L THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR PROFESSOR BARNES has Written SOCIOLOGY BEFORE COMTE HISTORY OF THE PENAL AND CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF NEW JERSEY history: its rise and development THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE WESTERN WORLD SOCIOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY THE NEW HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL STUDIES PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY HISTORY AND SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR THE REPRESSION OF CRIME He has Edited A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORIES: RECENT TIMES THE HISTORY AND PROSPECTS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES NEW AND ENLARGED EDITION OF THE PLOETZ- TILLINGHAST MANUAL OF UNIVERSAL HISTORY He has in Preparation TEN YEARS: 1 905-I9 1 4 THE HISTORY OF HISTORICAL WRITING THE INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF W'ESTERN SOCIETY CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY WORLD POLITICS AND THE EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION STUDIES IN HISTORY OF THOUGHT AND CULTURE THE EVOLUTION OF PENOLOGY IN PENNSYLVANIA AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF EUROPE (WITH KNIGHT AND FLUEGEL) He is Editing THE BORZOI HISTORICAL SERIES Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2017 with funding from Duke University Libraries https://archive.org/details/genesisofworldwa01barn © Underwood & Unaerwood POINCARE AND WILSON IN PARIS THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF WAR GUILT by HARRY ELMER BARNES Professor of Historical Sociology, Smith College; William Bayard Cutting Fellow in History, Columbia University (.191C-17); Biblio- graphic Editor of "Foreign Affairs" (19eS-2£). NEW YORK ALFRED - A- KNOPF ^ 1926 COPYRIGHT I926, BY ALFRED A. KNOPF, INC MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA I linin' ju-U. iv***-*' Oo 'C*-' ^“vur jV 5-0 H G TO HERBERT CROLY GEORGE W. OCHS-OAKES CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON AND OSWALD GARRISON VILLARD Distinguished American Editors, whose courage and public spirit in opening their columns to a discussion of the causes of the World War have been primarily responsible for such progress as has been made in dispelling war time illusions and laying the basis for an intelligent approach to contemporary international problems. PREFACE This book is frankly what the title implies: an introduction to the study of the problem of the responsibility for the World War. It aims to present the subject as it now stands on the basis of the secret documents published since 1917 and of the monographic literature which has ap- peared in this same period, analyzing and as- sessing the significance of this new documentary material. It is the purpose of the writer to arouse interest in the subject and to create a general conviction that there is here a major in- ternational problem, the nature and importance of which are scarcely realized by even the aver- age educated American. If this primary pur- pose of the book is realized, it is hoped that it will serve a second function equally well, namely, to act as a guide to the study of the more tech- nical and voluminous literature which is now ap- pearing on the subject of war guilt. It is the contention of the author that the book is a fair assessment of the facts and issues as they appear on the basis of the evidence at present available. The facts are collected and presented here in such a fashion as to indicate their bear- ing upon the views on war guilt which were en- vii VUl PREFACE tertained by most historical scholars in Entente countries during the War, and still guide and control the thinking of most educated persons and newspaper editors in these same states. The book is frankly controversial in tone, and for a number of reasons. Among them are the na- ture of the subject, the fact that this approach is probably the best procedure for the first book of the sort published, the belief of the author that such a method will do the most to arouse interest and demolish prevalent error, ~ancT the undoubted fact that the controversial method is the one which the writer can personally exploit most forcefully in this field. The writer offers no apology whatever for the style and tone of the book. Facts of this order of importance are worthy of clear and decisive statement. The only question involved is as to whether they are substantial and verifiable facts. Taken by them- selves alone, timidity of attitude and obscu- rity of statement are scarcely invariable proof of historical erudition or scholarly command of the subject. As far as possible, the writer has attempted to anticipate the objections to his particular for- mulation of the revisionist position on war guilt, and to answer such objections in the text of the present work. The writer has carefully fol- lowed most of the controversial literature on the subject for several years and is fully acquainted PREFACE IX with the nature of the attacks upon the revision- ist statement of the case. He believes that these are satisfactorily answered in the present work .1 Throughout there is consistent effort to refute the apologies for the war time illusions, partic- ularly the apologetic efforts of leading Entente statesmen. The author has especially endeavored to pre- sent what he believes to be the broad conclusions j to which we are forced by the newer material. This he has done not only for the convenience of the general reader, but also to challenge the more ) timid revisionists: (1) to indicate wherein the facts upon which such conclusions are based are erroneous; or (2) to expose the fallacious nature \ of the reasoning whereby such conclusions are / drawn from generally accepted facts. The writer has felt that, in general, the revisionist cause has suffered more than anything else from the excessive timidity or interpretative incapac- ity of many revisionist scholars who appear to the writer to be unwilling to draw the inevitable con- clusions from the facts which they present.- In this book he offers a good-natured invitation to . more conservative scholars to show why they re- gard their views as more sound and tenable than those which are here brought together. The same privilege is obviously extended to the equal number of writers who believe that the present writer does not go far enough in his departure X X PREFACE from the conventionally accepted views. After all, it is the basic conclusions of the studies in war guilt which are of primary importance. The writer has often been accused of being “too extreme” in his interpretation of the revi- sionist viewpoint. This has usually meant that he has departed too far from the conventional no- tions for the peace of mind of his readers. Ob- viously, there can be no validity to this charge unless it can be proved that the statements of fact are unreliable or the conclusions unwarranted. Facts themselves, and the interpretations which justly grow out of such facts, can never be too extreme, no matter how far they depart from popular convictions in the premises. Modera- tion is an excellent slogan in the abstract, but it has been used for the most part with respect to recent studies of war guilt as a commendable ideal under which writers have disguised their unwillingness completely to surrender their own war time illusions. The writer has never had it satisfactorily explained to him why it should be regarded as more scholarly to be fifty per- cent short of the truth than to be one percent be- yond it. The chapters on the countries involved in the diplomacy leading to the World War have been prepared so that each is, in a certain sense, ^a unit by itself, though introduced and clarified by reference To” previous material. This accounts PREFACE XI for the existence of some repetitions, and the cit- ing of particularly important documents in sev- eral places. It is believed that such a procedure is desirable for the sake of emphasis, as well as being indispensable for the guidance of the reader who is for the first time attempting a sys- tematic mastery of the problem of war respon- sibility. The author has prepared this book with the definite conviction that the problem of respon- sibility for the World War is not primarily an esoteric matter of erudite historical scholarship isolated from the world of affairs. The writer would have no time to waste upon this subject if he did not believe that the truth about the causes of the World War is one of the livest and most important practical issues of the present day. It is basic in the whole matter of the present Eu- ropean and world situation, resting as this does upon an unfair and unjust Peace Treaty, which was itself erected upon a most uncritical and complete acceptance of the grossest forms of war time illusions concerning war guilt. The facts in this case are also of the greatest significance as an aid in attacking the whole problem of the future of war — the chief menace to the inhabi- tants of our planet today. Never was any previ- ous war so widely proclaimed to have been necessary in its origins, holy in its nature, and just, moderate and constructive in its aims. -r , k PREFACE xii Never was a conflict further removed in the actu- alities of the case from such pretensions. If we can learn the great lesson here embodied we shall have a powerful argument with which to meet the propaganda of those who will announce the neces- sity and idealism of the next war. Like most other human beings the writer is not free from all animus or convictions, but his /animus is not the pro-Germanism of which he is frequently accused. He has no traces of Ger- Cman ancestry and all of his cultural and educa- tional prejudices are strongly pro-British and pro-French. The “LaFayette we are here!” at- titude toward France was from the beginning an integral part of his education, and he accepted thoroughly in 1917-18 the conventional mythol- ogy in the Entente epic. While early becom- ing sceptical of the pure and lofty idealism of the bullet-manufacturers who wrote brave tracts for the National Security League and the Amer- ican Defense Society, he was actually first awak- ened from his “dogmatic slumbers” by Professor Fay’s articles in the summer of 1920. Professor Fay ^demolition of the myth of ^the~Potsdam Conference was a shock almost equivalent to the loss of Santa Claus in his youth, v If Germany is here cleared of any significant amount of direct guilt in producing the War in 1914, it is because the writer believes that the facts lead one in- evitably to that conclusion. ' There is no effort in PREFACE Xlll this book to free Germany of her mutual share ii the responsibility ^ for the general international system which inclined Europe towards war, i though the writer does not believe that it can bel| demonstrated that Germany was more at fault here than any other major European nation. And in placing the guilt upon “France” ant “Russia” the writer obviously uses these terms in a purely conventional sense, and actually means the guilt of a few men like Izvolski, Sazonov, the Grand Duke Nicholas, Poincare, Delcasse, Paul Cambon, Vivian i et al. One can- not accurately indict a nation for the acts and policies of a half dozen temporary leaders. No one recognizes better than the author that France under men like Caillaux, Herriot, Painleve and Combes is quite a different thing from France under Poincare and Delcasse, or that the mass of French people wbre for peace in 1914. The main animus and tendenz motivating the writer in preparing this book is a hatred of war in general and an ardent desire to execute an adequate exposure of the authors of the late World War in particular. The World War was unquestionably the greatest crime against humanity and decency since the missing link ac- complished the feat of launching homo sapiens upon his career. Yet the authors of this crime have not only for the most part escaped censure hut the majority of them have even continued XIV PREFACE to be regarded as men of high nobility of charac- ter and as valiant crusaders for peace. Their reputations for unselfish human service have been actually enhanced by the War. Still they were the means of sending more individuals pre- maturely to the angels than all the individual murders since eolithic days. Nevertheless, we cannot put men like Sazonov, Izvolski, Poincare and Delcasse in the same category as the man who shoots down the paying-teller in a bank and makes off with a roll of bills. They were aTTT men with reasonably high standards of personal honor and morality and were doubtless convinced that they were high-minded and unselfish serv- ants of the state. Therefore, it is an adequate cause for reflection upon the type of ethical cri- teria and social system which makes it possible/ for a half dozen men to plunge the great major- ity of civilized mankind into mental and moral debauchery, physical slaughter and economic i ruin, and still escape with immaculate reputa-| tions. It has been charged that in placing the guilt for the World War upon a few individuals such as Poincare, Delcasse, Cambon, Izvolski, Sazo- nov and Grand Duke Nicholas, the writer has departed from his fundamental historical phi- losophy which stresses the primary significance of great intellectual currents, economic influences and social forces in determining the course of his- PREFACE XV torical events. The writer has never pretended to believe that general historical forces operate independent of the individual actors in the his- toric drama. The individuals above mentioned would never have been able to bring about a European war in 1914 if the general situation in Europe had not been shaping up for such an event for some years before 1914. Poincare and Izvolski were successful because the general orientation of European society and politics was favorable to the realization of their program through an appeal to economic envy, unreason- ing patriotism, secret diplomacy and military force. The writer has attempted to make the state- ments of fact as accurate as possible, and to present only conclusions which are the logical outgrowth of the facts presented. He has fur- ther profited by the critical aid and advice of experts, not only in regard to the present book but also in every stage of his work in this field. yEach chapter has been read by one or more of the chief specialists on the subject-matter of that particular chapter. Yep the author does not pretend that the present book represents any final statement of the matter of war guilt as re- ~"/>gards minor details. In so vast a field many /slips are possible and new evidence may require jY the modification of certain statements. The author feels sure, however, that the general out- XVI PREFACE lines of the picture and the basic conclusions will remain unshaken, and that subsequent additions to our information will only serve to make the case against the Entente even more decisive. Many critics held that the writer’s article in the New York Times Current History Magazine for May, 1924, was extreme in its statements, but the progress of investigation in this field since that time has already served to make many of the details and some of the conclusions of that article seem highly conservative if not archaic. In the light of these facts this book has been printed directly from type with the assumption that the publication of additional documents and further travel and conference with eminent au- thorities on war guilt abroad will render desirable the revision of some matters of detail. The final edition of this book, then, will await the results of such developments, as well as the critical re- views to which the work will be subjected. In- tellectually adult readers will not need to be re- minded that the detection of a few minor errors and the statement of open differences of opinion do not constitute the basis for a refutation of the major conclusions of the work as a whole. And it will scarcely be necessary to assure the many friendly readers of his studies of war guilt, who have been a constant source of encouragement to the author, that he will not fail to keep the battle against the epic-mongers moving steadily PREFACE XVI 1 and merrily forward, in spite of the storm of in- dignation which the present work is likely to^ arouse. Because of the fact that the chapter on Eng- land’s part in the diplomatic crisis of 1914 is much longer than that on any other state it might be assumed that the author has a special griev- ance against Great Britain, but this is in no sense the case. As we indicate at length in that chap- ter, fhe direct guilt of England does not compare with that of France and Russia. But there is today more need for realistic education on the matter of the relation of Great Britain to the World War than on any other subject con- nected with the general problem of war guilt. Some educated Americans have come to at least a vague apprehension of the fact that the French and Russian pretensions to immaculate inno- cence leave something to be desired, but few of them suspect that the English epic is not irre- fragable or that Sir Edward Grey did not risk diplomatic hernia by his efforts for the preserva- tion of peace in 1914. )>The attitude of Canadian and English writers towards the brief and almost eulogistic discussion of Grey’s diplomacy, which was published in the writer’s articles in the Chris- tian Century, as well as the objections of Mr. Percy Ashley to the equally mild and courteous characterization of Grey in the writer’s conclud- ing chapter to Ashley’s Europe from Waterloo 'i V XV111 PREFACE to Sarajevo, served to convince the writer of the almost unbelievable need for education on this subject in British quarters, in spite of the works of Morel, Gooch, Loreburn, Ewart and Beazley. The British illusions, as well as the perpetuation of the British epic, are just at present being vig- orously inflated and nursed along by the phe- nomenonallv popular memoirs of Viscount Grey. Hence, it has seemed to the writer that the time is highly opportune for a thorough demolition of the Grey fiction. The flexible and tentative na- ture of the mechanics of this first edition of the book has made it possible to put this decisive emphasis upon the destruction of the British myth. Once this purpose has been accom- plished, the chapter on Great Britain will be re- duced to approximately the length of the chap- ters on the role of the other major European states in 1914. In my work on war guilt my indebtedness to specialists has been heavy, and I can only men- tion the few who have been of the greatest as- sistance. Most of all I am indebted to Profes- sor William L. Langer of Clark University who has read and criticized everything of any signif- icance which I have written on the subject of the causes of the World War. His wide and pre- cise knowledge of the facts and literature of con- temporary diplomatic history has saved me from innumerable slips in matters of detail, and his PREFACE XIX sound judgment has often added much in way of interpretation. I am also heavily indebted to the courageous and illuminating writings of Pro- fessor Sidney Bradshaw Fay and to many help- ful conversations with him during which he has given me the benefit of his unrivalled knowledge of the facts regarding the diplomatic crisis of 1914. He is not, however, to be held in any sense responsible for any interpretations in this work. Professor Langer has read and criticized the proof of the entire volume. The first chapter was read in proof by Professor Harry J. Car- man of Columbia University; the second by Pro- fessor Parker T. Moon of Columbia University; the third with special care by Professor William L. Langer; the fourth by a highly competent critic who prefers not to be mentioned by name; the fifth by Dr. Joseph V. Fuller of the De- partment of State and Mr. William C. Dre- her of Amherst, Massachusetts ; the sixth by Dr. John S. Ewart of Ottawa, Canada; the seventh by Judge Frederick Bausman of Seattle, Pro- fessor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University and Professor Graham H. Stuart of Leland Stanford University; the eighth by Professor Manley O. Hudson of the Harvard Law School and by Dr. Ewart; the ninth by Professor E. M. Borchard of the Yale Law School and Mr. James Kerney of Trenton, New Jersey; the XX PREFACE tenth by Professor Lawrence Packard of Am- herst College; and the eleventh by Professor Carl Becker of Cornell University. All of these men have made extremely valuable suggestions and criticisms, most of which have been embodied in the book. In no case, however, is any one of these scholars to be held in any sense responsible for any statements in the book or for any errors of fact or interpretation which may still remain. I am also indebted to Mr. William C. Dreher of Amherst, Mass., for a critical reading of the page proof of the whole book. His wide knowledge of European affairs and his extensive acquaintance with the recent literature of war guilt have been of great assistance to me in check- ing up on matters of detail. Harry Elmer Barnes. Northampton, Mass. April 6, 1926 CONTENTS I. The Basic Causes of Wars'’ -I. Nece s s i t y ' 'of "Ex am i nin g the Funda- 1 i/ II mental Causes of War 1 II. Biological Factors Promoting War 2 III. Psychological Causes of War 9 IV. Sociological Causes of War 14 V. The F.oonomio Origins of War 16 VI. The Political Causes of War 24 VII. Conclusions 27 The General Historical Background of 1911 34 I. The New Documentary Evidence B4 ^11. Germany and Europe, 1870—1914 f43) Mil. Economic Rivalry : England and ^IV. Germany 45 Nationalism and Patriotism 51 \ v - Armaments and Preparedness 54 Vvi. The Great Alliances VII. Germany and The Hague Confer- \ ences 70 AVIII. Pre-War Diplomacy to 1912 74 1. The Franco-Prussian War 74 2. Alsace-Lorraine 76 3. The Near East 78 7 4. Morocco 80 IX. General Developments, 1908—1911 83 X. Conclusions 87 < XXI XXII CONTENTS III. The Franco-Russian Plot That Pro- duced the War “Two Heads are Better than One” Franco-Russian Military and Naval Understandings The Balkanizing of the Plot Poincare Becomes President of France The Bribery of the French Press Delcasse Replaces Georges Louis England is Taken in Tow The Conversion of Sazonov to the War Policy Franco-Russian Conclusions War Aims The Assassination of the Archduke and THE AuSTRO-SeRBIAN CrISIS I. The Political Development and In- ternational Relations of Serbia II. Serbia and the Sarajevo Plot 1. The Plot and Its Authors 2. The Execution of the Plot 3. Serbian and Russian Responsi- bility 4. Serbian Neglect in the Punish- ment of the Plotters III. Austria’s Determination to Punish Serbia 1. The Jeopard}- of Austria- Hungary 2. The Real Plans of Austro- Hungary with Respect to Serbia in the Crisis of 1911 3. Germany Agrees to Support Austria in Punishing Serbia 4. The Austrian Investigation of the Assassination Plot 96 96 103 110 116 119 124 129 138 142 146 153 153 156 156 161 166 1T0 175 175 178 184 186 CONTENTS XX111 5. The Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian Reply 190 IV. Austria Rejects Diplomatic Nego- tiations 212 V. Austrian and Russian Objectives in v the Crisis of 1914 217 VI. Conclusions 220 V. The Role Played by Germany in the Crisis of 1914 229 I. The Entente Mythology and the In- dictment of Versailles 229 II. Germany and the European System 230 III. The Legend of the Potsdam Crown Council of July 5, 1914 235 IV. The Kaiser’s Response to Austria’s Appeal following the Assassi- nation of the Archduke 247 V. The Kaiser’s Reaction to the Ser- bian Reply to Austria, and His Attitude Towards a Diplo- matic Settlement of the Crisis 255 1. The Kaiser and the Serbian Reply 255 2. The Kaiser’s Plan to Avert War 256 3. Germany and the Diplomatic Proposals of 1914 260 4. The German Pressure Tele- grams 265 5. The Alarm of the Kaiser 267 6. Did Germany Decide for War on the 30th of July? 272 7. The Szogyeny Telegram and Bethmann Hollweg’s Inquiry Concerning the Attitude of England 274 / , r XXIV CONTENTS 8. Was German Diplomatic Pres- sure Exerted Too Late? 279 VI. The Kaiser and the Outbreak of Hostilities 281 VII. The German Invasion of Belgium and the German Atrocities 290 VIII. Conclusions 299 VI. The Russian Mobilization Precipitates the World War 308 I. The Russian Situation up to the Assassination of the Archduke 308 II. Russia from the Murder at Sara- jevo to the General Mobiliza- tion 315 1. Poincare at St. Petersburg in July, 1914* 315 2. The Austrian Ultimatum and the Russian Decision for War 328 3. The Steps in the Fatal Rus- sian Military Measures 335 III. The Problem of Russian Responsi- bility for the World War 350 1. The Deliberate and Unjustifi- able Aggression of Russia in 1911 350 2. Sazonov and Russian Mobili- zation 355 3. Relative Guilt of Russia and Austria 356 4. Bogus Nature of Sazonov’s Diplomatic Proposals 359 5. Sazonov in Apology and Re- treat 361 IV. Conclusions 371 CONTENTS XXV VII. Poincare and His Clique Incite the Rus- sians in the Crisis of 1914 381 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. The War of 1870 and the World War 381 The Triple Entente and the Prep-/' 1 aration for the World War //381)/ Poincare and His Clique in the Cri- sis of 1914 396 1. Responsibility that of Poin- care rather than of French People 396 2. The Myth of “Defenseless France” 399 3. The Aftermath of the St. Pe- tersburg Visit 401 4. Diplomatic Subterfuges of “Reluctant France” 407 5. France Declares for War on July 31st 414 6. Autocratic Methods and Per- sonal Responsibility of Poin- care 417 7. Deluding the French Public 420 Poincare and Viviani in Retreat 422 1. The Modesty of Poincare 422 2. Poincare in the Quicksand 424 3. The Futile Rhetoric of Viviani 4! 4. Difficulties in Historical Apol- ogetic 4! Unique Guilt of France and Russia 4! Conclusions 4! VIII. Sir Edward Grey and the Responsibility of England 451 I. England and France to 1914 451 II. England and Russia 469 ' V, t ' J XXVI CONTENTS III. IV. V. VI. VII. England and Germany Sir Edward Grey in the Crisis of 1914 1. Grey theoretically for Peace in 1914 2. Grey’s disastrous Policy of Evasion and Indecision 3. Grey’s Indifference to the Austro-Serbian Quarrel 4. Grey’s Refusal to Restrain Russia or to Promise Eng- lish Neutrality 5. Grey, Germany and the Diplo- matic Efforts to Settle the Crisis u 6. Grey Surrenders to the War- makers ' 7. Why Grey Threw England into the War 8. What Grey’s Folly Cost Eng- land 9. Grey’s Psychology in 1914 Sir Edward Grey and the Belgian Imposture Asquith and Grey in Self-Justifica- tion Conclusions 475 488 488 492 493 496 500 508 517 527 537 540 575 IX. The Entry of the United States into the World War 587 I. The Transformation of American Sentiment Towards Germany, 1870-1914 ‘ 587 II. English Violation of Neutral Rights in Its Relation to the German Submarine Warfare 593 III. The Pressure for W ar by American Business and Finance 605 CONTENTS XXV11 IY. America and Entente Propaganda 609 Y. “He Kept Us Out of War” 614 VI. The Effect of American Interven- tion 636 VII. Conclusions 642 X. The Progress of the Revisionist View- point 651 Summary Statement of the Revi- sionist Position as to War Guilt 651 Authorities on War Guilt and the Revisionist Position 659 Conclusions 678 XI. Liquidating War Time Illusions 681 I. War Illusions and War Realities 681 II. Who Prolonged the War? 682 III. The War to Crush Militarism 684 IV. The World Safe for UemocracT' - 688 V. The Triumph of Idealism 691 VI. World Organization 694 VII. Disarmament 697 VIII. Security 699 IX. The Delusions and Mythology of War Propaganda 702 X. The Lessons 704 Appendix The Literature of War Guilt 709 I. Introductory 713 II. Germany and Austria 717 III. France 720 IV. Russia 725 • ----- v. Serbia 726 VI. Italy 727 'VII. England and Canada 728 VIII. The United States 731 737 I. II. III. Index THE GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Why Forget? A movement backed by more than 100 prominent British citizens, among them H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw and Maynard Keynes, has been launched to eliminate sections 227 and 231 of the Versailles treaty. These sections charge Germany with responsibility for the war, for the violation of international law and for serious offenses against the sanctity of treaties and the customs of war. These, the sponsors of this movement declare, are “manifestly unjust and constitute a grave obstacle to international understanding.” But are they unjust? Have any facts been brought to light since the peace conference to reduce Germany's responsibility for the war or to mitigate her violation of the neutrality of Belgium, or to justify such an offense against civilization as the torpedoing of the Lusitania? From some points of view it doubtless would be better if these war incidents were forgotten. The recent Lo- carno compact looks definitely in the direction of mutual understanding between Germany and her late enemies. But in forgetting them, is there any obligation upon England, France and Belgium to salve Germany’s feel- ing and write out of the treaty the articles which place the blame for the war definitely on her shoulders? If Germany was not responsible, who was? And if her war practices were defensible why did the United States take up arms against her and help to drive from Europe the Hohenzollerns and all they stood for? If they were wrong, why not invite old Kaiser Wilhelm and the crown prince back to Berlin with the humble apologies of the allied governments? The millions of soldiers who bore arms against Germany, remembering their comrades who made the great sacrifice at Verdun, Ypres and in the Argonne, have no sympathy with sentimentalists who would erase the war blame sections of the treaty. If Germany was not the offender, and is now to be given a clean bill, how are they going to justify the war they fought to their children and grandchildren? Editorial in Cleveland Plain Dealer. December 26, 1925. CHAPTER I THE BASIC CAUSES OF WARS I. NECESSITY OF EXAMINING THE FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF AVAR No adequate consideration of the causes and lessons of the late World War could well be limited to a discussion of diplomatic exchanges between June 28 and August 3, 1914. We must not only deal with the general diplomatic and political situation in Europe from 1870 to 1914, but also go back of diplomatic history to the fundamental causes of war in general. The World War could not have come in the summer of 1914 if the system of international relations prevailing at the time had not been one which invited armed hostilities. But likewise it may be held that a system of international relations making for war could not well exist unless there were certain deeper causes which have made war the usual method of solving international dis- putes. There can be no hope of ending war unless we understand thoroughly the basic and complex forces which lead mankind to continue this savage and archaic method of handling l 2 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the relations between states. War will disap- pear, not through petty and sporadic treatment of its symptoms, but only through an under- standing of, and a consistent attack upon, those material conditions and those attitudes of mind which make wars possible in contemporary so- ciety. 1 II. BIOLOGICAL FACTORS PROMOTING WAR First in order we may consider the biologi- cal causes of war, both those which represent biological realities and those which rest upon* a false application of biological and pseudo- biological principles to social processes. 2 The most important potential biological cause of war is to be found in that tendency, perceived by Malthus a century ago, on the part of mankind II to increase more rapidly than the means of sub- sistence. In other words, there is a propensity for the population to outrun the possibility of being maintained in a state of comfort or pros- perity within its political boundaries, with the re- sulting necessity of looking elsewhere for new homes. 3 As Dr. Thompson and others have con- vincingly demonstrated, the population changes since 1750 throughout the western world have amply confirmed Malthus’s main generaliza- tions. 4 'x There has been, however, up to the present time a vast amount of relatively unoccu- BASIC CAUSES OF WASS pied area on the earth’s surface to wh surplus populations of the more congest tricts of the world might freely n Hence, there has been no truly biologica, of war inherent in population increases. Yet there can be no doubt that popi pressure was a contributing cause in pro*, the late world catastrophe. This was bee a certain biological principle had become inse ± arably linked with a dangerous psychological at titude and political fetish. It was commonly believed disastrous to the mother country and emigrants alike for any large number of people to leave their native land and take up residence under the political authority of another country. It was held that migrating citizens should retain their citizenship and carry the glories of the fatherland overseas. Such an aspiration was possible of execution only in conjunction with the development of colonies . 5 While much of the earth’s surface was still an area for free and legitimate occupation, relatively little remained at the close of the nineteenth century as land available for colonial dominion, England, Russia and France having appropriated the larger por- tion of the earth’s surface not already under the domination of independent sovereign states. There thus inevitably came a clash between this desire to obtain colonies for outlet and the fact that potential colonial area was continually ENESIS OF THE WOELD WAR ling in extent. CThis struggle for colo- irticularly on the part of Germany, Italy pan, helped to precipitate many of the dional crises which constituted the diplo- background of the World War^l (It will 1, however, that the cause was not primarily cal but rather psychological and political!} not the patriotic and colonial psychosis ex- *ed, population increases up to the present date vould in no important sense have produced an in- ternational situation making for war . 6 Though it may be held that up to the present time specific biological factors in the way of pop- ulation increase may not have constituted a vital cause of conflict, we can scarcely hold that this constitutes a reason for neglecting the pos- sible importance of population pressure as a cause of war in the future. conventionally understood, and to substitute for it the constructive sentiment of civic pride and international good-will, there can be little hojie of developing those cooperative agencies and attitudes upon which the program of world peace necessarily depends . 29 ^ £A powerful stimulant of savage patriotism has been national history and literature. In the first place, our histories have been filled primarily with records of battles and the doings of military and naval heroes. A country’s importance has been held to depend primarily upon its warlike achievements. The activities of scientists, inven- tors, artists and others who have been the real ar- chitects of civilization receive but scant notice^ Hence, it is not surprising that as children we BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 13 develop the view that after all war is the most significant and important of human activities. Even worse, the history of wars and diplo- matic intrigues, which makes up the larger por- tion of the subject-matter of the majority of our historical works, has been most notoriously and inaccurately distorted in our school textbooks. The country of the writer is always represented as having been invariably right in all instances of international dispute, and all wars are repre- sented as having been gloriously fought defen- sive conflicts. In this way fear, hatred and intol- erance of neighboring states are generated in the minds of school children, to be continued later through perusal of the biased and prejudiced presentation of international news in the subsi- dized press . 31 No training is afforded in the development of a judicious and reflective consid- eration of international issues and inter-state rela- tions, though a few textbook writers have of late attempted to improve both the subject-matter and the tone of our school textbooks. Their ef- forts have, however, been savagely attacked by innumerable patriotic and hyphenated societies which endeavor to stir up international hatreds and prejudices. Such attention as is given in many textbooks to the questions of national cul- ture is usually devoted to a demonstration of the superiority of the culture of the state of the writer to that of any adjoining political group. 14 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR In the last few years we have had our attention called rather sharply to the dangers in the form of the super-patriotic teachings in the textbooks in the United States, but it is unfortunately true that the school textbooks in the majority of the European states are even more chauvinistic and bigoted to-day than were the worst of the school texts in this country a generation ago. When the minds of children are thus poisoned with sus- picion, fear, arrogance, bigotry and intolerance there is little hope that they will develop, along with physical maturity, a sense of calmness and justice in their scrutiny of international affairs . 32 These psychological causes of war are viewed by the writer as of transcendent importance because all other factors, biological, social, economic or political, become active and significant only through their psychological expression. IV. SOCIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF WAR p Of the alleged sociological causes of war the most important is that which rests upon the tend- ency of groups to develop conflicting interests and to struggle~Tor their realization by physical _force if necessary. It is alleged by many that this inevitable conflict of interests in human so- ciety will always remain as a permanent incen- tive to war, there being many forms of conflict- ing interests which can scarcely be eliminated by BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 15 any degree of social progress . 33 (Further, strug- gle or conflict is regarded as a great social dis- cipline and a highly significant impulse to social progress^ The inaccuracies in this position are apparent at once upon analysis. As Ratzenho- fer, Small, Bentley and others have so convinc- ingly shown, the struggle of conflicting interest- groups is even more prominent within each state than between different states . 34 Yet this strug- gle of groups within the state does not take the form of physical conflict but tends rather towards adjustment, compromise and intellectual compe- tition. If we were able to develop the same de- gree of legal control and juristic adjustment in world society as now prevails within the bound- aries of each state, there would no longer be any need or justification for the struggle of national groups to obtain their legitimate desires . 35 Again, while social struggles and conflicts may be an important means of progress, Novicow and other penetrating writers have long since demon- strated that purely physical struggle has become a disastrous anachronism in societj r . The con- structive forms of social conflict must become in the future more and more distinctly economic, cultural and intellectual. This sort of competi- tion may indeed prove a stimulant to progress, but physical combat will inevitably throw man- kind back toward primitive barbarism and mis- ery . 36 16 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR The remaining sociological cause of war is one which wasi dealt with above in connection with the biological factors, namely, the struggle of groups for areas into_ which increasing popula- tions may migrate. •Jt was earlier pointed out that, short of a complete filling up of the earth’s surface by increasing populations, the migration of emigrants is not necessarily a cause of war, ex- cept when accompanied by various psychological and political attitudes, such as imperialism and colonialism, which invite a clash of political sys- tems. Shorn of these fetishes, international mi- gration might proceed peacefully and construc- tively. 3 ^ V. THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF WAR Among the most potent causes of war are the economic . 38 The Industrial Revolution pro- duced an enormous increase in commodities avail- able for sale. The old local and home markets proved inadequate for this increasing flood of goods. It was deemed necessary to find new markets overseas . 39 In part these markets might be discovered among highly developed peoples in distant lands, but for the most part the industrial countries endeavored to develop or exploit colonies as potential customers for goods manufactured in the mother country. This led to what has been called modern economic impe- BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 17 rialism or the struggle for markets, raw materials and investment areas overseas. Probably the most dynamic incentive to imperialism, particu- larly in the last generation, has been the struggle for control over the sources of raw materials. The zeal exhibited to-day in the effort to get com- mand of the oil and rubber supply is but the most conspicuous contemporary manifestation of this tendency. As a result, most of the areas which were not already under the dominion of indepen- dent modern states in 1870 have been parceled out among the British, French, Russians and Americans. 40 I /[[This scramble for overseas territory was one of the most potent causes of i nterna tional dis- putes in the fifty years before 1914. 41 England and Ge rma ny clashed in Af rica over Walfisch Bay and over the German attitude toward the British policy in dealing with the Boers ; in Oce- ania concerning the Samoan and other islands; and in Asia Minor over the attempt of Germany to secure a port and naval base on the Persian Gulf. England and Russia were led by jeal- ousy over territory in the Near East into a bloody war in the middle of the century and to the brink of another in 1878; and mutual aggres- sion in Afghanistan and Persia ended without war only through a parcelling out of the territory between them. Englan d an d France, after ear- lier friction over northern Egypt, came near to 18 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR war over the Fashoda incident in the Sudan in 1898, and hostility was here averted solely by a redistribution of colonial possessions and ambi- tions. Germany and France twice threatened the peace of Europe over Morocco before the matter was even temporarily adjusted. The ri- valry of Germany and Russia in Asia Minor was not wholly settled by the “Willy-Nicky” corre- spondence or the convention of 1911, and the conflict between the “Mittel-Europa” and Pan- Slavic plans, and the mutual rivalry over Tur- key helped to create the diplomatic crisis which precipitated the war. Germany and the United States clashed over the Samoan Islands and in regard to the American conquest of the Philip- pines. Italy broke her long friendship with France over the latter’s annexation of Tunis and made war on Turkey to secure Tripolitania after being sharply obstructed in Abyssinia. Russia and Japan fought over eastern Siberia and Manchuria. Finally, the “glory” of the war with Spain and the rise of “the American Em- pire” served the better to prepare the United States to enter upon the World War. Not only has there been a struggle for over- seas dominions for markets and raw materials; the Industrial Revolution in due time produced an enormous supply of surplus capital that sought investment in overseas dominions. 42 This in itself was legitimate enough. But the in- BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 19 vestors sought special protection and unique rights independent of the laws and customs of the country in which the investments were made. Extra-territorial rights were demanded which made the investors free from the laws and courts of the exploited country. Each state, in ad- ministering its laws, was, naturally, biased in favor of its own nationals . 43 In many cases, when the exploited state was weak enough in a political or military sense to allow such oppres- sion, foreign investors have induced their home governments to impose severe economic handi- caps upon the country undergoing economic penetration. A notorious representative exam- ple of such procedure is the limitation of the cus- toms duties which may be imposed by the Chinese government. Chinese merchants ship- ping goods into foreign countries are compelled to pay the extortionately high customs duties imposed, while the Chinese are themselves lim- ited to notoriously low customs rates on im- ports . 44 The Boxer Revolution of 1900 and the recent uprisings in China have been very largely caused by the oppressive activities of foreign in- vestors supported by the armed forces of their home governments . 45 Such procedure makes for nothing but international hatred and a de- sire to throw off the oppressor. Nothing has done more to align the yellow race against the white than the economic exploitation of China 20 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR by European countries and the United States. Even more serious has been the intimidation or the military or naval occupation of weaker states at the behest of investors . 46 The investor of cap- ital in some weak state may believe that his inter- ests are not adequately protected by the laws and institutions of the state in which he is carrying on business, or may find it difficult to collect his debts in this same country. He then hastens at once to the state department or foreign office of his home government and demands that his economic and financial interests be protected by the army or marines of his mother country. This has led to notorious intervention on the part of various states and the forceful occupation of weaker or dependent states in order to collect the debts due to private citizens . 41 This proced- ure is a direct repudiation of the established practice within each state. An investor at home would never for a moment dream of re- questing so preposterous a thing as the use of the standing army to enable him to collect a debt, but the investor abroad demands exactly this form of special protection and intervention. This has produced a large number of irritating and oppressive incidents in modern international relations, perhaps the most notorious of which have been our own relations with various Latin- American countries, where our foreign policy has been very extensively dictated by the wishes and BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 21 interests of our investors, the vigorous disclaim- ers of ex-Secretary Hughes notwithstanding. Nothing else has done so much to produce in- ternational discord on the western hemisphere, but our American examples of this practice are only representative illustrations of a well-nigh universal practice on the part of the more powerful states of the modern world as exempli- fied by the recent activities of the British in Egypt, China and Persia, or the French in Mo- rocco and Syria . 48 The international menace inherent in many modern economic conditions, particularly im- perialism and foreign investments, has been in- tensified by the differential and discriminatory system of protective tariffs which has evolved parallel with the rise of modern industry and world commerce. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries there was a steady movement toward free-trade, but the rise of modern industrialism, nationalism and imperial- ism produced a strong reaction in favor of that form of economic nationalism which is known as the protective tariff . 49 Even the most extreme exponents of this policy in the earlier days con- tended that it was desirable only when helping a developing industrial state to establish itself in a condition of relative economic equality with more advanced states. E? Friedrich List him- self admitted, there is no valid justification for 22 GENESIS or THE WORLD W A JR, a protective tariff on the part of a well developed industrial state. 5 £J Yet modern politicians and special economic interests have secured a well- nigh universal adoption of the protective tariff system, which is nothing else than a form of economic warfare continuing during the periods of assumed political peace. Particularly has this been true of the discriminatory tariff systems which were common in Europe before the World War and have in some cases been continued in an even more irritating form since that conflict has officially terminated. We shall never be able to eliminate the economic causes of war so long as the archaic principle of the protective tariff remains an unabated nuisance . 51 Unfortunately, there is little prospect at present for relief in this direction. Even England has believed herself compelled to revert to the tariff system after nearly a century of approximately free trade, while the United States iioav finds itself labor- ing under the most atrocious tariff law in the history of our country. But the basest and most vile of all the forms of the economic causes of war are those which are related to the propaganda of various firms engaged in the manufacturing of armor, ex- plosives, and various other types of munitions used in warfare, both on land and water . 52 Such organizations subsidize j the militaristic propa- ganda, support patriotic societies and contribute BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 23 enthusiastically to the maintenance of speakers and periodicals which emphasize the value of citizen training camps and other forms of effort to keep the military cult forcefully before the people. In the period before the late European war it was not uncommon for munition manu- facturers to bribe foreign newspapers to print highly alarmist news in a rival country in order to stir up reciprocal fear in the state of the muni- tions manufacturers and hence make it possible to secure larger appropriations for armament and munitions . 53 Then there is the lust of those economic vultures who see in war an opportunity for unique pecuniary profit, and are willing to urge a policy which will lead to enormous loss of life and an increase of general misery in order that they may accumulate additional revenue over the dead bodies of their fellow citizens . 54 Though these very real and potent economic causes of war exist, it has long since been ap- parent to the intelligent and penetrating econ- omists that modern economic society is be- coming more and more a world society in every important sense. Modern methods of communi- cation and transportation have tended to make the world ever more an economic unit character- ized by interdependence and the necessity for cooperation . 55 Only the foolhardy psychologi- cal attitudes which have come down from an earlier age serve as pseudo-economic motives for 24 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR division and discord. Further, as Norman An- gell warned before the War and still further proved upon the basis of the results of the recent World War, no war can to-day be a profitable one, even for the victors. 56 The main hope for the mitigation of the economic forces making for war are, on the one hand, the development of an educational program designed to reveal the menace of economic imperialism and the high protective tariff system, and, on the other hand, the gradual recognition on the part of the more intelligent and forward-looking bankers and in- vestors that the old system was wrong-headed in its notions and must be modified if ultimate dis- aster is to be averted. 57 VI. THE POLITICAL CAUSES OF WAR Among the most important of the political causes of war is the modern national state sys- tem, the psychological results of which were men- tioned above in connection with the military cult and conventional patriotism. Largely as a re- sult of the rise of modern capitalism and the Protestant Reformation, the benign dream of a united political entity comprehending all Europe was replaced by the hard actuality of the modern national state. 58 This system was first thoroughly legalized in European public law in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. The BASIC CAUSES OP WARS 25 independence of nationalities in a political sense was at first confined primarily to the greater European states, but the aspiration to such in- dependence soon spread to the lesser peoples, and the nineteenth century was in part taken up with their struggles for emancipation. Owing to the fact that subject nationalities were frequently oppressed within the greater states, these op- pressed peoples came to regard nationality as something which required political independence for adequate expression . 59 In this way there grew up that disastrous tend- ency to confound the purely cultural fact of nationality with political autonomy and sov- ereignty. The acceptance of this view has pro- moted the creation of a large number of small national states which constitute just so much greater invitation to war unless brought within some world organization or some European fed- eration . 60 The Peace of Versailles carried to its logical extreme this recognition of political na- tionalism, without at the same time adequately safeguarding the process by a strong interna- tional organization. It is perfectly true that nationalism may be adjusted to world order and organization, but it will need to be a nationalism much more tempered and conciliatory than that which motivated and conditioned European psy- chology in the century before the World War . 61 Aside from its psychological expression in 26 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR J fanatical patriotism the chief reason why the national state has been a menace to peace and world order has been the fact that nationalism has been linked with the conception of absolute political sovereignty. This was a notion de- rived vaguely from Roman law, but primarily developed by political philosophers from Bodin in the sixteenth century, through Hobbes, Black- stone, Bentham and Austin to Burgess in our own day. In the words of Burgess it means the “original, absolute, universal and unlimited power of the state over any subject or group of subjects.” 62 Such a political concept, held to he the very key and core of the modern politi- cal order, has naturally proved a nasty theoreti- cal stumbling-block to any movement for world organization. It has been maintained that any such plan would involve some sacrifice of sov- ereignty and independence, and would therefore pull down the whole edifice of modern political society in its wake. Added to this metaphysical fetish has been the even more absurd notion of “national honor” — a phrase used normally to cover supposedly non- judicable topics and dis- putes . 63 It is easy to show that this view of absolute political sovereignty is a purely metaphysical fiction, the power of the state being in both theory and practice limited by every treaty and international arrangement, as well as by the so- BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 27 cial power exerted by various groups within the state . 64 The concepts and practices of political pluralism are already severely challenging the theory of the omnipotent sovereign state, and we may safely hold that there is nothing in sound political science of the present time which con- stitutes any obstacle to the plans for an effective society of states . 65 Yet the fetish of the sov- ereign state still persists to give pathological sensitivity to many contemporary statesmen and politicians when a program of world unity is brought up for discussion. The view that there are subjects which a state cannot submit to ad- judication without a lesion of national honor is as misleading as it is to contend that there are matters which a private individual should not submit to the courts of law. The concept of “national honor” is not an adjunct of national dignity or world order but a criterion and a stigma of international lawlessness, comparable to duelling and lynch law within the state . 66 VII. CONCLUSIONS The above brief discussion of some of the more obvious fundamental causes of war should be use- ful, if for_n o other rea son, because it makes plain the necessary breadth of any a dequate program for se c uring w orldjpeace. The pacifist has normally been a single-track reformer, put- 28 GENESIS OE THE WORLD WAR ting his trust in some one alleged panacea, such as disarmament, international arbitration, inter- national conferences, international discussion clubs, religious unity, leagues of nations, free- trade, non-resistance, and so on. "While every one interested in the cause of peace should be al- lowed to affiliate himself with whatever branch of the general peace movement is able to claim his most enthusiastic support, he should understand that his particular pet scheme will be helpful only as a part of a larger whole comprehending the consistent assault upon each and every one of the factors making for war in contemporary so- ciety. When we shall have eliminated the causes of international friction, the symptoms of this world malady will no longer be present to harass us . 67 SELECTED REFERENCES Bakeless, J., The Economic Causes of Modern Wars ; Bryce, J., International Relations ; Buell, R. L., Inter- national Relations; Culbertson, W. S., International Economic Policies; Duggan, S. P., The League of Na- tions; Dunn, R. W., American Foreign Investments; East, E. M., Mankind at the Crossroads; Enock, A. G., The Problem of Armaments; Hobson, J. A., Imperi- alism; Moon, P. T., Imperialism and World Politics; A Syllabus of International Relations ; Muir, R., Na- tionalism and Internationalism; Nearing, S., and Free- man, J., Dollar Diplomacy ; Nicolai, G., The Biology BASIC CAUSES OE WARS 29 of War; Novicow, J., War and Its Alleged Benefits; Page, K., War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure; Partridge, G. E., The Psychology of Nations; Playne, C. E., The Neuroses of the Nations; Potter, P. B., An Introduction to the Study of International Organiza- tion; Scott, J. F., Patriots in the Making; Swinburne, J., Population and the Social Problem ; Young, A. A., “Economics and War,” in American Economic Review, March, 1926. FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 As a syllabus and bibliography on the underlying causes of war the most useful book in English is Edward Krehbiel, Na- tionalism, War and Society. The most profound discussion of the problem is to be found in Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation. 2 The literature and the various biological and pseudo- biological theories involved in the biological causation of war are surveyed by the present writer in a series of articles on “Representative Biological Theories of Society,” in the Socio- logical Review, 1924-26. The most effective attack on the biological determinists and social Darwinists is contained in G. Nicolai, The Biology of War. 3 J. Bonar, Malthus and His Work. i W. S. Thompson, Population: a Study in Malthusianism. 5 M. S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League; A. Meggl4, La Domains coloniale de la France; A. G. Keller, Colonization; H. C. Morris, A History of Colonization ; S. P. Orth, The Imperial Impulse; P. S. Reinsch, World Politics; Colonial Government; D. S. Jordan, Imperial Democracy; S. Nearing, The American Empire; L. Yerlane, La Mdthode de colonisation; H. Robinson, The Development of the British Empire; L. Yignon, Un Pro- gramme de politique coloniale ; E. I .einonon, La P olitique coloniale de I’ltalie; A. Zimmermann, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonial- politik; A. Krausse, Russia in Asia; I. Bowman, The New World. e C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Eu- rope, Vol. II, Part V; H. A. Gibbons, Introduction to World Politics; R. L. Buell, International Relations; G. L. Dickinson, The Causes of International War; L. Woolf, Empire and Com- merce in Africa; W. Lippmann, The Stakes of Diplomacy . 30 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR 7 E. M. East, Mankind at the Crossroads. 8 M. Sanger, The Pivot of Civilization. 9 Carveth Read, Natural and Social Morals; The Origin of Man and of His Superstitions; P. Bovet, The Fighting Instinct; L. Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf. 10 E.g. Bovet, op. cit. 11 As by Tolstoi and others. 12 G. Wallas, Our Social Heritage; P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: a Factor of Evolution; G. Nicolai, The Biology of War. is E. Bevan, German Social Democracy during the War; G. Demartial, La Guerre de 191 4- Comment on mobilisa les con- sciences; C. E. Playne, The Neuroses of the Nations. i* See the positive statement in the writings of Gumplowicz ; and the critical expositions in J. Novicow, La Critique de dar- winisme sociale; and Nasmyth, G. AV., Social Progress and Dar- winian Theory. is See H. E. Barnes, Sociology and Political Theory, pp. 52-55. Gumplowicz’s Der Rassenkampf is the most important work of this sort. is Novicow and Nicolai as cited; and D. S. Jordan, TPar and the Breed; War and Manhood. 1 7 Cf. Novicow, Les Luttes entre societes humaines. is W. Irwin, The Next War; J. B. S. Haldane, Callinicus, a Defence of Chemical Warfare; B. H. L. Hart, Paris, or the Future of War; J. F. C. Fuller, The Reformation of War; J. Bloch, The Future of TFar. lo AVorks cited; and D. S. Jordan, The Human Harvest. 20 D. S. Jordan, War’s Aftermath; S. Dumas and K. O. A 7 andel-Petersen, Losses of Life Caused by War. 21 J. Novicow, La Critique dn darwinisme social; G. AVallas, Our Social Heritage. 22 F. N. Maude, War and the World’s Life; H. Maxim, De- fenceless America; A. T. Mahan, “The Place of force in Inter- national Relations,” in North American Review, January, 1912; H. Lea, The Valour of Ignorance; R. M. Johnston, Arms and the Race; J. A. Cramb, Germany and England; F. von Bern- hardi, Germany and the Next War; and the various writings of Paul Deroulede and Leon Daudet. 23 J. A. Cramb, The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain; H. Lea, The Day of the Saxon; S. Grumbacli, Germany’s An- nexationist Aims; T. Roosevelt, The Winning of the West. 24 W. G. Sumner, TFar and Other Essays; E. D. Alorel, Mili- tary Preparation for the Great TFar. 25 G. Wallas, Our Social Heritage; J. K. Turner, Shall It Be Again?; Z. Chafee, Freedom of Speech; L. Post. I he Deporta- tions Delirium; N. Thomas, The Conscientious Objector; L. F. Oppenheim, Profiteers. BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 31 26 E. Barker, Political Thought in England from Spencer to the Present Day, Chaps, i-iii; J. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty; The Hope of the Great Community. 27 Graham Wallas, Our Social Heritage; B. Russell, Why Men Fight; C. Read, op. cit; L. Perla, What is National Honor?; A. E. Stevenson, Revolutionary Radicalism in America; S. How- ard, “Our Professional Patriots,” in New Republic, 1924. For an inevitably unsuccessful, but suggestive, attempt to combine these two conceptions of patriotism, see F. H. Giddings, The Responsible State. 28 F. S. Chapin, An Historical Introduction to Social Econ- omy, Chap, xvi; C. H. Cooley, Social Organization, Part II. The best brief histories of nationalism are J. H. Rose, Nationality in Modern History; R. Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism; S. Herbert, Nationality and Its Problems; and C. J. H. Hayes, Nationalism. 29 The best work on the relation of patriotism to war is C. E. Playne, The Neuroses of the Nations, Vol. I, on Germany and France; Vol. II, on England. See also G. E. Partridge, The Psychology of Nations; and W. B. Pillsbury, The Psychology of Nationalism and Internationalism. The best criticism of patriot- ism in relation to war is J. H. Holmes, Patriotism Is Not Enough. See also E. Le Fur, Races, nationality, Mats. so C. Altschul, The American Revolution in Our School Text- books; J. B. Scott, Patriots in the Making; H. E. Barnes, His- tory and Social Intelligence, Parts I— II ; The New History and the Social Studies, Chap, i; J. Langdon-Davies, Militarism in Education. si Scott, op. cit.; W. Lippmann, Liberty and the News; L. M. Salmon, The Newspaper and Authority ; The Newspaper and the Historian. 32 B. L. Pierce, The Control of History Teaching; Public Opin- ion and the Teaching of History; Barnes, History and Social Intelligence, Chap. i. 33 This thesis is defended by Gumplowicz and his followers, and attacked by Novicow. si G. Ratzenhofer, Wesen und Zweck der Politik; A. W. Small, General Sociology; A. F. Bentley, The Process of Government. 35 Cf. Monroe Smith, “The Nature and Future of International Law,” in American Political Science Review, February, 1918. 36 Cf. Novicow, Les Luttes entre sociMis humaines. 37 For a presentation of the case for population pressure as a cause of war see C. Gini, Problemi sociologies della guerra. 38 The best brief survey is J. Bakeless, Economic Causes of Modern Wars. For an extreme but striking statement of the case for economic determinism in regard to war see A. Loria, Aspetti socials ed economici della guerra mondiale. 32 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR . 39 L ' Woolf ’ Economic Imperialism; J. A. Hobson, Imperial- ism; the best guide to a study of imperialism is P. T. Moon, Syllabus of Inter-national Relations. . 40 A- Viallate, Economic Imperialism and International Rela- tions; P. T. Moon, Imperialism and World Politics; E. Fueter, World History, 1815-1920; W. S. Culbertson, Raw Materials and Food Stuffs in the Foreign Policies of Nations. 41 H. A. Gibbons, Introduction to World Politics; Moon, op. cit. ; R. L Buell, International Relations; J. S. Ewart, The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918. 4 ~ J- A. Hobson, Imperialism; L. Woolf, E conomic Imperial- ism; S. Nearing and J. Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy; P. l’E. de la Tramerye, The World Struggle for Oil; E. H. Davenport, and S. R. Cooke, The Oil Trusts and Anglo-American Relations ; H. Withers, International Finance; R. Luxemburg, Die Ak- kumulation des Kapitals. 43 P . M. Brown, Foreigners in Turkey; C. S. Labingier, Extra- territorial Cases; Shih Shun Liu, Extra-territoriality, Its Rise and Decline. 44 M. J. Bau, The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China; M. T. Z. Tyau, Treaty Obligations between China and Other States. « P. H. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion; T. F. Millard, The Conflict of Policies in Asia; T. W. Overlaeh, Foreign Financial Control in China. 46 Cf. S. Nearing, The American Empire; Nearing and Free- man, Dollar Diplomacy ; Hobson, Imperialism; Woolf, Economic Imperialism; Empire and Commerce in Africa. 47 References as in footnotes 42 and 46 above; and C. L. Jones, The Caribbean Interests of the United Stafes; R. W. Dunn, American Foreign Investments; and E. Kimpen, Die Ausbrei- tungspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten. *8 E.g. our intervention in Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Cuba, and our recent recognition policy in regard to Mexico. 43 P. Ashley, Modern Tariff History; G. M. Fisk and P. S. Pierce, International Commercial Policies. so Gide and Rist, History of Economic Doctrines, pp. 264-S8. 51 R. R. Bowker, Economic Peace. 52 The existence of such propaganda on the part of the great munitions plants in Europe before the World War has been well established, and it is alleged to be true of this country as well. N. Angell, Arms and Industry; H. N. Brailsford, The War of Steel and Gold. 53 For literature on this subject see the bibliography in Krehbiel, op. cit., pp. 55—56. si J. K. Turner, Shall It Be Again? 65 J. L. Garvin, Economic Foundations of Peace; J. W. Hughan, BASIC CAUSES OF WARS 33 A Study of International Government; Friedman, International Finance; L. Woolf, International Government; W. S. Culbertson, International Economic Policies. N. Angell, The Great Illusion; The Fruits of Victory. 5 7 E.g. F. Vanderlip, What Next in Europe?; D. W. Morrow, The Society of Free States; H. Croly, Willard Straight. ss Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism; C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, Vol. I; P. Smith, The Age of the Reformation. 59 J. H. Rose, Nationality in Modem History; F. Schevill, History of the Balkan Peninsula; A. Toynbee, Nationality and the War. so A. E. Zimmern, Nationality and Government; I. Zangwill, What is Nationality? ; P. S. Mowrer, Balkanized Europe. 61 S. P. Duggan, Ed., The League of Nations; R. Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism, S. Herbert, Nationality and Its Problems; I. Fisher, League or War. 62 C. E. Merriam, A History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau. 63 Cf. C. E. Merriam and H. E. Barnes, Eds., A History of Political Theories: Recent Times, Chaps, iii-iv. 64 Cf. H. J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty ; A Grammar of Politics. 65 Laski, Grammar of Politics, Chap, xi; J. B. Scott, Sovereign States and Suits before Arbitral Tribunals and Courts of Justice. 66 A view for which I am indebted to Professor J. T. Shotwell. Cf. also Perla, What is National Honor? 67 G. L. Dickinson, War, Its Causes and Cure; K. Page, War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure; P. M. Brown, International Society; P. Kerr and L. Curtis, The Prevention of War. CHAPTER II THE GENERAL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 1914 I. THE NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, reads as follows: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war im- posed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. On the basis of this assertion the Entente Powers specifically and concretely erected their claim to reparations from Germany, and by im- plication the general nature of the entire treaty. Some have supposed that Germany, by appar- ently acquiescing in this charge of full and com- plete guilt in regard to the outbreak of the war, finally and for all time clinched the argument of the Allied Powers in regard to her sole responsibility. Such a position could hardly be held, however, by any one familiar with the *34 THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 35 methods of the Allies during the Peace Confer- ence. Germany occupied the situation of a prisoner at the bar, where the prosecuting at- torney is given full leeway as to time and pres- entation of evidence, while the defendant is denied counsel or the opportunity to produce either evidence or witnesses. It was, indeed, a case where the prosecution simply contented it- self with the assumption of the guilt of the de- fendant and was not required to furnish proof. Germany was confronted with the alternative of signing the confession at once or having her territory invaded and occupied, with every prob- ability that such an admission would be ulti- mately extorted from her in any event. In the light of these obvious facts it is plain that the question of the responsibility for the outbreak of the World War must rest for its solution upon the indisputable documentary evidence which is available in the premises. 1 Under the circumstances which ordinarily follow a war, we should still be as ignorant of the real causes of the World War as we were in 1914. It has been a general rule that the archives, or repositories of the public documents of the States involved, have been closed to non- official readers until from forty to eighty years after the events and negotiations which these documents describe. Hence we should normally have been required to wait until about 1975 for 36 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR as great a volume of documentary evidence as we now possess, and two generations of students would have passed away without progressing be- yond dubious guesses and intuitive approxima- tions to the truth. The explanation of our good fortune in this regard is to be found in the revo- lutionary overturns in Germany, Austria and Russia before the close of the World War. The new governments were socialistic in character and hypothetically opposed to war and milita- rism, despite the fact that the Socialists had for the most part remained loyal to their capitalis- tic or landlord governments in the World War. Desiring to make their tenure more secure by discrediting the acts and policies of the preced- ing regimes, the leaders of the new governments conceived one method of achieving this end by throwing open the national archives in the hope that historical editors might discover therein evidence of responsibility on the part of the former governing groups for the inundation of blood, misery and sorrow which swept over Europe after 1914. 2 In addition to these vol- untarily opened archives, the Germans seized the Belgian archives during the War and published collections of extracts. Then B. de Siebert, Secretary to the Russian Embassy at London in the period before the War, had secretly made copies of the important diplomatic exchanges be- tween London and St. Petersburg from 1908 THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 37 to 1914, and later gave or sold many of them to the Germans. The nature of the European diplomatic and military alignments in 1914 accounts for the fact that these revelations are reasonably ade- quate to settle the problems concerning the declarations of war in 1914, despite the further fact that England, France and Italy refused to make their archives accessible to scholars. In- asmuch as Italy was technically allied with Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance, the nature of much of her foreign policy and many of her diplomatic engagements may be gleaned from the German and Austrian archives. But she was at the same time secretly negotiat- ing with France, and, after 1914, with the mem- bers of the Triple Entente. This material is, in part, available in the documents in the Rus- sian archives and in those whichdias been pub- lished from the French archives. England and France having been the other members of the Triple Entente, the secret diplomacy of this group is reasonably covered in the Russian archives and the Siebert documents, the latter of which are now duplicated in part in the publi- cations from the Russian archives, though it would be desirable to know of any possible secret Franco-British exchanges not revealed to Rus- sia. The French have, of course, published some of their documents in the various Livres Jaunes — 38 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the most important of which is that on the Bal- kan policy (1922), but they are officially ed- ited and many incriminating documents are, naturally, suppressed. England is now allowing Gooch and Temperley to edit two volumes of pre-war material in the English archives. Although a vast number of documents in the archives of Germany, Austria and Russia have not yet been published, the collections thus far available are impressive. Many diplomatic doc- uments covering the broad historical background of the Austrian crisis of 1914 are presented in the admirable collection of Professor A. F. Pri- bram.' The documents in the Austrian archives dealing with the month preceding the outbreak of the World War have been edited by the pub- licist and scholarly journalist, Roderich Goos, in the three volumes of the Austrian Bed Book . 4 In Germany an even more voluminous collection on the diplomacy of Germany and related coun- tries from 1871 to 1914 is in process of publica- tion under the editorship of J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssolm-Bartholdy and F. Thimine. This embraces all the important diplomatic documents in the German Foreign Office; some thirty bulky volumes have already appeared. It is the most extensive publication of this sort yet undertaken in any country . 5 The documents dealing with the antecedents of August, 1914. were extracted from the German archives by the German So- THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 39 cialist, Karl Kautsky, and published in four vol- umes under the editorship of the eminent scholars, W. Schiicking, M. Montgelas and A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy. 6 A supplementary col- lection has been more recently published which embodies: (1) The testimony of leading Ger- mans in military, diplomatic and business life be- fore a committee appointed by the German post- war government to investigate the responsibility for the War; (2) the records of the reaction of Germany to Mr. Wilson’s peace note of Decem- ber, 1916, and (3) the negotiations between Ger- many and her allies, and Germany and the United States concerning submarine warfare, and the policies which produced the entry of the United States into the World War. 7 No Russian documents have been made avail- able as yet which cover so ample an historical background as the work of Pribram and the pub- lished volumes of the Grosse Politik. The Sie- bert documents 8 deal only with the period from 1908-1914. The Livre Noir (Black Book) is another important publication of the Russian documents. It was collected by Rene Marchand, a scholarly French publicist and journalist thoroughly familiar with the Russian language and with Russian public life and politics. It presents in detail the Russian diplomatic docu- ments of the years 1910-1914, particularly stress- ing Franco-Russian relations and policies. A. 40 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR much more thorough collection of the Russian documents has been edited by Professor Fried- rich Stieve in five volumes. These are the most important published collections of Russian source material . 9 The diary of Baron M. F. Schilling, Chief of the Chancellery in the Russian Foreign Office in 1914, is invaluable for many personal and other details in the crisis. This newly accessible archival material has enabled scholars to check up on the collections of apologetic or extenuating documents published by the great powers in the early days of the War. A step in this direction has been taken by G. von Romberg, who has brought out a publication of the actual exchanges between Paris and St. Petersburg following the submission of the Aus- trian ultimatum to Serbia on July 23, 1914. This lays bare the serious and important sup- pressions in the original Russian Orange Book, which eliminated all the damaging evidence re- garding conciliatory German proposals or ag- gressive Franco-Russian aims and policies. 19 Also from the Russian archives has come the re- cently published collection ‘ revealing Italy’s dickering' with the Entente for territorial cessions from 1914 to the time of her entry into the World War in May, 1915. 11 The Belgian documents published by Germany embrace chiefly the dis- patches and opinions of the Belgian ambassadors in the major European capitals following 1886, THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 41 playing up especially those which express fear of Entente collusion and aggression. Highly se- lected and one-sided, the collection is yet of real value as proving that the Belgians were alarmed at the policies of the states other than Germany and incidentally vindicating beyond any doubt the neutrality of official Belgian opinion as a whole before 1914. 12 Finally, we have the de- pressing Secret Treaties of the Entente, which eliminate once and for all any basis for the hy- pothesis of idealism underlying the military activ- ities of either side in the W orld W ar, and convict the Allies of aggressive aims as thoroughly as Grumbach’s Das A nnexionistische Deutschland proves Germany and Austria guilty of similar ambitions. 31 These collections of documents have been sup- plemented by a vast number of apologetic and controversial memoirs, reminiscences and auto- biographies which possess highly varied value and relevance, and by infinitely more important scholarly monographs analyzing in detail one or another of the many diplomatic and political' problems and situations lying back of the World War. 14 It is upon such material as this that we are able to construct a relatively objective and de- ^ finitive estimate of the causes of and responsi- v bility for the great calamity of 1914-18 and its aftermath. It is quite evident that if any ac- 42 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR count written prior to 1919 possesses any validity whatever or any approximation to the true pic- ture of events, this is due solely to superior guess- ing power or good luck on the part of the writer, and in no sense to the possession of reliable or pertinent documentary evidence. In his recent defense in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, Poincare has made the absurd insinuation that this new material bearing on war-guilt is German and Bolshevik propaganda. An examination of the facts will put this pre- posterous charge forever at rest. The German documents were made public by the Socialistic government which hoped thereby to discredit the Kaiser and the imperial regime. If the doc- uments had been garbled they would have been altered in the direction of attempting to empha- size German guilt. As an actual matter of fact, they were carefully edited under the direction and scrutiny of both liberal and conservative scholars. No informed person can question their authenticity. The same holds true of the Aus- trian documents. Of the Russian documents the exchanges between London and St. Petersburg were edited by Siebert, a Russian landlord and an enemy of the Bolsheviks, years before the Bolsheviks came into power. Those between Paris and St. Petersburg were edited in the first instance by two French scholars, Laloy and Marchand. An even more complete edition was THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 43 later prepared by Professor Stieve, a German scholar. There is no discrepancy of significance between these editions, and the Bolsheviks have in no sense interfered with the editing. Further, if Poincare knew that these documents were false, he had an admirable opportunity to clear him- self by ordering a full publication of the French documents, as he was premier of France after the appearance of the Livre Noir which con- tains the damaging evidence against him. He made no such move. It is even more significant that while Poincare makes a general and blanket charge that these new documents are untrust- worthy he has not seen fit to deny the truth of any specific incriminating document or statement of Izvolski. The whole question of the authen- ticity of the collections of Russian documents made by Marchand and Stieve has recently been settled by Sazonov. In his foreword to Baron Schilling’s diary, How the War Began, he ad- mits their complete authenticity. II. GERMANY AND EUROPE, 1870-1914 Without undertaking to make a detailed sum- mary of the diplomatic history of Europe from 1870 to 1914, we can at least present in its major outlines the picture of the European system which made possible the great calamity of 1914. Such an attempt is not only important in prepar- 44 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR ing the ground for an understanding of the im- mediate causes of the World War, but also as a refutation of a most significant phase of the Entente propaganda — a phase which has de- veloped chiefly since 1919. During the War the conventional propaganda in the Allied countries tended to rest content for its proof of full and complete German responsibility upon the alleged Potsdam Conference of July 5, 1914, where the Kaiser and his war-lords were supposed to have revealed their determination to precipitate the European struggle, urging Austria on in her policy of intimidating Serbia with the primary purpose of bringing Russia into the struggle and thus setting off a general European confla- gration. 15 The further documentary evidence which has recently come out with respect to the immediate causes of the War has decisively demonstrated that the German civil government not only did not will war in 1914 but was distinctly opposed to its outbreak. It has been impossible for any honest and unbiased student of the documents to deny these facts. Hence, those who are un- willing to adjust their conceptions fully and freely to the new facts, have turned from the immediate diplomatic events of June- August, 1914, to the general European setting from 1870- 1914 as proof of the primary German responsi- bility for the World War. They admit that the THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 45 evidence shows that Germany was specifically opposed to the War in the summer of 1914, and that the aggression came from the side of France and Russia. Yet they contend that if Germany did not will the War in 1914, she was per- sistently the most active and menacing bully in the general European situation from 1870 on- ward, and really forced France and Russia into their aggressive acts of 1912-1914 as a matter of self -protection#! 5 We shall here examine the actual facts in the situation with the aim of dis- covering how much truth there is in this com- mon allegation of contemporary Entente propa- gandists that if Germany did not specifically bring on the W orld W ar nevertheless she created that system of militarism and bullying which made the war inevitable. III. ECONOMIC RIVALRY: ENGLAND AND r GERMANY The general underlying causes of the Euro- pean military menace may be summarized under four main headings: economic and commercial rivalry, nationalism and patriotism, military and naval preparations, and the two great systems of counter-alliances. In regard to the first of these, the greatest guilt, if it may be thus called, falls unquestionably upon Great Britain and Germany. From the close of the War of 1812 46 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR onward Great Britain had been far and away the most powerful industrial and commercial country in the world. During the late ’70’s and ’80’s Germany experienced the Industrial Revo- lution which brought to her the mechanical technique and the factory system. A stu- pendous industrial and commercial transforma- tion ensued which, in rapidity and extent, has only been rivalled by the development of Ameri- can industry since the Civil War and the parallel transformation of Japanese industry. Partic- ularly in the textile industry, the iron and steel industry and the new chemical industry did Germany rapidly forge ahead, to become a no- table contender with Great Britain for the indus- trial primacy of Europe. Likewise Germany developed rapidly a great merchant marine which struggled with England for the carrying trade of the oceans, and she sought territory overseas for colonial empire and areas of investment to afford markets for her surplus products and out- let for her capital accumulations. And, in the same way that Great Britain had developed a great navy to protect her colonies and merchant marine, so toward the close of the nineteenth century Germany also began to lay plans for a real navy. 17 Many, including the present writer, have re- ferred to the German naval plans as “foolish" or worse. Doubtless this is true in an absolute THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 47 sense, as all forms of military and naval pre- paredness must be viewed as fundamentally idiotic. Yet the German naval plans were only a natural and normal outgrowth of the general spirit of the times and of the particular circum- stances of German developments following 1890. [No modern state has yet developed a colonial empire, extensive world trade and a great mer- chant marine without feeling that it is desirable to secure protection through the development of an adequate navy. The German naval expan- sion was unquestionably a psychological, diplo- matic and pecuniary liability, but the same may he said of all naviesfj The German naval plans formulated’ by Von Tirpitz were insane only in the sense that the whole preparedness race was imbecilic. Further, as will be apparent from the statistics of armaments given below, the German navy was never any real challenge to the naval supremacy of Great Britain alone, to say nothing oftlje combined navies of Great Britain, France, _ Russia and Japan. Finally, the German naval policy cannot be regarded as a direct cause of the war as Germany and England had reached a satisfactory, if informal, understanding before 1914 on the 16:10 basis. These developments in commerce and naval plans greatly alarmed Great Britain and led her to look upon Germany rather than France as the chief menace to her interests and safety in 48 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the west. Up to this time she had regarded France as the chief danger in this area, but shortly after the beginning of the present cen- tury France was supplanted by Germany as the chief object of British concern in the tradi- tional British policy to maintain England free from danger from any power on the coasts of the North Sea . 18 ^ Added to this British jealousy of German in- dustrial and commercial progress and her fear of the German menace to her safety on the North Sea, due to the development of German naval plans, was the growing influence of Germany in the Near East which was involved in the German plans for the railroad from- Berlin to Bagdad, j with the resulting desire to exploit the great re- sources of Mesopotamia. During the nineteenth century Great Britain had looked upon Rus- sia as the great menace to her interests in the Near East, but with the launching of the German plans for the railroad from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf England became more and more fearful about the possible results of German ad- vances in Turkey and Mesopotamia . 19 Dr. John S. Ewarf, Canada’s most distinguished contemporary jurist, whose recent book The Boots and Causes of the Wars is the best book in English on the subject, presents the follow- ing admirable summary of these causes of Anglo- German rivalry: 20 THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 49 1. Germany’s rivalry in manufactures, in commerce, in finance, in mercantile shipping, and in war-navy, added to her predominance in military power, aroused British apprehension, and created British antagonism. That was one root of the war between the United King- dom and Germany. 2. British policy in western Europe had for many years pivoted upon the determination to maintain free- dom from menace on the North sea coasts. While France was the danger in this regard, France was the potential enemy. As Germany waxed, and France rela- tively waned, British apprehension became fixed on the power to the east of Belgium and Flolland, instead of, as formerly, on the power to the west. That was an- other root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany. 3. British traditional policy in eastern Europe and the Near East had been the protection of Constantino- ple and India against the advances of Russia. The advent of Germany as a competitor for domination at Constantinople, and for political as well as economic ex- pansion in Asia Minor, Persia and Mesopotamia, di- verted iBritish apprehension from Russia to Germany. That was another root of the war between the United Kingdom and Germany. It is also undoubtedly true that the American willingness to enter the World War was con- siderably enhanced by the American jealousy of German commercial and industrial expansion, but this certainly played no part whatever in pre- cipitating the World War, and may thus be dis- 50 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR missed without any further mention as a cause of the War . 21 Many historians believe that there was no inconsiderable economic basis for the rivalry between Germany and Russia par- ticularly due to the German economic conquest of Russia, which was so complete that by 1913 fifty per cent of Russia’s imports came from Germany and thirty-five per cent of her exports went into Germany. Along with this German industrial penetration went a tariff war which was based upon the discriminatory and differen- tial tariff system common to the European states before the World War . 22 But unquestionably the chief economic and commercial cause of the War lay in the rivalries which developed between the industry, com- merce, imperialistic policies and naval arma- ments of Great Britain and Germany. It is probably inaccurate to apply the term “guilt” in any sense to either Great Britain or Germany in this connection. It was but natural that each country should do all it could to further its in- dustrial and commercial development and. grant- ing the existence of the prevailing economic and commercial policies of the time, it was equally inevitable that there should be a clash between these two powers. Certainly there was nothing in the situation which would justify one in hold- ing Germany primarily responsible for this Anglo-German economic antagonism. THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 51 IV. NATIONALISM AND PATRIOTISM With respect to the spirit of nationalism and arrogant patriotism, none of the Great Powers can here show a clean bill of health. All were afflicted with this chief psychological cause of hatred and suspicion. Probably the most viru- lent expression of this patriotism was to be found in France under the leadership of Deroulede, Barres and other apostles of revenge and Galli- canism. But certainly the difference between France and other major European states was chiefly one of degree rather than of kind. The Germans were exuberant over their successes in 1870 and the subsequent marvelous development of the united German Empire. The Russians were busy with Pan-Slavic programs designed to make Russia the most powerful state in the eastern hemisphere and the natural leader of all the Slavic peoples in Europe. A most vigorous ^ patriotism flourished in the naval clique in Great - Britain, 'and no more obsessed organ was pub- lished anywhere in Europe than the bellicose and chauvinistic National Review edited in London by Mr. L. J. Maxse. Likewise, the enthusiasm of the Italian patriots, led by men like D’An- nunzio, knew no bounds either in ambition or literary expression. 23 During the War the Entente propaganda rep- resented Germany as almost unique and alone in 52 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR this patriotic literature and lust for world-domin- ion, basing their assertions chiefly upon the pub- lications of the Pan-German League and the books of writers like Nietzsche and Bernhardi. 24 Dr. Mildred S. Wertheimer, in a recent thorough and painstaking study 25 of the Pan-German League, executed under the direction of Profes- sor C. J. H. Hayes of Columbia University, has shown that the Pan-German League was but a small organization of fanatical patriots, com- parable to our own National Security League and American Defense Society, and having less influence over the German government than our American societies had over the foreign policy of Woodrow Wilson from 1913-1916. Even in official circles the Pan-German League was laughed at as a noisy nuisance. Nietzsche fiercely hated the Prussian military bureaucracy and could in no sense be regarded as their spokesman, while Bernhardi was simply the German ex- positor of the military cult common to certain classes and groups throughout Europe in the half century before the War. The book had not been read by anybody in the German Foreign Office in 1914. It can be matched readily by comparable and synchronous publications in England, France and Russia. Fully as un- compromising adulations of the military cult are to be found in the writings of Maude, THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 53 Cramb, Lea, Wyatt, Maxim, Mahan, Derou- lede, Daudet and Barres. 26 The sane view of this matter is one which makes no attempt at either a special condemnation or whitewashing of Germany. She was, in general, as bad as the other countries with respect to patriotic propaganda and national pride, but certainly no ! worse. jfLeast of all can it be contended that it was Germany which gave birth to the ardent pa- triotic sentiments of the European states in the nineteenth century. In large part they were the product of general historical and cultural con- ditions, but in so far as they came from any particular country the responsibility must be assigned to the military tradition of the French Bourbons, and, above all, to the traditions of military glory and patriotic pride developed in France during the period of the Revolution and of Napoleon Bonaparte and revived with vigor by Napoleon III in the era of the second French Empire. German patriotism itself had its birth as a reaction against the indignities perpetrated upon the Prussians by Napoleon during the French occupation following 1806. 27 j Ewart presents the following statesmanlike conclusions with respect to this whole problem of the alleged unique German responsibility for obsessed pa- triotism and national arrogance : 28 54 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR From what has been said, the following conclusions may safely be drawn : 1. That Germany sought to dominate the world is a very ridiculous assertion. 2. That Nietzsche, Treitschke, or Bernhardi advo- cated world-domination is untrue. 3. That Germany desired to be able to exercise the chief influence in world affairs is as true as that the United Kingdom lias occupied that position for the last hundred years. 4. Germany’s desire for a strong navy was based upon the same reasons as those which actuated the United Kingdom, namely (1) protection of coasts, (2) protection of commerce, (3) protection of colonies, and (4) diplomatic influence. 5 . Of imperialism, all virile nations have been guilty. The victors in the recent war, and their friends, made the most of their opportunities. Previous to her de- feat, Germany was no exception to the general rule. 6. The prose and poetry of all nations boastfully as- sert superiorities, and reveal imperialistic proclivities. German authors were and are as foolish as the others. V. ARMAMENTS AND PREPAREDNESS In no other respect has there been more gen- eral unanimity of opinion in our country than in the assumption that the military prepared- ness of Germany was far superior to that of any other European country with respect to both the number and quality of troops and the equipment of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Germany THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 55 has been pictured as the one country overrun with soldiers armed to the teeth and trained to the minute, while the other European states have been represented as but conducting feeble and imperfect defensive programs in lame and fear- ful imitation of Germany. 29 Direct recourse to the facts quickly dispels this persistent and mis- leading illusion. The following table presents the effective peace strength of the various major world powers in 1899, 1907 and 1914: 30 1899 1907 1914 Germany 604,000 629,000 806,000 Austria 346,000 382,000 370,000 Italy 258,000 284,000 305,000 France 574,000 559,000 818,000 Russia 896,000 1,254,000 1,284,000 Professor Moon makes practically the same es- timate, with the addition of the population of the states involved: Germany 1895 585,000 Austria-Hungary 349,000 Italy 238,000 Russia 910,000 France 572,000 Great Britain 369,000 Japan United States Population 1910 1914 1914 634,000 812,000 68,000,000 327,000 424,000 52,000,000 288,000 318,000 36,000,000 1,200,000 1,300,000 174,000,000 634,000 846,000 40,000,000 255,000 250,000 43,000,000 230,000 250,000 54,000,000 81,000 105,000 99,000,000 General Buat, a leading French military expert, contends that the active French army in 1914 56 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR numbered 910,000 with 1,325,000 reservists, while the active German army he holds to have been at this time 870,000 with 1,180,000 reservists . 31 The distinguished French historian, Charles Seignobos, has recently pointed out in Lavisse’s Histoire de France contemporaine how, in in- stituting the new three year service act in 1913- 14, the French military authorities, in addition to calling up two new classes, also retained the one which would have ordinarily been released. Thus, in the summer of 1914, France had the unique and wholly temporary advantage of hav- ing four classes with the colors. In the decade from 1905-1914 the expendi- tures for arms on the part of the four major powers were the following: 32 Russia £495,144,622 France £347,348,259 Germany £448,025,543 Austria £234,668,407 In equipment, likewise, Russia and France were overwhelmingly superior to Germany and Austria-Hungary with the sole exception of heavy batteries. Some readers, while accepting the inevitable proof of these concrete statistics that quantitatively speaking the Austro-German forces were immensely inferior to the land forces of Russia and France combined, may quite likely assert that at least the German army was much THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 57 more thoroughly drilled and much more compe- tent in its manoeuvres than the armies of the Entente. To dispel this mistaken notion we may cite the opinion of Colonel Repington, a dis- tinguished British military expert, who closely observed German manoeuvres in 1911: 33 The writer has not formed a wholly favorable opinion of the German army, which appears to him to be living on a glorious past and to be unequal to the repute in which it is commonly held. There was nothing in the higher leading at the manoeuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes were committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of the command. The infantry lacked dash, displayed no knowledge of the use of ground, entrenched themselves badly, were extremely slow in their move- ments, offered vulnerable targets at medium range, ig- nored the service of security, performed the approach marches in an old-time manner, were not trained to understand the connection between fire and movement, and seemed totally unaware of the effect of modern fire. The cavalry was Tir many ways exceedingly old- fashioned. The artillery, with its out-of-date material and slow and ineffective methods of fire, appeared so in- ferior that it can have no pretension to measure itself against the French in anything approaching level terms, and finally, the dirigibles and aeroplanes pre- sented the fourth arm in a relatively unfavorable light. A nation which after all gives up little more than half its able-bodied sons to the army has become less mili- tarist than formerly. 58 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Some might contend that though this was true in 1911, it was not an accurate description of the state of affairs in 1914. As an actual matter of fact, however, it is well known that the French and Russians made much more progress in mili- tary preparations between 1911 and 1914 than did the Germans. It will be noted that in the above estimates we have left out entirely the large potential army which England was able to raise when war ac- tually came. This should be added to the al- ready overwhelming odds possessed by Russia and France as against Germany and Austria in a land war. In comparing the military prepara- tions of Germany and F ranee it must be remem- bered that the German population was nearly double that of France in 1914, so the fact that the French army was slightly larger than the Ger- man at this time indicates far heavier prepared- ness per capita in France than in Germany. When we turn to naval expenditures we find that here in the ten years before the War the joint expenditures of France and Russia were much greater than those of Germany and Aus- tria, in spite of the fact that we are commonly led to believe that, aside from England, Ger- many was the only European country which con- templated extensive naval preparations. Here, in particular, we have to add to the Franco- Russian appropriations for navies the enormous THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 59 and unparalleled British expenditures during the same period which amounted to more than those of France and Russia combined. The following tables indicate the comparative naval expendi- tures from 1904 to 1914: 34 France £161,721,387 Russia £111,216,513 £305,967,900 Germany £185,205,161 Austria-Hungary . . .£ 50,692,811 £235,897,978 Excess of France and Russia for 10 years £ 70,069,922 During the same period the British naval expenditure was £351,916,576 Many critics will cite the remarkable German successes in the World War as proof that Ger- many was more adequately prepared than any other European state, and that Repington was notoriously wrong in his estimate of the German army. No one realizes better than the writer the fact that the mere counting of noses or the foot- ing up of expenditures does not constitute a final and complete statement of the military fitness or preparations of a modern state. But they do prove that, as far as drafting a nation’s man power and draining a nation’s pecuniary re- sources for war preparations are concerned, the Entente efforts were far in excess of those of 60 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Germany and Austria. What the German suc- cesses proved was that Germany was more effi- cient than the other states in this field of en- deavor and got more for her money. There was not the same amount of graft that there was in France, and, particularly, Russia. The German successes were also in part due to the unexpected ease with which the Belgian forts yielded to modern heavy artillery, and to the strategic value of von Hindenberg’s unique knowledge of the East Prussian area where he dealt the Rus- sians the decisive blow that saved Germany in 1914. A common argument brought up by those who admit the superiority of preparations for war on the part of the Entente as compared to Germany and Austria is that if the German preparations were inferior to those of her enemies, at least she was responsible for the ag- gressive system and military tradition in the western world. One could trace primary re- sponsibility for militarism in one period or an- other back to the ancient Assyrians and earlier. As Fyffe has shown, the modern Prussian mili- tary system was developed following 1806 as a defense against Napoleon. It was kept alive from 1815 to 1866 chiefly through the auto- cratic and reactionary policy of Metternich and his successors who refused to sanction a pacific union of the German states and forced Bismarck THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 61 into the policy of union through “blood and iron.” At the time of the War of 1870 it was the almost universal opinion of historical and military experts that the second French Empire was the chief concrete embodiment of the mili- tary tradition and procedure. 35 It was the French eagerness for war in 1870 which enabled Bismarck to carry out his forceful policy in the way of unifying the German Empire through a victorious war against France in 1870-71. 30 Even if it were to be admitted, though it is ob- viously untrue, that it was German militarism prior to 1910 which forced France and Russia into their extensive preparations, it might be held with equal validity that it was the militarism of Austria, and the Second Empire in France which produced the Prussian military preparations of 1860-71. The practice of military conscription originated in the French Revolution, 37 but the system of extensive armaments cannot be said to be the invention of any single modern power. Specifically, the gre^tbst incentives to the exten- sive military preparations on the part of the European powers before the War were the re- 1 t venge aspirations of France, Germany’s fear ' ^ of being encircled, and, the frequently recur- ring imperialistic crises. Second to these three major motives was the Russian desire for a strong army and navy which would enable her ultimately to control the Near East. 38 62 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Nothing could be more absurd than to hold that it was Germany which forced the system of universal military service upon Europe. As the French writer, Gustave Dupin, has correctly and courageously stated: 38a There are three important facts which we must re- call to ourselves unless we are to lay ourselves open to the charge of not having approached the study of the causes and responsibilities of the last war with adequate candor: (1) It is we French who have contributed to Europe the practice of conscription (Law of the 18 Fructidor, Year VI) ; (2) it is we French who have in- augurated the system of universal and obligatory mili- tary service, without exemptions or exceptions (Law of 27 July, 1872) ; (3) it is we French who have brought into existence the latest development and, in conjunc- tion with our English allies, have imported tens of thousands of colored troops for service in Europe. Those who plead for Germany and her justi- fication of a large army are certainly correct in their contention that the German geographical position was unique in that she was surrounded by powerful enemies who could combine over- whelming odds against her on both land and sea. And, as we shall see later, the events of the sum- mer of 1914 proved that she was correct in con- tending that she was subject to a very real danger of attack by these encircling powers. No one could be more contemptuous of the military THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 63 system than the present writer, but it is difficult to see how any fair-minded student of the situa- tion can deny that Germany possessed better reasons for desiring a large army for protection than any other major European state. There was certainly as much justification for German militarism as for English navalism, for the Germans were as much in jeopardy from land attacks as England was from sea power. But the German militarism never approximated the proportions of British navalism. The Brit- ish desired a navy twice the size of her nearest contender or as large as that of her two nearest rivals. Germany’s army was smaller than that of either France and Russia, though by English naval precedents she would have been justified in maintaining an army as large as that of Russia and France combined. The “encirclement” con- ception was not a myth concocted in Germany, but was recognized by the most reputable of Entente authorities. J. Holland Rose, writing even after the World War had begun, was forced to confess that: We who live behind the rampart of the sea know but little (save in times of panic) of the fear which besets a state which has no natural frontiers. . . . Gei’many accomplished a wonderful work in unifying her people ; but even so she has not escaped from the disadvantages of her situation ; by land she is easily assailable on three sides. 64 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR 7 The distinguished French writer, Marcel Sem- bat, agrees that: The German has grown up under the overshadowing threat of a formidable avalanche suspended over his head ; an avalanche always ready to become detached, to roll down upon him ; an avalanche of immense sav- agery, of barbarous and brutal multitudes threatening to cover his soil, to swallow’ up his civilisation and his society. Sir Thomas Barclajq an ardent exponent of the Anglo-French Entente, frankly admitted that: Wedged in between France and Russia, with England dominating all her issues to the outer world, her fron- tiers open to all the political winds that blow, Germany has a geographical position which forces her statesmen to listen with an anxious ear to any movements, proj- ects, or combinations of her neighbors. In the light of these facts and the great armies of France and Russia the German precautions in the way of military preparedness tend to appear, in a quantitative sense, at least, careless and in- adequate almost to the point of leA T ity . 39 Again, some writers have recently maintained that even though France and Russia precipitated the World War, the situation which enabled them to do so was one which Avas forced upon them by the German military increases proA r ided in the army bill of 1913. The assumption is that THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 65 Germany initiated this policy of great military increases just before the War, and that the other states unwillingly followed her merely in terror- stricken self-defense. As an actual matter of fact no one country was solely responsible for the great increases in military preparations in 1913-14. They grew out of the general feeling of uneasiness and tension generated by the Bal- kan wars and near eastern difficulties. Indeed, the French bill providing for the great increases in the French army was framed before the French knew the terms of the German bill and was in- troduced in the Chamber of Deputies before the comparable German bill was introduced in the Reichstag, though the German bill was actually passed before the French bill. One of the strongest factors in leading the French to the army increases of 1913 was the insistence of Izvolski that the French revive the three year service practice to forward the war plans of Poin- care and himself . 40 The salient facts in regard to the French and German army bills of 1913 have been well sum- marized by Professor Fay in the New Republic for January 6, 1926: We are still too apt to accept the old myths. For instance, an editorial in the New York Times of Decem- ber 14, commenting on Marx’s article (in Foreign Af- fairs for January, 1926), indicated that it was Ger- many’s fault — German sabre-rattling — which changed 66 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the situation for the worse in the two years before the War. It implies that the French army law introduc- ing the three year service “passed by the Chamber of Deputies on July 9, 1913,” was in consequence of, and in reply to, “the fact that in March, 1913, the Bundes- rat approved a bill adopted in the Reichstag on May 1, raising the peace effectives of the German Army from 544,000 men to somewhere between 835,000 and 875,000 men.” In reality the new French Army Law was an- nounced in the Temps of February 17, 1913, discussed by Izvolski in a despatch of February 27, and laid be- fore the Chamber of Deputies on March 10 — eighteen days before the German law was laid before the Reich- stag on March 28. In both countries there were some newspaper guesses concerning new military laws prior to these dates, but it is almost certain that neither was the French military increase caused by the German, nor vice versa. In both countries the increase of arma- ments originated with the increasing suspicion and pol- itical tension growing out of the Balkan crisis. VI. THE GREAT ALLIANCES Unquestionably one of the chief diplomatic causes of the World War was the existence of the great counter-alliances that had come into be- ing between 1878 and 1914. ^ Osten si bly pl anned in the interests of defense and peace, they^_ actually operated to produce suspicion and fear. A forceful exposition of the part played by these alliances in producing the political and psycho- logical background of the War is contained in THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 67 the following citation from the pen of Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt : 41 The causes of the great war have been analyzed from many points of view. The explanation usually offered is the vaulting ambition of this or that great power, Germany being most often selected as the offender. Persons internationally minded insist that rabid na- tionalism was a universal disease and draw vivid pictures of the European anarchy. The pacifist points to t he b loated armame nt&^-and The Socialist can see only the conflict of rival imperialisms. Facts galore can be cited in support of each thesis. Yet no one of these ex- planations is entirely satisfactory, or the lot of them taken together. Why should the different kinds of dynamite explode simultaneously in August, 1914? Why, for instance, should a war break out between Great Britain and Germany at a moment when their disputes were seemingly on the verge of adjustment? There must have been some connecting link which acted as a chain of powder between the various accumulations of explosive material. And so there was ; as one peruses the innumerable memoirs by politicians, soldiers and sailors, from the German Emperor to obscure diplo- matists, or tries to digest the thousands of documents published since 1918 fom the German, Austrian, Ser- bian, Russian, French, Belgian and British archives fthe c onviction grows that it was the s chism of Europe in Triple Alliance and Triple Entente which fused the various quarrels and forces into one giga ntic s truggle for the balance of power; and the war came in 1914 because then, for the first time, the lines were sharply 68 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR drawn between the two rival groups, and neither could yield on the Serbian issue wi pass definitely to the ot her sid It would be misleading and unfair, however, to regard the Triple Alliance and the Triple En- tente as equally vigorous in 1914 and as equally a menace to the peace of Europe. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy had been formed by 1882. It possessed some degree of strength and unity up to 1900, when Italy began negotiations with France that ended in a secret ,agreement in 1902 which meant for practical purposes the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, though after 1910 the Italian Foreign Minister, the Marquis of San Giuliano, made a vain effort to revive Italian ardor. From 1908 onward Austria also became more and more of a liability to Germany by her truculent atti- tude towards Serbia. Several times the Austrian aggressiveness provoked tension between Ber- j lin and Vienna, and in 1914 it was the Austrian initiative which dragged Germany into disaster by allowing Austria to force her into the F ranco- Russian trap. Hence, during the decade before the War, the Triple Alliance had become an empty shell, inadequate even to the requirements of defense. The Triple Entente began with the Franco- Russian Alliance cemented between 1891 and thgut seeing the balance thgu e - J THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 69 1894 under the direction of Freycinet. Bis- marck had negotiated a re-insurance treaty with Russia, but the Kaiser allowed it to lapse. This \ left Russia free to be exploited by France, and Freycinet was quick to seize the opportunity. This loss of Russia was probably the chief diplo- matic blunder of the Kaiser’s regime. England and France drew together after the Fashoda crisis of 1898, and, by the time of the second Morocco crisis, presented a united front against Germany. This Anglo-French Entente was carefully nursed through by Delcasse. In 1907 England and Russia patched up their long- standing dispute over the Near East by dividing Persia between them, and the Triple Entente had come into being. Though both of these great alliances were avowedly purely defensive, they were, as Professors Gooch and Schmitt have in- dicated, in reality a menace to the peace of Europe, for when any major crisis presented litself neither organization could well back down [without losing some prestige. [From 1912 to 1914 France and Russia were' secretly coming into the closest relations in theiE joint plan for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the seizure of the Straits, using the Balkans as the most promising area in which to lay their plans for the crucial diplomatic stroke of provok- ing a European Avar when Russia had become 70 GENESIS or THE WORLD WAR adequately armed and the French people had been lashed into a belligerent attitude by the bribed Paris press . 42 Jj VII. GERMANY AND THE HAGUE CONFERENCES Finally, in this connection, there is the matter of the attitude of Germany at the Hague Con- ferences. Writers with a strong anti-German bias have contended that it was Germany and Germany alone which prevented the Hague Con- ferences from bringing about universal Euro- pean disarmament and compulsory arbitration of all international disputes . 42 In reality noth- ing of the sort was the case. [Germany certainly did not conduct herself during the Hague Con- ferences as an outspoken supporter of either dis- armament or general arbitration, but her conduct in this respect was certainly no worse than that of either France or England. The Germans at the Hague were simply more honest in express- ing their opinions, and, hence, in a diplomatic sense, just that much more foolish and incom- petentj The Russian proposals for disarmament at the first conference were not made in good faith. As Count Witte has confessed, the Russian proposal that the peace strength of the various European armies should not be increased for five years was THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 71 basic to his scheme of a continental alliance of France, Germany and Russia against England. He felt that such an alliance would enable the continental powers to save the money expended for arms to protect themselves against each other and they would thus be able to construct a joint navy capable of contending against that of Great Britain. The first great extension of Russian naval preparations actually came in 1898. There was also a special reason for the Russian pro- posal in 1899, namely, the fact that Russia did not possess resources to match the proposed Aus- trian increase in artillery. Further, the Russian proposal for army limitation made an exception of the Russian colonial troops, thus making the proposal unacceptable to any of the other powers. Instead of Germany alone opposing the Russian plan, all the other members voted against the Russian representative. Great Britain, led by Sir John Fisher, resolutely refused to accept any proposal for naval limitations; and, while the first Hague Conference! was still sitting, the British admiralty requested an additional appro- priation of approximately twenty-five million pounds for the completion of new warships. At the second Hague Conference the matter of dis- armament was not seriously discussed, its in- troduction having been opposed strenuously by both Germany and France . 44 The humanita- rian movement in England forced the English 72 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR leaders to bring up the matter of disarmament, but it was tabled without a vote. As to the relation of Germany to the proposals for arbitration at the Hague Conferences, Ger- many ultimately withdrew her opposition to the proposal of a permanent court of arbitration, though she did oppose making arbitration obli- gatory. At the second Hague Conference Germany had special reason for being opposed to compulsory arbitration as England had refused to abide by the terms of the Anglo-German arbi- tration treaty of 1904. As a literal matter of fact the international prize court, which was the main achievement in the matter of arbitration at the second Hague Conference, was really the product of the cooperative endeavor of Eng- land and Germany. F urther, it must be remem- bered that the proposals for arbitration in the Hague Conferences were not such as involved the compulsory arbitration of the major causes of war. The compulsory clauses were to apply only to legal disputes, and in no sense to politi- cal disputes which usually constitute the causes of war. \ The most that can be said against the Germans at the Hague is that diplomatically ! speaking they were extremely stupid to go on record as opposing the irrelevant arbitration proposals. These meant nothing anyway, but by going on record against them the Germans THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 73 put at the disposal of their enemies material which seemed extremely damaging to their pacific claims when maliciously distorted by Entente propagandists J Hence, it will quickly be seen that the common allegation that Germany’s action at the Hague Conferences was mainly responsible for the per- petuation of the military system in Europe is pure nonsense. Germany was no more opposed to the plan for limiting land armament than was France. England remained unalterably opposed to the proposals for the protection of commerce and the immunity of private property at sea, the absence of which was believed by the United States and other powers to be the chief reason for the existence and expansion of naval armament. In the very year of the second Hague Con- ference England and Russia were parcelling out Persia between them and cementing the Triple Entente. In the two years before 1907 England had, during the first Morocco crisis, aligned her- self with France. In the light of these circum- stances it was scarcely to be expected that Ger- many would show any great enthusiasm for a pro- posal of limitation of armaments which did not carry with it adequate guarantees of safety. The charge of encirclement seemed vindicated as never before in 1907. 45 jin short, the Russian proposals for armament J 74 ) GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR limitation were not made in good faith, but were a piece of selfish and temporizing Russian strat- egy ; the arbitration proposals in no sense covered the basic causes of war; Germany was no more opposed to limitation of land armament than France, though she had far greater need of ex- tensive preparations; England was unalterably opposed to any naval limitation; and Germany took as prominent a part as any major European state in bringing about such achievements in arbi- tration as were secured at the Hague Confer- ences . 46 VIII. PRE-WAR DIPLOMACY TO 1912 1. The Franco-Prussian War All discussions of the diplomatic background of the World War must necessarily begin with reference to the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and its aftermath, as the French desire for re- venge and the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine is ad- mitted by all competent students to have been the most powerful and persistent single force in keeping Europe in a continual state of an- ticipation of, and preparation for war. As Ewart has well said on this point: 4l Not France only,' but all Europe, kept in mind, be- tween 1871 and 1911, with varying intensity, the pros- pect — one might say the assumed certainty — of the re- currence of the Franco-Prussian war. Every change in the European situation raised apprehension of its im- \ THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 75 minence, and the most important of the international occurrences had direct reference to its anticipated ar- rival. If, for example, we were to select from Bis- marck’s foreign policy his principal purpose, it would / be that France should be kept isolated; while, on the other hand, the endeavor of French statesmen (gener- ally speaking) was to secure alliances without which France would be helpless. For forty-three years, Ger- many and France believed that the fate of Alsace- Lorraine would be settled by war (they still think so) and both countries arranged for the struggle as best they could, by alliances, by understandings, and by military preparations. We do not have space here to go into the prob- lem of the responsibility for the Franco-Prussian War, but it should be pointed out here that no informed scholar in any country, not even ex- cepting France, holds to the conventional no- tion that it was forced by the brutal Prussian bullying of a weaker and pacific state. Bismarck unquestionably wanted a glorious foreign war to unite Germany, but the direct responsibility > for the outbreak of the war is universally agreed to rest upon the French Foreign Minister, the Duke of Gramont, who played into Bismarck’s hands by insulting the Prussian King and pre- senting an impossible ultimatum to the Prussian government. 48 France had invited war even be- fore Bismarck published the condensed “Ems telegram.” Again, in 1870 France was a much 76 GENESIS OF THE WOULD WAR larger, supposedly more powerful, and more militaristic state than Prussia and the French leaders expected an easy victory. The public opinion of both Great Britain and the United States was overwhelmingly on the side of Prus- sia, and believed the Prussian victory was a salutary rebuke to military autocracy and aggres- sion. 40 2. Alsace-Lorraine The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Ger- many after the war has proved disastrous to both Germany and Europe, but it was only the natural outcome of events. Nations, particu- larly victorious nations, have never yet guided their conduct on the basis of the ultimate good of mankind, and certainly the terms of the peace of 1871 were most magnanimous to France as compared to the terms imposed by France upon Germany in 1919. The greater part of Alsace and Lorraine had originally been German ter- ritory, wrested from her by force by Louis XIV. Neutral opinion at the time agreed that Ger- many would be foolish not to take advantage of the situation to rectify her frontiers and protect herself against the further aggression of France, though many European statesmen recognized the danger to the future peace of Europe inherent THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 77 in the probable undying ambition of the French for revenge. 50 They were right; the Alsace- Lorraine problem blocked every move for suc- cessful rapprochement between France and Germany after 1870. Not even men like Cail- laux were able to overcome the French lust for retaliation. It became a veritable obsession with Deroulede and his followers after 1871, and later with men like Foch and Poincare who came into control of French policy after 1912. Foch con- fesses that: 51 From the age of 17, I dreamed of revenge, after hav- ing seen the Germans at Metz. And when a man of ordinary capacity concentrates all of his faculties and all of his abilities upon one end, and works without diverging, he ought to be successful. Poincare himself stated in an address to univer- sity students : 52 When I descended from my metaphysical clouds I could discover no other reason why my generation should go on living except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces. Of all the underlying political and diplomatic causes of the World War the French hope of avenging 1870 must be held to be, beyond all comparison, the most important. Next to it came the Russian ambition for the Straits. 78 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 3. The Near East The other main root of the War lay in the near eastern problem. From the time of Cather- ine the Great, Russia had entertained an ambi- tion to control Constantinople and the Straits in order to have a warm water port and an unrestricted naval outlet on the Mediterranean. After the conquest of India the interest of Eng- land in the Near East enormously increased, as the country which was ascendant in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia was a potential menace >to British India. This British sensitiveness to near eastern developments was still further intensified by the British occupation of Egypt following the ’70’s. Russia and England became tradi- tional enemies over the near eastern issue, fight- ing the Crimean War over this and nearly com- ing into armed conflict again in 1878. At the very close of the nineteenth century Germany became a factor in the Near East with the suc- cessful inauguration of her plan to build a railway to the Persian Gulf and exploit Mesopotamia." 3 This alarmed Great Britain, paralleling as it did the German commercial rivalry and the begin- nings of the German navy; and, when Holstein persuaded Bfilow to reject the British proposals for an adequate understanding with Germany, 54 Great Britain suppressed her ancient hatred for Russia and came to a temporary agreement over THE BACKGROUND OE THE WAR 79 the Near East in the partition of Persia in 1907. 55 Germany in the meantime continued her work on the Bagdad railroad and became the most influential of the great powers at Constanti- nople. 50 This greatly excited Izvolski, Sazonov and 1 other Russian expansionists, who entertained an ardent hope of ultimately securing control of the Straits. Poincare and the French mili- tarists were able to exploit this Russian fear in return for Russian sympathy with the cause of the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. After 1909, Austria had little or no economic or imperialistic interest in the Near East. Her program only involved preserving order among the diverse nationalities inhabiting her polyglot empire, thus maintaining the political integrity of the Dual Monarchy. This included the repression of the Jugo-Slav nationalistic movement in so far as it threatened the existence of Austria-Hungary. Germany supported her in the moderate phases of this policy, for Austria-Hungary was essential to Germany as her only strong ally and as a link in the territory keeping open the Bagdad rail- road. The Austrian antipathy to the Jugo- slavs gave Russia an ever present excuse for alertness in the Balkans as the assumed protector of the lesser Slavic peoples, though she never hesitated to betray them (as in 1908) when her interests dictated such action. Russia was active 80 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR in forming the Balkan League in 1912. In November, 1912, Poincare gave Russia a free hand in the Balkans, promising aid in the event of war. After 1912 Russia initiated a system- atic program of bribing leading Serbian states- men and plotters to keep alive the intrigues against Austria. 01 These facts prove the essen- tial hypocrisy and impropriety in the Russian pretense of righteous indignation at the Austrian attitude towards Serbia, and a lack of a sound ^basis for the Russian intervention in behalf of Serbia in 1914. 4. Mot 'OCCO Added to Alsace-Lorraine and the Near East as major factors in the diplomatic background of the War was the Morocco question. Entente propagandists have represented this as a situa- tion where, in 1905 and 1911, the Kaiser brought Europe to the verge of war through wanton and illegal bullying of France J In reality Billow merely insisted in 1905 that France could not proceed with the disposition of northern Africa without submitting the question to an international conference. 58 Ewart has effec- tively disposed of the allegation of Thayer and Bishop that President Roosevelt forced the Kaiser to accept the Algeciras settlement, as well as of Count Witte’s palpable fabrication THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 81 that it was he who persuaded the Kaiser to ac- cept this solution. 59 Even Poincare has ad- mitted that it was Germany who forced France to accept the submission of the problem to the concert of Europe. In 1911 Germany inter- vened to get compensation for French advances into Africa and to weaken Anglo-French rela- tions. Erudite German writers, such as Mont- gelas, do not attempt to defend all the details of German diplomacy in the Morocco crises, but we may admit with Ewart that, in the major issues involved, both moral and legal right were very distinctly on the side of Germany : 00 Germany was within her rights in insisting in 1905 upon a reference of her dispute with France concerning Morocco to an international conference. President Roosevelt was of that opinion. He warmly congratu- lated the Kaiser on his success in that regard. And the result of the proceedings of the conference — the act of Algeciras — was to a large extent a declaration in favor of the German contention for international equality in Morocco, and a denial of the claim of France and Spain to exclusive domination. French and Spanish military operations in 1911 were subversive of the chief principle of the act of Algeciras, namely, “the sovereignty and independence of his majesty, the sultan.” France so regarded the Spanish actions, and Spain so regarded the French. Germany, as a party to the act, was within her rights in objecting to these proceedings. 82 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR In some ways Great Britain emerges with the least credit from the Morocco crises. In 1905 , without consulting Germany, she made a secret treaty with France, giving the latter a free hand in Morocco, and she exhibited, particularly in 1911 , an unwarranted and gratuitous bellicosity towards Germany which did much to alarm the latter and increase the European tension . 61 Much has been made by some writers of the alleged national insult to France in a specific German demand for the resignation of the anti- German minister Delcasse in 1905 . As a matter of fact, Germany never officially made any such demand. Delcasse’s colleagues in the French ministry refused to support his belligerent policy and he had to resign . 62 In his recent defense of himself in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925 , Poincare makes a dramatic reference to France’s signing the treaty of November 4 , 1911 , concern- ing Morocco, “under the very cannon of the Panther It so happens that the Panther was an insignificant little German gunboat carrying a crew of 125 men — about as much of a ship of war as the Kaiser’s private yacht. Poincare apparently fails to see that it is chiefly a reflec- tion upon French policy if France had to be kept up to her treaty obligations concerning Morocco by even a symbolic show of German naval power. The Morocco crisis of 1911 markedly increased the European tension. The French jingo press THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 83 capitalized the alleged French “defeat” and used it to discredit Caillaux and the friends of peace in France. Germany was alarmed by the atti- tude of England and regarded encirclement by the Entente as now complete . 63 IX. GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1908-1914 The years from 1908 to 1914 were ominous ones for the future of Europe . 64 We have al- ready mentioned the second Morocco crisis and the tension in the Near East caused by the Berlin- Bagdad railroad. In 1908 Izvolski, then Rus- sian Foreign Minister, secretly proposed to Count Aehrenthal, the Austrian Foreign Minis- ter ( thus treacherously repudiating Russia’s role as protector of Slavic peoples), that Austria an- nex the two Serb provinces of Bosnia and Herze- govina, in return for which Austria was to sup- port the Russians in securing from Turkey the freedom of the Straits. Austria forthwith an- nexed these provinces, thus enraging the Ser- bians, while Great Britain blocked the Russian plan in regard to the Straits, to the exasperation and humiliation of Izvolski . 65 The latter, after some more fruitless negotiation, decided that Russia could gain her objective only by a gen- eral European war, and he set to work to bring into being those forces and circumstances which actually precipitated the World War in the sum- mer of 1914. He secured the appointment as 84 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Russian Ambassador to France, and was soon in collaboration with the French Revanchards led by Delcasse, Poincare, Jonnart and the military clique. 06 His two intimates in diplomatic collusion were Poincare and Delcasse. The former was born in Lorraine, and his one life-long obsession, like that of Foch, was the recovery of Alsace- Lorraine from Germany. 67 ^Poincare and Izvol- ski decided that their joint program — the Rus- sian seizure of the Straits and the French re- covery of Alsace-Lorraine — could be realized only by war, and they came to the conclusion that the Balkans were the most favorable area in which to foment or seize upon a crisis suitable for provoking the desired conflict. Poincare gave Russia a free hand in the Balkans, provided he have general supervisory control to see that France should not be involved in a way which would not advance the recovery of Alsace- Lorraine, and Izvolski obtained large sums of money from Russia to bribe the French press to print such news, articles and editorials as would convince the French people that they possessed a grave concern and vital interest in Balkan prob- lems. This money was distributed to the French papers under the direction of Poincare, Tardieu, Berthelot and others. Izvolski also gave finan- cial aid to the campaign of Poincare for the French presidency in 1912. 6S THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 85 The Balkan Wars of 1912-18 created great uneasiness throughout Europe, and were the chief factor in promoting the great military and naval increases of 1913 - 14 . There was a war scare throughout Europe. The anti- Austrian feeling in Serbia grew. Austria was twice pre- vented from attacking Serbia only by German opposition. Poincare expressed great disap- pointment about the relative lack of Russian con- cern over this fact. But the Russians were not asleep. On December 8 , 1913 , Sazonov in- formed the Tsar that the Russian ambitions in regard to the Straits could only be realized by a European war. In February, 1914 , the Rus- sians held a Crown Council in which they debated the wisdom of suddenly pouncing upon Constan- tinople and risking the consequences. They con- cluded that it would be best to await the out- break of a world war which they believed imminent. In the late spring of 1914 Great Britain and Russia initiated an arrangement as to joint naval action, and the Russians proudly boasted that they were ready for war . 69 The setting was, thus, ideal for the precipita- tion of a general European conflagration, and it was in this atmosphere that the Serbian fanatics laid the plot for the assassination of the Arch- duke Franz Ferdinand, which was executed on June 28 , 1914 . The only ray of hope on the horizon was the successful Anglo-German nego- 86 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR tiations over the Bagdad railroad, which were concluded in June, 1914, and brought better re- lations between these two states than had pre- viously existed since 1895. 71 But before this, could bear any fruit, Grey had allowed Britain to be drawn into the conflict to pull the Franco- Russian chestnuts out of the fire. 72 Ewart presents the following admirable sum- mary of the nature and outcome of the system of European international relations from 1870- 1914: 73 Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of the maze of military combinations and counter-combinations which had per- plexed European diplomats for over forty years. Dur- ing the latest ten, reasons for anxiety had rapidly ac- cumulated ; the combinations had hardened ; the work of the diplomats had become more difficult, more com- plicated, more continuous, more urgent; the general staffs of the allied nations, in conference with each other, had diligently elaborated their plans of cam- paign; every year had witnessed an increased expendi- ture upon Avar preparations, of many millions of money ; almost every year had witnessed a narrow avoidance of hostilities ; no effort had been made, by removal of fundamental disagreements, to escape from the ever- quickening rapids which were certain to tumble into maelstrom ; indeed, well-informed statesmen knew that many of the international rivalries could not be peace- ably adjusted; all were well aware that some incident might at any moment produce general war. THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 87 Before we pass on to the assassination of Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, we must, however, devote a separate chapter to the details of the collusion between Izvolski and Poincare, as this is by all odds the most important phase of the genesis of the World War. X. CONCLUSIONS (1) The whole question of the responsibility for the World War and the antecedent diplo- macy must be reexamined in the light of the new documentary evidence which has recently been made available by the publication of the material in the Foreign Offices of Austria, Germany and Russia. (2) It is generally assumed that Germany not only deliberately provoked the World War in 1914, but was also responsible for the system of arrogant nationalism, imperialism, armament and secret diplomacy that predisposed Europe to war in the generation prior to 1:914. (8) The chief factors which inclined Europe towards war from 1870 to 1914 were economic rivalry, nationalism and patriotism, extensive armaments on land and water, and secret alli- ances. ( 4 ) Germany was inseparably involved in this system of European relations, but was certainly no worse in any respect than the others. Eco- 88 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR nomic rivalry was chiefly Anglo-German, was in- evitable, and in no way involved direct war- guilt. German patriotism was no more highly developed or obtrusive than that of France or Italy. Germany w as far inferio r to France and Russia in regard to land armament, and equally inferior to England in naval preparations. The German navy was never any real menace to Great Britain’s naval supremacy, and, more than a year before the War broke out, the two coun- tries had arrived at a satisfactory arrangement as to future building plans. Germany did not in- itiate the system of compulsory universal mili- tary service, actually introduced by France in 1872. Nor was she responsible for the French Army Bill of 1913. (5) The chief roots of the War in diplomatic tension were Alsace-Lorraine and the French re- venge aspirations, the Near East, and Morocco. (6) The Franco-Prussian War was desired by both France and Prussia. France desired it to holster up the fortunes of the Bonapartist dynasty, and Bismarck wished it to forward the cause of German unity.- The opinion of the neutral world was heavily on the side of Prussia. The War left a fatal desire for revenge on the part of France, which remained to 1914 the main obstacle to European unity and the chief menace to the continuance of peace. (7) German progress in the Near East THE BACKGEOUND OF THE WAR 80 alarmed England and Russia, and led them to bury their ancient rivalries and form a combina- tion against Germany. Germany and England, however, arrived at a satisfactory diplomatic settlement of their near eastern problems in J une, 1914, but it was too late to keep England from joining France and Russia in the World War. Russia realized that she could oust Germany from her control of Turkey only by a general European war in which Germany would be de- feated. (8) In the Morocco crises Germany was in the right legally and morally, but sadly bungled matters in diplomatic procedure. The chief dis- astrous result was that the German diplomacy aided the French militarists and chauvinists in driving Caillaux and the pacific French group from office and led to the substitution of the ag- gressive anti- German and revenge clique headed by Poincare, Delcasse, Millerand, Jonnart, Pale- ologue and the Cambons. (9) In the Hague Conferences Germany was no more opposed to the vital proposals as to dis- armament than France or England. She took as active a part as any country in bringing about the constructive achievements of the Confer- ences, but by foolishly going on record against the irrelevant arbitration proposals she put at the disposal of her enemies a powerful instrument in propaganda. 90 GENESIS OF THE WORLD W A R (10) The years from 1908 to 1914 were threatening ones for the peace of Europe. Iz- volski was blocked in his plan to secure the Straits by diplomatic means, and was convinced that a European war must be provoked. In 1912 he was joined in this program by Raymond Poin- care as Prime Minister of France. Sazonov was converted to the scheme at the end of 1913, and before June, 1914, it was practically assured that Great Britain would enter any war on the side of France and Russia against Germany. An inci- dent was awaited in the Balkans which would serve as an adequate excuse for war. Meanwhile Franco-Russian military preparations pro- ceeded, and the French republic was prepared for war over the Balkans by a press bribed with Rus- sian gold. SELECTED REFERENCES Bailsman, F., Let France Explain ; Durham, E., Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle; Earle, E. M., Tur- key, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway ; Enock, A. G., The Problem of Armaments; Ewart, J. S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1911^—1918; Fabre-Luce, A., La Victoire; Fisk, G. M., and Pierce, P. S., International Commercial Policies; Gooch, G. P., Modern Europe, 1878-1920 ; Herbert, S., Nationality and. Its Problems; Hobson, J. A., Imperialism; Hull, W. I., The Two Hague Conferences; Montgelas, M., The Case for the Central Powers; Morel, E. D., Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy ; The Secret History of a THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 91 Great Betrayal; Playne, C. E., The Neuroses of the Nations; Rose, J. PI., Nationality in Modern History; Schmitt, B. E., England and Germany, 17J/.0-191J/.; “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,” in American His- torical Review, April, 1921; Stieve, F., Isvolshy and the World War; Toynbee, A. J., Nationality and the War; Woolf, L., Economic Imperialism, . FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 A. Pevet, Les Responsables de la guerre, p. 518; V. Mar- gueritte, Les Criminels , pp. 347ff. 2 See K. Kautskv, Wie der Weltkrieg entstand. 3 The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary , 1879-1914 . The American edition was supervised by Profesor A. C. Coolidge and published by the Harvard University Press, 1920. It should be pointed out that Pribram’s work is not yet finished. He is wait- ing for the complete publication of the German documents in the Grosse Politik. * Diplomatische Aktenstiicke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1914, three volumes, Vienna, 1919. These are now available in English translation by Allen and Unwin. 5 Die Grosse Politik der Europdischen Kabinette, 1 87 1-191 4 . Berlin, 1923. An indispensable guide to this collection is pro- vided in the Wegweiser of Dr. Bernhard Schwertfeger. 6 Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch, four vol- umes, Charlottenburg, 1919. They are now available in English translation by the Oxford University Prpss. 7 Official German Documents Relating to the World War. Car- negie Endowment for International l^eace. Two volumes, New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. s Edited by George Schreiner as Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909-1914. New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1922. It is asserted in some quarters that Siebert has held out the docu- ments most incriminating to the Entente. It is as yet impossible to prove or disprove this allegation. 9 Un Livre Noir: Diplomatic d’Avant-Guerre d’aprts les Documents Russes, Novembre, 1910, Juillet, 1914. Two volumes, Paris, 1922-23. Der Diplomatische Schriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911-1914. Five volumes, Berlin, 1924. A brief collection of these Russian documents was published in Paris as early as 1919 under the editorship of Emile Laloy. It is important as con- 92 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR taining the secret Russian conference in February, 1914, on the desirability of seizing the Straits. 10 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book. New York: Huebsch, 1923. 11 L’Intervento dell’ Italia nei Documenti Segreti dell’ Intensa. Rome, 1923. 12 Belgische Aktenstiicke 1905-1914 ■ Berlin, 1915. Zur Eu- ropdischen Politik. 1886-1893, 1897-1914. Five volumes, Berlin, 1919-22. These collections are edited by B. H. Schwertfeger. Some of them (1905-14) have appeared in English translation. is These treaties were courageously printed by Mr. Villard in the New York Evening Post early in 1918 as a result of their revelation by the Bolsheviki. They are printed in F. S. Cocks, The Secret Treaties. They are analyzed by R. S. Baker in his work, Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement. Air. Baker defends the truly astonishing assertion that Mr. Wilson left for the Peace Conference nearly a year later with no knowledge of their nature or contents. ii The best summary of this literature is contained in G. P. Gooch's “Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy,” Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs , January, 1923. See also below Appendix I. is H. Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, esp. Chap, vi; see the slashing critique of this legend by S. B. Fay in the Krieg sschuldf rag e , May, 1925, pp. 309 ff. is See the editorials in the New York Times for May 4, 1924, May 3, 1925, and September 15, 1925; and the review of the book by the Crown Prince, Ich Suche die Wahrheit, by Simeon Strun- sky, Ibid., August 30, 1925. ii B. E. Schmitt, England and Germany, 1740-1914 1 T. Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution: W. H. Daw- son, The German Empire; The Evolution of Modern Germany; Industrial Germany; E. D. Howard, The Causes and Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany ; J. S. Ewart, The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918, Chaps, v, xix-xxi, xxv; A. Hurd and H. Castle, German Sea Power; E. Protheroe, The British Navy; Viscount Haldane, Before the War; A. von Tirpitz, My Memoirs; W. S. Churchill, The World Crisis. is Ewart, op. cit., Chap. v. 19 E. M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, Ewart, op. cit., Chap. xxi. 20 Ewart, op cit., p. 876. 21 J. K. Turner, Shall It Be Again?; C. E. Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment towards Germany, Chap. iv. 22 P, Ashley, Modern Tariff History; W. S. Culbertson, In- THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 93 ternational Economic Policies; Fisk and Pierce, International Commercial Policies; V. Wittchewsky, Busslands Handels-Zoll- und-Industrie Politik; A. Zimmennann, Handelspolitik des deutschen Reiches. 23 C. J. H. Hayes, “The War of the Nations,” in Political Science Quarterly, December, 1914; H. A. L. Fisher, Studies in History and Politics, pp. 146-61 (on French nationalism); C. E. Playne, The Neuroses of the Nations; M. Wertheimer, The Pan- German League; A. D. Fischel, Der Pan-slawismus bis zum Weltkrieg ; A. Mayer, Der Italiemsche Irredentismus. 2 ± R. G. Usher, Pan-Germanism; A. Cheradame, The Pan- German Plot Unmasked; E. E. Sperry, The Tentacles of the German Octopus in America; C. Andler, Le Pangermanisme. 25 M. S. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, 1800-191 f. 2 G See the outline and references in E. Krehbiel, Nationalism, War and Society, pp. 16-25. 27 J. H. Rose, Nationality in Modern History ; R. Muir, Nationalism and Internationalism. zs Ewart, op. eit., pp. 477-78. 29 C. D. Hazen, Fifty Years of Europe; W. S. Davis, The Roots of the War. so M. Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, pp. 25, 27, 104 ff., 235; Ewart, op. cit.. Chap, xvii; Moon, Syllabus on Inter- national Relations, p. 75. si General Buat, L’Armie allemande pendant la guerre de 1914-18, pp. 7-9. 32 Bausman, Let France Explain, p. 165; Ewart, op. cit., p. 508. 33 Cited by Bausman, op. cit., p. 168. 34 Ewart, op. cit., p. 512. 35 Ibid., Chap, xviii, esp. pp. 662 ff.; C. E. Schieber, op. cit., Chap i.; D. N. Raymond, Contemporary British Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War. as Ewart, op. cit., Chap, xviii; R. H. Ford, The Origins of the War of 1870; and Richard Fester, works cited by Lord, op. cit., p. 286; B. E. Palat (Lehautcourt), Les Origines de la guerre de 1870; J. H. Rose, The Development of the European Nations. 37 F. M. Cutler, “Military Conscription,” in Historical Outlook, May, 1923, and references appended. 38 Ewart, op. cit., Chaps, xvi-xvii; Moon, Syllabus on Interna- tional Relations, Part IV. 38a G. Dupin, Conference sur les responsabilites de la guerre. p. 17. 39 Ewart, op. cit., pp. 494-7, 500-504, 716-17. 40 Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War, pp. 167ff. « B. E.. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,” in American Historical Review, April, 1924, pp. 449-50. 42 Schmitt, loc. cit., passim; Stieve, op. cit.; Gooch, op. cit.; 94 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR H. friedjung Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus ; E. Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege; F. Rachfahl, Deutschland und die Weltpolitik; A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria- Hungary, 1879-1914. «E.g. C. D. Hazen, Europe since 1815, pp. 639-40; E. R. Turner, Europe since 1870, p. 427. Even Gooch repeats the tra- ditional view in more moderate fashion. 44 For a brief demolition of the Entente propaganda concern- ing the Hague Conferences see Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, pp. 23-30. 45 Cf. Brandenburg, op. cit. 46 A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, Cambridge History of Brit- ish Foreign Policy, Yol. Ill, pp. 258 ff., 349 ff. 47 Ewart, op. cit., pp. 671-2. 4 » Lord, Palat and Fester as cited. 49 Miss Schieber and Mrs. Raymond, as cited. so Ewart, op. cit., pp. 666 ff. 51 Ibid., p. 671. 52 M. Morhardt, Les Preuves. Le crime de droit commun. Le crime diplomatique, p. 135; also cited by Langer, New Republic , October 15, 1924, p. 179. 53 Schmitt, op. cit., Earle, op. cit.; Ewart, op. cit., Chap. xxi. 54 J. Haller, Die Ara Billow; E. Fischer, Holsteins grosses “Nein.” 55 Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Yol. Ill, pp. 356 ff. ; H. A. Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, Chap. v. 56 Earle, op. cit., Chaps, iii-iv. 57 Friedjung, op. cit.; M. Bogitslievich, The Causes of the War; Stieve, op. cit.; E. Durham, The Serajevo Crime ; Ewart, Chap, xxiii. 58 Ewart, Chap, xxii; E. D. Morel, Ten Years of Secret Diplo- macy; Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, Yol. Ill, pp. 338 ff. 5b Ewart, op. cit., pp. 800 ff. 60 Ibid., p. 877; cf. Lord Loreburn, How the War Came, pp. 86-111; Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 41 ff.; J. Caillaux, Agadir, ma politique exterieure. P. Albin, La Querelle franco-allemandc: le coup de Agadir. ei Ewart, op. cit., 776 ff., 846 ff.; Morel, op. cit.; Loreburn, op. cit. ea Ewart, op. cit., pp. 781-2. On Delcasse and the Morocco crises see Gooch, in the Contemporary Review, April, 1923; and Ewart, op. cit., pp. 769 ff., 836 ff. ca Perhaps the best summary and estimate is contained in Gooch, op. cit., Chap. xiv. si Montgelas, op. cit., Part II. es Friedjung and Stieve, as cited. THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 95 66 Stieve, op. cit. ; F. Gouttenoire de Toury, Jaures et le parti de la guerre. 67 Ibid.; and Morhardt, op. cit. 68 Stieve, op. cit.; and Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal. 69 Stieve, op. cit.; and Gooch, op. cit., Chap. xv. 70 See the articles by Professor Fay in the New York Times Current History Magazine, October and November, 1925; and E. Durham, The Serajevo Crime. 71 Earle, op. cit., pp. 258 ff. 72 Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal. 73 Ewart, op. cit, p. 1001. CHAPTER III THE FRAN CO-RUSSIAN PLOT THAT PRODUCED THE IT A R I. “TITO HEADS ARE BETTER THAN one” In a remarkable article in the New York Times Current History Magazine for November, 1923, Professor Sidney B. Fay describes the plan to assassinate the Archduke in Bosnia as “The Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War.” While agreeing entirely with Professor Fay in his interpretation of the Serbian responsibility for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the present writer believes that behind the local plot to assassinate a member of the Austrian royal family there was a much larger and more far- reaching plot, without which the murder of June 28, 1914, could never have brought about the ,< World War. This was the plot carefully laid j II and elaborated by Alexander Petrovitch Izvol-J I ■ ski and Raymond Poincare between 1912 ancF 1914. on the basis of Izvolski’s previous schemes' and machinations. We have already pointed out how Izvolski in 1908 treacherously betrayed the Serbians by sug- gesting that Austria annex Bosnia and Herze- 96 FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 97 govina in return for Austrian support of the Russian seizure of the Straits. We indicated that Izvolski was blocked in this plan by the evasive opposition of England to the Russian control of the Straits. Foiled in this first plan to secure the chief object of his Politik , Izvolski turned to the scheme he brought to success in the summer of 1914 , namely, using the Balkan situ- I ation as the basis for European complications ‘ which would secure the Straits for Russia. He made a speech to the Russian Duma urging the federation of the Balkan states, and immediately put himself behind the Greater Serbia move- ment . 1 In December, 1909 , he proposed a secret military treaty with Bulgaria, the fifth article of which declared that : 2 The realization of the high ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan peninsula, which are so close to Russia’s heart, is only possible after a fortunate issue of the struggle of Russia with Germany and Austria-Hungary. On September 28 , 1910 , Izvolski resigned as Russian Foreign Minister and became the Rus- sian Ambassador to Paris. Many have regarded this as a sign of his displacement as the leader of Russian foreign policy. Lord Grey holds that this fact in itself proves that Izvolski is not to be held primarily responsible for Russian foreign policy after 1910 . We know that this view is wholly incorrect. Izvolski was not de- 98 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR moted or reduced in rank. As Count Muraviev, the distinguished Russian diplomat explained, Izvolski voluntarily resigned and chose the Paris portfolio because he felt that he could work better in Paris than in St. Petersburg. “To bring the healing crisis, to direct European politics to a breach, can be more effectively achieved in Paris than in St. Petersburg.” 3 There was another and special reason why Izvolski could do better work in Paris than St. Petersburg after 1909, namely, that his bungling of the Bosnian matter/ y had made things rather hot for him in certainj circles at the Russian capital. During the re- mainder of 1910 and 1911 Izvolski was not able to accomplish much of significance in strengthen- ing and Balkanizing the Franco-Russian Alli- ance, as Caillaux and the more pacific French group were still in control. But they were weakened through the reaction of the second Morocco crisis upon French politics, and were soon to be replaced by Poincare and the military clique . 4 On January 14, 1912, a revolutionary change took place. There came to the premiership M. Raymond Poincare, one of the ablest French- men since Jules Ferry, and the man who has con- fessed that he could see no reason for existing unless Alsace-Lorraine could be recovered, knowing well that it could not be restored ex- cept by force. Russian and French foreign pol- RRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 99 icy had now come under the control of two men who espoused programs which obviously could only be realized as the result of a military victory over Germany and Austria-Hungary. Izvolski immediately noted the change in the reception of his policy, and reported that he felt like a new man after Poincare’s accession to the office of Prime Minister . 5 In his apology in Foreign Affairs Poincare represents himself as having disapproved of Izvolski and his policy, and in- vites his readers to consult Professor Stieve’s elaborate edition of Izvolski’s correspondence to discover this fact. It happens that Professor W. L. Langer, an expert on contemporary diplo- matic history, and bibliographic editor of the very journal in which Poincare writes, has care- fully examined this same collection, and tells us in the following words of the close collaboration of Poincare and Izvolski in preparing Russia, France and the Balkans for the oncoming con- flict: 6 But the gods were with Izvolski and against hu- manity. Everything changed as in a dream when, in 1912, Poincare succeeded to the premiership. It was a disastrous event, for Poincare, convinced of the in- evitability of war with Germany, agreed entirely with Izvolski that the entente must be strengthened and that the central powers must be shown that the days of their dictation were over. After the first conversations with the new premier Izvolski felt like a new man. Life was 100 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR once more worth living. . . . Both Poincare and Izvol- ski were determined to succeed, and the chronicle of the two years preceding the war is the story of their victory over all opposition. They were not particular as to means, nor considerate of persons. Every opportunity was seized to revivify the entente and develop it, and the utmost care was taken to replace the European concert by two opposing coalitions. The story is a long one and not very edifying. Poincare seems to have disliked Izvolski personalty, and both appear to have distrusted each other. But in political matters they made an ideal team. There was no divergence in their views. And so they were able to cooperate, supporting and assisting each other in the attainment of the “great solution.” Together they in- trigued against the pacific French ambassador of St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, and Russian funds were put at the disposal of Poincare and Klotz to enable them to silence the opposition and even to bring about Poin- care’s election as president. And xvhere they could not cooperate, they supplemented each other. It was Poin- care’s opposition that wrecked the agreement between England and Germany and it was Poincare who effected the naval arrangement between England and Russia in 1911, after Izvolski had brought about the Russian- French naval pact in 1912. The same impression of Poincare’s enthusi- astic cooperation with Izvolski was also carried away by the distinguished Russian scholar, Baron Serge Korff, from his careful reading of the Livre Noir : 7 FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 101 We find new light thrown upon the pre-war attitude of Trance, strangely but constantly connected with one bif name — Poincare. Pichon, Barthou and many other faniliar names are frequently mentioned, but none s«ems to have played any such prominent role in the bidding up and strengthening of the l’ranco-Russian .vlliance as Poincare; and besides, with a very evident »bject — steady preparation for the coming conflict with Germany. The reader will put aside this volume with the inevitable conviction that Poincare long before 1914 had one idea on his mind, the war with Genua. y . . . These documents give a most vivid picture or French pressure exerted on Russia with that one object in view, a war with Germany. At times the Russians were even losing patience with the French, so little did the latter mind the Russian interests ; they were willing to lend the Russians money, but only on condition that Russia would increase her army and build new strategic, but otherwise quite useless, railways. Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt, one of our most judicious students of contemporary Euro- pean diplomacy, would even assign to Poincare the dominant part in the strengthening of Franco-Russian relations between 1912 and 1914. He writes on this subject: 8 The credit belongs in the first instance to M. Ray- mond Poincare, who became Premier of France in January, 1912. Under his masterly care, Franco- Russian relations, which had become somewhat tenuous, while one ally was absorbed in Morocco and the other 102 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR in Persia and the Far East, were soon exhibitirg the closest harmony. In the liquidation of the Tripditan war and throughout the Balkan wars, Paris ana St. Petersburg devised and applied a common polcv, carrying London with them if possible. M. Pon- care repeatedly assured Izvolsky, now Ambassador to France, that the republic would fulfill all the obligation, of the alliance; Izvolsky took the Paris press into pa] to create, a sentiment for Russia and to strengthen the poM'ion of, the Premier whom he recognized as most useful to Russia. The French statesman urged the Czar t«J proceed with tin ' r < tion of strategic rail- wa rS in Poland and sent Delcasse as his representative pC the Russian court; the Russian Ambassador, at least according to some persons, demanded that France re- vive the three years’ military service. The French and Russian General Staffs, in annual conferences, perfected their plans for war, which were based on a joint offen- sive against Germany. A naval convention was con- cluded. Finally, M. Poincare went to Russia, and M. Sazonov, the Foreign Minister, expressed to the Czar his hope that “in the event of a crisis in international re- lations there would be at the helm in France if not M. Poincare, at least a personality of the same great power of decision and as free from the fear of taking responsibility.” The elevation of M. Poincare to the Presidency of the republic in no way interrupted the newly developed intimacy. Indeed, from 1912 to the outbreak of the war, the Dual Alliance presented a solid front at every turn to the rival diplomatic group. It is probably impossible to over-emphasize the importance of this miion of Poincare and Izvol- FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 103 ski for the future of Franco-Russian and Euro- pean international relations. (While the Franco- Russian military Alliance had possessed impres- sive strength on paper from 1893 onward, it had little real power until 1912. It had no real “punch” in European diplomacy until Poincare and Izvolski were able to bring into a joint pro- gram the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the seizure of the Straits, and were also successful in giving this ambition a definite practical bent and feasible area for probable realization through the “Balkanizing” of the Alliance. Up to 1912 the Russians were irritated at the French conciliation of Great Britain, who blocked Russian ambitions regarding the Straits, and the French were un- willing to risk alienating England by openly backing Russia in her near eastern program. Several times between 1893 and 1912 Russia was on as good terms with Germany as with France. Izvolski and Poincare first turned the trick and made the Franco-Russian program the dynamic and pivotal element in European affairs from II. FRANCO-RUSSIAN MILITARY AND NAVAL UNDERSTANDINGS The Franco-Russian military arrangements had been perfected by 1893, and Poincare and Izvolski now turned their attention to the con- 104 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR elusion of a naval convention which was formu- lated on July 16, 1912, in the following terms: 9 Article 1. The naval forces of France and Russia operate jointly in all eventualities in which the Alliance foresees and provides for the co-operation of the land forces. Article 2. Provision is made in time of peace for the joint operation of the naval forces. To this end the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs are henceforth empowered to correspond direct with one another, to exchange all news, to study all possibilities of warfare, and to agree together on all strategic plans. Article 3. The Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs confer personally together at least once a year ; they draw up minutes of their conferences. Article 4. This convention is to be identical with the military convention of August 17, 1892, and the treaties arising out of it, in regard to its duration, elaboration', and secrecy. Paris, July 16, 1912. On August 5, 1912, Poincare left for Russia for a conference with Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister. The terms of the naval con- vention of July' 16th were confirmed at once. Poincare urged upon Sazonov the immediate con- struction of better railroad facilities to transport Russian troops to the German frontier: — 10 M. Poincare also spoke of the protocol of the last sitting of the Chiefs of General Staffs, and said that he attached great importance to the realization of the de- FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 105 sire expressed therein by the French General Staff for an increase in the efficiency of our railway system lead- ing to our western frontier by the construction of a second track on the lines indicated in the protocol. I [Sazonov] replied that I was aware of these desires and that they would probably be taken into consideration as far as possible. Most important of all, Poincare revealed to Sazonov the existence of the secret British agree- ments to aid France on land and sea in the event of a war with Germany, which Grey and Asquith were later to deny before the House of Com- mons, and urged Sazonov during his anticipated journey to England to propose to the British au- thorities an agreement for joint naval action be- tween Russia and Great Britain against Ger- many. Sazonov thus reports to the Tsar: 11 British-French relations were the subject of a spe- cially candid exchange of views between M. Poincare and myself. The French Premier mentioned that latterly, under the influence of Germany’s aggressive policy towards France, these relations had assumed the character of quite special intimacy, and he confided to me that while no written agreement between France and Great Britain was in existence, the General and Naval Staffs of the two States were nevertheless in close touch with one another, and were uninterruptedly and with entire openness consulting one another on matters of mutual interest. This continual exchange of ideas had led to 106 GENESIS or THE WORLD WAR a verbal agreement between the Governments of France and Great Britain, in which Great Britain had declared her readiness to come to the aid of France with her land and naval forces should the latter be attacked by Germany. Great Britain had promised to support France on land by a detachment 100,000 strong sent to the Belgian frontier, in order to ward off an invasion of the German army through Belgium, which was expected by the French General Staff. M. Poincare begged me urgently to preserve absolute silence about this information, and not to give even the British ground for suspicion that we were informed of it. When we spoke of the mutual assistance which Great Britain and France contemplated rendering to one an- other at sea, M. Poincare touched on the possibility of simultaneous cooperation between the Russian and British naval forces. Under our naval convention, France has undertaken the obligation to help us by diverting the Austrian fleet in the Mediterranean from us and preventing its penetration into the Black Sea. In Poincare’s view the British naval forces could undertake the same role in the Baltic, to which the French fleet is unable to ex- tend its activity. Accordingly, he asked me whether I would not take advantage of my impending journey to England to raise in my conversations with the leaders of British policy the question of joint operation of the Russian and British fleets in the event of a conflict with the Powers of the Triple Alliance. I replied to INI. Poincare that this question required close consideration. FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 107 How well Sazonov carried out Poincare’s sug- gestion, as well as the cordial reception of the idea by Grey and the King, is revealed in the fol- lowing report of Sazonov to the Tsar: 12 As a favourable opportunity occurred I felt it useful, in one of my conversations with Grey, to seek informa- tion as to what we might expect from Great Britain in the event of a conflict with Germany. What the director of British foreign policy said to me as to this, and King George himself later, I think is very signifi- cant. Your Majesty is aware that during M. Poincare’s stay in St. Petersburg last summer he expressed to me a wish that I would clear up the question of the extent to which we might count on the co-operation of the British fleet in the event of such a war. I informed Grey confidentially of the main points of our naval convention with France, and remarked that under the treaty concluded the French fleet would en- deavour to safeguard our interests in the southern theatre of war by preventing the Austrian fleet from penetrating into the Black Sea ; and I then asked whether Great Britain for her part could perform the same service for us in the north, by keeping the German squadrons away from our Baltic coasts. Grey de- clared unhesitatingly that should the anticipated con- ditions arise Great Britain would make every effort to strike a crippling blow at German naval power. On the question of military operations he said that negotia- tions had already taken place between the competent authorities concerned, but in these discussions the con- 108 GENESIS OF THE AV O R L D AVAR elusion had been reached that while the British fleet could easily penetrate into the Baltic, its stay there would be very risky. Assuming Germany to succeed in laying hands on Denmark and closing the exit from the Baltic, the British fleet would be caught in a mousetrap. Accordingly Great Britain would have to confine her operations to the North Sea. On his own initiative Grey then gave me a confirma- tion of what I already knew through Poincare — an agreement exists between France and Great Britain, under which in the event of war with Germany Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assist- ance to France not only on the sea but on land, by landing troops on the Continent. The King touched on the same question in one of his conversations with me, and expi’essed himself even more strongly than his Minister. When I mentioned, letting him see my agitation, that Germany is trying to place her naval forces on a par with Britain’s, His Majesty cried that any conflict would have disastrous results not only for the German navy but for Germany’s over- seas trade, for, he said, “We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of.” These words appeared to me to give expression not only to His Majesty’s personal feelings but also to the public feeling predominant in Great Britain in regard to Germany. That Poincare made an excellent impression on Sazonov during his A r isit is sIioaatl by the fol- loAving excerpt from the latter’s report to the Tsar : 13 Fit AN CO -RUSS I AN WAR PLOT 109 Finally, I feel bound to mention that I was very glad of the opportunity to make the acquaintance of M. Poincare, and to get into personal touch with him ; all the more since our exchange of views left me with the feeling that in him Russia has a true and trustworthy friend, gifted with uncommon statesmanly intelligence and unbending strength of will. In the event of a crisis in international relations it would be very desir- able that there should stand at the head of our ally’s Government, if not M. Poincare himself, at all events a personality as resolute as the French Premier, and as entirely unafraid of responsibility. On December 5, 1912, Izvolski confirmed Saz- onov’s judgment in a telegram to the latter: In a recent talk with me, Poincare remarked that opinion in France is strongly pro-peace, and that he has always to keep this in mind. We are, it seems to me, all the more indebted to him for his fixed resolve most loyally to fulfil his duties as an ally in case of need. ... If the crisis comes, the decision will be made by the three strong personalities who stand at the head of the Cabinet — Poincare, Millerand and Delcasse. And it is a piece of good fortune for us that we have to deal with these personalities and not one or -another of the oppoi'tunist politicians who have succeeded one an- other in the course of recent years in the Government of France (i. e. Combes, Caillaux, Herriot, Painleve et al., the opponents of the war policy— Author). The significance of what had been accom- plished by Izvolski, Poincare and Sazonov even 110 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars has been admirably summarized by Professor Stieve : 14 It is evident from all this how comprehensive were already the war preparations of the Entente Powers. A close network had been placed around the Central Powers. In the North Sea, British and French fleets were to act together. On top of this a British land army of 100,000 men was to join on in Belgium to the left wing of the French army, which had to carry out from there to Lorraine the speediest possible advance against Germany. In the Mediterranean the French fleet recently transferred thither aimed at holding the Austrian naval forces in check, and on the Russian frontier all conceivable measures were to be taken to expedite as far as possible the advance of the troops of the enormous Tsarist empire if the emergency arose. These were, indeed, gigantic plans, covering all Europe, which, as we have just seen, were in important respects developed and promoted by Poincare’s initia- tive in Russia. III. THE BALKANIZIXG OF THE PLOT Russia was primarily responsible for the Bal- kan War of 1912, as the Balkan League was to no small degree a creation of Izvolski, who hoped to use it as an instrument to drive the Turk out of Europe. The hostilities broke out rather earlier than was desired by Poincare, for, while a Balkan War by itself might secure the Straits for Russia, it would not return Alsace-Lorraine FEANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 111 to France. There was still a faint hope in 1912 that a struggle in the Near East might secure for Russia what Izvolski had been aiming at, but Poincare’s ambition quite obviously could only be realized by a general European war. There- fore, when trouble seemed imminent in the Bal- kans in 1912 Poincare endeavored to keep the situation under control and to prevent the out- break of hostilities. He was not yet ready to use the Balkans as the pretext for a general war. Russia was not prepared for war in a military sense, and the French people had not yet been converted by the bribed press to take an active interest in Balkan matters. He simply had to lie low in this crisis, as the time was not yet ripe to execute his plan. But the Grey-Cambon and other correspondence of 1912 shows that he was belligerent enough in his personal attitude after hostilities had actually broken out in the Balkans. Peace was maintained primarily because Sir Edward Grey at that time refused to allow England to be drawn into any conflict to for- ward the Russian ambitions, and cooperated with Germany in localizing the conflict. If he had done the same in 1914, as Germany urged him to do, there would .have been no European war. Izvolski was, of course, only interested in the Balkans in so far as Balkan disturbances might secure the Straits, and advance the Russian hegemony in this area. To Poincare this was 112 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR wholly secondary. To him the Balkans were im- portant as the one area over which a European war might be provoked and at the same time in- sure the Russian attack upon Germany which would provide the only possible method for the French to recover Alsace-Lorraine. Hence, he determined to adopt a policy which would pre- vent Russia from gaining her ends without the European war so indispensable to the French program. The Balkan situation must be so manipulated as to bring a European war. On the 12th of September, 1912, Poincare told Izvol- ski that France would probably refuse to follow him in a war over the Balkans unless Germany should support Austria : 15 Should, however, the conflict with Austria result in armed intervention by Germany, the French Govern- ment recognizes this in advance as a casus foederis, and would not hesitate a moment to fulfil the obliga- tions which it has accepted towards Russia. “France,” continued M. Poincare, “is beyond question entirely peaceful in disposition, and neither desires nor seeks a war; but German intervention against Russia would at once bring about a change in public feeling, and it may be taken as certain that in such an event Parliament and public opinion would entirely support the decision of the Government to give Russia armed support.” M. Poincare also told me that in view of the critical situation in the Balkans the superior French military FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 113 authorities are examining with increased closeness all the military eventualities which might occur, and that he knows that well informed and responsible personali- ties are very optimistic in their judgment of the prospects of Russia and France in the event of a general conflict. The outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans in the autumn of 1912 still further emphasized to Poincare the necessity of his preventing Russia from obtaining her ambitions short of a Euro- pean war. On November IT, 1912, he gave Izvolski and the Russians what practically amounted to a blank cheque in regard to the Balkans, promising Russia that if she went to war F ranee would follow. It was deemed better to go to war prematurely than to take a chance that France would lose out on the possibility of regaining her lost provinces: 10 “It is,” said Poincare, “for Russia to take the initiative in a matter in which she is the most closely interested party. France’s task is to accord to Rus- sia her most emphatic support. Were the French Government to take the initiative, it would berin dan- ger of forestalling the intentions of its Ally.” In order to leave him no doubt whatever as to the degree of our co-operation, I felt it necessary to acquaint him with a passage in M. Sazonov’s instructions to the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, in which it is stated that France and Great Britain have declared openly that they have no intention at all of joining 114 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR issue with the Triple Alliance over the conflict. “Broadly,” added M. Poincare, “it all comes to this : if Russia goes into the war, France will do the same, as we know that in this matter Germany would stand at Austria’s back.” I asked whether he knew the British standpoint in the matter; Poincare replied that according to his information the London Cabinet would confine itself for the moment to promising Russia its full diplomatic support, but that this would not ex- clude more substantial assistance in case of necessity. The effect of Poincare’s vigorous policy upon the attitude of the French government towards Russia’s conduct in the Balkans is admirably summarized by Izvolski in his letter of Decem- ber 18, 1912, to Sazonov: 17 It is still only a short time since the French Gov- ernment and Press were inclined to suspect us of egg- ing Serbia on, and one was constantly hearing people say that France has no desire to go to war about a Serbian port ( France ne veut pas faire la guerre pour un port Serbe). Now, however, there is astonishment and unconcealed dismay at our indifference to Austria’s mobilization. Anxietj 7 in this regard is finding ex- pression not only in the conversations of French Ministers with me and with our military attache, but is reaching the general public and newspapers of very varying political tendency. The French General Staff is so concerned that, as I reported in my telegram No. 445, the War Minister thought fit to draw Poin- care’s attention to the fact. Poincare showed me Millerand’s letter, which he had put before a Council FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 115 of Ministers called specially for this purpose. French astonishment has been anything but dissipated by the telegram from GeoPges Louis containing the reply of our general staff to General de la Guiche. I was shown the text of the telegram. According to this, General de la Guiche was told that we not only re- gard Austria’s arming as a purely defensive measure, but that Russia would not strike even in the entirely improbable event of an Austrian attack on Serbia. At this information Poincare and all the Ministers were utterly astonished. Poincare’s insistence that he should have knowledge of, and a veto upon, Russian conduct in the Balkans, lest it result in some form of ex- ploitation of the situation which would advance Russian interests and not those of the French, is expressed in a telegram of Izvolski on January 30, 1918: 18 Under present conditions, and in view of the exist- ing system of alliances and agreements, any isolated action in Balkan affairs on the part of one Power or another may very quickly lead to a general European war. The French Government fully realizes and recognizes the special situation of the Russian Govern- ment, which has to take account of nationalist feeling and of all-powerful historic traditions; the French Government is making no attempt to rob Russia of her freedom of action or to throw doubt on her moral ob- ligations towards the Balkan States. Russia is there- fore assured by France not only of armed assistance 116 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR in the event defined in the Franco-Russian agreement, but also of the most decided and energetic support of all measures adopted by the Russian Government in the interest of those States. But precisely in order that France may be able at any moment to extend to Russia her friendly help as an Ally in the fullest de- gree, the French Government earnestly asks us to take no steps on our own account without a prior exchange of views with France, our Ally; for only on this condi- tion can the French Government successfully prepare public opinion in France for the necessity of partici- pating in a war. IV. POINCARE BECOMES PRESIDENT OF FRANCE Because of the uncertainty in French political life, due to the group or bloc system, Poincare concluded to resign as Prime Minister and be- come a candidate for the French presidency, an office with a term of seven years, which would give him much greater certainty of maintaining a definite and consistent foreign policy. A powerful French President like Poincare would be able to control appointments to the cabinet. As President for seven years, with subservient foreign ministers, he knew that he had a far bet- ter prospect of continuing the French policy he had marked out in conjunction with Izvolski than he would have in the precarious position of Pre- mier and Foreign Minister in a French cabinet. Matters were headed right and he did not desire FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 117 to take any chances on having everything upset by so likely an eventuality as an overthrow of a French cabinet . 19 Izvolski well understood the importance of making Poincare’s election certain and he tele- graphed home frantically for large sums of Russian money to bribe the French press and members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in order to further Poincare’s candidacy and elec- tion. In particular was it necessary to combat the Radical , the organ of M. Perchot, which was vigorously attacking Poincare’s foreign policy and the closer relations with Russia . 20 The fol- lowing is a representative telegram asking for Russian financial aid. It was sent on January 3, 1913: 21 Poincare asked me to draw your attention again to the Perchot affair, which continues to be a source of anxiety to him. He says that the arrangement with the Russian banks mentioned in Perchot’s letter to V. N. Kokovtsov is at present under consideration in the Finance Ministry, and that he hopes that you will make a point of working for a satisfactory settlement. I learn from an entirely trustworthy source that it is very important to Poincare that the affair shall be dis- posed of by January 4 (old style), the date of the Presidential election, for Perchot can do a great deal of harm in this election. I am of opinion that it is greatly to our interest to give Poincare’s candidatui’e this assistance. 118 GENESIS OF THE WOULD WAR The Russian aid proved adequate and Poin- care was easily elected on the 17th of January, 1913. About two weeks after the election Izvol- ski tells of a long conference with Poincare, dur- ing which the latter gave assurance of his ability to maintain personal control of French foreign policy during his seven years as President, and urged Izvolski to come to him directly in case he desired to discuss important matters in this field : 22 I have just had a long talk with Poincare. He told me that in his capacity of President of the Republic it would be perfectly possible for him directly to influence France’s foreign policy. He will not fail to take ad- vantage of this during his seven years of office to assure the permanence of a policy based on close har- mony with Russia. He also expressed the hope that he would continue to see me often, and asked me to go direct to him in every case in which I felt this de- sirable. In regard to current affairs he spoke in much the same vein as Jonnart yesterday. As he put it, it is of the greatest importance to the French Govern- ment to have the opportunity of preparing French public opinion in advance for participation in any war which might break out over the Balkan question. This is why the French Government asks us not to take any separate action which might result in such a war without a prior understanding with France. This presents an illuminating contrast to Poin- care’s hypocritical and dishonest implication in FBANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 119 his Foreign Affairs article (loc. cit., p. 15), where he represents himself to have been but the merest ornamental figure-head as the French President, and suggests that all matters of foreign policy were handled responsibly and ex- clusively by the Foreign Minister, who was in this case Viviani. V. THE BRIBERY OF THE FRENCH PRESS fNot only was it necessary to get money from Russia to aid Poincare in becoming President of France; Russian gold was also essential in the campaign to bribe and corrupt the French press so that the F rench people might come to have the same enthusiasm for a war over the Balkans as that possessed by Poincare and his associates.J Consistently through 1912 and 1913 Izvolski wrote or telegraphed home for Russian money to bribe the French editors and writers to prepare articles, news and editorials designed to frighten or incense the French public, and make it feel that it was directly endangered by the German and Austrian policy in this area, and that its only adequate protection from the Austro- German menace lay in ever closer relations with Russia . 23 The following memorandum of Izvolski to Sazonov on July 21, 1913, telling of an interview with Poincare and of the need of more money for 120 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the bribery of the Paris papers, is representative of these insistent demands for Russian pecuniary aid in the corruption campaign. It is to be noted that Izvolski was astute enough to put the “kept'’ Paris editors on a monthly installment basis so that they would consistently deliver the goods. This particular communication was first printed by C. L. Hartmann in the Deutsche Rundschau in the summer of 1924 . It was believed by Dr. von Wegerer to be either spurious or altered (. Kriegsschuldfrage , August, 1924 ), but it has been identified under oath by former Russian Prime Minister, Kokovtzov, in the libel suit of the Matin against Humanite. It is printed in Behind the Scenes in French Journalism, by “A French Chief Editor” and reproduced in large part in The Progressive for February 1 , 1926 : No. 348. Strictly confidential. Dear Sergei Dimitrievitch : From this interview I was convinced that M. Poin- care is in every respect in accord with us, considers the moment has finally arrived to realize the century-old aims of our traditional policy (the seizure of the Straits), and therewith restore the European balance of power by the return of the stolen provinces of Alsace- Lorraine. Poincare did not conceal the great difficulties which we have to overcome yet. The principal trouble he ex- pects from the radical Socialists who are opposed to FRAN C O -RU SSI AN WAR PLOT 121 any war caused by financial or commercial I’easons, es- pecially when its origin is in the Balkans. This party has some highly intelligent men: Caillaux, Herriot, Painleve, and disposes of a considerable number of deputies and newspapers. Of the latter, some have only few readers — Le Radical, La Lanterne, Le Rappel, V Action, L’Aurore, La Depeche de Toulouse — but they have much influence. They are the mouthpiece of some prominent leader and accorded by his partisans unflinching political obedience. Each of these publish- ers and leaders is backed by a group of deputies and senators who want to rise with him and submit them- selves without contradiction . . . M. Poincare shares my opinion that a very large sacrifice on our part is nec- essary for this purpose. I hardly dare to mention the amount : three million francs, of which 250,000 francs alone is for the Radical, the organ of Senator Perchot. If we consider, that the Turkish Government has spent five millions to influence the French press and bought even one of their most prominent authors (Pierre Loti) and if we also contemplate the relative insignificance of this amount in comparison to the world-changing pro- gram which we can bring closer to realization therewith, you may want to undertake to submit this proposition to the cabinet for their immediate consent. I propose that the subsidy be paid in monthly install- ments as heretofore in order to be sure every minute of the zeal of the newspapers. I consider it advanta- geous this time not to use Lenoir but Laffon. Laffon has considerable influence with the Matin, whose finan- cial director he was, as well as with the great dailies. Izvolski. 122 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Sazonov made the following reply to this re- quest for funds : No. 2155. To be kept strictly secret. July 15/28, 1913 In consequence of your Excellency’s letter of July 8/21 (No. 318), I have not failed to submit your prop- osition and the report of your conversation to the cab- inet, presided over by His Majesty. It is a great joy to be able to communicate to you that the request of the President of the Republic regarding the amounts to be put by us at the disposition of the press , has, after some natural hesitations (quelques hesitations bien com- prehensibles), been granted by His Majesty with the condition that, as heretofore, Privy-Counselor Raffalo- vitch will be entrusted with the financial part of the transaction. The State-Counselor Davidov will start for Paris immediately with the most far-reaching in- structions. Sazonov. The report of A. Raffalovitch, Paris repre- sentative of the Russian Ministry of Finance for many years before the World War, rendered on November 19, 1913, setting forth the nature of his second series of bribery payments for the month, gives a fair idea of the nature and extent of this press campaign: Le Radical (Perchot’s paper) second installment 120,000 francs. La Lanterns (Millerand’s paper) . . . 35,000 Le Figaro 25,000 “ FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 123 Le Temps La Libre Parole 50.000 francs. 80.000 “ L’Aurore (Clemenceau’s paper) second installment 45.000 “ 25.000 “ 30.000 “ La Gaulois La Liberie The personal part taken by Poincare in super- vising the distribution of these funds is indicated in a telegram of Izvolski on October 23, 1912, asking for a subvention of 300,000 francs to lubricate the French political machinery: 24 It is important to do nothing without informing M. Poincare and securing his consent, for good re- sults can only be expected subject to this being done. French statesmen are very adept in deals of this sort. My conversation with M. Poincare has convinced me that he is ready to lend us his assistance in this matter, and to let us know the most suitable plan of dis- tribution of the subsidies. . . . He expressed to me his liveliest gratitude for my discussion of the matter with him in all candor, and added that he would him- self have approached me to ask me to do nothing with- out prior agreement with him. This bribery was supplemented by violently anti-German and anti-Austrian articles written by Tardieu and others in the semi-official Temps and elsewhere. Tardieu also aided Poincare and Izvolski in distributing the Russian money among the French papers. This shows how inadequate is Poincare’s characterization of Tar- 124 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR dieu as a “mere journalist.” The joint cam- paign of bribery and publicity was wholly suc- cessful in “Balkanizing” the Franco-Russian Alliance and arousing a most active and solicitous French interest in Balkan problems, towards which they had been indifferent before 1912. The French by 1914 were ready to support Poin- care in a war over the Balkans and the near east. In the meantime the Russian military prepara- tions had proceeded apace, financed by super- vised French loans which the Russians were com- pelled to expend chiefly for military purposes. Things were ready by June 28. 1914, as they had not been in November, 1912. VI. DELCASSE REPLACES GEORGES LOUIS In the spring of 1913 there were but three im- portant unfulfilled desires in the joint policy of Izvolski and Poincare. The first was the fact that the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg. Georges Louis, was sympathetic with the group in Paris who desired to avoid war over the Balkans and to check the dangerous collusion between Poincare and Izvolski . 20 Hence, he was no man to handle the French case at the Russian capital. Sazonov, Izvolski and Poincare were all agreed upon this, and on February 17, 1913. M. Louis was dismissed and replaced by M. Theophile Delcasse, a man who was scarcely FRANCO-RUSSIAN war plot 125 second to Poincare in his desire to avenge 1870. In fact, Delcasse had been the most tireless of all French diplomats in the generation preceding 1912 in working toward the diplomatic isolation of Germany, and the organization of an effective coalition against her. The failure of his aggres- sive policy in the first Morocco crisis had led to his resignation from the ministry at that time. He had also had a distinguished part in further- ing the Franco-Russian Alliance, as in August, 1899, he had been the man who went to St. Petersburg and effected what amounted to a transformation of the Franco-Ilussian Alliance from a purely defensive to an offensive basis. To promote an aggressive policy between France and Russia no man short of Poincare himself could have been more appropriately chosen for the Russian post. When Delcasse had com- pleted his mission he returned to Paris to col- laborate with Poincare and Izvolski at home. He was succeeded by Maurice Paleologue, one of the most ardent members of the Poincare clique. He had been a playmate of Poincare in youth and in diplomacy, and it was he who had worked out with Izvolski the details of the Franco-Russian naval convention of July 16, 1912. 26 In his recent defense in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, Poincare has attempted to defend himself in the Louis case by a discreditable at- 126 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR tack upon M. Louis and his deadly memoirs . 27 Poincare’s defense of himself in this episode has been subjected to merciless, if dignified, criticism by Professor Sidney B. Fay in the New Re- public for October 14, 1925 (pp. 199-200). As Fay points out, the one honest Frenchman in- formed in the premises, M. Leon Bourgeois, refused to join in the chorus of denials of the ac- curacy of M. Louis’ accusations. Izvolski's com- plete understanding of the character of Delcasse, as well as of what was expected of him during his mission to Russia, is well manifested in com- munications of February 17 and March 13, 1913: 28 Jonnart has also asked me to transmit to you the request to obtain the all-highest approval of the ap- pointment of M. Delcasse as ambassador in St. Peters- burg. He added the following information: The French Government has been moved to this choice mainly by the circumstance that in the eyes of lead- ing French circles and of public opinion 51. Delcasse is regarded, in the present exceedingly grave inter- national situation, which may call for the application of the Franco-Russian Alliance, as a personality of quite special authority, a sort of personification of the Alliance. From this point of view it is very important that when appointed ambassador 51. Delcasse shall be able to retain his mandate as Deputy. The legal ob- stacle to this, arising from the principle that Deputies may only be entrusted with temporary commissions, is purely formal in character and can be overcome by FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 127 periodical renewals of the decree by the President, for which precedents exist. I venture to add on my own account that M. Delcasse, whose past political career is familiar to you, is entirely devoted to the idea of the very closest association between Russia and France, and, as one of the most influential parliamentarians in France, may play, if the critical moment should come, a decisive part in overcoming any hesitation on the part of the Government, which is always exposed to pressure from various quarters. I know that it is desired here to proceed as quickly as possible with Delcasse’s appointment. As you are aware, M. Delcasse is specially compe- tent not only in questions of foreign politics but in all that concerns military and especially naval matters. Our military attache has learned that he is specially commissioned to persuade our military administration of the necessity of increasing the number of our strate- gic lines, in order to enable our army to be more rapidly concentrated on the western frontier. M. Delcasse is so well informed on this matter and is so familiar with the views of the French General Staff that he can discuss the question quite independently witli our military authorities. He is also empowered to offer Russia all the financial assistance required, in the form of railway loans. (jrhe Russian government was in need of money for the building of railroads, the increase of armament, and other general purposes. The French refused to make these loans except on the condition that Russia use a considerable pro- 128 GENESIS OF THE WOULD WAR portion of the money in the building of strategic railroads to the German frontier and in greatly increasing the size of the Russian army. This fact is well brought out in the letter of Kokovt- sov, Russian Minister of Finance, to Sazonov on June 27, 1913: 29 ^ The chairman of the Paris Stock Exchange, M. de Verneuil, has told me that while in St. Petersburg he is commissioned to communicate to us the standpoint of the French Government in regard to the floating in France of Russian Government loans, guaranteed by the State. This he has defined to me as follows : “I have been authorized to tell you that the French Government is ready to allow Russia to obtain in the Paris market every year from 100 to 500 million francs in the foi’m of a State loan, or of a loan guaranteed by the State, for the realization of a national programme of railway construction, subject to two conditions: “1. That the construction of the strategic lines planned out in collaboration with the French General Staff is begun at once ; “ 2 . That the effective peace strength of the Rus- sian army is considerably increased.” Morel, in his Secret History of a Great Betrayal, thus summarizes the Russian military prepara- tions : (a) Passing by the Duma of a law extending the term of service with the colors from three to three and a half years, involving an increase of the Russian Army of about 450,000 men for six months in the year FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 129 (October- April) ; (b) passing by the Duma of a law providing for an increase of the annual contingent of recruits by 130,000 men; (c) loan of £20,000,000 con- tracted in Paris for improvements in strategic rail- ways and roads in Russian Poland; (d) immense accumulation of stores of all kinds — the estimates for war expenditures for 1914 jumping to £97,500,000 from £87,000,000 in 1913, the 1913 figures showing an increase of £13,000,000 over 1912; (e) a complete mobilization (May, 1914) of all the reserves of the three annual contingents of 1907 to 1909, ordered for the whole empire under the form of “exercises” at an expenditure of £10,000,000 sterling; the “exercises” were to take place in the autumn, but the war turned them into real practice. That Poincare was willing to recognize the joint responsibility for Franco-Russian military in- creases is well borne out by the fact that he at once took the lead in putting through the great French army bill of 1913, reviving the three-year service practice, a policy urged by Izvolski . 30 VII. ENGLAND IS TAKEN IN TOW The second major achievement still in part un- fulfilled early in 1913 was to bring England into thorough accord with the Franco-Russian policy and to provide for an Anglo-Russian agreement upon joint naval action. By 1910 Lord Hal- dane ( Before the War, pp. 31 ff.) had worked 130 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR out complete plans, in consultation with the French, as to how and where the British were to land an army of 160,000 men opposite the Bel- gian frontier (the Belgians had refused the British request to land them on Belgian soil) to aid the French, in cooperation with the “assist- ance of Russian pressure in the east.” Thus, even the military basis of the encirclement policy had been laid no less than four years before the War. We have already seen how Poincare on his visit to Russia in August, 1912, had revealed the existence of this verbal agreement between France and England as to joint action. This was reduced to writing in a letter of Sir Edward Grey to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, on the 22nd of November, 1912, five days after Poincare had given Russia a free hand in the Balkans: 31 My dear Ambassador, — From time to time in re- cent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation be- tween experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British Fleets respectively at the FRAN CO-RU SSIAN WAR PLOT 131 present moment is not based upon an agreement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Gov- ernments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into considera- tion, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. After the outbreak of the Balkan Wars Poin- care put still more pressure on Great Britain for more explicit arrangements as to joint mili- tary action in the event of a European war. Izvolski thus describes these efforts and their re- sults in a despatch of December 5, 1912: Since the beginning of the present crisis M. Poincare has not ceased, on every occasion, to invite the London cabinet to confidential conversations, with the object of clearing up the position which would be adopted by England in the event of a general European conflict. On the British side no decision has been taken hitherto. The London cabinet invariably replies that this would 132 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR depend upon circumstances and that the question of peace or war will be decided by public opinion. On the other hand, not only has the examination of all eventualities which may present themselves not been in- terrupted between the French and British headquarters staffs, but the existing military and naval agreements have quite recently undergone a still greater develop- ment, so that at the present moment the Anglo-French military convention is as settled and complete (a un caractere aussi acheve et complet ) as the Franco- Russian convention; the only difference consists in the fact that the former bear the signature of the chiefs of the two headquarter staffs, and on this account are, so to speak, not obligatory upon the Government. These last few days General Wilson, the English chief of staff, has been in France, in the most rigorous secrecy, and on this occasion, various complementary details have been elaborated; moreover, apparently for the first time, it is not only military men who partici- pated in this work, but also other representatives of the French Government. Early in 1912 Lord Haldane, who had two years earlier completed his plans for crushing Germany between France and England on the west and Russia on the east, visited Berlin in the effort to bring about better relations between Germany and England. He was favorably re- ceived and would doubtless have been able to pro- mote a definite accord had it not been for Poin- care, who beard of the pacific developments and warned Sir Edward Grey that to confirm the FRAN CO-EU SSIAN WAR PLOT 133 Haldane negotiations would be to terminate the existing Franco-British relations. Grey, with humiliating docility, rejected the German pro- posal. Izvolski reveals this fact, together with the extent of the Anglo-French military plans in a letter of December 5, 1912: 32 England’s views are incomparably more important. In my conversations with Poincare and Paleologue I was informed, in strict confidence, that, during Lord Haldane’s well-known visit to Berlin (in February), Germany made Great Britain a very definite proposal to the effect that the British Cabinet should give a written undertaking to remain neutral if Germany be- came involved in a war not provoked by her. The British Cabinet informed M. Poincare of this proposal which Great Britain apparently hesitated either to accept or reject. Poincare expressed himself most emphatically against any such undertaking. He pointed out to the British Government that the sign- ing by Great Britain of such a treaty with Germany / would, with one blow, put an end to the present Franco-British relations. This objection had its due effect: the British Cabinet declined Germany’s pro- posal. Since the commencement of the present crisis, Poin- care has never failed to draw the British Cabinet into confidential conversations in order to obtain certainty as to the attitude which Great Britain purposed to adopt in the event of a general European conflict. . . . Not only has the examination of all conceivable possibilities by the French and British general staffs 134 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR not been interrupted, but the existing military and naval agreements have quite recently been extended in such a manner that, at present, the Anglo-French Military Convention is just as thoroughly and ex- haustively worked out in detail as is the Franco- Russian. . . . Sazonov was not satisfied, however, with the Anglo-French agreement. He felt that there must be greater assurance of English participa- tion in the prospective war. In a secret Russian conference of December 31, 1913, he expressed himself as follows: In reality a Russian initiative supported only by France would not appear particularly dangerous to Germany. The two States would hardly be in a posi- tion to deal Germany a mortal blow, even in the event of military successes, which can never be predicted. A struggle, on the other hand, in which Great Britain par- ticipated might be disastrous to Germany, who clearly realizes that if Great Britain were drawn in, the result might be social disturbances of a catastrophic nature within her frontiers in less than six weeks. Great Brit- ain is dangerous to Germany, and in the consciousness of this is to be found the explanation of the hatred with which the Germans are filled in the face of Great Brit- ain’s growing power. In view of this it is essential that before taking any decisive steps the Tsar’s Government shall assure itself of the support of the London Cabinet, whose active sympathy does not seem, in the Minister’s view, to be certain. FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 135 The next step was to bring about an Anglo- Russian naval convention. Poincare and Izvol- ski seized upon the opportunity provided by the visit of Sir Edward Grey and the British King to Paris in April, 1914. In a conference be- tween Sir Edward Grey and M. Doumergue, the French Prime Minister, the former expressed himself as heartily in favor of this naval conven- tion and promised to attempt to win over Asquith to this arrangement: 33 When the discussion of the various questions of current politics on the order of the day had come to an end, M. Doumergue came to the question of Russo- British relations, and made to Sir Edward Grey the representations which he and I [Izvolski] had agreed on. He brought into the field two main arguments in favour of a closer Russo-British agreement : 1. The German efforts to detach us from the Triple Entente, as a weak and unreliable political combina- tion, and 2. The opportunity afforded by the conclusion of a naval convention between us and Great Britain of re- leasing part of the British naval forces, not only as regards active operations in the Baltic and North Sea, but also in the Mediterranean. (M. Doumergue mentioned to Sir Edward Grey, among other things, that in two years’ time we should have a strong Dreadnought squadron in the Baltic.) Sir Edward Grey replied to M. Doumergue that he was personally entirely in sympathy with the ideas which he had expressed and was quite ready to con- 136 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR elude an agreement with Russia in the form of that in existence between Great Britain and France. But he did not conceal from M. Doumergue that there were, not only in the Government party but even among the members of the Cabinet, persons who were prejudiced against Russia and very little inclined to any further approach to her. However, he expressed the hope that he would be able to bring over Mr. Asquith and the other members of the Government to his view. . . . Sir Edward Grey’s idea is that only a naval convention could be concluded between us and Great Britain, and not a land convention, since all the British land forces are already distributed in ad- vance and they obviously could not co-operate with the Russian forces. He added that on his return to Lon- don he would at once submit the above plan to Mr. Asquith and his other colleagues for examination. On the 12th of May Sir Edward Grey sum- moned Count Benckendorff, the Russian Am- bassador at London, and told him with enthusi- asm of how he had won over Asquith to the plan for a naval arrangement with Russia: 34 On this occasion Grey spoke with a warmth unusual for him, showing that he has a solid basis for his con- clusions. It is evident what led him to send for me to make such a communication. He wanted to let me know that a new phase of still closer approach to France was beginning. This intention was still more evident to me when he went straight on to remark that I had no doubt been informed of the discussion which he had had with Doumergue about Russia. He told FRAN CO-EU SSIAN WAR PLOT 137 me that in Paris, away from his colleagues, it had been impossible for him to do more than express his own per- sonal agreement with the plan that the Governments of Great Britain and France should inform the Russian Government of all the existing military agreements be- tween Great Britain and France. To-day, he said, he was able to tell me that immediately after his return to London he had discussed this with the Prime Minister, and that the latter had agreed with his view and had had no objections to offer to the proposed plan. These arrangements were carried forward un- til the outbreak of the World War rendered them superfluous. The naval convention between England and Russia was not actually signed, but we do know that before England entered the War she had begun active cooperation with Rus- sia in the joint Anglo-Russian naval plans and manoeuvres. The actual signing of the Anglo- Russian naval convention was temporarily de- layed because of a “leak” which alarmed the Ger- mans and made Grey cautious. But the Rus- sian representative was in London awaiting the favorable moment when the War actually broke out and made such action unnecessary. Jt is an interesting commentary upon the diplomacy of Sir Edward Grey that at this very time he was also carrying on negotiations with Germany de- signed to settle Anglo-German tension over the Near East and Africa, and to promote a general Anglo- German understanding which would 138 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR render any military or naval cooperation with France and Russia quite unnecessary . 35 While subsequent events proved that England was thoroughly involved in the military and naval plans of France and Russia and felt herself abso- lutely bound to enter any war waged by France against Germany, it is quite true that Russia and France were never sure of the degree to which they could count upon British aid until August 2, 1914. As late as July 31, 1914, Poincare went so far as to telegraph George V. urging England to declare herself openly as on the side of France and Russia, and both Sazonov and Poincare were worried from July 24th to August 2nd about England, though they felt fairly cer- tain that they could count on her aid. Whatever their doubts, however, they were without any foundation. Not even the German proposal to keep out of Belgium or the German promise not to attack France in 1914 was adequate to secure English neutrality. Thus, England was safely “hooked” by April, 1914, if not by November, 1912, even if France and Russia were not con- vinced of the certainty of their “catch.” VIII. THE CONVERSION OF SAZONOV TO THE WAR POLICY The third element in the policy of Poincare and Izvolski was to convert Sazonov to the view FRANCO- RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 139 that the Straits were absolutely essential to a suc- cessful Russian foreign policy and could be ob- tained only by a European war. The failure of the Balkan League, with the resulting struggles among the Balkan allies, put a disastrous end to the hope which Sazonov had entertained that the Straits might be secured for Russia through the Balkan Wars. By the close of 1913 Sazonov had become converted to the war policy, and/ from that time on he presented a united front with Izvolski and Poincare. In a famous memo- randum to the Tsar, sent on December 8, 1913, he frankly confesses to his conversion to the war policy: 36 Our doubts of the continued vitality of Turkey bring again to the fore the historic question of the Straits and of their political and economic importance to us. . . . Can we permit any other country to ob- tain entire control of the passage through the Straits? To ask the question is to answer it — “No.” To give up the Straits to a powerful State would be equivalent to placing the whole economic development of Southern Russia at the mercy of that State. . . . Moreover, I must repeat that the questiom-of the Straits can hardly be advanced a step except through European complications. To judge from present con- ditions, these complications would find us in alliance with France and possibly, but not quite certainly, with Great Britain, or at least with the latter as a benevo- lent neutral. In the event of European complications, 140 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR we should be able to count in the Balkans on Serbia and perhaps also on Roumania. On the 8th of February, 1914, there was held the famous secret Russian Crown Council, at which the question was considered as to whether Russia should seize Constantinople and the Straits suddenly and unaided, or should await the coming of the expected World W ar. It was decided that the latter alternative was much the most attractive. Sazonov explicitly remarked that “it could not be assumed that our operations against the Straits could take place without a general European war, and that it was to be assumed that under such circumstances Serbia would direct all her forces against Austria- Hungary.” Plans were accordingly drawn up dealing in great detail with the military activities which Russia would execute in the campaign against Turkey in the event of the World War. 3, On the 23d of March, 1914, the Tsar reported, to use his own words, “I entirely approve of the resolutions of the Conference.” 38 Nothing remained now but to wait for the spark which would kindle the fire in the Balkans. But the Russian delay was not an idle one. Morel, in his Secret History of a Great Betrayal, tells how In February, 1914, the Tsar received Serbia’s “Minis- ter President,” M. Paschitsch. There ensued between FRAN CO-RU SSIAN WAR PLOT 141 these two worthies an alluring conversation, in the course of which Paschitsch congratulates the Tsar that “Russia had armed herself so thoroughly,” following up the compliment by a modest request for 120,000 rifles, munitions and howitzers, the Tsar replying that Sazonov shall be furnished with a list of Serbia’s re- quirements, plus a polite inquiry as to the number of men “Serbia can put in the field.” “Half a million,” answers Paschitsch. The Tsar is delighted. “That is sufficient, it is no trifle, one can go a great w r ay with that.” They part with mutual esteem. “For Serbia,” remarks the Tsar, “We shall do everything. Greet the King and tell him. For Serbia we shall do all.” !/■ v/ Russian gold was poured into Serbia to aid and encourage the Serbian plotters against the Austrian throne. We also have evidence of lirect com Russian authori- ties^ in the s pec i fic plot fo r the assassinati on of th e A rchduke. The active Austrian publicist, Dr. Leopold Mandl, has recently shown that there is good evidence that Dragutin Dimitri je- vitch, Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff, who laid the plot for the assassination of the Archduke, worked kucollu- sion with the Russian military attache at Bel- grade . 39 Robert Dell has also recently called attention to the fact that Izvolski was apparently aware of the plot, as he received a congratulatory i message on the subject from the King of Serbia shortly after the assassination . 40 j 142 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR IX. FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR AIMS The only defense which Sazonov has been able to bring forward against the charge that the World War was precipitated to allow Russia to seize the Straits and France to recover Alsace- Lorraine, is the brief paragraph in his Foreword to Baron Schilling’s diary: 41 I conclude these brief introductory lines by mention- ing the accusation often addressed by Germany to France and Russia, that they desired war in order that France might recover her lost provinces and Russia ac- quire the Straits and Constantinople. As regards the latter, I feel bound to state that shortly after Germany had declared war upon the Dual Alliance, and before the Berlin Government had sent its warships through the Straits into the Black Sea and had thus drawn Turkey into a war with Russia, the Russian Government, together with its allies, had of- fered Turkey to guarantee her territorial integrity on the sole condition of her remaining neutral. This fact, officially announced in the Russian Or- ange Book, speaks for itself, putting an end to the ac- cusations piled up in Berlin against Russian diplo- macy. The unmitigated hypocrisy and dishonesty in this statement is well revealed in Izvolski’s tele- gram of August 11, 1914, in which he states that the French Foreign Minister recommended that Russia attempt to purchase Turkish neutrality FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 143 by promising Turkey inviolabilitjr of her terri- tory. He was careful to state, however, that any such promise to Turkey made in 1914 would not in any way prevent Russia “from deciding the Dardanelles question according to her own wishes at the close of the war.” 42 As early as Septem- ber 2, 1915, we know that there existed between Russia and France “a political agreement which recognized Russia’s right to the final posses- sion of Constantinople after the conclusion of peace.” 43 French war aims also began to take definite form before the War broke out. Izvolski re- veals the fact that as early as Delcasse’s mission to Russia in 1913 France had insisted on the re- turn of Alsace-Lorraine . 44 After the War had begun under such auspicious circumstances, with England safely in on the side of France and Russia, the F rench added to the return of Alsace- Lorraine the demand that German economic power should be destroyed. This is revealed in a telegram of Izvolski to Sazonov on October 13, 1914. 45 Continuation. Personal. Very confidential. Del- casse then referred to the negotiations which took place in St. Petersburg in 1913, and earnestly asked me to draw your attention to the fact that the demands and aspirations of France remain unaltered, with the addi- tion only of the necessary destruction of the political and economic power of Germany. The necessity of this 144 GENESIS OF THE WOELD WAR is governed by the existing situation, above all in view of the participation of Great Britain in the war, and the French Government lays stress on the need for at- taining this aim, in the assumption that this is of equal importance not only for France but for the other Powers and even for the whole world. As the War went on the French demands as to German humiliation grew more severe. By February 14, 1917, they included not only the return of Alsace-Lorraine but also the seizure of the Saar Basin and the disintegration of the Ger- man Empire through the detachment of the Rhine Provinces. These demands were embodied in an exchange between Sazonov and the French Am- bassador in St. Petersburg on February 14, 1917. How much earlier they had been formulated we cannot say. These French war aims follow 7 : 40 1. Alsace-Lorraine to be restored to France. 2. The frontiers (of this territory) to be extended so as to include at least the former Duchy of Lorraine and to be fixed according to the wishes of the French Government, the strategic requirements being taken into account, so that the whole iron ore district of Lor- raine and the whole coal basin of the Saar shall be in- cluded in French territory. 3. The remaining districts on the left bank of the Rhine which now form part of the German Reich, are to be detached from Germany and to be freed from all political and economic dependence upon Germany. 4. The districts on the left bank of the Rhine which FRAN CO-RU S S I A N WAR PLOT 145 are not incorporated in the French territory shall form an autonomous and neutral state and shall remain oc- cupied by French troops until the enemy countries shall have finally fulfilled all the conditions and guarantees to be enumerated in the Treaty of Peace. Here we have the vital facts in the historical indictment of France and Russia, and it does not rest for its evidence upon any of that “micro- scopic document-chopping” of which Mr. Simeon Strunsky is so contemptuous. 47 The documents which support the case against France and Russia are not chips and pieces but great heaps of consistent and incontrovertible source- material, and we invite Mr. Strunsky to chew on this material for a few months. The same type of cerebro-gastronomic exercise might prove edi- fying to the learned archivist who wrote the New York Tribune editorial of May 6, 1925, declar- ing that all of the material upon which the re- visionists base their evidence is some chance re- marks and casual asides of Izvolski which were completely ignored by the St. Petersburg govern- ment and wholly misrepresented the French attitude and policies. In the light of the material brought forward in this chapter the following quotations from Sir Edward Grey’s speech of August 3, 1914, and his recent memoirs are at least mildly amusing: 48 I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be in- 146 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR volved in a war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. . . . France, indeed, dreaded war, and did all she could to avoid it. French minds were probably more preoccu- pied with the awful peril of war to France than with the dread of war as a general catastrophe. The immense growth and strength of Germany had smothered all French intention to attempt a revanche. [The idea of recovering the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine had tacitly been dropped, though the French Govern- ment might not have dared to say in public that it had been foi’ever abandoned. The Franco-Russian Alliance did not contemplate or cover a French revanche . . That the Tsar, or Sazonof, or anyone who had a deci- sive word in Russia was planning to provoke or to make war I do not believe. Perhaps it may be true to say, of Russia, that she was like a huge, unwieldy ship, which in time of agitation kept an uncertain course; not because she was directed by malevolent intentions, but because the steering-gear was weak. X. CONCLUSIONS (1) The original or basic thread in the im- mediate causes of the World War is to be found in the Russian desire to secure control of the Straits leading out of the Black Sea. The man who manipulated this program was Alexander Izvolski, Russian Foreign Minister and later Russian Ambassador to Paris. (2) In 1908 he made an effort to secure the FRAN CO-RU SSIAN WAR PLOT 147 Straits through diplomacy. He suggested that Austria annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, in re- turn for which Austria was to support Russia in her request for the Straits. Austria agreed, and annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, but Eng- land blocked Russia in her attempt to secure the Straits. After some more futile diplomatic manoeuvring, Izv olski became convinced that the Straits could only be secured by a European war — “the road to Constantinople is through Ber- lin” — and he set about it so to direct the Euro- pean situation that when the time came Russia would be in a position where victory would be probable. ( 3 ) Hence, in 1910 he went to Paris. In 1912 his plans were notably furthered by the entry of Raymond Poincare, a leader of the revenge and military group in France, into the office of Pre- mier and Foreign Minister of France. Poin- care’s dom inating ambition was the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. Izvolski quickly saw that he could exploit Poincare’s desire to recover the Lost Provinces in the interest of getting French support for Russia’s aspirations in regard to the Straits. He received cordial support from Poin- care. Though the two men disliked each other personally, and distrusted each other to some de- gree, they worked together with unwavering per- sistence and consistency to advance their joint program of a European war which would accom- 148 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR plish the dual result of returnin g - Alsac e-Lorr aine _tO-France and securing the Straits for Russia. (4) Franco-Russian military cooperation had been assured by 1893. A naval agreement was worked out in July, 1912. Poincare was opposed to war in the Balkans in 1912, because the Russians were not yet ready for war and the minds of the French people had not yet been pre- pared for the prospect of a war over the Balkans. Yet he feared a premature war less than he did the prospect of Russia’s getting the Straits with- out the European war which was essential to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine. Hence, he prom- ised Izvolski that if Russia went into a war over the Balkans France would follow and make the struggle a general European conflict. Poincare further safeguarded his scheme by insisting that he have full knowledge of Russian diplomatic activity in the Balkans, lest events might take some turn which would secure the Russian am- bitions without realizing the aims of France. ( 5 ) While awaiting the satisfactory incident in the Balkans over which war might be precipi- tated, French and Russian military preparations were to be hastened, and the French people made ready for war by a campaign of anti- German and anti- Austrian propaganda in the French papers, whose editors and writers were bribed by Russian funds obtained by Izvolski for that purpose and disbursed under the direction FRANCO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 149 of Poincare, Klotz, Berthelot and Tardieu. (6) In order to insure permanence in his for- eign policy, Poincare resigned as Premier and Foreign Minister and became President of France. He retained his control over foreign policy, however, and informed Izvolski that all important matters in foreign policy were to be discussed with him directly. (7) The pacifically inclined French Ambassa- dor in St. Petersburg, Georges Louis, was re- called and was replaced by the leader of the anti- German sentiment in France, Delcasse, who pressed the French war aims at St. Petersburg, and supervised the disbursement of the French loans to Russia, which were mainly directed to financing the army increases and the building of strategic railroads to the German frontier. (8) England was brought into line with the program of Izvolski and Sazonov through the Grey-Cambon correspondence of November, 1912, and the preliminary arrangements for the Anglo-Russian naval convention in the spring of 1914. While the French and Russians did not feel thoroughly sure of British aid until August 2, 1914, subsequent events proved that Grey felt that British interests bound him to support France in any war with Germany. (9) By December, 1913, Sazonov, the Russian F oreign Minister, was converted to the war policy in regard to the Straits. 150 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR (10) On February 8, 1914, the Russians held a secret Crown Council in which they considered the proposition of suddenly pouncing upon Tur- key and seizing Constantinople and the Straits. They rejected this proposition in favor of await- ing a general European war. (11) The Tsar received the Serbian Premier early in 1914, heartily encouraged the Serbian nationalist ambitions, and promised the Serbians arms and ammunition for their army. (12) The crux of the whole matter was ad- mirably stated by Colonel House in his letter of v May 29, 1914, to President Wilson: “When- ever England consents, F ranee and Russia will close in on Germany and Austria.” SELECTED REFERENCES U Alliance franco-russe : t roisieme livrc jaune; Bausman, F., Let France Explain ; Becker, O., Bis- marck; Ewart, J. S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918 ; Fabre-Luce, A., La Victoirc; Fried- jung, H., Das Zeitalter des Imperialismus ; Gooch, G. P., Modern Europe, 1878-1914; Huddleston, S., Poin- care; Laloy, E., Les Documents secrets des archives du ministere des affaires etrangeres de Russie; Langer, W. L., “The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894,” in Slavonic Review, 1925 ; “Poincare, Avenger of France,” New Republic, October 15, 1924; “Izvolski and Poin- care,” Ibid., April 15, 1925; Earl Loreburn, How the TFor Came; Marchand, R., Un I.ivre noir; La Condam- FRAN CO-RUSSIAN WAR PLOT 151 nation d’un regime; Morel, E. D., The Secret History of a Great Betrayal; Poincare, R., The Origins of the War; Schmitt, B., “Triple Alliance and Triple En- tente,” in American Historical Review, April, 1924 ; Schreiner, G., Entente Diplomacy and the World, 1909 — 1914 ; Seeger, C. L., The Memoirs of Alexander } Iswolsky; Stieve, F., Der Diplomatische Schriftweclisel Iswolskis, 1911 — 1914 ; Isvolsky and the World TFar. FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 Friedrich Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War, pp. 15-16. y 2 Ibid., p. 1,6. 3 Ibid., p. 17. Cf. E. Judet in Humanity, January 17, 1924. 4 Stieve, op. cit.. Chap. ii. 6 Ibid, pp. 54 if. 6 W L. Langer, in the New Republic, April 15, 1925, Part II, pp. 13-14. 7 American Historical Review, July, 1923, pp. 747-8. 3 Ibid., April, 1924, pp. 457-8. 9 Stieve, op. cit., p. 83. The reader may well be reminded here that Dr. Stieve is the world’s foremost authority on the Russian documents involved in the question of the pre-war di- plomacy. His five volume edition of these documents, Der Di- plomatische Schriftweclisel Iswolskis, 1911-1914, has superseded the earlier collections by Laloy and Marchand. In this chapter the references to the documents are made to those in Professor Stieve’s analytical volume based on his collection of documents. He here reproduces the most relevant documents, and they are thus available in English translation. In each case he gives in brackets the number of the document in his five volume collection. It is to be hoped that this collection will be translated into Eng- lish as the Kautsky Documents and the Austrian Red Book have already been. It has been charged that American and English publishers and foundations have been singularly unwilling to un- dertake this because they desire to keep these incriminating docu- ments from American and English readers as long as possible. 10 Stieve, op. cit., p. 87. 11 Ibid., p. 88. 1 2 Ibid., pp. 89-90. is Ibid., pp. 91, 118. 14 Ibid., p. 90. is Ibid., p. 106. 152 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR is Ibid., p. 113. i7 Ibid., pp. 122-3. is Ibid., p. 135. is Cf. Lindsay Rogers, “The French President and Foreign Affairs,” in Political Science Quarterly, December, 1925; R. H. Soltau, French Parties and Politics, p. 17; Joseph Barth^lemy, The Government of France, Chaps, vi, viii; Le President Poincari; R. Poincar£, How France is Governed. 20 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 129 ff. 21 Ibid., p. 132. 22 Ibid., p. 134. 23 Ibid., pp. 117 ff., 134 ff. ; the New Republic and the New York Nation, February 6 and 20, 1924. 24 Stieve, op. cit., p. 117. 25 Georges Louis, Carnets d’un Ambassadeur; Ernest Judet, Georges Louis. 26 L’ Alliance Franco-Russe: troisiime livre jaune francais, No. 93-5. Cf. J. Debrit, in Vers la veriU pp. 114-19. 27 loc. cit., pp. 11-2. 28 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 137-8. 29 Ibid., pp. 169-70. 30 Ibid., pp. 167 ff. si J. S. Ewart, The Roots and Causes of the Wars, 1914-1918, pp. 117-18. 32 Russia and France on the Road Towards War, p. 16; E. D. Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal, p. 12. 33 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 197-8. si Ibid., p. 199. 35 Cf. E. M. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, pp. 266 ff. 36 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 180-81, 187-9. 37 The full minutes of this Crown Council are contained in the appendix to Stieve, pp. 230 ff. 38 Ibid., p. 194. sn Ibid., p. 209. 40 London Nation, September 19, 1925, p. 723. 41 How the War Began, Foreword, p. 10. 42 France and Russia on the Road Towards IFnr, p. 22. 43 Ibid., p. 23. 44 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 247-8. 45 Ibid., p. 248. 46 F. Stieve, Iswolski im Weltkriege, p. 213. 47 See editorial in New York Times, September 15, 1924. 4s Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Vol. II, pp. 22-3, 313. CHAPTER IY THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARC FI DUKE AND THE AUSTRO- SERBIAN CRISIS I. THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND INTER- NATIONAL RELATIONS OF SERBIA In no respect has the newly revealed information been more startling or revolutionary than with regard to the explicit and direct guilt of Serbia in precipitating the immediate causes of the World War. Down to 1919 it was very generally be- lieved that Serbia was an oppressed and innocent little country, wholly lacking in responsibility for the assassination of the Archduke, and desirous of doing everything within the bounds of reason to satisfy the utterly unjustifiable and insulting demands of Austria-Hungary. The Commis- sion appointed by the Peace Conference at Paris in 1919 to investigate the responsibility for the War reported that “a crime committed by an Austro-Hungarian subject within territory of the Dual Monarchy can in no way compforhise Serbia,” and contended that “the war had arisen in consequence of Austria-Hungary’s deliberate intention to destroy this brave little country.” 1 153 154 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Recent evidence has, however, proved the full guilt of the Serbian civil and military authorities in the plot for the assassination of the Archduke. The facts in this matter are brought together with force, clarity and the most thorough scholarship by Professor Sidney B. Fay in the New York Times Current History Magazine for October and November, 1925. Readers may be referred to these articles, and to Miss Edith Durham’s book, The Serajevo Crime, for the details of the murder plot and the revelations of Serbian re- sponsibility. No examination of the guilt of Serbia could be adequate which is not based upon an initial understanding of the rudimentary political de- velopment of the Balkan states in general as well as of Serbia in particular. The prevailing tech- C nique of government in this area has been a mix- ture of tyranny, intrigue and assassination. In 1903 the entire royal family of Serbia and most of their ministers were assassinated in one of the most brutal murders in the annals of political history. Edward VII of England persistently blacklisted the dynasty which was brought in by the wholesale murders. The present dynasty of Serbia was thus installed, and it was one of the v members of the band of assassins op 1903 who took the lead in the plot of 1914. It must be made clear that however natural may have been the Serbian aspirations for the hegemony of the THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 155 Balkans and the realization of a Greater Serbia, there was nothing in the political life and institu- tions of Serbia which would have justified intrust- ing Serbia with political leadership and control. By 1914 she had not yet learned the lessons of orderly self-government at home, to say nothing of possessing the capacity to bring adjacent peo- ples under her dominion. I Whatever the defects in the political methods of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, there can be no doubt that Austria was far better fitted to govern the Jugo- slav peoples within her boundaries than was Serbia to emancipate them and bring them un- der her administration. Yet there was no coun- try in Europe more vigorously affected by patri otic ardor and expansionist ambitions than Serbia. [These had been inflamed by the Aus- trian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the menacing attitude of Austria in the period of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, and petty Austrian oppression in such instances as so-called “Pig War.” 2 j_The Serbian plots and intrigues against Aus- tria were encouraged by Russian approval and by Russian bribery of Serbian officials and plotters. The latter were given a feeling^of assurance and security by the Russian promises of protection against Austria. In other words, Russia encouraged a type of Serbian activity which was bound sooner or later to bring about an 156 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR acute Austro-Serbian crisis, and in 1914 inter- vened in behalf of Serbia in this crisis which she had herself helped to create. II. SERBIA AND THE SARAJEVO PLOT 1. The Plot and Its Authors In 1913-1914 the Serbian plotting against Austria for the emancipation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the independence and unifica- tion of Jugo-Slavia exceeded all previous de- velopments, and among these intrigues was the “Black Hand” plot which actually brought on the World War. The background of the plot to assassinate the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austrian throne, must be found in the general plotting of the “ Black jJan d,” the most aggressive and active of the various groups which were busy organizing intrigues in Serbia against the Austrian government. Among their membership were many important officials in the Serbian army and administrative force. They were encour aged in the ir activity by Russian funds, t he instigation of secret Russian agents, and the definite under standi ng hetween jthe Ser- bian and Russian governments that Russia would intervene to protect Serbia against any just punishment by the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. The Russian minister at Belgrade, THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 157 ^von Hartwig, who handled the relations between 'the Russian and Serbian governments in 1914, was one of the most notorious and corrupt char- acters among the unscrupulous Russian diplo- mats of the pre-War period. 4 Even before January, 1914, the “Black Hand” had decided that their great stroke should be the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, and they awaited an appropriate and suitable time for the execution of the plot. In March of 1914 it became known that Franz Ferdinand was to review the army manoeuvres at Sarajevo in Bosnia during the folio whig June. The con- spirators seized upon this as the opportunity for which they had been waiting, and plans were quickly matured for the execution of the plot. 5 The leader was Colonel Dragutin Dimitri je- vitch, the Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Serbian General Staff, and one of the lead- ers in the wholesale murders of 1903 which es- tablished the reigning Serbian dynasty. 6 Seton- Watson, nevertheless, calls him “an attractive personality.” 7 The three volunteers who were chosen to carry out the actual assassination were Tchabrinovitch, Printsip and Grabezh. By some these men have been represented as -pufe and noble-minded patriots, who, like Nathan Hale, regretted that they had only one life to give for their country. As a matter of fact they were actually rattle-brained adventurers. Even R. 158 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR W. Seton-Watson, whose hatred of Austria and whose love of the Serbians amounts to a verita- ble obsession, has described them in the following words: “All three were consumptive and neu- rasthenic and found it hard to make ends meet, and were ready for any deviltry.” 8 They were taken into tow by Dimitri jevitch and his aides, Tankositch and Tsiganovitch. These men gave the three prospective assassins elaborate training in the use of revolvers, furnished them with automatic pistols, ammunition and bombs from the Serbian arsenal, and arranged the details of the process of smuggling them into Bosnia where they awaited the coming of the Arch- duke. 9 These facts were revealed by a courageous professor of history at Belgrade. Stanoje Stano- jevitch, a member of the Narodna Odbrana, an- other Serbian nationalistic and revolutionary so- ciety. It had been charged by some that the Narodna Odbrana had been responsible for the plot to assassinate the Archduke, and Stano je- vitch appears to have written his brochure in- criminating Dimitri jevitch in order to clear his own society. This pamphlet 10 was written in 1923, and revealed the complicity of the Serbian army officers in the assassination plot. We did not at that time know that the Serbian civil gov- ernment possessed any information about the plot before the assassination, and the Serbian THE AU STRO-SEKBIAN CRISIS 159 Premier, Mr. Pashitch, in 1914 repeatedly de- nied any knowledge whatever of the plot or the plotters. Since 1923 we have, however, received the startling revelation that the whole Serbian cabinet knew about the plot nearly a month be- fore the assassination took place. In 1924 an exuberant volume was published in Belgrade celebrating the tenth anniversary of the out- break of the World War which had brought such glorious results to the Serbians in the way of the realization of the Greater Serbia aspira- tions. To this volume, entitled The Blood of Slavdom, one article was contributed by Mr. Ljuba Jovanovitch, Minister of Education in the Pashitch cabinet in July, 1914. 11 He apparently desired to establish such credit as was due the Serbian civil government for any part it may have had in this glorious achievement of the assassination of the Archduke and its aftermath. He reveals in the following paragraph the full knowledge of the plot possessed by the cabinet by the end of May, 1914: 12 At the outbreak of the World War, I was Minister of Education in M. Nikola Pashitch’s Cabinet. I have recently written down some of my recollections and some notes on the events of those days. For^jdfe present occasion I have chosen from them a few ex- tracts, because the time is not yet come for everything to be disclosed. I do not remember whether it was at the end of 160 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR May or the beginning of June, when one day M. Pashitch said to us (he conferred on these matters more particularly with Stojan Protitch, who was then Minister of the Interior ; but this much he said to the rest of us) : that certain persons (neki) were mak- ing ready to go to Sarajevo to murder Franz Ferdinand, who was to go there to be solemnly re- ceived on St. Vitus Day. As they told me afterward, this plot was hatched by a group of secretly organized persons and by patriotic Bosno-Herzegovinian students in Belgrade. M. Pashitch and the rest of us said, and Stojan agreed, that he should issue instructions to the frontier authorities on the Drina to prevent the cross- ing over of the youths who had already set out from Belgrade for that purpose. But the frontier “au- thorities” themselves belonged to the organization, and did not carry out Stojan’s instructions, but reported to him (as he afterward told us) that the instructions had reached them too late, because the youths had already crossed over. Iii spite of this information in the possession of the Serbian cabinet, the Serbian government took no active steps either to frustrate the plot or to warn the Austrian government of the danger to the Archduke in his prospective visit to Sara- jevo. As Professor Fay puts it: “The Aus- trian Foreign Office never received any ‘warning’ of any kind from the Serbian government.” 13 There is some evidence that Jovan Jovanovitch, the Serbian Minister in Vienna, passed on a hint to Bilinski, the Austrian Minister of Fi- THE AUSTEO-SEKBIAN CRISIS 161 nance, that the Archduke might meet with trouble on his visit to Sarajevo. It would ap- pear that Bilinski, if he received such informa- tion, never handed it on to the Archduke or Count Berchtold. 14 2. The Execution of the Plot A number of authorities, most notably Mr. H. Wickham Steed, author of the notorious myth concerning the plot supposed to have been hatched between the Kaiser and Franz Fer- dinand for the conquest and redistribution of Europe at their meeting at Konopischt in June, 1914, 15 have stated that Austrian authorities made no effort whatever to protect the Archduke on his visit, thus indicating that many in the Austrian government itself desired to see the Archduke assassinated. There is no ground whatever for this assertion. In the first place, the Austrian authorities did not possess any definite knowledge of the plot, and, in the second place, what seemed to be thoroughly adequate provisions for the protection of the Archduke had been made. The great defect in the ar- rangements for the defense of the Archduke lay in the fact that the detectives sent to protect him at Sarajevo were strangers in the locality and, hence, extremely ineffective in their pro- tective measures. The only remaining precau- 162 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR tion which might have been taken would have been to bring a large detachment of troops into Sarajevo, but such procedure would never have been tolerated by a man of the personal bravery of Franz Ferdinand . 16 One of the conspirators, Mr. Jevtitch, tells of the seeming elaborateness but practical helplessness of the precautionary measures taken by the Austrians to protect the Archduke in Sarajevo: 17 The preparations made by the Austrian police for guarding the Archduke were as elaborate as they were ineffective. On the day before the arrival of the Arch- duke a complete cordon enveloped the city. Hundreds of detectives came from Vienna in order to make the surveillance more complete. . . . But all these new agents, possibly even more zealous than those of Bosnia, appeared at a great disadvantage. They knew neither the language nor the identity of those they were expected to watch. They examined the pass of Printsip and let him enter Sarajevo, imagining, doubtless, that they had passed a rural Bosnian going to see the sights. In the same way they passed as “merchandise” the bombs and arms coming from Tuzla. The plot for the assassination of the Archduke was so perfectly planned that there was no chance whatever of his escaping. The details of the assassination Avere thus reA’ealed to Mr. Clair Price in 1924 by one of the conspirators of 1914: 18 THE AUSTEO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 163 Prinzip first learned of the Archduke’s intended visit to Serajcvo in a paragraph which appeared in a Zagreb paper in April, 1914. Somebody cut out the paragraph and mailed it to Prinzip, who was then in Belgrade, having been expelled from Serajevo by the Austrian police. There was only the clipping in the envelope, nothing else. Prinzip found all the help he needed at Belgrade. The arms were smuggled in a single package from Belgrade direct to Serajevo, and were delivered to a man named Hitch, who was the head of the organization here. Prinzip himself, along with Gabrinowitsch and the other volunteers, were smuggled across the frontier and into Serajevo by a chain of Orthodox families, all of whom belonged to the organization. On the night before the assassination Prinzip sud- denly appeared at his home in the country near here. His people had supposed he was still in Belgrade, but they asked no questions and he told them nothing. Pie put his arms round his father, his mother and his sister and kissed them good-bye. In five minutes he was gone. At 7 o’clock the next morning he went to a coffee house near the Hotel Central, where Ilitch was disti’ibuting the arms to the six volunteers. Given the complete lack of protection which the Austrian military authorities afforded to the Archduke that morning, nothing on earth could have saved him. Six men were waiting for him, and if Prinzip had missed him, there was another ready a few yards fui’ther along in the street and another a few yards still further. 164 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR As it happened, only two of the six were needed. The Archduke’s train reached the station from his general headquarters at Ilidja, a fashionable watering place about ten miles from Serajevo, at 9:50 o’clock. An inspection of the guard delayed him at the station until 10. The two and a half miles between the sta- tion and the quay took him about fifteen minutes. There were only three cars in the procession, the Archduke, his wife and the Austrian Governor in the first and the Archduke’s staff in the two following. The Mayor was to make an address of welcome at the Town Hall, that big pink and yellow building further up the quay above the corner here. They passed Gabrinowitsch about 10:15, and, as everybody knows, Gabrinowitsch’s bomb was tipped out of the car by the Archduke himself and exploded un- der the car behind, injuring the Chief of Staff, who was hurried away to the hospital at once, while the Archduke’s car continued along the quay to the Town Hall without stopping. At the Town Hall the Mayor, who knew nothing of the attack, began his address of welcome, but the Archduke burst out, “What is the good of your speeches? I come to Serajevo on a visit and get bombs thrown at me. It is outrageous.” With that burst of temper the Archduke went back to his car, intending to go to the hospital to see how badly his Chief of Staff had been injured. At the rate of speed at which his car traveled it took only two minutes to return to this corner from the Town Hall, but here his car had to slow down to make the turn. You can see for yourself that the turn is a sharp one and the street is not very wide. THE AUSTRO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 165 Prinzip and the rest of them were waiting here just around the corner, and Prinzip himself jumped on the running board of the car before it had time to resume its speed. What he did is history. Both the Archduke and his wife were dead almost before the car could be stopped. It happened just here, on this patch of new pavement on which we are standing. It is interesting to follow briefly the career of Dimitri jevitch, who led the plot. If the cul- pable members of the Serbian civil government have remained to gloat over the assassination, such was not the good fortune of Dimitri jevitch. By 1916 it began to appear that there was a reasonable prospect that the Central Powers would win the War, and particularly that Austria would conquer Serbia. Pashitch and his asso- ciates were panic-stricken, lest in such an eventu- ality the Austrian government should take up once more the question of the responsibility for the murder plot of 1914 and discover the com- plicity of the cabinet. Hence it was decided that Dimitri jevitch must be removed. The plans for his murder were put under the general super- vision of General Zivkovitch and this same Ljuba Jovanovitch, who has more recently re- vealed the prior knowledge possessed by Serbian cabinet concerning the plot. At first an attempt was made to assassinate Dimitri jevitch, but this failed. The Serbian government then resorted to a faked-up charge of treason, and 166 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR condemned Dimitri jevitch to death by what was a most notorious and obvious process of judicial murder. He was shot at Saloniki in June, 1917. It is one of the most curious ironies of fate in all history that the very information which the Serbian government hoped would pass out of existence with the death of Dimitri jevitch was actually later revealed to the world by the same man who was in general charge of the plans to put Dimitri jevitch out of the way. 19 3. Serbian and Russian Responsibility In the light of these facts we must certainly agree with Professor Fay that! the full responsi- bility for the immediate crisis, which ultimately was manipulated into the origins of a general European war, falls entirely upon Serbia!) 20 From what has been said above it will be seen that the Serbian Government was doubly responsible for the crime which became the occasion of the World War. It was responsible for permitting, in spite of its promises of 1909, the subversive nationalistic agi- tation of the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated agents, which tended to encourage a series of political assas- sinations of Austrian personages, of which the Sara- jevo crime was but the culmination. It also w r as re- sponsible for the Serbian officers who directly aided in the preparation of the plot in Belgrade and the successful smuggling of the assassins and their weapons across the frontier from Serbia into Bosnia. Fur- THE AUSTEO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 167 thermore, the Pashitch Cabinet was aware of the plot for nearly a month, but took no effective steps to prevent its execution or to warn the Archduke of the impending danger. Even Professor Seton-Watson admits that un- less new facts can be brought forth to disprove the assertions of Stanojevitch, Jovanovitch and Nenadovitch, the Serbian government must be held responsible for having plotted an assassina- tion designed to advance Serbian national aspira- tions through provoking a European war: 21 Public opinion in Europe and America is more interested than ever in the problem of responsibility for the Great War, and is entitled to demand a full and detailed explanation from Ljuba Jovanovitch and from his chief, Mr. Pashitch. Failing that, it will henceforth be necessary for the historian, while ex- posing the aggressive Balkan policy of the Ballplatz and emphasizing the criminal negligence of the Austro- Hungarian authorities in Bosnia, to convict the Serbian Government of the calculation that the as- sassination might serve their national ends and in oblivion of the fact that “murder will out.” The crime of Sarajevo is an indelible blot upon the move- ment for Jugoslav unity. As yet no evidence has been forthcoming to alter the facts so thoroughly and impartially amassed by Professor Fay. The anti- Austrian group are eagerly awaiting Seton-Watson’s Sarajevo, but if he has anjdhing with which to re- 168 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR fute Professor Fay’s major contentions, he has not revealed it in his recent review of Miss Dur- am’s book. It is important to note, however, that both Fay and Seton-Watson deny that these facts justified the action of Austria following June 28, 1914. 22 We shall examine this matter more thoroughly later, but it would seem that what- ever the element of unwisdom in the Austrian policy, in an absolute or cosmic sense, there can be no doubt whatever that any other modern v state placed in Austria’s position in the summer of 1914 would certainly have acted as severely and harshly in the circumstances as did Austria; and, if we may judge from their activities in the past, many would certainly have behaved in a much more rash and precipitate fashion. One only has to call attention to the examples of the activity of Russia in Poland in the nineteenth century, of England in India and Egypt, of the French in Algiers, Morocco and Syria, and of the United States in Cuba and Mexico, to find ample confirmation of the above statement. Austria’s action was unjustifiable and unpardon- able only in the sense that pacific diplomatic negotiations must be viewed by all rational beings as superior to the test and arbitrament of force. But in 1914 no powerful state or group of states had ever set the precedent for behaving in this rational fashion when confronted by an inter- THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 169 national crisis as serious as that which faced Austria after June 28, 1914. As to the degree of the direct responsibility of Russia for the assassination plot, and the problem of whether Russian as well as Serbian officials knew of the plot before it was executed we cannot make any dogmatic statements as yet. Russian encouragement of the general plotting is fully established. The alert Austrian publicist, Dr. Leopold Mandl, declares that Dimitri jevitch worked in collusion with the Russian military attache in Belgrade. Izvolski reports that just after the assassination he received a messenger from the King of Serbia to the effect that “we (the Serbians) have just done a good piece of work.” This would seem to indicate that Izvol- ski must have been informed of the plot in ad- vance of the assassination. Miss Edith Durham, after examining the evidence which exists on the subject, concludes that “there are indications that at least an influential section of the Russian military were cognisant and approved of the plot.” There are some authorities who hold that the Russian Minister in Belgrade and the Rus- sian military attache both knew of the plot, and that the latter worked hand in hand with Dimitri- jevitch. It is even asserted by Vladimirov and Mandl that Dimitri jevitch held up the plans for the plot until the Russian military attache got into touch with the Russian Minister and with 170 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR St. Petersburg, and received Russian approval and the promise of Russia to intervene to protect Serbia from Austria. The exact degree of Rus- sian responsibility and knowledge in the premises is one of the problems of war guilt which de- mands immediate and thorough investigation. We shall never be adequately informed on the subject until the Russians publish the communi- cations between St. Petersburg and Belgrade. 23 4. Serbian Neglect in the Punishment of the Plotters The conduct of the Serbian government after the assassination w r as as remiss as it had been in its failure to warn the Austrian government before the commission of the crime. During nearly a month which intervened between the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the Aus- trian ultimatum to Serbia, the Serbian govern- ment undertook no independent investigation of the responsibility for the murder on June 28tli. Two days after the murder the Austrian Minis- ter at Belgrade inquired from the Serbian government as to the measures already taken or proposed to investigate the responsibility for the double assassination and to punish the guilty. The Serbian government replied that “up till now the police have not occupied themselves with the affair.” 24 Nor did they so occupy them- THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 171 selves in the weeks that followed. During this same period the Serbian press glorified the as- sassins, and proclaimed the act to be a noble patriotic achievement. 240 In estimating the sig- nificance of such an attitude we must remember that the Serbian government had, after 1909, made a solemn promise to the Austrian govern- ment that it would curb the intrigues and plots against Austrian authority and punish those guilty of such activity. Even the historical counsel and advocate of the Jugo- Slavs, Mr. Seton- Watson, can find little to excuse the con- duct of the Serbian government in the weeks following the assassination: 25 The Serbian Government was, however, guilty of a grave blunder in not immediately forestalling Vienna’s demands by instituting a searching inquiry of its own. This omission is only very partially explained by absorption in the electoral campaign. The com- plicity of Major Tankositch and Tsiganovitch be- came known at a very early stage, and it would at least have been good tactics, if nothing else, to take some action against two notoriously suspect charac- ters. Inaction was all the more inexcusable, in view of the frank warning administered by Herr von Zimmermann, the German Foreign Under-Secretary, to the Serbian Charge d’Affaires in Berlin as early as July 1. He emphasized the grave consequences of any failure of Serbia “to do her duty” by proceeding against suspect persons : in that case “one could not tell what would happen.” It is indeed impossible to 172 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR deny Herr von Jagow’s plea that the Belgrade Gov- ernment, though giving official expression to its horror at the crime, took no serious steps either to search for its authors or to check propagandist excesses. Disregarding the advice of its Minister in Vienna, Jovan Jovanovitch, it remained inactive for three weeks, and when at last on July 20 it presented at Berlin a note formally inviting the German Govern- ment to use its good offices at the Ballplatz, and affirm- ing a desire to meet Austria’s demands wherever pos- sible, it was already far too late to produce any effect either in Berlin or Vienna, and in point of fact merely brought down a severe snub from Jagow upon the head of the Charge d’ Affaires. . . . Energetic action by Mr. Pashitch during the week or even fortnight following the murder would not of course have led the war party in Vienna to renounce its aims, but it would undoubtedly have deprived it of its tactical position and increased the chances of friendly mediation from the outside. To this extent, then, the Pashitch Cabinet must share the responsibility" for what befell. It could no doubt plead absorption in an electoral campaign which threatened the whole fu- ture of the Radical Party, but a true grasp of Euro- pean realities should have shown that infinitely more was at stake. Serbian apologists have attempted to extenu- ate the action of Pashitch and his cabinet in 1914 on the ground that there were so many plots and rumors of plots against Austria rife THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 173 in Serbia that the Serbian government would have had little time for anything else if it had taken seriously the reports of every plot and attempted to run it down and punish its instiga- tors, but this seems to the writer a naive and self -condemnatory excuse. If true, it would be a striking reflection upon the degree to which Serbia had made good its promises of 1909 to suppress the plots against Austria. Further, it is apparent from Jovanovitch’s article that the Serbian cabinet in early June, 1914, well understood that the plan to murder the Archduke was no bogus or merely rumored plot, and that they further recognized the seriousness of the plot and the results which might be expected to follow its execution. Much more honest and plausible was the statement of a Serbian student to Miss Edith Durham, a leading English authority on Jugo-Slavia: “Yes, it is a pity so many men were killed (in the World War), but you see our plan has succeeded. We have made Great Serbia.” 26 As Miss Durham has convincingly shown, it is as certain that the Serbian plotters planned to make the assassina- tion of the Archduke the means of precipitating a European war as that the Austrian army and civil government determined to make the same deed the justification for the long delayed punishment of Serbia. The question is merely 174 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR as to which was the more base and dangerous plan. 27 Much has been made of a savage attack upon Miss Durham’s book, The Serajevo Crime, by R. W. Seton-Watson in the Slavonic Review for December, 1925. The anti- Austrian group of historians in this country and England have hailed it with delight and proceeded upon the easy assumption that it leaves her book without a leg to stand on. Quite the opposite is the case. Seton-Watson does not upset or disprove a single vital assertion in this book or in Professor Fay’s erudite articles with regard to the complicity of the Serbian government. It is one of those facile and clever reviews, which, by a deadly assault upon errors in minor details, endeavors to leave the reader with an impression of having over- thrown the major theses of the work. And cer- tainly nothing of which he accuses Miss Durham with respect to her characterization of books or sources of information could be more misleading or unscholarly than his own characterization of Dr. von Wegerer’s Kricgsschuldfrage. Perti- nent here is Dr. Bogitshevich’s criticism of Seton- Watson’s own recent discussion of the Sarajevo crime in the Kriegsschiddfrage for January and February, 1926. The critical reader will prob- ably conclude that the truth lies in the ground intermediate between the versions of Miss Dur- ham and Seton-Watson. THE AUSTIO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 175 in. Austria’s determination to PUNISH SERBIA 1. The Jeopardy of Austria-Hungary The essential background for any comprehen- sion of the Austrian attitude and conduct fol- lowing the assassination must be found in an understanding of the composition and organiza- tion of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. It was made up primarily of a large number of Slavic peoples held together by the domination of the Germans in Austria and Magyars in Hungary. Any serious and successful revolt of one of those subject nationalities would have been a signal for similar efforts on the part of the others, with the resulting disintegration of the whole political structure of the Dual Mon- archy. We need not necessarily take the view that the preservation of the Dual Monarchy was a matter of great moral import for the world at large, but we can readily understand how Austro- Hungarian statesmen would naturally have re- garded it as the most vital necessity in their whole political policy. For some time the great- est menace to the integrity of the Austrian Em- pire had been the plotting of Serbia for the emancipation of the Jugo- Slavs under Austria domination . 28 Serbia was continually an irritat- ing nuisance to Austria — worse than the Mexi- 176 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR can menace to the United States in the palmiest days of Francesco Villa. Judge Bausman has well stated this parallel between Serbia and Mexico: 29 The relation of Serbia towards Austria was like that of Mexico to us at its worst, multiplied tenfold. Let us imagine that in the United States there were several millions of Mexicans, and that a constant in- trigue went on between Mexico and this bodj T of our citizens. To make the illustration simpler, suppose that Mexico was a negro republic and that it was in constant agitation of the negroes of the United States against our government. Is not this a question which we w’ould insist upon settling ourselves, and if some great Power like Russia resolved upon supporting Mexico in any such course of conduct or upon taking out of our hands the right of private settlement of our disputes with Mexico, would we not regard that other Power as aiming at our destruction? American readers can perhaps get some idea of the Austrian feeling by imagining the attitude of the United States if Theodore Roosevelt and his wife had been assassinated at El Paso, Texas, on July 4 , 1901 , while watching a review of the Rough Riders; their assassins having been members of a notorious Mexican secret society which had plotted for years against the United States, with the Mexican papers acclaiming the assassination as a noble and heroic act. There is THE AUSTEO-SERBIAN CRISIS 177 little probability that under these circumstances the United States would even have delayed long enough to send an ultimatum to Mexico. In all probability American military forces would have been rushed into Mexico without any formal diplomatic exchanges whatever. Certainly our conduct in initiating the Spanish- American War was less provoked than that of Austria and no more creditable in the details of its execution. With the assassination of the Archduke the Austrian statesmen believed that a final and definitive solution of the Serbian menace could no longer be postponed with safety. The long record of Serbian broken promises as to the ces- sation and punishment of plots against Austria convinced the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy that decisive steps must now be taken against Serbia. |JEven Sir Edward Grey frankly ad- mitted the situation justified a definite humilia- tion of Serbia . 30 If Serbia was not properly punished, other plots and assassinations might take place subsequently in other parts of the Dual Monarchy with results wholly disastrous to its existence,.! Officials who had earlier been lukewarm in the circumstances now took on a new determination. Even Count Berchtold, the Austrian Foreign Minister, was aroused from his political lethargy and interest in sports to a determined attitude in the situation, and the 178 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, was also soon won over to the policy of strong action against Serbia . 31 2. The Beal Plans of Austro-H ung ary with Be sped to Serbia in the Crisis of 191 A As is the case with most other phases of the pre-War diplomacy, little dependence can be placed in the veracity of the Austrian or Serbian public pronouncements, demands and promises of 1914, and we must seek in the secret telegrams, conferences and minutes of ministerial councils the truth as to the real purposes and plans of Austria in the crisis. Not having at our dis- posal as yet the Serbian archives we cannot ar- rive with such certainty as to the secret decisions of Serbia in this period. The chief source for the discovery of the basic Austrian policy is the minutes of the Austro-Hungarian ministerial council held in Vienna on July 7. 1914. 32 From this we quickly discern the fact that Berchtold and the Austrian ministers desired a sudden sur- prise attack upon Serbia, but were prevented from this foolhardy policy by the opposition of the Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza. He in- sisted that the first move should be adequate diplomatic demands upon Serbia. If these THE ATTSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 179 were refused he would approve a war upon Serbia, provided the Austrian ministers would agree in advance not to annex any part of Serbia. Tisza expressed himself as believing that terri- torial aggrandizement at the expense of Serbia would surely bring in Russia and provoke a European war. Berchtold and his group sharply maintained the opposite position, and contended that even the most thorough-going diplomatic victory over Serbia would be useless, as Serbia could not be trusted to fulfil her prom- ises. War was necessary, and the quicker the better. The longer it was postponed the more dangerous would become the Serbian nuisance, the more overwhelming the military strength of France and Russia and the larger the probabil- ity that they would interfere in any local puni- tive war of Austria upon Serbia. Tisza, never- theless, refused to yield, and the council came to the following decision : 33 1. All present wish for a speedy decision of the con- troversy with Servia, whether it be decided in a warlike or a peaceful manner. 2. The council of ministers is prepared to adopt the view of the Royal Hungarian Premier according to which the mobilization is not to take place until after concrete demands have been addressed to Servia and after being refused, an ultimatum has been sent. 3. All present except the Royal Plungarian Premier 180 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR hold the belief that a purely diplomatic success, even if it ended with a glaring humiliation of Servia, would be worthless and that therefore such stringent de- mands must be addressed to Servia, that will make a refusal almost certain, so that the road to a radical solution by means of a military action should be opened. Tisza not only opposed the war plans at the outset in the ministerial council, but also ex- pressed the same views in a letter to the Austrian Emperor on July 8th. Within the next ten days, however, Tisza yielded in some degree to the pressure of Berchtold, Krobatin, Bilinski, Sturgkh, Forgach, Hoyos and others of the war party and, at a second ministerial council held on July 19th, consented to sending an ulti- matum so severe that it could scarcely be expected that Serbia would accept it, with the result that Austria would then intervene through a military invasion of Serbia. 34 Tisza still insisted, how- ever, that the military action must he preceded by diplomatic action, and that there be a public declaration at the beginning of the actual war- fare that Austria intended no annexations or dismemberment at the expense of Serbia. He forced the council to make the following declara- tion: 35 The Common Council of Ministers at the proposi- tion of the Royal Hungarian Premier votes that as soon as the war begins, the monarchy declares to the THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 181 foreign powers that no war for conquest is intended, nor is the annexation of the kingdom (of Servia) con- templated. The Austrian Chief of Staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf, in his unusually frank and illumi- nating memoirs, candidly reveals the fact that the army group in Austria were from the first for quick and decisive military action against Serbia, and were greatly irritated by the necessity of awaiting prior diplomatic activities purely for the purpose of making a favorable influence upon European public opinion . 36 Some writers have quite legitimately pointed out the fact that in his letter to the Kaiser, drafted on July 2, 1914, the Austrian Emperor had stated that “my government’s efforts must in the future be directed to isolating Serbia and re- ducing its size.” The Austrian war party was undoubtedly in favor of this policy. But Tisza quickly pointed out the fact that such a program would, in all probability, bring about the inter- vention of Russia and produce a European war. He, therefore, forced the change of policy which we have just described above. After Austria had proclaimed before Europe that she would respect Serbian territory there was little probabil- ity that she would attempt to violate this promise. Even Sazonov admitted that he believed Austria on this point. Hence, what the Emperor may 182 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR have stated on July 2nd, or what Berchtold and his group may have wished for before being blocked by Tisza, can in no sense be regarded as the basis of Austrian policy after July 23rd. Likewise, the marginal note of the Kaiser, stat- ing that Austria must become ascendant in the Balkans at the expense of Russia and Serbia, can- not be held to be his dominating attitude after he later changed his mind when Serbia made her apparent conciliatory reply to Austria. From the above it will be quickly discernible that only in the light of these secret documents can we approach intelligently the policies and communications of Austria-Hungary in 1914 in regard to Serbia. Without these we might natu- rally suppose that Austria desired a diplomatic and juristic adjustment, when she actually aimed at nothing of the kind. The ultimatum of Austria to Serbia was to be purely a ruse to create a more favorable impression upon Euro- pean opinion than might be expected to follow a precipitate military occupation of Serbia. This stratagem, it was believed, would make France and Russia less likely to intervene to prevent a local punitive war, particularly when coupled with the promise to respect the terri- torial integrity of Serbia. In other words, the Austrian ultimatum had a purpose identical in character with that of the French frontier with- THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 183 drawal order of July 30th. On the other hand, this proof that Austria from the beginning in- tended war, and that the ultimatum was not only severe but not made in good faith, does not in itself demonstrate that Austria was wrong or immoral in her conduct. Such a conclusion could be arrived at only by proving that anything less than war would have been adequate to clear up the Serbian menace, and by showing that Austria could have proceeded to a war with Serbia in some manner less likely to incite Russia and France to legitimate intervention. No one, to the writer’s knowledge, has yet been able to bring forward conclusive evidence to establish either of these two potential indictments of Austrian procedure. 37 | One critical writer has contended that Austria might have solved the Jugo-Slav problem by a more liberal policy in regard to the Slavic peoples within the Austrian Empire, but he apparently overlooked a fact to which we have already called attention, namely, that it was just such a prospective policy on the part of the Archduke which led the Serbians to feel that he must be assassinated. There was nothing which the ad- herents to the Greater Serbia idea moreyfea'red than a change of Austrian policy which would make Serbians contented with Austrian rule and reluctant to fight for independence. 184 genesis of the world war 3. Germany Agrees to Support Austria in Punishing Serbia Two steps were essential before launching upon the scheme of punishment. One was to obtain the consent of Germany to the punitive policy, and the other was to carry out a careful investiga- tion of the assassination plot and of the responsi- bility of the Serbian government in the premises. Down to June 28, 1914, Germany had con- sistently opposed forcible Austrian intervention against Serbia. As late as July 1, 1914, Count Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, accused the Kaiser of special fondness for Serbia. 38 But Berchtold and Hotzendorf believed that the Kaiser would be so horrified by this last Serbian outrage that he would at last give his consent to strong Austrian measures against Serbia. They counted rightly upon the Kaiser’s change of heart. Berchtold formulated a personal letter from the Austrian Emperor to the Kaiser, calling attention to the imminent dangers which threat- ened the Dual Monarchy as the result of the Serbian plots which had culminated in the assas- sination of Franz Ferdinand, and asking for Ger- man approval of such punitive action against Serbia as Austria might find necessary. 39 One of Berchtold’s subordinates, Hovos, was s ent from ViennaM o Berlir g wi t h this mes sage, which was presented to the Kaiser on July 5 by the THE AU STllO - SERBIAN CRISIS 185 Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, Count Szog- yeny . 40 The next day Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, transmitted to Szogyeny the official statement of the policy of supporting Austria which the Kaiser and his ministers had decided uppn . 41 Austria must judge what is to be done to clear up her relation to Serbia ; whatever Austria’s decision may turn out to be, Austria can count with certainty upon it, that Germany will stand behind her as an ally and friend. Bethmann-Hollweg also telegraphed to Tschir- schky, the German Ambassador at Vienna: 42 As far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course, cannot interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his competence. The Emperor Franz Jos- eph may, however, rest assui’ed that His Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-Hungary, as is required by the obligations of his alliance and of his ancient friend- ship. This is the famous blank cheque which Ger- many gave to Austria. That this reversal of the previous restraining policy of Germany was foolish and ill-advised cannot be deniedv~AChe Kaiser himself, later in the month, frankly ad- j mitted this to be the case, and remarked in high ' irritation that he and Bethmann-Hollweg had thereby inserted their necks into a noose, 43 — the 186 GENESIS OF THE VOELD WAR complete truth of which assertion he very im- perfectly understood in 1914. Yet it must be kept clearly in mind that on July 5th the Kaiser felt certain that Austria would be able to take all necessary steps against Serbia without bringing on a European war. It should also be pointed out that Poincare had given Russia what amounted to a free hand in the Balkans in the fall of 1912; and, on his trip to St. Petersburg later in July, 1914, he gave Russia the same complete blank cheque in regard to the Austro- Serbian crisis that the Kaiser had extended to Austria on July 6, 1914. 44 \ And while the Kaiser only hastily and in a state of unusual excitement permitted his ally to undertake a program which was deemed essential to the in- tegrity of the Dual Monarchy, with the firm be- lief that such punitive policy would not bring about a general European war, Poincare calmly and deliberately encouraged Russia so to act, where her national safety and territorial integrity were in no sense at stake, that a general Euro- pean war would be inevitable . 45 \ 4. The Austrian Investigation of the Assassination Plot The secret investigation of Serbian responsi- bility for the assassination of the Archduke, which was ordered by Count Berchtold. was en- THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 187 trusted to Dr. Friedrich von Wiesner, who spent the three days from July 11 to July 13 at Sarajevo investigating the evidence which had been brought together for his scrutiny. His general conclusion was that while the Serbian government could not be proved to have in- stigated the plot, nevertheless the plot had originated in Serbia and had been carried out by secret societies whose activity had been tolerated by the Serbian government. 46 On April 4, 1919, the experts of the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, Sec- retary of State Robert Lansing, and Dr. James Brown Scott, cited as the only essential part of the von Wiesner report to Count Berchtold the following paragraph: 47 Herr von Wiesner to the Ministry of Foreign Af- fairs in Vienna: Serajevo, July 13th, 1914. 1.10 p. m. Nothing to show or even to lead one to conjecture the complicity of the Serbian Government or that it directed or prepared the crime or that it supplied the weapons used. On the contrary there is evidence that would appear to show that such complicity is out of the question. How far this single paragraph, torn from its context is in reality from being the gist of von Wiesner’s report may be seen from the fol- 188 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR lowing complete statement of von Wiesner’s memorandum to Berchtold : 48 That Pan-Serbian propaganda is being carried on here from Serbia as a centre, not only through the press but also through Clubs and other organizations, and further that this is taking place with the en- couragement as well as with the knowledge and ap- proval of the Serbian Government, is the conviction of authoritative circles here. The material that has been laid before me by the civil and military authorities as the basis on which they have formed their conviction may be characterized as follows : the material belong- ing to the period preceding the assassination offers no evidence that would lead me to suppose that propa- ganda was encouraged by the Serbian Government. There is, however, material which though sparse is suf- ficient to show that this movement with Serbia as a centre was fostered by Clubs with the toleration of the Serbian Government. Investigation of the crime: There is nothing to show the complied} 7 of the Ser- bian Government in the directing of the assassination or in its preparation or in the supplying of weapons. Nor is there anything to lead one even to conjecture such a thing. On the contrar} 7 , there is evidence that would appear to show that such complicity is out of the question. From the statements of the persons charged with the crime, it has been ascertained in a manner hardly controvertible that the crime was re- solved upon in Belgrade and that it was prepared with the assistance of a Sei’bian state official named Cigan- THE A U STRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 189 ovic and of Major Tancosic, these two men providing the bombs, ammunition and cyanide of potassium. The participation of Pribicevic has not been proven and the first reports on this point are due to a re- grettable misunderstanding on the part of the police authorities investigating the case. It has been proved objectively and beyond all doubt that the bombs origi- nally came from the Serbian army magazine at Kragu- jevac, but there is no evidence to show that they had only recently been taken from this magazine for the special purpose for which they were employed, as the bombs may have belonged to the war stores of the Comitatschis. Judging by the statements made by the accused, we can scarcely doubt that Princip, Cabrinovic and Grabez were secretly smuggled across the frontier into Bosnia with bombs and arms by Serbian organs at the instigation of Ciganovic. These organized transports were conducted by the Frontier Captains at Schabatz and Loznica and carried out by organs of the excise guards. Even though it has not been ascertained whether these men were aware of the purpose of the journey, they must surely have assumed the mysterious nature of the mission. Other investigations made sub- sequent to the assassination throw light upon the or- ganization of the propaganda of the Narodna Od- brana. The material obtained is valuable and can be turned to account. It has yet to be carefully^ exam- ined. Investigations are being made with all speed. In the event of intentions which prompted my de- parture still remaining unchanged, the demands could be still further extended: 190 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR (a) The suppression of co-operation of Serbian government organs in the smuggling of persons and articles across the frontier. (b) Dismissal of Serbian Frontier Captains at Scha- batz and Loznica, as well as of the excise guard organs concerned. (c) Prosecution of Ciganovic and Tankosic. I leave this evening, arriving Vienna Tuesday eve- ning. Will come straight to the Ministry. It is nec- essary that I should supplement my remarks with verbal report. 5. The Austrian Ultimatum and the Serbian lie ply Austria delayed ten days more before send- ing her ultimatum to Serbia. Up to July 14th the delay had been chief!}' to have time to convert Count Tisza to vigorous action against Serbia, and to aivait the report of Dr. von WiesnerA, The ten days’ delay between July 14th and July ^Srd, when the ultimatum was ultimately dis- patched, was due to the Austrian desire to allow time for Poincare to leave St. Petersburg and be on his way back to France before the ultimatum was delivered. 49 Austria preferred to have Poin- care out of Russia before she made her demands upon Serbia, for she quite correctly feared that Poincare would incite the Russians to interven- tion. which would make it all the more difficult to THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 191 localize the Austrian punishment of Serbia . 50 This demonstrates, however, that Austria desired, above all, to avoid a European war; otherwise she would have wished to submit her ultimatum while Poincare was in St. Petersburg, in order to make the world conflict that much more certain and inevitable. We now know that Austria’s precautions in this respect were all in vain. Though Poincare did not know of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum when he was in St. Petersburg, he urged the Russians to take a strong stand in regard to whatever action Austria decided upon, and promised complete French aid to the Russians in whatever policy they decided upon. This promise was subse- quently confirmed by Paleologue, and by Viviani from Reval on July 24th. 51 fin his defense of his alleged innocence as to war guilt in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, Poincare naively sug- gests that Austria desired to have him out of Russia before sending the ultimatum, because she felt that if he were on his way home there would be much greater probability of localizing the punitive action against Serbia. He does not'i seem to realize that this statement is a boomer- ang, and one of the best bits of evidence which i we have that Austria ardently desired torRyoid a general European war J. In formulating the specific terms of the ulti- matum Austria acted entirely independently of 192 GENESIS OF THE FOELD WAR Germany. Bethmann-Hollweg did not receive a copy of the ultimatum until the evening of July 22, the night before its delivery, and the Kaiser first learned of the terms through a newspaper ac- count which he read while on his vacation cruise.’" Both Bethmann-Hollweg and von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, believed the ultimatum too harsh, 53 but made no effort to protest, as they still adhered to the policy they had enunciated on July 6th of allowing Austria a free hand in the premises. The actual text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia here follows: 04 On the 31st March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on the instructions of the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government: “Servia recognizes that the fait accompli regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to the decisions that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Pow- ers Servia undertakes to renounce from now onward the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last Autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the di- rection of her polic}^ with regard to Austria-Hungary and to live in the future on good neighborly terms with the latter.” The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th June last, have shown the existence of a subversive movement with the object of THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 193 detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian Government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest on both sides of the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders. Far from carrying out the formal undertakings con- tained in the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress these movements. It has permitted the criminal mach- inations of various societies and associations directed against the monarchy and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the press, the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifesta- tions of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the monarchy and contempt of its institu- tions. This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian Gov- ernment had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th June last proved its fatal consequences to the whole world. Its results from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th June that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and, finally, that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized 194 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR and effected by the chiefs of the Servian frontier service. The above-mentioned results of the Magisterial in- vestigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian Gov- ernment to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in face of the machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose on it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the monarchy. To achieve this end the Imperial and Royal Govern- ment sees itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian Government a formal assurance that it con- demns this dangerous propaganda against the mon- archy; in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the monarchy territories belonging to it, and that it under- takes to suppress by every means this criminal and terrorist propaganda. In order to give a formal character to this under- taking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its Official Journal of the 26th June (13th July) the following declaration: “The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary — i. e., the general tendency of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy territories be- longing to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal conse- quences of these criminal proceedings. “The Royal Government regrets that Servian offi- cers and functionaries participated in the above- THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 195 mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st March, 1909. “The Royal Government, which disapproves and re- pudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to inter- fere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to anticipate and suppress.” This declaration shall simultaneously be communi- cated to the royal army as an order of the day by his Majesty the King and shall be published in the Official Bulletin of the army. The Royal Servian Government further undertakes: 1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity ; 2. To dissolve immediately the society styled Na- rodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propa- ganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Servia which en- gage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another namfe-and form ; 3. To eliminate without delay from public instruc- 196 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR tion in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary ; 4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and func- tionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves to itself the right of communicating to the Royal Government ; 5. To accept the collaboration in Servia of repre- sentatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy 7 ; 6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Servian terri- tory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Govern- ment will take part in the investigation relating thereto ; 7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the magisterial inquiry at Serajevo; 8. To prevent by effective measures the co-operation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier, to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by 7 facilitating their passage across the frontier ; 9. To furnish the Imperial and Roy 7 al Government THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 197 with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utter- ances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official position, did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th June to ex- press themselves in interviews in terms of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government ; and, finally, 10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures com- prised under the preceding heads. The Austro-Hungarian Government expects the re- ply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o’clock on Saturday evening, the 25th July. A memorandum dealing with the results of the mag- isterial inquiry at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads (7) and (8) is attached to this note. As to the nature and justifiability of this ulti- matum there is ample opportunity for the widest variety of opinions . 55 From the standpoint of the Austrian statesmen, however, who had as their background the long period of intrigues and broken promises on the part of Serbia, and who were faced on the immediate occasion with the hideous murder of their prospective monarch, it can scarcely be held that they could have been expected to adopt a more moderate or con- ciliatory tone. What even so unmilitary a presi- dent as Woodrow Wilson demanded of Mex- ico in the Vera Cruz incident and the Persh- ing expedition into Mexico shows clearly 198 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR enough that the United States has been willing to make even more severe demands upon an ad- joining independent sovereign state without anything like so serious an offense on the part of Mexico . 56 It is assuredly true that the fifth demand of Austria, to the effect that Serbia should accept the collaboration of Austrian authorities in suppressing Serbian intrigues against Austria, was scarcely compatible with the rights and dignity of a sovereign state. The vital question at issue is as to whether, in the light of her conduct towards Austria, Serbia was really entitled to be treated as an independ- ent and civilized political community . 57 It is certain that the total failure of Serbia’s past promises to put down intrigues against Austria within her boundaries had made it quite apparent to the Vienna statesmen that Serbia could not be trusted to carry out her promises in this regard. If there was to be any prospect of a suppression of the nationalistic plots, this would have to be achieved under Austrian super- vision, however much this might intrude upon the sovereignty of Serbia. It must be clear then that point five was the real core of the Austrian ultimatum. For Serbia to reject this meant for all practical purposes the rejection of the whole ultimatum ; but this was exactly the point which Serbia refused to concede. This demonstrates the fallacy in the easy remark of many commen- THE AUSTRO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 199 tators to the effect that Serbia acceded to all of the Austrian demands save one . 58 Nevertheless, our knowledge that the Austrian civil authorities shaped their policy wholly with the aim in view of forcing a situation where war with Serbia would be inevitable, and with a com- plete determination not to rest satisfied with even sweeping diplomatic and juristic triumphs, makes it impossible for the informed reader to take very seriously the Austrian defense of the ultimatum as a document designed to effect a pacific adjustment of the crisis with Serbia. One may forgive the Austrians for desiring a war with Serbia, but he can have little respect for their quibbling and pretensions about a will- ingness to settle the dispute by diplomatic nego- tiations and juristic processes. The Austrians ivould have been as much disappointed if the . Serbians had fully accepted their ultimatum as Sir Edward Grey would have been if Germany had not invaded Belgium . 59 The Serbian reply to the Austrian ultimatum can only be understood when viewed in the light of the plans of France and Russia. If Austria hypocritically planned her diplomatic approach to the Serbian problem in order to make the pro- posed punitive war more palatable to European opinion, so did France and Russia similarly^uti- lize the opportunity afforded by the Serbian answer better to prepare Europe for the initia- 200 GENESIS OF THE WORLD TV A R tion of the European conflict involved in their program. France and Russia desired to avoid, above all, either a truculent and arrogant attitude or an actual declaration of war on the part of Serbia. European opinion was still on the side of Austria on account of the murder of the Arch- duke. For Serbia to make a haughty and insult- ing reply to the Austrian demands would have made matters still worse. For her to declare war on Austria would not only affect European opin- ion very unfavorably, but would precipitate hos- tilities before Russia could get mobilized over her vast area. The first efforts of France and Russia were, therefore, directed towards securing an extension of time for the Serbian reply, so as to give France, and particularly Russia, more time for their military preparations before Austria de- clared war on Serbia. We know from Dobrorol- ski that the Russian army officials assumed that the European war was on when they heard of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Baron Schilling has recently revealed the fact that Sazo- nov expressed the same opinion. In fact, on reading the Austrian ultimatum he specifically exclaimed: “C’est la guerre europeenne If France and Russia were to precipitate a Euro- pean war in the guise of protectors of Serbia, it was necessary to do everything possible to make such intervention attractive before European and THE AU STRO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 201 world opinion. Serbia must be made to appear a “brave and innocent little country” who had gone to extreme limits in surrendering to the Aus- trian demands — but had not quite acquiesced. For Serbia to have acceded to all of the Austrian demands would have been as embarrassing to F ranee and Russia as to Austria. To carry out this program of putting the “soft- pedal” on Serbia, the Russian Ministerial Coun- cil of July 24, 1.914, decided to advise Serbia to avoid above everything else declaring war on Austria, and to make a response conciliatory in tone and content alike. France went even fur- ther. Philippe Berthelot, deputy political direc- tor of the French Foreign Office, and an ex- tremely influential person with Poincare and the Paris politicians, got hold of M. Vesnitch, Ser- bian Minister in Paris, and drafted in outline the Serbian reply to Austria. This reply, as we shall see, was formulated in very conciliatory language, feigned great friendliness for and humility toward Austria, and seemed to consent to everything of significance in the Austrian ul- timatum, while actually rejecting the only really important item in it. In this way, Serbia, as well as France and Russia later, were put in a good light before world opinion and Austria in an equally disadvantageous position when_$he proceeded to carry out the secret plans of the Austrian ministers and attack Serbia. the 202 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR diplomatic ruses of the Entente before the War there was no more clever bit of subterfuge than the planning of the Serbian response to Austria.^ As we shall learn later it sufficed completely to de- ceive even the Kaiser. The Serbian reply, sub- mitted on July 25th, follows. That the Serbians recognized the nature and import of their reply better than the Kaiser is evident from the fact that several hours before the messenger left Bel- grade with the Serbian response to Austria they secretly ordered the mobilization of the entire Serbian army and made arrangements for the evacuation of Belgrade : 60 The Royal Servian Government have received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th (i.e. 23rd, N. S., Author) instant, and are convinced that their reply will remove any misunder- standing which may threaten to impair the good neigh- borly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy and the Kingdom of Servia. Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skupshtina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State — protests which were cut short by the declaration made by the Servian Govern- ment on the 18th March, 1909 — have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Mon- archy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either b} r the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal state of THE AUSTKO-SERBIAN CRISIS 203 affairs created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government draw attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government have made no representation except one concerning a school book, and that on that occasion the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory ex- planation. Servia has several times given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to Servia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of Euro- pean peace that that peace has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for man- ifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies — manifes- tations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule escape official control. The Royal Government are all the less responsible in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose be- tween Servia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the majority of these questions to the advan- tage of the two neighboring countries. For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and surprised at the statements according to which members of the Kingdom of Servia are sup- posed to have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo ; the Royal Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an investiga- tion of all that concerns this crime, and they were ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their attitude, to take measures against any persons con- 204 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR cerning whom representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are prepared to hand over for trial any Servian subject, without regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the “Journal officiel,” on the date of the 13th (26th) July, the following declaration: “The Royal Government of Servia condemn all propaganda which may be directed against Austria- Hungary, that is to say, all such tendencies as aim at ultimately detaching from the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy territories which form part thereof, and they sincerely deplore the baneful consequences of these criminal movements. The Royal Government regret that, according to the communication from the Im- perial and Royal Government, certain Sei’vian officers and officials should have taken part in the above- mentioned propaganda, and thus compromise the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Servian Gov- ernment was solemnly engaged by the declaration of the 31st March, 1909, which declaration disapproves and repudiates all idea or attempt at interference with the destiny of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, and they consider it their duty formally to warn the officei’s, officials, and entire popu- lation of the kingdom that henceforth they will take the most rigorous steps against all such persons as are guilty of such acts, to prevent and to repress which they will use their utmost endeavor.” This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of THE AUSTRO- SERBIAN CRISIS 205 the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin. The Royal Government further undertake : 1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the Skupshtina a provision into the press law provid- ing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Mon- archy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Gov- ernment engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause an amendment to be introduced into Article 22 of the Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the categorical terms of Article 22 of the Constitution. 2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the “Narodna Odbrana” and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Gov- ernment will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the “Narodna Odbrana” Society and every other society which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary. 3. The Royal Servian Government undertake to re- move without delay from their public educational es- tablishments in Servia all that serves or could serve~to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, when- 206 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR ever the Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda. 4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the territory of the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later date the names and acts of these officers and of- ficials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to he taken against them. 5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the de- mand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Roy r al Government upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations. 6. It goes without saying that the Royal Govern- ment consider it their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15th (28th) June, and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Govern- ment cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure ; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 207 in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents. 7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Comman- dant Voislav Tankossitch. As regards Milan Zigan- ovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him. The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the latter inquiry. 8. The Servian Government will reinforce and ex- tend the measures which have been taken for prevent- ing the illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that they will im- mediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass. 9. The Royal Government will gladly give explana- tions of the remarks made by their officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile toward the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, 1 208 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR although the Royal Government will itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs. 10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Governments of the execution of the meas- ures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and carried out. If the Imperial and Royal Government are not sat- isfied with this reply, the Servian Government, consid- ering that it is not to the common interest to precipi- tate the solution of this question, are ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18th (81st) March, 1909. Belgrade, July 12 (25), 1911. As to the adequacy of the Serbian reply there can be as much difference of opinion as over the justice of the Austrian ultimatum. If Serbia had been a highly cultured, truly civilized, and politically developed state, with an excellent record as to the fulfillment of her promises to neighboring nations, it would most certainly have to be admitted that the Serbian reply was relatively adequate in content. In the light of the actual facts concerning Serbian politics and diplomacy, and the history of her relations with Austria in the decade before 1914, it can THE AUSTRO-SEKBIAN CRISIS 209 scarcely be maintained that Austria could have been satisfied short of Serbian acquiescence in the fifth Austrian demand concerning Austrian participation in the investigation of the respon- sibility for the plot to assassinate the Archduke and other similar intrigues in Serbia. 61 That the Serbians themselves recognized the truth of this assertion is to be seen in the fact that three hours before dispatching the messenger with her reply to Austria the Serbian government or- dered the mobilization of the 400,000 men in the Serbian army, and made provision for the aban- donment of Belgrade and retirement to Nich. 62 It must be admitted, however, that the Austrian complaints and arguments as to the unsatisfac- tory nature of the Serbian reply would be far more convincing if we did not possess the notes of the secret Austrian ministerial councils where it had been decided to attempt to force a war upon Serbia, however great the degree of Serbian diplomatic capitulation and humiliation. Likewise, we should have more respect for the reply of Serbia if we were unacquainted with the plans of France and Russia and with the part that they played in determining, not merely the nature, but even the phraseology of the Serbian response. In short, in spite of the large part which the Austrian ultimatum and the Serbian reply have played in the discussions of war guilt, and in 210 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR spite of the space we have devoted to them here, they really have little or no real bearing upon the actual plans and motives of either Austria or Serbia in the crisis. Austria was insistent upon a punitive war no matter what the Serbian attitude, and Serbia was equally determined to resist Austria and enter the local war which she hoped would bring Russia to her rescue and set off the European conflagration that would at its close bring into being Greater Serbia. Be- fore Austria sent the ultimatum she had made full military plans for the invasion of Serbia, and before Serbia sent her reply she had directed the mobilization of her army against Austria, six hours before the Austrian mobilization was or- dered. She had been preparing for the conflict actively for more than a year, and for several months had been receiving shipments of arms from Russia in anticipation of the ultimate struggle with Austria. The Kaiser, as we shall point out more thor- oughly later, regarded the Serbian reply as a quite unexpected and complete concession to Austria, and as removing any justification for Austrian military intervention in Serbia. r ' 3 On the other hand, the Austrians refused to accept this view, and, thoroughly in keeping with their previous secret arrangements, decided upon mili- tary activity against Serbia. On the evening of July 25th, some six hours after the mobilization THE AU STRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 211 of the Serbian army, Austria ordered the mobili- zation of a part of the Austrian forces against Serbia . 64 Germany, impressed by the extensive submis- sion of Serbia, alarmed at the prospect of Russian intervention, and urged on by Sir Edward Grey, began on the 27th of July to press Austria for suspension of military activities and the opening of negotiations with Russia on the Serbian is- sue. 65 To forestall further progress in this policy Berchtold declared war on Serbia at noon on July 28, and then contended that negotiations concerning the Austrian policy in Serbia were no longer possible on account of the outbreak of war. 66 Austria was, thus, determined not to let the crisis of 1914 pass without what seemed to be adequate punitive treatment of Serbia. This she did in spite of the fact that Germany was, after July 27; opposed to her conduct, but she could allege justification in the original blank cheque which Germany had handed her on the 6th of July. The rest of the story as to the strenuous but vain efforts of Germany to re- strain her ally and prevent the development of a general European war will be reserved for a subsequent chapter upon the role of Germany in the crisis of 1914. It will be apparent, how- ever, that as far as the decision upon the policies to be followed in regard to Serbia, both before and after July 25 , is concerned, the responsibility 212 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR falls almost entirely upon the statesmen and diplomats of the Dual Monarchy, though they may have been encouraged by von Moltke . 67 IV. AUSTRIA REJECTS DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS There is no more misleading myth about war guilt than the once popular theory that Austrian policy towards Serbia was decided upon and forced by Germany against the better judg- ment and wishes of Austria, and that, when Austria in terror decided to back down before Russian pressure, Germany stepped into the breach and prevented the success of pacific nego- tiations by a rash, hasty and unjustifiable declar- ation of war on Russia. As Gooch states the case, “the readiness of Austria for an eleventh- hour compromise, of which we heard so much at the beginning of the war, proves to be a leg- end.” 68 The facts about the Austrian attitude towards mediation and negotiations are the following: At the time of sending the ultimatum to Serbia Austria almost simultaneously informed the other powers that her relations to Serbia were a matter which coidd not be submitted to negotia- tion or conferences : 69 We cannot allow the demands which we have ad- dressed to Servia, and which contain nothing that THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 213 would not be considered natural between two neighbors, living in peace and harmony, to be made the subject of negotiations and compromises. This is in tone and content surprisingly like Sazonov’s statement on July 27th that the Rus- sians Avould not submit the Russian policy towards Austria to any outside parties or media- tive processes: 70 If there is any question of exercising a moderating influence on St. Petersburg, we reject it in advance. Germany disapproved of Sir Edward Grey’s proposal for a conference of powers on the Austro-Serbian issue, as she knew this would be rejected by Austria, but she suggested the open- ing of direct negotiations between Vienna and St. Petersburg. Sir Edward Grey heartily ap- proved this plan. 71 Berchtold, as we have pointed out above, desired to avoid even this and declared war on Serbia on July 28th to provide the excuse that the opening of hostilities pre- cluded the possibility of discussing Austro- Serbian relations. But with the increasing prospect of a general European war, Germany became ever more insistent that Austria should open negotiations with Russia concerning Ser- bia. Berchtold remained adamant, if evasive, until the 31st. On that day we learn from Sazonov that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg informed him that Austria was will- 214 GENESIS OE THE WORLD WAR ing to discuss the contents of the ultimatum to Serbia : 72 The Austrian Ambassador called on me and told me that his Government are ready to enter into an ex- change of opinions in reference to the contents of the ultimatum sent to Serbia. I expressed my gratification and remarked to the Ambassador that it would be preferable to have these negotiations in London under participation of the Great Powers. We hope that the English Government will accept the management of this conference, whereby it would oblige all Europe to gratitude. To assist these negotiations to a suc- cessful end it is most desirable that Austria discon- tinue her military operations on Serbian territory. On July 31st (telegram left Vienna at 1 a. m. August 1st) Berchtold communicated to Count Szogyeny, the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin, the following statement of his alleged willingness to accept Sir Edward Grey’s proposal of media- tion between Austria and Serbia, copies of which were also sent to the Austrian Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg: 73 I beg your Excellency to thank the State Chancellor very much for the information forwarded to us through Herr von Tschirschky and to declare to him that we, in spite of the change of the situation occasioned by the mobilisation of Russia, and fully appreciating the efforts of England for the maintenance of the world’s peace, are ready to approach the proposal of Sir Edward Grey of a mediation between us and Serbia. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 215 We pre-suppose of course that our military action against the kingdom shall meanwhile continue and that the English Cabinet shall make the Russian Govern- ment stop the mobilisation directed against us, in which case we would of course also stop the defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which the Rus- sian mobilisation has forced us to undertake. That this assumed acceptance of mediation by Berchtold was scarcely reliable or made in good faith is apparent from the fact that earlier on July 31st the Emperor of Austria had tele- graphed the Kaiser that Austria would not hold up her military activities in Serbia on account of the Russian threat, that he recognized the serious implications of this decision, and that he counted upon the armed assistance of Germany in the probable European war which might fol- low continued Austrian hostilities in Serbia : 74 The action my army is involved in at this moment against Servia cannot be interrupted by the threaten- ing and insolent attitude of Russia. A renewed rescue of Servia by Russian intervention would have the most serious consequences for my countries and I can therefore in no case admit of such an intervention. I am fully aware of the importance of my decisions and have made them, confiding in the justice of God, with the absolute certainty that your army, as an unfailingly true ally will stand by my country and the Triple Alliance. 216 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR It is, thus, quite obvious that neither Sazonov nor Berchtold was acting in good faith in their discussions of a diplomatic settlement on July 31st. Berchtold insisted on defying the Kaiser by continuing the campaign against Serbia, in- stead of resting satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade. Any talk by Sazonov at this time about negotiations was likewise pure hypocrisy, as the Russian general mobilization had been go- ing on for twenty-four hours, and hence Sazonov knew that the European war was on and could not be stopped. Austria, therefore, steadfastly refused to re- spond to German pressure for negotiation with Russia concerning the Serbian crisis until after Russia had ordered and proclaimed her fatal gen- eral mobilization which meant an inevitable and unavoidable European war. Her apparent will- ingness to discuss the Serbian affair at this late date was in all probability a fake and ruse, like the ultimatum itself, though we cannot be sure that this was the case, as Russia, England and France refused to “call her bluff'’ and went ahead with their war plans. 75 It was the premature Russian general mobilization which made it impossible for Germany to bring her pressure upon Austria to a logical completion and for Europe to test the genuineness or falsity of the avowed Austrian capitulation on July 31st. It was not, as some have contended, the German ultimatum to Rus- THE AUSTRO-SEEBIAN CRISIS 217 sia, which came surprisingly late and was as justi- fiable as it was inevitable. As to whether Aus- tria would have persisted in her stubborn deter- mination to continue her Serbian campaign if she had been sure that she and Germany would be attacked by Russia, France, England and Italy, we cannot be certain, but it does seem that she was willing to risk a war between herself and Germany and France and Russia rather than hold up the Serbian invasion. Grey’s evasive- ness certainly encouraged Austria. V. AUSTRIAN AND KUSSIAN OBJECTIVES IN THE SERBIAN CRISIS OF 1914 The part played by Russia in the Austro- Serbian crisis is a complicated but important as- pect of the case. \J.t was the Russian interven- tion which transformed the local punitive war into a conflict of European proportions. This much is certain, namely, that Austria was far more justified in military intervention to punish Serbia than was Russia in the military interven- tion to protect Serbia, particularly as even Rus- sian officials fully admitted that they were satis- fied that Austria did not contemplate depriving Serbia of any of her territory. Nothing could well be more misleading than the conventional notion that Russia was bound by either the dictates of international morality or the obli- 218 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR gations of a treaty to intervene to protect Ser- bia. The fact is that the Serbian affair of 1914 was merely the incident for which France and Russia had been waiting in the Balkans for at least two years in the hope of a fortunate time for the precipitation of general European hos- tilities . 70 Russia had betrayed Serbia in 1908 when she believed that she could secure the Straits by this action. Perhaps most astonishing of all is the fact that in the secret negotiations with Turkey from October to December, 1911, Russia offered to protect Turkey from the Bal- kan states if Turkey would give Russia the free- dom of the Straits. Russia had, further, en- couraged the Balkan League as a means of get- ting the Turk out of Europe, but this failed. Izvolski had long been convinced that war was the only solution of the Russian program, and Sazonov had been converted to this position by December, 1913, and so informed the Tsar. Even more, the Russian encouragement of Ser- bian plots against Austria, with the promise of aid against Austria, removed any moral justifi- cation for Russian intervention to protect Ser- bia from the just punishment which her actions merited. As far as the writer knows, Russia was under no treaty obligation to protect Serbia. The writer has been informed by an American diplomat formerly in St. Petersburg that there THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 219 was such a treaty, negotiated in 1905 and to run for ten years. No importance can be attached to this allegation, however, unless later confirmed from the documents. 77 But whatever attitude one may take concern- ing the justification of the Austrian response to the Serbian reply to her ultimatum, this much is clear, namely, that Austria did not at any time contemplate or desire a general European war. What she was determined upon was purely a punitive invasion of Serbia. She was appar- ently willing to risk bringing on a European war rather than desist from her Serbian foray, but she certainly did not desire to have general complications arise out of her policy. A Euro- pean war would naturally divert her forces away from Serbia toward a protection of her frontiers against the Russians, and possibly the Italians, the latter of whom had gradually slipped away from the Triple Alliance after the beginning of the present century. When the World War broke out later there was actually great confu- sion as a result of the necessity of transferring Austrian troops from Serbia to the Russian frontier. There is here a difference of the ut- most significance for assessing the responsibility of Austria on the one hand, and France and Russia on the other, for the outbreak of the World War. The Austrian policy was one 220 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR which envisaged a strictly local conflict and re- garded a possible European war as a disastrous interference with its main objectives, while from the beginning the policy of Russia and France in 1914 looked forward to the deliberate precipi- tation of a universal European conflict. Without keeping in mind this vital distinction between the type of war desired by Austria and unwillingly tolerated by Germany, and that worked for by France and Russia from July 23rd to August 1st, it is as impossible to assess the degree of war guilt shared by the various powers as it would be to make the attempt to do so without consulting the collections of docu- ments published since 1919. While the very ex- istence of Austria was at stake, the safety and territorial integrity of Russia were in no sense directly involved in the Serbian crisis. Nothing could be more erroneous than to hold that Rus- sia was as much justified in intervening to pro- tect Serbia as was Austria in intervening to punish her. VI. CONCLUSIONS The following conclusions as to the Austro- Serbian crisis and its bearing upon the genesis of the World War seem justified: (1) There was an intense nationalistic spirit among the Serbians, who desired to unite the southern Slavic peoples into a great Serbian THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 221 kingdom. This aspiration was encouraged by Russia, and was obstructed by Austria-Hungary. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina in 1908 had been a severe blow to this Serbian aspiration and to Serbian pride. At this time Serbia promised to cease plotting against Austria, but this date actually marks the beginning of more active and widespread Ser- bian intrigues against Austria. (2) The Serbian plans for a Greater Serbia could not be harmonized with the interests and territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. They were still further menaced by the proposal of Franz Ferdinand, once be became Emperor of Austria, to unite all the Slavs in the Dual Mon- archy into a Slavic kingdom to be federated with Austria and Hungary in a triple union. (3) The Serbians decided that Franz Ferdi- nand must be assassinated to forestall this plan and also to provoke a general European war in which, through the aid of Russia, they hoped to bring to realization the Greater Serbia program. (4) The assassination of the Archduke was planned by a high-ranking officer of the Serbian army, who furnished the assassins with arms and ammunition, trained them in pistol shooting, and smuggled them into Bosnia to await the coming of the Archduke. The Serbian civil govern- ment was fully aware of the plot a month before its execution, but did nothing to prevent it from 222 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR being carried out and failed to warn the Austrian government as to the peril of the Archduke. (5) Serbia undertook no independent investi- gation of the responsibility for the assassination, made no effort to suppress the intriguers, and the Serbian press praised the assassination as a patriotic act and a glorious national achieve- ment. (6) The assassination was a real challenge to the continued existence of the Dual Monarchy, and demanded severe retaliation. Even Sir Edward Grey conceded the fact that the Ser- bians would have to be humiliated. (7) Austria-Hungary decided that nothing short of a punitive war would suffice to put the Serbian situation under safe control, but Count Tisza forced the Austrian authorities to go through the form of prior diplomatic pressure on Serbia. Hence, the Austrian ultimatum was deliberately framed in such fashion that the Serbians were likely to refuse certain points. The Serbian reply, drafted in outline, if not in detail, in the French Foreign Office, was de- signed so as to create a favorable impression on European opinion, through its combination of a conciliatory tone and seeming capitulation to Austria with actual rejection of the very core of the Austrian demands. In the light of our present knowledge of Serbian complicity in the murder of the Archduke, Austria would appear THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CRISIS 223 to have been justified in her determination upon war, but this fact does not constitute a full justi- fication of her procedure in detail in 1914. (8) Germany gave Austria a blank cheque in regard to her settlement of the Serbian problem, but she did not have any part in framing the ulti- matum, regarded it as too harsh, held the Ser- bian reply adequate, and opposed the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. (9) When the prospect of Russian interven- tion threatened to precipitate a general Euro- pean war, Germany severely pressed Austria to begin conversations with St. Petersburg in re- gard to the Austro- Serbian dispute, but Austria refused to yield at all for four days, and when she simulated consent on the 31st of July it was too late, as the fatal Russian mobilization, which meant an unavoidable European war, had then been decided upon and proclaimed. " — (JO) Austria was as eager to avoid a Euro- pean war as she was to wage a punitive war on Serbia, and all of her plans in regard to the mode of initiating the war with Serbia were de- termined by this basic desire to avoid a general conflict. (Ill) Russia had no moral right to intervene to protect Serbia, as she had encouraged the Ser- bians in the very intrigues which had necessi- tated their punishment. She had very slight diplomatic or juristic grounds for intervention, 224 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR as Austria from the first steadfastly proclaimed her determination to respect the sovereignty and territory of Serbia. (12) The Austrian war on Serbia did not in itself involve or necessitate a European war. It was the unjustifiable and indefensible interven- tion of Russia, urged on by France, which pro- > duced the wider conflict. SELECTED REFERENCES Bogitshevicli, M., Causes of the War; Durham, E., Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle; “Why I Believe the Serbians deliberately Precipitated the War,” in the Kriegsschuldfrage, July, 1925; “The Guilt of the Serb Government in 1914,” in Foreign Affairs (Eng- lish), December, 1924; “More Light on Sarajevo,” in The Progressive, Februar}^ 1, 1925; Durham, E., The Serajevo Crime; Earle, E. M., Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway; Fay, S. B., “New Light on the Origins of the World War,” in American Historical Review, July and October, 1920; “Serbia’s Responsibility for the World War,” in New York Times Current History Magazine, October, 1925; “The Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War,” Ibid., Novem- ber, 1925: Reply to A. V. Seferovitch, Ibid., December, 1925; Goos, R., Das Wiener Kabinett und die Entsteh- ung des Weltkrieges; (Editor) The Austrian Red Book (English edition, Allen and Unwin) ; Jovanovitch, L., The Murder of Serajevo; Kanner, H., Kaiserliche K at astro phenpolitik ; Montgelas, M., The Case for the Central Powers; Morhardt, M., Les Preuves. Le Crime THE AUSTEO-SERBIAN CRISIS 225 de droit comvmn. Le Crime diplomatique; Renouvin, P., Les Origmes immediates de la guerre; Seton-Watson, R. W., The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy ; “The Murder at Sarajevo,” in Foreign Affairs (American), April, 1925; review of Durham E., The Serajevo Crime, in Slavonic Review, December, 1925, pp. 513-20; Szilassy, J. von, Der Untergang der Donau-monarchie; Temperley, H. W. V., A History of Serbia; Wendel, H., Der Kampf der Siidslawen um Freiheit und Einheit; Wiesner, F. von, “The Forged and the Genuine Text of the ‘Wiesner Documents,’ ” in the Kriegsscliuldfrage, October, 1925 ; “Der Sara- jevoer Mord und die Kriegsscliuldfrage,” in Das Neue Reich (Vienna), August 2, 1924. FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 F. von Wiesner, “The Forged and the Genuine Text of the ‘Wiesner Documents,’ ” in the Kriegsschuldfrage, October, 1925, p. i649. 2 The most elaborate work on this subject is H. Wendel, Der Kampf der Siidslawen um Freiheit und Einheit. See also his Die Habsburger und die Siidslawenfrage. The best books in English are R. W. Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question and the Hapsburg Monarchy ; and E. Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle. Seton-Watson writes from a distinctly anti- Austrian angle. The relation of these issues to the causes of the World War is well presented in M. Bogitshevich, The Causes of the War. There is a realistic brief summary of the question in M. Morhardt, Les Preuves, pp. 20-70. The most recent and complete summary of the Austro-Serbian problem in its rela- tion to the World War is contained in Edith Durham’s book. The Serajevo Crime. See the review of this by R. W. Seton- Watson in the Slavonic Review, December, 1925, pp. 513-20. s Bogitshevich, op. cit.. Annex, xxi; F. Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War; and footnote 23 below. i References as in previous footnote; and E. D. Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal, Senate Document No. 40, 08th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 20-21, 28; and S. B. Fay, “The 226 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR Black Hand Plot that Led to the World War,” in New York Times Current History Magazine, November, 1925. 6 Fay, loc. cit., pp. 203-4. 6 S. B. Fay, “Serbia’s Responsibility for the World War,” in Current History, October, 1925, pp. 42-3. t R. W. Seton-Watson, “The Murder at Sarajevo,” in Foreign Affairs (American), April, 1925, p. 500. s Ibid., pp. 505-6. Cf. A. Mousset, in Le Figaro, May 2, 1924; E. Durham, The Serajevo Crime, pp. 75 ff. s Seton-Watson, Ibid., pp. 500 ff.; Fay, in November Current History, 'passim. 10 S. Stanojevitch, Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Fer- dinand; Durham, op. cit., pp. 96 ff. 11 The Murder of Sarajavo, published in English by the British Institute of International Affairs, 1925. 12 Ibid., p. 3; and Fay, in October Current History, pp. 44—5; Durham, op. cit., pp. 127 ff. 12 Fay, in November Current History, p. 207. ii Ibid., pp. 206—7. Cf. L. Mandl, in the Kriegsschuldfrage, April, 1924, translated in Humanity and Its Problems, Sep- tember-October, 1924, pp. 358-62; Durham, op. cit., pp. 148 ff. is H. W. Steed, The Pact of Konopischt. See the characteriza- tion of this preposterous fabrication by Professor Fay in Cur- rent History for December, 1925, pp. 385-6. is Fay, in November Current History, p. 205. it Ibid. is C. Price, “Serajevo Ten Years After,” in New York Times, June 22, 1924, Section 4, p. 2. is E. Durham, “More Light on Serajevo,” in The Progressive, February 1, 1925; The Serajevo Crime, pp. 158 ff. N. Nena- dovitch, “Die Geheimnisse der Belgrader Kamarilla,” in La FSddration Balcanique, December 1, 1924; M. Bogitshevich, “Weitere Einzelheiten iiber das Attentat von Serajewo,” in the Kriegsschuldfrage, January 1925, pp. 15-21; and Ibid., July, 1925, pp. 437-44; January, 1926, pp. 21-8. 20 Fay, in November Current History, pp. 205-6. 21 Loc. cit., pp. 508-9. 22 Fay, in November Current History, p. 207; Seton-Watson, loc. cit., passim. 23 References above in footnotes 2 and 3; Stieve, op. cit., p. 209; L. Mandl, in Wiener, Neues Act-Uhr Blatt, July 27-28, 1924; Robert Dell, in London Nation and Athenceum, September 19, 1925, p. 723; Bogitshevich, in the Kriegsschuldfrage, July, 1925, pp. 437-44; Durham, op. cit., pp. 196 ff. 24 Morel, op. cit., pp. 28-9; Bogitshevich, Causes of the War, pp. 274—88; Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 73, 292. THE AUSTEO-SEIIBIAN CRISIS 227 2 4 a See S. Ruppricht. in Kriegsschuldfrage, September, 1925, pp. 618 If. 25 loc. cit., pp. 497-99. 26 In Kriegsschuldfrage, July, 1924, p. 258. 27 Ibid., pp. 255-8; The Serajevo Crime; and discussion of Austrian policy below. 28 References as in footnote 2 above. 29 Let France Explain, p. 174. so Ewart, Boots and Causes of the Wars, Vol. II, pp. 1018-19. si Fay, “New Light on the Origins of the World War,” in American Historical Review, July, 1920, pp. 626-39. 32 The Austrian Bed Book (edited by R. Goos), English edition published by Allen and Unwin, three volumes. Vol. I, pp. 22-33. 33 Ibid., p. 30. 34 Ibid., pp. 35-9, 53-58. 85 Ibid., p. 58. so Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus meiner, Dienstzeit, 1906-1918, four volumes. 87 The Austrian policy is condemned by H. Kanner, Kaiserliche Katastrophenpolitik ; and defended by Hans Delbriiek in Der Stand der Kriegssuldfrage, and M. Morhardt, Les Preuves. as Austrian Bed Book, Vol. I, p. 15. 39 Ibid., pp. 1-13. 40 Fay, in American Historical Review, July, 1920, pp. 626-7. 41 Ibid., p. 627; Bed Book, pp. 20-21. 42 The Outbreak of the World War. German Documents Col- lected by Karl Kautsky and edited by Max Montgelas and Wal- ther Schiicking. Translated and published by the Carnegie En- dowment for International Peace, 1924, p. 79. 43 Fay, in American Historical Review, July, 1920, p. 628, foot- note 38. 44 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 106, 113, 209 ff. ; A. Fabre-Luce, La Vic- toire, pp. 208 ff. 45 Morhardt, Les Preuves, pp. 117 ff. 46 Bed Book, Vol. I, pp. 44-5; F. R. von Wiesner, “The Forged and the Genuine Text of the ‘Wiesner Documents,’ ” in the Kriegsschuldfrage, October, 1925, pp. 649-57. 47 Wiesner, loc. cit., p. 650. 48 Ibid., pp. 653-4. 49 Bed Book, Vol. I, pp. 48-50. so, See Poincare’s own naive and damaging admission on this point in Foreign Affairs (American), October, 1914, p. 15. si Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 205 ff.; Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 139 ff. 52 The Outbreak of the World War, pp. 152, 227. 53 Fay, in American Historical Review, July, 1920, p. 636. Bed Book, Vol. I, pp. 58-63. The text reproduced here is 228 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR taken from International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 83, October, 1914. os Compare the bitter criticism of A. Dumaine, La derniere ambassade de France en Autriche with the defense in M. Mor- hardt, Les Preuves; and both with the moderate view in P. Renouvin, Les Origines immediate s de la guerre, pp. 38 ff.; and Ewart, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 1000 ff. 56 J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico. 57 Cf. Morhardt, Les Preuves, pp. 20 ff., 106 ff. ; M. Bogit- slievich, “Die Balkanstaaten,” in Schweizerische Monatshefte fur Politik mid Kultur, March, 1925, pp. 721-32. 58 The writer regards the whole matter as of no vital signifi- cance in the light of the actual plans and motives of both Austria and Serbia. 59 Cf. Red Book, Vol. I, passim; Ewart, op. cit., pp. 134 ff. so R. Viviani, As We See It, pp. 267-8; R. C. Binkley, “New Light on Russia’s War Guilt,” in Current History, January, 1926, pp. 531-3; P. Renouvin, Les Origines immhdiates de la guerre, p. 60; G. Dupin, “M. Raymond Poincare se defend en Amerique,” in La Revue de Hongrie, December 15, 1925, p. 174; International Conciliation Pamphlet, No. 83, October, 1914. 61 Cf. Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 58 ff. 62 Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 106 ff. 63 The Outbreak of the World War, p. 254. 64 Fay, loc. cit., July, 1920, p. 637 ; H. Lutz, in Current His- tory, May, 1925, p. 267. 65 Ewart, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1073 ff. 66 Fay, loc. cit., p. 638; Ewart, pp. 1097-8. 67 Ewart, pp. 1080 ff. 68 Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy , p. 18. 69 Red Book, Vol. I, p. 101. 70 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book (New York edi- tion, Huebsch), p. 17. 71 Ewart, pp. 1084 ff. 72 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 56. 73 Red Book, Vol. Ill, pp. 59-60. 74 Ibid., pp. 44-45. 75 Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 184 ff. 76 See above Chap. iii. 77 Stieve, op. cit., passim; Ewart, op. cit., pp. 930 ff., 1026 ff. CHAPTER Y THE ROLE PLAYED BY GERMANY IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 I. THE ENTENTE MYTHOLOGY AND THE INDICTMENT OF VERSAILLES In the Entente propaganda of 1914-18 Ger- many has been uniformly represented as the unique aggressor of 1914. She is reputed to have determined upon war for years before 1914, to have driven the other European states into the military system against their will and in self- defense, and to have seized upon the Sarajevo murder as “Der Tag” for which she had been waiting for a decade. This bellicose decision is supposed to have been revealed by the Kai- ser to German and Austrian statesmen and offi- cers at a conference at Potsdam on July 5, 1914. Austria is held to have been intimidated by Germany into taking her strong stand against Serbia and prevented by Germany from backing down, thus drawing the fire of Russia and pre- cipitating the long desired struggle. On the threat of a complete military occupa- tion of Germany the German representatives 229 230 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR were compelled at Versailles to subscribe to this indictment, as embodied in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles: The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their na- tionals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies. We shall here set forth the well-established facts and observe how much remains of this war-time romance of the Entente. II. GERMANY AND THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM It is necessary at the outset to summarize briefly the material embodied in the second chap- ter, namely, Germany’s part in the menacing system of European relations which prevailed before the World War. This is essential on account of the fact that, while most educated per- sons have come to see that the obvious facts com- pel them to give up the idea that Germany was solely guilty for the World War, they still cling to the illusion that it was Germany which pro- duced the system of nationalism, imperialism, militarism, navalism and secret diplomacy which challenged the peace of the world for decades THE HOLE O E GERMANY 231 before the great explosion came in 1914. And even ostensibly intelligent citizens of the United States are willing to arrive at this conclusion and cling doggedly to it on the basis of “general im- pressions” in the face of undeniable historical and statistical facts. 1 We have already made it clear that Germany shared in these reprehensible and ominous char- acteristics of the pre-War system. She was na- tionalistic, imperialistic, militaristic, ambitious as to naval plans, and given to secret diplomacy. But she was not as nationalistic as France, not as imperialistic as Great Britain, France or Rus- sia, not as m il itari stic^ as F rance or Russia, not as devoted to navalism as Great Britain, and not engaged in as dangerous or extensive a system of secret diplomacy as that which France and Russia were developing from 1911 to 1914. Germany was certainly not a lamb in the midst of the pack of European wolves, but it is just as apparent that she was not the unique wolf in the fold. And the fact that Germany was less adequately prepared on either land or sea than her potential foes is all the more striking, in the light of the fact that her position was the most precarious of all major European states. She was surrounded on land and sea by powerful enemies whose combined land and sea forces overwhelmingly outnumbered the armies and navies of Germany, Austria and Italy, the latter 232 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR of which could not, moreover, be counted upon with any certainty. Another matter to examine is the question as to whether Germany had any basic policy or ob- jective that she could gain only by war, md which was supported by any large body of citi- zens or by responsible persons in power before 1914. Austria felt that a war was necessary to punish the Serbians and furnish a salutary warning to the other subject nationalities within the polyglot Dual Monarchy. Serbia knew that she would have to await a European war to realize the Greater Serbia aspiration. Russia recognized that only by a European war could she secure the Straits, and France was well aware that Alsace-Lorraine could be recovered only by the successful outcome of a general Eu- ropean conflict. Did Germany have any similar ambition? It may be categorically stated that she did not. Everything was going smoothly. She was capturing yearly an ever greater per- centage of the world s trade, her phenomenal industrial development was proceeding apace, and her chief area of imperialistic expansion had come under her control, with the complete suc- cess of the Berlin to Bagdad railway scheme, and her triumph at Constantinople. The suc- cess of the negotiations with England over the Near East, Africa and naval construction by June, 1914, removed the basis for acute Anglo- THE ROLE OF GERMANY 233 German rivalry. The leaders of Germany in economics and politics well understood that she stood to win what she desired by the continua- tion of existing tendencies, while a war against the overwhelming odds she would have to face would put her whole future in jeopardy. To be sure, there were a few terrified autocrats who were alarmed at the growth of German socialism and were willing to risk a war in the hope of arousing the radicals to a new born loyalty to the reigning dynasty, and there were a few chauvinistic fools who desired a war on Great Britain because of commercial and naval rivalry ; but no large group in Germany wanted war, and the responsible members of the German civil government, from the Kaiser down, were thor- oughly opposed to war in the spring of 1914, though they were alarmed at the bellicose utter- ances of Russia and the rumors of an Anglo- Russian naval convention . 2 No myth in contemporary history is more diffi- cult to down than the contention that the over- whelming mass of the German people were slav- ish worshippers of militarism and eager for the first opportunity for war. While there was no German Stanley Hall to send a questionnaire to every German to discover his stand on war, a fair measure of German opinion in this matter can be secured in the popular vote for members of the Reichstag in the election of 1912. The dis- 234 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR tribution of votes among the main parties was as follows: Conservatives 1,149,916 National Liberals 1,671,297 Centre 2,012,990 Radicals 1,556,549 Social Democrats 4,238,919 Of these parties the last three, containing an over- ' whelming majority of the German people, were unalterably against war and militarism. The National Liberals were about equally divided on the subject. Only the Conservatives could claim a majority for militarism. It has been frequently contended that though the German civil government in 1914 did not de- sire a European war, yet the military classes did do so and felt that 1914 was the ideal moment for such a conflict. There seems little ground for such conclusion. We know that von Moltke secretly telegraphed to the Austrian Chief-of- Staff urging him to stand firm in his plan to punish Serbia and advising mobilization, but there is no evidence that von Moltke desired to provoke a general European war. It is known that von Tirpitz, the leader of the most bellicose element in Germany, ivas greatly disappointed that the War came in 1914 before his naval plans had been completed. Ewart says on this point : 3 THE HOLE OF GERMANY 235 Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, the creator of the German navy, has been particularly pointed at as a chief of the militarist class who dominated the German government and precipitated the war. Had not he been waiting for the completion of the Kiel canal, and, now that it could pass his big warships, was he not eager for hostilities? He was not. He was building a formidable navy, but it was still far from competent for war with the United Kingdom, and few people were more disappointed by its outbreak than Tirpitz. It would seem that the most that can be said against the military group in Germany in 1914 is that once they became convinced that war with Russia and France was inevitable they clamored for immediate action in order to avert dangerous delay in the face of the overwhelming Russian numbers. But Poincare has openly confessed to a similar degree of chafing and impatience upon the part of General Joffre and his associ- ates in their desire to get at Germany. y III. THE LEGEND OF THE POTSDAM CROWN COUNCIL OF JULY 5, 1914 In the later years of the World War the most important element in the Entente case against Germany as the unique instigator of the conflict and the sole war criminal was the allegation that on July 5, 1914 the Kaiser called together a great council of the economic, political and mil- 236 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR itary leaders of Germany and Austria and told them that he had decided to plunge Europe into war. The financiers protested that they needed a few days in which to call in their loans, and the Kaiser granted them two weeks’ delay for this purpose. The next morning the Kaiser left for a vacation cruise to prepare himself for the strenuous times which he knew were to follow his return, as well as to lull Europe into a wholly deceptive sense of security and continued peace. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which he had drawn up in such a manner as inevitably to pro- duce a general European war, was to be delayed in presentation during these two weeks needed by the bankers to put the country in complete readiness for war. This myth was first spread on a large scale in July, 1917. It had its origin with a waiter in the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin, who overheard and misinterpreted some gossip passed between subordinate officers of the German army and some members of the Austrian Embassy in mil- itary uniform who were dining at the hotel. It may have been spread by a correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung, though the correspondent accused has denied this allegation. 4 But the legend burst into full bloom only with the publi- cation in 1918 of a book by Henry Morgenthau. the American Ambassador to Turkey from 1913 to 1916, entitled Ambassador Morgenthau’ s T HE ROLE O F GERMAN Y 237 Story. It is somewhat strange that he withheld so important a bit of evidence against Germany for more than three years! Mr. Morgenthau thus describes how he learned of this foul plot from Wangenheim, the German Ambassador to Turkey very early in the World War: 5 / In those early days the weather for the German Ambassador was distinctly favorable. The good fortune of the German armies so excited him that he was sometimes led into indiscretions, and his exuber- ance one day caused him to tell me certain facts which, I think, will always have great historical value. He disclosed precisely how and when Germany had pre- cipitated this war. To-day his revelation of this secret looks like a most monstrous indiscretion, but we must remember Wangenheim’s state of mind at the time. The whole world then believed that Paris was doomed and Wangenheim reflected this attitude in his frequent declarations that the war would be over in two or three months. The whole German enterprise was evidently progressing according to programme. I have already mentioned that the German Ambassa- dor had left for Berlin soon after the assassination of the Grand Duke, and he now revealed the cause of his sudden disappearance. The Kaiser, he told me, had summoned him to Berlin for an imperial conference. This meeting took place at Potsdam on July 5th. The Kaiser presided and nearly all the important am- bassadors attended. Wangenheim himself was sum- moned to give assurance about Turkey and enlighten his associates generally on the situation in Constanti- 238 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR nople, which was then regarded as almost the pivotal point in the impending war. In telling me who at- tended this conference Wangenheim used no names, though he specifically said that among them were — the facts are so important that I quote his exact words in the German which he used — “die Haupter des Gen- eralstabs und der Marine” — (The heads of the general staff and of the navy) by which I have assumed that he meant Von Moltke and Von Tirpitz. The great bankers, railroad directors, and the captains of Ger- man industry, all of whom were as necessary to Ger- man war preparations as the army itself, also at- tended. Wangenheim now told me that the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn : “Are you ready for war?” All replied “yes” except the financiers. They said that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and to make loans. At that time few people had looked upon the Sarajevo tragedy as some- thing that would inevitably lead to war. This con- ference, Wangenheim told me, took all precautions that no such suspicion should be aroused. It decided to give the bankers time to readjust their finances for the coming war, and then the several members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. The Kaiser went to Norway on his yacht, Von Bethmann-Hollweg left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople. In telling me about this conference Wangenheim, of course, admitted that Germany precipitated the war. I think that he was rather proud of the whole per- formance, proud that Germany had gone about the THE ROLE O E GERMANY 239 matter in so methodical and far-seeing a way, and especially proud that he himself had been invited to participate in so epoch making a gathering. I have often wondered why he revealed to me so momentous a secret, and I think that perhaps the real reason was his excessive vanity- — his desire to show me how close he stood to the inner counsels of his empei’or and the part that he had played in bringing on this conflict. Whatever the motive, this indiscretion certainly had the effect of showing me who were really the guilty parties in this monstrous crime. The several blue, red and yellow books which flooded Europe during the few months following the outbreak, and the hun- dreds of documents which were issued by German propagandists attempting to establish Germany’s in- nocence, have never made the slightest impression on me. For my conclusions as to the responsibility are not based on suspicions or belief or the study of cir- cumstantial data. I do not have to reason or argue about the matter. I know. The conspiracy that has caused this greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his imperial crew at this Potsdam conference of July 5, 1914*. One of the chief partici- pants, flushed with his triumph at the apparent suc- cess of the plot, told me the details with his own mouth. Whenever I hear people arguing about the responsi- bility for this war or read the clumsy and lying ex- cuses put forth by Germany, I simply recall the burly figure of Wangenheim as he appeared that August afternoon, puffing away at a huge black cigar, and giv- ing me his account of this historic meeting. Why waste any time discussing the matter after that? 240 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR This imperial conference took place July 5th and the Serbian ultimatum was sent on July 22nd. That is just about the two weeks’ interval which the financiers had demanded to complete their plans. All the great stock exchanges of the world show that the German bankers profitably used this interval. Their records disclose that stocks were being sold in large quantities and that prices declined rapidly. At that time the markets were somewhat puzzled at this movement but Wangenheim’s explanation clears up any doubts that may still remain. Germany was changing her securi- ties into cash for war purposes. If anyone wishes to verify Wangenheim, I would suggest that he examine the quotations of the New York stock market for these two historic weeks. He will find that there were as- tonishing slumps in prices, especially on the stocks that had an international market. Between July 5th and July 22nd, Union Pacific dropped from 155 % to 1271/2', Baltimore and Ohio from 911/2 to 81, United States Steel from 61 to 50%, Canadian Pacific from 194 to 1851/0, and Northern Pacific from 111% to 108. At that time the high protectionists were blaming the Simmons-Underwood tariff act as responsible for this fall in values, while other critics of the Administration attributed it to the Federal Reserve Act — which had not yet been put into effect. How little the Wall Street brokers and the financial experts realized that an imperial conference, which had been held in Pots- dam and presided over by the Kaiser, was the real force that w r as then depressing the market ! This luxuriant and voluptuous legend was not only the chief point in the Allied propaganda THE ROLE OF GERMANY 241 ' against Germany after the publication of Mr. Morgenthau’s book, but it has also been tacitly accepted by Mr. Asquith in his apology, and solemnly repeated by Bourgeois and Pages in the standard conventional French work, both published since the facts have been available which demonstrate that the above tale was a complete fabrication. The myth has been sub- jected to withering criticism by Professor Sid- ney B. Fay in the Kriegsschuldfrage for May, 1925: 6 The contemporary documents now available prove conclusively that there is hardly a word of truth in Mr. Morgenthau’s assertions, either as to (a) the persons present, (b) the Kaiser’s attitude toward delay, (c) the real reasons for delay, or (d) the alleged selling of securities in anticipation of war. In fact his assertions are rather the direct opposite of the truth. a) As to the persons present, it is certainly not true that “Nearly all the important ambassadors at- tended.” They were all at their posts with the ex- ception of Wangenheim, himself, and it is not certain that even he saw the Kaiser. Moltke was away tak- ing a cure at Karlsbad, and Tirpitz was on a vacation in Switzerland. Jagow was also in Switzerland on a honeymoon and did not return until July 6. Ballin, the head of the Hamburg- American Line, who was absent from Berlin in the early part of July at a health resort, does not appear to have had any in- formation until July 20, that there was a possible 242 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR danger of warlike complications. Krupp v. Bohlen- Halbach, the head of the great munition works, was not at Potsdam on July 5, but saw Emperor William next day at Kiel as the Emperor was departing for his Northern cruise. Nor is there any evidence that there were gathered at Potsdam on July 5 any of the others who were “necessary to German war prepara- tions.” The only person with whom the Kaiser con- ferred on July 5, at Potsdam after his lunch with the Austrian Ambassador, were Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister of War, and certain subordinate routine officials. b) It is certainly not true that the Kaiser wished Austria to delay for two weeks whatever action she thought she must take against Serbia in order to give the German Bankers time to sell their foreign securi- ties. There is abundant proof to indicate that Em- peror William wished Austria to act quickly while the sentiment of Europe, shocked by the horrible crime at Sarajevo, was still in sympathy with the Hapsburgs and indignant at regicide Serbs. As he wrote in a marginal note, “Matters must be cleared up with the Serbs, and that soon.” c) The real reasons for the delay of two weeks be- tween July 5 and 23, were not to give the German bankers two weeks to sell their foreign securities. The real reasons for delay were due wholly to Austria, and not to Germany. They were mainly two, and are repeatedly referred to in the German and Austrian documents which were published in 1919. The first was that Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, could not act against Serbia until THE ROLE OF GERMANY 243 he had secured the consent of Tisza, the Premier of Hungary. It took two weeks to win Tisza over from his original attitude of opposition to violent action against Serbia. The second, and by far the most im- portant reason for the final delay, was the fact that Berchtold did not want to present the ultimatum to Serbia until it was certain that Poincare and Viviani had left Petrograd and were inaccessible upon the high seas returning to France. For otherwise Rus- sia, under the influence of the “champagne mood” of the Franco-Russian toasts and the chauvinism of Poincare, Iswolski, and the Grand Duke Nicholas gathered at Petrograd, would be much more likely to intervene to support Serbia with military force, and so Austria’s action against Serbia would less easily be “localized.” d) In regard to Germany’s alleged selling of se- curities in anticipation of war, if one follows Mr. Mor- genthau’s suggestion and examines the quotations on the New York Stock Exchange during these weeks, and reads the accompanying articles in the New York Times, one does not find a shred of evidence, either in the price of stocks or the volume of sales, that large blocks of German holdings were being secretly unloaded and depressing the New York market during these two w T eeks. The stocks that he mentioned de- clined only slightly or not at all; moreover, such de- clines as did take place were only such as were to be naturally expected from the general trend downward which had been taking place since January, or are quite satisfactorily explained by local American con- ditions, such as the publication of an adverse report 244 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Here are the facts. The amazing slump in Union Pacific from 155% to 1271/2 reported by Mr. Morgenthau repre- sented in fact an actual rise of a couple of points in the value of this stock. Union Pacific sold “ex-divi- dend” and “ex-rights” on July 20; the dividend and accompanying rights were worth 30%, which meant that shares ought to have sold on July 22nd at 125%. In reality they sold at 127% ; that is, at the end of the two weeks’ period during which it is asserted that there was “inside selling” from Berlin, Union Pacific, in- stead of being depressed, was actually selling two points higher. Baltimore and Ohio, Canadian Pacific, and Northern Pacific did in fact slump on July 14, and there was evidence of selling orders from Europe. But this is to be explained, partly by the fact that Baltimore and Ohio had been already falling steadily since January, and partly to the very depressing influence exercised on all railroad shares by the sharply ad- verse report on the New York, New Haven and Hart- ford Railroad, which was published by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The comment of the New York Times of July 15, is significant: “Stocks which had lately displayed a stable character in the face of great weakness of particular issues could not stand up under such selling as occurred in New Haven and some others today. There were times when it looked as though the entire market was in a fair way to slump heavily, and only brisk short covering toward the close prevented many sharp net declines. . . .For its own account, or on orders from this side, Europe was THE HOLE OF GERMANY 245 an unusually large seller of stocks in this market. The cable told that a very unfavorable impression had been created abroad by the Commerce Commission’s New Haven report. The European attitude toward American securities is naturally affected by such official denunciations of the way in which an important railway property has been handled.” Most extraordinary is Mr. Morgenthau’s assertion about United States Steel Common. He says that between July 5th and 22nd it fell from 61 to 51%. The real fact, as any one may verify from the Stock Market reports for himself, is that Steel during these two weeks never fell below 59%, and on July 22nd was almost exactly the same as two weeks earlier. When the facts are examined, therefore, it does not appear that the New York Stock Market can afford much confirmation to Mr. Morgenthau’s myth of German bankers demanding a two weeks’ respite in which to turn American securities into gold in prepara- tion for a world war which they had already plotted to bring about. In his apology in Foreign Affairs even Poin- care has been compelled to admit that there was no Potsdam Conference and that Germany and Austria had not decided upon a world war from the beginning of the 1914 crisis. He makes the following startling and revolutionary admis- sion : 7 ✓ I do not claim that Austria or Germany, in this first phase, had a conscious thought-out intention of 246 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR provoking a general war. No existing document gives us the right to suppose that, at that time, they had planned anything so systematic. Thus disappears the whole Entente case against Germany as it was presented during the war period and utilized to arouse the sympathy of the United States for the Allied cause, which was represented to us as the battle for civiliza- tion against the Central Powers, who had willed from the very beginning an unprovoked and brutal war. 8 As Mr. Morgenthau has persistently refused to offer any explanation or justification of his “story” or to answer written inquiries as to his grounds for believing it authentic, we are left to pure conjecture in the circumstances. It ap- pears highly doubtful to the present writer that Mr. Morgenthau ever heard of the Potsdam legend while resident in Turkey. It would seem inconceivable that he could have withheld such important information for nearly four years. The present writer has been directly informed by the Kaiser that Wangenheim did not see him in July, 1914. We know that Mr. Morgenthau’s book was not written by himself, but by Air. Burton J. Hendrick, who later distinguished himself as the editor of the Page letters. We shall await with interest Mr. Plendrick’s explan- ation of the genesis of the Potsdam fiction as it THE ROLE OF GERMANY 247 was composed for Ambassador Morgenthaus Story. IY. THE kaiser’s RESPONSE TO AUSTRIA’S APPEAL FOLLOWING THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE Having now cleared the field of the legend of the Potsdam Conference, we may examine the facts as to the reaction of the Kaiser to the assas- sination of Franz Ferdinand, and his response to the appeal of the Austrian Emperor for sup- port of the Austrian program of punishing Ser- bia. In the first place, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact that, up to the assassination, the Kaiser had been a moderating influence in re- gard to the belligerent attitude of Austria to- ward Serbia. Twice in 1912-13 he had pre- vented Austria from attacking Serbia. 9 As late as July 1, 1914, Count Tisza had accused the Kaiser of a special fondness for Serbia, and he wrote to Emperor Franz Josef that the Kaiser’s expected visit to Vienna to attend the funeral of the Archduke should be utilized to convert the Kaiser to the Austrian view of the Serbian prob- lem: 10 I considered it my duty to approach Your Majesty with the submissive request to graciously make use of Emperor William’s presence in Vienna for combating 248 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR that monarch’s preference for Servia, a thing that should not be difficult in the vie\v of the recent revolt- ing events and to induce him to support us energeti- cally in our intended Balkan policy. The murder of the Archduke wrought a com- plete transformation in the Kaiser’s attitude towards Serbia. The reasons were personal and political. The Kaiser was a warm personal friend of the Archduke and they had been to- gether at Konopischt only a couple of Aveeks be- fore the assassination. Quite naturally, as the head of a reigning dynasty, the Kaiser did not relish assassinations. He had been greatly per- turbed at the time of the assassination of Presi- dent Carnot of France and King Humbert of Italy. This time it had come closer home with the murder of the ITapsburg next in succession to the throne. He, himself, might be the next victim. The Kaiser, indeed, cancelled his A T isit to Vienna because of fear of assassination. 11 Berchtold was clever enough to play upon this fear. On July 3rd he reported to Tschirschkv that he had just learned that tAvelve assassins Avere on their Avay to murder the Kaiser. 1 * The political reason for the Kaiser’s alarm aatis his recognition that the murder AA*as a challenge to Austrian dominion OA r er her subject Slavs, which, if successful, Avould lead to the Aveakening or destruction of his only important ally, and THE HOLE OF GERMANY 249 serious interference with German plans in the Near East. The Kaiser’s change of attitude towards Ser- bia appears clearly in his marginal comments on the communications of his ambassadors to von Jagow and Bethmann-Hollweg. On July 2nd or 3rd he wrote on the margin of Tschirschky’s telegram to Bethmann-Hollweg to the effect that the former was trying to exert a moderating influence upon Austria: 13 This is none of his (Tschirschky’s) business, as it is solely the affair of Austria what she plans to do in this case. Let Tschirschky be good enough to drop this nonsense ! The Serbs must be disposed of and that right soon! In his letter of July 10th to von Jagow, Tschir- schky suggested that it might be well to attempt to influence the British press against Serbia, but that this should be done cautiously, so as not to alarm the Serbians. The Kaiser commented on this: 14 To act like “gentlemen” to murderers after what has happened ! Idiocy ! In a letter to Franz Josef on July 14th he wrote: 15 The dreadful crime of Serajevo has thrown a blazing light on the pernicious agitations of mad fanatics 250 GENESIS OE THE WOELD WAR and on the mischievous Panslavic disturbances that threaten the structure of the state. He wrote “Bosh!!!” “Bosh!” and “Hot Air!” in the margin of the telegram of his minister in Belgrade sent on July 8th and telling of a con- ference with Pashitch, in which the latter em- phasized the difficulty of holding in check the Serbian agitators and plotters, and his determi- nation to deal with them as severely as possible. 16 In his telegram of July 14th to Betlimann- Hollweg Tschirschky informed the Chancellor of Tisza’s decision to support a firm attitude towards Serbia, and the Kaiser’s marginal com- ment was: “Well, a real man at last!” 17 It is interesting to contrast this remark with Tisza’s complaint of two weeks earlier that the first step in the Austrian policy would have to be the conversion of the Kaiser from his excessive fond- ness for Serbia! On July 23rd von Jagow sent to the Kaiser an account of the attitude of Sir Edward Grey, as reported by the German Am- bassador in London. The Kaiser remarked on the margin: 18 Grey is committing the error of setting Sei’bia on the same plane with Austria and other Great Powers! That is unheard of ! Serbia is nothing but a band of robbers that must be seized for its crimes ! In the margin of the telegram of Tschirschky to von Jagow on July 24th, the Kaiser wrote: 19 THE ROLE OF GERMANY 251 Austria must become preponderant in the Balkans as compared with the little ones, and that at Russia’s expense; otherwise there will be no peace. The German Minister at Belgrade telegraphed to von Jagow that the harsh tone and severe terms of the Austrian ultimatum were a surprise to the Serbians. The Kaiser commented : 20 Bravo ! One would not have believed it of the Viennese ! In short, up to the time he learned of the na- ture of the Serbian reply to the Austrian ulti- matum, the Kaiser was enthusiastically for a severe and rapid movement of Austria against Serbia. He was quite willing to see this take the form of a punitive war, though, unlike the Austrians, he did not insist that the Austrian policy must involve war to be successful. He was from the first, however, unalterably against letting a local war grow into a European war which would bring in Russia, France and Eng- land against Germany. It should, of course, be emphasized that these private memoranda of the Kaiser expressing hatred for the Serbs were not communicated to Austria. Germany did noth- ing to incite Austria beyond giving her the / blank cheque on July 6th. We have already pointed out that, 21 on July 5th, the Kaiser received the letter from Franz Josef asking for support of the premeditated 252 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR action against Serbia, and that on the next morning Bethmann-Hollweg communicated to the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin the German decision to stand back of Austria in whatever policy Austria should adopt towards Serbia. The Chancellor also confirmed this in a telegram to Tschirschky the same day, and the Kaiser re- peated the same promise in his letter to Franz Josef on July 14th. These constituted the famous blank cheque to Austria, which was in its later developments to prove the undoing of both empires. The Kaiser has been severely, and perhaps justly, criticized for giving his carte blanche to Austria in the Serbian crisis. But it must be re- membered that this was essentially what Poin- care had already given to Russia in regard to the Balkans in 1912, and was exactly what he soon gave to Russia concerning the Austro-Serbian dispute of July, 1914, on his visit to St. Peters- burg before he was fully aware of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. Further, the offense of Poincare in the circumstances was a far more grievous one. The Kaiser merely gave consent to a purely localized punitive action essential to the preservation of an ally; Poincare consented to the wanton waging of a war which would nec- essarily involve all Europe. When the Kaiser saw that his action in regard to Austria threat- ened to bring Europe to war he made every ef- THE ROLE OF GERMANY 253 fort to restrain Austria; when Poincare saw that his encouragement of Russia meant certain war he secretly urged Russia to proceed more rap- idly with her fatal preparations. Far from announcing his determination to precipitate a European war on July 5th, the Kaiser left the next morning with the conviction that there was but the slightest probability of a general conflict developing out of any punitive policy which Austria might employ against Ser- bia. What were his reasons for holding this view? In the first place, he believed that the Tsar would be even more alarmed and horrified than himself at the assassination of the Arch- duke, and would be willing to see the Serbian plotters severely punished. As late as July 28th the Kaiser exclaimed : 22 I could not assume that the Czar would place himself on the side of bandits and regicides, even at the peril of unchaining a European war. Gennans are in- capable of such a conception. It is Slavic or Latin. Further, he knew from his military attache in St. Petersburg and other sources that the Rus- sians had shown no apparent alarm over the threats of Austria against Serbia in the two preceeding years . 23 Indeed, Henry Lutzow, former Austrian Ambassador to Italy, in a letter published in the London Times Literary Supple- ment for December 31, 1925, states that after the 254 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR assassination of the Serbian Royal Family in 1903, the Russian government confidentially in- formed the Austrian government that it would not interfere if Austrian troops occupied Bel- grade. Finally, and most fatally of all, he counted upon the sending of Lichnowsky to Eng- land and upon the successful negotiations with England during the previous months to secure the neutrality of England, which, he believed, would keep France and Russia from intervening in behalf of Serbia. Professor Fay has well summed up the Kaiser’s pacific intentions and anticipations as he left for his vacation cruise on July 6, 1914: 24 He expected military action by Austria against Ser- bia, but on July 5 he did not think it probable that the Austro-Serbian dispute would lead to a European war; he could safely start next morning as had long been planned, and as Bethmann advised, on his northern cruise. This he would hardly have done, if he had ex- pected that the early action, which he hoped Austria would take at once instead of delaying more than two weeks, would certainly involve serious European com- plications. Nevertheless, he realized that while it was not probable that Austria would kindle a European war, it was possible. Therefore, early on July 6, be- fore leaving Potsdam at quarter past nine for Kiel, he had brief separate interviews with subordinate repre- sentatives of the army and navy. He informed each of his interview with Szogyeny. He told them pri- THE EOLE OF GERMANY 255 vately to inform their chiefs, who were absent on furlough from Berlin, but added that they need not cut short their furloughs to return to Berlin, and that no orders for military preparations need be given, as he did not expect any serious warlike complications. Y. THE KAISER’S REACTION TO THE SERBIAN REPLY TO AUSTRIA, AND HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS A DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS 1. The Kaiser and the Serbian lie ply The Kaiser’s attitude towards the Austro- Serbian crisis underwent a marked transforma- tion as soon as he read of the nature of the Ser- bian reply to the Austrian ultimatum. Not knowing that the ultimatum was a faked ruse of Austria, behind which lay the determination to make war upon Serbia, he took the ultimatum and the reply seriously, and regarded the latter as wholly adequate and as removing all justifica- tion for a punitive war of Austria against Ser- bia. On his copy of the Serbian reply he made the following note : 25 A brilliant performance for a time-limit of only forty-eight hours. This is more than one could have expected ! A great moral victory for Vienna ; but with it every reason for war drops away, and Giesl (Aus- trian minister to Serbia) might have remained quietly 256 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR in Belgrade ! On the strength of this I should never have ordered mobilization ! In his letter to von Jagow of July 28th, setting forth the essentials of his “pledge plan” for the occupation of Belgrade by Austria, he renders an almost identical opinion: 20 After reading over the Serbian reply, which I re- ceived this morning, I am convinced that on the whole the wishes of the Danube Monarchy have been acceded to. The few reservations that Serbia makes in regard to individual points could, according to my opinion, be settled by negotiation. But it contains the announce- ment orbi et urbi of a capitulation of a most humili- ating kind, and as a result, every cause for war falls to the ground. This is the definitive answer to those who, like Poincare, 27 charge that the Kaiser urged the Austrians into a precipitate declaration of war on Serbia. The Austrians actually declared war to escape from the Kaiser’s pressure for a pacific settlement of the Serbian dispute after the receipt of the Serbian reply. 28 2. The Kaiser’s Plan to Avert War The Kaiser was not only convinced that the Serbian reply removed all cause for war, but he was also determined that Austria should be pre- vented from developing her plans so as to in- THE ROLE OF GERMANY 257 volve Europe in war. It has often been stated that the Kaiser showed no solicitude about war until he heard the early reports of Russian mobilization. This is not true. He became alarmed for the peace of Europe the moment he heard of the rumored Serbian mobilization at the time of handing in the Serbian reply to Austria. On Bethmann-Hollweg’s telegram of July 25th he wrote relative to the Serbian mobilization : 29 This may result in mobilization by Russia ; will re- sult in mobilization by Austria ! Learning the next day of Austrian mobilization, as well as the Serbian, he wrote on the margin of Bethmann-Hollweg’s telegram advising calm- ness: 30 Calmness is the first duty of a citizen ! Keep calm — only keep calm ! But a calm mobilization is some- thing new, indeed ! By the 27th of July Russian protests and the rumors of Russian military preparations against Austria convinced the Kaiser, Bethmann- Hollweg and von Jagow that Germany must give up her plan of allowing Austria a free hand with Serbia, in the expectation that the Austro-Serbian affair could be kept purely lo- calized, and must resume her policy of the two previous years in the way of restraining Austria. 258 GENESIS OF THE VOELD WAR The solution of the problem which he proposed was for Austria to occupy Belgrade as a guar- anty that the Serbians would fulfil their prom- ises, and then hold up further military activity against Serbia. This, together with the Aus- trian declaration that they would respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia, he believed should satisfy both Russia and the Austrian army. He summarized this plan in a letter to von Jagow on July 28th: 31 Nevertheless, the piece of paper (Serbian reply), like its contents, can be considered as of little value so long as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion. In order that these beautiful promises may be turned to truth and facts, a douce violence must be exercised. This should be so arranged that Austria would receive a hostage (Belgrade), as a guaranty for the enforcement and carrying out of the promises, and should occupy it until the petita had actually been complied with. This is also necessary in order to give the army, now unnecessarily mobilized for the third time, the external satisfaction d'honneur of an osten- sible success in the eyes of the world, and to make it possible for it to feel that it had at least stood on foreign soil. Unless this were done, the abandonment of the campaign might be the cause of a wave of bad feeling against the Monarchy, which would be dan- gerous in the highest degree. In case Your Exellency shares my views, I propose that we say to Austria : Serbia has been forced to retreat in a very humiliating THE ROLE OF GERMANY 259 manner, and we offer our congratulations. Naturally, as a result, every cause for war has vanished. But a guaranty that the promises mil he carried out is un- questionably necessary. That could be secured by means of the temporary military occupation of a por- tion of Serbia, similar to the way we kept troops sta- tioned in France in 1871 until the billions were paid. On this basis, I am ready to mediate for peace with Austria. Any proposals or protests to the contrary by other nations I should refuse regardless, especially as all of them have made more or less open appeals to me to assist in maintaining peace. This I will do in my own way, and as sparingly of Austria’s national- istic feeling, and of the honor of her arms as possible. For the latter has already been appealed to on the part of the highest War Lord, and is about to respond to the appeal. Consequently it is absolutely necessary that it receive a visible satisfaction d’honneur; this is the prerequisite of my mediation. Therefore Your Excellency will submit a proposal to me along the lines sketched out; which shall be communicated to Vienna. I have had Plessen write along the lines indicated above to the Chief of the General Staff, who is entirely in accord with my views. It is worth while to emphasize in this place that this so-called “pledge-plan” was the one which was also independently suggested with enthusi- asm by Sir Edward Grey and King George as the procedure best suited to the preservation of the interests of both Austria and Russia, and as a sufficient concession and guaranty to Russia to 260 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR justify the cessation of military preparations by the latter. 32 3. Germany and the Diplomatic Proposals of 19 U We may now turn to the measures proposed by the various European countries to bring about a peaceful settlement of the disputes be- tween Austria and Serbia, and Russia and Aus- tria. Here we shall be able to show the com- plete falsity of what has been, next to the alleged Potsdam Conference, the chief point in the Entente propaganda representing Germany as primarily responsible for the initiation of hos- tilities in 1914, namely, the charge that she not only offered no plans for pacific settlement her- self, but resolutely rejected all the plans for mediation and negotiation suggested by other states. We shall find that exactly the reverse was the case. Germany was as fertile as any other state in suggesting plans for mediation and negotiation, and warmly cooperated with England in advancing the two pacific modes of adjustment and accommodation which were agreed upon by both England and Germany as the most feasible and desirable under the circum- stances. Ewart has thus briefly summarized the facts: 33 THE ROLE OF GERMANY 261 We are now to examine the negotiations with refer- ence to the various proposed methods for arriving at a peaceful solution of the quarrel, keeping in view the frequently repeated statement that Germany declined every proposal for accommodation. Four methods were proposed: 1. A Conference at London of the Ambassadors of France, Italy and Germany with Sir Edward Grey. 2. Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. 3. Direct conversations between Austria-Hungary and Russia. 4. Mediation between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Of these, Germany and Russia declined the first with Sir Edward Grey’s approval. Germany concurred in the second, and actively assisted in it ; and eventu- ally proposed the third. The fourth was not sug- gested until the 27th, and Germany immediately and persistently, pressed acceptance of it upon Austria- Hungary. The first plan listed above, namely, a confer- ence of ambassadors at London, was suggested by Sir Edward Grey on July 26 th, when he put forward the proposal that the German, French and Italian ambassadors meet with him in Lon- don to discuss appropriate methods for a peace- ful solution of the differences existing between Russia, Austria and Serbia. This proposal was rejected by Russia, Germany and Austria. Germany and Austria were opposed to a con- 262 GENESIS OF THE WORLD W A E ference to adjust the Austro-Serbian dispute, and France and Russia were opposed to a con- ference which would deal with the Austro- Russian difficulties . 34 On the 27th Italy made the most constructive proposition as to a conference of powers which was brought forward during the whole crisis of 1914. 35 This was the proposal that there be a conference of England, Italy, Germany and France which would be committed to the com- plete acceptance by Serbia of the Austrian ulti- matum, but would save the face of Serbia by al- lowing her to make this capitulation before a European conference rather than to Austria di- rectly. France ignored the proposal, Grey for- warded it without enthusiasm, Sazonov hypo- critically evaded the issue, Germany urged it upon Austria, but the latter rejected it. Mor- hardt holds that this is the most damaging reflec- tion upon the Entente during the whole period of the negotiations. The second plan was one of mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. This was pro- posed by Grey on the 24th and 25th of July. Germany at once assented and agreed to medi- ation between Russia and Austria as soon as an occasion arose which would permit of such ac- tion. 36 This procedure was not followed, how- ever, as it was superseded by the method of pro- motino' direct conversations between Vienna and c“> THE ROLE OF GERMANY 263 St. Petersburg — the method suggested by Ger- many. On the 28th Sir Edward Grey admitted cheerfully that this third plan was the best method, after all: 37 “As long as there is a pros- pect of a direct exchange of views between Aus- tria and Russia, I would suspend every other suggestion, as I entirely agree that this is the most preferable method of all.” This expedient of direct conversations was urged upon Austria by Germany with great earnestness, but it proved unsuccessful because Russia insisted upon dis- cussing the relations between Austria and Serbia, and Austria maintained that this was her own affair, in spite of vigorous statements to the con- trary by Germany after July 28th. As we have seen above, Austria deliberately declared war on Serbia to forestall negotiations, and did not give in and even ostensibly assume to be willing to discuss her Serbian policy with Russia until after the declaration of the Russian general mobiliza- tion, which meant the unavoidable envelopment of Europe in a general conflict. 38 The fourth method of pacific accommodation attempted was mediation between Austria- Hungary and Serbia. This proposal came from England and was quickly accepted by Ger- many. Some of Bethmann-Hollweg’s most in- sistent telegrams to Vienna dealt with the matter of the necessity of Austria’s accepting media- 264 GENESIS OF THE WOELD WAS tion. 39 We have indicated earlier that on this point Berchtold did not even feign to accede un- til the telegram sent out of Vienna early in the morning of August 1st, in which he agreed to accept the mediation of England in regard to the Serbian issue. There is little reason to be- lieve that this capitulation was made in good faith, and even if it had been it would have availed nothing, as Sir Edward Grey took no action on the basis of the telegram, Russia had mobilized, and France had just informed Russia of her declaration for war. 40 The above facts are an adequate commentary upon the accuracy and reliability of Kautsky and Lichnowsky, and upon the honesty of Mr. Asquith who, long after the German and Aus- trian documents were available, quoted approv- ingly the following from Kautsky: 41 Austria rejected all mediation proposals that were made, none of which emanated from Germany. The latter was satisfied with simply transmitting the pro- posals of others, or else refusing them at the very out- set as incompatible with Austria’s independence. And also the following even more preposterous misrepresentation from Lichnowsky: 42 It had, of course, needed but a hint from Berlin to induce Count Berchtold to be satisfied with a diplo- matic success. But this hint was not given. On the contrary, the war was hurried on. THE HOLE OF GERMANY 265 A. The German Pressure Telegrams To give some impression of the tension and anxiety at Berlin over the increasing danger of a general European war after the 27th of July, as well as of the severity of the German tele- grams to Vienna urging conversations and the acceptance of mediation, we shall quote from some of the representative telegrams of this period and from the Kaiser’s personal comments. On July 30th Bethmann-IIollweg telegraphed to Tschirschky to convey to Berchtold the fol- lowing appeal to Austria to accept mediation: 43 As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us ; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to Eng- land’s opposition, the principal burden of the fight would fall. Austria’s political prestige, the honor of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Bel- grade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circum- stances Ave must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honorable con- ditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us. 266 GENESIS or THE world war On the same day Bethmann-Hollweg induced the Kaiser to send the following telegram to the Austrian Emperor : 44 I do not feel myself able to refuse the personal plea ^ of the Czar that I undertake to attempt mediation for the prevention of a world conflagration and the main- tenance of world peace, and had proposals submitted to your Government yesterday and today through my Ambassador. Among other things, they provide that Austria should announce her conditions after occupy- ing Belgrade or other places. I should be honestly obliged to you, if you would favor me with your de- cision as soon as possible. Later in the day Bethmann-Hollweg sent the following urgent telegram to Tschirschky, in- sisting that Austria accept mediation upon the basis of the “pledge-plan” as suggested by Ger- many and Sir Edward Grey : 45 If Vienna declines to give in in any direction, espe- cially along the lines of the last Grey proposal, as may be assumed from the telephone conversation of Your Excellency with Mr. von Stumm, it will hardly be pos- sible any longer to place the guilt of the outbreak of a European conflagration on Russia’s shoulders. His Majesty undertook intervention at Vienna at the re- quest of the Czar since he could not refuse to do so without creating the incontrovertible suspicion that we wanted war. The success of this intervention is, of \ course, rendered difficult, inasmuch as Russia has mo- bilized against Austria. This we have announced to THE ROLE OF GERMANY 267 England today, adding that we had already suggested in a friendly tone, both at Paris and Petersburg, the cessation of French and Russian war preparations, so that we could take a new step in this direction only through an ultimatum, which would mean war. We suggested to Sir Edward Grey, nevertheless, that he work energetically along this line at Paris and Peters- burg, and have just received through Lichnowsky his assurance to that effect. If England’s efforts suc- ceed, while Vienna declines everything, Vienna will be giving documentary evidence that it absolutely wants a war, into which we shall be drawn, while Russia re- mains free of responsibility. That would place us, in the eyes of our own people, in an untenable situation. Thus we can only urgently advise that Austria accept the Grey proposal, which preserves her status for her in every way. Your Excellency will at once express yourself most emphatically on this matter to Count Berchtold, per- haps also to Count Tisza. 5. The Alarm of the Kaiser The state of mind of the Kaiser at this time is admirably reflected by his long note appended to the telegram of Count Pourtales, the German Ambassador to St. Petersburg, on July 30th telling of the Russian decision to take the fatal step of mobilization: 46 If mobilization can no longer be retracted — which is not true — why, then, did the Czar appeal to my media- 268 GENESIS OF THE WOULD WAR tion three days afterward without mention of the issu- ance of the mobilization order? That shows plainly that the mobilization appeared to him to have been precipitate, and that after it he made this move pro forma in our direction for the sake of quieting his un- easy conscience, although he knew that it would no longer be of any use, as he did not feel himself to be strong enough to stop the mobilization. Frivolity and weakness are to plunge the world into the most fright- ful war, which eventually aims at the destruction of Germany. For I have no doubt left about it: Eng- land, Russia and France have agreed among themselves — after laying the foundation of the casus foederis for us through Austria — to take the Austro-Serbian con- flict for an excuse for waging an war of extermination against us. Hence Grey’s cynical observation to Lich- nowsky “as long as the war is confined to Russia and Austria, England would sit quiet, only when we and France mixed into it would he be compelled to make an active move against us (”) ; i. e., either we are shame- fully to betray our allies, sacrifice them to Russia — thereby breaking up the Triple Alliance, or we are to be attacked in common by the Triple Entente for our fidelity to our allies and punished, whereby they will satisfy their jealousy by joining in totally ruining us. That is the real naked situation in nuce, which slowly and cleverly set going, certainly by Edward "N II, has been carried on, and systematically built up by dis- owned conferences between England and Paris and St. Petersburg; finally brought to a conclusion by George V and set to work. And thereby the stupidity and ineptitude of our ally is turned into a snare for us. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 269 So the famous “ circumscription ” of Germany has finally become a complete fact, despite every effort of our politicians and diplomats to prevent it. The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of her per- sistently prosecuted purely anti-German world-policy, against which we have proved ourselves helpless, while she twists the noose of our political and economic de- struction out of our fidelity to Austria, as we squirm isolated in the net. A great achievement which arouses the admiration even of him who is to be destroyed as its result ! Edward VII is stronger after his death than am I who am still alive! And there have been people who believed that England could be won over or pacified, by this or that puny measure ! ! ! Unre- mittingly, relentlessly she has pursued her object, with notes, holiday proposals, scares, Haldane, etc., until this point was reached. And we walked into the net and even went into the one-ship-program in construc- tion with the ardent hope of thus pacifying England ! ! ! All my warnings, all my pleas were voiced for noth- ing. Now comes England’s so-called gratitude for it ! From the dilemma raised by our fidelity to the vener- able old Emperor of Austria we are brought into a situation which offers England the desired pretext for annihilating us under the hypocritical cloak of justice, namely, of helping France on account of the reputed “balance of power” in Europe, i. e., playing the card of all the European nations in England’s favor against us ! This whole business must now be ruthlessly un- covered and the mask of Christian peaceableness pub- licly and brusquely torn from its face in public, and 270 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the pharisaical hypocrisy exposed on the pillory ! ! And our consuls in Turkey and India, agents, etc., must fire the whole Mohammedan world to fierce re- bellion against this hated, lying, conscienceless nation of shop-keepers ; for if we are to be bled to death, England shall at least lose India. The same day he made the following comment on an article in the London Morning Post on “Efforts towards Peace ”: 47 The only possible way to ensure or enforce peace is that England must tell Paris and Petersburg — its Allies — to remain quiet, i. e., neutral, to the Austro- Serbian conflict, then Germany can remain quiet too. But if England continues to remain silent or to give lukewarm assurances of neutrality ; that would mean encouragement to its Allies to attack Austro-Gennany. Berlin has tried to mediate between Petersburg and Vienna on the appeal of the Czar. But His Majesty silently had already mobilized before the appeal; so that the mediator — Germany — is placed “ en demeure" and his work become illusory. Now only England alone can stop the catastrophe by restraining its Allies, by clearly intimating that — as Sir E. Grey de- clared — it had nothing to do with the Austro-Serbian conflict, and that if one of its Allies took an active pai't in the strife it could not reckon on the help of England. That would put a stop to all war. King George has communicated England’s intention to re- main neutral to me by Prince Henry. On the other hand the Naval Staff have this morning — July 30 — received a telegram from the German military attache THE ROLE OF GERMANY 271 in London, that Sir E. Grey in a private conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, declared that if Germany made war on France, England would immediately at- tack Germany with a fleet ! Consequently Sir E. Grey says the direct contrary to what his Sovereign com- municated to me through my brother and places his King in the position of a double-tongued liar vis-a-vis to me. The whole war is plainly arranged between England, France and Russia for the annihilation of Germany, s lastly through the conversations with Poincare in Paris and Petersburg, and the Austro-Serbian strife is only an excuse to fall upon us ! God help us in this fight for our existence, brought about by falseness, lies and poisonous envy ! As Ewart remarks: 48 “The attitude here re- vealed is not that of a man who finds himself, at his own selected moment, in the situation for which he has secretly prepared for forty years.” It is a striking indication of the progress in our knowledge of war guilt in the last six years that even so calm and judicious a student of the problem as Professor Fay could in 1920 desig- nate the above statements of the Kaiser as a “raving philippic,” 40 while to-day we must rec- ognize that it is a remarkably accurate and con- cise description of the actual facts as they have been established by the documents published since 1919, and especially the Russian docu- ments published since 1921. It is a most in- 272 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR structive exercise to compare these statements of the Kaiser with Morel’s Secret History of a Great Betrayal, the conclusions of Loreburn’s How the War Came, the concluding chapter of Morhardt’s Les Preuves, and the conclusions on pages 200-203 of Montgelas’ The Case for the Central Powers . 6. Did Germany Decide for W ar on the 30th of July ? A very important point in connection with the above is the question as to whether Germany gave up hope of diplomatic negotiations and de- cided upon war before she learned of the Rus- sian general mobilization, ordered late in the afternoon of July 30th and announced the fol- lowing day. If it can be demonstrated that she did, then the basic argument that Germany was driven into the decision upon war by the Rus- sian mobilization falls to the ground, though, of course, it would still be true that the Russian mobilization long preceded the German. A dis- tinguished student of the problem of war guilt has made this assertion, namely, M. Pierre Renouvin, in his important work Les Origines immediates de la guerre . 50 Professor Fay has, however, pointed out clearly the obvious false- ness of this contention. 51 It is based wholly upon the fact that at 11.20, on the night of July THE BOLE OF GERMANY 273 30th, B ethmann-Holl weg wired Tschirschky, cancelling a restraining telegram sent somewhat earlier that day. Renouvin, and Poincare, who has breathlessly followed him in this, contend that this is proof that by this time Bethmann- Hollweg had surrendered to Moltke and the militarists. Such an interpretation is preposterous in the light of what we know to have been the real rea- sons of Bethmann-Hollweg for this action. As Fay and Ewart point out from the documents, 52 there were two reasons why this was done. The first was the receipt of information from the army that the Russians were mobilizing on the German frontier, and he desired to get further information on this point before proceeding with diplomatic pressure. The second cause of his action was the receipt, late on the 30th, of a telegram from George V to Prince Henry of Prussia, stating that England was attempting to restrain France and Russia, and asking Ger- many to press Austria more vigorously to ac- cept the “pledge-plan” for the mere occupation of Belgrade. Bethmann-Hollweg desired to examine this telegram and its implications be- fore continuing with his own pressure plans. How far the Chancellor was from desisting in his peace pressure is evident from the fact that at 2.45, on the morning of July 31st, he sent the telegram of George V on to Vienna with his 274 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR approval and a forceful appeal for an immedi- ate decision from Vienna. As Professor Fay describes his action: 03 “Bethmann grasped at this telegram from George V as another chance for peace. He sent it on with a last urgent ap- peal ‘for a definite decision in Vienna within the course of the day.’ ” By the next day Germany learned of the general Russian mobilization, and from that time on her diplomatic activities were chiefly directed towards the futile effort to induce Russia to suspend her mobilization, with- out which there was no chance of averting war. Germany, then, remained firm for pacific ne- gotiations until the end. What prevented her from success in these endeavors were the stub- bornness and evasion of Austria, encouraged, perhaps, by Moltke’s secret telegrams to Hotzen- dorf, and the precipitate and unjustifiable Rus- sian mobilization, encouraged by Poincare. 7. The Szogyeny Telegram, and Bethmann- Hollweg’s Inquiry concerning the Attitude of England This will be as appropriate a place as any to dispose of two specious criticisms of German efforts to settle the July crisis by diplomacy which are still tenaciously adhered to by the “die-hards” and “bitter-enders” among the “old guard,” namely, the Szogyeny Telegram of July THE ROLE OF GERMANY 275 27, 1914, and Bethmann-Hollweg’s attempt to discover the attitude of Great Britain in the crisis on July 29th. Montgelas has reproduced the Szogyeny Telegram with appropriate comments riddling the notion that this is any proof of the lack of sincerity on the part of Germany in her pressure for peace in 1914. The telegram, with Montgelas’ reflections, follows: “The Foreign Secretary informed me, in the strictest confidence, that the German Government would shortly acquaint Your Excellency with possible English pro- posals of mediation. The German Government give the most positive as- surance that they do not identify themselves in any way with the proposals, they are even decidedly against their being considered, and they only forward them, in compliance with the English request. In doing so they are guided by the view that it is of the utmost importance that England should not make common cause with Russia and France at the present moment. Consequent^ everything must be avoided that would break off the communications between Ger- many and England which have hitherto worked so well. If Germany were to tell Sir Edward Grey plainly that she would not forward the wish to Austria-Hungary, which England thinks more likely to be considered if it comes through Germany, this would lead to the very state of affairs it is so essential to avoid. Moreover, whenever England made a request of this kind in Vienna, the German Government would state most explicitly that they did not in any way endorse 276 GENESIS OE THE WORLD WAR such requests for intervention, and only passed them on to Austria-Hungary in compliance with England’s wish. The English Government, it appears, had already approached him (the Foreign Secretary) yesterday through the German Ambassador in London, and through their representative here, with a view to in- ducing him to support England’s wish that we should modify the note to Serbia. He, von Jagow, replied that he would certainly comply with Sir Edward Grey’s wish that he should forward England’s request to Your Excellency, but he could not second it, as the Serbian dispute was a question of prestige for the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy, in which Germany had an in- terest. He, the Foreign Secretary, had therefore forwarded Sir Edward Grey’s Note to Herr von Tschirschkv, but without instructing him to submit it to Your Ex- cellency ; he had been able to inform the English Cabinet that he did not directly reject the English wish, and had even passed it on to Vienna. In conclusion the Secretary of State repeated his view of the case, and begged me, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, to assure Your Excellency that his having acted as intermediary in this instance does not at all mean that he is in favor of the English proposal being considered.” The American delegation at Versailles only published the two first paragraphs of this telegram, which, taken by themselves, must give an impression of Machiavel- lism. But if the fourth paragraph is correctly read, it does away with this impression. In it the Berlin Gov- THE ROLE OF /GERMANY 277 eminent state that whenever an English proposal is made which they do not think suitable, they will inform the Cabinet in London that they do not support the proposal, and are merely forwarding it to Vienna, in compliance with England’s request. This would have been a perfectly frank and honorable course, and it is what the German Government really did. With regard to the purport of the telegram, it should be noted : (1) that England never proposed that Austria should “modify the Note to Serbia.” The Ambassador was probably referring to the proposal which reached Ber- lin on the evening of July 25, that Germany should try to induce Vienna to consider the Serbian answer satis- factory. Neither Berlin nor London knew what the answer was at that time. (2) This proposal was for- warded to Vienna, and at the same time the British Charge d’ Affaires was told that it had only been passed on, and that the Government did not see their way to going beyond this. (3) Both Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and Herr von Jagow have stated most posi- tively that they never made any communication to the Austrian Ambassador, which would coincide with the two first paragraphs, published by the American dele- gation at Versailles. (4) The Austrian Ambassador, Count Szogyeny, was to have been recalled some time before. It was only at the request of the German Em- peror that the authorities in Vienna agreed to his holding his responsible post till the 18th of August, the Emperor Francis Joseph’s birthday. To Montgelas’ convincing remarks the writer would add the following considerations. The 278 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR telegram referred to a time and eA T ents before Germany had become convinced of the danger to Europe in the Austro- Serbian dispute and AA T hen she still clung to the view that this struggle could be localized. Germany’s determination upon restraint of Austria only de\ r eloped on the 27th and 28th. The telegram did not refer to any of the four plans of diplomatic settlement actually proposed or utilized in the crisis. The telegram is completely out of accord, not only with the actual achievements of Germany in regard to diplomatic pressure, hut also with the tone and contents of the Kaiser’s private memoranda of the period. It can scarcely be held that he lied to himself. The “old guard” have no hesitation in accepting the absolute veracity of the Kaiser’s memoranda when they happen to show a belliger- ent tone, as in the case of his attitude toAvards Serbia before the reply to the Austrian ultima- tum. The allegation that Bethmann-Holhveg's attempt on July 29th to discover the position of England in the event of a war proves the German decision upon war by that time is even more silly than the Potsdam Conference Myth and the Szogyeny Telegram accusation. It Avas a matter of great importance for Germany to learn Avhether or not England intended to remain neutral. The ineffecti\ r eness of Bethmann- Holhveg’s inteiwention in Vienna and the rumors THE ROLE OF GERMANY 279 of Russian mobilization made the outlook dark, though in no sense because of the policy or acts of Germany. Germany certainly had as much justification in being interested in British neu- trality as F ranee and Russia had in investigating her likelihood of intervening to aid them. And whereas Bethmann did not inquire until July 29th, Sazonov attempted to force the hand of England as early as the 24th when he stated to Buchanan that he “hoped that his Majesty’s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.” 8. JV as German Diplomatic Pressure Exerted too Late? It has often been held that German pressure was applied to Austria “too late” to achieve any effective results. It is essential to examine in just what sense and just why it was “too late.” 54 It was such because of the combined stubbornness of Austria and the overprecipi- tate and deliberately provocative general mo- bilization of the Russian army. If Austria had been amenable to reason there was plenty of time between the 27th and the 30th of July for her to have held up her military plans and ne- gotiated with Russia. Germany was from the first alert as to any symptoms that the proposed punitive war might develop into a European 280 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR war, and eager to prevent any such disaster. She acted as soon as it became at all evident that localization might not be successful. It might be said that she should have deserted Austria in the light of the latter’s refusal to ac- cept the German advice, but Germany never had any opportunity to bring Austria to her senses in this fashion, for, before she had ceased exerting pressure on Austria, Russia had inter- vened with her general mobilization which put an end forever to any hope of a pacific solution of the crisis of 1914. Indeed, Russia, following the advice of France, saw to it that Germany was afforded no opportunity to desert Austria. Russia mobilized directly against Germany, and after the outbreak of hostilities hurled the great bulk of her forces against the German frontier. Of the two the guilt of Russia was incompar- ably greater. 55 Austria insisted on a local war for reasons which involved her most vital inter- ests, and under conditions which made Russian intervention unnecessary and unjustifiable, namely, the promise to respect the territory and sovereignty of Serbia. Even more, Russia knowingly took the fatal step before it was in any sense certain that Germany’s pressure on Austria would not lead her to accept the pledge- plan favored by the Kaiser, George V and Sir Edward Grey. Indeed, at the time of proclaim- ing the mobilization, there seemed more proba- THE ItOLE OF GERMANY 281 bility of Austrian capitulation than at any other period in the crisis up to that moment. 56 There- fore, if Germany was “too late” with her pres- sure for peace, it was not her fault but that of Austria and, particularly, Russia. And cer- tainly neither France nor England can criticize Germany on this ground, as France made no effort whatever to restrain Russia, and England made but the most feeble, if not utterly faked and deceptive, efforts to restrain Russia, and none at all to restrain France. 57 Nor can the Russians complain about Austrian stubbornness in accepting mediation, as Sazonov, having been given a blank cheque by Poincare in St. Peters- burg, at the outset warned the other powers that Russia rejected in advance any proposals for moderation with respect to Russia’s policy towards Austria. 58 VI. THE KAISER AND THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES We shall reserve a detailed consideration of the Russian mobilization which produced the World War for the next chapter, limiting our- selves here to a discussion of Germany’s reaction to the military preparations of Russia. During the 27th and 28th of July there were repeated rumors brought to Berlin of extensive military preparations on the part of the Russians, rumors 282 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR which we now knoAv to ha\'e been founded upon substantial facts. 59 Late in the eA r ening of July 28 the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Tsar, urging him to keep the Russian situation under control: 00 It is with the gravest concern that I hear of the im- pression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country. The unscrupulous agita- tion that has been going on in Serbia for years has resulted in the outrageous crime to which Archduke Franz Ferdinand fell a victim. The spirit that led Serbians to murder their own king and his wife still dominates the country. You wall doubtless agree with me that we both, you and me, have a common interest, as well as all Sovereigns, to insist that all the persons responsible for the dastardly mui’der should receive their deserved punishment. In this politics play no part at all. On the other hand I fully understand how difficult it is for you and your Government to face the drift of your public opinion. Therefore, with regard to the hearty and tender friendship which binds us both from long ago with firm ties, I am exerting my utmost in- fluence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive at a satisfactory understanding with you. I confidently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. On the morning of July 29 the Tsar signed an order for the general mobilization of the Rus- sian army, and during the day General Dobrorol- THE ROLE OF GERMANY 283 ski, chief of the mobilization division, made his preparations for sending out the announcements and orders involved. 61 But at 6.30 in the after- noon of July 29 the Kaiser sent the following telegram to the Tsar: 62 I received your telegram and share your wish that peace should be maintained. But as I told you in my first telegram, I cannot consider Austria’s action against Serbia an “ignoble” war. Austria knows by experience that Serbian promises on paper are wholly unreliable. I understand its action must be judged as tending to get full guarantee that the Serbian promises shall become real facts. This my reasoning is borne out by the statement of the Austrian Cabinet that Aus- tria does not want to make any territorial conquests at the expense of Serbia. I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible for Russia to remain a spec- tator of the Austro-Serbian conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible war she has ever wit- nessed. I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable and as I already telegraphed to you, my Government is con- tinuing its exertions to promote it. Of course mili- tary measures on the part of Russia which would be looked on by Austria as threatening would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help. This telegram made a strong impression upon the Tsar, who, about Up. m., ordered the Rus- 284 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR sian Minister of War to stop the general mobili- zation and remain content with a partial mo- bilization. 03 But on the afternoon of the 30th Sazonov persuaded the Tsar to consent once more to the ordering of the general mobilization. Sazonov telephoned this information to the Chief of Staff about 4 P. m. on the 30th. G4 By 7 P. m. the announcement of the general mobilization had been telegraphed throughout the Russian Empire. At 2 p. m. on the 31st the Kaiser made a last desperate appeal to the Tsar: 05 In my endeavors to maintain the peace of the woi-ld I have gone to the utmost limit possible. The respon- sibility for the disaster which is now threatening the whole civilized world will not be laid at my door. In this moment it still lies in your power to avert it. No- body is threatening the honor or power of Russia who can well afford to await the result of my mediation. My friendship for you and your Empire, transmitted to me by my grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me and I have honestly often backed up Russia when she was in serious trouble, especially in her last war. The peace of Europe may still be maintained by you, if Russia will agree to stop the military measures which must threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary. These telegrams prove how eager the Kaiser was to avert hostilities. Moreover, his deeds at the time agree with his words, something which cannot be claimed for Sazonov, Poincare, Grey THE ROLE O F GERMANY 285 or George V. In spite of the fact that French, Russian and British authorities had long assumed that Russian mobilization was equivalent to a Russian declaration of war upon Germany, and would in all probability be followed by an im- mediate declaration of war by Germany, the Kaiser did not actually declare war upon Russia until two days after Russian general mobiliza- tion had been determined upon, and after all of his efforts to induce the Tsar to suspend mobili- zation had completely failed. At 1 p. m. on July 31st Germany proclaimed “the state of imminent danger of war.” At 3.30 on the afternoon of the 31st she warned Russia that she would mo- bilize unless Russia suspended mobilization within twelve hours. At 5 r. m. on the next day (August 1), after more than twenty-four hours’ delay, instead of twelve, to receive the Russian answer which never came, Germany ordered mobilization, and an hour later declared war on Russia. 66 Judge Bailsman comments in the fol- lowing manner on the Kaiser’s moderation and hesitation with respect to mobilization and the declaration of war: To me the patience of the Kaiser is incredible. . . . The fact is that if we look at this thing purely from the standpoint of German safety, the Kaiser should have ordered general mobilization a week sooner than he did, or at least have served upon Russia his ulti- matum that her military preparations cease. 286 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Sazonov and Poincare, in their attempts to defend their action, have contended that Russian mobilization was not equivalent to war, but this is pure quibbling and misrepresentation. The French and Russian military authorities from 1893 onward definitely operated on the candid assumption that this mobilization was equivalent to war, and expected a German declaration of war to follow immediately. When the English arranged their military conventions with France and Russia they fully accepted this view. Fur- ther, as Morhardt demonstrates, the Tsar, George V, the Kaiser and most of the leading statesmen and diplomats of 1914 frankly admitted this to be the fact . 67 Viviani openly proclaimed the first to mobilize as the aggressor, and tried to demonstrate that Germany had been the first . 68 Further, on July 25th, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, sol- emnly warned Sazonov that Russian mobiliza- tion would inevitably bring on a European war . 60 One other myth in this regard remains to be disposed of, namely, the allegation, repeated by Sazonov as late as the opening of the year 1925, that Russia determined upon general mobiliza- tion because of the publication of a false report of German mobilization in the Berlin Lokalan- zeiger at 1 p. m. on July 30th. 70 How prepos- terous this is may be seen from the fact that the Tsar had once ordered general mobilization on the morning of the 29th, and had arranged to meet Sazonov for the fatal decision to renew the order on the morning of the 30th. 71 Dob- rorolski himself has definitely stated that this announcement did not reach St. Petersburg until long after the mobilization had been ordered, and had no effect whatever upon the Russian deci- sion. 72 The audacity of Sazonov in including this fabrication in his foreword to Baron Schil- ling’s diary, which by itself proves the assertion obviously false, is truly stupendous. When Germany found herself unavoidably involved in war with Russia she attempted to secure the neutrality of France and England. The futility in any hope of inducing France to remain neutral is now well known since the publication of the Russian documents. 73 Poin- care had given Russia a free hand in regard to Austria and promised full French aid by the 23rd of July. After that he had not restrained the Russians, but had really encouraged them to proceed in as much secrecy as possible with the military preparations which he well knew must bring on war. 74 Hence, he had firmly bound himself anew to fulfil the promises he made to Russia in 1912 which we described in an earlier chapter. But, more important than this, we now know that late in the evening of July 31st the French government had firmly and irrevo- 288 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR cably decided upon war, and that, at 1 a. m. on the morning of August 1st, Izvolski telegraphed this information to Sazonov. 75 Hence, France had decided upon war at least sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia. Tech- nically France was not bound by the terms of the alliance with Russia to come to her aid in 1914, in the light of the priority of the Russian mobilization to that of the German, but the personal promises of Poincare had superseded the treaty obligation — a fact which he carefully kept from the Chamber of Deputies until 1918. 76 It was equally impossible to persuade England to remain neutral. As early as the 25th of July Sir Edward Grey had envisaged Russian mobili- zation, and he steadfastly refused to put any firm pressure on Russia to compel her to suspend her fatal military preparations. How mislead- ing is the conventional assertion that England entered the War because of the invasion of Bel- gium may be seen from the fact that on August 2nd, long before the German invasion, Grey promised Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, that England would enter the War on the side of France and Russia.' 1 Germany would unquestionably have kept out of Belgium if Grey had promised neutrality on this basis, but he refused to commit himself. 78 Germany even offered not to attack France if England would remain neutral, but the offer availed her nothing. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 289 The German declaration of war on France was a mere formality, and the English declared war on Germany. We might here also discuss briefly the atti- tude of the German officials and diplomats at the time of the outbreak of the World War. The French, Russians and British, fighting for their lives on the defensive, and hypothetically terror-stricken, should have been much down- cast at the prospect, while the Germans, at last realizing the prelude to their plans of a genera- tion for world dominion, should have been enormously elated. It is surprising that the re- verse seems to have been the case. Paleologue tells us of the great enthusiasm of the Russians (excepting the Tsar) for war , 79 and Izvolski tells of the “hearty, high spirits” with which the French informed him of their decision for war . 80 While Grey and Asquith took their decision for war with some gravity, there was enormous en- thusiasm on the part of Churchill, Bonar Law, Maxse and Nicolson . 81 Yet, von Tirpitz and the British military attache in Berlin tell us of the distress of the Kaiser when war was deter- mined upon; the British Ambassador in Berlin has given us a graphic picture of Bethmann- Hollweg as near a collapse during his last inter- view with him; and Buchanan, Paleologue and Baron Schilling have recounted how Pourtales, the German Ambassador to Russia, broke down 290 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR and wept when he handed the declaration of war to Sazonov . 82 VII. THE GERMAN INVASION OF BELGIUM AND THE GERMAN ATROCITIES There is no doubt whatever that the German invasion of Belgium was a diplomatic blunder of the first magnitude, but that it was a unique crime never contemplated by other powers is pure nonsense. The Franco-British military plans of 1911, 1912, and 1913 contemplated an Anglo-French movement through Belgium to the German frontiers . 83 France and Great Britain were not surprised by the German in- vasion of Belgium, as they knew of the plan by 1906. In spite of this knowledge, France had not erected any significant defenses on the Belgian frontier, thus indicating her intention to enter Belgium to meet the German advance. For a period of ten years before the War Eng- land had periodically approached Belgium to secure Belgian consent for the landing of British troops in Belgium in the event of a war with Germany . 84 The Belgian King expressed him- self in 1914 as more fearful of the French than the Germans . 85 In 1914 Germany simply “beat them to it.” France did not dare to move into Belgium before the British entry into the War, because this would have turned British opinion THE ROLE OF GERMANY 291 against France. Hence the French plan of ad- vance in the west was shifted to Alsace in 1914. 86 Grey could not swing British opinion for war until after the Germans had invaded Belgium. 87 Again, Germany had the candor at once to admit that the invasion of Belgium was a violation of neutral rights, but England defended as legal her atrocious and numerous violations of neutral rights on the seas during the War, and the bull- dozing of Greece by Great Britain to force her into the War is highly comparable to the conduct of Germany towards Belgium in 1914. The chief difference lies in the fact that Belgium was willing to fight to maintain her right to inde- pendence of action. 88 Further, what Germany did after the War be- gan obviously has little or no bearing whatever upon her responsibility for its origin. Hence the absurd nonsense in any such statement as the following from the pen of a “bitter-ender,” Mr. Simeon Strunsky, which appeared in the columns of the New York Times for August 30, 1925: 89 The telegrams of the diplomats were belied by com- mon sense and experience and utterly refuted by the final event of the German guns against Liege. All the carefully edited citations from telegrams, reports, con- versations, letters and speeches, despite their precision of year, day and minute, will not avail to establish Germany’s innocence against her record as written in 292 GENESIS OF THE WOELD WAR the general impressions of half a century — and in the light of the final event. It would also be useful here to destroy for all time a phase of Entente propaganda which suc- cessfully aroused world opinion against Germany — namely, that of the alleged atrocities of Ger- many during the War. While war itself is an atrocity, and the Germans may have been guilty of as many acts of misconduct as any other major power, with the possible exception of Russia, the stories which passed current during the War have been utterly repudiated by both Entente and neutral investigators. Even Belgian au- thorities themselves have denied the truth of such charges of German atrocities in Belgium as those embodied in the Bryce Report and other similar publications. Lloyd George and Xitti have admitted that no one has ever seen a Bel- gian child with its hands cut off by the Germans. Likewise, in regard to the submarine warfare, Admiral Sims has challenged anyone to produce evidence of more than one German atrocity in the period of submarine activity, and the officers guilty of this were punished by the German government. The astonishing falsification of “atrocity” pictures by the French and the British has recently been revealed by Ferdinand Avenarius . 90 The following example is one of thousands of similar character: Certain Ger- THE ROLE OF GERMANY 293 man officers early in June, 1914, had been given prizes for superior riding and manoeuvring. They had been photographed proudly exhibit- ing these trophies. The French took this pic- ture, removed the verbal explanation from be- neath it, and replaced it by a new and falsified description representing these officers as defiantly displaying spoil taken from ravaged Polish homes and churches. Likewise, the pictures purporting to exhibit German atrocities in Po- land have been shown to be actually pictures of the Russian pogroms against the Jews in Poland and elsewhere in 1905 and subsequent years. Much interest has also been recently aroused by the revelations of Brigadier General J. V. Charteris, during the War Chief of the Intelli- gence Division of the British General Staff. 91 At a speech before the National Arts Club in New York City on October 19, 1925, he naively revealed how he had switched the title of the picture of a train-load of dead German horses being taken to a fertilizer plant to a picture of dead German soldiers being taken to the rear. This picture was sent to China, a country be- lieving in ancestor worship, and hence outraged by this picture of the desecration of the dead. The photograph had a great deal of influence in inducing the Chinese to enter the World War on the side of the Allies. The picture was then sent back to England where the dead, 294 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR headed for the fertilizer plant, were represented as in part dead British soldiers. This aroused great indignation among the British, stimulating contributions and enlistments in the British Isles. Charteris still further revealed how he had en- deavored to give the fabrication still greater plausibility by faking a diary to be put in the pocket of a dead German soldier describing his horrible experiences while at work in one of these “corpse factories” boiling down his fellow- Germans who had died at the front. In the recent sensational book, Behind the Scenes in French Journalism , the author, “A French Chief Editor,” thus describes the organi- zation of propaganda in France during the World War: 91a If you reduce the lie to a scientific s} T stem, put it on thick and heavy, and with great effort and sufficient finances scatter it all over the world as the pure truth, you can deceive whole nations for a long time and drive them to slaughter for causes in which they have not the slightest interest. We have seen that sufficiently during the last war and will see it in the next one by which a kind providence will clumsily try to solve the problem of over-population. We concluded immediately and very correctly that it is not sufficient to inflame the masses for war, and, in order to escape the accusation of the war-guilt, to represent the enemy as a dangerous disturber of the peace and the most terrible enemy of mankind. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 295 We have not waited for Lord Northcliffe’s procedure. On the spur of the moment we appreciated the great importance to enthuse public opinion for our more or less just cause. As early as three days after the out- break of the war, Viviani promulgated a law which on the same day was passed by the Chamber and the Sen- ate, and which provided as the first installment of a powerful propaganda the trifling amount of 25 million francs in gold for the establishment of La Maison de la Presse, a gigantic building, Francois Street, 3, five stories high, without the basement, where the printing presses are located, and the ground floor, with its large meeting hall. A busy, lively going and coming, as in a beehive ; trucks arriving, elegant autos w T ith pretentious looking persons. The two hundred rooms contain the work-shops, offices, parlors, and reception-rooms, where those war-mad heroes are domiciled, whose courage grows with the degree of distance from the trenches. From the basement, up to the fifth story, covered with a glass roof — all is the embodiment of concentrated prop- aganda. In the basement stood the machinery neces- sary for printing and reproduction, under the glass roof operated the photo-chemigraphic department. Its principal work consisted in making photographs and cuts of wooden figures with cut-off hands, torn-out tongues, gouged-out eyes, crushed skulls and brains laid bare. The pictures thus made w 7 ere sent as unassail- able evidence of German atrocities to all parts of the globe, where they did not fail to produce the desired effect. In the same room fictitious photographs were made of bombarded French and Belgian churches, vio- lated graves and monuments and scenes of ruins and 296 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR desolation. The staging and painting of those scenes were done by the best scene-painters of the Paris Grand Opera. That bombardment of cities famous for their antiquities or art treasures is not a unique German crime or military procedure one may discover from reflecting upon the fate of Damascus during the last summer, a city far more precious in the historic traditions of human- ity than Rheims. The air-bombardment of non- combatants during the recent Riffian War in Morocco is also a pertinent ease at this point. Many will doubtless allege that this chapter constitutes a well-nigh complete “white-washing” of Germany as far as immediate responsibility for the World War is concerned, and the writer frankly admits that such is the case. But if the facts lead us to this conclusion we must be will- ing to accept it, however distasteful it may be. Of course, no one in his right mind would con- tend that Germany hereby escapes her due share of responsibility for the European system of na- tionalism, imperialism, militarism, navalism and secret diplomacy which predisposed that conti- nent towards war, but even here we must com- pletely abandon the idea that Germany was any more guilty in this respect than any of the other major states in Europe after 1870, and the THE ROLE OF GERMANY 297 writer doubts if it can be proved that she was even as much responsible for the system as France or Russia during this same period . 92 And it must further be recognized that, far from deliberately plunging Europe into war in 1914, the Kaiser acted more vigorously and con- sistently than any other person in Europe dur- ing the crisis of 1914 in the effort to avert the development of the general conflict. He may not have written more charmingly during this period than Sir Edward Grey, but he backed up his pretensions to the desire for peace by important concrete acts of restraint, something which cannot be claimed for Grey and his sup- porters. And the burden of proof lies on the Kaiser’s critics to demonstrate how, under the circumstances, he could have acted more promptly or effectively than he did. This chapter must not, of course, be inter- preted in any sense as an argument for or against the German system of government in 1914, or for the superiority or inferiority of German cul- ture. To hold Germany relatively guiltless as far as the immediate precipitation of the World War is concerned does not prove Cologne Ca- thedral superior to Rheims or Notre Dame, Rhine wine more delectable than sparkling Bur- gundy, Goethe more seductive than Rabelais, or Eucken more abstruse and profound than Berg- 298 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR son. Nor is the indictment of Poincare, Izvolski, Sazonov, Grey and Churchill a condemnation of their fellow-citizens or their national cultures. We are here solely concerned with the problem •of war guilt. Some have contended that even if Germany did not cause the War in 1914 , her policies and conduct would sooner or later have plunged Europe into general warfare. Taking the situa- tion as it existed before June 28 , 1914 , there is no ground whatever for such a view. She was on better terms with England than at any previous period for some fifteen years, and had reached a satisfactory arrangement with England con- cerning naval construction. It is highly prob- able that von Tirpitz would have been dismissed after the ratification of the treaty with England over the Near East. There was bitter antago- nism between him and Bethmann-Hollweg, and events were shaping up in favor of the policies of the latter. Aside from the possible development of greater Franco-Russian bellicosity, there is no reason to think that Germany would have grown more militaristic after 1914 , if the War had not come, and there are many reasons for believing that she would have become less warlike. Hence, if she did not desire war in 1914 , there is little probability that she would have wanted a war in 1916 , 1918 or 1925 . THE ROLE OF GERMANY 299 VIII. CONCLUSIONS -J We may safely state the following conclu- sions as to the role of Germany in the diplomatic crisis of 1914: (1) Germany was in no sense uniquely re- sponsible for the system which divided Europe \j into “two armed camps” by 1912. In 1914 she ^ had no reason for desiring war, as all of her am- bitions were being more effectively realized by peace than they could have been by war. (2) There is no basis in fact for the myth of the Potsdam Crown Council of July 5, 1914, at which the Kaiser is supposed to have revealed his foul plot to throw Europe into universal carnage. (3) The Kaiser, severely shocked and alarmed by the assassination of the Archduke, was in fa- vor of rapid and severe action by Austria against Serbia, though he was quite content that the hu- miliation of Serbia should be diplomatic rather than military. He agreed on July 6th to stand back of Austria in whatever policy she should take in regard to Serbia. This was a risky prom- ise, but at the time the Kaiser had no anticipation that the possible punitive war of Austria on Ser- bia would lead to a general European war. And his blank cheque to Austria cannot form the basis for holding him in any sense responsible 300 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR J p for the War, because the policies and action of * Austria in regard to Serbia prior to July 25th, which were tacitly encouraged by the Kaiser, fur- nished no adequate moral or legal reasons for the Russian mobilization. (4) The Serbian reply, in the light of the severity of the Austrian demands, greatly pleased the Kaiser, and he believed that it removed all justification for even Austrian mobilization against Serbia. He was distinctly opposed to the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. (5) Austria did not declare war on Serbia because of German incitement, but to create a situation which would allow her to escape from . The pressure which Germany was beginning to \] put on her to compel her to submit her dispute with Serbia to mediation and conversations with Russia. (6) When the Kaiser saw that a European war was possible because of the threatening attitude of Russia towards Austria, he pressed Austria to accept mediation and conversations. This pressure was “too late” only because of Austrian obstinacy, and, above all, because his efforts were cut short by the premature, unpro- voked and indefensible Russian general mobili- zation. Neither the Szogyeny Telegram nor Bethmann-Hollweg’s interrogation of England on the 29th affords any foundation whatever for doubting the extent, intensity or sincerity of the THE ROLE OF GERMANY 301 German pressure of Austria for peace after July 27th. (7) Germany did not decide to resort to war on the night of July 30th, but steadily worked for peace by diplomatic efforts until she learned of the Russian general mobilization order on the 31st of July. There is no ground what- ever for the assertions of Poincare and Sir Edward Grey that the militarists were in con- trol of the situation in Germany before late in the afternoon of July 31st, when the Russian action had made it practically impossible to avert hostilities. (8) In spite of the fact that the Russian, French and British authorities had for years agreed that Russian general mobilization was equivalent to a Russian declaration of war on Germany, and had expected it to be answered immediately by a German declaration of war, the Kaiser, though gravely threatened by war on two fronts against overwhelming odds, did not declare war until exactly forty-eight hours after the final issuance of the Russian mobiliza- ; " tion order, and after he had waited for more than twenty-four hours to receive an answer from Russia to an ultimatum with a twelve-hour limit. (9) He then tried to localize the war in the East and secure French and British neutrality, but the French had sixteen hours before tele- 302 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR graphed to Russia their declaration for war upon Germany. The next day (August 2nd), and two days before Germany invaded Belgium, Sir Edward Grey gave his promise to the French Ambassador that England would join France in making war on Germany. (10) The Belgian question has nothing what- ever to do with the question of the responsibility for bringing on the World War. The British and French had similar plans for invading Bel- gium, but the peculiar circumstances of getting England into the War in 1914 compelled them to abandon these plans at that time. This fact does not excuse Germany, and she has never tried to pretend that the invasion was legal, but it does show that her act was not one of unique perfidy never contemplated by another state. (11) There is no evidence that Germany re- sorted to a war of “frightfulness” or was guilty of “atrocities” to a greater degree than any of the other states involved, not even excepting the United States. The falsity of the major charges against Germany in this respect have been com- pletely exposed by Entente and neutral, as well as German, investigators. ( 12) There is no evidence that any responsible element in Germany in 1914 desired a world war, and the Kaiser worked harder than any other European statesman during the crisis to avert a general European conflagration. THE ROLE O F GERMANY 303 We may accept as an accurate estimate of the whole problem of Germany’s role in 1914 the conclusions of Dr. John S. Ewart in the follow- ing paragraphs : 93 C\ A Publication of the foreign office records of Germany and Austria-Hungary makes perfectly clear not only that Germany did not select 1914 for a European war, but that she was strongly opposed to its outbreak. Unquestionably, she agreed to the Austro-Hungarian pressure upon Serbia, and urged expedition in its prose- cution; for, in her view, punishment of Serbia was necessary for the maintenance, unimpaired, of the in- tegrity of the Dual Monarchy, and, consequently, for Germany’s own military security. But it is equally unquestionable that when Serbia, in her reply to the Austro-Hungarian demands, made extensive submis- sion, and when it became apparent that a local war would immediately take on European proportions, Ger- many endeavored to effect accommodation of the diffi- culty. . . . When, on the 27th— 28th, Germany became aware of the character of the Serbian reply to the Austro-Hun- garian note, her attitude changed, and from that time she persistently urged, even to the extent of threat of non-support, conciliatory methods on her ally. Rec- ognition of the probability that a local war would im- mediately become one of European dimensions prob- ably deepened Germany’s desire for conciliation. . . . The cause of the interruption of the negotiations was Russia’s secret mobilization by the Russian gen- erals (or the Czar) against Germany on the 29th of 304 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR July; the Czar’s sanction of it (if he had not previ- ously ordered it) on the 30th; and the proclamation of it on the 31st. That mobilization commenced while the Kaiser, at the request of the Czar, was putting heavy pressure upon Austria-Hungary. SELECTED REFERENCES Avernarius, F., How the War Madness was Engi- neered; Bausman, F., Let France Explain; Branden- burg, E., Von Bismarck zwm Weltkriege ; Biilow, B. von, Die Krisis; Die ersten Stand ensclilage des W eltkrieges ; Delbriick, H., Kautsky and Harden; Der Stand der Kriegsschuldfrage ; Dobrorolski, S., Die Mohilmachung der russisclien Armee, 1914; Ewart, J. S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars; Fay, S. B., “New Light on the Origins of the World War,” American Historical Review , July and October, 1920; “Morgenthau’s Leg- end of the Potsdam Council,” in Kriegsschuldfrage, May, 1925; Goos, R. (Ed.), The Austrian Red Book; Grelling, R., La Campagne “ Innocentiste ” en ATle- mange et le Traite der Versailles; Hammann, O., Um den Kaiser; Deutsche Weltpolitik, 1890- 1912 ; Kaut- sky, K., Wie der Weltkreig ent- stand ; Lichnowsky, K. M., My London Mission; Mars, W., “Responsi- bility for the War,” in Foreign Affairs (American), January, 1926; Montgelas, M., The Case for the Cen- tral Powers; The Outbreak of the World War, edited by Max Montgelas and Walther Schiicking; Renouvin, P., Les Origin.es immediates de la guerre; Schilling, M. F., How the War Began; Wilhelm, Kronprinz, Ich suche die Wahrheit. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 305 FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 E.g. Simeon Strunsky in New York Times, August 30, 1925, Section 3, pp. 1, 25; and editorial Ibid., September 14, 1925. 2 Cf. C. P. Gooch, Germany, Chap, vi; Ewart, op. cit., pp. 451 ff.; C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Yol. I, p. 261. 3 Ewart, op. cit., p. 569. 4 Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, p. 207. 6 Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story, pp. 83-87. 6 Loc. cit., pp. 309-15; and P. Renouvin, Les Origines immidi- ates de la guerre, pp. 13 ff. 7 Loc. cit., October, 1925, p. 14. 8 Cf. Sir Edward Grey, The Conflict for Human Liberty; W. S. Davis. The Roots of the War ; J. M. Beck, War and Humanity. 9 H. Friedjung, Das Zeitalter des Imperialisms, Vol. Ill; E. Brandenburg, Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege. io< Austrian Red Book, Vol. I, p. 15. 11 Outbreak of the World War, pp. 59-60. 12 Austrian Red Book, Vol. I, p. 15. 13 Outbreak of the World War, p. 61. 14 Ibid., p. 93. is Ibid., p. 90. is Ibid., p. 96. it Ibid., p. 113. is Ibid., p. 163. 19 Ibid., p. 182. 20 Ibid., p. 186. On this same telegram from the German Min- ister at Belgrade he also commented in regard to the Serbians: “Just tread hard on the heels of that rabble.” 21 See above, pp. 184 ff. 22 Outbreak of the World War, p. 266. 23 See also the remarks of Izvolski, above, pp. 114-15, as to the alarm of the french over Russia’s apparent indifference at this time. 24 American Historical Review, July, 1920, p. 629. 25 Outbreak of the World War, p. 254. as Ibifd., p. 273. 27 In Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, pp. 14-15. 28 Ewart, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 1097-8. 29 Outbreak of the World War, p. 201. so Ibid., p. 208. 31 Ibid., pp. 273-4. 32 Ewart, op. cit., pp. 1081, 1156. 33 Ewart, p. 1073;, cf. Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 66 ff., 120 ff. 34 Ewart, pp. 1073 ff. 35 Morhardt, Les Preuves, Part II, Chap. vii. 306 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 36 Ewart, pp. 1077-8. 37 Ibid., p. 1084. ss See above, pp. 211-13; and Ewart, pp. 1091 ff., 1110 ff. 39 See below, pp. 265 ff. 40 Montgelas, op. eit., pp. 165-9, 176, 184-7. 41 H. H. Asquith, The Genesis of the War, pp. 280. 42 Ibid., p. 290. 43 Outbreak of the World War, p. 345. 44 Ibid., p. 371. 45 Ibid., pp. 372-3. 46 Ibid., pp. 349-50. 47 Ibid., p. 351. 48 Ewart, op. eit., p. 1083. 49 American Historical Review, October, 1920, p. 50. so Op. cit., pp. 138-41, 162, 259-61; followed by Fabre-Luce. 51 American Historical Review, October, 1920, pp. 50-51; and, especially, in The Political Quarterly , December, 1925, pp. 628-9. 52 Fay, loc. cit.; and Ewart, p. 1109. 53 American Historical Review, October, 1920, p. 51. 54 Fay, in American Historical Review, July, 1920, p. 639; Oc- tober, 1920, p. 52; cf. Ewart, pp. 1123 ff. 55 Ewart, pp. 1123 ff.; G. Frantz, Russlands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg. The new evidence completely invalidates Gooch’s statement to the contrary in his History of Modern Europe, p. 547. 56 Ewart, pp. 1112-13; 1122-23; Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 156-65. 57 Montgelas, pp. 169 ff. ; Loreburn, How the War Came; Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal; Morhardt, Les Preuves. ss Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book (American edi- tion), p. 17. 59 Cf. S. Dobrorolski, Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee; and Frantz, op. cit. 60 Outbreak of the World War, pp. 296-7. si Dobrorolski, op. cit. ; and in French, Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 154 ff. 62 Outbreak of the World War, p. 315. 63 M. F. Schilling, How the War Began, p. 50; Fay, in Amer- ican Historical Review, January, 1921, p. 246; and references in footnote 61. 64 As above, and Schilling, pp. 65-6. 65 Outbreak of the World War, p. 399. 66 Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 167, 170, 172, 187, 192; Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 160-61. 67 Morhardt, pp. 295-6. 68 Ewart, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 107 ; Montgelas, pp. 182, 187, 189, 202. 69 Hermann Lutz, in New York Times Current History, May, 1925, p. 266; British Blue Book, No. 17. THE ROLE OF GERMANY 307 ^ 70 M. F. Schilling, How the War Began, Foreword, p. 9. ^3 71 Ibid., pp. 62 ff. 72 Montgelas, pp. 215-17 ; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 147 ff. 73 Schilling, pp. 113 ff. ; Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book. 74 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 53; Morhardt, pp. 117-161. 75 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 60-61. 76 G. Dupin (Ermenonville), Conference sur les responsabilitis de la guerre, pp. 33-5. 77 Ewart, pp. 140, 194-5; Montgelas, pp. 197-8. 78 Ewart, pp. 134 ff., 140, 413 ff. 79 M. Paleologue, An Ambassador’s Memoirs, Yol. I; cf. also F. Stieve, Isvolsky and the World IFar. so Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 61. si W. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1911-1914, Yol. I; L. J. Maxse, “Retrospect and Reminiscence,” in National Review, Au- gust, 1918. 82 F. Bausman, Let France Explain, pp. 26-7 ; Schilling, How the War Began, pp. 76-8. 83 Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, pp. 224-5; A. Pevet, “De Serajevo a Bruxelles,” in Kriegsschuldfrage, July, 1924, pp. 261 if.; E. L. Fox, Behind the Scenes in Warring Ger- many, Chap. XV. 84 Viscount Haldane, Before the War; C. A. Beard, Cross- Currents in Europe Today, pp. 50-55; Fox, op. cit., Chap. XV. 85 Montgelas, p. 225, and footnote 3. 86 Pevet, loc. cit. 87 Ewart, Vol. I, pp. 131 ff. 88 M. Caracciolo, L’Intervento della Grecia nella guerra mon- diale e I’opera della diplomazia alleata; A. Peret, Les Responsables de la guerre, pp. 476-7. so Loc. cit., Section 3, p. 25. 90 F. Avenarius, How the War Madness was Engineered. Cf. P. Gibbs, Now It Can Be Told, p. 521. si New York Times, October 20, 1925; cf. New York Nation, November 18, 1925. si * Hinter den Kulissen des Franzosischen Journalismns, von einem Pariser Chefredakteur, Berlin, 1925, pp. 224 ff. 92 Before the conventional view of Germany’s chief responsi- bility for the European system of 1914 can be established it will be necessary to refute the able German works by Rachfahl and Brandenburg, Ewart’s thorough analysis of the “roots of the War,” and the sharp attack upon France by Bausman and by the revisionist group in France. 9i3 Ewart, pp. 569, 1164, 1165. CHAPTER VI THE RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION PRECIPITATES THE WORLD WAR I. THE RUSSIAN SITUATION UP TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE ARCHDUKE We have already set forth in detail in the third chapter of the present work the description of how the French and Russians, under the leader- ship of Izvolski and Poincare, drew together in the plan to exploit the Balkan situation as the most suitable and probable basis for provoking a European war which would secure the Straits for Russia and Alsace-Lorraine for France. The plans for joint military action, which had been concluded by 1894, were supplemented by a Franco-Russian naval convention in 19 12. 1 The French public had been prepared for the prospect of a war over Balkan problems, hitherto a highly unpopular proposal, by corrupting the French press through the influx of Russian gold feverishly demanded by Izvolski for this pur- pose, and dispensed under his direction according to suggestions offered by Poincare and his clique. 2 England had made plans for joint naval action with France against Germany as 308 RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 309 early as 1905, and these were given a definite form in the correspondence between Grey and Cambon on November 22, 1912. 3 From 1906 onward the British laid plans with the French for the landing of a British expeditionary force on the Continent for cooperation with the French in the west and the Russians in the east to crush Germany between them. By 1912 the Franco-British plans for joint military action were as detailed as those between the French and Russian general staffs. In the spring of 1914 the circle had become complete through the negotiations for an Anglo-Russian naval con- vention. 4 We have also called attention to the fact that Poincare and Izvolski had successfully com- pleted their campaign for the conversion of Sazonov to the war policy by December, 1913. In his famous memorandum to the Tsar on December 8, 1913, he had stated that Russia must have the Straits, and that they could not be obtained without invoking European compli- cations which would lead to a general European war. 6 Izvolski reported in 1912 that Poincare had told him that the French General Staff felt that Russia and France together could defeat Germany and Austria, but Sazonov took the opposite view. 6 At a secret conference on De- > cember 31, 1913, he argued that it would be necessary to make sure of English cooperation 310 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR in the event of war to make a victory certain and rapid : T In reality a Russian initiative supported only by France would not appear particularly dangerous to Germany. The two states would hardly be in a posi- tion to deal Germany a mortal blow, even in the event of military successes, which can never be predicted. A struggle, on the other hand, in which Great Britain participated might be disastrous to Germany, who clearly realizes that if Great Britain were drawn in, the result might be social disturbances of a catastrophic nature within her frontiers in less than six weeks. Great Britain is dangerous to Germany, and in the con- sciousness of this is to be found the explanation of the hatred with which the Germans are filled in the face of Great Britain’s growing power. In view of this it is essential that before taking any decisive steps the Tsar’s government shall assure itself of the support of the London Cabinet, whose active sympathy does not seem, in the Minister’s view, to be certain. This doubt and uncertainty was diminished, as w r e have seen, by the descent of Izvolski, Poincare and the French ministers upon Sir Edward Grey during the latter’s visit to Paris in the spring of 1914. 8 From then on there was little to fear, particularly in the light of Rus- sia’s having a strong representative at London in Sir Arthur Nicolson who was Grey’s right- hand man in the Foreign Office. 9 As Paleologue tells us, however, the Tsar was still worried in RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 311 July, 1914; and laid stress on making absolutely sure of English adherence to the Entente. 10 It was earlier shown that in February, 1914, the Tsar warmly received Premier Pashitch of Serbia, inquired how many men Serbia could pub. in the field against Austria, promised to supply Serbia with rifles, cannon and ammunition, and told the Premier to convey his highest regards to the King of Serbia and tell him that Russia would do everything for Serbia. 11 We likewise referred to the secret Crown Council of Febru- ary 8, 1914, at which it was decided that Rus- sia would be wiser not to strike Turkey un- aided, but should await the outbreak of the an- ticipated European war. Definite plans were made for the campaign against Turkey as soon as the war should come. The Tsar approved the decision of the Council on March 23, 1914. 12 The negotiation of the naval convention with Great Britain was a practical step in preparing for the desirable alignment of powers as soon as the conflict should burst forth. We have also summarized the Franco-Russian war aims, which had been mutually agreed upon and officially ap- proved by February, 1914, providing that Rus- sia should have the Straits, and France Alsace- Lorraine. Finally, we made it clear that Russia had been putting forth heroic efforts to increase her army and navy, particularly the former, between 1912 and 1914. Delcasse, during his 312 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR mission to St. Petersburg in 1913, had encour- aged this military program, and France had insisted that the French loans to Russia be spent in large part for the arming of the Rus- sians and the building of strategic railroads to the German frontier . 13 Ry the beginning of the summer of 1914 the Russians were “feel- ing their oats” as a result of the success of their unparalleled military efforts. During the sec- ond week in June the Russian Minister of War, W. A. Sukhominlov, inspired the following arti- cle in the semi-official Russian paper, the Birshewija IV jedomosti , which was obviously published to help Poincare and his group in their campaign to increase the French army, and discredit enemies of the army bill of 1913: 14 Russia does not permit herself to mix into the in- ternal affairs of a foreign nation, but cannot remain merely an unconcerned onlooker during a crisis in a friendly and allied country. If the French parlia- ment feels itself at liberty to comment on such internal affairs of Russia as army contracts, which are con- nected with certain economic advantages to the con- tractors, Russia can certainly not remain indifferent in the face of a purely political question, such as the three-year service term, which constitutes a cause of dissension between the parties of the French parlia- ment. In Russia there is no divided opinion in regard to this matter. Russia has done everjdhing to which her alliance with France obligates her, and she now RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 313 expects that her ally will perform her obligations as well. It is known all over the world, what colossal sacrifices have been made by Russia to bring the Franco-Russian alliance to the point of the ideal. The reforms made in the Russian military departments during the training of Russia’s armed forces exceed anything that has ever been done before in this line. The recruit contingent this year has, by the latest ukase of His Majesty, been raised from 450,000 to 580,000 men, and the period of service has been length- ened by six months. Thanks to these measures there are in service every winter in Russia four contingents of recruits under arms, making an army of 2,300,000 men. Only the great and mighty Russia can permit herself such a luxury. Germany has at her command over 880,000, Austria somewhere over 500,000 and Italy rather more than 400,000 men. It is thus quite natural that Russia should expect from France 770,- 000 men, which is only possible under the three year term of service. It must be remarked that these army increases in time of peace are exclusively for the pur- pose of effecting rapid mobilization. Russia is at the same time moving on toward new reforms, to the con- struction of a whole network of strategic railways, for the most rapid concentration of the army in case of war. Russia wants the same thing from France, which she can only do by realizing the three year term of service. Russia and France want no war, but Russia is ready and France must be ready also. As we indicated in the fourth chapter, we are not yet certain as to the degree to which the 314 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Russians were informed concerning the plot to assassinate the Archduke, or the extent to which they cooperated in it. The Russians have not yet published the Russo-Serbian dispatches of this period. As Mandl and Bogitshevich have shown, there is no longer any doubt that the Russian Minister at Belgrade, N. von Hartwig, and the Russian military attache at Belgrade, Artamanov, were thoroughly aware of the plot before its execution. Hartwig was very power- ful in Serbia. 15 Franz Josef remarked to Tschirsehky on July 2, 1914, that “von Hartwig is master at Belgrade, and Pashitc-h does nothing without consulting him.” 16 While this may be an exaggeration, there can be no doubt that Pashitch and Hartwig must have discussed a matter of such great importance to the future of both countries as the plot, and the Russian authorities may well have given assurances of approval and support. Certainly the Russians had encouraged and bribed the Serbian plotters in wholesale fashion after 1912. 11 The dis- tinguished British publicist, Robert Dell, goes even further and alleges that he possesses con- fidential information to the effect that the plot was laid at the instigation of the Russian au- thorities : 18 The complicity of the Serbian government in the assassination is now admitted, or rather triumphantly claimed. The assassins have become Serbian national RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 315 heroes. I believe that we shall sooner or later have convincing proof of the complicity of the Russian government, of which I have already strong evidence from an inside source. According to my information the Tsar was kept in ignorance of the design. The late M. Izvolski, at any rate, seems to have known all about it. How else can one explain his report about the visit to him in Paris, just (after the assassination, of a diplomatist coming from Belgrade, who brought him the message from the King of Serbia that, “We have done a good piece of work”? My theory of the origin of the War, based on considerations and evi- dence into which I have not now space to enter, is that the Russian government had decided on war in June, 1914, and that the assassination of Serajevo was de- liberately planned to provoke it. Whether or not we go as far as Mr. Dell, it is certain that the Russian encouragement and financing of the Serbian intrigues and plots against Austria removed any justification for Russian intervention to protect Serbia against the just wrath of Austria. II. RUSSIA FROM THE MURDER AT SARAJEVO TO THE GENERAL MOBILIZATION 1. Poincare at St. Petersburg in July, 1914 There was much excitement in St. Petersburg after the assassination of the Archduke, though 316 GENESIS OF THE AVORLD AVAR just hoAV much and of what kind we shall never know with full certainty until Ave possess more information as to the degree of complicity and knowledge on the payt of St. Petersburg in the plot of Sarajevo. [The long delay of Austria in taking any action with respect to making de- mands upon Serbia seemed ominous^ As Ave have seen above, the delay after July 14th Avas chiefly due to the Austrian desire to postpone submitting the ultimatum to Serbia until after President Poincare had left Russia. 19 It has been charged that Poincare planned this visit after the assassination in order to lend en- couragement to the Russian militarists and make a general war certain. Whatever may haA'e been his intentions and achieA r ements in July, 1914, the visit was planned during the previous January. He arrived in Russia at 2 p. m. on July 20th and left at 10 p. m. on July 23rd. 20 In his defense in Foreign Affairs he represents himself as but a ceremonial figurehead Avho Avent to Russia as a mere symbolic representatiA'e of Franco-Russian friendship and took no part whatever in discussing foreign policy and Franco-Russian relations, full charge of which was left to his F oreign Minister, Viviani. 21 Pale- ologue and others have presented an altogether different picture of the situation. 22 If anybody Avas a figurehead it was Viviani. All the Russian attentions were showered upon Poincare, and he RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 317 took full charge of all negotiations and conver- sations with the Russian court and with the diplo- mats at St. Petersburg. Only the more significant aspects of Poin- care’s visit can be dealt with here. At the ban- quet given to him by the Tsar on July 20th, the evening of his arrival, Poincare made the follow- ing reply to the Tsar’s toast: 23 Sire! I thank your Majesty for your hearty recep- tion and beg you to believe that it has been a great pleasure to me to pay to-day another visit to the sub- lime Ruler of this friendly and allied nation. True to the path followed by my honourable predecessors, I have desired to bring to your Majesty here in Russia solemn evidence of the unalterable feelings dwelling in every French heart. Nearly twenty-five years have passed since our countries with clear vision have united the efforts of their diplomacy, and the happy effects of these enduring associations are daily made apparent in the world balance. Founded upon com- munity of interests, consecrated by the peaceful de- sires of the two Governments, supported by ai’med forces on land and sea which know and value each other and have become accustomed to fraternize, strengthened by long experience and augmented by val- uable friendships, the alliance to which the sublime Tzar Alexander III and the lamented President Carnot gave the initiative has ever since constantly afforded proof of its beneficial activity and its unshakable strength. Your Majesty can be assured that France in the future, as always in the past, will in sincere and daily 318 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR co-operation with her ally pursue the work of peace and civilization for which both the Governments and both the peoples have never ceased to labour. I raise my glass in honour of your Majesty, of the Tzarina, of Her Majesty the Imperial Mother, of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke, the heir to the Throne, and of the whole Imperial Family, and I drink to the greatness of welfare of Russia. On the afternoon of the 21st Poincare met the assembled diplomats in the Winter Palace. He ignored all discussions with the German Am- bassador, appealed to the Japanese Ambassador to remain faithful to the Triple Entente, at- tempted to impress upon the English Ambas- sador the moderation of the Tsar’s policy in Persia, then scolded the Austrian Ambassador for Austria’s past policy in regard to Serbia and threatened him in case Austria took a strong stand in the 1914 crisis, after which he turned and expressed sympathy to the Serbian Minis- ter. 24 Paleologue thus describes Poincare’s con- versation with Count Szapary, the Austrian Ambassador : 25 After a few words of condolence over the assassina- tion of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, the President asked Szapary, “Have you had any news from Serbia?” “The judicial investigation is going on,” replied Szapary coldly. Poincare replied, “I cannot but fear RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 319 the results of this inquiry, M. l’ambassadeur. I re- member two earlier investigations, which did not im- prove your relations with Serbia. ... You will re- member, M. l’ambassadeur . . . the Friedjung affair and the Prohaska affair.” Szapary answered drily, “We cannot, M. le Presi- dent, permit a foreign Government to prepare assas- sinations of our sovereigns on its territory.” Poincare tried, in the most conciliatory tone, to point out to him that in the present condition of feel- ing in Europe every Government must act with re- doubled caution. “With a little good will this Serbian affair can easily be settled. But it can also easily develop dangerously. Serbia has very warm friends among the Russian people. And Russia has an Ally, France. What complications are to be feared here!” In the next salon there were waiting the other representatives of foreign countries ; Poincare merely shook hands with them. He only stopped when he came to the Sei’bian minister, to whom he offei’ed a few words of condolence. Even more significant is Paleologue’s descrip- tion of the attitude of the Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Melitza, wives of Grand Duke Nicholas and Grand Duke Peter, respectively, at a dinner given to Poincare by Grand Duke Nicholas on July 22nd. It indicates the great enthusiasm for war engendered in the Grand Duke’s circle by Poincare’s visit, as well as show- ing that the war group felt that the Tsar was still opposed to their policy: 26 820 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR “Do you know, we are passing through historic days, blessed days ! ... At to-morrow’s review the bands will play nothing but the Marche Lorraine and Samhre et Meuse. ... I have had a telegram from my father to-day, in 'a code we agreed on; he tells me we shall have war before the month is out. . . . What a hero, my father ! He is worthy of the Iliad. . . . Stop a minute, look at this little box — it never leaves me ; it has Lorraine soil in it, Lorraine soil, which I brought over the border when I was in France two years ago with my husband. And now look at that table of honor! It is decorated entirely with thistles; I would not have any other flowers put on it. Now then! They are thistles from Lorraine! I picked a few stalks from close where I was, brought them here and had the seeds sown in my garden. . . . Melitza, go on telling the ambassador; tell him all to-day means to us, while I go and receive the Tsar.” During the meal I was sitting next the Grand Duchess Anastasia and the dithyrambics continued, mixed with prophecies. “War is going to break out. . . . There will be nothing of Austria left. . . . You will get Alsace- Lorraine back. . . . Our armies will meet in Berlin. . . . Germany will be annihilated. . . . Then suddenly — “I must control myself, the Tsar is looking at me.” At his farewell toast on July 23rd Poincare offered the following: 27 “Sii’e ! I do not wish to leave this shore without RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 321 once more declaring to jour Majesty how deeply touched I am by the moving cordiality manifested towards me by your Majesty during my stay, and by the warm reception accorded to me by the Russian people. In these proofs of attention with which I have been overwhelmed, my country will see a new guarantee for the sentiments which your Majesty has always manifested towards France and an emphatic affirmation of the indissoluble alliance which unites Russia and my native France. With regard to all the problems which daily confront the two Govern- ments and which demand the concerted activity of their united diplomats, there has always been agreement and always will be, and all the more readily because both countries have frequently experienced the advantages accruing to each from regular cooperation, and be- cause they are both animated by the same ideal of peace combined with strength, honour and dignity. I drink to the welfare of your Majesties, of the Empress Maria Feodorovna, of His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke, the Heir Apparent, and the whole Im- perial Family, and also to the fame of the Russian Empire.” That this speech had a very great effect on the Tsar is evident from Nicholas’ statement to Cruppi a year later that Poincare’s words of July, 1914, still rang in his ears. Paleologue re- garded Poincare’s Russian speeches as binding diplomatic documents. 28 The specific agreements reached are summar- 322 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR ized in a telegram which was deliberately omitted from the British Blue Booh in 1914. They were the following: 29 Minister of Foreign Affairs and French Ambassador told me confidentially result of visit of President of French Republic had been to establish the following points : 1. Entire community of views concerning the vari- ous questions facing the Powers, so far as concerns the maintenance of the general peace and balance of power in Europe, and especially in the East. 2. Resolve to take steps in Vienna to prevent a re- quest for explanation, or any demand equivalent to an interference in Serbia’s internal affairs, which Serbia might legitimately regard as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. 3. Solemn confirmation of the obligations laid by the Alliance on the two countries. This is confirmed by a despatch sent to Bienvenu-Martin by Viviani from Reval on July 24th: 30 In the course of my conversation with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs we had to take into con- sideration the dangers which might result from any step taken by Austria-Hungary in relation to Servia in connection with the crime of which the Hereditary Archduke has been a victim. We found ourselves in agreement in thinking that we should not leave any- thing undone to prevent a request for an explanation or some raise en demeure which would be equivalent to RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 323 intervention in the internal affairs of Servia, of such a kind that Servia might consider it as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. We have in consequence come to the opinion that we might, by means of a friendly conversation with Count Berchtold, give him counsels of moderation, of such a kind as to make him understand how undesirable would be any intervention at Belgrade which would appear to be .a threat on the part of the Cabinet at Vienna. The British Ambassador, who was kept informed by M. Sazonov, expressed the idea that his government would doubtless associate itself with a demarche for removing any danger which might threaten general peace, and he has telegraphed to his government to this effect. It is particularly significant that all of these conversations and the Franco-Russian agree- ments were made before Poincare, by his own confession, knew anything of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia . 31 It shows tha t the French and Russians had firmly determined to take an aggressive stan d against Austrian action in Serbia, no ma tter what it turn ed ou t to be. Poincare explicitly informed Paleologue that Sazonov should be kept from weakening in the crisis by prompt and persistent promises of French support. As Professor Stieve well sum- marizes this matter : 32 It proves irrefutably that, in full accord with what has already been established here in regard to the at- 324 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR titude of the French and Russian Governments, an assurance of mutual armed assistance was given be- fore there was any occasion for it arising out of the course of events. [The French and Russian will to war came together here at a critical moment, and from this moment on the Government of the Tsar knew that it had its Ally at its back if in the acute Austro- Serbian conflict it resorted to force^j The blank cheque for world war signed first by Poincare in 1912 was now signed again. An even more severe indictment of Poincare for inciting the Russians at this critical time comes from the pens of two distinguished French publicists. M. Mathias Morhardt of the Paris Temps , and one of the most active French leaders in the movements for justice and truth since the days of the Dreyfus Case, thus summarizes the significance of Poincare’s visit to Russia for the subsequent development of events in the crisis of July, 1914: 33 If one consults the diplomatic records during the first few weeks following June 28, one sees only hesi- tations and uncertainty. No Foreign Office knew ex- actly what steps to take. Confusion was general. The situation required direction and a leader. This leader was M. Raymond Poincare. In the midst of the European crisis he set out resolutely for St. Peters- burg. Tha-Ja^ d alone — oFo inderta ki ng such a trip at such a time meant a nlaii for war. How could there be RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 325 any doubt on this matter? If M. Raymond Poincare wanted peace, a letter to St. Petersburg would have sufficed. If Russia had been warned that France was resolved not to espouse, before the world, the cause of the assassins at Serajevo, the whole matter would have been solved. Peace would have been maintained. But M. Raymond Poincare set out for St. Petersburg ! He then had an idea to uphold, a program to develop, a policy to realize. To try to calm his ally? To lessen the conflict? Once more the thing would have been more easily done from Paris. Also, on this point, we have a crowd authori- tative, and irrefutable. \jVI. Raymond Poincare did not go to St. Petersburg to calm his ally or abate the conflict ; he went to intensify the strength of Pan- slavism, to exalt the chauvinistic and imperialistic Russian passions, and to push that irresolute and timid being, Czar Nicholas II, to extreme resolutions^/. . . Never, if he had not gone to preach savagely the war crusade in St. Petersburg, as M. Maurice Paleo- logue has told us, would the cowardly Nicholas II h^ave dared to take the aggressive initiative. Is there need to add that the fate of Serbia very little interested the Russian people who, in the great majority of cases, were even ignorant of the name? . . . The bits of evidence on this point we have often specifically mentioned during our discourse. They are : (1) The account of M. Maurice Paleologue concern- ing the discussion on the imperial yacht where Czar Nicholas II listened to M. Raymond Poincare with a “docile attention,” concerning the official toasts, con- cerning the instructions given to the Ambassador of 326 GENESIS OF THE WOELD WAR France (“it is necessary that M. Sazonoff be firm and that we support him”), concerning the unnecessary in- sults to the Austrian Ambassador; (2) the letter of July 22 from St. Petersburg, the letter of .July 24, from Reyal ; and (3) the confession of the connivance of Sir G. Buchanan, English Ambassador, in these con- temptible plots for war. It is abundantly proved that if Russia mobilized first, that if she precipitated the World War, July 30, 1914, it was more because she did not know how to resist her allies than to satisfy the need, which she probably didn’t really feel, of in- tervening in behalf of the assassins of Serajevo. Furthermore, on his return to Paris, July 29th, M. Poincare continued to play with a savage and pas- sionate energy on the cowardly spirit of the Russian government. It was he who assured and encouraged it. It was he who dragged it into the conflict. It was he, finally, who, on the historic night of July 29-30, in answer to the inquiry of Sazonoff (who was stricken with anxiety before the German protests against the Russian preparations) can we really count on you? replied implacably: “Go to it— we are ready !” The brilliant young French publicist, Alfred Fabre-Luee, in what is unquestionably the most judicious and comprehensive book which has yet come out of France on the broad question of war guilt and its implications for contemporary in- ternational relations, comes to essentially identi- cal conclusions: 34 RUSSIA precipitates w A R 327 There is, then, no possible doubt about the attitude taken by Poincare at £ Petersburg between the 20th and the 23rd of July. ^Without any knowledge what- i ever of the Austrian demands or of the policy of Germany in the circumstances, he assumed a position of energetic opposition to the Central Powers, gave this opposition a very specific character, and never modified it in the slightest Such a policy rests upon the assumption that the program of one’s adversary is a blind force, incapable of change or modification, and hence does away with any temptation to attempt a pacific adjustment of the situation. From that time on there was a very slight chance indeed of averting war ; and, moreover, Poin- care had given Russia carte blanche to initiate hos- tilities any time she wished to do so, as we know from the fact that two days after Poincare’s departure from St. Petersburg, Paleologue, following his instructions, promised Sazonov, without any reservations after the delivery of the Austrian ultimatum, that France would fulfil all the obligations of the alliance. Further, Viviani, who accompanied Poincare, declared to Nek- ludof at Stockholm on July 25th that “if it is a war for Russia, it will be, most certainly, a war for France also.” The material just presented as to the part played by Poincare in inciting the Russians to action in the crisis of 1914, together with the more thorough analysis of the role of France in 1914, which will be presented later, make it neces- 328 GENESIS OF THE WOELD AVAR 4 A C \ V \ sary to modify somewhat the severe judgment passed upon Russia by Ewart and others hold- ing that state to be the chief culprit in the pre- cipitation of the World War in 1914. While it_ is entirely true that Russia took the specific steps which made the War inevitable, and the only steps which made it unavoidable, yet she M ould never have dared to act as she did except Tor the preliminary encouragement of Poincare and his persistent promises of full French aid in the event of hostilities^ It is, thus, apparent that the responsibility for the fatal Russian mo- bilization which produced the War must be shared jointly, and probably about equally, by France and Russia. The present tendency to throw the blame entirely upon Russia is con- venient because of the disappearance of the Rus- sian government of 1914, but it is not consistent with the facts. Poincare is as guilty in the cir- cumstances as Sazonov. 35 2. The Austrian Ultimatum and the Russian Decision for War The effect of the French assurances upon Russia Avere quickly apparent. On July 22nd Sazonov sent a telegram to the Russian Minister in Vienna apprising him of the fact that Russia proposed to take a strong stand against any Austrian humiliation of Serbia. 36 This, it Avill RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 329 be remembered, was the day before the Aus- trians handed their ultimatum to Serbia. On the 24th, after he learned the terms of the Aus- trian ultimatum, he threatened Count Pour-tales, the German Ambassador, concluding his inter- view with the statement that “if Austria gobbles up Serbia, we shall make war upon her.” 37 He told Buchanan and Paleologue on the 24th that he thought Russia would mobilize. 38 In fact, as early as the 18th he had stated that he would never permit Austria “to use menacing lan- guage or military measures against Serbia.” 39 The news of the nature of the Austrian ulti- matum had stiffened his belligerent attitude still more, as the Austrian demands were sufficiently severe to allow him to use them as the basis for a menacing policy towards Austria and as an ex- cuse for the beginning of military prepara- tions. 40 There has been a general tendency among re- visionist students of war guilt in late years to date the real turning point of the crisis of 1914 from the decision for the general Russian mo- bilization on July 30th, but it seems to the writer that it is far more accurate to date it from the moment the Russians learned of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, remembering that the Russians possessed no knowledge whatever of the secret Austrian decision to attack Serbia, even if the latter gave a relatively conciliatory 330 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR reply to the ultimatum. The military clique in Russia, led by the Grand Duke Nicholas, and guided by the unfa lteringly aggressive diplomacy of Sazonov, immediately discerned that the ulti- matum was of the sort which would furnish Russia an admirable screen behind which to hide the fact that she had been determined to seize the first satisfactory opportunity to turn a Bal- kan crisis into a European war to secure the Straits . 41 According to Baron Schilling, Sa- zonov’s first words upon learning of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were: “This means a European war.” The European complications which Sazonov had foreseen and longed for on December 8 , 1913 , and the prospective British adherence to the Franco-Russian Alliance were now realized. And Poincare, who had assured Izvolski in 1912 that it only remained for Rus- sia to seize upon an appropriate incident in the Balkans to bring France into a general Euro- pean war, had, before he left Russia, given Sa- zonov explicit assurance that the particular “in- cident in the Balkans” which had been created by the assassination of the Archduke was a satis- factory one, quite adequate to evoke the fulfil- ment of his promise of two years before. The “European complications” could now he manip- ulated in such a manner as certainly to bring Europe to war, while Sazonov could mask his in- tentions under the pretense of protecting “a RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 331 brave and innocent little country” against wan- ton bullying, if not complete extinction. There were very special reasons why 1914 was a crucial year for France and Russia. Many in the British Liberal Party were becoming alarmed at Grey’s commitments to France and Russia. The symptoms of a growing rap- prochement between Germany and England in the early part of 1914 had thrown Paris and St. Petersburg into a panic, and had stirred Paul Cambon to heroic efforts in opposition. In an- other year Grey’s policy might be repudiated. Further, in June and July, 1914, Russia was threatened with an economic and social revolu- tion 42 which could probably be averted by war. The French situation was likewise one which made 1914 a most favorable year for war. There were four classes with the colors, and the radicals might soon develop sufficient strength under the leadership of Jaures to abolish the three-year service act of 1913. The militarists in Russia were thoroughly with Sazonov. As early as July 25th, says Professor Fay : 43 They were probably convinced that war was “in- evitable,” and that here was Russia’s heaven-sent op- portunity to have her final reckoning with Germany and to acquire Constantinople and the Straits. There- fore, the sooner full mobilization was declared the better. 332 GENESIS OF THE WO ELD WAR From the 24th onward the Russians carried their military preparations steadily and unhesitat- ingly forward, well knowing that they must in- evitably plunge the whole Continent into war. The 30th of July is important only as the date on which the preparations had been carried so far that a general mobilization was necessary to avoid obstructing the plans preparatory to war. In fact, the military crowd argued that the 28th was the desirable day for the order, and secured the Tsar’s consent on the 29th, only to have their premature joy cut short by the Tsar’s counter- manding order after he had received an appeal from the Kaiser. 44 A secret partial mobili- zation had been in operation since the 26th in both France and Russia. The Tsar was unquestionably desirous of pre- serving peace, once war imminently and con- cretely faced him, in spite of his approval of the war plans in the preceding March. But the preliminary military plans did not call for his ex- press sanction, and were carried out in part with- out his knowledge. By the time he was thor- oughly aware of what was going on, he found himself quite unable to stem the tide of military A. zeal in the court, the ministry and the army. His telegram to the Kaiser on the 28th practi- cally confesses his helplessness before the mili- tary crowd : 40 RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 333 Am glad you are back. In this most serious mo- ment I appeal to you to help me. An ignoble war has been declared on a weak country. The indignation in Russia, shared fully by me, is enormous. I fore- see that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me, and be forced to take ex- treme measures which will lead to war. To try and avoid such a calamity as a European war, I beg you in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going too far. Upon this telegram the Kaiser quite appropri- ately commented: “A confession of his own weakness, and an attempt to put the responsi- bility on my shoulders. . . . Instead of sum- moning us to check our allies, His Majesty should turn to the Emperor Franz Josef and deal with him in order to learn His Majesty’s intentions.” 40 The one thing which was needed after the 24th to make Sazonov relatively sure of his ground in deciding upon war was to have rea- sonable assurance that England would rally to the cause of France and Russia. This assur- ance was implicitly given on July 25th. On this day — the day before he proposed a Eu- ropean conference to Germany — Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Buchanan that he felt that the Austrian action towards Serbia would involve Russian mobilization. The same day he re- 384 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR peated the statement to Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London. Bencken- dorff immediately telegraphed this ominous and all-important statement to Sazonov, and to make doubly certain that Sazonov would get this in- formation and recognize its significance he tele- graphed it to Sazonov a second time on the same day. 47 This encouraged Sazonov in the hope and belief that England could be counted upon, and, as he had himself previously stated, he felt that a war of France, Russia and England against Germany and Austria, would end dis- astrously and rapidly for the Central Powers, and would enable the Entente to “strike a death blow” at Germany. 48 As Sir Edward Grey at no time after the 25th made any effort to obstruct the Russian mobilization, there was never any specific or concrete reason for Sazonov's sus- pecting that England could not be counted upon. As we shall see, the trend of events bore out his expectation to the full. Grey's state- ments on the 25th were peculiarly significant, as Buchanan had taken pains to remind Sazonov on this very day that Russian mobilization would inevitably produce a European war, 49 On this same 25th of July Grey was telling the German Ambassador that “with reference to the Austrian note he recognized the good right of Austria to obtain satisfaction, as well as the legitimacy of the demand for the punishment of the accom- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 335 plices in the assassination.” 50 As late as the 29th he wrote to the British Ambassador in Paris: 51 In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a stand. ... If Germany became involved and France become involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do ; it was a case that we should have to consider. As Grey was admittedly an ignoramus in regard to military matters, it may well be that he did not technically mean “mobilization” in his note to Buchanan and his interview with Benck- endorff, but Benckendorff and Sazonov as- sumed that he knew what he was talking about, and they acted accordingly. Sazonov’s belief in English cooperation was increased on July 26th by the information that the English fleet was mobilized. That Grey intended Sazonov to take this as an implication of probable British aid is stated in his telegram to Buchanan on July 27th. 52 We may now briefly review the stages in the development of the fatal Russian military activities which precipitated the World War. 3. The Steps in the Fatal Russian Military Measures The first step was taken at a council of min- isters held at 3 P. m. on the afternoon of July 336 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 24th. 53 It was here decided to mobilize the four 1 military districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow and Kazan, as well as the Black and Baltic Sea fleets, and “to take other military measures should circumstances so require.” It was de- cided at this time that all this military prepara- tion should, for the time being, be directed ex- clusively against Austria. The mobilization of the fleets proves, however, that at even this early date action against Germany was contemplated. The Minister of War was also authorized “to A. proceed immediately to gather stores of war material.” The Minister of Finance was di- rected to do all he could at once to call in all Russian money in Germany and Austria. To prevent Serbia from confusing the plans and “messing” the military and diplomatic program of Russia by premature military activity, it was decided to direct Serbia not to resist by military force an Austrian invasion. It is suggested by some competent students of the July crisis that this strange and novel plan of a partial Russian mobilization was suggested to Sazonov by Poin- care or Paul Cambon. It was quite evidently a diplomatic ruse, like the French ten kilometer withdrawal order, designed to create a favorable impression on European and English opinion, as well as to deceive the Austrians and Germans. The Russian army officials protested from the RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 337 beginning as to the impractical nature of any such thing as a “partial mobilization.” 54 The military measures were carried still fur- ther at another Crown Council held the next afternoon — this being before Austria had mo- bilized against Serbia. The council determined to recall the troops throughout the Russian Em- pire from their summer camps to their regular quarters, so that they could be equipped for war. All military manoeuvres throughout the Empire were called off. It was further agreed that preparation should he made for the mobili- zation of thirteen army corps, at a date to he determined by Sazonov. 55 The army group now took matters into their own hands, apparently not with the approval of the Tsar, but with the connivance of Sazonov. They proceeded to put the frontier districts adjoining Austria and Ger- many on a war footing just as rapidly as pos- sible. They were able to do this without the sanction of the Tsar, as the Minister of War had the authority to call out the reservists and militia for service in the frontier districts. “It was by these measures,” says Professor Fay, “that Sukhomlinov and Janushkevich really be- gan secret mobilization measures against Ger- many on July 26th and when war actually came surprised Germany and the world by the rapid- ity with which the Russian troops poured into 338 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR East Prussia.” 56 July 26th was the day, it will be recalled, when Sir Edward Grey suggested to Germany a European Conference to settle the Austro-Serbian dispute, 01 Germany’s refusal of which in favor of direct conversations between Austria and Russia is repeatedly stated by Grey in his memoirs to have been the cause of the World War . 58 It was also the same day that Sazonov assured Count Pourtales that “no mo- bilization orders of any kind had been issued.” 59 Pourtales reminded Sazonov of the possible seri- ous European complications which might arise out of Russian mobilization. On the 28th it was decided to mobilize the thirteen army corps against Austria, as had been determined at the Crown Council of July 25th. 60 The Russian Chief of Staff. Janushkevich, urged Sazonov to promise him at this time that the Rus- sians would make war solely on Austria, and re- frain from hostilities against Germany. Sazo- nov refused. Janushkevich then pointed out the necessity of supplanting the order for partial mobilization by one for general mobilization. 61 Sazonov felt quite safe in pressing the Tsar for the general mobilization, as Paleologue had called on him on the 28th to assure him once more that France would stand by Russia, 62 and Izvolski had telegraphed him on the same day that the French government “does not for a moment admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 339 in St. Petersburg.” Dobrorolski makes out an even more damaging case against Sazonov’s ac- tion on the 28th by stating that it was Sazonov who took the initiative in deciding to recommend general mobilization. Pie says that Sazonov ex- pressed astonishment that Janushkevich had not decided earlier for the general mobilization or- der. 63 On the morning of the 29th the Tsar was per- suaded to sanction the order for general mobili- zation, apparently without fully knowing what he was really doing. “This information,” says Baron Schilling, “was received with great en- thusiasm by the small circle of those acquainted with what was in progress.” 64 Telegrams were at once sent to London and Paris informing the English and French of the ominous decision which had been made. r Phe French government was to be thanked for its promise of support, and it was ordered that a telegram should be sent to the British government requesting it “to range itself alongside of Russia and France without delay in order to prevent the European balance from being destroyed.” 65 Dobrorolski, as chief of the mobilization division of the Rus- sian General Staff, was given orders to prepare for the telegraphing of this order throughout Russia. Just as he was ready to send it out that evening, the Tsar, on account of the Kai- ser’s moderating telegram which he had received 340 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR after ordering the general mobilization, directed ; the cancellation of the sending of the general mobilization order. There was no order given to stop the partial mobilization. 06 Sazonov had dispatched a telegram to the French government asking for final and explicit approval of the decisive Russian military meas- ures. Poincare, Viviani and Messimy held a secret night conference at Poincare’s official resi- dence, and Viviani later telegraphed to Paleo- logue stating that France was fully resolved “to fulfil all the obligations of the alliance,” and ad- vising him to tell the Russians to proceed as se- cretly as possible in their military preparations, so as not to afford the Germans any excuse for mobilization. 67 Izvolski telegraphed an almost identical statement to Sazonov, laying special stress upon the French advice as to preserving the utmost secrecy in the Russian military prep- arations. He added that the French were quite willing to have these speeded up, provided the necessary secrecy was maintained. 68 Izvolski telegraphed again that Paul Cambon had been informed as to the Russian military plans and the support promised by France, and that he would press Grey for a final answer as to Eng- land’s position as soon as the crisis had advanced far enough. 69 As will be pointed out later, he secured Grey’s definite promise to come into the war on August 2nd, the day before Grey s RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 341 speech in the House of Commons, and two days before the Germans invaded Belgium. 70 Saz- onov was further reassured by a telegram from the Russian Ambassador at Berlin. He stated to Sazonov that on July 29th he had been to see Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador in Ber- lin, with the following results: 71 He (Jules Cambon) said to me (Sverbeiev) that, in his opinion, the situation was very serious and that there was scarcely any hope of a peaceful issue. He added that at any rate, judging by a telegram from his brother, Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, in consequence of the refusal of the Vienna Cabinet to accept the more than conciliatory reply of Servia to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, France and Russia were assured of the actual support of England in the event of war. These assurances apparently satisfied Sazonov, though there is no doubt that he would have pressed the Tsar again for the general mobiliza- tion order without them, as he had done so on the 29th without having these repetitions of the as- surances of Poincare on his visit, and of Paleo- logue on the 25th and the 28th. Sharp refusals to sanction the Russian mobilization coming from Paris would, however, have prevented Sazonov from taking the fatal step. Instead came the exhortations to hasten the military preparations but to be as secretive about them 342 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR as possible. Therefore, Morhardt quite cor- rectly states that the secret conference of Poin- care, Viviani and Messimy, in consultation with Izvolski, on the night of the 29th of July, marks the moment when the horrors of war were specifically unchained upon Europe. After that there was no chance whatever of preserving peace, and the French President and ministers knew this as well as did Izvolski and Sazonov. 7 ' Hence, the complete hypocrisy in all diplomatic pretensions of either France and Russia after midnight of July 29th to any desire or efforts to avert war! The details as to the process of persuading the Tsar to give his consent to the final issuance of orders for the general mobilization are re- counted with thoroughness in the invaluable diary of Baron Schilling. His account proves how very reluctant the Tsar was to take the fatal step, hut how powerless he was before the persistent pleading and importuning of Sazonov and Janushkevich on July 30th: 3 Between 9 and 10 a. m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs (Sazonov) spoke to the Minister for Agricul- ture by telephone. Both of them were greatly dis- turbed at the stoppage of the general mobilization, as they fully realized that this threatened to place Russia in an extremely difficult position in the event of relations with Germany becoming acute. S. D. Sazonov advised A. V. Krivoshein to beg an audience RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 343 of the Tsar in order to represent to His Majesty the dangers called forth by the change. At 11 a. m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs again met the Minister for War (Sukhomlinov) and the Chief of the General Staff ( Janushkevich). Informa- tion received during the night still further strength- ened the opinion which they all held that it was im- perative to prepare for a serious war without loss of time. Accordingly, the Ministers and the Chief of Staff adhered to the view which they had expressed yesterday to the effect that it was indispensable to proceed to a general mobilization. Adjutant-General Sukhomlinov and General Janushkevich again en- deavored to telephone to persuade the Tsar to revert to his decision of yesterday to permit a general mobili- zation. His Majesty decidedly refused to do so, and finally shortly declared that the conversation was at an end. General Janushkevich, who at this moment was holding the telephone receiver, only succeeded in reporting that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was there with him and asked to be allowed to say a few words to His Majesty. A somewhat lengthy silence ensued, after which the Tzar expressed his willingness to hear the Minister. S. D. Sazonov requested His Majesty to receive him to-day, to enable him to present a report concerning the political situation which admitted of no delay. After a silence, the Tsar asked : “Is it all the same to you if I receive you at 3 o’clock, at the same time as Tatistchev, as otherwise I have not a free minute to-day?” The Minister thanked his Majesty and said that he would present himself at the hour named. 344 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR The Chief of Staff warmly pleaded with S. D. Sazonov to persuade the Tsar without fail to consent to a general mobilization in view of the extreme danger that would result for us if we were not ready for war with Germany should circumstances demand the taking of decisive measures by us after the success of a general mobilization had been compromised by re- course to a partial mobilization. General Janush- kevich requested the Minister that in the event of his succeeding in persuading the Tsar he would telephone to him to that effect from Peterhof, in order that he might immediately take the necessary steps, as it would be requisite first of all to stop as soon as possible the partial mobilization which had already been com- menced and substitute fresh orders for those which had been issued. “After that,” said Janushkevich, “I shall go away, smash my telephone and generally adopt measures which will prevent anyone from find- ing me for the purpose of giving contrary orders which would again stop our general mobilization.” On his return to the Foreign Office, S. D. Sazonov had an interview with the French Ambassador. Meanwhile A. V. Krivoshein informed S. D. Sazonov that in reply to his request that the Tsar would re- ceive him he w r as told that Flis Majesty was so ex- tremely occupied to-day that he could not see him. Krivoshein then expressed a desire to see S. D. Sazonov before the latter went to Peterhof. It was decided that they should breakfast together at Donon’s, and at 12.30 they and Baron Schilling met in a private room there. The general state of mind was tense and the conversation was almost exclusively concerned with the RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 345 necessity of insisting upon a general mobilization at the earliest possible moment, in view of the inevitableness of war with Germany, which momentarily became clearer. A. V. Krivoshein expressed the hope that S. D. Sazonov would succeed in persuading the Tsar, as otherwise, to use his own words, he would be marching towards a certain catastrophe. At 2 p. m. the Minister for Foreign Affairs left for Peterhof, together with Major-General Tatistchev, and both of them were received together there in the Alexander Palace by His Majesty. During the course of nearly an hour the Minister proceeded to show that war was becoming inevitable, as it was clear to every- body that Germany had decided to bring about a col- lision, as otherwise she would not have rejected all the pacificatory proposals that had been made and could easily have brought her ally to reason. Under these circumstances it only remained to do everything that was necessary to meet war fully armed and under the most favorable conditions for ourselves. There- fore it was better to put away any fears that our warlike preparations would bring about a war, and to continue these preparations carefully rather than by reason of such fears to be taken unawares by war. The firm desire of the Tzar to avoid war at all costs, the horrors of which fill him with repulsion, led His Majesty in his full realization of the heavy responsi- bility which he took upon himself in this fateful hour to explore every possible means for averting the ap- proaching danger. Consequently he refused during a long time to agree to the adoption of measures which, however indispensable from a military point of view, 346 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR were calculated, as he clearly saw, to hasten a decision in an undesirable sense. The tenseness of feeling experienced by the Tzar at this time found expression, amongst other signs, in the irritability most unusual with him, with which His Majesty interrupted General Tatistchev. The latter, who throughout had taken no part in the conversation, said in a moment of silence: “Yes, it is hard to de- cide.” His Majesty replied in a rough and displeased tone: “I will decide” — in order by this means to pre- vent the General from intervening any further in the conversation. Finally the Tzar agreed that under the existing cir- cumstances it would be very dangerous not to make timely preparations for what was apparently an in- evitable war, and therefore gave his decision in favour of an immediate general mobilization. S. D. Sazonov requested the Imperial permission to inform the Chief of the General Staff of this immedi- ately by telephone, and this being granted, he hastened to the telephone on the ground floor of the palace. Having transmitted the Imperial order to General Janushkevich, who was waiting impatiently for it, the Minister with reference to their conversation that morning, added: “Now r } ? ou can smash your tele- phone.” In great contrast to this gusto, buoyancy and enthusiasm of Sazonov was the attitude of the Tsar. Paleologue tells us how, after unwill- ingly granting Sazonov’s request for the gen- eral mobilization, he broke down and protested: RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 347 Think of the responsibility you advise me to take ! Remember that it is a question of sending thousands upon thousands to their death. The execution of the order for general mobi- lization which was to block any subsequent move for peace, is admirably described by General Serge Dobrorolski, who was in 1914 chief of the mobilization division of the Russian General Staff. After frankly admitting that general mobilization meant irrevocable Avar — “This once fixed there is no way backwards. This step settles automatically the beginning of Avar” — he presents the folloAving graphic account of the fatal decision and the sending out of the crucial telegram to all parts of the Russian Empire: 74 About 11 o’clock on the morning of the 30th of July, General Janushkevich telephoned me: “It is to be hoped that the situation will clear np” (i. e Tsar’s opposition to general mobilization overcome). “Bring me all the documents immediately after my afternoon conference.” Janushkevich had persuaded Sazonov to point out to the Tsar the great danger of a partial mobilization in its political implications, it being an obstacle to our fulfilling our obligations in the alliance with France. A partial mobilization would permit William II to de- mand of the French government a promise of neu- trality, and if we should remain in a state of partial mobilization, he would declare war upon us and would 348 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR have the advantage of the fact that we would not be prepared. About 1 o’clock in the afternoon, Janushkevich was called to the telephone by Sazonov who declared to him that the Tsar thought it necessary because of the latest news from Berlin, to proclaim the general mobi- lization of the entire Russian army and navy. Then Sazonov added, “Give your orders and keep out of sight for the rest of the day.” Immediately afterwards, Janushkevich called me to him and informed me of this conversation. It was then necessary immediately to send out another telegram ordering a general mobilization. The 31st of July was designated as the first day of the mobilization in all the military districts and throughout all Russian territory. It was now necessary once more to go to the three ministers to have the telegram signed which fixed the general mobilization for the 31st of July. The tele- gram of the preceding day was now worthless. At this moment a special meeting of the Council of Minis- ters was in session at the Palace of Marie presided over by President Goremykine. Janushkevich was on his way there. He suggested to me that I accompany him in his carriage, for, in view of the fact that all of the Ministers were there, the required signatures could be obtained immediately. Thus matters were brought to a conclusion. The telegram w T as finished. About 5 o’clock in the afternoon I deposited it at the central telegraph office. It was a repetition of the acts of the preceding day. Involuntarily I reflected : Would I succeed this time RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 349 in despatching the telegram without any obstruction? I thought of Sazonov’s words “Remain out of sight for the rest of the day.” Finally, by evening, all the instruments were ready to receive the telegram an- nouncing mobilization. I entered the office. All the operators, men and women, maintained an impressive silence. Each one was seated near his instrument and awaited the copy of the telegram which was to dispatch to all the corners of Russia the important news of the summoning of the Russian people for the great conflict. A few minutes afterward, while absolute silence reigned in the room, all the instruments began to tick. It was the begin- ning of a great epoch. Towards 7 o’clock in the evening from all points which were linked with St. Petersburg by direct tele- graph lines, came answers announcing that the mobili- zation telegram had been safely received. The thing was irrevocably begun. It was already known in all the large cities of our vast country. A change was no longer possible. The prologue of the great drama had commenced ! Ill spite of all this, and of the fact that the Russian military authorities recognized that the War was “on” from this minute, both technically and actually, the Tsar sent the following tele- gram to the Kaiser after the mobilization order had been announced publicly the next day: 75 I thank you heartily for your mediation, which be- gins to give one hope that all may yet end peacefully. 350 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR It is technically impossible to stop our military prep- arations, which were obligatory owing to Austria’s mobilization. We are far from wishing war. So long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia’s account are taking place my troops shall not make any pro- vocative action. I give you my solemn word for this. I put all my trust in God’s mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe. We may well give the poor exhausted, bewil- dered and simple-minded Tsar the benefit of the doubt, and assume that this telegram was sincere and that he did not realize that Russia had done the thing which terminated the significance and possible success of any and all subsequent at- tempts at conversations, mediation or confer- ences. III. THE PROBLEM OF RUSSIAN RESPONSI- BILITY FOR THE WORLD WAR 1. The Deliberate and Unjustifiable Aggression of Russia in 1914 It will be helpful at this place briefly to sum- marize the steady and unbroken progress of these Russian military measures which precipi- tated the War, and to indicate the state of mili- tary activities in Austria and Germany at this period. On the 24th the council of ministers de- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 351 eided to mobilize four military districts and the two Russian fleets, call in the Russian money in' Germany and Austria, gather stores of military material, and take into account the need for any further action. On the 25th the order was J issued for the recall of all troops, and their equipment for war; and it was provided that a blanket order be given for the mobilization of thirteen army corps (fifty-five divisions) against Austria whenever Sazonov deemed it de- sirable. On the 26th steps were taken to put the frontier districts on a war basis. On the 28th the partial mobilization against Austria was de- cided upon for the thirteen army corps. An at- tempt was also made on the 28th to secure an order for general mobilization, but it failed. On the morning of the 29th the order for gen- eral mobilization was approved by the Tsar, and measures were taken for its issuance. The partial mobilization against Austria was put into operation. Just as Dobrorolski was about to telegraph the order for general mobilization throughout Russia, the Tsar received an appeal from the Kaiser to hold the militarists in re- straint and not frustrate his efforts at mediation in Vienna. The Tsar cancelled the mobilization order in the evening of the 29th. The next af- ternoon he yielded to Sazonov and Janushkevich, and approved the mobilization order. It was immediately telegraphed throughout Russia, and 352 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR by 7 p. m. of the 30th the receipt of the message had been acknowledged by outlying districts of the Empire. The mobilization order was offi- cially proclaimed the next day. The German Ambassador was, however, left in ignorance of the order, and was not aware of it until he read it in the Russian papers on the forenoon of the 31st. All of this activity was determined upon and put into effect before there had been any coun- ter military measures against Russia by either Austria or Germany. The Austrians mobilized twenty-two divisions against Serbia on July 25th at 9.30 p. m., after Serbia had mobilized her whole army against Austria at 3 p. m. that after- noon. Austria declared war upon Serbia on the 28th at noon, first explicitly stating to Russia that she bound herself to respect the territory and sovereignty of Serbia. Austria did not mo- bilize against Russia until July 31st at 12.23 p. m. Germany did not mobilize against Russia until August 1st at 5 p. m . 76 This proves the inaccuracy in the Russian claims that the gen- eral mobilization was proclaimed as defense against previous military measures initiated by Germany and Austria. And it is also signifi- cant that, though Russia has tried to justify her mobilization on the ground of her danger at the hands of Austria, she yielded to French advice RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 353 and paid little attention to Austria, throwing all her forces against Germany. We may now survey the state of diplomatic negotiations for a pacific settlement on the 29th of July. This was the date on which Sazonov secured the first order for the general mobiliza- tion, which proves that by this time he had de- cided upon a European war. Were the diplo- matic efforts so demonstrably a failure by the 29th that Sazonov was justified in assuming that there was no way out except through war? It may be categorically denied that they were. 77 In the first place, Austria had explicitly in- formed Sazonov that she “had no intention of annexing Serbian territory, nor did she con- template infringing Serbian sovereignty.” As Montgelas says with entire accuracy, “This was all that Russia could legitimately ask.” 78 It assured Sazonov that Serbia would not be “gob- bled up” as he had affected to fear. But Ger- many was attempting to go much further to placate Russia. She was pressing Austria vig- orously to rest content with the mere occupation of Belgrade until Serbia fulfilled the promises made in her reply to the Austrian ultimatum, and to take up the dispute directly with St. Petersburg, the solution of the problem most highly “approved” by Sir Edward Grey. The German pressure on Austria was at its very 354 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR A A height on the 29th and 30th, when Sazonov and the Tsar took their fatal step. And both Sazonov and the Tsar were fully aware of these facts. Sazonov cannot escape guilt by asserting that he knew that the German efforts to curb Austria would not succeed. Nobody then knew they would not succeed, and no one can say that they would not have succeeded if Russia had re- frained from mobilization. It seems more than probable that they would have been successful if Russia had given Germany time enough, even though the symptoms of Austrian wavering on the 31st of July and August 1st may have been fictitious. Germany was certainly prepared to go to great lengths against Austria to avert a European war if she had not been threatened by the Russian mobilization. It may also be re- called that Grey expressed himself as satisfied with the trend of diplomatic efforts on the 28th and 29th. 79 It need not be pointed out here that the Russian mobilization was the one act which was bound to destroy every possible hope of a diplomatic solution of the problems of the crisis. It may, then, be stated with absolute assur- ance that there was nothing in either the military or diplomatic situation on July 29, 1914, to jus- tify the Russian determination upon general mobilization. It was a precipitate and gratui- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 355 tous act, which can be explained only on the ^ ground that Sazonov and the military crowd, encouraged by Poincare, had determined to ex- ploit the Austro- Serbian crisis as the incident over which to precipitate the long anticipated European war . 80 2. Sazonov and Russian Mobilization It is desirable to emphasize here that the more recent material on the Russian situation has proved that we must revise our views of the relative responsibility of Sazonov for the mobi- lization . 81 As Baron Schilling and Professor Frantz have proved beyond any doubt, we can no longer regard Sazonov as a trembling diplomat bull-dozed by the army officials. He was at every step the leader in St. Petersburg . 82 The Russian General Staff urged him not to mobilize against Germany, but he insisted upon doing so. And it was he who wrung the mobilization order from the reluctant Tsar on both the 29th and the 30th. He had in July, 1914, the courage of his convictions expressed on December 8 and 31, 1913, and February 8, 1914. Janushkevich was his right-hand man at St. Petersburg. Sukhorn- linov, the Minister of War, was such a notorious liar that we can place little confidence in his voluminous memoirs, but it seems that he lost his nerve at the last, and that Sazonov took full re- 356 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR sponsibility among the ministers for r ailroad ing the mobilization order through. 83 Izvolski was, of course, looking after matters at Paris, and his egoistic nature led him to attempt to snatch the credit for precipitating the War away from Sazonov. Lord Bertie, the British Ambassador at Paris, tells how Izvolski boasted about Paris early in August, 1914, that “c’ est via guerre!” 84 It will not be necessary in this place to discuss in detail the question as to whether the Russian mobilization was equivalent to war. We made it clear above that the Franco-Russian military convention of 1893 was very specific in declar- ing that the first to mobilize must be held the ag- gressor, and that general mobilization “is rear.” All responsible persons in France, Russia and England had subsequently acted on that suppo- sition, and Sazonov was fully aware of the fact. No person informed on matters of military strategy had suggested for a generation that Germany should lose the incalculable advantage of speed as against the overwhelming Russian numbers by simply answering the Russian gen- eral mobilization by an order for counter- mobilization and awaiting results. 80 3. Relative Guilt of Russia and Austria Next to the fact that the Russian general mo- bilization blocked every possible road to peace, RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 357 it seems to the writer that the most important aspect of the question of the relative guilt of Russia in bringing on the war is the enormous difference in the degree of justification for the Russian intervention against Austria as com- pared with the merits of the Austrian action against Serbia, even in the light of the informa- tion possessed by Austria in 1914. Even if Austria had planned to annihilate Serbia in 1914, Russia would have had slight justification for intervention in the light of her incitement of Serbia against Austria. When Austria gave assurance that she would not annex any part of Serbian territory or violate Serbian sovereignty, all cause for Russian intervention disappeared. When the Kaiser, in addition, promised Russia that he would press Austria sternly to compel her to cease military operations and remain v satisfied with the temporary occupation of Bel- grade, only an implacable Russian determina- tion upon war can explain the subsequent Rus- sian action. \In short, while Austria may have lacked complete justification for her policy to- wards Serbia in 1914, Russia had no justifica- tion whatever for her aggressive action towards Austria. Austrian integrity and national exist- ence were at stake; Russia had nothing at stake except her prestige, already sadly impaired in the Balkans, and her ambition to secure Con- stantinople and the Straits. ' Further, Russia 358 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR had shown herself willing to abandon Serbia when Russian interests w^ere to be advanced thereby, as was proved in 1908 by the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the annexation of which had been suggested by Izvolski in return for Austrian approval of prospective Russian occupation of the Straits. An even more fla- grant case of Russian abandonment of Serbian interests in advancing her own program is afforded by the Russian proposal to Turkey during the secret Russo- Turkish negotiations of October-December, 1911, that Russia should act as the protector of Turkey against the Balkan states in return for Turkish consent to Russian freedom of the Straits. Finally, even if one were to hold that her policy in regard to Serbia had no justification -whatever in 1914, Austria never planned or desired a general European war, while this was what Russia aimed at from her first military preparations. One of the most forceful statements of the threadbare nature of the Russian pretensions in 1914 comes not from a German nor an Austrian, but from no less a person than Lord Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris in 1914. Writing in his diary on July 26, 1914, he said: 80 I was to have gone to Martigny to-day. I had arranged with Grey to do so, subject to returning in the event of a crisis. When the Austrian Note ap- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 359 peared I made up my mind to give up Martigny. It seems incredible that the Russian Government should plunge Europe into war in order to make themselves the protectors of the Servians. Unless the Austrian Government had proofs of the complicity of Servian officials in the plot to murder the Archduke they could not have addressed to the Servian Government the stringent terms which the Austrian Note con- tained. Russia comes forward as the protectress of Servia ; by what title except on the exploded pre- tension that she is, by right, the protectress of all Slavs? What rubbish! And she will expect, if she adheres to her present attitude, France and England to support her in arms. Public opinion in England 1 would never sanction such a policy, but unfortunately we might be dragged into a war through reverses to French arms and the necessity to prevent the annihila- tion of France. 4. Bogus Nature of Sazonov’s Diplomatic Proposals. Some may hold that the writer has been un- fair to Sazonov, because the latter at times seemed to favor a pacific adjustment of the dis- putes between Russia and Austria and Austria and Serbia, but the good faith of all of these pro- posals is belied by his specific acts, the nature and dates of which cannot be denied or evaded. Nowhere in this book have we or shall we give any credence to words which do not agree with 360 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR acts. But, for the sake of thoroughness, we y shall examine his alleged efforts for peace. On the 24th it is held that he counselled moderation on the part of Serbia, and advised her not to open hostilities with Austria. He later stated that he would be satisfied if Austria would with- draw points four and five of the ultimatum. On the 30th he told Pourtales that if Austria ceased hostilities against Serbia and submitted the dispute to a European Conference, Russia would cease military preparations. On the 31st he requested Grey to initiate negotiations for a settlement in London. And the Tsar suggested that Austria and Serbia submit their dispute to the Hague Court. 87 What validity have these proposals as the basis for the assertion of Sazonov’s pacific intent in 1914, as over against his acts in leading Rus- sia straight to the general mobilization? It was but natural that he should advise Serbia against war on the 24th, as a Serbian declaration of war at that date would have greatly hastened mat- ters at the outset, and have led Russia, with its great area and few railroads, into a serious dis- advantage as compared with the more compact and better equipped countries such as Germany and Austria. He needed time to get Russia ready for the outbreak of war, and he made the best possible use of the time, as we have seen. It was also desirable from the standpoint of in- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 361 fluencing European opinion to have Serbia assume a humble and conciliatory attitude to- wards Austria. The insistence on the removal of points four and five of the ultimatum would, as we made clear in an earlier chapter, have robbed the document of any real significance. No country ever had up to 1914, and no country ever has since then, submitted a matter of the type of the Austro- Serbian dispute to the Hague Court. While such action would be highly com- mendable, it was as absurd as a practical ex- pedient as to have suggested to Judge Gary in 1919 that the best way for him to settle the Steel Strike would be to sign over the steel mills to W. Z. Foster. Further, as Montgelas has pointed out, Sazonov was himself primarily re- sponsible for the failure of any effort to submit the dispute to the Hague Court. On the 29th it was rather too late to act on the suggestion with- out seriously obstructing the Russian military operations, but on the 27th, as we have learned from the recently published Russian documents, the Tsar made the same suggestion in writing to Sazonov, but the latter disregarded the advice absolutely. Likewise, he made no effort to pro- mote the proposition on the 29th. 87a The pro- posal to Count Pourtale.s Avas obviously made in bad faith, as the general mobilization had already been determined upon. But the final and definitive proof of the com- K 362 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR plete bankruptcy of Sazonov’s claim to basic pacifism is to be found in his proposal of July 31st. On this day, twenty-four hours after the ordering of the general mobilization which all the Russians knew blocked every road to peace and meant that Europe was virtually at war, he telegraphed to Izvolski that the Austrian Am- bassador had just told him that Austria was willing to discuss the ultimatum to Serbia, that he (Sazonov) was much gratified, and had told the Ambassador that he would like to have Lon- don take charge of the negotiations. 88 He also had the obvious effrontery to telegraph to Benck- endorff in London: 89 I have requested the British Ambassador to express to Grey my deep gratitude for the firm and friendly tone which he has adopted in the friendly discussions with Germany and Austria, thanks to which the hope of finding a peaceful issue to the present difficulties need not yet be abandoned. I also requested him to inform the British Ministry that in my opinion it was only in London that the discussions might still have some faint chance of success and of rendering the nec- essary compromise easier for Austria. It is obvious that Sazonov knew that it was too late to preserve peace, but by a new suggestion as to negotiations he would gain more time for RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 363 the execution of the Russian mobilization before hostilities commenced. In the Protocol of 1912 it had, indeed, been suggested that Russia might gain time by “carrying on skilful diplo- matic negotiations” while executing her pre- liminary military preparations. 90 He would also give Grey additional material with which to dupe the English public by pointing to the ap- parent pacific intent of Russia at this late date. If Sazonov so patently faked this diplomatic proposal on the 31st, how can it be assumed that he did not fake them all, especially when his acts were the reverse of his pretensions offered for public, and particularly English, consumption? In 1916 Sazonov apparently forgot for a mo- ment that he was a diplomat and indulged in some amazing frankness. In a communique to the Russkoe Slovo he said at this time of his mo- tives for entering the war: 91 Herr Bethmann-Hollweg maintains that France and Russia would never have dared to accept the challenge of Germany if they had not been sure of the support of England. But the real political situation was the following, even if the Chancellor will not admit it : In reality, France and Russia, notwithstanding their pro- found love for peace and their sincere efforts to avoid bloodshed, had decided to break the pride of Germany, at any price, and to make her stop, once for all, treading on the toes of her neighbors. 364 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR The above constitutes a sufficient rejoinder to the naive article of Mr. Binkley in the Xew York Times Current History for January, 1926, attemjiting to prove from the minutes of the Russian ministerial council of July 24, 1914, that Russia did not want war. 92 5. Sazonov in Apology and Retreat Another method of dealing with Sazonov is to examine his defense of his action made in the leisure of his exile from Russia since the War. It would appear obvious that if he had been really working for peace in 1914 he would be vindicated by a calm statement of the case, with- out any necessity for flagrant and easily de- tected falsification of readily verifiable facts. At least twice in the last two years he has at- tempted to clear himself. In order to offset the effect of the present writer’s article in Current History for May, 1924, the New York Times obtained an interview with Sazonov, which was published in the Times for May 11, 1924. The former Foreign Minister here says that on the 29th of July Austrian mobilization was almost complete, that the German mobilization had be- gun, and that as an answer he ordered the mobi- lization of four Russian military districts. The facts are that the decision to mobilize these dis- tricts was made on the 24th, and that the Aus- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 365 trian mobilization did not begin until the 31st and the German not until the 1st of August. He further states that on the 29th Pourtales de- manded that Russia cease mobilizing on the Austrian frontier without promising that Ger- many would order Austrian mobilization to cease on the Russian frontier, but Austrian mo- bilization did not begin until two days later. Sazonov then resurrects the ancient myth of the Lokalanzeiger article. He states that he was unwillingly brought to the order for general mo- bilization by the publication of a false report of the German mobilization in the Berlin Lokal- anzeiger at 2 p. m. (Russian time) on July 30th. This is a most transparent falsehood. Sazonov had asked for the general mobilization on the 28th, had obtained it on the 29th, only to have it cancelled later, and on the 30th had ex- tracted the Tsar’s consent for the renewal and given the new order to Janushkevich and Dob- rorolski long before the Russian Ambassador in Berlin had telegraphed the news of the Lokal- anzeiger article. Dobrorolski says he got the order for mobilization at 1 p. m. on the 30th, but from Baron Schilling’s diary it would appear to have been about 4 p. m. that Sazonov informed Janushkevich to issue the order and “smash his telephone.” We now know that the Russian Ambassador’s telegram about the article was not handed to the telegraph office in Berlin until 36G GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 4.28 p. m. (Russian time). The excessive de- mands on the St. Petersburg wires, in large part due to the telegraphing of the Russian mobiliza- tion order, prevented this telegram from reaching St. Petersburg until 12.20. This was over five hours after the remote Russian districts had tele- graphed back to St. Petersburg that they had received the mobilization order as sent out by Dobrorolski late that afternoon. Therefore, Sazonov could not have learned of the article until at least nine hours after he had informed Janushkevich to go ahead with the order which the Tsar had approved, and to smash his tele- phone and keep out of sight for the rest of the day. Most important of all is the fact that in 1914 the Russians never mentioned this Lokal- anzeiger article as justification for Russian mobi- lization. It was a pure fiction invented by Sir Edward Grey from an inaccurate remark made by Bethmann-Hollweg. It was not until 1916, after Grey had again revived the myth, that the Russians stooped to exploit it in their defense. 93 Sazonov mentions the absurd proposal of the Tsar to refer the Austro- Serbian issue to the Hague Tribunal, a matter we shall not comment on further in this place. He contends that Rus- sia had an honorable and unbroken record as the protector of Serbia for one hundred and fifty years, while in 1908 Russia had actually been the instigator of the annexation of Bosnia and Her- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 367 zegovina which had so enraged the Serbs. And in 1912-13, when the Russians were as yet un- prepared for war, they offered no objection to the Austrian threats against Serbia. He con- tends that Russia had to act to prevent the anni- hilation of Serbia, though he himself admitted on July 29, 1914, that he was fully convinced that Austria intended to respect the integrity of Serbian territory . 94 Finally, he makes the atro- cious misstatement that “Germany proclaimed her intention to exercise her influence in the direction of moderation in Vienna but did noth- ing.” If this is all that Sazo nov has to offer, we may well conclude that he has no defense. Some might claim in extenuation of the above that Sazonov was careless in this interview and did not take time to present a carefully pre- pared vindication. He was given a second chance. Early in the year 1925 he consented to prepare a foreword to the diary of the Russian Foreign Office kept in 1914 by Baron Schilling. Apparently Sazonov had nothing new to offer. The following citation from this foreword re- veals the same old “chestnuts” of the Times in- terview: 05 Referring to the question of the Russian mobiliza- tion, to which German writers attach such importance, stated briefly the facts which preceded it or coincided with it were as follows: (1) On the 30th of July the 368 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Russian mobilization was decided upon about five o’clock p. m., and proclaimed on the 31st, after Bel- grade had been bombarded by the Austrians; (2) Austria’s mobilization was in full swing; (3) the semi- official Local Anzeiger bad published in a special edi- tion the decree of the German mobilization, which was afterwards denied, but not before it had time to reach St. Petersburg; (4) Count Pourtales had, on the 29th, in the name of his Government, presented the demand that Russia should stop all military preparations on her western frontiers without any reciprocal under- taking on the part of Austria; (5) the Emperor Nicholas had proposed to the Kaiser to submit the Austro-Serbian conflict to The Hague Tribunal; (6) the “Kriegsgefahrzustand,” which is equivalent to a decree of mobilization in any other country, “mobiliza- tion” being inseparable in Germany, according to Count Pourtales, with the commencement of hostilities, had been announced in Berlin on the 31st of July, i. e. simultaneously with the announcement of the Russian mobilization. I conclude these brief introductory lines by mention- ing the accusation often addressed by Germany to France and Russia, that they desired war in order that France might recover her lost provinces and Rus- sia acquire the Straits and Constantinople. As regards the latter, I feel bound to state that shortly after Germany had declared war upon the Dual Alliance, and before the Berlin Government had sent its warships through the Straits into the Black Sea and had thus drawn Turkey into a war with Rus- sia, the Russian Government, together with its Allies, RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 369 had offered Turkey to guarantee her territorial integ- rity on the sole condition of her remaining neutral. This fact, officially announced in the Russian Orange Boole, speaks for itself, putting an end to the accusa- tions piled up in Berlin against Russian diplomacy. As we have just shown the preposterous and misleading nature of the first five of these points, we shall not repeat the refutation here. His attempt to clear himself by contending that the German announcement of the “imminence of war” was equivalent to mobilization and came synchronously with the announcement of the Russian general mobilization, is of a piece with his other fabrications. This German announce-, / ment was not made until after Berlin had been informed by Pourtales of the Russian general mobilization, namely, two days after the Tsar had signed the first order for general mobiliza- tion, and a day after the final order had been is- sued. Germany then waited more than twenty- four hours before ordering mobilization, in spite of the fact that the Franco-Russian military plans had been formulated on the assumption that she would declare war the minute she learned of the Russian mobilization. As to his remarks about the Straits, we pointed out in the third chapter that this was simply a ruse to de- ceive the Turkish government, Izvolski and the French authorities having discussed the wis- 370 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR dom of proposing a guaranty of Turkish in- tegrity, and concluding that it would be desir- able and would in no sense interfere with the plans of the Entente in disposing of Constanti- nople and the Straits as they saw fit at the close of hostilities. And we know that an explicit agreement between France and Russia that the latter should get the Straits had been made be- fore Turkey entered the War . 96 While Russia executed the acts which led to the outbreak of the War, France and England cannot be exonerated from their share of the blame for the calamity. Russia would never have taken the deliberate steps to provoke war with- , out Poincare’s incitement on his St. Petersburg trip, and the French obligation to aid Russia in 1914 was based solely upon Poincare’s personal promises, as the fact of the priority of the Rus- sian general mobilization to that of either Aus- tria or Germany released France from the ob- ligations imposed by the military convention of 1893. Rut this fact was kept secret, and it was not until 1918 that even the Chamber of Depu- ties was able to learn that it was Poincare, and he alone, who was responsible for throwing France into the conflict. And England was both directly and indirectly involved in the Rus- sian mobilization. By telling Buchanan and Benckendorff on July 25th that England com- placently envisaged the possibility of Russian RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 371 mobilization as an answer to the Austrian ul- timatum to Serbia, Sir Edward Grey made Sazonov feel that England had implicitly com- mitted herself to the support of Russia in the event of war. No British warning was sent to ^ lead him to any other conclusion, and subsequent events proved him to have been correct from the outset in his assumption of British support. 97 IV. CONCLUSIONS (1) For several years previous to the out- break of the World War, Izvolski had become convinced that the most important point in Rus- sian foreign policy was the securing of the Straits, and that they could only be obtained by a European war. Sazonov was converted to this view by December, 1913 , and he expressed him- self as believing that, with British help, France and Russia could easily dispose of Germany and put an end to her existence as a first-class European power. A secret Russian Crown Council, held on February 8 , 1914 , decided | that Russia could not afford to strike Turkey through a surprise attack unaided, hut must await a European war. English adherence to the Franco-Russian plans was practically as- sured by the negotiations concerning an Anglo- Russian naval convention in May, 1914 . ( 2 ) Poincare had assured Izvolski in 1912 372 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR that as soon as Russia was adequately prepared in a military way, and the bribed French press had reconciled the French people to the idea of a war over the Balkans, he would join with Rus- sia in any satisfactory incident in the Balkans which might be used as the basis for precipitat- ing the war which would restore Alsace-Lorraine, as well as capture the Straits. To prepare for such an incident, the Russians had encouraged Serbian plots against Austria, supplied the Serbians with arms, and promised them Russian aid against Austria. (3) Poincare visited St. Petersburg late in July, 1914, fired the Russian militarists with new zeal and hope, and even stirred the Tsar. He gave the Russian extremists assurance of full support against Austria before he knew of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, and gave them to understand that the prospective Austro- Serbian crisis would be satisfactory to him as the “incident in the Balkans” over which the Rus- sians might kindle a European war and count upon finding France at their heels. Hence, while Russia brought on the War, she would never have done so but for prior incitement by Poincare. (4) Even before Poincare had left St. Peters- burg, and two days before he learned of the con- tents of the Austrian ultimatum, Sazonov in- formed the Russian Ambassador at Vienna that RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 373 Russia proposed to take a strong stand against any Austrian move against Serbia. Two days later Viviani dispatched a telegram from Reval to the French acting Foreign Minister telling him that France must likewise be prepared to move against Austria in her prospective dispute with Serbia. Sazonov’s early advice to Serbia to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Austria and, above all, not to declare war, cannot be taken as in any sense a proof of his desire for peace. It is belied by all of his subsequent procedure, and was paralleled at the very mo- ment by a decision upon measures designed to lead to Avar. This advice is to be accounted for on the basis of Sazonov’s desire to secure as much time as possible for Franco-Russian mili- tary preparations and to put Serbia and her protectors in as favorable a light as possible before world opinion. (5) From the 24th of July, the day they learned of the Austrian ultimatum, the Russians began steady and unabated military prepara- tions in anticipation of war, and carried these to their logical and fatal culmination in the general mobilization order of July 30th. The 24th of July, then, marks the turning-point in the his- tory of contemporary Europe which trans- formed the European system from one which invited war into one which was based upon a de- termination to precipitate war. Neither the 374 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR \ French nor the British offered any objections to these Russian military measures, and the French explicitly advised greater haste, coupled with more complete secrecy. Consciously or uncon- sciously, on July 25th, Sir Edward Grey led Sazonov to understand that Great Britain would countenance Russian mobilization. (6) Personal responsibility for the deadly Russian military preparations rests mainly upon the Grand Duke Nicholas, Sazono\ r and Izvolski, but chiefly on Sazonov, Avho led the militarists on rather than being bull-dozed by them. The Tsar was pacific, but confused and helpless. (7) In 1916 Sazonov, in a moment of indis- [/ creet candor, admitted that the war was brought on in 1914 through the determination of France and Russia to humiliate Germany. His recent attempt to clear himself of the charges against him, which haA r e been summarized in this chap- ter, ha\-e consisted solely of the most obA'ious and flagrant misstatements of easily A'erifiable and incontestable facts. He has not been able to offer one valid fact in extenuation of his con- duct. (8) Sazonov’s suggestions as to a diplomatic settlement were not made in good faith, but. fol- loAving the suggestions of the Protocol of 1912, were designed purely to gain more time for the execution of the Russian military preparations. His most definite and comprehensive sugges- RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 375 tions as to a diplomatic settlement were made after the general mobilization order had been issued, which he well knew blocked every pos- sible road to peace. At the time of the issu- ance of the mobilization order the movement for a diplomatic settlement of the crisis, which had been initiated by Germany and approved by Grey, was at its height. Moreover, Austria had weakened and agreed to discuss her dispute with Serbia before the expiration of the German ultimatum to Russia. ( 9 ) The German and Austrian military action against Russia came long after the Russian gen- eral mobilization, and neither country had made a move against Russia until after the Russian general mobilization order had been telegraphed throughout Russia. Germany did not even then move hastily, but vainly waited twenty-four hours for a reply to a twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia before ordering mobilization. SELECTED REFERENCES Bogitshevich, M., Carnes of the War; Buchanan, G., My Mission to Russia ; Biilow, B. von, Die Krisis; Dobrorolski, S., Die Mobilmachung der russischen Armee, 191 If.; “Noch einiges von der russischen Mobil- machung im Jahre 1914,” in Kriegssclmldfrage, April, 1924; “Die Kriegsbereitschaft der russischen Armee im Jahre 1914,” Ibid., January, 1925; Ewart, J. S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars ; Fay, S. B., “New 376 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR Light on the Origins of the World War,” in American Historical Review, January, 1921 ; Frantz, G., Russ - lands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg ; Gouttenoire de Toury, F., La Politique russe de Poincare; Honiger, R., Russlands Vorbereitungen zum Weltkriege; Lutz, H., “Lord Grey’s Responsibility for Russian Mobilization,” in New York Times Current History Magazine, May, 1925 ; Montgelas, M., The Case for the Central Powers; Morel, E. D., Tsardom's Part in the War; Morhardt, M., Les Preuves; Nansen, F., Russland vend der Friede; Paleologue, M., An Ambassador s Memoirs; Renouvin, P., Les Origines immediates de la guerre; Romberg, R., Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book; Schilling, M. F., How the War Began; Seeger, C. L. (Ed.), The Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky; Siebert, B. de, and Schreiner, G. A., Entente Diplomacy and the World: the Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909—1911/.; Stieve, F., Izvolsky and the World War; Die diplo- matische Scliriftwechsel Iswolskis, 1911-191 1/.; Siidland, L. von, Die sudslawisische Frage und der Weltkrieg ; Sukhomlinov, W. A., Erinnerungen; Tonnies, F., Die Schuld frage ; Der Zarismus und seine Bundesgenossen 1911/. ; Trubetzkoi, G. N., Russland als Grossmacht ; Wegerer, A., von (Ed.) Das Russisclie Orangebuch von 19 Ilf. FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 W. L. Langer, “The Franeo-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894,” in Slavonic Review, 1925. 2 F. Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War, passim; the New Republic, and the New York Nation, February 6 and 20, 1924. 3 E. D. Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal; Earl Loreburn, How the W ar Came. 4 Ibid., and Stieve, op. cit. RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 377 ® Stieve, op. cit., pp. 186 ff. « Ibid., p. 106. 7 Ibid., pp. 195-6. s Ibid., pp. 195 ff. 9 B. de Siebert and G. A. Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 525. 10 Stieve, op. cit., p. 110. 11 M. Bogitshevich, Causes of the War, pp. 127-34 and Annex xxi. 12 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 230 ff. is Ibid., pp. 136 ff., 168 ff. Cf. S. Dobrorolski, “Die Kriegs- bereitschaft der russischen Armee im Jahre 1914,” in the Kriegs- schuldfrage, January, 1925. ii The Outbreak of the World War, pp. 53-4. is L. Mandl, in Vienna Neues Acht-Uhrblatt, July 27, 28, 1924; M. Bogitshevich, “Weitere Einzelheiten iiber das Attentat von Sarajevo,” in Kriegssclmldfrage, July, 1925. io Outbreak of the World War, p. 62. 17 Bogitschevich, Causes of the War; E. Durham, Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle; and The Serajevo Crime. is In London Nation and Athenaeum, September 19, 1925, p. 723. io Austrian Red Book, Part I, pp. 47-8. 20 Outbreak of the World War, p. 147. 2i Foreign Affairs (American), October, 1925, p. 15; and more in detail in his Origins of the War. See the withering criticism in Lazare, A VOrigine du Mensonge, pp. 159-92. 22 M. Paleologue, The Memoirs of an Ambassador. See the brilliant review by W. L. Langer, in the New Republic, June 25, 1924. 23 M. F. Schilling, How the War Came, pp. 114-15. For Paleologue’s view of the significance of these speeches of the Tsar and Poincarf* see Schilling, p. 32. 21 Stieve, pp. 211 ff.; Lazare, pp. 167 ff. 25 Stieve, pp. 211-12. 26 Ibid., pp. 212-13. 27 Schilling, p. 115. 28 A. Fabre-Luce, La Victoire, p. 209; and Schilling, pp. 31-2. 29 Stieve, p. 214. 30 S. B. Fay, “New Light on the Origins of the World War,” in American Historical Review, January, 1921, p. 229; M. Mor- hardt, Les Preuves, pp. 139 ff. ; French Yellow Book, No. 22. ,si Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, p. 15. 32 Op. cit., pp. 214-15. 33 Les Preuves, pp. 299-301, 305. 34 La Victoire, pp. 209-10. 378 GENESIS OF THE AVORLD AVAR 35 Cf. Morliardt, 117 ff., 297 ff. ; Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 208 ff. ; Lazare, op. cit., passim ; A. Pevet, Les Responsables de la guerre. 33 Das russische Orangebuch von 1914, P- L 37 Outbreak of the World War, p. 187. 33 Fay, loc. cit., pp. 230-31. 3» Ibid., p. 229 and Outbreak of the World War, p. 162. Fay, loc. cit., pp. 229 ff.; Schilling, pp. 28 ff. 41 Schilling, p. 28-9. 42 Morel, Secret History of a Great Betrayal, pp. 21-2; Fay, loc. cit., p. 233; G. Louis, Carnets d’un Ambassadeur. 43 Fay, pp. 229 ff. 44) Schilling, op. cit., pp. 15-17, 47 ff. 45 Outbreak of the World War, p. 295. 46 Ibid. 47 H. Lutz, “Lord Grey’s Responsibility for Russian Mobiliza- tion,” in Current History, May, 1925, pp. 265 ff. 48 Stieve, op. cit., pp. 194^-5. 49 British Blue Book, No. 17. so Ewart, Roots and Causes of the Wars, p. 1018; Outbreak of the World War, p. 200. si Ewart, op cit., pp. 103, 114; British Blue Book, Nos. 87, 90. 52 British Blue Book, No. 47. 53 Schilling, p. 30; R. C, Binkley, “New Light on Russia’s AVar Guilt,” in New York Times Current History, January, 1926. Beyond all comparison the best account of the development of the Russian military preparations is G. Frantz, Rus stands Eintritt in den Weltkrieg. 54 Schilling, pp. 16-17, 49-50, 62-3; cf. S. B. Fay, in American Historical Review, April, 1925, p. 646. 55 Fay, American Historical Review, January, 1921, pp. 232-5. 56 Ibid., p. 236. 57 British Blue Book, No. 36. 58 Viscount Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, A T ol. I, pp. 308-9, 311, 314. 59 Outbreak of the World TFar, p. 233. so Fay, loc. cit., pp. 240-41. 6i Schilling, p. 16. 6 2 Ibid., p. 50. 63 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 30; Mont- gelas, op. cit., p. 161. 64 Schilling, p. 50. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. ; Dobrorolski, Die Mobilmachung der russichen Armee, 1914, pp. .25-8, 45-6. RUSSIA PRECIPITATES WAR 379 67 Morhardt, pp. 27 5 ff. This telegram was falsified when pub- lished in the French Yellow Book. 68 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 53. 69 Ibid., p. 52. 70 Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, p. 198. 71 Schilling, pp. 56-7. 72 Morhardt, pp. 287-9; Vers la verite, pp. 89-95 73 Schilling, pp. 62-6. 74 Dobrorolski, op. cit., pp. 10, 27-29. There is a French Trans- lation in Morhardt, pp. 154—9. There is a brief and more recent German description by Dobrorolski in the Kriegsschuldfrage for April, 1924. In the latter Dobrorolski takes up the matter of the discrepancy between his account and that of Schilling as to just when the final .order for general mobilization was given. Dobrorolski puts it as 1 r. m., and Schilling at some time after 3 p. m., probably as late as 4 p. m. Dobrorolski contends that he is right. If this is so, the order was given before the Berlin Lokalanzeiger of July 30th was even issued. 75 Outbreak of the World War, pp. 402-3. 76 Morhardt, pp. 160-61; Ewart, pp. 1Q67-8, 1124 ff. 77 See the excellent summary of this matter in Ewart, pp. 1073 ff., and especially pp. 1117 ff. Cf. Renouvin, Les Origines immGdiates de la guerre, Chaps, vi, vii, ix. 78 Montgelas, p. 162. 79 Ewart, p. 1084. so As in footnote 42. si Professor Fay, loc. cit., p. 233, was able to hold in 1921 that Sazonov was for peace, a view shared by the present writer in his article in Current History for May, 1924. It is now necessary to abandon that view completely. Cf. Fay, in American His- torical Review, April, 1925, p. 646. 82 See especially G. Frantz, Russlands Eintritt in den Welt- krieg; and Schilling, passim; and W. A. Sukhomlinow, in Kriegs- schuldfrage, November, 1925, pp. 753-4 83 Frantz, op. cit.; and Fay, American Historical Review, April, 1925, p. 646. 84 The Diary of Lord Bertie, 1914-1918 (Edited by Lady Al- gernon Gordon Lennox), Vol. I, pp. 16, 66. By November Izvolski had changed his tune with the increased disasters for the Entente. Bertie notes in his diary for November 10th: “What a fool Iswolsky is! He said a few days since: — ‘J’ai des rivaux et il y a des homines dont jeme sers.’ At the beginning of the war he claimed to be its author: — ‘C’est ma guerre!’ Now he says: — ‘Si j’^tais responsable en quoi que ce soit pour cette guerre je ne me pardonnerais jamais.’” Ibid., p. 66. i 380 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 85 Langer, loc. cit.; Montgelas, pp. 165 ff. 88 Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 1. 8" Schilling, pp. 30-31, and passim ; Ewart, pp. 1087-8, 1093, 1113-15, 1122. 88 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 56. so Ewart, p. 1123. so Montgelas, pp. 177-8. 91 Ewart, pp. 76, 154. 92 Loc. cit., January, 1926; See also the editorial by the present writer in the New York Nation, January 27, 1926, p. 77. 93 Montgelas, pp. 215-17 ; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 147 ff. 94 Austrian Red Book, Part III, pp. 17-19. 95 Schilling, pp. 9-10. ss See above, pp. 000. 97 Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 275 ff; Lutz, op. cit.; Ewart, Chap, v; A. Pevet, Les Responsables de la guerre, pp. 211 ff., 861 ff.; E. F. Henderson, The Verdict of History: the Case of Sir Edward Grey. CHAPTER Y I I POINCARE AND HIS CLIQUE INCITE THE RUSSIANS IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 I. THE WAR OF 1870 AND THE WORLD WAR Any intelligent and adequate discussion of the relation of France to the World War must begin with a consideration of the Franco-Prussian War, for, as Ewart has well expressed the situ- ation: “Alsace-Lorraine was the cause of the maze of military combinations and counter- combinations which had perplexed European diplomats for over forty years.” 1 We need here do nothing more than briefly summarize what was pointed out in an earlier chapter concerning this question. The conflict was a needless and fundamentally immoral war. It was produced primarily by: (1) the desire of Bismarck to use the Germanic patriotism, which might be gener- ated through a war against F ranee, as the means of bringing the unification of the German Em- pire to completion, and (2) by the aspiration of the politicians and diplomats of the Second Em- pire in France to exploit a war in the interest of 381 382 GENESIS OE THE WORLD WAR bolstering up for a time the tottering Bonaparte dynasty. Of the two ambitions that of Bismarck was doubtless the more constructive and laudable. The War was actually precipitated through the foolhardy aggressive diplomacy of the Duke of Gramont, the French Foreign Minister, but that does not remove the fact that his action played directly into the hands of Bismarck or that the latter was eagerly awaiting war. 2 The only important point with reference to the problem at hand in this chapter is to emphasize the fact that the popular impression that the Franco-Prussian War was a wanton war waged by a powerful and aggressive military state against a weaker, reluctant and pacific neighbor is pure illusion. France was a much larger and more powerful state than Prussia in 1870, was fully as eager for war as Prussia, and expected to win a quick and decisive victory over Prussia, to be followed by a triumphant entry into Berlin, thus repeating the glorious feat of the first Xapo- leon. In fact, the great majority of prominent Englishmen and Americans, and the greater part of the influential press in both countries, looked upon France as the most menacing military state in Europe in 1870, viewed her as the aggressor in 1870, and welcomed the early decisive victories of von Moltke’s armies. 3 The Franco-Prussian War has a direct bear- ing upon the causes of the World War chiefly FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 383 because at its close Bismarck, against his own best judgment and at the behest of the Prussian King and the extremists, annexed the former German provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to the new German Empire. The Germans could allege with entire accuracy that these provinces had originally been German for centuries, and had been ruthlessly torn from Germany by Louis XIV and other French autocrats, and in 1870 Alsace-Lorraine was still as much German as French in language and culture, but many Frenchmen found the idea of their permanent surrender to Germany ab- solutely intolerable. It is true that the annexa- tion was rather generally approved in Eng- land and America, though many at the time foresaw the danger of the development of a French movement for revenge, but it proved the most dis- astrous act in the history of contemporary Euro- pean diplomacy. 4 From 1871 onward there was a strong group in France which was determined L- never to rest until a victorious war over Germany should have restored the “Lost Provinces.” The early leader of this group of R evanchards was Paul Deroulede, who created the League of Patriots for the purpose of keeping alive an un- ceasing agitation for the recovery of Alsace- Lorraine. He even visited foreign countries, seeking aid for the movement and agitating against Germany. His place was taken after his death by Maurice Barres, a distinguished writer 384 GENESIS or THE world war and an equally fanatical apostle of revenge. These men had great influence on French senti- ment and opinion, and no little influence on French politics — certainly much more than that exerted on the German government by the Pan- German League . 5 The same spirit permeated the army officers. Marshall Foch has stated : 6 From the age of 17, I dreamed of revenge, after having seen the Germans at Metz. And when a man of ordinary capacity concentrates all of his faculties and all of his abilities upon one end, and works without diverging, he ought to be successful. In general, the chief Republican leaders of France were only lukewarm over the movement for the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, however much they may have desired to regain these prov- inces. Most of the prominent Revanchards prior to 1900 were, in differing degrees, enemies of the Third Republic, as they felt that a mon- archy would be more easily manipulated for war. After the final victory of the Republicans in the Dreyfus Case, there was a general movement away from revenge and towards better relations with Germany which was led by Caillaux, Combes, Painleve, ITerriot and others . 7 Unfor- tunately, these men allowed the foreign policy of France to be dominated by Delcasse, who was one of the foremost apostles of revenge and the FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 385 ultimate defeat of Germany. His activities more than offset all that the pacific group could accomplish to mitigate the revenge spirit, and his attitude in regard to the Franco-Russian Alliance, the Anglo-French Entente and the Morocco question did more than anything else to alarm Germany and prevent Franco- German relations from assuming a tranquil tone. When he was compelled to resign it was too late to re- pair the damage, and Poincare later took up his work where it had been laid down. 8 Raymond/Pomcare was a French lawyer of very great ability who had taken a fairly active part in French politics from early years. He was a Lorrainer by birth, and had always enter- tained an almost fierce determination to do all in his power to recover his Fatherland. 9 In an ad- dress to university students in October, 1920, he confessed that he had been unable to see any real reason for existence except in the hope of recov- ering Alsace and Lorraine: 10 In my years at school, my thought, stricken over the spectre of defeat, dwelt ceaselessly upon the frontier which the Treaty of Frankfort had imposed upon us, and when I descended from my metaphysical clouds I could discover no other reason why my generation should go on living except for the hope of recovering our lost provinces. Could life present any more satis- factory spectacle than to witness the reunion in Stras- bourg of the youth of Alsace and the rest of France? 386 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR In a similar vein, M. Colrat, an intimate personal friend of Poincare, wrote in U Opinion for December 14, 1918, with the approval of Poin- care: 11 We must recognize that the recovery of Metz and Strasbourg is not only the magnificent work of our soldiers, living and dead, of the dead more than the living — it is the final culmination of a definite political policy. It is the achievement of M. Raymond Poin- care who has worked for it with an ingenious perse- verance which sacrificed, when it was necessary, the accessory to the principal, the means to the end, men to the task. These statements constitute the basis for some rather serious qualifications upon Poincare’s as- sertion in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, that by 1912 the French had given up all hope of fighting for the recovery of the lost provinces: “The fact that she continued to think sorrow- fully of those who had been torn from her did not mean that she dreamed for a single moment of delivering them by force of arms.” 12 Mathias Morhardt, a distinguished French publicist, has concisely described Poincare’s ob- session in regard to the recovery of Alsace- Lorraine, with its decisive effect upon his poli- cies: 13 Let one take, one by one, the acts of his political life during these tw r elve long and terrible years ! Let one analyze even the secret intentions ! One always will FEENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 387 find there the same spirit, the same will, the same meth- ods. M. Raymond Poincare — he has solemnly af- firmed it in the Manifeste aux Etudiants which we have cited — had no other ambition than to recapture Alsace- Lorraine. His policy was invariably directed against Germany. It was a narrow policy full of violence and hate. But it was a policy of reparation. To satisfy it, he consented to the worst sacrifices and we have seen him putting France, the blood of two million of her children, even her fortune, to the service of the im- perialistic ambitions of the Russian autocracy, the least compatible of governments with the genius and with the democratic aspirations of our own coun- / ✓ try. . . . The plan created by M. Raymond Poincare was all- embracing. Let a spark be lighted in the Balkans and the world war would be certain — for Russia coveted Constantinople and the Straits ; and, like Austria, who was opposed to this dream and who was allied with Germany, France would undertake the struggle, be- cause Germany would also enter. The conflict was so certain that M. Raymond Poincare would do nothing either to eliminate it or even to avert it. . . . With an oriental fatalism he awaited serenely the hour of the realization of his program. We have pointed out how the French chauvin- ists exploited the second Morocco crisis to dis- credit Caillaux and the pacific group, and came into power themselves with the accession of Poin- care to the office of Premier of France and For- eign Minister on January 14, 1912. 14 This 388 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR marked the first instance in which the Revan- chard movement had captured the political sys- tem of the Third Republic. There had been plenty of vigorous activity on the part of the revenge group before this time, but they had been opposed by the majority of the Republican lead- ers. Now, for the first time, the Republic it- self became committed to the Revancliard cause. Poincare cannot escape, as he has tried to do, by calling attention to the fact that there were pacif- ically minded persons in his cabinet and that he became President in 1913. 15 He, Delcasse and Paleologue kept full control of French policy while he was Prime Minister, and, after he be- came President, he likewise maintained a whip- hand over his Foreign Minister and directed all important negotiations with Russia and England. From his first conversations with Izvolski in January, 1912, to the fatal and final decision upon a European war on the night of July 31, 1914, Raymond Poincare kept an absolute and autocratic grip upon French foreign policy, which he conducted wdth as much secrecy as was the case with Asquith and Grey in England, and with far greater continuity and inflexibility . 16 This fact demonstrates the misleading nature of his comparison of the theoretical constitutional and parliamentary control of foreign policy in France with its autocratic domination in pre-War Germany. FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 389 II. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE PREPARATION FOR THE WORLD WAR In the third chapter we summarized the vari- ous stages in the development of the Politik of Poincare and Izvolski. We shall here pass it in review, merely to emphasize the significance of these achievements for an understanding of the European situation in June, 1914 . The Franco- Russian Alliance, negotiated between 1890 and 1894 , was at the outset a purely defensive ar- rangement, though much was done to give it a more aggressive turn during Delcasse’s mission in the summer of 1899 . It was provided in the military convention of 1893 between the two countries that one was required to come to the aid of the other only in the event of a prior mobi- lization against one of them by Germany or Austria. In the Morocco crises Russia took no aggressive part in supporting France. Like- wise, the Franco-Russian Alliance was, to 1912 , based upon the provision for military coopera- tion alone. On July 16 , 1912 , a naval con- vention was completed which provided for coop- eration by sea. The scheme for land cooperation was also greatly strengthened between 1912 and 1914 by Delcasse’s mission, which dealt with the French loans to Russia, with their employment to increase the railroad facilities for transporting Russian troops to the German frontier, and with 390 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the necessity for enormous increases in the Rus- sian army. The plans worked out by the gen- eral staffs of the two countries became more pre- cise, and the interchange of views more intimate and frequent. Russian practice manoeuvres in Poland became more comprehensive and scien- tific. The French also provided for great mili- tary increases in their army bill of 1913 . As early as 1912 Izvolski reported that Poincare had stated that French military experts believed France and Russia had a good chance against Germany and Austria in the event of war. Diplomatic developments paralleled the naval and military increases . 17 The pacific and far- sighted Georges Louis was recalled as Ambas- sador to Russia, to be replaced by the belligerent arch-enemy of Germany, Theophile Delcasse. Poincare and Izvolski agreed that the Balkans were the most promising area to be exploited for the purpose of provoking a general European war to secure the Straits and recover Alsace- Lorraine, but the French people were strongly opposed to a war over the Balkans. Hence, they had to be scared and deluded into a favorable attitude towards the Franco-Russian Balkan policy of 1912 - 14 . This was achieved through the bribery of the French press by Russian money, obtained by Izvolski and dispersed by him with the advice of Poincare and his associ- ates. In this way the Franco-Russian Alliance FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 391 was “Balkanized.” 18 Poincare was at the out- set opposed to the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, for he felt that the war over the Balkans should not be precipitated before Russia had advanced further with her military increases and the French public was better prepared for war by the bribed press. But after war had broken out in the Balkans he was willing to take a chance on a prematurely initiated European war rather than to let the Balkan situation develop in such a fashion that Russia would get the Straits with- out the general European war necessary for the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine. Therefore, in the fall of 1912, he made arrangements with Iz- volski to the effect that France would willingly follow Russia into a European war over the Bal- kan question, and did all he could to prevent Russia from any possibility of gaining her ends without a reciprocal advantage to France. Hr thus insisted upon a supervisory knowledge of Russian policies in the Balkan area. Through- out the Balkan Wars Poincare and Izvolski actively cooperated to oppose the interests of Germany and Austria at every turn . 19 By De- cember, 1913, Sazonov was converted to the plan of a European war to obtain the Straits, and even the Tsar approved the scheme in March, 1914. 20 Poincare had from the first recognized that a gen- eral war was necessary to recover the lost prov- inces, and rejected in 1912 German advances for 392 GENESIS OF THE WOELD W A R better relations with France on the basis of far- reaching autonomy for Alsace-Lorraine. The French willingness for war is well described by no less a personage than Count Benckendorff in a report to Sazonov on February 25, 1913: 21 Recalling his (M. Cambon’s) conversations with me, the words exchanged, and, adding to that, the attitude of M. Poincare, the thought comes to me as a convic- tion that, of all the Powers, France is the only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon it without great regret. . . . The situation, as I regard it, seems to be that all the Powers are sincerely working to maintain peace. But of all of them, it is France who would accept war the most philosophically. As has been said, France ‘stands erect once more.’ Rightly or wrongly, she has complete confidence in her army ; the old ferment of animosity has again shown itself, and France would very well consider that the circumstances to-day are more favorable than they will ever be later. The transformation of the millennium long Anglo-French animosity and antipathy into ac- tive diplomatic cooperation between the two countries was begun when Delcasse seized the opportunity to exploit the Fashoda Incident of 1898 for the purpose of making a bid for English good-will and support . 22 By 1905 the Conser- vative government in England had laid specific and direct plans for cooperation with the French navy, and more nebulous plans for military co- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 393 operation. In 1906 Grey, as Foreign Secretary of the new Liberal government, participated in initiating in earnest the direct conversations be- tween France and England, providing for joint military action between England, France and Russia against Germany. Before the close of 1906 these plans had assumed a highly specific character, and were progressively worked over by the general staffs of the countries involved until the outbreak of the World War. At the time of the second Morocco crisis, in 1911, England took L the opportunity to announce through Lloyd- George her firm and aggressive relations with France against Germany in the case of a war be- tween the latter and France. In 1912 Poincare forced Sir Edward Grey to renounce the ar- rangements discussed by Lord Haldane during his visit to Germany to improve relations be- tween Germany and England. On November 22, 1912, Paul Cambon, French Ambassador to England, induced Grey to agree to a plan of naval cooperation with France, according to which the French navy could be concentrated in the Mediterranean to cooperate with the Russian Black Sea fleet and hold in check the Austrian navy, while the English bound themselves to pro- 1 tect the French coasts against any attack by the German fleet . 23 This meant that for all practi- cal purposes England was absolutely committed to make war on Germany whenever France did. 394 GENESIS or THE world alar for, as Cambon well expressed it, a nation does not make war by halves, its navy fighting while its army remains inactive. 24 The plans for mili- tary cooperation assumed a much more detailed and explicit form under the direction of Generals Wilson and French between 1912 and 1914, until they were as explicit and thorough as those exist- ing between the French and Russian general staffs. In November, 1912, Sazonov wrote to the Tsar that both Grey and Poincare had as- sured him that England had bound herself by a verbal agreement to come to the aid of France if the latter were attacked by Germany. 25 We have indicated above that Sazonov held that F ranee and Russia could not risk a war with any assurance except on the assumption that England could be counted upon. We have traced above the development of the understand- ings between France and Russia and between France and England. England and Russia had been rivals for a century over the Near East, but better relations began with the partition of Per- sia between these countries in 1907, though there was friction over Persia right down to the out- break of the World War. One of the con- spicuous acts of Poincare on his visit to St. Petersburg was to attempt to reassure the British Ambassador as to Russian policy in Persia. 26 From 1907 onward the British military plans were framed in contemplation of cooperation FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 395 with France in the west and Russia in the east against Germany. In 1910 another step was taken when Sir Arthur Nicolson was recalled from his post as Ambassador to St. Petersburg and made Permanent Under-secretary at the British Foreign Office. He was a great favorite of the Russian court, and Grey frankly admitted that he had been appointed to improve the rela- tions between Russia and England . 27 In the spring of 1914 Grey had persuaded Asquith and others in the British cabinet to consent to negoti- ations for an Anglo-Russian naval convention. This was advancing successfully when the crisis of 1914 came on, the Russian representative be- ing in London at the time . 28 UJ is thus ap- parent that by June, 1914, the ring around Germany and Austria was practically complete. France and Russia were firmly allied for aggres- sive action on land and sea. Both France and Russia had as the foundation of their foreign policy an ambition which could only be realized by war upon Germany and Austria, and they had arranged to support each other when the war came. They had agreed that the war should be precipitated in the Balkans at an opportune mo- ment. England was cooperating actively in the military preparations for this war, and both France and Russia believed that they could count with assurance upon English aid when the great test came . 29 \ 396 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR III. POINCARE AND HIS CLIQUE IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 1. Responsibility that of Poincare rather than of French People In treating the responsibility of France in the July crisis of 1914 it should be understood at the outset that the responsibility Avas that of scarcely more than a half-dozen men, including Poincare, Viviani, Messimy, Delcasse, Paul Cambon and Paleologue. The final decision upon Avar was officially made on the nights of July 29th and 31st by only three men — Poincare, Viviani and Messimy. As Messimy, the Minister of War, was called in as an expert from an important department involved, and as Viviani Avas not a militarist at heart, 30 it may almost be held that the complete responsibility for this momentous responsibility rests upon the shoulders of Poin- care alone. It may safely be said that there was more autocratic action in deciding upon entering the World War in France than in Russia, Ger- many or Austria. In no case did the legislature branches haA^e anything to do with the decisions in these countries, and a larger group of min- isters cooperated in making the decisions in Rus- sia, Austria and Germany than in France. The nearest resemblance Avas the case of Sazonov in Russia, but he was less the master of the situa- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 397 tion than was Poincare. Poincare had no Tsar to cancel mobilization orders or to resist the issuance of new orders. He was himself com- plete master of the policy of Paris. Therefore, when we speak of the responsibility of France for the great cataclysm, we do not mean the re- sponsibility of the F rench people, but the respon- sibility of Raymond Poincare, and his willing servants in the ministry and diplomatic service. It is certain that the French people were not clamoring for war in 1914, and they had ad- mittedly been overwhelmingly pacific in 1912. Nothing is more frequently mentioned in Izvol- ski’s reports to Sazonov concerning his inter- views with Poincare than the insistence of the latter upon the fact that the French people were peace-loving and opposed to war over the Balkan issue. Poincare very often emphasized with Iz- volski the fact that it would require a long cam- paign of corruption of the French press by the employment of Russian funds in order to delude the French people into feeling that they were in danger from the Austro-German policy in the Balkans, thereby rendering them willing to fol- low Poincare into war . 31 Even two years of persistent efforts in this respect were not ade- quate to lead the F rench populace into a belliger- ent attitude. When the war crisis came in 1914 it was found necessary to break up all pacifist meetings in Paris for days before the outbreak 398 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR of war, to print false statements concerning the German Ambassador in Paris, to misrepresent flagrantly the facts about the German attitude towards a diplomatic settlement of the crisis, to publish obvious lies about the relative state of the Russian and German military preparations and activities, to assassinate the great leader of the Socialists, to delay the formal mobilization order and to fake defensive military gestures, to develop a most rigid censorship of the new r s, to initiate the most thorough campaign of propa- ganda, and to refuse to submit the decision upon war to debate in the Chamber of Deputies. Only by deceiving the French people in these ways and leading them thereby to accept the fic- tion that France was waging a desperate war of defense were Poincare and his group able to drag tbe French people into the conflict . 32 Therefore, when we proceed to indict Poincare and his clique for the primary responsibility for the outbreak of the World War, we are not in any sense attempting to indict France. We well recognize that the French people were the unconscious but tragic victims of their unscrupu- lous masters, and that they have suffered more than any others for their delusion. We simply use the term “France” with respect to war re- sponsibility as a blanket term in ordinary usage. And we have to recognize that it was all France which ultimately went into the War, even though FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 399 a narrow political oligarchy controlled her policy and relentlessly pushed her into the bloody con- test. Least of all, would we hold that the in- dictment of Poincare and his policies from Jan- uary, 1912, to August, 1914, constitutes in any sense an indictment of French culture, in his ad- miration of which the present writer yields to no one. And, further, it may he pointed out here that there have been written in F ranee more creditable books attacking Poincare and his group as responsible for the War than there have been in Germany and Austria combined . 33 Finally, the first organized movement in any En- tente country to repudiate the old lies about war guilt was instituted in France late in 1925 by Victor Margueritte and his associates. There is little if anything to follow in this chapter to which any honest and informed Frenchman out of political life would not subscribe . 34 (diS, 2. The Myth of “Defenseless France ” There is a most persistent myth which we have already shown to be highly absurd, but which still crops up as one of the most frequently cited proofs of the innocence of France in 1914, namely, the allegation that the Triple Entente was hopelessly outnumbered by Germany and Austria, and that France was timid and fearful on the defensive. Only a few months ago, in his 400 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR recent book France and the French , Mr. Sisley Huddleston regaled us with this perennial illu- sion after the following fashion: 34a I have had the privilege of some personal acquaint- ance with the private sentiments of such outstanding French soldiers as Marshal Foch and General Gouraud, and I affirm emphatically that no greater pacifists could anywhere be found. It was with trepidation that France entered the War in 1914; neither M. Poincare, the President, nor M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, who were on the high seas when the fatal step was taken, would have deliberately dared to face the consequences of a new struggle with Germany with the recollection of the defeat and humiliation of 1870 in their minds and with no certainty of English or American aid. The odds against France were far too great. As for the French people, they were, as anybody who had any ac- quaintance with them at that time will concede, alto- gether pacific in their intentions. Much praise has been rightly bestowed on the tenacity and the bravery of the French, but on several occasions during the War the so-called defaitistes nearly brought about a cata- strophic surrender. Men like Clemenceau, when once the War began, were determined to see it through at any cost, and doubtless, though not seeking, they wel- comed the opportunity, as they supposed, of shattering once and for all the German peril. The statistics of comparative armaments which we cited in the second chapter are adequate to re- fute this. The truth is contained in the state- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 401 ment of former Chancellor Marx that “The Entente was so much stronger than the Central Powers that an aggressive scheme on the part of Germany and Austria would have been almost suicidal.” And we know that Poincare was fully aware of the facts. As early as 1912, be- fore the enormous increases in the Russian and the French armies, and before England had been brought into the Entente as closely as in 1914, he told Izvolski that the French military experts believed that France and Russia alone had an excellent chance against Germany and Austria. Now Sir Edward Grey tells us that in the spring of 1914 the French and British military experts held that France and England unaided would be able to withstand the Central Powers. Poin- care further knew in July, 1914, that he could certainly count on Serbia, and probably on Italy and Roumania. In the light of these facts the thesis of a cringing and terror-stricken F ranee in 1914 is utterly ridiculous. 3. The Aftermath of the St. Petersburg Visit In the preceding chapter we indicated at some length how the initial impulse to the aggressive action on the part of the Entente that produced the World War came from Poincare’s visit to St. Petersburg from July 20th to 23rd, 1914. 402 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR 4 f~ He put new vigor into the Russian militarists, stimulated the war spirit in the Russian court, stirred the Tsar, incited the Russians to take a strong stand against Austria, even before he knew what the terms of the Austrian ultimatum were to be, and gave the Russians to understand that France would stand firmly behind them in whatever action they took in the premises] 35 It is thought by some that the curious suggestion of partial Russian mobilization as a diplomatic ruse to deceive the Germans, Austrians and English as to the nature and status of the Rus- sian military preparations also came from Poin- care. On the 24th he had Viviani send a tele- gram from Reval telling the acting Foreign Minister at Paris that France must be prepared to act decisively in the Austro-Serbian crisis. Between the time of the Reval Dispatch and Poincare’s arrival in Paris Paul Cambon secretly rushed from London to Paris in alarm lest Bienvenu-Martin might become too conciliatory in his discussions of the crisis with the German Ambassador. Cambon thus stiffened up the policy of the French Foreign Office until the re- turn of Poincare and Viviani. Berthelot also contributed very clever and competent assistance to the Franco-Russian program at this time through his extremely astute drafting of the Ser- bian reply to the Austrian ultimatum in such a FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 403 manner as to simulate acquiescence while con- ceding nothing vital. Upon his return to Paris Poincare continued his aggressive policy without flinching. The acting Foreign Minister, Bienvenu-Martin, and the German Ambassador in Paris, Baron von Schoen, had discussed the Austro- Serbian affair in a friendly manner. This was a poor begin- ning for a policy of war, so Poincare’s henchman, Berthelot, published grave distortions of the conversations between Schoen and Bienvenu- Martin, obviously designed to inflame the French public; and this in spite of the fact that Poincare affects great indignation at Bismarck’s distortion of the famous Ems telegram of 1870. 36 Active steps in the way of military preparations began to be taken by the French military authorities from the 24th of July onward, though for purely diplomatic reasons the French delayed the order for general mobilization until just previous to the issuance of the German order. The French military preparations exactly paralleled the Rus- sian activities. Both took the first step on the 24th of July, and both provided for their first comprehensive military measures on the 26th. France did not order mobilization as early as Russia, but she carried on her military prepara- tions without this formal order. Poincare was quickly faced with the responsi- 404 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR bility incurred by his inflammatory policy while in St. Petersburg. On the very night after his return to Paris he received a telegram from Sazonov announcing the Russian mobilization O plans, the Russian decision that war was prob- able, and the Russian assumption that France could be counted upon to fulfil all the obligations of the alliance with Russia. 37 We have already shown how Poincare, Viviani and Messimy took up this crucial matter in a secret conference on the night of July 29th, and made the fatal de- cision for war. Though they did not actually announce their formal declaration for war until late on the night of the 31st, they well knew that their decision on the night of the 29th would lead the Russians to continue those steps which would make a general European war inevitable. 38 Vi- viani telegraphed the next morning to the French Ambassadors at London and St. Peters- burg that France was determined to fulfil all the obligations of her alliance with Russia, and that he had advised Russia to carry on her mili- tary preparations in such a manner as to keep Germany as much in the dark as possible and not afford the latter any pretext for counter mobilization. He also added that he had as- sured the German Ambassador in Paris that the French had taken no steps towards preparation for war and were eagerly supporting every diplo- matic effort being made to preserve peace. 39 Izvolski telegraphed Sazonov at once the content of the above telegram of Viviani, and told him that this same telegram had been sent to Paul Cambon in London with instructions to go right after Grey and get him to reaffirm the English agreement to aid France in the event of war, as embodied in the Grey-Cambon exchanges of November 22, 1912. 40 Perhaps Izvolski’s most important telegram was one to the effect that France was not op- posed to the Russian military preparations, but that Russia should be as secretive as possible about them. The French suggested that the Russian government issue a public declaration that they were willing to curtail their mobiliza- tion activities in the interest of peace, and then, under the cover of this announcement, actually speed up these mobilization measures. The in- sistence upon secrecy was, of course, dictated by the desire to gain as much time as possible on Germany and not to alarm England. By the early morning of the 30th of July, then, France was urging Russia to hasten the steps which would make war inevitable, but was instructing her to screen them behind public declarations of a desire to preserve the peace of Europe through negotiations. This famous telegram of Izvol- ski’s, one of the most important during the whole July crisis, was excluded wholly from the origi- nal Russian Orange Book , as, indeed, were the 406 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR two previous ones just mentioned. It reads as follows: 41 Margerie (Director of the French Foreign Office) with whom I just spoke tells me that the French Gov- ernment do not wish to interfere with our military preparations, that, however, they would consider it most desirable on account of the still continuing nego- tiations for the preservation of the peace, if these preparations were carried on in the least open, least provocative manner possible. For his part, the Min- ister of War expressed the same idea to our Military Attache, and said we might declare that, in the higher interests of peace, we were willing to slow down for the time being our preparations for mobilization, which would not hinder us to continue and even accelerate these preparations, but on so doing we would have to refrain as much as possible from the transportation of troops on a larger scale. These undeniable faets as to the French en- couragement of the aggressive Russian acts from the very first constitute a most illuminating com- mentary upon the honesty of Poincare in tele- graphing George V on July 31st that France had from the beginning of the crisis offered counsels of restraint and moderation to Russia, and that Russia had uniformly heeded such ad- monition. 42 The reverse was, of course, the truth. As early as July 27th Sazonov hastened to inform the French that “regarding counsels of moderation, we reject these at the outset.” 45 And Bienvenu-Martin was equally prompt in FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 407 informing Sazonov that he did “not for a minute admit the possibility of exercising a moderating influence in St. Petersburg.” 44 4. Diplomatic Subterfuges of “ Reluctant France ” Having thus committed themselves to an in- evitable European war the French considered with acumen the possible diplomatic ruses and subterfuges which might be employed to deceive the Germans as to the state of the Franco- Russian diplomatic agreements and military preparations, and to dupe the English, French and Italian peoples into thinking that France was steadfastly working for peace until the last hope of averting war had vanished. The im- pression was also to be spread abroad that when the French finally accepted the necessity of war, they entered upon hostilities in a purely defen- sive and reluctant attitude. The most famous and ambitious gesture in this direction was the order given on July 30th for the withdrawal of the French troops on the frontier to a distance of ten kilometers from the boundary. This, as General Joffre was fully informed at the time, and as Viviani and Messimy frankly admitted in speeches before the Chamber of Deputies on January 31, 1919, was purely and simply a dip- lomatic ruse to impress the peoples of England, 408 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR l France and Italy with the apparent fact that France was doing everything in her power to avert even the appearance of wishing war. 45 In this manner Poincare and Viviani hoped to rally the French people to the support of their gov- ernment, to put British opinion behind Sir Ed- ward Grey in coming to the assistance of France, and to help to detach Italy from the Triple Al- liance. Of the greatest importance was the hoped-for effect upon British opinion. This is well brought out in a telegram from Messimy (the Minister of War) to General Joffre on the afternoon of August 1st: 4G In order to secure the cooperation of our English neighbors, it is still essential not to allow patrols and detachments to go beyond the general line fixed in telegram No. 129 of the 30th of July. The bluff worked perfectly, not only in the case of England, but also with respect to France and Italy. Since the secret purpose of the order has been revealed, Poincare has attempted to defend him- self by alleging that this move was assuredly a serious effort to demonstrate the pacific inten- tions of France because it was a dangerous act from a military point of view, and was fiercely opposed by Joffre and the military authorities. 47 This is an obvious falsehood. Viviani stated in his speech of January 31, 1919, before the l-'RENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 409 Chamber of Deputies that the withdrawal order was not opposed by Messimy. Messimy im- mediately arose in the Chamber, confirmed this statement, and added that the withdrawal order was not opposed by the French General Staff. 48 We now know that there was no reason why it should have been. In some places the order was only for a four kilometer withdrawal. On those sections of the frontier where even tem- porary evacuation of posts might have been * dangerous the order was not executed. In other places there would have been a withdrawal from the frontier if this command had never been is- sued, in order to get the troops out of the line of the artillery fire. The order was given be- fore the Germans had taken any steps towards military preparations for imminent war. The patrols were left in the border posts to report the advance of any German troops, and the French troops could have been marched back over the ten kilometers in an hour. The ten kilometer limitation was removed on August 2nd, the day that Grey gave Cambon his promise that England would come into the War on the side of France. This was twenty-four hours be- fore the declaration of war. Hence, the with- drawal order was in no sense whatever a mili- tary menace or a handicap to the French General Staff. Indeed, it was a positive ad- vantage, as it provided a screen behind which 410 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR even more extensive secret military preparations could be carried on by the French. 49 The most striking and startling information concerning the withdrawal order is the alleged revelation that the suggestion came to the French from London as the result of collusion between Paul Cambon and Grey who, as Benck- endorff tells us, understood the importance of preparing English opinion for the coming con- flict. 50 This information that the withdrawal order was given at the instigation of England has come from Mr. Gerald Campbell of the Lon- don Times.* 1 It has been believed that the with- drawal order was a fake of French origin, de- signed to dupe Grey as well as the English popu- lace. If Campbell’s revelations are accurate they Avould prove that Grey had decided upon war by the 30th, and, with Cambon, suggested the withdrawal ruse to help him get English opinion ready for war by demonstrating to his country- men that France was a terrified nation acting wholly on the defensive. 52 We know that the order was given after Cambon received the tele- gram from Viviani instructing him to get into touch with Grey at once and secure from him ex- plicit word that England would come in on the side of France and Russia. Whether or not the withdrawal suggestion originally came from Grey, it is certain that he understood its nature and import, and exploited it to the fullest degree. FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 411 An amusing but utterly discreditable bit of stage-play appears in the telegrams exchanged between France and England over the with- drawal order. It will be remembered that all of these communications took place after France had decided, on the night of July 29th, to support the Russian activities which were cer- tain to bring on a European war, and after England had been informed of both the Russian intentions and the French support of these Russian military measures. On July 30th Viviani telegraphed to Paul Cambon that the withdrawal order had been carried out, and asked him to inform Grey to that effect. 53 On the same day Viviani again telegraphed to Lon- don to emphasize the necessity of informing the King as to the withdrawal order. 54 On the 31st Poincare blithely telegraphed the King that: 53 “We, ourselves, since the very beginning of the crisis, have recommended to our allies a policy of moderation from which they have not de- parted in any respect.” The King gallantly expressed his “appreciation” of these pacific measures by replying: 50 “I admire the restraint which you and your government have exercised in controlling military measures on the frontier, and in your adoption of an attitude which could not in any sense be interpreted as provocative.” In his telegram to the King on July 31st Poin- care included another ruse, namely, an effort to 412 GENESIS OF THE W O R L D WAR get George V to declare specifically that Eng- land would range herself on the side of France (/ and Russia. He argued for this action on the ground that it would restrain Germany from making war. He himself knew well enough at the time that it was Russia and not Germany which needed restraint if war was to be avoided. If George V had openly assented to this, the actual result would have been to make St. Peters- burg even more defiant and aggressive. What Sazonov had been wishing for ever since the 29th was absolute and explicit written assur- ance that Russia could count on England. ,/ It having already been determined by Russia and France that Germany was going to be attacked, such a declaration as Poincare at- tempted to obtain from George V could not have kept Germany from going to war unless she had been unwilling to fight for her existence. After this can one accept the good faith of the French suggestions of diplomatic measures for peace any more than he can the proposal of Saz- onov on July 31st for an international conference at London ? In his apology in Foreign Affairs Poincare attempts to establish his own innocence and that of France on the basis of an assertion that the German Ambassador in Paris reported to Berlin on July 29th that Viviani still hoped for peace and was taking every diplomatic step to bring FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 413 it about. What this statement proves is not the pacific intent of Viviani and Poincare, but their success in pulling the wool over the eyes of Baron Schoen. Further, the crucial French decisions upon war were not taken until the nights of July 29th and 31st. 57 It is, perhaps, worth while to emphasize once more that the F rench decision, on the night of the 29th, to support the Russians in making war, and the withdrawal order of the 30th, were both de- termined upon when the German pressure upon Austria to negotiate and accept mediation was at its height and when there was every prospect and opportunity for a successful diplomatic settlement of the whole crisis. Another phase of Poincare’s plan for mislead- ing public opinion as to French military meas- ures was his refusal to grant Joffre’s initial re- quest for mobilization on July 31st. Poincare ^ represents this as having been due to his deter- mination to act on the defensive as long as pos- sible. 58 In a telegram to Sazonov on August 1st Izvolski tells of his conference with the French authorities on the matter of the French mobilization, and explains the real reason for the French delay: 59 “It is very important for France on account of political considerations relative to Italy and most especially England, that the French mobilization should not pre- cede the German one, but form the answer to 414 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the latter.” The French did not, of course, wait for the German general mobilization, but ordered mobilization as soon as they were in- formed of the German proclamation of a state of imminent war. In spite of their delay with the formal mobilization order, the French had proceeded with their military preparations in a thorough fashion without issuing the mobiliza- tion order. For example, it was announced on August 1st, when the French mobilization was finally ordered, that the five French army corjis on the frontier were absolutely prepared for war. 60 5. France Declares for War on July 31st Poincare lays much stress upon the statement that the purely formal move for a declaration of war was taken first by Germany, in spite of the fact that he says it was of no significance whatever that France was the first to declare war in 1870. 61 “The aggressor is the one who renders inevitable the first shot, in other words the nation who first declares war.” 62 This opinion, of course, diverges entirely from the terms of the Franco-Russian military conven- tion of 1893, which stated that the aggressor is the one who first mobilizes, namely, Russia in 1914. 63 As every one knows, who is at all in- formed as to the details of the diplomatic crisis FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 415 and military preparations in 1914, the German declaration of war upon France was a pure formality which the French expected long before it came. 64 The important matters are as to who first ordered the general mobilization that made war inevitable and as to which state was the first to announce that it was through with diplomacy and determined to resort to war. It is incontestable that Russia was the first to order general mobilization. 65 Poincare and Renouvin have tried to shoulder Germany with the re- sponsibility of having been the first to decide to resort to war. 66 We have already indicated the utter lack of any factual foundation for this thesis. The Russians were the first to take steps which they knew must lead to war, but the French were the first to declare themselves through with diplomacy and determined upon war. This decision was arrived at in a minis- terial conference held under the supervision of Poincare at his official residence on the evening of July 31st. 67 At 1 a. m. on the morning of the 1st of August Izvolski telegraphed as follows to Sazonov: 68 The French Minister of War disclosed to me with hearty high spirits that the French Government have firmly decided upon war, and begged me to confirm the hope of the French General Staff that all our efforts will be directed against Germany and that Austria will be treated as a quantite negligeable. 416 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR The Russians, for all practical purposes, carried out this wish of the French General Staff, and turned most of their forces against Germany; and this in spite of the fact that Sazonov originally tried to justify his early steps in mobilization on the basis of his alleged fear of the Austrian mobilization against Rus- sia, which did not take place until two days after the Russian partial mobilization was initiated! France was, thus, the first country in the European crisis officially to announce her de- termination upon war . This announcement came sixteen hours before Germany declared war on Russia and two and a half days before Germany declared war on France. Many of the revisionist school are inclined to lay the greatest stress upon this French announcement of the 31st, but the writer is inclined to regard as even more damaging Poincare’s decision forty- eight hours earlier to support the Russian war measures at a time when Germany had not even taken any preliminary steps towards mobiliza- tion, and when the diplomatic negotiations, formally approved by the representatives of the Entente, were in full and uninterrupted swing. Even if the false charge of Poincare and Renouvin were true, namely, that Germany de- cided upon war just before midnight on the 30th, this would furnish no alibi for the French, FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 417 as they had decided to support the measures which they knew must mean war more than twenty-four hours earlier. 6. Autocratic Methods and Personal Responsibility of Poincare Poincare has contended that France could not have avoided taking the action that she did on July 31st unless she had been willing to “tear up her defensive alliance” with Russia, 69 but he knew well enough that this was not true, even if the French Chamber of Deputies was in ig- norance of the facts in the situation. We have pointed out a number of times that the terms of the Franco-Russian military convention of 1893 required French intervention only in case Russia was mobilized against by a member of the Triple Alliance before Russia had mobilized. The Chamber of Deputies first discovered this fact in 1918, but Poincare was fearful lest they might discover it before hostilities commenced in 1914. 70 Hence, he persistently refused to declare war on Germany, because, as he ex- plained to Izvolski, to do so would mean that he would have to summon the Chamber of Deputies. This would invite a debate upon the question of whether the Treaty of 1893 really required French intervention under the circum- 418 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR stances which existed in 1914. 71 He waited for Germany to declare war, and then exploited the psychology of fear generated by false propa- ganda to secure the approval of war by the Chamber. In spite of his explicit knowledge to the con- trary at the time, Sir Edward Grey gave ex- pression to the same falsehood in his speech of August 3, 1914, requesting the House of Commons to approve his promise to aid France : 72 I can say this with the most absolute confidence — no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in a war over a dispute with Austria and Ser- bia than the Government and country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Sir Edward Grey was here guilty of a double er- ror, for not only was France not required in 1914 to fulfil the agreement of 1893 with Russia, but the real reason why she was bound to aid Russia was Poincare’s promise in 1912 that if Russia would pick a suitable diplomatic crisis in the Balkans, presumably a struggle between Austria and Serbia, France would come to her aid. It was Poincare’s assurance to Russia, at the time of his visit to St. Petersburg, that the assassina- tion of the Archduke had created a satisfactory FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 419 incident for French intervention, together with his subsequent promises to Russia after July 23rd, which furnished the grounds for his insist- ence upon throwing F ranee into the W ar in sup- port of the Russian general mobilization. These circumstances relative to Poincare’s refusal to submit the question of the declaration of war to the Chamber of Deputies before the German declaration, and his concealment of the fact that the terms of the Alliance of 1893 did not apply to the situation in 1914, offer an illuminating commentary upon his more recent statement in Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, to the effect that: 73 The republican institutions of France are indeed conceived in such a manner that no one man can substi- tute his will for that of the people. No President of the Republic can act without the counter-signature of a minister and every minister is responsible to the Chamber for his actions. It would be a simple matter to show, year by year and point by point, that, before the war as since, the foreign policy of France has been carried on in the open and in complete accord with Parliament. We shall only casually mention in passing the additional interesting reflection occasioned by Poincare’s above cited remarks, namely, the method he followed of lubricating the political 420 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR machinery of republican France by the gold im- ported for the purpose from autocratic Russia. 7. Deluding the French Public One other matter remains to be discussed in this connection, namely, the methods employed by Poincare to mislead the French people about the facts of the crisis of 1914, and to bring them to accept the fiction that France had done every- thing in her power to avert war, that she was obligated to go to the aid of Russia, that she had been wantonly attacked by Germany, and that she was fighting a strictly defensive war. We have already indicated how the French were being brought around to the view of the im- minence and inevitability of a war over the Balkans through the bribery of the French press with that end in view. We have also called at- tention to the distortion of the conversations between the German Ambassador in Paris and the French acting Foreign Minister, prior to the return of Poincare and Viviani from Rus- sia, by Poincare’s confidant and henchman, Berthelot, as well as to the mode of concealing the facts and deceiving the French people in 1914 about the obligations of France under the Rus- sian treaty of 1893. A definite manipulation of the French press began early in the crisis. In- formation as to the diplomatic activities and paci- fic efforts of Germany was carefully concealed * FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 421 from the people, as was likewise the knowledge of the precipitate and unjustifiable mobilization measures of Russia. On the other hand, utterly false reports were circulated as to the date and priority of the Ger- man and Austrian mobilization and other military activities, while the avowed pacific intentions of France were emphasized by such impostures as the ten kilometer withdrawal order, the delay of the formal mobilization order, and the insistence of Poincare that he await the German declara- tion of war to avoid the necessity of a debate on the French obligations under the terms of the Russian Alliance. The friends of peace in France in 1914 were obstructed by the govern- ment at every turn, and long before France was in any danger of attack. As early as July 29th Izvolski telegraphed to Sazonov that he had been assured by the French government that they would take sharp and decisive measures to break up any pacifist meetings, and later in the same day telegraphed Sazonov that Viviani had forbid- den the holding of such meetings. Finally, the one outstanding French leader who saw through all of the impostures of Poincare and his clique and might have organized a large body of French- men for peace, Jean Jaures, was assassinated by a member of the military party before he could take any active steps to obstruct the war policy of Poincare. Just before his assassination he re- v' 422 GENESIS OF THE WORLD W A R marked: “That scoundrel Izvolski has now got his war!” During the entire period of the war the despicable assassin was not brought to trial. 74 IV. POINCARE AND VIVIANI IN RETREAT 1. The Modesty of Poincare In his article in Foreign Affairs , among the various ways in which Poincare attempts to wriggle out from under the conviction of guilt which has been fastened irrevocably upon him is to ask the question as to whether it could have been possible for one man to perpetrate a de- ception of such proportions upon the whole world. 75 His countryman, Mathias Morhardt, answers the query in a positive fashion, and con- tends that Poincare has achieved more to change the face of the world and the course of history than any other individual in human history, not even excepting the first Napoleon: 76 If we examine his role, not, indeed, from the point of view of morality and reason, but from the standpoint of historic events, he takes the first place among the men who have exercised a decisive influence upon the world. Take, for example, Napoleon I; the great Corsican adventurer did not succeed, after fifteen years of the most absolute power in accomplishing results at all comparable to those which M. Raymond Poincare can glory in having achieved. No one before him ever upset the world with more cold-blooded enthusiasm. FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 423 / Morliardt raises the further question as to why Poincare not only refuses to take credit for such a magnificent achievement, but even insists upon his being held entirely innocent in 1914. The answer is, of course, that Poincare expected a very short war in 1914, having ex- pressed himself as believing that either France and Russia or France and England could defeat Germany and Austria. With France, England and Russia all in against Germany and Austria, he believed that the Central Powers would be quickly crushed. Few realize how sound a priori were his convictions in this respect, though they seem reasonable enough as soon as one consults the statistics of armaments in 1914. If the Belgian defenses had not yielded to the German bombardment far sooner than the French and English had expected, and if von Hindenburg had not won the greatest and most striking victory in the history of warfare through his defeat of the Russians in the Battle of Tannen- berg in August, 1914, it is probable that the i/ Central Powers would have been compelled to sue for peace in the winter of 1914-15. The length of the war upset all Poincare’s calcula- tions, and even the recovery of his Lorraine and the temporary humiliation of Germany could not provide him with enough courage to face the relatives of the millions of dead and maimed Frenchmen and admit his sole responsibility for 424 GENESIS OF THE world war their decease and all the attendant suffering. It should also be pointed out here that, dur- ing his term of office as Premier since the War, the conduct of Poincare was strictly conformable to that from 1912 to 1918. By insisting upon continuing the policy of utterly crushing Ger- many, according to the French war aims of 1914, he alienated 'England and much of the rest of the world. By financing the aggressive occupation policy in Germany as well as the great armies of the new French allies against Germany, he doubled the French debt and put French finances in a state from which it will be difficult to escape short of the most crushing taxation for generations, if, indeed, bankruptcy and repudiation can be avoided. Since 1918 as before, Poincare proved himself far more an enemy of Germany than a friend of France . 77 2. Poincare in the Quicksand As we suggested above with respect to the case of Sazonov, if the Entente statesmen and diplomats were actually in favor of peace in 1914 and were doing all in their power to bring it about, it should not be necessary for them to falsify and evade on the main issues when de- fending their acts and policies. We shall not devote space here to a discussion of the striking falsifications and alterations of the original FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 425 Frencli-XeZZo®_ BooJc, as this question can be dealt with more adequately after the French documents are published in full. It may be re- marked in passing, however, that even at the pres- ent time most significant attempts at falsification have been detected, and have been made the sub- ject of a highly important chapter in M. Mor- hardt’s book on war guilt . 78 We shall here limit ourselves to a few observations on the attempts of Poincare and Viviani to defend their conduct of office in 1914. Poincare has been assailed for his guilt in precipitating the War in 1914 by a number of French scholars and publicists from 1919 on- ward. This led him to publish an attempted defense, The Origins of the W ar, in 1922. This contains so many errors of fact and in- terpretation that a French scholar, Lazare, has been compelled to write an even longer book in order carefully but scathingly to refute it point by point . 79 During the summer of 1925 Poin- care was induced by the editor of the important American periodical, Foreign Affairs, to pre- pare another defense, directed particularly against such American students of war guilt as Professor Fay, Judge Bausman and the present writer . 80 It has been our privilege to refute this statement by Poincare at length and in a number of periodicals, and we shall not repeat that performance in this place . 81 It will suffice 426 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR to enumerate a few of Poincare’s errors of fact in positive statement, ignoring here his errors of omission and interpretation. It is significant at the outset to note that even Poincare no longer dares to repeat the fiction of the Potsdam Con- ference. He makes the following startling and revolutionary admission : 82 I do not claim that Austria or Germany, in this first phase, had a conscious thought-out intention of pro- voking a general war. No existing document gives us the right to suppose that, at that time, they had planned anything so systematic. Thus disappears the whole Entente case against Germany, as it was presented during the War and utilized to arouse the sympathy of the United States for the Allied cause, which was represented to us as the battle for civilization against the Central Powers, who had from the beginning willed a brutal and unprovoked war. Poincare attempts to establish his innocence by quoting the unscholarly and intemperate book by the completely discredited German renegade, Richard Grelling, unmindful of the fact that there are a score of infinitely better French books by much more reputable authors which proclaim his own guilt. Poincare proceeds un- blushingly to assert that the Russian documents are for the most part forgeries; that the French entertained no thought of a conflict for the re- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 427 covery of Alsace-Lorraine ; that he was the merest ornamental figurehead on his Russian trip; that Germany encouraged Austria in her determination to declare war on Serbia, and did not seriously advise restraint or moderation; that “by their common action on July 27 Germany and Austria did everything to make a European war possible”; that Germany decided to aban- don diplomatic efforts on July 30th and to adopt the policy of resorting to war; that the Russian mobilization did not constitute an act of aggres- sion or justify the German counter-measures; that the ten kilometer imposture was really a serious effort of the French to mollify the Germans and was a risky military venture op- posed by the F rench General Staff ; that F ranee could not have failed to join Russia in the hostilities of 1914 without tearing up her sacred defensive treaty obligations; and that he could not have been responsible personally for the acts of France in 1914, as he could only act through his ministry, and his ministry could not act except with the consent of the Chamber of Deputies. These assertions require no comment! 8. The Futile Rhetoric of Viviani Viviani’s misrepresentations during the 1914 crisis are well known from such acts as his ad- mission that mobilization constituted aggression 428 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR and his effort to represent the German mobili- zation as preceding the Russian; as well as from his circular note of August 1st in which he contended that Russia had agreed to stop her mobilization measures, but had been forced to resume them by the German ultimatum. 83 In 1922 he brought out a lengthy defense, di- rected in part against the Memoirs of the Kaiser. This book is entitled As TV e See It, and is a much more absurd performance than Poin- care’s Origins of the TV ar, partially because Viviani exhibits less adroit restraint than Poin- care, and partially because he has more emotional drive and less cerebral power than the great Lorrainer. To answer Viviani point by point would require a longer book than that of Lazare. Indeed, this present effort by the writer may as a whole be regarded as a reply to Viviani, though not specificalfy or consciously intended as such. The book is veritably a compendium of the Entente propaganda and mythology, though Viviani admits that he knows the exist- ence of such revisionist literature as Dobrorol- ski’s memoir on the Russian mobilization, and though he wrote after some of the most damag- ing criticisms of Poincare and himself had appeared in France. The myth of the unique, malicious and un- paralleled German militarism is once more spread before us with the greatest thoroughness, FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 429 together with the fiction of defenseless and innocent France. He holds at the outset that Germany’s guilt is established and sealed for all time because of Germany’s acceptance of the charge in the Paris Peace Treaty, and because the Reichstag voted to accept the Treaty. 84 The legend of the Potsdam Conference is solemnly repeated, with the attendance slightly reduced. The Kaiser is represented as having determined upon a European war on the 5th of July, and his departure for a vacation cruise is designated a “deceiving alibi.” 85 Germany is represented as having known the terms of the Austrian ultimatum before July 10th (before it was even formulated by the Austrians) and von Jagow is said to have lauded it at this early date. 86 He contends that the Austrian Red Book contains absolute proof that the Germans spurred the Austrians on in their determination to declare war on Serbia. 87 He presents the abridged and falsified Wiesner Report as the full report made by Wiesner to the Austrian government. 88 His account of the visit to St. Petersburg in 1914 would awaken suspicion, even if one possessed no knowledge of what actually happened there. Here we have it : 89 M. Poincare and I left our country on the morning of July 16, 1914. Rocked lightly between the blue skies and the blue waters, in that isolation which, for a man in public office, is the reward of action, the Presi- 430 GENESIS or THE WORLD W A R dent of the French Republic and I sat chatting with each other. We were journeying with heads held high and clean of heart, toward peace, toward the strength- ening of our alliance with Russia, toward the establish- ment of friendly relations with other lands, toward that fusion of general sympathies wherein the privileged friendship caused by the existence of an alliance does not preclude additional knitting together of thoughts and interests. . . . What can I say of our conversations? The head of the French Republic spoke alone for almost an hour with the Tsar, as was proper. I too conversed with the Tsar ; also, naturally, with the Premier, and, above all, with M. Sazonoff. We were in agreement, as other Ministers had been before me, in 1912, and at all times, regarding the necessity for maintaining the alliance in dignity and peace. Shall I speak of celebrations, reviews, parades, of the reception by the Empress, so magnificent in her beauty, with her blue eyes as piercing as sapphires? How long ago it all is ! The soil of Russia, a shroud that is al- ways frozen, hides the horrors of hecatombs, to escape from which neither rank, age nor sex availed. This is all he has to tell us of the diplomatic significance and agreements on this momentous journey. The Kaiser’s pledge-plan, openly and warmly approved by Grey and George V, is condemned as a brutal and wanton scheme : 90 Is this not outrageous ? What more could insatiable Austria want beyond almost total occupation of an in- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 431 nocent country which, by its moderation, was making itself deserving of glory in the annals of history, since it was acting in the interest of peace? The Austrian Ambassador is denounced for leaving Belgrade after the Serbian reply to the ultimatum, ignoring the fact that before a mes- senger had been dispatched from Belgrade with this reply the Serbian government had ordered the mobilization of the Serbian army and the removal of the Serbian government from Bel- grade to Nich. 91 He once more repeats the demonstrable falsehood of 1914, to the effect that Austria and Germany mobilized before Russia, and, most discreditable of all and in spite of the fact that he had read Dohrorolski’s memoran- dum, he devotes page after page to the allegation that the Russian general mobilization was caused by the publication of the false report of the German mobilization in the Berlin Lokalanzeiger on July 30th. 92 He does not seem to recognize that, if the Russian mobili- zation came after the German and Austrian, as he contends, there is no need for devoting such heroic efforts and so much space to explaining its cause. Under such circumstances the prior German mobilization would have been quite ade- quate justification. He also forgets what was pointed out above, namely, that the responsi- bility of the Lokalanzeiger article for the Rus- u 432 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR sian mobilization was not even put forward by the Russians as a reason for their action during the crisis of 1914. It was a fiction invented by Sir Edward Grey in December, 1914, and it was not until 1916 that the Russian authorities con- sented to stoop to adopt the imposture. Viviani attempts to make Bethmann-Hollweg more of a war criminal than the Kaiser, and holds that his efforts to restrain Austria were not in any sense made in good faith because he can- celled a moderating telegram just before mid- night on July 30th. 03 Viviani neglects to tell us that this cancellation was due to the fact that information was leaking into Germany concern- ing the Russian mobilization upon which France had set its stamp of approval twenty-four hours earlier. The 1914 fiction that France and Eng- land worked for diplomatic adjustment from the first, and that Russia followed their suggestions meekly, is valiantly reaffirmed. 94 The ten kilo- meter withdrawal is played up as a genuine ef- fort to demonstrate pacific French intentions, and is represented as a move which was dan- gerous to French defensive strategy and opposed by the military authorities, forgetful of the fact that he and Messimy had both denied that such was the case in their speeches to the French Chamber in 1919. 95 Finally, he insists that France was obligated in 1914 to come to the aid FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 433 of Russia by the explicit terms of the Franco- Russian Alliance . 96 J). Difficulties in Historical Apologetic Perhaps even more significant than these ef- forts of Poincare and Viviani to squirm out of their responsibility is the misrepresentations of which even distinguished French scholars have been guilty in their effort to clear France. Two eminent French students of diplomatic history, Bourgeois and Pages, in the standard conven- tional French work on war origins , 97 even stoop to accepting in its entirety the myth of the Pots- dam Conference, though it had been demon- strated to be a pure fiction long before they wrote their book. Their work is so full of ob- vious misrepresentations that the German ex- Crown Prince has actually been able to riddle it . 98 Equally illuminating is the case of Pierre Re- nouvin, the best informed Frenchman who has written on the question of war guilt and a man free from the war psychology. Renouvin has found it necessary to avoid specifically stating that the Russian general mobilization meant war, though he knows such to be the case . 99 He main- tains the indefensible thesis that Germany hoped to localize the Austro- Serbian conflict to the very end. He tries to prove, in obvious defiance 434 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR of the facts, that the German government aban- doned its diplomatic efforts on July 30th and determined to resort to war. 100 He very inade- quately emphasizes the French diplomatic sub- terfuges involved in the ten kilometer withdrawal order, the delay in issuing the mobilization order, and the awaiting of the German declaration of war. 101 Finally, he presents a very conven- tional interpretation of the alleged pacific policy of Sir Edward Grey, at obvious variance with the facts assembled by Loreburn, Morel and Ew- art. 102 V. UNIQUE GUILT OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA We may thus saj 7 that the main, in fact the only, direct and immediate responsibility for the general European War falls upon Russia and France. It is difficult to say which should be put in the first place. Unquestionably there had been the closest collaboration between Izvol- ski and Poincare from 1912 to August, 1914, and the program of both was inseparably connected with the bringing on of a European war. Iz- volski proudly boasted in August, 1914, that the war which had just broken out was his war, but we may safely say that without the ardent and persistent cooperation of Poincare he would never have been able to lead his government into actual warfare. We may thus hold that France FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 435 and Russia share about equally the responsibility for the great calamity and that no other Euro- pean power, except Serbia, desired a general European conflict in the summer of 1914. The writer, in coming to this conclusion of the sole and direct responsibility of Russia and France for the European War in 1914, does so in full knowledge of the fact that many authorities contend that there was no plan about the events of 1914, and that all “stumbled” into the war. 103 He has also read all of the literature counselling caution in regard to an indictment of Poincare as overtly guilty. It is the opinion of the writer that the thesis of “stumbling” is as far from the truth as the older Entente mythology of wilful and malicious German determination upon war from July 5, 1914. Even cautious scholars like Professor Fay are now admitting that the more Poincare writes the more obvious his guilt be- comes. 104 Likewise, with regard to the theory that, whatever the truth, one ought to defend the thesis of divided responsibility because this would make it so much easier to woo people away from the old myth of full German responsibility, the writer is fully aware of the fact that it would be far more easy to convince people of the view of divided responsibility than it is to prove to them the sole responsibility of France and Russia, But the writer is not running for Congress on the issue of war guilt; he is only interested in 436 GENESIS OF THE world war expounding what appears to him to be the truth before an honest and intelligent group of read- ers. It seems to him better to make slow prog- ress in advancing the cause of truth than to be quickly successful in disseminating a benign illusion. VI. CONCLUSIONS (1) Alsace-Lorraine was the one important root of the War as far as the policy of France was involved. Up to 1912 the chief apostles of re- venge had been monarchists or conservatives: enemies of the Third Republic. The accession of Poincare to the premiership in 1912 for the first time committed the Republic to the policy of revenge and the program of recapturing the “Lost Provinces.” Poincare openly confessed that the hope of restoring them had long been his only real reason for existence. (2) To advance this ambition he transformed the Franco-Russian Alliance into an aggressive union, and by 1914 had been able to make Eng- land congenial to its general program of closing in on Germany at the opportune moment. (3) By the beginning of 1914 Poincare had agreed to aid Russia in any war precipitated over the Balkans, provided this would lead to a world war that would result in Russia’s securing the Straits and France’s recovering Alsace- Lorraine. The F rench war aims, many of which FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 437 were approved by Russia as early as February and October, 1914, involved not only the restora- tion of Alsace-Lorraine, but also the annexa- tion of the Saar region and the creation of an independent Rhenish state under French pro- tection. The French were highly confident of success in a European war, as they felt that either France and England or France and Russia would be able to cope successfully with Germany and Austria. With England, France and Russia joined against the Central Powers, an easy and rapid victory was expected. With Italy also in, Germany and Austria would have no chance at all. The only thing which upset the plan was Hindenburg’s colossal defeat of the Russians. (4) The French people were pacifically in- clined in 1912, but from 1912 to 1914 had been gradually prepared for the idea of a war over the Balkans through the propaganda carried on in the French papers, which was financed by Russian gold secured by Izvolski and disbursed with the advice of Poincare and his henchmen. (5) Even as late as 1914 the French people were sufficiently opposed to war so that it was necessary to resort to every form of deceit, cen- sorship, force and diplomatic chicanery in order to dupe the French populace into accepting the fiction of a defensive war. The obligations of France under the Russian Alliance were not even allowed to come up for debate in the Cham- / V 438 GENESIS OF THE world war ber of Deputies. Hence, the responsibility of France means the responsibility of Poincare and a half dozen trusted lieutenants. There was more autocracy in controlling French foreign policy in the crisis of 1914 than prevailed in same period in either Russia, Germany or Aus- tria. This completely refutes Poincare’s con- tinual reference to French democracy as a safe- guard against war and a guaranty of French innocence in 1914. (6) Poincare first gave a belligerent turn to the crisis of July, 1914, through his visit to St. Petersburg. He encouraged the military group at the Russian court, and gave them to under- stand that he regarded the Austro-Serbian crisis as a satisfactory incident in the Balkans over which to precipitate the expected European war. Viviani warned the French Foreign Office on July 24th to be prepared for decisive action in regard to the Austro-Serbian dispute. Philippe Berthelot, deputy political director at the Quai d’Orsay, outlined the Serbian reply to the Aus- trian ultimatum in such a fashion as to make it admirable propaganda for the Franco-Russian program. Paul Cambon made a secret trip from London during Poincare's absence to stiffen up the action of Bienvenu- Martin and Margerie in the Foreign Office pending the return of Poin- care and Viviani. As early as the 27th Sazonov had informed the French that he would not FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 439 tolerate any French restraint on his policies, and the French acting Minister of Foreign Affairs assured him that none would be attempted. By the time Poincare had returned to Paris Sazonov had determined upon the mobilization policy which inevitably meant a European war. (7) On July 29th, after the first Russian gen- eral mobilization order had been issued and be- fore the Tsar cancelled it, Sazonov informed the ' French of his military plans and inquired if he could count on full French aid. He also re- quested that France attempt at once to force Grey’s hand and get England committed to the aggressive plans. (8) Poincare, Viviani and Messimy took up this matter in conference on the night of July 29th, and decided to support the Russian policy, though they were perfectly conscious of the fact that this would mean a general European war and the end of all diplomatic efforts to settle the crisis. Viviani telegraphed the promise of full French aid, and counselled the Russians to be as secretive as they could in their preparations, so as to gain the utmost possible advantage of time over the Germans. Izvolski telegraphed that Messimy had informed him that the French would be glad to have the Russians speed up their military preparations, but that they should be secretive about them and also issue a public declaration that they were willing to slow down 440 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR these preparations in the interest of peace. He also informed Sazonov that Paul Cambon would immediately approach Sir Edward Grey and obtain his reaffirmation of the agreement of November 22, 1912. (9) In spite of the above facts, Poincare tele- graphed George V on July 31st that France had from the beginning counselled moderation upon Russia, and that Russia had uniformly accepted this advice. Poincare tried to trick George V into promising English aid to France under the guise of restraining Germany. France also supported Sazonov’s fake proposal of the 31st to submit the crisis to a European conference. But on the night of the 31st France decided _ upon war “with hearty high spirits,” and so in- \ formed Izvolski. France was, thus, the first country officially to announce her decision to abandon diplomatic efforts and resort to war. (10) Having decided upon war the French government executed a number of diplomatic manoeuvres to lead the French, Italian and Brit- ish peoples to believe that they were preparing for a strictly defensive war. Among these were the ten kilometer withdrawal imposture of July 30th, the delay in ordering mobilization, and the determination to await the German declaration of war in order to impress the English and to avoid a debate on the obligations to Russia under FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 441 the alliance. In spite of the delay in the mo- 1 bilization order, F rench military preparations J advanced steadily from the 24th onward. (11) While it was the Russian mobilization which actually precipitated the World War, France is as responsible as Russia, because Poin- care gave the initial encouragement to Russian aggression on his St. Petersburg visit, and con- firmed this attitude by his decision on the night of July 29th to support the Russian mobilization plans. France was not bound by treaty obliga- tion to aid Russia in 1914, as Russian priority in mobilization released France from the terms of the military convention of 1914. Poincare care- fully concealed this fact from the French Cham- ber of Deputies in 1914, and refused to allow the matter to be submitted to debate. (12) The French Yellow Booh was edited and falsified in 1914. Neither Poincare nor Vi- viani has been able to defend himself except by resorting to the most obvious and flagrant falsi- fications of fact. 105 In the light of the facts about war origins which we have brought together in this and pre- ceding chapters, and just summarized, the fol- lowing message of Poincare to the French Parlia- ment on August 4, 1914, presents an almost unique combination of heroic tragedy and light humor: 442 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR France has just been the object of a violent and pre- meditated attack, which is an insolent defiance of the law of nations. Before any declaration 'of war had been sent to us, even before the German Ambassador had asked for his passports, our territory has been violated. The German Empire has waited till yester- day evening to give at this late stage the true name to a state of things which it had already created. For more than forty years the French, in sincere love of peace, have buried at the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation. They have given to the world the example of a great nation which, definitely raised from defeat bv the exer- cise of will, patience and labour, has only used its re- newed and rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of humanity. Since the ultimatum of Austria opened a crisis which threatened the whole of Europe, France has persisted in following and recommending on all sides a policy of prudence, wisdom and moderation. To her there can be imputed no act, no movement, no word, which has not been peaceful and concilia- tory. At the hour when the struggle is beginning, she has the right, in justice to herself, of solemnly declaring that she has made, up to the last moment, supreme ef- forts to avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility for which the German Empire will have to bear before history. ( Unanimous and re- peated applause .) On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotia- FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 443 tions which had been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a peaceful conclusion, Ger- many suddenly declared war upon Russia, she has in- vaded the territory of Luxemburg, she has outrageously insulted the noble Belgian nation ( loud and unanimous applause), our neighbour and our friend, and at- tempted treacherously to fall upon us while we were in the midst 'of diplomatic conversation. ( Fresh and re- peated unanimous applause.) But France was watching. As alert as she Avas peaceful, she was prepared ; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the screen behind which the mobilisation of our national forces will be methodically completed. Our fine and courageous army, which France to-day accompanies with her maternal thought ( loud ap- plause), has risen eager to defend the honour of the flag and the soil of the country. ( Unanimous and re- peated applause.) The President of the Republic, interpi-eting the unanimous feeling of the country, expresses to our troops, by land and sea, the admiration and confidence of every Frenchman ( loud and prolonged applause) . Closely united in a common feeling, the nation will persevere with the cool self-restraint of Avhich, since the beginning of the crisis, she has given daily proof. Now, as always, she will know how to harmonise the most noble daring and most ardent enthusiasm with that self-control which is the sign of enduring energy and is the best guarantee of victory {applause) . In the war which is beginning France will have Right 444 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR on her side, the eternal power of wdiich cannot with im- punity be disregarded by nations any more than by individuals ( loud and unanimous applause) . She will be heroically defended by all her sons ; noth- ing will break their sacred union before the enemy; to- day they are joined together as brothers in a common indignation against the aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith ( loud and prolonged applause and cries of “Vive la France”). She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally ( loud and unanimous applause) ; she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain ( loud and unanimous ap- plause). And already from every part of the civilised world sympathy and good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands before the universe for Liberty, Justice and Reason ( loud and repeated ap- plause) ‘Haut les coeurs et vive la France!’ ( unanimous and prolonged applause) . SELECTED REFERENCES Barnes, H. E., “Poincare’s Guilt in the War,” in New York Nation, October 7, 1925; “A Rejoinder to M. Poincare,” in American Monthly, December, 1925 ; also in the Kriegsschuldf rage, December, 1925 ; and the Nuova Revista Storica, November— December, 1925 ; Bausman, F., Let France Explain; Bourgeois, E., and Pages, G., Les Origines et les Res pons abilites de la grande guerre; Converset, Colonel, Les trois ans de diplomatic secrete qui nous mendrent a la guerre de 1914; Demartial, G., Les Res pons abilites de la guerre; FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 445 La Guerre de 191 1;. Comment on mobilisa les con- sciences; Dupin, G., Considerations sur les responsa- bilites de la guerre; Conference sur les responsabilit'es de la guerre; Ewart, J. S., The Roots and Causes of the Wars; Fabre-Luce, A., La Victoire; Fay, S. B., “M. Poincare and War Responsibility,” in New Republic, October 14, 1925 ; “Who Started the War?” Ibid., January 6, 1926; Gouttenoire de Toury, F., Jauris et le parti de la guerre; Poincare a-t-il voulu la guerre? Judet, E., Georges Louis; Lavisse, E. (Ed.), Histoire de France contemporaine, Vol. X; Lazare, A Vorigine du mensonge; Louis, G., Carnets d’un Ambassadeur; Marchand, R., La Condamnation d’un regime; Margueritte, V., Les Criminels; Marx, W., “The Responsibility for the War,” in Foreign Affairs (American), January, 1926; Montgelas, M., The Case for the Central Powers; Morhardt, M., Les Preuves; Pevet, A. H., Les Responsables de la guerre; Poincare, R., Origins of the War; “The Responsibility for the War,” in Foreign Affairs, October, 1925 ; Au Service de la France ; Reinach, J., Histoire de douze jours; Renou- vin, P., Les Origines immediates de la guerre; Rogers, L., “The French President and Foreign Affairs,” in Po- litical Science Quarterly, December, 1925; Stieve, F., Isvolsky and the World War; Viviani, R., As We See It. FOOTNOTES AND FURTHER REFERENCES 1 The Boots and Causes of the Wars, p. 1001 ; cf. Earl Lore- burn, How the War Came, Chap. iii. 2 J. H. Rose, The Development of Modern European Nations; R. H. Lord, The Origins of the War of 1810. s Ewart, op. cit., Chap, xviii; D. N. Raymond, Contemporary British Opinion during the Franco-Prussian War; C. E. Schieber, The Transformation of American Sentiment towards Germany, Chap. i. 446 GENESIS OF T FI E WORLD WAR 4 In Foreign Affairs for October, 1925, p. 5, Poincare makes the astonishing statement that the culture of the Alsace-Lorraine area has no real bearing upon the morality of political control and possession. He holds that even though the Germans had made the district thoroughly Teutonic in culture and politically contented within the German Empire, it would still have been a moral mistake for France to allow it to remain under German control. It is obvious that this argument would, in real- ity, constitute a complete vindication of the German seizure of the provinces in 1870. s H. A. L. Fisher, Studies in History and Politics, pp. 146-61; C. E. Playne, The Neuroses of the Nations, Part II; E. Dimnet, France Herself Again. V. Margueritte, Les Criminels, pp. 113 ff. 6 Ewart, op. cit., p. 671. i G. P. Gooch, Franco-German Relations, 1870-1914; cf. A. Fabre-Luce, La Victoire, pp. 109 ff., 134 ff. s Ibid.; also Gooch, in Contemporary Review, April, 1923; and Ewart, pp. 769-73. 9 S. Huddleston, Poincare; M. Morliardt, Les Preuves; F. Gut- tenoire de Toury, Jauris et la parti de la guerre. 10 Morhardt, Les Preuves, pp. 135-6. ii Ibid., p. 135. I 2 Loe. cit., p. 5. is Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 297-9. 11 Ewart, op. cit., pp. 746 ff.; Stieve, op. cit., Chaps, ii-iii; Fabre-Luce, La Victoire, pp. 133 ff. is Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, pp. 4—5. is Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 117 ff.; Stieve, op. cit., passim; B. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,” in American His- torical Review, April, 1924, pp. 457-8. ii Stieve, op. cit.; Colonel Converset, Les trois ans de diplo- matic secrete qui nous menerent a la guerre de 1914; Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 140 ff.; E. Judet, Georges Louis. is Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 179-91; Stieve, op. cit.; Chaps, iv-v. 1 9 Stieve, Chaps, iii-v. 20 Ibid., pp. 186 ff. 21 Un Livre noir, Vol. II, pp. 303, 306; on the Alsace-Lorraine issue see Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, p. 52. 22 C. J. H. Hayes, Political and Social History of Modern Europe, Vol. II, p. 702; Earl Loreburn, How the War Came, p. 72. 23 Earl Loreburn, How the War Came, Chap, iv; E. D. Morel, The Secret History of a Great Betrayal. 21 E. F. Henderson, The Verdict of History: the Case of Sir Edward Grey, p. 204; see La Revue de France, July 1, 1921. 25 Schmitt, loc cit., p. 460; Stieve, op. cit., pp. 88-90. FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 447 26 Stieve, p. 211. 27 Siebert and Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and the World, p. 525. 28 Stieve, Chap, vi; Henderson, op. cit., p. 184. 29 Loreburn, op. cit., chaps, iv, vii; Morel, op. cit. so See the obituary article by Robert Dell in the London Na- tion, September 19, 1925, p. 723. si Stieve, Chaps, iii-iv; also New York Nation, February 20, 1924; The Progressive, February 1, 1926, pp. 182 ff. 32 G. Demartial, La Guerre de 1914 ■ Comment on Mobilisa les consciences. 33 See below pp. 720 ff. 34 The views here expressed agree fairly consistently with those of Fabre-Luce. Guttenoire de Toury, Morhardt, Lazare, Pevet, Converset, Dupin and Demartial are far more severe in their criticisms of Poincare. The utmost that can be said by a scholar in his defense is contained in the valuable work by Renouvin. 34a Prance and the French, pp. 37-38. 35 Fabre-Luce, op. cit., pp. 206 ff.; Stieve, Chap, vii; Lazare, A I’Origine du mensonge, pp. 161 ff. 36 B. W. von Biilow, Die Krisisj Die ersten Stundenschlage des Weltkriegs; Freiherr von Schoen, Erlebtes, pp. 162 ff. ; Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, p. 4. 37 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 38-40. 38 Ibid., pp. 50-51; Morhardt, pp. 275 ff.; Fabre-Luce, pp. 211 ff. ; Vers la verity, pp. 89-95. 39 French Yellow Book, No. 101. Compare the true text, and the false text as published in the Yellow Book, in Morhardt, pp. 275 ff.; Fabre-Luce, p. 227. 40 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 50-52; see British Blue Book No. 105 for evidence that Cambon got busy at once. 41 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 53-4. 42 Fabre-Luce, p. 227; G. Dupin, Conference sur les responsa- bilitds de la guerre, p. 21. 43 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 17. 44* Ibid., p. 30. 45 Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 217-20; Vers la verity, pp. 65-70; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 177 ff. The texts in English with Vivi- ani’s explanations are contained in R. Viviani, As We See It, pp. 191 ff. See also the Kriegsschuldfrage December, 1925 ; pp. 833-4. 46 Montgelas, p. 219; Yiviani, p. 197. 47 Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, p. 18. 48 Montgelas, p. 218. 49 Ibid., pp. 217-20; Dupin, op. cit., pp. 30-33. so Dupin, op. cit., p. 32. 448 GENESIS OE THE WORLD WAR si Ibid. ; and Kriegsschuldfrage, December, 1925, p. 834. B 2 Dupin, pp. 32-3. 53 French Yellow Book, No. 106; Viviani, op. cit., pp. 192-3. 64 Dupin, p. 31. 55 Ibid., pp. 21, 31; Loreburn, How the War Came, pp. 205-6. se Dupin, p. 32; cf. A. H. Pevet, Les Responsables de la guerre, pp. 211 ff.; 418 ff. 57 Foreign Affairs, October, 1925, p. 2; Viviani, pp. 215 fF. 58 Foreign Affairs, pp. 17-18. so Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 64-5. 60 Ibid., pp. 58, 163. 61 Foreign Affairs, p. 4. 62 Ibid.,' p. 19. 63 Livre jaune de I’alliance Franco-Russe, Nos. 53 and 71. 64 Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 193-4; Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 69-72; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 197 ff. 65 See above, pp. 335 ff. 66 Foreign A ffairs, pp. 16-17; Renouvin, op. cit., pp. 138 ff., 162, 259 ff. 67 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 59-60. 68 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 69 Foreign Affairs, p. 18. 70 Dupin, op. cit., pp. 33-5; Livre jaune de Valliance Franco- Russe, Nos. 28-92. 71 Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, p. 69. 72 Twenty-five Years, Vol. II, Appendix D, p. 313. 73 Loc. cit., p. 3; cf. Pevet, op. cit., pp. 387 ff. 74Demartial, op. cit.; Hinter den Kulissen des Franzosichen J ournalismus ; Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book, pp. 45, 48; Henderson, op. cit., p. 188; The Diary of Lord Bertie, Vol. II, p. 245; G. Dupin, in Vers la verity, pp. 136-7. 75 Loc. cit., p. 3. 76 Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 301-2. 77 Fabre-Luce, La Victoire; and, by the same author, La Crise des alliances; H. G. Moulton and C. Lewis, The Financial Prob- lem of France. 78Marhardt, Les Preuves, pp. 162 ff. See also Vers la veritS, pp. 13-8. 79 A VOrigine du mensonge. so P. 1, footnote, and p. 3. si New York Nation, October 7, 1925; The A merican Monthly, December, 1925; the Kriegsschuldfrage, December, 1925; and the Nuova Revista Storica, November-December, 1925; cf. also S. B. Fay, in the New Republic for October 14, 1925; and January, 1926; and G. Dupin, “M. Raymond Poincar6 se defend en Amer- ique,” in La Revue de Hongrie, December 15, 1925. FRENCH ENCOURAGE RUSSIA 449 82 Loc. cit., p. 14. 83 Montgelas, op. cit., pp. 180-82, 202. 84 Op. cit., p. 104. For a French criticism of Viviani see G. Dupin in Vers la verity, pp. 9-13. 85 Viviani, op. cit., pp. 111-13. 86 Ibid., pp. 88, 101. 87 Ibid., p. 104. 88 Ibid., p. 124. 89 Ibid., pp. 89-92. so Ibid., pp. 143-4. si Morhardt, op. cit., pp. 45 if., 293^. 92 Viviani, pp. 160 if. 93 Ibid., pp. 186 if. ; 201 ff. 94 Ibid., pp. 205 ff. 95 Ibid., pp. 191 ff. os Ibid., p. 211. 97 Les Origines et les responsabilitis de la grande guerre. Mich suche die Wahrheit; cf. Hans Delbriick, in the Kriegs- schuldfrage, September, 1925, pp. 604-8. 99 Les Origines immidiates de la guerre, pp. 261 ff. ; on Renou- vin see M. Montgelas in the Kriegsschuldfrage, July, 1925 and January, 1926; in the New York Nation, November 18, 1925; and S. B. Fay in Political Science Quarterly December, 1925, pp. 626-9. 100 Op. cit., pp. 138-41; 162; 259-61. 101 Ibid., pp. 175 ff. 102 Ibid., pp. 209 ff. 103 Gooch, Modern Europe, p. 559. New Republic, October 14, 1924, p. 200. Cf. Bausman in Foreign Affairs (London), and The Progressive, February 1, 1926. 105 With this set of conclusions may be compared the summary of Viviani’s defense of France ( As We See It, pp. 267-8): 1. As far back as July 24, 1914, at one o’clock in the morning I telegraphed, while on my way from Cronstadt to Stockholm, to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asking that it seek through our ambassador to Austria, to calm down Austria and suggest to England that mediation be attempted by the four nations in order that the dispute might be arranged peacefully. 2. France supported Sir Edward Grey’s proposal. 3. The French Government supported the request for extension of the time allowed Serbia ( Yellow Book, No. 29). 4. It renewed its request on July 27th ( Yellow Book, No. 61). 5. Same request, July 29th ( Yellow Book, No. 85). 6. On July 29th (No. 97) France urgently asked London that 450 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Sir Edward Grey renew the proposal of mediation by the four nations, in whatever form he might deem best. 7. On July 30th (No. 101) the French Government suggested to Russia that, if she adopted defensive measures against the mobilization already carried out by Austria, she would give Ger- many no excuse for meddling. 8. On July 30th a telegram was sent to England to inform the latter that the French Government had just given the order to have the French troops drawn back from the frontier a distance of ten kilometers. 9. On July 31st (No. 112) the French government urged all ambassadors to support the English proposal of mediation by the four nations. 10. August 1, 1914 (No. 122), France renewed her declaration that she would respect Belgian neutrality. It may be pointed out that the first five of the above were obvi- ously designed to gain time for Serbia, Russia and France in their military preparations. Grey admitted that mediation and direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were better methods of handling the problem than a conference of powers, and Germany was exerting herself to the fullest degree in this direction on the 29th, 30th and 31st of July when France approved the Russian military measures which were sure to produce war, and indulged in the diplomatic ruses designed to deceive Europe as to her real intentions. All diplomatic gestures of France after the morning of July 30th were obviously irrele- vant and purely deceptive. The French promise to respect Belgian neutrality on August 1st is no proof of French pacific intent. The French and British were in the closest collusion by August 1st as to measures which must be taken to avoid alienat- ing the British public, and neither would have countenanced for a moment so fatal a step as the French invasion of Belgium. Further, by this time it was evident that the circumstances sur- rounding the bringing of England into the War in 1914 were to be such that it would be impossible to execute the Franco-British plans of 1911, 1912, 1913 to march into Germany through Belgium. The French plan was altered to provide for an advance through Alsace. C HAPTEE Y 1 1 I SIR EDWARD GREY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ENGLAND I. ENGLAND AND FRANCE TO 1914 There can be no intelligent understanding of the reasons for the British entry into the World War unless we have a definite knowledge of the nature and development of Anglo-French relations as they existed on June 28, 1914. While England was involved in Entente relations with Russia, the Russian alliance was never popular in Eng- land, and until six months after the World War had been declared England persistently refused to accede to the chief aim of Russian foreign policy, the seizure of the Straits and Constanti- nople. As we shall see later. Sir Edward Grey had to resort to shady measures sufficiently to in- fluence British opinion to make a war with Russia as an ally at all palatable . 1 Grey per- sistently refused to make the Austro-Serbian dispute a direct issue with England, and in the midst of the last stage of the crisis of 1914 even the chauvinistic Bottomly journal, John Bull, published a leading article under the heading “To Hell With Servia . . . once more, to Hell 451 452 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR with Servia!” 2 Nor did England enter the war primarily because of the invasion of Belgium. Grey had committed himself in writing to enter the war on August 2, 1914, before Germany had made any move to invade Belgium; even before she had sent Belgium an ultimatum. Grey re- fused the German offer to respect Belgian terri- tory on condition that England remain neutral. Neither was Grey bound to come to the aid of France by his note of August 2nd, for, between that time and the declaration of war by England, Germany had offered to make concessions which entirely removed the conditions for joining France which were stipulated in Grey’s letter to Paul Cambon on August 2nd. It cannot be held that Grey wanted war for war’s sake or even to humiliate and weaken Ger- many, much as he desired the latter. The real reason why Grey threw Engla nd into the w ar was because he had brought England into such a condition of written and verbal promises to France that he felt obli ged to drag his country into any war in which France was engaged against Germany. In his memoirs Grey repre- sents himself as regarding the obligation to aid F ranee as resting more upon the conviction of the interests of England than upon the debt of honor to France which was emphasized at the time of the outbreak of the War. Doubtless both fac- tors played a large part in his decision, 'Jhis FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 453 obli gation was alleged to be so acute and spec ific that he has openly confessed that he would have resigned if he had not bj|en able to bring Eng- land into the conflict. 3 **^eing from the outset de- ceived as to Franco-Russian intentions and prep- arations, and unwilling to curb his allies after he knew of their belligerent plans, he was drawn into the conflict without having wished war in the abstract at the beginning of the crisis. In other words, England entered the wa r becau se | Grey was determined to stand hv an ally w ho I was herself determined upon war. As the for- mer Lord Chancellor of England, Earl Lore- burn, well expressed it: “We went to war unprepared in a Russian quarrel because we were tied to France in the dark.” 4< ^%n the Anglo- French understandings, then, is to he found the* Tsey to .British responsibility for the World War. the- master architects were Theophile Delcasse and Paul Cambon. We have in this chapter the interesting story of how a country which was theoretically against war came to be the one whose assured participation alone made the World War possible. Except for cooperation in the abortive Crim- ean War, France had been the most persistent and important rival of England for nearly a thousand years. Prior to the Fashoda Incident of 1898 there was bitter feeling between England and France. France had been vigorously op- 454 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR posed to British policy in South Africa. Even during the Boer War France, in spite of Delcasse and Fashoda, was much more hostile to England than was Germany, welcoming President Kruger with ostentatious cordiality. 5 The beginning of definite Anglo-French engagements came with the treaty negotiated by the Conservative gov- ernment in 1904, dealing with Franco-British procedure in Egypt, Newfoundland and else- where, and giving France a free hand in Mo- rocco. 6 The next year the Conservative govern- ment, still in power, laid the basis for direct naval conversations with France and for indirect mili- tary conversations. 7 It also is held to have promised France aid in the event of war with Germany during the first Morocco crisis. Sir Edward Grey continued the same policy with enthusiasm after he entered the Cabinet of Campbell-Bannerman in December, 1905. The significance of Grey’s entry into the Foreign Office with respect to the attitude of England towards Germany and France is well stated by Lord Loreburn in the following passage : s On the formation of the Liberal Government on 12th December, 1905, three Ministers, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Hal- dane, and Sir Edward Grey, laid the foundation for a different policy, namely, a policy of British intervention if Germany should make an unprovoked attack on France. They did this within a month, probably within FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 455 a few days of taking office, by means of communications with the French Ambassador and of military and naval conversations between the General Staffs of the two countries, who worked out plans for joint action in war if Great Britain should intervene. They did it behind the back of nearly all their Cabinet colleagues, and, what really matters, without Parliament being in any way made aware that a policy of active intervention be- tween France and Germany was being contemplated. Grey admits that in his childhood his pro- French father and grandfather attempted, we may guess with great success, to develop in him a sentimental love for France and hatred for Germany through instilling into his mind the conventional French view of the Franco-Prussian War . 9 We shall not press the potential Freu- dian interpretation of the 1914 crisis in the British Foreign Office. The British promise of aid to the French in the first Morocco crisis was kept secret, Grey’s statements after he came into office having been kept from the knowledge of the majority of the Cabinet. But in the sec- ond Morocco crisis the British defiance of Ger- many was openly uttered by Lloyd George in his Mansion House speech of July 21, 1911. 10 There is doubtless much truth in the conten- tion of certain authorities that Grey’s original purpose was more to establish a balance of power in Europe than to organize an alliance against 456 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR Germany or even to be a party to such an alli- ance. It was to no small degree the rather un- wise policy of Germany, particularly in Morocco, which led Grey further along the path of an alli- ance with France and Russia than he would orig- inally have chosen to go. While the German cause was legally just in both the Morocco crises, Germany was more interested in breaking the Anglo-French entente than in securing her rights in Morocco. This forced Grey into deci- sive support of France unless he was willing to abandon his plan of reestablishing the balance of power. The Balkan Wars which broke out in 1912 threatened the peace in Europe. Poincare was fearful lest Russia might secure the Straits with- out a European war. Hence, he gave Russia his promise that France would follow Russia into a European war over the Balkans. It was desirable that English participation should be as- sured, and Paul Cambon had been instructed to approach Grey and obtain from him the limit which England would promise at the time. After much negotiation the English agreement was expressed in the following form in Grey’s letter to Cambon on November 22, 1912. The plan referred to was that England would pro- tect the northern coast of France and allow the French fleet to be concentrated in the Mediter- ranean : ii FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 457 Nov. 22nd, 1912. My Dear Ambassador, — From time to time in recent years the French and British Naval and Military ex- perts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The dis- position, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to cooperate in war. You have, how- ever, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent ag- gression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what meas- ures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.” So important was this arrangement that Grey, in his famous speech of August 3, 1914, admitted 458 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR that it was the “starting-point for the Govern- ment with regard to the present crisis.” 12 It was literally so, because it was his confirmation of thisdocument on August 2, 1914, which made him feel irrevocably bound to bring England into the War. Cambon well understood thattlns agreement would bring England into a war in a wholehearted fashion, as it was unthinkable that a state would allow its navy to participate with- out its army . 13 This correspondence also had a most important effect on the British navy. Wins ton Churchill, First Lo rd of the Admiralty, fra nkly admits that from this time on the naya l x authorities assumed the inevitability of a war with Germany and steadily prepared for it in both a physical and psychological fashion.*^ While we cannot be certain in this matter until the publication of the French and British ar- chives, it would seem that there must have been more than mere chronological coincidence be- tween Poincare’s unconditional promise to aid Russia in the case of a European war over the Balkans, which was made on November 17, 1912, and the letter from Grey to Cambon on Novem- ber 22, 1912. It would appear relatively cer- tain that Grey must have given Cambon his ver- bal assurance at some date before November 17th. At any rate, the latter half of November, 1912, was a crucial period in European diplo- macy. It was the time when real teeth were at FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 459 last put into the Franco-Russian Alliance and when England was definitely committed in prin- ciple to the program of supporting France. The diplomatic background of the World War is to be fourid in the,, diplomacy of these two weeks quite as much aS it is in the two weeks following July 28, 1914. Army preparations paralleled the develop- ment of arrangements for naval cooperation. In January, 1906, Grey and Lord Haldane, Minister of War, secretly arranged for the con- tinuous collaboration of the French and British General Staffs, including explicit plans for cooperation with Russia in the east. By the end of 1910 these plans had taken on an elaborate development involving completed arrangements for the landing of a British expeditionary force on the Continent, if necessary in Belgium with or without the consent of the Belgian authori- ties . 15 Mr. Morel, taking his facts from Lord Haldane’s own book, Before the W ar, thus des- cribes the situation as it existed in 1910: 10 Within five years, “by the end of 1910,” the detailed “plans,” the existence of which Lord Grey was so anx- ious to conceal from the House in August, 1914, had been “worked out.” Lord Haldane had solved his “problem” of how to mobilize and concentrate “at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier,” “which had been settled between the staffs of France and Britain,” a force of 160,000 men to operate with 460 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR the French armies, “with the assistance of Russian pres- sure in the East.” Note that the cooperation of the armies of the Czar was part of the “problem,” an inte- gral part of the “plans” from the very beginning, i. e., from 1906, and ask yourselves what the progressive forces in the country would have said had they known of it, and how long the Government would have lasted had these “plans” been disclosed! British and French staff officers had thoroughly reconnoitered the ground upon which the allied armies were to fight in Belgium and in France; Sir Henry Wilson had been all over it on his bicycle. So comprehensive had the “plans” be- come by that time that at the first conference of the French and Russian headquarters’ staffs, held subse- quent to their completion — at Krasnoe-Selo, in August, 1911 — General Dubail, the French chief of staff, was able to assure his Russian colleagues that the French Army would “take the offensive against Germany, w T ith the help of the British Army on its left flank,” on the tenth day after mobilizing. In December of that 3 ’ear (1911) Lord French with his staff visited the French headquarters. Thus was the second milestone silently erected while the British people went about their daily business, in blissful ignorance of everything but the fact that they were in the proud position of enjoying a democratic constitution, and, unlike their benighted continental neighbors, were the masters and not the servants of their rulers. In his report of December 5, 1912, Izvolski pointed out that the Franco-British military con- FRANCE INVOLVES ENG I, AND 461 vention was as explicit and thorough as the Franco-Russian: 17 Since the beginning of the present crisis M. Poin- care has not ceased, on every occasion, to invite the London cabinet to confidential conversations, with the object of clearing up the position which would be adopted by England in the event of a general European conflict. On the British side no decision has been taken hitherto. The London cabinet invariably replies that this will depend upon circumstances, and that the ques- tion of peace or war will be decided by public opinion. On the other hand, not only has the examination of all eventualities which may present themselves not been in- terrupted between the French and British headquarters staffs, but the existing militax’y and naval agi’eements have quite recently undergone a still greater develop- ment, so that at the preseixt moment the Anglo-French military convention is as settled and complete (a un caractere aussi aclieve et complet ) as the Franco- Russian convention; the only difference consists in the fact that the foi’mer bear the sigixatui'e of the chiefs of the two headquarters staffs, and oix this account are, so to speak, not obligatoi'y upon the Government. These last few days General Wilson, the English chief of staff, has been in France, in the most rigorous se- crecy, and on this occasion vai’ious complementary de- tails have been elaboi*ated; moreovei’, apparently for the first time, it is not oixly military men who partici- pated in this woi’k, but also other representatives of the Fi’ench Government. 462 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR Lord Haldane himself indicates the bearing of these preparations upon the rapidity with Avhich the expeditionary force was mobilized and ship- ped across the Channel in 1914: 18 After the war was over, Lord Haldane explained with considerable and pardonable pride, how as minister of war from 1905 to 1912 he had reorganized the depart- ment and prepared for “eventualities” on the continent. This was done on the occasion of the coal inquiry. We may quote the question of the Chairman and the answers of Lord Haldane from the minutes of the commission: “Chairman. Am I right in thinking that during that time you organized the territorial forces of the crown and that also you provided for a speedy mobilization of our forces in the event of the nation being called upon to go to war? (Lord Haldane) That is so. “I think as a result of your efforts, a very speedy mobilization of our forces was effected when war was declared against Germany? — Yes. The thing we con- centrated upon was extreme rapidity of mobilization and concentration in the place of assembly, and that we carried out. “I suppose it is no longer a secret, but war was de- clared on Tuesday, August 4th, 1914, and I think within a matter of twelve or fourteen hours, under the scheme of mobilization which you had prepared, some of our troops were already in France? — Yes, within a very short time ; within a very few hours troops were in France. “How long was it before the whole of the British Ex- peditionary Force was placed in the field at the ap- FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 463 pointed place? — On Monday, August 3rd, 1914, at the request of the Prime Minister, I, as Lord Chancellor, went back to the War Office and mobilized the machine with which I was familiar. That was done at 11 o’clock upon Monday, August 3rd, and the giving of the orders took only a few minutes ; everything was prepared years before.” The details of the plans for military cooperation with France, as well as the anticipation of im- minent war in the British War Office long prior to the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, are admirably illustrated by the following revelation by Major W. Cyprian Bridge, official translator to the War Office in 1914 : 19 But what perhaps impressed me more than all was the fact that about an hour after we declared war on the fatal 4th of August there was taken out of its hid- ing place a big document marked “very secret.” It was drawn up in French and was entrusted to me for trans- lation. It proved to be an elaborate agreement between the British and French Governments regarding the man- ner in which payments on behalf of the British Expe- ditionary Force operating in North France were to be adjusted. It went into details, for instance as to the rate of exchange at which calculations were to be made, such as any military officer of experience would know could only be useful or necessary if the plan was ex- pected to be put into almost immediate execution. The document was dated and signed early in February (I think the 4th) 191 If.. 464 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR The Northcliffe (Harmsworth) press was solidly behind these military plans. Indeed, these papers in England assumed to influence French opinion by ardently supporting the French army bill of 1913, which greatly increased the land armament of France, and by violently attacking the opponents of the bill. 20 While the agreements between England and France were kept secret, hidden even from the majority of the members of the Cabinet, and known only to Asquith, Grey, Haldane and Lord Crewe, nevertheless suspicions developed that something more than amiable relations existed between England and the country across the Channel. Consequently, Asquith and Grey were openly questioned on the matter by members of the House of Commons. It would scarcely do to say that they lied about the situation; they merely gave false, untrue and misleading replies. On March 10, 1913, Lord Hugh Cecil put the following question to Asquith in the House of Commons: 21 There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an ob- ligation arising out of an assurance given by the Min- istry, in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe. This is the general belief. FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 465 Mr. Asquith answered: “I ought to say that is not true.” On March 24th he went even further to say: 22 As has been repeatedly stated, this counti*y is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parlia- ment, which compels it to take part in a war. In other words, if war arises between European Powers, there are no unpublished agreements which will restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should partici- pate in a war. On April 28, 1914, just after Grey had re- turned from Paris, where he had agreed to try to force an agreement upon a naval convention with Russia, he was asked: 23 Whether he is aware that demands have recently been put forward for a further military understanding between the Powers of the Triple Entente with a view to concerted action on the Continent in the case of certain eventualities, and whether the policy of this country still remains one of freedom from all obligations to en- gage in military operations on the Continent. Grey replied : 24 The answer to the first part of the question is in the negative, and as regards the latter part, the question now remains the same as stated by the Prime Minister in answer to a question in this House on March 24, 1913. 466 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR On June 11 , 1914 , within less than two months of the outbreak of the War, Grey was asked a similar question by Mr. King. He answered more at length : 25 The hon. Member for North Somerset asked a similar question last year with regard to military forces, and the hon. Member for North Salford asked a similar question also on the same day, as he has again done to- day. The Prime Minister then replied that if war arose between European Powers, there were no unpublished agreements which would restrict or hamper the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both the questions on the Paper. It remains as true to-day as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any Power that would make the statement less true. No such ne- gotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon so far as I can judge. But if any agree- ment were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister’s statement of last year, which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parlia- ment. When Grey made his notable speech of August 3 , 1914 , asking the approval of Parliament for his promise to aid France, he faced the difficult situation of having to request consent to fulfil an obligation which he had said did not exist. He had denied that there were any explicit written FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 467 arrangements such as the letter to Cambon, to say nothing of the plans of the general staffs of the two countries. It was what Professor Beard has designated as an “astounding” and “amaz- ing” revelation to admit the existence of even the general commitments of the Cambon letter. Grey could not summon up courage enough to admit that a military and naval convention existed between the two countries. Hence, in reading the letter to Cambon in the House of Commons, he left off the damning concluding sentence. We follow Morel in giving in parallel columns the significant part of the letter, as originally written to Cambon, and as read in the House by Grey: 26 The Conclusion of the The Conclusion of the Let - Grey-Cambon Letter as ter as actually written to read to the House of Com- M. Cambon. mons I agree that if either I agree that if either Government have grave Government had grave rea- reason to expect an unpro- son to expect an unpro- voked attack by a third voked attack by a third power, or something that power, or something that threatened the general threatened the general peace, it should immedi- peace, it should immedi- ately discuss with the ately discuss with the other whether both Gov- other whether both Gov- ernments should act to- ernments should act to- gether to prevent aggres- gether to prevent aggres- 468 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR sion and to preserve peace ; sion and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to they would be prepared to take in common. take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the general staffs would at once be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what ef- fect should be given to them. In his memoirs Grey offers the following illuminating and amusing explanation of his omission of the vital concluding sentence: 27 It was not until 1923, nine years later, that a charge of having omitted the last sentence of that letter was brought to my notice. My first impulse was to deny the thing as impossible ; but it is so : the last sentence of the letter does not appear in the report of the speech. A question, according to the report, was interjected about the date of the letter and it may be that the inter- ruption in the reading of the letter, so near the end, caused an accidental omission, or perhaps I thought the last sentence unimportant, as it did not affect the sense and main purport of what had already been read out. I cannot say. The letter was published in full in the White Paper two or three days later ; the proof of that Paper was submitted to me before publication ; 1 certainly did not raise any question of how the letter should appear in the White Paper, and so I must either FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 469 have attached no importance to the omission of a sen- tence in the speech, or have been unconscious of there having been any omission. It may be observed that it was most convenient for Sir Edward to omit accidentally the sentence that most obviously demonstrated the falsehood in his replies to the House of Commons in April and June, 1914; and that it was most curious for him to attach no significance to the most im- portant and damaging feature of the Cambon correspondence. We may further suggest that a cogent reason why he did not object to its pub- lication in full in the White Paper was that on August 4th Viviani read the letter in full in the French Chamber of Deputies. 28 It might be pointed out that Grey’s diplomatic undertakings with France and his explanations of these present some of the finest illustrations of what Theodore Roosevelt described in derision as “weasel words” when criticizing the diplomatic communications of Woodrow Wilson. They were extremely evasive and nebulous, though when the test came Grey stood firmly by the most extreme interpretation of his commitments to the Entente. II. ENGLAND AND RUSSIA. While Anglo-Russian rivalry did not have as long an historic past as Anglo-French antipathy, 470 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR it had been much more acute in the half century prior to the World War. England and Russia ^fought one war over the Near East and were close to a second in 1878. England looked upon Russian expansion in Asia as a menace to India, and the Russian aspiration to control of the Straits was believed to be inimical to English interests in Egypt and the Suez Canal. It was England which, in 1908-9, even after the parti- tion of Persia, blocked Izvolski’s plan for the Russian occupation of the Straits which he had coupled with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 29 After the German advances in Turkey and Mesopotamia the British became somewhat less alarmed over the Russian menace in Asia, and in 1907 came a temporary under- standing with Russia through the partition of Persia. 30 Still England remained evasive upon the Straits question, not only blocking the 1908-9 scheme, but also refusing to sanction the plan when Russia brought it up again during the second Morocco crisis. 31 England made another definite bid for Russian good-will in 1910 by the recall of Sir Arthur Nicolson, the Ambassador to Russia, and his appointment as permanent under-secretary in the British Foreign Office. The purpose of this transfer is stated in a telegram of Bencken- dorff to Izvolski on June 15, 1910: 32 FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 471 In connection with the probable recall of Nicolson from St. Petersburg, Grey told me last evening that he hoped the Petersburg Cabinet would be convinced that the appointment of the Viceroy of India, and the Am- bassadorial change at St. Petersburg, were intended chiefly to strengthen the ties between Russia and Eng- land. It is his opinion that the situation demanded that somebody should be in office in London who is as well acquainted with the current questions as Hardinge and Nicolson. Grey told me that he insisted upon the argument, because the Emperor, pex-haps, would not like to part with an Ambassador to whom he had al- ways given so gracious a reception. From this time on Nicolson exercised an influence over Grey in regard to strengthening the English entente with Russia wholly comparable to that exerted by Paul Cambon in promoting Anglo- French accord. Moreover, Grey was far less familiar with the details of European diplomacy than Nicolson, and was wont to rely heavily upon Nicolson for advice in all matters. From 1911 onward the triangular military plans of the general staffs of England, France and Russia grew more explicit and intimate. General Foch visited both London and St. Petersburg endeavoring to coordinate and unify the military plans of the Entente. Sazonov visited England in the late summer of 1912, and was able to write to the Tsar in September to the 472 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR following effect with respect to the English sym- pathy with Russia and her animus towards Germany: 33 As a favorable opportunity occurred I felt it useful, in one of my conversations with Grey, to seek informa- tion as to what we might expect from Great Britain in the event of a conflict with Germany. What the direc- tor of British foreign policy said to me as to this, and King George himself later, I think is very significant. Your Majesty is aware that during M. Poincare’s stay in St. Petersburg last summer he expressed to me a wish that I would clear up the question of the extent to which we might count on the co-operation of the [British fleet in the event of such a war. I informed Grey confidentially of the main points of our naval convention with France, and remai'ked that under the treaty concluded the French fleet would en- deavor to safeguard our interests in the southern the- atre of war by preventing the Austrian fleet from penetrating into the Black Sea ; and I then asked whether Great Britain for her part could perform the same service for us in the north, by keeping the Ger- man squadrons away from our Baltic coasts. Gre} r de- clared unhesitatingly that should the anticipated con- ditions arise Great Britain would make every effort to strike a crippling blow at German naval power. On the question of military operations he said that negotiations had already taken place between the competent author- ities concerned, but in these discussions the conclusion had been reached that while the British fleet could easily penetrate into the Baltic, its stay there would be very FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 473 risky. Assuming Germany to succeed in laying hands on Denmark and closing the exit from the Baltic, the British fleet would be caught as in a mousetrap. Ac- cordingly Great Britain would have to confine her op- erations to the North Sea. On his own initiative Grey then gave me a confirma- tion of what I already knew through Poincare — an agreement exists between France and Great Britain, un- der which in the event of war with Germany Great Britain has accepted the obligation of bringing assist- ance to France not only on the sea but on land, by landing troops on the Continent. The King touched on the same question in one of his conversations with me, and expressed himself even more strongly than his Minister. When I mentioned, letting him see my agitation, that Germany is trying to place her naval forces on a par with Britain’s, His Majesty cried that any conflict would have disastrous results not only for the German navy but for Germany’s overseas trade, for, he said, “We shall sink every single German merchant ship we shall get hold of.” These words appeared to me to give expression not only to His Majesty’s personal feelings but also to the public feeling predominant in Great Britain in regard to Germany. We pointed out above in some detail how in the spring of 1914 the French and Russians seized the opportunity afforded by Sir Edward Grey’s visit to Paris to initiate proceedings for an Anglo-Russian naval convention. Grey secured Asquith’s consent, but the negotiations pro- 474 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR gressed slowly because of a “leak” regarding them which greatly alarmed Germany and caused Grey vigorously to deny the existence of any such arrangements. Sazonov heatedly con- tended that the naval convention existed only “in the mind of the Berliner Tageblatt and in the moon.” Plans were made, however, for their resumption at an opportune moment, and the Russian delegation was still in London when the War broke out . 34 In spite of these ever closer relations with Rus- sia, the Russian entente was never popular in England, and the British public could never have been induced directly to sanction intervention in a war designed to advance Russian interests. There was still bad feeling over Persia in 1914, and there was no enthusiasm in the British gov- ernment for the Russian occupation of the Straits. Even Grey had to put the soft pedal on the Russian aspects of the crisis of 1914, and to hold that England in no sense entered the War to aid the Serbian cause. English acquiescence in the Russian demand for the Straits after hos- tilities commenced had to be embodied in the no- torious Secret Treaties. The reason that Eng- land supported the Entente in a “Russian quarrel” was that the Russian quarrel was also a French quarrel, and England under Grey was sure to support France against Germany . 30 The French and Russians were clear enough FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 475 about the import of those European “complica- tions” of which Sazonov wrote on December 8, 1913. A Serbian quarrel in the Balkans would bring in Austria, and a Russian attack on Aus- tria would cause German intervention. This would afford France an excuse for entering the conflict, and the French entry would bring the English in its train. This was what the French and Russians expected from 1912 to 1914, and it was essentially what happened in 1914. It was the Anglo-French accord and that alone, which made the Anglo-Russian entente a positive force in the crisis of 1914. 36 III. ENGLAND AND GERMANY Early in the present century the Conservative government made a real effort to improve rela- tions with Germany, but without success. The blame for the failure to bring about the Anglo-German rapprochement at this time has been usually laid at the door of Baron von Hol- stein. This interpretation has been based chiefly upon the views of Baron Eckardstein, but it would seem that it is now time to take the opinions of von Eckardstein cum grano. He was a son of German Walter Hines Page, and his account has been shown to be sadly lacking in intellectual honesty. Holstein actually appears to have been a rather astute diplomat, and his 476 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR chief mistake in his negotiations with England lay in the fact that he allowed England to strug- gle too long for an arrangement with Germany. This was due to his belief that an agreement be- tween England and Russia and England and France was out of range of probabilities. Hence, he preferred to play these countries off against one another. The English proposition to Germany was one which Germany could scarcely have accepted. England demanded a defensive agreement to include the whole British Empire, implying even the obligation to defend India against Russia. Yet England was quite unwilling to accept a reciprocal obligation con- cerning Germany’s closest allies. The negotia- tions fell through, and with their failure passed the possibility of an Anglo-German entente. 37 The Conservative government turned a favorable ear to France with the treaty of 1904 and subse- quent commitments, and when Grey came in as Foreign Minister the Germans had to face a less sympathetic figure than Lord Lansdowne. The first Morocco crisis further estranged Germany and England, but following the Kaiser’s visit to England in 1907 better feeling developed. The prospect for an understanding was greatly diminished, however, by the publi- cation in the London Daily Telegraph on October 28, 1908, of an interview with the Kaiser in which he declared his personal friendship for FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 477 England, but admitted that it was not wholly shared by his subjects or appreciated by Eng- land. L. J. Maxse, in the National Review , to- gether with the majority of the Northcliffe press, violently denounced Germany, and Sir John Fisher proposed that England seize and scuttle the whole German fleet. 38 The most important element in arousing Brit- ish antipathy was, however, the announcement in 1909 of plans for a somewhat larger German navy. This was, unquestionably, a foolish move for Germany, but Great Britain greatly exagger- ated its significance. We cannot agree with Gooch that the German fleet ever “threatened British naval supremacy.” The German naval plans never in the slightest degree challenged the naval power of Great Britain alone, to say nothing of the combined navies of Great Britain, France and Russia, to which were potentially added those of Japan and Italy. Negotiations for a mutual understanding on naval construc- tion seemed well under way in the summer of 1911, when the second Morocco crisis broke out. The strong stand of England against Germany at this time alarmed the Kaiser and his ministers, and made the Kaiser lose his confidence in Eng- land altogether. 39 In February, 1912, Lord Haldane visited Ber- lin to promote a better understanding with Ger- many. Except for the psychological results of 478 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AVAR the affair the significance of this Haldane “mis- sion” has been greatly exaggerated, for Hal- dane had little to offer Germany and apparently had no power whatever to carry through any definite agreement. He found Bethmann- Hollweg favorable to a naval arrangement, but Tirpitz was opposed. Finally, it was decided that a general benevolent neutrality pact should be agreed upon, with the assumption that Ger- many would in return hold up her proposed naval increases. 40 But the Haldane negotiations had no chance of success, as Benckendorff assured the Russian Foreign Office at the time. Grey stated that he would resign rather than see any arrange- ments made with Germany which would weaken the Triple Entente. 41 Poincare heard of the proposed neutrality arrangement with Germany, and induced Grey to refuse the proposition. Izvolski reveals this fact in his letter of Decem- ber 5 , 1912: 42 In my conversations with Poincare and Paleologue I was able to learn in strict confidence that on the oc- casion of the well-known journey of Lord Haldane to Berlin (in February of the present year) Germany made to Great Britain a quite definite proposal, as follows : the London Cabinet should engage itself in writing to maintain neutralit}^ should Germany be drawn into a war which was not provoked from her side. The Lon- don Cabinet informed M. Poincare of this, and ap- parently delayed sending either an acceptance or a re- FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 479 fusal of this proposal. M. Poincare expressed himself most emphatically against such an undertaking. He pointed out to the British Government that the signa- ture of such a treaty with Germany by Great Britain would end at a blow the existing Franco-Bi-itish rela- tions, since no written agreement of a general political character existed between France and Great Bi’itain. This objection had its result: the London Cabinet de- clined Germany’s proposal, to the lively dissatisfaction of Berlin. This was one of the most humiliating mo- ments in the entire history of British foreign pol- icy, but, as Mr. Morel has pointed out, it was the inevitable outcome of Grey’s relations with France and Russia : 43 Can one criticise Poincare? I hardly think so. Humiliating as was his veto, the humiliation had been invited. Could a more contemptible record be imag- ined? The very minister who, after the war, tells us that by the end of 1910 he had, after four years’ labour, reoi'ganized the British Army for the express purpose of pax’ticipating in a war with Germany in fulfilment of our “contract” with France, goes over to Germany in 1912 to discuss the possibility of our remaining neu- tral in a war between Germany and France! And the Government which sent him over actually consults Poin- care as to whether it shall accept, or reject, a Gei’man offer of conditional neutrality ! Small blame to Poin- cai*e for making it peremptorily clear that he would not allow us to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds ! But thenceforth British foreign policy was directed not 480 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR from London, but from Paris and Petrograd. We had become, in effect, impotent to exercise a decisive in- fluence over events. The British government could not, of course, admit the reason for the failure of the Haldane mission, so they preferred to keep secret the fact that it had failed. On July 25 , 1912 , Mr. As- quith spoke of Anglo-German relations before the House of Commons in the following terms : 44 Our relations with the great German Empire are, I am glad to say, at this moment, and I feel sure they are likely to remain, relations of amity and good-will. Lord Haldane paid a visit to Berlin early this year; he entered upon conversations and an interchange of views there which have been continued since in a spirit of perfect frankness and friendship, both on one side and the other. Instead of an Anglo-German understanding, the year 1912 ended with the Grey-Cambon cor- respondence of November 22 , 1912 , which spelled the end of complete English independence in foreign policy until the break-down of the Anglo- French Entente after the World War. In spite of the failures in the year 1912 , Anglo-German relations grew steadily better from the close of 1912 to the outbreak of the World War. In March, 1912 , Winston Chur- chill, first Lord of the Admiralty, announced that England would be satisfied with an arrangement FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 481 whereby Germany agreed not to build more than ten battleships to each sixteen constructed by Great Britain. On February 7, 1913, Von Tir- pitz announced that Germany would not exceed that ratio. 45 England had thus secured her am- bition in the Haldane proposals without Ger- many’s obtaining the reciprocal advantage of a guaranty of British neutrality. In spite of re- peated statements to the contrary by Grey, As- quith, and the mythologizing historians, German naval rivalry cannot, therefore, be designated as an important immediate cause of the World War in 1914. Still greater progress was made in 1914. Early in this year a large group in the British Liberal Party, even though most incompletely informed as to the lengths to which the negotia- tions with France had actually gone, became alarmed concerning the degree to which England had apparently become involved in the Entente. Efforts were initiated to improve relations with Germany. On New Year’s Day, 1914, Lloyd George gave out his famous interview in the London Daily Chronicle in which he declared that the rumored increases in the German army were “vital, not merely to the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and inde- pendence of the nation itself, surrounded, as Ger- many is, by other nations, each of which possesses armies as powerful as her own.” The King an- 482 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR nounced the satisfactory progress of negotiations regarding Mesopotamia and the Bagdad Rail- way. 461 These negotiations proceeded success- fully. By June 15th an agreement satisfactory to both parties had been reached, and thus was settled the most important dispute, indeed the only significant source of contention, between Germany and Great Britain. 47 As Lloyd George expressed it, even after war had been de- clared in August, 1914, Anglo-German relations in July, 1914, were better than they had been for fifteen years. He might have said for twenty years. There was no longer any significant cause for tension between these two states, and there is little validity in the efforts of anti-British or anti-German historians to refer to acute clashes before 1912 as active causes of the World War. The fly in the ointment lay in the fact that, with characteristic duplicity, Sir Edward Grey was at this very time arranging the naval convention with Russia which would close the ring about Germany and give Sazonov and Poin- care that assurance of British aid to the Franco- Russian military alliance which they deemed necessary in order to deal Germany the “mortal blow” mentioned by Sazonov in the secret min- isterial conference of December 31, 1913. 48 There is no doubt that this development of better relations between Germany and England was the determining factor in convincing Russia FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 483 and France that the desired European war must be fought, if possible, in 1914; in other words before England could be detached from the Entente. Georges Louis quotes Paul Deschanel as stating that the French leaders were also im- patient to initiate hostilities before the French radicals could secure the repeal of the French three year service act. 49 At any rate, the Anglo- German negotiations and the expression of sym- pathy for Germany in England threw Paul Cam- bon, Poincare, Izvolski and Sazonov into a panic, and they hastened to regain control of the situa- tion before their efforts of eight years had been undone. Mr. Morel has in the following pas- sages admirably summarized the effect of the pro- gress towards an Anglo-German rapprochement upon the Franco-Russian authorities and upon their determination to force the European war before England could be detached from the Entente: 50 The anxiety caused by these manifestations of im- proved relations between Britain and Germany at the very moment when the conspirators in Petrograd, Bel- grade, and elsewhere were reckoning that the plum was almost ripe enough for plucking, is evident in the Rus- sian dispatches we now possess. Thus the Russian am- bassador in Berlin, reporting to Sazonov, February 13, 1914, remarks that Cambon (French ambassador in Berlin, and brother of the French ambassador in Lon- don) “is very much worried by these constant rumors 484 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR of an improvement in Anglo-German relations, since he agrees that there is a possibility of rapprochement be- tween these two countries in the future.” Cambon’s Russian colleague did not “fully share these fears,” yet his dispatches show that he was disturbed and uneasy. But the uneasiness of the French and Russian ambas- sadors in Berlin was as nothing compared with that which reigned in Petrograd and Paris. (Note that the warlike announcements in the Russian press, the chief war measures taken in the Duma, and, especially, the great war council at Petrograd followed hard upon the King’s speech.) We obtain corroboration from totally different sources of this deep disquiet, lest Britain slip from the meshes of the net so patiently and closely drawn around her. Mr. Page, American ambassador to Britain, in a letter to Colonel House (January 11, 1914) explains how, as the result of Mr. Lloyd George’s speech, “the French allies of the British went up into the air. They raised a great howl. Churchill went to see them to soothe them. The} 7 would not be soothed !” Sazanov had been almost equally disquieted a year be- fore, when Tirpitz (the head of the German Admiralty) had made a speech in the Reichstag, which was a vir- tual recognition of British naval superiority. On that occasion Sazanov wired to Benckendorff about this “alarming symptom” and his uneasiness at the “effort of German diplomacy to bring about a rapprochement with England.” He wanted to know “in what degree machinations of that sort might find a favorable soil in London !” But now something obviously had to be done, and quickly, to grip the British nation still more tightly in FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 485 the vise into which certain British Ministers by their secret actions had placed us. The entire policy of eight laborious years was trembling in the balance. Was there consciousness of this among the protagonists of that policy in London? Read carefully the inspired Times throughout the months of February to June. Assuredly was there consciousness of it at Krasnoe- Selo and at the Quai d’Orsay. If the inconceivable happened and the British salmon should slip out of the net at the last moment, the fishers in troubled waters were down and out. If a section of the British cabinet should clearly perceive almost at the last moment the rocks ahead, and force the hands of the other section by some public reference that would suddenly electrify the British public into a sense of imminent peril leading to insistent inquiry as to their true relationship with the rival continental groups — then, indeed, all might be lost. For, without Britain, Sukhomlinoff might shout V/ through his newspaper that he was ready till all was blue — there would be nothing doing. Something had to be done — and this is what was done, in the silence and secrecy of the diplomatic closet. Sazonov led off with a series of dispatches to the Russian ambassadors in London and Paris, urging that “a further reinforcement and development of the so- called triple entente, and, if possible, its transforma- tion into a new triple alliance appears to me to be a de- mand of the present situation.” Lord Grey and King George were going to Paris ; Poincare and Doumergue (French foreign minister) should urge upon the former a “closer agreement between Russia and England.” Doumergue agreed. He thought the task would be 486 GENESIS OF THE WORLD WAR easy, “because it is most obvious that, inasmuch as France has special military and naval understandings with Russia and England, this system must be co- ordinated and completed by corresponding understand- ings between Russia and England.” The scheme as finally worked out was this. When Lord Grey reached Paris the French Government would urge him to (a) communicate officially to the Russians, the text of the Grey-Cambon exchange notes, of November 22, 1912, and the text of the military and naval conventions; (b) di’aw up a naval convention with Russia, active co- operation between the British and Russian armies being obviously impracticable. Such were the events which preceded Lord Grey’s visit to Paris three and a half months before the outbreak of w T ar. When Lord Grey reached Paris he went off to Ver- sailles to attend the French military manceuvers. The next day the conference met. Its members were Dou- mergue (French foreign minister), Paul Cambon (French ambassador to Britain), De Margerie (head of the permanent staff at the French Foreign Office), Lord Grey and Sir William Tyrrel, his private secretary. The results of the conference, which w r ere duly reported in great detail by Isvolsky to Sazonov, exceeded the ex- pectations of the French negotiators: “All three of those present at the conference — Messrs. Doumergue, Cambon, and De Margerie — told me they w r ere astonished at the clearly stated and defi- nite readiness to enter upon a closer approach to Rus- sia, which Sir Edward Grey had expressed.” Lord Grey, indeed, may be fairly said to have leaped at the bait, and to have sw T allow r ed it without a moment’s FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 487 hesitation, merely pointing out that there were certain elements in the cabinet prejudiced against Russia. But he hoped to win over Mr. Asquith and the whole cabinet. Thereupon he returned to London. The fish was fairly landed. Sazanov was naturally delighted at his success : “The readiness of the British Government to begin without delay negotiations regarding the conclusion of an agreement between Russia and England, which would concern joint operations of our naval forces in the event of a common military action, has been received, on our part, with a feeling of the greatest satisfaction. Quite apart from the fact that such an agreement is desirable from a special military standpoint, we attach great im- portance to it in a general political sense.” And with reason! Had not Le Temps, the official organ of the French Foreign Office, remarked (April 20), of the short official communique sent out to the press at the end of the conference, that it “says enough to make it unnecessary to insist that the Entente is the Triple Entente, and more than ever prepared for united action.” . . . But how can one explain the fact that Lord Grey, at the very time that he was negotiating a “colonial” agreement with Germany, was secretly fastening the Russo-French noose tighter around our necks, and de- nying right and left that he was doing anything of the sort? In the present state of our knowledge only sur- mise is possible. And surmise in this particular con- nection is fruitless. But there can be no doubt whatever as to the effect of the British Mesopotamian negotiations with Ger- 488 GENESIS OF THE WORLD AFAR, many, in which oil played a substantial but by no means exclusive part, upon the men who were directing Rus- sian and French diplomacy. If they did not know the exact nature of the negotiations, they were aware that negotiations of some kind had been going on for months, and had recently been accelerated, and they probably had a pretty good idea of their tenor. M. Cambon always took care to be well informed. They first sought to counterbalance them by an Anglo-Russian naval convention which would complete the circuit of triple military and naval conventions, and produce the conditions of a triple alliance in every- thing but name. But the actual conclusion of the con- vention was hanging fire, while negotiations with Ger- many continued. Then they made up their minds to strike, and they struck with the certain knowledge that the leading members of the Liberal cabinet — notably and above all the Foreign Secretary and the Prime [Min- ister — had placed themselves in a position from which they could extricate neither themselves nor the coun- try. It was a gamble. But they held the trumps. And they won. IV. SIR EDAA'ARD GREY IN THE CRISIS OF 1914 1. Grey Theoretically for Peace in 1914 It is of real importance at the outset to haA^e in mind A\ T hat seems to haA'e been the dominating attitude of Sir Edward Grey towards throw- ing England into a general European Avar. FRANCE INVOLVES ENGLAND 489 There are some who contend that from the first Grey was determined to make use of the crisis to crush German commerce and sea power. They cite as evidence his negotiation of the Rus- sian naval convention at the same time he was concluding the arrangement with Germany con- cerning the Bagdad Railway: ]iis suggestio n -an July 25 th to Benckendorff tha t, h^ ^r>nlrl