welfare ; or, if not ; — every 
 promotion unmeritedly given is pernicious to national virtue, and 
 an upright minifter will refufe to aflent to it. A king does not 
 fail to hear his power and prerogatives extolled, and he will no 
 doubt at fome time wifh to effay their reality in an unprovoked 
 war againft a foreign nation or againft his own citizens. 
 
 To fuppofe that a king and his minifters fhould through a 
 period of years agree in their genuine fentiments upon every 
 public topic, is what human nature in no degree authorifes. 
 This is to attribute to the king talents equal to thofe of the moft 
 enlightened ftatefmen, or at leaft to imagine him capable of 
 underftanding all their projects, and comprehending all their 
 views. It is to fuppofe him unfpoiled by education, undebauched 
 by rank, and with a mind ingenuoufly difpofed to receive the 
 impartial leflbns of truth. 
 
 Of thedif- « B u t if they difagree, the king can choofe other minifters." 
 
 miffion of 
 
 fters. \y e fhall prefently have occafion to confider this prerogative in 
 a general view j let us for the prefent examine it in its applica- 
 tion 
 
 mini 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 447 
 
 tion to the differences that may occur between the fovereisn and BOOK v. 
 
 ' D chap, vii r. 
 
 his fervants. It is an engine for ever fufpended over the heads ' * ' 
 
 of the latter to perfuade them to depart from the fternnefs of 
 their integrity. The compliance that the king demands from 
 them is perhaps at firft but fmall ; and the minifter, ftrongly 
 preffed, thinks it better to facrifice his opinion in this inferior 
 point than to facrifice his office. One compliance of this fort 
 leads on to another, and he that began perhaps only with the 
 preference of an unworthy candidate for diftinction ends with the 
 moft atrocious political guilt. The more we confider this point, the 
 greater will its magnitude appear. It will rarely happen but that 
 the minifter will be more dependent for his exiftence on the king, 
 than the king upon his minifter. When it is othenvife, there will be 
 a mutual compromife, and both in turn will part with every thing 
 that is firm, generous, independent and honourable in man. 
 
 And in the mean time what becomes of refponfibility ? The Refponfibf- 
 meafures are mixed and confounded as to their fource, beyond ftcrs. 
 the power of human ingenuity to unravel. Refponfibility is in 
 reality impoffible. "Far otherwife," cries the advocate of 
 monarchical government : " it is true that the meafures are partly 
 thofe of the king and partly thofe of the minifter, but the mini- 
 fter is refponfible for all." Where is the juftice of that ? It 
 were better to leave guilt wholly without cenfure, than to 
 condemn a man for crimes of which, he is innocent. In this 
 cafe the grand criminal efcapes with impunity, and the feverity 
 
 of 
 
448 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 £??r}^7rr °f tne law falls wholly upon his coadjutors. The coadjutors 
 
 CHAP. VIII. J J 
 
 v » ' receive that treatment which conftitutes the effence of all bad 
 
 policy : punifhment is profufely menaced againft them, and 
 antidote is wholly forgotten. They are propelled to vice by 
 irrefiftible temptations, the love of power and the defire to retain 
 it ; and then cenfured with a rigour altogether difproportioned 
 to their fault. The vital principle of the fociety is tainted with 
 injuftice, and the fame neglect of equity and partial refpect of 
 perfons will extend itfelf over the whole. 
 
 Appoint- I proceed to confider that prerogative in limited monarchy, 
 
 ment of mi- , . 
 
 nifters, its which, whatever others _may be given or denied, is mfeparable 
 
 importance. ' . 
 
 from its fubftance, the prerogative of the king to nominate to 
 public offices. If any thing be of importance, furely this rauft 
 be of importance, that fuch a nomination be made with wifdom 
 and integrity, that the fitteft perfons be appointed to the highefl 
 trufts the ftate has to confer, that an honeft and generous ambi- 
 tion be cherifhed, and that men who mail moft ardently qualify 
 themfelves for the care of the public welfare be fecure of having 
 the largeft fhare in its fuperintendence. 
 
 Its difficul- This nomination is a moft arduous talk, and requires the 
 
 warieft circumfpection. It approaches more nearly than any 
 other affair of political fociety to the exercife of difcretion. In 
 all other cafes the line of rectitude feems viable and diftinct. 
 Juftice in the contefts of individuals, juftice in queftions of peace 
 
 and 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 449 
 
 and war, juftice in the ordination of law, will not cbftinately l^OOK v. 
 ' J ' i chap. VIII. 
 
 withdraw itfelf from the refearch of an impartial and judicious ' » ' 
 
 enquirer. But to obferye the various portions of capacity 
 fcattered through a nation, and minutely ; to decide among the 
 qualifications of innumerable pretenders, muft after all our 
 accuracy be committed to fame degree of uncertainty. 
 
 The firft difficulty that occurs is to difcover thofe whom 
 genius and ability have made in the beft fenfe candidates for the 
 office. Ability is not always intrufive j talents are often to 
 be found in the remotenefs of a village, or the obfcurity of a 
 garret. And, though felf confcioufnefs and felf pofleffion are to 
 a certain degree the attributes of genius, yet there are many 
 things befide falfe modefty, that may teach its pofleffor to fhun 
 the air of a court. 
 
 Of all men a king is leaft qualified to penetrate thefe recefles, 
 and difcover merit in its hiding place. Encumbered with forms, 
 he cannot mix at large in the fociety of his fpecies. He is too 
 much engroffed with the femblance of bufinefs or. a fucceffion of 
 amufements to have leifure for fuch obfervations as mould 
 afford a juft eftimate of men's characters. In reality the talk is 
 too mighty for any individual, and the benefit can only be 
 fecured by the mode of election. 
 
 Other difadvantages attendant on this prerogative of choofing 
 
 3 M his 
 
tlOIU 
 
 450 OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 BOOK V. hi s own miniflers it is needlefs to enumerate. If enough have 
 
 CHAP.V1II. & 
 
 * » ' not been already faid to explain the character of a monarch as 
 
 growing out of the functions with which he is inverted, a 
 laboured repetition in this place would be both tedious and vain. 
 If there be any dependence to be placed upon the operation of 
 moral caufes, a king will in almoft every inftance be found 
 among the moil undifcriminating, the moft deceived, the leaft 
 informed and the leaft heroically difinterefted of mankind.. 
 
 Recapltula- Such then is the genuine and uncontrovertible fcene of a; 
 mixed monarchy. An individual placed at the fummit of the. 
 edifice, the centre and the fountain of honour,, and who is 
 neutral, or mull feem neutral in the current tranfactions of 
 his government. This is the firfl Teflon of honour, virtue and 
 truth, which mixed monarchy reads to its fubjects, Next 
 to the king come his adminiftration and the tribe of courtiers - y 
 men driven by a fatal neceflity to be. corrupt, intriguing and 
 venal; felected for their truft by the moft ignorant and ill 
 informed of their countrymen - y made folely accountable for 
 meafures of which they cannot folely be the authors j threat- 
 ened, if difhoneft, with the vengeance of an injured people ;, 
 and, if honeft, with the furer vengeance of their fovereign's- 
 difpleafure. The reft of the nation, the fubje&s at large 
 
 Was ever a name fo fraught with degradation and meannefs as- 
 this of fubjects ? I am, it feems, by the very place of my birth 
 
 become 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. • 45 t 
 
 become a fubject. Of what, or whom ? Can an honed man „ B0 ° K ..y.' 
 
 L. I'i .A i . \ 111. 
 
 confider himfelf as the fubject of any thing but the laws of juflice ? ' * ' 
 
 Can he acknowledge a fuperior, or hold himfelf bound to fubmit 
 his judgment to the will of another, not lefs liable than himfelf 
 to prejudice and error ? Such is the idol that monarchy worfhips 
 tn lieu of the divinity of truth and the facred obligation of 
 public good, It is of little confequence whether we vovr 
 fidelity to the king and the nation, or to the nation and the king, 
 fo long as the king intrudes himfelf to tarnifh and undermine 
 the true fimplicity, the altar of virtue. 
 
 Are mere names beneath our notice, and will they produce 
 no finifter influence upon the mind ? May we bend the knee 
 before the flirine of vanity and folly without injury ? Far other- 
 wife. Mind had its beginning in fenfation, and it depends upon 
 words and fymbols for the progrefs of its aflbciations. The true 
 good man muft not only have a heart refolved, but a front 
 ere&. We cannot praclife abjection, hypocrify and meannefs, 
 without becoming degraded in other men's eyes and in our own. 
 We cannot " bow the head in the temple of Rimmon," without 
 in fome degree apoftatiling from the divinity of truth. He that 
 calls a king a man, will perpetually hear from his own mouth 
 the leflbn, that he is unlit for the trull repofed in him : he that 
 calls him by any fublimer appellation, is haftening fall into the 
 moll palpable and dangerous errors. 
 
 3 M 2 But 
 
45 2 GF LIMITED MONARCHY. 
 
 CHAP^vm But P eraa P s " mankind are fo weak and imbecil, that it is in 
 ^T"^"^ vain to expect from the change of their inftitutions the improve- 
 weaknefsof ment f ^^ cnara ft er> " Who made them weak and imbecil ? 
 
 the human 
 
 fpecies. Previously to human inftitutions they had certainly none of this 
 
 defect. Man confidered in himfelf is merely a being capable of 
 impreffion, a recipient of perceptions. What is there in this 
 ' abftradt character that precludes him from advancement ? We 
 have a faint difcovery in individuals at prefent of what our 
 nature is capable : why fhould individuals be fit for fo much, 
 and the fpecies for nothing ? Is there any thing in the ftructure 
 of the globe that forbids us to be virtuous ? If no, if nearly all 
 our impreflions of right and wrong flow from our intercourfe 
 with each other, why may not that intercourfe be fufceptible of 
 modification and amendment ? It is the moll cowardly of all 
 fyftems that would reprefent the difcovery of truth as ufelefs, 
 and teach us that, when difcovered, it is our wifdom to leave 
 the mafs of our fpecies in error* 
 
 There is not in reality the fmalleffc room for fcepticifm refpedV 
 ing the omnipotence of truth. Truth is the pebble in the lake j 
 and however flowly in the prefent cafe the circles fucceed each 
 other, they will infallibly go on till they overfpread the furface. 
 No order of mankind will for ever remain ignorant of the 
 principles of juftice, equality and public good. No fooner will 
 they underftand them, than they will perceive the coincidence 
 of virtue and public good with private intereft: nor will any 
 
 erroneous 
 
OF LIMITED MONARCHY. 453 
 
 erroneous eftablifhment be able effectually to fupport itfelf BOOK v. 
 
 ' rr chap, vi ir. 
 
 againft general opinion. In this conteft fophiftry will vanifli, ' v ' 
 
 and mifchievous inftitutions fink quietly into neglect. Truth 
 will bring down all her forces, mankind will be her army, and 
 oppreffion, injuftice, monarchy and vice will tumble into a 
 common ruin. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 454 3 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 OF A PRESIDENT WITH REGAL POWERS. 
 
 ENUMERATION OF POWERS — THAT OF APPOINTING TO 
 INFERIOR OFFICES — OF PARDONING OFFENCES — OF 
 CONVOKING DELIBERATIVE ASSEMBLIES — OF AFFIXING 
 A VETO TO THEIR DECREES. — CONCLUSION. — THE TITLE 
 OF KING ESTIMATED. — MONARCHICAL AND ARISTOc 
 CRATICAL SYSTEMS, SIMILARITY OF THEIR EFFECTS. 
 
 „£ v * OTILL monarchy it feems has one refuge left. "We will 
 
 CHAP. IX. ^^ ' ° 
 
 BOOKV. 
 
 :hap. ix 
 
 1 * ' ^— " not," fay fome men, " have an hereditary monarchy, we 
 
 acknowledge that to be an enormous injuftice. We are not 
 
 contented with an elective monarchy, we are not contented with 
 
 a limited one. We admit the office however reduced, if the 
 
 tenure be for life, to be an intolerable grievance. But why not 
 
 have kings, as we have magiftrates and legiflative afiemblies, 
 
 renewable by frequent elections ? We may then change the 
 
 holder of the office as often as we pleafe." « 
 
 Enumera- Let us not be feduced by a mere plaufibility of phrafe, nor 
 
 tion of 
 
 powers: employ words without having reflected on their meaning. 
 
 What 
 
OF A PRESIDENT WITH REGAL POWERS. 455 
 
 What are we to underftand by the appellation, a king ? If the BOOK v. 
 
 office have any meaning, it feems reafonable that the man who v ' 
 
 holds it, mould pofTefs the privilege, either of appointing to 
 certain employments at his own difcretion, or of remitting the 
 decrees of criminal juftice, or of convoking and difmiiling 
 popular affemblies, or of affixing and refufing his fan&ion to the 
 decrees of thofe affemblies. Moft of thefe privileges may claim a 
 refpectable authority in the powers delegated to their prefident 
 by the United States of America. 
 
 Let us however bring thefe ideas to the touchftone of reafon. that of ap- 
 pointing to 
 Nothing can appear more adventurous than the repofing, unlefs inferior 
 
 • /-• r - offices & 
 
 in cafes of abfolute neceffity, the decifion of any afFair of import- 
 ance to the public, in the breaft of one man. But this neceffity 
 will fcarcely be alledged in any of the articles juft enumerated. 
 What advantage does one man pofTefs over a fociety or council 
 of men in any of thefe refpec~ts ? The difadvantages under which 
 he labours are obvious. He is more eafily corrupted, and more 
 eafily mifled. He cannot pofTefs fo many advantages for obtain- 
 ing accurate information. He is abundantly more liable to the 
 attacks of paffion and caprice, of unfounded antipathy to one 
 man and partiality to another, of uncharitable cenfure or blind 
 idolatry. He cannot be always upon his guard ; there will be 
 moments in which the moft exemplary vigilance is liable to 
 fiirprife.. Meanwhile we are placing the fubject in much too 
 6 favourable 
 
45 6 OF A PRESIDENT 
 
 BOOKV. favourable a light. We are fuppofing his intentions to be 
 
 CHAP. IX. & . 
 
 1 « ' upright and juft ; but the contrary of this will be more frequently 
 
 the truth. Where powers beyond the capacity of human nature 
 are intrufted, vices the difgrace of human nature will be en- 
 gendered. Add to this, that the fame reafons, which prove that 
 government, wherever it exifts, mould be directed by the fenfe 
 of the people at large, equally prove that, wherever public 
 officers are neceflary, the fenfe of the whole, or of a body of 
 men mofl nearly approaching in fpirit to the whole, ought to 
 decide on their pretenfions. 
 
 of pardoning Thefe objections are applicable to the moft innocent of the 
 privileges above enumerated, that of appointing to the exercife 
 of certain employments. The cafe will be Hill worfe if we con- 
 fider the other privileges. We fhall have occafion hereafter to 
 examine the propriety of pardoning offences,' confidered inde- 
 pendently of the perfons in whom that power is veiled : but, in 
 the mean time, can any thing be more intolerable than for a 
 fmgle individual to be authorifed, without affigning a reafon, 
 or affigning a reafon upon which no one is allowed to pronounce, 
 to fuperfede the grave decifions of a court of juftice, founded 
 of con- upon a careful and public examination of evidence ? Can any 
 
 berativeaf- thing be more unjuft than for a fingle individual to afTume the 
 function of informing a nation when they are to deliberate, and 
 when they are to ceafe from deliberation ? 
 
 i The 
 
WITH REGAL POWERS. 457 
 
 The remaining privilege is of too iniquitous a nature to be an J!?^ Xz 
 object of much terror. It is not in the compafs of credibility to V"^ ' 
 
 J *■ ' or arhxing a 
 
 conceive, that any people would remain quiet fpectators, while ?* t0 theu " 
 the fenfe of one man was openly and undifguifedly fet againft 
 the fenfe of the national reprefentative in frequent affembly, and 
 fuffered to overpower it. Two or three direct inftances of the 
 exercife of this negative could not fail to annihilate it for ever. 
 Accordingly, wherever it is fuppofed to exift, we find it foftened 
 and nourifhed by the genial dew of pecuniary corruption ; either 
 rendered unneceflary beforehand by a finifter application to the 
 frailty of individual members, or difarmed and made palatable in 
 the fequel by a copious efFufion of venal emollients. If it can in 
 any cafe be endured, it mult be in countries where the degene- 
 rate reprefentative no longer pofleiTes the fympathy of the public, 
 and the haughty prefident is made facred, by the blood of an 
 exalted anceftry which flows through his veins, or the holy oil 
 which the reprefentatives of the Moft High have poured on his 
 head. A common mortal, periodically felected by his fellow- 
 citizens to watch over their interefts, can never be fuppofed to 
 poffefs this ftupendous virtue. 
 
 If there be any truth in thefe reafonings, it inevitably follows CanduGo* 
 that there are no important functions of general fuperintendence 
 that can juftly be delegated to a fingle individual. If the office of 
 a prefident be neceffary, either in a deliberative aflembly or an 
 adminiflrative council, fuppofing fuch a council to exift, his 
 
 3 N employment 
 
45§ 
 
 OF A PRESIDENT 
 
 BOOK v. employment will have relation to the order of their proceedings, 
 CHAP. IX. r J _ . 
 
 and by no means confift in the arbitrary preferring and carrying 
 
 into effect his private decifion. A king, if unvarying ufage can 
 
 have given meaning to a word, defigns a man upon whofe fmgle 
 
 difcretion fome part of the public intereft is made to depend. 
 
 What ufe can there be for fuch a man in an unperverted and 
 
 well ordered ftate ? With refpect to its internal affairs certainly 
 
 none. How far the office can be of advantage in our tranfac- 
 
 tions with foreign governments we fhall hereafter have occafion 
 
 to decide. 
 
 The title of 
 the king . 
 eftimated. 
 
 Let us beware by an unjuflifiable perverfion of terms of con- 
 founding the common underftanding of mankind. A king is 
 the well known and Handing appellation for an office, which, 
 if there be any truth in the arguments of the preceding chapters, 
 has been the bane and the grave of human virtue. Why 
 endeavour to purify and exorcife what is entitled only to execra- 
 tion ? Why not fuffer the term to be as well underftood and as 
 cordially detefted, as the once honourable appellation of tyrant 
 afterwards was among the Greeks ? Why not fuffer it to reft 
 a perpetual monument of the folly, the cowardice and mifery of 
 our fpecies I 
 
 Monarchical IN proceeding from the examination of monarchical to that 
 «ratica'i of ariftocratical government, it is impoffible not to remark that 
 
 there 
 
WITH REGAL POWERS. 45g 
 
 there are feveral difadvantages common to both. One of thefe BOOK v. 
 
 ° CHAP. IX. 
 
 is the creation of a feparate intereft. The benefit of the governed v '* ' 
 
 r ° fyfterr.s, fimi- 
 
 is made to lie on one fide, and the benefit of the governors on la ™^ oftllcir 
 the other. It is to no purpofe to fay that individual intereft 
 accurately underftood will always be found to coincide with 
 general, if it appear in practice, that the opinions and errors of 
 mankind are perpetually feparating them and placing them in 
 oppofition to each other. The more the governors are fixed 
 in a fphere diftinct and diftant from the governed, the more will 
 this error be cherifhed. Theory, in order to produce an 
 adequate effect upon the mind, fhould be favoured, not counter- 
 acted, by practice. What principle in human nature is more 
 univerfally confeffed than felf love, that is, than a propenfity to 
 think individually of a private intereft, to difcriminate and divide 
 objects which the laws of the univerfe have indiffolubly united ? 
 None, unlefs it be the efprit de corps, the tendency of bodies of 
 men to aggrandife themfelves, a fpirit, which, though lefs 
 ardent than felf love, is ftill more vigilant, and not expofed to 
 the accidents of ileep, indifpofition and mortality. Thus it 
 appears that, of all impulfes to a narrow, felf-interefted conduct, 
 thofe afforded by monarchy and ariftocracy are the greateft. 
 
 Nor muft we be too hafty and undiftinguifhing in applying 
 the principle, that individual intereft accurately underftood will 
 always be found to coincide with general. Relatively to indi- 
 viduals confidered as men it is true ; relatively to individuals 
 
 3 N 2 confidered 
 
460 OF A PRESIDENT WITH REGAL POWERS. 
 
 /?u ?« Yv confidered as lords and kings It is falfe. The man will be ferved 
 
 ! v ' by the facrifice of all his little peculium to the public intereft, 
 
 but the king will be annihilated. The firft facrifice that juftice 
 demands at the hand of monarchy and ariftocracy, is that of 
 their immunities and prerogatives. Public intereft dictates the 
 laborious diflemination of truth and the impartial adminiftra- 
 tion of juftice. Kings and lords fubfift only under favour of 
 error and oppreffion. They will therefore refift the progrefs of 
 knowledge and illumination ; the moment the deceit is difpelledj, 
 their occupation is gone.. 
 
 In thus concluding however we are taking for granted that 
 ariftocracy will be found an arbitrary and pernicious inftitution> 
 as monarchy has already appeared to be. It is time that wq 
 ftxould enquire in what degree this is a&ually the cafe.. 
 
 C H A K 
 
E 4*i 1 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 
 
 BIRTH CONSIDERED AS A PHYSICAL CAUSE — AS A MORAL 
 CAUSE. — ARISTOCRATICAL ESTIMATE OF THE HUMAN 
 SPECIES. — EDUCATION OF THE GREAT. — RECAPITULA- 
 TION. 
 
 A 
 
 PRINCIPLE deeply interwoven with both monarchy BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP.x, 
 
 and ariftocracy in their mod flourifhing flate, but molt « „ > 
 
 Bmh con- 
 deeply with the latter, is that of hereditary preheminence. No fidered as a. 
 
 phyfical 
 
 principle can prefent a deeper infult upon reafon and juftice. caufe; 
 Examine the new born fon of a peer and a mechanic. Has 
 nature defignated in different lineaments their future fortune ? 
 Is one of them born with callous hands and an ungainly form ? 
 Can you trace in the other the early promife of genius and 
 underftanding, of virtue and honour ? We have been told indeed 
 that " nature will break out *," and that 
 
 " The eaglet of a valiant neft will quickly tower 
 Up to the region of his fire * ;" 
 
 and the tale was once believed. But mankind will not foon 
 again be perfuaded, that one lineage of human creatures produces 
 beauty and virtue, and another vice. 
 
 * Tragedy of Douglas, A<fl ill. 
 
 Att 
 
4 6 2 OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 
 
 BOOK v. A n aflertion thus bold and unfounded will quickly be refuted 
 chap. x. i / 
 
 v v ' if we confider the queftion a priori. Mind is the creature of 
 
 fenfation ; we have no other inlet of knowledge. What are 
 the fenfations that the lord experiences in his mother's womb, 
 by which his mind is made different from that of the peafant ? 
 Is there any variation in the finer reticulated fubftance of the 
 brain, by which the lord is adapted to receive clearer and ftronger 
 imprefiions than the hufbandman or the fmith ? 
 
 " But a generous blood circulates in his heart and enriches his 
 veins." What are we to underftand by this hypothefis ? Men's 
 actions are the creatures of their perceptions. He that appre- 
 hends moft ftrongly will act moil intrepidly. He, in whofe 
 mind truth is moft diftindlly impreiTed, who, underftanding its 
 nature, is bell aware of its value, will fpeak with the moft heart- 
 felt perfuafion, and write with the greateft brilliancy and energy. 
 By intrepidity and firmnefs in action we muft either underftand 
 the judicious and deliberate conftancy of a Regulus or a Cato, 
 or the brute courage of a private foldier, which is ftill an affair 
 of mind, confifting in a flight eftimate of life which affords him 
 few pleafures, and a thoughtlefs and flupid oblivion of danger. 
 What has the blood to do with this ? — Health is undoubtedly in 
 moft cafes the prerequisite of the beft exertions of mind. But 
 health itfelf is a mere negation, the abfence of difeafe. A man 
 muft have experienced or imagined the inconveniences of fick- 
 nefs, before he can derive pofitive pleafure from the enjoyment 
 6 of 
 
OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 463 
 
 of health. Again, however extravagant we may be in our efti- BOOK v. 
 
 mate of the benefit of health, is it true in fact that the lord enjoys ' «< — -* 
 
 a more vigorous health, experiences a more uniform chearfulnefs, 
 and is lefs a prey to wearinefs and languor than the ruftic ? 
 High birth may infpire high thoughts as a moral caufe ; but is it 
 credible that it mould operate inftinclively and when its exiftence 
 is unknown, while, with every external advantage to aifift, the 
 nobleft families fo often produce the moll degenerate fons ? Into 
 its value then as a moral caufe let us proceed to enquire. 
 
 The perfuafion of its excellence in this refpect is an opinion as a mora l 
 
 caufe, 
 
 probably as old as the inftitution of nobility itfelf. The very . .. 
 
 r / J J Anltocratical 
 
 etymology of the word expreffing this particular form of c '| 1, " ate of 
 government is built upon this idea. It is called ariftocracy or r P ecies - 
 the government of the belt [ a p«r"]- I n tne writings of Cicero 
 and the fpeeches of the Roman fenate this order of men is ltyled 
 the " optimates" the "virtuous," the " liberal," and the " honeft." 
 It is taken for granted, " that the multitude is an unruly beaft, 
 with no fenfe of honour or principle, guided by fordid intereft 
 or not lefs fordid appetite, envious, tyrannical, inconftant and 
 unjuft." From hence they deduced as a confequence, " the 
 neceflity of maintaining an order of men of liberal education and 
 elevated fentiments, who mould either engrofs the government 
 of the humbler and more numerous clafs incapable of governing 
 themfelves, or at leaft mould be placed as a rigid guard upon 
 their exceues, with powers adequate to their correction and 
 
 reftraintJ' 
 
464 OP HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 
 
 *wSd ^v rcftraint." The greater part of thefe reafonings will fall under 
 *"- — « ' our examination when we confider the difadvantages of demo- 
 cracy. So much as relates to the excellence of ariftocracy it is 
 neceflary at prefent to difcufs. 
 
 The whole proceeds upon a fuppofition that, " if nobility 
 fhould not, as its hereditary constitution might feem to imply, 
 i)e found originally fuperior to the ordinary rate of mortals, it is 
 at leaft rendered eminently fo by the power of education. Men, 
 who grow up in unpolifhed ignorance and barbarifm, and are 
 chilled with the icy touch of poverty, muft necefTarily be expofed 
 to a thoufand fources of corruption, and cannot have that deli- 
 cate fenfe of reclitude and honour, which literature and manly 
 refinement are found to beftow. It is under the aufpices of 
 indulgence and eafe that civil ifation is engendered. A nation 
 muft have furmounted the difadvantages of a firft eftablifhment 
 and have arrived at fome degree of leifure and profperity, before 
 the love of letters can take root among them. It is in individuals 
 as in large bodies of men. A few exceptions will occur ; but, 
 bating thefe, it can hardly be expected that men, who are com- 
 pelled in every day by laborious corporal efforts to provide for 
 the neceffities of the day, fhould arrive at great expanfion of 
 mind and comprehenfivenefs of thinking." 
 
 Education of In certain parts of this argument there is confiderable truth, 
 grea . ^^ ^^ philofopher will be the laft man to deny the power 
 
 and 
 
OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 465 
 
 and importance of education. It is therefore neceflary, either BOOK V. 
 r . J CHAP. x. 
 that a fyftem fhould be difcovered for fecuring leifure and * * ' 
 
 profperity to every member of the community, or that a para- 
 mount influence and authority fhould be given to the liberal 
 and the wife over the illiterate and ignorant. Now, fuppofing 
 for the prefent that the former of thefe meafures is impoffible, it 
 may yet be reafonable to enquire whether ariflocracy be the 
 moft judicious fcheme for obtaining the latter. Some 'light may 
 be collected on this fubject from what has already appeared 
 refpedting education under the head of monarchy. 
 
 * 
 
 Education is much, but opulent education is of all its modes 
 the leaft efficacious. The education of words is not to be 
 defpifed, but the education of things is on no account to be dif- 
 penfed with. The former is of admirable ufe in inforcing and 
 developing the latter ; but, when taken alone, it is pedantry and 
 not learning, a body without a foul. Whatever may be the 
 abftracT: perfection of which mind is capable, we feem at prefent 
 frequently to need being excited, in the cafe of any uncommon 
 effort, by motives that addrefs themfelves to the individual. 
 But fo far as relates to thefe motives, the lower claffes of man- 
 kind, had they fufficient leifure, have greatly the advantage of 
 the higher. The plebeian maft be. the maker of his own fortune; 
 the lord finds his already made. The plebeian muft expect to 
 find himfelf neglected and defpifed in proportion- as he is remifs 
 
 3 ° ia 
 
4 C6 OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 
 
 -hap v * n cultivating the objects of efteem ; the lord will always be fur- 
 
 ' ■» ' rounded with fycophants and Haves. The lord therefore has no 
 
 motive to induftry and exertion ; no ftimulus to roufe him from 
 the lethargic, " oblivious pool," out of which every finite intellect 
 originally rofe. It mult indeed be confeffed, that truth does not 
 need the alliance of circumftances, and that a man may arrive at 
 the temple of fame by other pathways than thofe of mifery and 
 diftrefs. But the lord does not content himfelf with excluding 
 the fpur of adverfity: he goes farther than this, and provides 
 himfelf with fruitful fources of efFeminacy and error. Man cannot 
 offend with impunity againft the great principle of univerfal good. 
 He that accumulates to himfelf luxuries and titles and wealth to the 
 injury of the whole, becomes degraded from the rank of man ; 
 and, however he may be admired by the multitude, is pitied by 
 the wile and wearifome to himfelf. Hence it appears, that to 
 elect men to the rank of nobility is to elect them to a poft of 
 moral danger and a means of depravity ; but that to constitute 
 them hereditarily noble is to preclude them, bating a few extra- 
 ordinary accidents, from all the caufes that generate ability and 
 virtue. 
 
 Recapitula? The reafonings we have here repeated upon the fubject of 
 hereditary diftinction are fo obvious, that nothing can be a 
 ftronger inftance of the power of prejudice inftilled in early 
 youth, than the fact of their having been at any time called in 
 
 queftion. 
 
OF HEREDITARY DISTINCTION. 467 
 
 queftion. If we can in this manner produce an hereditary BOOK v. 
 legiilator, why not an hereditary moralift or an hereditary poet * ? 
 In reality an attempt in either of thefe kinds would be more 
 rational and feafible than in the other. From birth as a phyfical 
 caufe it fufficiently appears that little can be expected : and, for 
 education, it is practicable in a certain degree, nor is it eafy to 
 fet limits to that degree, to infufe poetical or philofophical emu- 
 lation into a youthful mind ; but wealth is the fatal blaft that 
 deftroys the hopes of a future harveft. There was once indeed 
 a gallant kind of virtue, that, by irrefiftibly feizing the fenfes, 
 feemed to communicate extenfively to young men of birth, the 
 mixed and equivocal accomplifhments of chivalry j but, fince 
 the fubjects of moral emulation have been turned from perfonal 
 prowefs to the energies of intellect, and efpecially fince the field 
 of that emulation has been more widely opened to the fpecies, 
 the lifts have been almoft uniformly occupied by thofe, whofe 
 narrow circumftances have goaded them to ambition, or whofe 
 undebauched habits and fituation in life have refcued them from 
 the poifon of flattery and effeminate indulgence. 
 
 * See Pains'i Right* »f Msm. 
 
 3 O 2 CHAP; 
 
[ 4^8 ] 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 MORAL EFFECTS OF ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF PRACTICAL JUSTICE. — SPECIES OF IN- 
 JUSTICE WHICH ARISTOCRACY CREATES. ESTIMATE OF 
 
 THE INJURY PRODUCED. — EXAMPLES. 
 
 ^S? K v'r T^HERE is one thing, more than all the reft, of import- 
 CHAP. XI. h 
 
 T v » ' •*• ance to the 'well being of mankind, juftice. Can there 
 
 Importance ° 
 
 ofpraftical k e any thing problematical or paradoxical in this fundamental: 
 principle, that all injuftice is injury ; and a thoufand times more 
 injurious by its effects iri perverting the underftanding and over- 
 turning our calculations of the future, than by the immediate 
 calamity it may produce ?j 
 
 All moral fcience may be reduced to this one head, calculation 
 of the future. We cannot reafonably expect virtue from the 
 multitude of mankind, if they be induced by the perverfenefs of 
 the conductors of human affairs to believe that it is not their 
 intereft to be virtuous. But this is not the point upon which 
 the queftion turns. Virtue, is nothing elfe but the purfuit of 
 general good. Juftice, is the ftandard which difcriminates the 
 advantage of the many and of the few, of the whole and a part. . 
 
 If 
 
MORAL EFFECTS OF ARISTOCRACY. 469. 
 
 If this firft and mod important of all fubjects be involved in BOOK v. 
 
 LHa 1 . Alt 
 
 obfcurity, how fhall the well being of mankind be fubftantially ' * ' 
 
 promoted ? The moil benevolent of our fpecies will be engaged 
 in crufades of error ; while the cooler and more phlegmatic 
 fpectators, difcerning no evident clue that fhould guide them 
 amidft the labyrinth, fit down in felfiih neutrality, and leave the 
 complicated fcene to produce its own denouement. 
 
 It is true that human affairs can never be reduced to that ftate 
 of depravation as to reverfe the nature of juflice. Virtue will 
 always be the intereft of the individual as well as of the public. 
 Immediate virtue will always be beneficial to the prefent age, as 
 well as to their pofterity. But, though the depravation cannot • 
 rife to this excefs, it will be abundantly fufficient to obfeure the 
 underftanding, and miflead the conduct. Human beings will 
 never be fo virtuous as they might eafily be made, till juftice be 
 the fpectacle perpetually prefented to their view, and injuftice be 
 wondered at as a prodigy. 
 
 Of all the principles of juftice there is none fo material to the Species of in- 
 
 j jft'ce which ■ 
 
 moral rectitude of mankind as' this, that no man can be atfftocracy 
 
 creates. 
 
 diftinguifhed but by his perfonal merit. Why not endeavour to 
 reduce to practice fo fimple and fublime a leffon ? When a man 
 has proved himfelf a benefactor to the public, when he has 
 already by laudable perfeverance cultivated in himfelf talents, 
 which need only encouragement and public favour to bring them . 
 2 to; 
 
47Q MORAL EFFECTS 
 
 rwAP^vf t0 jn2LiUTlt Yt ^ et tnat man be honoured. In a ftate of fociety 
 
 1 * ' where fictitious diftindtions are unknown, it is impoflible he 
 
 fhould not be honoured. But that a man mould be looked up to 
 with fervility and awe, becaufe the king has bellowed on him a 
 . fpurious name, or decorated him with a ribband ; that another 
 ihould wallow in luxury, becaufe his anceftor three centuries 
 ago bled in the quarrel of Lancafter or York ; do we imagine 
 that thefe iniquities can be pradtifed without injury ? 
 
 Eftimate of L et thofe who entertain this opinion converfe a little with the 
 
 the injury 
 
 produced. lower orders of mankind. They will perceive that the unfortu- 
 nate wretch, who with unremitted labour finds himfelf incapa- 
 ble adequately to feed and clothe his family, has a fenfe of 
 injuftice rankling at his heart. 
 
 " One whom diftrefs has fpited with the world, 
 
 Is he whom tempting fiends would pitch upon 
 
 To do fuch deeds, as make the profperous men 
 
 Lift up their hands and wonder who could do them*." 
 
 Such is the education of the human fpecies. Such is the fabric 
 of political fociety. 
 
 But let us fuppofe that their fenfe of injuftice were lefs acute 
 than it is here defcribed, what favourable inference can be drawa 
 .from that ? Is not the injuftice real ? If the minds of men be fo 
 
 * Tragedy of Douglas, Act Hi. 
 
 withered 
 
OF ARISTOCRACY. 47I 
 
 withered and ftupefied by the conftancy with which it is practifed, BOOK V. 
 r ' J r > CHAP# XI . 
 
 that they do not feel the rigour that grinds them into nothing, ' « ' 
 
 how does that improve the picture ? 
 
 Let us for a moment give the reins no reflexion, and endeavour 
 accurately to conceive the ftate of mankind where juftice mould 
 form the public and general principle. In that cafe our moral 
 feelings would afTume a firm and wholfome tone, for they would 
 not be perpetually counteracted by examples that weakened their 
 energy and confounded their clearnefs. Men would be fearlefs, 
 becaufe they would know that there were no legal fnares lying 
 in wait for their lives. They would be courageous, becaufe no 
 man would be preffed to the earth that another might enjoy 
 immoderate luxury, becaufe every one would be fecure of the 
 juft reward of his induftry and prize of his exertions. Jealoufy 
 and hatred would ceafe, for they are the offspring of injuftice.. 
 Every man would fpeak truth with his neighbour, for there would 
 be no temptation to falfhood and deceit. Mind would find its 
 level, for there would be every thing to encourage and to 
 animate. Science would be unfpeakably improved, for under- 
 ftanding would convert into a real power, no longer an ignis 
 fatuusy mining and expiring by turns, and leading us into 
 floughs of fophiftry, falfe fcience and fpecious miftake. All 
 men would be difpofed to avow their difpofitions and actions : 
 none would endeavour to fupprefs the juft eulogium of his 
 neighbour, for, fo long as there were tongues to record, the 
 5 fuppreffion 
 
47* MORAL EFFECTS 
 
 BopKy. fuppreffion would be impoflible; none fear to detect the mif- 
 conduit of his neighbour, for there would be no laws converting 
 the fincere expreffion of our convictions into a libel. 
 
 Examples. Let us fairly confider for a moment what is the amount of 
 
 injuftice included in the inftitution of ariftocracy. I am born, 
 fuppofe, a Polifh prince with an income of £300,000 per 
 annum. You are born a manorial ferf or a Creolian negro, by 
 the law of your birth attached to the foil, and transferable by 
 barter or otherwife to twenty fucceffive lords. In vain fhall be 
 your moft generous efforts and your unwearied induftry to free 
 yourfelf from the intolerable yoke. Doomed by the law of your 
 birth to wait at the gates of the palace you mud never enter, to 
 fleep under a ruined weather-beaten roof, while your matter 
 fleeps under canopies of ftate, to feed on putrefied offals while 
 the world is ranfacked for delicacies for his table, to labour with- 
 out moderation or limit under a parching fun while he balks in 
 perpetual floth, and to be rewarded at laft with contempt, repri- 
 mand, ftripes and mutilation. In fact the cafe is worfe than 
 this. I could endure all that injuftice or caprice could inflict, 
 provided I poiTefled in the refource of a firm mind the power of 
 looking down with pity on my tyrant, and of knowing that I 
 had that within, that facred character of truth, virtue and forti- 
 tude, which all his injuftice could not reach. But a Have and a 
 ferf are condemned to fftipidity and vice, as well as to calamity. 
 
 Is 
 
OF ARISTOCRACY. 
 
 473 
 
 Is all this nothing ? Is all this neceflary for the maintenance of BOOK v. 
 
 CHAP. XI. 
 
 civil order ? Let it be recollected that for this diftinction there is v "" 
 not the fmalleft foundation in the nature of things, that, as we 
 have already faid, there is no particular mould for the conftrudtion 
 of lords, and that they are born neither better nor worfe than 
 the pooreft of their dependents. It is this ftructure of ariftocracy 
 in all its fanctuaries and fragments againft which reafon and 
 philofophy have declared war. It is alike unjuft, whether we 
 confider it in the cafts of India, the villainage of the feudal 
 fyftem, or the defpotifm of the patricians of ancient Rome 
 dragging their debtors into perfonal fervitude to expiate loans 
 they could not repay. Mankind will never be in an eminent 
 degree virtuous and happy, till each man fhall pofTefs that 
 portion of diftinction and no more, to which he is entitled by his 
 perfonal merits. The diflblution of ariftocracy is equally the 
 intereft of the oppreflbr and the oppreffed. The one will be 
 delivered from the liftleffhefs of tyranny, and the other from the 
 brutalifing operation of fervitude. How long fhall we be told 
 in vain, " that mediocrity of fortune is the true rampart of 
 perfonal happinefs ?" 
 
 3P CHAP. 
 
[ 474 ] 
 
 CHAP. XII. 
 OF TITLES. 
 
 THEIR ORIGIN AND HISTORY. — THEIR MISERABLE ABSUR- 
 DITY. — TRUTH THE ONLY ADEQUATE REWARD OF 
 MERIT. 
 
 BOOK v. / ■ A HE cafe of mere titles is fo abfurd that it would deferve to 
 CHAP.XII. 
 * — tv—-* -*- be treated only with ridicule, were it not for the ferious 
 
 Their origin 
 
 andhiftory. mifchiefs it impofes on mankind. The feudal fyftem was a 
 ferocious monfter devouring wherever it came all that the friend 
 of humanity regards with attachment and love. The fyftem of 
 titles appears under a different form. The monfter is at length 
 deftroyed, and they who followed in his train, and fattened 
 upon the carcaffes of thofe he flew, have fluffed his fkin, and by 
 exhibiting it hope ftill to terrify mankind into patience and 
 pufillanimity. The fyftem of the Northern invaders, however 
 odious, efcaped the ridicule of the fyftem of titles. "When the 
 feudal chieftains aflumed a geographical appellation, it was from 
 fome place really fubject to their authority ; and there was no 
 more abfurdity in the ftyle they aflumed, than in our calling a 
 man at prefent the governor of Tangiers or the governor of 
 Gibraltar. The commander in chief or the fovereign did not 
 5 then 
 
O F T I T L E S. 475 
 
 then eive an empty name ; he conferred an earldom or a barony, BOOK v. 
 ° r ^ ; ' CHAP. XII. 
 
 a fubftantial tract of land, with houfes and men, and producing v * ' 
 
 a real revenue. He now grants nothing but the privilege of 
 calling yourfelf Tom who were beforetime called Will ; and, to 
 add to the abfurdity, your new appellation is borrowed from 
 fome place perhaps you never faw, or fome country you never 
 vifited. The ftyle however is the fame ; we are ftill earls and 
 barons, governors of provinces and commanders of forts, and 
 that with the fame evident propriety as the elector of Hanover 
 and arch treafurer of the empire ftyles himfelf king of France. 
 
 Can there be any thing more ludicrous, than that the man, Their refera- 
 ble abfurdity. 
 
 who was yefterday Mr. St. John, the moft eloquent fpeaker of 
 the Britifh houfe of commons, the moft penetrating thinker, 
 the umpire of maddening parties, the reftorer of peace to bleed- 
 ing and exhaufted Europe, mould be to-day lord Bolingbroke ? 
 In what is he become greater and more venerable than he was ? 
 In the pretended favour of a ftupid and befotted woman, who 
 always hated him, as fhe uniformly hated talents and virtue, 
 though for her own intereft fhe was obliged to endure him. 
 
 The friends of a man upon whom a title has recently been 
 conferred, muft either be wholly blinded by the partiality of 
 friendfhip not to feel the ridicule of his fituation, or completely 
 debafed by the parafitical fpirit of dependence not to betray their 
 feelings. Every time they effay to fpeak, they are in danger of 
 
 3 P 2 blundering 
 
47^ 
 
 OF TITLES. 
 
 BOOK V. blundering upon the inglorious appellations of Mr. and Sir *. 
 Every time their tongue faulters with unconfirmed practice, the 
 queflion rufhes upon them with irrefiftible force, " What change 
 has my old friend undergone ; in what is he wifer or better, 
 happier or more honourable ?" The firft week of a new title is a 
 perpetual war of the feelings in every fpedtator,. the genuine 
 dictates of common fenfe againfl the arbitrary inftitutions of 
 fociety. To make the farce more perfect thefe titles are fubject 
 to perpetual fluctuations, and the man who is to-day earl of 
 Kenfington, will to-morrow refign with unblufhing effrontery all 
 appearance of character and honour to be called marquis of Ke w t 
 Hiftory labours under the Gothic and unintelligible burden j no, 
 mortal patience can connect the different ftories of him who is 
 to-day lord Kimbolton, and to-morrow earl of Manchefter ; to- 
 day earl of Mulgrave, and to-morrow marquis of Normanby and 
 duke of Buckinghamfhire,. 
 
 Truth the 
 only adequate 
 reward of 
 merit. 
 
 The abfurdity of thefe titles ftrikes us the more, becaufe they 
 are ufually the reward of intrigue and corruption. But, were it 
 otherwife, ftill they would be unworthy of the adherents of 
 reafon and juftice. When we fpeak of Mr. St. John, as of the 
 man, who by his eloquence fwayed contending parties, who 
 withdrew the conquering fword from fyffering France, and gave. 
 
 * In reality thefe appellations are. little lefs ab.furd than thofe by which they 
 are fuperfeded.. 
 
 8 forty 
 
OF TITLES, 477 
 
 forty years of peace and calm purfuit of the arts of life and BOOK v. 
 
 1 } r r CHAP. XII. 
 
 wifdom to mankind, we fpeak of fomething eminently great. v ~~ 
 Can any title exprefs thefe merits ? Is not truth the confecrated 
 and fingle vehicle of juftice ? Is not the plain and fimple truth 
 worth all the cunning fubftitutions in the world ? Could an 
 oaken garland or a gilded coronet have added one atom to his 
 real greatnefs ? Garlands and coronets may be bellowed on the 
 unworthy and proftituted to the intriguing. Till mankind be 
 fatisfied with the naked ftatement of what they really perceive, 
 till they confefs virtue to be then moft illuftrious when fhe mod 
 difdafris the aid of ornament, they will never arrive at that manly 
 juftice of fentiment, at which they are deftined one day to arrive. 
 By this fcheme of naked truth, virtue will be every day a gainer ; 
 every fucceeding obferver will more fully do her juftice, while 
 vice, deprived of that varnifh with which fhe delighted to glofs 
 her actions, of that gaudy exhibition which may be made alike 
 by every pretender, will fpeedily fink into unheeded contempt.. 
 
 C H A p; 
 
[ 473 ] 
 
 CHAP. XIII. 
 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL, CHARACTER. 
 
 INTOLERANCE OF ARISTOCRACY — DEPENDENT FOR ITS 
 
 SUCCESS UPON THE IGNORANCE OF THE MULTITUDE. 
 
 PRECAUTIONS NECESSARY FOR ITS SUPPORT. DIFFER- 
 ENT KINDS OF ARISTOCRACY. — ARISTOCRACY OF THE 
 ROMANS : ITS VIRTUES — ITS VICES. — ARISTOCRATICAL 
 DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY — REGULATIONS BY WHICH 
 IT IS MAINTAINED AVARICE IT ENGENDERS. ARGU- 
 MENT AGAINST INNOVATION FROM THE PRESENT 
 
 HAPPY ESTABLISHMENT OF AFFAIRS CONSIDERED. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 BOOK V 
 
 CHAP. XIII 
 
 ;A 
 
 RISTOCRACY in its proper fignification implies 
 neither lefs nor more than a fcheme for renderinp- 
 
 Intolerance ° 
 
 efarlftocracy; more permanent and vifible by the interference of |£>litical in- 
 ftitution the inequality of mankind. Ariftocracy, like monar- 
 chy, is founded in falfhood, the offspring of art foreign to the 
 real nature of things, and muft therefore, like monarchy, be fup- 
 ported by artifice and falfe pretences. Its empire however is 
 founded in principles more gloomy and unfocial than thofe of 
 
 monarchy. 
 
OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 479 
 
 monarchy. The monarch often thinks it advifable to employ BOOK V. 
 
 1 * 1 CHAP. XIII. 
 
 blandishments and courtfhip with his barons and officers ; but 
 the lord deems it fufficient to rule with a rod of iron. 
 
 Both depend for their perpetuity upon ignorance. Could dependent for 
 
 its fuccefs 
 
 they, like Omar, deftroy the productions of profane reafoning, upon the Ig- 
 norance of 
 and perfuade mankind that the Alcoran contained every thing the multi- 
 
 which it became them to ftudy, they might then renew their leafe 
 of empire. But here again ariftocracy difplays its fuperior harfh- 
 nefs. Monarchy admits of a certain degree of monki£h learning 
 among its followers. But ariftocracy holds a ftricter hand. 
 Should the lower ranks of fociety once come to be generally 
 taught to write and read, its power would be at an end. To make 
 men ferfs and villains it is indifpenfibly neceftary to make them 
 brutes. This is a queftion which has long been canvafled with 
 great eagernefs and avidity. The refolute advocates of the old 
 fyftem have with no contemptible forefight oppofed this alarm- 
 ing innovation. In their well known obfervation, " that a Ser- 
 vant who has been taught to write and read ceafes to be any 
 longer a paffive machine," is contained the embryo from which 
 it would be eafy to explain the whole, philolophy of human, 
 fociety. 
 
 And who is there that can reflect with patience upon the ma- Precautions 
 
 j~ r ' r neceflary for 
 
 levolent contrivances of theie infolent ufurpers, contrivances the its fupport. 
 end of which is to keep the human fpecies in a ftate of endlefs 
 
 degradation ? 
 
480 OF THE AR1ST0CRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 BOOK V. degradation ? It is in the fubjedls we are here examining that 
 
 *" • ' the celebrated maxim of " many made for one" is brought to 
 
 the real teft. Thofe reafoners were no doubt wife in their gene- 
 ration, who two centuries ago conceived alarm at the blafphemous 
 doctrine, " that government was inftituted for the benefit of the 
 governed, and, if it propofed to itfelf any other object, was no 
 better than an ufurpation." It will perpetually be found that the 
 men, who in every age have been the earlieft to give the alarm 
 of innovation, and have been ridiculed on that account as bigoted 
 and timid, were in reality perfons of more than common difcern- 
 ment, who law, though but imperfectly, in the rude principle the 
 inferences to which it inevitably led. It is time that men of re- 
 flexion mould choofe between the two alternatives : either to go 
 back fairly and without referve to the primitive principles of ty- 
 ranny ; or, adopting any one of the axioms oppolite to thefe, 
 however neutral it may at firft appear, not feebly and ignorantly 
 to fhut their eyes upon its countlefs hoft of coniequences. 
 
 Different & LS not neceffary to enter into a methodical difquifition of the 
 
 ftocracy. different fpecies of ariftocracy, fince, if the above reafonings have 
 any force, they are equally cogent againft them all. Ariftocracy 
 may veft its prerogatives principally in the individual, as in Po- 
 land ; or entirely reftrid them to the nobles in their corporate 
 capacity, as in Venice. The former will be more tumultuous 
 and diforderly ; the latter more jealous, intolerant and fevere. 
 The magiftrates may either recruit their body by election among 
 
 themfelves, 
 
OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 481 
 
 themfelves, as in Holland ; or by the choice of the people, as in ^p^Xf 
 ancient Rome. " ' 
 
 The ariftocracy of ancient Rome was incomparably the moft Ariftocracy 
 venerable and illuftrious that ever exifted upon the face of the mans : its 
 
 virtues % 
 
 earth. It may not therefore be improper to contemplate in them 
 the degree of excellence to which ariftocracy may be raifed. They 
 included in their inftitution fome of the benefits of democracy, as 
 generally fpeaking no man became a member of the fenate, but in 
 confequence of his being elected by the people to the fuperior 
 magiftracies. It was reafonable therefore to expect that the ma- 
 jority of the members would poffefs fome degree of capacity. 
 They were not like modern ariftocratical aflemblies, in which, as 
 primogeniture and not 1'elecT.ion decides upon their prerogatives, 
 we fhall commonly feek in vain for capacity, except in a few of 
 the lords of recent creation. As the plebeians were long re- 
 trained from looking for candidates except among the patricians, 
 that is, the pofterity of fenators, it was reafonable to fuppofe 
 that the moft eminent talents would be confined to that order. 
 A circumftance which contributed to this was the monopoly of 
 liberal education and the cultivation of the mind, a monopoly 
 which the art of printing has at length fully deftroyed. Ac- 
 cordingly all the great literary ornaments of Rome were either 
 patricians, or of the equeftrian order, or their immediate depend- 
 ents. The plebeians, though in their corporate capacity they 
 poflefled for fome centuries the virtues of fincerity, intrepidity, 
 
 3 Q^ love 
 
48a 
 
 OF THE ARISTOGRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 ghApxhi ^ ove °^j u ^ ce ar| d of the public, could never boaft of any of thofe 
 - " ' individual characters in their party that reflect luftre on mankind, 
 except the two Gracchi : while the patricians told of Brutus, Va- 
 lerius, Coriolanus, Cincinnatus, Camillus, Fabricius, Regulus, the' 
 Fabii, the Decii, the Scipios, Lucullus, Marcellus, Cato, Cicero, 
 and innumerable others. With this retrofpect continually fug- 
 gefted to their minds it was almoft venial for the ftern heroes of 
 Rome and the laft illuftrious martyrs of the republic to entertain 
 ariftocratical fentiments. 
 
 its vices. Let us however confider impartially this ariftocracy, fo incom- 
 
 parably fuperior to any other of ancient or modern times. Upon 
 the firft inftitution of the republic, the people poueffed fcarcely 
 any authority except in the election of magistrates, and even here 
 their intrinfic importance was eluded by the mode of arranging 
 the aflembly, fo that the whole decifion vefted in the richer claffes 
 of the community. No magiftrates of any defcription were 
 elected but from among the patricians. All caufes were judged 
 by the patricians, and from their judgment there was no appeal. 
 The patricians intermarried among themfelves, and thus formed 
 a republic of narrow extent in the midft of the nominal one, which 
 was held by them in a ftate of abject fervitude. The idea which 
 purified thefe usurpations in the minds of the ufurpers, was, " that 
 the vulgar are efTentially coarfe, groveling and ignorant, and that 
 there can be no fecurity for the empire of juftice and confiflency 
 but in the decided afcendancy of the liberal." Thus, even while 
 
 they 
 
L. 
 
 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 4 8 3 
 
 they oppofed the eflential interefts of mankind, they were ani- BOOK v. 
 
 J ir J CHAP. XIII. 
 
 mated with public fpirit and an -unbounded enthuhafm of vir- 
 tue. But it is not lefs true that they did oppofe the effential in- 
 terefts of mankind. Y/hat can be more extraordinary than the 
 declamations of Appius Claudius in this ftyle, at once for the 
 moral greatnefs of mind by which they were dictated, and the 
 cruel intolerance they were intended to inforce ? It is inex- 
 preffibly painful to fee fo much virtue through fucceflive ages 
 employed in counteracting the jufteft requifitions. The refult 
 was, that the patricians, notwithftanding their immeafurable fu- 
 periority in abilities, were obliged to yield one by one the exclu- 
 fions to which they fo obftinately clung. In the interval they 
 were led to have recourfe to the moft odious methods of counter- 
 action ; and every man among them contended who mould be 
 loudeft in applaufe of the nefarious murder of the Gracchi. If 
 the Romans were diftinguifhed for fo many virtues, conftituted 
 as they were, what might they not have been but for the iniquity 
 of ariftocratical ufurpation ? The indelible blemifh of their hif- 
 tory, the love of conquer!,- originated in the fame caufe. Their 
 wars, through every period of the republic, were nothing more 
 than the contrivance of the patricians, to divert their countrymen 
 from attending to the fentiments of unalterable truth, by leading 
 them to fcenes of conqueft and carnage. They underftood the 
 art, common to all governments, of confounding the underftand- 
 ings of the multitude, and perfuading them that the moft un- 
 
 3 Q^2 . provoked 
 
484 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 cHAP^ui P rov °ked hoftilities were merely the dictates of necefiary 
 * " ' defence. 
 
 AHftocratJcal The principle of ariftocracy is founded in the extreme inequa- 
 
 diftribution 
 
 of property : lity of conditions. No man can be an ufeful member of fociety, 
 except fo far as his talents are employed in a manner conducive 
 to the general advantage. In every fociety the produce, the means 
 of contributing to the neceffities and conveniencies of its mem- 
 bers, is of a certain amount. In every fociety the bulk at leaft of 
 its members contribute by their perfonal exertions to the creation 
 of this produce. What can be more reafonable and juft, than 
 that the produce itfelf mould with fome degree of equality be 
 fhared among them ? What more injurious than the accumulat- 
 ing upon a few every means of fuperfluity and luxury, to the 
 total deftru&ion of the eafe, and plain, but plentiful, fubfiftence 
 of the many ? It may be calculated that the king even of a li- 
 mited monarchy, receives as the falary of his office, an income 
 equivalent to the labour of fifty thoufand men *. Let us fet out 
 in our eftimate from this point, and figure to ourfelves the fhares 
 of 'his counfellors, his nobles, the wealthy commoners by whom 
 the nobility will be emulated, their kindred and dependents. Is 
 it any wonder that in fuch countries the lower orders of the com- 
 . munity are exhaufted by all the hardships of penury and immo- 
 derate fatigue ? When we fee the wealth of a province fpread 
 
 * Taking die average price of labour at one fhilling per diem. 
 
 upon 
 
OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 485 
 
 upon the great man's table, can we be furprifed that his neigh- ^J^cm 
 bours have not bread to fatiate the cravings of hunger ? 
 
 Is this a ftate of human beings that muft be confidered as the 
 lad improvement of political wifdom ? In fuch a ftate it is im- 
 poflible that eminent virtue fhould not be exceedingly rare. The 
 higher and the lower clafTes will be alike corrupted by their un- 
 natural fituation. But to pafs over the higher clafs for the pre- 
 fent, what can be more evident than the tendency of want to 
 contract the intellectual powers ? The fituation which the wife 
 man would defire for himfelf and for thofe in whofe welfare he 
 was interefted, would be a fituation of alternate labour and re- 
 laxation, labour that fhould not exhauft the frame, and relaxation 
 that was in no danger to degenerate into indolence. Thus in- 
 duftry and activity would be cherifhed, the frame preferred in a 
 healthful tone, and the mind accuftomed to meditation and re- 
 flection. But this would be the fituation of the whole human 
 fpecies, if the fupply of our wants were equally diftributed. Can 
 any fyftem be more worthy of our difapprobation than that which 
 converts nineteen-twentieths of them into beafts of burden, an- 
 nihilates fo much thought, renders impoffible fo much virtue and 
 extirpates fo much happinefs ? 
 
 But it may be alledged, " that this argument is foreign to the regulation* 
 
 r r • a. r t\ i . ky which it is 
 
 iubject of anftocracy ; the inequality of conditions being the in- maintained: 
 
 evi 
 
 table 
 
486 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 • 
 
 chap xm evitable confequence of the inftitution of property." It is true 
 v that many difadvantages flow out of this inftitution in its fimpieft 
 
 form j but thefe difadvantages, to whatever they may amount, 
 are greatly aggravated by the operations of ariftocracy. Arifto- 
 cracy turns the ftream of property out of its natural channel, and 
 forwards with the moft affiduous care its accumulation in the 
 hands of a very few perfons. The doctrines of primogeniture 
 and entails, as well as the immenfe volumes of the laws of tranf- 
 fer and inheritance which have infefted every part of Europe, 
 were produced for this exprefs purpofe. 
 
 genders? en " At the fame time that it has endeavoured to render the acqui- 
 fition of permanent property difficult, ariftocracy has greatly in- 
 creafed the excitements to that acquifition. All men are accuf- 
 tomed to conceive a thirft after diftin£tion and pre-eminence, 
 but they do not all fix upon wealth as the object of this paffion, 
 but varioufly upon fkill in any particular art, grace, learning, ta- 
 lents, wifdom and virtue. Nor does it appear that thefe latter 
 objects are purfued by their votaries with lefs affiduity, than 
 wealth is purfued by thofe who are anxious to acquire it. 
 Wealth would be ftill lefs capable of being miftaken for the 
 univerfal paffion, were it not rendered by political inftitution, 
 more than by its natural influence, the road to honour and 
 refped:. 
 
 . There 
 
OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 487 
 
 There is no miftake more thoroughly to be deplored on this chap^iii 
 fubject, than that of perfons, fitting at their eafe and furrounded a^^TT^ 
 with all the conveniences of life, who are apt to exclaim, " We vai^ from" 
 find things very well as they are ;" and to inveigh bitterly againft i ia p P y e e fta. 
 all projects of reform, as " the romances of vifionary men, and affijracpn- 
 the declamations of thofe who are never to be fatislied." Is it 
 well, that fo large a part of the community ihould be kept in 
 abject penury, rendered ftupid with ignorance and difguftful with 
 vice, perpetuated in nakednefs and hunger, goaded to the com- 
 miffion of crimes, and made victims to the mercilefs laws which 
 the rich have inftituted to opprefs them ? Is it fedition to en- 
 quire whether this Hate of things may not be exchanged for a 
 better ? Or can there be any thing more difgraceful to ourfelves 
 than to exclaim that " All is well," merely becaufe we are at 
 our eafe, regardlefs of the mifery, degradation and vice that may 
 be occafioned in others ? 
 
 There is one argument to which the advocates of monarchy Conchfion. 
 and ariftocracy always have recourfe when driven from every 
 other pretence ; the mifchievous nature of democracy. " How- 
 ever imperfect the two former of thefe inftitutions may be in 
 themfelves, they are found necerfary," we are told, " as ac- 
 commodations to the imperfection of human nature." It is for 
 the reader who has confidered the arguments of the preceding 
 chapters to decide, how far it is probable that circumftances can 
 
 6 occur. 
 
4 88 OF THE ARISTOCRATICAL CHARACTER. 
 
 book V. occur, which mould make it our duty to fubmit to thefe com- 
 
 CHAP. XIII, 
 
 * v ' plicated evils. Meanwhile let us proceed to examine that de- 
 mocracy of which fo alarming a picture has uniformly been 
 exhibited. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
E 489 3 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY. 
 
 DEFINITION. SUPPOSED EVILS OF THIS FORM OF GO- 
 VERNMENT ASCENDANCY OF THE IGNORANT OF 
 
 THE CRAFTY — INCONSTANCY — RASH CONFIDENCE 
 
 GROUNDLESS SUSPICION. — MERITS AND DEFECTS OF 
 DEMOCRACY COMPARED. — ITS MORAL TENDENCY. — 
 TENDENCY OF TRUTH. — REPRESENTATION. 
 
 DEMOCRACY is a fyftem of government according to BOOK v. 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 which every member of fociety is confidered as a man * yr~~- ' 
 
 Definition. 
 
 and nothing more. So far as pofitive regulation is concerned, if 
 indeed that can with any propriety be termed regulation which 
 is the mere recognition of the fimpleft of all principles, every 
 man is regarded as equal. Talents and wealth, wherever they 
 exift, will not fail to obtain a certain degree of influence, with- 
 out requiring any pofitive inftitution of fociety to fecond their 
 operation. 
 
 evils of derao- 
 
 But there are certain difadvantages that may feem the necef- Suppofed 
 
 evils c 
 
 fury refult of democratical equality. In political fociety it is C racy 
 rcafonable to fuppofe that the wife will be outnumbered by the 
 
 3 R unwife, 
 
49° GENERAL FEATURES 
 
 chap \7v unwn " e > an< ^ ^ w iU De inferred " that the welfare of the whole 
 afcendancy w iU therefore be at the mercy of ignorance and folly." It is- 
 rant : lg " P " true that the ignorant will generally be fufficiently willing to be 
 guided by the judicious, "but their very ignorance will incapa- 
 citate them from difcerniag the merit of their guides* The 
 of the crafty. 1 turbulent and crafty demagogue will often pofTefs greater advan- 
 tages for inveigling their judgment, than the man who with 
 purer intentions may pofTefs a lefs brilliant talent. Add to this, that 
 the demagogue has a never failing refource in the ruling imper- 
 fection of human nature, that of preferring the fpecious prefent 
 to the fubftantial future. This is what is ufually termed, play- 
 ing upon the pafhons of mankind. Political truth has hitherto 
 proved an enigma, that all the wit of man has been mfufficient to 
 fblve. Is it to be fuppofed that the uninftrucfed multitude 
 •ihould always be able to refill the artful fophillry and captivating 
 eloquence that will be employed to darken it ? Will it not often 
 happen that the fchemes propofed by the ambitious diflurber will 
 "* poilefs a meretricious attraction, which the fevere and - fober 
 project of the difcerning ftatefman. fhall be unable to compenfate ?. 
 
 Inconflancy t " One of the moft fruitful fources of human happinefs is to be 
 found in the fteady and uniform operation of certain fixed 
 principles. But it is the characteriftic of a democracy to be 
 wavering and inconftant. The philofopher only, who has, 
 deeply meditated his principles,, is inflexible in his adherence to 
 them. The mafs of mankind, as they have never arranged their 
 2 reflections 
 
OF DEMOCRACY. 
 
 491 
 
 refle&ions into fyftem, are at the mercy of every momentary BOOK V. 
 
 impulfe, and liable to change with every wind. But this incon- v *"""" J 
 
 ftancy is direcWy the reverfe of every idea of political juftice. 
 
 " Nor is this all. Democracy is a monflrous and unwieldy rafh confi- 
 dence : 
 veffel launched upon the fea of human paffions without ballaft. 
 
 Liberty in this unlimited form is in danger to be loll almoft as 
 
 foon as it is obtained. The ambitious man finds nothing in this 
 
 fcheme of human affairs to fet bounds to his defires. He has 
 
 only to dazzle and deceive the multitude in order to rife to 
 
 abfolute power. 
 
 " A farther ill confequence flows out of this circumftance. groundlefc 
 The multitude, confcious of their weaknefs in this refpecl, will, 
 in proportion to their love of liberty and equality, be perpetually 
 fuipicious and uneafy. Has any man dilplayed uncommon 
 virtues or rendered eminent fervices to his country ? He will 
 prefently be charged with fecretly aiming at the tyranny. 
 Various circumftances will come in aid of this accufation, the 
 general love of novelty, envy of fuperior merit, and the inca- 
 pacity of the multitude to underftand the motives and character 
 of thofe who fo far excel them. Like the Athenian, they will 
 be tired of hearing Ariftides conftantly called the Juft. Thus 
 will merit be too frequently the victim of ignorance and envy. 
 Thus will all that is liberal and refined, whatever the human 
 jnind in its highefc ftate of improvement is able to conceive, be 
 
 3 Pv 2 often 
 
492 GENERAL FEATURES 
 
 B00K ]^ often overpowered by* the turbulence of unbridled pafllon and 
 y the rude dictates of favage folly." 
 
 If this picture muft inevitably be realifed wherever democra- 
 tical principles are eftablifhed, the ftate of human nature would 
 be peculiarly unfortunate. No form of government can be 
 devifed which does not partake of monarchy, ariftocracy or 
 democracy. We have taken a copious furvey of the two former; 
 and it would feem impoffible that greater or more inveterate 
 mifchiefs can be inflicted on mankind, than thofe which are 
 inflicted by them. No portrait of injuftice, degradation and 
 vice can be exhibited, that can furpafs the fair and inevitable 
 inferences from the principle upon which they are built. If then 
 democracy could by any arguments be brought down to a level 
 with fuch monftrous inftitutions as thefe, in which there is 
 neither integrity nor reafon, our profpects of the future happinefs' 
 of mankind would indeed be deplorable,.. 
 
 Merits and But this is impoffible. Suppofino* that we fhould even be 
 
 mocracy obliged to take democracy with all the difadvantages that were 
 
 compared.) 
 
 ever annexed to it, and that no remedy could be difcovered for any 
 of its defects, it would be ftill greatly preferable to the exclufive 
 fyftem of other forms. Let us take Athens with all- its turbu- 
 lence and inftability ; with the popular and temperate ufurpations 
 of Pififtratus and Pericles ; with their monftrous oftracifm, by 
 
 which with undifguifed" injuftice they were accuftomed periodi- 
 cal! v 
 
OF DEMOCRACY. 493 
 
 eally to banifh fome eminent citizen without the imputation of a BOOK v. 
 erime ; with the imprifonment of Miltiades, the exile of Ariftides ' ' ' 
 and the murder of Phocion : — with all thefe errors on its head, 
 it is incontrovertible that Athens exhibited a more illuftrious and 
 enviable fpectacle than all the monarchies and ariftocracies that 
 ever exifted. Who would reject the gallant love of virtue and 
 independence, becaufe it was accompanied with fome irregu- 
 larities ? Who would pafs an unreferved condemnation upon 
 their penetrating mind, their quick difcernment and their ardent 
 feeling, becaufe they were fubjecl: occafionally to be intemperate 
 and impetuous ? Shall we compare a people of fuch incredible 
 achievements, fuch exquifite refinement, gay without infen- 
 fibility and fplendid without intemperance, in the midft of whom 
 grew up the greateft poets, the nobleft artifts, the moft 
 finifhed orators and political writers, and the moft difinterefted 
 philofophers the world ever faw, — {hall we compare this chofen 
 feat of patriotifm, independence and generous virtue, with the 
 torpid and felfifh realms of monarchy and ariftocracy ? All is not 
 happinefs that looks tranquillity. Better were a portion of 
 turbulence and fluctuation, than that unwholfome calm which 
 is a ftranger to virtue. 
 
 In the eftimate that is ufually made of democracy, one of the Its moral ten- 
 
 n r r v • dency. 
 
 moft flagrant fources of error lies in our taking mankind fuch as 
 monarchy and ariftocracy have made them, and from thence 
 judging how fit they are to legiflate for themfelves. Monarchy 
 
 i and 
 
CHAP. XIV. 
 I ., > 
 
 494 GENERAL FEATURES 
 
 ^hap^xiv' anc * ar ift°cracy would be no evils, if their tendency were not to 
 undermine the virtues and the underftandings of their fubjedts. 
 The thing raoft neceflary is to remove all thofe reftraints which 
 hold mind back from its natural flight. Implicit faith, blind 
 iubmiflion to authority, timid fear, a diftruft of our powers, an 
 inattention to our own importance and the good purpofes we are 
 able to effect, thefe are the chief obftacles to human improve- 
 ment. Democracy reftores to man a confcioufnefs of his value, 
 teaches him by the removal of authority and opprefllon to liften 
 only to the dictates of reafon, gives him confidence to treat all 
 other men as his fellow beings, and induces him to regard them 
 no longer as enemies againft whom to be upon his guard, but 
 as brethren whom it becomes him to afllft. The citizen of a 
 <3emocratical ftate, when he looks upon the miferable opprefllon 
 .and injuftice that prevail in the countries around him, cannot 
 .but entertain an inexpreflible efteem for the advantages he enjoys, 
 and the moil unalterable determination at all hazards to preferve 
 ihem. The influence of democracy upon tbe fentiments of its 
 members is altogether of the negative fort, but its confequences 
 are ineftimable. Nothing can be more unreasonable than to 
 argue from men as we now find them, to men as they may here- 
 after be made. Strict and accurate reafoning, inflead of fuf- 
 fering us to be furprifed that Athens did fo much, vould at firft 
 induce us to wonder that the retained fo many imperfecftions. 
 
 Tendency of The road to the improvement of mankind is in the utmoft 
 
 truth. 
 
 degree 
 
OF DEMOCRACY. 495 
 
 degree Simple, to fpeak and act the truth. If the Athenians had 
 had more of this, it is impoffible they mould have been fo 
 flagrantly erroneous. To tell the truth in all cafes without 
 referve, to administer juftice without partiality, are principles 
 which, when once rigorouSly adopted, are of all others the mofl 
 prolific. They enlighten the understanding, give energy to the 
 judgment, and Strip mifreprefentation of its fpecioufnefs and 
 plaufibility. In Athens men Suffered themfelvea to be dazzled 
 by fplendour and fhow. If the error in their conftitution which 
 led to this defed can be difcovered, if a form of political fociety 
 can be devifed in which men mall be accuStomed to judge Strictly 
 and foberly, and habitually exercifed to the plainnefs and Sim- 
 plicity of truth, democracy would in that fociety ceafe from the 
 turbulence, inftability, ficklenefs and violence that have too 
 often characterised it. Nothing can be more certain than the 
 omnipotence of truth, or, in other words, than the connexion 
 between the judgment and the outward behaviour. If Science 
 be capable of perpetual improvement, men will alfo be capable 
 of perpetually advancing in practical wifdom and juStice. Once 
 eSlabliSh the perfectibility of man, and it will inevitably follow 
 that we are advancing to a State, in which truth will be too well 
 known to be eafily mistaken, and juftice too habitually pradtifed 
 to be voluntarily counteracted. Nor Shall we See reaSon to think 
 upon Severe reflection, that this State is fo distant as we might at 
 firSt be inclined to imagine. Error is principally indebted for its 
 permanence to Social institution, . Did we leave individuals to- 
 
 the 
 
 BOOK v. 
 
 CHAP. XIV. 
 
•tion. 
 
 406 GENERAL FEATURES 
 
 B00I xiv tne P ro g re ^" s °f tne i r own minds, without endeavouring to regu- 
 1 * ' late them by any fpecies of public foundation, mankind would 
 in no very long period convert to the obedience of truth. The 
 conteft between truth and falfhood is of itfelf too unequal, for 
 the former to (land in need of fupport from any political ally. 
 The more it be difcovered, efpecially that part of it which relates 
 to man in fociety, the more fimple and felf evident will it 
 appear ; and it will be found impoffible any otherwife to account 
 for its having been fo long concealed, than from the pernicious 
 influence of pofitive inftitution. 
 
 Repvefenta- There is another obvious confideration that has frequently 
 been alledged to account for the imperfection of ancient demo- 
 cracies, which is worthy of our attention, though it be not fo 
 important as the argument which has juft been ftated. The 
 ancients were unaccuftomed to the idea of deputed, or reprefen- 
 tative affemblies ; and it is reafonable to fuppofe that affairs 
 might often be tranfadled with the utmoft order in fuch afTem- 
 blies, which might be productive of much tumult and confufion, 
 if fubmitted to the perfonal difcuflion of the citizens at large*. 
 By this happy expedient we fecure many of the pretended 
 benefits of ariftocracy, as well as the real benefits of democracy. 
 The difcuffion of national affairs is brought before perfons of 
 
 * The general grounds of tins inftitution have been ftated, Book III, Chap. 
 IV. The exceptions which limit its value, will be feen in the twenty-third 
 oiiapter of .the prefent hock. 
 
 fimerioi" 
 
CHAP. XIV. 
 
 OFDEMOCRACY. 497 
 
 Superior education and wifdom : we may conceive of them, net ^.? A ^ K X ^ 
 only as the appointed medium of the fentiments of their condim- 
 ents, but as authorifed upon certain occafions to act on their part, 
 in the fame manner as an unlearned parent delegates his autho- 
 rity over his child to a preceptor of greater accomplifhments than 
 himfelf. This idea within proper limits might be entitled to our 
 approbation, provided the elector had the wifdom not to relax in 
 the exercife of his own underftanding in all his political concerns, 
 exerted his cenforial power over his reprefentative, and were 
 accuftomed, if the reprefentative were unable after the fulleft 
 explanation to bring him over to his opinion, to transfer his 
 deputation to another. 
 
 The true value of the fyftem of representation is as follows. 
 It is not reafonable to doubt that mankind, whether acting by 
 themfelves or their reprefentatives, might in no long time be 
 enabled to contemplate the fubjects offered to their examination 
 with calmnefs and true difcernment, provided no pofitive ob- 
 ftacles were thrown in their way by the errors and imperfection 
 of their political inflitutions. This is the principle in which 
 the found political philofopher will reft with the moft perfect 
 Satisfaction. But, fhould it ultimately appear that reprefentation, 
 and not the intervention of popular affemblies, is the mode 
 which reafon prefcribes, then an error in this preliminary 
 queftion, will of courfe infer errors in the practice which is built 
 upon it. We cannot make one falfe ftep, without involving 
 
 3 S ourfelves 
 
498 GENERAL FEATURES OF DEMOCRACY. 
 
 book v. ourfelves in a feries of miftakes and ill confequences that muft 
 
 CHAP. XIV. * 
 
 ' <~~ J be expected to grow out of it. 
 
 Such are the general features of democratical government: 
 but this is a fubjecT: of too much importance to be difmhTed with- 
 out the fulleft examination of every thing that may enable us 
 to decide upon its merits. We will proceed to confider the 
 farther objections that have been alledged againfl it. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 499 1 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THIS TOPIC. — EXAMPLE IN THE DOCTRINfi 
 
 OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT — ITS INUTILITY ARGUED 
 
 FROM HISTORY — FROM THE NATURE OF MIND. — SECOND 
 EXAMPLE : THE RELIGIOUS SANCTION'OF A LEGISLATIVE 
 
 SYSTEM. THIS IDEA IS, I. IN STRICT CONSTRUCTION 
 
 IMPRACTICABLE 2. INJURIOUS. THIRD EXAMPLE: 
 
 PRINCIPLE OF POLITICAL ORDER. — VICE HAS NO ESSEN- 
 TIAL ADVANTAGE OVER VIRTUE. — IMPOSTURE UNNE- 
 CESSARY TO THE CAUSE OF JUSTICE — NOT ADAPTED TO 
 THE NATURE OF MAN. 
 
 ALL the arguments that have been employed to prove the BOOK v. 
 CHAP. XV. 
 infufficiency of democracy grow out of this one root, v v ' 
 
 Importance 
 
 the fuppofed neceffity of deception and prejudice for reftrain- of th ' 8 to P' c - 
 ing the turbulence of human pafTions. Without the afliimp- 
 tion of this principle the argument could not be fuftained for a 
 moment. The direct and decifive anfwer would be, " Are kings 
 and lords intrinfically wiler and better than their humbler 
 neighbours ? Can there be any folid ground of diftindlion except 
 what is founded in perfonal merit ? Are not men, really and 
 
 3 S 2 ftridly 
 
Soo OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 cH°p K xv' ft r ^7 confidered, equal, except fo far as what is perfonal and 
 * v ' inalienable makes them to differ ?" To thefe queftions there can 
 be but one reply, " Such is the order of reafon and abfolute 
 truth, but artificial diftindions are neceffary for the happinefs of 
 mankind. Without deception and prejudice the turbulence of 
 human pafnons cannot be reftrained." Let us then examine the 
 merits of this theory; and thefe will beft be illuflrated by an 
 inflance. 
 
 Example in It has been held by fome divines and fome politicians, that the 
 
 the do&rine 
 
 of eternal do&rine which teaches that men will be eternally tormented in 
 
 punifhmeut : 
 
 another world for their errors and mifconduct in this, is " in its 
 own nature unreafonable and abfurd, but that it is neverthelefs 
 neceffary, to keep mankind in awe. Do we not fee," fay they, 
 " that notwithstanding this terrible denunciation the world is 
 overrun with vice ? What then would be the cafe, if the irregu- 
 lar paffions of mankind were fet free from their prefent reftrainr, 
 and they had not the fear of this retribution before their eyes V* 
 
 its inutility This argument feems to be founded in a fingular inattention 
 
 argued from 
 
 latlory; io the dictates of hiftory and experience, as well as to thofe of 
 
 reafon. The ancient Greeks and Romans had nothing of this 
 dreadful apparatus of fire and brimftone, and a torment " the 
 fmoke of which afcends for ever and ever." Their religion was 
 lefs perfonal than political. They confided in the Gods as pro- 
 tectors of the ftate, and this infpired them with invincible cou- 
 li* r rage. 
 
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 501 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 V .. t 
 
 rage. In periods of public calamity they found a ready confola- 
 tion in expiatory facrifices to appeafe the anger of the Gods. 
 The attention of thefe beings was conceived to be principally 
 directed to the ceremonial of religion, and very little to the moral 
 excellencies and defects of their votaries, which were fuppofed to 
 be fufficiently provided for by the inevitable tendency of moral 
 excellence or defect to increafe or diminifh individual happinefs. 
 If their fyftems included the doctrine of a future exiftence, little 
 attention was paid by them to the connecting the moral deferts of 
 individuals in this life with their comparative fituation in an- 
 other. The fame defect ran through the fyftems of the Per- 
 fians, the Egyptians, the Celts, the Phenicians, the Jews, and in- 
 deed every fyftem which has not been in fome manner or other 
 the offspring of the Chriftian. If we were to form our judg- 
 ment of thefe nations by the above argument, we fhould expect 
 to find every individual among them cutting his neighbour's 
 throat, and hackneyed in the commiffion of every enormity 
 without meafure and without remorfe. But they were in rea- 
 lity as fufceptible of the regulations of government and the order 
 of fociety, as thofe whofe imaginations have been moft artfully 
 terrified by the threats of future retribution, and fome of them 
 were much more generous, determined and attached to the public 
 weal. 
 
 Nothing can be more contrary to a juft obfervation of the from the na- 
 
 c 1 1 ' r ture °f mi^uL 
 
 nature ot the human mind, than to fuppofe that thefe fpeculative 
 
 tenets 
 
5 o2 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 BOOK V. tenets have much influence in making mankind more virtuous 
 
 i^ ri AJt ■ A V. 
 
 <——v ' than they would otherwife be found. Human beings are placed 
 in the midfr. of a fyflem of things, all the parts of which arc 
 ftridtly connected with each other, and exhibit a fympathy and 
 unifon by means of which the whole is rendered intelligible and 
 as it were palpable to the mind. The refpect I fhall obtain and 
 the happinefs I fhall enjoy for the remainder of my life are to- 
 pics of which my mind has a complete comprehenfion. I un- 
 derftand the value of plenty, liberty and truth to myfelf and my 
 fellow men. I perceive that thefe things and a certain conduct 
 intending them are connected, in the vifible fyftem of the world, 
 and not by the fupernatural interpofition of an invifible director. 
 But all that can be told me of a future world, a world of fpirita 
 or of glorified bodies, where the employments are fpiritual and 
 tfie firft caufe is to be rendered a fubjedt of immediate perception, 
 or of a fcene of retribution, where the mind, doomed to everlaft- 
 ing inactivity, fhall be wholly a prey to the upbraidings of re- 
 morfe and the farcafms of devils, is fo foreign to the fyftem of 
 things with which I am acquainted, that my mind in vain en- 
 deavours to believe or to underftand it. If doctrines like thefe 
 occupy the habitual reflections of any, it is not of the lawlefs, the 
 violent and ungovernable, but of the fober and confcientious, 
 perfuading them paflively to fubmit to defpotifm and injuftice, 
 that they may receive the recompenfe of their patience hereafter. 
 This objection is equally applicable to every fpecies of decep- 
 tion. Fables may amufe the imagination j but can never ftand 
 
 in 
 
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 503 
 
 in the place of reafon and judgment as the principles of human ^^ K V Y* 
 conduct. — Let us proceed to a fecond inftance. v v ' 
 
 It is affirmed by RoufTeau in his treatife of the Social Contract, Second ex- 
 ample : the 
 R that no legiflator could ever eftablifh a grand political fvftem religious 
 
 fanctionofa 
 
 without having recourfe to religious impofture. To render a legislative 
 
 fyitem. 
 
 people who are yet to receive the impreflions of political wifdom 
 fufceptible of the evidence of that wifdom, would be to convert 
 the effect of civilifation into the caufe. The legiflator ought not 
 to employ force and cannot employ reafoning ; he is therefore 
 obliged to have recourfe to authority of a different fort, which 
 may draw without compulfion, and perfuade without con- 
 viction*." 
 
 Thefe 
 
 " u Pour qu'un peuph na'ijfant pttt gouter les fames maximes de la politique {5* 
 Jiiivre les regies fondatnentales de la raifon de Pet at, it faudroit que Veffet put devenlr 
 la caufe, que Pefprit focial, qui doit etre Pouvrage de Pinjlitution, prifiddt a Pinjlitu- 
 tion me me, Cs* que les hommes fufjint avant les lots ce qu'ils doivent devenirpar elles. 
 Ainft done le legiflateur tie pouvant employer ni la force ni le raifonnemetit ; dejl une 
 neceffite qu'il recoure a une autorite d'un autre ordre, qui puiffe entrainer fans violence t 
 isf ' perfuader fans convaincre" Du Contrat Social, Liv. II. Chap. VII. 
 
 Having frequently quoted RoufTeau in the courfe of this work, it may be al- 
 lowable to fay one word of his general merits as a moral and political writer. He 
 has been fubjedted to perpetual ridicule for the extravagance of the propofition 
 with which he began his literary career ; that the favage ftate was the genuine 
 and propeT condition of man. It was however by a very flight miftake that he 
 miffed the oppofite opinion which it is the bufinefs of the prefent volume to efta- 
 blifh. 
 
5o 4 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 B, OOK Y* Thefe are the dreams of a fertile conception, bufy in the erec- 
 
 * v ' tion of imaginary fyftems. To a rational mind that project 
 would feem to promife little fubflantial benefit, which fet out 
 from fo erroneous a principle. To terrify men into the recep- 
 tion of a fyftem the reafonablenefs of which they were unable to 
 perceive, is furely a very indire£t method of rendering them 
 fober, judicious, fearlefs and happy. 
 
 in ^£ t IS ' In reality no grand political fyftem ever w r as introduced in the 
 
 condniftion 
 
 ca y c; blifh. It is fufliciently obfervable that, where he defcribes the enthufiaftic influx 
 
 of truth that firfb made him a moral and political writer (in his fecond letter to 
 Malefherbes), he does not fo much as mention his fundamental error, but only 
 the juft principles which led him into it. He was die firft to teach that the im- 
 perfections of government were the only permanent fource of the vices of 
 mankind ; and this principle was adopted from him by Helvetius and others. 
 But he faw farther than this, that government, however reformed, was little ca- 
 pable of aifording folid benefit to mankind, which they did not. This principle 
 has fince (probably without any affiftance from the writings of Roufleau) been 
 exprefled with great perfpicuity and energy, but not developed, by Mr. Thomas 
 Paine in the firft page of his Common Senfe. 
 
 Roufleau, notwithftanding his great genius, was full of weaknefs and preju- 
 dice. His Emile is upon the whole to be regarded as the principal refervoir of 
 philofophical truth as yet exifting in the world, but with a perpetual mixture of 
 abfurdity and miftake. In his writings exprefsly political, Du Control Social and 
 Confute rations fur la Polognc, the unrivalled fuperiority of his genius appears to 
 defert him. To his merits as a reafoner we fhould not forget to add, that the 
 term eloquence is perhaps more precifely defcriptive of his mode of compofition, 
 than of that of any other writer that ever exifted. 
 
 6 manner 
 
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 505 
 
 manner Rouffeau defcribes. Lycurgus, as he obferves, obtained BOOK v* 
 the fanction of the oracle at Delphi to the conftitution he had * ^~~ J 
 eftablifhed. But was it by an appeal to Apollo that he perfuaded 
 the Spartans to renounce the ufe of money, to confent to an 
 equal divifion of land, and to adopt various other regulations the 
 moft contrary to their preconceived prejudices ? No ; it was by 
 an appeal to their underftandings, in the midft of long debate and 
 perpetual counteraction, and through the inflexibility of his cou- 
 rage and refolution, that he at laft attained his purpofe. Lycur- 
 gus thought proper, after the whole was concluded, to obtain the 
 fanction of the oracle, conceiving that it became him to neglect 
 no method of fubftantiating the benefit he had conferred on his 
 countrymen. It is indeed hardly poflible to perfuade a fociety 
 of men to adopt any fyftem without convincing them that it is 
 their wifdom to adopt it. It is difficult to conceive of a fociety 
 of fuch miferable dupes as to receive a code, without any imagi- 
 nation that it is reafonable or wife or juft, but upon this fingle re- 
 commendation that it is delivered to them from the Gods. The 
 only reafonable, and infinitely the moft efficacious method of 
 changing the inftitutions of any people, is by creating in them a 
 general opinion of their erroneoufnefs and infufficiency. 
 
 But, if it be indeed impracticable to perfuade men into the 2. injurious. 
 adoption of any fyftem, without employing as our principal ar- 
 gument the intrinfic rectitude of that fyftem, what is the argu- 
 ment which he would defire to ufe, who had moft at heart the 
 
 3 T welfare 
 
506 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 *hap K xv* We ^ are anc * improvement of the perfons concerned ? "Would he 
 * * begin by teaching them to reafon well, or to reafon ill ? by un- 
 
 nerving their mind with prejudice, or new {bringing it with 
 truth ? How many arts, and how noxious to thofe towards whorrt 
 we employ them, are neceffary, if we would fuccefsfully de- 
 ceive ? We muft not only leave their reafon in indolence at firft, 
 but endeavour to fuperfede its exertion in any future inftance. 
 If men be for the prefent kept right by prejudice, what will be- 
 come of them hereafter, if by any future penetration or any ac- 
 cidental difcovery this prejudice fhall be annihilated ? Detection 
 is not always the fruit of fyftematical improvement, but may be 
 effected by fome folitary exertion of the faculty or fome lumi- 
 nous and irrefiftible argument, while every thing elfe remains as 
 it was. If we would firft deceive, and then maintain our decep- 
 tion unimpaired, we fhall need penal ftatutes, and licenfers of the 
 prefs, and hired minifters of falfhood and impofture. Admi- 
 rable modes thefe for the propagation of wifdom and virtue ! 
 
 Third ex- There is another cafe fimilar to that ftated by RoufTeau, upon 
 
 ample : prin- 
 ciple of po- which much ftrefs has been laid by political writers. " Obe- 
 
 Htical order. 
 
 dience," fay they, " muft either be courted or compelled. "We 
 muft either make a judicious ufe of the prejudices and the igno- 
 rance of mankind, or be contented to have no hold upon them 
 but their fears, and maintain focial order entirely by the feverity 
 of punifhment. To difpenfe us from this painful neceflity, au- 
 thoiity ought carefully to be invefted with a fort of magic per- 
 
 fuafion. 
 
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 507 
 
 fuafion. Citizens fhould ferve their country, not with a frigid 59HF™ 
 
 fubrniffion that fcrupuloufly weighs its duties, but with an en- ' '' 
 
 thufiafm that places its honour in its loyalty. For this reafon 
 our governors and fuperiors muft not be fpoken of with levity. 
 They muft be confidered, independently of their individual cha- 
 racter, as deriving a facrednefs from their office. They muft be 
 accompanied with fplendour and veneration. Advantage muft 
 be taken of the imperfection of mankind. We ought to gain 
 over their judgments through the medium of their fenfes, and 
 not leave the conclufions to be drawn, to the uncertain procefs of 
 immature reafon *." 
 
 This is ftill the fame argument under another form. It takes Vice has no 
 
 eflential ad- 
 
 for granted that reafon is inadequate to teach us our duty ; and vantage over 
 
 virtue. 
 
 of confequence recommends an equivocal engine, which may 
 with equal eafe be employed in the fervice of juftice and injuf- 
 tice, but would furely appear fomewhat more in its place in the 
 fervice of the latter. It is injuftice that ftands moft in need of 
 fuperftition and myftery, and will moft frequently be a gainer by 
 the impofition. This hypothefis proceeds upon an aflumption, 
 which young men fometimes impute to their parents and pre- 
 ceptors. It fays, " Mankind muft be kept in ignorance : if they 
 know vice, they will love it too well ; if they perceive the charms 
 
 * This argument is the great common place of Mr. Burke's Reflections on the 
 Revolution in France, of feveral fucceflive productions of Mr. Necker, and of a 
 multitude of other works upon the fubjeel of government. 
 
 3T2 of 
 
5 o3 
 
 / 
 
 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 BOOK V. f error, they will never return to the fimplicity of truth." And, 
 v ftrange as it may appear, this barefaced and unplaufible argument 
 
 has been the foundation of a very popular and generally received 
 hypothefis. It has taught politicians to believe that a people 
 once funk into decrepitude, as it has been termed, could never 
 afterwards be endued with purity and vigour *► 
 
 Impofbre Is it certain that there is no alternative between deceit and un- 
 
 unneceffary 
 
 to thecaufe relenting feverity ? Does our duty contain no inherent recommen- 
 
 of juftice. 
 
 dations ? If it be not our own intereft that we fhould be tempe- 
 rate and virtuous, whofe intereft is it ? Political inftitution, as has 
 abundantly appeared in the courfe of this work, and will ftill far- 
 ther appear as we go forward, has been too frequently the parent 
 of temptations to error and vice of a thoufand different denomi- 
 nations. It would be well, if legiflators, inftead of contriving 
 farther deceptions and enchantments to retain us in our duty, 
 would remove the impoftures which at prefent corrupt our hearts 
 and engender at once artificial wants and real diftrefs. There 
 would be lefs need, under the fyftem of plain, unornamented 
 truth, than under theirs, that " every vifto fhould be terminated 
 with the galloWs f." 
 
 Why deceive me ? It is either my wifdom to do the thing you 
 require of me, or it is not. The reafons for doing it are either fuf- 
 ficient or infufficient. If fufficient, why fhould not they be the 
 
 Book I, Chap. VIII. 
 
 t Burke's Refleaions. 
 
 machine 
 
OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 509 
 
 machine to govern my underftanding ? Shall I moft improve ?„ ^ K X Y' 
 while I am governed by falfe reafons, by impofture and artifice, ""— " 
 
 which, were I a little wifer, I fhould know were of no value in 
 whatever caufe they may be employed ; or, while my under- 
 ftanding grows every day founder and ftronger by perpetual 
 communication with truth ? If the reafons for what you demand 
 of me be infufficient, why fhould I comply ? It is ftrongly to be 
 fufpected that that regulation, which dares not reft upon its own 
 reafonablenefs, conduces to the benefit of a few at the expence of 
 the many. Impofture was furely invented by him, who thought 
 more of fecuring dignity to himfelf, than of prevailing on man- 
 kind to confent to their own welfare. That which you require 
 of me is wife, no farther than it is reafonable. Why endeavour 
 to perfuade me that it is more wife, more effential than it really 
 is, or that it is wife for any other reafon than the true ? Why 
 divide men into two clafles, one of which is to think and reafon 
 for the whole, and the other to take the conclufions of their fupe- 
 riors on truft ? This diftinction is not founded in the nature of 
 things ; there is no - fuch inherent difference between man and 
 man as it thinks proper to fuppofe. The reafons that fhould 
 convince us that virtue is better than vice are neither complicated 
 nor abftrufe ; and the lefs they be tampered with by the injudi- >^ 
 cious interference of political inftitution, the more will they come 
 home to the underftanding and approve themfelves to the judg- 
 ment of every man. 
 
 Nor 
 
5 10 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XV. 
 
 1 * * 
 
 Not adapted 
 to the nature 
 of man. 
 
 OF POLITICAL IMPOSTURE. 
 
 Nor. is the diftinftion lefs injurious, than it is unfounded. 
 The two clafles which it creates, muft be more and lefs than 
 man. It is too much to expect of the former, while we confign 
 to them an unnatural monopoly, that they fhould rigidly confult 
 for the good of the whole. It is an iniquitous requifition upon 
 the latter, that they fhould never employ their underftandings, 
 never penetrate into the effences of things, but always reft in a 
 deceitful appearance. It is iniquitous, that we mould feek to 
 withhold from them the principles of fimple truth, and exert our- 
 felves to keep alive their fond and infantine miftakes. The time 
 muft probably come when the deceit fhall vanifh ; and then the 
 impoftures of monarchy and ariftocracy will no longer be able to 
 maintain their ground. The change will at that time be moft 
 aufpicious, if we honeftly inculcate the truth now, fecure that 
 men's minds will grow ftrong enough to endure the practice, in 
 proportion as their understanding of the theory excites them to 
 demand it. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 5" ] 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 OFFENSIVE WAR CONTRARY TO THE NATURE OF DEMO- 
 CRACY. — DEFENSIVE WAR EXCEEDINGLY RARE. — ERRO- 
 NEOUSNESS OF THE IDEAS COMMONLY ANNEXED TO THE 
 PHRASE, OUR COUNTRY. — NATURE OF WAR DELINE- 
 ATED. — INSUFFICIENT CAUSES OF WAR — THE ACQUIR- 
 ING A HEALTHFUL AND VIGOROUS TONE TO THE PUB- 
 LIC MIND THE PUTTING A TERMINATION UPON PRI- 
 VATE INSULTS — THE MENACES OR PREPARATIONS OF 
 OUR NEIGHBOURS — THE DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF 
 CONCESSION. — TWO LEGITIMATE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 E 
 
 XCLUSIVELY of thofe objections which have been book v. 
 
 • • . CHAP. XVI. 
 
 urged againft the democratical fyftem as it relates to the * « ' 
 
 internal management of affairs, there are others upon which 
 confiderable ftrefs has been laid in relation to the tranfaction of 
 a ftate with foreign powers, to war and peace, to treaties of 
 alliance and commerce. 
 
 There is indeed an eminent difference with refpect to thefe Offenfive war 
 
 contrary to 
 
 between the democratical fyftem and all others. It is perhaps the nature of 
 
 democracy. 
 
 5 impoffible 
 
5*2 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 ^- „ , I 
 
 impoflible to fhew that a fingle war ever did or could have taken 
 place in the hiftory of mankind, that did not in fome way ori- 
 ginate with thofe two great political monopolies, monarchy and 
 ariftocracy. This might have formed an additional article in the 
 catalogue of evils to which they have given birth, little inferior 
 to any of thofe we have enumerated. But nothing could be 
 more fuperfluous than to feek to overcharge a fubject the evi- 
 dence of which is irrefiftible. 
 
 What could be the fource of mifunderftanding between ftates, 
 where no man or body of men found encouragement to the 
 accumulation of privileges to himfelf at the expence of the reft ? 
 A people among whom equality reigned, would poflefs every 
 thing they wanted, where they poflefled the means of fubfiftence* 
 Why fhould they purfue additional wealth or territory ? Thefe 
 would lofe their value the moment they became the property of 
 all. No man can cultivate more than a certain portion of land. 
 Money is reprefentative, and not real wealth. If every man in 
 the fociety poflefled a double portion of money, bread and every 
 other commodity would fell at double their prefent price, and 
 the relative fituation of each individual would be juft what it had 
 been before. War and conqueft cannot be beneficial to the 
 community. Their tendency is to elevate a few at the expence 
 of the reft, and confequently they will never be undertaken but 
 where the many are the inftruments of the few. But this can- 
 not happen in a democracy, till the democracy fhall become 
 
 fuch 
 
OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 513 
 
 fuch only In name. If expedients can be deviled for maintain- ^P^K v. 
 
 * A tHAr, XVI. 
 
 ing this fpecies of government in its purity, or if there be any v v 
 thing in the nature of wifdom and intellectual improvement 
 which has a tendency daily to make truth prevail more over fall- 
 hood, the principle of offenfive war will be extirpated. But this 
 principle enters into the very efience of monarchy and arillo- 
 cracy. 
 
 Meanwhile, though the principle of offenfive war be in- Defenfivewir 
 
 exceedingly- 
 Compatible with the genius of democracy, a democratical ftate may rare. 
 
 be placed in the neighbourhood of ftates whole government is 
 
 lefs equal, and therefore it will be proper to enquire into the 
 
 fuppofed difadvantages which the democratical ftate may fuftain 
 
 in the conteft. The only fpecies of war in which it can con- 
 
 fiftently be engaged, will be that, the object of which is to repel 
 
 wanton invafion. Such invafions will be little likely frequently 
 
 to occur. For what purpofe mould a corrupt ftate attack a 
 
 country, which has no feature in common with itfelf upon 
 
 which to build a mifunderftanding, and which prefents in the very 
 
 nature of its government a pledge of its own inofFenfivenefs and 
 
 neutrality ? Add to which, it will prefently appear that this ftate, 
 
 which yields the feweft incitements to provoke an attack, will 
 
 prove a very impracticable adverfary to thofe by whom an attack 
 
 {hall be commenced. ~ 
 
 One of the moft, eflential principles of political juftice is diame- Erroneouf- 
 
 nefs of the 
 
 3 U trically 
 
5 U 
 
 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 CHAi 
 
 ideas com- 
 mon')' annex- 
 ed to the 
 phrafe, our 
 country. 
 
 ^ia? *vi" tr i ca ^7 tne reverfe of that which impoftors and patriots have 
 too frequently agreed to recommend. Their perpetual exhorta- 
 tion has been, " Love your country. Sink the perfonal exiftence 
 of individuals in the exiftence of the community. Make little 
 account of the particular men of whom the fociety confifts, but 
 aim at the general wealth, profperity and glory. Furify your 
 mind from the grofs ideas of fenfe, and elevate it to the fingle 
 contemplation of that abftracl: individual of which particular men 
 are fo many detached members, valuable only for the place they 
 fill*." 
 
 The leflbns of reafon on this head are precifely oppofite. 
 " Society is an ideal exiftence, and not on its own account 
 entitled to the fmalleft regard. The wealth, profperity and 
 glory of the whole are unintelligible chimeras. Set no value on 
 any thing, but in proportion as you are convinced of its tendency 
 to make individual men happy and virtuous. Benefit by every 
 practicable mode man wherever he exifts ; but be not deceived 
 by the fpecious idea of affording fervices to a body of men, for 
 which no individual man is the better. Society was inftituted, 
 not for the fake of glory, not to furnifh fplendid materials for 
 the page of hiftory, but for the benefit of its members. The 
 love of our country, if we would fpeak accurately, is another of 
 thofe fpecious illufions, which have been invented by impoftors 
 
 * Du Contrat Social, Zsfc. &c. bfc. 
 
 in 
 
OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 515 
 
 in order to render the multitude the blind mflxumenta of their ,?.?,? I \„Y I ' 
 crooked defigns." 
 
 Meanwhile let us beware of paffing from one injurious 
 extreme to another. Much of what has been ufually underftood 
 by the love of our country is highly excellent and valuable, 
 though perhaps nothing that can be brought within the ftrict 
 interpretation of the phrafe. A wife man will not fail to be the 
 votary of liberty and equality. He will be ready to exert him- 
 felf in their defence wherever they exift. It cannot be a matter 
 of indifference to him, when his own liberty and that of other 
 men with whofe excellence and capabilities he has the belt, 
 opportunity of being acquainted, are involved in the event of 
 the druggie to be made. But his attachment will be to the 
 caufe, and not to the country. Wherever there are men who 
 underftand the value of political juftice and are prepared to affert 
 it, that is his country. Wherever he can moft contribute to the 
 diffufion of thefe principles and the real happinefs of mankind, 
 that is his country. Nor does he defire for any country any 
 other benefit than juftice. 
 
 To apply thefe principles to the fubject of war. And, before 
 that application can be adequately made, it is neceffary to 
 recollect for a moment the force of the term. 
 
 Becaufe individuals were liable to error, and fufFered their ap- Nature of 
 
 war deline- 
 
 3 U 2 prehenfions ated. 
 
CHAP. XVI 
 
 516 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR, 
 
 ^Hvp ! xvi' P renen fions of juftice to be perverted by a bias in favour of them- 
 felves, government was inftituted. Becaufe nations were fuf- 
 ceptible of a fimilar weaknefs, and could find no fufficient 
 umpire to wbom to appeal, war was introduced. Men were 
 induced deliberately to feek each other's lives, and to adjudge the 
 controverfies between them, not according to the dictates of 
 reafon and juftice, but as either fhould prove moft fuccefsful in 
 devaluation and murder. This was no doubt in the firft inftance 
 the extremity of exafperation and rage. But it has fince been 
 converted into a trade. One part of the nation pays another 
 part to murder and be murdered in their ftead ; and the moft 
 trivial caufes, a fuppofed infult or a fally of youthful ambition, 
 have fufficed to deluge provinces with blood. 
 
 We can have no adequate idea of this evil, unlefs we vifit, at 
 leaft in imagination, a field of battle. Here men deliberately 
 deftroy each other by thoufands without any refentment againft 
 or even knowledge of each other. The plain is ftrewed with 
 death in all its various forms, Anguifh and wounds difplay the 
 diverfified modes in which they can torment the human frame. 
 Towns are burned, fhips are blown up in the air while the 
 mangled limbs defcend on every fide, the fields are laid defolate, 
 the wives of the inhabitants expofed to brutal infult, and their 
 children driven forth to hunger and nakednefs. It would be 
 defpicable to mention, along with thefe fcenes of horror, and 
 the total fubverfion of all ideas of moral juftice they muft occa- 
 
 fjon 
 

 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 517 
 
 fion in the auditors and fbedtators, the iinmenfe treafures which BOO" v. 
 
 1 CHAP. XVI. 
 
 are wrung in the form of taxes from thofe inhabitants whofe 
 refidence is at a diftance from the fcene. 
 
 After this enumeration we may venture to enquire what are 
 the juftinable caufes and rules of war. 
 
 It is not a juftifiable reafon, " that we imagine our own peo- rnfufficient 
 
 caufes of 
 
 pie would be rendered more cordial and orderly, if we could « ar : 
 
 6nd a neighbour with whom to quarrel, and who might ferve '^h^SfT 8 
 
 as a touchftone to try the characters and difpofitions of indi- and v! £ or ° ui 
 
 ' * • tone to the 
 
 viduals among ourfelves*." We are not at liberty to have P ublicmind: 
 recourfe to the moll complicated and atrocious of all mifchiefs 
 in the way of an experiment. 
 
 * The reader will eafily perceive that the pretences by which the people of 
 France were inftigated to a declaration of war in April 1792 were in the author's 
 mind in this place. Nor will a few lines be mifpent in this note in Hating the 
 judgment of an impartial obferver upon the wantonnefs with which they have 
 appeared ready -upon different occafions to proceed to extremities. If policy 
 were in queition, it might be doubted, whether the confederacy of kings would 
 ever have been brought into action againft them, had it not been for their pre- 
 cipitation ; and it might be aflced, what impreffion they muft expedt to be made 
 upon the minds of other ftates by their intemperate commifhon of hoftility ? 
 But that ftric~t juflice, which prefcribes to us, never by a hafty interference to 
 determine the doubtful balance in favour of murder, is a fuperior conGderation,. 
 in comparifon with which policy is unworthy fo mujh as to be named. 
 
 It 
 
5i* 
 
 OF THE CAUSES OF WAR. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 . chap. xvr. 
 
 t v ' 
 
 the putting 
 a termination 
 upjn private 
 infults : 
 
 It is not a juftifiable reafon, " that we have been expofed to 
 certain infults, and that tyrants perhaps have delighted in treat- 
 ing with contempt the citizens of our happy ftate who have 
 vifited their dominions." Government ought to protect the 
 tranquillity of thofe who refide within the fphere of its functions ; 
 but, if individuals think proper to vifit other countries, they 
 mull then be delivered over to the protection of general reafon. 
 Some proportion muft be obferved between the evil of which 
 we complain, and the evil which the nature of the propofed 
 remedy inevitably includes. 
 
 the menaces 
 or prepara- 
 tions of our 
 neighbours : 
 
 It is not a juftifiable reafon, "that our neighbour is preparing 
 or menacing hoftilities." If we be obliged to prepare in our 
 turn, the inconvenience is only equal ; and it is not to be 
 believed, that a defpotic country is capable of more exertion 
 than a free one, when the talk incumbent on the latter is indif- 
 penfible precaution. 
 
 the danger- 
 ous confe- 
 quences of 
 eonceffion : 
 
 It has fometimes been held to be found reafbning upon this 
 fubjecT:, "that we ought not to yield little things, which may 
 not in themfelves be fufficiently valuable to authorife this tremen- 
 dous appeal, becaufe a difpofition to yield only invites farther 
 experiments*." Far otherwife ; at leaft when the character of 
 
 * This pretence is fuftained in Paley's Moral and Political Philofophy, Book 
 
 VI. Ch. XII. 
 
 fuch 
 
OF THE CAUSES OF W AH. 519 
 
 fuch a nation is fufhciently underftood. A people that will not BOOK v. 
 
 J r r CHAP. XVI. 
 
 contend for nominal and trivial objects', that maintains the \ v ' 
 
 precife line of unalterable juftice, and that does not fail to be 
 moved at the moment that it ought to be moved, is not the 
 people that its neighbours will delight to urge to extremities. 
 
 " The vindication of national honour" is a very infufficient the vindica- 
 tion of na- ' 
 
 reafon for hoftilities. True honour is to be found only in tional ho- 
 nour. 
 
 integrity and juftice. It has been doubted how far a view to 
 
 reputation ought in matters of inferior moment to be permitted 
 to influence the conducl of individuals ; but, let the cafe of indi- 
 viduals be decided as it may, reputation, confidered as a 
 feparate motive in the inftance of nations, can never be jufti- 
 fiable. In individuals it feems as if I might, confidently with 
 the utmoft real integrity, be fo mifconftrued and mifreprefented 
 by others, as to render my efforts at ufefulnefs almoft always 
 abortive. But this reafon docs not apply to the cafe of nations. 
 Their real ftory cannot eafily be fupprefled. Ufefulnefs and • 
 public fpirit in relation to them chiefly belong to the tranfactions 
 of their members among themfelves ; and tbeir influence in the 
 tranfa&ions of neighbouring nations is a confederation evidently 
 fubordinate. The queftion which refpects the juftifiable caufes 
 of war, would be liable to few difficulties, if we were accuftomed, 
 along with the word, ftrongly to call up to our minds the thing 
 which that word is intended to reprefant. 
 
 4 Accurately 
 
520 "OF the causes of war. 
 
 ^ °K y* Accurately considered, there can probably be but two jufti- 
 
 CHAP. XVI. * ■ •* 
 
 TwTiegitN fi^ble caufes of war, and one of them is among thofe which the 
 *fwar. a eS '°S* C °^ fovereigns and the law of nations, as it has been termed, 
 profcribe : thefe are the defence of our own liberty and of the 
 liberty of others. The well known objection to the latter of 
 thefe cafes, is, " that one nation ought not to interfere in the 
 internal transactions of another ;" and we can only wonder that 
 fo abfurd an objection fhould have beeen admitted fo long. 
 The true principle, under favour of which this falfe one has 
 been permitted to pafs current, is, " that no people and no indi- 
 vidual are fit for the poiTeffion of any immunity, till they under- 
 stand the nature of that immunity, and defire to poflefs it." It 
 may therefore be an unjustifiable undertaking to force a nation 
 to be free. But, when the people themfelves defire it, it is 
 virtue and duty to aflift them in the acquisition. This principle 
 is capable of being abufed by men of ambition and intrigue ; but, 
 accurately confidered, the very fame argument that fhould induce 
 me to exert myfelf for the liberties of my own country, is 
 equally cogent, fo far as my opportunities and ability extend, 
 with refpect to the liberties of any other country. But the 
 morality that ought to govern the conduct of individuals and of 
 nations is in all cafes the fame. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
[ 5" ] 
 
 CHAP. XVII. 
 OF THE OBJECT OF WAR. 
 
 THE REPELLING AN INVADER. — NOT REFORMATION — 
 NOT RESTRAINT — NOT INDEMNIFICATION. — NOTHING 
 CAN BE A SUFFICIENT OBJECT OF WAR THAT IS NOT A 
 SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR BEGINNING IT. — REFLECTIONS 
 ON THE BALANCE OF POWER. 
 
 L 
 
 ET us pafs from the caufes to the objects of war. As BOOK v. 
 
 r J CHAP. XVII. 
 
 The repelling 
 ail invader. 
 
 defence is the only legitimate caufe, the object purfued, 
 reafoning from this principle, will be circumfcribed within very 
 narrow limits. It can extend no farther than the repelling the 
 enemy from our borders. It is perhaps defirable that, in addi- 
 tion to this, he fhould afford fome proof that he does not propofe 
 immediately to renew his invafion ; but this, though defirable, 
 affords no fufficient apology for the continuance of hoftilities. 
 Declarations of war and treaties of peace are inventions of a 
 barbarous age, and would never have grown into eftablifhed 
 ufages, if war had cuftomarily gone no farther than to the limits 
 of defence. 
 
 It will hereafter appear that what has been termed the crimi- Not reform*. 
 
 3 X nal 
 
 tion 
 
5 22 OF THE OBJECT OF WAR. 
 
 BOOK V. najjuftice of nations within therafelves, has only two legitimate 
 v v ' objects, reflraint and reformation. Neither of thefe objedls 
 applies to the cafe of war between independent flates ; and there- 
 fore ideas of criminal juftice are altogether foreign to this fubject. 
 War, as we have already feen, perhaps never originates on the 
 offending fide in the fentiments of a nation, but of a comparatively 
 fmall number of individuals : and, if it were otherwife, it is not 
 in a reciprocation of hoftilities that good fenfe would teach us to 
 iook for the means of reform. 
 
 «ot reftralnt : Reflraint appears to be fometimes neceffary with refpect to the 
 offenders that exift in the midft of a community, becaufe it is the 
 property of fuch offenders to affault us with unexpected violence; 
 but nations cannot move with fuch fecrecy as to make an 
 tinforefeen attack an object of confiderable apprehenfion. The 
 only effectual means of reflraint in this lafl cafe is by difabling, 
 impoverifhing and depopulating the country of our adverfaries j 
 and, if we recollected that they were men as well as ourfelves, 
 and the great mafs of them innocent of the quarrel againfl us,, 
 we fhould be little likely to confider thefe expedients with 
 complacency. 
 
 ■otindemni- Indemnification is another object of war which the fame 
 
 mode of reafoning will not fail to condemn. The true culprits 
 
 can never be difcovered, and the attempt would only ferve to 
 
 cbnfound the innocent and the guilty : not to mention that, nations 
 
 6, having 
 
OF THE OBJECT OF WAR* 5 i$ 
 
 having no common umpire, the reverting, in the conclufion of BOOK v. 
 
 ° CHAP. XVI r. 
 
 every war, to the juftice of the original quarrel and the indemni- v » ' 
 
 fixation to which the parties were entitled, would be a means of 
 rendering the controverfy endlefs. The queftion refpe&ing the Nothing c»« 
 
 be a fufficicrrt 
 
 juftifiable objects of war would be liable to few difficulties, if objea of war 
 
 that is not a 
 
 we laid it down as a maxim, that, as often as the principle or fufficieut 
 
 caufe for be- 
 
 object of a war already in exiftence was changed, this was to be s illnin g »*• 
 confidered as equivalent to the commencement of a new war. 
 This maxim impartially applied would not fail to condemn 
 objects of prevention, indemnification and reftraint. 
 
 The celebrated topic of the balance of power is a mixed con- Reflection* 
 fideration, having fometimes been propofed as the caufe for lance of 
 
 • r power, 
 
 beginning a war, and fometimes as an object to be purfued in a 
 war already begun. A war, undertaken to maintain the balance 
 of power, may be either of defence, as to protect a people who 
 are oppreffed, or of prevention to counteract new acquifitions, 
 or to reduce the magnitude of old poffeffions. We fhall be in 
 little danger of error however, if we pronounce wars undertaken 
 to maintain the balance of power to be univerfally unjuft. If 
 any people be oppreffed, it is our duty, as we have already faid, 
 as far as our ability extends, to fly to their fuccour. But it 
 would be well if in fuch cafes we called our interference by the 
 name which juftice prefcribes, and fought againft the injuftice, 
 and not the power. All hoftilities againft a neighbouring people, 
 becaufe they are powerful, or becaufe we impute to them evil 
 
 3X2 defigns 
 
524 OF THE OBJECT OF WAR. 
 
 chap^xvTi ^efigns which they have not yet begun to carry in execution, 
 are an enormous violation of every principle of morality. If 
 one nation chufe to be governed by the fovereign or an indi- 
 vidual allied to the fovereign of another, as feems to have been 
 the cafe of the people of Spain upon the extinction of the elder 
 branch of the houfe of Auftria, we may endeavour to enlighten 
 them on the fubjedt of government and imbue them with principles 
 of liberty, but it is an execrable piece of tyranny to tell them, 
 "You fhall exchange the defpot you love for the defpot you 
 hate, on account of certain remote confequences we apprehend 
 from the acceffion of the former." The pretence of the balance 
 of power has in a multitude of inftances ferved as a veil to the 
 intrigue of courts, but it would be eafy to ihow that the prefent 
 independence of the different ftates of Europe has in no inftance 
 been materially fupported by the wars undertaken for that pur- 
 pofe. The fafcihation of a people deiiring to become the appen- 
 dage of a fplenclid defpotifm can rarely occur, and might perhaps 
 eafily be counteracted by peaceable means and the diffemination 
 of a few of the moit obvious truths. The defence of a people 
 nxuggling with oppreflion muft always be juft, with this fingle 
 limitation, that the entering into it without urgent need on their 
 part, would unneceffarily fpread the calamities of war, and 
 diminifh thofe energies, the exertion of which would contribute 
 to their virtue and happinefs. Add to this, that the object itfelf, 
 the independence of the different ftates of Europe, is of an equi- 
 vocal nature. The defpotifm, which at prefent prevails among 
 
 therm 
 
CHAP. XVH. 
 * . J 
 
 OF THE OBJECT OF WAR. 525 
 
 them, is certainly not fo excellent as to make us very anxious ^p^n 
 for its prefervation. The prefs is an engine of fo admirable a 
 nature for the deftru&ion of defpotifm, as to elude the fagacity 
 perhaps of the moll vigilant police ; and the internal checks 
 upon freedom in a mighty empire and diftant provinces, can 
 fcarcely be expected to be equally attive with thofe of a petty 
 tyrant. The reafoning will furely be good with refpect to war, 
 which has already been employed upon the fubjecl: of govern- 
 ment, that an inftrument, evil in it's own nature, ought never 
 to be felected as the means of promoting our purpofe, in any cafe 
 in which fele&ion can be pradtifed. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 5*6 1 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 
 
 OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. — FORTIFICATIONS.— GENERAL 
 ACTION. — STRATAGEM. — MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS. — 
 CAPTURE OF MERCANTILE VESSELS. — NAVAL WAR. — HU- 
 MANITY. MILITARY OBEDIENCE. — FOREIGN POSSES- 
 SIONS. 
 
 cha^xvTh \ NOTHER topic refpecting war, which it is of importance 
 o"5~^ ' to confider in this place, relates to the mode of conducting 
 
 operations. .^ Upon this article our judgments will be greatly facilitated by 
 a recollection of the principles already eftablifhed, firft, that no 
 war is juftifiable but a war purely defenfive ; and fecondly, that a 
 war already begun is liable to change its character in this refpect, 
 the moment the object purfued in it becomes in any degree va- 
 ried. From thefe principles it follows as a direct corollary, that 
 it is never allowable to make an expedition into the provinces of 
 the enemy, unlefs for the purpofe of affifting its opprefled inha- 
 bitants. It is fcarcely neceffary to add that all falfe cafuiftry re- 
 fpecting the application of this exception would be particularly 
 odious ; and that it is better undifguifedly to avow the corrupt 
 principles of policy by which we conduft: ourfelves, than hypo- 
 critically to claim the praife of better principles, which we fail not 
 
 to 
 
OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 527 
 
 to wreft to the j uftification of whatever we defire. The cafe of BOOK V. 
 relieving the inhabitants of our enemy's territory and their defire * ' ' 
 of obtaining relief ought to be extremely unequivocal ; we mail 
 be in great danger of mifapprehenfion on the fubject, when the 
 queftion comes under the form of immediate benefit to ourfelves ; 
 and above all we muft recollect that human blood is not to be 
 fhed upon a precarious experiment. 
 
 The little advantages of war that might be gained by offenfive 
 operations will be abundantly compenfated, by the character of 
 magnanimous forbearance that a rigid adherence to defence will 
 exhibit, and the effects that character will produce upon foreign 
 nations and upon our own people. Great unanimity at home 
 can fcarcely fail to be the effect of fevere political juftice. The 
 enemy who penetrates into our country, wherever he meets a 
 man, will meet a foe. Every obflacle will oppofe itfelf to his 
 progrefs, while every thing will be friendly and affifting to our 
 own forces.. He will fcarcely be able to procure the flighteft in- 
 telligence, or underftand in any cafe his relative fituation. The 
 principles of defenfive war are fo fimple as to procure an almoft 
 infallible fuccefs. Fortifications are a very equivocal fpecies of Fortifica- 
 prote&ion, and will oftener be of advantage to the enemy, by 
 being firft taken, and then converted into magazines for his ar- 
 mies. A moving force on the contrary, if it only hovered about 
 his march, and avoided general action, would always preferve the General: 
 real fuperiority. The great engine of military fuccefs or mif- 
 
 carriage^ 
 
 tions. 
 
 a&ion. 
 
528 OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 
 
 cHAP^xvni carr i a g e > is tne article of provifions ; and the farther the enemy 
 1 v ' advanced into our country, the more eafy would it be to cut offhis 
 fupply ; at the fame time that, fo long as we avoided general ac- 
 tion, any decifive fuccefs on his part would be impoffible. Thefe 
 principles, if rigidly practifed, would foon be fo well underftood, 
 that the entering in a hoftile manner the country of a neigh- 
 bouring nation would come to be regarded as the infallible de- 
 ftruction of the invading army. Perhaps no people were ever 
 conquered at their own doors, unlefs they were firft betrayed 
 either by divifions among themfelves or by the abject degene- 
 racy of their character. The more we come to underftand of 
 the nature of juftice, the more it will fhow itfelf to be ftronger 
 than a holt of foes. Men, whofe bofoms are truly pervaded 
 with this principle, cannot perhaps be other than invincible. 
 Among the various examples of excellence in almoft every de- 
 partment that ancient Greece has bequeathed us, the moft con- 
 fpicuous is her refiftance with a handful of men againft three 
 millions of invaders. 
 
 Stratagem. One branch of the art of war, as well as of every other human 
 
 art, has hitherto confifted in deceit. If the principles of this 
 work be built upon a fufficiently folid bafis, the practice of de- 
 ceit ought in all inftances to be condemned, whether it proceed 
 from falfe tendemefs to our friends, or from a defire to haften 
 the downfal of injuftice. Vice is neither the moft allowable nor 
 effectual weapon with which to contend againft vice. Deceit is 
 
 not 
 
OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 529 
 
 not lefs deceit, whether the falfhood be formed into words or be BOOK V. 
 ' CHAP. xvni. 
 
 conveyed through the medium of fictitious appearances. We 
 ihould no more allow ourfelves to miflead the enemy by falfe 
 intelligence or treacherous ambufcade, than by the breach of our 
 declarations, or feigned demonflrations of friendfhip. There is 
 no effential difference between throwing open our arms to em- 
 brace them, and advancing towards them with neutral colours or 
 covering ourfelves with a defile or a wood. By the practice of 
 furprife and deceit we mail ofteneft cut off their draggling parties 
 and fhed moff blood. By an open difplay of our force we fhail 
 prevent detachments from being made, fha!l intercept the poffi- 
 bility of fupply without unneceffary bloodfhed, and there feems 
 no reafon to believe that our ultimate fuccefs will be lefs certain. 
 Why fhould war be made the fcience of difingenuoufnefs and 
 myftery, when the plain dictates of good fenfe would anfwer all 
 its legitimate purpofes ? The firft principle of defence is firmnefs 
 and vigilance. The fecond perhaps, which is not lefs immedi- 
 ately connected with the end to be attained, is franknefs and the 
 open difclofure of our purpofe even to our enemies. What afto- 
 nifhment, admiration and terror would this conduct excite in 
 thofe with whom we had to contend ? What confidence and 
 magnanimity would accompany it in our own bofoms ? Why 
 Ihould not war, as a ftep towards its complete abolition, be 
 brought to fuch perfection, as that the purpofes of the enemy 
 might be utterly baffled without firing a mufket or drawing a 
 fword i 
 
 3 Y Another 
 
53° 
 
 OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 
 V „ ' 
 
 Military con- 
 tributions. 
 
 Capture of 
 
 mercantile 
 
 vefielsj 
 
 Naval war. 
 
 Another corollary not lefs inevitable from the principles which 
 have been delivered, is that the operations of war fhould be li- 
 mited as accurately as poffible to the generating no farther evils 
 than defence inevitably requires. Ferocity ought carefully to be 
 banifhed from it.' Calamity mould as entirely as poffible be pre- 
 vented to every individual who is not actually in arms, and whofe 
 fate has no immediate reference to the event of the war. This 
 principle condemns the levying military contributions, and the 
 capture of mercantile veffels. Each of thefe atrocities would be 
 in another way precluded by the doctrine of fimple defence. We 
 fhould fcarcely think of levying fuch contributions, if we never at- 
 tempted to pafs the limits of our own territory ; and every fpecies 
 of naval war would perhaps be profcribed. 
 
 Humanity. The utmoft benevolence ought to be pradtifed towards our 
 
 enemies. We fhould refrain from the unneceffary deftruction of 
 a fingle life, and afford every humane accommodation to the un- 
 fortunate. The bulk of thofe againft whom we have to contend 
 are comparatively fpeaking innocent of the projected injuftice. 
 Thofe by whom it has been -moft affiduoufly foftered are entitled 
 to our kindnefs as men, and to our compaffion as miftaken. It 
 has already appeared that all the ends of punifhment are foreign 
 to the bufmefs of war. It has appeared that the genuine melio- 
 ration of war, in confequence of which it may be expected ab- 
 folutely to ceafe, is by gradually difarming it of its ferocity. The 
 horrors of war have fometimes been apologifed by a fuppofition 
 
 that 
 
OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 53 i 
 
 that the more intolerable it was made, the more quickly would it BOOK V. 
 
 ' * ' CHAP. XVIII. 
 
 ceafe to infeft the world. But the direct contrary of this is the * * ' 
 
 truth. Severities do but beget feverities in return. It is a mod 
 miftaken way of teaching men to feel that they are brothers, by 
 imbuing their minds with unrelenting hatred. The truly juft 
 man cannot feel animofity, and is therefore little likely to act as 
 if he did. 
 
 Having examined the conduct of war as it refpects our ene- Military obe- 
 dience. 
 
 mies, let us next confider it in relation to the various defcriptions 
 of perfons by whom it is to be fupported. We have feen how 
 little a juft and upright war ftands in need of fecrecy. The 
 plans for conducting a campaign, inftead of being, as artifice and 
 ambition have hitherto made them, inextricably complicated, will 
 probably be reduced to two or three variations, fuited to the dif- 
 ferent circumftances that can poflibly occur in a war of fimple 
 defence. The better thefe plans are known to the enemy, the 
 more advantageous will it be to the refilling party. Hence it 
 follows that the principles of implicit faith and military obedi- 
 ence will be no longer neceflary. Soldiers will ceafe to be ma- 
 chines. The eflential circumftance that conftitutes men machines 
 in this fenfe of the word, is not the uniformity of their motions, 
 when they fee the reafonablenefs of that uniformity. It is their 
 performing any motion, or engaging in any action, the object 
 and utility of which they do not clearly underftand. It is true 
 that in every ftate of human fociety there will be men of an in- 
 
 3 Y 2 tellectua! 
 
5P OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 
 
 chap* xvYfi te ^ e< ^ ua ^ capacity much fuperior to their neighbours. But dV- 
 * ,/ ™~ "* fenfive war, and probably every other fpecies of operation in 
 which it will be neceffary that many individuals fhould act in 
 concert, will perhaps be found fo fimple in their operations, as 
 not to exceed the apprehenfion of the moft common capacities. 
 It is ardently to be defired that the time fhould arrive, when no 
 man fhould lend his affiftance to any operation, without at the 
 fame time exercifing his judgment reflecting the honefty andi 
 the expected event of that operation,. 
 
 foreign pof- The principles here delivered on the conduct of war lead the 
 
 fdfions. 
 
 mind to a very interefting fubject, that of foreign and diftant ter- 
 ritories. Whatever may be the value of thefe principles con- 
 sidered in themfelve&, they become altogether nugatory the mo- 
 ment the idea of foreign, dependencies is admitted. But in rea- 
 lity what argument poffeffing the ; fmalleft degree of plaufibilityr 
 can be alledged in favour of that idea ? The mode in which de- 
 pendencies are acquired, muft be either conq,ueft, ceffion or colo-* 
 mzation. The firft of thefe no true moralift or politician will 
 attempt to defend. The fecond is to be considered as the fame, 
 thing in fubftance as the firft, but with lefs opennefs and inge- 
 nuity. Colonization, which is by much the moft fpecious pre- 
 tence,. is however no more than a pretence. Are thefe provinces, 
 held in a ftate of dependence for our own fake or for , theirs ? I£ 
 &>r our own, we muft recollect this is ftill an ufurpation, and 
 that juftice requires we fhould yield to others what we demand, 
 
 for. 
 
OF THE CONDUCT OF WAR. 533 
 
 for ourfelves, the privilege of being governed by the di&ates of BOOK V. 
 
 their own reafon. If for theirs, they muft be told, that it is the ' *— — '' 
 
 bufinefs of affociations of men to defend themfelves, or, if that be 
 impracticable, to look for fupport to the confederation of then- 
 neighbours^ They mud be told, that defence againft foreign 
 enemies is a very inferior confideration, and that no people were 
 ever either wife or happy who were not left to the fair develop- 
 ment of their inherent powers. Can any thing be more- abfurd 
 than for the Weft India iflands for example to be defended by 
 fleets and armies to be tranfported acrofs the Atlantic ? The fup- 
 port of a mother country extended to her colonies, is much oftener 
 a means of involving them in danger, than of contributing to 
 their fecurity. The connexion is maintained by vanity on one 
 fide and prejudice on the other. If they muft fink into a de- 
 grading ftate of dependence, how'will they be the worfe in be- 
 longing to one ftate rather than another ? Perhaps the firft ftep 
 towards putting aftop to- this fruitful fource of war, would be to* 
 annihilate that monopoly of trade which all enlightened reafoners 
 at prefent agree to condemn, and to throw open the ports of our 
 colonies to all the world. The principle which will not fail to 
 lead us right upon this fubject of foreign dependencies, as well as 
 upon a thoufand others, is, that that attribute, however fplendid, 
 k not really beneficial to a nation, that is not beneficial to the 
 great mafs of individuals of which the nation coufifts. . 
 
 GH A P, 
 
C 534 3 
 
 £ H A P. XIX. 
 OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND TREATIES. 
 
 A COUNTRY MAY LOOK FOR ITS DEFENCE EITHER TO A 
 
 -STANDING ARMY OR AN UNIVERSAL MILITIA. THE 
 
 FORMER CONDEMNED. THE LATTER OBJECTED TO AS 
 
 OF IMMORAL TENDENCY — AS UNNECESSARY — EITHER 
 IN RESPECT TO COURAGE — OR DISCIPLINE. — OF A COM- 
 MANDER. — OF TREATIES. 
 
 BOOK v. ' I ' K E ^ topic which it may be neceffary to examine as 
 
 "CHAP XIX. f : 
 
 v I j -*■ to the fubject of war, is the conduct it becomes us to ob- 
 ferve refpecting'it in a time of peace. This article may be diflri- 
 buted into two heads, military eftablifhments and treaties of 
 alliance. 
 
 Axovmtry If military eftablifhments in time of peace be judged proper, 
 
 may look for 
 
 its defence their purpofe may be effected either by configning the practice 
 
 either to a 
 
 ftanding of military difcipline to a certain part of the community, or by 
 
 army or an 
 
 uniyerfal making every man whofe age is fuitable for that purpofe a 
 foldier. 
 
 T^former The preferablenefs of the latter of thefe methods to the former 
 
 is 
 
OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS AND TREATIES. s35 
 
 is obvious. The man that is merely a foldier, mud always be J?,?£ K ^' 
 
 * * CHAP. XIX. 
 
 uncommonly depraved. War in his cafe inevitably degenerates *~ 
 
 from the neceffary precautions of a perfonal defence, into a trade 
 by which a man fells his fkill in murder and the fafety of his ex- 
 iftence for a pecuniary recompenfe. The man that is merely a 
 foldier, ceafes to be, in the fame fenfe as his neighbours, a citizen. 
 He is cut off from the reft of the community, and has fentiments 
 and a rule of judgment peculiar to himfelf. He confiders his 
 countrymen as indebted to him for their fecurity ; and, by an un- 
 avoidable trandtion of reafoning, believes that in a double fenfe • 
 they are at his mercy. On the other hand that every citizen 
 fhould exercife in his turn the functions of a foldier, feems pe- 
 culiarly favourable to that confidence in himfelf and in the re- 
 fources of his country, which it is fo defirable he fhould enter- 
 tain. It is congenial to that equality, which muft fubfift in an 
 eminent degree before mankind in general can be either virtuous 
 or wife. And it feems to multiply the powers of defence in a 
 country, fo as to render the idea of its falling under the yoke of 
 an enemy in the utmoft degree improbable. 
 
 There are reafons however that oblige us to doubt reflecting The latter 
 
 • r i • • i r i objefted to 
 
 the propriety of cultivating under any form the fyftem of mili- as of im- 
 
 . r . . . r . . moral ten- 
 
 tary duciphne in time of peace. It is in this refpecT: with na- dency ; 
 tions as it is -with individuals. The man that with a piftol bul- 
 let is fure of his mark, or that excels his contemporaries in the 
 exercife of the fword, can hardly efcape thofe obliquities of under- - 
 
 2 ftanding . 
 
jtf O* MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
 CHA? ! xnc ft anc K n g which thefe accomplifhments are calculated to nourifh. 
 ' ' It is not to be expected that he fhould entertain all that confi- 
 dence in reafon and diftafte of violence which fevere truth pre- 
 fcribes. It is beyond all controverfy that war, though the prac- 
 tice of it under the prefent ftate of the human fpecies may in 
 fome inftances be unavoidable, is an idea pregnant with calamity 
 and vice. It cannot be a matter of indifference, for the human 
 mind to be fyftematically familiarifed to thoughts of murder and 
 defolation. The difciple of mere reafon would not fail at the 
 fight of a mufket or a fword to be impreffed with fentiments of 
 abhorrence. Why expel thefe fentiments ? Why connect the 
 difcipline of death with ideas of feftivity and fplendour ; which 
 will inevitably happen, if the citizens, without opprefilon, are 
 accuftomed to be drawn out to encampments and reviews ? Is it 
 poffible that he who has not learned to murder his neighbour 
 with a grace, is imperfect in the trade of man ? 
 
 If it be replied, " that the generating of -error is not infepa- 
 rable from military difcipline, and that men may at fome time be 
 fufhciently guarded againft the abufe, even while they are taught 
 the life of arms ;" it will be found upon reflection that this argu- 
 ment is of little weight. Though error be not unalterably con- 
 nected with the fcience of arms, it will for a long time remain 
 fo. When men are fufEciently improved to be able to handle 
 familiarly and with application of mind the inftruments of death 
 •jaythout injury, they will alfo be fufficiently improved to be able 
 
 to 
 
AND TREATIES. 537 
 
 to mailer any fludy with much greater facility than at prefent, ^p 1 ^" 
 and confequently the cultivation of the art military in time of w 
 
 peace will have Hill fewer inducements to recommend it to our 
 choice. — To apply thefe confiderations to the prefent fituation of 
 mankind. 
 
 We have already feen that the fyflem of a {landing army is as unnecef- 
 
 ... . f al 7 ■ 
 
 altogether indefenhble, and that an univerfal militia is a much 
 
 more formidable defence, as well as infinitely more agreeable to 
 the principles of juftice and political happinefs. It remains to be 
 feen what would be the real fituation of a nation furrounded by 
 other nations in the midft of which Handing armies were main- 
 tained, which mould neverthelefs upon principle wholly negledt 
 the art military in feafons of peace. In fuch a nation it will pro- 
 bably be admitted, that, fo far as relates to mere numbers, an 
 army may be raifed upon the fpur of occafion, nearly as foon as 
 in a nation the citizens of which had been taught to be foldiers. 
 But this army, though numerous, would be in want of many of 
 thofe principles of combination and activity which are of mate- 
 rial importance in a day of battle. There is indeed included in either in re, 
 the fuppofition, that the internal Hate of this people is more equal rage : 
 and free than that of the people by whom they are invaded. This 
 will infallibly be the cafe in a comparifon between a people with 
 a Handing army and a people without one ; between a people who 
 can be brought blindly and wickedly to the invafion of their 
 peaceful neighbours, and a people who will not be induced to 
 
 3 Z %ht 
 
53 8 OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
 BOOK V. fig-hj- b ut [ n t ^ e i r own defence. The latter therefore will be 
 
 CHAP. XIX. o 
 
 v ., ' 
 
 obliged to compare the ftate of fociety and government in their 
 own country and among their neighbours, and will not fail to be 
 impreffed with great ardour in defence of the ineftimable advan- 
 tages they poffefs. Ardour, even in the day of battle, might 
 prove fufficient. A body of men, however undifciplined, whom 
 nothing could induce to quit the field, would infallibly be victo- 
 rious over their veteran adverfaries, who, under the circumftances 
 of the cafe, could not poffibly have an accurate conception of the 
 object for which they were fighting, and therefore could not en- 
 tertain an invincible love for it. It is not certain that activity 
 and difcipline oppofed to ardour, have even a tendency to turn 
 the balance of flaughter againft the party that wants them. Their 
 great advantage confifts in their power over the imagination to 
 aftonifh, to terrify and confound. An intrepid courage in the 
 party thus affailed would foon convert them from fources of 
 defpair into objects of contempt.. 
 
 «■ difcipline. But it would be extremely unwife in us to have no other re- 
 fource but in the chance of this intrepidity. A refource much 
 furer and more agreeable to juftice is in recollecting that the war 
 of which we treat is a war of defence. Battle is not the object 
 of fuch a war. An army, which, like that of Fabius, by keep- 
 ing on the hills, or by whatever other means, rendered it 
 impracticable for the enemy to force them to an engagement, 
 might look with fcom upon his impotent efforts to enflave the 
 
 country.. 
 
AND TREATIES. 539 
 
 country. One advantage included in fuch a fyftem of war is, book v. 
 
 J ° J ' CHAP. XIX. 
 
 that, as its very efTence is protraction, the defending army might k v ' 
 
 in a fhort time be rendered as fkilful as the affailants. Difcipline, 
 like every other art, has been reprefented by vain and interefted 
 men as furrounded with imaginary difficulties, but is in reality 
 exceedingly fimple ; and would be learned much more effec- 
 tually in the midft of real war than in the puppet mow exhibi- 
 tions ofa period of peace. 
 
 It is defirable indeed that we mould have a commander of con- Ofa com- 
 mander, 
 fiderable (kill, or rather of confiderable wifdom, to reduce this 
 
 patient and indefatigable fyftem into practice. This is of much 
 more importance than the mere difcipline of the ranks. But the 
 nature of military wifdom has been greatly mifreprefented. Ex- 
 perience in this, as well as in other arts, has been unreafonably 
 magnified, and the general power of a cultivated mind been 
 thrown into fhade. It will probably be no long time before this 
 quackery of profeffional men will be thoroughly exploded. How 
 perpetually do we meet with thofe whom experience finds incor- 
 rigible ; while it is recorded of one of the greateft generals of an- 
 tiquity, that he fet out for his appointment wholly unacquainted 
 with his art, and was indebted for that fkill, which broke out im- 
 mediately upon his arrival, to the affiduoufnefs of his enquiries, 
 and a careful examination of thofe writers by whom the art had 
 moft fuccefsfully been illuftrated * ? At all events it will be ad- 
 
 * Ciceronis Lucul!us,jive Academkorum Liber Seeutidus, init. 
 
 3 Z 2 mitted 
 
54° 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS 
 
 mitted, that the maintenance of a ftanding army or the perpetual 
 difcipline of a nation is a very dear price to pay for the purchafe 
 of a general, as well as that the purchafe would be extremely pre- 
 carious, if we were even perfuaded to confent to the condition. 
 It may perhaps be true, though this is not altogether clear, that a 
 nation by whom military difcipline was wholly neglected would 
 be expofed to fome difadvantage. In that cafe it becomes us to 
 weigh the neglect and cultivation together, and to caft the balance 
 on that fide to which upon mature examination it fhall appear to 
 belong. 
 
 Of treaties. A fecond article which belongs to the military fyftem in a fea- 
 fon of peace is that of treaties of alliance. This fubject may 
 eafily be difpatched. Treaties of alliance are in all cafes wrong, 
 in the firft place,, becaufe all abfolute promifes are wrong, and 
 neither individuals nor bodies of men ought to preclude them~ 
 felves from the benefit of future improvement and deliberation. 
 Secondly, they are wrong, becaufe they are in all cafes nugatory. 
 Governments, and public men, will not, and ought not to hold 
 themfelves bound to the injury of the concerns they condudr, 
 becaufe a parchment, to which they or their predeceflbrs were a 
 party, requires it at their hands. If the concert demanded in 
 time of need, approve itfelf to their judgment or correfpond with 
 their inclination, it will be yielded, though they were under no 
 previous engagement for that purpofe. Treaties of alliance ferve 
 to no other end, than to exhibit by their violation an appearance 
 
 of 
 
AND TREATIES. 
 
 541 
 
 of profligacy and vice, which unfortunately becomes too often BOOK v. 
 
 • CHAP. XIX. 
 
 a powerful encouragement to the mconnltency of individuals. » , ■ 
 
 Add to this, that, if alliances were engines as powerful, as they 
 are really impotent, they could feldom be of ufe to a nation 
 uniformly adhering to the principles of juflice. They would be 
 ufelefs, becaufe they are in reality ill calculated for any other pur- 
 pofes than thofe of ambition. They might be pernicious, becaufe 
 it would be beneficial for nations as for individuals to look for 
 refources at home, inftead of depending upon the precarious com- 
 panion of their neighbours. 
 
 x 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 542 ] 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 OF DEMOCRACY AS CONNECTED WITH THE 
 TRANSACTIONS OF WAR. 
 
 BOOKV. 
 
 CHAP. XX. 
 
 EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ARE OF SUBORDINATE CONSIDERA- 
 TION. — APPLICATION. — FARTHER OBJECTIONS TO DE- 
 MOCRACY I. IT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH SECRECY — 
 
 THIS PROVED TO BE AN EXCELLENCE 2. ITS MOVE- 
 MENTS ARE TOO SLOW 3. TOO PRECIPITATE. EVILS 
 
 OF ANARCHY CONSIDERED. 
 
 AVING thus endeavoured to reduce the fubject of war 
 to its true principles, it is time that we fhould recur to 
 
 External af- 
 fairs are of th e maxim delivered at our entrance upon this iubjedL that 
 
 fubordmate J 
 
 coniideration. individuals are every thing, and fociety, abftrac~ted from the 
 individuals of which it is compofed, nothing. An immediate 
 confequence of this maxim is, that the internal affairs of the 
 fociety are entitled to our principal attention, and the external 
 are matters of inferior and fubordinate coniideration. The 
 internal affairs are fubjecls of perpetual and hourly concern, the 
 external are periodical and precarious only. That every man 
 fhould be impreffed with the confcioufnefs of his independence, 
 and refcued from the influence of extreme want and artificial 
 
 defires, 
 
OF DEMOCRACY, &c. 543 
 
 defires, are purpofes the moft interefting that can fuggeft them- BOOK v. 
 
 felves to the human mind ; but the life of man might pafs, in a l v 
 
 ftate uncorrupted by ideal pafhons, without its tranquillity being 
 
 fb much as once difturbed by foreign invafions. The influence 
 
 that a certain number of millions, born under the fame climate 
 
 with ourfelves, and known by the common appellation of 
 
 Englifh or French, fhall poffefs over the adminiftrative councils 
 
 of their neighbour millions, is a circumftance of much too airy 
 
 and diftant confideration, to deferve to be made a principal 
 
 object in the inflitutions of any people. The beft influence we 
 
 can exert is that of a fage and upright example. 
 
 If therefore it fhould appear that of thefe two articles, internal Application. 
 and external affairs, one muft in fome degree be facrificed to the 
 other, and that a democracy will in certain refpects be lefs fitted 
 for the affairs of war than fome other fpecies of government, 
 good fenfe would not hefitate between thefe alternatives. We 
 fhould have fufficient reafon to be fatisfied, if, together with the 
 benefits of juftice and virtue at home, we had no reafon to 
 defpair of our fafety from abroad. A confidence in this article 
 will feldom deceive us, if our countrymen, however little trained 
 to formal rules and the uniformity of mechanifm, have ftudied 
 the profeffion of man, underftand his attributes and his nature, 
 and have their necks unbroken to the yoke of blind credulity and 
 abje£t fubmiffion. Such men, inured, as we are now fuppofing 
 them, to a rational ftate of fociety, will be full of calm confi- 
 dence 
 
544 OF DEMOCRACY AS CONNECTED WITH 
 
 ^P^^.Y' dence and penetrating activity, and thefe qualities will ftand 
 " ' them in ftead of a thoufand leflbns in the fchool of military 
 mechanifm. If democracy can be proved adequate to wars of 
 defence, and other governments be better fitted for wars of a 
 different fort, this would be an argument, not of its imperfec- 
 tion, but its merit. 
 
 Farther oh- It has been one of the objections to the ability of a democracy 
 
 je&ions to 
 
 democracy: in war, " that it cannot keep fecrets. The legiflative afTembly, 
 compatible whether it poffefs the initiative, or a power of control only, in 
 clccy- executive affairs, will be perpetually calling for papers, plans and 
 information, crofs examining minifters, and fifting the policy 
 and the juftice of public undertakings. How fhall we be able 
 to cope with an enemy, if he know precifely the points we 
 mean to attack, the ftate of our fortifications, and the ftrength 
 and weaknefs of our armies ? How fhall we manage our treaties 
 with fkill and addrefs, if he be informed precifely of the fenti- 
 ments of our mind and have accefs to the inftru&ions of our 
 ambaffadors ?" 
 
 this proved It happens in this inftance, that that which the objection attacks 
 
 ceiience; as the vice of democracy, is one of its moft effential excellencies. 
 The trick of a myfterious carriage is the prolific parent of every 
 vice ; and it is an eminent advantage incident to democracy, that, 
 though the proclivity of mind has hitherto reconciled this fpecies 
 of adminiftration in fome degree to the keeping of fecrets, yet 
 6 its 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
1 
 
AN 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE, 
 
 AND 
 
 ITS INFLUENCE 
 
 GENERAL VIRTUE AND HAPPINESS. 
 
 B Y 
 
 WILLIAM GODWIN. 
 
 IN TWO VOLUMES 
 VOL. II. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED FOR G. G. J. AND J. ROBINSON, PATERNOSTER-ROW. 
 M.DCC.XCIII. 
 
THE TRANSACTIONS OF WAR. 545 
 
 its inherent tendency is to annihilate them. Why fhould dif- BOOK v. 
 
 ' J CHAP. XX. 
 
 ingenuity and concealment be more virtuous or more beneficial v v * 
 
 in nations than in individuals ? Why fhould that, which every 
 man of an elevated mind would difdain in his perfonal character, 
 be entitled to more lenity and toleration, if undertaken by him 
 as a minifter of ftate ? Who is there tbat fees not, that this inex- 
 tricable labyrinth was artfully invented, left the people fhould 
 underftand their own affairs, and, underftanding, become in- 
 clined to conduct them ? With refpecl to treaties, it is to be 
 fufpected that they are in all inftances fuperfluous. But, if 
 public engagements ought to be entered into, what effential differ- 
 ence is there between the governments of two countries endea- 
 vouring to overreach each other, and the buyer and feller ia 
 any private tranfaclion adopting a fimilar proceeding ? 
 
 This whole fyftem proceeds upon the idea of national gran- 
 deur and glory, as if in reality thefe words had any fpecific 
 meaning. Thefe contemptible objects, thefe airy names, have 
 from the earl^eft page of hiftory been made the oftenfible colour 
 for the moft pernicious undertakings. Let us take a fpecimen of 
 their value from the moft innocent and laudable purfuits. If I 
 afpire to be a great poet, a great hiftorian, fo far as I am influ- 
 enced by the dictates of reafon, it is that I may be ufeful to man- 
 kind, and not that I may do honour to my country. Is Newton 
 the better becaufe he was an Englishman, or Galileo the worfe 
 becaufe he was an Italian ? Who can endure to pat this high 
 
 4 A founding 
 
546 OF DEMOCRACY AS CONNECTED WITH 
 
 59?J\Z" founding nonfenfe in the balance againft the beft interefts of 
 
 CHAP. XX. t - J ° 
 
 " mankind, which will always fuffer a mortal wound, when dexte- 
 
 rity, artifice and concealment are made topics of admiration and 
 applaufe ? The underftanding and the virtues of mankind will 
 always keep pace with the manly fimplicity of their defigns and 
 the undifguifed integrity of their hearts. 
 
 2. its move- It has farther been obje&ed to a democratical ftate in its tranf- 
 
 ments are too • • 
 
 flow : adions with foreign powers, " that it is incapable of thofe rapid 
 
 and decifive proceedings, which in fome fituations have fo emi- 
 nent a tendency to enfure fuccefs." If by this objection it be 
 underftood that a democratical ftate is ill fitted for dexterity and 
 furprife, the rapidity of an afTaffin, it has already received a 
 fufficient anfwer. If it be meant that the regularity of its pro- 
 ceedings may ill accord with the impatience of a neighbouring 
 defpot, and, like the Jews of old, we defire a king " that we may 
 be like the other nations," this is a very unreafonable requifition. 
 A juft and impartial reafoner will be little defirous to fee his 
 country figure high in the diplomatical roll, deeply involved in 
 the intrigues of nations, and affiduoufly courted by foreign 
 princes as the infbrument of their purpofes. A more groundlefs 
 and abfurd paflion cannot feize upon any people than that of 
 glory, the preferring their influence in the affairs of Europe to 
 their internal happinefs and virtue, for thefe obje&s will perpe- 
 tually 'counteract and da'fh with each other. 
 
 But 
 
THE TRANSACTIONS OF WAR. 547 
 
 But democracy is by no means neceflarily of a phlegmatic *? 00K v - 
 character, or obliged to take every propofition that is made to it, v * ' 
 ad referendum^ for the confederation of certain primary afTem- 
 blies, like the ftates of Holland. The firft principle in the 
 inftitution of government itfelf, is the neceffity, under the 
 prefent imperfections of mankind, of having fome man or body 
 of men to act on the part of the whole. Wherever government 
 fubfifts, the authority of the individual muft be in fome degree 
 fuperfeded. It does not therefore feem unreafonable for a repre- 
 fentative national afTembly to exercife in certain cafes a difcre- 
 tionary power. Thofe privileges, which are vefted in indivi- 
 duals {elected out of the mafs by the voice of their fellows, and 
 who will fpeedily return to a private ftation, are by no means 
 liable to the fame objections, as the exclufive and unaccommo- 
 dating privileges of an ariftocracy. Reprefentation, together 
 with many difadvantages, has this benefit, that it is able impar- 
 tially and with difcernment to call upon the moft enlightened 
 part of the nation to deliberate for the whole, and may thus 
 generate a degree of wifdom, a refined penetration of fentiment, 
 which it would have been unreafonable to expect as the refult 
 of primary affemblies. 
 
 A third objection more frequently offered againft democratical 3. too preci- 
 pitate. 
 government is, " that it is incapable of that mature and delibe- 
 rate proceeding which is alone fuitable to the decifion of fuch 
 important concerns. Multitudes of men have appeared fubject 
 
 4 A 2 to ' 
 
CHAP. XX. 
 v . ' 
 
 548 OF DEMOCRACY AS CONNECTED WITH 
 
 chS K xx' t0 ^ ts °^ occa ^ lona l infanity : they act from the influence of 
 
 rage, fufpicion and defpair : they are liable to be hurried into 
 
 the moll unjuftifiable extremes by the artful practices of an. im- 
 
 poflor." One of the moll obvious anfwers to this objection is> 
 
 that we mull not judge of a fovereign people by the example of 
 
 the rude multitude in defpotic Hates. We mull not judge of 
 
 men born to the exercife of rational functions, by the example 
 
 of men rendered mad with oppreffion, and drunk with the 
 
 acquifition of new born power. Another anfwer is, that for all 
 
 men to fhare the privileges of all is the law of our nature and 
 
 the dictate of juftice. The cafe in this inllance is. parallel to that 
 
 of an individual in his private concerns. It is true that, whila 
 
 each man is mailer of his own affairs, he is liable to all the flarts 
 
 of paffion. He is attacked by the allurements of temptation and 
 
 the tempeft of rage, and may be guilty of the moll fatal errors, 
 
 before reflection and judgment come forward to his aid. But 
 
 this is no fufEcient reafon for depriving men of the direction of 
 
 their own concerns.. We mould endeavour to make them wife- 
 
 1 
 
 and not to make them flaves. The depriving men of their felf? 
 government is in the firft place unjuft, while in the fecond this 
 felf-government, imperfect as it is, will be, found more falutary 
 than any thing that can be fubflituted in its place. 
 
 Evils of anar- The nature of anarchy has never been fufficiently underflood. 
 
 £dcred°. n " It is undoubtedly a horrible calamity, but it is lefs horrible than 
 
 defpotifm. Where anarchy has flain its hundreds, defpotifm ha3 
 
 a facrificed. 
 
THE TRANSACTIONS OF WAR. 
 
 P& 
 
 facrificed millions upon millions, with this only effect, to perpe- book V, 
 tuate the ignorance, the vices and- the mifery of mankind. 
 Anarchy is a fhort lived mifchief, while defpotifm is all but 
 immortal. It is unquestionably a dreadful remedy, for the people 
 to yield to all their furious paflions, till the fpecfacle of their 
 effects gives ftrength to recovering reafon : but, though it be a 
 dreadful remedy, it is a fure one. No idea can be fuppofed, 
 more pregnant with abfurdity, than that of a whole people 
 taking arms againft each other till they are all exterminated. It 
 is to defpotifm that anarchy is indebted for its fting. If defpo- 
 tifm were not ever watchful for its prey, and mercilefsly prepared 
 to take advantage of the errors of mankind, this ferment, like fo 
 many others, being left to itfelf, would fubfide into an even, . 
 clear and delightful calm. Reafon is at all times progreffive. 
 Nothing can give permanence to error, that does not convert it 
 into an eftabhlhment, and arm it with powers to reuft aa. 
 invafion» 
 
 CHAP, 
 
[ m ] 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 OF THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 HOUSES OF ASSEMBLY. — THIS INSTITUTION UNJUST. — DE- 
 LIBERATE PROCEEDING THE PROPER ANTIDOTE. — SEPA- 
 RATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWER CON- 
 SIDERED. — SUPERIOR IMPORTANCE OF THE LATTER. — 
 FUNCTIONS OF MINISTERS. 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 * , ' 
 
 Houfes of 
 auembly. 
 
 f~\ N E of the articles which has been moft eagerly infilled on 
 ^-^ by the advocates of complexity in political inftitutions, is 
 that of " checks, by which a rafh proceeding may be prevented, 
 and the provifions under which mankind have hitherto lived 
 with tranquillity, may not be reverfed without mature delibera- 
 tion." We will fuppofe that the evils of monarchy and arifto- 
 cracy are by this time too notorious to. incline the fpeculative en- 
 quirer to feek for a remedy in either of thefe. " Yet it is poflible, 
 without the inftitution of privileged orders, to find means that 
 may anfwer a fimilar purpofe in this refpect. The reprefenta- 
 tives of the people may be diftributed for example into two afTem- 
 blies ; they may be chofen with this particular view to constitute 
 an upper and a lower houfe, and may be diftinguifhed from each 
 other, either by various qualifications of age or fortune, or by 
 
 being 
 
OF THE COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT. 551 
 
 being chofen by a greater or fmaller number of ele&ors, or for a <?° A p K X x 
 fhorter or longer term." 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 V J 
 
 To every inconvenience that experience can produce or imagi- TI " s mftltu- 
 nation fuggeft there is probably an appropriate remedy. This 
 remedy may either be fought in the dictates of reafon or in arti- 
 ficial combinations encroaching upon thofe di&ates. Which are 
 we to prefer? There is no doubt that the inftitution of two 
 houfes of afiembly is contrary to the primary dictates of reafon 
 and juftice. How fhall a nation be governed I Agreeably to the 
 opinions of its inhabitants, or in oppofition to them ? Agreeably 
 to them undoubtedly. Not, as we cannot too often repeat, be- 
 caufe their opinion is a ftandard of truth, but becaufe, however 
 erroneous that opinion may be, we can do no better. There is 
 no effectual way of improving the inftitutions of any people, but 
 by enlightening their underftandings. He that endeavours to 
 maintain the authority of any fentiment, not by argument, but by 
 force, may intend a benefit, but really inflicts an extreme injury. 
 To fuppofe that truth can be inftilled through any medium but 
 that of its intrinfic evidence, is the raoft flagrant of all errors. 
 He that believes the raoft fundamental propofition through the 
 influence of authority, does not believe a truth, but a falfhood. 
 The propofition itfelf he does not underftand, for thoroughly to 
 underftand it, is to perceive the degree of evidence with which 
 it is accompanied ; thoroughly to underftand ; it is to know the 
 full meaning of its terms, and, by neceflary confequence, to per- 
 ceive 
 
■S& €F THE COMPOSITION 
 
 cPhap/xxi". ce ^ ve * n wnat refpeds they agree or difagree with each other. Ah 
 * ' that he believes is, that it is very proper he fhould fubmit to 
 ufurpation and injuftiee. 
 
 It was imputed to the late government of France, that, when 
 they called an aflembly of notables in 1787, they contrived, by 
 .dividing the aflembly into feven difiincl: corps, and not allowing 
 -them to vote otherwife than in thefe corps, that the vote of fifty 
 perfons fhould be capable of operating as if they were a majority 
 in an aflembly of one hundred and forty-four. It would have 
 .been ftill worfe, if it had been ordained that no meafure fhould 
 .be confidered as the meafure of the aflembly, unlefs it were 
 adopted by the unanimous voice of all the corps : eleven perfons 
 might .then, in voting a negative, have operated as a majority of 
 one hundred and forty-four. This may ferve as a fpecimen of 
 the effects of diftributing a reprefentative national aflembly into 
 two or more houfes. Nor fhould we fuffer ourfelves to be de- 
 ceived under the pretence of the innocence of a negative in com- 
 parifon with an affirmative. In a country in which univerfal 
 fruth was already eftablifhed, there would be little need of a re- 
 .prefentative aflembly- In a country into whofe inflitutions error 
 has infmuated itfelf, a negative upon the repeal of thofe errors is 
 -jthe real affirmative. 
 
 The inftitution of two houfes of affembly is the direct method 
 £0 divide a nation againit itfelf. One of thefe houfes will in a 
 
 greater 
 
OF GOVERNMENT. 553 
 
 greater or lefs degree be the afylum of ufurpation, monopoly and "BOOK v. 
 
 CHAP. XXI. 
 
 privilege. Parties would expire as foon as they were born, in a v — v ' 
 
 country where oppofition of fentiments and a fbruggle of interefts 
 were not allowed to aflume the formalities of diftinct infti- 
 tution. 
 
 Meanwhile a fpecies of check perfectly fimple, and which ap- Deliberate 
 
 proceeding 
 
 pears fufficiently adequate to the purpofe, fuggefts itfelf in the the pioper 
 
 antidote. 
 
 idea of a flow and deliberate proceeding which the reprefentative 
 aflembly fhould prefcribe to itfelf. Perhaps no proceeding of 
 this aflembly fhould have the force of a general regulation till it 
 had undergone five or fix fucceflive difcuflions in the aflembly, 
 or till the expiration of one month from the period of its being 
 propofed. Something like this is the order of the Englifh houfe 
 of commons, nor does it appear to be by any means among the 
 worft features of our conftitution. A fyftem like this would be 
 fufficiently analogous to the proceedings of a wife individual, who 
 certainly would not with to determine upon the moft important 
 concerns of his life without a fevere examination, and ftill lefs 
 would omit this examination, if his decifion were deftined to be 
 a rule for the conduct and a criterion to determine upon the rec- 
 titude of other men. 
 
 Perhaps, as we have faid, this flow and gradual proceeding 
 ought in no inftance to be difpenfed with by the national repre- 
 fentative aflembly. This feems to be the true line between the 
 
 4 B functions 
 
554 0F TH E COMPOSITION 
 
 CHAP. XXI 
 
 cHA° K xxi f unc ^ ons °f tne aflembly and its minifters. It would give a 
 character of gravity and good fenfe to this central authority, that 
 would tend eminently to fix the confidence of the citizens in its 
 wifdom and juftice. The mere votes of the aflembly, as diftin- 
 guifhed from its acts and decrees, might ferve as an encourage- 
 ment to the public functionaries, and as affording a certain de- 
 gree of hope refpecting the fpeedy cure of thofe evils of which 
 the public might complain ; but they fhould never be allowed to 
 be pleaded as the legal juftification of any action. A precaution 
 like this would not only tend to prevent the fatal confequences of 
 any precipitate judgment of the aflembly within itfelf, but of tu- 
 mult and diforder from without. An artful demagogue would 
 find it much more eafy to work up the people into a fit of mo- 
 mentary infanity, than, to retain them in it for a month in op- 
 pofition to the efforts of their real friends to undeceive them. 
 Meanwhile the confent of the aflembly to take their demand into 
 consideration might reafonably be expected to moderate their 
 violence. 
 
 Separation of Scarcely any plaufible argument can be adduced in favour of 
 
 legislative and „ .... . 
 
 executive what has been denominated by political writers a divifion of 
 
 power con- , ' . ' ' V , 
 
 fidered. powers. Nothing can feem lefs reafonable, than to prefcribe any 
 
 pofitive limits to the topics of deliberation in an aflembly ade- 
 quately reprefenting the people ; or peremptorily to forbid them 
 the exercife of functions, the depofitaries of which are placed 
 under their infpettion and cenfure. Perhaps upon any emer- 
 gence, 
 

 OF GOVERNMENT. 5S5 
 
 gence, totally unforefeen at the time of their election, and un- BOOK v. 
 
 commonly important, they would prove their wifdom by calling ' v — " J 
 
 upon the people to elect a new affembly with a direct view to 
 that emergence. But the emergence, as we fhall have occaiion 
 more fully to obferve in the fequel, cannot with any propriety be 
 prejudged, and a rule laid down for their conduct by a body prior 
 to or diftinct from themfelves. The diftindtion of legiflative and 
 executive powers, however intelligible in theory, will by no 
 means authorife their feparation in practice. 
 
 Legiflation, that is, the authoritative enunciation of abftradt or Superior im- 
 portance of 
 
 general propofitions, is a function of equivocal nature, and will the latter. 
 never be exercifed in a pure ftate of fociety, or a ftate approach- 
 ing to purity, but with great caution and unwillingnefs. It is 
 the moft abfolute of the functions of government, and govern- 
 ment itfelf is a remedy that inevitably brings its own evils along 
 with it. Adminiflration on the other hand is a principle of per- 
 petual application. So long as men fhall fee reafon to act in a 
 corporate capacity, they will always have occafions of temporary 
 emergency for which to provide. In proportion as they advance 
 in focial improvement, executive power will, comparatively 
 fpeaking, become every thing, and legiflative nothing. Even at 
 prefent, can there be any articles of greater importance than thofe 
 of peace and war, taxation, and the felection of proper periods 
 for the meeting of deliberative affemblies, which, as was obferved 
 in the commencement of the prefent book, are articles of tempo- 
 
 4 B 2 rary 
 
556 OF THE COMPOSITION 
 
 cHAP^xi rar 7 regukti 011 *? Is it decent, can it be juft, that thefe prero- 
 * gatives fhould be exercifed by any power lefs than the fupreme, 
 
 or be decided by any authority but that which moft adequately 
 reprefents the voice of the nation ? This principle ought beyond 
 queftion to be extended univerfally. There can be no juft reafon 
 for excluding the national reprefentative from the exercife of any 
 function, the exercife of which on the part of the fociety is at all 
 neceffary. 
 
 * 
 
 Functions of -j^g functions therefore of minifters and magiftrates commonly 
 
 mmiiters. ° y 
 
 fo called, do not relate to any particular topic, refpe£ting which 
 they have a right exclufive of the reprefentative affembly. They 
 do not relate to any fuppofed neceffity for fecrecy j for fecrets are 
 always pernicious, and, moft of all, fecrets relating to the interefts 
 of any fociety, which are to be concealed from the members of 
 that fociety. It is the duty of the affembly to defire information 
 without referve for themfelves and the public upon every fubject 
 of general importance, and it is the duty of minifters and others 
 to communicate fuch information, though it fhould not be ex- 
 prefsly defired. The utility therefore of minifterial functions 
 being lefs than nothing in thefe refpe&s, there are only two claffes 
 of utility that remain to them ; particular functions, fuch as thofe 
 of financial detail or minute fuperintendence, which cannot be 
 exercifed unlefs by one or at moft by a fmall number of perfonsf ; 
 
 * Chap. I. p. 381. f Ibid. 
 
 S and 
 
OF GOVERNMENT. J57 
 
 and meafures, proportioned to the demand of thofe neceffities book v. 
 
 r r CHAP XXI. 
 
 which will not admit of delay, and fubjecT: to the revifion and * ' ' 
 
 cenfure of the deliberative affembly. The latter of thefe claffes 
 will perpetually diminifh as men advance in improvement ; nor 
 can any thing be of greater importance than the reduction of 
 that difcretionary power in an individual, which may greatly 
 affect the interefls or fetter the deliberations of the many. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C 558 ] 
 
 CHAP. XXII. 
 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 
 
 QUANTITY OF ADMINISTRATION NECESSARY TO BE MAIN- 
 TAINED. — OBJECTS OF ADMINISTRATION : NATIONAL 
 GLORY — RIVALSHIP OF NATIONS. — INFERENCES : I. COM- 
 PLICATION OF GOVERNMENT UNNECESSARY 2. EX- 
 TENSIVE TERRITORY SUPERFLUOUS — 3. CONSTRAINT, 
 ITS LIMITATIONS. — PROJECT OF GOVERNMENT: POLICE 
 — DEFENCE. 
 
 TTTE have now endeavoured to deduca certain general prin- 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XXII. 
 
 ciples upon moft of the fubjects of legiflative and exe- 
 admimftra- cu ti V e power. But there is one very important topic which re- 
 
 to be main- 
 tained. 
 
 mains to be difcufTed. How much of either of thefe powers does 
 the benefit of fociety require us to maintain ? 
 
 Objefts of 
 adminiftra- 
 tion : 
 
 national 
 glory : 
 
 We have already feen that the only legitimate objecT: of poli- 
 tical inftitution is the advantage of individuals. All that cannot 
 be brought home to them, national wealth, profperi'y and giory, 
 can be advantageous only to thofe felf interefted impoftors, who, 
 from the earlieft accounts of time, have confounded the under- 
 5 Handings 
 
OF THE FUTURE HISTORY, &c. s59 
 
 Handings of mankind the more fecurely to fink them in debafe- BOOK v. 
 
 ° ' CHAP. XXII. 
 
 ment and mifery. ■ » ' 
 
 The defire to gain a more extenfive territory', to conquer or «»alftrip of 
 
 y nations. 
 
 to hold in awe our neighbouring ftates, to furpafs them in arts or 
 arms, is a defire founded in prejudice and error. Power is not 
 happinefs. Security and peace are more to be defired than a 
 name at which nations tremble. Mankind are brethren. We 
 affociate in a particular diftricT: or under a particular climate, be- 
 caufe affociation is neceffary to our internal tranquillity, or to de- 
 fend us againft the wanton attacks of a common enemy. But 
 the rivalfhip of nations is a creature of the imagination. If riches 
 be our object, riches can only be created by commerce ; and the 
 greater is our neighbour's capacity to buy, the greater will be our 
 opportunity to fell. The profperity of all is the intereft of all. 
 
 The more accurately we underftand our own advantage, the 
 lefs mail we be difpofed to difturb the peace of our neighbour. 
 The fame principle is applicable to him in return. It becomes 
 us therefore to defire that he may be wife. But wifdom is the 
 growth of equality and independence, not of injury and oppref- 
 fion. If oppreffion had been the fchool of wifdom, the improve- 
 ment of mankind would have been ineftimable, for they have 
 been in that fchool for many thoufand years. We ought there- 
 fore to defire that our neighbour fhould be independent. We 
 
 ought 
 
560 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAP. XXII. 
 
 * „ ' 
 
 ought to defire that he fhould be free ; for wars do not originate 
 in the unbiaffed propenfities of nations, but in the cabals of go- 
 vernment and the propenfities that governments infpire into the 
 people at large. If our neighbour invade our territory, all we 
 fhould defire is to repel him from it ; and for that purpofe it is 
 not necefTary we fhould furpafs him in prowefs, fince upon our 
 own ground his match is unequal. Not to fay that to conceive 
 a nation attacked by another, fo long as its own conduct is fober, 
 equitable and moderate, is an exceedingly improbable fuppo- 
 fition. 
 
 "Where nations are not brought into avowed hoftility, all jea- 
 loufy between them is an unintelligible chimera. I refide upon 
 a certain fpot, becaufe that refidence is moft conducive to my 
 happinefs or ufefulnefs. I am interefted in the political juftice 
 and virtue of my fpecies, becaufe they are men, that is, creatures 
 eminently capable of juftice and virtue ; and I have perhaps ad- 
 ditional reafon to interefl myfelf for thofe who live under the 
 fame government as myfelf, becaufe I am better qualified to un- 
 derftand their claims, and more capable of exerting myfelf in 
 their behalf. But I can certainly have no interefl in the infliction 
 of pain upon others, unlefs fo far as they are exprefsly engaged in 
 ads of injuftice. The object of found policy and morality is to 
 draw men nearer to each other, not to feparate them ; to unite 
 their interefts, not to oppofe them. 
 
 Individuals 
 
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 5 6i 
 
 Individuals cannot have too frequent or unlimited intercourie BOCK V. 
 
 1 CHAP. XXII. 
 
 with each other ; but focieties of men have no interefts to explain ^ * ' 
 
 ' x Inferences: 
 
 and adjuft, except fo far as error and violence may render expla- cation"of " 
 
 o 
 
 nation neceffary. This confideration annihilates at once the prin- vernme " t 
 
 J r unneceflary : 
 
 cipal objects of that myfterious and crooked policy which has hi- 
 therto occupied the attention of governments. Before this prin- 
 ciple officers of the army and the navy, ambafTadors and nego- 
 ciators, and all the train of artifices that has been invented to hold 
 other nations at bay, to penetrate their fecrets, to traverfe their 
 machinations, to form alliances and counter alliances, fink into 
 nothing. The expence of government is annihilated, and toge- 
 ther with its expence the means of fubduing and undermining 
 the determination of its fubje&s. 
 
 Another of the great opprobriums of political fcience is at the 2. extenfire 
 
 territory fu- 
 
 fame time completely removed, that extent of territory fubject to perfluous. 
 one head, refpe£ting which philofophers and moralifts have alter- 
 nately difputed whether it be mofl unfit for a monarchy or for a 
 democratical government. The appearance which mankind in a 
 future ftate of improvement may be expected to affume, is 
 a policy that in different countries will wear a fimilar form, 
 becaufe we have all the fame faculties and the fame wants; 
 but a policy the independent branches of which will ex- 
 tend their authority over a fmall territory, becaufe neighbours 
 are beft informed of each other's concerns, and are perfectly 
 «qual to their adjuftment. No recommendation can be 
 
 4 C imagined 
 
S 6 2 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY 
 
 BOOK V. imagined of an extenfive rather than a limited territory, except 
 ' — -* ' that of external fecurity. 
 
 Whatever evils are included in the abftract idea of govern- 
 ment, are all of them extremely aggravated by the extenfivenefs 
 of its jurifdidion, and foftened under circumftances of an oppc- 
 fite fpecies. Ambition, which may be no lefs formidable than a 
 peililence in the former, has no room to unfold itfelf in the lat- 
 ter. Popular commotion is like the waves of the fea, capable 
 whei e the furface is large of producing the moft tragical effects, 
 but mild and innocuous when confined within the circuit of an 
 humble lake. Sobriety and equity are the obvious characteriftics 
 of a limited circle. 
 
 It may indeed be objected, " that great talents are the offspring 
 of great paffions, and that in the quiet mediocrity of a petty re- 
 public the powers of intellect may be expected to fubfide into in- 
 activity." This objection, if true, would be entitled to the moft 
 ferious confideration. But it is to be confidered that, upon the 
 hypothecs here advanced, the whole human fpecies would con- 
 ftitute in one fenfe one great republic, and the prolpects of him 
 who defired to act beneficially- upon a great furface of mind, 
 would become more animating than ever. During the period in 
 which this ftate was growing but not yet complete, the compa- 
 nion of the bleffings we enjoyed with the iniquities practifing 
 
 among 
 
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 563 
 
 among our neighbours would afford an additional ftimulus to C ^ OOK v * 
 exertion *. 
 
 Ambition and tumult are evils that arife out of government in 3.conftraint, 
 an indirect manner, in confequence of the habits which govern- tions. 
 ment introduces of material action extending itfelf over multi- 
 tudes of men. There are other evils infeparable from its exift- 
 ence. The objects of government are the fuppreflion of vio- 
 lence, either external or internal, which might otherwife deftroy 
 or bring into jeopardy the well being of the community or its 
 members j and the means it employs is violence of a more re- 
 gulated kind. For this purpofe the concentration of individual 
 forces becomes neceflary, and the method in which this concen- 
 tration is ufually obtained, is alfo conftraint. The evils of con- 
 ftraint have been confidered on a former occafion f . Conftraint 
 employed againft delinquents or perfons to whom delinquency is 
 imputed, is by no means without its mifchiefs. Conftraint em- 
 ployed by the majority of a fociety againft the minority who may 
 differ from them upon fome queftion of public good, is calcu- 
 lated at firft fight at leaft to excite a ftill greater difapprobation. 
 
 Both of thefe exertions may indeed appear to reft upon the 
 fame principle. Vice is unqueftionably no more than error of 
 
 * This obje&ion will be copioufly difcufled in the eighth book of the prefent 
 work. 
 
 f Book II, Chap. VI. 
 
 4 C 2 judgment, 
 
5 6j\. OF THE FUTURE HISTORY 
 
 EOOK v. judgment, and nothing can juflify an attempt to correct it by 
 force but the extreme neceflity of the cafe *. The minority, if 
 
 erroneous, fall under precifely the fame general defcription, 
 
 i 
 
 though their error may not be of equal magnitude. But the ne- 
 ceffity of the cafe can feldom be equally impreffive. If the idea 
 of feceffion for example were fomewhat more familiarifed to the 
 conceptions of mankind, it could feldom happen that the feceffion 
 of the minority could in any degree compare in mifchievous ten- 
 dency with the hoftility of a criminal offending againft the moft ob- 
 vious principles of focial juftice. The cafes are parallel to thofe of 
 offenfive and defenfive war. In putting conftraint upon a mino- 
 rity, we yield to a fufpicious temper that tells us the oppofing 
 party may hereafter in fome way injure us, and we will antici- 
 pate his injury. In putting conftraint upon a criminal, we feerrt 
 to repel an enemy who has entered our territory and refufes to- 
 quit it. 
 
 Projeftofgo- Government can have no more than two legitimate purpofes, 
 police : the fuppreffion 01 lnjuftice againit individuals within the com- 
 
 munity, and the common defence againft external invafion. The 
 firft of thefe purpofes, which alone can have an uninterrupted 
 claim upon us, is fufficiently anfwered by an affociation of fuch 
 an extent as to afford room for the inftitution of a jury, to decide 
 upon the offences of individuals within the community, and upon 
 the queftions and controverfies refpe&ing property which may 
 
 * Book II, Chap. VI. Book IV, Chap. VII. 
 
 i chance 
 
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. 565 
 
 chance to arife. It might be eafy indeed for an offender to BOOK v. 
 
 to ' CHAP. XXII. 
 
 efcape from the limits of fo petty a jurifdicfion ; and it might * ' ' 
 feem neceffary at firft that the neighbouring parifhes or jurifdic- 
 tions fhould be governed in a fimilar manner, or at leaft fhould 
 be willing, whatever was their form of government, to co-ope- 
 rate with us in the removal or reformation of an offender, whofe 
 prefent habits were alike injurious to us and to them. But there 
 will be no need of any exprefs compact, and ftill lefs of any com- 
 mon centre of authority, for this purpofe. General juftice and 
 mutual intereft are found more capable of binding men than fig- 
 natures and feals. In the mean time all neceffity for caufing the 
 punifhment of the crime to purfue the criminal, would foon at 
 leaft ceafe, if it ever exifted. The motives to offence would 
 become rare : its aggravations few : and rigour fuperfluous. The 
 principal object of punifhment is reftraint upon a dangerous 
 member of the community; and the end of this reftraint. would 
 be anfwered, by the general inflection that is exercifed by the 
 members of a limited circle over the conduct of each other, and 
 by the gravity and good fenfe that would characterife the cen- 
 fures of men, from whom all myftery and empiricifm were ba- 
 nifhed. No individual would be hardy enough in the caufe of 
 vice, to defy the general confent of fober judgment that would 
 furround him. It would carry defpair to his mind, or, which is 
 better, it would carry conviction. He would be obliged, by a 
 force not lefs irrefiftible than whips and chains, to reform his 
 conduct. 
 
 In 
 
defeuce. 
 
 566 OF THE FUTURE HISTORY 
 
 BOOK V. J n this fketch is contained the rude outline of political govem- 
 ___ ,, ment. Controverfies between parifh and parifh would be in an 
 eminent degree unreafonable, fmce, if any queftion arofe, about 
 limits for example, juftice would prefently teach us that the 
 individual who cultivates any portion of land, is the propereft 
 perfon to decide to which diftrict he would belong. No affocia- 
 tion of men, fo long as they adhered to the principles of reafon, 
 could poffibly have any intereft in^extending their territory. If 
 we would produce attachment in our afTociates, we can adopt no 
 furer method than that of practifing the dictates of equity and 
 moderation; and, if this failed in any inftance, it could only 
 fail with him who, to whatever fociety he belonged, would 
 prove an unworthy member. The duty of any fociety to 
 punifh offenders is not dependent upon the hypothetical confent 
 of the offender to be punifhed, but upon the duty of necefTary 
 defence. 
 
 But however irrational might be the controverfy of parifli 
 with parifh in fuch a ftate of fociety, it would not be the Ief$ 
 poffible. For fuch extraordinary emergencies therefore provifion 
 ought to be made. Thefe emergencies are fimilar in their 
 nature to thofe of foreign invafion. They can only be provided 
 againft by the concert of feveral diftricts, declaring and, if need- 
 ful, inforcing the dictates of juftice. 
 
 One of the mofl obvious remarks that fuggefts itfeff upon 
 4 thefe 
 
OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES. s 6y 
 
 thefe two cafes, of hofUlity between diftrid and diftricT:, and of BOOK v. 
 foreign invafion which the intereft of all calls upon them jointly 
 to repel, is, that it is their nature to be only of occafional recur- 
 rence, and that therefore the provifions to be made refpecting 
 them need not be in the flricteft fenfe of perpetual operation. 
 In other words, the permanence of a national aifembly, as it has 
 hitherto been praC ifed in France, cannot be neceffary in a period 
 of tranquillity, and may perhaps be pernicious. That we may 
 form a more accurate judgment of this, let us recollect fome of 
 the principal features that enter into the conftitution of a national 
 aflembly. 
 
 chap: 
 
i 568 ] 
 
 CHAP. XXIII. 
 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 
 
 THEY PRODUCE A FICTITIOUS UNANIMITY — AN UNNATU- 
 RAL UNIFORMITY OF OPINION. — CAUSES OF THIS UNI- 
 FORMITY.: — CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODE OF DECISION 
 
 BY VOTE 1. PERVERSION OF REASON %. CONTENTIOUS 
 
 DISPUTES 3. THE TRIUMPH OF IGNORANCE AND VICE. 
 
 SOCIETY INCAPABLE OF ACTING FROM ITSELF OF 
 
 BEING WELL CONDUCTED BY OTHERS. CONCLUSION. 
 
 — MODIFICATION OF DEMOCRACY THAT RESULTS FROM 
 THESE CONSIDERATIONS. 
 
 I] 
 
 ' i 
 
 They pro- 
 duce a fifti- 
 tious unani- 
 
 BOOK V. TN the firft place the exiftence of a national aflembly introduces 
 
 the evils of a fictitious unanimity. The public, guided by fuch 
 
 an aflembly, acts with concert, or elfe the aflembly is a nugatory 
 
 mity : excrefcence. But it is impoflible that this unanimity can really 
 
 exift. The individuals who conftitute a nation, cannot take into 
 confideration a variety of important queflions, without forming 
 different fentiments reflecting them. In reality all matters that 
 are brought before fuch an aflembly are decided by a majority 
 of votes, and the minority, after having expofed with all the 
 power of eloquence and force of reafoning of which they are 
 
 capable 
 
OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 569 
 
 -capable the iniuftice and folly of the meafures adopted, are BOOK V. 
 
 r J * ' CHAP. XXII r. 
 
 obliged in a certain fenfe to aflift in carrying them into execu- v * ' 
 tion. Nothing can more directly contribute to the depravation 
 of the human underftanding and character. It inevitably renders 
 mankind timid, diflembling and corrupt. He that is not accuf- 
 tomed exclufively to act upon the dictates of his own under- 
 ftanding, muft fall infinitely fhort of that energy and fimplicity 
 of which our nature is capable. He that contributes his per- 
 fonal exertions or his property to the fupport of a caufe which 
 he believes to be unjuft, will quickly lofe that accurate difcrimi- 
 nation and nice fenfibility of moral rectitude which are the prin- 
 cipal ornaments of reaforu 
 
 Secondly, the exigence of national councils produces a certain an unnatural 
 
 uniformity ©f 
 
 fpecies of real unanimity, unnatural in its character, and perni- opinions. 
 cious in its effects. The genuine and wholfome ftate of mind is, 
 to he unloofed from (hackles, and to expand every fibre of its 
 frame according to the independent and individual impreffions of 
 truth upon that mind. How great would be the progrefs of 
 intellectual improvement, if men were unfettered by the preju- 
 dices of education, unfeduced by the influence of a corrupt ftate 
 of fociety, and accuftomed to yield without fear to the guidance 
 of truth, however unexplored might be the regions and unex- . 
 petted the conclufions to which fhe conducted us ? We cannot 
 advance in the voyage of happinefs, unlefs we be wholly at 
 large upon the ftream that would cany us thither : the anchor, 
 that we at firft looked upon as the inftrument of our fafety, will 
 
 4D at 
 
570 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES: 
 
 cH°?xxni at * a ^ a PP ear t0 ^ e tne means °f detaining our prcgrefs. Unani- 
 "^ ' mity of a certain fpecies will be the refult of perfect freedom of 
 enquiry, and this unanimity would, in a ftate of perfect free- 
 dom, become hourly more confpicuous. But the unanimity, 
 that refults from men's having a vifible ftandard by which to, 
 adjuft their fentiments, is deceitful and pernicious. 
 
 Cades of tin's In numerous affemblies a thoufand motives influence our 
 
 uniformity. 
 
 judgments, independently of reafon and evidence. Every man 
 looks forward to the effects which the opinions he avows will 
 produce on his fuccefs. Every man connects himfelf with 
 fome feet or party. The activity of his thought is fhackled 
 at every turn by the fear that his afTociates may difclaim him. 
 This effect is ftrikingly vifible in the prefent ftate of the 
 Britifh parliament, where men, whofe faculties are comprehen- 
 five almoft beyond all former example, are induced by thefe 
 motives fincerely to efpoufe the moft contemptible and clearly 
 exploded errors. 
 
 Consequences Thirdly, the debates of a national aflembly are diftorted from 
 
 of the mode 
 
 of decifionby their reafonable tenour by the neceffity of their being uniformly 
 
 vote : 
 
 i. perverfien terminated by a vote. Debate and difcuflion are in their own 
 nature highly conducive to intellectual improvement ; but they 
 lofe this falutary charader the moment they are fubje&ed to this 
 unfortunate condition. What can be more unreafonable, than to 
 demand, that argument, the ufual quality of which is gradually 
 and imperceptibly to enlighten the mind, fhould declare its 
 2 effect 
 
OT NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 571 
 
 -effect ia the clofe of a (ingle converfation ? No fooner does this BOOK v. 
 
 b CHAP. XXIFl. 
 
 : circumftance occur than the whole (bene changes its character. ' * 
 
 The orator no longer enquires after permanent conviction, but 
 tranfitory effecT:. He feeks rather to take advantage of our pre- 
 judices than to 'enlighten our judgment. That which might 
 otherwife have been a fcene of philofophic and moral enquiry, 
 » is changed into wrangling, tumult and precipitation. 
 
 Another circumftance that arifes out of the decifion by vote, 2. contenti- 
 ous difputcs : 
 is the neceflity of conftrudting a form of words that fhall beft 
 
 meet the fentiments and be adapted to the preconceived ideas 
 
 of a multitude of men. What can be conceived of at once more 
 
 ludicrous and difgraceful, than the fpectacle of a fet of rational 
 
 beings employed for hours together in weighing particles and 
 
 •adjufting commas ? Such is the fcene that is perpetually wit*- 
 
 nefled in clubs and private focieties. In parliaments this fort of 
 
 •bufinefs is ufually adjufted before the meafure becomes a fubjeel: 
 
 of public infpection. But it does not the lefs exift ; and fome» 
 
 times it occurs in the other mode, fo that, when numerous 
 
 amendments have been made to fuit the corrupt intereft of 
 
 imperious pretenders, the Herculean tafk remains at laft to 
 
 reduce the chaos into a grammatical and intelligible form. 
 
 The whole is then wound up with that intolerable infult upon 3. the tri- 
 umph of ig- 
 all reafon and juftice, the deciding upon truth by the calling up norance and 
 
 vice. 
 
 of numbers. Thus every thing that we have been accuftomed 
 
 4 D 2 to 
 
572 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 
 
 BpOKV. t0 efleem moft facred, is determined, at beft by the weakefb 
 
 CHAP. XXIII. ' ' J 
 
 " ' heads in the affembly, but, as it not lefs frequently happens, by. 
 the moft corrupt and difhonourable intentions^ 
 
 c° C abie of' ^ n t ^ te * a ^ P* ace > national' aflemblies will by nor means be- 
 
 fcfclff fr ° m thought to deferve our dired approbation,, if we recoiled for a- 
 moment the abfurdity of that fiction by which fociety is con- 
 fidered, as it has been termed, as a moral individual. It is in 
 vain that we endeavour to counteract the immutable laws of 
 neceffity. A multitude of men after all our ingenuity will ftilt 
 remain no more than a multitude of men. Nothing can. intel- 
 lectually unite them fhort of equal capacity and identical percep- 
 tion. So long as the varieties of mind fhall remain, the force 
 of fociety can no otherwife be concentrated, than by one man 
 for a fhorter or a longer term taking the lead of the reft, and. 
 employing their force, whether material or dependent on the. 
 weight of their character, in a mechanical manner, juft as he- 
 would employ the force of a tool or a machine. All govern- 
 ment correfponds in a certain degree to, what the; Greeks deno- 
 minated a tyranny. The difference is, that in defpotic countries 
 mind is depreffed by an- uniform ufurpation ; while in republics - 
 it preferve3 a greater portion of its activity, and the ufurpajion- 
 more eafily conforms itfelf to the fluctuations of opinion. 
 
 efbelngwett The pretence of collective wifdom is the moft palpable of alL 
 
 conducted by 
 
 •thers. impoftures, The acts of the fociety can never rife above the 
 
 fuggeftions 
 
OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. j- 73 
 
 fuggeflions of this or that individual who is a member of it. Let BOOK v. 
 
 00 CHAP.XXIII.1 
 
 us enquire whether fociety, confidered as an agent, can really * * ' 
 
 become the equal of certain individuals of whom it is compofed* 
 And. here, without flaying to examine what ground we have ta 
 expect that the wifeft member of the fociety will actually take 
 the lead in it, we find two obvious reafons to perfuade us that,,., 
 whatever be the degree of wifdom inherent in him that really 
 fuperintends, the acts which he performs in the name of the 
 fociety will be both lefs virtuous and lefs able, than under other 
 circumftances they might be expected to be. In the firft place* 
 there are few men who,, with the confcioufnefs of being able to 
 cover, their refponfibility under the name of a fociety, will not 
 venture upon meafures, lefs direct in their motives, or lefs jufll-- 
 fiable in the experiment, than they would have chofen to adopt, 
 in .their own perfons. Secondly, men who act under the name 
 of a fociety,. are deprived of that activity and energy which may 
 belong to them in their individual character.. They have a 
 multitude of followers to draw after them, whofe humours they 
 mull confult, and to whofe flownefs of apprehenfion they mufl 
 accommodate themfelves. It is for this reafon that we. frequently 
 fee men of the mod elevated .genius dwindle into vulgar leaders, 
 when they become involved hi the bufy fcenes of public life. 
 
 From-thefe reafonings we are fufficiently authorifgd to con- Conciufion, 
 tlude, that national affemblies, or. in other words affemblies* 
 inftituted for the joint purpofe. of. adjufting the differences 
 
 betweer* . 
 
574 OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. 
 
 BOOK v. between diftrict and diftrict, and of confultine; refpecting the 
 
 C IAP. XXIII. ° * ° 
 
 * * ' beft mode of repelling foreign invafion, however neceflary to be 
 
 had recourfe to upon certain occafions, ought to be employed as 
 fparingly as the nature of the cafe will admit. They fhould 
 either never be elected but upon extraordinary emergencies, like 
 .•the dictator of the ancient Romans, or elfe fit periodically, one 
 day for example in a year, with a power of continuing their 
 feffions within a certain limit ; to hear the complaints and repre- 
 sentations of their constituents. The former of thefe modes is 
 •greatly to be preferred. Several of the reafons already adduced 
 are calculated to fhow, that election itfelf is of a nature not to 
 he employed but when the occafion demands it. There would 
 be no difficulty in fuggefting expedients relative to the regular 
 ■originating of national afiemblies. It would be moft fuitable to 
 paft habits and experience, that a general election fhould take 
 place whenever a certain number of diftricts demanded it. It 
 would be moft agreeable to rigid fimplicity and equity that an 
 aflembly of t two or two hundred diftricts fhould take place, in 
 exact proportion to the number of diftricts by whom that mea- 
 fure was defired. 
 
 Modiacation It cannot reafonably be denied that all the obje&ions which 
 
 that refuks have been moft loudly reiterated againft democracy, become null 
 
 confident- in an application to the form of government which has now been 
 
 delineated. Here is no opening for tumult, for the tyranny of 
 
 & multitude drunk with unlimited power, for political ambition 
 
 oa 
 
OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES. S7S 
 
 on the part of the few, or reftlefs jealoufy and precaution on the BOOK V. 
 
 r J J r CHAP. XXIIV 
 
 part of the many. Here no demagogue would find a fuitable oc- 
 cafion for rendering the multitude the blind inftrument of his pur- 
 pofes. Men in fucli a ftate of fociety would underftand their 
 happinefs and cherifh it. The true reafon why the mafs of man- 
 kind has fo often been made the dupe of knaves, has been the 
 myfterious and complicated nature of the focial fyftem. Once 
 annihilate the quackery of government, and the mofl homebred 
 underftanding will be prepared to fcorn the fhallow artifices of: 
 the ftate juggler that would miflead him. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
I 576 3 
 
 C H A P. XXIV. 
 OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY — OF 
 JURIES. — CONSEQUENCE FROM THE WHOLE. 
 
 chap^xxiv T ^ rema i ns f° r us to confider what is the degree of authority 
 Pdi^i"^* ■*■ neceflary to be veiled in fuch a modified fpecies of national 
 Ldomdat aflembly as we have admitted into our fyflem. Are they to 
 iflue their commands to the different members of the confede- 
 racy ? Or is it fufficient that they fhould invite them to co-ope- 
 rate for the common advantage, and by arguments and addrefles 
 .convince them of the reafonablenefs of the meafures they pro- 
 pofe ? The former of thefe would at firft be neceflary. The 
 latter would afterwards become fufficient. The AmphicTyonie 
 council of Greece poflefled no authority but that which derived 
 from its perfonal character. In proportion as the fpirit of party 
 was extirpated, as the reftleflhefs of public commotion fubfided, 
 and as the political machine became fimple, the voice of reafon 
 would be fecure to be heard. An appeal by the aflembly to the 
 feveral diftri&s would not fail to obtain the approbation of all rea- 
 sonable men, unlefs it contained in it fomething fo evidently 
 
 queftionable, 
 
OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT. S77 
 
 ionable, a! 
 prove abortive. 
 
 «ueftionable, as to make it perhaps deferable that it fhould BOOK v. 
 n ' r r chap, xxiv 
 
 This remark leads us one ftep farther. Why fhould not the of juries. 
 fame diftindtion between commands and invitations, which we 
 have juft made in the cafe of national affemblies, be applied to 
 the particular affemblies or juries of the feveral diftricts ? At firft, 
 we will fuppofe, that fome degree of authority and violence 
 would be neceffary. But this neceffity does not arife out of the 
 nature of man, but out of the inftitutions by which he has al- 
 ready been corrupted. Man is not originally vicious. He would 
 not refufe to liften, or to be convinced by the expostulations that 
 are addreffed to him, had he not been accuftomed to regard 
 them as hypocritical, and to conceive that, while his neighbour, 
 his parent and his political governor pretended to be actuated by a 
 pure regard to his intereft, they were in reality, at the expence of 
 bis, promoting their own. Such are the fatal effects of myfteri-' 
 oufnefs and complexity. Simplify the focial fyftem in the man* 
 tier which every motive but thofe of ufurpation and ambition 
 powerfully recommends ; render the plain dictates of juftice level 
 to every capacity ; remove the neceffity of implicit faith j and 
 the whole fpecies will become reafonable and virtuous. It 
 will then be fufficient for juries to recommend a certain mode of 
 adjufting controverfies, without affuming the prerogative of dic- 
 tating that adjustment. It will then, be fufficient for them to in- 
 
 4 E rite 
 
57 3 OF THE DISSOLUTION 
 
 BOOK V. v it e offenders to forfake their errors. If their expoftulations 
 chap. xxiv. r 
 
 s " ' proved in a few inftances ineffectual, the evils arifing out of this 
 circumftance would be of lefs importance, than thofe which pro- 
 ceed from the perpetual violation of the exercife of private judg- 
 ment. But in reality no evils would arife, for, where the empire 
 of reafon was fo univerfally acknowledged, the offender would 
 either readily yield to the expoftulations of authority ; or, if he 
 refilled, though fuffering no perfonal moleftation, he would feel 
 fo uneafy under the unequivocal difapprobation and obfervant 
 eye of public judgment, as willingly to remove to a fociety more 
 congenial to his errors. 
 
 Conference The reac ler has probably anticipated me in the ultimate con- 
 
 from the ' x 
 
 whole. clufion, from thefe remarks. If juries might at length ceafe to 
 
 decide and be contented to invite, if force might gradually be 
 withdrawn and reafon trufted alone, fhall we not one day find 
 that juries themfelves and every other fpecies of public inftitu- 
 tion, may be laid afide as unnecefTary ? "Will not the reafonings of 
 one wife man be as effectual as thofe of twelve ? Will not the 
 competence of one individual to inftrucT: his neighbours be a 
 matter of fufficient notoriety, without the formality of an elec- 
 tion ? Will there be many vices to corredr, and much obftinacy 
 to conquer ? This is one of the rnofl memorable ftages of human 
 improvement. With what delight muft every well informed 
 friend of mankind look forward to the aufpicious period, the dif- 
 
 folution 
 
OF GOVERNMENT. 579 
 
 folution of political government, of that brute engine, which has BOOK V. 
 
 r D ' ° CHAP. XXIV, 
 
 been the only perennial caufe of the vices of mankind, and which, *- 
 as has abundantly appeared in the progrefs of the prefent work, 
 has mifchiefs of various forts incorporated with its fubftance, and 
 no otherwife to be removed than by its utter annihilation ! 
 
 4E2 AN 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 OF OPINION CONSIDERED AS A SUBJECT OF 
 POLITICAL INSTITUTION. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL 
 -SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 
 
 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THIS SUPERINTENDENCE. 
 
 ANSWER. — THE EXERTIONS OF SOCIETY IN ITS CORPO- 
 RATE CAPACITY ARE, I. UNWISE — 2. INCAPABLE OF 
 
 PROPER EFFECT. OF SUMPTUARY LAWS, AGRARIAN 
 
 LAWS AND REWARDS. — POLITICAL DEGENERACY NOT 
 INCURABLE. — 3. SUPERFLUOUS — IN COMMERCE — IN SPE- 
 CULATIVE ENQUIRY — IN MORALITY. — 4. PERNICIOUS — 
 AS UNDERMINING INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY — AS SUS- 
 PENDING INTELLECTUAL IMPROVEMENT — CONTRARY 
 
 T« 
 
5 82 
 
 GENERAL EFTECTS OF THE 
 
 Arguments 
 in favour of 
 this fuperin- 
 ttendence. 
 
 TO THE NATURE OF MORALITY — TO THE NATURE OF 
 MIND. — CONCLUSION. 
 
 CHApY A PRINCIPLE » which has entered deeply into the fyftems 
 of the writers on political law, is that of the duty of go- 
 vernments to watch over the manners of the people. " Go- 
 vernment," fay they, " plays the part of an unnatural ftep-mo- 
 ther, not of an affectionate parent, when fhe is contented by- 
 rigorous punifhments to avenge the commiffion of a crime, while 
 fhe is wholly inattentive beforehand to imbue the mind with 
 thofe virtuous principles, which might have rendered punifliment 
 unnecefTary. It is the bufinefs of a fage and patriotic magiftracy 
 to have its attention ever alive to the fentiments of the people, to 
 encourage fuch as are favourable to virtue, and to check in the 
 bud fuch as may lead to diforder and corruption. How long 
 ihal'l government be employed to difpfay its terrors, without ever 
 having recourfe to the gentlenefs of invitation ? How long fhall 
 fhe deal in retrofpect and cenfure to the utter neglect of preven- 
 tion and remedy ?" Thefe reafonings have in fome refpe&s 
 gained additional ftrength by means of the lateft improvements 
 and cleareft views upon the fubject of political truth. It has been 
 rendered more evident than in any former period, that govern- 
 ment, inftead of being an object of fecondary consideration, has 
 been the principal vehicle of extenfive and permanent evil to 
 mankind. It was natural therefore to fay, " fince government 
 can produce fo much pofitive mifchief, furely it can do fome po- 
 
 fitive good." 
 
 But 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 5 3 5 
 
 But thefe views, however fpecious and agreeable they may in BO° K VL 
 the firft inltance appear, are liable to very ferious queftion. If v >■ ' 
 
 11 J * Anfwef. 
 
 we would not be feduced by vifionary good, we ought here more 
 than ever, to recoiled the principles that have repeatedly been in- 
 filled upon and illuftrated in this work, " that government is in- 
 all cafes an evil," and " that it ought to be introduced as fparingly 
 as poffible." Nothing can be more unqueflionable than that the 
 manners and opinions of mankind are of the utmoft confequence 
 to the general welfare. But it does not follow that government 
 is the inftrument by which they are to be fafhioned. 
 
 One of the reafons that may lead us to doubt of its fitnefs for T . h r c «ert5wi 
 
 * of fociety in 
 
 this purpofe, is to be drawn from the view we have already taken lts cor P onuc 
 
 r r ' » capacity arc, 
 
 of fociety confidered as an agent *. A multitude of men may be *' unmfe: 
 feigned to be an individual, but they cannot become a real indi- 
 vidual. The acts which go under the name of the fociety, are 
 really the acts now of one fingle perfon and now of another. The 
 men who by turns ufurp the name of the whole, perpetually act 
 under the preiTure of incumbrances that deprive them of their 
 true energy. They are fettered by the prejudices, the humours, 
 the weaknefs and the vice of thofe with whom they act j and, 
 after a thoufand facrifices to thefe contemptible interefts, their 
 project comes out at laft diftorted in every joint, abortive and 
 monftrous. Society therefore in its corporate capacity' can by n© 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XXIII, p. 572. 
 
 meant' 
 
584 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. means be bufy and intrufive with impunity, fince its a&s muft- 
 
 * - — — ' be expected to be deficient in wifdom. 
 
 2. incapable Secondly, they will not be lefs deficient in efficacy than they 
 
 cfltft. are m wifdom. The object at which we are fuppofing them to 
 
 aim, is to improve the opinions, and through them the manners 
 of mankind ; for manners are nothing elfe but opinions carried 
 out into action : fuch as is the fountain, fuch will be the ftreams 
 that are fupplied from it. But what is it upon which opinion 
 muft be founded ? Surely upon evidence, upon the perceptions of 
 the underftanding. Has fociety then any particular advantage 
 in its corporate capacity for illuminating the underftanding ? Can 
 it convey into its addrefies and expoftulations a compound or 
 fublimate of the wifdom of all its members, fuperior in quality to 
 the individual wifdom of any ? If fo, why have not focieties of 
 men written treatifes of morality, of the philofophy of nature, or 
 the philofophy of mind ? Why have all the great fteps of human 
 improvement been the work of individuals ? 
 
 If then fociety confidered as an agent have no particular ad- 
 vantage for enlightening the underftanding, the real difference 
 between the difla of fociety and the difla of individuals muft be 
 looked for in the article of authority. But is authority a proper 
 inftrument for influencing the opinions and manners of men ? If 
 laws were a fufficient means for the reformation of error and 
 irice, it is not to be believed but that the world long ere this 
 
 6 would 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 585 
 
 would have become the feat of every virtue. Nothing can ^,9?^, V T 1 ' 
 
 be more eafy than to command men to be juft and good, to love * c ' 
 
 their neighbours, to pradtife univerfal fincerity, to be content 
 with a little, and to refill the enticements of avarice and ambition. 
 But, when you have done, will the characters of men be altered 
 by your precepts? Thefe commands have been iflued for thou-' 
 fands of years ; and, if it had been decreed that every man fhould 
 be hanged that violated them, it is vehemently to be fufpected 
 that this would not have fecured their influence. 
 
 But it will be anfwered, " that laws need not deal thus in ge- Of fumptuary 
 
 laws, agrarian 
 
 nerals, but may defcend to particular provifions calculated to fe- laws and re- 
 wards, 
 cure their fuccefs. We may inftitute fumptuary laws, limiting 
 
 the expence of our citizens in drefs and food. We may inftitute 
 agrarian laws, forbidding any man to poflefs more than a certain 
 annual revenue. We may proclaim prizes as the reward of acts 
 of juftice, benevolence and public virtue." And, when we have 
 done this, how far are we really advanced in our career ? If the 
 people be previously inclined to moderation in expence, the laws 
 are a fuperfluous parade. If they are not inclined, who fhall exe- 
 cute them, or prevent their evafion ? It is the misfortune in thefe 
 cafes, that regulations cannot be executed but by individuals of 
 that very people they are meant to reftrain. If the nation at 
 large be infefled with vice, who fhall fecure us a fucceflion of 
 magiftrates that are free from the contagion ? Even if we could 
 Surmount this difficulty, flill it would be vain. Vice is ever more 
 
 4 F ingenious 
 
586 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. ingenious in evafion, than authority in dete&ion. It is abfurd to 
 
 CHAP. I. & ' J 
 
 ^— -v — ' imagine that any law can be executed, that diredly contradicts 
 the propenfities and fpirit of the nation. If vigilance were able 
 fully to countermine the fubterfuges of art, the magiftrates, who 
 thus pertinacioufly adhered to the practice of their duty, would: 
 .not fail to be torn in pieces., 
 
 What can be more contrary to the move rational principles of 
 human intercourfe than the inquifitorial fpirit which fuch regu- 
 lations imply ? Who mall enter into my houfe, fcrutinife my ex- 
 penditure and count the dimes upon ray table ? Who fhall detect 
 the ftratagems I employ to cove? my real' poffeflion of an enoi> 
 mous income, while I feem to receive but a fmall one ? Not that 
 there is really any thing unjuft and unbecoming, as has been too 
 often fuppofed, in my neighbour's animadverting with the utmofl 
 freedom upon my perfonal conduct. But that fuch regulations 
 include a fyflem of petty watchfulnefs and infpedtion ; not con- 
 tenting themfelves with animadverfion whenever the occafion is 
 prefented, but making it the bufrnefs of one man conftantly to 
 pry into the proceedings of another, the whole depending upon 
 the uniformity with which this is done ; creating a perpetual 
 ftruggle between the reftlefs curiofky of the firft, and the artful 
 concealment of the fecond. By what motives will you make a 
 man an informer ? If by public fpirit and philanthropy inciting* 
 him to brave obloquy and refentment for the fake of duty, will 
 fumptuary laws be very neceflfary among a people thus far ad- 
 vanced 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 587 
 
 vanced in virtue ? If bv finifter and indirect confederations, will B 9P^> VI * 
 
 1 CHAP. I. 
 
 not the vices you propagate be more dangerous than the vices you ' v ' 
 
 fupprefs ? 
 
 Such muft be the cafe in extenfive governments : in govern- 
 ments of fmaller dimenfions opinion would be all fufficient ; the 
 infpection of every man over the conduct of his neighbours, 
 when unftained with caprice, would conftitute a cenforfhip of 
 the more irrefiftible nature. But the force of this cenforfhip 
 would depend upon its freedom, not following the pofitive dic- 
 tates of law, but the fpontaneous decifions of the underftand- 
 ing. 
 
 Again, in the distribution of rewards who fhall fecure u» 
 againft error, partiality and intrigue, converting that which was 
 meant for the fupport of virtue into a new engine for her ruin ? 
 Not to add, that prizes are a very feeble inftrument for the ge-» 
 neration of excellence, always inadequate to its reward where it 
 really exifts, always in danger of being beftowed on its fem- 
 blance, continually mifleading the underftanding by foreign and 
 degenerate motives of avarice and vanity. 
 
 In truth, the whole fyftem of fuch regulations is a perpetual 
 ftruggle againft the laws of nature and neceffity. Mind will in 
 all inftances be fwayed by its own views and propenfities. No 
 project can be more abfurd, than that of reverfing thefe propen- 
 
 4 F 2 fities 
 
5 88 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 ^OOK VI. f lt j es by t h e interpofition of authority. He that fhould cora- 
 
 1 o ' mand a conflagration to ceafe or a tempeft to be ftill, would not 
 
 difplay more ignorance of the fyftem of the univerfe, than he, 
 who, with a code of regulations, whether general or minute, that 
 he has framed in his clofet, expects to reftore a corrupt and lux- 
 urious people to temperance and virtue. 
 
 Political de- The force of this argument reflecting the ineflkacy of regu- 
 
 generacy not 
 
 incurable. lations has often been felt, and the concluhons that are deduced 
 from it have been in a high degree difcouraging. " The cha- 
 racter of nations," it has been faid, " is unalterable, or at leaft, 
 when once debauched, can never be recovered to purity. Laws 
 are an empty name, when the manners of the people are become 
 corrupt. In vain fhall the wifeft legislator attempt the reforma- 
 tion of his country, when the torrent of profligacy and vice has 
 once broken down the bounds of moderation. There is no longer 
 any inftrument left for the reftoration of fimplicity and frugality. 
 It is ufelefs to declaim againft the evils that arife from inequality 
 of riches and rank, where this inequality has already gained an 
 eftablifhment. A generous fpirit will admire the exertions of a 
 Cato and a Brutus ; but a calculating fpirit will condemn them, 
 as inflicting ufelefs torture upon a patient whofe difeafe is irre- 
 mediable. It was from a view of this truth that the poets de- 
 rived their fictions reflecting the early hiflory of mankind ; well 
 aware that, when luxury was introduced and the fprings of mind 
 unbent, it would be a vain expectation that fhould hope to recal 
 
 men 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 589 
 
 men from paffion to reaibn, and from effeminacy to energy*." BOOK VI. 
 r J bJ CHAP. 1. 
 
 But this conclufion from the inefficacy of regulations is fo far ' * ' 
 
 from being valid, that in reality, 
 
 A third objection to the pofitive interference of fociety in its 3- fuperflu- 
 corporate capacity for the propagation of truth and virtue is, 
 that fuch interference is altogether unneceflary. Truth and 
 virtue are competent to fight their own battles. They do not 
 need to be nurfed and patronifed by the hand of power. 
 
 The miftake which has been made in this cafe, is fimilar to in commerce -. 
 the miftake which is now univerfally exploded upon the fubjecl: 
 of commerce. It was long fuppofed that, if any nation defired 
 to extend its trade, the thing moft immediately neceffary was 
 for government to interfere, and inftitute protecting duties, 
 bounties and monopolies. It is now well known that commerce 
 never flourifhes fo much, as when it is delivered from the 
 guardianfhip of legiflators and minifters, and is built upon the 
 principle, not of forcing other people to buy our commodities 
 dear when they might purchafe them elfewhere cheaper and 
 better, but of ourfelves feeling the neceffity of recommending 
 them by their intrinfic advantages. Nothing can be at once fo 
 unreafonable and hopelefs, as to attempt by pofitive regulations 
 to difarm the unalterable laws of the univerfe. 
 
 Book I, Chap. VIII. 
 
 The 
 
59° GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 ^P K VI - The fame truth which has been felt under the article of com- 
 . v ~7 — ^T^ merce, has alfo made a confiderable progrefs as to the fubjects 
 
 ?n ipEeulative ' x o j 
 
 enquiry: Q f fpgcuiative enquiry. Formerly it was thought that the true 
 religion was to be defended by ads of uniformity, and that one 
 of the principal duties of the magiftrate was to watch the pro- 
 grefs of herefy. It was truly judged that the connexion between 
 error and vice is of the moft intimate nature, and it was con- 
 cluded that no means could be more effectual to prevent men 
 from deviating into error, than to check their wanderings by the 
 fcourge of authority. Thus writerSj whofe political views in 
 other refpects have been uncommonly enlarged, have told us 
 " that men ought indeed to be permitted to think as they pleafe, 
 but not to propagate their pernicious opinions j as they may be 
 permitted to keep poifons in their clofet, but not to offer them 
 to fale under the denomination of cordials *." Or, if humanity 
 have forbidden them to recommend the extirpation of a feet 
 which has already got footing in a country, they have however 
 carneftly advifed the magiftrate to give no quarter to any new 
 extravagance that might be attempted to be introduced f. — The 
 reign of thefe two errors refpecting commerce and theoretical 
 fpeculation is nearly at an end, and it is reafonable to believe 
 that the idea of teaching virtue through the inftrumentality of 
 government will not long furvive them. 
 
 * Gulliver's Travels, Part II, Chap. VI. 
 
 \Mably, de la Legijlatiott, Liv. IF, Chap. Ill: des Etats Unis d'Jmerique, 
 Lettre III. 
 
 All 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. S9 i 
 
 All that is to be afked on the part of government in behalf of ^° .^ V T I# 
 morality and virtue is a clear ftage upon which for them to exert ' <n — ' 
 
 in morality : 
 
 their own energies, and perhaps fome reftraint for the prefent 
 upon the violent difturbers of the peace of fociety, that the efforts 
 of thefe principles may be allowed to go on uninterrupted to 
 their natural conclufion. Who ever faw an inftance in which 
 error unaided by power was victorious over truth ? Who is 
 there fo abfurd as to believe, that with equal arms truth can be 
 ultimately defeated ? Hitherto every inftrument of menace of 
 influence has been employed to counteract her. Has fhe made 
 no progrefs I — Has the mind of man the capacity to chufe falf- 
 hood and reject: truth, when her evidence is fairly prefented ? 
 When it has been once thus prefented and has gained a few 
 converts, does fhe ever fail to go on perpetually increafing the 
 number of her votaries ? Exclufively of the fatal interference of 
 government, and the violent irruptions of barbarifm threatening 
 to fweep her from the face of the earth, has not this been in ail! 
 inftances the hiitory of fcience ? 
 
 Nor are thefe obfervations lefs true in their application to the 
 manners and morals of mankind. Do not men always act in 
 the manner which they efteem heft upon the whole or moft 
 conducive to their intereft ? Is it poffible then that evidence of 
 what is beft or what is moft beneficial can be thrown away upon 
 them ? The real hiftory of the changes of character they expe- 
 rience in this refpect is this* Truth for a long time fpreads itfelf 
 
 unobferved.. 
 
592 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK vi. unobferved. Thofe who are the firft to embrace it are little 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 aware of the extraordinary effects with which it is pregnant. 
 But it goes on to be ftudied and illuftrated. It perpetually 
 increafes in clearnefs and amplitude of evidence. The number 
 of thofe by whom it is embraced is gradually enlarged. If it 
 have relation to their practical interests, if it fhow them that 
 they may be a thoufand times more happy and free than at 
 prefent, it is impoffible that in its perpetual increafe of evidence 
 and energy, it fhould not at laft break the bounds of fpeculation, 
 and become an animating principle of action. What can be 
 more abfurd than the opinion, which has fo long prevailed, 
 " that juftice and an equal diftribution of the means of happinefs 
 may appear ever fo clearly to be the only reafonable foundation 
 of political fociety, without ever having any chance of being 
 reduced into practice ? that oppreffion and mifery are draughts 
 of fo intoxicating a nature, that, when once tailed, we can 
 never afterwards refufe to partake of them ? that vice has fo 
 many advantages over virtue, that the reafonablenefs and wifdom 
 of the latter, however powerfully exhibited, can never obtain a 
 hold upon our affections ?" 
 
 While therefore we decry the efficacy of unaffifted laws, we 
 are far from throwing any difcouragement by that means upon 
 the profpect of focial improvement. The true tendency of this 
 view of the fubject is to fuggeft indeed a different, but a more 
 confiftent and promifing method by which this improvement is 
 6 to 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 593 
 
 to be produced. The legitimate infcrument of effecting political p???^/* 
 
 reformation is truth. Let truth be incefTantly fludied, illuflrated k ' 
 
 and propagated, and the effect is inevitable. Let us not vainly 
 endeavour by laws and regulations to anticipate the future 
 dictates of the general mind, but calmly wait till the harveft of 
 opinion is ripe. Let no new practice in politics be introduced, 
 and no old one anxioufly fuperfeded, till called for by the public 
 voice. The talk, which for the prefent fhould wholly occupy 
 the friend of man, is enquiry, inflruction, difcuflion. The 
 time may come when his talk fhall be of another fort. Error, 
 being completely detected, may indeed fink into unnoticed 
 oblivion, without one partifan to interrupt her fall. This would 
 inevitably be the event, were it not for the reftieffnefs and incon- 
 fiderate impetuofity of mankind. But the event may-be other- 
 wife. Political change, by advancing too rapidly to its crifis, 
 may become attended with commotion and hazard ; and it will 
 then be incumbent on him actively to affift in unfolding the 
 cataftrophe. The evils of anarchy have been fhown to be much 
 lefs than they are ordinarily fuppofed * ; but, whatever be their 
 amount, the friend of man will not, when they arife, timidly 
 flirink from the poft of danger. He will on the contrary by 
 focial emanations of wifdom endeavour to guide the under- 
 flandings of the people at large to the perception of felicity. 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XX, p. 548. 
 
 4G I* 
 
594 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. j n t h e f our th place the interference of an organifed fociety for 
 * r~ — ' the purpofe of influencing; opinions and manners, is not only 
 
 4. pernicious: r l 01 ■> j 
 
 ufelefs, but pernicious. We have already found that fuch inter- 
 ference is in one view of the fubject ineffectual. But here a 
 diftinction is to be made. Confidered with a view to the intro- 
 duction of any favourable changes in the ftate of fociety, it is 
 altogether impotent. But, though it be inadequate to change, 
 it is powerful to prolong. This property in political regulation 
 is fo far from being doubtful, that tw it alone we are to afcribe 
 all the calamities that government has inflicted on mankind. 
 When regulation coincides with the habits and propenfities of 
 mankind at the time it is introduced, it will be found fufhciently 
 capable of maintaining thofe habits and propenfities in the greater 
 part unaltered for centuries. In this view it is doubly pernicious. 
 
 as under- fo understand this more accurately, let us apply it to the 
 
 mining intel- J " ' 
 
 leftualcapa- ca f e f rewards, which has always been a favourite topic with 
 the advocates of an improved legiflation. How often have 
 we been told, " that talents and virtues would fpring up fpon- 
 taneoufly in a country, one of the objects of whofe constitution 
 mould be to fecure to them an adequate reward ?" Now to 
 judge of the propriety of this aphorifm we fhould begin with 
 recollecting that the difcerning of merit is an individual, and not 
 a focial capacity. What can be more reafonable than that each 
 man for himfelf mould eftimate the merits of his neighbour? 
 
 To 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 595 
 
 To endeavour to inftitute a general judgment in the name of the B ^P K VI « 
 
 CHAP, I, 
 
 whole, and to melt down the different opinions of mankind into v * ""■' 
 
 one common opinion, appears at .firft fight fo monflrous an 
 attempt, that it is impoffible to augur well of its confequences. 
 Will this judgment be wife, reafonable or juft ? , Wherever each 
 man is accuflomed to decide for himfelf, and the appeal of 
 merit is immediately to the opinion of its contemporaries, there, 
 were it not for the falfe bias of fome pofitive inftitution, we 
 might expect a genuine ardour in him who afpired to excellence, 
 creating and receiving impremons in the judgment of an im- 
 partial audience. We might expect the judgment of the auditors 
 to ripen by perpetual exercife, and mind, ever curious and 
 awake, continually to approach nearer to the ftandard of truth. 
 What do we gain in compenfation for this, by fetting up autho- 
 rity as the general oracle, from which the active mind is to 
 inform itfelf what fort of excellence it fhould feek to acquire, 
 and the public at large what judgment they fhould pronounce 
 upon the efforts of their contemporaries ? What fhould we think 
 of an act of parliament appointing fome particular individual 
 prefident of the court of criticifm, and judge in the laft refort of 
 the literary merit of dramatic compofitions ? Is there any folid 
 reafon why we fhould expect better things, from authority 
 ufurping the examination of moral or political excellence ? 
 
 Nothing can be more unreafonable than the attempt to retain 
 men in one common opinion by the dictate of authority. The 
 
 4 G 2 opinion 
 
596 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. opinion thus obtruded upon the minds of the public is not their 
 
 CPiAa ■ I. 
 
 K-1 v ' real opinion ; it is only a project by which they are rendered in- 
 capable of forming an opinion. Whenever government aflumes 
 to deliver us from the trouble of thinking for ourfelves, the only 
 confequences it produces are thofe of torpor and imbecility. 
 Wherever truth ftands in the mind unaccompanied by the evi- 
 dence upon which it depends, it cannot properly be faid to be ap- 
 prehended at all. Mind is in this cafe robbed of its efTential cha- 
 racter and genuine employment, and along with them muft be 
 expected to lofe all that which is capable of rendering its opera- 
 tions falutary and admirable. Either mankind will refift the af- 
 fumptions of authority undertaking to fuperintend their opinions, 
 and then thefe affumptions will produce no more than an inef- 
 fectual fbruggle ; or they will fubmit, and then the effects will 
 be injurious. He that in any degree configns to another the tafk 
 of dictating his opinions and his conduct, will ceafe to enquire 
 for himfelf, or his enquiries will be languid and inanimate. 
 
 Regulations will originally be inftituted in favour either of 
 falfhood or truth. In the firfl cafe no rational enquirer will pre- 
 tend to alledge any thing in their defence ; but, even fhould truth 
 be their object,yetfuch is their nature, that they infallibly defeat the 
 very purpofe they were intended to ferve. Truth, when originally 
 prefented to the mind, is powerful and invigorating ; but, when 
 attempted to be perpetuated by political inftitution, becomes flac- 
 cid and lifelefs. Truth in its unpatronifed ftate ftrengthens and 
 
 improves 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 597 
 
 improves the underftanding ; becaufe in that ftate it is embraced I J2?? p Y l r " 
 
 only fo far as it is perceived to be truth. But truth, when recom- * » ' 
 
 mended by authority, is weakly and irrefolutely embraced. The 
 opinions I entertain are no longer properly my own ; I repeat 
 them as a leffon appropriated by rote, but I do not ftriclly fpeak- 
 ing underftand them, and I am not able to aflign the evidence 
 upon which they reft. My mind is weakened, while it is pre- 
 tended to be improved. Inftead of the firmnefs of independence, 
 I am taught to bow to authority I know not why. Perfons thus 
 trammelled, are not ftriotly fpeaking capable of a fingle virtue. 
 The firft duty of man is to take none of the principles of conduct 
 upon truft, to do nothing without a clear and individual convic- 
 tion that it is right to be done. He that refigns his underftand- 
 ing upon one particular topic, will not exercife it vigoroufly upon 
 ethers. If he be right in any inftance, it will be inadvertently 
 and bv chance. A confeioufnefs of the degradation to which he 
 is fulijedled will perpetually haunt him; or at leaft he will want 
 the confeioufnefs that accrues from independent confideration, 
 and will therefore equally want that intrepid perfeverance, that 
 calm felf approbation that grows out of independence. Such 
 beings are the mere dwarfs and mockery of men, their efforts 
 comparatively pufdlanimous, and the vigour with which they 
 fhould execute their purpofes, fuperficial and hollow. 
 
 Strangers to conviction, they will never be able to diftinguifh as fufpendmg 
 
 • i« 1 • n r intellectual 
 
 between prejudice and reafon. Nor is this the worft. Even improvement : 
 
 when 
 
598 GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. vvhen the glimpfes of enquiry fuggeft themfelves, they will not 
 dare to yield to the temptation. To what purpofe enquire, 
 when the law has told me what to believe and what mull be the 
 termination of my enquiries ? Even when opinion properly fo 
 called fuggefts itfelf, I am compelled, if it differ in any degree 
 from the eftablifhed fyftem, to fhut my eyes, and loudly profefs 
 my adherence where I doubt the moft. This compulfion may 
 exift in many different degrees. But, fuppofing it to amount to 
 no more than a very flight temptation to be infincere, what judg- 
 ment muft we form of fuch a regulation either in a moral or in- 
 tellectual view ? of a regulation, inviting men to the profeflion of 
 certain opinions by the proffer of a reward, and deterring them 
 from a fevere examination of their juftice by penalties and difa- 
 bilities ? A fyftem like this does not content itfelf with habitually 
 unnerving the mind of the great mafs of mankind through all 
 its ranks, but provides for its own continuance by debauching 
 or terrifying the few individuals, who, in the midft of the gene- 
 ral emafculation, might retain their curiofity and love of enter- 
 prife. We may judge how pernicious it is in its operation in 
 this refpect by the long reign of papal ufurpation in the dark 
 ages, and the many attacks upon it that were fuppreffed, previ- 
 oufly to the fuccefsful one of Luther. Even yet, how few are 
 there that venture to examine into the foundation of Mahome- 
 tanifm and Chriftianity, or the effects of monarchy and arifto- 
 cratical inftitution, in countries where thofe fyftems are eftablifhed 
 by law ? Suppofing men were free from perfecution for their 
 
 hoftilities 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 599 
 
 hoftilities in this refpeft, yet the inveftigation could never be im- p^ 01 ^, 1 * 
 
 partial, while fo many allurements are held out, inviting men to * « ' 
 
 a decifion in one particular way. 
 
 To thefe confiderations it fhould be added, that what is right contra, 7 to 
 
 the n.'.ture of 
 
 under certain circumftances to-day, may by an alteration in thofe m3rallt y : 
 circumftances become wrong to-morrow. Right and wrong are 
 the refult of certain relations, and thofe relations are founded in 
 the refpettive qualities of the beings to whom they belong. 
 Change thofe qualities, and the relations become altogether dif- 
 ferent. The treatment that I am bound to beftow upon any one 
 depends upon my capacity and his circumflanccs. Increafe the 
 nrft, or vary the fecond, and I am bound to a different treatment. 
 I am bound at prefent to fubject an individual to forcible reftraint, 
 becaufe I am not wife enough by reafon alone to change his 
 vicious propenfities. The moment I can render myfelf wife 
 enough, I ought to confine myfulf to the latter mode. It is per- 
 haps right to fuffer the negroes in the Weft Indies to continue in 
 flavery, till they can be gradually prepared for a ftate of liberty. 
 Univerfally it is a fundamental principle in found political fci- 
 ence, that a nation is beft fitted for the amendment of its civil go- 
 vernment by being made to underftand and defire the advantage 
 of that amendment, and the moment it is fo underftood and de- 
 fired it ought to be introduced. But, if there be any truth in 
 thefe views, nothing can be more adverfe to reafon or incon- 
 6 fiftent 
 
6oo GENERAL EFFECTS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VI. fiftent with the nature of man, than pofitive regulations tending 
 
 CHAP. I. r o o 
 
 ' » ' to continue a certain mode of proceeding when its utility is 
 
 gone. 
 
 to the nature If we would be ftill more completely aware of the pernicious 
 
 cf mind. 
 
 tendency of pofitive inftitutions, we ought in the laft place expli- 
 citly to contrail the nature of mind and the nature of govern- 
 ment. It is one of the moft unqueftionable properties of mind to 
 be fufceptible of perpetual improvement. It is the inalienable 
 tendency of pofitive institution, to retain that with which it is 
 converfant for ever in the fame ftate. Is then the perfe&ibility of 
 underftanding an attribute of trivial importance ? Can we recol- 
 lect with coldnefs and indifference the advantages with which this 
 quality is pregnant to the latefh pouerity ? And how are thefe ad- 
 vantages to be fecured ? By inceffant indufhy, by a curiofity 
 never to be difheartened or fatigued, by a fpirit of enquiry to 
 which a fublime and philanthropic mind will allow no paufe„ 
 The circumftance of all others mod necefTary, is that we fhould 
 never ftand ftill, that every thing moft interesting to the general- 
 welfare, wholly delivered from reftraint, fhould be in a ftate of 
 change, moderate and as it were imperceptible, but continual. Is 
 there any thing that can look with a more malignant afpect upon 
 the general welfare, than an inftitution tending to give perma- 
 nence to certain fyftems and opinions ? Such inftitutions are two 
 ways pernicious ; firft, which is moft material, becaufe they render 
 
 all 
 
POLITICAL SUPERINTENDENCE OF OPINION. 60 1 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 V > 
 
 all the future advances of mind Infinitely tedious and operofe ; ^^ 
 fecondly, becaufe, by violently confining the ftream of reflexion, 
 and holding it for a time in an unnatural flate, they compel it at 
 laft to rufh forward with impetuofity, and thus occafion calami- 
 ties, whifih, were it free from reftraint, would be found extremely 
 foreign to its nature. Is it to be believed that, if the interference 
 of pofitive inftitution were out of the queftion, the progrefs of 
 mind in part ages would have been fo flow, as to have ftruck the 
 majority of ingenuous obfervers with defpair ? The fcience of 
 Greece and Rome upon the fubjects of political juftice was in 
 many refpects extremely imperfect : yet could we have been fo 
 long in appropriating their difcoveries, had not the allurements 
 of reward and the menace of perfecution united to induce us, not 
 to truft to the firfl and fair verdict of our own underftandinjrs ? 
 
 "6" 
 
 The juft conclufion from the above reafonings is nothing more Condafion. 
 than a confirmation, with fome difference in the mode of applica~ 
 tion, of the fundamental principle, that government is little capable 
 of affording benefit of the firft importance to mankind. It 
 is calculated to induce us to lament, not the apathy and indif- 
 ference, but the inaufpicious activity of government. It in- 
 -cites us to look for the moral improvement of the fpecies, not in 
 the multiplying of regulations, but in their repeal. It teaches 
 us that truth and virtue, like commerce, will then flourifh mod, 
 when leaft fubjected to the miftaken guardianfhip of authority 
 and laws. This maxim will rife upon us in its importance, in 
 
 4 H proportion 
 
6o2 GENERAL EFFECTS, &c 
 
 BOOK VI. proportion as we conned it with the numerous departments of 
 
 ' * ■ political juftice to which it will be found to have relation. As 
 
 fail as it fhall be adopted into the practical fyftem of mankind, it 
 will go on to deliver us from a weight intolerable to mind, and in 
 the higher! degree inimical to the progrefs of truth,. 
 
 CHAR 
 
[ 6o 3 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 THEIR GENERAL TENDENCY. — EFFECTS ON THE CLERGY I 
 
 THEY INTRODUCE, I. IMPLICIT FAITH 2. HYPOCRISY: 
 
 TOPICS BY WHICH AN ADHERENCE TO THEM IS VINDI- 
 CATED. — EFFECTS ON THE LAITY. — APPLICATION. 
 
 ON E of the mod ftriking inftances of the injurious effects of BOOK V7. 
 CHAP. II. 
 the political patronage of opinion, as it at prefent exifts in * — > «* 
 
 r n r Their general 
 
 the world, is to be found in the lyftem of religious conformity, tendency. 
 Let us take our example from the church of England, by the con- 
 flitution of which fubfeription is required from its clergy to thirty- 
 nine articles of precife and dogmatical affertion upon almoft every 
 fubjec~t of moral and metaphyseal enquiry. Here then we have 
 to confider the whole honours and revenues of the church, from 
 the archbifhop who takes precedence next after the princes of the 
 blood royal to the meaneft curate in the nation, as employed in 
 fupport of a fyftemof blind fubmiffion and abject hypocrify. Is 
 there one man through this numerous hierarchy that is at liberty 
 to think for himfelf ? Is there one man among them that can lay 
 his hand upon his heart, and declare, upon bis honour and con- 
 fidence, that his emoluments have no effect in influencing his 
 
 4 H 2 judgment ? 
 
604. OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 B S a o Yl' judgment ? The declaration is literally impoffible. The moPc 
 
 Cirl-A.P • II. 
 
 that an honeft man under fuch circumflances can fay is, " I hope 
 not ; I endeavour to be impartial." 
 
 Effeasonthc Firft, the fyftem of religious conformity is a fyftem of blind 
 
 clergy: r/r ' . 
 
 they intra- fubmifhon. In every country polleffing a religious eftablifhment, 
 
 i. implicit tne ^ ate » fr° m a benevolent care it may be for the manners and 
 opinions of its fubjects, publicly encourages a numerous clafs "of 
 men to the ftudy of morality and virtue. What inftitution, we 
 might naturally be led to enquire, can be more favourable to 
 public happinefs ? Morality and virtue are the moft interefting 
 topics of human fpeculation j and the beft effects might be 
 expected to remit from the circumftance of many perfons, 
 perpetually receiving the moll liberal education, and fetting 
 themfelves apart, for the exprefs cultivation of thefe topics. 
 But unfortunately thefe very men are fettered in the outfet by 
 having a code of propofitions put into their hands, in a con- 
 formity to which all their enquiries muft terminate. The 
 natural tendency of fcience is to increafe from age to age, and 
 proceed from the humbleft beginnings to the moft admirable 
 conclufions. But care is taken in the prefent cafe to anticipate 
 thefe conclufions, and to bind men by promifes and penalties 
 not to improve upon the wifdom of their anceftors. The plan 
 is to guard againft degeneracy and decline, but never to advance. 
 It is founded in the moft fovereign ignorance of the nature of 
 mind, which never fails to do either the one or the other. 
 
 5 Secondly, 
 
OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 605 
 
 Secondly, the tendency of a code of religious conformity is to ^„9u VI " 
 
 CriA.r. II. 
 
 make men hypocrites. To underftand this it may be ufeful to ^— — ; ' 
 
 J 2. hypocnfy : 
 
 recollect the various fubterfuges that have been invented by topics by 
 
 which an ad- 
 ingenioUS men to apologife for the fubfcription of the Englifh herence to 
 
 them is vin- 
 
 clergy. It is obfervable by the way that the articles of the church dlcated. 
 are founded upon the creed of the Calvinifts, though for one 
 hundred and fifty years paft it has been accounted difreputable 
 among the clergy to be of any other than the oppofite, or 
 Arminian tenets. Volumes have been written to prove that, 
 while thefe articles exprefs predeftinarian fentiments, they are 
 capable of a different conflruction, and that the fubfcriber has a 
 right to take advantage of that conflruction. Divines of another 
 clafs have refted their arguments upon the known good character 
 and benevolent intentions of the firft reformers, and have con- 
 cluded that they could never intend to tyrannife over the con- 
 fciences of men, or preclude the refult of farther information. 
 Laftly, there are many who have treated the articles as articles 
 ©f peace, and inferred that, though you did not believe, you 
 might allow yourfelf in the difingenuity of fubferibing them, 
 provided you added to it the farther guilt of conftantly refraining 
 to oppofe what you considered as an adulteration of divine truth. 
 
 It wiould perhaps be regarded as incredible, if it refted upon 
 the evidence of hiftory alone, that a whole body of men, fet 
 apart as the inftructors of mankind, weaned as they are expected 
 to be from temporal ambition, and maintained from the fuppo- 
 
 fition 
 
v . 1 
 
 60S OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 BOOK vi. fition that the exiftence of human virtue and divine truth 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 depends on their exertions, fhould with one confent employ 
 themfelves in a cafuiftry, the object of which is to prove the 
 propriety of a man's declaring his aflent to what he does not 
 believe. Thefe men either credit their own fubterfuges, or they 
 do not. If they do not, what can be expected from men fo 
 unprincipled and profligate ? With what front can they exhort 
 other men to virtue, with the brand of vice upon their own 
 foreheads ? If they do, what muft be their portion of moral 
 fenfibility and difeernment ? Can we believe that men (hall enter 
 upon their profeffion with fo notorious a perverfion of reafon 
 and truth, and that no confequences will flow from it to infect 
 their general character ? Rather, can we fail to compare their 
 unnatural and unfortunate ftate, with the profound wifdom and 
 determined virtue which their induftry and exertions would 
 unqueftionably have produced, if they had been left to their 
 genuine operation ? They are like the victims of Circe, to whom 
 human underftanding was preferved entire, that they might more 
 exquifitely feel their degraded condition. They are incited to 
 ftudy and to a thirft after knowledge, at the fame time that the 
 fruits of knowledge are conftantly withheld from their unfuc- 
 cefsful attempts. They are held up to their contemporaries as 
 the profeffors of truth, and political inftitution tyrannically com- 
 mands them, in all the varieties of underftanding and fucceffion 
 of ages, to model themfelves to one common ftandard. 
 
 Such 
 
OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 607 
 
 Such are the effects that a code of religious conformity pro- £OOK y. L 
 
 ' CHAP. II. 
 
 duces upon the clergy themfelves ; let us confider the effects that ^rr * — f 
 
 r ° J Effetts on the 
 
 are produced upon their countrymen. They are bid to look k»ty. 
 for inftruction and morality to a denomination of men, formal, 
 embarraffed and hypocritical, in whom the main fpring of intellect 
 is unbent and incapable of action. If the people be not blinded 
 with religious zeal, they will difcover and defpife the imperfec- 
 tions of their fpiritual guidei. If they be fo blinded, they will 
 not the lefs tranfplant into their own characters the imbecil 
 and unworthy fpirit they are not able to detect. Is virtue fo 
 deficient in attractions as to be incapable of gaining adherents to 
 her ftandard ? Far otherwife, Nothing can bring the wifdom of 
 a juft and pure conduct into queftion, but the circumftance of 
 its being recommended to us from an equivocal quarter. The 
 mod malicious enemy of mankind could not have invented a 
 a fcheme more deftructive of their true happinefs, than that of 
 hiring at the expence of the ftate a body of men, whofe bufinefs 
 it mould feem to be to dupe their contemporaries into the practice 
 of virtue 
 
 One of the leffons that powerful facts are perpetually reading 
 to the inhabitants of fuch countries, is that of duplicity and pre- 
 varication in an order of men, which, if it exift at all, ought to 
 exift only for reverence. Do you think that this prevarication 
 is not a fubject of general notoriety ? Do you think that the firft 
 idea that rifes to the understanding of the multitude at fight of 
 
 a clergy- 
 
6o8 OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 
 
 BOOK vi. a clergyman, is not that of a man who inculcates certain propo- 
 CHAP. II. . . . 
 
 1 v ' fitions, not fo properly becaufe he thinks them true or thinks 
 
 them interefting, as becaufe he is hired to the employment ? 
 
 Whatever inftruction a code of religious uniformity may fail to 
 
 convey, there is one that it always communicates, the wifdom 
 
 of eftimating an unreferved and difinterefted fmcerity at a very 
 
 cheap rate. Such are the efFe&s that are produced by political 
 
 inititution, at a time when it moll zealoufly intends with parental 
 
 care to guard its fubje&s from fedu&ion and depravity. 
 
 Application. Thefe arguments do not apply to any particular articles and 
 creeds, but to the very notion of ecclefiaftical eftabliihments in 
 general. Wherever the ftate fets apart a certain revenue for the 
 fupport of religion, it will infallibly be given to the adherents of 
 fome particular opinions, and will operate in the manner of 
 . prizes to induce men at all events to embrace and profefs thofe 
 opinions. Undoubtedly, if I think it right to have a fpiritual 
 inftructor to guide me in my refearches and at ftated intervals to 
 remind me of my duty, I ought to be at liberty to take the 
 proper fteps to fupply myfelf in this refpect. A prieft, who 
 thus derives his muTion from the unbiafTed judgment of his 
 parifhioners, will ftand a chance to poffefs beforehand and inde- 
 pendently of corrupt influence the requifites they demand. But 
 why mould I be compelled to contribute to the fupport of an 
 inftitution, whether I approve of it or no ? If public worfhip be 
 conformable to reafon, reafon without doubt will prove adequate 
 
 to 
 
OF RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENTS. 609 
 
 to its vindication and fuppoi-t. If it be from God, it is profana- BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 tion to imagine that it ftands in need of the alliance of the ftate. >> „ / 
 
 It muft be in an eminent degree artificial and exotic, if it be in- 
 capable of preferving itfelf in exiftence, othenvife than by the 
 inaufpicious interference of political inftitution. 
 
 4 1 CHAP. 
 
[ 6io ] 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINION 
 IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 OF HERESY. — ARGUMENTS BY WHICH THE SUPPRESSION 
 
 OF HERESY IS RECOMMENDED. ANSWER. IGNORANCE 
 
 NOT NECESSARY TO MAKE MEN VIRTUOUS. — DIFFERENCE 
 
 OF OPINION NOT SUBVERSIVE OF PUBLIC SECURITY. 
 
 REASON, AND NOT FORCE, THE PROPER CORRECTIVE OF 
 SOPHISTRY. ABSURDITY OF THE ATTEMPT TO RE- 
 STRAIN THOUGHT — TO RESTRAIN THE FREEDOM OF 
 SPEECH. — CONSEQUENCES THAT WOULD RESULT. FAL- 
 LIBILITY OF THE MEN BY WHOM AUTHORITY IS EXER- 
 CISED. — OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS IN GOVERNMENT. — ■ 
 
 INIQUITY OF THE ATTEMPT TO RESTRAIN THEM. 
 
 TENDENCY OF UNLIMITED POLITICAL DISCUSSION. 
 
 BOOK VI. ' | *HE fame views which have prevailed for the introduction 
 -*- of religious eftablifhments, have inevitably led to the idea 
 
 CHAP. Ill 
 
 Ofherefy 
 
 of provifions againft the rife and progrefs ofherefy. No arguments 
 can be adduced in favour of the political patronage of truth, 
 that will not be equally cogent in behalf of the political difcou- 
 ragement of error. Nay, they will, of the two, be moft cogent 
 in the latter cafe ; for error and mifreprefentation are the irre- 
 concilable 
 
OF THE SUPPRESSION, &c. 61 r 
 
 concllable enemies of virtue, and if authority were the true means Sfjj^ ]'£ 
 
 to difarm them, there would then at leaft be no need of pofitive ' « '. 
 
 provifions to affift the triumph of truth. It has however happened 
 that this argument, though more tenable, has had fewer adherents. 
 Men are more eafily reconciled to abufe in the diflribution of 
 rewards, than in the infliction of penalties. It will not therefore be 
 requifite laborioufly to infift upon the refutation of this principle j 
 its difcuflion is principally neceffary for the fake of method. 
 
 Various arguments have been alledged in defence of this Arguments 
 
 by which the 
 
 restraint. " The importance of opinion as a general proportion fuppreffian 
 
 of nerefy has 
 
 is notorious and unqueflionable. Ought not political inftitu- been recom- 
 mended. 
 
 tion to take under its infpe&ion that root from which all our 
 actions are ultimately derived ? The opinions of men mud be 
 expected to be as various as their education and their temper : 
 ought not government to exert its forefight to prevent this dif- 
 cord from breaking out into anarchy and violence ? There is no 
 propofition fo abfurd or fo hoflile to morality and public good, 
 as not to have found its votaries : will there be no danger in 
 fuffering thefe eccentricities to proceed unmolefted, and every 
 perverter of truth and juftice to make as many converts as he is 
 able ? It has been found indeed a hopelefs tafk to endeavour to 
 extirpate by violence errors already eflablifhed ; but is it not the 
 duty of government to prevent their afcendancy, to check the 
 growth of their adherents and the introduction of herefies 
 hitherto unknown ? Can thofe perfons, to whom the care of the 
 
 4 I 2 general 
 
6 1 2 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS 
 
 BOOK VI. p-eneral welfare is confided, or who are fitted by their fituation 
 
 CH'\P. III. ° J 
 
 * » ' or their talents to fuggeft proper regulations to the adoption of 
 
 the community, be j unified in conniving at the fpread of fuch, 
 extravagant and pernicious opinions as flrike at the root of order 
 and morality ? Simplicity of mind and an underftanding unde- 
 bauched with fophiftry have ever been the characteriftics of a 
 people among whom virtue has flourifhed : ought not govern- 
 ment to exert itfelf to exclude the inroad of qualities oppofite to 
 thefe ? It is thus that the friends of moral juftice have ever con- 
 templated with horror the progrefs of infidelity and latitudi- 
 narian principles. It was thus that the elder Cato viewed with 
 grief the importation into his own country of that plaufible and 
 loquacious philofophy by which Greece -had already been cor- 
 rupted *." 
 
 Anfw-er. There are feveral trains of reflexion which thefe reafonin°-s 
 
 o 
 
 Ignorance fuggeft. None of them can be more important than that which 
 
 not neceflary 
 
 to make men may affift us in detecting the error of the elder Cato, and of 
 
 »virtuous. 
 
 other perfons who have been the zealous but miftaken advocates 
 of virtue. Ignorance is not neceflary to render men virtuous. 
 Jf it were, we might reafonably conclude that virtue was an im- 
 pofture, and that it was our duty to free ourfelves from its 
 
 * The reader will confider this as the language of the objectors. The moft 
 
 -.-eminent of the Greek philofophers were in reality diftinguifhed from all ether 
 
 teachers, by die fortitude with which they conformed to the precepts they 
 
 Mil gilt. 
 
 fhackles. 
 
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 613 
 
 '{hackles. The cultivation of the understanding has no tendency j£99? Yh 
 
 « CHAP. III. 
 
 to corrupt the heart. A man who fhould poflefs all the fcience * v— ' 
 
 of Newton and all the genius of Shakefpeare, would not on that 
 account be a bad man. Want of great and comprehenfive views 
 had as confiderable a fhare as benevolence in the grief of Cato. 
 It is like the taking to pieces an imperfect machine in order by 
 reconftrudting it to enchance its value. An uninformed and 
 timid fpe&ator would be frightened at the temerity of the artift, 
 at the confufed heap of pins and wheels that were laid afide at 
 random, and would take it for granted that nothing but deftruc- 
 tion would be the confequence. But he would be difappointed. 
 It is thus that the extravagant fallies of mind are the prelude of 
 the highert wifdom, and that the dreams of Ptolemy were deftined 
 to precede the difcoveries of Newton. 
 
 The event cannot be other than favourable. Mind would elfe 
 ceafe to be mind. It would be more plauiible to fay that the 
 perpetual cultivation of the understanding will terminate in mad- 
 nefs, than that it will terminate in vice. As long as enquiry is 
 fuffered to proceed, and fcience to improve, our knowledge is per- 
 petually increafed. Shall we know every thing elfe, and nothing 
 of ourfelves ? Shall we become clear fighted and penetrating in 
 all other fubjects, without increafing our penetration upon the 
 fubjcft of man ? Is vice raoft truly allied to wifdom or to folly ? 
 Can mankind perpetually increafe in wifdom, without increafing 
 in the knowledge of what it is wife for them to do ? Can a man 
 1 have 
 
6i4 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS 
 
 BOOK VI. have a clear difcernment, unclouded with any remains of former 
 CHAP. III. ' J 
 
 v « ' miftake, that this is the action he ought to perform, moll condu- 
 cive to his own intereft and to the general good, moft delightful 
 at the inflant and fatisfa&ory in the review, moft agreeable to rea- 
 fon, juftice and the nature of things, and refrain from perform- 
 ing it ? Every fyftem which has been conftru&ed relative to the 
 nature of fuperior beings and Gods, amidft all its other errors has 
 reafoned truly upon thefe topics, and taught that the increafe of 
 wifdom and knowledge led, not to malignity and tyranny, but to 
 benevolence and juftice. 
 
 Difference of Secondly, it is a miftake to fuppofe that fpeculative differences 
 
 opinion not 
 
 fubverfive of f opinion threaten materially to difturb the peace of fociety. It 
 
 public fecu- x J J 
 
 *"y« is only when they are enabled to arm themfelves with the autho- 
 
 rity of government, to form parties in the ftate, and to ftruggle 
 for that political afcendancy which is too frequently exerted in 
 fupport of or in oppofition to fome particular creed, that they 
 become dangerous. Wherever government is wife enough to 
 maintain an inflexible neutrality, thefe jarring feels are always 
 found to live together with fufficient harmony. The very means 
 that have been employed for the prefervation of order, have been 
 the only means that have led to its difturbance. The moment 
 government refolves to admit of no regulations oppreffive to 
 either party, controverfy finds its level, and appeals to argument 
 and reafon, inftead of appealing to the fword or the ftake. The 
 moment government defcends to wear the badge of a feci:, reli» 
 3 < g io u* 
 
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 61$ 
 
 srious war is commenced, the world is difgraced with inexpiable BOOK VT. 
 s ' ° r CHAP. in. 
 
 broils and deluged with blood, 
 
 Thirdly, the injuftice of punifliing men for their opinions and Reafon, and 
 
 not force, the 
 
 arguments will be ftill more vifible, if we reflect a little on the na- proper cor- 
 rective of 
 ture of punifhment. Punifliment is one of thofe clafles of coer- fophUhy. 
 
 cion, the multiplication of which is fo much to be deprecated, 
 and which nothing but the moft urgent neceffity can in any cafe 
 juftify. That neceflity is commonly admitted to exift, where a 
 man has proved by his unjuft actions the injurioufnefs of his cha- 
 racter, and where the injury, the repetition of which is to be ap- 
 prehended, is of fuch a nature as to be committed before we can 
 have fufEcient notice to guard ourfelves againft it. But no fuch 
 necefhty can poflibly exift in the cafe of falfe opinions and per- 
 verfe arguments. Does any man aflert falfhood ? Nothing far-* 
 ther can be defired than that it fhould be confronted with truth. 
 Does he bewilder us with fophiftry ? Introduce the light of rea- 
 fon, and his deceptions will vanifh. There is in this cafe a clear 
 line of diftinction. In the only admiflible province of punifhment 
 force it is true is introduced, but it is only in return for force pre- 
 vioufly exerted. Where argument therefore, erroneous ftate- 
 ments and mifrcprefentation alone are employed, it is by argu- 
 ment only that they muft be encountered. We fhould not be 
 creatures of a rational and intellectual nature, if the victory of 
 truth over error were not ultimately certain. 
 
 To 
 
616 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS 
 
 BOOK Vl.l To enable us to conceive properly of the value of laws for the 
 
 CHAP. III. r r j ■ 
 
 ^TT~r- — \ punifhment of herefy, let us fuppofe a country to be fufficiently 
 the attempt provided with fuch laws, and obferve the refult. The objed is 
 thought: t0 pj-gygnt men from entertaining certain opinions, or in other 
 words from thinking in a certain way. What can be more ab- 
 furd than to undertake to put fetters upon the fubtlety of thought I 
 How frequently does the individual who defires to reftrain it in 
 himfelf, fail in the attempt ? Add to this, that prohibition and 
 menace in this refpecT: do but give new reftleffhefs to the curiofity 
 of the mind. I muft not think of the poffibility, that there is no 
 God ; that the ftupendous miracles of Mofes and Chrift were 
 never really performed ; that the dogmas of the Athanafian creed 
 are erroneous. I mufl fhut my eyes, and run blindly into all the 
 opinions, religious and political, that my anceftors regarded as 
 •facred. Will this in all inftances be poffible ? 
 
 There is another confideration, trite indeed, but the tritenefs 
 of which is an additional argument of its truth. Swift fays 
 " Men ought to be permitted to think as they pleafe, but not to 
 propagate their pernicious opinions *." The obvious anfwer to 
 this is, " We are much obliged to him : how would he be able 
 to punifh our herefy, even if he defired it, fo long as it was con- 
 cealed ?" The attempt to punifh opinion is abfurd : we may be 
 
 * See above, Chap. I, p. 590. 
 
 Stent 
 
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 617 
 
 filent refpecting our conclufions, if we pleafe ; the train of think- r ^?P p k XI' 
 
 ing-by which thofe conclufions are generated cannot fail to be v * ' 
 
 filent 
 
 " But, if men be not punifhed for their thoughts, they may be *° «ftra»n the 
 punifhed for uttering thofe thoughts." No. This is not lefs f P eech - 
 impoffible than the other. By what arguments will you pe'r- 
 fuade every man in the nation to exercife the trade of an in- 
 former ? By what arguments will you perfuade my bofom friend, 
 with whom I repofe all the thoughts of my heart, to repair im- 
 mediately from my company to a magistrate, in order to procure 
 my commitment for fo doing to the prifons of the inquifition ? 
 In countries where this is attempted, there will be a perpetual 
 ftruggle, the government endeavouring to pry into our moft 
 fecret tranfa&ions, and the people bufy to countermine, to out- 
 wit and to deteft their fuperintendents. 
 
 But the moft valuable confederation which this part of the Confluence* 
 
 . . that would 
 
 fubjecT: fuggefts, is, fuppofing all this were done, what judgment refult. 
 muft we form of the people among whom it is done ? Though 
 all this cannot, yet much may be performed; though the em- 
 bryo cannot be annihilated, it may be prevented from ever ex- 
 panding itfelf into the dimenfions of a man. The arguments by 
 which we were fuppofing a fyftem for the xeftraint of opinion 
 to be recommended, were arguments derived from a benevolent 
 -anxiety for the virtue of mankind, and to prevent their degene- 
 
 4 K racy. 
 
6i8 OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS 
 
 BOOK VI. racy . Will this end be accomplifhed ? Let us contraft a nation 
 CHAP. III. J r 
 
 * » — J of men, daring to think, to fpeak and to adl what they believe to 
 
 be right, and fettered with no fpurious motives to diffuade them 
 from right, with a nation that fears to fpeak, and fears to think 
 upon the moft interefting fubjedxs of human enquiry. Can any 
 fpectacle be more degrading than this timidity ? Can men in 
 whom mind is thus annihilated be capable of any good or valu- 
 able purpofe ? Can this moft abjecT: of all flaveries be the genu- 
 ine Hate, the true perfection of the human fpecies ? 
 
 Fallibility of Another argument, though it has often been ftated to the world, 
 
 the men by 
 
 whomautho- deferves to be mentioned in this place. Governments, no more 
 
 nty is exer- 
 
 cifed. than individual men, are infallible. The cabinets of princes and 
 
 the parliaments of kingdoms, if there be any truth in confidera- 
 tions already ftated *, are often lefs likely to be right in their 
 conclusions than the theorift in his clofet. But, difmiffing the 
 eftimate of greater and lefs, it was to be prefumed from the prin- 
 ciples of human nature, and is found true in fad, that cabinets 
 and parliaments are liable to vary from each other in opinion. 
 What fyftem of religion or government has not in its turn been 
 patronifed by national authority ? The confequence therefore of 
 admitting this authority is, not merely attributing to govern- 
 ment a right to impofe fome, but any or all opinions upon the 
 community. Are Paganifm and Chriftianity, the religions of 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XXIII, p. 572. 
 8 Mahomet, 
 
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 619 
 
 Mahomet, Zoroafter and Confucius, are monarchy and arifto- BOOK VI. 
 ' ' ; CHAP. III. 
 
 cracy in all their forms equally worthy to be perpetuated among ' 1 ' 
 
 mankind ? Is it quite certain that the greateft of all human cala- 
 mities is change ? Muft we never hope for any advance, any im- 
 provement ? Have no revolution in government, and no reforma- 
 tion in religion been productive of more benefit than difadvan- 
 tage ? There is no fpecies of reafoning in defence of the fuppref- 
 fion of herefy which may not be brought back to this monflrous 
 principle, that the knowlege of truth and the introduction of 
 right principles of policy, are circumftances altogether indifferent 
 to the welfare of mankind. 
 
 The fame reafonings that are here employed againfl. the forcible Of erroneous 
 
 opinions in 
 
 fuppreffion of religious herefy, will be found equally valid with government, 
 refpedt to political. The firft circumftance that will not fail to iniquity of 
 
 • • n r\ • j • tin r r- the attempt to 
 
 fuggeft ltfelf to every reflecting mind, is, What fort of conftitu- reftntfn them. 
 tion muft that be which muft never be examined ? whofe excel- 
 lencies muft be the conftant topic of eulogium, but refpe&ing 
 which we muft never permit ourfelves to enquire in what they 
 confift ? Can it be the intereft of fociety to profcribe all invefti- 
 gation reflecting the wifdom of its regulations ? Or muft our de- 
 bates be occupied with provifions of temporary convenience ; 
 and are we forbid to aft;, whether there may not be fomething 
 fundamentally wrong in the defign of the ftructure ? Reafon 
 and good fenfe will not fail to augur ill of that fyftem of things 
 
 4 K 2 which 
 
foo OF THE SUPPRESSION OF ERRONEOUS OPINIONS 
 
 BOOK VI. which is too facred to be looked into : and to fufpeet that there 
 CHAP. III. * 
 
 **- — * ' muft be fomething eflentially weak that thus fhrinks from the 
 
 eye of curiofity. Add to which, that, however: we may doubt 
 of the importance of religious difputes, nothing can lefs reafon- 
 ably be expofed to queftion than that the happinefs of mankind 
 is eflentially connected with the improvement of. political 
 fcience. 
 
 Tendency of « g ut w ;u not demagogues and declaimers lead to the fub- 
 
 unlimited po- 
 
 inieal difcuf- verfion of all order, and introduce the moll dreadful calamities ?" 
 
 Son. ' 
 
 What is the ftate they will introduce ? Monarchy and ariftocracy 
 are fome of the moft extenfive and lafting mifchiefs that have 
 yet afflicted mankind. Will thefe demagogues perfuade their 
 hearers to inftitute a new dynafty of hereditary defpots to op- 
 prefs them ? Will they perfuade them to create out of their own. 
 body a fet of feudal chiefs to -hold their brethren in the moft 
 barbarous flavery ? They would probably find the moft copious- 
 eloquence, inadequate to thefe purpofes. The arguments of 
 declaimers will not produce an extenfive and ftriking alteratioa 
 in political opinions, except fo far as they are built upon a bafis. 
 of irrefiftible truth.. Even if the people were in fome degree 
 intemperate in carrying the conclufions of thefe reafoners into 
 practice, the mifchiefs they would inflict would be inexpreffibly- 
 trivial, compared with thofe which are hourly perpetrated by 
 the moft cold blooded defpptifm. But in reality the duty of go- 
 vernment 
 
IN RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT. 621 
 
 vernment in thefe cafes is to be mild and equitable. Arguments BOOK VI. 
 
 1 & CHAP. III. 
 
 alone will not have the power, unaflifted by the fenfe or the re- v v ' 
 
 colle&ion of oppreffion or- treachery, to hurry the people into ex- 
 ceffes. ExcefTes are never the offspring of reafon, are never the 
 offspring of mifreprefentation only, but of power endeavouring 
 to ftifle reafon and traverfe.the common fenfe of mankind. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 622 ] 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 OF TESTS. 
 
 THEIR SUPPOSED ADVANTAGES ARE ATTENDED WITH IN- 
 JUSTICE ARE NUGATORY. ILLUSTRATION. THEIR 
 
 DISADVANTAGES THEY ENSNARE. EXAMPLE. SE- 
 COND EXAMPLE. THEY ARE AN USURPATION. — INFLU- 
 ENCE OF TESTS ON THE LATITUDINARI AN — ON THE 
 PURIST. CONCLUSION. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 BOOK VI. ' | ^ H E majority of the arguments above employed on the 
 fubjecT: of penal laws in matters of opinion are equally 
 applicable to tefis, religious and political. The diftin&ion be- 
 tween prizes and penalties, between greater and lefs, is little 
 worthy of our attention, if any difcouragement extended to the 
 curioiity of intelledt, and any authoritative countenance afforded 
 to one fet of opinions in preference to another, be in its own 
 nature unjuft, and evidently hoftile to the general good. 
 
 Leaving out of the consideration religious tefts, as being al- 
 ready fufhciently elucidated in the preceding difcuffion *, let us 
 attend for a moment to an article which has had its advocates 
 
 * Chap. II. 
 
 among 
 
O F T E S T S. 623 
 
 among men of confiderable liberality, the fuppofed propriety of BOOK vr. 
 
 C- H A 1 . IV. 
 
 political tefts. " What, fhall we have no federal oaths, no oaths ' ' 
 
 of fidelity to the nation, the law and the republic ? How in that 
 cafe fhall we ever diftinguifh between the enemies and the friends 
 of freedom ?" 
 
 Certainly there cannot be a method devifed at once more inef- Their fup- 
 pofed advan- 
 feclual and iniquitous than a federal oath. What is the Ian- tages are . at * 
 
 ti.nded with 
 
 guage that in ftrictnefs of interpretation belongs to the act of the i-ijuftice : 
 legiflature impofmg this oath ? To one party it fays, " We know 
 very well that you are our friends ; the oath as it relates to you 
 we acknowledge to be altogether fuperiiuous ; nevcrthelefs you 
 muft take it, as a cover to our indirect purpofes in impofmg it 
 upon perfons whofe views are lefs unequivocal than yours." 
 To the other party it fays, " It is vehemently fufpected that you 
 are inimical to the caufe in which we are engaged : this fuipicion 
 is either true or falfe ; if falfe, we ought not to fufpect you, and 
 much lefs ought we to put you to this invidious and nugatory 
 purgation; if true, you will either candidly confefs your differ- 
 ence, or difhoneftly prevaricate : be candid, and we will indig- 
 nantly banifh you ; be difhoneft, and we will receive you as 
 bofom friends." 
 
 Thofe who fay this however promife too much. Duty and are nugatory. . 
 common fenfe oblige us to watch the man we fufpect, even 
 though he fhould fwear he is innocent. Would not the fame 
 
 precautions 
 
624 OP TEST S. 
 
 EOOK VI. precautions which we are ftill obliged to employ to fecure us 
 
 CHAP. iv. r . 
 
 againft his duplicity, have fufficiently anfwered our purpofe with- 
 out putting him to his purgation ? Are there no methods by which 
 we can find out whether a man be the proper fubjecT: in whom 
 to repofe an important truft without putting the queftion to hhn- 
 felf? Will not he, who is fo dangerous an enemy that we can- 
 not fuffer him at large, difcover his enmity by his conduct, 
 without reducing us to the painful neceffity of tempting him to 
 an a£h of prevarication ? If he be fofubtle a hypocrite that all our 
 vigilance cannot detect him, will he fcruple to add to his other 
 crimes the crime of perjury ? 
 
 Whether the teft we impofe be merely intended to operate as 
 an exclufion from office, or to any more confiderable difadvan- 
 tage, the difability it introduces is ftill in the nature of a punifh- 
 ment. It treats the individual in queftion as an unfound mem- 
 ber of fociety, as diftinguifhed [in an unfavourable fenfe from 
 the multitude of his countrymen, and pofleffing certain attri- 
 butes detrimental to the general good. In the eye of reafon 
 human nature is capable of no other guilt than this*. Society 
 is authorifed to animadvert upon a certain individual, in the cafe 
 of murder for example, not becaufe he has done an action that 
 he might have avoided, not becaufe he was fufficiently informed 
 of the better and obftinately chofe the worfe j for this is impoffi- 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VI. 
 
 i ble, 
 
O F T E S T S. 625 
 
 ble, every man neceflarily does that which he at the time appre- book VI. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 heads to be beft : but becaufe his habits and character render «— ^ — ' 
 him dangerous to fociety, in the fame fenfe as a wolf or a blight 
 would be dangerous *. It muft no doubt be an emergency of 
 no common magnitude, that can juftify a people in putting a 
 mark of difpleafure upon a man for the opinions he entertains, 
 be they what they may. But, taking for granted for the prefent 
 the reafonablenefs of this proceeding, it would certainly be juft 
 'as equitable for the government to adminifter to the man 
 accufed for murder an oath of purgation, as to the man accufed 
 of difaffection to the eftablifhed order of fociety. There cannot 
 be a principle of juftice clearer than this, that no man can be 
 called on in order to punifhment to accufe himfelf. 
 
 Thefe reafonings being particularly applicable to a people in Illuftrauon. 
 a Hate of revolution like the French, it may perhaps be allowable 
 to take from their revolution an example of the injurious and 
 enfnaring effects with which tefts and oaths of fidelity are ufually 
 attended. It was required of all men to fwear " that they would be 
 faithful to the nation, the law and the king." In what fenfe 
 can they be faid to have adhered to their oath, who, twelve 
 months after their conftitution had been eftablifhed on its new 
 bafis, have taken a fecond oath, declaratory of their everlafting 
 abjuration of monarchy ? What fort of efted, favourable or un- 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VI. 
 
 4 L favourable ? 
 
626 OF TESTS. 
 
 BOOK VI. favourable? muft this precarious mutability hi their folemn 
 ? J. j appeals to heaven have upon the minds of thofe by whom they 
 are made! 
 
 Their difad- And this leads us from the confideration of the fuppofed" ad- 
 vantages : 
 
 vantages of tefts religious and political, to their real difadvantages. 
 
 theyenfnare: The firft of thefe difadvantages confifts in the impoffibility of 
 eonftrucling a teft in fuch a manner, as to fuit the various 
 opinions of thofe upon whom it is impofed, and not to be liable 
 
 example : to reafonable objection. When the law was repealed impofing 
 upon the diffenting clergy of England a fubfeription with certain 
 refervations. to the articles of the eftablifhed church, an attempt 
 was made to invent an unexceptionable teft that might be fubfti- 
 tuted in its room. This teft fimply affirmed, " that the books 
 of the Old and New Teftament in the opinion of the perfon 
 who took it contained a revelation from God;" and it was 
 fuppofed that no Chriftian could fcruple fuch a declaration. 
 But is it impoflible that I fhould be a Chriftian, and yet doubt 
 of the canonical authority of the amatory eclogues of Solomon, 
 or of certain other books contained in a fele&ion that was origi- 
 nally made in a very arbitrary manner ? " Still however I may 
 take the teft, with a perfuafion that the books of the Old and 
 New Teftament contain a revelation from God, and fomething 
 more." In the fame fenfe I might take it, even if the Alcoran, 
 the Talmud and the facred books of the Hindoos were added to 
 the lift. What fort of influence will be produced upon the 
 2 mind 
 
O F T E S T S. 627 
 
 mind that is accuftomed to this loofenefs of conftru&ion in its BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 mod folemn engagements ? ' , • 
 
 Let us examine with the fame view die federal oath of the fecond ex- 
 
 ample : 
 
 French, proclaiming the determination of the fwearer " to be 
 faithful to the nation, the law and the king." Fidelity to three 
 feveral interefts which may in various cafes be placed in oppofi- 
 tion to each other will appear at firft fight to be no very reafonable 
 engagement. The propriety of vowing fidelity to the king has 
 already been brought to the trial and received its condemna- 
 tion *. Fidelity to the law is an engagement of fo complicated 
 a nature, as to ftrike terror into every mind of ferious reflection. 
 It is impoffible that a fyftem of law the compofition of men 
 fliould ever be prefented to fuch a mind, that fhall appear alto- 
 gether faultlefs. But, with refpect to laws that appear to me to 
 be unjuft, I am bound to every fort of hoftility fhort of open 
 violence, I am bound to exert myfelf inceffantly in proportion 
 to the magnitude of the injuftice for their abolition. Fidelity to 
 the nation is an engagement fcarcely lefs equivocal. I have a 
 paramount engagement to the caufe of juftice and the benefit of 
 the human race. If the nation undertake what is unjuft, fidelity 
 in that undertaking is a crime. If it undertake what is juft, it 
 is my duty to promote its fuccefs, not becaufe I am one of its 
 citizens, but becaufe fuch is the command of juftice. 
 
 * Eook V, Chap. II.— VIII. 
 
 4 L 2 Add 
 
623 
 
 OF TESTS. 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 V J 
 
 v 
 
 they are ati 
 ufurpationt 
 
 Add to this what has been already faid upon the fubjedt of obe- 
 dience *, and it will be fufficiently evident that all tefts are the off- 
 fpring of ufurpation. Government has in no cafe a right to 
 iflue its commands, and therefore cannot command me to take a; 
 certain oath. Its only, legal functions are, to impofe upon me a 
 certain degree of reftraint whenever I manifeft by my a&ions a 
 temper detrimental to the community, and to invite me to a cer- 
 tain contribution for purpofes conducive to the general intereftv 
 
 influence of it mav be alledged with refpe£t to the French federal oath, as 
 
 tefls on the J o r 
 
 latitudina- we u as vvith refpecl: to the religious teft before cited, that it may 
 
 nan: A * 
 
 be taken with a certain laxity of interpretation. When I fwear 
 fidelity to the law, I may mean only that there are certain parts 
 of it that I approve. When I fwear fidelity to the nation, the 
 law and the king, I may mean fo far only as thefe three autho- 
 rities mall agree with each other, and all of them agree with the 
 general welfare of mankind. In a word the final refult of this 
 laxity of interpretation explains the oath to mean, " I fwear that I 
 believe it is my duty to do every thing that appears to me to 
 be juft." Who can look without indignation and regret at 
 this proflitution of language ? Who can think without horror 
 of the confequences of the public and perpetual leflbn of dupli- 
 city which is thus read to mankind ? 
 
 onthepurift. B u t } fuppofing there fhould be certain members of the com- 
 
 * Book III, Chap. VI. 
 
 munity 
 
OF TESTS. 629 
 
 munity fimple and uninftructed enough to conceive that an oath BOOK vi. 
 
 contained fome real obligation, and did not leave the duty of v . - v * 
 
 the perfon to whom it was adminiftered precifely where it found 
 it, what is the leflbn that would be read to fuch members ? 
 They would liften with horror to the man who endeavoured to 
 perfuade them that they owed no fidelity to the nation, the law 
 and the king, as to one who was inftigating them to facrilege. 
 They would tell him that it was too late, and that they mull 
 not allow themfelves to hear his arguments. They would per- 
 haps have heard enough before their alarm commenced, to 
 make them look with envy on the happy ftate of this man, who 
 was free to liften to the communications of others without terror, 
 who could give a loofe to his thoughts, and intrepidly follow 
 the courfe of his enquiries wherever they led him. For them- 
 felves they had promifed to think no more for the reft of their 
 lives. Compliance indeed in this cafe is impoflible ; but will a 
 vow of inviolable adherence to a certain conftitution have no 
 effect in checking the vigour of their contemplations and the 
 elasticity of their minds ? 
 
 We put a miferable deception upon ourfelves, when we Conclufion. 
 promife ourfelves the moft favourable effects from the abolition 
 of monarchy and ariftocracy, and retain this wretched fyftem of 
 tefts, overturning in the apprehenfions of mankind at large the 
 fundamental diftinctions of juftice and injuftice. Sincerity is 
 not lefs effential than equality to the well being of mankind, 
 $ A govern- 
 
6«o O F T E S T & 
 
 'j 
 
 BOOK VI. A government, that is perpetually furnifhing motives to jefu- 
 
 CHAP IV. 
 
 itilm and hypocrify, is not lefs abhorrent to right reafon, than a 
 government of orders and hereditary diftin&ion. It is not eafy 
 to imagine how foon men would become frank, explicit in their 
 declarations, and unreferved in their manners, were there no 
 pofitive inftitutions inculcating upon them the neceflity of fait- 
 hood and difguife. Nor is it poflible for any language to 
 defcribe the inexhauftible benefits that would arife from the uni- 
 yerfal practice of fincerity. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 63 1 ] 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 OF OAT H S„ 
 
 OATHS OF OFFICE AND DUTY — THEIR ABSURDITY- 
 
 THEIR IMMORAL CONSEQUENCES^ — OATHS OF EVIDENCE 
 LESS ATROCIOUS.— OPINION OF THE LIBERAL AND RESOL- 
 VED RESPECTING- THEM. THEIR. ESSENTIAL FEATURES: 
 
 CONTEMPT OF VERACITY FALSE MORALITY. THEIR. 
 
 PARTICULAR STRUCTURE — ABSTRACT PRINCIPLES AS- 
 SUMED BY THEM TO BE TRUE THEIR INCONSISTENCY. 
 
 WITH THESE PRINCIPLES. 
 
 THE fame arguments that prove the injuftlce of tefts, may book VT. 
 CHAP V 
 be applied univerfally to all oaths of duty and office. If t * j 
 
 I entered upon the office without an oath,, what would be my office and 
 
 duty ? Can the oath that is impofed upon me make any altera- ; ' 
 
 tion in my duty ? If not,, does not the very act of impofing it, di*y ! 
 
 by implication, affert a. falfhood ? Will this falfhood, the aflertion 
 
 that a direct, engagement has a tendency to create a duty,, have 
 
 no injurious effect: upon a majority of the perfons concerned ? 
 
 What is the true criterion that I mall faithfully difcharge the 
 
 office that is conferred- upon me ? Surely my paft life, and not 
 
 any proteftations I may be compelled to make. If my life have. 
 
 been 
 
63* OF OATHS. 
 
 B^°KVI. been unimpeachable, this compulfion is an unmerited infult : if 
 * ■ v ' it have been otherwife, it is fomething worfe. 
 
 .•their Immoral It is with no common difapprobation that we recollect the 
 
 •eonfequence?. 
 
 proftitution of oaths which marks the hiftory of modern Euro- 
 pean countries, and particularly of our own. This is one of the 
 means that government employs to difcharge itfelf of its proper 
 functions, by making each man fecurity for himfelf. It is one 
 of the means that legiflators have provided to cover the ineffi- 
 ciency and abfurdity of their regulations, by making individuals 
 promife the execution of that which the police is not able to 
 execute. It holds out in one hand the temptation to do wrong, 
 and in the other the obligation impofed not to be influenced by 
 that temptation. It compels a man to engage not only for his 
 own conduct, but for that of all his dependents. It obliges 
 certain officers (church-wardens in particular) to promife an 
 inflection beyond the limits of human faculties, and to engage 
 for a proceeding on the part of thofe under their jurifdiclion, 
 which they neither intend nor are expected to inforce. "Will it 
 be believed in after ages that every confiderable trader in excife- 
 .able articles in this country is induced by the conftitution of its 
 government to reconcile his mind to the guilt of perjury, as to the 
 condition upon which he is accuftomed to exercife his profeflion ? 
 
 Oaths of evi- There remains only one fpecies of oaths to be confidered, 
 Mi atrocious. wracri have found their advocates among perfons fufficiently en- 
 lightened 
 
OF OATHS, 6 
 
 33 
 
 lightened to reject every other fpecles of oath, I mean, oaths ad- BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAP V 
 miniftered to a witnefs in a court of juftice. Thefe are certainly v—v-! > 
 
 free from many of the objections that apply to oaths of fidelity, 
 duty or office. They do not call upon a man to declare his aiTent 
 to a certain propofition which the legiflator has prepared for his 
 acceptance ; they only require him folemnly to pledge himfelf to 
 the truth of aflertions, dictated by his own apprehenfion of things, 
 and exprefTed in his own words. They do not require him to 
 engage for fomething future, and of confequence to fhut up his 
 mind againft farther information as to what his conduct in that 
 future ought to be ; but merely to pledge his veracity to the ap- 
 prehended order of things paft. 
 
 Thefe confederations palliate the evil, but do not convert it into Opinion of 
 
 r • the liberal 
 
 good. Wherever men of uncommon energy and dignity of mind andrefbived 
 
 refpefting 
 
 have exifted, they have felt the degradation of binding their after- them, 
 tions with an oath. The Englifh conftitution recognifes in a 
 partial and imperfect manner the force of this principle, and 
 therefore provides that, while the commin herd of mankind fhall 
 be obliged to fwear to the truth, nothing more fhall be required 
 from th er of nobles than a declaration upon honour. Will 
 
 reafon juftii -" this diflinction? 
 
 Can there be a practice more pregnant with falfe morality than Their eflen- 
 
 tial features: 
 
 that of adminiftering oaths in a court of juftice ? The language it contempt of 
 
 veracity : 
 
 cxprefsly holds is, " You are not to be believed upon your mere 
 
 4 M word;" 
 
634- OF OATHS. 
 
 BOOK VI. W ord ;" and there are few men firm enough refolutely to pre-- 
 
 * v f ferve themfelves from contamination, when they are accuftomed 
 
 upon the moft folemn occafions to be treated with contempt. To 
 the unthinking it comes like a plenary indulgence to the occafional 
 tampering with veracity in affairs of daily occurrence, that they 
 are not upon their oath ; and we may affirm without rifk of 
 error, that there is no caufe of infincerity, prevarication and 
 falfhood more powerful, than the practice of administering oaths 
 in a court of juftice. It treats veracity in the affairs of common,; 
 life as a thing unworthy to be regarded. It takes for granted that 
 no man, at leaft no man of plebeian rank, is to be credited upon 
 his bare affirmation ; and what it takes for granted it has an 
 irrefiftible tendency to produce. 
 
 falfe morality. Add to this a feature that runs through all the abufes of poli- 
 tical inftitution, it inverts the eternal principles of morality. Why 
 is it that I am bound to be more efpecially careful of what I 
 affirm in a court of \ juftice ? Becaufe the fubfiftence, the honeft 
 reputation or the life of a fellow man may be materially affected by 
 it. All thefe genuine motives are by the contrivance of human 
 inftitution thrown into made, and we are expected to fpeak the 
 truth, only becaufe government demands it of us upon oath, and 
 at the times in which government has thought proper or recol- 
 lected to adminifter this oath. All attempts to ftrengthen the 
 obligations of morality by fictitious and fpurious motives, will in 
 the fequel be found to have no tendency but to relax them. 
 
 4 Men 
 
OF OATHS. 635 
 
 Men will never act with that liberal iuftice and confcious inte- BOOK vi. 
 
 J CHAP. v. 
 
 grity which is their higheft ornament, till they come to under- 
 Hand what men are. He that contaminates his lips with an oath, 
 mull have been thoroughly fortified with previous moral inftruc- 
 tion, if he be able afterwards to underftand the beauty of an eafy 
 and fimple integrity. If our political inflitutors had been but 
 half fo judicious in perceiving the manner in which excellence 
 and worth were to be generated, as they have been ingenious and 
 indefatigable in the means of depraving mankind, the world, in- 
 ftead of a Daughter houfe, would have been a paradife. 
 
 Let us leave for a moment the general confideration of the Thar parti- 
 
 cular ftruc- 
 
 principle of oaths, to reflect upon their particular ftructure and tu,e : 
 
 abftraft prin- 
 
 the precife meaning of the term. They take for granted in the dplesaflumed 
 
 by them to be 
 
 firft place the exiftence of an invifible governor of the world, and true : 
 the propriety of our addreffing petitions to him, both which a 
 man may deny, and yet continue a good member of fociety. 
 What is the fituation in which the inftitution of which we treat 
 places this man ? But we muft not fuffer ourfelves to be flopped 
 by trivial confiderations. — Oaths are alfo fo conflructed as to take 
 for granted the religious fyftem of the country whatever it may 
 happen to be. 
 
 Now what are the words with which we are taught in this in- their Incon- 
 ftanceto addrefs the creator of the univerfe ? " So help me God, thefeprin- 
 
 ciplcs 
 
 -and the contents of his holy word." It is the language of im- 
 
 4 M 2 precation. 
 
C 3 6 O F O A T H S. 
 
 BOOK VI. precation. I pray him to pour down his everlafting wrath and 
 \ j curfe upon me, if I utter a lie. — It were to be wifhed that the 
 
 name of that man were recorded, who firft invented this mode 
 of binding men to veracity. He had furely himfelf but very 
 light and contemptuous notions of the Supreme Being, who could 
 thus tempt men to infult him, by braving his juftice. If it be 
 our duty to invoke his bleffing, yet there mull furely be fome- 
 thing infupportably profane in wantonly and unneceflarily 
 putting all that he is able to inflict upon us upon conditions. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 637 J 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 OF LIBELS. 
 
 PUBLIC LIBELS. — INJUSTICE OF AN ATTEMPT TO PRESCRIBE 
 THE METHOD IN WHICH PUBLIC QUESTIONS SHALL BE 
 
 DISCUSSED — ITS PUSILLANIMITY. INVITATIONS TO 
 
 TUMULT. — PRIVATE LIBELS. — REASONS IN FAVOUR OF 
 
 THEIR BEING SUBJECTED TO RESTRAINT. — ANSWER. 
 
 J. IT IS NECESSARY THE TRUTH SHOULD BE TOLD. SA- 
 LUTARY EFFECTS OF THE UNRESTRAINED INVESTIGA- 
 TION OF CHARACTER. OBJECTION: FREEDOM OF 
 
 SPEECH WOULD. BE PRODUCTIVE OF CALUMNY, NOT OF 
 
 JUST IC: —ANSWER. — FUTURE HISTORY OF LIBEL. 2. IT 
 
 IS NECESSARY MEN SHOULD BE TAUGHT TO BE SINCERE. 
 EXTENT OF THE EVIL WHICH ARISES FROM A COM- 
 MAND TO -BE INSINCERE. THE MIND SPONTANEOUSLY 
 
 SHRINKS FROM THE PROSECUTION OF A LIBEL. CON- 
 CLUSION. 
 
 IN the examination already beftowed upon the article of he- BOOK VS. 
 CHAP. vi. 
 refy political and religious *, we have anticipated one of the * ^ — ' 
 
 Public libels* 
 
 two heads of the law of libel ; and, if the arguments there adduced 
 be admitted for valid, it will follow that no punifhment can juftly 
 
 * Chnp. HL 
 
 be 
 
638 O F L I B E L S. 
 
 BOOKVI. be awarded againft any writing or words derogatory to religion 
 
 CHAP.VI. 
 
 or political government. 
 
 Injuftice of It is impoflible to eftablifh any folid ground of diftin&ion 
 
 an attempt to 
 
 prefcribe the upon this fubje£t, or to lay down rules in conformity to which 
 
 method in 
 
 which public the argument muft be treated. It is impoffible to tell me, when 
 
 queftions 
 
 fhaii be dif- I am penetrated with the magnitude of the fubje£t, that I muft be 
 
 cu(Ted_: 
 
 logical and not eloquent } or when I feel the abfurdity of the the- 
 ory I am combating, that I muft not exprefs it in terms that may 
 produce feelings of ridicule in my readers. It were better to for- 
 bid me the difcuflion of the fubjedr. altogether, than forbid me to 
 defcribe it in the manner I conceive to be moft fuitable to its me- 
 rits. It would be a moft tyrannical fpecies of candour to tell me, 
 <c You may w r rite againft the fyftem we patronife, provided you 
 will write in an imbecil and ineffectual manner ; you may en- 
 quire and inveftigate as much as you pleafe, provided, when you 
 undertake to communicate the refult, you carefully check your 
 ardour, and be upon your guard that you do not convey any of 
 your own feelings to your readers." Add to this, that rules of 
 diftindtion, as they are abfurd in relation to the diffidents, will 
 prove a continual inftrument of ufurpation and injuftice to the 
 ruling party. No reafonings will appear fair to them, but fuch 
 as are futile. If I fpeak with energy, they will deem me inflam- 
 matory ; and if I defcribe cenfurable proceedings in plain and 
 homely, but pointed language, they will cry out upon me as 
 a buffoon. 
 
 It 
 
F L I B E L S. 639 
 
 It mud be truly a lamentable cafe, if truth, favoured by the BOOK VI. 
 many and patronifed by the great, mould prove too weak to enter >■ „' '■> 
 the lifts with falmood. It is felf evident, that that which will mity. 
 ftand the teft of examination, cannot need the fupport of penal 
 ftatutes. After our adverfaries have exhaufted their eloquence 
 and exerted themfelves to miflead us, truth has a clear, nervous 
 and fimple ftory to tell, which, if force be excluded on all fides, 
 will not fail to put down their arts. Mifreprefentation will fpeedily 
 vanifh, if the friends of truth be but half as alert as the advo- 
 cates of falihood. Surely then it is a moft ungracious plea to 
 offer, " We are too idle to reafon with you, we are therefore de- 
 termined lo lilence you by force." So long as the adverfaries of 
 juftice confine themfelves to expoftulation, there can be no ground 
 for ferious alarm. As foon as they begin to ac~l with violence 
 and riot, it will then be time enough to encounter them with 
 force. 
 
 There is however one particular clafs of libel that feems to de- Imitations to 
 
 , , . tumult. 
 
 mand a feparate confideration. A libel may either not confine it- 
 felf to any fpecies of illuftration of religion or government, or it 
 may leave illuftration entirely out of its view. Its object maybe 
 to invite a multitude of perfons to affemble, as the firft ftep to- 
 wards acts of violence. A public libel is any fpecies of writing 
 in which the wifdom of fome eftablifhed fyftem is controverted ; 
 and it cannot be denied that a difpaffionate and fevere demonftra- 
 tion cf its injuftice tends, not lefs than the moft alarming tumult,. 
 
 to 
 
640 O F L I B E L S. 
 
 BOOK vi. to the deftruction of fuch inftitutions. But writing and fpeech 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 * v — * are the proper and becoming methods of operating changes in 
 
 human fociety, and tumult is an improper and equivocal method. 
 In the cafe then of the fpecific preparations of riot, it fhould feem 
 that the regular force of the fociety may lawfully interfere. But 
 this interference may be of two kinds. It may confift of precau- 
 tions to counteract all tumultuous concourfe, or it may arraign 
 the individual for the offence he has committed againfl: the peace 
 of the community. The firft of thefe feems fufficiently com- 
 mendable and wife, and would, if vigilantly exerted, be in al- 
 mofl all cafes adequate to the purpofe. The fecond is attended 
 with fome difficulty. A libel the avowed intention of which is 
 to lead to immediate violence, is altogether different from a pub- 
 lication in which the general merits of any inflitution are treated 
 with the utmofl freedom, and may well be fuppofed to fall under 
 different rules. The difficulty here arifes only from the confe- 
 deration of the general nature of punifhment, which is abhorrent 
 to the true principles of mind, and ought to be reftrained within 
 as narrow limits as poffible, if not inftantly abolifhed *. A dis- 
 tinction to which obfervation and experience in cafes of judicial 
 proceeding have uniformly led, is that between crimes that exift 
 only in intention, and overt ads. So far as prevention only is 
 concerned, the former would feem in many cafes not lefs entitled 
 to the animadverfion of fociety than the latter ; but the evidence 
 ©f intention ufually refts upon circumftances equivocal and mi- 
 
 * See the following Book. 
 
 nute, 
 
OF LIBELS, 641 
 
 pute, and the friend of juftice will tremble to erect any grave pro- BOOK VI. 
 
 ceeding upon fo uncertain a balls. It might be added, that he > . » 
 
 who fays that every honeft citizen of London ought to repair to 
 St. George's Fields to-morrow in arms, only fays what he thinks 
 is beft to be done, and what the laws of fmcerity oblige him to 
 utter. But this argument is of a general nature, and applies to 
 every thing that is denominated crime, not to the fuppofed crime 
 of inflammatory invitations in particular. He that performs any 
 action, does that which he thinks is beft to be done ; and, if the 
 peace of fociety make it neceflary that he fhould be restrained 
 from this by threats of violence, the neceffity is of a very painful 
 
 nature. It fhould be remembered that the whole^of thefe rea- 
 
 fonings fuppofe that the tumult is an evil, and will produce more 
 difadvantage than benelit, which is no doubt frequently, but may 
 not be always, the cafe. It cannot be too often recollected, that 
 there is in no cafe a right of doing wrong, a right to punifh for 
 a meritorious action. Every government, as well as every indivi- 
 dual, muft follow their own apprehenfions of juftice, at the peril 
 of being miftaken, unjuft and confequently vicious*. — Thefe rea- 
 fonings on exhortations to tumult, will alfo be found applicable with 
 flight variation to incendiary letters addrefled to private perfons. 
 
 But the law of libel, as we have already faid, diftributes itfelf Priratc libels, 
 into two heads, libels againft public eftablifhments and meafures 
 and libels againft private character. Thofe who have been willing 
 
 * Book II, Chap. III. 
 
 4 N to 
 
6 4 2 ' OF LIBELS, 
 
 BOOK VI. to admit that the firft ought to pafs unpunifhed, have generally 
 i j afferted the propriety of counteracting the latter by cenfures and 
 
 penalties. It ihall be the bufinefs of the remainder of this chap- 
 ter to fhow that they were erroneous in their decifion. 
 
 Reafons in The arguments upon which their decifion is built mull be al- 
 
 favour of their 
 
 being fub- lowed to be both popular and impreffive. " There is no exter- 
 
 jefted to re- 
 
 ftraint. nal poffeflion more folid or more valuable than an honeft fame. 
 
 My property, in goods or eftate, is appropriated only by conven- 
 tion. Its value is for the moll part the creature of a debauched 
 imagination ; and, if I were fufficiently wife and philofophical, he 
 that deprived me of it would do me very little injury. He that 
 inflifts a ftab upon my character is a much more formidable 
 enemy. It is a very ferious inconvenience that my countrymen 
 fhould regard me as deflitute of principle and honefty. If the 
 mifchief were entirely to myfelf, it is not poffible to be regarded 
 with levity. I mull be void of all fenfe of juflice, if I were cal- 
 lous to the contempt and deteflation of the world. I mull ceafe 
 to be a man, if I were unaffected by the calumny that deprived" 
 me of the friend I loved, and left me perhaps without one bofom 
 in which -to repofe my fympathies. But this is not all. The 
 fame Uroke that annihilates my character, extremely abridges, if 
 it do not annihilate, my ufefulnefs. It is in vain that I would 
 exert my good intentions and my talents for the affiflance of 
 others, if my motives be perpetually mifinterpreted. Men will 
 not liften to the arguments of him they delpife j he will be 
 5 fpurned 
 
 v 
 
O F L I B E L S. 643 
 
 fpurned during life, and execrated as long as his memory endures. BOOK vr. 
 
 . . CHAP. VI. 
 
 What then are we to conclude but that to an injury, greater than \ v -...> 
 
 robbery, greater perhaps than murder, we ought to award an ex- 
 emplary punifhment ?" 
 
 The anfwer to this ftatement may be given in the form of an Anfwer. 
 illuftration of two propofitions : firft, that it is neceflary the truth 
 fhould be told ; fecondly, that it is neceflary men ihould be 
 taught to be fincere. 
 
 Firft, it is neceflary the truth fhould be told. How can this >• Tt is ne- 
 ceflary the 
 
 ever be done, if I be forbidden to fpeak upon more than one fide *"* ftouli 
 
 be told. 
 
 of the queftion ? The cafe is here exactly flmilar to the cafe of 
 religion and political eftablifhment. If we mufl always hear the 
 praife of things as they are, and allow no man to urge an objec- 
 tion, we may be lulled into torpid tranquillity, but we can never 
 be wife. 
 
 If a veil of partial favour is to be drawn over the errors of 
 mankind, it is eafy to perceive whether virtue or vice will be the 
 gainer. There is no terror that comes home to the heart of vice, 
 like the terror of being exhibited to the public eye. On the con- 
 trary there is no reward worthy to be beftowed upon eminent 
 virtue but this one, the plain, unvarnifhed proclamation of its ex- 
 cellence in the face of the world. 
 
 4 N 2 If 
 
644 O F L I B E L S. 
 
 BOOK vi. If the unreftrained difcuflion of abftract enquiry be of the 
 
 CHAP.VI. . 
 
 * <, ' higheft importance to mankind, the unreftrained mveftigation of 
 
 Salutary ef- 
 
 feftsofthe character is fcarcely lefs to be cultivated. If truth were univer- 
 
 unrefh-ained 
 
 inveftlgation fally told of men's difpontions and actions, gibbets and wheels 
 
 of character. 
 
 might be difmiffed from the face of the earth. The knave un- 
 mafked would be obliged to turn honeft in his own defence. 
 Nay, no man would have time to grow a knave. Truth would 
 follow him in his firft irrefolute eflays, and public difapproba- 
 tion arreft him in the commencement of his career. 
 
 There are many men at prefent who pafs for virtuous, that 
 tremble at the boldnefs of a project like this. They would be 
 detected in their effeminacy and imbecility. Their imbecility is 
 the growth of that inaufpicious fecrecy, which national manners 
 and political inftitutions at prefent draw over the actions of indi- 
 viduals. If truth were fpoken without referve, there would be 
 no fuch men in exiftence. Men would act with clearnefs and 
 decifion, if they had no hopes in concealment, if they faw at 
 every turn that the eye of the world was upon them. How great 
 would be the magnanimity of the man who was always fure to 
 be obferved, fure to be judged with difcernment, and to be treated 
 with juftice ? Feeblenefs of character would hourly lofe its influ- 
 ence in the bread of thofe over whom it now domineers. They 
 would feel themfelves perpetually urged with an aufpicious vio- 
 lence to aflume manners more worthy of the form they bore. 
 
 4 To 
 
O F L I B E L S. 645 
 
 To thefe reafonij^gs it may perhaps be rejoined, "This indeed BOOK vi. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 is an interefting picture. If truth could be univerfally told, the > J. > 
 
 ObjedKon : 
 
 effects would no doubt be of the molt excellent nature ; but the freedom of 
 
 fpeech would 
 
 expectation is to be regarded as vilionary." b^produdive 
 
 of calumny, 
 not of jufticc. 
 
 Not fo : the difcovery of individual and perfonal truth is to be Anfwer. 
 effected in the fame manner as the difcovery of general truth, 
 by difcuflion. From the collifion of difagreeing accounts juflice 
 and reafon will be produced. Mankind feldom think much of 
 any particular fubject, without coming to think right at laft. 
 
 " What, and is it to be fuppofed, that mankind will have the 
 difcernment and the juftice of their own accord to reject the 
 libel ?" Yes ; libels do not at prefent deceive mankind, from 
 their intrinfic power, but from the reftraint under which they 
 labour. The man who from his dungeon is brought to the 
 light of day, cannot accurately diftinguifh colours ; but he that 
 has fuffered no confinement, feels no difficulty in the operation. 
 Such is the Hate of mankind at prefent : they are not exercifed 
 to employ their judgment, and therefore they are deficient in 
 judgment. The moft improbable tale now makes a deep im- 
 prefiion ; but then men would be accuftomed to fpeculate upon 
 the poffibilities of human action. 
 
 At firft it may be, if all reftraint upon the freedom of writing Future bif- 
 
 eclare 
 what 
 
 And fpeech were removed, and men were encouraged to declare 
 
646 OF LIBELS. 
 
 BOOK VI. what they thought as publicly as poflible, erery prefs would be 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 v_ v __-> burdened with an inundation of fcandal. But the ftories by 
 their very multiplicity would defeat themfelves. No one man, 
 if the lie were fuccefsful, would become the object of univerfal 
 perfecution. In a fhort time the reader, accuftomed to the dif- 
 fection of character, would acquire difcrimination. He would 
 either detect the impofition by its internal abfurdity, or at leaft 
 would attribute to the ftory no farther weight, than that to 
 which its evidence entitled it. 
 
 Libel, like every other human concern, would foon find its 
 level, if it were delivered from the injurious interference of poli- 
 tical inftitution. The libeller, that is, he who utters an un- 
 founded calumny, either invents the ftory he tells, or delivers 
 it with a degree of aflurance to which the evidence that has 
 offered itfelf to him is by no means entitled. In each cafe he 
 would meet with his proper punifhment in the judgment of the 
 world. The confequences of his error would fall back upon 
 himfelf. He would either pafs for a malignant accufer, or for 
 a ra£h and headlong cenfurer. Anonymous fcandal would be 
 almoft impoflible in a ftate where nothing was concealed. But, 
 if it were attempted, it would be wholly pointlefs, fince, where 
 there could be no honeft and rational excufe for concealment, 
 the defire to be concealed would prove the bafenefs of the 
 motive. 
 
 *" Secondly, 
 
OF LIBELS. 6 17 
 
 Secondly, force ought not to intervene for the fuppreffion of ^JpOK "VI. 
 private libels, becaufe men ought to learn to be fincere. There '"T - "" r 
 
 ■» ' ° 2. It is neceu 
 
 is no branch of virtue more effential than that which confifts in i? ry ?! e L 
 
 ihould be 
 
 giving language to our thoughts. He that is accuftomed to utter ^. au S ht t0 be 
 
 o P o o ° fincere. 
 
 what he knows to be falfe or to fupprefs what he knows to be 
 true, is in a perpetual ftate of degradation. If I have had parti- 
 cular opportunity to obferve any man's vices, juftice will not 
 fail to fuggeft to me that I ought to admonifh him of his errors, 
 and to warn thofe whom his errors might injure. There may 
 be very fufficient ground for my reprefenting him as a vicious 
 man, though I may be totally unable to eftablifti his vices fo as 
 to make him a proper fubjecSt of judicial punifhment. Nay, it 
 cannot be other wife ; for I ought to defcribe his character 
 exactly fuch as it appears to be, whether it be virtuous, or 
 vicious, or of an ambiguous nature. Ambiguity would prefently 
 ceafe, if every man avowed his fentiments. It is here as in the 
 intercourfes of friendship : a timely explanation feldom fails to 
 heal a broil ; mifunderftandings would not grow confiderable, 
 were we not in the habit of brooding over imaginary wrongs. 
 
 Laws for the fuppreffion of private libels are properly fpeaking Extent af the 
 
 evil which 
 
 laws to reftrain men from the practice of fincerity. They create a "f« from 
 
 a command 
 
 a warfare between the genuine dictates of unbiaffed private judg- to be infin- 
 
 ° cere. 
 
 ment and the apparent fenfe of the community, throwing obfcu- 
 rity upon the principles of virtue, and infpiring an indiffer- 
 ence to the pra&ice. This is one of thofe confequences of 
 
 political 
 
648 O F L I B E L S. 
 
 BOOK vi. political inftitution tliat prefents itfelfat every moment: mora- 
 chap.vi. r . . 
 
 v * ' lity is rendered the victim of uncertainty and doubt. Contra- 
 dictory fyftems of conduct contend with each other for the pre- 
 ference, and I become indifferent to them all. How is it poffi- 
 ble that I fhould imbibe the divine enthufiafm of benevolence 
 and juftice, when I am prevented from difcerning what it is in 
 which they confift ? Other laws affume for the topic of their 
 animadverfion actions of unfrequent occurrence. But the law of 
 libels ufurps the office of directing me in my daily duties, and, 
 by perpetually menacing, me with the fcourge of punifhment, 
 undertakes to render me habitually a coward, continually go- 
 verned by the bafeft and moft unprincipled motives. 
 
 Courage confifts more in this circumftance than in any other, 
 the daring to fpeak every thing, the uttering of which may con- 
 duce to good. Actions, the performance of which requires an 
 inflexible refolution, call upon us but feldom ; but the virtuous 
 economy of fpeech is our perpetual affair. Every moralift can 
 tell us that morality eminently confifts in " the government of 
 the tongue." But this branch of morality has long been inverted. 
 Inftead of ftudying what we fhall tell, we are taught to confider 
 
 « 
 
 what we fhall conceal. Inftead of an active virtue, " going 
 about doing good," we are inftructed to believe that the chief 
 end of man is to do no mifchief. Inftead of fortitude, we are 
 carefully imbued with maxims of artifice and cunning, mifnamed 
 prudence. 
 
 Let 
 
OF LIBELS. 649 
 
 Let us contraft the character of thofe. men with whom we are book vi. 
 
 C H \P VI 
 
 accuftomed to converfe, with the character of men fuch as they ; v '■> 
 
 ought to be, and will be. On the one fide we perceive a 
 perpetual caution, that fhrinks from the obferving eye, that con- 
 ceals with a thoufand folds the genuine emotions of the heart, 
 and that renders us unwilling to approach the men that we fup- 
 pofe accuftomed to read it, and to tell what they read. Such 
 characters as ours are the mere fhadows of men, with a fpecious 
 outfide perhaps, but deftitute of fubftance and foul. Oh, when 
 fhall we arrive at the land of realities, when men fhall be known 
 for what they are, by energy of thought and intrepidity of 
 action ! It is fortitude, that muft render a man fuperior alike te 
 careffes and threats, enable him to derive his happinefs from 
 within, and accuftom him to be upon all occafions prompt to 
 afllft and to inform. Every thing therefore favourable to forti- 
 tude muft be of ineftimable value ; every thing that inculcates 
 diflimulation worthy of our perpetual abhorrence. 
 
 There is one thing more that is of importance to be obferved The tr.i'nd 
 
 . - . . . ... , .... , i rr fpontaneoufly 
 
 upon this fubject of libel, which is, the good effects that would fhrinks from 
 
 the profecu- 
 
 fpring from every man s being accuftomed to encounter falfhood tionofalibel. 
 with its only proper antidote, truth. After all the arguments 
 that have been induftrioufiy accumulated to juftify profecution 
 for libel, every man that will retire into himfelf, will feel him- 
 felf convinced of their infufficiency. The modes in which an 
 innocent and a guilty man would repel an accufation againft 
 
 4 O them 
 
650 OF LIBELS. 
 
 book VI. them might be expected to be oppofite ; but the law of libel 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 v , » confounds them. He that was confcious of his rectitude, and 
 
 undebauched by ill fyftems of government, would fay to his ad- 
 
 verfary, " Publifh what you pleafe againft me, I have truth on 
 
 my fide, and will confound your mifreprefentations." His 
 
 fenfe of fitnefs and juftice would not permit him to fay, " I will 
 
 have recourfe to the only means that are congenial to guilt,. I 
 
 will compel you to be filent." A man, urged by indignation 
 
 and impatience, may commence a profecution againft his ac- 
 
 cufer ; but he may be affured, the world, that is a difinterefled 
 
 fpectator, feels no cordiality for his proceedings. The language 
 
 of their fentiments upon fuch occafions is, " What ! he dares 
 
 not even let us hear what can be faid againft him." 
 
 Conclufion. The arguments in favour of juftice, however different may 
 be the views under which it is confidered, perpetually run 
 parallel to each other. The recommendations under this head 
 are precifely the fame as thofe under the preceding, the genera- 
 tion of activity and fortitude. The tendency of all falfe fyftems- 
 of political inftitution is to render the mind lethargic and torpid. 
 Were we accuftomed not to recur either to public or individual 
 force but upon occafions that unequivocally juftified their 
 employment, we mould then come to have fome reipect for 
 reafon, for we fhould know its power* How great muft be the 
 difference between him who anfwers me with a writ of fummons 
 or a challenge^ and him who employs the fword and the fhield. 
 3 of 
 
OF LIBELS, 6$i 
 
 of truth alone ? He knows that force only is to be encountered book vr. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 with force, and allegation with allegation ; and he fcorns to ^— v ~> 
 
 change places with the offender by being the firft to break the 
 peace. He does that which, were it not for the degenerate 
 habits of fociety, would fcarcely deferve the name of courage, 
 dares to meet upon equal ground, with the facred armour of 
 truth, an adverfary who poiTeiTes only the perifhable weapons 
 of fahhood. He calls up his understanding ; and does not 
 defpair of baffling the Ihallow pretences of calumny. He calls 
 up his firmnefs ; and knows that a plain ftory, every word of 
 which is marked with the emphafis of fincerity, will carry con- 
 viction to every hearer. It were abfurd to expect that truth fhould 
 be cultivated, fo long as we are accuftomed to believe that it is an 
 impotent incumbrance. It would be impolTible to neglect it, if 
 we knew that it was as impenetrable as adamant, and as Lifting 
 as the world. 
 
 4 O 2 CHAP, 
 
[ 6 5 2 1 
 
 CHAP. VIL 
 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 DISTINCTION OF REGULATIONS CONSTITUENT AND LE- 
 GISLATIVE. — SUPPOSED CHARACTER OF PERMANENCE 
 THAT OUGHT TO BE GIVEN TO THE FORMER — INCON- 
 SISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF MAN. SOURCE OF THE 
 
 ERROR. — REMARK. — ABSURDITY OF THE SYSTEM OF 
 PERMANENCE. — ITS FUTILITY. — MODE TO BE PURSUED 
 IN, FRAMING A CONSTITUTION.— CONSTITUENT LAWS 
 
 NOT MORE IMPORTANT THAN OTHERS. IN WHAT 
 
 MANNER THE CONSENT OF THE DISTRICTS IS TO BE 
 DECLARED. — TENDENCY OF THE PRINCIPLE WHICH RE- 
 QUIRES THIS CONSENT. — IT WOULD REDUCE THE NUM- 
 BER OF CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLES — PARCEL OUT THE 
 LEGISLATIVE POWER — AND PRODUCE THE GRADUAL 
 EXTINCTION OF LAW. — OBJECTION. — ANSWER.. 
 
 BOOK VI. a jyj ar ticle intimately conne&ed with the political confidera- 
 CHAP. VII. /\ * 
 
 JlTTt: — 'r ~*T. L tidn of opinion is fuggefted to us by a doctrine which 
 
 Diftinction or * "** 
 
 regulations ^ lately been taught relatively to conftitutions.. It has been. 
 
 constituent * 
 
 and kgifla, g-j ^j (j^ e ] aws f eV ery regular ftate naturally diftribute them- 
 felves under two heads, fundamental and adfeititious j laws, the 
 
 object 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS. 653 
 
 object of which is the diftribution of political power and BOOK VI. 
 directing the permanent forms according to which public bufi- »■ v * 5 - 
 nefs is to be conducted ; and laws, the refult of the deliberations 
 of powers already conftituted. This diftinction beins; eftablifhed Suppofed 
 
 r J ° eharafterof 
 
 in the firft inftance, it has been inferred, that thefe laws are of permanence 
 
 that ought to 
 
 very unequal importance, and that of confequence thofe of the b ^ S iven to _ 
 firft clafs ought to be originated with much greater folemnity, 
 and to be declared much lefs fufceptible of variation than thofe 
 of the fecond,. The French national afTembly of 1789 pufhed. 
 this principle to the greateft extremity, and feemed defirous of 
 providing every imaginable fecurity for rendering the work, 
 they had formed immortal. It could not be touched upon any 
 account under the term of ten years ; every alteration it was to 
 receive mult be recognifed as neceffary by two fuccefTive national 
 affemblies of the ordinary kind j after thefe formalities an afTem- 
 bly of revifion was to be elected, and they to be forbidden to 
 touch the conftitution in any other points than thofe which had 
 been previoufly marked out for their confideration. 
 
 It is eafy to perceive that thefe precautions are in direct hofti- •inconMent 
 
 • ii ■• • 1 (v iwA 1 • ■ « « i -» With the na- 
 
 hty with the principles eltaDlilhed in this work. " Man and for ture of man. 
 ever !" was the motto of the labours of this afTembly. Jufl 
 broken loofe from the thick darknefs of an abfolute monarchy, 
 they affumed to prefcribe leJons of wifdom to all future ages. 
 They feem not fo much as to have dreamed of that purification 
 of intellect, that climax of improvement, which may very pro- 
 2 bably- 
 
6j4 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK vi. bably be the deftiny of pofterity. The true ftate of man, as has 
 CHAP.V1I. ' . . . 
 
 i been already dempnftrated, is, not to have his opinions bound 
 
 down in the fetters of an eternal quietifm, but flexible and un- 
 restrained to yield with facility to the impreffions of increafmg 
 truth. That form of fociety will appear moft perfect to an 
 enlightened mind, which is leaf! founded in a principle of per- 
 manence. But, if this view of the Subject be juft, the idea of 
 giving permanence to what is called the conftitution of any go- 
 vernment, and rendering one clafs of laws, under the appellation 
 of fundamental, lefs fufceptible of change than another, muft be 
 founded in mifapprehenfion and error. 
 
 error. 
 
 Source of the The error probably originally fprung out of the forms of politi- 
 cal monopoly which we fee eftablifhed over the whole civilifed 
 world. Government could not juftly derive in the firft inftance 
 but from the choice of the people ; or, to fpeak more accurately 
 (for the former principle, however popular and fpecious, is in 
 reality falfe), government ought to be adjufted in its provifions 
 to the prevailing apprehenfions of juftice and truth. But we fee 
 government at prefent adminiftered either in whole or in part 
 by a king and a body of nobleffe ; and we reafonably fay that 
 the laws made by thefe authorities are one thing, and the laws 
 from which they derived their exiftence another. But we do 
 not confider that thefe authorities, however originated, are in 
 their own nature unjuft. If we had never feen arbitrary and 
 capricious forms of government, we Should probably never 
 
 have 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS, 6 S $ 
 
 have thought of cutting off certain laws from the code under the EOOK vr. 
 
 CHAP VII 
 
 name of constitutional. When we behold certain individuals or i ,— » 
 
 bodies of men exercifing an exclufive fuperintendence over the 
 affairs of a nation, we inevitably afk how they came by their 
 authority, and the anfwer is, By the conftitution. But, if we 
 faw no power exifting in the ftate but that of the people, having 
 a body of reprefentatives, and a certain number of official fecre- 
 taries and clerks acting in their behalf, fubject to their revifal, 
 and renewable at their pleafure, the queftion, how the people- 
 came by this authority,, would never have fuggefled itfelf. 
 
 A celebrated objection that has been urged againft the govern- Remarks 
 ments of modern Europe is that they have no conftitutions *. 
 If by this objection it be underftood, that they have no written 
 code bearing this appellation, and that their conftitutions have 
 been lefs an inftantaneous than a gradual production, the criticifm 
 feems to be rather verbal, than of eflential moment. In any 
 other fenfe it is to be fufpected that the remark would amount 
 to an eulogium, but an eulogium to which they are certainly by 
 no means entitled.. . 
 
 But to return to the queftion of permanence. Whether we Abfurdltyof 
 
 thefyfkmof 
 
 admit or reject the diftinction between conftitutional and ordi- permanence. 
 nary legiflation, it is not lefs true that the power of a people 
 
 * Rights of Man, 
 
 to 
 
6 5 6 , OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK VI. to change their conftitution morally confidered, muft be ftri&Iy 
 
 CHAP VII 
 
 «- v ' / and univerfally coeval with the exiftence of a conftitution. 
 The language of permanence in this cafe is the greateft of all 
 abfurdities. It is to fay to a nation, " Are you convinced that 
 fomething is right, perhaps immediately neceflary, to be done ? 
 It fhall be done ten years hence." 
 
 The folly of this fyftem may be farther elucidated, if farther 
 elucidation be neceffary, from the following dilemma. Either 
 a people muft be governed according to their own appre- 
 henfions of juftice and truth, or they muft not. The laft of 
 thefe aflertions cannot be avowed, but upon the unequivocal prin- 
 ciples of tyranny. But, if the firft be true, then it is juft as 
 abfurd to fay to a nation, This government, which you chofe 
 nine years ago, is the legitimate government, and the govern- 
 ment which your prefent fentiments approve the illegitimate ; as 
 to infill upon their being governed by the diSta of their remoteft 
 anceftors, or even of the moll infolent ufurper. 
 
 Its futility. It is extremely probable that a national aflembly chofen in the 
 
 ordinary forms, is juft as much empowered to change the funda- 
 mental laws, as to change any of the leaft important branches 
 of legiflation. This fundtion would never perhaps be dangerous 
 but in a country that ftill preferved a portion of monarchy or 
 ariftocracy, and in fuch a country a principle of permanence 
 would be found a very feeble antidote againft the danger. The 
 
 true 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS. 657 
 
 true principle upon the fubjecl: Is, that no aflembly, though SS2vvh 
 
 chofen with the moft unexampled folemnity, has a power to * «—~* 
 
 impofe any regulations contrary to the public apprehenfion of 
 right ; and a very ordinary authority, fairly originated, will be 
 fufficient to facilitate the harmonious adoption of a change that 
 is dictated by national opinion. The diftindtion of conftitutional 
 and ordinary topics will always appear in pra&ice unintelligible 
 and vexatious. The aflemblies of more frequent recurrence will 
 find themfelves arrefted in the intention of conferring any emi- 
 nent benefit on their country, by the apprehenfion that they 
 fhall invade the conftitution. In a country where the people 
 are habituated to fentiments of equality and where no political 
 monopoly is tolerated, there is little danger that any national 
 aflembly fhould be difpofed to inforce a pernicious change, and 
 there is ftill lefs that the people (hould fubmit to the injury, or 
 not poflefs the means eafily and with fmall interruption of public 
 tranquillity to avert it. The language of reafon on this fubject 
 is, " Give us equality and juftice, but no conftitution. Suffer us- 
 to follow without reftraint the dictates of our own judgment, and to- 
 change our forms of focial order as fail as we improve in under- 
 ftanding and knowledge."" 
 
 The opinion upon this head moft popular in France at the Mode to Be 
 
 purfued in 
 
 time that the national convention entered upon its functions, framing a 
 
 conftitution* 
 
 was that the bufinefs of the convention extended only to the 
 prefenting a draught of a conftitution, to be fubmitted in the 
 
 4 P fequeli 
 
658 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 book vi. fequel to the approbation of the diftri&s, and then only to be 
 j confidered as law. This opinion is well deferring of a ferious 
 examination. 
 
 £s not more The firft idea that faggefts itfelf refpeding it is, that, if con- 
 tlfcKtW ftitutional laws ought to be fubjedted to the revifion of the 
 diftricts, then all laws ought to undergo the fame procefs, under- 
 Handing by laws all declarations of a general principle to be 
 applied to particular cafes as they may happen to occur, and 
 even including all provifions for individual emergencies that will 
 admit of the delay incident to the revifion in queftion. It is an 
 egregious miftake to imagine that the importance of thefe articles 
 is in a defcending ratio from fundamental to ordinary, and from 
 ordinary to particular. It is poffible for the raoft odious injuftice 
 to be perpetrated by the beft conftituted affembly. A law 
 rendering it capital to oppofe the doctrine of tranfubftantiation, 
 would be more injurious to the public welfare, than a law 
 changing the duration of the national reprefentative, from two 
 years, to one year or to three. Taxation has been fhown to be 
 an article rather of executive than legiflative administration *; 
 and yet a very oppreffive and unequal tax would be fcarcely lefs 
 ruinous than any fingle meafure that could pombly be deviled. 
 
 In what man- j t ma y f ar ther be remarked that an approbation demanded 
 
 ner the ccn- » cr 
 
 < 5" t .°^ tl ? e from the diftri&s to certain conflitutional articles, whether more 
 
 tlitmcts is to * 
 
 fee declared. 
 
 * Book V, Chap. I. 
 
 or 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS. 659: 
 
 or lefs numerous, will be either real or delufive according bookvi.. 
 
 €0 the mode adopted for that purpofe. If the diftricts be v „ ' ■»* 
 
 required to decide upon thefe articles by a fimple affirmative or 
 
 negative, it will then be delufive. It is impoffible for any man 
 
 or body of men, in the due exercife of their underftanding, to 
 
 decide upon [any complicated fyftem in that manner. It can 
 
 fcarcely happen but that there will be fome things that they will 
 
 approve and fome that they will difapprove. On the other hand, 
 
 if the articles be unlimitedly propofed for difcuffion in the diftricts, 
 
 a tranfattion will be begun to which it is not eafy to forefee a- 
 
 termination. Some diftricts will object to certain articles j and, 
 
 if thefe articles be modelled to obtain their approbation, it is 
 
 poffible that the very alteration introduced to pleafe one part of 
 
 the community, may render the code lefs acceptable to another. 
 
 How are we to be allured that the diffidents will not fet up a fepa- 
 
 rate government for themfelves ? The reafons that might be 
 
 offered to perfuade a minority of diftricts to yield to the fenfe 
 
 of a majority, are by no means fo perfpicuous and forcible, 
 
 as thofe which fometimes perfuade the minority of members 
 
 in a given aflembly to that fpecies of conceffion. . 
 
 It is defirable in all cafes of the practical adoption of any Tendency of 
 
 the principle - 
 
 given principle, that we fhould fully underftand'the meaning .of wKch re- 
 quires tliii 
 the principle, and perceive the conclufions to which it inevitably confent. . 
 
 leads. This principle of a confent of diftricts has an immediate 
 
 tendency, by a falutary gradation perhaps, to lead to the diffo- 
 
 4P 2. lutioni 
 
660 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK vr. lution of all government. What then can be more abfurd, than 
 
 v. ^ — > to fee it embraced by thofe very men, who are at the fame time 
 
 advocates for the complete legiflative unity of a great empire ? 
 It is founded upon the fame bafis as the principle of private 
 judgment, which it is to be hoped will fpeedily fuperfede 
 the pofllbility of the action of fociety in a collective capacity. 
 It is defirable that the moft important acts of the national repre- 
 fentatives mould be fubjed to the approbation or rejection of the 
 diftrids whofe reprefentatives they are, for exactly the fame 
 reafon as it is defirable, that the ads of the diftrids themfelves 
 fhould, as fpeedily as pra&icability will admit, be in force only fo 
 far as relates to the individuals by whom thofe ads are approved. 
 
 It would re- The firft confequence that would refult, not from the delu- 
 
 duce the 
 
 number of five but the real eftablifhment of this principle, would be the 
 
 ■conflitutional 
 
 articles : redudion of the conftitution to a very fmall number of articles. 
 
 The impradicability of obtaining the deliberate approbation of a 
 great number of diftrids to a very complicated code, would 
 fpeedily manifeft itfelf. In reality the conftitution of a ftate 
 governed either in whole or in part by a political monopoly, 
 muft neceffarily be complicated. But what need of complexity 
 in a country where the people are deftined to govern themfelves ? 
 The whole conftitution of fuch a country ought fcarcely to 
 exceed two articles ; firft, a fcheme for the divifion of the whole 
 into parts equal in their population, and, fecondly, the fixing 
 of ftated periods for the eledion of a national alTembly : not to 
 
 fay 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS. 66 1 
 
 fay that the latter of thefe articles may very probably be difpenfed BOOK vr. 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 with. »■ 
 
 A fecond confequence that refults from the principle of which parcel out 
 
 the legiilative 
 
 we are treating is as follows. It has already appeared, that the power: 
 reafon is no lefs cogent for fubmitting important legiilative arti- 
 cles to the revifal of the diftri&s-, than for fubmitting the confti- 
 tutional articles themfelves. But after a few experiments of this 
 fort, it cannot fail to fuggeft itfelf, that the mode of fending laws 
 to the diftri&s for their revifion, unlefs in cafes efTential to the 
 general fafety, is a proceeding unneceffarily circuitous, and that 
 it would be better, in as many inftances as poffible, to fuffer the 
 diftricts to make laws for themfelves without the intervention of 
 the national afTembly. The juftnefs of this confequence is im- 
 plicitly affumed in the preceding paragraph, while we ftated the * 
 very narrow bounds within which the conftitution of an empire, 
 fuch as that of France for example, might be circumfcribed. In 
 reality, provided the country were divided into convenient dif- 
 tricts with a power of fending reprefentatives to the general 
 afTembly, it does not appear that any ill confequences would en- 
 fue to the common caufe from thefe diftri&s being permitted to 
 regulate their internal affairs, in conformity to their own appre- 
 henfions of juftice. Thus, that which was at firft a great empire 
 with legiilative unity, would fpeedily be transformed into a con- 
 federacy of leffer republics, with a general congrefs or Amphicty- 
 onic council, anfwering the purpofe of a point of cooperation 
 3 upon 
 
662 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK vi. upon extraordinary occafions. The ideas of a great empire and 
 
 CHAP.VII. ,.„. . ,.,,,, • r,i 
 
 „ > legiilative unity are plainly the barbarous remains ot the days of 
 
 V. 
 
 military heroifm. In proportion as political power is brought 
 home to the citizens, and Amplified into fomething of the nature 
 of parifh regulation, the danger of mifunderftanding and rival- 
 fhip will be nearly annihilated. In proportion as the fcience of 
 government is diverted of its prefent myfterious appearances, 
 focial truth will become obvious, and the diftric"ts pliant and; 
 flexible to the dictates of reafon. 
 
 and produce ^ third confequence fufficiently memorable from the fame 
 
 the gradual l * 
 
 eftimation of principle is the gradual extindion of law. A great affembly,. 
 collected from the different provinces of an extenfive territory, 
 and conftituted the fole legiflator of thofe by whom the territory: 
 is inhabited, immediately conjures up to itfelf an idea of the vaft 
 multitude of laws that are necefTary for regulating the concerns 
 of thofe whom it reprefents. A large city, impelled by the 
 principles of commercial jealoufy, is not flow to digeft the vo~ 
 lume of its by-laws and exclusive privileges. But the inhabitants- 
 of a fmall parifh, living with fome degree of that fimplicity 
 which beft correfponds with the real nature and wants of a hu- 
 man being, would foon be led to fufpect that general laws were 
 unneceffary, and would adjudge the caufes that came before 
 them, not according to certain axioms previoufly written, but 
 according to the circumftances and demand of each particular 
 caufe. — It was proper that this confequence fhould be mentioned 
 4 in 
 
OF CONSTITUTIONS. 66 3 
 
 in this place. The benefits that will arife from the abolition of BOOK vr. 
 law will come to be confidered in detail in the following book, i 
 
 The principal objection that is ufually made to the idea of Objeftion. 
 confederacy confidered as the fubftitute of legiflative unity, is the 
 poffibility that arifes of the members of the confederacy detaching 
 themfelves from the fupport of the public caufe. To give this 
 objection every advantage, let us fuppofe that the feat of the 
 confederacy, like France, is placed in the midft of furrounding 
 nations, and that the governments of thefe nations are anxious 
 by every means of artifice and violence to fupprefs the infolent 
 fpirit of liberty that has ftarted up among this neighbour people. 
 It is to be believed that even under thefe circumftances the dan- Anfwsr. 
 ger is more imaginary than real. The national affembly, being 
 precluded by the fuppofition from the ufe of force againft the 
 malcontent diftri&s, is obliged to confine itfelf to expoftulation ; 
 and it is fufficiently obfervable that our powers of expoftulation are 
 tenfold increafed the moment our hopes are confined to expof- 
 tulation alone. They have to defcribe with the utmoft perfpi- 
 cuity and fimplicity the benefits of independence; to convince 
 the public at large, that all they intend is to enable every diftricl, 
 and as far as poflible every individual, to purfue unmolefted their 
 own ideas of propriety; and that under their aufpices there fhall 
 be no tyranny, no arbitrary puniihments, fuch as proceed from 
 the jealoufy of councils and courts, no exactions, almoft no tax- 
 ation. Some ideas refpecting this laft fubjed will fpeedily occur. 
 
 It 
 
664 
 
 OF CONSTITUTIONS. 
 
 BOOK VI. It is not poffible but that, in a country refcued from the inve- 
 
 CHAP VII 
 
 :< terate evils of defpotifm, the love of liberty fhould be confider- 
 
 ably diffufed. The adherents therefore of the public caufe will 
 be many : the malcontents few. If a fmall number of diftri&s 
 were fo far blinded as to be willing to furrender themfelves to 
 oppreffion and flavery, it is probable they would foon repent. 
 Their defertion would infpire the more enlightened and 
 courageous with additional energy. It would be a glorious 
 fpedtacle to fee the champions of the caufe of truth declaring 
 that they defired none but willing fupporters. It is not poffible. 
 that lb magnanimous a principle fhould not contribute more to> 
 the advantage than the injury of their caufe. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ ^5.] 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 ARGUMENTS IN ITS FAVOUR. ANSWER. — I. IT PRODUCES 
 
 PERMANENCE OF OPINION. — NATURE OF PREJUDICE 
 AND JUDGMENT DESCRIBED. — 2. IT REQUIRES UNIFOR- 
 MITY OF OPERATION. 3. IT IS THE MIRROR AND TOOL 
 
 OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. — THE RIGHT OF PUNISH- 
 ING NOT FOUNDED IN THE PREVIOUS FUNCTION OF IN- 
 STRUCTING. 
 
 A 
 
 MODE in which government has been accuftomed to 'BOOK vi. 
 
 CHAP.VIIL 
 
 interfere for the purpofe of influencing opinion, is by v v ' 
 
 the fuperintendence it has in a greater or lefs degree exerted in 
 the article of education. It is worthy of obfervation that the idea 
 of this fuperintendence has obtained the countenance of feveral 
 of the mod zealous advocates of political reform. The queftion 
 relative to its propriety or impropriety is entitled on that account 
 to the more deliberate examination. 
 
 The arguments in its favour have been already anticipated. Arguments 
 
 in its favour. 
 
 " Can it be juftifiablc in thofe perfons, who are appointed to 
 the functions of magiftracy, and whofe duty it is to confult for 
 
 4 Q^ the . 
 
666 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 BOOK VI. the public welfare, to neglect the cultivation of the infant mind, 
 * and to fuffer its future excellence or depravity to be at the dif- 
 
 pofal of fortune ? Is it poffible for patriotifm and the love of the 
 public to be made the characteristic of a whole people in any- 
 other way fo fuccefsfully, as by rendering the early communica- 
 tion of thefe virtues a national concern ? If the education of our 
 youth be entirely confided to the prudence of their parents or 
 the accidental benevolence of private individuals, will it not be 
 a neceflary confequence, that fome will be educated to virtue,, 
 others to vice,, and others again entirely neglected ?" To thefe 
 eonfiderations it has been added, " That the maxim which has- 
 prevailed in the majority of civilifed countries, that ignorance of 
 the law is no apology for the breach of it, is in the higheft de- 
 gree iniquitous ; and that government cannot juflly punifh us- 
 for our crimes when committed, unlefs it have forewarned us 
 againft their commiffion, which cannot be adequately done 
 without fomething of the nature of public education." 
 
 An Aver. The propriety or impropriety of any project for this purpofe 
 
 mull be determined by the general confideration of its beneficial 
 or injurious tendency. If the exertions of the magistrate in 
 behalf of any fyflem of instruction will ftand the teft as condu- 
 cive to the public fervice, undoubtedly he cannot be j unified in 
 neglecting them. If on the contrary they conduce to injury, it 
 is wrong and unjuftifiable that they fhould be made. 
 
 The 
 
OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 66 7 
 
 The injuries that refult from a fyftem of national education book VI. 
 
 CHAP. VI u. 
 are, in the hrft place, that all public eftablifhments include in > „ ' 
 
 I. It produ- 
 
 them the idea of permanence. They endeavour it may be to ces perma- 
 nence of opi- 
 
 fecure and to diffufe whatever of advantageous to fociety is al- nion - 
 ready known, but they forget that more remains to be known. 
 If they realifed the moft fubftantial benefits at the time of their 
 introduction, they muft inevitably become lefs and lefs ufeful as 
 they increafed in duration. But to defcribe them as ufelefs is a 
 very feeble exprefhon of their demerits. 1 hey actively refbrain 
 the flights of mind, and fix it in the belief of exploded errors. 
 It has commonly been obferved of univerfities and extenfive 
 eftablifhments for the purpofe of education, that the knowledge 
 taught there, is a century behind the knowledge which exifts 
 among the unfhackled and unprejudiced members of the fame 
 political community. The moment any fcheme of proceeding 
 gains a permanent eftablifhment, it becomes imprefTed as one of 
 its characteriftic features with an averfion to change. Some vio- 
 lent concuffion may oblige its conductors to change an old fyf- 
 tem of philofophy for a fyftem lefs obfolete ; and they are then 
 as pertinacioufly attached to this fecond doctrine as they were to 
 the firft. Real intellectual improvement demands that mind 
 fhould as fpeedily as poflible be advanced to the height of know- 
 ledge already exifting among the enlightened members of the 
 community, and ftart from thence in the purfuit of farther ac- 
 quifitions. But public education has always expended its ener- 
 gies in the fupport of prejudice ; it teaches its pupils, not the 
 
 4 Q^2 fortitude 
 
668 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 BOOK VI. fortitude that mall bring every proportion to the teft of examma- 
 
 CHAP.VIII. 
 
 •» » ' tion, but the art of vindicating fuch tenets as may chance to be 
 
 previoufly eftablifhed. We ftudy Ariftotle or Thomas Aquinas 
 or Bellarmine or chief juftice Coke, not that we may detect their 
 errors, but that our minds may be fully impregnated with their 
 abfurdities. This feature runs through every fpecies- of public 
 eftablifhment ; and even in the petty inftitution of Sunday 
 fchools, the chief leifons that are taught, are a fuperftitious ve- 
 neration for the church of England, and to bow to every man in 
 a handfome coat. All this is dire&ly- contrary to the true inr- 
 tereft of mind. All this muft be unlearned, before we can begin. 
 to be wife.. 
 
 Nature of ft \ s ^g chara&eriflic of mind to be capable of improvement; 
 
 prejudice and' 
 
 judgment de- ^n individual furrenders the beft attribute of man, the moment 
 
 fcnbed.. ' 
 
 he refolves to adhere to certain fixed principles, for reafons not 
 now prefent to his mind, but which formerly were. The inr 
 ftant in which he fhuts upon himfelf the- career of enquiry, is the 
 inftant of his intelle&ual deceafe. He is no longer a man ; he 
 is the ghoft of departed man. There can be no fcheme more 
 egregioufly ftamped with folly, than that of feparating a tenet 
 from the evidence upon which its. validity depends.. If I ceafe 
 from the habit of being able to recal this evidence, my belief is 
 no longer a perception, but a prejudice : it may influence me 
 like a prejudice ; but cannot animate me like a real apprehenfion 
 of truth. The difference between the man thus guided, and the 
 
 mant 
 
OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 669 
 
 man that keeps his mind perpetually alive, is the difference be- BOOKVr. 
 
 * ' CHAP. VIII. 
 
 tween cowardice and fortitude. The man who is in the bed * v ' 
 
 fenfe an intellectual being, delights to recollect the reafons that 
 have convinced him, to repeat them to others, that they may pro- 
 duce conviction in them, and ftand more diftinct and explicit in 
 his own mind ; and he adds to this a willingnefs to examine 
 objections, becaufe he takes no pride in confident error. The 
 man who is not capable of this falutary exercife, to what valu- 
 able purpofe can he be employed ? Hence it appears that no vice 
 can be more deftructive than that which teaches us to regard 
 any judgment as final, and not open to review. The fame 
 principle that applies to individuals applies to communities*. 
 There is no propofition, at prefent apprehended to be true, fo 
 valuable as to juftify the introduction of an eftablimment for the 
 purpofe of inculcating it on mankind. Refer them to reading-, 
 to converfation, to meditation ; but teach them neither creeds 
 nor catechifms, neither moral nor political. 
 
 Secondly, the idea of national education is founded in an in- 2- K requJrei 
 
 uniformity of 
 
 attention to the nature of mind. Whatever each man does for operation, 
 himfelf is done well ; whatever his neighbours or his country un- 
 dertake to do for him is done ill. It is our wifdom to incite 
 men to act for themfelves, not to retain them in a date of per- 
 petual pupillage. He that learns becaufe he defires to learn, will 
 liden to the indructions he receives, and apprehend their mean- 
 ing. He that teaches becaufe he defires to teach, will difcharge. 
 
 his 
 
670 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 BOOK VI. his occupation with enthufiafm and energy. But the moment 
 
 CHAP. VIII. _.''"' 
 
 » v— — ' political institution undertakes to affign to every man his place, 
 
 the functions of all will be difcharged with fupinenefs and indif- 
 ference. Univerfities and expenfive eflablilhments have long 
 been remarked for formal dulnefs. Civil policy has given me 
 the power to appropriate my eftate to certain theoretical pur- 
 pofesj but it is an idle prefumption to think I can entail my 
 views, as I can entail my fortune. Remove all thofe obftscles 
 which prevent men from feeing and reftrain them from pur- 
 fuing their real advantage, but do not abfurdly undertake to re- 
 lieve them from the activity which this purfuit requires. What 
 I earn, what I acquire only becaufe I defire to acquire it, I efti- 
 mate at its true value ; but what is thruft upon me may make 
 me indolent, but cannot make me refpectable. It is extreme 
 folly to endeavour to fecure to others, independently of exertion 
 on their part, the means of being happy. — This whole propor- 
 tion of a national education, is founded upon a fuppofition which 
 has been repeatedly refuted in this work, but which has recurred 
 upon us in a thoufand forms, that unpatronifed truth is inade- 
 quate to the purpofe of enlightening mankind. 
 
 3. It Js the Thirdly, the project of a national education ought uniformly 
 
 minor and J r J ° J 
 
 tool of nati- t be difcouraged on account of its obvious alliance with na- 
 
 ■onal govsrn- 
 
 ment - tional government. This is an alliance of a more formidable na- 
 
 ture, than the old and much contefted alliance of church and 
 itate. Before we put fo powerful a machine under the direction 
 2 of 
 
OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 671 
 
 of fo ambiguous an agent, it behoves us to confider well what it BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAI'.VIII. 
 
 is that we do. Government will not fail to employ it to » v— — ' 
 
 ftrengthen its hands, and perpetuate its inftitutions. If we could 
 even fuppofe the agents of government not to propofe to them- 
 felves an object, which will be apt to appear in their eyes, not 
 merely innocent, but meritorious; the evil would not the lefs 
 happen. Their views as inftitutors of a fyitem of education, 
 will net fail to be analogous to their views in their political ca- 
 pacity : the data upon which their conduct as ftatefmen is vin- 
 dicated, will be the data upon which their inftructions are 
 founded. It is not true that our youth ought to be inflructed to 
 venerate the constitution, however excellent; they mould be in- 
 flructed to venerate truth; and the conftitution only fo far as it" 
 correfponded with their independent deductions of truth. Had 
 the fcheme of a national education been adopted when defpotifm 
 was raoft triumphant, it is not to be believed that it could have 
 for ever ftifled the voice of truth. But it would have been the 
 moft formidable and profound contrivance 'for that purpofe that 
 imagination can fugged. Still, in the countries where liberty 
 chiefly prevails, it is reafonably to be aflumed that there are im- 
 portant errors, and a national education has the moft direct 
 tendency to perpetuate thofe errors, and to form all minds upon 
 one model. 
 
 It is not eafy to fay whether the remark, " that government The right of 
 
 punifhing not. 
 
 cannot juftly punilh offenders, unlefs it have previoufly informed founded in. 
 
 them, 
 
672 OF NATIONAL EDUCATION. 
 
 BOOK VI. them what is virtue and what is ofFence," be. entitled to a fepa- 
 
 CHAP.YlIf. . 
 
 i j rate anfwer. It is to be hoped that mankind will never have to 
 
 the previous # 
 
 fimdtion of learn fo important a leuon through fo corrupt a channel. 
 
 inilru£Ung. 
 
 Government may reasonably and equitably prefume that men 
 who live in fociety know that enormous crimes are injurious to 
 the public weal, without its being necefTary to announce them 
 as fuch, by laws to be proclaimed by heralds, or expounded by 
 curates. It has been alledged that " mere reafon may teach me 
 not to flrike my neighbour ; but will never forbid my fending a 
 fack of wool from England, or printing the French conftitution. 
 in Spain." This objection leads to the true diftin&ion upon the 
 fubjed. All real crimes are capable of being difcerned without 
 the teaching of law. All fuppofed crimes, not capable of being 
 fo difcerned, are truly and unalterably innocent. It is true that 
 my own underftanding would never have told me that the ex-, 
 portation of wool was a vice : neither do I believe it is a vice 
 now that a law has been made affirming it. It is a feeble and 
 contemptible remedy for iniquitous punifhments, to fignify to 
 mankind beforehand that you intend to inflict them. Nay, the 
 remedy is worfe than the evil : deflroy me if you pleafe ; but do 
 not endeavour by a national education to deflroy in my under- 
 ftanding the difcernment cf juflice and injuflice. The idea of 
 fuch an education, or even perhaps of the neceffity of a written 
 law, would never have occurred, if government and jurifpru- 
 dence had never attempted the arbitrary converfion of innocence 
 
 into guilt. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 673 ] 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 REASONS BY WHICH THEY ARE VINDICATED. — LABOUR IN 
 ITS USUAL ACCEPTATION AND LABOUR FOR THE PUBLIC 
 COMPARED. — IMMORAL EFFECTS OF THE INSTITUTION 
 OF SALARIES. — SOURCE FROM WHICH THEY ARE DE- 
 RIVED — UNNECESSARY FOR THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE 
 PUBLIC FUNCTIONARY — FOR DIGNITY. — SALARIES OF 
 INFERIOR OFFICERS — MAY ALSO BE SUPERSEDED. — TAX- 
 ATION. — QUALIFICATIONS* 
 
 A 
 
 N article which deferves the matureft consideration, and BOOK VI. 
 
 . ... CHAP. IX. 
 
 by means of which political inftitution does not fail to *■ * ■-' 
 
 produce the moft important influence upon opinion, is that of 
 
 the mode of rewarding public fervices. The mode which has 
 
 obtained in all European countries is that of pecuniary reward. 
 
 He who is employed to act in behalf of the public, is recom- 
 
 penfed with a falary. He who retires from that employment, is 
 
 recompenfed with a penfion. The arguments in fupport of this 
 
 fyftem are well known. It has been remarked, " that it may Reafoni m 
 
 indeed be creditable to individuals to be willing to ferve their ftfcution of 
 
 t . > t falaries i» 
 
 country without a reward, but that it is a becoming pride on the founded. 
 
 4 R part 
 
6 74 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 BOOK VI, part of the public, to refufe to receive as an alms that for which 
 
 CHAP IX 
 
 . -» ' they are well able to pay. If one man, animated by the molt 
 difinterefted motives, be permitted to ferve the public upon thefe 
 terms, another will afiume the exterior of difintereftednefs, as a 
 ftep towards the gratification of a fmifter ambition. If men be 
 not openly and directly paid for the fervices they perform, we 
 may reft aflured that they will pay themfelves by ways ten 
 thoufand times more injurious. He who devotes himfelf to the 
 public, ought to devote himfelf entire : he will therefore be in- 
 jured in his perfonal fortune, and ought to be replaced. Add 
 to this, that the fervants of the public ought by their appear- 
 ances and mode of living to command refpect both from their 
 own countrymen and from foreigners; and that this circum- 
 ftance will require an expence for which it is the duty of their 
 country to provide *." 
 
 Labour in its Before this argument can be fufKciently eftimated, it will be 
 tadonmid k- neceflary for us to confider the analogy between labour in its 
 public com- moft ufual acceptation and labour for the public fervice, what 
 
 p tired 
 
 are the points in which they refemble and in which they differ. 
 If I cultivate a field the produce of which is neceflary for my 
 fubfiftence, this is an innocent and laudable action, the firft ob- 
 ject it propofes is my own emolument, and it cannot be unrea- 
 fonable that that object fhould be much in my contemplation 
 
 * The fubftance of thefe arguments may be found in Mr. Burke's Speech on 
 Oeconomical Reform. 
 
 while 
 
OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 675 
 
 while the labour is performing. If I cultivate a field the produce BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 of which is not neceffary to my fubfiftence, but which I propole » 1 ' 
 
 to give in barter for a garment, the cafe then becomes different. 
 The action here does not properly fpeaking begin in myfelf. 
 Its immediate object is to provide food for another j and it feems 
 to be in fome degree a perverfion of intellect, that caufes me to 
 place in an inferior point of view the inherent quality of the 
 action, and to do that which is in the firft inftance benevolent, 
 from a partial retrofpect to my own advantage. Still the per- 
 verfion here, at leaft to our habits of reflecting and judging, 
 does not appear violent. The action differs only in form from 
 that which is direct. I employ that labour in cultivating a field, 
 which mull otherwife be employed in manufacturing a garment. 
 The garment I propofe to myfelf as the end of my labour. 
 We are not apt to conceive of this fpecies of barter and trade as 
 greatly injurious to our moral difcernment. 
 
 But then this is an action in the flightefl degree indirect. It 
 does not follow, becaufe we are induced to do fome actions 
 immediately beneficial to others from a felfifh motive, that we 
 can admit of this in all inftances with impunity. It does not 
 follow, becaufe we are fometimes inclined to be felfifh, that we 
 muft never be generous. The love of our neighbour is the 
 great ornament of a moral nature. The perception of truth is 
 the moft folid improvement of an intellectual nature. He that 
 fees nothing in the univerfe deferving of regard but hy^'elf, is 
 
 4 R 2 a con- 
 
676 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 BOOK VI. a confummate ftranger to the dictates of immutable reafon. He 
 CHAP. ix. ..„.., 
 
 v » i that is not influenced in his conduct by the real and inherent 
 
 natures of things, is rational to no purpofe. Admitting that it 
 is venial to do fome actions immediately beneficial to my neigh- 
 bour from a partial retrofpect to myfelf, furely there muft be other 
 actions in which I ought to forget, or endeavour to forget my- 
 felf. This duty is mod obligatory in actions moft extenfive in 
 their confequences. If a thoufand men be to be benefited, I 
 ought to recollect that I am only an atom in the comparifon, and 
 to reafon accordingly. 
 
 Iiwnorai ef- Thefe confederations may qualify us to decide upon the article 
 inaituti.n of f penfions and falaries. Surely it ought not to be the end of a 
 good political inftitution to increafe our felfifhnefs, inftead of 
 fufFering it to dwindle and decay. If we pay an ample falary 
 to him who is employed in the public fervice, how are we fure 
 that he will not have more regard to the falary than to the 
 public ? If we pay a fmall falary, yet the very exiftence of fuch 
 a payment will oblige men to compare the work performed and 
 the reward belt owed ; and all the confequence that will refult 
 will be to drive the beft men from the fervice of their country, 
 a fervice firft degraded by being paid, and then paid with an ill- 
 timed parfimony. Whether the falary be large or fmall, if a 
 falary exift, many will defire the office for the fake of its appen- 
 dage. Functions the moft extenfive in their confequences will 
 be convertad into a trade. How humiliating will it be to the 
 
 functionary 
 
OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 677 
 
 functionary himfelf, amidft the complication and fubtlety of BOOK VI. 
 motives, to doubt whether the falary were not one of his induce- v * * 
 merits to the accepting the office ? If he ftand acquitted to him- 
 felf, it is however dill to be regretted, that grounds fhould be 
 afforded to his countrymen, which tempt them to mifinterpret 
 his views. 
 
 Another confideration of great weight in this inftance is that of fource front. 
 
 which they- 
 
 the fource from which falaries are derived : from the public »« derived : 
 revenue, from taxes impofed upon the community. But there 
 is no practicable mode of collecting the fuperfluities of the com- 
 munity. Taxation, to be ftrictly equal, if it demand from the 
 man of an hundred a year ten pounds, ought to demand from 
 the man of a thoufand a year nine hundred and ten. Taxation 
 will always be unequal and oppreflive, wrefting the hard earned 
 morfel from the gripe of the peafant, and fparing him rnoft 
 whofe fuperfluities mod defy the limits of juftice. I will not fay 
 that the man of clear difcernment and an independent mind 
 would rather ftarve than be fubfifted at the public coft : but I 
 will fay, that it is fcarcely poflible to devife any expedient for. 
 his fubfiftence that he would not rather accept. 
 
 Meanwhile the difficulty under this head is by no means infu- unaeceflVy 
 perable. The majority of the perfons chofen for public employ- fiftence of 
 
 the public 
 
 ment, under any fituation of mankind approaching to the functionary: 
 prefent, will poffefs a perfonal fortune adequate to their fupport. 
 4. Thofe 
 
678 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 BOOK VI. Thofe felected from a different clafs, will probably be felected 
 
 CHAP IX 
 
 ■ j for extraordinary talents, which will naturally lead to extraordi- 
 
 ' nary refources. It has been deemed difhonourable to fubfifl 
 upon private liberality ; but this difhonour is produced only by 
 the difficulty of reconciling this mode of fubfiftence and intellec- 
 tual independence. It is free from many of the objections that 
 have been urged againft a public ftipend. I ought to receive 
 your fuperfluity as my due, while I am employed in affairs 
 more important than that of earning a fubfiftence j but at the 
 fame time to receive it with a total indifference to perfonal 
 advantage, taking only precifely what is neceffary for the fupply 
 of my wants. He that liftens to the dictates of juftice and turns 
 a deaf ear to the dictates of pride, will wifh that the conftitution 
 of his country fhould caft him for fupport on the virtue of indi- 
 viduals, rather than provide for his fupport at the public 
 expence. That virtue will, in this as in all other inftances, 
 increafe, the more it is called into action. " But what if he 
 have a wife and_children ?" Let many aid him, if the aid of one 
 be infufficient. Let him do in his lifetime what Eudamidas did at 
 his deceafe, bequeath his daughter to be fubfifted by one friend, 
 and his mother by another. This is the only true taxation, 
 which he that is able, and thinks himfelf able, affeffes on himfelf, 
 not which he endeavours to difcharge upon the moulders of the 
 poor. It is a finking example of the power of venal governments 
 in generating prejudice, that this fcheme of ferving the public 
 functions without falaries, fo common among the ancient repub- 
 5 licans, 
 
OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 679 
 
 licans, fhould by liberal minded men of the prefent day be ;52?£ V1, 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 deemed impracticable. It is not to be believed that thoie readers *- 
 who already pant for the abolition of government and regu- 
 lations in all their branches, fhould hefitate reflecting fo eafy 
 an advance towards this defirable object. Nor let us imagine 
 that the fafety of the community will depend upon the fervices 
 of an individual. In the countiy in which individuals fit for 
 the public fervice are rare, the port of honour will be his, not 
 that fills an official fituation, but that from his clofet endeavours 
 to waken the fleeping virtues of mankind. In the country where 
 they are frequent, it will not be difficult by the fhort duration of 
 the employment to compenfate for the flendernefs of the means 
 of him that fills it. It is not eafy to defcribe the advantages 
 that muft refult from this proceeding. The public functionary 
 would in every article of his charge recoiled!: the motives of 
 public fpirit and benevolence. He would hourly improve in the 
 energy and difintereftednefs of his character. The habits created 
 by a frugal fare and a chearful poverty, not hid as now in 
 obfcure retreats, but held forth to public view, and honoured 
 with public efteem, would fpeedily pervade the community, and 
 - aufpicioufly prepare them for ftill farther improvements. 
 
 The objection, " that it is neceffary for him who ads on the for dignity, 
 part of the public to make a certain figure, and to live in a ftyle 
 calculated to excite refpedt," does not deferve a feparate anfwer. 
 The whole, fpirit of this treatife is in direct hoftility to this ob- 
 jection* 
 
68o 
 
 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 BOOK VI. jedtion. If therefore it have not been anfwered already, It 
 
 CHAP. IX 
 
 would be vain to attempt an anfwef* in this place. It is recorded 
 of the burghers of the Netherlands who confpired to throw off 
 the Auftrian yoke, that they came to the place of confultation 
 each man with his knapfack of provifions : who is there that 
 feels inclined to defpife this fimplicity and honourable poverty ? 
 The abolition of falaries would doubtlefs render neceflary the 
 Amplification and abridgment of public bufinefs. This would 
 be a benefit and not a difadvantage. 
 
 Salaries of 
 inferior offi- 
 cers : 
 
 It will farther be objected that there are certain functionaries 
 in the lower departments of government, fuch as clerks and tax- 
 gatherers, whofe employment is perpetual, and whofe fub- 
 fiftence ought for that reafon to be made the refult of their em- 
 ployment. If this objection were admitted, its confequences 
 would be of fubordinate importance. The office of a clerk or 
 a tax-gatherer is confiderably fimilar to thofe of mere barter and 
 trade j and therefore to degrade it altogether to their level, would 
 have little "Tefemblance to the fixing fuch a degradation upon 
 offices that demand the moft elevated mind. The annexation 
 of a ftipend to fuch employments, if confidered only as a matteT 
 of temporary accommodation, might perhaps be endured. 
 
 way alfo be, But tne exception, if admitted, ought to be admitted with 
 pe great caution. He that is employed in an affair of public 
 
 neceffity. ought to feel, while he difcharges it, its true cha- 
 racter. 
 
OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 681 
 
 rafter. We fhould never allow ourfelves to undertake an office BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAP IX 
 
 of a public nature, without feeling ourfelves animated with a i 
 public zeal. We (hall otherwife difcharge our truft with com- 
 parative coldnefs and neglect. Nor is this all. The abolition lotion. 
 of falaries would lead to the abolition of thofe offices to which 
 falaries are thought neceflary. If we had neither foreign wars 
 nor domeftic ftipends, taxation would be almoft unknown ; and, 
 if we had no taxes to collect, we fhould want no clerks to keep 
 an account of them. In the fimple fcheme of political inftitu- 
 tion which reafon dictates, we could fcarcely have any burden- 
 fome offices to difcharge ; and, if we had any that were fo in 
 their abftract nature, they might be rendered light by the per- 
 petual rotation of their holders. 
 
 tlOliS, 
 
 If we have no falaries, for a (till ftronger reafon we ought to Qualifica- 
 have no pecuniary qualifications, or in other words no regula- 
 tion requiring the poffeffion of a certain property, as a condition to 
 the right of electing or the capacity of being elected. It is an 
 uncommon ftrain of tyranny to call upon men to appoint for 
 themfelves a delegate, and at the fame time forbid them to 
 appoint exactly the man whom they may judge fitteft for the 
 office. Qualification in both kinds is the moft flagrant injuftice. 
 It afferts the man to be of lefs value than his property. It fur- 
 nifhes to the candidate a new ftimulus to the accumulation of 
 wealth ; and this paffion, when once fet in motion, is not eafilv 
 allayed. It tells him, " Your intellectual and moral qualiftca- 
 
 4 S tions 
 
682 OF PENSIONS AND SALARIES. 
 
 BOOK VI. tions may be of the higheft order ; but you have not enough of 
 
 CHAP IX. 
 
 the means of luxury and vice." To the non-elector it holds the 
 mod deteftable language. It fays, " You are poor ; you are 
 unfortunate ; the inftitutions of fociety oblige you to be the per- 
 petual witnefs of other men's fuperfluity : becaufe you are funk 
 thus low, we will trample you yet lower ; you fhall not even 
 be reckoned in the lifts for a man, you fhall be palled by as one 
 of whom fociety makes no account, and whofe welfare and 
 moral exiftence fhe difdains to recoiled," 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 63 3 ] 
 
 CHAP. X. 
 
 OF THE MODES OF DECIDING A QUESTION ON 
 THE PART OF THE COMMUNITY. 
 
 DECISION BY LOT, ITS ORIGIN — FOUNDED IN THE SYSTEM 
 
 OF DISCRETIONARY RIGHTS IMPLIES THE DESERTION 
 
 OF DUTY. — DECISION BY BALLOT — INCULCATES TIMI- 
 DITY — AND HYPOCRISY. — DECISION BY VOTE, ITS RE- 
 COMMENDATIONS. 
 
 w 
 
 HAT has been here faid upon the fubject of qualifica- BOOK VI. 
 
 pUA p v 
 
 tions, naturally leads to a few important obfervations > v ' '» 
 upon the three principal modes of conducting election, by forti- 
 tion, by ballot or by vote. 
 
 The idea of fortition was firft introduced by the dictates of Decifion by- 
 lot, its origin : 
 fuperftition. It was fuppofed that, when human reafon pioufly 
 
 acknowledged its infufficiency, the Gods, pleafed with fo un- 
 feigned a homage, interfered to guide the decifion. This ima- 
 gination is now exploded. Every man who pretends to philo- 
 fophy will confefs that, wherever fortition is introduced, the 
 decifion is exclufively guided by the laws of impulfe and gravi- 
 tation. — Strictly fpeaking there is no i'uch thing as contingence. 
 
 4 S 2 But, 
 
684 0F THE MODES OF DECIDING A QUESTION 
 
 BOOK VI. But, fo far as relates to the exercife of apprehenfion and judg- 
 
 CHAP X. 
 
 t v ' 'j ment on the particular queftion to be determined, all decifion 
 by lot is the decifion of contingence. The operations of impulfe 
 and gravitation either proceed from a blind and unconfcious 
 principle ; or, if they proceed from mind, it is mind executing 
 general laws, and not temporifing with every variation of 
 human caprice. 
 
 founded in All reference of public queftions and elections to lot includes 
 
 the fyftem of # m 
 
 difcretionary in it two evils, moral mifapprehennon and cowardice. There 
 
 rights : 
 
 is no fituation in which we can be placed that has not its corre- 
 fpondent duties. There is no alternative that can be offered to 
 our choice, that does not include in it a better and a worfe. 
 The idea of fortition derives from the fame root as the idea of 
 difcretionary rights. Men, undebauched by the leiTons of fuper- 
 ftition, would never have recourfe to the deeifion by lot, were 
 they not impreffed with the notion of indifference, that they 
 had a right to do any one of two or more things offered to their 
 choice ; and that of confequence, in order to rid themfelves of 
 uncertainty and doubt, it was fufficiently allowable to refer the 
 decifion of certain matters to accident. It is of great importance 
 that this idea fhould be extirpated. Mind will never arrive at 
 the true tone of energy, till we feel that moral liberty and dis- 
 cretion are mere creatures of the imagination, that in all cafes 
 our duty is precife, and the path of juftice fingle and direct. 
 
 But, 
 
ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNITY. 68j- 
 
 But, fuppofing us convinced of this principle, if we afterwards book vr. 
 defert it, this is the moll contemptible cowardice. Our defer- v '• 
 
 . , . r c r • implies the 
 
 tion either anles from our want of energy to enquire, to com- defertion of 
 pare and to decide, or from our want of fortitude to defpife the 
 inconveniences that might attend upon our compliance with 
 what our judgment dictates. 
 
 Ballot is a mode of decifion flill more cenfurable than forti- Decifion by 
 
 ballot : 
 
 tion. It is fcarcely pomble to conceive of a political inftitution 
 that includes a more direct and explicit patronage of vice. It 
 has been faid, " that ballot may in certain cafes be neceffary to 
 enable a man of a feeble character to act with eafe and indepen- 
 dence, and to prevent bribery, corrupt influence and faction." 
 Vice is an ill remedy to apply to the diminution of vice. A inculcates 
 
 4 ' J timidity : 
 
 feeble and irrefolute character might before be accidental ; ballot 
 is a contrivance to render it permanent, and to fcatter its feeds 
 over a wider furface. The true cure for a want of conftancy 
 and public fpirit is 'to infpire firmnefs, not to infpire timidity. 
 Truth, if communicated to the mind with perfpicuity, is a fuffi- 
 cient bafis for virtue. To tell men that it is neceffary they 
 fhould form their decifion by ballot, is to tell them that it is 
 neceffary they fhould be vicious. 
 
 If fortition taught us to defert our duty, ballot teaches us to and hypo- 
 
 crify. 
 
 draw a veil of concealment over our performance of it. It points 
 out to us a method of a&ing unobfesved. It incites us to make 
 
 a myftery 
 
686 OF THE MODES OF DECIDING A QUESTION, & c . 
 
 BOOK VI. a myftery of our fentiments. If it did this in the moft trivial 
 
 CHAP. x. . 
 
 v „ 1 article, it would not be eafy to bring the mifchief it would pro- 
 duce within the limits of calculation. But it dictates this con- 
 duel; in our moft important concerns. It calls upon us to difcharge 
 our duty to the public with the moft virtuous conftancy ; but at 
 the fame time directs us to hide our difcharge of it. One of the 
 moft admirable principles in the ftructure of the material uni- 
 verfe, is its tendency to prevent us from withdrawing ourfelves 
 from the confequences of our own actions. Political inftitution 
 that fhould attempt to counteract this principle, would be the 
 only true impiety. How can a man have the love of the public 
 in his heart, without the dictates of that love flowing to his lips ? 
 When we direct men to act with fecrecy, we direct them to act 
 with frigidity. Virtue will always be an unufual fpectacle 
 among men, till they fhall have learned to be at all times ready 
 to avow their actions and affign the reafons upon which thev 
 .are founded. 
 
 • 
 
 Dedfion by If then fortition and ballot be inftiturions pregnant with vi^p 
 
 vote, its re- r ° vu.c, 
 
 commenda- it follows, that all focial decifions fhould be made bv onpn 
 
 tions. / ".Frf 1 
 
 vote ; that, wherever t we have a function to difcharge, we 
 fhould reflect on the mode in which it ought to be difcharp-ed • 
 and that, whatever conduct we are perfuaded to adopt, efpecially 
 in affairs of general concern, fhould be adopted in the face of 
 the world. 
 
 AN 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 i 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 OF CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT 
 
 WHICH RESULT FROM THE PRINCIPLES 
 
 OF MORALITY. 
 
 DEFINITION OF PUNISHMENT. — NATURE OF CRIME. RE- 
 TRIBUTIVE JUSTICE NOT INDEPENDENT AND ABSOLUTE 
 NOT TO BE VINDICATED FROM THE SYSTEM OF NA- 
 TURE. — DESERT A CHIMERICAL PROPERTY. — CONCLU- 
 SION. 
 
 THE fubjedt, of punifhment is perhaps the moft fundamen- ^9Sh?l 1 ' 
 tal in the fcience of politics. Men affociated for the fake 
 of mutual protection and benefit. It has already appeared, that 
 I the 
 
688 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VII. the internal affairs of fuch aflbciations are of infinitely greater 
 
 i ly '. '■* importance than their external*. It has appeared that the 
 
 action of fociety in conferring rewards and fuperintending 
 opinion is of pernicious effect f . Hence it follows that govern- 
 ment, or the action of the fociety in its corporate capacity, can 
 fcarcely be of any utility, except fo far as it is requifite for the 
 fuppreflion of force by force ; for the prevention of the hoftile 
 attack of one member of the fociety upon the perfon or property 
 of another, which prevention is ufually called by the name of 
 criminal juftice, or punifhment. 
 
 Definition of 
 punifhment. 
 
 Before we can properly judge of the neceffity or urgency of 
 this action of government, it will be of fome' importance to con- 
 fider the precife import of the word punifhment. I may 
 employ force to counteract the hoftility that is actually com- 
 mitting on me. I may employ force to compel any member of 
 the fociety to occupy the poft that I conceive molt conducive to 
 the general advantage, either in the mode of imprefling foldiers 
 and failors, or by obliging a military officer or a.minifter of ftate 
 to accept or retain his appointment. I may put an innocent 
 man to death for the common good, either becaufe he is infected 
 with a peftilential difeafe, or becaufe fome oracle has declared 
 it effential to the public fafety. None of thefe, though they 
 confift in the exertion of force for fome moral purpofe, comes 
 within the import of the word punifhment. Punifhment is 
 
 Book V, Chap. XX. 
 
 f Book V, Chap. XII. Book VI, pqfim. 
 
 generally 
 
DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT. 689 
 
 generally ufed to fignify the voluntary infliction of evil upon a BOOK vn. 
 
 CHAP I 
 
 vicious being, not merely becaufe the public advantage demands 1 ' > 
 
 it, but becaufe there is apprehended to be a certain fitnefs and 
 propriety in the nature of things, that render fuffering, abftract- 
 edly from the benefit to refult, the fuitable concomitant of vice. 
 
 The juftice of punifhment therefore, in the ftrict import of Nature of 
 
 crime. 
 
 the word, can only be a deduction from the hypothefis of free- 
 will, and mud be falfe, if human actions be necefTary. Mind, 
 as was fufEciently apparent when we treated of that fubject *, is 
 an agent, in no other fenfe than matter is an agent. It operates 
 and is operated upon, and the nature, the force and line of 
 direction of the firft, is exactly in proportion to the nature, force 
 and line of direction of the fecond. Morality in a rational and 
 defigning mind is not elTentially different from morality in an 
 inanimate fubftance. A man of certain intellectual habits is 
 fitted to be an aflkflin, a dagger of a certain form is fitted to be 
 his inftrument. The one or the other excites a greater degree 
 of difapprobation, in proportion as its fitnefs for mifchievous 
 purpofes appears to be more inherent and direct. I view a 
 dagger on this account with more difapprobation than a knife, 
 which is perhaps equally adapted for the purpofes of the affaifinj 
 becaufe the dagger has few or no beneficial ufes to weigh againft 
 thofe that are hurtful, and becaufe it has a tendency by means 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VI, 
 
 4T of 
 
6go 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VII. of allocution to the exciting of evil thoughts. I view the affaflin 
 t C ',, with more difapprobation than the dagger, becaufe he is more 
 
 to be feared, and it is more difficult to change his vicious 
 ftructure or take from him his capacity to injure. The man ia 
 propelled to act by necefTary caufes and irrefiftible motives, 
 which, having once occurred, are likely to occur again. The 
 dagger has no quality adapted to the contraction of habits, and, 
 though it have committed a thoufand murders, is not at all 
 more likely (unlefs fo far as thole murders, being known, may 
 operate as a flight affociated motive with the pofTefTor) to com- 
 mit murder again. Except in the articles here fpecified, the 
 two cafes are exactly parallel. The aflaffin cannot help the 
 murder he commits any more than the dagger. 
 
 Retributive Thefe arguments are merely calculated to fet in a more per- 
 
 juflice not 
 
 independent fpicuous light a principle, which is admitted by many by whom 
 
 and abfolute : ,' " f 
 
 the doctrine of neceffity has never been examined ; that the 
 only meafure of equity is utility, and whatever is not attended 
 with any beneficial purpofe, is not juft. This is fo evident a 
 propofition that few reafonable and reflecting minds will be 
 found inclined to reject it. Why do I inflict fufFering on 
 another? If neither for his own benefit nor the benefit of 
 others, can that be right ? Will refentment, the mere indigna- 
 tion and horror I have conceived againft vice, juftify me in 
 putting a being to ufelefs torture ? " But fuppofe I only put an 
 end to his exiftence." What, with no profpect of benefit either to 
 
 himfelf 
 
DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT. 691 
 
 himfelf or others ? The reafon the mind eafily reconciles itfelf BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 to this fuppofition is, that we conceive exiftenee to be lefs a 
 
 bleffing than a curfe to a being incorrigibly vicious. But in 
 that cafe the fuppofition does not fall within the terms of the 
 queftion : I am in reality conferring a benefit. It has been 
 afked, " If we conceive to ourfelves two beings, each of them 
 folitary, but the firft virtuous and the fecond vicious, the firft 
 inclined to the higheft acts of benevolence, if his fituation were 
 changed for the focial, the fecond to malignity, tyranny and 
 injuftire, do we not feel that the firft is entitled to felicity in 
 preference to the fecond ?" If there be any difficulty in the 
 queftion, it is wholly caufed by the extravagance of the fuppo- 
 fition. No being can be either virtuous or vicious who has no 
 opportunity of influencing the happinefs of others. He may 
 indeed, though now folitary, recollect or imagine a focial ftate j 
 but this fentiment and the propenfities it generates can fcarcely 
 be vigorous, unlefs he have hopes of being at fome future time 
 reftored to that (late. The true folitaire cannot be confidered 
 as a moral being, unlefs the morality we contemplate be that 
 which has relation to his own permanent advantage. But, if 
 that be our meaning, punifhment, unlefs for reform, is pecu- 
 liarly abfurd. His conduct is vicious, becaufe it has a tendency 
 to render him miferable : (hall we inflict calamity upon him, 
 for 'this reafon only becaufe he has already inflicted calamity 
 upon himfelf? It is difficult for us to imagine to ourfelves a foli- 
 tary intellectual being, whom no future accident fhall ever 
 
 4 T 2 render 
 
692 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE 
 
 BOOK VII. render focial. It is difficult for us to feparate even in idea 
 virtue and vice from happinefs and mifery ; and of confequence 
 not to imagine that, when we bellow a benefit upon virtue, we 
 bellow it where it will turn to account ; and, when we bellow 
 a benefit upon vice, we bellow it where it will be unproductive. 
 For thefe reafons the queflion of a folitary being will always be 
 extravagant and unintelligible, but will never convince. 
 
 not to be 
 vindicated 
 from the 
 fyftem of 
 nature. 
 
 It has fometimes been alledged that the very courfe of nature 
 has annexed fufFering to vice, and has thus led us to the idea of 
 punifhment. Arguments of this fort mufl be liflened to with 
 great caution. It was by reafonings of a fimilar~ nature that our 
 anceftors juflified the practice of religious perfecution : " Heretics 
 and unbelievers are the objects of God's indignation; it mull 
 therefore be meritorious in us to mal-treat thofe whom God has 
 curfed." We know too little of the fyftem of the univerfe, are 
 too liable to error reflecting it, and fee too fmall a portion of 
 the whole, to entitle us to form our moral principles upon an 
 imitation of what we conceive to be the courfe of nature. 
 
 It is an extreme error to fuppofe that the courfe of nature is 
 fomething arbitrarily adjufted by a defigning mind. Let us once 
 conceive a fyftem r of percipient beings to exift, and all that 
 we know of the hiflory of man follows from that conception 
 as fo many inevitable confequences. Mind beginning to exifl 
 mull have begun from ignorance, mull have received idea after 
 2 idea, 
 
DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT. 693 
 
 idea, rauft have been liable to erroneous conclufions from 1m- BOOKVII. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 perfed conceptions. We fay that the fyftem of the univerfe has v *— ' 
 
 annexed happinefs to virtue and pain to vice. We fhould fpeak 
 more accurately if we faid, that virtue would not be virtue nor 
 vice be vice, if this connedion could ceafe. The office of the 
 principle, whether mind or whatever elfe, to which the univerfe 
 owes its exiftence, is lefs that of fabricating than conducting ; 
 is not the creation of truth, and the connecting ideas and pro- 
 portions which had no original relation to each other, but the 
 rendering truth, the nature of which is unalterable, an active 
 and vivifying principle. It cannot therefore be good reafoning 
 to fay, the fyftem of nature annexes unhappinefs to vice, or in 
 other words vice brings its own punifhment along with it, there- 
 fore it would be unjuft in us not by a pofitive interference to 
 render that punifhment double. 
 
 Thus it appears, whether we enter philofophically into the Defertsch^ 
 principle of human actions, or merely analyfe the ideas of recti- perty. F 
 tude and juftice which have the univerfal confent of mankind, 
 that, accurately fpeaking, there is no fuch thing as defert. It 
 cannot be juft that we fhould inflict fuffering on any man, except 
 fo far as it tends to good. Hence it follows that the ftrict 
 acceptation of the word punifhment by no means accords with 
 any found principles of reafoning. It is right that I fhould 
 inflict fuffering, in every cafe where it can be clearly fhown that 
 
 fuch 
 
6 9 4 LIMITATIONS OF THE 
 
 BOOKVIT. fuch inflic"tion will produce an overbalance of good. But this in- 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 i v -» flic~tion bears no reference to the mere innocence or guilt of the 
 
 perfon upon whom it is made. An innocent man is the proper 
 fubjecl: of it, if it tend to good. A guilty man is the proper fubject 
 of it under no other point of view. To punifh him upon any 
 hypothecs for what is pail and irrecoverable and for the con- 
 fideration of that only, muft be ranked among the wildeft con- 
 ceptions of untutored barbarifm. Every man upon whom dif- 
 cipline is adminiftered, i-s to be confidered as to the rationale of 
 this difcipline as innocent. Xerxes was not more unreafonable 
 when he lamed the waves of the fea, than that man would be 
 who inflicted fuffering on his fellow, from a view to the paft, 
 and not from a view to the future, 
 
 Conclufion. ft i s of the utmoft importance that we fhould bear thefe ideas 
 
 conftantly in mind during our whole examination of the theory 
 of puniihment. This theory would in the paft tranfa&ions of 
 mankind have been totally diiferent, if they had divefted them- 
 felves of all emotions of anger and refentment ; if they had con- 
 fidered the man who torments another for what he has done, as 
 upon par with the child who beats the table ; if they had figured 
 to their imagination, and then properly eftimated, the man, who 
 mould fhut up in prifon fome atrocious criminal, and afterwards 
 torture him at ftated periods, merely in confideration of the 
 abftracl: congruity of crime and punifhment, without any pofh- 
 
 ble 
 
DOCTRINE OF PUNISHMENT. 6 9 $ 
 
 ble benefit to others or to himfelf; if they had regarded BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP I 
 infliction as that which was to be regulated folely by a difpaf- 
 
 fionate calculation of the future, without fufFering the paft, in it- 
 
 felf confidered, for a moment to enter into the account. 
 
 C H A P. 
 
[ 6 9 6 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 GENERAL DISADVANTAGES OF COERCION. 
 
 CONSCIENCE IN MATTERS OF RELIGION CONSIDERED — IN 
 THE CONDUCT OF LIFE. — BEST PRACTICABLE CRITERION 
 OF DUTY — NOT THE DECISION OF OTHER MEN — BUT 
 OF OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING. — TENDENCY OF COER- 
 CION. — ITS VARIOUS CLASSES CONSIDERED. 
 
 CHApS" T TAVING thus precluded all ideas of punifhment or retri- 
 *■ -*• bution ftri&ly fo called, it belongs to us in the farther 
 difcufiion of this interefling fubjecT:, to think merely of that 
 coercion, which has ufually been employed againft perfons con- 
 victed of paft injurious action, for the purpofe of preventing 
 future mifchief. And here we will firft confider what is the 
 quantity of evil which accrues from all fuch coercion, and 
 fecondly examine the cogency of the various reafons by which 
 this coercion is recommended. It will not be poflible wholly to 
 avoid the repetition of fome of the reafons which occurred in the 
 preliminary difcufiion of the exercife of private judgment *. 
 But thofe reafonings will now be extended, and derive additional 
 advantage from a fuller arrangement. 
 
 * Book II, Chap. VI. 
 
 It 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
GENERAL DISADVANTAGES OF COERCION. 697 
 
 It is commonly faid that no man ought to be compelled in BOOK VII. 
 
 ,. ■ r . CHAP. II. 
 
 matters of religion to act contrary to the dictates of his con- » ^ » 
 
 Confcience in 
 
 fcience. Religion is a principle which the practice of ail ages matters of 
 
 religion cort- 
 
 has deeply imprefled upon the mind. He that difcharges what fidered : 
 his own apprehenfions prefcribe to him on the fubject, ftands ; 
 approved to the tribunal of his own mind, and, confcious of 
 rectitude in his intercourfe with the author of nature, cannot 
 fail to obtain the greateft. of thofe advantages, whatever may be 
 their amount, which religion has to beftow. It is in vain that' 
 I endeavour by perfecuting ftatutes to compel him to refign a 
 falfe religion for a true. Arguments may convince, but perfe- 
 ction cannot. The new religion, which I oblige him to profefs^ 
 contrary to his conviction, however pure and holy it may be in 
 its own nature, has no benefits in ftore for him. The fublimeft 
 worfhip becomes transformed into a fource of corruption, when 
 it is not confecrated by the teftimony of a pure confcience. Truth 
 is the fecond object in this refpect, integrity of heart is the firft: 
 or rather a propofition, that in its abftract nature is truth itfelf, 
 converts into rank falfhood and mortal poifon, if it be profefTed-' 
 with the lips only, and abjured by the underftanding. It is* 
 then the foul garb of hypocrify. Inftead of elevating the mind 
 above fordid temptations, it perpetually reminds the worfhipper 
 of the abject pufillanimity to which he has yielded. Inftead of 
 filling him with facred confidence, it overwhelms with confufion - 
 and remorfe. 
 
 4 U The 
 
6 9 S GENERAL DISADVANTAGES 
 
 BOOK VII. The inference that has been made from thefe reafonings is, that 
 CHAP. II. 
 » v -» criminal law is eminently mifapplied in affairs of religion, and 
 
 in the con- m 
 
 &udt of life, that its true province is civil mifdemeanours. But this inference 
 is falfe. It is only by an unaccountable perverfion of reafon, 
 that men have been induced to affirm that religion is the facred 
 province of confeience, and that moral duty may be left undefined 
 to the decifion of the magistrate. What, is it of no confequence 
 whether I be the benefa&or of my fpecies, or their bitterefl 
 enemy ? whether I be an informer, or a robber, or a murderer ? 
 whether I be employed as a foldier to extirpate my fellow beings, 
 or be called upon as a citizen to contribute my property to their 
 extirpation ? whether I tell the truth with that firmnefs and 
 unreferve which ardent philanthropy will not fail to infpire, or 
 fupprefs fcience left I be convicted of blafphemy, and fact left I be 
 convicted of a. libel ? whether I contribute my efforts for the 
 furtherance of political juftice, or quietly fubmit to the exile of 
 a family of whofe claims I am an advocate, or to the fubverfion 
 of liberty for which every man fhould be ready to die ? Nothing 
 can be more clear, than that the value of religion, or of any 
 other fpecies of abftract opinion, lies in its moral tendency. If 
 I fhould be ready to fet at nought the civil power for the fake 
 of that which is the means, how much more when it rifes in 
 contradiction to the end ? 
 
 Bcftpraai- ' Of all human concerns morality is the mod interefting. It is 
 
 cable cri- 
 terion of the perpetual affociate of our tranfadiions : there is no lltuation 
 
 ■duty : 
 
 2 in 
 
O F C O E R C I O N. 6 99 
 
 in which we can be placed, no alternative that can be presented BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP II 
 to our choice, reflecting which duty is filent. " What is the \ v '< 
 
 ltandard of morality and duty ? " Juflice. Not the arbitrary 
 
 decrees that are in force in a particular climate ; but thofe laws 
 
 of eternal reafon that are equally obligatory wherever man is to 
 
 be found. " But the rules of juftice often appear to us obfcure, 
 
 doubtful and contradictory ; what criterion fhall be applied to 
 
 deliver us from uncertainty ?" There are but two criterions not the de- 
 cifions of 
 
 poffible, the decifions of other men's wifdom, and the decifions 0tlicr men : 
 
 of our own underflanding. Which of thefe is conformable to 
 
 the nature of man ? Can we furrender our own underflandings ? 
 
 However we may {train after implicit faith, will not confcience 
 
 in fpite cf ourfelves whiiper us, " This decree is equitable, and 
 
 this decree is founded in miflake ?" Will there not be in the 
 
 minds of the votaries of fuperftition, a perpetual dhTatisfaction 9 . 
 
 a defire to believe what is dictated to them, accompanied with 
 
 a want of that in which belief confifts, evidence and conviction ? 
 
 If we could furrender our underflandings, what fort of beings 
 
 mould we become ? By the terms of the propofition we mould 
 
 not be rational : the nature of things would prevent us from 
 
 being moral, for morality is the judgment of reafon, employed 
 
 in determining on the effects to refult from the different kinds 
 
 of conduct we may obferve. 
 
 Hence it follows that there is no criterion of duty to any man but of our 
 
 own undcr- 
 
 but in the exercife of his private judgment. Whatever attempts Ending. 
 
 4 U 2 . to 
 
7 oo GENERAL DISADVANTAGES 
 
 BOOK'VII. to prefcribe to his conduct, and to deter him from any courfe of 
 CHAP. II. , ■,. '. - 
 
 > action by penalties and threats, is an execrable tyranny. There 
 
 may be fome men of fuch inflexible virtue as to fet human ordi- 
 nances at defiance. It is generally believed that there are others 
 fo depraved, that, were it not for penalties and threats, the 
 whole order of fociety would be fubverted by their exceffes. 
 But what will become of the great mafs of mankind, who are 
 neither fo virtuous as the firft, nor fo degenerate as the fecond ? 
 They are fuccefsfully converted by pofitive laws into latitudina- 
 rians and cowards. They yield like wax to the imprefiion that 
 is made upon them. Directed to infer the precepts of duty 
 from the didtd of the magistrate, they are too timid to refill, 
 and too fhort fighted to detect the impofition. It is thus that 
 the mafs of mankind have been condemned to a tedious 
 imbecility. 
 
 Tendency of There is no criterion of duty to any man but in the exercife 
 
 coercion. 
 
 of his private judgment. Has coercion any tendency to en- 
 lighten the judgment ? Certainly not. Judgment is the per- 
 ceived agreement or difagreement of two ideas, the perceived 
 truth or falfhood of any propofition. Nothing can aid this per- 
 ception, that does not fet the ideas in a clearer light, that does 
 not afford new evidence of the fubftantialnefs or unfubftantial- 
 -nefs of the propofition. The direct tendency of coercion is to 
 fet our underftanding and our fears, our duty and our weaknefs 
 at variance with each other. And how poor fpirited a refuge 
 
 does 
 
OF COERGION. 701 
 
 does coercion afford ? If what you require of me is duty, are BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 there no reafons that will prove it to be fuch ? If you underftand 
 
 more of eternal juftice than I, and are thereby fitted to inftruct 
 me, cannot you convey the fuperior knowledge you poffefs from 
 your underftanding into mine ? Will you fet your wit againft 
 one who is intellectually a child, and becaufe you are better 
 informed than I, affurae, not to be my preceptor, but my 
 tyrant ? Am I not a rational being ? Could I refill your argu- 
 ments, if they were demonftrative ? The odious fyftem of 
 coercion, firil annihilates the understanding of the fubject, and 
 then of him that adopts it. DrefTed in the fupine prerogatives 
 of a mafter, he is excufed from cultivating the faculties of a 
 man. What would not man have been, long before this, if the 
 proudeft of us had no hopes but in argument, if he knew of no 
 refort beyond, and if he were obliged to fharpen his faculties, 
 and collect his powers, as the only means of effecting his pur- 
 pofes ? 
 
 Let us reflect for a moment upon the fpecies of argument, if 
 argument it is to be called, that coercion employs. It avers to 
 its victim that he muft neceffarily be in the wrong, becaufe I 
 am more vigorous and more cunning than he. Will vigour and 
 cunning be always on the fide of truth ? Every fuch exertion 
 implies in its nature a fpecies of conteft. This conteft. may be 
 decided before it is brought to open trial by the defpair of one 
 -of the parties. But it is not always fo. The thief that by main 
 
 force 
 
7 o2 GENERAL DISADVANTAGES 
 
 BOOK VII. force furmounts the ftrength of his purfuers, or by ftratagem and 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 > v J ') ingenuity efcapes from their toils, fo far as this argument is 
 
 valid, proves the juftice of his caufe. Who can refrain from, 
 indignation when he fees juftice thus miferably proftituted ? 
 Who does not feel, the moment the conteft begins, the full 
 extent of the abfurdity that this appeal includes ? It is not eafy 
 to decide which of the two is moft deeply to be deplored, the 
 magiftracy, the reprefentative of the focial fyftem, that declares 
 war againfl one of its members, in the behalf of juftice, or ia 
 the behalf of oppreffion. In the firft we fee truth throwing 
 afide her native arms and her intrinfic advantage, and putting 
 herfelf upon a level with falfhood. In the fecond we fee 
 falfhood confident in the cafual advantage fhe poflefles, artfully 
 extinguishing the new born light that would fhame her in the 
 midft of her ufurped authority. The exhibition in both is that" 
 of an infant crufhed in the mercilefs grafp of a giant. No 
 fophiftry can be more palpable than that which pretends to bring 
 the two parties to an impartial hearing. Obferve the confiftency 
 of this reafoning. We firft vindicate political coercion, becaufe 
 the criminal has committed an offence againft the community 
 at large, and then pretend,, while we bring him to the bar of 
 the community, the offended party, that we bring him before an 
 impartial umpire. Thus in England, the king by his attorney 
 is the profecutor, and the king by his reprefentative is the judge- 
 How long fhall fuch odious inconfiftencies impofe on mankind ?. 
 The purfuit commenced againft the fuppofed offender is the 
 
 poffc 
 
OF COERCION. 7 o 3 
 
 fojfc comitcittis, the armed ibrce of the whole, drawn out in fuch BOOK vil. 
 portions as may be judged neceffary ; and when feven millions » • 
 
 of men have got one poor, unaffifted individual in their power, 
 they are then at leifure to torture or to kill him, and to make 
 his agonies a fpectacle to glut their ferocity. 
 
 The argument againft political coercion is equally good againft Its various 
 
 claflfes con* 
 
 the infliction of private penalties between mafter and flave, and Cdered. 
 between parent and child. There was in reality, not only more 
 of gallantry, but more of reafon in the Gothic fyftem of trial 
 by duel, than in thefe. The trial of force is over in thefe, as 
 we have already faid, before the exertion of force is begun. 
 All that remains is the leifurely infliction of torture, my power 
 to inflict it being placed in my joints and my fmews. This 
 whole argument may be fubjected to an irrefiftible dilemma. 
 The right of the parent over his child lies either in his fuperior 
 ftrength or his fuperior reafon. If in his ftrength, we have only 
 to apply this right univerfally, in order to drive all morality out 
 of the world. If in his reafon, in that reafon let him confide. 
 It is a poor argument of my fuperior reafon, that I am unable 
 to make juftice be apprehended and felt in the moft neceflavy 
 cafes, without the intervention of blows. 
 
 Let us confider the effect that coercion produces upon the 
 mind of him againft whom it is employed. It cannot begin 
 ■with convincing ; it is no argument. .It begins with producing 
 
 the 
 
7 o 4 GENERAL DISADVANTAGES OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. the fenfation of pain, and the fentiment of diftafte. It begins 
 
 CHAP II 
 
 . j with violently alienating the mind from the truth with which 
 
 we wifh it to be imprefled. It includes in it a tacit confeffion 
 of imbecility. If he who employs coercion againft me could 
 mould me to his purpofes by argument, no doubt he would. 
 He pretends to punifh me becaufe his argument is important, but 
 he really punilhes me becaufe his argument is weak. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
 
C 705 ] 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 OF THE PURPOSES OF COERCION. 
 
 XATURE OF DEFENCE CONSIDERED. — COERCION FOR RE- 
 STRAINT FOR REFORMATION. — SUPPOSED USES OP 
 
 ADVERSITY — DEFECTIVE — UNNECESSARY. COERCION 
 
 FOR EXAMPLE I. NUGATORY. THE NECESSITY OF 
 
 POLITICAL COERCION ARISES FROM THE DEFECTS OF 
 
 POLITICAL INSTITUTION. 2. UNJUST. UNFEELING 
 
 CHARACTER OF THIS SPECIES OF COERCION. 
 
 PROCEED we to confider three principal ends that coercion BOOK vir. 
 . . CHAP. III. 
 propofes to ltfelf, reftraint, reformation and example. v v * 
 
 Under each of thefe heads the arguments on the affirmative fide 
 muft be allowed to be cogent, not irrefiftible. Under each of 
 them confiderations will occur, that will oblige us to doubt uni- 
 verfally of the propriety of coercion. In this examination I 
 fhall take it for granted that the perfons with whom I am 
 reafoning allow, that the ends of reftraint and example may 
 be fufficiently anfwered in confiftency with the end of reforma- 
 tion, that is, without the punifhment of death. To thofe by 
 whom this is not allowed in the firft inftance, the fubfequent 
 reafonings will only apply with additional force. 
 
 4 X The 
 
706 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 Nature of 
 defence con- 
 fidered. 
 
 OF THE PURPOSES 
 
 The fir(l and moft innocent of all the claffes of coercion is 
 that which is employed in repelling a&ual force. This has but 
 little to do with any fpecies of political inftitution, but may 
 neverthelefs deferve to be firft confidered. In this cafe I am 
 employed (fuppofe, for example, a drawn fword is pointed at 
 my own breaft or that of another, with threats of inftant 
 deftru&ion) in preventing a mifchief that feems about inevitably 
 to enfue. In this cafe there appears to be no time for experi- 
 ments. And yet even here meditation will not leave us without 
 our difficulties. The powers of reafon and truth are yet 
 unfathomed. That truth which one man cannot communicate 
 in lefs than a year, another can communicate in a fortnight. 
 The fhorteft term may have an underftanding commenfurate to 
 it. When Marius faid with a ftern look and a commanding 
 countenance to the foldier that was fent down into his dungeon 
 to aflaffinate him, " Wretch, have you the temerity to kill 
 Marius !" and with thefe few words drove him to flight j it 
 was, that he had fo energetic an idea comprefled in his mind, 
 as to make its way with irrefiftible force to the mind of his 
 executioner. If there were falfhood and prejudice mixed with 
 this idea, can we believe that truth is not more powerful than 
 they ? It would be well for the human fpecies, if they were 
 all in this refpect like Marius, all accuftomed to place an intrepid 
 confidence in the fingle energy of intellect. Who fhall fay 
 what there is that would be impoflible to men with thefe habits ? 
 Who fhall fay how far the whole fpecies might be improved, 
 6 were 
 
OF COERCION. 7 o 7 
 
 were they accuftomed to defpife force in othefs, and did they bookvit. 
 refufe to employ it for themfelves ? . i *' J 
 
 But the coercion we are here confidering is exceedingly Coercion for 
 different. It is employed againft an individual whofe violence 
 is over. He is at prefent engaged in no hoftility againft the 
 community or any of its members. He is quietly purfuing 
 thofe occupations which are beneficial to himielf, and injurious 
 to none. Upon what pretence is this man to be the fubject of 
 violence ? For reftraint ? Reftraint from what ? " From fome 
 future injury which it is to be feared he will commit." This is 
 the very argument which has-been employed to juftify the moft 
 execrable of all tyrannies. By what reafonings have the inqui- 
 fition, the employment of fpies and the various kinds of public 
 cenfure directed againft opinion been vindicated ? Becaufe there 
 is an intimate connexion between men's opinions and their con- 
 duct : becaufe immoral fentiments lead by a very probable con- 
 fequence to immoral actions. There is not more reafon, in 
 many cafes at leaft, to apprehend that the man who has once 
 committed robbery will commit it again, than the man who 
 diffipates his property at the gaming-table, or who is accuftomed 
 to profefs that upon any emergency he will not fcruple to have 
 recourfe to this expedient. Nothing can be more obvious than 
 that, whatever precautions may be allowable with refpect to 
 the future, juftice will reluctantly clafs among thefe precautions 
 
 4X2 any 
 
708 OF THE PURPOSES 
 
 BOOK vii. any violence to be committed on my neighbour. Nor are they 
 CHAP. in. ' 
 
 * <—j oftener unjuft than they are fuperfluous. Why not arm myfelf 
 
 with vigilance and energy, inftead of locking up every man 
 whom my imagination may bid me fear, that I may fpend my 
 days in undifturbed inactivity ? If communities, inftead of afpiring, 
 as they have hitherto done, to embrace a vaft territory, and to 
 glut their vanity with ideas of empire, were contented with 
 a fmall diftrict with a provifo of confederation in cafes of 
 neceflity, every individual would then live under the public eye 
 and the difapprobation of his neighbours, a fpecies of coercion 
 not derived from the caprice of men, but from the fyftem of 
 the univerfe, would inevitably oblige him either to reform or to 
 emigrate. — The fum of the argument under this head is, that all 
 coercion for the fake of reftraint is punifhment upon fufpicion 
 a fpecies of punifhment, the moft abhorrent to reafon, and arbi- 
 trary in its application, that can be devifed. 
 
 tion 
 
 for reforma- The fecond object which coercion may be imagined to pro- 
 
 ♦ inn * 
 
 pofe to itfelf is reformation. We have already feen various 
 objections that may be offered to it in this point of view. 
 Coercion cannot convince, cannot conciliate, but on the contrary 
 alienates the mind of him againft whom it is employed. Coer- 
 cion has nothing in common with reafon, and therefore can 
 have no proper tendency to the generation of virtue. Reafon 
 is omnipotent : if my conduct be wrong, a very fimple ftate- 
 ment, flowing from a clear and comprehenfive view, will make 
 
 it 
 
OF COERCION. 709 
 
 it appear to be fuch ; nor is there any perverfenefs that can BOOKVir. 
 
 CHAP. Ill 
 
 refill the evidence of which truth is capable. 
 
 But to this it maybe anfwered, " that this view of the fubjecT: Snppafcd 
 * ' J ufes of ad- 
 
 may indeed be abftractedly true, but that it is not true relative verflt y : 
 
 to the prefent imperfection of human faculties. The grand 
 
 requifite for the reformation and improvement of the human 
 
 fpecies, feems to confift in the roufing of the mind. It is for 
 
 this reafon that the fchool of adverfity has fo often been con- 
 
 fidered as the fchool of virtue. In an even courfe of eafy and 
 
 profperous circumftances the faculties fleep. But, when great 
 
 and urgent occafion is prefented, it fhould feem that the mind 
 
 rifes to the level of the occafion. Difficulties awaken vigour 
 
 and engender ftrength ; and it will frequently happen that the 
 
 more you check and opprefs me, the more will my faculties 
 
 fwell, till they burft all the obftacles of oppreffion." 
 
 The opinion of the excellence of adverfity is built upon a 
 very obvious miftake. If we will diveft ourfelves of paradox 
 and Angularity, we fhall perceive that adverfity is a bad thing, 
 but that there is fomething elfe that is worfe. Mind can neither 
 exift nor be improved without the reception of ideas. It will 
 improve more in a calamitous, than a torpid ftate. A man will 
 fometimes be found wifer at the end. of his career, who has been 
 treated with feverity, than with neglect. But becaufe feverity is one 
 way of generating thought, it does not follow that it is the beft. 
 
 It 
 
7 io OF THE PURPOSES 
 
 BOOK vii. It has already been fliown that coercion abfolutely confidered Is 
 \ — -v ' injuftice. Can injuftice be the beft mode of dineminating princi- 
 
 defeftive : 
 
 pies of equity and reafon ? Oppreflion exercifed to a certain extent 
 is the moil ruinous of all things. What is it but this, that has habi- 
 tuated mankind to fo much ignorance and vice for fo many 
 thoufand years ? Can that which in its genuine and unlimited 
 ftate is the worft, become by a certain modification and diluting 
 the beft of all things ? All coercion fours the mind. He that 
 fuflfers it, is practically perfuaded of the want of a philanthropy 
 fufficiently enlarged in thofe with whom he is moft intimately 
 connected. He feels that juftice prevails only with great limita- 
 tions, and that he cannot depend upon being treated with juftice. 
 The leflon which coercion reads to him is, " Submit to force, 
 and abjure reafon. Be not directed by the convictions of your 
 underftanding, but by the bafeft part of your nature, the dread 
 of prefent pain, and the pufillanimous terror of the injuftice of 
 others." It was thus Elizabeth of England and Frederic of 
 Pruflia were educated in the fchool of adverfity. The way in 
 which they profited by this difcipline was by finding refources 
 in their own minds, enabling them to regard unmoved the 
 violence that was employed againft them. Can this be the beft 
 poffible mode of forming men to virtue ? If it be, perhaps it is 
 farther requifite that the coercion we ufe mould be flagrantly 
 unjuft, fince the improvement feems to lie not in fubmiflion, 
 but refiftance. 
 
 But 
 
OF COERCION. 711 
 
 But it is certain that truth is adequate to awaken the mind BOOKVir. 
 
 r CHAP. III. 
 
 without the aid of adverfity. Truth does not confift in a certain < » * 
 
 unneceffary. 
 
 number of unconnected propofitions, but in evidence that mows 
 their reality and their value. If I apprehend the value of any 
 purfuit, fhall I not engage in it? If I apprehend it clearly, fhall I 
 not engage in it zealoufly ? If you would awaken my mind in the 
 moll effectual manner, tell me the truth with energy. For that 
 purpofe, thoroughly underfland it yourfelf, impregnate your mind 
 with its evidence, and fpeak from the clearnefs of your view, and 
 the fulnefs of conviction. Were we accuftomed to an education, 
 in which truth was never neglected from indolence, or told in a 
 way treacherous to its excellence, in which the preceptor fubjected 
 himfelf to the perpetual difcipline of finding the way to commu- 
 nicate it with brevity and force, but without prejudice and acri- 
 mony, it cannot be doubted, but fuch an education would be 
 much more effectual for the improvement of the mind, than all 
 the modes of angry or benevolent coercion that can be devifed. 
 
 The laft object which coercion propofes is example. Had Ie- Coercion for 
 giflators confined their views to reformation and reftraint, their P 
 exertions of power, though miftaken, would ftill have borne the 
 ftamp of humanity. But, the moment vengeance prefented itfelf 
 as a flimulus on the one fide, or the exhibition of a terrible ex- 
 ample on the other, no barbarity was then thought too great. 
 Ingenious cruelty was bufied to find new means of torturing the 
 victim, or of rendering the fpectacle impreffive and horrible. 
 
 It 
 
7 I2 
 
 OF THE PURPOSES OF 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 ! , ' 
 
 *.. nugatory. 
 
 It has long fince been obferved that this fyftem of policy con- 
 ftantly fails of its purpofe. Farther refinements in barbarity pro- 
 duce a certain impreffion fo long as they are new, but this im- 
 preffion foon vanifhes, and the whole fcope of a gloomy invention 
 is exhaufted in vain *. The reafon of this phenomenon is that, 
 whatever may be the force with which novelty ftrikes the ima- 
 gination, the unchangeable principles of reafon fpeedily recur, 
 and afTert their indeftru£tible empire. We feel the emergencies 
 to which we are expofed, and we feel, or we think we feel, the 
 di&ates of truth directing to their relief. Whatever ideas we 
 form in oppofition to the mandates of law, we draw, with fin- 
 cerity, though it may be with fome mixture of miftake, from the 
 unalterable conditions of our exiftence. We compare them with 
 the defpotifm which fociety exercifes in its corporate capacity, and 
 the more frequent is our comparifon, the greater are our murmurs 
 and indignation againft the injuftice to which we are expofed. But 
 indignation is not afentiment that conciliates; barbarity poflefies 
 none of the attributes of perfuafion. It may terrify; but it can- 
 not produce in us candour and docility. Thus ulcerated with 
 injuftice, our diftrefles, our temptations, and all the eloquence of 
 feeling prefent themfelves again and again. Is it any wonder they 
 fhould prove victorious? 
 
 With what repugnance fhall we contemplate the prefent forms 
 
 The neceflity 
 of political co- 
 
 frorTthTde- °f numan fociety, if we recoiled that the evils which they thus 
 
 fefts of poli-. 
 
 tical inftitu- * Beccttna, Dei Delitti e delle Pent. 
 
 mercilefsly 
 
 tion. 
 
 *** 
 
OF COERCION. 
 
 7*3 
 
 mercilefsly avenge, owe their existence to the vices of thofe very BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP IIT 
 
 forms? It is a well known principle of fpeculative truth, that true * v / 
 felf love and focial prefcribe to us exactly the fame fpecies of 
 conduct "*. Why is this acknowledged in fpeculation and perpe- 
 tually contradicted in practice ? Is there any innate perverfenefs 
 in man that continually hurries him to his own deftruction ? This 
 is impoffible ; for man is thought, and, till thought began, he 
 had no propenfities either to good or evil. My propenfities are 
 the fruit of the impreffions that have been made upon me, the 
 good always preponderating, becaufe the inherent nature of 
 things is more powerful than any human inftitutions. The ori- 
 ginal fin of the worft men, is in the perverfenefs of thefe inftitu- 
 tions, the oppofition they produce between public and private 
 good, the monopoly they create of advantages which reafon 
 directs to be left in common. What then can be more fhamelefs 
 than for fociety to make an example of thofe whom fhe has 
 goaded to the breach of order, inftead of amending her own 
 inftitutions, which, by ftraining order into tyranny, produced the 
 mifchief ? Who can tell how rapid would be our progrefs to- 
 wards the total annihilation of civil delinquency, if we did but 
 enter upon the bufinefs of reform in the right manner ? 
 
 Coercion for example, is liable to all the fame objections as 2. unjuft. 
 coercion for reftraint or reformation, and to certain other ob- 
 jections peculiar to itfelf. It is employed againft a perfon not 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. IX. 
 
 4. Y now 
 
7 i 4 OF THE PURPOSES OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK vii. n ow in the commiflion of offence, and of whom we can only 
 CHAP. III. ^ ■* 
 
 K v ' fufpect that he ever will ofFend. It fuperfedes argument, reafon and 
 
 conviction, and requires us to think fuch a fpecies of conduct our 
 duty, becaufe fuch is the good pleafure of our fuperiors, and be- 
 caufe, as we are taught by the example in queftion, they will 
 
 Unfeeling make us rue our flubbornnefs if we think otherwife. In addition 
 
 character of .... iji it rr 
 
 this fpecies of to this it is to be remembered that, when I am made to fuffer as 
 
 coercion. 
 
 an example to others, I am treated myfelf with fupercilious 
 neglect, as if I were totally incapable of feeling and morality. If 
 you inflict pain upon me, you are either juft or unjuft. If you 
 i be juft, it mould feem necefTary that there mould be fomething 
 
 in me that makes me the fit fubject of pain, either defert, which 
 is abfurd, or mifchief I may be expected to perpetrate, or laftly 
 a tendency to reformation. If any of thefe be the reafon why the 
 fuffering I undergo is juft, then example is out of the queftion : 
 it may be an incidental confequence of the procedure, but it can 
 form no part of its principle. It muft furely be a very inartificial 
 and injudicious fcheme for guiding the fentiments of mankind ; 
 to fix upon an individual as a fubject of torture or death, refpedt- 
 ing whom this treatment has no direct fitnefs, merely that we 
 may bid others look on, and derive inftruction from his mifery. 
 This argument will derive additional force from the reafonings of 
 the following chapter. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 7*5 ] 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 GF THE APPLICATION OF COERCION. ^ 
 
 DELINQUENCY AND COERCION INCOMMENSURABLE — EX- 
 TERNAL ACTION NO PROPER SUBJECT OF CRIMINAL ANI- 
 MADVERSION — HOW FAR CAPABLE OF PROOF. — INIQUITY 
 OF THIS STANDARD IN A MORAL — AND IN A POLITICAL 
 VIEW. — PROPRIETY OF A RETRIBUTION TO BE MEASURED 
 
 BY THE INTENTION OF THE OFFENDER CONSIDERED. 
 
 SUCH A PROJECT WOULD OVERTURN CRIMINAL LAW — 
 
 WOULD ABOLISH COERCION. INSCRUTABILITY, I. OF 
 
 MOTIVES DOUBTFULNESS OF HISTORY — DECLARATIONS 
 
 OF SUFFERERS. — 2. OF THE FUTURE CONDUCT OF THE 
 
 OFFENDER UNCERTAINTY OF EVIDENCE — EITHER OF 
 
 THE FACTS — OR THE INTENTION. — DISADVANTAGES OF 
 THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL SUIT. ' 
 
 A FARTHER confideration, calculated to fhow, not only BOOKVII. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 the abfurdity of coercion for example, but the iniquity of 
 
 Delinquency 
 
 coercion in general, is, that delinquency and coercion are in all and coercion 
 
 fncommen- 
 
 cafes incommenfurable. No ftandard of delinquency ever has furable. 
 been or ever can be difcovered. No two crimes were ever alike; 
 
 4 Y 2 and 
 
7 i6 OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 BOOK vn. and therefore the reducing them explicitly or implicitly to gene- 
 va — „ > ral clafles, which the very idea of example implies, is abfurd, 
 
 Nor is it lefs abfurd to attempt to proportion the degree of fuffer- 
 ing to the degree of delinquency, when the latter can never be 
 difcovered. Let us endeavour to clear in the moft fatisfaftory 
 manner the truth of thefe propofitions. 
 
 External ac- Man, like every other machine the operations of which can 
 
 tion no pro- J x 
 
 crimfoaf 61 ° f ^ e ma ^ e tne object °f our fenfes, may be faid, relatively, not ab- 
 animadver- f i ute ]y fpeaking, to confift of two parts, the external and the 
 internal. The form which his actions affume is one thing ; the 
 principle from which they flow is another. With the former it 
 is poflible we fhould be acquainted ; refpecting the latter there is 
 no fpecies of evidence that can adequately inform us. Shall we 
 proportion the degree of fufFering to the former or the latter, to 
 the injury fuftained by the community, or to the quantity of ill 
 intention conceived by the offender ? Some philofophers, fenfible 
 of the infcrutability of intention, have declared in favour of our 
 attending to nothing but the injury fuftained. The humane and 
 benevolent Beccaria has treated this as a truth of the utmoft im- 
 portance, " unfortunately neglected by the majority of political 
 inftitutors, and preferved only in the difpaflionate fpeculation. of 
 philofophers *.'* 
 
 * " 0$uejla e una di quelle palpabili ver'tta, die per una maravigliofa cotnbinazione 
 di circojlanze non fono con dtcifa Jicurezza conofciute, che da alcuni pochi penfatori 
 VQtnini d' ogni nazione, e d'ogni fecolo" Dei Dclitti e delle Pent. 
 
 2 It 
 
OF COERCION. 7 i 7 
 
 It is true that we may in many inftances be tolerably informed BOOK VII. 
 
 * CHAP IV 
 refpecting external actions, and that there will at firft fight » J. > 
 
 i • how far capa- 
 
 appear to be no great difficulty in reducing them to general bk of proof, 
 rules. Murder, according to this fyftem, will be the exertion of 
 any fpecies of action affecting my neighbour, fo as that the con- 
 fequences terminate in death. The difficulties of the magiftrate 
 are much abridged upon this principle, though they are by no 
 means annihilated. It is well known how many fubtle difqui- 
 fitions, ludicrous or tragical according to the temper with which 
 we view them, have been introduced to determine in each parti- 
 cular inftance, whether the action were or were not the 
 real occafion of the death. It never can be demonftratively 
 afcertained. 
 
 But, difmiffing this difficulty, how complicated is the iniquity iniquity- of 
 of treating all inftances alike, in which one man has occafioned the in amoral: 
 death of another? Shall we abolifh the imperfect diftin&ions, 
 which the moll odious tyrannies have hitherto thought them- 
 felves compelled to admit, between chance medley, man- 
 flaughter and malice prepenfe ? Shall we inflict on the man 
 who, in endeavouring to fave the life of a drowning fellow 
 creature, overfets a boat and occafions the death of a fecond, 
 the fame fuffering, as on him who from gloomy and vicious habits 
 is incited to the murder of his benefactor ? In reality the injury and m a poii- 
 
 ticalview, . 
 
 fuftained by the community is by no means the fame in thefe 
 two cafes ; the injury fuftained by the community is to be 
 
 meafured 
 
7 i8 OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 BOOK vir. meafured by the antifocial difpofitions of the offender, and, if 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 that were the right view of the fubject, by the encourage- 
 ment afforded to fimilar difpofitions from his impunity. But 
 this leads us at once from the external action to the unlimited 
 confideration of the intention of the actor. The iniquity of 
 tbe written laws of fociety is of precifely the fame nature, though 
 not of fo atrocious a degree, in the confufion they actually in- 
 troduce between varied intentions, as if this confufion were 
 unlimited. The delinquencies recited upon a former occafion, 
 of " one man that commits murder, to remove a troublefome 
 obferver of his depraved difpofitions, who will otherwife coun- 
 teract and expofe him to the world ; a fecond, becaufe he can- 
 not bear the ingenuous fincerity with which he is told of his 
 vices ; a third, from his intolerable envy of fuperior merit ; a 
 fourth, becaufe he knows that his adverfary meditates an act 
 pregnant with extenfive mifchief, and perceives no ottfer mode 
 by which its perpetration can be prevented ; a fifth, in defence 
 of his father's life or his daughter's chaftity *, and any of thefe, 
 either from momentary impulfe, or any of the infinite fhades of 
 deliberation *;" — are delinquencies all of them unequal, and 
 entitled to a very different cenfure in the court of reafon. Can 
 a fyftem that levels thefe inequalities, and confounds thefe differ- 
 ences, be productive of good ? That we may render men 
 beneficent towards each other, fhall we fubvert the very nature 
 
 * Book. II, Chap. VI, p. 131. 
 
 X)f 
 
0$ COERCION. 7 i 9 
 
 of right and wrong ? Or is not this fyftem, from whatever pre- BOOK vrr. 
 
 fences introduced, calculated in the moft powerful manner to ■»* 
 
 produce general injury? Can there be a more flagrant injury 
 
 than to infcribe as we do in effect upon our courts of judgment, 
 
 " This is the Hall of Juftice, in which the principles of right 
 
 and wrong are daily and fyftematically flighted, and offences of 
 
 a thoufand different magnitudes are confounded together, by 
 
 the infolent fupinenefs of the legiflator, and the unfeeling feliifh- 
 
 nefs of thofe who have engroifed the produce of the general 
 
 labour to their fole emolument !" 
 
 But fuppofe, fecondly, that we were to take the intention of Propriety of 
 
 a retribution 
 
 the offender, and the future injury to be apprehended, as the to be mea- 
 
 ' J J ft ■> fared by the 
 
 flandard of infliction. This would no doubt be a confiderable intention of 
 
 the offender 
 
 improvement. This would be the true mode of reconciling considered. 
 coercion and juftice, if for reafons already affigned they were 
 not in their own nature incompatible. It is earneftly to be 
 defired that this mode of adminiftring retribution mould be 
 ferioufly attempted. It is to be hoped that men will one day 
 attempt to eftablifh an accurate criterion, and not go on for ever, 
 as they have hitherto done, with a fovereign contempt of equity 
 and reafon. This attempt would lead by a very obvious procefs 
 to the abolition of all coercion. 
 
 It would immediately lead to the abolition of all criminal law. Such a pro- 
 
 An enlightened and reafonable judicature would have recourfe, overturn cri- 
 minal law: 
 in order to decide upon the caufe before them, to no code but 
 
 4. the 
 
720 OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 BOOK VjL the code of reafon. They would feel the abfurdlty of other 
 men's teaching them what they mould think, and pretending to 
 underftand the cafe before it happened, better than they who 
 had all the circumftances of the cafe under their inflection. 
 They would feel the abfurdity of bringing every error to be 
 compared with a certain number of meafures previoufly invented, 
 and compelling it to agree with one of them. But we fhall 
 fhortly have occafion to return to this topic *. 
 
 would abolifli The greateft advantage that would refult from men's deter- 
 
 coercion. 
 
 mining to govern themfelves in the fuffering to be inflicted by 
 the motives of the offender and the future injury to be appre- 
 hended, would confift in their being taught how vain and 
 iniquitous it is in them to attempt to wield the rod of retribu- 
 Infcrutabilky tion. Who is it that in his fober reafon will pretend to aflign 
 
 i. of motives. 
 
 the motives that influenced me in any article of my conduct, 
 and upon them to found a grave, perhaps a capital, penalty 
 againft me ? The attempt would be prefumptuous and abfurd, 
 even though the individual who was to judge me, had made the 
 longeft obfervation of my character, and been moft intimately 
 acquainted with the feries of my actions. How often does a 
 man deceive himfelf in the motives of his conduct, and affign it 
 to one principle when it in reality proceeds from another ? Can 
 we expect that a mere fpectator fhould form a judgment fufE- 
 ciently correct, when he who has all the fources of information 
 
 * Chap. VIII. 
 
 in 
 
OF COERCION. 721 
 
 in his hands, Is neverthelefs miftaken ? Is it not to this hour a ^ y ]J' 
 difpute among philofophers whether I be capable of doing good 
 to my neighbour for his own fake ? " To afcertain the intention 
 of a man it is neceffary to be precifely informed of the actual 
 impreffion of the objects upon his fenfes, and of the previous 
 difpofition of his mind, both of which vary in different perfons, 
 and even in the fame perfon at different times, with a rapidity 
 commenfurate to the fucceifion of ideas, paffions and circum- 
 ftances *;'•' Meanwhile the individuals, whofe office it is to 
 judge of this infcrutable myftery, are poffeifed of no previous 
 knowledge, utter ftrangers to the perfon accufed, and collecting 
 their only lights from the information of two or three ignorant 
 and prejudiced witneffes. 
 
 What a vaft train of actual and poffible motives enter into the 
 hiftory of a man, who has been incited to deftroy the life of 
 another ? Can you tell how much in thefe there was of appre- 
 hended iuftice and how much of inordinate felfifhnefs ? how 
 much of hidden paffion, and how much of rooted depravity ? 
 how much of intolerable provocation, and how much of fpon- 
 taneous wrong ? how much of that hidden infinity which 
 
 * " Quejla \V'uitftnuont\ dipcnde dalla imprejfione attuale degli cggetti, et dulla pre- 
 cedent difpo/izione della mente : ejfe variant) in ttttti g/i nomini e in ciafcun uotno colla 
 vehciffima fuccejfione delle idee, dclle pajjioni, e dclle arcoftanze." He adds, " Sarebbe- 
 dttnque necejfario formare non Jolo tin codice particolare per ciofiun cittadino, ma una 
 unova legge ad ogni dcHtto." 
 
 4 Z hurries 
 
722 
 
 OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 BOOK VII. hurries the mind into a certain action by a fort of incontinence 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 » ; > of nature almoft without any affignablernotive, and how much 
 
 douhtfulnefs of incurable habit ? Confider the uncertainty of hiftory. Do 
 
 of hiftory : 
 
 we not flill difpute whether Cicero were more a vain or a virtu- 
 ous man, whether the heroes of ancient Rome were impelled by 
 vain glory or difinterefted benevolence, whether Voltaire were 
 the ftain of his fpecies, or their moil generous and intrepid 
 benefa&or ? Upon thefe fubje&s moderate men perpetually 
 quote upon us the impenetrablenefs of the human heart. Will 
 moderate men pretend that we have not an hundred times more 
 evidence upon which to found our judgment in thefe cafes, than 
 in that of the man who was tried lafh week at the Old Bailey ? 
 declarations , This part of the fubjecT: will be put in a ftriking light, if we 
 
 of iufferers. t 
 
 recoiled: the narratives that have been written by condemned 
 criminals. In how different a light do they place the tranfa&ions 
 that proved fatal to them, from the conftruction that was put 
 upon them by their judges ? And yet thefe narratives were 
 written under the moft awful circumftances, and many of them 
 without the leaft hope of mitigating their fate, and with marks of 
 the deepeft fincerity. Who will fay that the judge with his flender 
 pittance of information was more competent to decide upon 
 the motives, than the prifoner after the fevereft fcrutiny of his 
 own mind ? How few are the trials which an humane and a 
 juft man can read, terminating in a verdict of guilty, without 
 feeling an uncontrolable repugnance againft the verdicl: ? If 
 there be any fight more humiliating than all others, it is that of 
 
 a miferable 
 
OF COERCION. 723 
 
 a miferable victim a:?:^owledging the juftice of a fentence, BOOKVir, 
 
 . • p ... CHAP. IV. 
 
 againft which every enlightened reafoner exclaims with horror, v „ * 
 
 But this is not all. The motive, when afcertained, is only ^ r ° ^0^% 
 a fubordinate part of the queftion. The point upon which only f cm i S r, 01 
 fociety can equitably animadvert, if it had any jurifdiction in 
 the cafe, is a point, if poffible, ftill more infcrutable than that 
 of which we have been treating. A legal inquifition into the 
 minds of men, confidered by itfelf, all rational enquirers have 
 agreed to condemn. What we want to afcertain is, not the 
 intention of the offender, but the chance of his offending again. 
 For this purpofe we reafonably enquire firft into his intention. 
 But, when we have found this, our tafk is but begun. This 
 is one of our materials, to enable us to calculate the probability 
 of his repeating his offence, or being imitated by others. Was 
 this an habitual ftate of his mind, or was it a crifis in his hiftory 
 likely to remain an unique ? What effect has experience pro- 
 duced on him, or what likelihood is there that the uneahnefs and 
 fuffering that attend the perpetration of eminent wrong may 
 have worked a falutary change in his mind ? Will he hereafter 
 be placed in circumftances that fhall propel him to the fame 
 enormity ? Precaution is in the nature of things a ftep in the 
 higheft degree precarious. Precaution that coniifts in inflicting 
 injury on another, will at all times be odious to an equitable 
 mind. Meanwhile be it obferved, that all which has been faid 
 upon die uncertainty of crime, tends to aggravate the injuftice 
 
 4 Z 2 of 
 
7 2 4 OF THE APPLICATION 
 
 BOOK VII. of coercion for the fake of example. Since the crime upon 
 
 CHAP. IV. , . , T . , 11/- i 
 
 i y j which I animadvert in one man can never be the lame as the 
 
 crime of another, it is as if I mould award a grievous penalty 
 
 againft perfons with one eye, to prevent any man in future from 
 
 putting out his eyes by defign. 
 
 Uncertainty One more argument calculated to prove the abfurdity of the 
 
 of evidence : 
 
 attempt to proportion delinquency and fuffering to each other 
 fads: ma y b e derived from the imperfection of evidence. The veracity 
 
 of witneffes will be to an impartial fpectator a fubject of 
 continual doubt. Their competence, fo far as relates to juft 
 obfervation and accuracy of underftanding, will be Hill more 
 doubtful. Abfolute impartiality it would be abfurd to expect 
 from them. How much will every word and everv action 
 come diftorted by the medium through which it is tranfmitted ? 
 The guilt of a man, to fpeak in the phrafeology of law, may be 
 proved either by direct or circumftantial evidence. I am found 
 near to the body of a man newly murdered. I come out of his 
 apartment with a bloody knife in my hand or with blood upon 
 my clothes. If, under thefe circumftances and unexpectedly 
 charged with murder, I falter in my fpeech or betray perturba- 
 tion in my countenance, this is an additional proof. Who does 
 not know that there is not a man in England, however blame- 
 lefs a life he may lead, who is fecure that he mail not end it at 
 the gallows ? This is one of the moft obvious and univerfal 
 bleflings that civil government has to beftow. In what is called 
 
 direct 
 
OF COERCION. 725- 
 
 direct evidence, it is neceffary to identify the perfon of the offender. BOOK vn. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 How many mitances are there upon record of perfons con- 
 demned upon this evidence, who after their death have been 
 proved entirely innocent ? Sir Walter Raleigh, when a prifoner 
 in the Tower, heard fome high words accompanied with blows 
 under his window. He enquired of feveral eye witneffes who en- 
 tered his apartment in fucceflion, into the nature of the tranfaction. 
 But the ftory they told varied in fuch material circumftances, 
 that he could form no juft idea of what had been done. He 
 applied this to prove the vanity of hiftory. The parallel would 
 have been more ftriking if he had applied it to criminal fuits. 
 
 But fuppofing the external action, the firfl part of the queftion or the intea- 
 
 tion. 
 
 to be afcertained, we have next to difcover through the fame 
 garbled and confufed medium the intention. How few men 
 fhould I choofe to entruft with the drawing up a narrative of 
 fome delicate and interefting tranfaction of my life ? How 
 few, though, corporally fpeaking, they were witneffes of what 
 was done, would juftly defcribe my motives, and properly re- 
 port and interpret my words ? And yet in an affair, that involves 
 my life, my fame and my future ufefulncfs, I am obliged to truft 
 to any vulgar and cafual obferver. 
 
 A man properly confident in the force of truth, would con- Disadvantages 
 
 of thedefend- 
 
 fider a public libel upon his chara&er as a trivial misfortune. But an . 1 ' n a . cri - 
 
 minal fait. 
 
 a criminal trial in a court of juftice is inexpreflibly different. Few 
 4 men, 
 
72 6 OF THE APPLICATION OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. men, thus circumftanced, can retain the necefTary prefence of 
 t / mind and freedom from embarraflment. But, if they do, it is 
 
 with a cold and unwilling ear that their tale is heard. If the 
 crime charged againft them be atrocious, they are half condemned 
 in the paflions of mankind, before their caufe is brought to a 
 trial. All that is interefting to them is decided amidft the firft 
 burft of indignation ; and it is well if their ftory be impartially 
 eftimated, ten years after their body has mouldered in the grave. 
 Why, if a confiderable time elapfe between the trial and the exe- 
 cution, do we find the feverity of the public changed into com- 
 panion ? For the fame reafon that a mafter, if he do not beat his 
 Have in the moment of refentment, often feels a repugnance to the 
 beating him at all. Not fo much, as is commonly fuppofed, 
 from forgetfulnefs of the offence, as that the fentiments of reafon 
 have time to recur, and he feels in a confufed and indefinite man- 
 ner the injuftice of coercion. Thus every confideration tends to 
 fhow, that a man tried for a crime is a poor deferted individual 
 with the whole force of the community confpiring his ruin. The 
 culprit that efcapes, however confcious of innocence, lifts up his 
 hands with aftonifhment, and can fcarcely believe his fenfes, 
 having fuch mighty odds againft him. It is eafy for a man who 
 defires to fhake off an imputation under which he labours, to talk 
 of being put on his trial; but no man ever ferioufly wifhed for 
 this ordeal, who knew what a trial was. 
 
 CHAP. 
 

 [ 7*7 ] 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF COERCION CONSIDERED AS A. TEMPORARY 
 
 EXPEDIENT. 
 
 ARGUMENTS IN ITS FAVOUR. — ANSWER. IT CANNOT FIT 
 
 MEN FOR A BETTER ORDER OF SOCIETY. — THE TRUE 
 REMEDY TO PRIVATE INJUSTICE DESCRIBED — IS ADAPTED 
 TO IMMEDIATE PRACTICE. — DUTY OF THE COMMUNITY 
 IN THIS RESPECT. — DVTY OF INDIVIDUALS. ILLUSTRA- 
 TION FROM THE CASE OF WAR — OF INDIVIDUAL DE- 
 FENCE. — APPLICATION. — DISADVANTAGES OF ANARCHY 
 — WANT OF SECURITY — OF PROGRESSIVE ENQUIRY. — 
 CORRESPONDENT DISADVANTAGES OF DESPOTISM. — 
 ANARCHY AWAKENS, DESPOTISM DEPRESSES THE MIND. 
 
 ■ — FINAL RESULT OF ANARCHY HOW DETERMINED. 
 
 SUPPOSED PURPOSES OF COERCION IN A TEMPORARY 
 
 VIEW. — REFORMATION EXAMPLE RESTRAINT. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 THUS much for the general merits of coercion confidered BOOK VII. 
 as an inftrument to be applied in the government of men. 
 It is time that we mould enquire into the arguments by which it 
 may be apologifed as a temporary expedient. No introduction 
 6 feemed 
 
7 2S OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 BOOK VII. feemed more proper to this enquiry than fuch a review of the 
 
 «- -> fubject upon a comprehenfive fcale; that the reader might be in- 
 
 fpired with a fuitable repugnance againft fo pernicious a fyftem, 
 
 and prepared firmly to refill its admilTion in all cafes where its ne- 
 
 ceffity cannot be clearly demonstrated. 
 
 Argaimentuin The arguments in favour of coercion as a temporary expedient 
 
 its favour. 
 
 are obvious. It may be alledged that, " however fuitable an en- 
 tire immunity in this refpeft may be to the nature of mind abfo- 
 lutely confidered, it is impracticable with regard to men as we 
 now find them. The human fpecies is at prefent infected with a 
 thoufand vices, the offspring of eftablifhed injuftice. They are 
 full of factitious appetites- and perverfe habits : headftrong in 
 evil, inveterate in felfifhnefs, without fympathy and forbear- 
 ance for the welfare of others. In time they may become ac- 
 commodated to the leflons of reafon ; but at prefent they would 
 be found deaf to her mandates, and eager to commit every fpe- 
 cies of injuftice." 
 
 Anfwer. One of the remarks that moft irrefiflibly fuggeft themfelves 
 
 men for a ' upon this ftatement is, that coercion has no proper tendency to 
 ef ibciety. prepare men for a ftate in which coercion fhall ceafe. It is ab- 
 furd to expect that force fhould begin to do that which it is the 
 office of truth to finifh, fhould fit men by feverity and violence 
 to enter with more favourable aufpices into the fchools of 
 reafon. 
 
 But, 
 
AS A TEMPORARY- EXPEDIENT. 7 2 9 
 
 But, to omit this grofs mifreprefentation In behalf of the fup- BOOK vn. 
 
 CHAP V 
 pofed utility of coercion, it is of importance in the firft place to v - \' '> 
 
 obferve that there is a complete and unanswerable remedy to thofe medy to pri- 
 evils the cure of which has hitherto been fought in coercion, that defcribed: L 
 is within the reach of every community whenever they ihall be 
 perfuaded to adopt it. There is a ftate of fociety, the outline of 
 which has been already fketched % that by the mere fimplicity of 
 its ftructure would infallibly lead to the extermination of offence : 
 a ftate, in which temptation would be almoft unknown, truth 
 brought down to the level of all apprehenfions, and vice fuffi- 
 ciently checked by the general diicountenance and fober con- 
 demnation of every fpedtator. Such are the confequences that 
 would neceffarily fpring from an abolition of the craft and myftery 
 of governing ; while on the other hand the innumerable mur- 
 ders that are daily committed under the fan£tion of legal forms, 
 are folely to be afcribed to the pernicious notion of .an extenfive 
 territory ; to *he dreams of glory, empire and national greatnefs, 
 which have hitherto proved the bane of the human fpecies, 
 without producing folid benefit and happinefs to a fingle in- 
 dividual. 
 
 Another obfervation which this coniideration immediately is adapted t« 
 
 immediate 
 
 fuggefts, is, that it is not, as the objection fuppoled, by any prafticc. 
 means neceffary, that mankind ihould pafs through a ftate of 
 purification, and be freed from the vicious propenfities which 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XXII, p. 565. 
 
 ? A ill 
 
73 o OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 BOOK VII. ill conftituted governments have implanted, before they can be 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 j difmiffed from the coercion to which they are at prefent fub- 
 
 je&ed. In that cafe their ftate would indeed be hopelefs, if it 
 were neceflary that the cure fhould be effected, before we were 
 at liberty to difcard thofe practices to which the difeafe owes its 
 molt alarming fymptoms. But it is the characteriftic of a well 
 formed fociety, not only to maintain in its members thofe virtues 
 with which they are already indued, but to extirpate their errors, 
 and render them benevolent and juft to each other. It frees us 
 from the influence of thofe phantoms which before mifled us, 
 fhows us our true advantage as confiding in independence and 
 integrity, and binds us by the general confent of our fellow ci- 
 tizens to the dictates of reafon, more ftrongly than with fetters of 
 iron. It is not to the found of intellectual health that the remedy fo 
 urgently addreffes itfelf, as to thofe who are infected with difeafes 
 of the mind. The ill propenfities of mankind no otherwife tend 
 to poftpone the abolition of coercion, than as they prevent them 
 from perceiving the advantages of political fimplicity. The mo- 
 ment in which they can be perfuaded to adopt any rational plan 
 for this abolition, is the moment in which the abolition ought to 
 be effected. 
 
 Duty of th« A. farther confequence that may be deduced from the principles 
 
 community in , 
 
 this refpeft. that have here been delivered,is that coercion of a domeftlc kind can 
 
 Jn no cafe be the duty of the community. The community is always 
 
 competent to change its inftitutions, and thus to extirpate offence 
 
 8 in 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. 731 
 
 in a way infinitely more rational and juft than that of coercion. BOOK vir. 
 
 CHAP V 
 
 If in this fenfe coercion has been deemed neceffary as a tern- * „ ' > 
 porary expedient, the opinion admits of fatisfactory refutation. 
 Coercion can at no time, either permanently or provifionally,make 
 part of any political fyftem that is built upon the principles of reafon. 
 
 But, though in this fenfe coercion cannot be admitted fo much Dutyofindf. 
 
 viduals. 
 
 as a temporary expedient, there is another fenfe in which it muft 
 be fo admitted. Coercion exercifed in the name of the ftate 
 upon its refpective members cannot be the duty of the com- 
 munity ; but coercion may be the duty of individuals within the 
 community. The duty of individuals is, in the firft place, to 
 difplay with all poffible perfpicuity the advantages of an im- 
 proved ftate of fociety, and to be indefatigable in detecting the 
 imperfections of the conftitution under which they live. But, in 
 the fecond place, it behoves them to recollect, that their efforts 
 cannot be expected to meet with inftant fuccefs, that the progrefs- 
 of knowledge has in all cafes been gradual, and that their obli- 
 gation to promote the welfare of fociety during the intermediate 
 period is not lefs real, than their obligation to promote its future 
 and permanent advantage. In reality the future advantage can- 
 not be effectually procured, if we be inattentive to the prefent fe- 
 curity. But, as long as nations fhall be fo far miftaken as to en- 
 dure a complex government and an extenfive territory, coercion 
 will be indifpenfibly neceffary to general fecurity. It is therefore 
 the duty of individuals to take an active fhare upon occafion, in- 
 
 5 A a fo 
 
732 OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 r.OOKVll. fii much coercion, and in fuch parts of the exifting fyftem-, as 
 j fhal! be fufHcient to prevent the inroad of univerfal violence and 
 tumult. It is unworthy of a rational enquirer to fay, " thefe 
 things are neceffary, but I am not obliged to take my fhare in 
 them." If they be neceffary, they are neceffary for the general 
 good ; of confequence are virtuous, and what no juft man will 
 refufe to perform. 
 
 Illuftrarion The duty of individuals is in this refpect fimilar to the duty 
 
 from the cafe 
 
 of war: of independent communities upon the fubject of war. It is 
 well known what has been the prevailing policy of princes 
 under this head. Princes, efpecially the moft active and enter- 
 prifing among them, are feized with an inextinguifhable rage 
 for augmenting their dominions. The moft innocent and in- 
 offenfive conduct on the part of their neighbours is an in- 
 fufHcient fecurity againft their ambition. They indeed feek 
 to difguife their violence under plaufible pretences ; but it 
 is well known that, where no fuch pretences occur, they are 
 not on that account difpofed to drop their purfuit. Let us 
 fuppofe then a land of freemen invaded by one of thefe defpots. 
 What conduct does it behove them to adopt ? We are not yet 
 wife enough to make the fword drop out of the hands of our 
 oppreffors by the mere force of reafon. Were we refolved, like 
 quakers, neither to oppofe nor obey them, much bloodihed 
 might perhaps be avoided : but a more lading evil would refulr. 
 They would fix garrifons in our country, and torment us with 
 
 perpetual 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT, 
 perpetual injuftice. Suppofing even it were granted that, if the BQOK \ n. 
 
 C H A P V 
 
 invaded nation fhould conduct itfelf with unalterable epnftancy v^l_l^_ ', 
 
 upon the principles of reafon, the invaders would become tired 
 of their fruitlefs ufurpation, it would prove but little. At p relent 
 we have to do, not with nations of philofophers, but with 
 nations of men whofe virtues are alloyed with weaknefs, fluctu- 
 ation and inconftancy. At prefent it is our duty to confult refpect- 
 ing the procedure which to fuch nations would be attended with 
 the moll favourable refult. It is therefore proper that we fhould 
 choofe the leall calamitous mode of obliging the enemy fpeedily 
 to withdraw himfelf from our territories. 
 
 The cafe of individual defence is of the fame nature. It does of individual 
 
 defence. 
 
 not appear that any advantage can refult from my forbearance, 
 adequate to the difadvantages of my fuffering my own life or 
 that of another, a peculiarly valuable member of the community 
 as it may happen, to become a prey to the firft ruffian who 
 inclines to deftroy it. Forbearance in this cafe will be the con- 
 duct of a Angular individual, and its effect may very probably 
 be trifling. Hence it appears, that I ought to arreft the villain 
 in the execution of his defigns, though at the expence of a 
 certain degree of coercion. 
 
 The cafe of an offender, who appears to be hardened in guilt, Application. 
 and to trade in the violation of focial fecurity, is clearly parallel 
 to thefe. I ought to take up arms againft the defpot by whom my 
 
 country 
 
734 OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 book vii. country is invaded, becaufe my capacity does not enable me by 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 '■> arguments to prevail on him to defift, and becaufe my country- 
 men will not preferve their intellectual independence in the 
 midft of oppreffion. For the fame reafon I ought to take up 
 arms againft the domeftic fpoiler, becaufe I am unable either 
 to perfuade him to defift, or the community to adopt a juft 
 political inftitution, by means of which fecurity might be main- 
 tained confiflently with the abolition of coercion. 
 
 To underftand the full extent of this duty it is incumbent 
 upon us to remark that anarchy as it is ufually underftood, and a 
 well conceived form of fociety without government, are exceed- 
 ingly different from each other. If the government of Great 
 Britain were diffolved to-morrow, unlefs that diffolution were 
 the refult of confiftent and digefted views of political juftice pre- 
 vioufly difleminated among the inhabitants, it would be very far 
 from leading to the abolition of violence. Individuals, freed from 
 the terrors by which they had been accuftomed to be reftrained, 
 and not yet placed under the happier and more rational reftraint 
 of public infpedion, or convinced of the wifdom of reciprocal 
 forbearance, would break out into ads of injuftice,, while other 
 individuals, who defired only that this irregularity mould ceafe, 
 would find themfelves obliged to afTociate for its forcible fup- 
 preffion. We fhould have all the evils attached to a regular 
 government, at the fame time that we were deprived of that 
 tranquillity and leifure which are its only advantages. 
 
 It 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. 7iS 
 
 It may not be ufelefs in this place to confider more accurately BOOK vn. 
 than we have hitherto done the evils of anarchy. Such a review > „ * 
 
 Difadvan- 
 
 will afford us a criterion by which to difcern, as well the com- tages of 
 
 anarchy ; 
 
 parative value of different inftitutions, as the precife degree of 
 coercion whioh mull be employed for the exclufion of univerfal 
 violence and tumult. 
 
 Anarchy in its own nature is an evil of fhort duration. The want of fc- 
 
 curity: 
 
 more horrible are the mifchiefs it inflicts, the more does it 
 haften to a clofe. But it is neverthelefs neceffary that we fhould 
 confider both what is the quantity of mifchief it-produces in a 
 given period, and what is the fcene in which it promifes to 
 clofe. The firft victim that is facrificed at its fhrine is perfonal 
 fecurity. Every man who has a fecret foe, ought to dread the 
 dagger of that foe. There is no doubt that in the word anarchy 
 multitudes of men will fleep in happy obfcurity. But woe to 
 him who by whatever means excites the envy, the jealoufy or 
 the fufpicion of his neighbour ! Unbridled ferocity inftantly 
 marks him for its prey. This is indeed the principal evil of 
 fuch a ftate, that the wifeft, the brighteft, the mofl generous 
 and bold will often be mofl expofed to an immature fate. In of pwgreffive 
 
 enquiry, 
 
 fuch a ftate we muft bid farewel to the patient lucubrations of 
 the philofopher and the labour of the midnight oil. All is here, 
 like the fociety in which it exifts, impatient and headlong. Mind 
 will frequently burft forth, but its appearance will be like the 
 corruptions of the meteor, not like the mild illumination of 
 
 the 
 
73 6 
 
 OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 BOOK VII. the fun. Men, who ftart forth into fudden energy, will refem- 
 ^CHAP.V. ^ e .^ tem p er t ^ e ^ ate jjjat brought them to this unlooked for 
 
 greatnefs. They will be rigorous, unfeeling and fierce ; and 
 their ungoverned paffions will often not ftop at equality, but 
 incite them to grafp at power. . • 
 
 Correfpond- 
 ent difadvan- 
 tages of def- 
 potifm. 
 
 With all thefe evils, we rauft not haftily conclude, that the 
 mifchiefs of anarchy are worfe than thofe which government is 
 qualified to produce. With refpect to perfonal fecurity anarchy 
 is certainly not worfe than defpotifm, with this difference that 
 defpotifm is as perennial as anarchy is tranfitory. Defpotifm, as 
 it exifted under the Roman emperors, marked out wealth for its 
 victim, and the guilt of being rich never failed to convict the 
 accufed of every other crime. This defpotifm continued for 
 centuries. Defpotifm, as it has exifted in modern. Europe, has 
 been ever full of jealoufy and intrigue, a tool to the rage of 
 courtiers and the refentment of women. He that dared utter a 
 word againft the tyrant, or endeavour to inftrucT: his countrymen 
 in their interefts, was never fecure that the next moment would 
 not conduct him to a dungeon. Here defpotifm wreaked her 
 vengeance at leifure, and forty years of mifery and folitude 
 were fometimes infufficient to fatiate her fury. Nor was this all. 
 An ufurpation that defied all the rules of juftice, was obliged to 
 purchafe its own fafety by aflifting tyranny through all its fub- 
 ordinate ranks. Hence the rights of nobility, of feudal vaffal- 
 age, of primogeniture, of lines and inheritance. When the 
 i philofophy 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. 737 
 
 philofophy of law mail be properly underflood, the true key to BOOK vir. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 its fpirk and its hiftory will be found, not, as fome men have v ' > 
 
 fondly imagined, in a defire to fecu're the happinefs of mankind, 
 but in the venal compact by which fuperior tyrants have pur- 
 chafed the countenance and alliance of the inferior. 
 
 There is one point remaining in which anarchy and defpo- Anarchy 
 tifin are ftrongly contrafted with each other. Anarchy awakens poufmde- 
 mind, diffufes energy and enterprize through the community, ami. 
 though it does not effect this in the beft manner, as its fruits, 
 forced into ripenefs, muft not be expected to have the vigorous 
 ftamina of true excellence. But in defpotifm mind is trampled 
 into an equality of the moft odious fort. Every thing that pro- 
 mifes greatnefs is deftined to fall under the exterminating hand 
 of fufpicion and envy. In defpotifm there is no encouragement 
 to excellence. Mind delights to expatiate in a field where every 
 fpecies of eminence is within its reach. A fcheme of policy, 
 under which all men are fixed in claffes or levelled with the duft, 
 affords it no encouragement to enter on its career. The in- 
 habitants of fuch countries are but a more vicious fpecies of 
 brutes. Oppreffion ftimulates them to mifchief and piracy, and 
 fuperior force of mind often difplays itfelf only in deeper treachery 
 •or more daring injuftice. 
 
 One of the moil interefting queftions in relation to anarchy is Final refuk 
 
 of anarchy * 
 
 5 B that 
 
73 8 OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 BOOK vii. that of the manner in which it may be expected to terminate. 
 
 CHAP. V. _, „, ... . . . . ■ . .. , 
 
 The poffibihties as to this termination are as wide as the 
 various fchemes of fociety which the human imagination can 
 conceive. Anarchy may and has terminated in defpotifm ; and 
 in that cafe the introduction of anarchy will only ferve to amid 
 us with variety of evils. It may lead to a modification of defpo- 
 tifm, a milder and more equitable government than that which 
 has gone before. And it does not feem impofhble that it fhould 
 lead to the beft form of human fociety, that the moft penetrating 
 philofopher is able to conceive. Nay, it has fomething in it 
 that fuggefts the likenefs, a diftorted and tremendous likenefs, 
 of true liberty. Anarchy has commonly been generated by the 
 hatred of oppreffion. It is accompanied with a fpirit of inde- 
 pendence. It difengages men from prejudice and implicit faith, 
 and in a certain degree incites them to an impartial fcrutiny into 
 the reafon of their actions. 
 
 how deter- The fcene in which anarchy fhall terminate principally de- 
 
 pends upon the ftate of mind by which it has been preceded. 
 All mankind were in a ftate of anarchy, that is, without govern- 
 ment, previoufly to their being in a ftate of policy. It would 
 not be difficult to find in the hiftory of almoft every country a 
 period of anarchy. The people of England were in a ftate of 
 anarchy immediately before the Reftoration. The Roman peo- 
 ple were in a ftate of anarchy at the moment of their feceffion 
 to the Sacred Mountain, Hence it follows that anarchy is 
 9 neither 
 
 mined. 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. ' 739 
 
 neither fo good nor fo ill a thing in relation to its cpnfequences, BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP V 
 
 as it has fometimes been reprefented. 
 
 It is not reafonable to expect that a fhort period of anarchy 
 fhould do the work of a long period of inveftigation and philo- 
 fophy. When we fay, that it difengages men from prejudice 
 and implicit faith, this muft be underftood with much allow- 
 ance. It tends to loofen the hold of thefe vermin upon the 
 mind, but it does not inftantly convert ordinary men into philo- 
 fophers. Some prejudices, that were never fully incorporated 
 with the intellectual habit, it deftroys ; but other prejudices it 
 arms with fury, and converts into inftruments of vengeance. 
 
 Little good can be expected from any fpecies of anarchy that 
 fhould fubfift for inftance among American favages. In order to 
 anarchy being rendered a feed plot of future juftice, reflexion 
 and enquiry muft have gone before, the regions of philofophy 
 muft have been penetrated, and political truth have opened her 
 fchool to mankind. It is for this reafon that the revolutions of 
 the prefent age (for every total revolution is a fpecies of anarchy) 
 promife much happier effects than the revolutions of any former 
 period. For the fame reafon the more anarchy can be held at 
 bay, . the more fortunate will it be for mankind. Falfhood may 
 gain by precipitating the crifis ; but a genuine and enlightened 
 philanthropy will wait with unaltered patience for the harveft 
 of instruction. The arrival of that harveft may be flow, but it 
 
 5B2 is 
 
74° 
 
 OF COERCION CONSIDERED] 
 
 BOOK VII. is infallible. If vigilance and wifdom be fuccefsful in their pre- 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 fent oppofition to anarchy, every benefit will be ultimately ob- 
 tained, untarnifhed with violence, and unftained with blood. 
 
 Thefe obfervations are calculated to lead us to an accurate 
 eftimate of the mifchiefs of anarchy r and prove that there are 
 forms of coercion and government more injurious in their 
 tendency than the abfence of organifation itfelf. They alfo prove 
 that there are other forms of government which deferve in ordi- 
 nary cafes to be preferred to anarchy. Now it is incontrovertibly 
 clear that, where one of two' evils is inevitable, the wife and 
 juft man will choofe the Ieaft. Of confequence the wife and 
 jufl man, being unable as yet to introduce the form of fociety 
 which his underftanding approves, will contribute to the fupport 
 . of fo much coercion, as is neceffary to exclude what is worfe, 
 anarchy. 
 
 Snppofed 
 purpofes of 
 coercion in 
 a temporary 
 
 view ; 
 
 If then conftraint as the antagonift of conftraint muft m cer- 
 tain cafes and under temporary circumftances be admitted, it is 
 an interefting enquiry to afcertain which of the three ends of 
 coercion already enumerated muft be propofed by the individuals 
 by whom coercion is employed. And here it will be fufficient 
 very briefly to recollect the reafonings that have been ftated 
 under each of thefe heads. 
 
 reformation : It cannot be reformation. To reform a man is to change the 
 
 fentiments 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. 
 
 741 
 
 fentiments of his mind. Sentiments may be changed either for BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 the better or the worfe. They can only be changed by the » .,'*■' 
 operation of falfhood or the operation of truth. Punifhment we 
 have already found, at leaft fo far as relates to the individual, is- 
 injustice. The infliction of ftripes upon my body can throw no 
 new light upon the queStion between us. I can perceive in 
 them nothing but your paSfion, your ignorance and your mis- 
 take. If you have any new light to offer, any cogent arguments 
 to introduce ; they will not fail, if adequately prefented,. to pro- 
 duce their effect. If you be partially informed, ftripes will not 
 fupply the deficiency of your arguments. Whatever be the 
 extent or narrownefs of your wifdom, it is the only, instrument; 
 by which you can hope to add to mine. You cannot give that 
 which you do not poffefs. When all is done, 1 have nothing 
 but the truths you- told me by which to derive light to my un- 
 derstanding. The violence with which the communication of 
 them was accompanied, may prepoffefs me againft giving them 
 an impartial hearing, but cannot, and certainly ought not, to 
 make their evidence appear greater than your Statement was able 
 to make it; — Thefe" arguments are conclufive againft coercion as 
 an instrument of private or individual education. 
 
 But confidering the Subject in a political view it may oe faid, 
 " that, however Strong may be the ideas I am able to commu- 
 nicate to a man in order to his reformation, he may be reStlefs and 
 impatient of expostulation, and of confequence it may be ne- 
 
 ceffary 
 
742 OF COERCION CONSIDERED 
 
 BOOK VII. cefiary to retain him by force, till I can properly have inftilled 
 
 CH AP V 
 
 J thefe ideas into his mind." It muft be remembered that the idea 
 here is not that of precaution to prevent the mifchiefs he might 
 perpetrate in the mean time, for that belongs to another of the 
 three ends of coercion, that of reftraint. But, feparately from this 
 idea, the argument is peculiarly weak. If the truths I have to com- 
 municate be of an energetic and impreffive nature, if they ftand 
 forward perfpicuous and diftinct in my own mind, it will be 
 ftrange if they do not at the outfet excite curiofity and attention 
 in him to whom they are addreffed. It is my duty to choofe a 
 proper feafon at which to communicate them, and not to betray 
 the caufe of truth by an ill timed impatience. This prudence I 
 fhould infallibly exercife, if my object were to obtain fomething 
 interefting to myfelf ; why mould I be lefs quick fighted when I 
 plead the caufe of juftice and eternal reafon ? It is a miferable 
 way of preparing a man for conviction, to compel him by 
 violence to hear an expoflulation which he is eager to avoid. 
 Thefe arguments prove, not that we fhould lofe fight of re- 
 formation, if coercion for any other reafon appear to be ne- 
 ceflary ; but that reformation cannot reafonably be made the ob- 
 ject of coercion. 
 
 example : Coercion for the fake of example is a theory that can never be 
 
 juftly maintained. The coercion propofed to be employed, con- 
 fidered abfolutely, is either right or wrong. If it be right, it 
 fhould be employed for its own intrinfic recommendations. If it 
 
 be 
 
AS A TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. 743 
 
 be wrong, what fort of example does it difplay ? To do a thing BOOK vn. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 for the fake of example, is in other words to do a thing to day, v v ■/ 
 in order to prove that I will do a fimilar thing to-morrow. 
 This muft always be a fubordinate confideration. No argument 
 has been fo grofsly abufed as this of example. We faund it un- 
 der the fubject of war * employed to prove, the propriety of my 
 doing a thing otherwife wrong, in order to convince the oppo- 
 fite party that I fhould, when occafion offered, do fomething 
 elfe that was right. He will difplay the beft example, who care- 
 fully fludies the principles of juftice, and affiduoufly practifes 
 them. A better effect will be produced in human fociety by my 
 confcientious adherence to them, than by my anxiety to create a 
 fpecific expectation reflecting my future conduct. This argu- 
 m ent will be flill farther inforced, if we recollect what has al- 
 ready been faid reflecting the inexhauflible differences of dif- 
 ferent cafes, and the impoffibility of reducing them to general 
 rules* 
 
 The third object of coercion according to the enumeration reftraint. 
 already made is reftraint. If coercion be in any cafe to be ad- 
 mitted, this is the only object it can reafonably propofe to itfelf. 
 The ferious objections to which even in this point of view it i3 
 liable have been ftated in another ftage of the enquiry f : the 
 amount of the neceffity tending to fuperfede thefe objections has 
 alfo been confidered. 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XVI, p. 518. f Chap. III. 
 
 The 
 
744 OF COERCION CONSIDERED, &c. 
 
 BOOK VII. The fubjed of this chapter is of greater importance, in pro* 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 ■ > 'j portion to the length of time that may poffibly elapfe, before any 
 
 Conclufion. _ , _ ■•_ _- _ _ 
 
 confiderable part of mankind lhall be perluaded to exchange the 
 prefent complexity of political inftitution for a mode which fhall 
 fuperfede the neceffity of coercion. It is highly unworthy of the 
 caufe of truth to fuppofe, that during this interval I have no active 
 duties to perform, that I am not obliged to co-operate for the 
 prefent welfare of the community, as well as for its future rege- 
 neration. The temporary obligation that arifes out of this cir- 
 cumftance exactly correfponds with what was formerly delivered 
 on the fubjeot of duty. Duty is the beft poffible application of 
 a given power to the promotion of the general good *. But my 
 power depends upon the difpofition of the men by whom I am 
 furrounded. If I were inlifted in an army of cowards, it might 
 be my duty to retreat, though abfolutely confidered it fhould 
 have been the duty of the army to come to blows. Under every 
 poffible circumftance it is my duty to advance the general good by 
 the beft means which the circumftances under which I am placed 
 will admit. 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VI, p. 308, 9. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 745 ] 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 1TTS SPHERE DESCRIBED. — ITS SEVERAL CLASSES. — DEATH 
 
 WITH TORTURE. DEATH ABSOLUTELY. ORIGIN OF 
 
 THIS POLICY — IN THE CORRUPTNESS OF POLITICAL IN- 
 STITUTIONS — IN THE INHUMANITY OF THE INSTI- 
 TUTORS. — CORPORAL PUNISHMENT. — ITS ABSURDITY — ■ 
 
 ITS ATROCIOUSNESS. — PRIVATION OF FREEDOM. DUTY 
 
 OF REFORMING OUR NEIGHBOUR AN INFERIOR CON- 
 SIDERATION IN THIS CASE. ITS PLACE DEFINED. 
 
 MODES OF RESTRAINT. INDISCRIMINATE IMPRISON- 
 MENT. — SOLITARY IMPRISONMENT. — ITS SEVERITY. — ITS 
 
 MORAL EFFECTS. — SLAVERY. — BANISHMENT. 1. SIMPLE 
 
 BANISHMENT. 2. TRANSPORTATION. 3. COLONISA- 
 TION. — THIS PROJECT HAS MISCARRIED FROM UNKIND- 
 NESS — FROM OFFICIOUSNESS. — ITS PERMANENT EVILS. — 
 RECAPITULATION. 
 
 I 
 
 T is time to proceed to the confederation of certain in- BOOKVII. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 ferences that may be deduced from the theory of coercion 
 
 which has now been delivered ; nor can any thing be of greater 
 
 5 C importance 
 
74 6 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. importance than thefe inferences will be found to the virtue, the 
 i / happinefs and improvement of mankind. 
 
 Its fpliere de- And, firft, it evidently follows that coercion is an act of painful 
 
 icribed. . 
 
 neceffity, inconfiftent with the true character and genius of mind, 
 the practice of which is temporarily impofed upon us by the cor- 
 ruption and ignorance that reign among mankind. Nothing can 
 be more abfurd than to look to it as a fource of improvement. It 
 contributes to the generation of excellence, juft as much as the 
 keeper of the courfe contributes to the fleetnefs of the race. No- 
 thing can be more unjuft than to have recourfe to it, but upon the 
 moft undeniable emergency. Inftead of multiplying occafions of 
 coercion, and applying it as the remedy of every moral evil, the 
 true politician will anxioufly confine it within the narrower!: li- 
 mits, and perpetually feek to diminifh the occafions of its employ- 
 ment. There is but one reafon by which it can in any cafe be 
 apologifed, and that is, where the fuffering the offender to be at 
 large fhall be notorioufly injurious to the public fecurity. 
 
 Its feveral Secondly, the confideration of refiraint as the only justifiable 
 
 claflcs. 
 
 ground of coercion, will furnifh us with a fimple and fatisfactory 
 criterion by which to meafure the juftice of the fuffering 
 inflicted. 
 
 Death with The infliction of a lingering and tormenting death cannot be 
 vindicated upon this hypothefis j for fuch infliction can only be 
 
 dictated 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. 747 
 
 dictated by fentiments of refentmerit on the one hand, or by the BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 defire to exhibit a terrible example on the other. v s , » 
 
 To deprive an offender of his life in any manner will appear "Death abfo- 
 to be unjuft, fince it will always be fufficiently practicable with- 
 out this to prevent him from farther offence. Privation of life, 
 though by no means the greateft injury that can be inflidted, mult 
 always be confidered as a very ferious injury ; fince it puts a per- 
 petual clofe upon the profpedts of the fufferer, as to all the en- 
 joyments, the virtues and the excellence of a human being. 
 
 In the ftory of thofe whom the mercilefs laws of Europe de- 
 vote to deftrudtion, we fometimes meet with perfons who fubfe- 
 quently to their offence have fucceeded to a plentiful inheritance, or 
 who for fome other reafon feem to have had the faireft profpedts 
 of tranquillity and happinefs opened upon them. Their ftory with 
 a little accommodation may be confidered as the ftory of every 
 offender. If there be any man whom it may be neceffary for 
 the fafety of the whole to put under reftraint, this circumftance is 
 a powerful plea to the humanity and juftice of the leading mem- 
 bers of the community in his behalf. This is the man who moft 
 ftands. in need of their affiftance. If they treated him with kind- 
 nefs inftead of fupercilious and unfeeling negledt, if they made 
 him underftand with how much reludtance they had been induced 
 to employ the force of the fociety againft him, if they prefented 
 truth to his mind with calmnefs, perfpicuity and benevolence, if 
 
 J C 2 they 
 
74 8 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. they employed thofe precautions which an humane difpofition 
 
 CHAP VI 
 
 'j would not fail to fuggeft, to keep from him the motives of cor- 
 ruption and obftinacy, his reformation would be almoft in- 
 fallible. Thefe are the profpects to which his wants and his mif- 
 fortunes powerfully entitle him ; and it is from thefe profpects 
 that the hand of the executioner cuts him off for ever. 
 
 It is a miftake to fuppofe that this treatment of criminals tends 
 to multiply crimes. On the contrary few men would enter upon 
 a courfe of violence with the certainty of being obliged by a flow 
 and patient procefs to amputate their errors. It is the uncertainty 
 of punifhment under the exifting forms that multiplies crimes. 
 Remove this uncertainty, and it would be as reafonable to expect 
 that a man would wilfully break his leg, for the fake of being 
 cured by a fkilful furgeon. Whatever gentlenefs the intellectual 
 phyfician may difplay, it is not to be believed that men can part 
 with rooted habits of injuftice and vice without the fenfation of 
 confiderable pain. 
 
 OngiBofthu The true reafons in confequence of which thefe forlorn and 
 
 policy : x 
 
 deferted members of the community are brought to an igno- 
 niptnefs of minious death, are, firft, the peculiar iniquity of the civil infti- 
 ftUutiens; 111 " tutions of that community, and, fecondly, the fupinenefs and 
 apathy of their fuperiors. In republican and fimple forms of go- 
 vernment punifhments are rare, the punifhment of death is almoft 
 unknown. On the other hand the more there is in any country of 
 2 inequality 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 749 
 
 inequality and oppreffion, the more punifhinents are multiplied. BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAP VI. 
 The more the inftitutions of fociety contradict the genuine fenti- v— _ v __-' 
 
 ments of the human mind, the more feverely is it necefTary to 
 
 avenge their violation. At the fame time the rich and titled in the in- 
 
 members of the community, proud of their fancied eminence, the inftitu- 
 
 tors. 
 
 Dehold with total unconcern the deftruction of the deftitute and 
 the wretched, difdaining to recollect that, if there be any in- 
 trinfic difference between them, it is the offspring of their 
 different circumftances, and that the man whom they now fo 
 much defpife, would have been as accomplifhed and fufceptible 
 as they, if they had only changed fituations. When we behold 
 a firing of poor wretches brought out for execution, juftice will 
 prefent to our affrighted fancy all the hopes and poflibilities 
 which are thus brutally extinguished, the genius, the daring 
 invention, the unfhrinking lirmnefs, the tender charities and ar- 
 dent benevolence, which have occafionally under this fyftem been 
 facrificed at the fhrine of torpid luxury and unrelenting avarice. 
 
 The fpecies of fuffering commonly known by the appellation Corporal pu- 
 nifhment. 
 
 of corporal punifhment is alfo profcribed by the fyftem above 
 eftablifhed. Corporal punifhment, unlefs fo far as it is intended 
 for example, appears in one refpect in a very ludicrous point of 
 view. It is an expeditious mode of proceeding, which has been 
 invented in order to comprefs the effect of much reafoning and 
 long confinement, that might otherwife have been necefTary, 
 into a very fhort compafs. In another view it is not poffible to 
 
 exprefs 
 
75 o SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK vii. exprefs the abhorrence it ought to create. The genuine pro- 
 t c j penfity of man is to venerate mind in his fellow man. With 
 
 ndT° a ° Ui ' what delight do we contemplate the progrefs of intellect, its 
 efforts for the difcovery of truth, the harveft of virtue that 
 fprings up under the genial influence of inftruclion, the wifdom 
 that is generated through the medium of unreftricted communi- 
 cation ? How completely do violence and corporal infliction 
 reverfe the fcene ? From this moment all the wholfome avenues 
 of mind are clofed, and on every fide we fee them guarded with 
 a train of difgraceful paflions, hatred, revenge, defpotifm, cruelty, 
 hypocrify, confpiracy and cowardice. Man becomes the enemy 
 of man ; the ftronger are feized with the luft of unbridled do- 
 mination, and the weaker fhrink with hopelefs difguft from the 
 approach of a fellow. With what feelings mufl an enlightened 
 obferver contemplate the furrow of a lafh imprinted upon the 
 body of a man ? What heart beats not in unifon with the fub- 
 lime law of antiquity, " Thou fhalt not inflict ftripes upon the 
 body of a Roman ?" There is but one alternative in this cafe on 
 the part of the fufferer. Either his mind mufl be fubdued by the 
 arbitrary dictates of the fuperior (for to him all is arbitrary that 
 does not ftand approved to the judgment of his own underfland- 
 ing) ; he will be governed by fomething that is not reafon, and 
 afhamed of fomething that is not difgrace ; or elfe every pang 
 he endures will excite the honeft indignation of his heart and 
 fix the clear difapprobation of his intellect, will produce con- 
 tempt and alienation, againft his punifher. 
 
 9 The 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. 75 i 
 
 The iuftice of coercion is built upon this fnnple principle : BOOKVlt. 
 
 J r r r r CHAP. VI. 
 
 Every man is bound to employ fuch means as fhall fuggeft them- >: — > ' 
 
 ' * * 00 Privation ot 
 
 felves for preventing evils fubverfive of general fecurity, it being fieedom ' 
 firft afcertained, either by experience or reafoning, that all 
 milder methods are inadequate to the exigence of the cafe. The 
 conclufion from this principle is, that we are bound under cer- 
 tain urgent circumftances to deprive the offender of the liberty 
 
 he has abufed. Farther than this no circumftance can authorife 
 us. He whofe perfon is imprifoned (if that be the right kind 
 of feclufion) cannot interrupt the peace of his fellows ; and the 
 infliction of farther evil, when his power to injure is removed, 
 is the wild and unauthorifed dictate of vengeance and rage, the 
 wanton fport of unquestioned fuperiority. 
 
 When indeed the perfon of the offender has been firft feized, Duty of re- 
 forming our 
 
 there is a farther duty incumbent on his punifher, the duty of neighbour 
 
 an inferior 
 
 reforming him. But this makes no part of the direct confidera- consideration 
 
 in tins cafe* 
 
 tion. The duty of every man to contribute to the intellectual 
 health of his neighbour is of general application. Befide which 
 it is proper to recollect what has been already demonftrated, 
 that coercion of no fort is among the legitimate means of re- 
 formation. Reftrain the offender as long as the fafety of the 
 community prefcribes it, for this is juft. Reftrain him not an 
 inftant from a fimple view to his own improvement, for this is 
 contrary to reafon and morality. 
 
 Meanwhile 
 
752 
 
 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOKViT. Meanwhile there is one circumftance by means of which re- 
 
 CHAP VI. 
 
 * v ' j ftraint and reformation are clofely connected. The perfon of 
 ferib'ed. the offender is to be reftrained as long as the public fafety would 
 
 be endangered by his liberation. But the public fafety will ceafe 
 to be endangered, as foon as his propenfities and difpofitions 
 have undergone a change. The connection which thus remits 
 from the nature of things, renders it neceffary that, in deciding 
 upon the fpecies of reftraint to be impofed, thefe two circum- 
 ftances be confidered jointly, how the perfonal liberty of the 
 offender may be leaft intrenched upon, and how his reformation 
 may be beft promoted. 
 
 Modes cf re. The moft common method purfued in depriving the offender 
 
 ilraint. _ • ^ m 
 
 or the liberty he has abufed is to erect a public jail in which 
 
 Indifcrimi- 
 
 nate impri- offenders of every defcription are thruft together, and left 
 
 for.irient. 
 
 to form among themfelves what fpecies of fociety they can. 
 Various circumftances contribute to imbue them with habits 
 •of indolence and vice, and to difcourage induftry ; and no 
 effort is made to remove or foften thefe circumftances. It 
 cannot be neceffary to expatiate upon the atrocioufnefs of this 
 fyftem. Jails are to a proverb feminaries of vice ; and he mufl 
 be an uncommon proficient in the paflion and the practice of 
 injuflice, or a man of fublime virtue, who does not come out of 
 them a much worfe man than he entered. 
 
 An 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. 753 
 
 An active obferver of mankind *, with the purefl intentions, BOOK vii. 
 
 CHAP. VI 
 
 and who had paid a very particular attention to this fubject, was ' . -» 
 
 ri • Solitary im- 
 
 ftruck with the muchievous tendency or the reigning fyftem, prifonment. 
 
 and called the attention of the public to a fcheme of folitary 
 
 imprifonment. But this, though free from the defects of the 
 
 eftablifhed mode, is liable to very weighty objections. 
 
 It mull ftrike every reflecting mind as uncommonly tyrannical lis ^verity, 
 and fevere. It cannot therefore be admitted into the fyftem of 
 mild coercion which forms the topic of our enquiry. Man is a 
 focial animal. How far he is neceffarily fo will appear, if we 
 confider the fum of advantages refulting from the focial, and of 
 which he would be deprived in the folitary ftate. But, inde- 
 pendently of his original ftrudture, he is eminently focial by his 
 habits. Will you deprive the man you imprilbn, of paper and 
 books, of tools and amufements ? One of the arguments in 
 favour of folitary imprifonment is, that it is neceffary the offender 
 fhould be called off from his wrong habits of thinking, and 
 obliged to enter into himfelf. This the advocates of folitary 
 imprifonment probably believe will be moft effectually done, the 
 fewer be the avocations of the prifoner. But let us fuppofe that he 
 is indulged in thefe particulars, and only deprived of focietv. 
 How many men are there that can derive amufement from books ? 
 We are in this refpect the creatures of habit, and it is fcarcely to be 
 expected from ordinary men that they fhould mould themfelves 
 
 * Mr. Howard. 
 
 5D to 
 
754 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. to any fpecies of employment, to which in their youth they were 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 j wholly ftrangers. But he that is raoft fond of ftudy has his mo- 
 ments when ftudy pleafes no longer. The foul yearns with inex- 
 preflible longings for the fociety of its like. Becaufe the public 
 fafety unwillingly commands the confinement of an offender, muft 
 he for that reafon never light up his countenance with a fmile ? 
 Who can tell the fufferings of him who is condemned to uninter- 
 rupted folitude ? Who can tell that this is not, to the majority 
 of mankind, the bittereft torment that human ingenuity can in- 
 flict ? No doubt a mind truly fublime would conquer this incon- 
 venience : but the powers of fuch a mind do not enter into the 
 prefent queftion. 
 
 Its moral From the examination of folitary imprifonment in itfelf con- 
 
 fidered, we are naturally led to enquire into its real tendency as 
 to the article of reformation. To be virtuous it is requifite that 
 we fhould confider men and their relation to each other. As a 
 preliminary to this ftudy is it necefiary that we fhould be fhut 
 out from the fociety of men ? Shall we be moft effectually 
 formed to juftice, benevolence and prudence in our intercourfe 
 with each other, in a ftate of folitude ? Will not our felfifh and 
 unfocial difpofitions be perpetually increafed ? What temptation 
 has he to think of benevolence or juftice who has no oppor- 
 tunity to exercife it ? The true foil in which atrocious crimes are 
 found to germinate, is a gloomy and morofe difpofition. Will 
 his heart become much either foftened or expanded, who breathes 
 the atmofphere of a dungeon ? Surely it would be better in this 
 
 refpecT: 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. ; 55 
 
 refpect to imitate the fyftem of the univerfe, and, if we would BOOKVii. 
 
 CHAP VL 
 
 teach juftice and humanity, tranfplant thofe we would teach > / • 
 into a natural and reafonable ftate of fociety. Solitude abfo- 
 lutely confidered may inftigate us to ferve ourfelves, but not to 
 ferve our neighbours. Solitude, impofed under too few limita- 
 tions, may be a nurfery for madmen and idiots, but not for uie- 
 ful members of fociety. 
 
 Another idea which has fuggefted itfelf with regard to the Slavery. 
 relegation of offenders from the community they have injured, 
 is that of reducing them to a ftate of flavery or hard labour. 
 The true refutation of this fyftem is anticipated in what has been 
 already faid. To the fafety of the community it is unneceffary. 
 As a means to the reformation of the offender it is inexpreffibly 
 ill conceived. Man is an intellectual being. There is no way 
 to make him virtuous, but in calling out his intellectual powers. 
 There is no way to make him virtuous, but by making him 
 independent. He muft ftudy the laws of nature and the necef- 
 fary confequence of actions, not the arbitrary caprice of his 
 fuperior. Do you defire that I mould work ? Do not drive 
 me to it with the whip ; for, if before I thought it better 
 to be idle, this will but increafe my alienation. Perfuade my 
 underftanding, and render it the fubject of my choice. It can 
 only be by the moft deplorable perverfion of reafon, that we 
 can be induced to believe any fpecies of flavery, from the flavery 
 
 5D2 of 
 
75$ 
 
 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOK VII. of the fchool boy to that of the moft unfortunate negro in our 
 
 CHAP VI 
 
 -. ' Weft India plantations, favourable to virtue. 
 
 Baniflimcnt. ^ fcheme greatly preferable to any of thefe, and which has been 
 tried under various forms, is that of tranfportation, or banifhment. 
 This fcheme under the moft judicious modifications is liable to 
 objection. It would be ftrange if any fcheme of coercion or 
 violence were not io. But it has been made appear ftill more 
 exceptionable than it will be found in its intrinfic nature, by the 
 crude and incoherent circumftances with which it has ufually 
 been executed. 
 
 i. Simple 
 banifhment. 
 
 Banifhment in its fimple form is evidently unjuft. The 
 citizen whofe refidence we deem injurious in our own country, 
 we have no right to impofe upon another. 
 
 a. Tranfpor- 
 tation. 
 
 Banifhment has fometimes been joined with flavery. Such 
 was the practice of Great Britain previoufly to the defection of 
 her American colonies. This cannot ftand in need of a feparate 
 refutation. 
 
 ^. Coloniza- 
 tion. 
 
 The true fpecies of banifhment is removal to a country yet 
 unfettled. The labour by which the untutored mind is belt 
 weaned from the vicious habits of a corrupt fociety, is the labour, 
 not which is prefcribed by the mandate of a fuperior, but which 
 is impofed by the neceffity of fubfiftence. The flrft fettlement 
 
 of 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. •- 7S7 
 
 of Rome by Romulus and his vagabonds is a happy image of book vn, 
 this, whether we confider it as a real hiftoiy, or as the ingenious v „ -> 
 fiction of a man well acquainted with the principles of mind. 
 Men who are freed from the injurious inftitutions of European 
 government, and obliged to begin the world for themfelves, are 
 in the direct road to be virtuous. 
 
 Two circumftances have hitherto rendered abortive this rea- This project 
 
 . , has mifcar- 
 
 fonable project. Firft, that the mother country purfues this Wed ■. 
 fpecies of colony with her hatred. Our chief anxiety is in reality ncfs .- 
 to render its refidence odious and uncomfortable, with the vain 
 idea of deterring offenders. Our chief anxiety ought to be to 
 fmooth their difficulties, and contribute to their happinefs. We 
 fhould recollect that the colonifls are men for whom we ought 
 to feel no fentiments but thofe of love and compaffion. If we 
 were reafonable, we fhould regret the cruel exigence that obliges 
 us to treat them in a manner unfuitable to the nature of mind ; 
 and having complied with the demand of that exigence, we 
 fhould next be anxious to confer upon them every benefit in 
 our power. But we are unreafonable. We harbour a thoufand 
 favage feelings of refentment and vengeance. We thruft them 
 out to the remoteft corner of the world. We fubject them to 
 perifh by multitudes with hardfhip and hunger. Perhaps to the 
 refult of mature reflection" banifhment to the Hebrides, would: 
 appear as effectual as banifhment to the Antipodes. 
 
 5 
 
 Secondly,, 
 
75 8 SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 BOOKVir. Secondly, it is abfolutely neceffary upon the principles here 
 
 CHAP VI 
 
 j explained that thefe colonifts, after having been fufficiently pro- 
 oufnefs. ' vided in the outfet, fhould be left to themfelves. We do worfe 
 than nothing, if we purfue them into their obfcure retreat with 
 the inaufpicious influence of our European inflitutions. It is a 
 mark of the profoundeft ignorance of the nature of man, to fup- 
 pofe that, if left to themfelves, they would univerfally deftroy 
 each other. On the contrary, new fituations make new minds. 
 The worft criminals when turned adrift in a body, and reduced 
 to feel the churlifh fang of neceffity, conduct themfelves upon 
 reafonable principles, and often proceed with a fagacity and 
 public fpirit that might put the proudeft monarchies to the blufh. 
 
 Its perma- Meanwhile let us not forget the inherent vices of coercion, 
 
 nent evils. ° ' 
 
 which prefent themfelves from whatever point the fubject is 
 viewed. Colonization feems to be the moft eligible of thofe 
 expedients which have been ftated, but it is attended with con- 
 fiderable difficulties. The community judges of a certain indi- 
 vidual that his refidence cannot be tolerated among them con- 
 fidently with the general fafety. In denying him his choice 
 among other communities do they not exceed their commiffion? 
 What treatment fhall be awarded him, if he return from the 
 banifhment to which he was fentenced ? — Thefe difficulties are 
 calculated to bring back the mind to the abfolute injuftice of 
 coercion, and to render us inexpreffibly anxious for the advent 
 of that policy by which it fhall be abolifhed. 
 
 6 • To 
 
SCALE OF COERCION. 
 
 759 
 
 To conclude. The obfervations of this chapter are relative to BOOK vn. 
 a theory, which affirmed that it might be the duty of individuals, i ¥ > 
 
 i c • • r • /• i. • t Recapitula- 
 
 but never or communities, to exert a certain ipecies of political tion. 
 coercion ; and which founded this duty upon a confideration of 
 the benefits of public fecurity. Under thefe circumflances then 
 every individual is bound to judge for himfelf, and to yield his 
 countenance to no other coercion than that which is indifpenfibly 
 neceflary. He will no doubt endeavour to meliorate thcfe infti- 
 tutions with which he cannot perfuade his countrymen to part. 
 He will decline all concern in the execution of fuch, as abufe the 
 plea of public fecurity to the moft atrocious purpofes. Laws 
 may eafily be found in almoft every code, which, on account of 
 the iniquity of their provifions, are fuffered to fall into difufe by 
 general confent. Every lover of juftice will uniformly in this 
 way contribute to the repeal of all laws, that wantonly ufurp upon 
 the independence of mankind, either by the muWplicity of their 
 reftrictions, or feverity of their functions. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 7 6o ] 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF EVIDENCE. 
 
 DIFFICULTIES TO WHICH THIS SUBJECT IS LIABLE — EX- 
 EMPLIFIED IN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN OVERT 
 
 ACTIONS AND INTENTIONS. REASONS AGAINST 
 
 THIS DISTINCTION. — PRINCIPLE IN WHICH IT IS 
 FOUNDED. 
 
 chap.vil "LJAVING fufficiently afcertained the decifion In which 
 
 1 " ' ■*■ ■*■ queftions of offence againft the general fafety ought to 
 
 terminate, it only remains under this head of enquiry to confider 
 the principles according to which the {rial fhould be conducted. 
 Thefe principles may for the mofl part be referred to two 
 points, the evidence that is to be required, and the method to be 
 purfued by us in claffing offences. 
 
 SS l ° The difficul *ies to which the fubjeft of evidence is liable, have 
 
 gg«* " been repeatedly ftated In the earlier divifions of this work*. It 
 
 may be worth while in this place to recoiled the difficulties which 
 
 attend upon one particular clafs of evidence, it being fcareely 
 
 * Book II, Chap. VI. Book VII, Chap. IV. 
 
 poffible 
 
OF EVIDENCE. 7 6i 
 
 poffible that the imagination of every reader fhould not fuffice BOOK VII 
 
 i • , i • i .1 r, r , • , CHAP.VII. 
 
 him to apply this text, and to perceive how eafily the lame kind » . j 
 of enumeration might be extended to any other clafs. 
 
 It has been afked, " Why intentions are not fubjected to the exemplified 
 
 in the dif- 
 
 animadverfion of criminal juftice, in the fame manner as direct tinaion be- 
 
 tween overt 
 afts Of offence ?" ads and in- 
 
 ■ tentions. 
 
 The arguments in favour of their being thus fubjected are ob- Reafbns a- 
 
 gainft this 
 
 vious. " The proper object of political fuperintendence is not diftinftion. 
 the paft, but the future. Society cannot juftly employ coercion 
 againft any individual, however atrocious may have been his 
 mifdemeanours, from any other than a profpe&ive confideration, 
 that is, a confideration of the danger with which his habits may 
 be pregnant to the general fafety. Paft conduct cannot properly 
 fall under the animadverfion of government, except fo far as it is 
 an indication of the future. But paft conduct appears at firft 
 fight to afford a {lighter prefumption as to what the delinquent 
 will do hereafter, than declared intention. The man who pro- 
 feffes his determination to commit murder, feems to be fcarcely a 
 lefs dangerous member of fociety, than he who, having already 
 committed murder, has no apparent intention to repeat his of- 
 fence." And yet all governments have agreed either to pafs over 
 the menace in filence, or to fubject the offender to a much lefs 
 degree of coercion, than they employ againft him, by whom 
 
 5 E the 
 
7 6i O F E V I Dl N C E, 
 
 BOOK VII. the crime has been perpetrated. It may be right perhap* 
 CHAP.VII. r r ' © r r 
 
 to yield them fome attention when they thus agree in for- 
 bearance, though little undoubtedly is due to their agreement in 
 inhumanity. 
 
 Principle in fpj j s Jiftinction, fo far as it is founded in reafon, has re- 
 
 which it is ' * 
 
 founded. l a ti n principally to the uncertainty of evidence. Before the 
 intention of any man can be afcertained in a court of juftice 
 from the confideration of the words he has employed, a variety 
 of circumftances muft be taken into the account. The witnefs 
 heard the words which were employed : does he repeat them 
 accurately, or has not his want of memory caufed him to fub- 
 ftitute in the room of fome of them words of his own ? Before 
 it is poffible to decide upon the confident expectation I may 
 entertain that thefe words will be followed with correfpondent 
 actions, it is neceflary I fhould know the exact tone with 
 which they were delivered, and gefture with which they were 
 accompanied. It is neceflary I fhould be acquainted with the 
 context, and the oceafion that produced them. Their con- 
 ftruction will depend upon the quantity of momentary heat 
 or rooted malice with which they were delivered ; and words, 
 which appear at firft fight of tremendous import, will fome- 
 times be found upon accurate inveftigation to have had a 
 meaning purely ironical in the mind of the fpeaker. Thefe 
 confiderations, together with the odious nature of coercion in 
 
 general,. 
 
OF EVIDENCE. 7 6$ 
 
 general, and the extreme mifchief that may attend our re- BOOK vir. 
 ftraining the faculty of fpeech in addition to the reftraint we * 
 conceive ourfelves obliged to put on men's actions, will pro- 
 bably be found to afford a fufficient reafon, why words ought 
 feldom or never to be made a topic of political animad- 
 verfion. 
 
 5E2 CH A P. 
 
[ 7*4 3 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 OF LAW. 
 
 ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT IS RECOMMENDED. — ANSWER. — 
 LAW IS, I. ENDLESS — PARTICULARLY IN A FREE STATE. 
 
 CAUSES OF THIS DISADVANTAGE. 2. UNCERTAIN 
 
 INSTANCED IN QUESTIONS OF PROPERTY. — MODE IN 
 WHICH IT MUST BE STUDIED. — 3. PRETENDS TO FORE- 
 TEL FUTURE EVENTS. LAWS ARE A SPECIES OF PRO- 
 MISES CHECK THE FREEDOM OF OPINION ARE DE- 
 STRUCTIVE OF THE PRINCIPLES OF REASON. DISHO- 
 NESTY OF LAWYERS. AN HONEST LAWYER MIS- 
 CHIEVOUS. — ABOLITION OF LAW VINDICATED ON THE 
 SCORE OF WISDOM — OF CANDOUR — FROM THE NA- 
 TURE OF MAN. — FUTURE HISTORY OF POLITICAL JUS- 
 TICE. — ERRORS THAT MIGHT ARISE IN THE COMMENCE- 
 MENT. — ITS GRADUAL PROGRESS. — ITS EFFECTS ON 
 CRIMINAL LAW — ON PROPERTY. 
 
 chaf.v/jl A FARTHER article of great importance in the trial of 
 
 - v *""~" v ' ^ ■*• offences, is that of the method to be purfued by us in 
 
 claffing them, and the confequent apportioning the degree of 
 animadverfion to the cafes that may arife. This article brings 
 
 us 
 
OF LAW. 7 6 S 
 
 us to the direct confideration of law, which is without dcnbt one BOOK vir. 
 
 CHAP VIII. 
 
 of the mod important topics upon which human intellect can be J * 
 employed. It is law which has hitherto been regarded in 
 countries calling themfelves civilifed, as the ftandard, by which 
 to meafure all offences and irregularities that fall under public 
 animadverfion. Let us fairly inveftigate the merits of this 
 choice. 
 
 The comparifon which has prcfented itfelf to thofe by whom 
 the topic has been inveftigated, has hitherto been between law 
 on one fide, and the arbitrary will of a defpot on the other. 
 But. if we would fairly eftimate the merits of law, we fhould 
 firfl confider it as it is in itfelf, and then, if neceffary, fearch 
 for the mod eligible principle that may be fubilituted in its place. 
 
 It has been recommended as "affording information to the Arguments 
 
 by which it 
 
 different members of the community refpecYing the principles w recom- 
 mended. 
 which will be adopted in deciding upon their actions. ' It has 
 
 been reprefented as the higheft degree of iniquity, " to try men 
 by an ex pqjl fafto law, or indeed in any other manner than by 
 the letter of a law, formally made, and fufiicicntly promul- 
 gated." 
 
 How far it will be fafe altogether to annihilate this principle Anfwer. 
 we _fhall prefently have occafion to enquire. It is obvious at 
 {irft fight to remark, that it is of moft importance in a country 
 where the fyftem of jurifprudence is moft; capricious and abfurd. 
 
 If 
 
7 66 
 
 OF LAW. 
 
 book VII. If it be deemed criminal in any fociety to wear clothes of a, 
 * particular texture, or buttons of a particular compolition, it is 
 natural to exclaim, that it is high time the jurifprudence of that 
 fociety fhould inform its members what are the fantaftic rules by 
 which they mean to proceed. But, if a fociety be contented with 
 the rules of juftice, and do not aflume to itfelf the right of 
 diftorting or adding to thofe rules, there law is evidently a lefs 
 necefTary institution. The rules of juftice would be more clearly 
 and efFe£tually taught by an actual intercourfe with human fociety 
 unreftrained by the fetters of prepoflefllon, than they can be by 
 catechifms and codes*. 
 
 Law is, T. 
 
 endlefs : 
 
 particularly 
 in free Hates. 
 
 One refult of the inftitution of law is, that the inftitution 
 once begun, can never be brought to a clofe. Edict is heaped 
 upon edict, and volume upon volume. This will be moft the 
 cafe, where the government is moft popular, and its proceedings 
 have moft in them of the nature of deliberation. Surely this is no 
 flight indication that the principle is wrong, and that of con- 
 fequence, the farther we proceed in the path it marks out to us> 
 the more fhall we be bewildered. No tafk can be more hopelefs 
 than that of effecting a coalition between a right principle and a 
 wrong. He that ferioufly and fincerely attempts it, will perhaps 
 expofe himfelf to more palpable ridicule, than he who, inftead of 
 profefling two oppofitc iyftems, fhould adhere to the worft. 
 
 •Caufcsoftnis 
 diiadvantage. 
 
 There is no maxim more clear than this, Every cafe is a rule 
 
 Book VI, Chap. VIII, p. 671. 
 
 to 
 
OF LAW. 767 
 
 to itfelf. No action of any man was ever the fame as any other BOOK VII. 
 
 r • . . • t CHAP. VIII. 
 
 action, had ever the fame degree of utility or injury. It fhould ■ » » 
 
 feem to be the bufinefs of juftice, to diftinguifh the qualities of 
 men, and not, which has hitherto been the practice, to con- 
 found them. But what has been the refult of an attempt to do 
 this in relation to law ? As new cafes occur, the law is perpe- 
 tually found deficient. How fhould it be otherwife ? Lawgivers 
 have not the faculty of unlimited prefcience, and cannot define 
 that which is infinite. The alternative that remains, is either to 
 wreft the law to include a cafe which was never in the contem- 
 plation of the author, or to make a new law to provide for this 
 particular cafe. Much has been done in the firft of thefe modes. 
 The quibbles of lawyers and the arts by which they refine and 
 diftort the fenfe of the law, are proverbial. But, though much is 
 done, every thing cannot be thus done. The abufe would fome- 
 times be too palpable. Not to fay, that the very education that 
 enables the lawyer, when he is employed for the profecutor, to 
 find out offences the lawgiver never meant, enables him, 
 when he is employed for the defendant, to find out fubterfuges 
 that reduce the law to a nullity. It is therefore perpetually 
 neceffary to make new laws. Thefe laws, in order to efcape 
 evafion, are frequently tedious, minute and circumlocutory. 
 The volume in which juftice records her prefcriptions is for ever 
 increafing, and the world would not contain the books that 
 might be written. 
 
 The 
 
7 68 O F L A W. 
 
 BOOK VII. The confequence of the infinitude of law is its uncertainty. 
 
 CHAP. viii. • . , 
 
 * „-—; This ftrikes directly at the principle upon which law is founded. 
 
 2. uncertain : 
 
 Laws were made to put an end to ambiguity, and that each man 
 
 might know what he had to depend upon. How well have 
 
 Manced in they anfwered this purpofe ? Let us inftance in the article of 
 
 queftiors of , 
 
 property. property, iwo men go to law tor a certain eftate. They 
 would not go to law, if they had not both of them an opinion 
 of their fuccefs. But we may fuppofe them partial in their own 
 cafe. They would not continue to go to law, if they were not 
 both promifed fuccefs by their lawyers. Law was made that a 
 plain man might know what he had to depend upon, and 
 yet the moft fkilful practitioners differ about the event of my 
 fuit. It will fometimes happen that the moft celebrated pleader 
 in the kingdom, or the firft counfel in the fervice of the crown, 
 fhall affure me of infallible fuccefs, five minutes before another 
 law officer, ftyled the keeper of the king's confidence, by fome 
 unexpected juggle decides it againft me. Would the iffue have 
 been equally uncertain, if I had had nothing to truft to but the 
 plain, unperverted fenfe of a jury of my neighbours, founded in 
 the ideas they entertained of general juftice ? Lawyers have 
 abfurdly maintained, that the expenfivenefs of ^law is neceffary 
 to prevent the unbounded multiplication of fuits j but the true 
 fource of this multiplication is uncertainty. Men do not quarrel 
 about that which is evident, but that which is obfeure. 
 
 Mode in He that would, fludy the laws of a country accuflomed to 
 
 which itmufi 
 
 be ftudied. r legal 
 
OF LA W. 7 6 9 
 
 legal fecurity, muft begin with the volumes of the ftatutes. He BOOK vn. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 muft add a ftrid enquiry into the common or unwritten law ; and 
 he ought to digrefs into the civil, the ecclefiaftical and canon 
 law. To underftand the intention of the authors of a law, he 
 muft be acquainted with their characters and views, and with 
 the various circumftances, to which it owed its rife, and by 
 which it was modified while under deliberation. To underftand 
 the weight and interpretation that will be allowed to it in a 
 court of juftice, he muft have ftudied the whole collection of 
 records, decifions and precedents. Law was originally devifed 
 that ordinary men might know what they had to depend upon, 
 and there is not at this day a lawyer exifting in Great Britain, 
 prefumptuous and vain-glorious enough to pretend that he has 
 maftered the code. Nor muft it be forgotten that time and 
 induftry, even were they infinite, would not fuffice. It is a 
 labyrinth without end ; it is a mafs of contradictions that cannot 
 be extricated. Study will enable the lawyer to find in it plaufi- 
 ble, perhaps unanfwerable, arguments for any fide of almoft 
 any queftion ; but it would argue the utmoft folly to fuppole 
 that the ftudy of law can lead to knowledge and certainty. 
 
 A farther confideration that will demonftrate the abfurdity of 3. pretends 10 
 
 foretel future 
 
 law in its moft general acceptation is, that it is of the nature of events, 
 prophecy. Its talk is to defcribe what will be the actions of 
 mankind, and to dictate decifions reflecting them. Its merits Laws area 
 
 fpecies of 
 
 in this refpect have already been decided under the head of prowifes: 
 
 5 F promifes. 
 
77° 
 
 OF LAW. 
 
 check the 
 freedom of 
 opinion ; 
 
 BOOK VII. promifes *. The language of fuch a procedure is, " We are fa 
 » v ^ wife, that we can draw no additional knowledge from circum- 
 ftances as they occur ; and we pledge ourfelves that, if it be other- 
 wife, the additional knowledge we acquire fhall produce no 
 effect upon our conduct." It is proper to ©bferve, that this fubs- 
 je£t of law may be confidered in fome refpects as more properly 
 belonging to the topic of the preceding book. Law tends no. 
 lefs than creeds, catechifms and tefts, to fix the human mind 
 in a ftagnant condition, and to fubftitute a principle of perma- 
 nence, in the room of that unceafing perfectibility which is the 
 only falubrious element of mind. All the arguments therefore 
 which were employed upon that occafion may be applied to the 
 fubjecl now under confideratiom 
 
 are deftruc- The fable of Procruftes prefents us with a faint fhadow of the 
 principles of perpetual effort of law. In defiance of the great principle of 
 
 leafon. 
 
 natural philofophy, that there are not fo much as two atoms of 
 matter of the fame form through the whole univerfe, it endea- 
 vours to reduce the actions of men, which are compofed of a. 
 thoufand evanefcent elements, to one ftandard. We have 
 already feen the tendency of this endeavour in the article of 
 murder f. It was in the contemplation of this fyftem of jurif~ 
 prudence, that the ftrange maxim was invented, that " ftrict 
 
 * Book HI, Chap. IIL 
 I Book II, Chap. VI, p. 131. Book VII, Chap. IV, p. 718. 
 
 jllftice 
 
OF LAW. 
 
 771 
 
 juftice would often prove the higheft injuftice*. There is no BOOKVii. 
 
 chap. VIII. 
 more real juftice in endeavouring to reduce the aclions of men < » ' 
 
 into clafles, than there was in the fcheme to which we have juft 
 
 alluded, of reducing all men to the fame ftature. If on the 
 
 contrary juftice be a refult flowing from the contemplation of all 
 
 the circumftances of each individual cafe, if the only criterion of 
 
 juftice be general utility, the inevitable confequence is that, the 
 
 more we have of juftice, the more we fhall have of truth, virtue 
 
 and happinefs. 
 
 From all thefe confiderations we cannot hefitate to conclude 
 univerfally that law is an inftitution of the moft pernicious 
 tendency. 
 
 The fubjecT: will receive fome additional elucidation, if we Dlrtionefty of 
 
 lawyers: 
 
 confider the pernicioufhefs of law in its immediate relation to 
 thofe who practife it. If there ought to be no fuch thing as 
 law, the profeflion of a lawyer is no doubt entitled to our difap- 
 probation. A lawyer can fcarcely fail to be a difhoneft man. 
 This is lefs a fubje& for cenfure than for regret. Men are the 
 creatures of the neceflities under which they are placed. He 
 that is habitually goaded by the incentives of vice, will not fail 
 to be vicious. He that is. perpetually converfant in quibbles, 
 £alfe colours and fophiftry, cannot equally cultivate the generous 
 
 * Summumjtis fumma injuria. 
 
 5 F 2 
 
 emotions 
 
772 O F L A W. 
 
 BOOK vii. emotions of the foul and the nice difcernment of rectitude. If 
 
 CHAP VIII 
 
 / a fingle individual can be found who is but fuperficially tainted 
 with the contagion, how many men on the other hand, in 
 whom we faw the promife of the fublimeft virtues, have by this 
 trade been rendered indifferent to confiftency or acceffible to a 
 bribe ? Be it obferved, that thefe remarks apply principally 
 to men eminent or fuccefsful in their profeffion. He that 
 enters into an employment carelefsly and by way of amufe- 
 ment, is much lefs under its influence (though he will not 
 efcape), than he that enters into it with ardour and devotion. 
 
 An honeft Let us however fuppofe, a circumftance which is perhaps aho- 
 
 lawyer mil- 
 
 «hiefous. gether impofTible, that a man fhall be a perfectly honeft lawyer. 
 He is determined to plead no caufe that he does not believe to 
 be juft, and to employ no argument that he does not apprehend 
 to be folid. He defigns, as far as his fphere extends, to ftrip 
 law of its ambiguities, and to fpeak the 'manly language of 
 reafon. This man is no doubt highly refpectable fo far as 
 relates to himfelf, but it may be queftioned whether he be not a 
 more pernicious member of fociety than the difhoneft lawyer. 
 The hopes of mankind in relation to their future progrefs, 
 depend upon their obferving the genuine effects of erroneous 
 inftitutions. But this man is employed in foftening and mafk- 
 ing thefe effects. His conduct has a direct tendency to poftpone 
 the reign of found policy, and to render mankind tranquil in 
 the midft of imperfection and ignorance. It may appear indeed 
 
 a para- 
 
OF LAW. 
 
 773 
 
 a paradox to affirm that virtue can be more pernicious than vice. BOOK vn. 
 
 chap. vur. 
 But the true folution of this difficulty lies in the remark, that * * ' 
 
 virtue, fuch as is here defcribed, is impoffible. We may amufe 
 ourfelves with enquiring in fuch inftances as this whether theory 
 could not afford us a better fyftem of intellectual progrefs than 
 the mixed fyftem which takes place in the world. But the true, 
 anfwer probably is, that what we call vice is mere error of the un- 
 derftanding, a neceflary part of the gradation that leads to good, 
 and in a word that the courfe of nature and the courfe of a per- 
 fect theory are in all cafes the fame. 
 
 The true principle which ought to be fubftituted in the room Abolition of 
 
 •r ii- •/•»• • law vindi- 
 
 of law, is that of reafon exercihng an uncontroled junfdiction cated on the 
 upon the circumftances of the cafe. To this principle no ob- dom ; 
 jection can arife on the fcore of wifdom. It is not to be fuppofed 
 that there are not men now exifting, whofe intellectual accom- 
 plifhments rife to the level of law. Law we fometimes call the 
 wifdom of our anceftors. But this is a ftrange impofition. It 
 was as frequently the dictate of their paffion, of timidity, 
 jealoufy, a monopolizing fpirit, and a lull of power that knew 
 no bounds. Are we not obliged perpetually to revife and 
 remodel this mifnamed wifdom of our anceftors ? to correct it 
 by_-a detection of their ignorance and a condemnation of their 
 intolerance ? But, if men can be found among us whofe wifdom is 
 equal to the wifdom of law, it will fcarcely be maintained, that 
 the truths they have to communicate will be the worfe for 
 
 having 
 
774 
 
 OF LAW. 
 
 book vii. having no authority, but that which they derive from the 
 
 chap. viir. 
 
 * v ' reafons that fupport them. 
 
 of candour: It may however be alledged that, "if there be little difficulty 
 in fecuring a current portion of wifdom, there may neverthelefs 
 be fomething to be feared from the paffions of men. Law may 
 be fuppofed to have been conftructed in the tranquil ferenity of the 
 foul, a fuitable monitor to check the inflamed mind with which the 
 recent memory of ills might induce us to proceed to the exercife 
 of coercion." This is the moft considerable argument that can. 
 be adduced in favour of the prevailing fyftem, and therefore 
 deferves a mature examination. 
 
 from the na- 
 ture of man : 
 
 The true anfwer to this objection is that nothing can be im- 
 proved but in conformity to its nature. If we confult for the 
 welfare of man, we mull bear perpetually in mind the Structure 
 of man. It muft be admitted that we are imperfect, ignorant, 
 the flaves of appearances. Thefe defects can be removed by no 
 indirect method, but only by the introduction of knowledge. 
 A fpecimen of the indirect method we have in the doctrine of 
 Spiritual infallibility. It was obferved that men were liable to 
 error, to difpute for ever without coming to a decifion,- to 
 miftake in their moft important interefts. What was wanting, 
 was fuppofed to be a criterion and a judge of controverfies. 
 What was attempted, was to endue truth with a vifible form, 
 and then repair to the oracle we had erected. 
 
 The 
 
OF LAW. 775 
 
 The cafe reflecting law is exactly parallel to this. Men BOOKVir. 
 
 CHAP. VII i. 
 
 were aware of the deceitfulnefs of appearances, and they fought 
 a talifman to guard them from impofition. Suppofe I were 
 to determine at the commencement of every day upon a certain 
 code of principles to which I would conform the conduct of the 
 day, and at the commencement of every year the conduct of the 
 year. Suppofe I were to determine that no circumftances 
 mould be allowed by the light they afforded to modify my 
 conduct, left I fhould become the dupe of appearance and the 
 flave of pafEon. This is a juft and accurate image of every 
 fyftem of permanence. Such fyftems are formed upon the idea 
 of flopping the perpetual motion of the machine, left it fhould 
 fometimes fall into diforder- 
 
 This confideration rauft fufficiently perfuade an impartial 
 mind that, whatever inconveniences may arife from the paffions 
 of men, the introduction of fixed laws cannot be the genuine 
 remedy. Let us confider what would be the operation and 
 progreflive ftate of thefe paflions, provided men were trufted 
 to the guidance of their own difcretion. Such is the difcipline 
 that a reafonable ftate of fociety employs with refpect to man 
 in his individual capacity * : why fhould it not be equally valid 
 with refpect to men adling in a collective capacity ? Inexperience 
 and zeal would prompt me to reftrain my neighbour whenever 
 he is acting wrong, and, by penalties and inconveniences 
 
 * Book V, Chap. XX, p. 548. 
 
 dcfignedly 
 
CHAP. VIII. 
 
 77 6 O F L A W. 
 
 BOOK vit. defignedly interpofed, to cure him of his errors. But reafon 
 
 r*u a o \/ I I I 
 
 evinces the folly of this proceeding, and teaches me that, if he 
 be not accuftomed to depend upon the energies of intellect, he 
 will never rife to the dignity of a rational being. As long as a 
 man is held in the trammels of obedience, and habituated to 
 look to fome foreign guidance for the direction of his conduct, 
 his underftanding and the vigour of his mind will fleep. Do 
 I defire to raife him to the energy of which he is capable ? I 
 muft teach him to feel himfelf, to bow to no authority, to 
 examine the principles he entertains, and render to his mind 
 the reafon of his conduct. 
 
 The habits which are thus falutary to the individual will be 
 equally falutary in the tranfactions of communities. Men 
 are weak at prefent, becaufe they have always been told they 
 are weak, and muil not be trufted with themfelves. Take them 
 out of their fhackles ; bid them enquire, reafon and judge ; and 
 you will foon find them very different beings. Tell them that 
 they have paffions, are occafionally hafty, intemperate and in- 
 jurious, but they muft be trufted with themfelves. Tell them 
 that the mountains of parchment in which they have been 
 hitherto intrenched, are fit only to impofe upon ages of fuper- 
 ftition and ignorance ; that henceforth we will have no depend- 
 ence but upon their fpontaneous juftice ; that, if their paffions 
 be gigantic, they muft rife with gigantic energy to fubdue them; 
 that, if their decrees be iniquitous, the iniquity fhall be all their 
 6 own. 
 
OF LA \V. 777 
 
 own. The effect of this difpofition of things will foon be vifi- BOOK Vii. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 ble ; mind will rife to the level of its fituation ; juries and v « > 
 
 umpires will be penetrated with the magnitude of the truft 
 repofed in them. 
 
 It may be no uninftructive fpectacle to furvey the progreffive Future hif- 
 
 tory of poli- 
 
 eftablifhment of juftice in the ftate of things which is here re- tlcaljuftice. 
 commended. At firft it may be a few decifions will be made Errors that 
 
 might arife 
 
 uncommonly abfurd or atrocious. But the authors of thefe in the com- 
 mencement, 
 decifions will be confounded with the unpopularity and difgrace 
 
 in which they have involved themfelves. In reality, whatever 
 
 were the original fource of law, it foon became cherifhed as a 
 
 cloke for oppreflion. Its obfcurity was of ufe to miflead the in- 
 
 quilitive eye of the fufferer. Its antiquity ferved to divert a 
 
 confiderable part of the odium from the perpetrator of the 
 
 injuftice to the author of the law, and ftill more to difarm that 
 
 odium by the influence of fuperflitious awe. It was well known 
 
 that unvarnifhed, barefaced oppreflion could not fail to be the 
 
 victim of its own operations. 
 
 To this ftatement it may indeed be objected, " that bodies of 
 men have often been found callous to cenfure, and that the 
 difgrace, being amicably divided among them all, is intolerable 
 to none." In this obfervation there is confiderable force, but it 
 is inapplicable to the prefent argument. To this fpecies of 
 abufe one of two things is indifpenfibly neceffary, either num- 
 
 5 G bers 
 
77 8 O F L A W. 
 
 BOOKVir. bers or fecrecy. To this abufe therefore it will be a fufficient 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 v „ ' remedy, that each jurifdiction be confiderably limited, and all 
 
 tranfa&ions conducted in an open and explicit manner. — To 
 proceed. 
 
 Its gradual "X\it juridical decifions that were made immediately after the 
 
 progreis. J J 
 
 abolition of law, would differ little from thofe during its empire. 
 They would be the decifions of prejudice and habit. But habit, 
 having loft the centre about which it revolved, would diminifh 
 in the regularity of its operations. Thofe to whom the arbitra- 
 tion of any queftion was intruded, would frequently recollecl: 
 that the whole cafe was committed to their deliberation, and 
 they could not fail occafionally to examine themfelves respecting 
 the reafon of thofe principles which had hitherto paffed uncon- 
 troverted. Their underftandings would grow enlarged, in pro- 
 portion as they felt the importance of their truft, and the un- 
 bounded freedom of their inveftigation. Here then would com- 
 mence an aufpicious order of things, of which no understanding 
 of man at prefent in exiftence can foretel the refult, the de- 
 thronement of implicit faith and the inauguration of unclouded 
 juftice. 
 
 Its effefts on Some of the conclufions of which this ftate of things would 
 be the harbinger, have been already feen in the judgment that 
 would be made of offences againft the community *. Offences 
 
 * Book II, Chap, VI, p. 131. Book VII, Chap. IV, p. 718. 
 
 arguing 
 
OF LA \V. 779 
 
 arguing infinite variety in the depravity from which they fprung, BOOK VII. 
 would no longer be confounded under fome general name. v__ v —<' 
 Juries would grow as perfpicacious in diftinguiihing, as they are 
 now indifcriminate in confounding the merit of actions and 
 characters. 
 
 Let us confider the effects of the abolition of law as it on property. 
 refpects the article of property. As foon as the minds of men 
 became fomewhat weaned from the unfeeling uniformity of the 
 prefent fyftem, they would begin to enquire after equity. In 
 this fituation let us fuppofe a litigated fucceffion brought before 
 them, to which there were five heirs, and that the fentence of 
 their old legiflation had directed the divifion of this property 
 into five equal lhares. They would begin to enquire into the 
 wants and fituation of the claimants. The firft we will fuppofe 
 to have a fair character and be profperous in the world : he is a 
 refpectable member of fociety, but farther wealth would add little 
 either to his ufefulnefs or his enjoyment. The fecond is a 
 miferable object, perilhing with want, and overwhelmed with 
 calamity. The third, though poor, is yet tranquil ; but there 
 is a fituation to which his virtue leads him to afpire, and in 
 which he may be of uncommon fervice, but which he cannot 
 with propriety accept, without a capital equal to two fifths of 
 the whole fucceffion. One of the claimants is an unmarried 
 woman paft the age of childbearing. Another is a widow, 
 unprovided, and with a numerous family depending on her 
 
 5 G 2 fuccour. 
 
7 So O F L A W. 
 
 BOOK VII. fuccour. The firft queftion that would fuggeft itfelf to unpre- 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 I > judiced perfons, having the allotment of this fucceffion referred 
 to their unlimited decifion, would be, what juftice is there in 
 the indifcriminate partition which has hitherto prevailed ? This 
 would be one of the early fuggeftions that would produce a 
 fhock in the prevailing fyftem of property. To enquire into 
 the general iffue of thefe fuggeftions is the principal object of 
 the following book. 
 
 An obfervation which cannot have efcaped the reader in the 
 perufal of this chapter, is, that law is merely relative to the 
 exercife of political force, and mull perifh when the neceflity 
 for that force ceafes, if the influence of truth do not ftill fooner 
 extirpate it from the practice of mankind. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 78 1 ] 
 
 CHAP. IX. 
 OF PARDONS. 
 
 THEIR ABSURDITY. THEIR ORIGIN. — THEIR ABUSES. 
 
 THEIR ARBITRARY CHARACTER. — DESTRUCTIVE OF MO- 
 RALITY. 
 
 ' I ^HERE is one other topic which belongs to the fubject of ™°.f, Y* L 
 
 •*■ the prefent book, but which may be difmifled in a very * * ' 
 
 few words, becaufe, though it has unhappily been in almoft all 
 cafes neglected in practice, it is a point that feems to admit of un- 
 commonly fimple and irrehftible evidence : I mean, the fubject 
 of pardons. 
 
 The very word to a reflecting mind is fraught with abfurdity. Their abfur- 
 
 dity. 
 
 " What is the rule that ought in all cafes to prefcribe to my con- 
 duct ?" Surely juftice ; underflanding by juftice the greateft uti- 
 lity of the whole mafs of beings that may be influenced by my 
 conduct. " What then is clemency ?" It can be nothing but 
 the pitiable egotifm of him who imagines he can do fomething 
 better than juftice. " Is it right that I fhould fufFer conftraint 
 for a certain offence ?" The rectitude of my fuffering muft be 
 founded in its tendency to promote the general welfare. He 
 
 therefore 
 
782 O F P A R D O N S. 
 
 BOOKVir. therefore that pardons me, iniquitoufly prefers the imaginary in- 
 
 CHAP. IX. . . . 
 
 » v * tereft of an individual, and utterly neglects what he owes to the 
 
 whole. He beftows that which I ought not to receive, and 
 which he has no right to give. " Is it right on the contrary 
 that I fhould not undergo the fuffering in queftion ? Will he by 
 refcuing me from fuffering, do a benefit to me and no injury to 
 others ?" He will then be a notorious delinquent, if he allow 
 me to fufFer. There is indeed a confiderable defect in this laft 
 fuppofition. If, while he benefits me, he do no injury to others, 
 he is infallibly performing a public fervice. If I fiuTered in the 
 arbitrary manner which the fuppofition includes, the whole 
 would fuftain an unqueftionable injury in the injuflice that was 
 perpetrated. And yet the man who prevents this odious injuf- 
 tice, has been accuftomed to arrogate to himfelf the attribute of 
 clement, and the apparently fublime, but in reality tyrannical, 
 name of forgivenefs. For, if he do more than has been here 
 defcribed, inftead of glory, he ought to take fhame to himfelf, as 
 an enemy to the intereft of human kind. If every action, and 
 efpecially every action in which the happinefs of a rational being 
 is concerned, be fufceptible of a certain rule, then caprice muft be 
 in all cafes excluded : there can be no action, which, if I ne- 
 glect, I mall have difcharged my duty ; and, if I perform, I fhall 
 be entitled to applaufe. 
 
 Their origin. The pernicious effects of the fyftem of pardons is peculiarly 
 glaring. It was firft invented as the miferable fupplement to a 
 
 fanguinary 
 
O F P A R D O N S. 783 
 
 fanguinary code, the atrocioufnefs of which was fo confpicuous, BOOKVir. 
 
 CHAP. IX 
 that its minifters either dreaded the refiftance of the people if it v v , > 
 
 were indifcriminately executed, or themfelves fhrunk with fpon- 
 
 taneous repugnance from the devaftation it commanded. The 
 
 fyftem of pardons naturally aflbciates with the fyftem of law ; 
 
 for, though you may call every inftance in which one man oc- 
 
 cafions the death of another by the name of murder, yet the in- 
 
 juftice would be too great, to apply to all inftances the fame 
 
 treatment. Define murder as accurately as you pleafe, the fame 
 
 confequence, the fame difparity of cafes will obtrude itfelf. It is 
 
 neceflary therefore to have a court of reafon, to which the deci- 
 
 fions of a court of law fhall be brought for revifal. 
 
 But how is this court, inexprefflbly more important than the Their abufcs. 
 other, to be conftituted ? Here lies the elfence of the matter ; 
 the reft is form. A jury is impanelled, to tell you the generical 
 name of the action ; a judge preiides, to read out of the voca- 
 bulary of law the fentence annexed to that name ; laft of all, 
 comes the court of enquiry which is to decide whether the re- 
 medy of the diipenfatory be fuitable to the circumftances of this 
 particular cafe. This authority has ulually been lodged in the 
 firft inftance with the judge, and in the laft refort with the king 
 in council. Now, laying aiide the propriety or impropriety of 
 this particular feleclion, there is one grievous abufe which ought 
 to ftrike the moft fuperficial obferver. Thefe perfons, with 
 whom the principal truft is repofed, confider their functions in 
 
 this 
 
tor. 
 
 7 8 4 O F P A R D O N S. 
 
 BOOK VII. this refpect as a matter purely incidental, exercife them with fu- 
 
 CHAP IX. 
 
 pinenefs, and in many inftances with the moft fcanty materials to 
 guide their judgment. This grows in a confiderable degree out 
 of the very name of pardon, which implies a work of fuperero- 
 gatory benevolence. 
 
 Their arbi- From the manner in which pardons are difpenfed inevitably 
 
 trary charac- 
 
 fiows the uncertainty of punifhment. It is too evident that pu- 
 nifhment is inflicled by no certain rules, and of confequence the 
 lives of a thoufand victims are immolated in vain. Not more 
 than one half or one third of the offenders whom the law con- 
 demns to death in this metropolis, are made to fuffer the fentence 
 that' is pronounced. Is it poflible that each offender fhould 
 not flatter himfelf that he fhall be among the number that 
 efcapes ? Such a fyftem, to fpeak it truly, is a lottery of death, in 
 which each man draws his ticket for reprieve or execution, as 
 undefinable accidents fhall decide. 
 
 It may be afked whether the abolition of law would not pro- 
 duce equal uncertainty ? By no means. The principles of king 
 and council in fuch cafes are very little underftood, either by 
 themfelves or others. The principles of a jury of his neigh- 
 bours commiflioned to pronounce upon the whole of the cafe, the 
 criminal eafily gueiTes. He has only to appeal to his own fenti- 
 ments and experience. Reafon is a thoufand times more expli- 
 cit and intelligible than law ; and when we were accuflomed to 
 
 9 confult 
 
O F P A R D O N S. 78^ 
 
 confult her, the certainty of her decifions would be luch as men BOOK vir. 
 
 CHAP IX 
 
 pra&ifed in our prefent courts are totally unable to conceive. 
 
 Another very important confequence grows out of the fyftem Defh-uftive oi 
 
 morality b 
 
 of pardons. A fyftem of pardons is a fyftem of unmitigated 
 flavery. I am taught to expect a certain defirable event, from 
 what ? From the clemency, the uncontroled, unmerited kindnefs 
 of a fellow mortal. Can any iefibn be more degrading ? The pu- 
 fillanimous fervility of the man who devotes himfelf with ever- 
 lafting obfequioufnefs to another, becaufe that other, having be- 
 gun to be unjuft, relents in his career ; the ardour with which he 
 confefles the rectitude of his fentence and the enormity of his de-» 
 ferts, will conftitute a tale that future ages will find it difficult to 
 underftand> 
 
 What are the fentiments in this refpett that are alone worthy 
 of a rational being ? Give me that and that only, which without 
 injuftice you cannot refufe. More than juftice it would be dis- 
 graceful for me to afk, and for you to beftow. I ftand upon the> 
 foundation of right. This is a title, which brute forcfe may re- 
 fufe to acknowledge, but which all the force in the world cannot 
 annihilate. By refilling this plea you may prove yourfelf unjuft j 
 but in yielding to it you grant me but my due. If, all things 
 confidered, I be the fit fubject of a benefit, the benefit is merited : 
 merit in any other fenfe is contradictory and abfurd. If you 
 beftow upon me unmerited advantage, you are a recreant from 
 
 5 H the 
 
786 O F P A R D O N S. 
 
 BOOK vil. the general good. I may be bafe enough to thank you ; but, if 
 CHAP. IX. 
 
 -' I were virtuous, I fhould condemn you. 
 
 Thefe fentiments alone are confiftent with true independence 
 of mind. He that is accuftomed to regard virtue as an affair of 
 favour and grace, cannot be eminently virtuous. If he occafion- 
 ally perform an action of apparent kindnefs, he will applaud the 
 generofity of his fentiments ; and, if he abftain, he will acquit 
 himfelf with the queftion, " May I not do what I will with my 
 own ?" In the fame manner, when he is treated benevolently by 
 another, he will in the firft place be unwilling to examine ftrictly 
 Into the reafonablenefs of this treatment, becaufe benevolence, as 
 he Imagines, is not fubject to any inflexibility of rule j and, in 
 the fecond place, he will not regard his benefactor with that erect 
 and unembarrafled mien, that complete fenfe of equality, which is 
 the only immoveable bafis of virtue and happinefs. 
 
 A N 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 CONCERNING 
 
 POLITICAL JUSTICE. 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 OF PROPER? r. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY DELINEATED. 
 
 IMPORTANCE OF THIS TOPIC. — ABUSES TO WHICH IT HAS 
 BEEN EXPOSED. — CRITERION OF PROPERTY : JUSTICE. — 
 ENTITLES EACH MAN TO THE SUPPLY OF HIS ANIMAL 
 WANTS AS FAR AS THE GENERAL STOCK WILL AFFORD 
 IT — TO THE MEANS OF WELL BEING. — ESTIMATE OF 
 LUXURY. — ITS PERNICIOUS EFFECTS ON THE INDIVI- 
 DUAL WHO PARTAKES OF IT. — IDEA OF LABOUR AS THE 
 FOUNDATION OF PROPERTY CONSIDERED. — ITS UNREA- 
 
 5 H 2 SONABLENESS. 
 
?8S 
 
 GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 SONABLENESS. — SYSTEM OF POPULAR MORALITY ON 
 THIS SUBJECT. — DEFECTS OF THAT SYSTEM. 
 
 BOOK VIII 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 ' | ^HE fubject of property is the key ftonethat competes the 
 ■*■ fabric of political juftice. According as our ideas refpect- 
 
 Importance 
 
 of this topic, ing it are crude or correct, they will enlighten us as to the con- 
 fequences of zfimple form of fociety •without government ', and re- 
 move the prejudices that attach us to complexity. There is no- 
 thing that more powerfully tends to diftort our judgment and opi~ 
 nions, than erroneous notions concerning the goods of fortune. 
 Finally, the period that lliall put an end to the fyftem of coercion 
 and punifhment) is intimately connected with the circumftance of 
 property's being placed upon an equitable bafis. 
 
 BookV. 
 
 Book VI. 
 Boek VII. 
 
 Abufes to Various abufes of the moft incontrovertible nature have infi- 
 
 fceen expofcd. nuated themfelves into the adminiftration of property. Each of 
 thele abufes might ufefully be made the fubject of afeparate in- 
 veftigation. We might enquire into the vexations of this fort 
 that are produced by the dreams of national greatnefs or magiftra- 
 tical vanity. This would lead us to a juft eftimate of the dif- 
 ferent kinds of taxation, landed or mercantile, having the neceL 
 faries or the luxuries of life for their fubject of operation. AVe 
 might examine into the abufes which have adhered to the com- 
 mercial fyftem ; monopolies, charters, patents, protecting du- 
 ties, prohibitions and bounties. We might remark upon the 
 tonfequences that flow from the feudal fyftem and the fyftem of 
 £ ranks i 
 
PROPERTY DELINEATED. 7 8 9 
 
 ranks ; feignorial duties, fines, conveyances, entails, eftates free- book vnr 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 hold, copyhold and manorial, vaflalage and primogeniture. We » — «v * 
 
 might confider the rights of the church ; firfi: fruits and tithes : 
 and we might enquire into the propriety of the regulation by 
 which a man, after having poffefTed as fovereign a confiderable 
 property during his life, is permitted to difpofe of it at his plea- 
 fure, at the period which the laws of nature feem to have fixed 
 as the termination of his authority. All thefe enquiries would 
 tend to fhow the incalculable importance of this fubjedt. But,, 
 excluding them all from the prefent enquiry, it fhall be the bu- 
 finefs of what remains of this work to confider, not any particu- 
 lar abufes which have incidentally rifen out of the adminiftration 
 of property, but thofe general principles by which it has in almoft 
 all cafes been directed, and which, if erroneous, muft not only be 
 regarded as the fource of the abufes above enumerated, but of 
 others of innumerable kinds, too multifarious and lubtle to enter 
 into fo brief a catalogue. 
 
 What is the criterion that mufl determine whether this or that Criterion of 
 fubftance, capable of contributing to the benefit of a human fultiJe, > 
 being, ought to be confidered as your property or mine ? To this 
 queflion there can be but one anfwer — Juftice. Let us then re- 
 cur to the principles of juftice *. 
 
 To whom does any article of property, fuppofe a loaf of bread, Entities each 
 
 man to the 
 fupply of his 
 * Book II, Chap. II. animal wants* 
 
 iuftlv as ^ ar as l ' ie 
 
79 o GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 book vni. juftly belong ? To him who mod wants it, or to whom the pof- 
 chap. I. J m r 
 
 < » ' feffion of it will be moft beneficial. Here are fix men famifhed 
 
 general flock 
 
 will afford it : w ith hunger, and the loaf is, abfolutely confidered, capable of fa- 
 tisfying the cravings of them all. Who is it that has a reafonable 
 claim to benefit by the qualities with which this loaf is en- 
 dowed ? They are all brothers perhaps, and the law of primoge- 
 niture beftows it exclusively on the eldeft. But does juftice 
 confirm this award ? The laws of different countries difpofe of 
 property in a thoufand different ways j but there can be but one 
 way which is moft conformable to reafon. 
 
 It would have been eafy to put a cafe much ftronger than that 
 which has juft been ftated. I have an hundred loaves in my 
 pofleflion, and in the next ftreet there is a poor man expiring 
 with hunger, to whom one of thefe loaves would be the means 
 of preferving his life. If I withhold this loaf from him, am I 
 not unjuft ? If I impart it, am I not complying with what juftice 
 demands ? To whom does the loaf juftly belong > 
 
 I fuppofe myfelf in other refpects to be in eafy circumftances, 
 and that I do not want this bread as an object of barter or fale, to 
 procure me any of the other neceffaries of a human being. Our 
 animal wants have long fince been defined, and are ftated to con- 
 iift of food, clothing and fhelter. If juftice have any meaning,, 
 nothing can be more iniquitous, than for one man to poffefs Su- 
 perfluities, 
 
PROPERTY DELINEATED. 791 
 
 perfluities, while there is a human being in exiftence that is not book vni. 
 
 CHAP. 1. 
 adequately fupplied with thefe. v , ' 
 
 Juftice does not ftop here. Every man is entitled, (o far as t0 th « m«n 
 
 of well being. 
 
 the general ftock will fuffice, not only to the means of being, but 
 of well being. It is unjuft, if one man labour to the deftru&ion 
 of his health or his life, that another man may abound in lux- 
 uries. It is urijuft, if one man be deprived of leifure to cultivate 
 his rational powers, while another man contributes not a fingle 
 effort to add to the common ftock. The faculties of one man 
 are like the faculties of another man. Juftice directs that each 
 man, unlefs perhaps he be employed more beneficially to the 
 public, fhould contribute to the cultivation of the common har- 
 veft, of which each man confumes a fhare. This reciprocity 
 indeed, as was obferved when that fubject was the matter of fe- 
 parate confideration, is of the very efTence of juftice. How the 
 latter branch of it, the necefTary labour, is to be fecured, while 
 each man is admitted to claim his fhare of the produce, we fhall 
 prefently have occafion to enquire. 
 
 This fubject will be placed in a ftill more ftriking light, if we Eftimate of 
 reflect for a moment on the nature of luxuries. The wealth of 
 any ftate may intelligibly enough be confidered as the aggregate 
 of all the incomes, which are annually confumed within that 
 ftate, without deftroying the materials of an equal confumptior* 
 
 in 
 
792 
 
 GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 r.ooK. Yin. in the enfuing year. Confidenng this income as being;, what hi 
 CHAP. I. . . 
 
 almoft all cafes it will be found to be, the produce of the induftry 
 
 of the inhabitants, it will follow that in civilifed countries the pea- 
 fant often -does not confume more than the twentieth part of the 
 produce of his labour, while his rich neighbour confumes perhaps 
 the produce of the labour of twenty peafants. The benefit that 
 arifes to this favoured mortal ought finely to be very extraor- 
 dinary. 
 
 Its perni- 
 cious effects 
 on the indi- 
 vidual who 
 partakes of 
 it. 
 
 But nothing is more evident than that the condition of this man 
 is the reverfe of beneficial. The man of an hundred pounds per 
 annum, if he underftand his own happinefs, is a thoufand times 
 more favourably circumftanced. What fhall the rich man do 
 with his enormous wealth ? Shall he eat of innumerable difhes of 
 the moft expenfive viands, or pcur down hogfheads of the moft 
 highly flavoured wines ? A frugal diet will contribute infinitely 
 more to health, to a clear underftanding, to chearful fpirits, and 
 even to the gratification of the appetites. Almoft every other ex- 
 pence is an expence of oftentation. No man, but the moft for- 
 did epicure, would long continue to maintain even a plentiful 
 table, if he had no fpedtators, vifitors or fervants, to behold his 
 eftablifhment. For whom are our fumptuous palaces and coftly 
 furniture, our equipages, and even our very clothes ? The noble- 
 man, who fhould for the firft time let his imagination loofe to 
 conceive the ftyle in which he would live, if he had nobody to 
 
 obfcrve, 
 
PROPERTY DELINEATED. 793 
 
 obferve, and no eye to pleafe but his own, would no doubt be book vjir. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 furprifed to find that vanity had been the firfl mover in all his \ ,. v ... j 
 actions. 
 
 The object of this vanity is to procure the admiration and 
 applaufe of beholders. We need not here enter into the 
 intrinfic value of applaufe. Taking it for granted that it is 
 as eftimable an acquiiition as any man can fuppofe it, how 
 contemptible is the fource of applaufe to which the rich man has 
 recourfe ? " Applaud me, becaufe my anceftor has left me a great 
 eftate." What merit is there in that ? The firft effect then of 
 riches is to deprive their poffeffor of the genuine powers of un- 
 derflanding, and render him incapable of difcerning abfolute 
 truth. They lead him to fix his affections on objects not ac- 
 commodated to the wants and the ftructure of the human mind, 
 and of confequence entail upon him difappointment and unhap- 
 pinefs. The greateft of all perfonal advantages are, independence 
 of mind, which makes us feel that our fatisfactions are not at the 
 mercy either of men or of fortune j and activity of mind, the 
 chearfulnefs that arifes from induftry perpetually employed about 
 objects, of which our judgment acknowledges the intrinfic value. 
 
 In this cafe we have compared the happinefs of the man of ex- 
 treme opulence with that of the man of one hundred pounds per 
 annum. But the latter fide of this alternative was affumed 
 merely in compliance with exiftinL, prejudices. Even in the 
 
 5 I prefent 
 
794 
 
 -GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 book viii. prefent ftate of human fociety we perceive, that a man, who 
 
 CHAP. I. r , 
 
 v — — v— J fhouid be perpetually earning the neceflary competence by a 
 
 very moderate induftry, and with his purfuits uncrofTed by the 
 
 peevifhnefs or caprice of his neighbours, would not be lefs happy 
 
 than if he were born to that competence. In the ftate of fociety 
 
 %ve are here contemplating, where, as will prefently appear, the 
 
 requifite induftry will be of the lighteft kind, it will be the re- 
 
 verfe of a misfortune to any man, to find himfelf neceffarily fti- 
 
 mulated to a gentle activity, and in confequence to feel that no 
 
 reverfe of fortune could deprive him of the means of fubfiftence 
 
 and contentment. 
 
 Idea of labom- But it has been alledged, " that we find among different men 
 
 as the foun- 
 dation of very different degrees of labour and induftry, and that it is not 
 
 property 
 
 coniidered. j u ft they fhouid receive an equal reward." It cannot indeed be 
 denied that the attainments of men in virtue and ufefulnefs ought 
 by no means to be confounded. How far the prefent fyftem of 
 property contributes to their being equitably treated it is very 
 eafy to determine. The prefent fyftem of property confers on 
 one man immenfe wealth in connderation of the accident of his 
 birth. He that from beggary afcends to opulence, is ufually 
 known not to have effecled this tranfition by methods very cre- 
 ditable to his honefty or his ufefulnefs. The moft induftrious 
 and a&ive member of fociety is frequently with great difficulty 
 ^ble to keep his family from ftarving. 
 
 But, 
 
PROPERTY DELINEATED. 795 
 
 But, to pafs over thefe iniquitous effects of the unequal diftri- bookviii. 
 
 r r CHAP. I. 
 bution of property, let us confider the nature of the reward » » ' 
 
 Its unrea- 
 
 which is thus propofed to induftry. If you be induftrious, you fonabknefs. 
 fhall have an hundred times more food than you can eat, and an 
 hundred times more clothes than you can wear. Where is the 
 juftice of this ? If I be the greateft benefactor the human fpecies 
 ever knew, is that a reafon for beftowing on me what I do not 
 want, efpecially when there are thoufands to whom my fuperfluity 
 would be of the greateft advantage ? With this fuperfluity I can 
 purchafe nothing but gaudy orientation and envy, nothing but 
 the pitiful pleufure of returning to the poor under the name of 
 generofity that to which reafon gives them an irrefiftible claim v 
 nothing but prejudice, error and vice. 
 
 The doctrine of the injuftice of accumulated property has been Syftem of 
 
 ... . popular mo- 
 
 the foundation of it II religious morality. The o')ject of this mo- rality on this 
 
 rality has been, to excite men by individual virtue to repair this 
 
 injuftice. 'I he moft energetic teachers of religion have been ir- 
 
 refiftibly led to aflert the precife truth upon this interefting fub- 
 
 ject. They have taught the rich, that they hold their wealth 
 
 only as a truft, that they are ftrictly accountable for every atom 
 
 of their expenditure, that they are merely adminiftrators, and by 
 
 no means proprietors in chief*. The defect of this fyftem is, 
 
 that they rather excite us to palliate our injuftice than to for-- 
 
 fake it. 
 
 * See Swift's Sermon on Mutual Subjection, quoted Book II, Chap. II. 
 
 5 I 2 No 
 
79 6 GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 nooKvin. No truth can be more fimple than that which they inculcate. 
 CHAP. I. . ... 
 
 » o ' There is no action of any human being, and certainly no aftion 
 
 that refpects the difpofition of property, that is not capable of 
 better and worfe, and concerning which reafon and morality do 
 not prefcribe a fpecific conduct. He that fets out with acknow- 
 ledging that other men are of the fame nature as himfelf, and is 
 capable of perceiving the precife place he would hold in the eye 
 of an impartial fpectator, muft be fully fenfible, that the money 
 he employs in procuring an object of trifling or no advantage to 
 himfelf, and which might have been employed in purchafing fub- 
 ftantial and indifpenfible benefit to another, is unjuftly employed. 
 He that looks at his property with the eye of truth, will find 
 that every milling of it has received its deftination from the dic- 
 tates of juftice. He will at the fame time however be expofed to 
 confiderable pain, in confequence of his own ignorance as to the 
 precife difpofition that juftice and public utility require. 
 
 Does any man doubt of the truth of thefe aflertions ? Does 
 any man doubt that, when I employ a fum of money fmall or 
 great in the purchafe of an abfolute luxury for myfelf, I am 
 guilty of vice ? It is high time that this fubjed fhould be ade- 
 quately underftood. It is high time that we fhould lay afide the 
 very names of juftice and virtue, or that we fhould acknowledge 
 that they do not authorife us to accumulate luxuries upon our- 
 felves, while we fee others in want of the indifpenfible means of 
 improvement and happinefs. 
 
 But, 
 
PROPERTY DELINEATED. 797 
 
 But, while religion inculcated on mankind the impartial na- book viu 
 • n • • CHAP. I. 
 
 rure of juftice, its teachers have been too apt to treat the prac- * v ' 
 
 . . Defects of 
 
 tice of juftice, not as a debt, which it ought to be confidered, thatfyftem. 
 
 but as an affair of fpontaneous generofity and bounty. They 
 have called upon the rich to be clement and merciful to the 
 poor. The confequence of this has been that the rich, when 
 they beftowed the raoft flender pittance of -their enormous wealth 
 in acts of charity, as they were called, took merit to themfelves 
 for what they gave, inftead of confidering themfelves as delin- 
 quents for what they withheld. 
 
 Religion is in reality in all its parts an accommodation to the 
 prejudices and weakneffes of mankind. Its authors communi- 
 cated to the world as much truth, as they calculated that the 
 world would be willing to receive. But it is time that we fhould 
 lay afide the inftruction - intended only for children in under- 
 Handing *, and contemplate the nature and principles of things. 
 If religion had fpoken out, and told us it was jufl that all 
 men fhould receive the fupply of their wants, we fhould pre- 
 fently have been led to fufpect that a gratuitous diflribution to be 
 made by the rich, was a very indirect and ineffectual way of 
 arriving at this object. The experience of all ages has taught us, 
 that this fyftem is productive only of a very precarious fupply. 
 The principal object which it feems to propofe, is to place this 
 fupply in the difpofal of a few, enabling them to make a fhow of 
 
 * i Cor. Chap, III. Ver. i, 2. 
 
 generofity 
 
798 
 
 GENUINE SYSTEM, &c. 
 
 BOoKViir. generofity with what is not truly their own, and to purchafe the- 
 CHAP. l. 
 < v ' gratitude of the poor by the payment of a debt. It is a fyftem 
 
 of clemency and charity, inftead of a fyftem of juftice. It fills 
 
 the rich with unreafonable pride by the fpurious denominations 
 
 with which it decorates their adls, and the poor with fervility, by 
 
 leading them to regard the {lender comforts they obtain, not as 
 
 their incontrovertible due, but as the good pleafure and the grace 
 
 of their opulent neighbours. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 799 ] 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE GENUINE SYSTEM 
 OF PROPERTY. 
 
 CONTRASTED WITH THE MISCHIEFS OF THE PRESENT SYS- 
 TEM, AS CONSISTING — I. IN A SENSE OF DEPENDENCE. 
 2. IN THE PERPETUAL SPECTACLE OF INJUSTICE, LEAD- 
 ING MEN ASTRAY IN THEIR DESIRES — AND PERVERTING 
 THE INTEGRITY OF THEIR JUDGMENTS. — THE RICH ARE 
 THE TRUE PENSIONERS. — 3. IN THE DISCOURAGEMENT 
 OF INTELLECTUAL ATTAINMENTS. — 4. IN THE MULTI- 
 PLICATION OF VICE GENERATING THE CRIMES OF THE 
 
 POOR — THE PASSIONS OF THE RICH — AND THE MISFOR- 
 TUNES OF WAR. 5. 'IN DEPOPULATION. 
 
 H 
 
 AVING feen thejuftice of an equal diftribution of pro- bookviii. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 perty, let us next confider the benefits with which it would ' * ■ 
 
 Conlrafted 
 
 be attended. And here with grief it muft be confefied, that, wi f h tlie m, ' f - 
 
 chiefs of the 
 
 however great and extenfive are the evils that are produced by p"&nt fyf- 
 
 tem, as ccn- 
 
 monarchies and courts, by the impofture of prieits and the ini~ fiain S : 
 quity of criminal laws, all thefe are imbecil and impotent com- 
 pared with the evils that arife out of the eftablifhed fyftem of 
 property. 
 
 Its 
 
cnce : 
 
 800 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 Booicvm. Its firft effect is that which we have already mentioned, a 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 j '■> fenfe of dependence. It is true that courts are mean fpirited, 
 
 of depend- intriguing and fervile, and that this difpofition is transferred by- 
 contagion from them to all ranks of fociety. But property 
 brings home a fervile and truckling fpirit by no circuitous me- 
 thod to every houfe in the nation. Obferve the pauper fawning 
 with abjecl: vilenefs upon his rich benefactor, and fpeechlefs with 
 fenfations of gratitude for having received that, which he ought 
 to have claimed with an erect mien, and with a confcioufnefs 
 that his claim was irrefiftible. Obferve the fervants that follow 
 in a rich man's train, watchful of his looks, anticipating his com- 
 mands, not daring to reply to his infolence, all their time and 
 their efforts under the direction of his caprice. Obferve the 
 tradefman, how he ftudies the paflions of his cuftomers, not to 
 correct, but to pamper them, the vilenefs of his flattery and the 
 fyftematical conftancy with which he exaggerates the merit of his 
 commodities. Obferve the practices of a popular election, where 
 the great mafs are purchafed by obfequioufnefs, by intemperance 
 and bribery, or driven by unmanly threats of poverty and perfe- 
 ction. Indeed " the age of chivalry is" not " gone * !" The 
 feudal fpirit ftill furvives, that reduced the great mafs of mankind 
 to the rank of flaves and cattle for the fervice of a few. 
 
 We have heard much of vifionary and theoretical improve- 
 ments. It would indeed be vifionary and theoretical to expect 
 
 * Burke's Reflections. 
 6 virtue 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. Sot 
 
 virtue from mankind, while they are thus fubje&ed to hourly book viii. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 corruption, and bred from father to fon to fell their independence ' - v " *, 
 and then" conference for the vile rewards that opprefiion has to 
 beftow. No man can be either ufeful to others or happy to 
 himfelf who is a ftranger to the grace of firmnefs, and who is 
 .not habituated to prefer the dictates of his own fenfe of rectitude 
 to all the tyranny of command, and allurements of temptation. 
 Here again, as upon a former occafion, religion comes in to il- 
 luftrate our thefis. Religion was the generous ebullition of men, 
 who let their imagination loofe on the grandeft fubjects, and 
 wandered without reftraint in the unbounded field of enquiry. 
 It is not to be wondered at therefore if they brought home im- 
 perfect ideas of the fublimeft views that intellect can furnifh. In 
 this inftance religion teaches that the true perfection of man is to 
 diveft himfelf of the influence of paflions ; that he mufthave no 
 artificial wants, no fenfuality, and no fear. But to diveft the hu- 
 man fpecies under the prefent fyftem of the influence of paflions is 
 an extravagant fpeculation. The enquirer after truth and the 
 benefactor of mankind will be defirous of removing from 
 them thofe external impreflions by xvhich their evil propenfities 
 are cherilhed. The true object that Ihould be kept in view, is to 
 extirpate all ideas of condefcenfion and fuperiority, to oblige 
 every man to feel, that the kindnefs he exerts is what he is 
 bound to perform, and the afliftance he afks what he has a right 
 to claim. 
 
 5 K A fecond 
 
.-JK 
 
 802 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 book viii. A fecond evil that arifes out of the eftablifhed fyftem of pro- 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 i j perty is the perpetual fpectacle of injuflice it exhibits. This 
 
 petualfpec- confifts partly in luxury and partly in caprice. There is nothing 
 
 juftice : more pernicious to the human mind than luxury. Mind, being 
 
 aftray in their in its own nature effentially a&ive, neceflarily fixes on fome ob- 
 
 dciircs * 
 
 ject public or perfonal, and in the latter cafe on the attainment 
 of fome excellence, or fomething which fhall command the 
 efteem and deference of others. . No propenfity, abfolutely con- 
 fidered, can be more valuable than this. But the eftablifhed fyf- 
 tem of property directs it into the channel of the acquifition of j. 
 wealth. The orientation of the rich perpetually goads the fpec- 
 tator to the defire of opulence. Wealth, by the fentiments of fer- 
 vility and dependence it produces, makes the rich man ftahd for- 
 ward as the only object of general efteem and deference. In vain 
 are fobriety, integrity and induftry, in vain the fublimeft powers 
 of mind and the moft ardent benevolence, if their pofleflbr be 
 narrowed in his circumftances. To acquire wealth and to dis- 
 play it, is therefore the univerfal paflion. The whole ftructure 
 of human fociety is made a fyftem of the narroweft felfifhnefs. 
 If felf love and benevolence were apparently reconciled as to their 
 object, a man might fet out with the defire of eminence, and yet 
 every day become more generous and philanthropical in his 
 views. But the paflion we are here defcribing is accuftofned to 
 be gratified at every ftep, by inhumanly trampling upon the in- 
 tereft of others. Wealth is acquired by overreaching our neigh- 
 bours, and is fpent in infulting them. 
 
 The 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 803 
 
 The fpectacle of iniuftice which the eftabliihed fyftem of pro- bookviii. 
 
 7 CHAP. II. 
 
 perry exhibits, confifts partly in caprice. If you would cheriih in * » — '-> 
 
 and pervert- 
 any man the love of rectitude, you mull take care that its prin- in S the inte ; 
 
 grity of their 
 
 ciples be impreffed on him, not only by words, but actions. It jadgrisat*, 
 fometimes happens during the period of education, that maxims 
 of integrity and confiftency are repeatedly inforced, and that the 
 preceptor gives no quarter to the bafe fuggeftions of felfifhnefs 
 and cunning. But how is the leflon that has been read to the 
 pupil confounded and reverfed, when he enters upon the fcene of 
 the world ? If he afk, " Why is this man honoured ?" the ready 
 anfwer is, " Becaufe he is rich." If he enquire farther, " Why- 
 is he rich ?" the anfwer in moft cafes is, " From the accident of 
 birth, or from a minute and fordid attention to the cares of gain." 
 The fyftem of accumulated property is the offspring of civil po- 
 licy ; and civil policy, as we are taught to believe, is the produc- 
 tion of accumulated wifdom. Thus the wifdom of legislators 
 and fenates has been employed, to fecure a diftribution of pro- 
 perty the moft profligate and unprincipled, that bids defiance to 
 the maxims of juftice and the nature of man. Humanity weeps 
 over the diftrelfes of the peafantry of all civilifed nations ; and, 
 when fhe turns from this fpedtacle to behold the luxury of their 
 lords, grofs, imperious and prodigal, her fenfations certainly are 
 not lefs acute. This fpec~tacle is the fchool in which ' mankind 
 have been educated. They have been accuftomed to the fight of 
 injuftice, oppreflion and iniquity, till their feelings are made 
 
 5 K. 2 callous, 
 
8o4 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 book vnr. callous, and their underftandings incapable of apprehending the 
 
 -* nature of true virtue* 
 
 The rich are I n beginning to point out the evils of accumulated property, wt 
 
 the true pen. ° ° r r / > 
 
 Sonera.- compared the extent of thofe evils with the correfpondent evils of 
 
 monarchies and courts. No circumftances under the latter have 
 excited a more pointed difapprobation than pennons and pecu- 
 niary corruption, by means of which hundreds of individuals are 
 rewarded, not for ferving, but betraying the public* and the hard. 
 earnings of induftry are employed to fatten the fervile adherents 
 of defpotifrn. But the rent roll of the lands of England is a much* 
 more formidable penfion lift, than that which is fiippofed to be 
 employed in the purchafe of minifterial majorities*. AH riches, and 
 efpecially all hereditary riches, are to be considered as the falary 
 of a finecure office, where the labourer and the manufacturer per- 
 form the duties, and the principal fpends the income in luxury and 
 idlenefs '*. Hereditary wealth is in reality a premium paid to idle- 
 
 nels, 
 
 * This idea is to be found in Ogilvie's Effay on the Right of Property in. 
 Land, publilhed about two years ago, Parti, Sect, ill, par. 38, 39. The rea-- 
 fonings of this author have fometimes confiderable merit, though he has by na 
 means gone to the fource of the evil.. 
 
 It might be amufing to fome readers to recoiled} the authorities, if the citation 
 •f authorities were a proper mode of reafoning, by which the fyftem of accumu- 
 lated property is openly attacked. The beft known is Plato in hjs treatife of a 
 
 Republic. 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 505 
 
 nefs, an immenfe annuity expended to retain mankind in RooKVrir. 
 
 . . CHAP. 11. 
 brutality and ignorance. The poor are kept in ignorance by the » „ * 
 
 want of leifure. The rich are furnifhed indeed with the means 
 of cultivation and literature, but they are paid for being diffi- 
 pated and indolent. The molt powerful means that malignity 
 could have invented, are employed to prevent them from im- 
 proving their talents, and becoming ufeful to the public. 
 
 4 
 
 This leads us to obferve, thirdly, that the eftablifhed fyftem 3 . j Q the dif- 
 
 couragement 
 
 Republic. His fteps have been followed by fir Thomas More in his Utopia. 
 Specimens o£ very powerful reafoning on the fame fide may be found in Gul- 
 liver'9 Travels, particularly, Part IV, Chap. VI. Mably, in his book De la 
 Legijlation, has difplayed at large the advantages of equality, and then quits the 
 fubjeft in defpair from an opinion of the incorrigiblenefs of human depravity. 
 Wallace, the contemporary and antagonift of Hume, in a treatife entitled, Various 
 Profpetts of Mankind, Nature and Providence, is copious in his eulogium of the 
 feme fyftem, and deferts it only from fear of the earth becoming too populous r 
 fee below, Chap. VII. The great pra&ical authorities are Crete, Sparta, Peru 
 and Paraguay. It would be eafy tofwell this lift, if we added examples where 
 an approach only to thefe principles was attempted, and authors who have in- 
 cidentally confirmed a do&rine, fo interefting and clear, as never to have been 
 wholly eradicated frorm any human uuderftanding.. 
 
 It would be trifling to objeft that the fyftems of Plato and others are full of 
 imperfeftions. This indeed rather ftrengthens their authority ; fince the evi- 
 dence of the truth they maintained was fo great, as ftill- to preferve its hold on 
 their understandings, though they knew not how to remove the difficulties that- 
 attended it. 
 
 & Qf 
 
So6 
 
 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 of inteUedtual 
 
 attainments! 
 
 BooK.vrir. of property, is the true levelling fyftem with refpect to the 
 CHAP. II. , . 
 
 human fpecies, by as much as the cultivation of intellect and 
 
 truth, is more valuable and more characteristic of man,, than the 
 gratifications of vanity or appetite. Accumulated property 
 treads the powers of thought in the duft, extinguiihes the fparks 
 pf genius, and reduces the great mafs of mankind to be 
 immerfed in fordid cares ; befide depriving the rich, as we have 
 already faid, of the moft falubrious and effectual motives to 
 activity. If fuperfluity were bani(hed ? the neceflity for the 
 greater part of the manual induftry of mankind would be fuper- 
 ieded ; and the reft, being amicably lhared among all the active 
 and vigorous members of the community, would be burthenfome 
 to none. Every man would have a frugal, yet wholfome diet ; 
 every man would go forth to that moderate exercife of his 
 corporal functions that would give hilarity to the fpirits ; none 
 would be made torpid with fatigue, but all would have leifure to 
 cultivate the kindly and philanthropical affections of the foul, 
 and to let loofe his faculties in the fearch of intellectual improve- 
 ment. What a contraft does this fcene prefent us with the 
 prefent ftate of human fociety, where the peafant and the 
 labourer work, till their. undcrftandings are benumbed with toil, 
 their finews contracted and made callous by being for ever on 
 the ftretch, and their bodies invaded with infirmities and fur- 
 rendered to an untimely grave ? What is the fruit of this difpro- 
 portioned and unceafing toil ? At evening they return to a 
 family, famifhed with hunger, expofed half naked to the in- 
 2 clemencies 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 807 
 
 clemencies of the Iky, hardly iheltered, and denied the flendereft. book viii. 
 : . . CHAP. II. 
 
 inftruetion, unlefs in a few inftances, where it is difpenfed by 
 
 the hands of oftentatious charity, and the firft lefTon communi- 
 cated is unprincipled fertility. All this while their rich neigh- 
 bour — but we vifited him before. 
 
 How rapid and fublime would be the advances of intellect, if 
 all men were admitted into the field of knowledge ? At prefent 
 ninety-nine perfons in an hundred are no more excited to any 
 regular exertions of general and curious thought, than the brutes 
 themfelves. What would be the ftate of public mind in a 
 nation, where all were wife, all had laid afide the fhackles of 
 prejudice and implicit faith, all adopted with fearlefs confidence 
 the fuggeftions of truth, and the lethargy of the foul was dif- 
 miflfed for ever ? It is to be prefumed that the inequality of mind 
 would in a certain degree be permanent ; but it is reafonablc to 
 believe that the geniufes of fuch an age would far furpafs the 
 grandeft exertions of intellect that are at prefent known. 
 Genius would not be deprefled with falfe wants and niggardly 
 patronage. It would not exert itfelf with a fenfe of neglect and 
 oppreflion rankling in its bofom. It would be freed from thofe 
 apprehenfions that perpetually recal us to the thought of perfonal 
 emolument, and of confequence would expatiate freely among 
 fentiments of generofity and public good. 
 
 From ideas of intellectual let us turn to moral improvement. 4. ; a the 
 And here it is obvious that all the occafions of crime would be t ; n $ lice. 
 
 cut 
 
«b8 BENEFITS. ARISING FROM THE 
 
 boor viu. cut off for ever. AH men love juftice. All men art confcious 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 *— — v 1 that man is a being of one common nature, and feel the pro- 
 priety of the treatment they receive from one another being mea- 
 fured by a common ftandard. Every man is defirous of affift- 
 ing another j whether we fhould choofe to afcribe this to an in- 
 ftindt, implanted in his nature which renders this conduct a 
 iburce of perfonal gratification, or to his perception of the rea- 
 fonablenefs of fuch affiftance. So neceffary a part is this of the 
 *conftitution of mind, that no man perpetrates any action how- 
 ever criminal, without having firft invented fome fophiftry, 
 fome palliation, by which he proves to himfelf that it is beft to 
 
 The crimes of be done *. Hence it appears, that offence, the inyafion of one 
 
 the poor. 
 
 man upon the fecurity of another, is a thought alien to mind, 
 and which nothing could have reconciled to us but the fharp 
 lling of neceffity. To confider merely the prefent order of 
 human fociety, it is evident that the firft offence muft have been 
 his who began a monopoly, and toqk advantage of the weaknefs 
 of his neighbours to fecure certain exclufive privileges to himfelf. 
 The man on the other hand who determined to put an end to 
 this monopoly, and who peremptorily demanded what was 
 fuperfluous to the poffeffor and would be of extreme benefit to 
 himfelf, appeared to his own mind to be merely avenging the 
 violated laws of juftice. Were it not for the plaufiblenefs of 
 this apology, it is to be prefum<jd that there would be no fuch 
 thins; as crime in the world. 
 
 *t> 
 
 Book II, Chap. Ill, p. 98. 
 
 The 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF' PROPERTY. 809 
 
 The fruitful fource of crimes confifts in this circumflance, BooKvnr. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 one man's pofleffing in abundance that of which another man is 
 
 deftitute. We muft change the nature of mind, before we can 
 
 prevent it from being powerfully influenced by this circumflance, 
 
 when brought ftrongly home to its perceptions by the nature of 
 
 its fituation. Man muft ceafe to have fenfes, the pleafures of 
 
 appetite and vanity muft ceafe to gratify, before he can look on 
 
 tamely at the monopoly of thefe pleafures. He muft ceafe to 
 
 have a fenfe of juftice, before he can clearly and fully approve 
 
 this mixed fcene of fuperfluity and diftrefs. It is true that the 
 
 proper method of curing this inequality is by reafun and not by 
 
 violence. But the immediate tendency of the eftabliflied fyftem 
 
 is to perfuade men that reafon is impotent. The injuftice of 
 
 which they complain is upheld by force, and they are too eafily 
 
 induced, by force to attempt its correction. All they endeavour 
 
 is the partial correction of an injuftice, which education tells 
 
 them is neceflary, but more powerful reafon affirms to be 
 
 tyrannical. 
 
 Force grew out of monopoly. It might accidentally have 
 occurred among favages whofe appetites exceeded their fupply, 
 or whofe paffions were inflamed by the prefence of the object of 
 their defire ; but it would gradually have died away, as reafon 
 and civilifation advanced. Accumulated property has fixed its 
 empire ; and henceforth all is an open contention of the ftrength 
 and cunning of one party againft the ftrength and cunning of 
 
 5L the.- 
 
Bio BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 book vni. the other. In this cafe the violent and premature ftruggles of 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 the neceffitous are undoubtedly an evil. They tend to defeat 
 the very caufe in the fuccefs of which they are moft deeply 
 interefted ; they tend to procraflinate the triumph of truth. But 
 the true crime is in the malevolent and partial propenfities of 
 men, thinking only of themfelves, and defpifing the emolument 
 of others ; and of thefe the rich have their fhare. 
 
 The fpirit of oppreflion, the fpirit of fervility, and the fpirit 
 ctf" fraud, thefe are the immediate growth of the eftablifhed 
 fyftem of property. Thefe are alike hoftile to intellectual and 
 moral improvement. The other vices of envy, malice and 
 revenge are their infeparable companions. In a ftate of fociety 
 where men lived in the midft of plenty, and where all fhared 
 alike the bounties of nature, thefe fentiments would inevitably 
 expire. The narrow principle of felfifhnefs would vanilh. No 
 man being obliged to guard his little ftore, or provide with 
 anxiety and pain for his reftlefs wants, each would lofe his own 
 individual exiftence in the thought of the general good. No 
 man would be an enemy to his neighbour, for they would have 
 nothing for which to contend ; and of confequence philanthropy 
 would refume the empire which reafon afiigns her. Mind 
 would be delivered from her perpetual anxiety about corporal 
 fupport, and free to expatiate in the field of thought which is 
 -•congenial to her. Each man would afiift the enquiries of all. 
 
 Let 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY, 8u 
 
 Let us fix our attention for a moment upon the revolution of Bo~!Kvirr. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 principles and habits that immediately grow out of an unequal * „ ' 
 
 the paflions 
 
 diftribution of property. Till it was thus diftributed men felt of the rich i 
 what their wants required, and fought the fupplyof thofe wants. 
 All that was more than this, was regarded as indifferent. But no 
 fooner is accumulation introduced, than they begin to ftudy a 
 variety of methods, for difpofing of their fuperfluity with leaft 
 emolument to their neighbour, or in other words by which it 
 (hall appear to be moft their own. They do not long continue 
 to buy commodities, before they begin to buy men. He that 
 poflefies or is the fpectator of fuperfluity foon difcovers the hold 
 which it affords us on the minds of others. Hence the paflions 
 of vanity and orientation. Hence the defpotic manners of them 
 who recoiled with complacence the rank they occupy, and the 
 refllefs ambition of thofe whofe attention is engrofled by the pof- 
 fible future. 
 
 Ambition is of all the paflions of the human mind the moft war. 
 extenfive in its ravages. It adds diftrict to diftricT:, and kingdom 
 to kingdom. It fpreads bloodfhed and calamity and conqueft 
 over the face of the earth. But the paflion itfelf, as well as the 
 means of gratifying it, is the produce of the prevailing fyftem of 
 property *. It is only by means of accumulation that one man 
 obtains an unrefifted fway over multitudes of others. It is by 
 means of a certain diftribution of income that the prefent govern- 
 
 * BookV, Chap. XVI. 
 
 5 L 2 mentj 
 
812 BENEFITS ARISING FROM THE 
 
 book viii. merits of the world are retained in exiftence. Nothing: more 
 
 CHAP. II. b 
 
 > . ' 
 
 eafy than to plunge nations fo organifed into war. But, if Eu- 
 rope were at prefent covered with inhabitants, all of them pof- 
 feffing competence, and none of them fuperfluity, what could in- 
 duce its different countries to engage in hoftility ? If you would 
 lead men to war, you muft exhibit, certain allurements. If you 
 be not enabled by a fyftem, already prevailing and which derives 
 force from prefcription, to hire them to your purpofes, you muft 
 bring over each individual by dint of perfuafion. How hopelefs 
 a talk by fuch means to excite mankind to murder each other ? 
 It is clear then that war in every horrid form is the growth of 
 unequal property. As long as this fource of jealoufy and corv 
 rdption fhall remain, it is vifionary to talk of univerfal peace. As 
 foon as the fource fhall be dried up, it will be impoffible to ex-» 
 elude the confequence. It is property that forms men into one 
 common mafs, and makes them fit to be played upon like a 
 brute machine. Were this {tumbling block removed, each man 
 would be united to his neighbour in love and mutual kindnefs a 
 thoufand times more than now : but each man would think and 
 judge for himfelf. Let then the advocates for the prevailing 
 fyftem, at leaft confider what it is for which they plead, and be 
 well affured that they have arguments in its favour which will 
 weigh againft thefe difadvantages, 
 
 5. in depopu- There is one other circumftance which, though inferior to thofe 
 
 htion. 
 
 above enumerated, deferves to be mentioned. This is popula- 
 
 4 tion. 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 813. 
 
 tion. It has been calculated that the average cultivation of Eu- book viti, 
 
 CHAP. II, 
 rope might be improved, fo as to maintain five times her prefent * v— — ' 
 
 number of inhabitants *. There is a principle in human fociety 
 
 by which population is perpetually kept down to the level of the 
 
 means of fubfiflence. Thus among the wandering tribes- of 
 
 America and. Afia, we never find through the lapfe of ages, that 
 
 population has fo increafed, as to render neceflary the cultivation 
 
 of the earth. Thus, among the civilifed nations of Europe, by 
 
 means of territorial monopoly the fources of fubfiflence are kept 
 
 within a certain limit, and, if the population became overflocked, 
 
 the lower ranks of the inhabitants would be flill more incapable 
 
 of procuring for themfelves the neceflaries of life. There are 
 
 no doubt extraordinary concurrences of circumftances, by means 
 
 of which changes are'occafionally introduced in this refpect ; but 
 
 in ordinary cafes the ftandard of population is held in a manner 
 
 stationary for centuries. Thus the eftablifhed fyftem of property 
 
 may be confidered as ftrangling a confiderable portion of our 
 
 children in their cradle. "Whatever may be the value of the life 
 
 of man, or rather whatever would be his capability of happinefe 
 
 in a free and equal ftate of fociety, the fyftem we are here op-< 
 
 pofing may be confidered as arrefting upon the threshold of ex-* - 
 
 iftence four fifths of that value and that happinefs. 
 
 * Ogilvie, Part I, Se&. iii, par. 35. 
 
 CHAP,: 
 
[ »«4 3 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 ADMIRABLE EFFECTS OF LUXURY. 
 
 NATURE OF THE OBJECTION. — LUXURY NOT NECESSARY — 
 EITHER TO POPULATION — OR TO THE IMPROVEMENT 
 OF THE MIND. — ITS TRUE CHARACTER. 
 
 book vni. ' | "'HES E ideas of juftice and improvement are as old as li- 
 chap. nr. 1 
 
 -*■ terature and reflexion themfelves. They have fuggefted 
 
 themfelves in detached parts to the inquifitive in all ages, though 
 
 they have perhaps never been brought together fo as fufficiently 
 
 to ftrike the mind with their confiftency and beauty. But, after 
 
 having furnifhed an agreeable dream, they have perpetually been 
 
 laid afide as impracticable. We will proceed to examine the ob-? 
 
 jedtions upon which this fuppofed impracticability has been 
 
 founded ; and the anfwer to thefe objections will gradually 'kad 
 
 us to fuch a development of the propofed fyftem, as by its com- 
 
 pletenefs and the regular adjuftment of its parts will be calculated 
 
 to carry conviction to the moft prejudiced mind. 
 
 Nature of the There is one objection that has chiefly been cultivated on Eng- 
 
 lifh ground, and to which we will give the priority of examina- 
 
 2 tion. 
 
OF THE SUPPOSED ADVANTAGES, &c. 815 
 
 tion. It has been affirmed " that private vices are public bene- book vnr. 
 
 CHAP III 
 fits." But this principle, thus coarfely ftated by one of its origi- > ' 
 
 nal advocates *, was remodelled by his more elegant fucceflbrsf. 
 They obferved, " that the true meafure of virtue and vice was 
 utility, and confequently that it was an unreafonable calumny to 
 ftate luxury as a vice. Luxury," they faid, " whatever might 
 be the prejudices that cynics and afcetics had excited againft it, 
 was the rich and generous foil that brought to perfection the true 
 profperity of mankind. Without luxury men muft always have 
 remained folitary favages. It is luxury by which palaces are 
 built and cities peopled. How could there have been high po- 
 pulation in any country, without the various arts in which the 
 fwarms of its inhabitants are bulled ? The true benefactor of 
 mankind is not the fcrupulous devotee who by his charities en- 
 courages infenfibility and floth ; is not the furly philofopher who 
 reads them lectures of barren morality ; but the elegant volup- 
 tuary who employs thoufands in fober and healthful induftry to 
 procure dainties for his table, who unites diftant nations in com- 
 merce to fupply him with furniture, and who encourages the fine 
 arts and all the fublimities of invention to furnifh decorations for 
 his refidence." 
 
 I have brought forward this objection, rather that nothing ma- Luxury not 
 
 neceflary, 
 either to po=- 
 * Mandeville ; Fable of the Bees. pulation^ 
 
 f Coventry, in a treatife entitled, Philemon to Hydafpes : Hume ; Eflays, 
 Part II, Eflay II. 
 
 terial; 
 
,8i6 ;(TF THE SUPPOSED ADVANTAGES 
 
 ■ bookvtti. ferial might appear to be omitted, than becaufe it requires a fepa- 
 . »-. — v- — * -rate anfwer. The true anfwer has been anticipated. It has been 
 Teen that the population of any country is meafuredby its cultiva- 
 tion. „ If therefore fufficient motives can he furnifhed to excite 
 -men to agriculture, there is no doubt, that population maybe 
 carried on to any extent that the land oan be made to maintain. 
 "But agriculture, when once begun, is never found to Hop in its 
 -career, but from pofitive difcountenance. It is territorial mono- 
 poly that obliges men unwillingly to fee vaft tracts of land lying 
 wafte, or negligently and imperfectly cultivated, while they are 
 fubjected to the miferies of want. If land were perpetually open 
 to him who was willing to cultivate it, it is not to be believed 
 but that it would be cultivated in proportion to the wants of the 
 community, nor by the fame reafon would there be any effectual 
 - ...check .-to .the increafe of population. 
 
 cr to the im- Undoubtedly the quantity of manual labour would be greatly 
 
 provement of 
 
 the mind. inferior to that which is now performed by the inhabitants of any 
 civilifed country, hnce at prefent perhaps one twentieth part of 
 the inhabitants performs the agriculture which fupports the 
 whole. But it is by no means to be admitted that this leifure 
 would be found a real calamity. 
 
 Its true chr.- As to what fort of a benefactor the voluptuary is to mankind, 
 this was fufficiently feen when we treated of the effects of de- 
 pendence and injuftice. To this fpecies of benefit all the crimes 
 
 and 
 
O F L U X U RY. g I7 
 
 and moral evils of mankind are indebted for their perpetuity. If book vnr. 
 
 CHAP. Ill 
 mind be to be preferred to mere animal exiftence, if it ought to i 
 
 be the wifh of every reafonable enquirer, not merely that man, 
 
 but that happinefs fhould be propagated, then is the voluptuary 
 
 the bane of the human fpecies. 
 
 5 M CHAP. 
 
C 818 3 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 ALLUREMENTS OF SLOTH. 
 
 THE OBJECTION STATED. — SUCH A STATE OF SOCIETY 
 MUST HAVE BEEN PRECEDED BY GREAT INTELLECTUAL 
 
 IMPROVEMENT. THE MANUAL LABOUR REQUIRED IN 
 
 THIS STATE WILL BE EXTREMELY SMALL. — UNIVERSA- 
 LITY OF THE LOVE OF DISTINCTION. — OPERATION OF 
 THIS MOTIVE UNDER THE SYSTEM IN QUESTION — WILL 
 FINALLY BE SUPERSEDED BY A BETTER MOTIVE. 
 
 book viii. A N O T H E R objection which has been urged againft the 
 CHAP. IV. /-\ _ n , . , _ , , . 
 
 » „ > ■*■ -*- fyftem which counteracts the accumulation or property, 
 
 The obiec- 
 
 tion ftated. is, " that it would put an end to induftry. We behold in com- 
 mercial countries the miracles that are operated by the love of 
 gain. Their inhabitants cover the fea with their fleets, aftoniih 
 mankind by the refinement of their ingenuity, hold vail conti- 
 nents in fubjection in diftant parts of the world by their arms, are 
 able to defy the moft powerful confederacies, and, opprefled with 
 taxes and debts, feem to acquire frefh profperiry under their ac- 
 cumulated burthens. Shall we lightly part with a fyftem that 
 feems pregnant with fuch inexhauftible motives ? Shall we be- 
 lieve that men will cultivate affiduoufly what they have no affur- 
 
 ance 
 
■'_ 
 
 OF THE PRO PENSIT Y, &c. 819 
 
 ance they fhall be permitted to apply to their perfonal emolu- book Vl 11. 
 . ..... CHAP. IV. 
 
 merit ? It will perhaps be found with agriculture as it is with 
 
 commerce, which then fiourifhes beft when fubjected to no con- 
 trol, but, when placed under rigid reftraints, languishes and ex- 
 pires. Once eftablifh it as a principle in fociety that no man is 
 to apply to his perfonal ufe more than his neceffities require, and 
 you will find every man become indifferent to thole exertions 
 which now call forth the energy of his faculties. Man is the 
 creature of fenfations ; and, when we endeavour to {train his in- 
 tellect, and govern him by reafon alone, we do but fhow our ig- 
 norance of his nature. Self love is the genuine fourcc of our 
 actions '*, and, if this fhould be found to bring vice and partiality 
 along with it, yet the fyftem that fhould endeavour to fuperfede 
 it, would be at beft no more than a beautiful romance. If each 
 man found that, without being compelled to exert his own in- 
 duftry, he might lay claim to the fupeifhiity of his neighbour, 
 indolence would perpetually ufurp his faculties, and fuch a foci- 
 ety muft either ftarve, or be obliged in its own defence to return 
 to that fyftem of injuftice and fordid intereft, which theoretical 
 reafoners will for ever arraign to no purpofe." 
 
 This is the principal objection that prevents men from yield- Suchaftate 
 
 of-fociety 
 
 ing without refiftance to the accumulated evidence that has al- ™uit have 
 
 & been preceded. 
 
 ready been adduced. In reply, it may be obferved in the firft by great in- 
 
 tcllcihial im- 
 
 place, that the equality for which we are pleading is an equality provemenfe- 
 
 * For an examination of this principle fee Book IV, Chap. VIII. 
 
 5 M 2 that 
 
Sao OF THE PROPENSITY 
 
 book vnr. that would fucceed to a ftate of great intellectual improvement. 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 j So bold a revolution cannot take place in human affairs, till the 
 
 general mind has been highly cultivated. The prefent age of 
 mankind is greatly enlightened ; but it is to be feared is not yet 
 enlightened enough. Hafty and undigefted tumults may take 
 place under the idea of an equalifation of property ; but it is 
 only a calm and clear conviction of juftice, of juftice mutually to 
 be rendered and received, of happinefs to be produced by the 
 defertion of our mod rooted habits, that can introduce an inva- 
 riable fyftem of this fort. Attempts without this preparation 
 will be productive only of confufion. Their effect will be mo- 
 mentary, and a new and more barbarous inequality will fucceed. 
 Each man with unaltered appetite will watch his opportunity to' 
 gratify his love of power or his love of diftinction, by ufurping 
 on his inattentive neighbours. 
 
 Is it to be believed then that a ftate of fo great intellectual im- 
 provement can be the forerunner of barbarifm ? Savages, it is 
 true, are fubject to the weaknefs of indolence. But civilifed and 
 refined ftates are the fcene of peculiar activity. It is thought, 
 acutenefs of difquifition, and ardour of purfuit, that fet the corpo- 
 real faculties at work. Thought begets thought. Nothing can 
 put a flop to the progreffive advances of mind, but oppreflion. 
 But here, fo far from being oppreffed, every man is equal, every 
 man independent and at his eafe. It has been obferved that the 
 eftablifhment of a republic is always attended with public enthu- 
 fiafm and irrefiftible enterprife. Is it to be believed that equa- 
 
 6 %, 
 
TOSLOTHFULNESS. 821 
 
 lity, the true republicanifm, will be lefs effectual ? It is true that book viii . 
 
 CHAP IV 
 
 in republics this fpirit fooner or later is found to languifh. Re- ■* 
 
 publicanifm is not a remedy that ftrikes at the root of the evil. 
 Injuftice, oppreflion and mifery can find an abode in thofe feem- 
 ing happy feats. But what fhall flop the progrefs of ardour and 
 improvement, where the monopoly of property is unknown ? 
 
 This argument will be ftrengthened, if we reflect on the The manual 
 
 labour re- 
 
 amount of labour that a ftate of equal property will require, qui.ed in this 
 
 itate will be 
 
 What is this quantity of exertion from which we are fuppofing extremely 
 
 fmall. 
 
 many members of the community to fhrink ? It isfo light a bur- 
 then as rather to afTume the appearance of agreeable relaxation 
 and gentle exercife, than of labour. In this community fcarcely 
 any can be expected in confequence of their fituation or avoca- 
 tions to confider themfelves as exempted from manual induftry. 
 There will be no rich men to recline in indolence and fatten 
 upon the labour of their fellows. The mathematician, the poet 
 and the philofopher will derive a new flock of chearfulnefs and 
 energy from the recurring labour that makes them feel they are 
 men. There will be no peribns employed in the manufacture of 
 trinkets and luxuries ; and none in directing the wheels of the 
 complicated machine of government, tax-gatherers, beadles, ex- 
 cifemen, tide-waiters, clerks and fecretaries. There will be nei- 
 ther fleets nor armies, neither courtiers nor footmen. It is the 
 unneceflary employments that at prefent occupy the great mafs of 
 the inhabitants of every civilifed nation, while the peafant labours 
 
 inceflantly 
 
g 22 OF THE PROPENSITY 
 
 rook vnr. inceflantly to maintain them in a ftate more pernicious than idle- 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 neis. 
 
 It has been computed that not more than one twentieth of the 
 inhabitants of England are employed ferioufly and fubftantially 
 in the labours of agriculture. Add to this, that the nature of 
 agriculture is fucb, as neceffarily to give full occupation in fome 
 parts of the year, and to leave others comparatively unemployed. 
 We may confider thefe latter periods as equivalent to a labour 
 which, under the direction of fufficient ikill, might fuffice in a 
 fimple ftate of fociety for the fabrication of tools, for weaving, 
 and the occupation of taylors, bakers and butchers. The ob- 
 ject in the prefent ftate of fociety is to multiply labour, in ano- 
 ther ftate it will be to fimplify it. A vaft difproportion of the 
 wealth of the community has been thrown into the hands of a 
 few, and ingenuity has been continually upon the ftretch to find 
 out ways in which it may be expended. In the feudal times the 
 great lord invited the poor to come and eat of the produce of his 
 eftate upon condition of their wearing his livery, and forming 
 themfelves in rank and file to do honour to his well born guefts. 
 Now that exchanges are more facilitated, we have quitted this in- 
 artificial mode, and oblige the men we maintain out of our in- 
 comes to exert their ingenuity and induftry in return. Thus in 
 the inftance juft mentioned, we pay the taylor to cut our clothes 
 to pieces, that he may few them together again, and to decorate 
 them with Hitching and various ornaments, without which expe- 
 
 rienc e 
 
TOSLOTHFULNESS. 823 
 
 rience would fpeedily fhow that they were in no refpect lefs ufe- eookviii. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 ful. We are imagining in the prefent cafe a ftate of the moft > v j 
 rigid fimplicity. 
 
 From the fketch which has been here given it feems by no 
 means impoffible, that the labour of every twentieth man in the 
 community would be fufficient to maintain the reft in all the ab- 
 folute neceffaries of human life. If then this labour, inftead of 
 being performed by fo fmall a number, were amicably divided 
 among them all, it would occupy the twentieth part of every 
 man's time. Let us compute that the induftry of a labouring 
 man engroffes ten hours in every day, which, when we have de- 
 ducted his hours of reft, recreation and meals, feems an ample 
 allowance. It follows that half an hour a day, ferioufly em- 
 ployed in manual labour by every member of the community, 
 would fufficiently fupply the whole with neceffaries. Who is 
 there that would fhrink from this degree of induftry ? Who is 
 there that fees the inceffant induftry exerted in this city and this 
 ifland, and would believe that, with half an hour's induftry per 
 diem, we fhould be every way happier and better than we are at 
 prefent ? Is it poffible to contemplate this fair and generous pic- 
 ture of independence and virtue, where every man would have 
 ample leifure for the nobleft energies of mind, without feeling 
 our very fouls refrefhed with admiration and hope ? 
 
 When we talk of men's finking into idlenefs if they be not Uaiverfality 
 
 of the love of 
 2 excited difuu&ion. 
 
824 OF THE PROPENSITY 
 
 book viit. excited by the ftimulus of gain, we have certainly very little con- 
 CHAP. IV. J G J J 
 
 1 » ' fidered the motives that at prefent govern the human mind. We 
 
 are deceived by the apparent mercenarinefs of mankind, and 
 imagine that the accumulation of wealth is their great object. 
 But the cafe is far otherwife. The prefent ruling paflion of the 
 human mind is the love of diftinction. There is no doubt a 
 clafs in fociety that are perpetually urged by hunger and need, 
 and have no leifure for motives lefs grofs and material. But is 
 the clafs next above them lefs induftrious than they ? I exert a 
 certain fpecies of induftry to fupply my immediate wants ; but 
 thefe wants are foon fupplied. The reft is exerted that I may 
 wear a better coat, that I may clothe my wife with gay attire, 
 that I may not merely have a fhelter but a handfome habitation, 
 not merely bread or flefh to eat, but that I may fet it out with a 
 fuitable decorum. How many of thefe things would engage my 
 attention, if I lived in a defert ifland, and had no fpectators of my 
 economy ? If I furvey the appendages of my perfon, is there one 
 article that is not an appeal to the refpecT: of my neighbours, or a 
 refuge againft their contempt ? It is for this that the merchant 
 braves the dangers of the ocean, and the mechanical inventor 
 brings forth the treafures of his meditation. The foldier ad- 
 vances even to the cannon's mouth, the ftatefman expofes him- 
 felf to the rage of an indignant people, becaufe they cannot bear 
 to pafs through life without diftinction and efteem. Exclufively 
 of certain higher motives that will prefently be mentioned, this is 
 the purpofe of all the great exertions of mankind. The man who 
 
 has 
 
TOSLOTHFULNESS. 825 
 
 has nothinsr to provide for but his animal wants, fcarcely ever book viit. 
 
 ° r J CHAP. IV. 
 
 •fhakes off the lethargy of his mind ; but the love of praife • v— ' 
 
 hurries us on to the moft incredible achievements. Nothing 
 is more common than to find perfons who furpafs the reft of 
 their fpecies in activity, inexcufably remifs in the melioration 
 of their pecuniary affairs. 
 
 In reality thofe by whom this reafoning has been urged, 
 have miftaken the nature of their own objection. They did 
 not fincerely believe that men could be roufed into action only 
 by the love of gain ; but they imagined that in a ftate of equal 
 property men would have nothing to occupy 'their attention. 
 What degree of truth there is in this idea we fhall prefently have 
 occafion to eftimate. 
 
 Meanwhile it is fufficiently obvious, that the motives which Operation of 
 
 this motiTe 
 
 arife from the love of diftinction are by no means cut off, by a under the 
 
 fyftem in 
 
 ftate of fociety incompatible with the accumulation of property, queftion t 
 Men, no longer able to acquire the efteem or avoid the contempt 
 of their neighbours by circumftances of drefs and furniture, will 
 divert the pamon for diftinction into another channel. They 
 will avoid the reproach of indolence, as carefully as they now 
 avoid the reproach of poverty. The only perfons who at pre- 
 fent neglect the effect which their appearance and manners may 
 produce, are thofe whofe faces are ground with famine and 
 diftrefs. But in a ftate of equal fociety no man will be opprefled, 
 
 5 N and 
 
S 2 6 OF THE PROPENSITY 
 
 bookviii. and of confequence the more delicate affections of the foul will 
 i v - j have time to expand themfelves. The general mind having, as we 
 have already fhown, arrived at a high pitch of improvement, 
 the impulfe that carries it out into action will be flronger than 
 ever. The fervour of public fpirit will be great. Leimre will 
 be multiplied, and the leifure of a cultivated underftanding is the 
 precife period in which great ceugns, defigns the tendency of 
 which is to fecure applaufe and efteem, are conceived. In tran- 
 quil leifure it is impoffible for any but the fubJimefl: mind to 
 exift without the paffion for diftindtion. This paffion, no 
 longer permitted to lofe itfelf in indirect channels and ufelefs 
 Wanderings, will feek the nobleft courfe, and perpetually fructify 
 the feeds of public good. Mind, though it will perhaps at no 
 time arrive at the termination of its poflible difcoveries and im- 
 provements, will neverthelefs advance with a rapidity and firm- 
 nefs of progreffion of which we are at prefent unable to conceive 
 the idea. 
 
 will finally be The love of fame is no doubt a delufion. This like every 
 
 fuperfeded by • 
 
 a better mo- other delufion will take its turn to be detected and abjured. It 
 
 tire. J 
 
 is an airy phantom, which will indeed afford us an imperfect 
 pleafure fo long as we worfhip it, but will always in a confider- 
 able degree difappoint us, and will not ftand the teft of exami- 
 nation. We ought to love nothing but good, a pure and immu- 
 table felicity, the good cf the majority, the good of the general. 
 If there be any thing more fubflantial than all the reft, it is 
 
 juftice, 
 
TOSLOTHFULNESS. 827 
 
 juftice, a principle that refts upon this fingle poftulatum, that book vnr. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 man and man are beings of the fame nature, and fufceptible, * ^— — ' 
 
 under certain limitations, of the fame advantages. Whether the 
 benefit proceed from you or me, fo it be but conferred, is a piti- 
 ful diftin&ion. Juftice has the farther advantage, which ferves 
 us as a countercheck to prove the goodnefs of this fpecies of arith- 
 metic, of producing the only folid happinefs to the man by 
 whom it is practifed, as well as the good of all. But fame can- 
 not benefit me, any more than ferve the beft purpofes to others. 
 The man who acts from the love of it, may produce public 
 good ; but, if he do, it is from indirect and fpurious views. 
 Fame is an unfubftantial and delufive purfuit. If it fignify an 
 opinion entertained of me greater than I deferve, to purfue it is 
 vicious. If it be the precife mirror of my character, it is defira- 
 ble only as a means, in as much as I may perhaps be able to do 
 moft good to the perfons who beft know the extent of my 
 capacity and the rectitude of my intentions. 
 
 The love of fame, when it perifhes in minds formed under the 
 prefent fyftem, often gives place to a greater degeneracy. Selfifh- 
 nefs is the habit that grows out of monopoly. When therefore 
 this felfiftmefs ceafes to feek its gratification in public exertion, 
 it too often narrows itfelf into fome frigid conception ofperfonal 
 pleafure, perhaps fenfual, perhaps intellectual. But this cannot 
 be the procefs where monopoly is banifhed. Selfifhnefs has 
 there no kindly circumftances to fofter it. Truth, the over- 
 
 5 N 2 powering 
 
8a8 
 
 OF THE PROPENSITY TO SLOTHFULNESS. 
 
 book vii r. powering truth of general good, then feizes us irrefiftibly. It 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 ; is impoflible we mould want motives, fo long as we fee clearly 
 
 how multitudes and ages may be benefited by our exertions, how 
 
 caufes and effects are connected in an endlefs chain, fo that no 
 
 honeft effort can be loft, but will operate to good, centuries after 
 
 its author is configrjed to the grave. This will be the general 
 
 palfion, and all wiil be animated by the example of all. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 8 29 ] 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 
 IMPOSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING RENDERED 
 
 PERMANENT. 
 
 GROUNDS OF THE OBJECTION. ITS SERIOUS IMPORT. 
 
 ANSWER, THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH A SYSTEM 
 
 •MUST BE OWING, I. TO A DEEP SENSE OF JUSTICE 2. 
 
 TO A CLEAR INSIGHT INTO THE NATURE OF HAPPINESS 
 AS BEING PROPERLY INTELLECTUAL NOT CONSIST- 
 ING IN SENSUAL PLEASURE OR THE PLEASURES OF 
 
 DELUSION. — INFLUENCE OF THE PASSIONS CONSIDERED. 
 MEN WILL NOT ACCUMULATE EITHER FROM INDIVI- 
 DUAL FORESIGHT OR FROM VANITY. 
 
 LET us proceed to another objection. It has fometimes been book viii. 
 CHAP. V. 
 faid by thofe who oppoie the dodtrine here maintained, » v ' 
 
 Grounds of 
 
 *' that equality might perhaps contribute to the improvement the objeaion. 
 and happinefs of mankind, if it were confiftent with the nature 
 of man that fuch a principle mould be rendered permanent ; but 
 that every expectation of that kind muft prove abortive. Con- 
 fufion would be introduced under the idea of equality to-day, 
 but the old vices and monopolies would return to-morrow. All 
 that the rich would have purchafed by the rnoft generous facri- 
 
 fice, 
 
830 OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE 
 
 uooicYiir. fice, would be a period of barbarifm, from which the ideas and 
 » , j regulations of civil fociety muft commence as from a new infancy. 
 
 The nature of man cannot be changed. There would at leaft 
 be fome vicious and defigning members of fociety, who would 
 endeavour to fecure to themfelves indulgencies beyond the reft. 
 Mind would not be reduced to that exacl: uniformity which a 
 ftate of equal property demands ; and the variety of fentiments 
 which muft always in fome degree prevail, would inevitably 
 fubvert the refined fyftems of fpeculative perfection." 
 
 its fenous jvj objection can be more effential than that which is here 
 
 import. 
 
 adduced. It highly becomes us in fo momentous a fubjec~t to 
 refift all extravagant fpeculations : it would be truly to be lamented, 
 if, while we parted with that ftate of fociety through which 
 mind has been thus far advanced, we were replunged into barba- 
 rifm by the purfuit of fpecious appearances. But what is worft 
 of all, is that, if this objection be true, it is to be feared there is 
 no remedy. Mind muft go forward. What it fees and ad- 
 mires, it will fome time or other feek to attain. Such is the 
 inevitable law of our nature. But it is impoffible not to fee the 
 beauty of equality, and to be charmed with the benefits it feems 
 to promife. The confequence is fure. Man, according to the 
 fyftem of thefe reafoners, is prompted to advance for fome time 
 with fuccefs ; but after that time, in the very ad: of purfuing 
 farther improvement, he neceiTarily plunges beyond the compafs 
 of his powers, and has then his petty career to begin afrefh. 
 
 6 The 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 8u 
 
 O' 
 
 The objection reprefents him as a foul abortion, withjuft under- book vin. 
 
 CHAP.V. 
 
 ftanding enough to fee what is good, but with too little to retain * « ' 
 
 him in the practice of it. — Let us confider whether equality, 
 once eftablifhed, would be fo precarious as it is here reprefented. 
 
 In anfwer to this objection it muft firft be remembered, Anfwer. 
 that the ftate of equalifation we are here fuppofing is not the 
 refult of accident, of the authority of a chief magiftrate, or the 
 over earneft perfuafion of a few enlightened thinkers, but is 
 produced by the ferious and deliberate conviction of the com- 
 munity at large. We will fuppofe for the prefent that it is poffi- 
 ble for fuch a conviction to take place among a given number of 
 perfons living in fociety with each other : and, if it be poflible 
 in a fmall community, there feems to be no fufficient reafon to 
 prove that it is impofhble in one of larger and larger dimenfions. 
 The queftion we have here to examine is concerning the proba- 
 bility, when the conviction has once been introduced, of its 
 becoming permanent. 
 
 The conviction refts upon two intellectual impreffions, one The l'ntro- 
 ofjuftice, and the other of happinefs. Equalifation of property fachafyftem 
 cannot begin to aflume a fixed appearance in human fociety, till wi n g, 1 . to 
 the fentiment becomes deeply wrought into the mind, that the ofjuftLe. 
 genuine wants of any man conftitute his only juft claim to the 
 appropriating any fpecies of commodity. If the general fenfe of 
 
 mankind 
 
832 OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE 
 
 book vin. mankind were once fo far enlightened, as to produce a perpetual 
 
 CHAP V 
 
 impreffion of this truth, of fo forcible a fort as to be exempt 
 from all objections and doubt, we fhould look with equal 
 horror and contempt at the idea of any man's accumulating a 
 property he did not want. All the evils that a ftate of mono- 
 poly never fails to engender would ftand forward in our minds, 
 together with all the exifting happinefs that attended upon a 
 ftate of freedom. We fhould feel as much alienation of thought 
 from the confuming ufelefsly upon ourfelves what would be 
 beneficial to another, or from the accumulating property for the 
 purpofe of obtaining fome kind of afcendancy over the mind of 
 our neighbours, as we now feel from the commiffion of murder. 
 No man will difpute, that a ftate of equal property once efta- 
 blifhed, would greatly diminifh the evil propenfities of man. 
 But the crime we are now fuppofing is more atrocious than any 
 that is to be found in the prefent ftate of fociety. Man perhaps 
 is incapable under any circumftance of perpetrating an action of 
 which he has a clear and undoubted perception that it is contrary 
 to the general good. But be this as it will, it is hardly to be 
 believed that any man for the fake of fome imaginary gratification 
 to himfelf would wantonly injure the whole, if his mind were 
 not firft ulcerated with the imprefTion of the injury that fociety 
 by its ordinances is committing againft him. The cafe we are 
 here confidering is that of a man, who does not even imagine 
 himfelf injured, and yet wilfully fub verts a ftate of happinefs to 
 
 which 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 833 
 
 which no defcription can do iuftice, to make room for the bookviii. 
 
 CHAP. V. 
 
 return of all thofe calamities and vices with which mankind have * *-— — ' 
 
 been infefted from the earlieft page of hiftory. 
 
 The equalifation we are defcribing is farther indebted for its *■• to a ^ lear 
 
 infight into 
 
 empire in the mind to the ideas with which it is attended of per- the n ? ture of 
 
 happinefs : 
 
 fonal happinefs. It grows out of a fimple, clear and unanfwerable 
 theory of the human mind, that we firft ftand in need of a certain 
 animal fubfiftence and fhelter, and after that, that our only true as ^'"2 P r0 " 
 
 * * « P er 'y wtel- 
 
 felicity confifts in the expanfion of our intellectual powers, the leftu » 1 : 
 knowledge of truth, and the pra&ice of virtue. It might feem 
 at firft fight as if this theory omitted a part of the experimental 
 hiftory of mind, the pleafures of fenfe and the pleafures of delu- 
 fion. But this omiflion is apparent, not real. However many not confiftincr 
 are the kinds of pleafure of which we are fufceptible, the truly pkafure : 
 prudent man will facrifice the inferior to the more exquifite. 
 Now no man who has ever produced or contemplated the happi- 
 nefs of others with a liberal mind, will deny that this exercife is 
 infinitely the moft pleafurable of all fenfation<=. But he that is 
 guilty of the fmalleft excefs of fenfual pleafures, by fo much 
 diminifhes his capacity of obtaining this higheft pleafure. Not 
 to add, if that be of any importance, that rigid temperance is 
 the reafonable means of tafting fenfual pleafures with the higheft 
 relifli. This Was the fyftem of Epicurus, and muft be the fyftem 
 of every man who ever fpeculated deeply on the nature of human 
 happinefs. For the pleafures of delufion, they are abfolutely orthepfea- 
 
 . fures of delu- 
 
 5 O incompatible Con. 
 
8 34 OF THE PERMANENCE OF THE 
 
 Booicvm. incompatible with our higheft pleafure. If we would either 
 
 CHAP V 
 
 t j promote or enjoy the happinefs of others, we mull feek to know 
 
 in what it confifts. But knowledge is the irreconcileable foe of 
 delufion. In proportion as mind rifes to its true element, and 
 lhakes off thofe prejudices which are the authors of our mifery, 
 it becomes incapable of deriving pleafure from flattery^fame or 
 power, or indeed from any fource that is not compatible with, or 
 in other words does not make a part of the common good. 
 The raoft palpable of all clafles of knowledge is that I am, per- 
 sonally confidered, but an atom in the ocean of mind. — The firft 
 rudiment therefore of that fcience of perfonal happinefs which is 
 infeparable from a ftate of equalifation, is, that I fhall derive in- 
 finitely more pleafure from fimplicity, frugality and truth, than 
 from luxury, empire and fame. What temptation has a man, 
 entertaining this opinion, and living in a ftate of equal property, 
 to accumulate ? 
 
 Influence of This queftion has been perpetually darkened by the doctrine, fo 
 
 coniidered. familiar to writers of morality, of the independent operations of 
 reafon and paflion. Such diftinctions muft always darken. Of 
 how many parts does mind confift ? Of none. It confifts merely 
 of a feries of thought fucceeding thought from the firft moment of 
 our exiftence to its termination *. This word paflion, which has 
 produced fuch extenfive mifchief in the philofophy of mind, and 
 has no real archetype, is perpetually (hifting its meaning. Some- 
 
 Book IV, Chap. VIT, p. 335. 
 
 times 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 835 
 
 times it is applied univerfally to all thofe thoughts, which, being book viii. 
 peculiarly vivid, and attended with great force of argument real or * 
 imaginary, carry us out into action with uncommon energy. Thus 
 we fpeak of the paffion of benevolence, public fpirit or courage. 
 Sometimes it fignifies thofe vivid thoughts only, which upon ac- 
 curate examination appear to be founded in error. In the firft 
 fenfe the word might have been unexceptionable. Vehement 
 defire is the refult of a certain operation of the underftanding, and 
 muft always be in a joint ratio of the fuppofed clearnefs of the 
 propofition and importance of the practical effects. In the fecond 
 fenfe, the doctrine of the paflions would have been exceedingly 
 harmlefs, if we had been accuftomed to put the definition inftead 
 of the thing defined. It would then have been found that it merely 
 affirmed that the human mind muft always be liable to precifely the 
 fame miftakes as we obferve in it at prefent, or in other words af- 
 firmed the neceffary permanence in opposition to the neceffary per- 
 fectibility of intellect. Who is there indeed that fees not, in the 
 cafe above ftated, the abfurdity of fuppofing a man, fo long as he 
 has a clear view of juftice and intereft lying on one fide of a 
 given queftion, to be fubject to errors that irrefiftibly compel him 
 to the other ? The mind is no doubt liable to fluctuation. But 
 there is a degree of conviction that would render it impoffible for 
 us any longer to derive pleafure from intemperance, dominion or 
 fame, and this degree in the inceffant progrefs of thought muft 
 one day arrive.. 
 
 5 O 2 This 
 
S36 OF THE PERMANENCE OP THE 
 
 book viii. This proportion of the permanence of a fyftem of equal pro- 
 y / perty, a fter it has once been brought into action by the energies 
 
 Men will not 
 
 accumulate of reafon and conviction, will be placed out of the reach of all 
 
 either from 
 
 individual equitable doubt, if we proceed to form to ourfelves an accurate 
 
 forefight : 
 
 picture of the action of this fyftem. Let us fuppofe that we are 
 introduced to a community of men, who are accuftomed to an in- 
 duftry proportioned to the wants of the whole, and to communi- 
 cate inftantly and unconditionally, each man to his neighbour, 
 that for which the former has not and the latter has immediate 
 occafion. Here the firft and fimpleft motive to perfonal accumu- 
 lation is inftantly cut off. I need not accumulate to protect my- 
 fclf againft accidents, ficknefs or infirmity, for thefe are claims 
 the validity of which is not regarded as a fubject of doubt, and 
 with which every man is accuftomed to comply. I can accu- 
 mulate in a confiderable degree nothing but what is perifhable, 
 for exchange being unknown, that which I cannot perfonally 
 confume adds nothing to the fum of my wealth. — Meanwhile it 
 fhould be obferved, that, though accumulation for private pur- 
 pofes under fuch a fyftem would be in the higheft degree irra- 
 tional and abfurd, this by no means precludes fuch accumulation, 
 as may be neceflary to provide againft public contingencies. If 
 there be any truth in the preceding reafonings, this kind of accu- 
 mulation will be unattended with danger. Add to this, that the 
 perpetual tendency of wifdom is to preclude contingency. It is 
 well known that dearths are principally owing to the falfe pre- 
 cautions 
 
GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 837 
 
 cautions and falfe timidity of mankind; and it is reafonable to book via. 
 
 CHAP. V 
 fuppofe that a degree of fkill will hereafter be produced, which v v ' , . '» 
 
 will gradually annihilate the failure of crops and other fimilar ac- 
 cidents. 
 
 It has already appeared, that the principal and unintermitting or raniey. 
 motive to private accumulation, is the love of diftin&ion and 
 efteem. This motive is alfo withdrawn. As accumulation can 
 have no rational object, it would be viewed as a mark of infa- 
 nity, not a title to admiration. Men would be accuftomed to 
 the fimple principles of juftice, and know that nothing was en- 
 titled to efteem but talents and virtue. Habituated to employ 
 their fuperfluity to fupply the wants of their neighbour, and to 
 dedicate the time which was not necefiary for manual labour to 
 the cultivation of intellect, with what fentiments would they be- 
 hold the man, who was foolifh enough to few a bit of lace upon 
 his coat, or affix any other ornament to his perfon ? In fuch • a 
 community property would perpetually tend to find its level. It 
 would be interefting to all to be informed of the perfon in whofe 
 hands a certain quantity of any commodity was lodged, and 
 every man would apply with confidence to him for the fupply of 
 his wants in that commodity. Putting therefore out of the 
 queftion every kind of compulfion, the feeling of depravity and 
 abfurdity, that would be excited with relation to the man who 
 refufed to part with that for which he had no real need, would 
 operate in all cafes as a fufficient difcouragement to fo odious an 
 
 innovation. 
 
838 OF THE PERMANENCE, &c. 
 
 book viii. fnnovation. Every man would conceive that he had a iuft and 
 CHAP. v. J J 
 
 v v ■■ * complete title to make ufe of my fuperfluity. If I refufed to 
 liften to reafon and expoftulation on this head, he would not ftay 
 to adjuft with me a thing fo vicious as exchange, but would leave 
 me in order to feek the fupply from fome rational being. Ac- 
 cumulation, inftead, as now, of calling forth every mark of 
 refpecT:, would tend to cut off the individual who attempted it from 
 all the bonds of fociety, and fink him in neglect and oblivion. 
 The influence of accumulation at prefent is derived from the idea 
 of eventual benefit in the mind of the obferver ; but the accu- 
 mulator then would be in a cafe ftill worfe than that of the mifer 
 now, who, while he adds thoufands to his heap, cannot be pre- 
 vailed upon to part with a fuperfluous farthing, and is therefore 
 the object of general defertion. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 8 39 ] 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 INFLEXIBILITY OF ITS RESTRICTIONS. 
 
 NATURE OF THE OBJECTION. — NATURAL AND MORAL IN- 
 DEPENDENCE DISTINGUISHED — THE FIRST BENEFICIAL 
 — THE SECOND INJURIOUS. — TENDENCY OF RESTRIC- 
 TION PROPERLY SO CALLED. — THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF 
 
 PROPERTY NOT A SYSTEM OF RESTRICTIONS DOES NOT 
 
 REQUIRE COMMON LABOUR, MEALS OR MAGAZINES. 
 
 SUCH RESTRICTIONS ABSURD — AND UNNECESSARY. — 
 EVILS OF COOPERATION. ITS PROVINCE MAY PERPETU- 
 ALLY BE DIMINISHED. MANUAL LABOUR MAY BE EX- 
 TINGUISHED. — CONSEQUENT ACTIVITY OF INTELLECT. 
 
 IDEAS OF THE FUTURE STATE OF COOPERATION. 
 
 ITS LIMITS. — ITS LEGITIMATE PROVINCE. — EVILS OF 
 COHABITATION — AND MARRIAGE. — THEY OPPOSE THE 
 
 DEVELOPMENT OF OUR FACULTIES ARE INIMICAL TO 
 
 OUR HAPPINESS — AND DEPRAVE OUR UNDERSTAND- 
 INGS. — MARRIAGE A BRANCH OF THE PREVAILING SYS- 
 TEM OF PROPERTY. — CONSEQUENCES OF ITS ABOLITION. 
 — EDUCATION NEED NOT IN THAT STATE OF SOCIETY 
 
 BE A SUBJECT OF POSITIVE INSTITUTION. THESE 
 
 PRINCIPLES 
 
8 4 o OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 PRINCIPLES DO NOT LEAD TO A SULLEN INDIVIDUA- 
 LITY. — PARTIAL ATTACHMENTS CONSIDERED. — BENE- 
 FITS ACCRUING FROM A JUST AFFECTION MATERI- 
 ALLY PROMOTED BY THESE PRINCIPLES. THE GENU- 
 INE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY DOES NOT PROHIBIT ACCU- 
 MULATION — IMPLIES A CERTAIN DEGREE OF APPRO- 
 PRIATION — AND DIVISION OF LABOUR. 
 
 book viii. A N obje&ion that has often been urged againfta fyftem of 
 
 * « ' ■*• ■*■ equal property, is, " that it is inconfiftent with perfonal 
 
 objeaion. independence. Every man according to this fcheme is a paffive 
 inftrument in the hands of the community. He muft eat and 
 drink, and play and fleep at the bidding of others. He has no 
 habitation, no period at which he can retreat into himfelf, and 
 not afk another's leave. He has nothing that he can call his own, 
 not even his time or his perfon. Under the appearance of a 
 perfect freedom from opprefiion and tyranny, he is in reality 
 fubje&ed to the moft unlimited flavery." 
 
 Natural and To underftand the force of this objection it is neceflary that we 
 pendence mould diftinguifh two forts of independence, one of which may 
 thefirftbene- De denominated natural, and the other moral. Natural inde- 
 
 C * 1 
 
 pendence, a freedom from all conftraint except that of reafon and 
 argument prefented to the underftanding, is of the utmoft import- 
 the fecond ance to the welfare and improvement of mind. Moral independ- 
 ence on the contrary is always injurious. The dependence which 
 
 is 
 
 wjuri 
 
 0\18. 
 
OF LIBERTY. 841 
 
 is eflentlal in this refpect to the wholfome temperament of lb- book vm. 
 
 f T-T A P V T 
 
 ciety, includes in it articles that are no doubt unpalatable to a v '> 
 
 multitude of the prefent race of mankind, but that owe their 
 unpopularity only to weaknefs and vice. It includes a cenfure 
 to be exercifed by every individual over the actions of another, 
 a promptnefs to enquire into them, and to judge them. Why 
 fhould I fhrink from this ? What could be more beneficial than 
 for each man to derive every poffible affiftance for correcting and 
 moulding his conduct from the perfpicacity of his neighbours ? 
 The reafon why this fpecies of cenfure is at prefent exercifed with 
 Dliberality, is becaufe it is exercifed clandeflinely and we fubmit 
 to its operation with impatience and averfion. Moral inde- 
 pendence is always injurious : for, as has abundantly appeared in 
 the courfe of the prefent enquiry, there is no fituation in which I 
 can be placed,where it is not incumbent upon me to adopt a certain 
 fpecies of conduct in preference to all others, and of confequence 
 where I mall not prove an ill member of fociety, if I act in any 
 other than a particular manner. The attachment that is felt by 
 the prefent race of mankind to independence in this refpect, the 
 defire to aft as they pleafe without being accountable to the prin- 
 ciples of reafon, is highly detrimental to the general welfare. 
 
 But if we ought never to act independently of the principles Tendency of 
 
 ' ... reftriftion, 
 
 of reafon, and in no inftance to fhrink from the candid examina- properly fo 
 
 called. 
 
 tion of another, it is neverthelefs effential that we mould at all 
 times be free to cultivate the individuality and follow the dictates 
 
 S P of 
 
842 OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 book vin. of our own judgment. If there be any thin? in the fcheme of equal 
 
 ch/j.vi. ... 
 
 v- — , > property that infringes this principle, the objection is conclufive. 
 
 If the fcheme be, as it has often been reprefented, a fcheme of go- 
 vernment, constraint and regulation, it is no doubt in direct ho- 
 ftility with the principles of this work. 
 
 The genuine g ut fa e { ru th J S) .{ha*, a fyftem of equal property requires no 
 petty not a reftrictions or fuperintendence whatever. There is no need of 
 
 fyftem ot re- r 
 
 ' : common labour, common meals or common magazines. Thefe 
 
 does not re- 
 
 qmre common are feeble and miftaken inftruments for reftraining the conduct 
 
 labour, meals ■ 
 
 »r magazines. w i t hout making conqueft of the judgment. If you cannot bring 
 over the hearts of the community to your party, expect no fuc- 
 cefs from brute regulations. If you can, regulation is unnecef- 
 fary. Such a fyftem was well enough adapted to the military 
 conftitution of Sparta ; but it is wholly unworthy of men who are 
 enlifted in no caufe but that of reafon and juflice. Beware of 
 reducing men to the ftate of machines. Govern them through 
 no medium but that of inclination and conviction. 
 
 Such reftric- Why mould we have common meals ? Am I obliged to be 
 
 tions ablurd : J 
 
 hungry at the fame time that you are ? Ought I to come at a 
 certain hour, from the mufeum where I am working, the recefs 
 where I meditate, or the obfervatory where I remark the pheno- 
 mena of nature, to a certain hall appropriated to the office of 
 eating ; inftead of eating, as reafon bids me, at the time and place 
 moft fuited to my avocations ? Why have common magazines ? 
 
 5 For 
 
OF LIBERTY. 843 
 
 For the purpofe of carrying our provifions a certain diftance, that book vrn. 
 1,-11 • • CHAP. VI. 
 we may afterwards bring them back again ? Or is this precau- * „ » 
 
 and unnecef- 
 
 tion really neceflary, after all. that has been faid in praife of equal fary. 
 fociety and the omnipotence of reafon, to guard us againft the 
 knavery and covetoufnefs of our aflbciates ? If it be, for God's 
 fake let us difcard the parade of political juftice, and go over to 
 the ftandard of thofe reafoners who fay, that man and the practice 
 of juftice are incompatible with each other. 
 
 Once more let us be upon our guard againft reducing men to Evils of co- 
 operation.. 
 
 the condition of brute machines. The objectors of the laft chap- 
 ter were partly in the right when they fpoke of the endlefs vari- 
 ety of mind. It would be abfurd to fay that we are not capable 
 of truth, of evidence and agreement. In thefe refpects, fo far as 
 mind is in a ftate of progreflive improvement, we are perpetually 
 coming nearer to each other. But there are fubjects about which 
 we fhall continually differ, and ought to differ. The ideas, the 
 affociations and the circumftances of each man are properly his 
 own ; and it is a pernicious fyftem that would lead us to require 
 all men, however different their circumftances, to ac~l in many of 
 the common affairs of life by a precife general rule. Add to this, 
 that, by the doctrine of progreflive improvement, we fhall always 
 be erroneous, though we fhall every day become lefs erroneous. 
 The proper method for haftening the decay of error, is not, by 
 brute force, or by regulation which is one of the claffes of force, 
 
 5 P 2 -to 
 
OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 book viir. to endeavour to reduce men to intellectual uniformity: but on 
 <JHAP. VI. . J 
 
 v , ' the contrary by teaching every man to think for himfelf. 
 
 From thefe principles it appears that every thing that is ufually 
 underftood by the term cooperation, is in fome degree an evil. 
 A man in folitude, is obliged to facrifice or poftpone the exemp- 
 tion of his bell thoughts to his own convenience.. How many 
 admirable defigns have perilhed in the conception by means of 
 this circumftance ? The true remedy is for men to reduce their 
 wants to the fewer! poffible, and as much as poffible to Amplify 
 the mode of fupplying them. It is ftill worfe when a man is alio 
 obliged to confult the convenience of others.. If I be expected 
 to eat or to work in conjunction with my neighbour, it muft ei- 
 ther be at a time rnoft convenient to me, or to him, or to neither 
 of us. We cannot be reduced to a clock-work uniformity. 
 
 Itsprovinct Hence it follows that all fupererogatory cooperation is care- 
 may perpe- 
 tually be di- fyijy to be avoided, common labour and common meals. " But 
 
 what mail we fay to cooperation that feems to be dictated by the 
 
 nature of the work to be performed ?" It ought to be diminifhed. 
 
 At prefent it is unreafonable to doubt, that the confideration of 
 
 the evit of cooperation is in certain urgent cafes to be poftponed 
 
 to that urgency. Whether by the nature of things cooperation 
 
 of fome fort will always be neceflary, is a queftion that we are 
 
 fcarcely competent to decide, At prefent, to pull down a tree,, to 
 
 cut 
 
OF LIBERTY. 8| 5 
 
 cut a canal, to navigate a veffel, requires the labour of many, book vnr. 
 
 CHAP VI 
 Will it always require the labour of many ? When we look at l , ' •* 
 
 the complicated machines of human contrivance, various forts of 
 mills, of weaving engines, of fteam engines,, are we not aflonifhed 
 at the compendium of labour they produce ? Who fhall fay where 
 this fpecies of improvement mult flop ? At prefent fuch inven- 
 tions alarm the labouring part of the community ; and they may 
 be productive of temporary diftrefs, though they conduce in the 
 fequel to the moft important interests of the multitude. But in a 
 ftate of equal labour their utility will be liable to no difpute. 
 Hereafter it is by no means clear that the moll extenfive opera- 
 tions will not be within the reach of one man ; or, to make ufe 
 of a familiar inftance, that a plough may not be turned into a 
 field, and perform its office without the need of fuperintend- 
 ence. It was in this fenfe that the celebrated Franklin conjec- 
 tured, that " mind would one day become omnipotent over 
 matter." 
 
 The conclufion of the progrefs which has here been fketched, Manual la- 
 is fomething like a final clofe to the neceffity of manual labour. It citbgdlhed. 
 is highly inftructive in fuch cafes to obferve how the fublime-.ge- 
 niufes of former times anticipated what feems likely to be the fu- 
 ture improvement of mankind* It was one of the laws of Lycur- 
 gus, that no Spartan mould be employed in manual labour. For 
 this'purpofe under his fyftem it was neceffary that they lliould.be 
 plentifully fupplied with Haves devoted to drudgery. Matter, or, 
 
 a to. 
 
846 OFTHEENJOYMENT 
 
 book vnr. to fpeak more accurately, the certain and unintermitting laws of 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 i i, ' the univerfe, will be the Helots of the period we are contemplat- 
 ing. We fhall end in this refpect, oh immortal legislator ! at 
 the point from which you began. 
 
 Consequent To thefe profpe&s perhaps the objection will once again be 
 
 intelleft. repeated, " that men, delivered from the neceffity of manual la- 
 bour, will fink into fupinenefs." What narrow views of the na- 
 ture and capacities of mind do fuch objections imply ? The only 
 
 » 
 
 thing neceffary to put intellect into action is motive. Are there 
 no motives equally cogent with the profpect of hunger ? Whofe 
 thoughts are moft active, moil rapid and unwearied, thofe of 
 Newton or the ploughman ? When the mind is ftored with prof- 
 pects of intellectual greatnefs and utility, can it fink into torpor ? 
 
 Ideas of the To return to the fubject of cooperation. It may be a curious 
 
 cooperation, fpeculation to attend to the progreffive fteps by which this feature 
 
 Its limits. 
 
 of human fociety may be expected to decline. For example : 
 fhall we have concerts of mufic ? The miferable ftate of mecha- 
 nifm of the majority of the performers is fo confpicuous, as to be 
 even at this day a topic of mortification and ridicule. Will it not 
 be practicable hereafter for one man to perform the whole ? Shall 
 we have theatrical exhibitions ? This feems to include an abfurd 
 and vicious cooperation. It may be doubted whether men will 
 hereafter come forward in any mode gravely to repeat words and 
 Ideas not their own ? It may be doubted whether any mufical 
 
 performer 
 
O F L I B E R T Y. 847 
 
 performer will habitually execute the cornpofitions of others ? We book vnr. 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 yield fupinely to the fuperior merit of our predecefibrs, becaufe * — -y — » 
 
 we areaccuftomed to indulge the inactivity of our own faculties. 
 
 All formal repetition of other men's id:as feems to be a fcheme 
 
 for imprifoning for fo long a time the operations of our own 
 
 mind. It borders perhaps in this refpect upon a breach of fin- 
 
 cerity, which requires that we mould give immediate utterance to 
 
 every ufeful and valuable idea that occurs to our thoughts. 
 
 Having ventured to ftate thefe hints and conjectures, let us i ts legitimate 
 endeavour to mark the limits of individuality. Every man that provmce * 
 receives an impreflion from any external object, has the current 
 of his own thoughts modified by force ; and yet without external 
 impreflions we fhould be nothing. We ought not, except under 
 certain limitations, to endeavour to free ourfelves from their ap- 
 proach. Every man that reads the compofuion of another, fuffers' 
 the fucceffion of his ideas to be in a confiderable degree under the 
 direction of his author. But it does not feem as if this would ever 
 form a fufficient objection againft reading. One man will always 
 have ftored up reflections and facts that another wants ; and ma- 
 ture and digefted difcourfe will perhaps always, in equal circum- 
 ftances, be fuperior to that which is extempore. Converfation is 
 a fpecies of cooperation, one or the other party always yielding to 
 have his ideas guided by the other ; and yet converfation and the 
 intercourfe of mind with mind feem to be the moil fertile fources 
 of improvement. It is here as it is with punifhment. He that 
 
 in 
 
S 4 g OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 BooKvur. in the gentleft manner undertakes to reafon another out of his 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 . vices, will probably occafion 'painj but this fpecies of puniflv- 
 ment ought upon no account to be fuperfeded. 
 
 Evils of coha- Another article which belongs to the fubject of cooperation is 
 cohabitation. A very fimple procefs will lead us to a right de- 
 cifion in this inftance. Science is moll effectually cultivated, 
 when the greateft number of minds are employed in the purfuit 
 of it. If an hundred men fpontaneoufly engage the whole energy 
 of their faculties upon the folution of a given queftion, the chance 
 of fuccefs will be greater, than if only ten men were fo employed. 
 By the fame reafon the chance will be alfo increafed, in propor- 
 tion as the intellectual operations of thefe men are individual, in 
 proportion as their conclufions are directed by the reafon of the 
 thing, uninfluenced by the force either of compulfion or fympa- 
 thy. All attachments to individuals, except in proportion to 
 their merits, are plainly unjuft. It is therefore defirable, that we 
 fhould be the friends of man rather than of particular men, and 
 • that we fhould purfue the chain of our own reflexions, with no 
 .ether interruption than information or philanthropy requires. 
 
 and -m image. This fubjecl: of cohabitation is particularly interefting, as it in- 
 cludes in it the fubjecl: of marriage. It will therefore be proper 
 They oppofe to extend our enquiries fomewhat further upon this head. Co- 
 
 the develop- ... 
 
 ment of our habitation is not only an evil as it checks the independent progrefs 
 
 faculties : f • • r ' r n • 
 
 of mind j it is alfo incontinent with the imperfections and pro- 
 pensities 
 
OF LIBERTY. Ho 
 
 penfities of man. It is abfurd to expect that the inclinations and book vnr. 
 r x CHAP. VI. 
 
 wifhes of two human beings fhould coincide through any long v — —y~r-f 
 
 " ' are inimical 
 
 period of time. To oblige them to act and to live together, is to to our hap. 
 fubject them to fome inevitable portion of thwarting, bickering 
 and unhappinefs. This cannot be otherwife, fo long as man has 
 failed to reach the ftandard of abfolute perfection. The fuppo- 
 fition that I muft have a companion for life, is the refult of a 
 complication of vices. It is the dictate of cowardice, and not of 
 fortitude. It flows from the dcfire of being loved and efteemed 
 for fomething that is not defert. 
 
 But the evil of marriage as it is pradtifed in European coun- and deprave 
 
 ...... r our under- 
 
 times lies deeper than this. The habit is, for a thoughtlefs' and Handings; ■ 
 
 romantic youth of each fex to come together, to fee each other 
 for a few times and under circumftances full of delufion, and then 
 to vow to each other eternal attachment. AVhat is the confe- 
 quence of this ? In almoft every inftance they find themfelves 
 deceived. They are reduced to make the beft of an irretrievable 
 miftake. They are prefented with the ftrongefl imaginable temp- 
 tation to become the dupes of falflaood. They are led to con- • 
 ceive it their wifeft policy to fhut their eyes upon realities, happy 
 if by any peryerfion of intellect they can perfuade themfelves 
 that they were right in their firft crude opinion of their compa- 
 nion. The inftitution of marriage is a fyftem of fraud ; and 
 men who carefully miflead their judgments in the daily affair of 
 their life, muft always have a crippled judgment in every XJther- • - 
 
 5 Q». concern, 
 
8 5 o OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 BooKVin. concern. We ought to difmifs our miftake as foon as it is 
 
 CHAP. VI. , : , . .. , „. , . 
 
 l v j detected ; but we are taught to chenih it. We ought to be m- 
 ceflant in our fearch after virtue and worth ; but we are taught 
 to check our enquiry, and fhut our eyes upon the moft attractive 
 and admirable objects. Marriage is law, and the worft of all laws. 
 Whatever our underftandings may tell us of the perfon from 
 whofe connexion we fhould derive the greateft improvement, of 
 the worth of one woman and the demerits of another, we are 
 obliged to confider what is law, and not what is juftice. 
 
 Marriage a Add to this, that marriage is an affair of property, and the 
 
 branch of the " . 
 
 prevailing worft of all properties. So long as two human beings are for- 
 
 fyftemofpro- ^ . . 
 
 P«tyV bidden by pofitive inftitution to follow the dictates of their own 
 
 mind, prejudice is alive and vigorous. So long as I feek to en- 
 grofs one woman to myfelf, and to prohibit my neighbour from 
 proving his fuperior defert and reaping the fruits of it, I am 
 guilty of the moll odious of all monopolies.. Over this imaginary 
 prize men watch with perpetual jealoufy,, and one man will find 
 his defires and his capacity to circumvent as much excited, as- 
 the other is excited to traverfe his proje&s and fruftrate his- 
 hopes. As long as this ftate of fociety continues, philanthropy 
 will be crofTed and checked in a thoufand. ways> and the ftill 
 augmenting ftream of abufe will continue to flow. 
 
 eonfeqtiences The abolition of marriage will be attended with no evils. We 
 
 ef its aboli- 
 
 iSoo. are apt to represent it to ourfelves as the harbinger of brutal 
 
 a. luft 
 
OF LIBERTY. S51 
 
 luft and depravity. But it really happens in this as in other bookviit. 
 
 r- • « . CHAP. VI. 
 
 cafes, that the pofitive laws which are made to reurain our ■ y— ~» 
 
 vices, irritate and multiply them. Not to fay, that the fame 
 fentiments of juftice and happinefs which in a ftate of equal 
 property would deftroy the relifh for luxury, would decreafe 
 •our inordinate appetites of eveiy kind, and lead us univerfally 
 Jo prefer the pleafures of intellect to the pleafures of fenfe. 
 
 The intercourfe of the fexes will in fuch a ftate fall under the 
 fame fyftem as any other fpecies of friendship. Exclufively of all 
 groundlefs and obflinate attachments, it will be impoffible for me to 
 live in the world without finding one man of a worth fuperior to 
 that of any other whom I have an opportunity of obferving. To 
 this man I lhall feel a kindnefs in exact proportion to my appre- 
 henfion of his worth. The cafe will be precifely the fame with 
 refpect to the female fex. I lhall affiduoufly cultivate the inter- 
 courfe of that woman whofe accomplishments lhall Strike me la- 
 the moft powerful manner. " But it may happen that other men 
 will feel for her the fame preference that I do." This will create 
 no difficulty. We may all enjoy her converfation ; and we 
 fhall all be wife enough to confider the fenfual intercourfe as a 
 very trivial object. This, like every other affair in which two 
 perfons are concerned, muft be regulated in each fucceffive in- 
 ftance by the unforced confent of either party. It is a mark of 
 the extreme depravity of our prefent habits, that we are inclined, 
 to fuppofe the fenfual intercourfe any wife material to the ad-> 
 vantages arifing from the pureft affection. Reafonable men no\f 
 
 .5 0^2 eat 
 
S S z OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 r - 
 
 book vin. eat and drink, not from the love of pleafure, but becaufe eating 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 '-—v——-' and drinking are effential to our healthful exiftence. Reafona- 
 
 ble men then will propagate their fpecies, not becaufe a certain 
 
 fenfible pleafure is annexed to this action, but becaufe it is right 
 
 the fpecies fhould be propagated ; and the manner in which they 
 
 exercife this function will be regulated by the dictates of reafon 
 
 and duty. - - 
 
 Such are fome of the confiderations that will probably regulate 
 the commerce of the fexes. It cannot be definitively affirmed 
 whether it be known in fuch a ftate of fociety who is the father 
 of each individual child. But it may be affirmed that fuch 
 
 i 
 
 knowledge will be of no importance. It is ariftocracy, felf love 
 „ and family pride that teach us to fet a value upon it at 
 prefent. I ought to prefer no human being to another, 
 becaufe that being is my father, my wife or my fon, but becaufe, 
 for reafons which equally appeal to all underftandings, that being 
 is entitled to preference. One among the meafures which will 
 fucceffively be dictated by the fpirit of democracy, and that pro- 
 bably at no great diftance, is the abolition of furnarries. 
 
 Education Let us confider the way in which this ftate of fociety will 
 
 need not in 
 
 that (late of modiry education. It may be imagined that the abolition of 
 
 fociety be a 
 
 fubjeftof marriage would make it in a certain fenfe the affair of the public- 
 
 pofitive inftv . 
 
 union. though, if there be any truth in the reafonings of this work, 
 
 to provide for it by the pofitive inftitutions of a community, 
 
 would be extremely inconfiftent with the true principles of the 
 
 4- inteJlettua* 
 
OF LIBERTY. g 53 
 
 intellectual fyftem *. Education may be regarded as confuting book viit. 
 
 CHAP VI 
 of various branches. Firft, the perfonal cares which the help- > „' * 
 
 lefs ftate of an infant requires. Thefe will probably devolve 
 upon the mother ; unlefs, by frequent parturition or by the 
 very nature of thefe cares, that were found to render her fhare of 
 the burthen unequal ; and then it would be amicably and wil- 
 lingly participated by others. Secondly, food and other necef- 
 fary fupplies. Thefe, as we have already feen, would eafily find 
 their true level, and fpontaneoufly flow from the quarter in which 
 they abounded to the quarter that was deficient j\ Laftly, the 
 term education may be ufed to fignify inftruction. The taik of » 
 
 inftru&ion, under fuch a form of fociety as that we are contem- 
 plating, will be greatly fimplified and altered from what it is at 
 prefent. It will then be thought no more legitimate to make 
 boys flaves, than to make men fo. The bufinefs will not then be. 
 to bring forward fo many adepts in the egg-ihell, that the vanity 
 of parents may be flattered by hearing their praifes. No man 
 will then think of vexing with premature learning the feeble and 1 
 inexperienced, for fear that, when they came to years of difcre- 
 tion, they mould refufe to be learned. Mind will be fufFered to 
 expand itfelf in proportion as occaiion and impreflion fhall excite 
 it, and not tortured and enervated by being caft in a particular 
 mould. No creature in human form will be expected to learn? 
 any thing, but becaufe he defires it and has fome conception of. 
 
 * Book VI, Chap. VIII. . ti Char, V, p. 837. 
 
 it£3 
 
?54 OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 book vin. its utility and value ; and every man, in proportion to his capa- 
 
 rHAP VI 
 
 i v ' J city, will be ready to furniih fuch general hints and comprehen- 
 five views, as will fumce for the guidance and encouragement of 
 him who fiudies from a principle of defire. 
 
 Thefe pnnci- Before we quit this part of the fubje£t it will be neceflary to 
 
 pies do not x 
 
 lcadtoafullen rfeniafog a n objection that will fuggeft itfelf to fome readers. 
 
 individuality. J ^ u 
 
 They will fay " that man was formed for fociety and l'eciprocai 
 kindnefs ; and therefore is by his nature little adapted to the 
 fyftem of individuality which is here delineated. * The true per- 
 fection of man is to blend and unite his own exiftence with that 
 of another, and therefore a fyftem which forbids him all partiali- 
 ties and attachments, tends to degeneracy and not to improve- 
 ment." 
 
 No doubt man is formed for fociety. But there is a way in 
 which for a man to lofe his own exiftence in that of others, that 
 is eminently vicious and detrimental. Every man ought to reft 
 upon his own centre, and confult his own underftanding. 
 Every man ought to feel his independence, that he can aflert 
 the principles of juftice and truth, without being obliged trea- 
 cheroufly to adapt them to the peculiarities of his fituation, 
 and the errors of others. 
 
 Partial at- ^° doubt man 1S formed for fociety. But. he is formed for, 
 
 ccmfidlred. or m ot ^ er words his faculties enable him to ferve, the whole 
 
 and 
 
OF LIBERTY. $ ss 
 
 and not a part. Juftice obliges us to fyrapathife with a man of book vnr. 
 
 - M - . r . c , , CHAP. VI, 
 
 merit more fully than with an mligmhcant and corrupt member > 
 of fociety. But all partialities ftrictly fo called, tend to the injury 
 of him who feels them, of mankind in general, and even of 
 him who is their object. The fpirit of partiality is well ex- 
 prefled in the memorable faying of Themiftocles, " God forbid 
 that I fhould fit upon a bench of juftice, where my friends 
 found no more favour than ftrangers !" In fad:, as has been 
 repeatedly feen in the courfe of this work, we fit in every action 
 of our lives upon a bench of juftice ; and play in humble imita- 
 tion the part of the unjuft judge, whenever we indulge the 
 final left atom of partiality. 
 
 Such are the limitations of the focial principle. Thefe limitations Benefits ac- 
 
 i • • r cnring from 
 
 in reality tend to improve it and render its operations beneficial, a juit affec- 
 tion ; 
 It would be a miferable miftake to fuppofe that the principle is 
 
 not of the utmoft importance to mankind. All that in which 
 
 the human mind differs from the intellectual principle in animals 
 
 is the growth of fociety. All that is excellent in man is the 
 
 fruit of progreflive improvement, of the circumftance of one age 
 
 taking advantage of the difcoveries of a preceding age, and fetting 
 
 out from the point at which they had arrived. 
 
 Without fociety we fhould be wretchedly deficient in motives matenaily- 
 
 promotsd by 
 
 to improvement. But what is moft of all, without fociety our thefe prin- 
 ciples.. 
 
 improvements would be nearly ufelefs. Mind without bene- 
 volence 
 
8 5 6 OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 book viii. volence is a barren and a cold exiftence. It is in feeking the 
 
 ) , ' good of others, in embracing a great and expanfive fphere of 
 
 action, in forgetting our own individual interefts, that we find 
 our true element. The tendency of the whole fyftem delineated in 
 this Book is to lead us to that element. The individuality it 
 recommends tends to the good of the whole, and is valuable 
 only as a means to that end. Can that be termed a felfifh 
 fyftem, where no man defires luxury, no man dares to be guilty 
 of injuftice, and every one devotes himfelf to fupply the wants, 
 animal or intellectual, of others ? — To proceed. 
 
 The genuine As a genuine ftate of fociety is incompatible with all laws and 
 
 fyftem of pro- 
 perty does reftrictions, fo it cannot have even this reftriction, that no man 
 
 not prohibit 
 
 aocumula- fhall amafs property. The fecurity againft accumulation, as has 
 already been faid, lies in the perceived abfurdity and inutility of 
 accumulation. The practice, if it can be conceived in a ftate 
 of fociety where the principles of juftice were adequately under- 
 ftood, would not even be dangerous. The idea would not 
 create alarm, as it is apt to do in profpect among the prefent 
 advocates of political juftice. Men would feel nothing but 
 their laughter or their pity excited at fo ftrange a perverfity of 
 human intellect. 
 
 implies* cer- What would denominate any thing my property ? The fact, 
 
 tain degree of 
 
 appropHa- that it was necenary to my welfare. My right would be coeval 
 with the exiftence of that neceflity. The word property would 
 
 probably 
 
 tion ,• 
 
O F L I B E R T Y. 857 
 
 probably remain ; its fignification only would be modified, book vin. 
 
 . CHAP VI 
 
 The miftake does not fo properly lie in the idea itfelf, as in v v J ' 
 the fource from which it is traced. What I have, if it be 
 neceffary for my ufe, is truly mine ; what I have, though the 
 fruit of my own induftry, if unneceiTary, it is an ufurpation for 
 me to retain. 
 
 Force in fuch a ftate of fociety would be unknown ; I fhould 
 part with nothing without a full confent. Caprice would be 
 unknown ; no man would covet that which I ufed, unlefs he 
 diftinttly apprehended, that it would be more beneficial in his 
 pofTeffion than it was in mine. My apartment would be as 
 facred to a certain extent, as it is at prefent. No man would 
 obtrude himfelf upon me to interrupt the courfe of my ftudies 
 and meditations. No man would feel the whim of occupying 
 my apartment, while he could provide himfelf another as good 
 of his own. That which was my apartment yefterday would 
 probably be my apartment to-day. We have few purfuits that 
 do not require a certain degree of apparatus ; and it would be 
 for the general good that I fhould find in ordinary cafes the 
 apparatus ready for my ufe to-day that I left yefterday. But, 
 though the idea of property thus modified would remain, the 
 jealoufy and felfifhnefs of property would be gone. Bolts and 
 locks would be unknown. Every man would be welcome to 
 make every ufe of my accommodations, that did not interfere with 
 my own ufe of them. Novices as we are, we may figure - 
 
 5 R to 
 
of labour. 
 
 858 OF THE ENJOYMENT 
 
 book viii. to ourfelves a thoufand difputes, where property was held by fo 
 
 CHAP VI. 
 
 flight a tenure. But difputes would in reality be impoffible. 
 
 They are the offspring of a mifhapen and difproportioned love 
 
 of ourfelves. Do you want my table ? Make one for yourfelf ; 
 
 or, if I be more fkilful in that refped: than you, I will make 
 
 one for you. Do you want it immediately ? Let us compare 
 
 the urgency of your wants and mine, and let juflice decide. 
 
 and dlvifion Thefe obfervations lead us to the confideration of one addi- 
 tional difficulty, which relates to the divifion of labour. Shall 
 each man make all his tools, his furniture and accommodations ? 
 This would perhaps be a tedious operation. Every man per- 
 forms the taik to which he is accuftomed more fkilfully and in a 
 fhorter time than another. It is reafonable that you fhould make 
 for me, that which perhaps I fhould be three or four times as 
 long making, and fhould make imperfectly at laft. Shall we 
 then introduce barter and exchange ? By no means. The ab- 
 ftracl; fpirit of exchange will perhaps govern j every man will 
 employ an equal portion of his time in manual labour. But the 
 individual application of exchange is of all practices the moft per- 
 nicious. The moment I require any other reafon for fupplying 
 you than the cogency of your claim, the moment, in addition to 
 the dictates of benevolence, I demands profpecl: of advantage to 
 myfelf, there is an end of that political juftice and pure fociety of 
 which we treat. No man will have a trade. It cannot be fup- 
 pofed that a man will conftruft any fpecies of commodity, but in 
 
 proportion 
 
OF LIBERTY, 859 
 
 proportion as it is wanted. The profeffion paramount to all book viit. 
 
 CHAP. VI 
 
 others and in which every man will bear his part, will be that of / 
 
 man, and in addition perhaps that of cultivator. 
 
 The divifion of labour, as' it has been treated by commercial 
 writers, is for the moft part the offspring of avarice. It has been 
 found that ten perfons can make two hundred and forty times as 
 many pins in a day as one perfon *. This refinement is the 
 growth of luxury. The obje£t is to fee into how vaft a furface 
 the induftry of the lower clafles may be beaten, the more com- 
 pletely to gild over the indolent and the proud. The ingenuity 
 of the merchant is whetted, by new improvements of this fort to 
 tranfport more of the wealth of the powerful into his own cof- 
 fers. The poffibility of effecting a compendium of labour by 
 this means will be greatly diminished, when men fhall learn to 
 deny themfelves fuperfluities. The utility of fuch a faving of 
 labour, where labour is fo little, will fcarcely balance againft the 
 evils of fo extenfive a cooperation. From what has been faid 
 under this head it appears, that there will be a divifion of labour, 
 if we compare the fociety in queftion with the (late of the fo- 
 litaire and the favage. But it will produce an extenfive compo- 
 fition of labour, if we compare it with that to which we are at 
 prefent accuftomed in civilifed Europe. 
 
 * Smith's Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chap. I. 
 
 5 R 2 G H A P. 
 
[ 36o ] 
 
 CHAP. VII. 
 
 OF THE OBJECTION TO THIS SYSTEM FROM THE 
 PR1N CI PLE OF POPULATION. 
 
 THE OBJECTION STATED. — REMOTENESS OF ITS OPERA- 
 TION. — CONJECTURAL IDEAS RESPECTING THE ANTI- 
 DOTE. — OMNIPOTENCE OF MIND. — ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 CAUSES OF DECREPITUDE. YOUTH IS PROLONGED BY 
 
 CHEARFULNESS — BY CLEARNESS OF APPREHENSION— 
 AND A BENEVOLENT CHARACTER. — THE POWERS WE 
 POSSESS ARE ESSENTIALLY PROGRESSIVE. — EFFECTS OF 
 ATTENTION.. — THE PHENOMENON OF SLEEP EXPLAINED. 
 PRESENT UTILITY OF THESE REASONINGS. — APPLICA- 
 TION TO THE FUTURE STATE OF SOCIETY. 
 
 rH°APvir* A ^ author who has fpeculated widely upon fubjects of go- 
 v- — jr — ' X A. vernment *, has recommended equal, or, which was rather 
 
 The objec- **-•#■•» 
 
 tion ftated. ^is j^ea, common property, as a complete remedy, to the usurpa- 
 tion and diftrefs which are at prefent the moft powerful enemies 
 of human kind, to the vices which infect education in fome in- 
 ftances, and. the neglect it encounters in more, to all the turbu- 
 lence of paffion, and all the injuftice of felfifhnefs. But, after 
 
 • "Wallace : Various Profpe&s of Mankind, Nature and Providence, 1761. 
 * having 
 
OF POPULATION. 86s 
 
 having exhibited this picture, not lefs true than delightful, he book vnr. 
 
 CHAP.VIZ, 
 finds an argument that demolifhes the whole, and reftores him «■ ■ v ■ ■■' 
 
 to indifference and defpair, in the exceffive population that would 
 
 enfue. 
 
 One of the moft obvious anfwers to this objection is, that to Remotenek 
 reafon thus is to forefee difficulties at a great diftance. Three tion, 
 fourths of the habitable globe is now uncultivated. The parts 
 already cultivated are capable of immeafurable improvement. 
 Myriads of centuries of ftill increafing population may probably 
 pafs away, and the earth ftill be found fufficient for the fubfift- 
 ence of its inhabitants. Who can fay how long the earth itfelf 
 will furvivethe cafualties of the planetary fyftem ? Who can fay 
 what remedies 'fhall fuggeft themfelves for fo diftant an inconve- 
 nience, time enough for practical application, and of which we 
 may yet at this time have not the fmalleft idea ? It would be truly 
 abfurd for us to fhrink from a fcheme of effential benefit to man- 
 kind, left they ftiould be too happy, and by neceftary confequence 
 SX fome diftant period too populous. 
 
 But, though thefe remarks may be deemed a fufficient anfwer Conje&urai' 
 
 ideas refpeft-- 
 
 to the objection, it may not be amifs to indulge in fome fpecula- ing the anti- 
 dote. 
 tions to which fuch an objection obvioufly leads. The earth 
 
 may, to fpeak in the ftyle of one of the writers of the Chriftian 
 Scriptures, " abide for ever *." It may be in danger of becom- 
 ing too populous. A remedy may then be neceflary. If it may, 
 
 * Ecclefiaftes, Chap. I, ver. 4. 
 
 why/ 
 
S62 OP POPULATION. 
 
 bookviii. whyfhould we fit down in fupine indifference and conclude that 
 
 CHAP. VII. . r ~ 
 
 i — -V, — ' we can difcover no glimpie of it ? The difcovery, if made, would 
 add to the firmnefs and confiftency of our profpects ; nor is it 
 improbable to conjecture that that which would form the regulat- 
 • ing fpring of our conduct then, might be the medium of a falu- 
 tary modification now. What follows muft be confidered in 
 fome degree as a deviation into the land of conjecture. If it be 
 falfe, it leaves the great fyftem to which it is appended in all 
 found reafon as impregnable as ever. If this do not lead us to 
 the true remedy, it does not follow that there is no remedy. The 
 great object of enquiry will ftill remain open, however defective 
 may be the fuggeftions that are now to be offered. 
 
 Omnipotence L e t us here return to the fublime conjecture of Franklin, that 
 
 •f mind. 
 
 8 mind will one day become omnipotent over matter *." If over 
 all other matter, why not over the matter of our own bodies ? If 
 over matter at ever fo great a diftance, why not over matter 
 which, however ignorant we may be of the tie that connects it 
 with the thinking principle, we always carry about with us, and 
 which is in all cafes the medium of communication between that 
 principle and the external univerfe ? In a word, why may not 
 man be one day immortal ? 
 
 * I have no other authority to quote for this expreflion than the converfation 
 of Dr. Price. Upon enquiry I am happy to find it confirmed to me by Mr. 
 William Morgan, the nephew of Dr Price, who recollects to hare heard it 
 repeatedly mentioned by his uncle. 
 
 6 The 
 
OF POPULATION. . 863 
 
 The different cafes in which thought modifies die external book vm. 
 
 r u - 11 t • vr 1 . , CHAP. VII. 
 
 umverie are obvious to all. It is modified by our voluntary v 
 
 thoughts or defign. We defire to ftretch out our hand, and it 
 is ftretched out. We perform a thoufand operations of the fame 
 fpecies every day, and their familiarity annihilates the wonder* 
 They are net in themfelves lefs wonderful than any of thofe mo- 
 difications which we are leaft accuftomed to conceive. — Mind 
 modifies body involuntarily. Emotion excited by fome unex- 
 pected word, by a letter that is delivered to us, occafions the mod 
 extraordinary revolutions in our frame, accelerates the circulation, 
 caufes the heart to palpitate, the tongue to refufe its office, and 
 has been known to occafion death by extreme anguifh or extreme 
 joy. Thefe fymptoms we may either encourage or check. By 
 encouraging them habits are produced of fainting or of rage. To 
 difcourage them is one of the principal offices of fortitude. The 
 effort of mind in refilling pain in the ftories of Cranmer and Mu- 
 cius Scasvola is of the fame kind. It is reafonable to believe that 
 that effort with a different direction might have cured certain dif- 
 eafes of the fyftem. There is nothing indeed of which phyficians 
 themfelves are more frequently aware, than of the power of the 
 mind in affifting or retarding convalefcence. 
 
 Why is it that a mature man foon lofes that elafticity of limb, Caufes of de- 
 crepitude. 
 
 which charatterifes the heedlefs gaiety of youth ? Becaufe he de- 
 fifts from youthful habits. He affumes an air of dignity incom- 
 patible with the lighrnefs of childifh fallies. He is vifited and 
 vexed with all the cares that rife out of our miftaken inftitutions, 
 
 and 
 
S64 OF POPULATION. 
 
 BooKvur. and his heart is no longer fatisfied and gay. ttence his limbs 
 
 GHAT 9 . VII. 
 
 v.^-v— w» become ftiff and unwieldy. This is the forerunner of old age 
 and death. 
 
 Youth is pro- The firft habit favourable to corporeal vigour is chearfulnefs. 
 
 longed fey 
 
 «hcarfulncfsj Every time that our mind becomes morbid, vacant and melan- 
 choly, a certain period is cut off from the length of our lives. 
 Liftleflhefs of thought is the brother of death. But chearfulnefs 
 gives new life to our frame and circulation to our juices. No- 
 thing can long be flagnant in the frame of him, whofe heart is 
 tranquil, and his imagination active. 
 
 fey clearness A fecond requifite in the cafe of which we treat is a clear and 
 
 of apprehen- 
 
 fion - diftinct conception. If I know precifely what I wifh, it is eafy 
 
 for me to calm the throbs of pain, and to aflift the fluggifh ope- 
 rations of the fyftem. It is not a knowledge of anatomy, but a 
 quiet and fteady attention to my fymptoms, that will beft enable 
 me to correct the diftemper from which they fpring. Fainting 
 is nothing elfe but a confufion of mind, in which the ideas ap- 
 pear to mix in painful diforder, and nothing is diftinguifhed. 
 
 andabcnevo- Yhe true fource of chearfulnefs is benevolence. To a youth- 
 
 lent charae- * 
 
 ta - ful mind, while every thing ftrikes with its novelty, the indivi- 
 
 dual fituation muft be peculiarly unfortunate, if gaiety of 
 thought be not produced, or, when interrupted, do not fpeedily 
 return with its healing oblivion. But novelty is a fading charm, 
 and perpetually decreafes. Hence the approach of inanity and 
 
 liftleflhefs 
 
OF POPULATION. '865 
 
 f 
 
 lillleflhefs. After we have made a certain round, life de- bookviu. 
 
 chap, vir, 
 lights no more. A deathlike apathy invades us. Thus the aged v . . v » 
 
 are generally cold and indifferent ; nothing interefls their atten^ 
 
 tion, or roufes the fluggifhnefs of their foul. How mould it be 
 
 otherwife ? The purfuits of mankind are commonly frigid and 
 
 contemptible, and the miftake comes at laft to be detected. But 
 
 virtue is a charm that never fades. The foul that perpetually 
 
 overflows with kindnefs and fympathy, will always be chearful. 
 
 The man who is perpetually bufied in contemplations of public 
 
 good, will always be active. 
 
 The application of thefe reafonings is fimple and irrefiftible. Thep 
 
 ower: 
 
 If mind be now in a great degree the ruler of the fyftem, why effentiaUy * 
 
 mould it be incapable of extending its empire ? If our involun- 
 tary thoughts can derange or reftore the animal economy, why 
 fhould we not in procefs of time, in this as in other inftances, 
 fubject the thoughts which are at prefent involuntary to the go- 
 vernment of defign ? If volition can now do fomething, why 
 fhould it not go on to do flill more and more ? There is no princi- 
 ple of reafon lefs liable to queftion than this, that, if we have in 
 any refpect a little power now, and if mind be effentially progref- 
 five, that power may, and, barring any extraordinary concuflions 
 of nature, infallibly will, extend beyond any bounds we are able 
 to prefcribe to it. 
 
 Nothing can be more irrational and prefumptuous than to 
 
 5 S . conclude, 
 
 progreflive. 
 
866 OF POPULATION. 
 
 9 
 
 book viii. conclude, becaufe a certain fpecies of fuppofed power is entirely 
 CHAP. VII. ~ ._ . • J 
 
 out of the line of our prefent obfervations, that it is therefore al- 
 together beyond the limits of the human mind. We talk fami- 
 liarly indeed of the limits of our faculties, but nothing is more 
 difficult than to point them out. Mind, in a progreffive view at 
 leaft, is infinite. If it could have been told to the favage inha- 
 bitants of Europe in the times of Thefeus and Achilles, that man 
 was capable of predicting eclipfes and weighing the air, of ex- 
 plaining the phenomena of nature fo that no prodigies fhould 
 remain, of meafuring the diftance and the fize of the heavenly 
 bodies, this would not have appeared to them lefs wonderful, 
 than if we had told them of the poflible difcovery of the means 
 of maintaining the human body in perpetual youth and vigour. 
 But we have not only this analogy, mowing that the difcovery 
 in queftion forms as it were a regular branch of the acquisitions 
 that belong to an intellectual nature ; but in addition to this we 
 feem to have a glimpfe of the fpecific manner in which the ac- 
 quifition will be fecured. Let us remark a little more diftinctly 
 the fimplicity of the procefs. 
 
 attention. 
 
 Effefts of We have called the principle of immortality in man chearfuf- 
 
 nefs, clearnefs of conception and benevolence. Perhaps we fhall 
 in fome refpects have a more accurate view of its potency, if we 
 conlider it as of the nature of attention. It is a very old maxim 
 of practical conduct, that whatever is done with attention, is done 
 well. It is becaufe this was a principal requifite, that many per- 
 
 fons 
 
OF POPULATION. 867 
 
 Ions endowed In an eminent desrree with chearfulnefs, perfpica- bock vnr. 
 
 . CHAP. VII. 
 city and benevolence, have perhaps not been longer lived than ' „ ' 
 
 their neighbours. We are not capable at prefent of attending to 
 every thing. A man who is engaged in the fublimeft and molt, 
 delightful exertions of mind, will perhaps be lefs attentive to his 
 animal functions than his moft ordinary neighbour, though he 
 will frequently in a partial degree repair that neglect, by a more 
 chearful and animated obfervation, when thofe exertions are fuf- 
 pended. But, though the faculty of attention may at prefent 
 have a very fmall fhare of ductility, it is probable that it may be 
 improved in that refpect to an inconceivable degree. The .pic- 
 ture that was exhibited of the fubtlety of mind in an earlier ftage 
 of this work *, gives to this fuppofition a certain degree of moral 
 evidence. If we can have three hundred and twenty fucceffive 
 ideas in a fecond of time, why ihould it be fuppofed that we mail 
 not hereafter arrive at the fkill of carrying on a great number of 
 contemporaneous proceifes without diforder ? 
 
 Having thus given a view of what may be the future improve- The pheno- 
 menon of 
 mem of mind, it is proper that we Ihould qualify this picture to fleep ex- 
 plained. 
 thefanguine temper of fome readers and the incredulity of others, 
 
 by obferving that this improvement, if capable of being realifed, 
 is however at a great diftance. A very obvious remark will ren- 
 der this eminently palpable. If an nnintermitted attention to the 
 animal economy be neceffary, then, before death can be banifhed, 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VII, p. 330. 
 
 5 S 2 we 
 
868 OF POPULATION. 
 
 book viii. w e muft banifh fleep, death's infiage. Sleep is one of the moft 
 
 CHA.P.VII. 
 
 } ir— *■ confpicuous infirmities of the human frame. It is not, as ha* 
 
 often been fuppofed, a fufpenfion of thought, but an irregular and 
 
 diftempered ftate of the faculty *. Our tired attention refigns the 
 
 helm, ideas fwim before us in wild confufion, and are attended 
 
 with lefs and lefs diftin&nefs, till at length they leave no traces in 
 
 the memory. Whatever attention and volition are then impofed 
 
 upon us, as it were at unawares, are but faint refemblances of our 
 
 operations in the fame kind when awake. Generally fpeaking, 
 
 we contemplate fights of horror with little pain, and commit the 
 
 moft atrocious crimes with little fenfe of their true nature. The 
 
 horror we fometimes attribute to our dreams, will frequently be 
 
 found upon accurate obfervation to belong to our review of them 
 
 when we wake. 
 
 Prefent utility One other remark may be proper in this place. If the reme- 
 
 oftheferea- 
 
 fonings. dies here prefcribed tend to a total extirpation of the infirmities 
 
 of our nature, then, though we cannot promife to them an early 
 and complete fuccefs, we may probably find them of fome utility 
 now. They may contribute to prolong our vigour, though not 
 to immortalife it, and, which is of more confequence, to make us 
 live while we live. Every time the mind is invaded with an- 
 guifh and gloom, the frame becomes difordered. Every time 
 that languor and indifference creep upon us, our functions fall 
 into decay. In proportion as we cultivate fortitude and equa- 
 
 * Book IV, Chap. VII, p. 335. 
 5 nimity, 
 
OF POPULATION. S6g 
 
 nimity, our circulations will be chearful. In proportion as we bookviij. 
 cultivate a kind and benevolent propenfity, we may be fecure of »■ 
 finding fomething for ever to intereft and engage us. 
 
 Medicine may reafonably be ftated to confift of two branches, 
 the animal and intelle&ual. The latter of thefe has beeen in- 
 finitely too much neglected. It cannot be employed to the pur- 
 pofes of a profeflion ; or, where it has been incidentally fo em- 
 ployed, it has been artificially and indirectly, not in an open 
 and avowed manner. "-Herein the patient muft minifter to 
 himfelf*." How often do we find afudJen piec: of good news 
 diflipating a diftemper ? How common is the remark, that 
 thofe accidents, which are to the indolent a fource of difeafe, 
 are forgotten and extirpated in the bufy and active ? It would 
 no doubt be of extreme moment to us, to be thoroughly 
 acquainted with the power of motives, habit, and what is called 
 refolution, in this refpect. I walk twenty miles in an indolent 
 and. half determined temper, and am extremely fatigued. I 
 walk twenty miles full of ardour and with a motive that en- 
 erofles my foul, and I come in as frefh and alert as when I 
 began my journey. We are fick and we die, generally fpeak- 
 ing, becaufe we confent to fuffer thefe accidents. This confent 
 in the prefent ftate of mankind is in fome degree unavoidable, 
 We muft have ftronger motives and clearer views, before we can 
 uniformly refufe it. But, though we cannot always, we may 
 frequently refufe. This is a truth of which all mankind are 
 
 * Macbeth, Ad V. 
 
 to . 
 
8 7 o . OF POPULATION. 
 
 book vi ir. to a certain degree aware. Nothing more common than for the 
 CHAP. vn. n . - „ , . r . . ,. ... 
 
 v— v— — ' raoft ignorant man to call upon his lick neighbour, to roule nim- 
 
 felf, net to fuffer himfelf to be conquered ; and this exhortation 
 
 is always accompanied with fome confeioufnefs of the efficacy 
 
 of resolution. The wife and the good man therefore fhould 
 
 carry with him the recollection of what chearfulnefs and a 
 
 determined fpirit are able to do, of the capacity with which he 
 
 is endowed of expelling the feeds and firft flight appearances of 
 
 indifpofition. 
 
 The principal part of the preceding paragraph is nothing more 
 than a particular application of what was elfewhere delivered 
 reflecting moral and phyfical caufes"*. It would have been eafy 
 to have caft the prefent chapter in a different form, and to have 
 made it a chapter upon health, fhowing that one of the advan- 
 tages of a better ftate of fociety would be a very high improve- 
 ment -of the vigour and animal conftitution of man. In that 
 cafe the conjecture of immortality would only have come in as 
 an incidental remark, and the whole would have affumed lefs the 
 air of conjecture than of clofe and argumentative deduction. 
 But it was perhaps better to give the fubject the moft explicit . 
 form, at the rifk of exciting a certain degree of prejudice. 
 
 £ P the C futoe To aPPty thefe remarks to the fubjed of population. The 
 siety.° tendency of a cultivated and virtuous mind is to render us in- 
 
 different to the gratifications of fenfe. They pleafe at prefent 
 
 * Book I, Chap. VII, Fart I. 
 
OFPOPULATION. 871 
 
 by their novelty, that is, becaufe we know not how to bookviii. 
 
 chap vir 
 eftimate them. They decay in the decline of life indirectly > > * 
 
 becaufe the fyftem refufes them, but directly and principally 
 
 becaufe they no longer excite the ardour and paffion of mind. 
 
 It is well known that an inflamed imagination is capable of 
 
 doubling and tripling the feminal fecretions. The gratifications 
 
 of fenfe pleafe at prefent by their impofture. We foon learn to 
 
 defpife the mere animal function, which, apart from the delu- 
 
 fions of intellect, would be nearly the fame in all cafes ; and to 
 
 value it, only as it happens to be relieved by perfonal charms 
 
 or mental excellence. We abfurdly imagine that no better road 
 
 can be found to the fympathy and intercourfe of minds. But a 
 
 very flight degree of attention might convince us that this is a 
 
 falfe road, full of danger and deception. Why mould I efteem 
 
 another, or by another be efteemed ? For this reafon only, 
 
 becaufe efteem is due, and only fo far as it is due. 
 
 The men therefore who exift when the earth (hall refufe 
 itfelf to a more extended population, will ceafe to propagate, 
 for they will no longer have any motive, either of error or 
 duty, to induce them. In addition to this they will perhaps 
 be immortal. The whole will be a people of men, and not of 
 children. Generation will not fucceed generation, nor truth 
 have in a certain degree to recommence her career at the end of 
 eveiy thirty years. There will be no war, no crimes, no ad- 
 miniftration of juftice as it is called, and no government. Thefe 
 
 latter 
 
%yi 
 
 OF POPULATION. 
 
 book vin. latter articles are at no great diftance ; and it is not impoffibie 
 ' . j that fome of the prefent race of men may live to fee them in 
 
 part accomplifhed. But befide this, there will be no difeafe, no 
 anguifli, no melancholy and no refentment. Every man will 
 feek with ineffable ardour the good of all. Mind will be active 
 and eager, yet never difappointed. Men will fee the progreffive 
 advancement of virtue and good, and feel that, if things occa- 
 fionally happen contrary to their hopes, the mifcarriage itfelf 
 was a neceffary part of that progrefs. They will know, that 
 they are members of the chain, that each has his feveral utility, 
 and they will not feel indifferent to that utility. They will be 
 eager to enquire into the good that already exifts, the means by 
 which it was produced, and the greater good that is yet in ftore. 
 They will never want motives for exertion j for that benefit 
 which a man thoroughly underftands and earneflly loves, he 
 cannot refrain from endeavouring to promote. 
 
 Before we difmifs this fubject it is proper once again to re- 
 mind the reader, that the leading doctrine of this chapter is 
 given only as matter of probable conjecture, and that the grand 
 argument of this divifion of the work is altogether independent 
 of its truth or falfhood. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
[ 873 ] 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 * 
 
 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING THE GENUINE 
 SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 
 
 APPREHENSIONS THAT ARE ENTERTAINED ON THIS SUB- 
 JECT. — IDEA OF MASSACRE. — INFERENCE WE OUGHT TO 
 MAKE UPON SUPPOSITION OF THE REALITY OF THESE 
 APPREHENSIONS. — MISCHIEF BY NO MEANS THE NECES- 
 SARY ATTENDANT ON IMPROVEMENT. — DUTIES UNDER 
 THIS CIRCUMSTANCE, I. OF THOSE WHO ARE QUALIFIED 
 
 FOR PUBLIC INSTRUCTORS — TEMPER SINCERITY. — 
 
 PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF DISSIMULATION INTHIS CASE. — ■ 
 2. OF THE RICH AND GREAT. — MANY OF THEM MAY BE 
 EXPECTED TO BE ADVOCATES OF EQUALITY. — CONDUCT 
 WHICH THEIR INTEREST AS A BODY PRESCRIBES. — 3. OF 
 THE FRIENDS OF EQUALITY IN GENERAL. OMNIPO- 
 TENCE OF TRUTH. — IMPORTANCE OF A MILD AND 
 BENEVOLENT PROCEEDING. — CONNEXION BETWEEN LI- 
 BERTY AND EQUALITY. CAUSE OF EQUALITY WILL 
 
 PERPETUALLY ADVANCE. — SYMPTOMS OF ITS PROGRESS. 
 IDEA OF ITS FUTURE SUCCESS. — CONCLUSION. 
 
 HAVING thus Hated explicitly and without referve the book. viii. 
 ■ r J CHAP. vni. 
 
 great branches of this illuftrious picture, there is but one ' *— — ' 
 
 5 T fubjeft 
 
$74 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vin. fubject that remains. In what manner fhall this intereftW im- 
 chap. vjii. ° 
 
 y * ' provement of human fociety be carried into execution ? Are 
 
 there not certain fteps that are defirable for this purpofe ? Are 
 there not certain fteps that are inevitable ? "Will not the period 
 that mult firft elapfe, neceflarily be ftained with a certain in- 
 fufion of evil ? 
 
 Apprehcn- No idea has excited greater horror in the minds of a multitude 
 
 *nt«tained of perfons, than that of the mifchiefs that are to enfue from the 
 
 •on this fub- 
 
 jeft. difTemination of what they call levelling principles. They 
 
 believe "that thefe principles will inevitably ferment in the 
 minds of the vulgar, and that the attempt to carry them into 
 execution will be attended with every fpecies of calamity." 
 They reprefent to themfelves " the uninformed and uncivilifed 
 part of mankind, as let loofe from all reftraint, and hurried into 
 every kind of excefs. Knowledge and tafte, the improvements 
 of intellect, the difcoveries of fages, the beauties of poetry and 
 art, are trampled under foot and extinguifhed by barbarians. It 
 is another inundation of Goths and Vandals, with this bitter 
 •aggravation, that the viper that flings us to death was warmed 
 in our own bofoms." 
 
 They conceive of the fcene as " beginning in maflacre." 
 They fuppofe " all that is great, preeminent and illuftrious as 
 ranking among the firft victims. Such as are diftinguifhed by 
 peculiar elegance of manners or energy of diction and compo- 
 
 fition, 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 875 
 
 fition, will be the inevitable obje#s of envy and jealoufy. Such ewAp^viri 
 
 as intrepidly exert themfelves to fuccour the perfecuted, or to *"" — * ' 
 
 declare to the public thofe truths which they are leaft inclined y 
 but which are moft neceffary for them to hear, will be marked 
 out for aflaflination." 
 
 Let us not, from any partiality to the fyftem of equality Idea of 
 
 maffacre. 
 
 delineated in this book, fhrink from the picture here exhibited. 
 
 Maffacre is the too poffible attendant upon revolution, and 
 maffacre is perhaps the moft hateful fcene, allowing for its 
 
 momentary duration, that any imagination can fuggeft. The 
 fearful, hopelefs expectation of the defeated, and the blood- 
 hound fury of their conquerors, is a complication of mifchief 
 that all which has been told of infernal regions cannot furpafs. 
 The cold-blooded maffacres that are perpetrated under the name 
 of criminal juftice fall fhort of thefe in their moft frightful 
 aggravations. The minifters and inftruments of law have by 
 cuftom reconciled their minds to the dreadful talk they perform, 
 and bear their refpective parts in the moft fhocking enormities, 
 without being fenfible to the paffions allied to thofe enormities. 
 But the inftruments of maffacre are actuated with all the fenti- 
 ments of fiends. Their eyes emit flafhes of cruelty and rage. 
 They purfue their victims from ftreet to ftreet and from houfe to 
 houfe. They tear them from the arms cf their fathers and their 
 wives. They glut themfelves with barbarity and infult, and 
 utter fhouts of horrid joy at the fpectacle of their tortures. 
 
 j T 2 We 
 
g 7 5 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vm. We have now contemplated the tremendous picture ; what is 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 « , ' the conclufion it behoves us to draw ? Mufl we fhrink from rea- 
 
 Inference we 
 
 ought to f on> from juftice, from virtue and happirfefs ? Suppofe that the 
 
 make upon 
 
 fuppofition inevitable confequence of communicating truth were the tempo- 
 
 of the reality * ? r 
 
 of thefe ap- rar y introduction of fuch a fcene as has juft been defcribed, mull 
 
 pretentions. J 
 
 we on that account refufe to communicate it ? The crimes that 
 were perpetrated would in no juft eftimate appear to be the refult 
 of truth, but of the error which had previoufly been infufed. 
 The impartial enquirer would behold them as the laft ftruggles 
 of expiring defpotifm, which, if it had furvived, would have pro- 
 duced mifchiefs, fcarcely lefs atrocious in the hour of their com- 
 miffion, and infinitely more calamitous by the length of their 
 duration. If we would judge truly, even admitting the unfa- 
 vourable fuppofition above dated, we muft contrail a moment of 
 horror and diftrefs with ages of felicity. No imagination can 
 Sufficiently conceive the mental improvement and the tranquil 
 virtue that would fucceed, were property once permitted to reft 
 upon its genuine balls. 
 
 And by what means fupprefs truth, and keep alive the falutary 
 intoxication, the tranquillifing infanity of mind which fome men 
 defire ? Such has been too generally the policy of government 
 through every age of the world. Have we flaves ? We muft af- 
 fiduoully retain them in ignorance. Have we colonies and de- 
 pendencies ? The great effort of our care is to keep them from 
 being too populous and profperous. Have we fubjects ? It is 
 
 4. " by 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 877 
 
 " by impotence and mifery that we endeavour to render them book vrn. 
 ' . m chap. vnr. 
 
 fupple : plenty is fit for nothing but to make them unmanage- 
 able, difobedient and mutinous *." If this were the true philo- 
 fophy of focial institutions, well might we fhrink from it with 
 horror. How tremendous an abortion would the human fpecies 
 be found, if all that tended to make them wife, tended to make 
 them unprincipled and profligate ? But this it is impoffible for 
 anyone to believe, who will lend the fubject a moment's impar- 
 tial confideration. Can truth, the perception of juftice and a de- 
 fire to execute it, be the fource of irretrievable ruin to mankind ? 
 It may be conceived that the firft opening and illumination of 
 mind will be attended with diforder. But every juft reafoner 
 muft confefs that regularity and happinefs will fucceed to this 
 confufion. To refufe the remedy, were this picture of its opera- 
 tion ever fo true, would be as if a man who had diflocated a 
 limb,fhould refufe to undergo the pain of having it replaced. If 
 mankind have hitherto loft the road of virtue and happinefs, that 
 can be no juft reafon why they fhould be fuffered to go wrong 
 for ever. We muft not refufe a conviction of error, or even the 
 treading over again fome of the fteps that were the refult of it. 
 
 Another queftion fuggefts itfelf under this head. Can we fup- 
 prefs truth ? Can we arreft the progrefs of the enquiring mind ? 
 If we can, it will only be done by the moft unmitigated defpot- 
 ifm. Mind has a perpetual tendency to rife. It cannot be held . 
 
 * BopkV, Chap. Ill, p. 405. 
 
 down 1 
 
S 7 3 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vi it. down but by a power that counteracts its genuine tendency 
 chap. vin. t _ 
 
 1 v ' through eveiy moment of its exiflence. Tyrannical and fan- 
 
 guinary muft be the meafures employed for this purpofe. Mi- 
 
 ferable and difguftful mud be the fcene they produce. Their 
 
 refult will be thick darknefs of the mind, timidity, fertility, hy- 
 
 pocrify. This is the alternative, fo far as there is any alternative 
 
 in their power, between the oppofite meafures of which the 
 
 princes and governments of the earth have now to choofe : they 
 
 muft either fupprefs enquiry by the moll arbitrary ftretches of 
 
 power, or preferve a clear and tranquil field in which every man 
 
 mail be at liberty to difcover and vindicate his opinion. 
 
 No doubt it is the duty of governments to maintain the moft 
 unalterable neutrality in this important tranfaction. No doubt 
 it is the duty of individuals to publifh truth without diffidence or 
 referve, to publifh it in its genuine form without feeking aid 
 from the meretricious arts of publication. The more it is told, 
 the more it is known in its true dimenfions, and not in parts, 
 the lefs is it poffible that it fhould coalefce with or leave room 
 for the pernicious effects of error. The true philanthropift will 
 be eager, inftead of fuppreffing difcuffion, to take an active fhare 
 in the fcene, to exert the full flrength of his facilities in difco- 
 very, and to contribute by his exertions to render the operation 
 of thought at once perfpicuous and profound. 
 
 Mifchiefby j t b eme; then fufficiently evident that truth muft be told at 
 
 no means the P * 
 
 whatever 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 879 
 
 whatever expence, let us proceed to confider the precife amount book viii. 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 of that expence, to enquire how much of confufion and violence ' » ' 
 
 neceflary at» 
 
 is inseparable from the tranfit which mind has to accomplifh. tendanton 
 
 improvement. 
 
 And here it plainly appears that mifchief is by no means infepa- 
 rable from the progrefs. In the mere circumftance of our ac- 
 quiring knowledge and accumulating one truth after another 
 there is no direct tendency to diforder. Evil can only fpring 
 from the clafh of mind with mind, from one body of men in the 
 community outftripping another in their ideas of improvement, 
 and becoming impatient of the oppofitien they have to en— 
 counter. 
 
 In this interefting period, in which mind mall arrive as it Dutfes under: 
 
 1 -r r • n i i • i 1 • this ci'rcum- 
 
 were at the true cnlis 01 its ltory, there are high duties incum- ftance, 1. of 
 
 . • thofe who 
 
 bent upon every branch of the community. Firft, upon thofe are qualified 
 cultivated and powerful minds, that are fitted to be precurfors to inftmaors s = 
 the reft in the difcovery of truth. They are bound to be active, 
 indefatigable and difmterefted. It is incumbent upon them to ' temper : 
 abftain from inflammatory language, from all expreffions of acri- 
 mony and refentment. It is abfurd in any government to erect 
 itfelf into a court of criticifm in this refpect, and to eftablifh a ■ 
 criterion of liberality and decorum; but for that very reafon it- 
 is doubly incumbent on thofe who communicate their thoughts - 
 to the public,, to exercife a rigid cenfure over themfelves. The 
 tidings of liberty and equality are tidings of good will to all or- - 
 ders of men. They free the peafant from the. iniquity that de- 
 
 prefles. . 
 
88b OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book viii. preffes his mind, and the privileged from the luxury and def- 
 
 CHAP VIII. 
 
 potifm by which he is corrupted. Let thofe who bear thefe 
 tidings not ftain their benignity, by mowing that that benignity 
 has not yet become the inmate of their hearts. 
 
 fkcerity. Nor is it lefs neceflary that they fhould be urged to tell the 
 
 whole truth without difguife. No maxim can be more perni- 
 cious than that which would teach us to confult the temper of 
 the times, and to tell only fo much as we imagine our contem- 
 poraries will be able to bear. This practice is at prefent almoft 
 univerfal, and it is the mark of a very painful degree of depra- 
 vity. We retail and mangle truth. We impart it to our fel- 
 lows, not with the liberal meafure with which we have received 
 it, but with fuch parfimony as our own miferable prudence may 
 chance to prefcribe. We pretend that truths fit to be practifed 
 in one country, nay, truths which we confefs to be eternally 
 right, are not fit to be practifed in another.' That we may de- 
 ceive others with a tranquil confeience, we begin with deceiving 
 ourfelves. We put fhackles upon our minds, and dare not truft 
 ourfelves at large in the purfuit of truth. This practice took its 
 commencement from the machinations of party, and the defire of 
 one wife and adventurous leader to carry a troop of weak, timid 
 and felfifh fupporters in his train. There is no reafon why I 
 mould not declare in any affembly upon the face of the earth 
 that I am a republican. There is no more reafon why, being a 
 republican under a monarchical government, I fhould enter into 
 
 a defperate 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 88t 
 
 adefperate faction to invade the public tranquillity, than if I book vr it. 
 
 CHAiV viu; 
 
 were monarchical under a republic. Every community of men, » v ~~ ^ 
 
 as well as every individual, mud govern itfelf according to it:. 
 ideas of juflice. What I fhould defire is, not by violence to 
 change its inftitutions, but by reafon to change its ideas. I have 
 no bufinefs with factions or intrigue ; but fimply to promulgate 
 the truth, and to wait the tranquil progrefs of conviction. If 
 there be any affembly that cannot bear this, of fuch an aiTembly I 
 ought to be no member. It happens much oftener than we are 
 willing to imagine, that " the poll of honour," or, which is 
 better, the poll of utility, " is a private ftation *." 
 
 The diflimdation here cenfured, befide its ill effects upon him Pernicious 
 
 .. ill i« i .... n effects of dif- 
 
 who pracufes it, and by degrading and unnerving his character fimulation in 
 upon fociety at large, has a particular ill .eonfequence with refpect 
 to the point we are confidering. It lays a mine, and prepares 
 an explofion. This is the tendency of all unnatural restraint. 
 Meanwhile the unfettered progrefs of truth is always falutary. 
 Its advances are gradual, and each ftep prepares the general mind 
 for that which is to follow. They are fudden and unprepared 
 emanations of truth, that have the greateft tendency to deprive 
 men of their fobriety and felf command. Referve in this refpect 
 is calculated at once, to give a rugged and angry tone to the mul- 
 titude whenever they fhall happen to difcover what is thus con- 
 cealed., and to miflead the depofitaries of political power. It 
 
 * AdJifon's Cato, Aft IV. 
 
 5 U fooths 
 
88 2 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vin. fooths them into falfe fecurity > and prompts them to maintain at* 
 
 CHAP. VlIJ. 
 
 inaufpicious obftinacy. 
 
 2. Of the rich Having confidered what it is that belongs in fuch a crifis t»- 
 
 and great. 
 
 the enlightened and wife, let us next turn our attention to a very- 
 different clafs of fociety, the rich and great. And here in the 
 Many of g r fl- place it may be remarked, that it is a very falfe calculation 
 
 them may be *■ J * 
 
 expeftedto ^at leads us univerfally to delbair of having thefe for the advo- 
 
 be advocates J *■ ° 
 
 ef equality. eateg Q £ e q Ua ]i t y # Mankind are not fo miferably felfifh, as; 
 fatirifts and courtiers have fuppofed. We never engage in any 
 action without enquiring what is the decifion of juftice refpedting 
 it. "We are at all times anxious to fatisfy ourfelves that what 
 our inclinations lead us to do, is innocent and right to be done. * 
 Since therefore juftice occupies fo large a fhare in the contempla- 
 tions of the human mind, it cannot reafonably be doubted that 
 a ftrong and commanding view of juftice would prove a power- 
 ful motive to influence our choice. But that virtue which for 
 whatever reafon we have chofen, foon becomes recommended 
 to us by a thoufand other reafons. We find in it reputation, 
 eminence, felf complacence and the divine pleafures of an ap- 
 proving mind. 
 
 The rich and great are far from callous to views of general 
 felicity, when fuch views are brought before them with that 
 
 * Book II, Chap. Ill, p. 98. 
 
 6 evidence 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 8S3 
 
 evidence and attraction of which they are fufcentible. From bookviii. 
 
 chap. vnr. 
 one dreadful difadvanrage their minds are free. They have not 
 
 been foured with unrelenting tyranny, or narrowed by the per- 
 petual prefTure of diftrefs. They are peculiarly qualified to 
 judge of the emptinefs of that pomp and thofe gratifications, 
 which are always moll admired when they are feen from a 
 diftance. They will frequently be found confiderably indifferent 
 to thefe things, unlefs confirmed by habit and rendered inve- 
 terate by age. If you fhow them the attractions of gallantry 
 and magnanimity in refigning them, they will often be refigned 
 without reluctance. Wherever accident of any fort has intro- 
 duced an active mind, there enterprife is a necefiary confe- 
 quence ; and there are few perfons fo inactive, as to fit down 
 for ever in the fupine enjoyment of the indulgences to which 
 they were born. The fame fpirit that has led forth the young 
 nobility of fucceffive ages to encounter the hardfhips of a camp, 
 might eafily be employed to render them champions of the caufe 
 of equality: nor is it to be believed, that the circumftance of 
 fuperior virtue and truth in this latter exertion, will be without 
 its effect. 
 
 But let us fuppofe a confiderable party of the rich and great conduft 
 
 which their 
 
 to be actuated by no view but to their emolument and eafe. It intereit as a 
 
 body pre- 
 
 is not difficult to fhow them, that their intereft in this fenfe will bribes. 
 admit of no more than a temperate and yielding refiftance. 
 Much no doubt of the future tranquillity or confufion of man-? 
 
 5 U 2 kind 
 
S8 4 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vnr. kind depends upon the conduct of this party. To them I would 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 fay : " It is in vain for you to fight againft truth. It is like 
 endeavouring with the human hand to flop the inroad of the 
 ocean. Retire betimes. Seek your fafety in conceffion. If 
 you will not go over to the flandard of political juftice, 
 temporife at leaft with an enemy whom you cannot overcome^ 
 Much, inexpreffibly much depends upon you. If you be wife, 
 if you be prudent, if you would fecure at leaft your lives and 
 your perfonal eafe amidft the general ihipwreck of monopoly 
 and folly, you will be unwilling to irritate and defy. Unlefs 
 by your rafhnefs, there will be no confufion, no murder, not a 
 drop of blood will be fpilt, and you will yourfelves be made 
 happy. If you brave the ftorm and call down every fpecies of 
 odium on your heads, ftillitis poflible, ftill.it is to be hoped that 
 the general tranquillity may be maintained. But, Ihould it 
 prove otherwife, you will have principally to. anfwer for all the. 
 confequences that fhall enfue.. 
 
 "Above all, do not be lulled into a rafh and headlong- 
 fecurity. We have already feen how much the hypocrify and 
 inftability of the wife and enlightened of the prefent day, thole 
 who c.onfefs much, and have a confufed view of ftill more, but 
 dare not examine the whole with a fteady and unfhrinking eye,, 
 are calculated to increafe this fecurity. But there is a danger, 
 ftill more palpable. Do not be milled by the unthinking and^ 
 iteming general cry of thofe who have, no fixed principles. 
 
 I. Addrefles 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. $s$ 
 
 AddrefTes have been found in every age a very uncertain criterion book vnr. 
 
 _ • ' _ chap. viir. 
 
 of the future conduct of a people. Do not count upon the v v ' 
 
 numerous train of your adherents, retainers and fervants. They 
 afford a very feeble dependence. They are men, and cannot 
 be dead to the interefts and claims of mankind. Some of them 
 will adhere to you as long as a fordid intereft feems to draw 
 them in that direction. But the moment yours mall appear to 
 be the lofing caufe, the fame intereft will carry them over to the 
 enemy's ftandard. They will difappear like the morning 
 dew.. 
 
 " May I not hope that you are capable of receiving impreflloa 
 from another argument ? Will you feel no compunction at the 
 thought of refilling the greateft of all benefits ? Are you 
 content to be regarded by the moft enlightened of your con- 
 temporaries, and to be handed down to the remoter! pofterity, as 
 the obftinate adverfaries of philanthropy and juftice ? Can you 
 reconcile it to your own minds, that, for a fordid intereft, for 
 the caufe of general corruption and abufe, you fhould be found 
 active in ftifling truth, and ftrangling the new born happinefs 
 of mankind?" Would to God it were poffible to carry home 
 this argument to the enlightened and accomplifhed advocates of 
 ariftocracy ! Would to God. they could be perfuaded to confult 
 neither paflion, nor prejudice, nor the flights of imagination, in 
 deciding upon fo momentous a queftion ! " We know that truth, 
 does not ftand in need of your alliance to fecure her triumph. 
 Ws do not fear your enmity.. But our hearts bleed to fee fuch 
 
 gallantry 
 
gg6 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING ' 
 
 bookvtti. gallantry fuch talents and fuch virtue enflaved to prejudice, and 
 
 CHM\ VIII. 
 
 ' enlifted in error. It is for your fakes that we expoftulate, and 
 
 v_ 
 
 for the honour of human nature." 
 
 jh nf , tlie f To the general mafs of the adherents of the caufe of juftice it 
 
 equality m ma y jjg p r0 p er t f av a f e w words. " If there be any force in 
 Omnipotence the arguments of this work, thus much at leaft we are authorifed 
 
 of toithi 
 
 to deduce from them, that truth is irrefiftible. If man be en- 
 dowed with a rational nature, then whatever is clearly demon- 
 ftrated to his underftanding to have the moll powerful recom- 
 mendations, fo long as that clearnefs is prefent to his mind, will 
 inevitably engage his choice. It is to no purpofe to fay that mind 
 is fluctuating and fickle ; for it is fo only in proportion as evi- 
 dence is imperfect. Let the evidence be increafed, and the per- 
 fuafion will be made firmer, and the choice more uniform. It 
 is the nature of individual mind to be perpetually adding to the 
 {lock of its ideas and knowledge. Similar to this is the nature of 
 general mind, exclufively of cafualties which, arifing from a more 
 comprehenfive order of things, appear to difturb the order of 
 limited fyftems. This is confirmed to us, if a truth of this uni- 
 verfal nature can derive confirmation from partial experiments, 
 by the regular advances of the human mind from century to cen- 
 tury, fince the invention of printing. 
 
 Importance " Let then this axiom of the omnipotence of truth be the rud- 
 
 of a mild and 1 i • t • • i i 
 
 benevolent der of our undertakings. Let us not precipitately endeavour to 
 
 proceeding. 
 
 accomplifh that to-day, which the difTemination of truth will 
 
 make 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. tSy 
 
 make unavoidable to-morrow. Let us not anxioufly watch for chap^ii 
 occafions and events : the afcendancy of truth is independent of * "~"~ "" * 
 events. Let us anxioufly refrain from violence : force is not 
 conviction, and is extremely unworthy of the caufe of juftice. 
 Let us admit into our bofoms neither contempt, animofity, re- 
 fentment nor revenge. The caufe of juftice is the caufe of hu- 
 manity. Its advocates mould overflow with univerfal good will. 
 We fhould love this caufe, for it conduces to the general happi- 
 nefs of mankind. We mould love it, for there is not a man that 
 lives, who in the natural and tranquil progrefs of things will not 
 be made happier by its approach. The moft powerful caufe by 
 which it has been retarded, is the miflake of its adherents, the air 
 of ruggednefs, brutiftmefs and inflexibility which they have 
 given to that which in itfelf is all benignity. Nothing lefs tharr 
 this could have prevented the great mafs of enquirers from be- 
 llowing upon it a patient examination. Be it the care of the 
 now increafing advocates of equality to remove this obftacle to 
 the fuccefs of their caufe. We have but two plain duties, which, 
 if we fet out right, it is not eafy to miflake. The firft is an un- 
 wearied attention to the great inftrument of juftice, reafon. We 
 muft divulge our fentiments with the utmoft franknefs. We 
 muft endeavour to imprefs them upon the minds of others. In 
 this attempt we muft give way to no difcouragement. We muft 
 fharpen our intellectual weapons ; add ts the flock of our know- 
 ledge ; be pervaded with a fenfe of the magnitude of our caufe j 
 and perpetually increafe that calm prefence of mind and felf pof- 
 
 fefllon 
 
SSS OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book: viit. feflion which muft enable us to do juftice to our principles. Our 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 * „ ' fecond duty is tranquillity. 
 
 Connexion It will not be right to pafs over a queftion that will inevitably 
 
 between li- 
 berty and fuggeft itfelf to the mind of the reader. * c If an equalifation of 
 
 equality. 
 
 property be to take place, not by law, regulation or public inftitu- 
 tion,butonly through the private conviction of individuals, in what 
 manner mail it begin?" Inanfwering this queftion it is not necefTary 
 to prove fo fimple a propofition, as that all republicanifm, all equal- 
 ifation of ranks and immunities, ftrongly tends towards an equal- 
 ifation of property. Thus, in Sparta this laft principle was com- 
 pletely admitted. In Athens the public largefles were fo great as 
 ahnoft to exempt the citizens from manual labour j and the rich 
 and eminent only purchafed a toleration for their advantages, by 
 the liberal manner in which they opened their ftores to the pub- 
 lic. In Rome, agrarian laws, a wretched and ill chofen fubftitutc 
 for equality, but which grew out of the fame fpirit, were perpe- 
 tually agitated. If men go on to increafe in difcernment, and 
 this they certainly will with peculiar rapidity, when the ill-conr 
 ftru&ed governments which now retard their progrefs are re- 
 moved, the fame arguments which fhowed them the injuftice of 
 ranks, will fhow them the injuftice of one man's wanting that, 
 which while it is in the poffeffion of another, conduces in no 
 lefpecl: to his well being, 
 
 Caufeof It is a common error to imagine, that this injuftice will be felt 
 
 Quality will 
 
 only 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 889 
 
 only by the lower orders who fuffer from it : and hence it would book viii 
 
 chap, viii, 
 appear that it can only be corrected by violence. But in anfwer ' ' 
 
 perpetually 
 
 to this it may in the firft place be obferved that all fuffer from it, advance, 
 the rich who engrofs, as well as the poor who want. Secondly, 
 it has been clearly fhown in the courfe of the prefent work, that 
 men are not fo entirely governed by felf intereft as has frequently 
 been fuppofed. It has been fhown, if poflible, flill more 
 clearly, that the felfifh are not governed folely by fenfual grati- 
 fication or the love of gain, but that the defire of eminence and- 
 diftinction is in different degrees an univerfal paffion. Thirdly 
 and principally, the progrefs of truth is the moft powerful of all 
 caufes. Nothing can be more abfurd than to imagine that 
 theory, in the beft fenfe of the word, is "not effentially connected 
 with practice. That which we can be perfuaded clearly and 
 diftinclly to approve, will inevitably modify our conducts 
 Mind is not an aggregate of various faculties contending with each 
 other for the maftery, but on the contrary the will is in all cafes 
 correfpondent to the laft judgment of the underftanding. When 
 men fhall diflin&ly and habitually perceive the folly of luxury, 
 and when, their neighbours are impreffed with a fimilar difdain, 
 it will be impoflible that they fhould purfue the means of it with: 
 the fame avidity as before. 
 
 It will not be difficult perhaps to trace, in the progrefs of Symptom* 
 
 of its pro-- 
 
 jnodern Europe from barbarifm to refinement, a tendency grefs.. 
 towards the equalifatioa of property. In the feudal times, as 
 
 5 X- nowr 
 
890 . OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vii r. now in India and other parts of the world, men were born to 
 
 CHAP. VIII. 
 
 a certain ftation, and it was nearly impoffible for a peafant to rife to 
 the rank of a noble. Except the nobles there were no men that 
 were rich ; for commerce, either external or internal, had 
 fcarcely an exiftence. Commerce was one engine for throwing 
 down this feemingly impregnable barrier, and fhocking the pre- 
 judices of nobles, who were fufficiently willing to believe that 
 their retainers were a different fpecies of beings from themfelves. 
 Learning was another, and more powerful engine. In. all ages 
 of the church we fee men of the bafeft origin rifing to the highefl 
 eminence. Commerce proved that others could rife to wealth 
 befide thofe who were cafed in mail ; but learning proved that 
 the low-born were capable of furpaffing their lords. The pro- 
 greffive effect of thefe ideas may eafily be traced by the attentive 
 obferver. Long after learning began to unfold its powers, its 
 votaries Hill fubmitted to thofe obfequious manners and fervile 
 dedications, which no man reviews at the prefent day without 
 aftonifhment. It is but lately that men have known that in- 
 tellectual excellence can accomplifh its purpofes without a 
 patron. At prefent, among the civilifed and well informed a 
 man of flender wealth, but of great intellectual powers and a 
 .firm and virtuous mind, is conftantly received with attention 
 and deference ; and his purfe-proud neighbour who " fhould 
 attempt to treat him fupercilioufly, is fure to be difcountenanced 
 in his ufurpation. The inhabitants of diftant villages, where 
 Jong eftablifhed prejudices are flowly deftroyed, would be 
 
 aftonifhed 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. 891 
 
 aftonifhed to fee how comparatively fmall a lljare wealth has In book ynr. 
 
 v* in xi -L • v ill* 
 
 determining the degree of attention with which men are treated * * ' 
 
 in enlightened circles. 
 
 Thefe no doubt are but flight indications. It is with morality idea of Its 
 in this refpecT: as it is with politics. The progrefs is at firft fo 
 flow as for the mofl part to elude the obfervation of mankind j 
 nor can it indeed be adequately perceived but by the contempla- 
 tion and comparifon of events during a confiderable portion of 
 time. After a certain interval, the fcene is more fully unfolded, 
 and the advances appear more rapid and decifive. While wealth- 
 was every thing, it was to be expe&ed that men would acquire 
 it, though at the expence of character and integrity. Abfolute 
 and univerfal truth had not yet mown itfelf fo decidedly, as to 
 be able to enter the lifts with what dazzled the eye or gratified 
 the fenfe. In proportion as the monopolies of ranks and com- 
 panies are abolifhed, the value of fuperfluities will not fail to 
 decline. In proportion as republicanifm gains ground, men 
 will come to be eftimated for what they are, not for what force 
 has given, and force may take away. 
 
 Let us reflect for a moment on the gradual confequences of 
 this revolution of opinion. Liberality of dealing will be among 
 its earlieft refults, and of confequence accumulation will become 
 lefs frequent and lefs enormous. Men will not be difpofed, as 
 now, to take advantage of each other's diftreffes, and to demand 
 
 5X2.- a price..' 
 
592 OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book viti. a price for their aid, not meafured by a general ftandard, but 
 
 CHAP. VJ1I. -»,.., 
 
 « \ ' hy the wants or an individual. They will not confider how 
 
 much they can extort, but how much it is reafonable to 
 require. The mafter tradefman who employs labourers under 
 him,, will be difpofed to give a more ample reward to their 
 induftry ; which he is at prefent enabled to tax chiefly by the 
 neutral circumftance of having provided a capital. Liberality 
 on the part of his employer will complete in the mind of the 
 artifan, what ideas of political juftice will probably have begun. 
 He will no longer fpend the little furplus of his earnings in that 
 diflipation, which is at prefent one of the principal caufes that 
 fubject him to the arbitrary pleafure of a fuperior. He will 
 efcape from the irrefolution of flavery and the fetters of defpair, 
 and perceive that independence and eafe are fcarcely lefs within 
 his reach than that of any other member of the community. 
 This is a natural ftep towards the ftill farther progreffion, in 
 which the labourer will receive entire whatever the confumer 
 may be required to pay, without having a middle man, an idle 
 and ufelefs monopolifer, as he will then be found, to fatten upon 
 his fpoils. 
 
 The fame fentiments that lead to liberality of dealing, will 
 alfo lead to liberality of diftribution. The trader, who is un- 
 willing to grow rich by extorting from his employer or his 
 workmen, will alfo refufe to become rich by the not inferior 
 injuftice of withholding from his poor neighbour the fupply he 
 
 wants. 
 
THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. S 95 
 
 ■wants. The habit which was created in the former cafe of book: vnr. 
 
 being contented with moderate gains, is elofely connected with *■ J ' 
 
 the habit of being contented with {lender accumulation. He 
 
 that is not anxious to add to his heap, will not be reluctant by 
 
 a benevolent diftribution to prevent its increafe. Wealth was 
 
 once almoft the fingle object of purfuit that prefented itfelf to 
 
 the grofs and uncultivated mind. Various objects will hereafter 
 
 divide men's attention, the love of liberty, the love of equality* 
 
 the purfuits of art and the defire of knowledge. Thefe objects 
 
 will not, as now, be confined to a few, but will gradually be 
 
 laid open to all. The love of liberty obvioufly leads to the love 
 
 of man : the fentiment of benevolence will be increafed, and the 
 
 narrownefs of the felfifh affections will decline. The general 
 
 difFufion of truth will be produ&ive of general improvement ; 
 
 and men will daily approximate towards thofe views according 
 
 to which every object will be appreciated at its true value. 
 
 Add to which, that the improvement of which we fpeak is 
 
 general, not individual. The progrefs is the progrefs of all. 
 
 Each man will find his fentiments of juftice and rectitude echoed, 
 
 encouraged and ftrengthened by the fentiments of his neigh* 
 
 bours. Apoftacy will be made eminently improbable, becaufe 
 
 the apoftate will incur, not only his own cenfure, but the' 
 
 cenfure of every beholder. 
 
 One remark will fuggeft itfelf upon thefe confiderations. " If Conclufion* 
 a the 
 
OF THE MEANS OF INTRODUCING 
 
 book vtii. the inevitable progrefs of improvement infenfibly lead towards 
 chap. vnr. . r o i / 
 
 an equalifation of property/ what need ' was there of propofing 
 it as a fpecific object to men's confideration ?" The anfwer to 
 this objection is eafy. The improvement in queftion confifls 
 in a knowledge of truth. But our knowledge will be very im- 
 perfect fo long as this great branch of univerfal juftice fails to con- 
 stitute a part of it. All truth is ufeful ; can this truth, which 
 is perhaps more fundamental than any, be without its benefits ? 
 Whatever be the object towards which mind fpontaneoufly ad- 
 vances, it is of no mean importance to us to have a diftinct view of 
 that object. Our advances will thus become accelerated. It is a. 
 well known principle of morality, that he who propofes perfection. 
 to himfelf, though he will inevitably fall fhort of what he. 
 purfues, will make a more rapid progrefs, than he who is. 
 contented to aim only at what is imperfect. The benefits to 
 be derived in the interval from a view of equalifation, as one 
 of the great objects towards which we are tending, are ex- 
 ceedingly confpicuous. Such a view will ftrongly conduce to 
 make us difinterefted now.. It will teach us to look with 
 contempt upon mercantile fpeculations, commercial profperity, 
 and the cares of gain. It will imprefs us with a juft apprehenfion 
 of what it is of which man is capable and in which his per- 
 fection confifts ; and will fix our ambition and activity upon 
 the worthiefl objects. Mind cannot arrive at any great and 
 illuftrious attainment, however much the nature of mind may 
 
 carry 
 
•THE GENUINE SYSTEM OF PROPERTY. . 895 
 
 carry us towards it, without feeling fome prefaces of its ap- bookviil 
 
 proach ; and it is reafonable to believe that, the earlier thefe » ^— r* 
 
 prefages are introduced, and the more diftin£t they are made, 
 the more aufpicious will be the event. 
 
 F I N -I S. 
 
ERRATA. 
 
 VOL. I. 
 
 Fage 131, line 15, — after "quantity of wrong," read " and to invent a fpecies of cor- 
 poral punifhment or reflraint," 
 P. 181, note, 1. ult., — -for " of former times" read " of the ancient model." 
 P. 182, — read the Jide note "from the unity of truth" as belonging to the top of the page, 
 P. 182, 1. 3 from the bottom, — -for "purfue" read " prefs." 
 
 , 1. 2 from the bottom, — -for " over whom he prefided" read " among whom he 
 
 refided." 
 P. 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, running title,— -for "OF OBEDIENCE" read "OF 
 
 FORMS OF GOVERNMENT." 
 P. 260, fide note, — read "juftice." 
 P. 324, 1. 4, — read " automation." 
 P. 330, fide note,— -for " Rapidity" read " rapidity." 
 P. 362, 1. 15, — for "exceptions" read "exception." 
 
 v oi^ 11. 
 
 P. 403, fide note,— for " Difiike" read " diflikc." 
 
 P. 427, fide note, — for "defire" read "defire's." 
 
 P. 47 r, 1. 4, for " no reflexion" read " to reflexion." 
 
 P. 503, note, 1. ult., — for "volume" read "work." 
 
 P. 511, 1. 5 from the bottom,— -for " tranfaftion" read " tranfaftions" 
 
 P. 551, 1. 3 from the ho^onx,— for " underftandit ;" read 11 underlb.nj it," 
 
 P. 564, note,— for "Book IV, Chap. VII" read " Book IV, Chap. VI." 
 
 P. 645, fide no\t,— for " of libel :"><W "of libel." 
 
 P. 673, fide note, — read " Rcafons by which they are vindicated." 
 
 P. 680, 1. ult., — for " necefllty." read " neceffity," 
 
 P. 706, 1. 14,— for "look" read "voice." 
 
 P. 730, 1. 3 from the bottom,— -for " domeftic" read " municipal." 
 
 P. 774, fide note, — -for "man :" read "man." 
 
 P. 791, fide note, — for "mean" read "means." 
 
 P. 807,- fide note, — after " vice" read " generating.'' 
 
 P. ScS, fide note,— for " The" read " the" 
 
 P. Si I, fide note, — read "and the misfoi tunes of war." 
 
 P. S37, fide note, — read "or from vanity." 
 
 P. 852, 1. 10, — for "be known" read " will be known. " 
 
 P. 878,1. 3 from the bottom,— -for "operation" read " operations - ' 
 
 P. 883, fide note,— for " conduct" read "Conduct" 
 
DIRECTION TO THE BINDER. 
 The volumes are to be divided at page 3 79 in fignature 3 C 
 The tables of contents to precede the refpective volumes* 
 
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