■"4- r- ^ - • "^'^ \ ^ DUK£ UTOPIA » - Digitized by tine Internet Archive in 2010 with funding from Duke University Libraries http://www.archive.org/details/politickdiscoursOOparu I m/Tcn.:(A)o: L ary-^o ccrao t Politick DISCOURSES; Written in ITALIA:]^ B y PAOLO PARUTA A Noble Venetian, Cavalier and Procurator ■'^-~~-^~~— — Tin- mii-i Whereunto is adde^J, A fliort S O L r L O Q U Y,' In which the A u t h o r biicfly examines the whole Courfe of his Life* r-JT^ti Rendred into E:^GLIS H By the Right Honorable, HENRY LOtiDON^ Printed for H. Meftlej/y and arc to be fold at the Trincis Arms in S^F/ Carthage was the rife of the mine of the Roman Kepteblici^. 4$ VIII. Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death ofJuVimCxCiT asjhe had formerly done^by driving the T ^rquim firjl mty and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri. 50 IX. Which isthefafer way to be ta^en, to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth ; that which was held by Cato, or that which was purfued by Caefar, $ 5 X, To what Age of the City o/Rome the grtatefi praife and merit k to be gtveuy fof the profperity and greatnefs whereto /he arrived. 5 9 XI. How the Roman Empire^ though it fell oftentimes into tU hands of bafe and wicked men, was notwithfiandiag able to maintain itfeif in the Reign of many Emperors, and how it came to be finally de- fir ojed. ^7 Why The Contents of the Difcourfes' XII. my the Common^ialth of Rome, though p^e frfferedmany Defeat! in divers Battels, y^t did fitU froi;e 'viSioriOjiS at lafi . 78 XIIL Whither the City of Rome could have maintain d herfelf hnger in the glory and tnajeBy of her Command, if /he had preferred her Li- hrty, and Form of Commonwealth, then fie did under the Go'vern- ment of Emperor/* o^ XIV. fVhy the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion, as dtd the Romans j and how Greece came to lofe her liberty. ^ 2 XV. fVhether Oftracifm nfed by the A ihcnians,^^ ajufi thing, cr no j a,^d ■ whether it be ufefulfor the frefervation of a Commoanealth. 1 04 The Second BOOK, Discourse L- Wf^y »^* Commonwealth of Venice h»th not fo far enlarged her Precin^s^ as did the Roman Commonwealth, 1 1 1 II. Whether or no the Commenwealth »/ Venice be to be blamed for having takfn upon her the defence of the City */Pifa, tPhen tt was oppuaned ^jr lib* Florentines, \ III. that the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate f^c cejfes of War, after the routing of the Venetian Army in the atUoti of Giaradada. ^ j (ba) Wbethir The Contents of the Difcourfes. IV. whether the Prinecs 0/ Italy dtdwell^orno, to ajfault the Army of Charls the Eight, King o/France, tvhen after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples, he haUed topafs cz/er the Mountains. 140 V. Whether or no the Forces of Leagues befit for great Enterprifes. 146 V I. Why modern Princes have not dom anions equal tothofs which rrere done by the Antients. i 5 6 VI J. What the caufe is xphy Italy hath enjoyed fo long pence and quiet in thefe latter times, 564 VIII. Whether Citadels and Strong-holds ^much ufedby our modern Princes^ be commodious y and of true fafety to a State^ or w. 1 5$ IX. Whether the OpiniokofPope Leo the tenth were good^ or no^ and his counfel fafcy of driving Foreign Nations out Of Italy by the help of other Tranfalpine Forces, 179 IVhether the Counfel tah^u by the Ewperdr Charls the Fifth, and by his Commanders, of not parting from the walls of Vienna, wheu Soly man was come with very great firength from Conftancinople to ajfault it^ deferve praifsy or blame. i ^ 5 A A TABLE \)f all the more notable Things contained in the prelent Politick Difcouries. Drian the Emperor, why he refolved to go on progrefs overall his States, and to vific every part thereof Pag. ji-pi. Where he fet the bounds of his Empire ibid. i^geftUtis^ though he were King in Sparta, was obedient to the Lap?s of the Country 48 AkibUdes^ by too much defire of glory, ruined his Country — 10. Had higher thoughts then the reft of the Greek Commanders — 95 AUxinder the Great, the greatncfs of his enterprifes — 19. His Militia — 20-83 An Indian Gymnofophift {hews him how in a large Kingdom infurreftions fall out — 71. How far he extended his Empire, and in how little time 157 and how — -159. His artifices, and laudable way, for opening the way more cafily tohis gieatatchisveinents, and greater glory — 162 \^mbiticn precipitated Rome into very grievous diforders — 1 5-1 6-51. When difcovcred, makes men diftaftefull — 58. It, and Fear raife in Princes minds a defire of innovation — 164. The important mifchief of it, if once gotten iaro mens hearts - 1 c6. How it is to be cured in States- men —ibid. An Arm-^ keeping the field, how greatly beneficial — 169 Arviits, maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts, taken only out of Italy 64 >4rr/i^^w/d» Kings of Naples, what they did for fearofthe French forces — 138 Artillery^ op what ufe in war - 1 5o. That in their ftcad the Antients had mi- raculous Engines, C2\\ed Tormcitta 173 Affaalting tre Enemy in his own State, how advantagious 54 Attalaricus King of the Goths dcfcends into Italy — 76. is afterwards emertain'd for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid. Jttila content to lofe the day, Co the Roman Commander might be flaio irt£he battel — 8^ i^thens^ why fhe foon loft her liberty 5- 1 J.-54 Athenians A Table of the principal Matters, i^tkcnuns of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and fivnur'd — ihid. Too h;ird for the reft in Sea-forces — ibid. Hinder'd by the Spart?ns fiom takir.g in Sicily, and from aflaulting Perfia 95. Why ihey could not enlarge tl.eir Dominion — 98 c^ NgujUts Cefar^ in many places enlarged the Empire — 68. Remained fole Lord of the whole World — 71. Reduced it all to Peace, though he was troubled with fome Infurredions — 72. See OfUvianus. BAttails^ fubje(5t to divers unexpefted accidents 3 1 When they are to be adventured upon 192 Brutus, Junius Br. how he ftirr'd up the people to Liberty — 51. Whyhecoit- demned his own fons to death — 52 Brutus^ Marcus Br. why he could not preferve the liberty of Rome, recover'd by Cxfais death — 51. That he endeavored it when 'cwas too late — 53 C- . CArthaginians, why they came to aid the Romans againft Pyrrhus 25 For a long time friends to tlie Romans — ibid. Should rather have been' afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were ftronger at Sea tlicn- thcy 36. Often fubdued 45 Qato A/4J or, caufing figs to be brought irom Carthage Into the Scnate-houfe, gives counfel that that City (hould be deftroyed — 45. How fuch counfel n.ighc be ufcful 49 CatoUticenfis^ what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and' the People — 55. Did many times prevail againft CcEfar — ibid. Founded his greatnefs upon nobler courfes — 57.- What demonftrations he received from the People of their Angular favour 10 him — 58, Becaufe his manners were not fuitable to the form of that Republick, he could not hold out hi^ repu- tation among them to the utmoft — 59 Charts the Great, having freed Italy from the flavery of the Northern Barbarians, made his fon Pipin King of Italy — 183 Charh the Eighth, King of France, his paffage into Italy for the conqueft of, . Naples 140. At his return afTaalted by the Italian Princes •, and whether they were well advis'd in it, difcourfed upon at large — ibid. Chirls the Fifth,Empcror, compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with Francis the F.rft, King of France, and his famous expeditions -—157. Why his enterprifes againft the Kingdom of France proved vairi — 158. Why he fhunn'd hazarding a fet battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fellto him — 165. Whether he was wtU advifcd in not parting from before the walls - of Vitona, when Solyman was com^ to aflauU it — 185 A city well ordered, how it (hould be qualified 1 o. For preferving of unity among the Citizens, whether tl>e courfes which Caefar took, or thofe ufcd by Cato, were more available 56. When it is grown to a great height, 'tis a hard matter to order it aright — 14. That which afpires to a large Dominion, ^uft have two t4ngs- 1:11. What is moft neccfTary for its long con;ifiu- nnce, efpeoally fuch a one as is caftinto iheform of a Republick — IC4. Of how great importance the fituatioH is -^;;^ 114 Citi:{ff! A Table of the phnctpal Matters] Ciiiz e;7s of (ingulnr quality barifli'd from Athens for ten years — — 5—^104 To make them vcrtuous, three things necelTary — 7. By what means they may acquire grcatnefs — 55. That quietncfs and concord between them is ot main importaiict: for the felicity of the State, and how it may be pr.fervcd ti>:ii. ^ — izi A Citi'i^en very potent, how to be correded , that he diftuib not the common Quiet 9) Cleomines King of Sparta, accounted the riches of the Perfians not worth the trouble they would (bnd his SolJicry 98 Cdories^ when firft ufed by the Rorvans, and how beneficial to them — 63 ^ i'j% Of the Venetians why k x inco C^indy — ihid. Co^fijtntine the Great divided the Empire betvVeen his three Sons 67. Why he transferred the Empire to Coniiantinople — 71 Ce»jiantine fon to the above-na 1 ed, wh it part of the Empire fell to his fhare — 6j Confaho Ferranie^ why kept under by Kin^; Ferdinand 106 Confuls^ of what autho' ity m Rome — 2-4-5 Cliff 0ms ^ bow profi:a'oIe good ones are to Cities 10 DAlmatiins^ with much difficulty fubdued by the Vencfans 1 ij> Decemvirate, held the formof aRepublick 50. Why Rome was able ;(J free herfclf from ics tyra:.ni-: — 51. Why driven ou' from thence — 52 Decit*s Emperor of Conita, t noplc, routed by che Guths, fl.cth, aad is drown 'd in a Fen 75 Difcerds fprung up in Rome from W -r, not from Peace — 4S jDi£f'itor, upon what occafi'tns chokn by ile Romans 12. Cf what relief to Rome, and who was the ftr^l — 62. Efteeraed nccefTury in times of gre?c danger, and what his dignity was — S6 £. EDucation good , hoV ufcful to a City or State 9 ilefhants iipployed by Pyrrhus in h,s wjrs againft the Romans — 26 ijf/petdrs of Rome, favour'd, alTifled, and maintained by the Soldiers and »he People 69-72-73. Thirty at one time rdTum'd th.it title 70, Why fome were chofen to bi their Companions in their lives, and theii SucoefTors after their deaths 72. Whf n thofe of Csefars r ice ended ihid. Which wcit fliin by the Soldiers, ford, fi ing to reduce them to good difciplne ^75 Etnpire of the Romans, when ir began ~ (: 8. WiH n it be^ati to decline 59 The caufes of its declination and ruine — 7 1 . Wher^ i, was void of worthy men and Valiant Commanders— - 8.. became tributary to the Go- hs—— -76 iqualitj or parity of goods, why obferved in Sparta 3, Of all the Citizens in povcrnment, is not good — 6. What equality is convenient toraCommoa- V. eaUh, that it may bfl long — — 104. Event, the furefl way to know what is likely to follow 1 9. That War is far more f bjedl to divers uncxpcdcd even'.s, then any other adt ons of ours 31 That it is the mnftcr of Fools 38. Not the event of things, but tl^e advice wherewith they were done, makes them either praife-wcrihy,orb]ame3ble--i 51 Fihim A Table of the principal Matters', F. I;j Ahitu Mixinttn^ his aftion and worth ap, &c. DderveJ to be praifed noc . only for prudence, but for Courage 3 1 . \ eared by Hannibal ibid, overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror <*/'^. Why he took a contrary coDrfe tothat of Scipio's- 23 Fame and Reputation, of great importance in all our aL^tions, but efpeciilly in War 85 /■^r^/wrfW King, brother to Ch^.rls the Fifth, why it would have been far better for him quietly to have fuffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour, then to pull upon hiaifelf the Turks forces 196 Ferdt/tand Kins. oF Spain, why he kept under Confalvo 106. Not juft in his league with the Venetians — — 152 Florence., why (h;: could not keep herfelf in a frm ftate of Government free from civil difientions^ 54 The Florentines fuccoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies, hindrcd the Venetians in thofe enteipnfcs 124, Not wd! thought of, and ' in Jeed hated by the Italian Princes, tor the correfpondLnce which they held with the French — 1 28. How their Fortrefles put them to much trouble ^nd da- mage, whrnthty were fc fed upon by the i rench brought in by their King Charls the Eighth 171 Forts or Furtreffes, ot how great furtherance to a State 148, 1 he doubts for which it may feem they are not available -168. Other more certain, and no left grievous 171. Why called ;' cefp delU Tofcarta. ihid. Argu- ments and reafons to demonftrate the great benefit of Forts- i ; a. How to be rightly ciifpofed and regulated 176. The defence and praife of rearing Forts ihid. The doubts and arguments againft them refolved ibid. Fortune^ wFat is to be underftood by that name - — 18 The Fortune of the Romans overborn by H.mnibal^ 41 . Why (he eafily rofe np agair, changing for the better 45. When flie proved crofs, they ftiU kept the fame minJs — 48 Fortune very crofs to the Venetians — ic6 France^ the Romans put fore to it ere they could take ic in 48. Whence the late troubles and dit'cords arofe 106 The French oftentimes alTaulted Rome 6i-6^. How timorous they fhewed themfelve; when the wars in Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have not been able to make great atchievcments in Italy, nor to ftay long there — 1 66 FfAttcefco Fofcari Duke of Venice, faid. That the Republick could not much in- creafe in power, iinlefs fhe made fome enterprifes by Land 1 1 5 FrAncU the Firft, King of France, how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes - — 152. For endowments of the mind, and other qUvilines, moil emi- nent ibid. Though his fortune gave wry to that of Chails the Fiftb,whoni yet he put to much trouble 157. ^ hy hi*; furious endeavor to a{l;ai;t Spain prov'd bootlcfs 159. and as much in vain his entcrprifes in Italy -161 q, GEnoefes conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at firft they entrcd into competition, and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians ^118 . . The A Table of the principal Matters* The Geths^ famous for the deftru6lion of the Empire,and of many Provinces — 76 Their original, and why they fell down into Italy- — ibid. Other anions of theirs under divers Conoraandcrs 77. They alfo took pay under the Em- perors ibid. Ccvernment, how the quality of every one may be known — 1-2 . What the right Form of it is — ibid. What it was in Rome — 2. What in Sparta — j^ii(i. Why after the death of Alexander, flie could not recover her liberty ico.- For the fame reafons, having afterwards the Empire of Conftantinople, (he could not preferve herfelf in that dignity — 10 ? How highly her Soldiers were efteemed by Philip of Macecfon, and Alexander theGwai — itiJ St 104 Guide Ui>ebh Duke of Urbio^ ttIj/ he would allow of no Fort^ in his Domini- HARnii>dl, apon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 3.4 What reafons fhould have removed him from that rcfolutioa — 3 j ,7 Honaritts the Emperor, his cowardifc and fimple faying — 77 Vttngarj., whence fo called 77. The occafion of the Wars for her, between the Hoofe of Auftria and the Turks 1^5 174/7, how much fhe abounded in Soldiers 84, The Romans meerly out of their own Citizens, and of their other Territories in Italy, were furnilb'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 6i. Was long obe- dient to the Wcftetn Emperors ; yet withdrew herfelf from under their com- mand, and fubraitted to Lords of her own 1 84 Italy , through her own Princes fault , at prefent , under the Command of Strangers — 140. Her late Quietnefe and Peace, and from what caufes — i ^4 When it began ——1^5. How it may be continued 167. Before the times of Pope Leo the Tenth, io great mifery fof thirty years -^^182 (c) ItiUin A Table of the princtpal Matters, lulhn Princes, whether they were well advifcd in fetting upon Cbarls ihc Eight King of France, at his depaiting out of Italy 140 ^u^tirth with a bitter faying , taxed the extreme gripplcnefs and avarice of the Romans- 13 ^mHw Csfar, what fierce people he conquer 'd in France- pi. Why it wai difficult and troubicfome for him to tame them- 159. He would always charge his Enemy firft 187 jf^Ugdem large and ample, why apt and fubjeft to infurreftions-T^-'^a LAtPs, what benefit they bring -^ I7. They ought to be confirmed by good Cuftoms 1 1 . Their aim ought to be, to take away the abufc of things, not the things themfeWes to9 LeagHts ( or Confederacies ) why they are made, their f«rrp and power 14^ Made by the Chriftians againft the Infidels — -147-151-155-191. Which arethefirmcft 147. Thedefefts whichthcymay, and ufc to have— 148 For what caufes they are made 1 54- How and when men may with reafon exped benefit by them — 1 54. Why they arc no better efteemed — ibid. That famous one of Cambray againft the Venetians, why made, how foon diflblved, and how unjuft it was — 154-^55 Leontdoi, his famous viftory againft the Perfians 98 Lcrpts the Twelfth, King of France, his nature and qualities of mindc 135 Why he confpircd againft the Venetians j and how injurioufly- 13a • 135 ledoffilsk sfor:^ Duke of Milaln , how fearful he (hewed himfelf upon the League between the French and the Veoccians^ 1 3 j^. He calls Charls the Eight King of France into Italy, and then to liis own great damage repents himfelf of it 140 Lycurgut, why his Laws proved good — 11. Had many means to help him in the fctiing of his Laws • 1 2 . Ordered his Republick fo, that it ihouki noc much incteafe its Dominions — — 47 M Agifiracia, the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 1 . They ought to be of limited authority, and for a ftiort time- 5 ^alu^ i?by it prefcrvcd it fclf againft ihe affauhs of Solyman — 175 Mtrim, M A Table of tbs principal Matters, MAriits^ by what ways he began his grcatnefs - — 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth — 10-47. His difcreec carriage in the (nter- prifc againfl the Cimbri, which were Come down into Italy — 194 Medici^ how that Family got the fuperiority in Florence, and kept it — 105 The (jW/V/VMofthe Greeks or Maccdonians,what it was 21. Of the Cartla- ginians, mercenary and incommodious — 39. Of the Romans, proved very profitable to the Commonwealth, by being in the hands of many — ibid. Well undci flood and pradtifcd by the Romans 58-49-61-80. Afterward grew corrupted and abjed: — df-73-74-75. Of the Turks, how numerous, well order'd, and in continual Pay — 186 195-1^5-196, Of the Chriilians, much inferior to that of the Turks — 186, Naval, cannot of it fdf much en- large the Dominion of a State • — 113. The Forces thereof are increafed and maintained by t hofe of the Land 114 H.' NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choife of our a(5Hons — 5 8 Hicelo Ory»»tf, Count of Pitioliano, like Fabius Maximus,3nd not like h.m-- 1 3 5 NobUs, why at firft of httle authority in Rome ^. Oppofing the Commu- nally, and hated by ir — 4. Authors of the deflruftion of Tyrannies 1 2 ■ 0. ctAvmm^ why eafily entertained by the Army after Caffars^death — 52 o PEace, how it remains of it felf, being brought into States — 1 64. How , in thefe lafl times it is eftabliihed in the minds of the Italian Potentates — i^s How Peace,. Concord , and Unity amongft Citizens ought to be preferved by :, Laws lai Flutarch, prefers Lycurgus before Numa 1 1 ppmpej , fet up by the Senate to take down Csefar 47. His triumpi- s — il>>J. After the war with Mithridates, quitted the Army 'j i. Subdued for the Romans above eight hundred Cities — 65. The laudable way and :irt by which he brought people to obey the Romans, and facilitated his enterprifes — 163 Tfie People of Rome, of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How fronn the beginning it was of great power, and increafed it more and more — 1 5 Loving liberty, howitametolofeit- — 51. Sought by fedinons to obrain from the Senate all things, though never fo unjuft 52 The People i That to curb it. Seventy prevails more then Meeknefs — 16. Thit out of its natural ficklencfs, it ufeth to favour a Forein Frince, and by feditions and violent attempts to plot againfl the prcfent Power — J70 (C3) A A Table of the princtp^il Matters, A Prirjce fhall do well and wifely to have a care, that no Subje<5l: of his grow to be Curpeifted for his grcatnefs^ io6. Muft not for his own relief make ufc of Forein aids, that he may be too ftrong for his Native forces 103 Princes^ what fort of Militia it is bell tor them to make ufc of in their expediti- ons, and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of War, and the choice of Commanders 145. Thofo of Italy have ufcd to imploy foreign Commanders , and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122 See mdre in States. REfublicks , how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known -- 18. How at laft they grow to be Ty- rannies 54. That a State deferves not the name of a Com n:ion wealth or Republick, where the Decrees of the People, and not the Laws, carry all the command — 6. For the long prefervation and quietnefs of them, nothing more ncccflary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Do- minion- 112 iJ<7w^, was a mixt, but imperfcft Commonwealth, and why 5-11. Was too Popular 3. Why it could not free it (elf from many diforders 14 How long it held its greatnff<:^ 68. When, and how (he might have freed hei felf from her many bad qualities and defers ihid. How (he abounded in Soldiers and Commanders 39-6^ 7V-So. How (be made way for Monarchy 39. She fcatter'd her corruptions amongft the Nobks and the Communalty — 50. That, thofe Citizens proved worfl cppreflbrs to her, whom for the meet confervation of her Liberty (lie had too much txjlred -51 Her firfl, fecond, and third Age 59. Her fiifl feven Kings, of wiiat con- fid erable benefit they were to her 60. At what time (he dcferved the praife of good Government 61 J^omans, why they rcfufed the Carthaginians aid againft Pyrrhus 26. Refnred to have peace with Pyrrhus — ^ — ibid. For what caufcs chiefly they had the better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not fo much prefenc dancers as future^ 45. Out of one War they ftill framed another 46 Why they were invincible,according t> Polybius 78. The two pretences under which they made their moft notorious acquifitions i^i. How by Colonies they kept their new Subje<3s in loyalty and obedience -173 Mcmuluj, a man tierce, ambitious, and defirous to enlarge his Efface, traia'd up the People according to his genius -113 s. SCipio Jlfricanui^ his worth and aflions -29-53. W^V ^* 5°°^ ^ com(z differing from that of Fabius 33. His palTage into Sicily, of what benefit it was - — -35 Scifio Nafica^ when Carthage was taken, difTwaded the Senate from deftroying that City 46. Whether that counfcl of his were founded upon good reafon il>iJ. • n- 1 The Senate of Rome, what number itconfifted of,and when firft inftitutea -id. Its authority 4. The generous anfwer the gave to the Ambafladors of Pyrrhus 25-857. Little cfteemed of by Julius C^far 4^' Snbjea to corruptions 50. . Severitj A Table of the principal Matters > Severity, in what fort of Commonwealth it doth good — 57. Was very oreac in Cato — fbid- Sylia^ brought into Rome licentious living — 51. Increnfed the Order of the Senators, to counterpoifethe Communalty, Gave honors and riches to [.is Favorites ibid. Solda/i of Cairc, how and why he loft all his Kingdom in a fhort time 160 Solymdn parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mmd and fortu'.e 157. His great atchievements — 158. Why he made no great pro- grefs in Hungary — 159. nor at Corfu againft the Venetians — ibid. Why he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four Empires, and eighteen Kingdoms 1$6 Sparta^ a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11 That authority which the Kings had there, not prejudicial to it — 48. Miny worthy men flouriflied in it, by reafon of the form of its government 58 For want of money, could not enlarge her Empire — 82 Spartans ^ when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people fol- lowed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the reft in Land forces — ibi-^. Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls — 171 Sutes^ whence iheir divers changes come — 53. How men grow defirous of their change — 72. Are augmented and preferved by the fame things which gave them their beginning, and corrupted by the contrary 73- W^ere they have been ruin'd by inteftine difcords, the over-great height of fome of their own hath been the caufe — 105. That tney have their beginning, increafe, ftay, declination, and ruine 8(< Siilicfiy a Barbarian, and by nation a Hun, called to the command of the Romaa Army, betrays the Empire 89 T. TBebans much efteemed of for the difciplinc of their Soldiers, called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, famous Commanders of theirs ibid. thtmiflecles^ what bts-advice was, and his Naval viftory againft the Perfians — 99 Tiberius Gracebuf flain by the Nobles of Rome, without any revenge from the People^ 17 Jribunefhip in Rome, of ho\v great power, and its infolence 6. Called Sacre- fan^tts ^52 Triumph in Rome, whf n firft inftituted, and to whom firft granted — 6i Turks^ their afliftance refufed by the Venetians, and yet fucd for by other Chriftian Princes 136. Why they cannot fo fuddenly nor cafily do any lignal enre> priles by Land- ^161 . Are accuftomed, for their own fecurity, to deftroy the inhabitants of fuch places as they take in, efpecially thofe of the better and licher fort 172; Their chiefcft flrengthconfifts in their Cavairy 187 Their Law promifeth everlafting reward in heaven, to every one that lofcth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194 F. Valerius Publicola^why in reforming the government of Rome, he yielded mmy things to the People -14-1). That he might haveorder'd the City better — ibid. fcniit A Table of the principal Matters, Venice^ in time brought her Government to perfedion — 12. How flie hath been able to prcftrve her Liberty thus long 54. What ber Government is — ibid. When it began - 77-116. Her Foundcis lovers of Peace, anj of an intent and end differing tiom that of the Founders ot Rome ibid. Her greateft and moft difficult iitempts have betn eitha in their own Defence, or for Religion, or in Affiffance of others — iij. What wars and efforts of fierce Nations flic at her firft beginning underwent 117. Why flie made ufe of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders— — 121. That for having ac- cuftom'.d to imploy Foreign Commanders, fliehath not been able (by reafoi of thtir difloyalty ) to profccute fuch Enterpnfes of hers as had been well begun — ibid. Venetians^ whatcourfc they took to free ihemfelves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces — 43. That thepradice of MerthandilinL^ is not to be blamed in them — \i6. Some of their illuitrious and famous Princes — tiid. ■ What title their Dukes afTumed for the taking in of Conftantinople 118 How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been — ibid. That, had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders, the State of Milan had been theirs 121. Their weighty and glorious enterprifes by Sea and Land againft the Saracens , for the Emperors of Conftantinople , and againft the Genocfcs 1 29. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy — 1 50 . Why almoft all Chriftian Princes entred into a League againft them - 1 3 2- 1 80 How difcreetly they have continued Neutrals in the difcords of Princes, that thereupon Peace might follow in vbcfe latter tinKS — 167, Why they ftnt into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry — 171 yertutj what two vertucs are necefl'ary for him that propofcth great matters to him- felf, and afpireth after glory — 88 Vcmtusy To make men vertuous, three things are needful 1 1 W, WARi brought home to the Enemies own doors, how advantagious — aS When it ought to be carded on with protra(5ling of time — 31. War, and not Peace, was the caufe of Romes rume — 4/1. It is fubjed to divers fucceffes and chances, more then any other aftion of ours— 31-183-185 }V4rs^ made by the Romans after the fubduing of Carthage — 748. Made and maintained by them in many places at once 65. Particulars moft necefTary for them — -149. The manner of Wars now ufed , is the chiefeft caulc why the enterprifes of modem Princes prove not equal to thofe ot the Anti- cnts 148 7 he end ofthefecond Table* siieEiii^iisii ERRATA. ft- h* A 4-4t /a.^C"*' reid««//< f-7 Iwlc mt. 8—17 FsrlicnicrreadtKntiOii/iie'//. 10-27 For r. 48 Dele mere. t9'l9 for of lead ^m4, fuf «ni rcsd «/. «f-)8 DelcraZ/i ad-a/t. After tittDence luCut ii. li-26 After figbtinitttdtbi;, 57 -4 J Alter tkefiimfeTt raker. 38.14 Afrert/lafertf/itAif. 3f* Before the ■■(crc (0.. 43.fffl. After 01 infert i/. S }-> 2 After muck iafert iA( /^r. (J-31 Alrera«ria(erc«n/> tf 0-3 After on infert onfy 7J-I7 Dcle4nd(chefir(l.) 74-27 Before C8f*/ infert £r«tw/oro/rif /6;if. 3 1 For Commander t read Soldier 1. Si,— $0 ¥or Rkodefinf reii RhodtniM. 89— }o fotSMieri reidCommtndert. ii2-;o for vf here retd were, xiS-48 De\e then by. iitf-20 For 4 te*Atbe. I »4-7 For them into his^reti him into their 1 1^-)4 Afcer mens inferc thtutbtt. i)io5 Before Fete, inferc vntbPriiKi$ King offnacei l$7-5 After J/ iafert wf- I $8-4 S For fidly read ffl/f//. i{9-a6 For Ccriit read C«r/i. ibii.i9 For Cor/ee reid Cor/i 17^.47 After tbereoj Infert rt«re. 1 99>2 Before not infert it. fbid. 3 Dele tr. 10] -19 Deltftr. J EiiiMi *itti Jiiu* .— .. *-fe. He who would diligently confider all the parts of the Republick, will find not only fo much diver (ity, but even contrariety in them, as he will not be able cafily to rcfolwe which was her propercll Form of Government : For if refpeft be had to the great Authority of Confuls, cfpecialjy in Armies, we may, not without reafon, believe, that that City under the name of a Commonwealth, was governed with Laws befitang a Kingdom -, (ince that Form of Magiftracie did ufe fuch Authority in managing of Arms, in concluding Peace, and in agreeing differe;nces between potent Kings, as one onelv Prince could hardly have treated of thofe things with more abfolute power : differing from Monarchy only in this, that they kept this Authority but for a (hort time, and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the People. But he who t\'ill confider what a (hare of the trjoft important refolutions of the Commonwealth the Senate bad, as that which governed tf,e publickTreafury, the chief foundation of a State, and to which the priviledg did belong firft to treat of, and then to refolve of fuch things as were to be propounded to the people, will be of opinion, that fuch a Commonwealth did lean more to- wards Ariftocracie, then any other Government. Yet paffing on to further Coiv- fiderations, 2nd finding the Authority of Confuls, Senate and Tribunes to be fo often baffled and nullified, and the Supreme Magiftracies oftentimes contaoiinated by the meannefs of popular men who have had the cxercife thereof, will vote other- wife, and think the Government to have been meerly Popular. Wherefore Poly- bitu being willing, in the fixth Book of his Hiftories, to affign fome certain Form of Government to the City of /f (7W(r,would not reftrain it under any one particular Foim, but called it amixt Republick, as was that of Sparta. Which opinion is fithence followed by fome modern Writers, who treating of the differing Forms of Commonwealths, and particularly of that of /?fl«»f, do pundually agree with foly- htHs. And certainly they were thus far all in the righr, to wit, That the divers manners of Rule by which that City was governed, could not be exprefTcd by any one name. For what gives the true Form to a City, but the communication of Gcvernment * which as it is participated by Citizens, makes fuch alteration or mutation in a State, as the Philofopher was of opinion, that though the City did totally remain the fame, the variation ofthis only was ablefo to metamorphofe it, as it cannot be faid to be what it was before : For it is not the Walls, nor the Inha- bitants, (i) bitants, but tl e Foimof Govtrnmtnt which makes it be fo. Thaeforehc vvhovvill dectrmine the Fotm of a City, tr.uft I averefpt ft rowhatfoeverc'oth therein help to the attai n ing of Magiftracic, that he may infold all paits that belong to the ma- naging of a Commonwealth. So as fit ce men of all ctnd.tions, according to the divers rcfpc ds either of Liberty, Kobil ty, Wealth or Worth, w ere admitted into Government, thefe divers conmunications will not admit ihc afcriptionof any peculiar or p art it ular form. Agreeing tfcielore here n with /'f/)/'//^, wewillnowcnc?eav( ur tofindouc what is more hard lo knew, and is better worth inowledg, to wit whatfoitot m xture this was. For tlongha m xi Ctmmrnwealthmaybeperfcd, itfollows not, that all mixtures may niakehei fo •, nay rather v\herc feveral differing parts aie wound up together, fo as a thiid kind e [nature is produced by their connexi- on, iuch acompofition will rather incrtafethe imperfedion of the State, and be the reafon wfy itcrnnct long continue under fuch a difproportionatc mixture. And as it falls out in curbed es, v. hie h being compounded of four Elements, con- tinue fo long in lite, as that propcrticn is maintained, which w hen it is dcftroyed, they are likcwife wafted and corrupted^ ( For that part which becomes too pre- valent, changeih the reft into its felf, and dilTolves the form which they made when all together:) So that Commonwealth which is compofcd of divers parts, may continue in one and the fame State, as long as the Authority of Government is proportioned with equal temperament, as it ought to be, to each part. But as foon as any one part begins to domineer too much, it is apparent that (lie grows towards corruption : For the prevalent part by confuming the reft, doth by little and little reduce them all into its kH, and alters the afpta of the City. Therefore fuch a difpofition is rpquircJ lo this Form of Coveinmenr, as no diforder may be therein fourd whereby that mixture may be broken or confufed. V\ hercfore as divers Fa- culties concur together to the fonning of Man, but are notwithftanding fo well ordered in that anion, as all of them partaking of fome office or other, they have their feveral degrees of dignity •, fo divers Citizens reduced to live together in one City, though all of them may in fome fort participate of Government, yet the imployments muft be diverfly difpofed of, fo as fome of them may hold the firfl place, and as certain primary Caufes, mufl give motion to other things which are done in the Commonwealth. Thefe confiderations being applied to the City of Ro»ie^ will make it appear clearly that there was no fuch equality nor order in her, as is to be defired in a mixc Commonwealth to render it excellent, and long liveJ. For the immoderate Au- thority, which was by the Laws granted to divers Magiflrates, hue much more the extraordinary power which was intrufied in many Citizens, Ihevvs how ill that fo necefl'ary proportion was obferved in her .- And on the other fide, the Peoples power, and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of Negotiations, gives manifeft tokens of acorfufcd difpofition, all Orders being mixt tother without diftindion either of Office or Degrce,and the bafer fore being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy. Hence it was, that amongll fuch con- fufion, many cuftoms might be introduced , which were "noc onely corrupt, but even contrary one to another •, as was that of prolonging the time of Magiftrates, which wa- repugnant to the great Authority which was referved to the people^ and that other of fuffering the wealth of private men to increafc to fuch a height in a City, where theie wasno prefixtboundeurof wealth appointed by the Laws for briig a Citizen • Which Laws or Cuftoms do fome of them tend to the pow cr of a few, and other fome of them are proper for a Popu'ar State. But it we proceed further, we Oiall find ther diforders fo far advanced, as not being able to confill together in one fubjed, they were the occafioa of that Common vealths B 2 dillblution (4) dirtblution. The confirming of their Authority, whofe Mjgiftracy was by the ufual time appointed by the Laws exp red, wasintroduccdat tirft with fomc ap- pearance of advantage, but with very bad example, for that havin» begun im- portant affairs in Countiies tar off, they might finifh them, and weaRen the Ene- my before tlicir return home. Thus was the charge of the Province left toMar- cits FulvtM.vfho fought in ^^fi* ag:xin{i Antitchui ,dii\tv hewasoutoftheConful- Hiip-, the which was done likcwife loGneus Manlitts to bridle the daiingit/o//4»/, and CO appeafe the affairs in Greece^ and the like upon many occafions was done to diveis others, and very long in enfuing times, with very pernicious exam[le, but the diiorder ceafcd not iiere, for, without need, the City Magiftrates were fb far prolonged, as the fame were fcen to return ten times robe the peoples Tribunes. Which made the Citizens infinitely ambitious, and afforded thcra occafion by be- ing fo long in Po'.ver, of plotting inanythngs, and of molefting the Common- wealth divers waits by the peoples Infurredions « Nor was it lefs prejudicial to permit private men to grow to fuch immoderate riches, as equalling therein the moft Potent Kings •, there was a Citizen of iJ^nwr who arrived to fuch grcatnefs, as he faid, He ought not to be efleemed rich who could not ou' of his own Re- venue maintain an Army: Whence itarofe that the Nobilty, being muchen- vied and fufpe<5ted by the people, the way was opened to the Cracehi to ex- cite thofe heinous diforders which ended not but with the utterruinof the Com- monwealth. Provifion was long before hand by the Lawagainft fuch diforders, Liciaeus the Tr.bune having inftituted, fo to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobi- lity, that no Citizen fhould poflcfs above Five hundred Acres of Land ^ Butthefe Orders in ■ ivil Affairs were fo weak and imperfedt, as one Law might eafily be broken, by introducing a contrary cuftom : The Nobles therefore little efteeming the L'.cinean Law, did very much increafe their wealth, and fraudulently ufurping the puWick Territories, which were wont to be kept for the benefit of tfie people, bi ought in Forainers to manure them ; fo as the people being become very poor, and fee ng the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia, did very unwillingly fuffer fuch an injury, and did very willingly liflen and adhere unto any one who would teed them wicli hopes of bringing things to a jufl equality ; wherefore fuch as were feditious took occafion to try Novelties, foasatlaftin the times of the Giacchi, recourfe muff be had unto Arms, and civil DifFereaccs mult be thereby decided : which (as fhall by and by be more clearly fhewn) might have been 1 ng before torefeen-, for fuchCuffoms did much diforder the Com- monwealth, not onely in that they partook not of civil modefly, but by their be- ing clean contrary to the Laws of that City, which lent moft towards a Popular State, all Authority being given by them to the People in their fuffragcs^ and alfo in the moft important State- refolutions. So as it fcemcd refped: was only had to the Lberty of dividing the Government amorgft Citizens: All places of Magiftracie were equally common to all, and fmall means kept not any one far from the Com- mi nwcalth ^ they mi^ht marry togeth-.r, Foreiners were eafily made Free Deni- zens ^ the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magiftrates -, the manner of living was nut frecbut very licentious : And the fupreme Authority of the Tribunes doth of all other things moft cleerly fhewwhat that Government was, who being greatly refpeded and reverenced by all men, and called by the fupcrftitious title of Sacre- fan^t^ they were fo infolentin their office, as a Tyrant could hardly have ufcd more feverity in his commands. See how boldly a Tribune of the People rmde Marias VJoUntts.jk Nob!eman,be feifed on, commanding tfiat he fhould be fuddenly thrown head-long down the Tarpeian Rock, for no other reafon, but that in a Speech wh ch he had madc,he ufed fome harfh words againft the People. But the Tribune Sulpitttu ufing ufing moic violence, cure one morning into the Pi at :[4 with many armed men and clriv.ng away the Confuls v\ ho would have oppofed fuch an adion, made Mari>^ be decreed forthe undcrcakiBgagainlt AiihrUates^ not caiing though therein tie went againft the Laws, which roc being in any thing obferved, all good Infticuti- ons wtre made in v. i^,\\ hilft the Laws were violated and deflroyedby the Tribunes too £Meat power. He tlun whofhall confider thefe things, will not Iby that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular-, yet many things were contrary to ilule, iS hath been confidercd in perpetuating the Government of the Aimies, and in the exceffivc Riches of fome Citizens. Some Popular Commonwealths, as ihatoi 'Athens, ufcd by a quite contrary advice, tobanifli fuch Citizens t n yeais from the City , who did tor fome excellent quality far ex^ ceed the reft •, In fome others, becaufe diey did in fome fort partake of populari- ty, ti.eequallity of means, or levelling was introduced, fo tocontenc, and pleafc the people, as in Sfdrta 5 andcerrainly to grant but a limited powcr,and but for a fliurt time, to Magiftraies are excellent precepts of fuch Legiflators as will conftl. tu;c a free City •, For fo all the Citizens may have their (hare of Government, but noncfredy difpofe thereof, to his own proper ufe, and then indcavour to bring things to an equality, or at leaft provide fo, as they may not increafe fo immodc- rately, as any one Citizen may be envied or fufpe^T^?«r/«f-, valuing more the ir.cieafe of their own powtr, by neceflitating the Senate to ycld to their defi:es, thenthctt putting tbe City into fuch adifoider. TleNobltslikewifemorefollicitous toabafe the People, and to increafe their own fortune?, then to preferve peace and union ia the City, did nfurilh Civil diCcord by ulurping the Common goods, and by re- ducing the People to ^reat Poveity through Ufury. By this difcoLirte it may be comprehended, how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government : But it may he m.ore cUeily fem, bycorapar«g this Commonwealth vith that of Sparta, which proved more excellent ti en any other in that mixt Covernment, and preftived it a long timefieelrom all difcord, by vertue of her moft < xcellent Laws. In Sparta^ the Princes power ended not buc with his life, to the end that he being pitferred before all others for making the Laws be obfei ved, he might the better do it, beirg detained by no fclf-refpcft from depofing of Magi{lrates,"or from being judged by the People. But his Authority was notwithftanding fo limited, as he was rather a Cujles of the C(..mmc|i Liberty, then a true Pr;nce in the City. The People had as gi eat a (hare in Govermeat, i» their condition required : For it being they who were to make ufc of the Magi- ftrates, itfeaned they might better know their abilities-, as we fee it falls out ia other Trades, that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to ufc it, then by the maker thereof- The People had the power given them of choofing and of correfting Magiftrates^ but greater authority was granted totfeSenaie, which was placed as in the midft to defend the Commonwealth trom the Princes power, and from the peoples infolence, to the end that the-eby it mghi the better temper the one and the ether. Now let us (ce how in the joint union of thcfe three Governments, certain Condiiions were appropriated unto every of them-, buc neither fo many, nor yet f. ch as made them of dean contrary qualities, but fo as they might very well be united in one and the fame perfon. The Frince had per- petuity of power •, but this flood fo correftt d by the Laws, as it might eafily con- lift with the other States. The Senate, which was made up of Forty ei^ht of the prim.e Citizens,reprefented a trie Arftocratical Commonwealth i but becau'c they acknowledged their Dignity from the People, their power was not fuch as bereft others of their Liberty. But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punifli- ments,as it was not dangerous, fo it afforded place for a mcdcfl Popular State, and re ndred that Government more perfed, by mixture of all the three beft. But above all things elfe, there was a miraculous profoitionobferved in5/>/irr/», inftiaiingouc thcfe thirgs,vvhich ufe to caufe Civil diflentions amongfl Citizens : For the Noble- men had the greateft part in Honors, but the People v. ere equal to them in Wealth, all the Revenues bciug in common ^ fo as the ambition of the one, and the necef- fities of theoiher v\ere (atihfied, and all of them being content, they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility, fo as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of thcantientReipublicks.Andifat the firftflie had been a little more large in coiiimu- nicating her Government, byencieafing the number of her Senators, fo as there had been no occafion in Theepompm h'\^ time, for the better regulating their too great Authority, ol introducing ihe Magiftracy of thc£;'/'cr/, whereby the City began to be a little too popular, and leaving Licurgtii his antient Inftitutions, gave it lelf over to licentioulnefs, nothing could have been defired in that i ity to have reduced her to the higheft p tchof perie(ffion. Therefore as f;ir as the Roman Co- vernment differed from this, it muft be confcft it fell fo far fliort of trae excellen- cie The Conluls of Rome had gieat Authority, and it may be more free xhtn became any Maj^iftracy in a Commonwealth, but the little durance thereof made it ( 7) itlefsben.Ha.'lto tht tlie Republick : For clieir Power being foon to be given over, m:ide tlieni lefs diliocnc, and lefs bold in undei taking Pablick Affairs : For Confulihip being laid afide, the -.vay was opened of revenging private Iniuries by the Tribunes. So Cicero^ who freed his Country from Catdtns Confpiracy, when he was out of Place, was banifhed. But the Senate, btcaufe it had not any Ordinary Mag iflracy, from whence no Appeal might be made, by which it might curb the Peoples Infoltncy, had not that rcfped given to it, by which the igno- rant common people is Governed .- So as the people, not being held back by this Bridle, ran into fuch licentioufuefs, as they dared to commit divers Indignities even againft the chief Magiftracy of Counfulfliip 5 as they did when they plucked the Conful dmitius Hefiare from the Tribunal, that they might by force ob:a'n ad- mittance to that Supream Magiftracy. The weaknefsof the Senate was likewife the occafion of the increafe of the powcrof fome Ciiizens, for the peoples rtfolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate, theway of ariving at great power by the favour of the people, in defpitc of the Senate, was opened to fuch as were ambi- tious. Thus didMart/^s caufe himfelf to be declared Conful, cor,trary to the Laws, and CafAr to be confirmed in his Province : And to fupprcfs thcfe mens immoderate greatnefs, which tended towards Tyranny, it wasrequifite ( fince the Commonwealth had no ufual means to do it) to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities fide, whofe greatnefs proved afterwards no lefs pernicious, then that of thofc whom they thought through their Authority tofupprefs, wherefore the Ci- ty became wholly divided-, fothat private injuries were with horrid cruelties re- venged by Syiia, though he profcfTed to vindicate the Common welfare .• And Pompey^ to mainriin his Greatnefs put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with Cxf/ir: Wherefore betaking themfelves to Arms, the Commonwealth could notaclaft but fall. Thefe diforders were occafioned through the weaknefs of the Senate .• But the people, polliffing themfelves of other mens Places, ufurp; thebeflimploy- mentsofthe Coinmonwealth, and being equall to the Nobility in point of liber- ty, would without any refpedl to other things partake equally of Government. So the right difpofure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confufed, which require Geometrical, and not Arithmetical proportion, in fuch fort, as the fame things be rot granted to all men , but to every one that which is moff con- venient for him. And certainly to conftitute a City of that form, as all her Citizens rtiould be equal, would be no better then to make a Confort of Mufick confifting all ot the fame voyces ; for as the latter produceth no true Harmony, fo doth no good concord refult from the former. Therefore care mud be had, that every Order may keep itsownftate, and be neither too much exalted, nor too muchabafcd, left the too flat, or too fliarp Tone occafion difllnance, as it was fcen to fall oitt in Rfime, where this juft proportion was but badly kept, people of unequal condition and \^ orih, being oft times made equal in Dignity, which caufcd a Governm.-n t full of confufion and diforder, not bouodcd in any one Form, but dif- pofed to recv.ive all Forms. But if we will aflign any particular State to the mixt body of this City, as prcdoniiaate over the rcfl , there can be none more properly given her then popularity. Which though it may be already comprehended , yet it will be better known by pafTmg to forae other more paiticular confiderations. The ftate of the Commonwealth is known by obferving in whom the chief command is found, but the ma;efty thrreof appears clearly In th." creating of Magiftrates , in making new Laws , or repealing old ones, in making War, in difpoling of Rewards or Punilliment ; All which things being by ma- ny examples feen to lie in the power of the People , do evidently witncfs that (8) that the State of this Commonwealth was PopuLr The People were they who gave authority to Magiftrates, nay even to the Senate it felf, by authenticating and invi^^oratino the Rcfolves thereof -, and as the foul ot that Governmenr, they did in dfvers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations. So as her trucft and propereft Form can only be taken trom them -, nay,it was feen that the rt Tolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate, and were ot equal force with the Peoples commands, prolonging Magiftrates in their places, and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars. Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further feen, by the immoderate power of the meaneft Citizens. Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth, which by a certain ordinary, and as it were natural change of condition, will (liew us what her firft Form was. For it being changed into Tyranny, which ufually arifeth from a Po- pular State, it appears that that City was formerly j^overned by the People, and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny; fo as this . ranfition was cafily made by the likenefs of State : For, that City where the People commands with licence, may be faid to be fubjeft to many Tyrants ^ nor admits ic of any change, faving that one man becomes the matter of thofe diforders, vhich a multi- tude were maftersof. There were likewifc always many popular Pick-thanks in l?pOTf,who,like the Flatterers of Tyrants,tracing the People in their humors, went a birding after favors, whereby they won credit and preferment. Which, as the Philofopher fays, is a manifeft fign, that in fuch a City the People command, not the Laws. VV hich is feen by many experiences, of which MArim was an evident example; who being born of very mean parents, and applying himfelf from the begining'to the Government of the Commonwealth,n0t guided by the glory of his PredecefTors, or any noble aftion of his own which might firft introduce him there- into, but confiding in a certain greatnefs of fpirit, began to think of acquiring great power fo as being become Tribune of the People,he betook himtclf u holly to abafe the authority of the Nohlcs,as he did in publiftiing the Law of Sulfrages,threatening Conful Cotta to imprifon him, if he forbare not to oppofe him. By which boldnefs he won fo much favor with the People, as he was able to difpofe of ihem afterwards as he lifted in any affair, how unjuft foever, or in working revenoe upon his Eoe- mies ( as he did in banifliing innocent Metellui) or to aggrandife himfelf •, infomuch as he contrary to the Laws, was created Conful, againft the CimbrtAns^ being ab- fent,'and in a contumacious time •, andlaftiy in making the Province be affigned unto him, which belonged to Sjlla. By fuch means the way was opened to the im- irioderate'power of Citizens, which in the height of their profpeiity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruinc. For thefe diforders being long before begun, were 3fterwardsby the fpacioufnefs of the City fo increafed, as the People being become powerful by reafon of the numeroufnefs of the Citizens, and growing more free and bold by iheir fo many profperities, not content to be equal to the Nobility, would become greater then the Laws. They banifh'd many Citizens without hear- in" the caufe-, they granted places of Magiftracie before the iifual time? they confirm'd the Authority of thofe that were already out of ir, and difpofed of all things not according to civil equity, but as they liked beft. Which things do fuf- ficiently manifeft the impertedions of that Government : For the^ Philofopher fays, that that State where the People command, and not the Laws, is fo corrupt, asitdtfeiv<;snotthenameof a Commonwealth, no fort of Government being to be thereunto aOigned. W hich cafily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful, as was that o(Rom. But it we fliall then confider the Conditions of thofe men into whofc hands that Government was put, we (hall thereby likewife find, that amongft the feveral Forms of Popular States, this may be thought the moft corrupt, ('O corrupt, as that wheieinto even Artificers were admitted : which being ufually but ill corduioned, and frequent ns; AfTemblies only that they may talktogeth.r, do conftituie an imperfcft State, and fubjecl to alterations. And h nee it ma v br de- duced, that this part being moft prevalent in that ib corrupt and imperfedl Corrs- munweal h, tf e other'; muft partake of the lame impe; fedtion : For n^ fuch union can be iramed out ot two good Governments, and one very bad one, as is requifite to give form ^o a good Govern nent-, neither could they continue together for n: V;r fo imail a time. Whence it may be likcwifc interred, that thofe orl er parts ot the Con«monvvealth, which may leem torefemble Monarchy .nd Ar ftocracy, as the Confuls and Senate, camelliortof fiich perfedion as isp 0|.er totho.c "^tatcs, de- clinit.g to th' contrary party For many t! ini:S may be obfcrvcd to have b^en done by Confuls with more utnoriry and boldnefs, then what became a Commonwtaiih. To pafs by many ot! er examples, C^far b:.ng confirmed in t^.at power v.hich he had received as Conful, ufurped the Liberty of the Commonwe.ilth. The e vcre lik'- wife many coiruptions in tne Senate, u h ch (hew how fuojed that part was iike- wife to various difordcrs : For when the C Ovtimonvs ealih was at the vtry 1. eight of htr perfedion. Senators were become fo mercenary, as ^ugurth having corrup ed many o^them, and purchafcd his own fatety by monies, it may well be faid, that the C tizens of R(me would have fold their City, if they could have mtt wjtha Chapman for it. Another Confideration may be added, to wit, That that Com- monwealth cannot be faid to be well ordered tv^n in the very Popular State which (he fo much affc ded : For it is eafie to frame any Government for a fhort time in any whatfoever Eltate -, but the fufficivncic of a Law- maker, and the cxccllencic of Laws, is f >uad ;>y the long continuance thereof. Therefore thofe O'dcrs by which the Peoples authority was too much incrc ifcd, cannot be faid to be truly Popular 5 bui fuch may be foeftecmed, whereby the State is long pre'er^'ed. Wherefore many thi gs be ng ordered in Rome v ithouc this temperance,in favor of the People, theyot tiiemfelvsb.retr the Stare of all folid.ty. T'us Liccntioufnefs of living, frequent Meeti, gs, App- aK to the Tribunes Freedom in accufing, and o her fuch things as fetmcd o cl one in favorofihc People-, ferved for the building up of Tyranny, and wr.ught Romes final ruine. Whicn was formcily feen in Athens-^ whuh bemg conftituted by J^/ow in a too Popuhr condition foonloft . er Liberty, and was poiteft by a Citiz-.n ot h rs named Ftjtfiratus^ who followed the fame way whch tiie Lcgiflator himfdf had opened unto him, by at ri-iucin^ too much to the I'eople. So what is intended for good, proves often fatal, if not well under- ftood. But havng d;fcourfcd fufficiently of the Form of the Government, it w.ll rot be amifs to exam ne for.ie other moie general Con itions, by whxh the perfedion of every State may be the better kncwn. In ordering a City, refpcd is ;o be had to twothngs^ to what belongs to War, to \^ hat belongs to Peace-, to the end that (he may not be governed by Chance in either of them, but by certain Laws, and may be cqua ly prcfeived from forem plots, and from home difcords ; and to en- c'civour, that as ihe cannot always enjoy Peace, fo ihe fhould not be continuilly molefteJ with War. But he who will confider the A(f^ions of the Romaos^ and the Inflitutions of their Ci'y, will find them fo ferioi fly adrr ft to M litary affairs, as he may eafily judge that they propofed no other things to themfelves, then how to increafe Empire, by makng one War beget another: wherefo.e many Armies were inflituted, and many rewards for military valor, to make men bold and valiant agamft the Enemy ^ but not any thing whereby to accuflom them to Jul^ice, Tem- perance and to other civil vertucs, whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity. " Tis therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won fo much Empire, and fuch Glory in tmcs of War-, and in times of Peace, like rufty Iron, loft all C, her (lo) her lufirc : So as troubles Aom Enemies abroad werenofooner ceafcd, but much greater v\erc excited at home by diflentions amongft the Citizens, whichdidnot terminate till things were iccallcd by cccaficn ot War to the fame Warlike order and difcipline in which the City was excellently well irftituted : Which might for a while prefcrve her -, but when tl rough the want ot occafion of War, (he could not by that means con eft her many diforders, nor reduce hcrfelf toany fctlcd condition for any fpace of time, being ftill agitated by ftcrms of Civil (edition, (lie muft at laft be miferably[loft,when it was time to begin toenjoy her greatnefs and profperity. For this caufe Scipio Nafca^ a very wife man, would not confcnt to the de- ftrudion of Carthage , knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war, could not laft long in idlenefs. How can that Government then be termed 2ood , which is fo ill difpofed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end 1 And w ho can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuoufly, not the inlarging of her Empire? Therefore tha Philofopher faid wellj 7 bat true civil Felicity rv^s not tobe exfe£ied from asiions which relate to things abroad, bat from thefe which are ufed a/Kongft Citizens. It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth, thatfhe overcame the whole world, fincethe perfedfion of Government lies in making a City vcrtuous, not in making her Miftrefs of many Countries. Nay the increafing of Territories, as it is commonly coupled with fome injuftice, fo is it remote from the true end of good Laws, which never part from what is honeft. Governments which aim at Empire are ufually fliort lived •, which denotes their imperfeflion : Which happens not onely becaufe they were not better accommodated in times of Peace, but that for the great inlarging of Confines, it is neccff ary to nourilli ambitious thoughts in Citizens, and fuch as are too dcfirous to domineer, which arc eaiily inrned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth itsfelf. For it is not to be affirmed that the fame thing can be good in refpeft of the puhlick, and bad in private Affairs. For the general felicity of the whole City, and the particular good of every Citizen, is one and the fame thing, they onely differ in fome certain refpetls. Then taking ones argument from thefe things, the end of this great Commonwealth might cafibly be conjeftured, which (as one faid well i wa^ over thrown by the wait of its own bulk. But grant, that the lives of fuch States may be prolonged, it cannot ceitainlybe done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers. Let CMariia his example ferve us to fee what advantage Citizens got by the immode- rate defire of Gloiy and Dominion^ who being alwaies bred op in .Arms, and havingwone Credit and Preferment thereby, finding that his antient Reputation besan to fail by enfuing Peace, raifed CMithridates King of Font us ^ againft the Commonwealth, to the end, that being to make ufe of his Vallor, he might re- cover his former Repute. Thus c>* thens who once in oyed a peaceful condition, under fmV/^j his good Government, when fhe turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet, to Arms and Dominion, and would change her manner of life, fhe reaped the like Fruits of Ambition, which by fuch Orders flie had fowcd in the minds of hcv Citizens. For Alcibiades out ot too immehfe a defire of Glory, was he, who ot himfelf did incite the Lacedemonians againff his Country, by whom (he w as afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire. For all this, you hear me not fay, that the ftudyof Arms ought to be neglefted . which are very neccfTaryin what foe ver State, to defend ones felf sgainft the Injuries of Neighbors, and to prefcrve Freedom and Liberty: Nay, x^riflotle xt^xe{\tx\d^ Plato, for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at thf firft; but onely when they began to have Dominion. But though they may be ufeful for fome other refpeds, Citizens ought not to fix their fludies fo much upon Military Exercifes, as not to know nor value any other praifebut that of the Militia, and to place their greatcft and chiefeft Good, (a) Good, and the welfare of the.r City therein-. But they muft know, that a rhart muft travel fu:ther to find out felicity, wliichis derived onely from vercuous a(^i- ons, refervedin Peace, as the true fruits of the labours oi War. Let us thtn CO elude, that this part which was very excellent in Jlome^ loft much of that praifc, which otherwife it might have dcftrved for the cxquifitencfs of its Orders, becaufe true ufe was not made thereof, ; s a means to obtain the true intent of the City. For if Artjictle laught atthofe who praifed the Lacedemsnian Commonwealth, becaufe flic had made her Citizens To valiant in War, by her excellent Military Difc pline, becaufe fli. exceeded the other Cities of Greece in thelargcncfs of her Confines; W hat would he havt faid of the Commonwealth of £0me^ where cer- tainly Military Excrcifes were ftiidicd much more, to the end, that (he might Van- quifh thcturtheft diftant Nations : ¥or in Spartd^ too boot withluch Inffitutions as appertained to the Militia, there were excellent cuftoms for the breeding of C itizens in C ivil Vtrtues : And it is fcen that Licurgtts his intention aiircd not fo much at Empire asd.dthatof Eomulus-, the former much more rerpe(5iing the peace of the City, and the av;reem. nt arr.ong Citizens, minding Military Affairs onely fo fur forth as they are necefliiry for the prefervation of Liberty againft For- rtign Forces. Another confueraiion to be had in regard no Icfs then thefe , is, thatina well-ordered City, the Laws ought to be confirmed by the Manners and Educations of the Citizens, ihe w hich is of more force to make men ^ oncft, then is the fear of punifhment ^ nay, trom hence Adt ons arifc according to true Honefty and Venue •, for they proceed from a vertuous Habit,which is only acquired by Ex- ercife, Therefore where good Inftitutions of life are wanting, the fevcrity of Magillratesisnotfu cient to make Citizens obedient to the Laws* For when theappctite hath already gotten power, and is accuftomed to vice, 'tis too hard a inatccr to overcome her by force. Therefore -ir/7?o^/f faid, Thdt Laws^ though very ufeful^ dohittltttlegoed^ ifmerthe not endued tvith futhCttfloms and Difci' fline dsftstfiththejlateeftheCitj. Wherefore teaching in the eighth of his foliticks^ howCitizensarc tobemadcgoodandhoncfl, he propofed three things requireable, joyning Reafon and Cuftom to Nature. But Cuftom may be thought fo much more nccefTary then the other two, as that a mans natural inclination to Vertue, makes him not vertuous, iinlefs he confirm his natural difpofition by ha- bit, accuftoming himfelf to do well. Nor can Reafon force Appetite, butmuft firft find it well reduced by good Education, if (he will make ufe thereof in vertu- ous operations. As much more then, as this partisnectflary, fo much more fail- ing will be found in that Commonwealth, where f ch orders were not taken by a civil way, for the good Education of Citizens ; Whence it arofe that their Laws met not with fuch due obfervance, as did them of Sparta^ not written in paper, but (as it were) ingraven in the hearts of eveiy one by the force of cuftom •, where- fore (he proved truly miraculous, by reafon of the excellent cuftoms introduced by Ljcurgm. to breed up Citizens in a vertuous and civil life. Therefore Flutdrch comparing Ljcurgtu with Numa^ preferred L^cttrgw^ior that his having confirmed Citizens by good cuftoms in thofe orders which he had introduced into the City, was the reafon why t' ey were Ion? obferved -, Whereas Numa^ contenting him- felf with bare written Laws, though good, and tending to peace, not takiogany fur.hcr care for theeducation of Citizens, could not make them be dbfcrvedfor lb fluirt a time, but that they terminated together with his lite. And it is found by experience, that Ljcnr^us his Orders vvere of fuch force, as they prcfcrvcd the Liberty of Spart* longer then the like of any other of iheantient Commonwealths. W hcrefore fA//(»^o»»^fl(rj having overcome the Licedemaniaar ^ yet would he not totally tame them, and reduce them under the Achxan CommonweaIth,till he had cancelled all the antient Inftitutions of their City, wherein whilft young, they were C a io fo bred up to Liberty, as they could by no means be brought to undergo fervi- tude. From this difcourfe it may then be concluded, That the Government of the RemAn Commonwealth was of a mixt Form, but ill proportioned within its fclf, too much inclnmg towards the corruption of a Popular State •, and that Ihe came fliort of the Spartans in three things : In the excellencie of Government , in the endeavours of Peace, and in good Cuftoms. The other part remains now to be difcufled • Whether the City of Keme might have received a better Form of State } For the good Orders of a City depend not always upon the Legiflators wifdom , but upon many other jfint Accidents. The firft thing to be had in refped , is the Nature of the People, with which the Form of Government ought to have a juft proportion. Wherefore Polititians fay, that the Legiflator ought not only to confider which is the beft Form of Government, but what beft befits cvtry City , and fuch other Accidents which make fo many alterations in States, as it cannot be tltaied but that Fortune hath a fhare therein. Lj- curgu4 was ju ly efteemed an excellent Legiflator;, but many things concutr'd in him which helped him very much to jut his thoughts in cfFedt : He was a King, and ufing force at firft, as it was fit to do, he might inttoduce fuch a Form of Go- vernment as would bridle the Peoples infolencic, and increafe the authority of the Senate y it made likewife much for his purpofe, that wealth of the City lay but in a few mens hands, fo as by bfeftowing Honors upon them, he could as it were by the way of bartering the cafilierdifpofe them to content themfelves with an equality of Goods, whereby he fatisfied the people of SfArtAs defire, who were but few in number, and confequently but weak, and the more cafie to be ordered in any fert of Government. Hence it was that the Legiflators of other Cities though they were wife men, could not notwithftanding form a Republick thr inghouc fo well ordered as did Ljc»rguf, becaufe they found not a Subjcft apt to receive fuch a Form, and becaufe they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful, or for other fuch like accidents, which did not correfpond well with what they did. Therefore Solon^ though he had had the fame intents, could not have in- troduced fuch a Government in /ff^fwj •, becaufe he was a private Citizen, chofcn by the Nobility, and confent of the People, to reform the City ; fo as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other, and his fmall Authority took much of that refpeft and reverence from the Laws ordained by him, which oyght to have been given them. Wherefore many blsmed him and his Inftitutions; fo as at laft,to (bun fuch vexation,hc was forced to part from his ungrateful Country. He met alio with another difficulty •, He found the City divided, the People much accuftomed to enjoy Liberty, and at that time much inccnfcd againft the Nobility by the opprcffioni. of Ufury under which they fuffered -, fo as he was compell'd, to the end that they might reft content with their new Government, to eafe them in the r Debts, and give them a fhare in the Government 5 which he could not do without much injury to the Nobility. The Commonwealth of renke hath gotten an excellent Government; but was not at firft governed by thofc Laws which fhe now is : But diverfity of Oc- cafions have opened the way to the wifdom of many of her Citizens, who adding new Ordeis to the old, have broughttier to fuch a height of perfedion. Which might the eafilier be done, becaufe that City was free-born, and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end, to wit, to Peace and Concord, and to the Union of her Citizens. But on the contrary, other modern Republicks, the Cities wherein fuch Governments were formed, having been formerly long accuftomed to obey Emperors, fince they got their Liberty by many Accidents, they knew not, as not being well acquainted therewith, how to ufe it, by reafon of the the Citizens various difpofuions of mind : So as wheeling often about with an lio- certain Form of Governmenr, they in procefs of time return'd under the command of one. Thefe Confuiciations being applied to the City ofiJ^we.will prove that the pru- dence of her Ciuzen=;,though they were v,ry wife and valiant men,was not fufficicnc to reduce her to a perfedl Form of Commonwealth •, but ihcy might have amended many great diforders in her, which did much (hoi ten lier life. For he who will con- fider the conditions of the people of i?cw«, will find them to be fuch,asnoFormof Gorernment could better agi ec with them then a Popular State •, for they were all warlike men, bred up even from the very firfl foundation of the City in the exercife of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongft thefe, which may have a certain fimilitude to an Ariflocratical State, when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws, partake every man moie or Icfs of that Government according to their worth ; ( For, Military difcipline hath a certain fpecies of Vertue, though It be none of thofe that do immediately fcrve to purchafe the ultimate end of a City ) yet this Government is very feldom met with •, and though it want the true and proper Form, is commonly called by the ufual name of a Commonwealth. So as I hough at firfl the City of Rome leaned much thereunto, in a fhort time the People had a great (hare therein; who not knowing how to moderate themfelves, made it grow licentious. But he who will look back even to her firfl beginning, will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increafe together with the City : For the Peoples power and liberty w^as great, not only after the driving out of the Tarquim^ but even when it was commanded by Kings ^ that City feeming even from that time to be naturally more difpofcd to the Form of a Commonwealth, then of a Kmgdom. For, after the death of Romttlus, the People being powerful, as having the weapons in their hand, and as being the firft Founders of that City, ofurpcd the aurhority of choofing Kings : who on the contrary fidcr, that they migfit the better confirm themfelves m their new Kingdom, endeavoured to accomoio- date themftlves to the nauirc of the People, and to purchafe their lovc by granting them many conirderable things. So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals, as app:ared in Horttim his cafe, who being condemned hy the Mag ftraies for his Sifters death, appealed to the People,and was by them freed. In favor of the m likewife the City was divided into Centuries, with a certain Order ofavery fmall Tax, according to which the Degrees ofthe Militia, and the Autho- rity of the Publick Courts ( things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State ) were to be diftributed. ' » To boot with thefe Law«, the great number of Citizens, which did even then arifcto One hundred and thirty thoufand, made the Peoples party very powerful; as alfo their having been fo ready and fo fuccefsful in engaging themfelves in fo many enterprifes for the Conimonwealth,without receiving any pay for tfieir pains. Bat the Nobility was a long time very weak, and in but little efteem : For the firft Founders of the City being Shepherds, and all of the fame condition, there was nodifiinftion of degree amongfl them, favewhat was fbon after brought in by Rtmttlui • u ho chooling the Senate out of all that former number, that they might be alTiftant to the King in providing for things requifite for the State, by this order he divided fomeof the worthieftof the People in this new City from the rcfl, who gave the rife to the Roman Nobility. But even this Order was very weak ; for it was at firft inftituted by Konmlus but of a fmall number of men •, and though others were afterwards added thereunto, yet till fuch time as the City got her liberty, it never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators •, nay, even thefe were much lefTened by the cruelty of Tarquiniuf SuperLw , and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoifeot Regal power. So as when the City put hcrfelt into («4) into Liberty, there were not Noblemen enough to form a ftate of opihfuti: in thii Ci(c 6\d Pul'liui y*Uriit4 find the City of Rome, a^ter the driving out of the TarcjBttts^ when he through Brutus his death, rema ning fole Conful, was to conftittite Laws, and new mould the Commonweahh. Whciclorc dtfiroas to introduce a State differing from the former, under the name of Liberty, it be- hoved him nottoUffen, but to encrcafe the Authority of ihe People: Kor elfe they would not have indured it j and by fiding v\ ith the Tarquivs^ they might ea- fily have confounded that Government, and reduced the City again under the power of Kings, For which reafon alfo, Brutus^ though he was firft created Conful, not willing to lofe the favor and afliftancc of the ptople,without which h^ ihoughc the new Orders of the City could not be well eftablifhed, perfwadcd his Colleague Tarc{mmuiCellt(ttnus, that to give fatisfaftion to the People, to whom the name of T4r(g«/ff was become odious, and fufpitious, tolay down hisConfullhip: By thefe Reafons it appears, that f''4/fr/»j was compelled to ordainmany things in fa- vour of the People, as were the Appeals from the Confuls •, 1 heorder, that upon pain of death no man ihould enter into any place of Magiftracy without the Peoples approbation-, the petty piinifhment appointed for them who (hould not obey the Confuls commands, which was no more but to pay fiveCxen and two Sheep, Moreover he cafed the poor of many grievances, and made many other very Po- pular Laws, whence he purchafed the name of ruhlicola. By which 'tis underftood, that in ordering of the Commonwealth, refpedwas to be had in many things to neceflity and to the condition ot thofe times: yet ifwefhallconfider other Accidents, we fhall find them much contrary to fiich a necelTity-, for the new Legiflator was not Prince, as was Hcurgm ^ butpoG- fefl a place of Magiftracy for a fliort time, the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known, and not much valued: Soas he could not ufe force to withdraw the people from a Popular State , as it would have been reedfnl , finding the People fo difpofcd, as hath been faid. Therefore the City being af- ter a while to be reformed again , the Magiflracy of Ten was chofen, with greater Authority then was that of the Confuls , which took away all Ap- peals, to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all, it might without any refpe^l conftitute new Laws with great fiimnefs. And if Affins his ambiti- on had not ruined the bufincfs, that Commonwealth might perhaps have been re- duced to fome better condition : but yet not to any very perfed one, it being too hard a thing to order Cities well , which arc already much augmented ^ juft is we fee it falls out in every particular man, who in his tender years may be eafily made to undertake any manner of life, but when by praftife he is fettled in, as it were, a certain proper nature of his own, he cannot eafily be altered from it. And if there have been any one, who hath been able to order a City already well grown, yetweftiall find that that City was not fo great nor potent, as was the City of Rome^ at this time of the new Reformation •, and therefore the difficul- ties were much lefs, it being a very hard thing, and w hich, as faith the Philofopher, doth almoft exceed humane power, to difpofe of a great multitude in an excellent Form of Government, Then as thefe things were the reafon why this Common- wealth was not well ordered at firft, fodid they in time bring her to great dif- orders and fed itions, and finally to her deftruftion. For it is ufual, that the further hcadvanceththatisonceoutofthcway, fomuchdoth he return back wards, isfo much the more pufled, and the further from the place he intended to go to. So the Authority of the people being by thefe new Inftituiions alwaies to incrcafe together with the greatnefs of the City, fhe fwarved the further from the end, true Liberty, to which (he feeraed to addrefs her felf. And becaufe this Common- wealth was born with this infirmity, theworthofnoncof her Citizens, though it were wtre never Co groJt, was furlicient to cure her thereof, or to prolong her life ; As it happens in our humane bodies, which contracfting fome ill difpofition of hu- mours at their fii ft entring into the World, are foon thereby opprell and brought lodeaih, no natural verrue, though of force for other things, being able to afford any cure. 'Tis notwithftanding very true, that though fuch like accidents ren- dred the City uncapable of any excellent Government, by inclining her to a Popu- lar State, yet had they notfo dcttrminately difpofcd of her, but thatflie might have freed her felf of many of her bad qualities, had not the ambition of hcrCitizcns by increafing thefe her natural imperftd:ions,made her fall into greaterWiforders. Let us begin to confider \^hat PubltcoWs adionj were from the very beginning of the Commonwealth, and we flialleafily difcovcrhis ambitious thoughts by ivbich he was moved tofludy fo over-much how to pleafethc peoples appetite in every thing. Ti efe his intentions were apparently feen, by taking his being re - fufe^linthe Eleftion of theConfuls fo heinoufly, as that he kept a good while from the Rcpublick, as if he had put his hand to the Government, for his own Grcatnefs, not for the common Good .- But much more for that having compaft that Degree, and finding the People jealous of him, for having built his houfeina higli and ftrong fcituation, fearing left together with the Peoples Love he might loofe his own A uthority and Power ,he chofe fo to humble himfdf ,as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the Supreme Magiftrate of fo great a City •, he made the Fafces , the enfigns of Confulfhip, be held in a pofture of Homage , whilft he made his Oration, to ftiew, (as he himfelf faid) That the Authority of the Con- fuls was fubje(fl to the Authority and Dignity of the People. This his defireof being efteemed Popular, was the rcafon why in this new Reformation, he went not abont to what was very nece(T;iry; to amend in part thofe defeifls which could noc totally be taken away 5 to wit, to givefjuft countcrpoife to the Authority of the people, tempering it with that ol the Senate, by very much incrcafing the number of the Senators, end by apropriating the weightieft affairs of State, to thatOr- der,which liow necefTiry it was, was afterwards feen, but too late put in execution; to wit, in S-jlit's time,by whom the fir ft number of Senators was doubled, yet but to little purpore,the Peoples Authority being already too mightily increafed,and many feeds O' corruption being by this means fown abroad in the minds of the people. But VAlenui added brit one hundred to the uumbea of ihe Senate, neither did make any Law in favour of thcin, both of which he might at that time eafily have done. For hcng r.t the time of the new Reformation to chufe new Senators of the Equeftral OrJer, or of fome other of the people, he would noc oncly have been content, I u: would have wone much honour, by exalting many of his Friends to that Dignity, as it was feen he did by thofe few that were chofen : And the Peo- ple would have had fufhcicnt power in the Commonwealth, if without commu- nicati-g the weighricft Affairs of the Kingdom unco them, the indcmptnity of chufirg.nd of corrcLl: ng Magiftrates hid been rcferved to them : And then that Appeals might have b en granted them, by which means they would notonely havclud a hand ill the City Affairs, but likewife they might have fee ured thcm- fdves horn being injured by the Nobility ( a thing much defired by the People ) and from djni;er of loofing their Liberties. And the Authority and Reputation of t' e Senate being by this means augmented, the Peoples Infolcncy might the mo e eafily have been moderated in thofe accidents which afterward happened. Which tough it leeraed ( as hath been faid) more harder to have been done m chat City, for another refpe^, yet the revolutions of Government in the firft birth of this Kepublick, didalictle kflen ordinary Difficulties. For paffingfrom Mo- narcfiy ( which in the T^v quins time was almoft become Tyranny) to a new condition the Lrgiflator might have made it ,an Ariftocracicj it being asic were natiral nitural in the chaiige of States, that the Government which had wont to be ih the power ot a Tyrant, paffcs into rhe hands of the Nobility, who are ufually the firft who lay hold in pulling down Tyranny, as in Rome^ where Tarquin and Erutus were the fiift Founders of L bcrty. Therefore if the People deferred to be made partaker in the new Government, for having afTifted h;rein, much more ought the Nobility to have their dignities anJ pr vilc'gesincreafed, this common benefit of the City having had its chief rife from thm^ nor would the People have had any reafon to complain thereof. But PubltceU^ in fiead of increafi g the honor of the Senate, introiu ed by s very pernicious example, fmal! refpecft to the M igiftrjcie of C'^nluls •, wf ,ch occafioned many difoi dcrs, which might eafily hjve been corrcde.i by ju t fear, as is cleerly feen by many txamplcs, but chiefly by this •, that the Pcop e bang in nfurreftion, and contumacious againft the power of Confulfhip, the creating of a Delator, a Magiftracie of fupreme authority and reverence, j roved a fure icmedy to af!\vage the Tamult. And what more minifeft fign could there be given, that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by refpe(fl unro the Magi- If races, then that which was given upon the occafion of ^^ppius his Decemvirate i For being fo ill dealt wiih by him and by his Colleagues, as they wanted rot reafon to apprehend Tyranny^ yet the authority of this Magiftracie, from which there was no Appeal to he made, and the fevcrity wherewith it was adminiftred didfo bridle the peopl as they patiently endured all injuries •, nor riurft they go about to (hake off th t fl."ery. till the Sen teinterpofe^ t felf, and that Heratifu and f^a- ler us d claiCi thcmfelvcs Hea.^s of the Infurredlion againft the Decemviri. There ought thcr fore either greater ref^jeft to nave been given to the Confolary /authority-, oreUe^ if them -re fevcreanj tree power of an orcinary Magiftratc fecmed not t be convenient for the (fa e of that Commonwealth, the refpetatus, and Gneus Julius Mento, who oppofed tficm therein, had recourfe unto the Tribunes, who by threatening imprifonmcnt fotc'd them to give way to the refolution; And thofe Noblemen did ufually take another courf; then what is to be held with the People, with whom, grave and fevere proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor. But they Wf re (o blinded by Am- bition, as not knowing, or not caring for fuch errors, they ftrove who fhould mbft ingraaate themfelvs with the the People, by Prerents,Shews,and fubmifs comport- ment. And ihi;; infttudtion might be learn'd by the example of the People oi Rome themfelvs : For it w as oft times feen,that greater refpe(a was given to thofe few who had known how to ufe fcverity to the People, then to thofe who canied themfelvfs fubmifsly unto them. And certainly, amongft other things, the juc^gmenr which followed upon chccaufc between Menimius^nd Spiirius Servilim^ was very remark- able ; able : who being both of them accafed of the fame fault by the Tribunes, to wit, that being Confuls they had oppofcd the Agrarian Law- Memmiu^^ who by in- ^reatit'sand fiilc.iufscarrijge endeavoured abfolution, was condemned-, h\\\.Sf>nritis Seri'tl.Ns ftoiuly w.itliftanding the Tribunes fury, and fpeaking fevercly to the People, \v?5 acquitted. And fiirius and ManiltMs, who had both of them been Conful*;, being not long after accured,the Nobles being willing totally to free them from fucH danger, killd the Tribune in his own houfc who had impeached them ; which did foaffnght his Colleagues, and the People, as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reallume the lame caufe : And all the Infurredions which were then in the City being fuddenly appcafed, all of them did willingly fubfcribe the Militia. Affius cUudtHs was always very fevere againft the People -, and amongft otiier of his adions, the punifliment which he took upon the Armies infolencie was very obfervable, for he made them be decimated, every tenth man be put to death ; which was fubmitted unto without any thelcaft tumult, by rcafon of the antienc opinion of the Captains feverity, and for the fcarinfufed into the Soldiers by the fentcnce of death againfl fome Centurions who were accufed for having been Au- thors of that Infurredtion. Which was fufficient fo far to curb them all, as though they were all of them then in Aims, every of them flood pcaceiully fpedtitors of the death of fo many Kinfmen and Friends, and of their own aoubtlul chance 5 and ( which peradventure is a greater wonder, and doth the better confinn tiiis truth ) jlfpius being accufed for this fentence by the Tribunes, ahei- he had laid down the Confulfhip, iifing the fame feverity in defending himfelf, he was not held lefs guilty for having bccuformeily Coniul: Soasthe People neither willing to abfolve him, nor daring to condemn him, the r.iufe was put off, and he fuffercd to depart. And in the latter times, when the Peoples power was greateft, Tiberius Grjechns en- deavouring to propound the obfervance of the Licinian Law, the Nobles, chan^in* their h.ibiC5, and (lievvin^ great humility, labored to win favor from the People^ but fince they lav/ they could do no good by this means, they refolvcd for their laftrelpg.; to nfc force, and kill'd the Author of thofe fedicions. Which aflion of their: did f ) aftonifh the People, as they fuffered the Tribunes death, whom they had (b dearly loved, and who had loft his life in defence of their caufe, to go unre- venged. And foon alter, Caius Gracchus reafluming the caufe which his Brothet had in vain endeavoured, the Nobles, ufing the fame cunning, fought hrft by faic means to deprive him of Popular favor, making ufe of another iribune to this purpofe.by caudng other popular Laws to be propounded by confent of the Senate. i5ut humility avail'd no more at this time, then ic had done formeily ^ fo as it be- hoving them to betake themfelves again to Arms, they flew Cains Grucchus in the yive/iiine, and after the death ot two Brothers, annuU'd all the Laws nude by them -, nor did the People ever feem to refcnt ir. Which if it might have been doncbyanufual way ofaMagiftratc, as hath been touched upon, doubtlefs thefe ruder remedies, as better fu^t ng with the infirmities of that Commonwealth^ might have freed her from many mifchiefs. This is Ukewifc confirmed by many other experiences : For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof, threatening to create a Diiflator, it kept the Teren- Tilu Law froin being made, of creating a Magiflracieof five men, «ha were to corre