( >jrnnb ijague Jlrare (Enrtfrrrnre (13117) mtb jEprmttmrnbfii by lit? Jnstitutf of Jnltntatianal Earn (1312) The Second Hague Peace Conference, which met on June 15 and adjourned on October 18, 1907, approved, among other projects, an ex- ceedingly important convention for the estab- lishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice and recommended that the Court be instituted and put in operation as soon as an agreement could be reached by the Powers, through diplomatic channels, upon the appointment of the judges. The significance of this action lay in the fact that for the first time in the world’s history the representatives of forty-four civilized na- tions, assembled in conference, recognized not merely the value of a judicial decision of international disputes which diplomacy may 3 have failed to adjust, but the inestimable ad- vantages that would inevitably flow from a determination of international controversies by a body of trained lawyers, appointed for a period of years and permanently in session, and acting under a sense of judicial responsi- bility. By this action the solidarity of na- tions, to use a phrase which has recently come into use, was transferred from the realm of theory to the domain of fact, and justice be- tween nations was declared to be of interest not merely to the nations in controversy, but to all members of the society of nations recog- nizing and applying in their intercourse the principles of international law. A truly per- manent court was to supersede the accidental or temporary mixed commission ; that is to say, a definite number of judges, selected by the nations as a whole and in advance of the controversy, was to take the place of the per- manent list of judges (devised by the Confer- ence of 1899), from which list, after much de- lay and difficulty, a temporary tribunal could be formed for the trial of an isolated case. The impartial and passionless decision of in- ternational controversies in accordance with 4 principles of law was to supersede the adjust- ment of such controversies “on the basis of respect for law.” In a word, a Court was to be created in the sense of municipal law, and to this Court, international in fact as well as in theory because called into being by the na- tions as a whole, international disputes of a legal or judicial nature could be referred with the same certainty and confidence that the dis- putes of individuals are submitted to munici- pal tribunals. The time at the disposal of the Conference was limited — it sat but four months — and many other subjects of interest to the nations were to be discussed and conventions framed to give them form and effect. The difficulties in the way of appointing the judges were great and required more time and thought than the delegates could spare in the storm and stress of the Conference, and the views of the larger and the smaller states were unfortunately op- posed and incapable of compromise in an at- mosphere charged with distrust and suspicion. It would have been an easy matter to compose a Court of forty-four judges, by assigning a judge to each state represented at the Confer- 5 ence. To reduce the number from forty-four to fifteen involved renunciation and com- promise ; it was not merely a problem of mathematics. But difficult as is the problem, it is not impossible of solution, if after re- flexion and with much good-will we approach it from a different point of view. For it is not necessary that each nation be individually rep- resented as such by a judge of its choice, but that the tribunal be a Court of the nations in the sense that it is created by the society of nations for the benefit of all, rather than for the profit of the few or of the many, and that the judges be delegates of the international community rather than representatives of any of its members. We do not in material mat- ters question the statement that the whole is greater than any of its parts. If we apply this simple axiom to international relations, we must admit that the society of nations is greater than any of its parts. If, then, in ac- cordance with this elementary principle, we consider the common good as superior to the claims of any nation or group of nations, we may assuredly blaze a trail through difficulties 6 which, like a dense and trackless forest, shut us from the light. The Second Hague Conference wisely trusted the future, for, while recognizing its inability to constitute the Court, it approved the con- vention of thirty-five articles providing for its organization, its jurisdiction, and its procedure, and recommended “to the signatory Powers the adoption of the project of a convention for the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice and putting it into effect, as soon as an accord be reached upon the choice of the judges and the constitution of the Court.” It is well known that the United States is seriously en- deavoring to establish the Court through dip- lomatic channels, proposing to invest the Prize Court with the functions and jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitral Justice, and that this recommendation was favorably received by the Naval Conference sitting in London in 1909. But it is gratifying to friends of the judicial settlement of international disputes that pri- vate bodies have also taken up the matter. Thus, the American Society for Judicial Set- tlement of International Disputes, organized in 1910 for the express purpose of creating 7 sentiment in favor of a permanent court, held an international conference in Washington in December, 1910, and the report of its proceed- ings deserves, to quote the Revue de Droit Inter- national et de Legislation Comparee, “to be read from beginning to end.” The Institute of International Law, com- posed of publicists from as many states as were represented at the First Hague Confer- ence, recently directed its attention to the es- tablishment of the Court of Arbitral Justice, and has both in committee and in full session declared itself squarely in favor of its institu- tion. Thus, a special committee of nine mem- bers of the Institute, namely, Messrs, von Bar, Fauchille, Fromageot, Holland, Hagerup, Re- nault, Ed. Rolin, J. B. Scott, and Westlake, who were appointed to consider subjects likely to be discussed by the Third Peace Conference, met in Paris on October 6-7, 1911, and unani- mously recommended the establishment of the Court, as appears from the following extract from the official report of its proceedings: Several members called attention to the fact that the solution of this question at the meeting of the 8 Second Hague Peace Conference encountered a po- litical rather than a juridical obstacle, arising from the difficulty of agreeing upon the choice of judges and upon the constitution of the Court. These members observed that, while the Institute cannot resolve a difficulty of this nature, it nevertheless ap- peared that the Institute should show the interest which it takes in the institution, and in consequence the question could not be passed over in silence. It is in this sense that the following resolution was unanimously voted: “The Commission considers it highly desirable that satisfaction be given to the first voeu adopted by the Second Peace Conference in favor of the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice.” The report of the Committee of Nine, was laid before the Institute at the Christiania ses- sion of 1912, and on August 28, 1912, the In- stitute recorded itself, after prolonged and thorough discussion, unequivocally in favor of the establishment of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, as appears from the official minutes of its proceedings. The following resolution, giving effect to the recommenda- tion of the Committee, was proposed by Dr. Lammasch and unanimously adopted: 9 While recognizing the great value of the Court of Arbitration, instituted by the Peace Conference in 1899, to international justice and the maintenance of peace, The Institute of International Law: — In order to facilitate and to hasten recourse to arbitration; to assure the settlement of differences of a legal nature by arbiters representing the dif- ferent systems of legislation and of jurisprudence; In order to reinforce the authority of the tribunals in the eyes of the representatives of the parties in controversy by having the members of the tribunal known to them in advance, and likewise to increase the moral force of the decision by having it rendered by a larger number and by the authority of arbiters recognized by the totality of the States; In order to resolve, in case of a treaty of com- pulsory arbitration containing a clause to this effect, the doubts which might arise as to whether or not a particular controversy belongs to the category of questions subject to compulsory arbitration under the treaty; In order to create a Court of Appeals for decisions rendered by tribunals constituted otherwise than in conformity with the rules of the Hague Convention, in case the special compromis should provide for the possibility of such a revision; Considers it highly desirable that satisfaction be given to the first voeu adopted by the Second Peace 10 Conference in favor of the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice. When it is borne in mind that publicists rep- resenting fourteen members of the society of nations were present, the action of the Insti- tute can be considered as little less than an event of international importance. In an address on the next Hague Peace Con- ference, delivered before the London School of Economics on October 5, 1912, Lord Justice Kennedy said, as reported by the London Times : “Ancther objective was the establishment of a Court which should be a real judicial tribunal; which by its character should command the respect and by the moral weight of its judgments compel the obedi- ence even of the most powerful and warlike nations. He did not mean a temporary Board of Arbitration, but a permanent Court of Justice. That was the most hopeful, if not the only way in which there would be gradually evolved in the civilized world a recognized system of international law. He could see no insuperable difficulty to the formation or working of such a Court. The position of its Judges would be one of the highest in the world. If all the conferring Powers would subscribe 11 amongst themselves, he supposed the cost would not amount to that of a single modern battleship.” If we accept the measured statement of Sec- retary Root in his instructions to the American delegates to the Second Hague Peace Confer- ence, that “among the most valuable services rendered to civilization by the Second Hague Conference will be found the progress made in matters upon which the delegates reach no definite agreement,” we may well admit that the approval in principle of a truly perma- nent Court composed of judges acting under a sense of judicial responsibility marks an epoch in international relations; for the exist- ence and successful operation of such a Court would demonstrate beyond the possibility of contradiction the juridical organization of the world. JAMES BROWN SCOTT. 12 PROCES-VERBAL. Extract from the Proces-Verbal of the after- noon session of August 28, 1912. Presidency of Mr. Hagerup. The President opens the discussion in regard to a voeu proposed by Mr. Lammasch in the interest of the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice. Mr. Lammasch reads the following voeu: While recognizing the great value of the Court of Arbitration, instituted by the Peace Conference in 1899, to international justice and the maintenance of peace, The Institute of International Law: — In order to facilitate and to hasten recourse to arbitration; to assure the settlement of differences of a legal nature by arbiters representing the dif- ferent systems of legislation and of jurisprudence; In order to reinforce the authority of the tribunals in the eyes of the representatives of the parties in controversy by having the members of the tribunal known to them in advance, and likewise to increase the moral force of the decision by having it rendered by a larger number and by the authority of arbiters recognized by the totality of the States; 13 In order to resolve, in case of a treaty of com- pulsory arbitration containing a clause to this effect, the doubts which might arise as to whether or not a particular controversy belongs to the category of questions subject to compulsory arbitration under the treaty; In order to create a Court of Appeals for decisions rendered by tribunals constituted otherwise than in conformity with the rules of the Hague Convention, in case the special compromis should provide for the possibility of such a revision; Considers it highly desirable that satisfaction be given to the first voeu adopted by the Second Peace Conference in favor of the establishment of a Court of Arbitral Justice. This conclusion agrees with that adopted by the Committee of Nine. The proposition to create a practically per- manent arbitration court, made by the Ameri- can delegates to the Second Peace Conference, has suffered from a misunderstanding. This misunderstanding consists in the fact that it was at first thought that the proposition was intended to do away with the existing perma- nent court and to substitute for it the one pro- posed by the American delegation. Now, this was not the case. As was subsequently ex- 14 plained to the satisfaction of everyone, it had for its object the establishment of a new court by the side of the old. In the course of the scientific discussion which followed the Second Hague Conference, the defenders of the Court of Arbitral Justice have oftentimes, in the opinion of Mr. Lammasch, made the mistake of introducing into the arguments which they advanced in the interest of this new court bitter and sometimes unjust criticism of the arbitral decisions rendered by the tribunals constituted within the precincts of the present court. Mr. Lammasch proceeds to set forth the reasons of a purely juridical nature that militate in favor of a permanent court on the lines of the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice. Such a court might well be composed of a larger number of arbitrators than we find in the present tribunals which, as a rule, have from three to five members. Now, the greater the number of judges who participate in one and the same decision, the greater will be the certainty of justice and also its moral force. This moral force wall be increased by the further fact that these members of the new court will represent the various systems of 15 legislation and procedure. The procedure which they will have followed and the result which they will have reached become, there- fore, the more intelligible to everybody. At the present time, it is mainly the difference between the Anglo-American system and the various systems of the European continent that leads at times to misunderstandings. These misunderstandings could be avoided if, in each case, we could make certain of the col- laboration of arbitrators belonging to both of these two principal groups of systems. Since the members of the Court of Arbitral Justice are known beforehand by the Powers in con- troversy, they may choose, with full knowledge of the members composing them, between the older court and the new one. If the members of the new court inspire them with confidence, they will choose that court. If they do not inspire them with con- fidence, then they organize an ad hoc tribunal in accordance with the regulations of the Hague Convention of 1899 as amended by the Second Conference. In the tribunals organized in accordance with the conventions of 1899 and 1909, the 16 members and the President, who are fre- quently but little known to the agents and the counsel of the Parties, must win their confi- dence in the course of the pleading, whilst in the Court of Arbitral Justice they will be known not only to the Parties themselves but to their representatives in the controversy as well, a fact which will increase and insure the force of the interlocutory decisions to which the Parties must submit. In the present system, the procedure to be followed in organizing the arbitral tribunal sometimes entails deplorable delays. In the course of the delays made necessary by the election of the arbitrators and especially of the President, the situation may become compli- cated by the heat of public discussion, and the amicable settlement of the difference by ju- dicial authority may be imperiled. As for the smaller States, we must not for- get that the present procedure is sometimes rather costly, whilst the expenses to be borne by them through the creation of the new Court of Arbitral Justice are small, if we are to judge by the expenses entailed by the Postal Con- vention. 17 But the greatest advantages of the system of the Court of Arbitral Justice may perhaps be stated to be the following: It may happen that two States which have concluded a treaty of compulsory arbitration are not agreed as to whether a definite con- troversy v/hich arises between them is of the character of those which they are obliged to arbitrate by virtue of the treaty. In such cases, it is quite clear that they should submit this preliminary question to the decision of the Court of Arbitral Justice. The arbitration treaty itself might contain a clause to that ef- fect, or a special compromis might refer the decision of this preliminary matter to the court. Lastly, the Court of Arbitral Justice might operate, if the special compromis or the arbi- tration treaty contained a provision to that ef- fect, as a tribunal of appeal (revision) for arbitral decisions rendered by tribunals organ- ized in accordance with the rules of the Hague Convention. For these reasons, in the opinion of Mr. Lammasch, the creation of a Court of Arbitral Justice as a complementary organ of the 18 present court would constitute real progress along the path of justice and of peace. Again Mr. Lammasch emphasizes the fact that it is not a question of substituting the new court for, nor of superimposing it upon, the present court. It seems to him that his personality alone constitutes the guaranty that any propo- sition emanating from him could not be in- spired by a spirit of hostility to the present court. Sir Thomas Barclay approves the remarks of Mr. Lammasch. He asks the latter if he thinks the Court of Prize should be taken as the base on which to establish the permanent court. Mr. Lammasch answers that that is not his intention. Sir Thomas Barclay then puts a question re- garding the residence of the judges and the manner of organizing the court. Mr. Lammasch declares that this last ques- tion is of too delicate a nature to be solved by the Institute. The system of rotation was in- vented by the Hague Court in order to safe- guard the mathematical equality of the States. As for the permanent residence of the judges 19 at The Hague, this evidently will not be necessary. Mr. Clunet remarks that actually the great- est difficulty lies in the selection of the arbitra- tors by the States, a selection which consumes too much time. Certain States are inclined to press the appointment as judges to the arbitra- tion tribunals of non-professionals and even their own officials. They would be spared this reciprocal temptation if there existed a body of magistrates rendered independent by the na- ture of their functions and by the fact that their government had selected them before any controversy had arisen. This would be of great advantage to counsel. Mr. Lammasch. — If we accept the principle of freedom of choice by the States between the permanent court and a tribunal composed cd hoc, the institution is excellent. The remark of Mr. Clunet is of the greatest value. I will go even further. The very presence of the nationals as arbitrators on the tribunals has certain drawbacks. Of course, they often dis- play perfect impartiality as, for instance. Mr. justice Gray and Sir Charles Fitzpatrick in the 20 North American Fisheries case. But the re- verse may happen. Mr. de Lapradelle insists upon the fact that on the proper occasion nationals as arbitrators know how to be true judges. Mr. Lammasch. — The establishment of a permanent court, while decreasing to a large extent the dangers set forth by Mr. Clunet, would not entirely remove them. If diplo- matists desire a compromise, they may make choice of a special tribunal. Mr. Kebedgy recognizes all the advantages of a permanent court and the necessity of organizing that court with competent persons on it. He could not, however, but be struck at the same time with the difficulties which the organization of this court has encountered. He declares himself ready to vote for the reso- lution offered by Mr. Lammasch, but on the condition that it be thoroughly understood that that implies in no way the acceptation before- hand of a court composed in any offhand manner. The President states that everybody agrees to eliminate the question of the composition of the court. Mr. J. B. Scott expresses his complete ac- ceptance of the views expressed by Mr. Lam- masch and of the judicious observations of Mr. Clunet upon the creation of a court of arbitral justice. He calls attention to the fact that in questions of a political nature, which governments have not been able to settle through diplomatic channels, a compromise may be reached by the existing court. But, if the governments wish to settle their differ- ences bj' the impartial application of principles of law, they must appeal to a court composed of jurists, that is to say, of men accustomed to apply principles of law to concrete problems. It may well be that the compromise of an in- ternational dispute is to be preferred to its judicial determination, but governments should know in advance and by the very nature of the institution to which resort is had, whether to expect a judgment based upon principles of justice also known in advance. Thus, within the last two years, Chile and the United States submitted a dispute — the so-called Alsop case — which diplomacy had failed to adjust and which the parties could not agree to arbitrate, to the King of Great Britain as amicable com- 22 positor. It may also be the desire of the dis- putants that a controversy shall be settled in general reliance upon principles of law or, as the convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes puts it, “on the basis of respect for law,” but not necessarily deter- mined by the mere application of those princi- ples to the esclusion of those larger and broader views, which we usually identify with equity. But the government should clearly know whether they are to expect a judicial or an equitable adjustment. In the present method cf arbitration, it is impossible to fore- cast the probable result, because it cannot be known in what proportion the judges of the parties’ choice may apply law or lean to equity, and it is to be feared that governments hesi- tate to resort to the present permanent court by reason of the doubt and uncertainty which must exist from its composition and from the tendency of persons appointed under such con- ditions to compromise. If, however, a court existed with a permanent body of judges, who had had either judicial experience or the train- ing of lawyers and jurists, nations in litigation might well be inclined to submit the case to 23 the judgment of such a tribunal, because the principles of law to be applied or rejected can be divined in advance and the members of the court, judges by profession or lawyers by training, could be relied upon to apply those principles of law, which either are or can be known by the parties before the submission of the case. In this way nations would be free to choose the method of adjustment appropri- ate to the dispute or to the principle involved, and instead of one method for the peaceable settlement of international disputes, we would have three — namely, amicable composition, ar- bitral adjustment, judicial decision. We may readily admit that peaceful settle- ment is in and of itself the goal toward which we strain our eyes, or in other words, that peaceful settlement is the substance ; the method of settlement a matter of form. A little reflection, however, will convince us that this is not really so, and that the manner of settling a controversy is not a matter of indif- ference to believers in peaceful, especially ju- dicial settlement. The opinion of an amicable compositor can neither be forecast nor serve as a precedent. Arbiters of the parties’ choice 24 are supposed to be free to exercise their dis- cretion in reaching a settlement, and, if this be so, it is clear that their holding need not influ- ence a future body as free to exercise its judg- ment and discretion as they. In the case of a tribunal composed of permanent judges, it is at once evident that they must of necessity consider carefully before rendering a judgment, as, when once rendered, they cannot very well question, overthrow or otherwise refuse to fol- low it, for by so doing they discredit them- selves as well as their judgment. A perma- nent court is therefore from its very nature calculated to develop international law by a series of precedents, just as, for example, the development of the common law of England is due almost wholly to judicial decisions. The proposers of the court of arbitral justice had in mind this inherent and inevitable tendency of a court of justice, when they recommended the court of arbitral justice as capable of assuring the continuity of arbitral jurisprudence. Mr. Scott is therefore a declared and outspoken partisan of the proposed court of arbitral justice, which must, in his opinion, of necessity inspire greater confidence among the States 25 than the existing court, and which would be capable of developing international lav/ as a system of law for the peaceful settlement of international controversies. While fully aware of the difficulties involved in the composition of such a permanent tribunal, he nevertheless believes that they will be overcome, if the na- tions really want the court, and devote them- selves seriously and with singleness of purpose to its creation. Mr. Gram is in harmony with the judgment expressed by Mr. Lammasch. The question of the composition of the court seems to him to be the most delicate, and so far as he is con- cerned, he can hardly foresee its solution. The representation of the States in controversy be- fore the tribunal cannot but present certain in- conveniences. Therefore, he believes that the total number of nationals acting as arbitrators on a given tribunal should not exceed the total number of neutral members of tribunal. Mr. Clunet asks Mr. Gram whether, in a general way, it would be desirable to exclude nationals entirely as arbitrators or whether the present system, that is, the system of a ma- jority of neutral members, is not more satisfac- :G tory since it permits both parties to call atten- tion, in the very bosom of the tribunal, to the arguments favorable to their case. Mr. Gram declares that this last form is not a bad one. It may, however, happen that there are more than two parties in controversy and, even if one were to approve the present com- position, one may ask whether it would not be preferable that there be only neutral magis- trates. I like to think, he said, that that will be the solution of the question in the future. Messrs. Jordan and de Lapradelle both re- marked that the presence of nationals as arbi- trators on the tribunal offers assurance to the parties against phraseology that might wound their susceptibilities. Mr. Lammasch believes that in certain cases of a political nature, the States would not readily give up the guarantee which they find in the presence of nationals as arbitrators on the tribunal. He believes that the present sys- tem has the advantage of reassuring the States and of causing them to accept arbitration more readily. It is better to have arbitration by national arbitrators than none at all. It might, 27 perhaps, be well to have nationals on arbitral tribunals only in an advisory capacity. Mr. Kebedgy, after having heard the state- ments of his eminent colleagues, Messrs. Gram and Lammasch, would relate the facts which have come to him from his own experience, having been a member of an international court of justice for four years. He thinks it very desirable that an international court should have among its members representa- tives of the interested parties. That consti- tutes a guarantee that the question has been examined from every possible viewpoint and that the decision will be better received by all those interested. The President puts the proposition of Mr. Lammasch to a vote and it is adopted unani- mously. 28 Ammrati ©nrielg far Subtrxal §>rttlrmrnt nf Jnfrrnaftmtal Siaptrtrs Ahutaortr Council Lyman Abbott, New York. Edwin A. Alderman, Virginia. James B. Angell, Michigan. Simeon E. Baldwin, Connecticut. Richard Bartholdt, Missouri. Alexander Graham Bell, Washington, D. C. R. L. Borden, Ottawa, Ontario. Theodore E. Burton, Ohio. Joaquin D. Casasus, Mexico City, Mexico. George E. Chamberlain, Oregon. Winston Churchill, New Hampshire. George B. Cutten, Wolfville, N. S. William R. Day, Ohio. Jacob M. Dickinson, Washington, D. C. Andrew S. Draper, New York. Charles W. Eliot, Massachusetts. William Dudley Foulke, Indiana. James Cardinal Gibbons, Maryland. George Gray, Delaware. Charles Noble Gregory, Iowa. Peter S. Grosscup, Illinois. Joseph F. Johnston, Alabama. David Starr Jordan, California. Harry Pratt Judson, Illinois. William H. King, Utah. George W. Kirchwey, New York. Philander C. Knox, Washington, D. C. Charles F. LiB 3Y, Maine. Francis B. Loomis, Washington, D. C. Horace H. Lurton, Tennessee. R. McBride. Victoria, B. C. Pablo Macedo, Mexico City, Mexico. Charles Marcil, Ottawa, Ont. Sidney E. Mezes, Texas. 29 S. C. Mitchell, South Carolina. Don Romulo S. Naon, Argentine Republic. Francis G. Newlands, Nevada. L. Oppenheim, Cambridge, England. Thomas Nelson Pace, Washington, D. C. Walter H. Pace, New York. W. Peterson, Afontreal. Sir Thomas Raleigh, London, England. Whitelaw Reid, London, England. William Renwick Riddell, Toronto, Ont. Uriah M. Rose, Arkansas. A. C. Rutherford, Edmonton, Alberta. Walter Scott, Regina, Saskatchewan. Albert Shaw, New York. Hoke S.mith, Georgia. Bishop Robert Strance, North Carolina. Sir Charles Hibeert Tupper, Vancouver, B. C. George Turner, Washington. Charles R. Van Hise, Wisconsin. Benjamin Ide Wheeler, California. William Allen White, Kansas. George G. Wilson, Massachusetts. Prince de Cassano, Italy. 30 Ammran' ©oriilij for Ifuiurinl Srtllemrnt of JJnlrntafinnal Sicpulrs (Officers Honorary President, William Howard Taft. President, Simeon E. Baldwin, Hartford, Conn. Vice-President, Joseph H. Choate, New York City. Secretary, Theodore Marburg, Baltimore, Md. Treasurer, J. G. Schmidlapp, Cincinnati, Ohio. Eirrutiur ffininmitlre Simeon E. Baldwin, Joseph H. Choate, Theodore Marburg, J. G. Schmidlapp, W. W. Willoughby, Henry B. F. Macfarland, James Brown Scott, ex-President, John Hays Hammond, ex-President. Life membership, $100; Sustaining membership, $10 a year; Annual membership, $1 a year. Remit to Treasurer, J. G. Schmidlapp, Cincinnati, U. S. A. Address inquiries to secretary, Theodore Marburg, Baltimore, U. S. A. Additional copies of this or other issues of the Judicial Settlement Quarterly may be obtained with- out charge from the Assistant Secretary, TUNSTALL SMITH, The Preston, Baltimore, U. S. A. 31 Publications of the American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes — 1. The New Era of International Courts, by Simeon E. Baldwin. August, 1910. 2. The Necessity of a Permanent Tribunal, by Ernest Nys. November, 1910. Supplement — The American Society for Judicial Settlement of International Disputes, by James Brown Scott. November, 1910. 3. The Importance of Judicial Settlement, by Elihu Root. February, 1911. 4. The Development of the American Doctrine of Jurisdiction of Courts Over States, by Alpheus H. Snow. May, 1911. 5. An International Court of Justice the Next Step, by George Grafton Wilson. Salient Thoughts, by Theodore Marburg. August, 1911. 6. The work of the Hague Court, by N. Politis. November, 1911. 7. The Proposed Arbitration Treaties with Great Britain and France, by William Howard Taft. February, 1912. 8. Non Justiciable Disputes and the Peace Treat- ies, by Omer F. Hershey. May, 1912. g. The International Grand Jury, by William I. Hull. August, 1912. 10. The Court of Arbitral Justice, by James Brown Scott. November, 1912. ANNOUNCEMENT. The Annual Conference of the Society will be held at the New Willard Hotel, Washington, D. C., December 20-21. There will be addresses by men equally as emi ’ — have heretofore appeared before the liam Howard Taft will speak at the < sions will close. Members of the So in the cause are cordially invited to S282C9efr0a seuEjqn tysjauun 0>fn(]