f- DUKE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY Treasure %gom ■f. r , IC; Avw* ^i-P li5<9y \ r.../<;., c-^^ -^"^;.i ^< years 5 among other Difcourfc told him , that ^{rw \vz himfelf was a Young Man, he had met ' itii a Peribn, from whom \x\ fikccn days time he idd learnt the greate'l: and moft material Part of L^gic. This Difcourfe gave occaiion to another Perfon then prelcnr, and one who was no great Ad- mirer of that ^Sciencc.toanfwer with a Smile of Con- tempt, That if MrnfuHY would give him- elt the trouble, he would undertake to teach liim dl that was of anv ufe, in the fo much crv*d up \n ot Logic ^ in four or five Days. Which Pro - ifal made in the Air, having for fome timefer\-d V. for Paftime, I relblv\] to make an ElTay : And lecaufe I did not think the vulgar lo^/V's, either i)mpendiouf!v or Politely written, I dclignM a'l '^.bridgment for the particular ufe of the'Your-g jer.tlcm.an himfelf This was the only Aim I had when I firft bc^^^n he Work ; nor did I think to have fpent above a A 1 da/ 00 3S30 An AdvertifeMent^ 8cc. day about it. But lb foon as I had fct my felf 1 work 5 fo piany new Reflexions crowded into i Thoughts, that I was confrrain'd to write ^em do) for the dikharge of my Memory. So that infte, of one day , I tJDent four or rive ; during whiji time, this Body of Logic was form'd, to w-fiich tcrwards leveral other tilings were added. Now rho it fwell'd to a greater Bulk of Matt thenwasat iirfl: intended, yet had the Effay t fame fucceis which I at tirft c>: peeled. For tl young Nobleman having reduc'd the whole in four Tables^ he learnt with eafe one a day ^ withoi any aflillance of a Teacher. T ho true it is, we caj not expe6t that others ftiould be fo nimble as hi who had a Wit altogether extraordinary and prom] to attain whatever depended upon thellnderftandin And this was die accidental occafion that pre du:*d this Treatife. But now whatever cenfiirc ! may undergo in theWorldJ cannot be juftly blam'l for committing it to die Prefsj (ince it was rathe a forc'd then voluntary A£c. For feveral Perfod having obtain'd Copies of it in Writing (which can not well be done without feveral Errors of the Pen and underH-anding withal , That feveral Brol^felkr were about to Print it, I thought it better to fend ii into the World correded and entire , than to let it be Printed from ddcdilvo. Mamjcrips. But thcni a-' gain I thought my felf obliged to make divers Addi-^ tions, which fvvcll'd it above a third Part^ believing the Limits of the TirjlEjfay too fnortfor 2. Public Vi erp. And to that purpofc we have made it the Sub- jccl of the following Difcourfe to explain the Eiid J which we prCpofe to our felves , and the reafonwhyj wc have included fo much variety of Matter. the! THE 2 TRANSLATORS i T O T H E EADER. THE Common Treatifes of LOGIC are almojl without mimber^ and white every Author jlrives to add fomething I ^fhis own^ fometimes little to the purpoje^ fome^ 'ir/ies altogether from the matter^ the Art is be^ ^onie^not only Ohfcure and Tedioffs^but in a great neafure Impertinent aud TJfelefs. Thus the Schoolmen may be [aid to have cloggd jrd fetter d Reajbn , ivhich ought to be free as '4ir^ and plain as Demonftration it Jelf with )ain mifappli cations of this Art to Notion and fsficety^ while they make ufe of it only to main^ din litigious Cavils and wrangling Difpntes. So bat indeed the common LOGICS are but as many Counterfca^ps to filter the obWnate and vain- 223830 The Trtnflators •vain-glorious, thai difdain Siibmijpon and C vificemnt, and therefore retire within their Foi \ tifications of difficult Terms, wrap themfelves ^ jnQuirkatd Siittkty , andfo efcapefromRek fin in the Clouds and Mifis of their own Raifin, For remedy of which we are beholden to th Famous Author, who has at length recover d tl^ Art, (then a noble Science when not Pedanti, front Night and Confufwn i clear d avpay the Ri hifh that opprefsdit, and pntn'd off thofeV\.^ derwoods and fuperfluous Boughs , that overfly { ded and eecUpfed the light of true Reafin;^^, that now LOGIC may be faid to appear \ l Truth it felf, naked and delightful, as be\l fieedfrom the Pedantic DuU of the Schools. It has had thk Influence upon the World ah dy, thatfeveral Books have been already W ^ telfiom the Rules of this LOGIC,not only by, Author himfelf, no lefs Celebrated for his \ tings, then for many other worthy AUtons recommend him to the Commonwealth of U . ing : Nor is hk diligence in thk particular : , to be applauded, for having cleansed the Au|; Stables offi many Syftems, fromftudied Bal to the Read p. 1 and Delirium.K?r which reafin this LOGIC as thrice Reprinted in France, fo great was tpitisfa^ion in thofe Parts^ and Ukewife Tran- \ted into Latin for TJniverfal Benefit 5 a?td ^w is rendered into Englifh , as being a Small 'eatijt\ no lefs Ufefidfor the Conduct and does not puff Men up with that fottifh va- nity, which they afcribe to themfelvesfrom the knowiedg of thofe fruitlefs and barren Scienceso The hidden fecrets and mifteries of thofe Arts are not onlyof httlc profit, but altoge- ther ufclefs, if Men confider 'em only in them- (elves and for themfelves. For Men were not born to employ their time in meafuring Lines, in examining the proportion of Angles, or con- fidering the different motions of Subftance. Their Souls are too lofty, their Life too fhort^ their time too precious, to bufy themfelves a- bout ilieh petty Objcfts. But they are obliged to be juft, to be upright, to be judicious in all their difcouries, in all their aftions, and in all affairs which they undertake. Which Care and Induftry is fo much the more neceffar y, by how much this one rare per- feftion, exaftnefiof judgment^is to be admired above all others : for every where we meet with none but wandring Underftandings, uncapable of difcerning Truth, who in all things take a wrong Courfe 5 who fatisfythemftlves with cor- rupted reafons, and fain would impofe the ianie upon others 5 who fuffer themfelves to be led away with the fmalleft Experiences ^ who are always in exceffes and extremities 5 who want fcfficicnt ftaidnels to preferve themfelves con- ft^t to the Truths which they know, as adher- B 7. ing 77;e Ftrfi Vifcourje. ing thereto rather by hazard, then found and judicious choice s or elfe quite contrary, con- tinue fo obftinately fix'd in their opinions, that they will not fo much as liften to thofe that could undeceive them 5 who boldly decide and determine Arguments, which they neither know nor underftand, and which were never yet un- derftood by any other : who make no diffe- rence at all between Speaking and Speaking ^ or only judg of the truth of things by the tone of the Voice : he that talks fmoothly and grave- ly,fpeaks reafon 5 he that cannot readily explain himfelf, and feems to be in a heat, muft be in the wrong 5 and more then this they know not. Which is the reafon that there are no ablur- ditieshow infupportablefoever, which do not find their Champions. He that has a defign to deceive the World, (hall not fail of Perfons as ready to be gulFd, and the moft ridiculous Fopperie« (hall meet with Underftandings pro- portionate to their Folly. And indeed we ought not to wonder at any thing, while we find fo many People infatuated with theFoole^ ries of judicial Aftrology,and perfons of gravity fo ferioufly handling that Subjeft. There is a cer- tain Conftellationin the Firmament which fome men have been pleas'd to call a Ballance 5 as like a Ballance as a Wind-Mill and all one. This Ballance^ they cry, is an Emblem of Juftice, and ill that are born under that conftellationlhallbe 77;e Firft Vifconrfe. upright and juft. There are three other Signs in the Zodiac which they call, the oneai?emonjlrat?on of the Rules of Figures 5 but at length we refolv'd not to leave 'em out, th^ difficulty it felf not being altogether ufelefs .' For true it is that when it does not terminate iri the knowledg of any Truth;, we may have rea- fon to fay, StHltum eU diffciks habere futgas^ 'Tif a foolifi thing to labour in difficult tribes. Yet are they not altogether to be avoided, when they lead us to fomething of Truths finceitmay prove to a mans advantage to exercife himlelf intheunderftanding of Truths that are intri- cate. There are fome ftomacks that dntydigefl: light and delicate Dyet, and there are fome Wits that cannot apply themfelves to the ftudy of other then eafie Truths array'd in the Orna-» ments of Eloquence. Both the one and theo- ther is a nicenefi not to be commended, or ra- ther a real Weaknefs. For a man muft endea- vour to enable himfelf to difcover Truth, when it ismoft conceal'd and envelopp'd, and tore- fpei^t her, in what (hape foever (he appears. For if a man be not able tofurmount tha^riice- nefi and diftafte ^ which is eafily coriceivd of things that appear a little futtle and Scholaftic, he does but thereby contrad and (hrivel up his liuder- The Fir ft Difcourfe. Underftanding, ami render himfelf uncapable to apprehend any more then what is to be known by a long feries of feveral Propofitions. So that when one Truth depends upon three or four Principles which he muft neceffarily con- fider and ftudy all at one time,heisamaz'd and foil*d, and many times deprived of the know- ledg of feveral things highly advantageous ^ which is a fault of great confequencc. The capacity of Man s Underftanding (hrinks or dilates it felf according to u(e andcuftom, and therefore for the enlarging of tlie Intellect the Mathematicks and all diflScult Studies chief- ly conduce 3 for they caufe an expanfion of thoughts, and exercife em in diligence, and embolden em in a fteddy confidence to ftick to what they know. Thefe are the reafbns that induc'd us not to omit thofe thornie Subjefts, and to difcourfe of em as nicely as any other treatift of Logic. They who think em tedious, may forbear to read em, and indeed we have already given em that caution at the beginning, that they may have no reafon to complain, fmce it is at their own choice to read or let em alone. Nor did we think it neceffary to mind the di(guft of fome perfons that abhor certain terms of Art, fram'd only to retain more eafily the feveral figures of Argumentation, as if they were fome Charms in Magic, and frequently fpend 1 6 The Firfi Btjcourfe. fpend their infipid jefts upon Baroco and Bara- liptojf^ as being too Pedantical 5 for we look'd upon their l?uns to be more Pedantical then the words 5 for there is nothing ridiculous in the Terms, provided they be not ador'd for too great Mifteries, for it would be very abfurd in- deed for a Man that was going todilpute, to admonilh his opponent before-hand that he in- tended todilpute in Baroco or Felapton. Men fometimes make an ill u(e of that re- proach of Vedantry^ and fometimes fall into it themfelves. while they lay it upon others. P^- dantry is a Vice of the Mind not of the Pro- feffion ^ for there arc Pedants in all habits, of all conditions, and all qualities. To utter Law and mean things in bombaft expreffions, to bring in Greeks and Latin by head and (boul- ders, to be in a pelting chafe about the order of the Attick Months, the habits of the Mace- donians or fuch like frivolous dilputes 5 outra- gioufly to abufe another, that is not of his opi- nion about a paflage in Seutonius 5 or about the Etimologie of a word, as if his Religion and his Country lay at Stake 5 to endeavour to raife all the World againfta Man, as a difturb- er of the peace of Chriftendom, that has not a venerable opinion of Cicero^ as Jtdius Scaliger has endeavour'd to do againft Erafmus 5 to in- tereft himfelf for the reputation of an antient Philofopher, as if he were one of his neareft . Relations, Tfc Firfl tifconrfi. i f Relations, this is properly that which entitled a y{2i^toPeda^ry. But to make ufe oF a term of Art ingeiiionfly found Out, for the eafe cjf the Metnoi'V may be eafily allow d without any fuchl*cproach. It remiii'i'i^ thtit We flioiikl giVc a reafon For omitting fo ttrany qucftions as are found in thd comjnon Lo^ic-Books, as thofe which arehand--^ led in the Pr^legomc^as^ liniverfiil a parte rei^ Relations^ and fuch hke. To which it may fofBce to ^-rtf^Ve'r, that they belong rather to Mctaphijfch then to Logic, tho' that was not the prindp.ll reafon that incliic'd us fo to do 3 for when we believe that fuch or fuch a thing inay con Jtrce to reftify the Judgment, 'tis not material to what Science it bdongs- The order- ing of vartous forts of knowledg is as free as the ranging and •i1let:^odizing Letters in a Piint- ine:-houie, provided the method be natural 'Tis fuflRcicfit that tlie thing inferted be fervice- aWe to o'llr itfe, and tiot to confider whether it be forreign, but whether it be proper, and therefore it is that you iT.all meet in this trea-* tife with feveral things appertaining to P/y)/f4, and B/j/V4f,and as much Metaphifiks as are ne^ ceffary tobe known^) thd as for thofe things we do not pretend to have borrowed &oni any o- ther pcrfbn. Whatever may be ferviceable to Logic appertains to it: and indeed itisari-r diculous thing to fee how feVef ai Amhors tor* 18 TheFirJlDifcourfe. merit themfelves, efpecially Ramus and the Ra- mifts^xho otherwife Men of fence, to bound the jurifdidion of every Science , and to keep em from entrenching one upon another, as if they were marking out the Limits of Kingdoms, or bounding the Prerogatives of Parliaments. But that which indued us wholly to lay afide theft School' queftions was not barely their dif- ficulty, and their being out of ufe 5 for we have handled feveral of the fame nature , but be- cauft that having fo many bad qualities, we thought they might be difpencd with, without offending any perfbn, as being fb little regarded or efteem'd. For it behoves us to make a great difference between unprofitable queftions, with which the writings of Philofbphers are infignificantly ftuffd. Some there are fufficiently contemn d by the Authors themfelves, and others there are which are celebrated and authentick, and which are notorioufly handled in the writings of perfbns otherwife of great efteem. And therefore it feems to be a kind of obli- gation upon us, in reference to thofe celebrated and common Opinions, how falfe foever they may be thought to be, not to be ignorant of v/hat has been faid concerning em. We owe that Civihty or rather that Juftice, not to their falfhood, which deftrves knot, but to men pre- judic d againft em, to prevent their rejefting what "The Ftrft lYtfcourfe. \ 9 what others value without Examination. It being but rcafonable to purchafe at the trouble of underftanding thofe queftions, the priviledg to fcorn em. But there is a greater liberty allowed in re- ference to the former , and thofe Logical ones which we have thought fit to omit are of that nature : They have this convenience that they are of little Credit, not only in that part of the World where they are unknown, but even among thofe that profefs to teach em. No Man, God be thanked, takes the part of ZJn/- verfd a parte rei^ the umtks of Reafon^ nor •S'e- cond Intentions^ and fo we have no reafon to fear leaft any one fhould be offended, for paf^ fing em over in Silence. Nor will it be amifs to advertize the Read- er, that we have allow'd our felves a difpenfati- on, not always to follow the rules of a Me- thod altogether cxaft, as having fet down ma- ny things in the Fourth Part^ »vhich relate to the Second and Third. But we did it of fet purpofe becaufe we thought it more proper 10 fee in one and the fame place, all that was necefiary to render a Science altogether perfeft, which is the main defign of the method handled in the Fourth Part^ and for that reafon it was that we referv'd the difcourfe of^ Axioms and Denionjira- tionf for that place. And thus we have well nigh given ye a pro- Q 2 fpeft 20 Tl^e Firjl V'lfcoiirje. {peft of our defjgn in this Logic. Perad venture for all this there will be very few that will reap any advantage by it, becaufe it is not their Cii- ftom ufually to pra&ice Precepts by exprefs Re- fieftions. Neverthelefs we hope that they who will carefully perufe thefe Sheets, will receive fuch a Tinfture from thence, as will render em more exaft and folid in their Judgment before they perceive it ^ as there are certain remedies that cure the Difeafesof the Body by augment- ing- and fortifying the vigour of the Parts. However it be^ the Trcatife will be no long trouble to anyone 5 for they who are but a lit- tle beforehand in the World of Learning may read and con it in (eveH or eight days, and it is a hard cafe, if in a Treatife that contains fb much variety 5 they do not find fomethinglufEcientto repay their trouble. THE 21 THE SECOND DISCOURSE Cortfahm^ an Anjwer to the Tniicipd Ob^ jc^ms made againjl this Logk. THEY who adventure to impart their Works topublick view muft refolve at the fame time to have as many Cen- furers ag Readers. Nor ought this Condition to appear either unjuft or burthen- fbm. For if they are really uninterrefled, they ought to have abandond their propriety in making the thing publick, and from that time look upon it with the Himc indifference, as up* on the Works of aStranger. The only right that they can reserve to thcm- felves is that of corrcfting what (hall be found defeftive^ to which end thofe various Cen- furcs that are made of Books, are very advan- tageous. For they are always profitable when they are juft 5 and when unjuft, they do no harm. Nevertheleft Prudence fometimes requires C 3 that 2 2 The Second Vtfcourfe. that npon feveral Occafions we fbould fiibmit to Cenfures not always altogether fo juft 5 for though they do not make appear the thing re- prov'd to be bad, they (hew us at leaft that it is not proportionable to the Underftanding of thofe that find fault. Now it is better without doubt, if it may be done without falling into any greater inconvenience to chufe a tempe- rature fo juft, as in (a tisfying the judicious, not to difpleafe thofe whofe judgments are not fo exaft^ fince 'tis not to be fuppos'd that all our Readers will be men of Wit and Intelligence. Thus, it weretobe witod, that men would not look upon the firft Editions of Books, but as rude Eflays which the Authors propofe to the Learned to underftand their Sentiments of the Compofitions to the end that by a CoUeftionof 'various thoughts and Cenfures, they may en- deavour upon a fecond review to bring their work to perfeftion to the utmoft of their Ca- pacities. And this is the Courfe we vvould willingly have taken in the Second Edition of this Lo- gic 5 had we heard more then what the World had already faid of the former. Neverthelefi we have done what we could: as having added, ftruck out,and Correfted feveral things accord- ing to the thoughts of thofe who were fo kind ps to let us know their objections. And firft of all for the Language, we have almoft The Second Vtfcourfe. 2 5 almoft in every thing folio w'd the advice of two Perfbns, who gave themfelves the trouble to obferve fome faults that were crept in through inadvertency : and certain Expreffions which they thought were not properly chofen. Nor did we adhere to their Opinions till by Con- fultationrwith others, we found that ail their Opinions agreed. In which cafe we thought we might be allow'd our Liberty. The Reader will find more Additions then Alterations or Retrenchments 5 not being duly informed of the faults that were found in what was already done. However tis true that we underftood of fome general Objeftions that were made againft the Book, which we thought noLetto our fartherProgreis^believingthat they themfelves who made 'em, would eafily be fatis- fy'd,when we (hould give our Reafons for what we did.For whichCaufe,it will not be amiis to re- turn an anfwer to the cheifeft of thofeObjeftions. Some there were offended at the Ti- tle, Of the Art of Thinkings inftead of which they would have had. The Art of well Reafonhtg, But wedefire 'em to confider, that in regard the aim and defign of Logic is to give Rules for all the Aftions of the Underftanding and as well for fimple Ideas^ as for Judgment and Argu- ments, there was no other word that compre- hended allthofe different Aftions, whereas jthe wprd Thought comprehends 'em all. Simple 2- C 4 de^ w .ta^ ' -iL.^.vy r' . ' ^! *' 24 The Second Difcourfe, ■■ li n^ -iJjyu.^i. de^ are thoughts ^ Judgments are thoftghts^ and jirgnmi^u^re thoughts. True it is, a man might have faid the Art of well' thtnkif2g :> but that Addition was not neceflary, being fufficiently iti^flyd by the vvprd Art^ which fignifies of it (elf a method of doing any thing well. And therefore it \s enough to fay the Art of Vamting^ the A't af- NfiwbrJing 5 fince no man ilippo^es \t to be an Art to Paint ijlj, or miftake in cafting ^^Qmpts. There is another Gbieftion againft that mul- titijde of things drqwn frorq other Sciences dif^ coursM of iv\ this Logic. Which becavife it aC ftults the whole defign, and gives us an occafi- ofi to e^cpl^iri pnr felves, it is neceffary to exa^ mine with fo mu^h the more care. To what pqrpqle J[ay they, all this niotley, variety ofRher tom^ Eih:^Sy Phjfc^ Metaphyfas^ and GeoMetry^ When we thought to meet only with Logical Precepts, we are tranfported of a fuddain into the Upper Region of the mpft lofty and notio- pal Sciences, befqrje the Authpr know whether we tjnderftand 'em or not. Rather -ought he not to have cpnfider'd, th^it if we had allthpfc Sciences already perieft, we fhould have no ■peed of his Logic ? And had it not been better for hirn tq have given us a plain ^nd/down-right Logic with Rules es:plaind by pxampks drawn irpm common Thiiigs, x\\tx\ to enccmber era with |>er|>lex'4 and intricate Notions^ 7 he Seco}i4 Difcourfc. if But they who argue thus have notfufgciently confiderd, that the greateft difadvant-age tea Book is not to be read 5 finv^e it can only befe- \:iceable to thofe that read it. And lb whatc ver contributes to caufc a Book to be read, con- tributes to render itufeful. Now it is certain that had I gratify'd their fancies, and made i^ dry barren Logic with the ufual Examples of Af2mal and Horfi^ how exa^ foever and me- thodical it might h^ve been, it would have on- ly augmented the number of ib many other Books, of vvhich the \\'orl4 is full, and which are therefore never read. Whereas it is this CoUeftion of different Things that has pro- cured the Sale of this, and caus'd it to be with lels annoyance and diftaft then o- thers. Neverthelefs this was not the Principal Aim we had in this mixture 5 for we are apt to believe we have followed the moft natural and moft ufeful way of liandling this Art, by applying a remedy as much as in us lay to an inconvenience that rendr'd the Study of italmoftfruitle(s. The Experience fhews us, that of a thoufand young men that Learn Logic, there are hardly ten that know any thing of it, fix months after they have performed their Exercifes. Now the realcaufe ofthi^ fo frequent either forgetful- pels or neglipence feems to be this, for that all the 2 6 T/?^ Secoui Difcourfe. the Subjefts treated of in Logic, being of them* ftlves abftrDfted and remote from ufe, the ex- amples alfo by which they are explained are no way taking, and feldom difcourft of other- where 5 fo that making no impreffion upon the fancy, they are with the greater difficulty re- tained in memory, which fuddenly lofes all the Ideas it had a while ago conceivd* Moreover finding thefe common Examples not fiifficient to prove that the Art it fclf may be appli'd to any thing ufeful , they accuftom themfelves to immure Logic within it felf, not fufferingit to extend any farther 5 whereas Logic was invented to be ferviceable as an In- ftrument to the reft of the Sciences ^ fb that having never feen its true ufe, they never make any ufe of it, but are glad to be rid of it, as of a mean and unprofitable Knowledg. For remedy of which Inconveniency, we thought it the beft way not to feperate Logic, according to the ufiial cuftom, fo far from the reft of the Sciences, for the Service of which it was defignd, but to join them together both the one and the other by the means of Exam- ples drawn from fblid Reading, ftiewing at. the lame time both the Rules and the Praftife, to the end that fo the Schollar may learn to judg of thofe Sciences by Logic, and retain Logic in his memory by the help of the Sciences. So The Second Difcourfe. 27 So that this variety is fo far from being a means to darken thefe precepts, that nothing can contribute more to brighten and explain them 5 for of thcmfclves they are too fubtil to make any Impreffion upon the Mind, if there be not Ibmething to make em pleating and ac- ceptable to the Fancy. Therefore to render this mixture the more acceptable , we have not borrovv'd examples at a venture from thofc Sciences, but have made choice of the raoft important Points of truth, and which might be moft ferviceable to the Rules and Principles to find out the truth in o- ther matters, which could not be handled at the fame time. For Example, as to what concerns Rhcto- rick, we confider^ that there is little advan- tage to be drawn from that xA.rt, for the finding outofthoughts,expreflions, and embellifhments. Our wit furnifties us with thoughts5lIfe affords us Expreffion, and for figures and ornaments they are many times fuperfluous 5 fo that all the Be- nefit from thence confifts in avoiding certain evil habits of writing and fpeaking, efpecially an Artificial and Rhetorical Stile composed of falfe Imaginations, Hyperboles, and forc'd Fi- gures, the moft unpardonable of all Vices in an Oratour. Nov/ perhaps you will find in this JLogic, as much Information for the knowing ^nd avoiding thofe defefts, as in thofe Books that 2 8 The Second DifcQur/e. that exprefly liandle that Subjeft. The laft Chapter of the Firli P^r^,fhewing the nature of figured Stile, at the fame time (hews the ufe of it, and difcovers the true Rule by which you may know Legitimates from Sfurioits Figures. The Chapter where we treat of l?laces in gene- ral may very much avail to prune off the fuper- fluous abundance of vulgar Arguments. That article wherinaremark'd out falfe and ill-cohe- ring Ratiotinations, into which the Vain-glo- ry of long and ornamental Haranguing fre- quently engages many, while it throws di(grace upon all manner of falftiood, proppfes by the by, a moft important Rule of Rhetorick, then which there is nothing more prevalent,to frame and adapt the Mind to a fimple, natural and ju- dicious Stile. Laftly, where we are in the fame Chapter cautioned to beware of provoking thole to whom we direft our Speech by (harp and biting Language, we are alfb taught to avoid feveral Errors which are therefore fo much the more dangerous, by how much they are moft difficult to be obfervd. As for Ethics^ the principal Subjeft of this Treatife would not permit us to infert more then we have done 5 neverthelefs I am apt to believe by what is fet down in the Chapter of falfe Ideas^ of Good and Evil^ in the Firfi Part^ as alfo in that other Chapter of fallacious ar- guing that happens in civil cpnverfe, that Men may The Second Vifcourfe. 19 may fee the large extent of it, and how it con- duces to difplay a great part of human Irregu- larities. There is nothing mMetafhyjics more con- fiderable than the Original of our Ideas , and the feperation of Spiritual Ideas^ from Forms Corporeal. ' The diftinftion of the Soul from the Body, and the proofs of it's Immor- tality founded upon that diftinftion. Allwhich things are largely handl'd in the Firfl and Fourth iPart. In ftveral places alfo occur the greateft part of the general Principles of Phypc^ which it will be no difficult thing to Colled together. From whence the Reader may be fufficiently enlightn^d in vvhat is mod proper to be known concerning Pondcrofity, the fenfible Qualities, Aftions, theSences, the attraftive Faculties, the occult Vertues, jfubftantial Forms, fufficient to undeceive Us of an innumerable company of falft Ideas which we fuckt in from our Infancy to the prejudice of Truth. Not that I however, becauft here are many things to be learnt, would have the Reader negleft Inch Books as exprefly treat upon thofe Subjeds, which are therefore careflilly to be ftudy'd. But we have confiderd that there are certain Perfbnj?, who may think this gene- ral and curfbry knowledge of the Sciences fuf- ficient 5 and lb it may be perhaps to thofe that never 3 o The Second Difcourfe. never intend to devote themftlves to the ftudy of Divinity. For Theology requires an accu- rate knowledge of Scholaftic Philofophy, which is as it w^re it's Mother Language. Now though it is inipoffible th^y fhould find all that they ought to learn in this Book, neverthelefs I dare affirm they may find whatever is convenient to be laid up in the memory for Ule. As to what they objeft that there are fome of the Examples that are not proportionate to the Capacities of young Beginners 5 they err in their affirmation, unlels it be in reference to Geometry. For as for any of the reft, they may be eafily underftood by all that are not altoge- ther void of underftanding, though they never learnt any thing of Philofophy. Nay, perhaps they may be more eafily underftood by thofo who are as yet free from all manner of preju- dice, thenbyfuch as are amply furnififd with theMaximes of Common Philofophy. As for the Examples of Geometry, 'tis very true they will not be underftood by all the World 5 but where lies the inconvenience? For they are only brought where Geometry is expre(ly,& by it felf, difcours't of, and fo may be pafs'd over without any harm, or at leaft where the things are fo clear of thcmfelves, that they need no illuftration, or elfe are fo explain'd by other examples,that the help of a Geometrician is no way requifite. Be- TJ:>e Second Vifcourfe. 5 Befides, if they examine the places where thefe Examples are made of ^ they will fee that it was a hard matter to find others that were Co proper : there being only this Science which is able to afford us clear Ideas and Propofitions not to be controverted. For Example, fpeaking of Reciprocal Pro- prieties, we have affirnrd, that there is fuch a Propriety in Reftangle Triangles, where the Squ2iYeoftheHypotem^Je\s equal to theSquarcs of the reft of the fides. Which is clear and certain to all that underftand it : They that do not ap- prehend it,may fuppofe it (btobe, nor will they for that the lefs apprehend the thing it felf which the Example is brought to prove. Again if we had been to produce the Com- mon Example of RifibilHy , which is the reci- procal Propriety of Man, certainly we had pro- posed a thing not only very obfcure but very much controverted. For if we underftand by RjfihilHy^ a power of contrafting and dilating the Lips, I know not why we may not teach Beafts to imitate thofc Motions of the Lips 5 and fbme we know there are that do fo. But if we include within the fignification of this word not only the change of the Countenance, but alfo the thoughts that accompany and produce it 5 and fo by Rifibility mean a Power to Laugh, bj thinking 5 in that manner all human Aftions may be call'd reciprocal Qualities 5 there being none ^ 1 1n?e Second Dijfconrfe. ttofife but what are prdpH* to rvkvi, iF We joyri ^em with Thoughts : And thus Walkiiig, featino-, t>rinking (hall be call d reciprocal Qtialities of Men ^ finte one Man Walks, Eats, and Drinks fhmkiftg, XVhich if it be granted, We (hall ne- ver want Examples of Reciprocal Proprieties , Which hoWeVer Will itever fatisfie thofe, who attribute Mhinkjng to B^fts, and who may as Well allow 'emLktightcr with Thought. Where- as the Example befote alledg d wlil not admit th'efe Cavils as being certain and utacoittrOvert- ed itiiongalliVIen. In anothet place we hinted that t^^e are /ome Corporeal things which We apprehend a^f- ter a Spiritual manner withoiH the help of Ima- gination. And to confirm this We brought the Example of the ChiHogoh or Thoufa'n'd Angbd Figure. Which Figure We conceive cleatly and diftindly in our minds, though the Imagination cannot from any delineation of it be fo diftinft as to difplay it's Pi'oprieties. Curforily alfo We alferted that one of the Proprieties of this Fi- gure was that all thefe Angles were equal to 199/1 Right Angles. And it is apparent that this iExarnple proves what we intended to make out in that place. It remains that we clear our felves from an envious Complaint that fbme Perfbns have made againft LK that we have taken out Of Ar^jiotles Examples of vitious defifiitionSj and Tlye Second Vtfcourfe. 3 j ill cohering Argumentations^ which (eems to be done out of a Iccret defign to deftroy the Peripatetic Philofophy. But they had never pronounced lb fevere a Sentence againft Us, had they confider'd the Rules to be obiervd in citing Exam- ples of Errors , which however we have adher'd to in quoting Ariflotk. Firft, Experience fhews us, that thoft which are vulgarly propos'd, are of little or no u(e, and difficult to be remembred^as being framd at pleafure 5 befides that the Errors are fb palpable and fo vifible, that a Man would think it impoffible to ftumble upon em. Therefore it is much more to the purpoft, to the end that what is laid concerning thole Errors may be the more deeply retaind in Memory, and the more eafily avoid- ed, to ftleft Ibme notable example of the Errors, into which Ibme celebrated Author has already fallen. For finding the Reputation of great Men not free from noted flips, vve are in- cited by Care and Induftry to prelerve our fclves from the like fur prizes. Moreover feeing every Man is bound to make what he writes as profitable as may be, therefore of fet purpole thole examples ^f Errors are to be produc'd, of which it moft imports us not to be Ignorant. For it D would 7 4 T^he Second T>ifcourfe. would be an endlefs toil to remember all the dreatris and trifles of Fhtd^ Vanhdmont and Paracelfus. And therefore it is better to fearch examples in famous Authors , whofe Errors it may be worth while to undcrftand. Now all this is to be found in Ariftotle to a Hair s Breadth. For nothing can fo ef- feftually perfwade a Man to avoid a fault, as to (hew that fuch a Man as he, ftumbled at the fame Block, And his Philofophy is become fo famous through the vaft number of delerving Ferlbns that have embrac'd it, that there is all the reafon in the World his defefts (hould be exposed. Which being fo, we thought it would be worth while for the Reader to take a review of the maxims of the Peripatetic Philofophy, yet becaufe it is never good to be deluded, thofe Maxims are fo propos d, that what they are may be eafi- ly known, as having curforily mark'd out the defefts, for farther deteftion of their fal- lacies. Which we have not done to leffen the Re- putation of Ariflotle ^ but rather to do him honour as much as may be done by thofe that differ in opinion from him. And 'tis vifible in other places, that the points which are tax'd of errors, are of no great Importance, nor (hake the foundations of his Philofophy, which we had no Intention to affail. But T7;e Second Difcourfe. ^ ^ But if we make no mention of thofe things wherein Ariflotle has excelVd in feveral of his Books , the reafon was this , becaufc the ftries of the difcourfe did not afford an op- portunity fo to do 5 which however we would willingly and gladly have done, if occafion had offer d 5 nor had AriUotle wanted his due applaufe 5 who beyond all controverfy was a perfon of a capacious and fearching Genius, upon which he relying, has link'd together long Chains of confequences in fuch matters upon which he difcours'd ; and therefore he has been very profperous in what he has writ-* ten in the ftcond Book of his Rhetorick con- cerning the Paffions. Egregious alfb are hi^ notions and oblcrvations which he has deli- vered in his Politicks, his Ethics, his Pro- blems, and his Hiftory of Animals : and as confus'd as his y^naltics are, yet we muft con- fe(s that almoft all we know concerning the Rules of Logic ^ is taken from thence 5 (b that there is not any Author from whom we have borrowed more then from Arislotle m this Logic, as one to whom the Body of the precepts belong. True it is that the moft imperfeft of his Works fcems to be his Phificks, as being alfo that which for a long time has been condemned and forbidden by the Church as a Learned Per/on has made appear in a Treatife written D 2 to 3 6 Tl^e Second Difcourje. to that purpofe 5 though the principal feult of it was not that it wasfalft, but that it was too true, and taught nothing but fuch things as could not be conceal'd from our Know- ledg. For whoever doubted but that all things were compofed of matter, and a cer- tain form ofmatter.ifcourfe^ and againft Ariflotles Philofophy. The Par rijian Conferences as well as their Writing^ are divided into two parts 5 nor does any one complain of this open War , declared a- gainft him. The moft famous ProfelTors no longer condemn themfelves to that flavery of blindly receiving and maintaining what- ever they find in his Books, and fome of his Opinions are utterly exterminated ^ for what Phyfician will now maintain that the Nerves proceed from the Heart, as AriJiotle believ'd, fince Anatomy clearly demonftrates now, that they derive ther Original from the Brain, Whence proceeded that faying of St. Jujlm. Qui ex punUo cerebri d^ quaji Centro omnes Senfm diffiidit. Who dijfus'd all the Senfisfrom the pointy and as it were the Center of the Brain. And what Philofopher dares be fb obfti^ nate as to aflBrm, that the fwiftnefs of pon^ derous things defcending encreafes propor- tionably to the proportion of their weight ? When any Man may end this difpute, by let- ting two ponderous Bodies never fo unequal in proportion,fall from a high place^at what time he (hall find very little difference in the fwift- nefs of their Motion. All things violent are of fhort Continu- ance, and all extreams are violent. 'Tis ve^ ry hard meafure to profcribe all Anflotles Or pinions The Second Dtfcourfe. ^9 pinions, as formerly has been done. On the cdier fide it is an unreafonable Servitude, for a Man to pledg his aflcnt to all he has written , and to allow only him for the ftan- dard ot Philofophy, as afterwards they went about to do. Men cannot long endure fuch a Tyranny, but by degrees they will recover the Poffeffion of their rational liberty, which confifts in approving what they judg to be true, and rejefting that which they judg to befalfe. For it docs not feem contrary to Reafon, that Reafon (liould fubmit to Authority in Sciences , which treating of things above Reafon, are bound to follow another Light , which is that of Divine Authority. But in Sciences that depend upon the fupport of Reafon 5 Reafon afts well and by her own Precepts , when (he decrees that there is no Obedience to be given to the Authority of Philofophers againft Reafon. This is the Rule, which we have follow 'd in difcourfing the Opinions of the Philofophers, as wellantient as modern, we have fought for Truth in both, neither efpoufing thequar- rel of any Seft , nor bidding batde to any. So that all that is to be concluded , when we rejeft the Opinion of Arijiotle^ or any o- theris only this , that in fuch a point we dif- fcent from 3 notjthat we do not confent in o- D 4 thers3 4o The Second Di/courfe. therss much lefs that we have any averfion againft em^ or feek to degrade or leffen their worth. And this modeft Procedure of ours we hope will be approv d by all juft Judges, and that they will acknowledge that there is nothing in the whole world, but a fincere de- fire to contribute to the Publick Good, as fiir as lyes in the Power of a Treatife of this na- ture , without Paffion or Hatred againft any Perfon Living. LOGIC,. 4> LOGIC; O R T H E ART O F THINKING LOGIC is the Art of well ufing Reafon in the knowledge of Things for the inftruftion as well of a mans felf, as of others. This Art is deriv d from the Reflexions which men have made upon the four Princi- pal Operations of the mind , Apprehenfion^ Judgment^ Difcourfe^ znA Diffo/ition. We call Afprehenfion thefimple Contempla- tion of Things that prefent themfelves to the Mind, 41 Logic ; Or^ Part. I. Mind, as when we confider the Sun^ the Earthy a Tree, Rotundity, a Square, Cogitati- on, Entity, pronouncing nothing cxprefly concerning era^ and the form under which we confidep^m is call'd an Idea. We call jfW?:«;e«^,that Aftion of the Mind, by which afl'embling together feveral Ideas^ we either deny or affirm this to be That. Thusconfidering the Idea of^ the Earthy and the Idea of Rounds we affirm or deny the Earth to he round. Difcourfe we call that Operation of the Mind, by which out of feveral Judgments we frame another : Thus when we have judg'd that true Vertue ought to be referrd to God, but that the Pagans did not refer it to God, from thence we infer that the Vertue of the Heathens was not true. We call Difpojition that Aftion of the Mind , by which we range various Ideas 'judgments^ and Ratiocinations upon one and the fame Subjeft 5 in that Order which is moft proper for it's Explanation 5 and this by another Name we call Method. Thefe Operations proceed meerly from Nature, and that fometimes more perfeftly from thofe, that are altogether ignorant of Logic, then from others that have learn t it. So that it is not the bufinefs of this Art to find out the way to perform thefe Operations, for Chap. I. The M of Thinking 4^ for that we have from Nature alone, that has given us the u(e of Reafon, but rather to make certain Animadverfions upon thole things which Nature her (elf operates in us, which may be of a threefold u(e to us. Firft we are thereby affur'd, that we make a right uft of our Reafon. For the Confi- deration of Rules begets in us a more fervent Application and attentive Induftry of the Mind. The Second is, that thereby we more eafi- ly deteft and explain the Errours and Defeds which we meet within the Operations of the Mind. For oftentimes it falls out, that we difcover by the meer Light of Nature the faults of Ratiocination, yet are not able to give a reafon why it is falfe. Thus they who know not what belongsto Painting,may take exceptions at the defefts of a Pifture j tho' they are not able to tell the reafon why they find fault. The third is that we are brought to a more accurate knowledge of the nature ofourlln- derftanding by thefe Reflexions upon the O- perations of the Mind. Which, if we look no farther then meer Speculation, is to be preferred before the knowledge of all Corpo- real Things, which are infinitely below Spi- ritual Confiderations. l^low fuppofing thofe things, which we re- volve 44 Logic; Okj Part. I- volve in otir Minds, in reference to our own Thoughts, were only done with re(peft to otir felves, it would fuffice to confider *em in themfelves, not cloath'd with words or any other figns : but in regard we cannot manifeft our thoughts to others but by the benefit of exterior Marks 5 and for that thisCuftom is foprevalent^that when we meditate alone,the Things themfelves do not prefent themfclves to our Thoughts, but in the cloathing of thofe words by which we exprefs 'em to o- thers, it is neceffary for Logic to ccMifidcr Ideas joya'd to words, and words joyfl'd to Ideas. And thus by what we have {aid it follows, that Logic may be divided into four Parts, ac- cording to the ftveral Refleftions which we make upon the four Operations of theMinA FIRST PART/ Containing Refie&rons npon Ideas or upon the firjl Operation of the Mind which if cal/'d Apprehenjion. SINCE we cannot have any knowledge of what is without us, but by the affi- ftance of Ideas which are within us, what we (hall chap. I. The Art ef Thinking. 45 (hall difcourft of Ideas may be thought per- haps to be themoft important Part of Lc^ic, as being the foundation of all the reft. We may reduce thefe Refleftions to five Heads, according to the five ways of confi- dering Ideas. 1. According to their Nature and Ori- ginal. 2. According to the Principal difference of tbeObjefts which theypreftnt. 3. According to their being fingle or com- pound 5 where we fliall treat of Ahflraliions and Precifions of thelntelleft. 4. According to their Extent orReftrifti- on^ that is to (ay, their Univerfality , Par- ticularity ,or Singularity. 5 . According as they are clear and obfcure, diftinft or confus'd. CHAP. I. Of Ideas, according to their Nature and Ori- ginal TH E word Idea is of the number of thofe words which are fo clear, that they need not to be explaind by any other 5 there being no other more clear and fimple. So 4^ Logic; Ory PartL' So that all that can be done in this cafe to avoid errour and miftake, is to oblerve the falfe notions and interpretations that may be attributed to this word : while fome make ufe of it only to fignifie that manner of conceiving, which isperform'd by the appli- cation of the Mind to thofe Forms that are depainted in our Fancies, and is call'd Ima- gwation* For as St. J»/?7V^ obferves, Man ever fince his fall has been {b accuftom'd to contemplate Corporeal Things^ the forms of which en- ter through our Sences into our Brains, that the moft part believe they cannot apprehend a thing, when they cannot imagine it, that is, contemplate it as a Thing Corporeal : As if Man had no other way to think or appre- hend. Whereas no man can make a Reflcftion upon what occurs to Mi^Thoughts^hm. he muft acknowledg, that he conceives many things altogether deftitute of Corporeal Form , and finds a difference between Jmagination and perfed underftanding. As for example, when I imagine a Triangle, I do not contemplate it only as a Figure confifting of three Right Lines 3 but I alfo confider thofe three Right Lines as preftnt by the force and internal Ap- plication of the Mind 5 and this is properly to imagine. Or if I would think of a Figure with chap. L The Art of Thinking. 47 withaThoufand Angles,! prefently apprehend that it is a Figure confiding of a Thoufand Sides, as eafily , as I apprehend a Triangle to confift of three Sides ^ but I cannot imagine the Thoufand fides of that Figure, nor be- hold 'em as being prefent, with the Eyes, as I may (b (ay, of my mind. Neverthelefs, 'tis very true, that the day- ly praftice of Imagination^ in apprehending Corporeal things is the reafon, that oft times, when we imagine a Figure of a tlioufand An- gles, we form in our Thoughts fome confufed Figure or other. But it is evident that the Figure thus form'd by the afliftance of Ima-' gination^ is not a Figure of a Thouland An- gles 5 as nothing differing from tliat form, which any one would frame in his Thoughts^ were he to imagine a Figure of ten Thoufand Angles 3 as alfb for that it is no ways fer- viceable to difcover the Proprieties that made the difference between a Figure of a Thou- fand Angles from any other Polygon. And therefore I cannot properly imagine a Figure of a Thoufand Angles 5 for that the Figure which I Would frame in my Imaginati- on would reprefent to me any other Figure with a great Number of Angles 5 and yet I can Very clearly and diftindly conceive it, as being able to demonftrate all it's proprieties 5 as that all the Angles together are equal to 48 Lo^'k; Or^ Part. I. 1996. Right Angles. And thus by conft- quence it is rone thing to imagine^ another thing to apprehend. This is yet more evident by theConfidera- tion of many things which we clearly appre- hend, and yet can no way in the World at- tain em by Imagination. For what do we apprehend more clearly, then our thought when we thinkj Neverthelefs, it is impofE- ble to imagine z thought^ nor to delineate any form of it in the Brain. What forms of the Particles of Affirmation , 2e/, and Ne- gation, No^ can be defcrib'd in the Fancy. Yet both he that denies, and he that affirnls the "Earth to be round have the fame exprefs Imaginations^ Earthy and Rotundity. To thefe the one adds Affirmation, which is an Adion of the Mind, which conceives with- out any Corporeal form 5 the other adds a Negative, which is another Aftion of the Mind, and much more incapable of a forma^l defcription. When wc fpeak then of IdeaSj we do not call by that name thofe Images that prefent themfelves to the Fancy, but whatever of- fers it fdi to oivc thoughts'^ at what time we may truly affirm, that we apprehend a cer- tain TA/>/^, after whatever manner we appre- hend it. Whence it follows that we can exprefs no- thing Part. I. The Art of Thinking. 49 thing in words, fo that we underftand what we (ay, but that it is evident from thence, that we have in our ftlves the Idea of the thing fignifi'd by our words 5 though that /- dea may happen to be fomctimes more plain and diftinft, fometimcs more obfcure and confus'd, as we (hall declare hereafter. For he would contradidt himfelf that (hould af- firm he knew what he meant by the words which he pronounces, and yet at the fame time that he pronounces em, fliould un- derftand nothing but the found of thofe words. And this is that which (hews us the fal'fity of two Opinions broach'd by the Philofo- phers of thefe Times. The firft is, that we have no Idea of God/ For if we had none, in pronouncing the word God^ we (hould apprehend no more then the three Letters G, 0, D, and he that only (peaks EngUfi^ would have no more in his thoHghts^'whtVi he hears that w^ord prondunc'd, then if he (hould come into a Synagogue not under(tanding a tittle of Hebrew and hear the names of God Adonia or Elohim. Moreover when (bme men would be cali'd Gods (which was the Frenzie of CdiguU and Domitian) there could be no Crime cf Impiety laid to their charge, for that there is nothing in the three Letters G, 0, I>, or the E twcy ^ l^OGlCy Or, Part. I. q two Syllables De-/^ which may not be attri- buted ta aMari, abftra&ing the Idea from the word : For which reafon the Hollander was never ta^*d with Impiety, who caird himfeliF 'LMo7j7c/at De-uf. What \yas theii the Impiety of thofe Princes, but that they' left at leaft A part of it's l4i^a to the wdfd Deuf^ lb that it fignifi'd that tfanfcendent anii adorable Nature of a Deity, and 'appropri^?-^' ted to themfdves both the Word and, the Idea. ■}'^-^; ;^-^^ -^ -'- ■ ■ -y^ -'[', But'had^/we not the J^e^ of God, uppil' what could we ground all that we fay ofGbdr " As that he is One^ that he is Eternal^ Ontni^o- ' tent^ all Mercy ^ 2in^ MWifdom. Of which^ there is nothing comprehended in the found^' of the word God^ but iri the Idea which we^ ' have of God^ and which we ioVn to the, ,. found of the word. ^'^ ^^ ..f^o; ^-l ,w-^ lO'i And hence it is that we refuft the name of ^ God to all falft Divinities 5 not but that thb ' Word might be attributed to em, being takn materially 5 but becaufe the 7^e^ which we have in our felves of the Supreme Bem^ and which we have annex'd to the word G^^^, be- longs only to the True God. ..;::. ^ The fecond of theft falfe Opinions is what an Englifi man aflerts, That Rattdcinattbn is nothing elje hut a Connexion and Chain df names links together by the rpord. Eft, it k. ' Whence H i chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 5 1 follows ^thut by reajonmg mtcm conclude nothing of the nature of Things^ hut only concern? ng^^ their Appellations '-i That is to fay ^ that we barely fee whether we ajfen/ble together well or ill ^ ac- cording to the Covenafits we have made with our Fnncy concerning their fgnificationsiJ To which the fame^Author adds, if this be trne^ as' it may be it Is^ reafining will depend upon words y words upon intagination^ and inia-^^ gination perhaps^ and which is my Opinion^ will depend tfpon the motion of the CorporealOrgans% and fd our Soid will prove no other then the mo-^^ Hon of fotne parts of the Organical Body, We are willing to believe that thefe words contain an Objection far remote from the- Sence of the Propofer 5 but in regard that" being fo Dogmatically exprefs'd, they ruin the Immortality of the Soul, it will be di^ great importance to lay open the fallacy of the Objeftion ^ which it will be no difficult thing to do. For the Covenants of which the Philofopher fpeaks-, canbe no other then the confent of men to take certain founds foi*- figns of thofe Ideas exifting m oUr Minds. So that ii We had not befides the Names, the Ideas ofThings in our ielves, thofe Covenants would have been iuipoflible'sas it is impoffible by any fuch Covenant to make a blind man underftand whatis nicant by the words. Red:, Green^ or Blew, For not having thefe /^c^.r E 1 ^ ii^ 51 LOGIC y o^y Chap. I. in his Mind, he cannot joyn 'em to the found. Moreover feveral Nations having given different Names to Thmgs^ even to thofe that are moft apparent and fimple, as are thole which are the Ob|e£l:s of Geometry, they could not diftourfe in the fame manner of the fame Truths, if difcourfe were nothing but a Connexion of names by die word, Ejtl it is. And fince it appears by this variety of words that the A^/^i^;?/ (for example fake) do not agree with the Englijh about the fame (ignificatioji of Names, fo could they never agree in judgment or difcourfe, if their Di- fcourfe depended upon that Covenant. LafHy, when we fay that the fignification of words are Arbitrary or ad placitum^ we ftick deep in Equivocation. For it is true that it is a thing altogether Arbitrary to joyn this Idea to that Sound, rather then another. But Ideas are not Arbitrary tVmgs that depend upon our Fancy, more efpecially thofe that are evident and diftinlt : Which that we may make manifeft we fay, that it would be very ridiculous to think that real EfFefts could de- pend upon things purely Arbitrary. Now when a man has concluded byhisReafbn, that the Iron Axel that pafles through the two MiU-Itones of a Corn-Mill could turn a- bout. Part. I. The Art of Thinking. 55 about , without turning the lower Mill-ftonc, if being round it pals d through a round hole '-y but that the fame Axle could not turn without turning the upper Mill-ftonej if be- ing (quare, it were faltn'd in a iquare hole of the upper Mill-ftone 5 what he has underta- ken to prove undenyably follows. And by confequence this Dilcourfc is not a Connexi- on of Names according to a Covenant en- tirely depending upon the Fancy of men 5 but a folid and conclufive Judgment of the Nature of Things by the confideration of /- deas 5 which men have been pleas'd to de- note and fignifie by certain Names. Thus much as to what we underftand by the word Idea 5 we are now to j[ay fbmething concerning their Original. And now theQueftion is, whether oar /- deas proceed from the Senfes , and whether that common Maxim be true. There is nothing in the IntelUU , which was not firjl in the Senje. This is the Opinion of a Philofopher of Great Reputation in the World, who begins his Logic with this Propojition 5 Every Idea de- rives irsOriginal frord- the Senfes, He confef- fts however that all Ideas are not the fame in our ^'enfes , as they are in the mind. But he pretends that they were at leaft formd out of thofe that paft through our Senfes , either by E 3 compofitioH 3 54 LOGIC; Or, Part. L compofition 5 as when out of the ftparate /- dcasofGold^ and a Mountain^ we make a Mountain of Gold 5 or by Amplification and Diminution^ as when out of the Idea of a Man of Ordinary Stature , we make a Giant^ or a Pig/f/ee 5 or by Jimlitude and Proportion 5 as when out of the J^e^ of a Houle we hav^ ften, we make the Delineations of a Stru- ctui-e that we have not feen: And thus, faith he, v^e apprehend God, who is above the reach of Senfe , under the fhape of ia vene-^ rable Old Man. But according to this Do6trine , it would follow, that all our ii^e^/, thp' relating to no particular Objeft that ever approached our Senfes : muft be all Corporeal, and reprefent nothing to us, but what has paft at leaft by parts, through our Senfes : and confequently that we can conceive nothing but by the help of Images, like thofe which are form'd in th^ Brain w^hen we fee, or imaging Bodies. But thothis Opinion be maintaind by o- ther School Philofophers as well as himfel^ I Giall not fcruple to affirm that it is very abr fiird, and as contrary to Religion as to true Philofophy. For to fpeak nothing but what is evident, what is there that we conceive more diftinftly then our thoughts themfelves? What propofition clearer then this, I thinh^^ therefore I am} Ho\Yever wp can never be certain chap. L The Art of VnnKm^ ^^ ' ' ' ' ' "t certain of the truth of this Propofition, un- lefs we underftand diftinftly what it is to Be^ and what to think. Neither is it to be re- quired from us to explain thefe terms any far- ther , becaufe they are fuch that Men Co clearly underfl:and,that a copious explanation would but render m more obfcure. If then it cannot be denied but that we have in pur felves the Ideas of Entity and Thought^ I ask, through what door of the Senfes they entered into the Mind ? Are they Ideas of Light or Colours to enter through the S7ght } Are they (hrill or deep founds to make way through the Ear} Are they Odoriferous or noifoni to enter the Smelling ? Are they favory or naufeous to enter the Tiafte ? hot or cold, foft or hard, to glide through the Feeling. If it be laid they were form'd of other fenfible Images, let'em demonftrate what thofe fen- fible Images are, from whence thefe Ideas of Entity and Thought proceeded 5 as alfo how they were form'd, whether by Cornpojiticn^ or by Amplification^ by diminution or propor- tion 5 for if they cannot anfvver agrcably to Reafon, it muft be takdn for granted, that the Ideas of Entity and Thought are far from anyway deriving their Original from Senfe ^ but that our Soul is endu'd with a Faculty to form'emcf her felf; though it may happen fometimes, that (he may be incited to make E 4 ufe is LOGIC; Or, Chap. I- uft of fomething that ftrikes the Sence. As a Painter may be indue d to paint a Pifture for the price that is promised him 5 and yet it cannot be faid that the pifture drew its O- riginal from the Money. But what the fame Authors add, that the Idea which we have of God, draws its origi- nal from Sence, becaufe wc apprehend him under the Idea of an Old-Man, is a thought unworthy any other then the Anthropomor- fhites ^ and which confounding the true Ideas that we have of Spiritual things with the falfe Imaginations that we conceive of thofe Sublimites out of an evil cuftom , of imagining all things amifs 5 whereas it is as abfurd to pretend to imagine that which is not Corporeal, as to hear Colours,andlee Sounds. To refute this opinion, we need no more then confider, that if wc had no other Idea of God^ then of a venerable Old-Man, all thoft other Judgments which we make of that Idea ought to appear faHe to us, that are contrary to that Idea 3 for we are natu- rally induc'dto believe that our judgments are falfe, when we clearly fee that they are contrary to the Ideas which we have of things. Otherwife we fhall never be able to conclude certainly that God does not con* fift of parts, that he is Incorporeal^ Omnipre^ fent^ and Invjjihk^ when all thofe Ideas are m Part. I. The Aft of Thinking. 5 7 no way agreeable to that of a venerable Old Man. And if God had at any time ever ap- peared in that form,it does not prefently follow that we fliould have no other Idea of him but that ^ for lb we fhould have no other Idea of the Holy-Ghofi then that of a Dove becaufe he once appear'd in that Shape, as God in the (ame manner might be conoeiv'd to be a Sounds becaufe the found with which the Name of God is pronounced, awakens the Idea of God in our Minds. It is therefore falfc that all our Ideas pro- ceed from the Senle : rather it may be affirm- ed on the other fide, that none of thofe L deas that enter our Minds, deduce their Ori- ginal from theSenfcs unlefs by accident, that is when the motions ftirr'd up in the Brain , which is all the Senfes can do, give an occa- fion to the Soul to produce true Ideas^ which it would not otherwife do 5 tho^ for the moft part thofe Ideas are nothing Hke the other that are form'd in the Sencc and in the Brain 5 and befidesthe greateft number of Ideas be- ing fuch, as not having any mixture of Cor- poreal form, cannot without a moft manifeft abfurdity, be referred to the Senfe. If any one objeft that at the fame time that we have an Idea of fpiritpal things, as of Thought ( for examples fake ) we entertain ^Ifo a certain Corporeal Image of the found that 58 LOGIC; Ory Part..!, that exprefles it, they averr nothing contra- ry to what we have alreadly prov'd 5 for that form of the Sound winch is prefent in the ima- ^ation is not the Image of the Thought] biit of the Sound ^ nor does itferve to repreftrit it other wife^then as the Soul being accurtom'd when (he hears this Sound, to conceive the thought, forms at the fame time an Idea of thought, akogether Spiritual ^ which has no reference to theldea of Sound,butas only an* nexed to it by Cuftom 5 Which is apparent in Deaf people, who have no Ideas of Sound, yet have the Ideas of their thoughts, at leaft when they refleft upon their thoughts. CHAP. IL Of the OhjeBs of Ideas. WHatever we conceive, is rcprefented to our Minds, either as a Ty^///^, or a fnanner of a Things or as a thing modified, I call that a T/^/;/^ which is conceived to con- fift of it felf, and as the Subjeft of allthofc things that are comprehended in it, which by another name is caird Subftance, The Manner , Attribute^ or Quality of a Things I call that, which when it is conceiv- ed to be comprehended in the Subftance, and not Chap. II. The Art of Jh'mKmg 59 not to be able to fubfift without it, deter- mines it to exifl: after a certain manner, and gives it a certain denomination. A Thing m^dified^ I call a fubftance, as it is determin'd by a certain mode or manner. All which things will be apprehended mott * clearly by Examples. When I confider a Body, the Idea of it reprefents to me a Thing or Subftance: be- cau(e I confider it as a thing (ubfifting by it fclf, and which has need of no other to exift. But when I confider this Body to be rotwd^ I confider a Rotmd-Body^ and this Idea re- prefentsto me the Thing Modified. The names which are ufed to exprcfs thcfe things are called Subftantives, or abfolute, as the Earthy the Sim^ the SohI^ God, Thofe alfo that primarily and direftly fig- nify the Modes or Mamiers^ becaufe they have fome Correfpondence with Subftantives, are called Subftantives and Abfblutes, as Hard- nefs^ Heat , Juflice^ Prudence ^ &c. Such names as fignifie the Things as Mod/fi- f ^^marking out primarily and direftly the 5//^- fiance^ thd more confufedly, and indireftly the Manner^ tho^ more diftindly, are call'd Adje&ives^ and Comwtatives^ as Romdj Hardy But 6o LOGIC; Or, Chap.II. But here we are to obferve that the Mind being accuftom'd to know moft things as Modified (in regard file attains nottheknow- ledg of 'em but only by accident, or by thofe qualities that ftrike the SenfeSy)often di- vides one effence of a Suhjiance'mto two Ide- as^ of which the one (he takes for the Snb^, jeh, the other for the Mode. Thus altho there be nothing in God, which is not God himfelf^ yet we apprehend him as an Infinite Being ^ and with us Infinite is the Attribute of God, as Being the Subjeft of the Attribute. Thus alfo we confider Man as the Subjeft of Humanity, or having Humanity, and con- fcquently as a Thing Modified. And then the e&ntial Attribute , which is the thing moft it felf^ is apprehended by the Manner of th^ Manner^ becaufe it is as it were inherent in the Subjed. And this is cairdtheSubftantiveAbftrafted , zsHumani* ty^ Corporeity^ Reafhn. Neverthelefs it is of great Importance to diftinguifti that which is truly the Mode from that which onelyfeems tobefo, For the Con- founding of Manners with Subftances, and Subftances with Manners is the chief ground of all our Errors. Therefore the Nature of the true Mode is fuch , that the Subftance of whichitistheiVf^;/;^er, may be clearly and diftinftly conceived without it, but the man- ner Part. I. The Art of TImKmg. 6 1 ner cannot be alternately clearly conceived', unlcis the Relation which it has to it's Sub- ftancebe as readily apprehended , vfithout which it cannot naturally exift. Not but that we may apprehend the Man-- 7ier^ without fuch an exaft and diftinft confi- * deration of the Subjeft. But that which de- nionftrates that the Relation of the Manmr to the ShIjcU , is contain d, at leaft, confiif- iedly in it s conception ^ becauft we cannot deprive the iVf^;?;/er of that Rehuonyo\\t that we muft deftroy the Idea, of it at the fame Time. Whereas when we conceive xv^oSnh^ fiances , we may deny one thing of the o- ther 5 yet never deftroy the Ideas of either. For example, I may deny Pr«^e//fe,without confidering theMan, who is prudent , but I cannot conceive Prudence , and at the fame time deny the Relation,which it has to Man^ or any other intelHgiblc Nature capable of "Prudence. Contrariwife , when I confider what ap- pertains to an extended Subftance , which is call'd a Body, as Extenfon^ Figure^ Mobility^ Divifihility^ and onthe other fide whatever belongs to the Mind, as Thinking, Doubting, Memory, Will,Di(courIc, I may deny all that ot the Extended Suhfiance^ which I conceive belongs to ihtThinking Suhfiance^ and yet di- ftinftly apprehend the ExtendfdSubfiance^znd all 6iz LOGIC; Or, PartL all the Adjunfts^that bebng to it. And I may r.eciprocally deny of the Thinking Subflarice^ whatever I apprehend o£ tht Extended Sub- J?^;/^e, without confidering what I have con- ceiv'd of the Thinking Sf^Jiance, Which alfo proves, that Thinking is not the Manner of the Extended Subflance , becaule that Extenfim with all the rm of the Attri- butes belonging to Extended Sublicmce may be deny'd of Thought , and yet a man may rightly apprehend of Thinking. It may be here farther obftrv'd, that there are fome of thefe Modes or Manners^ which may he c2i\Yd Intrinjic i, becaule they are ap- prehended to be in the Subftance, as round <^t fqaare 3 others may be faid to be extrinjic-y be- caule they aretakn from Ibme thing which is not inherent in the Subftances 5 as beloved^feen^ dejired 5 but thefe things depend upon the A- ftions of others. And thefe forts of Mode^ or Manners^ are called in the Schools, E^f^v tinficd Denominations. But if thele Modes are taken according to the Af<^/?//er wiiereby things are apprehended, they are called Second Intentions. Thus to be Subje3ed^ , toici Predicated are Second Intentions^ becaule they are the Manners whereby the things them- felves are apprehended, as they are in the Underftanding, conjoining two Ideas.^ affirm- ing one to be the other. It chap. 11. ' The Art of Thinking. 6^ It is farther to be obferv cf, that there are other iVWej which. we uisly.q^JI Sjil^fia/ztjals^ becaufe they reprcfent to us true Sithjiances appHed to othei: Sifbfta^jQC^s, like to Mariners 3 of which fort are CloatUd^ Arnid^ d^c. There are others which we i:nay call fimply ^eal^ and thejfeare the imt^^Iamzers^ which are not Subjlancesy but Manmrs of Snkfla?t€€^ Laftly, there a^re others which we may call Negatives^ becaufe they reprcftnt the Sub- ftancetouswith a Denial of. ror^erealorfub-. ffantial Manner:'^ •'^'Now if the Objefts reprefented by ^^^ Tdeas\ whether Siibfiances or. Mariners^ arere^' ally fiich as they are reprefented to us, we call 'em true. If not, they are falfe Ideas^^ inTuch a manner as, they may be." And thefe ' are they which in the Schools are called £//- tid Ratioms^ Entities of Bxafon^ which hap- pen for the moft part when the Mind con- ^ joins two Ide4s real in themfelves, but di- : ftinft 3 thus the ld.ea of a Golden Mountain is 2ih\p^titjf of Reafon^ compounded of two Ideas. Q^ a Mountain and Gold^ which the Mitid reprefent^ as conjoin'djWhen really they :> arenotfb/ Of 64 hOGI C'jOr^ Chap.III. '^ ' — ■- CHAP. in. of Ariftotle*s Ten Predicamnts. XOthii thetei this Head of the Objefts of Ideas^ ten Predicaments ofArijlotk may be reduced 5 as being but feveral Claffes, under which that Philofopher comprehended all the Objeds of our Thoughts , compredending all Subftances under the Firft, and all acci-i dentsunder theother Nine. , - '; Thefirft Subfiance^ which is either Spiritu- al or Corporeal, the fecond ^^«//>F,which is - either difirete^ when the Parts are divided ^s ,'. Numbers. 7.' Or Continued^ when the parts are conjoiq^ ed, and then either fucceflive, as Time arid Notion 5 or Permanent, which by another name is call'd Space, or Extenfion in Length, Breadth, and Profundity , length alone mak- ing lines, Length and Breadth making fur- face, and all together caufing Solidity. Third Quality^ of which AriUotk makes four Rinds. The firft comprehends Habitude^ a difpo- fitjon of Mind or Body, acquired by reitera- ted Ads, as the Sciences^ Vertue, Vice, Ex- cellency Part. I. Tl^eJrtof Thinking. 65 cellency in Painting , Writing , Dancing. The Second Natural Ability 5 fuch as are the Faculties of the Soul or Body, the Under - ftanding,the Will, the Memory, the Five Sen- fcs, Swiftnels of Foot. The Third, Senfibk Qualities^ as Hardnefs , Softnej(s,Pondero(ity,hot,cold,coloursXounds, odors and (evcral forts of Relifbes. The Fourth, Form and Figure^ which is the extrinfecal determination of Quantity , a^ Rounds Square^ Spherical^ Cubical. Fourthly Relation of one thing to another, as of Father to So^r^ Mafter to Se"vaf7t,Kif7gto Sdje&, of Power to the Objedf , of Jight to the Thing Vijible , to which may be added all things denoting Comparifon 5 as Uke^ eqaal^ biggerjefs. Fifth, Jff/^.v, either confider'd in it felf ^ as towall{^kap^ to l^wn\ to love '-y or externally, as/^ firike^ to farv , to breaks ^ to nianifeft^ to hear. Sixth, Suiferifig 3 as to be ftricf{cn^ broken.fo be manifefted^ heated. Seventh,W;ere 5 as when we anfwcr to Qiie- ftions about Place ^ He is at Rome,atParis.7>i his Study ^ or a bed. Eighth, When we anfwer to queftions a- bout Time, as wheti did he Live .' ^/ ^^^^^^ Number^ 8cc. It is eafie thence to underftand, that the Mind may confider one Part and not another^ becaufe thefc Parts are really di- F 3 aiftin- yo LOGIC; Or, Part. J. fringuifh'd : But this is not that which wc call Abflraciion. Now it will be more advantagious to con- fidcr thcfe Parts feparately, to a diftinft knowkdg of which wccan never elfe attain. For example the Body of Man can be no o- therwife known, then by dividing it into all I it s Parts ^ as wellfimilaras diflimilar, and by ^ fctting feveral names upon every one. A^ rithmctk alfo ftands upon this foundation. For \ye have no need of Art to meafure or compt little Numbers, for the Mind is a- ble to receive them entire. So that the whple Art confifts in numbring feperately thofe Parts of Number, which being whole w^e cannot reck n. For as Capacious as the Mind is, it is impoffible for it to multiply two Numbers confining of eight or nine Figurer, v/ithout a feperate Multiplication of each Fi- gure by it felf. Secondly, we know by Parts, when we apply our felves to one manner not confider- ing the Subftance , or to two feperately, which are not however inherent in one and the fame Sub jeft. This is done by the Geo- metricians who rcakc a Body extended in Length, Breadth, and Profundity, the Qb- jeft of Geometry. But for the more accu- rate knowledg of this they firfr apply them- felves to the Confideration of one only Di- menfion. chap. 1 V- The Jrt of V^tnkhix. y i menfion. Then they confider two dimenfi- ons, Lcftgth and Breadth^ which they call a Superficies ^ and laftly all the three dimcnfions together, which they cMJblid Bodies,' Hence it appears how vain and ridiculous the Sabtletiesof the Sceptics 2ivc^ who endea- vour to call in queftion the certainty of Geometry^ becaufe it fuppofe Lines and Su- perficies that never were ^ for it does not fup- pofe Lines without Latitude, nor Superficies without Profundity 3 but it fiippofcs that Longitude may^ be confider'd without the confideration of Latitude 5 which is a thing J3eyond all Controverfy, for inmeafiringthe diftance between City and City, we only meafurc the length of the vv^ay, not troubling our felves about the Breadth. Now by how many the more Mamiers we divide things , fo much the more capable vve become of accurately underftanding 'em. Thus we fee in motion, when the determina- tion to whatplace, is not rightly diftinguiQid as well from the motion, as the parts "of the determination, fo long nothing can clearly be concluded concerning the cauies of Rcjic&j* on and DiUinBion^ which is done by the help of this Diftinftion, as may be feen in the Se- cond Chapter of Des Cartes' s Optics. Thirdly we know by Abflrdtian^ \yhen the thing has feveral Attributes, but we only F 4 con- 71 LOGIC', Or, Chap. IV. confider one, fetting all the reft afide. For Example, I confider, That I thinly and by Confequence that / am he who thinks. Now in this Idea of my felf thinkings I can only confider the Thing-Thirtt^ng^ not confidering that I am the Thmg-Thinking^ t\id in Me^ My fclf^ and the Thing-Thinking are one and the fame, and fb the Idea which I have con- ceiv'd of the Perfon-Thinking will not only reprefent me my felf hut all other Perfons that think; In the fame manner, if I confider an E- quilateral Triangle, as it is defcrib'd in fuch a Paper, with all its other determining Cir- cumftances , that Idea will only reprefent this Triangle to me. But if I call off my thoughts from the confideration of thefe par- ticular accidents, and apply my felf to the con- fideration of thisFigure, asconfiftingof three Lines 5 the Idea thus formed will hence more clearly explain the Equality of the Lines, and thence I become more apt and Skilful to make a reprefentation of all other Triangles of the fame Nature. If I am to go farther, and not to ftop at the Contemplation of the E- quality of Lines , but am to confider it as a figure confifting of three right Lines, this Idea will exprefs all the forts of Triangles. Laftly, if omitting the number of the Lines, I only conceive a fuperficies bounded with {light-Lines, I (hall form ^n Idea of Figures confifting Part. I. T/;e Art of Thinking. 7 j confifting of Right-Lines^ and thus by de- grees I may afcend to extcnfion it ftlf. For in thefe Abftraftions, the inferiour degree contains the Superiour, together with fome conjoin d determination. Thus ///j/;/^ con- tains the Thing Thinking : thus an equilateral Triangle contains a Triangle, and thus a Tri- angle comprehends a Right-lind Figure , and the upper degree reprefents many things fb much the more clearly, by how much the left it is determined. Laftly, It is manifeft, that by the benefit of Extra&ion^ Common Ideas are produc d out of SinguUr-y and out of Common ones dill more Common. By which we are admonifh'd to proceed to what is to be faid concern- ing the ZJniverJaht^ and Particularities of Jaeas. C H A P. V. 74 LOGIC; Or, Part, I. C H A P. V^ Of the Vniverfality , Partknlantji and Singu- larity of Ideas, ALtho* whatever exifts be Singular^ ne- verthelefs by the help of Abftra&ions, we may have feveral forts of Ideas^ of which feme will exptefs Singulars , and fuch is the Idea which every one has of himfclf 5 others will exprefs many things together-) as when a Man thinks a Triangle, confidering nothing el ft but that it is a figure containing three Lines, and as many Angles 5 which Idea {6 form'd, mayfervefor the apprehenfion of all other Triangles. Id^as reprefenting onething,are cal Id Sin^ gular and Individjial : and their Objefts are called Individual', but they that reprefent feveral things, are called TJniverfal^ Common or General, The names that denote the firft, are Pro- per Names, as Socrates^ Rome^ Bucephalus. Thefe that fignify the latter Common and Ap- fellatives : as a Man^ a City^ a Horfe. And as chap. V. The Jrt gJ Thinking 7^ as well TJmverfal Ideas as Common names may- be caird Gcnerrcal Therms, Note that there are two forts of Generkd Terms^ one of thoft that are called Univo- cals^ to which the Ufiiverfd Ideas are fo tied» that the fame name may agree with ftveral things according to the fame found, and the fame Notion that is annexed to the Sound s of which fort are a Man^ a Otj^ a Horfi. The other is of thofe that are called £- quwoculls^ the Sound of which is the iame, annexed to different Ideas^ fo that the fame found or word may agree to foveral things, but not according to the fame but various I- ^e^j- which cuftom has fubjefted to the word. Thus Ca?io?i fignifies a great Gun, and Eccle- fiaftical decree, ami a Rule of Art 3 for thefc fignifications belong all to different Ideas. Thefe Univerfal Eqaivocalls are of two forts. For various Ideas fubjedted to one Sound , have either no Relation one with another, as in the word Canon ^ or elfe they have fome Relation 5 as when the name primarily figni- fies one Idea : others no otherwile then as they relate to the f\ii\. Idea^ as the Cauje^ Effcli or Sign , and thefe Equivocalls are called A^ 7talogotis 5 thus Animals^ the Air^ and Diet are (aid to be Healthy. Now the Idea firft joyn d to the word, de- notes Health, which is proper to Animals 5 but 76 LOGIC; Or, Chap.V. but others are added, approaching near to the primary Idea^ ns being the Caufe of Health 5 and therefore we call the Air Heal- thy,and Diet healthy, bccauft they both con- tribute to theprefervation of Health. Neverthelefs when we hear fpeak only of Z)mverfalTerms^ we underftand Dmvocalls only, with the TJniverfd Ideas annexed. But among all thefe Vniverfd Ideas there are two which it highly concerns us rightly to diftinguifli, that is to lay, Com^nhmjion and Bxtenfeon. I call the Comprehenfion of an Idea allthofe Attributes that are contained within it, fo that none can be taken away, but the Idea, mufl: be deftroyd. Thus the Comprehenfion of the Idea of a Triangle, includes Extenfi- on^ Figure^ Three Lines, three Angles, and the equallity of thofe Angles with two right Angles. lc2i\\ExteftJion the Snhje&s with which the Idea agrees, which are alfo called the hferi- ors of the TJmverfalTerm^ which being rela- ted to thofe, carries the name of Superior* Thus the Generkal Idea of a Triangle ex-- tends it felf to all the feveral Species of Trian- gles. But tho the Generkal Idea confufedly ex- tends it felf to all the inferior Subjefts, never- thelefi between the Attributes which it com- prehendS) Part. I. 77;e Jrt of 7hinkm^. yj prebends, and the SnhjeUs to which it is ex- tended, the difference arife from hence, that we cannot dejfpoil the Idea of any of its attributes without deftroying it,as hath been faid^whereas we may reftrain the ExUnfwn of the fame, by applying it to fome of the Sub- je&s^ yetnever injure the Z^e^. Now the ReftriSion of the Generical Idea may happen two ways. Firft by the addition of an Idea diftinftand determin'd. Thus if I add to the Generical Idea of a Triangle, that it has a right Angle, I reftrain the Generical Idea of a Triangles to a certain fpecies of a Triangle , which is therefore called a ReSangleTriangle. Secondly, By the addition of an Idea con- fus^d, and undetermin'd , as if a Man (hould fay, finfe Triangle. In which cafe the Term is made particular , becaufe that now it extends it felf only to a part of the SubjeSs^ which before comprehended all, and yet that part to which it is reftrain d is not deter- mind. CHAP. VL 78 LOGIC; Or, Parct CHAP. VL Of the five TJniverfal Ideas , Gertus^ Specks^ Difference^ Proper^ and Accident. WHAT has been (aid in the former Chapters opens us a way for the ex- planation in few words of thofe Dniverfals which are Vugarly made ufe of in the Schools. For when thcGenerical Idea repreftilts to us their Objefts as Things^ arid that in Sub- irantives and abfolute Terms, it is calVd either Gen/^ ot Species. Of Genus, Genus is call'd zxildea as being fo common that it extends it felf alfb to other Vniverfal Ideas. Thus a fquare Figure of four fides ig a Genus^ in refpeft of a VaraUellogram or a Trapezium. And in like manner Subftance is the fame in refpeft of Subjlance extended^ which is a Body, and the Thinkjng Snhfiance^ which is a Spirit. 0/ chap. VI. The Art of Thinking. 79 Of Specks. But the common Idea which is another more Common and General, is call'd Spcacs, Thus a Parallellograf^^ and Trapezim^t zrt Spe- dess of a Square Figure : and thus Ek)dy and Spirit arc Specks of Subftancc. But one^nd the fame We^ maybe caird a Genus^\( it be referred to other Ideas to which it extends it felf ; but the Species^ if it relates to an Idea more Genera), to which it isfubfer- vient. Thus Body is a Genus in rcfpeft of a Body animate or inanimate , but a Specks in refpeft of Subjlance. Thus a Square is a Ge- nus in refpeft of a ParallcUogrant^ but a Spe- cks in re(peft of a Figure indeterminately taken. But there is another Notion of Specks^ which does not fall but upon tho(e Ideas^ which cannot be caird Genus s ^ as when any Idea has only under it individuals znA fingHlars. Thus a Circle has only under it lingular Cir- cles, which yet are all of the (ame Species, T^ndi thefe Species *s are call'd the Lowermof}, There is alfb a Genus which cannot be a Species^ which is call'd the Supreme of allGe- nuss 3 whether it be Ens or SubUance. Nor is it much material to know it as relating ra- ther to Met^phvfrcs then Loq^ic, I 8o LOGIC; Or, Chap.VL I have caird thofQldeas which reprefent to us their Objefts as Things either Genus\ or 5^e- ckss. However it is not abfblutely neceffary that thofc Objefts (hould be either r/S/'/f^x or Subfiances ^ it fiifEces that they be apprehend-* ed to be like em. For though they be Man- ners^ they may be reprefented without any Relation to ^€\v Subfiances^ and only be re- ferr'd to cfllitxldeas of Manners either more or left General. Thus Figure^ which is the Manner of a Figured Body is a Qenus in refpeft of Figures confifting of ftreight or crooked Lines. On the contrary. Ideas that repreftnt to us their Objefts as Things modify d^ and that in adjeSive or connotative Terms^if they he com- pared with Snbslances which thefe Connotative Terms fignifie but confiifedly, though direct- ly, whether thefe Connotative Terms denote Ejjential Attributes (\v)\\c\i indeed are nothing elft but the Things themfelvesj or Manners^ yet are they not calVd €\th.tx Genush or Spe- cies s^ but either Differences^ or Propers^ or Ac-^ cidents. They are call'd Differences when theObjeft of the Ideas is an Effential Attribute^ by which the Species is diftinguifti'd from another Species as Extended^ ThinkingJR.ationaL They are call'd Propers^ when the Objeft jeally belongs to the Effence of the Things though, Chap. VI. 77;e Jrt of TImking. 8 1 though not thefirft thing that isconfidcrd in ij:, but depending upon the firft, as Di7jjjible^ Immortal^ Uodble. Common Accidents are fo call'd, when their Objefts are true Af^^/;/erj, which cannot be fc- perated by the Underftanding, from tlie Thing whofe Accidents thev are, without deftroying the Idea of the Thing in our Minds 5 as Ronnd^ Hard^ Juji^ Prfident. Of Difference. Now whereas Genus has under it two Spe- cies 5 of neceffity the Ideas of Both include fomething of themfelves, which is not com- prehended in the Idea of the Genus* For if they had nothing different from the Genus^ they would be Genus s themfelves , and as the Gentfs is predicated of both the Specks\ fo both the Specks s are predicated one of a- nother. Hence the Eflential Attribute to the Species not being found in the Genus^ is call'd the Difference of it, and is the ZJniverfal Idea which we have of it : becaufe it can folely and only reprefent to Us this Difference^, wherever it be found 5 that is, in all Inferiors of that Species, For Example, Body and Spirit, are two Species's ofSf/bfiance : therefore there muft be fomething more in the Ideas of Body and G Spirit, %z LOGIC', Or, Part.f. Spirit, then in the Idea of Suhflance. No\^ that which we firft fee more in Body is Exten-^ ftow^vAi^x we fee firft in Sprit is T/6^»gA^.Hence the Difference of Body will be extenfion 5 of Spirit^ Cogitation. That is Body will be a 5!^^- fiance extended^ Spirit, a Thinking Body. Hence it follows , that Difference is doubly referrd , either to the Genus ^ which it divides, or to thetSJpede/ which it Conftitutes, and farther that it is the primary part of that which in the Comprehenfionoixhc Idea is included in the Species. Hence every Species may be exprefs*d by one word only, as Viind^ Body ^ or by two conjoyntly,that is of Genus and%^/ej-,which isalfo caird aDefini- tion^2iS Subjiance extended^d. Thinking Subjiance. Secondly, Difference^ bec^ufe it confti- tutes the Species y and Differences it from other Species's^ ought to have the lame extent with Species ^ and for that reafon Difference and Species ought to be predicated one of ano- ther 5 as thus. Whatever thinks is a Spirit^ e- verj Spirit thinks. But oftentimes itha[^ens, that in leveral things there is no Attribute that offers it felf which agrees Co fully with the whole Species as to agree only with that Species and no o- ther. In this cafe the way is to join together ieveral Attributes, and the Affemblage not be- ing to be found in any other Species^ confti- tutes chap. VI. Tl)e Art of Thinking. 8 3 tutes the difference. Thiis the Platonics af- lerting that the 'Demons were no lefs rational Animals, then Men, would not admit 'Raiio- nal to be the Reciprocal difference of Man, but added another to it, that is to fay, Mor^ tal ^ which is not the Reciprocal difference of Man, as being common to Eeafts: yet be- ing both join d together, they only relate to Man. And thus we frame to our felves Ideas of the moft part of Beafts. Laftly, It is to be obferv'd , that it is not always required that both the Diferences di- viding the GetiHs^ fhould be Pofitive ; it fuffices that only one be fuch. Thus two Men are (ufficiently diftinguifh'd, if he be faid to follow an Employment which the other does not 5 tho' he that wants the Employment has no lefs pofitively then what the other has. Thus Man is generally diftinguifh'd from Brutes 5 for Man is a Creature endifd with a Sold 5 but Brutes are meer Animalu Yet the Generical Idea of Brutes contains nothing in it pojitively^ that is not found in Men 5 only we add to that Idea^ a denial of that to be in them which is in Men 5 that is the So;d. So that the difference between the Idea of an Aninial^ and the Idea of a Brute confifts in this, that the Idea of an Animal neither ex- cludes nor includes Cogitation within its Comprehenfion, whereas neverthekfs it^is G 2 contained S4 LOGIC', Or, Part.L contain'd in its Extenfion. On the other fide, the Idea of a Bmte excludes Cogitati- on out of its Comprehenjiony and therefore cannot fort with Ma^. Of Propers. The diference being found out which con- ftitutesthe lypeaex, that is, the primary effen- tial Attribute diftinguiftiing it from any other Species ^ if enquiring farther into the nature of it, we find another attribute depending upon the Principal by neceflary Connexion, and confequently altogether agreeing with this only Specks^ fuch an Attribute we call Vropriety: and becaule it agrees with all the Inferiors of the fame Species whereever it be, we adopt it into the number of Univerfals , and make a Fourth. For Example, To have a Right- Angle is the cffential difference of a ReSangle Triangle. Now becaufe it neceffarily follows that Angles being Rights the Square of the Hypote- nufe is equal to the jfquares of the other fides, the Equality of theft Squares is taken for the Propriety of a Reiiangle Triangle^ which a- grees with all and only ReSangle Triangles. Neverthelefs fomc will have this name of Proper to be of a larger Extent, and hence arife thofe four Species of it* The Chap. VI. The Art of Thinking. 8 5 The firftis that which we have already ex" plain'd^and which agrees with allfolcly^and al- ways : thus it is the propriety of all Circles, and only Circles, and always to have all Lines drawn from the Center to the Circum- ference equal. The Second agrees with j^ll^ but not o?ily AIL Thus it agrees with an extended Body to be divifible, becaufe all extended Bodies may be divided, altho Y>Hration^ Number^ and Force may al(b be divided. The third may agree with d;;e o^ly 3 but not with all. Thus it is only proper to a Man to bie a Phy fitian or a Philofopher 5 tho' all Men are neither Philofophers nor Phyfi- tians. The Fourth may agree with aU and only^ but not always. An Example of this we have in Grey-hairs of Old-men, which is proper folely and to allMen^ hut not always'^ that is, not till Men arrive to Old-age. Of Accidents* We have already declared in the Second Chapter, that a form or Manner \s that which cannot naturally fubfift but by the fubftance, and that it is not join'd to the Subftance with any neceflhry Connexion 5 So that the thing G 3 may 86 LOGIC; Or, Pa«. I. may be exaftly underftood, though the Form or Manner be not conceiv'd. Thus we exaft- ly underftand a Man, not confidering whe- ther he heFrudent or no , but Prudence car^- not be conceiv'd unlefs we apprehend the Man, or fbme Intelligence being capable -o€ prudence. But when we couple the confus'd and inde- terminate Idea of Subftance with thcDiJim^ Idea of any form or manner^ this Idea may reprefent all things, wherein this manner is included. Thus the Ideaof a Prudent Man will r€- prefent all prudent Men 5 the Idea of Round' will reprefent all Round Bodies. And thefe Ideas being thus exprefsd by Connota^mt: Term.s, are thofe things which make the yJr/? TJniverJal^ czWA an Accident '^ becaufe it does mot effentially belong to the X^^*^^, to which it is attributed 3 for if it di4», it '^wpul4 bf^ cxxhtr Difference or Propriety. - - -r,; Vfv v. But here it is alfo to be obferv'd,as we have hinted before, that when two Subftances are conceiv d together, another may be con- ceiv d as the form or manner of the other. Thus a Man Cloath'd may be eonfider d as fomething compounded of a Af^/^andC/^^i^^/.; But to he Cloatbd^ in refpeft of that Man, is the manner of his appearing only, uqdei^ which that Man is conceivd-, though the Garments j Chap. VI r. TheArtof ^mking.^%^ Garments are Subftances: and thusjto be dad/ will belong to the firjl ZJmverfiL And fo much for the Univerfalls (b pom- poufly cri'd up in the Schools 5 for 'tis little material to know that there are Gew/f^ Spe- c/eSf Difference^ Propriety ^ and Acd dent '^ but to know the true Gemt/s^ the true Species's of Genus s^ their Proprieties and accidents, that's the main thing requir'd 5 for the at- taining of which knowledg we make no qqeftion to give fome light in the following Chapters, after we have ipok'n fomething before-hand of the Complex" d Terms. CHAP. vir. Of the Complex d Terms^ their Univerfality^ and ParticnUritj. Sometimes to fome certain Term we join other Terms, from which arifes in our Minds a total Idea^ of which we may affirm or deny thofe things, which cannot either be de- ni'd or affirmed of the fingle terms ftparately taken 5 from whence proceed the Complex' d Terms 5 as a Prudent Man^ a Tranfparent Bo- dy^ Alexander the Son of Phillip, G 4 Thefe 88 LOGIC', or, Part. I. Thefe additions are fbmetimes made by Pronouns Relative, as the Body which is Tran- f^arcnt^ Alexander who is the Son of Philip 3 the Pope who k Antichriji. And indeed it may be affirm'd that altho thefe Pronouns are not always expreff'd , yet they are always to be underftood, becaufe that in altering the Propofition, they may be Expreft. For a Transparent Body^ and a Body that is Tranjparent^ are equivalent. But that which is chiefly to be obferv'd in Complex d Terms is, that there arc two kinds of Additions^ of which the one may be cal- led Explicative^ and the other^ Determinative. The Explicative in pofitive words, explains that v/hich before lay hid cither in the Compre- henfion of the Idea of the firft Term,or at leaft which agrees with it as? an Accident^ ft) that It agrees with it generally and according to its entire Extenfion. As when I fay, A Man who is a Creature endued with Reafen 5 or ^M^?^ who naturally defires Happinejs 5 or a Man who is Mortal For what is here added is only Ex- plicative^ not changing any thing in the whole Idea^ which is annex'd to the word Man : nor reftraining it to fignifie only certain Men 5 but only it denotes thofe things more clearly which are common to all Mankind. Of this nature are thofe Additions which . arp appli-d to I^ames, diflinftly 4enoting ' Jn* chap. VII. The Art of Thinking. 89 Individifals^ as when we fay, London k the largeji Gty in Europe 5 Julius C^far was the greateft Captain in the World '-^ Ariftotlc the Prince of Philofophers 5 Lewis the Fourteenth King of France ^ for here the Single Terms fb pronounc d, looft nothing of their E).ten- fion, as being firft determin d as much as they could be. Determinative is that, which being added, reftrains the Signification of the General Term^ fo that it is not now accepted in its full extenfion, but comprehends only a partof it^ as Tranfparent Bodies^ Wife men , a Rational Great Hre, Thefc additions are not fi'iiply £.r- plicative^bm Deter minative^tcdMft they maim and curtail the Extenfion of the firft Term , for the name of Body here fignifies only a part of the Body of Man^ as a part of Men, of a Creature , as part of the Creatures. But it is the Nature of thefe additions fometimes to create a Singular out of a Com- mon Term^ when they contain Condition^ Individuant:2S when I fay the King nmv Reign- ing, the Common name of King is determin'd to the fingle and only Perfon of James 11. There are alfo two other kinds of Com- plex'd Terms 5 of which the firft is Complex d in words, the other in Sence only. Of the firft kind are thofe that have the Addition exprefs'd, as in the Examples hi- therto mention d. Of po LOGIC; Or, Part. I. Of the other kind are They, in which one of the Terms is only pronounced, the other underftood : as when we fay ^t he King. This Term is Complex'^ d in Senfe ^ becaufe when we pronounce the word, the Idea of the Com- mon name does not prefent it felf to our minds alone, but, as adjoyn'd to it, the Idea of Lewis 14. who now Raigns in France. The infinite number of Terms is meant of thofe which being thus comfkx'd^ occur in daily Talk, as in every Family, Mafter^ implying fuch a One. Some Terms are 2Mb Complex' d a swell in WordsasSenfe, but after various manners. Thus the Vrince of Vhilofopkers is complex'd in words, becaufe the name of Vrince is determin'd by the word Vhilofopher 5 but in refpect of Arifiotle^ to whom the School-men are fb addicted to give that Ti* tie, it is complex'd in Senfe, when the Idea of Arijiotle is only obvious to the mind, nor be- ing exprefi'd by any Sound that denotes the Perfon. All Adje&ives or Connotatives2irc either Parts of Connexd Terms, though they are clapt to- gether with their Subftances, or complex'd in Senfe, when theSubftantives are underftood. Becaufe, as we have (aid in the Second Chap- ter, thefeConnotative Names denote theSub^ ject directly indeed, but more confufedly5 the Mode or Form indirectly 5 but more di- ftinctly. And chap. VII. TheJrtoJ Thinking 91 And therefore the Idea of the Subject is very General and very confus'd, reprelenting fometimes Entity^ Ibraetimes aBoJy^ which for the ixioft part is determin'd by a diftinct Form of the Idea. Thus White fignifies a Thing, th^t has Whitenefs. And hence the Confus'd Idea of the Thing, is determin'd to . fignifie thofe things only that avQWhite. However in this Matter, it is chiefly to be oblerv'd,that there arc fome Co/;/plcxd Terms, v/hich although they be only de* termin'd to one only hdjvjdifal^ nevertheless retain an Equivocal ZJnizerfahty^ which may be call d an Onivcrfabty o( Error, For when men agree that one only Thing is fignif-y'd by fuch a Term, but difpute what that only Thing really is, it happens that this Term is applyd by fome to fignifie this Thing, by o- thers, another Thing. Hence it is "requifite that fuch a Terra be farther determined ei- ther by the variety of Circumftances or the Series of Difcourfe that the fignification of the Term may be made precisely appa- rent. Thus true Religion fignifies one (ble Reli- gion, which is really the Church of Eng- land:-^ but becaufe all People and eve- ry Kerefie think their own Religion to be trueft, theic Terms are highly Ejuivo- fate^ by Et^uivocatJon of Errgr. For if an Hifto- 91 LOGlCyOr, Part. I. Hiftorian (hould write that his Prince was moft addicted to the true Religion^ it cannot be faid what he means, unlefi it be known what Rehgion the Hiftorian profefs'd. For if he were a Church of England Man^'it is under- ftood of a Church of England Prince^ or ofa Mahumetan^ if the Hiftorian were an Arabian Mahumetan 5 and fb of a Roman Catholic Prince 5 if the Author were a Roman Catho- lick Complex* d Terms^ wherein there is Equivo- cation of Error cheifly comprehends thofe Quahties of which the Senfc is no Judge, but the Mind. For men are prone to differ in their Opinion, concerning fuch Things. For Example, fhould we affirm, that no Soldiers were lifted hjMarius^ but fuch as were fix foot high, this Complex* d Term, SoU dier^ fix foot high^xs notfubject to Equivocation of Error^, when it is eafie for Soldiers to be meafurM 5 that we may know whether they be fix foot high or no. But had it been decreed that none fhould be Hfted but fuch as were iiout^ this Term had been much more liable to Equivocation^ when as it might be attribu- ted to fuch Soldiers, that lookt like ftout Men, but are indeed but meer Cowards. This Equivocation of Error is often found in Complex d Terms ^ The Chiefeji of theVariJian Geometricians 5 the mo3 Learned^ the rpkk§dr- eft. Chap. Vll- TI)eJrt of Ihinking. ^5 ejl , the rJchefl of Mert, For though thefe Terms are divided by J/'/^;7^/W//^;;^Conditions,feeing that one Perfbn might be the chiefeft of the Parifan Geometricians 5 neverthelefs this Term might be afcrib'd to feveral, though proper only to one^ in regard it is an cafie thing for men to vary in their Judgments con- cerning this matter ^ fo that every one fhall give this Title to him , whom he thinks to be the bcft and moft excellent Geometrician. Thefe Forms of Speech alfo 5 The Sertcc of the Author , vrhat the Author declares upon this SMbje6f^2iYe of the Number of thefe Eqidve- cates ^ efpecially if the Author be fo oblcure, that there beany Difpute about his Senfe.And thus v/e find continual Altercations concern- ing Ariftotles Opinion of Philofophers, while every one endeavours to draw him to their Party. For although Arijlotle had but one Sence concerning one Things yet becauft he is varioufly underftood by feveral,the(e words, the Sence of Arijlotle^ are the Equivocatiotis of Error. For every one pronounces that to be the Judgment of Ari!iotle,\\A\\c\\ he is perfwa- ded that Ari^otle meant 5 and fo if feveral believe, That Arijlotle had a different Opi- nion of the fame thing 5 thefe Ttxms.the Sence of Arijlotle in fuch a matter^ though Angular in themfclves, can never be apply 'd to Many, that is to fay, to all thofe things, that Arijlotle ihall 94 LOGIC; Or, Parti (hall be faid to have written upon fiich aSub- jeft 5 for fo they (hall fignifie with every one, what every one is perfwaded the Philosopher thought. But that we may the better underftand , where lies this Equivocation of Error^ it is to be obftrvd, that the Terms of it are Con- HOtative 5 either exprefly, or in fence. Now as I have (aid, in ConnotaHve^ txms may be confider'd as well the Subjefl:, which is di- reftly or confusedly expreis'd, as thtForm or Mode which is direftly and indiftinftly figni- fi'd. lL\iUsWhite confufedly denotes a body, di- Kmd\y Whit enefsx, thus, theSence of Arijiotk^ confufedly fignifiesfome Sentence, Thought, or Doftrine of his ^ diftinftly, the Relation of that Doftrine to Jrijiotle^ to whom it is attributed. However the Equivocation which is found in thefe Terms does not properly arife from the Form or Mode^ which being diftinft, can never vary 5 nor from the Subjeft confus'dly confidery, as not being freed from that con- fufion. For Example thefe words, T?rince of Vhilofophers^ cannot be Equivocates 5 in re- gard the Idea of Vrince of Philofiphers can be diftinftly apply 'd to no Individual. But E- quivocation confifts only in This, that the Wind inftead of the confus'd Subjeft (ubfti- tute^ chap. Vll. The Art of TlnnKmg. 95 tutes another which is diftinfl: and determi- nate, to yfYiich Form or M^;;^er are applyd. But in regard men difpute about this mattery they may afcribe the Title of Prince or Cheif to feveralPerfons, and fignahze em after- wards with what additional word they think moftconvenient.Thus formerlyP/f^/^ was call d the Vrhjce of P^/iTpf/^er/ 5 which Title is now conferr'd u^on Ariftotle. Thus the \vords^Tr;/e Religion^ not having any diftinft, but a con- fus'd Ide^ of any Religion, are no Equivo- cates^ becaufe they denote nothing but that Religion which is abfolutcly True. But when the Mind has anncx'd the Idea of True Reli- gion to the diftinft Idea of fome particular Worfhip diftinftly known, they become e- gregious equivocates, and fignifie thatWorftiip with every one, which they account the True Religion. The fame is the Condition of thefe words. That rrhichfucha Vhilofopher held offuch a Mat- ter. For while they abide in their general I- dea^ the general Idea fimply and generally will fignifie the Dodrine delivered byfuch a Philofbpher concerning fuch a Matter ; as the Doftrine of Ariftotk concerning the Nature of the Soul. Whereas the fame words, that which^ Sec, that is to fay, this Doftrine, while it is under a confus'd Idea applyd to no di- ftinft Idea^ is not capable of Equivocation* But 96 LOGIC', Or, Part. I. But when the Mind inftead of that Doftrine confusedly conceiv'd,fiibftitutes a diftinct Doc' trine,& a diftinftSub jectjthen according to the variety of diftinft Ideas ^ xhditi^imtThatwhich^ &c.may be liable to Equivocation.Thm the Do- ftrineof Ariftotk touching the Nature of the Soul is an Equivocate mthVor/jponatiifs^who at ferts that Arijiotlehdicv'd the Soul to be Mor- tal^and with ftveral others of his Interpreters, who on the other fide affirm that Ariftgtk taught the Immortality of the Soul, as well as PUto and Socrates, Hence it is, that words of this nature moft frequently fignify the thing with which the form indireftly exprefs'd cannot agree. Suppofe for example's lake, that Philip was not the Father of Alexandey^ as Alexander himlelf endeavoured to make out 5 theft words, the Son of Philips denoting Generality, any perfon begot by Philips erro« neouflylpokenof Alexander^ denote the per- fon that is not really the Son of Philip, In like manner theft words,the Sence of Scripture alledg'd by a Quaker, to prove a Sed quite contrary to Scripture (hall denote that very Sed in his Mouth, which he thinks to be ac- cording to the Sence of Scripture, and which he has therefore dignify'd with that name , of the Sence of Scripture j nor are the Papifts more in the right then they, who pretending to axlhere to the Word of God ^ for II Chap. VIIL tl?e Art of Vnnkmg . 97 for among them thezr^^r^^/G^^^fignifiesthatO- glio of Snperftitions which they would obtrude upon the Proteftants inftead of Gods Word. CHAP. VIII. Of the Clear/;efi aful Diflin^ron of Ideas, as alfo of their Ohfcirnty afid Confufton. TN Ideas clearnefs may be difccrn'd front DtfiwUion , and obfcurity from confu- fion 5 for wc may call that a clear Jdca^ when it imprints in us a lively, as I may call it, Sence of it fclf, whereas otherwife it may not be fo diftinft. The Idea of Pain becaufc it ftrikes us fo fenfibly, rtlay be call'd a Ckar Idea 5 but yet it is confus'd, becaufe it reprc- fents P^/;/ to us, as being in the Hand, when indeed it lies in the Sence. Neverthelefs we may call every Idea clear, fo far as it is diftinft 5 for all obfcurtty arifcs out of Confufion. Thus the fence of the Pain that hurts us is clear and alfo diftina ^ but what is confos'd in the Feeling, that is to iay,that the Vain is in the hand,cannot befaid to be clear. Now becauft Clearnefs and Diftinftion ate one and the fame in Ideas^ it will be very re- quifite to examiine why fome Ideas are clear, others confusd. H But LOGIC', Or, Part.r But this will be more apparent by the help of examples, then any other way 5 and there- fore let us weave together a Catalogue of the firft Idcas^ as well clear and diftindt, as ob- fcure and confus'd. The raoft clear Idea is that which every Man has of himfelf, zsoCthtThwgthatthmksy asalfothe Ideas of thole other Appendixes to our thoughts, as to J^idg^ Difcourfe^ De- liberate^ Perceive^ Imagine. Ideas of extended Subftances alfb are mofl: chiefly clear to us, as alfo the Ideas of their Properties ^ as Figures^ Motion^ Reft 5 for tho' we may feign that there is no Body, no Figure, (tho' we cannot feign any fuch thing of the thinking Subftance, while we think ) yet we cannot (ay we clearly perceive what is Extenjion and Figure. We alfo clearly apprehend Duration^ Or- der^ and Number^ fo that we confider the D//- ration of any thing to be form, under which we confider the thing, fo long as the form continues in it. Thus order and number no way differ in efFeft from things Order d and Numbered. All thefe Ideas are fo clear, that we fre- quently render 'em more obfcure, while we endeavour to illuftratc 'em with new Ob- lervations, and frame toourfelves other Idc" as then thofe which we have from Nature. We chap. VIII. The Art of Vnnktng. ^^ We may alfb (ay, that the Idea of God is clear in one refpeft, tho' in another moft o^b- fcure and imperfed. It is clear, becaufe it fufEces to difcover the gre.it number of Attributes in God, which we certainly know are no where elfe to be found but in Godnbut it is obfcure in refp^d of that Idea which the Bleffed have of him in Heaven.And it is alfo Imperfeft, in regard our Minds being limited and finite, cannot but moft Imperfcftly conceive an infinite Being ^ for Perfeftion and Clearness in Ideas are two different things. For they are PerfcEt^ when they reprefenttc us whatever is in trheObjeft, Clear when they reprefent to us as much as fuffices to apprehend the objeft clearly and diftinftly. On the other fide they are confus'd and obfcure Ideas which we have cf Se?tfible Qua* lities ^ as of Colours^ Somtds^ Odors^ Tajls^ Cold^ Heat, Vonderofity^ See. As alfo thofe of our defires, as of Hunger, Thirft, Pain, &c. Now mark the reafon of the Obfcurity of th^ik Ideas, In regard v/e were firft Children before we were Men, and that exterior things operating within us , ftirr'd up various Senfations in our Mind by the help of thofelmprefiions which they made in our Bodies 5 the Mind confcious that thoft Senfations are effected againft her H a vvili, loo LOGIC '^ Or^ Part.l. will, and that by fome Body s (as for example theSenfation of heat by the Eire) would not only judg that there were fome thins;s without her,which were thecaufesof thefeSenlations, (wherein (he was not deceiv d ) but going farther, imagined fomething in the Objects, altogether like Senfation, or at leaft like the Ideas thence arifing. Upon thefe Confidcra- tions therefore, (he formed Ideas to her felf^ and transfer*d the Senfations of Heat^ Cold^ Scioto thofe things that are without her. And by that means thofe confuted and obfcure /- deas of fenfible qualities arofe from hence, that the Mind intermixed her own falft Judg- ments with thofe that (he deriv'd from Nature. Now in regard thefe Ideas are not natural but Arbitrary^ Men have made a moft fanta- flical ufe of 'em, and turnd 'em into meer Chimeras , for tho' that Heat and Bnrmng are two forts of Senfatim 5 the one weaker, the other fiercer, we have allowed heat to the Fire, affirming Fire to be endu'd with Heat, yet we have dcpriv'd Fire of the burning faculty, or of the pain which we feel in ap- proaching too near it, denying Fire to be af- fefted with Pain. But if Men had rightly apprehended that Vain is not to be attributed to the Fire that burns the Hand 5 yet had they been in ano- ther error, while they thought pain to be in the chap. VIII. The Art of Thmktng. \ o i the hand which the Fire burns, when as pain is only in the Scnfe. This was not only the Opinion of fome of the antient Philolbpers, as the Cyrenarchs^ but even of St. ^//ff/^/himfelf^ For f^iyshc w hk 14 Boo/{^ de civitat* dei^ Pains faid to be Pah;s of the FleJIj 5 are pains of the Soul in the FleJI) and out of the Fkfl) ^ for pain of the , Flefl) js only an Injury to the Soul^ and a certain dijfent from its fuffering : as the Pain of the Soul^ nrhich is Sad?:efs^ is a dijjent from thoje things that befal us againji our Wills. Thus in his leventh Book upon Genefis, C 19. When the Soul feels the Affli^ionsof the Bo- dy^ f/je is offended in her a5 of Government of the Body^ her Rule being dijlurUd^ and thk of- fence is call'd Pain. Now that that Pain which is called the Pain of the Body, belongs to the Soul and not to the Body, is manifeft from this, that thofe things that affcft us with Pain, feldom trou- ble us when onr minds are intent upon other things, as we find by the African Prieft, (of whom 5t. AufiinL.l^. de Civitat.deiC. 24. Whorphen pleas d^upon the Counterfeiting of Groans and Lamentations^ would fo abftraft himftlf from his Senfes^ and lye as it were for Dead^ that they could not make him fenjible of Pinching and Prickings nor of the heat of Fire^ till it began to fcorch his Skin. H 3 Moreover 102 LOGIC; Or, Part. I. Moreover it is to be obferv'd,that neither the ill difpofition of the hand, nor any motion a- rifin^ from burning, caufes the Soul to be (enfible of the ]^ain, unlefs this Motion be Communicated to the Brain, by certain fmall Strings included in the Nerves, and extended from the Brain to the Hands, and other parts of the Body, which cannot be mov'd nnlefs that part of the Body be alfo movd from whence they derive themfelves. So that if there be any accident that hinders theft little Strings from communicating their motion to the Brain fas in the Pall}) a Man may en- dare Wounds and Pain without any Sence of Pain. Infomuch that what appears yet more ftrange, a Man may have a pain in his hands that v/ants hands, as often it happens to thofe whofe hands are cut ofF^ for that if the threads of the Nerves extended from the Hand to the Brain be movd near the Elbow, V/here they terminate, they may move that part of the Brain to which they are faftened, in the fame manner as it might be mov'd, if the fame threads defcended to thehand,as the one end of a fmall Rope may be moved in the fame manner, if drawn about the mid- dle, as if puird at the other extremity 5 and thus the Soul fhould feel the fame Pain as it would feel if the Perfon had hands. For the Soul direfts its attentjvenefs thither from whence chap. VIII. The Jrt of Vnnktnz. i o 5 whence that motion of the Brain us'd to pro- ceed, which before affefted it with that fort of Pain. Thus the Refleftions that we be- hold in a Glafs appear in the fame place where they would be, (hould they be lookt upon with direft beams, as being the moft ufaal manner of beholding Objcfts. And thefe things (liall fufEce to let us un- derftand that it may well be, that a Soul fe- parated from the Body may be liable to the Torments of Hell-Fire, and to feel the fame Pain, as any one would feel through the tor- tures of Earthly Fire 5 in regard that when it was join d to the Body,it was not the Body but the Soul that felt the pain of the Fire,and that pain was nothing but a certain fadncfs of the Mind wherewith it was afflifted for thefuife* rings of the Bodyr, to which it was join d by God. Why thenmay we not conceive that di- vine Juftice may fo accommodate (bme part of thematerial Body to the feparate Soul,that the motion of that matter may excite trouble- fome and affiifting thoughts in the Soul fo fe- parated. But let us return to confused Ideas. The Idea of Ponderofity is no left confus'd then any of the reft already recited 5 for having obferv'd from our Infancy, that Stones and other heavy things fall down as foon as let go out of our hands, we form'd an Idea of H 4 the 104 LOGIC', Or, Part. I. the thing falling whkh is genuine and true. We alfo form'd an Idea of the reafon why the thing does fall , which is true likewife , but when we only faw the Stone, and nothing elfe that forced it dowmvard, out of the rafhnefs of our Judgment we concluded that there was no fuch thing as what we did not fee, and therefore that the Stone fell by ver- tue of its own proper and intrinfic Force, and at length we affix d to this confufed Idea^ coin d only in our own Judgments the name of Pcnderofity. It came to pafs alfo that we made diffe- rent Judgments of the fame things of which the fame Judgment was to be allerted , tor as we ^w Stones mov'd toward the Earth, we found.Straw move toward Jet, and Steel toward the Loadftone. Therefore the fame Realbn that bc^cjueathes that quality to Stones to be mov'd toX^rd the Earth, ought to al- low the fame qualities to Straw and Iron for moving towards Jet *^ and the Loadftone. However this would not Catisfy 5 but on the ■ contrary we have affignd^^to Jet, Amber, and the Loadftone certain qualkies which we call Attraffive^ when with the fabie eafe we might have cndu d the Earth with tl^e fame quality ofvattrafiing heavy things. Hc)\vever thcfe attrahiive qualities, (as alfo Ponderofity \t felf ) /prang from Illegitimate Ratiodna-r Chap.VIII. The Art of Thinking. 105 //^/?, by which it was concluded, that Iron was neceflarily attrafted by the Loadftone, becaufe there was nothing feen that pufh'd the Iron toward the Magnet 5 whereas it can never be conceiv'd, that one Body (hould attraft another, unlcfs the Body attrafting be movM, and the Bodv attraftcd befaften d to it. To thefe Judgments of our infancy we owe for thofe Ideas that reprednt to us Pon- derous and hard things, more (olid then Light and thin, and having more Body or Mntter. Thus we believe that a Vcfld full of Gold contains more matter then if it were fiird with Air, for thofe Ideas derived thenift Ives fi'om no other Foundation, then that when we were Children we vz-^re vv ont to make ex- trinfical Judgments of all things, according to their Aftions in reference to us. Hence becaufe ponderous and hard Bodies afted more violently then Light and Thin, we con- cluded that they contain'd more Subftance then the other. When true Reafon tells m^ that the fame part of matter polTefles the fame fpace, and the famefpaccis always fiU'd with the fame quantity of Matter. So that a Cubic Veffel of a Foot will con- tain no more Matter^ being fill'd with Gold then Air. Nay, in fome Sence it may be (aid that being filFd with Air, it contains more iratter. \o6 LOGIC', Or, Part. I. matter for a Reafbn not now longer here to be infifted on. It may be faid that from the fame Root of fbi e-judging of things, fprang the fooUfti o- pinions of Ibme, that our Souls are either the thinneft part of the Air composed of A- toms^ according to Democritus with the -Epi- cureans^ or the Air kindled, as the Stokks b or a particle of Celeftial Light, as the Mani- cheans^ or of later days Find 5 or a liittle Wind, as the Socinians 5 for none of thefe could ever perfwade themfelves that Wood , Stones or Durt could ever be capable of thinking. And therefore Cicero at the fame time that he afferts with the Stokks^ our Soul to be a futtle Flame, places it among abfurdi- ties, not to be endud to think it fhould e're derive its Original from Earth or thick Air ^ For faith he, I hefeech j/e^ is it pojjible to thinks that fiich a force and mafi of Memory was ever fowed in the Earth tofpring up again^ or thich^rid together out of Cloudy and Boggy Air ? For they believ'd that the more futtle and pure they made the matter, fo much the lefs ma- terial, the lefs thick and corporeal it would be, that fo at length they might rarify it into a thing of Thought^ which however is very ri- diculous 5 for a Body is not thinner then a Body, only that it is divided into lefler par- ticles, and more eafily agitated. For thus on the Chap.VIII. V>eArtoj Jh'inKmg. 107 the other fide it makes left refiftance then o- ther Bodies ^ on the other it more eafily pe- netrates their Pores. But whether it be indi- vifible or divided , whether it reft or be -mov'd, however it is not le(s material, lefs corporeal, or more capacious of Thought, it being impoffible that the motion or figuie of the Matter whether futtl^ or thick fhould have any thing common with Cogitation 5 or that a certain part of the matter that never thought, when it refted like the Earth, or was gently mov d like the Water, (hould come to a knowledg of it felf upon a more vehe- ment Motion or augmenting the force of A- gitation. Much more might befaid upon thisSabjeft, but this (hall fuffice for the underftanding of all confus'd Ideas^ when they have all their Cauftsliketo theie. There is one Fvemedy for this mifchief^ to caft away all prejudicate opinions ingraft- ed in our Infancy, and to affert nothing of what it belongs to Reafon to pronounce, be- caufe we fo judged it heretofore, butbecaufe we now judg it to be fo upon Examination. So (hall we have only natural Ideas^ and for (uch as are confus'd, we fhall only retain thofe that are clear, as that there is fomething in the Fire which is the reafon that I feci the heat 5 that all things which are ponderous, are io8 LOG I C; Or, Part. I. arc pufh'd down by fbme certain caufe , not determining any thing of what is in the Fire that caufts that burning , or of the caufe that makes the Stone fall down till I find my know- ledg confirmed by clear Reafons. CHAP. IX. Some Examples of confused and ohjcure Ideas drawn from Ethics. IN the former Chapters we have brought fome Examples of confused Ideas ^ which for the reafons given we legally afl'ert to be falfe 5 But being all taken out of Phyficks, it may not be from the purpoft to produce fome others out of Ethics^ in regard that falfe Ide- as^ which are formM of Vertues and Vices^ are far more dangerous. Nor indeed is any one more happy, or more unhappy becaufe he has a true or falfe, a clear or obfoure Idea of Ponder ofty^ Senjihle Qualities^ or the Senfes. If in thofe things he be more or lefi knowing, he will neither be the better nor the worfe ^ whatever our opi- nion be touching thofe things, we (hall never alter Chap. IX* T^^^ ^^^ ^i Thinking. \ o^ alter it for our own fakes. Their Being is in- dependant from our knowledge,andthe Con- duft of our Life is Independant from their Be- ing. So that all Men are allowd to await that Knowledg which (hall be our portion after this Life, and to leave the Government of the World to the Goodnefs and VVifdom of God who governs it. But no Man can excufe himfelf from en- deavouring to acquire a right Information concerning Vertue and Vice, becaufe that from the prefcriptsof Judgments made upon thcfe things , our Lives are to be go- verned, our Manners composed, and the E- ternity of good or evil to be cxpefted. And as the falfe Ideas of Vertue and Vice are the realbnthat we judg amifsof em, fo in- finitely better would it be to know and amend thefe with Care and Induftry,then to ftudy the reftifying of thofe other,which precipitancy of Judgment, or the prcjudicate errors of Youth have obtruded upon us in reference to natu- ral things, which can only fupply Matter for lean and barren Speculation. To difcover all thofe falfe Ideas , would require a Tran(cription of the whole Body of Ethics^ but our only defign here is to pro - pofe certain Examples of the m.anner, how they are formM by annexing together fevcral Ideas that are not really annexed, which produces no LOGIC', Or^ Parti. produces fcveral vain and idle Philntoms 9 which Men never ceafe hunting after,and mife- rably wafte their time in hopes to attain that which is of no value when attained. Man finds in himfelf the Ideas of Miftry and Happinefs, which is neither falfe nor confusM, while general and abftrafted : He has alfo the Ideas of Bafenels and Excellency. He covets Happinefs, avoids Mifery 5 he ad- mires Excellency, defpifes Bafenefs. But the Contamination of Sin, which has a- lienated God from Man, in whom alone he could have found true felicity, and to whom alone he ought to afEx the Idea of it, has af- fix d this Idea of Happinefs to an Innumera- ble company of other things. To the Love and Prosecution of which Man is carried headlong, as if he thought to recover his loft feUcity in them. Hence has ariftn a vaft heap of falfe and obfcure Ideas^ while every one thinks he (hall be happy in the poffeffion of what he loves 5 miferable,if deprived of it. But Man has loft his true Nobility, and real Excellen- cy by Sinning. Hence,that he may love him- (elf, he is conftrain*d to repre(ent him(elf to him(elf, other then what indeed he is, and to hide his Indigencies and Miferies from him- (elf 5 to add many things to the Idea of him-- (elf^ v/hich belong not to him tQ the end he may chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 1 1 1 may appear Greater and more Augufl, And now behold the common Series of thefe falfe Ideas, The firft and chicfeft is the propcnfity of Concupifcence to the Pleafurcs of the Sence, arifing from (bme exterior things ; For when the Soul perceives that her darling Pleafures proceed from thofe things, (he immediately joyns the Idea of good to thofe things, and the Idea, of bad to thofe other things that de- prive her of thofe Pleafures. And obferving afterwards that Power and Riches are the u- (iial Inftruments, whereby to acquire the means to indulge Concupifcence , (he be- gins to efteem theft for great HappinefTes, and pronounces for Blefled, the Rich and Potent that enjoy 'em 5 the poor miftrable, for being deprivMof theft Delights. But now as Felicity has always Excellency for her Companion, the Mind never ftparates thofe two Ideas^ but always looks upon as great,all thofe that (he con{iders as happy,and as little and mean, all thofe that are poor and unhappy. And this is the reaft)n that we con- temn the poor, and admire the opulent. But thefe are fiichunjuft and falfe Judgments,that St. Tfjomas believes, it is this worship and ad- miration of Riches, which is fo much con- demn'dby St.J ames the Apoftle, while he for- bids a more honourable place to be aflign d to the Ill LOGIC:, Or, Part- 1. the Rich then to the Poor ^ tho* this place is not to be fb literally expounded, as if we were not tofhew fome outward-veneration to the Rich, which is not due to the Poors feeing that the order of the World, which Religion does not difturb, requires it, and this praftift has been all along obferv'd among men, high- ly eminent for their Piety, And therefore it is to be underftood of that inward refpeft, which looks upon the Poor asfiibjefted under the Feet of the Rich, and the Rich as infi- nitely exalted above the Poor, But though thefc Ideas and the judgments that arifc from thence are falfe and unreafo- able, yet are they common to all men that have not rcftifi*d 'em, as proceeding from concupifcence with which all men are infefted. Hence it happens that we not only think fo honourably of the Rich, but that we alfo know that all other Mortals render 'em the fame honour and efteem. So that we repre- fent to our felves their Condition not only as environd with all (plendour and advantages that attend it, but worfhip it with all that inward Adoration of Judgments with which we flatter the Wealthy, and are known not only by the Common Dilcourfe of Men, but by our own Experience. ThisPhantome of a Rich man, whom the Croud of his admifers furround, gaze upon with C^hap.IX. Tl)e Art of Thinking. 115 with fixed Eyes5an(J reverence w^ith an inward Worfhip of Fear, obfervance and abjed: ier- vility, is the true Idol of the Ambitious, fpr fcrwhofe j[ake they endure fo many miieries .and throw themfclves into fo many dangejps. Now that it may appear that this is that which they all covet and adqre, let us rfup- pofe.that there were,but one only man in the World endu'd with Reafon, and all the reft men meerly in (hape, were all but Statues mov,'d by Engines 5 and that that one Think- ing Man, knowing well that all thofe Statues that refembl'd him outwardly, .were all de- priv d of reafon and thought, had a fecret way to move 'em by certain Springs fo that they might perform all the Offices which he had a mind to require from men 5 we may be- lieve this Perfon would fometimes takeplea- fiire to divertifo himftlf with the ftveral Movments he (hould give to thefe Statues ^but fertainly he could never delight himfelf or take any pride in the Honours, Bows and Cringes that they made him ; rather he would be as weary of 'em as of fo many Puppets 5 .and at length would fatisfie himfelf withfuch a train as (hould fuffice forneceflhry Services, without defiringany greater number of thele Statues then (hould be for hisufe. So that it is not the limple and external Obe- dience of Attendants feperatedfrom die inter- I Dal 114 LOGIC', Or^ Part.I; nal fubmiffion of the Mind that is the Object of afpiring Ambition. Tis Dominion over men not Statues which they covet 5 and the plea- fure of thofe that Rule proceeds from theim- preffionsof Fear, efteem and admiration which they imprint in others. From whence it is manifeft that the Idea| %vith which they are blinded is no lefs vaini and empty, then the Idea of thofe whom we 1 properly call Vain-glorious men, who are they that feed themfelves with Praifes, Eulogies, Titles, and other things of this nature: The only thing that diftinguifhes the one from the other is the fingle difference of Opinions and Judgments, which both are defirous to com- municate to others. For as it is the main de- lire of th^Vain-Glorious to excite in others a {enfe of Love and Efteem for their Know- ledg, Eloquence, Wit, and Dexterity 5 'tis the delight of the ambitious to excite in others motions of Terrour, of Obedience and Sub- miffion to their Grandeur, and Ideas conform- able to thole judgments, by means whereof they appear formidable, exalted and Potent. So that both the one and the other place their happinels in the Thoughts of another: but the one make choice of one fort of Thoughts, the other of another. There is nothing more common then to fee theft vain Phantomes composed of the falle ]udg- Chap. IX. The Art of Tlmking. 115 Judgments of men, how they overturn Enter- prizes of greateft importance, as being the principal mark to which all the Aftions of our lives are direfted. That fame Valour fo highly efteem'd in the World, which caufes them that would be fignaliz'd for brave and ftout, to throw them- fclves into the moft apparent andthreatning dangers,is no more oft times then an over ear- neft bending the Mind tothefe vain and (hal- low Things that fill the Brain. FewPerfons when they are ierious defpifeLife, and they who feem to dare death at a Breach or in a Battel) tremble likeothersand frequently are more afraid when Death attacques' :m in their Beds. But this fame bra verv of th irs which they (hew upon fun 'ry Occa^ons proceeds from hence ^ that they have ftiU hovering be- fore their Eyes the reproachfb thrown upon Cowards and Pufilanimons Creatures 5 and on the other fide the applauies which are gi- ven to the Valiant 5 and the Phantofm arifing from thefe two Confiderations fo pofiTeflTes their Minds, that they have no leifiire to think upon Death. For this reafon thePerfon that is moft con- vcrfant in the fight of men, becomes the moft Generous and Brave 5 and that, becaufe of the Judgments which other men make of him. Hence it comes topafs that the Captains are 1 2 more 1 6 LOGIC', Or, Part.I. more couragious then the Common Souldiers, and that the Nobility and Gentry carry more lofty minds then the Ordinary Sort of People. For that having more honour to loofe and to acquire^they are more fenfible and jealous ofit. The lame labours, (aid a great Captain, are not equally toylfome to a General of an Ar- my and a Common Soldier : For the Captain of an Army, upon whom the Eyes of all men are fix'd, is thruft forward to difficult under- takings, whereas a Common Souldier dilates his thoughts no farther then the hopes of his Pay, or the gains of Plunder, or the Repu- tation of being (tout, which feldom extends beyond his own Regiment. ■ What do they propofe to themfelves I that build fiich ftatelyFabricks above their I Condition and their Fortune? Not the ad- I vantage of commodious living therein. For | (uch acoftly Magnificence does em more harm then good, and it is evident, that if they were alone in the World, they would never put themfelves to that Charge and trouble 5 or if they thought they ftiould be delpis'd by all that law thole Houles. Therefore the Houfes are built for the lake of others that they think will applaud the Buildings. They imagine that all that (hall behold thofc Pala- ces, will entertain motions of Relped and Admiration for the Mafter. And therefore they chap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 1 1 7 they reprefentthemfelves to themfelves as in a Theater, fitting in the midft of their Palaces environ d with crouds of People, that behold all from top to bottom, and thence conceive em Great, Potent, Happy and Magnificent s and this Idea filling their Minds, fpurs em on to ihofe expences and to be at that troiw He. Why do men load their Coaches v^ith fuch a great number ^of Lacqueys? Not for the great fervice they do, for they are rather a trouble then a Convenience 5 but to imprint in the minds of the beholders an Idea, that it is fome perfbn of great Quality that pafles bys and the profteft of that Idea, which they i- magine the iight of a Coach fo loaden will create in the beholders, fatisfies the vanity of him to whom thofe Coaches belong. And thus, if we weigh in the fame ballance all Conditions, all Employments, allProfeffi- ons that are efteem'd in the World, we (hall find that that which renders 'em delightful, and alleviates the pains and toyl that attends 'cm, is this, that they reprefent to the Mind the Ideas of Refpea,Efteem,Fcar and Admira- tion that others have for us. On the other fide, that which renders (blitude tedious to the moft part of the World, is this, that in feperating themfelves from the view, they alfo fcperate themfelves from the judgments and thoughts I 3 of ii8 LOCIC^, Or, Part, r.^ of men. For fo their hearts become empty andfiimifh'd as being depriv'd of their ufiial nouriftiment, and not finding in themfelves, wherewithal to feed their Thoughts. And therefore the Heathen Philofophers deem'd a folitary Life fo infupportable, that they ^ fcrupl'd, not to aver, that a wife man would not be bound to enjoy all the bleffings of Bo- dy and Mind, to live alone 5 and not to have any perfon to whom he might impart his hap- pinefs by difcourfe. And indeed there is no- thing but the Chriftian Religion that can ren- der Sohtude defirable 5 for becaufe it teaches men to defpife the World, it affords em at the fame time other Objefts to employ the i mind and more worthy to fill the heart, for which they have no need of the fight and commerce of Company. But here it is to be obferv'd, that the de- fires of men do not terminate in knowing the thoughts and judgments of others concerning themfelves^ but being known, they make a farther ufe of em to aggrandiie and exalt the Idea which they have of themfelves, adding to the^/^^and incorporating other Afcititious and Forreign Jdeas^ and imagining through a grofs delufion that they are really greater, be caufe they hve in a larger Houfe, and that there are more people who admire 'em. Tliough all thefe things are extrinfecal as to^ them* chap. IX. The Jrt of T^nnking. Up themfelves , and belong not to *em at all $ nor can the thoughts of other men preferve or vindicate em from the want and mifery to which they were before obnoxious. From whence we may difcover what it is that renders agreeable to men feveral things which otherwife are altogether incapable to divert and delight the mind. For the rea- (on of the pleafure that men take therein a- rifes from this, that the Idea of themfelves re- prefents 'em to themfelves greater then ordina- ry, by means of Ibme vain circumftatice which, they add to it. They take delight in difcourfing of the dangers they have run, as forming from the ac- cidents an Idea which reprefents us to our felves either as prudent, or el(e particularly favoured by God. We love to difcourfe of ficknelTes we haveefcapd, as reprefenting to our felves the ftrength of t)ur Bodies, able to encounter fiich defperate attacks of Mor- tality. We love to be Viftorious in every thing, e- ven in Play, wherein there is nothing of cun- ing but all hazard, though we do not play for gain 5 adding to our own Idea the Idea of Hap- pinefs at the fame time. This imaginary hap- pinefs we are apt to think, belongs to us, as a permanent Quality, which makes us claim the Tame fuccefs for the future as our Right. Thus I 4 Game- ifo LOGIC 'y Or, Part, t G^mefters chufe to try tlie fortune of tlic Dice witli fome before others : which is ne- verthetefs very; ridiculous : for a man may fee faid to have liv d happily to fuch a moment s but that he (hair have the fame Fortune the next hour y there is no farther probability, but that we may be. as certain that they who have been hitherto miferable , may for the fu- ture be happy. And thus their Minds wfio are addifted to the World, have no other Obje& of their defires , then thele vain Chimera's that daily diftraft their Brains , and even they who carry ^ the greateft reputation for vi^ifdom/eed them- 1 felveswith tfiefe Dreams and Delufions. And | therefore only they who direft their Liv^es an that it is no denial of a clear thing, but of a thing which is very oblcure, if not altogether falle, that Fire is hot in that Sence, or that a Stone is heavy 5 in regard it is apparent that Firecaufesinus a fence of Heat, bythatafti- on whertby it operates upon our Bodies, but it is no way evident that there is in the Fire any thing like to that which we feel in the Fire. And it is as evident in the fame man- ner that Stones fall down 5 but it is not Co clear, that they fall of themfelves without a- ny outward detruding Violence. • Thus we fee the great benefit of defining names, for that by this means we underftand what it is we dilpute of^ that we may ngt contend in vain about words, which : we Chap.XI. The Art of Thinking. \ j j we underftand fome one way, fbme another, as is frequently praftis'd even in our ordina- ry difcourfe. But befides this benefit there is alio ano- ther, which is, that we cannot many times have a diftinft Idea of a thing, unlefs we make uft of many words to denote it. Now it would be Impertinent efpecially in writings that concern the Sciences to be always repea- ting a long Series of words. And therefore having once defind the thing by (everal words, we fix to fome one word the Idea con- ceived to ferve inftead of all the reft. Thus after we have found tkat there are numbers that may be divided into two equal Numbers, to avoid, the often repEtitionof thofe words, we fix this Propriety, and call a number that may be divided into two e- qual Numbers, an even Number. Whjence it is apparent, that as often as we make ufe of the defin'd Name, the Definition is to be mentally (uppli'd, which a Man muft have al- ways fo ready in his Mind, that as foon as he hears even Numbers, he prefently underftands fuch a number as may be divided into two Numbers : and theft two things ought to be fo infeparable from the thoughts, that the Tongue (hould no fooner exprefsthe one, but the Mind ftiould add the other. For they who have defin d Names as the Geometrici- K 3 aw 154 LOGIC; Or, Part. I. ans do with fo much Care, did it only to a- bridg their Writings (or as St. Aujlm fays) Leaji by continual Circumlocution they fljonld Create delays : but yet they do not do it to abridg the Ideas of the things of which they di(courfe, beheving the Mind will fupply the entire Definition to (hort words, which they only make ufe of to a- void the Perplexity which multitude of words would produce. CHAP. XII. Certain Ohfervations of great Imprtance^ touch- ing the Definition of Words. H Aving thus explain'dthe nature, bene- ' fit and neceffity of the definition of "Names, it will not be from the purpofe to ipeak fomething of their ufe, leaft an ill ufe - be made of em. Firft, all Names are not to be defin'd 5 for that would be often unprofitable and impof- fible t o be d one. I (ay unprofitable s for that when the Ideas conceived of things are di- ftind, and that all Men underftanding the fanie Language, conceive the ftme Idea^ it v/ould chap. XII. The Art of Thinkino^. i j 5 woi.ld be fuperfluous to define fuch a name, be^ au(e we have already the intent of the Definition, as being fix'd without a definition to the diftinftand clear Idea, Buc this happens in things that are purely fimple, of which all Men naturally have the jfame IJea^ fo that the words by which they aredenotjd, pre undcrftood by all men in the fame fence, or if there be any mixture of obfcurity, th.^twhichis clear is primari- ly undei flood. And fothey who make u(e of fuch words to denote a cliar Idea, need not fear leaftthey (houW beund'rrftood amifi. Such are the words, Ens^ or beini^^ Thonght^ Extcf^/ion^ Eq/fahty^ Duration or T^^e. For tho' fome may obfcure the Idea of Time by leveral PropoGtions, which they call Definiti- ons 5 as that Time is the meajure of motion accor- ding to Priority and Pojleriority ^ neverthelefi they never mind thefe definitions themfelves, when they (peak of Time, nor do they con- ceive any other thing of it. So that both Learned and Unlearned with the fame facili- ty underftand the fame thing when they hear, that a Horje takes up lefs time in pacing a Fur-* long then a Tortoife, I have faid moreover ,that it is impoflible to define all words.In regard that to define fome words, there is a neceflity of ufing other words that exprefs the Idea^ to which that Ji 4 word 1^6 LOGIC', Or, Part. I. word is to be annexM. And then if thcfe words which were made ufe of to explain the the firft, be alfo to be defin'd 5 there will be a neceffity for other words, and fo to the Worlds end. And therefore there are fome primitive words which cannot be defind, and it would be as great a fault to be too curious about their Definitions, as not to define fiiffi- ciently 5 for both ways we fall into the fame Confufion, which we labour to avoid. The fecond obftrvation is, that we ought not to change Definitions known and alrea- dy receiv'd, unlefs we meet with fomething in em that is to be found fault with 5 for it is always more eafy to teach the fignification of a word to others, when Cuftom already re- ceiv'd , at leaft among the Learned, has fix'd it to an Idea^ then to annex it anew to ano- ther Idea^ and force it from a former ,to which it has been properly join d by daily ufe. And therefore it would be a great error to alter the Definitions receiv'd by the Mathematici- ans, unlefs M' here there are any that are not fufficiently plain and obvious to Sence , or fuch whcfe Ideas are not Pohtely defcrib'd as in Euclid may be thought the Definition of A?7.gk and Proportion. Thirdly it is'to be oblerv'd that when there is a neceflity to define a name, it behoves us to approach as near as may be to common Cuftom, "Chap.XII- The Art of Thmking. \ 37 Cuftom, and not to give to words a Sence altogether foreign to what they akeady have, or which are contrary to their Etimo- logie 5 as if a Parallelogram (hould be de- fin'd, a figure confiding of three Lines. But if the word has two fignifications, it muft be depriv'd of one, that the other may be only affixM to it. Thus when Heat fignifies as well the feeling which we have of it, as the Quality which we believe to be in the Fire, like to that which we feel, to re- move this ambiguity, I will u(e the name of Heat^ but I muft not apply it but to one of thefe Ideas^ difmifing it from the other, fay- ing, I call Heat that feeling which I have when I come near the Fire 5 and to the caufe of this Senfation I would give a name altoge- ther different, as of Ardour or Bnrmrtg '-, or elfe the fame name with feme addition, which determines and diftinguilhes it from Heat ta- ken for the Senfation of it, as is that of Vzr^ tttal-Heat. The reafbn of this obfervation is taken from hence, that Men after they have once affix d an I^ka to a word, are not eafily in- duc'd to feparate it from the word : and fb the old J^e^ftiU returning, obliterates the new which they have from the late Definition* So that Men more eafily accuftom them- felves to a v/ord of no Signification, as if a Man 138 LOGIC', Or, Part. I. manfliould rather ufe the wordBarato figni- fie a Figure confifting of three Lines, then delpoyl the word Paral/el/ogram of the Idea of a Figure whofe oppofite fides are Parel- lel, to make it fignifie a Figure whofe oppo- fite fides are not Parallel. This is an Errour into which all the Chy- mifts are fallen, who take delight to change the name^ of the moft things of which they difcourfe, and to give them names which already fignifie quite other things, and which have no correfpondence with the Ideas to which they joyn the words. Hence thoft ri- diculous Ratiocinations of fome of thofe people, particularly of one who afferts, that the Peftilence as he imagin d, being a Satw nine Difeafe^ was to be cur'd by hanging a- bout the Neck of the Patient, a plate of Lead, which is call'd Saturn by the Chymifts, and whereon is alfo to be engrav d upon a Satur- day, which day is alfo facred to Saturn^ the Chara&er by which the Aftronomers denote that Planet. As if arbitrary and feigned fympathetic Affinities between Lead and the Planet Saturn^ or between the fame Planet and Saturday or the little Signature of the A- ftronomers could be any way efFeftual for the Cureof Difeafcs. But that which is more infufferable in this jargonry, or gibbrifli of the Chymifts, is their chap. XII. Tf^eJrtof Thinkmg. 139 their Prophaning the Sacred Mifteries of Re- ligion to make 'em fervc as a Vail to cover their pretended Secrets 5 infomuch thatibmc arc arriv'd at thathightof Impiety 5 as to apply what the Scriptures fpeaks of the true Chriftians, That they are the Chofen Race ^ the Royal PrJefthood^ the Holy Nation^ the People purchased by God^ and whom he has call'd out of darknefi to his wonderpd Light , to the Chi- merical Fraternity of the RoJfeCrucians^whom in their ownlmaginatious they term the only wi(e men that have attained Immortal Happi- ne/s ^ as having by vertue of the Philofbphers Stone found out the way to fix the Soul in the Body, for as much, fay they, as there is no Body fo fix'd and incorruptible as Gold. Of which dreams, and of feveral others of the fame nature there are to be found a great number in Gajfendms Examen of Fh/dds Phi- lofophy. Which demonftrates that there is no difeale of the mind more dangerous then that of Enigmatical Scribling, which caufe men to imagine that their leaftfolid thoughts^ if I may not call 'em falfe and altogether Im- pious, will pafs for great Myftei^es, if clad in words unintelligible to the Common fort of men. Chap. 140 LOGIC'yOr, Part.L CHAR XUL Of another fort of Dejinitton of Names bj/ which their Sigftipcattons are denoted according to Common ufe. ALL that has been faid of the Definiti- on of names, ought to be undcrftood only of thofe, by which everyone defines the words for his particular ufe 5 and this is that which renders 'em free and Arbitrary, it be- ing in the power of every one to make ufe of what Sound he pleafes to exprefs hSsIdeas^ provided he give notice before hand. But in regard that men are not perfeftMafters of a- ny but their own language, every one has a priviledge to make a Diftionary for his own Uj[e,but not for others, nor to interpret their words by particular Significations which we have fix'd to words of his own. And there- fore feeing that notion of words is not to be explain'd which is proper to our (elves, but that which is proper to the word according to Common Ufe, fuch Definitions are not to be caU'd Arbitrary 5 yet are they to be oblig'd to Chap.Xni: The Jrt of thinking. 141 to reprefent, though not the truth of the Thing, yet the truth of the Ufe 5 and they are to be efteem'd falle^ if they do not really exprefs the U(e, that is, if they do not joyn to Sounds the fame Ideas which are annexed to fuch Sounds by the Common Cuftom of thole that make ufe of 'em. And this demon- ftrates alfb to us that Definitions may be con- tefted, becaufe we find daily riiiputes about the lignification which Cuftom gives to words. Now, though thefe forts of Definitions of words fcem to be the bufinefsof the Gramma- rians, whofe Province it is to make Dictiona- ries, which are nothing elfe but the Explica- tion of Ideas which men have agreed to af^ fix certain Sounds, yet may we raife upon this Subjeft fevcral important Refleftions for the reftifying our Judgments. The firft, which may ferve as the founda- tion of all the reft, that men do not many times confider the whole fignification of words ^ that is, that the words often fignifie more then they feem to fignifie, and" that therefore they who interpret the fignification, do not thoroughly unfold all the Ideas which the words imprint in the minds of the Hearers. For to fignifie in a Sound pronounced or written is no other then to raife an Idea by Itriking our Ears or our Eyes. Now it comes LOGIC; Or^ PartL comes frequently to pafi, that one word, be- fides the principal Idea^ which is look d upon as the proper fignification ot the word, ex- cites feveral other Ideas, which may beterm'd Acccjfories^ of which we take little no- tice, although the mind receive their Im- prcffion. For Example, if a man (hould fay to ano- ther ^ Ton Lie^ and that there fhould be no more notice taken then of the principal fig- nification of the ExpreflTiOH, 'tis no more then to fay, Ton know the centrary of vchat yon affirm. But befides this principal fignificati- on, the words according to Cuftom raife an immediate Idea of Scorn and Con- tempt, and make a man believe that he who (peaks the words cares not what injury he does the other s which renders the fignifica- tion of the words injurious and offcnfive. However fometimes thefe Accejfory Ideas are not fix'd to Vv^ords by Com-monllfe, but are only added thereto by him that makes ufe of 'em. And thefe are fuch as are rais'd by the Tone of the Voice, by the Alteration of the Countenance, by Gefl:ures, and other natural Signs which fix to our words an infi- nite numbLT of Ideas which vary, change, dimini(h, augment the fignification by joyn- ing thereto the Image of the Motions, Judg- ments and Opinions of him that (peaks. And Chap.XIII. TJoe Art of Thinking, i ^ 5 And therefore if he who affirniM that the Tone of the Voice was to be meafiir d Sy the Ears of the Hearers, believ'd it fuiticient to (peak loud enough to be heard, he under- ftood not the uft of the Tone of the Voice 5 the Tone oft times fignifying as niuch as the words themfelves. There is one Tone for Inftruftion, another for Flattery, another for Reprehenfion. Sometimes a man is willing that his Voice fhould not only reach the Ears of him he fpeaks to, but that it fhould peirce and run through em. Nor would any one think it well, that a Lacquey being loudly and vehemently reprov d, (hould anfwer^ Sir fieak^ lower ^ I hear you roell enough. For 'tis the Tone of the Voice that makes one part of the Reproof 5 and it is neceffary to im- print that Idea in the mind of the Servant 5 which theMafter would have it make. But fometimes thefe acceflbry Id^as are fix'd to the words themfelves, for that u- fually they thoroughly excite thofe that pronounce 'em. And this is the reafon that among feveral expreffions that feem to figni- fie the fame thing, fbme are injurious, (bme are mild, fome modeft, others impudent, fomc honeft, others diftionefts for that befides the principal 1dm with which they agree, men have affixed other Z^^^ which are the caufeof this variety. And 144 . LOGIC', Or, Part. I. And this obfervation may fcrve to difco- vcr apeiceof Injuftice very ufiial among thofe who complain of the reproaches thrown up- on 'em, which is to change the Subftantives into Adjcftives. For example , if they are accus'd of Ignorance or ImpoJiHre^ prefently they cry out for being caird ignorant and faU fifying fellows, which is not reafonable be- caufe that the words do not fignifie the fame thing 5 for the Ad jefrive, ignorant and falfiji- ing^ befide the fignification of the offence which they difeover 5 they include the Idea, of Scorn ^ whereas the Subftantives of igno- rance and impofiure^ denote the thing to be filch as it is, without aggravation or extenu- ation. And we might inftance other things that would fignifie the fame thing after fuch a manner,as would include moreover afbft and lenifying Idea^ and which would demonftrate that the" perfon had a defire to excufe and extenuate the Crime which he laid to the o- thers charge. And thofe are the ways which prudent and moderate men make ufe of, un- lefs fome reafbn prevail with 'em to ad with more tartnefs and vehemency. Hence alfo may be underftood the diffe- rence betv/een a plain and a figured Stile, and wliy the fame thoughts feem much more lovely, when they are exprcfs'd by a figure, then if they were reftrain'd to a plain man- ner Chap. XIII. The Art of Thinking. 1 5 5 her of Speech. Which proceeds from hence, that figur'd expreffions, befides, the principal thing, fignifie the Motion and Gefture of him that (peaks, and imprint both the one and the bther Idea in the mind , whereas fimpid expreffions fets forth only the naked Truth j For example, of this half Verfe of Virgil^ TJfque adeojie mori mifcrnm eji ? were exprefsd fimply and without a Figure ^ NoH ejl nfqtie adeo fnori mifemm. Without doubt the fenteflce would not have had that forces and the reafonis, becaufe the firft Expreffion fignifies more then the ft- cond^fbr it does not only exprefs the thought^ that it is not fo miferable a thing as Meni think to die ^ but it reprefents alfo the Idea of a Man, as it were provoking death , and undauntedly looking it in the face , which^ without queftionis a great and lively Acceffi* on to the fignification of the words. Hence it is no wonder that it makes a deep impreA (ion in the Hearer , for the mind is only in- ftrufted by the verity of Ideas, but Ihe i^' not rous'd but by the reprefentatioit of Af- feftions. ^.S^^;/ 156 LOGIC', Or, Parti. • ^vfs pjejlere dolendum el? Prinrnm iffe tibi • If thou wouldjl have me weep it firft behoves thy fe!f to grieve • But as figur'd ftile not only fignifies the things themfelves, but alfo thole affeftions of the mind, which we conceive in meditating and (peaking, we may judge from thence, the u(e which we ought to make of it, and what are the Subjefts moft proper for it. Vifible it is, that it is ridiculous to make ufe of it in matters meerly fpeculative, which we con- template with a eahn and placid Eye, and which produce no motion in the Mind. For fince that Figures exprels the Paffions of the Soul, when Figures are intermixed where the Soul is no way mov d, fuch agitations of the Mind are contrary to Nature, and feem to be a kind of Convulfion. For which reafon there can be nothing more prepofterous then the ftir and hurlyburly which fome Preachers make, who fly out into fury and extravagant Bombafts, upon all manner of Subjefts, and who are no left furious upon Philofophical Digreffions,then upon truths,the moft weigh- ty and neceffary for Salvation. On the other fide, when the Subjeft of the Dif- Chap. XIII. The Art of Thinking. 1 5 7 Difcourfe is fuch^ that it requires a roufing and waking of the mind , it is a fault to de- liver himfelf in a jejune and frigid ftile, and without anymanntrof motion. Therefore Divine Truths not being fimply propos'd only to be known, but much more to be belov'd, revercnc d and ador'd by Men, without doubt, the noble , elevated and fi- gur'd manner of Elocution, obfcrv'd by the Holy Fathers, is much more proportiona- ble to the Subjeft , then a fiat and meager Stile , hke that of the Scholaftics 5 fince it not only teaches us the Truths we are to know, but alfo endeavours to raife in us ^ thofe Sentiments of Love , Reverence and AfFeftion, which the Fathers had for thole Truths, when they wrote, and which repre- fenting to us the Image of that Holy difpofi- tion, muft of neceiiity contribute more to im.print the like in us. Whereas the Schola- ftic flile being plain , and contenting it felf with the Ide^K of the Naked Truth , is no- thing fo effectual to produce in oar Souls thofe Motions of Refpeft and Love,which we ought to have for the Truths of Chriftianity, which render it not only leis profitable, but lefs delightful, fincc the foul it felf is more delighted in obferving the motions of her a& feftions, then in acquiring knowiedg. Lj Laftly, 158 LOGIC', Or, Parti- Laftly, 'tis by means of this Obfervation , that we may refolve that famous Queftion a- mong the Ancient Philolbphers, whether there be any words to be counted unchaft ? And by which we may alfo refute the Arguments of the Stokes , who juftify'd that we might make u(e indifferently of any words, though impudent and obfcene. They were of opinion, laith Ckeroin a Let- ter, which he wrote upon thisSubjeft, that there were no words that were either naftie or obfcene ^ for they fay, that the obfcenity proceeds either from the things, or it is in the words. It does not proceed (imply from the things, becaufe they may be exprefs'd in other words that are not efteem'd fo naufeous 5 nor is it in the words, confider'd as they are, be- caufe it happens ofttimes, that one word fig- nifies two things, and fo in one fignification it may be naufeous, in another well enough approved. But all this is no more then a vain piece of futtlety which grew from hence , that thofe Philofophers did not confider thofe acceffory accidents, which the mind adds to the princi- pal Ide^s of thingsrfor from thence it comes to pafs, that one and the fame thing may be ex- prefs'd honeftly by one found,and lafcivioufly by another, if one of the founds has an J^e^i which covers the obfoenity, and the other an 1 Idea thsithys it open. .Thus" Chap.XIir. The Art ofThwl^wg. 1 5 9 Thus Adultery , Intere!i , Male-Copulation are no obfcene words, tho' they fignifie moft obfcene actions , becau(e they reprelent'cm cover d with a vail of x^bhorrency , which fliews that we look upon em as crimes , jfb that thofe words rather fignifie the wickcd- nefs of the aftions themfelves. Whereas there are certain words that exprefs thofe Afts , without any Abhorrency , and which defcribe em rather grateful and pleafing with- al, adding an Idea of Impudence and Lafci- vioufnefs. And thofe are the vvords which are (aid to be bawdy and difhoneft. There are alfo certain Circumlocutions, by which certain aftions are chaftly expreft , which though lawful , yet participate fome- thing of the Corruption of Nature 5 for fuch Circumlocutions, not only plainly exprcfs the things themfelves, but alfo the difpofition of him who fpeaks of 'em in that manner , and which by his referv'dnefi tcftifie, that he mentions 'em with trouble and diflike, and that it is hi; defire they fliould be conceal'd, as well from himfelf as from others : Where- as others uttering the fxme things m.ore free- ly and at random, makcit appcnr, that they take delight in thofe kind of objecJs, wliich being a Lafcivious pleafure, it is no wonder- if the words which imprmt that M\f, fliouki be accounted contrary to modefly. L3 For 1 6c LOGIC, Or, Parti. For which reafon it comes to pafs, that fometimes the fame word is cfteem'd modeft at one time and immodeft at another 5 which has conftraind (ov^ of the Hebrew Rabbies' to place certain Hebrew words in the Margin of the Bible, to be pronouncM by thofe that read it, inftead ol thofe which the Scripture makes ufe of ^ which happened from hence , that when thofe words v/ere made ufe of, they were not at all immodeft, becaufe they were read with feme certain Idea that repre- fented theft wT)rds with refov dnefi and mo- defty. But afterwards that Idea being fcpa- rated, and cuftom having added another of impudence and vVantonnefs,they became nau- feous and uncivil : And therefore the Rab- byes, to prevent the mind from being amus'd with that evil Idea, were folicitous, that the People fhould make ufe of others in reading the Bible, which no way alter'd the Text. And therefore it was an ill Excufe of an Author , whom the profeffion of Religion obligd to an exaft Modefty, and vvhp was deferv'dly tax'd to have made ufe of an un- dece nt word, to fignifie an in&mous place, to alledge, tktt the Fathers had not fcrupl d to make ufe of the word Lupanar-^ a Brvt^l- boufe, and that he often found in their wri- tings, the words Meretrix and Lcm, whore ^X\3i Pander^ and feveral others hardly to be Chap.XIII. TheArtofThinkwg. i6i endur'd in our Language. For the liberty which the Fathers took to make ufe of thofe words, ought to have convincd him , that they were not at that time accounted words of Ignominie 5 that is to fay , that cuftom had not added that Idea of obfcenity which rendered 'em Infamous^and therefore he drew an ill conclufion from thence, that it was for that reafon, permitted him to make uie of terms of Debauchery, fb efVeem'd to be in our languagesfbr that theie words do not really fig- nifiethc fame thmg, which thole did of which the Fathers made u(e 5 feeing that befides the Principal Idea in which they agree, they alfb exhibit the Idea of a debauch'd mind, and contain a mixture of Licentious Impudence. Seeing then thefe Acceffbry Ideas are of (b great huportance, and difTolve the Vri- mark Notions into fb many various Ideas^ they would do well, who compile Vocahuhrks or DiclJomrirs^ to mark out thofe fignifications, and make a diftin'ftion to the Readers, be- tween words Contunielious and Civil, Tart^ Chaft and Imniodeft, or rather abfblutcly to obliterate the Latter, which it would be much better to be ignoi^nt pfthen to underftand. The End of the Firii Part. L 4 LOGIC- l62 Part II. LOGIC; p IV THE ART O F THINKING. Cwtming Conftderations of Men about Tro^ - ' fer Judgments. Part II. iUOflf Chap. L What a Vropopthn is ? Of the four forts of Pr^? pofitjons^ AFter wc apprehend the things them- felves^by the help ofjdeas we compaer the /^e^/5 together^ and obfcrve em as they agree or differ one among another , and in that manner joyn or fcperate 'em , * * which Chap.I. TheArtofThi?2king. 163 which is caird to affirm or deny , and by a general name to judge. This Judgment is otherwife calFd a Propo- fition ^ and it is manifeft that it ought to have two Terms, the one, oi which any thing is affirm'd or deny d, which is call'd the SuLje^y the other which is affirm'd and deny'd, which is call'd the Attribute or Predicate, Nor does it fiiffice to have apprehended thefe two Terms, but they muft be conjoynd or leparated in the Mind. And this operati- on of the mind, is noted in the Propofition, by the worft £i? -^ it is ^ when it is alone, it is Affirmative 5 but when we deny, \vp add the Participle non or mt : Thus when I fay, Qod kjnfi^ God is the Subjeft of the Propo- fit'^on, juft the Predicate. The Verbs k^ de- notes the aftion of the mind affirming , th^t is conjoyning the Jdea of God , and the Idea of ]H^^ as agreeing together. But if I ftiould fay, God is not iinjuli , the Verb is ^ with the Adverb joyn'd , denotes an aftion contrary to affirmation 5 by which I affirm thoft ideas do not agree together 5 tor that there is fomething in the Idea o^unjuft^ which does not agree with that which is contained in the Idea, of God. But though it be neceffary that every Pro- pofition (hould confift of theft three words, yet it may confift of two, and fometimes on- ly of one. Fo;* i64 LOGIC':, Or, PartIL For Men, for the more fiiccinft way of (peaking, have invented feveral words, which fignifie both the. affirmation, that is the Sub- ftantive, and the attribute which is affirmed. Of this number artf all thofe words that are call'd Subftantives, as God exifls, that is, is exiflent : God loves Men^ that is. He k a lover ^f Men i, but the Subftantive , when it is An- gle, ceafes to be purely Subftantive 5 for that then the moft general of the attributes, is joyn'd to it , which is ens, or being, and fb non egofnm, lam not, is as much as, I am not a being, or any thing. In the fame manner at other times,the Sub- jeft and the Affirmation is included in the fame word,, as in the firft and fecond Perfons among the Latins , as when I fay, funt Chri- fiianus , lam a Cbriflian 5 for ego is the Sub- jeft of thisPropofition, included in the word Jum. ; ■ • • . ' Heriee it ft apparent, that one word among the Latir.s conftitutes a Propofition , in firft and fecond Perfons of thoie Verbs, which before contained the affirmation with the Pre- dicate^ {oveni, vidr, vici, are thcee intire Propofitions. -niisri.i.^rrK^- Hence it may alfo be concluded, that eve- ry Propofition is either Negative or Affirma- tive 5 and this is that which is contained ei- ther in the affirmation or the denial But I Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 165 But there is another oifFerencc of Propo- fitions deduce! trom the Uniyerlality, Parti- cularity or Singularity. For the Tt^nns , as is faid in the firft part, arc either liiigular, particular or Univerfal. Univcrfal terms may be taken , either ao- cording to the full extent , the figns of U- niverfality being either expre/s'd or under- ftood. As are all ^ for an affirmation, for denial notic , as all Ale^/^ Jto Men \ 01 accor- ding to the indefinite part of the extent, with the addition of the wordy^/?/t', as aliqiik H(h- 7'no^ fi;;;e Man ^ or any other way , accor- ding to propriety of Speech. Kence happens a certain variety , greatly to be obferv^'d in propofitions 5 for when the fubjed of the propofition is the Univerfal Term, taken in its full extent , it is call'd a univerfal propofition, whether it be atfiiina- tive ^ as every impious Man is a fool 5 or ne- gative, no wicked Man is blclTed. When the common Term is taken accor- ' ing to the indefinite part of its extent, as be- ing reftrain'd by the addition of the word fifne^ it is call'd a particular propofition, whe- ther it be Affirmative, as fame cntel Men are Cowards 5 or Negative, fame poor Men are not mifcrablc. But if the Subjea of a Propofition be An- gular, as when I fay, Lewis the rgth. hath ta- k^n Rochclj it is calFd fingular. But i66 LOGIC':, Or, Part II- But tho this Propofition fingular be diffe- rent from the Univerfal in this, that the Sub- jeft of it is not common, yet has it a greater Affinity with it, then with the particular, be- caufe the Subjeft, for the very reafon that it is fingular, is neceffarily taken in its full ex- tent, which is the Eflential Propriety of an Univerfal Propofition, and diftinguifties it from the particular 5 for , that a propofition maybe univerfal it little imports, whether the extent of the Subjeft be great or fmall, pro- vided it comprehend all things : And this is the reafon that fingular Propofitions fiipply the place of Univerfals in Argumentation s fb that all Propofitions may be reduced to four forts which are mark'd by thefe four Vow- els A. E. L 0. for the eafe of the Memo- ry. J. An Univerfal Affirmative, as, AU vicious Men are (laves. E. An Univerfal Negative,as, No vicious Man is happy. I. A Particular Affirmative, as Some vicious Man is Rich. 0. A Particular Negative , as, Some vicious Man is not Rich. And that they may be the better retain d in memory , they are comprehended in this in Diftic. AJferit Chap.IL The Art ofThinki^g i6y Ajferit A^ negatE^ vtrunt gemraliier amhoi AJlcrit Ij negat 0^ fed farticnUriter dmbo. They are wont alfo to call Quantity, the llniverlality , or Particularity of Propofiti- ons. And Quality is call'd the affirmation or ne- gation, which depend upon the word which is accounted the form of the Propofition. And fo A, and £. agree according to quan- tity, but differ according to Quality , as do alio /. and 0. But A. and /. agree according to quality, but differ according to quantity , as alfo do E. and 0. Propofitions are alfo divided according to matter, into true or falfo 5 and it is clear, that there can be no Propofition, which is neither true nor falfe 5 for that every Propofition de- claring the judgment which we make of things, it is true, when that judgment is con- formable to truth 5 and falfe when it is not conformable. , But becaufe we often fail of fufficient light, to difcern truth from falfehood, befides thofe Propofitions that feem to be true , and thofe that feem to us to be falfe,there are fome that feem to be true ^ but of which the truth is not fo evident , but that we have fome ap-^ prchenfion i68 LOGIC', Or, Part If. prehenfion that they may be falfe^ or d(e fuch as fecm to be falfe ^ but of the faldiood ot which we are not fully aflurM. Thefe are call'd probable Propofitions , of which the firfl: are more probable , and the latter left probable.: CHAP. II. Of the oppoftion of Propofitions^ having the fame SfiiJJeS and Predicate. WE have already declar'd, there are four forts of propofitions , A,\E, L 0. Now it may be demanded wherein they agree or differ, when feveral forts of Propo- fitions are deduc'd from the fame Subjedi^and the fame Attribute, which is caird oppofiti- on. It is eafily feen, that there can be but three forts of oppofitions ^ tho one of the three is fubdividcd into two others. For if they be oppos'd in quantity and quality both together, A. 0. and £. /. they are calf d contradiftories , as every Man is an Animal 5 Some Man is not an f7iimal : ^ Man is free from fin : Some Man is free from fin. If Chap. II. The Art of Thinking. 169 If they differ in Quantity only, and agree in Quality, as A. I. and E. 0. they are caird Sfihalterns. As every Man is a Creature, fbme Man is a Creature .• No Man is free from fin^ fome Man is not free from fin. Btit if they differ in Quality, and agree in Quantity, then they are call'd contraries or fnhcontr (tries : Contraries^ when they are "Uni- verfal 3 as Every Man is a Creature , No Man is a Creature, Sffbcontraries^whtnthty :irt particular: Some Man is a Creature'-^Some Man is not a Creature, Now if thefe Propofitions are lookt upon as they are true or falfe 5 it is cafie to judg, That contradiftories are never together ei- ther true or falfe 3 but if one be true, the other is falfe 5 and if one be falfe, the other is true ^ For if it be true that every Man is a Creature, it cannot be true that fome Man is no Creature 5 on the other fide, if it be true that Ibme Man is no Creature , it can- not be true that every Man is a Creature. This is fb clear that a farther explanation would but render it more obfcure. 2. Contraries can never be probable, but they may be both falfe. They cannot be true, becaufe then contradiftories would be true 5 for if it be true that every Man is an Animal, it is falfe that fome Man is not an Animal , %vhich is the contradiftory -^ and by con(e- quence, tjo LOGIC', Or, Partn. quence, much more falfe , that no Man is an Animal ^ which is its contrary. But the falfity of the one ddes not infer the fiilfity of the other 5 for it may be falfe, that all Men are juft, and yet it may not be true, that no Man is juft 5 fince there may be jufl: men, though all men are not fo. 5. Subcontrarics, by a Rule altogether dp-^ pofite to that of contraries may be probable^ as in thefe two Propofiticns. So?^e Man if jpffi'-) fome Man is notjnfi 5 for juftice may agree with one part of Men 5 and not with the other. And therefore afErraation and negation never happen in the lame Sub^ jeft 3 iorfome Man is taken for one part of Men, in one part of the Propofition , and- for another part in the other. Bur tfiey can- not be both falfe 5 for if it were falfe, that fome Man is jufl^ it would be true , that no Manispift^ which is the Contradictory, and much more true, that^^/^e Man is not jufi ^ which is the fabcontrary. 4. As for the oppofition of Subalterns^ it is no true oppofition : becaufe the particular is the confequence of the Univerfal 5 for if al/ Men are Creatures , fome Man is a Cred^ ture : li^no Man be a7t Jpe^ fome Man is not ari Ape : Therefore the truth of Univerfality in- fers that of Particulars but the truth of Par- ticulars does not infer that of Univerlak 5 for Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. 171 tor it does not follow, becaufc it is true, that fonte Man is juft^ that it (hould be true , that all Men arejujl : On the other fide the falf. hood of Particulars infers the falfhood of Univerfils 3 for if it be falfe that fome Man is free from fin, it is more fahe that all Men are free from fin : But the falfhood of Uni- verfals does not infer the falftiood of Parti- culars ^ For though it be falfe , that all Men are juft, yet it does not follow, but that fome Man may be juft ; Whence it follows , that many times Subaltern Propofitions may both happen to be true , and foraetimes both to be falfe. I forbear to fpeak of the Reduftion of oppofite propofitions to the fame fence, as be altogether unprofitable, and for that the Rules are only true in the Latin. CHAP. III. Of Proportions fmple and compos d 5 That there are fome which feem to be Jimple^ but are not ^ and which may be calPd complex. Of Complex Propofitions both as to the Subject and Attri-- hute. VV E have faid, that every Propofi- tion ought to have at leaft , one M Sub- 172 LOGIC:, Or, PartlL Subjea and one Attribute 5 but it does not follow from thence, that it ought not to have no more then one ^yubjeft and one Predicate. Such then as have but one Subjeft and one Attribute are calPd fimplc,and they that have more then one Subjeft and one Predicate are callM ComposM. As when I fay Good and Evil, Life and Death, Poverty and Riches come from the Lord. The predicate, Come from the Lord is affirm'd not only of one Sub- jeft, but of many, that is of Good and Evil, But before we explain the composM Pro- pofitions, we muftobfervc that there arefbme which (eem to be composed that are not io, but Simple. For the finglenels of a Propofi- tion is taken for the Unity of the Subjeft and the Attribute. Now there are feveral Pro- pofitions that have properly but one Predi- cate and one Attribute 5 but of which either the 5ubjea or the Attribute is a term com- plex, which includes other Propofitions , that may be call'd Incident , which make no part of the Sabjeft or Predicate, being joinM by the Pronoun Relative, zrA(? or which, whoie propriety it is to join together feveral Propo- fitions, to the end they may all encorporate into one. Thus when Chrift fays , He that does th^ will of my Father who is in Heaven, Jhall enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. The Chap. III. The Art of Thmking. 173 ; The Subjeft of this Propofition contains two Propofitions, as containing two Verbs ^ but in regard they are joinM by the Relative vpho^ they only make a part of the Subjcft. Whereas when I lay, good and evil proceeds from the Lord, there are properly two Sub- jefts, becaufe I affirm equally both of the one and the other,that they come from God. The reafon is this, for that the Propofiti- ons being join'd to others by the Relative, vi>ho^ are either Propofitions but impa-fcftly , as (hall be faid hereafter^ or elfe are not con* fider'd as Propofitions then made, but as Propofitions that have been made before , vvhich are at that time only conceived like fingle Ideas. Whence it happens to be the fame thing, whether we pronounce thefc Pro- pofitions by Noun-Adjcftives, or by Partici- ples without Verbs , and without the Relative, rvho 5 or with Verbs and with the Relative. For it is the fame thing to fay. The invifihile God has created the vifihle rvorld 5 or God who is vifible, has Created the World which k vtjible. k\QX2inAtv themofl vaUant of Princes vanquijli' d Darius s or Alexander rrA^ n?^ the moji vali- ant of Princes^ vanqmflj'^d Darius. For as well in the one as the other, my principal aim. is, not to affirm that God is Invifible,or that Alex- ander was the moft generous of Princes 5 but fuppofing both the one and the other as af M 2 firmM 174 LOGIC), Or, PartIL firm*d before, I affirm of God, conceivM as Invifible, that he Created the vifible World 5 and of J/ex^WerconceivMtobe the moft ge- nerous of Princes, that He vanquifhM Z)<€- rius. But if I fhould fiiy, Alexander was the mofl. valiant of Princes^ and the Vanquijhcrof Dari- us, 'tis evident that I fhould no lels affirm ofi4/ejc^«^er,both that was he the moft valiant of Princes, and that he was the Vanquifher of Darius ^ and therefore there is good rea- fon that the latter fort of Propofitions fhould be call'd compos'd Propofitions 5 whereas we may call the other Propofitions complexM. We are alfb to obferve, that complex'd Propofitions may be of two forts. For Com- plexity, if I may fo call it, may light either upon the matter of the Propofition, that is to (ay, upon the Subjeft, or the Predicate, or both 5 or el(e upon the form only. I. Complexity falls upon the Subjeft, when theSubjeftis a Term ComplexM, as in this Propofition. He is a King voho fears nothing. P Beatus tile qui proculnegotiis ZJtprifca gens Mortalium, Paterna Rnra bohus exercet Suis Solutus omni fcenore. For Chap. III. The Art ofThwkl^g- 1 7 5 For the Verb EJl is underftood in the laft Propofition 5 Beatushcing the Predicate, and all the reft the Subjeft. 2. Complexity falls upon the Attribute , when the Attribute is a Term complex'd, as Pietj/ is a Vertue that readers a Man happy in the greateji AdverJ/ties, SumDcus lEneas^famafnper d:thcra notus. But here we muft obftrve that all Propo- rtions composed of Verbs aftive, and their cafes governM, may be calPd Complex, as containing in ibme manner two Propofitions. For example , if I fay , Brutus kill'd a Ty- rant , this is as much as to fay , that Brutus kiird fome-body, and that he whom he kiird was a Tyrant 3 which is very remarka- ble to be obfervM 5 for when thefe Propofi- tions are urgM in Arguments, fometimes there is but one part prov d, the other being fup- pos'd, by which we are frequently obliged to reduce thofe Arguments into the moil: natural Form, and to change the Aftive into the Paffive, to the end, that the part which is prov'd may be diredly exprefs'd 5 as we (hall (hew when we coHie to difcourfe of Argu- ments composed of complex Propofitions. 5. Sometimes Complexity falls upon both Subjeft and Predicate, both the one and the M 3 other 176 LOGIC':, Or, Part It other being a complex Term, as in this Pro- pofition. The great ones who opprefs the Poor^ fljall be pnnijh'^d by God, who is the Protector of the Poor. pie ego, qui quondam gracili modnlatus aVem Carmen, ^ egrejfus jylvis, vkina coegi, Ut quamvis avido parerent arva Colono : {Martk Gratum opus Agricolis 5 ut nunc horrentia Arma^uirumque cano, XroJ£ qui Primus aborh Italiam, fatoprofugus, lavina que venit Littora, The firft three Verfes, and the half of the fourth, compoft the Subject of this Propofi- tion, and the reft makes the Predicate, and the affirmation is included in the word Cam. Theft are the three ways that Propofirions may be complex'd as to their Matter, that is to fay, both as to the Subjed atid the Pre- dicate. CHAP. Chap. IV. TheArtofllinking. IJJ CHAP. IV. Of the Nature of Incident ^ropjitions^ that make a fart of Profofitions Complex^ d. BUT before we fpeak of Propofitions , whofe Complexity may fall upon the Form, that is to (ay, upon the Affirmation or Negation , there are leveral important re- marks to be made upon the nature of Incident Propofitions, which make one part of the Subjeft or Attribute of thofe that are com- plex'd according to matter. I. It has been already faid, that Incident Propofitions are thole whofe Subjeft is the Pronoun, Whoh as Men who are created to know and love God 5 or Men who are Pious , where the Term Men being taken away, the reft is an Incident Propofition. But here we muft call to mind what has been faid in the fixth Chapter of the firft Part. That the additions of Terms complex'd are of two forts, the one may be callM fimple ExpHcations, when the addition alters no- thing in the Idea of the Term, in regard that what is added, agrees generally with the term in its full extent : as Men who are created to kftow and love God, M 4 The 178 LOGIC:, Or, Partll. The other may be callM Determinations 5 for that, what is added to the term not a- greeing with it in its full extent, reftrains and determines the Signification, as in the lecond Example Men who are Pious. From whence it follows that there is a Pronoun, Who, Ex- plicative, and a Pronoun QVho) Determina- tive. Now when the Pronoun (rvho) is Explica- tive, the Attribute of the Incident Propofi- tion is affirm'd of the Subjeft, to which the Pronoun (who) refers 5 tho'it bebutincident- ly inrefpeft of the total Propoiition 5 fbthat the Subjeft it felf may be fubftituted to the Pronoun (who) as in the firft Example, Men who were Created to know and love God. For we might (ay, Men were created to kliow and love God. But when the {who) is Determinative, the Predicateof the Incident Propofition, is not properly affirm'd of the Subjeft to which the (who) refers. For if in this Propofition, Men who are Pious are Charitable, we fhould put the wordMe;^ in the place of (who) by fay- ing, Men are Pious^ the Propofition would be falfe, for this would be to affirm the word (Pious) of Men, as Men. But in the other Propofition, Men ivho are Pious are Charitable, we affirm neither of Men in general, nor of any Man in particular, that they are Pious 5 but Chap.IV. The Art ofThh!ki^;g. 1 7 9 but the UnderftancUng joining together the Idea of (Pwu:f) with that of Aftw, and ma- king an entire /^e^ , judges, that the attri- bute of Charitable agrees with the entire Idea. And therefore the entire Judgment which is cxprefs'd in the Incident Propofition is only that, by which our Underftanding Judges that the Idea of Pwud^^ is not incompatible with that of Mr//, and fb they may be confider'd as join d together 5 and afterwards we may examine how they agree together, being thus united. Many times there are Ter;;ts that are dou- bly and trebly Complex'd, being composd of fcveral parts, of which every one is ftpa- rately complex'd 5 and fb we may meet with fcveral Incident Propofitions, and of feveral (brts 5 the Pronoun of the one being Expli^ catJve^ and the other Determinative 5 as in this Example. TheDo&rine that places Soveraign Happinefs in the pleafures of the Body^ which was taught by Epicure, is unxporthy a Philojo^ pher. The attribute of this Propofition is Z)nxvorthy a Philofophyer and all the reft is the Subjeft : and fb the Propofition is a Complex Term that includes twoincidentPropofitions. The fir ft, That places Soveraign happinefs in the pkafiires of the Body^ where the I^ronoun is determinative , for it determines (Doftrine) in general to be that which affirms Soveraign Felicity i8o LOGIC'-, Or, PartIL Felicity to confift in thepleafuresof theBody^ whence it would be an abfurdity tofiibftitute the word DoSrine to the Pronoun, by faying T>o6lrine places Soveraign Happmef in bodily Fleafiire. 2.Thefecond incident Propofition is,which was taught by E;?/Vft!r//j-,and the Sub jed where- to the Pronoun \_ which "] refers, is the whole complex Term [^The DoBrine which places Soveraign happinnef in bodily Pleajure "] which denotes a fingular and individual Doflirine, capable of divers accidents 5 as to be main- tained by feveral perfbns ; tho' in its felf itbe determin'd to be taken always after the fame manner, at leaft in this precife cafe, as it is extended. And therefore it is, that the Relative of the fecond Incident Propofition, Qwhich was taught by Epicurus^ is not deter- minative but only Explicative 5 fo that the Subjeftto which the Pronoun refers may be fubftituted in the place of the pronoun, by laying, The DoSrine which places Soveraign happinef in bodily Pleafare, was taught by Epi- curus. g. The laft remark is, that to judg of the nature of thefe Propofitions , and to know whether it be determinative or explicative, it behoves us to mind rather the Sence and Intention of him that (peaks ^ then the Expreflion alone. For Chap. IV. The Art of Thinking. 1 8 1 For there are many times complexM Terms, that feem uncomplex d 5 or left complexM then indeed they i?re 5 for that one part of what they enclofe in the mind of him that difcourfes, is altoo^ether underftood and not expreff d, as has been faid in the fixth Chapter of the firft part , where we have fhown that there is nothing more ufual in difcourft then to fignify fingulars by general words, for that theCircumftancesof di(courlemakeit appear that there is a Angular and diftinft Idea^ join'd to that common Idea which anfwers to the word, that determines it to fignifie only one thing. I (aid that this was generally known by the Circumftances, as in French^ the word Roy or Kifjg fignifies Lewis' XIV. But there is yet a Ruk that may f rve us to judg, when a common Term retains a ge^ neral Idea , and when it is determin'd by a di* ftinft and particular Idea^ though not ex- prefs'd. When it is a manifeft Abfurdity to apply a Predicate to a Subjed:, retaining a general Idea^ we muft believe that he who made that Propofition, has depriv'd that Subjeft of its general Idea. Thus if I hear a Man fay, the King has contmartded mefuch a things I am aC- fur'd that he has not left the word King in its general Idea^ for a King in general gives no particular Command. If i82 LOGIC', Or, Part II. If a Man (hould fay to me, The BruffilU Gazet of the 2 4^^ ^/ January 1662. is falfi as to what vpas tranfa&ed at Paris, I fliould be aflbr'd , that there was fomething more in the mind of him that (poke , then what was expreffd in thofc Terms. For thofe words are not fufficient tomakeme judge whether the Gazet be true or falfe: So that the Rela- tor muft have in his thoughts fome piece of News Diftinft , and particular which he judges contrary to the Truth 5 as if the Gazet had related, that the King had made a hundred Knights of the Order of the Garter. Alfo in fuch judgments as are made of the Opinions of Philofophers, when we fay, that the Doftrine of fuch a Philofopher is falfe , without exprefTmg diflinftly what that do- ftrine, is as (ths Doftrine of Lucretius, touch- ing the Nature of our Soul is falfe) it necefla- rily follows, that in fuch forts of Judgments they who make 'em, do mean a diftind and particular Opinion under the general words (Doftrine of fuch a Philofopher). And fb fuch forts of Propofitions diffolve into others like to thefe. Such an opinion that was main^ taind by ftich an Author is falfe. The opinion that our Soul is Compos d of Atoms^ which was taught by Lucretius is falfe. So that thefe kinds of Judgments always enclofe two Affir- mationsj when they are not difVindly ex- prefs'd Chap. V. The Art of Thinking 1 83 I — ■ — — — — — ■ prefi'd. The one Primary which relates to the Truth it felf 5 which is, that it is a great error to believe that our Soul is composed of Atoms the other Incident^ which refers on- ly to the Hiftorical part 5 that this error was generally taught by Lucretiytf, CHAP. V. Of thefaljhood that occurs inComplexTerms and Incident Frofojitions. WH A T we have already faid may ferve in anfwer to one celebrated Queftion, how to know whether there be no fallhood but in Propofitions, and whether there be none in Ideas and fimple Terms. I fpeak of falfhood, rather then of Truth, for there is a truth in things that is cer- tain, which 'is their Conformity to the Will of God, whether Men think of 'em or not 5 but there can be no falQiood of things , but as they relate to the underftanding of Man, or any other underftanding fubjeft to errors, which judges falfly that a thing is that which it is not. The 1 84 LOGIC; Or, PartH __^ • TheQueftion is, whether this falfliood is only to be met in Propofitions and Judgments. The ufual anfwer is, no^ which is true in one fence^however that hinders not,but that there may be falfliood , not in fingle Ideas , but in complex Terms. For it is (ufficient, that fome- thing may be judg'd or affirm'd in them , ei- ther exprefly or virtually. Which will be more plain, if we confider particularly two forts of complex Terms 5 the one, of which the Pronoun is explicative, the other of which it is determinative. In the firft fort of Complex Terms, we are not to wonder if we find any falfliood. For the attribute of the incident Propofition, is affirm'd by the Subjeft to wliich the Pronoun relates. As in Alexander who is the Son of Phi- lip ^ 1 affirm, though incidently, the Son of Philip of Alexandfir ^ and by confequence there is ^ falfliood in it, if it he not fo. But here we are to make two or three re- marks of moment. I. That the (zdhj of anlncidentPropoJiiion does not blemifli the truth of the PrincipalPropofition. For example, Alexander who was the Son of Philips overcame the Perfians : This propofition ought to pais for true5 though Alexander v/ere not the Son of Philip j becaufe the affirmati- on of the principal Propofition, falls only up- on Alexander^ and what is incidently added , does Chap. V. The Art of Tlm^hfg. 1 8 5 does not hinder , but that Alexatider might vanquifh the Perfians. Neverthelefs^ if the attribute of the prin- cipal propofition, had relation to the incident propofition, as if I fhould fay, Alexander the Son of Philip was AmintasV Grandchild : Then would it only be, that the falfhood of the in- cident propofition , would render the princi- pal propofition falfe. 2. Titles that arc given to certain Dignities may be given to all that poflefs that Dignity 5 though what is fignify'd by the Title, do not at all agree with em. Thus bccauft the Ti- tles of Holy^ and Thrke Holy , was formerly given to all Bifhops, we find, that the Catho- lic Bifhops at the conference of Carthage , did not fcruple to give that Title to the Donatijl Bifhops (the moft Holy Petelianyi/W it) though they knew well that there could be no true HoHnefs in a Heretic Bifliop. We find alio , that St. Vanl gives the title o^beft and moft ex- cellent to FeUus Governour of Judea^ becaufe it was the Title ufiially given to the Chief Go- vernours, 3. But it is not fo, when a Perfon is the Author of a Title which he gives to another^ and which he gives according to his own, and not the opinion of others, or according to popular errors for then we may impute to himfelf the falftiood of fuch propofition. Thus when i86 LOGIC:, Or, Part 11. when a Man fays, Ariftotle Tvho is the Prince ofPhilofophers^ or fimply. The Prince of Philo- fophersS^tXxcwA that the Original of the Nerves was in the Heart ^ we have no reafon to tell him this is fal(e, becaufe Arijiotle was not the beft of Philofophers ^ for it is enough that he has foUow'd in this the common opinion, though it were falfe. But if a Man (hould (ay, That Gaflendus, ivho is the mojl Learned of Phi- lofophers , believd that there was a Vacuum in nature , we may with reafon di(putc the Title which he would give Qaffindus, and make him refponfible for the fallhood , couch'd in that incident propofition. A Man may be al- fo accus d of Falfhood, who gives to the fame perfon a Title which is not fuitable to him, yet not be blam'd for giving him another Ti- tle, which is lefs true and lefs agreeable. For example, Pope John the XIL was neither Holy^ nor Chaji , nor Pious : As Baronius acknow- ledges ^ for tho' they who call'd him moH Holy could not be tax'd of falfhood, yet they who calld him moft Chaft and Pious, were very great Liars^ though they did it by Inci- dent Propofitions 5 as if they had faid, John the XII. the moft Chafl Pope^ decreed fuch a thing. This is what I had to (ay concerning inci- dent Propofitions, where the Pronouns (Who or Which ) are explicative 3 as to thofe other Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 187 other where the Pronouns are determinative, as Men who are Pious ^ Kings who love their Sub^ jeSs^ certain it is, they are not liable to falp. hood , becaule the predicate of the Incident Propofition is not affirm'd of the SubjeS to which the Pronoun relates. For example, fhould it be faid, That fuch Judges as do nothing for favour or reward^ are worthy of applanje^ it is not therefore affirmed, that there are any fiich Judges, who are fo upright. Neverthelels I be- lieve there is always inthefePropofitionsra ta- cit and virtual Affirmation, not of the aftual Congruity of the Predicate, with the Sub- jeftto which the Pronoun relates \ but of the poffible Congruity. And if there be any de- ceit in this, we may rationally conclude there is a fallhood in the Incident Propofitions. As if it had been faid. Souls that arejquare are more folid than thoje which are round 3 here the Idea's of Square and Round being Incompati- ble with the Idea of a Soul, taken for the principle of Thought, I judg that thofe Inci- dent Propofitions ought to pafi for falfe. And hence it may be laid, that the great- eft part of our errors proceed. For having t\iQldeaoi a thing we frequently join to it another incompatible Idea , and by that means attribute to the fame Idea^ that which is not fuitable to it. Thus finding in ourfelves t^oldeas^ one N of i88 LOGIC:, Or, Part II. of the thinking Sabftance, another of the extended Subftance, it frequently happens, that when we confider our Soul, which is the thinkins; Subftance, we infcnfibly intermix Ib'Tiething of the Idea of the extended Sub- ftance, as when we imagine that the Soul fills up a fpace like the Body, and that it could not beat all if it were no where, which are not Properties that belong to a Body. Whence arofe that Impious error of the Mor- tality of the Soul. We may read an excel- lent difcourfe of St. Jujim upon thisSubjcft^ in his tenth Book of the Trinity ^ where he (hews that there is nothing fo eafy as to know the nature of our Soul. But that which con- founds men is this, that being defirous to know it, they are not (atisfied with what they know, without any great trouble, that is to fay, that it is a Subftance that thinks, defires, doubts, and knows 5 but they add to what it is, what it is not, fancying the Soul under fbme of thoft Phantofins, under which they were wont to conceive Corpore* al things. On the other fidc^ when we confider Bo^ dies, we have much adoe to abftain from in- termixing fomething of the Idea of the Sub- ftance that thinks, hence we affirm that hea- vy things tend to the Center 5 of Plants, that they feek for pvoper nourifliment 5 of Cr/fi/s in Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 189 in Difeafes, that it is nature that goes about to difcharge it ftlf of what is baneful, and a thoufand other Whimfeys. More efpecial- ly in our Bodies, that Nature has an Inclinati- on to do this or that^vvhen we are alTur'd that we have no flich defire, nor ever had any (uch thought, and that it is ridiculous to imagine, that there is within us any other thing then our felves, that knows what is good or hurt- ful for us, that defircs the one^ and efchcws the other. I believe moreover that we are to attri- bute to theft incompatible Idem^ all thoft murmurings of Men againft the Deities s for it would be impoffible to murmur againft God, if we conceived him aright : as he is,al- together Wife, Omnipotent, and all Good- nefi. But the Ungodly confidering him as Omnipotent, and the Sovereign Lord of all the World, attribute to him all the misfor- tunes that befall em, wherein they are not deceiv'd 5 but becauft at the fame time they apprehend him to be cruel and unjuft, which is mcompatible with his goodneft, they im- piouUy inveigh againft him as the Author of the miferies which they fufFer. Na CHAP. 190 LOGIC'. Or, Partll. ,;: C H A P.'VL Of Complex Vropdjkions^ according to Ajfirma- ^ tipn and Negation : of one fort of thofe kjnds ' 6f ^ropojitions vohich the Philofophers call Modal, BEfides thole Propofitions where the Sub- jeft or Attribute is a Term Complex ^ there are alfo others that are Complex 5 be- caufe there are Terms or incident Propofitions, which only regard the form of the Propofiti- on; that is , the Affirmation or Negation, which is cxprefsd by the Verb 5 as if I (hould fay^, la^rm that the Earth k round. Here / affirm^ is only an incident Propofition, which. ought to make a part of fomething in the principal Propofition. Neverthclels it is vifi- ble that it makes no part either of the Sub j eft. or bf the Attribute : for they foffer no alte- ration, as being underftood as entirely as. if I Ihould fimply aver, the Earth is round. So that the incident Propofition falls only upon^ the Affirmation which is exprefs^d in two man-, ners s the one moft commonly by the Verb \Eft~\ the Earth is round '-^ and the other ex- prelly by the Verb I maintain. So Chap. VI. The Art ofThi?tki»g, 1 9 1 So when they fay, I deny it, it is true 5 it is not true. Or when they add in one Pro- pofition that which fupports the Truth 5 as when I fay, TheReafo?ts of Aflronomy convince 7/ J", that the Sim k much digger then the Earth. For the firft part is only a fupport of the Argument. Neverthelefi it is of great Moment to know that there are a fort of thefe Propofiti- ons which are Ambiguous, and which may be taken differently, according to the defign of the Propounder. , As whe^ Lfay, all Phi- lofophcrs ajfnre Ui\ that heavy things fall.df themfclves. Now if it be ray Intention to (hew that heavy thines fall down of thejn- (elves, the firft part of this/ P^qpofition will be only Incident, and will only fupport the affirmation of thelattf-rpart. * Bi|tjf I intend to report this opinion of the Philpfbphers , without approving it, then the fir(V part will be the principal Propolition, and the la(t will only be a part of the Attribute. :For fb laP- firm not only that heavy things fall of them*- (elves, but that all Philofophers afTert it. And it is eafily (een that thefe- two ways of changing the propo(ition, alter it in manner, that it becomes two different Propofitions , and different in Sence. But it iseafy to judg by the Confequence, in which of the two Senfes the Propofitions are to be taken. For . N 3 Example, 192 LOGIC', Or, Part 11 . Example, the Propofition being laid down, Ifhcf'i i\r.d ^ But Stores are heavy, therefore theyfki/ down of themfelves, would be plain that I had taken the firftSence, and that the firft part was only Incident. On the other fide, iflftiould conclude thus, Now this is an Error, and hy confequence an Error may be taught by the Philofophersj then it would be ma- nifeftthat I had taken the Propofition in the (econd Sence ^ that is, that the firft part will be the principal Propofition, and the fecond part only the predicate. As for Complex Propofitions^ where the Complexity falls upon the verb, and not up- on the Subjeft, nor the Predicate, Philofo- phers have particularly taken notice of thofe that are called M^dal 3 becaufe the Affirma- tion or Negation is modified by one of the four Modes , PoJJibkj Contingent, Impojjihle , i^eceffary. And becaufe every Mode may be afErm'd or denied, Sisit kpoJiJible,7tis notpojfible, and in both manners be joined with the Affirma- tive or Negative Propofition, every Mode may have four Propofitions, and the four to- gether fixteen, which are denoted by thefe four words, PVRPVREA, ILIACE, AMAB IMV S,EDENTVLI', of which this is the Miftery. Every Syllable marks one of the four Modes. I. Poflible. Chap. VI. The Art of Thinking. I93 1. Poffibie. 3. Impoffible. 2. Contingent. 4, Neceffary. And the Vowels in every Syllable, which are A. E. I. or U. denotes whether the Modebeaffirm'd or denied, and whether the Propofition vvhich they call the Thing faid^ ought to be denied or affirm''d la this manner. A. The Affirmation of the Mode, and the Affirmation of the Propofition. E. The Affirmation of the Mode and denir al of the Propofition. I. The denial of the Mode, and Affirma- tion of the Propofition. U. The denial of the Mode, and denial of the Negation. It would be loft time to produce Examples, which are eafily found out. We are only to obferve that PVRPVRE ^ anfwers to the A, of Propofitions Incomplex. / Z lA- CE to the E. AMABIMVS to the I. EDENTVLI to the U. So that if we intend the Example fhould be true, hav- ing chofen a Subjeft, we muft take for P//r- pf^rea an Attribute that may be '^niverfally affirmed. For Iliace^ one that may be uni- verfally denied. For Amahimus , one that may be affirm'd particularly , and for Edenti- li , one that may be denied particularly* N 4 But 194 LOGIC':, Or, Partn. But whatever Predicate we take, this is al- ways certain, that all the four Propofitions of the fame word have always the fameSence, fo that one being true, all the reft are true. CHAP. VII. Of fever al fort^ of Composed Propofitions. WE have already faid, that compos'd Propofitions have either a dou- ble Subjedi:, or a double Predicate. Now of thefe there are tvvo forts. One where the Compofition is expreuj^marky^ the reft where it lies more conceal'd, and which the Logici- ans for that reafon call Expomhkj which require Expofiition or Explanation. Thofe of the firft fort may be reduc'd to fix Kinds, Copulatives, Disjunftives, Conditi- nal, Caufal, Relative and Difcretive. COPVLATIVES. ■ We call Copulatives thofe that include fe- ver al Subjedts or (everal Attributes join'd to- gether by an Affirmative or Negative Conjun- aion J that is to fay, (And) or (neither) For (Neither) Chap.VII. The Art of Thinking. 155 {Neither) does the fame thing as (and) in thefe forts of Propofitions^ for that (neither) fignifies [and'] with a Negative which falls upon the Verb and not upon the Union of the two words which it joins 5 as if I fhould fay, that Knowledg and Riches do not make a Man happy. Here I unite Knowledg and Rich- es, affirming of both that they do not make a Man happy, in the fame manner as if I (hould have faid, that Knowledg and Riches render a Man vain-glorious. Thefe Propofit ions may be diftingui(hed in- to three forts. 1. When they have more Subjefts. Lifi and Death are in the power of the Tongue, 2. When they have feveral Predicates. Auream quifquis mediocritatem Diliget^ tutus caret obfoleti^ Sordibus Te3i, caret invidenda. Regibus Aula. A well Compos'd Mind hopes for good Fortune in bad, and fears not bad fortune in Profperity. 3. When they have feveral Subjefts and feveral Attributes. Nor %96 LOGIC', Or, PartIL (Gold, Nor Houfe^ nor Land^ not heap of Brafs or From th Sick^ Lord a Fever can withhold^ Nor anxious cares repeL . > -' <^^ The truth of thefe Propofitions depends upon the truth of both the two parts. Thus if I (ay that Faith and a good Life are neceC- fary to Salvation, this is true, becaufe both the one and theothw is neceflkry. Butfliould I have laid, a good Life and Riches are nccef. lary for Salvation, this is a falfe Propofition, becaufe Riches are not neceflkry for Salva- tion. Propofitions that are confidef d as Nega- tives, andcontradiftoryinrefpeftof Copu- latives and all others composed, are not all fuch, where Negations occur, but only fiich where the Negation falls upon the Conjunfti- on, which happens feveral ways, as by put- ting the [ Not ] at the head of the Pro- pofition. Thou doft not love, and forfake thy Friend. For thus it is, that a Propofition is made Contradi&ory to the Copulative, byexprefi- ly denying the Conjunftion 5 as when we fay that it cannot be, that a thing Jhould he this andihat at ihfifime time. That Chap. Vn. The Art of Thinking. 197 That a Man cannot be wife and in love at the fame time, Amare & fafere vix Deo conceditur* That Love and Majefty do not accord wcU together. Nan bene convenmnt ^ nee in una jede Mo- rantur Majejias & Amor, Of DisJHnSives. Disjunftives are of great u(e s and thefe are they, wherein the disjundtive conjunfti- on Q^r] is found. Amity either finds friends equal, ormak^s 'em equal A Woman either loves orhates^ there is no Medium. } Autamaty ant oditmulier^ nihil efl tertinm. He that altogether lives in Solitude, is ei- ther a Bcaft or an Angel fays Arifiotle. Men 198 LOGIC:, Or, Part 11. Men are guided either hy interejl or fear. Either the Sun moves ihout the Earth, or the Earth about the Sun. ( ment. Every aBion proceeds from good^^er had judg- The truth of thefe Propofitions . depends upon the necelTary Oppofition of the parts , which admits no Medium. But as they ought to admit no Medium , that they may be ne- caflarily true 5 Co that they may be only morally true, it fufEces that they do not ufii- ally admit a Medium. And therefore it is abfolutely true that anaftion done with Judg- ment is either good or bad, the Theologians making it tnanifeft that there is nothing in particular that is untrue. But when they fay, that Men never aft but by intereft or fear , this is not abfolutely true, fince there are fbme who are lead neither by the one or the other of. thefe Paffions , but meerly upon the confideration of their Duty : So that the main truth of this Propofition lies in this^ that the greateft part of Men are govern d by thefe two Aflfeftions. Propofitions contradiftory to disjunctives are thofe where the Truth of the Disjuncti- on is denied. Which among the Latins ( as in all other compofed Propofitions ) by put- ting the Negative at the Head of the Propo- fition. Non omnis aUio efi bona vel Mala : and Chap. Vn. Th Art ofThinkjng 199 and in EngliJI?. It is not true, that every a- ftion is good or bad. Condit'w^ial. Conditionals are fuch as have two parts bound by the condition (if) of which the firft where the condition lies, is call'd the Antece- dent 3 and the other the Confcquent. IftU Soul be Spiritual^ is the Antecedent, jt is im* mortal^ is the Confequent. This Confequence is Ibmetimes mediate s fbmetimes immediate ; It is only mediate , when there is nothing in the terms that binds both parts together, as when I fay, If the Earth ftand Jlill^ the Sun moves : If Godbejuji^ the wicked fiall be pmijJyd, The conftquences are very good , but they are not immediate 5 for that the parts not having any common term, are bound toge- ther by fomething which is not exprefs'd but refer vM in the mind , that the Earth a ad the Sun being pcipetually in different Situations, riecelfarily it follows, that the one is move- able, and the other immoveable. When the confequence is immediate ^ it is ufually requifite, I. Either that both parts have the fame Subjeft. If 200 LOGIC'^Or, Part II. Jf Death be a pajffage to a more happ^ lije , it is aefirahle. if yoH have fattd to feed the Poor^ you have kilfd the Poor. 2. Or that they have the fame Predicate. If whatever God infliSts tfpon us for Tryals fih-i (^ght to he dear to us. Skh^efs ought to he dear to us. 3. Or that the Attribute of the firft, be the Subjeft of the fecond. If Patience he a Vertue^ Some Vertues are irksome. 4. Or laftly , that the Subjeft of the firft part be the Attribute of the fecond 5 which cannot be but when the fecond part is Nega- tive. If all true Chrijiians live according to the Gojpel , There are no true Chrijiians. Here the truth of th^Propofition is not re- garded, but the truth of the Confequenee. For though the one and the other part be ftlfe, neverthelels if the confequenee of the one, in refpeft of the other , be good , the Propofition, as far as it is conditional, is true. As, If the will of the Creature he ahle tdinder the accomplijhing of Gods voill^ God is not Omnipotent. Negative Contradiftories are oppos d to Con- Chap. Vn. The Art of Thinking. 2 C l Conditionals, when the condition is deny'd 5 which an ong the Latins is done by prefixing the Negative — -Nonjtmfemm forUma Simomm Tinxit^v^num eiiam mtudactrnq'-i imfrohafix tim But in Engltlhthey are expreis d by (altho) and a Negative, If )'0H eat of the forbidden Fruit ^y oh fhaU die ^ Though you eat of the forbidden Fruity yon fh all not die. Or elfe by, // is not True 5 It is not true^ that yoii fl)all die if yon eat of the forbidden Fruit. Of Caufals. Caufals are thofe that contain two Propo- fitions joyn'd together by Conjunftions of the caufe becaufe) or ^to the end that) Woe to the Rich^ becaufe tf^ey have their felicity in this world. The wicked arc advancd^ totheend^ that falling frow on high^ their ^lU may be the greater. Tfjey can^ becaifje they ihmkthey can. Such a Prince rcas unfortunate^ becaufe he vpos not born u^der fitch a Planet. Under theie forts of Propofitions may be alfo reduc'd thofe which arc calVd Redupli- catives, Me?i 202 LOGIC':, Or, Partll. Men, as Men^are rationd, Kings, as Kings^are JuhjeB to none but God. That thefe Propofitions be true, it is requir d, that one of the parts (hould be the caufe of the other 5 whence it comes to pals that both are true h for that which is falfe is no caufe, nor has it any caufe why it (hould be. Yet both parts may be true , when the Caufal is falfe. Thus a Prince may be unfortunate and born under fiich a Planet : Though it be falfe that he was therefore unfortunate, be^ caufe he was born under fiich a Planet. Therefore the contra diftories of Propofi- tions chiefly confift in this , that one thing is deny d to be the caufe of the other. Not therefore unh^py, becaufe horn under fitch A Conftellation, RELATIVES. Relatives are thofe that include fomeCom- parifon and fome Relation. Where the Treafnre is, there is the Heart. As he livd, fo he dyd. As much as thou hafl, fo much art thou worth. Here the Truth depends upon the exaft- ncfs of the Relation s and they are contradi- fted by denying the Relation. It is not true, that as he livd fo he d/d. It is not true, that a Man is efieem^d in this world according to what he has. O F Chap. VII. the Art of Thinking. 2o3 OF DISCRETIVES. Difcretivesarethoft, where various Judg- ments are made, and this variety is denoted by the Particles (out) (notwithftanding) or words of the lilie nature, either exprefs'd or underftood. Fortune may deprive Me of my T'Vealth , but not my Vertuc. I endeavour to fet nryfelf above things^ but not to bcfubje&ed to "em. They 7vho crofs the Seas^ change only their Cottn^ try^ but not their Dijfojition. The truth of thele Propofitions depends up- on the truth of both parts 5 and the repara- tion between em. For though both parts were true, a Propofition of this fort would be ridiculous, if there were no oppofition be- tween em, as if I fhould fay, Judas was a Thief and yet he took,it ill that Ma- ry Magdalen poiver'd out her precious oynt- ments upon Chriji. ? There may be feveral Contradiftories of a ^ Propofition of this nature ^ as if one (hould 'T/j not tipon Riches^ hut upon knowledge that happinefs depends^ ; Which Propofition May be contradicted feveral ways, O B-t- 2C4 LOGIC:, Or, PartI L Happinefs depends upon Riches, and not upon kitovpledge, Happinefs depends neither upon Riches norknow^ ledge. Happinefs depends both upon Riches and Know* ledge. Thus we fee that Copulatives arecontradi- ftoriesof Difcretives. For thefe two laftPro- pofitions are Copulative. CHAP. VIIL Of Propoftions Composed in Sence. THere are other composed Propofitions, whoft Compofition is more conceard and intricate 5 which may be reducM under four forts. I. Exclufive, 2, Exceptive, ^.Com^ farative, 4. Inceptive or Defitive. I. Of EXCLUSIVES. Thofe are callM Excluiive, which denote, that a Predicate fo agrees with his fubjefl:, as to agree with that alonc^and no other. Whence it follows, that they include two various Judgments, and by confequence are composd in fence. Which is exprefsd by the word (only; Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinl^ng. 205 (only^or (bme fuch like words.Or in Englifh^ There is none hut God only jrho is to be belov*d for his own fake ^ all other things are to be ad- mired for the iakeof God. Only thofe Riches which thou freely heliovoft , pjalt thoH freely enjoy- Vertne only makes Nobility^ nothing elfe renders a Man truly noble, I know this only^ that I k^wrv nothings faid the Academics, Lucan fpeaking of the Druids, makes this Disjunctive Propofition compos d of two Ex- clufives * — -you kftow The God and Heavenly ISlpintens^ you alo;ie^ Or elfe to only you they are Jtnknowji. The(e Propofitions are contradicted three manner of ways. 1. By denying that the predicate agrees with the fubjeB alone. 2. By affirming it agrees with fomething elfe, 3. By alleadging it agrees with the one and the other. Thus this Propofition , only Vertus is true Nobility , it may be contradided. 1. That Vertue does not make any one Noble, 2. That Birth renders a Man Noble as well as Vertue. ^, 5. That Birth ennobles a Man^ and not Vertue, O 2 So 2o6 LOGIC'-, Or, Part II. So the Maxim of the Academic's, this is only certain that there is nothing certain, was varioufly contradicted by the Dogmatics, and the Pyrrhonians, For the Dogmatics deny it, by maintaining that it is doubly falfe, becaufe there are many things that we know moft certainly, and therefore it was not true, that we were certain that we knew nothing. And the Pyrrhonians averred that it was falft , for the contrary reafon, that every thing was fo uncertain, that it was uncertain whether any thing was certain. And therefore there is a defeft of Judg- ment in what Lncan fpeaks of the Dnnds'^ be- caufe there was no neceflity , that only the Druids ftiould be in the truth , in refpeft of the Gods, or that they (hould only be in an error. For in regard there were fijndry er- rors, concerning the nature of the Gods, it might well be , that though the Druids had different thoughts concerning the Gods, from thofe of other Nations, they were no lefs in an error then other Nations. Here it is alfo to be obferv'd , that there are Propofitions which are exclufive in fence , though the ex- clufion be not exprefs*d. As in this Verft of Virgil, where the Exclufion is marked out, Dnafalffs vi&is^ nulkmjf^arefalutem. Thus Oiap. VIII. The Art ofThhiking. 207 Thus luckily Tranllated into Frefich , where the Exclufion is underftood. Lefilut des vdncus ejl dc Wat foint attendre. Thefafety of the va?2qujfl)d^ is mt to expe^ it. Neverthelels it is more ufual in the Latin then French^ to fupprefs Exclufions. So that there are Ibme paflages not to be Tranflated with all their force, without making exclufive Propofitions , though in the Latin the Exclu- fion be not mark'd. Thus 2 Cor. 10. 17. Qui gloriatnr ^ glorietur Domino 5 ought to be thus Tranllated, Who- ever rejoices^ let him rejoice in the Lord. Gal. 6. 7. Qu£ feminaverit homo^ h£c & me- tet. A Manjfjall reap no more then what he has foivn. Ephef 4. 5. TJnus Dominus^ vna fides ^ u- nt^ Baftifmus. There is but one God , but one Faith, but one Baptifm. Mat. 5. 46. Si diligitis eos qui vos diligunt^ quam mercedem habebitis } If you love only thofe that love you , what recompence (hall ye deferve . drinhjn the hot fit of a Fever 5 and Phyfitians nowbeheve, &c. For in the firft Propofiti- on, the Phyfitians^ concludes all Phyfitians : But in the fecond, Phyfitians denotes only fome particular Phyfitians. But frequently there is^ or there are^ pre- cede the Singular or the Plural Number, and that in two manners. The firft by placing after there k^ or there are^ the Subftantive to be the. Subjeft, and the Chap.X. The Art of Thinking. 225 the Adjeftive to be the Attribute of the Pro- pofition. There are fome pains rvholefom '-) There are feme pleajnres deadly-^ There are falfe Friends, There is a generous Humility 5 There are Vices conceatd under the appearance of Vertue. The fecond manner is by joyning the Adjective and the Subftantive together, by the Parti- cles which or who. As^ there are fears which are rational But theft Particles do not hin- der, but that theft Propofitions may be An- gle in ftnce, though complex'd in expreffion. For 'tis no more then to fay, fome fears are ra* tionaL But theft Phrafts of Speech are moft ufual^ There are fome Men who only love themfelves 5 There are Chriflians who are unwor- thy of the Name, All or every one with a Negation makes a particular Propofitiott. Every one that fays to ^e, Lord^ Lord^ flMlI not enter into the King-' dom of Heaven, Every fin is not a crime. 6. OBSERVATION. When there is no Term of Univerfality or Particularity, as Man is reafonahle^ Man is jufi^ is a queftion bandy'd among the Phylo- fophers, whether theft Propofitions which they call Indefinite , ought to pafs for llniverlal or Particular. To which the Phylofophers reply, that the Propofition ought to be Univerfal in a matter P 4 necefla- i26 LOGIC', Or, Partll. neceffary 5 but particular in a Contingent matter. I find this opinion approvd by feveral learned Men, and yet it is very erroneous. Rather we ought to believe the Indefinite Propofition to be Univerfiil , in what ever matter it be, when ibmething is affirmed of the common Term, and therefore in Contin- gent matter, it ought not to be calFd a par- ticular Propofition, but a falfe univerfai Pro- pofition. And this is the natural judgment ot all Men concerning Propofitions, rejefting 'em as falfe, when they are not generally true, or at leaft not in a moral generality, which is fufBcient in common difcourfe of the affairs of the World. For who would endure to hear a Man affir- ming, that Bears are white^ that Men are blacky that the Parjjians are Gentlemen 5 the Poloni- Ans^ Socinjans , the EngliJJj, Quakers, Never- thelefs, according to the diftindion of thefe Philofophers, thefe Propofitions ought to pafs for true, in regard that being indefinite in a contingent matter , they ought to be taken for particulars. NovV it is'true that fome Bears are white, as in Nova Zembla h fome Men are black as the EJjiop/ans --^ fQmc Pari- fans are Gentlemen , fome Polonians are So^ ciniahis 5 and fome of the EngliflyzvG^ Qiiakers. Clear iris then, that in whatevci* matter they be Chap.X. The Art ofThinking 227 be made, indefinite Propofitions of tliis Na- ture are taken for Univerfal : But in a Con- tingent matter, a Moral Univerlality is fuf- ficient. Therefore thcfe Propofitions are true, the French are valiant , the Italians are jea- lous 5 the Ger/^^/// are tall , the Ow;//^/j- are voluptuous 3 though they be not true of all particulars, but only for the moft part. Here is therefore a more pertinent Diftin- ftion to be made , that thefe indefinite Pro- pofitions are Univerfal in matter of Doftrine, when we fay, the Angels are incorporeal , and only particular in matters of Fad, and Hifto- rical Narrations. As when it is fiid in the Gofpel, The Souldiers having made a Crown of Thorns^ Jet it upon his Head. This is clearly to be underftood of fome and not of all tlie Souldiers. For in matter of fingle aftions, e- fpecially when they are determinM to a cer- tain time, they do not ufually agree with the common Term, but becaufe of fome particu- lars, the Idea of which is diftinft in the under- ftanding of thofe that make the Propofitions, as may be judg d by what has been faid of complex'd Terms in (cnce, i part cap. 6. 2 part cap. 4. 7. OBSERFATION. The Names of Bodj, Communalty^ People^ being as ufually they are taken Colleftively , for 228 LOGIC', Or, Partir- for the whole Body, the whole Communal- ty, all the People, do not make the Propofi- tions wherein they are inferted properly llni- verfal ^ nor particular , but rather Angular. Thus when I fay. The Romans vanquiflPd the Carthaginians. The Venetians make War againfi the Turk, The Judges of fitch a place condemn d a CriminaL Thefe Propofitions are not Univerfal 5 o- therwife we Ihould conclude of every Roman^ that he had vanquifh'd the Carthaginians, which is falle. Nor are the particulars. For that would be no more then if I (hould fay. That fome of the Romans vanquifh'd the Car- thaginians. But they are fingular. For the Veople is confider'd morally as one Man , li- ving ieveral Ages, and fo long fubfifting , as long as the Common-wealth endures .• And ceafes not to aft by thofe People of which it is compos'd , as a Man ads by his Members. Whence we may fay, that the Romans who were vanquifb'd by the Gauls, when they took Rome, overcame the Gauls in C^fars time 5 by by one and the fame Term, Romans, under- ftanding that they were vanquift'd at one time, and Viftors at another. Here we may note by the way, Mpon what a fandy Foun- dation that vain-glory leans , which private Perfbns challenge to themfelves the honour of the famous Atchievements of their Nation , wherein wherein they had no part^ as idle, as for a deaf Ear to claim particular glory from the quicknefs of the light, or the nimblenefs of the Hand, CHAP. XI. OjTvco forts ofProp^ftioNs mccffary for the leAm- ing of the Sciences^ Defir/tt^on and Divijion, IT is requifite that we fay fomething of two forts of Propofitions , which are of p;reat ufe for the attaining of the Sciences 5 Definition and Divifion. Divifionis the Partition of the whole into all that it contains. But as there are two forts of the vchole^ fo there are two forts of Divifions. There is one whole compos'd of (everal parts , which are really diftinft , whole parts are call'd In- tegral parts 5 and the Divifion of this whole is properly call'd Partition. As when we di' vide a Koufe into its apartments , a Qty into its Wards and Quarters 5 a Kingdom into its Provinces : Man into Body and Soul, and the Body into its Members. The only Rule for making this Partition aright , ccnfifts in the accurate numbring of the parts , fo that no- thing be omitted. The other Whole is call'd by another name, AU^ and its parts are Subjebivc' or Liferior parts ; 230 LOGIC', Or, Part II. parts : for that this All,\s a common term,and its parts aretheSubjeftscontain'd in its extent. As the word Creature is the JZ^ of that nature, whofc inferior parts, as Man and Beaft, which arc comprehended in its extent, are fubjeftive parts. This Divifion retains properly the name of Divifion, of which there are four forts. I. When the Ge/^us is divided by its Spe- cies. Thus, Allfubflance is either Body or Sp- rit, All Creatures are Man or Beasi, 7. When the Genus is divided by differen- ces. Every Creature k either rational or irratio- nal. All numbers are even or odd. All Propo- rtions are true orfalje. All Lines are fir eight or crook§d, 3. When a common Subjeftis divided by theoppofite Accidents, of which it is capa- ble or according to the diverfity of Acci- dents and Times. As every Star gives light of itsfelfi or by reflexion. All bodies either move, orflandfiill. All the French are either Gentle- men, or Plebians. All Men arejickoor well. All People to exprefs their minds, mah^ ufe of words or of writing. 4. When the Accident is divided into va- rious Subjefts. As when happinefs is divided into that of the Mind or Bod}', The Rules of this Divifion are. I. That it be entire 5 that is, that the Mem- bers of the Divifion contain the whole extent of Chap. XL The Art of Thinking, 251 of the term divided. Thus even and odd com- prehend the full extent of number 5 there be- ing no number which is not even or odd. Nor is there any thing that plunges us more int-o falfc Argumentation, then want of obferving this Rule. And that which deceives us is , that many times there are Terms, which ap- pear fo oppofite, that they feem to admit no Medium^ when really they do. Thus between Ignorant and Learned, there is a certain Mediocrity of knowledge , that exempts a Man from the rank of the Igno- rant, though it does not advance him among the Learned. Between Vertuous and Wick- ed, there is a certain Eftate, of which we fay, as Tacitus fays ofGalba^ niagk extra vitia^ qitam cum virtntihus^rsithQT declining from vice, then adhereing to Vertuc. For there are fbme People, who not being guilty of enormous Vices, are not call'd vicious, yet not being eminent for goodnefs cannot be faid to be vertuous. Between Healthy and Sick, there is the condition of a Man indifpos'd and fick- ly. Between day and night there is Twilight. Between Piety and Impiety there is luperfti- tion. And fbmetimes this Medium is tvvo fold, as between Covetoufnefi and Prodigality , there is Liberality and Frugality. Bt;tween fear that fears every thing, and raflinefs, that fears nothing , there is valour that is not af- frighted 232 LOGlC^Or, Part if frighted at danger^ and warinefs, that avoids unneceflary dangers. 2. Tlie fecond Rule is, that the Members of theDivifion be oppos'd^ zseven^ odd^ ra- tional^ hratiofial. However it is not neceffa- ry that all the differences that make the Mem- bers oppofite , (hould be Pofitive 5 it being fiifficient that one be fo , and that the other be the Genf^ alone, with the Negation of the other difference 5 for from hence arifes the mo/l certain oppofition of the Members. Thus a Beaft is diftinguifh'd from a Man, only by his want of reafon, which is nothing Pofi- tive. Thus odd in number is only the negation of divifibility into equal parts. Thus in the firft number, there is nothing more then what is in the compound number, unite being the meafure ot both 3 and the firft number no way differing from the Compound number, but in this, that it has no other meafure but the Unite. However we muft confefs it is better to ex- prefs the oppofite differences by pofitive Terms, if it may be done. For thereby the Nature of the Members of the Divifion , is more clearly underftood. Therefore the Di- vifion of Subftance into Thinki^^g-i and exten^ ded^ is better then into Material and Imma- terial J or into Corporeal and Incorporeal 5 for tChap.XI. The Art of Thinking. 233 or that the words Immaterial and Incorpo- real, give us but an imperfeft and confiisM Idea^ of what is much better apprehended by the words thinking Suhflance. The Third Rule, being a Confequence of the Second, is, that one of the Members be not fo enclos'd in the other, that this may De affirm'd of that ^ though perhaps it may be included another way. For a line is included in the fuperficies, and the term of the folid, as a term of the Iblid. But that does not hinder, but that the extent may be divided into furface, line and folid ^ for that it cannot be affirmM, that the Line is a Superficies, nor that the Superficies is a folid. But on the o- ther fide, number cannot be divided into c- ven^ (?^<^andy^//^re,becau(e every fquare num- ber being even or odd, it is enclosed in one of the two firft Members. Neither muft we divide opinions into true, falle and probable, becaule every true opini- on is either true or falfe. But they may be firft divided into true and falle 5 and then both the one and the other into certain and probable. Ramus and his Followers ftrangely torment tbemfclves to (hew that allDivifions ought not to have above two Members. Which indeed is the beft way of Divifion , when it may be commodioullydone. But Clearnefs and Fa- cility 234 LOGIC', Or, Part IL cility, being that which ought to be moftcon- fi(ier*d in the Sciences, Divifionsinto three or more Members, ought not to be rcjefted, fo much the rather, when they are moft natural, and that there be a neceflity of forcM fubdi- vifions, to make em confift of no more then two Members. For then inftead of eafing the Memory, which is the only benefit of Di- vifions, we load it with a great number of Subdivifions , much more difficult to be re- tained in Memory, then a Divifion into more Members, all at once. For example, is it not more (hort and natural to (ay , every ex- tent is either a Line ^ a. Superficies , or afilid, than with Ramus , Every Magnitude k a Line, or a thing Confining of Lines 5 every thing con* fifting of Lines, k either a fuferficies or afolid Body, Laftly we may obferve that it is equally er- roneous not to make anow, as to make too many Divifions -^ the one does not fufficient- ly fatisfie the Mind 5 the other confounds and amufes the Underftanding. Crajfotm^ in great Efteem among the Interpreters of Ariflotle , has greatly injur'd his Book with a multi- tude of Divifions, by which we fall into that Confufion which we feek to avoid. What- ever is cut i^to DuU is Confusd* Chap, Chap. XII. The Art ofThwki^g. 235 CHAP. XII. Of the defimtionof a thing, THcre are two forts of the Definition of things , the one more cxaft, which retains the name of Definition 5 the other le(s exaft, which is called a Defcription. The more exaft is that which explains the nature of the thing byeffential Attributes^ of which thole that are common are callM Genm^ and thole that are proper Difference. Thus man is defin'd a rational Creature. The Soul is a Subftance that thinks ; the Body is a Subftance extended ^ God is a perfeft Be- ing. And great care is to be taken that the Genus in th^ Definition be the next, and not the remote Genus of the thing defin d. Sometimes we define by integrant parts, as when we lay, a Man is defind ot Sg\A and Body. But then there is fomething that lupplies the place of Genus ^-^ as here the Com- poundBcing'-)thQ reft are taken for the difference. Thelefsexad Definition, which is called Delcription, is that which gives fome know- ledg of a thing by the accidents that are pro- per to it 5 and lb determines it, that we may frame fuch an Idea of it, as diftinguifties from other things. Q^ Thus ^^36 LOGIC', Or, Part II. Thus we defcribe PlantSj Fruits and Ani- mals by their fliape,by their bulk, their colour, and fuch like accidents. And thefe are the defcriptions moft ufed by Poets^and Orators. There are alfo Defcriptions made by the Caufes, by the Matter, Form, by the end 5 ^c. As when we define a Clock to be an En- gi}ie composed of feveral Wheels, whofe re- gular motion limits the feveral hours. There are three things neceflary to make a Definition good; that it be univerfal, proper, and clear, 1. It muft be univerfal, that is, it muft contain the whole thing defined 5 therefore the common definition of Time, to be the meafure of Motion is not good. For that is very probable that time may be the meafure pf Fvcft as well as Motion, in regard we (ay as well, that a thing has been fo long at rdl:, as that it has becnfo long in Motion. So that time feems to be nothing ehe but the continu- ance of a thing in any Condition whatever. 2. It muft be proper, that is, it muft agree with the thing dcfinM. Therefore the com- mon Definition of Elements, to be a Simple Corruptible Body, is erroneous. For the Hea- venly Bodies being no lefs fimple Bodies then the Elements by the Confeffion of the Philo- fophers, we have no reafbn to believe but that ^jiere are alterations in the Heavens Analogous to Chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 237 to thofe that happen upon Earth 5 fince not to (peak of Comets which we now find, are not formM of the Exhalations of the Earthy as AnBotle imagin'd, we difcover fpots in the Sun, v\ hich gather together, and then fcatter again in the fame manner as our Clouds, tho'much larger in extent. Thirdly it muft be clearer 5 that is, it ought to render the Idea of a thing defin'd, more plain and diftind, and make us as much as may be to underftand the nature of it, and be ferviceable to us to give a reafon of its principal Proprieties. Which is that which we ought principally to confider in Definiti- ons , and which is wanting in the greatcft part of Arjftotles. For whoever underftood the nature of motion , the better for the help of this De- finition 3 An AS of Ens in Potentia^ as in Po- tent 7 A^ or Power ? Is not the Jdea of it, where- with Nature furnifhesus,a hundred times more clear then that ? and indeed what did it ever avail to explain the Proprieties of Motion ? The four celebrated Definitions of the four firft qualities are nothing better. Dr/e, fays he, is that which is eafily re- tain d within its bounds, and difficulty withii? thofe of another Body. Moiflure. On the other fide is that which is eafily retain d in the Bounds of another Body difficultly within its own, i.Thefc 238 LOGIC'-, Or, Partll. I. The ie Definitions better agree with hard and Liquid Bodies, then with Bodies moift and dry. For we (ay of the Air, that. here it is dry, in another place nioift, tho' it be always eafily retained within the Bounds of another Body , as being always Liquid. Moreover we do not fee how Ar 7 sfotle could fay that Fire, that is, Flame, was dry accor- ding to this Definition , becaufe it is eafily confin'd withinthe Bounds of another Body. Whence Virgil calls it liquid Fire. And it is a vain fubtilty tofiiy with Campamlla,t\\^tY\xQ enclored,either breaks or is broken'^^^ov that pro- ceeds not from its pretended drineis, but be- caufe its own Smoak ftifles it, if it have not Air^ and therefore it will be more eafily re- ftraiuM within the limits of another Body, provided it may have fome Breathing-hole to to let out the Smoak v^hich it continually fends forth. As for .^c7^,he defines \Uhat irhich congregates rjomogemals , andfcparates Hetcrogeneals. Cold he defines that which smites Heterogene- aJs^ ayid dijjipates Homogerieals. Which fome- times agrees as well with Hot as with Cold '-, butnot alvvays.and which is of no ufe, neither to (hew us the caufe why v/e call fome Bodies Hot, and others C^Id. So that Chancellor Ba- con had reafon to fay , that thefe definitions were like thofe that fhculd define a Man to be ^Shcomakcr^ or aVine-drejfer, ' ' 1^\\% Chap. XII. The Art ofThinkl^ig. 2:^9 The fame Philofbpher defines Nature, the principle of Motion and Reji^ in that wherein it ■k. Which is grounded upon an opinion that he had,, that all natural Bodies difFer'd in this from Artificial Bodies, that natural Bo- dies had in themfelves the. Principle of their Motion, and that the motion of Artificial Bodies was from without ^ whereas it is evi- dent that no Body can give motion to itsfelf .• in regard that matter being indifferent either to Motion or Reft, cannot be determined to either of thefe , but by an extrinfic caufe, which not being able to proceed to Infinity ,it follows that God alone gives motion to mat- ter, and preferves it in its Motion. His celebrated definition of the Soul is no lefs defeftive. The fir U a&^ of a natural organic Body^ that has life in Poivcr. Firft it does not appear what he would de- fine. For if it be the Soul, as common to Men and Beafts, it is a Chimera which he has dcfin'd, there being nothing common be- tween thofe two thins:s. 2. He has explain^d an obfcure Term by four or five that are more obfcure. Fcr to o- mit the reft, the Idea which we have of the word/.7/i', is no lefs confus'd then that which we have of the Soul 5 thefetwo Terms being equally ambiguous and Equivocal. Thefeare the Rules of Definition and Di- Q 3 vifion 240 LOGIC', Or, Part 11. vifion 5 but tho' there be nothing of more mornent in the Sciences, then to define and divide well, we need fay no more in this places becaufe it depends much more upon the knowledge of the Subjeft in difputes then upon Logical Rules. CHAP. XIII. Of the Converjion of Tropofitions , where is a thoroughlnquijition into the Nature of Affirma- tion and Nej^ation^ upon which this Converfion depends. And firfi of the Nature of Affirmation. I Have deferr'd till now to fpeak of the Converfion of Propofitions, becaufe up- on that depends the Foundation of all Argu- mentation, of which we are to difcourfe in the next part.And therefore it was not proper that this matter (hould be remote from what we have to fay of the nature of Arguments, though it behoves us to repeat forae thing of what we have (aid concerning Affirmation and Negation, that we may throughly explain the Nature both of the one and the other. Certain it is, that we cannot explain a Pro- pofition to others , but we muft make ufe of two Idecps^ the one for the Subjed, the other for the Attribute :, as alfo of another word which Chap. XIII. The Art ofThinlqng, 24 1 which denotes the Union, which our under- ftanding conceives between 'em. This Union cannot be better exprefs'd then by the words themfelves which we make ufe of to affirm, while we fay, that one thing is anothei* thing. From whence it is evident,.that the Nature of Affirmation is to Unite and Identifie, as I may (b fay^the Subjeft with the Attribute:, for this is that which is fignic}' d by the word (?/?, it k. And it follows alio, that it is the nature of Affirmation, to put the Attribute in all that is exprefs'd in the Subjed:->according to the Ex- tent which it has in the Propofition. As when I fay, "Every Man is a Creature^ I would fignifie, that whatever is Man is alfb a Creature^ and fo I conceive a Creature to be in all Men. Whereas if I only fay, fome Man is juft, I do not unite the Attribute of jf///^ to all, but only to fbme one Man. Here we muft alfo confider what has been already faid , that in Ideas we muft diftin- guilTi their Comprehenfion from their Exten- fion ^ for that the Comprehenfion marks out the Attributes contained in one Idea 5 and the Exteniion the Subjects which contain that Idea. For thence it follows, that an Idea is al- ways affirmM according to its Comprehenfi- on, for that by depriving it of fome one of Q. 4 it-s 242 LOGIC., Or, PartIL . ^ its Eflential Attributes, it is entirely annihila- ted,lb that it is no more the fame J^^. And by confequence when it is afBrm'd,it is always ac- cording to all thatwhicHit comprehends in it . fel£ Thus when I fay,that a RzUangk is a Pa- raUellogram^ I affirm of a Re&angk ill that is comprehended in the Idea of a Farallellogram. For if there were any part of this Idea^ which did not agree with QiRe^angle^it would follow, that the Idea it fclf did not agree with it, but only one part. And therefore the wordP^r^/Ze/. lograpi oi7ght to be deny'd , and not affirm'd of a Re&ar.gk. Which we (hall find to be the Ground of all Affirmative Argsments. And it follows, on the other fide, that the Idea of the Attribute is not taken according to its full Extenfion 5 at leaft that its Exten- fion was not greater then that of the Subjeft. For if I fay,that allLafcivioffsMen are damn d^ I do not (ay they only (hall be damn'd,but that they fhall be of the number of the damn'd. Thus theAitirmation placing theldea of the Predicate in the Subjeft, it is properly the Sub- jeft which determines the extenfion of the At- tribute, in anAffirmativePropofition,and the I- denticy which it denotes,regards the Attribute, as included in an extent equal to that of the Subject^Sc not in all itsUniverfality,ifithave a- any more then the Subjeft.For it is true,thatLi- ons are all included in the Idea of Creatnre^hut it is not true that they are all the Creatures that are. I Chap.XII. The Art of Thinking 245 I have faid, that the Predicate is not taken in its full Generality, if it have any more then the Subjed.For not being reftraind but by the Subjea,if theSubjeftbe as general as theAttri- bute,it is clear^that the Predicate (hall enjoy all its Generality, becaufe it (hall have as much as the Subje6i:,and for that we fuppole,that accor- ding to its own nature it cannot have more. From whence wemay gr^ther thefe four un- doubted Axioms. 1. AX I M. The Attribute k placed in the Sttbjc^ by the Proportion affirn/ative^ according to the fall ex- tent of the SubjeS in the PropoJFtion, That is, if the Subjeft be Univerfal , tlie Attribute is conceiv'd in the full extent of the Subjeft^and if the Subjeft be particular , the Predicate is only Conceiv'd in a part of the Extenfion of the Subjeft : As in the foregoing Examples. 2. A X TO M The Predicate of an Affirmative Propojition^ is affirmed according to its full ComprehenJion\X\idX h to fay, according to all its Predicates. 3. AX 10 M. The Predicate of an Affirmative Propofition-, may be affirmed according to its full Extenjion ■> if it be in its fe If greater then that of its Sub- jeU. As when we (ay that Men are Crea- tures, the word Creature (igni(ies no more all fort of Creatures, but only fuch Creatures as are Men. CHAP. 244 LOGIC':, Or, Partn. CHAP. XIV. Of the Converjion of Affirmative Propofitioni. WE call that the Converfion of a Pro- portion, when the Subjeft is chang'd into the Predicate , and yet the Propofition holds true^if it were fo before : Or rather that it neceffarily follows to betrueby theConver- lion, fuppofing that it were fuch before. Now from what we have faid, it may be eafily nnderftood how this Converfion is to be made. For as it is impoifible that one thing (liould be joyn'd and united to ano- ther^ but that the other muft be joynMto the firft 5 and that it follows of courfe, if A • be joyn'd to B. B. is alfo joyn'd to A. it is evident that it is impofiible , that two things (hould be conceiv'd as IdentifyM , which is the moft perfeft of all Unions, but that the (aid Union muft be reciprocal, that is, unlefs it may be affirm'd of both Terms, that they are united in the fame manner as they are faid to be. Which is called Converfion. Therefore as in particular Affirmative Pro- pofitions for example , when it is faid , Jome Man isjuji, the Subjeftand the Predicate are both Particular ^ for that the Predicate j//)? bemg Chap.XIV. The Art of Thinking. 245 being reftrain d by the extent of the Subjeft, fignifies only that particular juftice which is in fbme one Man 5 it is evident that if fbme one Man be Identify*d withy///?, fomewhat of juft is alio Identify 'd with fome one Man. And therefore there needs no more then fimply to change the Attribute into the Subjeft, obfer- ving the fame particularity, to convert thefe forts of Propofitions. We cannot fay the fame thing of Univer- (al Affirmative Propofitions, becaufe that in thofe Propofitions the Subject is only Univer- fal, that is, is taken in its full extent, and the attribute on the other fide is limited and re- ftrain d. And therefore when it is to be made the Subjeft by Converfion, the fame reftrifti- on is to be obferv'd, and the mark which de- termines it, muftbe rdded, leaft it fhould not be taken generally. Thus when I^fiiy, that Man is a Creature, I unite the Idea of Man with that of a Creature, reftrain'd and limited only to Men. And therefore if / would invert this Union , by beginning from a Creature^ of which may afterwards be pre- dicated,the fame reftriftion of the firftTerm is to be obferv'd,and for fear of being deceivd, fome note of determination muft be added. However, becaufe Affirmative Propofitions cannot be converted,but into particular Affir- matives, that they are le(s properly converted then 246 LOGIC', Or, Part 11. then others.Biit as they are compos d of a gene- ral Subjeft , and a reftrain'd Predicate, it is evident when they are converted, by chang- ing the Attribute into the Subjeft, they ought to have a reftrain'd or Umited SubjeO:. When we deduce thefe two Rules. I. Rule. Zjmt^erfal A ffir /native Propo/itions nidy he con- verted^ by adding a mark^of Particularity to the Attribute^ dnd become the SubjeU. 2* Rule. Particiflar Affirmative Propojitions are to he converted rvithont any addition^ or any change. That is, retaining only for the Attribute, be- come the Subjefts the Mark of particularity that belong d to the firfl: Subjeft. But thefe two Fvules maybe reducM to one that fhall comprehend both. The Attribute being limiied by the SubjeS^ in dU affirmative Propo/itions^ if the predicate is to be changd into the SubjeS , the Reftri^ion muft be cbferv'^d: And. by confequence it mufl have a marh^ of particularity annex d, whether the firfl Subject ivere Univerfal or Particular. Ntverthelefs it often happens , that Uni- verfal Affirmative Prcpofitions, may be con- verted into others that are Univerfal But this is" only when the Attribute is of it felf no larger in extent then the Subject, as when dif^ fercnce Chap.XV. The Art ofThwkir?g. 247 ference or propriety are affirm^ of theSpecies, or the definition of the thing defind.For then theAttribute not being refkr ain d^may be taken in the Converfion,as e;enerally as the Subjefl:,^^ Men areRatwnal^a// Rational Creatures areMen* But theie Converfions not being true,unle(s upon particular occafions,they are look'd upon as true Converfions,which ought to be certain and infalhble^by theDifpofition of the Terms. CHAP. XV. Of the Nature of Negative Proportions, '^He nature ofaNegativePropofition cannot 1 be more clearly exprefs'd then by ftyJng, that one thing is conceiv'd not to be anothe'r. ' But to the End one thing may not be ano- ther, it is not neceflary that it (hould have notl-iing common with it 5 it being fufficient that it has not all which the other has 5 as it is fufficient for a Beaft not to be a Man , that he has not all that a Man has, not but that he may haA^e fomething common with Man. From whence this Axiom follows. 5. AXIO M. A Negative Propcfition does ?iot feparate from the Sftbjecl all the parts contain d in the Comprehen- jion of the Attribute 5 hut it only feparates the total \A^^ compofed of aU the united Attributes, If 248 LOGIC', Or, Partll. If I fay that Matter is not a thinking Subftance,yet do I not deny it to be a Subftance, but I fay it is not a Ibinhing Subftance, which is the total and entire which I deny of the Matter. It is quite otherwife with the Extcnfion of an Ided. For the Negative Propofition ieparates from the Sub- ]tQiihQldea of the Attribute in its full extent. The reafon of which is evident. For to be the Subjed of an Idea, and to be contained in its extenfion is no more then to include that/^^/i^ and by confequence when we fay^ that one IdcA does not include ano- ther, v^ich may becall'd denying ^ we fay that it is not one of the Subjeftsof the Idea. Thus when I fay that aMan is not an In[enfihle Be- ing^ I fav at the fame time that Man is none of the In- fenlible Beings, and by confequence I deny all things Infenfibleof Man^ whence we may derive this Axi- om. 6. A KIOM, The Attribute of a Negative Profofition is ahays ta- ken generally- \Vhich may be exprefs'd more diftinft- ly.All the Subjects of an ldc2L^ivhich are dented of anithcr IdcsL^are aljo denied of the former Idea. If a Triangle be denied of Squarcs.,whatever is Triangular fhall be denied of a Square. In the Schools they ufually fay, what is denied of the Oenm^ is denied alfo of the Spe- cies. For the Species is the Subjed of the Genus^^s Man IS the Subjed of Cremre^ being contained in the Ex- tenfion of Creature, Not only Negative Propofitions feparate the At- tribute from the Subjed according to the full Exten- fion of the Attribute^ but they feparate that Attribute, alfo Chap.XVI. The Art of Thinlq)2g. 249 alfo from the Subject 5 according to the full cxtenfion which the Subjc6i has in the Propel iti- on . That is, it fcparates itiTnivcifally^if the SubjCsit beUniverial ; parties jarly, it particular. i\sif I lay, no vicious Man ]s> happy, I kparate all vicious per- fcns from happv per (ons. And if I lay fomeone Hq- clor is not Icarncj', 1 fcparate learned from fomc 13o- ctor. From whence \ve draw this Axiom. 7. AXIOM^ Every Attrihuie denied of i SuhjeEt^ k denied of dll rkit is contained in the extent xfhich the Suhject has in the Propjition CHAP. XVI. Of the Converfwn of Negative Prof )fitions* A S It is impoffible to feparate two things total- jt\ ly, but that the fcparation muft be mutual and Reciprocal, it is evident: t'-.at ii I fay, No min 16 a Stone^ I can likewifc lay, No Stor.e u a Man, For if any Stone were a Man, that ^ 'an would be a Stone, a^id by c infcviuencc it would not be true that no mm was a Stone; Haice this Rule. Vnroerfal Negative Propfitions may he co'nroerted frnfly. 250 LOGIC':, Or, Part II. fmply^ hy chaugirig the Attrihifte into the Subjeff^ and h frefer^umg the Attrihuie^ become the Su:b]eB^ the fame Vm^verfaltty which the former Sdjeut had' In Negative PrGpofitionS) the Attribute is always taken Univcrlally 3 as being denied according to its full extent. ^ But the Chme Reafon will not allow the Converfi- on of particular Negative Propofitions. For ex- amplc^ v;e cannot lay that ibme one^ Phyfitian is not; a Man, bccaufe we may fay that fomeoneMan is no Phylitian. Which proceeds from the nature of the Negation it feif, that in negative Propofitions the Attribute is always taken Univerfally, and ac- cording to its full Extenfion. So that when a par- ticular Subjeft becomes an Attribute by Converfi- on in a Negative particular Propofition, it be- comes Univerfalj and changes its nature, contrary to the Rules of true Converfion ; which ought not to change the reftriftion of the Terms. So in this Propofition, Some one Man m m Phyfitian, the term Man is taken particularly. But in the falfe Conver- fion, Some one Phyfitian is no Man^ the word Man is taken llniverfaliy. Now it no way follows, that becaufe the quality of the Phyfitian is feparated from fome one Man in this Propofitionj Some one Man is no Phyfitian ; or becaufe the Idea of a Triangle is denied of (bme o- ther Figure, as ixx this Propofition, S'.me on: Figure is m Triangle^ I fay it does not follow hence, that there are any Phyfitians that are not Men, nor any Triangles that are not Figures. The End of the fecond Part, THE ART O F LOGIC. The Third Part. Of Difcourfeor Ratiocination. THISPaitofwhich we are now to treat, containing the Rules of Difcourlc^ is accompted the mod important Fart of Logic, and is almoft the only Part which ought to be handi'd moft accu- rately. But we have fome reafon to fuipcNSt whi- ther it be altogether fo ufeful. For the greatefl Pait of the Errours among OTen^ as we have al- A a ready X LOGIC. ParUlI. ready laid, arifes from hence, that they build their difcourfes upon falfe Principles, rather then from their drawing falfe conclufions from their Princi- ples. It rarely h appens that we are imposed upon b v linch difcourfes which are therefore onl}^ falfe^becaufc the confequences are ill drawn. Seeing they who are not able to difcover thofe falfiries by the light of Nature, will for the mod part be as unable toun- derftand, much lefs to apply the Rules which are laid down for difcourfe. Neverthelefs fliould thefe Rules be looked upon only but as fpeculative Truth, they would be very ufetul for the exercife of the Wit» And moreover it cannot be deni^ but that they be of fomc u(e upon feveral occafions, e- fpecially to fuch who being of a quick and lively apprehenfion, never fufftr themfelves to be delu- ded by falfe Confequences,,bvit for want of heed and attention, which a due reflcdion upon thefe Rules would eafily reftifie. However it be, we here pre- fent ye witnwhat has been ufuallyfaid concerning this matter and with fomething more then has hi- therto yet been difcoverM. CHAR I. Of the Nature of Katiocimtion and the feveral for fs of iu THE neceflity of difcourfe is only founded up- on the narrow Bounds of Human Wit; which being to judge of the truth or faWhood of a Pro- Chap. I. n^e Art of ^ polition , which is then caliMa queflirn^ cannot al- ways do it by the confidcration of the two Ideas than compofe it, of which that which is the Subjed is caird the hlftrir Term^ bccaiife the Subjeft is of a Icfler extent then the Predicate ^ and the Predicate k called the Greater Term for the contrary Reafon. .So then, when the fole Confidcration of'thcfe two Td'^^;^>' doesnotfufficefor amanto jude; whether he ought to affirm the one or the other, there k a ne- ceility to have rccourlc to a third Idea^ eidjer In- complex or Complex (according to what has been faidof Complex Terms)and this third Idea iscallM the Medtim. Now this Comparifon of the two Ideas together bj^ means of the Medium would beufclefs. were the Comparifon to be made wfth only one of tne Terrsas. i\s for example, if I would know, whether the Soul be Spiritual or no f and not underftanding it at firil, i Ihould make choice of the Idea of Thought, to dilucidate the queftion ; it is clear that it would be to no purpofe to compare Thought with the Soul, if it did not conceive fome corrcfpondcnq^ between Thought and the Predicate or thing Spiritual, by means of which I may be able to judge whether it agrees with the Soul. Thus I may fay the Soul thinks, but I cannot thence conclude that the Soul is Spirimal, unlefs I conceive fomeRclaticn between Thought and that of Sfiritual So then it is requifite that the Middle Term fhould be comparM as well with the Subjcd or Lef- fer Term , as with the Predicate or Greater Term, whether it be with both apart as in Svllogifms, which are therefore call'd Simfle ; or with both to- gether at one time,as in Arguments which are callM Conjunctive, Aa 2 But LOGIC. PartJII. But as well in the ome as other manner this G)m- parifon requires two Propofitions. We fhall fpeak in particular of Conjunftive Ar- guments: but in Simple Arguments the thing is clear; for that the Middle Term being compar'd with the Predicate of the Conclufion (which can- not be done but by affirming or denying) makes the Propofition which we call the Mapr^ becaufe the Attribute of the Conclufion is call'd the Greater "Term And beiiig another time comparM with the Sub- je£t of the (Jonclufion, it makes that propcrfition which is call'd the Major ^ becaufe the Subjeffc of the Conclufion is call'd the Lefer Term- And the Conclnficn is inferred, which is the Propofiti- on it felf to be provM, and which before it was prov*d was call'd the question. It is alfo ncceffary to know that the two firft Propofitions are callM the Premijes^ becaufe they are placd at leafl: in the underftanding^ before the Conclufion, which ought to be a neceflary confe- quence^ if dieSyllogifm be good; that is to fay; the Truth of the Premifes being fuppos'd, fit follows neceffarily, that the Conclufion lliall be good. True it is, that both the Premifes are not al- was exprelsM, becaufe that oft times one alone {offices to reprefent Both to the underftanding. And v/hentwo Propofiticns only are exprefs'd that fort of Argument is call'd an Enthyme/ie^ as being a true Syllogifm in th e Ititelleft, becaufe it fupplies the Propofition that is not exprefs'd 5 however it is defedive in words^and concludes nothing but by ver- tiie of the Propoiition which is not exprefs'd. chap. I. Th Art of 5 I have faid that there are at lead three propofr dons In one Argumait^ however there may be more, and yet the i^rgumait not be faulty;, prO'* vided the Rules be alio obfcrv'd. For after we have confulted a third Idea, to know whether a Predicate agrees or not agrees with a Subje^l, and compared it with one of vie Terms, I may make choice of a Fourth and a Fifth to make the matter plain, till I come co a predicate of the Conclulion mat agrees with cheSubjeft. As tor example, if I put the queftion, iVhether Covetom men be mferaf^Ie. I may firft confider, that covaoLis mm are tull of dcfii-es and pallions ; but if from that confideration I cannot conclude coruetom men to be mi[e>alle^ I will coriider what it is to be full of dclircs, and there I i}:all confider the Idea of wanting thofe things which a man de- fires, and the miferv of that privadonj from whence I may form this Argument. Covetom men are full of Defires. They who ire full of Defires rrant jeveral things ; it being imfojjible they fhould fatisfie their de- fireS'Noiv they that rrant rehat they defirc are wi- ferable- Covetous men are therefore miferable- This fort of Argument compos'd of feveral Pro- pofitions, of which the fecond depends upon the fird, the third upon the fecond, and fo forward is callM Sorites. Arid thefe are thole Arguments which are moftufualin the Mathematics-Butbecaufe when they are fo long the Intelleft has much ado to follow 'em 5 and for that the mimber of three Aa 3 Pr^ 6 to QIC. Part. HI. Propofitions \s fufficiently proportionable to the ex- tent of ourUnderftanding; men have taken the more care to examine the Rules of good and bad Syllogifms, that is to fay, of Arguments of three Propolitions. Wherein ii will not be amifsto'fol^' low the footfteps of others. Becaufe thofe Rules - may be readily applyM to all Arguments com- posed of feveral Propofitions 5 fo that if they are goodjtiieymay be reduced lintoSyllogifms* CHAP. II. 'the Viyifiom of SyUogifms into Sim-pie and Con- ]mcii've^ and of Simple imr Jncomfk^: 4«^i, Complex* " ^'- ~r ' • '>^>{i jjyllogifins are either Simple or ConjunSlive. Sim-' pie SyUogifms are thofe which are onhj' joyn*d ^c one time to one of the Terms of the Conclufi- on. ThuSj this is a fimple Argument. ETJe/y good Prince i to th6 Twelfth are fuch^ of which we have ffoken in our Vreliminary Difcourfe^ that contain things fnhtil and quaint^ and necejjary for the Spe- culationof Logic^ but of little t)fe. X 5\ 7E have already feen in the foregoing Chap- V V tersj that a fimple Siilogifm ought to have no more then three Terms, the two Terms of the Conclufion, and the middle Term ; each of wliich being twice repeated , make three Propofitions. The Major containing the middle Term, and the predicate of the Conclufion, callM the Major Termi the 7VZ/^3y containing the middle Term, and the Subjedof the Conclufion, call'd the lefler Term, and chap. III. 77;e Jrt of 9 and theConclufion whcrem the IcfTcr Term is the Subjeft, and the greater Term the Predicate. Bpt bccaufe ail forts of Conclufions are not to be drawn from all manner of Premifes , there are General Rules that make it appear^ that a Conclu- fion cannot well be drawn into a Sillcgifm, where they are not duly obferv'd. And thcfe Rules are grounded upon chofe Axioms cftablifh'd in the fe- cond part, concerning the nan: re of PropolitionS Ai^rmkivc^ Negative , Univerfal and Particular^ which we fljall here only repeat as being proved in another place. 1. Particular proportions are included in gene- rals of die fame nature, and not generals in par- ticulars. 7. in A> aixl 0. :n £. not A. in /., nor E in 0. 2. The 5ub ' I of a propofition taken univer- fally or particularly is that wliich renders it uni- verfal or particular. 3. The predicate cf an affirmative Propofition, being never of a larger extait then the Subjeft^ is always confidcr'd as taken particularly: For that it is only by accident, if it be fometimes taken Ge- nerally. 4. The Predicate of a Negative propofition is always takai generally. Upon diefe Axioms chiefly are founded the ge- neral Rules of Sillogifms^ not to be violated without falling into falfe Argumentation. I. RULE lo LOGIC Pare. III. I. R U L E. The middle term cannot be taf(n tmce J^articularlyj but it ought to be tah^n at leaft once Vmverjally^ For in regard the two Terms of the Conclufion are to be united or disjoined, it is apparent that no fuch thing can be done, if tne middle Term be ta- ken for two different parts of the fame whole, finee it may happen that it may not prove to be one and the fame part of the two Terms that ihall be united or dil'united. Now being taken twice parricularlv'j.ic may be taken for two different parts of the fame whole : and by Confequence nothing can be conclu- dcd^ or at leaiT; not neceffarily. Which is enough to render an Argument Vicious : fince we call a true Sillogifm, only that whole Conclufion cannot be falfe if the Premifes be true. As thus in this Argument. Some one Man is Piom. Some one Man is a 'Kobhev. Therefore [om^ one Kobher i6 Piom- Here the word Man being taken for the feveral parts of Men, cannot unite Ro^/^r with /^/o?/5; be- caufe it is not the fame perfon tliat is a Kobher^ and Piou6. The fame cannot be faid of the Subjed and Predicate of Conclufion. For tho' they be taken twice particularly, yet may they be joined together by uniting one of the Terms to the middle Term in the full extent of the middle Term. For it fol- lows from thence very well; that if the middle Term be united in any one of its parts to fome part of C^hap. III. TheJrtoJ ti of the other teriTij the firft term which we have faid to be joined to the entire mddle Term, will be join'd alfo with the term to which any part of the middle Term is joined. Thus if there be fome French in ail the hoiiles in Pari^^ and diat there be Germans in fome Houfcs in Paris^ it follows that tJiere are fome Houfes in Pari^^ where there lives together at leaft one German^ and one Vremhmxn. If fome Rich Men are Fooh. And all Kich Men are to he honoufd. There ar^ \ome Fools to he hjnoufd. For the Rich that are Fools are alfo to be ho- noured, fincc all Rich Men are to be honoured, and by conlcquence in thofe Rich ard honour'd Fools, the qualities of Fools and Honoured are join'd together. a. RULE. The Terms of the Condufion cannot he tah^nmore Vni- _ 'veffally in th: Conchjion then in the Premifes. And therefore if the one or the other Term be taken UniverfallyintheConcluiion, the Argument will be falfe, if it be taken particularly in the two iirfl Proportions. The Reafon is, for that nothing can be conclu- ded from a Particular to an Univerfal. For bccaufe fome one Man is a BlacJ^amorey k cannot be thence concluded that all men are BIack£mores. CcTQlhry. 12 LOGIC Part. III. I. Corollary. There mufi: be always one UniverCal Term more in thePremifes which is not fuch iu the Con- clufion. For evay Term that is iiniverfal in the Conclufion muft be Iiniverfal in the Premifes ; and moreover the middle Term muft be at leaft once univerfally taken. 2 Corollary. . When the Conclufion is Negative, of neceffity the greater Term muft be taken generally in the Major. For it is taken general] v in the Conclufi- on (by the Fourth Axiom) and by confequence muft be taken generally in the Major ( by the id. Rule.) I 3 CorolUry. The Major of an Argument, of which the Con^ clufion is Negative, can never be a particular Af- firmative : For the Subjeft and Predicate of an Af- firmative Propofition are both taken particularly (by the Second and Third Axiom) and fo the greater Term would be taken particularly contrary to the Second Corollary. 4. Axiom. The leffer Term is always in the Conclufion as in the Premifes, that is as it cannot but be parti- cular in the Conclufion when it is particular in the Pre ,# 1 Chap. III. The An of 15 % , I — ^»^M^^^— ^^l^^i^^— ^IM^M^— ^— ^l— ^1— — Premifesj fo on :he contrary it muft be always ge- neral in the Concliifion when it is fo in the Pre- mifes. For the lefferTerm cannot be General in the Minor- when it istheSubjcfl: of it, unlefs it be generally united or difunited from the middle Teijn. ' For it cannot be a Predicate and taken u- niverfally, unlefs the Propofition beNegative, be- caufc the Predicate of an Affirmative Propofition is always taken partiailarly. Now in Nega- tive Propofitions, if the Predicate be taken in its full extent, it isa fignthatit is difunited from its Subjeft. And by confequence , a Propofirion where the middle Term is univerfal, denotes a uni- on of the middle Term witli the whole lefferTerm, or a difunionof the middle Term from the whole lefTcr Term. Now if by this Union of the lefferTerm with the whole middle Term, it be concluded that fome other Idea is joyn'd with the lefler Term, it is to be concluded that it is joyn*d with the whole, and not with part: For the middle Term being joyn'd to the whole lefTer Term can bv that Union prove nothing of one part, which it does not prove of the refl as being jo}TiM to the whole. In like manner, if the difunion of the middle Term from the leffer Term prove any thing of any part ot the lefferTerm. it proves it of all the parts, as being from all tne parts equally difu- nited. 5. Corollary- When the Miner is a Negative univerfal, if a lawfnl conclufion may be dravm from it, it mufl he i 14 LOGIC. Part III. be always General. This is a confequence of the Corollaiy preceding. For the leffer Term cannot fail to be taken generally in the Minor when it is a Negative llniverial, whether it be theSubjeft (by the fecond Axiom ) or the Predicate ( by the Fourth.) 3. Rule. islothwg cm he concluded from tm Negative Pro- Pofitions. For two Negative Propofitions feperate the Sub- jeci: from the middle Term, and the Predicate al- io. Now when two Things are feperated from the third Thing, it does not follow either that thofe things are or are not the fame third Thing. For from hence thsit the Spaniards are not Turl{S^ and that the Tz/ri^ are not Chriftians, it does not follow that the Spaniards are not Chriftians. Nor does it follow thztthc Chinefes are Chriftians, though they be no more Turl^ then the Spaniards. 4 Rule. A Negative Conclufion cannot he prov'd hy tm Af- firmative Propofitions. For becaule the two Terms of the Conclufion arc united with the third Term, it does not fellow but that they may be difunited one from another. 5 Rule. The Conclufion alvpays foHom the npeaker Part: That vs to fayy if one of the Propofitions he Negative: the Chap- III. The Art of 15 the Conclufion mujl le 'Negative -^ if the Profofition be particulars the Conclujion mull be particular. For if onePropoliclon be Negative, the middle Term is difunitcd from one of the pam of the Conclufion, and therefore cannot unite both, which however is nccelTaiily required to make an Affirmative Conclufion. Alfo if one of the Propofitions be particular ; the Conclufion cannot be General ^ For if the Con- clufion be a llniverfal Affirmative, the Subjed be- ing Univerfal, it ought to beUniver(al in theM- mr and by confequence the Subjeft of it, the pre- dicate never being taken generally in Affirmative Propofiticns. Therefore the Middle Term added to. this Subjefl: fhall be particular in tlie Minor and therefore General in the Major ; other- wife it will be twice particularly taken. Therefore it (hall be die Subje6t: of it/ and by confequence this Major Propofition fhall be Univerfal. Thus it is plain that nopaiticular Propofition can precede, whofe conclufion fliall be Univerfal. Which is yet more manifefl: in Univerfal Ne- gative Conclufions. For thence it would follow that there ought to be three Univerfal Terms in the /'remifes (by die firft Coroll) But in regard there ought to be one ftopofition Affirmative (by the 3. Kule ) whofe predicate is taken partiailar'ly, it jfollows that all the other three terms are taken U- niverfally and by confequence both Subjeds of die Premifes fhall be taken Univerfally , whidi renders *em Univerfal Which was die thing to be demonftrated. 6 Corollary 1 6 LOGIC. ParMIL 6 Conlkry. That yphich concludes the General^ concludes alfo the Particular. That which concludes A, concludes I. and that which concludes E, concludes O. But that which concludes the Particular does not for all that con- clude the General. This is a coniequence of the preceding Rule and the firft Axiom. But we are to underftand that moft men are pleas'd to confi- der thefe forts of Syllogifms only according to their moft Noble Conclufion which is the General: So that they do not accompt for a particular fort of Syllogifm that wherein it is only concluded of the Particular; becaufe it may be concluded of the Univerfal. So that there is no fort of Syllc^ifm where the Major being A. and the Minor Ethe conclufion is O. For (by the "^XoroIIary) the Conclufion of an Uni- verfal Negative Minor may be always Univerfal. So that if an Univerfal Conclufion cannot be drawn, the Reafon is, becaufe there can be none at all. Hence A.E. O. never conflitucea Syllogilba^ but whenA.E.E. are included. , 6 Rule. From tmf articular Propfithns nothing follows For if they are both Affirmatives, the middle Term fhail there be taken twice particularly, whe- ther it be theSubjed (by the i Axiom) or Ae pre- dicate (by the 3 Axiom.y'How by the firft Rule there is nothing concluded by a Syllogifm, whofe middle Chap. IV. The Art of Thinkif^, 1 7 ■ - ■ — • — middle Term is taken twice particularly. But if one of the Premifes be a Negative, the Conclufion being the fame, by the rr'^^ceding Rule, tliere ought to be at leaft two Uuivenai Terms in the Premifes, (according to the a Corollnry.) Tnerie- fore there muft be one Urn verf^l Propof ition in the two Premifes, it being {mv^^iUy.i fo to difpofe ihree Terms in twoPropolitions, v/here there ought to be two Terms takm Univerfdly, but that there muft be two Negative Predicates, which would be againft the third Rule ; or feme one of the Sub- je6ts Univcrfal, whicli makes the Propofition Uru- verfal. CHAP. IV. Of the fi^/ires and Modes of Syllogifm in Qent^ ral "that there can he m wore then fowr Figures. 'THE General Rules being eftablifht which ne- ceflarily ought to be obfcrv'd in fimple 5yl- logifms, it remains that we obfei-ve how many forts of 5yllogifms there are. Generally there are many as forts of 5yl- logifms^ ^ there arc different Manners of difpofing,^ according to thefe Rules, the three propofitions oF one5yllogifm, and the three Terms of which they are composed. TheDifpofiuon of the three 5yllogifms accord- Bb ing 1 8 LOGIC; Or, Part. til. ing to their foiir Differences A.E. L O. is call*d the Mode, .^ The Difpofitictti of the thre^ Terms, that is^ of the middle Term, with the three Terms of the Conclufion^is call'd F/^//rf . Now it may be knowii how biany ccmGluding Modes there may be. the various figures tWt beii% confider'd, according to which eVcry Mode may conftitute feveralSyUorifms. ForbytheDo6trine of Combinations, toitr Terms, as A.EIO» being tiaken three and three, canndfc be varioufly dilpos'd ih any more then ^4 manners. But of the{e 64 man- ners, they who will" take the pains to confider eVory one apart fhall find that there are— - 18 excluded by the 3 and 6 Rule, that no- thing IS concluded From two Negatives and two particulars. ^^ , 18 by the 5. Tnat thfe Gonclufion follows the weaker part. 6 by the 4. Tliat nothing can be concluded Ne- gatively from two Affirmatives. i: That is to fay IE.O. by the 3 Corol/aryof gaieral Rules. I. Thatistofay A.E.O. by the 6 Corollary ot general Rules. Which make in all 54. and bv confequence there remain but i o concluding Modes. rEA.E. X/i.EE. . \A. I. I. ^xT JEA.O. 4 Affirmative,>^^ ^ j^ 6Neganve. {^.o.O. /O.A.O. Ce. I. O. But Chap. IV. The Art ofjh'mking. i p ' But ic follows not from hence that there are only- ten forts of Syllogifms ; in regard that every one of thefe Modes may compofe leveral forts j accor- ding to the manner, whence arifes the Diver- fity of SyllogilmSj which is the various difpofition of the three Terras, whicli is call'd Figure as we have alreacy faid. Now for this difoofition of three Terms, it only regards the two firit PropolTtions j for the Conciu- iion is fuppos'd before you car: make the Syllogilm to prove it. -And thus when the middle Term can only be difpos'd hi to'U' manners, there can be no more the four poilible Figures. For either the middle Term is the Sdjeci in the Majjr^ mi the Predicate in the Minyr-^ which makes the firft Figure. Or it is the Predicate in the Major and Mimr^ which makes the fccond Figure. Or it is the S'SjeS: both in the one and the other j which makes the third Figure. Or it is tlie Predicate in the Major and the Subject in the Minor^ which makes the fourth Figure. It being certain, tliatwhat fuffices neceffarily to make atrueSyllogifm, maybe fometimes concluded in this manner. We (hall produce Examples after- wards. Neverthelefs, becaufe nothing can be prov'd from this fourth Manner, but after a manner , not very nauiral, Ariftotle and his followers have not allow'd the name of Figure to this Mode. Yet Galen main- tains the contrary : So that it is clear the Difpute is only about words, which is to be decided, when they fhall both agree what they mean by the word Figure. B b 2 Bit lo LOGIC ;0r^ PartJII. But thev moft certainly lye under a miftake^who take for clie founh Figure (which they accule A- riflotle not to have underftood) thofe Syllogiims, wherein the Major and Minor are tranfpos'd as thus. E'very Body is divifible. , , , Bvery thir:g that is divifiklc is imferfecl- Therefore^ every Body h jmferfey. I admire Gajfendus fiiould tali into tliis fnare. For it IS ridiculous to take for the Major of aSyllo- gifin^ the propofition which fiiil appears, and for the Minor the fecond prc^fitfon. For fo we might as well take the Conclullon for the Major, or the Minor of an Argument, becaufe it is oft times the firft or fecond of the propofitions that compofe it : as in thefe Verfes of Horace the Conclufion is the the firft, the Minor the fecond, and the Major the third. qui 7neli:r fervo qui liherior fit a'VJro. In triviis fixim amfe dimittit ad affem> Non 'video : nan qui ctipet^mtuet rfuoque forro qui metuens vi'vit^ liher mihi non erit unqmm* All which maybe reduc'd into this Syllogifm. He thatlwes under contimal AHYehenjions is not free. Every covetom man lives under continual Apfre- henfions. "therefore^ no ovetomwan m fre'. Therefore there is no regard to be had to the Am- ple Local Difpcfition of the Propofitions, wliich make no change in the Intelle6t. But we are to take for SyiloQ:ifms of the firft Figure, all thofe where the 'middle Term is the Subjeft of the Pro- pofition, where is found the greater Term or Predi- cate Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 21 cate of the Conclufion ; and the Predicate in that propofition where is found the lelTer Term, or the Subjed of the Conclufion. And fo thofe are to bereckonMSyllogilmsof the fourth Figure, where middle Term is the predicate in the Major, and the Subject in the Minor. And lb hereafter we ftall call 'em, hoping ,10 body will tcke itill,beeaufe we give 'em fan notice before hand, that we do not underftand by this word Figure^ any thing more, then a different Diipofition of the middle Term, CHAP. V. The Kules^ Modes , a?7d Foundations of the fir ft Figure. THE firft Figure is that where the Middle Term is the Subjed of the Major and the Predicate of the Minor. And this Figure has two Rules. I Kule. The Minor muji be Affirmative, For were it Negative^the Major would be Affir- mative by the third general Rule^and the conclufion Negative by the fifth. Therefore the greater Term would be taken Univerfally in the Conclufion, as Bb 3 being 21 LOGIC; Or, Part. III. being a Negative, and paiticiilaiiy in the Major^ bccaufe it is the predicate of it iii this Figure, and would be the Major Affirmative 5 wliich is contrary to thefecond Rule^which forbids concluding from a Particular to a General. TIus Rcafon alfo takes place in the third Figure, where the greater Term is the predicate in the Major. 2. RULE "The Major muft he umverfaL For the Minor being affirmative by the preceding Rule^the middle Term which is the Predicate of it, is there taken particularly, therefore it muft be Uni- verfal in the Major where it is the Subjcftj which renders it Univerfal ; otherwife it would be taken twice particularly againft the firft General Rule. 'That then can he but four Modes in the firfl Figure. The Vemnftration. We have fhewed in the preceding Chapter 5 that there can be but ten concluding Modes. But ot thefe ten Modes A. E. E. and A. O. O. are exclu- ded by the firft Rule of this Figure. L A. I. and O. A. O. by the fecond^ where the Major is to be Univerfal. A. A. I. and E. A. O. are excluded by the fourth Corollary of the General Rules. For that the leffer Term being the Subje6l of the Minor , it cannot be Univerfal^ but the conclufion maybe Univerfal likewife. And chap. V. The 4^t of Jhmkmg. 2 3 And fo by Conlequcnce there remains but thefe four Modes. 2, Affirmative. <^"j''^* ^'^^S-Se f'o Which we are to Demonftrate. Thefe four Modes, to the end they may be tlie more caiily rctaiuM in Memory, have been deno- ted by certain artifkial words; of which the three SillaSles denote the three Propofitions ^ and tiie vowel of each Syllabic the mode of the Propofiti-. ons. So that thefe three words have this Conve- nience in the Sch(X)k, thai they fl:iew the entire Species of theSyilog^.m, which without it could not be done withr, :t a long Circamlocution of words. BAR- Whoever [:^m to die for Hunger thofe n?hom he ought to preferi'f. U a Homicide, B A- M Rich Men who do mt evve Alms in fublick^ necefjities fufer thofe to dye rvith Hunger tfhm they ought toprejerve^ ^W:> R A. They are Homicides. C E. No impenitent Kohber can exteS: to he[a'V^d. L A- All thofe rrho dye after they ha've enriched themfehes rvitb the goods of theChi^rchmthr out Reftit.'ition^ are impenitent Robbers. RENT. Therefore mne of thofe can espeif to be Sa- ued, D A- Whatever makes for Salvation is advantar geoii6' R I" So?ne AffliSions wa^ for Salvation. I. Therefore there are AffliHions that are advan- tageous F E- Whatever Z6 attended with a juft Kepentan:e is not to be defired. Bb4 Kh There 24 LOGIC y or. Part. III. R I. There are fome Pleafwres that are attended mthjuft Repentance. O. Therefore there are [ome Pleasures that are not to U de fired. Now in regard that in this Figure the greater Term is denied or affirmed of the middle Term taken Univerfally, affirmM afterwards in the. Minor of thelefler Term, or the Subjed of the G)nclufi- OU:; it is clear that it is only founded upon nvo prin- ciples, the one, for Moods Affirmative, the o thcr for the Negative Moods. The Principle of the Moods Affirmathe. TVhatezfer agrees with an Idea taken Vnherfally^ ames with all whatever that Idea is affirmed ofy whe- ther it he the Sui^jeU of that Ide^z^ nr comprehended mthin its I^te^ion ; For thefe Expreflions are S}*- nonimous. Thus the Idea of Animal agrees with all Meny It agrees alio with all the Ethiopians. This Prin- ciple has been fo explain^ in the Chapter where wc have treated of affirmative propofitions, that there is no need of any farther Expofirion. It fhall fuffice to add that in the Schools it is exprefs*d in thefe Terms, That which agrees with the Confeguent^ agrees with the Antecedent 5 and that b^ the Term Confequent is meant a general Idea that is affirmed of another, for that in effeftthe Predicate is drawn by Confequence from the Subjed. If he be a Man he i^ an Animal. Tke Chap.V. The Art of TlnnKtug, % j The Ground of theNegatiz;e Modes. I'hat rvhich is denied of an Ide.i tak^n VnherfaUy, is denkd of all that is ir;prm'^d of that Idea. A Tree is daii'dof ail AnimaJs, it is therefore deni'd of all Men, becaufe they are Ariimals. It is thus exprds'd in the Schools, iVhatczer is denied of the C^onfequent^ is denied of the Antecedent* That wnich has been already fpoken in the Chapter of Negative Proportions^ is the reafon wc fay. no more here. It is to be obferv'd that only the firft Figure con- cludes in A E L 0, And chat only the fame Ficure concludes in A. The reafon ofit is,for that to the end the conclufion may be Affirmative, there is a necellity that the Icf- fer term ftiould be generally takenin tlie Minor, and by conlequence that it Ihould be the Subject of it, and that the Minor term fhould be the Predicate of it 5 from whence it comes to pafs that the middle Term is taken particularly. It muft be therefore takai generally in the Major (by the firft general Rule ) and by Confequence it muft be the Subjed of it. Now this is the nature of the fiiift Figure, that the middle Term is the Subject in the Major, and the Predicate in the Minor, CHAP. VI. 26 LOGIC, Or, Part. III. CHAP. VI. 7'he Rules', Modes^ and Principles of the fecond Figmre- T^H E fecond Figure is that where the middle M. Term is twice predicated. And from thence it follows that to the end it may conclude neceffari- ly, it ought to obfervethefe two Rules. J. RULE. 0'/?e of the tm firfl Propofitions mufi he ^egmve^ and by Confequence^ jo mufi alfo be the Conchfion by the Sixth general 'Rule, For if they were both Affirmative^ the middle Term, which is always the Predicate would be taken twice particularly contrary tothefirft general Rule. 2. RULE.. The Major muft be Vmnoerfal> For the Conclufion being Negative, the greater term fhall be taken Univerfally. Now the fame Term is the Subjefi: of the Major. Therefore it ought to be Univerfalj and by Confequence render the Major llniverfal. Vemonjiration, chap, VI . The 0/ At Thbikm^. 2 7 Dtmonjlration* That there cm he hia jour Model in the Second Ft- gisre. Of the ten concluding Moods, the four Affir- mative are excluded by thefccond Rule of this Fi- gure, that one of the Prcmifcs ought to be Nega- tive. O. A. O. is excluded by die fecond Rule, that the major ought to bellniverfal. E. A. O. is excluddd for the fame Reafon, as in thefirft Figure, bccaufe the lefler Term \s the Sub- jea in the Minor. So that only thefe four Moods remain. a. Gencral-^A. E E ^- P^^ticular. ^^ q. O. Which &:ur Moods are comprehended under thefe Artificial T/'/ords. C E- Iso lyar iz to ie heli^x/d. S A- U'vnv good Mm is to be heliev^d. R E. Therefore m i^ood Man is a Lvar. G A. AP ihoid that belong to Je[m CJjrift^ Crucify theFlejh. M E S- All thofe that lead a Life of Pleafure and Foluf- tmufnefs^ do tM Crucify thcmftVvei. F R E S. Therefore none of thoje belong to Jejm Chrift. FES- No Vertue is contrary to the Lo've of Truth, T I- There is a Love of Peace rplnch is contrary to the Lou e of Truth. N O. Therefore there is a Love of Peace^ n>hich is not Vertue. B A- All Vert lie is ac corn-famed with Vifcretion. KO. Their 28 LOGIC; Or^ Pare. HI. R. O. Thm are fom forts of Zeal that are not ac^ comf anted with Prudence. C O. Therefore aU forts of Zeal are not Vertues* The foundation ot this fecond Figure. It would be eafy to reduce all thefe forts of Argu- ments to one Prindple^fliould we make ufe of many- words. But it is more advantageous to reduce two to one Principle, and twotoanother^ becaufe their Depcndance and Connexion with thefe two princi- ples^ will thereby be made out more Clear and Im- mediate. The Principle of the firfl Arguments in Cefare and Feftino. The firft of thefe Principles, is thatwliich ferves alfo as a Foundation for negative Arguments of the iirft Figure, That whatever is denied of a Vni'verfal Idea^ is- alfo denied of whatever the Idea is affirnfd^ that 16 of all the Subjects of that Idea. For it is clear, that all the Arguments in Cefare^ and Feflino are grounded upon this Principle . For example, to fhew that no good Man is a Liar; I have affirm'd to he believed of cvcty good Man^ and I have deniy a Uar^ of every Man to be believed* Saying no Liar is to be belic/d. I confefs the way of denying is fomewhat indireit 5 for when Lyar is to be deniM of the peifon to be believM, to be hehev^d is denied of Lyars. But when llniverfal negative Propofitions are fimply converted, by de- nying the predicate of a Subjed llniverfal, the ll- niverfal Subjeft of the Predicate is alfo denied. This fliews us however that the Arguments^ in Cejare are in fome manner indired, fince that which ought Chap. VI. The Art of Th'mkiug. 29 ought to be denied, is not denied but indireftly- But becaufe that does not hinder the Intelleft from comprehending ealily and clearly the force of the Argument* they may pais for dired, if this word may fignine a clear and natural Argument. This (hews us alfo diat thefetwo Modes of Ce[are and Fe^iino nothing differ from the tvvo Modes of the firft Figure, Celarent and Fmo ^ only that the major is converted. But tho* we may (ay that the negative modes of the firft Figure are more di- reft, it often happens neverthelefs that thefe two Modes of the fecond Figure that are anfwerable to •em. are both more natural and more eafy to be un- derrtood. For example^ as to what we firll proposed, tho the direft order of Negauon rcquir^, that we ftould havefaid, no perfon that is to be believ'd is a Lyar, which had made an Argument in Celarentj yet it Is more clear to the Undcrftanding that no Lyar is to be believ^ . The ground of the Argument in Camefbcs and Barocco. In thefe two Modes the middle Term is affrm'd of the predicate of the Conclufion, and deni'd of the Subjeft, which (hews tliat they are direftly grounded upon diis Principle. iVhaterer is com- prehended in the Extenfion of an Vniverfal Idea^ a- grees mth noneof theSuhjecis of rrhich that is drm'*d. The Predicate of a 'Negative Propfition being taken according to its full Bxtenty as has beeen poifd in the fecond Part. True Chr'ftian is comprehended under the ex- tent of Charitable, in regard every true Chrifti- an is Charitable. Charitable is deni'd of one that has no pity upon the Poor, and therefore a true Chrifb'an JO LOGIC; Or ^ Part. Ill Chriftian is deni'd to have no pity upon the Poor which ptoduces this Argument. Ervery True Chriftian u cbmtahk, No ferjon without tity toward ihe Poor is Charitahk Therefore no terfon without Pity toward the Poor is a true Chriftian^ ,i . : 1 CHAP. VII. TheKuIes, Modes ^ and the Grounds of the Third Figure. N the third Figure, the middle Term is twice the Subjeft. "W hence it follows. I. RULE. That the Minor ought to le Affirm ati'ue. Which we have prov'd by the lirft Rule of the iirft Figure; bccaufc that both In the one and the o- ther the predicate of the conclufion is predicate in the Major. 2. Kuh There is no concluding hut Particularly- For the Minor bciiigal ways Affirmative ^thc lefler Term, which is the predicate is particular, therefore cannot be Univerfal in the Conclufion, where it is theSubjeft ^ wliich would be to conclude a general from a pai'ticular. Demonftration. That there can he hut fix modes in the third Figure, Of the ten concluding Modes, A. E.E. and A. 0. 0» are excluded by the firft Rule of this Fi- gure, chap. VII. The Art of Thinking. ^i giirc, that the Minor cannot be Negative. A. A. A. and E A. E. are excluded by the fe- cond Rule, that the Ccncluiion cannot be'general. So that only fix modes remain. 7AA.1, ^EA.O. 3. Affirmative. >A. 1. 1. 3. NegXE. I. O. 31. A. I. CO.A.O. All thefe Modes arc reduced unda* fix anificial words, tho in another order. D A- The Dhijibility of Infinite matter cannot he comprehended, k A- The pivifibility of Infinite matter is moft cer- tain. P T I. Therefore there are fome moft certain things which are Incomfrehenfibk. F E N(? man can deferthimfelf LAP. Every wan is an Enemy to himfelf 1r O N. Therefore fome Enemies cannot he defer ted. D I. There are fome mcl^d Men that abound in wealth. S A- All wicked Men are miferable. MIS. Therfore fome miferable Men abound in Wealth. D A- Every Servant of Oodis a King. T I- There are Servants of God that are Poor. S I, Therefore tljere are fome poor Men that are Kings. B O- There are foTnt forts of Anger not to he hlam^d, C AK- All Anger Is a Paffion. D O. Therefore fome Paffions are not to be hlanPd. F E- Tslo abfurdities are Elegant. R I- There are abfurdities in Figures. SOlSl.Therefore there are Figures that are not Elegant. The ^i LOGIC', Or, Part.Iir The Groundof the third Figure. Thetwo terms in the Conclufion being Attributes in the conclufion being £x*d to the {ameTerm in the Prcmifes which fiipplv the place of a middle term, the Affirmative mocfcs of this Figure may be re- duc'd under this Principle. The Ground of the Affirmative Moods- iVhen two Terms may be affirmed of one and the fame things the one Term p:ay be affirvid of the other farticuUrly. For being united with the fame thing, becaufe they both agree with it ; it follows that they are Ibniietimes united together, and therefore die one may affirm of the other particularly. But that we mav be affuT'd that two terms are affirm'd of one andf the fame thing, the middle Term muft be ta- ken univerfally. For fhould it be taken twice parti- cularly, they would be thought to be two feveral paits of one common Term , which would not be the fame thing. The Ground of the Negative Modes. 7fhen of the two Terms the one may he deni^d^theo- ther affirmed of the fame things the one may be denied of the other particularly For it is cenain tliey are not always conjoined when they are not united in this thing.' Therefore the one mar fometimes be denyM of the other, chat Chap. Vllf- The Jrt of Thinking. 35 that is, that the one may be denied of the other ta- ken particularly ; but for the fame reafon, the middle term muft be always taken univeriallyj tluc it may be one and the ianie thing. CHAR VIIL Of ths Modes of tk fourth Figure. THE fourth Figure is that wherein the middle Term is the predicate ot the Major, and the " Subje6l in the Minor ; but it is fo irregular, that it is hardly worth while to fet down die Rules, v/creic not that nothing maybe wanting to dcmonilrate all the limple Modes ot Arguments. 1. RULE. J'^ljen the Major 16 affi'rmatlve% the Minor is aU rpays Vni'verfal For the middle Term is taken particularly m the major Affirmative. And therefore by the firft Ge- neral Rule, it muft be taken Uiiiverfaliy in the Minor, becauie it is the Subjeft of it. 2. R U L E. I'Vhen the Minor is aftrrndtiue^ the Conclufioh if ^hrays Partic/dar. For the leffer Term is the Predicate in the Minor And by confequcnce it is taken particularly when. it is affirmative 5 w^hence it follows by the fccond C c ' General 34 LOGIC; Or, ParcIIi; i General Rule, that it ought to be alfo particular in the conclufion, which renders it particular^ as beiiig the Subjed of ir. 3. RULE In the Negatizfe Modes the Major muji he General. For the concluf ion beir^ Negative, the greater term is there taken generally. And therefore by the fecond General Rule, it muft be taken generally • in the Prepiifes. Now it is the Subjedof the ma- jor, as well as in the Figure, and therefore by con- lequence as well here as in the fecond Figure,' being generally taken, it muft render the major Gene- fal. Vemonftration, That there can he hut five Modes in the fourth Figi^re. Of the ten concluding Modes, A.I.I. andA.O. O, are excluded by the firft Rule. A. A. A. andE.A. E. by the fecond. O. A. O. by the third. So that only five remain. cA. A. I. 5A. E E. 2. Affirmadve. S^ A. I. 3- Neg. SE. A.O. I ^E. 1. O. Thefe five Figures are reducM under thefe five artificial words. BAR- All miracles of Islatiire are ordinary. B A- What k ordinary does not move m. RI. There- chap. VIII. The At of Thinking. 35 R i. Therefore fome things do not move m which are Miracles of Nature- C A- All the evil of ths Life are tranfitory. LEN- Alltranfitoryhvils are not to k fear'd TES. - Therefore no Evil of this Ufe is an Evil to he feared' D 1- SoPie Fools ffeakl Truth. B A- Whoever fpeal^Truth^ is my thy to be admi-- red. T IS. Therefore there are fome to be admifd^ n'ho ceaje njt hwever to be Fools. FES. No vertue 16 a natural quality* P A- Every natural quality foa.^ God for its Author. M O. Therefore fome Natural qualities that have God for their Author^ are mt Vertues. PRE- No miferable Perfon m content. S I- There are contented Perfom that are Poor. SOM. Therefore there are fome poor Men that .vrenot : Mtferabie. It is to be obferv*d that thcfe five modes are generally denoted by thefe words * Baraltf- ton^Celantes ^ Dalit i6 ^ Fafefmo ^ Trifejomorum-y which proceeded from this, that y^A//?of/f^ not have- ing made any feparated Figure of thefe Modes, they are not look'd 'pon, but as indirect modes of the firft Figure, wherein the Concluilon was Inverted, the true Subjed being the term Predicated. For wliich reafon, they who follow'd that Opinion, have put for the firft Propfition^that wherein the SabjeSl: of the Conclufion enters, and for tlie Minor, that wherein the Predicate enters. And therefore to this firft Figure they affigny nine Modes, four dire6l, and five indircd, wnicli they rcduc'd under thefe two Verfes. C c i Barbard 5^5 •: LOGlt;^, -^^ktt; Felafton^ Vtianis^PMiji^ Bociirdo^ Ferifon, ,, But in regard the cdndiiiion being' alwavsXiip^ pofed, as beincr. that w^-irb is to be prov'd, cannot properly be faia to be ever in^^^rted, ^e thoa'ght^it more advantageous to take, always ior ^he Major^ the Propofition wherc the Attribute of tht-Conclu- iion cntersjwhich obligM listhat we might put the Major iirft, to invert the order of the Syllables o£ 'thofe Artificial words in this manner. Barbaric Cakntes^Dibatis^ Feff^afm^ Frifefon. A Recapitulation of the feveral forts of Syllogi&rik. From what has been faid, we may conclude that there are Nineteen forts of Syllogifms^ Which may be variouflv divided. I. Into 7 generals 5. /j ^Affirm. 7 5 Particulars 14. ^' ^^^^ ^Negat. 12. A I. 3. Into fuch as conclude <^l 6 4. According to feveral Figures, ih'fubdii^iding ^em by the Modes, which has already beeti Effici- ently done by the explication of every Figtfre. .' {. On the contrary according to die Modbs in fubdividing "^em by the Figures, which will produce .Nineteen fpccies of Sillogifms, becaufe there are three modes, of which every one conclude in one Figure only^ fix, of whicii every one concludes -n rwo Figures^and one that concludes in all the four. CHAP. IX: . i chap- IX. The Art of Tlnnkuig. 37 CHAP. IX. Of complex Sylbgifmi^ and bow they may bt^ Yeduced into common Syllogijm^y and horv judged hy the j'ame Rules* WE mufl: confcfs, that if there be any thing wherein Logic docs good, there is much more wherein it docs mifchief: and wemuftac- knowledg at the lame time, that there are none to whom it docs mo''c Injury thm thofe who vain- glorioully afFed to appear mort excellent in the Art. For this afFe£btion it felf being a mark of a Wit mean^ and of little Solidity, it happens ufually that while they employ their whole time rather up- on die bark of Rules, then in the Study of good Sence, they are eaiily inducM to rejeft, as Evil, Arguments fuch as are very good, not having di- Icretion enough to accommodate ^em to the Rules themfelves> which only ferve to deceive ^em, be- ing but imperfeftly underftood. To avoid this vanity which favors fo much of Pedantry fo unbecoming a generous Spirir , we ought to examine the folidity of an Argument ra- ther by the Light of reafon, then by forms. And one of the ways to fucceed is^ when we meet with any difficulty/ to form other Syllogifms of the fame nature upon different matters, and when it clearly appears to us that they conclude right, to confider only true Sence. For then if we find any thing _Cc 3 diat 38 LOGIC', Or, Patt^lIL that does not feem conformable to rules, we ought rather to believe 'tis the deted of our Underftand- ing, and not that they are contrary to Rule. ^ But thofe are the Arguments of which it is mofl: difficult to make a true Judgment 5 and in which it is mofteafyto be deceived, which as we have alrea- dy faid, are call'd Complex^d^ not fimply, becaufe they confiftof complexM propofitions ^ but becaufe the Terms of the Conclufion being complex^d^ were not rakai entirely in any of the premifes to be join'd with the middle Term, but only with a part of one of the Terms* As in this Example. The Sun is a thing Infenfibk' . The Pcrfians adore the Sun. Therefore the Perfians adored a thing In[enfdle, Where we find that the conclufion having for its Predicate, adored a thing In[enfible^ there is but one pan in the Major, that is a thing Infenfible^ and ador'dm the Minor. As to thefc Syllogifms therefore we fhall do two things. Firfl, we fhall fiiew how they may be reduced to Incomplex'd Syllgifms, of which we have fpo- kai hitherto, that we be may able to examine ^em by the fame Rules. ' In the fecond place we (hall demonftrate, that- there maybe general Rules given for the quick Ex- amination of the Truth , or falftiood of thefe Syl- logifms, without the help of Reduftion. And indeed it is a ftrange thing, that although Logic be fo highly valu'd above its deferts, even to maintain that it is abfolutely neceflary lor the acquifition of the Sciences, it is yet fo fuperficially handl'd , that there has been nothing faid of thofe things Chap.IX. The Art oj Thinking. ^p things which arc moft ufefiil in it. For they gene- ^ rally content themielves with giving Rules for lim- pie Syllogiijms, which are fo clear, that no body ever thought to propofc 'em icrioufly in any Di- fcourfe 'y forwhoevever mtnded fuch a Syllogifm as this ? Every Man is an Animal, Peter is a Man, therefore Peter is an Animal. But they never trouble themfelves to apply the Rules of Syllogifms to Arguments, whofe Propo- fitionsareComplex'd, tho* it be ofttimes very diffi- ailt, and that there are many Arguments of this nature, which appear to be falfe ^ but yet are very true. Beiides that thefe forts of Arguments are much more in ufe thenthofe that are entirely fim- ple ; which is more eafy to be fhewn by Examples then Rules. J. EXAMPLE. For example, we have affirmed that all Propo- fitions compof'd of Verbs Adive, are in fome manner complex'd, and of thefe Propofitions oft- times arguments are fram'd, whofe form and force of concluding, it is a hard matter to underfiand j as in this* The Divine Law Commands m to honour King^, James the Second is hing. Therfore the Divine Larv commands m to honour James the Second, Some Perlons wanting Judgment, have accuPd thefe forts of Syllogifms of being defective. Be- caufe fay they, they are composed of pure Affir- jnaiives in the fecond Figure, which is an effential defca. But thefe perfons plainly make it appeat C c 4 that 40 LOGIC; Or, Part.IlI, that they confultcd more the Letter and outward RindorRiiies^tbcn the Light of R.cafon by which thefe Rules were found out 5 for this Arguxnait 15 fo true and concluding, that if it were contrary to the Rule, it would be an Argument that the Rule it felf wasfalfe, and not the S^'^II^gifm. I fay then that this Syllogifm is ti'ue 5 for in this Prnpofition^ the Law of God commanch m to ho- 770 nr Kings , the word Kings is taken generally for all Kings in Particula'/, and by Confequence y^w^y the Second is of the number of thole iCings, whom the Lav/ of God commands us to Honour. In the Second place I fay^that the word King which is the middle Term, is not the Predicate in this Propofition, The Law of God Commands m to ho- n.m Kings ^ tho' it be join'd to the Predicate Qmi- mands , for that which is truly the Predicate \s affirm'd and agrees with the Law of God. 2. The Predicate Is r^ftrain'd to the Subjed. Now the word Kjng is not reftrain'd in thisPropofition, The di'vine Law commands m to honour KingSy becaufe it is taken generally. If therefore any one demand where the mifteiy liesj that that word is the Subjedt of another Pro- poiition envelopp'd in :he tormxr. For when i fay, the Lan> of God commands us to honour Kings^ I attribute command to the Law, and homw to Kings, as if I iliould have faid^ The Law of God commands that Kings fhould he honoured- Moreovrr in this Conclufion, the Law of God Comjnands us to bonorn James the Second. ^ James I the Second is not the Predicate, though join-d to* the Predicate, but on the contrary the Subje6l: of rhe latent Propofition, as if I had faid, the Law of Chap.IX. The Jrt of Thinking. 41 of God commands that Jams the Second lliould be honour'd. So then the Propofitions being unfolded in this manner. Tie Dhi'/ie Lm commands ihat Ki^gs fhould he honoured, James the Second is a King. Therefore the druine Law co}rmmd^ that James the Second he homitred. It is clear that the whole Argument confifts in dicfe Propofitions. Kings ought to he Lommured* James the Second m a King. Therefore James the Second ought to he honoured. And that this PropofitioUj the di\ine Law com- mands5which appeared to be the Principle, is only a Propofition incident to the Argument^wliich is joined to the Affirmation of which the Law of God is a Proof. And it is alfo clear that this Syllogifm belongs to the fii-ft Figure in Bjrkira.thc fingular Terms,?^^^^^ die Second, paffing for Univerlal, as being taken in their eutirc extent. 2. EXAMPLE For the fame reafon this Argument which feems to be of the fecond Figure, and conformable to the rules of that Figure is Invalid. iVe ought to believe the Serif tme. Tradition U no Scnfture. Therefore rre ought not to lelieve Tradition, Fcf ^ LOGIC; Or, Part. III. For it ought to have been reduced to the firft Fi- gure^ as thus. Tfe Scripture ought to he believed. T'radition is not the Serif ture. Therefore "tradition Z6 not to he believed* Now there is nothing concluded from a Negative Minor in the firfl: Figure. 3. EXAMPLE. There are other Arguments which feem to be purely Affirmative in the fecond Figure, which ne- verthelefs are moft concluding, as thus. Bvcry good Shepheard M ready to lay down his Life for his Sheep But there are now adaysfew Shefheards who are re/i- dy to lay down their Lives for their Sheep, Therefore there are now adays few good Shepheards, Now that which makes this Argument good is this, that there is no Conclufion affirmativciy, but in Appearance ; for the Minor is an exclufive pro- pofition which contains in its Sence this Negative. Several Shephtards now adays are not ready to lay down their Lives for thir Sheep. And the Conclufi- on reduces it felt to this Negative, Several Shep- heards now adays are not good Shepheards. 4. EXAMPLE Here is an Argument, which being of the firft Fi- gure, feems to have a minor Negative, and yet is very true. chap. IX. The Art of Th'tnkirig. 47 All they J fromrlhomrphat they delight in cannot he taken aivay byforce^ are [afe from the ajfaults of their Enemies. But from thofe^ mho love God alone , thofe things in Tphich they deltght Cannot he taken array. "Therefore all thy rrho love God alone^ are free from theajfdilts of their Ln^mies. That which mAkes this i .rgiimcnc good is^ that the Minor is nor Negative hut in appearance^ being really Affirmative. ^ For the Subjcft of the Major, which ought to be the Predicate of the Minor, is not, Thy from rvhom can he taken what thy delight in ; but quite contrary, they from whom thole things cannot be taken. Now this is that which is affirm'd of thofe tliat love none but God alone, according to the Sence of the Minor. Novp all they vpho love mm hut God alone^ art of the Number of thofe from vphom that rphich they delight in cannot he tah^n array. Which is vifibly an Affir- mative Propolition. 5. EXAMPLE. And this happens alfo when the Major is a Pro- pofition Excluiivc- as thus, The Friends of --od are only happy. Norp there are fome Men ivho are nn the Friends of God. Therefore there are fome Kich Men that are not happy. For the Particle only is the reafon that the firft Propofition of this Syllogifm is equivalent to thefe two, The Friends of God are happy ^ hut other Mor- tals 44 LOGIC', Or, PattJU, tals^ who are not the Friends of Ood^ are not hafpy. Now in regard the force of the Argument de-, pends upon the fecond Propofitionj the Minor' which feem'd to be Negativebecomes Affirmative, becaufethe Subjedof the Major, which ought ta be the predicate in the Minor, is not the Friends of God^ but they who are not the Friends of God, io that the Syllogifm ought to be reduced into this , Term. All thjfe who ^re not the friends of God are not happy. But there are fome Kich Men who are not in the nmhtr of thoje who are the Friends of God. Therefore there are fome Rich Men who are not . happy^ Nowbecaufe it is not neceffary to exprefs the Mi- nor in this manner, but that the form of a Nega- tive Propofition may be allowM it, therefore it is the fame thing to fay Negatively, a$ affirma- tively chat a Man Is of the number of thofe who are not the Friends of God. d EXAMPLE. There are many other Syllogifms of the f^me nature, whofe Propofitions appear Negative, and vet they are true, becaufe there is one which is not Negative but in appearance, and which is really affirmative, asweihall make appear by thisExam- "That which has mt Parts cannot perifh hy the diffo- lution of parts- The Soul has no parts. Therefore the Sot4 cannot pmfh_ hy the diffohmpn of parts There bhip. !X. 77;e Jrt of Thinking. ^ There are fome who brin^ thcfe forts of SyUo- ! gifmstoftew that that fame Logical Axiom (no- thing is to be concluded irom pure Negatives is true ) is not ttue. But they did not coniider that as to the Sence, the Minor of this 5yllogifm and othcfs of the fame nature is Affirmative^ becaufe -)Dhe middle Term which is theSubjeft of the Ma- jor^ is its predicate. Now thcSubjcd rf the Ma- jor is not, Whatever hjvs Parts^ but whatever ha*; no parts. And fo the Sence of the Minor is^ Cw Soul 16 n thingwhich has no tarts ^ which is an Affir- marive Propofition of a Negative Predicate. The Came perfons prove rhatthcfe Syllogifms arc •concluding by thcfe Exa.mples. John is not rational therefore John U mta Man. No Animal fees. Therefore John does not fee. But they ought to confiderthatthofe Example arc only Enthymemes-j and no Enthymeme concludes , tut by vertueof a Propofition fubintellefted, and confequently ought to be referv^ in the Mind, tho^ not exprefs*d. Now in both thefe Examples, the Propofition fubintellefted is neceffarily Affirmatire, as thus. Every Man is reafomhle^ John is mt tea- jmable^ therefore John is no Man ; and every Man is anAnimal{no Animal fees/herefore no ManfeesSo that It cannot be faid thefe Syllogifms are purely Negative: and by Confequence Enthymemes whicn ■never conclude but becaufe they incLs)fe the whole Syllogifms in the Mind of the Argumentator, can> not be brought as an example to (hew that fome Sil- logifms purely Negative, truly conclude. Chap. X. 46 LOGIC; Or, Part.Ift C H A R X. A General Prhci-fle hy the help of which^ without d- ny other KeduEiton to Figures and Modes theWt^th or faljhood of all Syllogifmsmaykk^^own, WE have ieen how to judg of Gomplex'd Syllogifms whether conclufive ;or defe- ctive 5 by reducing 'cm to the forms of common Sillogifms^and ezamining 'em , by the common rules. But as it is nor likely that our underfranding fhould ftand in need of that Redudion, to judge of the force of Syllogifms, fo we bethought our felves, that there mull: be fome more General Rules, upon which the Common Rules depend, by which an eafie judgment may be given of the Truth or fal- fhood ot all manner of Syllogifms. And this is that which came into our Thoughts. WhenaPropolition, the truth of which is not fo clear, is offerr'd to be proved, there feems only this to be done, to find out a propofition more known which confirms that, which for that rcaibn may be calPd xh^ Containing Prop fition. But becaufe the Firlt cannot contain the Second- exprelly and in {o many words, for fo it would not be a; different thing and confequently prove ufelefs for the delucidation of the Firft, it is neceffary that there (hould be another Propofition, to fhow that the ContainiKg Propofition contains in efled that o- ther which is to be provM, and this Lafl may bean Applicati'vs Propofition. lu chap. X. Tloe Art ef Thinking. j^y In wAffirmativcSyllogiinis it \% not much mate- rial many times which is call'd the Containing Pro- pfition^ bccaufe that both in fome manner contain the Concluding Propofition, and for that they mutually ferve to Ihew that this is contain'd in the other. As for example^ if Iqucftion whether a vicious man be happy, and argue thus. Bvery Sh've to his PaJJion is unhappy^ Bveryvicious man is a flarve to his Paj/ions^ Therefore every 'vicious man is unhappy* Now take either of the Propofitions and you may fay diat the one contains the Conclufion, and. the other ihews it. For the Major contains it, in regard that a [lave to his Pafions comprehaids *vi€iom-^ that is, that viciou6 is cnclos'd in it"s ex- tent, and is one of it's Subjeds, as the Minor makes manifeft. Ncverthelefs, when the Major is mod common- ly univerfal it is ufually look*d upon as the Con- taining Protojition^znd the- Minor as the Applicative. As for Negative Syllogifms, whereas there is in them but one Negative Propofition, and that the Negative is properly aiclofed in the Negation only^'t feems that the negative Propofition ought always to be taken for the Q>;^4/W, and the Affirmative for the Applicative 4 whaher the Negative be the Ma- jor, as in Celarent^ ferioyCefare^feftino ^ or whether it be [the Mi-nor as in Cainejlres and Baroco : as if I were to prove by this Argument, that no covetous man is happy. Every happy man is content^ No covetous man is cement^ "Therefore no covetous mm is happy. 48 LOGIC; O'', V Part. HI. It h move iiaturdl to ^y that the Minor, which IS Negative contains the Conclufion which is alfo Negative, and that tiie Major denionftrates it. For the Minor 5 m Covetous man is contented^ totally fc- perating content from covetous, fcparates alfo nap- py ; fince according to the Major ^ happy is totally excluded in the extent of Content. It is no difficult thing to ihew, that all the Rules which we have given fei vc only to fliew that the Con- clufion is contained in one of the firft Propofitions, and tliat the other makes the thing dear.And that Arguments are not defeftive but when they fail to obfcrve that Rule, and always true when they do obferve it. For all thefe Rules are reduc'd to two princplc ones, which are the foundation of the reft 5 The one, that no Term can he more general in the Conclujhn then in the J^remifes. ^ Now this vifibly depends upon this general Principle, that the Pre- miffes cftigit to contain the Conclufion. Which could never be, H tlie fame Term being in dhe Premifes and in the Conclufion, tliere Ihould beleis extent in the Premifes then in the Conclufion. For the lefs General never contains the more general, fome menj never contains All-men. The other General Rule is. That the Middle Term ought to Le tak^n at leaft once Vni'verfalfyy which depends upon tlias Principle , Tkit the Con- clufion ought to be contained in the Premfes* For fuppofe we were to prove, That fome one friend of God is poor ; I fay, we fhall never evidently fiftd, that this Propofition contains the Conclufion, but by another Propofition, where the middle Terrn which is i/o/y, may be taken univerfalJy- For icis vifible, that to the end this Propofinon, Some Saint is Chap. X. The Art of Thinking. 4P ^^foor^ may contain the Coridu£oa5 fm^Fr.'e^ of God is por^ \i is reqiiilitej and itiufficcs that the Term fome Holy Perfo^^ contains * the Term ibme friend of GocL For as to the other Term both Propofitions have it in common. Biit now the particular Term has no determined ExtcnCc'ii ; nor docs it certainly contain any thing befidcs r/hat it enclofes within it'scomprehcnfion andZ^^^. And by confequencc, to die end die Term, fomc Holy Perforiy may contain the Tcrm^ fonie frknd of God^ it is requifite that frknd of God be cai- tain'd within thecomprehcnlionof the Idea oiHoly, Now whatever is containM in the comprehenii- on of an Ide:i^ may be uni\'cr{ally affirm'd of ir. Whatever is coiicain'd in die compreheniion of the Idea of a Tfriangle may be afFirm'd of aU Tri- angles. Whatever is contaixi'd in the Idea of Man may be affirm'd of dll Me/:., And by conlequencc, to the end that friend of God may be enclosed in the Idea of Holy^ it is requillte that ez^ery holy Per- jon be a friend of Goi. Whence it follows that this Conclufion, [ome friend of God is foor^ cannot be contained in this Propoiition, fome holy 3^n /V por^ whaithe middle Term /f^/y k taken parti- cularly, but by vertue of a Propofition where ic may be taken liniverfally, fincc it ought to ihew that friend of God is cdntain'd in die comprehend- on of the Idea of Holy. Which it cannot ihcw but by affirming /;^i^;?^ of Goil^ of Holy, taken univer- fally thus, every holy f^erfo/i is a friend of God. And by confequehce none of the Premifes would conta n the Conclufiori, if the middle Term beiiig taken paxdcularly in, one of the Propofitions, whua-e not take» .uruVerfally id the othcir. P feHAP; 50 LOGIC; Or^ Part III CHAP. XL 7'he Application of this General Prmiple to feveral Syllogifms which [eem to he mtricute. KNowing then by what we have already faid in the Second Part, the meaning of compre- heiifion and extent of Terms, by which it may be judged whether one propofition 'docs or does not contain another^ we may judg of the truth or in- validity of all Syllogiims, without confidering whe- ther it be fimple or composM, complex or incom- plex, and without any regard to Figures or Modes, by this Gaieral Principle. Some one of the Pro- pofitions ought to contain the Condufion and the c- ther to demonftrate that which is contained . I SyUogi[m. Iqueflion whether this Syllogifoi be true. It is the duty of a Chri^ian^ not to paife thofe that commit mch{d ABions^ But they who fight Duels commit a wicked ASion Therefore it is the duty of a Ciriftian not to com- mend thofe that fight Duels. I fhould loofe time in examining to what Mode or Figure thisSyllogiim ought to be reduced. And therefore it isfufficienc to coniidcr whether theCon- cluiion be contain'd in either of the two firfl Pro- politions; and whether the other makes it out. Now Chap. XI. The Art of Thinkingi 5 1 Now I find that the Major propolition has not any thing difierent from the concluiion, but only there is in the one, they rrh commit rptckcd Acti- ons y and in the ether , they rrho fight Duels. Now that Proposition wherein thel-e is ro?!^«^/r///^ wicked ABiom^vjill contain that wherin there is ^^/?^ ing Vuels^ provided that Co?ymitug wicked Actiom , I contains fighting Duels. Now 'tis viliblc by the Scncc, that the Term , I they rrho Commit wicked Aciiom^ is taken Univerfai- ly, and that it extends to all that commits wicked a£ls of what fort loevcr. So that the Minor, They who fight Duds ccmmit a mcked A^fton^ manifcfting thsii fightu/g Duels is contain'd under the Term of Ommittirig nicked ABions^ it evidences alfo that the f.rftPropofition contains the Conclufion. 1. EXAMPLE. I qucftion the Truth of this Syllogifm. The Oofpeifromifes Salvation to Chriftians^ There are rpickedPerfons rrho areChriftians^ Therefore the Goffel fromtfes Salvation to wicked Perfcns. To judg of thisi amonlv toconfider, that the Major cannot contain the Conclulion, it the word Chr i ft ians he not generally taken for all Chriffians^ and not for fome Chriflians only. For if the Gof- pel promifes Salvation only to tome Chriftians, ic does not follow that it promifes Salvation to the Wicked, who profefs Chriftianity : becaufe fuch Chriftians may not be of the number of thofc Chriflians to whom the Gofpel promifes Salvation. Therefore this Argument concludes well j but the D 1 Major 52 LOGIC; Or, PartHli[; Major IS falfe, if the word Chnftmhs be takch for all Chriftians. And it concludes ill^ if it be taktn only for fome CJmjtiam ; for then the firft Propc- fition will not contain the Conclufion. But to know whether it ought to be taken Uni- \$rfally, that muft be examined by another Rule which we have given in the fecond Part, as io ex- dufive ASs whatever is affirn^d of 'em is ta^n Vni- Terfally^ when it i^ ex]^rejfed indefinitely '>> But now tho' diis Term^ they that commit wicked aBSy in the firft example, and Chrifliam in the fecorid be parts of the Predicates, yet they fupply the place of Subjefts, of which the other parts or the fame Predicates are affirmed ; for they are the ^irts of which the affirmation is made, that they are not to be fraifed^ that they are p-omifed Salvation. And by confequence not being reftrain'd,thcy are to be taken Univerfally. And fo both Syllogifms are true in Form. But the Major of tlie fecond example is falfcjif only they are underftoodby the word Chri- fiians who live conformably to the Gofpel ; becaufe no wicked perfons live conforniably to the Gofjpel. 3. EXAMPLE. By the fame principle it is eafy to fee that this Syllogifm Is invalid. ^ The Lm of Ood commmds m5 to obey fecular Ma-^l giftrates. Therefore the Law of God does not cormdnd m to obey Bijhofs- For here neither of the Premife coritains the Conclusion. For it does not follow that when thCi^ taw of God ccanmands one thing, it does not command Chap. XI. The Art of Thinking. 5 5 coinmand another. And thus the Minor fhevvs that Bifhops are not comprehaidcd under the Term Secuhr M^giftrateSy and that the command to ho- nour Magiftrates does not comprehend Bijhops, Nor does the Major fay that God has made no o- ther command then that, as it ought to have done, that by the Minor it mignt have been apparent, that it comprehended the Conclulion. For which rea- fon the following Syllogifm is true. 4. EXAMPLE Chrijilmty does mt oblige Servants to obey their Majlers but in things which are agreeable to the Lam of Oodibut frocimng of Harlots is contrary to the Lam of God. Therefore Chrifiianity does mt oblige Servants to obey their Mafters in procuring of Harlots. For the Major contains the Conclufion, fincc by the Minor proairing of Harlots is included in the number of thofe things which arc contrary to the Law of God, and that the Major being cxclufive, 1$ the fame as if it had been faid. The Law of God does nn oblige Servants in things rvhich are contrary to the Law of God. 5. Example- This Sophifm alfo may be deteded by the help of this General Principle. He that fays yOu are an Animal fays true. He that fays you are a Goofe^ faysyoi^ are an Ar^i- mal Therefore he that fays yon are a Goofe^ fays true- D 3 For 54 LOGIC', Or^ Part 111, For it isfufficient to fay, that neither of the tvP firft propolitions contains the Conclufion. For if the Major contain'a it, not being different from the Conclufion, but only in the word AnmaJln the Major, and Odofe'm the Conclufion;of necdlity. Animal fl^ould have comprehended Goofc v But Animd is not taken particularly in the major, be- caufe it is the Predicate of the Incident affirmative Propofition, _)/o^ are an Animd \ and confequcnt- Iv it cannot contain Goofe but in its Comprehenlion. For proof of vrhkh^Anmal lliould be taken univer- fally in the Minor by affirming Goofe of every Animal, which is neither done nor can be done, feeing that Animal is taken partiaiiarly in the Mi- nor, being as well there as in the Major, the predi- cate of the Incident Propofitionj/o'f ^/^^;^ Animal In the fame manner may be diicoverM that ai;.- cient Sophifm quoted by St. Ai^fiin* Tou are not what I am> I am a Man. Therefore you are no Man. This Argument is Invalid by the Rules of Fi- giires, as being of the iirft; and for that the firft rropofitiqn which is here the Minor is a Negative. But it is fufficient to Cay that the Conclufion is not contained in the firft Propofition,nor does the lecond, (7 am a Man) make it out to be fo. For the Con- clufion being Negative, the Term man is here ta- ken Univerfally, andfo cannot be contain'd in the Term (what I am) becaufe he that fo argues is not all Men^ bnt [ome one Man^ Which appears from hence for that in the Applicative propofition, he only fays I am a Man-^ where the Term of Man \s rcftraiuM to one particular Signification, becaufe it chap. XII. The Art of Thinking. 55 j it is the Predicate of an Affirmative Propofition. Now the General is never contained in the particu- lar. CHAP. XIL Of CoujunHive SyliogifwS' Syllogifms Conjun6livc arr not all thofe SvUch gifms, whofe propofitions areConjnndive or Com- posed, but thofe whofe Major is fo compos'd that it includes the whole Conclufion. They may be. reduced to thvcc[ons Conditional^ DisjitnUivCj and CofuUtive. Of Syllogifms Conditional Syllogifms Conditional are thofe, where the Ma- jor is a Conditional Propofition that contains the whole Conclufion. If thdre be a God^ he is to he leloru'd. But the/e is a God. Therefore he is to be Belo'v'd* The Major confifts of two parts, the firft is call'd the Antecedent, If there be aGod-^ the fecond is called the Conclufion ; he ought to be Beloved, This Syllogifm may be of two forts, becaufc that from the fame Major may be form'd two Conclufions. The firft is, when having affirm'd theconfequcQC of the Major, the Antecedent is affirmed in the Mi- nor, according to this Rnle , the Antecedent being granted^ the Confeoumt is granted. £>4 V 56 LOGIC; Or, PartJir Jf mMter canmt m^ve of it feify kmuft have h^ firjiw^Qtio'a from God. But matter cannot move of it felf therefore it miift have it'sfirft Motion from God, The fecondis, whein the Coiifeqiieiu is taken a- way, to takeaw^'^ihe Antecedent according to the Riile^take away the confeqiient^and the Antecadentis tiken away. If any one of tJ)e EkB Perifhy God U deceived. But Ood is not deceived. Therefore not any one of the Elect ferifh* This was the Argument of St. Afiftin; If any one of thefe. ferifh^ God 16 deceived-^ hut mm ferijhy iiecaafe God if mt dxceiv^d. Tilde cooditional Arguments are falfe two man- ner of iwaysf Frft when the majar includes a pro- pofition quite from the pitipofe, ^od whofe confc- quence is contrary to all Rules ; as when I con- cliide a general kom tl parcicul.ar5 as Ixi faying., if wc deceive cur felvfisia any Aii:igj w?e deceive oi^tr felves in all things. But this falfliood of diefe Syllogifrns In the ma- jor relates rather to the matter then the Foi:m. So that they are n-ver looked upon as yjciou^ in FQx:m> ^ when ifhere is a falfe conclufion drawnfro^ a ma- jor true or falfe, confonanr or contrary to Reafon, which is done two ways. Firft when the Antecedent isinferM from the confequent in this Tnanner. If the Chine fes are Mahimetans they are Infidels* But they are I//fideh' Therrfjre.they are Mahumetans, The fecond foxr of falfe conditional Arguments, is when from the denial of the Aatccedent^ thede-' , ma] Chap^XII* Tbe Jrt of Tl?ivkin^. 57 nial of the Ccmfcqucnc is infeir^dj as in Cihe exam- If the Chinefei are Mahumetam^ tky (^t In^h. But they are mi Mahumeum^ 'Xh^Ycjure they arc mt Infidelu Neverthclcfs there arc fp.mc of thefe conditional Argwmeiits which fcem to have this laft dcfeft ^ which are ncvcrthelefs very true ^ becauie there is an exclufion fubintelleded in the major, rho qot cx- prefs'd, as for example. Cicero having made 4 Law againfttho(e that bought voices, and Mm'cn.ih6ng accLifed for breach of that Law, Cicero fpeaks for him, and thus argues in his own Juftification, bejng rcprpach'd by C.ito for pleading againfl: liis own L|iw. Indeed if I defended the Brihery given^ and defended the Fdci 06 well done^ I fhould do wickedly ^ tho"* ano- ther hsdfnjide the Larp 5 but rvhen T defend notlnng cowmtted ijgaipft the Law^ iVIjy fhoitU the making of a Laiv hinder my defence. This Argument is like that of a great Blafphc- mer, who 00 excufe himfclf thus argued. If I de- nied there fpjts ^ God Ifbouldhe a v^y wicked P erf on 5 hid tfjo^ I Elafthemei I do net deny there is a 0(J^ therefore lam no wicked P erf on. This Argument is iRvalid, hccaufe there are other Sins befid^ Atheifm that Tender a man Wicked. Blk that which makes C/V^o's Argument good, (cho' propofed by ^a/^j(6 as an Argumetit of a falic Syllogifin) is this, that it enclofes an cxclufivc particle in the Scncc, and which might be more diftinftly pxprds'd under ihefeTe:rms. It 58 LOGIC, Or, Pan Hi : It would be only then that they could reproach ?r^ for having a^ei againfi my own Law^ fljould I con- fers that M!4rena kid furchasd voices^ and yet for all that Ifhodi juftifie the Arl. Bit I ajfert that he was nn guilty of ft4r chafing 'voices^ And therefore I do nnhing againft my own Law. The fame thing mav be faid of that Argument of r^««5 fpeaking tojupiter inVirgil Si fine -pace tm^ atq >e invito numirue Uroes Italiam petiere^ hant peccata^ neque illos Juveris auxilio : Sin tot Kefponfa feqmti X^4^ fuperimanefq/te dab ant ^ cur nunc tuaqmfqaam Fleciere j^4(fa poteft^ aut cur nwa conderefata? Which Argument may be expre(s'd in thefe Terms. If ri^ Trojans adventured intolt^ly againft the good will of the Gods^ they deferod punifhment. But they did mt adventure againft the good will of the OodSy Therefore they do nn deferve punifhment. Here tha-efore is fomething to be lupply'd, other- wife it vwuld^bs Jike-^Cp this that concludes no- things .'.-*.,vr'"-{'p' t.V:. If Ju(h<; had entered into th& Apoftlefbip without being calPd he ought to to have been rejected of God. But he did njt enter into it uncalled; Thenfore he ought mt to be rejected of God. But that which makes the Argumait of Venus xo be true is this, that th^ major is to be confider»d as cxclufive in the Sencc; as if it had been thus ex- prels'd. Then only had the Trojans to have been pumjh'd and have Chap.XlI. The Art of Thinking. 55^ have Leen thought unworthy of the Godi^ if they had aduentur'd into Icaly againfi their nilh. But they did mt advent 'tre againjl their rrills^ Therefore^ &c. Or it may be faid, which is the fame thing that thofe affinnarivc uords fine face tuUj &:c. include this negative \n .Sence. If the Trojans did not ad'ventirre into Italy hnt ly order of the Oods^ it is not juft that the Godi fhould abandon 'em- But they did mt adventure 'em J?ut hy crder of the Gods. Therefore-i&ca Of Syllogifms disjun^ive. DisjiindliveSyllogifms arc thofe, whofefirft pro- pofition is disjundive; that is, whofe parts arc u- nited by the word Or^ like that of Cicero. They 7tpho ^^'^"Celar are Parricides^ or defenders of the ftiblic Liberty But they are not Parricides Threforc' they are defenders of the fuhJichJJherty, Of thefe Syllogifms there are two Sons: the firft whai one part is taken away to prcfeiTe the o- ther, as in the foregoing Syllogifm or this that fol- lows All Tricked feofle ought to Le funifh'd either in this jporld or the other ; But there are fome rrick^d feofle that are not fu- nifh'd in this ivorld^ Therefore they fh all be in the other. . Sometimes there are th ree members in Syllogifms of this Sort j and then two members are to be ta- ken '" • ■■■' 'I 60 'TOGIC; Or, farUTT }ccn away to preferve cxie. As in that Argument of S. Aufiin in his Book of Lying. Either ive m^ft kUeve gaodme^^ or m 9»ufi be-^ lieve thofe who 7ve believe ought [ometim^ to lie. Or we mujt ml b^iev^ dm good men do fometimes (y^- . . . 7'he frft is -pernicious^ the fecond foolijb : it remains then that good men never Hi. The fecond Sort, though lefs natural, is when we admit one of the parts to takeaway the other. St. Bernard teftifying thAt Qod h^d confirmed by his Miracles the f reaching of his Crofs^ jpas either a holy Man^ or anlmpjior. But he was a holyMan^ Therefore he was m I^npoftor. The disjunftiveSylloglfms arenotfalfe, but only in the falfity of the major^ wherein the diftindion is not exaa, there being a middle Term between two oppofite members : As if I ihould fay, ffe are to oky Princes m what they command con- trary to the Law of God or revolt from 'em^ But we are mt to obey 'm^ in what is contrary to the Lojv of God^ l^herefare m muft revolt from ^m. Or, We mjifl nn^ revolt from 'em^ therefore we muft obey '^em in what they command iontrasry to the Law of God- Both thefe Syliygifms are falfe, becaufe in .the dif- junitionsihere \s, a medium that intervenes which has been obferv'd by the Chriftians, which is to fuffer thofe things patiently, rather then do any thingcontrar)^totheLawQt God, and yet not re- volt from -their Princes. Thefc Chap.XlII. the Art dj Thinking. 6\ Thefefalfe disjurhStiotis are in part the common Springs whence arife all the falfe arguments among iiicrt. Of Copulative Syllogifms. ThcfeSyllogifms are but of oneSortj when In the prn^ontion Copulative and Negative, the one part is confirm'd^ the other rejcdled. No man can he both together a Servant of God^and Ak IdoUzer of his monty^^ But a covetom plan is an Idolixjer of Ins money ^ Therefore he is not a Servant of God, This fort of Syllogifm does not neceffarily con- elude, when one part is takai away to fix the other, as may be fcen by this Argument, drawn from the fame propofition. No man can be at the fame time a Servant of Gody AndanldoUzer of hts mrney^ But the -prodigal are no Idolixjers of their money ^ Therefore they are Servants of God. CHAP, xm. Of Syllogifm rrhofe Conchfions are conditional \J\1^ have feen that a pcif eft Syllogifm can- V V not have lefs then three Propoliticns. But this is only true when they conclude abfolutely, not hypotheticallv. For ib the conditional propo- fition 6% LOGIC; Or, Part III fition may include one of the piemifes befides the concliifioHj and fometixncs both. For example, ii I would prove that the Moon is a rough uneven Body, and not polifti'd like a mirrour. as Ariftotle thought it to be, I cannot abfolutcly conclude but by the help of three Pro pofiticns. Every Body that refiecis iCs light from all prts is rugged md uneven "The moon refleSs her light from all farts therefore the moon is a rugged and uneven Body. But to conclude conditionaJly, 1 need no more then two Propofitions in this manner. Every Body that reJIeSs its light from all farts is rugged and uneven therefore if the nwonrefleS: her light from all farts fhe is a rugged and uneven Body. And I may include this Argument in one fingle propofition thus. If every B^dy that refletls her li^ht from all farts ie rugged and unevrn^ and that the mjon re/leUs her light from all farts^ we mufl ach^orpledg that fhe is no folijh'd Body^ but rugged and uneven. Or I may annex one propofition to another by the caulal particles 5 ^fr^///e', orjiae r/?/ir, as thus. If every tr te friend aught to he ready to lay down his life for his friend^ there are very fen> true friends^ heca'^fe^ Very few friends arrive at that degree offriendjJjif. This fort of arguing is very common and very neat ; and this is that which fhews us how vainly they imagine that there are no other arguments, but where they fee three propofitions feparated and rangM as in the Schools : For certain it is, that this pro- :-| Chap. XIII. The An of Thinking. 65 Propofition alone conuins this 5yllogifm cntirc- Every true friend ought to lay dotfn his life for his friendy But there are few feofle jvho are ready to lay down their lives for their friends^ Therefore there are few true friends. All the difference that there is, bcnvecn abfolute 5yllogifms and thofc where the Concluiicn is in- cluded with one of the pr^mifes, in a conditional propofition, is this, that the former cannot be entire- ly granted, iinleis that prefcntly follow that was to be proved ^ whereas Syllogifms of the fecond fort may be entirely grantccl. and yet the difputant fhall gain no advantage all tne while. For he is ftill to prove, that the condition be true, upon which de- pends the confe(]uence allow'd him. So that thefc Arguments are indeed no more then preparations to an abfolute Conclufion ; but tliey are very proper for that purpofe ; and we muft confets that theie ways of arguing are very ordina- ry and natural 5 and that they have this advantage, tliat being more remote from the air of the Schools, they are therefore the more graceful to other men. Befides we rnay conclude from Syllogifms of this nature in all forts of Figures andVoods, and fo they need no other Rules befide the Rules of the feveral Figures. Only we are to obferve that the conditional con- clufion containing one of thepremifcs befides the conclufion, is fometimes the ma']3r and Ibmetimes r the minor. Which we fhall find by the Examples of moft conditional conclufions drawn from two general ma- ximf". d4 LOGIC; Or, P^rt.llIV ximsi, the one Affirmative the other Negative ^ whe- ther the Affirmative be already pmv*ci or granted. AU fence t)f fdn is a Thought. From when it is concluded aUTrmatively, 1. Therefore if all Benfts arefenfible of fdn^ AUBeafts think^ Barbara. 2. Therefore if fame Plmn are fenfibk of fain , Some Plants think^^ Darii 3. Therefore if all thought he an aBion ofthernind^ AU [enfihility of J>ain is an aSion of the mind^ Barbara 4. Therefore if all fenfe of fain be an evil^ Some thoughts are e^Jtls- Darapti. 5. Therefore if the fence of fain be in the hani (nirich IS burnt There is feme ther^ght in the hand rrhich is burnt f Dilames NegativcH'. •6. Therefore if no thnght he in the hody^ No fence of fain is in the body. Cclarent 7. Therefore if no beafi thinks^ No beaft feels fain, Cameflres '8. Therefore Jf fome fart of man does mt thin\^ Some fart of man does mtfeel fain. Baroco 9. Therefore if no motion of matter be a thought No fence of fdn is motion of matter. Gefarc lO.Therefore if mfentiment of fain be delightful. Some thoughts are mtdelightful Felapton 1 1. Therefore tffome fentimerd of fain be not ^olun- Seine thoHghtsare notvohntaryi Boeardo {titry^ Some Chap.Xni. Ti?e Art gf Thinking. 65 Some other conditional conclufions might be drawn from this general Maxim. AH Senfihilty of fain k a thought 5 but not being very natural, we omit*em. Oftnofe propofitionswhicK we have produc'd^there arc Tome that contain the Minor befidc^ the Conclii- iion5X^/z.'.the 1. 1.7. and 8. and others the Major bo- lides the conclu^lon5^^'?: the 3, 4, 536, 9, 10^ and 12. We may alfo obfcrv'c fcveral conditional Con- clu lions that may be drawn from a general Nega- tive pvopofition. For Example^ ^ N(? m.xiter thlrihi^ I. Therefore if njery Sod of a Bt\ifl ke matter^ No So'il of a Beafl thinly. Cclarent. Therefore if fom^ prt of a Man kmattq^ [om^ Part of a Man does not- think^ Ferio. ', . ' / 3. Therefore if 'our Sod thinly'- Our So'J M not Matter.^. Cc[^vc, Therefore if feme fart of a Manthir/l^ Some fart of a Man is not matter. Feftino. Therefore if all that u fenfihU of Pain thinks : No matter is fenfihle of Pairi. Camcftres. , Therefore if all matter he a Suhfance : Som^Suhflance does not think^ Felapron. . Therefore iffome matter te the caufe of federal ef- feds that affear miracdous ^rvhate^-^er m the caufe of miracubmeffefJs does not think^ Feriibn. Of thefe Conditionals there are hut five which include the Major befides the Couclufion j all the reft include the M inor. The chicfeft ufe of thefe Arguments, is to ob- lige him with whom we difpi^tc to acknowlcdg the truth of a Confequence, which he may. grant WitlK)ut giving his cohfent farthsF^ beeaufc it is E only 66 LO GIC^ Or, Part IIL only propounded conditionally, and fcparatedfrom the material T ruch^ as I may fo fayjor what it con- tains And by this means the Opponent is dilpos'd the more eafily to admit the abfolute conclufion drawn from thence, either granting th;; Antecedent to gain the Confequent, or barring the Confequent to take away the Antecedent. Thus if any one grant me, that no matter thinks, I will conclude, that if the Soul of a Beafl thinks, it muft be difUnft from matter. And as he cannot deny me this conditional con- clufion, I may draw from thence either the one or the other of tnefe two abfolute confequences. But the Soul of a Beaft thinks- therefore it is difiincifrom matter. Or contrary. But the Soul of a Beajl is mt dijlin^from matter , therefore it does not thinly From what has been laid It appears that there ought to be four Propofitions, to the end, thefe fons of Arguments may be perfeft, and prove fomething abfolutely. And yet they are not to be placed in the number of Sillogifms5which are calPd composM , becaufe thefe four Propofitious con- tain nothing more in Sence, then the three Propo- fitions of a common Syllogifm. No matter thirtkl- Brvery Soul of a Beaft m matter. Therefore no Soul of a Beaft thinkl- CJHAPi Chap. XIV. The Jn of Thi?ikingi 67 CHAP. XIV. Of Entl^mcmes^ and EnthymmMtch^ Sentences. X^XjT^ h^v^ already faid, that an Enrhymcme is a Sillog: fm perfeft in the mind, but imper- kdi in the expreifion : becauie Ibme one of the pro- pofitions is fiippreft, as being too clear and com- mon 5 andeafHy fuppli'd by the underftanding of thqfc with whom we difcourfe. This manner of argument is common in di- fcourfe and writing, that it is a rare thing to find all thePropofitionscxprcfsM, as being fo ev^idcnt that they may be eafily fupposM ; belides that it is the priie of humane wit to chufe ratho- to have fome- thing left that ii:;av be fuppli'd, rather then to be thought to vant luftrudion in every thing. So that this fupprcflion flatters the vanity of thofe with whom we dilcourfe, while we remit Ibmething to their own Underflanding, and by abridging our difcourfes, render it more fmart and efficacious. For example, if from this verfe of Medea in Ovid^ which contains a mcfl elegant Enthimeme. Servare fotui^ fa^dere anfojjim roga^ ? Any one fhould m^ike an argument in Form, after thi^ manner. He that canpe[er've thee^ can dejlroy thee ^ Bt4t I can frej'erue thee^ therefore I cm deflroy thee. E2 He 68 LOGIC; Ory Part.III. He had certainly dilpoil'd it of all its Elegancy, nnd the rcafon of it is, becaufe as it is one of tlie principal Beauties of difcourfe to be full of Sence, and to dvc an occcafion to the Underftanding to form a Thought more extenfive then the Exprefli- on, ib it is on the contrary, oneof thegreateit rie- fxiencies to be void of Senfe, and to fpend multi- plicity of words upon a few thoughts; which is al-- mofl: inevitable in Philofophical Syllogifms: ^"Fca* the motions of the Mind being more fwitt then thofe of the Tongue, and one of the Proportions fuffi- cing for the underftanding of mo ; the cxpreiEon of the fcc3nd becomes unprofitable , not contain- ing any new Sence. And this is that which ren- ders theic forts of arguments fo rare in the conver- fation of mai ; becaufe without making any Re- flexions, we prefendy quit that which is tedious and troublefome, and betake our felves to what is precifcly neccilary to be underftood, Enthvmcmesthen are the ulual way of reafon- ing moft common among Men, fupprelfing the pro- polition which they judg may be eafily fuppli'd -, and this propofition is fometimes the major, ibme- times the minor, and fometimes the conclufion : a'tlio' thai it be not properly call'd an Enthymeme, wlien the v;holc force of the argument is included in the two firft Prqpofitions. It alfo happens fometimes, that the two propo/i- tions of theEnthymeme are included in one propo- fition, which for that reafon A(/?or/^ calls an £;7^ thymmaick^ Sentence^ of which he gives this Ex- Sample. Chap. XV. The Art of Thinking. 6c/ '. Iwmond angtr hear ml , leing Mortal : which whole Argument would run thus. He that m Mortal ought mt to bear Iff, mr/tal hatred-^ hut yon * r.' Mortal J Therefore hear mt Immortal hatred. CHAP. XV- Of Syllogifms comfos*d of more then three Prolojiti- ons, ,y: WE have already intimated, that Arguments compos'd of 'more then three Propolitions arc called Sorites. They may be diftinguiihcd into three forts, i. Into gradations, of which we need fay no more then what has been already i'aid, in the firH: Chap- ter, third Part. 2. Into 'Dilemmx6 of which' we ihall treat in the following Chapter. 3. Into thofe which the GreeJ^ call Eftcherema's^ which comprehend the Proofs either of one of the two firft Propofitioi s, or of both together, /nd of thefe we lliall difcourfcin this Chactei'. Now in regard we are bound to fupprefs m dil- courfe certain Propolitions, which are io clear that nothing cante clearer ; it isallofomctimesrequilitc to advance uncertain and doubtful ones, aqd to join proofs to 'em at tlic f ime time, to prevent the Im- E ;; ' patience 70 LOGIC y Or ^ Part 111. Patience of thofe we difpute wich, who are offend- ed fomedmes when we go about to perfwade ^em by reafons which to them appear falle and doubtful 5 fcr tliough the quarrel be eafily afterwards recon- cii'd, yet is it dangerous to provoke tlie Minds of the Auditors, though it be for nr/er fo lide awhile. And fo it is much better that proofs ihould immedi- ately follow doubtful queftions, then that they (hould be feparated from them. Which leparation produ- ces aifo another Inconvenie ce_, that we are bound to repeat the propolition which we endeavour to prove. And therefore whereas it is the method of the Schools to propound the Argument entire, ^nd afterwards to prove the Propofition which rca ivts the difficulty, that which is ufual in ordinary dif- courfe, is to join to doubtful propofitioris the Proofs that confirm 'em ; which makes a fort of Argument compos'd of feveral propofitions. For to the Major are the proofs of the Major jo^n'd, to the Minor thofe of the Minor, and then comes the Conclufion. ^ 1 Thus the whole Oration for Mih may be re- duced into a compound Argument, of wliich the Ivlajor is, that it is lawful to kill him that lies in wait for my Life. The proofs of this Argument are drawn from the Law of Nature, the Law of Nations and Examples. The Minor \s that Clo^lim laid wait for Mth's Life. And the proofs of the Minor are the the Equipage of Cbdim^ his train {yc The Conclufion is, that it was therefore law- ful for Milo to kill him. The proof of Original Sin is deducd from the miferies which Infants indure, according to Dialedi^ cal method in this manner. Children Chap*,XV. The Art of Thinking. 71 — — '■ __A. Children could not be born miferablc, but bv the punilhment of fome Sin which thcv deriv'd frorn their Infancy. But they are mifciablCj therefore it IS by rcafon of original Sin.^ Now the Major and the Minor are to be proved in their turns. The Ma- jor by this disjunftive argument^ the miferies of Infants cannot proceed but from one of thcfe four caufes, firft from Sins that preceded this Life. 2. O^ from the Inability of God who had not power to protcft 'em. 3. Or from the Injuftice of God^ who fufFers them to be mifcrable without a caufc. 4. Qr from original Sin. Now it is Impious to affirm from the three firft Caufes, and therefore they muft be denVy from the fourtli, which is original Sin. The Minor that Infants pre mii'erablej is to be proved by the Catalogue of their miferies. But it is eafieto fee with what Elegancy and Ef- ficacy St. Auftin has propounded the proof of ori- ginal Sin, which he has enclofed in an Argument compofed after this Form. ' ^ Confider the number and the greamefi of the ' ^ miferies, with which Children are overwhelm'd, ^ ^ and how the firft years of their Lives arc full of 'Wanity, fufferings, delufions and fears. After- ^ ' wards as they grow up and begin to be of years ' ' to ferve God, error aflails them to fcduce their '^ Minds. Labour and Pain attempts ^em to wea- ^ ' ken their Bodies. Conaipifcence tempts 'em to en- *^ flame their defires, fadnefs tempts 'em to defpair, ' ^ Pride tempts 'em to Ambition ; and indeed who ' ^ in few words is able to exprefs the manifold words ^'and pains that render ponderous the Yoke of *^the Children of Adam. The Evidence of thefe ^' miferies has forcM the /'^^^t; Philofophers, who E 4 ncidicr 72 LOGIC; Or, ParUL ^ ^ neither knew nor thought any thing of the Sin of * ^ our firft Parent^to fay that we were onlv bonito ^ ■ fuffer the punifhment of fome crimeswhich they ^ ' had committed in another Life, and in like manner '^ that our Souls were conjoined to corruptibleBodies, ^^ according to that fort of punifhment. which the ^ ^ Tyrants of Tufcany caufed thofe to jfuffer whom /, *^they ty'd alive to dead Bodies ^ but that opinion ''' ' /a? that the Soul is join'd to the Bodv for the punift- ^^'>ment of crimes preceding in another Lite is r-ejed- ^^ edbythe Apoftle.What remains then but tiiatei '* neither Juft nor Impotent .» there only remains ^ ^ that which you are unwilling to acknowledg 5 ^^ but vou muft acknowledg it whether you will or ' ^ no; that this fame heavy yoke which the Sons of A- ' ^dam are obliged to bear .from the time that they are ' ^ delivered out of their Mothers Womb, till the day ^^ that they enter into the womb of their common ^ ^ Mother, the Eareh, could never have been, had ^^ they notdeferved it for the Sin which they derive f ^ froni their Original CHAP- Chap.XVl. The Art of ThhKmg. 7 3 CHAP. XVI. WE may define a 'Dilemma^ a compos\l Ar- giiincnr, where after thedivifion of die whole into parts, we conclude negatively or affir- matively, of the whole that which is concluded of every part. I fay, tb.it jrhich m concluded of every fart^ and not that which is only affirm'd. For that is only properly called a Dilemrfiay when that which is faid of every part is fuftain'd by its particular Reafons. For example being to prove, ih,n a Mdn cannot he happy in this iVorldy it may be done by this Di- lemma. We cannot live in this iVorld ^ hut nr wuji either abandon our [elves to our Pajfiom^ or war ^.gainft '^em. If we abandon our [elves to'^em-^ we are miserable -^ for it renders m Ignominious^ nor are we ever fatts- fied. If we war againfl V^, we are miferable 5 in regard there is nothing more painful and irksome then that inteftin war which a Man is alwa}S obliged to maJ^ a- gainfl himfelf Therefore he cannot have any true Happincfs in this Lite. If we would prov^ that fuch Bifbops who do not labour for the Salvation of So'ds committed to their Charge^ are inexcujable before Ood^ it may be done by this~D/7f»^;^^^. ' Esther 74 LOG Id Or^ Parr Iir Either thyarecafdJe of that charge^ or they af^ unca'pable ; If they are Cdpal?k ^ they are inexctt[eahle for not employing their farts in the execution of their charge. If they are uncafabky they a:re inexcufeahle for un- dertah^ng [o imprta^nt a charge which they are not able to undergo. And by conjequence^ rvhich rvay foever you take itj they are tKexcufahle before Ood^ tf they do not attend mth dilligence the fahation of the Souk that are com-* mtted to their charge. But there are fome obfervations to be made upon thefe ions of Arguments. TheFirftiSj that all the Proportions are not al- ways exprefs'd: For example, thcDilen^ma which we have propos'd was comprehended in a few words in the Oration of the Lord Charles at the en- trance of a certain perfon into the Provincial Coun- cils. If yoH are uncafable of fo great a charge^ jvhy fo amhitiom ? If fit for it^ ivhy Jo negligent f" ^ 1 husthere are many things fubinrelfeted in that memorable T)ilemma by which an ancient Philofo- phcr pr6v'd. That no man ought to bufie himfelf in public Affairs. If any -perfon act well^ he mil offend men-^ if head ill^ he mil offend the Gods : therefore he ought not to meddle rvith the public. In die fame mmner another proved that it was not expedient to marry. If the woman marry" s be lovely .^ fbemllcaufejea- hufies 3 // fhe be deformed., fhe mil never delight him : fiJK^e it is not expedient to marry. ^^r in bo'ii thefe Dilemmas, the propofition which Chap.XVl. Tl^e Art of Thinking. 7j which ought to caufe the Partition is fubintelk«a- ed. And this is that which is very uilial ; becauLcic may be caiily lupplyM as being marky out by the particular propolitions that argue each part. Moreover to the end the Conclulion may be in- cluded in the premifcs, fomcthing general is every where to be fupply'd, which may agree with the whole : as in the former c:\ample. If he act well he m i 'fend imn^ rvhich u ill endw'cL If hedS: iily he mu offend God-y which is equally -per* nicious. Therefore it is a thing every way troullefome to meddle :n State /iffairs. This advice is very important, to the end a man may make a true judgment of the force of a Di- lemma. For the reafon why this is not concluding is, becaufe it is not a thing fo troublefome to oflenS men, when it cannot be avoided without offendmg God. The fecond Obfcrvation is, that a Dilemma may be vicious chiefly through v^o defects. The one is when the disjunftive upon which it is grounded, is erroneous, not comprehending all the members of the whole that is divided. Thus the Dilemma againft marriage concludes nothing. For a Wife may be chofen, neither too fair to create a jealoufie, nor deformed to breed a loathing. For this reafon that was a moft erroneous Di- lemma which the ancient Philofophers made ule of j to perfwade men not to fear death. O'rr Soul J faid they, ferifloes with the Body^ and fo being zoid of any more Sence^ we fhall nn ke ohm* xiom to any further mfery : Or if theSoul furvives tie y6 LOGIC', Or ^ Part. III. ^he Body^ it mil ie more hapfy^ then it rpas in the Body^ , therefore death is not to be fear" d.^ For asMontai^n has well obierv'd, it was a great blindnefs not to tee a third condition between thefe ■ two. Which is, that the 5oul furviving. the Body may be in a fiate of mifery and torment * Whicli * may be a jufl: reafon for a man to fear deatli, for fear of falling into that condidon. Another Errour that hinders Dilemma's from be- ing conckifive is, when the particular concliifions of every part are not neceilary. So it is not of neceffi- ty, that a beautiful woman fhould create jealoufie. for fne may prove fo wife and ib vertuous^ that her Husband may have no caufe to miiftrurt her fi- delitv. Nor is it of neceffity that being deformed , fhe * Ihould diflike her Husband; becaufe fhe may have ' thofe other advantageous qualitys and vercaes , wherein a man may take the greateft delight. The third Obfei vation is. That he who makes ufe of a Dilemma ought to take care, that his argu- ment be not turn'd upon himfelf. Thus Ariftotle teftifies that he turn'd upon the Philofopher, who went about to prove that men were not to meddle with State Affairs, his own argument. For fays he, // a mxn govern according to the corr/4pt lam of meny he fhall content wen. If he obfer've true jujlice he will content the GodSy ' "Therefore he ought to intereft himfelf in pdlic Affairs. Nevcrthelefs this Turn is not rational; for wc ought nx to offend God that we may plcafe men. CHAP. Chap.XVll. The Art of Thinking. 77 CHAR XVIL Of the -phces^ or •method to find outArgmienn ; and hoiT this method iS of little ufe? Places of i^rgumcnts^ focallM bycheRhccorici- ans and Logicians arc certain General Heads, underwhich may be brought all the proofs which are made life of in the various matters of dif- courfe : and that part of Logic which they call In'vention^ is nothing elle but what they teadi con- cerning thefe places. Kamm quarrels with Arftotle and the School-men, becaufe they difcourfc of places after they have gi- ven the rules of arguments -, and he affiriiis againft 'cm, that they fhould firfl: explain what concerns places and Invention before they Jay down the rules 'of argument. R.imii^'s reaiba is, fcecaufc matter is firfl: to be found out, before we think of difpo- ling it. But this^ reafon is very weak : For though it be very requilite that matter fliould be found out for difpofition, yet is it not necaflary to teacli Itow to find out matter, before we know how to difpofe it. Pert 3 teach the difpofition of matter, itfulTlces to have certain general matters toferve for examples. Befides that the underftanding and common Stncc affords matter fufficient without going a begging to Art or the method of Invention. So that it 15 true that we ought to have matter ready to apply to 78 LOGIC; Or, Part III. to the lilies of arguments ; but rhat there is any ne- ceffity to find out this matter by the method of places, is a mcer falfity. We may rather urge the quite contrary 5that it is neceflary to know what an argument or 5yllogifm is^ before we learn from the doarine of places to draw out Arguments and 5yliogifiTis. But it may be they will anfwer, that nature alone fiirnidies us with a general knowledge of Ratiocination ; which isfuf- iicient to undcrftand what is faid in the difcourfes of places. Therefore they mifpend their time, who anxiouSy trouble themfelves, in what place Places are to be handled, ^ fince it is dich an indifferent Thing. But perhaps it would be more profitable, whether it be to any purpofe to difcourfe of ^em at all. We know the ^ncimts held this method for a facred myftery; and that Cicero prefers it alfo be- fore all other parts of Logic, as it was taught by the Stoics , who took no notice of places. Let us forego, faith he, that art which is mute in the finding out of argument, loquacious in judging of ^tm^mntilim and all the other Khetoriciam^Arijlotle and all the Philofophers iing the fame fong, fo that they would almoft prevail with us to agree with them, were thay not opposM by univerfal expe- rience. We might produce almoft as many Witneffes as there are perfons who have run through the ufual courfesof fludy, and have learnt from this artificial method to iind out proofs, as they are taught in Colledgcs. For is there one that can truly affirm^ that when he was obliged to handle any fubje(9:, that he ever made any Reflexions upon thefe places, or fought Chap. XVII. Tl^e Art of Thinking. 79 fought thofe reafons which he wanted from thence ? Let 'em confult all the famous Pleaders and Preachers which are in the World ; and all thofe numbers of Writers and Difputers, who never are fumpt fo dry, bat that they could ftill fay more 5 quc'h'on whether there will one be found 'that ever fo much as dreamt of Maces from the Caufcy Places from the Bfftct^ Places from tk Adjun^i to prove what they defir'd to perfwade. Qtiintilian alfo notwithflanding the great eftcem which he fhows for this Art^ is oblig'd neverthelcS to acknowledge that there is no necelGty, when a man handles any fubjeft to go and knock at the door of all thefc Places for Proofe and Arguments. Let the ftudtous of Eloqt^ence mind this alj'o^ that, rrhen matter of Argument is trops^d^ there is m m- ceffity to fearch all the feveral placeSy and a^ it rrere to go from door to door to kndrp rrhether they will anfrrer to jrhat ne intend to prove. True it is that all Arguments may be brought under thefe general Heads and Terms which are caliy Places ; but their Invention is not to be a- fcribM to this method. Nature, confideration of the Subjed, and the fore- knowledge of various truths lead us to thofe probations; and at length Art reduces 'em to certain Qenmh^ So that we may tally fay of thefe Places what ^t, Auflin pronounc^i in general concerning Rhetoric. We find, faith he,^ that the Rules of Eloquence are obferv'd in the Difcourfes of Eloquent pcrfons, though whether they know 'em, or know 'em not, they never think of *em. Theypraftife thefe Rules, becaufe they are Eloquent, but they d*^ not make ufe of 'em to att liu Eloquence. We 8o LOGIC; Or, Part. lU. We naturally walk as the fame Father obferVes, and in walking, we move regularly with our Bodies But it would be ridiculous for a Mafter of^ jvall^/ig to pretend to tell us, that the Animal Spirits were to be fent into certain Nerves ; that Cuch Miifcles were to bemovM; or to teach us, to move fuch joynts, and to fet one Leg before another. *Tis true, Rules might be given tor all thefe things : but thatthefeadions fhould ever be performed by th(i help of any rules were ridiculous. So in com- mon difcourfe all thefe P/^;fi are made ufe of; nor can any thing be faid but what may be referrM to 'em. But it is not an cxprefs Reflexion upon thofe Places that produces our thoughts; fuch a reflexion ferving rather to {top the Career of Wit. and pre- i^enting it from finding out more natural and effe- ftual Reafons, which are the Ornaments of Di- fcourfe. f^irgil in his ninth Book oi Mneads^ after he has repreiented Eurydm furprizM and environ'd by his Enemies who were ready to i*evenge upon him the death of their Friends, whom l Terms. jl I. That which is affirm'd or deni'd of the Ge/imj is affirm'd or denied of the Species , rphatever be- falls all Men^ hafpts alfo to the moil Potent* For they cmnot petend to acl'vantages above Huma^ nity. 1. By deftroymg the Gemis^ the Sfecies is dejiroy'^d* He that never judges atall^ never judges ami/I, He I that never [Peahi at all^ never j-peaki ^^^if^r.'tly. f 3. In deftroying all the Sfecies^ the Genm is defiroyed. "Terms called Sdftantial^ except the rati- onal Soul^ are neither Body ncr Spirit -, therefore no Sdftances* 4. If the total difference may be denied or af- firmed of any thing, the Species may be deoi'd or affirm'd. Extent is no ivay agreeable to thought Thjiight^ nrr a round or a fqu'are "thought^ it is im- poffihle it fbotdd be a Body. The thing defin'd is deni'd or affirm'd, of which the definition is affrmM or deni'd. There are ferp persons ']!tfl^l>ecaHfe there are fewperfons rpillingto give to every one their due* Places Chap. XVIII. TheJrtof Vnnking. 85 Pldces of Metafhyfi:s, Places of Metaphyfics^ are general Terms agree- ing with all Beings^ to which many Arguments arc reter*d, as Arguments from the Cwfe ^ EffeB: ^ fVhole^ PartsfJppjites. Wherein that which is mod ufeful is to know fome general Divilions, and chief- ly of caufes. The School-defin'tions of Caufes in General; that a Caufe U that which produces an Effeci ; or that whereby a thing is^ are fo (lovcnly ; and it is fo diffi- cult to difcernhow they acree with all the Oenu6*s of caufe, that they would" have done better never to have feparated this word fromfuch as cannot be defined ; the Idea which we have of it, being as clear as the definitions which they give. But the divifion of caules into four Species^ which are the caufe Final^ Efficient , Material and Formal h fo celebrated, that it behoves us to take a little notice of it. The final caufe is call'd die end for wliich a thing IS. There are primitive ends which arc primarily confidered, and Secondarit ends, which ate confi- der'd Secondarily. What we ad to do or obtain a thiog, is call'd the end for whofe fake. Thus Health is the end of Phyfick, becaufe it pretends to proairc it. The end for which we labour is call'd the Finis cut. Thus Man is in this Sence the end of Phylic, for whofe lake fhe pretends to make Medicines. There is nothing more ufual ^hen to draw Argu- ments from the End^ either to (hew tha: a thing is Imperfed, as an ill-contrived difcourfe, when it h not adapted to pcrfwade, or to lliew 'tis probable F 3 that .J ^6 LOGIC; Or , Part 111. cliat a Man has done, or will do, fome afticwi. be- caufe that it is conformable to the encL whicn he has accLiftom'd to propofe to himfelt Whence that famous faying of a Koman Judg, Qui Bom, which ought always to be our £rft examination^ that isy what profit a Man aims ^t in doing fuch a thing; for generally profit and Intereft governs the a<9:ioiisof Men. Or elfe to fhewthat we ought not to fufped a Man for doing fuch an aftion, as being contrary to his Intercft. There are alfo feveral other Arguments drawn frorn the end, which a ripe Underftanding will foon- er difcQver then all the diredion of Rules. The Caufe Efficient is that which produces ano- dier thing, from whence feveral Arguments arc dra\yn to Ihew that the EfiFedl is not, in regard the Caufe is not fufficient ; or to fhew the eftcd is or \vill be in regard the Caufes are apparent. If the caules are not neceflary, the Arguments are not ne- ceffary. If they are free and contigent, the Argu- ment is only probable. 1 here are feveral forts of Efficient Caufes, who names it is ufeful to know. God creating Adam was the total Caufe, in re- gard tliat nothing could concur without him. But the Father and Mother are only the partial caufes of the Infants, in regard they want another. The Sun is the Profer caufe of Light; but he is only the accidental caufe of the Death of a Man, whom excefs of heat kills, in regard he was not o|' ? ftrong Conftituti9n before^ The Chap. XVIII. The Jrt ef Thinking. 87 The Father is the '/;ext Caufe of the Son; The Grandfather the rmote caule. The Mother the ProduBtve Caufe. The Nurfe the Preftrvi/^g caufe. The Father is the Vnivocal caufe of Children becaufe they are of the fame nature with him. God is only the Equivocal caufe in refpeft of the Creatures, becaufe they are not of the nature of God, An Artift is the Principal C^uk of his Work- manlhip, his Tools are the Injirfmenu1lC2.uk. The Wind that fills the Organ-Pipes is the uni- ^verfal c^uk oi the Harmony. The Sun is a haviral Caufe. Man is an IntelkSml Caufe in refped of what he a&with Judgment. The Fire that burns the wood is the Necefary Caufe. The Sun enlightning a Chamber is the proper caufe of the Light; the Window is only the caufe or Conditim without which the effed could not be, otherwife Sine qua mn. Fire burning a houfc, is the Phyfical caufe of the Flame. The Man tliat fet it on Fire iht Moral Csiuk. To the efficient caufe is alio added the Rxenifla- ry caufe; which is the Model propofed in making the Work. As the deflgn of a building, by which the Architeft governs himfelf, or generally that which is the Ohjecii've caule of our Idea^^ or of any other Reprefentation whatever. As Lervis the Fourteenth is the exemplary caufe of his Pifture. The material Caufe is, that out of which all things are made. That which agreess or docs not F 4 Agree 88 LOGICy Or, Part.III. agree with the matter^ agree? or difagrees with thole things which are compos'd put of it. The formal caiiie is, that which makes the thing what itjs, and dift!nguifhes it from^ others. Whe- ther It be a Being really diftinguifh'd from the Matter, according to the opinion of the Schools ; or only a difpolition of the Parts. By the knowled^ of this Form, Propriety is to beexplain'd. There are as many different Effed:^ as caiifes, the words being Reciprocal. Theufual maaner of draw- ing Arguments from hence is to ihew, that if the Effe<5l be, the caufe is, fiiice nothing cannot be witnoiit a caufe. It proves alfo that a caafe is good or bad, when the EScdis are good or bad. Which k not always true however in eaufes by accident. W^e have fppken fuffi^entlv of the whole and Parts in the Ghapter of Divifion ; and therefore i^ will be necdlefs to add aiiy thing more here. • There are fo ar forts of OppoTite Terms. Relatives, as Father and Son, Ma/ler and Ser- vants. Contrarys, Cohl^ Hot') Sound and Sicl^ Pnvativcs,aslife, death, fight, blindncfs , hear- ing, deafnefs , knowledge, ignorance. Contradidlories which conlifl: in one Term, and in the f imple Negation of the Term, to fee, and not to fee. The difference which there is between thefc two latter forts of Oppofites, that the Priwi- ti've Terms include the Negation of a Form in a Subjed which h capable of it,whereas the Negatives do not denote that Capacity. Therefore we do not fay a Stone is blind, or dead, as not being capable either of life or feeing. No\v in. regard thefe Ter^ns are oppofitc, they iriake Chap.XVlIL The Art of TInvking. 89 make ufe of the one to deny the other. The con- tradiftory Terms have this Property, that by taking away the one, the other is confined.' Comparifdns are of many kinds. For they com- pare things whahcr equal or unequal^like or un ike. They prove that what agrees or di (agrees with one thing equal or unequal, like or unlike, a^^rees or difagrccs with another thing to which it is either 1 ke or unlike, equal or unequal. Of things unequal it is prov'd Negatively, that If what is moft probable is not^ that which is lead probable is not/i/orr/orf.Affirmaavcly, if that which is leafl: probable, be, that which is moil: probable is alio Thefe differences or diilimilitudcs are made iife of, to ruin thofc things, which others would have eftablifh'd upon fimilituJes ; thus we ruin an ArgumePit drawn from the fciuence of a Judg by affirming it; was pronounc'd in a difFcrettCalc. This'is the cheifeft part of what is bl' cklifnly deliver'd concerning PLicei. There are other things which are more profitable to be known, then v. hac is here explain'd . They who defirc more may con- fult the Authors themlclves who have more accu- rately handi'd thefe things. But I would not advife any one to confult the Topics of Arifloth^ as being Books very confus'd. But there is fomthing which is not a little to be commended in the firfl: Book of his Rhetoric^ wlicre he teaches feveral ways to (hew that a thing Is profitable, pleafing, greater or lefi. Though it be certain that a man ftiall never by this way arrive at any certain knowledg. CHAP. 5>o LOGICyOr, Patt IIL CHAP. XIX. Of the feveral forts of "vitiows Agtmenti rvhich arc caJ'd Sofhifm. ALTHOUGH that when we underftand the Rules of right Arguing^ it be no difficult thing to diftingui(h thofe that are falfe ^ neverthelefs as examples to be avoided make a deeper impreffi- on in our minds, then examples that are worthy imitation, it may not be amifs to hy open the fources of bad Arguments, which are calPd Sofhifms or Pamhgifms^ whereby they may the more eafily be avoided. I fhall reduce *cm only to (evai or eight Heads, there being fome (o notorioiifly ftupid that they are not worthy remembrance. Sofhifm I. To prove amther thing then that rrhich is in queftion. ThisSophifm is calPd hy Ayiflotle^IgniratioEIen- chi : The ignorance of that which is to be prov'd againfl: the Opponent. For in difpute we grow hot, when many times we do not underftand one another. This is a common vice in the difputesa- mong men. Through pallion, or falfhood we at- tribute thrt to the Opponent, which is remote from his thoughts, to combat him with more ad- vantage: [, Chap.XIX, The Art of VnnKmg. 91 \ vantage : or we tax him with confequences which \ we think we can draw from his doctrine, which he i difavows and denies. All this may be referred to : the firft fort o\ Sophii'm^ which a man of worth and fincerity ought to avoid above all tilings. It were to be widi'd that Ariftotle^'who is too care- iu\ toadmonifh us of this defed, had been alfo as careful to avcid it For it cannot be dcny'd, but that he has encounter 'd fcvcral of the ancient Pfii- lofophers bv citing their Opinions, not with that fncericy which he oitght to have done. He refutes Parmehidei and Meliffu^^ for not admitting but one fole Principle cf all things, as if they had meant by that, the Principle of which they are composed; whereas they meant the fole and only^ Principle from whence all things draw their Original, God himfelf. He accufesall theAnciaits for not acknowledg- ing Privation, one of the Principles of natural things; and for that, he inveighs agairifl *cm as dull and ruflic. But who fo blind as not to fce^ that what he reprefents to us as a grand myftcry not known till he difcoverM it , could never b? con- ceal'd from any man : l?nce it is impolfible for a man not to apprehend, that the matter of which a Table is made, mufl: have the Privation of the form of a Table, that is can be no Table bcfoie it isfhap'd into a Table. 'lis true, the ancients ne- ver thought of this ufe of Privation to explain the Principles of things natural, bccaufe indeed there is nothing lefs ferviceable to that purpofc It being vifible, that we do not therefore the better know how a Clock is made , becaufe we know that the matter of v;hich a Clock v/as madc^^ was not a Clock before, Thercfpre pi LOGIC; Or ^ Part. III. Therefore it is a great peice of fcjuftice in Arifio- tie to reproach thefe ancient Philolophcrs for ha- ving been ignorant of a thing which it was impofli- ble for 'em to be ignorant of; and to accufe *em for not making ufe of a principle for the Explana* tion of Nature that explains nothing at all : nay he is guilty of delufion, andSophifm while he ob- trudes upan us the principle of Privation for a rare fecret, when this was not that which they fought, when they enquired into the principles of Naoire. For it is certain, that nothing can be^ before it is* But we are defirous to know of what principles it confifts and what is the Caufe that produced it. ThuSj for example, there was never any ftatuary, who to teach another the way to make a fratue, gave his Scholar thatLeffon for his firftlnftniftion where- with Ariftotle would have us begin the Explanation of the works of Nature. Friendjthe firft thing you are to know is this, that for the making of a Sta-^ tue, you mud chufe a peice of Marble , which is not yet that Statue which you defiga to make. II. 7^0 ffipfofe for truth the thing that is inqae^ion. ^ This is that with Ariftot'ecAk begging of the que-* fiion 3 which v/e manifeftly lee to be contrary to true reafon. Since in all Arguments, that which foves for Proof, ouglit to be more clear and known then the thing which we would prove. Neverthelefs Galilefis accufes Ariftdtle , and that juftlv too, to have fallai into this Error, when he would prove by this Argument, that the garth is the Centt r of the world. >Ti$ Chap.XlX. VoeArtof Thinking. ^5 'Tis the 'Nature of hea^vy things to tend to the Cen^ ter of the mrld^ and of light things ^ to l^ep at a di- fiance from it. N01V experience jherrs us^ thatHea^vy things tend to the Center of the Earthy and light things k^ef at a difiancefrom it. Therefore the Ccntct of the Earth is the Center cf the world. Moft apparent it is that there is in this Argument a manifeft Legging of the Princifle. For we find that heavy things tend to the Center of the Earth, but where did Arifiotle learn that they tend to the Cen- ter of tlie world, unlefs he fuppole the Center of the Earth and the Center of the world to be the fame. \Vhich is the Conclufion that he would prove by this Argument. Meer beggings of the queftion alfoare thofe Ar- guments which are madeufe of to prove a whimfi- cal Genus of (iibftances, call'd in the Schools fnb^ ftantialForms^vfhich. they would have to bcCorpore- al, though they are no Bodys ^which is difficult for the underflanding to apprehend. If there were no Subflantial Forms, fay they, there would be no Generation: But there is Generation in the v/orjd, therefore there are Subftantial Forms. Now to fhew that this Argument, is a meer Beg- ging of the queftion, there needs no more then to lay opai the Equi\^ocarion that lyes in the word Generation. For if we muft underhand by the word Generation, a namral produ6lion of a nen7 n'hole in Nature, as the Produdion of a Hen, which is form'd in an Egg, in tliis fence we may truly allow of Generation 5 but we cannot thence conclude that there are new Subftantial Forms, becaufe the fole ^4 LOGIC', Of, Part III. Ible Diipofition of the Parts by nature^may produce thoknenp T4^hoks, But if they mean by the word generakon^ as they iifiially do, the Produdion of^ a new fubilance wliich never was before, that is to fay of Subftantial Form, ^we may juftly doubt the thing that is in queftion, it being vifible that he who denyes Subftantial Forms can never gra':t that na- ture produces Subftantial Forms. And fo far is this Argument from perfwading a man to admit Subftantial Forms , that he may draw a quite con- trary Conclulion in this manner. If there rrere Suhflandd Formi ^ mture might fro- dice Suhjiances that ne^^cr were before. But nature cannotfYoducenew SubfiamSt hecaufeit would he a hind of Creation. Ani therefore there are no Suhjlantial Form* Of the fame levai is this 5 Iftherewereno Sub- ftantial Forms, fay they, there would be no fuch natural Beings atall,asthey cdiW P er [e^Toum Per fey but Beings by accident. But there are T'ota^ or Wholes Perfe-^ Therefore there are Subftantial Forms. Firft we are to defire thofe that make iife of this Argument to explain themfelves , what they mean by JVhok fer fe^ totum ferife. For if they mean,as they doja Being composM of Matter and Form, then it is clearly a Begging of the quefti- on ; for then it would be as if they fliould have faid, if there were no Subftantial Forms, natural Beings could not be composM of Matter and forms Subftan- tial. But they are composed of Matter and Forms Subftantial, Therefore there are Forms SuftantiaL If they mean any thing elfe la 'em tell us and we fliall fee whether it will avail to maintain their con- clufion. Wc Chap. XIX* The An of Tlmking. 95 We havcftopp'd here a little by the by, to (hew the weakneis of thefe Arguments^ upon which the Schools have grounded thefe forts of Suhftanccs, which can neither be difcovcr'd by the fence nor apprehended by the underftanding, and of which weknow nothing more , but that they are called Su^antial Forms- Becaufethat although there Supporters do it, out ofa gooddefign, nevcrthelefs the Grounds which they make ufe of, and the Ideas which they give of Forms obfcure, and trouble the folid and con- vincing Proofs of the Immonality of the Soul, which are drawn from the diftinftion between Bodies and Spirits, and the Impoflibiiity that a fub- ftance which is not matter fhould perili by the Changes that happen to matter. For by the means of thefe Subftantial Forrns, Uhenines fiirnilli them- fclves with examples of fubftances that perifli, which arc not properly matter.and to which they attribute in Animals an Infinity of thoughtSjtliat is5'of a6lions purely fpiritual. And therefore it is for the benefit Religion, and the Conviction of Infidels to o\'er- turn this Anfwer of theirs, to ihew that there is no- thing more ftupid nor worfc grounded, then thefe periihable fubftancc5j which they call Subftantial Forms. To this may be referr'd that fort of Sophilm which is drawn from a principle different from what IS in the queftion, but which \s> known to be no lefs contefted by the Opponent. Thefe are two Maxims equally conftant among theCatholicksThe one that all points of faith can't be prov'd by Scripture alone : the other , that Children arc capable ot Bapcifm; Therefore an Anabaptift would zx^yiQ illj to prove againft ^6 LOGIC], Or, Part.lU. againft the Cacholicks^, That they are in the wrong to believe that Children are capable of Baptifm, bc- caufe we find nothing to preve it in Scripture ; be- caiife that would fuppofe that we ought to belie\-e no i\rtlcle of Faith but what is in the Scripture, which is daiy*d by the Catholics. Laflly we may refer to this Sophifm, all thofe Arguments, by' which we endeavour to prove one J thing unknown, by another altogether as much un- 1 knowrii or a thing uncertain by another tiling alt> I gether or more uncertain. III. Ti tdh^for the Caufe that which is mt the Caufe, This Sophfm is caiPd mn Caufa fro Ca'ija^ This IS very ufuai among men, and they fall into it feve- 'ral ways.The one thrciigh the bare knorance of the real Caufcs of things. Thus the Philofophers have attributed a Thoiifand Effefts to the Fear of Vacwm^ which at this day and by moft ingenious experiments is demon ftratively proved to have no other Caufe then thePonderof ity of the Air,as we may fee in that excellent Treatife of Monf. P^ca^ lately Printed! The fame Philofophers teach us, that Veflels full of water, crack when the water is frozm, becaufe the water clofes it felf, and leaves a voy'd fpace which nature cannot endure 5 whereas it is well Inown, that thofe Veffels break, becaufe the' water when congeaPd takes up more fpace then when fluid ; which is the reafon that the Jce fwims upon the water. To this may ref errM that other Sophifm, when' wemakeufc of remote caufes, and fiich as prove nothing. chap. XIX. The Jrt of Thinking. 97 nothin?, to prove things either clear of themfelves or falfe, or at Icaft doubtful , as when AriftotJe would prove that the world is p:rfe£l by this Reafon. "The rrorUh ferfeci tecaufeit cont.um Bod)S ^ Th Body is ferfeci iecaufe tt conuim three dimenjicn; the three dimmfiom are prfeEi^ becnufe there are ally (quia tria funt Omnia), and there are all , Iecaufe rre never ufc the Word ally rrhen the thing is either one or tJPOy hut there are three. By which reafon a man might prove that the leafl: Atome is as perfed as the world, bccauie it has three dimcnfions as well as the world. But this is fo far from proving the world tobcpcrfe£l:, that the quite conaary is rather to be ailertcd, that cvciy Body^f//4atenuS3.Body^is efTentially impcrfcft; anil that'the perfection ot the world coniifts chcifly in this, that It includes Creatures that are not Bodies. The fame Philofophcr proves that there arc three fimple motions , becaufc there are three Dimcnfions. Though it be a very difficult thing to find a Condufion from the Prem' fcs.. He alfo proves that the Heaven is unalterable and Incorruptible , becaufe it moves circularly. But firft, it is not well difcover'd ya what Contrariety of motion has to do with the Corruption or Altera- tion of Bodys. In the fecond pJace there is leis Reafon to be given, why a circular motion from Eaft to Weft,(hould be contrary to a circular motion from Weft to Eail. In the fecond place we fall into this fort of Sophi- dry through that filly Vanitv that makes us aihanvd to confefs our Ignorance. From whence it happais, G t.:ai: ^8 LOGIC; Or, Part.llf, that we rather chufe to forge imaginary caufes of the things, for which weareask'd thereafon. then to confers that we know it not. And it is a pretty kindof way whereby we avoy'd this Confeffion of our Ignorance. For when we fee the effeft of a caufe unknown we imagin we have difcoverM it, when we have joyn'd to this effed a general word of Vir- tue or Faculty^ which Forms in our mind no other Idea^ butonely that the efleft has fame caufe, which we knew before we found out chat w^ord.For example there is no body but knows that theArterys beat, that Iron cleaves to the AdAmenu xkssxSen^ pur,ees, and /^jp^j^ ? Smpifies. They who make no profcllion of knowledge, and whoarenotaftiam'd of Ignorance, freely confefs that they know the Effedls, but underftand not the canfe, whereas others that would bluOi to fay fo, and pretend to have difcovepd the real caufe of effects prefently cry, there is a pulfiiiic vertuein the Arteries, a Magnetic ^Trtue in the Adamxm^ a Purgative vertue in Sm^^ and a Soporific, vertue in Poppy, Now is not this quaintly refolv'd ; and might not the Chine[es with as much facility have extricated themfelves from all their admiration of our Clocks, whenfirft brought into their Country ? For they might have laid they knew perfeftly tKc reafon of what others were fo puzzl'd at, by aftrmincj that it was only by an In- ^ Vr^/iz'f vertue that thisEngin marbd out the hours upon the plane^ and by a Sonorefic quality that the Bell ftrook. Certainly they might have paff d for as learned Perfons m the knowledge of Clocks, as our Philfophers in caufes of the beating of the Arterys, iirc. There are afo certain other words that ferve to render chap. XIX. Voe Art of Thinking. ^9 render men learned atafmall expence, as Sympathy, Amiptby and occult Qualities. Yet they that uTe 'em would utter nothing of fallhood, provided they annexed the general notion of the caufe to the words Fertue and Faculty:, ^Vhether it is Internal or External, Diipofitive ou aT fome ether Country which they have moft a peek at ; tho there be no reafon that either Comets or Eclipfes ftiould have any confiderable cff^ upon the Earth, or that general caufes as they arCjihould operate more cffeftually in one part more then in anotheijor threaten aKing or aPrince more then a Mechanic, befides that we find a hundred Comets that were never Infamous for any of thofe Dire effefts lay'd to their charge. For what if Mortality, Peftilences, Wars^Dcaths of Princes do fometimes happen after the Appea- rance of Comets and fight ofEcclipfes, they as of- ten happen without any fuch fignals. Befides thefe effeds are fo general and common, that it is much if they do not happen in fome part of the world e- very year. So that they who talk at Random^ that luch a Coma threatens the death of fome great Perfonage, do not hazard their Reputation over much. But it is far worfe when they give thefe Chi- merical Influences for the caufe of the vertuous or vitious Inclinations of men, as alfo of the particular anions and events of their Life, without having any other ground, then only that among ten thoufand Predidions Chap. XIX. The Art of Thinking, loi Predidions it falls out by hap-hazard that fomc one proves true. Altho it a man were to judge of thefe things rationally and according to good fence, he might as well lay that a Candle lighted in the Chamber of a woman tliat lyes in, ought to have a greater Influence upon the Body of the In- fant, then the Vhn^i Saturn in whatlbcvcr Ajfe(J or Conjunfiionk be. Laftly there are fome, whoaffign Chimerical caufes of Chimerical effeds ; and luch arethofe whofuppofing that nature abhors a va- cuity, and that ihe does her utmoft to avoy'd k^ fcun more Fidious caufes of this Fiftftious hor- rour ; the effed it felf being imaginary , feeing that nature fears nothing, and that all the effeds which are attributed to this dread of nature, depend upon the fole Gravity of the Air. Naaire abhors ^ Vacuum izss one of thefe profound Philofophers^, becaufe (he nas need oiContimity of Bod)'stoTran{- mit her lafluences^and for the Propagation of quali- ties. A mod wonderful Science indeed which goes a- bout to prove that which \s not,bythat which is not. Therefore v/hen we fcarch the caufes of extra- ordinary effefts, weoughtcarefullvfirftto examin whether the effefts be true. For (omaimes we la- bour to no purpofe to fcarch out the rcafon of things that are not. Infomuch that there arc an Infinite number of queftions which are to be rcfolv'd, as Plutarch refolves this propounded bv himfclf, iVhy fu:h Colts as are furfu*d hy the JVolf are jhifter then others- For after he has laid, that perhaps the Wolf might have alTail'd die more flow cf Foot firn-,and lo they that efcap^d were the fwifteft, or elfe chat fear having added wings to their feet had imparted to 'em that habitude ofTviftnefs which afterwards G 3 they loz LOGIC y Ory ParMU. they retainMjhe a lafi: brings another folution which leems to be very true and genuine^ Perhaps^ fays he, the thing it f elf may he aftory. And this is the method we ought to obferve in Philofophizing concerning fundry effeds which are attributed to the Moon/uch as thcfcjthat the bones are fliU mar- row upo 1 thelncrcafe of the Moon ; but empty when fhe is in her wain , And whereas alfo the fame is faid of crevices or Crayfilh^there is no other anfwer to be made but that the whole is a Fable, as feveral Perfons verv diligent and exa6l have afTur'd me, that as well! the bones and Crayfilh are fometimes empty, fometimes full in all the quarters of the Moon. Many obfervations of this nature there are in reference to the cutting of Wood, fowing and gachering of Fruit, Graftings and the very moment when nt to take Phyfic. But the vvorld will be delivered at length from thcfe little Bondages which have no other ground then meer fuppofitions that were never ferioufly examined. And therefore they are unjuS: who require us, without any Exami- nation to believe their figments, meerly upon one fingle Experiment, or an Allegation outof lome an- cient Author. To this fort of Sophiftry ought alfo to be re- fer'd that ufual fallacy oiHummmt^Pofl hoc ^ Ergo frofter hoc After this, therefore for this. Hence it is that the Dog Star is concluded to be the caufe of the violent heat at thit time of the year which is call'd the Dog-days, wiiich cans' dT/V^/Y, fpeaking of that Star to pronounce thefe Verfes. Ait i chap. XIX* Tl:e Art of DnnKmg. 103 Atit firias ardor. Illejitim moriojque ferem morLiUhus dcgris Nafcitur^ ir l contrijlat limine cxlim- Whereas Moiifiucr Gajfendus has well obfcrvM that there is nothing lefs probable then this vain Imagination. For this lame Star being beyond the Line^ the Influences ought to beftronger in thofe places that lye more pcrpaidicularly under it. And yet when the Dog-days arc to vehemently hot with us,it is Winter in odicr parrs. So that they beyond the Line may as well believe the Dog-Star to be the caufe of Cold, as we to believe it to be the caufe o[ Heat. IV. Soi^hijm, Imferfed Emmeraihn, There is no vice of Argument into which the Learned fall more ealily then into this of filie Enu- meration , and of not duly confidcring all the manners how things may be or be efifeftcd, which makes 'em conclude rafhly 5 either that it is nor, be- caufe it is not in fuch a manner, though it may be after another manner ; or elfe that it is after fuch or fuch a manner, when it may be a' ter another man- ner then they have yet thought of We may' find feveral of thefe defechive Argu- ments in the Proofe upon which Oaffmdm eftablilhcs the Ground of his Philofophy, uiz That V^xcvmi is interfpac'd between the Parts of matter which he calls his DifTeminated Vac : urn. And 1 am die more willing to produce 'cm,in re,^ard that Oiiifeki'^^ G 4 ha\iiig 104 LOGIC; Or, Part 111. having been a famoiisPerfon in his timCjand of great knowledge inthemoft curious parts of Learning, the Errours and failings which are to be feen fcattered into many great Volums of his Works publiihed after his death, are therefore the more worthy to be known and diicufled : whereas it would be to no purpofe to take notice of the Errours fo frequent in Authors of no account. The firfr Argument which G^/d-z^^/^s employs to prove his Dijfemimted Vacuum^ and which ne would make us believe to be ascertain as a Mathematical Demonftration. is this. If there were not a fucuumhnt that the whole were fiird with Bodies, the motion would be impofliblej and the world would be a meer heap of Stiff, inflexible and immoveable Matter. For the world being all full , no body could be mov*d but it muft go into the place of another. Thus if the Body A. be mov'd, it muft difplace another Body at lead equal to it, 'vitl, B. andB. removing muil difplace another. Now this cannot happen other- wife then two ways : one that this di^lacing of Bodies muft extend it felt to Infinity, which is Ri- diculous and impofible : the fecond that the motion mnft be circular ,diat fo the laft body removM may fupply the placeof A. Hitherto there is no impcrfeft Enumeration ap- pears : and it is true moreover, that it is a Ridicu- lous thinj^ to imagin, that one body being remov'd other bodys fiicceliively by removing difplace onea- nether to infinity: Only they fay that the motion is Circular, and that the lafl- Bodies being removM poffcflcs the place of the firft which hA. and fo the whole is full. And this is that which Oajfendi^ i:ndcr- Chap.XIX. Tl^eArt of Tlwiking. 105 undertakes to refute by the following Argument. The firft body removM which is A. cannot be mov'dj ifthe Jaft whichisX. do not move. Now X. cannot move for that if it remain it muft poffcls the Place of A, which is not yet void ; andfo X. not being able to move, neither can A, for which reafon the whole mufl be immoveable. All winch Argument is founded only upon this Suppoiiticn, that the body X. which is immediateiy before A. cannot be removed, unlefs the place ot A. be void before han '.when it begins to move. So that before that inftant that it polTclTcs that place, there may befaid to be another wliich may be faid to bcp'a- cuum. But this Suppofition is falfe and impcrfeft* For there is yet another cafe, wherein it is very impcfli- ble that X. may be mov'd, tliat is to lay^that at the fame inftant that it poflellcs the place ot A, A. may quit that place, and in that cale, there will be no inconvenience, if A.pufli B. forward, and B. thrufk forward C. till they come to X. aixl that X. at the fame time poff:flcs the place of A. For by this mean there will be a Motion, and vet no Fdcmm. Now diat it may be polfible tnat a Body may poflefs the Place of another Body at the fame in- ftant that the Body leaves it, is a thing which v^e arc obligM to confefs, in whate\^er Hypothecs, provi- ded only that we adm>it fome continued N'^atter. For example let us grant two parts in a Staff', im- mediately contiguous, it is evident that at the iame time that the place is quitted by the firft, it ispof- fefl'd by the fecond, and tliat there is no inftant wherein there can be (aid to be a VaC't'im. But this Is more clear by an Iron Circle that turns about its Center to6 LOGIC', Or, Part. III. Center, for then at the feme inftant every part pof- fes the fpace which was quitced by that which went before, with that celerity that will admit no Vacutmy fo much as to be 'ma^^ined. Now if this be pofli- ble i . a Circle of Iron , fhall ic not be the lame in a Circle partly of Wood, ^ and partly of Aire ? And tlierefore die Body A. ilippos'd to be of Wood ^ puftiing forward, and dilplacing the Body B. fup- pos'd to be of Air, why may not B. difplace ano- ther, and that another to X. which fhall enter into the place of A. at the fame inftant that A. quits it. It is clear then that the faid effeSt oiGafendus's Rcafon proceeds from hence,that Oaffendus thought that one Body could not poflefs the Place of the o- ther, but that the place muft be void beforehand, and in a preceeding inftant ; not confidaing that there was the fame inftant of quitting and polTef- ling. His other proofs are deducMfrom feveral experf- mentSjby which he proves with good reafon that the Airiscomprefs'd, and that new Air may be forc'd into the place which fecmM already full \ as we fee in vVind-Guns and Bladder Foot balls. Upon which Expcrimait he forms this Argu- mait. If the fpace A. already full of Air, be ca- pable to receive a new quantity of A"r by Compref- lion, of necellity this new Air, muft either be forcM in, by Penetration into the fpace already poffeffd by Peiietrarion , which is impoflile j or elfe that the Air which is enclos'd in A. does not entirely fill the fpace ; but that baween the parts of the Air there were certain void fpaces, wherein this new Air is receiv'd3 And this fecond H)fotke!is fays Chap.XIX. TheJrtofTh'wkmj^, 107 fays hc^provcs what I aim a'rjwhfch is to make it out, that there are void fpaccs between the parts of mat- ter. But itis vciylbange, thatG4//>//W//5 did not apprchaid that he rcafon'd upon a talfc Enumera- tion^ and that befides the Hvppothejis of Penetrati- on, which he had reafon to judge naturally impof- fiblc, and that of P\ictmms diffcmin.itedhQWzoxi the parrs of matter, there was yet a third, of which he fays nothing^and which being poifiblc, is t!ic reafon that his Ai'gument concludes nothing. For we may fuppofc that between the thick and groffcr parts of the Air, there may be another more futtle rarify'd, and v;hich being able to pafs through the pores of all the Bodys , caufes the fpace which fcems full of Air, may alfo receive other nav Air. For that this rarifvM ' matter being cha.sM out of the pores througfi the parts of the Air which h forc'd in, gives way to the new Air. And indeed yioniOi^jfcndus was fo much the more oblig'd to refute diis //)^/'or/;d'/Fy, as admitting him- felf this futtle matter which pcnaratf^s Bodys, and paflcs through the Pores , in regard he affirms, that cold and heat and certain little Bodys that en- ter the Pores of our Bodys, and afferts the lame thing of Light, and acknowledges, in that famous Experiment made withQLTick-Silvcr,in pipes fill'd up to the heiglit of two foot three fingers and a half,lca- ying ftill a fpace above that length which fccms, voidj as not bcin.?; fill'd with an)' fcnfible matter; I fay he acknowledges, that fpace cannot be call'd Vacwm^ as being penetrated by the Light which betakes for a Bo Jy. And fo bv filling with furtlc matter thofe Vpaccs whichheta&stobcvoy'djhe will hnd as much (pace for io8 LOGIC, Or^ Pan III. for his Bodys to enter, as if they were aftually voy'd. V. To judge of a thing which only agrees with it hy Ac- cident. This Sophifm is callM in Schools Fallacia ac- cidentia^ the fallacy of the Accident, When wc draw an abiblute Conclufion fimple and without reftridion from what )S not true but onlv byaccident. This is that which caufes fo many people to exclaim againft Antimony, becaufe that'jbeing ill applyM it'produces bad efre£ts. And that others attribute to eloquence all thofe bad effeds which the abufe of it ^ produces^ and to Phyiice the Faults of Ignorant Do- . dors. But it is no Sophifnij as the Papifts pretend, when urg'd againft thofe Inventions of Satan, Invocation of Saints, Veneration of Reliques and Praying for the dead which were never of any antiquity, but fuperftitious cheats impos'd upon the people by Popes far remote from Antiquity in the times of darkeft Is;norance and Impiety. Wealfo fall into this vitious way of arguing when we take fimple occafions for real caufes ; as if wefhould acaifethe Chriftian Religion for having been the caufeof theMaflacre of lo many Multi-. tudes, who rather chofe to fuffer Death then re- nounce Chrift ^ whereas we are not to impute thofe Murders to the Chriftian Religion,nor tbeConftancy of the Maityrs , but only to the Injuilice and cruelty of the Pagans. We alio find a confiderablc example of this Sophifm Chap. XIX* The Ac of Tlnnkin^. 1 09 Sophilm in the lUdiculous Arguments of the Eficuream^ who concluded that the Gods had hu- man fhape^ becaufe that only man is aidu'd with Rcafon. The Oods^ fay tliey, are moji hafpy. No^e can he hapfy mthout vertue^ thrre ts no vertue rvithout Keafon^ andReafo/7 is found nj where but in human Form ; tre wujl therefore confefs the Gods to be of hu- manfhape. But they were ftrangely blind, not to fee that the Subftance which thinks and reafons may be joyn'd to the Body 5 'tis not human fhapc that caufes thought and Reafon in man. It being ridiculous to imagin that Thought and Reafon depend upon a mans having a Note, a Mouth, Cheeks^two Arms, two Hands two Feet. And therefore it was a Chil- di(h Sophifm of thofc Philolbphers to conclude that there could be no Reafcn but in human fhapes; it being only joyn'd by accidents to human fhapc in Man. VI. To fafs from fence divided to fence compos* d^ or from jence composed to fence divided- The one of the Sophifinsis call'd Fallacia Com- pfitionis 5 Fallacy of Compofition ; and the other f^///jr>' of divifion: which are both apprehended better by examples, Jefus Chrifl faith in his Gofpel, fpeaking of his Miracles, The Blind fee^ the La?ne rrallu the Deaf hear. This cannot be true, while we take things feperately and not conjoyndy, that is to fay, in a fence no LOGIC; Or, Part. III. Icnce divided, and not in a fence conipos'd. For the blind fee not^ while they are blind, neither do the deaf hear, while thev remain (o ; but after they had recovered their fieht and hearing by the Mi- racles of Chnft they bodi heard and iaw. In die fame fence it is faidin Scripture that God juftifies the wicked. Not that he accompt? thofe for juft who abide in their wickednefs ; but that by his Grace he juftifies thofe who were Impious' be- fore. On the ether fide there are fome Propofitions, whicharcnot truebut in a fence opposed to diat which is the fence divided. As when St. Paul fays, diat Slanders^ Fornicators, and Covetous men fhall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. For it is not meant that none ofthofe who are Guilty of thofe vices fhall be fav'd ; but only thofe who re- main im.penitent, andobftinatelygoonin their fins fhall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. It ismanifcft now that there is noTranfition from one of thcfe fmcesto the other without a Sofhijw. A(id for example, it is apparait that they would argue very ill, that (hould hope for Heaven, that perfevere in their fins, becaufe that Chrift came p iave finners, and becaufe he fays, that wicked wo- men fhall precede the Pharifees in the Kingdom of Heavai 5 feeing that he did not come to lave fin- ner»s abiding in their fins, but to teach and admo- nifli 'cm toforfake their fins. viL ro Chap.XlX. The Jrt of Thinking. m VII Topafsfromnphat is True in feme refpeii to jphat is jmply true. Thiscall'd in the Schools a ^y//?^ fectmdtm quid I ad ditium {implicifler. As for example the Epi- curems prove that the Gods had human fhapc, becaufe there is no form fo lovely as that, and tor that all that is lovely ought to be in God. For human form is not abfolutely Bcautitul, but on- ly in refpeft of other Bodys. ' And fo being a Per- feftion only Secimdim quid^ or in feme refpcd and not fimply, k does not follow that it ought to be the fhape of God, becaufe all perfeftions are in God there being no perfedions but what arc fimply fo, that is, which exclude all manner of Imperfcdnon, that can be afcrib'd to God. We find alfo in Ciceroy 1. 3- de naturaVeoruw^ a Ridiculous Argument of Cmta^ againft the exi- ftence of God, which may rcducd to this Sophifm. Hon> {aiys he, can rre conceive God^ rvhtn ne cm attribute no vertue to him ? for fh all rre fay that he has Prudence ? Prudence conjifts in the choice of good and e'vih now God can have nd need of this ch:ice^ n: t being capable of any evil Shall we fav that he has under fanding and Reafcn <' we make ufe of unJerftand- ing and Rtafon to dif cover what is unknown to us by nmat we k^ow : now there can be nothing unknown to God. Nor can Juftice be in God which only relates to Hivian Society : Nor temperance^ lecauje he has no pleafures to govern; nor Fortitude^ for t- at pain never opprejfes God^ nor labour wearys him ; and hefides Ill LOG IC; Or, Part III. hefidei he is exposed to no danger. How then cari that le Ood^ which has neither mderftanding n:r 'vertue > Nothing can be conceived more impertinent then this manner of arguing.For thus might anyCountry man difcourfe, wlio never having feen any other then Thatch'd Houfes, and having heard that in Citys their are no houles cover 'd withThatch^fhould thence conclude that there are no houfes in Citys, and that they who lives in Citys live miferably ex- posed to all the Injurys of the weather. For thus CMta^ or rather Cicero argues. There can be no vertues in God like to thofe which are in men; therefore there can be no vertue in God. And what is more wounderful is this, that he does no conclude, that there h no vertue in God but only becaufe the imperfec'^ions of human vertue cannot be in God. So that it is one of his proofs that God wants underftanding and knowledge, becaufe all things are known to him. That is, that God fees nothing, becaufe he fees all things : that he is unable b?cauie he is Ominpotent : that he enjoys nothing of happinefs, becaufe he enjoys all felicity. VIII. To ahfe the Amhiguity of rpords becaufe it m.iy be done diver fe jpays. To this fort of Sophifm may be referred all Syllo- gfifms that are vicious,as having fourTerxns. Whether it be that tne middle Term be taken twice particu- larly,orwhe:her it be that it is taken in one fence in thefjrilPropofiticn^ and in another fence in thefe-i cond Ghap. XIX. The Art of TlnnKmgi 1 1 j cond, or laftly whether the Terms of the Con- cliifion be not taken in the fame tcrxe in the Pre- mifes, as in the Conclufion. For do not reftraiii the word Amblgiiit}' to the onely words which are j?rofly equivccal; for they rarely fail^ but we mean by that whatever can change the fence of words, efpecially when men are not ealily aware of the change^ in regard tliat divcric tilings being fig- nify'd by the fame found they take 'cm for the fame thing. In reference to which may be fccn what has been faid already toward the end of the firftPart, where we ha\^c not oncly fpokcn of the Remedies againft the Confufionot Ambiguous words, by de- fining 'em fo clearly that nomanca- be deceivM- I fhall therefore produce fome examples of tlii? Ambiguity that many timts deceives men of ripe apprehenfions. Such is that, which is found in words that fignifie fome IVhok^ which may be taken ei- ther colle6i:ively or diftributively; thus ought the Sophifm of the Stoicki to be refoh 'd, who argird that the world was an Animal enduM with rca- fon. For that vpbich has the ufe ofKeajor, is letter then that tphich has not. Nojv there is nnhing , [ay thty^ canbebnter then the world, Therefjrethenmld hath the ufe ofKeafon. The Minor of this Argument is ialfe, becaufe they attribute to the world what is only to be af- crib*d to God.Who is fuch a Beirig^thcn whichthere can be nothing greater or more per fed. But if it be fpoken of die Creatures only nothino; can be more perfed then the world, if it be collc^liyely taken for the Univerfality of things created by God. But H hence 114 LOGICyOr, Part.111. hence it can only be inferr'd that the world is en- du'd with reafon. In fome of its parts as Angels^and men; but conjunftively it cannot be faid to be a rational Animal. It would be alfo a bad way of Arguing to fay, that a man thinks, or a man is compos'd of Soul and Body, therefore the Soul and Body think. For it is fufficient to fay that a man thinks^ when one part of him only is faid to think ; from whence it no way follows that the other part thinks. IX. To draw a general ConcUfion from a clefeEHvc InduBi- on. We call induftion, when the fcarchof feveral particulars leads us to the fearch of a general Truth. Thus when we have experimented that mod Seas are falt^ and that the water of moft Rivers is frefli, we generally conclude that the Sea water is fait and River water frelh. The various experi- ments which we make that Gold loofes nothing in the fire, gives us reafon to Judge that this is true of all Gold. And in regard wc never met with any people but what fpoke we belive that all men fpeak, that is make ufe of Sounds to fignifie their thoughts. From this Indudion alfo all our knowledge takes its rife, in regard that particulars prefent themfelves to usb:?foreUniverfa]s ; though afterwards we make ufe of unlverfals to underftand particulars. However it is equally certain diat Induftion alone is chap. XIX. Tloe Art of Thinking, nj IS never any affured means to acquire pcrfeft know- ledge^as wefhall demonftrate in another place.The conlideration of fingnlars, affording an cppormnity onlytotheunderftandingtobemore attentive upon natural Ideas ^ according to which we Judge of the Truth of generals. For example I il^ould never have thought of confidering the nature of a Triangle, had I never fcena Triangle ivhich gave mean oc- cafion to think ot k. Howcvxr it is not the parti- cular Examination of all Triangles which makes me conclude generally and certainly of all, that the fpace which they comprehend is equal to that of a Rcftangle of all their Bafe, and the half of their Height (for this examination would be impoifible) but the folc conlideration of what J know is inclu- ded in the Idu of a Triangle which I find in my under ftanding. However it be , having refolvM to treat of tliis matter in another place , it fuffices here to fay that dcfedive Indudions, that is to fay, fuch as are not entire, are the caufes ot manifold Errours. I fhall only produce one memorable example. /\11 Philofophers to this day, have held it for an unqueftionable Truth , that a Pipe being ftopM, it was impoifible to pull out the ftoppcl without breaking the Pipe, and that water might be forcM as high as a man pleafes by the help of Crifdim Engins call'd Alfirmt Pimp. And that which made 'em fo confident was, tiiat they thought them- felvesaifur'dof itbya moft certain Indu6tion, as having made an infinite number of Experiments. But both the one and the other \s found to be falfe ; for that newExperimcnts havefiace been made that a Stopple may be drawn out of a Syfhy? never fo H 1 v.el ii6 LOGIC, Or, PartIII> well ftopt wi'diour breaking the Pipe^ provided the force be equal to the weight of the Cylinder of the Water, thirty three foot high, and of the fame tliicknefs with the Pipe : and that in Pumps af- pirant the water does not afcend higher then from thirty two to thirty three foot. CHAP. XX. Of bdd reafoning in civil Converfation and common difcourfe. Hitherto we have fhewn exarnples of falfe Ar- gum<"iitations in matters of fcience. But becaufc the principal ufe of reafon does not confift in acqui- ring Sciences that are of little ufe for the conduft of well living, wherein it is of dangerous confequence to be deceiv*d ; it will be of much more advantage to confider gaierally that which engages men into thefe falfe Judgments which are made of all forts of things, and blind men with prejudice in matters cheifly importing manners, and conducing to the Goverment of Civil Life^ and are the general Sub- je6i:s of our Common dikourfe. But in regard this dellgn would require a Treatile by it felf, which would comprehaid almoft all morality ; we fhall only mark out here in general a part of the caufcs of thofe falfe Judgmmts that are fo common a- mon?, Men. W'c ([ all not here fpcndtime in diftinguilhing falfe judgments from bad rcafoning 5 as well for that falfe Judgments chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 1 1 7 Judgments are the fources ofbadRcafonfngSjWhich they draw after 'em by a neceflarv Confequcnce; as alfo for that there is for the moft part an Implicite and latent ratiocination in that wliich to us ap- pears a fimple Judgment, there being r-Iways fome- thjngthatferves as a Motive and Principle to that Judgment. For example, -vhai wc (ay that a flick is crooked in the water, becaufeitfo appears to us; This Judgment is grounded upon this general and falfePropofition, tbatwhat appears crooked to our fences is crooked indeed, and lo includes a reafon whichdoesnot difplay it lelf, generally therefore confider'd, the caufcs of our Errors may be referred to two heads ; the one internal^ which is the Irregu- larity of our will, that troubles and diforders our Judgment; the ether External, which confifts in the Objefts of what we Judge, and which delude our underftanding by a falfe appearance. Now that thcfe caufesare feldom feparated;neverthelefs5there are certain Errors wherein the one difcovers it felf more plainly then the other ; and therefore we (hall treat of 'em a part. Of the SofhifmSi of felf Love Jnterejl andPaffion* If we carefully examin whv fome men fo obfti- natelydote, rather upon one Opinion then another, we fhall find it to be not through any penetration into the Truth, or the force of Arguments, Jbiit fome engagement of felf Love, Intereft or Pallion. This is the weight that weighs down the Ballancc, and which determines the moft part of our doubts; this is that which gives us the greateft ihogg to our judgments , and ftops the career of Gonfultation, ^ ^ ' ' H 3 We uS LOGIC; Or, ParUlt We judg of things not as they are in themfelves, but as they are in refped of ns : and Truth and Pro- fit are to us die fame thing. We need no other proofs of this, then what wc fee every day, that things in other places generally held for doubtful or falfe, are accounted altogether uncertain by all thofe of one Nation, Profeffion, or Order. For it not being poffible that what is true in Spam fhould be falfe in Frame ; or that the un- derfbinding of the SfmUrds^ that,while both judge of things by the Rules of Reafon,what generally ap- pears true to the one, fhould generally appear falfe to theother,ic is apparent that this diverfity of Judg- ment can proceed from no other caufe then that the one are pleas'd to hold for Truth what is for their advantage, which not being for the interelT: of the other, they have a contrary opinion of it. Now what is there more unreafonable,thcn to take our Intereft for a Motive to believe a thing? All that ought to be done in fuch a cafe, is but to confider the more attentively to usthe reafons that may difco- ver to us theTruth of what wc defire fhould be true. Nor is there any other Truth then this, that ought to be independant from our delires, which oueht to prevail over us,\ am ot thisCountry5thereforeImuft believe that fuch a Saint firft Preach'd the Gofpel here. I am of fuch an Order, therefore I believe fuch an Inftitution is true. But triefe arc no Reafons. Be of what Order or Country foever, we are only to believe what is true, and which we would believe, of whatever Country, Profeffion or Order foever we are. Put Chap. XX. The Art of VnnKmg. 1 1 9 II. But this Delufion is now apparent when it hap- pens from change of Paffions. For tho all other things remain in the fame condition, yet to them that are provok'd with new Paffions it lecms, that the new chanee that lias happened in their Defires^ has altered the whole courfe of things, which are any way related to 'em. As we find that there are fome PerfonSj that will not acknowledg any ^ood Cjiialityj^ either natural or acquired, in thofe a- gainfl: wliom they have conceiv'd an Antipathy, or that have in any thing thwarted their Sentiments, their defircs or their Interefts ? Prefently fuch muft be traduc'd for rafh, haughty, ignorant, perfidious, faithlefs and void of allConfciencc. Their Affeftions are no lefs unjuft and iminoderate then their defires. If they have an Affeftion to another, he is free from all manner of Faults. All that they de- fire is juft and eafy, whatever they do not defire,un- juft and impoffibfe ; without alledging any reafon for thcfe Judgments , other then that overrules 'em. So that altho they do not form this rational Argument in their Minds. I love him5therefore he is the moft accomplifli'd Perfon in the world; I hate him, therefore he is a worthlefi Rafcal; yet they do it in their hearts ^ and therefore we may call thefe (bits of Extravagancies, Sophifms and Delu- fions of the heart; whofe Nature it is to tranf- port our Paffions to the Objeds of our Defires ^ which we therefore judge to be fuch as we would have, or defire they fhould be. Which is a thing moft unreafonable, fince our Defires change no- H 4 thing 120 LOGIC; Or ^ Part III. thing of the Being of wliat is without us ; and that there is none but God alo :e wiiofc will is fo all-pow- erful 3 that things are always what his plcafure it is, they Ihould be. Ill V/e may alfo refer to this Delufion of felf Love that other' delufion of thofe who determin all things by a moft general and convenient Principle, That they ha-ve reaj'on mdl^mrp the Truth. Whence it is no difTiaik thing for them to determin^ tliat tlieyw'ho think the contrary are deceived : for tlie copxluiion neceffarily follows. TheMiftakeof thcfePerfons proceeds only from hence that the good opinion which they have of their Wit caufcs 'cm to deem all their thoughts to be fo clear and evident, that they believe the bare pro- pounding 'em to be fufficient to make all the world (iibmit. And for this reafon they take litde care to bring proofs. They cive little car to the Reafons of others ; they would carry the day by their own Authori- ty ; becaufe they make no diftiuftion between their Authority and Reafon: They take all Perfons for inconflderate who are not of their Opinion 5 not coniidering that if others be not of their JudgmentSj thev themfclvcs arc not of the Opinions of others ; and, that it is not jud to fuppoie without proof, that we have reafon, when we make it our bufinefs to convince others that differ from us , for no other Reafon, but becaufe they believe we are not in the Right/ There Cliap.XX. T/;e Jrt of Tlnnhng. \ 1 1 IV. There are others who have no other ground to re- jefl: certainOpinionSjthen this plcafant Argument,/^ it rverefo^l fhould not be aLearncdPerion, now I am a Learned Perfon therefore it is lo.For this rcaibn^cer- tain pad: profitable cures inPhiiic have been negle6i:- ed^ and fo many certain Experiments have been laid aiide^becaiife they who had not the good hap to think of 'em^were afraid to be thought to liavc been fo long in an Error ^How ! fay they ^it the Blood had am^ cir- cular Motion in the Body , if the nourilliment did not pafs to the Liver through the Mejar^iic Veins. If the Vein Artery conveyed the Blood to the Heart ^ If the Blood afcended through the defcaiding hol- low Vein 5 if Nature did not dread a Vacuim ; if the Air were Ponderous and had a Tv lotion down- v/ard, I had been igcorant of many important things both in Phyfick and Anatomv, And therefore thefe things muR not be (b. Tlierefore for the aire of fuch diftem.pet^d Fancys, there needs but only thiswholfome Initrudion, that it is a fmall matter for a man to be deceived, and that they may be learned in other things, tho perhaps not fo well vers'd in new difcoverys. V. There is nothing alfo more common , then to hear men fcnrriloufly revile one another, and to tax one another of Obftinacy , Paffion ^ and Li- tigious wrangling, becaufe they cannot agree in their Opinions j and fo they that are in tiie right and Ill LOGIC y Or^ Part. III. and they that arc in the wrong, talk all the fame Language 5 make the fame complaints, and aicribe to another the fame dei'cds 5 then which there is hardly to be found a greater mifcheif among men, and which obfcures Truth and Error , Juftice and Injufticein fuch a manner, thatit isimpoffible for the vulgar fort of men to difcern ^em ; and hence it happens that feveral men adhere at hap hazard, fometothe one, and fome to the other, of the two diflenting parties, and that others condemn both being equally in the wrong. Now all this Fantafticalnefs of humour arifes from this diflemper, that every one is conceited of his own reafon. For trom that Principle it iseafy to conclude, that all thofe that contradict us are opini- onatred ^ fince obftinacy is nothing elfe butaftub- born refufal to fubmit to Reafon. Now though it be true, thatthefe Reproaches of being Paflionate, Blind, and Brablers, which are veiy unjuft from thofe that are in the wrong, are juft and lawful from thofe that are in the right: ne- verthelefs, becaufe the Truth is fiippos'd to be up- on the Upbraider's fide, prudent and judicious Per- fons that handle any matter in Controverfy ought to avoid the ufeof 'em before they have fufficiently confirmed the Truth and Juftice of the Caufe,which they maintain ; and never let them accufe their Adverfarys of obftinacy, raftinefs and want of com- mon Sence, before they have well prov'd it. Let 'em never fayjbefore they have made it appear, that they talk abfurdlyandextravagantlyjForthe others will retort as much back again : for this is the way never to come to any iffue. So that it will be much better to obferve tliat equitable Rule of SuAuftin-, Let I Chap.XX. T7;e Art of TInnking. 1 2 5 Let U6 omt thofe common things that may be [pken on either fide^ though they cannot he [fok^en truly of either fide. A nd then they will think it lliflficient to defend the Truth with thofe Arms which are moil proper, and which falfhood cannot borrow, which are clear and folid Reafons. VI. Men are not only fond of themfelvcs, but natu- rally alfo jealous, awious ^ and maligncrs one of another, hardly enduring others to be preferred be- fore em, as coveting all advantages to thcmfelves : and as it is a thing that deferves great honor to have four (d out any Truth, or brought any new Light into the world,all men nave afecret defire to ravilh that honor to themfelves ; which often engages men to encounter the Opinions and Inventions of others without any fliadow of Reafon. And therefore as felf Love caufes us frequently to utter thefe ridiailous forts ot Reafoning, This is a thing of my own Invention ; this pro- ceeded from fome of my own Profcffion^ this fits' my humour ; and therefore it is true. So natural Malignity fuggeffs another way of Arguing no lels abfurd. 'Twas another, and not I, that faid it, therefore 'tis falfe ; 'Twas not I tliat made this Book, therefore 'tis idle and filly. This is thefourceof the fpirit of Contradiffion fo frequent among men, which when they hear or read anv thing of another man's , they take little heed of the reafons urg'd for Convincement, and mind only thofe which they think they canoppofe. They are always upon the Gentry againft the Trutb^ and think of nothing but how to repel and obfcurc IZ4 LOGIC'y Or^ Pad: IIL obfcLire it, where they generally prove fuccesful, the wit of man being an in exhauftible fpring offalfe Reafons. When this vice predominates, it marks out one of the Principle Charaders or Pedantry, whofe cheifefl: plealiire and delight it is to brable and wrangle about petty thingSjand to contradift all men with a mean and abje£l Malignity. But fometimes this vice lyes more conceal'd then to be eafily per- ceiv'd^and it may be affirm'd^thatnoman is exemp- ted from it,becaufe it is rooted in felf love which ne-- ver dies in Men. The knowledge of this Malignant and envious difpofition which refides in the Bottom of Mens hearts teaches us one of the moft important Rules that are to be obfervM, for fear of engaging thofe with whom we difpute into headlong iirror , and alienating their minds from the love of that Truth to which we endeavor to be invite 'em, is this5that is to fav, as little as may to irretate their envy and jealoufie by boafting of a Mans felf, or by fpeaking of other things on which thofe afFeftions may lay For men Paffionately in love with themlelves impatiently brook thole honors which are done to other men; whatever they cannot challenge to themfelves is odious and troublefom, fo that oft- times from the hatred of the Perfon they fly out in- to a hatred of his Reafons and Opinions ; and therefore prudent men avoid as much as in 'cm lies, the expofing of their Advantages of parts and en- dowments to the Eyes of other men, they withdraw from publick view, and fly applaufc ; and rather chufe to lye hid among the croudj to the end that nothing Chap. XX* The Art of V?inking. 1 1 5 — • nothing may appear in their djfcoiirfes but the bare Truth which they propole. The deceas'd Monlieur Pafckil who knew as much of Rhetoric as ever any Perfon living^extend- cd this Rule Co far ^ as to affirm that every wife man ought to abftain from fo much as naming himfelf, or making ufc cf the words Z, or Me : and and was wont to fay upon thisSubjcd, that Chrifti- an Piety had abolifli'd that humane Expreflion, 7, wliich common civility had only before fupprefs'd, not that this Rule ought to be fo exa£Hy obferv*d neither. For there are lomc occafions, where it would be a vain Torture,to forbear the mention of a mans felf. But it is good to have this Rule always before a mans Eyes, whereby we may the more eafily ihun that evilcujftom of Ibme Perfons, who never talk but of themfelves, and are always quoting thjcm- fclves, when there is no queftion concerning meir Sentiments. Which give an occafion to their Hea- rers, diat this fo frequent refpcfl of themfelves arifes from a Secret complacency which they bear toward the objed of their Love ; and raifes in *em by a natural confequence a fecret averfion for other Perfonsj i^nd whatever they fay. And this is that which (hews us, that one of the moil unworthy Chara6fcrs of a Perfon of credit is that which Mont,vgne has affefted; which is, to entertain his Readers with nothing elfe bat his own humors, his own Inclinations, his own Fancys, his own dii tempers, vcraies and vices : all which ariles as well fromadefed of Judgment as from a violent love of himfelf True it is that he endeavours as much as he can to remove from himfelf the fufpi- tion 117 LOGIC; Or, Part.IIL tion of a mean and Popular vanity, fpeaking freely of his defccls, as well as of his good Qualities j wherein there is fomething of comely, througn an appearance offincerity. but it is eafy to fee that all that is but a kind of fportand Artifice which ought to render him more odious. He fpeaks of his vices todifplay 'em to the worldjUOttocaufea dcteftation of *em/not efteeming 'em any diminution of his honours. He looks upon *em as things almoft Indif- ferent,and rather peicesofGallantry then Ignominy. If he difcover 'em^ 'tis becaufe he thinks they little concern him, and that he beleives himfelf never the worfe^nor more defpicable for what he hasdone.But where he apprehends any blot or ftain of his credit, no man more cunning or diligent to conceal it. For which reaion an eiriinent Autnor of this age very pleafantly obferves, that feeing he was fo careful to little purpofe, to adveitifc us , that he had a Page (who was a lort of Servant little becoming a Gentle- man thathad not above fix thoufand ^ about 300 L Hirers Tourmis a year) he did not take per annum. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^ ^^jj ^^ ^^^^ j^^ j^^j ^ Clerk too, feeing he was a Counfeller in the Parlia- ment of Bourdeaux. But that employment, though very hcnourable in it felf, was not fufficient to fliew the vanity of the man who would rather be thought a Gentleman and a Soldier, then one of the long Robe and a Pleader of Proceffes. However It is very probable he would not have concealM that part of his life, could he have found out any Marfhal of France that had been aCounfeller of the Parliament of BourdrnXy as he was : fincehc is no lefs diligent to Trumpet forth himfelf to have bin Maior of that Citv. e're he hasfirft told us that he chap. XX. I7;e Jrt of TImking. \ i^ \ he fucceeded Marfljd Byron and rcfign'd it to Mar- \ Jhal MAtignon. But the vanity of this Author is not his worft crime^ he is io full of fhamkfs infemy, lb abound- ing in Epicurean and impious Maxijues, that 'tis a wonder he has bin fo long fufiei'd to be publick in the world, and that fo many Perfons of great under- fianding have taken fo little notice of the venome that fpreads it felt in all his writings. We need no other proofs to judge of his liberti- nifm than his manner of repeating his vices. For Confefling in his Book that he had bin guilty of feveral Criminal Diforders^he declares neverthelcis in other parts that he never repented of any, and that if he were to live over his life again, he would again a6i: the fame things. As formy.klf; (ays he, / muld not defire in general to be other then 1 am. I might CondemnmyVni'verial Form-, I might defire of God an entireKe formation and toexcufe my natural In- firmities^ but I ought not to call this Repentance m more then a dif content that lam not an Angel or Cato. My Actions are regulated and conformable to what I ani and my Condition and repentance do not properly concern us as to thofe things that are not in our Porrer. It rpas never in my thoughts monfter Itke to tye the tayle of a Philopher to the Head and Body of a Profli- gate^ nor that the end and remainder of a wretched and miferable life fhould accufe and bely the fair^ entire y and longer part of my days- Were I to Hue '*em over a- gain^ Irrouldlive "em as I have don^ nor do I complain oftphatispa^^ nor do I fear rrhat is to come. Hor- rible words, and which denote an utter extin51fbn of all thoughts of Religion. But well enough be- coming him who thus delivers himfelf in another Part. ti8 LOGIC; Or, Part HI. ^art. Jflu/ige my felf headlong ftuf idly into Deaths as into d jilent and obscure Ahyis^riphich [wallows me uf all at an Inftant and ftifles me in a moment^ full of pwerfdfleef^ffdl of Injifidnefs a?ul Indokncy ; and in an other jUce Death is no more then a Quarter of an hours fifferingt mtho/it future Confequence or Harmf and which merits m panic uUr pecefts* Now tliough this Digreffion feems remote from the matter, yet it returns again where it left ofF^ for this reafoiij in regard there is no book that more inftifes this evil cuftomof magnifying a mans felf^of making ufcof himielf and his own thoughts up on all occafions, and requiring others to do fo too. Which extreamly corrupts in us our Reafcn and Sence^th rough tliat vanity v/hich always accompanys thefe difcourfes ; and in others, through that hatred Antipathy which they have againft it. Therefore no menareproniittedtofpeak ofthemfelves, butPer- fons of Eminent vertue who teftiiie by their manner of doing it , that they only publiih ^ their good Aftions, oncly to excite others to praife God, or for their Edification 5 and if they alfo make their faults publickj it is only to humble themfelvcs be- fore men, and todifwade'em from the likecourfcs. But for commo 1 Perfons it is a Rediculous vanity, to inform others of their petty parts, and an Impu- dence defervingPuniflimentto difcover their Diior- ders to the world without the leaft touch of remorfe, fince it isthehigheftexcefsof \k^ neither to bluih, nor be afr-amM, nor repent of eviladioiis ; bur to difcourie carelcisly and indifferently of their Ln- pietys, as of other matters \ wherein properly con- fUls the excelle: cy of Montaignes Wit. VII. We Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 1 2 9 VII. We may diftlnguifh from malignant and envious contradifti'on, another Humor lis milcheivous, but which engages us in the fame errors of rcafonine, which is the Itch of difputing, which very miicla depraves the underftanding. Not that Difputcs are to be blam*d in general^ rather the contrary is to be affirm'd 5 provided a right uie be made of *em ; for fo there is nothing more ferviceable, either for the difcovery of Truth, or to convince others. The motion of a wit alto- gether bufyM in the examination of fome knotty matter, is generally too cold and languifhingThcrc is a certain Ardor requilitc to excite and awak'n its Ideas. And it frequently comes to pals, that by di- veriity of oppofition, we difcovcr where conf ifb the diflFiculty of perfwafion , and the obfcurity ot the Thcfis ; which gives us an occafion to endeavour to overcome it. But true it is , that as this Excrcife is profitable, when we make a right ufc of it, dilingag'd from pallion ; fo it is as dangerous when we make a wrotig ufe of it, and glory in maintaining an Argument at what rate foever, merely for contradiftions fake. There being nothing m.cre effedual to Eloigne us from Truth, and plunge us into Fegaries and idls humors, then this fort of humour. Haice we ac- cuftom our felvcs to feek for realons every where , or rather to fet oui felvcs above reafon , to which we fcorn to fubmit. Which by little and little leads us to have nothing certain, and to confound Truth with error, looking upon the one and the other, as I equally I30 rOOlC'^Or, Partftl. equally probable. Which is the reafon , tliat it s a thing fo raie, that v/c dctcrmin any thing by dif- pute , and that it never happens that two Pliilofo- phcrs. agree. We have always fomcthing to reply, and wherewith to maintain the Combat ; b?caufe it was never their intention to avoid the error^but be- ing fiient ; believing it leis ignominious to be always deceived, dien to confefs themielves once mifiak'n. Therefore, unlets we have accuftom'd our fel ves by long exercife to govern our paiiions, it is a diffi- cult thing not to loofe the proiped of Truth in Difputes, there being nothing that more heats and exafperates all regulated Affedicns. iVkit Vice do they not arr alien ^ faith a famous Author, being for the moil: part commanded by choler ? We are at enmity iirfi: widi theReafons and then with the Paf- 'jGons. We learn to difputc meerly to contradi6l:; and while every one contradids and is contradided, iz happens that the Fruit of difpute is the Annihi- lation of Truth. One goes into the Eafi, another into the Weii, they loofe the Principal , and wan- ute at the Begirning, or elfe in the miciclle mutinoiifly give over, affefting a haughty coft^mpt, or an avoiding of contention' iniipidly Another j Chap. ^X. J^e Arf of Thinking. 131 Another , fo he may hit his Advcrfary , cares nor how he lays himfejf open to his Opponent. Anotlicr Counts his words, and weighs 'cm for rea- fons. Another onJy makes uic of the ad\'antage of his Voice and his I iings. And fome you fhall fee, that argue again! L themfelves^ and fome there are that tire anddunny a 1 the world with long Pre- faces and ufelefs digrelfions : And others there are that Porcupine thcmfclves with Reproaches, and will quarrel like Dutchmen in their drink , to [hear clear of a Peifon that prefTes too clofe upon 'em in a difpute. Thefe are the ordinary vices of our Dif- putants 5 which are ingenioufly dcfcrib'd by this Writer, who being ignorant of the true dignity of iiuman Nature , has fufEciently underftood the vi- ces and corruptions of it, from wi?ence it is ealie to judge, how apt thefe contentious difputes arc to .diibrder the mind, unlcfs a Man be very wary, net only how he falls firft himfclf into thefe errors, b:it alfo how he follows others into the lame Ihares, and fo to regulate himfelf , that he may be able to ob- ferye the Fcgaries of others, without wandring him- fclf from the aid which he propofes , which is the Dilucidation of the Truth. VIII. There are fome Perfons, chiefly in die Courts of Princes, who, knowing how troubkfome and diipleaiing thefe humours of contradidion are , fteer a quite contrary courle, which is to commend and applaud all things indiflerei^tly. And this is that which they call Complaifance { which is a hu- mor more commodious for the gaining of pretcr- I 2 meiit 132 LOGIC':, Or, Partin, mentj but altogether as niinoiis to the judgment. Fcr as they that ftudy contradi6i:ion , take always for the Truth, the contrary of what is fpoken ; the Complaifant, admit for truth whatever you fay to 'cm, and this aiftom corrupts, firft their Difcourfe^ and then their Underflanding. Hence Commendations are become fo common, and Praife fo promifcuoufly beftow^d upon all Men, that we know not what to conclude of the Perfons applauded. What Preacher is there whom the Ga-- zet does not extoL for the mod eloquent of Men, and a Raviflier of his Auditorv, through the pro- foundnefs of his Learning ? All that die are lUu- ftrious for their Piety. Petty Authors might make whole Books of Elogies, wHich thev receive from their Friends.. So that in this exceflSve Prodigality of incomiums made with fo little difcretion , wp cinnot but wonder that Mai Ihould be fo covetous of 'cm. It is impoffible but that this confufion in Lan- guage, mull breed the fame confufion in Under- flanding , and that they who accuftom themfelves to praife every body, muft accuftom themfelves al- fo to approve every thing. But though the falfity fhould be only in the words and not in the mind, vet it fhould fervc mcthinkSjto alienate from it^thofe that fincerely love Truth. It is not neceffary to re- prove whatever a Man fees amifs. But there is a necelhty of not commending what is truly commen- dable ; otherwife we throw thofe that we thus com- mend into delufion : They contribute to deceive thofe, who judge of thefe Perfons by their praifes ^ and they wrong thofe that merit true praife , by making it common to thofe tliat deferve it not; anci laftly Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 133 laftlv we dcftroy all Faith of Speech^ arxl confound all tne Ideas of WordSj making 'em ceafc to be the figns of ourjudgments and our Thoughts, but on- ly of an outward Civility, which we are willing to pay to thofe we commend. Which is all that is to be concluded of ordinary Praiies and Comple- ments. IX. Among the feveral ways that felf-Love plunges Men into error, or rather fixes *em therein, we muft not forget one, which without doubt is one of the Chiefeft and moft common- That is, the en- gaging a Mans felf to maintain an opinion, ro which a Man is urg'd by other confidcration^, then thofe of Tmth. For this condition of defending an Ar- gument caufcs fuch a negh'gence, that we never re- gard the reafons which we make ufe of whether they be true or falfe, but whether they may be fer- viceable to perfwade what they go about to main- tain. To this purpofe they rnake ufe of all fons of Arguments good or bad ; that fomething may be faid, to impofe upon all the world. And fome- timcs we proceed fo far , as to utter thines which we know to be abfolutely talfe, to the end that thcj may ferve to the end which is propos'd. Of which we fhall produce fome examples. No intelligent Perfon fufpedts xhztMontaigne ever believ'd all the Dreams aud Extravagancies of judi- cial Aftrology. Neverthelefs when he thinks it proper to make ufe of 'em, in contempt of Human Nature, he produces 'em as good Reaions 5 iVhen TPe confider^ favs he, the Vommon and Power which I 3 the[e 134 LOGIC, Or, Pslirttll. thefe Bodies Im've not only over our Lcves^ and the con- dhiom of oar Fortune^ hut over owtncli/iatiom them- jeh-es^ptjtyd forn-ard at the mercy of their Influeficies^ ivlyjha'l rre deprive 'em of a So d^ of Life arid t)ij- CO irfe \ , , VViil he dcftrdy the Pn'viledg? that Men have over Beads, by the Commerce of Speech ? He telis us rioiciiloiis Tales, of which he knows the extra- ^ agancy as well as any man , and yet from thence tirav/s more ridiculous Concliifions. Inhere ,rrc fome^ faid he , tkit h.ive hoafted their un lerfUn !i/>g the Langmge of Beafis^ as ApoUohius, Thyancus, Mc- lampus, Tyre'iias, T hales ; and fince^ as fome Cof- mografhers afltm^ there are l^^ations that 'acknmledg a t):gfor their King^ they mafi of necefjity under ft and his Barkings^ and inter fret his geftic'uldttons. From this reafon we may conclude, that When Cdligiila made his Horfe Conful, there was a ne- ccJity for his OfF-ccrs to iinderftand the Orders which he gave m the exerciic of his charge. But we v^rong Montaigne^ to accufe him of this bad con- fcqiience. His defign vvas nor to fpeak rationally , but to make ;a, conruisM Colieclion oi- what could be faid agn inft Men t which however is a vice ako- ,f?,ct!ier contrary to the Equity of Realbn, and t!ie Candor of Ingenuity. A^ infr;[r:rable is an^^ther Ari^ument of the {amc Author, upon the Subjeft of the 'Heathen South- faycrs. Of all ' the 'Prediaions . of irifies _ faf^^d , the rnift ancient and the v:oft certain nvere'thofe 'n hit h' it ere taken from tie flight 'of Birds ^ J^fe have Aothing c ml" arable to it^ nor fo admirable, B'H tlm regular and orderly motion of tie yving^from ndyence 'they drew th: hmrr'.edge QffnwcConfepences^r^ft be condu'dedby fome Ctiap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 1 3 5 [ome excellent means , to fo noble an operation. But to afcriie this jvjnd.rf/d ejfe^f^ mthjut the conjent^ mderftandiyig c/n-l d^jco/irje of Urn ^ by whom it is froduc'^d^ to the Lr/vs of Nature is a madncfs , (ind the opimon is eviderdly falfe. Is it noi: a very plcalant thing to fee a Man, who believes noth.ing to be evidciiLly true, or evidently lalfcj in a Trcatifc exprcily compols'd to edabiirfi Pyrronifm^ and to dcftroy c\'idcnce and certainty , ierioully cxpoihig thefc raving iarxics , for certain truths, and condemning tlie oppoiitc opinion for evi- dcntlv" falic ? But he only laughs at us,whcn he prat- tles in this manner, and is inexcuiable lor impofing thus upon his Readers , obtruding things upon 'em which he docs not believe himfelf , and which it were a folly to believe. He was without doubt as good a Philofopher as Virgil^ \'Oi did not he afcribe to tlie Intelled of Birds, thofc regular alteradons which we fee in their Motions according to the various Conflitution of the Air, from whence we make Conjeftures con- cerning the future temper of the Sky, as may ap- pear by the following vcrfcs in his Georgics* Jslon eq ddem cyedo^ (]-na fit di'vinitus illis Ingen'im^ ant rerimfato prudentia major ; rm/m di tempejl'as^ isr Cili moUlis Aer Mf4tazrre zfia^^ ; for that fame curiofity calls off their minds I'rom theconliderationof P^calti*??!, and weakens the vigour ot our thoughts, as Painters obferve, that thev who are excellent for Colouring, are fcldom good Dcfigners; the m:nd not being ca- pable to ftudv two things at once, and the one di- fturbing and hindring the other. And indeed we may lay m general that the mod: part df the World judges of things by the outward appearance ; for there are h.ardly any that pene- ti'ate the iniide and bcttom of things! The Rule of all Juds:raent is the Tide, and woe be ro them whofe Title difpleafes. Be a Man a Learned, as Prudent, as perfpicatious as he pleaies^ ii he fal- ter in his Language, and decs not anlwer accuraie- jy to an cflncious Complement, he is undone for the whole Remainder of his Life, and condemned to live defpifed among the Vulgar. 'Tis no great matte" to want due Prail'e; but the greatell thing is to infill upon thefe prejudices, and to look no farther I40 LOGIC:, Or, Partlll/^ farther then the back of things; and this is that wc fhould endeavour to avoid. II Among the caufes that engage us in Error, through a falfe Luftre that hinders us from difcern- ing it, we may juftly reckon a certain pompous and Magnificent fort of Eloquence, which Cicero calls a- bounding in founding words and copious Sentences. , For it is a wonderful thing how falfe Keafoning deals away our aflent with a Period that tickles the Ear, or a furprizing Figure that fets all the Hearers a crazing. Thefe Embsllifhments not only rob us of the Profpeft of thofe Fallhoods whicK are intermix'd in difcourfe ; but infenfibly allure U5 to others, be- caufethey feem ncceflary for the more curious Com- pofure of the Period or Figure. So that when wc fee an Orator begin a long Gradation, or an Anti- thefis of feveral Members, we ought to (land upon our Guards ; for it rarely happens that he ^ts quit of 'em, without wrefting and fcrewing the Truth , to make it conformable to this Figure. He orders the fame truth as they do Stones in a Building, or the materials for a Statue, he cuts and extends it». fore-fliortens it, and difguifes it to make it fit for the place which he defigns it,in his vain piece of Work- manftiipand ftrudure of words. How many falfe thoughts has the defire of main- taining a nicety produced ? How many Lies has the Law oiKhime begot? The great affedationtomake ufe of none but Cicero man words, and that^ which thevcall purely to; of how many abfurdities has j it Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 141 it made feveral Italian Authors guilty ? Who would not laugh to hear Bembo cry that the Pope was E- ledcd by the favour of thelminortal Gods ? Deo- rum Immortalitm bemficm. There are alfo certain Poets that Imagine it to be eilcntial to Poetry, to introduce the Pagan Divinities into their Po- ems ; and thus a certain German Poet, being de- fervedly reprov'dby Picm Miranduh^iox: having in- troduc*d into a Poem which he made of the Wars of the Chriftians^all the Pagan Divinities,and inter- mixed Apllo^ Diana and Mercury with the Pope, the Emperor and the Eleftors, maintains that had he not fo donejhe had been no Poct;and to prove his aflertionalledgesfora ftrangcRcafon, that the ver- fcs of Hefiod^ Homer and Firg'il , are full of the Names and Fables of the Gods. Whence he con- cludes it lawful for him to do the fame. Thefc falfe arguments are imperceptible to thofe that make >em, and deceive them firft of all. They are dizzied witli the found of words ; and the Lufter of their Figure dazles 'em, and the pomp of certain words allures 'em unawares to thoughts fo vain and frivolouSjthat if they did but make any reflexion up- on 'em, tliey would certainly re/eft 'em them- fclves. Is it credible that a Writer of this age fhould be fo in Love with the word Vejlal^ as to ufe it in an Argument to perfwade a young Lady not to be a- (ham'd to learn the Latin Tongue, telling her that fhe need not be afham'd to fpcak a Language which the Fe\iah fpoke. For had he weighM the force of his Argument, he could not but have appre- haided that he might as well have toJd the Lady, that Ihe needed not be aiham^d to fpeak a Language, which 142 LOGIC', Or, Partm. which all chc Korr7a.>^ Curtejjm fpoke, who were far more numerous thcnthc f^ejUIls ; ortliat fhe needed not to be ainaiTi'd to fpeak any other Language then that -oi- her own Country, fince the Feftalls fpake no other. All thefe Arguments chat -jfigni- £y nothing , are as good as any that Author .brin^; and the truth is, ti:fce r Pel fon may have faii'd in payfng diat re- (pe-l: which he ought to have done where it was due. ThisMan, cry they, is proud and Infolent^ whai perhaps it may be only Inadvertency, or bare for- getful nefs. All exteriour things are only equivocal figns, tliat is to fay, fuch as maylignirie feveral things, and therefore it will be railmels in him to determine this fignto anv particular thing, without fomc particu- lar Reafon. Silaice is fometimes a iv^ of Mo- dcfty and Judgment,^ fometimes of a Brute. De- lay 'and Helitation fometimes denotes Prudence ^ fome- 144 LOGIC', O r, Part III. lometinicsdulneisof lV)ind. Change is fometimes a fign of InconftancVj fometimes ot Sincerity. So that it is a point of ill-reafoning to conclude a Man inconftant, meerly becaufe he has chang'd his Opi- nionj for he may have reafon fo to do. IV. Falfe Induftions by which we draw from general Propofitions particular Experiments , are one of the moft common Sources of falfe Reafoning a* mong Men. We nf'ed not above three or four Examples to form an Axiom, and common Place 5 of which we may afterwards make ufe as of a Prin- ciple to decide all things. There are many Difeafes that are concealed from the moft ablePhylitians, fo that Remedies are ma- ny times of litde Efficacy. From hence fome Hot- fpurs conclude^ that Phyfic is altogether unprofita- ble, and all Phylitians no better then Mounte- banks. There are fome Women wanton and unchaft. This is enough for thole that arejcalons to have an ill opinion of thofe that are chaft ai:d honcft, and for licentious Authors to condemn all in gene- ra. There are fome Perfons that conceal great vices under a fhew of Piety ; from whence Ukr tines con- clude that all Devotion is Hipocrify. There are fome things obfcure and concealed, and we are fometimes groifly miftaken ; therefore fay the ancient and new PyrrhomanSy all things are ob- fcure and uncertain, and we cannot certainly dif- cern thetri.thfrcmfalfhood. There Chap.XX. The Art oflhinh^ng. 145 There is an inequality among the anions of fome Men 5 this is fufficicnt to frame a common Place, out of which no IVJan fhail be excepted. Ke^on^ fay thcy^t6fodefe6U7Je^ and jo hliyid^ that rrhat things are accomped mojl clear ^ are yet to Keafon offcm -, Eajy and Difficult are the fame things^ all Suites e- qually^ and Nature in general ^difa'vorrs its Jurisdicti- on. fVe thinhof nnhi'/g thatrve ha've a iVtllto^ but at the very Injlant we have a Will to it ; and. rpe rvill nothing freely^ nothing dfolutely. nothing co nil antly> The greatcft part of the World pronounce the Vertues and Vices of others only in general and Hyperbolical Terms. Out of which particular aits they infer Habit; out of three or four defaults Cuftom. That which happens once a Month , or once a Year happens every day, everv hour, every moment in the Dilc ourfe of Men. So little care do they take in their Words, and the Bounds of Veri- ty and Juflice. V. ^Tis a piece of Weaknefs and Injuftice, often condemned and little avoided, to Judg of Counfels by events, and to render guilty of all the bad enfu- ing Confequences, thofe who have taken a prudent Refolution according to all the Circumflances which they could forefee ; either thr ^.ugh the bare chance or malice of thofe that crofs'd 'em, or through fome other Accidents which they could not poifibly forefee. Men not only live to be as fortunate as wife, but they make no differaice between fortunate and wife, nor between unfortunate and wicked* fThis diftin^li- K on 14 6 10 G IC^yOr, Part HI. on they look upon as too nice. We are ingenious to find out the defefts that we believe occafionM our bad ^uccck. And like Aftrologers when they are certain of an Accident, fail not to find out die Af- ped of the Star that producMit. In like manner after Calamities and Misfortunes, we never fail to pafs our Cenfures upon the Pcrfon, that he deferv'd 'em by his Imprudence. He did notfucceed, there- fore Ke was in the wrong. Thus they reafon in the World, and thus they have always reafon'd; be- caufe tlie Judgments of Men have always wanted the guidance of Equity, and for that not knowing the true Caufes of thing?, they fubftitute others ac- cording to the Events, extolling the fuccefsful, and condemning the Unfortunate. VI. But there h no fo fort of falfe Reafoning more frequent then when we judg rafhly of the Truth, by vertue of fuch an Authority which is not fufficient to affure us ; or when we decide the bottom of things by the manner of their being Propounded. The one is call'd a Sophifm of Authority y the other a Sophifm of the Manner, That we may underfland how frequently we fall into thefe Sophifms we need only confiaer, that the mod part of Men never believe one opinion more then another, upon folid and eflential Rea- fons, which would difplay the Truth,but upon cer- tain outward marks, which are more agreeable,or at ieaft feem more agreeable to Truth then Falfhood. The reafon is, tliat the internal verity of things lies frequently concealed j that the Underftandings of Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 41; of Men are weak and dark , full of Clouds and fklfe Lights, whereas the external marks are clear and perceptible. So that Men being more eaiily inclin'd to what is moft facile^they always rake that lide where they fee the external marks that are ea- jGly diicernable. They may be reduced to two princ'pal Heads , the Authority of the Propounder, and the man- ner of Propounding. And thefetwo v. ays are fo powerful, that they draw after 'em the AlTcnt of almoft all underftandings. And therefore God who defign'd^ that the cer- tain knoivledgc of the Myfterics ot Faith, might be acquired by the meanell capacities, among the Faithlul, vouchfaf'd to condefcend to the Infirmity of Human Under/landings, which he w^ould noc therefore have depend upon a particular examina- tion of the point'^, which are proposed to us to be- lieve,but has given us,tbr a certain Rulcj^'thc Autho- rity ofthcUnvierlalChiuxh,w^hich is thePropofer of thefe Articles ; which being clear and undoubted , retreives our underftandings from that Laberynth , where particular difcuffions of Myfteries, would of ncccffity engage iz. Therefore in matters of Faith, the authority of the Univerfal Church is entirely decifive ; and lb far it is from being fubjeft to error , that we never fall into error, but when we wander from its autlio-* rity, and refufe to (ijbmitto it. Wc alfo draw convincing Arguments in mattets of ReKgion, from the manner of their being pro- pounded. For example, when we find that for thefe many Ages of the Church, efpecially in thefe latter ages, K a chat 148 LOGIC':, O r, Partnr. that fo many perfons have earieavour'd to cftabliQi their opinions by Fire and Sword , when we have leen *em arm'd a^^ainft the Church with Schifm, a- gainft the Temporal Magiftrate, with Rebellion ; when we have fcen People without ordinary Mif- fion, without Miracles, without any marks of Pie- tv, but rather with fcniible marks of Impiety, un- dertake to change the Faith and Difcipline of the Church, fuch a criminal manner of propounding is more then fufficient, to caufe all rational Perfons to reje£b the thing propounded , and to prevait the meaner fort from liftening to fuch Arguments. But in things the knowledge of which is notabfo- lutely neceffary^and where God has left every Man to his own particular reafon. Authority and Man- ner cf propounding, ferve only to engage feveral Perfons in judgment contrary to the Truth. We do not undertake here to give Laws and prefcribe Rules and precife Limits of that refpeft w^hich we owe to Authority in Human Things ; but to mark out fome grois miftakes that are com- mltt;ed, touching this matter. Sometimes v/e only regard the number of Te- fUmonies, not confidering whether number be the mofi probable Argument that we have found out the Truth. For as an Author of this age has ob- ferv'd in difficult things , Truth difcovers it felf to one, fooncr then to many. Therefore this is no good Conff quence ; This opinion is upheld by a great number of Philofophers, therefore it is true. Sometimes we arc perlwadcd by certain qualities and endowments of Men, which have no coherence with the truth of things wh.ich are difcoursM of. Thus there are a great number of People that be- lieve Ghap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 149 lieve without any other examination^ thofe that are more aged and have more experience 5 the the things believ'd, neither depend upon age nor experience, but the acutenefs of underflanding. Piety, Wifdom, Moderation arc without doubt qualities the moft to be efteem'd in the world , and there is a great Authority due to fuch perfons , in things that depend upon Piety 3 Sincerity, and an Illumination from God, probably more paiticu- larly conferred upon thofe that ferve him moft pure- ly. But there are an infinite number of things that only depaid upon human Intelled, human Experi- ence, and human Penetration. In which things, they who have the grcatcft advantages cf wit and fiudy, merit more bdief then others. Neverthe- lefs the contrary often happens, and moft Mm think it moft faf e to follow in the fame, the opinion of the greatcft number. Which comes to pafs in part from hence, that thefe advantages of wit are not fo confpicuous, as the exterior Regularity, which appears in Perfons of Piety, and partly for that Men never care to make diftinftions. Thefe diftinfbions confound ^em^ fo Jthat they will have all or nothing. If they give credit to any Perfon in fome things , they believe him in all things ; if they give no cre- dit to another Man, they believe him in nothing. They love thofe ways that are (hort , decifivc and compaidious. But this humour, though u- fual, is contrary to reafon ; which fhews us, tliat the fame Perfons do not merit belief in all things , becaufe they are not eminent in all things, and that it is a deprav'd mode of concluding. This is a grave perfon, therefore he is intelligent and learned in all things. K 3 True 150 LOGICpOr, Parttg. VII. True it is that there are fnm pardonable errors, fiich as arc thole, when we give a greater Refped, to the Opinions of thofe whom we efteem to be men of Credit. But there is one delulicn, much more abfurd in it felf, and which is neverthelefs ve- ry frequent ; which is to believe that a Man fpcaks Truth, becaufe he is a Perfon of QLiality, Rich, and advancM in Dignity. " Not that any Perfon exprelly makes thefe can- clulions 5 He has a Hundred Thoufand Li\^rs a year, therefore he is wife. He is nobly defcend- cd , therefore we muft believe what he fays to be true. Such a one is a Perfon of no Eftate ; there- fore he is in the wrong. .Yet fomething like this prevails in the minds of the moft part of tne world, and which carries away their judgments , without any other confideration. Let the fame thing be proposed by a Perfon of quality, and a Man of mean condition , they will approve what the Perfon of Quality utters, when they will not v'ou^hfafe to hear what the other of- fers. The Scripture inftrufts us, touching this hu- mour of Men, perfectly reprefenting it to us in the Book of Ecclefidft/cm. PVhen the Rich Man ffe^kl all Men are filent , and exiol his words to the Clouds : if a. por Man fPeaks^ they cry rvho is that ? Certain it is, that complacency and flatcerv have a great iliarc in the approbation which is ^^vcw to the^ anions and words of Perfo is of Quality, and which oft-times they dr^w tothemfelvcs by a certain ex- Chap. XX. The Art af Thinking. 1 5 1 external Grace, and manner of Behaviour, noble, free and natural. Which is fomecimes fo peculiar to themfelves^that it is hardly to be imitated by thofe who are of a low and mean Birth. But as certain it is^ that there are alfo feveral , who approve all that great Men fay and do, out of an inward pronencls of Spirit, which bows under the burden cf Gran- deur, and which has not a fight ftrong enough to abide its Luftcr ; and that the exterior Pomp which environs thofe great Men, impofcs not a little, and makes Ibme impreflion upon the more prudent fort. Tiiercafon oftliisdeception, proceeds from the Corruption of the Hc?.rt of Man , who having a burning paffion for honour and pleafure , neceffari- ly conceives a grcat'Iove for Wealth and Riches , and thofe other qualities whereby they acquire both pleafurcs and honour. Now the Love which they have for all thefe things that the "^Vorld admires, is the reafon that they are efteem'd happy who en- joy *em \ and judging them happy , they place thofe Perfons above themfelves, and look upon 'em as eminent and exalted. Which cuftom infenfibly glides from the confideration of their Fortunes, to the confideration of their Minds. Men do not 11- fually do things by halves. .And therefore they give the Rich and Potent a Soul as exalted, as their condition ; and this is the reafon of that great cre- dit, which they meet with in all Affairs, that they manage But this delufion is much more prevalent in the great ones themfelves, who are not careful to cor- reft that impreffion, which their fortune naturally makes in their minds, as well as in the minds of their Inferiors. For there are few of 'em , with K 4 whom 152 LOGIC', Or, PartllL whom Riches and Digaitys have riot the weight o^ Reafori, and who do not believe that their opini- ons and judgments are fuperior to the judgments of thofe that are beneath 'em. They cannot brook that Perfon^whom they look upon with contempt fliould pretend to have fo much reaibn and judg' nient as they. And this is that which makes ^em fo impatient of the Icaft contradiftion; This proceeds from the fame fource, that is , from the falfe W^^^which they have of their Gran- deur^ their Nobility and their Wealth. Whereas they fhould confider 'em^ as things entirely Stran- gers to their Being -^ and which are no grounds for them to believe, but that they are equal to all the reft of Mankind, both in Body and Soul , but that thqr judgments are as weak , and as apt to be de- ceived, as the judgments ot other Men. They in- corporate, as it were in their Eflcnce, all thefe qua^ lines of Great, Noble, Rich, Mafter, Lord, Prince; they m.agnifie their Idea^ and never reprefcnt them- iclvcs to themfelves, without all their Titles, and all their Train of fplcndor. They accuflom thcmfclvcs from their Cradles, to loiDk upon themfelves as diftind from the reft of human Race : Their Imaginations never intermix ' with the common crowd of Men. They are al- ways Comu or Dom in their own Eyes , never meer Mortals ^ and To they cut a Soul and a Judgment, according to the Propofition of their Fortune. And bche^^e diemfclves no lefs above others in their Un- derftaiiding, *hen they towre above 'em in Wealth 3.nd Dignity. The Ghap.XX. The Art of Thinking 1 53 The Folly of Men is fuch, that there is nothing of which they do not make Life to aggrandize the IdcA 5 v/hich they have of themielves. A fump- tuous Houfe, a Magnificent habit, and a great Per- rivvigg makes him efteem himfelf more learned then pthers ; and if we take a nearer obfervation , we fhall find , that forac believe themielves wifer a Horfeback or in a Coach, then a Foot. 'Tis an eafie thing to perfwade the world , that there is nothing more ridiculous then t'.^ofe judg- ments 5 but it is a difficult thing to exempt ^em from the fecret Imprellion , which thefe exterior things, make in the mind. All that can be done, is to ac- cuftom our felves as much as in us lies, not to give any Authority to any of thefe qualities that do not contribute to the finding out of Truth : Nor to them neither, farther thai as they contribute effe- lively. Age , Knowledge , Saidy , Experience , Wit, Vivacity. Moderation, Accuratenefs, Labour, fcrvetofind out the Truth of things conceal'd, and fo far thefe qualities defcrve to be refpeded. But they are diligently to be wei.^^h'd, and afterwards to be compared with contrary Reafons. For from a- ny of thefe things in partiailar, there is nothing to be concluded of certainty 5 fmce there are falfc opi- nions that have been approv'd by Perfons of great wit^and endow'dwith the greateft paitof thcfc good qualities: VIII. There is yet fomething more deceitful in the fur-^ prizes vvhicli arife from the manner. For we are naturally enclinM to believe that Man has reafoa , who 154 LOGIC'-, Or, Partni, who fpeaks with a Grace, fluendy, with gravity j with moderation^ and fweetnels, and to believe that Perfon in the wrong that fpeaks rafhly, pailionate- ly, inventively 3 andwidiprefumptioninhisadions and his words. Neverdielefs, if we judge not to the bottom of things, but by thefe exteriour and fenfible man- ners, i^is impoflible but that we m«ft be often de- ceiv'd. For there arefome Perfons that utter their follies gravely and modeftly, and others o'the con- trary, who being naturally brisk and airy, or lels governed by fome paflion that appears in their Ge- ftures and Words, have no lefe truth however on their fide. There are fome Men of mean and fu- perficial capacities, who having been bred atCourt, where they more diligendy fludy and^radife the Arc of Complacency, then in other places, have acquired manners that are very i^leafing, under which they make pafs for currant rnany filfe judg- ments, while others not having thofe outward em- bellifliments, ceafe not however to have large Intel- lefts, and folid at the bottom. There are (bmc who fpeak better then they think, and others who think better then they (peak. And therefore rea- fon requires, that they who are capable fo to do, fhould not jud^e by exterior appearances, but al- ways fubmit to Truth, not only when it is proposed after thefe harfh and unpleafing, but alfo when it is intermixed with innumerable falfities. For the fame Perfon may fpeak Truth in one thing, and falfe in another ; be right in this, in that wrong. We are then to confider every thing apart, that is, we muft judge of the manner by the mmner^ of the thing by the thing r^ not of the thing by the manner Chap. XX. The Art of Thinking. 155 manmr^ nor of x}aQ.miinmr by the thing: li a Maa fpcak paffionately, he is to be blanrd, but to be ap- pjaiided, if he ipcak truth. On the other fide a Man is to be commended for fpeaking prudently and moderately, but to be blam'd if he utter falt- hood. But great care is to be taken, leaft we conclude any thing to be true or falfc, becaufe it is propvis^d after fuch or fuch a manner. It is but juft alfo, that they who defire to perfwade others into a belief of fome Truth which they have found out, fhould en- deavour to cloath It in the moft graceful form. which is moft proper to caufc it to be approy'd^ana to avoid thofe irkfome manners that only ferve to alienate the mind. We mud alfo remember, that when we intend to perfwade, 'tis not of fo much importance to fpeak Truth ; but that it is of the grcate^v impor- tance when we {pake Truth , to (peak onlv tiiofe things that arc neceffan^ to make Truth dele£lable. They that honourTruth^will not diftonour it,by covering it over with the contaminations of falfho(>3. And if they love it lincerely,they ou^h: not to draw upon it, the hatred and averfion or Men, by deli- vering it in a manner uns;rateful. This is the grea- tcft precept of Rhetoric^ therefore the more uleful; becaufe it ferves to regulate the Soul as well as our words. For though they be mo different things, to be wiong in the manner, and Thing, neveithe- lefs the Vices of the mm'tur are more pernicious then the vices of the Thing. And indeed all thofe fiery, infolent, bitter, opi- niated paffionated manners, proceed from fome Ir- regularity of the mind, which is many times worfe then 156 LOGIC', Or, Part III. then the defed of inceile6t and knowledge which we reprove in others^ and it is always unjiift to think to perfwade Men in char manner. For it is jiili: that they fhould flibmit to triirii wnen they know it, but it is luijuft that they fliould exaft from others, to hold that for Trnth which we believe, upon th^-: fole fcore of our Authority. Yec this is that which they do^ when they propofe Truth after thofe unpleafant manners. For the Air of the Difcourfe caters our minds together with the P.eafons. I'he mind be- ing more quick to perceive that Air, then to appre- hend the folidity of the Proofs, which many times they underftana not at all. Now the Air'oif the Difcourfe being thus federated from the Proof s, de- notes only the Authority which he that fpeaks at- tributes to himfelf. So that if he be eager and im- perious, he alienates the minds of his auditors ; be- caufe it feems, as if he wbuld carry by his Autho- rity and a kind of Tyranny, what he ought to ob- tain by reafon and perfwafion. This Injuftice is much greater, when ft makes ufe of thefe difpleafing manners, to combat and over- throvvT opinions commonly received. For the rea- fon of a particular Perfon, may be preferred before riiat of fevcral, when it is moft in the right, but no private Perfon ought to pretend his Auchoriry to be more prevalent then the judgment of all others. So that not only Modefty and Prudence, but Ju- Gke it felf, obliges us to an humble and fubmiffive Air of Reafoning, when we combat commonly re- ceived opinions or a confirm'd Authority ; otherwife that Injuftice can never be avoided of oppofing pri- vate to public and univerfal Authority, or at lead the chiefeft and beft eftabiilh'd. \Ve cannot fliew too Ghap.XX. The Art of Thinkings 157 too much moderation^whcn we go about to trouble the poflcffion of a recelv'd opinion, or a beh'ef that has been fix'd time out of mind 5 which h fo true that St. Aujiin extends the fame to the Verities ot Religion y having given this excellait Rule to all thofe that are obliged to inlh'ud others." See^ faith he, what method the Prudent and Piom Catholic teachers tal^ , in what they are bound to teach others. If they are things common and antho- rivd 5 they propofe 'em after a moft affur^d manner , and which teftifies nothing of doubt , yet with all the fweetnefs and mildnefs imaginable. But if they be things which are extraordinary.^ though they are fuch things which ^ they clearly know to be true^ yet they ra- ther fropofe 'em as doMful gueflions , and to he exa- min% then as Axioms ^ and Maxims.^ that in this they may condefcend to the infirmity of the Auditors. Or if it be a Truth fo fublime^ that is^ above the reach of thofe to whom it is fropunded., they rather chafe to fupfrefs itforfometime^ that their Hearers may have time to encreafe their knowledge and enlarge their ca- facitieSy then to difcoyer it" to ^m.^ in the height of their weakpefs^ when it would but Amaiu and ftufifie their under fiandtngs. The End of the Third Part. 1 $ 8 PartiV j LOGIC; O R T H E ART OF THINKING. Part IV- Concerning MET HOD. IT remains for us to difcourfe, touching the Fourth pait of Logic,, which concerns Method^ which without doubt is the moft profitable and important part. We thought it requifite to j infert into this part, that which relates to Demons I ftratlon ; which does not ufually confift in any one fingle Argument, but in a Series of fcveral Syllo- gifms, by which we invincibly prove fome certain ' Truth 5 and for that it is of little ufc in Demoa- > ftration Chap, XX. . Th Art of Thinking. 159 ftration to know the rules of Syllogifins, whcre^^'^ wefeldom fail ; but the main bufinefs is for a Man to difpofe his Thoughts in good order, making ufc of thofe which are mod: clear and evidcnt^to pene- trate into what fecms moft occult and conceal'cf. And becaufe that Knowledg h the end of E)emon- ftration, it will be neccflary to fpcak fomething of it in the firft place. CHAP. I. Oflsjiorpledg^ that there is [uch a things that the ISnovphdg of things by the Mind is more certain then what vpe h^on> by our Senfes^ that there are [owe things of rphich Mans Vnierflanding is uneatable. T'he advantage of this neceffary Igno- rance, IF when we confider fome certain Maxim, wc underftand the truth of it either by it felfjOr by jfuch an Evidence as perfwades us without any other iReafon, this fort of Knowledg is callM Underftand- J ing, and thus it is that we underrrand the firft Prin- I Iciples. i I On the other fide if it^do not perfwade us by it felf, ) but that we have need of fome other Arguments to . overrule us, whether it be Authority or Reafon; If it . jbe Authority, which caufes us to embrace what is jpropolcd this is that which is called Faith ; If it be , Tcafon, then where this Reafon does not produce an i6o LOGIC'-, Or, PartlV- an aitire Convi6lion) but leaves f^me doubt ftill behind, this Acquiefcency of the Mind accompa- nied with fon.e fort of diflatisiattion is call'd opi- nion. , ^ « But if Reafon clearly convinces us, then where * it is not clear^ but only to outward appearance, and for want of attention, then the perfv^afion which it produces^ proves an Error, if it be falfein reality ; • or at iealt a falfe Judgment, if being true in it felf^ ' we have nor reafon fufiicient to believe it true. But if t! is Reafon be not only apparent but folid and true, which is found out by a more dilligent and exadt attention, by a more firm Perfwafion, and by the quallity of perfpicuity which is more lively and more penetrating, then the Convidii- . on which this Reafjn produces, is call'dKnowledg, about which many qucf!-ions arife. The firfl: is, w'hether there bcanyfuch know-- ledg, that is to fay, whether we have any know- ledg grounded upon clear and certain Reafons 5 or in general , vvhether we have any clear and certain knowledg; for this queftion relates as well to Uuderf^andinp^ as to Knovledg. There are lorne Phfloibphers who,make it their Profeffiog to deny this Kn wleig, and who have raifed the whole Stru6>uie of thnr Phiiofophy up- on this Foundation. Of which P' ilofophers, fome there are who deny certainty, adnntting Probability, and thcfearethe new Acade?mcs: the other fort, who are the Py>rkmam. deny even probability it felf, pretending tiiat all things are equally uncertain. But the truth is, that all'thefe opinions that have made fuch a noife in the World, had never any fubfiilence but only in Difcourfes, Difputes and Writing?, Chap. X The Art of Thinking. i6i Writings, and that no Man was e\'-cr-Gi;hcnvife per- fwadcd, but that they were only the tov^ and Dili- riums of ingenious perfons that had nothing elfe co do, but never fuch Sentiments of which they were entirely fo fatisiiy as to walk and (land bv thofe Maxims, as the Rules of Life. And therefore the befl way to convince thefe Philofophers, is to cite 'em to the tribunal of their Confcicnces, and fin- cere Honefty, and to ask 'em after allthci'edifcour- {qs^ by which they aideavcAir to (l.ew that dicre is no difference bcr^ecn lleeping and wakinp . nor be- tween Madnels, ard being in a Man's Saic?.s, whe- ther they do not verily believe at the lame time, indcfpiteof all their Realons, thacthey are both a- wake, and in their VVj'ts^ and whether if they had buttheleall remainder of Ingenuity, they would not give the Lvc to all thefe Vanities and Subtikies, and frankly confefs that they could never believe thefe things, though they fhould make it never io much rhcir endeavour. But if there Ihould be any perfon, who fhould doubt whether he were awake, or in his Senccs, of could believe that the Exiftaicypf all exterior things is uncertain, and that he quefljons whether there be a Sun, a Moon, or any fuch thing as Matter, yet no Man could ever doubt, as St. Ajijltn affirms, whether he be, whether he think, or whether he live. For whether he be afleep or awake, whether in or out of his Wits, whether he be deceived or not deceived ^ it is certain at leaft, that while bethinks, he both 7^ and fe.% it being impoffible to feparate Beir.g and Life from Thougiit, and to believe that he who thinks he neither is ncK' lives. So that fro;n this clear, certain and unqueftionable Know- L ledg, i62 LOGIC:, Or, Part IV. ledg, may be drawn a Rule, whereby to approve all thofe thoughts as true and clear, which^appea-r to a Man like this. It is impolFible alfo to doubt of the Perceptions of the Scnfes by fcparating 'em from their Obje6ti For whether there be a Sun cr an Earth or no ; certain it is that I imagine I fee one. I am certain that I am in doubt while I doubt, that I believe I fee, when 1 doubt whether I believe I fee • and I b:lieve I hear, when I queftion whether I believe I hear, and therefore not extending our thoughts be- yond thofe things which are afted in the Mind it felf, and confiderina what is only done there, wc fhall find there an Infinite number of Certainties of which it is Impoffible to doubt. Which Confideration may ferve to decide ano- ther quertion which arifes upon this Subje6i:5 which is, whether thofe things are only perceiv'd by the Mind, are more or lefs certain then thofe things which we underftand by the Sences > For it is clear bv what we have faid, that we are more aflur'd of our Perceptions and Ideas^ which we only know by the Reflexion of our Minds, then we are of all the objeds of our Senfcs. We may alfo fay, that tho' onr fences do not always deceive us in tiK: report c-f tilings which they make us, yet that the affurance we have , that they do not de- ceive us , does not proceed from our Senfes , but from a reflexion of the Mind^ by which we difcern when we ought, and when we ought not to believe our Sencfs. And therefore we muft acknowledg that St. Ai- fiin2.(x.tv PlatOy had reafon to affirm.^ that the judg- ment of Truth, and die Rule to difcern it belongs not Chap. I. The An of Thinking, 165 not to the Senfc, but to the Mind. And that the afTiirance to be depended on from the Sences , IS of no large (Xtent , and that there are ma- ny thi'nps which we believe we know by the Scnces, of which we cannot fay, that we have any abfolutc certainty. For example, wc may know by the Scnccs that one Body is bigger then another 5 but we cannot know certainly what h the true and natural bignefs of every Body ; for the manifeilanon of which, we are only to cc nfider^that ii all the World had ne- ver look'd upon exterior obje^ls, but with multiply- ing-Glaflcf, certain it is^ they would not have fi^ap'd thofc Bodies and mcaiiircs of Be dies othcrwife thai according to the Bignefs rcprelentcd by the Magnify- ing-glaflcs. Now our Eyes are Mignifying-glalles,and whether we know not prccifely, we dimriniiL or en- large die ob j c£i:s w h icli \\ c fee. C r w li c th cr the ar- tificial \'':agnifving-G]affes, which we bclie\ e, to aug- ment or diminifh, do not rather rcprefentthe fome things according to their true Ma,o;nitude. So that wc do not certainly knoiv the abfolute and natural bignefs of any Body. Neither do we know whether wc fee thincs to be ot the fame bignels with other Men. For tho* two perfons in mxafuring, agree together, that inch a Body does not contain above five Foot, yet perhaps that which one Man means by one Foot,' is ncr what another means by the fame m'eafurc. For one con- ceives what k reprefcnted to him by his Eves ; and ar. other concei\es the fame thing ; yet it may be the Eyes of the one pcrlbn do not reprefent the fame thing which the other mans Eyes do ; in regard their Eyes tmy be like Glaftcs v^arioufly .ground L 1 How- i64 LOGIC'^Or, Part IV. However there is great Probability, that this dif- ference is not very great • becaufe we do not fee a- ny difference in the forming of the Eye, able to produce a change fo remarkable, for tho' our Eyes are GlafTcs, yet they are GlaiTes cut by the Hand of God ; and fo we have reafon to believe, that they reprefent the tmth of Objefts i only that there are fomc defeats which alter and deprave the natural Figure. However it be, if the Judgment of the bignefs of Objeds be any v ay uncertain, fo is it neither neceffary, nor have we any reafon to conclude that there is any more certainty in any other reports of theScnces. For i: I do not know precifely what 1% the abfolute and natural bignefs of an Elephant, however I know that an Elephant is bigger then a Horfe, and lefs then a Whale, which is fuificient for common Underftanding. Therefore, there is both certainty and uncertain- Vfi as well in the Mind as in the Sences, and it would be an equal miftake to look upon all things as ceruin, or all as things uncertain. Reafon on the contrary propofcs three things to us to be obferv*d. For there are fome things to be known clearly and certainly. There are other things, the truth of which we do not as yet clearly and evidently un- derftand, but which we may hope to underftand hereafter. And there are other things which it is, Impolfible that we fhould underftand widi certain- ty ; either becaufe we are ignorant of the Principles . that lead us to the Truth, or becaufe they are above ' the reach of our Under (landings. The Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 165 The firfl fort comprehends ;iii that we know by Demonftration, orUnderfuii'ing. The fccond is the continur.i exercife of Philofo- phical Study. But it may eafily happen that they may loofe their time, if they cannot diftinguifli this from the third fort^ if they cannot difcern thofe things to which the Mind may attain ^ from thofc other things which it is not capable to apprehend. The moll compendious way ro the fiill extent of knowledg is not to toil our lelvcs in the fearch df that which is above us^and which we can never ration- ally exped to comprehend. Such are thofe queftions that relate to the Omnipotency of God. which ic would be ridiculous to confine within tlie narrow Limits of our Undcrftandings j and generally, as to whatever partakes of Infinity. For our under- {landing being finite, loofes it felf in the Labyrinth of Infinity ; and lies ovcrv; helm*d under the multi- tude of thoughts, contradi6ling one another. Hence may be drawn the mod convenient and fliorteft (blution of many queftions, about which there will be no end of difputing, fo long as Mai arc infeftedwith t--»e Itch of difpute, io regard they caa never be able to arrive at any certain knowledge wha*eby to affureand fix die underftanding. L it poffible any creature (hould be created from Eternity? Is it poffible for God to make a Body infinite in quantity, a movement infinite in fwiftnefs, a multitude infinite in number > Is a number infinite even or odd > Is one infinite more extcnfive then a- nother > He that fhould anfwer once for all, I know nothing of it , may be iaid to have made as fair a Progrefs in a moment, as he that had been beating his Brains twenty years, about thefe Niceties. The I L 3 only \66 LOGICi, Or, Partly. only difference bcrwccn thefe Perfons is, that he that drudges day and night about thele Queftions , is in the greatcit danger ot falling a degree lower thai bare Ignorance 5 which is, to believe he knows that which he knows not at all. There are alfo an infinite number of Metaphylical Queftions", which being far remote and abftratted from principles clearly known^can never be refolv'd : So that the fureft way is, for a Man to rid himfelf of 'em the foonel he can ; and after we have llight- ly read what has been (aid of 'cm , to rcfolvc to unlearn 'em again. Nefcire q^idedm mixgm fars faJmtU* By which means, riddi g our felvesof vain and ufelefs fcrutinies, we (hall be the more able to make a fairer progrels in fjch things as are more propor- tionable to our underftandings. Moreover we are to underftand , that there are fome things which are incompreheniible in their manner, yet certain in their exigency , we cannot comprehend how they are, however it is certain , they are. VVhat is more incomprehcnfible then Eternity > atid yet at the fame time y/hat is more certain ? In- fomuch that they, who through a detettable blind- nefs, have defac'd in their minds the knowledge of God, are co livrainM to attribute it to the vileft and mofl: contemptible of Beings^ which is matter. How can we comprehend that the fmalleft At- tom of matter is divifible to infinity , and that we can never come to fo fmall a partjthat does not on- ly eiiclofe feveral others, but alfo an infinity of o- ' ' ther Chap. I. " The Art of Thinking. i6y ther parts. That a fmall grain of Wheat enclolcs in it felt as many parts, though leflcr in proportion as the whole world? That all imaginable figures are aftually the'c to be found, and that it contains a little woi'ld m it felf with all its parts,a Sun, a Hea- ven, Stars, Planets, and an Earth, in a moft admi- rable correfpondency of Proportion ? What can that part of this Kttlc world be, which anfwers to the bignefsof a grain of Wheat ; and what a ftu- paidious exiguity muft that be, of which we may truly fay , that it is fuch in refpcd of a grain of Wheat, as a grain of Wheat is compared with the whole World .^ Neverthelefs this part which is fo incomprchenfible to us, contains another proportio- nable world, and fo ad infinitum-^ there being (till no part which docs not comprehend as many pro- portional parts as the world , how large foevcr we make it. Thefe things are above Conception ; yet nccef- farily they muft be fo , becaufe the divilibility of matter is dcmonftrable , as appears by the proofs which Geometry flirnifhes us with ^ as clear as any which fne prodiices.' For this Science fliews us, that there are fome lines which have no common Meifure, which for that reafon arecall'dlncommenfurablc, as the Dia- gonal and fides of a Square. Now if this Diago- nal and fides were compos'd of a csrtain number of divifible paits, oiieof thefe parts would be the com- mon meafure of thofe Lines ; and by confequencc it would be impodible that thofe two' Lines fhould be compos'd of Indivifible parts. Secondly^ the fame Science teaches us, that it is Impoffible that a fquare Number, ihould be double L 4 another i68 LOGIC, Or, PartJV. another fquarc Number^ and yet 'tis poffible for an' extended Square to be double to another extendccl Square. Now it thefe two Squares were composed of a certai ^. number of Finite parts, the great Square would contain double as many parts as the lefs, and both being fquare, there would be a fquare Num- ber double to another fquare Number , which is impoflible. Laftly^ there is nothing more clears then that two nnbings of an Extent can form an Extent; and tHat every Extent has parts. Now takinp^ two of thefe parts which are fuppos'd to be indivifible, I dem,and whether they have extent or no ? If they have , then they are divifible and have parts ^ if they have not, then they are Nothings of an Bctent , and fo it is impoffible they can form an Extent. We mull renounce all Human Affu ranee ,. to doubt of the vaity of thefe Demonftrations ; But for. the better apprehending this infinite Divifibility of matter, I will add one more procf, which fliew^s us at the fame time a Divifion into infinite, and a motion that flack'ns to infinite^ yet never ends in reft. ^.,,.^ .,.; Certain it is , that though it may be doubted, whether extent may be di\4ded to Infinity, it is un- qucPdonablc that it may be .enlarged to Infinity; and iriat to a Plain of a Hundred Thoufand Leagues, may be added another Plain of a Hundred Thou- fand LcagucS) and lo ad injinitim. Now this Infi- nite Augmentation of Extent proves its infinite di- vifibility. For proof of which , there needs no more then to fuppofe a pbin Sea, which is augmen- ted to Infinity ^ togcrha* with a Ship continually failing fromfo.me part of thatSca^ in a dired Line.^ Certain Chap. I. The Art of Thinking. 169 Certain it is, that the Ka^dh^ that ihall come from the bottom 01 the Ship , to the Eye of the Perfon looking from the Foit , through a Glafs orTranf- paLxnt Body fhail pafs through a certain point of the Glafs, and the Horizontal 'Radius (hall pafs through another fomevvhat more Elevated. Now as the Vcffel makes Sail, the point ot the Kddim that terminates at the bottom of the Ship^ (hall al- ways mount, and infinitely divide the fpacc between the two points, and the 'farther theVeflel moves off, the higlier it will (lowly afcend. without eA^r ceafmg to afcend , or ever being able to touch the Point of the Horizjontd Kadiu6^ becaufe thole two Lines interfering each other in the Eye , can never be Paraikl nor the (ame Line. Which Lyamplc^ at the fame time, affords us an Infinite Diviiibility of an Extent , and a (lackning of motion to Infinit^^ By this Infinite Diminution of Extent , which arifes from its divifibilky may be prov'd thefe Pro- blems that feem impolliBle in their Terms. To fi-nd 'an Infimtejf^ce equal to a Finite -^ or rrhich is no piore then the half ^ or the third fart of a Finite ff ace. Of which among many others, here is one, very cafie, though not fo polite. Take die half of a Square, and the half of that Square, and fo ad infinivmy and joyn all thefe halfs by their longeft Line ^ the . Confequence will be a fuperficies of an irregular Fi- gure, and which will dimlnifh ad infinittm^ at one of the ends, but which will be equal to the whole fquare. For the half and the half of the half, the half of the fecond half, and fo ad infinivm^ make the whole. The third, and the third of the third, and die third of the new third, and fo ad infinitum make I70 LOGIC':, Or, Partly. make the half. The fourth's taken after the fame manner make the third part, and the fifth part is the foLirdi ; which joyning together at the ends, will produce a Figure containing a half, or a third part of the Area of the whole , and which on the one fide fhall be infinite in laigth , diminifhing propor- tlonably in breadth. The' advantage that may be made of thefe fpe- culationSj is not only the bare knowledge of thefe things, which is barren enough 5 but to teach us the limits of our uhderftandings, and to make us ac- knowledge infpite of our felves, that there are cer- tain things that are, which we are not capable to apprehend. And therefore it is profitable in fome meafure to take pains about tliefe niceties , wereic only to tame our preiiimption, in oppofing our fee- ble apprehenfions againft the Truths which the Church propofes, under pretence that we cannot ap- prehend 'em. For feeing that the force and vigor of human wic is forc'd to liicGomb to the leaft Atom of matter , and to confefs that he clearly fees, that it is divifibic into Infinity, not apprehending how it can be done 5 is it not vifibly a fin agamfl: Reafon , to refufe to beleive the vifible EfiFeds of Gods Omnipotency ^ which is of it felf incomprehenfible ; and only be- caufe it is above our Apprehenfion ? But as it is fometimes profitable for a Man to make himfelf fometimes fenfible of the weaknefs of his own Underftanding, by the confideration of thofe objefts which are above it, it is no lefs certain, that he ought to make choice of Subjeds and Mat- ters, for his more general ftudy which are within the reach of his capacity 3 the truth of which he may Chap. IL The Art of Thinking, 171 may be able to find out and comprehend ^ wliedier by proving the hfeds by the Caiiics, or a Priori-, or by demonftrating the Caufes by the Erfe6ls5which is call'd Demonfli-ation a Pojlmori- Nevcrthclefs , the iignificaticn of thefe Terms mull: be diJatcd, 10 the end that under them all forts of Demonftrati'ons may be reduc'd ; though here it may fuff cc to give a hint of 'em by the by, that they' be undcrftood and not feem uncouth to us , when we meet with 'cm in the Writings and Difcourfcs ot Pliilofophy; and for that, i^rgumentsof this Nature bcinq com- posed of feveral parts ; it is requifite , for the rcn- dring 'em more clear and concluding , to difpofc *em in a certain Order and Method. Of which Method it is, that we fliall difcourfe in the chiefeft part of this Dook. CHAR II. Of the tm forts of Method^ Aualyfis and Synthefis. An Examfk of Analyfis. MEthod may be generally call'd Thi^ Art of well dijfofwg a feries of feveral Thoughts , either to dtfcoTer the Truth of rrhicb we are ignorant^ or to 'J'ro've others of nrhich we know the truth already. Thus there are two forts of Mahods ; the one to difcover the Truth, which is callM Analyjis^ or the Method of Unfolding^ and which may be alfo call'd the Method of IniJention : And the other to make k underflood by others when it is found outj which is 172 LOGIC:, Or, Partly, is call'd Synthefis^ or the Method of Compojitiony and may be alfo call'd the Method of DoS:nne. Thecntire Body of any Science is rarely hand- led AndmcaUy, Andyfis being only made ufe of to refolve ibme ^ Qiiefti- * The greateft part of wliat on. . is here difcours'd concerning j^^^ jj Q^^eflioilS Oueftions,was taken from a Ma- .1 , ^ luw « mifcript of the Deceased D'ejc^r- ^^^ p^^^^r about WOrds tes, which Monfieur Ckrchelier Or tilings.^ did me the favour to lend me. I call in this place queftions about words^ not thofe that hunt after words, whereby things may be (ignify'dj but which fearcn for things fignify*d out of the words themfelves : As when we endea^ vour to find out the meaning of a Riddle ; or what an Author means by obfcure or ambiguous words. Queftions about things may be reduc'd under four feveral forts. The firft, when we feek for the cau- fes by the effc6i:s. For example 5 we know the va- rious effeds of theLoadflone, and by their affiftance fearch for the caufe. We know the various efFefts which are ufually attributed to the abhorrency of ^vacuum : We fearch whether that be the true caufe, and we find it is not. We know the Sea ebbs and flows ; and we feek for the true caufc of fo regular : a motion. The fecond iV, whai we feek to find out the Ef- fe6bs by the Caufes. For example 5 we find that wind and water have a great force to move bodies. But the Antients not having fufiicien»:ly examined what might be the effefts of thofe caufes , never made ufe of 'em 5 for many inventions afterwards' found out to the great benefit of Mankind, and the great eafe of human Labour, which ought to have been Chap. IL The Art of Thinking. 1 73 been the true Fruit ot Phylical Study. So that it may be faid, the firfl: fort of Queftions, whereby we feek the Caufcs by the Effects, include the fpe- ailative part of Phylics, and the fecond part that feeks for the Effeds by the Caufes , contains the Pra6lical part. The third fort of QiicfKons, is when we feek for the knowledge of the whole by the pares. As whai we have many Numbers , we feck for die Sum by Addition or Multiplication. The Fourth is^when having the whole and fomc part, we feek for the other part : As when we know a certain number, and what is fubftraded from it, we feek to find what remains ; or as when we feek to know what will be the/i much^ of a given num* ber. But here it is to be oblerv'd, that for the farther extenfion of thefe two forts of Queftions ; and that they may comprehend what cannot be properly re- ferr'd to the former , the word part is to be taken more generally for all that comprehends a thing , its Manners^ its ExtremitteSy its Accidants^ its Peg- frieties^ and generally all its Attributes* So that he may be faid to feek the whole by its parts, who feelcstofind out the Area of a Triangle by its neight and Balis : And he may be faid to feek a part by the whole and another part,who feeks to find out the fide of a Re6tangle, by the knowledge which he has of the Area^ and one of the fides. Now whatever be the nature of the Queftion pro- posed, the firft thing is to conceive clearly and di- ftinully, what is the precife point of the Qiieftioa For the error of many is to be avoided, who out of heat and precipitancy , are ready with their anfwers 174 LOGIC', Or, Partly , anfwcrs, before they rightly underflandjby the Cir- aimlrances and other marks, what is propounded. Like a Servant, that being commanded to go for one of his acquaintance , runs away in haft before he knew particularly from his Matter , who that friend is. Now in regard there is in all queftions ibmething unknown, which clfe would never be to fcek, ne- verthelcfs that which is unknown muft be mark'd out, and dclign'd by certain conditions , which li- mit us to fearch out one thing rather then another, and caufe us to underhand vmen we have found it out, that it is the thing which we feek aften^ And thefe Conditions we are well to conlider be- fore band, with great care, leaft we add any other then what is enclosed within the thing propounded , and of omitting any thing which is therein inclads ed : For both ways a Man may commit a manifeft error. As for example, in the firft manner, if it fhould be demanded of us, what Creature that goes upon four Feet in the Morning, upon two at Noon, and three in the. Evening, we fhould err to think our felves bound to take thefe words, Feety Mornin^^ iSfoon^ Evening in their proper and genuine fignin- cation : For the Propounder of the Emgma requires no fuch condition : And therefore it is fufficient that they may be apply'd by a Metaphor to fome other thing : And fo the Riddle will be well refolv'd, by faying "that lame Creature is a Man. ' Let us fuppofe the Quefdon to be, how the Sta- tue of Tdntdm could be made lying upon a Co- lumn in the midft of a Vafe^ in the pofture of a Man ftooping down to drink, but could not do it,becaufe the. Chap. II. The Art of Thinking. 175 the water in the f'A^e ^ might aicend up to his Mouth ; but fank down again fo loon as it began to touch his Lips. We fhould err in adding luch Queftions that would be of no ufe to the folution ot the Qiieftion. and trouble our brains to find ouj. fome wonderful fecret in the Statue of Tantalus that causM the Water to fink down fo ibon as it' approach'd his Lips. For nothing of chat is inclu- ded in the queftion. For if it be rightly conceived, it may be fuff cient that we imagine a VcfTcl made to contain Water to fuch a height 3 and which em- ties again , if it be till'd above fuch a mark 5 which is eafy to be done, by concealing a private Pipe in the Column, of which one Branch admits the Wa- ter into the I'aj'e^ the other which is longer, hangs down below the bottom of the Vafe. For the Wa- ter pour'd into thfcVafe will ftay till it come to the top of the Syfhon or Pipe, but being filhd up to the top of the Pipe , away it &\qs again through the longer branch of the Pipe that hangs down below the Vafe. The Qiieflion alfo mav be put what fecret that fame waterDrinker had5who fhcw'd his tricks SLtParis about twenty years fince ; and how by vomiring only water out of his Mouth , he could fill at the fame time five or fix feveral Glaffes with water of different colours. If any one believe, that thefe waters of different colours were in his Stomach, and that he made a fcparation there , as he threw *em up into the (everal GlafTcs, that Perfon will hunt after a fecra never to be found 3 becauie it is an im- poiUbilicy. And therefore he is only to ask why the water coming out of one and the fame Mouth, at one and the fame tixiic , appear *d to be of divers colours ^^6 LOGIC^ Or, Partl y, colours in every one of the Glafles ; which it is ve- ry probable , was occafion d by ibme Tin6ture , which the Mountebank put at the bottom of the Glafles. 'Tis the cunning alfo of thofe that propound Que- ftionSj which they would not have eaiily refolvd, to environ and cloud the thing which is to be re- folv*d with fo many frivolous conditions , which fer\^e nothing to the folution of the queftion, oa purpofe to prevent the difcovery of the true point of the thing propounded ; and fo v/e lofe time and beat our brains to no purpofe^ about things that con- tribute nothing to the difcovery of the thing de- manded to be refolv'd. The other manner of erring in the examinati- on of the marks and circumftauces of the thing which we fearch for^is when we omit what is moft e£ fential to the queftion propounded. For example, we propofe to find out the perpetual motion by Art* For we know well that there are perpetual motions in nature, as thofe of Fountains, Rivers and Stars. There are fome, who believing tlie earth turns up- on its center , which is nothing but a great Load.-' ftone, of which the common Adamant has all the properties , believe alfo that an Adamant may be fo order'd^as always to tum about circularly. Which though they could bring to pafs, yet would it no- thing contribute to find out the perpetual motion by Art ; in regard that other morion would be as' natural, as that of a Wheel exposed to the current of a River. Therefore when we have well examined the Cir- cumftances , that mark out what is unknown in the queftion, we are next to examin what is known , for. Chap. II. The Art of Thmkjng. 177 for thereby we ihall come to the knowkdcrc of what is unknown. For we are not to Imagine tliat we are to find out new Oenm's of thineSj m regard our minds are no farther capable to find out thin^^s un- known, then as they participate after fuch or fuch a manner, with the nature of things which we know. For example, if a Man were blind from his birth, we fhould kill our fei ves in vain, to feek out Argu- ments and proofs, to make him fcnfible of the true Ideji6 of Colours, fuch as we liave by m.eans of our fences. Alfo if the Loadilone , and thofe other Bodies, whofe nature we are inquifitive to find out, were new Qenms of Beings^ and fuch that our un- derftandings could not conceive the like^ we might defpair for ever to attain to the knowledge of 'em, by reafons or arguments, but we fliould fland in need of another underftanding then our own. And therefore we are to believe that we have found out ail tliat can be found by human Invention, could we conceive difHnftly , that fuch a mixture of Be- ings and yiatures^ which are known to us, could pro- duce thofe efle6ls which are known to us in the Load- (lone. Now it is chiefly in our Attention to uhar is known to us in the qucftion which we fhould re- folve, that the Amlyjis ccniifls : it being our main bufinefs to draw from that exahiination many Truths that may lead us to the knowledge of what wc feek. As if the Qiieftion wtxt^rvhether thefo-d lye Immor^ td^ and to find it out, we apply our fclves to con- fidcr the nature of our foul; wc obferve in the firff^ place, that it is the propriety of the foul to think , and that it m.ay doubt of all things elfe , without M doubting : J 178 LOGlC'^Or, Part IV. doubting whether it think or no , in regard the doubt it felf is a thought. After this we examin what: it is to think ; and not finding in the Idea of Thought 5 that there is any thing included in the Idea of extended Subftance. which is call'd a Body^ and that we may deny ot Thought whatever be- longs to a Body, as to be long^ broad^ deep^ to have dfverjity of parts ^ to be of fuch or fuch a figure^^ to be di'vifibk^ &:c. withoutdeftroyingtheW^^ which we have of Thought, we conclude that Thought is no manner of extended Sdftance ; becaufe ft is of the nature of a manner that cannot be conceived, if the thing be deny'd of it v/hofe mode it k. Whence we infer, that Thought being no Manner of extend- ed Subftance, it muft be the Attribute of fome o- ther Subftarxe ; and fo the Subftance that thinks and the extended Subftancc, muft be two Subftan- ces really diftinft. Whence it follows that thede- ftruclion of the one does no way argue the deftru- ftiori of the other, (ince the extended fubftance is not properly deftroy*d, but that all that happens in that which we call dcftrudion is nothing elfe but a change or diflblution of fome parts of the mat- ter which remains always in Nature, as we rightly jud^e, that in breaking the Wheels of a Clock , the fubftance of the Clock is not dcftroy'd, though wc fay the Clock is deflroy'd. W^hich fhewj, that the Soul not being divifible or compos'd of any parts, cannot periil^ 3 and by confequencc is immor- ti! This is that which is c^WAAnalyfiS'^ or on unfold- ing^ where we are to obferve , i. That we ought m take our progrefs, as in the method of Compo- i]ticn,fromthat which is moil: known,to that which IS Chap. 11. The Art ofThinklng, ly^^ is Icaft known. For there is no true method that can difpence with this Rule. 1. That it differs trom the method of Compo- fition in this, that tveconfider thefe known Truths in the particular examination of the thing which we propofe to underffand , and not in things more General, as in the method of Do61:rine. Thus in le foregoing example, we do not begin with the general maxims, that no fubflancC) to (peak pro- perly, perifhes ; That what we call defcru(fiio is only a diflbluiion of the partsffhat wl:atfoc\ er has no parts cannot be dciiroyM : but we mount up bv degrees to thole gaieral Rules. 3. That we ncA^r propofe clear and evident ma- ^j'mSjbut as we have occaiion to make ufe ot *em ^ T.hercas in S}mh:'fis v>e produce thofe hrft^ as we fliall fhew hcreaiter. 4. That tliefe two methods differ only, as the way that leads from a Valley to a Mountain, dif- fers from that which leads from the top of the Mountain to a Valley : Or as the xsko manners dif- fer, to prove that fuch a Perfon is defcended from St. Lenif^ of which the the one way is to ihew, that f.ich a Perfon had fuch an one to his Father, who was the Son of fuch an one, and he the Son of iiich an one^ and fo down to St. LerriA. The other to bcgiu from St. Z^ r/>, and to fhew that heh.ad fuch Children, thofc Children others, till thev come to the haz defcent, w ho is the Perfon intended. And this Ex.imple isthe more proper at this time, be- caufe it is the moil certain way to r^nd out an ob- fcure Pedigree, by afcending from the Son to the Father ; whereas for the inflruciion of .others that it is alread}' found, the moll: ufual wav is to begin M 2 ' frqm i8o LOGIC':, Or, Partly. from the flockj the more eafily to dcmonftrate who they were that defccnded from it. Which is ufii- ally obferv*d in the Sciences, where after we have made iife of Amlyfis to find out fome truth, we ap- ply our felvesto the other method, to explain what we have found out. By this we may underftand what is the Amlyfis of thcGeo^etnciai7$^which confifts in this. AQiieftion be- ing propounded to them, which they know not whe ther it be true or falfe.As whether it be ztheorevK^ot iizTheoreme the poffibility or impoffibility of it.They (iippoferit to be as it is propos'd,and examining what will follow from thence, if upon that examination they light upon evident Truth ,of which that which is^'propos'd is a neceffary confequence,they conclude from thence, that the thing proposed is True : Then beginning again where they left off^ they demon- ftrate it by the mahod of Comfofition.But if through neceffary Inferences , they fall into abfurdity and impoffibility, they conclude the thing proposed to be abfurd and impoffible. This is what can be scncrally faid of Amlyfis , which confifls more in judgment and dexterity of wit then in particularR^fa.Neveithelefs thefe four which Monfieur Vefcartes propos'd in his method may be beneficial for a Man to guard himfelf from er- ring in the fearch of Truth , relaunT^ to human Sciences, though indeed thev may be generally ap- plyM to all forts of Methods, and not partiailarly only to Amlyfis. I. Neve^ to receive any thing for Truth^ which is not k^mn to he evidently [uch 5 that is^ carefully to a- void precipitation and prejudice ; and not to compre- hend any thing m^m in a Mans judgment , then what frefents I Chap. in. The Art af Thinking. i8i ■frefents it [elf clearly to the under jlanding^ and rphich is altogether and abfolutely unquefiknMe. 2. To divide the 'Difficulties that are under Rxami- nation^ into as many farts or parcels as he can^andare requifitefor their [oluion. 3. To govern his thoughts by order^ heginmng from objecfs the moft fUin and eafie to knorr^ that he may he able to [oar by degrees y to the J{nowledge of things more difficult and compounded ; and juppofing a certain or- der among thofe things n^hich do not naturally precede one amthfr* 4. To mmber his Mediums, and make his reviews fo exaifly^ that he may be afur^dof not having omit- ted the leaft Particle. True It is, that it is a very difficult thing to ob- fcrvc thelc Rules ; but it is always neceflarv to bear 'cm in mind, and to obferve *em with all the ex- aftnefs that lies in a Mans power, when he would find out Truth by^ the way of Reafon , and as far as our undcrftanding is capable to reach. CHAP, in, of the Method of Comfofition , and particularly that Tphich i/s obfervd by the Geometricians. WHat we have faid in the foregoing Chap- ter, has already given us lome Idea of the Method ot Compofition, wliich is the moft im- portant as being that which we make ufe of in the explanation of the Sciences. M 3 Thi^ i82 LOGIC; Or, PartlV. This niethod conlife principally in beginning from Things the mofi: plain and gcneral^andafcendirg to the Ids general and more compounded. By this means wclLiin ungraretul Repetitions 5 for I'hould we be to treat of Sfecits*s before Ge?;u6\ (ince it is impoflible to undjrftand the S'l'ccies rightly before we underiland the Oenm^ th.ere would be a neceffi- ty of ieveral times explaining the nature of Genm in the explanation of every Sfecfcs. There are many things a-fo to be obferv'd^to ren- der this met-iod ^perfeft and proper foa obtaining the propos'd end, which is to give us a clear and diftind knowledge of the Tr.ith. But becaufe the gene- ral Precepts are more difficult to underftarid, when thcv are abftradcd from all manner of matter, we will confidcr the Method of the Oeometricians , as being that whic^^ we have always thoughr^moft pro- per to ccnvirce us of the Truth. And Ml we (hall ilxw what is to becommicnded in this method, and fecondly what it has defedive. It beino: the chief aim of the Geometricians to ad- vance norhin':; hm vjhzt is truly convincing , th^r might attain tiieir ends by cblerving three things in general. y Not p [uffcr /inv A'mhigtity in their I'cms , a- gaiuft wliich they have provided by definitions of w'ords. 2. Njt f) gfO'ind their Arguments b n uj-on clear ani ep:dent Principles ^ and which can never be queftionM by an}^ Perlbn of underflanding ; which isthereafon^that'they lay down their Axioms which they require , lliould be granted 'em, as being fo deav, that they would be" but obfcurM, bv going about to prove 'em. y Chap. III. The Art of Thinking. /Sj 3. To trove demonjlratively all theje Cortch^jions^ by the help of fctled Definitions, Principles qranc- ed 'em, as being mofi: evident, and Propofitioiis wliich they have already drawn by the li)rce of Reafon. infomuch, that after that they become Principles. So that we may reduce to thefe three Heads, whatever the Geometricians obfeiTe to convince the Underftanding. and include the whole in thefr five Rules of great Importance. Rules necejfaryfor Definitions. 1. Not to lejrue any thing in the Termi obfc/ire^ or Equivocal rriihout defining it. 2. To make ufeof nme but Terms ferfecily l^norrny or already exj^lain'd. For AXIOMS. 3. To propound no Axiom but rphat U m-^fi clear and evident. For Demonjlrations- 4. To froTe all Propofitions any thing obfcure^ by the help of preceding Propofitimi or Axioms conceded^ PropofitiomT)emonjirdted^ orlafllyby the Conftruciion of the thing in qufftion^ jvhen there is any Operation to hefhervn. 5. lr that he has not been conftant to the fame Idea which he had defign'd, but that he is infenfibly fallen into another, which is that of Nature. For example, he teaches us to divide an Angle in two. Compare his Definition, and you fhall find that it is not the meeting of two Lines that he would have us divide in two , that it is not the meeting of two Lines that has two fides and a Bafe • but that all this agrees vvith the fpace comprehended between two Lines. It isvifible therefoie, that that which puzzl'd Eu- clid^ and hindered him from defining an Ande, to be a fpace comprehended between two Lines tnat meet,was this tliat he found that fpace might be larg- er Chap. IV, The Art of Thinking 187 cr or Icis, as tlic fides of the Angle were longer or (horter, and } ec the Angle not be lels or bio;ger. Neverthelefs he ought not to have concluded from hence, that an Angle was not a Ipace, but only that it was a ("pace comprehended between two right Lines that meet indetcrmin'd inretpedof one oif the two Dimeniions that aniwer to the length of the Lines, ar,d determin\-i according to die othcr^by the propor- tional part of a Circumference, which has for its Center, the point where the Lines meet. The Dchnicion define (o clearly the Ide,i which all Men have of an Angle, that it is both a Definition of the word, and of the thing 5 only that the word Ande comprehends in common dif courfe a folid Angle, whereas by this Dcfinidon it is rcftrain'd to fignify a Plane' Reclilinial Angle. And when wc have thus dQfin"di\\cA>igk^ it is un- queftionable that whatever afterwards can be faid of a plain Redilinea] Angle, fuch as is found in all Refti lineal Figures , fliall be true of this Angle thus dcfin'd , without beir.g oblig'd to change the Ide^ ; nor will any abdirdity follow by fubfrituring the Definition in the place of the thing defin'd. For.it is the fpace thus explain'd, that cannot be divided into two, three, or four. This is that fpace which has two fides between which it is comprehended ; and which on tliat part which is undetcrmin'd of in it felf,may be determined by a Line which is call'd the Bafe, or H}pten'(e. Isor is it accounted greater or leis, as beino; comprehen- ded between longer or fhortcr Linc% for die mea- ii»re of great or leCs is not to be taken from the part which is undetermin'd according to its Dimcnfion. By this Definition we find out the way to judg whe- tha-. i88 LOGIC, Or, PartlV. ther one Angle be equal to another^ whether bi^er or lels. For the bignei's of this fpace being only de- terminM by the proportional part of a Circum- fcrence, which has for its Center the Point where the Lines that comprehend the Angle meet^ when the two Angles are meafur'd by equal parts of iK Cir- cumference, as the tenth part, they are equal : if one by the tenth, the other by the twelfth 5 that which is meafupd by the tenth, is bigger then tliat which is meafui'dby the twelfth ^ whereas by Eu- r//^\^ Definition, we fhould never underftand where- in confifts the equality of two Angles. Which caufes a horrible Confufion in his Elements, as R^- mu^ has obferv'd , tho* he himfelf no lefs unfortu- nate in his Re6i:ifications, Behold another of Euclids Definitions, where he commits the fame fault, as in that of the Angle. Kea[on fays he, is a habitude of two Magmtudes of the fa^f^kind^ compared one with another according toi quantity. Proportion is a Similitude of Keafons* By thefe Definitions the word Reafon fhould com- prehend the Habitude which is between the two A^agnitudes, when we confider how much the one exceeds the other. For we cannot deny but that this habitude is a habitude of two Grandeurs, com- pared according to quantity. And by Confequence four Magn'tudes will be proportionable one to ano- ther, while the difference between the firft and fecond is^eqnal to the difference between the third and fourth. So that there is nothing to be (aid to thefe Definitions of Euclid^ provided he continue conflant tothofe /- deoys which he has defign'd by thefe words,and which he has given to the words ot Reafon and Proportion. Bur he is not conffant, for that according to the whole C hap.IV. The Art of Thinking. 18 9 whole feries of his Book, thefe four Numbers, 3* 5. 8. 10. are not proportionable, tho* the Defini- tion which he has given to the word Propoition a- grees with 'em. For that there is between the hrft number and the fecond compared together according to quantity, a habitude h"ke to that between the third and the fourth. Now that he might avoid falling into this Incon- venience he fhouldhaveobferv'd, that there are two ways of comparing two Magnitudes ; one by conii- dering how far the one furpalles the other, and the fecond, by confidering after what manner the one iscontain'd in the other. And in regard thefe two habitudes are different, hs ou^ht to have given 'cm different Names, to the firft the name of 'Dif- ference J to the fecond the name of Ke^^fon. After- wards he ought to have dcfin'd Propoition, the E- quality of the one or the other of theie two foits of Habitudes, that is,of Difference or Reafoii. And as this makes two Sfecies^s^ to have diftinguifli'd 'em alfo by two feveral names, calling the Equallity of . Difference^ Arithmetical Proprtton^ and equality oJt Keafon^ Proprtion Geometrical And becaule the latter is much more beneficial then the former, the Readers are to be admonifhy , that when Proportion or Prof ortional Magnitudes 2iTe barely nam'd, it is to be underftood of Geometrical Proportion ; but for Arithmetical Proportion, it is never to be under- ftood,but when it is expreis'd. Which would have un- veird allobfcurity, and taken away all Eguivjcation. This (havs us that we are not to make an ill ufe of that Maxim, That the Definitions of words are Arbitrary. But that great heed is to be takai to de- iign fo clearly and exadly the Idea to which we affix die I I90 LOGIC:, Or, Part IV. the word, that \^ to be dcfin'd, chat we may not be deceivVl in the Scries of the]3ifcoLirfe;by taking the word in another Scnce theni/4S up- on Euclid^ a long difpute and mighty hot, between Pelktier and Him, touching the fpace between the Tangent and tlie Circumference, which Chvius dc- nyes, Pelktier affirms to be an Angle. Who docs not lee,that all this might be determin'd in one word, by demanding of Both , what they meant by the word Angle > We ^Aid alb the ¥2Lmous Simon StCTin^ Mathe- matician to the Prince of Grange , having defin'd Number to be. That hy which is explain d the quan- tity Chap. V. The Art of Thinking. 191 thy of every Things he puts himfelf into fuch a pel- ting Chafe againft thofc that will not have the V- nite to be a I^m/ber^^s to exclaim againft Rhetoric^ as if he were upon fomc foh'd Argument. True it is that he intermixes in his Dilcourfcs a queftion of fome^ Importance , that is^ whether a V/iite be to N/mler ^2is a Poim is to a Lir^e. But here he fhould have made a diflindion, to avoid the fiimbling toge- ther of two different things. To which end thcfe two qiiejiions were to have been treated apart 5 rvbe- ther a Unite he ISlmber^ and rrbether a Unite he to isJumher , as a Point is to a Line 5 and then to the firfl: he (hould have faid , that it was only a Dif- putc about a Word, and that an Unite was^or was not a Number, according to the Definition, which a Man would give to Number. That according to Euclid's Definition of l this Truth, That the Pfhjle is bigger then a fart^- but by our obfcrvatioiis from our Infancy, in regard Indudlion is no certain means to know a thing, but whai we are affjr'd the Indu6tion.is entire. There being nothing more frequent , then to difcover the falfity of what we have believM upon the credit of Indudions, which feem'd to us fo general, that it was thought impoffible to make any exceptions a- gainft 'em. Thus it is not above two or three years fince, that it was thought a thing not to be queftion'dj that the Water contained in an Arch*d Veflel, ha- ving one fide much more capacious then the other, kept always at an even level, not rifing higher on the greater fide then on the Idler, ibecaufe we feem*d to be affur'd of it, by an infinite number of expe- riments. But lately this has been found to be falfe, provided that one of the fides of the VefTel be ve- ry narrow, for then the water will rife higher on tnat, then on the other fide. This (hews us, that Indudions only can give us no folid afliirance of any Truth , unlefs we could be certain they were general., wnich is impoffible. And by confequence we could be but probably affurM of the Truth of this Axiom 3 l^h: rvhole is bigger then the fan^ were we no other way affur'd of it, but becaufe we have fcca a Man bigger then his Head, a Forrefl: bigger then a Tree^ a Houfe bigger then a Chamber, or the Heavens then a Star. For that we fi;ould have always reafon to doubt , whether there were not fome other rrhok , not fo big as its part that had eicap'd our knowledge. ♦Tis not then upon the obfervations we have made from our Infancy, that the certainty of this Axiom Ghap. I. The Art of Thinking. 197 Axiom dq)ends5 there being nothing more likely to precipitate us into error, then to trufl to the pre- judices of our Infancy. But it folely depends upon that which is contained in the clear and diftind Idea6 oi the jphole^ dindz part -^ that is, tliat the 7r/'(?/e IS bigger then a ■part-^ and a part lefs then the jrhole. And as for all our former obfcrvations cf a Mans being bigger then his Head, a Houfe then a Cham- ber, they only furnifh us with an occafion to con- fider more diligently the Idea6 of the rrhole and a fart. But it is abfolutely falfe, that they are the abfolutc and undeniable caufes of the Taith of this Axiom. What we have faid of this Axiom may be faid of others, and fo I believe that the certaintv and evidence of human knowledge in natural tilings, depends upon this principle. fVhat ever U contained in the di^inB and clear Idea of a things may '.e truly affirmed of that thing. Thus becaufe that Animal is included in the Idea of Man^ I can affirm of Man , that he is an Animal Becaufe to have all its Diameters equal, is included in the Idea of a Circle, I can affirm of any Circle, that all its Diameters are equal : Be- caufe the having of all Angles equal to two Right Angles, is included in the Idea of a Triangle, I can affirm it of every Triangle. Nor can this Principle be dilputcd , without de- nying all evidence of Human Knowledge , and fet- ting up a ridiailous Pyrronifm. For we cannot j udge of things but by the Idexs which we have of 'em , fince we have no way to conceive 'em, but as they are reprefented to our thoughts , and that only by their Idea6> Now if the judgmaits which we rfiake N 3 while 198 LOGIC, Or, Partly. while we contemplate thele Idea^s^ fhould only re- prcicnt our Though ts^ and not the Things thcm- ifclves ; that is to lav, if fr:m the knowledge that we have ; that the equality of three Angles , with two right Angles^ is contained in the I^/ea of a Tri- a'^gle, I could not conclude that every Triangle has three Angles, equv.I with two right Angles, but one tha.t I thought fo, it is vilible, that then we fhoald have no knowledge of Things , but only of our Thoiu^hts ; and by coqfcqucnce we fhould know nothing of thofe things which we perfwade our lelves to be moll certain of; only we might fay that we think fo ; thaf would manifeftly deflroy all man- ner of Sciences. ^\nd we need not fear, that there are any Perfons who feriouily agree upon this confequence , that we know not the truth or fallhood of any thing confl- der'd in it felf. For tliere are fome things fo plain and evident 5 as, / thinly therefore I am ; the TVhok is iigger then its P^rt^ that'it is impollible ferioufly to doiibc, whether they be flich in themfelvesas we conceive 'em to be. For we cannot doubt ot 'em with- o'.i.t thinking^nor can we think without belciving'em true, and by confequence we cannot doubt of "^em. Neverthelefs this one principle does not fiiff ce to pdgc of what ought to be received for anAxiomPor there are Attributes, which both may and ought to be enclcs'd in the Meu of thino^s, which neverthcleis both mav and ought to be demo ifh'atei,as the equality of all the Angles of a Triangle to two Pvight oncs:C)rof all the An^-^les of a Hexagm to eight Right Angles. iBiit it will be needful to obferve.whether the IdeA of a thing require only a flight confideration , to fee clearly th^t phe Atrribuce is cpntain'd i^. the Id: a-, oc whether Chap. VL The Art ofThwkj^g. 199 whether It be requiTitc to joyn feme other Ide.i , to difcovcr the Connexion when it is only necellary to coniider the Ide,i only , the Proportion may be ta- ken for an Axiom^ clpcciaJly it that confideration requite but a llignt attention, ot which ordinary iinderflandings may be capable 5 but it it be requi- Tite to joyn another Idea to the IdtKi of the thing , 'tis a Propolition to be demonftrated , and fo theie two Rules may be givai concerning Axioms. I. RULE. Wheriy to fee that an Attrihute agrees rrith a S'tl- jeS: 5 a6 to fee that it agrees rrith the rrljole to he big- ger then its part^ there needs lut a /light Attention to conjider the two Ideas of the Sub]e'i and the Attri- bute ; infomuch that it may be done^ rAthoat fercel- 'ving that the Idea of the Attribute is induded in the Idea of theSuhject^rre ha've then reafon tj take that fro- pjfitionfor an Axiom irhich recjuires no D.^monftration^ becaufe it contains in it feJf all the E'vidence ihat De- monftration could give it ; rvhich can do no more th:n fherv that the Attribute agrees rrith the Sul]e8: , by making ufe of a third Idea to Iherr the Connexion^ rrhich is already fen rrithout the affifiance of d third Idea. But wc muft not confound a bare Explication , though it carry y fome form of an Argument with a true Demonflration. For there b: Axioms that require Explanation 5 that they may be the better underftood, though they have no need of Demon- llrarion , explanation being nothing clfe but to fpcak in other terms, and more at large what is con- tained in the Axiom j whereas an Axiom requires N 4 fomc 2cp LOGIC^jOr, Partly, fome iiear way which js not clearly coutain'd in thq Axiom. 2. RULE, iVre/z the [ok confidenxtion of the Ideas of the Suh^ jeB and the Attmb'ite [uffices not to jherv clearly^ that the Attribute agrees mth the Suhjecl^ t':e Profojition that ajfirmuh is mt to be tak^nfor an Axiom 5 but it oight to be demonfirated by making ufe of certain other Ideas to fherv the Cmn^xion , a/s rve make ufe of the Idea of Parallel Lines to fherv that three Angles of a Tr/ay/g!e are eg ml to two Right Angles* Thefe two Rules are of greater momentj then they arc generally taken to be. For it is one of the nioft iifaal errors anpng Men, not to confult them- ielves fufficiently in wh^t they deny or affirm, but to give credit to what they have heard others fay, pr what they have formerly thought themfelves, never minding what they would think thpmfelvesj illQuld they take more time and ftudy to confider their ov;n thoughts 5 heeding more the found of words ; and affirming for clear and evident what is impoiiible for 'em to conceive ^ and denying as falfc, what it would be as impoffible for 'em to believe not to be true, would they hut take the pains of more fcj ioiis confideration. For example, they who fay that in a piece of Wood, bcf ides its parts and their lituation, their figure, their motion and their reft , and the pores that lie between the parts , there is yet a fubftantial iorm diftind from all thefe things, believe they fpeak nothing but Truth , yet all the while they fpeak what neither They, nor any other Perfon li^ ying do comprehend or ever will ' ' However Ghap. VII. The Art of Thinking, 201 However , if they would explain the effefts of Nature, by the infenfible parts of which Bodies are composMj and by their different fituation, bignefs, figure, motion or red, and by the Pores between the parts, that open or flop the paffage for other matters, they believe we talk nothing but Chime- ras^ though wc*ll tell 'cm nothing but what may be eafily conceived. And by a ftrange blindnefs of underftandi ng,the eaiinefs of conceiving thefe things, carries 'em to believe that they are not the real cau- fes of Natures efte£}s ; but that they arc more oc- cult and myfterious. So that they rather chufe to believe thofe that explain 'cm by Principles which diey conceive not, then thofe that make ufe of Prfn- ciples which they underfland. And what k yet more plcafanr, when we talk to *em of infenfible parts, they beJieve they have fuf- ficient ground to rejed 'cm^ becaufe they can nei- ther be felt nor feen : Whereas they can fwallow fub- rt-antial Forms,Ponderofity, Vertue Attractive, i)x. which they cannot only neither fee nor feel, but not lb much as conceive. CHAR VIL (ierutn Axioms of Moment that may ferve for Prin- ciples of great Truth. IT is a thing by all confcfs'd, that it is of great Moment^ to bear in our Memories and Minds feveral Axioms and Principles, which being clear ■'-:"•: 002 LOGIC:, Or, Partly. clear and unqucffionablc may lervc as a Foiinda- tion to lead us to the knowledge of things moil oc- cult. Though many that are moft* ufiially laid down 5 arc of fo little ufe , that it is needlefs to know 'em. For that which they call the hrft prin- ciple of Knowledge , it 16 imfofihle that the [ame thing fhould be^ and not he , is moil: clear and evi- dent. But I know no occafion wherein it may b^ ferviceable to teach us general knowledge. Bat thefe that follow may be of fome ufe. . I. AXIOM, . All that is included in the clear and diftind Uca of a Thing may be affirm'd with Truth. % AXIOM. The Exijience^ at leafly that which k pffible is in- cluded in the Idea of that which we conceive clearly i and diftinclly. Pol- after aThing is conceived clearly and diftinft- ly 5 we cannot deny it poffible Exiftence. In re- ,i gard that we deny tilings to be by reafon of the '1 contradidion between our Idejcs. -i. AXIOM. ' Nothing can he the catife of any thing. From this fprings other Axioms that may be call'd Corolla- riesj fuch as thefe that follow. 4. A X- Chap. Vn. The Art of Thinking. 205 4. AXIOM', or I. cmOLLARToiihQ 3. •No Thing, or no Pcrfedioii of a Tiling In Be- ing, can have no Thinf^^ or a Thing not being tor the caufe of its Hxiftence. 5. AXIOM; or 1. COROLLA. IT of the 3. , Ail Reality or Perfection of d Thi-^g i^ found for- millyand c^iinently^ in the fir ft And adequate ca^e. 6. AXIOM', or 3. COROLLAKT of the 3. Nj^ Bhiy cm moz'e itfelf^ that is give motion to It felf, not having any. This Principle is fo naturally eminent, that it \s that which has introduced fubftantial Forms, and the real qualities ot Ponderolity and Lighmefs. For the Philofophers on the one lide , finding it impof- lib c , that that which o.ight to be movVi (hould move it felf ^ and being erroneoully perfwaded oa the ( ther lide, that there was notliing vvithout,that puQi'd down the Stone when \i fell, thought it ne- celTary to diftinguifli two diingsin a Stone,the mat- ter that received the morion , and the fubftantial . furm alfilled by gt avity, that begat the motion : Not heeding tliat they tell thereby into that incon- venience which they fought to avoid , ii the form it fclf were material, that h real matter. Or if it were not matter , that then it was to be a fubftance really diftirid. Which it was impoffible for them clearly to conceive, at lealt to concci\T it as a Spi^ rit, or thinking Subftance j as is the Form of Man and not the Forms of other Bodies. 7-Al- 204 LOGIC', Or, Part IV J. AXIOM. ■ No Body can move another^ unlefs it be mwd it felf. For if a Body being at reft cannot give motion to It felf, it can never give motion to another. S. AXIOM. We muft deny that rvhich is clear and evident, because that which is objcure , cannot be afpehended. 9. AXIOM. '■ It is the nature of ^ final Spirit not to apprehend An Infinite. 10. AXIOM. ^ The Teflimony of aperfon infinitely Pomrfd, infi- nitely Wife^ infinitely Good^ andinfinitely True, ought to bemoreeffe'rlualto convince m then the mofl^revail- ing Demonftrations. For we ought to be more aflur'd, that He who is infinitely wife cannot be deceived ; and that he who isinfinitely good will not deceive us ; then we can beaffurM 5 that we are not deceived our felvesin thines mod evident. Tnefe three laft Axioms are the Foundations of Faithj of which more hereafter. 11. AXIOM. Thofe Anions of rphich theSenfe may eafily judge^ being Chap. Vm. The Art of Thinking. 205 heing attefted hy a Great Number of Perfom of fundry Cent'irys^ [unclry Nations and Tarious Interefls , nho ffeaks of "em^as feen ky themfehes^ and whom rre can- not fuffeci for confpring to uphold a Falfhood ought to fafs for as conftant and unqueftionahle , as if rpe had feen 'em mth our Eyes. This is the Foundation of the greatcft part of our Knowledg, there being infinitely a greater Number of things 5 which we know by this means, than of thofe which we know of ourfelves. CHAR VIII. Of Rules relating to Vef^ionftration- A True Demonftration requires two Things-The one that in the matter there be nothing , but what is certain and unqueftionable. The other that there be nothing faulty in the Form of the Argu- ment. Now we fhall obtain both the one and the o- ther 5 if we obferve the two Rules, which we have premisM. For there will be nothing^but what is certain in the Matter, if all the Proportions made ufe of for Proofs, be, Either Definitions of words already explained, which being arbitrary cannot bequcftion'd. Or Axioms conceded, and which ought not to be admitted,if they be not clear and evident of them- felves by the 3^.Rule. Or P'ropofitions already demonftrated^and which bv 2o6 LOGIC', Of, Part IV. by conlcqucnce arc bxomc clear and evidaii; by tnc Dcmonltratlon made Or the Conltructi'on of the thi' ^g it fclf^which is in Dirpiite, whai there is any Operation to be done, which ought to be as imqucfhonablc as the reft, iince the Poilibility ought to be firic demonfttatedjit there be any qucftion concerning it. Clear it is therefore, that obfcrving the firftRulc, nothiiig miift be brought to prove a Propofition^but whatiscercain and evident. Itis alfoeaiieto fheiv, that there can be no Error aga"nil: the Form of Ar- gujpncnt 5 by obferving thelccond Rule, which is not to make an ill life of the Equivocation of Terms , by failing to iub-ftiaite mcntaHy tiicDefinitions that refirain and explain 'em. For it ever we tranfgrcfsa^ainil' the Rules of Syl- logifms^it is in deceiving our Iclvcswich the Equivo- cation of fomcTcrm ; and taking it in one Saiie in one of the firft Propoiitions, and in another Scnfc iti/_ the othcr,which happens chiefly in the Middle Ternv: which being taken iii two various Senles in the tw(D? firfiPrC'poiitions, is the ufualtault of vicious Argu- ments. Now it is clear^chat Fault may be avoided^' if v/c obferve the fecond Rule, Not that thofe arc the only Vices of Syllogifnv," that arifeirom the Equivocation ot Tcrms-b jt thole, other are of fuch a nature, that it is almoft impoifi^ blc, that aPerfcn but of a mean andordin-^ry capa- city/ fhould ever fall into 'em, efpecially in ipcculav tive Matters. And therefore it would be a needlefs thing to admonifc 'em to beware of thofe Errors,oi to prefcribe Rules. Beiides that it would rather be hurtful, in regard the confideration of thefc fuper- fluoiis Rules, would but draw oli" our Studies from thofe that are more neceflarv. Therefore Chap. VIII. The Art of Thinking. 2C7 Therefore we find the Oeometricirns never trouble theiniclves about the Forms of theirArgLimentS5nor dream of conformity to the Rules of Logic , and yet they are never dccciv'd ^ in regard they are gui- ded by nature, with the Aififcance of much Study. There h another Obfervaticn to be made upon Proportions that require Demcnftrations. That is^ that they are not to be reckoned for fuch, which may be demonftrated for fuchby the Application of the Rule of Evidence to every evident Propofition.For if it were fo, there would hardly be any Axiom, which would not require Demcnflration ; when almoft all may be dcmcnflrated by that Axiom , which we have laid down as the Foundation of all Evidence. IV hat ever rre find to be contain^'din one clear and diflinci Idea, T/^ay k a^rm'dfor Truth. A s for Example, All that we finAinone clear and difti /2^ Idea, may he affirm'* d for Truth. iSlorv rre fee that the clear and dijlin'} ldai.^jvhich vpe haue of the rrhole^ includes it's being bigger than it'^sPart. Therefore rre may affirm for Truth thai the rvhole is linger then its Part. But though tnis be a very good Proof, \-ct is \t not abfolutelv ncceffary ,becaufe the Underftanding fupplies the Major, without any necedity of a par- ticular confideration, and clearly and evidently fee? that the whole is bigger then a part, without re- fleding from whence the Evidence arifes. For they are two different things to know a thing Evidentl}', and to know from whence arifes the Evidences. CHAP. 2o8 LOGIC:, Or, Part IV CHAP. IX. Of fom Errors ufually occming in the Method of the Gsometncians. "t 7'\7'Ehavefcen what is good in the method V V of the Geomeaicians , that it has re- duc'd us to five Rules, in the obfervation of which we cannot be too exact. And we muft con-- fe& it for a thing moft admirable, they having dif- coverM fo many occult things, and their having dc- monftratcd 'cm by fo many firm and invincible rca- fons, by the help of fo few Rules. So that among all the Philofophcrs, they have only the advantage. to have banifh*d out of their Schools and Writings, Ccnteft and Difpute. Neverthclefs to make a judgmait of things with- out prejudice, as we cannot deny 'em the honour to have follow'd a way much morealTur'd then others, to find out the truth, fo we cannot ^ denv but that they are fallen into fome errors , which ao not lead 'cm however from their end, but are the caufethat oft-times they do not attain their end by the moft di- reft and commodious way. Which I ihall endea- vour to make out. drawing from Euclid himfelf, the Examples of thele defaults. I. DEFAVLT To be more diligent^ md take more care of Cer- tainty then of Brndence^and of corwincing than an En^ lightening the VnJerftandi/ig, The Chap. IX. Th^ Art of Thinkjng. 209 The Geometricians are to be commended for aflerting nothing but what is certain and demonftra- ted. But thcv feem not to have heeded, that to have a perfea Knowledg of a Truth, it does not fuflSce to be convincM that ft is a Truth, unlefs we dive into the Rcafons taken from the Nature of the thing, why it \s true. For ^ill we are arrived at that point, our Underflanding is not fully fatished, and therefore fearchcs ftill after a farther Knowledg, then that which it has ; a fign it has not yet aaair»M a true knowledg. And this is the fource of all die reft which we ihall obferve. a. £RROR. Ti frove Things that have m need, of Proof. The Geometricians confefs that there is no need of proving thofe things tliat are clear of themfclves. Neverthelefs they do it frequently^ for diat being more fedulous to convince, then clear the Under- (landing, they think they fhall be more able to con- vince, by producing fome Proof of things them- fclves the mod evident, thai by propofing'cm bare- Iv, and leaving the Underflanding to find out the Evidence. This inclined Luclici to prove that two fides of a Triangle being taken together, are bigger than one onlv, though it be evident by the fole noc:on of a rignt Line 5 which is the ihortcft length that can be drawn between two points, and the natural mea- fure of the Interval between Point and Point ; which it could not be, if it were not the fborteft of all the Lines cliarcan be drawn from a Point to a Point. O This 2IO LOGIC'^Or, PartiV* This alfo induced him to makf a Problem of that which he ought to have made a Queftion, viz. To draw ciLine equal to a Line given ; tho* it be as eafy, and more cafy then to draw a Circle having one Ra- , dins given. This Error without doubt proceeded from his not confidering that all certainty and evidence^ of dur knowledg in namral things arifcs from this Princi- ple. That rpe may affirm of ^ a things whatever ii contained in its clear and dijtinci Idea. Whence it follows that it were needlefs to know, that an Attrl-^ kite is included in an Idea^ that upon the barecon- fideration of the Idea without the addition of any other, it ought to pafs for evident and clear, as we ^ have already faid. I know tKere are fome Idea^ that are more eafily known to be included in the Ideas^ then others. But I believe it fufficient , if they maybe clearly known with a flight confideration, fo that no perfon that has any thing of Ingenuity can ferioufly queftion it, that the Propofitions be look'd upon as drawn from a bare confideration of Ideas^ as from Princi- ples that have no need of Proof, but of Explanati- on and fome little Difcourfe. Thus I affirm that there is no Man who has never fo (lightly confide; M tiie Idea of a Right-Line ; but he will not only pre- fcntlv conceive that its Pofition depends only upon- two Points; (which Emlidiook, for one of his Qiie- ftions) but that he will alfockii'ly and eafilv appre- hend,; that if one Ric^ht- Line cut another, and that there be two points in the cutting Vmc^ each ccfi /^al- ly diftant from the points of the Line cut, there is uo other point of the Line cutting,^ which will not be . equally diftantfram the two poititsof the cut Line. From Chap, IX. The Art ofThwking. 211 From whence it will be eafy to know when any one Line will be PerT^dicular to another, without the help of Angle or Triangle ; which ought not to be handled till after the laying down of many things which cannot be dcmonftratcd, but by Perpendi- culars. We are alfo to obferve, that excellent Oeome- tricum have laid down for Principles^ Propofitions much more obfcure then this of ours. As when Archimedes builds his neatcft Dcmonih-ations upon this Maxim. If trro Lines in the [.,me Plane kiz'e two Extremities ; and if they he cr.^oked or holJorp to- rrard the fiW:e fart^ the contaiiid mil h-e leffar then that jvlich contains it. I ccnfifs this error of going about to prove that which required no Proof, fccms to be but a fmall fault, and indeed none in it felf^ yet we fhall find it to be a great one, if we confider the Coniequen- ces* For from hence arifesthat tran^crfmcnt of the order of Nature, of which hereafter ; tliis defire of proving that which is to be fuppos'd clear and evident of 'it felf, having often oblig'd Oermnrictans to treat of things on purpofe to furnifh themfelves with Proofs for thofe things which they ought not to prove, and which according to the order of Na- ture, ought not to have been treated of till after- wards. 3. DEFJT'ir. Ho fl?en> by Imloffihillity. Thefe forts of Demonftratiocs tnat fliew a thing to beflich, not by Principles, butby fome abfurdi-^ O 2 ' ty -^ 21 2 LOGIC'-, Or, ^art IV, ty that would follow, if itwereotherw^ areverv ordinary in £vr //.d Propofitions in Euclid. And yet it is evident that the manner by which he there' proves it is not fo natural ; fince the equallity of Squares does no way depend upon the equallity of Triangles, which are taken however as the means for this Demonftration ; but upon the Proportion of Lines, which may eafily be demon- flratcd without the help of any other Line, then the Perpendicular from die top of thf Right Angle tQ the Bafe. AW Euclid \s full of thefe forrcign Derponftr^cions. 03 5. D£- 2 14 LOGIC', Or, ' PartlV. 5. DEFAV^LT To take m care of the tme order of Nature. This is the greateft error of Qeometriciar.s. For theybe- Ikve there is no order to be obfcrvM , lb that the firft Propofitions nmy but lerve to dcmoiiftrate thofe that follow. Aiid therefore never heeding the Rules of true method, which is always to begin at the moft plain and general things , from thence to afcend to things more compos'd and particular^ they confound every thing, and treat pell mell of Linej; and Surfaces, Triangles and fquares ; prove by fi- gures the Proprieties and fimple Lines , and make . an infinite number of other topfie-turvies , that dift figu'-Q the n:ble Science. The Elements of Euclid arc ftuft with errors of this nature ^ after he has treated of jExtent in his four firft Books , he treats of the Proportions of all forts of bulks in his fifth. He refumes his -Ar- gument of extent in the fixth, and treats of num-^ bers in the fa^entfi, eighth and ninth, to refume a-' gaiin in his tenth his firit, difcourfe of extent. Which is a prcpofterous diforderin general; But there arc many others more particular. He be^jins his firft Book wiih the Conftrudion of an equilateral Trt- angle^and 22 Propofitions.after he has prcfcrib*d the general method of making aTriangle of three Right Lines given ; provided that two be bigger then the third ; which deletes the particular conftniftion of an equilateral Triangle, upon a Line given. He proves nothir.gas to perpendicular Lines, and Parallels but by Triangles ; and intermixes Dimen- fion of furfaces with that of LineSc He Ghap. IX. The Art of Thinking. 215 He proves, L. i. prop. 16, that the fide of a Tri- angle being extended in length, the exterior Angle is bigger then either of the Angles inwardlv oppo- fite 5 and fixteen Propofitions after that , that this exterior Angle is equal to two oppofire. It would require a Tranfcription oi Euclid to give all the Examples of thisdiforder that might be pro- duct, 6. DEFAVLT Not to make ufe of Dhifions and Partitions, It is another great error zmongGeometricians , not to make ufe of Divifions and Parcitioris* Not but that thev mark out all the Sfecies*soi thofe Qenm's of which they treat, but becaufc they do it fimply, by defining the Ternis, and putting all the Defini- tions afterwards, without obferving that a Genm has fo many Sfecies's , and that it can have no more; becaufc the general Idea of the Genm can recdve but fo many difiei*ences ; which would give us a great deal of fight to dive into the nature of Genu^ and Sfecies* For example^ we Ihall find in the firft book of Euclid^ the Definitions of all the SVecies's of a Tri- anglcBut who doubts not but that toe Thing would be much more clear, were thefe Sfecies's thus pro- pounded. A Triangle may be divided either according to Its fide, or Angles. O 4 The ^i6 LOGIC':, Or, Part IV' The Sides are, ^ All equals and are call'd Eguihterd^ Either^ Two only equals then call'd Ifofecles* CAll unequal, then call'd Scdtenim^ The Angles are, /^ All three Acute, and are call'd Oxmns. V u STwo only Acute, and then the third is ^^^^^SRight, thencallMR^ff^;^/^. CObtufe, then callM Amblygon. And it is better not to give this Divifionof Tri-» angles, till after the general explanation and de-- monftration of all the Proprieties of a Triangle ; whence wc fhould have learnt, that at leaft two or the Angles of a Triangle mun be Acute, becaufc? that all three together are but equal to two Right- Angles. This Error minds us of that of inverted order,' fince we ought not to treat oiSfecies^ nor to define •em, 'till after we underftand tne Gem^^ efpecially • when there are many things to be faid of the Ge- nm^ which may be explained without mentioning^ the Species. CHAP. ChapX The Art ofThmkjrig. 317 CHAP. X. An An[ni^r to irhat -the Geometricians alledge for themjelves. THere are fomc Geometrician who believe they have juftify'd thcmfelves as to thefe defaults 3 by faying that tney never troubled their heads a- bout 'em ; that it is fuflflcient for them to aver no- thing but what they prove convincingly, and that they are thereby aiiur*d that they have round out the Truth, which is all they aim at. Wc muft confefs indeed, that thefe defers are not fo confiderable, but that wc muft acknowledge, that of all human Sciences there are none better handl'd, then thofe that are comprehended under the general name of Mathematics. Only we affirm, that there may yet be fomething added to render 'em more perted , and that though the Principal thing which they ought to confider, be, co advance nothing but what is true , yet it were to be wifh'd that they would be more diligent in finding out the moft namral manner of imprinting the fame Tmtk in the underftanding. For let 'em fay if they pleafe, that they take no heed to obferve any genuine order, or to prove their propofitions, whether by ways natural or re- mote, fo they have their end of convincement^ yet can they not thereby alter the nature of our undcr- fta.nding, nor imprint a iporc clear j more entire and 2i8 LOGIC:, Or, PartlV- and more perfed knowledge of things which we know by their true caufes and their true Principles, by thoie other proofs of theirs, which are remote and Forreign. Befides that it is unqueftionably true, that thofe things are far more eafily learnt, and better retained in the memory^ which we learn by right order, in regard thofe Ideas ^ that are linkM one to another in a continued fcries, are without confufion commit- ted to the memory, and awaken each other when need requires more promptly and with greater fa- cility. We may alfo affirm this moreover, that what we aff rm by diving into the true reafon of things, is not retained fo much by the memory as by the Judgment 5 and it becomes fo much our own, tliat we cannot forga it. Whereas that which we only know by demonftrations , not grounded upon natural Reafons, foonerflip out of our minds, and is more difficultly recovered ; becaufe our un^ derftanding docs not furnifh us with the means to. recover what we have lofl. We muft then agree, that it is much better to obferve then not to obferve this order. So that all that the moft equal judges can fay in this particular, is that we muft negle6b a fmaller inconvenience , when it cannot be avoided , for fear of falling into a grcatei'. And thus it is indeed an inconvenience not to ob- ferve a right order ; but that it is better not to ob- ferve it, then to &il of proving invincibly what is propounded : and to expofe our felves to error and Paralogifm , by fearching after certain Proofs that may be more natural , but which are not fo con- vincing, nor fo exempt from all fufpicion of De- ceit. This Chap. XL TheArt of Thinking 219 This is a very fpccious anfwer : And I confels that affurancc of not being deccivM ^ is co be preferr'd before all things 5 and diat right order is to be neg- leded, where it cannot be followed without looiing the force of Demonllration and expoiing our fclves to miftake. But I cannot agree, that it is impolfi- ble to obfervc both the one and the other : And I believe that the Elements of Oeomdry might be fo composed, that all things might be handled in their natural order, all the propolitions prov'd by ways that are mod namral and iimple , and yet that all things fhould be clearly demonftrated. CHAP. XL The Methd of Sciences reduc'd to Eight Primpd Rules. IT may be concluded froni what has beai faid , that to have a more per fed method, then that in ufe among the Qt^ometricians ^ we ought to add two or three Rules to thole five already laid down in the fecond Chapter. So that all the Rules mav be reduc'd to eight. Of which the two firft relate to Idea6^ and may be referred to the firft pait of this Logic. The third and fourth relate to Axioms., and may be referr'd to the fecond part , and the fifth and fixth relate to Arguments, and may be referred t3 the tliird part. And the two la(l relate co order , and may be referr'd to the fourth part. Tm 220 LOGIC', Or, Part IV- TiPd Rules touching J)efinitions, I . To let go none of the Terms that are but a little obfciire or equivocal^ without defining 'em. 1, In Definitions not to make ufe of Terms that are not perfedly knownj or already explained. Tvpo 'Rules for Axioms . 3. To require in Axioms only thofe things that are perfeftly evident. 4. To receive for evident that which requires but a flight confideration to make it pa(s for truth. Two Rules for Vemonftratiom. .J. To prove all the Propofitions that arc but a little obfcui'e , by the aflSftance of preceding Defi- nitions, Axioms conceded ^ or Proper Propofitions already demonftrated. 6. Never to make an ill ufe of the Ambiguity of Terms, by failing to fubfHtute at leaft maitai- ly, thofe definitions that reftrain and explain 'em. Tjpo Rules for Method. 7. To handle ThingS5a5 much as may be^in their Natural Order, beginning from the mofl fimple and general, and explaining whatever appertains to the nature of the Genm^ before we proceed to par^ ticular Sfecies\ 8. To divide , as much as may be every Gemis into all its Sfecies , eveiy whole into its parts, and every ■1 Cha p.XIL The Art of Thinking. 22 1 ^vcry difficulty into all Cafes. I have added to ^hefe Rules, ^ much a6 m.iy he^ becaufc it is true, that we may meet with Ibme occafions, wherein they cannot be obferv'd to the utnioft fevcrity ; ei- ther becaufe of the narrow limits of human under- ftanding ; or by rcafon of thofe Bounds diat we arc conftram'd to affign to every Science. . Whence it happens , that a Siccus is fometime* to be explained before we can explain all that be- longs to the Oenm. Thus in common Geometry wc treat of a Circle , without faying any thing of a crcoked Line, which is the Gei7i^ of a Circle, which we think fufficient to define. Nor can we explain all that might be faid of a G^^/7f5, which would often prove too tedious. But it fuffices then to fpeak as much as we think expe- dient, before we pafs to the Sfecies. However I believe no Science can be pcrfeftly de- livet'd, without obferving thefe two lafl: Rules , as well as the reft ; which are not therefore to be dif- pcns'd withal, but upon abfolute neccffity , or for fome great advantage. CHAP. xir. Of vphat m k^oyv hy Faith , v^hether Humm or Di- y^Hat we have hitherto difcours'd relates to Sci- ences purely human, and Knowledge founded upon the evidence of Reafon. But before we con- clude. I 222 • LOGIC':, Or, Part IV* clnde, it will not be amifs to fpeak of another fort of Knowledge, which ofttimcs is no lefs ceruin, nor lels evident in its manner^ then that which we draw from Authority. For there are two general ways , by which wc know a Thing to be true • The firft is the know- ledge which wc have by our felveSjwhether we have attained it by Obfervation or Ratiocination, whe- ther by our Sences or by our Reafon -, which may be generally termM Keafon , in regard the Sences themfelvcs clepend upon the judgment of Reafo/i or 'Kmrrledge 3 the word being here more generally taken than in the Schools ; for all manner of know- lede^e of an objed drawn from the fame obje£b. The other way is the Authority of Perfons wor- thy of credit, whoaffureusthat a thing isfo. Tho ot our felves we know nothing of it. Which is caird Faith or Belief, according to the words of St. Aiiilin^ for what we know, we owe to reafon; for what we believe, to Authority. But as this Authority may be of two forts^ eitlicr from God or Men, fo there are two forts of Faidi, Divine and Human. Divine Faith cannot be Subje£t to error, becaufe that Gcxl can neither deceive us nor be decciv'd. Human Faith is of itsfelf fubjca to error, for all Men are Lyars according to Scripture : And be- caufe it may happen, diat he who Ihall affure us of the certaintv of a thing, may be deceived himfelf. Neverthelefs as we ha^t- already obferv'd; there are fome things which we know not, but by a Hu- man Faith, which neverthelefs we ought to belieVc for as certain and unqueftionable , as if they were Mathematically demonftrated. As that which is known Chap. XIL The Art of Thinking. 2 23 known by the confent relation of fo many Per- fons, that it is niorally impoflible thev fhould eva* have confpir'd to affirm the fame tnings, if they were not true. For example. Men have been na- turally moft averfe from conceiving any Amifodes^ neverthelcfs though we never were in thofe place*;, and know nothing of any Amfodes but by human Faith, he mufl: be a Fool that does not believe 'cm. And ne muft be out of his wits, who queftions whe- ther ever there were any fuch Pcrfons as Q-ejar ^Pom- fey ^Cicero or Virgil^or whether they were not feigned Names , as Am>xdi6 de Gaul True it is^that it is a diffic^ult thing to know when Human Faith has attain'd to this lame ailurance ; and this is that which leads Menaftrav into two fuch oppofite Deviations : So that fome believe too fli^ht- ly upon the lead report. Others ridiculoufly make ule of all die force of their wit, to annul tlie belief of things attefted by the greatefl: authority, when it thwarts the prejudice of their underftariding. And therefore certain Limits are to be adign'd, which Faith muft exceed to obtain this ailurance 5 and o- thers, beyond which there is nodiing but uncertain- ty, leaving in the middle a certain fpace, where we fliall meet with certainty or uncertainty, as we approach nearer to the one or the other of thefe Bounds. Now then if we do but compare the two gene- ral ways, by which we bcleive a thi g to be tiue, Reafon and Faith; certain it is , that Faith always fyppofes fome Reafon. For as St. A'/fti/i fays in his ill. Epif^le, and in lev ral other places, we could never h'-'n^ our felves to believe that which is above our reafon^ if reafon it felf had not pcrfwaded us, tliac 224 LOGICoOr, PartlVj that there are fome things which wc do well to bc> lieve, tho' we are not capable to apprehend 'era. Which is principally true in refpcd of Divine Faith. For true Reafon teaches us, that God being truth it felf, he cannot deceive us in what he reveals to us concerning his Nature and his Myfteries 5 whence It appears that though we are obliged to captivate our Underftanding in obedience to Faith, as faith St. Panl 5 yet we do it neither blindly nor unreafo- nably (which is the original of all faife Rcligion^J but witha knowledgot the Caufe, and for that it is but a rcafonable Aft to Captivate our felvesto the Authority of God, when he has given us fuffi- cient Proofs, fuch as are his Miracles and other Prodigious Accidents, which oblige us to believe that he himfelfhas difcoveredto Men the Tniths which we arc to believe. As certain it is in the fecond Place, tliat divine Faith ought to have a greater Power over our Underftanding then our own Reafon.And that upon this Didate or Reafon it felf, that the more certain is to be prefer'd before the lefs certain ; and that is more certain which God aflures us to be true, then that which Reafon perfwades us ; when it is more contrary to the Nature of God to deceive us, then the nature of Qur own Reafon to be deceiv'J. CHAP.XIII. Chap. XIIL The Art of Thinking. 2 a $ CHAP. XIIL Certain Kulesfor the guidameof Reafopjs the belief of hvents that dele :d ufon Human Faith. TH E moft cnftoiTiary ufc of found Judgment^ and that faculty of the Soul, by which vvcdif- cern Trudi from falJhood Is not cmplo> 'd in fpccu- latiVc Sciences, about which fo few Pcrfons arc o- bh'g*d to fpend their time, and }'et there is no occafi- on wherein it is more frequently to be made ufe of, and where its more neceflary thai in that Judgment which we ought to make of what paiTes every day among Men. I do not fpeak of judging whether an Aftion be good or bad, worthy ot applaufe or reproof, for that belongs to the regulation of Morallity ; but of judging of the Truth or Falfl.ood of human E- vents, which may only be refcrr*d to Logic, whe- ther we confider *em as part, as when we only en- deavour to know whether we ought to believe 'em or not ; or whether we confider 'em as beir.g to come, as when we fear or hope they will comegD pafs, which regulates our hopes and our fears. Certain it is, that fome Reflexions may be made upon thisSubjeft ; which perliaps may not b;^ alto- gether unprofitable, or rather may be of great ufe tor the avoiding of ceitain Errors into which moft People fall, becaufe they do not fufficiendy ftudy the Rules of Reafon. P Tb^ 226 LQOIC:, Or, l>artIV. The firft Reflexion is, that tliere is a vaft diffe- rence to be made between two forts of Truths ; the one that only relates to the nature of things^and their Immutable Effences abftraded from their exift- cnce, the other that relates to things exiftent that re- late to human and contingent events, which mayor may not come to pafs when we fpeaK of tbefiimrej ancl may probably never have been, when we talk of what is paft. I fpeak this with reference to their nextcaufes, making an abftradion of their Immu- table order in Divine Providaice ; becaufe on the one fide it does not hinder Contingence, and on the other fide being unknown to us,' it contributes no- thing to make us believe the things themfelves. Now as all things are requifitein truths of the firft fort, there is nothing Cure, which Is not Uni- verfallytrue, and fo we muft conclude that a thing is falfe if it be falfe inanv cafe* But if we think to makeufeof the fame Rules in human Events; we fhall always judg falfly, and I make a thoufand falfe Arguments. ;. :' -^^ ' For thefe Events being naturally cotitfngent, ft would be ridiculous to feek out in them for a necef- fary.Trmh. And fo that perfon would be altoge- ther void of Reafon, who would believe nothing of fuch things unlels it were made out to him, that it ^as abfolutely ncceflary they fliould befo. ^ Now would he lefs deviate from Reafon that W^puld require me to believe any particular Event, ( fuppofeitwerethe Converflon of the King of Ch'h m to the Chriftian Religion) upon this only ground, becaufe it is not Impoffible to be fo. For feeing that another who fhould afiure me to the contrary may make ufe of the fame Reafon s it is clear that that reafon Chap. XIII. The Art of Tlrinking, 227 reaion alone cannot determine me to believe the one rather then the other. We mull therefore lay it down h^r a certain and unqueftionable Maxim upon mis eccafion, that the Poilibillity alone of an Lvent is not a fufficlent rca- fon to make me believe it^ and rhat I may have rca- fon alfo to believe a thing, tho I judg it not irnpof- fible, but that the contrary may have come to pais; So that of the Two Events I may rationally believe the one and not theodier, tho I believe ^em bodl polfible. How then (hall we rcfolve to believe the one ra- ther than the other, if we judg 'em both poilible ? Obferve the following Rule. To judge of the Truth of an Event, and to pcr- fwade my felf into a Refolurion to believe, or not to believe a thing ; it mufi: not be co.if ider-d naked- ly 5 and in it felf, like a Propolition in Geometry 5 but all the circumftances that accompany it, as well internal as external, are to b? weigh'd with the fame confideration ; I call hiternal Circumftances fuch'as bdongto the Faft it felf ; and external , thofe that relate to the Perfons , whofe Teflimonies induce us believe it. 1 his being done, if all the Circum- ftances are fuch, that it never , or very rarely hap- pens 5 that the lame Circumftances are accompa- ny'd with Fahhood : Our Underftanding naturally carrys to believe the thing to be true ; and there is a rcafon for fo doing,efpecially in the Condud: of the A6i:ions of our Life, that never requires a greater affurance than a moral Certainty , and which k fa- tisfyMupon moft occaiions with a great Probability. But on the other lid e, if thefe Circumftances are inch as are frequently accompany^! with Fallhood ; P 1 Reafon ^28 LOGlCi Or, Part IV. - Rcalbn requires us to (ufpcndour Belief 5 or that we- ft: o ]ld look upon asfeltc what is told us 5 when we fee no likclvhood, that it ftiould be true^ tho wc do not find any abfolutc Impoilibility. For bxamplc^we demand , whethct the Hiftory; of the Bapcifm of Con\lantmehy Silvefter betrue^or falfe .^ Bitroni'ii believes it true ^ but Cardinal Per- ron , Bifhop Spondanus^ Petavius^ MorimSy and the mon eminent of the Rom.tn Church believe it iaifc. Now if Vv'C infill upon the iole Polfibility , we have no rcafon zovcjZ^X Bar omus. For his opinion contains nothing abfolutelyimpolfible; and to fpeakabfo- kuelvj'it is alfo poilible^that jEvjfi/'/ys , who affirms the contrary, a(T;rnvd an untruth in favour oi the Arriam-, and that the Fathers that followed him weredeccivM by hisTeftimony.But if we make ufe of the Rule already laid down, which is to confider what are the Circuinfianccs both of the one and the ether Baptifm of Conflantine^ and which are thofe that carry die greatcft marks of Truth^we fliall find 'cm to be the latter. For on the one lide^thcre is no great renfon to relvupon theTeftimonyof a Wri- ter as fabulous as the Author of the A6ts of Syl- "v.'ftiT who is the only perion of Antiquity, who has fpoken of Co/ijUmns being baptiz'd at Rome. And on the ether fide there is no liklihood that a Pcrf. n (o ScriOLis and Learned as Et^'eUus fhould v/!iich oupjit to have been fpread over all the World , at the (ame time that he wrote, which was hot above f )nr t r five Hundred years after the Death of the faid Fmpcror. • Never- Ghap.XIII. The Art of Thhikiftg. 229 Nevcrthelofs there [<> an Exception to tliis Rule, by which wc ought to be fati'sded with poliibillity or likelihood. That \s^ when an aclion, which is otherwiCe fufficientlyattefteJ, is contradicted by In- coiigruitieSj and apparent contrarieties with other Hiftorles. For then it fiifliccs that the Solutions brought to enervate thefe Repugnancies be poilible and proba- ble ; and it would be unreafcnable to require other pofitivc Proofs 5 for that the Ad it iclf being luiTi- cient y proved, it is not equitable to require that we fhould prove all the Circumftances in the lame manner. Other vviic we might call in qudtion a thoiiland mod: certain Hiftorics, which we cannot make agree with others of Icfs Authority, but bv Conje«3tiires which it is impoiiiblc to piove pofi- tively. For example, we cannot bring to an agreemC::t what k delivered in the Kings and Cl^romclcs concern- ing the years of the Reigns of fcveral of the Kino^s of ^ Jtida and I[rael^ but by alfigning to fome of the Kings, two beginnings ot their Reigns, the one du- ring the Life of the Reigning Prince , and the otiier after the dcceafe of their Paretus. Now if it be ask'd what Proof we have that fuch a Princp raign*d for fome time with his Father ; we murt confefs there \s none Politive. But it fuiTlces that it is a thing Poilible, and which has oitcn come to pafs at other times, to make it Lawful for us to iup- pole it, as a Cicumftance nccelTary to reconcile Hi- llories othcrwife certain. And therefore there is nothing more ridiculous then the endeavours of fome perfons of this latter Age, to prove that St. Peur never was at Kom^. P 3 They ago LOGIC, Or, PartlY. They cannot deny this Truth to be attcfted by all the Lcclcfiaftic VV riters, and thofe the mod- ancient, as Pafui6^ Dionifim of Co/intb^ Cairn , Iren^^m ^ tertnliixn ; againtl whom there is not any one that has made the the leaft Contradi61:ion. Neverthelcfs they imagine they can ruin this Truth by ConjGicturcs ^ for example^ bccauic St.' Pml makes no mention of St. Pete-^ in his Epifl-lcs written to Ilo»2^ ^ and when they are anfwcrM^ that St, J'eter might be then abfent from liome^ in re- gard he is not faid to have fixM his feat there, as being one that often travail-d abroad to Preach tiic Gofpel in other places 5 they reply that this is iirg'd without any Proof, which is Impertinent, bc- caufe the Aft which they oppofe, being one of the mod conf irm'd Truths in Ecclefiaftical Hiftory , it is iufficient tor thofe that uphold it to reconcile thcic pretended Contrarieties5as they do thofe of the Scrip-^ tare it felf^ for which, as wc have iliew'd Poffibilli- tv is (uilicient. CHAP, VIL An Ajfh cation of thepeceedingKue totkeBdief of I\Jiracl.'S'. THE KfAe which we have explained is without doubt of great Importance [or the well re- gulating our Reafon in the belief of particular A6i:s. For want of the due Obfervation of which we are in great danger of falling into the two dangerous pxtrcmiue3of Crcduliry and Incredulity. For Chap. XIV. The Art of Thinking. 231 For example, there are fome , who make a Con- fcience of queftionins any Miracle ; becaule they have a fancy , that they fhould be oblig'd to quefti- on alljftiOLild they qucftion any ; and for that they are perfwaded , that it is enough for them^by know- ing that all things are poiiible with God, to believe whatever is told 'em touching the EfFefts of hisC3m- nipocency. Others as ridiculoufly imagin, that it is in the I^ower ot the Underftanding to call all Miracles in quclHon s for no other reafon , becaufe fo many have be '^ ^'latedthat have prov'd tobefalfc , and thcreiort tucrc is no more reafon to believe the one tiian the other. The Inclination of the firflis much more tolera- ble than that of the latter; tho true it is^ that both the one and the other argue equally amife. They both depend upon common Places. The firft upon the Power and Goodnefs of God 5 upon certain and unqueftionablc Miracles , which they bring for proof of thofe that are called in queftion ; and upon the Blindnefs of Libertines ; who will be- lieve nothing , but what is proportionable to their Reafon. All this is very good in it's felf ; but very weak to convince us of a particular A^»irade. For God does not always ad according to his Power^nor is it an Argument , that a Miracle was wrought, becaufe others of the fame nature have been wrought. And we may do well to believe,what Is a- bovc our Reafon,without being oblig'd to believe all that Men are pleased to obtrude upon us, as being a- bove our Reafon. The latter rnake ufe of common Places of ano- ther fort, P 4 truth 232 LOGIC:, Or, Partly. T'ruth lays one of 'em^ a/id Faljhojd apfear mth Countemnces alike-^the [nmeG a teethe jaweStefs ire behold mth the {ame £) ei.I ha^ve [een the rife of feveral miracles in my I'm e. And tho* they vrnijhdin thebirth^et we cannot but forefee the "Train they jvodd have gather had they li'v'd to their full Age* For it is but to fin. I on the eni of the Thready and tj c. it it into as many J>c'i:t'S 06 rre fleafe^ and there is nn a greater diftance ieljveen nothng and the fmalkft thing in the Worl \ then there is between this and the great-^fl. Now the firfi that rpere intoxicated with this beg.nning of ,\ o- "vdty^ coming to ffread their Hiflory^ find by the op- fojition Tphich they meet mth^ where the difficulty of Perfwafion lodg ;, and make it their bufinefs to F.icm O'ver t 'm part of a falfe •' 'eice.Partic 'dar Error fir jl ca i- fes p'dblLiMiftake^and after jp.-rds pMicl^mifiake ca^- fes particular Error. T'hus the whole Strufiure of tl e miracle by fometulPd down .^ by others upheld^ and hv additim enhrg d at length gro^s up to a confideraUe Pile. So that the moft remote Pfitnefs is better inftru- Bed then he that lives clofe by^ and the lafl that heard of it., bettt'.r confirmed then the firfi Puhlifber. This Difco -irieis ingenious, and may be profita- ble to prevent iis from being led awav with every Idle Report. But k would be. an fixtravaeance from hence to conclude generally that we ought to fiafpecb whatever is faid of" Miracles. For certain it is, that what Is here allcdgM rebates onJy to thofe things which are taken up upon common Fame, without enquiring into the original caufe of the Report. And we have no reafon to be confident of whjt we know upon no better grounds. But Chap.XIV. The Art of Thinking. 233 But who fo blind as not to fee that we may make a common place oppofite to this, and that at lead: upon as good a Foundation ? For as there are lome miracles that would de- fervc but 1 tele credit, ilould we enquire into their Original, lb there are others that vanilh out of the memories of Men, or which find but little credit fu their judgments, becauic they will not take the pains to inform themfelvcs. Our undcrOanding is not fubjed only to one foi t of diftcmper, but feveral, and thofe quite contrary. There is a fottiih ftupi- dity , that believes all things the lead probable. But there is a conceited prefumption that condemns for falfe, whatever furpafes die narrow limits of the underftandine. Sometimes we hunt after trifles, and negled tilings of grcateft moment. Falle fto- ries fpread themlelves every where, while true ones caH hardly get liberty to creep abroad. Few Perfons have heard of the mii'acle that hap- pened in our time, at Faramo'/jjiitr , in the Perlon of a Nun, fo blind, that hardly the Balls of her Eyes were left in her Head, who rccov#-*d her fight by touching the Reliques of St. Favii^ as I am af- fur'd by the Teflimony of a Perfon that faw her in both conditions. St. Aujlin ciffirms, that many real miracles were wrought in his time , that were krown but to few; and which, tliough mod: remarkable and wonder- ful , fpread no farther then from one end of the Town to the other. Which induc'd him to write, and refate, m hisSermons% to the People, fuch as WTte mofl certain. And he obfervcs in his Trvemy feconi Booh^of the Chy of Ood^ that in the Angle Ci- ty of Hiffo^ near Seventy Miracles were wrought within 224 LOGIC ; Or, Part IV. within two years after the Building of a Chappel in Honour of St. Stephea ^ befides a great number of others which he did not commit to writing, which however he tcdifies to be true upon his know- ledge. VVe therefore fee that there is notliingmoreirra' tional, then to guide our felves by common places^ upon thcfe occaiions -, whether it be in rejefting all Miracles, or embracing all. And thereforcTwemuft examin 'em by their particular Circumflances^ and by the credit and knowledg of the Reporters. Piety does not not oblige a Man of Sence to believe all the Miracles in the Golden Legend or the Metafhraji : In regard thofe Books arc fo full of Fables 3 that there is nothing to be credi- ted upon their Authority : As Cardinal BelUrmin has made no fcruple to confefs of the laft. But I affirm , that every Man of Sence , bating his Piety, ought to acknowledge for true the Mira- cles which St Aupn recites in his Confeffions and his Book de Chitate Dei 5 fome of which he faw ^ and others oL which he was informed by the Per- fons themfclves, in whofe fight they were wrought. As of the Blind Man cur'd at Milan before all the People 5 by touching the Relics of St. Gervace and Prouliu6^ which he reports in his Confeflion , and of which he fpeaks in the 22^. Book de Ci'vi- tate Vei^ cap. 8. A certain Miracle n>a6 wrought At Milan, rvhen we were there ^ when a Blind Man was reftofd to hireight in Perfwafion, then long Poffeffion. So that akho* the Epiflle of St. Clement to St. James Biiho^oijerufaiem be tranflatcd by K'tffinui^ near upon thirteen hundred Years ago, and tliat it is cited and own'd for St. Clement by a Council of France^ above twelve Hundred years ago, yet we can hardly believe it otherwife then Counterfeit. In regard that St. James being Martyr'd before St. Pet r , it is impoilible that St. Clement fliould write after^ the Death of St. Peter ^ as the Epiftle fuppofes. Thus tho the Commentaries upon St. Paul2X\ attributed to St. Amiroj'e^ and cited under hisNai by a great number of Authors, together with th imperfei Chap. XV. The Art of Thmkjng. 24 1 impcrfcd Vv^orkuponSt. Mathtrr^ under the name of Chryfoftome. AH ^Vlen however at this day agree that they belong to neither, but to other antient Au- thors full of many Errors. Laftly^ the Ads of the two Sin'tejfan Councils xmAcr Marcellin^ and two or three at Kopie^ under Sihefter^ and another at Rome under Sixt'fs III. might be fufficient to perfwade us of the verity of thofe Councils, if they contained nothing but what were congruous to rcafon, and whicli micht be pro- per for the times, wherein they arc faid to be Ce- lebrated ; but they contain [o many abfurditics , fo difagreeable from thofe times , that there is great likeUhood of their being falfc and counterfeit. And thefc are the Remarks which may fcrve for thefe forts of judgments. But wc muft nor ima- gin'em to be of fuch great ufe, as always to free us from the danger of" being deceivd. All that they can do at molt, is to guard us from the more grofs and apparent Abfurdities, and to enure us not to be carry'd aftray by common Places, which contain- ing fomething of general Truth, ceafe not however to be falfe upon many particular occafions , which is one of the chiefeft Sources of huxuan Error. Q. CHAP. 242 LOGIC'^Or, Part IV CHAP. XVI. Of the JudgmenH we ought to make of Future Accidents. THcfe Rules that ferve us to judge of Tilings paft, may be apply M to things to come. For as we probably judge a Thing to have come to pafs^ when the certain Circumftances which we know to be rfually joyn'd to the Faft; we may as probably b;lieve that fixh a thing will happen, when the prefent Circumftances are fuch as are u- lually attended by (iich an Effeft. Thus the Phy- fitians judge of the good or bad fuccefs of Difeafes; Captain of the future Events of War ; and that we judge in the world of the moft part of contin- gent Affairs. But as to thefe Accidents of which we arc fomc part our felves, and which we may either promote or prevent by our care and forefight , in avoiding or expofing our felves to harm or danger 5 k hap= pens that moft pa:ionsi fall into many errors , fo much the more greivous, by how much they fcem to be guarded by rcafon ; bccaufe they only fet before their Eyes, the Grandeur and confequence of the advantage, which they wiih for , or the mif- chiefs that they fear, not confideiing the likelihood and probability that this advantage or inconve- nic xe mav hnppen or not happen. In like m.anner, when it is a,ny great misfortune wtiich they fear , as lofs of Life or Eftatc , thcv think Chap.XVI. The Art of Thinking. 245 think it prudence not to take aiiV car'^ lu pre, cnc it. Or if it be anv great advai^tage vvhich rhty expcftjas the gain of a Hundred ThiOniandCu^^w;?, they think they ad wifely to cndcav.ur the g.iin- ing of it^ if the Vaitcr cofi: but iitde, kt the pro- babih'ty of fucccfs be never fo iii-all. BylLicha Ratiocination as tius it vvas^ that a Princeis hearing diat fonie Perfons had been ovcr- whclmM by the fall of a Roof, would never go in- to a Houfe, 'till fhc had all the Roofs firft viewed ; and (he was fo fully perfwaded, that c e had a rca- fon for io doing, that flic accounted all other im- prudent, that did not as (lie did. Tisalfo this appearance of Rcafon, that engages feveral Perfons into inconveniciu and cxccliive cauti- ons for the prefervation of their Hcalth.This is that which renders others diftrufiful even in little Things; for that having been fometimes deceived ,thfy believe they fhall be deceived in all their other Bufincis. This is that which enveagles fo many People to Lotteries , to gain, cry they , Twenty Thoulan.d •Crowns for one Crown, is not that a verv great ad- vantage > And every one believes himfclf fliall be that happy Perfon, upon whom this great Fortune (hall (howr it felf : Never coniidering, that though the Lets promife Twenty Thoufand for One , 'm Thirty times more probable to every particular perfon, that he fhall be a looler then a winner. : And this is the Defe^l of this Ratiocination ; for -that we may judge what is fir to be done, to ob- .tain the good and avoid theevil^ we ou^ht not only to confider the good and die evil in its fclf ; but al- "fo the probability whether it may liappen or no •, and Geometrically to confider the Propqrtion which : ' Q. 1 the 244 LOG I Co Or, Part IV. tiic things hold together ; which may be demonftra-. ted by this Example. Ten Men at play , ftakc every one a Crown ^ there is but one can win the whole Stake,^ all the reft are loofers. So that every one has thcie two chan* CCS, cither to loofe One Crown or win Nine. Now if v/elhould cnfideronly the gain and lofs in them- lelvcs^ k might ieem that all had an equal advan- tage : But we arc to conlidcr moreover, that if c- \Try one may win Nm^ Crowns 5 and can only loofc one^ it is alib nine times more probable in rcipect of every one, that he (hall loole his One, then win the Nine ; while every Man has nine De- grees of Probability to loofc one Crown, and but one degree of Probability to gain Nine ; which equals the hopes and fears of Gain and Lofs. All Plays of this Nature, a^c as equitable as Plays can be, but all that are not under this Equal- lity'of Lots are unjuft. And hence it is that it may be plainly made out, that there is an evident Inju- (lice in ail forts of Lotteries ; for the Maflcr of the Lottery ufually claiming the tenth part of the whole Fund for his own (hare , the whole crowd of thofe that play is cheated in tfie fame manner as if a Man playing at a Game,wherein there were as much likelihood of winning as loofing ihould Play nine Pillols to pr.c. Now if this be diCidvantageous to the whole Crowd, it muft be alfo the fame to eve- "^ ry particular perfon, bccaufe the Probability of loofing, fir morcliirpailcs the Probability of gain- ing, then the advantage we hope for, the difadvan- ta'?c of F.oodnci^. . Sometimes there is fo little likelihood in the fuc- ccis (J a thins, thnt how advantageous fo ever ic be, Chap.XVI. The A^ af Thwl^wg. . 245 be, and how fmall Ibcver the hazard of wirjiiing^ it is better not to hazard. Thus it would be a foo- liih tiling to pkiy twenty Soh againfttcn Milh'ons of Li^res^ or againli a Kingdom, upon condition he fhould not win, unlefs fuch an Infeint takirg out the Letters out of a Printers Cafe by accident , did all of a fuddain Compofethe firfl: twenty Verics of Vtrgih JEntiadi, For indeed there are few Mo- ments icape US3 wherein we do not run the Rilco of looling more, than a King tliat thould ft ike his Kingdom to fuch a Condition. 1 hefc Reflexions feem of little value, and are fo indeed if we flop hcre^ but we may make wio. of 'cm in matters of greater Importance ; and the chiefeft ufe we can make of 'em is to render us more rational in our hopes and fears. For Example, there arc (ome Perfons that are \w a Pannic dread when thev hear it Thunder ; which clatter and hurly-burly in the Sky, if it put *em in mind of God and Death, 'tis well ; but if only the fear of being Thunder-flaick caufcs this extraordinary ap- prehenfion, then it will eafily appear how little Rea- fon they have. For of two Mil lions of Perfons 'tis very much if one be kill'din that manner : and wc may alfo averr, that there is no fort of violent Death happens fo rarely. Since then the fear of mifchief ought to be Proportionable to the great- ncfs of the danger, and the Probabilitv of the E- vent, as there is no foit of dang:r that fo rarely be- falls us as to be kill'd with Thunder, fo have we the leaft reafon to fear it : lince that fear will no way avail us to avoid it. Hence Arguments may be produced not only to undeceive fuch People as'are fo over morofcly and 0^3 u»^ 246 LOGIC', Or, FartlV. iirfeafonably cautious in the Prcfei'vation of their Hcalrh and Livc^, by {hewing ^em that thofe Pre- cautions are much more mifcneivous then the dan- ger fo remote irom the accident which they fear ; but alio to difabufe another fort that always argue thus h other affnirsj there is liinger iuthis-Bufinefi,- thereto' e it is evil. There is Profit in this, there- fore it is good : In regard We are not to < judg of thofe things, either by the danger or the advantage, but by their proportion one with another. It is the Nature of things Finite to be exceeded, how bulky foever they be by the leaft of things, if rriultiplie^ often enough ; or if the little things are far more Super iour to the great ones in probability of Event, then they are inferiour to 'em in big- nefs. For an Atome may exceed a Mountain if it be fu^cicntly multiplieS, or if this great Good we wif]] for Is fo difFcult to be obtained, that it furpaf- fcs the little one more in Magnitude, then the little one furpaffcs the greater in facility oi being obtain'd. The fame is to be faid of thofe mifchi^fs which we fear ; that is^ that the leaft Evil may be more con- fiderablc then the grc ateft Evil^ which is not Infinite, if k furpafs it according to this Proportion. Tiiei-e are nothing but Mnice things that can be equalrd by any temporal advantage, and therefore f hey arc neva* to be pat in the Ballance with any of the things of. this Word. And therefore the leaf r ^iegree of Facility for a Man to fave himfelf is wr>rrhall the felicities of f his World joi:fd together. A :(i the leaf!" danger of loofingit is m^re confide- rablc then all temporal mifchcifs, if only look'd upon as Misfortunes. And Chap- XVI. TU Art ofThmkjng. 247 And this may be fufficient, for all rational perfons to draw from what has been faid, this Conclullon, with which we will end our Logic. That the grca- tejl^ of al! Impudence^ and hjghejl of all Madne^es i6 this ftoff end our Lives and otr Time in any thing tiff then in ivhat may be ferviceahle to acquire us a Life that never Jhall have any end. Since the Good and Evil of this Life isnothbg, if compart to the fcli- cirics and fufferings of the other^ and the danger of falling into the one is as great as the difficulty of acquiring the other. They who draw this Conclufion"', and follow it in the conduct of their Lives^are Prudent and Wife, let 'em be never fo unlearned in Arguments con- cerning the Sciences. \Vhereas they who neglcft It 5 tho never fo Learned in other things, arccall'd in Scripture Fools, Madmen, and make but an ill ufe of Logic, Reaibn, or their Lives. THE END, THE TABLE. THE firft Vifcourfe. Shewing the defign of this new Lo^ic. ^ Fol. i. Jh^ Second Dijcourfe^ Containing an Anfwer to the Prindpal Obje6tions made againft this Logic. 2. PART I. Containing Reflexions upon T4ea^^ or upon the firft Operations of fhe jnindj which is call'd the Ap-"* prchenfion 44. Chap, h Of /^f^j^^acGOi ding to their Nature and Original 45. ,C. % Of theObjeasof /^^^^ 58. c. 3. Of Aiflotles Tea Predicaments 6^* C. 4. Of the Compofition and Simplicity of Zr/^^53where- in is difcours'd the manner of Jcnqwing by Ab- itraiSioa " 60, c. y. Of the Univerfalityj Particularity and Singularity pf Jdw ' ' ' ' ' 74. m The rABLE. C6. Of the Five Univerfal Ideas^ Oemis^ Species^ Vif- ference^ Proper and Accident 73- cr Of the Compkx*d terms^ their Univerfality and Singularity 87. C 8. Of the Clcamefs and Diftinftion of Idea^ ^ as alfa of their oblcurity and confufion 97. C.9. Some Examples of confiis^d Idcai , drawn from £- thics ^ 108. Of another caufe of Confufion in our thoughts and difcourfes 1 21. C. II. Of the Remedy of conhifions in our Thoughts and Ratiocinations , arifing from the confufion of words. Of the benefit ot defining words ; and of the difference between the Definition of Things and Names I2d C n. Certain Obfervations of great Importance^ touch- ing the definition of words 1 34. C. 13- Of another fort of Definition of Names, by which their fignifications are denaed according to com- mon ufe 140. PART II. Chaf. I. What % Propofition is > Of the fouit forts of Pro- pofitions l6^, Of The rABLE. C 2. Of the Oppofition of Propofitions, having the fame Subjca "and Predicate l6S. a 3. Of Propofitions Simple and Compound. That there are fome which feem to be fimple but are not; and which m^y be called Complex Propofitions , both as to the Subjcft and Attribute 171. C. 4. Of the Nature of Incident Propofitions, that make - part of Propofitions complex'd 177' C. 5- V le falfliood that occurs in Complex Terms , ^nd Incident Propofitions i83' a 6. Of Complex Propofitions 3 according to Affirmati- on ana Negation. Of one fort dF Propofitions which the Philofophers call Modal 190. Of feveral forts of Composed Propofitions 194. : C. 8. Of Propofitions composed in knee 204. C. 9. Obfervations to find out the Predicates and Snbjefts in Propofitions, cxprefsM after a lefs ufual man- . ner 215. C. 10. Other Obfei-vatioHs to know whether Propofitions are Univerfal or Particular 219. Of The TABLE, C. II. Of two forts of Propofitions neceflary for the Learn- ing of the Sciences^ Definition and Diviiiai 219. C 12. Of the Definition of a Thing 235. C. 13. Of the Converfion of Propofitions , with a tho* rough Inquifition into the Nature of Aflfirmatiotj and Negation, upon which the Converfion de- pends. And firft of the Nature of Affirmation 240- C. 14. ;•: T Of the Converfion of Affirmative Propofitions 247. C. 15. Of the Nature of Negative Propofitions 249. C. 1(5. Of the Converfion of Negative Puopofitioi:s 249, PART ni. Of Difcourfe or Ratiocination T. C. I. Of the Nature of Ratipcination 5 and the fcvcral parts of it 2. The Divifion of Syllmfm into Simple and Conjun- ctive 5 and of iimplc' in:o lacomplex and Com- plex ^ c. 3. General Rules for fimpk Syllogifms incomplex=d 8- The TABLE. C. 4. Of the Figures and Modes of Syllogifms in general. That there can be no more then tive Figures 1 7. C. 5. ThcRuIeSj Modes and Foundations of the firfl Fi- gure 21. C. 6, The Rules, Modes and Principles of the fecond Fi- gure 26. C.7' The Rules Modes and. Grounds of the third Figure a 8. Of the Modes of the Fourth Figure 33. C. 9. Of Complex Syllogifms^ and how they may be re- folv'd into Common Syllogifms , ^nd how judg'd by the fame Rules 37. C 10. A General Principle, by the help of which, with- out any other Redudion into Figures and Modes, the Truth or Falfliood of all Syllogifms may be known. 44 a II. The Application of this General Principle to feve- ral Syllogifms that feem to be intricate. 50. C. 12. Of GDnjunfti vc Syllogifms 5 J. a 13. Oi Syllogifms ^v!ho[c ConclufionsareDifjuri(ShVc 61. Of The TABLE. C. 14. Of Enthj'memes and i^nthymemAtic Sentences 67. C 15. Of Syllogifm compos'd of more then three Propo- fitions 60. C. 16. Of Dilemmas 75. C. 17. Of the Places or Method to find out Arguments j and how this Method is of Ifttlc ufc 77. C. 18 The Divifion of Places into Places of Gra^fmar^ Logic^ and Metafhyfics 82, C. 19. Of the feveral forts ot vicious Arguments, caHM Sophijms go. C 10. Of bad reafoning in civil Converfation and common Dilcourfe I kJ. PART IV. 0)ncerning Method 1 58* Chaf. I. Of Know'lcdg . that there is fuch a thing, that the Knowledg of things by the mind is more ceitain then what we know^ by our Senfes, that there arc fome thing^of which Mans underftanding is un- capablc. The advantage .of tliis neceilary igno- rance. ,r,^p; •:'- ' Ijp. Of The TABLE C. 1. j Of the two forts of Method , Amlyfis and Synthe- fis. An Example of Amlyfis. 171. c. 3. . Of th^ Method of Compofition , and particularly that which is obferv'd by the Oeo?nemctms. 18 1. C. 4. A morepanicnlar Explication of the foregoingRuIes, and £rfl: of thofe that relate to Definitions . 184 c. 5. That the Geometrkiam (ccm not to have rightly underftood the difference between the Definition of words and things 190. C. 6. Of the Rules in Reference to Axioms 194. C. 7. Ccrt2iin Axiom of Moment that may ferve for Prin- ciples of great Truth 201,, C. & Of Rules relating to Demonftration 205. C. 9. Of fome Errors ufualiy occuring in the Method of the Geometriciaxs /i.'i; 208. C; fh. An Anfwer to what the Ckomctncians aHcdge fo; themfelves 21 C. fi. The Method of Sciences reduc'd to eight Principal Rules 110. i The TABLE. C 17. Of what we know by Faitli, whether Human or Di- '* vine.^ 221. C. 13. Certain Rules for the guidance of Rcafon, the belief of Events that depend upon Himian Faith 225 C 14. An Application of the prcceeeding Rule to the Be- lief of Miracles 230. C. 15. Other Remarks upon the fame Subjea, of the Be- lief of Events 2^7. C 16. ^^ Of the Judgments wc ought ro make of Future AccidenEs 242. FINIS. m'^^ - Oji