Duke University Libraries Report of the S Conf Pam #385 REPORT OP THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. Confederate States of AMRutcA, Treasury Department Richmond, December Ith, 1863 Hox. T. S. BococK, Speaker of the House of Representatives : ENT, > 3. S Sir: — I have tlie lionor to submit the following report of the condition oftliis Department : RECEfPTS FROM JANUARY IST TO SEPTEMBER SOlII, 1863. For eiglit per cent, stock, - - $107,292,900 70 seven " - - - 38,737.650 70 six " - - - (),810,0r)0 00 five *' call certificates, - 22,'J92.900 00 four " - - - 482.200 00 Cotton certificates, act April 21. 1862, 2,000,000 00 Interest on loans, - - - 140,210 11 War tax, - - . . 4.128,988 97 Treasury notes, - - - 391,623.5^0^)0 Sequestration, - - - - l,8(;2,.m0 21 Customs, - - . . 934,798 68 Export duty on cotton, - - - 8,101 78 Patent fu ml, - - " - - 10,794 04 Miscellaneous, including repayments by dis- bursing officers, - - - 24,498,217 93 Total, - - - . $601,522,893 12 EXPENDITURES DURING SAME PERIOD. War Department, - - - ;]t7,988,244 00 IJrtvy " . . - - ;j8,437,r)(n 00 Civil, miscellaneons, &c., - - lL(')2y,278 00 Customs, . . - . 5H,(;3fi 00 Public Debf, - - . - - 82,212,290 00 Notes caiicelletl and redeemed, - 59,044,449 00 Total of expenditures, - - $519,308,559 00 Total of receipts, - - - 601,522,893 00 Balanre in Treasury, - - |82, 154,334 00 From which is to be deducted the amount of treasury notes which have been funded and brought in for cancella- tion, but have not yet been regularly audited, estimated at, - - 05,000,000 00 Total, ... - $17,154,334 00 The public debt (exclusive of the foreign loan) at the same period, was as follows : FUNDED. Eight per cents, - - - |207, 128,750 00 Seven " " - . - 42.745,(^00 00 Six *< «« . - - - 41.006,270 00 Six " cotton interest bonds, - 2,035,000 00 Total, ... - $292,915,020 00 UNFUNDED. Treasury notes : General currency, - - - $603,032,798 50 Two Year notes, - - - 8,477,975 00 Interest notes at 3.65, - - - 627,450 00 *' " 7 30 - - - 122,582,200 00 Under $5, .... 4,887,095 50 Five per cent, call certificates, - - 26,240,000 00 Total, .... $766,447,519 00 Deduct amount of treasury notes funded and "^ cancelled, above referred to - 65,000,000 00 $701,447,519 00 In order to estimate the amount of Treasury notes in cir- culation at the date of this report, there must be added the ftirtlier sum of one hundred millions for the two months which have eUnDscd since the date of the above schedules. Tlie balances of appropriations already made by Congress, and not drawn on 30th September, stood as follows: War Department, - - - $395,502,698 00 Navy, - - - . . 24,413,045 00 Oivil. miscellaneous, &c., - - 56,240,996 00 Customs, . - _ . 294'460 00 Total, $476,451,799 00 The estimates submitted by the various Departments for the support of the Government, are made to 1st July, 1864 the end of the fiscal year, and are as follows : Legislative Department, - - . 309,005 00 Executive ♦'--.. 52^359 qq Treasury '" , - . 25,583,359 00 ^■^''^r, '^ . _ . 438,078,870 00 Nuvy " - • - . 13,624.945 00 State '' - > . 544,409 00 •J»'«t'ce " - - - . - 222,587 00 Post Office " - . - _ 82,968 00 Total, $475,498,493 00 If these estimates be extended to embrace the rcmaiuinf^ six months of the calendar year, they must be doubled and that sum added to the undrawn appropriations would make an aggregate ot $1,427,448,778, which Congress is formally called upon to provide. It is obvious, however, that the amounts to the credit of undrawn appropriations cannot be called for, inasmuch as there remain but three months of the present calender year to be provided for, and the expen- ditures are limited to fifty millions per mouth. So too as to the estimates. Any measures which will promptly reduce the currency will act upon prices and thereby materially re- duce t-he estimates. But the larger figures exhibit to us in a distinct and tangible form the problem which we are now required to solve. The currency has, by this time, attained dimensions of five times its proper size. The estimates are based upon prices fixed by this condition [of the currency. If these estimates are to be supplied by new issues of cur- rency, prices must agaitj increase and large editions must be made to the figures which represent both currency and estimates. It is obviors, therefere, that some other mode of raising supplies must bo devised ; and the necessity is eqiial- ly obvious of reducing the currency. We are thus dis- tinctly presented with these two conditions, as necessary elements of the problem to be solved, namely: reduction of the existing currency, and a supply of means from some source other than Treasury notes. In a former re[»ort, it was shown that 150 million of dol- lars was ])rt)l)ably the amount of currency which could be put in circulation tinder existing circumstances, in the Con- federate States, without material derangement of values. The cuirency in circulation when the estimates for tb.e en- suing year were made up, was about four times that amount ; and it may be fairly assumed that the prices were then nearly four times what they Avould have been if the curren- cy had been restored to its original condition. A reduction of the currency should, therefore, be a preliminary measure. It is substantially the most efiicient means of raising sup- plies ; far more so than cither taxes or loans. These last serve only to provide the amount which they nominally raise, but a reduction of the currency by reducing prices furnishes three or four times the amount of such reduction. It may be fairly assumed that a reduction of the currency to 200 millions would enable the government to sustain itself with an expenditure of only 400 millions in money, and if our problem be then stated in figures, it requires the apparently opposite conditions of raising 400 millions of supplies and of retiring an equal amount of currency. But there is also one further condition, involved. The support of the government requires continued supplies. Any delay in the action of measures to relieve the currency, aggravates all tlie difficulties. In the interval, other issues must he made, and those issues re-act on prices and increase the Government'expenditure. Promptness and certainty in the reduction are, therefore, as im[)ortant as the reduction itself. Thus are we fairly confronted with the three diffi- culties to be surmounted. 1. The currency must be reduced. 2. The supplies must be raised. 3. The measures to attain these ends must be prompt and certain. 1. The currency must be reduced. In the present expanded state of tlic currency it would not be expedient to reduce the circulation to its proper nor- mal standard. In order to effect the results demanded by the public interests the contraction must, of necessity, be great and sudden. But it is presumed that a reduction of the entire volume to 200 nullions will be sufficient. After the war, measures may be adopted for such further reduc- tion as may then be piO[)Gr. The excess of currency over this i)rnposed stanilard is now about 500 millions. The re- duction of prices which would follow the retiring of this ex- cess would in all probability, so reduce the expenses of the Government, that 400 millions of money would be a suffi- cient supply. Thus we have before us a demand for 900 millicJns in the course of the ensuing year. In the present state of the country, it is manifestly im- possible to raise this laige sum by taxes alone, and we are, therefore, compelled to resort to the only other resource presented by experience, namely : a loan. In the voluntary form, loans have already been tried by the Government, and have succeeded to the extent of up- wards of 300 millions, since the commencement of the war For an agricultural country like ours, this, under the unex- pected pressure upon our people, would justly be deemed a large contribution. At the commencement of the war no on& foresaw the extent to which it would be carried. It was not expected that we would be called upon to ciieck the advHDce 6 erf half a million of men, supported by the whole outer ^vo^lcl, while we were shut into our own soil and resources. Our products were thought essential to the rest- of mankind, and it was believed tliat tliey would come and buy them. Our financial measures were commenced with these views and were founded upon the basis of specie values. We issued treasury notes without interest, and then oftered to exchange them for bonds whose interest was paid in coin. This in- terest was made as high as eight per cent, because the legal rate of inlerest in the greater number of the original Con- federate States was at and over seven per cent.' This system was based upon sound principles, and if we could have exported our produce and thereby have procured specie, or its equivalent, the plan would liave effected the objects intended. Unfortunately the blockade Avas accepted by neutral powers, and our just expectations were disap" pointed. The specie of the world could not flow in upon us, and, when ours was exhausted, we were compelled to pay interest on our bonds in treasury notes. The foundation of the system was thus lost. Paper money rested on other pa- per, and as both accumulated, they acted and re-acted on each other, until both have been reduced to the rate at which tliey now stand. The obvious mode of recovery is to restore the specie foun- dation, or to obtain a substitute approaching specie values. This was attempted at the last session of Congress by tho issue of cotton interest bonds, and by the proposal to obtain the guaranty of the States on the bonds of the Confederate States. These bonds, if negotiated in Europe, it was ex- pected, would provide funds for the redemption of the cur- rency, and thus replace it upon a firm foundation. As late as the fall of Vicksburg, the credit of the Confederacy wa.s so good in Europe that it is believed that bonds with such a guaranty could have been negotiated at a rate which would have enabled the Secretary of the Treasury to control both the currency and the foreign exchanges. Unfortunately^ sorae of the States refused their concurrence, and the mea- sure failed. While these various measures were in progress, eflforts were made by the government to put in action the only other mode of raising money, namely: taxes. The first tax was laid in August, 18G1, and although not collected until 1862, yet so little were the people prepare I to respond, that the tax was actually collected from them in only three States. In the rest, thi States themselves advanced the amount due by th vr citizens, and aggravated existing evils by issues of their own notes and bonds. The small avails of this tax left the Government no re- sourse but to continue the issue of treasury notes, and to sustain them, as far as possible, by funding them in bonds. Efiforts were made by inducements and limitation of privi- leges, to promote funding. These efforts added to those which had preceded them, led to the funding of upwards of three hundred millions as already stated — a sum which would have been deemed satisfactory in any ordinary war, but which is wholly inadequate for the present. At the last session, Congress passed another tax bill, ■which is now in the course of being executed. But the large increase in prices, and the consequent increase of de- mands on the government clearly show already that the tax, if even now realized, would be wholly inadequate to sup- ply these demands. A further issue of treasury notes is, indeed, a necessity, until other measures can be adopted ; but the public mind has at last become awakened to the stronger necessity of devising such measures, and seems prepared to adopt any remedy, however sharp, if it can be satisfied that such a remedy will be effective. I have already stated that there arc but two legitimate sources of supidy, to wit : taxes and loans. No nation en- gaged in a war like the present has ever been able to sus- tain itself by taxes alone. Loans, also, are necessary ; but in order to negot ate them, an assurance must be given that the interest will be paid in a medium of certain value. The departure from this principle has undermined our credit, and our first effort should be to recover our first po- 8 sition. We must make tlie interest of any l this course will de- stroy the value of every note already issued. The measures proposed are intended to save the notes, and nothing short 10 of them will have that effect. If some other mode conld be devised, if a tax. or an)'^ other means of relief could he found, it would he preferred. But they are all inadequate, and the Government finds itself unahle to comply with the letter of it.s engagement. It endeavors, the'n, to cnnijily with its spirit. It tenders the creditor payment of its deht hefore it is due in a security of greater value. It gives him time to accept the payment, and, if he should prefer to retain the obli- gation, it allows the alternative upon the simple condition that he shall forego thepi'ivilege of demanding payment until after the war. It does exactly what an honest debtor in dis- tress is hound to do. it recognizes its deht, oifers the best secu- rity for payment in its power, and asks for time. This, in plain terms, is the projiosal of the Government ; and if it were the case of an individual, his creditors would meet, and, as a body, would accept his offer. In the case of the i)ublic the creditoi's cannot meet. But tliey have rcpreseY)tatives who can. The Congress represents tlie people as well as the Government, and, althougli it may be difficult to act for both parties, yet it is not difficult to ascertain the claims of justice, and Congress is the proper tribunal to adjust them. Their judgment in the matter should stand as a com])Osition between the parties. 2. The next reason which will be considered is, that the continuance of the notes as a circulating medium to their present extent, involves the ruin of public and piivate credit, and will deprive the government of the means of defending the lives and property of its citizens. If the currency re- mains in its present expanded state, no measure of relief can be made effectual. Prices must advance, and the means of the government to pay these prices must daily loose effi- ciency. Taxes beconie fruitless, by reason of the deprecia- tion of the money. The army can neither be paid, clothed nor fed ; arms and munitions of war can no longer be sup- plied ; the officers of the government cannot be supported, and the country must succumb. Calamities so disastrous must certainly be averted by every means within the power 21 of the government. No contract, however solemn, can re- quire national ruin ; and, in such case, the maxim must prevail that the public safety is the supreme law. The objection to these _measures of compulsion is greatly raotlificcl by the certainty that but a small portion of the notes will be brought under their influence. The induce- ments to the loan are so many that the greater part of the currency will be voluntarily converted ; and the true question is, whether the fraction which remains shall be permitted to gain an undue advantage over the rest, and to defeat the great public interests, which are involved in the withdrawal of the entire amount. These measures, it v.-ill be perceived, contemplate a per- manent financial policy, capable of expanding to suit the future vrants of the Government. It is obviously, there- fore, of the utmost importance that the ultimate payment of the bonds now issued, and of those which may be added, should be completely secured. Confidence is one of the largest elements which enter into public credit, and in this case the means are at hand to secure it. The South is in possession of products which are desired by the whole world. For at least five years after peace, the demands for these products will probably so far exceed the supply, that a duty on exports would full upon the consumer. For the five years following, the usual contest between producer and consumer will possibly divide the burthen ; but the necessi- ties of the country ofier a controlling reason for the contin- uance of the duty. To this may be added a certain portion of the duties on imports; and the two together, if now pledged to a sufiicient extent, would provide an adequate security for the payment of the debt. Assuming that, when, trade is re-established, we shall have the same products to export, and, in a few years fhereafter, the same quantity to sell, our exports and imports may each" be set down at three hundred nuliions. Any export duty of ten per cent, on all products of the field and forest would, upon this assumption, 22 produce thirty millions annually ; anfl, if an equal poHiora of the duties on imports be added, the ajjgregate would be sufficient (o pay the wliole interest of the debt. If Congress would now pass a law to tliis effect, as it is perfectly cou)pe- tent to do, the public credit would instantly revive, and probably to such a degree as to render inoperative the mea- sures of constraint which have been recommended. The guaranty which it would afford to the bonds of the consolidated loan, would induce a prompt exchange for thera of all other securities, except, probably, the tifteeii million loan, which is already protected by a simihir pledge. An exchange of the one hundred million \oi\i\ will, of itseU!, cause an annual saving of §2,000,000, and., if to this be ad- ded the saving which, would be made on other portions of the public debt, the sum total will be about five and a half millions. The annual saving of this sum certainly pre- sents another strong inducement to the immediate enact- ment of the proposed law. Such a law would still leave unpledged such other taxes and import duties as it may be found ex[)cdient to levy,: and which will furnish a sufficient and apjjropriatc means of supporting the Government, and of discharging the prin- cipal of the public debt. Thus a system of properly adjusted measures would be set in action, which would secure the public credit, and enable us to carry on the war with energy and success. In case, however, there should be any doubt as to the effi- ciency of the {»lan in raising the supplies required for the ensuing year, two further measures of relief may be added. It is possible that the severe contraction attending a redac- tion of the currency to two hundred millions, may limit the sale of the bonds after the efftct of such contraction shall be fully felt. It may, on that account, be necessary, for a time, to sell the bonds below par, to supply any deficiency in the means of the Treasury. I would, therefore, suggest as a measure of precaution, that such a power should bo granted to the Secretary of the Treasury. Another measure 23 of similar cliaracter could be provided by authorizing certi- ficates of indebtedness, payable after the war, to be issued ia part payment of supplies necessary for the array. It is not probable that either of these measures will be required. Still it is a wise precaution that they should be provided for .iny case of necessity. The large issue of bonds which is called for by these mea- sures, together with the new issue of treasury notes, present •a field of labor amjjly sufiicient to occupy the attention of ■nnother bureau officer. I would respectfully renew the re- commendation heretofore made, of establishing a separate bureau for t!ie issue of bonds and notcis, and for taking charge of all the arrangements connected with sucli issues. The number of coupons which will be required is so great that unless they are allowed to be prepared by machinery, the delay in getting out the bonds will be very great. The same difficulty attends the notes isued as currency. The number of persons who are necessarily employed to sign notes renders the signatures of no value in detecting coun- terfeit.s. No one can become acquainted with all the signa- tures, and but few of the officers know even the names of the signers. The genuineness of each note must be deter- mine I by the plate and not the signatures. I reaew, there- f.jre, my recommendation that the notes and coupons may be ii-sued with engraved signatures, under such precaution as experience may advise. In connection with this subject, I would respectfully bring to the attention of Congress the inequality which has arisen between the bonds and registered stock of the fifteen million loan. An export duty on cotton was imposed to pay the principal and interest of this loan, and the coupons of the bonds were authorized to be received in payment of that duty- T (• registered stock, having no coupons, did not enjoy this advantage, and the result has been a difierence of as much as fifty per cent, between the two portions of the same loan. This inequality can be remedied by authorizing the Secreta- ry of the Treasury to cause checks to be issutd fur the iuter- 24 est, as it accrues, Remi-aunu.'illy uixm the stock, and allowing these checks to be received i'or the duty in the same manner as the coupons. It uill be necessary to add a iew precau- tions for preventing the iVands and ibrgcries to which such checks would be exposed, all of which could be adjusted by regulations of this department. The report of tlie commissioner of Taxes, herewith sub- mitted, will cxinbit the details of the war tax of August, 1861, and of the taxes the present year, as far as progress has been made. The tax of 1861 had been actually collect- ed from the people in only three States — South Caroliiia, Mississippi and Texas. In the other States the tax was paid by the State Governments. Assessments were actually made in only ten of the States, and the results are exhibi- ted in the schedules annexed to the report. The total value of the property assessed is four thousand two hundred and twenty millions, of which, real estate is set down at one thou- sand three hundred and ninety-three millions, and slaves at one thousand four hundred and eighty millions. The total amount of the tax assessed is $21,142,662, of which, $19,- 418,393 have been collected ; leaving a balance uncollected of $2,044,275 ; of this balance $705,233 is absorbed by an un- adjusted difference in assessment claimed by the State of Tennessee ; and a large portion of the remainder is due in counties overrun by. the public enemy. The amounts actu- ally collected have been paid over by the collectors with commendable exactness and punctuality. .The tax imposed at the last session of Congress is now being rapidly collected. From present appearances, the commissioner estimates its probable collections at one hun- dred millions in money, and he reports that it is paid Avith general cheerfulness and alacrity. The novelty of many of the provisions of the law has given rise to questions which are presented in detail in the report of the commis- sioner, to which I respectfully invite your attention. The report of the chief clerk for the produce loan and 25 agency for the purchase of cotton and tobacco, herewith submitted, will exhibit the details of that branch of the De- partment. The general results are, that the whole amount of sub- scriptions realized from the produce loan is $32,758,875, and that there yet remains uncollected about $12,?<68,080. This is a large i)roportion of the whole amount, and the greater part is prt)baltly due from persons whom thecalami- ties of war and the destruction of pioperty have deprived of the means of" meeting their engagements. There are many others, however, who may have been tempted by the high prices to neglect their engagements, and to reach these it is proposed by the chief clerk to publish the lists in the neighborhoods where they were subsciibed. The measure is submitted for the consideration of Congress. The |)urcliases of cotton made under the act of April 30th, 1863, amount to 3'J'J,753 bales at the date of the reports last received, at a cost of' $30,3 14,769. The average price paid was $16 85 per pound, exclusive of Sea Island cotton; the lowest price being 6^ and the highest 36^ ; and five-sixths of the entire purchase money have been paid in bonds. The difficulty of procuring reports in detail from the agents in Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas and Texas, has prevented a precise return of the cotton which has been destroyed ; but from the estimates made by each of them it may be assumed that the entire loss is not more than 30,000 bales. To this must be added several thousand bales used for military and naval defences ; and also several thousand more turned over to the ordnance and quartermaster's departments to fulfil contracts for supplies, and also for shipments made by the Treasury Department. The whole of these deductionsrfnay be set down at 70,202 bales, leaving on hand an aggregate of about 329,500 bales. Of this amount about 30,000 bales are stored in warehouses in cities, and the remainder in cotton houses on the plantations where they have been purchased. The time which has elapsed since much of this cotton was purchased has damaged the rope and bagging of a portion 26 thereof; and the aid of Congress is asked in procuring the means of renewing it I had hoped that the skill of our people would discover a substitute for i-ope and bag^Mug, and probably an ofi'er of a reward for the best phm would pro- duce beneficial results. It' resort must be had to foreign supplies, the plan, wliich may be aibipted to ship the cot- ton, will furnish the nicaiis ol importing the rope and bag- ging, and in either view, it will be necessary to make an appropriation to cover the expense. The amount of tobacco purchased is two thousaud and ninety hogsheads, costing $772,846, at an average of twen- ty-nine cents per pound. These vari()us purchases have nearly exhausted the appropriation of thirty-five mlllious made by the act of 20th April, 18lJ3. In order to meet the objects stated in other reports, if these objects are ap[)roved, it will be necessary to increase the stock in the hands of the Government, by an additional appropriation of at least the same amount heretofore appropriated. The collection of the tax in kind on cotton and tobacco has been deemed so germain to the business of this l)ranch of the Department, that I have made arrangements for uniting them. Wherever cotton is collected, it is to be turned over to the chief agents already app;)inted in each of the cotton States. The same plan is pursued with tobacco, and I have appointed chief agents in the States of Virginia and North Carolina, at a commission with a maximum limit of four thousand dollars per annum. These ageuts are to appoint subordinate agents in each county for the purpose of receiving, sorting, prizing and preparing the satne for market. The details of these processes require much care and attention, and the constant supervision of a competent officer. It appears also that the parcels should, not be de- livered as early as the month of March, as now required by law, and it will be, therefore, proper to extend this period. The compensation of these subordinate agents has not yet been adjusted, owing to the Department not having suffi- cient information as to their duties. 27 The cotton interest honrls will naturally fall within the raanagetnent of this division of the Treasury Department, and it is proposed that they shall take that course. It is not clear what was the design of Congress in authorizing these honds. The iirst law passed was in connection with the funtling act, and the coupons were thereby made payable at the option of the holder of the bond in coin, or cutt^m valued at eight pence sterling pei' pound. The object of this law was obviouly to provide moans of raising money abroad ; and after it WdS passed I recommended that the rate, at whicli the cotton was to lie taken, should be reduced to six pence, or t!ie averai^o [nice at Liverpool before the war. At this rate purchasers could have been [)rocured at any time belbrc the fall of Vicksburg. The amendment which was uuide to tlie law by Congress reduced the price as proposed, but shifting the option of be- ing paid in cotton from the purchaser to the Government. This converted the bond in the view of a European purcha- ser into a simple six per cent, money bond, with the interest ])ayal)le here. The ahseuce of the right to require cotton for the bonds took away tiieir availahleness in the foreign market. -On the other hand, the option which they allowed the holder to receive cotton at six pence when it was selling at three or four times that price, made the operation very unfavorable for the Government, unless the bonds were sold at a large advance. For this reason, I deemed it my duty, after due explanation ef the nature of the bonds, to adver- tise for bids ; and as an experiment I accordingly offered five millions. The bids ranged at various rates from par up to one hundred per cent. I accepted all the bids at and over fifty percent, premium, and issued a second advertisement. The bids which were offered in both cases, were far below the amount of bonds offered for sale. Bnt those bids which came from persons of known intelligence and patriotism, indicated that fifty pes cent, was the probable value of the bonds. I, therefore, adopt- ed that rate, and authorized sales* to be made accordingly. 28 These sales have been made to a very limited extent, chiefly because it was belit'ved that the blockade would j)ieveiit the shipment of any cotton to be received in payment. This impediment was so 8erit)iis, tliut, in tiie judj^ment of men of business, even a reduction of the price of bonds to par would not induce larj^e sales. The scheme of finance hereinbefore proposed, will, if adoi)ted, render unnecessary any other elToit to call in the currency. These cotton bonds will tlieiel'ore not be required for that purpose, and, as they are not available to raise funds abroad, I recommend that the law authorizing their issue be repealed, I must again ask your attention to the necessity of in- creasing tlie compensation of the treasurer, assistant treasu- rers, depositaries, and clerks attached to each of them. Each of these officers discharge the duties of a bank, and its officers must have qualifications wliich wonhl fit them to discharge like ofBces in banks. Such qualifications cannot be commanded, unless at the same rate of compensation paid by banks. Congress has limited the salary of a teller in these offices to $1,200, where $3,500 is paid for like services- The result is, that the Government cannot procure compe- tent men to do its work. With the higher officers the diffi- culties are greater. Several of those in office desire to re- tire, and it has been found impracticable to procure com- petent successors. These embarrassments are greatly in- creased, when we come down to the rank and file of the clerks. The amount of their salaries does not furnish them •with support, and it is distressing to know the suffering which some of them encounter. I trust that the measures recommended for the relief of the currency will remedy the evil ; but, until these measures can be brought into action, these clerks will be sadly straightened to support themselves and their families. I would, therefore, respectfully recom- mend, as a temporary means of relief, that they be allowed to draw from the commissary's stores in the same manner as if they were detailed ou duty in the army. 29 The various estimates and schedules, which contain de- tails of the general statements above made, are hereunto ap- pended, together with a report of the proceedings of a con- vention of banks, at Augusta, Georgia, which I have been requested by it to submit to your consideration. All of which is resjiectfully submitted. C. G. MEMMINGER, Secretary of Treasury. penmAliF€« pH8.5