Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/bluegray01gilb PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL EDITION The BLUE and GRAY A HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS DURING LEE S INVASION and BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG r : * jSBil C Containing Complete Roster of the Two Armies Replete with Incidents and Maps BEING FOR THE MOST PART CONTRIBUTIONS BY UNION AND CONFEDERATE OFFICERS CONDENSED AND ARRANGED FOR POPULAR READING By Prof. J. AVarren Gilbert Copyrighted, May, 1922, by Prof. J. 'Warren Gilbert qvv T m,?3H I '(jf<53 Table of Contents Page. Introduction 5 The Army of the Potomac, and the Army of Northern Virginia 7 Confederate Plans 14 Movement of the Armies Before the Battle of Gettysburg 22 Cavalry Engagement at Brandy Station 24 Capture of Winchester 25 Concentration of the Confederate Army Near the Potomac River 30 Cavalry Engagements in the Loudon Valley, Va 30 Confederates Advance from the Potomac 32 Concentration of the Union Army at Frederick, Md 34 Position of the Armies on the Night of June 30th 39 First Day’s Battle, by Gen. Doubleday 44 Meeting of Barlow and Gordon, by Capt. T. J. Mackey, C. S. A 52 The Hero of Gettysburg 57 Battlefield of July 2nd and 3rd 58 Federal Position on the Morning of July 2nd 60 Change of Front of the 3rd Corps July 2nd 63 Second Day’s Battle, by Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles 67 Struggle for Round Top, by Maj.-Gen. E. M. Laws, C. S. A 70 Attack at Peach Orchard and Wheatfield, by Maj.-Gen. Kershaw, C. S. A 74 Second Day’s Battle, by Maj.-Gen. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. A 79 Fighting on Little Round Top, by Adj. Farley, 140th N. Y. Regt 85 Third Day’s Battle 88 Artillery Duel, by Maj.-Gen. Hunt, U. S. A 94 Pickett ’s Charge and Artillery Fighting, by Gen. Alexander, C. S. A 96 Story of the Grand Charge, by Lieut. -Gen. Longstreet, C. S. A 103 Repelling Lee’s Last Blow, by Lieut. -Col. Rice 105 Cavalry Operations on the Right, July 2nd and 3rd, 1863 109 Confederate Cavalry — The Cavalry Battlefield 110 The Cavalry Battle, July 3, 1863 112 Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge, by Capt. Parson, 1st Vt. Cav. Regt 113 Lee After the Battle, by Brig. -Gen. Imboden, C. S .A 116 Lee’s Army on Retreat 119 Meade’s Army in Pursuit 120 Soldier’s National Cemetery — Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address 123 Gettysburg National Park 125 Lieutenant Hemenway’s Account of the March to Gettysburg 126 Romantic and Pathetic Incidents 127 The Romance of the Heroine and the Martyr 136 The great Battles of the Civil War 145 Roster of the Army of the Potomac 146 Roster of the Army of Northern Virginia 159 List of Illustrations Page. Marsh Creek Bridge, Bailroad Cut 2 Chambersburg Boad, Gettysburg in 18G3 2 Meade and his Commanders 8-10-12 Lee and his Commanders 16-18 Statues of Gen. Meade, Hancock, Beynolds, Sedgwick and Slocum 26 East and West Confederate Avenues, Va. State Monument 35 Lee’s Hq’ts. — Whitworth Guns — Conft. Tablets— 2nd Md. Mon 35 Meade’s Hq’ts. — Meade’s Council of War — Meade and Hancock 38 Hancock Ave. Showing the Angle and High Water Mark 38 Death of Gen. Beynolds — Fighting at the Peach Orchard 42 Charge of Penna. Beserves — Hancock Assuming Charge 42 Sgt. Crippen Befuses to Surrender the Flag 50 Portraits of Barlow, U. S. A., and Gordon, C. S. A 52 Lousiana Tigers Storming Cemetery Hill— Attack at McPherson’s Barn 55 11th Corps Sallying — Betreat of 1st and 11th Corps 55 John Burn’s Home — Portrait and Statue 57 Dead on the Battlefield and at Trostle’s House and Barn 61 Spangler’s Spring — Devil’s Den — Gen. Warren at Signal Station 66 Lieut. Wilkeson ’s Battery in an Exposed Position 69 Charge of the 1st Minnesota — Attack at Devil ’s Den 72 Charge of the 1st Mass. Begt. — Fighting on Little Bound Top 72 Incident of the Battle — Whirlpool of the Wheatfield 82 Conf. Driven from Culp’s Hill — Steuart’s Brig. Attack on Culp’s Hill 82 Culp ’s Hill — Little Bound Top — Wheatfield — Cemetery Hill 87 Battlefield from Big Bound Top — Wright Ave. 44th N. Y. Mon 87 Union Artillery in Action — Pickett Taking Orders to Charge 100 Lee Viewing Pickett’s Charge — Cushing’s Last Shot — High Water Mark 100 Panorama View of Pickett ’s Charge — Armistead Crosses Stone Wall 100 Saber Fighting July 3rd — Gregg’s and Stuart’s Cav. Charge Ill Charge of 1st Mich. Begt. — Farnsworth’s Cavalry Charge Ill Betreat of Lee’s Army After Gettysburg — Monterey Gap 118 Lee’s Wagons in the Mud — The Pontoon Bridges 118 Soldier’s National Cemetery 122 Begimental Monuments 124-125 Caring for the Confederate Wounded 128 Hummiston Children 132 The Jennie Wade House 136 Theological Seminary — Gettysburg College 138 Father Corby’s Benediction 141 Maps Outline Map of the Campaign 23 Operations of the Cavalry During the Invasion 31 Position of the Troops July 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 1863 47-62-89 I F any reader, taking up his morning newspaper, should learn that on the preceding day, somewhere in our country, a great calamity had destroyed more than 4,000 lives, the news would certainly sadden him all day. And if the next day he should read a repetition of the story, with some change of locality, and the next, he would surely wish to be told the cause of all that destruction of life — who was responsible for it, and to what result it was tending. In the great Battle of Gettysburg, the average destruction of life was more than 4,000 a day, for three days, July 1st, 2nd and 3rd, 1863; 200,000 men were called to the field; the thea- tre of conflict covered twenty-five square miles ; and there were sufficient im- portance to have a name in history producing effect that reached well nigh around the world, and perhaps determine the cause of civilization and industrial development more than any other event of modern times. Its cause was watched with eager interest and widely varying emotions and wishes by the most diverse classes and powers. European capitalists heard the thunder of the guns at Gettysburg, whether viewed in its picturesque and dramatic aspect or with reference to its influence on the civilized world. Not only was the absurdity of slavery in a republic brought to an end, hut the efficiency of volunteer armies was demon- strated, and some principles of international law were brought to a settlement. Several able writers have recorded or discussed this piece of history in various styles, from different points of view. Some have concerned themselves only with the military movements and problems. Some have shown a predetermination to make one participant the hero of the story, some another. Some write for the sole purpose of bringing out the truth, others for the purpose of distorting or reversing it. While some have given their closest attention to the political problems involved. The object of the present work is to present the essential facts, as accurately and vividly as possible, so that the reader may clearly understand the story, as to how the battle was conducted, what it cost in life, suffering and treasure; also why it ended as it did. If these lessons are thoroughly learned by the rising generation, the knowledge should go far to prevent 5 1 6 THE BLUE AND GRAY any repetition of the sorrowful experiences; if they are neglected or mis- learned through inadequate or erroneous representation, who can answer for the future. Nothing has been so fully or so accurately illustrated, being arranged in such relation as to bring you face to face with the actual scene of the Battle of Gettysburg. A RETROSPECT. In the annals of warfare the Battle of Gettysburg is fitly termed 1 ‘ The Greatest Conflict of Modern Times. ’ ’ History does not record its equal in magnitude, desperation, valor and human slaughter, nor in the vast interests which were decided by the result. The Civil War, beginning at Sumter and ending at Appomattox, found its turning- point at Gettysburg. General Longstreet* writing a description of the battle in 1886, says: “For myself, I felt that our last hope was gone, and that now it was only a question of time with us. ’ ’ Gettysburg was founded by James Gettys, in 1780; was made the seat of Adams County in 1800, and was incorporated in 1807. At the time of the battle in 1863, its population was about 2,000, while its present population is about 6,000. And were it not for the memorials erected to commemorate the scenes of strife and carnage during the long and sultry days that the tide of battle swept through and around this little quiet village, the visitor would little suspect that here had been fought the most decisive and sanguinary battle of the Bebellion. Thousands joined the great majority during the battle, and many thousands more died from injuries received on those eventful days. Prof. J. Warren Gilbert, Author, Guide and Lecturer. ♦Names of all Confederate officers are in Italic type. The Army of the Potomac, and the Army of Northern Virginia VIPETENT historians as well as the highest military authorities concede that the skill displayed in the Pennsylvania campaign in the year 1863, by both the commanders of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Army of the Potomac, has never been sur- passed in any other campaign in the annals of mili- tary history; and it may as truthfully be said, that no other great military movement involved conse- quences so momentous and far-reaching as did that one. With a view, then, to give the reader a clear understanding of this great crisis in that terrible struggle in which not only the destiny of the government was at stake, but the higher and greater problem whether a “Government of the People, by the People, and for the People’ ’ was at all practicable. Before proceeding, however, to the narration of these events, it will be necessary to have a correct understanding of the organization and strength of the two armies, the design and purpose of the invasion, and the relative positions they occupied when the movement began. These may be stated thus : Number of the Forces in the Pennsylvania Campaign. The Army of the Potomac. As constituted in the Gettysburg Campaign, was composed mainly of the forces which operated with General McClellan on the Peninsula, and General Pope, in Northern Virginia. These two armies were united in September, 1862, and together took part in the battles of Antietam, Md., September 17th, 1862, under General McClellan; Fredericksburg, Va., De- cember 13th, 1862, under General Burnside, and at Chancellorsville, Va., May lst-3rd, 1863, under General Hooker. The Battle of Gettysburg was fought under still another commander, Major-General George G. Meade. The army was organized info army corps, two corps of the artillery reserve were united to form a grand division. General Hooker abolished the grand division, and reorganized both the artillery and cavalry. Of the seven corps which now formed the army, the 2nd, 3rd, 5tli and 6th, had been with McClellan on the Peninsula; the 1st, 11th and 12th, had formed Pope’s Army of Virginia. To each corps was assigned a brigade of artillery. The normal strength of a brigade was five batteries of six guns each, or 30 guns. The actual number of guns with the army, not counting those with the cavalry, was 320. Of the guns of the corps artillery, one- 7 BATTLE OP GETTYSBURG 9 half were three inch rifles, the other half were twelve pound Napoleon smooth bore. Of the guns of the artillery reserve, eight were four and one-half inch siege rifles (which however did not reach the battlefield of Gettysburg), two were howitzers and the remainder were three-inch rifles and twelve-pound Napoleons in equal number. The cavalry after General Pleasonton was placed in command was re- organized a few days before the Battle of Gettysburg. Stahel’s division was transferred from the Department of Washington to the Army of the Potomac, and became the third division of the cavalry corps. General Kilpatrick was placed in command of this division, which was reorganized into two brigades and General Custer and General Farnsworth were pro- moted to command them. To the cavalry corps were attached two brigades of artillery, each having five batteries of six 3-inch rifles. There has been a disposition by nearly all historians upon both sides, to magnify the strength of the opposing army, as well as to understate that of their own. At the opening of the campaign on May 31st, 1863, the strength of the seven army corps, the cavalry corps and the artillery reserve was: Seven infantry corps 86,690 Cavalry corps 10,192 Artillery reserve 3,898 Total 100,780 June 30th, 1863, the strength of the Army of the Potomac for duty equipped: Infantry 77,208 Cavalry 14,973 Artillery reserve 3,898 Cavalry with army corps 258 Stannard’s Vermont infantry brigade (estimated) joined evening July 2nd 2,000 Lockwood’s Maryland infantry brigade (estimated) joined evening July 2nd 1,500 Total 99,837 Present for duty not equipped, not stated. Of the infantry all the organizations were on the field or in its immediate vicinity on July 3rd. Of the cavalry, not more than five of the eight brigades were on the field at any one time. All the artillery was on the field July 3rd, except two batteries of siege guns. — ( W . R. No. 40, pp. 574-651.) Before reaching the field, the Union Army lost an unknown number through sickness and stragglers. This number was probably large as the army marched rapidly for several days before the battle in rainy weather and in the heat of the latter days of June. As the march was in a friendly country, the Union stragglers were in no danger of capture as were those of the Confederate Army .” — ( Battles and Leaders, Vol. 4, p. 421.) General Meade, in his testimony before the Congressional Committee on the conduct of the war, states the strength of his army as “a little under 100,000 men.” This BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 11 being reliable, is, of course decisive, and establishes the number of men in the Army of the Potomac in the Pennsylvania campaign. This army was organized as follows: Major-General George G. Meade, Commander-in-Chief * STAFF. Major-General Daniel Butterfield, Chief of Staff. Major-General D. W. Flagler, Chief Ordnance Officer. Major-General Alfred Pleasonton, Chief of Cavalry. Major-General Henry J. Hunt, Chief of Artillery. Major-General G. K. Warren, Chief of Engineers. Brigadier-General M. R. Patrick, Provost Marshal-General. Brigadier-General Seth Williams, Adjutant-General. Brigadier-General Edmund Schriver, Inspector-General. Brigadier-General Rufus Ingalls, Quartermaster-General. Colonel Henry F. Clark, Chief of Commissary of Subsistence. Major Jonathan Litterman, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Dept. Captain L. B. Norton, Chief Signal Officer. The infantry force of the army was as follows: First Corps. — Maj.-Gen. John Fulton Reynolds, commander. His division com- manders were: Brig. -Gen. James S. Wadsworth, 1st division; Brig. -Gen. John C. Robinson, 2nd division; Maj.-Gen. Abner Doubleday, 3rd division. The brigades were commanded respectively by Brig. -Gen. Solomon Meredith, Brig. -Gen. Lysander Cutler, Brig.-Gen. Gabriel Paul, Brig. -Gen. Henry Baxter, Brig. -Gen. Thomas A. Rowley, Col. Roy Stone and Brig.-Gen. Geo. J. Stannard. The first two to the 1st division, the next two to the 2nd, and the last three to the 3rd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Col. Chas. S. Wainwright. Second Corps. — Maj.-Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, commander.t The division commanders were Brig.-Gen. John C. Caldwell, 1st division; Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon, 2nd division; Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays, 3rd division. The brigades were com- manded by Col. Edward E. Cross, Col. Patrick Kelly, Brig.-Gen. S. K. Zook, Col. John R. Brooks, Brig.-Gen. Wm. Harrow, Brig.-Gen. Alexander S. Webb, Col. Norman J. Hall, Col. Samuel S. Carroll, Col. Thomas A. Smyth and Col. Geo. L. Willard. The first four to the 1st division, the next three to the 2nd and the last three to the 3rd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Capt. J. G. Hazard. Third Corps. — Maj.-Gen. Daniel E. Sickles, commander.^ The division command- ers were: Maj.-Gen. David Birney, 1st division; Brig.-Gen. Andrew A. Humphrey, 2nd division. The brigades were commanded by Brig.-Gen. C. K. Graham, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Ward, Col. P. R. De Trobriand, Brig.-Gen. Joseph B. Carr, Col. Wm. R. Brewster and Col. Geo. C. Burling. The first three to the 1st division and the last three to the 2nd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Capt. Geo. E. Randolph. Fifth Corps. — Maj.-Gen. Geo. Sykes, commander.§ The division commanders were: Brig.-Gen. James Barnes, 1st division; Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres, 2nd division, and Brig.-Gen. S. Wiley Crawford, 3rd division. The brigades were com- manded by Col. W. S. Tilton, Col. J. B. Sweitzer, Col. Strong Vincent, Col. Hannibal Day, Col. Sidney Burbank, Col. S. H. Weed, Col. Wm. MeCandless and Col. Joseph W. Fisher. The first three to the 1st division, the next three to the 2nd, and the last two to the 3rd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Capt. A. P. Martin. The first and 2nd brigades of the 2nd division were composed of U. S. Regulars, and the third division was composed of Pennsylvania Reserves. *Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker was in command of the Army of the Potomac up to Sunday, June 28th, 1863, and on this day, for causes which will hereafter be stated, resigned that position while on the march to Gettysburg, and was succeeded by Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade. tThe 2nd corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. D. N. Couch until June 9th, 1863, when in order to prepare for the reception of the threatened invasion of Pennsylvania, he was placed in command of the Department of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, and Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock succeeded to the command of this corps. JAt the commencement of the Pennsylvania campaign, Maj.-Gen. D. B. Birney was tem- porarily in command of the 3rd corps, but General Sickles resumed command on Sunday, June 28. §Major-General Meade was in command of the 5th corps until Sunday, June 28th, when he was made commander-in-chief, and the command of this corps was given to General Sykes. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 13 Sixth Corps. — Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, commander. The division commanders were: Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright, 1st division; Brig. -Gen. A. P. Howe, 2nd division, and Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton, 3rd division. The brigades were commanded by Brig.- Gen. A. T. A. Torbert, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell, Col. L. A. Grant, Brig.-Gen. T. A. Neill, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler, Col. H. L. Eustis and Col. David I. Nevin. The first three to the 1st division, the next two to the 2nd, and the last three to the 3rd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Col. C. H. Tompkins. Eleventh Corps. — Maj.-Gen. Oliver 0. How r ard, commander. The division com- manders were Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow, 1st division; Brig.-Gen. A. Von Steinwehr, 2nd division, and Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, 3rd division. The brigades were commanded by Col. Leopold Von Gilsa, Brig.-Gen. Adelbert Ames, Col. C. R. Coster, Col. Orlando Smith, Brig.-Gen. A. Scliimmelfennig,* and Col. Wm. Krzyzanowski. The first two to the 1st division, the next two to the 2nd, and the last three to the 3rd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Maj. Thomas W. Osborn. Twelfth Corps. — Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum, t commander. The division com- manders were Brig.-Gen. Thomas H. Ruger, 1st division and Brig.-Gen. John W. Geary, 2nd division. The brigades were commanded by Col. Archibald L. McDougall, Brig.- Gen. Henry H. Lockwood, Col. Silas Colgrove, Col. Chas. Candy, Col. G. A. Cobham, Jr. (Kane), and Brig.-Gen. Geo. S. Greene. The first three to the 1st division, and the next three to the 2nd. The artillery brigade attached to this corps was commanded by Lieut. Edward D. Muhlenberg. The cavalry corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. The division commanders were: Brig.-Gen. John Buford, 1st division; Brig.-Gen. D. McM. Gregg, 2nd division, and Brig.-Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, 3rd division. The first, second and reserve brigades of the 1st division were commanded by Col. Wm. Gamble, Col. Thomas C. Devin and Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt. The three brigades of the 2nd division were commanded by Col. J. B. McIntosh, Col. Pennock Huey and Col. J. Irvin Gregg ; and the two brigades of the 3rd division were commanded by Brig.-Gen. E. J. Farnsworth and Brig.-Gen. Geo. A. Custer. The first brigade of Horse Artillery with the cavalry, was commanded by Col. James M. Robertson. The reserve artillery, of which there were five brigades, was commanded by Brig.-Gen. R. O. Tyler. The brigades were commanded by Col. D. R. Ransom, first regular brigade, Col. F. McGilvery, first vol. brigade; Col. E. D. Tafe, second vol. brigade, Capt. J. F. Huntington, third vol. brigade, and Capt. R. H. Fitzhugh, fourth vol. brigade. Comparison. — Lieut.-Col. G. J. Fieberger, U. S. M. A., author of “Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg,” says, that if the organization of the two armies is studied, it will appear that the Confederate Army was superior in all respects save numbers and equipment. General Lee had commanded an army in five separate campaigns, and in more than twice as many important battles. General Hooker had com- manded in but one campaign and battle, and General Meade was to be in supreme command only three days before he fought his first battle. General Lee had the absolute confidence of his superiors and was free to operate as he saw fit. Both officers and men of his army were confident of success under his guidance, and he had confidence in the ability and *Gen. Von Schimmelfennig, himself mixed up with the retreating forces July 1st, P. M., had barely time to conceal himself under a pile of wood, in Garlach's yard, Baltimore Street, was forced to remain there until the battle ended, then joined his command. jGeneral Slocum commanded the right wing of the army on July 2nd and 3rd. His corps during that time, was commanded by General Alpheus S. Williams. In like manner and at the same time. General Hancock commanded the left center, and General Reynolds, up to July 1st, commanded the 1st, 3rd and 11th corps, which composed the left wing of the Union Army. 14 THE BLUE AND GRAY hearty support of every officer and man of his army. Nearly all the general officers had been promoted on his recommendation. General Hooker, having been unsuccessful in the campaign of Chan- cellorsville, Va., caused his suggestions and plans, as a rule not to meet with cordial approval, by both officers and men who distrusted his ability to maneuver and fight his army. While General Meade was given all the support possible by his superiors, his lack of experience made him hesitate to utilize his authority to its fullest extent. It led him to trust too much in the judgment of the corps commanders. He had not complete confidence in the ability of some of his principal assistants, and because of his lack of experience and confidence in his own judgment, he did not create in all his subordinates confidence in himself. The corps and division commanders of both armies were, as a rule, officers who had attained these commands only after successful service as brigade commanders; in the Confederate Army, all except one, General Bodes, were graduates of the United States Military Academy, and had served in the regular army; nearly all the older graduates had seen service in the Mexican War. Their commanders had greater power and responsibility. This was emphasized by giving the former the grade of lieutenant-general and the latter, that of major-general. The organization of the Confederate artillery was almost ideal. The chief of artillery having absolute control of its equipment and employment on the field. While in the Union Army the duties of its chief of artillery were not definitely fixed. The only guns in his absolute control were those of the artillery reserve, as a rule its guns were not so available as those of the corps artillery. The cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia had been under the personal charge of General J . E. B. Stuart from the beginning of the war as an independent unit. In the Union Army, its first commander had not been very successful and he was succeeded by General Pleasonton. It was still inexperienced as an independent unit and it will be observed that General Hooker always gave it an infantry support when sent against General Stuart’s cavalry. The Confederate Army had in the Battle of Gettysburg, fewer raw troops and fewer newly organized brigades and divisions than its adversary ; this was a distinct advantage, therefore if the differences of the two armies are fairly weighed it is not too much to say that the chances of success in the Gettysburg campaign were in favor of General Lee, notwithstanding his numerical inferiority. * * * * The Army op Northern Virginia. General Longstreet, in an article contributed by him to the Philadel- phia Weekly Times and since published in a book entitled “Annals of the War,” says, that General Lee informed him at Chambersburg, that on June 30th, 1863, his infantry consisted of about 72,000 bayonets, and his whole force including the detachments which would join him on the march, amounted to a trifle over 90,000. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 15 In the campaign on the peninsula, General Longstreet, and General Jackson, commanded half the army; after Antietam battle, their com- mands were made army corps and both officers were promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. Finding, however, that these corps of 35,000 men each were too large to be conveniently handled, and after the death of General Jackson, at Chancellorsville, General Lee formed his army into three corps. Upon his recommendation, the 2nd and 3rd corps were com- manded by Major-General Ewell* and A. P. Hill, who were both promoted to the grade of lieutenant-general. Both had commanded divisions in Jackson’s corps, the former being chosen by Jackson to succeed him. A new division was made by uniting two of the six brigades of A. P. Hill’s division with the brigades of General Pettigrew and Davis, sent about May 31st, 1863, from the Department of Richmond and North Carolina. Al l of the brigades had been reorganized so that, as far as possible, each was composed of troops from the same state. Each division was com- manded by a major-general; each brigade by a brigadier-general, if pos- sible from the same state as his command. The artillery, under the control of Brig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, had been reorganized just before the Gettysburg campaign ; one battalion of four batteries of four guns each was assigned as corps artillery. The pre- scribed number of guns to each of the three corps was therefore 80 ; this was slightly exceeded, as the actual number with the army was 351. Of these 12 were 20-pound siege rifles, 2 were English Whitworth rifles, 26 were howitzers, and the remainder 3-inch rifles and 12-pound smooth bore Napoleons in about equal number. The cavalry commanded by Maj.-Gen. J . E. B. Stuart, was strengthened before the Gettysburg campaign by General Lee adding to it the brigades of Gen. A. G. Jenkins and W. E. Jones, which had been operating in the Shenandoah Valley; also that of Gen. B. H. Robertson from North Carolina. To this cavalry division was attached a battalion of horse artillery of 24 guns, one battery for each brigade. — “ Battles and Leaders, Vol. 4, p. 422.” The Army of Northern Virginia was organized as follows: Lieutenant-General Bobert E. Lee, CommanderA STAFF. Colonel W. H. Taylor, Adjutant-General. Colonel C. S. Venable, Aid-de-Camp. Colonel Charles Marshall, Aide-de-Camp. Colonel James L. Corley, Chief Quartermaster. Colonel E. G. Cole, Chief Commissary. *Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell was an officer of great ability. He had at one time been civil engineer of the Columbia R. R.. in Pennsylvania, and had also for several years had charge of the U. S. barracks at Carlisle. He was therefore well acquainted with the topography of the State, and was well qualified to conduct Lee’s advance. At the Second Battle of Bull Run he lost a leg and after that was always strapped to his horse when mounted. fAt the opening of the Gettysburg campaign, June 1st, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia had been under the command of Gen. Robert E. Lee for over a year. In that period it took part in the seven days battle about Richmond, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Fredericks- burg and Chancellorsville. The almost uniform success of its operations raised the morale of the entire army to the highest pitch and caused both officers and men to feel absolute confidence in their commander. E. B, Stuart* flgr-ifl -'“(CKET'V fWEtV BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 17 Colonel B. G. Baldwin, Chief of Ordinance. Colonel H. L. Peyton, Assistant Inspector-General. General W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery. Doctor L. Guild, Medical Director. Colonel W. Porter Smith, Chief Engineer. Major H. E. Young, Assistant Adjutant-General. Major C. B. Cook, Assistant Inspector-General. The army was composed as follows:* First Corps. — Lieut. -Gen. James Longstreet, commanding. The division com- manders were Maj.-Gen. L. McLaws, Maj.-Gen. Geo. E. Piclcett and Maj.-Gen. J. B. Hood. The brigade commanders were: Brig. -Gen. J. B. Kershaw, Wm. Barksdale, P. J. Semmes, W. T. Wofford, R. B. Garnett, J. L. Kemper, L. A. Armistead, Evender Law, J. B. Robertson, G. T. Anderson and H. B. Benning. The four first named belonged to the 1st ( McLaw’s ) division, the next three to the 2nd {Pickett’s) , and the last four to the 3rd (Hood’s). The artillery belonging to this corps was commanded by Col. J. B. Walton, and consisted of 84 guns. Second Corps. — Lieut.-Gen. R. S. Ewell, commanding. The division commanders were: Maj.-Gen. J. A. Early, Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes and Maj.-Gen. Edward E. Johnson. The brigade commanders were: Brig. -Gen. H. T. Hays, R. F. Hoke,\ Wm. Smith, J. B. Gordon, Geo. H. Stewart, J. A. Walker, F. T. Nicholls, J. M. Jones, J. Daniel, A. Iverson, Geo. Doles, S. D. Ramseur and E. A. O’Neal. The first four named belonged to the 1st (Early’s), the next five to the 2nd (Rodes’), and the last four to the 3rd (Johnson’s ) , divisions. The artillery belonging to this corps was commanded by Col. J. F. Brown and consisted of 84 guns. Third Corps. — Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill, commanding. The division commanders were: Maj.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Maj.-Gen. Henry Heth and Maj.-Gen. W. D. Pender. The brigade commanders were Brig. -Gen. C. M. Wilcox, A. R. Wright, Wm. Mahone, E. A. Perry, C. Posey, J. J. Pettigrew, J. M. Brockenbrougli, J. J. Archer, J. R. Davis, J. H. Lane, E. L. Thomas, A. M. Scales and Abner Perrin. The first five named be- longed to the 1st (Anderson’s) , the next four to the 2nd (Heth’s), and the last four to the 3rd (Pender’s) divisions. The artillery belonging to this corps was com- manded by Col. R. L. Walker, and consisted of 80 guns. Cavalry Corps. — Lieut.-Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, commanding. The brigade com- manders were: Brig. -Gen. Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, J. R. Chambliss, A. G. Jenkin, B. H. Robertson, W. E. Jones and J. D. Imboden. With the cavalry was one battalion of horse artillery commanded by Col. M. Backham, and consisted of 24 guns. *The Army of Northern Virginia was divided into three corps, while the Army of the Potomac was divided into seven. Bach of the three Confederate corps, therefore, represented a third of their whole force, while each of the seven Federal corps, represented a seventh of their combined force. The same ratios extended to divisions and brigades. Wrig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke, being severely wounded in the battle at Fredericksburg, Va., his place was worthily filled by Col. J. E. Avery, 6th North Carolina regiment, who, also fell mortally wounded on Cemetery Hill, July 2nd, 1863. — “General Early’s Report, No. 470, Official Record, Vol. 27, p. 473.” 2 A N offensive movement by the Army of Northern Virginia was almost on the Confederate authorities. On the Mississippi River, General Pemberton was invested in Vicksburg by a superior force under General Grant, and it was apparent to those in authority that it was only a question of weeks when Pemberton must surrender. At Port Hudson, a short distance south of Vicksburg, General Gardner was similarly invested by General Banks. "When these two places fell, the banks of the Mississippi would fall in the possession of the Union forces from the Ohio to the Gulf ; Arkansas, Texas and Louisiana would then be separated from the Confederate states east of that river. This would be a serious blow to the Confederate cause, both at home and abroad, and a brilliant counter-stroke at some other point in the theatre of war was desirable to counteract its effect. The forces in the Department of Tennessee and South Carolina had been depleted in the attempt to form a relieving army for Vicksburg, that neither General Bragg in Tennessee, nor General Beauregard in South Carolina could be expected to make this counter-stroke. General Hill, in North Carolina, was also reduced to the defensive because of the forces drawn from his department to reinforce the Army of Northern Virginia and cover Richmond from an attack along the north banks of the James River. The task of making this counter-stroke, therefore, fell on the Army of Northern Virginia, which had just been reorganized and recruited and was in the highest state of efficiency. There Were Still Other Reasons for an Offensive Movement. The Confederate authorities found themselves short of food supplies and had great difficulty in filling the requisitions of the armies, no relief from this situation could be expected until the coming harvest. 19 20 THE BLUE AND GRAY The numerical strength of the Army of the Potomac was decreasing daily, due to the mustering out of the two-year men from New York, who volunteered in the spring of 1861, and the nine-month militia from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, who entered the service under the call of August, 1862. This army reached its minimum strength on June 20th, 1863, before the troops of other departments were united with it ; it numbering 89,000 men present for duty. The Union troops in southeastern Virginia were giving the Confeder- ate authorities some uneasiness about the safety of Richmond, and it was thought they would be drawn to Washington if that Capital was threatened. General Lee also recognized the fact that the South could hardly hope to succeed in a prolonged struggle with the united North. In a letter to President Davis, dated June 2d, 1863, just before starting north, he writes : We should not therefore conceal from ourselves that our resources in men is constantly diminishing, and the disproportion in this respect between us and our enemies, if they continue uniting in their efforts to subjugate us, is constantly augmenting. In this letter he advocates the encouragement of the peace party in the north by a discontinuance of speeches and newspaper articles in the south rejecting the terms of peace advocated by that party. He probably hoped to make his invasion of the North another argu- ment for those members of the peace party, who declared that the South could never be subdued. In his circular order directing that no supplies should be taken in the North except on regular requisition, he also sought to avoid unnecessarily irritating the inhabitants of the invaded country, and to make the establishment of a permanent government in the South of material interest to them. On June 8th, he wrote to the Secretary of War, Leroy P. Walker, as follows : “As far as I can judge, there is nothing to be gained by this army remaining quietly on the defensive, which it must do unless it can be reinforced. I am aware that there is difficulty and hazard in taking the aggressive with so large an army in its front, intrenched behind a river, where it cannot be advantageously attacked. Unless it takes its own time to prepare and strengthen itself to renew its advance on Richmond and force this army back within the intrencliments of that city. This may result in any event; still, I think it is worth a trial to prevent such a catastrophe. Still, if the Department thinks best to remain on the defensive, and guard as far as possible, all the avenues of approach, and await the time of the enemy, I am ready to adopt this course. I think our southern coast might be held during the sickly season by local troops, aided by a small organized force, and the predatory excursions of the enemy be repressed. This would give us an active force in the field with which we might hope to make some impression on the enemy on both our northern and western frontiers. Unless this can be done, I see little hope of accomplishing anything of importance. All our military preparations and organizations should be pressed forward with the greatest vigor, and every exertion made to obtain some material advantage in this campaign. ’ ’ General Lee further explains the object of his plan of campaign in the report he submitted at its close : BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 21 The position occupied by the Union Army opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was deter- mined to draw him from it. The execution of his project embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley, from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the center of hostilities north of the Potomac River. It was thought the corresponding movement on the part of the Union Army, to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any event, that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy’s plan of campaign for the summer would be broken, and parts of the season of active operation be consumed in the formation of new com- binations and the preparations they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations, that will hereafter be presented, the movement began June 3rd, 1863. On June 25th, while his army was north of the Potomac River, in further development of this plan, General Lee wrote to President Davis, as follows: “You will see that the apprehension for the safety of Washington and their own territory has aroused the Federal Government and the people to great exertion, and it is incumbent upon us to call forth all our energies. In addition to the 100,000 troops called for by President Lincoln, to defend the frontier of Pennsylvania, you will see that he is concentrating other organized forces in Maryland. It is stated in the papers here, that they are withdrawing their troops from Suffolk, and according to General Bucicner’s report, General Burnside, and his troops are recalled from Ken- tucky. It is reasonable to suppose that this would be the ease if their apprehension was once aroused. “It is plain that if all the Federal Army is concentrated upon this, it will result in our accomplishing nothing, and being compelled to return to Virginia. If the plan I suggested the other day can be carried into effect, it would do more to protect both states from marauding expeditions of the enemy than anything else. “I have not sufficient troops to maintain my communications, and therefore will have to abandon them. I think I can throw the Union Army across the Potomac and draw troops from the south, embarrassing their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do nothing more and have to return. “I still hope that all things will end well for us at Vicksburg. At any rate, every effort should be made to bring about that result. ’ ’ Movement of the Armies before the Battle of Gettysburg Operations from June 1st to July 1st, 1863. The Army of Northern Virginia Starting Northward with Numerous Engagements with the Army of the Potomac. T HERE is a limit to human endurance, and the victories won by the Confederates had exhausted to the last degree. They were hungry, ragged, barefooted and worn out; they must have rest. But, while gaining that, their eyes turned longingly toward the fair fields of Maryland and Pennsylvania spread out before them, and the temptation to gather from their abundance was too great to resist. It can be understood that there were many reasons why General Lee desired to carry the war into the North. It was natural that he and the other Confederate authorities should wish to press the bitter cup, of which they had tasted so often, to northern lips. While it was a tremendous risk to move the army so far from its base, there was a fair prospect of being able to capture Harrisburg, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washing- ton. This done, who could doubt that England would intervene in favor of the Confederacy? It was decided, therefore, to invade the North, instead of attacking Washington alone. Lee began maneuvering so as to lead Hooker to uncover that city. The first step of the Confederate leader was to enter Maryland and establish his communication with Richmond through the Shenandoah Valley. Threatening Harrisburg by the Cumber- land Valley, he hoped to draw the Union Army far enough from the national capital to make it possible to seize Baltimore, or Washington, and to force Hooker to give battle at a long distance from his base of supplies. On June 1st, 1863, the main body of the Confederate Army lay on the south banks of the Rappahannock River, with headquarters at Fredericks- burg. General Stuart’s cavalry division was at Culpeper, where five brigades were assembled. The infantry divisions of General Hood and Pickett, of Long street’s corps which had recently returned from Southern Virginia, were not with the main army; Hood was at Verdiersville, south- east of Culpeper, and Pickett was near Hanover Junction, Va., with Pettigrew’s brigade of General Heth’s division. The Union Army lay on the north banks of that river and along the railroad to Aquia Creek, with headquarters at Falmouth. The cavalry corps was assembled at Bealeton, Va., on the Orange and Alexander railroad north of Culpeper. On June 2nd, General Lee was informed that the Federals had evacuated West Point, on the York River and no longer threatened to advance on 22 BATTLE OP GETTYSBURG 23 Richmond. He at once ordered the concentration of Ewell’s corps and the divisions of Hood and McLaws of General Longstreet’s corps, at Culpeper, General Hill’s corps was left to hold Fredericksburg, and Pickett was ordered to join the army as soon as it was certain that his presence near Hanover Junction, was no longer required. (General Hooker, seeing a great diminution of tents in his front, suspected that the Confederates were leaving Fredericksburg. He said to General Sedgwick, — a life-long friend and classmate — “John, go over there and see if they have gone. They may have left merely their empty tents to deceive us. ” So on June 6th, Sedgwick threw bridges out, under cover of his artillery, crossed the river, sent back word to General Hooker, “There is a pretty stiff opposition; I think their main body must be still here.” General Pleasonton was directed to take all the cavalry that could be spared and go to Culpeper, to ascertain if anything unusual was going on there. All of General Stuart’s cavalry and two-thirds of the Confederate Army were in that vicinity. General Lee, having reached Culpeper in person, on June 7th, issued orders to the cavalry forces of Generals Jenkins and Iniboden to prepare the way for his advance into the Shenandoah Valley. The former was ordered to move down the Shenandoah Valley as far as Strasburg and 24 THE BLUE AND GRAY Front Royal, and there await the arrival of the infantry. In the meantime he was to obtain all possible information as to the strength and position of the different Union posts in the lower valley. General Iniboden, with his cavalry brigade, was to move from the upper Shenandoah, into the South Potomac Valley and engage the attention of the forces in and around Romney. He was to collect cattle, and if possible interrupt railroad communication between Cumberland and Martinsburg, by destroying bridges, water-tanks, etc. While awaiting the execution of his preliminary orders, General Lee, reviewed General Stuart’s cavalry on the plains about Brandy Station. Cavalry Engagement at Brandy Station. The withdrawal of Ewell’s forces from the Fredericksburg line and their movements westward having been reported by the Union pickets, General Hooker ordered the cavalry corps to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Culpeper where it was reported that General Stuart had united his cavalry. Two brigades, each composed of 1,500 infantry and a battery of horse artillery were to accompany the cavalry. Stuart, who was preparing for an offensive movement instead of anticipating an attack on himself, had only one brigade along the river. Jones’ brigade was picketing the river about Beverly Ford. FitzJmgh Lee was further up the river, and W. H. F. Lee, Hampton and Robertson were near Brandy Station. Early in the morning, June 9th, General Buford with his own division, the reserve (Merritt’s) cavalry brigade, and one brigade of infantry moved to Beverly Ford. It was a foggy morning and Jones’ pickets were taken by surprise. The Confederates were being driven back when Stuart came to their assistance with Fitzhugh Lee’s, Hampton’s and W. H. F. Lee’s brigades. He stopped Buford’s advance, but could not drive him back as Buford was supported by infantry well posted. In the meantime General Gregg with two divisions of cavalry and a brigade of infantry crossed without opposition at Kelly’s Ford. One division he sent on the direct road toward Culpeper ; with his own division he marched toward Brandy Station ; the infantry he sent northward on a road nearer the river. He found Robertson alone at Brandy Station, and drove him out. Stuart now came to Robertson’s assistance with W. II. F. Lee and Jones. After desperate cavalry fighting, General Gregg was obliged to fall back on his infantry. As General Buford had been slowly pushing the cavalry in his front and advancing on the station, General Gregg now found himself on Buford’s left flank. Together they checked Stuart’s advance until 5:00 P.M., when they were withdrawn across the river. The 3rd division of the Union cavalry corps met only a single Confederate regiment on the Culpeper road, which was easily brushed aside; it took no further part in that day’s operation and withdrew to the river with the other divisions. The forces engaged in this battle were about 10,000 Confederate cavalry, and about 10,000 Union cavalry and infantry. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 25 The Union lost 500 killed, wounded and missing; Confederates lost 700 killed, wounded and missing. General W. H. F. Lee was wounded, and Colonel Chambliss succeeded to the command of that brigade. The reconnoissanee had been successful in developing the strength of the Confederate cavalry and had also shown that they were supported by infantry. Bodes’ infantry division was sent by General Lee to Stuart’s assistance and arrived at Brandy Station too late to take part in the engagement. Capture of Winchester. On June 12th, before the Union Army could profit by the knowledge obtained or frustrate his movements, General Ewell was ordered to march on Winchester, Va., via Front Royal, and there, if possible, capture the division of General Milroy. That town was not occupied by Union troops after its evacuation, in the Antietam campaign, until January, 1863, when Milroy was sent there. Although General Halleek had given repeated in- structions that this town was not to be occupied in force and its troops were to be withdrawn promptly whenever threatened by superior numbers, nevertheless, it was gradually converted into base for operation in the Shenandoah Valley, by the formation of a weak entrenched camp and by the increase of its garrison to a division of three brigades. Finally, on June 10th, when he learned of the concentration of the Confederates at Culpeper, General Halleek ordered the immediate evacua- tion of Winchester. This order was sent to General Milroy by General Schenck, chief -of-staff, but afterwards on General Milroy ’s representation was in effect rescinded by General Schenck ; in view, however, of an ex- pected attack, the brigade, which had occupied Berryville, was ordered to Winchester, Va. Ewell reached Cedarville, on the evening of June 12th, and was there joined by Jenkin’s cavalry brigade. From the information given him, he decided to send Bodes ’ division with Jenkins’ on the 13th to capture the brigade at Berryville, then have Bodes push on and capture the post at Martinsburg, W. Va. General Early’s division was to move on the Cedar- ville road. General Bodes’ division moved on Berryville and while making dis- position to surround it, found that the Union forces had retreated, leaving only a small rear guard. Bodes followed the retreating force to Summit Point, on the railroad where the Union brigade had turned off toward Winchester; he there bivouacked for the night. In pursuance of his original orders, on the following morning he marched on Martinsburg, and captured five pieces of artillery and some stores, which he took with him. The garrison of that post having orders to retreat if menaced by superior forces, made its escape during the night. The cavalry was pursued by Jenkin’s cavalry brigade, as far as Williamsport, Md., but the infantry escaped to Shepherdstown. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 27 General Early, and Johnson’s infantry divisions marched on Win- chester, on the 13th and met Milroy’s force north of Kernstown, and drove him to his fortified position north of Winchester. On the morning of the 14th, finding the position south of Winchester too strong to warrant an assault, Early was directed to make a retrograde and turning movement with three of his infantry brigades and assault the fortifications north and west of the town. General Early reached his point of attack without being discovered and having prepared the way with 20 guns, carried the works in his front by assault. That night General Milroy decided to retreat on Harper’s Ferry, W. Va. This movement was anticipated by General Ewell, who sent three brigades of Johnson’s division of infantry to prevent his escape. General Johnson reached the Martinsburg road at a point five miles northeast of the town, with two brigades some time after midnight. At that moment the head of the retreating troops reached the same point. The opposing troops fought in the early dawn, and the Confederates were about to be over- whelmed when the opportune arrival of Walker’s brigade turned the tide. The Union retreat then became a riot. General Ewell reports — The fruits of his victory were 23 pieces of artillery “nearly all rifles,” 400 prisoners, 300 loaded wagons, more than 300 horses, a large amount of commissary and quartermaster stores. Confederate loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded and 3 missing; aggregate 269. General Milroy’s forces reached the Potomac, at Harper’s Ferry. Bodes ’ division was too far from the line of retreat to intercept either of the columns. Leaving three of Early’s regiments (13th, 58th Ya. and 54th N. C.), to guard the prisoners, General Ewell moved to the Potomac, where Bodes’ division crossed the river on the 15th, at Williamsport Ford, and on the 19th, moved to Hagerstown, Md. ; on the 18th, Johnston’s division crossed at Shepherdstown, W. Va. From the time General Lee’s army crossed the Potomac River until the Battle of Gettysburg began, there was nothing in his front to interfere with his onward march. After moving his army into Maryland, he con- centrated it at Hagerstown, six miles from the Potomac, and 74 from Harrisburg, his objective point. Action Taken by the President to Meet the Invasion of Northern States. In view of the probable invasion of Pennsylvania on June 10th, the President formed two new departments; that of the Susquehanna, with headquarters at Harrisburg, under General Couch, and that of the Monon- gahela, with headquarters at Pittsburgh, under command of General W. T. H. Brooks. On the 15th of June, when the news of the disaster at Winchester, Ya., was received in Washington, President Lincoln issued the following procla- mation : 28 THE BLUE AND GRAY BY THE PRESIDENT OP THE UNITED STATES OP AMERICA. A PROCLAMATION. “Whereas, The armed insurrectionary combinations now existing in several of the states are threatening to make inroads into the States of Maryland, Western Vir- ginia, Pennsylvania and Ohio, requiring immediately an additional military force for the service of the United States: “Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States and Com- mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, and of the Militia of the several States when called into actual service, do hereby call into service of the United States 100,000 Militia from the States following, namely : ‘ ‘ Prom the State of Maryland, ten thousand. ‘ ‘ Prom the State of Pennsylvania, fifty thousand. “From the State of Ohio, thirty thousand. “Prom the State of West Virginia, ten thousand. “To be mustered into the service of the United States forthwith, and to serve for the period of six months from the date of such muster into said service, unless sooner discharged — to be mustered in as infantry, artillery and cavalry, in proportions which will be made known through the War Department, which department will also designate the several places of rendezvous. “These militia are to be organized according to the rules and regulations of the volunteer service, and such orders as may hereafter be issued. “The States aforesaid will be respectively credited, under the enrollment act, for the military service rendered under this proclamation. “In Testimony Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. “Done at the City of Washington, this 15th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1863, and of the Independence of the United States the 87th. “By the President: “Abraham Lincoln. “Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State.” The governors, also, of the states which were in the most danger of invasion, issued to their people the most stirring proclamations calling on them to rally in defense of their homes, and beat back the foe from northern soil. Governor Seymour offered 20,000 men from the state of New York, and the great “War Governor,” Andrews, of Massachusetts, all the avail- able men of his state, including three regiments of old soldiers, who had returned after serving out their term of enlistment, but who now most nobly offered to return to the post of danger and help save the imperiled Government. Retrograde Movement of the Army of the Potomac. As soon as General Hooker became aware of the flank movement of the Confederate Army, he wrote to General Halleck (commander-in-chief), suggesting that he be allowed to attack the forces left at Fredericksburg, should it develop that General Lee was dividing his army to make an offensive movement. He was advised by Halleck, not to move across the Rappahannock River. Again, on June 10th, he requested permission to move on Richmond. This was also refused. Free action, however, was not permitted to the Army of the Potomac. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 29 General Hill was at Fredericksburg with 20,000 men against Hooker’s 70,000 across the river. General Long street was at Culpeper, 35 miles away, and General Ewell, 40 miles beyond Long street. It will be seen that General Hooker had the choice of either breaking Lee’s attenuated line by holding Hill in check while he smashed Longstreet, or of holding him stationary at Culpeper, while destroying Hill at Fredericksburg, and then march south and capture Richmond. This would effectually have drawn Lee after him, away from his double threat and of invasion. This able strategist, tied hand and foot by his sleeping superior at Washington, quickly saw Lee’s fatal position and pleaded for permission to take advan- tage of it. General Halleck’s timidity and incompetency, however, stood firm — like a mule in the road — Hooker was ordered to hold his army from increasing the peril of his antagonist until Lee should recover his army to safety; then to trail on after him — to keep the invasion going safely past Washington. Commenting on the condition of the War Office at this time, President Lincoln said, “Our folks (Halleck and Stanton), appear to know but little how things are and show no evidence that they ever will avail themselves of any advantage. General Grant said of Halleck, “The commander-in-chief must be a fighter as well as a strategist, and that his authority is exercised better anywhere else than from the seat of political authority.” Gideon Wells, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln, does not far miss the truth when he said : “I have seen nothing to admire in the military management of General Halleck. At a time when activity should pervade military operations, has no activity, never exhibits sagacity or foresight, sits back in his chair, scowls and swears about the stupidity and worthless- ness of others. This seems his way to escape censure himself, and cover his stupidity in high position.” General McClellan said of Halleck: “Of all men I have ever en- countered, I do not think he ever had a correct military idea from beginning to end. It was more difficult to get an idea through his head than can be conceived by anyone who never made the attempt.” On the 11th of June, General Hooker began to withdraw his troops from the Rappahannock River and concentrate along the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, near Manassas Junction, enroute for the Potomac River near Leesburg, Va. June 15th, the 1st (Reynold’s), 2nd (Hancock’s), 3rd (Sickle’s), 5th (Meade’s) and 12th (Slocum’s) infantry corps were around Manassas Junction. The cavalry had remained at and near Warrenton, Va., to cover this movement, on the 15th and 16th joined the infantry forces about Manassas Junction. On the 17th, the 5th corps was ordered to Gum Springs, near the Little River Turnpike, northwest of Manassas ; to cover this movement, General Gregg’s cavalry division was ordered to Aldie. 30 THE BLUE AND GRAY Concentration of the Confederate Army near the Potomac River. When General Lee learned of the withdrawal of General Hooker’s forces from the Rappahannock, he ordered General Hill to move with his corps to Culpeper and thence to Winchester, and General Longstreet with his corps to move along the east slope of the Blue Ridge Mountains from Culpeper northward to Ashby and Snickers Gaps. The exposed flanks of General Longstreet and Hill’s corps was covered by General Stuart’s cavalry division. Hill’s corps reaching Shepherdstown, W. Va. June 23. On June 19, Longstreet halted Hood’s division in Snicker’s Gap. McLaw’s division in Ashby Gap with Pickett’s division in the mountain passes between the other two divisions. In this movement Gen. Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry brigade formed the advance guard as far as the Manassas Gap railroad, the cavalry brigades of Chambliss and Robertson formed its flank guard. General Hampton’s brigade was left on the Rappahannock, and Jones’ cavalry was between Hampton and Robertson’s cavalry brigades. Cavalry Engagements in the Loudon Valley, Va. On the 19th of June after escorting Longstreet’ s corps to the passes of the Blue Ridge Mountains, Fitzhugh Lee’s cavalry brigade moved east- ward toward Aldie Pass, in the Bull Run Mountains. On the same day General Gregg’s cavalry division, after escorting the 5th corps to Gum Springs, moved westward through Aldie Pass to ascertain the position of the enemy. The two met just west of Aldie where the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and Kilpatrick had a spirited engagement, losing 24 killed, 41 wounded and 89 missing. Confederate loss was about 100 killed, wounded and missing. On the approach of Gregg’s remaining brigades, Fitzhugh Lee retired. On the following day the brigades of Chambliss and Robertson having arrived they were posted on the road leading from Aldie to Aldie Gap and about six miles from the former place. Jones’ cavalry brigade, having arrived, it relieved Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade, which was then moved to the road from Aldie to Snickers Gap. The following day, June 20th, Hampton’s brigade arrived and was attached to the left wing. There was some skirmishing between the cavalry commands at Middle- burg, Va., on the Ashby Gap road June 18th and 19th, but no serious move- ment until the 21st, when General Pleasonton was authorized to attack the cavalry in his front and to ascertain what Confederate forces was east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. In this he was to be supported by the 5th corps which had been ordered to Aldie. Therefore, with General Gregg’s cavalry and Barnes’ infantry division of the 5th corps on the Ashby Gap road and Buford cavalry division on his right, General Pleasonton moved against General Stuart and drove him from his intrenched position at Upperville, into the Blue Ridge passes. In the defense of the passes, Stuart’s command was temporarily relieved by Longstreet ’s infantry. Only MAP ILLUSTRATING OPERATIONS OF THE CAVALRY CORPS, ARMY N. VA„ DURING THE Pennsylvania Campaign, 1863, UNDER COMMAND OF MAJ. GEN J E. B. STUART. Explanations: Route of Main Column, March of Detachments. — - - — • ~ Rail Roads. ten Cccvulry Engagements. XXX 32 THE BLUE AND GRAY Vincent’s infantry brigade of the 5th corps was actively engaged in this movement, the Union lost 94 wounded; Confederates lost, 20 killed, 100 wounded and 60 missing. June 22nd, General Pleasonton’s command returned to Aldie, where they remained with the 5th corps until the 26th, when they moved to Leesburg, Va. General Stuart’s cavalry returned to the valley between Bull Run and the Blue Ridge Mountains where he remained until the 25th. Confederates Advance From the Potomac. As it was apparent on the 22nd of June, that the Federal Army had no intention of advancing across the Loudon Valley, General Lee issued the order for the advance of his army into Pennsylvania. Therefore, on the 23rd, General Ewell’s infantry corps moved northward. His orders were to move to the Susquehanna River, to gather stock as he passed along, as well as provisions of all kinds, and to collect, at the same time, all the money possible by assessing the various towns. General Ewell’s main body consisting of one (17th Va.) regiment of Jenkins’ cavalry brigade, and the infantry divisions of Bodes and Johnson marched through Hagerstown, Md., Greencastle, Chambersburg and Car- lisle, Pa. His left was protected by Stewart’s infantry brigade, with the Maryland line, which moved via McConnellsburg, its right by General Early’s infantry division, with one (Col. White’s), battalion of Jones’ cavalry brigade, which moved via Waynesboro to Greenwood, east of Chambersburg. The march was a slow one because of the flanking columns and the collecting of supplies in a hostile country. From Carlisle, part of Jenkins’ cavalry was sent to reconnoiter the defenses of Harrisburg, and Ewell himself, was preparing to move against it on the 26th, when he was ordered to move toward Gettysburg. Early’s division, on reaching Greenwood, turned east through the South Mountains, Gordon’s infantry brigade moved directly on Gettysburg, and the infantry brigades with the 17th Va. cavalry regiment moved to Mummasburg. From there Hay’s infantry brigade was sent to Gettysburg. The requisition made upon the authorities, was not complied with. (See page No. 142.) The right wing of Early’s division then moved on the road to York. The cavalry going to Hanover Junction, Pa., while his left wing moved through Hunterstown and East Berlin. The division reached York on June 28th, and made a demand. General Early’s report (No. 470, Vol. 27, Official Record, p. 466), “The requisition made upon the authorities of York, Pa., was for 2,000 pairs of shoes, 1,000 pairs of socks, 1,000 hats, $100,000 in money, and three days of rations of all kinds. Fifteen hundred pairs of shoes, the hats, rations and socks, together with only $28,600 in money was furnished. General Gordon was sent at once to seize the bridge over the Susque- hanna River at Wrightsville, in this he was unsuccessful, as the bridge was BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 33 burned by local troops under command of Colonel Crane at Columbia. Gordon was to destroy the Pennsylvania Railroad at Columbia, and move on the north side of the river to Harrisburg, and join the main column of Lee’s army which was moving in that direction, via the Cumberland Valley. General Early’s division therefore, encamped around York, where on June 29th, he received orders to join his corps near Gettysburg. General Hill’s corps crossed the Potomac River on the 24th, and marched through Hagerstown, Md., and Chambersburg to Fayetteville, Pa., where it arrived June 27th. On the 29th, General Heth’s division was sent across the mountains to Cashtown. General Longstreet’s corps crossed on the 25th and 26th, and reached Chambersburg on the 27th. On the 29tli, the divisions of McLaw and Hood were sent to Greenwood; Law’s brigade of Hood’s division was posted as an outpost at New Guilford, Pa. General Imboden, who had carried out his preliminary instructions and had destroyed many of the bridges, blockhouses and water-tanks along the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, was ordered to keep on the left flank of Ewell’s corps and gather information and collect supplies. He therefore, assembled his force at Hancock, Md., on the north bank of the Potomac, where Lee’s courier found him on June 29th. Upon Stuart’s cavalry, General Lee depended for information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac. He was therefore directed to cross the river with three brigades ( Hampton’s , FitzhugJi Lee’s and Chambliss’) , as soon as their service could be spared from the defense of the Blue Ridge passes. He was directed to place himself on Ewell’s right flank and was informed that one of Ewell’s columns would probably march to Emmitsburg, Md. General Stuart, it appears, had proposed a plan by which he was to move through Hopewell Gap and reach the Potomac by moving around the rear and right flank of the Union Army. This plan was referred to by General Long street in transmitting General Lee’s order to Stuart, and in his letter to Lee informing him of its transmittal. General Lee finally gave Stuart permission to move by the route which seemed best. However, adding that if the Union Army was not moving northward, he had better move into the Shenandoah Valley on the night of June 23rd, and cross the river at Sheperdstown, W. Va., and move toward Frederick, Md. Acting under the discretionary orders thus given him, on the 23rd, General Stuart assembled the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee, Chambliss and Hampton on the Manassas Gap Railroad. His original intention was to move through Hopewell Gap, northward through Thoroughfare Gap, Gum Springs and Dranesville, Va. However, at that time the Union forces were too far south to permit it. In Aldie Gap were the cavalry and the 5th corps ; in Thoroughfare Gap and Gainsville was the 2nd corps ; at Bristoe Station and Centerville, was the 6th corps. Not knowing fully the position of the Union forces, Stuart went through a gap south of Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 25th, and ran into the 2nd corps. The whole 3 34 THE BLUE AND GRAY day was spent in reconnoitering the Union troops and in a useless engage- ment with them. On the following day he marched by Brentsvilky to a point on the Occoquan River below its junction with the Bull Run. Chn the 27th, Stuart made a long march and that night crossed the river art Rowser’s Ford. Finding that the entire Union Army was at or near Frederick, Md., on the 28th, he marched northward through Rockville to' Brookville, Md. Near Rockville he captured a train of about 125 wagons, loaded with stores, and 25 teams without wagons, sent to haul pontoons from Edward’s Ferry. On the night of the 29th, when the other com- manders were receiving orders to march on Gettysburg, he had just reached Hood’s Mills, marching northward on the Washington-Westmister road,, reaching the vicinity of Westmister between 4 : 00 and 5 : 00 P.M. Stuart’s advance was discovered by the outpost of the 1st Del. cavalry commanded 1 by Maj. N. B. Knight, who at the time was very ill. Capt. Chas. Corbit of Co. C with 82 men dashed toward Stuart’s three brigades then approaching from the hillock in front with “Draw sabers”! In the spirited mel’ee which resulted the Confederates lost 3 killed, 15 wounded ; Union lost 7 wounded and 2 killed, Captain Corbit being among those killed and Lieu- tenant Churchman wounded. The Confederates captured one wagon laden with hospital stores, together with garrison equippage and regimental books and papers. The brigades of Robertson and Jones were left by Stuart to guard the passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains as long as the Union Army was in their front. When that army crossed the Potomac, General Robertson , who was in command was to withdraw beyond the Shenandoah River, cross the Potomac and place himself on the right and rear of their army. One battalion of Jones’ brigade was attached to Ewell’s infantry corps and another was on picket duty near Harper’s Ferry. Robertson’s brigade and the three remaining regiments of Jones’ brigade, was assembled at Berryville on the 29th, preparatory to crossing the Potomac and joining their army, when they received orders to march to Gettysburg. Concentration of the Union Army at Frederick, Md. On June 25tli, the Union Army began crossing the Potomac and moved toward Frederick, Md., it was preceded by Stahel’s cavalry division of the Department of Washington, which had been sent from Fairfax Court House, for this purpose. On the 26th, the cavalry corps, which formed the rear guard, left Aldie and marched to Leesburg. The following day the entire army was; concentrated in a circular area whose diameter is twenty miles and whose center is Frederick. That evening General Hooker was, at his own request, relieved from the command of the army. There were then 10,000 men at Harper’s Ferry, under command of General French. These troops former- ly belonged to the Army of the Potomac, but the “pepper box strategy,” of Halleck, had detached them, General Hooker believing that Lee’s army CON. TABLETS VIRGINIA STATE MON Z" d tA. D. IMF. 36 THE BLUE AND GRAY out-numbered his; and at the same time knew they were of no use at Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., while the enemy was in Pennsylvania. Halleck finally telegraphed General Hooker saying that “Harper’s Ferry is the key to the Shenandoah Valley, that those troops cannot be spared.” Hooker’s reply was, “If Harper’s Ferry is the key to the Shenandoah Valley, what the devil good is the key if the lock is broken? If I can’t have those troops, send on my successor.” The following day he issued the following order and in a few hours left the army. “Headquarters Army of the Potomac, Frederick, Md., June 28th, 1863. “General Order No. 65. — In conformity with the orders of the War Department, dated June 27th, 1863, I relinquish the command of the Army of the Potomac. It is transferred to Major-General George G. Meade, a brave and accomplished officer, who has nobly earned the confidence and esteem of the army on many a well-fought field. Impressed with the belief that my usefulness as the commander of the Army of the Potomac is impaired, I part from it, yet not without the deepest emotion. Th.e sorrow of parting with the comrades of so many battles is relieved by the conviction that the courage and devotion of this army will never cease nor fail; that it will yield to my successor, as it has to me, a willing and hearty support. With the earnest prayer that the triumphs of its army may bring success worthy of it and the nation, I bid it farewell. Joseph Hookee, Major-General. “S. F. Barston, Acting Adjutant-General.” Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, commander - of the 5th corps was ap- pointed by President Lincoln, to succeed General Hooker and assumed command on the 28th. His instructions were to maneuver and fight in such a way as to cover Baltimore and Washington. He was placed in command of all the forces in his sphere of operation, including those at Harper’s Ferry, and was authorized to remove from, or assign to, the command of any part of his army, any officer whom he saw fit. On taking command he issued the following order : “Headquarters of the Army of the Potomac, June 28th, 1863. “General Order No. 66. — By the direction of the President of the United States, I hereby assume command of the Army of the Potomac. As a soldier, in obeying this order, an order totally unexpected and unsolicited, I have no promises or pledges to make. The country looks to this army to relieve it from the devastation and disgrace of a hostile invasion. Whatever fatigues and sacrifices we may be called upon to undergo, let us have in view constantly the magnitude of the interests involved, and let each man determine to do his duty, leaving to an all-controlling Providence the decision of the contest. It is with just diffidence that I relieve in command of this army an eminent and accomplished soldier, whose name must ever appear conspicuous in the history of its achievements ; but I rely upon the hearty support of my com- panions in arms to assist me in the discharge of the duties of the important trust which has been confided to me. George G. Meade, Major-General Commanding. “S. F. Barston, Assistant Adjutant-General.” In pursuance of his order and from what definite information that the corps of Ewell, Hill and Longstreet, had marched north of Hagers- town, Meade decided to move his army to a line Emmitsburg-Hanover, covering Baltimore and Washington. (Capt. J. G. Rosengarten, in Penn- sylvania at Gettysburg, Yol. 1, pp. 22, says: “When Meade took com- mand he unfolded his army like a fan, keeping it always between the invading enemy and the great cities threatened by Lee.”) Therefore BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 37 General Meade moved headquarters to Taneytown, Md., having his engi- neers carefully survey the country two miles south, at a place called Pipe Creek, where he expected to fight a general battle. The location for a battle at Gettysburg was a mere accident. Being simply a matter of two great armies marching toward each other, a question of time only as to when and where they would come together. On the 29th of June, General Buford with two brigades (Gamble- Devin), of his division of cavalry, marched northward through Frederick, Md., toward Fairfield, Pa., his third (Merritt) reserve brigade was sent to Mechanicstown. General Gregg’s cavalry division marched from Ridge- ville, to New Windsor, Md. General Kilpatrick’s cavalry division marched from Frederick to Littlestown, Pa., where it was joined by the 5th and 6th Michigan cavalry regiments. That same day the 1st and 11th corps moved to Emmitsburg ; the 3rd to Taneytown ; the 2nd to Union Mills ; the 5th to Liberty ; in rear of the 2nd ; the 12th to Bruceville, in rear of the 3rd and the 6th to New Windsor, on the road to Westminster, Md. During the night of June 28th, General Lee learned from a spy that the Union Army was around Frederick. This was his first intimation that the Army of the Potomac was north of the Potomac River. ( General Lee writes : ‘ ‘ After seeing that my communication with Richmond was some- what seriously endangered, I in this emergency concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a preliminary measure, I directed my entire army to move on Gettysburg.”) He had assumed that General Stuart would precede the Union Army across the river and give him due notice of that fact. General Hooker, having out-generaled Stuart, cut him off from General Lee’s command entirely. The Union Army crossed the river lower down. Lee was therefore compelled to abandon his attack on Harrisburg, and also abandon the Cumberland Valley. He crossed the South Mountains, into Ahe Susquehanna Valley. On the evening of June 29th, these orders reached all the separate Confederate commanders, except General Stuart. The military situation was then as follows : Of the nine infantry divisions of the Confederate Army, one was at York ; two at Carlisle ; one at Chambersburg ; four near Fayetteville; and one at Cashtown. General Stuart with three brigades of cavalry, was at Union Mills, enroute for Littlestown. Robertson with two cavalry brigades, was at Berry ville in the Shenandoah Valley, and General Imboden was at Hancock, Md., north of the Potomac River. Of the Union forces, Buford with two cavalry brigades was moving on Fairfield; Gregg’s cavalry division was nearing Westminster; and Kilpatrick’s cavalry division was at Littlestown, enroute for Hanover. The infantry corps were assembled on the Emmitsburg-Taneytown- Westminster roads. 1 Position of the Armies on the Night of June 30th l N June 30th, the movement of each army was in con- g formity to its general plan of operation. The Confederate m Army moved toward Cashtown-Gettysburg. J B • General Meade sent forward General Buford, with his | cavalry, who was in advance of the infantry on the i left, with instructions to find the enemy, to bring on *" -n — _ — 1 an engagement, and then to fall back to Pipe Creek, Md. Buford moved by the Emmitsburg road, and upon that marched to Gettysburg, took possession of the town and posted his pickets so as to watch all the roads from the Fairfield road on his left, to the Carlisle road on his right. Gamble’s brigade was between the town and Willoughby Run, north and south of the Cliambersburg road. Its picket line was on a ridge west of the run, and an advance picket (Co. E) of the 8th 111. regiment, was on a ridge nearly a mile and a half in its front, where Sergeant Jones fired the opening shot, as the enemy crossed Marsh Creek bridge (see page 2). Devin’s brigade was north of the town.* General Stuart , who was at Hood’s Mills, learned that the Union cavalry had just marched to Littlestown. To avoid them, he therefore marched to Hanover. As his advance guard ( Chambliss leading regiment), marched into the town it encountered General Kilpatrick’s rear guard which was just passing through it. Although out-numbering Kilpatrick, Stuart was hampered by the long wagon train he had captured and was desirous of avoiding an engagement which would still further delay him. In this engagement the Confederates lost about 145 killed, wounded and missing. Union lost 11 killed and 62 wounded. Stuart turned eastward, made a force march and reached Dover July 1st, A. M. That night, June 30th, the position of the opposing forces was as follows: At Heidlesburg, was General Ewell with Bodes ’ division and three miles east of that village was Early’s division. At Cashtown, were General Seth and Pender’s divisions. Across the mountains in the vicinity of Fayetteville, were the divisions of Anderson, McLaw and Hood. Pickett’s division was still at Chambersburg. Robertson and Jones’ cavalry brigades were near Martinsburg, W. Ya., and Imboden’s brigade was near Mc- Connellsburg, Pa. The main line of the Union Army was composed of Merritt’s reserve cavalry brigade, at Mechanicstown, Md., the 1st corps at Marsh Creek, *0n the evening of June 30th, General Buford said to General Devin : “Rest assured that the enemy will attack us in the morning. Their skirmishers will come thundering along several lines deep, and we shall have to fight like devils to maintain ourselves until the arrival of the infantry.” 39 40 THE BLUE AND GRAY midway between Emmitsburg and Gettysburg; the 11th corps at Emmits- burg; the 3rd corps a short distance east of Emmitsburg; the 12th corps at Littlestown ; the 5th corps at Union Mills ; the 6th corps near Man- chester; the 2nd corps was in the second line at Union Mills; Kilpatrick’s cavalry division was at Hanover, and General Gregg had two brigades of his cavalry division at Westminster and one (Huey’s) at New Windsor, Md. Movements Preceding the Battle. Confederate Army. — Of his nine infantry divisions, General Lee had only four east of the South Mountains, and these were not concentrated. All the other divisions were still west of the mountains echeloned along the single road all must use to pass this barrier. Of his cavalry Lee had no knowledge whatever, and Robertson was still far in the rear. Of the posi- tion of the Union Army he knew nothing more than the report of General Pettigrew's scouts that some Federal cavalry had taken possession of Gettysburg. No new orders were therefore given for July 1st, the corps commanders were allowed to complete the concentration and were informed that no general engagement was desired until the army was concentrated. General Lee remained with Geiieral Longstreet until the afternoon, when his corps began to cross the mountains. The Confederate point of concentration having been shifted by General Hill from Cashtown to Gettysburg, on the morning of July 1st, he ordered the divisions of Heth and Pender to move to Gettysburg. He also sent General Ewell word that he was going there. Early that morning Heth started with his division, accompanied by Pegram’s battalion of artillery. That same morning General Ewell started with Rodes’ division to march directly from Heidlersburg to Cashtown; before reaching Bigler- ville, he was met by General Hill’s messenger and therefore moved from Biglerville to Gettysburg. General Early was moving on the Harrisburg road southward when he was overtaken by a message from General Ewell to move to Gettysburg. Gen. Edward Johnson, with the 2nd corps train, was leaving the Carlisle road about five miles north of Chambersburg, marching on a cross road for Fayetteville. General Longstreet was preparing to move across the mountains with the divisions of McLaw and Hood as soon as the road was cleared ; Pickett with his division was to join them east of the mountains as soon as relieved by Imboden’s cavalry brigade, which was expected that day. Union Army. — General Meade’s orders for the movements on July 1st were issued before he knew definitely of the withdrawal of the Confederate forces from York and Carlisle. Although he took the precaution to have all the unnecessary trains sent to the rear, and the army ready for battle, he did not intend that the movements ordered should involve any of his army corps in the engagement with the enemy. His orders were : The 1st corps to Gettysburg ; the 11th to supporting distance ; the 3rd to Emmits- BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 41 burg; the 12th to Two Taverns; the 2nd to Taneytown and the 5th to Hanover. After issuing these orders, he learned that the Confederate Army was being concentrated probably to make a sudden descent upon him. The point of concentration could not be accurately fixed, but he thought it would be somewhere on the road from Chambersburg to York. As his army was deployed over a long line, it was necessary for him to concentrate for battle either in advance of his present position or in rear of it. Select- ing a line along Pipe Creek, between Middleburg and Taneytown, Md., and sent a circular to his corps commanders to study the roads by which it would be necessary for them to move in order to concentrate there. He also wrote to General Reynolds giving him an outline of the mili- tary situation and asking his views as to the advisability of concentrating the army in the vicinity of Gettysburg, in view of the information given him in General Meade’s letter, and the knowledge Reynolds had of the nature of the country, etc. He informed him that the orders for July 1st were issued before the evacuation of Carlisle and York were known. Having great confidence in the ability and judgment of General Reynolds, he had placed him in command of the left wing of the army, which included the 1st, 3rd and 11th corps, with instructions “to make such dispositions and give such orders as circumstances may require. ’ ’ General Reynolds ordered the 11th corps to follow his own (the first) on to Gettysburg; all the other corps moved according to the order of the day. At 7 : 00 A.M., July 1st, "Wadsworth’s division, which was bivouacked on the Emmitsburg road near Marsh Creek, with Hall’s 2nd Maine battery, moved toward Gettysburg. The 2nd division, which was bivouacked on the road running from Marsh Creek crossing to Fairfield, and the 3rd division which was in rear of the 1st division started at 7 : 30 A.M. The 11th corps started from Emmitsburg some time after 8:00 A.M. Barlow’s division moved by the direct Emmitsburg road, but the other two (Steinwehr- Sehurz) divisions being encamped east of Emmitsburg, moved by a country road which entered the Taneytown road about five miles south of Gettys- burg. Neither the Confederate nor Federal movements were made with haste or with extreme caution ; the rains of the preceding days made the roads difficult and neither commander was expecting to meet the enemy in force. General Hill assumed that Gettysburg was held by a small cavalry force, which could readily be brushed aside by Heth’s division. General Reynolds assumed that no enemy could be met enroute since Buford’s cavalrymen held Gettysburg. As no other troops received orders or requests to move to Gettysburg until the afternoon, the only troops engaged in the battle of July 1st, were the Confederate divisions of Heth, Pender, Bodes and Early, seventeen bri- gades, and the Union corps of Reynolds and Howard (less Smith’s brigade), assisted by Buford’s cavalry, eleven infantry and two cavalry brigades. A Battlefield of July 1st T HE field upon which the opposing forces met this day lies north and west of Gettysburg, and is limited on the east and west by two insignificant streams called Rock Creek and Willoughby Run. It is limited on the south by the Hanover and Fairfield roads, and is traversed by the roads running to Chambersburg, Mummasb'urg, Carlisle, York and Harrisburg. About a half mile west of the town there is a ridge running due north and south, which forms the divide between the two streams. At its extreme north end, where, in the report of the battle it is called Oak Hill, it rises 120 feet above the creeks; opposite the town, where it is called Seminary Ridge, it rises to a height of only 60 feet. Its eastern slope is quite steep ; its western very gentle. Between Rock Creek and this ridge is a level plain. Its only elevation is Barlow’s Knoll, which rises about 30 feet above the level of the plain and is connected with Seminary Ridge by a low divide. The field between Seminary Ridge and Willoughby Run, is traversed by two intermediate ridges, both radiating from Oak Hell. The first ridge west of Seminary Ridge, crosses the Fairfield road 14 of a mile west of Seminary Ridge. North of the Chambersburg road, the depression between this and Seminary Ridge is hardly perceptible, but at the Fairfield road its elevation is 15 feet less than Reynold's Ridge, which is, 20 feet less than Seminary Ridge. Between Reynold’s Ridge and Willoughby Run and about 350 yards from the former is McPherson Ridge. This ridge is pierced by Bender’s Ravine, north of the Chambersburg road and terminates in the McPherson Woods. The depression between this and Reynold’s Ridge is a shallow one. The Western Maryland Railroad, at the time of the battle graded but not completed, runs nearly parallel to and about 100 yards north of the Chambersburg road. It traversed all the ridges above described in cuts from 8 to 20 feet deep. The field was generally open, but scattered over it were groves of small extent. The most notable was the McPherson Woods, a grove extending from Reynold’s Ridge to Willoughby Run; Shead’s Grove, covering the west slope of Oak Ridge from the railroad northward, and the Seminary Grove, between the Chambersburg and Fairfield roads. In rear of the position and the town, is Cemetery Hill. This elevation commands the plain north of it by about 100 feet, and the ridge at the Seminary buildings by about 50 feet. Since it commanded all the reads by which the 1st and 11th corps could retreat or be reinforced, it was the true key-point of the position. 43 O N the afternoon of June 30th, General Meade directed .the chief of engineers to select a field of battle on which his army might be con- centrated, whatever General Lee’s line of approach, whether by Har- risburg or Gettysburg — indicating the general line of Pipe Creek, as a suit- able locality. Carefully drawn instructions were sent to the corps command- ers as to the occupation of this line should it be ordered ; but it was added that developments might cause the offensive to be assumed from present posi- tion. These orders were afterward cited as indicating General Meade’s in- tention was not to fight at Gettysburg. They were, under any circumstances, wise and proper orders ; but events finally controlled the actions of both leaders. At 7:00 A.M., July 1st, General Buford’s scouts reported Heth’s division advancing on the Chambersburg road (see page 2), when Gamble’s cavalry brigade formed on McPherson’s ridge from the Fairfield road to the railroad cut, with one section of Calef’s battery A, 2nd U. S., on the Chambersburg road. Devin formed his disposable squadrons from Gamble’s right toward Oak Hill, from which he had afterward transferred them to the north of the town to meet Ewell. As Heth’s* division advanced, he threw Archer’s brigade to the right. Davis’ brigade to the left of the Chambersburg road, with Pettigrew’s and Brockenbrough’s brigades in support. The Confederates advanced, skirmishing heavily with Buford’s dismounted troopers. Calef’s battery, engaging double the number of its own guns, was served with an efficiency worthy of its former reputation as “Duncan’s battery,” in the Mexican war, and so enabled the cavalry to hold their long line for two hours. When Buford’s report of the enemy’s advance reached General Reynolds ordering the 1st and General Howard - — \ *General Heth, whose division opened the battle on the Confederate side, says, as he ordered his troops forward on the morning of July 1st, he was struck on the head by a minie ball and fell unconscious, in which condition he lay for 30 hours. The hat worn by him was too large for his head — he had folded a newspaner and placed it inside around the band. This paper saved his life — the bullet glancing followed the paper band but ieft a deep dent In his skull. 44 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 45 with the 11th corps to follow, hastened toward Gettysburg with Wadsworth’s division of two brigades (Meredith-Cutler) and Hall’s 2nd Maine battery. On approaching, he heard the sound of a battle, directed the troops to cross the fields toward the firing, galloped himself to the Lutheran Theological Seminary (see page 138), met Bulford and both rode to the front where the dismounted cavalrymen were gallantly holding their ground against great odds. After viewing the field, he sent back word to hasten General Howard, and as the enemy’s main line was now advancing to the attack, directed me, — having arrived in advance of my division, to look to the Fairfield road. I sent Cutler with three of his five regiments north of the railroad cut (see page 2), posted the other two under Colonel Fowler, of the 84th N. Y. (14th Brooklyn) regiment, south of the railroad cut, replaced Calef’s battery by Hall’s, thus relieving the cavalry. In the meantime, Archer’s brigade had occupied McPherson’s Woods, as Meredith’s “Iron Brigade” came up they were sent forward. I fully recognized the impor- tance of the position to dislodge Archer.* At the entrance of the woods they saw Reynolds in person and animated by his presence, the men of the Iron Brigade rushed forward, struck successive heavy blows, out-flanked and turned the enemy’s right, captured General Archer and a large number of his men, and pursued the remainder across Willoughby Run. Wadsworth’s division had thus won decided success against superior numbers, but it was at grievous cost to the army and the country, for General Reynolds, while directing the operation, was killed. It was not, however, until by his promptitude and gallantry he had determined the decisive field of the war, and had opened brilliantly a battle, which re- quired three days of hard fighting to close with a victory. To him may be applied, in a wider sense than in its original one, Napiek’s happy Eulogium on Ridge. “No man died on that field with more glory than he; yet many died, and there was much glory.” The fatal bullet pierced his head and he fell, dying almost instantly. His remains were taken to Lancaster, Pa., the city of his birth, where, on July 4th, midst tolling bells and muffled drums, and solemn requiems sadly chanted, all that was mortal was laid away in quiet rest until that day when carnal strife is lost in everlasting peace” (see page 42). *General Archer’s men had been told that they would meet nothing but Pennsylvania militia which they expected to brush out of the way with but little trouble ; but when they saw the “Iron Brigade,” some of them were heard to say “ ’Taint no Militia ; there’s them black hatted devils again; it’s the Army of the Potomac!” Note. — Maj.-Gen. J. G. Rosengarden says of Major-General Reynolds ; "Brave, generous and true, his courage never failed where duty called. In all the intrigues of the army, and interference of the politicians and its management, he silently set aside the tempting offers to take part, and served his successive commanders with unswerving loyalty, zeal and faith. In the full flush of life and health, watching and even leading the attack of a comparatively small body, a glorious picture of the best type of military leader, superbly mounted, horse and man sharing in the excitement of the shock of battle. Reynolds was, of course, a shining mark to the enemy. He had taken his troops into a heavy growth of timber, and, under their regimental and brigade commanders, the men did their work well and .promptly. Re- turning to rejoin the expected division, he received the fatal shot. At that moment his body was taken to the rear, for his death was almost instantaneous. General Archer and other prisoners were sent to the rear almost at the same time, and their respectful conduct was in itself the highest tribute they could pay to him who had thus fallen.” 46 THE BLUE AND GRAY The line north of the Chambersburg road (Cutler’s brigade) had hardly formed when it was struck by Davis’ brigade on its front and right flank, whereupon to save it I ordered it to fall back to Seminary Ridge. This order not reaching the 147th N. Y. regiment, its gallant commander held it in its position until having lost half its number, the order to retire was repeated. Hall’s battery was now imperiled, it withdrew by sections, fighting at close range and suffering severely. Major Fowler thereupon changed his front to face Davis’ brigade which held the railroad cut with Dawe’s 6th 'Wisconsin regiment, I sent to aid the 147th N. Y. and 14th Brooklyn regiments, which charged and drove Davis from the field. The Confederates suffered severely, losing all its field officers but two, and a large proportion of its men killed, wounded and captured, the brigade being disabled for further effective service that day.* After the repulse of Archer and Davis’ brigades, Heth’s division was formed in line mostly south of the Chambersburg road, with Degram’s and McIntosh’s artillery (9 batteries) occupied the commanding position on Herr’s Ridge west of Willoughby Run. I then reestablished our former line, Meredith’s brigade, holding McPherson’s Woods. Soon after Rowley’s and Robinson’s divisions and the four remaining batteries of the corps artillery arrived. Rowley’s (my old) division was thrown forward. Stone’s brigade to the interval between Meredith’s and Cutler’s brigades, and Biddle’s brigade with Cooper’s battery to occupy the ridge between the woods and the Fairfield road. Reynold’s battery relieving Hall’s battery. Calef’s IT. S. battery rejoined Gamble’s cavalry brigade now in reserve. Robinson’s division, two brigades (Paul-Baxter), was halted near the base of Seminary Ridge. By this time near noon, Gen. 0. 0. Howard arrived, assumed command, directed General Schurz, temporarily com- manding the 1 1th corps, to prolong our line toward Oak Hill, with Schimmelfening’s and Barlow’s divisions of two brigades each, the former (Yon Amsberg-Ivryzanowski’s), the latter (Ames-Von Gilsa’s), and three batteries (Wheeler’s 13th N. Y., Dilger’s 1st Ohio, Wilkenson’s 4th U. S.), and posted Stinwehr’s division of two brigades ( Coster-Smith’s), and two batteries on Cemetery Hill as a rallying point. By 1 : 00 P.M., when his corps was arriving, Gen. Buford reported the approach of Ewell’s corps by the Harrisburg road. General Howard then called on General Sickles commanding the 3rd corps at Emmitsburg *Gen. R. R. Dawes says, of the charge of the 6th Wis. regiment at the railroad cut (see page 2) : “The only command I gave, as we advanced, was ‘Align on the colors; close up on the flag !’ The regiment was being broken up so that this order alone could hold the body together. Meanwhile the colors were down upon the ground several times, but were raised at once by the heroes of the color-guards ; not one of the guards escaped, every man being killed or wounded. Pour hundred and twenty men started from the Chambersburg road (see page 2), of whom 240 reached the cut; years afterwards I found the distance passed over to be 175 paces. Every officer proved himself brave, true and heroic, encouraging the men to breast this deadly storm; but the real impetus was the eager, determined valor of our men who carried muskets in the ranks. The enemy’s flags could be seen waving defiantly above the edge of the cut. A heroic ambition to capture it took possession of several of our men. Corporal Eggleston, a mere boy, sprang forward to seize it, was shot dead the moment his hand touched the flag. Into the deadly mel’ee rushed Corporal Waller, who seized and held the battle flag. It was that belonging to the 2nd Miss, regiment. Corporal Kelly turned to me as we both moved hurriedly forward. He pulled open his shirt and a mark where a deadly minie ball entered his breast was visible. He said: ‘Colonel, won’t you please write my folks that I died a soldier.’ ’’ BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 47 and General Slocum, commanding the 12th corps at Two Tavers for aid, to which both of these officers promptly responded. It was now no longer battle of QETTTSBrRG-jajy i«t, 1863 , afternoon. a question of prolonging our line, but of protecting it against Ewell while engaged in front with Hill. General Schurz’s two divisions, hardly 6,000 effectives, accordingly formed in line on the open plain half a mile north of the town. They were too weak to cover the ground, and a wide interval was left between the two corps cov- ered only by the fire of Dil- ger’s and Wheeler’s batter- ies. That morning whilst on the march toward Cashtown, General Ewell received Gen- eral Hill’s message that his corps was advancing on Gettysburg, whereupon he (Ewell) turned the head of his men to that point. Re- porting the change by a staff-officer to General Lee, Ewell was instructed that if the Federals were in force, a general battle was not to be brought on until the rest of the army was up. Approaching Gettysburg, General Bodes , guided by the sound of a battle, followed the prolongation of Oak Hill; Iverson, Daniel and Ramseur’s brigades on the western, O’Neal and Dole’s brigades on the eastern slope. General Ewell recog- nizing the importance of Oak Hill, ordered it to be occupied by Carter’s artillery battalion of four ( Carter’s Va., Fry’s Va., Page’s V a. and Reese’s Alb.) batteries of four guns each, which immediately opened fire on both of the Federal corps, enfilading our entire line. This caused General Wadsworth again to withdraw Cutler’s brigade to Seminary Ridge and Reynold’s battery was posted near McPherson’s Woods under partial cover. Stone therefore placed two (143rd, 149th Pa.) of his three regiments on the Chambersburg road, so as to face Oak Hill. This left an interval between Stone and Cutler’s brigades through which the batteries of Cooper and Reynolds could fire with effect, giving also to these lines a cross-fire on troops entering the angle between them. General Robinson now sent his two (Paul-Baxter’s) brigades to strengthen Cutler’s right. They took position behind the stone fence on Oak Ridge. Paul’s brigade facing west, Baxter’s north. General Rodes regarding this advance as a menace, gave orders about 3:00 P.M. to attack. Iverson’s brigade sweep- Note. — Gen. R. F. Hoke, being wounded at the battle of Friedericksburg, and General McGowan at Chancellorsville, their brigades were commanded respectively by J. E. Avery and Abner Perrin. 48 THE BLUE AND GRAY ing around to liis left, engaged Paul’s brigade, O’Neal attacking Baxter’s troops. General Bodes’ attack was therefore unsuccessful. O’Neal’s bri- gade was repulsed by Baxter who had the cover of a sunken (Mummasburg) road; the repulse of O’Neal soon enabled Baxter’s troops to turn upon, Iverson’s brigade. Cutler’s men also attacked Iverson’s troops with an enfilading fire between Shead’s grove and Oak Hill, after losing severely, killed and wounded; three of Iverson’s regiments surrendered. General Robinson reports the capture of 1,000 prisoners and 3 stands of colors. General Paul was severely wounded, losing both eyes. Meanwhile Daniel’s brigade advanced directly on Stone’s brigade, who maintained his line against this attack and also Brockenbrough’s* brigade, of Hill’s corps. Colonel Stone fell severely wounded, Colonel Wister who succeeded him met the same fate, the command of the brigade falling to Colonel Dana. Bamseur who followed Daniel’s left, caused the fighting to become severe. East of the ridge Dole’s troops had been held in observation, but about 3:00 P.M. on the arrival of Early’s division, that approached from the northeast by the Harrisburg road, sent his skirmishers forward, and those of Devin’s Union cavalry had gallantly held the enemy’s advance in check with his dismounted troopers from their line and its hillock on Rock Creek. General Barlow considering this an eligible position for his own right, advanced his division supported by Wilkeson’s 4th U. S. battery and seized it. This made it necessary for General SJvurz to advance Kryzanow- ski’s brigade, of Schimmelfening’s division to connect with Barlow, length- ening his already too extended line. The arrival of General Early’s division of four ( Gordon , Hays, Smith and Avery’s ) brigades of infantry, and Jones’ artillery battalion of four ( Green’s La., Garber’s Va., Tanner’s Va., Carrington’s Va.), batteries of 16 guns, had by this time brought an overwhelming force on the flank and rear of the 11th corps. Jones’ artillery was placed in the woods north- east of Rock Creek, within easy range, enfilading its whole line and took it in reserve, while the brigades of Hays, Gordon and Avery in line, with Smith’s brigade in reserve, advanced about 3:15 P.M., upon Barlow’s position. Dole’s brigade of Bodes’ division, connecting with Gordon’s brigade, an obstinate and bloody contest ensued, in which General Barlow was desperately wounded, and Lieutenant Wilkeson mortally wounded and the whole line was forced back to its original position, on which, with the aid of Coster’s brigade of Steinwehr’s division and Hickman’s Ohio battery from Cemetery Hill. General Schurz endeavored to rally it and cover the town. The fighting here was well sustained, but the Confederates were overpowering in number, and the Union troops were being forced back (see page 55), General Ewell’s troops entering the town from the north at about 5 : 00 P.M. These retrograde movements had un- covered the left flank of the 1st corps and made its right untenable. *General BrocTcenbrough, in an article contributed by Mm to the Philadelphia Weekly Times, states : “As my brigade charged south of the Chambersburg road, I suffered a severe loss in killed and wounded, from the fire of the Pennsylvania Bucktails (Stone’s brigade) who took shelter in the old (McPherson) barn. For a while it seemed as if beneath every shingle on the west of the roof there was a gun barrel” (see page 30). BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 49 Meanwhile the 1st corps had been heavily engaged along its entire line; on the approach of Rodes’ division, General Hill attacked with his divisions. They were thus opposed to a single disconnected Federal line south of the Cliambersburg road, two solid Confederate lines which out- flanked their left a quarter of a mile or more. Biddle’s small brigade, less than 1,000 men, was gradually forced back in the McPherson Woods and beyond. Meredith and Dana’s brigades respectfully repulsed their assail- ants; but as Biddle’s retirement uncovered their left; they too fell back to successive positions, from which they inflicted heavy losses, until finally all three reached the foot of Seminary Ridge, where Colonel Wainwright, commanding the corps artillery had planted 12 guns south of the Cham- bersburg road, with Stewart ’s battery manned in part by men of Meredith ’s (Iron) brigade, north of it. General Buford had already thrown half of Gamble’s cavalry brigade, dismounted, south of the Fairfield road. Heth’s division had suffered so severely that Pender’s division passed to its front thus bringing fresh troops to bear on the exhausted Federal line.* About 5 : 30 P.M., the whole Confederate line advanced to a final attack, Perrin and Scales’ brigades were badly broken, as Stewart swinging half of his guns on the above-mentioned road raked it. The whole corps being now heavily engaged and its right uncovered, I gave the order to fall back to Cemetery Hill, which was effected in comparatively good order, the rear covered by the 7th Wisconsin regiment turning when necessary to check pursuit. At this time the position of the Union forces was a most critical one. The Confederates advanced in massive columns. The fighting was terrible. Colonel Wainwright had clung with his battery to Seminary Ridge until seeing the infantry retreating to the town, he then moved down the road until lapped on both sides by the enemy, abandoning one gun, all its horses being killed, the 11th corps also left a disabled gun on the field. Of the troops who passed through the town, many became confused, got entangled in the streets. The Confederates rushed after them (see page 55), making prisoners in the town and on the roads leading to Ceme- tery Hill. Thus the 1st day’s battle ended in defeat, through the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the Confederate forces. The Union troops were driven from all ground fought over that day, also from the town, being compelled to leave their dead and wounded in the hands of the enemy (see page 61). So you will understand that the general moral effect of the 1st day’s battle was greatly against the Union Army. The hard fighting of this day prevented the enemy from occupying the best position, and the heroic work of the Union troops had saved the credit of the day, and made possible the victory. *As evidence that the Confederates lost heavily this day, I quote from General Heth’s official report. The general himself was severely wounded. He says : “In less than 25 min- utes, my division lost in killed and wounded, over 2.700 men.” The character of the fighting may also be judged from the loss sustained by the 151st Pennsylvania regiment, which taking into action 466 officers and men, lost 337 killed and wounded in about 40 minutes, mean- while inflicting a nearly equivalent loss upon the N. C. regiment opposing. •*»*»• 4 50 THE BLUE AND GRAY On ascending Cemetery Hill, the retreating Union troops found the sharpshooters of General Steinwehr’s division occupying the buildings of the town in front of their line. Colonel Wainwright and Osbourn soon had a formidable array of cannon ready to cover with its fire all the approaches. General Buford assembled his cavalry on the plain southwest of Cemetery Hill, covering the left and presenting a firm front to any attempt at pursuit. The first corps found a small reinforcement awaiting it, in the 7th Indiana regiment, part of the train escort which brought about 500 fresh troops. General Wadsworth led them to Culp’s Hill, where under directions of Captain Patterson, a defensive line was constructed. There brigade (Cutler’s) soon joined them; wood and stone were plentiful, and their line was solidly established (see page 142). An Heroic Incident — Sgt. Benjamin Crippen Refuses to Surrender the Flag. Lieut. -Col. Freemantle, of the English army, a spec- tator, riding by the side of General Hill, relates the follow- ing: “A Yankee color-bearer floated his standard in the field and the regiment fought around it, and when at last it was obliged to retreat, the color-bearer retreated last of all, turning around now and then to shake his fist in the face of the advancing Confederates. ’ ’ He was shot. General Hill said he felt sorry when he saw this gallant soldier meet his fate. This regiment was the 143rd Pa. and the color-bearer Sgt. Ben. Crippen, to whose heroic conduct the survivors of the regiment have erected a monument near the spot where he fell. It is chiselled from granite, life size, and in that defiant attitude in which he met his death. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 51 General Lee, who witnessed the final attack of this day, sent Colonel Long of his staff, a competent officer, to examine the position, and directed General Eivell to carry it if practicable, renewing however, his previous warning to avoid bringing on a general engagement until his army was all up. Both of these officers found the position a formidable one, strongly occupied and not accessible to artillery fire. General Eivell’ s men were indeed in no condition for immediate assault; General Rodes’ division had suffered severely; General Early had but two brigades disposable, the other two having been sent on a report of the advance of the Federal troops, probably the 12th corps then near, by watching the York road. General Hill’s two ( Heth , Pender’s ) divisions had been roughly handled, and he withdrew them to Seminary Ridge, as General Rodes’ division entered the town. Ewell’s absent divi- sion ( Edward Johnson), of four ( Stewart , Jones, Walker and Nicholls’) brigades was expected, but did not arrive until dark, when the 3rd and 12th corps of the Union Army was arriving. In fact, an assault by the Confederates was not practicable before 7 : 30 P.M., and after that the position was perfectly secure. For the first time that day the Federals had advantage of position and sufficient troops and artillery to occupy it, and Ewell would not have been justified in attacking without the positive orders from General Lee, who then wisely abstained from giving them. * * * A Comparison. — The hard fighting of this clay is measured by that best test, the casualty list strikingly alike on both sides, in spite of the contrast of the numbers engaged. Much of the details of this kind will be found in ‘ ‘ Fox ’s Book of Regimental Losses.” The 1st corps took into action 8,200 and lost 6,025. The 11th corps, General Howard says, took into action ‘‘hardly 6,000” and lost 3,801. On the Confederate side in General Hill’s corps, Heth says he took into action 7,000 and lost 2,850, — -and Pender lost 1,690 out of 4,260 engaged. Rodes’ division had 6,207 engaged and lost 2,853. Early’s division having 5,477 engaged, lost 1,188. The 1st corps of the Union Army lost over 70 per cent., the 11th over 60 per cent. The 1st (Wadsworth’s) division had 2,300 engaged and lost 2,128. The 2nd (Robinson’s) division had 2,500 engaged and lost 1,667, while the 3rd (Rowley’s) division had 2,069 engaged and lost 1,748, over 80 per cent. Biddle’s brigade lost 897 out of 1,287 engaged, leaving only 390, a fragment of a regiment. Colonel Wister reports that Stone’s brigade lost 825 out of 1,300 engaged. The Confederate report lays stress on the severity of their losses. The 26th N. C. regiment, reported by the “War Department,” lost 588 out of 800 engaged, One company lost out of 3 officers and 84 men, all the officers and 83 men; another company of the 11th N. C. regiment lost 36 men out of 38 engaged. The Confederate Army fought to win the first day, but the Union Army fought to win the next day, and the next, and the final victory. The Account Here Given of this Interesting Incident is Taken from an Article by Capt. T. J. Mackey of the Confederate Army, later Published in McClure’s Magazine. T HOUGH never a war was fought with more earnestness than our own civil war between the North and the South, never a war was. marked by more deeds of noble kindness between men, officers and privates, of the contending sides. Serving at the front during the entire war as a captain of engineers in the Confederate Army, many such deeds came under my own personal attention, and many have been related to me by eye-witnesses. Here is one especially worthy of record: The advance of General Early’s line of battle commenced early on the afternoon of July 1st. The brigade commanded by Maj.-Gen. J. B. Gordon, of Georgia, was among those to attack the Union right. The daring commander of that corps occupied a position so far advanced beyond the main line of the Federal Army, that, while it invited attack, it placed him beyond the reach of ready support when the crisis of battle came to him in the rush of charging lines more extended than his own. The Confederate advance was steady, and it was bravely met by the Union troops, who for the first time found themselves engaged in battle on the soil of the North, which until then had been virgin to the war. It was “a far cry” from Richmond to Gettysburg, yet Lee was in their front, and they seemed resolved to welcome their southern visitors “with bloody hands to hospitable graves.” But the Federal flank rested in the air, and being turned, the line was badly broken and, despite a bravely resolute defense against the well-ordered attack of the Confederate veterans was forced to fall back. General Gordon’s brigade was in motion at a double-quick to seize and hold the vantage ground in their front from which the opposing line had retreated, when Gordon saw laying directly in his path the apparently dead body of a Union officer. He checked his horse, and then observed that the officer was still living. He at once dismounted, and seeing the head of his wounded foeman was lying in a depression in the ground, placed under it a nearby knapsack. While raising him at the shoulder for that purpose, he saw that the blood was trickling from a bullet-hole in the back, and then knew that the officer had been shot through the breast. He then gave him a drink from a flask of brandy and water, and, as the man revived, said, while leaning over him, ‘ ‘ I am very sorry to see you in this condition. I am General Gordon. Please tell me who you are, I wish to aid you all I can. ’ ’ The answer came in feeble tones: “Thank you, General, I am Brigadier-General Barlow of New York. You can do nothing for me; I am dying.” Then, after a pause he said, “Yes you can; my wife is at either the headquarters of General 52 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 53 Howard, or Meade. If you survive the battle, please let her know I died doing my duty. ’ ’ General Gordon replied: “Your message, if I live, shall surely be given to your wife. Can I do nothing more for you!” After a brief pause. General Barlow re- sponded: “May God bless you, only one thing more. Feel in the breast pocket of my coat, the left breast and take out a pack of letters.” As General Gordon unbuttoned the blood-soaked coat and took out the packet, the seemingly dying soldier said : ‘ ‘ Now please read one to me. They are from my wife, and I wish that her words shall be the last I hear in this world. Besting on one knee at his side, General Gordon, in clear tones but with tearful eyes, read the letter. It was the missive of a noble woman to her worthy husband whom she knew to be in daily peril of his life, and with pious ferver breathed a prayer for his safety, and commended him to the care of the god of battles. As the reading of the letter ended. General Barlow said: “Thank you, General. Now please tear them all up. I would not have them read by others.” General Gordon tore them into fragments and scattered them on the field, “Shot- sown and bladed thick with steel. ’ ’ Then pressing General Barlow ’s hand, General Gordon bade him good-bye and mounting his horse quickly joined his command. He hastily penned a note resting on the pommel of his saddle, giving General Barlow ’s message to his wife, stated that he was still living, though seriously wounded, and informing her where he lay. Addressing the note to Mrs. General Barlow, at Meade’s headquarters, he handed it to one of his staff, told him to place a white handkerchief upon his sword, and ride in a gallop toward the Union line and deliver the note to Mrs. Barlow. The officer promptly obeyed the order. He was not fired upon, and on being met by a Union officer who advanced to learn his business, he presented the note, which was received and read, with the assurance that it should be delivered instantly. Let us turn from Gettysburg to the capital “Washington,” where, eleven years later General Gordon held with honor, a seat as senator of the United States, and was present at a dinner party given by O. B. Potter, a representative in Congress from the State of New York. Upon Mr. Potter introducing to him a gentleman with the title of General Barlow, General Gordon remarked: “Are you a relative of the General Barlow, a gallant soldier who was killed at Gettysburg?” The answer was: “I am that General Barlow who was killed at Gettysburg, and you are the General Gordon who succored me ! ’ ’ The meeting was worthy of two such brave men — every inch American soldiers. * * * I should add that, on receiving General Gordon’s note which had been speedily delivered, Mrs. Barlow hastened to the field, though not without danger to her person for the battle was still in progress. She soon found her husband and had him borne to a near-by farm-house where he could receive surgical attendance. Through her de- voted ministration he was enabled to resume the command of the ‘ ‘ Excelsior Brigade, ’ ’ and add to the splendid reputation which it achieved under General Sickles, its first commander. At the first reunion of the “Blue and Gray,” held at Gettysburg July 1st, 1888, General Gordon, then the governor of the State of Georgia, and General Barlow, a prominent attorney of New York City, met upon the same spot where they first met in battle. * * * Movement of the Troops Not Engaged in Battle July 1st. Confederate Army. — Early in the morning, July 1st, Anderson’s division marched from the vicinity of Feyetteville to Cashtown, in pursuance of orders received on the previous day. At the latter place General Anderson heard the artillery of Eeth’s morning attack, and an hour later received orders from General Hill to move to Gettysburg, reaching the field in the afternoon, shortly after General Pender’s division moved to attack and remained in reserve until the close of the day. 54 TIIE BLUE AND GRAY McLaw’s and Hood’s divisions, followed Anderson through, the mountain gaps, their advance was so delayed by Ewell’s wagons that they bivouacked that night near Marsh Creek bridge on the Chambersburg road (see page 2). General Hood left one brigade (Law’s) on picket duty at New Guilford, which did not join the division until noon July 2nd. On July 1st, General Stuart with the brigades of Fitzliugh Lee and Chambliss marched from Dover to Carlisle, where he captured General Smith’s forces and burned the government barracks, “where the Indian Industrial School now stands.’’* General Hampton with his brigade stopped at Dillsburg, during that night Stuart received orders to move on Gettysburg. Robertson’s brigade and three regiments of Jones’ brigade, reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 2nd, and bivouacked on the road to Cashtown; on the following day they marched through Cashtown to Fairfield. t hnboden’s brigade reached Chambersburg on the evening of July 1st and relieved. General PicLett’s infantry division; the following morning Imboden started for Gettysburg with the trains. General Lee first heard the guns at Gettysburg as he rode toward Cashtown at the head of Hill’s corps on the morning of July 1st, but remained in the vicinity of Cash- town, reaching the field about 4: 30 P.M Union Army. — General Meade was at Taneytown, on July 1st, and received his first information of the battle about 1: 00 P.M., when he learned of the death of General Reynolds. At this time the 2nd corps was also at Taneytown, and he was explaining his proposed position at Pipe Creek to its commander, General Hancock. Since Han- cock was fully acquainted with his plans he at once sent him to Gettysburg to take command of the 1st, 3rd and 11th corps and to examine the site. If, under the existing circumstances, General Hancock found the field a better one he was to notify General Meade, who would order up the remaining troops. Hancock proceeded to Gettysburg, arriving about the time the Union forces were falling back. He at once established a new line along the crest of Cemetery Hill (see page 87). About 6:30 P.M., he sent a written message to Meade, in which he reported General Slocum coming up with the 12th corps and probably General Sickles with his 3rd corps. He stated that the ground appeared to him not unfavorable for a battle with good troops. Upon the receipt of this communication, Meade decided to con- centrate at Gettysburg, toward which point many of his troops were already marching. The 2nd corps started toward Gettysburg that afternoon on the Taneytown road, to protect the right flank of the 1st corps should it retreat to Emmitsburg. This corps reached a point three miles south of Gettysburg after dark and there bivouacked for the night. The 3rd corps was ordered to the front on the afternoon of July 1st by General Howard. This order was modified by General Meade, who directed that a brigade be left at Emmitsburg to guard that point. General Birney left De Trobriand’s brigade and Winslow’s battery, and with the other two marched toward Gettysburg, reaching the left of the field after dark. General Humphrey also left Burling ’s brigade and Smith’s battery, at the same place and with the other two marched on a parallel road to the westward which entered the Emmitsburg road at the Peach Orchard. Being led astray by his guide, did not reach the field until 1 : 00 A.M. July 2nd. As soon as Meade decided on the concentration, he ordered the two brigades left at Emmitsburg to join their commands. They reached the field at 9: 00 A.M. July 2nd. The 5th corps, which had reached Hanover about 5 : 00 P.M. July 1st, had received orders to move to Gettysburg. The 1st and 2nd divisions made a night march and reached Bonneauville at midnight; they were on the march again at 4: 00 A.M. *General Stuart in the Official Report, Vol. 17, p. 697, says not a building was fired ex- cepting the U. S. cavalry barracks, which was burned by my orders, the place having resisted my advance instead of peaceable surrender. tAt Fairfield on the afternoon of July 3rd, the 6th, 7th Va. regiments of Jones’ brigade attacked the 6th U. S. cavalry regiment of Merritt’s brigade. The Union regiment numbered about 400, and its casualties were 232, of whom 184 including the commanding officer were captured. The Confederates lost 60. 56 BLUE AND GRAY July 2nd, and reached the enemy’s position on the Hanover road (see page 126) at 7: 00 A.M. The 3rd division joined the others about noon. That afternoon, Meade ordered the 6th corps to march straight to Gettysburg. They made a forced night march and reached the field between 4: 00 and 6: 00 P. M. July 2nd, by the Baltimore road. The 12th corps reached Two Taverns at 11: 00 A.M., July 1st, that afternoon General Slocum received notice from General Howard that the left wing of the army was heavily engaged. At 3: 30 P.M. he started and reached the field at 5: 00 P.M. On approaching the sound of the battle misdirected Slocum, being anxious to reach the field, quickly sent the 1st division to the Hanover road and threatened Ewell’s left. It was later bivouacked near the Baltimore road east of Eock Creek. The 2nd division crossed the creek and bivouacked near Eound Top. On the morning of July 2nd, Buford, with the brigades of Gamble and Devin, was ordered to Taney town to collect the trains and take them to Westminster; General Gregg, with the brigades of J. I. Gregg and McIntosh, reached the field about noon, July 2nd, and was posted on the extreme right of the line on the Hanover road. General Kilpatrick’s cavalry division spent the 1st and 2nd of July in recon- noitering the country north of the York road, and after the encounter that evening with Stuart’s cavalry ( Jenkin’s brigade) near Hunterstown, his division bivouacked near Two Taverns. General Meade remained at Taneytown until he had dispatched the final orders for concentration to the 3rd, 5th and 6th corps. He then rode to Gettysburg and reached Cemetery Hill shortly after midnight July 2nd. Resume. On the morning of July 2nd, General Lee had, in the immediate vicinity of Gettys- burg, all of Ewell’s and Hill’s corps, and two divisions of Long street’s corps less one brigade, or 33 infantry brigades in all. Of these 16 had not been engaged in the battle of July 1st. He had also one brigade of cavalry.* At the same time, General Meade had in the vicinity of Gettysburg all of the 1st, 2nd, 11th and 12th corps, four brigades of the 3rd and six brigades of the 5th corps. In all he had 39 infantry brigades; of which 11 had been engaged in the battle of the 1st day. In addition he had Buford’s two cavalry brigades. Although numerically stronger on paper, it is probable that there was little difference in the numerical strength of the two armies. At noon Law’s brigade had joined Longstreet’s corps, the two brigades left at Emmitsburg had joined the 3rd corps and the 3rd division had joined its 5th corps; Lee, therefore, had 34 brigades, and Meade had 43. During this morning, Gregg’s two cavalry brigades, and the reserve artillery of the Union Army arrived, but Buford ’s two brigades marched to Taneytown. About 4: 00 P.M. the 6th corps began to arrive and at dark all the infantry of both armies was on or near the field. *In his report of the battle July 2nd, General Lee says: “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by tne Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy’s main body, as he was enabled to restrain our toraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. The remainder of Ewell's and Hill’s corps having arrived and two divisions of Longstreet’s, our preparations were made accordingly. The Hero of Gettysburg. A T the commencement of the Battle of Gettysburg July 1st, 1863, John L. Burns, a citizen of that place, inspired by the spirit of true patriotism, shouldered his rille and went out to meet the enemy, who were then advancing towards Gettysburg, and within a short distance of the town. In the early part of the engagement he was wounded twice, and, although suffering greatly from Iiis wounds he faltered not, but pressed on, taking an active part until 4: 00 P.M., when he fell badly wounded in the ankle. Soon after his fall the loyal army retreated, leaving him upon the field, in the enemy’s line, where he remained until the following morning. John Burns was for many years the borough constable of Gettysburg, and was* very strong-willed and positive. He died February 4th, 1872, and was buried in Ever- green Cemetery. In his official report, General Doubleday says: “My thanks are specially due to a citizen of Gettysburg named John Burns, who although over seventy years of age, shouldered his musket and offered his services to Colonel Wister, 150th Penna. Vol. Colonel Wister advised him to fight in the woods, as there was more shelter there; but he preferred to join our line of skirmishers in the open fields. When our troops retired he fought with the Iron Brigade. ’ ’ Just where the tide of battle turns, Erect and lonely, stood old John Burns. How do you think the man was dressed? He wore an ancient long buff vest, Yellow as saffron — but his best; And buttoned over his manly breast Was a bright blue coat, with a rolling collar, And large gilt buttons — size of a dollar — With tails the country-folk called “swaller.” He wore a broad-brimmed bell-crowned hat. White as the locks on which it sat. Close at his elbows all that day. Veterans of the Peninsula, Sunburnt and bearded, charged away ; And striplings, downy of lip and chin — Clerks that the Home Guard mustered in — Glanced, as they passed, at the hat he wore, Then at the rifle his right hand bore ; And hailed him, from out their youthful lore, With scraps of a slangy repertoire. ’Twas but a moment for that respect Which clothes all courage their voices checked And something the wildest could understand, Spake in the old man's strong right hand, And his corded throat and the lurking frown Of his eyebrows under his old bell-crown ; Until, as they gazed, there crept an awe Through the ranks in whispers, and some men «aw In the antique vestments and long black hair, The Past of the Nation in battle there ; And some of the soldiers since declare. That the gleam of his old white hat afar, Like the crested plume of the brave Navarre, That day was their oriflamme of war. That is the story of Old John Burns ; This is the moral the reader learns : In fighting the battle, the question’s whether You’ll show a hat that’s white, or a feather. 57 Battlefield of July 2nd and 3rd T HE field occupied by the opposing troops on these days, lies south of the Fairfield and Hanover roads. Its western limit is Willoughby Run; the eastern, the wooded ridge which passes through Wolf Hill, and crosses the Hanover road about a mile east of Rock Creek. The field is traversed by three of the highways over which the Union Army reached the field ; the Emmitsburg, Taneytown and Baltimore roads. These are connected by various cross roads, the principal of which is the Wheatfield road, running from the Peach Orchard, on the Emmitsburg road, east- ward to near the bridge over Rock Creek, on the Baltimore road. From the Peach Orchard the road runs westward to Willoughby Run, Avhence a branch road runs to the Black Horse Tavern on the Fairfield road. The field is traversed by various ridges which separate the watersheds of Rock Creek, AVilloughby Run and their various tributaries. The principal of these ridges are Cemetery, Emmitsburg Road, Seminary and Schneider’s Ridges, East Cemetery and Culp’s Hill, thence parallel to the Baltimore road to Spangler’s Spring. Each of these hills command the field to the north by about 100 feet. The lowest point- of the connecting ridge is about 50 feet lower than the summit of the hills. From Culp’s Hill the crest of the ridge slopes gradually downward to Spangler’s Spring, where the ridge terminates. Culp’s Hill and the ridge to the south was covered by a thick growth of timber and was strewn thick with boulders. In rear of Culp’s Hill is a valley followed by the Baltimore road. This valley and the ridge south of Culp’s Hill is com- manded by Power’s Hill in the angle between the Baltimore and Taney- town roads. Cemetery Ridge, now followed by Hancock, Sedgwick and Sykes Avenue, runs southward from Cemetery Hill to Round Tops. From Cemetery' Hell, as far southward as the intersection of Plum Run, and the Emmitsburg road near the Codori’s House, this ridge is very clearly defined and commands all the ground to Seminary Ridge on its west. From this point southward, as far as the Round Tops, it is broken, wooded and the field of view is limited by the ridge followed by the Emmitsburg road. Big Round Top is the most conspicuous elevation in the vicinity of Gettysburg; it is a conical peak, covered with thick growth of timber and innumerable boulders which rises 150 feet higher than Cemetery Hill. Little Round Top is a rocky hill separated from Big Round Top by a wooded depression about 40 feet lower than Big Round Top. From the latter hill, the view is limited only by Seminary and Schneider’s ridges. At the time of the battle the slope in front of Little Round Top was cleared of heavy timber. 58 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 59 Schneider’s Ridge is the prolongation of the ridge east of Willoughby Run. It crosses the Emmitsburg road about three-quarters of a mile south of the Peach Orchard. Seminary Ridge, south of the Chambers- burg road, is a prolongation of the same ridge. It runs nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road and Cemetery Ridge until it intersects Schneider’s Ridge. Seminary and Schneider’s Ridges, are now followed by Western Confederate Avenue. The Emmitsburg Road Ridge begins just west of the Codori’s House and terminates near the intersection of the Emmitsburg-Wheatfield roads. It is followed by Sickles Avenue. Devil’s Den is a cluster of large boulders, west of Plum Run, in front of Round Tops. The Loop is a rocky salient of the ridge between Devil’s Den and the Peach Orchard. The Wheatfield is an open field almost surrounded by woods which lies behind the line (northeast) connecting Devil’s Den and the Loop. Brinkerhoff’s Ridge, east of Rock Creek, is a ridge extending from Rock Creek across the Hanover road; Wolf Hill on this ridge, is about 25 feet higher than Culp’s Hill. In the angle south of the Hanover road, east of Rock Creek is Benner’s Hill, whose elevation is 50 feet less than Culp’s Hill. At the time of the battle, Wolf Hill, Culp’s Hill, Big Round Top, and nearly all the ground in front of Big Round Top, Devil’s Den and the Loop were covered with trees and undergrowth. Plum Run is a branch of Rock Creek, whose valley (Valley of Death) separates Devil’s Den from the Round Tops, a branch valley also separates Devil’s Den and the Loop from the Emmitsburg road. Pitzer’s Run is a small branch of Willoughby Run, which is nearly parallel to Seminary Ridge, and has two small dry branches which intersects this ridge. Federal Position on the Morning of July 2d A FTER General Meade arrived he established his headquarters near the Cemetery on the Taney town road (see page 38), and he at once proceeded to study the position and decided on the proper disposi- tion of the troops. General Howard, with the 11th corps, was left in its position of the previous evening. Its artillery was on the crest of Cemetery Hill, and its infantry, on the slope in advance ; one division was on the Taneytown road ; one between the Taneytown and Baltimore roads ; and the other east of the Baltimore road. The 1st, General Newton’s corps,* had one division on the right of the 11th corps extending the line to the summit of Culp’s Hill; one division on the left of the lltli corps at Ziegler’s Grove; the other formed a reserve in rear of the 11th corps. The 2nd division of the 12th corps, being relieved by the 3rd corps, was marched from the vicinity of Little Round Top to Culp’s Hill, and there put in position on the right of Wadsworth’s division of the 1st corps. Its line extended from the summit of the hill southeast to Spangler’s Spring (see page 66), two brigades being in the first line and one in the second. The 1st division, being relieved on the east side of Rock Creek by the 5th corps, was posted on the right of the 2nd division, extending the line along the Creek ; one brigade was to the left and at Spangler ’s Spring ; the others to the rear and right. Knapp ’s battery, five guns, was placed on Culp’s Hill in the afternoon of t^at day. The 1st and 2nd divisions of the 5th corps arrived by the Hanover road at about 7 : 00 A.M., and remained east of Rock Creek until General Gregg ’s cavalry division arrived in that vicinity about noon ; these two divisions now joined by the third, took post as a reserve on the west bank of Rock Creek, where the roads fork to Cemetery Hill and Round Top. The 2nd corps marched to the field early in the morning, and was posted on the left of the 11th corps, extending the line toward Round Top; the 3rd division on the right ; the 2nd in the center, and the 1st on the left. Each division had a brigade in the second line. The corps artillery was placed in the intervals between the brigades of the first line. In the morning the 3rd corps was bivouacked in mass along the Taney- town road, north of Little Round Top. Being ordered to relieve the 2nd division of the 12th corps and extend the line of the 2nd corps southward ; the 1st division was extended to Little Round Top. About noon the 2nd division was moved to a line in front of Plum Run, and deployed in three ‘Major-General Reynolds of the 1st corps was killed July 1st, while in command of the left wing of the Union Army; General Doubleday commanded the corps July 1st, and General Newton, who was assigned to that command, superseded him July 2nd. 60 62 BLUE AND GRAY lines. The left of the corps now extended from Little Round Top, to a point in front of the 2nd corps. The picket line of this corps was along the Emmitsburg road. The 6th corps did not reach the field during that morning. Confederate Position. — Because of the absence of his cavalry, General Lee was wholly in ignorance as to the position of all the Union corps, save the 1st and 11th. As the Union line from Cemetery Hill eastward ap- peared to be a strong one, on the evening of July 1st, Gen- eral Lee ordered General Eivell to move his corps to the right, if it could not be used to advantage where it was. Two of Ewell’s aids had how- ever been on Culp’s Hill in the early evening and re- ported it unoccupied; as this hill was an important tactical point. Ewell was allowed to remain to secure it. At midnight therefore, Ewell directed General Johnson to occupy this hill if he had not already done so; but the latter, on sending out a reconnoitering party found it occupied by a regi- ment (7th Ind.) of the 1st corps. While the reconnoitering party was out, they captured a message from General Sykes to General Meade, saying that he would reach the field at daylight by the Hanover road. As this would bring the 5th corps on his flank and rear, Johnson decided to await further orders before attacking Culp’s Hill. General Ijee’s plans on the 2nd day was to attack both flanks and the center at the same time. He had decided to make his main attack with his right wing, as the ground here seemed favorable for offense. The main attack was to be made by General Longstreet with three divisions not em- ployed on the preceding day; those of Hood and McLaw’s, of his own and Anderson’s division of General Hill’s corps. As it was too late to move Ewell’s corps to their support after the latter found he could not take Culp’s Hill without fighting, Lee ordered him to make a demonstration at the time of Long street’s attack and convert it into a regular attack if possible. General Hill was to occupy the center and threaten attack to prevent the reinforcement of the wings of the Federal army. In the morning, the position of the Confederate Army was as follows : East of Rock Creek with Johnson’s division of three ( Stewart , Jones’ and Nicholls ’ brigades, south of the Hanover road, and Gordon and Smith’s brigades of Early’s division near the York road. Between Rock Creek and BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 63 the town were the brigades of Hays and Avery (Vie Hoke). In the town extending to Seminary Ridge, were the brigades of Doles, Iverson and Ramseur; to their right and rear, along the railroad, were those of Daniel and O’Neal of Rodes ’ division. General Pender’s division was along Semi- nary Ridge. Anderson’s division was in the rear at Willoughby Run ; Hood and McLaiv’s divisions were near March Creek on the Chambersburg road. It was General Lee’s intention to make the attack in the morning as early as possible, but there were unavoidable delays due to the necessary examination of the position and the movement of the troops into place. Anderson’s division was moved in the morning (near noon) from Willoughby Run, and deployed in a single line along Seminary Ridge south of Pender’s division, thus relieving Heth’s division which was moved back to Willoughby Run. That morning, Hood and McLaw’s divisions of Longstreet’s corps, were moved from Marsh Creek bridge (see page 2) to a position near the Black Horse Tavern, but north of the Fairfield road. About noon being joined by Law’s brigade,* they started to march by a road running from the above tavern direct to Willoughby Run. After moving for some distance along this road, it was apparent that the column would come in full view of Round Top. As it was desired to have the attack in the nature of a surprise, the column was counter-marched to a point midway between the Fairfield and Chambersburg roads, moved into the valley of Willoughby Run, and then down the valley to the right of Anderson’s division. Here, the divisions were deployed in line behind the belt of woods which crowns Schneider’s Ridge. In the front line from right to left, were the brigades of Law’s, Robertson, Kershaw and Barksdale-, in the 2nd line those of Benning, An- derson, Semme, Wofford. The center of McLaw’s division was the road leading to the Peach Orchard ; that of Hood, the Emmitsburg road. Alexander’s battalion of reserve artillery was in the center of McLaw’s division, and Cabell’s on the right. One-half of Anderson’s divisional ar- tillery was between Anderson and McLaw’s divisions. Two batteries of Henry’s battalion were on the extreme right of the line. The developments of the troops for battle was not completed until about 4 : 00 P.M. Change of Front of the 3rd Corps July 2nd. In the morning all the Confederates visible in the field were in front of the line of the 2nd to the 12th corps. All of Buford’s cavalry had by a misunderstanding, been sent away from the left of the line by General Pleasonton, a fact that General Meade was not aware of until informed by General Sickles ; orders were at once sent to have them returned. This order could not be complied with however until the following day. For information as to the movements of the Confederates on the left, Meade had *General Laiv’s brigade marched from New Guilford, 29 miles in nine hours, then swung into fierce battle, without rest or breakfast, and fought till darkness. 64 BLUE AND GRAY to rely on the signal station on Little Round Top.* “The first report by the signal station of operation on the left flank was made about 11 : 45 A.M., when Wilcox’s skirmishers were sighted. At 11 : 55 A.M., the signal station reported the 3rd corps skirmishers falling back. At 1:30 P.M., they re- ported a large force about 10,000 troops moving from their left to the right, and at 2 : 10 P.M., added that they were moving back toward the Chambers- burg road. This column was evidently Longstr eel’s corps making its counter-march.” — (W. B. No. 45, p. 487.) The flank movement of Longstreet’s corps was discovered when his skirmishers appeared in the woods along Schneider’s Ridge at about 3:30 P.M. The ground occupied by the 3rd corps was rough and wooded; to its left and front were the woods extending from Devil’s Den along the further side of the Wheatfield, and thence in a fringe along Plum Run. It was commanded by the Emmitsburg road ridge, which limited the view in this direction. In front of the above-mentioned ridge where the 3rd corps had its skirmish line, was open country in all directions as far as Seminary and Schneider’s Ridges. Being impressed by the defects of his position and the advantage of the Emmitsburg road ridge, General Sickles rode to General Meade’s headquarters to request Meade to examine the ground in front of the 3rd corps himself or to send General Butterfield, his chief -of-, staff. Unfortunately, General Meade did not anticipate an attack on his left and did not feel that either he or Butterfield could go. However, at that moment, General Hunt, chief of artillery, came in and he was requested by General Meade to accompany General Sickles. It was 3 : 00 P.M. when the two officers rode toward the Peach Orchard to examine Sickles’ proposed line. General Hunt was impressed by the favorable position it would give the enemy if abandoned to him, but also by the difficulties attendant on its occupation by the 3rd corps. He also saw that the right flank of the 3rd corps would be in the air, and that its front would be too long for its effective strength. He noted the woods on Schneider’s Ridge in front of the Peach Orchard and suggested that a reconnoitering party be sent into them. It was this party that met Wilcox’s brigade about 3 : 30 P.M. General Hunt would not take the responsibility of authorizing Sickles to move to his proposed line, but said he would report the matter to General Meade. While awaiting the order he hoped and expected to receive, he advanced General Humphrey’s division beyond Plum Run, and deployed it in three lines, one brigade in each. As Anderson’s] division was now in force in the woods in his front, it was apparent to Sickles that he must now either occupy the Emmitsburg *A Confederate general, who writes: "The wretched signal station upon Little Round Top, that day caused one of our divisions to lose two hours, and probably delayed our assault nearly that long (see page 66). fThe reader must not confound Anderson’s division of Hill’s corps, with Anderson’S brigade of Hood’s division of Longstreet’s corps. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 65 road ridge at once or abandon all hope of occupying it, as the Confederates would soon drive back his skirmish line. Believing he would be sustained in his action, he therefore advanced his whole line. Ward’s brigade of Birney’s division was advanced to Devil’s Den and the woods to its right, and Smith’s 4th N. Y. battery was placed on the knoll. De Trobriand’s brigade was advanced to the Wheatfield and Loop; Graham’s brigade to the Peach Orchard cross roads. As Birney’s line was long he was given Burling ’s brigade, of Humphrey’s division as a reserve. The movement was completed by advancing Carr’s and Brew- ster’s brigades of the same division along the Emmitsburg road. Along this road were placed three batteries of artillery, and the fourth was placed along the Wheatfield road east of the cross-roads. The general line of the 3rd corps is now marked by Sickles’ Avenue. These troops had just reached their new position when Long street’s artillery appeared in their front. General Meade was not aware of this movement, as General Hunt had reported to him that he advised Sickles not to move his troops to this line unless authorized by General Meade. A meeting of the corps commanders was called on the afternoon of July 2nd, in anticipation of the arrival of General Sedgwick with his 6th corps. Meade had already ordered the 5th corps to move to the left of the line to make way for the 6th corps. As General Sickles approached Meade’s headquarters, General Longstreet's artillery opened fire. He at once returned to his corps and was later followed by General Meade. The latter appreciated the impossibility of withdrawing the 3rd corps under fire and therefore confined himself to reinforcing it. General Sykes with his 5th corps and Caldwell’s division of the 2nd corps was ordered to support Sickles. When, about 6 : 00 P.M. the whole advance line gave way, he ordered up the 12th corps ; Hunt was ordered to assist Sickles with artillery and at once sent forward Mc- Gilvery’s brigade, of which two batteries were posted in the Peach Orchard, and two to its left and rear on the Wheatfield road. General Lee, whose headquarters were near the Seminary buildings (see page 138), had not reconnoitered the field since morning; he was under the impression that the main Federal line lay along the Emmitsburg road. His plan was therefore to form Longstreet’s corps across this road beyond the Union flank and then sweep along the road. Although the conditions were found by Longstreet, who had personal charge of the attack to differ somewhat from those upon which the movement was based, he did not feel justified in changing the plans already made. After the preliminary artillery attack, the brigades were to move forward in echelon from right to left and then each face to the left and move parallel to the Emmitsburg road. GEN. WARREN AT SIGNAL STA. \7 lh PA. CAV. STATUE OF GEN. WARBEN ON UTTLE BOUND TOP Second Day’s Battle, Thursday, July 2nd, 1863 The Ever-beginning, Never-ending Topic of Conversation is the Second Day’s Battle of Gettysburg. MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL E. SICKLES VISITS THE BATTLEFIELD. ENERAL SICKLES has been criticized somewhat severity for the erroneous position taken by his corps on the second day of the battle which resulted in the great slaughter at the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. On a subsequent visit to Gettysburg he gave the fol- lowing explanation of his action : “It was quite early when I rode to General Meade’s headquarters for orders. The general told me that he did not think we would be attacked, as he believed the enemy was in no condition to renew the fight. I freely expressed to him my belief that the enemy would not only force a battle at Gettysburg, but would do so soon. From General Meade’s conversation, and his manner, I concluded he did not intend to fight a battle at Gettysburg if he could avoid it. General Butterfield told me that orders were being then prepared for a change of position to Pipe Creek, Md. After waiting some time for a decision as to what was to be done, I said to General Meade that I should put my command in position with a view to meet any emergency along my front, and at the same time asked him to send General Butterfield with me to look over the field and inspect the position I had decided to occupy. “Butterfield is busy,” said he, and he suggested that I use my own judg- ment. I again replied that I should prefer to have some one of his staff officers sent with me and asked that General Hunt be sent. General Meade assented, and together we rode away. Carefully we surveyed the ground in my front. I expressed the opinion that the high ground running from the Emmitsburg road to Round Top was the most advantageous position. Hunt agreed with me. “Then I understand that I am to take this position, and you, as General Meade’s representative, so order.” “I do not care,” said he, “to take the responsibility of ordering you to take that position, but as soon as I can ride back to Meade’s headquarters you will receive his order to do so.” He rode away, but before he reached headquarters, or 1 received any orders my danger became imminent, and I was forced to go into line of battle. Just after I had taken position on the high ground selected, with General Humphrey’s division on the right, and General Birney’s division on the left, I received an order from General Meade to report at his headquarters. There was vigorous skirmishing in my front, I returned •word to the General that I was about to be attacked and could not leave 67 68 THE BLUE AND GRAY the field. It was not long before I received a peremptory order to report at once at headquarters, as General Meade was going to hold an important conference of corps commanders (see page 38). I sent for General Birney, and put him in command, then I rode rapidly to Meade’s headquarters. As I rode along I could hear the increasing fire along the line, and I felt very solicitous for my command. As I came up to headquarters at a rapid gait, General Meade came out hurriedly and said, “Don’t dismount, don’t dismount ! I fear your whole line is engaged, return to your command, and in a few moments I will join you on the field. I rode back with all possible speed, reaching my corps before the enemy had made his first furious assault. General Meade soon joined me, and together we in- spected the position I had taken. “Isn’t your line too much extended?” said he. “It is,” I replied, “but I haven’t the Army of the Potomac, and have a wide space to cover. Reserves should at once be sent up. My dependence will have to be upon my artillery until support comes, and I need more guns.” “Send to General Hunt for what guns you want,” said he, and he glanced over the slender line of my infantry that stretched toward Round Top. Just before he left I said to him: “Does my position suit you? If it does not, I will change it.” “No, no !” he replied quickly; “I'll send up the 5th corps, and Hancock will give you any other support you may require.”* He rode away, and soon after the battle began. That terrific struggle along the whole line, and especially in the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield on the right and left of my line, respectively, need not be gone over. It is matter of history (see page 42-82). I sent to General Hunt, when Meade had gone, for forty pieces of artillery, which gave me the guns to keep up the fighting while I waited for reinforcements. General Warren, who was then an engineer officer, was on Little Round Top sending urgent appeals to me to send troops to hold that important position. One brigade (Vincent’s of the 5th corps), sent to me, was immediately dispatched him. As the fighting went on and increased in intensity, I looked for the 5th corps again and again. General Sykes was slow,f and finding the needs of the hour growing greater and greater every moment, I sent to Hancock for help. General Hancock was always prompt and generous and with eager haste pushed forward his best troops to the assistance of the strug- gling 3rd corps. But the moments I waited for reinforcements that day were as long to me as an eternity, and the boys who wore the diamond ‘General Meade, before the committee on the conduct of the war, states: “I told him (General Sickles), it was not the position I had intended him to take; that he had advanced his line beyond the support of my army, and I was fearful he would be attacked and lose the artillery which he had put so far to the front, before I could support it. General Sickles expressed regret that he should have occupied a position which did not meet with my ap- proval, he very promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to a line which I had intended him to take. But I told him I was fearful that the enemy would not allow him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change or movement. Before I had finished that remark, the enemy’s guns opened and the action commenced. tGeneral Doubleday says in his “Chancellorsville and Gettysburg,” p. 167, General Sykes’ own report is extremely difficult to follow. It does not afford a satisfactory explanation of his delay in marching his troops (5th corps) to the assistance of the 3rd corps. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 69 during all this time were obliged to stand the shock of as furious an assault as was ever dealt against troops on any battlefield of modern times. The struggle in that now peaceful Peach Orchard was then fierce as death. The AVheatfield yonder was like the wine press with the dead and dying. Men fought there, hand-to-hand, I think, as never they grappled before.* Onward - and over against each other they bent again and again. Now the boys in blue would push those in gray back at the point of the bayonet. Graham's and the Excelsior brigade that I organized and commanded dur- ing the first of the war were in that section of the field, and hundreds of them lav down to sleep under the shade of the peach trees that hot July day. * * * *Capt. Wm. J. Patterson, in an address delivered at the dedication of the 62nd Penna. Mon., Sept. 11th, 1889, said : “At no place was there fiercer or more continuous fighting. This field had been taken and retaken, swaying back and forth repeatedly (see page 82 J. It is fitly termed the ‘whirlpool of death.’ When the action opened it was covered with the plumage of waving grain, ready for the harvest, and when twilight gathered over its surface the ripening stalks were trampled into the earth and dyed with the blood of the Blue and the Gray, and when the light of the moon cast its gentle rays over this gory plain it revealed scores of the pale, upturned faces of friends and foes, whose only heritage in the glory of the battle was a soldier’s grave” (see page 87). LIEUT. BAYARD WILKESON HOLDING HIS BATTERY TO ITS WORK IN AN EXPOSED POSITION. Note. — “The death of Lieutenant Wilkeson, who commanded Battery G, 4th U. S. artillery, was one of the most heroic episodes of the fight. He was but 19 years old, and a son of Samuel Wilkeson, who, as a correspondent of the N. Y. Times, was at General Meade’s head- quarters. Gen. John B. Gordon, finding it impossible to advance his troops in the face of the fire of Wilkeson’s battery, and realizing that if the officer on the horse could be disposed of, the battery would not remain, directed two batteries of Jones’ battalion to train their guns upon him. Wilkeson was brought to the ground, desperately wounded, and his horse killed. He was carried to the barn of the county Almshouse (or dragged himself there — the account differs), where he died that night. Just before he expired, it is said, he asked for water; a canteen was handed to him ; as he took it a wounded Confederate lying next to him, begged “For God’s sake, give me some !” He passed the canteen untouched to the man, who drank every drop it contained. Wilkeson smiled on the man, turned slightly and expired.” The Struggle for Round Top BY E. M. LAWS, MAJOR-GENERAL, C. S. A. COMMANDING A BRIGADE IN THE ASSAULT ON LITTLE ROUND TOP. T HE Confederate line of battle occupied a ridge, partly wooded, with a valley intervening between it and the heights held by the Federal troops in front. The position occupied by the Federal left wing in front of us was fully disclosed to view, and it was certainly one of the most formidable it had been the fortune of any troops to confront. Round Top rose like a huge sentinel guarding the Federal left flank, while the spurs and ridges trending off to the north of it afforded unrivaled position for the use of artillery. The puffs of smoke rising at intervals along the line of hills, as the Federal batteries fired upon such portions of our line as became exposed to view, clearly showed that these advantages had not been neglected. The thick woods which in great part covered the sides of Round Top and the adjacent hills concealed from view the rugged nature of the ground, which increased fourfold the difficulties of the attack. How far up the slope of Round Top the Federal left extended we could not tell, as the woods effectually concealed from view everything in that quarter. Our order to attack — issued as soon as the two divisions of General Long street’s corps came into position on the line already described — was, that the movement should begin on the right, my brigade on that flank leading, the other commanders taking it up successively toward the left. It was about 4 : 00 P.M. on the second day of the battle, when we advanced to the attack. The artillery on both sides had been warmly engaged for about 15 minutes, and continued to fire heavily until we became engaged with the Federal infantry, when our batteries ceased firing to avoid injury to our own troops, who were then, for the most part, concealed by the woods about the base of Round Top and the spurs to the north of it. General Hood was severely wounded as we moved into action. Advancing rapidly across the valley which separated the opposing lines, — all the time under a heavy fire from the batteries, — our front line struck the Federal skirmishers posted along the further edge of the valley. Brushing these quickly away, we soon came upon their first line of battle, running along the slopes of the hills known as Devil’s Den (see page 66). The fighting soon became close and severe. Exposed to the artillery fire from the heights in front and on our left, as well as to the musketry of the infantry, it required all the courage and steadiness of the veterans who composed the Army of Northern Virginia, — whose spirit was never higher than then — to face the storm. Not one moment was lost. With rapidly thinning ranks the gray line swept on, until the blue line in front wavered, broke and seemed to dissolve in the woods and rocks on the mountain side. The advance continued steadily, the center of the division 70 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 71 moving directly upon the guns on the hill adjoining Devil’s Den from which we had been suffering so severely. In order to secure my right flank, I extended it well up the side of Round Top, and my brigade in closing to the right left a considerable interval between its left and the right of the Texas brigade of General Robertson. Into this interval I threw General Benning’s Georgia brigade which had up to that time occu- pied the second line. At the same time, seeing a heavy Federal force on Robertson’s left, and no troops having come up to extend our line in that direction, General Anderson’s Georgia brigade, till then also in the second line, was thrown out on that flank. 1 Thus disposed, the division continued to move forward, encountering as it ascended the heights around the battery on the spur of Devil’s Den, and to the right and left of it, a most determined resistance from the Union troops, who seemed to be continually reinforced. The ground was rough and difficult, broken by rocks and large boulders, which rendered an orderly advance impossible. Sometimes the Federals would hold one side of a huge boulder on the slope, until the Confederates occupied the other. In some cases my men, with reckless daring, mounted to the top of the large boulders in order to get a better view, and to deliver their fire with greater effect. One of these, Sergeant Barbee, of the Texas bri- gade having reached a rock a little in advance of the line, stood erect on the top of it, loading and firing as coolly as if unconscious of danger, while the air around him was fairly swarming with bullets. He soon fell helpless from several wounds ; but he held his rock, lying upon the top of it, until the litter-bearer carried him off. In less than an hour from the time we advanced to the attack, the hill by Devil’s Den was taken with three pieces of artillery. In the meantime my brigade had swept over the northern slope of Round Top, cleared it of the Federals, and then advanced upon Little Round Top. While our center and right were engaged General Anderson’s brigade on the left was subjected to great annoyance and loss by movements of the Federals upon its left flank, being frequently compelled to change the front of the regi- ment on that flank to repel attack from that direction. Up to this time I had seen nothing of General McLaw’s division, which was to have extended our left and to have moved to the attack at the same time. I therefore halted my line, which had become broken and dis- organized by the roughness of the ground over which it had been fighting, and placing it in as advantageous a position for receiving any attack that the Federals might be disposed to make. I hurried back to the ridge from which we had originally advanced. I found McLaw’s division still in position there, his troops suffering considerably from a severe fire of ar- tillery from the opposite hills. I was informed by General Kershaw, that although he understood the general instructions that the forward move- ment was to be taken up from the right, he had not yet received the order to move from his division commander. I pointed out the position of General Hood’s division, and urged the necessity of immediate support on ATTACK. AT DEVIL’S DEN FIGHTING ON LITTLE ROUND TOP BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 73 its left. General Kershaw requested me to designate the point on which his right flank should be directed, and promptly moved to attack. When General Hood's division first attacked, General Meade alarmed for the safety of his left wing and doubtless fully alive to the importance of holding so vital a point as Round Top and its adjacent spurs, com- menced sending reinforcements to the threatened points (see page 72). We encountered some of these in our advance, and others were arriving as McLaiv’s division came up on our left. In its advance this division ex- tended from the Peach Orchard near the Emmitsburg road, on its left, to the Wheatfield where its right wing connected with my left. As McLaw’s division advanced, we again moved forward on his right, and the fighting- continued in see-saw style — first one side then the other, gaining ground or losing it, with small advantage to either until dark. At the close of the engagement, Hood’s division held the hill where the three guns (Smith’s N. Y.) battery had been captured, and the ridge to its left — our right extending across Devil’s Den, and well up on the northwestern slope of Round Top. During the night the lines were strengthened by the construction of a breastwork of the loose stone that abounded all along the position occupied by the troops, and the light of the next morning disclosed the fact that the Union troops in front of us had improved their time in the same way. In fact, all through the night we could hear them at work as the rock were dropped in place, and no doubt they could hear us just as distinctly, while we were engaged in the same life-preserving operation. Though the losses had been severe on both sides, comparatively few prisoners had been taken. But early in the night in the confusion resulting from the fight over such rugged ground, and the darkness of the wooded hill-sides, men of both armies in search of their commands occasionally wandered into the opposing picket -lines and were captured. Many of the Federal wounded were left in our lines on the ground from which their troops had been forced back, and some of ours remained in their hands in the most advanced position which we had reached and had been compelled to abandon.* Among these latter was Colonel Powell of the 5th Texas regiment, who was shot through the body and afterwards died. Powell was a stout portly man, with a full beard, resembling in many respects General Longstreel, and the first impression of the captors was that they had taken that officer. Indeed, it was asserted positively by some of the prisoners we picked up during the night that General Longstreet was badly wounded and a prisoner in their hands, and they obstinately refused to credit our state- ment to the contrary. * * * *Col. Joshus L. Chamberlain (of the 20th Maine regiment), Official Report No. 196, Vol. 27, p. 625-626, says : “400 prisoners, two field and several line officers, were captured mainly from the 15th and 47th Alabama regiments ; with some of the 4th and 5th Texas ; 150 of the Confederates were found killed and wounded in our front. My loss being 136, of whom 30 were killed, among those were Captain Billings, Lieutenants Kendall and Linscott. We went into the fight with 386 officers and men. Longstreet’s Attack at the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield BY J. B. KERSHAW, MAJOR-GENERAL C. S. A., COMMANDING A BRIGADE AT GETTYSBURG. M r BRIGADE, composed of South Carolinians, the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 8th and 15th regiments of infantry, and the 3rd S. C. artillery battalion, constituted with Semme’s, Wofford’s and Barksdale’ s brigades, Maj.-Gen. Lafayette McLaws and with the divisions of Pickett and Hood formed the first corps, Army of Northern Virginia. At about 4:15 P. M. July 2nd, the head of my column emerged from the woods into the open field in front of the stone wall fence which extends along the Flaherty farm, and to the east past Schneider’s. Here we were in full view of the Federal position. Their main line appeared to extend from Little Round Top, where their signal flags were flying, until it was lost to sight far away to the left. An advanced line occupied the Peach Orchard, heavily supported by artillery, and extended from that point toward our left along the Emmitsburg road. The intervening ground was open fields, interspersed and divided by stone fence. The position just here seemed almost impregnable. I immediately formed line of battle, my left resting about Flaherty’s house, my right near Schneider’s. This was done under cover of my skirmishers, who engaged those of the Union troops near the Emmitsburg road. In the meantime I examined the position of the Federals with some care. I found them in superior force, strongly posted in the Peach Orchard, which blistered my artillery with the main line of battle in their rear, apparently intrenched, and extended to, if not upon Little Round Top, far beyond the point to which their left had been supposed to rest. To carry out my instructions would have been, if successful in driving the Union troops from the Peach Orchard, to present my own right flank and rear to a large portion of the Union main line of battle. I therefore placed my command in position under the cover of the stone fence, and communicated the condition to Maj.-Gen. McLaws. The division was then formed on this line. Semme’s brigade, supporting my brigade 200 yards in rear, with Wofford’s brigade in rear supporting Barksdale’s brigade, Cal) ell’s artillery battalion was placed along the stone fence on my right and my 15th regiment was thrown to their right to support them on that flank. In the meantime, General Hood’s division was moving on our right to gain the Union left flank. I was directed to commence the attack as soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the Peach 74 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 75 Orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood’s division and co-operating with him. It was understood that he was to sweep down upon the Federals in a direction perpendicular to our line of battle. I was informed that Barksdale would move with me and conform to my move- ments; that Semme would follow me, and Wofford follow Barksdale. These instructions I received in sundry messages from General Longstreet and McLaw’s. In my center-front was a stone (Rose’s) farm-house and barn. These buildings were about 500 yards from our position and on a line with the crest of the Peach Orchard hill. The Federal infantry was posted along the front of the orchard, also on the face looking toward Rose’s, six of their batteries were in position at the orchard near the crest of the hill, and the others about 200 yards in the rear, extending in the direction of Little Round Top. Behind Rose’s was morass, and, on the right of that a stone fence running parallel with our line, some 200 yards from Rose’s. Beyond the morass was a stony hill, covered with timber and thick undergrowth interspersed with rock and large boulders, extending some distance toward the Federal main line. Beyond the stone fence, and to the right of the stony hill, was a dense forest extending far to our right. From the morass a small stream ran into the woods. Looking down from Rose’s, a large wheatfield was seen. In rear of the wheatfield, and between that and Round Top, there was a large force of Federals, posted in line behind a stone fence. I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear. About 4 : 00 P.M. I received the order to move at a signal from Cabell’s artillery. They were to fire for some time, then pause, and then to fire three guns in rapid succession. At this I was to move without further orders. I communicated these instructions to the commanders of each of the regiments in my command, directing them to convey them to the company officers. They were told, at the signal, to order the men to leap the fence without further orders, and to align the troops in front of it. Accordingly, at the signal, the men leaped over the wall fence and were promptly aligned ; the word was given and the brigade moved off with great steadiness and precision, followed by Semmes’s bri- gade, with equal promptness. General Longstreet accompanied me in this advance on foot, as far as the Emmitshurg road. All the field and staff officers were dismounted on account of the many obstacles in the way. "When we were about the Emmitsburg road, I heard General Barksdale’s drums beat the assembly and then knew that I should have no immediate support on my left, which was about to be squarely presented to the heavy force of infantry and artillery at, and in rear of the Peach Orchard. The 2nd and 8th regiments and 3rd {James) artillery battalion, were then moving majestically across the field to the left of the lane leading to the Rose buildings. They were ordered to charge to the left and attack the batteries in the rear of the Peach Orchard, and accordingly moved rapidly on that point. 76 THE BLUE AND GRAY In order to aid this attack, the direction of the 3rd and 7th regiments was changed to the left. After passing the Rose buildings the charge of the left wing was no longer visible from my position ; although the move- ment was reported to have been magnificently conducted until the can- noneers had left their guns, and the caissons were moving off, when the order was given to move by the right flank by some unauthorized person, and was immediately obeyed by the men. The Federals returned to their guns and opened on these doomed regiments with a raking fire of grape and canister, which proved most disastrous. Hundreds of the bravest and best men of South Carolina, fell victims of this fatal blunder. While this tragedy was being enacted, the 3rd and 7th regiments were conducted rapidly to the stony hill (now the Loop). In consequence of the obstruc- tions in the way, the 7th regiment had lapped the 3rd a few paces, and when they reached the cover of the stony hill I halted the line at the edge of the woods for a moment, and ordered the 7th to move by the right flank to uncover the 3rd regiment, which was promptly done. It was no doubt this movement observed by some one from the left, that led to the terrible mistake which cost so dearly. The moment the line was rectified the 3rd and 7th regiments advanced into the woods, the left of the 3rd regiment swinging around and attacking the batteries to the left of that position, which, for the reason already stated, had resumed their fire. Very soon a large column moved in two lines of battle across the wheatfield (see page 82), to attack my position in such a manner as to take the 7th regiment in flank on the right. The right wing of this regiment was then thrown back to meet this attack. I then hurried in person to General Semmes, then 150 yards to my right rear, and also to bring forward my right regiment, the 15th, which sep- arated from the brigade by the artillery at the time of the advance, was cut off by Semmes ’s brigade. In the act of leading his regiment, the gallant and accomplished commander, Col. W. G. de Saussure, of the 15th regiment had just fallen when I reached it. He fell some paces in front of the line, with sword drawn leading the advance. General Semmes promptly responded to my call, and put his brigade in motion toward the right, preparatory to moving to the front. While his troops were moving he fell mortally wounded. Returning to the 7th regi- ment, I reached it just as the advancing column of Federals had arrived at a point some 200 yards off, whence they poured into us a volley from their whole line, and then advanced to a charge. They were handsomely received and entertained by this regiment, which long kept them at bay in their front. One regiment of Semmes’ s brigade came at a double-quick as far as the ravine in our rear, and checked the advance of the Federals. There was still an interval of 100 yards, between this regiment, and the right of the 7th and into this the Federals were forcing their way, causing my right to swing back more and more ; still fighting at a distance not exceeding thirty paces, until the two wings of the 7th regiment were nearly doubled on each other. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 77 About this time, the fire of the battery on my left having ceased, I sent for the 2nd regiment to come to the right. Before I could hear any- thing of them, the Union troops had swung around and lapped my whole line at close quarters, and the fighting was general and desperate and so continued for some time. These men were brave veterans who fought from Bull Run to Gettysburg, and knew the strength of their position, and so held it as long as it was tenable. The 7th regiment finally gave way, and I ordered Colonel Aiken to re-form it at the stone fence about the Rose buildings. I passed to the 3rd regiment, then hotly engaged on the crest of the hill, and gradually swung back its right as the Federals made progress around that flank. Semmes’s advanced regiment had given way. One of his regiments had mingled with the 3rd, and amid rocks and trees, within a few feet of each other, these brave men, Blue and Gray, main- tained a desperate conflict. The Union forces could make no progress in front, but slowly extended around my right. Separated from view of my left, of which I could hear nothing, all my staff being with that wing, the position of the 15th regiment being wholly unknown, the 7th regiment having retreated and nothing being heard of the other troops of the division, I feared the brave men around me would be surrounded by the large force of Federals constantly increasing in numbers and all the while gradually enveloping us. In order to avoid such a catastrophe, I ordered a retreat to the Rose buildings, on emerging from the woods, as I followed the retreat I saw General Wofford riding at the head of his fine brigade then coming in, his left being in the Peach Orchard which was then cleared of the Federals. His movement "was such as to strike the stony hill on the left, and thus turn the flank of the troops that had driven us from that position. On his approach, the Union troops retreated across the wheat- field; when, with the regiments of my left wing, Wofford attacked with great effect, driving the Federals back near Little Round Top, I now ascer- tained that General Barksdale had advanced upon the troops at the Peach Orchard; that he had cleared that position with the assistance of my 8th regiment, driving all before him, and having advanced far beyond that point until enveloped by superior forces, had fallen mortally wounded and left within the Federal line. He had passed too far to my left to afford me any relief except in silencing the batteries that had so cruelly punished my left. When Barksdale passed to my left, my left regiment moved into the woods on the left of the stony hill, and maintained that position against great odds. When the Federals fell back from the stony hill on the advance of Wofford’s brigade, the 15th regiment and a portion of Semmes’s brigade followed them and joined Wofford’s in his attack upon the retreating columns. I rallied the remainder of my brigade, also that of Semmes at the Rose buildings and advanced with them to the support of Wofford, taking position at the stone wall overlooking the forest to the right of the Rose house, some 200 yards in front. Finding that Wofford’s men were coming out, I retained them at that point to check any attempt of the Federals to follow. It was now near night-fall 78 THE BLUE AND GRAY and the operations of the day were over. That night we occupied the ground over which we had fought, gathered the dead and wounded, a long list of brave and efficient officers and men. General Kershaw further states in his report No. 432 Official Record, Vol. 27, p. 366 : One company of the 2nd regiment went into action with forty men, of whom but four remained unhurt to bury their fallen com- rades, his loss exceeded 600, killed and wounded, about one-half of the force engaged. * * * AN EXTRACT PROM CHAPLAIN J. O. SLOAN’S REPORT OP THE SCENES AFTER THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG. “The scene in Gettysburg, as one went over the field at the close of the three days’ fighting was a painful one. The dead and dying lay in all directions (see page 61). We attempt no description of that scene. I only wish to refer to one of the worst scenes that ever came under my observation, the case of John F. Chase, a noble boy of the Fifth Maine Battery. His wounds and sufferings were almost incredible, in view of the fact that he lived through them all. By the bursting of a shell his right arm was torn off and one of his eyes blown out. He received in different parts of his body 48 wounds from the fragments of the exploded shell. He lay on the field in this condition two days before it was noticed that he was alive. Then he was removed in an unconscious condition to the hospital. After a week there were some hopeful signs that he might recover. Soon erysipelas appeared in all his wounds. He was indeed a pitiful sight. The surgeon said there was no hope for him ; that he could live but a day or two. He was carried out of the hospital and put in a tent alone, there to die, it was supposed by some of his attendants. Death was not to be, however, for by Heaven’s blessing on the perseverance and unceas- ing attention of one who had dedicated himself to the relief and comfort of the suffering soldiers, he was in a few weeks able to go about. After a few months he had recovered suffi- ciently to go to his home in Maine.” On fields of Gettysburg there raged the fiercest battle flame, As the “Tigers” suddenly upon our army came ; Yet ere the eve of day had passed, they started up anew, To try once more their boldest charge to overwhelm the blue. For hours the battle raged again, in fiercest, deadliest way ; The blue were fighting mightily against three-fold more of gray. But look! whose are those lightning guns that on the hill I see; By glorious men they’re served ; ah ! yes ! it’s the Fifth Maine Battery. But two were left, who stood alone and kept on firing fast ; Their streaming shells howl through the air, to burst with deadly crash. Who are those two superb heroes, who dare the foe to face, Their names are Corporal Lebroke and Private John F. Chase. The Second Day’s Battle BY HENR1 T J. HUNT, BREVET, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. A. JL S soon as Long street’s attack commenced, General Warren was sent by General Meade to see to the condition of the extreme l eft the Union battle line. The duty could not have been intrusted to better hands. Passing along the line he found Little Round Top the key of the position, unoc- cupied, except by a signal station (see page 66). The Confederates at the time lay concealed, awaiting the signal for assault, when several shots in their direction caused a sudden movement on their part, which by the gleam of reflected sunlight from their bayonets re- vealed their long line out-flanking the position. Fully comprehending the imminent danger, Warren sent to General Meade for a division. The Confederates were already advancing when, noticing the approach of the 5th corps, Warren rode to meet it, caused Vincent’s and Weed’s brigades of infantry, and Hazlett’s battery D, 5th U. S., to be detached and hurried them to the summit. The passage of the guns through the roadless woods, and amongst the rocks and undergrowth was marvelous. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been considered an impossible feat, but the eagerness of the men to get into action with their comrades of the infantry, and the skilful dragging by hand and rope brought them without delay to the very summit (see page 72). They were hardly in time, for the Con- federates were also climbing the hill. A close and bloody hand-to-hand struggle ensued which left both Round Tops in our possession. General Weed was mortally wounded and while Lieutenant Hazlett was leaning over his body receiving his dying message, he, too was shot and fell dead across Weed; Colonel Vincent was also mortally wounded — all young men of great promise. General Weed had served with distinction as an artillerist in the Peninsular, Second Bull Run and Antietam campaigns, had become chief of artillery of his army corps, and at Chancellorsville, showed such special aptitude for large artillery commands that he was immediately promoted from captain to brigadier-general and transferred to the infantry. After the fall of Hazlett, Lieutenant Rittenhouse efficiently commanded the battery during the remainder of the battle. The Confederates, however, clung to the woods and rocks at the base of Round Top, carried Devil’s Den and its ridge. The breaking in of the Peach Orchard angle (see page 42) exposed the flanks of the batteries on its crest, which retired firing in order to cover the retreat of the in- fantry. Many guns of different batteries had to be abandoned because of the destruction of their horses and men; many were hauled off by 79 80 THE BLUE AND GRAY hand; all the batteries lost heavily.* Bigelow’s 9th Mass, battery made a stand close by the Trosel farm buildings (see page 61) ; although already much cut up, he was directed by Colonel McGilvery to hold that position at all hazards until a line of artillery could be formed in front of the woods beyond Plum Run; that is, on what we called the “Plum Run line.” This line was formed by collecting the serviceable batteries and fragments of batteries that were brought off, with Dow’s Maine battery fresh from the reserve, formed a solid line, which supported by infantry, held this part of the field, and aided General Humphrey’s movements and covered by its fire the abandoned guns, until they could be brought off, as all were except one. When, after accomplishing its purpose, all that was left of Bigelow’s battery was withdrawn, it was closely pressed by General Barksdale’s 21st Miss, regiment which succeeded in crossing the run. His men had entered the battery and fought hand-to-hand with the cannoneers ; one was killed while trying to spike a Union cannon, another knocked down with a hand- spike whilst endeavoring to drag off a prisoner. General Barksdale was killed. The battery went into action with 104 officers and men. Of the four officers one was killed and another mortally wounded, the third Captain Bigelow, severely wounded; of 7 sergeants, 2 were killed and 4 wounded ; or a total of 28 men, including 2 missing ; and 80 out of 88 horses were killed or wounded. As the battery had sacrificed itself for the safety of the line, its work is especially noticed as typical of the service that artillery is not unfrecpiently called upon to render, and did render in other instances at Gettysburg besides this one. After General Sickles was wounded, General Meade directed General Hancock to take command of the 3rd as well as his own corps during the remainder of that day. About 7 : 15 P.M., the field was in a critical con- dition. Birney’s division was now broken up; Humphrey’s division was slowly falling back, under cover of McGilvery ’s guns. Anderson’s line of Confederates was advancing. On its right, Barksdale’s brigade except the 21st Miss, regiment, was held in check only by McGilvery ’s artillery, to whose support Hancock now brought Willard’s brigade of the 2nd corps. Placing the 39th N. Y. regiment in reserve, Willard with his other three (111th, 125th and 126th N. Y.) regiments charged Barksdale’s Confeder- ates and drove them back nearly to the Emmitsburg road, when he was himself repulsed by a heavy artillery and infantry fire, and fell back to his former position near the sources of Plum Run. In this affair, Col. Geo. L. Willard was killed. Meanwhile, the 21st Miss, regiment charged and drove out the men of Watson’s battery I, 5th U. S., of McGilvery ’s line, but was in turn driven off by the 39th N. Y., led by Lieutenant Peeples of the battery, musket in hand, who thus recovered his guns, Watson being wounded. ♦The accuracy on the part of the Union gunners during the fighting at the Peach Orchard July 2nd, 1863, could not be excelled. “Clark’s” Battery B, 1st N. J., held a position near the Peach Orchard, from 2 : 00 until 7:00 P. M., firing 1,300 pounds of ammunition, “with but six muzzle-loading guns. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 81 General Birney’s division once broken, it was difficult to stem the tide of defeat. General Hood and McLaw’s divisions — except Barksdale’s bri- gade — compassed the Devil’s Den and its woods, and the Federal rein- forcements from other corps came piecemeal, were beaten in detail until by successive accretions, they greatly out-numbered their opponents, who had all the advantage of position, when the latter in turn retired, but were pursued. This fighting was confined almost wholly to the woods and wheat- field (see page 82), between the Peach Orchard and Round Tops, and a great number of brigades and regimental commanders, as well as inferior officers and soldiers, were killed and wounded on both sides, bears testi- mony to its close and desperate character. General Meade was on that part of the field, active in bringing up and putting in reinforcements. At the close of the day the Federals held Round Tops, the Plum Run line and Cemetery Ridge. During the night the Plum Run line was occupied by McCandless’ brigade of General Crawford’s division of Penna. reserves and buck-tail troops.* When Longstreet’s guns were heard, Ewell opened a cannonade, which after an hour’s firing was overpowered by the Federal artillery on Ceme- tery and Culp’s Hills. Early and Bodes had been ordered to assault Cemetery Hill. General Early’s attack was made with great spirit, by Hays’ Louisiana Tigers (see page 55), assisted by Avery’s brigade, Gordon’s brigade being in reserve; the hill was ascended through the wide ravine between Cemetery and Culp’s Hills, a line of infantry on the slope was broken, and Wiedrick’s 11th corps and Rickett’s reserve batteries near the brow of the hill were overrun; but the excellent position of Steven’s 5th Maine battery (see page 78), with six 12-pound guns at the head of the ravine, enabled him to sweep it with an enfilading fire, the arrival of Carroll’s brigade sent unasked by Hancock — a happy inspiration, as this line had been weakened by sending support to General Sickles — and the failure of Bodes to cooperate with Early caused the attack to mis- carry. The cannoneers of the two batteries, so summarily ousted, rallied and recovered their guns by a vigorous attack with pistols, by those who had them, by others with hand-spikes, rammers, stone and even fence-rails, the “Dutchmen” showing that they were in no way inferior to their “Yankee” comrades who had been taunting them since the battle of *The 3rd division (Crawford’s Penna. Reserves), of which the author’s father was a member, were fighting at their own homes and in defense of all that was dear to them. They had also just learned of the death of their dear old commander, General Reynolds, and as they charged upon the enemy the cry “Revenge for Reynolds,” rang out above the din of the conflict. The foe could not stand against the terrible impetuosity of this charge, and at last broke and fled from the field. In this charge we lost one of our most gallant officers in the person of Col. Fred Taylor, commanding the 1st Rifles, Penna. Buck-Tail regiment. Professor M. Jacobs, of the Gettysburg College, who was within the Confederate line during the battle, and who published “Notes of the Confederate Invasion,” J. B. Lippincott Company, Philadelphia, 1864, in speaking of that day says on page 37 : “To us the results seemed doubtful * * * At about 6 : 00 P.M., it is true, we heard cheering, different from that which had so often fallen dolefully upon our ears, and some of the Confederates said to each other, ‘Listen ! the Yankees are cheering.’ But whilst this — which we afterwards found to be the cheering of General Crawford’s men, as they charged and drove the enemv down the face of Little Round Top — afforded us a temporary encouragement.” (See page 42.) 6 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 83 Chancellorsville, Va.* After an hour’s desperate fighting, the enemy was driven out with heavy loss. General Avery being among the killed.! Later that evening, General Johnson’s division advanced, and found only one brigade (Greene’s) of the 12th corps in position on Culp’s Hill, the others of that corps having been sent to the aid of the 3rd corps at Round Top. Greene’s troops fought with skill and determination for two or three hours and, reinforced by about 800 men of the 1st and 11th corps, succeeded in holding their own intrenchments, the enemy taking possession of the abandoned works of Geary and Ruger’s. This brought Johnson’s troops near the Baltimore road, but the darkness prevented them marching straight ahead through the woods to the above road, about 400 yards distant, where they would have been in the rear of the Union Army in possession of its supply train and reserve artillery and on its proper line of retreat. It was past midnight when the tired, weary troops of the 12th corps (less Greene’s brigade), returned to Culp’s Hill. 'With creditable caution, skirmishers were thrown forward to ascertain the position of the enemy; they found Johnson’s troops in possession of their intrenchments, and im- mediately prepared to drive him out at daylight. At the close of the second day’s fighting a consultation of corps commanders was held at Meade’s headquarters (see page 38). I was not present, although sum- moned, but was informed that the vote was unanimous to hold our line and await an attack, for at least one day before taking the offensive, as General Meade so desired. * * * THE MEASURE OF VALOR. So far as valor is to be measured by danger voluntarily encountered and losses sustained, the American citizen may justly compare with pride the incident and statistics of the great civil war with those of any modern conflict in Europe. At Gettysburg the close resemblance between that battle and Waterloo — in numbers engaged on each side and the losses — has been pointed out. When comparison is made of the losses of regiments and other organizations, in particular engagements, the larger figures are with Americans. The charge of the British Light Brigade at Balaklava in 1854, has been celebrated in verse by Tennyson and other poets, and is alluded to over and over again, as if it were the most gallant achievement in modern warfare. Every time that some old soldier choose to say he is one of the survivors of that charge, the news- papers would talk about him as a wonder, reporting his words and publishing his portrait. Yet that exploit sinks into insignificance when compared with the charge of the 1st Minnesota regiment at Gettysburg. ‘Many exciting incidents of this twilight battle are told. When the Confederates charged Wiedrick’s battery there was a difficulty in depressing the guns sufficiently, or they probably never would have reached it ; they were now subjected to a flank fire from Steven's “5th Maine” battery which poured in double shotted canister at point-blank range. At Rickett's battery a Confederate lieutenant sprang forward and seized a guidon, when the bearer, Private Riggen, shot him with his revolver. Another rushed into the battery, laid his hand upon a gun and demanded its surrender ; his answer was a blow from a hand-spike that dashed out his brains. At another gun a Confederate sergeant, with rifle in hand, confronted Sergeant Stafford with the demand for the surrender of the piece ; whereupon Lieutenant Brockway threw a stone that killed him (see page 55). Sergeant Geible, 107th Ohio regiment, sprang upon the low stone wall defiantly waving the regimental colors, but was immediately shot. Adjutant Young captured the flag of the 8th Louisiana regiment, but was aimed a heavy blow by a Confederate musket and sank fainting, but his life was saved, and he was afterwards promoted for gallantry. tin popular accounts of the battle Hays’ ("Louisiana Tigers”) brigade is described as having been almost annihilated. The absurdity of this is shown by General Hays’ official report, in which his loss on this occasion is given as 237 officers and men killed and wounded, 76 captured; total 313. * * * 84 THE BLUE AND GRAY The order for the charge at Balaklava was a blunder, blunderingly obeyed ; it accomplished nothing, and the total loss to the Light Brigade was 37 per cent. At Gettysburg, on the second day, General Hancock observing a gap caused by the advance movement of the 3rd corps and seeing that Wilcm’s brigade was pushing forward with the evident intention of passing through it, he looked about for troops to close the gap, and saw nothing within immediate reach but the 1st Minn. Riding- up to Colonel Colville, he said: “Do you see those colors?” pointing at the Con- federate flag. “Take them!” Instantly the regiment dashed forward and charged the brigade; there was a short, fierce fight, and the regiment lost 83 per cent, of its number in killed and wounded, but the onset of the enemy was stayed, the desired time was gained, and even the colors were captured and brough off (see page 72). COLONEL TIPPIN, 40th N. Y. regiment, writes: General Birney rode up and ordered a forward movement and directed that the largest regiment of the brigade be sent double-quick to prolong the line on the left so as to fill in the intervening gaps to the foot of Round Top, for the occupation of which both forces were now engaged in a deadly struggle. General De Trobriand designated the 40th N. Y. for this duty, and ordered me to conduct it to its assigned position, and, if necessary, to remain there with it. We proceeded, the air was filled with smoke by the interchanging fires of artillery and musketry. The shouts of the men of both armies were almost deafen- ing, but I succeeded in placing the regiment where it was ordered, and decided to remain with it. The enemy had us at a disadvantage. They were on higher ground, and were pouring a terrific fire into our front. I trust in God I may never again be called to look upon such a scene as I there beheld. Colonel Egan, the commander of the regiment, was charging with the command when his horse was shot and sank under him. Major Warner was borne past me for dead, but was only terribly wounded, his horse came dashing by a few moments later; as my own having been disabled and rendered unfit for use, I caught and mounted him. Col. A. V. H. Ellis, commanding the 124th N. Y. regiment, one of the most chivalrous_ spirits that ever breathed, had received his mortal wound. He was riding at the head of his regiment, waiving his sword in the air and shouting to his men — his “Orange Blossoms,” as he called them, the regiment having been raised in Orange County, New York — when a shot struck him in the forehead. He was borne to the rear and died within a few moments. Major Cromwell, also of that regiment, was killed almost at the same time. The Adjutant was killed as the regiment was moving off the field. He had fought bravely for hours, and it seemed hard that one so young and hopeful should be thus stricken by a chance shot, after having faced the thickest of the fight unharmed. It happened by the merest accident that I was within a few feet of General Sickles when he received the wound by which he lost his leg. When our command fell back after being relieved by part of the 5th corps, I hastened to find General De Trobriand; seeing a knot of officers near a farm house (Trosel’s), (see page 61), I rode up to see if he (De Trobriand) was among them. The officers proved to be General Sickles and his staff. I saluted him and was about to ask for De Trobriand, when a terrific explosion which seemed to shake the very earth, occurred. This was instantly followed by another equally stunning, and the horses all began to jump. I instantly noticed that Sickles’ pants at the knee was torn clear off, which was swinging loose. The jumping of his horse was fortunate for him, as he turned just in time for him to alight on the upper side of the slope of a hill. As he attempted to dis- mount, he seemed to lose strength, half fell to the ground. He was very pale, and evidently in most fearful pain, as he exclaimed ‘ ‘ Quick, quick ! get something and tie it up before I bleed to death. ’ ’ Those were the exact words, and I will never forget the scene as long as I live. He was carried to a near-by farmhouse, coolly smoking a cigar, quietly remarking to a Catholic priest, a chaplain to one of his regiments, “Man Proposes and God Disposes.” His leg was amputated within less than half an hour after receiving the wound. * * * BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 85 The Story of the Critical Struggle for the Possession of Little Round Top Has Been Graphically Related by Adjutant Farley, of the 140th N. Y. Regiment. “It was a moment which called for leadership. There was no time for tactical formation. Delay was ruin. Hesitation was destruction. The bullets flew in among the men the moment the leading company reached the top of the hill, and not a musket was loaded. The natural impulse was to halt and load them, but Colonel O’Rorke permitted no such delay. Springing from his horse, he threw the reins to the Sergeant- Major; his sword flashed from its scabbard into the sunlight, and calling ‘This way boys.’ Then came a struggle so desperate and bloody that the enemy was compelled to yield. When that struggle was over, the exultation of victory was soon chilled by the dejection which oppressed us as we counted and realized the cost of all that had been won. Of our regiment, 84 enlisted men and 6 officers had been wounded, besides these 26 of them who had marched with us that afternoon had fallen dead before the tire of the enemy. Grouped by companies, a row of inanimate forms lay side by side. No funeral ceremony, and only shallow graves could be accorded them. In the dark- ness of the night, silently and with bitter dejection, each company buried its dead. Colonel Patrick O ’Rorke was among the dead ; shot through the neck, he had fallen without a groan, and we may hope without a pang. The supreme effort of his life was consummated by a death, heroic in its surroundings and undisturbed by pain. * * *’’ (See page 72.) NARRATIVE NOTES. In view of the successes gained on the 2nd day, General Lee resolved to renew his efforts. The successes were: First, On His Right, the lodgment at the base of Round Tops, the possession of Devil’s Den and the woods, Wheatfield, Peach Orchard and ridge along the Ernmits- burg road, which gave him the coveted position for his artillery. Second, On His Left, the occupation of part of the intreneliments of the 12tli corps, with an outlet to the Baltimore road, by which all our lines could be taken in reverse. Third, At the Center, the partial success of three of Anderson’s brigades ( Wilcox , Perry and Wright), in penetrating our lines, from which they were expelled only because they lacked proper support. It was thought that better concert of action might have made good lodgment here also. Both armies had indeed lost heavily, but the account in that respect seemed in favor of the Confederates, or at worst balanced. Pickett’s and Edward Johnson’s divisions were fresh, as were Posey’s and Mahone’s brigades of R. PL. Anderson’s division, and Wm. Smith’s brigade of Early’s division. These could be depended upon for an assault; the others could be used as supports, and to follow up a success. The artillery was almost intact. General Stuart had arrived with his cavalry, excepting the brigades of Jones and Robertson guarding the communications, and Imboden had also come up. General Lee, therefore, directed the renewal of operations both on his right and left. While the actions of the first two days were complicated, that of the third was extremely simple. Lee had tried both flanks and failed. He now determined to attempt piercing the center of Meade’s line. General Long street, wiser than his chief, protested but in vain. On a visit of Long street to Gettysburg, when asked if he really opposed Pickett's charge, he said he had; that he had earnestly urged General Lee not to attempt it, as the distance was too great, and the position of the Union forces a strong one. He said when General Pickett came to him to say that everything was ready, and asked if he should move, “I was so overcome,’’ said Longstreet, “and was so positive of the failure of the charge, and knew so well that it was only sending thousands of brave souls, the flower of the army, to their graves, that I could not speak, I merely gave a nod of assent [see page 100], and then the tears rushed to my eyes as I saw those brave fellows rush to a certain death.’’ 86 THE BLUE AND GRAY CRITICISMS. General Meade was afterwards accused of having made up his mind to retreat, it is said that he had definitely instructed his chief staff officer. General Butterfield, to draw up the necessary orders. The statement was denied by General Meade; in any case, the action affords no proof of any such fixed intention on his part, being merely a precaution such as a prudent general would take in view of possible emer- gencies. On the one hand, he testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that he never thought of such a thing ; on the other. General Doubleday, in his ‘ ‘ Chaneellorsville and Gettysburg ’ ’ presents testimony that seems to have no reason- able doubt. There is nothing intrinsically improbable in the story. General Meade had been in command of the Army of the Potomac but a few days, and he cannot be said to have been, in the ordinary sense of the term, the master- spirit at Gettysburg. It was General Reynolds who went out to meet the enemy, and stay his advance on the first day; it was General Hancock who selected the advan- tageous position for the second day; it was General Warren who secured the neglected key-point. The fact of calling a council of war at all, implies doubt in the mind of the commander. But after all, the question is hardly important so far at least as it concerns General Meade’s place in history. He is likely to be less blamed for con- templating pursuit at the end of the third day when the enemy was defeated. There are some considerations, however, which must give General Meade’s conduct of this battle a very high place for generalship. He unhesitatingly excepted General Han- cock’s judgment as to the propriety of receiving battle on Cemetery Hill, and showed every disposition to do all that would tend to secure the great purpose, without the slightest reference to its bearing on anybody’s reputation. Furthermore, he had, what brilliant soldiers often lack, a complete comprehension of the entire situation, as regarded the war, and appreciated the importance of the action in which he was about to engage. This is proven by the following circular, which he issued on the 30th of June, one day before the battle, to his subordinates. ‘ ‘ The commanding general requests that previous to the engagement soon expected with the enemy, corps and all other commanding officers will address their troops, explaining to them briefly the immense issues involved in this struggle. The enemy are on our soil. The whole country now looks anxiously to this army to deliver it from the presence of the foe. Our failure to do so will leave us no such welcome as the swelling of millions of hearts with pride and joy at our success would give to every soldier in the army. Homes, firesides and domestic altars, are involved. The army has fought well heretofore. It is believed that it will fight more desperately and bravely than ever if it is addressed in fitting terms. Corps and other commanders are au- thorized to order the instant death of any soldier who fails in his duty at this hour.” Note.- — In fighting the second day’s battle, the Confederates engaged hut 50 regiments on their right, while General Meade found it necessary to employ 197 of his infantry regiments in order to resume and hold his true position intact on his left alone. And during the entire day, out of his total of 231 regiments of infantry, Meade had 210 engaged, against 86 of Lee’s total of 171. » 5/ MINN CULP'S HILL «*» STEVEN'S KNOLL SHOWING distance THE BATTLEFIELD FROM &IS ROUND TOP lfT TLE ROUWO TOP 7Z* y PA.INF. VV RIGHT AVE-. Third Day’s Battle, Friday, July 3, 1863 ^HREE courses of action are open to General Lee: (1) to fight it out where he is; (2) to retire and take position in the passes of the South Mountains, and there compel General Meade to attack, his present position being weak for de- fense; (3) to move to his right and take a chosen position between the Union Army and Washington, where a Fed- eral attack would he imperative on account of jeopardy to the Federal Capital. But when General Lee was informed of the arrival of Pickett’s in- fantry and J. E. B. Stuart’s cavalry divisions, a consultation was held by the Confederate authorities and Lee determined to assault the Union left center on the following day, selecting the umbrella-shaped trees on Cemetery Ridge as the point of attack. It was then that General Longstreet objected to Lee’s plan, and urgently requested him to withdraw from here and move southward toward Washington, compelling the Union Army to follow after, then in all probability be enabled to make battle on more favorable grounds. But Lee said, “No! Tomorrow I will have my cannon concentrate its fire on that point which will demolish their guns or exhaust their ammunition, then have Pickett’s division and its support charge his front. In the meantime, I will send Stuart’s four brigades of cavalry around their right and attack them from the rear. In this way I will cut their line in two, then use that army up by detail.” Early that morning General Johnson had been reinforced by Daniel’s, O’Neal’s, Smith’s and Walker’s brigades. He now had seven brigades, two of which had not been in action since they came upon the field. Op- posed to him were six brigades of the 12th, and Shaler’s brigade of the 6th corps. Before the grey light of the early morning had fairly displaced the shadows of the night, the artillery from Powers and McAllister Hills opened fire on Johnson’s troops who were within the cover of the woods. They were already in line and about to attack when this artillery fire anticipated their movements. Johnson having no artillery, being unable to bring any with him owing .to the condition of the ground over which he passed. The Confederates not only held their position, but charged again and again (see page 82). During the course of the fighting, Colonel Colgrove made an attempt to effect a lodgement of the enemy on the right, and ordered the 2nd Mass, and 27th Ind. regiments forward for that purpose. These veterans charged on a double-quick (see page 72) in the face of a terrible musketry fire — like leaves in autumn gales, they dropped while crossing over a short piece of open ground. These two regiments together lost in this action 246 killed and wounded out of 659 officers and men engaged. The 49th 88 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 89 Va. regiment opposing losing two-fifths of its number in the affair. Before making the charge it was apparent to every officer and man that some one had blundered, and that there was some misunderstanding in the trans- mission of the order. Still both regiments moved forward with cheers as promptly as if they were certain of success. When Colonel Mudge, of the 2nd Mass, received the order, he remarked to some of his officers, “It is murder ; but it is the order. ’ ’ He fell dead before he had gone ten rods. His regiment lost five color-bearers. The 13th N. J. boys were annoyed by Confederate sharpshooters, who occupied the Taney house, on the farther side of Rock Creek. Battery M, 1st N. Y., in position near the Baltimore road, fired several well-aimed percussion shells which soon made the building untenable. In the struggle on Culp’s Hill, the 1st Md. Confederate fought with the 3rd Md. Union regiment. Brother against brother, kinsmen and neighbors were ar- rayed against each other, and their mingled dead strewed the ground thickly where this bloody scene of civil war was enacted. It was a remarkable fight. For seven hours the unremitting roar of the rifles continued. Discomfited and discouraged, torn and bleeding, the Confederate dead and wounded were piled in heaps on the ground where they fell, fighting, as they retired with a courage which commanded the admiration of their foes (see page 82). Shouts of victory now filled the air. Men cheered themselves hoarse, laughed, rolled themselves on the ground, while others shook hands with their comrades, and thanked God that the star corps had again triumphed. General Meade, after lis- tening to the incessant mus- ketry around Culp’s Hill, thought that the Union troops were expending ammunition unnecessarily, and notified General Slocum to that effect. Meade, however, expressed satisfaction when Slocum ex- plained the situation. It was now 11:00 o’clock, General Johnson had been completely baffled in his plan. He had flung away his oppor- tunity the night before, and to reclaim it he had now done his best and failed. He could not find fault with his men; for never, even under Gen- eral Jackson had they fought more bravely. But they were now pitted against men of equal bravery, of equal determination with themselves — BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG- July 3rd. 1003. 90 THE BLUE AND GRAY men who were now on their own soil, and fighting for the sanctity of their : 1 own homes. C General Geary says: My division alone — 3,702 men — having fired into i 11 this superb valor 277,000 rounds of ammunition. The casualties are re- ^ ported at 1,156, of which 47 occurred in Slialer’s brigade. The losses to c the first and 11th corps, troops that reinforced Greene’s brigade, not given. 1 Johnson sustained a loss of 2,015, including many stands of colors, not in- f eluding the casualties in Smith’s, Daniel’s and O’Neal’s brigades. Over 900 1 of the enemy’s dead were buried by my troops, and a large number left un- j * buried, marching orders having been received before the work was com- a pleted. The Blue and Gray were sometimes found in one common heap. * The color sergeant, Wm. C. Lilly, 149th N. Y. regiment, had his flag- 1 staff broken by a shot, and during the hottest part of the fighting he * was seen pealing the bark from off of young saplings and spliced the same, which he carried at the head of the command until the end of the battle. ; The woods in which the battle raged was “torn and rent with shell, and | pierced with innumerable minie balls. ’ ’ Oliver O. Howard, Major-General U. S. A., writes : “It would require the whole history of the battle, to fairly portray Slocum ’s part there. The most impressive I 1 incident of the battle to me was Slocum’s own battle on the morning of the third day. For seven hours he commanded the field to our right; that dreadful struggle went on ■ until Ewell with Early and Johnson’s divisions were forced to give up and abandon his prize of the night before. Slocum’s resolute insistence on the second day, upon ! leaving Greene ’s brigade as a precaution when Meade ordered the 12th corps to be sent to his left, with Greene ’s marvelous midnight battle and more still, Slocum ’s j organized work and engagement of the following morning, in my judgment prevented General Meade losing the battle of Gettysburg. ’ ’ “Governor’s Island, N. Y. July 6, 1894’’ (see page 82). The last sound of battle liad died away. There was silence over the whole field. It was evident, however, that preparations were being made for another gigantic and possibly crowning effort. As the forenoon ad- vanced, the hot July sun poured down its rays with a tropical intensity. It soon began to be manifested that the point of attack was to be the Union left center — the depressed part of Cemetery Ridge, midway between Cemetery Hill and Round Top. It will be seen that General Meade, after the repulse of Johnson’s troops, anticipates further attack, and improves the respite given him until 1 : 00 P.M. in rectifying the position of his troops. The 12tli corps is in its old position on Culp ’s Hill, with Lockwood ’s brigade added to the division of Ruger (vice Williams), Shaler’s brigade of the 6th corps is in reserve, Neill’s brigade of the same corps are on Wolf’s Hill, east of Rock Creek, j forming the extreme right of the line, and covering the Baltimore road. Wadsworth’s division of the 1st corps, is to the left of the 12th, on Culp’s Hill, continuing the line to the 11th corps of three divisions, with Carroll’s brigade of the 2nd corps in support on Cemetery Hill ; then the 2nd corps of three divisions — Hays, Gibbons and Caldwell — with Robinson’s division of the 1st corps in rear and left at Ziegler’s Grove. Doubleday’s BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 91 division of the 1st corps is between Gibbon and Caldwell’s divisions on Cemetery Ridge. Stannard’s brigade of Vermonters — just from the Wash- ington defense — is posted a little in advance of the general line. Behind Doubleday is Birney with remnants of the 3rd corps. Joining Caldwell’s division on the left are McGilvery’s batteries, with Brewster’s brigade of the 3rd corps, and Eustis and Torbert’s brigades of the 6th corps in support, while Humphrey massed Carr’s and Graham’s brigades of the 3rd corps in the 2nd line supporting the batteries and 2nd corps. Immediately to the left of McGilvery’s guns is the brigade of McCandless of the 5th corps across Plum Run. Supporting McCandless is the brigade of Nevin, of the 6th corps, being in the near front of Sweitzer’s brigade of the 5th corps; on Sweitzer’s left is Bartlett’s brigade of the 6th corps. At the western base of Little Round Top and to Bartlett’s left are the brigades of Rice (vice Vincent), Fisher, Tilton and Garrard (who superseded Weed), supported by Day and Burbank ’s brigades on its crest, all of the 5th corps. The brigades of Russell and Grant of the 6th corps are southeast of Round Top. General Kilpatrick with the brigades of Farnsworth of his own cavalry division, and that of Merritt’s of Buford’s division are on the extreme left from Plum Run gorge to and beyond the Emmitsburg road. General Gregg with McIntosh and J. I. Gregg’s brigades of his own and that of Custer’s brigade of Kilpatrick’s division, are on the right flank at the Hanover-Low Dutch roads. After weighing all considerations, General Lee accordingly orders to the immediate support of Pickett’s right, Wilcox’s brigade of Anderson’s division. Garnett and Armistead’s brigades extending the front to the left. The remaining brigades of Anderson’ s division are formed in rear of Pickett. From right to left are the brigades of Perry, Wright and Mahone. On Pickett’s left are those of Lane and Scales of Pender’s divi- sion, under command of General Trimble, supporting Heth’s division of Hill’s corps, now commanded by General Pettigrew, composed of the bri- gades of Frys (vice Archer, a prisoner in the Union line), Davis, Brocken- brough and Marshall (who supersedes Pettigrew) . Kemper’s brigade holds the right. Armistead’s the left, with Garnett’s in the center. By noon the cannon were put into position on the ridges occupied by both armies. About 1 P.M. the report of two guns was heard. It was the signal for attack, the smoke had hardly emerged from those guns until Seminary Ridge seemed as if swept with a tongue of flame. Then came the loud thundering roar of artillery; about 150 cannon along Lee’s entire line opened fire, and from their angry mouths poured death and destruction on the Federal line. General Hunt, chief of the Union artillery, was in no haste to reply. After the enemy’s guns were well located, they opened upon them with 80 cannon — that being all that could be placed on their interior line. Instantly the whole ridge from Cemetery Hill to Round Top seemed ablaze. It was the grandest artillery combat that ever occurred on this continent. The din was terrific. Shell were bursting everywhere, while the earth itself trembled for two hours from the mighty concussion 92 THE BLUE AND GRAY that was felt for miles away (see page 100). While the artillery duel was raging General Warren, chief of engineers, rode to the signal station on Little Round Top and discovered the formation of a large body of troops in the edge of the woods in front of the Union center. He communicated the fact per signal (see page 66) to the right of the line, and General Hunt ordered all the gunners to gradually cease firing, in order to allow their able cannon to cool, to replace the disabled batteries, and to retain enough ammunition to receive the attack from the woods in front. The Confederates were now deceived, they believed they had de- molished the Union guns or exhausted their ammunition. It was just 3 : 00 P.M. when the column of attack was seen forming on the edge of the woods which crown the summit of Seminary Ridge. The fresh division of Pickett was appointed to lead the van. These brave veterans emerged from the woods with their guns upon their right shoulder marching across the mile of open ground as though they were on parade. When they had reached half way all guns along the Union line renewed their fire, con- centrating the same on their advancing columns ; the Confederate cannon were silent. “Why?” said the men who were rushing into the jaws of death. “Why?” said the men on the heights behind. “Why?” said the Federals on the heights in front. The reason was not known to Lee himself, his ammunition was exhausted. The Union batteries were tearing them apart in many places. Still their line moved steadily on, closing the vacant gaps, time after time; their battalions seemed to fear no fire, to dread no foe. Hesitating in the face of the increasing difficulties that await their nearer approach, the fire of the Union guns was redoubled, and soon their troops became separated by the blinding artillery smoke. General Hancock rode down the line to speak to General Stannard, whose Vermonters were moved forward, when he (Hancock) was grievously wounded. A ball struck the pommel of his saddle, tearing out and twisting a nail from it, and both bullet and nail entered his thigh. Two of Stan- nard ’s aids caught him as he fell from his horse. While in an ambulance he wrote a note to General Meade, urgently advising that as soon as the Confederate charge was over a return charge be made with comparatively fresh troops of the 6th corps. Some think that if this had been done, the Army of Northern Virginia would have found the end of its career then and there, instead of at Appomattox, Va., April 9, 1865. But Longstreet said he expected and was prepared for such a charge, and that General Sedgwick’s troops would have fared as badly as Pickett. General Stannard successfully executed a difficult movement of chang- ing the front of his rear rank while under fire; his gallant men poured forth a well-directed and most destructive fire upon Wilcox and Perry’s troops moving southward while others fired volley after volley in rapid succession into the now trembling lines of Armistead and Kemper * moving * General Kemper writes, "I was nearly up to the Federal line when repulsed; so near that I could easily see the faces and expression on the countenances of the Union men, and I thought I could identify the individual that shot me. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 93 north, which are torn and tattered. Stannard’s men press forward and capture more men than they had in their own organization.* 1 Now came the culmination of a mighty struggle to pierce the Union line. Squarely in front of the now desperate Confederates, was Pennsyl- vania regiments. Veterans of former campaigns, now for the first time on the soil of their own state, it was their proud distinction to stand in the breach. Their line held on firm and impenetrable. Many of the Union batteries had been nearly demolished during the artillery duel. Lieutenant Cushing, commanding Battery A, 4th U. S., had but one gun left. He was working that gun himself, with a lanyard wrapped around his wrist and being mortally wounded he cried to General Webb, “General, I'll give them one more shot.” He fell dead and the weight of his body discharged the piece (see page 100). General Armistead had reached the stone wall “at the angle.” His hat upon the point of his sword, he calls to his men, “Boys, give them the cold steel,” and followed by his men crossed the wall, and fell mortally wounded near one of the Union cannon (see page 100). Then came the hand-to-hand conflict which lasted for a few moments only, when the terror-stricken Confederates broke in utter confusion, large l numbers of them flinging down their arms and their hands above their heads as a token of surrender, they had done their best and their utmost — they had fought like true heroes; but now, utterly overpowered, and re- duced to the last stage of desperation, they gave up the fight. Thus Lee’s last and mosUdesperate effort — Pickett’s charged failed of its object; but it will ever live in the annals of fame as the most brilliant and gallant effor t. Equalling the most noted “Charge of the Light Brigade” at Balaklava. *Lieut. Stephen P. Brown, of the 13th Vt. regiment, went into and almost through the battle armed only with a camp hatchet. This came about from the circumstance that on the march to Gettysburg, Brown had taken some canteens to a well and filled them with water, for some of his men who were almost fainting from thirst, in violation of an order which forbade officers or men to leave the ranks, except during the halts for meals, etc. Brown was therefore placed under arrest for disobedience of orders. When the regiment reached the field he was released from arrest by General Stannard. but could not have his sword back because it was in one of the w r agons. He accordingly armed himself with a hatchet, which he carried until in the repulse of Pickett’s charge, he received the surrender of a Confederate officer and took his sword and pistol. On returning from the charge he was stunned by the concussion of a shell, but declined to leave the ranks . — From Benedict’s “Vermont in the Civil War," p. J/78, Vol. XI. mil til In sli P il ft 9 It if ft O N the morning of July 3 the Federal side held Cemetery Ridge, Com- pactly arranged on its crest was MeGilvery’s artillery, 41 guns, con- sisting of his own batteries reinforced by others from the artillery reserve. Well to the right, in front of Hay’s and Gibbon’s divisions was the artillery of the 2nd corps under its chief, Capt. Hazard. Woodruff’s battery was in front at Ziegler’s Grove; on his left in succession were Arnold’s R. I., Cushing’s U. S., Brown’s R. I. and Rorty’s N. Y. batteries. In the battle j of the preceding day the two last-named had been to the front and suffered severely. Lieut. T. F. Brown was wounded, and his command devolved on Lieutenant Perrin. So great had been the loss in men and horses, that they were now of four guns each, reducing the total number in the corps to 26 pieces. Daniel’s battery four guns was at the angle (see page 38). Cowan’s 1st N. Y., six guns was placed on the left of Rorty. In addition, some of the guns on Cemetery Hill, and Rittenhouse ’s battery on Little Round Top could be brought to bear, but these were offset by batteries similarly placed on the flanks of the enemy’s line, so that on the 2nd corps line, within the space of a little more than a mile were 77 guns to oppose about 150 (see page 100). They were on an open /crest plainly visible from all parts of the opposite line. About 11:30 A.M. everything looking favorable at Culp’s Hill, I crossed over to Cemetery Ridge to see what might be going on at other points. Here a magnificent display greeted my eyes. Our whole front for two miles was covered by batteries, already in or going into position. They stretched — apparently in one unbroken mass — from opposite the town to the Peach Orchard which bounded the batteries to the left. Never before had such a sight been witnessed on this continent, and rarely if ever abroad. What did it mean? It might possibly be to hold that line while its infantry was sent to aid Ewell or guard against a counter-stroke from us, but it most probably meant an assault on our center, to be preceded by a cannonade in order to crush our batteries and shake our infantry ; at least to cause us to exhaust our ammunition in reply, so that the assaulting troops might pass in good condition over the mile of open ground which was beyond our effective musketry fire. 94 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 95 I instructed the artillery commanders to withhold their fire for ten minutes after the cannonade commenced, then to concentrate their fire with all possible accuracy on those batteries which were most destructive to us — but slowly, so that when the enemy’s ammunition was exhausted we should have sufficient left to meet the assault. At about 1 : 00 P.M. I had just given these orders to the last battery on Little Round Top, when the signal-guns were fired, and the enemy opened with all his guns. From that point the scene was indescribably grand. All their batteries were soon covered with smoke, through which the flashes were incessant, while the air seemed filled with shells, whose sharp explosions, with the hurling of their fragments, formed a running accompaniment to the deep roar of the guns. Thence I rode to the artillery reserve, to order fresh batteries and ammunition to be sent up to the ridge as soon as the cannonade ceased ; both the reserve and train had gone to a safer place. Messengers, however, had been left to receive and convey orders, which I sent by them. Turning into the Taneytown road, I saw evidence of the necessity under which the reserve had “decamped” in the remains of a dozen : exploded caissons, which had been placed under cover of a hill. In fact, the fire was more dangerous behind the ridge than on the crest. * * Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chest I found that the ammunition : was running low. I therefore ordered its immediate cessation. Finally all our guns ceased ; this was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy under the mistaken impression that they had silenced our guns. Almost immediately their infantry came out of the woods and formed for an assault. On my way to the Taneytown road I met the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, and put them in the following position : Fitzhugh ’s, Weir’s, "Wheeler’s and Parson’s were put south of the “Clump of Trees.” Brown’s and Arnold’s batteries had been so crippled that they were now withdrawn. Brown’s was replaced by Cowan’s. In the meantime the enemy advanced, and McGilvery’s guns opened a destructive oblique fire, reinforced by Rittenliouse’s six rifle guns from Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy, enfilading Pickett’s lines. The Confed- erates’ approach was magnificent and excited our admiration. The steady fire in their front and on their right caused Pickett’s men to “drift” in the opposite direction, so that the weight of the assault fell upon the position occupied by Hazard’s batteries. I had counted on an artillery cross-fire that would stop it before reaching our line. Except for a few shots here and there, Hazard’s batteries were silent until the enemy came within canister range. They had unfortunately exhausted their long-range projectiles during the cannonade, under the orders of their corps com- manders, and it was too late to replace them. Some were firing double- canister at ten yards. So great was the loss of men and horses, that Cushing’s and Woodruff’s U. S. and Brown’s and Arnold’s R. I. batteries were consolidated to form two serviceable ones. * * * E ARLY in the morning of Jnly 3rd, General Lee informed me that we were to assault Cemetery Ridge, which lay rather to our left. This necessitated a great many changes of our positions, which the Federals did not altogether approve of, as they took occasional shots at us, though we shifted about, as inoffensively as possible, carefully avoiding getting into j bunches. At about 11:00 A.M. Dearing having come up, we had 76 guns j in what was virtually one battery, so disposed as to fire on Cemetery Ridge. Pickett’s division had arrived, and his men were resting. A short distance ! to our left were 64 guns of A. P. Hill’s corps, under Col. R. L. Walker. I As the distance was a little too great for effective fire, General Pendleton offered me the use of nine howitzers. I accepted them, intending to take them into the charge with Pickett, so I put them in a hollow behind a bit of woods with no orders but to wait there until I sent for them. About 11:30 A.M. some of Hill’s skirmishers and the Federals began fighting over a barn* between the lines, and gradually his artillery and that of the Federals took part, until at least 100 guns were engaged, and a tremendous roar was kept up for quite a time. But it gradually died oift and the whole field became as silent as a church-yard. About 1 : 00 P.M. the Federals, aware of the strength of his position, simply sat still and waited for us. It had been arranged that when the infantry column was ready, General Long street should order two guns fired by the “Washington Artillery,” ! on that signal all our guns were to open on Cemetery Ridge which was ; 1 covered with Union batteries. I was to observe the fire and give Pickett the order to charge. I accordingly took position about noon at the most ! favorable point, with one of Pickett’s couriers with me. Soon after I re- ceived the following note from General Long street : “Colonel, If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the j Federals or greatly demoralize them so as to make our efforts pretty 1 ' certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make i *The barn referred to was the large Bliss barn ; both house and barn was burned on the : morning of the 3rd, by the 12th New Jersey and 14th Conn, regiments, as both buildings 1 , were filled with Confederate sharpshooters. 96 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 97 I the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your good judgment to determine I the matter, and shall expect you to let General Pickett know when the ( moment offers.” This note rather startled me. If that assault was to be made on | General Lee’s judgment it was all right, but I did not want it made on I mine. I wrote to General Longstreet, to the following effect : “General, I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire on the Federals by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If as I infer from your note, there is any alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the results are unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort. And even if this is entirely successful, it can only be so at a very bloody cost. ’ ’ To this presently came the following reply : ‘ 1 Colonel : The intention is to advance the infantry if the artillery has the desired effect of driving the Federals off, or having other effect, such as to warrant us in making the attack. When the moment arrives, advise i General Pickett and of course advance such artillery as you can use in aiding the attack.” ( I hardly knew whether this left me discretion or not, but at any rate it seemed decided that the artillery must open. I felt that if we went that far we could not draw back, but the infantry must go too. Gen. A. R. Wright was with me looking at the position when these notes were received, and we discussed them together. Wright said, “It is not so hard to go there as it looks; I was nearly there with my brigade yesterday. The trouble is to stay there. The whole Yankee army is there in a bunch.” I was somewhat influenced by this, and by a sort of camp rumor which I heard that morning, that General Lee had said that he was going to send every man he had upon that ridge. At any rate, I assumed that the ques- tion of supports had been well considered, and that whatever was possible would be done. But before replying, I rode to see General Pickett, who was with his division a short distance in the rear. I did not tell him my object, but only tried to guess how he felt about the charge. He seemed very sanguine, and thought himself in luck to have the chance. Then I felt that I could not make any delay or let the attack suffer by any indecision on my part. And, that General Longstreet might know my intention, I wrote him only this : “General, when our artillery fire is at its best, I shall order Pickett to charge. ” Then, getting a little more anxious, I decided to send for the nine howitzers and take them ahead of Pickett, up nearly to musket range, so I : sent a courier to bring them up in front of the infantry. The courier ’ could not find them. He was sent again, and only returned after our fire was opened, saying they were gone. I afterward learned that General Pendleton had sent for a part of them, and the others had moved to a 7 98 THE BLUE AND GRAY neighboring hollow to get out of line of the Union fire. At exactly 1:00 P.M. (by my watch), the two signal guns were heard in quick suc- cession. In another minute every gun was at work. The Pederals were not slow in coming back at us, and the grand roar of nearly the whole artillery of both armies burst in on the silence almost as suddenly as the Bill notes of an organ would fill a church. The artillery of Ewell’s corps, however, took only a small part. I believe in this, as they were too far away, on the other side of the town. Some of them might have done good service from positions between Hill and Ewell enfilading the batteries fighting us. The opportunity to do that was the single advantage in our having the exterior line, to compensate for all its disadvantages. But our line was so extended that all of it was not well studied, and the officers of the different corps had no opportunity to examine each other’s ground for chances to cooperate. The Union position seemed to have broken out with guns everywhere, and from Round Top to Cemetery Hill was blazing like a volcano. The air seemed full of missiles from every direction. The severity of the fire may be illustrated by the casualties in my own battalion under Major Huger, under my predecessor, Gen. S. D. Lee ; the battalion had made a reputation at the second Manassas, and also at Antietam. At the latter battle it had a peculiarly hard time, fighting infantry and superior metal ; nearly all day, losing 85 men and 60 horses. Antietam they called “Antie- tam Hell.” At Gettysburg the losses in the same command, including , those who helped serve the guns, were 144 men and 116 horses, nearly all by artillery fire. Some parts of the Federal artillery suffered in the same proportion under our fire. I heard of one battery losing 27 out of 36 horses in ten minutes.* j Before the cannonade opened, I had made up my mind to give Pickett the order to advance within fifteen minutes after it began, but when I j looked at the full development of the Federal batteries, and knew that their infantry was generally protected from our fire, by stone walls and swells of the ground, I could not bring myself to give the word. It seemed mad- ness to launch infantry into that fire, with nearly a mile to go at midday , under a July sun. I let 15 minutes pass, 20 and 25, hoping vainly for something to turn up. Then I wrote to General Pickett: “If you are coming at all, you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support ; the Union fire has not slackened at all ; at least 18 guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself.” Five minutes after sending that message, the Federals fire suddenly slackened, and the guns in the Cemetery limbered up and vacated the position. We often did such things as that to save our ammunition for use against infantry, but I had never before seen the Federals withdrawn their — *The shot and shell ploughed up the ground, and dismounted many guns. A house used for General Meade’s headquarters in the rear of the Union line, was completely riddled. General Butterfield, (Meade’s) chief of staff, was grieviously wounded while engaged in writing! orders. Around the house lay 16 dead horses (see page 38). BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 99 guns simply to save them up for the infantry tight. So I said, “If he does not run fresh batteries in there in five minutes, this will be our fight.” I looked anxiously with my glasses, and the five minutes passed without a sign of life on that deserted position, still swept by our fire, and littered with dead men and horses, and fragments of disabled carriages. Then I i wrote General Pickett urgently: “For God’s sake come quick. The 18 guns are gone; come quick, or my ammunition won’t let me support you properly.” I afterwards heard from others what took place with my first note to General Pickett. Pickett took it to General Longstreet ; Longstreet read it, and said nothing; Pickett said, “General, shall I advance?” Longstreet, knowing it had to be, but unwilling to give the word, turned his face away. Pickett saluted and said, “I am going to move forward, sir,” galloped off to his division, and immediately put it in action (see page 100). Longstreet, leaving his staff, came out alone to where I was. I was then more hopeful, but afraid our artillery ammunition might not hold out for all we would want. Longstreet said, “Stop Pickett immediately, and replenish your ammunition. ’ ’ I explained that it would take too long, and the Federals would recover from the effect our fire was then having, and w r e had. moreover, very little to replenish with. General Longstreet said, ‘ ‘ I don ’t want to make this attack ; I would stop it now, but that General Lee ordered it and expects it to go on; don’t see how it can succeed. ” I listened, but did not dare offer a word. The battle was lost if we stopped. Ammunition was far too low to try anything else, for we had been fighting three days. There was a chance, and it was not my part to interfere. While Longstreet was still speaking, Pickett’s division swept out of the woods and shown the full length of its gray ranks and shining bayonets, as grand a sight as ever a man looked on. Joining it, on the left, General Pettigrew stretched further than I could see. General Garnett, just out of the sick ambulance, and buttoned up in an old overcoat, riding at the head of his brigade, passed us and saluted General Longstreet — Garnett was a warm personal friend. We had served on the plains to- gether before the outbreak of the war. I rode with him a short distance, and then we wished each other luck and good-bye, which was our last. Then I rode along the line of guns, selecting such as had enough ammunition to follow Pickett’s advance, and started them after him as ■ fast as possible. I got, I think, about 18 in all in a little while, and went ; with them. Meanwhile, the infantry had no sooner debouched on the plain than all the Union guns, which had been silent, broke out again with all its batteries. The 18 guns w T ere back in the Cemetery, and a storm of shell : began bursting over and among our infantry. All of our guns — silent as : the infantry passed between them — reopened over their heads, when the lines had got a couple hundred yards away, but the Federal artillery let : us alone and fired only at the infantry. No one could have looked at that advance without feeling proud of it. HIGH WAT EB MARK" MON. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 101 B. Briggs Devenport, writing for the Philadelphia Public Ledger the story of Piclcett’s famous charge (published June 28th, 1903), is as follows: ‘ ‘ Still onward press the men in gray, their ranks growing thinner, their lives shorter, as the living press toward the center to till the gaps left by the dead. Nearly every mounted officer goes down. Eiderless horses are flying hither and thither. Above the battle’s roar is heard the familiar southern yell. It proclaims fresh hope, but false hope. Union batteries * * * like burning lava from volcanic vents, pour a ceaseless current of fire into the now Confederate ranks. The Southern left is torn to fragments. Quickly the brilliant Alexander, his ammunition almost exhausted, flies at a furious gallop with his batteries to the support of the dissolving infantry. Here and there his horses and riders go down and check his artillery progress. His brave gunners cut loose the dead horses, seize the wheels, whirl the guns in position and pour the hot grape and canister into the face of the Federals. The Confederates rally under the impulse and rush onward. At one instant their gray jackets and flashing bayonets are plainly seen in the July sun. At the next 'they disappear, hidden from view as the belching cannon conceal and envelop them in sulphurous smoke. The brisk west wind lifts and drives the smoke from the field, revealing the Confed- erate banners close to the stone wall. ‘Will they go over?’ Look! They are over and in the Union line. The left center is pierced, but there is no Union panic, no general flight. The Confederate battleflags and Union banners are floating side by side. Pace to face, breast to breast, are the hostile hosts. The heavy guns are silent. The roar of the artillery has given place to the rattle of rifles and the crack of pistol shots. The awful din and confusion of close combat is heard, as the men batter and brain each other with clubbed muskets. The brave young Lieutenant Cushing, shot in both thighs, still stands by his guns (see page 100). The Confederates seize them; but he surrenders them only with his life. One southern leader is left. It is the heroic Armistead. He calls around him the shattered southern remnant. Lifting his hat on the point of his sword, he orders ‘ Forward ! ’ on the second line, and dies with half these remnants amidst the culminating fury of Gettysburg fires.” But as our supporting guns advanced, we passed many poor, mangled victims left in its trampled wake. A terrific infantry fire was now opened upon Pickett, and a considerable force of the Federals moved out to attack the right flank of his line. We halted, unlimbered and opened fire upon it. Pickett’s men never halted, but opened fire at close range, swarmed over the fence and among the Union guns — were swallowed up in smoke, and that was the last of them. The conflict hardly seemed to last five minutes before they were melted away, and only disorganized stragglers pursued by a moderate fire were coming back. Just then General Wilcox’s brigade passed by us, moving to Pickett’s support. There was no longer anything to support, and with the keenest pity at the useless waste of life, I saw them advance. The men, as they passed us looked bewildered, as if they wondered what they were expected to do, or why they were there. However, they were soon halted and moved back. They suffered some losses, and we had a few casualties from canister sent at us at rather long range. From the position of our guns, the sight of the conflict was grand and thrilling, and we watched it as men with a life and death interest in the result. If it should be favorable to us, the war was nearly over ; if against I us, we each had the risks of many battles yet to go through. The event culminated with fearful rapidity. Listening to the rolling crashes of musketry, it was hard to realize that they were made up of single reports, 102 TIIE BLUE AND GRAY and that each mnsket-shot represented nearly a minute of a man’s life in that storm of lead and iron. It seemed as if 100,000 men were engaged, and that human life was being poured out like water. As soon as it ap- peared that the assault had failed, we ceased firing in order to save ammunition in case the Federals should advance. But we held our ground as boldly as possible though we were entirely without support, and very low in ammunition. The Federals gave us an occasional shot for awhile, and then, to our great relief, let us rest. About that time General Lee, entirely alone, rode up and remained with me for a long time (see page 100). He then probably first appreciated the full extent of the disaster as the disorganized stragglers made their way back past us. The Count de Paris, in his excellent account of this battle, remarks that Lee, as a soldier, must at this moment have foreseen Appomattox — that he must have realized that he could never again muster so powerful an army, and that for the future he could only delay, but not avert, the failure of his cause. However this may be, it was certainly a momentous thing to him to see that superb attack end in such a bloody repulse. But whatever his emo- tion, there was no trace of them in his calm and self-possessed bearing. I thought at the time his coming there very imprudent, and the absence of all his staff-officers and couriers strange. It could only have happened by his express intention, I have since thought it possible that he came thinking the Federals might follow in pursuit of Pickett personally to rally strag- glers about our guns and make a desperate defense. He had the instincts of a soldier within him as strongly as any man. Looking at Burnside’s dense columns swarming through the fire of our guns toward Maryes Hill at Fredericksburg, he had said: “It’s well war is so terrible, or we would grow too fond of it.” No soldier could have looked on at Pickett’s charge and not burned to be in it. To have a personal part in a close and desperate fight at that moment would, I believe, have been at heart a great pleasure to General Lee, and possibly he was looking for one. We were here joined by Colonel Fremantle of Her Majesty’s Coldstream Guards, who was visit- ing our army. He afterward published an excellent account of the battle in “Blackwood” magazine and described many little incidents that took place here, such as General Lee encouraging the retreating stragglers to rally as soon as they got back to cover, and saying that the failure was his fault, not theirs. Fremantle was near General Long street when Pickett’s charge was made. Standing with his back to the sun, and witnessing the operation on the great slope before him, he, although a soldier by pro- fession, was so thoroughly possessed with the wish and the expectation that the Confederate cause might succeed, that he mistook Pickett’s awful defeat for a glorious success, and rushing up to General Longstreet, congratulated him upon it, and told him how glad he was to be there and see it. “Are you indeed!” said Longstreet, surprised, “I am not.” That was the end of the battle there. Little by little we got some guns to the rear to replenish and refit, and get in condition to fight again, and some we held boldly in advanced positions all along the line. * * * Story of the Grand Charge BY JAMES LONGSTEEET, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL, C. S. A. BOUT 1 : 00 P.M., everything was in readiness. The signal-guns broke the prevailing stillness, and imme- diately the Confederate cannon burst into a deafening roar, which was answered by a thunder almost as great from the Federal side. The great artillery combat pro- ceeded. The destruction was of course not great; but the thunder on Seminary Ridge, and the echo from Cemetery Ridge showed that both commanders were ready. The armies seemed like mighty wild beasts growling at each other and preparing for a death-struggle. For an hour and a half the fire was continued, and met such steady response on the part of the Federals that it seemed less effective than we had anticipated. I sent word to Colonel Alexander that unless he could do something more, I would not feel warranted in ordering the troops forward. After a little, some of the Federal batteries ceased firing, and Alexander thought the most suitable time for the advance had come. He sent word to Pickett and Pickett rode to my headquarters. As he came up he asked if the time for his advance had come. I was convinced that he would be leading his troops to needless slaughter, and did not speak. He repeated the question, and without opening my lips, I bowed in answer (see page 100). In a determined voice, Pickett said: “Sir, I shall lead my division forward.” He then rode hack to his command. I mounted, and rode to a point where I could observe the troops. That day at Gettysburg was one of the saddest of my life. I foresaw what my men would meet, and would gladly have given up my position rather than share in the responsibility of that day. It was thus I felt when Pickett at the head of 4,800 brave men marched over the crest of Seminary Ridge and began his descent of the slope. As he passed he rode gracefully, with his jaunty cap raked well over on his right ear, and his long auburn locks, nicely dressed, hanging almost to his shoulders. He seemed rather a holiday soldier than a general at the head of a column which was about to make one of the grandest, most desperate assaults recorded in the annals of war. Armistead and Garnett, two of his brigadiers, were veterans of nearly a quarter of a century’s service. Their minds seemed absorbed in the men behind, and in the bloody work before them. Kemper, the other brigadier, was younger, hut had experienced many battles. He was leading my old brigade that I had drilled on Manassas plains before the first battle on that noted field. The troops advanced in well -closed ranks and with elastic step, their faces lightened with hope. Before them lay the ground over which they were to pass to a point of attack. Intervening were several 103 104 THE BLUE AND GRAY fences, a field of corn, a little swale running through it and then a rise fi’om that point to the Federal stronghold. As soon as Pickett passed the crest of the hill, the Federals had a clear view and opened their batteries, and as he descended the eastern slope of the ridge his troops received a fearful fire from the batteries in front and from Round Top. As soon as they passed my batteries, I ordered my artillery to turn their fire against the batteries on our right (Round Top) then raking my lines. I sent an officer to caution the commanders to guard against that move. * * * After crossing the swale, the troops kept the same steady step, but met a dreadful fire at the hands of the Federal sharpshooters ; and as soon as the field was open the Federal infantry poured down a terrific fire which was kept up during the entire assault. The slaughter was terrible, the enfilade fire of the guns on Round Top being very destructive. At times one shell would knock down five or six men. I dismounted to relieve my horse, and was standing watching closely the movements of the troops. As Pickett’s division concentrated in making the final assault, Kemper fell severely wounded. As the division threw itself against the Federal line, Garnett fell and expired, “as I have since learned his body was never identified.” The Confederate flag was planted in the Federal line, and immediately Armistead fell mortally wounded at the feet of the Federal soldiers. The wavering division then seemed appalled, broke their ranks and retired. Immediately the Federals swarmed around Pickett, attacking on all sides, enveloped and broke his command, having killed and wounded more than 2,000 men in about 30 minutes. They then drove the fragments back upon our lines. As they came back I fully expected to see General Meade ride to the front and lead his forces to a tremendous counter-charge. Sending my staff officers to assist in collecting the fragments of my command, I rode to my line of batteries, knowing they were all I had in front of my impend- ing attack, resolved to drive it back or sacrifice my last man and gun. The Federals were advancing a line of skirmishers which I thought was the advance of their charge. As soon as the line of skirmishers disappeared, my mind was relieved of the apprehension that Meade was going to follow us. General Lee came up as our troops were falling back, encouraged them as well as he could ; begged them to reform their ranks and reorganize their forces, and assisted the staff officers in bringing them all together again. It was then he used the expression that has been mentioned so often : “It was all my fault ; get together, and let us do the best we can toward saving that which is left us. ” * # # Of Pickett’s three brigadiers, General Garnett and Armistead were killed, and General Kemper dangerously wounded. Colonel Fry, who com- manded General Pettigrew’s brigade, which adjoined Garnett on the left, was also left on the field desperately wounded. The men who made the attack were good enough ! the only trouble was, there were not enough of them. * * * Repelling Lee’s Last Blow at Gettysburg BY EDMUND BICE, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, U. S. A. HE brigades of Harrow, Webb and Hall, of Gibbon’s division, Hancock’s corps, occupied the crest on Ceme- tery Ridge on July 3rd, 1863. The right of Hall’s and the left of Webb’s brigades were in a clump of trees, called the “Umbrella Shaped Trees,” the salient of our posi- tion, and this grove was the focus of the most fearful cannonade ever witnessed; it preceded Pickett’s charge. One of our regiments, the 72nd Pa. Yol. Inf., in Webb’s brigade, was a little in rear of the left of its command ; two regiments, 19tli Mass, and 42nd N. Y., were in rear right of their brigade. From the opposite ridge, three-quarters of a mile away, a line of skirmishers sprang lightly forward out of the woods, and with intervals well kept moved rapidly down into the open fields, closely followed by a line of battle, then by another, and by yet a 3rd, almost a mile in length. Both sides watched this never-to-be-forgotten scene — the grandeur of attack of so many thousand men. Gibbon ’s division, which was to stand the brunt of the assault, looked with admiration on the different lines of the Confed- erates marching forward with easy swinging step, and our men were heard to explain : ‘ ‘ Here they come ! Here they come ! Here comes their infantry ! ’ ’ Soon little puffs of smoke issued from the skirmish line, as it came dashing forward, firing in reply to our own skirmishers in the plain below, and with this faint rattle of musketry the stillness was broken ; never hesitating for an instant, but driving our men before it, or knocking them over by a biting fire, as they rose up to run in their skirmish line reached the fences of the Emmitsburg road. This was Pickett’s advance (see page 100). I was just in rear of the brigade, standing upon a boulder in front of my regiment, the 19th Mass., where from the configuration of the ground, I could see the entire formation of the attacking lines. Pickett’s separate brigade lines lost their formation as they swept across the Emmitsburg road. They pushed on toward the crest, and merged into one crowding, rushing column, many ranks deep. As they crossed the road, Webb’s infantry, on the right of the trees commenced an irregular, hesitating fire, gradually increasing to a rapid file firing, while the shrapnel and canister from the Union cannon tore great gaps through those splendid Virginia battalions. The men of our brigade, with their muskets at the “ready,” lay in waiting. One could plainly hear the order of the officers as they com- manded, “Steady, men, steady! Don’t fire!” and not a shot was fired at the advancing hostile line, now getting closer every moment. The heavy file firing on the right of Webb’s brigade continued. 105 106 THE BLUE AND GRAY By an undulation of the surface of the ground to the left of the ‘ ‘ Clump of trees, ’ ’ the rapid advance of the dense line of Confederates was for a moment lost to view; an instant after they seemed to rise out of the earth, and so near that the expression on their face was distinctly seen, and could wait no longer. Aiming low, they opened a deadly concentrated discharge upon that moving mass in their front. Staggered by the storm of lead, the charging line hesitated, answered with some wild firing which soon increased to a crashing roll of musketry, running down the whole length of their front, and then all that portion of Pickett’s division which came within a zone of this terrible close musketry fire appeared to melt and drift away in the powder-smoke of both sides. At this juncture someone behind me gave the quick impatient order, “Forward, men! For- ward! Now is your chance!” I turned and saw it was General Hancock, who was passing the left of the regiment. He checked his horse and pointed toward the clump of trees to our right and front. I construed this into an order for both regiments — the 19th Mass, and 42nd N. Y.- — to run for the trees, to prevent the enemy from breaking through. The men on the left of our regiment heard my command, and were up and on the run forward before the 42nd N. Y., which did not hear Hancock’s order until Colonel Devereux repeated it to Colonel Mallon. All the men who were now on their feet could see to the right and front, Webb’s wounded men with a few stragglers and several limbers leaving the line, as the battle flags of Pickett’s men were carried over it. With a cheer the tw T o regiments left their position in the rear of Hall’s right, and made an impetuous dash, racing diagonally forward for the clump of trees. Many of Webb’s men were still lying down in their places in the ranks and were firing at those who followed Pickett’s advance, which in the meantime, had passed over them. This could be determined by the puffs of smoke issuing from their muskets, as the first few men in gray sprang past them toward the cannon only a few yards away. But for a few moments only could such a fire continue, for Pickett’s disorganized mass rolled over, beat down, and smothered it. One battle flag after another, supported by Pickett’s infantry, ap- peared along the edge of the trees, until the whole copse seemed literally crammed with men. As the 19th Mass, and the 42nd N. Y., passed along the brigade line, on our left, we could see the me'n prone in their places, unshaken, and firing steadily to their front, beating back the enemy. I saw one leader try several times to jump his horse over our line. He was shot by some of the men near me. The two regiments in a disorganized state, were now almost at right angles with the remainder of the brigade — the left of the 19th Mass, being but a few yards distant — and the officers and men were falling fast from the enfilading fire of the hostile line in front, and from the direct fire of those who were crowded in among the trees. The advance of the two regiments became so thinned that for a moment there was a pause. Captain BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 107 Farrell, of the 1st Minn, regiment, came in on the left. As we greeted each other he received his death-wound, and fell in front of his men, who now began firing. The gaps in the line seemed to widen, for the enemy in front, being once more driven by a .terrible musketry in their very faces, left to join those who had effected an entrance through Webb’s line. Seeing no longer an enemy in front, and annoyed by a galling fire from the flank, the 7th Mich, and 59th N. Y., followed by the 20th Mass, and the regiments of Harrow’s brigade, left their line, faced to the right, and in groups with all order of organization lost, joined in the rush with those already at the edge of the clump of trees ; all cheering and yelling, ‘ ‘ Hurrah ! for the white trefoil!” “Clubs are trump !” “Forward the white trefoil !” (The badge of Gibbon’s division — the second of the second corps — was the white trefoil.) The men near seemed to fire very slowly. Those in the rear, though coming up at a run, seemed to drag their feet. Many were firing, through the intervals of those in front, in their eagerness to injure the enemy. The men in gray were doing all that was possible to keep off the mixed men in blue who were moving upon them swiftly and without hesi- tation. I could feel the touch of the men to my right and left, as we neared the edge of the copse of trees. The grove was fairly jammed with Pickett’s men, lying and kneeling firing over those in front. By the side of those who were firing, were others with their hands up, in token of sur- render. In particular, I noticed two men, not a musket-length away, one aiming so that I could look into his musket-barrel ; the other, lying on his back, cooly ramming home a cartridge. A little further on was one on his knees waving something white with both hands. Every foot of ground was occupied by men engaged in mortal combat, or lying dead or wounded. A Confederate battery, near the Peach Orchard, commenced firing, probably at the sight of Harrow’s men leaving their line and closing to the right upon Pickett’s column. A common shot tore a horrible passage through the dense crowd of men in blue, instantly another followed, and fairly cut a road through the mass. My thoughts were to bring the men forward, where I could at once extinguish that destructive musketry and he out of the way of that deadly artillery fire. Voices were lost in the uproar; so I turned partly toward my men, raised my sword to attract their attention, and motioned them to advance. They surged forward, and just then, as I was stepping backward with my face to the men, urging them on, I felt a sharp blow as a shot struck me, then another, I whirled round, my sword torn from my hand by a bullet or shell splinter. My visor saved my life, but the shock stunned me. As I went down our men rushed forward past me, capturing battle flags and making prisoners. Pickett’s division lost nearly six-sevenths of its officers and men. Gibbon’s division with its leader wounded, and with a loss of half its strength, still held the crest of Cemetery Ridge. * * * 108 THE BLUE AND GRAY A Contrast. — It is a little difficult to understand why so much has been made in literature of the great Pickett’s Charge, unless perhaps, it is owing to the picturesque circumstances. It was at the close of the greatest battle of the Civil War; it was heralded by the mightiest cannonade of the war; it was witnessed by two great armies; it was made in the middle of the afternoon of a hot summer day, on a gentle slope with the sun at the backs of the assailants, the best possible arrangements for a grand display; it exhibited magnificent courage and confidence on the part of the soldiers that made it, and quite as great courage and confidence on the part of those who met and thwarted it. It is, perhaps, for these reasons that it has been made unduly famous; for, after all, it was a blunder and a failure. There were other charges in the war that tested quite as much devotion and endurance of soldiers, and they were not all failures. The charge of General Hooker and General Thomas ’ men up the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge was even more picturesque, and was a grand success. The Federal position at Gettysburg is always represented as being along a ridge ; this in a general way is true ; but near the center the ridge is so low that it almost dies away into a plain, and Pickett’s men, being directed toward this point, had only the very gentlest of slopes to ascend. Gen. A. S. Webb, whose command was at this point, said in conversation: “We had no intrenchments, not a sod was turned.’’ “But why did you not intrench?’’ “Because we never supposed that anybody would be fool enough to charge up there. ’ ’ The peril to the charging column was more from the cross-fire from the batteries on the higher ground to the right (Old Cemetery) and left (Round Top), than from the direct fire in front. “Pickett’s three brigades, according to the returns, numbered about 4,800 men, of these 1,389 were killed or wounded, 1,499 were captured. General Trimble, who commanded Pender’s brigades, the latter officer having been wounded, was captured in the assault. ’ ’ “Of the 15 field officers and 4 generals, Pickett and one lieutenant-colonel alone returned unharmed. The number of Confederate troops participating in this move- ment was 18,000, of which they lost more than 12,000, killed, wounded and captured.” — (W. K. No. 44, p. 645.) “Far away in humble cottage Sits his mother sad and lone. And her eyes are red with weeping Thinking of her absent son.” Cavalry Operations on the Right, July 2nd and 3rd, 1863 A T noon, July 2nd, the brigades of McIntosh and J. Irvin Gregg, of Gen. D. McM. Gregg’s cavalry division, reached a point on the Hanover road about three miles east of Rock Creek, where the Low Dutch or Salem Church road connects the York, Hanover and Baltimore roads. At this time a regiment (9th Mass. Inf.) of the 5th corps, was on outpost duty on Brinkerhoff’s Ridge. At 3:30 P.M., this regiment was relieved by the cavalry and joined its corps. The Confederate outpost on the Hanover road at Brinkerhoff ’s Ridge was the 2nd Va. Inf. regiment of Walker’s brigade of Johnson’s division. At 6:00 P.M., a reconnoitering squad of 50 men was sent forward by the cavalry leaders to develop the Confederate strength. This led to an engagement between the Confederate infantry and some squadrons of dis- mounted Union cavalry on the ridge near the Howard House, west of Cress Run. As Walker’s regiment was repulsed, he reinforced it with his whole brigade, and was therefore absent that night from the attack on Culp’s Hill. At 10:00 P.M., the Union cavalry retired to the Baltimore road at White Run, a mile southeast of Rock Creek. The orders for July 3rd were for Gregg’s division to move back to the Hanover road to protect the right flank of the Union Army and Kilpatrick’s division which bivouacked that night at Two Taverns, to replace Buford’s division on the left flank. By mistake, Custer’s brigade of Kilpatrick’s division moved up the Low Dutch road to the Hanover road. Until noon, Custer remained in the vicinity of the cross-roads with out-post squadrons about a mile north on both the Low Dutch, and road connecting the Low Dutch with the York road. J. Irvin Gregg’s brigade was massed about a quarter of a mile south of the Hanover road. He had established a skirmish line extending from the Hanover road in front, west- ward to Wolf Hill, where it connected with Neill’s infantry brigade of the 6th corps. McIntosh’s cavalry brigade was massed along the Low Dutch road, about a half mile behind Custer; two of his regiments (1st Penna., 1st Mass.) were absent on detached duty. He had been reinforced by a company of Maryland cavalry and a platoon of two guns, picked up while marching to the field. About noon, General D. McM. Gregg received a copy of a message from General Howard to General Meade informing the latter that a large cavalry force was marching toward the left flank of their army. At the same time he also received an order from General Pleasonton to send Custer’s brigade to Kilpatrick as originally ordered. To comply with the latter orders, McIntosh’s brigade was directed to relieve Custer, which he 109 110 THE BLUE AND GRAY at once proceeded to do. McIntosh replaced Custer’s squadrons in the woods at the cross-roads by the 1st N. J., placing the 1st Md. and 3rd Pa. south or in rear of these woods. Custer’s brigade prepared to move off the field. Confederate Cavalry. — General J. E. B. Stuart with three brigades of cavalry reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the afternoon of July 2, where he was joined by Col. M. J. Ferguson (16th Va.) vice Jenkin’s (who was wounded that morning at Ilunterstown). On the morning of the 3rd, with the brigades of Chambliss, vice W. H. F. Lee (who was wounded at Brandy Station June 9), moved to the York road and along the cross- roads toward the Low Dutch road. He knew from his map that the road he was following would enable him to reach the Baltimore road, only four miles distant, at a point two miles southeast of Rock Creek. He would thus be in rear of the Federals and on his line of communications, the very point where he could make a diversion in favor of General Lee. As he reached the bend of the road he halted his command behind the woods and rode into the field to scan the country. He saw it opened and sloped gradually southward. None of the Union cavalry were in sight, as General Gregg’s troops were concealed by the woods and ridge on Stuart’s left. McIntosh’s brigade by the woods at the fork of the road, and Custer’s men by distance and minor obstructions on the field. Ferguson and Chambliss were placed by Stuart in the woods, and a messenger was sent to bring up Fitzhugh Lee and Wade Hampton. The Cavalry Battlefield. (See Map at Front of Book.) The field upon which Stuart’s cavalry met that of Gregg is about three miles east of Rock Creek, and lies in the northeast angle of the Hanover and Low Dutch roads. Its western boundary is Cress Ridge, which extends from Granite Hill on the York road to the Hanover road at Cress’s house; its elevation, where it crosses the road by which Stuart advanced, is about 100 feet higher than the elevation at the Hanover and Low Dutch roads. The field is traversed by the road which Stuart advanced and by a private road running east and west near the Rummel farm buildings. The east branch of Littles Run rises near this road and flows parallel to, and , a mile west of the Low Dutch road. A woods about 200 by 400 yards extends from this road on which the Con- federates reached the field, southward along the ridge. This is the woods in which the Confederates were concealed. Another woods about 350 yards square was in the southeast angle of the Low Dutch and its intersecting roads. In this woods rested the right of the Union cavalry. Otherwise the ground was open, but divided into fields by stone and rail (worm style) fences, which had to be thrown down for mounted maneuvers. The Lott house is about a half 'mile north of the Hanover road, and is about 300 yards west of the Low Dutch road. The Rummel house with its large barn is about a mile north of the Hanover road, and about 350 yards south of the woods in which the Confederates were concealed. « Note. — The Count de Paris states (Vol. iii. A.M. Ed., Hist, of Civil War in America, p. 673), that General Stuart’s object was to move his command west of Cress’ Ridge, so as to turn the left of the Union cavalry unobserved, and thus separate it from the rest of the army, in order to create a panic in rear of the main Union line of battle, but that his presence having been disclosed by the debouching of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton’s brigades into the open fields beyond the Rummel Buildings, and McIntosh having forced the fighting, he ( Stuart ) was compelled to leave those brigades to detain the Union cavalry north of the Hanover road while he continued his movements with Ferguson and Chambliss’ brigades, which were soon forced to join in the fight, the consequence being that he was prevented from accomplishing his object. * * * 112 THE BLUE AND GRAY The Cavalry Battle. About 2:00 P.M., immediately after reaching the angle of the road, Ferguson’s brigade took possession of the Rummel place and Chambliss was put in the woods on his left. When McIntosh observed the troops at Rummel ’s he sent the 1st N. J. regiment dismounted to develop their strength. Ferguson’s troops met this movement, which was soon observed, by sending his dismounted troops to occupy the line of fence along Little ’s Run. McIntosh sent a part of the 3rd Pa. to reinforce the 1st N. J. and the remainder to occupy the woods vacated by the 1st N. J. He also sent word to Gen. D. McM. Gregg that he could not alone hold the enemy with his three small regiments. The latter thereupon ordered J. Irvin Gregg to move to the Low Dutch road, and ordered General Custer to remain and support McIntosh until further orders. Upon reaching the field itself and seeing Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton’s brigades appear, he ordered McIntosh’s 3rd regiment (1st Md.) to occupy the woods in front and protect his right flank. The Confederate line along Little ’s Run was strengthened by Chambliss and the line was prolonged to the left by Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee’s brigades. The attack- ing Union line was strengthened on the left by the 5th Mich, and on the right by a squadron of the 6th Mich, regiments. These attacks were aided by Pennington and Randol’s batteries near the Hanover-Low Dutch roads, which soon silenced the Con- federate battery which appeared in front of the woods north of Rummel ’s. At length Ferguson’s troops, who had only ten rounds of ammunition, were compelled to retire, and the Union line advanced to the run. Shortly thereafter the Union troops retired for the same reason, and were pursued by two of Chambliss’s regiments, the 9th and 13th Va., one mounted the other dismounted. The 7th Mich, regiment, mounted, was sent to protect the right flank of the retreating troops and encountered Chambliss’s regiments in the northwest corner of the field containing the Lott house ; there the regiments fought over stone and rail fence, and there occurred the greatest cavalry fight of the war, known in history as the “saber fight.’’ Horses reared into the air and rebounded many feet (see page 111). While thus engaged the 1st Va., one of Fitzhugh Lee’s regiments, charged upon the right of the 7th Mich., and two of Hampton’s regiments, the 1st N. C. and Davis’s legion on its front and left. The 7th Mich, fell back and the 1st Va. almost reached a platoon of artillery and charged in flank by the 5th Mich, who were also forced back. This was followed by the final charge of the remaining regiments of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton’s brigades, save one regiment of each held in reserve. This attack, made in column of squadrons, was met first by the artillery and then by the last regiment, the 1st Mich, (see page 111), of Custer’s brigade, under his personal leadership. The column was charged by squadrons of the 3rd Pa. and 1st N. J., which had fought dismounted in the earlier part of the engagement were now again mounted, also by such scattered troopers as could be collected by McIntosh. The successive shocks caused the Confederates to fall back to their original position and at 5 : 00 P.M., the fight was over. In this last attack Generals Wade Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were wounded. Immediately after the fight the Union picket line was re-established along Little’s Run, which had been the scene of the dismounted fighting, and the Confederate line was established at Rummel ’s and in the woods to the north. Gen. J. Irvin Gregg ’s brigade w r as not engaged in the fight, but held in reserve along the Low Dutch road south of the Hanover road. Correct statement prepared by the War Department, are as follows: July 3rd. in McIntosh ’s, J. Irvin Gregg ’s and Custer ’s brigades, 1 officer and 29 enlisted men killed ; 18 officers and 131 enlisted men wounded; 75 enlisted men missing; total 254. But total on right July 2nd and 3rd, 313. This estimate does not include the batteries. General Stuart’s report says: “Thus having three brigades in my front, num- bering about 5,000 troopers. He had himself no less than 6,000 sabers in the four brigades placed under his command. My losses were: 36 killed, 140 wounded, 64 missing; total 240. No report of Ferguson’s brigade pr his artillery obtained.” * * * O N the eve of the Battle of Gettysburg, Capt. Elon J. Farnsworth of the 8th 111. cavalry regiment, an aide on General Pleasonton ’s staff, was promoted for gal- lantry to brigadier-general and given command of a brigade in General Kil- patrick’s division, consisting of the 5tli N. Y., 18th Pa., 1st Yt. and 1st W. Va. regiments. On the morning of July 3rd, the brigade moved from Two Taverns to the field west of Big Bound Top, and being joined by Merritt’s brigade of Buford’s division, formed a line extending from Plum Run to Willoughby Bun. The right of the line rested on a wooded knoll, covered with boulders, which is separated from Bound Top by Plum Bun gorge. Farnsworth’s brigade held this hill, and a short distance to the left was Elder’s battery E, 4th U. S. Merritt’s brigade extended his line to Willoughby Bun, with Graham’s battery K, 1st U. S., near the Emmitsburg road. Kilpatrick ’s orders were to press the enemy, to threaten him at every point, and to strike at the first opportunity, with an emphatic intimation that the best battle news could be brought by the wind. His opportunity had now come. If he could bring on a battle, drive back the enemy by breaking their line on Big Bound Top, Meade’s infantry could surely drive them into the valley, and then the 5,000 cavalry in reserve could strike the decisive blow. To meet this flank movement, General Laws, who now commanded Hood's division, sent the 1st Texas regiment to form a line across the valley from Plum Bun to Schneider’s ridge; this regiment intrenched itself behind the stone fence at the foot of the wooded knoll occupied by Farnsworth. Anderson ’s brigade was also withdrawn from the line and sent to prolong the line of the 1st Texas to Willoughby Bun. The brigades of Sheffield (vice Law’s) and Robertson's, lay behind stone walls, which they had thrown up on the west face of Big Bound Top parallel to Plum Bun. Hood’s artillery was along the ridge behind the line. The operation of note, were the mounted charges made by different units of Farnsworth’s brigade, in which the brigade com- mander was killed. * * * (See page 111.) The 1st W. Va. regiment was selected to attack the 1st Texas infantry regiment. The 3rd battalion of the 1st Vt. was thrown out as skirmishers; the 1st and 2nd battalions were held for the charge on the Bound Top. The 1st W. Va. charged at our left and front dowm the open valley, in the direction but to the right of the Bushman house, upon the 1st Texas regiment, which was in line behind a rail fence that had been staked and bound with withes. A thin line shot forward and attempted to throw the rails, tugging at the stakes, cutting with their sabers, and failing in the vain effort. The regiment came on in magnificent style, and received a deadly volley before which it recoiled, rallied, charged the second time, and fell back with great loss. 113 8 THE BLUE AND GRAY 114 I was near General Kilpatrick when he impetuously gave the order to General Farnsworth to make the last charge. Farnsworth spoke with emotion: “General, do you mean it? Shall I throw my handful of men over rough ground, through timber, against a brigade of infantry. The 1st Vt. has already been fought half to pieces; these are too good men to kill.’’ Kilpatrick said: “Do you refuse to obey my orders? If you are afraid to lead this charge, I will lead it. Farnsworth rose in his stirrups — he looked magnificent in his passion— and cried, ‘ ‘ Take that back ! ’ ’ Kilpatrick returned his defiance, but, soon repenting, said : “I did not mean it. ’ ’ For a moment there was silence, when Farnsworth spoke calmly, ‘ ‘ General, if you order the charge, I will lead it, but you must take the responsibility.” I did not hear the low con- versation that followed, but as Farnsworth turned away he said: “I will obey your orders.” Kilpatrick said earnestly, “I will take the responsibility.” * * * We rode out in columns of fours with drawn sabers. General Farnsworth, after giving the orders to me, took his place at the head of the 2nd battalion; Major Wells com- manded the same. In this action I commanded the 1st battalion. Captain Cushman and Lieutenant Watson rode with me; General Farnsworth and Adjutant-General Estes rode with Major Wells. As the 1st battalion rode through the line of our dismounted skirmishers, who were falling back, they cried us to halt. As we passed out from the cover of the woods the 1st W. Va. was retiring in disorder on our left. We rode through the enemy’s skirmish line across the fields, over the low fences, past the Schneider house, and down the road. The sun was blinding; Captain Cushman shaded his eyes with his hand and cried: “An ambuscade!” We w T ere immediately upon the enemy, and the deadly volley which is referred to, in the Confederate report was fired, but it passed over our heads ; although they report that one-half of our saddles were empty, not a man was shot; yet the fire was the close and concentrated volley of the regiment. * * * * (After describing the charge of the two battalions over boulders and stone fences into the heart of the enemy’s camps, and the return charge through two lines of Con- federates, Captain Parson concludes as follows) : The whole number who rode with Farnsworth was about 300. Their casualties were 65. They brought in over 100 prisoners; they rode within the Confederate lines nearly a mile; they received at short range the direct or enfilading fire from three regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery; they drew two regiments out of line and held them permanently in new positions, breaking the Confederate front and exposing it to an infantry charge if one had been immediately ordered.* Their assault was so bold that the Confederates received it as the advance of a grand attack, and finding themselves exposed to infantry in front and cavalry in the rear, they were uncertain of their position. Why the Union infantry, when they heard fighting in Law’s rear, or when, afterward, we delivered to their skirmish line our prisoners, did not advance and drive his brigade into the valley where it would have been exposed to a general flank attack, has never been explained; but it was not “a charge of madmen with a mad leader.” We believed, and yet believe, that Farnsworth’s charge was wisely ordered, well timed, well executed and effective. The behavior of the horses in this action was admirable. Punning low and swift, as in a race; in their terror surrendering to their masters, and guided by the slightest touch on the neck; never refusing a fence or breaking from the column; crowding together and to the front, yet avoiding the many obstacles with intelligence, they carried their rider over rocks and fallen timber, that the boldest hunter would hardly attempt today, and I doubt if there was a single fall of man or horse, except from a shot of the enemy. * * * There was no charging of cannon, no sabering of men. Farns- worth and his troopers understood that they were to draw the enemy’s fire, to create *Maj.-Gen. E. M. Laxos commanding Hood’s division on the 3rd day, says in the Century Magazine December, 1888, p. 304 : “It was impossible to use our artillery to any advantage, owing to the close quarters of the attacking cavalry with our own men — the leading squadron forcing their horses up to the very muzzles of the rifles of our infantry.” BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 115 a diversion, preparatory to the main movement. They were to ride as deep into the enemy’s lines as possible to disclose his plan and force his positions. The taking of the prisoners on the return was an accident. There was no encouragement of onlooking armies, no cheer, no bravado ; each man felt as he tightened his saber belt, that he was summoned to ride to death. Farnsworth fell in the enemy’s lines, with his saber raised, with several mortal wounds* and without fame. So fell this typical volunteer soldier of America, a man without military training, yet born with a genius of war which carried him to high command, and to the threshold of a great career.f * * * Maj.-Gen. St. Clair A. Mulholland, in Penna. at Gettysburg, p. 635, says: “On the morning of the 5th of July we found the Confederates had gone, and then what a scene; what a cheer went up; a cheer that swelled into a roar and was taken up by the boys in blue on Cemetery Hill, and rolled along the ridge to Pound Top, and then back again. Cheers for the Philadelphia brigade that stood a living wall against which the hosts beat in vain. Cheers for Meade, a soldier “without fear or reproach,” who here began with a great victory. Cheers for Hancock, who had stemmed the tide of defeat on the first day and selected the ground on which this glorious victory was achieved, who on the second day had again stopped the tide of defeat and restored our shattered lines, and on the third day had met and repulsed the final assault on which Lee’s all was staked, and won the battle that was the death- blow to the Rebellion. ’ ’ General Meade has done well and noble, when his lamest action is contrasted with that of the controlling military mind at Washington. For ever under the hampering imposed upon him, he has not only defeated Lee’s heretofore victorious army, but in doing that great feat of arms he has also repelled the Confederate invasion and defeated all that its success w r ould have accomplished, both at home and abroad. He has unwittingly sealed the doom of the Confederacy, and defeated those who schemed and plotted against the American Republic. All thanks, then, to Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, who in failing to secure the essential substance of the Gettysburg campaign, thereby missed the personal crown of glory, more than once offered through the ability of the Army of the Potomac during its continuance. Again we hear the call, and in its tones a vail of anxiety almost grief — “Watchman, what of the night?” The answer is heard all over the land — “All’s well. The Army of the Potomac has gained a great victory.” * General Laics further states on p. 305 : “As General Farnsworth fell to the ground. Lieutenant Adrian, of the 15th Ala. Regiment, approached him and demanded his surrender. He curtly refused, at the same time killing himself with his pistol, which he still held in his hand. tGeneral Farnsworth's commission was dated June 29, five days before his death. As he had been on detached service, it did not reach him, being carried among General Pleasonton's headquarters papers until after the battle. General Kilpatrick's official report, Vol. 27, p. 993 : “We lost 4 officers killed, 13 wounded, 4 missing; 34 enlisted men killed, 138 wounded, 117 missing ; total 319. W HEN night closed the struggle, July 3rd, Lee's army was repulsed. We all knew that the day had gone against us, but the full extent of the disaster was only known in high quarters. The carnage of the day was generally understood to have been frightful; yet our army was not in retreat, and it was surmised in camp that with tomorrow’s dawn would come a renewal of the struggle. All felt and appreciated the momentous consequences to the cause of southern independence of final defeat or victory on that great field. It was a warm rainy summer night; there were few camp-fires. The weary men were lying in groups, discussing the event of the day, speculating on the morrow, or watching that our horses did not straggle off while browsing. About 11 : 00 P.M., a horseman came to summon me to General Lee. I promptly mounted and accompanied by an aide on my staff, and guided by the courier who brought the message, rode about a mile toward Gettysburg to General Lee’s headquarters. On inquiry, I found that he was not there, but had gone to the head- quarters of General Hill, a mile further south. When we reached the place indicated, a flickering candle visible from the road through the open front of a common wall-tent exposed to view General Lee and Hill seated on camp-stools with a map spread upon their knees. Dismounting, I approached on foot. After exchanging the ordinary salutations, General Lee directed me to go back to his headquarters and wait for him. I did so, but he did not make his appearance until about 1 : 00 A.M., when he came riding alone at a slow walk, and evidently wrapped in profound thought. When he arrived there was not even a sentinel on duty at his tent, and no one of his staff awake. As he approached and saw us under a tree, he spoke, reined in his jagged horse, and essayed to dismount, the effort to do so betrayed so much physical exhaustion that I hurriedly stepped forward to assist him, but before I reached his side he had succeeded in alighting, and threw his arm across the saddle to rest, and fixing his eyes upon the ground, leaned in silence and almost motionless upon his equally weary horse,- — the two forming a striking and never-to-be-forgotten group. The light from a close-by camp fire, shone full upon his massive features, and re- vealed an expression of sadness that I never had before seen upon his face. Awed by his appearance, I waited for him to speak until the silence became embarrassing, when, to break it and change the silent current of his thoughts, I ventured to remark, in a sympathetic tone, and in allusion to his great fatigue; “General, this has been a hard day on you.’’ He looked up, and replied mournfully, “Yes, it hds been a sad, sad day to us,’’ and immediately lapsed into his thoughtful mood and attitude. Being unwilling again to intrude upon his reflections, I said no more. After perhaps a minute or two, he suddenly straightened up to his full height, and turning to me with more animation and excitement of manner than I had ever seen in him before, for he was a man of wonderful equanimity, he said in a voice tremendous with emotion : ‘ ‘ I never saw troops behave more magnificently than Piclcett ’s division did today in that grand charge; and if they had been supported as they were to have been — but, for some reason not fully explained to me were not — we would have held that 116 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 117 position and the day would have been ours. ’ ’ After a moment ’s pause he added in a loud voice, in a tone almost of agony, “Too bad! too bad; OH! TOO BAD! ” I shall never forget his language, his manner, and his appearance of mental suffering; in a few moments all emotion was suppressed, and he spoke feelingly of several of his fallen and trusted officers. He invited me into his tent and as soon as we were seated he remarked: “We must now return to Virginia A.s many of our poor wounded as possible must be taken home. I have sent for you because your men and horses are fresh and in good condition to guard and conduct our train back to Virginia. The duty will be arduous, responsible and dangerous, for I am afraid you will be harassed by the Union cavalry. How many men have you?’’ “About 2,100 effective present, and all well mounted, including McClanahan’ s 6-gun battery of horse artillery.” “I can spare you as much artillery as you require,” he said, “but no other troops as I shall need all I have to return safely by a shorter route than yours. The batteries are generally short of ammunition, but you will probably meet a supply I have ordered from Winchester, Va., to Williamsport, Md. Nearly all the transportation and the care of all the wounded will be intrusted to you. You will recross the mountains by the Chambersburg road, and then proceed to Williamsport by any route you may deem best, and without a halt until you reach the Potomac Eiver, rest there long enough to feed your animals; and do not halt again until you reach Winchester, where I will again communicate with you. That night and early next morning, Ewell’s corps was withdrawn from the town and south of it, to west of Seminary Ridge and Stuart’s cavalry, was ordered to move to the extreme right of the Confederate Army, leaving Fitzliugh Lee’s and Hampton’s brigades on the Chambersburg road to assist in guarding the trains, that were being collected on the same road. Also all the wounded and prisoners, ammunition, artillery and general supply trains. At about 2 : 00 P.M., we started, with the wounded first, marching through Cashtown, Greenwood to Greencastle, my column being 16 miles long, including my brigade assisted by those of Fitzliugh Lee and Hampton, and 23 guns. General Imboden describes it as one of the most pitiful and heart-rending scenes ever witnessed. ‘ ‘ It was in a furious rain, drenching the soldiers and transforming the roads into a sea of mud (see page 118), through which it was almost impossible for the men and horses to force their way.” Few of the wounded had been properly eared for, their ambulance and common wagons being crowded, they were jolted along in agony ; they were groaning, cursing, babbling of their homes and calling upon their friends to kill them and put them out of misery. But there could be no halt for the Potomac was rising, and an attack was hourly expected from the Federals then in our rear. The head of my column reached Williamsport (via Hagerstown), on the afternoon of the 5th and on the morning of the 6th all the wagons were at the river. The two brigades which acted as our rear guard, did not reach Williamsport until that evening.* When we reached the river we found that the heavy rains had raised it level above its fording height. Being informed that the pontoon bridge (see page 118) at Falling Waters, had been destroyed the day before by the Union cavalry sent from Frederick. We were therefore obliged to intrench our position, and send the wagons with the wounded over on small flat boats. We were here reinforced by two of Early’s regi- ments (13th Va. “Smith’s,” 54tli N. C. “ Every’ s” brigades), which escorted an ammunition train from Winchester. On the afternoon of July 6th, we were attacked by Buford ’s cavalry. ‘ 1 By arming the teamsters and the least seriously wounded soldiers, we were able to hold our own until the approach of Stuart’s six brigades, which caused Buford to fall back and guard his own communications. The trains were not again attacked. My columns had been ferried over the river and marched to Winchester, Va. ” * * * * *At Greenwood, General Gregg’s cavalry overtook the rear guard and had an unimportant skirmish with it. At Greencastle, the column was attacked hy a picked body of 200 cavalry sent from General Milroy’s old command, which had been assembled near Bedford ; they captured and destroyed about 60 wagons, and a number of stragglers. THE PONTOON BRIDGES BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 119 Lee’s Army on Retreat. On July 4th, General Lee gave his final order for the retreat. At about 7: 00 A.M., the corps trains began to move along the Fairfield road toward Monterey Gap, then the corps of Hill, Longstreet and Ewell. The movement was to begin at daylight. Robertson, who vcas at Fairfield with his own and Jones’ brigade of cavalry was to assist in protecting the trains, while Stuart, with the brigades of Chambliss and Ferguson, was to move to Emmitsburg and watch the roads leading to the mountains. The trains were not properly guarded, since Iverson’s infantry brigade had not reached its position in the columns, and Stuart had not had time to place his cavalry astride the road running from Emmitsburg to Monterey Gap. This road was guarded only by a single company of Maryland cavalry on patrol duty.* The train having been observed by the signal officers on Eound Top. General Kilpatrick, who had been moved to Emmitsburg, was directed to move on Monterey Pass and attack it. They reached the mountains about dusk in a rain-storm. The officer in command of the Confederate patrol at once rode to the train passing in his rear and ordered the wagons to be driven in haste to Williamsport. He also ordered the wagons which had not reached the fork of the road to be stopped. He then returned to his station and made such demonstrations of resistance that he deceived Kilpatrick and succeeded in delaying his advance. He thus saved the first section of the train, which reached Williamsport in safety. As the road had to be cleared for the troops, the head of the second section could only stop long enough to close up and then was obliged to move on. When Kilpatrick finally brushed aside the patrol, he found a part of the second section in his front and took it with him to Smithburg, Md. On the morning of July 5th, General Stuart, with the brigades of Chambliss and Ferguson, reached Emmitsburg and there learned that he was too late to stop Kil- patrick. He at once decided to seek him by crossing the mountains by the Mechanics- town, Md., road. As he was leaving the mountains in the afternoon, he found Kil- patrick’s cavalry in his front, and was therefore unable to get through the passes. Towards evening the Union cavalry withdrew to Boonsboro, and Stuart advanced to Smithburg, Md. On the morning of the 6th, Buford and Kilpatrick with six brigades of cavalry were at Boonsboro, and it was agreed between them that Kilpatrick with his three brigades should go to Hagerstown and delay the advance of the Confederate Army, while Buford marched with his forces to Williamsport to capture their trains. Stuart was at Smithburg on the above morning where he was joined by the brigades of Eobertson and Jones. That morning he started for Hagerstown and found Rich- mond’s brigade of Kilpatrick’s division in the town and Huey’s brigade in support. Stuart attacked them vigorously with all his cavalry, aided by Iverson’s brigade of in- fantry. He drove Richmond’s brigade back on the Boonsboro road and Huey’s brigade on the Williamsport road. It was the noise of Stuart’s guns in their rear that caused Buford and Custer’s cavalry troops to retire from Imboden’s front before piercing his lines. That night Buford and Kilpatrick’s cavalry were again in Boonsboro, Stuart’s cavalry now joined by the brigades of Fitzhugh Lee and Hampton, was posted along the Antietam Creek. On the morning of July 7th, Stuart strengthened his cavalry line by securing Wofford’s infantry brigade from General Longstreet ; this was posted on the Boons- boro-Williamsport road, in rear of the cavalry. Anderson’s brigade of Hood’s division was at the time on the Antietam Creek at Funkstown, Md. July 9th-10th, there were also indecisive engagements on the Boonsboro-Hagerstown road, in which Anderson’s brigade took part. At the same time intrenchments was established around Williamsport and Falling Waters. The cavalry was withdrawn from the front and placed on the left flank. ♦Part of the 1st Md. battalion of Hampton’s brigade. Union lost at Fairfield, Monterey Gap, Pa., and Smithburg, Md., 30 killed and wounded ; Confederates, 30 killed and wounded, 100 prisoners. 120 THE BLUE AND GRAY Meade’s Army in Pursuit. As soon as General Meade learned that the Confederates were withdrawing from the field, he decided that a direct pursuit through the passes of the mountains would be impracticable; if lie found that General Lee was really retreating, he proposed to move his army parallel to the Hagerstown road, through the passes west of Frederick. He therefore ordered General French, who was stationed at Frederick, Md., with most of the troops withdrawn from Harper’s Ferry, W. Va., to occupy these passes at once. July 5tli was spent by General Meade in ascertaining the position and intention of the Confederate Army, as well as in the care of the wounded and dead of both armies left on the field (see page 61). The 11th corps advanced one brigade into Gettysburg; the 6tli corps pursued the retreating army and attacked the rear guard of Ewell’s corps at Fairfield. From the information obtained on this day, General Meade decided that the Confederates were retreating. He therefore ordered all his corps to march for the passes west of Frederick, leaving one brigade of the 6th corps with McIntosh ’s cavalry brigade to follow the Confederate Army along the Fairfield road. On July 9th, the 5th and 6th corps were at Boonsboro, and the 2nd and 12th, at Rolirersville, the Confederate Army deployed on a line a short distance below Falling Waters, to a point a mile west of Hagerstown. This line was well defended by artillery; Longstreet’s corps held the right, Hill’s the center, and Ewell’s the left. The cavalry was in rear of Ewell’s corps. July 12th, the entire Union Army was deployed on a line extendng from Funkstown, on the Antietam Creek, on the Hagerstown-Sharpsburg road, opposite the Confederate left flank. The right wing was composed of the 1st, 6th and 11th corps; the left, of the 2nd, 5th and 12th corps; the 3rd corps was in reserve. Kilpatrick’s cavalry was on the right; Buford’s cavalry on the left, and Gregg’s cavalry in reserve. Since reaching the river, the Union Army had been reinforced by the four brigades of French’s division. They also had a reserve composed of three brigades of blew York and Pennsylvania militia, which had assembled by General Couch for the defense of Harrisburg. On the retreat of the Confederate Army, these brigades took the field as a division commanded by Gen. W. F. Smith. On the 12th they were northeast of Hagerstown, Md. On the night of July 12th, General Mead called a council of war and submitted the question of advisability of assaulting the enemy on the following day, July 13th. Those in favor of attacking were Wadsworth and Howard; those opposed were Hays, Sykes, French, Slocum and Sedgwick. It was therefore decided to defer the assault. The pontoon bridge at Falling Waters was repaired, and the river at Williamsport had reached its fording stage. General Lee therefore decided to retire into Virginia, as it was difficult to subsist his army. In accordance with his plan, the infantry and artillery were to withdraw from the trenches immediately after dark and be replaced by the cavalry. General Longstreet’s troops were to cross at once at Falling Waters, to be followed by General Hill’s infantry and the cavalry along his front, General Ewell’s infantry and the rest of the cavalry were to ford the river at Williams- port (see page 118). The 13th was overcast and misty, and the night following dark and stormy. This made it easy to withdraw the Confederate Army without attracting the attention of the Union troops, but made it difficult for the troops to move rapidly. At 5: 00 P.M., the artillery was started to the rear, and immediately after dark Longstreet’s infantry followed. He was at once followed by two squadrons pf cavalry which had been left to cover Hill’s rear but by mistake crossed the river ahead of him. Ewell’s corps moved to Williamsport and there forded the river about midnight. The artillery ammunition chests and one brigade of infantry were taken across in boats. Their crossing was completed at 8: 00 A.M., on the 14th, with the exception of the two cavalry squadrons mentioned above. General Stuart’s cavalry crossed with Ewell. On the morning of July 14th, General Kilpatrick’s cavalry moved to Williamsport only to find Ewell and Stuart on the Virginia side. They then moved down the river to Falling Waters. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 121 Hill’s corps marched all night in the rain in the order, Anderson, Pender, Heth. Next morning, Heth’s division was placed in line on the hills about two miles from the pontoon bridge to protect the troops in his rear, while the artillery and trains were crossing. Pender’s division was in his rear as a reserve. About 11: 00 A.M., after the artillery, trains and Anderson’s division had crossed, Heth was ordered to send Pender’s division to the bridge. He was also directed to hold his line with one brigade, and to direct the others to follow Pender’s division. About this time Kilpatrick’s cavalry appeared in his front. An advance guard of Custer’s brigade consisting of about 50 mounted troopers at once charged the Confederates without a preliminary exmination. This movement deceived the Confederates, who thought it must be a troop of their own cavalry. The Confederate infantry fire was therefore delayed until the Union cavalry was almost upon it. This was followed by an advance of one of Custer ’s regiments dismounted ; they were driven back by Brockenbrough, whose in- fantry brigade became an advanced skirmish line. At this moment Buford appeared on the field and moved his dismounted cavalry to turn Heth’s right flank and intercept his retreat. Heth was about to recall Pender’s brigades to meet this movement when he was ordered to retreat at once. He sent one brigade to form a line one-quarter of a mile in his rear and then retired his other brigades through it ; by repeating this operation he reached the bridge. Broekenbrough’s brigade was too much involved to withdraw easily when the order was given; he therefore left on the field three regimental colors. Hill’s corps was obliged to abandon two guns. Union lost 29 killed, 36 wounded. Confederates, 125 killed and wounded, 1,500 prisoners; Confederate Major-General Pettigrew killed. At 1: 00 P.M., the Confederate Army, being on the Virginia shore, the bridge was cut loose. It has been stated time and again that Confederate regiments went back to Virginia under the command of corporals. According to the estimate of Major-General Hunt, there was expended in the great Battle of Gettysburg 569 tons of deadly missiles, including all the various kinds of shot, shell, shrapnel and ball, known then to this country and Europe. * * * General Robert E. Lee Asks to be Relieved. About a month after the battle of Gettysburg, General Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, in which he said : “We must expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater disasters. Our people have only to be true and united, to bear manfully the misfortune incidents of war, and all will come right in the end. I know how prone we are to censure, and how ready to blame others for the nonful- fillment, of our expectations. This is unbecoming in a generous people, and I grieve to see its expression. The general remedy for the want of success in a military com- mander is his removal. This is natural, and in many instances proper; for, no matter what may be the ability of the officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster must sooner or later, ensue. “I have been prompted by these reflections more than once since my return from Pennsylvania to propose to your excellency the propriety of selecting another com- mander for this army. I have seen and heard of expressions of discontent in the public journals at the result of the expedition. “I do not know how far this feeling extends in the army. My brother officers have been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary to us that nothing should be risked to secure it. I therefore in all sincerity request your excellency to take measures to supply my place.” Mr. Davis declined to relieve General Lee from the command of the Army of Northern Virginia, consequently he retained it until he surrendered himself and that army as prisoners of war in the spring of 1865. 'Soldier, rest; thy warfare oer, Sleep the sleep that knows no breaking ; Dream of Battlefield no more Days of danger, nights of waking.” Soldiers 5 National Cemetery A GKEAT national cemetery was laid out on the battlefield, the grounds of which embrace seventeen acres on the highest point on Cemetery Hill, and the remains of 3,564 Union soldiers who had fallen in that battle were placed there, arranged in the order of their States, in a semi-circle in sections. The Gettysburg Cemetery Company, organized and incorporated by the State of Pennsylvania soon after the battle, projected the cemetery, but in 1872 they assigned it to the care of the U. S. Government. This was dedicated on the 19th of November, 1863; and this occasion furnished a striking instance of the difference between national genius and artificial reputation. The orator of the day was Hon. Edward Everett, who by long cultivation and unlimited advertising, had attained the nominal place of first orator in this country; but he was by no means entitled to speak for the men who had laid down their lives in the cause of universal liberty; for, through all his political life until the breaking out of the war, he had been a strong pro-slavery man. President Lincoln was invited to be present, as a matter of course, and was informed that he would be expected to say a little something. Mr. Everett delivered a long address, prepared in his usual elaborate and artificial style, which was forgotten by every hearer within twenty-four hours. Mr. Lincoln, on his way from Washington, jotted down a few notes on the back of an old yellow envelope, by way of memorandum, and when called upon, rose to his full height, and delivered a speech of fewer than 300 words, which very soon took its place among the world’s immortal orations, giving utterance to the following: “Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that ail men are created equal. Now we are engaged in a great civil war, test nation, so conceived and so dedi met on a great battlefield of the a portion of that field as a final gave up their lives that the nation and proper that we should do this, dedicate — we cannot consecrate — brave men, living and dead, who far above our power to add or de long remember what we say here, did here. It is for us, the living, unfinished work which they who nobly carried on. It is rather for task remaining before us, that increased devotion to that cause measure of devotion ; that we here shall not have died in vain ; that a new birth of freedom, and that the government of the people people, shall not perish from the earth.” ing whether that nation, or any cated can long endure. We are war. We have come to dedicate resting place for those who here might live. It is altogether fitting But in a larger sense we cannot we cannot hallow this ground. The struggled here, have consecrated it tract. The world will little note or but it never can forget what they rather to be dedicated here to the fought here have thus far so us to be dedicated to the great from these honored dead we take for which they gave the last full highly resolve that these dead this nation, under God, shall have by the people, and for the The Soldiers’ National Monument stands in the center of the semi-circle surrounded by the Union dead; it is 60 feet high, is 25 feet square at the base, and is crowned with a statue representing the Genius of Liberty. Projecting from the four corners are an equal number of allegorical statues representing respectively Peace, War, History and Plenty. These figures were made in Italy by Randolph Rogers. It was formally dedicated July 1st, 1869. General Meade made an address, Governor Morton an oration, and Bayard Taylor contributed an ode. Following are the dead by States: 104 Ohio 131 New Hampshire 49 Indiana 80 61 6 159 171 Rhode Island 12 Wisconsin 73 22 52 867 534 New Jersey 78 U. S. Regulars 138 15 22 West Virginia ii Total 123 IZfe M N.Y. INF. 2^ OHIO INF. 142'" / PA. INF. 6 W OHIO CAV. 24^ MICH. INF. WINEOAR’S BATT. M \>* N.Y. I49 M N.Y. INF SMITH'S 4" I3 M N.J.INF. 42*‘ / N.Y.INF. 4^ MICH. INF. 5^ N.Y. mil. BATT. PICKETT’S BATT. C0.4,I«'WIS. IT"* CONN. INF. SHARPSHOOTERS GETTYSBURG NATIONAL PARK. N O battlefield of the Great Bebellion, none indeed of the world’s history, is so visited yearly as is that at Gettysburg. Since the battle thousands of visitors have passed over its historic grounds yearly. But great as has been the influx in the past, it appears as if the tide has only fairly commenced. The near future will behold visitors from every portion of the civilized world in numbers far surpassing what has yet been. There are several reasons for this. Each year deepens the appreciation of the fact that here was decided the fate of a mighty nation; that the struggles on this field was the turning point in the war of the Rebellion, the most remarkable and most important in its effects upon the future. Another reason for the constant increase of visitors is the unsurpassed beauty of the situations and surroundings. The continued and increasing national interest in this American Mecca of Reconciliation, has led to the erection of numerous beautiful monumental memorials of that fierce strife. On no other battlefield of the world will be found so many markers and monuments, showing accurately the position of the various commands of the opposing armies. This fact has done much to entice an increased flow of travel, as regiment after regiment, and State after State, have gone into the work of erecting monuments, beautiful in conception, artistic in design, and priceless in historical value. Southern States ’ regiments and batteries are impelled to vie with their Northern comrades in the work of decoration and designation. There is upon the battlefield (Gettysburg National Park), several million dollars worth of memorials in granite and bronze, erected to the memory of the heroes who fought there. Gettysburg is without a doubt the monumental battlefield of the world. * * * 125 A T the request of the writer, he contributes to this work the following graphic sketch, I which is especially valuable on account of the outline it gives of the suffering of the noble Army of the Potomac in reaching Gettysburg. What the lieutenant says of his regiment is equally true of all the commands of the Union Army. No words can adequately portray the suffering of the men during the march from Falmouth to Gettysburg, or the exhausted condition in which they reached the bloody scene of conflict. “In the advance toward Pennsylvania, the 5th corps was in the center column of the army. The night of June 30th found our regiment at Liberty, Md., on picket duty. From the continuous march since leaving Virginia the men had become so tired out and footsore that it was no uncommon thing to find a man with blisters on both feet as large as a silver dollar, and not a few were marching in their stocking feet. This with the chafing of the equipment and luggage upon the body required no small amount of physical endurance to enable the men to get over the rough roads, even when urged on by the stern commands of the officers. “At Hanover, Pa., we made a short halt. The streets of this good old town were packed with troops, all moving toward the battlefield. We received there an enthu- siastic ovation from the loyal-hearted citizens. On a balcony of a residence several young ladies were assembled dressed in red, white and blue, who entertained the passing troops with patriotic songs, prominently the ‘Star Spangled Banner.’ Many of our brave boys there heard it for the last time. From Hanover we moved for Gettysburg. Never since the formation of the Union Army were men put to the crucial test of human endurance to the same extent as during this famous march. General officers in command during the night, became unusually anxious to move forward the troops more rapidly, and various means were used to urge the men along. General Barnes, commanding our division, suggested that the men close up the ranks and join in singing the old army songs. To the strains of ‘Old John Brown,’ etc., the men for a time forgot their exhausted condition. The draft upon a man ’s zeal and courage to perform, the march was fully equal to any effort that would be required to the enemy in battle. Indeed this march may well be considered as no small part of the victory won on the soil of the Keystone State. ’ ’ * * * 126 ROMANTIC AND PATHETIC INCIDENTS “Under the sod and the dew Waiting the Judgment Day ; Under the one the Blue, Under the other the Gray.” name of Mrs. Mary W. Lee will recall to the mind of thousands of our brave soldiers who fought in the Army of the Potomac, the face and figure of a cheerful, active, efficient, yet tender-hearted woman, herself the mother of a soldier boy, who for month after month, and year after year, while the war continued, moved about the hospitals of the army, a blessing, a comfort and a hope to thousands of the weary sufferers. Mrs. Lee was at Gettysburg as soon as the cannon smoke had cleared away from the blood-stained hill- side, and labored in the 2nd corps hospital, and also at Letterman ’s General Hospital, for three months following the great battle. One of her patients who died was Aaron Wills, a color corporal in the 72nd Pa. Vol. Infantry, the regiment in which her son was serving. A ball struck the flag-staff and shattered it. Aaron wrapped the flag around his arm and shouted: “Don’t let the colors fall boys. ’ ’ The next moment a ball struck him in a vital part, and he fell, yet held the flag up so that it would not touch the ground, until it was taken from his faithful hands and carried on at the head of the regiment. A year later, on the anniversary of his son’s death, the father of Aaron wrote an effecting letter to Mrs. Lee. ‘ ‘ Today, ’ ’ he said, ‘ ‘ I walked out to look at the little mound that covers the remains of my beloved boy. As I looked the words of his last letter, those blessed words, came into my mind ; ‘ Father, do not worry at my being in a dangerous position. I believe, as you say, I can die in no nobler cause; and, to tell you the truth, I would as soon die on the battlefield, as I would a natural death.’ He need not have said, ‘to tell the truth’; for he never told a lie.’’ Mrs. Lee was very much interested in a brave little fellow from Co. B, 72nd Pa. — name Willie Morrow. He fought all day with uncommon bravery, acting as a sharp- shooter. He and his companion at one time, came marching in with six prisoners, captured by only those two. As Willie was going back to the front, a common shot hit him and carried off both his legs. When brought to the rear he asked the surgeon if there was any hope of getting over it. “No,” he said, “Willie there is no hope.” Turning to his companion, he said, ‘ ‘ Tell them at home that I died happy — that I was glad to give my life for my country.” The blood continued to run from the severed arteries, and he grew weaker. “Tell them I die happy,” were his last words; and in death his pale young face wore a smile. Another in the care of Mrs. Lee was sinking into a soldier’s grave, when just be- fore he died she saw that he was making an effort to speak. She bent over him, to catch, if possible, his Darting words. Slowly and without pain he whispered them, 127 E 128 THE BLUE AND GRAY one by one, in her ear : “I want — -I want ’ ’ — said he. ‘ ‘ What do you want, Russell ? ’ ’ “I want to tell you what — what I will do — for you — when I go to — another place.” In the fall of 1863, when those who remain of the sufferers had been collected in one great hospital, Mrs. Lee again sought the front, and again joined the army, doing hospital work on the field until the end of the war. A Good Mother to the Confederates. T HIS is the title that deservedly belongs to Miss Clarissa Jones, who cared for the wounded of Pickett’s division, and others that were fortunate enough to fall into her hands. Miss Jones had been on many battlefields — she was a school teacher and spent her vacations as a nurse in the hospitals — the horrors of none made as strong an impression upon her mind as at Gettysburg. Any other woman with less courage would have given up the work in disgust. She left her home in Philadelphia for Baltimore, thence to Gettysburg; to be threatened with arrest as a southern spy was considered an unpleasant task indeed for a Yankee girl ; she possessed the ability to face the horrors of war and to nurse the most desperate cases. The men were always courteous to her, ever anxious to do her a favor, and appreciated everything she did for them. “I will never forget my first case. He was a young fellow, lying on a rock, and suffering intensely from lockjaw. Beside him was his brother, nursing and caring for him. . The anxious brother was bathing the wound with a piece of paper. I was burdened with handkerchiefs, so I gave him a few, and my, he was so glad to get them. I stayed with him some time, bandaged his wound and did what I could for him, and his brother told me his story. Their name w T as Presgrave, and they lived on the James River. He said that he had two other brothers in the battle and he feared that they too had been killed. When he saw his brother fall, he allowed himself to be taken prisoner, purposely, so he could be with him. When he had told this much of his story, he looked up at me with his big tear-filled eyes, for he knew his brother would die. “How am I going back to my father and tell him of this, and that, in all probability his other two boys have been killed in the same battle? I am afraid that I am the only one left. My poor father! He was more like a big brother to us, and you don’t know how much we loved him. “The tears came to my own eyes. I did everything I possibly could do for him. He was so affectionate to his brother, and waited on him day and night. “Four days later the poor fellow died. His brother ask if he could not go into Gettysburg and buy a pine coffin, for he intended to come back after the war and bring the body home. He was given the permission and instead of being buried in a blanket, as was the case, this one boy had a pine coffin. Major Holstein read the burial service each day over the long stretch of dead. A Miss Moore, and I always accompanied them. But at this particular time, the Major did not have his glasses with him, and could not read without them. They were preparing to bury the boy without any service. As soon as the brother realized this, he sat down and cried as though his heart would break. Finally he regained his composure and, looking up, said: ‘Is there not somebody who will say a word over my brother? Must I go home and say that he was buried like a dog, without even a prayer for him?’ “Miss Moore and I could not resist this appeal. Major Holstein let us have his book, and we read the burial service. “We all felt intensely sorry for this poor boy; he was so much affected by his loss. He told us that he was going to escape — told us how he was going back to his BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 129 father. We all knew about it. So, of course, we were not surprised when we heard that he was missing. “We had a nephew of Jefferson Davis in our camp. Poor fellow, he suffered terribly. A special chair was rigged up for him because his back was injured; but he begged so hard to be taken out of it that the doctor finally consented. But no matter in what position he was placed, he was not satisfied. When the order came to take the men not dying to Camp Letterman, the Union men had considerable trouble in lifting him into the wagon. Finally, one gruff soldier said: ‘That’s what you get for fighting against us.’ ‘ ‘ But the poor fellow answered in a kindly tone of voice : “ ‘I fought against you only once, and I’ll never fight again. And remember, my dear man, the Lord says that you must forgive, if they fight seventy times seven. ’ That was the last I saw or heard of him. “The Union men could not understand my devotion to the Confederates, and finally I noticed among them a coldness to me. I asked them what was the trouble, and one of them said: “ ‘Miss Jones, where are you from?’ “I told them I was from Philadelphia. “ ‘Are you a Confederate sympathizer?’ another asked. “I answered, most decidedly no. And then I had a heart to heart talk with them, and told them of the sufferings of the Confederates and how desperately they needed the affectionate care of a woman, just as much as they did. The boys soon saw the other side and agreed with me. “ ‘That’s right, Miss Jones, you do all you can for those Jonnies; they are not such a bad sort after all.’ “We became better friends after that. “So it was with the Gettysburg battle. I was too much occupied earing for these poor fellows to think how -terrible it really was, and how much the men had suffered. When the trouble was over everything came to me.’’ * * * Miss Arabella Griffith, was a native of New Jersey, and at the beginning of the Civil War was engaged to Francis C. Barlow, a promising young lawyer. On April 19th, 1861, Mr. Barlow enlisted as a private ; on the 20th, they were married, and on the 21st, he went with 'his regiment to Washington. A week later Mrs. Barlow followed him, and still later she joined in the hospital work of the Sanitary Com- mission. The day after the battle of Antietam, she found her husband badly wounded, and when, in the spring, he went to the field again, she accompanied him. At Gettys- burg he was again wounded and she by great effort managed to take care of not only him, but many other wounded men in that great battle. A friend who knew her at the time writes, “We called her “The Raider.’’ This devoted woman served at the front until 1864, and died from fever contracted in the hospital at Petersburg, Ya. Her husband meanwhile had risen to the rank of brigadier-general, and was known as one of the most gallant men in the army. * * * An Old Army Nurse. Harriet P. Dame’s record as a hospital nurse during the war of the Rebellion is second to none. This heroic and devoted woman went to the front with the 2nd N. H. Vol. Infantry in April, 1861, and remained in the field four years and eight months, the longest service of any woman. During this time she passed through many thrilling experiences, on more than one occasion barely escaping with her life. She was with the army in the Seven Days’ Retreat, and in the trenches of Fair Oaks, and at Gettysburg. At the close of the war a vote of thanks was given Miss Dame by the N. H. Legislature, as well as a present of $500, which she donated toward founding a home for the Veterans of her regiment. * * * They find there a little flag in the grass, And fling a handful of roses down ; And pause a moment before they pass To the soldier’s grave with a gilted crown. 9 Women Who Dared and Suffered for the Flag W HEN the 7th Mich. Vol. regiment started for the seat of war, Annie Etheridge, a woman just out of her teens, volunteered as daughter of the regiment. Her dress was a riding habit, and she wore a round military cap as a badge of her calling. A pair of pistols rested in their holsters for use in emergencies. She served four years, part of the time with the above regiment, and always with the Army of the Potomac. Her service was the relief of the wounded on the field which means under fire. Her State presented her with a badge for her devotion to the wounded at Gettysburg. Once while bandaging a wound for a New York boy a shot killed him under her hands. Though not called on to fight, Annie had spirit enough to make a battle heroine. At Gettysburg she went to the outposts with the skirmishers, and was ordered back. On her way back she passed a line of low trenches where the Union soldiers lay con- cealed, and spurning the thought that the affair must end in a retreat, she turned her face to the front and called, “Boys, do your duty and whip those fellows! ” A hearty cheer was the response, and “those fellows” poured a volley into the hidden trenches. Annie was hit in the hand, her horse was wounded and her skirt was riddled. She performed deeds of daring in bringing wounded from the field, under fire, turning a party of retreating soldiers back to their place in their ranks by offering to lead them into battle. One day as Annie entered the 2nd corps hospital' a young soldier of her regiment, who seemed to be at the point of death, appealed 'to her, saying, ‘ ‘ Come and take care of me, and I shall get well; if you do not come, I shall die.” On the battlefield she toiled under the scorching sun, and the pouring rains, with no thought but for those who were suffering and dying all around her. After the war she wrote: “I mark my hospital days as the best ones, and thank God for the way in which he led me into the good work, and for the strength which kept me through it all.” * * * D R. BELLOWS, president of the Sanitary Commission, writing of his experiences on the field of Gettysburg, said: “I went to the field hospital of the 3rd corps, where 2,000 men lay in their tents, a vast camp of mutilated humanity ; all hungry and thirsty, not having had anything to eat or drink, except hard crackers, for 24 hours, when we carried in bread, hands from every quarter were outstretched and the cry, “Give me a piece, oh please; I have had nothing since Wednesday.” Another, “Nothing but hard crackers since the fight,” etc. So with the remnant we threaded our way through the suffering crowd, amid such exclamations as, “Oh! please don’t touch my foot! ” or “For mercy sake, don’t touch my arm! ” Another, “Please don’t remove the blanket, I am so terribly cut up. ’ ’ One woman (Miss Gilson), young and fair, but grave and earnest, clothed in purity and mercy — the only woman in that vast camp — moved in and out of the hos- pital tents, speaking some tender word, giving some restoring cordial, holding the hand of some dying boy, or receiving the last words of a husband to his widowed wife. I can never forget how, amid scenes which, under ordinary circumstances, no woman could have appeared in without gross indecorum, the holy pity and purity of this angel of mercy made her presence seem as fit as though she had indeed dropped out of heaven. The men themselves, sick or well, all seemed awed and purified by such a resident among them. Miss Gilson continued her labors unremittingly through the war, and died about two years after its close, probably from the effects of her arduous work, at the age of thirty-two, * * * 130 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 131 Life and Duty in the Field Hospital. O N the 4th of July, 1863, the Washington Journals contained accounts of the great engagement on the lst-3rd, at Gettysburg. On the 6th, Mrs. Charlotte E. McKay went to Baltimore and thence to the point nearest the field accessible by rail. After some delay and difficulty, travelling the last 24 miles in a huge army wagon on a pile of forage, she reached the hospital of the 5th corps, about five miles south of the town; and here, for the remainder of July and the greater part of August, her labors were such as the vast accumulation of suffering around her seemed to demand. Many incidents occurred during her stay which illustrates the swift vicissitudes and tragic scenery of war. In all these fearful scenes and constant labors, Mrs. McKay took an active and efficient part. The sight of a woman seemed to cheer the poor fellows, for many a “God bless you ! ’ ’ greeted me before I had done them a single act of kindness. The first call was for volunteers to go for water; nine offered their service, five were furnished each with a pail, which they soon filled, and supplied the wants of the poor sufferers. After bathing and bandaging their burning wounds, I soon found that I was well repaid for my exertions in seeing them all more comfortable. An Irishman, though badly wounded, did much to keep up the spirits of the disheartened, as he was still in possession of his native wit, remarked, “How thankful we are for a little attention! ” One old man, whose last days should have been passed in a quiet home, lay dying; at every breath of his life, blood gushed from the wound in his breast. At his side lay a mere boy, both his lower limbs had been taken off ; his hours were few. Here lay another; a ball pierced his cheek near the eye. The surgeon had probed in vain to find the deadly missile; his breathing was of that horrible sort which once heard is never forgotten. He too, was passed all cure. Another had a ball lodged deep in the upper part of his thigh. The surgeon had been unable to afford him any relief. He was very calm, and said he did not suffer much; but something about his face, when I looked at it, showed that he would soon “be mustered out.” A young sergeant was brought to our hospital, supported by two of his comrades, as both his arms were broken. His greeting to us was, “Well, they have winged me;” To see that strong man, now utterly helpless, and almost fainting from the loss of blood, and exhausted from a long walk, was a piteous sight indeed. And that operation table! These scenes come up before me now with all the vividness of reality. Sometimes I hope it is only a fever-dream that haunts me, but too well I know it was no dream; for, one by one, they would take from different parts of the hospital a poor fellow, lay him out on those bloody boards, and administer chloroform; but before insensibility, the operation would begin, and in the midst of shrieks, curses and wild laughs, the surgeon would wield over his wretched victim the glittering knife and saw; and soon the severed and ghastly limb, white as snow and splattered with blood, would fall upon the floor — one more added to that terrible pile. Many nights I lived over the horrors of the field hospital and the amputating table. If I but closed my eyes, I saw such horrible sights that I would sometimes spring from .my bed; and not until fairly awakened could I be convinced of my re- moteness from the sickening scene. Those groans were in my ears; I saw again the quivering limbs, the spouting arteries and the pinched and ghastly faces of the sufferers. In the fall of 1863, when those who remained of the sufferers had been collected in one great hospital, Mrs. McKay again sought the front, and there was much suffering and destitution in the numerous hospitals, which she visited regularly dis- pensing such comforts as she could draw from the Sanitary Commission and other sources. * * * Some fell on far-off fields of fame. Some here sank down to rest ; And the dear land they love so well. Now folds them to her breast. 132 BLUE AND GRAY A Sad Sig-ht. O N the side at Gettysburg, near the 11th corps battle-line, is York street. After the battle, in an enclosed lot a few yards from the street, was found a corpse in Fed- eral Blue. Nothing unusual that — for the dead were everywhere for miles of trodden, blood-soaked battlefield. Tightly grasped in the dead soldier’s hand was the likeness of three sweet innocent little children, and on them his last gaze had been fastened, as, alone and unattended, on the field of slaughter, his soul had departed to its God. That awoke the tenderest sympathies of those who found him, dead and unknown, another of the numberless sacrifices of the altar of an imperilled nation. He was buried at the time on the lot of Judge Kussell, near where he was found. The picture was photographed and widely circu- lated. A copy reaching Cattaragus County, N. Y., was recognized as the children of Orderly Sergeant Hummiston, 154th N. Y. regiment. The children were brought to the Soldiers’ Orphans’ Home at Gettysburg and educated, their mother for a time being matron of the institution. The remains of Sergeant Hummiston now rest in grave No. 14, Section B, of the New York lot in the National Cemetery. The Philadelphia branch of the Sanitary Commission, offered a prize of $50 for the best poem upon this touching incident. The award was made to James G. Clark, of Dansville, N. Y., for these thrilling and well-known stanzas : Upon the field of Gettysburg, The summer sun was high ; When freedom met her traitorous foe, Beneath a Northern sky. Among the heroes of the North, Who swelled her grand array — Who rushed, like mountain eagles forth. From happy homes away, There stood a man of humble fame, A sire of children, three. And gazed within a little frame, Their pictured forms to see ; And blame him not if, in the strife, He breathed a soldier’s prayer — “O ! Father, guard the soldier's wife, And for his children care.” Upon the field of Gettysburg, When morning shown again ; The crimson cloud of battle burst. In streams of fiery rain. Our legions quelled the awful flood Of shot, and steel, and shell ; While banners, marked with ball and blood, Around them rose and fell. And none more noble won the name, Of Champion of the Free ; Than he who pressed the little frame. That, held his children three ; And none were braver in the strife, Than he who breathed the prayer ; "O ! Father, guard the soldier’s wife, And for his children care.” Upon the field of Gettysburg, The full moon slowly rose ; She looked, and saw ten thousand brows. All pale in death’s repose. And down beside a silver stream, From other forms away ; Calm as a warrior in a dream, Our fallen comrade lay ; His limbs were cold, his sightless eyes, Were fixed upon the three. Sweet stars that rose in memory’s skies, To light him o’er death’s sea ; Then honored be the soldier’s life, And hallowed be his prayer ; “O ! Father, guard the soldier’s wife, And for his orphans care.” An Oration on Patriotism. I HAVE listened to the best speakers our country has, possessed in the many years which have elapsed since the Battle of Gettysburg, but not one of them has made the impression on my mind which a few words, falling from the lips of a private soldier, did away back in 1863. It was the night of July 4th, and I, with others, was lying in the Spangler farmhouse, near Culp’s Hill. The time of night I do not know. I had been semi-unconscious from the joint effect of chloroform and amputation. The room in which I lay was crowded with desperately wounded men, or boys, for some of us were not nineteen years of age — consciousness returning some time in the night, I became aware of voices near-by. I turned my head as I lay on the floor; I soon made out that some one was kneeling BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 133 by a wounded man and examining his wound. I heard the injunction given, “Tell me honestly, doctor, what my chance is.” He had been shot in the abdomen, and all too soon came the verdict, “My poor fellow, you will not see another sunrise.’’ I heard his teeth grate as he struggled to control himself, and then he spoke: “Doctor, will you do me a favor?” “Certainly,” was the response; “what is it?” “Make a memorandum of my wife’s address.” I did not remember them the next day, or since, I only recall it was some town in Michigan. It appeared that the dying soldier was a man of some property, and in the clearest manner he stated his advice to his wife as to the best way to handle it. All this was noted down, and then he paused ; and the surgeon, anxious, it is to be piresumed, to get along to others who so sorely needed his aid, said, “Is that all, my friend?” He replied falteringly, “That is not all. I have two little boys, Oh my God! ” Just this one outburst from an agonized heart, and then, mastering his emotion, drew himself hastily up, resting on his elbows, said, ‘ 1 Tell my wife, doctor, that with my dying breath I charge her to so rear our boys that if, when they have come to years of manhood, their country shall need their service, even unto death, they will give them as fully as, I trust under God, their father gives his life this night.” That was all. He sank back exhausted, and the surgeon passed along. In the grey of the morning, when I roused enough to be aware of what was transpiring around me, I glanced toward Mm. A cloth was over his face, and soon his silent form was carried out. I repeat, I have heard the best speakers of my time, but after all these years I still pronounce the dying utterances of that unknown soldier as the grandest oration on patriotism I have ever listened to. David R. Mayne, Sergt. SOtli Regiment Maine Vol. Inf. Miss Carrie Sheads of Gettysburg. T HE name, besides its association with that great battle, will be remembered as of one who, being summoned by the terrible boom of hostile cannon, from a life of quiet and scholastic seclusion, met the terrible demands of the hour with the calmness of a heroine, and, amid the roar and crash of battle, and the fierce hate of the fiery belligerents, acted with a discretion and genuine courage which entitle her name and her act to be held in perpetual remembrance by the Daughters of America. When Lee’s army advanced to the invasion of Pennsylvania, Miss Sheads was principal of Oakridge Seminary, situated a short distance west of the village. The evening of June 30th came, and with it Buford’s cavalry division, the van of the Army of the Potomac. The 1st brigade camped on the Chambersburg road, not more than 200 yards from the Seminary. Closing the usual routine of the day, she promised her scholars a holiday on the morrow, to enable them to visit the camp and contribute to the comfort of the weary and hungry soldier boys. The next morning was ushered in by the heavy boom of artillery and sharp carbine shots. So suddenly and unexpectedly had war unfurled its gorgeous but bloody panorama around her and the cluster of girls in her care, that no time was left to withdraw to a place of safety. So near the line of battle is situated the build- ings of Oakridge Seminary, that it soon became a hospital; and, with that amazing suddenness which can happen only in time of active and invasive warfare, Miss Sheads found herself converted from the principal of a young ladies’ seminary, into the lady superintendent of an army hospital. Among the last to leave the 1st day’s field was the 97th N. Y. Yol. Infantry regiment, commanded by Lieut. -Col. Charles Wheelock, who, after fighting hand-to-hand as long as there was a shadow of hope, arriving on the ground of Oakridge Seminary, the gallant Colonel, finding all his efforts vain, rushed into the basement thoroughly exhausted. Soon a Confederate officer, with a detail of men entered. On seeing Colonel Wheelock vainly endeavoring to break his sword, which was of trusty metal, 134 BLUE AND GRAY the Confederate officer demanded the weapon; but the Colonel declared he would never surrender his sword to a traitor while he lived. Then the Confederate drew a revolver, and told him if he did not surrender his sword he would shoot him. But the Colonel was a veteran; drawing himself up proudly, he tore open his uniform, bared his bosom, and bade the officer “shoot,” but he would guard his sword with his life. At this moment, Elias Sheads, Carrie’s father, stepped between the two, and begged them not to be rash; but he was soon pushed aside. Seeing the danger to which the Colonel was exposed, Miss Sheads, true to the instincts of her sex, rushed between them. Turning to the Colonel, she pleaded with him to surrender his sword, and save his life; that by refusing he would lose both. Fortunately, at this moment the attention of the Confederate officer was drawn away by the entrance of other prisoners. Miss Sheads, with admirable presence of mind, unclasped the Colonel ’s sword from its belt, and hid it in the folds of her dress. When the officer returned, the Colonel told him he was willing to surrender, and that one of his men had taken his sword and passed out. Soon the Colonel “fell in” with the other prisoners and marched to the rear. On the 5th of July, Colonel Wheelock unexpectedly made his appearance, and received his sword from the hands of its noble guardian, with those profound emotions which only a soldier can feel and understand. He had managed to effect his escape while crossing the mountains, and, after considerable difficulty and suffering, succeeded in reaching Gettysburg in safety. He finally died of camp fever, in Washington, D. C., in January, 1865. * * * * A Prisoner in Gettysburg. I DO not know who the Confederate Provost Marshal was during the occupancy of Gettysburg by General Lee. I wish I did, for a more gallant-appearing officer I never met, and of the social and agreeable kind, too, without doubt the Confederate officers, if not the men, as a rule entertained a more bitter feeling toward the enemy than did the Unionists. It was quite the custom for the haughty Southerner, clad in shabby gray — often times unkempt and unclean — when taken prisoner, to draw himself up with a cold and repellant air, and refuse all but “official” intercourse with his captors. This was particularly the case in the early stage of the war, but somehow it has a softening, humanizing effect upon men to die together, though, by each other’s hands, and so by the close of the war both sides had grown quite admirably glad, I suppose, to be humanized by having somebody else killed. The Provost Marshal of Gettysburg was however, not of the repellant kind. He was a Lieutenant-Colonel, a very handsome man and with a uniform quite fresh and bright. We had been wounded on the first day — myself and many others I mean — most of us had been knocked over in the early afternoon, and had been carried back to the town into a church which had been made a hospital. We had not been there long when such of us as could hobble to the door saw what was left of the 1st corps — which had been while acting as the advance guard of the army, broken and defeated but not dismayed — marching by the flank through the town. I was one of the liobblers, and I shall never forget the firm-set determined features of the men. We couldn’t go with them, but we afterwards learned that they had met that ‘ ‘ Confederate ally, ’ ’ General Hancock outside, and on another day there was another tale to tell. We hobbled back to our cots again, and soon an attendant came and told us that the Confederates had relieved our guards and they were collecting all the non-wounded men except the stewards, nurses, etc., and sending 'them to the rear. I managed to save my man who had carried me from the field, by tying a white handkerchief around his arm. About 8:00 o’clock P.M., the Provost Marshall came in. He approached the group of cots occupied by wounded officers, and greeted us quite cheerily. ‘ ‘ Good evening, gentlemen,” he said. “I trust none of you are seriously hurt. You have your own surgeons and men here, and they will not be disturbed.” BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 135 We saw that he was not of the repellant sort and so we soon began to ply him with questions. He was quite communicative. Lee ’s army was practically all up and flushed with victory. The Union army was very much demoralized. “We shall walk over it to-morrow, ’ ’ he said, and then he added something about the time they expected to arrive in Philadelphia. Now the truth is, I had always been rather an optimist in this matter of pre- serving the Union, and although things certainly did look rather black, I somehow had no confidence in that trip to Philadelphia, and so I replied to the Colonel: “I say, Colonel, if there should happen to be any ‘just cause or impediment’ which prevents that walk-over would you mind dropping in and tell us about it?’’ He laughed a little and said he would. The next day some of us had sad duties, too. There were those who were seriously hurt, and as their wounds took on that condition which indicates death’s firmest grasp, those of us again that could hobble about, were called to their bedside to receive their dying message. “I would like to have seen it over,’’ said one, and another had lain in a stupor, suddenly opened his eyes, and to the ear bent his lips muttered, ‘ ‘ Tell my mother — ” but the tale was never told. It was late in the evening of the second day when the Lieutenant-Colonel appeared again. He smiled as usual when he approached us, though I fancied not as cheerily as before. “It has been a terrible day,” he said. The Union Army was all in front of Lee’s now, and the fight had been raging with varied success all day and had closed with the advantage all in favor of the South. He spoke of the position on Cemetery Hill as a very strong one, and said its capture was a necessity. They had been waiting for Pickett and on the following afternoon a charge would be made, and Cemetery Eidge would be taken. We were in much improved spirit. We had, had some experience, and knew that when hard fighting was the order, that if the Army of the Potomac was not whipped very soon, it was not apt to be whipped at all. “If the Army of the Potomac is planted,” said one, “you won’t be able to dig it up.” And as the Colonel was about retiring, I called after him, thus: “I say, Colonel — that strong position of which you speak — that is a matter in which we have much interest, as you will concede. Would you mind calling or sending us word about the time you take it. ’ ’ He laughed pleasantly again. “You will see,” he said. We knew when the charge took place well enough. It was to us, in the noise which was made, as though all hell had broken loose. We knew from the sounds, too, when it failed. It grew still, as night crept on. The Colonel was late in making his appearance, and there was no smile in response to our eager greetings. “Yes, the charge has failed. There has been a dreadful loss.” He lingered but a little while, and was reticent. He said, however, that another charge was to be made at 4 : 00 o ’clock in the morning, and the position would be taken. “Do not fail to notify us, Colonel,” I said. “No, I will not. Good-night.” ‘ ‘ That is good-bye, ’ ’ I said to an officer on a stretcher beside me. Our sleep was rather of the desultory character, and we were all wide enough awake at 4: 00 o’clock, but there was no sound indicating a charge. A little later an attendant rushed in. “Our men are skirmishing through the town,” he said. We hobbled to the street, and there sure enough were the boys in blue, moving after the manner of skirmishers, quick, eager, alert ; watchful, gradually moving through the town. We gave a rather feeble cheer of welcome, and then we were driven to cover. Lee and his defeated battalions, brave among the bravest, had struck a rock they could not break, and were marching back to the “sacred soil.” With the rear guard was the handsome, dark-eyed Lieutenant-Colonel, who did not come to tell us of the second charge. William J. Starkes, 104tli New York Vol. Inf. Regiment. The Romance of the Heroine and the Martyr The Story of Miss Jennie Wade, Killed at Gettysburg, — And Corporal Skelly, Who Fell at Winchester, Va. PRETTIER girl was not to be found in Gettysburg than Jennie Wade, l| representing the very ideal of those war-time girls, who adorned the I* dreams of the soldier boys as they slumbered fitfully on the field of battle. To one soldier boy at least, she was an ideal. When the 30-day men were off to the front, she was the girl left behind. Later, as it became evident that the Rebellion was to last much longer, he was graduated into a three-year man. It was her pic- ture, and her letters that cheered him through the long, weary campaign under General Milroy, at Winchester, Va. Corporal Johnston Skelly, of Co. F, 87tli Regt. Pa. Vol. Inf. (whose name is now borne by Post No. 9, G. A. R., of Gettysburg), a lad of 19, when the call came for volunteers, needed no second call as the camp life was attractive to him from the start. With him was a brother, which helped to give the camp something of the atmos- phere of home. While the regiment was fighting in Carter’s Woods, an emi- nence beyond Winchester, June 14th, 1863, the two brothers were among those wounded. There was no way for Jennie Wade to know that her lover had been shot down during a hand-to-hand fight, that his chance for life was daily growing less, because of the lack of adequate med- ical attention. No doubt it was just as well that she was ignorant of her lover ’s plight, for the fates had decreed that she, along with other pretty girls that the soldiers were dreaming about, was to be sorely tried. Strangest of all, though, the martial order was never fully shared by Jennie Wade, her heart and her lover were for the Union; she realized that the Confederates had a cause; she was persuaded to hate them, though the man dearest to her might fall from their bullets — as he did, even then, she could not know of it ; news traveled more slowly then than now. Facilities were lacking for sending back a list of killed and Wounded after every engagement. A few days later the streets in Gettysburg were jammed with Confederates. To the citizens the worse had come. Yet, in the midst of all these scenes of carnage, the stork had been busy. The stork is a bird that cares neither for peace or war ; it had visited the home of Jennie’s sister, a Mrs. McClellan. War or no war, that baby had to have attention, and its mother must be kept comfortable. From their home went Jennie and her mother to the little brick house that was in the path of the invading army; sister and babe in adjoining room. While the lead began to fly, Jennie was placidly baking. The men she had learned to hate were fighting desperately 136 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 137 all around her. The lover who had opposed their northern march had a few days before succumbed to his wounds, and was lying in an alien country. But of all this Jennie could not have the slightest suspicion. All she knew was that her little family was hungry. While the battle raged ever fiercer, the girl went on kneading dough, undismayed by her obvious danger. At last a ball struck the outer door and ricochetted through an inner door, behind which she was preparing for her baking. With a con- vulsive cry, she clasped her hands to her breast and fell. They found her a few hours later, lying by the table on which was the half-kneaded dough. The irony of events had decreed that she was to be the only citizen to be killed during the whole battle. Maybe, after all, it was a friendly bullet that kept her from learning that the only man she ever loved had found a friendless grave only a few days before. * * * Brave Annie Roberts. 0 a humble home on Lewis Street, New York City, the early days of July, 1863, throbbed the news that amid heaps of mangled men, the Stars and Stripes waved victorious over the field of slaughter, but that the 14th Brooklyn regiment that had met the first terrible swell of the mighty invading wave, scarcely existed, except in its dying and its dead. Young, gentle and affectionate Annie Boberts, not even taking a change of clothing, was in less than ten minutes on a train swiftly gliding toward the ensanguined field. At Harrisburg she was told she could go no further. The only railroad leading to Gettysburg had been destroyed by the Confederates, its bridges burned and its rails warped into shapeless masses, on piles of burning ties. The Provost Marshal refused her a pass to enter the army lines. What cannot a determined woman accomplish when actuated by sacred love ? She had a husband and a brother in the 14th Brooklyn, and both were dead or severely wounded on that battle-plain. With limited means, with no friends, that little timid, delicate woman, transformed for a time by a bravery sublime into a strength more than masculine, overcoming every obstacle, was among the first of civilians to tread that blood-soaked sod, even before the dead were all buried (see page 61). From hospital to hospital, from trench to trench of the festering dead, amid rain and mud, through crowds of soldiers and amid sickening stenches, that noble woman plodded on — on — forever on, day after day, scarcely pausing, occasionally to get perhaps on the floor of some farmhouse — with noise and groans and noisome smells all around — a few hours of needed sleep. On the first day’s field, the dead were buried wherever they fell — right in the road with teams driving over them — in the fields and through the woods on either side. Buried did I say? Most of our dead that fell the first day were left unburied (see page 61), during the three following days that the Confederates held the field. When the "Unionists again took possession of Seminary Bidge, the Army of the Potomac was 23,000 men less than it had been July 1st, those that were left were needed for the pursuit of Lee’s Army, and to attend to the wounded; the dead on the first day’s field were much decomposed. Often a very few inches of earth was the covering, through w'hich portions of the body and clothing were visible after the first heavy rain. Oh! the ghastly horrors of those sickening burials of valiant men. Here and there, and everywhere, at the head of a rude mound was a piece of a cracker box — and on it were written in lead pencil: “Unknown 14th Brooklyn” or “Unknown 95th N. Y., ” or as you moved into the McPherson woods (Beynold’s Grove) “Unknown 24th Mich.,” etc., etc. Did Annie Boberts succeed? She found her noble gray-haired brother with a leg torn off. At length heard from her brave husband, a wounded prisoner in Libby. This was no isolated case. They came by thousands — from far Wisconsin, from the hills of Maine, from the granite cliffs of New England — all on one common errand of love, all torn by the same agonizing feeling of doubt, which in thousands of cases, was too soon dissolved in the certainty of despair. They came to search for their dead — 138 BLUE AND GRAY to minister to their wounded. Some were successful — some failed. Some exhumed hundreds of bodies, but never found the dead for whom they searched. God grant our nation may never behold another field of fraternal slaughter. * * * Theological Seminary. The Seminary of the General Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the United States, founded in 1826, is an able officered institution of high rank. It is from this seminary that the ridge receives the appellation by which it is generally known. This building figured conspicuously in the battle as a prominent point. Be- neath the shadow of its consecrated walls the noble 1st corps, on the first of July, 1863, struggled for weary hours to hold the line against the overwhelming masses in gray that were surging upon them. At its very portals many of the boys in blue fell dead or sorely wounded. From its groves and lawns, Confederate cannon belched forth death. From its cupola, General Lee Viewed the long line of blue, that he vainly endeavored to crush, as they stood on ele- vated points of observation. After the battle it was for many weary weeks a hos- pital (as was indeed every prominent building in Gettysburg and vicinity), from every room of which resounded the groans of agony and pain. Within its walls the Blue and Gray were impartially nursed by tender hands to a new lease of life, whilst there many brave men breathed their last, far from their loved homes amid northern hills, or on western prairie, or sunny southern plain. In this building the valiant Kemper and the chivalrous Trimble, both sorely wounded prisoners in the land they had hoped to prostrate before the arms of the Confederacy. Pennsylvania College. Another celebrated institution, is Pennsylvania College, which was chartered in 1832, and ranked amongst the leading colleges of the land. It is under the super- vision of the Lutheran Church, unsectarian in character, being patronized by all prot- estant denominations, from almost every State in the Union, and even Roman Cath- olics from Mexico, attracted by its repu- tation, have been enrolled amongst its students. Its alumni now fill responsible positions in every portion of our Republic and even in foreign lands. The college is situated on a plain in the northern suburbs of the town. When on that sunny July day the ruthless storm of battle so suddenly burst upon the quiet town nestling amongst enclosing ridges, there were only fragments of classes pres- ent, to have their recitations rudely closed by the shrieking shells bursting in mid-air above the lovely campus that engirdles the stately buildings. For when Lee’s army crossed the Potomac River. Governor Curtin called on Pennsylvanians to rally for their imperilled homes, and promptly did the brave boys of the college respond. In a few hours, from its students a full company BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 139 \ras recruited for the “emergency,” those brave young men, many of very tender years, exchanged the refinements of a student’s life, for the perils of a camp. Scarcely a student remained behind, except those physically unable to enlist. The company was attached to the 26th Emergency Regiment, Penna. Vol. Inf. The first screaming shell that flew across Seminary Eidge, July 1st, effectually closed the collegiate work of the day, and before night, the few that remained saw shattered regiments in blue sullenly retreating before the exultant foe in gray ; saw the dead and the wounded falling at every step; saw thousands of brave soldiers hemmed in by the narrow streets and shot down or captured ; saw for miles on every side, far as vision could reach, mighty hosts above ■whom gleamed long extended forests of shining steel, tramping to the great battle center. For weeks these classic halls resounded, not to the recitations of ambitious youths, but to the groans of strong men as they realized that for them life was rapidly ebbing. From its cupola, General Lee is said, beneath the hospital flag, to have scanned closely the Union battle-line of the third day. At the present time the college is enjoying the prosperity it so richly deserves, officered by one of the ablest faculties to be found in the land. The Confederate Dead. Thickly mingled with the boys in Blue, were many corpses that were clad in Gray. As you crossed Willoughby Eun and proceeded westward, they were more numerous, many having, after the fighting of the 1st day, been removed to the rear; and dying there. Nearly all were scantily buried, if you may dignify the few shovels- full of earth thrown over them with the term burial. As all are aware, the desecration of the remains of the Union dead was rectified as speedily as possible by the action of Governor Curtin, in the establishment of the National Cemetery. We are glad to chronicle the fact that after the war “in 1877- 1879,” the remains of the Confederate dead were removed to Richmond, Va., and properly interred in Hollywood Cemetery. Of course, in consequence of the length of time that had elapsed and the imperfect manner in which they had been buried over a very wide extent of country, in unmarked pits and trenches and often in unfrequented places, this was imperfectly done, and even to the present time human bones are frequently turned up by the plow where their presence was not suspected. An Adams County Company on its Own Soil. L ITTLE Adams County, in which Gettysburg is situated, sent twenty-eight full com- panies into the Union Army during various periods of the war. In addition, portions of at least nine others were recruited within its limits, whilst its sons in considerable numbers were found in regiments from many other States as well as in the regular army. It contributed, in the aggregate, at least three full regiments to the hosts battling for national perpetuity. Yet at the time of the battle of Gettysburg, there was but one Adams County company in the Army of the Potomac, to participate in the battle. This was Co. K of the 1st regiment of the celebrated Pennsylvania Reserve Corps. The author is proud to say that his father, Chas. E. Gilbert, was a member of the above company. There were other Adams County commands that participated in the operations of the campaign which attended Lee’s invasion of the North; but to Co. K belongs the proud distinction of being the only company from the county that fought in the Battle of Gettysburg. This company was one of the finest and noblest that the Keystone Commonwealth sent to the war, being recruited principally from the best families of Adams County- young men of principle and integrity, who in the dark days of 1861 sacrificed the ease and comfort of home, because they felt it to be a sacred duty to rush to the rescue of an imperilled Union. The company went out under the Hon. Edward McPherson. 140 BLUE AND GRAY The brave and accomplished Brevet Brigadier-General W. W. Stuart, started his military career as a private in this company. In the Gettysburg campaign it was com- manded by Captain H. N. Minnigh. Their record, as of all that noble corps, “Penn- sylvania Reserves, ’’ was one of hard service, honorably and conscientiously performed. As this company charged across the rugged cliffs of Little Round Top, many of its members could see in the distance their own homes and farms over which were now surging the terrible billows of bloody strife. * * * Tribute to General Birney. N O more distinguished or remarkable man — no purer patriot or braver soldier was evolved by the fierce strife attending the great Rebellion than Maj.-Gen. David Bell Birney. Born in the heart of the slave region, at Huntsville, Ala., he was, like his distinguished father, an ardent lover of liberty and justice. The father James G. Birney, twice candidate of the once despised Liberty party, for the presidency, had dared the wrath of the minions of slavery and shown the earnestness of his convictions by manumitting his own slaves, over twenty in number. Afterwards, when in Cin- cinnati, 0., he established a paper that advocated emancipation, he was mobbed, narrowly escaped with his life, and his printing outfit pitched into the Ohio River. The son inherited the devotion to duty transmitted from the father. Early in 1861, he was made a brigadier-general. At Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, he proved himself an able commander, who combined sagacity with the greatest personal courage and an intentive power of inspiring the troops that fought under him. It is at Gettysburg, however, that his name was wreathed by an unfading garland of glory. Able and courageous, he was a fit commander for such lieutenants as Ward, De Trobriand and Graham, who handled his brigades. When General Sickles was borne from the field he succeeded in command of the corps, and did all that judicious arrangement and personal valor could do to stay the tide of disaster and secure the retreat to a safer line. He fearlessly exposed himself everywhere along the line ■where the danger was greatest and the need of a commander most keenly felt. Twice struck and slightly wounded, he kept the saddle till the last regiment had been established on a new line. His laurels won on that disastrous day will never fade in a nation’s grateful recollection. Elevated in 1864 to the command of the 10th army corps, his untimely demise the same year brought sorrow to all his former com- rades in arms. * * * Rhode Island Drummer Boy. “Kiss me before I die,’’ said the little drummer boy, to Mrs. Judge Fisher, of York, Pa., as he lay at the foot of Round Top, dying far away from home and his dear mother. She kissed his pale cheek, and tenderly held him in her arms, till his spirit had fled. His bereaved mother came several times in search of his body, but it could not be found until 1867, when it was sent to his home in Providence, R. I. His broken drum was found near him, by Farmer Jacob Weikert, who turned it into a bee-liive, which for sixteen years was used in this strange and significant employment. Death seemed the legend : but it only slept To wake beneath our sky ; Just on the spot when ravening Treason crept Back to its lair to die. [bounds Bleeding and torn from Freedom’s mount’n, A stained and shattered drum, Is now the hive, where on their flow'ry rounds, The wild bees go and come. The Rev. Father Corby’s Benediction. J UST before the Irish brigade went into the Wheal, field, one of the most impressive scenes of the entire battle was enacted. Col. Patrick Kelly was in command and when he gave orders to form for battle, there was no call to explain that the business in hand was of a serious nature. Every moment was precious, but still it was deemed wise and fitting to take time for a parting benediction by the chaplain, the Rev. Wm. Corby, C. S. C. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 141 For hundreds it was tlieir last. Shot and shell were whistling over the field. Even where the troops were formed there came shots that bespoke the danger near-by. Drawn by the side of the brigade were General Hancock and his staff, in full regi- mentals — a collection of officers that inspired, not only by the appearance of the Rev. Father Corby, whose rugged simplicity of face and figure was in full accord with his character. A rock formed a natural pulpit on which Father Corby stood. His first words were of comfort. All, he declared, might receive the benefits of absolution by sincere contrition at this time, to be followed by the confession of their sins at the opportunity. Next he urged the men to do their duty well, reminding them of the high and sacred nature of the trust reposed in them, also that the Catholic Church refused Christian burial to a soldier who turned his back on the foe, or deserted his flag. Standing at attention, the brigade heard the short simple address, at its close, with one accord, every man fell to his knees and bowed his head. Then Father Corby stretched forth his right hand and pronounced the words of general absolution. Dominus noster Jesus Christus vos absolvat, et ego auctoritate ipsius, vos absolvo a vinculo excommunications et interdict i in quantum possum et vos indigetis ; delude, ego vos absolvo a peccatis vestris in nomine Patris, et Filii, et spiritus Sancti. Amen.” The scene was more than impressive, it was awe-inspiring. When he had finished the words, the men were led on in a furious charge in which scores of them met their death. The roar of battle rose and swelled and re-echoed through the woods, making music more sublime than ever sounded through cathedral aisles. General Mulholland says: “I do not think that there was a man in the brigade who did not offer up a heart-felt prayer. For some it was their last; they knelt in their grave clothes; who can doubt but that their prayers were good?” Father Corby was undoubtedly impressed by the reverence showm by the men as he pronounced the words of absolution, for in his “Memoirs of Chaplain Life,” he says: “In performing the ceremony, I faced the army. I noticed that all Catholics and non-Catholies, officers and men, showed a profound respect. Major-General Hancock removed his hat, and bowed in reverential devotion. That general absolution was intended for all — in quantum possum — not only for our men, but for all, North and South, who were susceptible of it, and who w'ere about to appear before their Judge. Note. — The statue of Rev. Father Corby, now marks the spot where he stood on that memorable day. It wms erected by the Catholic Alumni Sodality of Philadelphia, through the interest of Gen. St. Clair Mulholland of the 116th Pa. Regiment. The monument is to the memory of three New York regiments belonging to the brigade. * * * 142 BLUE AND GRAY The Present Breast-Works. It. is wonderful how rapidly during a night as if by magic, miles of earthworks will arise, where a battle is anticipated. Old soldiers know all about that by re- peated experience. How often, after a toilsome march, the hours so badly needed for rest were used for fortifying. It was hard labor for exhausted men, but better than to be unprotected from the bullets of the enemy. Most of the earthworks built by the two armies at Gettysburg had for their basis fence-rails, cord- wood, felled trees, stone, etc., against which earth was thrown. * * * A Confederate Sharpshooter’s Fate at Devil’s Den. All the massive rocks in this vicinity bear numerous marks of the missiles from artillery and small arms. Some of them have hundreds of the peculiar discoloration made wherever a musket ball strikes one of these granite rocks, whilst many places can be seen where fragments were scaled off by the shot and shell of death-dealing cannon. Only a few yards from this spot, a Confederate sharpshooter had placed himself in the fissure between two rocks. There was just room in the narrow aperture for his body. He had built up in front a stone wall for protection, and from behind this he picked off at leisure the exposed officers on Little Bound Top. Shell after shell was fired at him, but an error of only a yard or two caused them to strike the solid rock on .either side, which still bears unmistakable marks of this fierce bombard- ment. At length a shell more truly aimed reached the exact spot, and after the battle his body was found, without a mark upon it. It was supposed his death was due from the concussion of an exploding shell. * * * (See page 61.) General Early’s Requisition. On the afternoon of June 26th, General Early arrived at Gettysburg, and made the following requisition on the borough authorities: 60 barrels of flour, 7,000 pounds of pork or bacon, 1,200 pounds of sugar, 600 pounds of coffee, 1,000 pounds of salt, 10 bushels of onions, 1,000 pairs of shoes, 500 hats, or $10,000 in money. He was answered by Mr. David Kendlehart, president of the Council, as follows: Gettysburg, Pa., June 26th, 1863. To General Early : Sir: — The authorities of the Borough of Gettysburg, in answer to the demand made by you upon the said borough and county, say their authority extends but to the borough. That the requisition asked for cannot be given, as it is utterly impossible to comply. The quantities required are far beyond that in our possession. In compliance, however, to the demands we will request the stores to be opened, and the citizens to furnish whatever they can of such provisions, etc. Further we cannot promise. By authority of the council of the Borough of Gettysburg, I hereunto, as President of said borough, attach my name. David Kendlehart. General Early that evening received orders to proceed to York, and the requisition was not again asked. * * * Mrs. B. H. Spencer, of Oswego, N. Y., whose husband enlisted in the 147th N. Y. regiment, followed that organization to the front, and made herself useful as a nurse and hospital attendant. On the march toward Gettysburg she rode a horse which carried, besides herself, bedding, cooking utensils, clothing, and supplies for the sick and wounded. While the great battle was in progress, Mrs. Spencer, a part of the time actually under fire, established a field hospital in which 60 wounded soldiers were treated. One day she discovered a townsman of her own, who had been shot through the throat, and he could swallow nothing. She ask him if he could do without food for a week. The soldier, who was young and strong, gave signs that he could. “Then,” BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 143 said she, “Do as I tell you, and you shall not die.” She procured a basin of pure cold water, and directed him to keep the wound continually wet, which he did; the inflammation soon subsided and the edges of the wound could be closed up, after which she began to feed him carefully with broth, and every day brought further improvement until he entirely recovered. * * * During one of the charges made upon the 147th regiment Penna. Vol. Inf., on the morn- ing of the 3rd, and after the repulse of the enemy, a wounded Confederate, in their front was discovered loading his gun. A number of the boys fired at him, when, soon after, his gun was discharged, and it was ascertained that he hal biown the whole top of his head off. He had been wounded through the thigh, and probably preferred ending his misery to undergoing the suffering ; or, perhaps he was a deserter from the Union Army. As the foe in one of their assaults were retreating, Orderly-Sergeant Howieter, of Co. H, said: “Why don’t we charge? Why don’t we charge?” when he was struck by a Con- federate bullet and fell dead in the ranks. Another incident, furnished by a member of the same regiment, is given to illustrate the horrors of this spot, as well as the indiffer- ence produced by continued contact with the shocking scenes of war. Whilst details were burying the dead which had fallen in the attack on Culp’s Hill, and one of the trenches was ready to cover, a member of one of the Ohio regiments asked: “How many are in this trench?” “Seventy-three,” was the an- swer, “Make it 73 and a foot,” and suiting the action to the word, he threw into the trench a foot, which had been torn from some soldier by a shell. * * * The Second Maryland Confederate regi- ment, commanded by Lieut. -Col. James R. Herbert, the boast and pride of the Southern army, made an assault on the night of July 2, on the Federal entrenchments on Culp’s Hill. In this movement they occupied part of the Federal works, but the next morning, in storming the hill in the face of Geary’s White Star division, they were compelled to" fall back with heavy loss. Nearly all the com- missioned officers were killed or wounded, of the 400 who went into the fight, 52 were killed and 140 wounded. Colonel Herbert was severely wounded. Being captured he was sent to Johnson’s Island, Ohio, and in 1864 was exchanged for a lieutenant-colonel of a New York regiment, and within 30 days again commanded his regiment. * * * The Confederate General, Armistead. As he was being carried to the rear, he was met by Captain Bingham of General Hancock’s staff, who, getting off his horse, asked him if he could do anything for him. Armistead replied : “Take my watch, spurs and letters to General Hancock, that they might be sent to my relatives.” His wishes were complied with, General Hancock sending them to his friends. He was shot through the body and fell inside the Union lines. * * * A young Confederate officer shot by a Yan- kee cavalryman, lay dying on the field. He begged for a drink of water, and the soldier who shot him dismounted to give it to him. As he took the dying soldier’s head in his arms to raise it, he recognized the features of his own brother. * * * General Iverson of the Confederate Army, says in his official report: "The enemy ( Rob- inson’s division), charged in overwhelming force upon and captured nearly all of my three regiments that were unhurt. When I saw white handkerchiefs raised and my line of battle still lying down in position, I char- acterized the surrender as disgraceful ; but when I found afterwards that 500 of my best men were left dead and wounded in a line as straight as a dress parade, I exonerated the survivors and claim for the brigade that they nobly fought and died. * * * Massachusetts was the commonwealth that gave the impetus to the movement for monumental indications on the Gettysburg battlefield. All honor to her for it. Double honor to the regiment that out of 360 organ- izations, erected the 1st monument long be- fore the States had moved in the matter. That regiment was the 2nd Mass. Their monument was dedicated July 3rd, 1879, the first regimental monument on the grounds. Hancock and Cross. As General Cald- well’s division of the 2nd corps crossed the road north of the Wheatfield, going into action, July 2nd, General Hancock sat upon his horse looking at the troops. As Colonel Cross, of the 5th N. H. regiment, passed by, he said to him : “Cross, this is the last battle you’ll fight without a star.” Without stopping, Cross replied, “Too late, too late, General, this is my last battle.” Ten minutes later the country lost one of its best soldiers. Colonel Cross was dead, shot at the head of his brigade, leading them to the charge. * * Barksdale and Bigelow. On the evening of July 2nd, the 21st Miss, regiment of General Barksdale’s brigade, charged Bigelow’s 9th Mass, battery. As they swept forward, the battery tore them with grape and canister, but it was finally exhausted. “Shell without fuse,” shouted the brave captain, as the Confederates thronged about the muzzles of his guns. Gen- eral McLaw testified as to the admirable serv- ice of the battery. He reports that one shell killed and wounded 30 out of a company of 37. On August 29th, 1914, George W. Wood- ward, in searching plowed ground for relics of the battle, found human bones that were over- turned by a plow, with a dig iron. He later unearthed the remains of three Union sol- diers (as shown by buttons, etc.). In the shoe of one of the bodies were found, two well-preserved five dollar gold pieces, dated 1835-1844. # The bodies were reburied in the Soldiers’ National Cemetery. * * * The first Union soldier killed on the Gettys- burg battlefield was Sergt. Geo. W. Sandoe, who enlisted on the 20th of June, 1863, and was mustered into the United States service on the 23rd. in Co. B, 21st Penna. Cavalry. He was killed on the 26th, while opposing the advance of Early’s division, of the Con- federate Army. * * * James P. Ulrich, of Co. G, growled at one of his comrades for kicking his gun, while he was loading it. This his comrade denied. When Jim came to a ready, he found that the stock had been carried away by a Confederate shot. * * * 144 BLUE AND GRAY A Bullet-marked House. Confederate sharpshooters occupied a large brick house on South Washington Street, fancied security. The Union sharpshooters failed to dislodge them, when suddenly a Union shell tore through the gable end of the house, sweeping furniture and Confederates from it with more haste than grace. The house bears the marks of over 500 bullets. Similar was the experi- ence of George Little, West Middle Street, who, just rising from their supper table had it abruptly cleared for them by a Whitworth shell. * * * How the Town Escaped. Visitors express surprise when told that the town suffered but little damage from shot and shell, but this is easily accounted for. The batteries were placed on opposite hills, the town lying between, and to land shot or shell among their opponents, it was necessary to fire them not through but over the town, and it was only when they fell short that damage re- sulted. * * * The Fortunes of War. A young Wentz, whose father lived near the Peach Orchard, went south before the war. When it broke out, he donned the gray and through the irony of fate stood, during the battle with his battery in his father’s yard. * * * Wesley Culp went south, and entered the Confederate Army and with EivelVs men traversed the familiar streets of Gettysburg, calling on his sister, and promising to see them again. But he came no more, for a few hours later he was one of the hundreds of corpses in gray that lay amid the rocks on Culp’s Hill, where he once roamed and played in boyhood’s joyous hours (see page 87). There was much sickness in Gettysburg after the battle, and many of the heroines died as the result of overwork and the unsani- tary conditions. Mr. and Mrs. Culp were both ill with typhoid fever when their son’s body was brought home. * * * Sherffy House, near the Peach Orchard, was struck by over 150 minie balls, and four shells passed entirely through the building. The barn was burned by an exploding shell, and with it were consumed the bodies of many wounded of the 114th regiment Penna. Vol. Infantry, who were posted at this point and lost heavily, many of the wounded having taken refuge in the barn. * * * Where is the Battlefield? asked a new arrival, as he stood in the center square of the town and addressed a one-legged veteran, who came hobbling on his timber toe. “Right where you are, sir,” said the old soldier, saluting. “A battery of artillery was wheeled into action and down that street, a withering fire was poured on an advancing regiment of •the enemy.” * * * Colonel Jeffords, of the 4th Mich. Inf. Regiment, was killed by a Confederate bay- onet thrust while heroically holding up with his own hands the colors of his command. * * There are five lofty observation towers on the battlefield, which command a splendid birds-eye view of the scene of the great hos- tilities. They are constructed of steel, GO to 75 feet high, and the tops are reached by wide stairways. * * * The first soldier killed on the Confederate side was Henry Raison, of Co. B, 7th -Tenn. Infantry Regiment. He fell dead on the skirmish line. The company was commanded by Capt. John Allen. * * * Court House. The present court house corner Baltimore and Middle streets, was built in 1858-9, at a cost of $17,000. A shell exploded in the cupola, on the second day of the battle, while the building was filled with wounded soldiers. * * * At the foot of Christ Lutheran Church steps on Chambersburg Street, stands a me- morial tablet which marks the spot where Chaplain Howell, of the 90th Penna. regiment, was shot and instantly killed whilst ascending the steps to minister to the wants of the wounded and dying with which the church was filled. * * * Drummer Gilbert’s wife, the author’s mother, was driven from her baking-tray. So emulating in her wrath the famous Moll Pitcher, she marched to the front .and re- mained with her husband. * * * Spangler’s Spring, located within the Union lines, southeast of Culp’s Hill. During the night of the second day’s battle, the Confederate and Federal soldiers mingled freely in obtaining water for the wounded. * * * (See page G6.) During the cannonading on the afternoon of July 3, each gun was fired at least twice a minute-, and allowing 150 guns, we have 300 missiles thrown from the Confederate guns each minute ; 31,500 for the one and three- quarters hours during which the firing con- tinued. * * * Of the 27,574 muskets picked up on the battlefield of Gettysburg and turned into the Washington Arsenal, at least 2,400 were loaded, about one-half of this number con- tained two charges each ; one-quarter, three to ten charges each, and the balance, one charge each. The largest number of cart- ridges found in any one piece was 20. In some cases the paper of the cartridges was unbroken, and in others the powder was up- permost. — “Benton’s Ordnance and Gunnery, P. Hi,” It has been well said that Gettysburg was the common soldier's battle ; that its great results were due, not so much to any general- ship either in strategy or in tactics, as to the intelligent courage and the magnificent staying power of the Federal soldiers. * * THE GREAT BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR. Manassas (Bull Run), Va., July 21st, 1861. Union lost 2,552. Confederates lost 2,405, also Brigadier-General Bee and Barton, killed. Fort Donnelson, Tenn., February 14th, 1862. Union lost 1,286. Maj.-Gen. John A. Logan -wounded. Confederates lost 15,067. Shiloh (Pittsburgh Landing), Tenn., April 5th, May 3rd, 1862. Union lost 13,285. Brig. -Gen. W. T. Sherman and H. L. Wallace, wounded, and B. M. Prentiss, captured. Confederates lost 2,699. Maj.-Gen. A. S. Johnson, commander-in-ehief, and Brig. -Gen. A. H. Gladden, killed. W. S. Cheatham, C. Clark, B. R. Johnson and J. S. Bowen, wounded. Antietam, Md., September 17th, 1862. Union lost 12,469. Brigadier-General Mansfield, killed; Major-General Hooker, Richardson, Brigadier-General Rodman, Weber, Sedgwick, Hartsuff, Dana and Meagher, wounded. Confederates lost 25,899. Brigadier-General Brauch, Anderson and Stark, killed; Maj.-Gen. Anderson, Brigadier- General looms, Lawton, Ripley, Rodes, Armistead, Gregg and Ranson, wounded. Fredericksburg, Va., December 13th, 1862. Union lost 12,353. Brigadier-General Jackson and Bayard, killed; Gibbon and Vinton, wounded. Confederates lost 4,576. Brig. -Gen. T. R. R. Cobb, killed; Maxey, Gregg, wounded. Chancellorsville, Va., May lst-4th, 1863. Union lost 16,030. Major-General Berry, Brigadier-General Whipple, killed ; Devan and Kirby, wounded. Confederates lost 14,281. Lieut.-Gen. J. S. (Stonewall) Jackson, mortally wounded; Brigadier-General Paxton, killed; Maj.-Gen. A. P. Hill, Brigadier-General Hoke, Nichols, Ramseur, McGown, Heth and Pender, wounded. Siege of Vicksburg, Miss., May 18th, July 4th, 1863. Union lost 4,536. Confed- erates lost 31, 277. Chattanooga, Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, Tenn., November 23rd- 25th, 1863. Union lost 5,616. Confederates lost 8,666. Wilderness, Va., May 5th-7th, 1864. Union lost 46,337. Brigadier-General Wads- worth, Hays, killed, and Webb, wounded. Confederates lost 11,400. General Jones and Pickett, killed, and Longstreet, Pegram, Stafford, Hunter and Jennings, wounded. Spottsylvania, Va., May 8th-18th, 1864. Union lost 23,441. Major-General Sedgwick and Brigadier-General Rice, Owens and Stevenson, killed; Robertson, Bartlett, Morris and Baxter, wounded. Confederates lost 9,000. General Daniels and Perrin, killed; Hays and Walker, wounded; Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson and Brigadier-General Stewart, captured. Cold Harbor-Gaines Mills, Va., June lst-12th, 1864. Union lost 14,931. Brigadier- General Brooks and Barnes, killed; Tyler, Stannard and Johnson, wounded. Con- federates lost 17,000. Brigadier-General Doles and Keitt, killed; Kirkland, Finnegan, Law and Lane, wounded. Antietam, the bloodiest; Chancellorsville, hardest fought; Gettysburg, the greatest battles. Closing Days of the Rebellion. April 3, 1865, April 9, 1865, April 17, 1865, April 26, 1865, May 10, 1865, May 10, 1865, May 11, 1865, May 26, 1865, Fall of Richmond, Va ...with 6,000 Confederate prisoners Surrender of Lee to Grant with 26,000 Confederate prisoners Surrender of Mosby to Hancock with 1,700 Confederate prisoners Surrender of Johnson to Sherman with 29,942 Confederate prisoners Capture of Jefferson Davis, at Irvinsville, Ga., Surrender of Sam Jones to McCook with 8,000 Confederate prisoners Surrender of Jeff. Thompson to Dodge. .. .with 7,454 Confederate prisoners Surrender of Kirby Smith to Canby with 20,000 Confederate prisoners 145 IO Roster of the Armies Detailed Report of Losses in Each Army of the Battle of Gettysburg. Compiled from Official Reports. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. CAPTURED OR KILLED WOUNDED MISSING u ho bo ◄ General Headquarters — Staff. . . 2 2 4 Command of Provost-Marshal, Brig. -Gen. Marsena R. Patrick 93rd New York Infantry* 2nd Pennsylvania Cavalry.... 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry 8th U. S. Infantry* 8 companies (Detachment Regular Cavalry) 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th Oneida (N. Y.) Cavalry — Engineer Brigade, Henry W-. Benham — - 15th N. Y. (battalion)* 3 com. 50th New York* Battalion United States — — FIRST ARMY Corps Headquarters. — Staff. . . . CORPS — Reynoldsf, Doubledayt, Newton, 1 1 2 1st Maine Cavalry, Co. L 1 2 3 First Brigade, Meredithj. W. W. Robinson — Staff First Division — Wadsivorth. 1 1 19th Indiana 2 25 12 121 4 46 210 24th Michigan 8 50 13 201 3 88 363 2nd Wisconsin 1 25 11 144 5 47 233 6th Wisconsin 2 28 7 109 22 168 7th Wisconsin 21 10 95 i 51 178 Total 1st Brigade 13 149 54 670 13 254 1,153 Second Brigade, Cutler — 7th Indiana 2 5 3 10 76th New York 2 30 ie 116 70 234 84th N. Y. (14th Bklyn. Mil.) 13 6 99 99 217 95th New York 7 8 54 i 45 115 147th New York 3 40 9 125 92 269 56th Penna. (9 companies) . . . 1 13 5 55 2 54 130 Total Second Brigade. . . . 6 105 44 454 3 363 975 Total First Division 19 254 98 1,124 16 617 2,128 Staff Second Division- — Robinson. V 1 1 •Not engaged. fKilled July 1st, while in command of the left wing of the army; Major-General Doubleday commanded the corps July 1st, and Major-General Newton on July 2nd-3rd. tWounded. 146 BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 147 KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED OR MISSING Officers Enlisted Men Officers Enlisted Men Officers Enlisted Men Aggregate First Brigade, Paul,* Leonard,* Coulter * — Staff 1 1 2 1 5 16th Maine 2 7 5 54 11 153 232 13th Massachusetts 7 4 73 3 98 185 94th New York 12 6 52 8 167 245 104th New York 11 10 81 10 82 198 11th Pennsylvania 1 2 12 15 107th Pennsylvania 11 8 48 6 92 165 Total First Brigade 2 49 36 321 40 593 1,041 Second Brigade, Baxter — Staff 1 1 12th Massachusetts 2 3 7 45 3 59 119 83rd N. Y. (9th Militia) 2 4 3 15 58 82 97th New York 2 10 9 27 3 75 126 11th Pennsylvania! 5 6 44 62 117 88th Pennsylvania 3 3 51 4 45 106 90th Pennsylvania i 7 3 42 1 39 93 Total Second Brigade.... 7 32 31 224 12 338 644 Total Second Division 9 81 68 545 52 931 1,686 Third Division Staff Douhleday ,* Rowley.* 1 8 9 First Brigade, Biddle, Rowley * — Staff . . . '. 1 1 80th N. Y. (20th Militia) 3 32 15 93 i 23 170 121st Pennsylvania 12 5 101 l 60 176 142nd Pennsylvania 3 10 11 117 2 68 211 151st Pennsylvania 2 29 7 195 2 100 335 Total First Brigade 8 83 39 509 6 251 896 Second Brigade, Stone,* Wister* Dana — 143rd Pennsylvania 1 20 10 130 91 252 149th Pennsylvania 1 33 12 159 4 127 336 150th Pennsylvania 2 27 10 141 4 80 264 Total Second Brigade 4 80 32 430 8 298 852 Third Brigade, Stannard,* Randall — Staff 2 2 12th Vermont 2 2 13th Vermont io 4 99 io 123 14th Vermont i 18 1 66 21 107 15th Vermont 16th Vermont i6 5 97 i 119 Total Third Brigade l 44 12 262 32 351 Total Third Division 13 207 84 1,201 14 581 2,100 Artillery Brigade, Wainwright — - 2nd Maine Light Battery B . . . . 18 18 5th Maine Light Battery E. . . . 3 2 11 7 23 1st New York Light Battery L 1 1 14 1 17 1st N. Y. H’y Artillery attached 1st Penna. Light Battery B... 2 i 8 ii 4th U. S. Battery B 2 2 29 3 36 Total Artillery Brigade. . 8 6 80 11 105 Total First Army Corps. . 42 551 257 2,952 82 2,140 6,024 ‘Wounded. •{Transferred on afternoon of July 1st, from 2nd to 1st Brigade; other losses reported In latter brigade. 148 BLUE AND GRAY KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED OR MISSING to Fh X} Q) to Fh o CO G C ® o hS CAPTURED OR MISSING CO O s Artillery Brigade, Osborn — Staff otaii 1st New York Light Battery I ' 3 "2 8 13 New York Light 13th Battery 8 3 11 1st Ohio Light Battery I 13 13 1st Ohio Light Battery K 2 i 10 2 15 4th United States Battery G. . . . i 1 11 4 17 Total Artillery Brigade. . . . 1 6 3 50 9 69 Total Eleventh Army Corps 33 335 120 1,802 62 1,449 3,801 TWELFTH ARMY CORPS— Slocum, Williams. Staff General Headquarters — 10th Maine (Battalion) 4 com.. — First Division — Williams, Ruger. Staff .... First Brigade — McDougall - — • Staff 5th Connecticut 20th Connecticut 5 22 i 28 3rd Maryland i 1 6 8 123rd New York 3 1 9 i 14 145th New York 1 1 8 10 46th Pennsylvania 2 1 9 i 13 Total First Brigade l 11 4 56 1 7 80 Second Brigade, Lockwood * — Staff 1st Md. Potomac Home Brigade 3 20 3 77 i 104 1st Maryland Eastern Shore. . . 5 18 2 25 150th New York 7 23 15 45 Total Second Brigade 3 32 3 118 18 174 Third Brigade, Ruger, Colgrove Staff 27th Indiana 23 8 78 i iio 2nd Massachusetts 2 21 8 101 4 136 13th New Jersey 1 3 17 21 107th New York 2 2 3rd Wisconsin 2 i 7 10 Total Third Brigade 2 47 20 205 5 279 Total First Division G 90 27 379 1 30 533 Second Division — Geary. Staff First Brigade, Candy — Staff 5th Ohio i i i 1.5 is 7th Ohio 1 17 18 29th Ohio 2 5 31 38 66th Ohio 3 14 17 28th Pennsylvania 3 1 20 3 27 147th Penna. (8 companies).. i 4 15 20 Total First Brigade 4 14 5 112 3 138 Second Brigade, Cobham, Kane — Staff 29th Pennsylvania 2 ii 43 8 66 109th Pennsylvania 3 6 1 10 111th Pennsylvania 5 i 16 22 Total Second Brigade .... 2 21 1 65 9 98 •Unassigned during progress brigade. of the battle ; afterwards attached to 1st division as 2nd 156 BLUE AND GRAY KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED OR MISSING Officers Enlisted Men Officers Enlisted Men ra u Q) o G o 0 0) S Aggregate Third Brigade, Greene — Staff 60th New York 11 2 39 52 78th New York 6 1 20 i 2 30 102nd New York 2 2 1 16 8 29 137th New York 4 36 3 84 10 137 149th New York 6 3 43 3 55 Total Third Brigade 6 61 10 202 l 23 303 Total Second Division 12 96 16 379 l 35 539 Artillery Brigade, Muhlenberg — Staff 1st New York Light Battery M Penna. Light Battery E 3 3 4th U. S. Battery P 1 1 5th U. S. Battery K 5 5 Total Artillery Brigade. . . . 9 9 Total Twelfth Army Corps 18 186 43 767 2 65 1,081 CALVARY Staff CORPS— -Pleasanton. Staff First Division — Buford. First Brigade, Gamble - — Staff 8th Illinois 1 i 4 1 7 12th Illinois (4 companies)... 4 3 7 6 20 3rd Indiana (6 companies) .... i 5 1 20 5 32 8th New York 2 1 21 16 40 Total First Brigade 1 12 6 52 28 99 Second Brigade, Devin — Staff 6th New York i 8 9 9th New York 2 2 7 11 17th Pennsylvania 4 4 3rd West Virginia (2 com.) . . 4 4 Total Second Brigade 2 3 23 28 Reserve Brigade, Merritt — Staff 6th Pennsylvania 3 7 2 12 1st United States 1 9 5 15 2nd United States 3 i 6 i 6 17 5th United States 4 1 5 6th United States 6 5 23 5 203 242 Total Reserve Brigade .... 13 6 49 6 217 291 Total First Division 1 27 12 104 6 268 418 Second Division — McM. Gregg. Staff Headquarters Guards — 1st Ohio (Co. A) First Brigade, McIntosh — Staff 1st Maryland (11 companies) . . 2 i 3 1st New Jersey 7 7 1st Massachusetts* 1st Pennsylvania 2 2 3rd Pennsylvania ' 5 io 6 21 Purnell (Maryland) Leg., Co. A Total First Brigade 5 19 9 33 ♦Served with 6th Corps. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 157 KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED OR MISSING Officers Enlisted Men Officers Enlisted Men Officers Men Aggregate Second Brigade, Huey * — Staff 2nd New York 4th New York 6th Ohio (10 companies) 8th Pennsylvania Total Second Brigade. . . . Third Brigade, J. I. Gregg — Staff 1st Maine (10 companies).... i 4 5 10th New York 2 4 i 2 9 4th Pennsylvania! 16th Pennsylvania , s , . . A i 6 Total Third Brigade 5 12 1 2 20 Total Second Division 5 5 31 1 11 53 Staff Third Division — Kilpatrick. Headquarters Guards — 1st Ohio (Co. C) First Brigade, Farnsworth, X Richmond — Staff 1 1 5th New York 1 i 4 6 18th Pennsylvania 2 4 8 14 1st Vermont 13 3 22 27 65 1st West Virginia (10 com.) . . 2 2 3 1 i 3 12 Total First Brigade 3 18 6 28 i 42 98 Second Brigade, Custer — Staff 1st Michigan 10 6 37 20 73 5th Michigan i 7 1 29 18 36 6th Michigan 1 2 24 1 28 7th Michigan (10 companies) 13 4 44 49 100 Total Second Brigade.... l 31 13 134 78 257 Total Third Division 4 49 19 162 i 120 355 3rd Penna. Heavy Artillery, Section Battery H (serving as light artillery with 1st Brig.). First Brigade, Robertson — 9th Michigan Battery Horse Artillery. 1 4 5 6th New York Battery 1 1 2nd U. S. Batteries B, L 2nd U. S. Battery M i i 4th U. S. Battery E i 1 Total First Brigade 2 1 5 8 Second Brigade, Tidball — 1st U. S. Battery K 2 1 3 2nd U. S. Battery A 12 12 1st U. S. Batteries E, G* . . . . 3rd U. S. Battery C* Total Second Brigade. . . . 2 13 15 Total Cavalry Corps 5 85 37 315 8 399 849 At Westminster, not engaged in the battle. fOn detached duty. tKilled. 158 BLUE AND GBAY KILLED WOUNDED CAPTURED OR MISSING O "5 w u to OT (h