frm, Duke University Libraries D03209706R MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT. To th r Senate and House of Representatives of the Confederate Stat At the date of your last adjournment the preparations of the enemy for further hostilities had assumed so menacing an aspect as to excite in some minds apprehension of our ability to meet them with sufficient promptness to avoid serious reverses. These preparations were com- t shortly after your departure from the seat of government, and the armies of the United. States made simultaneous advance on our frontiers, on the western rivers and on the Atlantic coast in masses so great as to evince their hope of overbearing all resistance by mere weight of numbers. This hope, however, like those previously • tained by our foes, has vanished* In Virginia, their fourth attempt^ at invasion by armies whose assured su< - confidently predicted, has met with decisive repulse. Our noble defenders, under the Bum mate leadership of their general, have again, at Fredericksburg, inflicted on the forces under General Burnside the like disastrous overthrow as had been previously suffered by the successive invading: armies commanded by Generals McDowell, McClellan and Pope. In the West obstinate battles have been fought with varying for- tunes, marked by frightful carnage on both sides, but the enemy's hopes of decisive results have again been baffled, while at Viok another formidable expedition has been repulsed, with inconsiderable* loss on our side and severe damage to the assailing forces. On the Atlantic coast the enemy has been unable to gain a footing b< the protecting shelter of his fleets, and the city of Galveston has just been recovered by our forces, which succeeded not only in the capture of the garrison hut of one of the enemy's vessels of war, which was carried by boarding parties from merchant river steamers. Our for- tified positions have every where been much strengthened and im- proved, affording assurance of our ability to meet, with success, the t efforts of our enemies, in spite of the magnitude of their pre- parations for attack. A review of our history during the two years of our national ex- istence affords ample cause for congratulation and demands the most fervent expression of our thankfulness to the Almighty Father who • has blessed our cause. We are justified in asserting, with a pride, surely not unbecoming, that these I ate States have added an- other to the lessons taught by history for the instruction of man: thatj they have afforded another example of the impossibility of sub- jugating a people determined to be free, and have demonstrated that no superiority of numbers or available resources can overcome the resistance offered by such valor in combat, such constancy under suf- fering and Buch cheerful endurance of privation as have been conspic- uously displayed by this people in the del their rights and liber- ties. The anticipations with which wo entered into the contest have- 2 now ripened into a conviction which is not only shared with as by tlio common opinion of neutral nations, but is evidently forcing Itself our enemies them eel vc#. If we but marl the history of the pri year by resolute perseverance in the path we have hitherto pursued; by vigorous effort' in the development of all our resources for defence; and by the continued exhibition of the same unfaltering courage in our soldiers and able conduct in their leaders as have distinguished th: past, we have every reason to < it this will be the cl year of the war. The war. which in its inception, was waged for forcing us hack into the Union, having failed to accomplish that pur- pose, passed into a second stage in which it was attempted to conquer and rule these States as dependent provinces. Defeated in this second Resign, our enemies have evidently entered upon another, which can have no other purpose than revenge and thirsl for blood and plunder of private property. But however implacable they may be, they ran have ■either the spirit nor the resources required for a fourth year of a struggle uncheered by any hope of success, kept alive solely for the indulgence of mercenary and wicked passions, and demanding so ex- haustivcan expenditure of blood and money as has hitherto been impose i on their people. The advent of peace will be hailed with joy. Our desire for it has never been concealed. Our efforts to avoid the war forced on us as it was, by the lust of conquest and the insane passions of our foes, are known to mankind. But earnest as has been our wish for peace and great as have been our sacrifices and sufferings during the war. the determination of Lhis people has with each succeeding month become more unalterably fixed, to endure any sufferings and Continue any sacrifices, however prolonged, until their right to self- government and the sovereignty and ind spendencc of these States shall have been triumphantly vindicated and firmly established. In this connection, the occasion seems not unsuitable for some ref- erence to the relations between the Confederacy and the neutral powers of Europe since the separation of these States, from the former Union. ■ Four of the States now members of the Confederacy were recog- aaised by name as independent sovereignties in a treaty of peace, •concluded in the year 1783, with one of the two great maritime powers of Western Europe, and had been, prior to that period, allies in war of the other. In the year 1778 they formed a Onion with nine other States under articles of Confederation. Dissatisfied with that Union, three of them, Virginia, South Carolina and (jieorgia, together with eight of the States now members of the Unite, 1 States, geceded from it in 1789, and these eleven seceding States formed a second union, although by the terms of the Articles of Confederation express provision was made that the first union should be perpetual. Their right to secede, notwithstanding this provision, was neither contested by the States from which they separated, nor made the subject of discussion with any third power. When, at a later period, North Carolina acceded to that second union, and when, still later, the other seven States, now members of this Confederacy, became also members of the same Union, it was upon the recognized footing of equal and independent sovereignties, nor had it then entered into "the minds of men that sovereign States could be compelled, by force, "to remain members of a confederation into which they had entered of their own free will, if. at a subsequent period, the defense of their safety and holier should, in their judgment, justify withdrawal. The experience o! the past had evinced the futility of any renunciation of such inherent rights, and .accordingly the provision for perpetuity contained in the Articles of Confederation of 1778 was omitted in the Constitution of 1789. When, therefore, in 1S61 eleven of the States Id thought proper, for reasons satisfactory to themselves, to secede from the second union, ami to form a third one under an amended .constitution, they exercised a right which, being inherent, required no justification to foreign nations, and which international law did not permit them to question. The usages of intercourse between nations do, however, require that official communication be made to friendly powers - f :i!l organic changes in the constitution of State-, and there was obvious propriety in giving prompt assurance of our desire to continue amicable relations with all mankind. It was under the influ- ence of these considerations that your predecessors, the provisional government, took early measures for sending to Europe Commissioners charged with the duty of visiting the capitals of the different powers, and making arrange! r the opening of more formal diplomatic intercourse. Prior, however, to the arrival abroad of those Commissioners, the United States had commenced hostilities against the Confederacy by despatching a secret expedition for the reinforcement of Fort Sumter, ^"ter an express promise to the contrary, and with a duplicity which has been fully unveiled in a former message. They had also addressed communications to the different Cabinets of Europe, in which they umed the attitude of being sovereign over this Confederacy, alleg- ing that these independent States were in rebellion against the remain- ing States of the Union* and threatening Europe with manife; tataons of their displeasure if it should treat the Confederate States as having an independent existence It soon became known that these pretem inns were not considered abroad to be as absurd as they were known to lie at home, nor had Europe } r et learned what reliance was to be placed on the official statements of the Cabinet at Washington. The delega- tion of power granted by these States to the Federal Government to represent them in foreign intercourse had led Europe into the grave error of supposing that their separate sovereignty and independenci had been merged into one common sovereignty, and had ce.\> d *.■ Lave a distinct existence. Under the influence of this error, which -all # ^appeals to reason and historical fact were vainly used to dispel, our Commissioners were met by the declaration that foreign government! could not assume to judge between the conflicting representations of the two parties as to the true nature of their previous mutual rela- tions. The governments of. Great Britain and France accordingly signified their determination to confine themselves to recognizing the self-evident fact of the existence of a war, and to maintaining a strict neutrality during its progress. Some of the other powers of Europe pursued the same course of policy, and it became apparent that by some understanding, express or tacit, Europe had decided to leave the initiative in all action touching the contest on this continent to the two powers just named, who •• agnized to have the largest inter- ests involved, both by reason of proximity and of the extent and intimacy of their commercial relations with the States engaged in W !1\ It is manifest that the course of action adopted by Europe, 'while bused on an apparent refusal to determine the question, or to si le with either party, was in point of fact an actual decision against our rights and in favor of the groundless pretend i ns of the United States. It was a refusal to treat us as an independent government. If wc Wtere independent States, the refusal to entertain with us tl>c same in- ternational intercourse as was maintained with our enemy was unjust, and was injurious in its effects, whatever may have been the motive which prompted it. Neither was it in accordance with the high moral obligations of that international code whose chief sanction-is the con- science of sovereigns and the public opinion of mankind, that those- eminent powers should decline the performance of a duty peculiarly incumbent on them, from any apprehension of the consequences to themselves. One immediate and necessary result of their declining the responsibility of a decision which must have been adverse to the extravagant pretensions of the United States, was the prolongation of hostilities to which our enemies were thereby encouraged and which have resulted in nothing but scenes of carnage and devastation on this continent, and of misery and suffering en the other, such as have scarcely a parallel in history. Had those powers promptly admitted our right to be treated as all other independent nations, none can doubt that the moral effect of such action would have been to dispel the delusion under which the United States have persisted in their efforts to accomplish our subjugation. To the continued hesitation of the same powers in rendering this act of simple justice towards this Confederacy is still due the continuance of the calamities which man- kind Buffers from the interruption of its peaceful pursuits-, both in the old and the new worlds. There are other matters in which less than justice has been rendered to this people by neutral Europe, and undue advantage conferred on the aggressors in a 'wicked war. At the inception of hostilities the inhabitants of the Confederacy were almost exclusively agriculturists ; tfeoseof the United States, to a great extent, mechanics and merchants. Wo had no commercial marine, while their merchant vessels covered J:hc ocean. We were without a navy, while they had powerful fleets. The advantage which they pi r inflicting injury on our coasts f and harbors was thus counterbalanced in some measure by the expo- sure of their commerce to attack by private armed vessels. It was known to Europe that within a very few years past the United States had peremptorily refused to accede to proposals for abolishing priva- teering, on the ground, as alleged by them, that nations owning pow- erful fleets would thereby obtain undue advantage over those possess- ing inferior naval forces. Yet no sooner was war flagrant between the Confederacy and the United States, than the maritime powers of Europe issued -orders prohibiting either party from bringing prizes into their ports. This prohibition directed with apparent impartiality against -both bcligerents, was in reality effective against the Confederate States alone, for they alone could find a hostile commerce on the ocean. Merely nominal against the United States, the prohibition operated with intense severity on tbe Confederacy, by depriving it of tbe only means of maintaining, with some approach to equality, its struggle on the ocean against tbe crushing superiority of naval force possessed by its enemies. Tbe value and efficiency of the weapon which was thus wrested from our grasp by the combined action of neutral European powers in favor of a nation which professes openly its intention of ravaging their commerce by privateers in any future war, is striking- ly illustrated by the terror inspired among the commercial classes' of the United States by a single cruiser of the Confederacy. One national steamer commanded by officers and manned by a. crew who •are debarred, by the closure of neutral ports, from the opportunity of causing captured vessels to be condemned in their favor as prize, baa sufficed to double the rates of marine insurance in Northern ports and ton sign to forced inaction numbers of Northern vessels, in addition to the direct damage inflicted by captures at sea How difficult, then, ftp overestimate the effects that must have been produced by the hundreds •of private armed vessels that would have swept the seas in pursuit of the commerce of our enemy, if the means«Of disposing of their prizes had not been withheld by the action of' neutral Europe ! But it is especially in relation to the so-called blockade of our coast that the policy of European powers has been so shaped as to cause the greatest injury to the Confederacy, and to confer signal advantage* on the United States. The importance of this subject requires soms development. Prier to the year 1856, the principles regulating this subject were to be gathered from the writings of eminent publicists, the decisions of admiralty courts, international treaties, ami the usages of nations. The uncertainty ami doubt which prevailed in reference to the true rules of maritime law, in time of war, resulting from the discordant and often conliicting principles announced from such varied and in- dependent sources, had become a grievous evil to mankind. Whether a, blockade was allowable against a port not invested by land as well ..* by sea; whether a blockade was valid by sea. if the investing fleet wat merely sufficient to render ingress to the blockaded port '"evidently dangerous," or whether it was further required for its legality that it should be sufficient " really to prevent access ;" and numerous other similar questions bad remained doubtful and undecided. Animated by the highly honorable desire to put an end " to differ- ences of opinion between neutrals and belligerents, which may > ccasion' serious difficulties and even conflicts,' 3 (1 quote the official language,) the five great owera of Europe, together with Sardinia and Turk y\ adopted., in 1S5G, the following "solemn declaration'' of principles: 1. Privateering is, and remains abolished. 2. The neutral Hag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. . 3, Neutral L r oods. with the exception of contraband of \sar, are not liable* to capture under enemy's flag. 4. Blockades^ in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to- gay, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy. Not only did this solemn declaration announce to the world the principles to which the signing powers agreed to conform in future wars, but it contained a clan-; 1 to which those powers gave immediate effect, and which provided that the States, not parties to the Congress cf Paris, should be invited to accede to the declaration. Under this invitation every independent State in Europe yielded its assent ; at least, no instance is known to me of a refusal ; ami the United States. while declining to assent to the proposition which prohibited privateer- ing, declared that the three remaining principles were in entire accord- ance with their own views of international law. No instance is known in history of the adoption of rules of public law under circumstances of like solemnity, with like unanimity, and pledging the faith of nations with a sanctity so peculiar. When, therefore, this Confederacy was formed, and when neutral powers while deferring action on its demand for admission into the family of nations, recognized it as a belligerent power, Great Britain and France made informal proposals about the same time that their own rights as neutrals should be guarantied by our acceding, as belligerents, to the declaration of principles made by the Congress of Paris. The request was addressed to our sense of justice, and there- fore met immediate favorable response in the resolutions of the Pro- visional Congress of the 13th August, 1861, by which all the principles announced by tb>o Congress of Paris were adopted as the guide of our conduct during the war, with the sole exception of that relative to privateering. xVs the right to make use of privateers was one in* which neutral nations had, as to the present war, no interest; as it was a right which the United States had refused to abandon and which tin'y remained at liberty to employ against us; as it was a right of which we were already in actual enjoyment, and which Ave could not be expected to renounce flagrante bello against an adversary possessing, an overwhelming superiority of naval forces, it was reserved with en- tire confidence that neutral nations could not fail to perceive that just reason existed for the reservation. Nor was this confidence misplaced, for the official documents published by the British Government, usually I *' Blue Books," contain the expression of the satisfaction of that government with the conduct of the officials who conducted suc- cessfully the delicate business confided to their charge. These solemn declarations of principle, this implied agreement be- tween the Confederacy and the two powers just named, have been- suffered to remain inoperative against the menaces and outrages on neutral rights, committed by the United States with unceasing and progressing arrogance during the whole period of the war. Neutral Europe remained passive when tho United States, with a naval force Insufficient to blockade, effectively, the coast of a single State, pro- . claimed a paper blockade of thousands of miles of coast,, extending. from the capes of. the Chesapeake to those of Florida, ancf encircling the Gulf of Mexico from Key West to the mouth of the Rio Grande. Compared with this monstrous pretension of the United States, the blockades known in history, under the names of the Berlin and Milan decrees, and the British orders in Council, in the years 18 6 and 1807 sink into insignificance ! Yet those blockades were justified by the powers that declared them, on the sole ground that they were retaliatory; yet those blockades have since been condemned by the publicists of those very powers as violations of international law ; yet blockades evoked angry remonstrances from neutral powers amongst which the United States were the most conspicuous ; yet. those blockades became the chief cause of the war between Great Britain ami the United States in 1812 ; yet those blockades were -ir relations with the Indians generally continue to be friendly A portion of the Cherokee people have assumed an attitude hostile 'to the Confederate Government; but it is gratifying to be able to state that the mass of intelligence and worth in that nation have remained true and loyal to their treaty engagements. With this exception, there have Keen no important instances of disaffection among any of the friendly n itions and tribes. Dissatisfaction recently manifested itself among certain portions of them : but this resulted 'from a misappre- hension of the intentions of the Government in their behalf. This has been removed and no further difficulty is anticipated The Report of the Secretary of the Navj herewith transmitted ex- hibits the progress made in this branch of the public service since your adjournment, as well as its present condition. Tin details em- braced in it are of such a nature as to render it, in mv opinion, incom- patible with the public interests that they should be published with this message. I therefore confine myself to inviting your attention to the information therein contained. The Report of the Postmaster General shows that during the first postal year under our Government, terminating on the 30th of June our revenues were in excess f those received by the former Government in its last postal year, while the expenses were greatly decreased There is still, however, a considerable deficit in the reve- nues ot the Department as compared with its expenses, and although the grants already made from the general Treasury will suffice to cov°er all liabilities to the close of the fiscal year, ending on the 30th June next, I recommend some legislation, if any can be constitutionally devised, for aiding the revenues of that Department during the ensuing fiscal year, in order to avoid too great a reduction of postal facilities lour attention is also invited to numerous other improvements in the service recommended in the report, and for which, legislation is required. ° 1 recommend to the Congress to' devise a proper mode of relief to of our citizens whose property has been destroyed by order of the Government in pursuance of a policy adopted as a means of na- tional defence. It is true that full indemnity cannot now be made but some measure of relief is due to those patriotic citizens who have borne private loss for the public good, whose property in effect has been taken for public use, though not directly appropriated 16 \ eminent, born of the spirit of freedom and of the equality and inde] of the States could not have survived a seliisli <»r jealous di d making each only careful of its own interest or, safety. The fate of the Confederacy under the blessing of Divine .'ends upon the harmony, energy and unity of the States. Ives ou you, their representatives, as far as practi- } to correct errors, to cultivate fraternity and i in the people a just confidence in the Government of their chuiev . To that confidence and to the unity and self-sacrificing patri- otism hitherto displayed is due the success which has marked the un- equal contest, and has brought our country into a condition at the ut time such as the most sanguine would not have ventured to predict at the commencement of our struggle. Our armies are larger, better disciplined and more thoroughly armed and equipped than at any previous period of the war. The energies of a whole nation, de- voted, to the single object of success in this war, have accomplished ii y of our trials have, by a beneficent Providence, ed into blessings. The magnitude of the perils which ed have developed the true qualities and illustrated the ■four people, thus gaining for the Confederacy from its birth a just appreciation from the other nations of the earth. The injuries resulting from the interruption of foreign commerce have received compensation by the development of our internal resources. Cannon crown our fortresses that were east from the products of mines opened and furnaces built during the war. Our mountain caves yield of the nitre for the manufacture of powder and promise in- crease of product. From our own foundries and laboratories, from our c iries and workshops we derive, in a great measure, the warlil rial, the ordnance and ordnance stores which are expended so pr< in the numerous and desperate engagements that rapidly >ach other. Cotton and woollen fabrics, shoes and bar-