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 332.1 
 
A N 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 H - 
 
 WEEgg 
 
 / 
 
 INTO THE 
 
 Principles and Tendency 
 
 OF CERTAIN 
 
 PUBLIC MEASURES. 
 
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 V ' ci ; 
 
 H /■ 
 
 
 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 Printed by THOMAS DOBSON, No. 41, South 
 
 Second-street. 
 
 M DCC XCIY. 
 
fv^ c».2. 
 
 
 Digitized by the Internet Archive 
 in 2016 with funding from 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 https://archive.org/details/enquiryintoprinc01tayl 
 
[ iii 3 
 
 T O T H E 
 
 p 
 
 president 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES.; 
 
 S I R, 
 
 In the fpirit of truth, and not of adulation, 
 does the following performance folicit your attention. 
 Nor is its hope of acquiring fome fhare of your coun- 
 tenance diminifhed, by the circumftance of your not 
 having in an official charafter withheld your fignature, 
 from feveral of the meafures inveltigated. 
 
 A refponfibiiity in the chief magiflratc, for the efiefts 
 of every legiflative aft — an avowal, that unforefeen 
 confequences, however mifchievous, ought to be fub- 
 mitted to, for the fake of confiftency in error — that ex- 
 periment in fearch of truth, is to be rejefted ; are po- 
 fitions to which a liberal and enlightened mind will ne- 
 ver accede. 
 
 Y our general affent to laws ought to be afcribed to 
 republican principles, and not to an indifcriminate ap- 
 probation of their contents. To yourfelf therefore, as 
 well as to every other citizen, remains iDtire the inva- 
 luable birth-right of freedom in the re-examination of 
 public meafures. For furely the right and duties of a 
 citizen cannot be abforbed by official functions. ' 
 
3?S?/j 
 
t iv ] 
 
 Whilft, under the influence of republicanifm, you 
 have cautioufly checked the will of the people, you 
 have a!fo referved your negative power, to be exerted 
 on great and momentous occalions, for the prefervation 
 of their rights. Such an occafion occured in a direft 
 attempt upon the principles of reprefentation, the do- 
 feat of which fufliciently evinces, that you cannot ap- 
 prove of the indireft means by which thefe principles 
 have been fo much more deeply w r ounded, than that 
 attempt contemplated. Can it then be delufion to che- 
 rilh a hope, that alfaults directed againfl; the vital organ 
 of popular government, are deltined to be defeated by 
 the ame laudable vigilance ? 
 
 The AUTHOR. 
 
{|FuUs$W 
 
 AN 
 
 ENQUIRY 
 
 INTO THE PRINCIPLES AND TENDENCY OF CERTAIN 
 PUBLIC MEASURES. 
 
 SECTION I. No FREE GOVERNMENT OR THE BLESS- 
 
 INGS OF LIBERTY CAN BE PRESERVED TO ANY PEO- 
 PLE, BUT BY A FREQUENT RECURRENCE TO FUN- 
 DAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. 
 
 T THE (late of politics at all times, ought to attract 
 the attention of a nation, jealous of its liberty, 
 lately purchafed at the expence of much blood and trea- 
 fure. To what more important fubject, can a portion 
 of our attention and enquiries be applied ? Private im- 
 
 I morality, is often confined to the deflruction of an in- 
 dividual, whilft political immorality- will ruin a nation. 
 When the honelt and unfufpicious, are falling into the 
 fnares of the felfifh and cunning, it behoves all pollened 
 of a fmgle fympathetic fpark, to found the alarm ; and 
 when an alarm is founded, temerity and folly only, will 
 have to deplore the want of prudence and caution. 
 
 National watchfulnefs is the only preff rvative or 
 liberty. A patriot magiftracy hardly appears to glad- 
 den the hiftoric patre, once in a century. Shall Ame- 
 ricans then rely on a phenomenon to guard tnetr ngn.s. 
 Fanaticifm alone will fondly wait for a miracle. Or 
 fliall we call in the aid of plain and unerring arithmetic, 
 from whence to extract a rule for our conduct. Cal- 
 I culate. How jnany bad kings for one good one are 
 I recorded inhiftory ? Aicertain this, and the refult 
 
 B 
 
[ * ] 
 
 dibits the exact chance for freedom, held by the tenure 
 of a blind and implicit reliance on the integrity of the 
 magiftracy. 
 
 If to be watchful at all times, is a neceflary effort of 
 national prudence, the precept is pronounced by the 
 tongue of liberty to be indifpenfable, at an epoch of ex- 
 periment. Corrupt morals in a ftate of infancy, fore- 
 bode a licentious manhood, and a wicked old age. — 
 By giving a proper tone to a young government, and 
 rooting an adminiftration in the found principles or 
 political morality, happinefs will be acquired for our- 
 felves and our polterity. By fparing the rod, we may 
 fpoil the child. Like an ill weed which grows apace, 
 it wilifoon become loo flrong for correction, and in- 
 ftead of being a bleffing, it will turn out a curie to its 
 parents. 
 
 To leave the allegory. As a bad form of govern- 
 ment, may by means of a good adminiftration, produce 
 national happinefs, fo a good form of government, may 
 be abufed into an engine of fraud and corruption. 
 Mifchievons precedents, or innovations upon the con- 
 flitution, are matured by time into municipal regulati- 
 ons, or fundamental rules. Antiquity will begin to 
 fhew its filvered locks, and under the difguife of lanfti- 
 ty, will lay hold of the firit admiffible moment to in- 
 trench itfelf behind the bulwark of prefeription. Cuf- 
 tom will be arrayed againfl reafon. Prejudice, intcreft, 
 ridicule, invective, authority and power, will appear as 
 auxiliaries to the former; whil'd the latter will have no 
 nllv, except argument, andmuft alfo ruTume the qnplea- 
 fant language of reformation. Combating with fuch 
 odds, a defeat would be almoft inevitable, and afflicting 
 would be the fenlations of honeftmen in the reflection, 
 that by their fupinenefs they have betrayed the molt 
 facred depofit, inffead of tranfmittipg it unimpaired to 
 polterity. 
 
 
[ 5 1 
 
 Every acquifition is infallibly loft by inattention.— ~ 
 I.iberty, tho’ ineftimable, is the mod difficult to pre-- 
 ferve. It is incapable of being fecured by bars and' 
 bolts, and is therefore conftantly expofed to the pilla- 
 ges of intereft. It is a general indivinble property, 
 whence few feel a particular obligation or intereft, to be 
 militant under its banner. It is committed to the cuf- 
 tody of magiftrates, but in the end they feldom fail to 
 betray t'neir trull, unlcis awed by thefocial jurifdiclion. 
 Are magiftrates enraptured with her beauties, and jea- 
 lous left others ihould participate in her charms ? Or 
 do they deteft a deity, who bellows liberally upon all, 
 becaufc it is her character to bellow impartially ? 
 
 The aflfaults upon the virtue of men in power, if facts 
 can be afeertained from etfedls, mud be hard to with- 
 ftand. But many brilliant examples exile, proving that 
 they are not irrefutable. A frequent and firm national 
 enquiry into the meafures of government, will check 
 political vice, and reward political virtue. The ardour 
 of honefty will be awakened. ~W hat incitement to pa- 
 triotifm exifts, if the good and bad — the noneft and 
 knaviffi — the benevolent and mifanthropic, are depoli- 
 ted by national fupinenefs in one common oblivious 
 receptacle ? Sell intereft, chicanery, peculation, and 
 not public efteem, will (ha pen the adminiftration. M x- 
 gillrates will provide fuch a recompence as they love, 
 and when fordid paffions are to be gratified, and are 
 their own carvers, what degree of moderation is to be 
 expected ? The wheat can only be feparated from the 
 chaff by fifting. Lazinefs in politics is like lazinefs in 
 agriculture. It will expofe the foil to noxious weeds. 
 The wholefome plants will {brink from a ftate of indis- 
 criminate amnefty, and difdaining a difhonprable fo- 
 ciety, will lea/e the held in the pcffeffion of tares and 
 thillles. 
 
 If thefe principles are political axioms, whence hap- 
 pens it, that the direction in which the American go- 
 
 % 
 
i 4 : 
 
 «rernmcnt is moving, hath hardly attra&ed the public 
 notice of the particular flates, or of private individuals? 
 Is this direction invariably right ? Is it univerfaliy fa- 
 tisfaclory ? Have intereft, ridicule or inventive, depri" 
 ved truth of her articulating powers ? Or is fhe brow- 
 beaten by power or authority ? * 
 
 That this univerfal fatisfaclion does not exift, is exhi- 
 bited by almoll every private company. It is often af- 
 i’erted that the administration is driving at monarchy — : 
 that the legiflature is corrupt — and that the conflitution 
 has been more deliberately broken, than it was formed. 
 
 t 
 
 Thefe aiTertions are alarming. Theydeferve invefti- 
 gation. The national mind is moved, and muff be fa- 
 tisfied. Shew it the good or harm which awaits the 
 community, that it may either rejoice in the one, or 
 repel the other. 
 
 The conclufion of a Prefidential revolution, is a pro- 
 per period from whence to look back. Let us confider 
 whether the retrofpecl exhibits encouragement to pro- 
 ceed, and to what ultimate point the fame direction will 
 probably lead us. 
 
 Will you, reader, accompany me in fuch reflections ? 
 Ye fovereign flates, will you contribute your contin- 
 gents of invelligation ? It may obviate a neceflity for 
 contingents of another nature, upon fome occaflon, 
 which may not be very dillant. 
 
 SECTION II. — The principles of the investi- 
 gation. 
 
 B UT before we proceed it is proper to form apolitical 
 compafs to guide our courfe. If political principles 
 pxift — if the rights of man , are words of real mean- 
 
[ 5 1 
 
 ing; if there are none favoured of heaven, with an infcrip- 
 tion of fupremacy on their foreheads, furely there can 
 be no difficulty in {'electing a few fimple axioms, beyond 
 the reach of polemical artifice, and containing adegree of 
 internal evidence, compelling indubitable convidtion. 
 
 Unhappily we dare not rely intirely on the conftitu- 
 tion of the United States. That hath indeed a confo- 
 lation, in not having been treated vrorfe than the holy 
 feriptures. Political and religious herefy, being of 
 kindred families, will act from fimilar motives. Nei- 
 ther will ever want a text to defend its ufurpations up- 
 on orthodox principles either human or divine, becaufe 
 neither have in view the public good. And felf inter- 
 eft is the moft induftrious principle imaginable, in hunt- 
 ing out cafuiftical arguments and diftinftions, to de- 
 lude mankind into a Hate, the moft favourable for its 
 defigns. It would be difficult for inflance, for a man of 
 underftanding, w’hofe only motive was the common 
 good, to find in the conflitution, a fingie exprdfion 
 w’hich contemplated the erection of banks, or other 
 corporations. For corporations are only deeds of gift, 
 or of bargain and fale, for portions of valuable common 
 rights ; and parts may be difpofed of, until the whole 
 is distributed among a few individuals. But yet, poli- 
 tical herefy, views of intereft,and a union of talents and 
 induftry, may puzzle, perplex and miflead, even a found 
 head, and a good heart. Hence arifes an argument 
 for avoiding fo broad a theoremic bafts, as the confti- 
 tution of the United States. 
 
 A feleftion of plain, tho’ great principles, refulting 
 from the conftitution, as the theorems to guide our in- 
 veftigations into the objects and defigns of the adminif- 
 tration,is the only remaining alternative. Without a teft 
 for truth, felf interelt and innovation, by their wiiy ar- 
 tifices, will flip out of our grafp. Or by affirming new 
 and harmlefs forms, they may withdraw thcmielvcs from 
 the view 7 , even oi an inveftigating eye. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
C « ] 
 
 Are not the following propofitions unqueftionable ? 
 
 1. That the conftitution contemplates a republican 
 form of government, Mowing from and depending 
 on the people ; and that a mode of administration, 
 deftructive of fuch dependence, and introductory 
 of monarchical ingredients, innovates upon and fub- 
 verts the conftitution. 
 
 2. That Congrefs can impofe taxes for the common 
 defence and general welfare, of the United States, 
 but not for the benefit of individuals or their own 
 private emolument . 
 
 3. That the right of legislation, refided, and yet re- 
 fides in the people cf the United States. 
 
 4. That this right is periodically delegated by electi- 
 on to their reprefentatives. 
 
 5. That the right of election is a fubftance and not a 
 form, and that a legitimate reprefentation,implies an 
 exifling operative principle, in the reprefenting, im- 
 pelling them for the good of the reprei’ented. 
 
 6. That whenever this principle ceafes to exift, go- 
 vernment is converted into an ufurpation. 
 
 Let thefe pofitions conftitute the text. Compare 
 with it ftrictlv the enfuing commentary. Confider if 
 the arguments are conformable and appofite. With- 
 out much reflection we aflent to propofitions, felf evi- 
 dently true, but a compofition of reafonings, deducing 
 political effects from political caufes, and trying mea- 
 sures by the teft of principle, require conlideration. If 
 conviction would flalh in upon our minds, when a 
 public mifehief was barely named, argument would be 
 fuperfluous. And yet too ready an aifenr, leaves the 
 mind unprepared to repel the deceitful efforts, which 
 will be made to delude it ; whereas a conviction, re- 
 fulting from a deliberate inveftigaiion is hard to lhake. 
 The following performance folicits nothing, but a cir- 
 cumfpect confideration. Confcious of human weak- 
 nefs, it prefumes not to fet up for infallibility ; and in 
 exerting its own privilege of thinking, only deftgns to 
 
 \ 
 
Viduce others to think alfo. Confeious too of politi- 
 cal purity, a detection of its errors will give it pleafurc, 
 ■tvhilft it will cling to its truths with principled fidelity. 
 
 SUCTION III. — The bank or the united states 
 
 CONSIDERED. 
 
 T HE bank of the United States, is the matter key 
 of that fyttem, which governs the adminittration- 
 It could unlock a depofitory of fecrets, which would, if 
 expofed, reflect much light upon the fubiect. But we 
 are confined to the information to be extracted from the 
 law itfelr, and its obvious effects ; premifing however, 
 that fecrets enacted by law, are fecrct laws. They ope- 
 rate upon the ignorant, and punifh the innocent ; and 
 are as inevitable, as the ttroke of death. An inttituti- 
 on, the object of which is gain, would not have ftudi- 
 oufly legalifed the privacy of its tranfadions, unlefs that 
 privacy had begotten gain. The wilue to fome, of be- 
 ing in the fccrer, is precifely the amount of a fraudu- 
 lent lofs inflicted upon others, who are not fo. 
 
 It is about to be proved, that a defign for erecting 
 arittocracy and monarchy, is fubfifting — that a money im- 
 ■pulfe , and not the public good , is operating on Congrefs; 
 and that taxes are impofed upon motives, other than 
 the general welfare. The leading evidence evincing 
 thefe attentions, is to be extracted from the bank fcheme, 
 which was contrived, propofed, and modelled by the 
 Secretary of the Treafury, and therefore it is felected 
 as the firft fubjecl of inveftigation. 
 
 The bufinefs of banking, is firnply a reiterated ex- 
 change -of obligations for the payment of money. A. 
 gives his bond to B. and receives B’s bond in exchange. 
 But A. pays B. an intereft, whereasB. pars A. none. A. 
 is the community , B. is the bank. How mutt this traffic 
 end ? 
 
- E * 3 
 
 This idea requires illuftration. In a barter of two" 
 commodities, two interefts only are concerned, altho* 
 each of thefe interefts may be compounded of many 
 individuals. Thus buyer and feller comprife many 
 perfons, though they confift of but two claffes. All 
 thofe who deal with the bank, conftitute one clafs, and 
 the ftockholders, or proprietors of the bank, another, 
 lhe dealers depofit their bonds or notes carrying an 
 intereft, and receive in exchange the bonds or notes 
 of the ftockholders, carrying no intereft. And the 
 difference between receiving an intereft out of paper, 
 >*hilft it pays none on fimilar paper, conftitutes the 
 great ground of profit to the bank. 
 
 . fcheme reprefents the idea of a perpetual rota- 
 tion, depofiting a profit at every revolution. It might 
 have been compared to a fpecies of hazard, called the 
 A. B. C. table, except that the latter propofes to the 
 adventurers fome chance to win; whereas the bank 
 can never lofc. I he fable bets with its gamblers up- 
 on every revolution ico to ics £, fio that in forty re- 
 volutions, the adventurers bet two to one. Yet a 
 chance for winning exifts. But in that refpect the 
 companion fails. r I he bank i-s perpetually betting ioo 
 to , t ^ le wager is always drawn, and the bank re- 
 ceives the fix in every hundred, by way of forfeit. 
 
 Suppofe two perfons were every moment in the year 
 exchanging bonds, one paying an intereft of fix per 
 centum, and the other not, how would matters ftand 
 vvnen a fetllement took place? r ihe gain acquired by 
 one, would be precifely fimilar to that which confti- 
 tuics the dividend of banks. In a private cafe, it 
 would be called a grofs device, to evade the ftatutes of 
 nfury ; and yet the enactors of thofe ftatutes have le- 
 ga ifed the fame device in the erection of banks, and 
 thus fubject the whole community to that which 
 would be a fraud upon an individual. 
 
 The bank evidently conftitutes one clafs, and thofe 
 wuo deal with it another. It evidently appears that 
 
f if ] 
 
 tfie bank muft gain. This gain neceflarily implies a 
 lofs, becaufe the traffic is of an unproductive nature. 
 ’ 1'is a traffic in ideas, not in fubflances. But it is not 
 fo eafy to difcern upon whom this lofs falls. And 
 this is a difficulty, which the favourers of the artifice 
 have taken care to promote, becaufe a detection upon, 
 this point would blow up the contrivance. 
 
 And yet a fmall portion of reflection mud get over 
 it. The misfortune mull; fall upon fomebody. r lhe 
 immediate dealers with the bank mull bear it, or they 
 are reimburfed by thofe who deal with them. There- 
 fore the lofs mud fall upon the whole community, or a 
 part of it. What defence of the inftitution would it 
 be, to fay, that it felects a devoted few for annual ruin* 
 whilft it fpares the great mafs of the community ? If 
 the monfter is to be fed on human labour, it would be 
 fair to determine the victim by lot, as to refort to a 
 decoy; 
 
 But it would be unjuft to impeach the bank of an 
 impofition, not palliated by the fubterfuge, “ that 
 thofe imported; on are able to bear the lofs.” To this 
 fpecies of palliation, it is certainly entitled. For it the 
 lofs neceflarily refulting from the traffic, had fallen 
 exclufively on the immediate adventurers, inevitable 
 and fpeedy ruin muft have enfued from the enormous 
 profit of the bank ; and the deftruction of feme would 
 have deterred others from adventuring within the 
 reach of this devouring monfter. A contrary efl'eft is 
 clearly obfervable ; and therefore the immediate deal- 
 ers muft, by lbme circuitous operation, obtain a re- 
 imburfement. Hence the bank may certainly boaft, 
 that the evils fhe difpenies, like the contents ol Pan- 
 dora’s box, are pretty equally diftributed. 
 
 Though it might redound to our amufement to 
 trace this operation, it would contribute but little to 
 our edification. The conclufion will be better evinced 
 
 0 
 

[ 10 ] 
 
 by a few ftrong lines, than by an aflemblage of thd 
 tnoft diverfified colourings. The gain is made. The 
 lofs cannot fall on the immediate gamblers, /or two 
 reafons. They are not ruined, nor do they work. 
 Gain can never arife out of nothing, becaufe it is fub- 
 ftantial. It mu ft therefore be the product of labour, 
 and labour only ; and that which produces the gain, 
 mull ofcourfe bear the lofs. The gamblers themfelves 
 are only the brokers between the bank and thofe who 
 really l'uffer by the inftitution. Brokers add nothing 
 to the commodity. They carry on the traffic between 
 their employers to a great amount for a profit. If 
 they made no profit, they would ceafe to purfue the 
 profeflion. The immediate receivers of the bank pa- 
 per, circulate it identically, or virtually, among their 
 principals, who pay both their profit, and the gain of 
 the bank. This gain flows in upon the bank in num- 
 berlefs devious ftreams, fupplied by the whole commu- 
 nity. Thefe ftreams, unlefs thus fupplied, would 
 have become dry, becaufe they would have exhaufted 
 a few unfed refervoirs. But they appear to be inex- 
 hauftible, and therefore they muft arife from the la- 
 bour of the community, which is the only inexhaufti- 
 bie, ever running fountain of wealth. 
 
 The principals of thefe brokers, are the original 
 fellers of wharever labour produces, and the confumers 
 of the wares the brokers deal in. This definition in- 
 cludes the whole agricultural, mechanical, profeflional 
 and mercantile interefts of the community, unconcern- 
 ed in the device. And upon this aggregate muft fall 
 the gain fo regularly collected by the bank. 
 
 Without perplexing ourfelves, to trace out the vari- 
 ous modes, by w r hich the firft dealers with the bank 
 are reimburfed from the wealth ot this aggregate, it 
 may not be amifs to felebt one, the features of which are 
 fo grofs and prominent, as not eafily to be for- 
 gotten. 
 
[ ” 3 
 
 The fydem throws into a few hands, a monopoly of 
 the bulk of the circulating medium. If a man could 
 monopolize any neceffary article of commerce, he would 
 gain, by borrowing money at fix per centum to effect 
 fuch an object. In the event, he would not lofe this inte- 
 red. The profits refulting from his monopoly, would 
 reimburse it manifold. The intereft, as well as his pro- 
 fit, would be reimburfed by thofe upon whom the mo- 
 nopoly operated. Can any monopoly be more diffufve in 
 its operations , than that of the great bulk of the circulating 
 medium. 
 
 Such a monoply is a kind of general fearch warrant 
 for wealth, filently penetrating, and condantly ex- 
 tracting from, the mod fecure funds. The profits of 
 the national labour, are in the fituation of a treafure, 
 gradually diminifhed by fecret and continual thefts. 
 
 SECTION IV. — The same subject continued. 
 
 T HE powers of a weapon ought to be thoroughly 
 underflood, before we venture to try its edge. — - 
 A bank is a machine of fuch wonderful and cunning 
 contrivances, that we mud be content to proceed much 
 farther in our enquiries, before we fhall comprehend 
 its mechanifm, or be able to form a competent judg- 
 ment of its effects. 
 
 If the reafonings of the lad fection are jud, we are 
 forcibly impelled to an awful idea. The reader has 
 already exclaimed, that the profits of the bank are ob- 
 vioufly an indirect tax upon the community. He is 
 right, and it is impoffible for the mod cunning argu- 
 mentative delufion to refute the affertion. 
 
 Can the pecuniary neceffities of a government be 
 fupplied by any poffible contrivance, w r hich will not 
 operate as a tax ? If an anfwer is given in the affirma- 
 tive, divulge, we reply, the glorious l'ecret for man- 
 
[ i? 3 
 
 kind, by which they may enjoy all the benefits of good 
 government, without paying for them. If in the ne- 
 gative, we thus proceed : 
 
 The capital of the United States’ bank is ten millions, 
 of which the United States own two. The dividend is 
 eight per centum per annum. This alone is an annual 
 income of 800,000 dollars, of which 160,000 belong 
 to the nation. The whole dividend, though but an 
 article of the income, is confiderably more than fuffi- 
 cient to defray the whole expence of the civil govern- 
 ment. If it was the property of the continent, it 
 would be thus applied, and in fuch an event, would the 
 government be carried on, without any expence to the 
 community ? 
 
 Except for the unaccountable infatuation which ex- 
 ills upon the fubjeft, arguments, as to this point, would 
 appear puerile. Becaufe pofitions, evidently true, re- 
 quire no proof. 
 
 If the whole profits of the bank had been railed and 
 applied for public ufe, as a part really are, it mull be 
 admitted, that it would have been an indirect tax, un- 
 til it is proved, that government poflefs a faculty of fup- 
 porting itfelf, by paper flight of hand, without burthen- 
 mg the community. 
 
 It then occurs to demand, whether the nature of the 
 contribution is altered as to the payers, by a tranfmu- 
 tation of thofe who receive the tribute ? Is it the lefs a 
 tax upon the community, becaufe it is received by an 
 Individual corporation, confilling of a few private per- 
 fons, many of them foreigners ? 
 
 But fuppofe we borrow one of thofe newly invented 
 expreflions, conveying no determinate idea, and cal- 
 culated to deceive : And inltead of calling the bank adl 
 a tax law, baptize it thus, “ a law exercifin^ a faculty 
 of government.” It mull yet be confefled, that it is a 
 ygry valuable faculty. It is worth to the bank of the 
 

 * 
 
C 13 ] 
 
 United States, an annuity, more than fufficient to 
 I defray the whole expence of civil government, and to 
 I all the banks now operating, an income probably equi- 
 I valent to the public expences, both ordinary and extra- 
 | ordinary. 
 
 But whatever is its value, it was undoubtedly a pub- 
 lic property, becaufe the legiflature in exerciling this 
 faculty, were public, and not private agents. The con- 
 veyance then of this faculty by law, was a gift or bar- 
 gain and fale, of fo much public property to private 
 perfons. If the former, it beflowed upon them gra- 
 fuitoufly, an immenfe revenue, which can only arife 
 | from the common ftock of wealth ; if the latter, it fells 
 
 i in a ratio of Sop, 000 dollars annually of faculty, for the 
 privilege of having 160,000 dollars of the fame faculty, 
 annually reftored. In either view, the meafure was a 
 J public folly, and a private gain. 
 
 The public poflefs a great variety of valuable facul- 
 ! ties. In parcelling them out among an ariftocracy,whom 
 I we fee growing up as if by the power of magic, a 
 I difpofition by portions, would have been lefs grievous 
 I than to give them all away at once. The faculties of 
 1 fome cities, counties, and even ftates, bellowed upon 
 I private corporations, would yet have left others in pof- 
 I ieflion of their rights and privileges. And it would 
 I have been more excufable for the legiflature of a great 
 I nation, to have proflituted the public interefl in a few 
 I particular inflances, than to conftitute itielf the bawd- 
 I general, for fupplying the infatiable luff of an ariftocracy. 
 1 The attempt of Appius upon Virginia, was more tole- 
 . rable, than a general ariftocratical invafion of the na- 
 | tional chaflitv. And yet, preferring death to proflitution, 
 
 I; her bright example aroufed the Roman fpirit, and the 
 j virtue of a fnnple maid, reftored the liberty of a whole 
 I people. 
 
 The public faculties are the offsprings of labour. — 
 j Leaving therefore unmeaning terms, which may mif- 
 

[ *4 ] 
 
 lead or perplex us, xve will refume expreffions, which 
 convey a determinate idea. 
 
 Bank flock is public debt. It is public debt of the 
 vrorfl kind, fince it bears an enormous and incomputa- 
 ble intereft, as will hereafter be (hewn. Nothing but a 
 tax can pay this intereft, unlefs it is proved that the in- 
 tereft on the funded debt, might have been paid with- 
 out a tax. And if this could be proved, then it would 
 be replied, that the faculty ought to have been dedica- 
 ted to that ufe. 
 
 The bank might have been fold to public creditors 
 in lieu of intereft. If the price had been ten millions 
 of fix per cents, and the profits eleven per centum, the 
 purchafers would have made a good bargain, fuppofing 
 they had depofited ten millions more of aftual fpecie, 
 as flock upon which to circulate paper. But if they 
 could have circulated ten millions of paper, upon a de- 
 pofit of not more than one million of fpecie, as the bank 
 probably does, the bargain would have been a good 
 one, reducing the profit even to eight per centum. — 
 Such a foftening meafure, is dated as illuftrating the 
 pernicioufnefs of the contrivance, and not as allowing 
 that it would have been a fufficient ground of juftifica- 
 tion. Where is the merit of afyftem of finance, which 
 ufes public property to increafe, and not to diminifhthe 
 public burthens ? 
 
 Bank flock is public debt of the mod ruinous kind, 
 and yet no confederation was paid, really or nominally for 
 it. If the legiflature had prefented the bank proprie- 
 tors with ten millions of funded debt, in lieu of this 
 faculty, the community would have been gr«at gainers, 
 becaufe the profit accruing from the gift, could not 
 have exceeded an average of between four and fire per 
 centum. If twenty millions had been fo prefented, 
 even that would have been better for the community, 
 becaufe the profit would not only have been as low as 
 the gain made by the bank, but it would have been 
 
[ J 5 3 
 
 known and limited — it might have been provided by 
 tax-laws equalizing the burthen — it would have been 
 fubject to redemption — and above all, it wc uli not have 
 committed a depredation upon the fundamental princi- 
 ples of reprefentation. 
 
 Had fo much public debt btznbonejlly , and not artificial - 
 /^accumulated, it mud have been earned by labour, which 
 would have produced a general didribution of it, obvi- 
 ating an exorbitant accumulation of wealth in a few 
 private hands. 
 
 But an effect, which was a leading motive for the 
 contrivance would then have been defer te 1. Its chief 
 defign was to make the rich, richer ; and the poor, 
 poorer. And thus I prove it. 
 
 Money and credit, or an equivalent for them, wer« 
 to be depofited as the only mode of acquiring bank- 
 dock. The poor had neither to depofit, the rich pof- 
 feffed both. An exclufion of the one, and a preference 
 of the other, though not expreffed, w-as evidently de- 
 fined, becaufe it unavoidably refulted from the nature 
 of the contrivance. And the effedt anfwcrs the defign. 
 A portion of the rich clafs of citizens, are the pro- 
 prietors of the device, whilit labour fupports it. An 
 annuity to a great amount, is fuddenly conjured up 
 by law, which is received cxclufively by the rich, that 
 is the ariffocracy. Will it n t make them richer? It 
 is paid out of labour, and labour in all countries falls 
 on the poor. Will it not make this clafs poorer ? and 
 do fuch effedts tend to corredt the principles of either ? 
 
 Suppofe a religious fociety fhould be excluhvely in- 
 corporated, and by hook or crook provided with an 
 ample revenue, payable from the labour of all fuch 
 focieties. Would it not become an ejlabljhed churchy 
 and w'ould it not impoverifh and eventually fwahovv up 
 all others ? A political fedt, thus incorporated, and 
 thus provided for, will have a political tendency, of a. 
 

 
 * 
 
C i6 ] 
 
 nature precifely fimilar. No diftindlion ex’ifts between 
 * the cauies, and none therefore will appear in the effects. 
 And if it be faid, that our political rights are nor worth 
 preferring, let it be remembered that they are the 
 foie guardians of religious liberty.- 
 
 If the arillocratical fecit, thus incorporated, had ac- 
 tually depofited fpecie in their bank, it would yet have 
 remained in their own cuftody, and under their own 
 direction ; for the corporation manages its own con- 
 cerns. Even in this event, labour would have been 
 taxed, to pay to the rich an exorbitant ufurio.us inte- 
 reft, for their own money, in their own pockets, and 
 at their own difpofal. But ufury upon actual money* 
 was too flow a procefs for effecting a vaft difproportion 
 of wealth. The contrivance is calculated to beftow 
 upon the rich, intereft upon the amount of their cre- 
 dit, not of their cafh. Bank-paper is circulated to an 
 amount, far beyond a depoilt in money. It refts upon 
 an idea called credit. And all intereft gotten for this 
 furplus of paper, beyond a fpecie depoftt, is paid by 
 labour to the rich, becaufe they have, what the poor 
 ardently with for ; and therefore they ought not to be 
 taxed for wanting it, ffnce this precludes even a hopi 
 of fuch an acquifttion. 
 
 How delufive is a comparifon between bank-debts, and 
 private loans ? The latter muff; confift of money or mo- 
 ney’s worth, and without one, debts between individuals 
 cannot becreated; the former may be created, though the 
 bank pofl'efles neither money or money’s worth, and a 
 banker may live upon the labour of others during his 
 whole life, if he can conceal the fraud of his being a 
 bankrupt. The latter are limited within reafonable 
 bounds, becaufe they are founded on real wealth, which 
 cannot be even doubted by impreffing hireoglyphicks 
 upon paper ; the former may be infinitely multiplied 
 by a printing prefs, and are unlimited fo long as the 
 nation is able to pay fix pounds fpecie, for every hun- 
 dred pounds of idea, which a bank may be pleaied to 
 
t l 7 f 
 
 emit. Tn the latter cafe, fomething is given for fome- 
 thing ; in the former, the community pays fomething 
 for nothing. 
 
 But a feature of this monftrous contrivance is now 
 to be difclofed, which expofes the partiality of admi- 
 niftration to a moneyed intereft, and its real defign, 
 beyond a remnant of doubt. 
 
 This fame worfhipful ariftoeracy, favoured of go* 
 vernment, for the bulk of their bank-ftock, were not 
 even obliged to depofit money. Public fecurities car- 
 rying an intereft of fix per centum, for three fourths 
 of the whole amount, are by law receivable as a depofit. 
 If actual fpecie had been locked up in the vaults of 
 the bank, to be occafionally counted by public autho- 
 rity, a femblance of an excufe might have been made, 
 by urging, that the intereft of the money thus depo- 
 fted, was loft. But paper certificates are depofited as a 
 fund upon which to circulate other paper certificates. 
 Thefe are gaining of the public a never ceafing intereft, 
 whether kept by the body corporate, or the individuals 
 compofing the body corporate. What an unheard of 
 degree of political iniquity is here difclofed ? To the 
 fix per centum paid by government on feven millions 
 five hundred thoufand dollars of the public debt, is 
 fuperadded by minifterial contrivance, the cuftomary 
 profit gained by a bank, and the unufual acquifitions, 
 amaffed by this particular feheme. Legiflative power 
 itfeif cannot afeertain, to what thefe amount. If they 
 extend only to fix per centum, then twelve per centum 
 is received out of the public labour, by certificate- 
 holders to the amount of 7,500,000 dollars, fome of 
 whom may pofiibly poffefs no other merit, but the fraud 
 of having purchai'ed them of the true owners, by con- 
 cealing their knowledge of the minifterial defigns. 
 
 A depofit of paper, as a fund on the credit of which- 
 to iffue other paper, is a ruinous feature, exhibited in 
 no other feheme of the fort extant, except that of tha 
 
 D 
 
t >8 ' ] 
 
 United States. Hence the poor compenfatioh to the 
 public, of locking up fpecie in the bank ready for an 
 urgency, in lieu of that taken out of circulation, though 
 pretended, does not exift. Inftead of fupporting the 
 credit of government, government muflfupport the cre- 
 dit of the bank. For if the credit of the government 
 wavers, public paper cannot fuppoit the credit of the 
 bank. When government lhall need help, the bank 
 will need it alfo ; nor can the political evils refulting 
 from being com pleat ly ftript of the fubjiantial means 
 of defence, be alleviated bv unlocking a hoard of paper 
 certificates. If the bank had really collected the fpecie 
 into its vaults, government would have been rendered 
 dependent on a private corporation, for the means of 
 national defence. If the bank (hould difapprove of de- 
 fence, it would withhold the means. Thus it would, 
 have become the arbiter of peace and war , and in cafe 
 a combination of foreign potentates, fhould endeavour 
 to impofe on America a government of king, lords, and 
 prelates, what would have been the arbitrament of a 
 clafs, from whence thofe materials muff have been 
 taken ? 
 
 Banking in its bcjl view, is only a fraud, whereby la- 
 bour fuflers the impofition of paving an interefl: on the 
 circulating medium ; whereas if fpecie only circulated, 
 the medium would in palling among the rich, often lie 
 in the pockets of the arinocracy without gaining an in- 
 tereft. But the ariftocracy, as cunning as rapacious, have 
 contrived this device, to inflict upon labour a tax, con- 
 flantly working for their emolument, whilft. they alio 
 retain the chief ufe of the call;, and fcldorn part with its 
 cuftody. 
 
 The Venitian nobility one day in a tear, convert 
 their palaces into gaming houfes, referving and exer- 
 cifing the privilege of cheating the citizens with falfe 
 dice, who are on that occalion indilcriminately admit- 
 ted. Worthy Venitian ariflocracy ! Three hundred 
 
[ 1 
 
 and fixtv-five times more worthy than ihofe, who grow 
 rich by means of apolitical cheat, diurnally revolving, 
 and inevitable by prudence itfelf. 
 
 SEC i ION V.— The same subject continued. 
 
 T HE profits of the bank are then a tax upon the 
 community. But a miferable excufe tor this pub- 
 lic impofition is urged, in the affertion that it is volun- 
 tary. 1 he effects are the fame, whether it is paid 
 willingly or unwillingly. Labour is deprived ot its 
 hard earned fruits. A portion of thefe is gotten from 
 it, and bellowed upon eafe and affluence. 1 he lols is 
 the fame, whether a daring robber, extorts your pro- 
 perty with his pitlol at your bread, or whether a mid- 
 night thief fecretly filches it away. Are my misfortunes 
 palliated, becaufe I cannot unravel the fr-aud by which 
 they were brought upon me ?- 
 
 A wife nation and an honed man, will view with 
 contempt an apology, founded in a diftinciion between 
 fecret fraud and open violence* 
 
 Miferable as the excufe is, it is not true. Labour 
 which pays the tax, has no volition, or even agency 
 in the t ran fact ion. It being edablithed by law, labour 
 mull pay it of neceffity, becaufe the law enables the 
 rich, to tranfmute the circulating coin of the nation, 
 to their own paper money, bearing an intered. 
 
 The immediate dealers with the bank, do not pay 
 the tax, as hath been proved. If reimburfement had 
 not followed their advance of it, inevitable ruin mud 
 have enfued, and a general bankruptcy of the deal- 
 ers, would have annihilated the traffic.. 
 
 A corporation of merchants, and of the rich, pof- 
 feffing an unlimited monopoly of the great mafs ot the 
 circulating medium, can iaife or diminish the price of ail 
 
£ 3 
 
 /commodities, and in this enormous power is contained 
 an unlimited fcope, not only for reimburfement, but 
 for profit. Now, labour produces, and pays for the 
 consumption of all commodities, and out of commodi- 
 ties both the reimbursements and profits arifes. The 
 bank is a clofe party in this monopolifing conspiracy, 
 fcecaufe its own interefi: is combined with the defigns of 
 the immediate dealers, by two indiifoluble links, ill. 
 They are the collectors of the tax the bank receives. 
 2d. Without reimburfement they would fail; an inftant 
 lofs would thence fall upon the bank, and the crafts- 
 men would in future loofe alio, the gain of printing 
 pi&ures for the Ephefians. 
 
 Even a lottery has ever been confidered by the Bri- 
 tiih parliament, as an article of the ways and means 
 for railing a national revenue. The purchafe of a 
 ticket is really voluntary, but this was never urged as 
 an excufe for bellowing its annual product on a corpo- 
 ration, or for excluding it from the catalogue of taxes. 
 
 If the fa£t had Supported the excufe, it might have 
 been illullrated by a comparison. When the Pope was 
 felling his paper indwgencies over all Europe, did it not 
 operate as a tax ? Did it not enrich the church and im- 
 poverish the laity ? And was the fraud jullifiable, be- 
 caufe it was voluntarily fubmitted to ; If So, let us join 
 in one general condemnation of our anceltors, for rid- 
 ding themfelves of the impofition. If not, fnall we 
 tolerate a political papacy, which is eternally felling 
 its paper indulgencies to our ruin, and their own emolu- 
 ment ! Especially as it is eafier to detect a fraud, pre- 
 tending to be the difpenfer of temporal advantages, 
 than to explode a promife of eternal happinefs. The 
 priefthood in both cafes put on myltery, the vail of 
 prieftcraft, and in both call in the aid of excom- 
 munication. In one an opponent w^s branded with the 
 epithet of heretic, and excluded from the pale of the 
 church ; in the other, antifederal is vociferated, drowns 
 argument, and excludes from civil offices. 
 
t « ] 
 
 But the falfhood of the excufe will appear, from 
 an aflimilation of the bank tax to the import. The 
 merchants who advance the import, do not pay it. Re- 
 iinburfement,' and often with a profit on the advance, 
 is received by them from labour. Is the import a vo- 
 luntary or a necetfary tax ? The bank-tax is higher upon 
 the capital, than the import. The capitals of all the 
 banks now operating, probably exceed' the whole a- 
 mount of foreign articles imported, and their annual 
 profits, the whole amount of the annual import. Had 
 the mercantile interert exclufively borne the burthen 
 of the import, would it not have been unjult and 
 ruinous P Does this interert bear a heavier tax, without 
 complaint or ruin ? If not, who does ? Both conftitute 
 national burthens indiftinguifhable in their effetls, for 
 neither can be paid but by a national effort ; yet more 
 than half of the total is received by private individuals. 
 If no occafion for the import had exifted, could it 
 conrtitutionaily have been impofed for twenty years, and 
 bertowed upon private perfons, for the bleiled national 
 purpofe of creating an arirtocracy ? 
 
 All taxation is limited by the ability of the nation 
 to pay. Ability is labour. Whatever of it fruits be- 
 yond its furtenance, labour can fpare, is ability. An 
 honert policy leaves to labour which earned it, as much 
 of this ability, as is not rendered indifpenfable by a 
 real national neceflity. A difhonert policy comprifes 
 its principles in its motto. It exclaims “ A national 
 debt is a national hleffing,” and it filches all it can get. 
 In private life, an individual is defervedly detefted, who 
 grinds the face of the poor, for the purpofe of buying 
 power, influence or fplendour. Airy trifles, weighed 
 againrt moral redtitude ! What can be faid of a policy, 
 which grinds a nation for fuch objects ? It fays for it- 
 felf, “ A nation cannot pay too much for an arifto- 
 cracy.” 
 
 Can a minifter create a national ability to pay taxes, 
 by paper flight of hand, or cunning contrivances ? If 
 

r « 3 
 
 / he can, fuch taxes may not fall on labour. If he can,., 
 a poor nation may pay as much as a rich one, or moro 
 if its minilter is molt cunning. If he can, taxation 
 has no boundary, but may be multiplied as indefinitely 
 as human artifice. Then the beft conjurer is the wifeft 
 minifter, and it would be right to collect all the tum- 
 blers, flight of hand men, and fhifters of cups and balls 
 in the nation, into an academy or corporation, for 
 the inrtruclion of a diplomatic corps, who will be 
 matter of aftonifhment in the prefent times, and of 
 wonder in future ages* 
 
 Suppofe it had been propofed to Great Britain, when 
 flie commenced the fubjugation of America, to erect 
 a debt in the very fame mode, equal to the prefent 
 amount of circulating bank-paper in America, to have 
 bellowed upon her a monopoly of the circulating medi- 
 um — and to have inverted her with the profits of the 
 contrivance to all eternity. Would not Great Britain 
 have clofed with the propofition? Would not the pro- 
 fits of the banking bufinefs have been to her a conqueft ? 
 What did (he fight for ? Tribute. If it had been paid 
 in this way, would it not have impoverifhed America,, 
 and enriched Britain ? Is not this the direft operation 
 of a tribute ? America has defeated a nation, but is 
 fubdtied by a corporation. She defended her property 
 againft open violence, to be cheated of it by private 
 fraud. iShe was too hard for her enemies, but a junto 
 of falfe friends are too hard for her. The bank with- 
 out a pretence of claim upon the community, has found 
 means to occupy the ftation precifely, which Great- 
 Britain was ftriving to fill. 
 
 And if America had fubmitted to pay a tribute to 
 Britain, fucb a mode of railing it, w r ould have been 
 the worft poffible tax, which could have been impofed. 
 No check upon the quantity of paper circulated would 
 have exirted, except the extent of the national ability 
 to pay for it ; and the tax might have been fecretly in- 
 creafed, by increafing this paper. So rtands the tax 
 
C «s ] 
 
 paid to the corporation. Its books are placed by law, 
 beyond the reach of legiflative infpection, and an intire 
 union of interefts, among every member of the junto, 
 is a motive ftrong enough to produce an increafe of the 
 tax, and a concealment of its extent. 
 
 The people have not intrufted the S nate of the 
 United States, with a power of originating money-bills, 
 from a jealoufy in the tender cafe of taxation, again!! 
 the leaf! degree of ariftocratical afcendency. But this 
 ariftocratical corporation, containing no reprefentative 
 feature, can increafe or diminifh a tax at plea fu re, 
 without the alfent or knowledge of the people. They 
 polfefs this important legiflative power, fubject to one 
 only reftraint. The quantity of paper is unavoidably 
 limited by the national ability to pav for it. How 
 came this limit to exifl, if the profits of the bank arofe 
 out of paper flight of hand, and were not bunhenfome 
 upon the national ability ? Scepticifm itlelf, will no 
 longer deny that they are a tax. 
 
 Is this a fyftem of national charity ? To filch from 
 the poor principalities for the rich, whence princes 
 themfelves naturally fprout up. Is the religion of re- 
 velation, or the religion of nature, acting as it does by 
 an hidden impulfe upon the mind, fatisfied with fuch 
 charity ? Is the tribute due to Cefar, or are the fcanty, 
 uncertain, occafional donations of oftentation, a rcim- 
 burfement for a permanent and growing oppreflion ? Is 
 the confcience of this fyftem fatisfied, by the fubflitu- 
 tion of hard gotten private alms, of a penny for each 
 pilfered pound, in the place of political juftice, which 
 filches nothing? 
 
 The maxim “ that an individual had better fufter a 
 misfortune, than a whole community,” is rcverfed.fmce 
 the community is facrificed for the emolument of a few 
 
 j 
 
 individuals. Morals and maxims withdraw from the 
 defence of the contrivance, and a mii'conllruction of 
 the fcripture which faith, “ unto every one that hath 
 

t 14 J 
 
 /hall be given, and he /hall have abundance, but from 
 him that haih not, fliall be taken away even that which 
 he hath,” is the only remaining fubterfuge. 
 
 SECTION VI. — The same subject continued. 
 
 A ND yet its continuance fliall not be commenfu- 
 rate with the frauds of a bank. I would not im- 
 pofe on my readers an endlels talk. It is only defign- 
 ed to felect and exhibit fo many of its mifchiefs as will 
 illuftrate the adminiflration. For this a pamphlet will 
 fuflice, whereas a Ample vocabulary of its tricks and 
 fins would fill a volume. 
 
 The contrivance is now to be exhibited in a point of 
 view yet more alarming. ’Tis thefummit of a climax, 
 fufficient to ftrike a whole community with confirma- 
 tion. 
 
 If a'number of the members of Congrefs are flock- 
 holders, or bank directors, then an illegitimate intereft 
 is operating on the national legislature — then the bank 
 hath feduced away from their natural and conftitutional 
 allegiance, the representatives of the ftafes — and then, 
 even foreigners — our late moft malignant and inveterate 
 enemy — have obtained an influence on our national 
 councils, fo far as they have obtained bank flock. The 
 Englifli w'ho could not conquer us, may buy us. Foolilh 
 Fnglifli, to expend an hundred millions in fighting for 
 the power of legiflation, when a twentieth part of the 
 money, will peaceably obtain it by purchafe ! But you 
 have feen your error, whereas we are entering into ours 
 
 But fuppofe for argument fake, that a majority of fuch 
 members did not exifl. It is owing only to the curtefy 
 of the fcheme, fince in addition to the flockholders, the 
 bank could elect all its directors out of Congrefs, of 
 which it regularly gives us fix famples, three in each 
 houfe. And more it would elect, if more it needed, for 
 
[ »S ] .• ... 
 
 a 
 
 there is no conftitutional or legal reftraint upon its oc- 
 cafions. To what an humble Ration hath the American 
 legiflature dwindled down, within four years of its crea- 
 tion $ its independency is held by curtefy of a corpora- 
 tion : And an adminiftration will call itfelf federal, and 
 3 lover of liberty, when it has deftroyed its fundamental 
 principle. 
 
 An exclufive private intereft, too often outweighs a 
 common public obligation. What we can enjoy alone 
 we value mod, and are mod eager to attain. Each man’s 
 ihare of liberty, is held in fo general a partnerfhip, that 
 it is often difregarded, under a fhonger inducement. It 
 cannot be depofited in a vault,- nor will it produce him. 
 an enormous annuity in hard money. 
 
 Hence when paper men get into Congrefs, or mem- 
 bers are metamorphofed into paper men after they get 
 there, it is obvious that they will be influenced by their 
 perfonal private interefl:, producing them an immenfe 
 profit in cafh, rather than the public good. If the latter 
 fuffers, they will confider their own acquifitions in 
 money, as a kind of boot, compenfating them abundant- 
 ly for their portions of the common lofs. One partner 
 may thrive and the reft be ruined. And upon fuch prin- 
 ciples it is, that exclufions from the legiflature are jufli- 
 fied. •*' 
 
 That an abundance of paper men have been in Con- 
 grefs, can never be denied. An unnatural alliance exifts 
 between certificate and ftockholders ; unnatural, as I 
 fhall take occafion to fhew. But the interpofition of a 
 third power will often reconcile contradictions, and a 
 fovereign hath been known to manage two kingdoms, 
 of different languages. 
 
 • The public money is lodged in the bank. The higher 
 the taxes are,the more of this money is therein depofiteeb 
 The more of this money is depofited in the banks, 1 the 
 more paper the bank can circulate on its credit, and the 
 
 E 
 
t ** 1 
 
 greater will be its profits. If the bank will ftiek by a mini- 
 der, a minifter may flick by a bank. The amount of taxes 
 and loans are propofed by the minider’s eftimates. 
 When thefe get into Congrefs, they meet with a great 
 number of paper men, who have a private intereft in 
 the accumulation of public burthens, and thus efcape the 
 Uriel difcuflion, to be expected from unbiafled reprefen- 
 latives. if a minifler fhould in this way douctur the 
 bank and member-dockholders, the bank and fuch mem- 
 bers may in fome other douceur him and his friends. 
 Occaficnal accommodations of money, operating to ac- 
 quire an influence in Congrefs, may be eafily obtained 
 by means of a good ur.derftanding, and a good under- 
 flanding is eafily formed between good friends, united 
 by the flrongeft of all ties mutual fupport. 
 
 And mutual fupport is neceflary. The egregious 
 impofitions of a bank, cannot expert a long continuance, 
 but by the help of ininifterial influence ; and minifterial 
 influence reds, for its fupport, on paper evolutions. 
 '1 hey are partners in a game, knowing each other’s 
 hands, and playing into them. Let us win the public 
 money, fays the bank, and you fhall certainly win an ari- 
 docracy out of the flockholders. Befides you may 
 fcatter the public money in the bank and its branches, 
 from Bofton to Charleflon, fo that it never can be 
 counted ; perplex your ftatements, fo that nobody 
 can underftand them, and we can always bring you 
 off without detection, by beading of an intuitive 
 knowledge, or inward light, making the whole matter 
 as pellucid as the meridian fun. Our votes in Congrefs 
 count as well as others. 
 
 It is to be obferved, that poflibilities are here 
 dated. When fads are afierted, they refult from the 
 datutebook, or are of public notoriety. Apprehenfions 
 are hazarded, for the purpofe of fubmiting it to the 
 public mind, whether it will remain expol'ed to the 
 mod imminent danger, or rid itfelfoffo difquieting a 
 dtuation, by fubjoining new checks for the recovery of 
 
C 27 ] 
 
 violated rights, and the reftraint of unconftitutional de- 
 figns. Such would be' only an expolition of the conlll- 
 tution, which never contemplated a fyftem ftriking at 
 the root of liberty. 
 
 A nation rifks too much, by laying heaps of public 
 wealth in the way of her fervants, which they may 
 take up, and put in their pockets, without being feen, 
 and without account. Such trials of integrity, involve 
 too ferious and fatal confequences for national amufe- 
 ment. 
 
 A part of the paper fyftem, as the minifter hath pub- 
 licly announced, contemplated the introduction of 
 foreigners into the American fpeculations — Conlider 
 the effect of this. Paper men get into Congrefs,and go- 
 vern the legiflature — The bank governs the paper men 
 — -A majority of ftockholder-s govern the bank — And 
 foreigners may conftitute this majority — Therefore fo- 
 reigners may guide the legiffature of America. Every 
 great national queftion maybe influenced by them. Is 
 a treaty to be made refpefting commerce or territory — 
 are regulations concerning trade under confideration — 
 or is a propofition for abolifhing banks and {lockjobbing 
 to be decided upon, and a Britifh influence may poflibly 
 give the catting vote in every queffion. If the queftion 
 fliould relate to a war with Britain, the public fituation 
 would be abfolutely farcical. Specie being expelled 
 by bank paper, a war could not be carried on, but by 
 the help of fuch paper. A majority of the flock may 
 be held by Britifh fubjefts, who would be more likely 
 to embarrafs public ineafures, by demanding the debt 
 due to the bank, into which the nation is already 
 plunged, than to furnifh 'the means of attacking' them- 
 felves. What a train of humiliating reflections are 
 fuggefled by this idea ? Forbear to indulge your grief. 
 Let an effeminate impreffion be fuppreffed by a manly 
 refolution, to lend your aid in deftroying a fyftem, by 
 which even Britain may be better reprefented in Con- 
 grefs, and have more influence in the great queftion of 
 peace or war, than any Angle ftate. 
 
[ *8 1 
 
 The paper fyftem poflefles more than a prefidential or 
 triBlinitial veto. Thefe were only powers of prevention, 
 or fufpenfion. Whereas the paper fyftem in its majo- 
 rity, hath acquired that tempting power, for which 
 Britain wafted her blood and treafure in vain, “ of bind- 
 ing us in all cafes whatsoever.” 
 
 Paufe reader, and awfully recollect, that the govern- 
 ment is in the hands of Speculators. Is an inordinate 
 love of money, a proper principle for legiflators or ma- 
 giftrates of any kind ?; Does.hiftory record the benefits 
 which fuch a -political principle hath procured for man- 
 kind ? What author hath celebrated this new fpecies of 
 government — this money-cracy ? What ought to be the 
 predominant principle of a politician ? Ought the chief 
 Spring of government, to derive its movements from 
 the engine of corruption itfelf, or from the immutable 
 principles of moral re&itude ? , . . . , l ; ; . 
 
 < > ; ' • 
 
 SECTION VII. — The foregoing facts applied to 
 
 THE PRINCIPLES OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
 
 B UT it is neceflary to unload the memory, before 
 we proceed farther, by an application of the facts 
 which have been difclofed and imprefled, to the text 
 yhich was fele£ted as a guide for our enquiries. 
 
 It was affirmed as a pofition, “ That the conftitution 
 contemplates a republican form of government, flowing 
 from, and depending on the people, and that a mode 
 of adminiftration.deftructive of fuch dependence, and 
 introductory of monarchical ingredients , innovates upon, 
 and Subverts the conftitution.” 
 
 r 
 
 Now let me afk, whether an ariftocracy, is net only 
 an ingredient, but the harbinger of monarchy ? In this 
 view it is unimportant to decide, whether the profits 
 of the bank, are actually a tax upon the people or not. 
 It is enough for our purpofe, that the inftitution tends 
 
[ 2 9 3 
 
 to accumulate great wealth in the hands of a few indi- 
 viduals ; and that it is only calculated for the admifiion 
 of the rich. Nor is it necelTary here to contend, that 
 it adts with double force, in continually reducing the 
 poor, whilft it is exalting the rich. 
 
 Let me further demand, what conftitutes a real arif- 
 tocracy? Names, or wealth united with exclufive pri- 
 vileges. America recoils againft tides. A confcioufnefs 
 of this, hath arrefted a propofition in the Senate for 
 their introduction, which, it is faid, came from a mem- 
 ber of Virginia, in violation of the fentimenc of that 
 ftate, and remains yet, to be decided upon when occa- 
 fion fhall.be ripe. Though the Senate did not dare to pafs 
 it, they could not bear to reject it. Is it not puerile to 
 fpurn at the fhadow* whilft we eredt by law the fub- 
 ftance ?' Which is moft to be dreaded ; titles without 
 wealth, of exorbitant wealth without titles ? Have the 
 words , prince j lord, highnefs '■ or proteftor, a magical in- 
 fluence upon our minds, or can they lay a fpell upon 
 our exertions ? The- molt honorable and bed earned 
 title exifting (and to the propriety even of this, I do 
 not mean to fubfcribe) is that of the Cincinnati. This 
 title does neither influence the legiflature, nor plunder 
 labour. Who are mofl to be dreaded, the nominal or 
 real lords of America ? It is evident that exorbitant 
 wealth conftitutes the fubftance and danger of ariftocra.- 
 cy. Money, in a ftate of civilization is power. If we 
 execrate the fhadow, what epithet is too hard for an 
 adminiftration, which is labouring to introduce the fub- 
 ftance ? * The fhadow is an ugly, yet harmlefs picture, 
 fit only to frighten children j the fell monfter itfelf is 
 good caufe of alarm to men. In a land of liberty, the 
 pidture difgufts, though incapable of doing mifchief, 
 and is therefore excluded. Shall we confult our fjenfa- 
 tions, and yet neglect our fafety ? Whilft the conftitu- 
 tion inhibits a nobility even nominally , are its principles 
 permiflive of its erection in reality ? Does it rejedt the 
 term “ murder,” and yet allow the crime to be perpe- 
 trated ? 
 

 
 
 
[ 3 ° ] 
 
 A democratic republic is endangered by an immenfe 
 difproportion in wealth. In a (late of nature, enor- 
 mous ftrength pofftfled by one or feveral individuals, 
 would conflitute a monarchy, or an ariftocracy — in a 
 Hate of civilization, fimilar confequences will refult 
 from enormous wealth. But the deity feems to have 
 indicated his will in favour ol liberty, -by equalifing the 
 one, and limiting the other. The acquifitions of an 
 honejl induflry can feldom become dangerous to public 
 or private happinefs, whereas the accumulations of fraud 
 or violence , conftantly diminilh both. And providence 
 vifibly exprelfes its difapprobation of fuch attempts, by 
 raifing up an extravagant heir to diftipate ill-gotten and 
 difproportionate wealth ; a natural eff'ecl, of w hich arif- 
 tocracies'are lb fenfible, that thev conftantlv counteract 
 it by artificial regulations, eftablilhing perpetuities. 
 
 Tyrants and flaves — an ariltocracy enormoufly rich, 
 and a peafantry wretchedly poor, approximate in morals.. 
 Is it from a fociety thus compofed, that the blefilngs of 
 political morality are expe&ed to refult? The compo- 
 sition is Healing upon us like death. The bank is the 
 time of the body politic. It will lead it immaturely to 
 the decrepitude of old age, and defert it in the hour of 
 dilfolution. Is this a direction for a wife people to pro- 
 ceed in ? If the community will madly prefs forward to 
 this goal, the fooner fhe arrives the better ; there Phoc- 
 nix-like fhe will expire, with a confolatory hope that a 
 founder offspring will arife out of her allies. 
 
 A miniffer intoxicated with influence, will exclaim, 
 “ Public debt is a public blefling,” for taxes are an in- 
 citement to induftry. Where does the conflitution con- 
 template an influential character in the perfon of a 
 Secretary of the Treafury, entitling him to preferibe to 
 Cortgrefs political dogmas ? Or whence arifes the right 
 of the federal government, to apply llimulants to induf- 
 try ? Does the conflitution invefl it with fuch a power ; 
 if fo, what is become of the liberty of labour ? A whore 
 will adminifler provocatives to luff, by the rule of her 
 
C 3* ] 
 
 own infatiable appetite, and not the ability of her para- 
 mour ; and when his drength and health are exhauded, 
 will defert him with contempt. Did labour intend to 
 plan itfelf under the whip of an avaricious, infatiable, 
 and luxurious aridocracy ? 
 
 Labour, in the erection of a government, after deduc- 
 ting the necefi'ary expence of fupporting it, defigned to 
 fecure fafety to itfelf, in the enjoyment of its own fruits. 
 The ftimulating fyltem frudrates this object, and changes 
 government into its mailer, brandifhing the lalh of legif- 
 lation, and leaving to labour what mealurc of fullenance 
 it pleafes. Inllead of the owners fparing to government, 
 government fpares to the owners. The fyltem it is true, 
 will make men lefs indullrious in the prefervation of 
 liberty. An urgent prelfure for food and raiment, is un- 
 likely to indil into the mind the liberal fentiments of 
 freedom. A bead of burthen is more remarkable for 
 its patience than its l’pirit. An aridocracy, therefore 
 have good reafon to exclaim “ a national debt is a na- 
 tional bleding,” and in purfuance of their maxim, to 
 create one that is fictitious, payable to themfelves out of 
 the hard earned fruits of labour. To them it is a mine, 
 vielding gold without work. By loading labour with 
 dimulants, a coinage for their ufe is continually proceed- 
 ing, and a tame and broken fpirited fubmidion to the im- 
 polition, will be effectually fecured. 
 
 A nation opprelfed by debt, real or fictitious, is a na- 
 tion of Haves. 
 
 The plebians of this age are too wife to be individually 
 cozened by the patricians, fo that the latter are obliged 
 to create a fictitious debt, by the help of law, impofing 
 generally upon the former, both an ufurious and com- 
 pound intered. It is time to retreat to the facred mount, 
 if no other expedient is left, and there aifert the rights 
 of judice. 
 
 But perhaps benevolence is at the bottom of this bank- 
 ing contrivance,and though the aridocracy are fpurring 
 

[ 3 2 3 
 
 •up labour to induftry, by large annual draughts from its 
 product, they may entertain a fecret purpofe of making 
 an unexpected reftoration of thefe draughts to the true 
 owners. A furprife fo agreeable, would create a day 
 of jubilee, and perhaps the community, in its hour of 
 good humour, might prefent the feveral banks with' a 
 continuation of their charters, provided they would 
 thenceforward pay all the expences of government.— 
 But what a degree of prodigality would it be, to farm 
 out a revenue for half its annual product ? 
 
 The fecond propofition aflumed, was, “ that Congrefs 
 can impofe taxes for the common defence and general 
 •welfare of the United States, but not for the benefit of 
 individuals, or their own private emolument.” 
 
 Although in applying -the faCts to the firft propofi- 
 tion, it was not necefiary to aiTert r that the profits of 
 the bank are fubftantially a tax, yet we muft now re- 
 collect the arguments urged to prove it, and rely that 
 they have left on the mind of the reader an indelible 
 conviction. ■. 
 
 And then it follows, that the moll alarming infringe- 
 ment of the conftitution, in the molt dangerous and 
 tender point, exiits in the bank law. 
 
 To thofe recolle&edi 1 ; fubjoin another argument. 
 Banks, all confefs, banilh fpecie. It is the nature of 
 fpecie to equalize itfelf throughout the commercial 
 world, and therefore whatever is banifhed from any 
 country, creates a neccjjity pro tanto. This nccejfity can 
 only be fupplied by iome fubfliUitc> and bank paper is 
 with us the only fubftitute. The nation therefore, by 
 the contrivance, is compelled either tofuffer th enecejfity, 
 or refort to the fubftitute. If the lofs refulting from the 
 want of a circulating medium, is greater than the price 
 demanded by the bank for its paper, people are impelled 
 by the motive of intereft to buy it. A want is artifici- 
 ally created, producing an alternative, confining, oa 
 both fides, of evil - t the bank calculating, that of twe 
 
C 33 1 
 
 evils, the leaft would be chofen. When all, the circulating 
 fpecie is banifhed, the nation mujl pay for the whole 
 of its circulating medium. If a part, they mujl pay for 
 fo much as will fupply that part. In proportion as a 
 bank can inflift on the community, the misfortune of 
 lofing its circulating fpecie, will its profit accumulate. 
 A total lofs, the depth of misfortune to the one, is the 
 fummit of profperity to the other. In an affair of the 
 utmoft national confequence, the intereft of a corpo- 
 ration, and the intereft of the nation, are precifely in 
 oppofition, and the affair is managed exclufively by the 
 corporation. So long as there is fpecie enough for the 
 national occafio'ns, bank paper will bear no price, or 
 but little can be fold. Is not a preffing need, a tax ? 
 An import: is founded on a need for imported articles. 
 Home manufactures or forbearance, may evade it. 
 Which will prefs moft, the need for imported articles, 
 or for a circulating medium, and how is the latter to 
 be evaded ? 
 
 Life and property, are the two great objefts of hu- 
 man folicirude. Government feldom delights in hu- 
 man blood, and hence our fafety on that fcore. But 
 its bowels often yearn for human wealth. Checks 
 againft this unhappy inclination, are confidered as the 
 moft important, and are the moft numerous in our con- 
 ftitution. It exhibits a degree of caution, amounting to 
 fufpicion. 
 
 Of what avail are thefe checks, if they are to be eva 
 ded by mere names ? Inftead of ufing the w r ord “ tax,’* 
 the word “ bank,” is reforted to. Suppofe the title 
 of the law had been, “ An aft for railing an annual 
 “ fupply of money for public purpofes, by the efta- 
 “ blifhment of a bank.” Would the money railed 
 have been a tax ? Or, fuppofe the law had been en- 
 titled, “ An aft for taxing the community by the efta- 
 “ blifhment of a bank, and dividing the money fo raifed, 
 
 F 
 
£ 54 3 
 
 u among fundry members of Congrefs, and certain other 
 “ individuals therein named.” This title precifely fits 
 the law as it fiands, and as it operates. 
 
 What then has become of the confiitution ? The rai- 
 fing of money is the efience of a tax law ; this aft: raifes 
 money, pofleffing the efience, though not the name. 
 Sundry members of the legiflature who impofe the tax, 
 receive a portion of it, and private individuals the re- 
 fidue. How does this redound to the common dcfcnce r 
 or general welfare of the United States ? 
 
 In a ftamp aft, the word tc tax,” might be avoided, 
 and that contrivance might be as conftitutionaliy re- 
 fortcd to, for the emolument of Congrefs and com- 
 pany. 
 
 And if a depofit fliould be necefiary, permit me to 
 fuggeft an admirable hint. By the bank law, three 
 fourths of the depofit, might confift of certificates, 
 which are evidences of a depofit, heretofore made for 
 public fervice. When a depofit of thefe is made in the 
 bank, an evidence is received of this fecond depofit. 
 Let this feccnd evidence be depofited, as ftock in the 
 Lamp-office, and a third evidence taken out. Ereft 
 a new contrivance, where this third evidence may be 
 depofited as fiock alfo, and fo on ad infinitum. For the 
 one fourth fpecie depofited in the bank, the proprietors 
 do not probably now r gain a profit, of above cent, per 
 cent. Whereas one or two other depofitories of evidence 
 as fiock , will produce an appreciating efieft, the reverfe 
 of the depreciating operations during the late war. Or 
 the idea will be better exemplified, by reminding my 
 readers of doubling the grains of corn, for every nail 
 on a horfe’s Ihoe. This fimilitude will fit at both ends. 
 It exhibits the ftock necefiary to fet cut with, and alfo 
 the gainfulnefs of fuch operations. 
 
'.yyr:;. 
 
 
 . * - 
 
 
 • r. 
 
 
 •: J ' ' 
 
 • v ' - 
 
 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 -Jwx-'C' 
 
 u_K ■>■ 
 
 Cv.-V 
 
 
f 35 1 
 
 SECTION VIII. — The same subject continued. 
 
 I T was farther affumed, “ that the right of legiflation 
 “ refided and yet refides, in the people of the United 
 “ States. That this right is periodically delegated by 
 “ election to their reprefentatives. That the right of 
 “ election is a fubftance and not a form, and that a fe- 
 “ gitimate reprefeniation implies, an cxijiir.g principle , 
 “ operating upon the reprefenting, impelling them for 
 “ the good of the reprofented. And that whenever 
 “ this principle ceafcs to exijl , government is converted 
 “ into an ufurpatian 
 
 Can you poffibly, reader, comprehend a difference 
 between the good of bank dirc&ors and flock holders, 
 and the good of the community ? Arc the burthens and 
 profits of this corporation, the burthens and profits of 
 the nation ? May not the good of the one, be the harm 
 ofahe other ? And may not a flockholding bank-direc- 
 ting member of Congrefs, legiflate harm to the one, 
 that he may fhare in the good with the other ? 
 
 Reafoning, to prove felf evident propofitions, though 
 apparently fuperfluous, may yet be neccffiiry by way of 
 parapet, to defend them agaiaft the affaults of overbear- 
 ing wealth and power. 
 
 The confiitution, thoroughly impreffed with the opi- 
 nion, that a fimilitude of intcreffs, of burthens, of be- 
 nefits, and even of habits, between the people and their 
 reprefentatives, was effentially ncceffary for the mainte- 
 nance of liberty, and the diipcnfation of civil happinefs, 
 reforts to numerous precautions for its attainment. 
 
 Having this end in view, it preferibes, 
 i. That no perfon fhall be a reprefentative, who 
 has net been feven years a citizen of the United States. 
 
 i. That each reprefentative, muft be an inhabitant 
 of the hate in which he is chofen. 
 
[ 3 « 1 
 
 3. That the reprefentation {hall be in proportion to 
 numbers. < 
 
 4. That no reprefentative (hall be appointed to any 
 office created, or the emoluments whereof have been 
 increafed, during the period for which he was ele&ed ; 
 and that no perfon holding an office ffiall be a repre- 
 fentative. - 
 
 The purpofe of thefe fundamental rules, was to fe** 
 cure a legitimate legiflature, by excluding every fpecies 
 of undue influence then forefeen. 
 
 The idea of a bank, does not appear to have been 
 contemplated or difeuffed in the minuted: degree by the 
 convention which framed the cbnftitution. And not a 
 trace of fuch an idea, is to be found in the inftrument 
 refulting from their deliberations. 
 
 Thofe who argue in favour of the conftitutionality of 
 the corporation, are reduced to the narrow grouncTof 
 afferting, that a power is tacitly implied, conflifting and 
 fubverting the moft fundamental principles, earneflly 
 and loudly expreffed. 
 
 Conftru&ive powers, are like conflru&ive treafons. 
 Have we fecured our lives againft the latter, and left 
 «ur property, which fupports life, expofed to the for- 
 jner ? 
 
 From the bank contrivance, the following infra&ions 
 of the cleared: conflitutional principles, obvioufly enfue. 
 
 1 . Members of Congrefs may vote for the ereftion of 
 a gainful projeft, and be the receivers of the gain. 
 
 2. They may impofe a tax on the community or a 
 a part of it, and inftead of fharing in the burthen, fhare 
 in the plunder. 
 
 3. The higher and more unneccffiiry the taxes and 
 loans are, the more public money will be depoftted in 
 the bank, and the. greater will be the profit of the bank? 
 
r 37 i 
 
 members of Congrefs, who neverthelefs vote for taxes 
 and loans. 
 
 4. A member of Congrefs, debauched by a profit- 
 able banking interefl, ceafe3 to be a citizen of the U- 
 nion, or an inhabitant of the ftate which choofes him, 
 as to the purpofes of the conftitution. He becomes a 
 citizen, and inhabitant of Carpenters Hall. 
 
 5. Being a member of a corporation, confiding 
 chiefly or in part of foreigners, he is more under ;he 
 influence of foreigners, than of thofe who elc&cd him. 
 
 6 . The conftitution aims nt a real reprefentation of 
 the dates in proportion to numbers, making no pro- 
 vifion for members from corporations ; and yet if the 
 members of this corporation keep their feats in con- 
 grefs, it is moderate to aflert that it will be better re- 
 pfefented than any date. For furely it will be admir- 
 ed* that a man poflefles as much fidelity to his own 
 interefl, as to the interefl of his condiments. And 
 hence the evident druggie in the conflitution to fecure 
 a common interefl. 
 
 7. The bank can only gain its reprefentation, by fe- 
 ducing the reprefentatives of the ftates from their natu- 
 ral allegiance; thus a date may be deprived of the 
 whole or a part of her reprefentation, and the appor- 
 tionment according to numbers is defeated. It would 
 be better to allow the bank members, than to permit it 
 to plunder the dates of their feveral quotas. 
 
 8. It was evidently defigned, that the Senate as judges 
 of impeachments, fiiould be conjlitutionaliy preferved 
 in a ftate of impartiality. Impeachments originate in 
 the houfe of reprefentatives, and the crimes to be re- 
 frained by this procefs, will moftly be comprifed in a 
 mifapplication of public money. But if thofe who are 
 to inquire into fuch mifapplications, to impeach, and to 
 decide upon impeachments, may in coafequence of 
 

C 33 3 
 
 banking and paper fyftems, be gainers by the mifappli- 
 cations, it is obvious that the check provided by this 
 article of the conflitution, upon a fpecies of criminali- 
 ty, fo dangerous as to have attratted the particular 
 attention of a general convention, is intirely defeated. 
 If accomplices are to fet enquiries on foot, — to accufe 
 — and to decide, no prophetical fpirit is necefiary to 
 forefee the decifion. Can a contrivance be conllitu- 
 tional, by which a judiciary, the power of which ex- 
 tends even to the punifhment of undefined crimes, may 
 be influenced out of its integrity and independence ? 
 The fountain of juftice ought to be pure and uncorrupt. 
 An influence which may fway a fearful tribunal, not 
 only for the acquital of the guilty, but for the condem- 
 nation of the innocent, was never contemplated by the 
 conflitution. Bank direflors, flock holders, and a pa- 
 per interefl, may be more likely by their judgments to 
 difqualify honefl patriots from holding, “ any office of 
 honour, trufl or profit under the United Sates,” who 
 {hall obfiruft peculations from public labour in any 
 flrape, than to remedy frauds favouring a monied in- 
 terefl: in general, and accruing to their own emolument 
 in particular. A tribunal, which may try a president, 
 ought to be ns free from fufpicion, as Cxfars wife. 
 
 But leaving an endlefs enumeration of conftitutional 
 violations, we will adventure a general obfervntion ; 
 that the contrivance is a vehicle of undue influence, ope- 
 rating fenfibly, and often irreflftibly, upon almofl every 
 important queflion which can occur in Congrcfs. It 
 remains with the community to decide whether the 
 iippulfe tends to their good, and whether, if it does not, 
 government is not converted into an ufurpation, in one 
 of its mod effential qualities ? 
 
 Members of Congrefs, who arc alfo members of the 
 bank, arc under a triple bondage. If they difpleafe the 
 ininifter, he may not only lefien the trade in public mo- 
 ney, which the bank now monepolifes, bat he may re- 
 

 
 
r 39 1 
 
 move the money to another place of depofif, and he 
 niay refufe the inftitution his fupporting influence, when 
 its conftitutionality is queftioned. The minifter is by- 
 law, let into a confidcrable portion of bank fecrets. 
 This knowledge is a conjurer’s wand, with which the 
 fpirits may be raifed or exorcifed, juft as the magician 
 pleafes. Such reprefentatives, whilft they are making 
 laws to govern a nation, are themfelves liable to laws 
 enabled by a corporation ; for the bank can make bye 
 Jaws. And if the national laws do not pleafe the cor- 
 poration, it may revenge itfclf through the medium of 
 its bye laws, upon the national reprefentatives for en- 
 abling them. But a cclliflon of this kind is not likely 
 to happen, as a common intereft guides the corporation 
 collectively and individually. A third mafter, the pub- 
 lic intereft prefents itfelf. It does not offer the influ- 
 ential elaftic, which the others can liber'ally be flow, 
 and is to maintain a combat at the odds of two to one. 
 Xo bondage is fo feldom rebelled againft, as one which 
 produces money. Mankind daily fell their beft fervices 
 and exertions, and the higheft bidder is ufually the pur- 
 chafer. 
 
 The bank realizes the doCtrine of tranfubftanria-.ijn 
 upon a member of Congrefs. He goes one thing, and 
 by adminiftering to him quantum fufficit of paper, he is 
 converted to another. A tranfubftantiated or vir- 
 tual legiflature, was juft what the F.nglilh defigned to 
 impofe on America. In what part of the conftitution 
 is a dodrine fanclioned, which juftifics the epithet of 
 rebel, beftowed during the war by the enemy, upon 
 thofe who oppofed fuch a legiflature ? 
 
 If the bank — the paper fyftem — and the minifter, 
 can influence a majority of the members of Ccngrefs, 
 or even a Angle member, where are fuch reprefenta- 
 tives of the ftates, as are clearly contemplated by the 
 conftitution ? Againft the evil not a Angle check cxifts. 
 Influence is a courtly term for corruption. It is never 
 
L 40 l 
 
 ncceffary to induce a national reprcfentation, to purfue 
 the national good. And although it is only ufed, for 
 the purpofe of obtaining exclufivc benefits for the few 
 at the expence of the many, yet the few, counting up- 
 on the reconciliation to abufes, produced by habit, will 
 loon begin to infinuate, that influence, alias, corrup- 
 tion, is an indifpenfable attribute of good^government. 
 
 Even fchool boys ridicule and contemn the corrup- 
 tion which guides the Britifh parliament, according to 
 the will of a minifler. They have fufficient penetra- 
 tion to difeern, that the fyflem is a cheat, exhibiting 
 the picture of liberty, in lieu of the fubftance. Com- 
 pare the two cafes, and point out, if you can, a differ- 
 ence. 
 
 Antient and modern tyranny have reforted to differ- ^ 
 ent modes for effecting the fame end. The former, 
 unpractifed in the arts of diffimulation, ufed open vio- 
 lence. The latter, lkilful in deception, has changed 
 the old fyftem, and reforts to the wily tricks of private 
 influence. One depended upon downright fighting, 1 
 and an action in the open field, generally proclaimed 
 the tyrant ; the other prefers the generallhip of fifeal 
 arubufeade, and the tyrant is often concealed from pub- 
 lic view, long after he is defpotic. A defeat could on- 
 ly deftroy the one, but a detection may overfet the o- 
 ther. Search, and you will inevitably find a prefent 
 acting ufurpation ; for if the proceedings of govern- 
 ment are inconfiftent with the principles of ihe confti- 
 tution, there is nothing to jullify them. 
 
 Slaver}', when impofed by antient ambition, wasf 
 foftened by a military generofity of difpofition ; but 
 from the modern fordid, money-loving meannefs of 
 mind, what melioration can be expected ? 
 
E 41 ] 
 
 SECTION IX. — The Funding System. 
 
 I T hath palled, irrevocably paffed. Being compound* 
 ed of materials originally honell, and confifting at 
 this time in a great mfeafure offuch materials, it is pro- 
 bably impoffible to unravel and remedy the intermedi- 
 ate fraud. 
 
 It remains however an indelible hieroglyphic of the 
 principles and defigns of adminillration, and in that 
 view deferves to be decyphered. 
 
 The perfon who framed the fyftem, was certainly ca- 
 pable of contemplating, and of guiding its effects. Had 
 a motive of impartiality and public good prefided at its 
 formation, the feveral Hates, the commercial, the a- 
 gricultural, mechanical and profeflional interefts, all 
 of which are too bufily engaged in a variety of ufeful oc- 
 cupations, to hunt out minifterial fecrets, would have 
 been plainly forewarned of the defign, and publicly 
 cautioned to preferve their paper property. But this 
 would have yiolated the minifterial defigns. It would 
 have obviated the contemplated intention, of ere&ing 
 an enormous ariftocracy or monied intereft, becaufe the 
 public debt, like other property, would have remain- 
 ed confiderably dilperfed. 
 
 It was and is the fafhion of thinking, that a public 
 debt unequally held, gives permanency and weight to 
 government. That is, to ufe plain terras, it will ena- 
 ble government to controul the will of the people, by 
 counterbalancing it with the weight of wealth. The 
 ' conftitution is compiled upon a principle precifely in 00- 
 pofition to this idea. The fovereignty of the people 
 gave it birth, and it acknowledges their parental au- 
 thority. This is a defign of a few individuals, exclu- 
 fively to appropriate to themfelves the management of 
 the national offspring, that they may change its nature, 
 and debauch its affections from the great ob)e£t of it" 
 
 G 
 
[ 42 ] 
 
 political duty. It is an attempt to tranfplant the confti- 
 tution from democratic ground, in which it might flou- 
 ri(h, to an ariftocratical foil, in which it muft perifh. 
 
 And hence the funding fyftem. It was lo contrived 
 as to enable {peculators and monied men, to defraud 
 the great bulk of the community of their paper proper- 
 ty. As to transfer it, from thofe who earned it, to 
 thofe who pilfered it, either by fuggefting falfehoods 
 or concealing truths. As to concentrate it in a few 
 hands, fo that it could be applied with impreffion, and 
 poflefs activity as a political machine. And as to leave 
 the true owners, by way of retribution for their pro- 
 perty, a burthenfome tax. 
 
 Speculators could calculate events in Congrefs. 
 They had leifure to pry into accounts. They could even 
 interpret the filence of a minifter by watching indica- 
 tions. Silence, was a negative confecration of the un- 
 informed multitude to the lull of rapacity. A general, 
 taking a city, condemns it to be plundered, if he does 
 not actively interpofe for its protection. 1 
 
 The nation, but juft; emerged from the unforefeen 
 misfortunes of paper money, are fuddenly overwhelmed 
 by the ruin of a paper policy. The accidental bril- 
 liancy of paper acquifitions, gave the hint for a fyftem. 
 It fet out with the plaufible pretence of curing an evil, 
 and it applies a worfe evil. As if fire would cure a 
 burn. The wounds fuffered by individuals, from paper 
 money, were healing; but an accidental misfortune is now 
 convened into a fyftem, by which a few individuals 
 {peculate on a nation ; the old wounds are made to* 
 bleed afrefh, and new ones are indiferiminately inflict- 
 ed. 
 
 Of this fyftem, the affumption is a ftriking feature. 
 For this there was no general petition from the people. 
 No urgency prefled it. But it favoured the objeCt of 
 

C 43 ] 
 
 adminirtration. State debts fold at a low rate, and 
 therefore might eafily be monopolized. To dilfolve all 
 money relationftiip, between individuals, and the fepa- 
 rate ftates, would on the one hand diminifh the date 
 power, and tend to confolidation, and on the other cre- 
 ate an undue influence, by which the confolidated pow- 
 er might be managed. 
 
 If the payment of public debts had been an objeft, 
 accident had already effe&ed, that which fuch a mo- 
 tive would have dictated. Congrefs poflefs the power 
 of indirect, and the States that of diredi taxation. Hence 
 the public debt could have been diflfufed upon the re- 
 fources of the nation, fo as to have been lefs burthen- 
 fome upon an excluflve branch of thofe refources, by 
 leaving the States refpe&ively to provide for State 
 debts. And an import might have been equivalent to 
 thofe of the union. 
 
 A recurrence to direct taxation by Congrefs, will 
 fwaJlow up the little fovereignty, now left to the once 
 fovereign individual States ; and every accumulation of 
 the debts of the union, is an impulfe towards that end. 
 
 Hence all aflumptions, and hence , the enormous 
 loans which have been negociated. In the power of 
 money, is the confidence of adminiftration placed. f»y 
 afluming all money negociations, a face of bufinefs, 
 and a&ivity, will be beftowed on the Federal govern- 
 ment. The excluflve payment of debts, and impofition 
 of taxes, will exhibit it as the only political objeft, to 
 intereft the attention of individuals whilft the ftate 
 governments will become only fpeculative common- 
 wealths, to be read for amufement like Harring- 
 ton’s Gceana, or Moore’s Utopia. Without pulfation, 
 without elafticity they will dwindle gradually into a 
 tale that has been told, and their parts will crumble and 
 diflipate, like a corporation of beavers, whofe w-aters 
 have been drained away. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. t 44 1 
 
 Does this fyftem comport with the conftitution, where 
 it guarantees to each State a republican form of govern- 
 ment : If the term “/or;;;,” means Jhadow , it does; 
 but if the guarantee extends to fubftance , we may bold- 
 ly aflert, that it does not. 
 
 A money fyftem may be called the natural enemy of 
 State conftitutions — of State laws — of State police (for 
 we dare not afpire to an higher expreflion) and of 
 State difpofitions. Accumulations of enormous wealth 
 in a few hands, by legal legerdemain, is deftru&ive of 
 that equality among citizens, which the State conftitu- 
 tions contemplate — is worfe than liviited finecures, 
 which they reprobate — defeat the effcfts of State law r s 
 for the divifion of property in cafes of inteftacy — and 
 wound our feelings, by converting our equals of yefter- 
 day, into our lords of to-morrow. A few dwaris are 
 fuddenly metamorphofed into giants, by a paper necro- 
 mancy, and the reft of the community whom it makes 
 more dwarfilh, both really and comparatively, are in- 
 chanted by fyren notes, into an infenlibility of their dan- 
 ger. 
 
 If many individuals in four years, have acquired from 
 ioo,coo to i,coo,ooo of dollars, how much will they 
 gain in twenty years ? What has been, and will be the 
 impreflion upon the community ? Which is moll to be 
 deplored ; Great Britain, opprefled for the fupport of 
 her royal brood, or America, fleeced by her brood of 
 fpeculators ? 
 
 A lineament of the fyftem, is alfo exhibited in the 
 finking fund. Even its name was a fraud upon the 
 community. It ought to have been denominated Ct the 
 raifing fund,” for it was defigned to raife the price of 
 certificates. It is the pap of paper, upon which the 
 child was to fubfift, until it was old enough to be w 7 ean- 
 ed. This artifice is fo grofs, that it will at once be feen 
 through a few plain facis. * * 
 
n 45 3 
 
 The finking fund was ere&ed in 1790, confiding of 
 about 1,300,000 dollars, which the minifler then re- 
 ported, as a furplus of revenue, beyond the public oc- 
 cafions. Lefs than 1,000,000 of it had been applied in 
 Tanuary 1793 ; between which time, and the erection 
 of the fund, nearly that fum was expended in periodical 
 purchafes of certificates. In 1790 alfo , the miniller 
 commenced the bprrowing of money in HollanJ, and 
 drawing it to this country, without law, and without 
 the fanhion of the Prefidcnt ; by which means, continu- 
 ed even to the prefent year, monies have been obtained 
 to a much greater amount, than the whole finking 
 fund. 
 
 Apply to thefe fatts, the following queftions. 
 
 If the furplus of revenue exifted, why was the mo- 
 ney borrowed, and drawn illegally hither from Hol- 
 land ? If not, why was the fa£t officially aliened l 
 How was the debt funk , by the ereftion of a fund, 
 producing the neceffity of incuring a new debt, to a 
 greater amount than the fund itfelf? If finking the 
 debt was the fimple objeft, why is it that the Jinking 
 fund has not been fooner applied ? Does the paying fil- 
 tered: in Holland for monies to replace this fund, whilft 
 the fund is lying dead here at a lofs of filtered, contri- 
 bute towards finking the debt? Was the minifter fo 
 wide of the truth, when he called the finking fund “ a 
 furplus ,” as to have been obliged to divert both that, 
 and monies borrowed, for the preferibed purpofe of pay- 
 ing the French debt, to current governmental occa- 
 fions ? or were no certificates to be purcliafed ? 
 
 But if keeping up, or raffing the price of certificates 
 be confidered as the primary objeft, all thefe difficulties 
 are folved. The occafional recurrences to the finking 
 fund are explained. And the miniftcrial financiering?, 
 (brink to political artifices, which incurred an enormous 
 national expence, in the purchafe of the aridocratical 
 
[ 46 ] 
 
 defideratum. Artifices, turned into laws, by an illegiti- 
 mate legiflature. 
 
 The refemblance between monarchical or aridocra- 
 tical contrivances, and the adminidration of the govern- 
 ment, is not leflened, by playing off upon America, the 
 Englilh bubble of a finking fund. When theirs was 
 cdablilhed, their debt was moderate, but fince this fpe- 
 cies of fund hath been operating, it has fwelied to a- 
 bove three hundred millions of pounds derling. Under 
 the operation of our finking fund, the public debt, has 
 been continually accumulating alfo, and a proportional 
 augmentation, will undoubtedly in lefs than a century, 
 enable us to contend with England itfelf, for the fird 
 rank among the honourable fociety of national fpend- 
 thrifts. 
 
 The asra when the government began to aft, was the 
 moment of lead fufpicion. At that unwary moment, 
 an ufurping fydem could be moll fafely introduced, and 
 precedents for expounding the conditution edablilhed, 
 which might be afterwards quoted. Relying upon the 
 unlimited national confidence which then exided, the 
 fydem diftated an attempt to bind future legidatures, 
 and to fecurc perpetually to the nation the blejjing of a 
 public debt, by rendering a great proportion of it ir- 
 redeemable. The conditution limits the power of Con- 
 grefs “ to the payment of the debts of the United 
 States,” and whilli the echo of the mandate is yet vi- 
 brating in our ears, the funding fydem declares that 
 they fliall not be paid. What barrier, will not rapaci- 
 ty and ambition overleap ? 
 
 Funding, banking, afluming, loaning, have compi- i 
 led a fifeal and political perplexity. The fifeal, which 
 could mod eafily have been explained, fince figures can 
 exhibit an account of money, is not even underdood by 
 the members of Congrefs. And the political, though 
 better underdood, is dill a capital auxiliary towards the 
 
C 47 J 
 
 general obfcurity. Perplexity in money ftatements is 
 ground enough for fufpicion. Detection would expel 
 fufpicion to make room for certainty. And the want of 
 ilmplicity in politics, ‘is ever a badge of defign. 
 
 The funding fyftem was intended to effect, what the 
 bank was contrived to accelerate. 
 
 1 . Accumulation of great wealth in a few hands. 
 
 2. A political moneyed engine. 
 
 3. A fuppreffion of the republican hate aflemblies, 
 by depriving them of the political importance, refulting 
 from the impofition and difpenfation of taxes. 
 
 And hence the tone of this inllrument alfo, in its fe- 
 veral vibrations, harmonizes with the perilous defign, 
 radically to deftroy the conftitution, and to ere<ft upon 
 its ruins an ufurpation, not fanttioned by the national 
 will, or acknowledging the fundamental principle ; 
 that the people are the only legitimate fountain of civil 
 government. 
 
 SECTION X. — The remedy. 
 
 T O determine whether a remedy to thcfe threatening 
 evils is neceffary or not, the inquiry ought to be 
 brought to the following fimple point. Whether Ame- 
 rica is now governed according to the fyftem of the con- 
 flitution, or the fyftem of an adminiftration. 
 
 This latter fyftem is indeed a riddle, but its efFefts 
 furnifh the folution. By its fruits {hall it be known. 
 Effetts are the language in which a political defign 
 fpeaks, and furnifh a conftruftion, furpafting prof efforts 
 in veracity, as far as the permanency of things, ex- 
 ceeds that of words. 
 
 If the conftitution meditates the producing of great 
 
: 48 j 
 
 inequality of wealth among citizens — the enriching of 
 a favoured few at the public expence — the impofition of 
 an enormous tax for private benefit, and not for the ge- 
 neral welfare — the eflablifhment of corporations, with 
 gainful rights and privileges, which neceffarily dimi- 
 nifh the general flock of rights and privileges, from 
 whence they are deduced — the transferring of the pa- 
 per property of the citizens into a few hands without 
 value received — the ere&ion of a fund, under a pre- 
 tence of finking the public debt, whereas its true de- 
 lign was to raife the value of that very paper, thus filch- 
 ed from the real owmers, at the public expence — the 
 rendering the debt of the United States irredeemable by 
 law — the giving to foreigners an immenfe, indirect and 
 fccret influence over our national counfels — and above 
 all, the introduflion of a monied anil undue influence 
 into the legiflature ; an influence which fubfifls at the 
 public expence, inflead of being a&uated by the public 
 good ; if the conflitution meditates fuch defigns, then 
 the point is determined one way, and it mufl be conce- 
 ded that America is governed according to the conflitu- 
 tion ; if it does not, candor will acknowledge, that A- 
 merica is governed according to a fyflem of an admini- 
 flration. 
 
 To come at the truth, fearch our political fcripture, 
 confider it text by text, and difcover where thefe defigns 
 have been fo covertly concealed, as to have efcaped the 
 penetration of every convention w r hich fifted and confi- 
 dered the inflrument ; and as to remain a monument of 
 a treafonable intention in the general convention, to de- 
 ceive and impofe upon their conflituents. 
 
 If we rely on the united integrity and wifdom of Ame- 
 rica, we fhall rejeft overflrained conflruiftions, tending 
 to impeach thefe qualities, and feek for the plain and 
 confiflent meaning. 
 
 After having afeertained the principles of the confu- 
 tation, let it be confidered, whether the fyflem of the 
 

 
r 49 ] 
 
 adminidration may not be overturned, and the conditu- 
 tion Hill remain unhurt ? If fo, is not that fydem a vi- 
 olation of the conditution ? 
 
 Then it ought to be dedroyed. America has aflum- 
 ed a character upon the theatre of the world, which ho- 
 nour — fame and political pliilofophy, call upon her to 
 fupport. She is the inventor of principles, aflerting 
 the equal rights of man, and exploding king-craft, 
 pried-craft, nobility-crhft and minider-craft. It is in- 
 cumbent upon her to prove by example, that her the- 
 ory is practically found. Otherwife Ihe betrays man- 
 kind, after having condituted herfelf the vindicator of 
 their rights. Indead of honour, die will then deferve 
 reproach ; and her future fame will be that of a gene- 
 ral Arnold for indance, who has betrayed the caufe 
 he undertook to defend, and deferted over to the ene- 
 my he engaged to defeat. 
 
 A divifion of power among king, lords, and com- 
 mons, is fetting out in government with an allotment of 
 parties. It is providing the materials for civil diffen- 
 tion. Power will fluctuate like wealth, if it is propofed 
 as the fubjeCI of controverfy among three contending 
 intereds. And every fluctuation mud diforder the 
 fanciful idea of the bala?ice. A precife equipoife 
 among thefe three intereds, from which only the pub- 
 lic good is expeCted to refult, could not exid above a 
 moment in an age. Whereas by taking the people as 
 the only genuine and legitimate fountain of power, and 
 ,by avoiding legal artifices producing an inequality of 
 wealth or privileges, we efcape the black train of evils 
 recorded in liiflory, as having been in mod ages and 
 governments, engendered by combinations of nobles to 
 opprefs the people ; and by more judifiable combina- 
 tions of the people to reduce the nobles. Evils, which 
 are the natural efFect of the whimfical balancing notion, 
 and which invariably end in defpotifm. Nobility is the 
 .caufe of thefe- evils, and of courfe the feed of tyrannv, 
 
 11 
 
C 50 ] 
 
 As a rivalfliip for power, is the uniform confequence 
 of three branches l of government, it mull inevitably de- 
 ftroy the balance, and produce a continual political 
 fermentation. And the conteft will not be allayed by 
 refle&ing, that thofe for whofe good the fcheme is faid 
 to have been invented, are fure of being degraded to 
 the defpicable (late of a mere tool, to be ufedby ambi- 
 tion and artifice, for the attainment of their own felfilh 
 purpofes. 
 
 The people are the natural body politic ; king, lords 
 and commons, are artificial llructures. Thofe who fa- 
 vour art at the expence of nature, confider the people 
 as a mere mafs of matter, upon parts of which they ex- 
 ert a plaftic political-craft, and lorm a fort of intaglio. 
 The refidue of the mafs is confidered only as a ftore- 
 houfe of materials, to mend, patch, and fupport thefe- 
 lecled or fecreted parts, as they happen to impair each 
 other by their collifions. 
 
 King, lords and commons are a fleet, confifling of 
 an admiral fibip, firft rates and frigates, and the people 
 are the forefls, out or which this fleet is built and re- 
 paired ; to be cut, hacked and hewed, as the occafions 
 of the fleet fhall require. Further by way of accommo- 
 dating myfelf to thofe poifing ideas ; the people in fuch 
 a fyftcm, may be likened to a balance mailer, dag- 
 gering about with a ladder upon his chin, a chair 
 mounted on the ladder, and a fword on the chair. 
 Can the equilibration be long fuftained ? Inllead of 
 fuch mountebank pantomimes, is it not advifable, left 
 they fall upon you, to flip from under them, and fo let 
 all three fall to the ground. And then, a natural pofi- 
 tion, which only can produce liability, may be relum- 
 ed. 
 
 This'balancing whimhath been tried by many nations, 
 and if all have failed either to find or maintain the ba- 
 lance, it is time to conclude, that it is an attempt to put 
 
C 51 1 
 
 fetters on air, or a fearch after the philofopher’s done. 
 That it is founded in fpeculation and not in principle. 
 That the idea of forming a government by the help of 
 a pair of fcales, condru&ed for weighing power, is more 
 fanciful than folid. And that the multiplied examples 
 of thofe who have failed, ought to deter the flighted 
 degree of prudence, from renewing an experiment, 
 invariably unfuccefsful. 
 
 By adhering to the idea, that the people are the only 
 genuine fountain of power, a conditution is immortal ; 
 for if a change is made in its parts by the public will, 
 it only proves that fundamental principle continues 
 
 unimpaired. Such would be a plain conditution, not poi- 
 foned by the drugs of a fpeculating policy. A change of 
 times, temper, and circumdances, may often require a 
 change of political regulations. By clinging to this 
 Ample principle, a peculiar fltuation may be gratified. 
 Without internal commotion ; -whereas a mixed prin- 
 ciple — a political falmagundi, is feldom brought back 
 to its primitive parts but by a civil war. 
 
 Who is to fuperintend the political tripod ? If a 
 member of it is from time to time to adjud the weights, 
 he will be for ever filching from the other two, to add 
 to his own fcale. Thus the equilibrium is lod and 
 then the effects of the machine are wide of every calcu- 
 lation. 
 
 The perplexity of this mechanifm requires frequent 
 repairs, and yet its delicacy makes it unfafe to mend it.- 
 Whereas from fimplicity, both ffrength and duration, 
 are mod likely to refult. 
 
 The precife adjudment of tiled Balances, is an at- 
 tainment, furpaflnlg human intellectual powers, as far 
 as the precife adertainment of the true religion. As to 
 both, no two perfons would hardly agree in every par- 
 ticular, and when there are as many opinions as there 
 
r 52 ] 
 
 are men, what is the chance for Rumbling on the right ? 
 Sincerity in political error, will not render its confe- 
 quences to focicty lbfs baneful. 
 
 The doftrine of the graces — the graces, may be per- 
 petually rung in our ears, but conveying no perfpicu- 
 cus idea, the manners it will produce can never be 
 forefeen ; and if one in a thoufand fucceeds, all he ac- 
 quires is a fpecies of ceremonious tinfelled frippery of 
 gcRure of little worth either to himfelf or others ; 
 whereas a deportment, founded in moral re&itude, is 
 the bafts of individual happinefs, and the difpenfer of 
 bleflings to others. The balances — the balances, are 
 the graces — the -graces of government. They are a 
 confufed aifcmblage of notions, conveying no diRinfr 
 idea, and compofed by the rule of fancy. The prin- 
 ciple, “ that the people are the only legitimate foun- 
 e; tain of power,” and of courfe the only fafe corrector 
 of its abufe, is a political guide, furpamhg the one in 
 point of public fafety, as far as true morality exceeds the 
 other in refpect to private manner^. 
 
 Obvious is the vanity of an expectation, that one equal 
 conflituent member of a government, is a fufficient and 
 fafe check upon two others ; as is the folly of depofit- 
 ing all focial and natural rights, under a Reward -fliip,, 
 as unreRrained, as if the proprietors had travelled into 
 a far country. Whether is it moR likely, that one 
 member will enter on the perilous undertaking of con- 
 trouling the wicked defigns of the other two, or that 
 motives of intereR and fafety flrould dictate to all, the 
 policy of a triple alliance ? The example of Great Bri- 
 tain carries this idea beyond conjecture. 
 
 Can the majority of the people defign to opprefs ? 
 Does hiRory exhibit fuch a cafe ? The writers in favour 
 of monarchy are reduced to the miferable Riift, of fub- 
 Rituting the mobs of cities in the place of nations, in 
 order to conjure up the idea of a popular defpotifm, 
 which cannot, as America is fituated, exiR. r i lie many 
 
% 
 
L 53 1 
 
 have no motive to opprefs the few. Temptations to 
 fraud are in an inverfe proportion, to the multitude 
 who are fharers in the plunder, and the diminution of 
 the booty to be divided. A combination of the great 
 bulk of the community, to ereft adefpotifm over an in- 
 confiderable number of individuals, though it would 
 not exhibit the extreme cafe, of a tyrannic nation, do- 
 mineering over one man, would yet prefent the ridi- 
 culous objeft, of an hundred perfons, owning a linglc 
 {lave. 
 
 But whither are we going ? Did America fight for a 
 revolution of dominating families, or of principles ? If 
 of principles define and compare them with the fenti- 
 inents now avowed, by words, in books, in news- 
 papers, and by actions, all evincing a concerted defign. 
 Serioufly concerted as the defign is, I will believe that 
 America is not fufficiently regenerated, for the intro- 
 duction of king, lords and commons. She yet knows 
 well, that eftabtifhed religions — bilhops — tythes — and 
 {landing armies, being feions of the fame frock, ine- 
 vitably fprout up together with ariftocracy. 
 
 The people are the only fafe guardians of their own 
 liberty, and the focial jurifdi&ion, the only impartial 
 corrector of unconftitutional political defigns. 
 
 SECTION XI. — The same subject continued. 
 
 T HE people are the only fafe guardians of their own 
 liberty. The component parts of government are 
 the creatures of the conftimtion. A fubjettion of the cre- 
 ator to the created, is a reverfal of the courfe of nature. 
 The conilitution is a limitation to legiilative power. It 
 iniulates arbitrary defigns, and continually pronounces, 
 “ thus far {halt thou go.” Butfuppofe a legiflaturefhoul'd 
 go further. Is the veto abortive ? Is it only an empty 
 
[ 54 ] 
 
 echo of a nation’s laft dying words? or is it to be cn* 
 forced and by whom ? 
 
 Without legiflative encroachment or connivance, no 
 infringement upon the conflitution can happen. The 
 laws will act upon and reflrain individuals, by the en- 
 forcement of the courts of juflice ; but the conflitution 
 only can aft upon the legiilature, by the enforcement 
 of the focial jurifdiftion. The laws being competent 
 to every other objeft of good government, the confli- 
 tution mufl have been exclufively defigned for the cafe, 
 to which ic is now applied. Until a violation of the 
 principles of the conftitution appears, no occafion for 
 xeforting to the remedy exifls ; and when it does ap- 
 pear, to affert that there is no mode of getting at the 
 remedy, or that the body prefuppofed by the violation, 
 to be vitiated, are yet to enforce it upon themfelres, is 
 making the conflitution a dead letter. 
 
 Therefore if liberty is a national objeft, the nation 
 itfclf mufl watch over the conflitution, preferve it from 
 violation, and i'upply its defefts, or admit it to be the 
 Lethe of the community, producing an intire forgetful- 
 ncl's of the rights of man. 
 
 The national judgment or will may be brought to 
 aft in two modes, without recurring to a general con- 
 vention. 
 
 i. By cautioufly elefting members of Congrefs, of a 
 fimilarity of interefls — of burthens — of benefits — and 
 of habits with the eleftors. For an unbiaffed judgment 
 upon good information, will correft political abufes, 
 and invent new checks againft their repetition. 
 
 i. Through the organs of flate legiilature s. 
 
 The firfl will operate flowly. The people may be 
 deceived by profeflions, and a reprefentative though 
 found at firil is fometimes debauched. But yet as the 
 
 \ 
 
[ 55 J 
 
 people when informed, arealmoft invariably right, and 
 as a reprefentative is often firm, it deferves the moft 
 fedulous attention. 
 
 The feeond is a fecurity for liberty of the happieft 
 texture which could have been devifed. 
 
 The ftatc legiflatures are the people themfelves in a 
 fine of refinement, poffe fling fupcrior information, 
 and exhibiting the national fufirage in the fairefi and 
 fafeft mode. 
 
 They are annual conventions, fubjeCt to no undue in- 
 fluence, not participating of loaves and fifhes, and aCtua- 
 ted by the motive of public good. 
 
 Holding their pow r er by an annual tenure, they are 
 frequently accountable to the people, often changed, 
 and incapable of forming combinations for their private 
 emolument, at the public expence. 
 
 Being more immediately within the view of their con- 
 fiituents, fhauld they mifinterpret the doings of the 
 national government, or mifreprefent the public mind, 
 a detection, or a contradiction, would be almofi infian- 
 taneous. 
 
 As electors of fenators, they conftirute a chief link 
 conneChng the general and hate governments, through 
 which the conduct of the former may be better under- 
 ftood, and the will of the people readied ; fo as to fill 
 up in fome meafure, the great fpace between Congrefs 
 f and the people. 
 
 They may operate decifively upon the general govern - 
 vient, by conjlituting the fenute according to a republican 
 Jlanaard . 
 
 And finally the ftate legiflatures have at leaft as good 
 a right to judge of every infraction of the conftitution, 
 as Congrefs itfelf. 
 
[ ] 
 
 The alarming mode of thinking avowed by the arifto- 
 cracy, “ that they are only refponfible to God and their 
 “ own confciences,” inllead of weakening the argument, 
 is an additional reafon for clinging to every means, tend- 
 ing to produce an effedual refponfibiliry in the mem- 
 bers of Congrefs, to the conflitution, and to the people 
 who made it. Whilft the avowal goes to the fubver- 
 lion of every principle of liberty — to the annihilation of 
 the conflitution — and is in fact a rebellion again ft the 
 firft principles of liberty, the act of (hutting the fenate 
 doors accords with the doctrine, and exhibits one of its v 
 effects, by obflrucling the evidence upon which a re- 
 fponfibility can only be enforced. If a jurifdiftion is 
 compelled to decide upon incomplete evidence, a power 
 to impofe fuch a neceflity, inllead of being amenable to 
 that jurifdiiftion, is fuperior to it ; and by concealing a 
 part, a 'fumes a right of with-holding the whole teflimo- 
 ny. Of what avail is a right of decilion, when the 
 grounds upon which to exert human reafon and reflec- 
 tion, arc with-held either completely or partially ? 
 
 A aifavowal of every fpecies of refponfibility to focial \ 
 obligations, is a difavowal of all claim to focial confi- 
 dence. 
 
 SECTION XII. — The same subject continued. 
 
 U nconstitutional defigns have been 
 
 demonflrated ; the corrective power is found ; 
 and it now remains to fpecify the remedies. 
 
 The natural intercjl of every country, ought exclu- 
 fively to legiflate. A complete transfer of this power 
 to an artificial inter cji, is a thorough legislative corrup- 
 tion. A partial transfer, is a legiflative taint. The na- 
 tural interefl of a country includes whatever may fub- 
 fiil, without the direft aid of municipal law, as agricui- 
 

 
 
 
[ 57 ] 
 
 ture, commerce, manufactures and arts. An artificial 
 intereft, whatever is immediately created by law. As 
 public debt, public officers, and private banks. 
 
 If this idea is not a principle of the conftitution, and 
 a neceflary one for the prefervation of liberty, upon 
 what grounds were public officers excluded from Con- 
 grefs, and a variety of precautions introduced for the 
 purpofe of preventing an undue influence from creeping 
 into that body ? No admiffion of an artificial intereft in- 
 to the legiilature, is recognized by the conftitution, and 
 unlefs the principle of the exclufion, and not the exam- 
 ples adduced, is conlidered as fundamental (the gift of 
 prefcience not having prefided at the formation of the 
 conftitution) then the legiflative branch may evade it 
 without reftriftion, by creating an artificial intereft not 
 forefeen or contemplated, and beftowing upon it a legif- 
 lative influence. 
 
 For example. Congrefs impofe taxes and borrow 
 money. The higher the tax, and the more they bor- 
 row, the more they may receive as flock-holders. 
 Which violates the principle of the conftitution mod 
 forely, the cafe it dates, of excluding a member becaufe 
 he receives a fixed falary as an officer of government ; 
 or the cafe unforefeen, of a member’s receiving uncer- 
 tain and unlimited gain from the public labour, and in 
 part from the public purfe, depending on his own 
 vote ? 
 
 Again. Public monies are to be accounted for to 
 Congrefs. Suppofe they fhould be employed in favori- 
 tifm to the bank, or in keeping up the price of certifi- 
 ( cates. Will certificate or dock-holders, who receive 
 the money, be very inexorable in detecting and punifh- 
 ing fuch a mifapplication ? Or being bound by number* 
 lefs ties of the ftrongeft intered, in the clofed alliance 
 with a minider of finance, is not an explanatory and en- 
 lightening effect upon their minds rather to be expect- 
 
 J 
 
C S3 ] 
 
 cd, if incomprehenfible accounts of public monies 
 fhould be exhibited. 
 
 It is the chief principle of the conftitution, that the 
 natural, and not an artificial intereft, fhould be repre- 
 fented in the legiflaturc. They are ufually in oppofition 
 to, if not at enmity with, each other ; becaufe the lat- 
 ter conftantly fubfifts upon the former. Therefore the lat- 
 ter, ought to be limited and reftrained by the fimple 
 rule of the public good. But if it legiflatcs, it is fubjec- 
 ted to no rcflraint or limitation. 
 
 Slavery is only a domination of an artificial, over the 
 natural intereft of a nation. In whatever fhapethat ar- 
 tificial intereft appears, the effeCt is the fame. And if 
 the artificial intereft poffeffes a power of erefting itftlf, 
 and of legiilating to preferve and fupport itfelf, the na- 
 tion is already enflaved. 
 
 Public creditors and ftock-holdcrs ought to be ex- 
 cluded from Congrefs, upon the fame principle as pub- 
 lic officers are excluded, becaufe all may acquire pub- 
 lic monies by their own votes, and the acquifiti- 
 ons of the two former being behind the curtain, are 
 molt to be apprehended. Would fuch characters 
 have been fit perfons to form a conftitution for America, 
 and if not, are they proper guardians, of that which 
 they could not have been entrufted to enact ? 
 
 Suppofe for inftance, wliilft the funding and affump- 
 tion laws were under difeuflion, members of Congrefs 
 had held paper, the value of which was to be greatly 
 enhanced by funding and affiaming. Would fuch mem- 
 bers have been impartial judges of the propriety of 
 thefe meafures ? or of the propofition to make fome re- 
 tribution to the original holders for their lofs, leaving 
 ftill to the purchafers a handfome gratuity ? Could not 
 members of Congrefs upon that occafion have been in- 
 terwoven by fpeculators, with their projects ? Or whilft 
 the queftions were under confideration, if members had 
 
[ 59 J 
 
 drawn the wages paid by their country for impartiality, 
 and inverted them in the purchafe of a perfonal interelt 
 on one fide of the’queftion, could a greater degree of 
 legiflutive corruption have been conceived ? When the 
 bank law was before Congrefs, were certificate holders 
 impartial legislators, fince an effect of it, was to increafe 
 the interert on 7,500,000 dollars of certificates, from 
 fix to at leart twelve per centum ? 
 
 Illurtrations refulting from an actual rtate of things, 
 and drawn from laws, fo important in their conie- 
 quences, enable us to look forward for future effects, 
 upon better grounds than conjecture, and bring the 
 queftion to this iffue. Ought Congrefs to decide upon 
 the mort important national regulations, from motives 
 of public good, or ought they to be governed, or even 
 biaffed by thofe of private interert ? 
 
 Natural deafnefs would be confidered as an unan- 
 fwerable objection to a candidate for a feat in Congrefs, 
 and yet it would be preferable to an artificial deafnefs, 
 as far as an equal chance of doing right, is preferable to 
 an automaton member, whofe motions are governed by 
 a fecret impulfe, when that impulfe is felf-intereft. 
 
 Laws then ought to be made by the natural or gene- 
 ral interert of a nation, and every artificial, local and 
 particular interert, ought to depend upon the juflice 
 and integrity of that which is natural or general, be- 
 caufe of this every individual participates, whereas a 
 few perfons only are concerned in the others ; becaufe 
 the fmaller the number, and the more exclufive the in- 
 terert, the greater the temptation to injuftice and par- 
 tiality ; becaufe national confidence in the important 
 matter of legillation, can only refide in the nation itfelf; 
 and becaufe, when a power to legislate, is the offspring 
 of legislation and not of the conftitution, legillation' 
 which gave, can refume the power, can transfer it from 
 one exclufive interert to another, and can caufe politi- 
 

 
 
[60]. 
 
 cal principles, intended to be made conftirutionally per- 
 manent, to flufluate. The power of legiflation, by the 
 feveral paper laws, is in fact and fubftance (for we are 
 tegardlefs of form) transferred from the nation to a 
 paper junto. And if the bank and certificate artificial 
 interefts, were in a ftate of warfare, legal transfers of 
 this power, and fluctuations of political principles, 
 would prefently exemplify the objefts of a legiflative 
 power, flowing in fa<ft, though not in form, out of le- 
 giflation. 
 
 If this is not the principle of exclufions from the le- 
 giflature, upon what bafis do they reft ? Admiting it to 
 be fo, is not the artificial, exclufive, private paper in- 
 tereft completely embraced by it ? 
 
 When fuch an intereft feduces a part of the repre- 
 fentatives of the general or national intereft, into its 
 views or defigns, liberty is dangeroufly wounded ; 
 but when a majority of fuch reprefentatives is thus fe- 
 duced, liberty is theoretically annihilated. 
 
 An unanfwerable illuftration of this doftrine refults 
 from the recolle&ion, that the paper intereft is tranfi- 
 tory. It is a bird of paflage, regardlefs of climes, in- 
 capable of national feelings — of national attachments — 
 or of that amor patriae, which is the moft tender pledge 
 of legiflative kindnefs. Inftead of poffeffing perma- 
 nency, it may connect itfelf occafionally with French, 
 Spanifti, Dutch, or Englifti politics. Are thefe fuch 
 fupports as the conftitution folicits ? And what muft be 
 the view’s of an admir.iftration, which has feletted an 
 itinerant, unfeeling vifitant, as the guardian of its de- 
 figns ? Of the public good, paper is a moft unnatural 
 guardian. It is a rapacious calculator of intereft, 
 whofe confluence is feared by its acquifitions and its 
 hopes. In Congrefs, it is an inexorable creditor, with 
 an execution or a deed of truft in its hand, ready to 
 feize and fell — with a power to borrow money for its 
 
L 61 ] 
 
 own purpofes, at any lofs to the debtor — and able to 
 perplex its demands and add to its ufury, by fly tricks 
 or legiflative contrivances. 
 
 Hence the depofiting of certificates in the national 
 bank, by which the paper more than doubled intereft 
 - — hence the enormous loans made of the bank, carry- 
 ing intereft, whilft it poflefled and ufed an enormous 
 fum of public money, carrying no intereft — hence the 
 continual foreign loans, whilft the nation is amufed 
 with a finking fund, with compliments to the trade of 
 financiering, and with official recommendations from 
 the minifter, conveyed through the pureft channel, to 
 commence the aifeharge of the public debt — and hence 
 that afiemblage of contrivances, placing the people in a 
 ftate of utter darknefs, as to the difpofition of their 
 money. 
 
 If we tempt men’s defires, by hopes of boundlefs ac- 
 quifitions, the conftant incitements of private intereft, 
 will leave no interval of time or reflection, to be ap- 
 propriated to the public good ; a reflection, out of 
 which, if it is juft, arifes a ftrong argument for expel- 
 ling every fpecies of private undue influence out of 
 Congrefs, that the attention of this body may be bent 
 to the nati ' sal welfare. 
 
 The ex] '■ Ion of paper men out of Congrefs would 
 brin < thole obfervationc to the teft of an impartial le- 
 gitimate iegiflature. Is fuch an event deiirable ? An- 
 ticipate it, and behold its efteCfs. If the paper intereft 
 would be expe’led from Con grefs — if the incorporating 
 ufurpation, and all conitruftive contrivances, violating 
 republican principles, would be reftrained — if any other 
 mifeonftrued or doubtful expreffions in the conftitution 
 would be explained, and new fecurities for liberty de- 
 viled — and if fimplicity in the finances would be en- 
 forced ; fuch decinons would prove the truth and juft- 
 nefs of my arguments. ] challenge the ariftocracy to 
 
C 62 ] 
 
 fubmit to this fair and honed; trial. A decifion by pa- 
 per in its own favour, is no proof at all. If they 
 flirink from fo unexceptionable a proportion, and will 
 continue both judge and jury in their own caufe, it can 
 only flow from a confcioufnefs , which will not efcape the 
 notice of the community, in confldering whether real 
 reforms are deftrable, and whether it will Hop at ima- 
 ginary anticipations of its willies. Such a legiflature 
 •mould alfo repeal the bank lam. 
 
 What ! exclaims the appalled ariilocracy, will you 
 alfo invade rights of private property, as by law ejta- 
 blijhed? Yes, If they are interdicted by the principles of 
 the conjlitution , they are wrongs , and not rights. 
 
 This fubje£t deferves a further examination. It may 
 illuftrate and unravel the unconftitutional deflgns of a 
 monarchical faction. 
 
 We hear on all hands of the [acrednefs of private 
 property, held by legijlative finch on ; of the inviolabi- 
 lity of legiflative faith ; and it is even afferted, that 
 Congrefs ought never to repeal a law, by which they 
 have bellowed a valuable boon upon an individual. 
 Congrefs have themfclves plainly expreffed their fuf- 
 frage in favour of thefe doctrines, by pledging the pub- 
 lic faith, that the exclufive privileges of the bank Ihall 
 be enjoyed for twenty years unrivalled , and by making 
 a portion of the public debt irredeemable , in virtue of 
 their conftitutional power to redeem. It is evident 
 that thefe doctrines are invented to prop the laws, and 
 the laws grounded in a contemplation of the do&rines. 
 Whence both the doctrines and the laws are clearly a- 
 fcribable to a common fource. 
 
 A legiflature influenced by private motives, will ex- 
 alt legiflative fanctions, and debafe conftitutional barri- 
 ers. Thofe who invent wrongs for their own ufe, will 
 alfo invent doctrines to fupport thofe wrongs. 
 
[ 63 : 
 
 Combining the do&rine and laws, they engender a di- 
 reft claim by .the legiflature of a power to ufurp upon 
 the rights of the nation, Provided, the depredation is fold 
 or given to an individual or a corporation. It is a doc- 
 trine which proflrates every conftitiitional fence, dcvi- 
 fed, or capable of being deviled lor the prefervation of 
 liberty and property, at the feet of a leg'flature. They 
 may parcel out public property and public rights, which 
 are the only wares they deal in, until none worth having 
 remain. They may endow an arillocracy at the nation- 
 al expencc, and if the inviolability of legifla rive faith is 
 to obviate a reclamation, then the arillocracy is per- 
 petual. Congrefs may even distribute among their baf- 
 tards the revenues of- cities, countries or Sates in perpe- 
 tuity, through the medium of paper, banks, coals, or 
 any neceflary of life ; and an example for it is to be 
 found in a fyftcm, which is obviouSy the polar Star of 
 the politics of government. Nay they may divide the 
 fruit of the national labour among themfelves, not for 
 twenty years only, but for ever. The limitation of the 
 bank tax was merely arbitrary ; and if-thc inviolability 
 of legiSative faith, is to fan&ion the contrivance for 
 twenty years, a precedent exiSs for conveying the 
 whole national ability to a Single corporation, in tail 
 fucceffional, for all eternity. 
 
 This legal immutability, fuppofes conSitutional mu- 
 tability. Congrefs are mounted by it to a pre-emi- 
 nence over a national convention. It goes to the pre- 
 fervation of legal wrongs, beyond a revolution itfeif. 
 It is an affumption of a power, not actually poflefled by 
 anyexiSing generation of mankind, and which the na- 
 tion itfeif could not beSow even on a general conven- 
 tion. It renders conSitutional ri: ! its vi '.-table , l y af- 
 ferting that legal rights are invi'J;i!;!c ; thus in a mari- 
 ner repealing political gofpcl, by form of law. And is 
 indeed a doctrine fo replete with evil and uhfurdity, as 
 to have been avowed but Seldom, lince the ti nes of the 
 Medes and Perfians. 
 
C 6+ ] 
 
 But the Medes and Perfians were more confident than 
 Congrefs. Immutability was a concomitant of their laws 
 univerfally. Whereas with us the whole doftrine is 
 monopoliic by thofe, who can drip the nation of its 
 wealth or rights by form of law. Laws of this kind 
 are called deeds, and the fign, feal and deliver of Con 
 grel', clofes the conveyance for ever. As if all laws 
 did nor in fame way affect private perfons. As if to fe- 
 core the nation individually , they mud be plundered col- 
 lectively. As if it was a confolation to a man, whom 
 you are about to dedroy on one fcore, to declare him 
 fafe as to another. 
 
 The conditution empowers Congrefs to make laws, 
 not to make deeds. Mutability is attached to legifla- 
 tion. Otherwife each fucctffive Congrefs would have 
 its power narrowed by the preceding, though derived 
 from the fame fource, and held by the fame tenure. To 
 keep faith to the bank law, we mud be guilty of a 
 breach of faith to the conditution. 
 
 To return more immediately to the fubjech The 
 conditution in the fifth article, recognizes the date le- 
 giflatures, as date conventions, and Congrefs as a ge- 
 neral convention. Congrefs, united with two thirds 
 of the date legillatures, may alter the conditution. Con- 
 templated, as they are in this important indance, as the 
 organs of the people, can it be improper for them to 
 make knowm the public will, or to reconfider emenda- 
 tions of the conditution, of which they are ultimately 
 to judge ? The power of forcing Congrefs, by the man- 
 date of twm thirds, immeafurably tranfeends a mere re- 
 commendation. 
 
 A genuine, impartial, unadulterated legiflature, would 
 fairly confider, and impartially determine quedions of 
 a national magnitude, exceeded by none. Therefore 
 the remedies prefenting themfelves are ; 
 
 u. In all elections, to exclude paper men of every de- 
 
nomination, and alfo every fpecies of artificial interest 
 created, or to be created. 
 
 ‘2. To compile the Senate by a republican Jlandard. 
 
 3. To recommend, through the medium of ftate le- 
 gifiatures, explanations of the conflitution, according 
 with its fpirit — its conflru&ion when adopted — its un- 
 trained conflru&ion now — and with republican princi- 
 ples. 
 
 SECTION XIII. — The subject cf the Bank re- 
 sumed. 
 
 I T is refumed to evince the integrity of the obferva- 
 tion, intimating the exigence of numerous frauds 
 in this contrivance, not yet adduced. 
 
 National wealth, and national rights, tottering on 
 the brink of perdition, irrefiflibly folicited our firfi: at- 
 tention ; and all poflible hafte was made to exhibit their 
 danger, without ditlratting the public attention, by 
 compelling it to view the Proteus in too great a variety 
 of fhapes. 
 
 This important duty being difeharged, it may not be 
 amifs to continue our enquiries concerning the public 
 or private morality of this inftitution. 
 
 The bank may buy and fell lands including their ca- 
 pital to the amount of 15,000,000 of dollars. But if 
 they exceed their capital, who is to know it ? They 
 are not to difclofe the extent of their landed eftate, even 
 to the miniftcr ; and no power, can require fuch a dif- 
 clofure of them. If an excefs is difeovered,' and could 
 be proved, which is almofl impoffible, no penalty is fub- 
 joined or forfeiture incurred ; and the effett of fuch a 
 difeovery would have been eafily fruftrated, had a for- 
 feiture followed it, bv a fraudulent exercife of the pow- 
 
 K ^ 
 

I 66 ] 
 
 er to fell. In this view the bank law is a ftatute of 
 mortmain, and the land; of the community may be gra- 
 dually fwallowed up by a corporation, which does not 
 propofe in exchange for them, either political or eter- 
 nal falvation. Perpetuities of landed eftates. devolving 
 by fucceffion, are eftabiifhed, to the difeouragement 
 of commerce and induftry; to the impoverilhment of 
 the laity ; and to the aggrandifement of the bank mili- 
 litant miniltry. It is an incorporated feudal tenure, and 
 the community is fubje&ed to homage and fealty, for 
 their circulating medium, as well as their lands. 
 
 The bank dividends are not to be coextenfive with the 
 real profits, but are to be regulated by the direftors. 
 Hence the extent of the impofition is concealed from 
 the public. The community lofe the chance of having 
 all they pay thrown back into circulation, by the extra- 
 vagance or luxury of individuals. An accumulating 
 fund, which may make the corporation richer than the 
 nation, and of courfe more powerful, is a branch of the 
 fcheme. It may conftantly retain, what the nation a- 
 lone fupplies. Thus the amufements of mathematici- 
 ans, in calculating the elP&s of compound intereft, are 
 to be realized at the national expence ; and a fund is 
 fecured for extending the mortmain bufinefs, or with 
 which to buy a new charter at the end of twenty years 
 by public or private negociations, if the bank fliould not 
 then have members enough in Congrefs to give it to it- 
 felf. The body corporate can either extend or diminifh 
 its profits. This is a kind of lafh capable of being ap- 
 plied to their refractory bodies natural, either in or out 
 of Congrefs, to whip them in, to the incorporated mea- 
 fures. r i he fupremacy of the body politic over its mem- 
 bers is by this means effectually eftablilhed, and a uni- 
 ted impetus fecured to it. Ip this part of the fcheme is 
 alio to be difeerned an unnecefiary precaution, as expe- 
 rience has evinced, in cafe things Ihould go badly. In 
 this event, the corporation by its dire&ors, had nothing 
 to do, but to declare ail exorbitant dividend, and then 
 
[ ] 
 
 to fell out individually to the unwary, the bank ftock, 
 thus enhanced in price. 
 
 Thedebtsarenot toexceed 10,000,000 of dollars, over 
 and above the money depcfited in the bank for fafe-kecping , 
 and over and above 5,000,000 worth of lands. Diffi- 
 cult as it is to afcertain what may be the flock, property 
 and debts of the bank by law, yet no penalty exifls for 
 enforcing obedience to the law, except that if the bank 
 incurs debts beyond 10,000,000, they fhall attually 
 pay them. The profit of the bank arifes out of paper, 
 money, or debts, bearing no interefl. Where is the pe- 
 nalty of paying^ ico, and receiving £ icC for fo doing? 
 The traffic of the bank; is under no limitation, but the 
 national ability to bear it. The partial power of in- 
 fpe&ion, conferred upon a member of the coalition, by 
 way of national fecurity, might have been exemplified 
 by a common proverb, except for the indelicacy of the 
 terms. 
 
 Why does the law hold out an idea of limiting the 
 acquifitions of the bank ? If they are honeft, to limit 
 them was urjufl; if difhoneft, it fliould acquire nothing. 
 If the gain came from abroad, it was reflraining a na- 
 tional good; but if the reflraint admits that it was to 
 come out of the nation, it is a tax when not a penny was 
 due, and not a penny of public money could Congrefs 
 bellow, in liberality to the rich. If the gain was not like 
 to be fo enormous, as to endanger the common-wealth, it 
 required no limitation, if it was, why erc< 5 t a mifehief in 
 order to reflrain it — why extend it fo enormoully — or 
 why reflrain it with fetters of fand ? This pretence of a 
 limitation tells a tale. It confefTes that the gain is enor- 
 mous — that it is paid at the public expence — and that 
 the contrivance contains fomc lurking mifehief. 
 
 Eut the huv prevides that the bank may lend to go- 
 vernment to any amount. Its acquifitions in this mode 
 are rendered indefinite, if any definition could before 
 have been difeerned. And here the contrivance, ex- 
 

C 68 1 
 
 panding its views, exhibits an unlimited fcope of defigns, 
 and contemplates a direCt operation on government it- 
 felf. Bank people in Congrefs, may in this cafe, vote 
 that government fhould make unneceffary loans of them- 
 felves, for the purpofes of extending their capital — en- 
 creafing their profits — and acquiring an influence. The 
 eagernefs to put this part of the fyftem into a train, 
 hath already explained its objeCts. Two millions four 
 hundred thoufand dollars have been already borrowed 
 by government of the bank upon intereft, and a further 
 loan of 800, coo dollars was fanCtioned at the laft Con- 
 grefs, although above 1,300,000 dollars of public mo- 
 ney was at that time lying dead in fundry banks. By a 
 fimilar trick, the bank of England has indiffolubly con- 
 nected itfelf with that government, and a perpetual re- 
 newal of its charter is infured. Although its dividends 
 have never been lower than five and an half per centum , 
 it hath alfo gotten more than cent, per cent, on its capital 
 in a government debt. Great as this property is, it is 
 far outftripped by the American bank, as will prefently 
 be fhown. In that country, an enormous profit, and an 
 undue legiflative influence, have flowed from the contri- 
 vance. In this,the ufe of fimilar means, clearly indicates 
 an intention to attain fimilar ends. With this difference, 
 that our inflitution exceeds enormity itfelf. 
 
 The twenty five bank directors may be paid by the 
 corporation much or little as they choof* ; and whether 
 paid or not, the whole of them may be taken out of the 
 Senate, which confifls of thirty members. Even the 
 prefident of the United States may be chofen, and aCt 
 as a bank director. In what part of the conftitution is 
 the flaw to be found, permiting infractions of its own 
 principles, fo egregious ? If bank directors ferve the 
 bank without wages, whilft they demand wages of the 
 nation, their affeCtion for or interefl in the one, muff 
 be greater that their affeCtion for, or intereft in, the 
 other. And if wages are their objeCt, they will be pro- 
 portioned to their earnings. Something beyond, “ Well 
 
[ «9 J 
 
 done thofe good and faithful fervams,” will be expefted 
 for doubling the talents. 
 
 The intimation that the profits of the bank are ex- 
 travagant, deferves an expofition by items. Premiiing, 
 that a perfon out of the fecret, is confined to fuch items 
 only, as are of public notoriety, fo that thofe of a pri- 
 vate nature, will remain uncalculated 
 
 Three fourths of the bank depofit, are to confifl of 
 certificates, and one fourth of fpecie. Suppofe £ 1 oo thus 
 depofited. The dividend at the end of the year was 
 was eight per centum. The £75 of certificates were 
 gaining an interefl of fix per cent per annum , fo that 
 the whole profit is made out of the £25 fpecie, which 
 is all the perfon making the depofit lofes the ufe cf. Up- 
 on this fum the profit in one year is above thirty per 
 centum. But the bank began to operate when only one 
 fourth of the flock fubferibed was depofited, four in- 
 ftalments of fix months each being allowed, and yet the 
 dividends have been made upon the total flock fubferi- 
 bed. Hence only £12 10 o. attual cafh for each 
 
 £\oo fleck, was depofited during the whole of the 
 rirft year, and this received an ufance of ^8, as regu- 
 lated by the directors, exclufive of the gain in lands, 
 debts, fpcculations, and loans for the incorporated be- 
 nefit. Are not the talents doubled ? and may not the 
 bank exclaim, “ Well done thou good and faithful fer- 
 vantsr” 
 
 Though the fix per centum upon certificates, confli- 
 tuted a portion of the total gain, made by the corpora- 
 tion, yet there was gain enough to conllitute the dhi- 
 dends, exclufive of this^.v per centum. 
 
 It would hardly be afferted, that the profit of a bank, 
 favoured of government, would be only t-u o per centum , 
 fuppofing the flock to have confifted of fpecie, fo as not 
 to get an interefl, both by circulating paper on its cre- 
 dit, and alfo as a debt due by government. 
 
[ 7 ° ] 
 
 But the fact fhould not reft upon a fuppolnion which 
 can be denied. 
 
 Exclufive of the dividends, and all other gains, the 
 bank had already lent to government on the firft of Ja- 
 nuary 1793, 2,400,000 dollars, for which it was then 
 receiving intereft. 
 
 Therefore the profits, fupplying not only this loan, 
 but alfo the dividends, it follows obvioufly, that the 
 intereft upon the certificates was more than doubled at 
 the national expence ; 'and confequently that the 
 7,500,000 dollars of public debt deposited, was inftan- 
 taneoufly conjured up by what is called financiering /kill 
 and federation, to between fifteen and thirty millions. 
 
 The precife amount cannot be afeertained, becaufe 
 both the item of lands acquired, and that important ar- 
 ticle of private debts due to the bank, are left out of the 
 calculation ; both being of a fecret nature. 
 
 As the republic did not depofit her two millions of 
 (lock, all the fpccie of the whole bank fubfeription, 
 fuppofing every fhilling paid, amounted to 2,000,000 
 of dollars ; and out of it the dire&ors have not only 
 made a dividend of eight per centum on 10,000,000 
 which is a gain of 800,000 dollars per annum, but have 
 alfo lent the government 2,400,000 dollars. The ta- 
 lents are trebled in two years. It is not faid, that the 
 bank had fold its certificates previous to January 
 1 793 * 
 
 The capital of the bank of England was^ 10,000,000 
 fterling. It has only been able to lend to that govern- 
 ment from its inftitution, about £. 12,000,000, and its 
 dividends have long been as low as jive and an half per 
 centum. Thefpecie capital of theUnited States bank was 
 only 2,000,000 of dollars, and in lefs than two years, 
 it lent 2,400,000 to government, and divided eight per 
 

[ 7 * 1 
 
 centum on 10,000,000. How far, arithmeticians, does 
 the copy outftrip the original ? 
 
 Did or did not the bank lend to the public 2,000,000 
 in aflual fpecie, to depoiit for the public hock. If it 
 did, ignorant as we are of the other items of profit, its 
 enormity is fulficiently evinced. If it did not, the re- 
 public was defrauded in a variety of ways. 
 
 1. Had attual cafli been borrowed elfewhere and de- 
 pofited, the bank might have extended its bufinefs, to 
 the increafe of the profits, of which the public would 
 have received a fifth part ; whereas 60,000 dollars are 
 now annually paid for no advantage, four-fifths of 
 which are divided among the private fubferibers. 
 
 2. The credit of the bank refts upon the credit of 
 the republic, as to 7,500,000 dollars of certificate 
 flock, and whilfl individuals are depofiting the credit 
 of the republic for three-fourths of their fubferiptions, 
 the republic is prohibited from depofiting her own cre- 
 dit, for any proportion of hers. 
 
 3. Further, although the credit of the bank refts up- 
 on the credit of the government, yet the government 
 is made to borrow 2,000,000 of bank credit, which 
 itfelf eredled, fuftains and can annihilate, and for thefe 
 nothings, to pay annually 60,000 fomethings. When 
 this is done upon an affertion, “ that the credit of the 
 bank is necefifary to fupport the credit of the nation,” 
 precifely the reverfe of the truth, may it not be 
 pronounced, that there is verity in the charge, “ that 
 the public good is facrificed to this inflitution.” 
 
 4. But that which carries the impoficion to the moft 
 extravagant degree, is, that the public (if the bank did 
 not lend aclua! cafh) pays interefl for the credit of 
 the bank, whilfl the bank pays none, for the monc'j of 
 the public. The fecretary reported, that on the ill of 
 
L 7 2 ] 
 
 January 1793, 1,2 29, <517 dollars 20 cents, of public 
 money, in the bank of the United States, exclusive of 
 614,^93 dollars 2 cents, which he reported to be due 
 for bills drawn for foreign loans, negociated by that 
 bank ; and exclufive of 158,778 dollars 25 cents, de- 
 pofited in other banks. And on that day the public 
 was paying intereft to the bank of the United States for 
 2,400,000 dollars. 
 
 If the bank advanced this large fum to the public in 
 aftual cafli, whilft it was hourly lending to individuals 
 a!fo, it muft either have been drained of its cafh, or its 
 profits muft have exceeded imagination ; it is therefore 
 probable, that it was- difeounting from the ufe of the 
 1.229,517 dollars 20 cents of public money, whilft it 
 was receiving intereft of the public. If it lent only 
 2;OCO.oeo of credit, and laid out the 2,000,000 of cafh 
 which it ought to have lent in certificates, and depofi- 
 ted the certificates as a fund upon which to circulate 
 paper, what would be the annual gain upon the fame 
 2,000,000 ? Anfwer. 60,000 dollars intereft for the 
 credit lent, 6o,oco for the certificates bought, and 
 t 20.000 for 4,000,000 of paper circulated on the de- 
 polit. Excluding the idea of certificates, eighteen per 
 centum per annum is paid. The refources of no body 
 muft be very great. I acknowledge that one fifth of 
 thefe gains conftitute an article of thofe refources. 
 
 Let the fact be either way, the enormity of the im- 
 pofition is evinced by lefs than a moiety of the items. 
 Suppofe we had the reft P It is not furprifing, that 
 the public, thought one fifth owners of the machine, 
 are allowed no directors. For what would come of it, 
 if the v. hole fecret was known ? 
 
 And this is a contrivance for creating “ >1 attive ca- 
 pita!.” It is indeed an appofire expreftion. In activity 
 it is a perpetual motion, collecting wealth for an arifto- 
 cracy, and impoverifliing all other claffes of the com- 
 munity. IIow does the filching annually an enormous 
 
 2 
 
[ 73 ] 
 
 fum from their capitals, to conditute. annual dividends 
 for a few rich individuals, and to erect an incorporated 
 monger, fecretly and condantly ingulphing real proper- 
 ty, and national refources, in the abyfs of perpetuity, 
 favour agriculture, commerce or manufactures ? 
 
 It would be better for the community, if fuch con- 
 tributions were thrown into the fea. Though the pro- 
 perty would be loll, liberty would be preferved. Now 
 its wealth foders its natural enemy, whild the general 
 welfare is impoverilhed, and the common drength, dif- 
 abled. The finew of defence is transfering to thofe, 
 from whom we have molt caufe to fear offence. And 
 the dud of a few new terms, interfperfed with the jargon 
 of a fyflcm, whofe principle is perplexity, and whofe 
 defign, is treachery, is expelled to hide from the public 
 view, the ambufeade which lurks behind. 
 
 The bank having the monopoly of the bulk of the 
 circulating medium, may occafionally increafe or dimi- 
 nilh the quantity. It may diminilh the quantity, thus 
 enhance its value, and purchafe with its own paper, cer- 
 tificates or other property, which are depreciated, in 
 the fame proportion, as the medium is appretiated. 
 It may then increafe the quantity of this circulating me- 
 dium, leffen its value, appretiate certificates or other 
 property of courfe, and then fell a portion of the fame 
 certificates or other property, to take in the paper which 
 the whole cod. If the law prohibiting this incorpora- 
 ted traffic in certificates , could even difeover the faft, 
 yet the traffic would dill have open to it, the endlcfs 
 lid of whatever is valuable. And the individual mem- 
 bers are not even nominally redrained. 
 
 This is a compleat commercial defpotifm. Every mer- 
 chant is fc ired beyond the reach of government, and 
 yet the bank can ruin almod any merchant, without 
 even a power in government to fave him. A refpefta- 
 ble clafs of citizens, are thus cajoled by a few of its mem- 
 
 L 
 
I 
 
C 74 ] . 
 
 bers, who enjoy Tome exclufive fruits from the contri- 
 vance, into an approbation of the mod unreflrained fpe- 
 cies of indirect and fecret power over their property ; 
 whilft the fame men would fpurn at the fame thing, if 
 exhibited in a fimple incorporated fociety, for enriching 
 or impoverifhing, whomfoever it might pleafe the direc- 
 tors. Honefty, induftry, and pun&uality, are no lon- 
 ger a fecurity for fuccefs. Profit is to be made by fu- 
 perior cunning and intrigue in finding out bank fecrets. 
 The profits of trade will no longer be an honourable 
 compenfation, for fupplying the mutual wants of diftant 
 nations. They will confifl: chiefly of mean pilferings 
 from our next neighbours. The reputable and ufeful 
 fociety of merchants, will dwindle into adifhonefi: aflo- 
 ciation of fpecularors, for tricking each other, as well 
 as the whole community, of their money, by a trade 
 in ideas. 
 
 The circulating medium is the foul and food of com- 
 merce. A corporation, pofiefling a pow r er over the 
 loul, can animate, or annihilate the body at pleafure. 
 By with-holding its food, they may flarve commerce ; 
 by glutting it, they may produce a mercantile pletho- < 
 ra. A foreknowledge of thefe efFeCts, is an unlimited 
 power of taxation. In a civilized fociety, the circula- 
 ting medium, is alfo the foul of agriculture., arts and 
 manufactures. All the faculties of the nation are fub- 
 je£t to the regimen of an incorporated quackery, in- 
 llead of purfuing a natural impulfe, in fearch of their 
 own fubfiflence. If the phvfician was honefl:,' yet an 
 artificial regimen in a ft ate of health, produces debility, 
 and haflens diiTolution ; but Tthen his fees depend on 
 the irregularity of his preferiptions, and when he is a 
 mere Hiccius Doccius of a fellow, he will foon deftroy • 
 the founded: conllitution. 
 
 A monopoly of the circulating medium, is an uni- 
 verfal power of embargo, over trade, agriculture, and 
 manufactures, depofited in the hands of a few private 
 
L 75 1 
 
 citizens. In what place does the conftitution contem- 
 plate fuch a power, and if the place can be found, 
 why does it fo cautioufly devife checks retraining go- 
 vernment' within certain limits, whilft this power, fo 
 greatly tranfcending any right devolved upon govern- 
 ment itfelf, is left uncontrolled? 
 
 Suppofe a monopoly of gold was bellowed on one 
 corporation — of filver on another — of the Englifh and 
 French trades on others ; proceeding to parcel out all 
 the branches of trade, agriculture, arts, and almoll 
 fciences, among fo many limilar minifterial contri- 
 vances. It might enrich the members of the feveral 
 corporations, but the public would exclaim, trade is 
 ruined — the national happinefs is deftroyed. And yet 
 fuch a fyftem would be more juft than the bank contri- 
 vance, in being more general — in producing fome little 
 competition — and in being lefs an engine of political 
 defigns and legiflative corruption. The monopoly of 
 the circulating medium involves a monopoly of all thefe 
 objedls. The bank has a flulla of trumps, with palm, 
 the knave, at their head, which loos the reft of the 
 community ; and if it does not fcize the whole ftake at 
 one grafp, it is on account of the obvious impolicy of 
 deftroying the hen which lays the golden eggs. 
 
 The little fpecie left by the fyftem in circulation, is 
 only a kind of fmall change, or a fort of permiflive 
 bank alms, as it pays them no tax, and is too inconfi- 
 derable in its amount, to impugn a fingle important ef- 
 fefl, flowing from the monopoly of the circulating me- 
 dium. 
 
 The calamities of the laft war, refulting from the 
 banidiment of fpecie by a paper medium, were proba- 
 bly equivalent to thofe produced by the fword. The 
 banking contrivances are rapidly reducing us again, to 
 the fame ruinous and raiferable fituarion. 
 
[ 7 « ] 
 
 SECTION XIV. — The same subject continued. 
 
 T H E tax paid to the bank as inevitably falls upon 
 labour ultimately, as the import does ; nor has 
 labour in either cafe the fmalleft chance of exerting any 
 degree of volition ; it can only exert its induftry, to 
 pay a debt impofed upon it by law, which it muft ne- 
 ceflarily difcharge. 
 
 The whole grofs value of the exports from the Uni- 
 ted States, for twelve months previous to October 
 1791, was 17,371,551 dollars. This was the produft 
 of labour, exclufive of its food. And out of this a- 
 mount muft be deduced the freight, commiflions, 
 clothing, tools, liquors, and other necefiaries, which 
 it muft pay for. Conjecture that an annual profit is 
 made by labour beyond its annual needs, even of 
 8,000,000. One days profit requires four day’s work. 
 Taking thefe data, and narrowing the profit of the 
 bank down to itsfimple annual dividend, labour muft 
 toil at leaft forty-nine days in each year to raife the di- 
 vidend of the bank of the United States, amounting to 
 800,000 dollars. And if the profits of all the banks 
 amount to 2,000,000 annually, labour muft toil ninety- 
 one days every year to pay them. Recoiled that the 
 prefent annual expenditure of the nation, intereft, and 
 the expences of government included, exceeds 5,000,000 
 of dollars, and then confidcrthe prefent ftate of labour. 
 Suppofe a law was propofed, a neceffary effeCt of 
 which would be, that a few rich men fliould work 
 ninety-one days in the year for the reft of the commu- 
 nity. Both the oppreftion and the gain would be in- 
 finitely contracted. But the principle would remain 
 unchanged, though the cafe would be altered greatly 
 for the better. If the profit made by labour extended 
 even to 10,000,000 annually, the bank of the United 
 States would be receiving eight per centum annually, in 
 its dividends only, out of this profit. And if the capj- 
 
L 77 2 
 
 tals of this, and the other banks, extend to 17,371,551 
 dollars, and their dividends amount to eight per centum 
 upon an average, then labour pays that enormous iute- 
 reft to banks, upon the grofs amount of her exports. 
 Buf if we add to the dividends, every other item of 
 profit, and allow the community a maintenance, it is 
 within bounds to conjecture, that forty per centum up- 
 on her nett profit, is annually paid by the community to 
 the feveral banks. 
 
 And what compenfation do the banks make to the 
 community for thofe enormous gains and exclufive privi- 
 leges ? Have they made a bufhel of wheat or a horn 
 tooth comb ? ACtual fpecie is but a reprefenraiive of 
 real wealth. But it is equivalent thereto, becaufe it can 
 transfer real wealth to us from a foreign nation ; where- 
 as bank paper can neither increafe our exports^ or pay 
 for our imports, fince its currency is local. The bank 
 is therefore an incorporation of finecures, quartered 
 upon labour, and may be jultly ftiled, the Irilh eftablilli- 
 ment of America. 
 
 Debt is fervice or labour, and fervice or labour is 
 flavery. And fo is flavery defined in the fourth fec- 
 tion of the conflitution. For money being the repre- 
 fentative oflabour, and the only medium by which debt 
 can be paid, the creditor is in faCt the mailer of the 
 debtor, for the quantum of fervice or labour, nectf- 
 fary to difcharge that debt. If fo, the United States 
 are by the bank contrivances, placed precifeiy in the 
 fituation of a Have, who has purchafed of his mailer 
 about four day’s freedom in each week j becaufe lor 
 more than one day in each week, they owe fervice to 
 the bank of the United States, and for about tw'o days, 
 to the feveral banks no\v operating. How improperly 
 then do we fpeak ? Inftcad of faying, “ the bank of the 
 United States,” it would be more proper to fay, the 
 United States of the bank,” 
 

 
 
[ 78 ] 
 
 And the law enacts that weihall be the United States 
 of the bank for twenty years. During fo long a leafe 
 without impeachment of wafte, the tenant will either 
 ruin the eflate, or provide for the purchafe in fee. If 
 the product of the eflate, and not its improvement, had 
 mot been the object, wherefore were other tenants ex- 
 cluded ? This wife exclufion of partners in fpoiling the 
 nation, evinces the truth of the line of argument I have 
 adopted by dil'clofing the defign of the contrivance. 
 
 The law of primogeniture and firft fruits is revived. 
 The bank is the firfl born of legiflation, with an intail 
 for 20 years, and more than a chance for the reverfion 
 in fee. Or it is rather an heir apparent, in pofifefiipn 
 of the regency, on account of the parent’s idiocy. 
 
 A pretence of rendering fome compenfation to the 
 community, for its pre-eminent powers, and exorbitant 
 acquilitions, was neceffary to lull enquiry into a coraa- 
 tofe flate. And therefore it is alleged that the inflitu- 
 tion enables merchants to extend commerce, to give 
 better prices for commodities, and to encourage indu- 
 flry. And England is reforted to, as an example pro- 
 ving thefe allegations. 
 
 Merchants are brokers, honourable and ufeful, whilfl 
 adhering to a heady line of commerce, and fupplying 
 the wants of a nation ; but pernicious and dangerous, 
 whilfl fpeculating indiferiminately on foes and friends for 
 the acquilition of wealth, and afpiring to exclufive pre- 
 vileges and prerogatives. 
 
 They are of a clafs unproductive, and therefore if ca- 
 pitals are to be raifed at the public expence, it would 
 be more beneficial to commerce, to beflowthem on agri- 
 culture or manufactures, which alone create the real 
 fund for an extenfion of commerce, for the purpofe of 
 enabling them to make lading and productive improve- 
 ments. Taking from the productive clafs therefore, to 
 
■5 
 
[ 79 3 
 
 beftotf upon the unproductive is inverting the courfe of 
 nature, when an extenfion of commerce is the objeCt. 
 
 A reaction of thefe capitals as an incitement to indu- 
 ftry, cannot be a permanent effect from a bank. The 
 quantity of paper which can be circulated, is limited by 
 the national ability to pay for it, and the employment it 
 can find. Specie is liable to the latter limit only, and 
 therefore more fpecie than paper, can find employment 
 in a nation, becaufe for fpecie there is nothing to pay. 
 If a member of the commercial world, poflefles fpecie 
 fufficient for its oceafions, and banks are eftablifhed 
 which emit paper equal in amount to this fpecie, the 
 latter mud depart for want of employment. If more pa- 
 per is emited, a momentary and unnatural fpur may be 
 given to induftry, at the commencement of the operati- 
 on ; but it would be fleeting and tranfitory, for the in- 
 leant the true level of circulating medium has regulated 
 itfelf, things at beft, would fubfide to their ufual courfe. 
 But they will fink lower, becaufe the community having 
 exchanged fpecie for paper, hath loll a long firing of 
 advantages poflefled by the former over the latter ; and 
 becaufe worfied as it is in numberlefs ways by the ex- 
 change, labour will moreover be burthened with an in- 
 terefi of fix per centum on the amount of the circulating 
 paper, whereas the national labour paid nothing for fpe- 
 cie. How compleatly is fucha community jockeyed ? 
 
 Again. Lq/iing improvements can never be produced 
 by bank contrivances, on account of the rapidity with 
 which bank paper, whilfi it is alive, is pafled from hand 
 to hand. Lading and productive improvements in ma- 
 nufactures and agriculture, require the ufe cf a capital 
 for feveral years, becaufe profit from labour flows in 
 flowly. And fuch capitals our banks never furnifh. 
 The contrivance is only adapted for fudden fpeculati- 
 ons ; to favour a quick and rapid fitcceflion of good 
 bargains ; and to enable the bank to gain compound en- 
 tered:, by renewing its paper three or four times a year. 
 
r *° j 
 
 The medium for fuch a traffic being local alio, the 
 gain refulting from it mull not only be filched from citi- 
 zens, but inftead of producing, it muft obdruefc lading 
 improvements, and difeourage, by impoverifliing, in- 
 dustry. And merchants, from an honourable profef- 
 fion, will be converted in a fet of ^contemptible gam- 
 blers. 
 
 Suppofe two or three large dates, Mafiachufetts 
 and New-York, or Virginia and North Carolina, for 
 indance, ffiould dedroy banks, and inhibit the circula- 
 tion of all bank notes by making it felony ; would not 
 fuch dates become a refervoir for the fpecie of the uni- 
 on ? And would not the effects be. fo forely felt by the 
 fidcr dates, as fbon to dedroy tlie banking fydems 
 throughout the union ? The United States, as a mem- 
 ber of the commercial world, will fpeedily occupy a fi- 
 milai pre-eminent dat ion, over fider nations, by abo- 
 lifhing banks. For fpecie will ever flow, where it can 
 find emoicvment. 
 
 A -• 
 
 Tn lieu of this fydem is fubdituted a corporation of 
 rich men, podeffing a power of expelling the only uni- ( 
 verfal medium of commerce, of fubdituting a local me- 
 dium in its dead, having a monopoly of this local medi- 
 um, and thus compleatly enabled to regulate the price 
 of every fpecies of produce. The lower this produce 
 can be bought, the higher are their gains ; becaufe 
 thofe who buy bank paper at a premium, cannot pay the 
 premium, and mud ceafe to deal at the paper diop, un- 
 lefs they can fell it at a higher price than they gave. 
 The bank fells the commodity bv wholefale, and are 
 paid a wholefale profit. The dealers will then retail 
 it, getting an advance upon the whole fird cod, and 
 fmee the commodity will not do for tranfportation, the 
 nation as the only ccnfumers, pay this double profit. 
 Will the bank exert the power of regulating the price 
 of labour, for the purpofe of railing it ; and is a mono- 
 poly a good fubditute for a competition r Reflect. Can 
 
[ 8 . 3 
 
 .the bank caufe the price of produce or of paper, to 
 fluctuate ? What mult be the effect of this power ? and 
 compare the price of wheat in 1789, when there was a 
 partial and local Scarcity in France, with the price ot 
 the fame article in 1 792, when a general European lcar- 
 city and warfare united to enhance it. Not forgetting 
 that many of thefe contrivances, have been erected in 
 the interim. 
 
 'The truth is, that the price of our exports abroad, 
 arid not the banking operations at home, can only en- 
 hance their value. Out of that price mull be deduced, 
 freight, profit and commifiion; and to thefe deductions 
 are fuperadded the dividends and other profits of banks. 
 Will deductions raife the price ? 
 
 Mercantile or fpeculating people can only borrow of 
 the bank, becaufe of its fhort credit ; and to lend to o- 
 thers, fo as to aid lading improvements or encourage 
 indultry, is never a purpefe of thole who deal in bank 
 paper. In no Hate does the legal intered for money 
 exceed Jix per centum , and this intered mull be paid to 
 the bank ; therefore no perfon will borrow of the bank 
 to lend again, when he can gain nothing. In all dates, 
 where the legal intered is dill lower, a lofs would obvi- 
 oufly enfue. As would alfo be the cafe, wherever that 
 is the legal rate ; becaufe the bank, by calling in loans 
 feveral times a year, manages to gain more than Jix per 
 centum per annum, which being a fhift to evade, would 
 not in a private cafe be tolerated by, a datute of ufury. 
 Therefore bank paper is a proper medium for fudden 
 Jlrokcs at good bargains only. Thefe drokes fall upon 
 citizens only , and conditute a mode for the encourage- 
 ment of indudry, novel and incomprehenfible to thefe 
 who receive, but clear and confpicuous to thofe who 
 infli<d the droke. 
 
 Labour is burthened with a compound intered on 
 this bank medium, under the pretences of encouraging 
 indudry, and furnifliing a capital for improvement, 
 
 M 
 
r «j ] 
 
 which are obvioufly deceitful and fallacious. If labour 
 had received the loans of the bank, and had thus efca- 
 ped the gain which it pays to thofe who do, yet it mull 
 have paid the bank profits. The dividends are eight per 
 centum , exclufive of other great acquifitions before Ha- 
 ted. Can agriculture or manufa&ures afford to pay 
 fuch an interell for a capital ? The returns made by 
 lading improvements, bear no Cmiltude to thofe of fpe- 
 culating rogueries. Who will lend for the pilrpofe of 
 encouraging induftry, or to aid lading improvements, 
 at five per centum , when by inveding his money in bank 
 ftock, he will certainly gain above eight per centum ; 
 Private loans are thus annihilated, and no fubditute for 
 the attainment of fuch objefts propofed. A rate of 
 bank profit, exceeding the rate of legal intered, mull 
 draw the national money to this vortex of impofition. 
 
 Banks are money brokers, receiving exorbitant com- 
 miflions. A kind of treafurers of the whole circula- | 
 ting medium, receiving annually of the nation, among 
 whom it circulates, above fix per centum on its amount. 
 
 In lefs than feventeen years, they gain the intire total. 
 Enough to fupport at lead a feven years war, with 1 
 20,000 men condantly in the field. What an alarm- 
 ing idea ? Suppofe government and the bank fliould 
 coalefce, and form a treaty with fome foreign poten- 
 tate, to dedroy what they have already united to in- 
 fringe ? Are ufurpations more eafily corrected in a 
 date of maturity, than at their commencement ? 
 
 It is pleafant to obferve the dilemma to which Con- 
 grefs are reduced by the contrivance. The conftitu- 
 tion, in terms framed from a confideration of the mif- 
 chiefs heretofore produced by paper mediums, drives i 
 mod carefully to interdict them in future. In dealing 
 out power to Congrefs relative to a currency, it permits 
 that body “ to coin money ;** and in refraining the 
 power of the dates, it prohibits them from “ coining 
 money, emitting bills of credit , or making any thing a 
 
C 83 3 
 
 tender but gold and filvcr.” In not giving the power 
 of eflablilhing a paper currency to the one, and in ta- 
 king it exprefly from the other, the conllitution defign- 
 cd to fecure the focicty againfl the frauds and vices of 
 paper tricks. That a circulating paper medium of eve- 
 ry kind was intended to be inhibited, is obvious from 
 the diftin&ion, between fuch a medium, and making 
 any thing a tender. Both are feparately condemned ; 
 and the medium, though unaccompanied with the ten- 
 der, is exprefsly forbidden. The tender is indeed an 
 aggravation of that which is mifehievous without the 
 tender. The Hates being reHrained from eHabli thing 
 a paper currency, could not empower a corporation to 
 do it. They could not bellow, what they did not pof- 
 fefs. But, alas ! poor Congrefs ! having broken the 
 conllitution themfelves, they are obliged to wink upon 
 its flagrant breach by moll of the Hates, which have, 
 without any bad intention, followed their baneful ex- 
 ample. With grief mull Congrefs fuffer their twenty 
 years monopoly to be broken in upon, and fnacks of 
 the national plunder to fall to the lhare of rival corpo- 
 rations. It mull however be confefled, that the contell 
 is unequal, fince the good things redounding from the 
 public purfe, are exclufively enjoyed by the purfe bear- 
 ers. Had the Hates gone into the fyflem of tljeir own 
 head, and not as blind tranferibers of the example fet by 
 the higher powers, we fltould hive heard clamourings, 
 ■which could not now be uttered by a party of the cho- 
 rus. 
 
 Ignorant as we are of the efl'e&s of banking in Eng- 
 land, it is necefiary to take fomc notice of an example 
 quoted in favour of the contrivance. Bold aflertions 
 may be hazarded, when the proof is beyond our reach ; 
 and therefore the quotation. But if England may be 
 likened unto a feigniory poflelTed of profitable eilates, 
 pouring into its lap their products in conHant flreams 
 of wealth — if the riches of the EaH and Well-Indies roll 
 into her treafnry- — if Ihe is the tax gatherer of Ireland 
 
[ 34 ] 
 
 and Scotland — if (he fhares in the fifheries — if (he is al- 
 moft unrivalled in manufactures and unequalled in com- 
 merce — if her labouring clafs of citizens arc induffrious 
 and her foil exuberant, why is her prbfperity (if (he 
 profperous) attributed to her banking ctmtrifcmcfes.’ 
 Whilfl a glare of imaginary profperity is'painted by 
 terms, the offsprings of invention, to tempt the hation, 
 a produttivc caufe equally falfe is credited‘for it, r'd 
 miflead us. If effects, bearing a faint refembfahce, r TQ 
 the high colourings in which they are depicted’ do *(?*** 
 ift, they are accounted for by an unfeen fpcculatingln- 
 fluence, without reforting to a fragle obvious caufe. 
 
 On the contra ry, fuppofe we were to confider the 
 poor rates, and the rate of luxury in England, as the ex- 
 politors of hanking fchemes. Redundant wealth and 
 pinching want, would turn out to be the effects in par- 
 celling out the neceflaries of life ; and tyranny and 
 flavery the divifion they make, of what the)’ term, 
 fe civil rights.” Nothing could have deprived the Eng- 
 lifh (the nation not the court) of enjoying diffufively 
 their exclufive advantages, but a fyftem conftantly pil- 
 laging from labour, to aggrandize wealth. Unlefs,, 
 therefore, America is languifhing for a peafantry, 
 wretchedly poor, and an aviilocracy luxurioufly rich 
 and arrogantly proud, this Englifli precedent has been 
 unfortunately adduced, and more unfortunately pur- 
 fued. 
 
 But to conhder how the bank will afFeft liberty at its 
 extremities, when it hath (truck at its heart, by corrupt- 
 ing the lcgillature itfelf, is really iuperfluous. It is 
 therefore time to difmifs the fubject. 
 
 Subjoining, that the public wealth is pillaged to the 
 extent of the national ability, and that no food for fpe- 
 culation remains, except the public territory. 
 
 Ifthofe who have pledged this territory for the re- 
 demption of the debt, by legiflaircc faith , fhould now 
 
[ SJ } 
 
 pervert the arms and treaties of the nation, to the 
 breaking of this Faith, f($r the purpofe of acquiring ' 
 principalities' ’out of the national territory for them- - 
 laves- -If thofe who call themfelves federal, thou id '• 
 league with Indians and' foreigners, to remove the land ' 
 marks of union, and to revoke a fundamental ftipula- 
 tion for the .fecurity of independency itfelf, it would 
 both ’explode their profeiTions, and prove the juftr.efs * 
 of my arguments. 
 
 SECTION XV. — The put sen i state oe parties 
 
 CONSIDERED, 
 
 F ROM a collifion of parties' tnith'fi allies forth, and 
 the community is the great arbiter between them. 
 Parties are counfel on oppoiite iidcs, capable, by argu- 
 ment and reafoning, of enlightening, or by buffoonery, 
 fophifms and perplexity, of infuking the judge. A fong 
 in the place of an explanation, or farcical newfpaper 
 ebullitions, inftead of definitions and illuftrations, mu ft 
 awaken the idea of a merry Andrew, entertaining a mob 
 by his tricks and grimace, whilft his accomplices are 
 picking their pockets. 
 
 A party however muft fignifv, a confederation of in- 
 dividuals for the private and exclufivc benefit of them- 
 lelves, and not for the public good. If then the ob- 
 ject of this confederation is in conflict with the public 
 good, thofe who cppofe it, deferve rather the appella- 
 tion of “ a band of patriots,” than the epithet of 
 “ a party,” they are not contending for the benefit of 
 a part, but of the whole community. 
 
 It is of importance to the community to difeern, what 
 dntereft falls within this definition of a party, ami what 
 line of politics, as excluded by ir, is intitlcd to their con- 
 fidence, . 
 
[ S6 ] 
 
 And firft let us find out the delign of thofe who dif- 
 approve of the meafures of adminiftration. Are they 
 in fearch of loaves and fiflies ? If fo, let the community 
 demand, what thofe loaves are ? The poffeffors of them 
 can bell tell. Legal falaries of office are too mo- 
 derate to conftitute an objeefc for avarice, or to be a 
 fund for thofe enormous acquifition«, which have not 
 efcaped the eye of America. Is the favour of admi- 
 niftration lucrative, or in any mode beneficial ? Tell us, 
 in what way, and to what extent, ye who know, that 
 we may dilcern the undue felfiffi influence, operating 
 upon thofe who complain of its meafures. 
 
 If the government is already a government of loaves 
 and fiflies, then the neceffity of an immediate reforma- 
 tion is admitted, becaufe time fanttifies abufes ; if not, 
 the motives which a&uate thofe who are driving to 
 prevent its becoming fo, mud be pure and patriotic. 
 
 The bank, ’tis alferted, is uRconftitutional — that it 
 is a burthenfome and fraudulent tax — that it impove- 
 rilhes all daffies of the community, except a fele&ed 
 few — that itfubverts the principles of reprefentation — 
 and that udth other meafures of adminiftration, it pro- 
 ceeds unerringly and infallibly to ariftocracy and mo- 
 narchy. Now what exclujive intereft can a party, fou- 
 thern or northern, compounded of States or indivi- 
 duals, have in defeating fuch defigns ? There is no dif- 
 ficulty in difeerning au intereft of immenfe magnitude , 
 and of an exclujive nature , refiding in a party, for fup- 
 porting a contrivance, of fo gainful a nature. 
 
 Can a majority of the people of a fingle ftate, Maffa- 
 chufetts for inftance, be interefted in the fupport of mea- 
 fures, for amailing wealth in a few hands, and levelled 
 at the fundamental principles of civil liberty ? 
 
 The agricultural, profeffional, and mechanical inte- 
 j-efts of the community, at whatever point of the com. 
 
C 87 3 
 
 pnfs they refide, are fo obvioufly in the fame predica- 
 ment, that it is necefiary to difclofe the arts, by which, 
 they have been disunited. 
 
 1. Public abufes combine for mutual fupport, and 
 the greateft will be'fele&ed as the patron of the reft. 
 Hence not only ftock-holders themfelves, but public 
 officers who wifh for higher falaries — paper men and 
 lpeculators, who will gain by an increafe of the public 
 debt, and by the diftipation of the finances — and all 
 who languifh after ariftocracy and monarchy, have en- 
 lifted under the aufpices of a chief. And hence the in- 
 duftrious and vociferous cry, in favour of the' meafures 
 of the adminiftration. A lift of dock and certificate 
 holders would explain it, to be the voice of private in- 
 tereft, and not of impartial approbation. 
 
 2. A parry will receive with open arms recruits of e- 
 very chara&er. Among others the old tories are raeft 
 cordially enlifted. They naturally fall to thofe, who 
 are gaining by intrigue, what they fought for in vain. 
 They are gratifying their paffions without any expence 
 to their principles. A vi&ory, after a defeat, is the 
 more pleafing, as being a retaliation. 
 
 3. In. this mod worfliipful fociery, an endeavour is 
 made to affociate the President. The affociates afiume 
 the chara&er of being the fupporters, of that which 
 they are undermining, becaufe they know his attach- 
 ment to the conftitution and good government. By 
 geting polfeflion of the fortrefs, whilft the commandant 
 is unfufpicious of the fraud, it will be more eafy to be- 
 tray it to an enemy, or fieze it for themfelves. They 
 ftile themfelves “ federalifts,” though it is obvious that 
 they difregard the conftitution, in its principles, as well 
 as letter. The artifice is ftale ; the Neros and Caligulas 
 of Rome, were perpetually vociferating the terms “ re- 
 public and republican,” long after the government 
 was defpotic. 
 

 
r as ] 
 
 4. Honed: men, when deceived, are the bell fuppor- 
 ters of knavery ; hence the party, by a demarcation 
 of fallacious intercds, is driving to convert tint cordial 
 union, which was founded in times of -didrefs — ce- 
 ment'ed bv mutual filterings, and fealed by compact, in- 
 to the mod inveterate enmity. And a concord of hearts, 
 •habits — and of intereft, which really exids between the 
 great bulk of the citizens of every dare, is the devoted 
 victimof machinations, defigned to enrich and aggrandize 
 a few. The aridocratic'al inrered is a kind of dying fqua- 
 dron, vvhofe object it is to divide the great mafs of the 
 peoo!e,by a geogr iphical line, and to cajole one divillon, 
 that it ntltv live at free quarter on the labour of both. 
 
 e. The party boad of the prefent fiouridung condi- 
 tion of our connttp , and aferibe it to their own politics. 
 
 Horsed v though devoid of nodefty, wouid have confef- 
 
 JO __ J' # 
 
 ftd, that peace,' iunuitrr, and an increafed population, 
 rather than paper contrivance*, were the real grounds 
 of national urofperiry. Caufes, which in many Euro- 
 pean countries, have fo far lurmountcd politital oppref- 
 ijons, as to exhibit a high degree of agricultural and 
 mechanical improvement. But by adducing an argu- 
 ment from a parallel between the prefent times, and 
 tiir.es oi wav, : t is contcllcd, that a fuffieient degree of 
 dmilitude exids to bear a companion. It is admitted, 
 that the community which is warring againft monarchy 
 and aridocracy, armed with paper only, docs indeed 
 occupy a fituation, preferable to a neceflity of fighting 
 againft the fame enemies, armed with the inftruments 
 of death . 
 
 6. The party call .themfidves the government, and 
 then de land of the public a confidence in the magiftra- 
 cy. I I d they demanded a critical invedigation of their 
 condttid, it would have been a better proof of integrity. 
 But faith, and not truth, is their political motto. King 
 crab, like religions edablifhed by law, fubditutes my- 
 dery in the place of knowledge. It depends, not upon 
 an enlightened conviction, but upon a blind idolatry. 
 

I 89 j 
 
 Confidence or faith, is nod clamourouflyinfided on, when 
 it is lead merited. Watchfulness , and not confidence, is 
 inculcated by the conditution. But if an uninformed 
 faith is dill demanded, let us know with precidion, how 
 far it is to go — how many arguments it ought to re- 
 fute — how many proofs it can fmother — and how much 
 mifchief it can judify. And the blinded faith may per- 
 haps difcover, that it is already time to open its eyes 
 and look about. 
 
 7. An unnatural alliance between dock and certifi- 
 cate holders has been eftefted ; unnatural fo far excep- 
 ted, as certificates are depofited as bank dock. By this 
 means a real debt is interwoven with an artificial debt. 
 A canditutional demand is linked in brotherhood, with 
 an unconditional contrivance. A jud claim upon the 
 public ability is rendered precarious, by burthening that 
 ability with an unjud and exorbitant tax. Real credi- 
 tors are decoyed into a belief, that the bed means of 
 fecuring themfelves, is to impofe on their debtor a debt 
 to a vad amount, founded upon fiction, but yet fecurcd 
 by a mortgage in die nature of a rent charge for twen- 
 ty years. Thofc who have the fecurity of the prefent 
 conditution, are feduced into meafures, fubverfive of 
 conditutional fanftions, and if they fucceed, they de- 
 ltroy their own fecurity. In fliort, a combination with 
 a party, whofe exidence is precarious, hath been pre- 
 ferred to an union with the whole community, whofe 
 will is law. 
 
 8. It is even pretended, that the community do not 
 feel their taxes ; and inferred, that not feeling they do 
 not pay them. A date of political apathy is mod dan- 
 gerous to liberty. If the community can only judge by 
 their feelings, it is better to bring them to their fenfi- 
 bility, through the medium of their underdandings, 
 than to leave them in fuch a date of dupefa&ion, until 
 their natural, as well as their political arteries, are pier- 
 ced by the goads of defpotifm. And if they are infenfi- 
 ble of the impod, becaufe it operates only on confu- 
 
 N 
 
[ 9^ * J 
 
 rricrs of imported articles ; yer they will certainly feel 
 the bank tax, which is mQreover an excife npon labour 
 in every article it produces. 
 
 9. A great merit is claimed by the ariftocracy, on 
 account of their being addicted to an, “ energetic .go- 
 vernment.” What latitude is concealed under this ge- 
 neral expreilion, cannot be difcoyered. Judging by 
 rite extent to which they have already puflied their ae- 
 figns, we may fairly conftrue it thus $ “ a power to fup- 
 prefs difcor.tent and commotion, excited by oppreflion, 
 and to fuftain the oppreflion.” For when did a go- 
 vernment want energy to do juftice, in times of peace 
 and profperity ? “ Submit quietly and peaceably to 
 
 to the bleflings of an energetic government,” is the 
 language of the king of Pruffia, whilft he is marching 
 an army into Poland, for the purpofes of plunder and 
 defpotifm. 
 
 When thefe arts are exploded, tliofe who by intrigue 
 and deception, have really formed themfelves into a pow- 
 erful party, will turn out by right and nature, to be a 
 mere junto, operating upon a whole fociety, for their 
 own felfifh purpofes. And however their leader, like a 
 young prince, may be flattered with the tongue of inte- 
 refl into a good opinion of himfelf ; and though his de- 
 pendants may at firfl: pafs him upon the world for pro- 
 digious parts and aftonifliing integrity ; yet manhood in 
 the one, and the eflefts of the other’s policy, will of- 
 ten unmalk the deception, and exhibit them as prodi- 
 gies of another fort. 
 
 Raiflng up an ariftocracy, and fevering the communi- 
 ty into the two orders of nobles and people, is provi- 
 ding a faftion to teize and torment the public mind, by 
 perpetual tricks and artifices, for appropriating to them- 
 felvcs the purfe and power of the nation. This fcheme 
 has operated, and is yet operating. The wealth alrea- 
 dy amafied by fpecious frauds, hath produced vifibly its 
 
C 9 1 1 
 
 natural effeCts, by corrupting thofe principles of mode- 
 ration and repablicanifm, which a-e the only pledge of 
 public liberty and private happinefs. 
 
 What can the people of any Hate gain by ariftocra- 
 tical and paper reprefentatives r Decency and cunning 
 in government, is the utmofl: poffible acquilition. Will 
 a foul be fo foolilh, as to trull in a band and furplice for 
 falvation, or a body lb infanef as to rely for health in a 
 full-bottomed wig ? And will a foul, a body, or a nati- 
 on be confoled by the reflexion, that it is dcllroyed J'e- 
 cundum artem. 
 
 And what can the author gain by fuccefs ? If he is 
 poor, what is his object ? If rich, what influences him ? 
 If he is an olRcer of government, will he gain prefer- 
 ment ? If nor, does he propofe to creel an cilice for 
 himfelf ? Does he favour national profulion ? Or is eco- 
 nomy the language of public rapacity ? Will deipo- 
 tifm contend for liberty, and legal equality ? Do his ar- 
 guments inlill him with a party, Hrugglingfor exclude 
 gains; or is he telling a falvation of which he can only 
 participate with the community in genera! ? Is he not 
 labouring to defend the ccnllitution againlt the moll 
 fatal attacks, and are not the remedies propofed of a 
 general, and not a local nature ? Whilll he deplores 
 his want of ability and information, equal to a talk, 
 which no one elfe hath undertaken, and folieirs a cor- 
 rection of his errors, he boldly aflerts, that he is actu- 
 ated by no unchalte deflgn, and that he has written in 
 the fpirit of truth. 
 
 An adminiflration without a maxim, would be like 
 a fhip without a rudder. From the effeCts of the con- 
 trivance, and not from its profeflions, is this governing 
 maxim to be collected. Of the following maxims l'cleCt 
 the moll appofite. “ Honefly is the bell policy ? Sim- 
 “ pliciry and knowledge preferve liberty. Divide and 
 conquer. A public debt is a public bleHing.” 
 
 CC 
 
r 9 2 ) 
 
 The model of Nebuchadnezzar’s image feems to be 
 the idol of adminifl ration ; but although the head was 
 of gold, and the feet of clay, let it be remembered, that 
 the clay contained a mixture of iron, and that one com- 
 mon cataftrophe humbled the gold itfelf to the duft. 
 
 The natural interefts, and the honed: politics of the 
 nation will unite, and prevent the erection of an image, 
 which all muff fall downwind worfhip. The attempt to 
 fet it up, violates the conftitution, and therefore fede- 
 j-alifm will be ftrenuous to defend its own work. And 
 even antifederalifm will join in the good caufe, fince 
 the principles it nrofcffes are alfo violated. The artifi- 
 ces of a party, foment a difunion between them, in or- 
 der to dupe and to ufe both. 
 
 
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