FACES OF INTERNATIONALISM Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2019 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/facesofinternati01witt FACES OF INTERNATIONALISM Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy Eugene R.Wittkopf Duke University Press Durham and London 1990 © 1990 Duke University Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper °° Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1943- Faces of internationalism: public opinion and American foreign policy / Eugene R. Wittkopf. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8223-1052-X. — ISBN 0-8223-1070-8 (pbk.) 1. United States—Foreign relations—1945—Public opinion. 2. Public opinion—United States. I. Title. E839.8.W57 1990 327.73'009'045—dc20 90-2710 CIP for Alfred B. Clubok and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. valued colleagues, invaluable friends Contents Figures ix Tables xi Preface xvii 1. The Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences of the American People: A Thematic Overview 1 2. The Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Their Po¬ litical and Sociodemographic Correlates 12 3. Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs: Policy Preferences and Performance Evaluations 52 4. The Structure of Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Their Correlates 107 5. A Comparison of the Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences of Leaders and the Mass Public 134 6. Was There Ever a Foreign Policy Consensus in American Popular Opinion? 166 vii viii Contents 7. Bipartisanship in Congressional-Executive Relations: Myth or Reality? 194 8. Faces of Internationalism: Retrospect and Prospect 214 9. Epilogue: Americans Talk Security, 1987-88 222 Appendix 1 Questionnaire Items Used to Construct the Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Mass Samples, 1974-86 238 Appendix 2 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Foreign Policy Beliefs and Policy Preferences, Mass Sam¬ ples, 1974-86 257 Appendix 3 Questionnaire Items Used to Construct the Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Leader Samples, 1974—86 275 Appendix 4 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Foreign Policy Beliefs and Policy Preferences, Pooled Samples, 1974-86 289 Appendix 5 Historical Data on Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1947-86 305 Appendix 6 Indexes of Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1947-86 334 Notes 338 Bibliography 365 Index 379 Figures 1.1 Intemationalist/Isolationist Trends in American Public Opinion, 1964-85 7 2.1 The Distribution of the Mass Public Among the Four Types of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 26 2.2 Political and Sociodemographic Correlates of Americans' For¬ eign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 49 3.1 Attitudes Toward America's World Role, by Foreign Policy Be¬ liefs, Partisanship, and Ideology, 1986 63 3.2 Attitudes Toward Defense Spending Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Ideology, 1982 and 1986 69 3.3 Attitudes Toward Support of CIA Assassination of Terrorists, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 86 3.4 Attitudes Toward the Use of Military Force Against Terrorist Organizations, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1986 87 3.5 Attitudes Toward Unilateralism and Cooperation to Cope with Oil Shortages, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974 88 4.1 The Distribution of Leaders Among the Four Types of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 116 5.1 The Distribution of Leaders and the Mass Public Among the Four Types of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 140 7.1 Bipartisan Foreign Policy Voting in the House and Senate, by Administration, 1947-86 200 7.2 The Partisan Gap in the House and Senate, by Administration, 1947-86 203 7.3 Partisanship and Ideology in the House, by Administration, 1947-86 207 7.4 Partisanship and Ideology in the Senate, by Administration, 1947-86 208 9.1 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Pro-Soviet, Communist Govern¬ ments in Different Regions and Countries, 1988 224 IX x Figures 9.2 The Goals of U.S. National Security, 1988 225 9.3 Attitudes Regarding Threats to U.S. National Security, 1988 226 9.4 Attitudes Toward Cooperative Soviet-American Ventures, 1988 227 9.5 Considerations Related to the Use of U.S. Military Force, 1988 229 9.6 Attitudes Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam, 1988 230 9.7 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Military Force, 1988 232 9.8 Attitudes Toward the Commitment of Military Strength to Protect American Interests, 1988 233 9.9 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Troops Abroad, 1988 233 Tables 2.1 Foreign Policy Attitude and Attentiveness Scales, Mass Samples, 1974-86 1 7 2.2 The Dimensionality of Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes Based on Eight Attitude Scales, 1974—86 22 2.3 The Dimensionality of Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes Based on Six Attitude Scales, 1974-86 24 2.4 Mass Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Troops, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 28 2.5 Mass Attitudes Toward the Goals of American Foreign Policy, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 31 2.6 Mass Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 32 2.7 Mass Attitudes Toward Soviet-American Relations, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 33 2.8 Bivariate anova and Multiple Classification Analyses (mcas) of the Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974^-86 35 2.9 Bivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Education and Socioeconomic Status, 1974-86 38 2.10 Bivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Region, Gender, Religion, Age, and Race, 1974-86 41 2.11 Multivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Party Identification, Political Ideology, Education, and Region, 1974—86 47 3.1 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward the Role of the United States in World Affairs, Defense Spending, Foreign Aid, and CIA Intervention, 1974-86 54 xi xii Tables 3.2 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, 1986 55 3.3 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1982 and 1986 58 3.4 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward the Role of the United States in World Affairs, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1986 62 3.5 Support for the View that the United States Plays a More Important and Powerful World Role than Ten Years Ago, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 66 3.6 Attitudes Toward Foreign Economic Aid and Military Aid and Sales, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 72 3.7 Attitudes Toward Foreign Economic Aid and Military Aid and Sales, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1974-86 73 3.8 Support for the View that the cia Should Try to Weaken or Overthrow Unfriendly Governments, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 76 3.9 Support for the View that the cia Should Try to Weaken or Overthrow Unfriendlv Governments, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1974-86 77 3.10 Support for the View that the United States May Have to Support Some Military Dictators Friendly to the United States and Opposed to the Communists, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 80 3.11 Support for the View that the United States May Have to Support Some Military Dictators Friendly to the United States and Opposed to the Communists, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1978-86 80 3.12 Support for the View that Vietnam Was Fundamentally Wrong and Immoral, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 81 3.13 Support for the View that Vietnam Was Fundamentally Wrong and Immoral, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1978-86 82 3.14 The Lessons of Vietnam, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974 83 3.15 The Lessons of Vietnam, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1974 84 Tables xiii 3.16 Support for the Elimination of Tariffs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 91 3.17 Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1982 and 1986 92 3.18 Attitudes Toward Strategic Defense Initiative Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 93 3.19 Attitudes Toward Relations with Communist Countries, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 95 3.20 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and "Thermometer” Ratings of Foreign Policy Officials, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1978-86 100 3.21 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Evaluations of President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's Performance, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1974 103 4.1 Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, header Samples, 1974—86 113 4.2 The Dimensionality of Leaders' Foreign Policy Attitudes, 1974— 86 114 4.3 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Importance of Containing Communism as a U.S. Foreign Policy Goal, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974, 1978, and 1986 118 4.4 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Lessons of Vietnam, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974 119 4.5 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Morality of the Vietnam War, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1978 and 1986 120 4.6 Leaders' Attitudes Toward Covert Cl A Activities Abroad, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974, 1978, and 1986 121 4.7 The Distribution of Leaders on the Cooperative (Cl) and Militant (MI) Internationalism Dimensions by Role/ Occupational Groups, 1974, 1978, and 1986 125 4.8 The Distribution of Nongovernmental Leaders by Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974, 1978, and 1986 126 4.9 Multivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Nongovernmental Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974, 1978, and 1986 128 4.10 The Relationship Between Nongovernmental Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1986 131 xiv Tables 5.1 Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Pooled Samples, 1974-86 137 5.2 The Dimensionality of Leader and Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes Derived from the Pooled Samples, 1974-86 138 5.3 Multivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Americans' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974—86 142 5.4 Multivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Americans' Foreign Policy Beliefs, Attentiveness, Party Identification, and Political Ideology, 1974—86 145 5.5 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Active U.S. Involvement in World Affairs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 148 5.6 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Defense Spending Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 150 5.7 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Foreign Economic Aid and Military Aid and Sales, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 152 5.8 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the View that the CIA Should Try to Weaken or Overthrow Unfriendly Governments, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 154 5.9 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for Support of Dictators, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974U86 155 5.10 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the View that Vietnam Was Fundamentally Wrong and Immoral, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 156 5.11 The Lessons of Vietnam as Seen by Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974 157 5.12 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Alternatives for Dealing with Terrorists, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 158 5.13 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the Elimination of Tariffs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 159 5.14 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Nuclear Weapons, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1982 and 1986 160 5.15 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward SDi Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 161 Tables xv 5.16 The Relationship Between Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance by Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology Controlled, 1986 163 6.1 Attitudes Toward Stopping the Spread of Communism, 1950- 51 169 6.2 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1974-86 170 6.3 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1948 171 6.4 The Relationship Between Willingness to Use Troops Abroad and Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War, 1978-86 176 6.5 Circumstances that Might Justify the United States Going to War in the Future, 1969-71 177 6.6 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Respond to Communist Attacks, 1950 178 6.7 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend West Berlin, 1961-80 179 6.8 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops in Central and South America, 1947-83 182 6.9 Attitudes Toward Eastern Europe and Cuba, 1953-63 183 6.10 Attitudes Toward A Soviet Invasion of Poland, 1980-81 184 6.11 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops, Military Aid, and Noninvolvement in Communist-Backed Conflict Situations, 1971 and 1975 185 6.12 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Military Force in Indochina, 1953-54 187 7.1 Multivariate anova and mcas of the Relationship Between Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, Partisanship, and Ideology, by Administration, 1947-86 210 Preface Whether politics ever stopped at the water's edge is dubious, but it is clear that the nature and purpose of American foreign policy are today the subject of often deep and bitter domestic contention. It has been that way at least since the Vietnam War. The experience of the United States in the protracted and tragic war in Southeast Asia caused a fundamental reorientation of the thinking of political leaders and the mass public about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. Before the Vietnam War, a fundamental consensus about that role existed. Vietnam led to its demise, and in its wake American foreign policy has become the subject of an unprecedented level of partisan and ideological dispute. Fueled in part by developments at home and abroad caused by Vietnam, the past fifteen years have witnessed considerable interest in public attitudes toward American foreign policy among scholars and political commentators. What the American people are thinking and what they are thinking about have become a constant source of interest— and sometimes surprise and concern—in daily newspapers, weekly news magazines, and the electronic media as well as scholarly journals. The profusion of public opinion polling, much of it the product of the media establishment who are themselves its major consumers, is both a cause and consequence of this interest. The result is that fundamental tenets of democratic theory can now be examined more extensively and systematically than ever before. This book is a study of public opinion and foreign policy. It seeks to advance an understanding of the changed and changing nature of public attitudes toward American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam era and the role that public opinion plays in the American foreign policymaking process. The empirical analyses draw heavily on four mass and four elite opinion surveys sponsored at four-year intervals by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations beginning in late 1974. Other data stretch- XVII xviii Preface ing back to the immediate post-World War II era are also examined as a way of illuminating the similarities and dissimilarities of the pre- and post-Vietnam eras. Much of the analysis is necessarily descriptive in nature, but it is driven by theoretical concerns throughout. The book is the product of a decade of research and writing about public opinion and foreign policy. It began with a paper presented at the International Studies Association in 1979 entitled "Who Cares About Foreign Aid?" The paper was a product of my intellectual concern with the source of nations' foreign policies, but it also reflected my growing dissatisfaction with the kinds of explanations associated with the tradition of aggregate cross-national approaches to the comparative study of foreign policy in which I had been steeped. Little did I know then that I would be grappling with the same concerns in 1989. My thinking about these ideas and how best to examine them have appeared in several professional journal articles, but this book extends far beyond them. The analyses of the 1986 mass and leader surveys have not appeared previously; most of the earlier surveys have been reanalyzed so as to enhance inter-temporal comparisons; the examination of leaders' foreign policy beliefs and their correlates has not appeared in this form before; and the analyses of the relationship between beliefs and preferences is completely new. Although most of what appears here is new and different, in the course of the decade or more in which the ideas have taken shape I have been fortunate to work with a number of people who have helped in many ways and to have had the support of many institutions. Michael A. Maggiotto and I worked together during the early stages of the project and published some papers together. I learned much from him and owe him a debt of gratitude. In the closing stages of the project I have been equally fortunate to have worked with James M. McCormick. We collaborated on the historical materials in chapters 6 and 7 and especially closely on the question of congressional foreign policy voting behavior. An abbreviated version of chapter 6 appeared under our joint authorship in the Summer 1990 issue of Polity. Chapter 7 is also a joint effort, but Jim did virtually all of the extensive data analysis and deserves substantial credit for the final product. I thank him for permission to use our joint efforts here and am pleased to acknowledge how much I have enjoyed working with him personally as well as professionally. The historical materials analyzed in chapter 6 came primarily from the extensive public opinion archives amassed by Benjamin I. Page and Preface xix Robert Y. Shapiro, and from the Harris data archives at the University of North Carolina. These were supplemented by data reported in the historical records of the Division of Public Studies, Office of Public Affairs of the U.S. Department of State. I am especially indebted to Robert Shapiro of Columbia University and Diana McDuffee of the University of North Carolina for willingly providing access to their data archives and for the time and attention they generously gave to my many inquiries. Barbara L. Miracle, formerly director of Professional Education Service at the Congressional Quarterly, also helped with the historical analyses by providing necessary documentation not otherwise available. James E. Campbell, James C. Garand, and Roger Wojtkiewicz gave generously of their time and insight in response to my many calls for help and advice, and Clifford Clogg helped point the way toward the analyses reported in chapters 3 and 5. Alan F. Kay, director of the Americans Talk Security (ats) project, has kindly granted permission to reprint the figures that appear in chapter 9. Ole R. Holsti and an anonymous reviewer (who proved to be a tough but always constructive critic) read the entire manuscript and made many helpful suggestions for improvements. I have also benefited from Professor Holsti's insights shared in discussions about the subject of the book over several years. Staff personnel and graduate assistants at Louisiana State University, the University of Florida, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill contributed in important ways to the final product. Mary Angela Schauf was indispensable in smoothing the transition from one computer environment to another, Mark J. Dehaven, John McShane, and W. King Mott provided valuable research assistance, and Jo Scurria helped immeasurably with the preparation of the tables and other portions of the manuscript. The research was made possible in part by the support of the National Science Foundation under grants SES-8014984 and SES- 8311478. The Chicago Council surveys and the congressional voting and related data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (icpsr). The ATS data were provided through the Roper Center. All of these individuals and institutions share in my gratitude, but none is responsible for the analyses or interpretations that follow. Two others share my special gratitude and affection for reasons that extend well beyond this book. It is with great pleasure that I dedicate it to them. FACES OF INTERNATIONALISM 1 . The Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences of the American People: A Thematic Overview A number of developments during the 1970s contributed to the break¬ down of what is widely presumed to have been the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years. The Vietnam trauma, the onset of detente with the Soviet Union, and the Watergate episode were key elements in the challenge to the assumptions on which the consensus had been built. The wrenching Vietnam experience shook to its very foundation the assumption that American military power by itself could achieve the objectives of American foreign policy. The policy and process of detente called into question the wisdom and assumptions underlying the containment strategy that had served as the cornerstone of American foreign policy for more than two decades. And Watergate challenged the belief that American political institutions were uniquely virtuous and that a presidency preeminent in foreign policy continued to be a necessity in the post-Cold War era. The Cold War foreign policy consensus thus dissipated as the American people became divided not only over the question of whether the United States should be involved in world affairs—which traditionally had divided them along interna¬ tionalist-isolationist lines—but also how it ought to be involved: which now raised questions about the means of American foreign policy as well as its ends. As differences about ends and means emerged, support for internationalism, which for two decades had sustained an active U.S. role in world affairs, began to manifest different faces. By the end of the 1970s a number of developments at home and abroad seemed to point to the conclusion that the 1970s may have been little more than an interlude in the nation's historic oscillation between introversion and extroversion (Klingberg, 1952, 1979) that did little to challenge the orthodox postwar world view based on the premises of globalism, anticommunism, containment, military might, and interven¬ tionism (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987). Events in Iran and Afghanistan were widely reputed to have contributed to a shedding of the Vietnam 1 2 Faces of Internationalism legacy and to have rekindled Americans' willingness to be actively and assertively involved in world affairs (see, e.g., Nelson and Conover, 1981; and Yankelovich and Kaagan, 1981). Public support for increased defense spending rose dramatically from the trough of the early 1970s, and the Carter administration laid aside its earlier "global issues" orientation as it girded for renewed battle with the Soviet menace not only in Afghanistan but also in Africa and elsewhere. The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1980, given Reagan's long-standing ideological opposition to communism and the Soviet threat, seemed to confirm how profoundly the domestic context of American foreign policy had shifted toward support of a more assertive America in the course of less than a decade. And the widespread public approval the Reagan administration received for its invasion of Grenada in 1983 and for its air attack on Libya three years later seemed to prove that the ghost of Vietnam had finally been exorcised. Questions about the nature and purpose of American foreign and national security policy during the remainder of this century and into the next, nonetheless, have been the subject of a continuing and often vigorous debate. A common thread among the various positions that have been advanced is that the foundations on which the role of the United States in world affairs since 1945 was built no longer provide a coherent basis for American policy and no longer enjoy widespread bipartisan support among the American people. 1 Illustrative are the comments of Richard J. Barnet (1987: 76), who argues that "ever since the crisis in the nineteen-sixties over the war in Vietnam the foreign- policy consensus has been under attack, and in recent years [the four pillars that have undergirded postwar U.S. foreign policy] have been wobbling." Barnet describes the "four pillars" as: (1) A war-prevention system known as deterrence. . . . (2) A global coalition whose purpose is to contain Soviet power and Com¬ munist ideology, and which is maintained by a network of political and military alliances. (3) A commitment to intervene—by military means, if necessary—in internal wars and insurgencies, mostly in the Third World, in order to prevent revolutionary political change and "Marxist-Leninist" models of economic development. (4) A liberal international economic order . . . that reflects a strong preference for free trade, freely convertible currencies, and fixed exchange rates. (1987: 76) Against this backdrop he suggests that "The current discussion about Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 3 national security—the issues are not distinct enough and the choices are too unclear to call it a debate—is about how to shore up deterrence, how to remove the strains in the alliance, how to undertake military inter¬ ventions in ways that the American public will accept, and how to dilute the commitment to free trade enough to quiet the public anger about foreign goods while holding fast to the principle." At the same time that these questions were being pondered, other analysts began to worry about the economic burdens of America's global involvement. Concerned with its precarious financial condition in the face of persistent trade and mounting federal government budget def¬ icits, the prescribed policy was a turn from superpower confrontation toward economic reconstruction and revitalization. Paul Kennedy (1987) drew on the historical record spanning five centuries to warn of the ad¬ verse economic (and ultimately political) consequences of "imperial ov¬ erstretch" in his best-selling The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Variants on the theme included David P. Calleo's (1987) Beyond American Hegemony and James Chace's (1988) essay in Foreign Policy, in which he proposed "A New Grand Strategy." Drawing on Walter Lippmann's (1943: 9) ob¬ servation that "foreign policy consists in bringing into balance . . . the nation's commitments and the nation's power," Chace argued that the United States "is becoming more ordinary, more like the others, and increasingly subject to unaccustomed constraints." Like Lippmann, Chace urged "solvency" as "the fundamental principle of a wise foreign policy." Solvency, he argued, "means recognizing not only U.S. limitations but also the opportunities that lie ahead for international cooperation and institution-building as America prepares to negotiate the end of the cold war with the Soviet Union" (Chace, 1988: 3-4). Among others, 2 Zbigniew Brzezinski (1988: 680) responded to the pro¬ ponents of the solvency school by observing that "the rumors of Amer¬ ica's imminent imperial decline," while "quite fashionable," are "pre¬ mature." He conceded, nonetheless, that "on the strategic, geopolitical and global levels the need exists for significant adjustments in the way the United States participates in the global political process and promotes its fundamental national interests" (1988: 682). The theme was echoed by two former secretaries of state, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance (1988: 920), who urged in Foreign Affairs "a more restrictive approach to the defense of American objectives than that in the immediate postwar period." Importantly, Kissinger and Vance prefaced their prescription with the observation that "[it is] our deep belief that the security of free 4 Faces of Internationalism peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restoration of bi¬ partisan consensus in American foreign policy. . . . [W]e are convinced that the American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined—or even subject to redefinition—with every change of admin¬ istration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world. . . . Other nations—friends or adversaries— unable to gear their policies to American steadiness will go their own way, dooming the United States to growing irrelevance" (1988: 899). The implication is that the former secretaries of state believed these processes were already in motion. Consensus and Its Breakdown The foreign policy consensus presumed to have held sway in the United States prior to Vietnam years captured elements of both conflict and cooperation. The United States was willing to cooperate with other na¬ tions to solve global as well as national problems, but if need be it would also intervene in the affairs of others, using force if necessary to protect its self-defined national interests. It was an approach toward active global involvement that seemingly enjoyed strong domestic support. Dissenting voices were heard, to be sure, but support for active in¬ volvement in world affairs was widespread. Ole R. Holsti (1979: 341-42), for example, has argued that in the decades following World War II "lead¬ ership opinion in the United States . . . tended to converge around a series of propositions defining the essential character of the global system and of America's proper role within it. . . . The result was a politically centrist coalition that supported the main contours of a globalist foreign policy." Similarly, Ralph B. Levering (1978) has argued that the Cold War consensus embraced by foreign policy activists placed them near the middle of a unilateralist-multilateralist continuum, the extremes of which reflected the views of conservative, nationalist critics of American foreign policy and liberal, internationalist critics. Thus, Levering (1978: 105) argues, foreign policy activists "supported forming alliances, work¬ ing through the United Nations, and giving foreign aid—but only if these multilateralist policies clearly were promoting the national interest." Ga¬ briel A. Almond (1960: 158) also observed in his classic study. The Amer¬ ican People and Foreign Policy, first published in 1950, that "a general ideo¬ logical consensus" exists in the United States. "At the level of general opinion on public policy, one may speak of a consensus of mood, of Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 5 shared emotional states in response to changes in the domestic and for¬ eign arenas. At the level of articulate elite policy formulation there is a broad consensus ... to be understood as an adherence to a broad com¬ promise on political procedures and policies.” Anticommunism provided much of the glue of the foreign policy con¬ sensus. As I. M. Destler, Leslie Gelb, and Anthony Lake (1984: 19) put it, "The anti-Communist-policy consensus was at the heart of centrism and majorityship and gave [American foreign policy] steadiness and di¬ rection." Similarly, James Chace (1978: 3), a former managing editor of Foreign Affairs, observed how "selling programs to Congress and the American people . . . was always made easier if they could be clothed in one garment," namely, anticommunism. Presidential dominance in foreign affairs and bipartisanship in congressional-executive relations were important elements of the way the consensus operated in practice. Destler (1985: 14) has pointed out that there was a constant foreign policy debate on matters involving Congress and the president, and on some issues, such as foreign aid appropriations, "presidents did not always win on Capitol Hill," but on security issues the president did reign supreme. The best evidence is found in the overwhelming congressional support for the "area reso¬ lutions" granting the president broad authority to cope with external conflict situations in the Middle East, Berlin, Cuba, the China straits, and Vietnam. By the mid-1970s, however, this picture had been fundamentally al¬ tered. As challenges were mounted at home and abroad to the position the United States had occupied in world affairs since World War II, the consensual beliefs seemingly so self-evident in the 1950s and 1960s be¬ came the object of often bitter partisan and ideological disputes. 3 In the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski: [0]ur foreign policy became increasingly the object of contestation, of sharp cleavage, and even of some reversal of traditional political commitments. The Democratic Party, the party of internationalism, became increasingly prone to the appeal of neo-isolationism. And the Republican Party, the party of isola¬ tionism, became increasingly prone to the appeal of militant interventionism. And both parties increasingly found their center of gravity shifting to the extreme, thereby further polarizing our public opinion. (1984: 15-16) Further evidence of the breakdown of the Cold War foreign policy consensus can be found in the vigorous introspection about the nation's 6 Faces of Internationalism appropriate posture in the world that found its way into various journals during the late 1960s and 1970s, particularly Foreign Policy. 4 At issue were a number of questions central to the premises of the Cold War consensus: the nature of the Soviet threat, the wisdom of containment, the role that force should play in American foreign policy, and whether American interests and values were best protected by pursuing an active world role or by concentrating attention on problems at home. It was as though a “new" foreign policy establishment was vying with the “old"—which had based its power and position on the premises of the Cold War con¬ sensus—for the right to control the making and execution of American foreign policy for the duration of the millennium (Gershman, 1980). In short, the bipartisan consensus of the Cold War years regarding the ends and means of American foreign policy was shattered. And in the view of many, it was unlikely to be rebuilt. “The kind of broad con¬ sensus that obtained during the postwar era and which became a shib¬ boleth of American foreign policy may no longer be possible to resurrect short of war," wrote Chace (1978:15). “American interests are too diverse and American power much less predominant." As the bipartisan con¬ sensus was shattered, so too was the belief that "politics stops at the water's edge." Always more myth than reality, perhaps, the perception was nonetheless a key element of a domestic political environment that had permitted presidents from Truman to Johnson to count on broad- based domestic support for their foreign policy initiatives. Their suc¬ cessors would not enjoy that luxury. 5 The Nature of Americans' Internationalist Attitudes The view that the United States ought to take an active role in world affairs has enjoyed persistent public support throughout the post-World War II era. Beginning in the 1940s, several different surveys and polling organizations have asked the following question: “Do you think it would be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" The response has been re¬ markably consistent. Roughly two-thirds of the American people sup¬ ported an active world role at about the time President Truman enun¬ ciated his famous doctrine, and the proportion stayed at this level or higher throughout the 1950s. During the 1960s the question was asked only once, in 1965, but it received a nearly 80 percent margin of support. Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 7 Figure 1.1 Internationalist/Isolationist Trends in American Public Opinion, 1964-85 (percentages) 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Internationalist —I— Mixed Isolationist Source: William Watts, "Americans Look at the World: Internationalism on the Rise," The Gallup Report International 3 (July): T and William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, State of the Nation III (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), p. 133. Support for the proposition declined somewhat during the 1970s, but it averaged 63 percent during the decade and remained at that level during the 1980s .* Thus the view that a consensus in favor of internationalism has characterized public attitudes throughout the post-World War II era receives strong and consistent support. But even while the American people have continually supported an active role for the United States in world affairs, the nature of their in¬ ternationalist attitudes has changed. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free (Watts and Free, 1978; Watts, 1985) illustrate these changes with re¬ sponses to several questions in public opinion surveys they conducted between 1964 and 1985, which they used to place respondents on an internationalism-isolationism continuum. The results are depicted graphically in figure 1.1. The picture suggests a gradual erosion of in¬ ternationalist attitudes between 1964 and 1972, followed by a sharp de¬ cline in the immediate post-Vietnam years of 1974^76, with less than a majority of respondents falling into the internationalist category during 8 Faces of Internationalism that time. Inspection of the items used to construct the internationalism index indicates that declining support for the United Nations and a drop in the number of Americans willing to defend Europe and Japan militarily in the event of a Soviet or Chinese attack account for these developments. The findings have a parallel in attitudes toward military spending during this period, which show a remarkable decline in support for increased defense spending between 1965 and 1975 and an even more dramatic increase in the number of Americans who believed that too much was being spent on defense (Kriesberg and Klein, 1980; and Russett and DeLuca, 1981). The trends in both series are consistent with the proposition that the Vietnam experience and related developments during the 1970s pro¬ foundly affected the attitudes of Americans toward the role of the United States in world affairs. More problematic is whether the changes apparent in the 1970s have had a lasting effect. As shown in figure 1.1, support for internationalism rebounded in the 1980s to levels similar to those in the 1960s. The shift is explained in part by an increase since the 1970s in the proportion of Americans willing to use military force to defend Europe and Japan. The dramatic reversal of defense-spending attitudes in the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s is also noteworthy. In 1971, when the United States was still deeply mired in the Vietnam conflict, only 10 percent of the American people supported increased defense spending. The pro¬ portion grew only slightly, to 25 percent, by 1976, but by 1980 it had skyrocketed to 71 percent. It is also well known that the pro-defense climate dissipated as rapidly as it was built. By 1983 only two-fifths of the American people wanted more defense spending increases, and a year later the proportion dropped to 14 percent, or roughly the level of a decade earlier (Harris, 1987: 344). Arguably, however, the decline in support during the 1980s reflected as much satisfaction with the Reagan administration's rearmament program as it did dissatisfaction with its burdens, which is quite different from the situation in the 1970s. Despite these indications of an apparent return to patterns of foreign policy attitudes characteristic of an earlier era, there is considerable evi¬ dence that the divisions among the American people associated with the breakdown of the Cold War consensus have persisted. On the critical issue of using troops abroad, for example, Europe and Japan appear to be the exception, not the rule; more often, opposition to the use of force in different scenarios evident in the 1970s persisted into the 1980s. 7 Fur¬ thermore, a number of analysts have taken advantage of the growing Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 9 body of public opinion data to probe the foreign policy attitudes of the American people and their leaders in the post-Vietnam era. The data and methodologies used by these analysts often differ, but collectively they paint a portrait that depicts the American people and their leaders as divided on many of the issues comprising the foundations on which post-World War II American foreign policy was built, 8 thereby dem¬ onstrating the absence of consensus and, with it, the continuing absence of widespread bipartisan support for many of the nation's foreign policy initiatives. Faces of Internationalism: An Analytical Overview This book is a study of public opinion and foreign policy. Its primary focus is on change and continuity in the internationalist attitudes of the American people in the post-Vietnam era. The analysis draws heavily on four mass and elite public opinion surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations at four-year intervals beginning in late 1974 (see Rielly, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987). The surveys reflect the widespread interest in public attitudes toward public policy issues in contemporary America manifested in the ubiquity of public opinion polling in recent years, but are unique not only in their breadth and depth but also in the opportunities for inter-temporal and elite-mass comparisons they invite. The analyses in subsequent chapters based on these data will dem¬ onstrate empirically that the American people have been divided in the post-Vietnam era not only on the question of whether the United States ought to be involved in world affairs but also on how it should be in¬ volved. 9 They will demonstrate that questions regarding conflict and co¬ operation abroad divide rather than unite Americans. The Cold War for¬ eign policy consensus presumed to have been operative prior to the Vietnam war will be shown to have given way to two forms of internationalism, one captured in the phrase cooperative internationalism, the other in militant internationalism. Attitudes toward communism, the use of American troops abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union will be shown to distinguish proponents and opponents of the alternative forms of internationalism. They in turn give rise to four distinct foreign policy attitude clusters or foreign policy beliefs: internationalists, isolationists, accommodationists , and hardliners. The prescriptions associated with each often differ. Herein lies important insight into the domestic discord that has frequently char- 10 Faces of Internationalism acterized recent American foreign policy and the foreign policymaking process. The study develops the themes briefly identified here in the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 spells out the conceptual, methodological, and empirical foundations for the remainder of the book. It begins by dis¬ cussing traditional views of the nature of mass political attitudes toward foreign policy and their shortcomings. It then probes the Chicago Council public opinion data to determine the structure of mass foreign policy beliefs. It is here that the two faces of internationalism are identified and described. The political consequences of the bifurcation of Americans' internationalists attitudes are explored and their political and sociode¬ mographic correlates identified. Chapter 3 examines the policy preferences associated with mass for¬ eign policy beliefs. The analyses, which build on the premise that no consideration of public opinion is meaningful without sensitivity to the political context in which it is expressed and measured, validate the belief system typology identified and elaborated in chapter 2 by demonstrating systematically the relationship between beliefs and preferences. Herein lies further insight into the domestic divisions that so often have plagued the nation's approach to world affairs and have contributed to the seem¬ ingly consistent inconsistency of American foreign policy in recent years (Destler, Gelb, and Lake, 1984). Chapter 3 also explores the relationship between Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their evaluations of policymakers' performance. The premise underlying the inquiry is that insight into the elusive relationship between public opinion and American foreign policy may in this way be found. The strategy is pursued elsewhere in the remainder of the book. Chapter 4 repeats for elites the analyses in chapter 2 so as to determine the nature of their foreign policy beliefs. The structure of elite and mass foreign policy attitudes proves to be quite similar. This permits, in chapter 5, a systematic assessment of the arguments in elite theory that predict and explain expected differences between elites and masses. Chapter 4 also demonstrates that among elites political factors are more important than role or occupational factors in explaining differences in leaders' for¬ eign policy beliefs. Chapter 5 compares systematically the policy preferences of elites and masses. Although elites and masses embrace similar foreign policy be¬ liefs, they differ in the salience they attach to the prescriptions inherent in them. The occupancy of leadership roles is an important explanation Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 11 of these differences. The result is that differences between elites and masses about whether and how the United States should be involved in world affairs often follow predictable patterns. Chapter 6 deviates from the previous chapters in that it focuses not on the four Chicago Council mass and elite surveys but on a broad array of public opinion questions asked in mass surveys from the 1940s to the 1980s in an effort to determine whether a foreign policy consensus ever existed. That it did exist is widely accepted, as indicated earlier in this chapter, and that assumption is a primary building block on which this study is premised. In chapter 6 the assumption is treated as an hypoth¬ esis. The conclusions drawn indicate that the previous chapters are built on a firm foundation, but they also warn that quicksand may be close at hand. Chapter 7 continues the query raised in chapter 6. Elites are the focus here. Because survey data that could be used to examine elite attitudes historically in the same way that mass attitudes are examined in chapter 6 are absent, congressional voting behavior is used to determine whether and when bipartisanship accurately characterized congressional-execu¬ tive relations since World War II. The themes underlying the study sug¬ gest that bipartisanship should be more evident before the Vietnam War and partisanship after it. These expectations are borne out to some extent, but partisan and ideological voting are also shown to be prominent throughout the post-World War II era. Chapter 8 summarizes the conclusions drawn in the main body of the study and suggests where theory and evidence must be pursued if the complex nexus between public opinion and American foreign policy is to be unraveled. It is followed in chapter 9 by a brief epilogue based on a series of surveys sponsored by the Americans Talk Security (ats) project during the 1987-88 presidential campaign. The purpose is to speculate on prospects for the continuation of two faces of internationalism in the 1990s and beyond. 2 . The Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Their Political and Sociodemographic Correlates Continuity and change both aptly describe post-World War II American foreign policy. Continuity is evident in the fundamental assumptions that American leaders have made about the nature of international real¬ ities and the corresponding role of the United States in world affairs. Projecting American power worldwide, opposing the spread of com¬ munism, containing the expansion of Soviet influence, and relying on military might and intervention in the affairs of others to achieve these objectives have persisted as the ends and means of American foreign policy for more than four decades. No president who has occupied the Oval Office since World War II has seriously questioned the emphases placed on these consistent themes or the assumptions of realpolitik that underlie them (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987). Change is also evident. If the level of abstraction is moved from the broad, historical generalizations that range across the various Democratic and Republican administrations that have held the reins of power in Washington since the 1940s to the attributes that differentiate them, American foreign policy often seems better characterized by change than by continuity. The electoral system itself contributes to the impression since it encourages the belief that by changing personnel, policy will also change. Examples include the Eisenhower administration's commitment to terminate—one way or another—the Korean War; the shift from a policy of massive retaliation to assured destruction under Kennedy and Johnson; the inauguration of an era of Soviet-American detente during Nixon's presidency; Carter's commitment to a "global issues" foreign policy; and Reagan's subsequent reinvigoration of an anticommunist thrust. Each of these shifts, while not challenging the fundamental premises of globalism, anticommunism, containment, military might, and interven¬ tionism, carried with it other changes in emphases and tactics that con¬ tributed to the seeming inconsistency so often ascribed to American for¬ eign policy by the nation's allies and adversaries alike. 12 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 13 Perspectives on Mass Public Opinion Toward Foreign Policy Mass public opinion regarding the nation's behavior abroad, like Amer¬ ican foreign policy itself, can be expected to manifest both consistency and coherence on the one hand, and inconsistency and incoherence on the other. Typically, however, the latter descriptions have dominated discussions of the nature of mass foreign policy attitudes and have in turn been used to deprecate the role of public opinion in the foreign policymaking process. The reasons can be found in the well-established beliefs that the American people are uninterested in and ill informed about foreign policy, with a corresponding penchant to evince unstable foreign policy attitudes highly susceptible to manipulation by political elites. The reasons for this unflattering description and the corresponding inference that public opinion is largely irrelevant to the making of Amer¬ ican foreign policy can be traced in part to Gabriel Almond's influential book The American People and Foreign Policy (1960), in which Almond as¬ cribed to the American people a ''moodishness'' about foreign policy issues that grew naturally out of their relative indifference to foreign policy except in times of crisis and peril. Almond (1960: 53) argued spe¬ cifically that "the characteristic response to questions of foreign policy is one of indifference. A foreign policy crisis, short of the immediate threat of war, may transform indifference to vague apprehension, to fatalism, to anger; but the reaction is still a mood, a superficial and fluc¬ tuating response." William R. Caspary (1970) later challenged Almond's premises and conclusions, but the view of an uninterested and ill-informed public eas¬ ily subject to elite manipulation nonetheless persisted. In part the reason is the pervasiveness of evidence consistent with Almond's arguments. Consider, for example, that in 1979 only 23 percent of the adult popu¬ lation in the United States knew the two countries involved in the salt (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) negotiations; or that in 1985 less than two-thirds of the public knew that the United States supported South Vietnam in the Vietnam War, which cost some 58,000 Americans their lives (cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987: 288). This, of course, is the kind of environment ripe for manipulation by foreign policy elites in the sense that public support for particular policies may be created where none existed previously. Again, consider some evidence: In 1970 only 7 percent of the American people favored an invasion of Cambodia, but 14 Faces of Internationalism after President Nixon announced the “incursion," 50 percent favored the policy; and in 1977, following the signing of the Panama Canal treaties, there was an 18 percent increase in the proportion of respondents willing to turn the canal over to Panama (cited in Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987: 307). The cyclical swings implied in the “moodishness" Almond ascribed to the American people (see also Klingberg, 1952, 1979; and Holmes, 1985) also have counterparts in the oscillations in support for an active U.S. world role and defense spending described in chapter 1. A second body of empirical theory pointing to the inconsistency and incoherence of mass foreign policy beliefs can be traced to the pioneering work of Philip E. Converse (1964), who argued in a seminal paper on “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" that a liberal/conservative axis “betokens a contextual grasp of politics that permits a wide range of more specific idea-elements to be organized into more tightly con¬ strained wholes," and that "constraint among political idea-elements be¬ gins to lose its range very rapidly once we move from the most sophis¬ ticated few toward the 'grass roots'" (1964: 228). Because the mass public is typically uninterested and ill informed about public affairs, the ar¬ gument continues, mass political beliefs are often regarded as simplistic and undifferentiated. "The mass public," according to this argument, "has neither the educational background, the contextual knowledge, nor the capacity to deal with abstract concepts that sustain an organized set of beliefs over a wide range of political issues" (Nie, with Andersen, 1974: 543). The views of elites, on the other hand, are assumed to be richer in detail and structured more coherently because elites have "more information about politics and society and . . . more sophisticated con¬ cepts for interpreting, storing, and using this information" (Putnam, 1976: 87). 1 Given these attributes, it is not surprising that V. O. Key described the function of political elites thus: "The political elite mediate between the world of remote and complex events and the mass public. A great function of political leadership is the clarification of public problems and the presentation of courses of action" (cited in Putnam, 1976: 140). The analyses in this chapter challenge these views. Specifically, they challenge the propositions (1) that instability characterizes mass political attitudes toward foreign policy; 2 and (2) that the mass public is incapable of relating discreet foreign policy issues to one another in a systematic and coherent fashion. It will be demonstrated that Americans' foreign policy attitudes are constrained in that they exhibit both structure and ideological sophistication. 3 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 15 Constraint relates closely to the concept of a belief system, defined by Converse (1964: 207) as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.” In less technical terms. Ole R. Holsti describes a belief system as ”a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him and identifying for him its salient characteristics. ... In addition to organizing perceptions into a mean¬ ingful guide for behavior, the belief system has the function of the es¬ tablishment of goals and the ordering of preferences” (1962: 245). Prac¬ tically speaking, then, if the mass of the American people manifest "structural consistency” (constraint) in their foreign policy beliefs or world views, it should be possible to predict their attitudes on one issue from knowledge of their attitudes on another. 4 It will be shown that this is indeed the case. Not challenged in the analyses that follow is the well-documented finding that the mass of the American people are, relatively speaking, uninterested in and ill informed about foreign policy issues. 5 It is not challenged because interest and knowledge are largely irrelevant to whether the American people are able, in the aggregate, to hold politically relevant foreign policy beliefs. These beliefs may not conform to what political sci¬ entists and journalists would like to see as they contemplate the theory and practice of contemporary democracy, but foreign policy beliefs may be both coherent and politically relevant even if they are not grounded in political sophistication. 6 One example suffices to make the point: most Americans may not know where in Central America El Salvador and Nicaragua are or who the United States may or may not have supported there, but, nonetheless, they may be firm and unwavering in their con¬ victions about whether American boys should be sent to fight in the region—and the evidence suggests they are (see also Graham, 1988). From the point of view of policymakers in Washington, the latter is the important, politically relevant datum. Putting aside, then, the (politically dubious) question of whether the mass of the American people are well informed about foreign policy issues—and hence politically sophisticated—how can we determine what Americans' foreign policy beliefs are? How, in other words, can it be demonstrated that consistency and coherence characterize the foreign policy attitudes and corresponding goals and preferences of the Amer¬ ican people? 16 Faces of Internationalism Methodology Each of four Chicago Council mass foreign policy surveys contains sev¬ eral dozen questions from which it is possible to extract general patterns of foreign policy attitudes and, from these, Americans' foreign policy beliefs. 7 The strategy involves several steps. First, items were identified that sought to elicit responses to common underlying dimensions. Attention was confined to those related to tra¬ ditional foreign policy issues and whose basic, underlying thrust was repeated in each of the four surveys through the use of identical or anal¬ ogous items. This permits inter-temporal comparisons to be made, even though the precise wording of the questions used to tap an underlying dimension may have changed. 8 In the 1974 survey, for example, re¬ spondents were asked if it would be a threat to the United States if various regions or countries were to become Communist. Four years later they were presented with the names of six different countries and asked, “How much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power in that country through peaceful elections." Then, in 1982 and again in 1986, somewhat different lists of countries were used, and the phrase “through peaceful elections" was dropped from the question. Clearly the variations in these items can be expected to produce some variations in responses, yet in all four instances perceptions of the threat of communism is the common underlying concept, and it is this infor¬ mation that I ultimately wish to measure and trace through time. Second, once the specific questions were identified, they were treated as Likert-type items, with numerical scores attached to each response and the scores summed to create a single scale score for each respondent. The inter-item correlations were examined to ensure that all of the items correlated correctly (that is, had the proper sign) with the underlying scale, and Cronbach's alpha was used to assess the reliability of the scales. Following convention, the goal was to attain a coefficient of 0.7 before the scale was accepted. Items were deleted from the scale if they unduly depressed the level of alpha. As a practical matter, however, it was not always possible to achieve this desired level (see table 2.1). Nonetheless, the goals of the scaling strategy were to use as much of the intended richness of the data as possible and to avoid the inherent instability of single-indicator measures of underlying constructs (Kritzer, 1978). Third, once the reliability of the scales in each of the surveys was determined, the scales were factor analyzed to determine the structure Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 17 Table 2.1 Foreign Policy Attitude and Attentiveness Scales, Mass Samples, 1974-86 No. Acronym Year Items Alpha N Foreign Policy Scales The United States should pursue ACTIVE- 1986 1 — 2,872 an active role in world affairs. COOPERATION/ 1982 1 — 2,706 but with an emphasis on cooperative APARTHEID 1978 3 .50 2,698 ties with other nations 3 1974 7 .54 1,463 The larger the number of COMMUNIST 1986 6 .84 2,872 nations that become Communist, 1982 6 .77 2,706 the more threatened would be 1978 5 .86 2,698 American interests 1974 6 .90 1,498 Closer ties between the United DETENTE 1986 6 .55 2,872 States and the Soviet Union are 1982 5 .57 2,706 desirable 1978 3 .51 2,698 1974 9 .84 1,475 Foreign economic aid should be ECONOMICAID 1986 — — — supported because of its multiple 1982 8 .69 2,706 benefits 1978 6 .66 2,698 1974 10 .77 1,476 Military aid should be supported MILITARYAID 1986 — — — because of its multiple benefits 1982 8 .65 2,706 1978 6 .69 2,698 1974 9 .73 1,461 Some circumstances might justify TROOPS 1986 11 .82 2,872 the use of U.S. troops abroad 1982 11 .80 2,706 1978 10 .80 2,698 1974 12 .87 1,470 The goals of American foreign policy USGOALS 1986 14 .80 2,872 should embrace a wide range of 1982 14 .83 2,706 security and nonsecurity issue areas 1978 13 .83 2,698 1974 18 .86 1,419 The United States has vital interests VITALINTERESTS 1986 22 .76 2,872 in many countries 13 1982 22 .78 2,706 1978 24 .80 2,617 In terms of the interests of the USRELATIONS 1974 7 .92 1,398 United States, it is important to maintain good relations with as many countries and regions as possible" 18 Faces of Internationalism Table 2.1 Foreign Policy Attitude and Attentiveness Scales, Mass Samples, 1974-86 (Continued) No. Acronym Year Items Alpha N Attentiveness Scales I [respondent] follow news about FOLLOWNEWS 1986 4 .83 2,783 international affairs closely 1982 7 .82 2,529 1978 7 .82 2,449 1974 11 .90 1,382 1 [respondent] am very interested in INTEREST 1986 5 .78 2,670 reading newspaper articles relating 1982 5 .77 2,489 to the local, state, national, and 1978 5 .77 2,472 international scenes 1974 5 .79 1,366 Note: dashes (—) indicate not applicable. a In 1982 the scale consists of only one item in which respondents were asked the level of agreement with the statement, "We should take a more active role in opposing the policy of apartheid— that is, racial separation—in South Africa." In 1986 the scale consists of only one item in which respondents were asked, "Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa? (1) We should support the South African government. (2) We should take no position. (3) We should impose limited economic sanctions if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system. (4) We should ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system." The question was scored as a Likert scale with those responding "don't know" assigned the midpoint (see appendix 1, table A.1.2). It was reverse scored before being used as a scale. b Items were split between two forms. Each set was scaled separately, and the two sets were then merged to create a single variable. The alpha for the scale is the average alpha for the two sets of items. The items did not appear in the 1974 survey. c Appears only in the 1974 survey. and dimensionality of mass foreign policy attitudes. The precise method used was principal components using Pearson's correlations with pair¬ wise deletion of missing data so as to preserve the sample sizes. 9 In all, more than 300 items were examined and 281 used to construct eight foreign policy attitude scales. Two attentiveness scales were also created. The ten (analogously comparable) scales are summarized in table 2.1. Each is described by a simple descriptive assertion followed by an identifying acronym that will be used in the subsequent analyses. The number of items used to construct the scale, Cronbach's alpha for the scale, and the number of respondents for which data are available are also reported. The items themselves are reported in appendix 1. The tables in the appendix include the precise wording of each question, the distribution of responses on them, the order of the response categories used to assign numerical scores (and hence the way "not sure" and “don't Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 19 know" responses were treated), an identification of the items that were reverse scored, and an identification of the items that were deleted from each scale if they depressed the value of alpha. Several comments about the scales are in order. First, if the items drawn from the four mass surveys tap attitudes toward common un¬ derlying constructs, then we would expect the statistical data on the scales to be similar. Clearly they are. It should be noted, however, that many of the items making them up are properly conceptualized as valence rather than position issues (Stokes, 1963), and these can be expected to manifest continuity rather than change over time. William Schneider describes the important differences between po¬ sition and valence issues: Position issues involve legitimate alternative preferences or values—hawk versus dove, for or against a constitutional amendment. . . . Valence issues entail only one position or value, which may have either a positive or negative "valence." Peace, prosperity, reform, and good government are all positively valued by the electorate, while unemployment, military weakness, incompetence, and corruption have negative valences. Position issues are inherently divisive, in the sense that candidates and voters can take sides on them. In the case of valence issues, however, everyone is on the same side. Salience is the most important characteristic of valence issues. (1983: 39) The questions probing attitudes toward the threat of communism, de¬ scribed above, are good examples of valence issues (see appendix 1, table A.1.3). Others include the questions used to construct the usgoals scale, which asked respondents how important such goals as containing com¬ munism, helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries, combating world hunger, and protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression should be in American foreign policy (see appendix 1, table A.1.8). It might reasonably be expected that the salience Americans attach to questions such as these will be relatively invariant temporally. As noted above, the inclusion of a large number of valence issues in the analyses that follow might therefore be expected to bias the results toward stability rather than change. Noteworthy, however, is that meaningful variations occur in the salience accorded the issues making up the scales. As a result, even though temporal stability in Americans' foreign policy attitudes will be demonstrated in the analysis that follows, it will also be shown that divisions persist through time. Together these characteristics contribute 20 Faces of Internationalism to the development of theoretically and empirically meaningful con¬ structs. Second, although an effort was made to include in each of the scales items that were identical or analogous through time, for a variety of reasons this was not always possible. For example, the questions used to create the economic and military aid scales in 1974, 1978, and 1982 were not included in the 1986 survey. Similarly, only one of the items that proved scalable in 1974 and that was therefore used to construct the activecooperation scale in that year—an item pertaining to apartheid in South Africa—was included in the 1978 survey. Four years later, in 1982, the apartheid item did not scale with the other two items included in the 1978 and 1982 surveys that were analogous to those first used in 1974. The result is that the activecooperation scale in 1982 is properly interpreted as an apartheid scale. It has been retained in the analysis since it is the one item that provides continuity from the 1970s to the 1980s on the attitude scale first used in the 1974 analysis. 10 By the same token, a South Africa item in the 1986 survey that probed attitudes toward apartheid has been included for that year so as to preserve temporal continuity. (The wording of the apartheid items is included in the notes to table 2.1.) Two other items included in earlier surveys (having to do with Vietnam and support for dictators) were also included in the 1986 survey, but since neither proved scalable previously no attempt was made to integrate them with the South African item. Third, the 1974 survey included several items that probed respon¬ dents' views of the importance of the United States maintaining good relations with a number of different countries and regions (usrelations). The subsequent surveys did not include these items but did contain a series of questions about the nations in which the United States had vital interests (vitalinterests). The different sets of items were regarded as analogous in their intent and, therefore, treated as comparable concep¬ tually. Fourth, the actual items used to construct the vitalinterests scales were divided between two forms in the surveys. The responses in each were analyzed separately, with the result that the actual countries about which the surveys inquired vary even while their conceptual content does not (see appendix 1, table A. 1.10). Finally, follownews, one of the two scales used to measure respon¬ dents' attentiveness to public affairs, probes how closely respondents followed news about issues and events that, perhaps more than any Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 21 others included in the scales summarized in table 2.1, are quite time dependent. However, as the statistical data in the table indicate, the utility of the underlying construct—attentiveness—is not diminished by the vagaries of the issues and events themselves. The Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes Table 2.2 reports the results of the principal components analysis of the various scales used to measure Americans' foreign policy attitudes. The analyses demonstrate that mass foreign policy attitudes are structured parsimoniously, with no more than three factors necessary to capture the essential elements of Americans' attitudes toward the nation's world role. Noteworthy, however, is that a single internationalism-isolationism continuum does not describe mass attitudes adequately. Since all of the scales used in the analyses measure attitudes toward traditional foreign policy issues central to the conflictual and conciliatory elements com¬ prising the presumed Cold War foreign policy consensus, it is clear that the analyses capture something quite interesting and novel. The question is how best to characterize these emergent patterns. Since all of the scales tap attitudes toward the traditional ends and means of American foreign policy, all are internationalism dimensions of one sort or another. What sort they are can be inferred from the factor loadings, each of which can be interpreted as the correlation of the in¬ dividual attitude scale with the underlying dimension captured in the principal components analysis. From this perspective, three sets of var¬ iables delineate the differences between and among the dimensions most clearly: the communist and troops scales; the detente and active- cooperation/apartheid scales; and the two foreign aid scales, econ- omicaid and militaryaid. The first two, which measure attitudes toward the threat of communism and a willingness to use American troops abroad, suggest that one distinctive dimension points toward the conflictual side of the presumed Cold War foreign policy consensus; and the second two, which tap attitudes toward (improved) relations with the Soviet Union and toward cooperative international involvement abroad more broadly defined, point toward the conciliatory side of that consensus. Thus the dimensions symbolize the arrows and the olive branch in the eagle's claws in the great seal of the United States. Less easily characterized are the two foreign aid scales. In 1974 they Table 2.2 The Dimensionality of Mass Foreign Policy Attitudes Based on Eight Attitude Scales, 1974-86 (Varimax C/5 s~ o Xj rz ■-*— T3 QJ u cn o» 73 3 1^. "3* ON nO ON a O o (N (N 00 CN O ^ 1 CN cm m 00 I I 05 O tN 1-H O 26 78 co M I I nO 00 1-H xO cn vO in o o 1/5 2 0 H < UJ c/5 9 5 P < < 2 0 ON — m NO O xO nO r “J (N r-< i-H o N 00 00 CO CO CO NO 0 (N *—« m o o 00 CO O' m on on in co a > i-i o — a > X a» c D H .2 cn H CO UJ < K UJ Q < D 5— > H C/5 2 D C/5 e- tD -J < e£ UJ F 2 UJ H 2 0 0 u UJ U § 0 < > < c c o 0 0 -J UJ > z H 01 •43 2 0 u < c_ H F 0 □ u Vh rs o c/1 r— UJ u u 0» u H D > O < UJ i Cu £ c O o +1 Al C/5 oc c 22 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 23 cluster with the other attitude scales in such a way as to reaffirm the foregoing interpretation, with economicaid closely correlated with the conciliatory international dimension and militaryaid with the more mil¬ itant one. But in 1978 and especially in 1982 it is clear the two aid scales— which measure attitudes toward the costs and benefits of foreign aid— comprise quite distinctive orientations toward international involve¬ ment. This is unexpected, since support or opposition to foreign aid is a standard measure of Americans' internationalist attitudes. It could be that the questions used to measure attitudes toward foreign aid as em¬ bodied in the economicaid and militaryaid scales are not framed in such a way as to elicit clear-cut internationalist-isolationist responses (a conclusion reinforced by the analyses in chapter 3, where I will examine the correlates of Americans' foreign policy beliefs). It could also be, how¬ ever, that the mass public perceives foreign aid as a redistributive issue, whereas they may respond to other traditional foreign policy issues as though they are distributive in nature, or perhaps as comprising a wholly distinct issue-area (see Lowi, 1964, 1967). In either case the absence of clear-cut findings for the two foreign aid scales combined with the omis¬ sion from the 1986 survey of the questions used to construct them argues for their elimination from an effort to determine the nature of Americans' foreign policy beliefs. This is not to say that attitudes toward foreign aid are unimportant, only that an interpretation of Americans' foreign policy beliefs will be aided by the elimination of the two foreign aid scales from the subsequent analysis in this chapter. The preferable alternative is to treat attitudes toward foreign aid as a product of Americans' underlying foreign policy beliefs, not a part of them. This is the approach underlying the analysis in chapter 3. 11 Table 2.3 repeats the foregoing analyses with the two foreign aid scales eliminated. Two dimensions are now identified in each year, and they have quite clear and distinctive interpretations. Factor I in 1982 and 1986 is dominated by the four scales that capture the perceived threat of com¬ munism (communist), a willingness to use American troops abroad (troops), a sense of global responsibility (usgoals), and a belief that the vital interests of the nation are wide-ranging (vitalinterests). The com¬ munist and troops scales also dominate factor II in 1978, and the two are joined by usgoals in dominating factor II in 1974. In all four cases the term militant internationalism captures the orientations toward in¬ volvement in world affairs underlying these specific dimensions. In contrast, cooperative internationalism appropriately describes the at- 24 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 25 titudes reflected in the remaining attitudinal dimensions in each year. The detente scale is the most important key to understanding this di¬ mension, although activecooperation/apartheid also contributes to its distinctive qualities, usgoals and vitalinterests/usrelations, the two attitude dimensions most closely related to the theme of globalism char¬ acteristic of postwar American foreign policy, also help to define the cooperative international dimension in 1974 and 1978. In fact, it is in¬ teresting to note that in the 1970s the cooperative internationalism di¬ mension is most important in defining the orientation of the mass public toward world affairs, but in the 1980s it is militant internationalism (as indicated by the percent of the total variance account for by each factor). These findings are consistent with the general orientation toward world affairs held by the Nixon-Ford-Carter presidencies, on the one hand, and the Reagan administration on the other. Thus the findings enjoy face validity given the propensity of the mass public to acquiesce to what the administration does, whoever the president may be. The fact that us¬ goals and vitalinterests/usrelations account in large part for the shift from the dominance of cooperative internationalism to militant inter¬ nationalism also has face validity in that the Reagan administration char¬ acteristically defined the foreign policy interests of the United States over¬ seas more broadly than did its predecessors, for whom the "Vietnam syndrome," symbolized by the Nixon Doctrine, seemed to dictate a lower profile and less active U.S. role in world affairs. The foregoing demonstrates unambiguously that the American people no longer embrace a unidimensional internationalist-isolationist orien¬ tation toward world affairs. Instead, internationalism now has two faces: a cooperative face and a militant face. Attitudes toward communism, the use of military force abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union are the principal factors that distinguish proponents and opponents of the two faces of internationalism. The two faces of internationalism yield four distinct attitude clusters or foreign policy belief systems that have proven to be invariant temporally. Consistent with traditional views of Americans' attitudes toward the role of the United States in world affairs, internationalists are those who sup¬ port active American involvement in international affairs, favoring a com¬ bination of conciliatory and conflictual strategies reminiscent of the pre¬ sumed pre-Vietnam internationalist foreign policy paradigm. Isolationists, on the other hand, oppose both types of international involvement, as we would expect. The two remaining groups, appropriately regarded as 26 Faces of Internationalism Figure 2.1 The Distribution of the Mass Public Among the Four Types of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 (percentages) Support cooperative internationalism Oppose militant internationalism Accommodationists i t Internationalists 1986 24 1986 28 1982 26 1982 28 1978 26 1978 29 1974 27 1974 29 Isolationists Hardliners 1986 24 1986 24 1982 22 1982 24 1978 22 1978 22 1974 22 1 ' 1974 23 Support militant internationalism Oppose cooperative internationalism selective internationalists, are presumed to be newly emergent in the 1970s. Accommodationists embrace the tenets of cooperative internationalism but reject the elements implicit in militant internationalism, while hardliners, on the other hand, manifest just the opposite preferences. We can hy¬ pothesize that these selective internationalists have been important in coloring the domestic context of American foreign policy in the post- Vietnam era, for while both groups are appropriately described as "in¬ ternationalists," their prescriptions for the U.S. world role often diverge markedly, thereby undermining the broad-based domestic political sup¬ port the foreign policy initiatives that presidents in the Cold War era could count on and complicating the task of coalition-building that more recent presidents have faced. The distribution of the mass public among the four foreign policy belief systems described by the cooperative and militant internationalism di¬ mensions is illustrated in figure 2.1. (Scores of zero are used to divide respondents into groups of supporters and opponents of the alternative forms of internationalism.) The diagram shows that the American people have remained committed to the view that the United States should be involved in world affairs, but it also illustrates the sharp differences among Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 27 the four belief systems described by the two dimensions and the re¬ markable stability through time they manifest. The overwhelming pro¬ portion of respondents fall into one of the three attitude clusters reflecting some kind of internationalist predisposition; fewer than a quarter can be classified as isolationists. At the same time, it is also apparent that the mass public is sharply divided in its views of the form that international involvement should take, with roughly half of them split between the accommodationist and hardliner quadrants, which reflect concern not with whether the United States should be involved abroad, but with how that involvement should be pursued. 12 If, as suggested by some ob¬ servers, the American people were by the 1980s ready to embrace a more assertive orientation toward world affairs than they were in the 1970s, that shift is not apparent in the abstract beliefs that underlie their attitudes toward more discrete issues. The American people as a whole may have shifted in a more assertive direction over time, but measurable differences persist in their attitudes toward whether the United States should be involved in world affairs and how that involvement ought to be pur¬ sued. 13 Political Consequences of the Two Faces of Internationalism: An Interpretation The bifurcation of Americans' foreign policy beliefs into two distinct in¬ ternationalism dimensions demonstrates the presence of quite divergent preferences regarding the ends and means of American foreign policy. As a practical matter, this means that the American people are divided in their views about those issues relating to conflict and cooperation that once united them around a common conception of the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. This is easily shown by examining the distribution of the American people among the four attitude clusters or belief systems described in figure 2.1 on the questionnaire items used to derive the two internationalism dimensions depicted in the figure. Tables 2.4—2.7 contain pertinent examples based on the 1986 Chicago Council mass survey. Situations in which respondents would be willing to support the use of American troops abroad are recorded in table 2.4. The overall picture is one in which few scenarios elicit broad support among the American people—a Soviet invasion of Western Europe or Japan clearly does, and 28 Faces of Internationalism Table 2.4 Mass Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Troops, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 (percentages) There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . Total Inter¬ nationalists Accommoda- tionists Hardliners Isola¬ tionists Soviet troops invaded Western Europe 74 88 64 88 51 Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union 60 77 44 76 36 The Nicaraguan government allowed the Soviet Union to set up a missile base in Nicaragua 52 66 29 74 32 The Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S. 41 45 23 63 33 Arab forces invaded Israel 38 53 18 62 14 The Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic of China 31 42 18 44 17 The government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels 30 39 10 56 14 Iran invaded Saudi Arabia 30 40 17 48 14 Nicaragua invaded Honduras in order to destroy Contra rebels' bases there 29 38 9 51 17 North Korea invaded South Korea 28 40 12 47 9 The People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan 22 31 7 41 10 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 29 perhaps a Soviet attempt to place missiles in Nicaragua, but no others. Particularly noteworthy is the division between hardliners and accom- modationists on this issue, which is a core element underlying the bi¬ furcation of Americans' foreign policy attitudes. In the Nicaraguan case, for example, nearly three-quarters of the hardliners would be willing to send in American boys, but fewer than a third of the accommodationists would. Even on the issue of defending Europe and Japan, hardliners and accommodationists are widely separated. In the case of Japan, for example, 76 percent of the hardliners are willing to support the use of troops in the event of a Soviet attack, but only 44 percent of the accom¬ modationists are similarly disposed. The general pattern is one that pits internationalists and hardliners against accommodationists and isola¬ tionists, with the former two groups much more disposed to support the use of force than the latter two. Such a pattern of potential coalitions and countercoalitions may help explain such things as the seeming in¬ ability of the Reagan administration to act more forcefully in Central America and perhaps elsewhere. The apparent "alignment" between the accommodationists and iso¬ lationists on the issue of military intervention deserves further comment. Isolationists are among those described by William Schneider as non¬ internationalists—those who, being less well educated, have "a limited understanding of the relevance of events that are complex and remote from their daily lives" (Schneider, 1983: 43). They are in some respects unwitting participants in the contest between accomodationists (foreign policy "liberals") and hardliners (foreign policy "conservatives"). Mo¬ tivated more by valence than by position issues, Schneider argues, they are "predisposed against American involvement in other countries' af¬ fairs unless a clear and compelling issue of national interest or national security is at stake. If we are directly threatened or if our interest is in¬ volved in any important way, this group wants swift, decisive action but not long-term involvement" (Schneider, 1983: 42). Accordingly, isola¬ tionists are consistently neither conservatives nor liberals on foreign pol¬ icy issues. Instead, Schneider (1983: 43) continues, they "support the conservative elite on many issues having to do with defense and tough¬ ness. They support the liberal elite when it becomes a question of direct American involvement." 14 Extending this argument to the internationalist group, we can hy¬ pothesize that they will be motivated more by position than valence is¬ sues, and hence that they will tend to strike a middle ground between 30 Faces of Internationalism accommodationists and hardliners, depending on the issue or issue-area. On issues involving the arrows in the eagle's talon, we would expect them to appear more alike, or align with hardliners rather than accom¬ modationists, as, indeed, they do on the scenarios posed in table 2.4. On issues where the olive branch leads, however, we would expect them to appear more alike or to align more closely with accommodationists. This is in fact the case, as will be shown later (see table 2.7). Patterns reflecting at least some of the configurations anticipated in the preceding discussion are shown in the salience different groups ac¬ cord various goals of American foreign policy. Table 2.5 records the dis¬ tribution of respondents on the fourteen goal questions used to construct the usgoals scale in 1986. The split between internationalists and hard¬ liners on the one hand, and accommodationists and isolationists on the other, is again quite evident on some questions, particularly those with clear national security implications. The goal of containing communism stands out: 83 percent of the hardliners believe this to be a very important goal of U.S. foreign policy, compared with only 30 percent of the ac¬ commodationists. Similarly, on the question of whether matching Soviet military power should be a “very important" goal of American foreign policy the hardliners and accommodationists split 76-26 percent, and on the goal of "defending our allies' security" they split 77-32. In all of these examples it appears as though the accommodationists are more isola¬ tionist than the isolationists, and the hardliners more internationalist than the internationalists. The net result overall is that goals other than those associated with the themes of military might and interventionism characteristic of postwar American foreign policy often take precedence. Table 2.6 reports responses on the questions measuring the perceived threat of communism used to construct the communist scale. The pattern is the expected one of two very distinctive coalitions, with internation¬ alists and hardliners on one side, and accommodationists and isolation¬ ists on the other. Noteworthy is that in none of the countries listed would a majority of either of the latter groups perceive it to be a great threat to the United States if the Communist party came to power there. Large numbers of Americans who comprise the groups do share the view that it would be somewhat of a threat to the United States if Communists came to power in these countries, but the point is that there are wide differ¬ ences in how threatening Americans perceive such developments, which in turn relate significantly to their foreign policy beliefs. Just as hardliners and accommodationists part company on the issue Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 31 Table 2.5 Mass Attitudes Toward the Goals of American Foreign Policy, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 (percentages) I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Inter- Accommoda- Isola- Total nationalists tionists Hardliners tionists (percent very important) Protecting the jobs of American workers 79 81 65 89 83 Securing adequate supplies of energy 71 80 54 83 64 Worldwide arms control 71 83 65 75 58 Reducing our trade deficit with foreign countries 67 77 59 77 48 Combating world hunger 64 73 60 70 52 Containing communism 60 72 30 83 49 Defending our allies' security 58 74 32 77 43 Matching Soviet military power 55 61 26 76 54 Strengthening the United Nations 48 58 43 53 37 Protecting the interests of American business 45 53 23 62 38 abroad Promoting and defending human rights in other countries 43 56 41 49 23 Helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries 38 49 35 38 27 Protecting weaker nations against foreign 34 46 13 55 19 aggression Helping to bring a democratic form of 32 40 18 44 22 government to other nations 32 Faces of Internationalism Table 2.6 Mass Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 (percentages) I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power. . . .First, what if the Communist party came to power in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the U.S., not very much of threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the U.S.? Total Inter- Accommoda- nationalists tionists Hardliners Isolation¬ ists (percent great threat) Mexico 66 86 40 85 45 Saudi Arabia 43 58 22 59 24 The Philippines 40 56 15 62 20 France 32 44 13 51 13 El Salvador 30 39 9 50 17 South Africa 23 34 5 39 10 of communism's threat, so, too, they differ markedly on whether to co¬ operate with the Soviet Union. Responses to the items on prospective Soviet-American relations used to construct the detente scale are re¬ corded in table 2.7. Negotiating arms control agreements with the Soviets enjoys broad-based support within the American polity, as it has his¬ torically (see chapter 6), but most other issues on the Soviet-American agenda tend to divide rather than unite. Here, as suggested earlier, the coalition configurations reverse the patterns shown previously. The issue of grain sales, for example, tends to pit large numbers of internationalists and accommodationists against hardliners and isolationists, who support increased grain sales in much smaller numbers. Similar divisions are apparent on the issues of exchanging scientists, trading with the Soviets, and selling advanced computers to them. Support for sharing with the Soviets information about the Reagan administration's strategic defense initiative (sdi) is also divided, but it is interesting to note that in none of the attitudinal groups does a majority favor the proposal. Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 33 Table 2.7 Mass Attitudes Toward Soviet-American Relations, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1986 (percentages) Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationships with the Soviet Union. Inter- Accommoda- Isolation- Total nationalists tionists Hardliners ists (percent favor) Negotiating arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 86 98 96 78 68 Resuming cultural and educational exchanges between the U.S. and Soviets 84 98 95 73 62 Increasing grain sales to the Soviet Union 65 84 81 43 43 Sharing technical information with the Soviet Union about defending against missile attacks 26 35 44 11 10 (percent oppose) Prohibiting the exchange of scientists between the U.S. and the Soviet Union 59 67 79 42 46 Restricting U.S.-Soviet trade 59 72 80 31 48 Limiting the sales of advanced U.S. computers to the Soviet Union* 37 38 44 28 37 *Not included in the DETENTE scale in chapter 2. Who Believes What? Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs A primary hypothesis underlying this study is that foreign policy issues since the 1970s have become subject to an unprecedented degree of par¬ tisan and ideological dispute. As I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and An¬ thony Lake (1984: 13) argue in their provocative book on the unmaking of American foreign policy, the heart of the problems plaguing recent American foreign policy is that "for two decades, the making of American 34 Faces of Internationalism foreign policy has been growing far more political—or more precisely, far more partisan and ideological. . . . We Americans . . . have been spending more time, energy and passion in fighting ourselves than we have in trying, as a nation, to understand and deal with a rapidly chang¬ ing world." Partisanship and Political Ideology These speculations lead to the hypothesis that Americans' partisan at¬ tachments and ideological predispositions will be closely associated with their foreign policy beliefs. It can be tested using (one-way) analysis-of- variance techniques, which permit a systematic examination of the re¬ lationship between each of the internationalism dimensions and Amer¬ icans' self-defined partisan identifications and ideological predisposi¬ tions. 15 The results, shown in the form of a Multiple Classification Analysis (mca) in table 2.8, lend some support to the partisanship hypothesis and strongly confirm the view that ideology colors perceptions of the ap¬ propriate role of the United States in world affairs. They demonstrate that Republicans are consistently the strongest supporters of militant internationalism and that, in 1982 and again in 1986, they are also strongly disposed against cooperative internationalism which leads them, not sur¬ prisingly, to be characterized throughout the 1980s as hardliners. Dem¬ ocrats, on the other hand, tend to be best characterized either as inter¬ nationalists or accommodationists. Similarly, the results (based on the signs on the two internationalism dimensions considered simultane¬ ously) show that throughout the time period conservatives are appro¬ priately described as hardliners and liberals as accommodationists. Par¬ tisanship and ideology are thus important correlates—and explanations— of the domestic divisions about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs that have become so commonplace in recent years. The findings on the relationship between ideology and foreign policy beliefs reinforce those of Norman Nie (Nie, with Andersen, 1974) and Bruce Russett and Elizabeth Hanson (1975: 130-38) who, on the basis of both mass and elite data, conclude that during the 1960s and early 1970s there was a gradual realignment of domestic and foreign policy attitudes that saw (domestic) liberals adopt "dovish" foreign policy attitudes and (domestic) conservatives adopt "hawkish" attitudes (see also Hero, 1969; and Schneider, 1974-75). Previously those who regarded themselves as "liberal internationalists" held attitudes consistent with the internation- Table 2.8 Bivariate ANOVA and Multiple Classification Analyses (MCAs) of the Relationship Between Mass Foreigi Policy Beliefs and Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974-86 c rz o3 n> -*-• *3- QJ C — 03 03 u " c ^ 03 03 gj -•-» ^ v C — —i 03 03 u £ X c ^ 03 03 £ V C 03 u v c ^ 03 03 0> -Jr; c ^ «—I 03 03 3 o CO ^ (N H O c-l r-i O r-4 I I (N O IT) fO o ^ o o ^ tc Poo ^ 00 (N CP P o o o CN CN ^ O r-< O O 00 CN IN r—< O ^3 o O N CO CN in VO 00 i—i H ^ ^ CO O T—i r—l I I O' (N m in o o o o o o ^ N co m N O' O IN 00 T-( VO ^ h O CO CO M O H O CO CO t—( O in O CN I I o co o CO c vO VO IN ON m J- CN CO LO CO (N CJ 00 r-H O I I LO ^ O t—< t-h CN CN ON IN t - 1 CO ON , s— o >N vO c r—H LO in VO C/3 LO ON o r —1 ON ON m 1 CC _o 73 -j O IN o o vO CO H H O (N CO ^ o IN IN 00 O' O' ip ON CN O H O PI I I N H PI H o CO 00 LO IN IP LP O O vO 03 - C C 01 p a « "S o hf VI Q_ "O C 0) .SP 3 “ c/d N 03 — 0/ 03 ■ ^ 03 1 " >• C/3 V C cn 03 Q cj s a U QJ *-*— 03 a/ C c o E O 03 03 J-> 35 (**) following eta. Dashes (—) indicate not applicable. 36 Faces of Internationalism alist foreign policy consensus that embraced both conflict and conciliation as means to the ends of American foreign policy (cf. Sanders, 1983: 77- 81). Thus, as Russett and Hanson (1975: 131-32) explain, "John Kennedy could in 1960 campaign both as a liberal and against failures of the Re¬ publican administration to keep up the nation's military guard and pre¬ vent emergence of the alleged (and illusory) 'missile gap.'" "Many lib¬ erals," they continue, "today recall in rather embarrassed silence the 'internationalist' rhetoric of Kennedy's purple Inaugural Address." The further implication of their observations is that no meaningful differences existed in the internationalist attitudes of liberals and conservatives. Clearly this is no longer the case. Although the correlations between ideology and the ci (cooperative internationalism) and mi (militant internation¬ alism) dimensions taken one at a time are modest at best, 16 viewed in the context of the bifurcation of the internationalist attitudes of the Amer¬ ican people evident since the mid-1970s, ideological differences are really quite pronounced. Party differences are less clear-cut (differences on ci during the 1970s are not significant statistically), but again viewed against the background of previous research, which shows few party differences on foreign policy issues (Hughes, 1978: 124-28), the differences that do emerge are sig¬ nificant—all the more so since they remain consistent throughout the time period examined here. Indeed, if attention is confined to differences on the mi dimension (which are statistically significant in all four years), there is some corroboration of the description of the emergent party di¬ visions on foreign policy issues offered by Zbigniew Brzezinski to explain domestic cleavages on foreign policy issues in recent years, which was noted in chapter 1, namely: "The Democratic Party, the party of inter¬ nationalism, became increasingly prone to the appeal of neo-isolation¬ ism. And the Republican Party, the party of isolationism, became in¬ creasingly prone to the appeal of militant interventionism" (1984: 16). In some respects, of course, the differences reflect policy orientations of the party in the White House and the positions of the president on those matters. The foregoing findings on the partisan and ideological correlates of Americans' foreign policy beliefs both reinforce previous findings and provide new insights. Do the same apply to the relationship between the foreign policy beliefs of the American people and their sociodemo¬ graphic characteristics? Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 37 Education and Socioeconomic Status Historically education has been an important predictor of Americans' attitudes toward involvement in world affairs (Hero, 1959, 1969; and Hughes, 1978). The more educated people were, the more likely they were to support internationalist policies; conversely, the less educated they were, the more likely they were to be isolationists. William Watts and Lloyd A. Free (Watts and Free, 1973; Watts, 1985) have shown that these general patterns persisted into the 1970s and 1980s. Barry B. Hughes has also shown that while some weakening of support among highly educated people occurred during the early 1970s on those issues asso¬ ciated with what he calls "military internationalism," support remained high for nonmilitary internationalist policies (Hughes, 1978: 42-44). Wil¬ liam Schneider (1974-75) broached at about the same time the interesting question of what was happening as more Americans joined the ranks of the highly educated. Noting that the ability of the well educated "to follow the complex reasoning behind foreign policy actions" typically "led to a critical margin of support for foreign policy decisions among the educated elite," Schneider (1974-75: 92-93) argued that "simply being aware of the reasoning behind foreign policy decisions need not produce agreement with that reasoning or support for the policy entailed. Over the past decade [1964-74], while the 'followership' has broadened, the support which 'followership' was often thought to imply has not in¬ creased in proportion. Instead, there has been a divergence of views among the educated elite, fracturing the consensus within the stratum of the electorate traditionally most responsive to leaders' initiatives." Table 2.9 records the mca table and one-way analysis-of-variance (an- ova) tests of the relationship between education and the ci and mi di¬ mensions. They confirm the historic view in that those with postsec¬ ondary educations typically tend to be more supportive of internationalist values than those with less education. A more precise characterization, however, also shows that those with college educations support the te¬ nets of cooperative internationalism more strongly than they support the tenets of militant internationalism. In the 1970s, in fact, they can be char¬ acterized as accommodationists in that they supported cooperative in¬ ternationalism but opposed militant internationalism. They differ from the two other educational groups that are best characterized either as hardliners or as isolationists. The findings thus confirm and extend T3 C (Z rz U W Tj £ rz cn a; CO u O Oh C b£) Uh CD CD 03 C 0> OJ £ OH 0> CO — 0> < u c o Z < a; .5 "0 03 > £ q fN JJ X> <3 sO 00 rN O' CD u i H c/> C ^ «5 (CJ c ^ m (3 OJ ua? c ^ ~ 03 OJ S ^ S C ^ —. ra ra u s X c — rs 03 £ aJ c ^ — 03 03 USX c ^ 03 03 C ^ M (3 (3 U i£ 3 O CD ON I W 00 'O N Tt o n tN I I n in nd o o o o -h \D N O fN fN I I t\ rt" — ^ —• o o o (N in ’t fN (N O rH M I I 00 (N ’t o o o o I I Tt O ON LO fO (N fN fN I I rn in N 00 N Tf O O rH o fN O' fO nC on (N O H fN rn I I I I NO fN O O m 'O nC 1 , O O' ■rt ON c NO O IN fN fN rf fN O' ON NO 1 NO rt fN m m fN 1 1 fN fN r j m X rH N m O rH O I I \OvO^CXfnfNfOvO COOOOrnOfNrH rf in O O NO fN O r< (N 1 — 1 IN in ON vO fN CO O O fN fN I I I I I I 0 s GO 00 fN in fN in fN 0 in in In CD O O' m m fN m m nC m tN fN k. co rj ON m cn in m m IN in tN fOfNNfOOMDN OOOOrnOfNO \DOOrHfOfOfONX fNOOOrH— — 1 -* 2 J2 o u 00 y (A V - c cd T 3 - a» r £ S 5 cl ^ cn £ u! X cS 'Ll s c 0 1 H E V- 03 0 O S O O JC 03 03 X X U c 0 JO 03 03 u (D CD a> jC CD ta 1-4 0^ £ 3 ”o -s: £ L. £ u* aj 0 ”- U C O g Jj c Cl >5j Vi > ^ -C 2 w- 0 O 0/ jr 3 3 O X q o a. ■- .3 J X X c O ID c o £ it -3 X> 03 . O ° 3 a. d ^ ■“ f0 03 C 03 H 0» 03 o £ K .y c ® £ fee O *u O IN •a e v£ fee si N O '0 v2 c r* «/j ^ c -£> .2 03 ra S ■r ra 1 £ ^ 1 03 — n i_ 03 03 £ ^ 2 o ID c VI * ^ 8 « c *- £ c u 0 J c R §■ O' 3 ~ 03 C C — 03 O 8! § & B o «» O > 2 ac o c J C ID 03 S E Q.) 0 ; IN *- v- . u feC CL 03 O u c O 0 O £ 05 c £ O CD k- ffe k- O u s£ c dJ •£ r“ 0 L. t: •- 03 a. c 3 « Q tn “ 03 .5 S 38 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 39 Hughes's based on data from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s; they also provide some limited support for Schneider's observations. Noteworthy, however, is that these same patterns do not persist into the 1980s. Al¬ though those with less than a postsecondary education continue to be best described as either hardliners or internationalists, it appears that the most educated stratum of Americans moved during the 1980s back toward an embrace of internationalism as traditionally defined. Coop¬ erative internationalism continues to enjoy its greatest support among the college-educated, but the data suggest that the college-educated also became supporters of the tenets of militant internationalism during the 1980s, which they had opposed in the 1970s. Education is closely associated with occupation and income. Not sur¬ prisingly, therefore, all three have tended to be similarly related to public attitudes toward the nation's world role (see Hughes, 1978: 44-45). The analyses summarized in table 2.9 are generally consistent with earlier findings in this regard. Most noteworthy is that those with professional occupations and in the highest income groups are consistently the stron¬ gest supporters of cooperative internationalism. Where they fall on the mi dimension is somewhat more variable, but the patterns generally fol¬ low those of education, hinting that high-income professionals moved from being accommodationists in the 1970s toward a more traditional internationalist orientation in the 1980s. Conversely, those in the two lowest income groups and those in blue-collar occupations are typically best described either as hardliners or as isolationists. Region, Gender, Age, Religion, and Race The Midwest historically has been regarded as more isolationist in its attitudes toward foreign policy than other regions of the country, but few studies actually confirm this. 17 Almond, for example, argued as long ago as 1950 that “Regional differences in foreign policy attitudes were quite pronounced in the period before World War II, but the evidence for the period since Pearl Harbor shows regional differences to be of declining importance" (1960:131). He went on to say that “in some cases the Middle Western respondents have shown themselves to be more 'internationalist' than the respondents from other regions" (p. 131), and he noted specifically that "The South now appears to be the region char¬ acterized by the greatest deviation in foreign policy attitudes" (p. 132). Using evidence from the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hughes (1978: 50) 40 Faces of Internationalism reaffirmed that "Midwesterners now appear no more isolationist than inhabitants of other regions." He also observed that people from the Northeast, long regarded as the region most consistently internationalist compared with other parts of the country, "show no greater interna¬ tionalism . . . than that of citizens in the Midwest or West." Finally, Watts (1985: 5) found no significant regional differences in Americans' inter¬ nationalist attitudes in 1985, which led him to conclude that "increased American involvement in the international economic environment, and an accompanying greater sense of personal engagement on the part of many Americans, may have softened feelings of isolationism once felt in particular parts of the country." But regional differences are apparent on the cooperative and militant internationalism dimensions, as shown in table 2.10. During most of the period from 1974 to 1986 the East can be described as accommodationist in orientation (1986 is the exception), and the Midwest as hardline (1974 is the exception here). The South, on the other hand, moved from a hard¬ line orientation in the 1970s to an internationalist orientation in the 1980s, while the West vacillated between the accommodationist and interna¬ tionalist quadrants. Except for the 1982 mi dimension, the differences in these regional orientations are statistically significant throughout. 18 Sex differences on public policy issues have sparked considerable in¬ terest in recent years owing to the "gender gap," which first appeared in the 1980 presidential election when Ronald Reagan was found to enjoy considerably less support among female voters than among male voters. The differences, which were repeated four years later, may have prompted Walter Mondale to choose Geraldine Ferraro as his running mate in 1984. 19 Numerous explanations have been offered for the gender gap, and foreign policy issues have figured prominently among them. Kathleen A. Frankovic, for example, found that women were less likely than men to approve of Ronald Reagan's overall job performance and his handling of foreign policy in particular. In a May 1982 survey half of the women respondents "said they feared Reagan would get the United States into a war; by a margin of 2 to 1, men thought he would not. . . . Women were [also] less likely to trust Ronald Reagan to make the right decisions about nuclear weapons" (1982: 441). The comparatively greater negative assessments of Reagan by women extended to other issues as well, but Frankovic concluded that concerns about foreign policy aggressiveness and the risks of war were fundamental to them (see also Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986; Silverman and Kumka, 1987; and Smith, 1984). Table 2.10 Bivariate ANOVA and MCAs of the Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Region, Gender, Religion, Age, and Race, 1974-86 C 2 * % c — •—I 03 03 U |S c — (Z o3 QJ -*-» ^ CD C ^ •—« 03 03 u *3 c ^ 03 03 flj -H* ^ 01 c — ►—t 03 «J Uji? c ^ 03 03 £ * c ^ M (U 03 u * X I I N ro N O (N (N O H n nO n O' «-H rH O I I 1* N ^ ^ O' O O I o o n h Nin I—I CN rH rH CO VO N o o o CD IN o o O I-H \D CN rH On n O O) h \fi h I I I N H \Q |< 2 (N (N M o o o O N’t N rH o o o OMJ' (N O 0 0 rH in (N \D G O Tf o o o in ^ I I I I O Os O »-• O rH 00 00 00 o o o O O IN IN O o o ’I" rf Tf Tf o o o o in cn ^ m vo co O O CM CN < O ^ o o o N o o o NO CO ON O O rH O rH <—• co co in CN O ^ H I I I I Oo cm 3 nj 03 O ^ w cn .y a> 2 3: u E 0600 'N rH ro in a; o J c o O 2 o tM- O O \D ON N O rH o 00 nO nO ON CN In O rH NO -F IN 0 CO 00 O nO r-1 0 CN rH NO 3 CO CO r-H in 00 0 — CO co CO CN NO NO CO IN CO rH rH CN m CN 000 ON 00 CN 00 NO H IN OO NO O 00 CO 00 IN O 3C CC IN in NO CN ON IN in 00 m NO CO oc NO IN IN CN CO IN 00 On in IN rH CO CN rH rH rH CN 000 000 nO 00 00 NO O CO 1—1 IN CO NO ON rH in O CO m 0 On rH CN 00 O O in m IN NO IN IN IN in CN Tt< IN IN NO 00 rH CO CO rH NO IN 00 CN O ON O rf O CO CO rH O CN CN —H 4-> U D O <-D O' 5 (N nO On CM CN rn O (N CO (N I I LT) ^ O H O O O ^ O CN CN CD CN o ro O CO M I I O CO 00 'Cf CD T-H O H r-I nO 00 o o m ^ \o 0 CD O CN rH O ^ r-< o O CN O O h O in so o co O o o in o in CD CO "vD o O O O N O \D CN 'n O o o o I I O' 1-H a\ cD CN CN CN CN I I O CD ON 00 CD o rH rH r-t rH CD CD 00 r-t O O I I NO in NO IN rH NO in CD CN 00 CD CD 00 in o o o CD O O 00 ON rH 00 NO o O 5 ON CD CN CD CN CN CN r-t CN CD CD CD IT) NO rH o o o 00 N ’Cf ^ O O »—i O o 00 00 NO CD rH Os CN in r-H IN CN IN o On NO rH CN CD in NO 00 NO 00 in CD o 00 IN CN o 00 in in in CD IN 00 in o o (N O H H N O ^ NO O O O O 00 CD rH O CD in IN ON NO 00 NO CD rH CN CD (N ON O' CN rH o 2 rH 00 00 in CN O ON in NO m m IN On CN C * ___ * (Z CN m r-t CN m o CD CD ON CN IN 00 IN NO CN CD NO QJ cu O rH o rH o o O O o o o o O CN O rH 2 s^ 1 1 1 ' " i i - -- oo (N n m o o o o CN CD CN CD NO IN CN CD IN 00 CD ON CN | IN OO NO O O CN ON 00 O ON NO | CN rH rH NO NO IN m IN 00 ON oi > x rz > J-i 01 oi T5 03 OJD X X 60 __ 3 O O O X "is u & 03 T3 C o - « 8 .y •tC c ^ 0i -r< o O ° £ S jc^ 60 O zxx r- O ££+- So to 3 7S o ^ 0 J o VH > «wui2> re G. ° QJ C •a £ £ Q u 01 > £ .2 £ t£ £s 47 Note: cell entries are mean factor scores, which measure differences in standard deviations from the mean of zero for each internationalism dimension. Differences between or among categoric means statistically significant at p £ .05 are indicated by one asterisk (*) following beta and at p £ .01 by two asterisks (**). Covariates statistically significant at p < .05 are indicated by one asterisk (*) and at p £ .01 are indicated by two asterisks (**)• Dashes (—) indicate not applicable. 48 Faces of Internationalism down of regional barriers associated with the rapid migration from the rustbelt to the sunbelt during recent years. These are speculations, of course, but they are interesting nonetheless, since they point to the con¬ tinuing impact of regionalism even as the nation continues to undergo a process of homogenization. Least consistent (other things being equal) is the relationship between partisanship and Americans' foreign policy beliefs. The data suggest that during the 1980s Republicans were more likely than other partisan iden¬ tifiers to espouse hardline values, whereas in the 1970s they tended to¬ ward internationalism. These findings might have been expected, but, interestingly, they are not matched by analogous shifts among Demo¬ crats. Democrats are best described as accommodationists in 1974 and again in 1986, but as internationalists in 1978 (during Carter's admin¬ istration) and in 1982 (during Reagan's). Compared with ideology as a source of the divisions that so often seem to have plagued recent Amer¬ ican foreign policy, partisanship is again shown to be the less important factor. 22 Finally, mention should be made of the fact that both attentiveness scales are linked to foreign policy beliefs in that both are positively related to how strongly the American people embrace internationalist values. In none of the cases, however, is the association particularly strong, and in one (the mi scale in 1974) the association is not significant statistically. Attentiveness, nonetheless, generally proves to be important in under¬ standing the orientations of the American people toward the role of the United States in world affairs. Figure 2.2 summarizes the foregoing multivariate findings graphi¬ cally. Only those characteristics with statistically significant differences among the groups are shown. The figure reinforces the conclusion that the American people are divided in their views of the nation's appropriate role in world affairs, and that those divisions are related systematically to various political and sociodemographic clusters of importance in un¬ derstanding the contours of contemporary American politics. The per¬ sistent differences between liberals and conservatives along the accom- modationist-hardline divide stands out. The other thing that stands out is that isolationism is not a particularly meaningful construct politically, inasmuch as it is largely unrelated to other politically significant variables. Thus, unlike the isolationists, we can to some extent (and at the risk of distortion and oversimplification) characterize the attributes associated Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 49 Figure 2.2 Political and Sociodemographic Correlates of Americans' Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 Support cooperative internationalism Oppose militant Accommodationists i k Internationalists Liberal (1974-86) Radical (1974) Moderate (1978, 1986) Independent (1982-86) Postsecondary (1974—82) East (1974-86) Midwest (1974) West (1974) Moderate (1974—82) Democrat (1982) Postsecondary (1982) High school (1974—78) South (1978-86) Midwest (1978) West (1978, 1986) - Isolationists Hardliners 1 Conservative (1974-86) Republican (1982-86) None through 8th grade (1974-82) High school (1982) South (1974) Midwest (1982-86) West (1982) Support militant internationalism Oppose cooperative internationalism Note: the years, shown in parentheses, indicate when the differences among the categoric means are statistically significant. Moderates in 1978 and those with postsecondary education in 1982 are classified as both accommodationists and internationalists since the value of the factor scores on the militant internationalism dimension is zero. with the other belief systems. Accommodationists are typically liberals and perhaps moderates with college educations who reside in the East. Hardliners, on the other hand, are conservatives who tend to have less than a college education, who, at least in the 1980s, are Republicans who tend to live in the Midwest or West. Finally, internationalists tend to be moderates, they may be Democrats and may be college-educated, but at least in the 1970s were better characterized as high school educated from various regions of the country other than the East. 50 Faces of Internationalism Summary and Conclusions The findings in this chapter demonstrate conclusively that the mass pub¬ lic holds stable foreign policy attitudes and that the American people are capable of relating discreet foreign policy issues to one another in a sys¬ tematic and coherent fashion. Two dimensions, cooperative interna¬ tionalism and militant internationalism, capture Americans' foreign pol¬ icy attitudes throughout the period from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. Attitudes toward communism, the use of military force abroad, and re¬ lations with the Soviet Union are the primary factors underlying the two faces of internationalism. The dimensions themselves and the fourfold typology of foreign policy beliefs they define—summarized by the in¬ ternationalist, isolationist, accommodationist, and hardline labels—dem¬ onstrate that a single internationalism-isolationism continuum of the sort characteristic of the presumed Cold War foreign policy consensus does not describe adequately the attitudes of the American public toward the nation's world role. A single dimension implies differences only over the question of whether the United States should be actively involved in world affairs. The bifurcation of Americans' foreign beliefs indicate that divisions now also exist on the question of how that activism should be pursued. For some the emphasis is on the arrows in the eagle's talons, for others it is on the olive branch, and the two have come to be perceived as separate means. The bifurcation of Americans' foreign policy attitudes is clearly not a transitory phenomenon peculiar to the 1970s that presumably gave rise to the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus and that might have been expected to pass as the memory of Vietnam, Watergate, and the issues surrounding detente faded. On the contrary, the foreign policy beliefs + of the mass public have remained intact over a period when four administrations governed in Washington—one Democratic, three Re¬ publican—and over a time that witnessed the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam, the full effects of the opec oil-price squeeze, the human rights campaign of the Carter administration, the incarceration of American diplomats in Iran, the stalling of an arms limitation treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union, the long slide away from detente, which included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, un¬ precedented levels of U.S. defense spending, and the election of a pres¬ ident driven by the belief that America's principal adversary is an evil empire, a resumption of the willingness of the United States to use force Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 51 abroad, as in Grenada, Lebanon, and Libya, a renewed dialogue with the Soviet Union on arms control and other issues, and disclosure of an arms-for-hostage deal that once more raised fears of an imperial presi¬ dency. Americans' foreign policy beliefs have been impervious to these changes and challenges; there is simply no evidence that the public psy¬ che has been shocked into new forms of thinking about America's world role in the same way that the trauma of Vietnam and related develop¬ ments of the early 1970s appear to have caused a fundamental restruc¬ turing of Americans' foreign policy beliefs. Just as Americans' foreign policy beliefs have remained unchanged, the domestic divisions about the nation's world role associated with them have likewise endured. To the extent that these different foreign policy beliefs are correlated with other factors, notably ideology and partisan¬ ship, which they are, they have contributed to the demise of the time¬ worn aphorism that politics stops at the water's edge. 3 . Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs: Policy Preferences and Performance Evaluations Attitudes toward communism, the use of military force abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union are the most important factors that distinguish proponents and opponents of the faces of internationalism captured in the cooperative and militant internationalism dimensions. The two dimensions and the fourfold typology of foreign policy beliefs they describe—internationalists, isolationists, accommodationists, and hardliners—by themselves provide important insight into the foreign policy preferences of the American people insofar as they identify issues on which the mass public is known to be divided. The practical political consequence is that policymakers must build coalitions of support for their initiatives because they cannot count on them automatically. The way cooperative and militant internationalism reflect the divisions inherent in mass political beliefs about recent American foreign policy was examined in chapter 2, but the utility of the dimensions as theoretical constructs ultimately depends on their ability to “predict” other policy preferences in systematic and meaningful ways. The purpose of this chapter is to make that assessment. Primary attention is given to Americans' policy preferences regarding discrete issues (both actual and hypothetical) posed in the four Chicago Council mass surveys and to judgments about different states of affairs they were asked to make. Throughout, an effort is made to give some sense of the political context in which the questions were asked and the preferences and judgments expressed. Implicit in many of these preferences and judgments are assessments of the performance of the policymakers responsible for American foreign policy during the 1970s and 1980s. The relationship between Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their views of policymakers' performance is therefore examined directly. Beliefs impact on the nation's foreign policy by contributing to a “climate of opinion" 1 that contributes to a president's ability to realize his foreign policy objectives. Presidents enhance the 52 Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 53 favorableness of the domestic political climate by successfully building coalitions that support their policies, and favorable political environ¬ ments enhance their ability to build supportive coalitions. The result is a complex, reciprocal relationship between opinion and policy in which the nature of foreign policy beliefs and the forces that create, sustain, and change them demand careful scrutiny, for herein may lie a key to unraveling the complex yet elusive linkages between public opinion and foreign policy in the American polity. The Relationship Between Americans' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences: An Analytical Preface The four Chicago Council mass surveys together contain dozens of items that not only inform us about the foreign policy beliefs of the American people but that also permit an assessment of the relationship between those beliefs and Americans' foreign policy preferences. Consider, for example, the four questions in table 3.1. The first records responses by foreign policy beliefs to the long-standing internationalism- isolationism question, ''Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?" Strong support for the proposition is registered by all three of the groups that espouse an internationalist orientation toward the role of the United States in world affairs (internationalists, accom- modationists, and hardliners). As expected, support is weakest among the isolationists, among whom a majority consistently believes it would be best for the United States if it stayed out of world affairs. The three remaining questions highlight differences between the two groups of selective internationalists. Responses to the defense spending question indicate that hardliners are consistently more willing to increase defense spending compared with the other groups, whereas accom- modationists are consistently the strongest supporters of reduced de¬ fense spending. Foreign economic aid, on the other hand, garners rel¬ atively greater support among accommodationists than among hardliners. The "natural" coalition of aid supporters would therefore seem to com¬ prise internationalists and accommodationists. Finally, potential cia in¬ volvement in other countries, like defense spending, finds its greatest support among hardliners and internationalists, with accommodationists typically opposed (1978 is an exception). The pattern affirms the greater 54 Faces of Internationalism Table 3.1 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward the Role of the United States in World Affairs, Defense Spending, Foreign Aid, and CIA Intervention, 1974-86 (percentages) Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs? Total Internationalists Accommodationists Hardliners Isolationists (percent active part) 1986 71 85 70 74 48 1982 61 75 62 65 34 1978 67 82 80 60 36 1974 75 89 85 71 46 Do you think that we should expand our spending on national defense. keep it about the same, or cut back? Total Internationalists Accommodationists Hardliners Isolationists (percent expand) 1986 20 21 11 29 22 1982 22 27 10 32 19 1978 34 41 24 46 22 1974 14 20 6 21 10 (percent cut back) 1986 23 16 45 11 23 1982 24 19 40 12 26 1978 18 8 28 13 24 1974 35 24 53 21 38 On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations for purposes of economic development and technical assistance? Total Internationalists Accommodationists Hardliners Isolationists (percent favor) 1986 60 75 63 60 38 1982 56 70 66 54 28 1978 53 65 69 38 32 1974 60 78 76 46 31 In general, do you feel the CIA should or should not work secretly inside other countries to try to weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the U.S.?* Total Internationalists Accommodationists Hardliners Isolationists (percent should) 1986 57 63 40 72 50 1982 54 61 36 64 51 1978 74 86 66 82 58 1974 62 78 45 77 50 * In 1978 the wording was as follows: In general, do you feel that the CIA should or should not work inside other countries to try to strengthen those elements that serve the interests of the U.S. and to weaken those forces that work against the interests of the U.S.? The wording in 1974 was the same as in 1978 except that U.S. was spelled out. Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 55 Table 3.2 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, 1986 (percentages) How do you rate the Reagan administration's handling of the following problems? Would you say the administration's handling of . . . was excellent, good, fair, or poor? Total Internationalists Accommodationists Hardliners Isolationists (percent good and excellent) Overall foreign policy 55 65 38 76 46 Arms control 46 49 27 62 43 Human rights 45 53 30 54 41 Terrorism 45 53 34 52 40 The Middle East 44 52 31 52 39 Relations with the Soviet Union 41 46 29 50 35 Trade policy 29 33 22 33 29 Illegal immigration 20 20 13 29 17 support for the interventionist thrust characteristic of postwar American foreign policy inherent in the hardline belief system. The foregoing usefully demonstrates how Americans' foreign policy beliefs are related to their policy preferences. Their beliefs are also related systematically to their evaluations of policymakers' performance. In the 1986 survey, for example, respondents were asked to evaluate the Reagan administration's general foreign policy performance as well as its han¬ dling of several more specific issues or issue-areas. The relationship be¬ tween these evaluations and Americans' foreign policy beliefs are shown in table 3.2. The data indicate that internationalists and hardliners con¬ sistently gave the administration higher marks than did the accommo¬ dationists and isolationists. Although no group rated the administration highly in all situations (a sizable majority of all of the groups rated its handling of illegal immigration and trade policy as only fair or poor), the gap between the accommodationists and the hardliners is particularly pronounced and consistent. The foregoing approach toward understanding the relationship be¬ tween Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their policy preferences and performance evaluations is useful, but it is less than satisfactory for the purposes here for two important reasons. First, it ignores the fact that 56 Faces of Internationalism Americans' attitudes toward foreign policy are a product not only of their underlying beliefs but of other factors as well (see chapter 2). Partisanship and ideology are especially germane, since both can be assumed to affect Americans' preferences regarding particular policies and at different points in time (depending on the party in power, for example). The evaluations of the Reagan administration's policy performance summarized in table 3.2, for example, doubtless reflect partisan and philosophical differences as well as underlying foreign policy beliefs. To probe adequately the independent effects of foreign policy beliefs on policy preferences and performance evaluations a methodology must be employed that sepa¬ rates beliefs, partisanship, and ideology. Second, the fourfold classification of foreign policy beliefs derived from the bifurcation of Americans' internationalist attitudes is descrip¬ tively accurate but ignores the analytical richness inherent in the two dimensions underlying these attitude clusters. Because Americans vary in the intensity with which they identify with the two internationalism dimensions, creation of the fourfold classification of their foreign policy beliefs by collapsing two continuous variables results in throwing away considerable information about potentially wide variations in attitudes toward the alternative forms in internationalism that the militant and cooperative dimensions encompass. Ordinary least-squares and logistic regression with dummy variables are analytical techniques that avoid the pitfalls of other research strategies relevant to the questions raised here. Both techniques will be used in the analyses that follow, with the choice dictated by the nature of the dependent variable and assumptions made about it, as examined below. The Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance As the data in table 3.2 make clear, the American people are not of one mind in their views of the Reagan administration's foreign policy per¬ formance. What accounts for these differences? It is reasonable to hy¬ pothesize that partisanship, ideology, and foreign policy beliefs all play a part. The task is to determine the effects of each. Following the procedures used in chapter 2, each of the eight items in table 3.2 can be treated as a Likert scale and summed to create a gen¬ eralized interval-scale measure of respondents' evaluations of the Reagan administration's foreign policy performance. 2 Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 57 For purposes of explaining variations in evaluations of the adminis¬ tration's policy performance, partisanship is measured with two dummy variables, the first coded 1 for Republicans (with Democrats and inde¬ pendents coded 0), and the second coded 1 for independents (with Re¬ publicans and Democrats coded 0). Similarly, political philosophy is measured with two dummy variables, with one coded 1 for self-defined conservatives (with moderates and liberals coded 0), and the other with moderates coded 1 (and conservatives and liberals coded 0). Analytically, these rules will provide a measure of the effects of partisanship in relation to the position of Democrats and the effects of ideology in relation to the position of liberals, as explained in more detail below. Finally, the two internationalism dimensions, cooperative internationalism (ci) and militant internationalism (mi), are used to measure Americans' foreign policy beliefs. The results using ordinary least-squares regression analysis to assess the impact of these four variables on Americans' evaluations of the Rea¬ gan administration's foreign policy performance are shown in table 3.3. The table includes evaluations of Reagan's handling of foreign policy in 1986 based on the eight items in table 3.2 plus two other scales built from items in which respondents were asked to evaluate actions of the "U.S. government." In 1982 these included the government's handling of the seizure of U.S. hostages in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the declaration of martial law in Poland, the fighting between the govern¬ ment and rebel forces in El Salvador, the war between Britain and Ar¬ gentina over the Falkland Islands, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In 1986 they included U.S. efforts to overthrow the leftist government of Nicaragua, the invasion of Grenada, the response to the destruction of Korean Airlines flight 007 by Soviet military planes, and the bombing of Libya. Some of the 1982 items arguably include situations whose im¬ portant developments occurred before Reagan took office, like the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but they are the only items in the 1982 survey analogous to those in the 1986 survey, and all of them fit the requirements of scalability and reliability applied in chapter 2. 3 (No comparable questions were asked in 1974 or 1978.) Looking first at Reagan's handling of foreign policy, it is clear that foreign policy beliefs, partisanship, and ideology are all related to Amer¬ icans' evaluations of the administration's stewardship. With the excep¬ tion of the ideology variable for moderates, the regression coefficients for all of the variables are statistically significant. Lurthermore, the sign Table 3.3 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1982 and 1986 Foreign Policy Beliefs Party Identification Political Ideology Cl Ml Republican Independent Conservative Moderate R 2 o e'¬ m o< V 4 ■ O C /3 C /3 t - 0 / X c O' en 03 C G • 03 00 vO X X X Js o O .-3 c VI x £ c C /3 . < ^ c X — ■** C /3 >s ^ Cl = G X ? TO cn o rt* — "3 o Ol fc. *— ^ -2 > £ O X o o o cn C 73 "9 tn 73 3 ' d d 15 u 5/3 ‘3 03 £ is T 3 .. C 0 / 0 / 2 N 0 S G 03 C X _c ^ O 2 0 .2 c — > -G U? £ 15 ZJ Q 1 H t n >, X 8 O X ^ G 03 p X £ G m CN o o \£) in cn rf cn vc o 03 > ■- " o e* 3 cn 03 X £ l u 00 03 G 3 CL C 0) 73 c g £ 15 73 0C 3 g O — £ 7? r- C £ o o u *Q c/3 S- <3 £3 r X £ X o G o c 03 I I X x ro c w s c 73 03 o ■£ c Cl 5-1 05 tO £ b o <0 ts 03 73 03 3 C o G >> r 2 „ 3 o > c > o > o X c/3 73 G cl G ~ O “ c r~ ' G - c I x g £ 'O 3 ■3 " S' § |£ J > X -G •-G s ^ Cl X — .3 C &■ p 3 e r * C c __ G 73 > C O 03 c •§ £ 5 0/ c X - v— x 2 D C 0/ C X £ Q/ ^ .2 C Cl CL C rti C/3 a. £ .g a a. ai « 3 J S -G n ro c/3 5 g > -G « x -C 'o 733 G S -2 X c X rs <0 X 3j G 03 o i 4 ? " 73 o i ^ 3 c x t £ I .= 73 c X 03 — G 03 cri *- o 0/ > £ o o» ^ £ -S ^ S-S >2 0 v-> 03 1/3 X 3 L s2 c co c C/3 0/ c G 73 ' X c _QJ E c C/3 03 3 O C/3 x 0/ c c X *-* O — X *? c U, y G >s G 0) Cl c^ U X C/3 JU a g 03 ~ v- C 3 O O > £ 3 2 r .22 c 5 £ te ^ o - y — Qj £ 111 I G or, _ i_ « 1 a) c H c P £ -2 o « o •£ ~ <0 a. * " = n fc' o ° 4 c “ ^ S “ ■ j -> O O e =3 u X 73 C ^ X 5 £ t o o o *- X >- < g 1 C (TJ -r r- 03 > ra •- n ^ *- DC £ | c £ c Si S (T> I > o r 0 r- O X ± X X f c 58 Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 59 for each is consistent with expectations. The positive signs for the Re¬ publicans and independents indicate that they were more favorably dis¬ posed toward Reagan than Democrats (against whom, as noted earlier. Republicans and independents are measured). Similarly, the positive sign on the coefficient for conservatives indicates that, compared with liberals, they too evaluated Reagan's performance positively. In the case of the two internationalism dimensions, the signs indicate that the more favorably disposed toward militant internationalism Amer¬ icans were, the more likely they were to evaluate Reagan's policy per¬ formance positively. Conversely, the more favorable to cooperative in¬ ternationalism they were, the less likely it was that they would evaluate Reagan's performance positively. The combination of signs—positive on the mi variable and negative on the ci variable—indicates that Reagan tended to receive his strongest evaluations from those disposed toward hardline values and his weakest from those disposed toward accom- modationist values. This is precisely what was shown in table 3.2. The substantive message is clear: midway through the Reagan administra¬ tion's second term, the American people were sharply divided in their assessments of its foreign policy performance. They were divided along party lines, they were divided along ideological lines, and they were divided in terms of their beliefs about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. Similar conclusions derive from the assessments Americans made of the actions of the U.S. government in the foreign policy arena in 1986. Surprisingly, the results for 1982 are less easily characterized in that ideo¬ logical differences between liberals and conservatives are not apparent. Moreover, differences between the two internationalism dimensions are also absent. Greatest support for the government's action came from the internationalist direction, as indicated by the signs on the ci and mi di¬ mensions, whereas later, in 1986, it came from the hardline direction. It is unclear whether this is because many of the items used in the analysis are only tangentially tied to the Reagan administration compared with those in 1986. What is clear is that partisanship affected Americans' views on foreign policy issues in 1982 just as it did four years later. In fact, because the regression coefficients are standardized, they can be com¬ pared with one another to determine their relative importance in ex¬ plaining evaluations of Reagan's foreign policy performance. The mi and Republican party identification variables stand out in this respect, as both 60 Faces of Internationalism are consistently the most important explanatory factors in all three of the models shown in table 3.3. I will return to the Reagan administration later in this chapter and ask how partisanship, ideology, and Americans' foreign policy beliefs affected their evaluations of key administration officials. Before doing so, however, attention will shift to an examination of the relationship between these factors and Americans' opinions and evaluations regard¬ ing a number of issues about which they were asked in the Chicago Council surveys. The Relationship Between Foreign Policy Beliefs and Policy Preferences The foregoing analyses affirm the widespread view that partisan and ideological dispute are characteristic features of contemporary American foreign policymaking. Whether politics ever stopped at the water's edge may be still asked, but it is clear that it does not today. Partisanship and ideology will therefore be incorporated into the analyses that follow, but primary attention will be directed to the utility of the ci and mi dimen¬ sions in explaining Americans' foreign policy preferences. The theoretical issue at stake is whether the foreign policy beliefs of the American people have an effect on their opinions and preferences independent of their partisan attachments and philosophical dispositions. Another Analytical Interlude For analytical convenience, the responses to the survey items examined below have all been converted to simple dichotomies, such as yes/no, agree/disagree, and favor/oppose. The items are reported in the form of declarative statements, with responses supportive of the statement coded 1 and those opposed coded 0. Because the dependent variables are di¬ chotomies, logistic regression rather than ordinary least-squares regres¬ sion is appropriate. The reasons are spelled out in the technical note in appendix 2, which contains the complete set of logistic regressions dis¬ cussed in this chapter. An examination of those results along with the diagnostic statistics explained in the appendix supports three important generalizations: that the overall explanatory power of the models is gen¬ erally high; 4 that Americans' foreign policy preferences, as measured by Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 61 the dependent variables, are not independent of their foreign policy be¬ liefs, partisan attachments, and ideological orientations; and that beliefs, regardless of partisanship and ideology, are typically quite important in understanding preferences. The applicability of those generalizations in particular cases can be determined from the individual regression equations. Table 3.4, which is based on table A.2.1 in appendix 2, reports for the 1986 mass survey the regression for the question of whether it is best for the country to take an active part in or to stay out of world affairs. The results, which are similar in format to ordinary least-squares results, indicate a positive and statistically significant relationship between Americans' foreign pol¬ icy beliefs and their support for an active U.S. world role. Specifically, the more strongly respondents embrace the tenets of cooperative and militant internationalism, the greater is the probability that they will sup¬ port an active role. Because the signs on both internationalism variables are positive, the “direction'' of the support is toward internationalism, not toward one of the other quadrants of the fourfold belief system ty¬ pology elaborated in chapter 2. It is also clear that partisanship has an impact on Americans' disposition toward the nation's world role (both party identification variables are statistically significant), but that ide¬ ology does not (neither ideology variable is statistically significant). The analytical purpose of the regression analysis can be conceptual¬ ized as an effort to determine the probability that respondents prefer one policy option over another. This probability can be expressed as the odds of falling into one category (e.g., agree) rather than another (e.g., disagree). The natural logarithm of the odds ratio is called a logit. Logistic regression derives its name from the fact that the logit is the dependent variable. The regression coefficients in table 3.4 thus measure changes in the log odds of falling into one category rather than another. We can take advantage of this to determine the probability that respondents will deem it best if the United States pursues an active world role depending on where they lie on each of the independent variables. Figure 3.1 depicts these probabilities graphically. Looking first at the bottom half of the figure, the bar for Republicans indicates that, other things being equal, 5 the probability is .77 that Republicans will support an active U.S. world role. Put somewhat differently, the equation esti¬ mates that in 1986 77 percent of the Republicans in American society supported active U.S. involvement in the world. The probability for Dem¬ ocrats, on the other hand, is, at .67, somewhat less, while that for in- C/5 QJ rz 2 -a QJ *5 D a> jo o C£ a; -C ns S Q H c/5 Tj C to C/5 T" O QJ i-, m c >. o u tS 6C c -2 •SP g £ 2 o ^ 13 C/5 C/5 -w 03 ^ £ "g Oi C 1 .£* CQ _C c r> a- c 1c ro « .2 s s - O ns US fi¬ ll; £ a> c/5 H .vj '-S of " 4 “ CO* a> 2 C3 H < 2 c £ _ TO C 3 a* o a" ^ Cl. c a* C IS J l_ 0» c u a> Cl c a» "o TO qj > L 2 C3 o Cl c cr c/3 c >L bo o ai TO CQ u *5 cl c .to ‘5 u. o Cl 0/ > *J3 03 > L> O) C/5 c o U c 0/ "O C 0> CL a» TO C _C D CL O* O' U UT co •of lx O ^ o oo CO rx in LT5 CO O r—< O CO 03 -C I— VI CL C tc & c £ CQ ra > o TO >> 1/3 C O o C VI I *■ R «j a .fcp tn cr •Si - c O Jr a, 2i co c - U co LO LO o O' io a> £ o > 03 3 O -G T3 a; c D a; -C H ON X (N CO + ON vO cl 2 D ~ 03 O ^ C c £ E o .2 £ o 60 C m E <-> £ 03 2 X) £ ° m £ & r- C/3 3 E < o G 2 3 o X 04 vO O! G 3 O u O cu -G c/3 ■+■' d/ X LO vO 03 > «n ^ "3 2 c -tv, o .2P-c 3 01 o 7 r- O « ii 52 5 a; 2 73 m3 03 > 2 -a 3 03 O •■3 JZ vO X CD -C 60 C av x 00 X CD X E E o o c 3 O X 83 defense of corrupt governments abroad Table 3.15 The Lessons of Vietnam, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1974 (probabilities) u c 05 u z 3 Cu o; oc tx O' -** o m CM rf 00 O' in CM in 0t $ CD V. 05 £ "3 '3 > 05 3 3 0> 2 Cn *3 C f! £ 05 H o> CM m ON in o in oo sO vO sO in vC 05 CD 73 o ■£ * i! e tx tx in is. in ix oc tx m t^ cn Oi £ CD k- ■3 a» a> § £ a» c j- 05 a> S3 6C C .* 3 y E as £ o ^ 2 u 0t (3 C 3 ZJ r- CD “ 3 S CD 05 £ at at c a . S -a a» ^ at p x> c 3 3 > 3 £ IX O £ cn m x> m (N rt- m 0- o c CO cj ‘3 £ CD £ ^ < '£ ** c £ o 11 vO Tt IX tv. m t^s OO a> > at 05 12 3 I o 00 00 CD 05 at a.= O 05 CD — - 05 « E a» rf in in o oc vO o tx vO in o X O' x tx tx IX a. « CD -c Tj a* C 3 05 CD CD C £*: »- c os a* 3 £ £ c X £ 12 ° 2 § CN vO O -S j= so IX a» SL 3 CD 05 P o > k. — JD r- 05 a» CD S-2 at o 5 <= a» >. at -»-» u 3 x> oc 05 c >-> a a> E O' - c Xj < u- *3 £ ts a» > ■3 v 0 ^ £ 0 c oc ■s -2 c Z. £ c at 3 w- a .2 ■3 — C k* 0 u 05 > at -n *3 C 3 05 C x .: 3 o -C a» — at H 2 S £ c o a 3 84 Note: cell entries are probabilities of support for the attitude question by each political group. Entries are in boldface if differences between one or more of the groups are statistically significant at p ^ .05. Otherwise they appear in roman type. Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 85 Terrorism As Ronald Reagan was being inaugurated as the fortieth president of the United States on January 20, 1981, some fifty American diplomatic personnel who had been held hostage by the Iranian regime of the Ay¬ atollah Khomeini were in the process of being released. In the months that followed the administration pledged that it would never negotiate with terrorists. Then, in October 1986, news broke of an arms-for-hos- tages deal between the administration and the Khomeini regime that became known as the Iran-contra affair because of the alleged diversion of the sale's profits to rebel forces opposing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua in apparent contravention of the law. The revelations once more conjured up the picture of executive abuse of power and cost several their jobs: Donald T. Regan, White House chief of staff, John M. Poin¬ dexter, national security adviser, and Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, the National Security Council staffer primarily responsible for the Iran- contra connection. News of the arms-for-hostages deal came just as the American people were being polled to determine what they thought the United States should do to protect its citizens from terrorism. 21 In a series of questions with an ironically prophetic ring, they were asked: (1) "Should the U.S. negotiate with terrorist organizations to try to solve the problems they're concerned with?" (2) "Should the U.S. order the cia to assassinate known terrorists before they can commit future terrorist acts?" (3) "Should the U.S. use military force against terrorist organizations that harbor ter¬ rorists even if there is a risk that civilians may be killed?" Negotiating with terrorist organizations enjoyed the least support (41 percent in favor), followed by cia assassinations (46 percent), and the use of military force (62 percent). The analyses of these responses show no differences according to Americans' foreign policy beliefs on the negotiation question but sharp and predictable differences on the assassination and use-of-force prop¬ ositions (table A.2.7). Partisan and ideological differences on the proposal to use military force to deal with terrorism are also pronounced. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 summarize these divergent viewpoints. The findings un¬ derscore the viewpoints on use-of-force issues that differentiate accom- modationists from hardliners and liberals from conservatives, but what they might have told the Reagan administration as it contemplated the arms-for-hostages deal is unclear. Once news about it became public. 86 Faces of Internationalism Figure 3.3 Attitudes Toward Support of CIA Assassination of Terrorists, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 (probabilities) Oppose Cl and Ml Support Cl and Ml however, the president's popularity (job approval rating) plummeted more than 20 percentage points—one of the sharpest declines ever re¬ corded. It should also be noted that in 1978 respondents were asked if they thought it was justifiable to limit civil liberties in order to stop terrorism. Similar to responses to the use-of-force proposition in 1986, the question evoked strong partisan and ideological differences, but only the mi di¬ mension proved to be salient in relating Americans' foreign policy beliefs to the issue (table A.2.7). Interdependence If coping with terrorism dominated the headlines in the 1980s, coping with the economic challenges of an interdependent world dominated them in the 1970s. Challenges to the value of the dollar abroad and rising protectionist sentiment at home symbolized the changed and changing position of the United States in the global political economy. But none seemed more threatening than the cartelization of the oil market by opec Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 87 Figure 3.4 Attitudes Toward the Use of Military Force Against Terrorist Organizations, by Partisanship and Ideology, 1986 (probabilities) 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries), whose efforts to use oil as an instrument of influence in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War seemed to demonstrate that resource power could be every bit as effective as military power. The 1974 Chicago Council survey contained many items with a bearing on the issues and choices the industrialized West faced in those fateful days. One dealt with future Western cooperation. Perhaps in anticipation of the development of the International Energy Agency which the United States fostered to ensure cooperation in the event of another energy crisis, the 1974 survey asked respondents if they would favor cooperation among Western nations so as to "make us less dependent on the decisions of the foreign oil-producing countries." Ninety-three percent said yes. Another question asked what should be done "if the United States, Western Europe and Japan were faced with another oil embargo by the Arab states." The choices were sharing oil with Europe and Japan "even if it means less oil for Americans"; going it alone and letting Europe and Japan "fend for themselves"; and invading the oil-producing countries. Invasion received little support (7 percent), but the other two options commanded sizable backing. When analyzed according to Americans' foreign policy beliefs, the results indicate that both were perceived in clear-cut internationalist-isolationist terms, as illustrated in figure 3.5. Strong support was registered on both internationalism dimensions for the proposition that the United States should share its oil even if it meant 88 Faces of Internationalism Cooperation -3-2-10 1 2 3 Oppose Cl and Ml Support Cl and Ml Unilateralism -3-2-10 i 2 3 Oppose Cl and Ml Support Cl and Ml Figure 3.5 Attitudes Toward Unilateralism and Cooperation to Cope with Oil Shortages, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974 (probabilities) Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 89 less for Americans; similarly, opposition was expressed to the go-it-alone alternative among those inclined toward internationalism. Noteworthy is that neither proposition engendered identifiable partisan or ideological differences (table A.2.8). Another proposal for coping with the oil crisis about which respon¬ dents were asked had to do with Third World countries. It was that "the industrialized nations [extend] easy-term loans to developing countries which currently have large deficits in their balance of payments because of the high cost of oil." This is precisely what was done, with private banks in Western Europe and North America becoming primary conduits through which petrodollars were recycled from the oil-producing to the oil-consuming nations. The result by the early 1980s was a serious debt crisis resulting from the inability of many Third World borrowers to gen¬ erate the export earnings necessary to make the interest and amortization payments on their prior loans. The problem percolated throughout the remainder of the 1980s, sometimes erupting to crisis proportions as debt¬ ors and creditors sought to avert a massive debt default that might threaten the entire global monetary and trading systems. When asked in 1974 if they favored providing oil-dependent Third World nations with low-cost loans, a majority (55 percent) said no. Ana¬ lyzed in terms of their foreign policy beliefs, however, those disposed toward cooperative internationalism demonstrated very strong support for the proposal (militant internationalism was not salient in explaining attitudes toward the issue; see table A.2.8). Twelve years later, when the issue was framed not in terms of helping Third World countries but in terms of U.S. government guarantees for loan repayments to American banks that large numbers of developing countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, might not be able to make, it was the supporters of militant in¬ ternationalism who came to the rescue. 22 The suspicion is that these dif¬ ferences are explained by the varying political contexts in which the ques¬ tions were asked. In 1974 the situation was perhaps perceived as one in which aiding Third World nations was in the best tradition of transna¬ tional cooperation to cope with unexpected challenges, whereas in 1986 it was more likely to have been perceived as a case in which the private sector in the United States stood to lose unless the government inter¬ vened. If this interpretation of the public response to the debt crisis as it was posed in 1986 is correct, it fits with the argument that interdependence may be a curse as well as a blessing. As barriers to transnational trade 90 Faces of Internationalism and capital flows are lowered, economic interdependence grows. As it grows, the political choices made in one political jurisdiction designed to affect the health of the domestic economy may have repercussions abroad, but interdependence undermines the ability of governments in those other national jurisdictions to control the effects of choices made by others over whom they exercise no control. The appealing prescription is to diminish interdependence so as to reassert sovereign control. That makes particularly good political sense when the economic well-being of various domestic groups is threatened by foreign competition. 23 Growth in world trade since the 1940s has arguably been the single most important engine behind the historically unprecedented growth in worldwide economic well-being experienced since World War II. The expansion of world trade has been fueled by a series of multilateral trade negotiations whose purpose has been a systematic reduction in the bar¬ riers to world trade. Efforts to create an open, multilateral trade regime were first stimulated by the lessons of the 1930s, when intensely na¬ tionalistic economic policies resulted in a dramatic reduction in world trade, which in turn contributed to the global economic depression of the 1930s and eventually to world war. The question in the Chicago Council surveys most directly related to the perceived costs and benefits of interdependence asked: "It has been argued that if all countries would eliminate their tariffs and restrictions on imported goods, the costs of goods would go down for everyone. Others have said that such tariffs and restrictions are necessary to protect certain manufacturing jobs in certain industries from the competition of less expensive imports. Generally, would you say you sympathize more with those who want to eliminate tariffs or those who think such tariffs are necessary?" "Tariffs are necessary" was the preferred choice by a wide margin in all three of the surveys in which it was asked. Americans' foreign policy beliefs have some impact on their attitudes toward tariffs, but not in the direction that might be expected (table A.2.8). As summarized in table 3.16, eliminating tariffs—-the free trade option— is actually opposed, not supported, by those who tend to embrace inter¬ nationalist values. Only the mi variable is significant (in a negative di¬ rection) in 1982 and 1986, but both internationalism dimensions are sig¬ nificant—and negatively signed—in 1974. By themselves these unexpected findings do not prove that the mass public is not supportive of all of the tenets that relate to the Liberal International Economic Order devised under the aegis of American hegemony in the decades following World Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 91 Table 3.16 Support for the Elimination of Tariffs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 (probabilities) Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Direction Direction Oppose Support 1986 .37 .31 0 .40 .28 1982 .30 .27 0 — .32 .25 1978 .32 .23 — IS .32 .23 Note: see explanatory note with table 3.5. War II. Many more ideas would have to be probed before that conclusion could be drawn. 24 What can be said in the face of them is that the mass public seems in this instance to equate internationalism with "America First" policies. Objective observers might regard those two viewpoints as anathema to one another, but the consistency through time in the relationship between the two internationalism dimensions and the tariffs question warrants its consideration. Nuclear Weapions and National Defense Issues growing out of the complex interdependent economic ties among many of the nations in the world continued to command attention in the 1980s, but for a variety of reasons—not least of which was the re¬ newed hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union—na¬ tional defense issues and especially issues related to nuclear weapons and nuclear war gained priority on the public agenda. A peace movement emerged in Europe whose purpose was to prevent nato's deployment of new intermediate-range Euromissiles as part of the Atlantic alliance's force modernization program agreed upon in 1979. In the United States the call for a nuclear freeze united diverse public interest groups. Public opinion polls repeatedly showed overwhelming support for the idea, which was also endorsed by candidates in numerous state and local elec¬ tions. The freeze was debated and voted on in Congress and eventually was made a plank in the Democratic party's 1984 presidential campaign platform. The common thread which seemed to unite diverse groups within the United States and across the Atlantic behind the cause of peace was the threat of nuclear war and efforts to avoid it. The Chicago Council surveys asked about the freeze (mutually ver- 92 Faces of Internationalism Table 3.17 Attitudes Toward Nuclear Weapons, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1982 and 1986 (probabilities) _d_ Support _ Mi_ Oppose Support Direction Pattern Direction Oppose Support Favor mutual verifiable freeze with inspections right now if Soviets agree 1986 .55 .87 + — 0 .75 .74 1982 .46 .80 + AC .79 .56 Favor mutual verifiable freeze with inspections after U.S. builds up nuclear weapons 1986 .23 .08 - — 0 .13 .15 1982 .27 .17 HA + .12 .32 U.S. should stop building nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union agrees to do so 1986 .52 .70 + — 0 .61 .62 1982 . 44 . 62 + IN + .48 .57 U.S. should continue to build nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviets do 1986 .40 .10 - HA + .13 .30 1982 . 44 .14 HA + .22 .30 Note: see explanatory note with table 3.5. ifiable with inspections) in 1982 and in 1986. In both years it was strongly embraced by cooperative internationalists (see tables 3.17 and A.2.9). Furthermore, the data indicate that they were generally "freeze now" advocates in that they opposed the proposal for a freeze only after the United States had built up its own nuclear weapons. They were opposed in this viewpoint in 1982 by militant internationalists, thus giving the issue a distinctly accommodationist-versus-hardline cast. The two Chicago Council surveys in the 1980s also asked whether respondents favored a halt in the production of nuclear weapons. The proposition that the United States should stop weapons production now, regardless what the Soviets do—a unilateral freeze—produced compar¬ atively little support (fewer than 20 percent favored it). However, when respondents were asked if the United States should continue building nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviets did, clear differences along the accommodationist-hardline divide emerged, with hardliners in favor and accommodationists opposed. When the proposition was altered to reflect the possible agreement of the Soviet Union to a halt in nuclear weapons production, it enjoyed strong internationalist support in 1982 and strong support among cooperative internationalists in 1986 (the coefficient for mi is not significant in 1986; see tables 3.17 and A.2.9). Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 93 Table 3.18 Attitudes Toward Strategic Defense Initiative Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 (probabilities) Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Direction Direction Oppose Support Research .48 .58 + — 0 .56 .51 Build .38 .22 HA + .18 .42 Note: see explanatory note with table 3.5 Perhaps the most intriguing national security proposal to emerge in the 1980s was the Reagan administration's Strategic Defense Initiative (sdi). The proposal, often referred to as a "Star Wars" approach to de¬ fense, sought to utilize developments in ballistic missile defense (bmd) technology to shift the strategic posture of the United States from of¬ fensively oriented conceptions of deterrence to defensively oriented ones. Thus the president's charge to the scientific community in his March 1983 speech was to render the "awesome Soviet missile threat" "im¬ potent and obsolete." Americans were asked about sdi in the 1986 Chicago Council survey. Although Reagan's initial proposal was essentially directed toward the creation of a research effort, already by 1986 there was much discussion about the feasibility—both political (because of the 1973 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty with the Soviet Union) and technical—of moving toward early deployment of a bmd system. The 1986 survey considered that op¬ tion along with the research thrust and abandoning sdi altogether. As with the unilateral nuclear freeze, abandoning sdi enjoyed only modest support among the American people, but on the question of actually building a "Star Wars" system clear patterns of support and opposition along the familiar accommodationist-hardline split are evident, with co¬ operative internationalists opposed and militant internationalists sup¬ portive. Finally, cooperative internationalism was important in explain¬ ing support for the research only position, but the mi dimension was unrelated to the question (see tables 3.18 and A.2.9). Efforts to negotiate arms control agreements with the Soviets have a long if somewhat uneven history. The Reagan administration came to Washington convinced that the salt II agreement signed by President Carter and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in 1979 was seriously flawed, and it therefore proposed a new round of talks—known as start (Stra- 94 Faces of Internationalism tegic Arms Reduction Talks)—whose purpose was not simply to place ceilings on strategic weapons but actually to reduce their numbers. Little progress was made on the issue, however, and when nato began de¬ ployment of intermediate-range and ground-launched cruise missiles late in 1983 the Soviet Union abruptly ended all arms control talks with the United States. Negotiations were eventually renewed and an agreement was reached on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces (inf) from Eu¬ rope. Efforts to realize deep cuts in the superpowers' strategic arsenals were given impetus following the 1987 Washington summit, during which the inf accord was signed. Earlier, in 1986, Americans were asked if they agreed (and how strongly) with the statement that "the United States has not tried hard enough to make an agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides." Fifty-four per¬ cent did agree. Variations in support of the proposition followed the now familiar pattern of pitting those inclined toward accommodationist values against those inclined toward hardline values (table A.2.9). The state¬ ment also produced predictably sharp partisan and ideological cleavages, with Republicans and conservatives very much in disagreement with Democrats and liberals over it. Relations with Communist Countries Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union figure prom¬ inently in the construction of the two internationalism dimensions. We would expect, therefore, that the two dimensions would be related to other questions having to do with relations between the United States and Communist nations. As shown in table 3.19, they are, but not always in expected ways. The first two questions in the table probe whether the Russians and the Chinese can be trusted. Since detente was still the official policy of the United States in 1974 when these questions about reaching long-term agreements were asked, broad support for them might have been ex¬ pected. Instead, the divisions inherent in the two faces of internation¬ alism are repeated here, with those tending toward accommodationist values likely to "trust" the Soviets and Chinese and those inclined toward hardline values likely to "distrust" them (also see table A.2.10). Both, however, reject the notion that how the Soviet Union treats Soviet Jews and other minorities is none of our business. The issue became a heated Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 95 Table 3.19 Attitudes Toward Relations with Communist Countries, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 (probabilities) _Cl_ Support _ MI_ Oppose Support Direction Pattern Direction Oppose Support It is possible for the United States and Russia to reach long-term agreements to keep peace 1974 .39 .91 + AC - .84 .62 It is possible for the United States and Communist China to reach long-term agreements to keep peace 1974 .40 .87 + AC - .79 .58 How the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minorities is none of our business 1978 .58 .35 - IS - .55 .39 1974 .61 .32 IS .60 .32 Favor entering negotiations with Cuba regarding reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations 1986 .38 .82 + — 0 .65 .61 1982 .35 .75 + IN + .53 .60 Favor establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba 1974 .29 .88 + AC .74 .57 Note: see explanatory note with table 3.5. one during the Nixon presidency, when Congress passed the Jackson- Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act in which it stated that the Soviet Union would be denied most-favored-nation trade treatment without a liberalization of its policies relating to the emigration of Soviet Jews. The Soviet Union understandably rejected those restrictions, labeling them a violation of the 1972 Trade Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union (which had called for an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions and reaffirmed the principle of nonin¬ terference in domestic affairs). The issue was among the first of many that produced the long slide from detente experienced during the re¬ mainder of the decade. Relations between the United States and Cuba have often been stormy in the years following Vietnam. In the 1970s, for example, Cuban troops were sent to Angola to support Marxist forces in the ongoing civil war there. When the Ford administration sought to use the cia to assist anti- Marxist elements in Angola, it was prevented from doing so by the so- 96 Faces of Internationalism called Clark amendment, passed by Congress in 1976. Later in the decade it was alleged that a Soviet brigade, apparently left in Cuba after the 1962 missile crisis, had been organized into a combat unit. President Carter assured the nation that the unit posed no security threat to the United States, but the issue touched a raw nerve in the American polity—even as far away as Idaho where Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair¬ man Frank Church faced a tough reelection challenge (see Hampson, 1988). And when Reagan became president the administration repeatedly argued that Cuba was a source of arms and support for the leftist forces in Central America that the new administration was committed to op¬ pose. Secretary of State Alexander Haig talked of the need to "go to the source" to stop the flow of arms into Central America, which many be¬ lieved was only a thinly veiled threat that the United States might take military action against Cuba itself. Against this background, the American people were asked in the 1974 Chicago Council survey and in both of the surveys in the 1980s about reestablishing normal diplomatic ties with Cuba. As shown in table 3.18, those inclined toward cooperative internationalism repeatedly and strongly embraced the prescription. In 1974 they were opposed by militant in¬ ternationalists, such that the issue divided respondents much as the issue of making long-term agreements with Russia and China divided them. Interestingly, however, in 1982 there was support in the internationalist direction for reestablishing diplomatic and economic relations, and in 1986 the mi variable proved not to be salient on the issue (table A.2.10). The results suggest the possibility that renewing ties with Cuba might not provoke undue domestic opposition. Linkages Between Opinion and Policy: Evaluations of American Foreign Policymaking Officials The inconsistency and incoherence often characteristic of American for¬ eign policy in the post-Vietnam era have been traced in part to the break¬ down of the Cold War internationalist consensus (Destler, Gelb, and Lake, 1984). In the absence of consensus, policymakers must seek to build support for their policy initiatives, which runs the risk of alienating one domestic group and then another as the support of still others is pursued. Disarray and oscillation are natural outcomes of such a domestic political environment, for they reflect simultaneously the uncertainty among the Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 97 public about the course that can best serve the national interest and the need that leaders perceive to placate divergent groups at home as well as abroad. There is much in the history of the foreign policy disputes unfolding during the fifteen years following the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam consistent with the proposition that the absence of a do¬ mestic consensus has colored not only the rhetoric of American foreign policy but its content as well. President Carter's inability to win approval of the salt II treaty and President Reagan's inability to deal more harshly with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua come readily to mind. The analyses in the previous section reinforce with systematic evi¬ dence the conclusion of many observers that a consensus about the ap¬ propriate role of the United States in world affairs has not existed for many years. Although there are some issues on which the American people are joined in an internationalist thrust reminiscent of the pre¬ sumed consensus of the Cold War years, there are many others in which the elements of conflict and cooperation around which the consensus was built tend to divide rather than unite. The result, noted at the outset of this chapter, is that presidents today must build coalitions of support for their foreign policy initiatives, for they cannot count on that support in the same way that presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson once could. Although the correlation between the absence of consensus and policy "failures” like those experienced by Presidents Carter and Reagan is clear, drawing causal connections between them is more difficult. Elite dis- sensus arguably plays itself out in Congress, but why should presidents care about mass foreign policy beliefs? Conventional wisdom holds that public opinion sets the boundaries on permissible foreign policy behav¬ ior, thereby constraining the alternatives from which a president might choose. But because these limits are known to be more elastic than fixed (perhaps because of the way political and media elites present and in¬ terpret information), they are at best viewed as postponing rather than limiting factors in the political process. An alternative to the "direct effects" view of the role that public opin¬ ion plays in the foreign policymaking process is suggested in the liter¬ ature dealing with the determinants and consequences of presidential popularity. Briefly stated, research on presidential popularity suggests that (1) the public's evaluation of presidential performance is significantly affected by the state of the nation's economy and by dramatic political 98 Faces of Internationalism events, both foreign and domestic; and that (2) presidents care about their popularity with the American people because it affects their ability to work their will with others involved in the policy process. As Richard Neustadt observes in his classic study. Presidential Power (1980: 64), “The Washingtonians who watch a President have more to think about than his professional reputation. They also have to think about his standing with the public outside of Washington. They have to gauge his popular prestige. Because they think about it, public standing is a source of in¬ fluence for him. . . ." (See also Kernell, 1986.) In short, the more popular a president is, the more likely he is to accomplish his political agenda. 25 This is the essence of what Dennis M. Simon and Charles W. Ostrom (1988) call “the politics of prestige." The effects of presidential popularity on American foreign policy per¬ formance are explored by Ostrom and Brian L. Job (1986), who conclude that popular presidents have a greater proclivity to engage in the use of force short of war because higher popularity levels free them from the domestic constraints that would otherwise inhibit resort to force. The impact of foreign policy behavior on presidential popularity, on the other hand, is examined by Ostrom and Simon (1985), whose analysis invites the conclusion that, historically, the American public had rewarded a confrontational foreign and military policy by showing that threats, the actual use of military force, and talking tough to the Soviets won pres¬ idents popular approval, whereas cooperating with the Soviets typically cost them. Although the research on presidential popularity is replete with evi¬ dence pointing to the impact of foreign policy events and opinions on evaluations of presidential performance and their consequences, most is based on aggregate data. Because of this, it is impossible to infer from it knowledge of the impact that the breakdown of the presumed Cold War foreign policy consensus has exerted on American foreign policy performance in the post-Vietnam era. The insight alternative research strategies promise is suggested by Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (1987b), who demonstrate with survey data the important impact that evaluations of presidents' foreign policy performance ultimately exert on their overall popularity. Building on Morris P. Fiorina's (1981) work on retrospective voting in American national elections, Hurwitz and Peffley persuasively argue that citizens' evaluations of an administration's performance (and, by implication, a candidate's attractiveness) will include not only ret¬ rospective evaluations based on the performance of the economy but Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 99 also of its ability to realize its foreign policy objectives and the means chosen to realize them. Refocusing attention on presidential performance from the aggregate to the individual level in principle permits a straightforward means to assess the impact of Americans' foreign policy beliefs on their assess¬ ments of presidential performance which in turn, and in combination with the state of the economy and dramatic foreign and domestic events, affect the climate of opinion within which presidents must formulate and carry out their foreign policy choices. Regrettably, however, none of the available data used to assess systematically the nature of Americans' foreign policy beliefs includes the information necessary to ascertain re¬ spondents' approval of presidential performance in the manner typical of studies of presidential popularity. 26 The Chicago Council data do, however, contain some information that point in the direction of unraveling the relationship between Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their evaluations of presidential performance. Thus we were able earlier to examine the relationship between evalu¬ ations of the Reagan administration's handling of foreign policy and Americans' foreign policy beliefs, partisan attachments, and philosoph¬ ical dispositions (see table 3.3). The results demonstrated the importance of all three factors in explaining Americans' views of the Reagan admin¬ istration's foreign policy performance. A similar methodology can be used to inquire into Americans' views of policymakers themselves. Beginning in 1978 the Chicago Council sur¬ veys contained a series of "thermometer" items in which respondents were asked to record their affect in the form of "temperature feelings" toward different countries and political leaders throughout the world. Although these data are not comparable to the presidential performance questions the Gallup organization and others have asked over the years, they do permit some further assessment of the likely impact that foreign policy beliefs exert on the domestic context within which American for¬ eign policy is created and sustained. The results are presented in table 3.20. 27 The analyses strongly reinforce the proposition that Americans' for¬ eign policy beliefs affect their evaluations of presidents' (and other pol¬ icymakers') performance. More importantly, perhaps, they reinforce the veracity of the conclusion that prior foreign policy beliefs significantly shape the domestic environment within which presidents must for¬ mulate and build support for their foreign (and domestic) policy choices. Table 3.20 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and "Thermometer" Ratings of Foreign Policy Officials, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1978-86 in 4 —< nO CN i IN CO tN 4_< IN tN in O' X O' in Z nO CO Tt 00 vq CO o CM rsT r | CN cm' ci cm' O tN O o X N CO o , ik co q CM CO q q ' J B- Tt* sb 00 IN rsi o CM O c Tt« CO in in tN nO in 0 / * * * V * ,—^ * is in O' CO nO — O' Cl CM m nO CM CM X CM CO O' 0 / tN 00 in 4 —1 (N pH X o CO O CM q tN o q o 73 o —3 vb —✓ O IN S' q S' rJ, x i ^ 60 o 1 1 1 vL i I O 1 c 2 Zj 2 2 > *3 * y _ s ★ * * * ' _ v * * __ s v * __^ ■*-> 4-H sO r—< co CO o NO o CM nO tN in 4—4 CO ”7* tN > u- IN r j q CM v© CM CNj CM in X o IN q CM o m p 0 / CO S' 00 —✓ O' —^ ni S' cb —^ CM CM i q ,* x 1 C/5 1 i 1 c 1 i 1 u c 0 / ★ ★ ★ __ v ★ ' _^ * ^ ★ ★ CN $ CO r~ t—4 CM >“■« <—i On On in ON o X Tt- X O m U Q c O) d. «—< CM ON 4 —< ON o q CM IN o 4—J o CM q q ^ o CO o O- CO o ON o CM o cb o IN 4—' i i 1 <0 0/ 73 1 W i ^ i c c Z) 2 c >s rz * ★ * * * ,_^ * * ^^ * v ★ v . ^ 3 CO CO m IN o O X CO X X in tN CM tN rZ s T* IN CM r—* q in X X CM CM q O O' q 0- 3 no S' O —^ vb S' in —^ nO —✓ in S' NO i cb 1 ^ i Cl 4—< £ E 3 V- >s u -T3 C < 100 Note: cell entries are unstandardized regression coefficients followed (in parentheses) by their standardized regression coefficients. Coefficients statistically significant at p £ .05 are indicated by an asterisk (*). Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 101 During most of his term in office Ronald Reagan was popularly perceived as a staunch opponent of the Soviet Union and a firm believer in the importance of military might as an instrument of political influence. In a similar vein, the results in table 3.20 indicate a close correspondence between how warmly Americans felt about Reagan and how strongly they embraced the tenets of militant internationalism. Conversely, the more strongly respondents espoused cooperative internationalism, the more likely they were to feel coolly toward Reagan (although the rela¬ tionship is statistically significant only in 1986). The patterns, as in the evaluations of Reagan's handling of foreign policy (see table 3.3), indicate a clear division of opinion on Reagan along accommodationist-hardline lines. The coefficients on the party identification and political philosophy variables warrant comment. All are significant statistically, which par¬ allels earlier findings showing the importance of partisan and ideological differences on foreign policy issues. The coefficients in fact show how wide these differences are. The Republican party coefficient in 1986 in¬ dicates that Republicans felt 26 "degrees" (equivalent to percentage points) more warmly toward Reagan than Democrats did. Similarly, indepen¬ dents rated Reagan 13 degrees higher than Democrats; conservatives 14 degrees higher than liberals; and moderates 11 degrees higher than lib¬ erals. Finally, the intercept shows the "warmth" liberal Democrats felt toward Reagan—which in 1986 was a rather chilly 48 degrees. Evaluations of other members of the (two) Reagan administrations can be similarly interpreted. There are few surprises here except perhaps in the "internationalist" support that Jeane Kirkpatrick received in 1982. The former ambassador to the United Nations was often portrayed as a staunch Reaganite, and she was promoted by conservative groups for the post of national security adviser when the conservative William Clark unexpectedly resigned to become secretary of the interior in October 1983. Furthermore, Kirkpatrick not only enjoyed comparatively stronger thermometer ratings by those inclined toward internationalism, the mag¬ nitudes of the party and political philosophy coefficients indicate much less division among partisan and ideological identifiers than on the pres¬ ident himself in 1982 and on the administrations' secretaries of state and defense, particularly in 1986. What about Jimmy Carter? Popular conceptions of Carter's politics portray the former Georgia governor as a "liberal" in nearly equal mea¬ sure to the popular view of the former California governor as a "con- 102 Faces of Internationalism servative." We would expect, therefore, that both ideological orientations and partisanship would yield different evaluations of the two presidents, and they do. Interestingly, however, once partisan and ideological dif¬ ferences are controlled. Carter appears to have enjoyed greater support ("warmth”) among those inclined toward internationalist values com¬ pared with Reagan, for whom differences in Americans' evaluations more typically—and predictably—fell along the accommodationist-hardline di¬ vision evident in the American polity since Vietnam. Regrettably, questions that would permit President Ford and mem¬ bers of his administration to be assessed in similar terms were not in¬ cluded in the 1974 Chicago Council survey. Two questions that can be analyzed were included, however (see table 3.21). One asked respon¬ dents how they would rate President Ford "on working for peace in the world"; a second asked how they would rate "the job Henry Kissinger is doing as Secretary of State." (The response categories were excellent, pretty good, only fair, and poor. 28 ) Both enjoyed strong Republican back¬ ing, but at least Ford did not evoke the kind of sharp division between liberals and conservatives that would later characterize evaluations of his successors (although Kissinger did). Both also enjoyed clear-cut and, in the case of Henry Kissinger perhaps, somewhat unexpected support among those inclined toward internationalist values. It is important to remember that the 1974 Chicago Council survey was taken within a few short months of Richard Nixon's forced resignation. Although Ford had by then pardoned Nixon for any wrongdoing in the Watergate affair— an act which cut short the "honeymoon" new presidents typically enjoy and caused Ford's popularity to plummet in an unprecedented fashion— conceivably these findings reflect a more benign evaluation of Ford and Kissinger than might otherwise have been the case. 29 Nonetheless, the contrast with the Carter and Reagan administrations is striking. Summary and Conclusions The relationship between Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their pol¬ icy preferences and performance evaluations is complex. Understanding the relationship is made even more difficult by the temporal thrust to¬ ward explanation in this book, which requires documenting that rela¬ tionship empirically across more than a decade of events, circumstances, and personalities. Generalizations do emerge, however. Indeed, the im- J-H 03 QJ 5— ( u QJ CD 73 G 03 c n 73 5—i o X 4_i c QJ 2 QJ Ph Uh O C/3 g o (\ ON 4—» T-H 03 J3 73" 2 2 > w 0 5-( 73 g G 03 0 C/3 U M-i QJ bJD 2 JO CO 3 >, u QJ 73 'o ^H Ph 03 U g X .bp *0 ’5 Jh (X o 73 X G c/3 03 C/3 03 X C/3 g c QJ 03 QJ C/3 £ X QJ CQ 03 Gh .x X X ’> C/3 K* c V o QJ u 2 G 03 2 c cQ G Jh QJ O X 'HH Jh H QJ CQ rH C/3 04 X CO QJ bJD QJ _G 3 *55 C/3 cQ H 2 bO O o QJ 73 O Ch G QJ 2 »-i 03 Ph cj JP c/3 aj u_l O PL, CQ O) 73 O C o u c CD 73 G U a. QJ 73 G u CN o 00 o On 00 ^ lo O r-H On 04 LO T_ * O W) G 2 Ch o £ c o 73 03 cQ v£> On O O LO CO Th O VO O 03 * _ _ * 00 CO 2 r—1 LO T-H 0 X IO QJ PC in o O C4 CO H QJ C/3 b0^ QJ CJ •55 CO CJ aj X 73 03 QJ 2 03 4-> O cu CL, Jh QJ 4-> 03 QJ Ci u 2 03 CJ 'S O -4—1 CQ QJ C/3 c VI Oh C t>0 £> -a c a» a/ '£ % aj c _, 03 !u 103 104 Faces of Internationalism portant substantive message of the long and somewhat tedious analyses reported in the chapter is simple: the divisions inherent in the foreign policy beliefs of the American people since Vietnam often produce sharp and persistent differences in the support Americans accord different pol¬ icy proposals. And the important theoretical message is that those di¬ visions follow predictable patterns. They emerge along the lines used to describe the conceptual distinctions between the two faces of interna¬ tionalism, which is to say that attitudes toward communism, the use of force, and relations with the Soviet Union predict preferences on other issues as well. More specific generalizations emerge from the several dozen items (and many more “item years") analyzed here, which reinforce the ob¬ servation that the bifurcation of Americans' foreign policy attitudes re¬ sults from fundamental divisions not only about whether the United States should be involved in world affairs, but also how. When asked if the United States should pursue an active role in world affairs, the responses of the American people consistently fall along the internationalist-isolationist fault, as supporters of cooperative and mil¬ itant internationalism both favor active world involvement. But few pol¬ icy questions produce similar response patterns. Surprisingly, perhaps, questions about foreign aid are most consistently among them. Although neither economic nor military aid enjoys strong and persistent support among the American people, the more they support cooperative and militant internationalism, the more likely they are to support various forms of foreign aid. That support has been shown to extend to some specific situations as well, such as maintaining at current levels aid for Israel. Other issues that elicited strong internationalist responses in¬ cluded sharing oil with U.S. allies and eschewing a go-it-alone strategy during the energy crisis atmosphere of the early 1970s. On occasion other policy proposals enjoy internationalist support among the American people, including government support of anticommunist dictators in other countries and the proposition that the Soviet Union's treatment of Soviet Jews is a matter of concern to the United States. (In both instances the suspicion is strong that the anticommunist and anti- Soviet overtones of the issues explain the preferences.) Finally, one issue that enjoyed “internationalist'' support in 1978—almost as a contradic¬ tion in terms—is the maintenance of protective trade barriers. In 1982 and 1986 significant differences between pro- and anti-tariff forces were apparent only along the militant internationalism dimension, but the Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 105 issue nonetheless elicited a curious response in that it appears as though the mass public equates political internationalism with economic na¬ tionalism. As will be shown in chapter 5, this is an issue—and per¬ ception—on which elites and masses are widely separated. In contrast with the issues that unite proponents of the two faces of internationalism, those that divide them are more numerous. Typically they involve questions of military force and intervention. Sharp differ¬ ences along the accommodationist-hardline fault are evident on such issues as expanding defense spending, assisting rebels with economic and military aid, employing military force against drug traffickers, and using the cia to assassinate terrorists and to intervene covertly in other countries. Nuclear weapons issues salient on the public agenda during the 1980s illustrate the differences well. Accommodationists advocated stopping nuclear weapons production, regardless of what the Soviets did, and they favored a nuclear freeze if the Soviets would agree. Hard¬ liners, on the other hand, supported the continued production of nuclear weapons, regardless of what the Soviets did, and they supported a nu¬ clear freeze only after the United States had built up its nuclear stockpile. Clearly there is a hawk-dove dichotomy here. The terminology has been avoided heretofore, not only because of its strong emotive connotations but also because attitudes embedded in the two faces of internationalism range more broadly than this simple dichotomy suggests. The metaphor of the arrows and the olive branch in the eagle's talons clearly applies, however, as the divisions between accommodationists and hardliners on issues of military might and interventionism are stark. Although the focus of attention has been on the policy preferences associated with the two faces of internationalism, it is noteworthy that neither partisanship nor ideology is as closely or predictably associated with Americans' policy preferences as their foreign policy beliefs are. In part this is due to the fact that partisanship and ideology are associated with beliefs, as shown in chapter 2, but the fit is not so close as to expect that the two political variables would contribute little to an understanding of Americans' preferences. To the extent that generalizations may be appropriate, they suggest that liberal Democrats tend to prefer the same policy choices as accommodationists and conservative Republicans those of hardliners. Nonetheless, the comparatively greater explanatory power of Americans' foreign policy beliefs (shown systematically in appendix 2 by the differences in the model chi-squares between the full and re¬ duced-form models) deserves emphasis. Indeed, a practical consequence 106 Faces of Internationalism toward which these generalizations point is that differences on policy issues tend to reinforce rather than cross-cut one another, thus pointing once more toward the sources of the domestic contention that so often has characterized recent American foreign policy. There is another important finding that emerges from the analyses that lies at the core of explaining the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy: the demonstrably close association between Amer¬ icans' foreign policy beliefs and their evaluations of policymakers' per¬ formance. There are no startling findings here in that, for the most part, the more internationalist Americans' foreign policy beliefs are, the more likely they are to evaluate their policymakers positively. This is precisely what would be expected, given the combination of an internationalist ethos and an understandably nationalistic tendency to support political leaders, regardless of what they do. But the qualifications that must be added are compelling. During the second Reagan administration accom- modationists and hardliners were divided in their support for the pres¬ ident, just as they were on many policy issues. Similarly, in the first Reagan administration the president received his greatest support among those strongly disposed toward militant internationalism, with little measurable increase in support among those disposed toward cooper¬ ative internationalism. The same was true of the thermometer ratings Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger received in 1986. The faces of internationalism bear on the evaluations that pol¬ icymakers are given by the American people. Policymakers depend on public support to realize their goals. Unless they are able to build coalitions of support for their proposals that bridge the gaps between those holding different foreign policy beliefs, their personal popularity with the American people will suffer. If it suffers, so will their programs. 4 . The Structure of Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Their Correlates A general proposition shared by elite theorists is that the political attitudes of elites and masses are dissimilar. Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler's (1978) popular arguments about the meaning of elitism are typical. Public policy, including innovations in it, reflects elite interests and values, they argue, not mass demands. Responsibility for the common weal lies within an elite that has reached fundamental consensus about the rules of the game and about the general thrust of public policy. In foreign affairs the consensus shared by the liberal establishment “includes a desire to exercise influence in world affairs, to oppose the spread of communism, to maintain a strong national defense, and to protect pro-Western governments from internal sub¬ version and external aggression" (Dye and Zeigler, 1978: 111). Only a narrow range of disagreement, chiefly about means, not ends, persists within the broader consensus, the argument continues, despite the erosion of elite legitimacy resulting from the failure of American policy in Vietnam. Compelling as this argument may once have been, the balance of available evidence points toward the breakdown of elite consensus, with Vietnam playing a critical role in its demise. 1 The question that naturally arises then is: What is the nature of elites' foreign policy beliefs in the post-Vietnam era? This chapter seeks an answer to that question. Based on the four quadrennial elite surveys sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (ccfr) at the same time as its mass surveys, it will be shown that the structure of elite attitudes closely parallels that of the mass public and that the political attributes of leaders are an important correlate of the differences between and among their foreign policy beliefs. These important findings lay the basis for the analysis in chapter 5, where the foreign policy beliefs of elites and masses are compared systematically. 107 108 Faces of Internationalism A Foreign Policy Elite? The proposition that American foreign policy is the prerogative and prod¬ uct of an elite enjoys a long tradition. 2 The elite has been widely known as “the establishment" ever since Richard Rovere wrote a spoof of it in The American Scholar in 1961. Following World War II the establishment became the champion of “liberal internationalism," the tenets of which comprised what came to be the core elements of the Cold War consensus. As Godfrey Hodgson observed in the early 1970s: The grand strategy of the Truman Administration was the establishment's policy. For the kernel of policy was simple: to oppose isolationism. That is the bedrock of the American establishment's thinking about the world. The experience of World War II had reinforced it. . . . The American opponents of isolationism, to a man, felt that appeasement had been a disaster, and that the lesson to be drawn from the struggle against Fascism was that there were those in the world who could only be restrained by force; that the use of force in international affairs might therefore indeed be justified; and that great powers must maintain the credibility of their willingness to use force. Thirdly, the policy of the establishment was anti-Communist. . . . Establishment anti-Communism was essentially for export. One of the issues which distinguished the establishment from the right was the establishment's far lesser concern with domestic Communism. . . . (1973: 9) Hodgson (1973: 8) describes the establishment as three groups brought together by the experience of World War II: “the internationally-minded lawyers, bankers and executives of international corporations in New York; the government officials in Washington; and the academics." 3 Al¬ though he eschews the notion that the establishment is (or was) syn¬ onymous with any single institution, others see the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations as its institutional manifestation. 4 The council's lim¬ ited membership is drawn from among the most prestigious and best connected of the nation's financial and corporate institutions, univer¬ sities, foundations, media, and government bodies. Its members have included a long line of influential policymakers, including presidents of the United States. The veracity of the viewpoint that equates the estab¬ lishment and the council is reinforced by the consistency between po¬ sitions supported by the council and key elements in post-World War II American foreign policy. Included is the policy of containment, the Mar¬ shall Plan, the nato alliance, the challenge of “flexible response" to the doctrine of “massive retaliation," the initial impetus toward military in- Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 109 volvement in Vietnam, the subsequent policy of withdrawal, and an in¬ ternational campaign on behalf of human rights, among others. Vietnam and the Breakdown of Elite Consensus Hodgson (1973: 40) concluded his analysis of the establishment with the observation that "An establishment may always be with us. . . . But his¬ torically speaking, it is clear that the establishment which has exercised such a remarkable influence over American foreign policy since World War II is dead, and that Vietnam, if not the murderer, was at least the occasion for its demise.” The opinions of the establishment "will no longer be even broadly homogeneous," he wrote. "They will no longer spring, as they did spring before the Vietnam War, from a shared view of the world, and of the proper goals for American policy" (Hodgson, 1973: 39). In a similar vein, Carl Gershman observes in his critique of the "new" foreign policy establishment emergent in the mid-1970s that "the prin¬ cipal way the Council [on Foreign Relations] had changed [in the wake of Vietnam] was that its leading members had ceased to believe in the world outlook they had espoused since the end of World War II." In contrast to the once prevalent views of the establishment, Gershman urges that "opposition to containment was the principle that united all the writers who participated in the redefinition of an establishment per¬ spective on foreign affairs" in the waning days of the Vietnam conflict, and that it became a unifying threat among those of the "new" foreign policy establishment who assumed positions of power in the Carter administration. Opposition to containment could not by itself serve as a new creed, since it pointed in no positive direction. But the reaction to the Vietnam War was such that it was possible to bring people together merely on the basis of what they were against. And what everyone was against—at least everyone who aspired to a place in a new foreign-policy establishment—was American resistance to the advance of Communism in the world. Thus during the first half of the 1970s, an elaborate intellectual structure was built in defense of the idea that the containment of Communism by the United States was neither possible, nor necessary, nor even desireable. This idea, above all others, was the "lesson of Vietnam," and the overriding purpose of the aspiring establishment was to make it the guiding principle of American foreign policy as a whole. (Gershman, 1980: 15) 110 Faces of Internationalism But by the end of the 1970s, Gershman (1980: 24) continues, "the American people . . . overwhelmingly rejected the ideas of the new es¬ tablishment. Apart from having been exposed as mistaken in all its major judgments, the new establishment never spoke for the country as a whole but only for a narrow if influential section of the elite which had ceased to believe in America after Vietnam, and which despite its proclaimed optimism . . . resigned itself to the forward momentum of political forces in the world committed to America's ultimate defeat." The judgment may have been prophetic, for the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought to the White House a president with a renewed sense of alarm about Soviet intentions, a determination to free the nation from the shackles of the Vietnam syndrome, and a commitment to reverse the decline of American power and military prowess alleged to have occurred during the 1970s. The views found intellectual sustenance among another for¬ eign policy elite, the Committee on the Present Danger, which counted among its members not only the new president but also many of the key foreign policy advisers he brought into his administration. The foregoing sketch of the foreign policy elite widely assumed to be responsible for American foreign policy and of its characteristics, views, and judgments is in no way intended to be an assessment of the accuracy of them or of the elitist perspective on American foreign policymaking generally. Instead, it is designed only to suggest in broad outline what a systematic examination of the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders during the 1970s and 1980s can be expected to reveal. Differences about the lessons of Vietnam figure prominently among them, as do assess¬ ments of the goals of American foreign policy, the threat of communism, the wisdom of cooperating with the Soviet Union, and the utility of mil¬ itary force as an instrument of policy. The foregoing also suggests that elites can be expected to adjust their preferences (and perhaps their be¬ liefs) in response to changing international circumstances, but that as a consequence their views at any particular point in time may be out of step with (ahead of?) mass attitudes. These expectations will inform the analyses in this chapter and the next. Assessing Elites' Foreign Policy Attitudes Despite the long tradition of elitism in the study of American foreign policy, who "the foreign policy elite" comprises remains ambiguous. There are compelling reasons to assume that members of the Council on Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 111 Foreign Relations are among the foreign policy elite; but if we also assume that elite attitudes relevant to foreign policy include potential occupants of decisionmaking roles as well as those in American society whose social or occupational roles have the capacity to shape mass attitudes toward foreign policy (see Rosenau, 1961, 1968), then it is difficult to assume that the members of the Council on Foreign Relations constitute a rep¬ resentative sample of elites. Unfortunately, however, it is unlikely that agreement could be reached on who constitutes the foreign policy elite. 5 I will, therefore, proceed as though the Chicago Council leader surveys, purported to be surveys of "Americans in leadership positions with the greatest influence upon and knowledge about foreign relations," com¬ prise a reasonable sample of elites and rely on statistical analyses to draw inferences from them. Each of the four ccfr leader surveys consists of somewhat over three hundred individuals drawn from the ranks of government (both Con¬ gress and the executive), business, labor, the media, academia, religious institutions, foreign policy organizations, and special interest groups. The distribution of leaders among the different role/occupational groups is as follows: 6 Political Business Education Communications Religion Voluntary organizations Labor Minorities/dissident-ethnic 1986 1982 1978 1974 70 64 81 59 62 63 55 55 54 56 54 51 49 52 65 62 41 42 58 33 38 36 34 32 29 28 19 24 — — — 14 343 341 366 330 Recognizing the caveats above, what commends the four ccfr leader surveys to inter-temporal comparisons is that each can be conceptualized as a survey of the occupants of various leadership roles, and that those roles have remained a consistent feature of each survey. The role oc¬ cupants can in turn be conceptualized as opinion makers, defined as those in society "who occupy positions which enable them regularly to trans- 112 Faces of Internationalism mit . . . opinions about any issue to unknown persons outside of their occupational field or about more than one class of issues to unknown professional colleagues” (Rosenau, 1961: 45, emphasis deleted). The Structure of Leaders' Foreign Policy Attitudes The methodology used to determine the structure of leaders' foreign policy attitudes parallels that used in chapter 2 to assess mass attitudes. To reiterate briefly, it requires the identification of items in each of the Chicago Council surveys designed to elicit responses to common un¬ derlying dimensions, assigning numerical scores to the responses, and then summing them to create Likert-type scales. Once the reliability of the scales in each of the surveys has been determined, the scales are normalized and then factor analyzed (principal components using pair¬ wise deletion of missing data) to determine the dimensionality and struc¬ ture of leaders' foreign policy attitudes. An additional constraint has been added here to enhance comparability with the analyses in chapter 2: only those items in the leader samples related to the scales used in the final factor analysis in chapter 2 (see table 2.3) are examined. As in chapter 2, then, items making up two foreign aid scales tapping attitudes toward economic and military assistance have been excluded since data on them are not available for the entire period examined. The six scales included in the analysis are described in table 4.1. The data themselves appear in appendix 3. (Each of the tables in the appendix is constructed so as to maximize comparability with the mass public tables in appendix 1. There are no attentiveness scales for the leader samples.) The principal components analyses of the six foreign policy attitude scales in each of the four surveys are reported in table 4.2. The most striking result is that elites' foreign policy attitudes in the post-Vietnam era are, like the mass public's, described by two underlying attitude di¬ mensions. 7 Two internationalism dimensions are evident, with attitudes toward communism, the use of force, and cooperation with the Soviet Union important elements differentiating leaders' views of the role of the United States in world affairs. Once more, then, a single interna¬ tionalism-isolationism dimension fails to describe Americans' foreign policy attitudes adequately. A close inspection of table 4.2 reveals that the labels cooperative inter¬ nationalism and militant internationalism are also appropriate ways to cap- Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 113 Table 4.1 Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Leader Samples, 1974-86 No. Acronym Year Items Alpha N The United States should pursue an ACTIVE- 1986 1 _ 343 active role in world affairs, but with COOPERATION/ 1982 3 .63 341 an emphasis on cooperative ties APARTHEID 1978 5 .67 366 with other nations * 3 1974 7 .55 321 The larger the number of nations COMMUNIST 1986 6 .82 343 that become Communist, the more 1982 6 .75 341 threatened would be American 1978 5 .83 366 interests 1974 6 .88 316 Closer ties between the United DETENTE 1986 7 .63 343 States and the Soviet Union are 1982 7 .63 341 desirable 1978 6 .56 366 1974 9 .72 313 Some circumstances might justify TROOPS 1986 6 .63 343 the use of U.S. troops abroad 1982 11 .64 341 1978 11 .67 366 1974 12 .80 318 The goals of American foreign policy USGOALS 1986 14 .67 343 should embrace a wide range of 1982 14 .66 341 security and nonsecurity issue areas 1978 7 .70 366 1974 17 .71 318 The United States has vital interests VITAL- 1986 16 .79 343 in many countries INTERESTS 1982 22 .86 341 1978 24 .86 366 In terms of the interests of the USRELATIONS 1974 7 .73 321 United States, it is important to maintain good relations with as many countries and regions as possible b Note: dashes (—) indicate not applicable. 3 In 1986 the scale consists of only one item in which respondents were asked, "Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa? (1) We should support the South African government. (2) We should take no position. (3) We should impose limited economic sanctions if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system. (4) We should ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system." The question was scored as a Likert scale with those responding "don't know" assigned the midpoint (see table A.3.2). It was reverse scored before being used as a scale. b Appears only in the 1974 survey. 114 Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 115 ture the structure of leaders' foreign policy attitudes, as the communist and troops scales typically define one of the two dimensions, and the detente and activecooperation/apartheid scales the other. 1982 is an exception, however. In this case the four scales load together (but pre¬ dictably with opposite signs) to form one dimension, while usgoals and vitalinterests are the principal scales defining the second dimension, which is appropriately described as a globalism dimension. The clearest difference in the results for 1982 compared with those for the other years occurs with the first dimension. Typically, the com¬ munist and troops scales define one orientation toward U.S. involve¬ ment in the world, and detente and activecooperation/apartheid an¬ other. But in 1982, unlike the other years, the four scales cluster together. As a result, militant and cooperative internationalism now appear as opposite ends of the same continuum, not distinctly separate elite pref¬ erences about how the United States should be involved abroad. Those who feared communism and who were prone to support the use of force abroad were also likely to disapprove of detente and an active role in opposition to apartheid. The reverse is also true, of course. Such dif¬ ferences over the means of American foreign policy, even while a basic consensus over ends was maintained, is, as noted above, one of the hallmarks of the Cold War internationalist consensus hypothesized to have held sway among American elites prior to Vietnam. From this it is but a short step to the speculation that American leaders may have re¬ sponded to the early Reagan administration's militantly anti-Soviet for¬ eign policy posture in a way reminiscent of the Cold War years, thereby perhaps signaling a fundamental shift in the post-Vietnam beliefs of American leaders in the direction of a renewed internationalist consen¬ sus. But that conclusion is undermined by the findings in 1986, which show that cooperative and militant internationalism remain distinctly separate elements of leaders' foreign policy attitudes. 8 Even the 1982 results suggest caution, for they continue to show that elites' foreign policy beliefs are bidimensional. Moreover, they indicate separation of anticommunist and interventionist predispositions (factor I) from those most intimately related to global activism (factor II). The internationalist consensus characteristic of the Cold War years implies that those atti¬ tudes go hand-in-hand. Perhaps the best that can be said of the (anom¬ alous) results for 1982 is that American leaders in that year continued to be appropriately described as "selective internationalists," but they defy easy characterization beyond that. 9 Because the results for 1982 do not 116 Faces of Internationalism Figure 4.1 The Distribution of Leaders Among the Four Types of Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 (percentages) Support cooperative internationalism Oppose militant internationalism Accommodationists i 1 Internationalists 1986: 24 1986 32 1982: — 1982 — 1978: 24 1978 29 1974: 30 1974 28 Isolationists Hardliners 1986: 22 1986 22 1982: — 1982 — 1978: 23 1978 24 1974: 20 , r 1974 22 Support militant internationalism Oppose cooperative internationalism Note: dashes (—) indicate not applicable. conform to those of the remaining years, they will be excluded from further consideration in this chapter. Excepting the results for 1982, those for the remaining years again permit use of the terms internationalists, isolationists, accommodationists, and hardliners to describe the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders. The distribution of leaders among these groups is illustrated in figure 4.1. As in the case of mass attitudes (and because of the algorithm used to locate leaders on the two underlying dimensions), leaders are dis¬ tributed relatively evenly among the four quadrants of the belief system typology, indicating that the distribution of their attitudes along the in¬ ternationalism dimensions is not particularly skewed in one direction or another. The somewhat smaller proportion of leaders in the isolationist quadrant compared with the others indicates a modest skewness toward the supportive end of the two dimensions, as would be expected. 10 It is also apparent, however, that in all three years for which the four-part categorization is appropriate sizable numbers of American leaders are best regarded as "selective internationalists," with between 46 and 52 Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 117 percent of them falling into the accommodationist and hardline quad¬ rants in each of the years. Containment, Vietnam, and the Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders Earlier it was noted that changing attitudes toward the containment of communism and conclusions about the lessons of Vietnam are especially critical in explaining the breakdown of the consensus among American elites hypothesized to have characterized their foreign policy attitudes prior to the Vietnam War. The foregoing demonstrates that differences regarding the threat of communism, the utility of military force, and relations with the Soviet Union, among others, are systematically related to the bifurcation of leaders' foreign policy beliefs. How does this attitude structure relate to more specific items regarding the containment of com¬ munism and the Vietnam War? The Containment of Communism One of the items used to construct the usgoals scale included in the principal components analysis asked respondents to evaluate the im¬ portance of "containing communism" as a goal of U.S. foreign policy. The responses to the item according to the fourfold typology of foreign beliefs described above are shown in table 4.3. 11 The results are striking. Internationalists tend to be about evenly split in viewing the containment of communism as either a very important or a somewhat important for¬ eign policy goal, and only a few regard it as not at all important, whereas isolationists are much more inclined to regard the goal as only somewhat important and with a larger number viewing it as unimportant. Accom- modationists and hardliners, on the other hand, differ widely in the salience that they attach to this issue. In 1974, for example, nearly two- thirds of the hardliners regarded the containment of communism as very important, and one-third regarded it as somewhat important. Among accommodationists, however, only 13 percent regarded containment as very important, while nearly three times as many responded that it was not at all important. Half of the accommodationists did regard contain¬ ment as somewhat important, but the contrast with hardliners is striking 118 Faces of Internationalism Table 4.3 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Importance of Containing Communism as a U.S. Foreign Policy Goal, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974, 1978, and 1986 (percentages) I am going to read [1974: Here is] a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one [1974: would you] please say whether you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal [1978-86: of the United States], a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Containing communism Inter- Accommoda- Hard- Isola- Total nationalists tionists liners tionists Very important 1986 43 43 12 78 42 1978 45 53 13 65 32 1974 34 46 13 66 16 Somewhat important 1986 48 56 60 22 51 1978 47 44 59 35 59 1974 48 46 50 33 67 Not at all important 1986 9 2 28 0 7 1978 8 3 28 0 8 1974 18 9 37 2 18 nonetheless. The results for the two remaining years are equally pro¬ nounced, with marked variations in the salience leaders attach to the containment of communism apparent throughout the post-Vietnam years. The Lessons of Vietnam Leaders' foreign policy beliefs are also related systematically to their Viet¬ nam views. Table 4.4 records responses by foreign policy belief to the eight "lessons" questions that were asked in the 1974 Chicago Council surveys. As in the case of the containment of communism, sharp dif¬ ferences are especially evident in the conclusions drawn by accommo- dationists and hardliners. Their differing views regarding the threat of communism are apparent in response to the proposition (number 3) that Vietnam taught that "we sometimes have to back governments we don't like because a Communist takeover would be worse." Two-thirds of the hardliners believed that to have been a lesson of Vietnam, whereas more than four-fifths of the accommodationists believed it was not. Equally wide differences are apparent on a proposition related to the utility of force (number 2)—"if we are to keep our commitments . . . we must Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 119 Table 4.4 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Lessons of Vietnam, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974 (percentages) Looking back on it, do you feel that the Vietnam War taught us that ... or don't you feel the Vietnam War taught us this? Interna- Accommoda- Hard- Isola- Total tionalists tionists liners tionists (percent taught vs. not sure, did not teach) 1 The United States should 38 37 44 33 35 avoid all wars we cannot win 2 If we are to keep our 49 commitments to our friends and allies, we must sometimes fight limited wars 3 We sometimes have to 38 back governments we don't like because a Communist takeover would be worse 4 We should not commit 73 American troops to civil wars in other countries 5 We can stop aggressors 24 who would take over small allies 6 In the future we should 52 send arms and supplies, but not lose our own men in such wars 7 Military leaders should 16 be able to fight wars without civilian leaders tying their hands 8 We should not commit 62 American lives to the defense of corrupt governments abroad 61 51 71 29 53 19 53 31 63 46 14 67 26 84 60 74 13 44 14 54 51 49 9 30 9 76 57 61 120 Faces of Internationalism Table 4.5 Leaders' Attitudes Toward the Morality of the Vietnam War, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1978 and 1986 (percentages)_ The Vietnam War was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. Total Inter¬ nationalists Accommoda¬ tionists Hard¬ liners Isola¬ tionists Strongly agree 1986 1978 22 31 26 35 44 64 8 10 10 24 Agree 1986 1978 20 20 26 33 21 19 13 7 18 20 Disagree 1986 1978 29 27 24 23 26 16 36 34 32 33 Disagree strongly 1986 1978 29 22 24 9 10 0 43 48 41 23 sometimes fight limited wars"—which finds over 60 percent of the hard¬ liners believing this to have been a lesson of Vietnam, compared with only about 30 percent of the accommodationists. Similar differences among the two groups of selective internationalists are apparent in their eval¬ uations of the other lessons. Perhaps the only surprise is that a majority of nearly all of the groups supported the view (number 6) that Vietnam "taught us that in the future we should send arms and supplies, but not lose our own men in such wars. As noted in previous chapters, comparable questions about the les¬ sons of Vietnam were not included in the surveys completed after 1974, but in each of them respondents were asked how strongly they agreed with the statement that "The Vietnam War was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral." The responses in 1978 and 1986 by leaders' foreign policy beliefs are displayed in table 4.5. If the Vietnam War has had a continuing impact on the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders, as both theory and evidence suggest, then we would expect to find through time a continuing relationship between leaders' foreign policy beliefs and their evaluations of the war. The evi¬ dence in table 4.5 is consistent with that expectation. In 1978 and again in 1986 those espousing accommodationist predispositions were far more likely than those inclined toward hardline foreign policy values to sup¬ port the view that the Vietnam War was morally wrong. In 1986, for example, 65 percent of the accommodationists were so inclined, whereas Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 121 Table 4.6 Leaders' Attitudes Toward Covert CIA Activities Abroad, by Foreign Policy Belief System, 1974, 1978, and 1986 (percentages) 1986: In general, do you feel the CIA should or should not work secretly inside other countries to try to weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly to the U.S.? 1974 _ 78 : i n general, do you feel the CIA should or should not work inside other countries to try to strengthen those elements that serve the interests of the U.S. and to weaken those forces that work against the interests of the U.S.? Inter- Accommoda- Isolation- Total nationalists tionists Hardliners ists (percent should vs. should not) 1986 52 42 25 84 66 1978 63 67 20 86 58 1974 38 45 12 73 31 only about 20 percent of the hardliners agreed with the proposition and nearly 80 percent disagreed. Internationalists and isolationists fell be¬ tween the extremes of the other groups, although isolationists generally tended more toward the hardline viewpoint and internationalists toward the accommodationist. Similar patterns are evident in 1978. The wisdom of containing communism and debates about the lessons of Vietnam inevitably touch other questions related to the interventionist thrust characteristic of post-World War II American foreign policy. That American leaders differ in their assessments of at least the military di¬ mension of foreign involvement is demonstrated by their differing at¬ titudes toward the use of troops abroad, which is a crucial scale under¬ lying the bidimensional attitude structures summarized in table 4.2. What about leaders' attitudes toward other interventionist strategies? cia involvement abroad figures prominently in any assessment of postwar American foreign policy. When asked if they approved of covert cia activity designed to weaken or overthrow governments unfriendly toward the United States, American leaders responded predictably, as shown in table 4.6. Accommodationists consistently disapprove of cia involvement in much greater numbers than any of the other groups; hardliners support it in much greater numbers; and internationalists and isolationists split the differences in various ways. Differences between accommodationists and hardliners on cia in¬ volvement have parallels on other policy issues. In 1986, for example, respondents were asked if they thought military aid to Central America 122 Faces of Internationalism would lead to U.S. military involvement there. Seventy-six percent of the accommodationists believed that it would, whereas 63 percent of the hardliners believed that it would not. These differences, like others that might be mentioned, are to be expected, as they flow naturally from the two faces of internationalism that have come to characterize the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders in recent years, much as they have mass foreign policy beliefs. Who Believes What? Correlates of Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs Chapter 3 inquired into the correlates on mass foreign policy beliefs by examining a number of political and sociodemographic variables. De¬ termining the correlates of leaders' beliefs is more difficult in that only the 1974 Chicago Council survey included a like complement of socio¬ demographic variables, whereas the others included only the party iden¬ tification and self-identified political ideology of the respondents. And even in these cases the variables were confined to leaders other than members of Congress or the administration. There is another way to examine the nature of elites' foreign policy beliefs, and that is to compare the beliefs of those comprising the various role/occupational groups included in each of the ccfr surveys with one another. The small number of respondents in each of the groups and questions about the population of which the elites may be a sample urge caution in making judgments from such comparisons. But the available data warrant scrutiny nonetheless. Furthermore, once the character of the foreign policy beliefs of opinion makers has been established, it will be possible to determine whether they are a product of the roles that they occupy or of their underlying political characteristics, as reflected in their partisan identifications and ideological predispositions. Role and Occupational Correlates The foreign policy beliefs of the leaders comprising each of the role/ occupational groups can be characterized by examining their relative po¬ sitions on the cooperative (ci) and militant (mi) internationalism dimen¬ sions. This is done in table 4.7, which reports the average factor scores for each group on each internationalism dimension. The table also in¬ dicates the groups whose mean scores on each of the internationalism Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 123 dimensions differs significantly from the rest of the leaders (taken as a whole). Groups whose beliefs are best described as internationalist in nature would have positive scores on both dimensions, those whose are isolationist negative scores on both, those whose are accommodationist positive scores on ci and negative scores on mi, and those whose are hardline positive scores on mi and negative scores on ci. The data in table 4.7 suggest somewhat less stability in particular groups of leaders' foreign policy beliefs than might have been expected, since the principal components analyses point toward continuity in the struc¬ ture of elites' foreign policy beliefs. Stability is most apparent among education and religious leaders, who can be characterized as accom- modationists and internationalists, respectively, in each of the three years examined. It is least apparent among communications and voluntary organization leaders. The former are best described as accommodation- ists in 1974, hardliners in 1978, and internationalists in 1986, and the latter as internationalists in 1974, hardliners in 1978, and isolationists in 1986. There is no way of explaining why the leaders of voluntary or¬ ganizations exhibit such divergent foreign policy postures. On the other hand, it is tempting to explain the changes among communications lead¬ ers as responsiveness among them to changes in the nation's political ''atmosphere'' that seems to have occurred across the time period ex¬ amined—from a period of introspection to one of renewed assertiveness and then self-confidence perhaps reminiscent of the pre-Vietnam era. Elite theory holds that leaders should respond to political developments at home and abroad more readily than masses, as their greater interest in and knowledge about the world relative to the mass public causes them to adjust their attitudes and perceptions. The available data cannot confirm that this explains the shift in communications leaders' foreign policy beliefs, but they are not inconsistent with the interpretation. Each of the three remaining groups—political, business, and labor— can be described as hardliners in two of the three survey years. Inter¬ estingly, they are joined in that description in 1978 by communications and voluntary organization leaders, thus making the vast majority of the leaders best characterized as hardliners in that year. It was at about this time that public attitudes supporting increased defense spending began their sharp upward movement, which culminated in 1980 to produce a domestic environment favoring increased defense spending unsur¬ passed since the onset of the Korean War in 1950. Evidence that leaders were part of this dramatic shift can found in the ccfr surveys. Thirty- 124 Faces of Internationalism four percent of the mass public in 1978 supported expanding defense spending (compared with 14 percent in 1974), and 18 percent favored cutting it back (compared with 35 percent in 1974). Similarly, among leaders 31 percent favored more defense spending in 1978 (compared with only 8 percent in 1974), and 28 percent favored cutting it back (com¬ pared with 55 percent in 1974). Thus leaders were hardly in the forefront of the emerging pro-defense climate, but they were clearly part of it. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that support for more defense dol¬ lars was greatest among business and political leaders, the two groups of hardliners whose members in 1978 were, respectively, the strongest opponents of cooperative internationalism and the strongest supporters of militant internationalism. 12 Few of the leaders characterized as hardliners in 1978 remained so in 1986. As noted, communications leaders were best described in that year as internationalists, labor leaders had moved into the accommodationist category, and business and voluntary organization leaders had shifted into the isolationist quadrant. Only political leaders remained hardliners. The elites who perhaps stand out most from the others in 1986 are the business leaders. Previously, in 1974 and 1978, they were best char¬ acterized as hardliners, but in 1986 they emerge as isolationists. This is surprising since the executives interviewed in that year, according to the Gallup organization's design, were all vice presidents in charge of in¬ ternational affairs from the top one hundred firms in the Fortune 500 list of the nation's largest corporations. 13 Despite this, what the analysis sug¬ gests is that—relative to other leaders—business executives in 1986 were least prone among all elites to support either cooperative or militant U.S. involvement in world affairs. Despite the otherwise perplexing results for business leaders in 1986, a common feature of their foreign policy beliefs is their persistently strong opposition to cooperative internationalism. In this sense there is conti¬ nuity in business executives' foreign policy beliefs in the ccfr surveys as well as consistency with Russett and Hanson's (1975: 123-24) earlier work, which demonstrated a strong correlation in business executives' attitudes between domestic conservatism and foreign policy hawkish¬ ness. More recently, Holsti and Rosenau (1984: 150) have also demon¬ strated that business executives are among the strongest proponents of Cold War internationalism and the strongest opponents of post-Cold War internationalism. Paralleling the question of temporal stability in elites' foreign policy Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 125 Table 4.7 The Distribution of Leaders on the Cooperative (Cl) and Militant (MI) Internationalism Dimensions by Role/Occupational Groups, 1974, 1978, and 1986 (percentages) Role/ Occupational Group 1986 1978 1974 N CI MI N CI MI N CI MI Political 70 — .26* .45* 81 -.27 .42* 53 -.10 -.05 Business 62 — .35* -.14 55 -.72* .14 52 -.24 .28* Education 54 .32* -.37* 54 .11 -.35* 40 .05 -.28 Communications 49 .06 .14 65 -.01 .30 52 .06 -.19 Religion 41 .41* .06 58 .66* .27 32 .52* .25 Voluntary organizations 38 -.39* -.25 34 -.10 .50 29 .09 .02 Labor 29 .62* -.08 19 -.04 .17 18 -.30 .13 Minorities/ dissident-ethnic " ~ " 10 -.35 -.67 Note: CI and MI column entries are average factors scores for the corre sponding role/occupational group. Groups with mean scores significantly different from the remaining leaders at p £ .05 are indicated by an asterisk (*). Dashes (—) indicate not applicable. beliefs is how they stack up against one another. The difference-of-means tests summarized in table 4.7 suggest that elites are comparatively ho¬ mogeneous in their foreign policy beliefs with the notable exception of 1986, when sharp differences on the cooperative internationalism di¬ mension are apparent. Given the militantly anti-Soviet policy of the Rea¬ gan administration still evident at that time (in combination with the striking new developments being set in motion by Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev), it is not surprising that wide differences existed in leaders' assessments of the policies and prescriptions underlying the ci dimen¬ sion, which distinguishes leaders' attitudes toward Soviet-American de¬ tente in particular. Not unexpectedly, difference-of-means tests on each of the pairs of leader categories in table 4.7 reveal somewhat less homogeneity among leaders than suggested above, but the overall patterns do not differ mark¬ edly from them in that most track differences already evident in the table. 14 The important theoretical question is whether these differences should be ascribed to the role and occupational groups of which leaders are a part or to their underlying political predispositions. It has already been suggested in the case of business executives that, while the two may be correlated, political considerations may be more potent than role factors. 126 Faces of Internationalism Table 4.8 The Distribution of Nongovernmental Leaders by Party Identification and Political Ideology, 1974, 1978, and 1986 (percentages) N Republican Independent Democrat 1986 270 27 36 36 1978 280 23 35 41 1974 268 20 36 43 N Conservative Moderate Liberal 1986 266 34 28 38 1978 280 25 32 43 1974 253 13 42 45 Political Correlates The distribution of respondents in the three Chicago Council leader sur¬ veys according to their party identifications and political ideologies is shown in table 4.8. 15 The respondents are now a subset of nongovernmental leaders, since data on the political characteristics of members of Congress and the administration in the 1978 and 1986 surveys are not available. (Congressional and administration leaders in the 1974 survey, for whom party identification and ideology are available, are excluded so as to en¬ sure comparability with the other surveys.) The overall picture paints nongovernmental leaders as inclined somewhat more toward the Dem¬ ocratic party than the Republican and more toward liberalism than con- servativism (but with a notable temporal shift toward conservativism between 1974 and 1986). With the exception of ideology in 1974, however, none of the samples is especially skewed on either of the political var¬ iables. 16 A central proposition of the breakdown-of-consensus thesis is that foreign policy issues in the post-Vietnam era have become subject to greater partisan and ideological dispute than during the Cold War era. Partisanship and ideology, therefore, should distinguish among non¬ governmental leaders' foreign policy beliefs, much as they do among the mass public's foreign policy beliefs (see chapter 2). This is in fact the case. Bivariate analysis-of-variance (anova) tests demonstrate that both political variables are significantly related to differences among nongov¬ ernmental leaders on the ci and mi dimensions. Republicans support the tenets of militant internationalism and oppose cooperative interna¬ tionalism in all three years, which makes them hardliners throughout Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 127 the time period. Democrats and independents, on the other hand, are best described as accommodationists in two of the three years (1974 and 1986, and 1974 and 1978, respectively), with Democrats evincing inter¬ nationalist dispositions and independents isolationist sentiments in the other. Similarly, conservatives are hardliners in 1974 and 1978 (but iso¬ lationists in 1986), and liberals are accommodationists throughout. Although partisanship and ideology are both systematically related to differences among leaders' foreign policy beliefs, there is reason to expect that ideology is in fact the more critical variable. 17 This is generally borne out in table 4.9, which reports multivariate analyses of the rela¬ tionship between ci and mi and the two political variables. Not only is ideology more often related in a statistically significant fashion to dif¬ ferences among nongovernmental leaders, but also the beta coefficient for the variable (which can be interpreted as a standardized regression coefficient) is almost uniformly greater than the one for party identifi¬ cation. The single exception occurs on the mi dimension in 1986 where, surprisingly, neither political variable is significantly related to differ¬ ences among nongovernmental leaders' foreign policy beliefs. Moreover, the patterns that are discernible generally parallel those among the mass public following its realignment described in chapter 2. Apart from statistical differences among nongovernmental leaders on the ci and mi dimensions, the substantive differences reflected in table 4.9 clearly reinforce the conclusion that sharp differences along political and ideological lines exist among them. The cleavage between liberals on the one hand, and moderates and conservatives on the other, is es¬ pecially clear. In all three years analyzed liberals are shown to espouse accommodationist values, whereas conservatives and moderates are var¬ iously described as internationalists, hardliners, and isolationists—but never as accommodationists. Similarly, in all three years Republicans are appropriately described as hardliners, whereas Democrats are best de¬ scribed as internationalists in two of the three (1974 and 1978) and as accommodationists in the third (1986)—but never as hardliners. Thus, even though some temporal variations are evident in the precise de¬ scriptions that might be used, clear-cut differences among nongovern¬ mental leaders are apparent in their beliefs about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. These findings raise the question whether the differences in the for¬ eign policy beliefs among elites associated with their various roles and occupations, briefly alluded to above, may be due not to roles and oc- Table 4.9 Multivariate ANOVA and MCAs of the Relationship Between Nongovernmental Leaders' Foreign Folic sO 00 ON TJ C oo - IX O' IX O' 00 O' o -a 03 Oh -a c 03 C/3 — .Si 13 DO 05 ^5 13 a; - % 2 u le a S 2 Qj & - n 2 U ^ a; 2 ■£. S 5 03 03 ~ % 2 {j v u cn X 00 CO O *-■ oo ■** r-i Ln o o o o x m rt Ln x on — oc m x x o x o 00 m rf h o h I I X X so ON Tf 00 LO ON o *— ^ o I I 00 00 co —' O X n x X ON ON oo Ln m oo in <—< x x x Ln x x nC O -h X cn x sc cn on on X ON X ^ X o o X Tt H Ln m X X nD vC 00 O Tf x 0^0 o in x c Tt- cn o cn x on x o ^ _ c c t3 « ■2 s ^ y •§ a. o 3 n F fe 8-5 I cu c£ J5 O o 13 > f0 13 £ 2 - 91 * 2 r T3 0J c ° a U 3> J > 03 TJ TJ C £ _c o IE S 128 Differences between or among categoric means statistically significant at p s .05 are indicated by one asterisk (*) following beta and at p s .01 by two asterisks (**). Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 129 cupations but instead to elites' political attitudes. Radical critics of Amer¬ ican foreign policy often see the United States acting abroad to promote and protect the economic interests of domestic elites. Whether elites ac¬ tively conspire to promote a foreign policy that advances their interests or whether otherwise uncoordinated, diverse elite groups merely have convergent interests may be debated. From either viewpoint, what is beyond dispute is that the interests of elites are similar. If this is indeed the case, then we would expect elites' foreign policy attitudes, regardless of their particular roles or occupations of the mo¬ ment, to be quite similar. That is, to the extent differences may be ap¬ parent, they should not be attributable to roles or occupations. A variant of this viewpoint derives from the finding that historically those with the most internationalist foreign policy attitudes (and those most sup¬ portive of presidential initiatives) were also the best educated and most attentive to foreign affairs. Since we can reasonably assume that those comprising the ccfr leader surveys are also generally well educated and attentive, we would not expect to find significant differences associated with the roles and occupations of the respondents. An effort was made to test these expectations by examining the dif¬ ference between each group of nongovernmental leaders relative to each other on the ci and mi dimensions after controlling for the effects of partisanship and ideology. If, as elite theory predicts, the interests of elites are similar, then we would expect differences among them to be explained better by the two political variables than by the role/occupa¬ tional variables. The analyses are generally consistent with expectations. Whereas eleven of the paired comparisons between the role/occupational groups of nongovernmental leaders in 1974 (regardless of the interna¬ tionalism dimension) produced statistically significant differences with¬ out controls, only seven did so once controls for party identification and ideology were introduced (but two "new” significant relationships also emerged). In 1978 the number was reduced from thirteen to eleven (plus two newly emergent ones); and in 1986 the number was reduced from ten to two (plus one newly emergent one). These results by no means refute the proposition that economic or other interests motivate elites' world views, but they do reinforce the viewpoint that political attitudes are more important than interests insofar as roles and occupations may embody them (see also Russett and Hanson, 1975). It is perhaps note¬ worthy in this respect that sixteen of the twenty-five relationships that were significant after the imposition of controls involved education and 130 Faces of Internationalism religious leaders, the two groups that perhaps more than any of the others are least aptly characterized as approaching American foreign pol¬ icy from the vantage point of economic or other easily identifiable in¬ terests. Leaders' Views of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance In chapter 3 the foreign policy beliefs of the mass public were shown to be related systematically to its evaluations of the Reagan administration's foreign policy performance.and to its general assessments of key foreign policymakers. 18 Regrettably the leader samples do not contain compa¬ rable general assessment items, and only in 1986 were the questions about the Reagan administration's performance as complete as in the mass samples. But the scales for that year—one tapping attitudes toward the administration's handling of eight general foreign policy issues, the other the government's handling of four specific foreign policy situa¬ tions—do permit for nongovernmental leaders a replication of the mass public analyses. The results are shown in table 4.10. As in the case of the mass public, the foreign policy beliefs of non¬ governmental leaders are important determinants of how they viewed the Reagan administration's foreign policy performance. The analyses are similar as well in that the direction of support and opposition clearly falls along the accommodationist-hardline fault, with those inclined in the former direction expressing disapproval of how various foreign policy problems were handled and those inclined in the latter direction ex¬ pressing approval. The evidence thus points once more toward the po¬ tential impact of public opinion on foreign policy as mediated through public evaluations of policymakers' performance. The evidence also reinforces the important role that ideology and, especially so in this case, partisanship play in differentiating the re¬ sponses of American leaders to the Reagan administration. The conclu¬ sions drawn from the analyses in chapter 3 for the mass public bear repeating here for nongovernmental leaders: midway through the administration's second term important segments of American leader¬ ship opinion where sharply divided in their assessment of its perfor¬ mance along political and ideological lines and in terms of their beliefs about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. Table 4.10 The Relationship Between Nongovernmental Leaders' Foreign Policy Beliefs and Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1986 On CN 2 in CN CN LO Be: 0/ •*-> ^— v * ,,—^ TO CO CO CN a/ O 00 CN ON 73 -~L- CO 60 O 2 O a> 73 M _ a> to u > ■5 TO S\ * CO o o > L< r—l 00 CO CL 0/ T-H C o U c 0/ 73 fv LfT in aT c c 0/ Cl CN in o o o t-H 4-» 03 u 01 73 X C •p c 0/ 73 1 c >p TO it * L. _Oi 00 co' 00 LO 03 Cl Z in 00 CN ON 3 ON CO CL '—■ ^—' o» C^ * * CO nT m o? r —I vO t-L '“p y CN CO O C/3 C 33 bO a; 'S ^ * _ * _ u CO 00 o NO O _ CN CO •n UL U 1 rtV 1 IN 1 bJD C c Z Si C/3 TO bJD £ c TO 0> TO X cn _o ce C/3 b u TO 'c M-l C/3 o _o _ o C/3 -M C/3 C/3 £ c TO 6 c o c o J-< 4-» y _o TO y C/3 c (— X o Li TO c C L ai c Cl TO > > 73 m-i > o w TO O UJ 60 VI Cl X3 O .t! bo £ C cn 1! ro 0/ C/3 CO t: g o .5 " g ^ o 8 * c bJD O u c n O cj ‘V x A3 O ij a. a» c 73 •p TO £ .b 73 -v TO C a> .2 ■£ « £ 3 £ o — 3 S o — £ 3 o c o 73 ^ O ^ o 73 bO ai ^ X £ o * c O o Qj CL L C/3 0/ CD £ * ^ cn to ^ £ D U N 73 C c c £ o a; u ;n X ai X c a/ j-. 03 CL C X> £ 2 £ Cl 03 bO In ■| £ £ bO O '£ a > £ X 3 ** X bo to C W -p ^ 73 =3 g 3 X § C/3 V ^ L .2 ^ 2 n -b .2 o .£ Cl £ c 73 bO £ o 3 ^ o __ V—< X 73 -p C/3 O 03 O 2 £ o X C/3 73 £ n i r“ u CL 3 £ c L o bO c/S b .3 Sn X x X o D 2 bO ■£ c TO I bO O TO X 03 C/3 = 2 ^ > & O O (V X. c 4_ * o L o 0) £ o 03 c Cl L L L 3 03 > o O o N bC £ 2 c/3 3 •C o o £ L L £ ^ o c X o .. ■p c/3 D £ —' 0/ e £ > o cn xi t\ £ £ 2 73 C X bO 131 132 Faces of Internationalism Summary and Conclusions The evidence examined in this chapter demonstrates conclusively that sharp differences exist in the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders and that those differences have persisted throughout the post-Vietnam era. For the most part cooperative and militant internationalism describe the structure of elites' foreign policy attitudes, with attitudes toward communism, the use of force, and relations with the Soviet Union critical in explaining the underlying differences between them. These differ¬ ences in turn are related to leaders' views about the containment of com¬ munism and the Vietnam War in a fashion consistent with the frequent argument—noted at the outset of this chapter—that the breakdown of the presumed Cold War internationalist consensus among elites is sys¬ tematically related to the lessons of Vietnam drawn by them. Although the structure of elites' foreign policy attitudes is temporally invariant, differences within various groups of opinion makers across time and among various groups within each time period sampled are evident. Elite theory postulates that leaders will be more responsive than masses to new issues and ideas that may arise, which might lead to the expectation that changes in elite attitudes will be evident, but the per¬ sistence through time of similar attitude structures for elites as a whole weakens this explanation of the variations evident among different lead¬ ership strata. On the surface, then, it might appear that leaders' foreign policy beliefs will vary depending on the role or occupational groups of which they are a part, and that the beliefs shared by members of these groups are indeed responsive to changes in the world around them. The corresponding theoretical argument attributes leaders' foreign policy be¬ liefs to the common interests of the groups of which they are a part. The argument does not hold up well when compared with a com¬ peting explanation, which attributes leaders' beliefs not to their interests but to their political views. Partisanship and ideology both go a long way in explaining differences in leaders' (specifically nongovernmental lead¬ ers') foreign policy beliefs. Republicans and liberals are most consistent in their views, with the former embracing hardline values and the latter accommodationist values throughout the post-Vietnam era. Similarly, conservatives tend toward hardline values and Democrats toward in¬ ternationalist or accommodationist values. Thus the evidence reinforces the frequent argument that American foreign policy in the post-Vietnam Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 133 era has been subjected to unprecedented levels of partisan and ideolog¬ ical dispute. The consistency in the analyses of leaders' foreign policy beliefs in this chapter and those of the mass public in chapter 2 is striking. Elites and masses generally hold similarly structured foreign policy attitudes and corresponding beliefs about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. They also share beliefs that are related systematically to their political orientations, and these differences as well as their beliefs relate systematically to how they evaluate policymakers' performance. An important empirical question that remains to be answered, then, is whether elites and masses also have similar policy preferences. The ques¬ tion will be addressed, along with others, in chapter 5. 5 . A Comparison of the Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences of Leaders and the Mass Public Theoretical arguments bearing on mass and elite foreign policy beliefs were examined in chapters 2 and 4. To reiterate briefly, the argument from the perspective of elite theory assumes that elites are capable of maintaining ideologically consistent (constrained) beliefs, whereas the mass public is not. As Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler observe in their well-known elaboration of elite theory, "the masses are largely passive, apathetic, and ill-informed." "The characteristic [mass] response to questions of foreign policy," wrote Gabriel Almond (1960: 53), is one of "indifference." Because of their lack of information and relative indifference toward foreign affairs, members of the mass public are incapable of forming coherent foreign policy beliefs, as do elites. Correspondingly, elites and masses can be expected to hold quite different attitudes toward and beliefs about world affairs. "Except for a small educated portion of the electorate, the ideological debate between the elites has very little meaning . . . [because] the masses cannot be expected to possess an ideology" (Dye and Zeigler, 1978: 164). The analyses in previous chapters have done much to debunk these long-held but apparently dubious views of Americans' foreign policy beliefs. They demonstrate that, in the aggregate, both the mass of the American people as well as leadership segments hold coherent belief systems. They also demonstrate that elites and masses structure their foreign policy attitudes similarly, and that the character of their foreign policy beliefs has persisted for the most part uninterrupted throughout the post-Vietnam era. Unanswered, however, is whether the policy preferences of elites and masses are similar or dissimilar. Both groups may evince the same faces of internationalism, but the relative priority each attaches to the prescriptions inherent in them may differ markedly. Research stretching over some three decades on the attitudes of delegates to presidential nominating conventions and rank-and-file party members, for example. 134 Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 135 has routinely shown important differences between these groups of elites and masses. 1 Furthermore, a central deduction from elite theory— that elites adjust their opinions more readily in response to changing circumstances than the mass public—implies that elites and masses may differ at any particular point in time in their foreign policy preferences, even if the structure of their attitudes and corresponding beliefs remains invariant. The analyses in this chapter address these concerns by seeking answers to four questions. First, do elites and masses distribute them¬ selves similarly along the dimensions defining their similarly structured foreign policy attitudes? Second, if the answer is no, which it is, should the differences be attributed to the occupancy of leadership roles or to other factors? Third, are the beliefs of those attentive to foreign affairs more like elites or masses? Finally, how do the differences between elites and masses play out in the policy preferences and performance evaluations of each? The Structure of Elite and Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs The bases for comparing the foreign policy beliefs and preferences of elites and masses are the pooled Chicago Council leader and mass sur¬ veys and a replication of the procedures used in previous chapters to determine the structure of Americans' foreign policy attitudes. The dis¬ proportionate number of mass respondents necessarily means that those in the four leader samples are in effect forced to locate themselves on dimensions largely defined by the mass public. The analyses in chapters 2 and 4 demonstrate the soundness of the approach, as elites and masses have generally been shown to manifest conceptually similar foreign pol¬ icy attitude structures. 2 An important exception is apparent in the 1982 leader survey, where elite attitudes deviate from the patterns otherwise shown throughout the inter-temporal analyses. Flowever, the compar¬ ative advantages derived from pooling the two 1982 surveys, like the others, outweighs concern for the violence to the generalization regard¬ ing the structure of elite and mass attitudes that otherwise holds. Once each pair of elite and mass samples was pooled, the procedures described in previous chapters to construct and assess the reliability of the foreign policy attitude scales appropriate for analysis were fol¬ lowed. As in chapter 4, only items related to six underlying attitudes 136 Faces of Internationalism scales were examined (that is, attitudes toward foreign aid are excluded). 3 The summary data for the six scales paralleling those in chapters 2 and 4 are shown in table 5.1. The principal components analyses are shown in table 5.2. As expected, cooperative and militant internationalism emerge from table 5.2 as the two dominant dimensions. They demonstrate once more that Americans' foreign policy attitudes are distinguished primarily by their attitudes toward communism, the Soviet Union, and military in¬ volvement abroad. The substantive message also bears repeating: Amer¬ icans—elites and masses alike—have been divided throughout the post- Vietnam era in their beliefs about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. To the extent that policymakers are responsive to public opinion as they seek to build domestic support for their foreign policy initiatives, it is clear that their task has been formidable due to the absence of a foreign policy consensus like that on which decisionmakers in pre¬ vious decades could presumably rely as they responded to external chal¬ lenges. The bifurcation of Americans' foreign policy attitudes again permits the identification of four distinct foreign policy belief systems: interna¬ tionalists, accommodationists, hardliners, and isolationists. If, as hy¬ pothesized, elites and masses differ in their foreign policy preferences, even though they may hold similarly structured attitudes toward the nation's world role, then we would expect the two groups to distribute themselves among the four belief systems differently. This is indeed the case, as shown in figure 5.1. Several factors stand out from the figure. Most apparent is that the American people are committed to the view that the United States should be involved in world affairs. The overwhelming proportion of respon¬ dents, whether elites or members of the mass public, falls into one of the three attitude clusters reflecting some kind of internationalist pre¬ disposition. But the differences between elites and masses about how, if not whether, to be involved in world affairs are striking. Whereas the mass public is relatively evenly divided among the four types of belief systems in each of the years, elites by comparison espouse very different views. They lean much more toward cooperative than militant inter¬ nationalism, as witnessed by the comparatively higher proportion falling into the accommodationist category in each of the four years depicted in the figure. Compared with the mass public, then, elites are more likely to espouse accommodationist and internationalist predispositions and Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 137 Table 5.1 Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Pooled Samples, 1974U86 No. Acronym Year Items Alpha N The United States should pursue an ACTIVE- 1986 1 _ 3,215 active role in world affairs, but with COOPERATION/ 1982 1 — 3,047 an emphasis on cooperative ties APARTHEID 1978 3 .51 3,064 with other nations 3 1974 5 .66 1,791 The larger the number of nations that COMMUNIST 1986 6 .84 3,215 become Communist, the more 1982 6 .76 3,047 threatened would be American 1978 5 .85 3,064 interests 1974 6 .90 1,814 Closer ties between the United DETENTE 1986 6 .59 3,215 States and the Soviet Union are 1982 6 .58 3,047 desirable 1978 5 .48 3,064 1974 9 .85 1,788 Some circumstances might justify TROOPS 1986 7 .74 3,215 the use of U.S. troops abroad 1982 11 .78 3,047 1978 10 .79 3,064 1974 12 .85 1,788 The goals of American foreign policy USGOALS 1986 13 .77 3,215 should encompass a wide range of 1982 14 .82 3,047 security and nonsecurity issue areas 1978 13 .82 3,064 1974 18 .84 1,737 The United States has vital interests VITAL- 1986 16 .78 3,215 in many countries* 1 2 INTERESTS 1982 22 .79 3,047 1978 24 .80 2,983 In terms of the interests of the USRELATIONS 1974 7 .90 1,719 United States, it is important to maintain good relations with as many countries and regions as possible 0 Note: dashes (—) indicate not applicable. a In 1982 the scale consists of only one item in which respondents were asked the level of agreement with the statement "We should take a more active role in opposing the policy of apartheid—that is, racial separation—in South Africa." In 1986 the scale consists of only one item in which respondents were asked, "Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa? (1) We should support the South African government. (2) We should take no position. (3) We should impose limited economic sanctions if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system. (4) We should ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system." The question was scored as a Likert scale with those responding "don't know" assigned the midpoint. It was reverse scored before being used as a scale. b Because the countries in the leader samples were split between two forms in the mass samples, each respondent's score in the pooled samples is an index which measures the proportion of countries the respondent was presented with in which he or she felt the United States had vital interests. The index was normalized for the three types of respondents included in the variable by adjusting for the number of countries to which each group was asked to respond. Reliability coefficients refer to the average alpha for the pooled samples corresponding to each form in the mass surveys. The items did not appear in the 1974 surveys. c Appears only in the 1974 survey. vO q I Cs| o -r (N U, G u ns 03 C O 73 '55 G c QJ 5 S O l-H 5 X iri sO _CJ 2 00 4 n H r—< H C/5 2 D 0 u C/5 nJ < 0 r J C/5 D C/5 CU 0 o C/5 2 0 H < UJ v C/5 5 C/5 H C/5 UJ UJ H 2 UJ H UJ D < 2 O H < & UJ O o u UJ > H U < a> x> c <3 c V Cl £ o +1 Al < °9 u 4 •5 *5 ON 73 C TO >, be < ° > o O 4 2 ~ < TO U Si x TO TO ^ 2 73 a c 3 TO 2 c o r<“> Xl TO H c a/ 73 TO 3 o> xi 2 e - 5 5 u ^ 2 £ - TO 3 ^ a; 2£ - TO 3 u ie - TO 2 c 03 a» a> 2£ - TO £ [J QJ U ■5 X - TO 3 ^2£. - TO 3 (J a> a> S£ 3 O cn cd in m 000 N O CD N h CD «-« O CM 00 CM O sO CD CD OOO in cd sO o m cd ^00 O N vC GO O IN O' 00 sO GO O C\I 2 in N N X -^000 N N (N (N OOOO r-H t-H ON o o CM Tt* sO o in o <-« o f-H O O ^ rt 0^00 cd 00 in CM O O N X: (N m OOOO in 0 tM sO sO IM IM (N sO oc cm" * * CM T—< CM CM CM 0 0 CM O CM I I CM O CM CM OOOO D -fr r-« J 2 c .0 SJ - 4 -* ^ - C o c 0 ) c t! t; <5j ^ r ^ "rr 1-1 *“* ►5 'n 0» u v 3 Q- 2 t a.^E G, OS ,5 Q O O rD N '— 1 *- 1 (M i—< nO D CD 4 ^ O (N m O' n O' nO CD cd in cd in CM O' CD *-< O T-H r-. O N X r-1 (N *-• O Tf CM 00 0 00 ,_1 O' r—t sC 00 O' 0 vC CM CD sO Os 0 O' 0 sO in cd 1-1 o N CD ^ NO 1—1 O CM t—( in o- in O CD GO O O sO M h in o ^ I I O O r- O CM O CD CM in H 0 sO 0 CM O vO in CD O Os r - 1 CD CM sO cm" 00 O' O T“H r—* o r—> tM O ”5 > IS “ ■§ 3! « _ • ~ c 72 O CO r-H 04 0 O r-H r-H 0 0 O 2 01 2 01 X 1 ' f * * * 00 * ★ * ON G ' 03 ' O CO LO r-H O 00 00 r—l X 00 -t X r-H _ 03 00 CM O tM CO 0 0 O 0 r-H 0 CM r-H u CD 1) _^ 2 X LO 1 LO 1 00 1 On 01 r-H 1 00 0 NO co NO CO X [M X 00 co 00 2 CM r-H t—' 1 r-H X 00 r—H On 0 X CM r-H r-H * * * C O CO 1 NO O 04 LO H O LO 04 *—i rz 04 CO O r-H 04 O r-H r-H t-H O r-H r—H 2 D 2 V X 1 1 1 f ' 1 0 NO * GO * * ON C "oT CO IM LO r-H 00 CO O 04 CM 0 O r-H O 1 _ 03 00 O O 04 0 O O O 04 O CO 04 u 01 1> v A ^ A 2 X LO 1 CM 1 ON 1 IM 1 00 04 04 1 O ON . NO LO On O 04 On 00 O IM 04 2 c CM r-H CM CM 00 ON 0 r-H o tM 0 cm' r-H r-H r-H c 0 K U 2 ■.G ■JZ .O 8 >c. .2 "G 03 > CD S X 3 G- CJ X 3 CL CD c G a» >3 & 8 o» > U-t cs X > T3 Democrat “TS 01 O Oi U j-. 3 O cn 2 ■73 § -J Leaders > C 0 ; < 3 Cl CD C/3 C3 2 c _CD "S CJ >3 L. 3 X Republic G CD O. o> -3 c .U "0 > u D C/3 G 0 u Moderat Liberal 145 Note: cell entries are mean factor scores, which measure differences in standard deviations from the mean of zero for each internationalism dimension. Differences among categoric means statistically significant at p s .05 are indicated by one asterisk (*) following beta and at p s .01 by two asterisks (**). 146 Faces of Internationalism supported it. Similarly, in the 1980s the attentive public never embraced cooperative internationalism with the same intensity as nongovernmen¬ tal leaders, and in fact attentives rejected it in 1986, thus making them hardliners. Nongovernmental leaders, on the other hand, are consis¬ tently strong proponents of cooperative internationalism and are never characterized as hardliners. Thus nongovernmental leaders consistently place greater emphasis on the olive branch in the eagle's talons, whereas the attentive public places greater emphasis on the arrows. If in the opin¬ ion-forming and opinion-circulating process foreign policy attitudes flow in a top-down fashion—from elites through nongovernmental leaders to the attentive public and then less well-informed segments of society— we would not expect to find such a consistent temporal disjuncture in the beliefs of leaders and attentives. Perhaps nongovernmental leaders are more responsive to changing external events, as elite theory predicts, but that theory also holds that elites are able to mold public preferences to fit their own. The evidence examined here is not kind to that inter¬ pretation. 7 A Comparison of the Policy Preferences of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Sharp differences on many important policy issues exist in the prefer¬ ences of elites and the mass of the American people. Consider the fol¬ lowing elite-mass comparisons. In 1974 more than twice as many leaders as members of the mass public opposed covert cia activities abroad. In 1978 nearly twice as many leaders supported foreign economic aid. In 1982 more than three times as many leaders supported the elimination of tariffs. And in 1986 only about half as many supported the continued expansion of defense spending. Many more examples could be cited. But the important analytical question is whether these differences in the preferences of leaders and the mass public persist after their foreign pol¬ icy beliefs, partisan attachments, and ideological predispositions have been controlled. As in chapter 3, logistic regression is used to make these comparative assessments. The presentation as well as the analytical technique par¬ allels that chapter. The complete set of regression results are reported in appendix 4. 8 The tables in the chapter itself focus on the probabilities of supporting particular policy alternatives that are associated with the Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 147 occupancy of nongovernmental leadership (opinion-making) roles. Prob¬ abilities of support associated with different points along the cooperative (ci) and militant internationalism (mi) dimensions are also shown. Internationalism The celebrated transformation of American foreign policy from a tradition of isolationism to one of internationalism during and following World War II was doubtless the product of political leadership. The surprise Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 helped to crystallize the view that isolationism was no longer the best strategy for protecting American national interests. But the eventual shape of American efforts to participate actively in the maintenance of a postwar structure of peace was significantly affected by the lessons of the 1930s that political leaders learned, particularly those relating to the appeasement of aggressors and to the linkage between economic prosperity and international peace. 9 Active U.S. support for the creation and maintenance of the United Na¬ tions and for the principles of a liberal international economic order em¬ bodied in the International Monetary Fund (imf), the World Bank, and gatt (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) were expressions of these lessons. So too were the later decisions to create nato, the nation's first permanent peacetime military alliance, and to oppose militarily the North Korean attack on South Korea, believed by many to be the first step in a Communist quest for world dominance reminiscent of the Axis's aggressive behavior years earlier (see Neustadt and May, 1986). Enthu¬ siasm for both nato and the Korean campaign waned in late 1950, and both came under attack during the "Great Debate" over American na¬ tional security policy during 1950-51, in which Senator Robert Taft, the outspoken conservative Republican critic of Truman's policies, was a leading protagonist. But nato survived, the Korean War continued to be prosecuted, and eventually the conservative critics of a policy built on the premises of globalism, anticommunism, containment, and mili¬ tary might, and interventionism fell by the wayside. In the same month that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor Elmo Roper re¬ ported "that a majority of Americans favored 'an active part' for the United States in world affairs 'after the war' " (Foster, 1983: 19). Follow¬ ing the war, public support for the emerging design of a new American policy also became evident (see chapter 6; also Foster, 1983). In both instances mass opinion seems to have been responsive to leadership as 148 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.5 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Active U.S. Involvement in World Affairs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support 1986 .98 .74 + .63 .90 + + .60 .91 1982 .98 .65 + .54 .85 + + .47 .87 1978 .99 .73 + .44 .94 + + .66 .88 1974 .99 .83 + .66 .97 + + .81 .95 Note: cell entries are probabilities of support for the attitude question among nongovernmental leaders, the mass public, and Cl and MI supporters and opponents. Support and opposition to Cl and MI are shown at ± 1.5 standard deviations from the mean. The sign in the leaders vs. mass column indicates whether support is greater (+) or less (-) among leaders compared with the mass public. Plus ( + ) and minus ( —) signs in the support pattern columns indicate a statistically significant positive or negative relationship (at p s .05) between Cl and/or MI and responses to the attitude question. Zero (0) here and in the leaders vs. mass column indicates that the relationship is not statistically significant (at p £ .05). Entries in the support pattern columns also indicate whether the relationship is in the internationalist ( + , + ), isolationist ( — ,—), accommodationist ( + ,-), or hardline (-, +) direction. well as to events (see Shapiro and Page, 1988). It was not until the Viet¬ nam War that serious divisions between leaders and followers over the ends and means of American foreign policy became evident. In March 1975, the month before Saigon fell to Communist forces, public support for the proposition that "it will be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs" stood at 61 percent. This was the nadir of public support for internationalism as measured by this question in the three decades following the end of World War II. Comparable longitudinal evidence on elite attitudes toward global activism is not available, but the 1974 Chicago Council surveys revealed that 99 percent of the respondents in the leader sample supported active U.S. involvement in the world compared with 67 percent of the mass sample. The differences are consistent with historical arguments as well as elite theory. These differences are reaffirmed by the data in table 5.5 (The prob¬ abilities refer to levels of support once foreign policy beliefs, partisanship, and ideology have been controlled at their mean levels.) Nongovern¬ mental leaders are considerablv more disposed toward active U.S. in¬ volvement in the world than the mass public, regardless of other sim¬ ilarities between them. This is true throughout the post-Vietnam era. Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 149 Indeed, as a practical matter nongovernmental leaders are nearly unan¬ imous in their support of an active U.S. role in world affairs. In a similar vein they are generally more prone to view the United States as a force for good in its foreign policies since World War II (1978 is an exception), but, interestingly, they are generally less likely than the mass public to believe that the United States plays a more important and powerful role as world leader than a decade earlier (1986 is the exception) (see appendix 4, table A.4.1). 10 The inference seems plausible that nongovernmental leaders are more cognizant than the mass public of the evidence pointing toward the relative decline of the United States in world affairs during the 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps they are also more aware of the contro¬ versies surrounding interpretations of the evidence. Defense Spending Augmenting U.S. military prowess through increased defense spending was the Reagan administration's prescription for reversing the deteri¬ oration of the U.S. power and position in the world it believed had oc¬ curred during the 1970s. To the extent that nongovernmental leaders are responsive to leadership initiatives, we would expect to find that they supported increased defense spending in the two Chicago Council sur¬ veys taken during the 1980s more so than the mass public. On the other hand, during the 1970s, the period that the Nixon administration had proclaimed an era of negotiation not confrontation, we would expect to find that nongovernmental leaders were more supportive of either re¬ duced spending or the status quo, prescriptions not unlike those that would be expected of the mass public, given the inward looking domestic political environment of the decade and the implications of the Vietnam syndrome that symbolized it. Significant differences between leaders and masses during the 1970s should therefore not be expected. Table 5.6 summarizes the analyses of the defense spending attitudes of nongovernmental leaders and the mass public (see also table A.4.2). For the most part evidence and expectations are widely divergent. Wide differences between nongovernmental leaders and the mass public are apparent in 1986 on the option to expand spending and in 1978, 1982, and 1986 on the option to reduce spending. In no case are nongovern¬ mental leaders supportive of increased defense spending, even during the Reagan years when it figured so prominently on the administration's agenda. On the other hand, they were typically stronger supporters of 150 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.6 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Defense Spending Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 Leaders Leaders Mass vs. Public Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support Expand defense spending 1986 .08 .18 - .26 .11 - + .11 .25 1982 .20 .19 0 .27 .14 - + .10 .34 1978 .31 .31 0 .39 .25 - + .15 .53 1974 .12 .11 0 .17 .07 - + .05 .22 Cut back defense spending 1986 .32 .19 + .10 .36 + - .41 .08 1982 .31 .22 + .13 .36 + - .41 .12 1978 .23 .15 + .15 .16 0 - .38 .05 1974 .37 .33 0 .25 .42 + — .58 .17 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. reduced defense efforts than the mass public. In practice a sizable pro¬ portion of both groups preferred to keep defense spending the same, but it is clear, nonetheless, that the mass public was more supportive of devoting increased resources to defense than were nongovernmental leaders. These unexpected findings are not as perplexing as they might first appear. An examination of the detailed analyses in appendix 4 clearly indicates a systematic relationship between foreign policy beliefs and ideology on the one hand, and defense spending attitudes on the other. Republicans, for example, were especially strong proponents of in¬ creased defense spending during the 1980s. They were joined in that view by conservatives, who also were forceful opponents of reduced defense spending throughout the 1970s as well as the 1980s. Thus non¬ governmental leaders and members of the mass public who share similar attributes on these variables respond similarly to the defense spending questions. The differences between them that remain should not be ig¬ nored—for they suggest that nongovernmental leaders were not only out of step with the preferences of the mass public but perhaps also with those of political leaders—but they are by no means unreasonable. The reasonableness of the response patterns is reinforced by the re¬ sults for the questions that asked whether the United States was falling behind the Soviet Union in military power (1982 and 1986) or influence Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 151 (1974) (table A.4.2). In all three years the relationships between the for¬ eign policy beliefs of nongovernmental leaders and masses and their responses to the questions follow predictable patterns, and in all three nongovernmental leaders differ sharply from the mass public in their assessments (once other factors are controlled). Specifically, nongovern¬ mental leaders have been markedly less disposed than the mass public to believe that the United States is falling behind the Soviet Union. The consistency of the viewpoint helps explain the equally consistent con¬ viction (from 1978 onward) that defense spending should either be cut back or remain the same. Foreign Aid Although there is little enthusiasm for foreign aid among the bulk of the American people, support for economic development assistance has long been regarded as a straightforward internationalism-isolationism prop¬ osition. The analytical results in chapter 3 support that view in that those who support foreign economic aid are also supporters of cooperative and militant internationalism. These findings are reaffirmed twofold in table 5.7: the strongest supporters of aid are also the strongest supporters of cooperative and militant internationalism, and nongovernmental lead¬ ers—shown earlier to be stronger proponents of internationalism than the mass public—are also stronger supporters of foreign aid (table A.4.3). In fact, the findings extend to military aid and sales as well. Thus leaders generally and internationalists among the mass public form a natural coalition of aid supporters on whom policymakers can depend as they seek to maintain the principle of this long-standing instrument of Amer¬ ican foreign policy. Less clear is whether in practice aid will always enjoy the same degree of support. The “slippery slope" analogy argues that in some instances aid is merely the first step toward protracted and ill-advised intervention in the affairs of others that may prove detrimental to the interests of the United States. The Reagan Doctrine has been similarly criticized by those who see its prescriptions as unwarranted interventionism. The items in the Chicago Council surveys germane to these issues asked in different ways whether U.S. economic or military aid to Africa or Central America would lead to further U.S. involvement there and whether and in what ways the United States should aid rebels seeking to overthrow established Communist governments. In all three cases 152 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.7 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Foreign Economic Aid and Military Aid and Sales, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 Leaders Support Mass vs. _ Q _ Pattern _NB Leaders Public Mass Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support Favor giving economic aid for economic development and technical assistance 1986 .90 .62 + .50 .79 + + .49 .80 1982 .96 .60 + .42 .84 + + .50 .80 1978 .92 .57 + .27 .87 + + .55 .70 1974 .91 .67 + .33 .93 + + .60 .82 Favor giving military aid to other nations 1986 .74 .35 + .40 .37 0 + .16 .67 1982 .60 .30 + .25 .42 + + .16 .55 1978 .59 .33 + .27 .44 + + .22 .51 1974 .40 .25 + .17 .39 + + .10 .55 Favor selling military equipment to other nations iyov — 1982 .70 .44 + .40 .53 + + .32 .61 1978 .70 .38 + .36 .47 + + .30 .53 1974 .59 .43 + .34 .58 + + .34 .57 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. Dashes (—) indicate not applicable. when respondents were asked if aid would lead to military intervention nongovernmental leaders and the mass public were sharply divided, with the former strongly committed to the belief that it would not. Given the simplistic view of foreign policy decisionmaking implicit in the “slip¬ pery slope" and similar analogies, there is perhaps no better evidence of the comparatively greater sophistication of elites' foreign policy think¬ ing. The Reagan Doctrine question asked in 1986 also produced clear dif¬ ferences between nongovernmental leaders and the mass public (table A.4.4). In this instance they tracked those on foreign aid generally in that nongovernmental leaders are more disposed to support both eco¬ nomic and military aid to rebel groups and opposed to denying them any assistance. Interestingly, however, there are no discernible differ¬ ences between the two on whether aid to rebel groups should be confined to economic aid and not include military assistance. Other questions regarding the use of foreign aid as an instrument of policy include public support for aid to Israel and the use of aid to cope Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 153 with illegal drugs. There is some evidence (from 1982) that nongovern¬ mental leaders are more content to maintain existing levels of aid to Israel than is the mass public. They are also more inclined to use aid to assist farmers to grow crops other than illegal drugs. But striking differences occur on the possible use of military force to deal with illegal drugs. This is not an option the mass public supports to any great extent, but com¬ paratively speaking it is one overwhelmingly opposed by nongovern¬ mental leaders (table A.4.4). 11 Interventionism Does this mean nongovernmental leaders are markedly less interven¬ tionist in orientation than the mass public? Logic suggests otherwise, since the tenets of liberal internationalism embraced by political elites following World War II implied the arrows as well as the olive branch, and since elite theory holds that the masses are responsive to (manip¬ ulated by?) elites. The mass public also came to embrace the conflictual and conciliatory elements of the foreign policy consensus in the decades following World War II, but given a choice, it has been argued, the mass public prefers noninvolvement to involvement, especially since Vietnam. "Even though most Americans describe themselves as internationalists," William Schneider (1987: 51) has written, "the public's willingness to support international commitments is quite limited. We should be friendly and cooperative, the public feels. We should protect our vital interests. But we should draw the line at involvement." He goes on to suggest that "Grenada is a textbook example of the kind of foreign policy action likely to win the public's approval. If a vital national interest is at stake, Americans want to take action that is swift, decisive, and relatively cost- free. . . . Lebanon [on the other hand] is a good example of the kind of military action Americans are likely to oppose—one that is protracted, inconclusive, and tragically costly" (1987: 59). The general disposition of leaders and the mass public toward military involvement abroad is captured in the two internationalism dimensions, especially mi. During the 1980s leaders were in fact more supportive of militant internationalism than the mass public, but during the 1970s the reverse was true. In neither instance, however, is it clear whether leaders and masses would respond very differently to such issues as the length and conclusiveness of overseas military involvement. Some hint of potential differences between elites and masses on these 154 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.8 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the View that the CIA Should Try to Weaken or Overthrow Unfriendly Governments, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974—86 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl Ml Oppose Support 1986 .53 .56 0 .68 .43 — + .40 .71 1982 .46 .53 0 .63 .41 - + .33 .68 1978 .67 .76 - .73 .77 0 + .47 .90 1974 .49 .63 - .69 .52 - + .32 .82 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. matters can be gleaned from the approval each gave to how the gov¬ ernment handled various foreign policy problems during the 1980s. Two stand out: the invasion of Grenada (1983) and the bombing of Libya (1986). In the first, 56 percent of the mass public rated the government's handling of the situation as either good or excellent, and in the second 64 percent gave it similar marks. Among leaders, the Grenada invasion received an identical 56 percent good or excellent approval rating and the Libyan bombing episode a nearly similar rating at 58 percent. I will return later in this chapter to examine further the similarities or differ¬ ences in the evaluations that leaders and the mass public made of the government's and the Reagan administration's foreign policy perfor¬ mance. Here the important finding, albeit one based on very limited information, is that leaders and masses seem to respond with equal levels of enthusiasm to interventions that are “swift, decisive, and relatively cost-free." Unfortunately, responses to the Reagan administration's in¬ tervention in Lebanon and the tragedy that followed it were not probed in the Chicago Council surveys, so it is not possible to ascertain whether elites and masses respond similarly to interventions that are “protracted, inconclusive, and tragically costly." An important item tapping interventionist attitudes that is available is the question of whether the cia should engage in covert activities abroad. Interestingly, it reveals clear differences between nongovern¬ mental leaders and the mass public during the 1970s (when the mass public supported intervention more than leaders) but the absence of dif¬ ferences during the 1980s (see tables 5.8 and A.4.5). Again, other ques- Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 155 Table 5.9 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for Support of Dictators, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974-86 3 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support 1986 .36 .35 0 .43 .29 — + .20 .54 1982 .28 .34 0 .28 .30 0 + .14 .53 1978 .33 .54 - .30 .40 + + .19 .55 1974 .19 .30 - .18 .23 0 0 .24 .18 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. a During the period 1978-86 the proposition is that the United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly to us and opposed to the Communists. In 1974 the proposition is that it is morally wrong for the United States to support a military dictatorship that strips its people of their basic rights, even if it allows the United States to set up military bases. tions that would permit a probe of similarities or differences in the at¬ titudes of elites and masses toward specific instances of interventionist behavior are not available, but the responses to at least this one do not suggest any clear-cut differences between them once the foreign policy beliefs, political preferences, and ideological predispositions of nongov¬ ernmental leaders and the mass public are taken into account. As described in chapter 3, much of the concern about the cia's foreign policy role in the post-Vietnam era has turned on whether and how it should be controlled. Analyses of these questions show little disposition among nongovernmental leaders or the mass public either to restrain the cia further or to “unleash” it. Much the same is true on the question of congressional involvement in foreign policymaking. Differences are evident on other variables, but not between nongovernmental leaders and the mass public in any particularly notable way (table A.4.5). 12 This is not so in the case of questions relating to the support of military dictatorships and to assessments of the morality of the Vietnam War (table A.4.5). In the first instance, nongovernmental leaders during the 1970s were clearly more opposed than the mass public to supporting military dictators because of their anticommunist credentials or because of promised access to military bases, but in the 1980s these differences disappeared (see table 5.9). Whether the temporal changes reflect re¬ sponsiveness to the renewed anticommunist rhetoric of the Reagan administration is problematic, but it is interesting to note that nongov- 156 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.10 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the View that Vietnam Was Fundamentally Wrong and Immoral, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support 1986 .45 .72 _ .66 .74 + - .79 .58 1982 .44 .80 - .72 .81 + - .85 .67 1978 .64 .79 - .81 .76 0 .89 .66 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. ernmental leaders appeared to hold more "principled" positions than the mass public on this question during the 1970s, which perhaps also reflects comparatively less importance attached to the threat of com¬ munism by leaders. The Vietnam question presents no ambiguity: the mass public views the war to have been "more than a mistake" and to have been "fun¬ damentally wrong and immoral," whereas—comparatively speaking— nongovernmental leaders do not feel this way (see table 5.10). Further¬ more, it appears that the gulf between them may have widened as time and distance from the war have increased. It is unclear whether these elite-mass differences should be regarded as expected or surprising, but much as nongovernmental leaders reject the slippery slope view of for¬ eign aid, the results on the Vietnam morality question seem to reinforce the notion that leaders engage in more sophisticated thinking than the mass public, for regardless of what normative or political convictions about the war respondents might hold (which for the most part should be captured in their foreign policy beliefs and political attributes and orientations), its import and consequences demand more reflection than the question posed in the ccfr surveys permits. A less benign inter¬ pretation, of course, is that nongovernmental leaders simply supported the war more than the mass public. 13 The interpretation is not easily dismissed, given the argument that the mass public willingly supports only those interventionist exercises that are "swift, decisive, and rela¬ tively cost-free"—for Vietnam was clearly none of these. How, then, did nongovernmental leaders and the mass public re¬ spond to the more sophisticated questions about the lessons of Vietnam Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 157 Table 5.11 The Lessons of Vietnam as Seen by Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1974 Leaders Support Mass vs. _Cl_ Pattern _Ml_ Leaders Public Mass Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support The United States should avoid all wars we cannot win .46 .48 0 .57 .55 - - .39 .40 If we are to keep our commitments to our friends and allies, we must sometimes fight limited wars .57 .58 0 .50 .64 + + .29 .80 We sometimes have to back governments we don't like because a Communist takeover would be worse .50 .62 - .64 .56 0 + .26 .84 We should not commit American troops to civil wars in other countries .80 .76 0 .76 .77 0 - .81 .71 We can stop aggressors who would take over our small allies .30 .40 - .47 .31 - + .20 .60 In the future we should send arms and supplies, but not lose our own men in such wars .56 .72 - .64 .75 + 0 .70 .70 Military leaders should be able to fight wars without civilian leaders tying their hands .26 .52 - .60 .35 - + .36 .58 We should not commit American lives to the defense of corrupt governments abroad .72 .79 - .79 .76 0 - .82 .73 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. that were posed in the 1974 Chicago Council surveys? The evidence, summarized in table 5.11, demonstrates that they do part company on several important judgments about the war (also table A.4.6). Compared with the mass public, nongovernmental leaders reject the following les¬ sons: that some governments should be protected because a Communist takeover would be worse; that aggressors who would seek to take over small allies can be stopped; that in future wars the United States should provide arms and supplies but not manpower; that military leaders should be free of civilian inhibitions; and that the United States should not com¬ mit resources to the defense of corrupt governments. Again, these results can reasonably be interpreted as reflecting greater sophistication in the thinking of nongovernmental leaders relative to masses. But it is also interesting to note the absence of differences between leaders and the 158 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.12 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Alternatives for Dealing with Terrorists, bv Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern Cl MI MI Oppose Support Oppose Support Negotiate .24 .41 — .39 .40 0 0 .42 .37 Assassinate .35 .44 - .59 .29 - + .38 .49 Force .70 .62 + .66 .59 0 + .49 .75 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. mass public on one important proposition: “If we are to keep our com¬ mitments to our friends and allies, we must sometimes fight limited wars." Support for that viewpoint also requires a sense of sophistication, one that normally would not be ascribed to the mass public. Terrorism Alternative strategies for coping with the threat of international terrorism often imply the use of force or other forms of interventionism. Against the backdrop of the preceding analyses it is not clear whether leaders and the mass public will differ in their support for these alternative strat¬ egies—but they do. Nongovernmental leaders are less willing than the mass public either to negotiate with terrorist organizations or to use the cia to assassinate known terrorists, but they are quite disposed to the use of military force to cope with the terrorist threat (see tables 5.12 and A.4.7). Once more, then, the evidence builds to support the proposition that leaders engage in more sophisticated thinking than the mass public since they eschew the use of certain forms of force in some situations but embrace it in others. Interdependence just as nongovernmental leaders and the mass public differed on how to deal with the terrorist threat of the 1980s, they differed on how to deal with the interdependent challenges of the 1970s, notably the oil crisis of 1973-74. In chapter 3 it was shown that sharing oil with American allies enjoyed strong internationalist support among the mass public. Interestingly, the option as a mechanism for coping with an Arab oil Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 159 Table 5.13 Support Among Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public for the Elimination of Tariffs, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1978-86 Leaders Mass Public Leaders vs. Mass Cl Support Pattern MI Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support 1986 .70 .34 + .41 .35 0 .45 .30 1982 .67 .28 + .31 .33 0 .37 .28 1978 .76 .27 + .35 .29 0 .39 .26 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. embargo enjoyed even stronger support among elites. Whereas roughly half of the mass public preferred to share oil with Europe and Japan in the event of an embargo, fully 85 percent of the leaders surveyed opted for that strategy. These differences are reflected in the regression anal¬ yses, which show that, comparatively speaking, nongovernmental lead¬ ers were far more supportive of the sharing option than the mass public. Similarly, they were more supportive of extending loans to Third World nations suffering balance-of-payments deficits due to the high cost of oil (table A.4.8). Table 5.13 summarizes attitudes toward free trade as reflected in sup¬ port for the option of maintaining or eliminating protective tariffs (see also table A.4.8). The results show striking differences on the issue, with nongovernmental leaders "free traders" and the mass public "protec¬ tionists." In 1986, for example, the probability of support for eliminating tariffs is nearly 70 percent among leaders, which is more than twice the level among the mass public. What is striking is that the differences persist even after controlling for the foreign policy beliefs of respondents and their partisan identifications and political ideologies. Clearly the gulf between leaders and masses on this topic, which is near the heart of many contentious political economy issues in recent American foreign policy, is very wide. The likely reason is that the mass public sees the issue as one of jobs and economic security (theirs), whereas leader groups are more likely to view it abstractly and as a matter of principle. Nuclear Weapons and National Defense Two of the prominent national security issues of the 1980s addressed in the Chicago Council surveys concerned a freeze on nuclear weapons 160 Faces of Internationalism Table 5.14 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward Nuclear Weapons, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1982 and 1986 Leaders Support Mass vs. _y_ Pattern _MI_ Leaders Public Mass Oppose Support Cl MI Oppose Support Favor mutual verifiable freeze with inspections right now if Soviets agree 1986 .78 .75 0 .56 .88 + 0 .76 .75 1982 . 78 . 66 + .49 . 82 + - .78 . 56 Favor mutual verifiable freeze with inspections after U.S. builds up nuclear weapons 1986 .08 .14 - .22 .07 - 0 .12 .14 1982 .14 .21 - .26 .16 - + .12 .31 U.S. should stop building nuclear weapons only if the Soviet Union agrees to do so 1986 . 76 . 62 + .53 . 72 + 0 . 61 .66 1982 .79 .53 + .49 .63 + + .50 .61 U.S. should continue to build nuclear weapons regardless of what the Soviets do 1986 .16 .19 0 .37 .08 - + .13 .27 1982 .09 .25 - .41 .12 + .19 .26 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. production and the Reagan administration's sdi system designed to pro¬ duce a ballistic missile defense (bmd) system. The contentiousness of these issues in American society was affirmed in the analyses in chapter 3, which demonstrated that on both the mass public was divided along the accommodationist-hardline fault as well as along partisan and ideo¬ logical lines. To these divisions can be added another, those between nongovern¬ mental leaders and the mass public. In 1982, when the freeze movement was active and thriving, nongovernmental leaders were more prone than the mass public to favor a freeze (with inspections) immediately if the Soviets would agree, and they were more clearly disposed against the alternative of first building up the U.S. nuclear arsenal (see tables 5.14 and A.4.9). These differences are all the more interesting since they exist despite the controls for respondents' positions on the two internation¬ alism scales, which otherwise reveal leaders more inclined toward ac- commodationist than hardline values. On a related proposal that asked about conditions under which the United States should stop building nuclear weapons, leaders were also more prone than the mass public to reject a weapons production halt Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 161 Table 5.15 Attitudes of Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public Toward SDI Alternatives, by Foreign Policy Beliefs, 1986 Mass Leaders vs. CI Support Pattern MI Leaders Public Mass Oppose Support CI MI Oppose Support Research .62 .53 + .50 .59 + 0 .55 .53 Build .22 .28 — .36 .20 — + .18 .41 Note: see explanatory note with table 5.5. regardless of Soviet behavior, preferring instead to stop building nuclear weapons "only if the Soviet Union agrees to do so." In combination the response patterns on the freeze and nuclear production halt questions suggest a somewhat more cautious approach among leaders than among the mass public that perhaps reflects a more realistic assessment of how closely intertwined Soviet and American strategic policies have become. The response patterns on the sdi question reinforce the notion of cautiousness among nongovernmental leaders. Here the preference is unambiguously for continued research, and neither deployment nor abandonment of the bmd effort. As shown in table 5.15, other things being equal, roughly three-fifths of the nongovernmental leaders can be expected to prefer continued research on sdi compared with half of the mass public. Relations with Communist Countries The ubiquity of the Soviet Union in postwar American foreign policy is matched by its centrality in the thinking of the American people, elites and masses alike. Fear of communism, how to deal with the Soviets, and whether to use American troops abroad, often in scenarios that depict Soviet or Communist aggression, are the three factors that most clearly and consistently distinguish the two faces of internationalism embraced by elites and masses since the Vietnam War. In addition to differences between nongovernmental leaders and the mass public on these issues as reflected in the ci and mi dimensions, they differ on two others as well: whether the Soviet Union's treatment of its Jewish citizenry is the business of the United States (in 1978 but not 1974), and whether efforts should be made to seek to negotiate re¬ establishment of political and economic relations with Cuba (1982) (table 162 Faces of Internationalism A.4.10). In both instances nongovernmental leaders embrace what might he regarded as the liberal position (despite the fact that political ideology has been controlled). Thus in 1978, by which time the Carter adminis¬ tration had made human rights a centerpiece of American foreign policy, nongovernmental leaders were comparatively more supportive of the view that the Soviet treatment of Soviet jews is a matter of concern to the United States, which for some time has been a central issue on the East-West agenda of both those who wish to enhance Soviet-American cooperation and those who wish to extract a cost for doing so. They were also more supportive early in the Reagan administration of efforts to normalize U.S.-Cuban relations. The differences on the Cuban issue are consistent with elites' generally greater propensity to support accommodationist rather than hardline val¬ ues. But, beyond being a liberal position, the question of how to treat Soviet Jews is more difficult to interpret, since the position supported by nongovernmental leaders is what the Soviet government regards as interference in its internal affairs and, therefore, is antithetical to the goal of improved Soviet-American relations; but the position again seems rea¬ sonably interpreted as a principled one that supports the notion that leaders are capable of making sophisticated distinctions in their foreign policy thinking. Another Look at the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance It has been argued in previous chapters that a potentially important link¬ age mechanism in explaining the elusive relationship between public opinion and foreign policy may be found in how Americans evaluate policymakers and their performance. It has been argued that foreign policy issues may figure prominently in these evaluations, and the evi¬ dence demonstrates that the foreign policy beliefs of both the mass public and nongovernmental leaders are systematically related to their evalu¬ ations of policymakers and their performance. Interestingly, leaders and masses individually register similar eval¬ uations, and they are also similar to one another comparatively. The results in table 5.16 parallel the analyses on these issues in previous chapters but with the occupancy of leadership (opinion-making) roles now added as a separate variable. The addition has no material affect Table 5.16 The Relationship Between Evaluations of the Reagan Administration's Foreign Policy Performance by Nongovernmental Leaders and the Mass Public, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology VO 00 C3A T3 QJ O s-< >+-» C o J X 6JD jo o <11 o Cu c 1 T3 73 Cl X u Jp C/5 O. 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It remains the case that Americans' foreign policy beliefs, partisan attachments, and ideological predispo¬ sitions are systematically related to their evaluations of policymakers and their performance. But leadership per se makes little significant addi¬ tional inroads. 14 Thus, despite other differences between leaders and the mass public on discrete foreign policy issues, the overarching similarity in the structure of their foreign policy attitudes is matched by similarities in their ultimate judgments about political leaders. In the final analysis these may be the judgments that matter most. Summary and Conclusions J Elite theory holds that political leaders are able to structure their foreign policy beliefs in a consistent and coherent way, whereas the mass public is not. Although that view does not hold up under close scrutiny, it is true that elites and masses differ in the salience they attach to the pre¬ scriptions inherent in the dimensions that define their commonly held foreign policy beliefs. Comparatively speaking, leaders are more prone to support accommodationist and internationalist values than the mass public, among whom hardline and isolationist values are more evident. The differences generally hold up on the ci dimension even after ac¬ counting for partisanship and ideology, but they do so less consistently in the case of mi. At the same time, however, the importance of ideology in explaining variations among both nongovernmental leaders and the mass public is striking. Liberals are accommodationists, conservatives hardliners. Partisanship also has some impact in explaining differences on the two internationalism dimensions, but ideology is the dominant factor. Attentiveness also affects foreign policy thinking. Attentives are clearly more inclined to support global activism than the rest of the mass public, especially inattentives, but they are also dissimilar from leadership seg¬ ments in important ways when the emphasis shifts from whether to how the United States should be involved in the world. Attentives are con¬ sistently more supportive of militant internationalism than leadership groups, which raises serious questions about the argument in elite theory that postulates that leaders lead and the masses follow. Differences over whether and how questions also characterize the policy preferences of nongovernmental leaders and the mass public gen- Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 165 erally, thereby reinforcing the finding that the occupancy of leadership roles significantly affects attitudes toward American foreign policy. Non¬ governmental leaders are generally more internationalist than the mass public, for example, as suggested by their greater proclivity to support active U.S. involvement in the world and various forms of foreign aid. But they also manifest selectivity on other important issues, notably the use of force. Selectivity in leadership preferences may be explained by another ele¬ ment of elite theory, which argues that leaders are capable of more so¬ phisticated thinking than the mass public. Exactly what constitutes so¬ phistication is unclear, but examples where greater sophistication may explain differences between nongovernmental leaders and the mass pub¬ lic include attitudes toward a proposed halt in nuclear weapons pro¬ duction, beliefs about the relationship between foreign aid and foreign military involvement, the use of force against terrorists, and beliefs about the Vietnam War. Better data and conceptual clarity are required before the inferences drawn from these and other cases can be used with con¬ fidence, but the examples cannot be ignored, for they help to understand the differences in the thinking of elites and masses despite their com¬ monly structured foreign policy attitudes. What is perhaps most important to note in this regard is that differ¬ ences between leaders and the mass public follow reasonable and pre¬ dictable patterns. Furthermore, they do not fall along the hawk/dove dichotomy used (reluctantly) in chapter 3 to summarize differences within the mass public on many of the important policy issues raised in the ccfr surveys since the Vietnam War. This is instructive in itself, for it suggests that simple dichotomies do not adequately characterize the pol¬ icy preferences of leaders and the mass public once similarities in their foreign policy beliefs, partisanship, and ideology have been considered. How Americans evaluate policymakers and their performance and how their foreign policy beliefs affect those judgments have been hy¬ pothesized to be important ingredients in the process whereby public opinion affects American foreign policy. Leaders and masses share im¬ portant similarities in this respect, despite their other differences, among which is that their foreign policy beliefs bear an important and systematic relationship to how they see policymakers and their performance. 6 . Was There Ever a Foreign Policy Consensus in American Popular Opinion? Consensus and bipartisanship are key concepts conventionally used to describe the domestic political environment that sustained the broad outlines of American foreign policy since World War II. Beginning perhaps as early as 1941, when President Roosevelt secured bipartisan support for the Lend-Lease Act, policymakers, other political elites, and the public at large generally came to support a few fundamental ideas about the ends and often the means of American foreign policy that fundamentally shaped the nation's role in world affairs at least until the mid-1960s, and perhaps beyond. According to this viewpoint, presidents from Truman to Johnson could generally count on broad-based political support for their foreign policy initiatives, because the bipartisan consensus served to mute domestic criticism. Foreign policy was not an important issue that engendered divisive public debate between the 1940s and the 1960s; instead, it was often a unifying issue for the American people and the major political parties. To the extent that any debate did occur, it was largely over the tactics of American foreign policy, but not its objectives. Whether a Republican or a Democrat was in the White House, the largely Democratic congresses were willing to provide support for the president's foreign policy actions. The public, too, according to this viewpoint, was basically supportive. Bipartisanship and consensus thus dominated American foreign policymaking. As compelling as the conventional wisdom about the Cold War era is, little systematic evidence has been brought to bear on the question of whether a bipartisan consensus accurately portrays the domestic political context of American foreign policy prior to Vietnam. Thus it is fair to ask: Was there ever a foreign policy consensus in American popular opinion? And does bipartisanship accurately reflect the way policy was shaped by Congress and the executive in the first two decades of the postwar era? The answers are important not simply as 166 Consensus in Popular Opinion? 167 a matter of historical curiosity but also because it is only through a better understanding of the Cold War years that confidence can be built about the magnitude and implications of changes that may have occurred in the post-Vietnam period. The purpose of this chapter and the next is to provide answers to the foregoing questions. Whereas in previous chapters the existence of consensus and bipartisanship prior to the 1970s was assumed, it is now treated as an hypothesis. Building on the analyses in previous chapters, attention will be given in this chapter to public attitudes toward communism, the use of force abroad, and relations with the Soviet Union as revealed in public opinion polls from the 1940s to the 1980s. Then in chapter 7 congressional voting behavior on foreign policy issues across the same four decades will be examined to determine whether bipartisanship ever existed and if it may have changed over time. Although few are likely to agree on what constitutes evidence for the presence or absence of a foreign policy consensus, 1 it cannot be said to have existed without majority support for policies and programs related to the fundamental premises of postwar American foreign policy—captured in the themes of globalism, anticommunism, contain¬ ment, military might, and interventionism (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1987)— and that can only have been generated by drawing from diverse regional, educational, partisan, ideological, and other groups. Absent the ideal situation—cross-sectional and longitudinal data spanning the entire postwar era that would permit a detailed examination of foreign policy attitudes comparable to that in previous chapters—the focus will be on those issues for which some aggregate national public opinion trend data are available which will permit a determination of whether and when majority support may or may not have existed. 2 Inevitably differences in question wording, and even the meaning of similar words and phrases used in polls over such long stretches of time, as well as other questions regarding survey design and measurement require that the available information be approached with caution. Still, a probe of the historical record such as exists is in order. The Threat of Communism Although fear of communism is intimately related to the anticommunist and anti-Soviet thrust of postwar American foreign policy and to the 168 Faces of Internationalism associated foreign policy strategy of containment, what is meant by the phrase "threat of communism" is not unambiguous. For some it might be conceived primarily in terms of a threat from within, as during the McCarthy period in the early 1950s. In this instance the broad anticom¬ munist consensus at the general philosophical level in the United States actually permitted McCarthyism to thrive (see Ewald, 1986). Evidence from Gallup polls in the late 1940s and early 1950s that asked respondents to name the most important problems facing the nation indicates that what was often uppermost in the thinking of many Americans was the threat of communism at home. 3 More often, however, the threat of communism is conceived as ex¬ ternal in nature and frequently linked to the behavior of the Soviet Union. In 1951 a vast majority of the respondents in a National Opinion Research Center (norc) survey explained the importance they attached to stopping the spread of communism with the view that "Communism is a real threat to U.S. security and to our free way of life. Only a few based their position on philosophical or ideological grounds" (U.S. Department of State, 1951:1). Nearly four decades later, in March 1986, a poll sponsored by the National Strategy Information Center found that 85 percent of the respondents tended to be suspicious of the Soviet Union rather than to trust them, and more than half of those suspicious attributed their beliefs to the Soviets' "aggressive international behavior." "Communist ide¬ ology” was a distant second choice. Although anticommunism and anti- Sovietism do not necessarily go hand-in-hand, it appears that for most Americans we can presume that containing communism means primarily containing an external security threat, not an ideological or internal sub¬ versive one. Attitudes Toward the Containment of Communism and the Threat from Abroad How important is containing communism? As described in previous chapters, containing communism is one of the foreign policy goals the United States might have about which respondents were asked in each of the Chicago Council surveys. In the first ccfr survey (1974), 55 percent of the respondents regarded the goal as very important goal, 27 percent regarded it as somewhat important, and 13 percent regarded it as not at all important (5 percent were not sure) (see appendix 1, table A. 1.8). Consensus in Popular Opinion? 169 Table 6.1 Attitudes Toward Stopping the Spread of Communism, 1950-51 (percentages) In general, how important do you think it is for the United States to try to stop the spread of communism in the world—very important, only fairly important, or not important at all? Date Very important Fairly important Not important Don't know 1/50 77 10 5 8 4/50 83 6 4 7 6/51 82 7 4 7 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). There are slight variations from these proportions in the three subsequent ccfr surveys, but they are inconsequential. How do these response patterns compare with the historical record? Interestingly, norc asked an analogous question in three surveys in the early 1950s: "In general, how important do you think it is for the United States to try to stop the spread of Communism?" As shown in table 6.1, the overwhelming proportion of the American people believed the goal to be very important, and almost none believed it was unimportant. It appears, then, that containing communism is an enduring theme in pub¬ lic perceptions of postwar American foreign policy. (Whether anticom¬ munism and containment remain as salient as earlier is, however, an¬ other matter to which I will return.) Moving from the abstract level to particular situations, table 6.2 reports the evidence from the four ccfr surveys regarding Americans' percep¬ tions of the threat of communism. It points to considerable variability in the salience the mass public attaches to the countries and regions that might see Communist forces come to power insofar as such develop¬ ments would be a threat to the United States. Communism in Japan or in Europe or Latin America is clearly seen as threatening, but even in these cases there is considerable variation in the apparent importance Americans attach to different countries. A clear majority perceives com¬ munism in Mexico as a great threat to the United States, for example, but there is a measurable difference between the salience attached to the threat of communism in Mexico compared with El Salvador. Similarly, there is significant variation in how threatening the American people think a Communist Italy or France would be, even though both are West 170 Faces of Internationalism Table 6.2 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1974-86 (percentages) If . . . were to become Communist, do you think this would be a threat to the United States, or not? No Not sure/ Date Threat threat ascertained Western Europe 12/74 71 19 10 Japan 12/74 68 23 11 African countries 12/74 51 35 14 Latin American countries 12/74 69 20 10 Italy 12/74 50 37 14 Portugal 12/74 47 39 14 A. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power in that country through peaceful elections. First, what if the Communist party came to power through peaceful elections in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the U.S.? B. 1 am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power. First, what if the Communist party came to power in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the Date Wording Great threat Somewhat a threat Not very' much No threat at all Don't know Mexico 11/78 A 53 26 9 5 7 11/82 B 61 19 8 4 9 11/86 B 62 18 10 5 5 Iran 11/78 A 35 35 11 6 13 11/82 B 24 35 22 10 10 France 11/78 A 26 41 17 7 10 11/82 B 31 38 17 6 9 11/86 B 30 38 18 8 6 Italy 11/78 A 18 40 24 9 9 Chile 11/78 A 17 35 24 9 15 Saudi Arabia 11/82 B 49 31 8 3 9 11/86 B 39 35 12 5 8 El Salvador 11/82 B 21 43 21 6 10 11/86 B 27 43 17 4 8 Taiwan 11/82 B 17 37 23 11 13 The Philippines 11/86 B 37 35 15 6 7 South Africa 11/86 B 21 40 22 8 9 Note: 1974 survey conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, 1978-86 by The Gallup Poll. Consensus in Popular Opinion? 171 Table 6.3 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Communism, 1948 (percentages) A: Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether the countries in Western Europe go Communist or not? B: Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether Germany goes Communist or not? C: How about China? [Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether China goes Communist or not?] D: And how about the small countries in South America? [Do you think it makes much difference to the United States whether they go Communist or not?] E: Do you think it makes much difference to our country whether China goes Communist or not? F: How about Mexico—Do you think it would make much difference to our country whether or not Mexico were to go Communist? G: And how about the countries in South America? [Do you think it makes much difference to our country whether they go Communist Date Wording or not?] Yes No Don't know Western Europe 7/48 A 80 10 10 Germany 7/48 B 80 9 11 China 7/48 C 73 14 13 South America 7/48 D 70 15 15 China 11/48 E 71 17 12 Mexico 11/48 F 82 8 10 South America 11/48 G 80 8 12 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). European allies of the United States. Although there are no countries or regions in which the majority of the American people regard the rise of communism to be no threat or not very much of a threat to the United States, it is equally clear policymakers would face varying degrees of difficulty in selling an anticommunist program to them, depending on how and where the threat occurred. That conclusion seemingly does not apply to the limited comparable historical evidence as shown in table 6.3. On the basis of these data it would appear that policymakers would have enjoyed broad support for pursuing an anticommunist strategy virtually anywhere. On closer in¬ spection, however, it is not altogether clear that the 1940s differ markedly from the 1970s and 1980s. In each year between 1978 and 1986, for ex¬ ample, roughly four-fifths of the American people regarded the possi¬ bility of communism in Mexico as either somewhat or a great threat to 172 Faces of Internationalism the United States. In 1948, 82 percent thought "it would make a difference to our country [if] . . . Mexico were to go Communist." Other compar¬ isons of the data in tables 6.2 and 6.3 raise as many questions as they answer. Would the American people have attached any greater salience to the threat of communism in South Africa in 1948 than they did in the 1980s? Or in Saudi Arabia? Or Chile, or El Salvador, or Italy, or Iran? Combating Communism Although the foregoing suggests continuity in public attitudes toward containment and the perceived threat of communism in other countries, there is considerable evidence that challenges the proposition that an¬ ticommunism is as salient in the post-Vietnam era as it was in the period between the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the decade bracketed by Congress's approval of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution in 1964 and the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia in 1973. Eleven possible foreign policy goals were specified in all four of the Chi¬ cago Council surveys. 4 If the rank order of these goals is examined so as to determine the relative (as opposed to absolute) salience Americans attach to different foreign policy objectives, containing communism is found to rank either fourth or fifth in terms of the proportion of the respondents who regarded the goal as very important, consistently plac¬ ing behind protecting the jobs of American workers, securing adequate supplies of energy, and worldwide arms control. Also interesting to note is that "protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression," arguably a major tenet of postwar American foreign policy interventionism, came in tenth among the eleven goals in all four of the surveys. 5 Contrast these findings with responses to the question asked by NORC in 1951 and again in 1952: "If you had to choose, which would you say is more important—to keep communism from spreading, or to stay out of another war?" Roughly two-thirds chose to keep communism from spreading; less than 30 percent chose to stay out of another war (see appendix 5, table A.5.1). 6 Similarly, in five surveys between September 1950 and June 1952 norc asked: "If Communist armies attack any other countries in the world, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend these countries, like we did in Korea." Although the responses reflected growing disillusionment with the Ko¬ rean War in which the United States was then mired, helping to defend others consistently out-polled "stay out"—by a 66 to 14 percent margin Consensus in Popular Opinion? 173 at its peak in September 1950 and by a 45 to 33 percent margin at its low point in June 1952. Furthermore, if those responding “it depends" (pre¬ sumably on the circumstances or countries involved) are added to those opting to “help others," a majority of Americans always chose involve¬ ment over noninvolvement (table A.5.2). At another level relating the ends and means of American foreign policy, consider responses to a series of questions asked by Gallup and norc between 1955 and 1957, which inquired of respondents whether they approved of the use of economic assistance for purposes of sup¬ porting countries willing “to stand with us" in opposing Communist aggression. Although some variations in wording exist on this item, the average level of support across eight norc surveys between January 1955 and January 1956 was 81 percent (table A.5.3). Contrast this with the support—which averaged only 46 percent—for the following proposition posed in 1956 and 1957: “We have also sent economic aid to some coun¬ tries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Com¬ munists. Do you think we should continue to send economic aid to these countries, or not?" 7 Although comparable data linking foreign aid to anticommunism are not available in the post-Vietnam period, public sup¬ port for foreign aid since the 1950s generally has fallen far short of these levels (see also chapter 3; cf. Contee, 1987: 23). Military aid has also figured prominently as an anticommunist in¬ strument in American foreign policy and, like economic assistance, has historically enjoyed considerable, if not always overwhelming, popular support when cast in an anticommunist framework (table A.5.5). In 1948 and 1949, for example, norc asked respondents in several polls if they approved or disapproved of sending military supplies to help the Chinese government in its battle with the Chinese Communists. Only about one- third responded favorably in February 1948, but support was higher thereafter and reached 55 percent in an April 1948 survey. More striking are the responses to the question "Do you think the United States should send military supplies to help those governments in Asia that [which] are threatened by Communism?" In six surveys taken in 1950 and 1951 the proportion of favorable responses averaged 57 percent and never fell below 50 percent. A similar question asked in 1952 elicited a 54 percent approval rating, and in July 1950, a month after the North Koreans in¬ vaded South Korea, nearly two-thirds of the American people were will¬ ing "to help those governments in Asia [other than Korea] that are threat¬ ened by communism." 174 Faces of Internationalism Aid to Western Europe, the focal point of American foreign policy in the immediate postwar years and throughout the 1950s, combined the use of military and economic assistance to combat communism. Although public opinion surveys conducted during this period did not tie questions about support for economic and military aid to its anticommunist roots directly, there is little doubt that the rhetoric of the period did so (see Winham, 1970). Interesting to note in this context is that both the Mar¬ shall Plan and sending military supplies to Europe enjoyed considerable popular approval. Even before the Marshall Plan was publicly unveiled, between 70 and 80 percent of the American people approved "sending machinery and other supplies to help the countries of Western Europe get their factories and farms running again." Once the plan was in place, support (in 1949-50) for "continuing to send economic aid to Western Europe" rarely dropped below 60 percent and frequently ran higher. Similar levels of support were registered for supplying Western Europe militarily. It is interesting to note that the proportion of favorable re¬ sponses grew from less than a majority in much of 1949 to over 60 percent a year later, and it remained at that level throughout the rest of the decade (table A.5.6). The Use of Force As noted in earlier chapters, three interrelated developments in the 1960s and 1970s lie at the core of the argument that the foreign policy consensus of the Cold War years was shattered during this period: Vietnam, de¬ tente, and Watergate. Among these, the changing attitudes of the Amer¬ ican people toward the Vietnam War were arguably the most important in contributing to a disposition against overseas interventionism pop¬ ularly captured in the phrase "the Vietnam syndrome." Trends in at¬ titudes toward the war itself are illustrated by responses to the Gallup question: "In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" Early in 1966 only about 25 percent of the American people responded affirmatively, but the proportion grew steadily there¬ after, crossing the 50 percent threshold in August 1968 and the 60 percent mark in May 1971 (table A.5.7). Growing antagonism to the war gen¬ erally, especially apparent from late 1968 onward, reflects a growing bi¬ partisan conviction that the war was a mistake. Democrats had consis- Consensus in Popular Opinion? 175 tently supported the war in greater numbers than Republicans while Lyndon Johnson was in office, but once Richard Nixon became president party differences largely disappeared (table A.5.8). 8 The lasting impact of these views is suggested in responses to a series of questions asked by the Harris and Gallup organizations about the morality of the Vietnam War. The evidence indicates that sometime during 1971 an overwhelming proportion of the American people became convinced that the Vietnam War was fundamentally misguided (table A.5.9). That viewpoint has per¬ sisted ever since. Alternative Scenarios Some hint of the impact of Americans' attitudes toward the Vietnam War on their disposition to use American troops in potential conflict situations elsewhere can be gleaned from the relationships shown in table 6.4, which link judgments about the war with support for use of troops abroad (only situations probed more than once are listed). Although there is no one- to-one correspondence between the two variables, clearly they are re¬ lated. The scenario projecting a possible North Korean invasion of South Korea illustrates the trends: more than half of those who disagreed strongly with the proposition that Vietnam was morally wrong would send troops to Korea, whereas fewer than 25 percent of those who agreed strongly that Vietnam was wrong would do so. Inferences about the impact of Vietnam somewhat earlier can be drawn from table 6.5, which records responses to a set of questions asked by the Harris organization between October 1969 and July 1971 about cir¬ cumstances that might justify the United States going to war again in the future. (Again, only those circumstances that were probed more than once are recorded.) The results are unambiguous: With the single ex¬ ception of the hypothetical situation in which Israel was losing in a war to the Arabs, all of the proposed scenarios witnessed a decline in the proportion of Americans who believed that they would be worth going to war again. Furthermore, in a majority of them the balance between the "worth" and "not worth" responses tipped in the latter direction. The data in table 6.5, while not unambiguous, generally register an erosion of support during the short period between 1969 and 1971 for the interventionist thrust characteristic of postwar American foreign pol¬ icy. More difficult to answer is whether similar patterns appear within a longer historical context. The survey data from the early 1950s indi- 176 Faces of Internationalism Table 6.4 The Relationship Between Willingness to Use Troops Abroad and Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War, 1978-86 (percentages) The Vietnam War was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. Circumstances when U.S. troops might be used Agree strongly Agree somewhat Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly Soviet troops invaded 1986 69 73 82 88 Western Europe 1982 58 66 80 85 1978 55 64 77 86 Japan were invaded by 1986 55 62 59 74 the Soviet Union 1982 45 50 67 68 1978 39 50 65 76 The Arabs cut off all oil 1986 38 46 39 48 to the U.S. 1982 36 42 38 52 1978 41 45 34 41 Arab forces invaded Israel 1986 31 34 45 58 1982 26 30 38 48 1978 18 21 22 32 North Korea invaded 1986 23 24 31 53 South Korea 1982 16 21 32 58 1978 17 25 33 62 The Soviet Union invaded 1986 29 33 33 23 the People's Republic of China 1982 21 19 24 27 Iran invaded Saudi 1986 26 28 36 47 Arabia 1982 22 24 29 56 The government of El 1986 24 27 32 56 Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels 1982 26 21 17 38 The People's Republic of 1986 21 21 21 31 China invaded Taiwan 1982 16 19 23 36 Note: "don't know" excluded except in 1982, where the response is grouped with "Oppose" on the questions related to the use of troops. eating a preference for stopping communism rather than averting war, summarized above, support an affirmative conclusion. The data sum¬ marized in tables 6.6 and 6.7 also suggest the answer may be yes. Table 6.6 displays responses to three Gallup questions asked in 1950 that are arguably analogous to those asked by Harris in 1969-71. Whereas the 50 percent response rate in support of going to war "if Western Eu¬ rope were invaded by the Communists" is the highest recorded in table Consensus in Popular Opinion? 177 Table 6.5 Circumstances that Might Justify the United States Going to War in the Future, 1969-71 (percentages) There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify the United States going to war again in the future. Do you feel if . . . it would be worth going to war again, or not? Not Not Date Worth worth sure Western Europe were invaded by 10/69 50 34 16 the Communists 8/70 45 35 20 7/71 47 31 22 The Communists invaded Australia 10/69 49 35 16 8/70 40 40 20 7/71 40 38 22 The Russians took over West Berlin 10/69 37 46 17 7/71 32 47 21 The Russians tried to take over 8/70 39 42 20 West Berlin Castro took over a country in 10/69 35 50 15 South America 8/70 34 47 19 7/71 31 50 19 Communist China invaded 10/69 25 57 19 Formosa 7/71 18 58 24 Israel were losing the war [1970: a 10/69 16 67 18 war] with the Arabs 8/70 19 57 24 The Russians occupied Yugoslavia 10/69 12 70 18 7/71 11 66 23 Source: Louis Harris and Associates. 6.5, 9 in 1950, 80 percent of the respondents were willing to go to war with Russia if "Communist troops attack the American zone in Germany" (see table 6.6). An even higher proportion was willing to go to war over the Philippines (82 percent). Recognizing that question wording as well as the context of the times may affect the responses, the contrast with public attitudes two decades hence is nonetheless striking. Table 6.7 charts responses to questions posed by Gallup, Harris, and Roper that generally tap the willingness of the American people to defend West Berlin against Soviet encroachment. Once more the pattern is com¬ paratively clear: strong majority support during the 1960s, followed by a sharp decline in the early to mid-1970s, and a modest upturn thereafter. The trends closely parallel the internationalist-isolationist sentiments 178 Faces of Internationalism Table 6.6 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Respond to Communist Attacks, 1950 (percentages) Do you think the United States should or should not go to war with Russia if any of these things happen? Date Should Should not No opinion Communist troops attack the Philippines 7/50 82 9 9 Communist troops attack the American zone in Germany 7/50 80 12 9 Communist troops attack Formosa 7/50 58 25 16 Source: The Gallup Poll. measured by William Watts and Lloyd A. Free described in chapter 1 (see figure 1.1). Other situations are less easily characterized. In the case of Western Europe (table A.5.10), for example, which has figured prominently in American foreign policy since even before enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, only 50 percent of the respondents in a 1970 Harris poll in¬ dicated a willingness to use American troops to oppose a Communist takeover, and the proportion so disposed in analogous questions asked thereafter ranged from only 40 percent in 1974 to 68 percent in 1986. Entirely comparable questions in the historical record do not exist, but, interestingly, these figures are not dramatically different from responses to two norc polls taken in 1947 and 1949, in which only 52 and 55 percent of the respondents approved the use of armed forces to stop an attack by Russia on “some small European country" or by “some big country” on “a Western European nation." Similarly, when asked in September 1950 if they would approve of “sending large numbers of American troops to help build up the defense of Western Europe," 57 percent responded affirmatively, but when the same question was posed in the months immediately following the intervention of Communist China in the Ko¬ rean War the approval levels dropped to 36 and 41 percent (table A.5.11). They rebounded to more than the 50 percent mark again in the spring and summer of 1951—but arguably because the phrase “large numbers" was omitted from the question, not because opinions had changed. Other data from this period, on the other hand, indicate strong sup¬ port for the North Atlantic alliance (table A.5.12). In 1949 more than three- Consensus in Popular Opinion? 179 Table 6.7 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend West Berlin, 1961-80 (percentages) A: If Communist East Germany closes all roads to Berlin and does not permit planes to land in Berlin, do you think the United States [1962: U.S.] and its allies should or should not try to fight their way into Berlin? (Gallup) B: Our government has guaranteed the freedom of West Berlin. We have said if the Communists try to take over West Berlin, we will defend that city, even if it means war. Do you favor or oppose this policy on West Berlin? (Harris) C: As you know, there have been several crises over keeping West Berlin from being taken over by the Communists. Suppose the Communists moved to take over West Berlin, do you think we should help West Berlin or stay out? (Harris) D: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of West Berlin. Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) E: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if the Russians took over West Berlin you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (Harris) F: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the Russians took over West Berlin? (Gallup) G: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the Soviet Union invaded West Berlin? (Roper) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Not sure/no opinion 7/61 A 71 15 14 8/61 A 64 19 17 9/61 A 70 18 12 10/62 A 60 21 20 11/63 B 72 15 13 4/69 C 63 25 12 2/73 D 40 45 15 12/74 E 34 43 22 5/75 E 38 41 21 7/78 G 40 47 13 11/78 F 48 38 14 2/80 G 54 31 15 180 Faces of Internationalism quarters of the American people supported Senate approval of the nato treaty, and support for the alliance grew thereafter, with some 87 percent of the respondents in a 1955 norc survey viewing favorably the mutual commitment of the United States and Western Europe “to defend each other against attack." 10 Outside of Western Europe, Yugoslavia has often been the focus of pollsters' attention (table A.5.15). In 1951 norc asked: “If Communist armies were to attack Yugoslavia, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them?" Forty-two percent of the respondents favored helping the Yugoslavs. A similar question asked by Harris in 1969 found only 27 percent willing to help Yugoslavia. Even less support (11-18 percent) was registered in three polls taken in 1974 and 1978 in which the use of troops to defend Yugoslavia was the focus of attention. However, in two 1980 polls an average of 34 percent of the respondents favored the use of U.S. troops if Soviet troops invaded Yu¬ goslavia. The trends thus generally mirror attitudes toward the defense of West Berlin, but at a generally lower level of support throughout. 11 These findings have a parallel in the case of Iran, even though Iran is a country in which the United States has had long-standing interests, unlike Yugoslavia, and a history of close involvement. Twice in 1951 a national cross-section was asked: “If Communist armies were to attack Iran (Persia), do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them?" Between 47 and 48 percent of the re¬ spondents preferred to help defend Iran. Sending troops in addition to military supplies was also preferred by a majority of those willing to defend Iran which, extrapolated across the entire sample, translates into about one-quarter of the American people willing to use American troops to defend Iran against a Communist attack. 12 Contrast these findings with the results of an early 1973 Harris poll: 57 percent of the respondents opposed U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops, in the event “there were a danger of a Communist takeover of Iran." Only 23 percent supported the idea(s). Although this proportion compares fa¬ vorably with those willing to use troops in Iran's defense in the early 1950s, the clear majority opposed to military involvement does not (table A.5.16). (Less clear perhaps is the meaning that should be ascribed to these results given the widely discrepant circumstances to which they apply.) Two other non-European countries that have figured prominently in postwar American foreign policy, and to which the United States has Consensus in Popular Opinion? 181 been tied in mutual defense treaties, are South Korea and Nationalist China (Formosa/Taiwan). In the case of Korea, of course, the United States did commit troops to its defense, and the data in table 6.6 show that in July 1950, a month after the United States became involved in the Korean conflict, a clear majority of the American people were willing to go to war over the defense of Formosa—which at the time must surely have seemed a likely possibility. Somewhat less enthusiasm was ex¬ pressed later in response to a 1956 item which asked: "If the Chinese Communists attack Formosa, do you think the United States should help defend Formosa, even if other countries do not join with us?" None¬ theless, over half of the respondents responded affirmatively, and only one-third negatively. Since the 1950s, however, the American people as a whole (cf. table 6.4) have been decidedly unwilling to support the use of troops to defend either South Korea or Taiwan (table A.5.17). In 1969, for example, 48 percent of the respondents in a Harris poll were willing to support the use of U.S. troops in the event there "were a danger of a Communist takeover of South Korea," and 38 percent were similarly disposed in the case of Taiwan (Formosa). By 1974, however, those will¬ ing to defend the two against attack had dropped to 15 and 17 percent, respectively, and the support level has hovered around 20 percent ever since. 13 In the case of Central and South America the available data suggest some rather dramatic shifts in attitudes toward the use of troops. At several points between 1947 and 1965 Americans indicated a willingness to come to the defense of their southern neighbors (see table 6.8). In 1965, for example, norc asked: "Suppose there is a revolution in one of the countries of South America, and it looks as though a Communist government will take over. Do you think the United States should or should not send in American troops to prevent this?" Nearly three-quar¬ ters said yes. But when confronted with a situation in El Salvador in the early 1980s that arguably fit the scenario posed a decade and a half earlier, less than one-fifth of the American people were willing to send in Amer¬ ican boys. Aid Versus Troops Historically, Americans have been especially reluctant to support rolling back the Iron Curtain. As shown in table 6.9, which reports items drawn from the period 1953-63, neither in Eastern Europe nor in Cuba has a 182 Faces of Internationalism Table 6.8 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops in Central and South America, 1947-83 (percentages) A: Suppose some country attacked one of the countries in South America. Would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending armed forces along with other American countries to stop the attack? (NORC) B: Suppose some big country attacks a South American nation. Would you approve or disapprove of the United States using its armed forces to help stop the attack? (NORC) C: How about South America—Would you approve or disapprove of the United States using its armed forces to help stop any attack on a country in South America? (NORC) D: Suppose some country in South or Central America does set up a Communist government. Would vou favor trying to get them out, even if we have to use armed force? (NORC) E: Suppose there is a revolution in one of the countries of South America, and it looks as though a Communist government will take over. Do you think the United States should or should not send in American troops to prevent this? (NORC) F: And would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending troops to fight in El Salvador? [Followed "If the El Salvadoran government cannot defeat the rebels, do you think the United States will eventually send American soldiers to fight in El Salvador or not?"] (ABC News) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ qualified/ no opinion 6/47 A 72 12 16 4/49 B 62 19 19 9/49 C 50 30 20 6/54 D 65 26 9 6/65 E 73 19 8 3/82 F 18 79 4 5/83 F 14 80 6 majority of the American people supported efforts to topple Soviet-sup¬ ported regimes. Little had changed by the 1980s. In late 1980 (the Carter administration) and again in early 1981 (the Reagan administration), Har¬ ris asked what the United States should do in the event of a Russian invasion of Poland designed to cope with worker unrest there. The dip¬ lomatic option was the overwhelming favorite, with support for eco¬ nomic sanctions close behind (see table 6.10). Unambiguously the most unpopular tactics were "threatening to go to war with Russia if they don't get out of Poland" and "going to war to liberate Poland from Rus¬ sian Communist control." Consensus in Popular Opinion? 183 Table 6.9 Attitudes Toward Eastern Europe and Cuba, 1953-63 (percentages) A: As you probably know, a number of countries of Eastern Europe, like Poland and Czechoslovakia, have been under Russian control in the last few years. Do you think our government should do anything at the present time to try to free these countries from Communist rule? (NORC) B: Some people say that the United States should send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro. Do you agree or disagree? (Gallup) C: If the Russians do not remove their troops from Cuba, do you think we should invade Cuba with American troops or not? (Harris) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ not sure/ no opinion 6/53 A 30 58 12 6/55 A 40 52 8 11/55 A 35 55 10 6/61 B 24 65 11 9/62 B 24 63 13 2/63 B 20 64 16 11/63 C 32 44 24 Using military aid to cope with the Polish situation ranked high on the list of policy options preferred by Americans. In the abstract, how¬ ever, neither military aid nor sales has enjoyed strong support as a policy instrument in recent years. As noted in chapter 3, in each of the Chicago Council surveys since 1974 respondents were asked whether they fa¬ vored or opposed giving military aid to other nations or selling equipment to them. The response to the former question ranged between 23 percent (1974) to 33 percent (1986), and to the latter from 34 percent (1978) to 39 percent (1982) (table A.5.20). 14 However, when asked in a context where aid becomes a tradeoff for the use of troops, aid is clearly the preferred instrument of policy. Consider, for example, responses to the Gallup items shown in table 6.11, in which respondents were asked their choices about how to deal with attacks by Communist-backed forces against sev¬ eral different nations-—send troops, send supplies, or refuse to get in¬ volved. In few situations is one option preferred by a majority over the others (using troops is the majority preference in one case and refusing to get involved in four), but aid is preferred over the use of troops in nineteen of the twenty-four situations posed. 184 Faces of Internationalism Table 6.10 Attitudes Toward A Soviet Invasion of Poland, 1980-81 (percentages) 1980: The Russians have 750,000 troops near the Polish border. It is possible that they will go into Poland to repress the labor unrest, as they went into Czechoslovakia in 1968. The U.S. and Western European leaders have warned Russia not to invade Poland. There is a well-trained Polish army and air force of 350,000 that might resist a Soviet invasion. If Russia sends troops into Poland would you favor or oppose . . . 1981: If the Russians invade Poland militarily to put down w'orker and farmer unrest, would you favor or oppose . . . Date Favor Oppose Not sure Getting the United Nations General Assembly to condemn Russian aggression 12/80 87 10 3 The U.S. and its allies in Western 12/80 80 17 3 Europe ending all trade with the Soviet Union 2/81 75 19 6 The U.S. and its allies sending in 12/80 66 30 4 money and military supplies to help the Polish workers and militia to resist the Russian invasion 2/81 53 42 6 The U.S. refusing to discuss any further arms control agreements with the Russians 12/80 63 34 3 The U.S. staying out of a conflict that is between two Communist countries 12/80 58 37 5 The U.S. withdrawing its 12/80 46 51 3 ambassador from Moscow and breaking diplomatic relations with the Russians 2/81 44 50 6 The U.S. threatening to go to war 12/80 28 68 4 with Russia if they don't get out of Poland 2/81 22 73 5 The U.S. going to war to liberate Poland from Russian Communist control 12/80 25 71 4 Source: Louis Harris and Associates. Consensus in Popular Opinion? 185 Table 6.11 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops, Military Aid, and Noninvolvement in Communist-Backed Conflict Situations, 1971 and 1975 (percentages) In the event a nation is attacked by Communist backed forces there are several things the U.S. can do about it. As I read the name of each country, tell me what action you would want to see us take if that nation is actually attacked—send American troops or send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved at all. Send Refuse Send supplies to get No Date troops only involved opinion Canada 4/75 59 18 14 9 Mexico 3/71 47 25 18 9 4/75 44 25 22 9 England 3/71 38 32 20 10 4/75 39 30 23 8 The Philippines 4/75 29 34 27 10 West Germany 3/71 28 41 22 9 4/75 28 33 32 8 Japan 3/71 17 35 39 10 4/75 16 36 34 8 Brazil 3/71 15 37 33 15 4/75 16 33 39 11 Israel 3/71 12 45 32 11 4/75 12 45 36 8 Thailand 3/71 11 37 38 14 4/75 9 33 48 10 Turkey 3/71 11 36 37 16 4/75 9 30 50 11 Formosa (1975: Nationalist China) 3/71 11 31 45 13 4/75 8 29 53 9 India 3/71 8 41 39 13 4/75 6 35 47 11 Yugoslavia 3/71 7 27 51 15 Saudi Arabia 4/75 7 27 55 11 Source: The Gallup Poll. 186 Faces of Internationalism The data in table 6.12 suggest an historical counterpart to the tradeoff between aid and troops summarized in table 6.11. During 1953-54, as the French were fighting to maintain their colonial empire in Indochina, the American people were presented with several options regarding the situation. When asked in May 1954 if they thought the United States should join with others to prevent a Communist takeover of Indochina (question wording A), an overwhelming majority (69 percent) said yes. When asked if "our own air force should take part in the fighting" (word¬ ing B), support dropped to the 50-60 percent range. When sending air and naval forces to help the French (wording C) was posed, support dropped to around one-third. And when "sending United States soldiers to take part in the fighting" was suggested (wording D), favorable re¬ sponses ranged from less than 10 to less than 25 percent. These responses arguably reflect Americans' retrospective judgments about the Korean War in much the same way that attitudes toward the use of force in the 1970s are hypothesized to have been influenced by the Vietnam experience. In fact, John Mueller (1971) has shown that trends in attitudes during the two wars follow similar patterns, with declining support for the wars closely correlated with the casualties suf¬ fered in each. Responses to norc questions about whether "the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea" and whether the war was "worth fighting" illustrate growing dissatisfaction with the war while it was being fought (1950-53), but show less clear-cut feelings after the war than in the case of Vietnam (table A.5.22). 15 Nonetheless, the rough similarity in the attitudinal responses of the American people to their two experiences in limited war deserves attention, for it cautions against accepting too readily that the response to Vietnam uniquely shaped Americans' attitudes toward the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs (see also Mueller, 1973). Relations with the Soviet Union Detente as a phase in the Soviet-American relationship is typically as¬ sociated with the 1970s, but the question of how to deal with the Soviet Union, and in particular how to avoid military conflict with it, has dom¬ inated American foreign policy for more than a generation. Arms control issues figure prominently on the Soviet-American agenda, and for many years the American people have supported efforts to utilize arms control Consensus in Popular Opinion? 187 Table 6.12 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Military Force in Indochina, 1953-54 (percentages) A: If other countries are willing to join with us, do you think the United States should or should not take part in the fighting, to keep the Communists from taking over all of Indochina? (NORC) B: If it looks like the Communists might take over all of Indochina, do you think our own air force should take part in the fighting? (NORC) C: Would you approve or disapprove of our sending air and naval forces, but not ground forces, to help the French? (Gallup) D: The United States is now sending war materials to help the French fight the Communists in Indochina. Would you approve or disapprove of sending United States soldiers to take part in the fighting there? (Gallup) No opinion/ Favorable Not not sure/ Date Wording response favorable don't know 5/54 A 69 23 8 5/53 B 55 35 10 9/53 B 53 34 13 4/54 B 61 31 8 5/54 C 36 52 12 5/54 C 33 55 12 6/54 C 33 56 12 8/53 D 8 86 5 2/54 D 11 82 8 5/54 D 22 69 9 5/54 D 20 72 8 6/54 D 18 72 10 to dampen Soviet-American hostility. In 1968, for example, Harris asked: "If you had to choose, would you prefer that our government put greater emphasis on building up U.S. military power or in trying to come to arms control agreements with the Russians?" Thirty percent of the re¬ spondents chose to emphasize U.S. military power, but more than twice that number—61 percent—preferred more emphasis on arms control agreements. A decade later, when the salt II treaty was being negotiated and then actively debated, the American people once more demonstrated their support for arms control. In twelve polls taken by nbc News be¬ tween 1977 and 1981 in which respondents were asked whether they 188 Faces of Internationalism favored an agreement (or a new agreement) between the United States and Russia that would limit nuclear weapons, the level of favorable re¬ sponses never fell below 60 percent and averaged nearly 70 percent (table A.5.23). Similar levels of support were registered in a series of Harris surveys taken between 1975 and 1979 in which salt was specifically mentioned (table A.5.24). Despite this long-term and apparently broad-based support for reach¬ ing accommodations with the Soviet Union, it appears not always to have been so. Between April 1948 and November 1953 norc posed the fol¬ lowing question in ten different surveys: “How do you feel about our dealings with Russia—Do you think the United States should be more willing to compromise with Russia, or is our present policy about right, or should we be even firmer than we are today?" To be even firmer was typically the choice of about three-fifths of the respondents; to compro¬ mise never enjoyed more than 10 percent support (table A.5.25). During this period strong support was also registered for going to war against Russia “with all our power, if any Communist army attacks any other country," including throughout much of the time support for the use of atomic and nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. Not until the mid- 1950s did support for the thermonuclear option fall below the 50 percent mark (table A.5.26). Furthermore, the one significant arms control pro¬ posal during this period—President Eisenhower's "open skies" proposal offered at the 1955 Geneva summit—failed to enjoy the approval of a majority of the American people. 16 Apart from the issues of war and arms control, the prospect of in¬ creasing trade with the Soviet Union, presumably as a route not simply to economic gain but also to positive political payoffs, has a long history. Interestingly, responses to a variety of different public opinion questions on this subject reveal that a majority of Americans more often than not favored enhanced commercial ties with the Soviets. For example, across nine surveys taken between 1953 and 1963 the average level of support was 51 percent. A decade later, however, support for expanding trade averaged 67 percent across some ten surveys (table A.5.28). Recognizing that question wording may account in part for these variations, none¬ theless, the overall picture is clear: There was an unambiguous step-level increase in support for increased Soviet-American trade between the 1950s and early 1960s on the one hand, and the 1970s on the other. If the changes summarized above are indicative of a broad shift in public attitudes away from confrontation with the Soviet Union and to- Consensus in Popular Opinion? 189 ward cooperation, then we would expect the changes to be reflected on other issues as well. Regrettably, the trade issue—defined broadly and abstractly—is the only one among several that have been the focus of the Soviet-American dialogue since the Nixon presidency for which there is much historical data. But what is available again raises as many ques¬ tions as it answers, even on trade issues when specific products are men¬ tioned. Consider, for example, the question of selling wheat and other grains to the Soviet Union (table A.5.29). In 1963 Harris asked whether re¬ spondents would favor or oppose selling Russia surplus wheat and other food. Fifty-four percent said they would favor such a move. Little more than a decade later, an analogous question (Do you favor or oppose an agreement to "sell wheat to Russia on a long-term basis?") elicited sup¬ port from only 29 to 32 percent of the respondents in the two surveys where it was asked. Then again, about another decade later, in the 1986 Chicago Council survey, 57 percent of the respondents approved "in¬ creasing grain sales to the Soviet Union." In many respects the trends in these data are the exact opposite from what might be expected. The suspicion is that domestic politics—particularly adverse reactions to "The Great American Grain Robbery" of 1972—soured Americans' attitudes regarding this particular element of detente. Automobiles, machinery, machine tools, computers, and advanced computers have been mentioned as possible trade items in several dif¬ ferent surveys between 1948 and 1986 (table A.5.30). If these are con¬ ceived broadly as high technology exports, as each might properly have been regarded in their appropriate historical context, then it is clear the American people have never supported trade in such goods. In 1963, 51 percent of the respondents in a Harris survey supported the idea of "sell¬ ing Russia U.S. automobiles," but this is the only instance in the eight surveys in which the foregoing items are mentioned where a majority supported the specified relationship. 17 On the other hand, space exploration seems to have become accepted as a legitimate area of Soviet-American cooperation. In 1963 only about one-third of the respondents in a Harris survey approved of the idea of "sending a man to the moon with the Russians." A decade later it was commonplace for two-thirds of the public to support joint Soviet-Amer¬ ican space ventures. Perhaps because the United States had won the race to be the first to place a person on the moon, space was no longer re¬ garded as a primary area of Cold War competition (table A.5.31). 190 Faces of Internationalism Much the same is true in the area of scientific exchanges (table A.5.32). Again using 1963 as the base point, only about one-third of the public in that year supported "exchanging engineers, physicists, and other sci¬ entists with Russia." 18 In December 1974, 64 percent supported "ex¬ changing scientists and other technical missions" with the Soviet Union. 19 Most of the data summarized here are consistent with the proposition that the American people were more willing to build bridges of accom¬ modation to the Soviet Union in the post-Vietnam era than they were before the war in Southeast Asia. 20 As with the other data examined in the preceding sections of the chapter, this conclusion is not unambig¬ uous, but clearly it makes little sense to talk about joint exploration of space with the Soviet Union—as was preferred in the 1970s—in an en¬ vironment where using nuclear weapons against Moscow in the event of a Communist attack elsewhere is widely supported—as it was in the 1950s. Neither Vietnam nor Watergate may explain that change—the growing capability of the Soviet Union to destroy the United States with nuclear weapons is a better bet—but the change in attitude is no less real. 21 Summary and Conclusions Was there ever a foreign policy consensus in American popular opinion? Was it shattered by the Vietnam experience? Generating answers to these important questions is difficult, and the historical data and analytical approach used here may be insufficiently tailored to the task. Any num¬ ber of different partisan, ideological, educational, and regional config¬ urations, for example, could produce the opinion patterns examined here. 22 Furthermore, there are other elements of the consensus that might be examined, such as attitudes toward the United Nations and other in¬ ternational organizations and toward elements of the liberal international economic order created after World War II, that may reveal patterns at variance with those unearthed here. Recognizing these caveats, the anal¬ yses nonetheless offer important insight into the domestic context of American foreign policy in the four decades following World War II. Specifically, the probe of the historical record suggests a cautious but affirmative response to both of the questions posed above: a foreign pol¬ icy consensus seems to have existed in American popular opinion prior to Vietnam, but it has since eroded. Consensus in Popular Opinion? 191 Evidence for the existence of a foreign policy consensus and for its erosion in the wake of Vietnam is clearest in the attitudes of the American people toward the threat of communism. Throughout the postwar period, the American people have regarded containing communism as an im¬ portant goal of American foreign policy, and they continued to see com¬ munism as a threat in the 1980s, just as they did in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. Nonetheless, the need to combat this threatening force is less enthusiastically embraced than earlier. An important key to understand¬ ing the changing climate of opinion lies in the choice of roughly two- thirds of the American people in the early 1950s to stop the spread of communism rather than avert war. A second key is found in the broad support for the use of economic and military aid for purposes of com¬ batting communism evident in the 1940s and 1950s. Although questions worded in the same way since then are not available, the enthusiasm for using aid as an anticommunist instrument early in the postwar years compared with the general dissatisfaction with aid of any sort in the 1970s and 1980s cannot be overlooked. 23 The inference is that commu¬ nism remains a threat, but greater disagreement now exists about the question of how to deal with it. Whether the Vietnam experience contributed to these changes is not easily determined, and the data do not point to any direct causal con¬ nection. But to many people Vietnam symbolized the bankruptcy of mil¬ itary solutions to political problems, and in this sense it doubtless con¬ tributed to growing divisiveness about how best to deal with the Communist threat. It is also true, however, that the world today is more complex and diverse than it was in the 1950s, and this fact, often pointed to by analysts concerned with the question of whether (or why) the Cold War consensus has broken (did break) down, may likewise account for the apparent lack of clarity on how best to cope with the Communist menace. As issues that once seemed black and white coalesce into shades of gray, devising appropriate responses becomes more problematic. The evidence based on mass public attitudes that best supports the view that Vietnam was a causal factor as well as watershed in American foreign policy is that regarding the use of force. It is comparatively clear that in the immediate post-Vietnam years the disposition to use force in a broad range of overseas conflict situations was severely restricted. In several instances the evidence also suggests that as the memory of Viet¬ nam recedes, the willingness of the American people to use force has grown once more. But there is a perceptible difference: public support 192 Faces of Internationalism for the use of force has not regained the same level that seems to have existed prior to Vietnam. Majority support—an admittedly timid criterion for the existence of consensus—was typically (but not universally) re¬ alized before Vietnam but more often failed to be realized once overt American military involvement in Southeast Asia began. Evidence relating to cooperation in Soviet-American relations also points toward change in the postwar years, but in this case, as noted earlier, it is difficult to relate changes in attitudes to the Vietnam experience in the same way that attitudes toward the use of force seem causally related to it. Vietnam doubtless influenced mass attitudes toward America's world role, which in turn affected Americans' views of the Soviet Union just as it affected attitudes toward the threat of communism, but the impact is less clearly identifiable and hence less dramatic than might have been expected. Even the conclusion that changes in public attitudes toward Soviet- American relations have occurred is somewhat circumstantial in that it is drawn less from what Americans approve than from what they dis¬ approve. Clearly they have registered greater support over time for in¬ creased trade with the Soviet Union, but there is no clear indication of what particular commodities or items should be exchanged in greater quantities. Instead, the evidence for change derives from the contrast in support for increased trade and greater cooperation in some spheres (for example, space) compared with the willingness of large numbers of Americans in the 1940s and 1950s to support a firmer policy toward the Soviets, including a widespread willingness to go to war with them. By the 1970s and thereafter the general climate of opinion was arguably more favorable to accommodations with the Soviets than to confrontations with them. This is not to say that the Soviets may have become either more trusted or less feared than earlier—the contrary may in fact be the case—but only that "compromise" with the Soviets seems to have re¬ placed "firmer" as the preferred approach to them. In summary, the public opinion data examined in this chapter show greater or lesser degrees of erosion in enthusiasm for the foundations on which the Cold War consensus was built, but they are less than de¬ finitive in showing that the Vietnam experience produced dramatic shifts in public attitudes. In this sense one might easily conclude that the Cold War foreign policy consensus supportive of an internationalist role cap¬ tured in the themes of globalism, containment, anticommunism, military might, and interventionism has eroded but has not entirely dissipated. Consensus in Popular Opinion? 193 The findings thus provide important but inconclusive support for both the (old) conventional wisdom, which leaves little question that a foreign policy consensus governed the Cold War years, and for the (new) con¬ ventional wisdom, which is equally compelling in asserting that the post- Vietnam era has been marked by greater levels of partisanship and ideo¬ logical dispute. 7 . Bipartisanship in Congressional-Executive Relations: Myth or Reality? Congressional behavior can in some respects be regarded as a surrogate for elite opinion, for there is evidence that executive branch officials often equate public opinion with congressional opinion (Cohen, 1973; and Powlick, 1988). The extent of bipartisanship in congressional- executive relations warrants examination in its own right, however, because bipartisanship, like consensus in popular opinion, is often deemed a casualty of the Vietnam War, and because its restoration is frequently sought by policymakers and political commentators as a way to recapture the halcyon days of the early postwar era. The centrality of bipartisanship in the thinking of American policymakers, the unto¬ ward effects of its perceived breakdown, and the critical role of Vietnam in precipitating its demise were underscored by President Bush in his inaugural address in January 1989: We need a new engagement . . . between the Executive and the Congress. . . . There's grown a certain divisiveness. . . . And our great parties have too often been far apart and untrusting of each other. It's been this way since Vietnam. That war cleaves us still. ... A new breeze is blowing—and the old bipartisanship must be made new again. I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake (1984) describe the rise and subsequent demise of bipartisanship cogently. “Congress-based isolationists who had fought against Roosevelt's cautious internation¬ alism were gone or discredited by the early 1950s," they write. “The Democratic party had emerged from the war overwhelmingly interna¬ tionalist. Republicans were more divided, but the famous Vandenberg transformation had established a basis for cooperation at least on Europe when, as Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, Vandenberg brought critically needed support to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and nato." Thereafter “politicians would squabble on the second- order issues but rally round the President's flag in East-West confrontations 194 Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 195 There were Congressional leaders with whom Presidents and Secretaries of State could deal. And the belief that there ought to be bipartisanship helped to curb or isolate extreme critics” (1984: 60-61). "Vietnam changed all this," they continue. As the war began to es¬ calate in 1965, more young Americans were drafted and sent to fight abroad, and the war itself became a daily feature on the evening news. As a result. President Johnson "was forced to wrestle with a knottier political problem at home than had faced any of his predecessors. . . . Before, peace could be promised through containment. If we could avoid the mistakes of Munich, . . . then aggression could be deterred and peace maintained. Now, for more and more Americans, Vietnam seemed to show that global containment meant war, not peace. The conceptual basis of American foreign policy was now shaken, and the politics of foreign policy became far more complicated" (1984: 61). Does bipartisanship accurately describe the nature of congressional- executive relations in the first two decades of the postwar era, as Destler, Gelb, and Lake (among others) argue? Was bipartisanship itself a casualty of Vietnam? And has partisan and ideological dispute emerged in its place as the dominant factor coloring relations between Congress and the president on foreign policy matters? These are the principal questions addressed in this chapter, which focuses on congressional-executive re¬ lations as reflected in congressional voting behavior on foreign policy issues in the four decades from 1947 through 1986. Bipartisanship in Congressional-Executive Relations Anticommunism was a key element of the Cold War foreign policy con¬ sensus about the role of the United States in world affairs following World War II, and bipartisanship was a primary mechanism enabling Congress and the president to work together in pursuit of common objectives, even while they may from time to time have disagreed about particulars. Bipartisanship, from this perspective, is primarily a process that entails two elements: (1) "unity in foreign affairs," which means "policy sup¬ ported by majorities within each political party," and (2) a set of "prac¬ tices and procedures designed to bring about the desired unity" (Crabb, 1957: 5). Nearly four decades ago Robert A. Dahl (1950: 228) identified "support of certain policies in Congress by both parties" as one of the key practices associated with a bipartisan foreign policy. 1 He examined the voting pat- 196 Faces of Internationalism terns of Democrats and Republicans on several key bipartisan proposals related to the emerging design of postwar American foreign policy— such as the United Nations and its related agencies, and aid to Greece, Turkey, and Western Europe generally—and concluded from evidence showing that "between 1945 and 1948 on the eleven major bipartisan issues in the House, nearly eighty-four percent of the votes cast favored the bipartisan stand; and on the fifteen major bipartisan issues in the Senate the figure was almost identical" that "the record of bipartisan voting since 1945 is an excellent one" (1950: 228). Some years later, Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau again looked at congressional voting behavior to probe the question of whether a sub¬ stantial foreign policy consensus existed during the two decades follow¬ ing World War II. Citing the overwhelming support given by the House and Senate to several issues related to fundamental aspects of America's world role from 1945 to 1964—the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, nato, the mutual defense pact with Korea, the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution—Holsti and Rosenau (1984: 218) concluded that congressional voting behavior in these instances strongly supports the proposition that a consensus did indeed exist. 2 It is reasonable to describe that consensus as bipartisan. Aaron Wildavsky's (1966) classic essay on the two presidencies also drew attention to the close cooperation between the president and Con¬ gress on foreign policy matters prior to Vietnam. Drawing on the Congressional Quarterly's annual "presidential boxscore," in which it recorded congressional action on presidential proposals, Wildavsky (1966: 8) concluded from data for 1948 through 1964 that "presidents prevail about 70 percent of the time in defense and foreign policy, compared with 40 percent in the domestic sphere." He went on to suggest that the absence of distinct partisan alternatives for dealing with world affairs and an unwillingness in Congress to compete with the president to de¬ termine the nation's foreign policy were among the factors explaining differences between foreign and domestic affairs. "The President's nor¬ mal problem with domestic policy is to get congressional support for the programs he prefers," he wrote (Wildavsky, 1966: 7). "In foreign affairs, in contrast, he can almost always get support for policies that he believes will protect the nation." There is no disputing the conclusions reached by Dahl, Holsti and Rosenau, and Wildavsky given the data they examined, but there is rea- Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 197 son to wonder whether a more thoroughgoing examination of the record of congressional voting across the broad sweep of foreign policy issues members of the House and Senate inevitably face would yield equally clear-cut conclusions. Such an approach will go beyond the "hurrah” issues of the pre-Vietnam period analyzed by others, on which bipartisan unity might be expected to be greatest, and also beyond the most visible issues relating to the shape of the U.S. role in the post-Vietnam era ex¬ amined by still others, which arguably can be expected to be particularly divisive. In addition, what might be called the "Vietnam casualty" prop¬ osition, which asserts that foreign policy issues have been subjected to greater partisan and ideological dispute since the Vietnam War than be¬ fore it, requires an examination of the entire post-World War II era if an accurate assessment of the effects of Vietnam is to be made. 3 Finally, there is also reason to wonder whether a more complete examination of the Truman record than has been undertaken heretofore would dem¬ onstrate that the Korean War had an impact on congressional-executive relations similar to that attributed to the Vietnam War. The survey data examined in the previous chapter demonstrate at least some parallel in the public's response to the nation's two limited war experiences. Might the same also hold for congressional-executive relations? Empirical Measures of Congressional-Executive Bipartisanship Since the totality of foreign policy issues germane to the president's con¬ duct of foreign policy voted on by Congress is the concern here, and not simply a selected number presumed to represent the primary themes in postwar American foreign policy, the reference point against which the voting behavior of Republicans and Democrats is assessed consists of all of the recorded votes in Congress on foreign policy issues where the president took a stand. This articulates what Dahl and Holsti and Ro- senau implicitly did in their analyses, since they looked only at congres¬ sional votes on issues that were prominent on the foreign policy agendas of the respective administrations in power at the time. Throughout, for¬ eign policy issues were defined broadly to include relations with other countries, national security, internal security, foreign aid and trade, and immigration, including authorizations and appropriations related to them. In all, some 2,250 foreign policy votes are included in the subsequent analyses. 198 Faces of Internationalism The president's position on these issues is taken from the reports in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the 83d through the 99th Con¬ gresses (1953-86). For the three Truman Congresses, the 80th, 81st, and 82d (1947-52), for which the Congressional Quarterly did not indicate the president's position on issues before Congress, the Congressional Quarterly's rules, as described in its annual volumes beginning in 1954, were used to determine Truman's position on foreign policy issues. 4 The Congressional Quarterly Almanac for the years 1947-52 and the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman comprised the data sources. 5 Bipartisanship is defined in two ways. First, it is defined as the per¬ centage of votes on which a majority of Democrats and a majority of Republicans agree with the president's position. The measure is closely akin to Dahl's definition of bipartisanship in Congress cited above, but with the explicit proviso that it takes into account the position of the president on each foreign policy vote. It will be referred to as the Congress Index of bipartisanship. Although the index ignores differences in intra¬ party unity once a majority threshold is reached (for example, unanimity vs. a 51M9 percent split), it does yield a straightforward measure of inter¬ party agreement with the president. Since there is no agreed upon con¬ vention for determining when bipartisanship is significant politically (and since some degree of bipartisanship presumably will exist in every Con¬ gress), it seems reasonable for comparative purposes to adopt the view that scores greater than 50 percent represent substantial bipartisan agree¬ ment. Second, bipartisanship is also defined as the percentage of agreements for each member of the House and Senate with the president's position across all foreign policy issues, 6 referred to as the Member Index. It differs from the Congress Index in that the individual member of Congress is the unit of analysis. An advantage over other measures is that it permits characteristics of congressional members themselves to be incorporated into the analysis. 7 Thus it provides a straightforward means to assess the impact of partisanship and ideology on foreign policy outcomes. Congressional Foreign Policy Voting, 1947-86 Scholarly and political commentary suggests that bipartisan voting was greatest in the early Cold War congresses, particularly during the Truman Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 199 and Eisenhower administrations, and that it declined thereafter. Based on the argument advanced by Destler, Gelb, and Lake, the years from 1965 through 1968 (the 89th and 90th Congresses) can be hypothesized to be a transition period, with bipartisanship less in evidence after that than before and partisan and ideological differences, by implication, more in evidence. 8 Bipartisaii Voting Based on the Congress Index, the historical evidence reveals that the high point of bipartisan foreign policy voting in the House occurred in the 86th (1959-60) Congress, when President Eisenhower enjoyed ma¬ jority support from both parties on four-fifths of the foreign policy issues he supported, and the low point occurred in the 99th Congress (1985- 86), when President Reagan received bipartisan support on only one of every seven issues he supported. In the Senate, where one would expect bipartisan support to be greater due to the traditionally stronger foreign policy role played by the upper chamber, the Congress Index peaked at 75 percent in the 80th Congress (1947-48), and it reached its low point in the 95th (1977-78) Congress, when President Carter received bipar¬ tisan support just over one-quarter of the time. 9 In all, presidents received majority support from both parties on a majority of votes that they sup¬ ported in about two-fifths of the congresses in the House and three-fifths in the Senate. 10 In both chambers five of these occurred during the Tru¬ man and Eisenhower presidencies. Figure 7.1 summarizes the experience of each of the presidents (the data by both administration and Congress are reported in appendix 6, table A.6.1). 11 Figure 7.1 suggests that the overall trend is toward less bipartisan voting, but it should be noted that within this temporal pattern wide variations are also sometimes evident. Truman's experience is especially notable. 12 He received bipartisan support for his foreign policy positions roughly two-thirds of the time in both chambers during the 80th Con¬ gress—which was Republican—but his level of bipartisan support plum¬ meted to about one-third in the two subsequent congresses controlled by Democrats. Partisan differences over Truman's Asian policies may account for these dramatic shifts. Despite strong congressional support for the containment of communism in Europe, Truman's application of the principle in the Far East came to be bitterly opposed (for being too soft) by Republican members of Congress. Symbolic is the position of 200 Faces of Internationalism Figure 7.1 Bipartisan Foreign Policy Voting in the House and Senate, by Administration, 1947-86 (percentages) 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Note: each bar represents the proportion of foreign policy votes on which the majority of both parties supported the president's position. Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration Arthur H. Vandenberg, the Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee whose conversion from isolationism to interna¬ tionalism contributed so much to the emergence of an internationalist foreign policy following World War II. Vandenberg backed Truman on Europe; but he attacked Truman on Asia. The impact of the Korean War on the pattern of foreign policy voting provides some insight into this dynamic. In the Senate, Truman received bipartisan foreign policy support 45 percent of the time prior to the North Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950, but following the attack, the proportion dropped to only 29 percent. Interestingly, however, the reverse occurred in the House, where Truman experienced an increase in support of nearly 20 percentage points, as the Congress Index moved from 24 to 53 percent. The apparent anomaly arises from the fact that Truman lost significant support among members of his own party, but he actually gained some among Republican members of the House. Dur¬ ing the 82d Congress, however, the patterns in the House looked much Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 201 like those in the previous Senate. Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of his Korean command on April 11, 1951. The House took twenty-two recorded votes on foreign policy issues after that date. Tru¬ man's success rate on them, as measured by the Congress Index, was only 32 percent. The absence of a majority among Republicans for the president's position was responsible for the failure of bipartisan support on three-fifths of the remaining foreign policy votes. Thus the overall pattern demonstrates that Korea had an immediate and profound effect on Truman's relations with Congress. Did Vietnam have a similar impact? The average level of bipartisan voting among the pre-Vietnam presidents (Truman through Kennedy) was 53 percent in the House and 59 percent in the Senate, compared with 32 percent and 49 percent in the respective chambers among the post-Vietnam presidents (Johnson through Reagan). The division be¬ tween Kennedy and Johnson conforms roughly to the 1965-68 period postulated by Destler, Gelb, and Lake as one of change, and the data suggest that a transition from a bipartisan to a more political environment may have occurred. The hypothesized impact of Vietnam on this apparent transition can be assessed systematically using one-way anova tests or an interrupted time series design. The latter is appropriate for the House, where the temporal changes depicted in figure 7.1 are statistically significant (the average decline in the Congress Index per administration is 4.9 percent); the former is appropriate for the Senate, where the changes do not man¬ ifest a significant linear decline. Interestingly, however, in neither the House nor the Senate are the differences in the pre- and post-Vietnam administrations significant statistically. 13 Change may have occurred, but Vietnam appears not to have caused it. The test of the Vietnam effect used here is a simple one, and alternative indicators of the war and its impact can be explored. One of them, fol¬ lowing John Mueller's (1971) analysis of trends in popular support for the wars in Korea and Vietnam, is the number of casualties incurred, which measures the severity of the conflict. To determine whether the severity of the war, rather than simply its presence or absence, affected congressional-executive relations, the relationship between the number of Vietnam casualties and bipartisan voting in Congress was examined in a variety of different ways, but none was found to be significant. This is not to deny that Vietnam had an effect on congressional-executive relations, but only to suggest that its impact is not easily measurable. I 202 Faces of Internationalism will return to this point below. For the moment, however, one message is clear: the Korean War had a sharply polarizing effect on executive- congressional relations during the Truman administration in a way that the Vietnam War never did for the Johnson administration. Why Korea and Vietnam should produce such different consequences is not entirely clear, for both were Asian policy areas where the consensus about containment was seemingly limited. 14 What appears to have dis¬ tinguished Korea from Vietnam is that partisan differences over the con¬ duct of the war and its political objectives, brought to a head when Tru¬ man fired MacArthur, were especially pronounced (see Spanier, 1965). This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the polarizing effect of Korea first evident in the 81st Congress and repeated again in the 82d did not carry over into the first Congress of the Eisenhower adminis¬ tration, the 83d, which, unlike its two predecessors, was a Republican Congress sitting with a Republican president. Eisenhower's campaign pledge to visit Korea and seek a peace agreement doubtless contributed to defusing partisan differences over the war. Partisan Voting Advocates of bipartisanship in American foreign policy often seem mo¬ tivated by an urge to restore the domestic political environment of the early postwar era, when the internationalist consensus in popular and elite opinion supported active U.S. involvement in world affairs and bi¬ partisanship in congressional-executive relations laid the basis for the principles of the containment foreign policy that would be pursued for decades to come. Aside from the untoward policy consequences that resulted from consensus and bipartisanship—the Vietnam War is the preeminent case in point—what is also evident is that partisanship and bipartisanship coexisted simultaneously. The empirical question, then, is whether partisanship has grown markedly stronger in the post-Viet¬ nam era. We can begin to answer the question by mapping variations in the partisan gap —the difference between the two parties' level of sup¬ port for the president (see Edwards, 1985)—to determine whether it has widened through time, and, if so, whether that growth is related sys¬ tematically to Vietnam. Figure 7.2 shows for each administration the average Member Index for the president's party and the opposition party in each congressional chamber. (The data appear in appendix 6, table A.6.2, which also reports Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 203 House 90 |- 1 80 - Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration Senate 90 — 80 - Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration Overall iBH President's party Opposition party Note: each bar represents for each party the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. The overall line measures the average level of support for the president in the House and the Senate, regardless of party. Figure 7.2 The Partisan Gap in the House and Senate, by Administration 1947-86 (percentages) 204 Faces of Internationalism the Member Index by Congress.) The figure highlights the significant partisan gap that has existed throughout virtually the entire postwar era. Members of the president's party in the House provided support that averaged 66 percent on foreign policy issues while members of the op¬ position party provided support that averaged only 43 percent, thus yielding an average partisan gap of more than 20 percent. Only the Ei¬ senhower administration enjoyed a partisan gap that was markedly less. In the Senate the average level of support is higher among both the presidents' party members (73 percent) and the oppositions' (54 percent), but the partisan gap is again nearly 20 percent, and only two adminis¬ trations, Eisenhower's and Johnson's, enjoyed a noticeably lower level. 15 Thus congressional voting on foreign policy issues has always been a more partisan phenomenon than suggested by the concept of biparti¬ sanship. Even though partisanship has always characterized foreign policy vot¬ ing by Congress, has it been more marked since Vietnam, as argued by the proposition that bipartisanship was a Vietnam casualty? There is some hint, depending on the points used for comparison, that the gap may have grown over time and that the war may have had some discernible impact on the trends, but the war was not a measurably significant factor in accounting for differences in voting patterns in the pre- and post-Vietnam periods (again using Kennedy and Johnson to demarcate them). In the House, for instance, the partisan gaps averaged 19 percent before Vietnam and 25 percent after it, while in the Senate they averaged 18 and 20 percent, respectively. In neither case are the differences significant statistically. 16 Thus the historical record once again fails to support the view that the Vietnam War caused a pronounced change in the nature of congressional voting on foreign policy issues. It is important to emphasize that this conclusion does not prove in any definitive sense that Vietnam did not contribute to an erosion of bipartisanship and perhaps a rise in partisan differences, only that its effects are indistinguishable from others. Noteworthy in this respect is that the Congress-by-Congress data suggest that breakpoints in congres¬ sional-executive relations occurred not with the Johnson administration but later, with the Nixon and Ford administrations. In this sense Wa¬ tergate may more easily be identified as the immediate causal factor, even though the background to the affair was lodged in the antiwar sentiment Nixon had determined to eliminate, while the affair itself contributed to the continuing foreign policy debate that Vietnam had set in motion. As Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 205 Leslie H. Gelb and Anthony Lake (1973: 177) observed nearly a year before Nixon's forced resignation in 1974, "Watergate . . . widened the fissures which the Vietnam War opened within the foreign policy es¬ tablishment. . . . It . . . raised in bold type the biggest foreign policy is¬ sue of them all—what is 'national security'? . . . It . . . thrust into sharp relief the new diplomacy of the Nixon Administration whereby old ene¬ mies have become the President's new domestic allies. . . . [And it] has shown signs of breaking the President's stranglehold over the Congress on national security matters." At the same time the congressional-ex¬ ecutive tug of war over Vietnam spurred Congress to undertake reforms whose effect was to loosen leadership control of congressional policy¬ making, especially in the House (see Smith and Deering, 1984), and many of those newly elected to Congress in the immediate aftermath of Viet¬ nam—particularly the House members of the so-called "class of '74"— adopted different attitudes toward foreign policy issues compared with their predecessors (Schneider, 1989). Vietnam is appropriately viewed as a causal as well as coincidental agent underlying these changes, even though its separate effects remain elusive. Ideological Voting A central tenet of the Vietnam casualty proposition is that the war in Southeast Asia contributed to growing partisan and ideological dispute about the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs as well as about specific foreign policy issues. The preceding analyses offer only limited support for the view that partisanship in congressional-executive relations was greater after Vietnam than before. Indeed, the interesting finding is that partisanship has always been a characteristic feature of congressional foreign policy voting, just as it has been on domestic issues. What about ideology? If partisanship in foreign policy voting has been more pronounced and bipartisanship less pronounced than conventional wisdom suggests, and if partisan differences have not changed signifi¬ cantly during the postwar years, does the political ideology of members of Congress provide a better explanation of their voting behavior than their partisan affiliations, much as it does on domestic policy issues? If so, has this been a consistent phenomenon, even during the height of the Cold War as well as in the post-Vietnam environment? And have the patterns of ideological support and opposition changed over time, or have they remained the same? 206 Faces of Internationalism The plausibility of an ideological explanation of congressional foreign policy voting behavior is supported by studies of several specific issues in which political ideology has consistently been shown to be a potent explanatory factor (Bernstein, 1989; Bernstein and Anthony, 1974; Fleisher, 1985; Lindsay, 1990; McCormick, 1985; McCormick and Black, 1983; Moyer, 1973; and Wayman, 1985). The question is whether this explanation holds over a wide array of issues and over an extended time span. The Member Index permits a systematic examination of the question. To assess the impact of ideology members of Congress were grouped into one of three ideological categories—conservative, moderate, lib¬ eral—on the basis of their voting record as rated by the Americans for Democratic Action (ada ). 17 Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show for each adminis¬ tration in the House and Senate the level of foreign policy support across these categories within the president's party and the opposition party. (The data by administration and Congress are reported in appendix 6, tables A.6.3 and A.6.4.) The results demonstrate that even during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations—presumably the time of wide¬ spread bipartisanship—foreign policy voting displayed a marked ideo¬ logical dimension. Liberals in both parties in the House gave strong sup¬ port to Truman's and Eisenhower's foreign policies, moderates a little less, and conservatives the least support. The pattern is the same in the Senate for the Truman administration, although Eisenhower enjoyed a greater level of support from moderates of his own party than from lib¬ erals. 18 For the Democrats in the Senate, however, the ideological pattern paralleling Truman's is again evident. Party (the president's party versus the opposition party) also makes a difference, but ideology typically makes a greater difference. Ideological divisions hold across most of the administrations from the 1960s onward, just as they do for Truman and Eisenhower. There is a difference, however, in that Republican presidents since Eisenhower have tended to enjoy their greatest support from conservatives, not liberals, as Eisenhower did. 19 The pattern is especially striking for Reagan in the House, where the gap in presidential support between conservatives and liberals is 40 percent among Republicans and 48 percent among Dem¬ ocrats. (Nixon received roughly equal levels of support in the House from conservatives and moderates in both parties, as did Ford among Re¬ publicans). Using the Eisenhower administration as the historical bench¬ mark, the changing patterns of foreign policy voting described here sug¬ gest a realignment of partisan attachments and ideological predispositions Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 207 President’s Party 90 Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration Opposition Party Administration ‘ Overall Conservatives 1.1 Moderates \ . Liberals Note: each bar represents for each ideological group the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. The overall line measures the average level of support for the president in each party, regardless of ideology. Figure 7.3 Partisanship and Ideology in the House, by Administration 1947-86 (percentages) 208 Faces of Internationalism President’s Party Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration Opposition Party 90 Truman Eisenhower Kennedy Johnson Nixon Ford Carter Reagan Administration — Overall Conservatives I I Moderates . Liberals Note: each bar represents for each ideological group the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. The overall line measures the average level of support for the president in each party, regardless of ideology- Figure 7.4 Partisanship and Ideology in the Senate, by Administration 1947-86 (percentages) Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 209 since the 1970s in such a way that they now reinforce once another. Republicans appear to have become the conservative party in foreign as well as domestic policy, and Democrats the liberal party (see also chapter 2 ). The comparative effects of partisanship and ideology on foreign policy voting can be determined more precisely using multivariate analysis-of- variance procedures with the Member Index as the dependent variable and party and ideology as the predictors. The results, summarized in table 7.1, demonstrate that ideology is statistically significant for every administration in both chambers, and party is significant in all but the House and Senate for the Kennedy administration. 20 The interaction of party and ideology, on the other hand, is significant only about half of the time. 21 Thus partisanship and ideology contribute independently to an explanation of congressional foreign policy voting. Moreover, their contributions are temporally invariant, thus eroding further the Vietnam casualty proposition, which says that partisan and ideological dispute have been greater since Vietnam than before. The results also demonstrate that the comparative impact of ideology is greater than partisanship. This can be determined from the beta coef¬ ficients (standardized regression coefficients), which are almost uni¬ formly greater for ideology than partisanship. The single exception oc¬ curs in the House during the Ford administration, when the beta for party is somewhat larger than the beta for ideology. 22 Thus ideology rivals both partisanship and bipartisanship as a description and explanation of congressional foreign policy voting behavior since World War II. At the same time the anova results reaffirm that a realignment has occurred in the pattern of foreign policy support given Republican presidents since Eisenhower. Conservatives are now the strongest supporters of Repub¬ lican presidents, compared with moderates and liberals earlier. Summary and Conclusions Three questions were posed at the outset of this chapter: Does biparti¬ sanship describe the nature of congressional-executive relations during the first two decades of the postwar era? Was it a casualty of Vietnam? And has it been replaced by partisan and ideological dispute? 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Using the criterion of majority support for the positions of the pres¬ ident on foreign policy issues facing members of Congress, compara¬ tively high levels of bipartisanship have been shown to have generally existed in the immediate postwar years, but they have declined sub¬ stantially since then. Furthermore, the level of bipartisanship over the past forty years has almost always been higher in the Senate than in the House, and the degree of decline in bipartisanship has been greater in the House than in the Senate. Although these changes are consistent with the Vietnam casualty hypothesis, systematic tests of the impact of the Vietnam War do not support the often-claimed hypothesis that the war, by itself, was a watershed in postwar American foreign policy that produced a significant change in the level of bipartisanship between the Congress and the executive. While some substantive differences between the pre- and post-Vietnam periods are evident, they are not large enough to support the contention that Vietnam was singularly responsible for them. As an aside to the Vietnam question, the results for the Truman admin¬ istration suggest some parallels in congressional-executive relations im¬ mediately after the onset of Korea and after Vietnam, but the effects of Korea are more easily identifiable and of much greater intensity, albeit of seemingly shorter duration, than those that might be attributed to Vietnam. In effect, Korea appears to have produced a more pronounced short-run erosion of bipartisanship than did the Vietnam War. Turning to partisanship and ideology, an important finding is that partisan differences on foreign policy issues have been quite marked across the entire postwar era. Although an increase in partisan divisions in recent years is to be expected, what is surprising is that the partisan gap existed during the height of bipartisanship as well. While these pat¬ terns are not logically incompatible (since partisan divisions can still exist even when a majority of the members of the two political parties agree with the president), the underlying assumption implicit among those who use the concept seems to be that if bipartisanship exists, partisanship does not. On balance, then, the findings are consistent with Destler, Gelb, and Lake's description of the Cold War years as a period fraught with partisan divisions over specific policies in Congress, even though bipartisanship was widespread. Ideology has also provided continuity in foreign policy voting during Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 213 the height of the Cold War and beyond. Liberals, conservatives, and moderates within both parties tend to vote similarly on foreign policy issues, regardless of the president in power. While party ties enhance the level of support for the president, ideology clearly has been more important throughout the postwar era. Increasingly, however, who occupies the White House affects the ideological component of congressional-executive relations. Prior to the Nixon administration, liberals typically provided presidents their great¬ est foreign policy support, regardless of the party in power, and con¬ servatives the least. Beginning with Nixon, however, conservatives have generally provided the greatest support to Republican presidents and liberals the greatest support to Democratic presidents (that is. Carter). Congressional voting behavior insofar as it supports active U.S. involve¬ ment in world affairs is thus consistent with a description of the Re¬ publicans as the party of conservative internationalism and the Demo¬ crats as the party of liberal internationalism. Little wonder that foreign policy has seemingly become the subject of greater partisan and ideo¬ logical dispute and bipartisanship a more elusive goal—all the more so in a domestic environment where internationalism now wears two faces. 8 . Faces of Internationalism: Retrospect and Prospect The belief that politics ought to stop at the water's edge has long been part of the nation's cherished political mythology, but for two decades or more partisan and ideological dispute have dominated the domestic political environment that shapes and sustains the nation's role in world affairs. In the years following World War II isolationism gave way to internationalism as the dominant philosophy undergirding American foreign policy. Internationalism implied conflict as well as cooperation with other nations. The United States sought cooperation with other nations but would resort to intervention, including force, if necessary. The arrows and olive branch in the eagle's talons provide a fitting symbol of the duality of internationalism. As isolationism gradually, sometimes fitfully, gave way, a fundamental consensus emerged about the nation's world role that came to be reflected in the themes of globalism, anticommunism, containment, military might, and interven¬ tionism. Domestic discord was often evident, to be sure, but the foreign policy consensus muted differences at home as the nation pursued its mission abroad. In some ways the foregoing is more a caricature than a description of the domestic context of American foreign policy following World War II, but it provides a useful backdrop for understanding the domestic contention about foreign policy that has become so commonplace in the decades following the intervention in and subsequent withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam. The analyses in the previous chapters provide considerable insight into the shape of that contention since the mid-1970s. It does less well in illuminating the shape of consensus prior to Vietnam, which perhaps reflects both the simplicity of the caricature and the murkiness of the reality- 214 Retrospect and Prospect 215 A Recapitulation The principal finding of the study is that the American people, both the mass public and leadership segments, are divided not only over whether the United States ought be involved in world affairs but also how. They have been divided since the Vietnam War, if not before. Internationalism now wears two faces, a cooperative face and a militant one, as the arrows and the olive branch around which Americans were once united now divide them. Attitudes toward communism, the Soviet Union, and the use of American troops abroad consistently distinguish proponents and opponents of the alternative forms of international involvement. More¬ over, the divisions have proven to be remarkably stable over diverse circumstances (and, for that matter, measurement strategies). Nothing seems to have been capable of shocking the public psyche into new forms of thinking in the same way that the trauma of Vietnam and related developments of the early and mid-1970s seem to have caused a break¬ down of the Cold War foreign policy consensus and a fundamental re¬ structuring of Americans' foreign policy beliefs. Several other findings extend and elaborate these. Principal among them are the following: Partisanship and ideology are both important in explaining differences in the foreign policy beliefs of the American people, but ideology is consistently more important. Accommodationists are liberals, hardliners are conservatives. The differences are evident among both nongovernmental leaders and the mass public. Education and related measures of socioeconomic status continue to be related to mass public support for active U.S. involvement in world affairs, but support is often greater for cooperative internationalism than militant internationalism among those higher on the socioeconomic ladder. Gender, age, religion, race, and region of the country are other sociodemographic factors that, taken one at a time, differentiate among the foreign policy beliefs of the mass public. Differences are most evident between men and women, the youngest and oldest age cohorts, and Jews and other religious groups on the cooperative internationalism dimension; between residents in the Eastern United States and other regions on the militant internationalism dimension; and between whites and nonwhites on both dimensions. In combination with others, education and region are the most important sociodemographic cor¬ relates of mass foreign policy beliefs. Leaders are not of one mind in their foreign policy beliefs, but the differences 216 Faces of Internationalism between and among them are better explained by political rather than occu¬ pational factors and the variant interests they imply. The occupancy of leadership roles is the most important factor distinguishing the foreign policy beliefs of elites and masses. American leaders and the mass public share in common the foreign policy beliefs implicit in cooperative and militant internationalism, but they attach different values to the prescriptions inherent in them. Leaders tend more toward ac- commodationist and internationalist values than masses, who tend more to¬ ward hardline and isolationist values. Those attentive to foreign and other public affairs support active U.S. involve¬ ment in world affairs more than other segments of the mass public, but they typically differ from leadership segments in the type of internationalism they embrace. Compared with American leaders, attentives are more likely to sup¬ port militant internationalism. Americans' foreign policy beliefs are related systematically to their foreign policy preferences. Among the mass public preferences typically fall along hawk- dove lines, whereas differences in the preferences of leaders and the mass public tend to reflect "liberal" policy postures and a greater sophistication regarding the issues posed among the former compared with the latter. Americans' foreign policy beliefs are related systematically to their evaluations of policymakers and their foreign policy performance. For the most part these evaluations reinforce popular images of the foreign policy orientations and actions of policymakers. Historical evidence focused on the threat of communism, the use of force, and cooperation with the Soviet Union supports the conventional wisdom that a foreign policy consensus in popular opinion once existed, but it is less than clear-cut in demonstrating that the Vietnam War was the causal agent in its demise. Erosion of public support for the premises of the Cold War foreign policy consensus is evident nonetheless. Evidence pointing toward the Vietnam War as a watershed in American foreign policy is clearest in public attitudes toward the use of force abroad, and the continuing impact of the war is reflected in the widespread judgment that the war was "fundamentally wrong and immoral." Differences on the question fall along the hardline-accommodationist fault and reflect sharply divergent partisan and ideological judgments. Some bipartisan voting in Congress has always existed, but its level since World War II has often been less than would be anticipated in the face of a Cold War foreign policy consensus. The level of partisanship has also been consistently high and the extent of ideological voting substantial. At the same time there is evidence that bipartisan voting has declined and that, especially since Viet¬ nam and Watergate, partisan and ideological differences on foreign policy is¬ sues have widened. They now reinforce rather than cross-cut one another. Retrospect and Prospect 217 Both the survey data and the congressional voting data point to the emergence of the Republican party as the party of conservatism in foreign as well as domestic affairs and the Democratic party as the party of liberalism. These summary statements and the more detailed conclusions that have been drawn during the course of the inquiry provide insight into the nature of the domestic discord that has surrounded American foreign policy in the recent past and reaffirm the veracity of the observation that American foreign policy since Vietnam has become the object of partisan and ideological dispute. Unanswered Questions Two important theoretical questions that have been touched on in the course of the inquiry deserve additional scrutiny, even if they cannot be answered with certainty. First, what is the relationship between the for¬ eign policy beliefs of elites and masses? Second, what is the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy? Elites and Masses The persistence of highly structured mass foreign policy beliefs is an important finding that raises interesting questions about the process of opinion formation and transmission. Elite theory builds on the premise that masses are largely uninterested in and ill informed about foreign policy matters. This does not necessarily mean that members of the mass public are incapable of holding opinions, but it does make those opinions suspect. Minimally, it means that the mass public cannot be expected to hold coherent world views, that is, it cannot hold "constrained” or "con¬ sistent" foreign policy beliefs. The combination of ignorance, lack of in¬ terest, and incoherence makes mass opinion acquiescent, and hence sub¬ ject to manipulation by policymakers and other elites. The final product is a model of the opinion-policy linkage that sees the former as flowing from the latter. It is difficult to argue with this conclusion in its abstract form. The alternative formulation—that policy springs from the preferences of an informed and attentive public—faces so many falsifying cases that it can¬ not be accepted. For most Americans most of the time, the foreign policy choices faced by political leaders deal with matters remote from their 218 Faces of Internationalism daily lives. It is reasonable and logical that the resulting opinion-policy nexus is one where decisionmakers decide and the public responds. But the mass public does not have to respond ignorantly or inconsistently. The evidence in this study demonstrates that it does not. On the contrary, the mass of the American people has been shown in the aggregate to hold quite coherent foreign policy beliefs. By itself this finding challenges a key premise underlying the elitist perspective on foreign policymaking. Attitudes and their more fundamental underlying beliefs, once formed, are resistant to change, which presents elites with a formidable task should they seek to mold mass political attitudes as their own interests and interpretations change. How, then, do elites respond? There is at least some evidence to suggest they respond in very traditional, pluralist ways. Sanders's (1983) study of the Committee on the Present Danger, for ex¬ ample, focuses on the way the organization utilized linkages with interest groups, with Congress, and with the mass media to capitalize on what Sanders perceives to have been the growing patriotism of the mass public in the aftermath of Vietnam to sell a doctrine and ideology consistent with containment militarism immediately prior to and during the Carter presidency. Substantively, Sanders's case study suggests that conservative ele¬ ments in the American polity are able to capitalize on the fear of Soviet communism to engender domestic political support for an interventionist foreign policy sustained by high levels of military spending. Concep¬ tually, it suggests that the synergistic effects of internal and external stimuli involved in the formation and perpetuation of foreign policy be¬ liefs may constrain the role that elites play in shaping those beliefs. Com¬ bined with the fact that elites and masses share many values, beliefs, and perceptions of the external environment and the place of the United States within it, the role that elites play in shaping other Americans' foreign policy attitudes and beliefs appears less clear-cut than elite theory otherwise suggests. Noteworthy in this context is that the results of the foregoing analyses demonstrate that elites have consistently subscribed to the premises of cooperative internationalism in greater proportions than members of the mass public, who distribute themselves more equally among accom- modationist, hardline, internationalist, and isolationist values. Further¬ more, the attentive public, which theory suggests should hold more elite¬ like attitudes than other segments of the mass public, has also been shown to be out of step with leaders' preferences during much of the post- Retrospect and Prospect 219 Vietnam era. If masses are subject to manipulation by elites, how should these persistent disjunctures in the relative priorities of elites and masses be explained? The answer seems to be that elite theory is flawed. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Most foreign policy analysts schooled in the logic of realpolitik regard public opinion as largely irrelevant to the choices that foreign policy¬ makers face. From the perspective of political realists it is only the dis¬ tribution of capabilities at the international level that explains states' for¬ eign policy behavior. Attributes of the system, not attributes of the actors making it up, determine state behavior. Moreover, the constraining ef¬ fects of the realities of international politics are such that all states behave in similar ways, which implies that the vagaries of domestic politics are largely irrelevant. The logic of political realism is often compelling, but as a theory of international politics it deals poorly with the forces propelling change in the world because it ignores the dynamism of systemic transformation that often resides in the attributes of the actors, not the system. Tech¬ nological change is one of them. Public opinion, at least in democratic states, is arguably another. How the process that links opinion and policy actually works has eluded scholarship, as have the linkages between microbehavior at the level of individuals in society and the unit behavior of states at the macro level. But face validity supports the proposition that the linkages exist. It is difficult to explain much of the foreign policy behavior of the United States during the mid- to late 1970s, for example, without some sense of the constraining forces of the Vietnam syndrome that the Ford and Carter administrations must surely have perceived. In one sense it may be reassuring to think that public opinion, at least mass public opinion, is largely irrelevant as a determinant of state be¬ havior, as the "profiles in courage" image of political leadership lauds the notion that leaders act out of conscience, not convenience. But dem¬ ocratic theory ultimately depends on the responsiveness of political lead¬ ers to the public will, however ill informed and fickle it may seem to be. An important finding of this study is that the American people are not fickle; they may be ill informed, but they are still capable of holding coherent, stable beliefs about the role of the United States in world affairs. But even putting that aside, it is so self-evident that public opinion mat¬ ters to policymakers, especially so in an age of increasingly sophisticated 220 Faces of Internationalism electronic media, that to argue otherwise is silly. The important question is not whether public opinion matters, but how it comes to impact on the process of policymaking. Even those who pose the question in these terms often search for answers in the wrong places. Did the secretary of state read the most recent analysis of the department's Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans before meeting with the president to discuss refinements in the latest U.S. Mideast peace proposal? Did the arms control negotiators in Geneva absorb the meaning of the latest Gallup survey on strategic and con¬ ventional arms reductions before meeting with their Soviet counterparts? Did the latest congressional vote on Central American aid really reflect the preferences of Peoria? The questions are often misspecified, if not misplaced. Public opinion polls measure the climate of public opinion. They are snapshots in time of what the public is thinking, even if someone else (the media, pollsters) determine what they ought to be thinking about. There are other ways to measure public opinion (newspaper editorials, for example, or Rotary Club luncheons). In some instances it is appropriate to inquire about attitudes toward specific issues, but an understanding of the nexus be¬ tween public opinion and foreign policy is not likely to advance very much even from a collage of snapshots motivated by such case specific, time-dependent concerns. Public opinion does matter, and it matters most as part of the mix of resources that those responsible for the foreign policy of the United States use as they seek to forge political support for their policies and programs at home and abroad. Public opinion is only part of that mix, and opinion toward foreign policy is only a portion of the public opinion recipe. But it plays out best not in terms of attitudes toward discrete, time-de¬ pendent issues but in the effects that attitudes toward foreign policy have on the overall judgments that Americans make about their leaders and their leaders' policies. The state of the economy as well as short-term political considerations also bear on these judgments, but it has been demonstrated that the foreign policy beliefs of the American people affect their judgments in important ways. Differences in their beliefs impact on their ultimate evaluations, and these in turn affect the climate of opin¬ ion in which policymakers must forge political support. A consideration of the impact of domestic discord on recent American foreign policy would thus be incomplete without a consideration of differences in the foreign Retrospect and Prospect 221 policy beliefs and preferences of the American people. Refinements must still be made before further advances in empirical theory are realized, but armed with this knowledge we can begin to forge a better under¬ standing of how public opinion affects American foreign policy, as it surely does. 9 . Epilogue: Americans Talk Security, 1987-88 During the 1987-88 presidential campaign the Americans Talk Security (ats) project conducted twelve public opinion surveys that contain a wealth of information about the attitudes and preferences of the American people toward national security issues, broadly defined. An exhaustive examination of the information in the ats surveys would inevitably carry this study in new directions, but the potential insight they offer in understanding whether the themes of the study continue to be relevant as the United States looks toward the 1990s and beyond warrants attention to them. The principal theme of this book is that the American people are divided in their views of the appropriate role of the United States in world affairs. The bifurcation of their attitudes and corresponding foreign policy beliefs turns principally on differing assessments of the threat of communism, the utility of force, and relations with the Soviet Union. Each of these elements central to the breakdown of the Cold War foreign policy consensus is addressed one way or another in the ats surveys. A related theme of the study is that domestic contention over American foreign policy has in recent decades become more partisan and ideological. The elements of those disputes play out in the rela¬ tionship between Americans' foreign policy beliefs and their partisan attachments and ideological predispositions. Replicating with the ats surveys the previous analyses so as to ascertain the nature and structure of foreign policy beliefs embedded in them would go beyond the purpose of this brief epilogue, but it is possible to ascertain whether partisanship and ideology continue to differentiate the attitudes of Americans on the principal elements underlying the two faces of internationalism. A third major theme of the study is that public opinion ultimately impacts on the nation's foreign policy through the evaluations that 222 Epilogue 223 Americans make of policymakers and their performance, and through the effects that their foreign policy beliefs have on these evaluations. Several of the ats surveys asked respondents to rate President Reagan's overall job performance as well as his foreign policy performance. Again it is not possible to relate these evaluations precisely to Americans' foreign policy beliefs, but some sense of their fit can be made. The ats data are especially valuable in this context, for they were gathered during a period of relative economic stability, with the result that the effects that economic conditions usually have on inter-temporal presi¬ dential evaluations are effectively held constant. The Threat of Communism, Soviet-American Cooperation, and the Use of Force The faces of internationalism symbolized by the arrows and the olive branch build upon and play themselves out in attitudes toward actual and hypothetical situations. They also manifest themselves in the relative priority Americans attach to potential goals of American foreign policy. The Threat of Communism One of the most important sets of items in the Chicago Council surveys used to determine Americans' foreign policy beliefs asked how threat¬ ening to the United States communism would be if it came to power in various regions or countries. In April 1988 the ats project posed some¬ what similar questions in which respondents were asked "how much a threat the presence of pro-Soviet, communist governments" would be in various regions and countries. 1 Central America, Western Europe, Southeast Asia, and Africa were the regions; and Panama, several other Central American countries, Canada, the Philippines, and France the countries. For the regions the "very serious" and "serious" responses ranged from a high of 69 percent for Central America to a low of 39 percent for Africa, and for the countries from 68 percent for Panama to 43 percent for France (see figure 9.1). Another set of questions in the Chicago Council surveys important in understanding the salience Americans attach to the Communist threat concerns the goals of American foreign policy. Marked differences in the importance of containing communism compared with other priorities are 224 Faces of Internationalism Figure 9.1 Attitudes Toward the Threat of Pro-Soviet, Communist Governments in Different Regions and Countries, 1988 (percentages) Central America Panama Nicaragua El Salvador Mexico Canada Philippines Western Europe Southeast Asia France Source: ats. National Survey no. 5, final report, May 1988: 19. evident in the ccfr surveys. They are also evident in the ats surveys. In March 1988 "combating international drug traffic" was deemed to be the most important national security goal by a plurality of Americans (22 percent). "Keeping Communist governments out of Central and South America" and "containing Soviet aggression around the world" followed in fourth (13 percent) and fifth place (12 percent), respectively (see figure 9.2). These priority rankings follow closely the security threats perceived by the American people to be most ominous (see figure 9.3). One of the striking findings of the ats project is what the American people perceive these to be. The emergence of whole new categories of threats to national security [is one of several major findings of the ats surveys]. International drug trafficking emerged as the number one threat and held that position throughout the . . . election year. Additional issues which were perceived as greater threats to U.S. national security than the traditional notions of Soviet military strength and global expansionism were: the trade deficit, the budget deficit, international terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons in the third world, acid rain, the pollution of air and water, and the greenhouse effect. (Americans Talk Security, 1989: iv) Epilogue 225 Figure 9.2 The Goals of U.S. National Security, 1988 (percentages) Combating international drug trafficking Correcting the U.S. trade imbalance Reducing U.S./USSR nuclear forces by 50 percent Keeping Communist governments out of Central and South America Containing Soviet aggression Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to the Third World Combating terrorism wmmm. 0 5 10 15 20 25 Source: ATS, National Survey no. 4, final report, April 1988: 46. Communism doubtless continues to be regarded as an important threat by many Americans, and containing potential Soviet expansion remains an important goal of American foreign policy. But the ats surveys, like the Chicago Council surveys before them, demonstrate measurable var¬ iation in the salience Americans attach to both the threat and the objective and to the related policy priorities and prescriptions they imply. The differences are important in understanding the roots and consequences of the two faces of internationalism. Relations with the Soviet Union Having said that, antagonistic, distrustful attitudes toward the Soviet Union continue to dominate the thinking of most Americans. When asked how serious a threat "Soviet aggression around the world" posed to the nation's security interests, between 17 and 22 percent responded "ex¬ tremely serious" in the half dozen times it was asked between October 1987 and October 1988, and another 30-40 percent responded "very se¬ rious" (Americans Talk Security, 1989: 95). 2 Similarly, when asked how much of a threat the Soviet Union poses to the United States, a majority responded "serious" or "very serious" in three of the four 1988 ats sur¬ veys in which it was asked. Early in the year nearly two-thirds agreed with the statement that "the Soviets lie, cheat and steal—they'll do any- 226 Faces of Internationalism Figure 9.3 Attitudes Regarding Threats to U.S. National Security, 1988 (percentages) Drug trafficking Domestic problems Nuclear proliferation to Third World Terrorism Economic competition from Japan Acid rain Greenhouse effect Soviet aggression Undermining of government Oil shortages 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 100 I Not very serious Somewhat serious HI Very serious Hill Extremely serious Source: ATS, National Survey no. 9, final report, October 1988: 40. thing to further the cause of communism." And in October 1987 nearly two-fifths agreed that "the Soviet Union is like Hitler's Germany—an evil empire trying to rule the world." Juxtaposed against these negative views and judgments is the con¬ clusion of nearly two-thirds of the public (in June 1988) that "we can get along with Communist countries." Similarly, 40 percent expressed the view (also in June) that the Soviets can be trusted more than they could ten years ago, and almost four-fifths agreed (in February 1988) that "the U.S. has to accept some of the blame that has plagued U.S.-Soviet re¬ lations in recent years." 3 Against this backdrop, how did the public respond to various pro¬ posals for improving Soviet-American relations? The answer is that it responded in different ways, depending on the issue or policy proposal. This is similar to other evidence in the historical record. In the June 1988 ats survey respondents were presented with fifteen ways in which "we could begin to cooperate with the Soviets" and asked "if you think we should proceed with that idea, or don't you trust the Soviet Union enough to do that now?" Four items received the support of more than three-quarters of the people: expanding cultural exchanges Epilogue 227 Figure 9.4 Attitudes Toward Cooperative Soviet-American Ventures, 1988 (percentages) Stopping illicit drug trade Halting environmental pollution Expanding cultural exchanges Fighting terrorism around the world Resolving Mideast conflicts Eliminating most nuclear weapons by year 2000 Selling nonmilitary technology to the Soviets An immediate 50 percent reduction in long-range nuclear arms Stopping work on SDI—as part of an arms agreement Sharing SDI as it is being developed 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 Source: ATS, National Survey no. 7, final report, July 1988: 26. between the United States and the Soviet Union, and working with the Soviets to stop illicit drug trade, halt environmental pollution, and fight terrorism. At the other end of the spectrum, four received the support of only about one-third of the respondents: "a 50 percent reduction in long-range nuclear weapons without any reduction in Soviet conven¬ tional weapons in Europe"; "a 50 percent reduction in long-range nuclear weapons even before we see how the new inf Treaty with the Soviets is working out"; selling the Soviets "nonmilitary high technology, like advanced computer equipment and software"; and stopping work on the Strategic Defense Initiative "as part of a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union." Least support among the fifteen items, with only 28 percent in favor, was registered for another sdi proposal, namely, to share the initiative with the Soviets "as it is being developed" (see figure 9.4). Clearly what differentiates attitudes at the two ends of the spectrum is a concern for national security, which doubtless reflects a legacy of distrust of the Soviet Union and a suspicion of its intentions. At the same time there is strong support for seeking negotiated agree- 228 Faces of Internationalism ments with the Soviet Union on many of these same issues. In October 1988 respondents were asked if they approved or disapproved of the positions the candidates had taken on national security issues during the course of the campaign. (Who had taken what position was not spec¬ ified.) Nine of the eighteen items referred specifically to "the Soviets/' and seven of these related in one way or another to negotiating or co¬ operating with them. The average level of "strongly approve" responses among the seven was 58 percent, with the three that specifically men¬ tioned nuclear weapons at the top of the list. When those who approve of the positions are added to those who strongly approve, it is clear that an overwhelming majority of Americans supports improved Soviet- American relations. The Use of Force Whether and under what conditions the American people will support the use of force in pursuit of foreign policy objectives has been a critical issue on the national agenda for a number of years, particularly since the Vietnam War. In a speech on "The Uses of Military Power" in late 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, drawing on the lessons of Korea and Vietnam, suggested that U.S. military forces should be committed to combat only when vital interests are at stake, when the political and military objectives are clearly defined, when the United States "has the clear intention of winning," and when the support of Congress and the American people is assured. Clearly these are difficult requirements to meet, but they seem to fit the public mood. The September 1988 ats survey asked respondents to rate the im¬ portance of different factors to be considered should they be asked to make a decision about the use of military force. Most were deemed to be very important, but a clear hierarchy also emerged, in which the loss of life (American and foreign), public and congressional support, possible Soviet or Chinese involvement, and the length of the engagement were accorded relatively greater importance. Interestingly, the cost in dollars was considered least important (see figure 9.5). Respondents were also asked to make retrospective judgments about actual American military interventions and about hypothetical circum¬ stances in which they might support the use of force or other forms of involvement. Among the former were the invasion of Grenada (1983), the bombing of Libya (1986), the naval blockade of Cuba (1962), and Epilogue 229 Figure 9.5 Considerations Related to the Use of U.S. Military Force, 1988 (percentages) 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Percent very important Source: ATS, National Survey no. 9, final report, October 1988: 27 80 90 “American participation with other United Nations members in the Ko¬ rean War." Support was most widespread for the Cuban intervention (76 percent), followed by Libya (65 percent), Korea (60 percent), and Grenada (56 percent); but in all four cases a clear majority supported U.S. actions. Resondents were also asked about the U.S. intervention as a peace¬ keeping force in Lebanon in 1982. Surprisingly, 55 percent supported the operation, despite the fact that it ended in tragedy. Earlier (chapter 5) it was argued that Grenada is the quintessential example of the type of intervention the American people will support and Lebanon the type they will oppose. The ats data do not support the distinction. The use of the term “peacekeeping force” to describe the Lebanon intervention may partially explain the absence of expected differences, but the na¬ tionalistic tendency to rally round the flag in support of political leaders, even when their decisions run amok, may also be at work. Vietnam is the final interventionist episode about which respondents were asked. Of the six, it is the only one in which a majority (65 percent) responded that “we should not have used our military the way we did." In a later survey respondents were asked specifically about the lessons of Vietnam. Two with which they agreed by very wide margins were. 230 Faces of Internationalism Figure 9.6 Attitudes Regarding the Lessons of Vietnam, 1988 (percentages) Should not send troops to defend ally that is not supported by its own people U.S. government must have support of all its people to wage war U.S. officials cannot be trusted U.S. armed forces did not get full support from political leaders Only fight to repel invasions of our country Never fight a ground war in Asia Stop TV coverage of war in the future U.S. cannot fight and win a guerilla type war 80 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 80 Strongly agree L:.U Somewhat agree 1H Somewhat disagree WsM Strongly disagree Source: ats. National Survey no. 12, final report, January 1989: 19. “We lost the Vietnam War because American political leaders did not give U.S. armed forces the full support they needed to win"; and “The Vietnam War showed that the U.S. government must have the support of all its people in order to wage a war against another country." Another with which they overwhelmingly agreed was the proposition that Viet¬ nam “showed the American people that U.S. officials who are deeply involved in conducting the war cannot be trusted to give reliable infor¬ mation to the public." At the same time a majority rejected the views that the war demonstrated that the United States cannot fight and win a guerrilla war and that it should not send troops to support an ally that does not also have the support of its own people (see figure 9.6). In all of these cases judgments about the lessons of Vietnam are more clear-cut and informative than those gleaned from the first Chicago Coun¬ cil survey in late 1974 in which analogous questions were asked. How much of that is due to the questions posed and the wording used and how much to a crystallization of attitudes over the past two decades is problematic, but it is clear the Vietnam War continues to profoundly affect Americans' foreign policy attitudes. Turning to interventionist scenarios, respondents were asked in Sep¬ tember 1988 which of four options was the strongest action the United Epilogue 231 States should take in situations where military force might be called for— stay out, use diplomatic and political pressure only "against the aggressor nation," send military aid "to the country under attack," or "send Amer¬ ican troops to assist the attacked country." The scenarios were the cross¬ ing of the border into Honduras by Nicaraguan troops to destroy Contra bases; a Soviet occupation of Poland following strikes and protests that weaken the Polish government; and the invasion of Israel by Arab forces, Taiwan by the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia by Iran, Pakistan by India, and West Berlin by Soviet and East German forces. The historical evidence examined in previous chapters demonstrates conclusively that when given a choice the American people will always prefer something short of overt military intervention. The data from the ats surveys demonstrate that that remains the case. In fact, in five of the seven scenarios, "stay out" was the option preferred by a plurality. Berlin and Poland were the two exceptions. Among the remaining options, diplomatic and political pressures were typically the most popular, and in the choice between sending supplies and sending troops the latter won out twice by only a single percentage point (18-17 percent in the cases of Saudi Arabia and Israel). In only one instance—the defense of West Berlin—was the use of troops the most popular option, but even there it was preferred by only 38 percent of the respondents (see figure 9.7). In another set of questions respondents were asked if they would support the commitment of "our military strength" to protect interests "that might be seen as important to American prosperity and security," or if they were "not worth the cost in money and lives." The prospective interests were the Panama Canal, the supply of Middle Eastern oil, the right to send ships into the Persian Gulf, "the tiny islands in the Pacific that are American possessions, but have small populations and no mil¬ itary bases," and "our military bases in countries that don't want them there." In this instance, in which military intervention is not posed as a trade-off with other options, markedly greater willingness to support the use of troops is evident. Seventy-one percent of the respondents would commit the military to the defense of the Panama Canal, 67 percent to the defense of the right to send ships into the Persian Gulf, 57 percent to the defense of American possessions in the Pacific, and 51 percent to the defense of the Middle Eastern oil supply. Only in the case of de¬ fending countries with military bases who don't want them does a clear majority of Americans feel that a military commitment exceeds the cost (see figure 9.8). The response seems as astute as it does unexceptionable. 232 Faces of Internationalism Figure 9.7 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Military Force, 1988 (percentages) USSR/GDR invade West Berlin Arabs invade Israel Nicaragua crosses into Honduras Iran invades Saudi Arabia USSR occupies Poland PRC invades Taiwan India invades Pakistan 0 10 20 30 40 Note: the choice is relative to using diplomatic and political pressure and sending military supplies and aid. Source: ats. National Survey no. 9, final report, October 1988: 21. Americans' attitudes toward the use of force were probed again in the December 1988 ats survey. This time the question was whether in different situations "we should be prepared to commit our military strength," or if the prospective use force "is not worth the cost in money and lives." Four of the scenarios first posed in September were re¬ peated—a Soviet and East German invasion of Berlin, an Iranian invasion of Saudi Arabia, an Arab invasion of Israel, and a Nicaraguan assault on Honduras—but this time diplomacy and military aid were not given as potential alternatives to military force. The responses tended to split the difference between those in the two sets of questions on the prospective use of force in the earlier survey. Berlin again emerges as the situation that would elicit greatest support for the use of military force, but it is the only one of the four scenarios to gain majority support. One final set of questions in the September 1988 survey also bearing on attitudes toward the use of force asked respondents about scenarios where nuclear weapons might be called upon. The only instance that demands the use of nuclear weapons in the eyes of the majority of Amer¬ icans is a full-scale attack on the United States itself. Other means are typically preferred in other scenarios, ranging from a Soviet nuclear at¬ tack on a German city to an attack by a Third World country on an Amer- Epilogue 233 Figure 9.8 Attitudes Toward the Commitment of Military Strength to Protect American Interests, 1988 (percentages) 80 Panama Right to sail in American Middle Eastern U.S. military Canal Persian Gulf possessions in oil bases in unfriendly Pacific nations Source: ats, National Survey no. 9, final report, October 1988: 23. Figure 9.9 Attitudes Toward the Use of U.S. Troops Abroad, 1988 (percentages) USSR/GDR invade West Berlin to make it part of the Communist bloc Iran invades Saudi Arabia to gain control of Persian Gulf oil supplies Arab forces invade Israel to establish an Arab state Nicaraguan troops cross into Honduras to destroy Contra rebel bases Send troops Mill Not worth the costs Baseline of support (see Figure 9.7) Source: ats. National Survey no. 12, final report, January 1989: 29. 234 Faces of Internationalism ican Third World ally. Thus it is clear from a variety of vantage points that the American people are generally reluctant to support the use of force. Given that, it is also clear that considerable variation exists among them in terms of what they will support and where. Partisanship and Ideology as Predictors of Foreign Policy Attitudes Politics extend beyond the water's edge. Foreign policy is now often subject to marked domestic contention, and partisanship and political ideology both provide important insight into who believes what and who supports or opposes what. That conclusion may always have been ac¬ curate to some extent, but it is demonstrably so in the years since Viet¬ nam. More importantly, although partisan and ideological differences were once cross-cutting, they are now reinforcing. The Republican party has become the party of conservative internationalism, of which militant interventionism is a key component, and the Democratic party the party of liberal internationalism, in which reluctance to support the more mil¬ itant elements of the Cold War consensus is a vibrant strain. The findings from the ats surveys generally reaffirm these bold con¬ clusions. The correlates of the questions discussed above follow pre¬ dictable patterns: Republicans and conservatives are more likely than Democrats and liberals to subscribe to the view that communism is a threat to the United States and that force is a viable instrument of policy, while Democrats and liberals are more likely to support various forms of increased Soviet-American cooperation. 4 It is also possible to assess the comparative importance of partisanship and ideology. Whereas previously the latter was shown to be more im¬ portant than the former, the ats surveys point in the opposite direction. Many of the items discussed in the preceding section can be used to create generalized attitude scales analogous to those in previous chap¬ ters, and they can be assessed using the same techniques as there to determine the relative importance of partisanship and ideology. Eight scales were created, one tapping attitudes toward the threat of com¬ munism, three tapping attitudes toward the use of force, and four tap¬ ping attitudes toward Soviet-American cooperation. 5 In the case of the threat of communism, partisanship and ideology are related systematically and predictably to Americans' foreign policy attitudes. The notable difference (compared with the results based on Epilogue 235 the Chicago Council surveys) is that party identification emerges as com¬ paratively more important than political ideology. 6 The results pertaining to the use of force and Soviet-American cooperation are somewhat more varied, however. The results based on the scale in the December 1988 survey having to do with the commitment of U.S. military strength to the defense of others find both partisanship and ideology important in the predicted ways, but the two scales from the September survey having to do with the use of troops and the trade-off between troops and other forms of involvement find only partisanship to be an important predictor. Finally, only one of the four scales on Soviet-American cooperation finds both partisanship and ideology important in the predicted directions, a second finds only ideology to be important, and neither is important in understanding Americans' attitudes on the remaining two. Nonetheless, the generalization that partisanship and ideology both continue to ex¬ plain differences in the foreign policy attitudes of the American people remains. Foreign Policy Attitudes and Evaluations of Policymakers' Performance There is no question that partisanship and ideology affect Americans' evaluations of their political leaders. In May 1988, for example, the ats project asked the familiar presidential evaluation question: “In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president?" Fifty-four percent (excluding not sures) responded affirmatively. When asked if they approved of Reagan's foreign policy performance, the respondents were split fifty-fifty. However, when par¬ tisanship and ideology are introduced into the evaluations, a radically different picture emerges. Eighty-five percent of the Republicans ap¬ proved of Reagan's overall performance compared with only 29 percent of the Democrats, and 74 percent of the Republicans approved of his foreign policy performance compared with only 32 percent of the Dem¬ ocrats (independents fall in the middle on both questions). Similarly, conservatives approved of Reagan's overall performance by a 67-36 per¬ cent split over liberals and of his foreign policy performance by a 59-38 percent split (moderates again fall in the middle). The analyses in previous chapters demonstrate that Americans' for¬ eign policy beliefs also impact on their assessments of policymakers and 236 Faces of Internationalism their performance independently of respondents' partisan preferences and ideological predispositions. It is important to emphasize the concept of beliefs in this connection, for the analyses range beyond the particular issues of the moment and the gut responses they might be expected to elicit. They point instead toward enduring values that can be expected to remain invariant across seemingly isolated yet recurrent experiences in post-World War II American foreign policy that, at least since Vietnam, have come to divide rather than unite the American people. The intersection of partisanship and ideology on the one hand, and evaluations of presidential foreign policy performance on the other, is again clearly demonstrated with data from the May 1988 ats survey, in which respondents were asked how well or poorly they felt President Reagan had handled a broad range of foreign policy issues and situations, including, for example, international drug trafficking, terrorism, arms control, and preventing Communist expansion. Although the American people tended to give the president high marks across the range of issues, differences in their evaluations followed predictable patterns in that Re¬ publicans and conservatives generally gave him higher marks than Dem¬ ocrats and liberals. Interestingly, however, when the sixteen specific items are combined to form a single evaluation-of-Reagan scale, a comparative assessment of the importance of partisanship and ideology once again indicates that, with the ats surveys, the former is relatively more im¬ portant than the latter—although both have an important impact. The foreign policy attitude scales described above are analogous to those used in previous chapters as building blocks to determine Amer¬ icans' foreign policy beliefs. Each can, therefore, be expected to be related to the evaluations that the American people made of Ronald Reagan. Unfortunately, the two surveys from which scales measuring attitudes toward Soviet-American cooperation could be created did not include questions about Reagan's job performance. In the other instances, how¬ ever, the results follow expected patterns. After controlling for the effects of party identification and political ideology, Reagan received his strong¬ est support from those who believe that communism poses a threat and that the use of force abroad should be supported. The attitudes are con¬ sistent with the principles of militant internationalism and its corre¬ sponding hardline dispositions, among whose supporters Reagan would be expected to receive his greatest applause, as he did in each of the years covered by the Chicago Council surveys. By inference, of course, it also seems reasonable that those disposed toward accommodationist Epilogue 237 values were least likely to support the president, although in the absence of additional information this cannot be known with certainty. The inference combined with what is known is especially interesting, as it suggests that the political support Reagan received during the wan¬ ing days of his presidency continued to track the tenets of militant in¬ ternationalism, despite the fact that the president himself had embarked upon a bold new course of friendship and cooperation with the Gor¬ bachev regime that stood in marked contrast to the days when he branded the Soviet Union an "evil empire." The change in orientation and its seeming lack of correspondence with public attitudes suggests that lead¬ ership in America may be in the forefront of forging new directions in American foreign policy. The interesting question—and the important one from the point of view of democratic theory—is whether they will also be able to build mass political support for their initiatives as long as the American people remain divided in their assessments of the na¬ tion's appropriate role in world affairs. Postscript Dramatic changes have taken place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu¬ rope since the ats surveys and the analyses of them were completed. Because the perceived threat of communism and relations with the Soviet Union have figured so prominently in American foreign policy for so long, the distintegration of the Soviet empire, the emergence of a Eu¬ rope no longer divided between East and West, and the diminution in the perceived security threat to the United States that these changes portend can be expected to stimulate new thinking in the American pol¬ ity. As a result, analysts may come to regard events in 1989-90 as com¬ prising the kind of dramatic development that transforms durable foreign policy beliefs into new forms. Nonetheless, there are compelling theo¬ retical and empirical reasons to expect that cooperative and militant in¬ ternationalism will continue to characterize the orientation of the Amer¬ ican people toward the nation's world role, even though the precise elements giving rise to the two faces of internationalism may change. Appendix 1 Questionnaire Items Used to Construct the Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Mass Samples, 1974—86 Table A. 1.1 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the ACTIVECOOPERATION Scales, 1974-86 Mass Samples (percentages) 1978-86: I am going to read some statements about international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. For each, tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statement. 1974: Now 1 would like to read to you a number of statements people have made about American foreign policy. For each of these statements, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly. A. The U.S. has not tried hard enough to make an agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides. B. The Vietnam war was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. C. [The United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly toward us and opposed to the Communists.] D. We should take a more active role in opposing the policy of apartheid—that is, racial separation—in South Africa. E. [How the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minority groups is a matter of internal Soviet politics and none of our business.) F. The U.S. should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights. G. The U.S. should trv to expand trade and technical exchanges with the People's Republic of China. H. The United States has a real responsibility to take a very active role in the world. I. [America's real concerns should be at home, not abroad.] J. [We should give foreign aid only to our friends, and not to countries who criticize the United States.] K. [We should build up our own defenses and let the rest of the world take care of itself.] L. We should conduct more and more of our foreign affairs through genuinely international organizations. M. With our improving relations with the Soviet Union and China, there is little chance for world war any more. N. With our improving relations with the Soviet Union, we should work more closely with the Russians to keep smaller countries from going to war. 238 Appendix 1 239 Table A.1.1 (Continued) Year Agree strongly Agree somewhat Don't know Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly A. Nuclear agreement 1986* 22 29 5 27 16 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 — — — — — B. Vietnam 1986* 42 24 7 17 10 1982* 46 26 7 15 7 1978* 47 25 9 13 7 1974 — — — — — C. Dictators 1986* 17 41 11 19 13 1982* 17 46 10 16 12 1978* 18 40 14 15 14 1974 — — — — — D. South Africa 1986 — — — — — 1982 17 28 16 24 15 1978 15 24 16 26 19 1974 15 19 22 22 23 E. Soviet Jews 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978* 21 29 8 24 18 1974* 15 26 11 28 20 F. Human rights 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 32 36 8 17 8 1974 — — — — — G. China 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 25 39 15 13 8 1974 — — — — — H. Active role 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 50 36 2 8 3 I. Concerns at home 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 58 29 1 8 3 J. Aid friends only 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 34 28 5 23 9 240 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.1 (Concluded) K. Own defense L. International organizations M. Chance for world war N. Work with Russians Agree Agree Don't Disagree Disagree Year strongly somewhat know somewhat strongly 1986 1982 — 1978 1974 24 1986 1982 — 1978 1974* 27 1986 1982 — 1978 — 1974* 7 1986 — 1982 — 1978 — 1974 36 28 3 28 33 16 14 20 10 31 37 11 12 17 10 31 4 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given in the survey. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. The items from the 1986 survey did not yield a scale, and the question about South Africa used in the 1974-82 scales was worded differently in 1986. Therefore, only the South Africa question was used. The distribution on responses on the 1986 South African item is shown in table A. 1.2. Table A.1.2 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used as the APARTHEID Scale, 1986 Mass Sample (percentages) Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa? Percent We should support the South African government 8 We should take no position 23 Don't know 12 We should impose limited economic sanctions if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system 28 We should ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if the South African government does not dismantle its apartheid system 28 Note: the item was reverse scored before being used as a scale. Appendix 1 241 Table A.1.3 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the COMMUNIST Scales, 1974U86 Mass Samples (percentages) 1982-86: I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power. First, what if the Communist party came to power in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the United States, somewhat of a threat to the United States, not very much of a threat to the United States, or no threat at all to the United States? 1978:1 am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the United States if the Communists came to power in that country through peaceful elections. First, what if the Communist party came to power through peaceful elections in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the United States, somewhat of a threat to the United States, not very much of a threat to the United States, or no threat at all to the United States? 1974: If . . . were to become Communist, do you think this would be a threat to the United States, or not? No Great Somewhat Don't Not threat Year threat a threat know very much at all El Salvador 1986 27 43 8 17 1982 21 43 10 21 1978 — — — — France 1986 30 38 6 18 1982 31 38 9 17 1978 26 41 10 17 Saudi Arabia 1986 39 35 8 12 1982 49 31 9 8 1978 — — — — Mexico 1986 62 18 5 10 1982 61 19 9 8 1978 53 26 7 9 Philippines 1986 37 35 7 15 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — South Africa 1986 21 40 9 22 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — Iran 1986 — — — — 1982 24 35 10 22 1978 35 35 13 11 Taiwan 1986 — — — — 1982 17 37 13 23 1978 — — — — Italy 1986 — — — — 1982 — — — — 1978 18 40 9 24 4 6 8 6 7 5 3 5 4 5 6 8 10 6 11 9 242 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.3 (Continued) Year Great threat Somewhat a threat Don't know Not very much No threat at all Chile 1986 1982 — — — — — 1978 17 35 15 24 9 Year Threat Not sure No threat Western Europe 1974 71 10 19 Japan 1974 68 10 23 African countries 1974 51 14 35 Latin American countries 1974 69 10 20 Italy 1974 50 14 37 Portugal 1974 47 14 39 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Table A.1.4 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the DETENTE Scales, 1974-86 Mass Samples (percentages) 1978-86: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. 1974: For each of these proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose [Restricting U.S.-Soviet trade] 1986 37 11 52 1982 47 13 40 1978* 39 14 46 1974 — — — Sharing technical information with 1986 23 10 67 the Soviet Union about defending 1982 — — — against missile attacks 1978 — — — 1974 — — — [Prohibiting the exchange of 1986 36 11 53 scientists between the U.S. and the 1982* 35 13 52 Soviet Union] 1978* 34 12 54 1974 — — — Negotiating arms control 1986 81 7 13 agreements between the U.S. and 1982 77 10 13 the Soviet Union 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Appendix 1 243 Table A.1.4 (Continued) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose [Limiting the sales of advanced 1986* 57 9 33 U.S. computers to the Soviet 1982* 59 13 28 Union] 1978* 51 16 33 1974 — — — Resuming cultural and educational 1986 78 7 15 exchanges between the U.S. and 1982 70 11 18 Soviets 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Increasing grain sales to the Soviet 1986 57 12 31 Union 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Undertaking joint efforts with the 1986 — — — Soviet Union to solve energy 1982 64 13 22 problems 1978 68 11 21 Undertaking joint efforts to solve the world energy shortage 1974 84 6 9 [Forbidding grain sales to the Soviet 1986 — — — Union] 1982 28 15 57 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Signing another arms agreement to 1986 — — — limit some nuclear weapons on both 1982 — — — sides 1978 71 12 18 Substantially limiting the number of nuclear missiles each country has 1974 — — — Signing an agreement to ban all 1986 — — — weapons on both sides 1982 — — — 1978 62 14 24 1974 — — — Expanding trade between the 1986 — — — United States and the Soviet Union 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 68 11 21 Giving the Soviet Union the same 1986 — — — trade treatment that we give other 1982 — — — countries 1978 — — — 1974 63 14 24 Undertaking joint efforts to curb air 1986 — — — and water pollution 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 81 7 12 244 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.4 (Concluded) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Bringing about peace in the Middle 1986 — — — East 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 82 9 9 Undertaking joint space missions 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 61 11 28 Substantially limiting the number of 1986 — — — nuclear missiles each country has 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 77 10 13 Exchanging scientists and other 1986 — — — technical missions 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 65 11 24 Reducing the number of American 1986 — — — and Russian troops in Europe 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 73 15 12 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given i n the survey- Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. Table A.1.5 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the ECONOMICAID Scales, 1974-82 Mass Samples (percentages) 1978-82: Do you feel U.S. economic aid to other countries generally: 1974: Do you think that giving such economic aid to other countries . . . , or not? No/don't Year Yes/think Not sure think Helps our national security 1982 44 13 43 1978 45 11 44 1974 45 10 45 Helps the national security of other 1982 68 12 20 countries ("national" not in 1974 1978 72 12 16 wording) 1974 65 11 24 Helps our economy at home 1982 30 13 57 1978 34 12 54 1974 26 10 64 Appendix 1 245 Table A.1.5 (Continued) [Gets us too involved in other countries' affairs] Helps the economy of other countries [Benefits the rich more than the poor in other countries] Helps prevent the spread of communism Is worth the economic cost to us [Aggravates relations with other countries] Strengthens our political friends abroad [Hurts our economy at home] Improves American relations with other countries [Makes other countries too dependent on the United States] Is a good substitute for the use of American troops and manpower Helps people in other countries live better [Makes rulers of foreign countries rich] No/don't Year Yes/think Not sure think 1982 75 8 17 1978* 75 9 16 1974 73 10 17 1982 76 11 13 1978 78 11 11 1974* 77 8 14 1982 67 21 12 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1982 36 20 44 1978 36 17 47 1974 36 16 47 1982 30 20 49 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1982 — — — 1978* 64 14 22 1974* 53 16 31 1982 — — — 1978 50 17 32 1974 50 13 37 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 63 11 26 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 51 13 36 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974* 75 9 17 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 46 19 36 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 70 10 20 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974* 67 18 16 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given in the survey. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. 246 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.6 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the MILITARY AID Scales, 1974-82 Mass Samples (percentages) 1978-82: Do you think that giving military aid to other countries generally: 1974: Do you think that giving military aid to other countries . . . , or not? No/don't Year Yes/think Not sure think Helps our [1974: own] national 1982 37 15 48 security 1978 35 15 50 1974 36 13 52 Helps the national security of other 1982 71 13 16 countries 1978 72 12 16 1974 69 9 22 Helps our economy at home 1982 39 12 49 1978 43 12 44 1974 32 11 57 Helps the economy of other 1982 55 16 29 countries 1978* 59 16 25 1974* 60 13 27 Is a good substitute for the use of 1982 51 18 31 American troops and manpower 1978 49 18 33 1974 45 21 34 Helps prevent the spread of 1982 34 18 47 communism 1978 34 18 48 1974 36 16 48 [Gets us too involved in other 1982 78 9 14 countries' affairs] 1978* 79 9 12 1974* 78 9 13 [Lets dictatorships use their military 1982 66 21 14 power against their own people] 1978* 61 23 16 1974* 60 24 16 [Aggravates relations with other 1982 — — — countries] 1978* 73 13 14 1974* 68 14 18 Strengthens our political friends 1982 — — — abroad 1978 46 16 38 1974 42 17 41 [Hurts our economy at home] 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 53 13 34 Improves American relations with 1982 — — — other countries 1978 — — — 1974 38 16 46 [Makes other countries too 1982 — — — dependent on the United States] 1978 — — — 1974* 76 9 15 Appendix 1 247 Table A.1.6 (Continued) Year Yes/think Not sure No/don't think Helps people in other countries live 1982 — — — better 1978 — — — 1974 48 12 40 [Leads to the support of military- 1982 — — — controlled governments] 1978 — — — 1974* 58 25 17 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given in the survey. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. Table A.1.7 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the TROOPS Scales, 1974—86 Mass Samples (percentages) 1978-86: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . 1974: There has been a lot of discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union 1986 53 10 36 1982 51 * 49 1978 42 13 45 1974 — — — The Nicaraguan government allowed 1986 45 13 42 the Soviet Union to set up a missile 1982 — — — base in Nicaragua 1978 — — — 1974 — — — The Arabs cut off all oil shipments to 1986 36 12 51 the U.S. 1982 38 * 62 1978 36 12 52 1974 — — — North Korea invaded South Korea 1986 24 12 64 1982 22 * 78 1978 21 15 63 North Korea attacked South Korea 1974 15 20 65 248 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.7 (Continued) The government of El Salvador were about to be defeated by leftist rebels Iran invaded Saudi Arabia Arab forces invaded Israel Israel were being defeated by the Arabs The People's Republic of China in¬ vaded Taiwan Mainland China invaded Nationalist China (the island of Taiwan) Communist China invaded Formosa (Taiwan) Soviet troops invaded Western Europe Western Europe were invaded The Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic of China Nicaragua invaded Honduras in order to destroy Contra rebels' bases there The Soviet Union invaded Poland South Africa invaded Angola Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia Soviet troops attacked Yugoslavia after Tito's death Year Favor Not sure/ don't know Oppose 1986 25 19 56 1982 19 * 81 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 26 15 59 1982 25 * 75 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 33 14 54 1982 30 * 70 1978 17 16 67 1974 28 22 50 1986 19 17 64 1982 18 * 82 1978 20 16 64 1974 17 24 59 1986 68 8 24 1982 64 * 36 1978 54 14 32 1974 40 19 40 1986 27 12 61 1982 21 * 79 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 24 16 60 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 — — — 1982 29 * 71 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 — — — 1982 8 * 92 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 18 16 66 1974 11 24 65 Appendix 1 249 Table A.1.7 (Concluded) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Rhodesia were invaded by Cuban 1986 — — — troops supplied by the Soviet Union 1982 — — — 1978 25 16 59 1974 — — — The Russians took over West Berlin 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 48 14 38 1974 34 22 43 Panama refused to let the U.S. use the 1986 — — — canal 1982 — — — 1978 58 11 31 1974 — — — Canada were invaded 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 78 11 11 North Vietnam launched a major attack 1986 — — — against Saigon 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 11 16 73 Communist China attacked India 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 17 25 58 The Arabs cut off the supply of oil to 1986 — — — Western Europe 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 21 22 57 Castro's Cuba invaded the Dominican 1986 — — — Republic in the Caribbean 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 32 24 44 The Arabs cut off the oil supply to 1986 — — — Japan 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 14 22 63 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. * Don't know grouped with oppose. 250 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.8 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the USGOALS Scales, 1974-86 Mass Samples (percentages) I am going to read [1974: Here is] a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one [1974: would you] please say whether you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal [1978-86: of the United States], a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Year Very important Somewhat important Not sure/ don't know Not important Containing commu- 1986 57 30 4 9 nism 1982 59 27 6 8 1978 60 24 6 10 1974 55 27 5 13 Helping to improve 1986 37 50 4 9 the standard of living 1982 35 50 4 11 of less developed 1978 35 47 6 12 countries 1974 39 49 4 9 Worldwide arms con- 1986 69 22 4 6 trol 1982 64 25 6 6 1978 64 23 8 4 1974 66 24 6 5 Defending our allies' 1986 56 36 4 5 security 1982 50 39 6 5 1978 50 35 8 7 1974 33 50 8 9 Securing adequate 1986 69 25 3 3 supplies of energy 1982 70 23 4 3 1978 78 15 5 2 1974 76 18 4 2 Helping to bring a 1986 30 48 5 17 democratic form of 1982 29 47 7 18 government to other 1978 26 43 9 21 nations 1974 28 42 7 22 Protecting the interests 1986 43 42 4 12 of American business 1982 44 43 5 9 abroad 1978 45 40 6 9 1974 39 42 6 14 Protecting the jobs of 1986 78 18 2 3 American workers 1982 78 17 3 3 1978 78 15 4 3 1974 74 18 3 5 Matching Soviet mili- 1986 53 34 4 9 tary power 1982 49 34 6 12 1978 — — — — 1974 — — — — Appendix 1 251 Table A.1.8 (Continued) Very Somewhat Not sure/ Not Year important important don't know important Combating world 1986 63 31 3 4 hunger 1982 58 33 4 5 1978 59 31 5 5 1974 60 32 3 5 Strengthening the 1986 46 33 5 16 United Nations 1982 48 32 7 14 1978 48 32 8 13 1974 46 32 8 14 Reducing our trade 1986 62 26 7 5 deficit with foreign 1982 — — — — countries 1978 — — — — 1974 — — — — Promoting and de- 1986 42 45 4 10 fending human rights 1982 43 42 6 9 in other countries 1978 38 40 7 14 1974 — — — — Protecting weaker na- 1986 32 54 6 8 tions against foreign 1982 34 50 7 9 aggression 1978 34 47 9 10 1974 28 53 7 11 Keeping up the value 1986 — — — — of the dollar 1982 70 22 5 2 1978 86 8 4 2 1974 — — — — Keeping peace in the 1986 — — — — world 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — 1974 85 11 2 2 Promoting and de- 1986 — — — — fending our own 1982 — — — — security 1978 — — — — 1974 83 12 3 2 Promoting the devel- 1986 — — — — opment of capitalism 1982 — — — — abroad 1978 — — — — 1974 17 40 13 30 Maintaining a balance 1986 — — — — of power among 1982 — — — — nations 1978 — — — — 1974 48 34 10 8 252 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.8 (Concluded) Year Very important Somewhat important Not sure/ don't know Not important Helping solve world 1986 _ _ _ inflation 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — 1974 64 27 5 4 Strengthening coun- 1986 — — — — tries who are friendly 1982 — — — — toward us 1978 — — — — 1974 38 49 5 8 Fostering international 1986 — — — — cooperation to solve 1982 — — — — common problems. 1978 — — — — such as food, inflation. 1974 66 24 6 4 and energy Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Table A.1.9 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the USRELATIONS Scale, 1974 Mass Sample (percentages) In terms of the interests of the United States, how important do you feel it is for the United States to have good relations with . . .—very important, somewhat important, or hardly important at all? Very important Somewhat important Hardly important Western Europe 78 20 2 Japan 72 25 3 Soviet Union 74 22 5 Asia 66 29 5 Latin America 65 30 5 Africa 58 34 8 The Arab countries 71 24 5 Appendix 1 253 Table A.1.10 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the VITALINTEREST Scales, 1978-86 Mass Samples (percentages) Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is. certain countries of the world are important to the U.S. for political. economic or security reasons. I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in that country. Year Does Don't know Does not Italy 1986 41 21 38 1982 35 20 45 1978 36 22 42 Egypt 1986 61 19 20 1982 66 15 19 1978 76 14 10 West Germany 1986 77 13 10 1982 76 11 14 1978 70 15 15 Iran 1986 50 15 34 1982 51 13 36 1978 69 18 13 Japan 1986 78 12 11 1982 82 9 9 1978 80 10 11 Mexico 1986 74 12 14 1982 74 10 16 1978 61 16 23 Israel 1986 76 13 11 1982 75 10 15 1978 79 13 8 Syria 1986 48 20 33 1982 36 31 34 1978 — — — India 1986 36 22 42 1982 30 26 44 1978 38 28 34 Canada 1986 78 11 11 1982 82 8 10 1978 70 11 19 Brazil 1986 44 25 31 1982 46 23 32 1978 39 29 33 Great Britain 1986 83 6 11 1982 80 9 11 1978 67 13 20 254 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.10 (Continued) Year Does Don't know Does not Saudi Arabia 1986 77 9 14 1982 77 13 10 1978 81 11 8 China (PRC) 1986 60 13 27 1982 64 17 19 1978 70 13 16 France 1986 56 13 31 1982 58 17 26 1978 55 15 30 Taiwan (Formosa) 1986 53 19 28 1982 51 21 29 1978 54 20 26 South Korea 1986 58 16 26 1982 43 22 36 1978 62 14 24 Poland 1986 35 22 43 1982 43 20 38 1978 29 26 46 South Africa 1986 59 12 30 1982 38 25 37 1978 63 14 23 Nigeria 1986 31 27 42 1982 32 33 35 1978 44 27 29 Philippines 1986 73 10 16 1982 — — — 1978 — — — Nicaragua 1986 60 15 25 1982 — — — 1978 — — — Jordan 1986 — — — 1982 40 27 32 1978 — — — Lebanon 1986 — — — 1982 55 18 27 1978 — — — Panama 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 78 11 11 Turkey 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 40 29 31 Appendix 1 255 Table A.1.10 (Concluded) Year Does Don't know Does not Cuba 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 67 10 23 Rhodesia 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 50 24 26 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Two forms were used to record responses. In those cases where countries appeared on both forms (Canada, Japan, and the Soviet Union in 1978; Canada and Japan in 1982), the distributions shown are an average of the responses on the two forms. Table A.1.11 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the FOLLOWNEWS Scales, 1974-86 Mass Samples (percentages) How closely would you say you personally have followed news about the following [1978-86: issues and] events—very closely, somewhat closely, or not very closely? Very Somewhat Not very closely closely closely 1986 Fighting in Central America 20 40 40 Problems in the Middle East 24 42 35 The negotiations for strategic arms 29 41 30 limitations Events in South Africa 24 42 35 1982 The 1982 congressional elections 24 41 35 Fighting in Central America 15 36 49 Problems in the Middle East 34 38 29 President Reagan's economic policies 51 35 13 Negotiations for strategic arms 23 37 40 limitations Events in Poland 27 38 35 Trade problems with Japan 17 30 52 1978 The recent congressional elections 31 37 32 Cuban military activities in Africa 16 31 53 Problems in the Middle East 32 41 26 The negotiations for strategic arms 17 36 47 President Carter's wage-price guidelines 38 38 24 Senate debate on the ratification of 32 33 35 the Panama Canal Treaty Congressional debates on foreign aid 11 29 60 1974 Problems in the Middle East 30 40 30 Congressional debates on foreign aid 14 36 50 256 Faces of Internationalism Table A.1.11 (Continued) 1974 (Continued) The Ford-Brezhnev summit meeting The elections in Great Britain The Cyprus war Congressional debates on foreign defense spending What's happening in Vietnam these days Discussions about the U.S. recognizing Cuba Arafat's visit to the United Nations Kissinger's trip to China The World Food Conference Very closely Somewhat closely Not very closely 17 34 49 6 20 73 16 35 50 17 36 46 14 35 50 19 37 44 22 29 49 28 40 32 32 33 35 Table A.1.12 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the INTEREST Scales, 1974-86 Mass Samples (percentages) When you pick up a newspaper these days, how interested are you in reading articles relating to news about the following: very interested, somewhat interested, or hardly interested at all? Some- Year Very interested what interested Hardly at all News about your local 1986 61 32 6 community 1982 63 30 6 1978 60 32 8 1974 58 32 10 News about your state 1986 46 43 10 1982 45 45 10 1978 43 46 11 1974 49 42 9 National news 1986 50 40 10 1982 53 37 10 1978 51 37 12 1974 59 32 10 News about other countries 1986 32 45 23 1982 30 46 24 1978 27 44 29 1974 36 43 21 News about the relations of the 1986 52 36 12 United States with other countries 1982 48 38 14 1978 46 38 16 1974 51 36 13 Appendix 2 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Foreign Policy Beliefs and Policy Preferences, Mass Samples, 1974—86 Logistic regression rather than ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression is an appropriate analytic technique when the dependent variable is di¬ chotomous. A dichotomous dependent variable typically violates two assumptions underlying OLS: "that the dependent variable should exhibit (1) constant variance (homoscedasticity) and (2) a normal distribution at each level of the independent variables. Ignoring these assumptions casts a shadow over both the efficiency of the estimated regression coefficients and the validity of the tests of significance" (Swafford, 1980: 665; see also Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). In other words, if ordinary regression is used rather than logistic regression, there is a risk of making erroneous con¬ clusions about the relationship between Americans' foreign policy pref¬ erences on the one hand, and their foreign policy beliefs, partisan at¬ tachments, and ideological orientations on the other. The parameters for the independent variables shown in the tables that follow measure changes in the log odds of falling into one category rather than another, which makes their interpretation directly analogous to least- squares regression. The statistical significance of the parameters is de¬ termined by comparing them with their standard errors. The standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients. It is possible to derive a partial R statistic from logistic regression that compares the relative magnitude of the regression coefficients after ad¬ justing for their standard errors. The statistic is an analogue to a stan¬ dardized regression coefficient (beta weight) in OLS in that it permits an assessment of the relative explanatory power of each independent var¬ iable. In the interest of not further complicating the tables that follow, the statistic has not been reported, but it can be noted that the rank order of the coefficients' magnitude is nearly identical to the rank order of their relative explanatory power. Assessing the overall explanatory power of a logistic regression model is difficult in that there is no standard measure of variance explained, such as R 2 in OLS. However, it is possible to use the percentage of re- 257 258 Faces of Internationalism spondents whose positions on the dependent variable is predicted cor¬ rectly by the model as a rough measure of its explanatory power (see also note 4 in chapter 3). This is reported in the second to last column in the tables. (Discriminant function analysis is sometimes used for mak¬ ing predictions. Logistic regression is preferable if the explanatory var¬ iables do not meet the normal distribution, equal covariance assumptions of discriminant analysis, which could lead to statistically inconsistent discriminant function estimators. Furthermore, it has been shown that the predictions of discriminant analysis in such circumstances will be less accurate than the predictions derived from logistic regression [Fienberg, 1980: 105-9].) It is also possible to test the (null) hypothesis that the dependent variable is independent of the independent variables using a model chi- square. The statistic is roughly comparable to an overall-F test in ols, in that it permits the overall utility of the model to be assessed. It is also comparable to the chi-square test of independence typically used in the analysis of cross-classified tables. The model chi-square is reported in the third to the last column in the tables that follow. Below the chi-square, in parenthesis, is a percentage figure which reports the improvement in the model chi-square compared with the chi- square based on a reduced-form model, in which only partisanship and ideology are assessed. The figure permits an assessment of the contri¬ bution that respondents' foreign policy beliefs make, above and beyond party identification and political ideology, to their foreign policy beliefs. The value of the reduced-form chi-square can be calculated using the following formula: reduced form chi-square = (1-percent improve¬ ment) x model chi-square. In appendix 4 the reduced form model includes all of the variables analyzed here, with membership in the leader sample the excluded var¬ iable as the intent is to determine the contribution that the occupancy of leadership roles makes to the overall model. CD CD CJ 03 73 C 03 JD O CD -C 73 Sh 03 o H cd 73 QJ CD 73 =3 3 g S c ^ o U TS C (0 to o uU O a> qj s 13 Q ) —* CO — . « >. u u -J3 LD 00 in O r-H r-H O co r-H m O m O' ON co 2 CN r-H O in CO q q_ oT 04 04" r-H 04" oT oT r-H _ T3 C £2 O) u Tt< O m O ON 04 ON O 73 IN IN IN 00 in CN NO IN 0) CD a ir Cl- cd . J_ -*-> QJ (D 05 C £ O _ s o 0 , _ v l n ^^ O ^ IN ^^ IN -7-5 33 CL) c c q O 1-H IN. 04 CO NO r-H tN r-H 04 NO q q o cr ^ ^ a; Lo rr\ r* n. C r-H CO ON 00 IN in IN CO IN NO CO 0 0 in > i - r c GO CO GO 00 cq NO ON 00 no CO no in 00 r-H ~ - u. 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O > X > QJ r“ 7 o c CT3 03 X ML 03 X o fX c 263 Note: see explanatory note with table A.2.1. "O < QJ c c Q '"' X 00 C £ ns bJO -Q 2 c e£ * (N 05 00 x 2 T3 ' J-, 73 03 05 O ”3 H * (/5 as T3 < -a £ ns 75 as C o U bC _o Q as -o CQ CU >> -a .a c o c- &, c IS bC <£ £ ^ " C/5 03 Cu X i c a> ^ <& c/5 § &0 *3 £ CQ Q a- — 03 X bJD C/5 0/ C X a> DC a> X H *- 73 c £ a> u u "5 15 15 =- cL is c E b -C s bo C ‘a. o < ns us — •c as X ns rs H J2 15 o c 3 £ a. c jT2Le E a* Q- 73 15 C o — 3 2P o 0/ fZ X ^ c a» 73 73 X O ^ r 05 x > 5 S U c 05 «*- CL C 05 15 73 73 C 3 C d-3 05 X 0C 05 ■IS 05 £ ^ u cn tT f'x in t\ CO H o I &J m O (N ^ q cn O' k- g > '5b 'c3 _C o 'E '5b q u X Q- Cl c o o IE 3 (d 7C 3 CJ c 3 .73 X C/5 15 V Q X ~ C/5 X ' X C/5 E Cu C/5 C/5 03 C/5 tn 73 3 E 3 c Is X cn D c 05 0 M5 E E E b s^-E o <- as so 73 2 £ _ c ■s be 3 u E ■£ 5 | * x &- S 3 Xl U X •- o E ■- X 3 '75 C/5 _ 05 .£ ~ c 3 u x f H 15 tV 264 ilitary, no aid) IS CO LT) 00 ID CO 1 IS IS 00 1 Gn r* CO 04 rf 3 (N 04 04 04 04' CO 1 NO ON J-l NO NO ID NO cs 00 CO 0 ,_ s NO CO ,— s NO ^ I 04 CO t-h ^ 1 0 NO ON NO NO 06 LD IS IS CO IS co IS NO 00 NO IS On NO 0 00 04 '—' s — ■ ' '■ ' — ' T-H ' " ON IS IS 00 LD 0 r-H 1 ts m r —I I H N CO H 00 O? 04 r-H r-H T—( T—< GO O 00 04 04 r-H I- ° LT) 04 04 04 O r-H O H * GO CO On 04 O o l n nO o IS ^ o o g a £ c S -2 > ~ o 3 00 C )T3 T3 V C u 03 ° U ) CL ' IS. o O H ^ o O r-H nO CO H If) H ^ CO O 04 O o 04 rt 04 O o o CO r-H GO T“H I CO o ON ^ o o NO CO CO 04 CO T“H no in 04 O LT) LT) co o NO 04 NO 04 NO 04 NO 04 00 00 00 00 00 GO 00 00 ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON T-H r —H I—1 r-H T—1 r-H r-H r-H £ Cl. C /5 ^ 6 ■* 3 a j rz X TO T3 C 03 )£ Xi £ T3 X c/5 ^ £ Lh rc O- £ X) 3 O c/5 C 4 ^ o 3 3 > -a >,. *- n ^L Cl- O ^ .N> U txO 03 T3 G 3 .SP O a « <£ CD £ D 2 £ “G o — J-. 03 00 00 rri o s— CL Cl. 03 . 01 CD y C 03 •2 D c/5 C 00 O 3 T3 CL 'G 2 c 2 S o c :s l- o 03 c -2 CL O Z 265 Table A.2.5 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward Intervention Abroad and Related Issues, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled cn IN X m o O' cn CD tN CN CN CN C Ji at u ^ d at a* nO CsJ vO l n tN ON O CN sC CN sC CN \C CN O | 1 ™ o 1 ^ rH o 1 ^ 1 ^ CN CN CN CN CN CN O J—' 1 ^ O' 1 1 nO cn tN tN 1 X tN 1 m in ■ » •+-» rj a g > c ■5- ^ £- E i/i Q. c m ^ ON , _ v IN __ s o „__ *-* vC sC cn IN o — 1 ^ CN t-H o *—J r-« CO — X o IN d 1 X cn d IN cn tN in IN cn X CN sC On m in i CN --- *—< ^ CN --r—« '—’ "—' X tN „_ v X __ s cn in O' q i 1 ^ ON ON O' in d d cn 1 o IN X o sC cn tN 'C r—• — ^ . y — "5 ^ T3 u, *- at Cu ■3 & C u T3 Z O > cc C t- u « '-3 “™ C , * ★ * * * a c IN CN o in CN 1—1 sC cn CN in r—* X n? 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X CO 04 CO LO o IN oT o CO t-H CO 1 NO t-H CO t—H q t-H 1 q fH t-H t-H CO t-H CO r-H CO t-H q r-H t-H 04 q t-H On r-H CO | 1 1 1 1 1 i 1 1 1 * * k k k * * 00 LO X LO' IN LO ^ O oT LO io 04 IO 00 LO 00 CO LO O io r-H NO 1 o q q q r-H q 1 q q q O r-H q LO q q q q q q CO q CO q LO q 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '—^ '—' 1 1 1 1 s —^ 1 ie * * •k * * * * k X io o ltT oT LO LO 04 X LO o lcT r-H LO X oo 04 io ON irT IN NO 1 r-H q 04 o 04 q 1 q o CN q i-H o r-H q q q CO o q q r-H q q q r-H q 1 1 1 1 1 ’ ’ " 1 s —^ 1 '—^ ' ’ v " N —" '— 1 s —’ 1 NO 04 00 X 04 00 X 04 00 X 04 00 00 00 IN IN 00 00 IN IN 00 00 IN 00 00 IN IN O' ON On ON ON ON ON ON ON ON ON On ON ON ON ON r-H t-H r-H r-H r-H t-H t-H r-H r—l r-H r-H t—H r-H r-H t—H t-H 0) X 1 bO C3 Li 0) -t-> o Q ) X -L—* 1 bo c bo (T3 4—• u 73 1) o X 0 QJ > ^ 03 G o u 73 o N4-I O u ~n o 'O C/3 O L o QJ Oh v 3 03 X 0> _C/3 .£ >o 0/ C/3 o O. ^ Q ) b 0) Oh Oh co 4-> 03 C/3 -i_, X. d» QJ c/3 a; a o bO w C ns U ■* 73 v 5: K c * Q-T3 o g ’55 O J M U a.e o _c CL, bO C • SP 3 S O o -£ h-i rO X c W> 5 c c o f— l G a a/ Cl 73 £ o „ U a. ^ r- 03 -l K 04 x .SP £ bO CD ^ •c S g 03 -*-> X x s | 8 ^ t: O) O a/ Cl bv Cl bo q < 3 £5 C ■*“* C/3 3 0/ 3 g c/3 _ 3 3 O g n3 o 8 .b ^ _Q "O o O ^ ^ b £?f O 33 % B rN 1C — L/J •g> O L< A-t u •3 LO £ ■ W S q a> X ^ c/3 c/3 ^ a. 5 £ — b C/3 73 05 03 < 03 X > c r> C o/i C/3 0> 0> X x < c/3 a> T5 3 T3 C 03 c/3 "3 CQ C bC O tx c/3 C/5 3 c 01 01 I 0> aa O' T) 01 c U >~> t>C Q o at CD "O c a> c£ o; X H 03 Ot T3 C 03 > a> -3 3 'c "3 £ c t a 2 a» 3 J- a> > 3 , m ON in ^ , O C u- a CL C IN o X IN X ON ON MM nT in ni ON X X tN IN LT5 IN X c b a* 3 o -a c o -* u 03 X bC C 15 o o — >, 03 tc .y o CL *0 03 33 *" C 5 2 c ■*- Q CO u c o» *3 CL C a at 73 73 C •§ C 0.3 a cl C/3 N+- a c — “tg a ^ £ sn (2 -M o CL C 03 D 73 J o c H % 03 X C/3 a t 6 a £ o rt* IN O' in tN 5 03 > a» o a bC X in m o m (N (N MM C\| On IN (N mm rsl On (N m in X — o m x o o a» C/3 W-. 3 £ > O C f a £ * ll C/3 c 5 c U § S 03 ^ c IS a» at 2 5 > x 2 c x x ON m x o IN ■** O' in mm o ° ’T* (N m x O MM MM X O MM in x in o in o o a* > ’C C 2 c (A 5 CL ^ ll c o .S c ‘C ’ — 0/ c/3 £ S < ^ c/3 no - , *M o C/3 a/ X > t O be a/ CD ^ > jr: ^ -C ^ &c s ■X — 1 01 00 ON ov IN o ^ LO CN ^ vd !—! ^ IN r— i CN CN LO CN CN CN CN O CN CN CN 00 O 00 o o £ £ £ S 8 £ O CD C > .1 -o — ^ C X> X ^ C3 u JC 3 O x: ^ £ £ < -a C3 Kg 3 X> C CD £ c u Oi > o b0 o c N u o 03 c JH a. o 2 269 Table A.2.7 The Relationship Between Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs and Attitudes Toward Terrorism, with Partisanship and Political Ideology Controlled, 1978 and 1986 CN O' O 00 O i 1 CO i 1 x 2 in i CO 1 CO 1 1 9 cnT cnT (N CN _ 73 c 2 0> Ot tj • — ON i o 1 NO 1 1 s- 73 n 1 NO 1 NO 1 1 tx Ot Ot - CL x i-1 L c > o „ NO „ _ s ON x _ v O ^ — ^ ^ c c i—< o i 00 1 CO CO 1 1 U7 CO •S 3 S s—■ at Cl. c 1 in d 1 CO rl 1 1 ri nC x zr t- 2 « a£ co **—' CO 00 in in IN CN rH , NO CO CO 00 at Cu o 1 1 o 1 1 ^ at c at | 1 * * • O' CN t-h On r\T NO nT CN O? t: 3 T— 1 i 1 CO »- 1 i 1 ^ c TO o 1 — >> S i .y o •3 o c ^ > * * * cl 2 - Qj GC co CN CN IN CO a< > s * * yv t-L — t-H CO o c TO N c TO V-. a» 73 Ih O o c a> £ at C/5 3 O C/5 h c at o ^ TO C/5 c O .-3 - £ j>n d 2 tr C/5 ^ o at tl c 2 to 2 TO 2 S C In ■— ^ C o QJ C 73 2^ 3 t- o 3 C 3 at 3 at o X C/5 O X "c/5 C/5 TO C/5 C/5 O X to o o to Z m 2 Jr u at Ot 7a £ .2 v- a» o >- TO c C/5 C/5 "C C/5 C t- o C/5 o a> o * '■—’ cn D Ih i- a an D TO o L l_ QJ on D U ■^ O <0 O ^ S -O C/5 -*-• ■— C/5 3 : .2 ties ism 270 Note: see explanatory note with table A.2.1. 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'_r C/5 04 c O a reach (/5 r* C D C/5 C E i > peace E D .E c c .5 CJ rz tiC £ C/5 c "E ill o c O >- V oc gp X, _ ^ ^ • —■ cj r“ CJ '75 c c rz Jr ^ O O Cl Cl. to "V tn -8 g> (T* C -*4 _ .2 s 04 C X - i I 5 £ _04 Cj rE T3 C O E i a; S 5 u z rz o; -O ill 3 to ,fc tl “*~ c c to Sb C ZJ •r >- £ ra - o C JZ. C/5 „ 04 04 — L- VL4 04 C/5 rz c o V. 04 C 04 04 Tj C/5 04 o C3 55 3 l_ to rs S— r- < -C O c c > - to .a .5 £ •c o L= £ « § I 1 04 “ L- (tJ § o c b * c S3 CL 274 Appendix 3 Questionnaire Items Used to Construct the Foreign Policy Attitude Scales, Leader Samples, 1974—86 Table A. 3.1 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the ACTIVECOOPERATION Scales, 1974U86 Leader Samples (percentages) 1978-86: I am going to read some statements about international affairs and U.S. foreign policy. For each, tell me if you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the statement. 1974: Now I would like to read you a number of statements people have made about American foreign policy. For each of these statements, please tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat or disagree strongly. A. The U.S. has not tried hard enough to make an agreement with the Soviet Union to reduce the number of nuclear weapons on both sides. B. The Vietnam war was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. C. [The United States may have to support some military dictators because they are friendly toward us and opposed to the Communists.] D. We should take a more active role in opposing the policy of apartheid—that is, racial separation—in South Africa. E. [How the Soviet Union handles the treatment of the Jews or other minority groups is a matter of internal Soviet politics and none of our business.] F. The U.S. should put pressure on countries which systematically violate basic human rights. G. The U.S. should try to expand trade and technical exchanges with the People's Republic of China. H. The United States has a real responsibility to take a very active role in the world. I. [America's real concerns should be at home, not abroad.] J. [We should give foreign aid only to our friends, and not to countries who criticize the United States.] K. [We should build up our own defenses and let the rest of the world take care of itself.] L. We should conduct more and more of our foreign affairs through genuinely international organizations. M. With our improving relations with the Soviet Union and China, there is little chance for world war any more. N. With our improving relations with the Soviet Union, we should work more closely with the Russians to keep smaller countries from going to war. 275 276 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.1 (Continued) Year Agree strongly Agree somewhat Don't know Disagree somewhat Disagree strongly A. Nuclear agreement 1986* 32 24 0 23 21 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 — — — — — B. Vietnam 1986* 22 20 1 29 29 1982* 21 24 1 26 28 1978 30 19 3 26 21 1974 — — — — — C. Dictators 1986* 9 52 1 24 14 1982* 14 51 1 23 12 1978 16 49 4 19 12 1974 — — — — — D. South Africa 1986 — — — — — 1982 36 42 1 16 4 1978 26 40 4 20 9 1974 28 31 3 24 14 E. Soviet Jews 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 6 24 3 45 22 1974* 13 21 2 38 26 F. Human rights 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 27 51 4 15 3 1974 — — — — — G. China 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 61 34 3 1 2 1974 — — — — — H. Active role 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — -. — — — 1974 86 11 0 2 1 I. Concerns at home 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 46 27 1 18 8 J. Aid friends only 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 39 42 2 14 3 K. Own defense 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — 1974 73 19 0 7 2 Appendix 3 277 Table A.3.1 (Concluded) Agree Agree Don't Disagree Disagree Year strongly somewhat know somewhat strongly L. International 1986 — organizations 1982 — 1978 — 1974 24 M. Chance for world 1986 — war 1982 — 1978 — 1974* 5 N. Work with Russians 1986 — 1982 — 1978 — 1974 59 34 2 22 19 22 2 32 38 32 1 5 2 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given in the survey. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. The items from the 1986 survey did not yield a scale, and the question about South Africa used in the 1974-82 scales was worded differently in 1986. Therefore, only the South Africa question was used. The distribution on responses on the 1986 South African item is shown in table A.3.2. Table A.3.2 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used as the APARTHEID Scale, 1986 Leader Samples (percentages) Which of the statements on this card comes closest to your view of how the United States should respond to the situation in South Africa? Percent We should support the South African government 3 We should take no position 14 Don't know 4 We should impose limited economic sanctions if the South African govern- 46 ment does not dismantle its apartheid system We should ban all trade with or investment in South Africa if the South 33 African government does not dismantle its apartheid system Note: the item was reverse scored before being used as a scale. 278 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.3 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the COMMUNIST Scales, 1974-86 Leader Samples (percentages) 1982-86: I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power. First, what if the Communist party came to power in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the U.S.? 1978: I am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me how much of a threat it would be to the U.S. if the Communists came to power in that country through peaceful elections. First, what if the Communist party came to power through peaceful elections in. . . . Do you think this would be a great threat to the U.S., somewhat of a threat to the U.S., not very much of a threat to the U.S., or no threat at all to the U.S.? 1974: If . . . were to become Communist, do you think this would be a threat to the United States, or not? No Great Somewhat Don't Not threat Year threat a threat know very much at all El Salvador 1986 16 46 0 32 6 1982 10 42 1 36 11 1978 — — — — — France 1986 40 38 0 16 5 1982 37 44 1 14 3 1978 33 44 0 17 5 Saudi Arabia 1986 51 38 1 5 5 1982 61 32 1 5 2 1978 — — — — — Mexico 1986 74 20 0 4 2 1982 70 24 1 4 1 1978 51 36 0 9 4 Philippines 1986 28 55 0 13 3 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — South Africa 1986 20 47 0 21 12 1982 — — — — — 1978 — — — — — Iran 1986 — — — — — 1982 17 50 1 21 12 1978 52 38 0 7 3 Taiwan 1986 — — — — — 1982 6 25 1 33 35 1978 — — — — — Italy 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 13 46 0 33 7 Chile 1986 — — — — — 1982 — — — — — 1978 5 34 0 38 23 Appendix 3 279 Table A.3.3 ( Continued) No Year Threat Not sure threat Western Europe 1974 68 7 24 Japan 1974 66 6 28 African countries 1974 30 8 62 Latin American countries 1974 54 9 36 Italy 1974 45 8 47 Portugal 1974 36 8 55 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Table A.3.4 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the DETENTE Scales, 1974—86 Leader Samples (percentages) 1978-86: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. 1974: For each of these proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose [Restricting U.S.-Soviet trade] 1986 24 3 73 1982 28 3 69 1978 18 2 81 1974 — — — [Prohibiting the exchange of scientists between 1986 13 4 83 the U.S. and the Soviet Union] 1982 18 4 79 1978 12 1 88 1974 — — — Negotiating arms control agreements between 1986 95 1 4 the U.S. and the Soviet Union 1982 96 0 4 1978 — — — 1974 — — — [Limiting the sales of advanced U.S. computers 1986 78 2 20 to the Soviet Union] 1982 80 2 19 1978 59 6 36 1974 — — — Resuming cultural and educational exchanges 1986 98 0 2 between the U.S. and Soviets 1982 94 1 5 1978 — — — 1974 — — — 280 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.4 (Continued) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Expanding grain sales to the Soviet Union 1986 82 4 14 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Subsidizing grain sales to the Soviet Union 1986* 27 5 68 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Undertaking joint efforts with the Soviet Union 1986 84 3 13 to solve energy problems 1982 78 2 20 1978 90 0 9 Undertaking joint efforts to solve the world 1974 93 3 4 energy shortage [Forbidding grain sales to the Soviet Union] 1986 — — — 1982 16 3 81 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Signing another arms agreement to limit some 1986 — — — nuclear weapons on both sides 1982 — — — 1978 92 3 5 Substantially limiting the number of nuclear 1974 — — — missiles each country has Signing an agreement to ban all weapons on both 1986 — — — sides 1982 — — — 1978 61 6 34 1974 — — — Expanding trade between the United States and 1986 — — — the Soviet Union 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 97 1 3 Giving the Soviet Union the same trade 1986 — — — treatment that we give other countries 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 85 2 12 Undertaking joint efforts to curb air and water 1986 — — — pollution 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 97 1 3 Bringing about peace in the Middle East 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 96 1 3 Undertaking joint space missions 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 90 2 8 Appendix 3 281 Table A.3.4 (Concluded) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Substantially limiting the number of nuclear 1986 — — — missiles each country has 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 97 1 2 Exchanging scientists and other technical 1986 — — — missions 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 91 1 8 Reducing the number of American and Russian 1986 — — — troops in Europe 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 92 2 7 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Wording shown in brackets indicates the item was reverse scored in creating the scale. The percentages reported in the table do not reflect these reversals but instead report the responses given in the survey. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. Table A.3.5 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the TROOPS Scales, 1974-86 Leader Samples (percentages) 1978-86: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if . . . 1974: There has been a lot of discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union 1986 82 6 12 1982 78 ** 22 1978 81 2 18 1974 — — — The Nicaraguan government allowed the Soviet 1986 67 6 27 Union to set up a missile base in Nicaragua 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — The Arabs cut off all oil shipments to the U.S. 1986 — — — 1982 36 ** 64 1978 29 5 66 1974 — — — North Korea invaded South Korea 1986 64 4 32 1982 50 ** 50 1978 45 4 50 North Korea attacked South Korea 1974 19 14 67 282 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.5 (Continued) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose The government of El Salvador were about to be 1986 — — — defeated by leftist rebels 1982 10 ** 90 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Iran invaded Saudi Arabia 1986 — — — 1982 54 ** 46 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Arab forces invaded Israel 1986 57 5 38 1982 48 ** 52 1978 31 4 66 Israel were being defeated by the Arabs 1974 41 16 44 The People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan 1986 — — — 1982 15 ** 85 Mainland China invaded Nationalist China (the island of Taiwan) 1978 18 4 78 Communist China invaded Taiwan 1974 11 10 79 Soviet troops invaded Western Europe 1986 93 2 5 1982 92 ** 8 1978 92 1 7 Western Europe were invaded 1974 77 9 14 The Soviet Union invaded the People's Republic 1986* 14 8 78 of China 1982 6 ** 94 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Nicaragua invaded Honduras in order to destroy 1986 17 9 74 Contra rebels' bases there 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 — — — The Soviet Union invaded Poland 1986 — — — 1982 6 ** 94 1978 — — — 1974 — — — South Africa invaded Angola 1986 — — — 1982 5 ** 95 1978 — — — 1974 — — — Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 15 6 80 Soviet troops attacked Yugoslavia after Tito's death 1974 8 10 82 Appendix 3 283 Table A.3.5 (Concluded) Not sure/ Year Favor don't know Oppose Rhodesia were invaded by Cuban troops 1986 _ _ _ supplied by the Soviet Union 1982 — — — 1978 10 4 86 1974 — — — The Russians took over West Berlin 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 77 2 21 The USSR took over West Berlin 1974 54 12 33 Panama refused to let the U.S. use the canal 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 49 3 48 1974 — — — Israeli forces invaded Arab countries 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 10 4 86 1974 — — — Canada were invaded 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 90 6 4 North Vietnam launched a major attack against 1986 — — — Saigon 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 6 7 87 Communist China attacked India 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 17 13 70 The Arabs cut off the supply of oil to Western 1986 — — — Europe 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 22 13 65 Castro's Cuba invaded the Dominican Republic 1986 — — — in the Caribbean 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 43 11 46 The Arabs cut off the oil supply to Japan 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 — — — 1974 15 15 71 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. Don't know grouped with oppose. 284 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.6 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the USGOALS Scales, 1974-86 Leader Samples (percentages) I am going to read [1974: Here is] a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one [1974: would you] please say whether you think that should be a very important foreign policy goal [1978-86: of the United States], a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. Very Somewhat Not sure/ Not Year important important don't know important Containing communism 1986 43 48 0 9 1982 44 46 2 8 * 00 tN. 0 s 45 47 1 8 1974 34 48 1 16 Helping to improve the 1986 46 51 0 4 standard of living of less 1982 55 44 0 1 developed countries 1978 64 33 0 2 1974 62 36 1 1 Worldwide arms control 1986 82 13 1 4 1982 86 12 0 2 1978 81 16 0 2 1974 86 12 0 1 Defending our allies' 1986 78 21 0 1 security 1982 82 16 1 1 1978* 77 20 1 1 1974 47 49 2 2 Securing adequate 1986 72 26 0 2 supplies of energy 1982 72 27 0 2 1978* 88 12 0 1 1974 77 21 0 1 Helping to bring a 1986 29 56 0 15 democratic form of 1982 23 57 1 18 government to other 1978 14 62 0 23 nations 1974 13 55 2 30 Protecting the interests 1986 32 54 1 13 of American business 1982 25 66 1 9 abroad 1978* 26 64 1 9 1974 17 64 0 18 Protecting the jobs of 1986 43 43 2 12 American workers 1982 43 46 1 10 1978* 34 57 2 7 1974 34 53 1 12 Matching Soviet military 1986 59 34 0 8 power 1982 52 41 1 7 1978 — — — — 1974 — — — — Combating world 1986 60 36 0 3 hunger 1982 64 35 0 1 1978 66 31 0 2 1974 76 22 1 1 Appendix 3 285 Table A.3.6 (Continued) Year Very important Somewhat important Not sure/ don't know Not important Strengthening the 1986 22 44 1 33 United Nations 1982 25 48 0 28 1978 25 49 0 25 1974* 31 44 1 24 Promoting and 1986 44 50 0 5 defending human rights 1982 41 54 0 5 in other countries 1978 36 56 1 8 1974 — — — — Protecting weaker 1986 29 64 3 4 nations against foreign 1982 43 52 2 3 aggression 1978 30 63 2 5 1974 26 66 3 6 Keeping up the value of 1986 35 44 2 20 the dollar 1982 38 50 2 10 1978* 73 25 0 2 1974 — — — — Keeping peace in the 1986 — — — — world 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — 1974 95 4 0 0 Promoting and 1986 — — — — defending our own 1982 — — — — security 1978 — — — — 1974 92 7 1 1 Promoting the 1986 — — — — development of 1982 — — — — capitalism abroad 1978 — — — — 1974 9 44 2 45 Maintaining a balance of 1986 — — — — power among nations 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — 1974 55 34 2 8 Helping solve world 1986 — — — — inflation 1982 — — — — 1978 — — — — 1974 82 16 1 2 Strengthening countries 1986 — — — — who are friendly toward 1982 — — — — US 1978 — — — — 1974 28 67 1 5 Fostering international 1986 — — — — cooperation to solve 1982 — — — — common problems, such 1978 — — — — as food, inflation, and 1974 87 12 1 1 energy Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Items not scalable are indicated by an asterisk (*) following the year. 286 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.7 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the USRELATIONS Scale, 1974 Leader Samples (percentages) In terms of the interests of the United States, how important do you feel it is for the United States to have good relations with . . .— -very important, somewhat important, or hardly important at all? Very Somewhat Hardly important important important Western Europe 97 3 0 Japan 93 7 0 Soviet Union 87 11 2 Asia 61 37 2 Latin America 64 34 2 Africa 44 43 13 The Arab countries 77 22 1 Table A.3.8 Distribution of Responses on Survey Items Used to Construct the VITALINTEREST Scales, 1978-86 Leader Samples (percentages) Many people believe that the United States has a vital interest in certain areas of the world and not in other areas. That is, certain countries of the world are important to the U.S. for political, economic or security reasons. 1 am going to read a list of countries. For each, tell me whether you feel the U.S. does or does not have a vital interest in that country. Year Does Don't know Does i Italy 1986 — — — 1982 79 1 20 1978 80 0 20 Egypt 1986 — — — 1982 90 1 8 1978 91 0 9 West Germany 1986 98 0 2 1982 98 1 1 1978 98 0 1 Iran 1986 — — — 1982 60 2 38 1978 92 1 7 Japan 1986 98 0 2 1982 97 1 2 1978 99 0 1 Mexico 1986 96 0 4 1982 98 1 2 1978 90 0 10 Appendix 3 287 Table A.3.8 (Continued) Israel Syria India Canada Brazil Great Britain Saudi Arabia China (PRC) France Taiwan (Formosa) South Korea Poland South Africa Year Does Don't know Does i 1986 86 0 14 1982 92 1 8 1978 91 1 8 1986 — — — 1982 46 3 52 1978 — — — 1986 55 1 44 1982 57 3 40 1978 55 2 43 1986 96 0 4 1982 95 1 4 1978 95 1 4 1986 63 1 36 1982 80 2 19 1978 74 2 25 1986 94 0 6 1982 97 1 2 1978 94 0 5 1986 88 1 11 1982 93 1 6 1978 95 0 5 1986 89 0 11 1982 87 1 12 1978 93 1 6 1986 82 0 18 1982 84 1 15 1978 90 0 10 1986 48 1 51 1982 44 3 54 1978 55 2 43 1986 80 1 19 1982 66 3 31 1978 70 2 28 1986 — — — 1982 48 3 50 1978 42 3 55 1986 63 2 36 1982 54 3 43 1978 62 1 37 1986 — — — 1982 53 3 44 1978 59 2 38 Nigeria 288 Faces of Internationalism Table A.3.8 (Concluded) Year Does Don't know Does not Philippines 1986 81 1 18 1982 — — — 1978 — — — Nicaragua 1986 63 1 36 1982 — — — 1978 — — — Jordan 1986 — — — 1982 67 2 31 1978 — — — Lebanon 1986 — — — 1982 74 3 23 1978 — — — Panama 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 66 1 33 Soviet Union 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 95 1 4 Turkey 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 75 1 24 Cuba 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 69 2 30 Rhodesia 1986 — — — 1982 — — — 1978 49 3 48 Note: dashes (—) indicate the question was not asked. Appendix 4 Logistic Regression Analyses of the Relationship Between Foreign Policy Beliefs and Policy Preferences, Pooled Samples, 1974—86 Table A.4.1 The Relationship Between Americans' Attitudes Toward the Role and Place of the United States in World Affairs, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology Controlled Foreign Policy Party Political Model Beliefs Identification Ideology chi-square; “ Repub- Inde- Conserv- Mod- _ ,P ercent Percent o o rH rH O IN o IN ,_ r o CO rsl rsi H LD nO ID rH LO NO LO z u^ n 00 NO ID CN CO NO LO CN rsi r4 n rH CN CN CN rH CN CN CN rH o Si NO co Us o rH CO CN LO o ON 0-3 IN Us CO NO IN Us Us Us LO NO LO 01 > -*H LO - CN LO NO ^^ _ CO _ r—l IN ON CN O G i—i CN CO NO IN ON NO rH Us lO CN LO Us nO O NO CN NO NO LO LO CO 00 00 O' 00 LO T—< IN LO ON rH O^ oi X NO no CO o LO CO rH CN o G- G ON i—i Ci 00 rH sO T—1 o '*—•' ON LO Us LO LO v —" ’l* Ci 00 LO u^ 1 LO LO CN rH i 00 Us CN LO CN 'l* CO o Us IN l O' Cl NO LO ON nO 00 ON rH CO CN +z G o i 1 1 f 1 1 1 1 0/ CO l. 0» vocooco no in 2 O rH co CN rH rH rH 04 rH O CN O 00 (N Us CN O' O' O 1 -H O 1—I O r-H * o rsi \D CO r—< rH ON 3 o IN O t-H c 0» 13 C o CL c co • u U x n in rn co cm sO r—< CO rH CO rH b (N b ^ co ^ tn H n H cN 1 * * -—' * -—- in to x m t* ld O o x o o * * •on * 'OT' n m n m o no LO O LD O o o Pi o Osl -so 0 s Tf O sO O' ON o ON o Os O CO ' O CO rsl rsi lo co o rsi ON T ‘f o o o LO rsi o o ^ o *0 o LO rsi o o lo CN O IN o LO o O on n sD ^ n ^ —< o Us. LD o o NO ON o o in co ON T t l O o o ^ *-< o SO ON o o CO CO CO CO O 1— in o 2 o O C/3 ★ * _ _ v ★ * * ^^ ★ s ★ ^ ★ ^^ * ★ a> 13 ON ON LO CO ON IN rH On LO rH CO IN 00 rH CO rH LO On O' rH IN ON LO CN LO CN LO CO o rH rH CN o O CN CN rH 00 rH ON *—* CT3 rsi G' CO o CO s_3 CO rH s3 r-i —^ rH —^ rH S-J^ — —^ O —^ 0/ -- - 1 | | | _) NO CN 00 nO CN 00 NO CN 00 00 00 Us IN 00 00 Us Us 00 00 In Us ON On ON On ON ON ON ON O' On ON ON rH rH rH rH 11 T—1 T_H 1 r_H rH CO Cl 01 > ’•C u 03 c 03 13 C 03 O' G 13 03 03 O CL £ 0i ra a -2 .1 5 0» £ S s 01 E *- Qj >s rr\ 5 2 CO "3 G cm l - >s — 01 ^ s <3 c^3 3 0 ^ 2 s ■3 tfi In ch ^ 01 i- ai 5 • O co CO ^ D CL CL O 00 ^ 03 1/3 G 1 - 03 SI Cl 0 c 13 u c c In ’ H CT 3 0/ 0) -a L Q G (0 f— 03 0/ ^E "G 0 2 0 CL g t- 0 00 CO c CO C /3 +H L L C /3 C /3 O C /3 CO 01 CL H 2 >s E (0 0 G C /3 >s Li a/ C /3 CO CO 3 0 V 3 h L c O' 13 CO cn > 0i > L "l 0 ca 0 D Cl CL CL 290 IN CN IN LO t-H co HH CN CN T-h O OV CN vD LO vO IN CN IN LO t-h CO T-H CN CN pH T-H IN 00 00 IN LO O vO O CO vO vO CN CN CN T-H IN Ov IN vO LO vO vO T-H CN CN CN CO LO CM CN CN t-h 00 00 IN IN IN IN CO _ v IN s LO ^ IN ^ IN LO ^ IN ^ OV ^^ LO ^-v T-H ^^ 00 IN o' Ov vO T-H 1 r "J Ov CO CO ^H Ov 1 ^ vO O T-H vO 1 ^ vO CO Ov t-h 00 00 a Ov IN 1 LO CO 00 a a CN 1 00 IN O LO co IN 1 CN IN 00 T-H 00 00 LO t-H o w w LO T-H CO OV ^ T*< LO ^ CN LO ^ O CN CO CO ON IN CN IN LO LO O Ov CO o OV o CN 1 ^ r-J 1 ^ CN IN 1 ^ T-h 1 1 T-H 1 T-H T-H 1 1 1 T-H X—V * ✓—v * ,—V * co T-H o T-H vO IN ^ r-H LO vO O^ CO ^ 00 o 00 vO CO *- C in 1 M C -t-> 03 S 2 o--o £ HE — o & in 03 3 O X QJ £ O CL Lf) 73 X C X 03 O Oh £ n in *-< 03 0J • ■ QJ 03 C' C 73 C >> * .£ s C.H , S o o ^ Q, u C X 1) u 3 £ 73 CD u Cl, TO C •n D H z r z SI -C u cl £ a ) o £ i- a/ £-£ v Cl C u 3 | •S o o ^ Cl 2 fa Cl > l 0/ f C o U . c a» a* -a 13 c c —< a» Cl ■§ e a. S cS ~ >, u o C/3 C- V c — ■5 m L o UL U a j T3 ra at — On , _ s X tx _ s o _ s r—l ^^ sO r J o X o tx o q i—< fN CO CO OC tx o T“* d OC d 00 CO OC rsi tx — '—' 3 v —■" sO tx O' X o r i rsi fN in CO fN m fN tx in X On IX o ON q q sO q •— 1 fN 1 1 1 r j 1 1 1 *—< 1 * * * O Tf* X o fN sC 3 s o n? o rsT 'l* fN r—' fN r—* T-H fN fN r—> tx in W ' -—' 1 " -' 1 --- 1 ★ * * ★ * * * O X nT fN O' O CO sO co' X T-H CO •'t X fN in r—< q in O' —✓ >o O —✓ o ^ co co f-1 tx rsi fN r-< (N n x (N co tx ,—< sc ^ o co in co o ci in in o U in so o o co rsi O fN sO O' m o m co o * «•—-» * * x m n m n fN O fN O CO Cl I tx m f-. rsi in sC o sO sO in o m I tX r—■ m m in o co I in ci ON tX ci m Tt o o so in on CM fN sO O r- IX lx ^ rsl IX sO rf* r-< Cl m sO fN X sO fN X X X tx tx X X tx O' ON O' O' O' O' O' 13 c Qi CL 13 C 0/ CL c L* a» u 'tr fa •S f 13 3 C w s, ^ x £ c 0/ St_ a/ 13 U fa _Q a» 13 ^ •q CL o a» 2 a/ *“ s/ c/3 13- a; oc £ £ 0/ £ C/3 Cl a» a/ 3 ^ ^ 13 13 C 2 fa I - C/3 w- a/ &c £ .5 292 (.16) (.06) (.06) (.15) (.12) (.15) (.13) (3.4) 1974 .20 .25* -.64* -.19 -.09 -1.25* -.91* .14 225.71 71 1,235 (.18) (.08) (.07) (.18) (.15) (.19) (.16) (0.6) In CO On IN IN i 1 1 1 O 1 IN LO 1 1 1 1 q 1 CN CN CN CO r—1 | 1 1 1 NO 1 00 IN 1 1 1 1 NO 1 o CN q oo oo 1 1 1 1 q q' 1 CN r—1 T-H LO 1 1 1 CO LO 1 LO (N CO H r-H s — y r-H r-H IN On o q q I 1 1 1 LO 1 r— < 1 r-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 k ON ^ o oT o <“ H CN r-H r-H r-H 1 1 1 1 r-H T-H 1 ^ 1 N —' 1 1 1 1 '—' 1 k 00 LO CN oT ON oT CO h q r-H I 1 1 1 r-H T-H 1 1 1 1 1 1 * ON CO On O ON O T-H hh lo r-H 1 1 1 1 q T-H 1 ' ' " ’ 1 1 1 1 1 1 * —v * LO co o CnT r-H r-H co H q r-H I 1 1 1 q r-H 1 ' '—' 1 1 1 1 i N —' 1 ,-v * ★ 00 LO i £ co "3 X 53 C X b o -o £ X c a i a» X 03 V- X CD c 03 o c C a» > X J-H a i «s > 'u 00 > C/5 J-. C3 O -C ^ & c > o Cl c c nat Lh a» 00 c o &> § 03 >- 4-r 4J ^3 cn "f0 c 1) a> c expla J- o > o CO 0) u c 0) o 2 293 CD N4—I ~QJ CQ m U "o Ph c SP ’£ Vh o Uh Tj < r- Sc '5 Ih o Uh <8 O -T-J £ C H a: CX co .hr X • CD < g CT3 a; cd 3 '■£ C3 03 H Cu oc 00 00 00 CO CN m CN o m ON IN 00 X vO o 00 m 1 "T 00 m Z X 2 co CN VO in CO 1 m cq CN CN CN CN CN CN r—H* CN CN rH c 73 a i 2 O' o o sO O' 00 00 co 1 CN in CO £ £ X £ ^ X IN IN CN sO X NO IN 1 X NO NO QJ , i- U C3 C Si - OC ^ ' X ^ ' 00 . IN in ON CN CO CO NO T3 -J C u X LO q co i—t IN q q 00 r-H CO cc q r-H IN 1 q Cn rsj 1-H q q o srs l- V n. c 00 LO o o 00 IN 00 00 CO d CN Cn IN 1 d CN nC r-H in > i cy - c o r-H CN nJ IN r-H -1- ■■—■ 00 CN CN CN o CN IN ■—' CO CS 00 00 ~ e "7 '*■*'' m ' ■" in co rf '—' CO '—' CN ' ' r—* CN CJ • X CN CO in 00 in o r-H CO Cn Qj Cl. tN 2 IN ON CN q in 1 Cn in in £ Q-» CJ 1 r-J 1 T-i 1 1 1 1 * * 1 * 1 * * 1 a> CN rT CO CO IN o r7 CN CN CN CN 00 Cn nT r-H r-H r—H 3 s 73 r 13 l— CD hh ' CN <-• CN 1 '~ i CN r-H co t“H — 1 r-H q r-H 1 CO r-H r-H r-H CO rH In 03 bO w 2 1 '— 1 -—' 1 1 '—' '-' 1 -- 1 ' 1 w W X o ■*-* i — «n > * ,—, * ^^ ^^ ^^ * ^^ s ,,_^ O 2 J- Qj ON (N co o CO m —■ CO CN CN CO CO CN o r-H Cn CN CO CN ON 00 x 2 CU N CD X tN q m q CN q CN (N q q r-H q r-H CO CN 1 q c 1 i 1 c 13 1 l 1 1 u a_, r- * * ^-s v y—V * c ii x P a j i i 1 ■*- CJ V- 03 X Cl- ■*-* Cl ★ * ★ * * * ★ ^ c X c CN ?—< O' nT m CN m 00 X r—< o CN co CN nO 00 00 rH CO r-H CN X V c rr. —< r—i r-* CN r-H r-H r-H CO r-H in r-H o r-H CO r-H 1 in r-H CO •-H r-H r-H 2 a. o o O * o o O' O- o ■O 1 O- _^ _1 0) ;3 0£ 1 1 * •k * * * _ -' * ^ ' * * ^^ * _ - _ * * IN in \D in CN IN CO 00 in CN m IN m r-H 00 rH q CN CN NO u •~~ l q o q CN q CO q IN q sO q q q 00 q 1 q CO q CO q O CD 2 ° ° 1 X L4— 1; c bp a» •k ★ * * * ★ * * * * X in in X m sC IN ON in in in in in in Cn on 00 m Tf Cn ’ey i—i q o nO o q o q o o o CN o CN o CO o 1 H o H o CO O o u o — ^ o X O' * o o o o 1 o o o X CD * it ★ * * * ★ * * Vr * r-H Co o O' 00 00 00 co ON R CN lFT IN in X On' o X s CO (n CN 00 T3 IN CN IN CO r-H CN in CO q r-H CN O IN 1 q CO q q 03 X O CN CN o X O' X O' r-H ■O r-H O- O' 1 r-H o r—. —i —^ cy X X CN 00 x CN 00 rf X CN 00 00 OC IN tN 00 00 Cn IN oc OC Cn Cn On ON O' ON ON ON ON ON On ON ON O' ~ 1 T_H r-H rH *“• r-H rH rH 1—1 q 6 CJ 0) 2 CJ 1-4 cy _c c >— C a» O X o £ V4- CJ o q- 2 £ 2 T3 2 cr CJ C 2 Oi E 03 kN l_l b o c 03 C3 c CL> o £ o 7Z3 CJ 0) CL E E bC JO bJO bJD CD c C *> ‘5b Ol > a» 0) CJ c c ’> 'bb CD C 2 CD o H3 c In .CJ 03 >— c U. i_ o c _CD o o O 01 > c CD > *J0 > _c 03 o CD CC3 03 fC X c 03 Uh c Uh o 294 Note: see explanatory note with table A.4.1. Table A. 4.4 The Relationship Between Americans' Attitudes Toward the Reagan Doctrine, Aid to Israel, and Coping with Illegal Drugs, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology Controlled, 1982 and 1986 o o o _ IN IN 1 IN 2 vO 1 X 1 X CN CN CN c 13 Perce pre- dicte X 1 O I IN 1 IN X CJ i J-4 qj 03 c 2- X ^^ X CN -n 3 c & IN CN | IN CN X-H C0 o cr N: rn r 5- 0> r> <- « 1 T—( L£^ 1 CD X > i c £ £ CN CD CD CJ , 4-» On 00 a> D- O 1 00 1 CN c CN l-H in rH "C 4-> CN rH I H r—, CN T - ^ c 03 O ■p bo Jh o* 1 .y o •S o > ie _ s _ s ie o 6J J- aj rH X CN r—1 r-H a, 2 cj ■> CD X ID o 1 o T—( 1 3 T-H C C la 1 1 w u 4_, r. ie * c 2 0» O X X LO cj •—• on o o o 1 X o O C/3 s 1 1 CU -4-1 0» c 3d ID * ON ID X 01 *—1 rH q | q O 1 o o o U 1 •X 1 1 PL CD ie 1 ★ 0) T3 00 X X C3 LO On q | r—< <-1 1 IN rH * —^ 1 I o 0» 1 1 X X CN X CN X 00 00 00 00 00 on ON On ON ON 1 rH T-H C/3 o j-< C X c 3 01 C/3 13 G X 13 M) u ° ;-X 4-J C 3 X E x c 3 01 X Dx 03 CJ g '■*- Jh ^ g 3 X CJ '§ 60 _c X S ^ > o O c 60 v 13 ^ Vx O o- £ 01 J-X o 4—* 35 C/3 1/3 O c o CJ 0> 0> O 3 u Jh C/3 X to x E —X c/3 O o> ’p c •f X O 0> 2 CJ o c o CJ 0» 01 to X 3 X o> 3 3 o c oi 3 0 E E o > '5b 6 ^ o c ^ 4-> C C/3 3 *£ > ’5b >- o 4—> D-. ““ 3 T5 “ C > '5b U J-< 2 3 x r J C 3 u £ o c 13 3 3 3 4-x 03 •5 -y 3 3 3 X o J-X C o b c o 60 _C X C/3 fr'S c S F S 3 sc > E .S oo ef* 03 X C/3 03 3 c £ ° £ c X C/3 u.s. 1 cn b milil Corr (eco X D X 60 X CO o rH LO CO CO LO LO X LO IN (J CD 60 C/3 E Jh 3 o X 13 a> C/3 03 0 o U C/3 Jh OI c 3 Jh 13 3 b D Jh 13 CC3 03 c V4 3 03 CL 13 c D- J-4 u ai 03 •4H 60 QJ O CD CC3 D X 13 o a. 773 1 O 3 £ ai X 13 a/ C/3 ai > ’5b CJ X o c 03 X CJ C/3 3 CD 3 ir 3 03 CJ 3 Jh 3 X 03 3 CJ c X o X CJ C D O ’£ X D o 3 o *s C/3 X c o X CJ c —, a» E C/3 60 CD C/3 Jh CO X D C/3 03 C/3 b o ■4H Jh CJ b o I I I I I I I I CN 00 ON -o c 03 CJ e o c o u CD c a» £ c CJ > O to -a CJ 4-> Jh O CL 295 Table A. 4.5 The Relationship Between Americans' Attitudes Toward Intervention Abroad and Related Issues, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology Controlled c o U lx 01 Cx a j •*-> cr £ ? s a> u. xX CO X 0 CO O' CO O' ,__ 0 O' in 1 r ^ in 1 1 tN in z 0 CN CN 0 1 ^ 1 CN CN CN CN CN CN CN CN ^3 Zj vO CO in rx 1 0 CN I 1 ^ ON u 'O sO In IN 1 IN tN | 1 X IN > p CN tN ^ O O ^ — CN ^ X X 0 53 i_ zj IN 0 0 CO tN in CN 1 ^ ^ 1 1 ^ sO r-< n I 1 ^ a- g £ O' 0 in XX IN CN r-^ 1 sO 0 GC CN 1 1 tN LO^ CN CS 1 vC IN CO ''-X' CO ^ CN XX CN O' sC CN CN CO CN lx X IN in IN CO rx X sO IN tN It Cl. 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E b £ 8 o ^ u o o c 5/5 c c 2 vSi "a o> o -o X 0- ^ o c Er o o 2 298 Table A.4.7 The Relationship Between Americans' Attitudes Toward Terrorism, with Foreign Policy Beliefs, Partisanship, and Political Ideology Controlled, 1978 and 1986 C , T 3 i £ 04 CO o IN 01 Cl, ■3 ^ c u o i LO 1 1 rH 1 1 1 ^ 3 | •S o o ^ cf 2 c o ^3 J- 03 TH ^ c oi T 3 T3 O 2 - <11 ai > o ^ U . c Qj 01 73 T3 C C •—I 01 Oh ■§ C Cl- cj o CD c 1=5 01 ^ u. o CL, U 01 73 03 01 —1 rH IN LO | ON | 00 I 1 ^ 1 ^ 04 04 04 04 r —1 1 vO 1 1 vO vO vO 1 IN LT> CO IN 04 vO On rH O ^ o CO t—I IN Tt< o o o o ON vb IN rH 01 -4-> •2 o bO 01 c 3 O J= c o c ^ 5) P o LO 04 04 O 04 rH C> rH CO rH LT) ^ i-i O CO ^ ^ o GO \0 CO rH 00 CO 04 04 VO r—t IN O 04 r-H 04 ON CO o O Tf 1-1 o LOt LO CO P-H < u 0» -C O) 73 73 3 o JZ o .2 .CD &\h 03 © N C F >- C QJ _ os +* £ o O 01 -4-» CD CD <3 3 'C -C 73 2 § s 5 ’5 2 C _c CO "os On CM LT) O 04 rH VO Tt CO rH LO LO 04 O ^ LO rH O rt< LO O rH VO 00 VO 00 VO 00 VO 00 00 IN 00 IN 00 IN 00 IN Os ON ON ON ON ON ON ON rH rH rH rH rH rH CD o ‘C o J-H L- 1 CD 03 01 u l—> l- o 03 cd L- OJ T5 01 4—1 o CD C CD CD o J-H o 0> £ E % £ O IS 03 CD , ^ ^ > E c u 01 "G 3 c O CT.S £ 2 ^ QJ 6jo ^ 03 C • -H ~ 3 CL, o 299 Note: see explanatory note with table A.4.1. 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Stop Stay out Date communism of war No opinion 7/51 63 29 8 2/52 67 27 6 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Table A.5.2 Attitudes Toward Helping Other Countries Should Communist Armies Attack Them, 1950-52 (percentages) If Communist armies attack any other countries in the world, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend these countries, like we did in Korea? Date Stay out Help defend Depends No opinion 9/50 14 66 15 5 12/50 28 48 15 9 8/51 28 53 13 6 12/51 30 52 13 5 6/52 33 45 16 6 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 305 306 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.3 Attitudes Toward Foreign Economic Aid as an Instrument of Anticommunism, 1955-57 (percentages) A: As you may know, the United States has been sending economic aid—like machinery and supplies—to countries that have agreed to stand with us against Communist aggression. Do you think we should continue to send economic aid to these countries, or not? (NORC) B: Do you think we should or should not continue to send economic aid—like machinery and supplies—to countries that have agreed to stand with us against Communist aggression? (NORC) C: Congress is now debating what should be done to keep Russia from getting control of the countries in the Middle East. . . . Would you approve or disapprove if the United States gave economic—that is, financial—aid to the countries in the Middle East area that are friendly to the United States? (Gallup) D: We have also sent economic aid to some countries like India, which have not joined us as allies against the Communists. Do you think we should continue to send economic aid to these countries, or not? (NORC) Favorable Not Don't know/ Date Wording response favorable no opinion 1/55 A 78 17 5 10/55 A 79 16 5 1/56 A 80 14 6 4/56 B 87 9 4 9/56 B 86 11 3 11/56 B 90 7 3 1/57 C 69 18 12 4/57 B 81 16 3 1/56 D 53 40 7 4/56 D 43 50 7 6/56 D 48 48 4 9/56 D 43 49 8 11/56 D 46 47 7 12/56 D 52 43 5 4/57 D 40 54 6 Appendix 5 307 Table A.5.4 Attitudes Toward Foreign Economic Aid as an Instrument of Economic Development, 1949-55, 1974-86 (percentages) A: In general, do you think it is a good policy for the United States to try to help backward countries in the world to raise their standard of living, or shouldn't this be any concern of our government? (NORC) B: Do you think the United States should or should not send economic aid to friendly countries in Asia, to help them develop their countries? (NORC) C: On the whole, do you favor or oppose our giving economic aid to other nations for purposes of economic development and technical assistance? (1974: Harris; 1978-86: Gallup) Favorable Not Don't know/ Date Wording response favorable not sure 3/49 A 72 23 5 11/49 A 75 20 5 4/50 A 73 22 5 7/50 B 63 28 9 11/50 A 62 31 7 4/51 B 71 21 8 2/52 A 69 27 4 8/52 A 73 23 4 3/55 A 79 18 3 12/74 C 52 37 10 11/78 C 46 41 13 11/82 c 50 39 11 11/86 c 53 36 11 308 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.5 Attitudes Toward Sending Military Aid and Supplies to Asia, 1948-52 (percentages) A: In China there is a serious civil war now going on between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese government. Do you think we should try to help the Chinese government by sending them military supplies, or should we stay out of it? B: In China there is a serious civil war now going on between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese government. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending military supplies to help the Chinese government against the Communists? C: Do you think the United States should send military supplies to help those governments in Asia that [which] are threatened by communism? D: Thinking of other countries in Asia besides Korea, do you think the United States should send military supplies to help those governments in Asia that are threatened by communism? E: Do you think the United States should send military supplies to help those countries in Asia which are threatened by communism? Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know 2/48 A 32 60 8 3/48 A 41 46 13 4/48 B 55 32 13 6/49 B 40 48 12 8/49 B 43 45 12 6/50 C 55 35 10 7/50 D 65 24 11 10/50 C 61 22 17* 12/50 c 51 27 22’ 1/51 c 58 24 18* 4/51 c 58 25 17* 6/52 E 54 29 17* Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). * Includes "depends on the country." Appendix 5 309 Table A.5.6 Attitudes Toward Sending Military Supplies to Western Europe, 1949-56 (percentages) A: Would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending military supplies to the countries of Western Europe now, in order to strengthen them against any future attack? B: Do you approve or disapprove of the United States sending military supplies to the countries of Western Europe now, in order to strengthen them against any future attack? C: Do you approve or disapprove of sending military supplies to the countries of Western Europe? Favorable Not Date Wording response favorable Don't know 3/49 A 55 36 9 4/49 A 43 46 11 6/49 A 47 44 9 6/49 A 51 40 9 8/49 A 47 44 9 9/49 A 48 44 8 1/50 B 55 37 8 3/50 B 53 38 9 4/50 B 61 32 7 6/50 B 62 32 6 7/50 B 73 21 6 10/50 B 69 25 6 11/50 B 72 22 6 12/50 B 71 21 8 1/51 B 75 18 7 3/51 B 76 19 5 5/51 C 70 24 6 11/51 C 64 29 7 6/52 C 71 23 6 10/55 C 66 28 6 11/55 C 69 25 6 11/56 C 65 30 5 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 310 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.7 Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War, 1966-73 (percentages) In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam? Date Yes No Don't know 3/66 25 59 16 5/66 36 49 15 9/66 35 48 17 11/66 31 51 18 2/67 32 52 16 5/67 37 50 13 7/67 41 48 11 10/67 47 44 9 2/68 46 42 12 3/68 49 41 10 4/68 48 40 12 8/68 53 35 12 10/68 54 37 9 2/69 52 39 9 10/69 58 32 10 1/70 57 33 10 4/70 51 34 15 5/70 56 36 8 1/71 59 31 10 5/71 61 28 11 1/73 60 29 11 Source: The Gallup Poll. Appendix 5 311 Table A.5.8 Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War by Party Identification, 1966-73 (percentages) In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam? Yes No Date Republican Independent Democrat Republican Independent Democrat 3/66 27 27 24 56 59 60 5/66 42 37 32 47 49 50 9/66 42 32 32 43 49 51 11/66 34 32 28 52 50 52 5/67 43 41 31 45 47 55 7/67 51 46 33 41 43 55 10/67 54 48 41 37 44 48 2/68 53 47 41 39 40 45 3/68 53 54 43 39 39 46 4/68 52 52 43 39 38 43 8/68 58 54 50 31 37 37 10/68 57 53 52 35 38 40 2/69 54 59 47 36 35 44 10/69 57 60 59 35 30 31 1/70 53 64 56 36 30 32 4/70 49 57 49 38 33 33 5/70 54 55 58 38 37 33 1/71 61 60 59 32 31 30 5/71 58 60 64 31 29 27 1/73 54 58 64 35 31 26 Source: The Gallup Poll. 312 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.9 Public Views of the Morality of the Vietnam War (percentages) A: The war in Vietnam is morally wrong and we should get out as fast as possible. (Harris) B: Do you think it is morally right or morally wrong for the U.S. to be fighting in Vietnam? (Harris) C: The Vietnam War was more than a mistake; it was fundamentally wrong and immoral. (Gallup) Date Wording Agree Disagree Not sure/don't know 10/69 A 44 46 10 12/69 A 39 51 10 1/71 B 47 36 17 4/71 B 58 29 13 10/71 B 65 21 14 11/78 C 72 20 9 11/82 C 72 22 7 11/86 c 66 27 7 Note: for the 1971 surveys, the response "wrong" is equated with agree, and "right" with disagree. In the 1978 to 1986 surveys, "agree strongly" and "agree somewhat" are equated with agree, and "disagree strongly" and "disagree somewhat" are equated with disagree. Appendix 5 313 Table A.5.10 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend Western Europe, 1947-49, 1970-86 (percentages) A: Suppose some small European country were attacked by Russia. Would you approve or disapprove of the United States sending armed forces along with other countries to stop the attack? (NORC) B: Suppose some big country attacks a Western European nation. Would you approve or disapprove of the United States using its armed forces to help stop the attack? (NORC) C: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of Western Europe. Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) D: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if Western Europe were invaded you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (Harris) E: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. How about if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe. [Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops?] (Roper) F: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd Eke to ask your opinion about several different situations. [W]ould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Soviet troops invaded Western Europe? (Gallup) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Not sure/no opinion/don't know 6/47 A 52 28 20* 4/49 B 55 25 20* 2/70 C 50 33 17 2/73 C 43 43 14 12/74 D 40 40 21 5/75 D 67 23 10 7/78 E 43 43 14 11/78 F 54 33 14 2/80 E 60 27 13 11/82 F 64 36 ** 11/86 F 68 24 8 * Includes qualified response. ** Included in unfavorable responses. 314 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.11 Attitudes Toward the Sending of American Troops to Defend Western Europe, 1950-51 (percentages) A. Do you approve or disapprove of the idea of sending large numbers of American troops to help build up the defense of Western Europe? B. Do you approve or disapprove of the idea of sending American troops to help build up the defense of Western Europe? Favorable Not No Date Wording response favorable opinion 9/50 A 57 35 8 12/50 A 36 56 8 1/51 A 41 49 10 3/51 B 54 39 7 4/51 B 57 34 9 5/51 B 56 40 4 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Appendix 5 315 Table A.5.12 Attitudes Toward the Mutual Defense of Europe and North America, 1949-56 (percentages) A: Well, as you say [as you probably know], under this pact the countries of Western Europe, Canada and the United States would agree to defend each other against any attack. Now it's up to the United States Senate to vote for or against the treaty. How do you feel about it—are you in favor of the North Atlantic treaty, or against it? B: As you may recall, the United States signed an agreement with Canada and the countries of Western Europe last year, to defend each other against any attack. How do you feel about this treaty now—Do you think it's a good idea or a bad idea to have this agreement? C: As you may recall, the United States has an agreement with Canada and the countries of Western Europe, to defend each other against any attack. How do you feel about this treaty now—Do you think it's a good idea to have this treaty? D: As you know, the United States has an agreement with the countries of Western Europe, to defend each other against any attack. How do you feel about this treaty—is it a good idea, or a bad idea? E: [H]ow about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, sometimes called NATO. Under this treaty, the United States and the countries of Western Europe have agreed to defend each other against any attack. Do you think this agreement is a good idea, or a bad idea? Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable No opinion 4/49 A 76 12 12 6/49 A 76 12 12 6/49 A 77 10 13 3/50 B 81 9 10 7/50 B 87 6 7 12/50 B 78 10 12 8/51 C 85 7 9 6/53 D 84 9 7 5/54 D 86 6 8 10/55 D 80 ii 9 11/55 D 87 6 7 4/56 E 82 8 10 11/56 D 81 12 7 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 316 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.13 Attitudes Toward the Defense of Southeast Asia, 1954 (percentages) A: How would you feel about the United States signing an agreement for the defense of Southeast Asia, along with such countries as the Philippines, Siam, and Australia—would you approve or disapprove? B: Do you think the United States should do all it can to organize the defense of countries in Southeast Asia, like Siam and Burma—or should we avoid such further involvement in Asia? C: This treaty [the Southeast Asian Defense Treaty which our government recently signed, along with the Philippines, Siam, and Pakistan] is to help defend these Southeast Asia countries against Communist attack. Do you approve or disapprove of our signing this treaty? Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable No opinion 6/54 A 58 24 18 9/54 B 55 30 15 11/54 C 76 8 16 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Table A.5.14 Attitudes Toward Keeping Communism from Taking Over Europe or Asia, 1951-53 (percentages) In general, which do you think is more important for the United States to do—to keep the Communists from taking over Asia, or to keep the Communists from taking over Europe? Date Asia Europe Equally Neither Don't know 4/51 16 32 35 2 15 5/53 15 43 30 2 10 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Appendix 5 317 Table A.5.15 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend Yugoslavia, 1951, 1969-80 (percentages) A: If Communist armies were to attack Yugoslavia, do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them? (NORC) B: Suppose Yugoslavia were invaded by outside Communist military forces—would you favor the U.S. helping Yugoslavia or staying out? (Harris) C: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if the Soviet Union attacked Yugoslavia after Tito's death you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (Harris) D: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia? (Gallup) E: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. How about if Soviet troops invaded Yugoslavia. [Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops?] (Roper) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Not sure/ no opinion/ don't know/ 8/51 A 42 37 21 4/69 B 27 52 21 12/74 C 11 64 25 7/78 E 16 67 17 11/78 D 18 66 16 1/80 C 36 48 16 2/80 E 31 47 22 Table A.5.16 Attitudes Toward the Defense of Iran, 1951 and 1973 (percentages) A. If Communist armies were to attack Iran [Persia], do you think the United States should stay out of it, or should we help defend them? (NORC) B. Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of Iran. Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) Date Wording Defend/ favor Stay out/ oppose No opinion/ not sure 3/51 A 48 30 22 8/51 A 47 34 19 2/73 B 23 57 20 318 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.17 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend South Korea and Nationalist China, 1969-86 (percentages) A: It the Chinese Communists attack Formosa, do you think the United States should help defend Formosa, even if other countries do not join with us? (NORC) B: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of South Korea/Formosa. Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) C: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if North Korea attacked South Korea/Communist China invaded Formosa (Taiwan) you would favor or oppose U.S. military' involvement? (Harris) D: The U.S. has 36,000 troops and airmen in South Korea. If North Korea invaded South Korea, we have a firm commitment to defend South Korea with our own military' forces. If South Korea were invaded by Communist North Korea, would you favor or oppose the U.S. using troops, air power, and naval power to defend South Korea? (Harris) E: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. How about if North Korea invaded South Korea/Mainland China invaded Nationalist China (the island of Taiwan). [Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops]? (Roper) F: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [W]ould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if North Korea invaded South Korea/ Mainland China invaded Nationalist China (the island of Taiwan)? (Gallup) G: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [WJould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the People's Republic of China invaded Taiwan? (Gallup) H: Suppose Formosa were invaded by outside Communist military forces—would you favor the U.S. helping Formosa or staying out? (Harris) Appendix 5 319 Table A.5.17 (Continued) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Not sure/ no opinion/ don't know South Korea 2/69 B 48 24 28 2/73 B 25 59 16 12/74 C 15 64 22 5/75 C 28 52 20 6/75 D 40 45 15 7/78 E 19 69 13 11/78 F 21 63 15 11/82 F 22 78 * 11/86 F 24 64 12 Formosa/Taiwan/ 1/56 A 54 34 12 Nationalist China 2/69 B 38 36 26 4/69 H 42 37 21 2/73 B 27 54 19 12/74 C 17 58 25 5/75 C 21 56 24 7/78 E 16 68 16 11/78 F 20 64 16 11/82 G 18 82 * 11/86 G 19 64 17 * Included in unfavorable responses. 320 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.18 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend Canada, Australia, japan, and India, 1969-86 (percentages) A: Suppose . . . were invaded by outside Communist military forces—would you favor the U.S. helping ... or staying out? (Harris) B: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of. . . . Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops? (Harris) C: There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel if Canada were invaded/ Communist China attacked India you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement? (Harris) D: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of. . . . Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) E: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Japan were invaded by the Soviet Union? (Gallup) F: Suppose Australia were going to be taken over by the Communists—would you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to keep Australia from being taken over? (Harris) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Not sure/ no opinion Canada 4/69 A 79 12 10 2/70 B 81 12 7 2/73 B 65 23 11 12/74 C 78 11 11 5/75 C 81 11 9 Australia 2/70 B 48 34 18 1/71 F 48 37 16 2/73 B 40 44 15 Japan 2/69 D 39 21 40 2/73 B 32 53 15 11/78 E 42 45 13 11/82 E 51 49 * 11/86 E 53 36 11 India 2/69 D 33 40 27 4/69 A 37 40 23 2/73 B 22 59 19 12/74 C 17 58 25 * Included in unfavorable responses. Appendix 5 321 Table A.5.19 Attitudes Toward the Use of Troops to Defend Israel, 1968-80 (percentages) A: If a full-scale war were to start there, do you think the United States should or should not send troops to help Israel? (Gallup) B: Suppose war breaks out again between Israel and the Arab countries. What if it looked as though Israel would be overrun by the Arabs with Russian help, do you think the U.S. should help Israel or stay out? (Harris) C: Suppose there were a danger of a Communist takeover of Israel. Would you favor or oppose U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops? (Harris) D: If it looked as though Israel were going to be taken over by the Russians and Arabs, do you feel the United States should do everything to save Israel, including going to war, or do you think the U.S. should avoid getting involved with our own troops, even if Israel were going under? (Harris) E: Suppose it looked as though Arabs, with the help of the Russians, were going to take over Israel in the Middle East—would you favor or oppose sending U.S. troops to keep Israel from being taken over? (Harris) F: There has been a lot of discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask you your opinion about several situations. [Wjould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Israel were being defeated by the Arabs? (Harris) G: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. How about if Soviet troops invaded Israel. [Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops?] (Roper) H: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several situations. [W]ould you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if Arab forces invaded Israel? (Gallup) Favorable Not Not sure/no Date Wording response favorable opinion/don't know 7/68 A 9 77 14 4/69 B 44 39 18 2/70 C 27 49 24 10/70 D 34 51 15 1/71 E 39 44 18 7/71 E 25 52 23 2/73 C 31 52 17 12/74 F 27 49 23 7/78 G 21 65 15 11/78 H 17 67 16 2/80 G 35 47 18 11/82 H 30 70 * 11/86 H 33 54 14 Included in unfavorable responses. 322 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.20 Attitudes Toward Military Aid and Sales, 1974-86 (percentages) On the whole, do you favor or oppose our government giving military equipment to other nations? [1982 and 1986: By military aid 1 mean arms and equipment, but not troops.] Date Favor Oppose Not sure/don't know 12/74 23 64 13 11/78 29 58 13 11/82 27 63 9 11/86 33 58 9 On the whole, do you other nations? favor or oppose our government selling military equipment to Date Favor Oppose Not sure/don't know 12/74 35 52 13 11/78 34 54 13 11/82 39 53 8 11/86 37 54 10 Source: 1974: Louis Harris and Associates; 1978-86: The Gallup Poll. Table A.5.21 Attitudes Toward Military Supplies, 1951-56 (percentages) Do you think it's a good idea or a bad idea to send military supplies, like tanks and guns, to help build up the armies of countries that are friendly to us? Date Good Bad Don't know 6/51 65 26 9 10/51 67 26 7 12/52 70 24 6 5/53 76 20 4 9/53 75 20 5 4/56 67 28 5 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Appendix 5 323 Table A.5.22 Attitudes Toward the Korean War, 1950-56 (percentages) A: In view of developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United States made a mistake in deciding to defend Korea, or not? (Gallup) B: Do you think the United States made a mistake in going into the war in Korea, or not? (Gallup) C: As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea has been worth fighting, or not? (NORC) D: As things stand now, do you feel that the war in Korea was worth fighting, or not? (NORC) Date Wording Not worth fighting/mistake Worth fighting/no mistake No opinion/ don't know 8/50 A 20 65 15 1/51 A 49 38 13 3/51 B 50 39 11 3/52 B 51 35 14 11/52 B 43 37 20 10/52 C 56 32 12 11/52 C 58 34 8 12/52 C 52 39 9 4/53 C 55 36 9 6/53 C 58 32 10 8/53 C 62 27 11 11/53 D 50 38 12 11/54 D 51 39 10 9/56 D 41 46 13 324 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.23 Attitudes Toward Nuclear Arms Control Agreements with the Soviet Union, 1977-81 (percentages) Do you favor or oppose a new agreement [12/78: an agreement; 7/79 and 9/79: agreements] between the United States and Russia which would limit nuclear weapons? Date Favor Oppose Not sure 4/77 68 18 14 6/78 67 22 11 8/78 71 22 7 10/78 70 21 9 11/78 71 17 12 12/78 75 17 8 2/79 81 14 5 3/79 71 18 11 4/79 68 22 10 7/79 65 25 10 9/79 62 30 8 10/81 70 21 9 Source: NBC News. Table A.5.24 Attitudes Toward a New SALT Agreement with the Soviet Union, 1975-79 (percentages) A. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. and Russia coming to a new SALT arms control agreement? B. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. and Russia coming to a new SALT arms agreement? Date Wording Favor Oppose Not sure 12/75 A 59 14 27 3/77 A 67 8 25 4/77 A 78 8 14 4/78 A 76 11 13 11/78 B 74 14 12 1/79 B 75 16 9 4/79 A 76 14 10 4/79 B 74 17 9 4/79 B 76 14 10 Source: Louis Harris and Associates. Appendix 5 325 Table A.5.25 Attitudes Toward U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1948-53 (percentages) How do you feel about our dealings with Russia—Do you think the United States should be more willing to compromise with Russia, or is our present policy about right, or should we be even firmer than we are today? Date Compromise About right Even firmer Don't know 4/48 10 19 61 10 6/48 10 26 53 11 11/48 8 23 59 10 1/49 8 22 60 10 6/49 6 27 59 8 3/50 9 15 67 9 4/52 6 24 63 7 5/53 6 24 65 5 8/53 7 19 65 9 11/53 8 24 60 8 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). 326 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.26 Attitudes Toward the Use of Force and Atomic/Nuclear Weapons Against the Soviet Union, 1949-81 (percentages) A: Do you think it would be a good idea or a bad idea for the United States to tell Russia now that we will immediately go to war against her with all our power, if any Communist army attacks any other country? (NORC) B: Suppose the Russian army should attack one of our allies in Western Europe. Would you approve or disapprove of our using hydrogen bombs against Russian cities? (NORC) C: If we get into a big war with Russia, do you think we should use the atom bomb right away, or should we use it only if they bomb us first? (NORC) D: If we did get into a big war with Russia, do you think we should use the atom bomb right away, or should we use it only if they use it first? (NORC) E: If we get into a big war with Russia, do you think we should use the hydrogen bomb right away, or should we use it only if they use it first? (NORC) F: If we had a war with Russia, do you think we should use the hydrogen bomb right away, or should we use it only if they use it first? (NORC) G: If one of our allies in Western Europe were attacked by the Russian army, do you think the United States would be justified in using atomic bombs against Russia? (NORC) H: If Western Europe were threatened with a Russian takeover, would you favor the use of nuclear weapons against the Russians, or not? (Harris) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ not sure 10/49 G 49 38 13 1/50 G 52 37 11 9/50 A 59 31 10 6/51 C 63 22 5 5/52 A 59 31 10 5/52 D 70 19 11* 4/54 B 51 43 6 4/54 E 57 32 11* 4/54 H 51 43 6 1/55 F 44 41 15* 1/55 B 41 47 12 11/55 B 44 48 8 4/79 H 41 51 8 12/81 H 46 47 7 Includes “never use it." Appendix 5 327 Table A.5.27 Opinions About Whether the Soviet Union Will Live up to Agreements with the United States, 1955 (percentages) Do you think we could count on Russia to live up to whatever agreements may result from this [Geneva summit meeting]? Date Yes No No opinion 6/55 23 62 15 8/55 24 63 13 9/55 18 69 13 Source: National Opinion Research Center (NORC). Table A.5.28 Attitudes Toward Expanding Soviet-American Trade, 1953-86 (percentages) A; Should the United States and Russia work out a business arrangement to buy and sell goods to each other? (Gallup) B: Should the United States and Russia work out an arrangement to buy and sell goods to each other? (Gallup) C: Do you approve or disapprove of Americans carrying on trade with Russia, if this trade does not include war material? (NORC) D: Should the United States and Russia work out a business arrangement to buy and sell more goods to each other? (Gallup) E: In a recent meeting with the U.S., Bulganin, the Russian Prime Minister, made these suggestions. Do you think that the U.S. and its Western allies should or should not agree to expand East-West trade? (Gallup) F: Would you favor or oppose agreement between the United States and Russia on expanding trade between the two countries? (Harris) G: Let me read you some possible areas of agreement that might come out of the Nixon- Brezhnev talks in Washington this month. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Expanding trade between the two countries. (Harris) H: Let me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreements between Russia and the United States. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Expanding [1975: expand] trade between the two countries. (Harris) I: For each of these proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Expanding trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. (Harris) ]: Would you favor the U.S. and Russia increasing trade with each other? (Harris) K: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . Restricting U.S.-Soviet trade.* (Gallup) 328 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.28 (Continued) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ not sure 8/53 A 40 48 12 2/54 A 42 44 14 6/55 B 55 29 16 6/56 C 63 32 5 6/57 D 50 33 17 11/57 D 46 33 21 1/58 E 57 21 21 2/59 D 55 27 18 10/63 D 55 33 12 8/70 F 75 14 12 6/71 F 76 14 10 2/72 F 75 12 13 6/73 G 72 14 14 11/73 H 72 16 12 12/74 I 68 21 11 12/75 H 52 25 23 3/77 J 67 16 17 4/78 J 71 17 12 11/78 K* 46 39 14 11/82 H 70 26 4 11/82 K* 40 47 13 11/86 K* 52 37 11 Response categories reversed so "restricting trade" is treated as an unfavorable response. Appendix 5 329 Table A.5.29 Attitudes Toward Selling Wheat and Other Grain to the Soviet Union, 1963-86 (percentages) A: For the first time in many years, the Russians seem willing to ease tensions in the Cold War. Would you favor or oppose. . . . Selling Russia surplus wheat and other food? (Harris) B: [L]et me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreements between Russia and the United States. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Sell wheat to Russia on a long-term basis. (Harris) C: Do you favor or oppose the U.S. selling wheat and other grains to the Soviet Union? (Harris) D: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . Forbidding grain sales to the Soviet Union.* (Gallup) E: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . Increasing grain sales to the Soviet Union. (Gallup) Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ not sure 11/63 A 54 36 9 8/75 B 29 58 13 12/75 B 32 48 20 11/76 C 38 46 16 8/82 C 51 39 10 11/82 D* 57 28 15 11/86 E 57 31 12 Response categories reversed so "forbidding grain sales" is treated as an unfavorable response. 330 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.30 Attitudes Toward Selling Automobiles, Machinery, and Computers to the Soviet Union, 1948-86 (percentages) A: Do you think this country should permit the sale of such things as machinery and automobiles to Russia, in return for things we need from them—or would it be better to stop all trade with Russia? (NORC) B: Do you think this country should permit the sale of such things as machinery and automobiles to Russia, in return for things such as minerals we need from them—or would it be better to stop all trade with Russia? (NORC) C: For the first time in many years, the Russians seem willing to ease tensions in the Cold War. Would you favor or oppose. . . . Selling Russia U.S. automobiles? (Harris) D: For the first time in many years, the Russians seem willing to ease tensions in the Cold War. Would you favor or oppose. . . . Selling Russia machine tools and computers? (Harris) E: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . Limiting the sales of advanced U.S. computers to the Soviet Union. (Gallup)* Favorable Not Don't know/ Date Wording response favorable not sure 7/48 A 31 60 9 9/50 B 19 74 7 9/53 B 25 67 8 11/63 C 51 39 10 11/63 D 37 46 17 11/78 E* 33 51 16 11/82 E* 28 59 13 11/86 E* 33 57 9 * Response categories reversed so "limiting the sales of advanced U.S. computers" is treated as an unfavorable response. Appendix 5 331 Table A.5.31 Attitudes Toward Joint Exploration of Space with the Soviet Union, 1963-84 (percentages) A: For the first time in many years, the Russians seem willing to ease tensions in the Cold War. Would you favor or oppose. . . . Sending a man to the moon with Russia? B: Would you favor or oppose agreement between the United States and Russia on. . . . Exploring outer space? C: Now let me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Undertaking more joint space missions. D: Do you favor the U.S. and the Soviet Union sitting down to negotiate. ... A joint mission in space manned by U.S. astronauts and Russian cosmonauts? Date Wording Favorable response Not favorable Don't know/ not sure 11/63 A 35 54 10 8/70 B 62 27 11 6/71 B 64 25 11 2/72 B 66 23 11 12/74 C 61 28 11 7/84 D 68 27 5 Source: Louis Harris and Associates. 332 Faces of Internationalism Table A.5.32 Attitudes Toward the Exchange of Scientists and Related Personnel with the Soviet Union, 1963-86 (percentages) A: For the first time in many years, the Russians seem willing to ease tensions in the Cold War. Would you favor or oppose. . . . Exchanging engineers, physicists, and other scientists with Russia? (Harris) B: Now let me read you some proposals that have been made for possible agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. For each, tell me if you would favor or oppose such an agreement. . . . Exchanging scientists and other technical missions. (Harris) C: Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States have been the subject of disagreement for some time. Please tell me if you would favor or oppose the following types of relationship with the Soviet Union. . . . Prohibiting the exchange of scientists between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.* (Gallup) Favorable Not Don't know/ Date Wording response favorable not sure 11/63 A 34 54 12 12/74 B 65 24 11 11/78 C 54 34 12 11/82 C* 52 35 13 11/86 C* 53 36 11 * Response categories reversed so "prohibiting the exchange of scientists" is treated as an unfavorable response. Appendix 5 333 Table A.5.33 Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union, 1953-80 (percentages) You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five— for a country you have a very favorable opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for a country you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the . . . Soviet Union? Date Favorable Not favorable Don't know 9/53 1 92 7 8/54 5 88 7 12/56 5 87 8 12/66 17 76 7 12/67 19 77 4 4/73 34 56 10 7/73 45 44 11 6/76 21 72 7 4/78 26 64 10 2/79 34 60 6 1/80 13 84 3 Source: The Gallup Poll. Appendix 6 Indexes of Congressional Foreign Policy Voting 1947-86 Table A.6.1 Congress Index of House and Senate Support for the President's Position on Foreign Policy Issues, by Administration and Congress, 1947-86 (percentages) Administration/Congress House Senate Truman 43.6 45.5 80th 65.2 75.0 81st 37.5 40.4 82d 30.4 33.3 Eisenhower 67.0 68.2 83d 60.9 61.7 84th 66.7 74.1 85th 63.3 72.0 86th 80.0 64.5 Kennedy 46.8 61.5 87th 56.8 52.7 88th 10.0 80.0 Johnson 40.5 67.7 88th 28.0 58.5 89th 42.2 72.8 90th 46.3 67.3 Nixon 47.1 52.5 91st 68.8 71.4 92d 58.1 42.2 93d 28.9 50.7 Ford 23.9 52.8 93d 17.6 35.9 94th 27.6 62.7 Carter 25.0 39.4 95th 20.5 25.7 96th 28.0 51.3 Reagan 24.3 33.5 97th 48.0 38.5 98th 18.9 34.1 99th 14.1 29.2 Note: the Congress Index is the proportion of foreign policy votes on which the majority of both parties supported the president's position. 334 Appendix 6 335 Table A.6.2 Member Index of House and Senate Support for the President's Position on Foreign Policy Issues, Controlling for Partisanship, by Administration and Congress, 1947-86 (percentages) Administration/ Congress House Senate Overall President's party Opposition party Overall President's party Opposition party Truman 56.2 66.8 44.5 60.0 73.8 45.8 80th 60.4 64.4 57.4 67.5 76.8 59.8 81st 54.7 65.6 37.8 57.4 72.5 38.5 82d 53.6 69.9 34.6 55.0 72.4 36.7 Eisenhower 62.4 64.4 60.8 70.0 75.7 65.1 83d 60.4 66.7 53.7 64.1 69.8 58.1 84th 65.2 59.2 70.6 75.4 79.6 70.9 85th 59.9 66.6 54.2 73.9 77.5 70.3 86th 64.1 65.5 63.4 66.6 75.5 61.9 Kennedy 57.2 70.2 38.2 67.6 72.8 57.0 87th 65.4 75.5 50.8 68.8 76.6 52.8 88th 48.8 64.9 25.5 66.3 69.0 61.0 Johnson 59.7 72.0 40.5 67.6 68.5 66.0 88th 59.5 75.5 36.7 66.0 70.8 56.5 89th 60.7 71.4 38.0 69.3 69.1 69.5 90th 59.0 69.2 45.8 67.7 65.5 71.5 Nixon 56.2 64.3 50.1 63.2 75.0 54.4 91st 61.8 60.8 62.6 69.9 78.2 64.1 92d 59.2 72.8 49.8 57.7 72.5 45.6 93d 47.6 59.8 38.2 61.9 74.3 52.7 Ford 45.4 53.3 40.4 60.3 71.2 52.9 93d 37.7 43.9 32.9 51.8 64.0 42.8 94th 53.1 65.8 46.8 68.6 79.2 62.1 Carter 52.4 61.9 34.8 61.9 71.0 48.8 95th 50.8 58.2 36.1 60.8 71.6 44.5 96th 53.9 65.7 33.5 63.0 70.4 52.8 Reagan 53.1 75.3 37.2 59.8 76.0 41.0 97th 57.8 71.9 46.5 59.7 72.1 45.1 98th 54.5 77.9 39.6 58.3 74.5 39.0 99th 47.1 76.4 25.7 61.3 81.5 38.9 Note: the Member Index is the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. 336 Faces of Internationalism Table A.6.3 Member Index of House Support for the President's Position on Foreign Policy Issues by Ideology, Controlling for Partisanship, by Administration and Congress, 1947-86 (percentages) ^ President's Party Opposition Party Congress Overall Cons. Mod. Lib. Overall Cons. Mod. Lib. Truman 66.8 50.5 63.6 72.0 44.5 40.9 56.2 62.6 80th 64.4 40.6 61.4 66.0 57.4 53.6 71.4 65.2 81st 65.6 51.5 60.2 71.3 37.8 35.9 45.1 68.8 82d 69.9 50.3 69.5 79.6 34.6 28.4 44.3 60.3 Eisenhower 64.4 55.8 75.9 81.7 60.8 37.0 55.9 72.5 83d 66.7 61.2 77.5 77.2 53.7 32.3 43.8 63.9 84th 59.2 45.5 71.4 78.8 70.6 50.7 70.8 78.1 85th 66.6 51.3 78.0 83.6 54.2 33.1 53.3 67.0 86th 65.5 61.5 79.6 87.1 63.4 32.8 58.4 78.1 Kennedy 70.2 36.0 59.0 82.3 38.2 31.3 61.3 68.8 87th 75.5 41.4 67.8 87.6 50.8 42.1 76.3 81.1 88th 64.9 29.2 50.8 77.2 25.5 21.3 41.4 54.0 Johnson 72.0 39.4 66.8 85.0 40.5 34.7 60.5 75.4 88th 75.5 35.9 62.8 88.0 36.7 30.8 58.9 79.2 89th 71.4 41.5 71.0 83.7 38.0 34.3 60.1 75.6 90th 69.2 39.1 66.4 83.0 45.8 39.1 61.9 73.6 Nixon 64.3 65.5 66.0 52.0 50.1 56.0 57.7 43.6 91st 60.8 54.7 69.6 76.8 62.6 44.5 73.2 68.8 92d 72.8 77.7 69.6 30.4 49.8 71.9 61.0 32.9 93d 59.8 63.5 57.7 38.4 38.2 49.5 42.2 31.5 Ford 53.3 53.5 55.2 47.0 40.4 46.1 41.6 37.6 93d 43.9 43.8 44.9 42.4 32.9 38.5 34.2 30.0 94th 65.8 65.3 69.0 61.5 46.8 52.6 48.5 43.7 Carter 61.9 37.5 61.7 72.7 34.8 29.0 52.7 68.2 95th 58.2 36.4 60.6 68.1 36.1 30.5 50.7 70.1 96th 65.7 38.9 63.0 76.9 33.5 27.6 54.9 66.5 Reagan 75.3 80.1 56.7 39.6 37.2 72.7 53.2 24.8 97th 71.9 77.3 57.1 47.0 46.5 72.5 60.5 33.6 98th 77.9 81.1 62.6 28.4 39.6 75.6 58.9 27.3 99th 76.4 81.9 49.1 27.2 25.7 69.2 41.7 14.4 Note: the Member Index is the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. Conservatives are members of Congress whose ada scores are more than half a standard deviation below the mean for the corresponding Congress, mod¬ erates those with ada scores equal to or less than half a standard deviation above or below the mean, and liberals those with ada scores more than half a standard deviation above the mean. Appendix 6 337 Table A.6.4 Member Index of Senate Support for the President's Position on Foreign Policy Issues by Ideology, Controlling for Partisanship, by Administration and Congress, 1947-86 (percentages) President's Party Opposition Party Congress Overall Cons. Mod. Lib. Overall Cons. Mod. Lib. Truman 73.8 58.2 67.1 81.5 45.8 34.9 65.1 66.9 80th 76.8 54.2 76.3 79.3 59.8 48.9 78.4 62.5 81st 72.5 63.4 65.1 82.7 38.5 28.7 53.2 67.7 82d 72.4 48.1 64.2 83.0 36.7 26.5 55.0 71.8 Eisenhower 75.7 68.1 88.8 78.4 65.1 49.4 60.1 73.6 83d 69.8 59.5 82.6 71.3 58.1 44.4 49.6 67.2 84th 79.6 74.9 95.8 51.7 70.9 56.9 64.8 76.0 85th 77.5 66.4 89.9 82.6 70.3 54.3 70.6 81.6 86th 75.5 69.2 89.6 91.0 61.9 44.4 58.4 71.1 Kennedy 72.8 49.4 73.1 83.6 57.0 45.3 73.6 87.9 87th 76.6 50.6 72.6 88.8 52.9 44.2 66.1 89.2 88th 69.0 48.6 73.7 78.2 61.0 46.4 81.1 87.4 Johnson 68.5 58.3 65.6 75.1 66.0 58.0 74.7 86.7 88th 70.8 53.9 67.6 81.3 56.5 41.3 73.5 89.8 89th 69.1 58.8 63.4 75.7 69.5 64.2 82.3 86.0 90th 65.5 62.2 65.5 67.5 71.5 68.3 72.2 83.4 Nixon 75.0 80.4 75.6 54.1 54.4 71.0 58.1 46.0 91st 78.2 81.6 79.3 65.0 64.1 72.3 67.1 58.4 92d 72.5 79.6 75.7 41.3 45.6 72.1 55.1 31.1 93d 74.3 80.0 72.4 56.5 52.7 67.6 54.1 47.4 Ford 71.2 76.0 69.1 57.9 52.9 68.6 56.4 45.5 93d 64.0 67.1 64.3 51.7 42.8 58.2 43.0 37.8 94th 79.2 84.5 80.6 62.5 62.1 78.0 65.1 54.0 Carter 71.0 54.4 65.2 79.3 48.8 38.4 71.1 71.7 95th 71.6 48.2 64.1 82.4 44.5 30.4 77.7 71.1 96th 70.4 60.6 66.1 76.1 52.8 45.8 66.0 72.4 Reagan 76.0 81.3 69.4 47.8 41.0 64.8 55.3 34.4 97th 72.1 75.8 66.7 53.3 45.1 59.5 54.5 39.8 98th 74.5 78.8 70.5 52.0 39.0 55.3 52.3 34.0 99th 81.5 89.1 71.8 38.5 38.9 73.4 59.4 29.8 Note: the Member Index is the average percentage level of support by members of Congress for the president's position on foreign policy votes. Conservatives are members of Congress whose ada scores are more than half a standard deviation below the mean for the corresponding Congress, mod¬ erates those with ada scores equal to or less than half a standard deviation above or below the mean, and liberals those with ada scores more than half a standard deviation above the mean. Notes 1 Foreign Policy Beliefs and Preferences 1. In the mid-1980s Thomas L. Hughes (1985-86: 26), president of the Carnegie Endowment, went so far as to speak of the "twilight of internationalism," concluding that the values embodied in the "international ethos" of the postwar era have "pretty much exhausted themselves in mainstream American political life. Traditional internationalist themes are no longer significant outlets for political idealism in the United States. Instead, they are the objects of derision and contempt." At about the same time Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1985) wrote about the retreat from multilateralism as evinced in the ebbing of national support for the international regimes the United States had helped to build in the early post-World War II era. 2. See, for example, Haas (1988), Huntington (1988-89), and Nye (1988). Others who have disputed the alleged decline of American power include Gill (1986), Russett (1985), and Strange (1987). 3. Even fissures along educational lines became evident. This was a significant development since education historically had been a strong predictor of internationalist attitudes. The more educated people were, the more likely they were to support active U.S. involvement in world affairs. On the emergence of these partisan, ideological, and educational divisions, see Schneider (1974-75). See also chapter 3. 4. Exemplary are Bloomfield (1972-73), Brzezinski (1973, 1976), Falk (1976), Gelb (1971), Gray (1975), Hoffmann (1973), Holbrooke (1976), Hughes (1975, 1976), and Ullman (1975-76). Also see Barnet (1972), Halberstam (1972), Shulman (1966), and Thomson (1968, 1972). 5. Whether consensus was or is desirable, and what the effects of its demise have been or will be, are questions that have provoked considerable commentary. Illustrative are Brown (1984), Chace (1978), Destler, Gelb, and Lake (1984), Falk (1976, 1983), Gershman (1980), Holsti and Rosenau (1984), Kegley and Wittkopf (1982-83), McCormick and Wittkopf (1990), Quester (1982), Sigler (1982-83), and Winik (1989). 6. These generalizations are based on the results of more than two dozen 338 Notes 339 surveys taken by norc (National Opinion Research Center) and the Gallup, Harris, and Roper organizations between 1947 and 1986 in which this question was asked. 7. Public support for the Reagan administration's attack on Libya in April 1986, noted earlier, does not indicate support or opposition to the use of force generally but instead is an instance of the well-established "rally round the flag" phenomenon that typically boosts support for a president during times of crisis or dramatic foreign policy initiatives (see Brody, 1984, 1986; Lanoue, 1989; Lee, 1977; and Mueller, 1970; cf. Stoll, 1984). 8. See Bardes and Oldendick (1978, 1983, 1988), Chittick (1987), Chittick and Billingsley (1988, 1989), Fraser, Green, and Guth (1988), Hinckley (1986, 1988), Holsti (1987a, 1987b), Holstiand Rosenau (1984, 1988a, 1988b), Kegley and Wittkopf (1982-83), Knudsen (1984, 1985), Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981), Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979), Oldendick and Bardes (1981a, 1981b), Schneider (1974U75, 1983, 1987), Wittkopf (1981, 1986, 1987, 1988a, 1988b), and Wittkopf and Maggiotto (1983a, 1983b). 9. The Chicago Council data do not permit a direct test of the proposition that Vietnam was a major causal agent behind the domestic divisions over foreign policy since the 1970s, but the data and circumstances are consistent with that interpretation. Holsti and Rosenau (1984, 1988a) systematically probe the effect of Vietnam on the foreign policy beliefs of elites and conclude that the war not only shattered the Cold War consensus but has also had a continuing impact on the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders. 2 Structure of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 1. See Rogers, Stuhler, and Keonig (1967) for a comparison of mass and "informed" opinion on foreign policy issues, and Gamson and Modigliani (1966) for an exploration of the relationship between knowledge and foreign policy opinions. Gamson and Modigliani provide evidence consistent with the proposition that attitudinal consistency increases with knowledge. See also Bennett (1974) for an application of the structural consistency argument to foreign policy, in which Bennett finds that Americans' attitudes toward the Vietnam War were more constrained than were their attitudes toward U.S. relations with Communist nations. 2. Shapiro and Page (1988) demonstrate that stability rather than change is the characteristic response of the American people to foreign and national security policy issues. They find that a majority (51 percent) of responses to some 425 identically worded survey items asked between 1935 and 1982 on a broad range of these issues vary less than 6 percentage points from one polling period to the next, and that in nearly half of the remaining instances the percentage change is less than 10 percentage points (1988: 340 Notes 216-17). Many of the items in Shapiro and Page's analysis are examined in chapter 6. See also Russett and Graham (1988) and Graham (1986) for additional evidence regarding the stability of public attitudes toward foreign policy. A contrasting viewpoint may be found in Holsti (1987a). 3. As used by Converse, the fewer the dimensions necessary to define attitudinal structure, the more “constrained" is the attitudinal framework of beliefs. In the limiting case only one dimension would be required, a liberal-conservative continuum. It should be noted that the concepts of “constraint" and "ideology" used by Converse and many others since imply structural consistency across issue-areas, not just within one, such as foreign policy, as in this study. Converse concluded that since the average correlations between domestic and international issues in the mass public (.11) was less than among congressional candidates (.25), the mass public manifests less internal consistency in its political beliefs, and hence less of an ideological orientation, than do elites. (Achen [1975] addresses methodological issues related to the data on which Converse based his findings and concludes that meas¬ urement error, rather than the absence of coherent political thinking, may explain the low correlations Converse found.) Interestingly, however, the average correlations reported by Converse were the same for the mass public within the domestic domain as within the foreign policy domain (.23), and both approximated the level between the domains for the elite sample. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that while the analyses that will be reported here demonstrate unambiguously that the mass of the American people maintain highly structured foreign policy beliefs, the nature of the conjuncture of their foreign and domestic policy beliefs remains unanswered. Holsti and Rosenau (1988b; see also Hero, 1969, 1973) examine the relationship between the foreign and domestic policy beliefs of American leaders. The foreign policy attitude clusters they use are based on the four belief systems derived for the mass public in this chapter and for American leaders in chapter 4. Kinder (1983) usefully summarizes much of the literature on mass political beliefs more broadly defined. 4. An antecedent to Converse's well-known arguments can be found in The American Voter, in which Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1964: 110) argued that an "attitude structure" may be said to exist "when two or more beliefs or opinions held by an individual are in some way or another functionally related. . . . Although any specific person may show congru¬ ence of opinions 'accidentally,' it is generally supposed that correlations between attitudes that are visible in aggregates are reliable evidence of some structuring of the attitudes on the part of individuals." They also defined ideology "as a particularly elaborate, close-woven, and far-ranging structure of attitudes" (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1964: 111). They found evidence supporting the existence of an activism-withdrawal Notes 341 attitude dimension in international affairs but none linking attitudes toward international affairs with attitudes toward liberalism or conservativism in domestic affairs. 5. See Neuman (1986: 3) for a broader treatment of what the author calls "the paradox of mass politics," namely, "the gap between the expectation of an informed citizenry put forward by democratic theory and the discomforting reality revealed by systematic survey interviewing," which, according to Neuman, continues to demonstrate low levels of political interest and knowledge. Although Neuman does not deal with foreign policy attitudes directly, the implications of his arguments about how to resolve the paradox are relevant to foreign policy issues. 6. Drawing on social cognition theory, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987a: 1114) argue that individuals utilize heuristics, or information shortcuts, to make political judgments and to relate preferences toward specific foreign policy issues to general attitudes. Thus, paradoxically, ordinary citizens hold coherent (constrained) attitude structures because they lack detailed knowledge about foreign policy: "individuals organize information because such organization helps to simplify the world. Thus, a paucity of information does not impede structure and consistency; on the contrary, it motivates the development and employment of structure. Thus, we see individuals as attempting to cope with an extraordinarily confusing world (with limited resources to pay information costs) by structuring views about specific foreign policies according to their more general and abstract beliefs." See also Conover and Feldman (1984). 7. The Chicago Council mass surveys are stratified systematic national samples containing 1,546 respondents in 1974 and a weighted N of 1,546 in 1978 and 1982 and 1,585 in 1986. When weights are applied to the samples, the N increases to 2,698 in 1978, 2,706 in 1982, and 2,872 in 1986. 8. It should be noted that the response categories for the conceptually analogous questions generally remain the same from one survey to the next, as can be seen from the data in appendix 1. The principal exception occurs in 1974 on the items comprising the communist scale. 9. Principal components analysis maximizes the extrachon of common variance and minimizes unique or error variance. As a data reduction device, it tends to "bias" the search for structural uniformity by highlighting the common and perpetual and minimizing the transient and ephemeral. Although for some purposes these characteristics may be regarded as shortcomings, given the theoretical purposes that motivate the inquiry here they are decided virtues. It should be noted, moreover, that the substantive conclusions drawn from the patterns unearthed through factor analysis inhere not in the technique itself but in the underlying variance patterns that factor analysis summarizes. Having said that, enthusiasm for factor analysis must still be tempered by the fact that, as Rummel (1970) dem¬ onstrated some years ago, it is able to extract only what the data capture 342 Notes in the first place. It is in this context that the discussion below of the distinction between valence and position issues and the possible bias toward stability that valence issues may entail takes on special importance. 10. The analyses for 1982 were done with and without the apartheid item. The interpretation of the results was not materially affected by its inclusion or exclusion. 11. It is important to emphasize that the two aid scales are eliminated merely to clarify the interpretation of the subsequent analysis. Clearly the attitudes of the mass public toward foreign aid are a part of its orientation toward America's world role, but it is equally clear analytically that they are not intimately and consistently related to a broader range of foreign policy attitudes. Retaining the aid scales in the calculation of factor scores for the other dimensions in 1978 and 1982, used later in the analysis in this chapter and the next, would add little to our understanding (since their loadings on the remaining internationalism dimensions is small), and focusing on the single aid dimension unearthed in these years would tell virtually nothing about Americans' foreign policy attitudes outside this specific, narrowly construed domain. Even in 1974, when the two scales do load on the underlying dimensions, the economic aid variable adds little distinctive information since it contributes nearly equally to the two dimensions. 12. Importantly, others working independently with different mass and elite data sets have made similar discoveries and have found the militant and cooperative internationalism concepts useful to describe and interpret their results (Fraser, Green, and Guth, 1988, 1989; Hinckley, 1986, 1988; Holsti, 1987b; Holsti and Rosenau, 1988b, 1990; and Knudsen, 1984, 1985). Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979) drew attention to differences among the American people on the questions of whether and how the United States should be involved in the world in an early study using some of the "goals" questions from the first Chicago Council survey, in which they concluded that foreign policy attitudes could be arrayed along an interna¬ tionalist-isolationist dimension and a cross-cutting liberal-conservative di¬ mension. These were used to define three groups: liberal internationalists, conservative internationalists, and noninternationalists. The first groups conform nicely to the accommodationist-hardliner dichotomy described above, and the last embraces the isolationists. In addition to these empirical studies, others who have addressed the various stands of foreign policy thinking in recent years include Falk (1976), Krauthammer (1985), and Sanders (1983). 13. Because the factor scores used to construct the fourfold typology of foreign policy beliefs are standardized scores, the zero means on the internationalism dimensions used as the cut points may mask changes over time in the number of people tending toward one end or the other of the dimensions. In other words, because the factor scores are normalized around a mean of zero, the distributions tend toward equal proportions above and below the mean. As a partial check on the possibility that aggregate temporal shifts may have occurred, the four data sets were pooled and the factor Notes 343 analysis repeated, with a single set of factor scores constructed from the pooled data. The scores were then partitioned by year to determine whether, when compared with a common bench mark, deviations over time were apparent. They were not; in all cases the percentages were either the same or within a couple of points of those reported in figure 2.1. This is only a partial check, however, since the data used to create the attitude scales used in the principal components analysis are themselves standardized. This was done to facilitate comparisons among them within a single year and also across time. Since the same questions are not asked in all of the surveys (even though the questions tap the same concepts), it is inappropriate to use the unstandardized scale scores to make inter¬ temporal comparisons of the sort described in the preceding paragraph. Standardization does not affect the interpretation of any single year, since normalization is a linear transformation of the original data. Furthermore, factor scores are, by definition, standardized scores. Finally, it should be noted that a perusal of the data in appendix 1 for which both the questions and response categories are exactly the same from one year to the next reveals comparatively little change in terms of the proportion of respondents embracing particular viewpoints. 14. Noninternationalists, as described here, constitute a large residual category of respondents in Mandelbaum and Schneider's (1979) analysis who reg¬ istered support for neither conservative nor liberal internationalism. Schnei¬ der has described the group as the "inattentive” public, but he specifically eschews use of the term isolationists to describe them. "Isolationism," he argues, "implies a principled opposition to American participation in world affairs. Noninternationalists are not so much opposed as they are nonsup- portive. Being less well educated—that is the strongest demographic correlate of noninternationalism—this group has a limited understanding of the relevance of events that are complex and remote from their daily lives" (Schneider, 1983: 43). Later in this chapter it will be shown that those with the least education do tend to be isolationists, but my estimate of the size of the group—22- 24 percent—is considerably less than Schneider's 43 percent (Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979: 43). Furthermore, in chapter 5 an operational definition of the "attentive" public will be offered that shows its size to be substantially smaller than the 57 percent implied by Schneider and Mandelbaum, and thus much more in line with previous studies (see Devine, 1970; Krosnick and Carnot, 1988; and Rosenau, 1961, 1974). 15. Analysis of variance is preferable to simple cross-tabulations to determine the relationship between partisanship and ideology on the one hand, and Americans' foreign policy beliefs on the other, since it permits full use of the information regarding respondents' position on the two internationalism scales, which are interval-level measures, in analyzing the relationship between foreign policy beliefs and the party identification and political philosophy variables, both of which are nominal-scale measures. 16. Eta is a measure of the correlation between the variables. In the bivariate 344 Notes case its interpretation is comparable to Pearson's r, the square of which measures the variance shared between the independent (party identification or political ideology) and the dependent variables (the two internationalism dimensions). Its importance for the analytical purposes here is that it tells whether the differences in the magnitudes of the cell means in the mca table are large enough to be statistically significant and hence of potential substantive significance. 17. Geography is only one manifestation of the isolationist tradition in American politics. Lubell (1955), for example, argues that isolationism is an ethnic, not geographic phenomenon. Adler (1957) discusses both in his historical treatment of isolationism in the twentieth century, and Rieselbach (1966) examines them empirically in his study of isolationist voting behavior in Congress. Jonas (1966) also discusses isolationism in the period immediately preceding World War II and finds it useful to differentiate among various strands of isolationist thinking. 18. Hero's (1965) study of southerners' attitudes toward world affairs is perhaps the most extensive treatment of regionalism ever undertaken. Hero describes among other things how differences between the South and the rest of the nation decreased between the 1930s and 1960s insofar as they related to attitudes toward world affairs. The findings reported here, which show the South increasingly internationalist in orientation, confirms and extends Hero's analyses. I will return to this point below. 19. See Shapiro and Mahajan (1986) for an examination of gender differences in public attitudes toward force and violence (as well as other policy issues) from the 1960s to the 1980s. See also Smith (1984) for historical data on gender differences in attitudes toward violence, including war. 20. Hughes (1978: 52-53) noted some gender-related differences on military measures in the late 1960s and early 1970s that parallel these findings. 21. See Gilboa (1987) for a broad-based study of American public opinion toward Israel and the Middle East conflict. 22. The interaction between education and ideology is significant (at p < .05) on both internationalism dimensions in all years except 1978, when it is significant only on the mi dimension. Otherwise, there are no consistent patterns among the interactions. 3 Correlates of Mass Foreign Policy Beliefs 1. The concept is borrowed from Lepper (1971), who uses it to examine the factors contributing to the Kennedy administration's successful bid in 1963 to conclude a partial test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. 2. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .87. 3. Cronbach's alpha for the scale is .73 in 1982 and .65 in 1986. 4. This generalization is supported by the large number of respondents whose Notes 345 position on the various policy issues is predicted correctly by the model. A measure that compares the predicted responses against the modal response reveals that the "reduction of error" associated with the model is typically minimal. This is often the case in logit analysis when the dependent variable distribution is skewed. A potentially preferable alternative measure of the predictive capability would involve a comparison of the average predicted probabilities for responses coded 0 and 1 relative to the average predicted probabilities for the "null" model. Furthermore, it is clear that the model performs well given other assessment criteria, including not only those cited here but also by the statistically significant coefficients found for many of the variables. 5. The effects of the other variables are controlled by holding them constant at their mean values. In the case of the dummy variables for party and ideology, this means the variables are evaluated at the level of their proportions in American society, plus or minus some small margin of error for missing data. The level at which the probabilities are calculated is important since the logistic function is curvilinear, as illustrated in the top half of figure 3.1. 6. In practice the mean is slightly different from zero due to missing data on some of the other variables included in the equation, as is true throughout the analyses. 7. The "80 percent rule" is used to avoid those issues or formulations of responses whose results are largely trivial due to the absence of meaningful variations. The Ns used to determine the percentage support or opposition are the number of respondents included in the analyses for which data on beliefs, partisanship, and ideology are also available. Exceptions are occa¬ sionally made so as to preserve a series of questions from one survey to the next, even though more than 80 percent may respond in one way in any particular year. Because each question posed more than two responses, it was necessary for analytical purposes to group two or more of them together, with the result that more than one regression model is required to fully analyze the response patterns. In general, the number of models required to analyze a particular question will be n — 1, where n is the number of different responses posed. If two or more responses are included in the obverse of the declarative statement in the tables in appendix 2 (and hence coded zero), they are indicated in parentheses following the statement. In the interests of avoiding unnecessary and excessive reporting, not all questions asked in the Chicago Council surveys and not all alternative formulations of the questions asked are always shown. References will therefore sometimes be made to results not actually reported in the tables. 8. So as to minimize interruptions in the narrative presentation, references to the complete logistic regressions in appendix 2 will hereinafter be made simply by referring to the table number. 9. Reiterating a point made earlier, since only the mi coefficient is significant statistically, all that can be said with confidence is that the more militantly 346 Notes internationalist respondents are, the greater is the probability that they will support the proposition that the United States should play a more important and powerful world role. Although it is probable that many people subscribing to that view would be shown to be hardliners on other issues, it is equally likely that many would be internationalists. 10. Fewer than 20 percent of the respondents believed that the United States was more respected than ten years ago. It is plausible that more would have agreed with the statement in 1986, but the question was not asked in that year. 11. The reverse formulation of the proposition—that the United States has been a force for evil—is supported by less than 20 percent of the respondents in anv year. The 1974 survey included several other questions that tapped Americans' general orientation toward world affairs. Among them was a series of ten items that asked how important it was for the United States to be a world leader in several different areas, such as economic and military strength, moral values, and political leadership. Together the items formed a gen¬ eralized leader scale which, when analyzed using ordinary least squares regression, is shown to enjoy strong support among those inclined toward internationalist values. Earlier analyses of the 1974 mass survey (Wittkopf, 1981) in fact demonstrated that the leader scale clustered with the other scales making up the cooperative and militant internationalism scales, but it was not included in the analyses in chapter 2 since the items making up the scale were not repeated in subsequent years. Another set of items in the 1974 survey used in earlier analyses to delineate the two faces of internationalism (Wittkopf, 1981; and Wittkopf and Maggiotto, 1983a) asked if the United States would be justified if it was to its advantage "to establish trade relations with Communist coun¬ tries"; "to recognize democratic left-wing governments when they come to power"; "to back governments which believe in our free enterprise system but not in democracy"; and "to back socialist governments that respect the basic political rights of their people." When grouped together, the items form a single scale that has strong realpolitik connotations not unlike those associated with the Nixon-Kissinger strategy of detente which came to be criticized during the 1976 presidential election for its alleged amorality. When regressed on the ci and mi variables, the scale is shown to divide respondents along accommodationist-hardline lines, with those inclined in the latter direction more likely to support the prescriptions inherent in the scale and those inclined in the former direction to oppose them. 12. The responses on these issues indicate that 45 percent of the American people in 1982 believed the United States and the Soviet Union were about equal in military power, 32 percent gave the edge to the Soviet Union, and 23 percent gave it to the United States. The comparable percentages in 1986 were 52 percent equal, 30 percent for the United States, and 18 percent for the Soviet Union. 13. It should be noted that the percentages reported here are slightly different Notes 347 from those in table 3.1 since the number of respondents included in the calculations are different. Table 3.1 includes only those for whom all of the data necessary to construct the two internationalism scales and the attitude clusters derived from them are available. 14. As noted above, there is virtually no support for increasing federal spending on foreign aid but much in favor of reducing it. Noteworthy is that opposition to reduced spending on economic aid parallels the patterns in tables 3.6 and A.2.3 in that it is most evident among those inclined toward internationalist values but that opposition to reduced spending on military aid is less easily characterized, with divisions along accommodationist- hardline patterns apparent in the most recent year (1986). 15. In 1985 the U.S. aid effort, defined as the amount of official development assistance as a proportion of its gross national product, placed the United States last among the seventeen major Western foreign aid donors who comprise the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The proportion in that year stood at .24 percent. 16. The probabilities among the various political groups associated with the belief (in 1986) that military aid would lead to involvement are as follows: Republicans—.75; independents—.81; Democrats—.85; conservatives—.77; moderates—.84; and liberals—.82. 17. The probabilities among the various political groups associated with support for economic and military aid are as follows: Republicans—.26; indepen¬ dents—.25; Democrats—.15; conservatives—.24; moderates—.21; and lib¬ erals—.18. The probabilities for the no aid options are: Republicans—.40; independents—.43; Democrats—.50; conservatives—.41; moderates—.45; and liberals—.48. 18. In the 1982 and 1986 surveys respondents were asked if they favored or opposed President Reagan's Mid-East peace plan, which called for no further Israeli settlements on the West Bank and the Gaza strip and a homeland for Palestinians in those territories. Strong support in the internationalist direction was registered in both years. 19. A third question proposed the use of U.S. military and Drug Enforcement Agency personnel to help foreign governments stop drug trade. This proved to be the most popular approach, with 86 percent of the respondents endorsing it. It is not analyzed here due to the absence of meaningful opposition. 20. The probability of support for the proposition is .83 for conservatives and .76 for liberals. 21. It is literally the case that the 1986 Chicago Council survey was in the field at the time the news broke, but I have no evidence to indicate that the results from the survey have in any way been contaminated by that unique occurrence. 22. See Kegley and Wittkopf (1989) for a discussion of the debt crisis as it evolved during and after the "opec decade." 23. The Chicago Council surveys asked a series of questions about the impact 348 Notes of foreign policy on the domestic political and economic systems. Included were such questions as the impact of U.S. foreign policy on food and gasoline prices at home, unemployment, the value of the dollar, and the like. In each year the items formed a reliable scale which permitted an assessment of Americans' general perceptions of the impact of foreign policy on the United States itself. Because many of the specific questions dealt with political economy issues, it was expected that they would track variations along the cooperative internationalism dimension. This was not the case. In three of the four years examined (using ordinary regression analysis) only the mi variable was significant. Only in 1978 was the ci variable significant statistically (mi was not). Furthermore, in none of the years did the model account for more than 7 percent of the variation in Americans' attitudes regarding the domestic impact of foreign policy (the R 2 s in the four survey years from 1974 to 1986 were .01, .01, .02, and .07). An interdependent world is one in which foreign and domestic policies and politics are inextricably intertwined—but these data raise serious questions about whether the American people comprehend the world in these terms. Interesting to note in this respect is that Schneider attributes to the liberal internationalists who emerged among the better educated, attentive public during 1970s a preference for dealing with "economic and humanitarian problems over security issues. . . . They tended to regard the common problems facing all of humanity as more urgent than the ideological differences between East and West. Liberal internationalists approved of detente as a necessary first step toward a new world order based on global interdependence" (Schneider, 1983: 40-41). 24. Among them is the changing position of the United States in the global political economy since World War II (see Gilpin, 1987). 25. The research on presidential popularity is extensive. Mueller's (1970, 1973) is especially noteworthy in that it seeks explicitly to incorporate foreign policy variables in models of presidential performance. Other relevant studies include Kernell (1978), Hibbs (1982a, 1982b), Chappell and Keech (1985), and Ostrom and Simon (1985). Fluctuations in presidential popularity in turn have been shown to be related to congressional support of presidents' domestic and foreign policies (Edwards, 1981) and to the outcome of congressional and presidential elections (Kernell, 1977; and Abramowitz, 1985). 26. A partial exception is the Americans Talk Security (ats) project briefly examined in chapter 9. 27. The analyses should be regarded as illustrative and not definitive in part because of the absence of other variables known to affect evaluations of policymakers' performance or that may be correlated with the variables in the model. The state of the economy is principal among them. Interestingly, however, analyses that have examined at the level of individuals' perceptions of the state of the economy along with respondents' foreign policy pref¬ erences still demonstrate the importance of the latter of their evaluations of policymakers (see Wilcox and Alsop, 1989; and Wittkopf, 1989). Notes 349 28. To facilitate interpretation, ordinary least squares regression was used even though the dependent variable is technically ordinal, not interval. The response categories for Ford were also collapsed into a dichotomy and analyzed using logistic regression. (Excellent and pretty good were coded 1, and only fair and poor were coded 0.) The interpretation of the results remains the same as with ols. In the case of Kissinger, more than 80 percent of the respondents evaluated his performance as excellent or pretty good. 29. Two points are worth recalling in this respect. One is that Kissinger alone among Nixon's closest advisers was able to emerge from the Watergate scandal unscathed. The other is that during the 1976 presidential campaign President Ford found it expedient in the face of a strong challenge to his leadership by conservative Republicans, led by Ronald Reagan, to purge the word "detente" from his campaign rhetoric. The move was widely interpreted as a repudiation of Secretary Kissinger, detente's principal architect. 4 Structure and Correlates of Leaders' Beliefs 1. The definitive study of the impact of the Vietnam War on the breakdown on elite consensus is Holsti and Rosenau's (1984) American Leadership in World Affairs. Other studies of elite attitudes that bear some relevance to the breakdown-of-consensus thesis include Barton (1974—75), Gershman (1980), Hodgson (1973, 1977), and Russett and Hanson (1975). 2. C. Wright Mills's (1956) The Power Elite remains the classic statement of the elitist perspective on American foreign policymaking. Donovan (1974) examines the attitudes and policy positions of many of those responsible for American foreign policy between the end of World War II and Vietnam, and Barnet (1972) and Halberstam (1972) focus on the elites' responsibility for the Vietnam War and its failure. 3. More precisely, Hodgson argues that the foreign policy establishment consists of a self-recruiting group of men (virtually no women) who have shared a bipartisan philosophy towards, and have exercised practical influence on, the course of American defense and foreign policy. I would add that to qualify for membership a man must have a reputation for ability in this field that is accepted by at least two of three worlds: the world of international business, banking and the law in New York; the world of government in Washington; and the academic world, especially in Cambridge, but also in a handful of other great graduate schools and in the major foundations. And I would further suggest that this group of men was in fact characterized, from World War II until the late 1960's at least, by a history of common action, a shared policy of "liberal interna¬ tionalism," an aspiration to world leadership, an instinct for the center, and the 350 Notes habit of working privately through the power of the newly bureaucratized Presidency. (1973: 13) 4. Domhoff (1971; also 1983) was among the first to draw attention to the Council on Foreign Relations as a foreign policy elite. See also Dye (1978). 5. The issue is not confined to foreign policy, for elite theory holds that other areas of public policy are influenced, if not controlled, by a select few who are in a position to call the shots and shape the outcomes. Dye's (1976, 1979, 1983, 1986) studies of Who's Running America? provide empirical data on American elites as well as assessments of their influence. Dve argues that the number of “institutional elites" in America is about 5,400, but he does not clearly identify who among these might appropriately be regarded as foreign policy elites. 6. The leader samples contain 330 (1974), 366 (1978), 341 (1982), and 343 (1986) respondents. The categories used here are based on the 1974 survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates. The categories for the later surveys, conducted by the Gallup organization, have been aggregated so as to correspond to the groups first used by Harris. These larger groups will be used for reporting purposes later (with the exception of the 1974 minorities/dissident-ethnic group, which has no clear counterpart in the Gallup surveys). The number of respondents in the categories in the Gallup polls that were aggregated to conform to the groups first used by Harris are shown below'. Finer distinctions are available in some cases in the codebooks for the data available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (icpsr). 1978 1982 1986 Communications 41 21 22 Newspapers 8 10 5 General interest magazines 7 9 11 Television 4 4 3 Radio 3 5 5 Foreign policy journals 2 3 3 Wire services Political 42 39 29 U.S. House of Representatives 23 11 22 Administration 16 14 19 U.S. Senate Voluntary organizations 16 19 21 Special interest groups 18 17 17 Special foreign policy organizations 7. If the two foreign aid scales for which data are available are included in the analyses, they load on the two dimensions shown in table 4.2 in 1974 but form a specific foreign aid dimension in 1978. In 1982 economicaid loads with detente to form a specific dimension, and militaryaid loads Notes 351 highly (with the same sign) with the communist and troops scales and (with the opposite sign) the detente and activecooperation/apartheid scales. 8. Confidence that cooperative and militant internationalism accurately de¬ scribe leaders' foreign policy attitudes throughout the post-Vietnam era is reinforced by Holsti and Rosenau's (1990) reanalysis of their Foreign Policy Leadership Project data, in which they demonstrate using somewhat different data and analytical techniques the presence of the same two dimensions in 1976, 1980, and 1984. 9. Commenting on the foreign policy climate following Reagan's election to his firm term, Holsti and Rosenau (1984: 244) suggested the possibility of a growing division among the leaders they describe as Cold War interna¬ tionalists between “unilateralists" and “multilateralists," which would be in the direction of the fourfold division of leaders' foreign policy beliefs described later in this chapter. Interestingly, the results based on the 1982 ccfr leader survey suggest a shift away from, rather than toward, this fourfold classification. Where the results for that year converge with Holsti and Rosenau's is in the suggestion that the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders in the early 1980s were in flux. 10. Holsti and Rosenau (1990: 103) report the following distributions based on their leader surveys: 1976 1980 1984 Internationalists 30% 33% 25% Accommodationists 42 41 51 Hardliners 20 20 17 Isolationists 8 7 7 The distribution of their respondents points toward greater skewness in the direction of cooperative internationalism than is apparent in the ccfr surveys, which results in a higher proportion of accommodationists and a lower proportion of isolationists. However, when elites and masses are compared systematically by locating their attitudes in the same geometric "space," as is done in chapter 5, the results indicate that leaders typically embrace accommodationist values and eschew isolationist predispositions in much greater proportions than do masses. In this respect Holsti and Rosenau's results are similar to those that the comparative analyses in chapter 5 yield. (The reader is cautioned in contemplating these interpre¬ tations to recall that the factor scores used to derive the belief system categories from the ccfr data are normalized around a mean of zero, which tends to move the distributions toward equal proportions above and below the mean.) 11. "Containing communism" was not used in the construction of the usgoals scale in 1978, but it was used in 1974 and 1986 (see appendix 3, table A.3.6). Because of this, the item is not independent of the dimensions used in those years to construct the belief system typology. The results in the table, therefore, should not be regarded as "causal" in any sense but only as 352 Notes illustrative of the centrality of differing attitudes toward containment in delineating the foreign policy beliefs of American leaders. 12. The proportion of each of the groups described as hardliners that in 1978 supported expanded defense spending is as follows: business, 44 percent; political, 43 percent; voluntary organizations, 35 percent; communications, 29 percent; labor, 26 percent. 13. Neither the 1974 nor 1978 datasets is as clear on the nature of the business elites included in those surveys. 14. There are fifty-six paired comparisons to be made on each of the interna¬ tionalism dimensions in 1974 and forty-two in 1978 and 1986. Of these, six produced significant differences (at p < .05) on ci and six on mi in 1974, twelve on ci and five on mi in 1978, and eleven on ci and eight on mi in 1986. Noteworthy is that nine of the twelve significant differences in 1974 and seven of the seventeen significant differences in 1978 involved com¬ parisons between religious and other leaders; and that nine of the nineteen in 1986 involved comparisons between political and other leaders, with another six involving business or labor leaders (excluding differences between them and political leaders). In each of the surveys, then, the differences among leaders are concentrated in a relatively few groups. As will be shown below, ideological differences between and among the role/ occupational groups account for many of them. 15. Excluded from the 1974 data in the table and from the analyses employing the ideology variable that follow is a small group of self-described radicals, since the category was not included in the surveys conducted by the Gallup organization beginning in 1978. 16. For comparative purposes, the percentage distribution of leaders by party and ideology in Holsti and Rosenau's (1984: 22-23, 1988b: 279; and personal communication with Professor Holsti) 1976-88 elite surveys is shown below. Since Holsti and Rosenau's data include public officials and foreign service officers, their survevs and the three ccfr surveys as described in table 4.8 are not entirely comparable. Nonetheless, the close parallels in the distri¬ butions are noteworthy. The only difference that perhaps merit some attention is the small proportion of conservatives in the 1974 ccfr survey compared with the 1976 Foreign Policy Leadership Survey (or any other, for that matter). Repub¬ licans Indepen¬ dents Demo¬ crats Conser¬ vatives Moderates Liberals 1988 32 28 40 38 27 35 1984 32 28 40 38 28 34 1980 30 32 38 40 27 32 1976 28 36 37 37 26 38 17. The expectation is based not only on the analyses of the mass public in chapter 2 both also the findings of Holsti and Rosenau (1984, 1988b), who demonstrate that ideology is consistently more important than partisanship Notes 353 in explaining differences in the foreign policy beliefs of the leaders com¬ prising their samples. 18. Differences in the policy preferences of leaders according to their foreign policy beliefs are also evident, but they are not examined here since, knowing that beliefs matter, the interesting and theoretically important question is whether the occupany of leadership roles also affects policy preferences. The question is examined in chapter 5. 5 Comparison of Leaders and the Mass Public 1. See, for example, Jackson, Brown, and Bositis (1982), Kirkpatrick (1976), McClosky, Hoffmann, and O'Hara (1960), Miller (1988), and Miller and Jennings (1986). McClosky, Hoffmann and O'Hara's early study found that Republican party elites tended to be closer to their Democratic counterparts than to their own followers, while later studies have generally shown that party elites tend to be at the extremes of the liberalism-conservativism continuum, with Democratic party elites more liberal than their counterparts in the mass public and Republican party elites more conservative. 2. ft is noteworthy that Miller (1988) found in his study of political party elites and masses relative attitudinal stability between 1980 and 1984 among both activists and followers across several policy domains, including foreign policy. Although modest increases in inter-party differences on foreign policy were evident, generally there was "minimal change in assessments of traditional party groups" (Miller, 1988: 42). 3. In 1974 the activecooperation/apartheid scale retained the item in which respondents were asked about apartheid so as to enhance comparability with the other years examined as well as with the analyses of leaders and the mass public, despite the fact that its inclusion depressed the value of alpha (from .70 to .66). The vitalinterests scales were also constructed somewhat differently than in chapters 3 and 4, as explained in the notes to table 5.1, since not all leaders and members of the mass public were presented with the same lists of countries in which the United States might have vital interests. 4. Although these comparisons do not speak directly to the findings on elite- mass differences among party leaders and followers (see note 1), they are in some ways parallel in that they indicate leaders tend more toward liberalism than conservativism (as reflected in the accommodationist-hard- line fault) in their foreign policy beliefs than do masses. 5. Once more a note of caution is in order. Because the categorization of respondents is based on factor scores normalized around a mean of zero, the distributions in each year among the four belief systems will tend to be relatively equal. Because the number of mass respondents is so much greater than the number of elite respondents, it is not surprising to find 354 Notes relatively equal distributions for them. What is not obvious, however, is that the distribution of elites should be so dissimilar. The analytical approach thus yields non-obvious as well as theoretically meaningful results. 6. These changes may be due to the exclusion of members of Congress and the administration from the multivariate analyses, although this cannot be known for certain, since partisanship and ideology, and not the occupancy of leadership roles, may also distinguish political leaders from the mass public. Noteworthy in this respect is that the mean factor scores for elites and masses change relatively little between the bivariate and multivariate cases, which suggests that partisanship and ideology are the important variables. 7. The fact that the views of the mass public have in the aggregate remained essentially unchanged over the twelve years examined here reinforces these doubts about elite theory. However, it is necessary to caution once more that the analytical technique used to derive the belief system categories will tend to push most respondents to the midpoint, which means that analytically meaningful differences based on dichotomizing the ci and mi dimensions may be obscured. 8. To facilitate comparisons with the results in chapter 3, the analyses reported in appendix 4 parallel those in chapter 3 and appendix 2. In some cases this means that results are reported in appendix 4 that are not discussed in chapter 5. The reduced form model used in the analyses in appendix 4 is based on all of the variables except membership in the leader samples. 9. How well policymakers learned the lessons of the 1930s and how well they applied them later is a matter of considerable interest. Neustadt and May (1986) conclude from a wide-ranging examination of many different cases that policymakers often apply the lessons of history inappropriately. 10. As in chapter 3, references to tables in appendix 4 will hereinafter cite only the table number. 11. Whereas 29 percent of the mass public supported the use of force in other countries to stop illegal drugs, only 7 percent of the leaders (including members of Congress and the administration) did. 12. The combination of signs on the two Congress questions analyzed in table A.4.5 suggests that, compared with the mass public, leaders are more likely to view the role of Congress in the foreign policymaking process as about right. 13. Of the many studies on Vietnam, two that speak in some ways to this issue are Gelb with Betts (1979), and Hoopes (1973). 14. The leader coefficient for the evaluation of the government's action in table 5.16 is statistically significant, which demonstrates that leaders were relatively more approving of the government's action than the mass public, but it ranks with the moderate ideology variable as among the least potent of all of the explanatory variables. Notes 355 6 Consensus in Popular Opinion? 1. Despite its ubiquitous use, consensus has taken on a myriad of meanings, with the result that no clear understanding of it exists. Relevant discussions can be found in Almond (1960), Barnet (1987), Chace (1978), Destler, Gelb, and Lake (1984), Holsti (1979), and Levering (1978). 2. The analyses in this chapter are based on responses to roughly 500 public opinion survey questions that have been asked since the 1940s. The collection is the result of as comprehensive a survey of public opinion questions relevant to the issues that I have been able to accomplish. Inevitably this means that some information has been included that is not consistent with the arguments regarding consensus or that does not speak unambiguously to them (just as it may be possible that I have missed something that would enlarge the picture). The information has been included, nonetheless, since it is important to admit evidence that may refute the hypothesis at hand as well as that which may support it. This is, of course, a simple canon of scientific inquiry, but it is especially germane to the task at hand, since it would be quite possible to pick selectively among the available data so as to support a particular hypothesis while ignoring that which may refute it. 3. Interestingly, a 1969 survey of business leaders sponsored by Fortune magazine found that 31 percent believed that the threat of communism had increased during the 1960s, and two-thirds of them attributed the increased threat to the rise of Communist strength within the United States (Louis, 1969: 207). The perception presumably related directly to the anti- Vietnam War demonstrations which had by that time become commonplace. Recall from chapter 4, however, the argument that “establishment anti¬ communism was essentially for export" in that the foreign policy establish¬ ment showed “far lesser concern with domestic communism" (Hodgson, 1973: 9). 4. The goals, ranked in terms of the proportion of respondents in the 1986 ccfr survey who regarded each goal as "very important," are as follows: (1) protecting the jobs of American workers; (2) securing adequate supplies of energy; (3) worldwide arms control; (4) combating world hunger; (5) containing communism; (6) strengthening the United Nations; (7) defending our allies' security; (8) protecting the interests of American business abroad; (9) helping to improve the standard of living of less developed countries; (10) protecting weaker nations from foreign aggression; and (11) helping to bring a democratic form of government to others. See also appendix 1, table A. 1.8. 5. These findings are reinforced by the results of a poll sponsored by the Americans Talk Security (1988: 58) project in early 1988, which show that "containing Soviet aggression around the world" ranks below "combating international drug traffic," "correcting America's growing trade imbalance," "reducing U.S. and Soviet long-range nuclear forces by 50 percent," and 356 Notes "keeping communist governments out of Central and South America" in Americans' assessment of what "should be the most important goal of our national security." 6. Responses to about a fifth of the items examined here are included in the tables in the chapter. Responses to the others to which reference is made in the chapter (including the notes) are reported in appendix 5. As in previous chapters, these supplementary tables are cited onlv once and only by identifying the table number in appendix 4. 7. A caveat is in order here. In addition to the question about using economic aid as an anticommunist instrument, norc probed attitudes toward foreign aid as an instrument of economic development. In nine surveys conducted between 1949 and 1955 the average response level in favor of economic aid was 71 percent (table A.5.4). These findings are not easily reconciled with those showing a sharp drop in support for aid to India compared with situations where aid was directly linked to anticommunism, although it is the case that during this period security interests dominated the philosophy of the U.S. aid program, as witnessed by the title of the legislation governing it: the Mutual Security Act. 8. This is not meant to imply that the reasons for the growing opposition to the war were always the same. As Godfrey Hodgson (1977: 392) has observed, "There were . . . two oppositions to the war, one moral, the other pragmatic. . . . The opposition to the war on the campuses of the great universities, among intellectuals, in the media, and even at the comparatively 'grass roots' level of state and local leadership . . . reflected moral considerations. ... To the great majority of Americans the war . . . was a mistake. . . . [Wjhere they could see that it was affecting their own lives . . . the majority of Americans made up their minds, pragmatically and, . . . certainly not out of any sense of moral guilt, that the war was a mistake." See also Converse and Schuman (1970), Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse (1970), and Schuman (1972). 9. Because table 6.5 includes only those responses to items that appeared at least twice, not shown is the response to a 1970 question about whether it would be worth going to war again if Canada was invaded. In this case 78 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively. 10. In the case of U.S. mutual defense commitments in Asia, 58 percent of the respondents in a June 1954 norc survey approved the idea of the United States signing a defense agreement with the Philippines, Siam, and Australia, and in November of that year over three-quarters approved the just-signed Southeast Asia treaty that created seato (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) (table A.5.13). However, when asked whether it was more important for the United States "to keep the Communists from taking over Asia, or to keep the Communists from taking over Europe," Europe won out by margins of 32-16 and 31-12 percent in two 1951 surveys and a margin of 43-15 percent in 1953, with between 30 and 40 percent of the samples attaching equal importance to both regions (table A.5.14). 11. Mueller (1977: 332) makes the point in his study of "Changes in American Notes 357 Public Attitudes Toward International Involvement" that "public support for military intervention to defend against an invasion of a friendly power was much the same in the mid-1970s as it was in earlier years in the cold war, going back at least to 1950." Responses to the 1950 norc and 1974 Harris (Chicago Council) questions are used as evidence, in which he reports 15 percent support for the use of troops to help Yugoslavia in 1950 and 11 percent in 1974. Interpreting the 1950 response is more problematic than Mueller suggests, however. The 15 percent figure represents those willing to help Yugoslavia who preferred to send American troops rather than just military supplies (25 percent preferred the latter). As discussed more fully below, when given the choice Americans typically prefer military aid to overt military involvement. What portion of the 42 percent of the respondents who would have preferred the use of troops if not given the option of military aid, as in the 1974 item, is uncertain. It seems that the most relevant data are that in 1950, 37 percent of the respondents preferred to stay out of Yugoslavia entirely, while in 1974 the proportion mushroomed to 64 percent. 12. Interestingly, a norc survey taken in September 1952, about a year before the U.S. sponsored coup that ousted the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq, found that, by a 39-44 percent split, a plurality of Americans preferred not to do anything in the event that "Communists in Iran seize control of the government there." The inference is that support was considerably greater for combating overt Communist aggression than internal subversion, an apparently obvious distinction even to a mass public typically described as ignorant about key elements of foreign policy and international politics. 13. Other countries for which some time series data are available on the willingness of Americans to support the use of U.S. troops in their defense include Canada, Australia, Japan, India, and Israel. Canada elicits strong support for the use of troops (65-81 percent affirmative between 1969 and 1975); Australia (40-48 percent between 1971 and 1973) and Japan (32-53 percent) somewhat less so; and India only marginal support (16-37 percent). The commonality among these four countries is that for all four the lowest levels of support for the use of U.S. troops in their defense occurs in 1973 and 1974 (table A.5.18). Israel presents a particularly interesting case because the United States has been tied so closely to it. Surprisingly, the willingness of the American people to defend Israel militarily has been strikingly low; indeed, it has not differed very markedly from the Korean and Chinese cases. In 1969, 44 percent of the American people responded affirmatively when asked: "Suppose war breaks out again between Israel and the Arab countries. What if it looked as though Israel would be overrun by the Arabs with Russian help, do you think the U.S. should help Israel or stay out?" A year later, however, in response to a similar question, only 27 percent of the respondents supported the use of U.S. troops. Since that early 1970 poll, the proportion of Americans willing to use troops to defend Israel, as 358 Notes measured by ten surveys taken between late 1970 and late 1986, has ranged from only 17 to 39 percent (table A.5.19). 14. Contrast these findings (which include not sure and don't know responses in the calculations of the percentages) with those from six different surveys taken between 1951 and 1956 that asked whether it was "a good idea or a bad idea to send military supplies, like tanks and guns, to help build up the armies of countries that are friendly to us." The idea was consistently approved by two-thirds to three-quarters of the respondents (table A.5.21). Part of the reason for the markedly higher levels of support for military aid as measured here, compared with the 1974-86 period, may be found in the way that aid was linked to friendly countries. 15. In another norc series running from September 1950 through March 1952, respondents were asked if they thought the United States was "right or wrong in sending American troops to stop the Communist invasion of South Korea." Eighty-one percent responded "right" in the first poll, but in the second, which came shortly after the intervention of Communist China in the war, only 55 percent responded that way However, support for the view that the United States was right rose somewhat thereafter and averaged 58 percent across seven surveys taken between January 1951 and March 1952. 16. Lack of support for Eisenhower's proposal may be a direct consequence of the lack of confidence that the Soviets would live up to such an agreement. When asked in three surveys taken in the summer and fall of 1955 whether "we could count on Russia to live up to whatever agreements may result" from the Geneva summit, by an overwhelming margin of 40 to 50 percent the judgment was no (table A.5.27). 17. Again a caveat is in order. In each ccfr survey between 1978 and 1986, which are among the eight surveys discussed here, the question asked was whether respondents favored limiting the sales of advanced U.S. computers to the Soviet Union. Because of the negative wording of the question, a favorable response for detente in these instances would be a negative reply. Although the proportion of respondents giving negative answers (28 to 33 percent) is consistent with the historical pattern, it is conceivable that the phraseology produced more negative responses than would otherwise have been the case. That suspicion is reinforced by the responses to the question posed in each of the same surveys in which it was asked if respondents favored restricting U.S.-Soviet trade. Here the favorable (i.e., do not restrict trade) response ranged from only 46 to 52 percent. However, in two other surveys taken in 1978 and 1982 in which respondents were asked if they favored increased trade, the favorable responses stood at 71 and 70 percent, respectively. In these cases, at least, question wording seems to have seriously affected the response patterns (table A.5.28). Where these two sets of questions differ, of course, is that in the case of the computers question, the responses fit the historical patterns, whereas in the trade question they do not. 18. These findings are roughly comparable to the results of a norc survey Notes 359 taken in April 1956, less than a year after the Geneva summit involving the leaders of Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents favored exchanges of musicians and athletes between the United States and the Soviet Union, but only 40 percent favored visits by scientists. 19. As noted in note 17, the 1978-86 Chicago Council surveys contained several items relating to Soviet-American relations that were stated in negative form. In this instance the item posed was prohibiting the exchange of scientists between the United States and the Soviet Union. Between 52 and 54 percent of the respondents opposed the item, meaning they supported the exchange of scientists, which is consistent with the data cited in the body of the chapter, but the suspicion is that a higher percentage of support would have been registered with a differently worded question. 20. Noteworthy in this respect is the change in public attitudes toward Communist China, as reflected in support for its admission to the United Nations. In 1954 a Gallup survey showed that nearly 80 percent of the American people opposed the admission of China, and less than 7 percent supported it. Over the next seventeen years these proportions were gradually reversed. By 1971, when Communist China did come to represent the state of China in the world organization, 46 percent of the respondents in a Gallup survey supported the move, compared with 37 percent who opposed it. If those with no opinion are excluded, a majority was actually on the affirmative side. See Kusnitz (1984) for a detailed examination of public opinion toward U.S. China policy. 21. Interesting to note in this respect is that Gallup data from the period 1953 through 1980 indicate a dramatic increase in the proportion of Americans approving of the Soviet Union (table A.5.33), from almost none in 1953 to a near majority in the mid-1970s (followed, however, by a decline thereafter) (see also Nincic, 1988). 22. Unfortunately, the requisite data that would permit a complete examination of the propositions from this viewpoint are not readily available—although, it should be added quickly, those that are do not contradict the findings summarized above. Education is the variable most often available in the early surveys examined here, particularly the more than one hundred items in the norc surveys sponsored by the U.S. Department of State in the 1940s and 1950s examined here (see Foster, 1983). The evidence from these supports overwhelmingly the conclusion that education and internationalism are correlated. Interestingly, the data also demonstrate that in the vast majority of cases a majority of the respondents in each of the educational groups supported the same policy option, which is the criterion for consensus used here. The same generalization holds for the much smaller number of survey items in which partisanship, economic status, or region of the country was used. Gallup and Harris from time to time report responses to their survey items by various political and sociodemographic groups. It is more difficult 360 Notes to generalize about these data than about the norc surveys, in part because more subgroups are typically included. Noteworthy, however, is that Shapiro and Page (1984) have shown (using domestic as well as foreign policy data) that trends in the public attitudes of various population subgroups generally track aggregate national trends. 23. Recall from chapter 3, however, that support for aid is greatest among those disposed toward internationalism compared with the other foreign policy belief systems. 7 Bipartisanship: Myth or Reality? 1. The others he identified were "executive consultation or collaboration with foreign policy leaders of both parties" and "the exclusion of certain policies from campaign debate, particularly the presidential campaign" (Dahl, 1950: 227-28). See also Crabb (1957: 161-72). Nelson (1987) describes the way John Foster Dulles went about building bipartisan support in Congress for Eisenhower's foreign policies. 2. Kesselman (1961, 1965) provides some evidence of departures from bipar¬ tisan voting behavior in the House. Based on data for the 81st, 86th, and 87th Congresses used to compare voting behavior on foreign policy issues when the party in the White House changes (from Truman to Eisenhower, and from Eisenhower to Kennedy), Kesselman found that most of the members of Congress who moved toward internationalist voting postures were members of the new president's party, while most of those who moved in the isolationist direction were members of the opposition party. The results are partially confirmed for the Senate by Tidmarch and Sabatt (1972). 3. The analogous question raised in the two presidencies literature is whether developments since Wildavsky first published his article may not have undermined the argument (see, e.g., LeLoup and Shull, 1979; Peppers, 1975; and Sigelman, 1979; but cf. Fleisher and Bond, 1988). Recently, Wildavsky (Oldfield and Wildavsky, 1989) conceded that the two presiden¬ cies thesis was "time and culture bound" in that it explained differences in foreign and defense policy compared with domestic policy during the Eisenhower administration, but that it has been unable to do so in the environment that emerged beginning in the late 1960s, during which time partisan and ideological dispute came to characterize contention over foreign and defense policy as well as domestic policy. 4. Sigelman (1979) has argued that the Congressional Quarterly box scores used by Wildavsky to develop the two presidencies thesis contain many trivial issues and thus are not adequate tests of presidential success on major foreign and domestic issues (cf. Shull and LeLoup, 1981). The criticism is especially germane to the Truman administration, since the Notes 361 Congressional Quarterly Service itself has warned that the box scores for the Truman administration and for the first year of the Eisenhower administration are not comparable to those in later years, as an examination of the data makes readily apparent. Unfortunately, however, no alternative measures for the early Cold War years are readily available, which doubtless explains why they have generally been ignored. The suspicion is that by excluding the Truman administration in particular, and especially the years 1951 and 1952, our understanding of the pre-Vietnam experience may be biased, for it was during this period that "the nation had both an unpopular war and a highly unpopular President" (Levering, 1978: 102). 5. James M. McCormick and I each coded the president's position from one of these sources, and we then compared results. Differences were resolved through consultation. The unevenness of coverage in the two data sources precluded the use of systematic tests of intercoder reliability. 6. In order to maximize the amount of information, a member's actual vote or his or her indicated position, pairing for or against, or announcing a position for or against a measure was used to calculate the index. To make the analysis as comparable across congresses as possible, only members who served during the entire Congress in the House or the Senate were included. Thus members who died, retired, resigned, or filled vacancies were not included. Additionally, the speaker of the House, who rarely votes, was excluded throughout. Members of third parties, a total of seven in all, were excluded from the analyses. 7. The most common measure of congressional voting behavior vis-a-vis the president is a presidential success index, which measures the percentage of times a president's position is supported by members of Congress. Although from the vantage point of the White House winning is perhaps the most important perspective that presidents bring to congressional- executive relations, as a measure of bipartisanship the index is less than satisfactory, as it neither accounts for the party composition of a president's legislative victories nor permits characteristics of the members who sup¬ ported or opposed the president to be assessed. For discussions of alternative measures of congressional voting behavior, see Covington (1986), Edwards (1985), and Fleisher and Bond (1988). 8. Clausen (1973) provides some empirical support for this demarcation. He describes congressional voting behavior in the foreign and defense policy domain as falling along an "international involvement" dimension (which closely parallels an internationalism-isolationism dimension) and argues that the dimension manifests continuity and stability from 1953 to 1964 and again from then on through 1969-70. However, he reports that "during the Ninety-first Congress, 1969-1970, we witnessed the emergence of a policy dimension, concerned with the Vietnam War and the defense establishment, that was independent of the international involvement dimension" (1973: 229-30). The inference is that a dramatic change in elite attitudes occurred during this time. 9. For the 88th and 93d Congresses separate scores were created for Kennedy 362 Notes and Johnson and Nixon and Ford. These congresses were divided at the appropriate points for each president. 10. The precise numbers are eight of twenty congresses in the House, or eight of twenty-two if the split of the 88th Congress between Kennedy and Johnson and the 93d between Nixon and Ford are both counted as two congresses; and twelve of twenty in the Senate, or thirteen of twenty-two if the 88th and 93d are counted twice. 11. The administration scores are a weighted average of the scores for the individual congresses. 12. An examination of the Congress level data in appendix 6 indicates that, in addition to the Truman administration in the 81st and 82d Congresses, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' levels of bipartisan support in the 88th House are unusually low. Their experience is not easily explained. It could be that—in contrast to the two presidencies argument—domestic political divisions over such issues as recession, inflation, and civil rights activism adversely impacted on congressional-executive relations in the foreign policy domain. Fleisher and Bond (1988: 754), using presidential support scores, in fact show that Kennedy and Johnson enjoyed much less success in the 88th Congress than other presidents. This does not dem¬ onstrate that contention over domestic issues adversely affected foreign policy issues, but the results do contrast sharply with the two presidencies thesis. 13. To test the effect of Vietnam in the House where a significant linear decline is evident, the Congress Index was regressed on a time variable, a dummy variable for the Vietnam interruption (0 before Vietnam, 1 after Vietnam), and a counter variable (0 before Vietnam, 1, 2, 3, etc., after Vietnam). None of the coefficients was statistically significant for the administration data. For the Congress data, the counter variable was significant for the Senate. This indicates that the trend in bipartisanship is different after Vietnam compared with the entire postwar period, which is evidence pointing to the impact of the war on senatorial foreign policy voting behavior. 14. Recall from chapter 6 that the level of popular support for active U.S. involvement in Asia was seldom as great as support for involvement in Europe. 15. One-way anova tests using the administration data show that the differ¬ ences between parties are significant in both chambers for all of the administrations except in the Senate during Johnson's presidency. For the Congress data, the results show that in the House the differences between the president's party and the opposition party are significant statistically at p < .01 in all but two of the congresses (the 86th, where p < .05, and the 91st, where the differences are not significant), and in the Senate in all but five (the 84th and 90th, where p < .05, and the 85th, 88th [Kennedy], and 89th, where the differences are not significant). 16. One-way anova tests were used to assess the differences in the partisan gaps before and after Vietnam. None proved significant for either the administration data, as reported above, or for the Congress data. Notes 363 17. Members of Congress were classified into one of the three ideological groups according to the following procedures. First, a mean ada score was calculated for each chamber and each Congress. Conservatives were then defined as members whose ada scores were more than half a standard deviation below the mean for each chamber and Congress; moderates as those whose ada scores were equal to or more or less than half a standard deviation from the mean; and liberals as those whose ada scores were more than half a standard deviation above the mean. For the administration analyses, the ada scores for each Congress of the corresponding president were used and the same decision rules applied. ada scores were drawn from various issues of Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, ADA World, interest group ratings file tape available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, and the compilation by Sharp (1988). Because ada changed its coding of "dead pairs" and "position announcements" in 1972 (Sharp, 1988: xii). Sharp was used for all ada scores prior to 1972 because the scores included there had been recalculated to be consistent with the post-1972 rules. Some of the foreign policy votes used here overlap with the votes used by the ada to determine its rating of each member of Congress. Elimination of the overlapping votes from the calculation of the ada scores yields somewhat different numerical scores, as would be expected, but the overall interpretation of the results does not change materially. The most notable change is that the level of support given presidents by moderates is relatively greater compared with that given them by conservatives and liberals. 18. For the "cleaned" ada data (that is, the ada scores calculated without the votes that overlap with the foreign policy votes comprising the dataset), moderate Republicans in the Senate gave Eisenhower his greatest support (89.7 percent), followed by conservative Republicans (70.3 percent) and liberal Republicans (69.4 percent). 19. For the cleaned ada data for the Kennedy administration in the House, moderate Republicans provided greater support (58.1 percent) than liberal Republicans (54.6 percent). 20. For the cleaned ada data for the Kennedy administration in the House, the party variable was also significant. 21. The party and ideology interaction term can be expected to capture the often distinctive behavior of southern Democrats, who are not treated separately here. 22. For the cleaned ada data for the Eisenhower administration in the Senate, the beta for party is larger than the beta for ideology. 9 Epilogue 1. Unlike the Chicago Council surveys, the ats surveys specifically used the term "pro-Soviet, Communist governments" in the question, which perhaps 364 Notes links the responses more directly to anti-Soviet sentiments than in the case of the ccfr surveys. 2. The responses are drawn from five ats surveys and one by the firm Martilla and Kiley for the American Jewish Congress. Unless otherwise noted in this way, the responses reported here are drawn exclusively from the ats surveys. It should be noted, of course, that the dramatic changes that have taken place in the Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe since ats conducted its surveys merit attention as they may affect the dispositions reported here in perhaps dramatic ways. 3. The proportion is similar to that found in surveys in 1983 and 1984, when three-quarters of the respondents agreed that the United States had to share blame for the state of U.S.-Soviet relations (Americans Talk Security, 1989: 99). 4. It should be noted that while these generalizations are accurate, cross tabulations using chi-square tests to determine whether partisanship and ideology are independent of responses to each of the items generally support the null hypothesis of no relationship on the Soviet-American cooperation questions. The reason lies in the way independents and moderates tend to be distributed. 5. 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Index Abramowitz, Alan I., 348 n.25 Academic leaders. 111, 123-24, 130 Accommodationists: and allies' defense, 30, 120; and age, 43; and aid, 53, 71, 73, 79, 105; and anticommunist rebels, 105; and cia intervention, 53, 76, 77, 105, 121; and communism, 30, 118; and con¬ tainment, 30, 117-18; and defense spending, 53, 105; and detente, 32; and dictatorships, 79; and drug trafficking, 75, 105; and education, 37, 46; elite characteristics of, 117, 133, 136-37, 144, 162, 164, 351 n.10; evaluation of Carter, 102; evaluation of Reagan, 55, 59, 101, 106, 130; and human rights, 95; and ideology, 34, 46, 127, 133, 141, 164; mass characteristics of, 9, 26, 27, 29, 49, 136-37, 164; and military might, 10, 105, 346 n.ll; and nuclear weapons, 92-94, 105; occupational correlates of, 123-24; and partisanship, 34, 48, 127, 133, 141, 164; and region, 40, 46; and relations with Communist countries, 95, 162; and religion, 44; and socioeconomic status, 39; and terrorism, 85, 105; and the use of force, 29, 30, 79, 85, 122; and Viet¬ nam, 81, 118-21. See also Cooperative Internationalism; Liberals Achen, Christopher H., 340 n.3 Acid rain, 224 ACTIVECOOPERATION/APARTHEID, 20, 21, 25, 115, 350 n.7, 353 n.3 ADA World, 363 n.17 Adler, Selig, 344 n.17 Afghanistan: Soviet invasion of, 1-2, 50, 57, 68; aid to rebels, 74 Africa: aid to, 72-73, 151-52; communism in, 2, 223; Reagan performance on, 57 Age, 42-43, 45 Aid. See Economic aid; Foreign aid; Mili¬ tary aid Allies: Cold War network of, 2, 4, 108; defense of, 30, 82, 118-19, 157, 158, 355 n.4; sharing oil with, 88-89, 158-59 Almond, Gabriel A., 4-5, 13, 39, 45, 134, 141, 355 n.l Alsop, Dee, 348 n.27 "America First" policies, 91 American Jewish Congress, 364 n.2 American Leadership in World Affairs, 349 n.l The American People and Foreign Policy, 4—5, 13, 14 The American Scholar, 108 Americans for Democratic Action (ada), 206, 363 nn. 17-20, 363 n.22 Americans Talk Security (ats) surveys, 11, 222-37, 348 n.26, 355 n.5, 356 nn. 10-11, 357 n.12 363 n.l, 364 nn.2-3, 364 n.5 The American Voter, 340 n.4 Analysis-of-variance (anova) techniques, 34, 37, 45-47, 127, 139, 201, 209, 343 n.15, 362 nn. 15-16, 364 n.6 Andersen, Kristi, 14, 34 Angola, aid to rebels in, 74, 96 anova. See Analysis-of-variance tech¬ niques Anthony, William, 206 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (1973), 93 Anticommunist rebels, aid to, 57, 74, 85, 96, 105, 151-52, 231 Apartheid, 20, 115, 342 n.10, 353 n.3 Area resolutions, 5 Argentina, 57 Arms control, 13, 32, 50, 51, 92-94, 97, 159-61, 165, 172, 187-88, 224, 227-28, 234, 355 n.4 Asia: communism in, 356 n.10; Truman policies toward, 199-200, 362 n.14 Asia, Southeast: communism in, 223; use of force in, 186. See also Vietnam Assured destruction, 12 ats. See Americans Talk Security surveys Attentiveness: and age, 143; and Cl/Ml, 45, 143, 144-45, 216, 218; and education, 45, 143; and gender, 143-44; and ideol¬ ogy, 144; and mass beliefs, 29, 45, 48, 112, 139, 141^6, 218, 343 n.14, 348 379 380 Index Attentiveness ( continued ) n.23; and partisanship, 144; and region, 144; and role/occupational groups, 129; and socioeconomic status, 45, 143 Australia: defense agreement with, 356 n.10; use of force in, 357 n.13 Baird, Mary, 72 Ballistic missile defense (bmd), 93, 160, 161 Bardes, Barbara A., 339 n.8 Barnet, Richard }., 2-3, 338 n.4, 349 n.2, 355 n.l Barton, Allen H., 349 n.l Bax, Frans R., 78 Belief system, definition of, 15, 25-26. See also Accommodationists; Elite foreign policy beliefs; Hardliners; International¬ ists; Isolationists; Mass foreign policy beliefs. Bennett, Stephen Earl, 339 n.l Berlin, use of force in, 5, 43, 178-79, 180, 231, 232 Bernstein, Robert A., 206 Betts, Richard, 354 n.13 Beyond American Hegemony, 3 Billingsley, Keith R., 339 n.8 Bipartisanship: in congressional-executive relations, 194-213, 362 n.12; in congres¬ sional voting behavior, 196, 198, 199- 202, 216-17, 360 n.2; definition of, 198; and foreign policy consensus, 4, 5-6, 8, 34, 166, 338 n.l, 360 nn.1-3, 361 n.7, 361 n.8 Black, Michael, 206 Blacks, 44 Bloomfield, Lincoln P., 338 n.4 bmd. See Ballistic missile defense Bond, Jon R., 360 n.3, 361 n.7, 362 n.12 Bositis, David, 353 n.l Brazil, debt restructuring of, 89 Brezhnev, Leonid, 94 Bricker Amendment, 196 Brody, Richard, 339 n.7 Brown, Barbara Leavitt, 353 n.l Brown, Seyom, 338 n.5 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 3, 5, 36, 338 n.4 Budget deficit, 224 Bush, George, 194 Business leaders. 111, 123-24, 352 nn.12- 14, 355 n.3 Calleo, David P., 3 Cambodia, invasion of, 13-14 Campbell, Angus, 340 n.4 Camp David accords, 75 Canada: communism in, 223; use of force in, 356 n.9, 357 n.13 Cantril, Hadley, 44 Carnegie Endowment, 338 n.l Carnot, Catherine, 342 n.14 Carter, Jimmy, 48, 68: and CIA interven¬ tion, 77; and congressional voting be¬ havior, 199, 213; and cooperative inter¬ nationalism, 25; and Cuba, 96; and dictatorships, 79; evaluation of, 102; and globalism, 2, 12; and human rights, 50, 162; and SALT II, 94 Caspar)', William R., 13 Catholics, 44 CCFR. See Chicago Council on Foreign Re¬ lations surveys Central America: aid to, 72-73, 151-52; communism in, 223, 224; Cuba as source of arms for, 96; use of force in, 29 Chace, James, 3, 5, 6, 338 n.5, 355 n.l “Changes in American Public Attitudes Toward International Involvement," 356 n.ll Chappell, Henry W., Jr., 348 n.25 Chemical weapons, 224 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (ccfr) surveys, 9-10: methodology of elite surveys, 111-17, 350 nn.6-7, 351 n.10, 353 n.3, 353 n.5, 354 nn.6-8; methodology of mass surveys, 16-21, 341 nn.7-9, 342 nn. 10-11, 342 n.13, 343 nn. 15-16, 344 nn.2-4, 345 nn.5-8, 346 n.13, 348 n.28 China. See People's Republic of China; Taiwan China straits, 5 Chi-squares, 106, 364 n.4 Chittick, William O., 339 n.8 Church, Frank, 96 ci. See Cooperative internationalism CIA intervention, 53, 76-77, 79, 154-55, 165; and Angola, 96; and terrorists, 85-86 Civil liberties, suspension of, 86 Clark, William, 67, 101 Clark amendment (1976), 96 Clausen, Aage R., 361 n.8 Climate of opinion, 52, 99, 191, 192, 220, 351 n.9 Coalitions: and aid, 53, 151; and executive foreign policy goals, 26, 29, 52, 53, 97, 101, 106, 136, 220, 360 n.l Cohen, Bernard C., 194 Committee on Present Danger, 110, 218 Communications leaders. 111, 123-24, 352 n.12 Index 381 Communism, attitudes toward: in Africa, 2, 223; in Angola, 74, 96; in Asia, 356 n.10; in Canada, 223; in Central Amer¬ ica, 223, 224; and elites, 117, 118-19, 121, 132, 136, 144, 161, 165; in El Salva¬ dor, 169; and foreign policy censensus, 1, 9, 16, 110, 112, 115, 147, 167-74, 191- 92, 215, 216, 223-25, 234-35, 236-37; in France, 169, 223; in Italy, 169; in Japan, 169; and mass beliefs, 30-32, 52, 79, 104, 136, 161, 165; in Mexico, 169, 171- 72; in Panama, 223; in the Philippines, 223; and Reagan, 2, 12, 74, 93, 101, 115, 125, 351 n.9; in South America, 223; in Southeast Asia, 223; in Western Europe, 169, 177, 223, 356 n.10. See also Com¬ munist countries, U.S. relations with; Vietnam Communist countries, U.S. relations with, 94-96, 161, 163, 339 n.l, 346 n.ll communist scale, 21, 23, 30-32, 341 n.8, 350 n.7 Conflict, 4, 9, 21, 29, 36, 97, 99. See also Militant internationalism Congress: and aid, 71; bipartisan voting behavior of, 198, 199-202, 216-17, 360 n.2; and cia hearings, 77; and Clark amendment, 96; and defense spending, 68; elite dissensus in, 97; and Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 172; human rights trade restrictions, 95; ideological voting behavior of, 195, 205-9, 216-17, 363 nn.17-22 and nuclear freeze, 91; partisan voting behavior of, 295, 202-5, 209, 212, 216-17, 362 nn. 15-16; role in foreign policymaking, 78-79, 155, 354 n.12 Congress Index, 198, 199, 200, 201, 362 n.13 Congressional Quarterly, 196, 198, 360 n.4 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 198 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 363 n.17 Conover, Pamela Johnston, 2, 340 n.6 Consensus, foreign policy: breakdown of, 1-8, 11, 50, 80-82, 96-97, 107, 108, 155- 58, 174-75, 191-92, 204, 205, 209, 211, 338 nn.1-6, 339 n.9, 349 nn.1-3; exist¬ ence of, 166-93, 355 n.l. See also Biparti¬ sanship; Vietnam; Watergate Conservative internationalists, 342 n.12, 343 n.14 Conservatives, 34—36: and aid to anticom¬ munists rebels, 74; and arms control, 94; and cia intervention, 77; congres¬ sional voting behavior of, 206, 209, 213, 363 nn. 17-18; and defense spending. 150; and dictatorships, 79-80, 347 n.20; and economic aid, 347 n.17; elite beliefs of, 127, 133, 141, 217, 218, 353 n.l; and evaluation of Ford/Kissinger, 102; and evaluation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101; and internationalism, 64; mass beliefs of, 34-36, 46, 48, 141, 217, 218; and military aid, 347 nn. 16-17; and performance evaluation, 105-6; and terrorism, 85; and the use of force, 85. See also Hardli¬ ners; Ideology; Militant internationalism Constraint, 14-15, 134, 217, 218, 339 n.l, 340 nn.3-4, 341 n.6 Containment: elite beliefs on, 117-18, 121, 132, 351 n.ll; and foreign policy con¬ sensus, 1, 2, 12, 147, 168-74, 191, 355 nn.4-5, 356 n.7; mass beliefs on, 19, 30, 86; wisdom of, 6, 108-9, 117 Contee, Christine E., 71, 173 Contras, 57, 75, 85, 231 Converse, Philip E., 14, 15, 340 n.3, 340 n.4, 356 n.8 Cooperation. See Communist countries, U.S. relations with; Interdependence; Soviet Union: U.S. relations with Cooperative internationalism (ci), 9, 23, 25; and aid, 71, 73-74, 104, 151; and anticommunist rebels, 74; and arms control, 92-93; and attentiveness, 45; and Carter performance, 102; and Cen¬ tral American aid, 73-74; congressional foreign policy role, 78-79; and defense spending, 68-70; and debt restructur¬ ing, 89; and dictatorships, 82, 104; and education, 36-39, 344 n.22; and elite be¬ liefs, 112-17, 132, 351 nn.8-10; and free trade vs. tariffs, 90, 105; and gender, 42; and ideology, 36, 46, 139, 141, 344 n.22; and mass beliefs, 25-26, 56, 215, 344 n.4; and oil sharing, 89, 104; and partisanship, 36, 139, 141; and political correlates, 127, 129, 136, 139, 141; and race, 44; and Reagan administration performance, 57, 59, 101, 106; and re¬ gion, 40; and religion, 44; and relations with Cuba, 96, 161; and role/occupa¬ tional groups, 122-23, 124, 125; and SDI, 93; and socioeconomic status, 39; and Soviet Jews, 104; and U.S. world role, 61, 64, 65-67, 104, 346 n.ll; and use of force, 82; and Vietnam, 120. See also Ac- commodationists; Liberals Council on Foreign Relations, 108-11, 350 n.4 Covariance, 45 Covington, Cary R., 361. n.7 382 Index Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., 360 n.l Cronbach's alpha, 16, 18, 344 nn.2-3 Cuba, 5: naval blockade of, 229; U.S. rela¬ tions with, 95-96, 161-62, 182-83 Dahl, Robert A., 195-96, 197, 198, 360 n.l Debt restructuring, 89-90, 159, 347 n.22 Deering, Christopher }., 205 Defense spending, 8: and elite beliefs, 146, 149-51, 352 n.12; and gender, 41; and Korean War, 123; and mass beliefs, 50, 53, 67-70, 105, 149; and role/occupa¬ tional groups, 124, 352 n.12 DeLuca, Donald R., 8 Democratic convention (1968), 66-67 Democrats: and aid, 71, 74, 347 nn. 16-17; and attentiveness, 144; and bipartisan¬ ship, 196; and cia intervention, 78; congressional voting behavior of, 194, 196, 199, 200, 206, 298, 363 n.21; elite beliefs of, 126-27, 217, 353 n.l; and evaluation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101; and internationalism, 61, 64-65; internation¬ alist split, 5, 36, 65; mass beliefs of, 34, 48, 217; and nuclear weapons, 91, 94; and performance evaluations, 105-6; and Soviet-American relations, 234; and Soviet military strength, 70; and Viet¬ nam, 81. See also Bipartisanship; Parti¬ sanship Department of State, 168, 359 n.22; Office of Opinion Analysis and Plans, 220 Destler, 1. M., 5, 10, 34, 96, 141, 194-95, 199, 201, 212, 338 n.5, 355 n.l Detente; and consensus breakdown, 1, 2, 3, 12, 32, 50, 187-88; and containment, 1; and elite beliefs, 115; and mass be¬ liefs, 94-95, 346 n. 11, 348 n.23, 349 n.29, 358 n.17; and relations with Com¬ munist countries, 94, 95. See also Com¬ munism, attitudes toward; Communist countries, U.S. relations with; Soviet Union: U.S. relations with DETENTE scale, 21, 25, 32, 115, 350 n.6 Deterrence, 2, 3, 93 Deutsch, Karl W., 42 Devine, Donald }., 343 n.14 Dictators, support for, 20, 79-80, 82, 104, 155-56, 347 n.20 Difference-of-means testing, 125 Domhoff, G. William, 350 n.4 Donor fatigue, 72 Donovan, John C., 349 n.2 Drug Enforcement Agency, 347 n.19 Drug trafficking, 75-76, 105, 152-53, 224, 227, 347 n.19, 354 n.ll Dulles, John Foster, 360 n.l Dye, Thomas R., 107, 134, 350 n.4, 350 n.5 Economic aid: against drug trafficking, 75; and foreign policy consensus, 173, 174, 191, 356 n.7; and mass beliefs, 70-76. See also Foreign aid; Military aid economic aid scale, 21, 23, 350 n.7 Economy: and interdependence, 90, 347 nn.23^24; and presidential evaluations, 99, 220, 348 n.27 Education: and internationalism, 338 n.3; and mass beliefs, 29, 36-39, 45, 46, 215, 343 n.14, 344 n.22, 359 n.22; and role/ occupational groups, 129 Edwards, George C., 202, 348 n.25, 361 n.7 80 percent rule, 345 n.7 Eisenhower, Dwight D.: and arms con¬ trol, 188, 35 n.16; and congressional voting behavior, 199, 204, 206, 360 nn.3-4, 363 n.18, 363 n.22; and foreign policy consensus, 97; and Korean War, 12 Eisenhower Doctrine, 196 Elite foreign policy beliefs, 107-33, 215-19, 353 n.2; and cooperative international¬ ism, 112-17, 122-23, 132, 218, 351 nn.8 distribution of, 116-17, 136-39, 218-19, 351 n.10, 353 n.5; and evaluation of Reagan, 130-32, 162-64; differences with mass beliefs, 139^46, 352 n.4; and ideology, 126-30, 141, 216-17, 218, 234- 35, 352 nn.15-17, 353 n.l, 353 n.4, 354 n.6, 364 n.4, 364 n.6; impact on evalua¬ tions, 130-31, 162; and internationalism split, 122-23, 218, 351 n.8; and mass beliefs, 135-64, 216, 217-19, 353 n.4; and militant internationalism, 112-17, 122-23, 124, 125, 218, 351 nn.8-10; par¬ tisanship, 126-30, 141, 216-17, 352 nn. 16-17, 353 n.l; and preferences, 136, 147-64, 353 n.18; and role/occupational groups, 110-12, 123-24, 129-30, 132, 139, 147, 162, 352 nn. 12-14, 353 n.18; structure of, 112-17, 135-39. See also Ac- commodationists; Elite foreign policy preferences; Elite theory; Hardliners; In¬ ternationalists; Isolationists Elite foreign policy preferences, 107-33, 215-19; and aid, 151-53, 165; and de¬ fense spending, 149-51; and evaluation Index 383 of Reagan, 162-64; and interdepend¬ ence, 158-59; and internationalism, 147- 49; and interventionism, 153-58; and mass preferences, 134—64, 216, 217-19; and national defense, 159-61; and nu¬ clear weapons, 159-61; and relations with communist countries, 161-62; and terrorism, 158 Elite theory: composition of elites, 110-11, 350 n.5; and constraint, 14-15, 134, 217, 218, 339 n.l, 340 nn.3-5, 341 n.6; doubts about, 146, 354 n.7; elite/mass differences, 107; and group interests, 129, 130; and manipulation of mass be¬ liefs, 13-14, 111, 146, 147, 153, 164, 217- 18, 219; responsiveness of elites, 123, 130, 135, 146; sophistication of elites, 156, 157, 162, 165, 216; stability of elites, 134 El Salvador: communism in, 169; Reagan performance on, 57; use of force in, 15, 182 Energy supply, 172, 355 n.4. See also Oil sharing Environmental concerns, 224, 227-28 Establishment, 108-9, 349 n.3 Europe, Eastern: use of force in, 182-83 Europe, Western: aid to, 108, 174, 194, 196; communism in, 169, 177, 223; peace movement in, 91; sharing oil with, 86-89; use of force in, 4, 8, 12, 27-29, 177, 178-80 Eward, William Bragg, Jr., 168 Executive foreign policymaking: and coali¬ tions, 26, 52, 53, 97, 101, 106, 136, 220, 360 n.l; and congressional relations, 166, 194r-213, 348 n.25; dominance of, 1, 5, 6, 25, 196; and performance evalua¬ tions, 98-101, 348 nn.25-27, 349 nn.28- 29 Factor analysis, 16, 112, 341 n.9, 342 n.13, 351 n.10, 353 n.5 Falk, Richard, 338 nn.4—5, 342 n.12 Falkland Islands war, 57 Feldman, Stanley, 340 n.6 Ferraro, Geraldine, 40 Fiorina, Morris P., 98-99 Fleisher, Richard, 206, 360 n.3, 361 n.7, 362 n.12 Flexible response, 108 Followership, 37 follownews scale, 20-21, 45, 46, 143. See also Attentiveness Force, use of: in ATS surveys, 228-34; in Australia, 357 n.13; in Canada, 356 n.9, 357 n.13; in Central America, 29; in China, 181; in Cuba, 182-83; against drug traffickers, 75, 151-52, 354 n.ll; in Eastern Europe, 182-83; and elite be¬ liefs, 117, 118-19, 121, 132, 136, 144, 152, 153-54, 161, 165; in El Salvador, 15, 182; in foreign policy consensus, 9, 174— 86, 191-92, 215, 216, 228-34, 235, 236- 37; in Grenada, 2, 50, 57, 153, 154, 229; in Honduras, 231, 232; in India, 231, 356 n.13; in Iran, 180-81, 231, 357 n.12; in Israel, 175, 231, 232, 357 n.13; in Ja¬ pan, 4, 8, 12, 27, 29; in Lebanon, 50, 75; in Libya, 2, 50, 154, 229, 339 n.7; and mass beliefs, 27-29, 50-52, 82, 136, 152- 54, 161, 165, 228-34, 344 nn. 19-21, 356 nn.ll, 357 nn.12-13; in the Middle East, 231-32; in Nicaragua, 15, 29, 231, 232; in opec countries, 87; in Pacific U.S. possessions, 231-32; in Pakistan, 231; in Panama, 231; in the Philippines, 178; in Poland, 231, 232; and presidential eval¬ uations, 98, 101; and Saudi Arabia, 231, 232; in South America, 182; in South¬ east Asia, 186; in South Korea, 147, 357 n.13; in Taiwan, 181, 231; against ter¬ rorists, 85-86, 105; in Vietnam, 80-82, 109-10, 117, 118-21, 132, 165, 174C75, 191-92; in Western Europe, 4, 8, 12, 27- 29, 177, 178-80; in Yugoslavia, 180, 356 n.ll Ford, Gerald: and cia in Angola, 96; and congressional voting behavior, 204, 206; and cooperative internationalism, 25; mass evaluation of, 102, 349 nn.28-29 Foreign Affairs, 5 Foreign aid: to Africa, 72-73, 151-52; to anticommunist rebels, 57, 74, 85, 96, 105, 151-52, 231; to Central America, 72-73, 151-52; and coalitions, 53, 151; and congressional-executive relations, 5; to dictators, 20, 79-80, 82, 104, 155-56, 347 n.20; and elite beliefs, 151-53; and foreign policy consensus, 4, 173, 174, 182-86, 191, 356 n.7, 360 n.23; to Greece, 196; to India, 173, 356 n.7; to Iran, 74K75, 104; to Israel, 74-75, 152- 53; and mass beliefs, 19, 53, 70-76, 104, 151-53, 231, 342 n.ll, 347 nn. 14-17, 347 nn. 19-21; to Taiwan, 173; to Turkey, 196. See also Economic aid; Military aid Foreign aid scales, 19, 112, 342 n.ll, 350 n.7 Foreign Policy, 3, 6 384 Index Foreign policy beliefs. See Elite foreign policy beliefs; Mass foreign policy be¬ liefs Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 351 n.8, 352 n.16 Foreign policy scales, 18-21 Formosa. See Taiwan Fortune, 124, 355 n.3 Foster, H. Schuyler, 147, 359 n.22 France, 358 n.18: communism in, 169, 223; in Indochina, 186 Franck, Thomas M., 78 Frank, Charles R., Jr., 72 Frankovic, Kathleen A., 40-42 Fraser, Cleveland R., 339 n.8, 342 n.12 Free, Lloyd A., 7, 37, 44, 178 Fulbright, William }., 72 Gallup polls: on aid vs. troops, 186; and CCFR elite surveys, 350 n.6, 352 n.15; on internationalism, 338 n.6; on presiden¬ tial performance, 99; on Soviet-Ameri- can relations, 359 nn.20-21; on the use of force, 174-75, 177, 178 Gamson, William A., 339 n.l Gaza strip, 347 n.18 Gelb, Leslie H„ 5, 10, 34, 96, 141, 194-95, 199, 201, 205, 212, 338 nn.4-5, 354 n.13, 355 n.l Gemayel, Bashir, 75 Gender, 40-42, 45, 344 nn. 19-20 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (gatt), 147 Geneva summit (1955), 188, 358 n.16, 358 n.18 Germany, East, 231, 232 Gershman, Carl, 6, 109-10, 338 n.5, 349 n.l Gilboa, Eytan, 344 n.21 Gilens, Martin, 42 Gill, Stephen, 338 n.2 Gilpin, Robert, 348 n.24 Globalism, 1, 2, 3, 12, 50, 115, 147, 148, 164 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 125, 237 Graham, Thomas W., 15, 340 n.2 Gray, Colin S., 338 n.4 Great Debate, 147 Greece, aid to, 196 Green, John C., 339 n.8, 342 n.12 Greenhouse effect, 224 Grenada, U.S. invasion of, 2, 50, 57, 153, 154, 229 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 78, 172, 196 Guth, James L., 339 n.8, 342 n.12 Haas, Richard N., 338 n.2 Haig, Alexander, 96 Halberstam, David, 338 n.4, 349 n.2 Hampson, Fen Osier, 96 Hanson, Elizabeth G., 34-36, 124, 130, 349 n.l Hardliners: and allies' defense, 30, 120; and age, 43; and aid, 53, 71, 73, 79, 105, 146; and anticommunist rebels, 105; and attentiveness, 1 44 4 5; and CIA interven¬ tion, 53, 76, 77, 105, 121, 146; and com¬ munism, 30, 118; and containment, 30, 117-18; and defense spending, 53, 105, 124, 146, 352 n.12; and detente, 32; and dictatorships, 79; and drug trafficking, 75, 105; and education, 37, 46; elite characteristics of, 117, 133, 137, 162; evaluation of Carter, 102; evaluation of Reagan, 55, 59, 101, 106, 130; and hu¬ man rights, 95; and ideology, 34, 46, 127, 133, 141, 164; mass characteristics of, 9, 26, 27, 29, 49, 137, 164; and mili¬ tary might, 10, 105, 346 n.ll; and nu¬ clear weapons, 92-94, 105; occupational correlates of, 123-24; and partisanship, 34, 48, 127, 133, 141, 164; and region, 40, 46; and relations with Communist countries, 95, 162; and religion, 44; and socioeconomic status, 39; and tariffs, 146; and terrorism, 85, 105; and the use of force, 29, 30, 79, 85, 120, 122; and U.S. world role, 345 n.9; and Vietnam, 81, 118-21. See also Militant internation¬ alism Harris (Louis) polls: on internationalism, 8, 338 n.6; and CCFR elite surveys, 350 n.6; on Soviet-American relations, 188, 189; on the use of force, 175-77, 178, 180-81 Hero, Alfred O., Jr., 36, 37, 44, 340 n.3, 344 n.17 Heuristics, 341 Hibbs, Douglas, 348 n.25 Hinckley, Ronald H., 339 n.8, 342 n.12 Hodgson, Godfrey, 108-9, 349 n.l, 349 n.3, 355 n.3, 356 n.8 Hoffman, Paul ]., 353 n.l Hoffman, Stanley, 338 n.4 Holbrooke, Richard, 338 n.4 Holmes, Jack E., 14 Holsti, Ole R„ 4, 15, 42-43, 81, 124, 196, 197, 338 n.5, 339 nn.8-9, 340 nn.2-3, 342 n.12, 349 n.l, 351 nn.8-10, 352 nn.16-17, 355 n.l Honduras, use of force in, 231, 232 Hoopes, Townsend, 354 n.13 Index 385 House of Representatives, voting behavior in, 199-201, 204, 205, 206, 209, 212, 362 n.13, 363 nn. 19-20 Hughes, Barry B., 36, 37, 39, 40, 44, 344 n.20 Hughes, Thomas L., 338 n.l, 338 n.4 Human rights, 50, 79, 109, 346 n.ll, 348 n.23; and Soviet Jews, 95, 162 Hunger, world, 19, 355 n.4 Huntington, Samuel P., 338 n.2 Hurwitz, Jon, 98-99, 340 n.6 Ideology: and aid, 71; and aid to anticom¬ munist rebels, 74; and cooperative in¬ ternationalism, 36, 46, 139, 141, 344 n.22; and CIA intervention, 79-80; and civil liberties, 86; and congressional vot¬ ing behavior, 195, 205-9, 216-17, 363 nn. 17-21; and defense spending, 150; and elite beliefs and preferences, 126- 30, 132-33, 139, 141, 216-17, 218, 234- 35, 352 nn.16-17, 353 n.l, 353 n.4, 354 n.6; and evaluation of Carter, 102; and evaluation of Ford/Kissinger, 102; and evaluation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101, 130- 31; and foreign policy consensus, 4, 5, 34, 338 n.3; and internationalism, 61; and mass beliefs, 34—36, 50-51, 139, 141, 215, 216-17, 218; and mass prefer¬ ences, 105-6, 215, 216-17, 218, 234-35, 344 n.22, 353 n.4, 354 n.6; and militant internationalism, 36, 46, 139, 141, 344 n.22; and military aid, 74; and perform¬ ance evaluation, 56; and sharing oil, 89; and Soviet-American relations, 234-35, 364 n.4; and terrorists, 85; and the use of force, 85. See also Conservatives; Lib¬ erals; Moderates Immigration, illegal, 53 Imperial overstretch, 3 Income: and attentiveness, 45, 46; and mass beliefs, 37-39 Independents: and aid, 74, 347 nn. 16-17; and anticommunist rebels, 74; and CIA intervention, 78; and evaluation of Rea¬ gan, 57, 59, 101; and internationalism, 61-64, 65; and Soviet military strength, 70 India: and economic aid, 173, 356 n.7; use of force in, 231, 357 n.13 INF treaty, 94, 227 Institutional elites, 350 n.5 Interdependence, 86-91, 158-59; and debt restructuring, 89-90, 159; and oil crisis, 87-89, 158-59; and world trade, 90-91, 159, 347 n.23 INTEREST scale, 143 International Energy Agency, 87 Internationalism: and education, 357 n.12; and elite beliefs, 112, 128, 133, 136, 147- 49; and foreign policy consensus, 5-7, 338 n.6; and ideology, 64; and mass be¬ liefs, 19, 48-50, 61, 64-67, 136, 148-49, 345 n.9, 346 nn. 10-11; and partisanship, 61-64. See also Conservative internation¬ alists; Cooperative internationalism; Liberal internationalists; Militant inter¬ nationalism; Noninternationalists Internationalist-isolationist continuum, 7, 342 n.12; and aid, 75, 157; inadequacy of, 21, 23, 112; and oil crisis, 87; and U.S. world role, 67, 104; and use of force, 178; and Vietnam, 81 Internationalists (belief system): and age, 43; and aid, 75, 347 n.14, 360 n.23; and attentiveness, 144; and CIA intervention, 53, 76; and communism, 30; and con¬ tainment, 117; and detente, 32; and dic¬ tatorships, 79; and drug trafficking, 75; and education, 39, 46; elite characteris¬ tics of, 117, 136-37, 144; and evaluation of Reagan, 55, 59; and gender, 42; and ideology, 46, 127, 133; mass characteris¬ tics of, 9, 25, 136-37; and Mid-East peace plan, 347 n.18; and partisanship, 34, 48, 127, 133; and region, 40, 46; and religion, 44; and role/occupational groups, 123-24; and socioeconomic sta¬ tus, 39; and the use of force, 29; and Vietnam, 121 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 147 Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (icpsr), 350 n.6, 363 n.17 Interval-scale measures, 56, 343 n.15 Interventionism, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, 30, 147, 153-58. See also CIA intervention; Force, use of Iran: hostage crisis, 1, 50, 57, 85; military aid to, 74—75, 104; Reagan performance on, 57; use of force in, 180-81, 231, 356 n.12 Iran-contra affair, 85, 347 n.21 Isolationism, 108, 147, 194 Isolationists: and attentiveness, 144; and communism, 30; congressional voting behavior of, 344 n.17; and containment, 117; and defense, 29; and detente, 32; and education, 29, 37, 39, 343 n.14; elite characteristics of, 116, 137, 164, 351 n.10; and gender, 42; and ideology, 127; mass characteristics of, 9, 25, 27, 29, 386 Index Isolationists (continued) 137, 164; and partisanship, 127, 133; and region, 39—40, 344 n.17; and role/ occupational groups, 123-24; and socio¬ economic status, 39; and U.S. world role, 53; and the use of force, 29; and valence issues, 29; and Vietnam, 121 Israel; aid to, 74-75, 152-53; invasion of Lebanon, 75; Jewish support for, 44; public opinion toward, 344 n.21; and settlements, 347 n.18; use of force in, 175, 231, 232, 357 n.13 Italy, communism in, 169 Jackson, John S., Ill, 353 n.l Jackson-Vanik amendment, 95 Japan: communism in, 169; sharing oil with, 87; use of force in, 4, 8, 12, 27, 29 Jennings, M. Kent, 353 n.l Jews, 44. See also Soviet Union: treatment of Jews Job, Brian L., 98 Job security, 172, 355 n.4 Johnson, Lyndon B., 66: and assured de¬ struction, 12; and congressional voting behavior, 201, 204, 362 n.12, 362 n.15; and foreign policy consensus, 6, 78, 97, 166, 194 Jonas, Manfred, 344 n.17 Kaagan, Larrv, 2, 70 Keech, William R., 348 n.25 Kegley, Charles W., Jr., 1, 12, 13, 78, 167, 338 n.5, 339 n.8, 347 n.22 Kennedy, John F.: and assured destruc¬ tion, 12; and congressional voting be¬ havior, 201, 209, 362 n.12, 363 nn. 19-20; and foreign policy consensus, 36, 97 Kennedy, Paul, 3 Kennedy, Robert, 66 Keohane, Robert O., 338 n.l Kernell, Samuel, 98 Kesselman, Mark, 360 n.2 Key, V. O., 14 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 75 Kinder, Donald R., 340 n.3 Kirkpatrick, Jeane )., 353 n.l; performance of, 101 Kissinger, Henry: and detente, 346 n.ll, 349 n.29; evaluation of, 102, 349 nn.28- 29; restrictive approach of, 3-4 Klein, Ross, 8 Klingberg, Frank L., 1, 14 Knudsen, Baard Bredrup, 339 n.8, 342 n.12 Koenig, Donald, 339 n.l Korea, North, 147, 173-74, 175, 200 Korea, South, 147, 174, 175, 181, 196, 200, 358 n.15 Korean Airlines flight 007, 57 Korean War, 12, 43, 172-75, 181, 186, 228, 229, 358 n.15; and congressional-execu¬ tive relations, 197; and congressional voting, 200-201, 202, 212; defense spending in, 123; use of force in, 147, 358 n.13, 358 n.15 Krauthammer, Charles, 342 n.12 Kreisberg, Louis, 8 Kritzer, Herbert M., 16 Krosnick, Jon A., 342 n.14 Kumka, Donald S., 42 Kusnitz, Leonard A., 359 n.20 Labor leaders. 111, 123-24, 352 n.12, 352 n.14 Lake, Anthony, 5, 10, 34, 96, 141, 194-95, 199, 201, 205, 212, 338 n.5, 355 n.l Lanoue, David J., 339 n.7 Latin America, communism in, 169 Leadership opinion, 4 Lebanon, 153, 154, 229; Reagan perform¬ ance on, 57; use of force in, 50, 75 Lee, Jong R., 339 n.7 LeLoup, Lance T., 360 n.3 Lend-Lease Act, 166 Lepper, Mary Milling, 344 n.l Levering, Ralph B., 4, 355 n.l, 360 n.4 Liberal international economic order, 2, 91, 147, 191 Liberal internationalists, 36, 108, 153, 342 n.12, 343 n.14, 347 n.23 Liberal-conservative continuum, 342 n.12, 353 n.l Liberals: and aid, 74, 79-80, 347 nn. 16-17, 347 n.20; and anticommunist rebels, 74; and arms control, 94; and Cl/Mt split, 46; and cia intervention, 77; congressional voting behavior of, 206, 209, 213, 363 n.17; and dictatorships, 79-80, 347 n.20; elite beliefs of, 127, 133, 141, 353 n.l; and evaluation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101; and evaluation of Ford/Kissinger, 102; and human rights, 162; mass beliefs of, 46, 48, 141, 217; and performance eval¬ uations, 105-6; and relations with Cuba, 162; and relations with Soviet Union, 234; and terrorism, 85; and Vietnam, 81; and the use of force, 85. See also Ac- commodationists; Cooperative interna¬ tionalism; Ideology Index 387 Libya, U.S. bombing of, 2, 50, 154, 229, 339 n.7; Reagan performance on, 57 Likert scale treatment, 15, 56, 112 Lindsay, James M., 206 Lippman, Walter, 3 Logistic regression, 56, 60, 61, 146, 344 n.8, 349 n.28 Logit analysis, 61, 68, 345 n.4 Louis, Arthur M., 355 n.3 Lowi, Theodore J., 23 Lubell, Samuel, 344 n.17 MacArthur, Douglas, 201, 202 McCarthyism, 168 McClosky, Herbert, 352 n.l McCormick, James M., 206, 338 n.5, 361 n.5 Maggiotto, Michael A., 339 n.8, 346 n.ll Mahajan, Harpreet, 42, 344 n.19 Mandelbaum, Michael, 339 n.8, 342 n.12, 343 n.14 Marshall Plan, 108, 174, 194, 196 Martilla and Kiley, 364 n.2 Mass foreign policy beliefs, 12-106, 215- 19; and age, 42^43, 45, 215; and atten¬ tiveness, 139, 141—46, 164, 216, 218; and cooperative internationalism, 25-26, 56, 215, 344 n.4; and education, 37-39, 45, 46, 139, 215; and elite beliefs, 134—65, 216, 217-19; and foreign policy prefer¬ ences, 53-56, 60-96, 215; and gender, 40-42, 45, 215, 344 nn. 19-20; and ideol¬ ogy, 14, 34-37, 45-46, 141, 215, 216-17, 340 nn.3-4, 353 n.4, 354 n.6; and mili¬ tant internationalism, 25-26, 56, 215, 345 n.9, 346 nn. 10-11; and partisanship, 34-37, 45-46, 141, 215, 216-17, 354 n.6; perspectives on, 13-15, 219, 339 nn.1-3, 340 nn.3-4, 341 nn.5-6; and perform¬ ance evaluations, 99-106, 216, and polit¬ ical consequences of bifurcation, 27-32; and race, 44, 45, 215; and region, 39^10, 45, 46-48, 139, 215, 344 nn.17-18; and religion, 43-44, 45, 215; and socioeco¬ nomic status, 37-39, 45, 215; structure of, 21-27, 215; summary of, 50-51, 215, 217-19; and the use of force, 29-32, 215, 344 nn.19-21. See also Accommodation- ists; Elite theory; Hardliners; Interna¬ tionalists; Isolationists; Mass foreign policy preferences Mass foreign policy preferences: and par¬ tisanship, 56, 216-17; and aid, 70-76; and defense spending, 67-70; and de¬ tente, 346 n.ll; and elite preferences, 134—65, 216, 217-19, 352 n.4; and ideol¬ ogy, 56, 216-17; and interdependence, 86-91; and internationalism, 53, 64-67; and interventionism, 76-82, 215; and mass beliefs, 53-56, 60-96, 216; and na¬ tional defense, 91-94; and nuclear weapons, 91-94; and relations with communist countries, 94—96 Massive retaliation, 12, 108 May, Ernest R., 147, 354 n.9 MCA. See Multiple Classification Analysis Member Index, 198, 202-4, 206, 209 Merritt, Rich L., 42 Mexico: debt restructuring of, 89; commu¬ nism in, 169, 171-72 mi. See Militant internationalism Middle East, 5: Reagan peace plan, 347 n.18; use of force in, 231-32 Militant internationalism (mi), 9, 23, 25: and aid, 71, 74, 104, 151; and anticom¬ munist rebels, 74; and arms control, 92- 93; and attentiveness, 45, 216, 218; and Carter performance, 102; and Central American aid, 73-74; and civil liberties, 86; and debt restructuring, 89; and de¬ fense spending, 68-70; and dictator¬ ships, 82, 104; and elite beliefs, 112-17, 351 nn.8-10; and education, 37-39, 344 n.22; and Ford/Kissinger performance, 102; and free trade vs. tariffs, 90, 105; and gender, 42; and ideology, 36, 46, 139, 141, 344 n.22; and mass beliefs, 25- 26, 56, 215, 345 n.9, 346 nn.10-11; and oil sharing, 89, 104; and partisanship, 34, 36, 82, 86, 127, 139, 141; and politi¬ cal correlates, 127, 129, 136; and Reagan administration performance, 57, 59-60, 101, 106; and region, 40; and relations with Cuba, 96, 161; and religion, 44; and role/occupational groups, 122-23, 124, 125; and SDI, 93; and socioeconomic status, 39; and Soviet Jews, 104; and U.S. world role, 61, 64, 65-67, 104, 345 n.9, 346 nn.10-11; and the use of force, 82; and Vietnam, 82, 120. See also Con¬ servatives; Hardliners Military aid: and elite beliefs, 151-52; and foreign policy consensus, 182-86, 358 n.14; and mass beliefs, 70-76, 151-52; and military involvement, 73-74, 151— 52, 165, 347 n.16 military aid scale, 21, 23, 350 n.7 Military bases, 156-58, 231-32 Military might, 1, 2, 6, 12, 108, 110, 147, 188, 338 n.2, 346 nn.11-12 Military sales, 70-71, 151 388 Index Miller, Warren E., 340 n. 4, 353 nn.1-2 Mills, C. Wright, 349 n.2 Minority leaders. 111, 350 n.6 Missile gap, 36 Moderates: and aid, 347 nn. 16-17; and cia intervention, 77; and congressional vot¬ ing behavior, 206, 209, 213, 363 nn.17- 18; and dictatorships, 79; evaluation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101; and international¬ ism, 46, 64, 127 Modigliani, Andre, 339 n.l Mondale, Walter, 40 Mossadeq, Mohammad, 357 n.12 Moyer, Wayne, 206 Mueller, John E., 186, 201, 339 n.7, 348 n.25, 356 n.ll Multilateralism, 4, 338 n.l, 351 n.9 Multiple Classification Analysis (mca), 34, 37, 364 n.6 Munich Conference (1938), 43 Munich generation, 42-43 Mutual Security Act, 71, 356 n.7 Nationalist China. See Taiwan National security: and aid, 72; and Central America, 96; and foreign policy consen¬ sus, 2-3, 5, 67, 147, 205; human rights, 79; and nuclear weapons, 93-94. See also Defense spending National Security Council, 85 National Strategy Information Center sur¬ veys, 168 NATO, 91, 108, 147, 180, 194, 196 "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 14 nbc News, 188 Nelson, Anna Kasten, 360 n.l Nelson, Daniel N., 2 Neo-isolationism, 5, 36 Neuman, W. Russell, 341 n.5 Neustadt, Richard E., 98, 147, 354 n.9 "A New Grand Strategy," 3 Nicaragua: aid to contras, 57, 74, 85; Rea¬ gan performance on, 57; use of force against, 15, 29, 231, 232 Nie, Norman H., 14, 34 Nincic, Miroslav, 359 n.21 Nixon, Richard, 67, 102; and Cambodia, 13-14; and congressional voting behav¬ ior, 204-5, 206, 213; and cooperative in¬ ternationalism, 25; and detente, 12, 149, 346 n.ll, 349 n.28; and foreign policy consensus, 78; and Soviet Jews, 95 Nixon Doctrine, 25 National Opinion Research Center (norc) surveys: on containment, 168, 169, 172, 173, 356 n.7; on internationalism, 338 n.6; on the use of force, 178, 180, 181, 186, 188, 356 nn. 10-11, 357 nn.12, 358 n.15 Nominal-scale measures, 343 n.15 Noninternationalists, 342 n.12, 343 n.14 norc. See National Opinion Research Center surveys North, Oliver L., 85 Nye, Joseph S., Jr., 338 nn.1-2 Nuclear weapons. See Arms control Occupation: and attentiveness, 45, 46; and mass beliefs, 37-39 OECD. See Organization for Economic Co¬ operation and Development O'Hara, Rosemary, 353 n.l Oil sharing, 86-89, 158-59 Oldendick, Robert W., 339 n.8 Oldfield, Duane, 360 n.3 opec: embargo, 50, 87, 104, 158-59, 347 n.22; use of force against, 87 "Open skies" proposal, 188 Ordinary least-squares regression, 56, 57, 60, 61, 349 n.28 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd), Development Assistance Committee, 347 n.15 Ostrom, Charles W., Jr., 98, 348 n.25 Pacific possessions (U.S.), use of force in, 231-32 Page, Benjamin I., 148, 339 n.2, 359 n.22 Pairwise deletion, 18, 112, 125 Pakistan, use of force in, 231 Palestinian homeland, 347 n.18 Panama: Canal treaties, 14; communism in, 223; use of force in, 231 Partial Test Ban Treaty, 196, 344 Partisan gap, 202, 204 Partisanship: and aid to anticommunist rebels, 74; and arms control, 94; and attentiveness, 45-46, 48, 144; and Carter performance, 102; and CIA intervention, 76, 77; and civil liberties, 86; and congressional voting behavior, 195, 202- 5, 209, 212, 216-17, 234-35, 362 nn.15- 16, 363 nn. 18-21; and cooperative inter¬ nationalism, 36, 139, 141; and defense spending, 68, 150; and economic aid, 71; and elite beliefs and preferences, 126-30, 132-33, 139, 141, 352 nn. 16-17, 353 n.l, 354 n.6; and evaluation of Carter, 102; and evaluation of Ford/Kis¬ singer, 102; and evaluation of Reagan, 56, 57, 59-60, 99-101, 130-31; and for- Index 389 eign policy consensus, 4, 5, 34, 338 n.3; and mass beliefs and preferences, 34, 36-37, 50-51, 105-6, 139, 141, 215, 234- 35, 354 n.6; and militant international¬ ism, 34, 36, 82, 86, 127, 139, 141; and military aid, 71; and performance, 56; and sharing oil, 89; and Soviet-Ameri- can cooperation, 234, 364 n.4; and So¬ viet military strength, 70; and terrorism, 85; and U.S. world role, 61; and use of force, 85; and Vietnam, 81. See also Bi¬ partisanship; Congress; Democrats; In¬ dependents; Republicans Pearl Harbor, 147 Pearson's correlations, 18, 344 n.16 Peffley, Mark, 98-99 People's Republic of China, 231: aid to nationalists, 173; and Korea, 358 n.15; and UN admission, 359 n.20; use of force in, 181; U.S. relations with, 94—95 Peppers, Donald, 360 n.3 Performance evaluations, 220-21, 348 nn.25-27, 349 nn.28-29; and elite be¬ liefs, 130-32; and mass beliefs, 96-106 Persian Gulf shipping rights, 231-32 Phalange party, 75 Philippines, the: communism in, 223; de¬ fense agreement with, 356 n.10; use of force in, 178 Poindexter, John M., 85 Poland, 57; use of force in, 231, 232 Political leaders. 111, 123-24, 352 n.12, 352 n.14 Pollution, 224 Position issues, 19, 29, 30, 342 n.9 The Power Elite, 349 n.2 Powlick, Philip J., 198 Presidential Power, 98 Presidential success index, 361 n.7 Principal components analysis, 18, 21, 112, 117, 123, 341 n.9, 342 n.13 Protection of weaker nations, 19, 172, 355 n.4 Protestants, 44 Public opinion and foreign policy, 96-106, 219-23 Published Papers of the President of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 198 Putnam, Robert D., 14 Quester, G. H., 338 n.5 Race, 44, 45, 215 Reagan, Ronald: and aid to Central Amer¬ ica, 74; and anticommunism, 2, 12, 74, 93, 101, 115, 125, 351 n.9; and arms control, 94; and cia intervention, 77; and congressional voting behavior, 199, 201, 206; and defense spending, 67, 149; and Democrats, 48; and detente, 349 n.29; and drug trafficking, 75; and Libyan bombing, 339 n.7; Mid-East peace plan of, 347 n.18; and militant internationalism, 25, 29, 68; perform¬ ance of, 57, 59-60, 67, 68-70, 99-102, 106, 162-64; and rearmament programs, 8, 32, 67, 68-70, 93; rejection of new consensus, 110; and Soviet military strength, 70, 110; and terrorism, 85-86 Reagan Doctrine: and aid to Central America, 74; as unwarranted interven¬ tionism, 151, 152 Regan, Donald T., 85 Regionalism, 39-40, 46-48, 215, 344 nn. 17-18 Religion, 43-44, 45, 215 Religious leaders. 111, 123-24, 130, 352 n.14 Republicans: and aid, 71, 74, 347 nn.lb- 17; and bipartisanship, 196; and cia in¬ tervention; 78; congressional voting be¬ havior of, 199, 200, 206, 209, 363 nn.18- 19; and defense spending, 150; elite be¬ liefs of, 126, 127, 133, 217, 353 n.l; eval¬ uation of Reagan, 57, 59, 101; and inter¬ nationalism, 5, 36; mass beliefs of, 34, 48, 217; and nuclear weapons, 91, 94; and performance evaluations, 105-6; and Soviet-American relations, 234; and Soviet military strength, 70; and Viet¬ nam, 81. See also Bipartisanship; Parti¬ sanship Restraint, 3-4 Reverse scoring, 19 Rielly, John E., 9 Rieselbach, Leroy N., 344 n.17 The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, 3 Rogers, William C., 339 n.l Role/occupational groups, 10, 110-12, 122- 26, 129-30. 132, 147, 162, 215-16, 352 n.12, 352 n.14, 353 n.18 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 166, 194 Roper (Elmo) polls: on internationalism, 147, 338 n.6; on the use of force, 178 Rosenau, James N., 42-43, 81, 111, 112, 124, 141, 196, 197, 338 n.5, 339 nn.8-9, 340 n.3, 342 n.14, 349 n.l, 351 nn.8-10, 352 nn. 16-17 Rosenberg, Milton J., 356 n.8 Rovere, Richard, 108 Rummel, R. J., 340 n.9 390 Index Russett, Bruce, 8, 34-36, 124, 130, 338 n.2, 340 n.2, 349 n.l Sabatt, Charles M., 360 n.2 Sabra refugee camp, 75 Salience, 19 salt. See Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Sanders, Jerry W., 36, 70, 218, 342 n.12 Sandinistas, 85, 97 Saudi Arabia, use of force in, 231, 232 Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., 78 Schneider, William, 19, 29, 36, 37, 141, 153, 205, 338 n.3, 339 n.8, 342 n.12, 343 n.14, 348 n.23 Schuman, Howard, 355 n.8 Scientific exchange with Soviets, 32, 190 SDi. See Strategic Defense Initiative Selective internationalists, 115 Senate, voting behavior in, 199-201, 204, 206, 209, 212, 360 n.2, 362 n.13, 363 n.18, 363 n.22 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 96, 194, 200 Shapiro, Robert Y., 42, 148, 339 n.2, 344 n.19, 359 n.22 Sharp, Michael ]., 363 n.17 Shatila refugee camp, 75 Shull, Steven A., 360 nn.3-4 Shulman, Marshall D., 338 n.4 Shultz, George, performance of, 101, 106 Sigelman, Lee, 360 nn.3-4 Sigler, John H., 338 n.5 Silverman, Jane M., 42 Simon, Dennis M., 98, 348 n.25 Slippery slope, 151, 152, 156 Smith, Steven S., 205 Smith, Tony W., 42, 344 n.19 Socioeconomic status, 39, 45, 46, 215 Solvency, 3 South Africa, 20 South America: communism in, 223; use of force in, 182 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 356 n.10 Soviet Union: cultural exchange with, 190, 227, 358 n.18; military power of, 57, 190, 224, 225, 346 n.12; and relations with U.S., 9, 32, 110, 112, 115, 117, 125, 132, 136, 161, 162, 165, 168, 187-90, 192-93, 215, 216, 223-27, 234-35, 236, 358 nn.16-17, 364 nn.3-4; technological trade with, 32, 190, 227, 358 n.17; scien¬ tific exchange with, 32, 190; treatment of Jews, 104, 161-62. See also Commu¬ nist countries, U.S. relations with Space, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in, 190 Spanier, John W., 202 Spiegel, Steven L., 75 start. See Strategic Arms Reduction Talks "Stars Wars," 93 Stokes, Donald E., 340 n.4 Stoll, Richard, 339 n.7 Strange, Susan, 338 n.2 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (salt), 13, 50, 94, 97, 188 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (start), 94 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDi), 32, 93, 160, 161, 227 Stuhler, Barbara, 339 n.l Taft, Robert, 147 Taiwan: aid to, 173; use of force in, 181, 231, 357 n.13 Tariffs, 2, 3, 90-91, 105 Technological exchange with Soviets, 32, 189-90, 227, 358 n.17 Terrorism, 85-86, 105, 158, 165, 224, 227 Tet offensive, 66 Thailand, defense agreement with, 356 n.10 Thermometer evaluations, 99-102 Third World: aid to, 71; debt restructuring in, 89-90 Thomson, James C., Jr., 338 n.4 Tidmarch, Charles M., 360 n.2 Time series design, 201 Trade: with Communist countries, 346 n.ll; deficit, 224; free vs. tariffs, 2, 3, 90-91, 105, 159; and Reagan perform¬ ance, 52; with Soviets, 32, 188-90, 192, 227, 358 n.17 Trade Act (1974), 95 Trade Agreement (1972), 95 TROOPS scale, 115, 350 n.7. See also Force, use of Truman, Harry S.: and congressional vot¬ ing behavior, 198, 199-201, 206, 360 n.4, 362 n.12; and foreign policy consensus, 6, 108, 147, 174 Truman Doctrine, 6, 165, 172, 178, 194, 196 Turkey, aid to, 196 Two presidencies thesis, 196, 360 nn.3-4, 362 n.12 Ullman, Richard H., 338 n.4 Unilateralism, 4, 351 n.9 Unilateralist-multilateralist continuum, 4, 351 n.9 United Kingdom, 57, 358 n.17 United Nations, 147, 191, 196, 229, 355 n.4, 359 n.20 Index 391 "The Uses of Military Power," 228 usgoals scale, 19, 23, 25, 30, 115, 117 usrelations scale, 20 Valence issues, 19, 29-30, 342 n.9 Vance, Cyrus, 3-4 Vandenberg, Arthur H., 194, 200 Verba, Sidney, 356 n.8 Vietcong, 66 Vietnam: and congressional voting behav¬ ior, 201-2, 354 n.13; and consensus breakdown (casualty thesis), 1, 2, 4, 7— 8, 11, 50, 80-82, 107, 109-12, 155-58, 165, 174-75, 191-92, 195, 197, 201, 204, 205, 209, 211, 339 n.9, 349 nn.1-2, 362 n.13; elite beliefs on, 117, 118-21, 132, 165; mass beliefs on, 50, 80-82, 156-58, 165, 215, 229-31, 339 n.l, 356 n.8; and the use of force, 80-82, 174—86, 191-92 Vietnam, North, 66 Vietnam, South, 13 Vietnam generation, 42-43 Vietnam syndrome, 110, 174 vitalinterests scale, 23, 25, 115, 353, n.3 Voluntary organization leaders. 111, 123- 24, 352 n.12 Voting behavior. See Congress War Powers Resolution, 78 Washington summit (1987), 94 Watergate, 1, 50, 174, 190, 204-5, 349 n.29 Watts, William, 7, 37, 40, 44, 178 Wayman, Frank Whelon, 206 Weinberger, Caspar, 228; performance of 101, 106 Weisband, Edward, 78 West Bank, 347 n.18 Whites, 44 Who's Running America?, 350 n.5 Wilcox, Clyde, 348 n.27 Wildavsky, Aaron, 196, 360 n.3 Winham, Gilbert R., 174 Winik, Jay, 338 n.5 Wittkopf, Eugene R., 1, 12, 13, 78, 167, 338 n.5, 339 n.8, 346 n.ll, 347 n.22, 348 n.27 World Bank, 147 Yankelovich, Daniel, 2, 69-70 Yankelovich, Skelly, and White, 68 Yom Kippur War (1973), 87 Yugoslavia, use of force in, 180, 356 n.ll Zeigler, L. Harmon, 107, 134 The Author Eugene R. Wittkopf is professor of political science at Louisiana State University. He has also held appointments at the University of Florida and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has contributed articles on international politics and foreign policy to a number of books and journals, including the American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Orbis, Social Science Quarterly, and Washington Quarterly. He has published (with Charles W. Kegley, Jr.) World Politics: Trend and Transformation (third edition, 1989), The Nuclear Reader: Strategy, Weapons, War (second edition, 1989), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (1988), The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives (second edition, 1988), American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process (third edition, 1987), and Perspectives on American Foreign Policy: Selected Readings (1983). DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA 27706