C- RANDALL 277 4 
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 #3*1 
 
 Duke University Libraries 
 
 Speech of Mr. J 
 Conf Pam 12mo #381 
 
 D c H073 l lfl3D 
 
SPEECH 
 
 Me, JOHNSON OF ARKANSAS, 
 
 IN THE 
 
 C. S. SEMTE, FEBRUARY 9th, 1864, 
 
 ON 
 
 THE BILL TO LIMIT AND DEFINE 
 
 THE 
 
 TERMS OF OFFICE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PRINCIPAL OFFICEBS OR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS. 
 
 RICHMOND: 
 
 JAMES E. GOODE, PRINTER. 
 
 1864. 
 
DUKE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 LIBRARY 
 
 Treasure 'Room 
 
/ ' -, I A 
 
 SPEECH. 
 
 Mr. President : 
 
 The bill under consideration proposes to enact — 
 
 " That the term of office of the secretary or principal officer of each 
 one of the several executive departments, shall be for the same period 
 of time as that of a member of the house of representatives, and shall 
 expire at the end of each congress of the Confederate States ; but that 
 the same officer may be renominated, and shall be competent, if con- 
 firmed, to occupy and to enjoy the rights and to discharge the duties of 
 said office for any number of terms." 
 
 There are those in the legislative and in the executive departments 
 of our government, whose opinions are justly entitled to great weight, 
 who contend that this bill is contrary to the constitution, and who avow 
 "the spirit of the constitution" as the rule of construction, by which 
 they attain this conclusion, though that instrument is itself silent. If 
 this be a sound and safe rule of construction, it remains for examina- 
 tion to determine whether, in this instance, it is well and justly applied. 
 
 The bill limits the term of office of a secretary to two years, and this 
 limitation involves a new appointment or a renomination, which in its 
 constitutional course must be submitted to the senate, where it may be 
 confirmed or rejected. This renomination, it is objected, creates an ac- 
 countability on the part of the secretary biennially to the senate, which is 
 a part of the legislative branch of the government ; and thus is in- 
 fringed, by a co-ordinate branch of government, the control of the pre- 
 sident over his cabinet officers. To say that an accountability is thus 
 created is not strictly correct. The officer renominated is not required 
 to render an account of his acts ; no penalty is inflicted or proposed to 
 be inflicted upon him. When his term has expired, he is out of office. 
 The action of the senate has no relation to the past. It relates exclu- 
 sively to the fitness and qualifications of the nominee for the duties of 
 the office in future ; and if the conduct and action of the officer during 
 a previous term is referred to by the senate, it is not by way of inflict- 
 ing any penalty, but it is referred to simply as the best means to form 
 their own judgment, so that they may discharge wisely their own duty 
 in regard Xo confirmation or rejection, and to this no objection can weil 
 be taken. 
 
 That the limitation of office infringes the control of the president 
 over his cabinet officer, where that control is sought to be exercised for 
 acy laudable or patriotic purpose, is not well founded. If the control 
 
 yibZHb 
 
is for purposes of usurpation, or is otherwise pernicious, destructive or 
 criminal, then all will agree that to that extent this control ought to be 
 abridged ; and any action producing that effect, we may feel assured, no 
 one will contend is an infringement, such as is embraced in the "spirit" 
 of the objection. To contend for a corrupt executive control by the 
 "spirit of the constitution," would pervert the constitutional intent and 
 would betray the spirit of the paid advocate employed by a criminal at 
 the bar, and not the candid debater and statesman, who seeks for truth 
 and prefers it to a meretricious victory. If the control is for a merito- 
 rious purpose, the president's power is ample to compel concurrence or 
 to remove the officer. 
 
 That this limitation can produce no other infringement of control, and 
 that it is not prohibited by the constitution, I cite as proofs the words 
 of the instrument itself, which declares in article 2, section 2, para- 
 graph 3, that 
 
 "The principal officer in each of the executive departments, and all 
 persons connected with the diplomatic service, may be removed from 
 office at the pleasure of the president." It will be seen by this that the 
 right of removal, which is the means of control by the president, is not 
 invaded. He can remove " at pleasure" the officer for two years as 
 well as the officer for life. The control is perfect for all laudable pur- 
 poses, and may be exercised daily and new officers appointed. The 
 secretary knows he is subject to it at any hour and for any cause, not 
 even excepting whim and caprice. For all wholesome purposes the con- 
 trol is even increased, for by force of the expiration of the term of 
 office, the president is compelled periodically, even though not so in- 
 clined, to pass his judgment upon the officer, and the officer must ever 
 look upon renomination as necessary by the president, before reconfirma- 
 tion by the senate can come in question ; and will ever feel that removal 
 is imminent, that he is specially subject to the president whilst a denial 
 of confirmation by the senate is remote and is dependent : first, upon 
 the expiration of the term of service ; and second, upon the will of the 
 president to renominate ; and thirdly, upon the authority of the presi- 
 dent, the strength of his party, the merit of the officer, and other causes 
 tending to influence the mind of the senate, and to render uncertain 
 any adverse decision. 
 
 It is not to be presumed that the senate will act factiously upon cabi- 
 net nominations. Experience of seventy years has not shown it to be 
 so. Mr. Hamilton says, speaking of the act of rejection by the senate : 
 "It can only be to make place for another nomination by himself, (the 
 president.) The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his 
 preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not pro- 
 bable that his nomination would often be overruled. The senate could 
 not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to another, to reject 
 the one proposed. They could not assure themselves that the person 
 they might wish would be brought forward by a second or any subse- 
 quent nomination. They could not be certain that a future nomination 
 would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them, and 
 as their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual re- 
 jected, and might seem to reflect upon the judgment of the president ; 
 
it is not likely their sanction would often be refused when there were 
 not special and strong reasons for the refusal." 
 
 Yet further in speaking of that power of the senate to confirm and 
 reject a nomination. Mr. Hamilton remarks, that " it would have a power- 
 ful though in general a silent operation. It would be an excellent check 
 upon a spirit of favoritism in the president, and would tend greatly to 
 prevent the appointment of unfit characters from state prejudice, from 
 family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popu- 
 larity.*' 
 
 The "powerful though in general silent" influence referred to, would 
 relate not only to the increased solicitude and thoughtful care of the 
 president in the selection of his officers, it would operate effectively upon 
 their energy and devotion to their duties when in office, and to their so- 
 licitude to discharge those duties satisfactorily, which constitutes the 
 Strength of a popular government, and to abate all gratuitous rudeness, 
 discourtesy or insulting exhibition of authority, which goes so far to 
 render a people unhappy and to cripple even the wisest and ablest ad- 
 ministration. Indeed, the arrogant, inflated, conceited, tyrannical and 
 unnecessarily insulting demeanor of our officers, civil as well as military, 
 humiliating and breaking the pride and spirit of our people, is universally 
 remarked. It is the evil of our day. and it exists in all executive cir- 
 cle-, even in the first circle of chief officers around the president. The 
 only remedy for it, of reasonable efficacy and of expanded influence, is 
 the example of those higher circles. To secure the heaven-born exam- 
 ple of patient courtesy from the highest functionaries, limit the cer- 
 tainty of their power. 
 
 Under the old constitution, the apprehension of the federal statesmen 
 was that the legislative would encroach upon the executive branch of the 
 government. It was not so however with the states' rights party < they 
 feared encroachment by the executive. Mr. Hamilton preferred a pre- 
 sident for life. His theory was overthroAvn in the convention. He 
 then defended the constitution as he found it, except that in accordance 
 with his original theory, fearing always a legislative encroachment, he 
 and his party spared no opportunity to denounce the danger of it, and 
 availed themselves of all means and at e\cry occasion, whether by the 
 enactment of measures, or by rules of construction upon uncertain or 
 doubtful clauses of the constitution of general significance, to fortify the 
 executive power and to strengthen the executive arm. These facts fur- 
 nish an important mean to the interpretation and proper estimate of 
 his vii 
 
 It is somewhat strange now, to look over the list of states' rights men 
 in and out of c who* join that party and who entertain the same 
 
 suspicions of encroachment by the legislative upon the executive branch 
 of government, who adopt the policy, if they do not take their in- 
 spiration from Alexander Hamilton, and who adopt the freedom of his 
 rule's of construction to achieve their unfortunate polic\', and that too 
 when the features of the two governments are so widely different that 
 it may be regarded as tpestionable to say the least, whether Mr. Ham- 
 ilton, an honest and conscientious statesman, if he were now here, 
 would not himself, as a lover of the liberty secured by representative 
 
6 
 
 government, have repudiated -his positions in the case of the United 
 States and contended for additional guards against the executive, now so 
 greatly strengthened and in favor of the legislative, now so seriously 
 weakened, in fact, as well as relatively. I will not compliment the dis- 
 tinguished apostles of Jefferson and Calhoun for this startling departure 
 in this hour of darkness, and I cannot confide in and cannot follow 
 them, though their pathway be illuminated by a great northern light. 
 Neither ought they to suppose that the great alterations which have 
 been made in our constitution will pass unobserved by our people, nor 
 that the votes and opinions, in which they indulge, are free from respon- 
 sibility, nor that these questions will not ultimately be presented and 
 submitted to the great liberty loving and conservative democratic heart 
 of the southern states. I will trust that I shall be able to show, in the 
 course of these remarks, that the careful and well tested balance hereto- 
 fore existing between these co-ordinate and coequal branches of the 
 government has been seriously disturbed and endangered ; though by no 
 means so well could I accomplish it as these sa,me eloquent and able 
 apostles, could they emancipate their minds from a most singular bewil- 
 derment as it plainly appears to my humble comprehension. 
 
 That any accountability for a mal-administration is created by this 
 bill, is denied ; that any interruption to the power of the president over 
 his ministers, to dismiss all that are refractory, and to surround again 
 his council board, as often as he pleases, with such only as are of his 
 own selection, is wdiolly untrue ; or that any influence is established in- 
 imical to the proper and useful control designed to be secured to the 
 president, or that* is calculated to override the wise object of the con- 
 stitution, which is to secure to the people the best possible administra- 
 tion, is without just and substantial foundation. 
 
 One- proposition, illustrating and expounding the operation of the bill 
 before us, is self-evident. It declares that a corrupt, tyrannical or in- 
 competent minister, or a great and unscrupulous ambitious statesman, 
 shall not be armed with great powers, and inaugurated with high office 
 and hold it for life. Those who oppose this bill would fasten this re- 
 sult, so repugnant to the first principles of free government, M upon our 
 constitution. 
 
 If there is any rule in government, which the freedom of man inex- 
 orable exacts, and which has been canonized by every philosopher, and 
 consecrated in every written code or constitution by every eminent law- 
 giver, it is that every office, which is the exponent, or is likely to be- 
 come such, of real power, shall be limited and restricted in duration 
 and extent. 
 
 If this bill establishes any control in Vne co-ordinate legislative 
 branch, it is subordinate wholly to that of the president, and can only 
 be with justice defined as being a healthy influence. It proposes only 
 a negative, and fixes only a limit of time beyond which, what the public 
 may condemn as incompetency, may cease to idiotize in office to the de- 
 triment of a nation, and tyranny and encroachment may cease to tram- 
 ple upon the laws, and haughtily to float in the faces of the people their 
 inflated official robes. Already, in the brief period of oiy national ex- 
 istence, we have had in some instances, in public judgment, too little 
 
capacity for the public good, with too much of conceit, insult and annoy- 
 ance for patient public endurance, united in all likelihood, as is natural 
 to such qualities, with a determined love for office and power, which 
 could alone be reached and cured by the rigid force of public law. 
 
 If the limitation upon the duration of a cabinet officer, as proposed 
 in this bill, does violence to the spirit of the constitution, then no limi- 
 tation can be imposed by law upon any other of the executive officers. 
 The constitution is silent as to the duration of office of all appointees of 
 the president. In paragraph 2 of section 2 of article 2, the constitu- 
 tion ordains that the president " shall nominate, and by and with the ad- 
 vice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors and other public 
 ministers, &c, &c, and all other officers of the Confederate States, 
 whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and tvhich 
 shall be established by law;" and in paragraph 3 of section 2 article 2, 
 it is declared that " the principal officers in each of the executive de- 
 partments, &c, may be removed from office at the pleasure of the presi- 
 dent. All other civil officers of the executive departments may be re- 
 moved at any time by the president," &c, for certain eau 
 
 The power is given to establish the offices of secretary of state, 
 treasury, war, &c, and the full power to affix and define all the duties 
 and elements requisite or usual, which enter into or constitute an office, 
 (and of which the length of term is one,) without other reservation or 
 limitation than the power of removal by the president. The constitu- 
 tion does not say that the secretary or other civil officers of the execu- 
 tive department shall hold office at the pleasure of the president ; but 
 it does say that the secretaries "may be removed at the pleasure," and 
 all others "at any time." To be removed "at pleasure" and to be re- 
 moved "at any time" is the same thing; and it seems a fair inference 
 if the legislative power establishing both classes cannot affix the con- 
 stituent of duration in one class, then it cannot in the other, and as the 
 constitution is silent except for removal, no limitation is lawful. 
 
 It may be argued in the case of the class of officers to be removed 
 " at any time," that the causes for the removal of that class have been 
 prescribed as "for incapacity, inefficiency," &c., and that a material 
 distinction is thus declared between them and that class which is re- 
 movable "at pleasure." This is certainly true in some particulars, and 
 it may not be improperly inferred from the specification of causes of 
 removal in one class, that it is made the duty of the president to remove 
 that class whenever such causes exist; and it maybe plausibly inferred 
 in those cases removable "at pleasure" and without cause, that the 
 question of removal is optional, however incapable or inefficient. Now,' 
 whether such retention in office be the result of misjudgment or other 
 cause, if incapacity or inefficiency do really exist, it is not the less un- 
 authorized and deplorable. But to infer as a distinction, that because 
 in the one class of officers the authority to remove requires a cause for 
 its exercise, and is thus made a duty, that it is different from the other 
 class and may be limited by congress ; whilst in the other class, which 
 is removable at pleasure and requires no cause, it is therefore sanctified 
 and consecrated to executive control, even to abuse, and is exalted 
 above the power of legislative limitation, would not seem to be logical- or 
 
8 
 
 plausible. The natural conclusion must be that the legislature, which 
 was specially empowered to create and establish both classes of offices, 
 can attach to each a restricted duration ; otherwise, our system is one 
 of office for life, of irresponsibility, and of a thousand despicable, egotis- 
 tical tyrants, distributed through all the -departments. 
 
 The questions involved are of a consequence neither minor nor tran- 
 sient — they are concurrent and coexistent with this government. 
 
 The able and invaluable report of the judiciary committee by the 
 chairman, (Mr. Semmes,) though too studiously condensed and too se- 
 verely retrenched, is filled with evidences of thorough research and in- 
 dustrious examination, and has brought to light many facts and much of 
 the constitutional learning so difficult to attain by the ordinary student. 
 He has discussed the subject with enlarged views, as well as a close logi- 
 cal reasoning, well calculated to remove all doubts from his theory of 
 the power and true intent of the constitution. Previous to the presen- 
 tation of that report, I awaited, I confess, with some anxiety and per- 
 haps apprehension, the results of discussion, knowing as I did, the 
 assured positiveness of the opponents of the bill upon constitutional 
 grounds. I am now satisfied, from the facts and history, precedents 
 and early opinions, constituting special learning in this connection, and 
 by the admirable argument of the senator, that there is no just founda- 
 tion of constitutional objection ; and if I am now engaged in continuing 
 this discussion, it is not that I feel it to be essential, but as the author 
 of the measure, I feel it to be my duty, however unwelcome the labor or 
 unpleasant the task. 
 
 If the opponents of the measure, who have resisted it so promptly 
 and confidently, are unable to demonstrate, even to palpability, their 
 constitutional moorings, they must abandon the contest. They are 
 patriots and republicans, and surely will not attempt to fasten upon us, 
 from any obligation less imposing than the constitution, a system so 
 odious to freemen as that by which all offices are to be held for life and 
 at the pleasure of all future chief magistrates. 
 
 If it be so determined, then we have made a fearful step backwards, 
 and it involves another revolution, which I do not hesitate to predict. 
 Neither can I believe that this act, after the constitutional objection is 
 given up, will be resisted by congress or the executive, on the ground 
 that the doctrine of life office is expedient even as to the heads of de- 
 partments. 
 
 Our affairs are the subject of too much anxious thought to hesitate to 
 speak the whole truth. Public confidence in the cabinet of the president 
 is shaken, and with many it is lost. The whole burden of this adminis- 
 tration rests on the president. Persistently now the public turns to him; 
 the expression is common that some of the cabinet are incapable for 
 more than mere clerks, and such is their proper sphere forneed of judge- 
 ment, foresight, and practical sense. The situation is one of evil promise 
 and of public anxiety, and it is proper that it be discussed. Upon the 
 president alone rests the whole weight of this administration, and through 
 him exists the bond of confidence with the people ; and unsupported as 
 he is, the public strictures, censure and reproach are passing by the in- 
 competent subordinates, where they are properly due, to be thrown in 
 
magazine at his doors. His strength among both the people and the 
 army is essential to our success. Yet we all know that these things are 
 undermining his strength, and we cannot in discharging our duty honest- 
 ly, hesitate to say them to him ; nor do I feel apprehension or doubt 
 that he has that magnanimity of soul which can prefer a candid opinion, 
 however unwelcome, if candidly and courteously, and not malevolently 
 expressed. 
 
 The difficulty with the cabinet demands a remedy ; it is great in its 
 influence and easily remedied. If they or any of them have lost the 
 coiffidcnce of the public, they ought to be subjected to some further 
 test. It cannot be, if rejected, that there are none others capable of 
 their places. If so subjected, those will be rejected only who ought to 
 be. But let them all be reconfirmed, at which I should not be surprised, 
 and it is not to be denied that such action will show to the public the 
 continued confidence of the senate, who have the best of all opportunities 
 to judge fully and wisely, and it will greatly stimulate them and strengthen 
 the government and confirm the public confidence. 
 
 This appeal to the " spirit of the constitution " is intended to defeat 
 the pending bill, and is to guarantee the inviolability of the cabinet offi- 
 cers — the highest officers in government next to the president ; and after 
 having enthralled them and declared them to be mere " tenants at ivM" 
 to confer upon them by decision of the whole congress, office for life 
 and immunity from all liability to lose it, by incompetency, dishonesty, 
 usurpation or other cause, except the whim or judgment of a partial 
 master. 
 
 It is fashionable whilst defending thia class, to depreciate their power 
 and importance. Nothing can be more mistaken or unjust. They are 
 now far more powerful than judges, senators or congressmen. In the 
 government of the United States, by George Washington's rules and 
 etiquette, they took precedence below the senate ; the extent of power, 
 the duration of office, the amount of salary, and the avidity with which 
 the position is sought by the. eminent talent of the country, enter inti- 
 mately into the title to rank and precedence. The rank was so decided. 
 But now in our government it has become a matter of serious doubt. 
 Our president holds for six years — our ministers for life, and they are 
 authorized to be admitted to the floors of congress with full voice in 
 debate. I sec them now, six in number, entering the senate with formal 
 air and ceremonious reserve, followed by their clerks with the official 
 portfolio, great rolls of records and red tape, and seating themselves in 
 selected seats specially provided, with their high salaried attendants by 
 their sides, and I see flitting around them an obsequious majority of the 
 senate ; and I see a senate subjugated and lost to its high place in the 
 government of the country. 
 
 After this conjunction of departments in the constitutional programme, 
 this official hybridity, there will be no question of precedence to be 
 justly entertained. The cabinet " life oligarchy " must rank next to 
 the president. The union of the executive with the legislative depart- 
 ments in the constitution, seems clearly designed, though not happily, 
 to reduce this government to the English system, and it is justly to be 
 feared that it has been overdone. The judiciary may have to protect 
 2 
 
10 
 
 the public rights, whilst the house of representatives, not only unaided, 
 but actually embarrassed by a stupifiecl and subjugated senate, may have 
 to rescue public liberty from a system far more despotic than the English. 
 There, the house of commons can turn out a ministry ; but here, never ! 
 
 The spirit of the constitution is invoked to confer office for life — upon 
 whom ? Upon the highest class of officers known to the government. 
 
 The secretaries have power, and a vast deal of it, legal and lawless. 
 They have far more than a judge or a member of the house or senate. 
 Their offices are sought for with avidity ; they are the high objects of 
 the ambition of our most eminent orators, legislators and statesmen. 
 They command the highest class of able statesmen and sharp-sighted 
 politicians. 
 
 It is not proper to invoke a spirit from the charter of liberty, to es- 
 tablish office for life upon this great and dangerous class of pensioners 
 u at the will of the president " They will soon become too strong for 
 subordination to law and the security of personal rights. It is impos- 
 sible the president can desire a system which will defeat his high objects 
 and damn his great labors. 
 
 The report of the committee, pp. 5 and 6, establishes in this connec- 
 tion an invaluable fact, to wit : " that the insertion of the removal clause 
 in our constitution, (par. 3, sec. 2, art. 2,) was intended to settle a grave 
 constitutional dispute as to the power of the president to remove an ex- 
 ecutive officer without the concurrence of the senate, as well as to 
 restrain him in the exercise of that power as to all the civil officers," 
 except the heads of departments and the diplomatic corps. But for this 
 explanation it might be inferred and would be argued, that the true 
 intent of the removal clause was not only to give to the president the 
 power of removal " at pleasure" and " at any time" but also to estab- 
 lish a personal control over all classes of his appointees so complete, as 
 that it should interdict to congress the right to limit the duration of an 
 executive officer. 
 
 If such exclusive control had been designed, it would have been de- 
 clared, and would not have been left to interpretation and inference. 
 By that clause the executive power of removal is placed beyond dispute, 
 but the legislative power to establish a term of years, as the official term 
 was not destroyed. The report of the committee has well remarked, 
 that " to create an office and to regulate its tenure is an exercise of 
 legislative power ; to remove an officer is an executive act." 
 
 It may be justly added, that the first and paramount " spirit of the 
 constitution" is that of limitation upon powers otherwise absolute in 
 character and unrestricted in duration. 
 
 The president shall be thirty-five years old, and can hold office but 
 for six years, and is not re-eligible. He is subjected to a number of 
 other conditions. 
 
 The vice-president may become president, and would seem to be sub- 
 ject to all the same restrictions and conditions. 
 
 The judges of the confederate courts are limited to "good behavior" 
 as the official term. 
 
 The senator shall be a citizen, shall be not less than thirty years old 7 
 and his official term, is six years. 
 
11 
 
 The representative shall be a citizen, not less than twenty-five years 
 old, and his official term is two years. 
 
 Upon other officers there is no limitation ; but it is to be remarked 
 that the constitution, whilst it authorizes, does not create any other 
 office. No other officers have existence, except at the discretion and by 
 the creation of the legislative power, and the legislative power is en- 
 dowed with all authority in clause 18, sec. 8, art. 1, and in clause 2, 
 sec. 2, art. 2, to create and establish the offices to be enjoyed, and is 
 invested with full and complete power, since no limit is prescribed, over 
 the duties, attributes and constituent features of such officers. There is 
 in fact no office created by the constitution, whose duty and powers are 
 essential to the system, and are defined, and whose existence is inde- 
 pendent of the legislative will, to which the constitution has not affixed 
 a specific duration with the exception of the judiciary, and in that case 
 the exception is expressly declared and is for manifest reasons. From 
 these facts, if it be not allowable to sa>, that the " spirit of the consti- 
 tution" requires that the duration of high offices shall be limited, it is 
 at least conclusive that the spirit of the constitution interposes no ob- 
 stacle to limitation, but leaves the question as one of policy to be de- 
 termined by the law making power. 
 
 Upon the conduct, management and business of this war alone, this 
 measure is of incalculable consequence in the new spirit and vigor it 
 will impart generally to the public serviee, whether it result in immedi- 
 ate change of any of its officers or not. But there is ground to appre- 
 hend that through all our future, the steady efficiency of the govern- 
 ment itself is involved, and that its powers and machinery have been 
 distured and lost balance through the instrumentality of constitutional 
 innovations, and that the tranquility of the country and happiness of 
 the people may be dependent for a check or guard upon this or some 
 kindred measure. Our constitution is not the same with that to which 
 we have been so long accustomed. It is believed to be far better ; but 
 it is certainly widely different, and to that extent is an experiment de- 
 manding thoughtful observation and carefully guarded administration. 
 The views here submitted upon those changes and amendments in our 
 constitution, are submitted with all humility, believing they may have at 
 least the merit of suggestiveness. That I have given any thought at 
 this time to these very serious questions and have risked its expression, 
 is the result of a determined will to remove as far as possible all ob- 
 stacles, and to enlist every power and every auspicious influence to the 
 promotion of our speedy triumph. 
 
 To this end it is believed that this measure is essential in order that 
 we may bring fresh energies, new thoughts and the highest efficiency to 
 the administration of any one of these departments, in which if we have 
 them not already, all must admit they are now of incalculable impor- 
 tance. 
 
 But as the opponents of this policy have seemed to rely almost en- 
 tirely on constitutional obstacles, (thus abandoning most unjustly for 
 some of the secretaries all claim to any superior efficiency of depart- 
 mental administration,) the friends of the measure are driven to the con- 
 sideration of those obstacles, and the constitution itself, rather than to 
 
12 
 
 that great immediate expediency which is enforced by the present emer- 
 gency. 
 
 The consideration, therefore, of the new and unsettled features of the 
 constitution, and their effects taken severally and collectively upon our 
 government, is wholly unavoidable ; not, however, that more than a 
 sketch is now pretended. Yet, in the course of it, a strong conviction 
 will arise with many, that there exists danger that our system of the dis- 
 tribution of powers has been unbalanced and that guards are needed to 
 be furnished from legislation to preserve the integrity of the government. 
 
 By some it is not believed that the convention which framed this con- 
 stitution, fully appreciated at the time the vast magnitude of the changes 
 made by them upon the old constitution, which had successfully with- 
 stood faction and fanaticism, and preserved its machinery, form, shape 
 and system over seventy years, or they would have thrown around those 
 innovations, by express provisions, additional guards. 
 
 The intent of the convention is apparent from its work. It was to 
 strike out an intermediate system of a government between those of 
 England and the United States — avoiding the monarchy and titled aris- 
 tocracy of the first, and the frequent recurring elections, factious con- 
 vulsions and restless instability of the last. The danger now is, not that 
 we shall fall into either of those systems, but into one that has vices 
 from which both the others have escaped, and under which we may be 
 most disastrously entrapped. 
 
 In the meanwhile, to preserve the constitution in its essential guaran- 
 tees of popular government until peace gives opportunity for a reform, 
 is a paramount object ; and to this end it is not to be forgotten, that as 
 this government shall have asserted either its powers or 'prerogatives and 
 have been trained to its work by the present executive, so is it likely to 
 continue in the hands of his successors, of whom we cannot always 
 expect the same unbounded patriotism or even the same self-denial and 
 .forbearance in its administration, as we can from him whose glory it 
 more especially is to be its author and ruling spirit. 
 
 His fame and influence hereafter must be counted and considered. 
 The birth of this republic, in the midst of the mighty throes which have 
 convulsed the continent and distressed a world, bounding at a leap across 
 dangers so fearful, full armed into the arena of nations, the unconquer- 
 able competitor, if not the equal of the greatest of the family — the crea- 
 tion of a great and independent nationality, in the face of such a war, 
 and in despite of the great wrongs of a treacherous and pusilanimous 
 neutrality on the part of an unfriendly world — the character of the 
 government itself — the prosperity, happiness and greatness of its people — 
 all will go to establish the rank of Jefferson Davis amongst the most 
 remarkable and renowned men of any age. Immaterial whether all 
 think he deserve it or not : no man of sense, after calmly reflecting, 
 will deny it. The overflowing confidence and affection of this people 
 will attend him through life. This will be the natural reward of great 
 and patriotic labors and painful responsibilities. Success will perfect 
 his title, and it will be sound and enduring. He alone can abridge or 
 enlarge this award of posterity, by his wisdom and statesmanship, or by 
 
His influence, then, upon the opinions of our people, and upon the 
 nature and machinery as well as policy of our government, will be al- 
 most certain to predominate. These facts he must recognize ; they re- 
 double his responsibilities, and require of him the wisdom of a great 
 statesman and self-denial of a great philosopher. As his co-laborers, 
 we are forced to recollect that his practice hereafter is to constitute pre- 
 cedent — his dictum, decision — his naked word is to assume the force of 
 solemn warrant. Errors originated, tolerated or cherished by him, will 
 fuse and consolidate in our system. Let us then be warned and ob- 
 servant. 
 
 Every guard ought to be secured during his term that is essential. No 
 one more readily than he will recognize these truths, and, as I believe, 
 sympathize with them. 
 
 After his term, no cardinal organic change even to abridge executive 
 license and impunity will be allowed by his successors, but through the 
 ordinary channel of violent party conflict; and to this obstacle to reform 
 is to be superadded that of a concurrence in sueh reform on the part of 
 our exaggerated state sovereignties. These state sovereignties arc new 
 and untried instruments of stubborn power. I look upon them in this 
 connection with great apprehension. When they shall be invoked in 
 conflict upon constitutional questions and a president shall head the;', 
 ral party in opposition to popular or states' rights element, which is 
 almost inevitable, it will rack this Confederacy sorely. 
 
 But far more ominous is it of our disaster when these sovereignties 
 shall have become usual elements in our ordinary political conflicts ; and 
 it is idle to hope that ambitious men will not lead them into it. 
 
 By the innovations in our constitution, the presidential office has been 
 greatly elevated. 
 
 To appoint each successor is to become an object of fearful struggle 
 between the incumbent, the state sovereignties and geographical sec- 
 tions it is to be feared. 
 
 But the Office will certainly increase in dignity and splendor with its 
 growth in power and duration, and with the freedom of the subordinates 
 from the checks and restrictions of law. 
 
 The government will assuredly shake off its respect for public interest 
 and popular opinion to the extent that it has been shorn of the hopes of 
 further promotion, and relieved of that dependence upon the people in- 
 volved in a re-election, whilst it is likely to be only the more resolved 
 to appoint its own successor. I will not say that the presidential office 
 has outgrown our system ; but I will say of our future history, that 
 every occupant after Jefferson Davis, will feel this growth and reflect it, 
 in the style, the manners and the ceremonies of the court, and ultimately 
 in the improvident and reckless administration of the government. 
 
 One proposition would seem to be plain, to wit : that it will not do to 
 surround this presidential office, as now constituted, with a cabinet com- 
 posing an oligarchy of the six most powerful officers of government, 
 who shall be attached as mere dependants, commissioned for life, re- 
 movable "at pleasure," with or without cause, and subjected to no check, 
 limitation or accountability, other than the judgment, the passion, the 
 
14 
 
 ambition or corruption of any and every man who may hereafter chance 
 to be elected to the office of president. 
 
 Heretofore our people have been accustomed to a plain style of living ; 
 to republican manners, and the unassuming simplicity of fraternity and 
 equality. But hereafter, if no guard, or check, or accountability shall 
 be interposed, the cabinet will become the government in fact, the presi- 
 dential court will become one of ceremony, extravagance, and regal 
 grandeur, and the lesser lights and satellites will rival that court in os- 
 tentation, expenditure and pretension, until finally their folly shall cor- 
 rupt public manners, threaten our political rights, and force the states 
 to reform the system. 
 
 The picture is an unpleasant one; but I feel no fear of injury to our 
 great cause, whether present or future, fiom this discussion. The sub- 
 ject, thank God, whilst this president lasts, is yet within our control, 
 and I hope and trust not only congress, but the guardians and thought- 
 ful men of our state governments will take up and consider the remedies 
 in due time, even to the extent of reforming the constitution in conven- 
 tion. 
 
 Our constitution enlarges the duration of the official term of a presi- 
 dent to six years, and limits the eligibility to one term, 
 
 The United States' constitution restricts the official term to four years, 
 and allows without limit his re-eligibility. He may be re-elected any 
 number of terms. 
 
 By our constitution, when once installed^ our president has attained 
 the summit of honor — he has filled the measure of his glory. He can 
 indulge no further legitimate ambition of place and power. He has 
 nothing more to ask for or to hope. His ambition is fired — it is not 
 quenched. He becomes independent of popular opinion ; he may tread 
 it under foot as he pleases, (and we all know the frailty of man;) he may 
 labor hard and patriotically, or selfishly, or perfidiously in the adminis- 
 tration of the government, or he may turn it over to his prime minister 
 and devote himself to a life of luxury and enjoyment, or to the pageantry, 
 magnificence, extravagance and ceremonial of a great court. It is a 
 most inviting style of life both to the gentlemen and the Jadies, and it 
 lasts for all of six years. How long will it be before some president 
 will adopt all this ease, stylo and dignity, and, like other potentates, 
 conduct his government by his prime minister and his principal officers 
 of executive departments ? Why should the president not do so ? Our 
 system invites him to repose. He is wholly independent. He has 
 labored a life-time to win the prize ; why encounter six more long years 
 of increased trouble and perplexity ? He is cut off from re-election. 
 He is independent of the love and the hatred of the people. Why not 
 enjoy it ? And when once this example is set, our political institutions 
 will have undergone a radical change. 
 
 He who does not perceive that this is a possible and even probable 
 result of the innovation upon the presidential tenure, has a credulous 
 nature or a shallow knowledge of human kind. The forecast would 
 suggest timely guards. 
 
 Not to consume time, I will barely refer to what must be familiar, by 
 
15 
 
 way of illustration, as showing the tendency of power to imperial rules, 
 princely forms, and courtly style and manners. I will but refer to our 
 days of purest men and patriots — to the period of the administrations 
 of George Washington and John Adams — times when we would least 
 expect it. The style of those courts was repugnant to the people, and 
 their tendency more and more to forms, style and assumptions monar- 
 chial, until the opposition and elevation of Mr. Jefferson annihilated the 
 whole courtly fabric, and established a republican simplicity which pre- 
 vails to the present day. But this occurred when the purest patriots 
 governed and the purest politicians lived, and when the president could 
 hold but for four years, and when he was capable of re-election for any 
 number of terms, and actually desired the re-election, and was thus all 
 the while responsible to the love or hatred of the people, and dependent 
 on their voice of praise or censure — dependent on their votes. It can- 
 not be difficult to foresee the difference in results, now that we have a 
 ruler for six years, instead of four, incapable of re-election, disconnected 
 and wholly independent of the people. 
 
 When the first president shall have thrown from his shoulders the 
 cares of state, it will be upon one or two of his favorite secretaries, and 
 this will then be a different system of government. The results will 
 probably be satisfactory at first. The vices of a system rarely ever ap- 
 pear at the hands of its authors — rarely ever develop at the outset. 
 
 But it may be safely concluded, that with rare exceptions, every pre- 
 sident elected afterwards will accept the office, regarding it as a settled 
 feature, that it is his right to labor at the duties of government when 
 and as much or as little as he may please, and to assign such part of 
 them, or all, as he may determine, to whomsoever may be his favorite 
 secretary or head of a department. The government will then change. 
 The people will elect the president, who will elect the ruler, and the 
 ruler will be independent of the people, and of all other branches of 
 government, and for life, if congress wills it. 
 
 That such a transfer or assignment of the duties and the powers of 
 administration is to be the result, there are many other reasons and 
 causes naturally arising under the particular innovation now under con- 
 sideration, to which time, and perhaps your patience, will not allow 
 present reference ; but a reference must be had to a few of the more 
 prominent, and particularly to those causes and influences, the result of 
 other innovations bearing upon the postulate of the transfer by the 
 president of the duties of administration to cabinet officers, which, it is 
 believed, will be decisive in their effect to bring out that result. 
 
 Not only have we the extension of the presidential term to six years — 
 the inhibition of re- eligibility after that term — the latitudinary con- 
 struction of the constitution to the effect that the duration of the tenure 
 of cabinet executive officers shall not be prescribed by congress — and 
 its corollary that the duration of the tenure of all the subordinate ex- 
 ecutive officers is placed beyond legislative limitation — and its true, but 
 secondary result, the hidden meaning, to wit : that in the hands of the 
 president rests the appointing power to all executive officers, and the 
 power of removal at pleasure, to wit : of perpetuation in office at pleas- 
 ure and for life, since there is to be no other legitimate method of 
 
16 
 
 limiting the duration, thus rendering hiiii the fountain of all office, and 
 if he be an ambitious and corrupt man, thus rendering subservient to 
 him and his designs, whatever they may be, the whole, or as many as he 
 may wish to use of the entire official corps, civil and militaiy, of the 
 Confederacy. Not only have we all this in the enlargement of the ex- 
 ecutive power, but, as if it were not enough, we have still another inno- 
 vation of overwhelming magnitude, provided in the 2d clause of the 6th 
 section of the 1st article, where it is declared that "congress may by 
 law grant to the principal officer in each of the executive departments 
 a seat upon the floor of either house of congress, with the privilege of 
 discussing any measures appertaining to his department." 
 
 These ministers have not yet taken their seats in congress. But every 
 man of common sense knows that the time must and will come when they 
 will take their seats on both floors of congress. Many ^causes will serve 
 to produce it — the personal supremacy of some great orator— the great 
 wisdom of some profound statesman, or public benefactor — high party 
 excitement still more likely — love of change — spirit of experimental- 
 ism — even a legislative freak — ma*ny motives, causes, influences and 
 casualties can, and some will concur, to seat first upon one and then 
 both floors of congress the whole executive cabinet corps. 
 
 To any one familiar with, and experienced in legislative proceedings, 
 the stupendous power of this provision to control, direct and shape 
 legislation is evident at once. To make it manifest in its vast and al- 
 most incalculable proportions and influences, is a task worthy of the .pen 
 of Madison, Hamilton or Jefferson, and is impossible to one of less ca- 
 pacity. -I shall therefore be content if I can only effect a faint con- 
 ception ; I could not hope to do more. 
 
 I am aware of the ruling argument in its favor, I believe ; but I will 
 leave to its friends to state it. It is plausible, and under some circum- 
 stances it would enable a legislative body, if filled with men of such 
 transcendent powers and rigorous nature and dominating character as 
 Mr. Clay, Mr. Benton, Mr. Calhoun, and perhaps only a few more who 
 have lived in our history, te crush or to purify a corrupt administration. 
 But such men are rare, and even they could not triumph if confronted 
 with their equals in the elements of state craft and personal ascendancy. 
 
 It is the Trojan horse; the outer wall established in the old constitu- 
 tion was torn down by the Montgomery convention, and it only remains 
 for congress, in some thoughtless mood of unguarded confidence or cre- 
 dulity, to introduce it in the city ; it is filled with armed men ; the city 
 will be betrayed, its gates thrown open, and congress, the citadel of 
 liberty and popular good government, may fall beneath the false and 
 perfidious legislation which will be planned by the* mbitious and cor- 
 rupt, and enacted under the influence of eloquence over the weak, threats 
 on the timid, bribes to the corrupt, and the unnumbered agencies which 
 personal association aiid a seat in the same legislative body will always 
 confer upon the man who holds the great executive powers, augmented 
 by personal ascendancy and greater intellect. The judiciary can be 
 crippled by legislation ; the congress can be made subservient — can 
 prostitute its powers, or indirectly destroy them; the executive can be 
 invested with every power requisite to tyranny and ambition, and all 
 
17 
 
 without violating a letter of the constitution. Those who make, or con- 
 strue, or execute the laws, and who have reasonable experience in legis- 
 lative and executive political life, know how easy of accomplishment are 
 these propositions. 
 
 The experience of several thousand years, during which we are fur- 
 nished by history with somewhat of the efforts and experiments by all 
 nations, upon all classes of government, all serve but to show that re- 
 publics have been the least stable, and that if there be any one system 
 of liberty and self-government capable of permanent success, it is that 
 which is based upon a guarded system of representation and a practical 
 distinct subdivision and separation of the powers, executive, legislative 
 and judicial. Yet our constitution has jumbled together the executive 
 and legislative departments. If it shall be allowed to be consummated, 
 I do not hesitate to assert, that it will prove in our system, which is so 
 different from that of the English, to which alone i nee made to 
 
 justify the innovation, it will prove to be a deadly blow at the equality, 
 the purity, and the independence jof the legislative department. 
 
 This innovation has n ated the Executive upon the floors of the 
 
 Senate and House, where he is authorized to use official, social and per- 
 sonal influences, to utter his persuasions, or to denounce his fiat ; but 
 it has proposed to place his reserve corps upon their sacred floors, the 
 six highest executive officers of government, his instruments holding at 
 pleasure, to represent him and " to do his pleasure;" agents far more 
 able and effective certainly upon this theatre, than he would be, and se- 
 lected with that view. 
 
 This innovation has created an OLIGARCHY, and hedged around with 
 them a master, and not the people's president. The sj . es us an 
 
 oligarchy's president, and a president's oligarchy. I feel myself on 
 the highway to humiliation, whenever my duty forces me to call on one 
 oligarch. Though to do justice by the system of oligarchs, I feel my- 
 self honored and proud of the respect and friendship of some other 
 ''oligarchs;" for to be an "oligarch" is not essentially to cease to be a 
 faithful officer and a courteous, proper gentleman. 
 
 This innovation has created a corps of official hybrids — neither execu- 
 tive nor legislative — but both. Official hybridity and hybridous oligar- 
 chy, and oligarchal democracy : it is a rare, representative, republican, 
 constitutional spawning. There is a genius in the conception ; there is 
 originality in or about the cabinet institution, or there was about the 
 constitutional profundity of hatching; so anomalous and vigorous the 
 hybridous, long-lived constitutions of this extreme oligarchical circle. 
 
 I did not expect this brood to be declared by old state's rights repub- 
 licans of any party, under any rule of construction, to be a life office 
 oligarchy. It must greatly elevate the dignity, power and seductive- 
 ness of the commission. A leadership in congress few men would ex- 
 change for the silent though ever so inflated honors of a cabinet. But 
 as if to furnish the " il habet," the last blow to congress, a cabinet ; 
 is made by this mongrel feature to insure a membership and ship 
 
 not in one but in both houses of congress, in addition to all the other 
 great powers and distinctions, and that, too, for life, if the oligarchy 
 and their life office subordinates, their official tools, can only elect the 
 
18 
 
 successive presidents. This will enable every president, always, with 
 honorable bid, to enlist in the cabinet council, and to recruit from the 
 halls of senate and house all the evident individual ascendancy that is 
 developed in either, and that might otherwise prefer patriotic opposition 
 to official subserviency. 
 
 But I am warned by the length of this address that it is proper to 
 conclude. 
 
 I cannot do so however without stating that there are other most ma- 
 terial considerations I would desire to present, and yet I presume they 
 will be better presented by others ; and particularly the enquiry as to 
 the character and extent and explicitness of the confirmation of these 
 cabinet officers, and the proper language of their commissions in obe- 
 dience thereto. It is a matter of just enquiry now. 
 
 But above all, I regret that I cannot now, though I may hereafter take 
 occasion, to enter the broad field of the immediate expediency of this 
 measure. Exclusive of the fact, that the administration of the govern- 
 ment can never leave the president and go into the hands of unelected 
 and irresponsible departmental officers, if this bill is enacted, besides 
 other great and most weighty considerations, which I am not now able 
 to sum up, in connection with the justice, wisdom and purity of govern- 
 ment. Yet all may safely conclude, that if the offices of the ministry 
 shall periodically expire, it will at least result in that, which of all 
 others is by far the most desirable at present, in constant and faithful 
 labor in office, and in the utmost energy and efficiency. 
 
 In conclusion, I may say that I have seen indications of a disposition, 
 to regard this measure as a party movement, and perhaps extending so 
 far even as to indicate a disposition on the part of its opponents to force 
 it to that result. If this be so, I say nothing yet as to what would seem 
 to be the prompting motive ; but I will say, that so far as* I am con- 
 cerned, such suspicion, if really entertained, is unfounded ; and any such 
 charge, if really made, is false. I regard these innovations on the presi- 
 dential tenure, and the cabinet institution, as now construed in and un- 
 der our constitution, as being defective and the weakest part of our sys- 
 tem ; and I do not believe that all the powers and talent of this cabinet 
 are faithfully exerted, nor that the essential spur is yet applied to 
 force it. 
 
 But as to this being an opposition party movement, whilst I cannot 
 be a follower of any cabinet officer, or other subordinate, that I be- 
 lieve either unfit or incompetent, I am free to say that I desired and 
 sought frankly to converse with the president beforehand on this matter, 
 but had to give it up, and trust to his sound and discriminating judg- 
 ment to read me and my motives truly : and also to say, that whilst this 
 war lasts, it is not possible I can be driven to sympathize with any party 
 opposition organization. 
 
 With President Davis, the salvation of the country and the establish- 
 ment of a durable and efficient republican government, I am satisfied, 
 is the one all engrossing and superlative desire. The motive is the 
 same with many who are connected with him in their public duties, and 
 they (myself of the number) may not always pursue that course, which 
 would most entirely conform to what would be consistent either with 
 
19 
 
 his judgment or feeling. And for one, I cannot, so long as my judg- 
 ment shall be able, with reasonable strength of conviction to direct me, 
 I will not, "seeing the right, still the wrong pursue." 
 
Date Due 
 
pewruLiffc* 
 
 P H8.5